Theoretical Foundations of Homeland Security: Strategies, Operations, and Structures 2020032411, 2020032412, 9780367201692, 9780367201708, 9780429259920

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“In the two decades since 9/11 the United States has been forced to deal in a new area of public policy – Homeland Security – that lies between two heretofore well understood areas – National Security and Law Enforcement. National Security dealt with threats from abroad while Law Enforcement, or more broadly public safety, dealt with internal threats. Both were underpinned with ample theory. In the rush to ‘do something about’ Homeland Security there has been precious little intellec­ tual capital spent on developing the needed theoretical underpinnings. In Theoretical Foundations of Homeland Security: Strategies, Operations and Structures, Ramsay, Cozine, and Comiskey have done this labor for us, in a readable and well thought out explication of the theory that should support such a broad integrated effort at all levels of government, including the private sector, including academia”. —Barry Zulauf, Professor of Applied Intelligence at Georgetown University, and President of IAFIE “Theoretical Foundations of Homeland Security: Strategies, Operations and Structures stands as one of the most significant contributions to the scholarship of homeland security studies. In developing the first-ever homeland security textbook specifically dedicated to theory; Ramsay, Cozine, and Comiskey have set a solid foundation upon which future scholars of this emerging discipline can build. In every regard, this textbook skillfully sets out and explains the related theories that have contributed to the emergence and evolution of the homeland security enterprise— ultimately forming the basis for an integrated theory of homeland security. This book is a must for inclusion in any homeland security or related academic program and also serves as a valuable tool for practitioners in the field”. —Kelly W. Sundberg,

Mount Royal University, Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute,

Former Senior Policy Officer with the Ministry of Public Safety Canada,

Citizenship and Immigration Canada Investigator,

and Canada Border Services Agency Inland Enforcement Officer

“Theoretical Foundations of Homeland Security: Strategies, Operations and Structures is an extremely useful book and an essential contribution to the debates about the concept of Homeland Security; a concept that is more than the sum of its parts - national security and internal security. The individual contributions offer up invaluable insights into the various aspects of Homeland Security and, taken together, provide an understanding of the concept that is both broad and deep. This book will be an indispensable resource for academics, students, and policymakers alike”. —David Strachan-Morris, Lecturer in Intelligence and Security, University of Leicester, UK

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“Theoretical Foundations of Homeland Security: Strategies, Operations and Structures takes on the mammoth challenge of developing a grand theory of home­ land security. In a single volume, the book presents basic theoretical frameworks from more than a dozen disciplines that contribute to an understanding of contempo­ rary and future homeland security problems. The text will offer unique value to col­ lege courses that seek to integrate practical and conceptual approaches to homeland security”. —Chris Bellavita, Director of Programs for the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security “Theoretical Foundations of Homeland Security: Strategies, Operations and Structures is a recognition that acceptable levels of security can vary over time and across nations, depending upon a variety of factors. I saw this first-hand just within my three years as U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security. ‘Security’ as we know it is in reality a continuing effort to strike the right balance between the public’s basic physical security on the one hand and the preservation of the public’s basic freedom and privacy on the other. Those in public safety are the guardians of one as much as the other”. —Jeh Charles Johnson,

Partner Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP,

and former Secretary, US Department of Homeland Security

“We live at a historic juncture as old notions of threat and security ring hollow and new paradigms must be currently found. Ramsay, Cozine and Comiskey’s ambitious book aims to do just that. By drawing on the established understanding in different areas of scholarship the authors masterfully redefine the field of homeland security for in the twenty first century. This is much more than a theoretical primer for stu­ dents and neophytes. This volume will prove invaluable even to seasoned scholars and practitioners in the field”. —Allon J. Uhlmann and Stephen McCombie, Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Macquarie University, Australia

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Theoretical Foundations of Homeland Security

This new textbook outlines the main theories and concepts from a variety of disci­ plines that support homeland security operations, structures and strategies. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, “homeland security” (HLS) grew in importance within the U.S. government (and around the world) and matured from a concept discussed among a relatively small cadre of policymakers and strategic think­ ers to a broadly discussed issue in Congress and society with a growing academic presence. Yet the ability to discern a theory of homeland security that would support overall security strategy has been more elusive to both scholars and policymakers. This textbook aims to elucidate a grand theory of homeland security by leveraging the theoretical underpinnings of the disciplines that comprise the strategies, operations and structures of the HLS enterprise. In this way, each chapter contributes to a grand theory of homeland security as it explores a different discipline that influences or sup­ ports a domain of the homeland security enterprise. These chapters cover intelligence systems, terrorism origins and ideologies, emergency management, environmental and human security, cybersecurity policy, crime and security, global governance, risk management, public health, law and policy, technology, interagency collaboration and the sociology of security. This book will be essential reading for students of Homeland Security and Emergency Response, and recommended reading for students of terrorism, intelli­ gence, cybersecurity, risk management and national security. James D. Ramsay is a professor of Security Studies and coordinator of the Homeland Security Program at the University of New Hampshire, the United States. He is also founding chair of the Department of Security Studies. Keith Cozine is an associate professor and director of the doctoral program in Home­ land Security at St. John’s University, the United States. He has a decade and a half of law enforcement and intelligence experience including nearly ten years with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. John Comiskey is an associate professor of Homeland Security at Monmouth Univer­ sity, the United States. He is a retired New York City Police Department Lieutenant and U.S. Coast Guard Senior Chief Petty Officer.

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Theoretical Foundations of Homeland Security

Strategies, Operations, and Structures Edited by James D. Ramsay, Keith Cozine, and John Comiskey

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First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 selection and editorial matter, James D. Ramsay, Keith Cozine, and John Comiskey; individual chapters, the contributors The right of James D. Ramsay, Keith Cozine, and John Comiskey to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Ramsay, James D., editor. | Cozine, Keith, 1972- editor. | Comiskey,

John, 1964- editor.

Title: Theoretical foundations of homeland security : strategies,

operations, and structures / edited by James D. Ramsay, Keith Cozine,

and John Comiskey.

Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021. | Includes

bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2020032411 (print) | LCCN 2020032412 (ebook) | ISBN

9780367201692 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367201708 (paperback) | ISBN

9780429259920 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: United States. Department of Homeland Security. |

Terrorism--United States--Prevention. |

Terrorism--Prevention--Government policy--United States. | National

security--United States--Management.

Classification: LCC HV6432.4 .T44 2021 (print) | LCC HV6432.4 (ebook) |

DDC 363.325/15610973--dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020032411

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020032412

ISBN: 978-0-367-20169-2 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-367-20170-8 (pbk)

ISBN: 978-0-429-25992-0 (ebk)

Typeset in Times

by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd.

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To all those who promote and defend liberty around the globe.

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Contents

List of figures List of tables List of contributors Foreword Acknowledgements List of abbreviations Glossary 1 Introduction to security theory

xi

xiii

xiv

xvi

xix

xxi

xxiv

1

JAMES D. RAMSAY, KEITH COZINE AND JOHN COMISKEY

2 Risk assessment and the homeland security enterprise

16

BRIAN HARTE

3 The sociology of security

38

TERRENCE O’SULLIVAN

4 Crime and security

58

CHELSEA A. BINNS

5 Terrorism: origins, ideologies and goals

78

KYLE W. MCDONNELL AND KEITH COZINE

6 Interagency collaboration

99

JOHN COMISKEY

7 Emergency management—theories of preparedness,

mitigation, response and recovery

121

IRMAK RENDA-TANALI

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x

Contents 8 Global governance and the relationships between nations

148

KEITH COZINE

9 Intelligence and the theory of preventive action

168

ERIK J. DAHL

10 Human and environmental security theory

187

JAMES D. RAMSAY AND TERRY O’SULLIVAN

11 Public health security

208

TERRENCE M. O’SULLIVAN AND JAMES D. RAMSAY

12 Homeland security law and policy theory

231

MICHAEL MCDANIEL

13 Cybersecurity policy and theory

257

MAEVE DION

14 Theoretical underpinnings of homeland security technology

285

MICHAEL D. LARRAÑAGA AND PATRICK K. SMITH

Index

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Figures

2.1 Severity of event’s impact-decision matrix. 2.2 Estimating the impact of an event utilizing probability

and impact indicators. 2.3 Global risk profile. 2.4 COSO enterprise risk management cube. 6.1 The US DHS logo. 6.2 US federal government interagency collaborations

regarding climate change. 7.1 The aftermath of the Johnstown Flood. “Ruins from Site

of the Hulburt House”. In: “History of the Johnstown Flood”,

by Willis Fletcher Johnson, 1889, p. 181. Library call number

M79.4 J71h. 1889 June. Photographer: Archival photograph

by Mr. Steve Nicklas, NOS, NGS. Image source: Flickr.com 7.2 Galveston, Texas hurricane devastation and destruction,

image source: pixabay.com 7.3 The great dust bowl, image source: pixabay.com 7.4 Washington, D.C. World War II memorial. Image source:

pixabay.com 7.5 Flooding after Hurricane Betsy, 1965, Image source:

flickr.com 7.6 Days after Sep. 11 terrorist attacks, fires still burn amidst

the rubble of the World Trade Center. U.S. Navy photo

by Photographer’s Mate 2nd Class Jim Watson.

(RELEASED) Source: flickr.com 7.7 FEMA leadership organizational structure.

Image source: FEMA 7.8 Organizational chart of DHS and FEMA’s position.

Image source: DHS 7.9 National preparedness system, Source: FEMA 7.10 Aerial views of the damage caused by Hurricane Sandy to the New Jersey coast taken during a search and rescue mission by 1-150 Assault Helicopter Battalion: New Jersey Army National Guard: Oct. 30: 2012. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Mark C. Olsen/Released)

Source: Wikimedia

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29

30

31

33

101

106

123

124

124

125

126

129

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130

133

134

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Figures

7.11 7.12 7.13 7.14 7.15 10.1 10.2 10.3 11.1 11.2 14.1

Cyber-attack. Source DHS.gov Explosives terrorism attack. Source: DHS.gov Major storms/severe weather event, source: DHS.gov Pandemics, source: DHS.gov National political conventions, source: DHS.gov Theoretical example of how environmental security

may be tied to national security Relationships between homeland, national and

environmental security. General structure of the environmental security

construct, drivers and consequences Infectious disease triangle, Terrence M. O’Sullivan, adapted

from CDC (2012) Medical Countermeasures (MCMs) used for Public

Health Emergency/Disaster Response (graphic by FDA, 2019) Technology acceptance model (TAM)

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139

140

141

141

142

193

197

199

210

212

292

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Tables

6.1 Homeland security focusing events 7.1 Hazard types based on originating source,

Source: CPG 101, p. 1-8 7.2 Sample List of hazards based on originating source,

Source: CPG 101, p. 4-10 7.3 FEMA’s current definition of key planning areas 10.1 Suspected knowledge domains of homeland security 11.1 CDC select category a bioagents and public

health characteristics 14.1 Capability domains and priorities

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102

135

135

137

193

223

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List of contributors

Editors James D. Ramsay, Ph.D. is a full professor of security studies, coordinator of the Homeland Security program and founding chair of the department of security studies at the University of New Hampshire. Current research interests include climate security; homeland security theory, cyber-intelligence; and the relationship between environmental and human security and national security strategy. Keith Cozine, Ph.D. is an associate professor of Homeland Security at St. John’s University in Queens, NY. He earned an M.A. in Criminal Justice and Ph.D. in Global Affairs, both from Rutgers University. In addition, Dr. Cozine has nearly a decade and a half of law enforcement and intelligence experience. John Comiskey, Ed.D. is an associate professor of Homeland Security at Monmouth University. He is a retired NYPD Lieutenant and US Coast Guard Reserve Intelligence Officer. Current research includes climate security, homeland security theory, homeland security education and mass shootings.

Contributors Chelsea Binns, Ph.D., is an assistant professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. She is the author of Fraud Hotlines: Design, Performance & Assessment (CRC Press), editor of The Art of Investigation (Routledge) and an expert in security & investigations who has a Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from the CUNY Graduate Center. Erik J. Dahl, Ph.D. is an associate professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and the author of Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond (Georgetown University Press, 2013). He is Chair of the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association. Maeve Dion, J.D. teaches cybersecurity and homeland security at UNH, where she directs the online M.S. in Cybersecurity Policy and Risk Management. Professor Dion specializes in the legal, policy and educational issues relating to cybersecurity and organizational resilience. Over the past two decades, she has supported efforts of the EU, COE, OECD, NATO CCDCOE; DHS, DOD, NSTAC, and ABA, among others.

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List of contributors

xv

Brian K. Harte, Ph.D. is a full professor of Homeland Security and Criminal Justice at St. John’s University. He formerly served as a probation administrator in the state of Texas. Currently, he serves as the Master of Professional Studies in Homeland Security and Criminal Justice Leadership Program Director at St. John’s University. Michael D. Larrañaga, Ph.D. is President of R.E.M. Risk Consulting, a science-based risk management firm. He has served as an appointed member of the Board of Scientific Counselors for the CDC’s National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and the DHS First Responders Group. He is an innovation scholar and cofounder of the Center for Homeland Defense and Security’s HSx Advanced Thinking in Homeland Security initiative. Brigadier General (ret.) Michael McDaniel, J.D. is Associate Dean at Western Michigan University-Cooley Law School, Director of the Master of Laws in Homeland and National Security Law program and a tenured professor of Constitutional Law. He previously served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Strategy and as Michigan’s first Homeland Security Advisor. McDaniel has a B.A. from St. Bonaventure University, a J.D. from Case Western Reserve University, and graduate degrees in security studies from the Army War College and the Naval Postgraduate School. Kyle W. McDonnell, M.P.S. is currently a senior project manager assigned to the NYPD’s Project Management Office (PMO), and an adjunct assistant professor at St. John’s University. He has served on active duty in the United States Army. He received his bachelor’s degree from LIU Post, his master’s degree in Criminal Justice Leadership & Homeland Security from St. John’s University and is currently a doctoral candidate in the St. John’s University’s Homeland Security Doctoral Program. Terry O’Sullivan, Ph.D., is an associate professor in the University of New Hampshire’s Security Studies program. His teaching, research and publications concentrate on domestic and international security studies, broadly writ—including pandemic disease, the climate crisis, community disaster resilience, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and the theoretical, policy and practice-level integration of homeland security and other security frameworks. Irmak Renda-Tanali, Ph.D. is a senior disaster risk specialist at the Pacific Disaster Center of the University of Hawaii. She specializes in risk assessment of natural and human-induced disasters. She has over 20 years of experience in researching, consulting and teaching in the emergency management field. She holds a doctoral degree in engineering management from George Washington University. Patrick K. Smith, Ph.D. is a partner with R.E.M. Risk Consultants. His expertise is technology innovation, continuous improvement, energy management and risk management in a variety of settings. Patrick has a background in data analytics and management information systems with experience managing and analyzing large data sets. Dr. Smith was previously a DHS Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics Fellow at Oklahoma State University.

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Foreword

By Paul Stockton

As a curriculum and field of research, homeland security rests on an enduring puzzle. What does homeland security comprise? In contrast to traditional graduate-level dis­ ciplines, such as biology or engineering, homeland security lacks a system of accred­ itation that rests on an agreed set of curricular requirements and learning outcomes. The absence of such accreditation reflects a deeper problem. Through innovation and constant revision, graduate and undergraduate programs in homeland security are still developing an agreed set of core principles and distinctive methodologies. By providing a grand theory of homeland security, this book is structured to advance consensus-building on the meaning of homeland security and the education and research components at its heart. The shifting priorities within and between homeland security programs reflect the abrupt changes in the practice of homeland security at all levels of government and— increasingly—by the owners and operators of critical infrastructure. The National Defense Panel’s 1997 report on “Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century” helped coin the terms “Homeland Defense” and “Homeland Security”. That report exclusively focused on responding to terrorism and did not mention the emergency management or public safety requirement for preparedness against natural disasters. 9/11 sharpened and institutionalized that focus. As stated by the National Strategy for Homeland Security of 2002, homeland security comprises “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnera­ bility to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur”. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 drove a fundamental rethinking of that emphasis. With the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act and subsequent initiatives, legislators, homeland security practitioners and their partners brought emergency management and public safety priorities into the core of the emerging discipline. Superstorm Sandy (2012) and Hurricane Maria spurred an equivalent expansion of the field to include the resilience of the electric grid and other critical infrastructure sectors, as well as associated expertise in engineering and incident response possessed by owners and operator of those systems—not government agencies. That evolution continues today. The COVID-19 pandemic is prompting a deep rethinking of supply chain resilience, catastrophic threats to public health, business continuity and a range of other education and research topics that forward-looking curricula must now embrace. Manmade threats must drive further changes. The Fourth Edition of the National Response Framework (2019) emphasized the need for preparedness efforts to support

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Foreword

xvii

US national security, including against nation state threats that possess capabilities dwarfing those of Al Qaeda or any other terrorist organization. Accordingly, the Framework (NRF) emphases the need to “help maintain essential services for critical national security installations” and other initiatives that have never before been a priority of homeland security. And all such changes, including those that should be considered for inclusion in homeland security curricula, must account for rise of cyber threats to US infrastructure and the emergence of information warfare against US citizens as the “new normal”. Without a guiding theoretical framework, homeland security is at risk of becoming an ever-changing grab bag of education and research priorities. That trend comes at a cost. We need an educated cadre of future homeland security leaders who can not only respond to threats of today but are also prepared to meet challenges that cannot be foreseen. The US National Preparedness Goal provides a starting point to identify the core requirements for developing such a cadre. The Goal calls for “A secure and resilient Nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk”. Helping fulfill that goal will require the development of shared expertise in specific methodologies—for example, risk-based analysis and data analytics. The diversity of threats confronting the United States will also require homeland security curricula to be multidisciplinary, and encompass emergency management, public health and safety, and a range of other disciples with their own deep roots for education and pro­ fessional development. Maturing homeland security as an academic field will require new approaches to integrate these disparate parts into a coherent whole. That is, to truly become a profession, the discipline needs an organizing theoretical framework. This volume argues that such a framework should accomplish four goals: (1) it should guide and predict research on best practices and strategies to protect the nation; (2) the theory must support curriculum development; (3) it must explain how the disciplines that comprise the homeland security enterprise support and contribute to its mission; and (4) it must build upon the solid and progressive foundation already established in academic homeland security, which has been led by the Center for Homeland Defense and Security’s University and Agency Partnership Program (UAPP). At the time this text is set to be published, the Department of Homeland Security will be 18 years of age, and academic homeland security roughly 15 years of age. As the homeland security enterprise has matured, so has its corresponding academic component. For example, as of 2019, UAPP lists around 460 homeland security-related academic programs, including programs at the Associate, Bachelor, Masters and Doctoral levels. While several programs started as new programs, many others were merely extensions of existing programs in criminal justice or emergency preparedness. Since homeland security does not yet enjoy recognized accreditation, there has not been a set of learning outcomes shared across all homeland security programs as there is in medicine, law, engineering, nursing, etc. However, recent scholarship in this area indicates that degree programs tend to leverage a common set of knowledge domains including risk management, emergency management, terrorism, intelligence, strategic planning, law and policy, environmental and human security to name a few. Further, significant progress has been made in the development of a body of knowledge includ­ ing journals dedicated to basic and applied research, the scholarship of teaching and learning, as well as resilience. Supporting development of scholarship, education,

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Foreword

networking and ideation, several annual conferences such as the Homeland Security Education Summit sponsored jointly by FEMA and the UAPP as well as FEMA’s Emergency Management Higher Education Symposium are held each year. An established theoretical foundation, an established common curriculum and a research agenda must be aligned to professionalize a discipline. In this way, homeland security can learn from medicine. Indeed, the parallels between how medicine grew and matured as a discipline and how it became a sovereign profession are already vis­ ible in homeland security. Consider that both homeland security and medicine share several characteristics. For example, modern medicine is complex and dynamic and is a composite of many disciplines such as anatomy, physiology, toxicology, chemis­ try, physics, biochemistry, psychology, epidemiology, to name a few. Not only does such a structure support the medical curriculum, it supports and guides research that optimizes best practices, strategies, and healthcare structures. And not surprisingly, theories of health and medicine contain elements from several disciplines. Indeed, advancements in component disciplines often find applications in medicine such as advancements in physics created MRI and PET scanners, while advancements in bio­ chemistry have improved chemotherapy. Theoretical Foundations of Homeland Security: Strategies, Operations and Structures posits a grand theory of homeland security that will help the discipline professional­ ize. Ultimately, this volume is timely, necessary and meets a critical need in the growth and professional development of the homeland security discipline. I hope you enjoy it, learn from it and are empowered to advance the discipline as we continue to work together to protect the nation. Paul N. Stockton is the Managing Director of Sonecon, LLC. Before joining Sonecon, he served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs from May 2009 until January 2013.

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Acknowledgments

Anytime one endeavors to produce a complex product of high quality, one of the first things one notices is that they are going to need a great deal of help and support. This volume represents such a product. Theoretical Foundations of Homeland Security: Strategies, Operations and Structures has been years in the making. From initial talks with friends, to conference presentations and debate among colleagues, this book rep­ resents the cumulative expression of years of scholarship, debate and discourse. Interestingly, one of the complicating factors in producing this book was that it is somewhat the first of its kind. Establishing a grand theory of homeland security has been difficult in the past because of the nature of the discipline. Every aspect of the homeland security enterprise that enables it to function in a dynamic, interconnected world is also the leading prohibitor to a theory of what it is and how it works. Indeed, it would appear as though homeland security is a metadiscipline, that is a discipline of disciplines. It was logical for us, therefore, to enlist the help and support of scholars, practitioners and academics to contribute the individual components that together and collectively synergize into the strategies, operations and structures that represent homeland security. Toward this end, we would like to extend our heartfelt gratitude to Routledge for believing in this effort early on, to our contributing authors who labored long and hard to produce draft after draft and who were writing about a discipline in which they are experts, but who were attempting to create a chapter that blends with and mutually supports the other chapters, that together comprise the wholeness of home­ land security. Specifically, we would like to thank Brian Harte for his expertise and vision in risk management, Terry O’Sullivan for his ability to focus the broad field of sociology in a way that supports homeland security strategy, for Chelsea Binns for recognizing just how criminology supports the mission of homeland security, for Kyle McDonnell who with Keith Cozine, was able to distill terrorism into digestible parts that illustrate its role in protecting the homeland, to Irmak Renda-Tanali for her keen insights into emergency management and her ability to tease out where emergency management synergizes with homeland security, and how its mission supports the practice of home­ land security, to Erik Dahl for his insightful grasp of the intelligence discipline and how theories of intelligence work to support homeland defense and security, to Mike McDaniel who had the incredibly arduous task of explaining the role law and pol­ icy have in homeland security, to Maeve Dion for creating a compelling explanation of what cybersecurity is, and how the laws, and policies that define it are critical to homeland security, and finally to Mike Larrañaga and Patrick Smith for developing

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Acknowledgments

a novel and innovative approach to our understanding of the role technology play in supporting how institutions and agencies work to protect its citizens. Next, we would like to extend our gratitude to our colleagues who gave us insightful comments and course corrections, to Chris Bellevita who forever asks “what is your claim and why should we believe you”, to Steve Recca for indulging and supporting the national conversation and debate over what may or may not be a theory of home­ land security, to Linda Kiltz for inspiring us to a higher level of thought and who facil­ itates our ability to connect homeland security to other critical disciplines on which the enterprise depends, and to Paul Stockton who provides unparalleled perspective and insights into this discipline. Last but never least, we would like to thank our families for listening to us “think aloud”, for supporting us when things were not working well, for encouraging us to carry on and for just always being there. We sincerely hope you find this book of value, and we would welcome feedback and dialog as we continue to define, refine the discipline we love and ultimately to make the world a safer, more secure and happier place. Happy reading! James, Keith and John

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List of abbreviations

AI APT ARPANET AST CC CDC&P CHDS CIA CISA COSO CPG CPTED CRS CTA DARPA DHS DOD DOI DOJ EOP EPA ERM ES EU FBI FEMA FINDER FRG FTC GAO GDP GHG HIPAA HLS HSIB ICAO

Artificial Intelligence Advanced Persistent Threats Advanced Research Projects Agency Network Adaptive Structuration Theory Climate Change Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (aka CDC) Center for Homeland Defense and Security Central Intelligence Agency Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Committee of Sponsored Organizations Comprehensive Preparedness Guide Crime Prevention through Environmental Design Congressional Research Service Clandestine Transnational Actor Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency U.S. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Department of Defense Diffusion of Innovation Theory U.S. Department of Justice Emergency Operations Plan(ing) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Enterprise Risk Management Environmental Security European Union Federal Bureau of Investigation Federal Emergency Management Agency Finding Individuals for Disaster and Emergency Response First Responders Group U.S. Federal Trade Commission Government Accountability Office Gross Domestic Produce Greenhouse Gas(es) Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 Homeland Security Homeland Security Industrial Base International Civil Aviation Organization

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xxii

List of abbreviations

ICC Interagency Collaborative Capacity ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ICS Incident Command System IOCS-CERT Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team IGO International Governmental Organizations IMC Interagency mechanisms for collaboration IoT Internet of Things IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IR Incident Response ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria ISO International Organization for Standardization IT Information Technology JIOCS Joint Intelligence Operations Centers JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force LDC Less Developed Country(ies) MDC More Developed Country(ies) NAPA National Academy of Public Administration NCCIC National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center NCPC National Crime Prevention Council NCMEC National Center for Missing and Exploited Children NERC North American Energy Reliability Corporation NGA National Governors Association NGO Non-governmental Organization NIH U.S. National Institute of Health NIMS National Incident Management System NIST U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST-CSF National Institute of Standards and Technology-Cybersecurity Framework NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NRCC National Response Coordination Center NRF National Response Framework NTRO National Terrorism Response Objectives NYPD New York City Police Department ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence PCCIP President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection PCI-DSS Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard PDD Presidential Disaster Declarations PPD Presidential Policy Directive PEU Perceived Ease of Use PII Personally Identifiable Information PPD Presidential Policy Directive QDR Quadrennial Defense Review REDOPS Response and Defeat Operations Support RIC-M Radio Internet-Protocol Communications Model RRCC Regional Response Coordination Centers SARP Standards and Recommended Practices SAPBER Semi-Autonomous Pipe Bomb End Cap Remover SBIR Small Business Innovation Research

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List of abbreviations

xxiii

SMART Social Media Analytics and Reporting Toolkit SMT Social Movement Theory SNA Social Network Analysis SNRA Strategic National Risk Assessment STR Socio-Technical Systems Theory SSA Sector-Specific Agency TAM Technology Acceptance Model TAN Transnational Advocacy Networks THIRA Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment TSA U.S. Transportation Security Administration UN United Nations UTAUT unified theory of acceptance and use of technology USGCRP U.S. Global Change and Research Program VUCA volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous WLFF-APPSWildland Firefighter Advanced Personal Protective System

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Glossary1

Adaptation in human systems, the process of adjustment to actual or expected cli­ mate and its effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In natural systems, the process of adjustment to actual climate. All-hazards approach is a risk-based, integrated approach to emergency prepar­ edness planning that focuses on capacities and capabilities that are critical to preparedness for a full spectrum of emergencies or disasters, including internal emergencies, terrorism, natural or man-made disasters. Anthropogenic resulting from or produced by human activities. For example, anthro­ pogenic climate change (aka global warming) refers to changes in the earth’s cli­ mate due to human activities that produce emissions (i.e., greenhouse gases) that in turn warm the earth. Balance of Power the theory that security is enhanced when military capabilities are distributed so that no one state is strong enough to dominate all others. If one state gains too much power in relation to its neighbors, the theory predicts that it will take advantage of its strength and attack those weaker neighbors, thus pro­ viding an incentive for those threatened to unite in a defensive coalition. Bilateral Agreement an agreement where one state cooperates or enter into a formal arrangement with another state in return for some sort of preferential treatment. Bounded rationality logic that leads to decisions or actions within a broad sense within one part of a system, but which may not be reasonable within a broad con­ text or when seen as a part of a wider system. Carbon neutrality achieving net zero carbon dioxide emissions at a global scale through the balance of residual carbon dioxide emissions with the same amount of carbon dioxide removal. Clandestine Transnational Actors (CTAs) non-state actors, operating across national borders in violation of law and evading law enforcement efforts. Climate is in a narrow sense usually defined as the average weather, or more rigor­ ously, as the statistical description in terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities over a period ranging from months to thousands or millions of years. Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural internal processes or external forcings such as modulations of the solar cycles, volcanic eruptions and persistent anthropo­ genic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in land use.

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Glossary xxv Cognitive Dissonance a state of conflict or discomfort—dissonance—that happens when strongly held beliefs, emotions or assumptions are contradicted by new information that motivates someone to either convince themselves the new infor­ mation does not exist, or to explain it away in order to relieve the emotional ten­ sion caused. Collaborative Federalism an approach to homeland security which contends that homeland security is a national problem that requires national solution. Congress and its executive agent, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), should pro­ vide leadership and appropriate funding. DHS should be an agent of subnational levels of government, and states and local governments should collaborate with jurisdictions both vertically and horizontally. Conflict Theory social science theory that contends friction in the modern world has to do with a clash of the “old ways” versus the on-going march toward modernity and increased globalization. The preservation of traditional ways of life is often diametrically opposed to the rapidity of modernization, which has ultimately been sped up by the break-neck pace of technological advancement. Consequence the effect of an event, incident or occurrence. Consequence Assessment the product or process of identifying or evaluating the potential or actual effects of an event, incident or occurrence. Consequence Management include measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services and provide emergency relief to govern­ ments, businesses and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. Constructivism the classic international relations theory that asserts that the struc­ tures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, which is often referred to as an idealist approach to social life; and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature, which is seen as holistic or struc­ turalist approach that emphasizes the power of social structure as opposed to individualism. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) the criminology concept that asserts that effective use of the “built environment” can lead to reduced crime and increased quality of life. It contends that properly designed spaces with sur­ veillance opportunities, boundaries and a positive image discourage crime. Criminology the scientific study of crime that examines the people who commit crime, explores the reasons why they commit crime, the ways they can be stopped from committing crime and how society responds to this crime. Criticality the importance to a mission or function, or continuity of operations. Criticality Assessment the product or process of systematically identifying, evalu­ ating and prioritizing based on the importance of an impact to mission(s), func­ tion(s) or continuity of operations. Cybersecurity includes the protection of information and computer and data pro­ cessing infrastructure and operating systems from harmful interference from malicious actors (criminals, terrorists, pranksters). It thus involves not only national defense and homeland security but also law enforcement. Deepfake is a technology that uses AI to produce or edit contents of a video or an image to show something that may never have happened or did happen but in a different context.

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xxvi

Glossary

Defensible space the criminology theory that crime can be controlled through the design and structure of the environmental and can be addressed through a variety of security design concepts. Disaster any severe alterations in the normal functioning of a community or a soci­ ety due to hazardous physical events interacting with vulnerable social conditions, leading to widespread adverse human, material, economic or environmental effects that require immediate emergency response to satisfy critical human needs and that may require external support for recovery. Economic Consequence effect of an incident, event or occurrence on the value of property or on the production, trade, distribution or use of income, wealth or commodities. Economic Security involves not only protecting the capacity of the economy to pro­ vide for the people but also the degree to which the government and the people are free to control their economic and financial decisions. It also entails the abil­ ity to protect a nation’s wealth and economic freedom from outside threats and coercion. Thus, it comprises not only economic policy and some law enforcement agencies but also international agreements on commerce, finance and trade. Emergency Management is the managerial function charged with creating the frame­ work within which communities reduce vulnerability to hazards and cope with disasters. Energy and Natural Resources Security is most often defined as the degree to which a nation or people have adequate and sustainable access to such energy resources as oil, gas, water and minerals. Access includes availability of energy resources determined by the energy market without interference from other nations or polit­ ical or military entities for non-market, political purposes. Enterprise Risk Management a comprehensive approach to risk management that engages organizational systems and processes together to improve the quality of decision making for managing risks that may hinder an organization’s ability to achieve its objectives. Environmental Security is a process for understanding how extreme environmental or climatic events, acting locally or trans-nationally, can destabilize countries or regions of the world, resulting in geopolitical instability, resource conflicts, and subsequently enhanced risk to critical infrastructure, or a combination of these. Epidemic refers to an increase, often sudden, in the number of cases of a disease above what is normally expected in that population in that area. Epidemics occur when an agent and susceptible hosts are present in adequate numbers, and the agent can be effectively conveyed from a source to the susceptible hosts. Extreme weather event An extreme weather event is an event that is rare at a particu­ lar place and time of year. Definitions of rare vary, but an extreme weather event would normally be as rare as or rarer than the 10th or 90th percentile of a proba­ bility density function estimated from observations. The characteristics of what is called extreme weather may vary from place to place in an absolute sense. When a pattern of extreme weather persists for some time, such as a season, it may be classed as an extreme climate event, especially if it yields an average or total that is itself extreme (e.g., drought or heavy rainfall over a season). Focusing events sudden, unpredictable and harmful events that gain the attention of policy makers and the public and drive national policy more so than other similar events.

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Glossary xxvii Food Security a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (FAO, 2001). Fossil Fuels carbon-based fuels from fossil hydrocarbon deposits, including coal, oil and natural gas. Future shocks a dizzying disorientation brought upon by the premature arrival of the future. Game Theory a theory that seeks to explain strategies for dealing with competitive situations where the outcome of an individual’s choices depends critically on the other individuals involved in the competition. It has its roots in mathematics but has been used in the social sciences to explain the behavior of individuals, groups, organizations and nation states. Global governance when governance is utilized to address areas or issues of concern that affects more than one state or region and the actors involved in the process are transnational. It encompasses the institutions, policies, norms, procedures and initiatives through which states and their citizens try to bring more predict­ ability, stability and order to their responses to transnational challenges in the absence of overarching political authority, such as in the international system. Global warming an increase in global mean surface temperature averaged over a 30-year period, relative to 1850–1900 unless otherwise specified. For periods shorter than 30 years, global warming refers to the estimated average temperature over the 30 years centered on that shorter period, accounting for the impact of any temperature fluctuations or trend within those 30 years. Globalization the increased connection of different parts of the world from advance­ ment in communication and transportation technology resulting in the expansion of international cultural, economic and political activities. It is the movement and integration of goods and people among different countries. Governance the sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. Greenhouse gas (GHG) greenhouse gases are those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and emit radiation at specific wavelengths within the spectrum of terrestrial radiation emitted by the earth’s surface, the atmosphere itself and by clouds. This property causes the greenhouse effect. Water vapor (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4) and ozone (O3) are the primary GHGs in the earth’s atmosphere. Moreover, there are several entirely human-made GHGs in the atmosphere, such as the halocarbons and other chlorine- and bromine-containing substances, dealt with under the Montreal Protocol. Besides CO2, N2O and CH4, the Kyoto Protocol deals with the GHGs sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs). Hazard a natural or man-made source or cause of harm, or loss or difficulty. Homeland Security a value-laden term, which often means different things to dif­ ferent constituents, organizations or stakeholders. Generally, homeland security refers to a set of collective actions of all levels of government (local, tribal, state, federal), constituents, organizations or stakeholders (i.e., members of the home­ land security enterprise) to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to and recover from threats and hazards that pose risk to the nation.

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xxviii

Glossary

Homeland Security Enterprise an umbrella term that describes a collective of all lev­ els of government, institutions and disciplines that collectively contribute strate­ gies, structures or operations to the homeland security mission. The “enterprise” often includes all levels of government, constituents, organizations or stakehold­ ers such as law enforcement, fire service, public health, academia, emergency medical services, the military, public works, and the public and private sectors. The enterprise is synonymous with “whole-of-community” and “all-of-nation” approaches to homeland security. Human Agency Bias the condition wherein people and even entire societies are far more interested in human threats—versus natural ones. Human Security a condition that is met when the vital core of human lives is pro­ tected, and when people have the freedom and capacity to live in peace, security and with dignity. The term is multidimensional and will often include constituent elements such as economic security, environmental security, food security, health security, personal security, community security, political security and the pro­ tection of women and minorities. Its distinguishing characteristic is to avoid or downplay national security as a military problem between nation states, focusing instead on an assumed international “responsibility to protect” peoples from vio­ lence. It is to be determined and administered by the United Nations. Intelligence (basic definition) information that provides decision makers with knowl­ edge or foreknowledge of the world around them for the purposes of supporting policy or other strategic decisions. Intelligence Cycle a process wherein policy makers (consumers) decide what infor­ mation they need (intelligence requirements) followed by collectors who gather raw data and analysts who try to make sense of that data, and a dissemination system that provides intelligence to the consumer—at which point the cycle starts over again. Interagency Collaborative Capacity (ICC) the results of a process that takes bits and pieces of existing organizations and somehow gets them to cohere and create a functioning entity that is better than the sum of its parts (also known as crafts­ manship theory). Interagency Mechanism for Collaboration (IMC) include an array of arrangements or applications that can facilitate collaboration among agencies, including intera­ gency offices, groups, task forces, councils, conferences and communities of prac­ tice, collaborative technology and similar constructs. Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) a formal entity formed by an intergovern­ mental agreement such as a treaty, charter or statute that involves two or more nations working in good faith, on issues of common interest. Issue-attention Cycle the ascension of issues to the top of the national policy agenda followed by declining public interest and the fading of the issue from the center of public attention. Kyoto Protocol the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was the seminal international treaty adopted in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, at the Third Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP3) to the UNFCCC. Liberalism the classic international relations theory that holds human nature is basi­ cally good, social progress is possible and human behavior is malleable and perfect­ ible through institutions. It argues that injustice aggression and war are products of

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Glossary xxix inadequate or corrupt institutions or misunderstanding among leaders and there­ fore that injustice, aggression and war are not inevitable but can be eliminated by collective action and institutional reform. Subdisciplines of liberalism include neo­ liberalism, functionalism, regime theory and collective or public good. Lone Wolf Terrorism a form of terrorism that is usually purely a domestic threat, even though the causes and the actors may be from abroad. It occurs when an individual or group of individuals are inspired to take action in support of a ter­ rorist organization’s goals or ideology even though they have no formal conten­ tion to that organization. Mitigation focuses on the impact of a hazard, encompasses the structural and nonstructural approaches taken to eliminate or limit a hazard’s presence; people’s exposure; or interactions with people, property and the environment. The empha­ sis on sustained actions to reduce long-term risk differentiates mitigation from those tasks that are required to survive an emergency safely. Multilateral Agreement an agreement where three or more states cooperate or enter into a formal arrangement with one another in return for some sort of preferential treatment. Nation state a sovereign state (country) whose citizens are relatively homogeneous in terms of such factors of culture, language and common descent. National Incidence Management System (NIMS) NIMS provides a common, nation­ wide approach to enable the whole community to work together to manage all threats and hazards. NIMS applies to all incidents, regardless of cause, size, loca­ tion or complexity. National Preparedness is based on core capabilities that support “strengthening the security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics and catastrophic natural disasters”. National Preparedness Goal (NPG) FEMA defines the NPG as “A secure and resil­ ient Nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk”. National Response Framework (NRF) The NRF is formerly the National Response Plan and is the basis for national-level planning for large-scale emergencies regardless of threat or hazard origin. National Security a capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity, well-being and culture. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) voluntary group of individuals or organi­ zations, usually not affiliated with any government, that is formed around a par­ ticular issue or concern. Non-state actors an individual or organization that has significant influence of soci­ ety but is not allied to a particular nation or state. Non-state actors that pose a threat to security include terrorists, narcotics traffickers, transnational crime groups, organized gangs and individual offenders. Offensible space when criminals and other bad actors use defensive space tactics to create a safe space where they can conduct their crimes. Pandemic refers to an epidemic that has spread over several countries or continents typically at the same time and usually affecting a very large number of people.

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Glossary

Paradigm scientific practice including theories, laws, applications and instrumenta­ tions that are generally accepted by scientific communities. Paris Agreement the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted on December 2015 in Paris, France, at the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC. The agreement, adopted by 196 Parties to the UNFCCC, entered into force on 4 November 2016 and as of May 2018 had 195 Signatories and was ratified by 177 Parties. Political Economy the set of interlinked relationships between people, the state, soci­ ety and markets as defined by law, politics, economics, customs and power that determine the outcome of trade and transactions and the distribution of wealth in a country or economy. Political Security refers to protecting the sovereignty of the government and polit­ ical system and the safety of society from unlawful internal threats and exter­ nal threats or pressures. It involves both national and homeland security and law enforcement. Public Health the science of protecting and improving the health of people and their communities achieved by promoting healthy lifestyles, researching disease and injury prevention, health promotion and detecting, preventing and responding to infectious diseases. Rational choice a social science theory that crosses multiple disciplines but draws heavily on the theoretical foundations of psychology and economics. It assumes that humans are motivated by personal goals reflecting their preferences. They achieve their goals by a mindful and calculated process, whereby they review their goals against the means of attaining them, and decide the best way to proceed in order to optimize the odds of success relative the odds of failing and make decisions accordingly. Rational Choice theory has been applied to individuals, groups, organizations and nation states. Realism the classic international relations theory that argues that the international system is anarchic; there is no actor above states capable of regulating their interac­ tions; therefore, states must arrive at relations with other states on their own, rather than having it dictated to them by some higher controlling body. Adding to this anarchy is the idea that the international system exists in a state of constant antago­ nism. Since there is no higher controlling body, states are the most important actors in the international system. All states within the system are unitary, rational actors that tend to pursue self-interest and strive to attain as many resources as possible. Subdisciplines of realism include neorealism and rational choice. Recovery encompasses both short-term and long-term efforts for the rebuilding and revitalization of affected communities. Recovery planning builds stakeholder partnerships that lead to community restoration and future sustainability and resiliency. Referent Organizations centralized organization that formalizes institutions, estab­ lishes ground rules for membership and consensus building, and organizes the systematic mobilization of resources. Referent organizations are featured in IMCs. See Interagency Mechanism for Collaboration. Regime sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making pro­ cedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of interna­ tional concern that require collective action.

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Glossary xxxi Resilience as defined in PPD-21, is “the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions…[it] includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents”. Resilient infrastructure assets, systems and net­ works must also be robust, agile and adaptable. Mitigation, response and recov­ ery activities contribute to strengthening critical infrastructure resilience. Response embodies the actions taken in the immediate aftermath of an incident to save and sustain lives, meet basic human needs and reduce the loss of property and the effect on critical infrastructure and the environment. Following an inci­ dent, response operations reduce the physical, psychological, social and economic effects of an incident. Risk in a risk management context, risk the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associ­ ated consequences. In the context of the assessment of climate impacts, the term risk is often used to refer to the potential for adverse consequences of a climate-related hazard, or of adaptation or mitigation responses to such a hazard, on lives, liveli­ hoods, health and well-being, ecosystems and species, economic, social and cultural assets, services (including ecosystem services) and infrastructure. Risk results from the interaction of vulnerability (of the affected system), its exposure over time (to the hazard), as well as the (climate-related) hazard and the likelihood of its occurrence. Risk Assessment the product or process which collects information and assigns values to risks for the purpose of informing priorities, developing or comparing courses of action, and informing decision-making. Risk Control the deliberate action taken to reduce the potential for harm or main­ tain it at an acceptable level. Risk Management process of identifying, analyzing, assessing and communicating risk and accepting, avoiding, transferring or controlling it to an acceptable level considering associated costs and benefits of any actions taken. Risk Perception the subjective judgment that people make about the characteristics and severity of a risk. Routine Activity a criminology theory that focuses on criminal events and activities rather than focusing on the offender or crime setting. Under routine activity the­ ory, crimes require the convergence of a motivated offender, a suitable target (vic­ tim), and needs to take place in circumstances where the target lacks protection of a capable guardian. Prevention consists of actions that reduce risk from human-caused incidents, pri­ marily terrorism. Protection reduces or eliminates a threat to people, property and the environment. Primarily focused on adversarial incidents, the protection of critical infrastruc­ ture and key resources (CIKR) is vital to local jurisdictions, national security, public health and safety and economic vitality. Salafi jihadism movement which serves as the ideological base of most Sunni Islamic terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda, ISIS and their affiliated groups. Salafi movements contend that only by returning to the way of life at the time of the prophet may Muslims once again experience a golden age. Salafi jihadists promote the use of violence to achieve this goal. Situational Crime Prevention a crime prevention concept that attempts to analyze specific incidents and activities—associated with a crime, rather than focus on

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xxxii

Glossary

offenders or their motivations. The context of the crime is more important than the offender or their motivation. If it is more difficult to carry out a crime, it increases the risk the offender takes by attempting the crime. Higher risk reduces the rewards (or the benefits) the offender expects to receive by committing the crime as well as the motivation used to justify their criminal action. Social Identity a theory that attempts to explain how individuals self-ascribed sig­ nificance attached to the social groups or communities to which one belongs and with which one interacts directly, along with the feelings associated with partici­ pation in these groups’ activities. Social Movement a group of people with a common ideology who try together to achieve certain general goals and some level of social or political change through collective action. Social Network Analysis an application of social network theory that analyzes net­ work nodes to understand who anything from networks, people and even things like events are linked. It looks at not only the inextricable links that bond together religious, familial or cultural groups but also the fluid and dynamic groupings that are more prevalent in a global society where transience and rootlessness in both the physical and digital world. Social Network Theory a social science theory that crosses multiple disciplines in fields as diverse as psychology to economics. It seeks to explain the factors con­ trite to the formation, cohesion, and continuation of links between individuals and groups that form networks. Network are examined in terms of “nodes”, which are tightly coupled groups of people that coalescence around complex-yet under­ standable relationships. Sustainable Development Goals the current set of 17 global goals for development for all countries established by the United Nations through a participatory pro­ cess and elaborated in the 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development which includes ending poverty and hunger; ensuring health and well-being, education, gender equality, clean water and energy, and decent work; building and ensur­ ing resilient and sustainable infrastructure, cities and consumption; reducing inequalities; protecting land and water ecosystems; promoting peace, justice and partnerships; and taking urgent action on climate change. Target Hardening the crime prevention technique of employing security measures as a deterrence the use of alarms, barriers, gates, locks, fences or other security devices. It assumes that criminals are rational actors and would conduct a some­ what imaginary cost-benefit analyst on a given target beforehand to see if they will be able to successfully commit their crime. If a target that has been hardened it would be unattractive to a criminal. Terrorism there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism but for the purpose of this text terrorism will be defined as the use or the threat of violence or other destructive behavior by a non-state actor to inciting fear or intimate a population with the goal of achieving some level of social or political change. Theory a systematic and evidence-based approach to a processes or phenomena, and the presumed relationships between and among components of the process or phenomenon. Threat a natural or man-made occurrence, individual, entity or action that has or indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment and/or property.

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Glossary xxxiii Threat Assessment product or process of identifying or evaluating entities, actions or occurrences, whether natural or man-made, that have or indicate the potential to harm life, information, operations and/or property. Transgovernmentalism an emerging international relations theory that contends that globalization has created an environment traditional means of international interaction, like diplomacy and treaties, seem less effective in dealing with today’s threats to international security as may be too slow and cumbersome to combat certain problems in a globalized world as they were in dealing with past threats. Today’s threats require the development of relationships between similar agen­ cies across governments, rather than dealing exclusively through foreign minis­ tries. Governments operate internationally through transgovernmental networks comprised of government officials from various nations, forming both formal and informal global networks that reach out to their foreign counterparts to help address the problems that arise when national actors or issues spill beyond their borders. Transgovernmental Network network comprised of government officials from vari­ ous nations, forming both formal and informal global networks that reach out to their foreign counterparts to help address the problems that arise when national actors or issues spill beyond a nation’s borders. Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) networks are constructed of “nodes” of individuals or groups which utilize modern technology to connect with other “nodes” around the globe who share their ideals or beliefs. Through their col­ lective action, the nodes of the network can turn their attention to problems and issues of a global scale. Uncertainty (in science) the degree to which a calculated, estimated or observed value may deviate from the true value. Uncertainty is the state of incomplete knowledge that can result from a lack of information or from disagreement about what is known or even knowable. It may have many types of sources, from impre­ cision in the data to ambiguously defined concepts or terminology, incomplete understanding of critical processes, or uncertain projections of human behavior. Uncertainty can therefore be represented by quantitative measures (e.g., a proba­ bility density function) or by qualitative statements (e.g., reflecting the judgment of a team of experts). United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) the UNFCCC was adopted in May 1992 and opened for signature at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. It entered into force in March 1994 and as of May 2018 had 197 Parties (196 States and the European Union). The Convention’s ultimate objec­ tive is the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”. The provisions of the Convention are pursued and implemented by two treaties: the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Unity of effort refers to organizations working together collaboratively. Vulnerability the qualitative or quantitative expression of the level to which an entity, asset, system, network or geographic area is susceptible to harm when it experiences a hazard. Vulnerability Assessment product or process of identifying physical features or oper­ ational attributes that render an entity, asset, system, network or geographic area susceptible or exposed to hazards.

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Glossary

Wave Theory (of terrorism) a theory that contends terrorism ebb and flow in incre­ ments of 40-year iterations. The different “waves” are products of the conditions and climate of the times in which they occur; driven by myriad factors that com­ pel terroristic actors to heed the clarion call of violence in action around a par­ ticular ideology. Westphalian Sovereignty the assumption of international law that a nation state has sovereignty over its land and internal affairs, to the exclusion of all external pow­ ers, on the principle of non-interference in another country’s internal affairs, and that each state is equal in the eye of international law.

Note 1 This glossary draws on terms and definitions from the US DHS Lexicon (2010) retrieved at: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/dhs-risk-lexicon-2010_0.pdf, the IPCC Glossary (2018) Retrieved At: Https://Www.Ipcc.Ch/Site/Assets/Uploads/2018/11/ Sr15_Glossary.Pdf, and the Guide To Emergency Management And Related Terms, Defi­ nitions, Concepts, Acronyms, Organizations, Programs, Guidance, Executive Orders & Legislation (2007) by Wayne Blanchard, retrieved at: https://training.fema.gov/hiedu/ docs/terms%20and%20definitions/terms%20and%20definitions.pdf

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1

Introduction to security theory James D. Ramsay, Keith Cozine and John Comiskey

Description. Security is an elusive concept. It is dynamic, value-laden and complex. Ultimately it means different things to different people or governments and can even change in meaning over time to the same people or governments. Modern homeland security overlaps, but not entirely the notion of domestic, national and international security, which necessitates a broad integrated effort at all levels of government, includ­ ing the private sector, as well as an interagency collaborative capacity. Complicating the structure and operation of homeland security is the terrific variation in security models and laws that are held by our allies internationally. Ultimately, “being secure” is an end state that all national security models pursue. How best to secure the US nation from threats foreign and domestic, including natural threats and hazards from climate change to landslides consumes much of the US federal government’s time and treasury and can be likened to a complex, adaptive system since the “problem set” that homeland security struggles to solve includes more wicked than tame problems. This chapter reviews the origins of theory, levels and models of theory, and will offer a brief overview of the nature of wicked problems. Upon successful completion of this chapter, students should be able to: 1. Describe what a theory is and how theory supports professional disciplines. 2. Distinguish between four levels of theory: grand theory, macro-theory, meso­ theory and micro-theory. 3. Offer a working definition of homeland security. 4. Distinguish between wicked and tame problems. 5. Describe how individual disciplines contribute structure, strategy and theory to modern homeland security, thus creating a theoretical underlayment for a “grand theory of homeland security”.

1.1 Introduction The term homeland security first came into the American lexicon ten days after the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001 when the U.S. President George W. Bush created the Office of Homeland Security. The office was created to “develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks”. (History.com Editors, 2019; White House, 2001). President Bush appointed former Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge as inaugural director of the office the following month. The idea and con­ cept of homeland security were further solidified with the passage of the Homeland

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Security Act of 2002, which created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a cabinet-level federal department. However, both the term homeland security and the concept of a specific agency dedicated to preserving it predate the September 11 terrorist attacks. The U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, under President Clinton, was estab­ lished in 1998 to provide a comprehensive review of US national security require­ ments in the 21st century. The commission argued that the United States was facing a radically new security environment in which the threat of a mass casualty attack on the American homeland was real, and called for a “National Homeland Security Agency” to deal with this new (and mostly domestic-facing) threat environment (Roxborough, 2001). Over the last 18 years, we have witnessed an evolution in both the DHS and its role in preserving and protecting liberty and the free flow of people and commerce. It has grown into something much more than a single government agency. As the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review points out, providing for the safety and secu­ rity of the American people from a variety of natural and man-made threats requires partnerships between federal departments and agencies; state, local, tribal and terri­ torial governments; nongovernmental and private sector organizations; our foreign allies; and the American public (DHS, 2014). While the term “homeland security” is somewhat uniquely American, the under­ lying concepts, strategies and structures constituting the homeland security enter­ prise are not. Indeed, a Federal Department whose mission is squarely focused on a coordinated and seamless effort involving all levels of government to confront the complex and wicked threat environment of the 21st Century as outlined in the HartRudman Commission is not only logical, but present in most developed nations. After the events of September 11, 2001, the United States as well as several other peer nations especially within the Anglosphere, strategically restructured their govern­ ment at the national level in order to be better situated to protect its populations. In a post “9/11” world, domestic security suddenly seemed more dynamic, asymmetric, transnational, complex and pernicious. In 2003, Public Safety Canada was created to “ensure coordination across all federal departments and agencies responsible for national security and the safety of Canadians” and included the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in the Department. (Public Safety Canada, 2015). Since 2001, the United Kingdom has periodically restructured several of its security agencies to now include the UK Border Force, the UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI) office and the Immigration Enforcement (IE) office all within the Home Office. In addition to the Home Office, there are other security and safety agencies such as HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, National Counter Terrorism Security Office and UK Security Service (MI5). In 2013, the National Crime Agency (NCA) was established to combat organized crime; human, weapon and drug trafficking; cybercrime; and economic crime that goes across regional and interna­ tional borders (Cozine, 2016). In December of 2017, Australia created the Department of Home Affairs with the responsibilities for immigration and customs border policy; national security and law enforcement policy; emergency management, including crisis management and disaster recovery; countering terrorism; cyber-security pol­ icy; countering foreign interference; critical infrastructure protection; and trans­ portation security. Agencies within Home Affairs include the Criminal Intelligence

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Commission, Australian Border Force, Australian Federal Police, AUSTRAC (the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre) and Australian Intelligence and Security Organizations (Home Affairs, 2019). Along with the development of federal “homeland security” organizations within the Anglosphere, a tremendous growth of homeland security academic programs at colleges and universities has occurred, particularly in the United States. As of 2019, the University Agency Partnership Program administered by the Naval Post Graduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security lists 460 homeland security-related academic programs, including programs at the Associate, Bachelor, Masters and Doctoral levels (UAPP, 2019). While some of these programs emerged from existing criminal justice or emergency management programs, others were built from the ground up drawing academic content from existing fields such as criminal justice, emergency management, political science, public administration and secu­ rity studies to name but a few. Over the past decade and a half, homeland security programs have evolved core topics and curricula centered on all-hazard threats, crit­ ical infrastructure, critical thinking, collaboration, cyber security, emergency man­ agement, intelligence, law and policy, leadership, preparedness, risk management, strategy and terrorism (Comiskey, 2018). Another recent development in the matu­ ration of homeland security as an academic discipline was the International Society for Preparedness, Resiliency, and Security (INSPRS) identification of nine knowledge domains, which should be part of undergraduate homeland security curricula. These include critical infrastructure and resilience, emergency management, human and environmental security, intelligence, law and policy, professionalism, risk manage­ ment, strategic planning and terrorism. Knowledge domains refer to the knowledge, skills, abilities and behaviors that should be part of a discipline’s curricula (Ramsay & Renda-Tanali, 2018). Despite these steps and initiatives to move homeland security forward as an aca­ demic discipline, no grand theory or overarching framework of homeland security has evolved. As Comiskey (2018) points out, “homeland security academics as well as practitioners have an obligation to the evolving discipline to identify, develop, and test theories and methodologies that will prepare practitioners for the field and to address homeland security problems”. He continues, “they must introduce, explain, analyze, test, develop and generate theory and other methodologies that will grow and mature the field”. (Comiskey, 2018) A profession uses its underlying theory to establish best practices and legitimacy of practice. As knowledge evolves, theory evolves, and vice versa. It turns out that theory, though a critical underlayment to all disciplines, is not static. As in all disciplines, theory is both dynamic and foundational and continues to evolve as research, changes in technology, best practices, lessons learned all contrib­ ute to the body of knowledge of the field. Theory also subsequently serves as a guide for ongoing research and scientific inquiry. In short, theories are the pillars of any academic discipline, and ultimately, any profession. But what exactly is theory?

1.2 What is a theory? In everyday use, the word “theory” often means an untested hunch, or a guess without supporting evidence. However, for the academic, the scholar or the scientist, a theory has nearly the opposite meaning and is nearly always accompanied by observation and other data to support the relationships theorized. To these professionals, theory

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is a well-substantiated explanation of some aspect of the natural world that can incor­ porate laws, hypotheses and facts (American Museum of Natural History, 2005). A theory provides reasoning (or suspected logic) for why something may occur the way it does, or why things may be related the way they appear to be, or it may attempt to explain observed patterns in behavior. Theories appear from many sources with vary­ ing quantities (and quality) of evidence that reinforces an observed relationship. Some theories have little to no evidence, and seem mostly constituted by observation while others are supported by considerably more empirical evidence. Components of a defi­ nition of theory should include a set of assumptions, propositions or accepted facts that attempt to provide a plausible or rational explanation of cause-and-effect (causal) relationships among a group of observed phenomena. One of the major functions of a theory is to provide an answer to the question “why?”. Asking “why?” is central to our need to understand how the world works, to increase our knowledge of a subject area or to predict what might happen next, or to realign thoughts and opinions. Asking “why?”, therefore, is an essential skill for anybody who wants to learn and develop and grow. Defining “theory”, therefore, must consider the “why?” question. But a more complete theory is necessarily deeper than merely asking “why?”. A more robust the­ ory also includes an attempt to explain why and so to provide understanding. A theory is not just “any” explanation—a theory comes into being when a series of ideas or observations come to be held and accepted by a wider community of people as being factual. Moreover, a theory is not only factually based, but how we understand and provide explanations about real-world phenomena also involves one’s cultural back­ ground as well as one’s worldview. What then is a theory? Put simply, a theory not only is a logical attempt to explain observed phenomena and known facts; it also allows scientists to make predictions of what they should expect to observe were their theory true. In this sense, theories are testable. New evidence should be compatible with a theory. If it is not, the the­ ory is refined or rejected. A theory can never be considered wholly true. Indeed, a well-evidenced theory that is widely considered factual at a given point in time may, in the future, need to be modified upon the discovery of new evidence. Similarly, a theory with little supporting evidence may, in time, be corroborated by evidence gained through the development of new technologies and research techniques. In this way, theories can be modified or amended over time as understanding of the subject matter evolves, as technologies are invented that can gather better evidence, or as repeated application of the theory may reveal confirming or disconfirming evidence. Just as no theory can ever be considered pure fact, no theory can like­ wise be completely discredited even if there is an overwhelming amount of opposing physical evidence. In fact, competing theories can complement each other or conflict with each other. This is healthy, encourages critical analysis, supports the scientific method and leads eventually, to a more robust and in depth understanding of each theory and the evidence/research that supports it. The longer the central elements of a theory hold—the more observations it predicts, the more tests it passes, the more facts it explains—the stronger the theory. For example, Darwin’s theory of evolution explains why so many plants and animals—some very similar and some very different—exist on Earth now and in the past, as revealed by the fossil record. Many advances in science—the development of genetics after Darwin’s death, for example—have greatly enhanced evolutionary thinking. Yet even with these new advances, the theory of evolution persists today, much as Darwin first described

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it, and is universally accepted by scientists as valid (American Museum of Natural History, 2005; Darwin, 1859).

1.3 The goal of theory development and the rise of homeland security theory Theories are developed for many reasons. A common goal of theory development is, for example, to better predict future events. Understanding how certain businesses tend to react under certain circumstances can, for example, lead to more successful investment strategies. However, we also point out that the goal of theory develop­ ment is not always the same and the type of theory developed often has its origins in the initial question of “why?” For instance, in an attempt to better understand what might constitute appropriate content in academic homeland security curricula, Comiskey (2018) identified five types of theory widely utilized in homeland security studies as an academic discipline; descriptive theory, explanatory theory, normative theory and predictive theory, as well as the inductive process referred to as grounded theory. Descriptive theory describes or classifies specific dimensions or character­ istics of individuals, groups, situations or events by summarizing the commonal­ ities found in discrete observations (Godfrey-Smith, 2003; Joas & Knobol, 2009). Explanatory theory predicts precise or causative relationships between dimen­ sions or characteristics of phenomena or differences between groups (Fawcett & Downes, 1986; Turner, 2017). Normative theories make value judgments; they pre­ scribe what should be (Godfrey-Smith, 2003; Sjoberg & Nett, 1968). Predictive the­ ory predicts outcomes (Betts, 1982; Bookstaber, 2017). Last, grounded theory is the product of inductive inquiries from which general theories of processes, actions or interactions are derived (Glaser, 1967). Just as the “why?” is important to theory development, “what” is being studied, or the level of analysis of the study, also plays an equally important role. Combining the “why”, with the “what” leads to four super-ordinate levels of theory: grand the­ ory, macro-theory, meso-theory and micro-theory. Grand theory attempts an overall explanation of social life, history or human experience. Grand theory also provides a general framework for many smaller theories (Ek & Tesfahuney, 2011; Mills, 1959; Skinner, 1985). Macro-level theories explain larger social systems, processes and institutions. Meso-, or midlevel theories, are less ambitious than their macro-level counterparts, tend to be less abstract while they emphasize midscale processes and interactions, and as the name implies, often links macro and micro theories (Creswell, 2009). Microlevel theories provide explanations of smaller social groups, systems, processes and institutions (Ougaard, 2013). Understanding the origins and types of theory is helpful when trying to understand the discipline of homeland security, or at least in our attempt to apply a theoretical description of it. In fact, using theory to better explain homeland security is rather important to the overall health and safety of the nation. Consider that a good theory of homeland security would enhance our ability to be prepared for pandemics, hurricanes or terrorist attacks. Indeed, a robust theory of homeland security would improve how we teach the next generation of practitioners and ultimately is key to our national pre­ paredness and our national security. In addition, this complexity begets the question security studies academics have pondered since the advent of the first academic degree programs; that is, what do we teach students of homeland security and why? However,

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it is at this point that our understanding of homeland security needs to be checked. Like medicine and engineering, homeland security is actually more complex than one might think at first blush. In practice, homeland security acts more like a discipline of disciplines, or a meta-discipline (Ramsay, 2012; Ramsay & Renda-Tanali, 2018). In other words, modern homeland security is component of several extant disciplines including criminal justice, emergency management, cybersecurity, risk management, preparedness, resilience, communication, strategy and decision-making, intelligence and terrorism to name a few. From the perspective of theory development, the dilemma this poses is whether it is possible to develop a theory of a meta-discipline? When attempting to consider a “theory of homeland security”, it is immediately obvious that theory typology and levels of analysis are central to this task. To start, let us explore the complexity of the concept of “security”. The term “security” derives from the Latin word securitas whose root is securus meaning “without care”. Further, security has been ascribed various definitions within academic literature. Manunta (1999) has defined security as a “basic need”. Another view of security offered by Fischer and Green (2004) is that it “implies a stable, relatively predictable environment in which an individual or group may pursue its ends without disruption or harm and without fear of disturbance or injury”. Security is often tied to feel­ ings of safety as indicated in a hierarchy of needs as proposed by Maslow. Security has been classified as the second-most important need for all humans, trailing only the physiological necessities such as food, water and shelter (McLeod, 2007). Security is a combination of material circumstances and the physiological state pro­ duced by those circumstances. Security is as much about peace of mind, order and stability as it is about physical wellbeing (Caldwell & Williams, 2016). Wolfers’ (2011) work addresses security as a value, defining security as the absence of threats to acquired values, or the fear that those values will be under threat. These are but a few of the many definitions of security found in the academic literature. For our purposes a simple definition of security is as a condition or state of being free from a threat of harm. Security it seems, in its most basic form covers a broad terrain and implies several levels. On one extreme it is an individual’s perception of well-being when one is free from threats to one’s welfare. Yet, on the other extreme, security can imply a condition where either a nation or even the international community is stable and free of conflict. The perspective that security subsumes a broad array of levels from individ­ ual well-being to global security mirrors the concept of the Homeland Security Enterprise. As suggested above, the Homeland Security Enterprise concept includes a broad and expansive effort, across several levels of government and the private sector, to provide for the safety and security of the American people from a vari­ ety of natural and man-made threats. Specifically, such an effort requires partner­ ships between federal departments and agencies; state, local, tribal and territorial governments; nongovernmental and private sector organizations; our foreign allies; and the American public (DHS, 2014). Clearly, this is the case if security concerns encompass individual, the international system, and several levels of security in between. As such, it is readily apparent that all four levels of theory; grand theory, macro-theory, meso-theory and micro-theory are important to the development of homeland security theory. Likewise, as homeland security programs have evolved core topics and curricula centered on all-hazard threats, critical infrastructure, crit­ ical thinking, collaboration, cyber security, emergency management, intelligence,

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law and policy, public health, leadership, preparedness, risk management, strategy and terrorism; the diversity of these topics means that descriptive theory, explana­ tory theory, normative theory and predictive theory will be equally important in the future development of homeland security theory. Consequently, the theories men­ tioned here will serve as pillars on which a distinct homeland security theory will begin to be built. As we’ve discussed, a theory is critical to a discipline’s ability to test, evaluate and advance its operations or strategies. What aids theory develop­ ment is the degree to which the concept can be defined. After all, it seems inherently difficult to develop a theory around something that cannot be defined. Toward this end, the next section will offer a working definition of homeland security and the nature of the problems it attempts to manage.

1.4 Wicked vs. tame problems and the homeland security problem set A decision science perspective would describe the challenges that confront the Homeland Security enterprise as wicked problems. Wicked problems are those that exhibit the following characteristics: the solution depends on how the problem is framed; the problem can change in response to an attempted solution; stakeholders vary considerably in how they define and understand the problem or what a solution would be; suspended judgment and iteration are key in resolving the problem; the constraints and resources available to address the problem change over time; and the problem is never (totally) solved—that is wicked problems are better managed than solved.1 The primary difference between wicked problems and their counterparts, tame problems, is that although tame problems can be complex (i.e., building a jet engine), there is typically broad agreement on the solution pathway, benchmarks of success and general agreement on what the end state should be. Wicked problems do not tend share these characteristics. For example, classic issues homeland secu­ rity grapples with that we would classify as wicked include climate change, immi­ gration and border security, pandemic preparedness, asymmetric violent extremism and cybersecurity. Herein lies the difficult with a precise definition of what homeland security is, and logically, what it is not. The next section will promote a working defi­ nition of homeland security. 1.4.1 A working definition for homeland security It seems logical that to develop a theory of something, we would first need to define it. Several have attempted robust definitions of homeland security (Bellavita, 2008, 2011; Ramsay, 2013; Ramsay & O’Sullivan, 2013; Ramsay & Renda-Tanali, 2018). The diffi­ culty in devising a simple definition is that homeland security is a conceptual frame­ work that we suspect contains at least three generic, primary characteristics: 1. Homeland security is complex. That is, it is multifaceted and multidimensional and interdisciplinary—it is a composite system of systems, which even in its simplest conceptions (as primarily terrorism-focused) involves multiple levels and realms, from local to international, and a diversity of institutions, societies and demographics. 2. Homeland security is dynamic. As both concept and practice and given the evolving nature of possible threats (including the perceptions of and responses

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James D. Ramsay, Keith Cozine and John Comiskey to those threats), what is and is not homeland security can itself be expected to change in concept, as well as in application over time. 3. Homeland security is value laden. That is, homeland security can be expected to hold different meaning to different constituents or stakeholders.

In order to begin to devise a grand theoretical framework for homeland security, we offer a broad working definition of homeland security. We offer this with the caveat that it is neither an all-inclusive nor perfect definition, and that homeland security will in many regards always be a contested term. But by having a working definition, we have a clearer path toward establishing of a working theory of homeland security; that is, a theory that needs to be inclusive of the range of policy, law, practice, operations, strategies, structures and objectives that collectively comprise the homeland security enterprise. Thus, as follows: Homeland Security2 may be described as risk-based, multidimensional (or interdiscipli­ nary) complex adaptive system3 which includes an integrated national effort by all levels of government – federal, state, local and tribal – as well robust domestic and interna­ tional partnerships between the public and private sectors and nongovernmental organ­ izations to protect the people, property, the environment and territories of the United States from natural, accidental, and unconventional (nonmilitary) manmade threats and hazards in order to defend liberty and ensure the free flow of people and commerce. The above definition offers a robust operationalization of the homeland security con­ cept, and would include the relative contributions of several subdimensions, from aca­ demic to applied, among them (not a comprehensive, but also a working, list—for the sake of framing the broader argument): public health, science and technology, envi­ ronmental systems and security, law and policy, pubic administration, systems engi­ neering, organizational and leadership theory, criminal justice, critical infrastructure protection, economic analysis, public opinion and social psychology (from a variety of social science perspectives), politics4 and international relations, intelligence analysis, counterterrorism and emergency management. With a working definition in mind, we are ready to consider how a “theory of homeland security” might be constituted.

1.5 A theory of homeland security? As alluded to above, the search for a “grand theory of homeland security” is vexed by its expansive nature, its operational dependencies and the types of problems the home­ land security enterprise seeks to resolve. Due to the wicked nature of the homeland security problem set, some have characterized the nature of homeland security as a meta-discipline, or a discipline of disciplines with different functions and specialties that range from counter terrorism to national security, border security to intelligence and critical infrastructure protection to environmental and human security (Church, 2010; Ramsay, 2012; Ramsay & Renda-Tanali, 2018; Simon, 2009). That is, homeland secu­ rity as academic discipline is by its nature, inherently interdisciplinary. Indeed, a recent study by Comiskey (2015) found that that the majority of all collegiate homeland security curricula in the United States were categorized as either multidisciplinary or interdis­ ciplinary drawing their content from a variety of other disciplines further corroborat­ ing homeland security’s interdisciplinary nature. Though such a nature complicates

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our search for a theory of homeland security, it seems rather common for emergent academic disciplines to “borrow” content and theory from other disciplines. Consider the growth of medicine. Medicine today is a composite of many subdisciplines such as chemistry, physics, anatomy, physiology, toxicology, biochemistry, psychology and epi­ demiology, to name a few. As research has supported the practice of medicine, theories of medicine have improved from disbalances of humors in ancient Greece, to germ the­ ory to the modern use of pharmaceuticals or the use of positron emission tomography (PET). Likewise, interdisciplinarity is an important characteristic of homeland security in terms of theory development because it supports the very goals of the kind of research that informs the discipline. For instance, the purpose of interdisciplinary research is not merely to integrate information, but to provide a more comprehensive collection of information from different fields in order to optimize understanding, application or prediction. Consequently, interdisciplinary research explicitly attempts to integrate the plurality of information (Pohl, Truffeer, & Hadron, 2017). Whether labeled interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary or a meta-discipline, it is clear that several more established academic disciplines have an impact on the intellectual and operational aspects of modern homeland security, and as such, confirming that it is an integrated academic discipline. That is, we assert that an overall theory of homeland security can be constructed by leveraging its interdisciplinary nature. As such, we attempt to establish a grand theory of homeland security as the composite of theories of its component parts. Further, components of the practice, organization or strategy of homeland security would seem to be critical to the formation of an over­ all or grand theory. Hence, by establishing how the component disciplines of homeland security support either the strategy, the operations or the structural organization of the homeland security enterprise, we approach a grand theory of homeland security as the integrated set of theories of its component disciplines. For instance, homeland security is largely based on law. By understanding the theory of law, how law supports opera­ tions, tactics, strategy and structure of domestic security (i.e., its agencies, operations, practices, policies), we discover a component of the larger whole, that is, overall home­ land security theory. The subsequent chapters of this text will examine how the component disciplines of homeland security support its operations, strategies, tactics and structure. The theories described in this text may serve to guide academic and practitioners when researching homeland security problems, issues and concepts. It is our hope that such future research and subsequent inductive inquiries will lead to the development of a grounded theory of homeland security. From this, it would be possible to derive more general theories of processes, actions, or interactions of homeland security that in turn inform academic curricula that in turn supports national workforce develop­ ment, policy development and the identification of best practices. Last, were such a grand theory to evolve and mature, we expect for example that our nation’s ability to anticipate disasters, develop resilience or avert violent extremism would improve, thus defending liberty and enhancing the safety and security of the nation and its people.

1.6 Organization and overview of this text Including this introduction, this text is organized into 14 chapters. Chapters 2-14 each discusses a core discipline upon which the modern profession of homeland security draws expertise that supports its organization, structure, strategy or operations. Each

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chapter describes how that discipline is organized and how its own theoretical under­ pinnings directly impact aspects of the practice of homeland security. The following synopses briefly overview each of the remaining chapters. Chapter 2. Risk and the Homeland Security Enterprise by Brian Harte. The dyna­ mism and complexity of the homeland security environment requires the use of a variety of risk frameworks, models and theoretical applications to effectively assess both current and future threats, risks and vulnerabilities. Moreover, the need for comprehensive resiliency building and risk management strategies are also apparent within this environment. The primary goal of this chapter is to illustrate how risk and risk management work and lie at the heart of modern homeland security practice and strategy. Chapter 3. The Sociology of Security by Terrence O’Sullivan. Security is often under­ stood as a perception of reality by individuals, social groups and institutions. Whether one’s perspective is from that of a government and adviser or a mem­ ber of society, security is a perception of the social world which has profound consequences for the way we live our daily lives. A better understanding of the sociology of security helps us formulate theory, strategy and operations. Chapter 4. Crime and Security Chelsea Binns. Criminology, like homeland secu­ rity, initially drew its theoretical foundations from other disciplines. Now, crim­ inology has its own theoretical base, much of which is in turn contributing to the emerging theory in homeland security. This is particularly true of theories related to deterrence and crime prevention. This chapter will examine some of these theories and how they are specifically applicable to deal with security threats and hazards faced by security professionals. Case studies will be used to demonstrate how these theories have been applied in the real world. Chapter 5. Terrorism: Origins, Ideologies and Goals by Kyle McDonnell and Keith Cozine. It is imperative that security policy makers, practitioners and research­ ers understand the political, historical and social theoretical underpinnings of international and domestic terrorism. While there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, this chapter will nonetheless attempt to define terror­ ism. Next, it will examine the various social theories of terrorism and how they contribute to the development of the different types of terrorism. Finally, the chapter will explore how these theories might help develop an estimation of what the terrorism will look like in the future so that effect policy and strategies to counter terrorism can be developed. Chapter 6. Interagency Collaborative Capacity by John Comiskey. Homeland secu­ rity draws on expertise and requires working relationships with dozens of other agencies and organizations. When one considers the origins of terrorism, for example, one realizes that to understand and defeat terrorism requires exper­ tise from sociologists, the legal and law enforcement communities, the intelli­ gence community, the military as well as the State Department to name a few. Interagency collaborative capacity (ICC) theory provides a practical framework for homeland security policy makers and practitioners to cooperate, coordinate and collaborate effectively to protect the Nation. This chapter will trace home­ land security’s interagency collaboration imperative to the post-World War II U.S. security and intergovernmental relations landscape. The chapter will then describe the post-9/11 and post-Hurricane Katrina threat landscape and the

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multiple interagency partnerships and processes that developed as a result. It will describe interagency initiatives that were brought about by new challenges such as catastrophic natural disasters, industrial accidents and cyber vulnera­ bilities. The chapter will illuminate interagency partnerships and initiatives that exemplify ICC’s efficiencies and effectiveness. Chapter 7. Emergency Management and Theories of Prevention, Response and Recovery by Irmak Renda-Tanali. The theory of being “secure nation” does not mean that adverse events never occur. Indeed, the hallmark of a secure nation is indeed the resilience and preparedness capabilities of a nation, and its ability to withstand and recover from adverse events. Hence, existing theories from both emergency management and security to describe the degree to which the United States is prepared for, can prevent, respond to and recover from adverse events including acts of mankind (i.e., terrorism, violent crime) or of Mother Nature (i.e., weather-related challenges, natural disasters, climate change). As a result, the United States has developed a national preparedness goal. The field of emergency management plays a critical role in supporting and sustain­ ing a national workforce capable of accomplishing the national preparedness goal. This chapter will provide a history of the law and policy that gave rise to and that supports the emergency management discipline. It will also provide a basis for including emergency management into a more inclusive concept of human security and as a necessary basis for a more complete model of national security. Chapter 8. Global Governance and The Relationships Between Nations by Keith Cozine. International Relations theory explains why nations do or do not cooperate with other to address issue that is transnational in nature. Global governance theory tries to explain the mechanisms used to facilitate this coop­ eration. The chapter will first define global governance in terms of the con­ cept of governance in the absence of government and how this approach is used to address the natural and man-made security threats faces today. Key theories and concepts explored in the chapter include the theory of the State, Anarchy, Multilateralism, hard and soft law, international norms, regime the­ ory and network theory. Various tools of global governance will be discussed in terms of how they are used to combat various natural and man-made threats to security. Chapter 9. Intelligence and Theory of Preventive Action by Erik Dahl. Intelligence in its most basic definition is about providing decision makers with knowledge or foreknowledge of the world around them. Good intelligence is essential to developing policies and strategies to deal with the wide range of threats and hazards faced by security professional today. Theories of intelligence and its use date back to the fifth century BCE and Sun Tzu’s Art of War. While Tzu’s the­ ory focused primarily on intelligence for military conquest, uses for intelligence has expanded overtime so too have theories on intelligence and its use. This chapter examines these theories and their applications in today’s diverse threat environment Chapter 10. Human and Environmental Security Theory by James Ramsay and Terrence O’Sullivan. This chapter describes some of the various dimensions of human security—a highly complex system of “wicked problems”, and the link to an environmental security mandate, in the face of climate disruption. The

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James D. Ramsay, Keith Cozine and John Comiskey all-encompassing climate security magnifies the need to use human security as a strategic planning priority, integrated across the more traditional notions of national and homeland security. Chapter 11. Public Health as a Critical Infrastructure by Terrence O’Sullivan and James Ramsay. One of the Nation’s 16 Critical Infrastructure Sectors, the Healthcare and Public Health Sector protects the Nation from hazards such as terrorism, infectious disease outbreaks and natural disasters. Public health can proxy several challenges posed by large complex and adaptive systems that comprise the many sectors of our nation’s economy. For example, the public health sector exemplifies the need for public–private partnerships, cybersecurity, civil liberties, privacy and international relations and the implications of climate change on security. From a threat intelligence perspective, public health includes both pandemics (such as the current COVID-19 pandemic) and epidemics as significant threats to liberty, and the free flow of people and commerce making public health an integral component of homeland security theory. Chapter 12. Law, Policy and Domestic Security by Michael McDaniel. At the end of the day, homeland security is a discipline based on law and policy. This chapter will provide an overview of key legal, policy and ethical issues and the legal and policy bases to modern Homeland Security. The chapter will examine legal concepts regarding constitutional rights of individuals, the legal process, access to courts, the law(s) of war and national security principles as they relate to homeland security legislation and policy initiatives. Legal principles of due pro­ cess, habeas corpus, search and seizure, compulsory process and international agreements are explored in greater depth. The law of war will be examined in the context of preemptive war and the current National Security Strategy, as well as issues involving the status of combatants and detention. Chapter 13. Cybersecurity Policy and Theory by Maeve Dion. Both modern life­ styles and modern concepts of national security are dependent on a safe, sta­ ble and resilient cyberspace. However, to create and sustain a safe and secure cyberspace is itself a wicked problem as the threat environment is dynamic, complex and policy responses untested and value laden. This chapter will pro­ vide a survey of the broad and emergent field of cybersecurity and informa­ tion assurance and how it is critical to preparedness and resilience of modern governments and private industry. Specifically, topics will include a definition of information security, the concept of threat vectors, offensive and defense policies and strategies, ethical and legal issues that surround the practice environment, risk management strategies planning and information security technology. Chapter 14. Technology—Adaptation, Management and Application by Michael Larrañaga and Patrick Smith. Technological advances are shaping the human experience at an exponential rate. There are a few theories, frameworks and models attempting to address technology, which tend to be associated with the disciplines of science and technology and communication studies. The theories attempt to address the relationship between technology and society and prompt questions about agency, determinism/autonomy and teleonomy. Homeland secu­ rity professionals are charged with preventing terrorism, securing the Nation’s borders, enforcing and administering immigration laws, safeguarding and

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securing cyberspace and ensuring resilience to disasters. Each of these mission spaces is impacted by new and emerging technologies. This chapter examines a multitude of existing and emerging technological theories, frameworks and models and their applications in the homeland security ecosystem.

1.7 Summary and conclusions This chapter discussed the nature of “theory” and presented several types of theories and how they might be used in social science research. Among these was the notion of a “grand theory”. Grand theories attempt to provide an overall explanation of social life, history or human experience. In addition, a grand theory also provides a general framework for many smaller theories—a key aspect we leveraged in order to accom­ modate a “theory” of homeland security. Supporting the use of a grand theoretical framework regarding homeland security, we described (and characterized) the home­ land security discipline as a “discipline of disciplines” or “meta-discipline”; hence, any theory that would envelop the gestalt the homeland security enterprise would need to accommodate the breadth inherent in the component parts, or pillars, that constitute the strategies, operations and structure of the homeland security discipline. Toward this end, each chapter described above represents a pillar or contributing discipline of homeland security. Collectively, in this way, “homeland security theory” is a compos­ ite of the theoretical foundations of its disciplines that contribute to the operations, strategies and institutional structures of the homeland security enterprise. Just as all theories evolve in the presence of new research, best practices and improvements in technology, so will a grand theory of homeland security evolve as new revelations of our understanding of public health, terrorism, crime, emergency management arise, or as other disciplines contribute to the strategies, operations or even structures of the enterprise, or as improvements in technology and cybersecurity evolve. This evolution is healthy, appropriate and even expected given the wicked nature of the homeland security problem set. We hope you enjoy and benefit from this text.

Notes 1. A full discussion of wicked and tame problems is beyond the scope of this chapter. Inter­ ested readers should see: Rittel and Webber (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of planning, Policy Science, 4, 155–169; and Wicked Problems by T. Ritchey (2011), Swedish Morphological Society, Springer Publications, VI, ISBN 978-3-642-19653-9. 2. Many have commented as Bellavita that even the term “homeland security”, can have multiple meanings to different constituents; see for example: Bellavita, Christopher. (2008). Changing homeland security: What is homeland security? Homeland Security Affairs, 4(2). http://www.hsaj.org/?article=4.2.1. Hence the authors here conclude that given the institutional reality of the Department of Homeland Security, for the time being we are likely stuck with the name. 3. Complex adaptive systems are systems “… in which large networks of components with no central control and simple rules of operation give rise to complex collective behavior, sophisticated information processing, and adaptation via learning or evolution”. Mitchell (2009). Complexity: A guided tour (p. 13). USA: Oxford University Press. 4. Up to and including political ideology, which is prominent in critical current U.S. polit­ ical debates about the appropriate role of government in providing public goods, from human security (social welfare safety nets, critical infrastructure and disaster response) to national (and homeland-) security priorities.

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References American Museum of Natural History. (2005). Darwin. Available at: https://www.amnh.org/ exhibitions/darwin Bellavita, Christopher. (2008). Changing homeland security: What is homeland security? Homeland Security Affairs, 4(2). Available at: http://www.hsaj.org/?article=4.2.1 (accessed February 4, 2020). Bellavita, Christopher. (2011). Changing homeland security: In 2010 was homeland security useful? Homeland Security Affairs Journal, 6(1). Betts, R. K. (1982). Surprise attack. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press. Bookstaber, R. (2017). The end of theory: Financial crises, the failure of economics, and the sweep of human interaction. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Caldwell, D., & Williams Jr, R. E. (2016). Seeking security in an insecure world. Rowman & Littlefield. Church, K. (2010). Enhancing unity of effort in homeland defense, homeland security, and civil support through interdisciplinary education (Master’s thesis). Retrieved from http://www.hsdl. org/?abstract&did=25735 Comiskey, J. (2015). How do college homeland security curricula prepare students for the field? Journal of Homeland Security Education, 4, 20–40. http://www.journalhse.org/v4-comiskey. html Comiskey, J. (2018). Theory for homeland security. Journal of Homeland Security Education, 7, 29–45. Cozine, K. (2016). Fragmentation and interdependency: Border security intelligence in North America and Europe. The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, 18(3), 175–197. Creswell. J. W. (2009). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed method approaches (3rd ed.). Los Angeles, CA: Sage. Crenshaw, M (1990). The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 7–24. Darwin, C. (1859). The origin of species by means of natural selection. London: John Murray Department of Homeland Security. (2014). Quadrennial homeland security review. Available at: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf Dorothy Estrada-Tanck has published Human Security and Human Rights under International Law: The Protections Offered to Persons Confronting Structural Vulnerability (Hart Publishing 2016). Ek, R., & Tesfahuney, M. (2011). Theorizing the earth. In Corvellec, H. (Ed.). What is theory?: Answers from the social sciences. Copenhagen, Denmark: CBR Press. Fawcett, J., & Downs, F. (1986). The relationship of theory and research. Norwalk, CT: Appleton Century Crofts. Fischer, R.J. and Green, G. (2004) Introduction to Security. Boston, MA: ButterworthHeinemann. Glaser, B. G. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative observations. Chicago, IL: Aldine Publishing. Godfrey-Smith, P. (2003). Theory and reality: An introduction to the philosophy of science. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. History.com Editors. (2019). The Office of Homeland Security is founded. A&E Television Networks. Available at: https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/office-of-homeland­ security-founded. Home Affairs. (2019). Who are we. Available at: https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/ who-we-are/overview Joas, H., & Knobol, W. (2009). What is theory? In Social theory: Twenty introductory lectures. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

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Manunta, G. (1999). What is Security?. Security Journal, 12(3), 57–66. McLeod, S. (2007). Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Simply Psychology, 1. Mills, J. S. (1959). The sociological imagination. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. Mitchell, Melanie. (2009). Complexity: A guided tour (p. 13). USA: Oxford University Press. Ougaard, M. (2013). What is theory in political science? In Corvellec, H. (Ed.). What is theory? Answers from the social and cultural sciences. Stockholm, Sweden: Copenhagen Business School Press. Pohl, C., Truffeer, B., & Hadron, G. H. (2017). Addressing wicked problems through transdisciplinary research. In Frodeman, R., Klein, J. T., & Pacheco, R. C. S. (Eds.). The Oxford handbook of interdisciplinarity. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. Public Safety Canada. (2015). About public safety Canada. Retrieved from http://www.pub­ licsafety.gc.ca/cnt/bt/index-en.aspx#prtfl Ramsay, J. (2012). Epilogue. In Logan, K. G., & Ramsay, J. D. (Eds.) Introduction to homeland security. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Ramsay, J. (2013). The case for accreditation in homeland security. Journal of Homeland Security Education, 2. Ramsay, J., & T. O’Sullivan. (2013). “There’s a pattern here”: The search for a theoretical framework for modern homeland security and the case of environmental security. Homeland Security Affairs Journal, Spring. Ramsay, J. D., & Renda-Tanali, I. (2018). Development of competency-based education standards for homeland security academic programs. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 15(3). Ritchey, Tom. (2011). Wicked problems (Swedish Morphological Society, © 2005, revised 2013). http://www.swemorph.com/pdf/wp.pdf Rittel, H. W. & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of planning, Policy Science, 4, 155–169. Roxborough, I. (2001). The Hart-Rudman Commission and Homeland Defense, Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute. Available at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=2085 Simon, C. (2009). Safety first. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes. com/2010/01/03/education/edlife/03homeland.html Sjoberg, G., & Nett, R. (1968). A methodology for social research. New York, NY: Harper & Row Publishers. Skinner, Q. (1985). The return of grand theory in the human sciences. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Turner, S. (2017). Knowledge formations: An analytic framework. In Froderman, R., Kline, J. T., & Pacheco, R. C. S. (Eds.). The Oxford handbook of interdisciplinarity (2nd ed.). Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. University Agency Partnership Program (UAPP). (2019). Homeland security programs. Available at: https://www.uapi.us/programs/category/programs White House. (2001). Executive Order 13228: Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council. Wolfers, A. (2011). National security as an ambiguous symbol. In Security studies: A reader (pp. 5–10).

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Risk assessment and the homeland security enterprise Brian Harte

Description: Homeland security attempts to manage a wide array of problems from natural disasters, to terrorism, and from climate change to aging infrastructure. Clearly, there is not enough time, money or manpower to protect all our infrastructure all the time from all hazards. Therefore, the homeland security enterprise depends on a robust understanding of risk and risk assessment and risk management. In this chapter, readers are exposed to key concepts, models, policies and theories relating to risk assessment, risk management, mitigation, prevention and control strategies and tools and how those concepts and principles support homeland security operations and strategies. Upon successful completion of this chapter, student should be able to: 1. Discuss risk measurement concepts, models and theories pertinent to the home­ land security enterprise. 2. Examine “Wicked Problems” in terms of the Risk Landscape. 3. Analyze Risk Management Tools in Assessing Homeland Security Risk. 4. Examine Decision-Making Theory as it pertains to risk. 5. Identifying Homeland Security Strategic, Operational and Institutional Risks. 6. Identify the components of Enterprise Risk Management. 7. Relate the principles of risk management to the strategy, operations and struc­ ture of the homeland security enterprise.

2.1 Introduction The dynamism and complexity of the homeland security environment requires the use of a variety of risk frameworks, models and theoretical applications to effec­ tively assess both current and future threats, risks and vulnerabilities; making risk assessment a clear pillar of homeland security. Moreover, the need for comprehen­ sive resiliency building and risk management strategies is also apparent within this environment. The primary goal to mitigate losses, including the loss of human life, remains the utmost priority within all homeland security risk assessment scenarios. Likewise, the complexity posed by wicked problems and unforeseen circumstances requires a holistic approach to examine and evaluate homeland security environ­ ments in both thoughtful and comprehensive fashion. Thus, tools to effectively assess the severity and likelihood of specific risks, their consequences and antici­ pated outcomes are needed across the homeland security spectrum. Adverse events are inevitable within an uncertain and everchanging world. Thus, a deliberate and

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strategic risk management plan is necessary to build infrastructural capacities and capabilities to strengthen the homeland security posture. In this chapter, we will examine various risk management: strategies, analysis techniques, theories and models. The process for identifying, analyzing and communicating risks will also be examined.

2.2 Wicked problems and the risk landscape Wicked problems, or complex problems that are not easily defined, pose significant challenges in thoroughly examining and evaluating the homeland security risk envi­ ronment. The highly evolving nature of wicked problems makes strategic solutions to problem sets extremely difficult if not impossible to analyze. Within the homeland security enterprise, wicked problems may include, but are not limited to, issues such as terrorism, climate change, social justice, criminal activity, pandemics and even nat­ ural disasters (Head, 2019). Alternately, tame problems represent problems that have possible solutions and can be solved through a deductive reasoning approach. Tame problems are less complex in nature than wicked problems, and can more easily be defined, explained and analyzed. Rittle and Webber (1973) recognized that wicked problems are difficult to solve due to differences in various stakeholders’ values, interests and perceptions. Moreover, there is a juxtaposition of ideas regarding how to tackle these complex issues. That is, should these issues be examined by: (1) scientific evidence-based (linear) decision-making (Nutley, Walter, & Davies, 2007) or (2) through nonlinear decision-making approaches that form relational associations and map possible consequences of these relation­ ships and their outcomes (Rittle & Webber, 1973)? Therefore, the divergence of values and perspectives between and among various stakeholders must be addressed in order to effectively examine these complex issues. 2.2.1 Conceptual issues posed by wicked problems Conceptually, there are a variety of dynamic factors that affect the interplay between and among political, social, environmental and economic conditions. Notwithstanding the fact that the interdependencies of the homeland security landscape rely on collaborative associations with government, NGOs and various other stakeholders. Furthermore, balancing the needs and demands of various stakeholders can be a significant challenge. Thus, the need for cooperation, col­ laboration, and negotiation is apparent to work together to clearly define these often-muddied issues. Since the lenses by which these political, social, environmental and economic issues may become blurred within the aforementioned associations, an understand­ ing and agreement of “what” will be measured and “how” is imperative to maintain a common operating picture in assessing the risk landscape. Likewise, the inclusion of a variety of stakeholders in establishing risk frameworks can benefit risk analysis through a balanced approach that takes into account a variety of viewpoints. Thus, mapping both their complex associations and likely consequences can prove bene­ ficial in helping to delineate the connective tissue between and among these issues. This understanding should drive and stimulate discussions regarding the develop­ ment of risk assessment and analysis frameworks from inception through completion.

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Arguably, the key to analyzing wicked problems is the realization that a variety of beliefs, values and perspectives must be balanced between community, state and gov­ ernment entities. Therefore, a shared understanding and “big picture” thinking are required to examine and evaluate highly complex or wicked problems. Additionally, nonlinear thinking may be needed to map the intersection of complex wicked prob­ lem relationships. Risk management tools can assist to equalize concerns of vari­ ous stakeholders through mathematically quantifying a phenomenon’s likelihood, impact and potential consequences. However, careful attention is needed in prac­ tical application of risk management tools to ensure that the problem we intend to examine is, in actuality, the problem that is addressed. While there are no definitive solutions to wicked problem sets, due to their complexities, the application of risk frameworks can assist to quantify existing event associations and relationships. It is important to mention, however, that decision-making is a dynamic process that involves consideration of many political, sociological, ecological factors as well as mathematical computations.

2.3 Reliance on risk management tools in assessing homeland security risk As discussed in this chapter, risk management tools can provide a practical means to assess risks on a continuum of unlikely through highly likely. Additionally, the use of quantifiable methods to predict certainly can aid in our understanding of the need for measuring not only risks and threats but also vulnerabilities. Moreover, due to a lim­ itation of resources within the Homeland Security Enterprise, risk assessment tools can assist to discern what risks and vulnerabilities should receive the most attention, funding and resources. While an all-hazards approach is useful to plan for an event’s occurrence, quantifiable methods and probabilistic models are needed to address the likelihood of regionally specific events that may have catastrophic consequences. In order to properly delineate the “what” and “how” aspects of risk methodologies, we must first establish a basic understanding of what constitutes a “risk”. 2.3.1 What is risk? The term “risk” is typically associated with activities that may lead to gains or losses, harm or intentional or unintentional consequences. “Consequences are commonly measured in four ways: human, economic, mission, and psychological, but may also include other factors such as impact on the environment (DHS, 2008, p. 16)”. For the purpose of the homeland security spectrum, the term consequences are often associ­ ated with negative risks. Moreover, risk relates to uncertainty, probability and likeli­ hood of losses that may be sustained. “Risk is classically represented as the product of a probability of a particular out­ come and the results of that outcome (DHS, 2006, p. 4)”. While consequences may be good or bad in nature, within homeland security scenarios, the failure to act, or to act inappropriately, may lead to both unintended and dire consequences. These conse­ quences, either perceived or actual, may oftentimes be preventable if action steps are taken to prevent, mitigate or avoid the risk’s occurrence. For the purpose of this chapter, risk can be separated into three main categories as follows: (1) personal risks, (2) property risks or (3) liability.

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Personal risks are of the utmost priority within the homeland and security enter­ prise. The need to protect and preserve human life and the well-being of individu­ als is foremost in the minds of emergency planners, and other homeland security professionals. Property risks are risks that have a direct impact on personally owned assets. “Personal property” is an example of property risk. Homeowners are required to carry homeowner’s insurance to prevent against risks that may be perceivable or not per­ ceivable. Both natural and man-made events necessitate a homeowner to be vigilant to protect against the most common types of risks to their property. Insurance provides a mechanism by which homeowners can provide a reasonable amount of protection to their property assets. Likewise, businesses can benefit from a minimum of General property and liability insurance to account for unforeseen circumstances that may produce damages or leave businesses liable. Moreover, businesses will require busi­ ness continuity planning to maintain and sustain operations through these unforeseen circumstances, threats or occurrences. Liability is a term that relates to legal issues that may ensue based on actions or failure to act of an individual, employer, business or other entity. Liability poses a variety of challenges for various stakeholders that are designated with the duties of safeguarding and protecting others. Notwithstanding the fact that people may be per­ sonally liable for their actions, in terms of civil suits and torts, individual actions of various factors may leave their companies liable as well. While risks may be actual or perceived, failure to protect against known risks may leave individuals, businesses, governments and the community vulnerable. Risk anal­ ysis is needed to evaluate the risk landscape to best fortify against a possible manmade disaster, natural disaster, accident or pandemic. The components of risk include both probability and impact. Probability is the likelihood that something (i.e., an event or situation) will happen. Probability can be stated as (1) highly likely, (2) likely, (3) possible or (4) unlikely. If an event does not have a probability of happening, its likelihood is zero. Impact can be described as the strong effect of someone or something on someone or something. In terms of homeland secu­ rity, an event would be a situation that would have an impact. Measurement of impact of probable and likely risks is a crucial part of homeland security operations. While magnitude is also a consideration of risk, for the purpose of this chapter, risk will be discussed in relation to marginal, serious, critical and catastrophic effects.

2.4 Identifying homeland security strategic, operational and institutional risks In terms of homeland security, risks may be categorized across a variety of different dimensions. Within the homeland security enterprise, organizational risk categories may be operationalized as follows: (1) Strategic risks, (2) Operational risks and (3) Institutional risks. Strategic Risks may be viewed as a risk that impacts a specific organization’s ability to execute strategy, impede interests, or impose threats both externally or internally that may ensue from a flawed or weak strategic implementation (DHS, 2011). The ability to achieve desired goals may be threatened by these risks through an inability to achieve a desired strategic position, thus leaving the entity in a weakened state to address current and future trends, challenges, patterns or conditions.

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20 Brian Harte Operational Risks are risks that may impede the successful execution of current operations, challenge existing resources or subdue the implementation of strategies or capabilities (DHS, 2011). These risks may have a specific impact on tactics, informa­ tion, technology, equipment, time, materials or technology (DHS, 2011). Institutional Risks are risks that may impede an organization’s ability to maintain, and/or develop, control systems and effective management practices (DHS, 2011). These risks may also affect the organizations ability to adapt to changing conditions to meet its overall needs (DHS, 2011). These risks may include a variety of factors that may threaten the ability of an organization to provide operational support or to organize, recruit, train or administer and officiate its responsibilities (DHS, 2011). 2.4.1 Risk parameters of the homeland security enterprise Safety, security and resilience are key components of any national or global homeland security strategy. There are a variety of potential threats that may impact the safety and security of citizens locally, regionally, nationally and globally. This vast array of threats and hazards may include but are not limited to the following: (1) Acts of terrorism, (2) national disasters, (3) illicit and malicious activity in cyberspace, (4) epidemic and pandemic events, (5) man-made incidents and (6) transnational crime (DHS, 2011). Moreover, building resilience to recover from these threats requires comprehensive planning, resource management and risk management. It should be noted, however, that not all risks should be completely avoided. Based on the esti­ mated impact of the event itself, and the cost of preventing the risk, it may be more prudent to accept the risk. Therefore, risk scenarios should consider frequency, likeli­ hood (probability) and impact when determining what risks to accept and what risks to avoid. Moreover, across the homeland security enterprise, a reasonable tolerance for risk should be expected. 2.4.2 What is risk analysis? In order to properly analyze the risk landscape, an ongoing effort to determine likely and known risks is imperative. Observance of the three primary risk categories iden­ tified above is beneficial in determining how risks may impact stakeholders across a variety of levels. In order to make sound decisions regarding one’s personal, busi­ ness or enterprise risk profile, an examination of total personal, property and liability risks is needed. Risk analysis affords the reviewer and other stakeholders the ability to assess and estimate perceived losses before they actually occur. A variety of stakeholders can benefit from the use of a risk assessment to iden­ tify gaps, implement strategies and determine challenges and obstacles they may face before an actual event unfolds. Within a global homeland security setting, risk analy­ sis may also be used to identify areas where mutual aid agreements may be necessary in order to sustain overall long-term, near-term and short-term operations. It should be noted, however, that not all risks can and should be avoided. It is impor­ tant to achieve an economic balance between what is reasonable, what is acceptable and what is tolerable. That is, some risks may pose such a small financial impact on an individual, small business, corporation or enterprise that the entity may choose to assume the risk. If estimated losses are perceived to be low, the entity may choose to assume the risk and thus, accept the consequences of the risk. One personal example

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of risk acceptance could be your choice of your computer’s password. If you are prompted to change your computer’s password today, you may consider whether you want to change your password or not. You will need to decide whether you want to choose your password now or wait until later, what password you will choose and the ultimate security of that password. You could decide to not do anything and forgo changing your password at all, but in doing so, you are accepting the risk if someone decided to illicitly hack your computer. At the business level, business owners and organizational representatives make risk analysis decisions daily regarding their information technology (IT) infrastructure. For example, when new threats and viruses are detected within a network, decisions need to be made regarding what protective measures, if any, should be put into place to prevent or mitigate opportunities for network disruption or network damage. What information will be allowed on the network, where it will be backed up and when are daily concerns for businesses. Oftentimes, we use a cost-benefit analysis when making financial decisions, allocating resources and/or deploying assets. 2.4.3 Cost-benefit analysis Cost-benefit analysis is a process whereby individuals, businesses or organizations evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of a particular decision or sets of decisions. In light of these considerations, you may stop and ponder both the risks and con­ sequences associated with not having full coverage insurance on your personal automobile. Practically speaking, you may ask yourself several questions including: (1) What is the likelihood that I will get into an accident? (2) How much money will it cost to replace my vehicle? (3) Am I willing to accept the consequences of not having full coverage insurance if I am in an accident? Each one of us make determinations of the likelihood of risk consequences on nearly a daily basis. However, the need to thoroughly assess risk exposure is needed to comprehensively plan and prepare for current and future events and their consequences. Risk analysis is supported by the core competencies of critical infrastructure pro­ tection. For example, when utilized properly, risk analysis can support incident com­ mander, executive and managerial decision-making. It is important conceptually as well to justify the creation and prioritization of services, resources and equipment in support of the homeland security enterprise. Moreover, it informs the selection of protective measures and mitigation strategies in support of its goals. Risk analysis is performed to develop and utilize metrics to establish goals and objectives. Thus, it affords the reprioritization of goals when past, present and/or future risks are reduced to an acceptable level. Finally, risk management, coupled with risk analysis, affords a common framework for the discussion and communi­ cation of apparent critical infrastructure risks. This communication structure may prove very effective in information sharing, collaboration and communication of risks impacting State, tribal, territorial, and local government officials, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel, Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs) and infra­ structure owners and operators. Through partnership building and networking, these relationships can be effectively maintained. Alternately, through public/private partnerships and the construction of mutual aid agreements, risks may be better mitigated. However, to optimize risk reduction strategies, data collection is needed

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that incorporates sector-specific entities to leverage the true strengths of these part­ nerships. Partnership building and networking are an important step toward solidi­ fying these relationships. Moreover, forging a common risk lexicon enables private/ public sector knowledge to thrive through building understanding. Risk analysis is a complex process that considers the balances, benefits, costs and compromises that are associated with the use of various tools and concepts. Moreover, there are various forms of mathematical expressions and/or statistical concepts that encompass risk analysis. Many of these concepts will be discussed later in this chapter. The selection of the most appropriate risk assessment models and techniques is imperative when examining systems, networks and critical infrastructure assets. Additionally, both identifying and recognizing the threat landscape requires prac­ titioners and academics alike to correctly and accurately apply threat, vulnerability, consequence information and statistical data in risk calculation and decision-making activities. Moreover, a vast understanding of important evaluation attributes to define risk, (i.e., security vs. risk analysis) across broader industry sectors is also required. Thus, through threat analysis collaboration, an accurate depiction of the overall threat landscape can be achieved. To provide the greatest benefit, risk analysis should be viewed within the context of strategic, tactical, policy and operational considerations. Examining risk within these contexts affords a multidimensional approach to risk analysis. 2.4.4 Risk exposure Limiting the exposure of risks is an important strategy that involves consulting a vari­ ety of stakeholders. In order to make a thorough assessment of known risks, vul­ nerabilities and exposures, it is necessary to quantify and qualify risks themselves. Quantifying risks involves determining the financial impacts of the risk’s occurrence. Since assets have a known value, financially determining the value of an asset is necessary to quantify the overall risk. Limiting exposures also involves examining the impact of disruptions, delays and the destruction of business assets. Probability of occurrence is another important factor when determining overall risk exposure. Contingency plans should be in place to limit risks and risk exposure across the home­ land security enterprise. Critical infrastructure and key resource protection require an ongoing review of risk exposures to best fortify the homeland security enterprise against the most common types of risks. Lastly, risk exposure is a complex concept that should be thoroughly examined. The various previously described dimensions of risk should be comprehensively explored to ensure that all probable personal, prop­ erty and liability risks are adequately assessed.

2.5 Risk measurement While a variety of both simple and complex risk measurement strategies exist, the strategy employed should be both quantifiable and appropriate for the entity being measured. Moreover, measuring risks requires an ongoing commitment to continu­ ally assess the overall function of operations. Probability of risks occurrence must be evaluated to determine the likelihood that either a natural or man-made event may occur.

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Risk, as a pillar of homeland security, may have first began to be constructed in 1792 when Marquis de Laplace, based on philosophical proofs, wrote his Theorie Anaytique des Probabilites (1902). Laplace established 10 primary principles concern­ ing probability. The following philosophies of his treatise are reprinted as follows: 1. Probability is defined as the ratio of the number of favorable cases to all possible cases. 2. If the cases are not equally possible, then the possibility is the sum of the possi­ bilities of each favorable case. 3. When the events are independent of each other, the probability of their simulta­ neous occurrence is the product of their separate probabilities. 4. If two events are dependent on each other, then the probability of the combined event is the product of the probability of the occurrence of the first event in the probability that the second event will occur given the occurrence of the first event. 5. If probability of a combined event of the first phase and that of the second phase is determined, then the second probability divided by the first is the probability of the expected event drawn from an observed event. 6. When an observed event is linked to a cause, the probability of the existence of the causes is the probability of the event resulting from the cause divided by the sum of the probabilities of all causes. 7. The probability that the possibility of an event falls within given limits is the sum of the fractions falling within these limits (as described in #6 above). 8. The definition of mathematical hope is the product of the potential gain in the probability of obtaining it. 9. In a series of probable events, of which some produce a benefit and the others a loss, we shall have the advantage that results from it by making a some of the products of the probability of each favorable event by the benefit that it pro­ duces, and subtracting from this sum of the products of the probability of each unfavorable event by the loss that is attached to it. If the second sum is greater than the first, the benefit becomes a loss and hope is changed to fear. 10. Moral hope is defined as the relation between its absolute value divided by the total assets of the involved entity. This principal deals with the relation of poten­ tial gain to potential loss and describes the basis for not exposing all assets to the same risk (Laplace, 1902). Laplace’s seminal works helped to establish the framework for assessing the like­ lihood that an event may occur. It should be noted, however, that identifying risks is not the same as assessing risks. When identifying risks, we recognize that a cer­ tain risk may have serious potential consequences. In assessing risk, we review the totality of those consequences in terms of their impacts on systems, organizations, businesses and governments. While on its face, these principles may appear abstract, they have particular relevance to the enterprise of homeland security and the study of probability. Even today, Laplace’s teachings are relevant to our understanding of probability in relation to 21st-century homeland security operations and risk measure­ ment. An enhanced interpretation of these theoretical principles can assist students to better understand their practical relevance within the context of homeland security. Moreover, these principles may prove important considerations when examining the

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overall risk measurement process. Laplace’s principles are further expounded upon below. Laplace’s principle #1 above is relevant to likelihood in terms of “favorable cases”, but in terms of natural disaster, man-made disasters or accidents, the most relevant cases are viewed within the context of unfavorable, thus undesirable cases. Additionally, while situational readiness is highly favorable in homeland security operations, probability is an equally important concept describing the likelihood, severity and frequency of the occurrence of an event, to inform where resources may be best utilized. Laplace’s principle #2 above relates to the concepts of security and an event’s occurrence. Since the likelihood of certain events is more probable than others, the occurrence of each event will not be equally possible. This relates to principle #1 in relation to more likely and less likely occurrences of specific types of events. It should be noted, however, that some events are more likely to occur in particular regions than in others, that is, wildfires in the state of California or Volcanos in the state of Hawaii. Laplace’s principle #3 above has specific applications to the need for redundancy in system operations to reduce the likelihood of overall system failure. Having backup systems, such as in the case of a nuclear facility to avoid a cataclysmic event, can significantly reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of the event. That is, it is highly unlikely that two systems would fail simultaneously if they work inde­ pendently of one another, as opposed to two systems that are dependent on one another to operate. Laplace’s principle #4 above describes the relationship of events when they are dependent upon one another. If the first event was to occur directly in connection with the second event, the likelihood that the second event will occur is higher than if the two events were to happen independent of one another. For example, the crime of murder occurred and the crime of arson was committed by the perpetrator in an attempt to conceal the initial crime. Laplace’s principle #5 above describes how when two events are combined for anal­ ysis, such as past and future events, past events cannot always accurately predict the occurrence of future events. However, the use of redundancy and backup systems can significantly reduce the consequences of occurrence of a future event. Laplace’s principle #6 above has specific relevance to the relationship between cause and effect. This principle discusses that while direct evidence is most compel­ ling in drawing conclusions, circumstantial evidence may also be used, but with less reliability. Laplace’s principle #7 above relates to confidence intervals. That is, the reporting of data that falls within certain limits within a statistical curve expressed in terms as a confidence coefficient or interval estimate. Moreover, confidence coefficient is expressed practically in terms of probability percentages, that is, 90%, 95%, 99%. Note: confidence coefficient should not be confused with probability, as it relates spe­ cifically to the replicability of results and certainty of findings of statistical analysis. Laplace’s principle #8 above describes how probability can be conveyed in both monetary, as well as probabilistic terms. This principle is important to homeland security planning in estimating potential financial losses. Laplace’s principle #9 above encapsulates the sentiment that risk is involved in everything we do. Moreover, risk solutions should involve the incorporation of

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redundancy capabilities as well as a thorough cost-benefit analysis. Appropriate redundancy systems and equipment may significantly reduce the likelihood of both human and monetary losses. Laplace’s principle #10 above relates that the total assets of the actual entity at risk observed can be communicated in term of potential gains versus potential losses. That is, if the entity is large and assets are plentiful, it may be less necessary to protect against threats that are ordinary, routine and have minimal impact(s) on operations. Appling basic principles gleaned from Laplace’s quartets can assist scholars and practitioners in better understanding the complexities of risk measurement. 2.5.1 Risk management “Risk management is the process for identifying, analyzing, and communicating risk and accepting, avoiding, transferring, or controlling it to an acceptable level consid­ ering associated costs and benefits of any actions taken (DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010b)”. While exploring the various dimensions of risk management as they pertain to the homeland security enterprise, it is important to achieve a healthy balance between risk perception and risk tolerance. 2.5.2 Risk perception Risk perception refers to the perception of a risk’s likely occurrence (probability). Risk tolerance refers to an individual or organization’s tolerance to either accept or try to avoid a specific risk, or a combination of multiple risks. Oftentimes, statistical analysis is needed to determine the appropriate level of risk to assess whether risk avoidance or risk acceptance/tolerance should be the ultimate goal. The transference of risk, that is, through the use of insurance, is often a risk acceptance/tolerance strat­ egy to ensure against some, but not all probable and possible risks. Risk management is a complex process with two overarching functions: (1) Risk communication and (2) Risk management cycle. Both risk communication and risk management cycle are inherent concepts of the risk management process itself. These terms will be discussed in the next section. Understanding how these concepts relate to decision-making, implementation and strategy decisions, deployment of assets and risk mitigation and risk reduction are important considerations in conducting appropriate threat assessment vulnerability assessment and consequence assessment instruments. Additionally, risk should be viewed through the lenses of international, national, regional and local contexts. The process may best be viewed through observance of common strategies relating to risk including risk communication, risk identification, risk analysis and assessment and risk management strategy.

2.6 Decision-making theory Decision-making as an interdisciplinary theory draws its roots from a variety of intel­ lectual discipline including, but not limited to mathematics, sociology, psychology, economics and political science (Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006). Moreover, in com­ plex dynamic environments, decision-making should be viewed both contextually

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and psychologically, given time, mental (computational) and economical limitations (Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006). In the work entitled Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox, Gigerenzer and Selten (2001) describe the working relationship between risks and uncertainty and the need for both heuristics and intuition in support of rational decision-making. Moreover, the authors discuss how decisions containing elements of uncertainty and risk require both adoptive tools and “ecological rationality” to interpret what he described as “bounded rationality” (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001). Gigerenzer and Selten (2001) assert that complex calculations, in and of themselves, do not account for heuristic and environmental factors needed to implement intuitive decision-making. Thus, beyond the use of computational strategies in the risk management process, an interdisciplinary approach to decision-making may also positively affect risk man­ agement discussions. This may prove to be especially true for domestic and global homeland security-oriented decision-making. 2.6.1 Choice and uncertainty In 1738, Daniel Bernoulli, a Swiss mathematician and physicist, published the paper titled Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk (Bernoulli, 1954). In this influential work, Bernoulli provides a solution to a shipping problem through apply­ ing a concept known as expected utility, a more common financial utility issuance calculation. The solution was initially generated to solve the St. Petersburg paradox, derived from the St Petersburg game, where a coin is flipped until it comes up heads, resulting in the player winning two dollars. If the coin lands on heads successively, the player continues to win, $2, $4 and $8, respectively. The question this game poses is—How much should a player risk for a single play of the game? Since the relationship between choice and uncertainty is a true dilemma in home­ land security scenarios, a paradox exists between (1) How much preparation and resources should be brought to bear to deal with a potential event? and (2) What finan­ cial allocations should be brought to support them? These are key considerations in homeland security—enterprise risk management planning and prioritization. That withstanding, an examination of how, where, when and under what circumstances resources could and should be used is an important step in prioritization. 2.6.2 The risk management process The risk management process is often displayed as a cylindrical process that char­ acterizes important actions steps necessary to manage risks. Van der Waal and Versluis (2017) developed a model of the risk management process with A.F. de Wild that described the organizational decision-making, planning and prioritization. The model can be used in a stepwise fashion to establish priorities and objectives, as well as identify and assess respond and monitor risks. The model can be interpreted as six linear steps as follows: Step one: Set objectives. In step one, the user sets common goals/objectives estab­ lished through collaboration with stakeholders. Step two: Identify risks. Step two involves a process of thoughtfully identifying both known and possible risks.

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Step three: Assess impact and likelihood. In this step, a careful and comprehensive review is needed to assess possible consequences and impact from the likelihood of an event’s occurrence. Step four: Prioritize risks. Prioritization involves categorizing risks in terms of actions that should be taken immediately through actions that can be performed at a later date. Risk prioritization will be based on the risk’s likelihood and impact. This step involves planning to adequately and reasonably address what resources and allocations are necessary. Step five: Respond to and measure risks. In step five, resources are deployed to respond to prioritize risks in a timely and strategic fashion. Step six: Monitoring risks. Risk monitoring involves continually assessing possible risks to determine: (1) If currently prioritize risks are being managed reasonably and (2) If the risk profile has changed, and if so, should the process start over again at step one. Effective collaboration and communication are both necessary to move from one step to another without becoming stuck on any particular step. Moreover, there is no pre­ scribed time frame to move from one step to another. It is also important to note, however, that decision-making within a risk management content is often nonbinary. That is, it is not based on wrong or right, but instead is based on judgments of multiple stakeholders and a shared mission and vision. 2.6.3 Risk communication Risk communication is a bifurcated process involving both the perceived risk itself and the tolerance for the risk, whether actual or perceived. That is, the likelihood that the risk may occur and the potential consequences in terms of loss of human life, property or other infrastructural damage. In managing risks within the homeland security environment, precise and unam­ biguous language is needed to: (1) process risk information, (2) communicate risk information, (3) analyze and aggregate risk information (DHS, 2008). Thus, the DHS has established a risk lexicon framework to provide key terminology to be used by the homeland security risk community. This framework may be used to support an integrated risk management language to facilitate a clear exchange of information and promote greater interoperability among and between risk practitioners and other stakeholders (DHS, 2008). Moreover, this common language may prove to improve communications regarding risk and risk-related concepts. The framework itself synthesizes and applies relevant terminology identified through the following documents: • • • • • • •

Unclassified Homeland Security Presidential Directives National Strategy for Homeland Security National Strategy for Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace DHS Strategic Plan—Securing Our Homeland National response framework National incident management system

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National infrastructure protection plan Integrated planning system Grant guidance for the homeland security grant program, port security grant program, transit security grant program and other only in security grants Homeland security exercise and evaluation program policy and guidance (DHS, 2008).

Utilization of the above documents affords users the opportunity to examine policy and procedures consistent within U.S. homeland security operations, as well as to process and communicate risk information while observing aggregate risks.

2.7 Department of homeland security risk management process A comprehensive view of the risk management process requires a thorough investi­ gation of possible threats, vulnerabilities and consequences of potential attacks or disasters. As such, an effective risk management plan begins with appropriately iden­ tifying risks and assessing their possible consequences. In terms of vulnerabilities, the process should assess weaknesses that may make threats more possible and likely. Since resources are limited across jurisdictions, it is imperative to identify and manage likely risks that impact the homeland security enterprise at all levels. The first step of the DHS (2011) risk management process begins with defining the context of the risk scenario. Second, the process requires that potential risks be identified. Third, poten­ tial risks must be assessed and analyzed to determine their possible consequences. Fourth, alternatives should be developed and examined to address these risks. Fifth, a plan of action should be decided upon and implemented. Sixth, continuous and ongo­ ing evaluation and monitoring of the process should occur to ensure the effectiveness of the risk mitigation strategy. The importance of ongoing communication among and between various stakeholders at the national, state, regional, local and tribal levels in concert with additional public and private partners is essential. This communication is imperative in order to maintain the effectiveness of the process. The ever-evolving threat landscape requires a dynamic assessment process that is adaptable and can account for new information, rapidly changing conditions and new and emerging threats. In this vein, the homeland security enterprise should oper­ ate from a global perspective and consider not only national, but transnational and multinational threats. Figure 2.7 presented above provides a mechanism for analyz­ ing and evaluating risks that impact individual stakeholders and groupings of stake­ holders as a whole. Moreover, the above model assists in addressing risk in order of priority. The interdependency of the homeland security enterprise can best be served through effective communication strategies that disseminate and make available information that can assist in protecting overall homeland security operations. Rather than shar­ ing information from merely a top-down or bottom-up approach, models for commu­ nication should be multidimensional and provide for an open dialogue and open lines of communication with all stakeholders throughout the risk management process. As with any effective risk management process, primary goals should be centric to the prevention of, protection against and mitigation of the most likely risks. Although an all-hazards approach is best, the likelihood of some risks may be more realistic within certain locations, localities or regions. Therefore, localized risk assessments

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are needed to weigh the costs and consequences of these risks. Thus, assessing the seriousness of risk consequences is an important step toward determining where pri­ oritization efforts should begin. 2.7.1 Assessing the seriousness of risks Assessing the seriousness of risks effectively requires the use of appropriate tools and instruments. Prioritization to protect and manage critical infrastructural assets and key resources is also necessary to provide for their protection. Through determining loss potential, and other collateral consequences of a threat’s occurrence, decision makers can estimate the potential impact of both the frequency of loss and the overall severity of losses. Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationships between frequency of loss and severity of loss in terms of the loss magnitude as low, medium or high. Decisions have consequences both good and bad. In the evolving and highly adaptable homeland security environment, rapid decision-making is quite common. Decision makers attempt to make the best decisions they can based on all available information. Accurately processing and interpreting information is an important step toward appropriate decision-making. In risk-based scenarios, it is possible that no one decision may appear to be the obvious good choice. Therefore, assessing an event’s impact in terms of severity of loss and frequency of loss can help to quickly determine the effective strategy or control necessary to prevent, avoid, assume or transfer the anticipated risk. Loss prevention and loss reduction are the primary goals of all riskbased scenarios. When deciding on a relevant course of action, decision makers can utilize a contin­ uum of pure uncertainty to complete certainty to assess the impact of probability on choice selection. In decision-making, it is important to ascertain as much information as practically possible to make as informed a decision as one can. Theoretically, this exercise can assist to recognize the importance of information gathering and intelli­ gence seeking activities to make the most informed decision possible based on rele­ vant, reliable and available data. The probabilistic model integrates random variables, coupled with probability dis­ tribution, to model the event or phenomenon expected to occur. This model considers

Figure 2.1 Severity of event’s impact-decision matrix.

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30 Brian Harte that it is impossible to accurately account for every factor in any given situation. In the deterministic model, the parameter values of the model are predetermined, as well as the initial conditions. Concepts of pure uncertainty and ignorance relate to having no knowledge to support a fact or conclusion. It is important to recognize that, in order to be credible, information examined must have a factual basis and be more than just mere assertions or suppositions. In life, oftentimes we are confronted with the realization that “we do not know, what we do not know”. Therefore, a state of ignorance, or the inability to recognize a fact, as a fact, may impede accurate and timely decision-making. Thus, where possible, information should be confirmed and triangulated to determine its factual authenticity. Preserving this process may assist decision makers to not jump to judgments, absent of all necessary facts. While it may not be possible to gather all facts in any given situation before a decision is ren­ dered, theoretical models of this type may assist to provide a strong foundation for decision-making. Figure 2.2 provides a tool to estimate the impact of risk and probability. The fol­ lowing tool discusses risk and probability based on a range of low risk situations to high risk situations. Utilizing this theoretical tool, practitioners and academics alike can assess whether planning, action or no action may be necessary based on perceived impact of the event. In interpreting Figure 2.2, it is essential to recognize that the interrelationship between risk and probability is a very important one. Numerical designations are frequently used to estimate the impact of risks and their probability of occurrence. Quantifying these risks through the use of a scale can assist to represent action steps needed based on a continuum of both probability and impact. Moreover, the use of a continuum represented as a scale, such as seen in Figure 2.3, can help the user to conceptualize multiple risk and action relationships. Risks that carry the “highest level of probability”, can be perceived as highly likely. These risks may be numerically represented as a four (4) or a five (5) (on a scale of 0 to 5). Risks that are most likely can be numerically represented as a three (3). Risks that are likely could be categorized as a two (2). Risks that are not likely could be

Figure 2.2 Estimating the impact of an event utilizing probability and impact indicators.

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Figure 2.3 Global risk profile.

categorized as a one (1), and risks that are rare in their occurrence, or may never occur, could be assigned a value of zero (0). As illustrated in Figure 2.3, risks with a very low probability and very low impact would require an assessment of the costs of avoiding the risk versus accepting the risk, that is, risks numerically designated as a zero (0) or one (1). Alternately, if the prob­ ability of the risk is very high, and the impact of the risk is very high (i.e., designated as a 4 or 5 on a scale of 0 to 5), then comprehensive contingency plans need to be established and immediate action will need to be taken to create a reasonable level of assurance that the risk can be appropriately managed or mitigated. Risks that reach a threshold of three (3) on a scale of 0 to 5 will need to be evaluated to determine if the risk should be protected against or assumed. If the goal is to protect against the event, a cost-benefit analysis should be conducted to determine the costs necessary to provide a reasonable level of protection in preparation for the event. It is important to denote that while comprehensive planning and appropriate resource allocation and management can assist to lessen an event’s impact, not all events are completely avoidable. Therefore, it is important to devise strategies to lessen the impact of the event’s consequences, while building resiliency and recovery capabilities to withstand the event. Figure 2.3 provides a graphical depiction of a global risk profile to determine global impact utilizing color schemes. This method can assist to identify the projected impact of specific events, based on the event’s criticality. Categorizing impact and risk based on situational determinants may prove advantageous for homeland security practitioners, academics and other professionals alike. Moreover, this method affords the affiliate, local, regional, state, federal or global user to prioritize planning efforts against the most probable (likely) events. Note: It is important to view critical event planning and prioritization in terms of both a historical context and a future-oriented context. That is, review the past to assist in planning for the future. While many risk management tools use numerical designators for each category to quantify the level of risk, the above profile intends to inform the reader by providing a simple matrix for categorizing risks in order to prioritize resources, personnel and partnerships. Furthermore, this matrix may assist to categorize an event’s level of risk in terms of its perceived impact. Determining the appropriate risk appetite for

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the entity concerned about an event’s occurrence is imperative in assessing what the level of risk tolerance will be for the entity. Since there is interdependence and interconnectedness across all levels within the homeland security enterprise, risk tolerance should be discussed with a variety of stakeholders to ensure that minimal levels of risk assurance are maintained to support the system as a whole.

2.8 Enterprise risk management Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) as defined by the Committee of Sponsored Organizations (COSO) is “a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, man­ agement and other personnel, applied in strategy-setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risks to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives (COSO, 2004, p. 2)”. Each entity must assess what their risk appetite should be. Moreover, the establishment of priorities, mission and objective parame­ ters may be fully explored utilizing the COSO framework. 2.8.1 The Committee of Sponsored Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) The Committee of Sponsored Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Framework was established in 1992 with the purpose of providing businesses with an internal control framework for risk management to identify, assess and improve the con­ trol of internal processes (COSO, 2004). This framework functions as an internal mecha­ nism for organizations to improve their internal control and decision-making processes. “The COSO is a voluntary private-sector organization, established in the United States, dedicated to providing guidance to executive management and governance entities on critical aspects of organizational governance, business ethics, internal control, enterprise risk management, fraud, and financial reporting (Iowa State University, 2018)”. COSO’s concept of ERM can be used within the homeland security enterprise to theoretically conceptualize ERM relationships. With a goal of leverag­ ing a process to define mission, vision and core values to enhance performance, the COSO Integrated Framework strategically assesses risks to strategy and performance goals (COSO, 2017). One distinct benefit of using an established risk-management framework as illus­ trated in Figure 2.4 is the adherence to a methodology for effective risk management. The cube illustration above provides a multifaceted view of the dimensions of risk across a variety of categories including its: (1) strategic, (2) operational, (3) reporting and (4) compliance domains. The face of the cube model indicates the internal environment the entity operates within and establishes the: (1) objective setting, (2) event identification, (3) risk assessment, (4) risk response, (5) control activities, (6) information and communication and (7) monitoring activities. While the model is presented from a business perspective, its use as a model for the enterprise of home­ land security is appropriate. From a homeland security perspective, a wholistic model of risk management should include a multilevel, multidimensional perspective that examines priorities, objectives, risk control, communication and compliance moni­ toring activities. The right face of the cube can assist in explaining the relationships between and among all levels of homeland security jurisdictions and private sector

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Figure 2.4 COSO enterprise risk management cube.1

elements. Understanding the complexities of the risk and control environment can assist in strategy, prioritization and resource allocation. 2.8.2 Risk measurement fundamentals The DHS (2011) established a homeland security risk management doctrine delineat­ ing the fundamentals of risk management. The purpose of this document was to pro­ vide a comprehensive approach to risk management that viewed risks in the context of internal sources, external sources and key practices. Additionally, risk communi­ cation strategies in the risk management process define the context, risk potential and assessment and analysis risk strategies. One main function of this document was to assist users to implement risk management strategies to effectively evaluate and mon­ itor probable and possible risks. While this instrument is not meant to be a substitute for innovation or independent thought regarding these topics, this document outlines items of concern that helped to shape issues that impact the operating environment. It is recommended that homeland security practitioners weigh the practicality of this document against their own experience to consider how, when and where this infor­ mation is most applicable (DHS, 2011). This document has five primary goals, as follows: • • •

to promote a common understanding of, and approach to, risk management; to establish organizational practices that should be followed by DHS components; to provide a foundation for conducting risk assessments and evaluating risk man­ agement options;

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34 Brian Harte • •

to set the doctrinal underpinning for institutionalizing a risk management culture through consistent application and training on risk management principles and practices; to educate and inform homeland security stakeholders in risk management applica­ tions including the assessment of capability, program and operational performance, and the use of such assessments for resource and policy decisions (DHS, 2011, p. 2).

This document helps to establish the risk management lexicon for federal intera­ gency partners, state and local agencies, and the larger homeland security commu­ nity (DHS, 2011). Since there are a myriad of potential homeland security threats, a complete guide for assessing future risks is not possible. However, this instru­ ment assists in clarifying risks to increasingly intricate and interconnected critical infrastructure systems, as a means to anticipate the cascading effects of known and evolving threats. In terms of the overall threat landscape, the homeland security environment has many complexities and challenges that contribute to both external and internal risks. “Compounding this complexity is the fact that future trends—such as technological advancements, global climate change, asymmetric threats, and the evolving nature of Nation-states—have the potential to significantly alter the homeland security risk landscape in unexpected ways (DHS, 2011, p.7)”. Living within the dynamic and uncertain world that we do, disruptions within sys­ tems and connections that facilitate homeland security functions can have unantici­ pated cascading effects throughout our nation. 2.8.3 Capabilities-based planning Capabilities-based planning is an important consideration for assessing an entities operational readiness, as well as its capacity to operate throughout the phases of an event, that is, response, recovery and mitigation. Smaller entities with fewer resources within the homeland security enterprise may become quickly overwhelmed during a critical incident. Therefore, proper risk assessment and measurement and con­ trol strategies require all impacted or potentially impacted entities to plan for both expected and unexpected events. The true measure of an entity’s readiness is its sustainment of operations through­ out an event’s duration to operate in the short-term, near-term and long-term. With an ultimate goal of resiliency building, the enterprise of homeland security should remain scalable in its approach to homeland protection, while also placing safeguards within the system to avoid cataclysmic system break downs and failures. This can only be accomplished through cooperative system-wide efforts to support the homeland security enterprise. While threat-based planning starts with risk assessment, it is essential to consider the current capabilities and the entity being protected. 2.8.4 Strategic national risk assessment (SNRA) The Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA), established through Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD 8), “calls for the creation of a National Preparedness Goal, a

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Preparedness System and a National Preparedness Report” to “strengthen the secu­ rity and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risks to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics and catastrophic natural disasters (DHS, 2015, p. 1)”. The SNRA has three primary goals: • • •

To identify high risk factors that supported development of the core capabilities and capability targets in the National Preparedness Goal; To support the development of collaborative thinking about strategic needs across prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery requirements and To promote the ability for all levels of Government to share common under­ standing and awareness of National threats and hazards and resulting risks so that they are ready to act and can do so independently but collaboratively (DHS, 2015, p. 1).

The document calls for a strategic and deliberate effort to effectively establish capa­ bilities to withstand incidents that pose critical threats to the United States. Through examining various threats and hazards, this document establishes threat/hazard groups responsible for planning and incident preparation activities across the areas of (1) natural, (2) technological/accidental and (3) adversarial/human caused events, respectively (DHS, 2015). Thresholds were established by the DHS to determine what incidents would qual­ ify as a nation-wide level event (DHS, 2015). It is important to denote that while the current SNRA does not address environmental, economic, social and political trends, these trends are anticipated to appear in the next iteration of the SNRA (DHS, 2015).

2.9 Summary and conclusions As this chapter has illustrated, risk is a foundational pillar of homeland security. Within the enterprise of homeland security, preparedness efforts are needed to iden­ tify capabilities, capacities and resilience across all elements and levels of the nation as a system. In this vein, comprehensive risk and probability tools, coupled with strategic mitigation and control strategies and policies, are needed to assist in this process. Decision-making cannot occur within a vacuum. Therefore, the various actors within the homeland security enterprise must operate from a common framework and a shared operational perspective. A commitment to “systemness” must permeate all facets of homeland security operations. This chapter provides an overview of some of the tools that can be used to facilitate the risk measurement process. While the scope and usage of risk assessment tools vary across academic disciplines, the examples provided herein represent tools that may be used for rapid decision-making devoid of the use of calculations or advanced statistical methods. It is important to denote that the system of homeland security operations must determine and establish its priorities in order to effectively devise a comprehensive plan that can meet the need of a variety of stakeholders. Only through collaboration, effective lines of communication and cooperation, can the system truly reach its full potential.

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2.10 Discussion questions 1. Describe challenges of assessing risk in the homeland security environment. 2. Discuss the purpose and uses of risk assessment techniques within a homeland security context. 3. Explain mitigation and control strategies relevant within homeland security operations. 4. Identify the components and key deliverables of the SNRA. 5. Describe how risk and probability are important concepts for homeland secu­ rity planning. 6. Discuss how homeland security operations and strategies use (depend on) risk analysis principles.

Note 1. Source: COSO Model for Internal Controls Based Upon the Enterprise Risk Manage­ ment Integrated Framework Model Developed by the Committee of Sponsoring Organi­ zations of the Treadway Commission by permission.

References Bernoulli, D. (1954). Evolution of a new theory on the measurement of risk (reprint). Econometrica, 22(1). 23–36. Buchanan, L., & O’Connell, A. (2006). A brief history on decision making. Harvard Business Review, 84(1), 32. Committee of Sponsored Organizations of the Treadway Commission. (2004). Enterprise risk management: Integrated framework. Retrieved from https://www.coso.org/Documents/ COSO-ERM-Executive-Summary.pdf Committee of Sponsored Organizations of the Treadway Commission. (2017). Guidance on enterprise risk management. Retrieved from https://www.coso.org/Pages/erm.aspx Department of Homeland Security. (2006). Risk analysis for fiscal year 2006 homeland security grants. Risk Management Division and DHS Office of Grants and Training. Department of Homeland Security. (2008). DHS risk lexicon. Retrieved from https://www.dhs. gov/dhs-risk-lexicon Department of Homeland Security. (2011). Risk management fundamentals: Homeland security management doctrine. Retrieved from: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ rma-risk-management-fundamentals.pdf Department of Homeland Security. (2015). Strategic national risk assessment (SNRA). Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/strategic-national-risk-assessment-snra Gigerenzer, G., & Selten, R. (2001). Bounded rationality: The adaptive toolbox. MIT Press. Head, B. W. (2019). Forty years of wicked problems literature: Forging closer links to policy studies. Policy and Society, 38(2), 180–197. Iowa State University. (2018). COSO. Retrieved from https://www.internalaudit.iastate.edu/ internal-controls/coso Laplace, P.S. (1902). A philosophical essay on probabilities. Translated by Frederick Wilson Truscott and Frederick Lincoln Emory, New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. Nutley, S. M., Walter, I., & Davies, H.T.O. (2007). Using evidence: How research can inform public service. Bristol, United Kingdom: The Policy Press.

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Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. (2010). Quadrennial homeland security review report. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2010-qhsr­ executive-summary.pdf Rittle, H. W. J., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Developments in design methodology. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. Van der Waal, D., & Versluis, V. (2017). Introduction to risk management: Main principles of the risk management process. Retrieved from http://www.perm.lv/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ PermIntroToRM.pdf

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The sociology of security Terrence O’Sullivan

Description: Notions of security encompass sets of understandings of how the world works and cultural perceptions of uncertainty and indeterminacy, security and inse­ curity. Security is an ever-shifting, culturally grounded concept about safety and potential disruption of normalcy that ultimately guides almost everything in human societies. Sociology is a pillar of homeland security theory that guides strategy, oper­ ations and structure. It does this by helping understand how people, institutions and societies define and prioritize various securities, and where, how and why security threats may emerge. This chapter addresses sociological and historical roots of vary­ ing concepts of security among various demographic groups, ideologies, experts and current security risk perception around the world. Upon successful completion of this chapter, student should be able to: 1. Describe how the definition of security changes across social groups, institu­ tions or nations. 2. Describe the relationship between social security and uncertainty. 3. Explain how the sociology of security can impact the political process and one’s understanding of democracy. 4. Describe how the sociology of security is influenced by (or influences) interper­ sonal notions of privacy, trust and governmental or corporate power. 5. Compare and contrast the social definition of national security in the Cold War era (post World War II) to the prevailing current concept of security in a post 9/11 era. 6. Understand how sociology relates to homeland security strategy, operations and structure.

3.1 Introduction This chapter addresses the importance of a key pillar of homeland security, the soci­ ological understanding of varying ways societies and groups of individuals think about and frame security and insecurity—the common or competing risk percep­ tions of people and institutions existing simultaneously, at multiple levels of analysis (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2017; Rothschild, 1995). Sociology is “the scientific study of society, including patterns of social relationships, social interaction, and culture” (Calhoun, 2002). Humans are social animals, and security is a powerful, emotional, socially con­ structed phenomenon, that historically had more influence than any other issue over

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virtually every aspect of societal organization and human interactions (Wæver, 2010; Wendt, 1999)—or the “dominant ordering principle in social life” (Bajc, 2013). And from a theoretical and practical perspective, sociology analyzes broad societal pri­ orities and dynamics that can help shape homeland security strategy, operations and structure. Security framing and response can inspire the best in people, or be invoked as a manipulative, even demagogic rhetorical or institutional bludgeon, inciting fear, panic and extremism to justify terrorism, oppression, state authoritarianism, milita­ rism and even genocide. The traditional national security framing is oriented toward militaries, the existen­ tial survival of nation-states, and external national interest. In contrast, nontradi­ tional human security approach—”a person-centered axis of freedom from fear, from want and [the right to] to live with dignity” (Estrada-Tanck, 2016)—embraces a more nuanced, complex societal security, with multiple securitized issues, including health, the environment and economic prosperity (Bajc & De Lindt, 2011; Buzan, Wæver, Wæver, & De Wilde, 1998). People tend to adopt perspectives that most reflect their immediate self-interest— and/or that of their family, trusted leaders, media, the bureaucratic organizations they work for, etc. The social psychologically literature on social contagion theory has found collective emotions and behavior can spread like a virus through groups. Social contagion can be positive and reassuring, prompting beneficial behaviors (like good public health practices in a pandemic, generosity and tolerance.). But it can also lead to irrational, intolerant and sometimes even violent views and behavior—as with mobs or radical extremist movements (Christakis & Fowler, 2013), and in the age of social media, especially in times of stress, foster globalized radicalization and politi­ cal extremism.1 Depending on their societal perspectives, academic scholars, security practition­ ers and average citizens may have very different, diverse, often shifting security risk perception, including threats from nations, nonstate terrorism, antibiotic resistance, nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, economic distress (income inequality, job and resource security), refugees and immigration, bigotry (race, gen­ der, religion, other), cybersecurity, ethno-nationalism, threats to democracies from authoritarianism and two of the biggest global threats in our lifetimes—pandemics like 2020’s COVID disaster and ongoing global climate crisis. The sociological roots of some of these perceived security threats will be discussed below, as will the direct conceptual and practical correlation among traditional secu­ rity, human security, environmental security and homeland security. Societal security has been described not only as more than survival, but also as “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats” (Wæver, 1993, 2010). The following are just some of the ways security risk perception varies across and within societies, and the ways this helps shape homeland security strategy, operations and structure.

3.2 Terrorism and the 21st century Terrorism has been among the top security fears common to most Western (and many other) nations since before the U.S. September 2001 al Qaeda terrorist attacks— shaped by various pivotal radical Islamist terrorism and domestic extremist attacks around the world. Terrorism was Americans’ number one security concern after the

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September 11th attacks (Bellavita, 2008, 2011)—although in ensuing years, that was replaced by Hurricane Katrina (2005), a massive economic downturn (2008–10), and multiple additional major catastrophic disasters such as the SARS-coronavirus-22 have at least for now led terrorism to be less of a priority. 3.2.1 Basic human needs People’s basic needs constitute human security at the most fundamental level, such as avoiding job losses, health problems, homelessness, threats from war, water stress, malnutrition or starvation. Relatively stable or prosperous democratic societies will tend to focus on improving citizens’ well-being, but in any society, being deprived of basic needs can lead to political and social instability, and a trigger for securitization. This can lead to weak or failed states, violent extremism and cross-border resource competition-related wars. One illustration of this dynamic is the countries of Western Europe—devastated after World War II, with at-risk populations and little surviving infrastructure, they were all unstable in varying ways, and vulnerable to domestic extremism and author­ itarianism. Many decades later, after a long process of recovery and economic inte­ gration aid in part by American security-motivated investments and aid, the (still relatively unified) European Union (EU) deals with common social standards and regulations, collectively addressing economic security issues. These nations and their governments have given up some of their national sovereignty in exchange for mem­ bership in the collective institutions of both the EU (for economic security) and the military/defense-oriented joint North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), even as each nation within the EU and NATO has both common interests and their own par­ ticular security concerns (Urwin, 2014). 3.2.2 Geographic (regional, national, international) variations on security concerns Security risk perception varies widely across societies and subgroups. A 2018 poll of 26 nations’ views on security showed that many countries’ populations consider U.S., Chinese and Russian power and influence to be among the top global security threats. The collective fear of U.S. power and influence (45%) was a ten-point increase from 2013—greater than Russia (36% overall) and China (35%) in the countries surveyed. German and French negative views of U.S. power (both 49%) increased 30 points from 2013 to 2018; Mexicans’ by 26%. Israel, Hungary and Poland had the least concern about American influence. The countries most concerned about China’s power and influence were South Korea (82%) and Japan (66%), while Americans most believed Russia (50%) was a major security threat (Poushter & Huang, 2019). Interestingly, as an example, even though climate (change) disruption concerns vary across nations they were still among the most serious perceived global 2018 security threats, especially in the European Union. For instance, 83% of French respondents listed climate change as the top security threat (despite prominent terrorist attacks in recent years), and Greece 90%. Whereas in the United States, with one of its major political parties that is skeptical of anthropomorphic climate change, climate was third (59%) in the rankings of most important security concerns

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(behind cyber-attacks and ISIS, and close to the North Korea threat) (Monmouth University Polling Institute, 2018; Poushter & Huang, 2019). 3.2.3 Economic security and class disparities Economic class issues—income/wealth disparities among and within even wealthy nations—are security concerns in the present era of globalization and global eco­ nomic distress, which are often precursors to societal instability, and thus potential homeland security-level threats. Globally, income inequality has been rising since the beginning of neoliberal, free market-based “trickle-down” economic theories and practice came into favor in the 1980s. This was further magnified in the 2008 “Great Recession” global economic downturn—the worst since the 1929 Great Depression (as of this writing), and the gathering, increasingly severe COVID pandemic public health “lock-down”-related recession in 2020.3 Economists have shown that large wealth gaps between rich and poor both reduces economic growth and is histori­ cally destabilizing for democracies (Dabla-Norris, Kochhar, Suphaphiphat, Ricka, & Tsounta, 2015; Jones, 2015). A majority of nations’ populations listed global economic conditions as a top secu­ rity concern (Poushter & Huang, 2019). In the United States most of the postrecession “recovery” went to the wealthiest 10% of Americans. Thirty trillion dollars—nearly a third of all then U.S. wealth—was newly created and distributed to the richest 10% after 2008, and by 2019 three American billionaires owned as much as half the American public (Buchheit, 2018). The level of social mobility fell precipitously: An American child’s chance of earning more than his or her parents has plummeted from 90% in 1940 to 50% (Chetty et al., 2017), even before the COVID recession. Nearly 20% of American children are at risk of hunger, and U.S. infant mortality rate is the highest, and life expectancy lowest, among the 35 richest countries (Illing, 2019). The United States and other Western countries’ middle classes have been hollowed out as well-paying jobs were sent overseas or replaced by automation (McGrath, 2016). Wealthier, mostly white Americans have continued to see trillions in wealth redis­ tributed to themselves through the stock market and 2018 tax cuts under the GOP Congress and Trump administration), even as federal deficits ballooned (Graetz, 2018), also subsequently from over $3 trillion in 2020 COVID crisis economic bailouts (Cornwell & Zengerle, 2020). 3.2.4 Ideological and political variations in risk perception Ideological orientation and party affiliation can significantly influence security per­ spectives and behavior, and thus Homeland Security strategy and operations. Social and/or economic conservatives and liberals frequently diverge on domestic (and some­ times international) priorities—far more complex than a linear left–right ideological spectrum. Far right libertarians (e.g., Sovereign Citizens) and left (anarchists) believe government is a threat, while others believe in “big” authoritarian government (e.g., Nazism/fascism/religious theocracy vs. communism). In 2019, for example, several far-right parties made considerable gains in Europe, illustrated by EU Parliament elections, where Hungary, Denmark, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria all ended

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with right wing nationalists party representation over 20%, and nine far-right parties formed a new bloc, called Identity and Democracy (ID) (BBC News, 2019). American security views on crime, immigration, gun control and climate change have become ideological issues of tribalist, partisan loyalty (Milman & Harvey, 2019). Developing since the 1980s, these trends accelerated during the presiden­ cies of Barack Obama and Donald Trump (Dunlap, 2019; Dunlap, McCright, & Yarosh, 2016). American conservatives have become increasingly fearful of crime and immigrants, in part because of right wing media. Conservatives believe overall crime rates are higher than ever (Azarian, 2016), even though violent (and other) crime dropped by a third between 1998 and 2017 (Norman, 2018). Conservatives (19% of Americans) believe immigrants responsible for disproportionate rates of crime, though studies show undocumented immigrants commit fewer crimes per capita than the general U.S. population (Farley, 2018), and 77% of Americans believe immigrants are not a security threat (Da Silva, 2019). This issue played a role in the vociferous political debate about amnesty for undocumented immi­ grants, President Trump’s vilification of immigrants, and efforts to “build a wall” along the Mexico-U.S. border—using “reallocated” military and DHS/TSA resources (Tackett, 2019). Self-identifying Christian white supremacists have historically defended—often violently, as in the case of Oklahoma bomber Timothy McVeigh—their self-perceived “white” cultural and racial purity. Many believe allowing or promoting interethnic marriage and children is an effort at “replacement” or “white genocide”. Some white Christian hyper-nationalists are even now preparing for a violent racial holy war (RaHoWa) against people of color, Muslims, Jews and liberals who support U.S. pluralism and diversity, to take back their perceived former status (ADL, 2019). For example, even terrorism fears can have a racial bias, as some studies indicate. White Americans tend to associate terrorism with Muslims, and people of Middle Eastern origin, yet do not apply that label to ideologically or religiously radical white people who commit the same acts even though, as noted, white right-wing terrorism has been a much larger domestic threat in the United States (Jones, 2018). 3.2.4.1 Environmental, ideological, and generational intersections Environmental and climate disruption are often generationally, ideologically diver­ gent issues, influenced heavily by corporate wealth and influence peddling. For exam­ ple, the United States is among the only Western countries with a major political party that denies climate change. 96% of U.S. Democrats saw “aggressive action” against climate change as the top policy issue for any 2020 candidate (Corbett, 2019); while among “very right-wing” Americans, 52% believed global warming a “hoax”—rein­ forced by prominent right-wing Republican leadership’s continued assertions of the same science-denying conspiracy theory (Milman & Harvey, 2019). Nevertheless, some Republicans have also slowly become more in favor of climate action, even if their political leadership had generally not (Friedman, 2019; Monmouth University Polling Institute, 2018). Younger people have far more to lose from climate catastrophe, and polls demon­ strate this divide, with 65% affirming the climate consensus (it is happening, and mostly man-made), compared to only 47% of Baby Boomers. Millennials directly blame both the resource use and vast wealth of older generations for environmental

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damage (Pickering & Barry, 2012), and indeed, even older U.S. Democrats still tend to take fossil fuels’ consumption-tolerant, incrementalistic approach to climate, despite increasingly dire warnings from the global scientific community. The Green New Deal, a legislative framework oriented toward reducing greenhouse gas emissions and creating infrastructure and jobs, has been championed primarily by younger gener­ ations. Recently elected Congressional leaders like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and activist groups such as the Sunrise Movement and Extinction Rebellion (Corbett, 2019), have begun to force these issues into the public eye. In 2019, both the British and the Irish governments each declared a national “climate emergency” in response to mas­ sive environmental protests (Irish Parliament, 2019). 3.2.4.2 Shootings and gun control fears Around 40% of Americans are afraid of mass shootings (Gallup 2018)—in schools, places of work, public venues, etc. Conservatives, led by the National Rifle Association (NRA) and its supporters, tend to minimize or even dismiss these shootings, and pro­ fess a fear of government authoritarianism. Conservatives believe reactions to shoot­ ings will lead to gun confiscations and oppression, and thus are less supportive of gun control laws than Democrats and independents. Nonetheless, after a surge of prom­ inent shootings, between 2016 and 2019, even Republicans support for stricter gun laws increased 37–53% (Shepherd, 2018). However, conservatives are far more in favor of arming classroom teachers as a presumed deterrent—a move strongly opposed by most Democrats. 3.2.5 Other demographic variables: class, age (generation), gender, ethnicity, religion Class, minority status, religion and gender also interact with generational differences on security, and a host of related social and economic issues (Pew, 2018). The gap between rich and poor around the world is the worst it has been since the early 1900s Gilded Age (just preceding the Great Depression)—with slightly more women in poverty. After 2008, the average net worth for the poorest 50% of Americans, who own only 1% of American wealth, decreased from $11,000 to $8,000—particularly among ethnic minorities, whose net worth on average was less than half that of white Americans (Borns, 2018). A significant majority of Americans, for instance, now put income redistribution (taxes on the rich and corporations) (The Hill, 2019), universal health care (Medicare for All—which even half of Republicans support) and free col­ lege tuition (Stein, Cornwall, & Tanfani, 2018), and more robust social welfare safety net, with expanded Social Security (66%) and federal intervention to lower drug prices (84%) (PPP, 2018), and other politically threatened New Deal and Great Society era government programs, and related new proposals, among their highest priorities (Pew Research, 2019). The Millenial and “GenZ” generations are particularly anxious and insecure, as the first since the early 1900s that are less well-off than their parents—born after the mid­ 1980s and raised entirely in an era of high technology, Internet and social networks, and the so-called gig economy.4 Those under 40 years old are mired in debt, relegated to low-wage jobs, and unable to afford homes, vacations and retirement (Bricker, Kennickell, Moore, & Sabelhaus, 2012). Understandably, they tend to prioritize

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security issues such as the economy, existential climate disruption, student debt (from 2003 to 2018 cumulative student debt increased 700%—$200 billion to $1.4 trillion, most carried by students after 2000), reducing military spending and a host of other issues. In contrast, these are unpopular among Baby Boomers (born roughly between 1946 and 1964) and older, who benefited from the most prosperous period in human history—with cheap education (little college debt) and housing, high middle class wages and, at least until the 1980s, relative economic stability (Chetty et al., 2017).

3.3 Societal security Societal security is “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats” as Wæver and others have noted (Wæver, 1993). Societal insecurities are magnified when individuals or group perceive their self- or group identities threatened (their national or regional heritage, religious faith, racial or cultural identity, etc.) (ibid.). Cognitive psychology5 has shown that humans are notoriously imperfect at hypothesis testing or reasoning rationally about costs and benefits of their actions or priorities. 3.3.1 Limits on cognition related to post-9/11 American institutional and public views of security Interdisciplinary scholarly observations derived from the sociology, economics, political science and neuro- and social-psychology literatures reveal a multitude of explanations of why people might not recognize the gravity of potential security threats—including voting against their apparent self-interests in elections. Humans tend to discount events that seem far away, to allow ideology or emotional “cultural” issues to cloud our judgment and be overly optimistic that “normalcy” (past experi­ ence) is more permanent than it is. In contrast, we are too pessimistic and thus passive about whether we can do something about security threats, and one psychologist has dubbed these the “Dragons of Inaction” (Gifford, 2015). Threats beyond our experience, such as unprecedented (in human history) climate disruption, or wide-reaching disease disasters, are particularly difficult to judge. Threats beyond the experience of our (or anyone’s) lifetimes tend to elicit disbelief or outright denial, as with 2020’s COVID-19 pandemic (Krugman, 2020)—that is, until they overtake us. These tendencies especially apply to those more prone to cer­ tain types of cognitive dissonance: a state of conflict or discomfort—dissonance—that happens when strongly held beliefs, emotions, or assumptions are contradicted by new information, that motivates someone to either convince themselves the new infor­ mation does not exist or to explain it away in order to relieve the emotional tension caused (Oswald & Grosjean, 2012). Another human cognitive failing is the human agency bias, where people and even entire societies are far more interested in human threats—versus natural ones. Thus, contemporary failure to grasp existential environmental threats to humanity from the natural environment/climate change, given the distant and future uncertainty (though neither is true of the very current and certain impacts from global heating). Human threats from crime, immigrants, terrorism or other countries occupy us far more viv­ idly, and deceptively. People are also subject to an immediacy bias about current or

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recent emotional reactions, compounded by a distorted memory of their own history as “the good ol’ days”, and present times as the worse ever (Pohl, 2012). Many Americans, including educated elites, claim this is the most dangerous time in U.S. history because of the current threats from terrorism, Russia, North Korea, etc. This has been used as a post-9/11 reason to curtail Constitutional civil liberties (particularly since 2001), justify torture (as during the Bush administration) or spend as much as $6.4 trillion on foreign wars (Crawford, 2019). This “worst-ever” assertion is, of course, dubious at best, given the historic perils of the U.S. Civil War, the existential Cold War threat of nuclear annihilation and devastating world wars in the 20th cen­ tury, and the 1918 Flu Pandemic. Assertions illustrating the human agency and imme­ diacy biases by policymakers and other government officials include claims that “We are living in the most dangerous time in my lifetime, right now” and “I will personally attest to the fact that [the world is] more dangerous than it has ever been” (Gen. Marin Dempsey, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, 2012 and 2013); “The world is literally about to blow up” (Sen. Lindsey Graham, 2014); and “I have not experienced a time when we’ve been beset by more crises and threats around the globe” (Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, 2014) (Zenko, 2019). Needless to say, much of this historically irra­ tional hyperbole from even veteran, well-educated security practitioners who should know better is quite demonstrably untrue from a human agency perspective, even as it is, ironically, from an existential environmental (climate) security perspective. 3.3.2 Distrust of government: a racial and class divide Ethnic, religious and other minority groups feel the most vulnerable in most soci­ eties—and can fear immediate government and law enforcement threats far more than they fear external national security threats. Economic upheavals and disparities, political corruption and ideological partisanship have a corrosive effect on citizens trust in government to ensure safety from human violence (including terrorism, crime and criminal justice biases), but other issues as well (Craig, 2018). In the United States, trust in government and public officials has fallen from over 75% in the mid-1960s to below 20% in recent years. Super-majorities of Americans want government to help solve major human security problems, such as “fighting terrorism, responding to nat­ ural disasters, keeping food and drugs safe, protecting the environment, strengthen­ ing the economy and improving education”—yet also believe public officials are out for their own interests (Citrin & Stoker, 2018). Fear of social injustice, neglect, local police treatment (including shootings) and mass incarceration have been long present, but now are rising among people of color. For example, African Americans distrust government for its failure to protect them from lead-contaminated water in cities like Detroit, and the Black Lives Matter movement reflects a fear of racially biased criminal justice systems and lack of police accountability in Ferguson, Missouri and everywhere else. Meanwhile, 70% of white people believed local police treat people of color and whites equally, compared to just 36% of blacks (Drake, 2015). White distrust of government, in contrast, consists primarily of perceptions of lost status, “discrimination” against whites by liberal gov­ ernments, up to the point of paranoiac “white genocide” fears on the fringe far right, where fears of gun confiscation, and other conspiracy theories about government eco­ nomic and political tyranny and violent racial plots abound (Schwartzburg, 2019).

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3.3.3 Influence of traditional and social media on security views, trust in government and private sector institutions The traditional news media (i.e., newspapers, radio and television) has always had a significant influence on security views among both the general population and elites, particularly those over 50 years old, in most Western nations. However, the Internet is rapidly eclipsing traditional, legacy news sources, especially among younger people (Gottfried & Shearer, 2017). The era of 24 hours news emerged in 1980, when CNN began the cable broadcasting revolution, it had a profound influence on the level and shape of public security fears. Before then, most people’s news was limited to radio, daily newspapers and limited nightly news from 3 major networks (Robinson, 2005). For example, CNN introduced the “24 hour news cycle” which greatly influenced how many seemingluy got their news and thought about the news generally. The irony of the Internet is its role in both promoting plural democracy yet at the same time helping to undermine democracy, as a magnifier of dysfunctional social trends. One might claim that the Internet has been a diverse, divisive and passion­ ate information, communications, and organizational democratizer. But the Internet has also become a source of political confirmation bias as it facilitates one’s ability to avoid information/media that contradicts one’s predisposed beliefs. This characteris­ tic includes magnified transnational political and social radicalization and extremist antimodern religious and social movements, ranging from ISIS and al Qaeda to the radical Christian right, neo-Nazi and white supremacist movements, etc. These move­ ments reject modern norms or trends of gender or race, religious, sexual orientation tolerance, pluralism, secularism (etc.) and have traditionally been isolated, as opposed to global or even widespread movements. The Internet has connected many of these previously isolated, or disparate movements or philosophies. Indeed, terrorists around the world have been radicalized remotely, and inspired by infamous extremist attacks in Norway (2011), New Zealand (2019), Canada (1989, 2018), the United States, etc. The radical right is inspired by a mosaic of fears, conspiracies, and anti-abortion, -women’s rights, -LGBTQ, and other biases, including belief that Muslims and Jews seek to impose religious law and World Government on Christians (Mantyla, 2019), and that urban people of color will rise up and try to violently take America from rural and suburban whites, etc. (Zaitchik, 2010). 3.3.4 Societal trust and radical violence/terrorism Fear of terrorism and government’s ability to protect citizens from it is volatile— including in the United States since the 9/11 attacks. Domestic extremist violence and intimidation creates fear among the general population, but particularly among demo­ graphic groups that have been targeted by domestic radical movements: people of color, immigrants, religious minorities (e.g., Muslims and Jews in Western countries), women, socially tolerant/cosmopolitan people and others (Rydgren, 2018). Many Americans have been losing faith in their government and society’s ability to protect them from domestic radical right-wing white nationalist attacks, as well as related misogynist white male “Incels” (“involuntarily celibates”) (Williams, 2018), radical Salafist Muslims and other religious extremists and non-ideological mass shootings. For instance, white supremacists and radical militia adherents were responsible for most U.S. domestic terrorist killings since 1973. Of the 50 extremist-related murders

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in 2018, from the Pittsburgh Tree of Life synagogue attack to the Parkland school shooting in Florida, almost all were perpetrated by right-wing extremists (ADL, 2019). Continued scholarship demonstrates both economic and cultural factors work in tan­ dem for far-right recruitment and movements (Ausserladscheider, 2019). 3.3.5 Climate mistrust and democratic dysfunction Climate disruption is one of the reasons for declining trust in the traditional or main­ stream American press. One media analysis group noted, “…the existential crisis of our time… was pitifully under-covered in 2018” (Hymas, 2019), even though it increased somewhat in 2019 after the release of the progressive Congressional Democrats’ Green New Deal framework. U.S. major media coverage actually declined in the years after the release of the pivotal 2007 IPCC Fourth Assessment (Pachauri & Reisinger, 2007). American broadcast TV networks 2018 coverage dropped 45% from 2017 (with already low mention)—even after a historically devastating $350-plus billion year of extreme weather losses. In 2018, over a dozen dire climate science reports from both American government agencies and the U.N. climate report warned that deep cuts in carbon pollution were needed by 2030 (Romm, 2019). 3.3.6 Election security Voter suppression through voter registration interventions are being seen by many Americans as a threat to the very democracy. Also, prominently discussed after 2016 were claim of cyber interference (domestic and international) by Russian “troll farms”, and the alleged email hacking of 2016 presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s political campaign. Meanwhile, those who observe and use social media have been concerned, going into the 2020 elections, about growing domestic political manipulation of elec­ tions by both major political parties and their allies. Exacerbating this is a public lack of confidence in voting machine integrity, ballot protection (hacking, manipulation, rigged votes) and partisan government voter registration manipulations in states like Georgia and Florida (Citrin & Stoker, 2018; Lightman, Lowry, & Clark, 2019). 3.3.7 Civil liberties and use of security as government leverage and control Often, people who believe that they have nothing to hide are unconcerned about infor­ mation surveillance. Security and defense are both potent words and concepts, used by government and politicians push everything from overseas military operations, domestic infrastructure programs (e.g., the 1950s U.S. National Highway System) to undermining of constitutional civil liberties. Invoking security can be used for justi­ fying draconian undermining of democracies, and consolidation of authoritarianism, as well (Bajc, 2013). This was clearly evident in President Erdogan’s management of the civil unrest in Turkey as the military declared martial law in 2016. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, significant concerns grew in the United States about civil liberties—particularly related to the Bush administration’s 2001 USA PATRIOT Act and its policies toward international law, torture, detention of suspected terrorist and domestic liberties. The Patriot Act and other Bush (and later Obama and Trump) policies were viewed by many as U.S. and global threats to civil liberties in a range of areas—particularly First Amendment (speech, religion, press freedoms) and Fourth

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Amendment (search and seizure, privacy), and due process (trial by jury, habeas corpus/ detention, right to an attorney, etc.) (Bellavita, 2008; Cole & Dempsey, 2006). For more than ten years, successive U.S. administrations assured Americans that they were not violating fundamental liberties (Bakir, 2015). Nonetheless, in 2013, Edward Snowden, a former CIA, NSA employee, became the biggest U.S. government whistleblower in U.S. history, and challenged Americans and other nations’ citizens’ notions about the extent of government surveillance around the world. Among Snowden’s numerous NSA rev­ elations given to U.S. and British news organizations, was massive big data collection, overseas and domestic, from U.S. Internet and phone traffic, from most major social media/Internet companies, including Microsoft, Google, Yahoo, Facebook and Apple; and online Internet “dirty tricks” disruption campaigns and “False flag operations”, and smears of those deemed subversives (Greenwald, 2014; Lyon, 2015).

3.4 High politics in the post-world war II cold war era and academic debate on security Despite the existence of many “dangerously ambiguous” definitions for security, some academic analysts have suggested that security is not so much contested as it is vague and poorly articulated. As David Baldwin (1997) noted in the “new” postCold War era, dozens of American theorists made redefining security “something of a cottage industry” that mostly addressed “normative and empirical concerns … even though “[r]elatively little attention is devoted to conceptual issues” (1997, quoted via Šulović, 2010). Post-WWII Europe was seen as high risk of falling to communist governments sympathetic to the newly minted “Soviet Bloc” in Eastern Europe and Asia. Thus, $400 million in American aid and investment was pledged to at-risk countries such as Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine—to “assist free peoples to work out their destinies in their own way”.6 1947 saw the now-famous $13 billion (around $185 billion today) European Recovery Program—the Marshall Plan, designed to fight “hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos… [and revive] a working economy in the world so as to permit the existence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist” (ibid.) The Marshall Plan was a self-interested investment in markets for U.S. goods and capital, as well as a hybrid traditional and humanitarian security strategy—a recognition that without human security, traditional/national security is threatened (Corbridge, 2004; Estrada-Tanck, 2016). After WWII ended in 1945, global tensions once again rose when the territorial and imperial ambitions of Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union became clearer, and deadly serious when the Soviets succeeded in exploding their own atomic bomb. This event seemed to be the impetus for the ensuring superpower “Cold War” which soon set­ tled into decades of dangerous, tense military standoffs, competing alliances and surrogate “hot” wars in places such as Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia), Africa (Angola, Zaire/Congo, etc.) and Central America/Caribbean region (Cuba, El Salvador/Nicaragua/Honduras). The Cold War also influenced global trade and poli­ tics for the following 70 years. Not all analysts saw security during the Cold War through a lens of superpower politics, economics and the existential threat of nuclear war. During the 40-plus years of the Cold War, anticolonial movements and decolonization were occurring around the world, and various structural Marxists and critical theory scholars (Krause, 1998)

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like Frantz Fanon believed the Western postcolonial capitalist system was hegemoni­ cally exploiting LCDs powerlessness, keeping their economic prosperity in check and preventing them from benefiting from their raw materials exports (Baylis et al., 2017). 3.4.1 Post-cold war: the era of economic and political globalization, and terrorism When the Cold War abruptly ended around 1990 with a mostly peaceful whimper as opposed to a bang, with the collapse of the Soviet empire, the world became increas­ ingly integrated economically and politically—in the era of deregulated trade regimes and free market globalization. After the 9/11 attacks, homeland security reshaped American domestic institutions and policymaking, to the tune of trillions of dollars in reorganization, infrastructure and material, and massive foreign military involvement in the name of the so-called global war on terrorism (GWOT). Even before 9/11, the impacts of globalization were already causing economic and political security anxieties. The U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan gradually undermined American global credibility (soft power), and economic health, as they became expensive, destructive quagmires. But especially after the 2008–10 Great Recession,7 Western establishment elites were challenged by domestic populist discontent exemplified by the U.S. election of self-proclaimed anti­ establishment president, Donald Trump (Baylis et al., 2017). Though the public in countries such as the United States are as-yet not fully aware of all the possibilities, despite the Snowden NSA (etc.) revelations (Bauman, 2014), many tech and civil liberties experts are wary of even worse privacy and surveillance tools being adopted (Bakir, 2015; Cole, Blanton, Wasserman, & Mills, 2015). For instance, the rapid rise of facial recognition camera surveillance on most urban streets in China is one harbinger of future Western adoption of similar systems (Stokel-Walker, 2019). This technology will soon enable tracking in real time of Western citizens, unless there is intervention.8 Other methods, such as the secretive law enforcement “Stingray” devices, which monitor all cellphone traffic in the vicinity, are being used by police departments for secret, warrantless violations of privacy (Bates, 2017). 3.4.2 Academic conceptions beyond traditional security: securitization Even before their American counterparts were rethinking security beyond balance of power and existential nuclear war, European academics were already eroding traditional military conceptions via the so called social constructivist “Copenhagen school”. Constructivists sought to reframe and securitize subnational, human and transnational (transcending the nation-state) societal security, bringing in institu­ tions, people, political practice, identities and culture and evolution of state-society relations (Buzan et al., 1998; Trombetta, 2008; Wendt, 1999).

3.5 Varying conceptions of security: post-9/11 attacks, and climate disruption as a threat multiplier “Homeland security” (HLS) became a common term in the United States, and even globally, largely because of its institutionalization in the American Department of Homeland Security. But several competing, changing visions of HLS emerged after

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50 Terrence O’Sullivan the 9/11 attacks, when first American “homeland security” was all about terrorism— amply illustrated by the fact that in the Congressional authorizing legislation for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) terrorism was the only issue men­ tioned. Discussion of natural disasters and emergency management was left out, despite the DHS absorption of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Coast Guard, and other government entities involved in civilian issues (Bellavita, 2008), even as it is historically clear that natural disasters of all types are a threat to peace and security (Tipson, 2013). Among increasing numbers of scholars and practitioners alike, traditional security, HLS, human security and environmental security are now all seen as interrelated, the latter both precursors for and causal threats to even traditional security and national interests (Buzan, 1983; Buzan et al., 1998; Deudney, 1990; O’Sullivan & Ramsay, 2015; Ramsay & O’Sullivan, 2013; Trombetta, 2008). Climate disruption is also increasingly viewed as a threat and risk multiplier by national security institutions, including the U.S. military and intelligence community (Coats, 2019; Wuebbles, Fahey, & Hibbard, 2017), including the projected catastrophic impact it will have on water and food security (Devereux & Edwards, 2004). North and Central American, for example, are being particularly hard hit. There is a growing lit­ erature posing an “environmental conflict thesis” and addressing the “role of environ­ mental scarcity as an independent variable in violent conflict”—within and between states, but also unrelated to borders. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned immediacy- and human agency cognitive biases also apply to many scolars and experts either unaware of, or less able to connect the climate dots (the connection between severe weather, food or water shortages, immigration/refugee crises, civil insurrections, terrorism and war; and sea level rise threatening coastal cities and infrastructure such as airports) (Ramsay & O’Sullivan, 2013; O’Sullivan & Ramsay, 2015). Both the United States military and intelligence communities had, by the time of the Obama administration, shifted their security mission toward more overseas humanitarian civilian disaster missions, highlighted in the Pentagon’s 2010 and 2014 (Dale, 2014) Quadrennial Defense Reviews and Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap (DoD, 2014) vision of social, economic and political security concerns in the context of climate disruption. Climate will affect the military’s own train­ ing, supply chains, critical infrastructure and operational variables—at home and abroad—in increasingly challenging ways. Naval and military installations alone are threatened by sea level rise, which could reach as high as 6–7 feet by 2100 (Bamber et al., 2019). 3.5.1 Other public, practitioner and academic security viewpoints Beyond terrorism, climate change and other traditional security concerns, there are other major non-traditional security issues with sometimes unique professional and academic perspectives. For example: •

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—chemical, biological (bioterrorism, using infectious diseases or toxins), radiological dispersion device (RDD or the so-called dirty bomb) and nuclear (CBRN) events could be triggered by terror­ ists—or even by warring nation-states. The two central nuclear weapons concerns (from a probability standpoint) among experts are terrorists being able to set off

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•

•

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an RDD in a major city, and a war between two nuclear nations such as Pakistan and India that could lead drag other nations into the conflict due to extant alli­ ance agreements, and ultimately lead to nuclear winter. Cybersecurity is an threat area that had for years been undervalued by average citizens, but now both experts and increasing numbers of Westerners are con­ cerned in the wake of massive private sector data hacks that disseminated sensi­ tive financial and private identity information. This ranges from cyber hacktivism and crime, to cyber warfare and espionage, and other forms of interference with Internet and computer-based systems—up to and including remote seizure of command and control that could damage physical infrastructure or cause deadly events, such as train wrecks or gas pipeline explosions (Hinds & Joinson, 2017). Electricity grid collapse, the threat of extended national or regional power out­ ages from technological accidental, or electromagnetic solar storms. Power is the lynchpin for most of modern society, and disaster scenario modeling shows just how damaging to the economy and even (with possible very long outages) the fabric of society such worst case scenarios could produce (McCreight, 2019; Zimmerman, Zhu, De Leon, & Guo, 2017). Even before catastrophic global COVID outbreak, pandemics were recognized in the global public health security community as being among the top threats in today’s interconnected, mobile world.

And almost a generation after the U.S. government’s post-9/11 war on terrorism, American national security priorities appear to be coming full circle—domestically, and militarily in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Trump administration’s 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) made it clear that the U.S. military apparatus is being directed back toward emphasizing competition among the great powers (Grieco, 2018). The NDS emphasizes threats to U.S. economic, diplomatic and military interests from China and Russia, as well as “destabilizing” rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran. “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security”. The NDS further declares that “[t]oday, every domain is contested–air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace”—though it is for China alone that the NDS reserves its strongest language (ibid.).

3.6 Summary and conclusions The societal concepts of security and insecurity combine both objective and subjec­ tive framing and states of mind among individuals, groups, society and even within governments and the military. In developing its strategy, operations and structural priorities, the homeland security enterprise must adapt to the dynamic and varied risk perceptions held by the public, to academics and to policymakers. These perceptions are both value-laden and dynamic. They are also grounded in a variety of cultural and cognitive sociological realities, from actual to distorted (and even include imaginary) threats. Understanding the sociology of security, and the varying conceptions of what societal security consists of is a way of contextualizing the significance of all “securities” and insecurities and a way of optimizing political responses. Without integration of the sociology of security and the insights it reveals, the operations and strategies of homeland security may not address the real issues it faces, and instead chase fictitious security issues down the proverbial rabbit hole.

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3.7 Discussion questions 1. How is national security different from human security or environmental security? 2. What issues do you think are the highest priority security issues today—for yourself and your family, your area, the nation, or other parts the world? 3. Why do the definitions and conceptions of security often vary so much across individuals, socio-economic groups, institutions, ideologies, generations, eth­ nicity, and nations (etc.)? 4. Why do you think that people tend to focus primarily on what’s immediately around them, or primarily on threats caused by people vs. nature, and to find ways to deny evidence (cognitive dissonance) that conflicts with their core beliefs? Does being educated make that less so? 5. How is societal security and insecurity influenced by people’s ideas of trust in insti­ tutions, democracy/elections, civil liberties and government or corporate power? 6. What role does social media/the Internet play in modern societies, and around the world? 7. How have academic, security practitioner and general public views of security changed and even diverged throughout history? 8. Why is an understanding of sociology important for guiding homeland security strategy, operations and structure?

Notes 1. See, for instance, Souad Mekhennet (2020), “Far right and radical Islamist groups are exploiting coronavirus turmoil”, Washington Post (April 10, 2020). 2. For a look at actual events and perspectives from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, see 2019 National Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA): Overview and Methodology (FEMA, 2019). 3. See Chapter 11 in this volume, on Public Health Security, for discussion of the coronavirus/COVID pandemic and its implications for homeland security. 4. “In a gig economy, temporary, flexible jobs are commonplace and companies tend toward hiring independent contractors and freelancers instead of full-time employees. A gig economy undermines the traditional economy of full-time workers who rarely change positions and instead focus on a lifetime career” (Chappelow, 2019). One example of this would be Uber and Lyft drivers. 5. Cognition is “the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses”. Oxford Dictionary www.oxforddictionar­ ies.com. 6. The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. U.S. State Department (2019). https://history. state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/truman. 7. And then of course the startling dramatic impact of the 2020 COVID pandemic, the full impact of which is yet to be determined. 8. The City of San Francisco passed an ordinance in 2019 banning future facial rec­ ognition surveillance, in anticipation (and fear) of the growing adoption worldwide (Conger, Fausset, & Kovaleski, 2019).

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Pickering, J., & Barry, C. (2012). On the concept of climate debt: Its moral and political value. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 15(5), 667–685. https://doi.org /10.1080/13698230.2012.727311 Poushter, J., & Huang, C. (2019). Climate change still seen as the top global threat, but cyberat­ tacks a rising concern. Pew Research Center (February 10, 2019). Public Policy Polling (PPP). (2018). Data from March 9-11, 2018. https://socialsecurityworks. org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Nat-Social-Security-March-18-2-Results.pdf Robinson, P. (2005). The CNN effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention. Routledge. Romm, J. (2019). 2018 was a year of alarming climate reports, but you wouldn’t know it watching TV news. Think Progress (March 11, 2019). https://thinkprogress.org/ climate-change-mainstream-media-coverage-2018-4d76f27dbbf8/ Rothschild, E. (1995). What is security? Daedalus, 124(3), 53–98. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/ stable/20027310 Rydgren, J. (Ed.). (2018). The Oxford handbook of the radical right. Oxford University Press. Schwartzburg, R. The ‘white replacement theory’ motivates alt-right killers the world over. The Guardian (August 5, 2019). https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/aug/05/ great-replacement-theory-alt-right-killers-el-paso Shepherd, S. (2018). Gun control support surges in polls. Politico (February 28, 2018). https:// www.politico.com/story/2018/02/28/gun-control-polling-parkland-430099 Stein, L., Cornwall, S., & Tanfani, J. (2018). Inside the progressive movement roiling the Democratic Party. Reuters (August 23, 2018). https://www.reuters.com/investigates/ special-report/usa-election-progressives/ Stokel-Walker, C. (2019). The backlash against face recognition has begun. New Scientist, 242(3232) 9. Šulović, V. (2010). Meaning of security and theory of securitization. Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 1–7. Tackett, M. (2019). Key takeaways from Trump’s decision to use a National Emergency Declaration to build a border wall. New York Times (February 15, 2019). The Hill. (6 February 2019). New poll finds overwhelming support for an annual wealth tax (February, 6, 2019). https://thehill.com/hilltv/what-americas-thinking/428747-new-poll­ americans-overwhelmingly-support-taxing-the-wealth-of Tipson, F. S. (2013). Natural disasters as threats to peace. U.S. Institute of Peace (Special Report 325) (February 2013). Trombetta, M. J. (2008). Environmental security and climate change: Analysing the discourse. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21(4) 585–602. Urwin, D. W. (2014). The community of Europe: A history of European integration since 1945. Routledge. U.S. Department of Defense. (2014). D epartment of Defense 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap. Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment. U.S. State Department. (2019). The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. https://history.state. gov/departmenthistory/short-history/truman (accessed March 2019) Wæver, O. (1993). Identity, migration and the new security agenda in Europe. Pinter Publishers. Wæver, O. (2010). Towards a political sociology of security studies. Security Dialogue, 41(6), 649–658. Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics. Cambridge University Press. Williams, Z. (2018). ‘Raw hatred’: Why the “incel” movement targets and terrorises women [Internet]. The Guardian.

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Wuebbles, D. J., Fahey, D. W., & Hibbard, K. A. (2017). Climate science special report: Fourth national climate assessment (Vol. I). Zaitchik, A. (2010). ‘Patriot’ Paranoia: A look at the top ten conspiracy theories. Southern Poverty Law Center. Zimmerman, R., Zhu, Q., De Leon, F., & Guo, Z. (2017). Conceptual modeling framework to integrate resilient and interdependent infrastructure in extreme weather. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 23(4), 04017034.

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Crime and security Chelsea A. Binns

Description: Understanding crime and the criminal mindset seem integral to modern concepts of homeland security (HLS). Criminology, like HLS, initially drew its the­ oretical foundations from other disciplines such as psychology, sociology and even the physical sciences. Now, criminology has its own theoretical base, much of which is contributing to the emerging theory in HLS. This is particularly true for theories related to deterrence and crime prevention. This chapter examines some of these the­ ories and how they are specifically applicable to deal with security threats and hazards faced by security professionals. Cases are presented to demonstrate how these theo­ ries have been applied in the real world. Upon completion of this chapter, students will be able to: 1. Identify the linkage between Criminology Theory and Homeland Security strategies, operations and structures. 2. Develop an understanding of Defensible Space theory as it applies to security. 3. Analyze the concept of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) and deterrence. 4. Compare and contrast Defensible Space Theory and CPTED. 5. Explain Rational Choice Theory in terms of man-made threats to security. 6. Apply Routine Activity in the development of security policies and programs.

4.1 Introduction This chapter examines the criminological theories that apply to homeland security (HLS). These theories will be explored to determine how they inform the general body of knowledge that comprises HLS. These theories also provide a framework to con­ ceptualize how HLS developed into an academic discipline. It is believed that over time, HLS will develop its own set of theories, informed by the work of these crimi­ nologists. Thus, their contributions continue to add value as they help HLS scholars to conceive theories and advance this dynamic knowledge base. Criminology is an established academic field. Garland et al. discuss its presence in the field as evidenced by the overwhelming number of dedicated academic depart­ ments, research centers, postgraduate and undergraduate programs, books and journals (Bosworth et al., 2011). At this point, it is considered so well developed that its conceptual history doesn’t need to be explained (Shearing, 1989). By definition, criminology is the scientific study of crime (Vito & Maahs, 2015). Leading criminol­ ogist Edward Sutherland distinguishes criminology from criminal justice by defining

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criminology as the study of law breaking, to include the nature, extent and causes of crime, and criminal justice as the response to criminal behavior, such as policing, courts and corrections (Vito & Maahs, 2015). Criminology, as a discipline, examines the people who commit crime, explores the reasons why they commit crime, the ways they can be stopped from committing crime and how society responds to this crime (Shearing, 1989, p. 170). Criminology is largely concerned with the theoretical perspectives on crime and its causation. Several disciplines have contributed to the development of criminology, including law, medicine, sociology, psychology, psychiatry, chemistry, physics, archi­ tecture, history, theology and social work (Jeffery, 1959). Criminologists who under­ stand and appreciate the historical development of their discipline are better able to grasp the current issues scholars face in their discipline (Jeffery, 1959). It is in this spirit that we evaluate the development of a theory of HLS. HLS is more challenging to define. There is no generally accepted definition of HLS, to date, despite a body of academic work focused on developing one (Bellavita, 2008; Reese, 2012; Smith, 2005). The absence of a definition symbolizes the ongoing process by which HLS continues to evolve both conceptually and theoretically. Early scholars related HLS to terrorism and later scholars broadened the scope. Newmann (2002) defined it as a subset of national security. Reylea (2002) found the prevailing definition was related to the common use of the term “homeland security”, which is to protect against and to combat terrorism. Later, Bellavita (2008) said the definition of HLS should include a wide variety of interests in the field, such as ter­ rorism, all hazards, terrorism and catastrophes, jurisdictional hazards, metahazards, nation security and security uber alles. HLS, as an emerging academic discipline, is drawing upon established theoreti­ cal perspectives from other academic disciplines. Today, scholars are taking appli­ cable theories and adapting and blending them toward the end goal of building a theory of HLS (Kiltz & Ramsay, 2012). This process is similar to the early days of criminology. This chapter will focus on the theories and concepts that most closely represent the linkage between crime and security. Specifically, these theories can be applied to the concept of terrorism, which is a primary concern of HLS efforts. Thus, it makes sense to analyze the criminological theories that can be examined under this lens. By comparison, the other chapters of this book outline how theories from other disciplines serve as pillars on which the foundation of HLS is built (see Chapters 3 and 5). While terrorism receives a great deal of attention within the HLS field, the reality is that there are several intentional man-made threats to security such as arms, drug, human trafficking and cybercrime. These threats are posed by a variety of nonstate actors including narcotics traffickers, transnational crime groups, organized gangs and individual offenders. Thus, it should come as no surprise that theories of crime may also serve as pillars on which to build an emerging HLS theory. This chapter examines the following theoretical perspectives: Defensible Space Theory, Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), Rational Choice Theory and Routine Activity Theory. Situational crime prevention will also be discussed. This chapter will analyze the relevance of these theories to security by explaining how theoretical assertions and discrete managerial and environmental changes reduce the opportunity for crime through deterrence and crime prevention; thereby reducing the vulnerability to a variety of intentional man-made threats.

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Although these theories provide a good foundation for understanding the strategies and operations of HLS vis-à-vis terrorism, it is important to note that there are some gaps (Kettl, 2003). In terms of terrorism, understanding its occur­ rence through any single theory is problematic, as some scholars observe (see e.g. Fusey, 2009, Kiltz & Ramsay, 2012). Thus, several theories will be analyzed for their applicability in addressing these terrorist-related crimes. Another challenge is that terrorism offers many circumstances that are unique to most crimes and thus make them harder to apply to criminological theory. For instance, terrorism is more rarer than other violent crimes; therefore there are fewer victims; victims often do not have contact with perpetrators, and terrorism victims are often killed by their attackers (Freilich & LaFree, 2014). Another gap is that today’s theories tend to focus on HLS as being primarily focused on terrorism (Kiltz & Ramsay, 2012). Kiltz and Ramsay (2012) also point out that HLS is also challenged by natural haz­ ard response, intentional or man-made threats beyond terrorism such as human, drug, or arms trafficking and cyber threats. Nevertheless, terrorism is a fundamen­ tal concern for HLS. This chapter will also consider terrorism as a crime, and thus a criminal justice prob­ lem to be analyzed by criminological theories (Kiltz & Ramsay, 2012). The chapter will consider antiterrorism efforts as essentially crime prevention efforts similar to Nunn (2005). Terrorist organizations are very deliberate in their selection of targets for violence, as they seek to maximize their possibility of success (Asal et al., 2009). This suggests the agents that commit such acts of terror are rational actors. In fact, terrorists, as rational actors, deliberately seek the greatest benefit and the least pos­ sible effort, risk and failure in their criminal endeavors, and this is a “key theoreti­ cal argument” in the situational study of terrorism (Clarke & Newman, 2006; Hsu & McDowall, 2017, p. 932). As a result, criminological theories focusing on deterrence and crime prevention provide a strong framework for analyzing the phenomenon of crime in public spaces by deliberate actors. Deterrence assumes rational actors, who weigh costs and benefits before engaging in their crimes and make decisions based on their calculation of success. First, these theories are referred to as “defensible space” and are described next.

4.2 Defensible space theory At the heart of defensible space theory is the fundamental concept of location-based crime and how it might be addressed through a variety of security design concepts (Merry, 1981). Criminologists have often wondered why some places are at a greater risk of crime than others. They have explored this phenomenon since discover­ ing certain areas remained crime ridden, despite population turnover (Reynald & Elffers, 2009; Stark, 1987). Criminologists turned their attention to building struc­ tures, positing that the physical design of spaces might contribute to criminality (Newman, 1972). In 1972, Oscar Newman was looking to explain the growing crime problem in city high-rise buildings. He developed the concept of defensible space and defined it as “a model for residential environments which inhibits crime by creating the physical expression of a social fabric that defends itself” (p. 3). According to the theory of defensible space, crime can be controlled through the design and structure of the environmental (Jacobs, 1961; Newman, 1972)—hence giving rise to the theory of crime prevention through environmental design, or CPTED as discussed below.

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Defensible space theory stresses the importance of a building’s residents’ role toward achieving physical security goals (Newman, 1972). Per Newman’s theory, the residents of a community provide security (or not), contingent upon the design of a given structure. Some of the security features include “real and symbolic barriers”, “strongly defined areas of influence” and “improved opportunities for surveillance” (Newman, 1972, p. 3). In other words, the design of a given building, insofar as it is conducive to security goals, can cause its inhabitants to defend their own space by making them feel territorial (Merry, 1981; Newman, 1975). Defensible space has four features, involving space, windows, building form and location (Merry, 1981; Newman, 1973). Each of these features speaks to its security posture. The definition of the space serves to “influence” inhabitants to be territo­ rial, and thus defend the space (or not). The position of windows provides security in its “natural surveillance” of public areas. The building’s form speaks to its potential security vulnerability, and the location of the structure can make it either more or less secure based on its proximity to threatening areas (Merry, 1981, pp. 398–399; Newman, 1973, p. 50). Under defensible space theory, the most secure buildings are small, lowrise structures (Merry, 1981; Newman, 1973). Larger buildings are less secure, for a number of reasons. They have more inhabitants and visitors. The inhabitants (i.e., residents) are unable to monitor the space well, due to its size and breadth. There are more visitors, and thus more strangers in the space. As a result, the inhabitants are less likely to develop a relationship (a sense of “territory” or “community”) with the space, which is required for them to defend it, under the theory (Merry, 1981; Newman, 1973). To illustrate this concept, Newman cites research regarding New York City public housing developments. He says the ones with the highest crime rates are the largest developments, located in high-rise buildings (Merry, 1981; Newman, 1973). He finds them so dangerous, that he expressly cautions people with low incomes from living in high-rise developments, finding they should be “strictly avoided” (p. 193). He also says the worst security design prototype is “the slab with high-rise banks of apartments on both sides of the corridor serviced by a central elevator” (Newman, 1973, p. 50). One may ask why builders would use design concepts that contradict defensible space the­ ory. There are several reasons. For one, good environmental design doesn’t necessar­ ily or automatically prevent crime (Yancey, 1971). Also, while defensible space informs security design, it is not an exact science. Overall, researchers are quite vague about the process of defending space, and much of it is not well understood (Merry, 1981). There is a relationship between crime rates and environmental design, yet studies have stressed the importance of the residents when evaluating defensible space design as a security solution (Merry, 1981). Defensible spaces are not always defended by their communities. In instances where the spaces were defensible, yet crime still occurred, it is believed that the social conditions of the neighborhood inhibited residents from safeguarding their space (Atlas, 1991; Merry, 1981). Merry’s (1981) study of one east coast housing development found that a defensible space might not provide a complete security solution. Here, a building that was pre­ sumably safe according to the theory was found to have both high crime rates and residents that lived in fear of crime. Merry’s victimization story revealed that almost half of the residents she interviewed were a victim of robbery, burglary or assault since moving into the housing development. Yet overall, the building met the standards of a defensible space. It was low and small, with few points of entry and adequate, wellpositioned windows. While this building did have some areas that were not considered

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“defensible” (dark passageways, hidden corridors), most of the crime was not com­ mitted in those areas. Most crimes in the building were committed in an area with architecturally “defensible space”. This study showed that poor social cohesion could be an impediment to defen­ sible space design. In other words, the residents’ antisocial behaviors inhibited the value of the defensible space. The residents didn’t develop a sense of “territory” or “community”. They kept their windows covered—for privacy reasons and to (ironically) prevent crime. They also didn’t tend to know their neighbors, due to a strong cultural divide. As a result, residents were unable to determine the presence of outsiders. The residents also lacked the initiative, desire and capacity to proactively contact law enforcement upon observing something out of character. This was also, in part, due to cultural reasons (Merry, 1981). Merry’s study concludes that “architectural strategies alone are not adequate”, to deter crime and that defensible space design theory appears to be “a necessary, but not sufficient condition for crime prevention” (1981, p. 420). Her findings demonstrate that defensible space theory should be supported with a strategy that emphasizes the role of the community in building security. In that sense, Merry’s results are consistent with Newman’s own findings—that residents are a key element in his security concept. Per Newman, [defensible space] “is about an alternative, about a means for restruc­ turing the residential environments of our cities so they can again become livable and controlled, controlled not by the police, but by a community of people sharing a common terrain” (1972, p. 2). 4.2.1 Target hardening There are important policy implications of these studies in defensible space for HLS personnel. For one, this theory supports the general value of target hardening in coun­ terterrorism. Target hardening is when crime is deterred with the use of alarms, bar­ riers, gates, locks, fences or other security devices. As a deterrence strategy, target hardening is aimed at rational actors. Under the theory of defensible space, crimi­ nals are rational actors. This means that would-be criminals first conduct a some­ what imaginary cost–benefit analysis. They evaluate a given space beforehand to see whether they will be able to successfully commit their crime. A target that has been hardened is (relatively) unattractive to terrorists, who are very “attack oriented” in that, they rationally attempt to optimize the benefits relative to risks (Kiltz & Ramsay, 2012, p. 6). A defensible space will theoretically reduce the likelihood of an attack. Targets that have been hardened are less likely to be selected simply because the odds of a successful crime and escape appear lower relative to the targets that are less hardened. Cities have used target hardening logic and techniques from defensible space the­ ory to fight terrorism. One notable example was in Belfast, where the efforts to pro­ tect their central shopping area became known as the “ring of steel” (Coaffee, 2004, p. 201). After September 11, cities also employed target hardening logic and tech­ niques. In London, for example, the use of physical barriers, such as barricades and bollards increased so much that media referred to this as their attempt to “design out terrorism” using “defensible space principles” (Coaffee, 2004, p. 202). Despite theoretical support, the subject of target hardening is controversial in ter­ rorism studies. There is limited evidence that target hardening can cause terrorists

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to choose certain targets in favor of others (Morris, p. 417). Also, not all terrorists are ideal subjects for deterrence strategy, since they do not fear punishment (Fussey, 2009; Kiltz & Ramsay, 2012). Ironically, Oscar Newman, who coined the concept of defensible space, disagrees with the excessive use of barriers to harden targets. He thinks that terrorists will always find their way around a barrier, and that more effort should be put into “eliminating terrorists” (Schneider, 2003, p. 142). Yet it is still generally recommended that counterterrorism strategies focus on general target-hardening techniques (Morris, p. 417). 4.2.2 Defensible space and policy An important policy implication is the unique deliberation of a terrorist actor. Some criminologists, such as Clarke (1980), are critical of the value of crime prevention strategies such as defensible space theory. Clarke (1980) claims that defensible space theory deemphasizes the role of the offender, though he readily acknowledges that “theoretical dilemmas” do exist in the mind of offenders that have a “deliberate inten­ tion of committing the offense and ha[ve] sought out the opportunity to do so” (p. 141). In a criminology sense, terrorists are similar actors to criminals, and thus can theoret­ ically be manipulated away from crime when the likelihood of success seems reduced by measures taken. As such, defensible space theory provides a solid foundation in a comprehensive antiterrorism strategy. Newman’s theory of defensible space assumes a rational actor, such as one that commonly commits an act of terror. In Newman’s view, when such a potential criminal evaluates a space and sees it is well defended, they will be deterred (p. 3). This is a form of “target hardening” that serves as a basic element of good security design (p. 3). Scholars who have built upon his work demonstrated the value of public awareness and engagement in supporting a defensible space. Further, a more comprehensive approach to defensible space occurs when security professionals integrate the power of the building’s inhabitants. Indeed, Federal security campaigns such as The Department of Homeland Security’s “see something, say something” is a direct attempt to integrate the collective power of residents to deter crime. In fact, defensible space theory ultimately “depends on resident involvement to reduce crime and remove the presence of criminals” (Newman, 1996, p. 9).

4.3 Crime prevention through environmental design CPTED is a concept that originally developed as an offshoot of Newman’s (1996) defensible space theory. It is a place-based theory, asserting that “effective use of the built environment” can lead to reduced crime and increased quality of life (Cozens, Saville & Hillier, 2005; Crowe, 2000). In other words, per CPTED theory, properly designed spaces (with surveillance opportunities, boundaries and a positive image) discourage crime (Cozens, Seville & Hillier, 2005, p. 3). The focus of CPTED is on primary crime prevention. According to Brantingham and Faust (1976), CPTED prevents crime because it changes the conditions or context (the physical and socio­ logical conditions) in which potential crime could occur. CPTED posits that environ­ mental manipulations block criminal opportunities, resulting in a reduction in crime (Cozens, 2008; Reynald, 2010). As a crime preventive theory, CPTED is a “complex strategy” which is highly pro­ active and provides strategies that deter or mitigate crime (Cozens, Saville & Hillier,

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2005, p. 3). It has evolved over time, with input from the academic and professional community, from what is now known as the first generation CPTED to the second generation CPTED. The first generation of CPTED was advanced by Moffatt (1983) and included six key concepts: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Territoriality; Surveillance; Assess control (to the site); Target hardening; Maintenance (of the site and surrounds) and Activity support.

The second generation of thought extends these concepts to include the social factors associated with crime, such as poverty, homelessness, inadequate parenting, individual personality and behavior, peer association, poor education, community disintegration and unemployment (Cozens, Saville & Hillier, 2005; Olajide, Lizam & Adewole, 2015). Most scholars agree that Defensible space and CPTED logic are based on rational choice theory (discussed below) which assumes that criminals are rational actors and can be deterred from committing crime (Laufer, 2017). 4.3.1 First generation of CPTED The first generation of CPTED focused largely on physical design (Cozens & Love, 2017). Each of the key concepts constitutes design principles. These princi­ ples have been demonstrated to reduce specific crimes, such as burglary (Casteel & Peek-Asa, 2000). Here, the applicability of these principles toward HLS-related crime prevention goals will also be considered (see 4.3.4 CPTED and Terrorism). In all, the concepts speak toward the universal goal of making a space appear well defended. Under CPTED, spaces that are well defended are less of a crime/ terrorism target. The six key concepts of CPTED outline the scope of the theory. 1. Territories are established via design techniques and create a “sphere of influ­ ence over a property” as a crime deterrent (FEMA, 2013). Territory is reinforced through sidewalks, landscaping and porches, where users can display signs of ownership to help discourage bad actors (NCPC, 2009). 2. Surveillance strategies keep intruders under observation (St. Petersburg Police Dept, 2019). They include placement of windows, parking lots and walkways to maximize the visibility of people, vehicles and activities by all members of the neighborhood (NCPC, 2009). 3. Access control strategy is to deny access and create a perception of risk (St. Petersburg Police Dept, 2019). Natural access control is accomplished by the design of streets, sidewalks and building entrances, toward where access to private areas is discouraged (FEMA, 2013). 4. Target hardening in CPTED is different from traditional target hardening, in that it encourages local law enforcement and government agents to prevent crime with better lighting, use of signage, among other methods (DHS, 2015).

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5. Maintenance is an expression of ownership which helps to deter crime (SPPD, 2019). Well-maintained areas are a signal to potential criminals that the area is well cared for and bad activity will not be tolerated. 6. Activity support involves the use of design strategy to encourage acceptable behavior in public spaces. Here, “unsafe” activities are placed in “safe” areas, where surveillance opportunity is abundant (Cozens & Love, 2015). 4.3.2 Second generation of CPTED The second generation of CPTED evolved to address observed shortcomings in the first generation’s theoretical scope. Like defensible space theory, it was noted over time that citizens didn’t always defend their spaces (Cozens & Love, 2017). The sec­ ond generation CPTED addresses this shortfall by encouraging communities to serve an active role in their security with careful and thoughtful observations (Cozens & Love, 2017). The additional strategies included (NJDOT, 2017): 1. Cohesion—encouraging community relationships; 2. Connectivity—fostering relationships between citizens; 3. Culture—incorporating community cultural activities to foster pride and own­ ership and 4. Capacity—mindful of the potentially negative influences in a community, such as an excessive number of loud bars in a given area or territory. 4.3.3 CPTED implementation Implementing CPTED is a detailed process. To begin, an assessment is conducted to determine assets and liabilities. Information is gathered, safety audits are conducted, community members are surveyed, area crime is mapped, police calls for service are analyzed and crime report summaries are reviewed (NJDOT, 2017). In contrast to defensible space theory, which relied upon residents to defend their space, after the fact, CPTED stresses community involvement from the inception, to inform the entire building planning process. In defensible space theory, keen environmental design is viewed as the impetus for getting inhabitants (i.e., residents) to defend their space. The main tenet of CPTED is that crime can be prevented in the design phase of the building or neighborhood. On their website, the National Crime Prevention Council urges early intervention, by asking law enforcement, architects, city planners, land­ scapers, interior designers and resident volunteers “to create a climate of safety in a community right from the start”. Cozens and Love (2015) assert case studies are the generally accepted way to ascertain the collective crime reduction value of CPTED. CPTED studies have revealed the predominant security issues for many communi­ ties. Between 2007 and 2009, the National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC) assisted crime-ridden communities in ten large cities with CPTED implementation, including neighborhoods in Washington, D.C., Dallas, TX and Omaha, NE. They found some common criminogenic conditions among the areas examined, including abandoned houses, faulty traffic flow, difficulty securing total surveillance, overgrowth of foliage, vacant lots, absentee landlords, complex and difficult-to-enforce laws and regulations, and inadequate street lighting (NCPC, 2009). It is believed these conditions resulted in local crime problems (NCPC, 2009).

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66 Chelsea A. Binns Localized improvements in the built environment affirm the protective value of CPTED implementation. For example, a CPTED team was dispatched to a Dallas, TX, neighborhood of 7,000 residents, where a strong fear of crime permeated the community.1 The relative level of fear of crime is an important component in a com­ munity’s overall sense of well-being because the fear of crime can negatively affect citizens’ emotional health (Hale, 1996). Thus, it was important for the CPTED team to restore order to the community and improve the quality of life for residents. The team noted the high burglary and theft rate in this area, associated with heavy drug use. These crimes were particularly impacting one area employer—a large paratran­ sit facility (NCPC, 2009). The CPTED team’s recommendations prompted commu­ nity-level improvements necessary for crime reduction. Teams were put in place to monitor lighting and to report any outages, and a new private parking facility for the paratransit workers was built that effectively reduced car burglaries. In addition, storefront cameras were installed by area shopkeepers and a new branch of the pub­ lic library was created for residents. Collectively, these measures resulted in reduced crime (NCPC, 2009). In contrast to its intention, scholars have also found that environmental design can also be used by bad actors to conceal and/or perpetuate crime. Atlas studied 21 crime sites in South Florida and found that defensible space tactics were used by the criminals, turning them into “offensible spaces” (1991). An offensible space is created when defensive space tactics are used by ill-intentioned actors to create a “safe space” where they can conduct their crimes (Atlas, 1990, p. 571). Criminals can use offensible spaces to claim territories for the purpose of perpetuating terrorism 2 (Atlas, 1991; Ekblom, 2010. Criminals that have the resources (illegally obtained capital) and consensus (total control and willingness to defend) can have success in applying defensible space concepts (Atlas, 1991). 4.3.4 CPTED and terrorism CPTED theory has informed HLS strategy. CPTED planning is promoted as an effec­ tive post 9/11 strategy. The ultimate security goal is to achieve a “reasonable balance” between the goals of preventing terrorism and everyday crime prevention (FEMA, 2013, A-4). This is not that easy a balance to strike. For example, many security meas­ ures implemented post 9/11 have been criticized for creating fear and negatively and for subsequently altering the character of communities (FEMA, 2013, A-5). Under CPTED, acts of terror are understood to be unique events. Thus, security measures are designed to be more subtle so as to preserve the integrity of the community and quality of life of its inhabitants. Logically, terrorism prevention via security design under CPTED requires a delicate balance between preserving the ebb and flow of society and the need to surveil and interdict criminal behavior. Actions that may serve to deter terrorism, such as closing off roadways, can actually cause everyday crime to increase (FEMA, 2013, p. A-5; Matijosaitiene & Petriashvili, 2017). To prevent such unintended consequences, it is important to integrate CPTED strategy with anti­ terrorism design principles in a more “holistic approach to safety, security and civic design” (Matijosaitiene & Petriashvili, 2017, p. 29). CPTED features that are effec­ tive in decreasing crime provide surveillance and access control, including windows, lighting, locks, fencing, alarm systems and building entrances that require electronic identification (NYC.gov, n.d., p. 35). Landscaping is also considered an environmental

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access control feature as it can limit access to crime targets and escape routes. To this end, for instance, it is recommended that bushes remain short and lower tree limbs cleared to maintain natural surveillance (NYC.gov, n.d., p. 55). In the HLS enterprise, CPTED strategy is being integrated into counterterrorism efforts. For example, both “soft targets” and “iconic places” can be reinforced with CPTED strategy and techniques (Ekblom, 2010, 24; Matijosaitiene & Petriashvili, 2017, p. 28).3 The use of environmental design to inform safe space planning from a counterterrorism perspective is viewed as an “essential factor” for the 21st cen­ tury security design (Matijosaitiene & Petriashvili, 2017). In this way, studies have shown the best CPTED prevention strategies include minimizing vehicle access points to buildings and separating public and private activities (Matijosaitiene & Petriashvili, 2017).

4.4 Security synergy: combining defensible space theory and CPTED Ultimately, both defensible space theory and its successor CPTED have been highly influential in the law enforcement and urban design communities (FEMA, 2013). Both theories stress the involvement of residents and local law enforcement toward build­ ing community-based resiliency against terrorism. Both theories are believed to be uniquely capable of understanding the “needs, risks and vulnerabilities” of the com­ munities they serve and can provide tailored security solutions (Comiskey, 2017). By advancing these theories on a local level, law enforcement is providing “hometown security”, which is a critical component of HLS (Comiskey, 2017). Hometown security efforts “enhance the protection and resilience of community-based critical infrastruc­ ture”4 (NIHS, 2020). Local law enforcement partners are often best positioned to uti­ lize the logic and techniques of both CPTED and defensible space in order to protect vital/critical local assets in to a level, which experts believe could not be duplicated on a national level (Comiskey, 2017). The direct contributions from both theories are evident in many communities. Defensible space theory is said to have contributed to the proliferation of gated communities, which now comprise 60% of all housing (Cozens & Love, 2017) and consultants, specialists and training programs in CPTED are widely available. The concepts have been married to provide comprehensive, integrated security solutions. After global terror incidents during 1992–93, urban planners attempted to “design out terrorism” using “defensible space” (Cozens & Love, 2017). For instance, projects included a reinforced concrete barrier at the Emirates football stadium in North London. This barrier incorporates “soft measures” insofar as the barrier spells out the club’s name, giving it a design flair, rather than present­ ing as a traditional concrete barrier (Cozens & Love, 2017). The National Capital Planning Commission also employed this technique to increase security around the nations’ monument. They used “architecturally pleasing landscape treatments and street furniture” to include benches and planters, strong enough to defend the structure against a “bomb-laden vehicle” while maintaining a friendly appearance (Schneider, 2003, p. 142). There are some critics who have identified shortcomings of both concepts. Newman is critical of CPTED. In his 1996 report “Creating Defensible Space”, Newman opined that the scholars who attempted to replicate and expand upon his work from 1972 for­ ward were unsuccessful. Other critics of CPTED have opined that the underlying ideas

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have been “oversimplified” and “poorly applied” (Cozens & Love, 2015; Ekblom, 2010). Critics of defensible space say it is does not work in all communities, such as low income urban public housing developments (Atlas, 1991). Another criticism is the ben­ efits of defensible space tactics are hard to sustain over time due to diminishing atten­ tion and resources (Atlas, 1991).

4.5 Rational choice theory Rational choice theory is regarded as one of the most powerful theories in social sci­ ence and draws heavily on the theoretical foundations of psychology and econom­ ics (Ostrom, 1998). The foundation of rational choice theory is basic human action.5 Under rational choice theory, humans are motivated by personal goals reflecting their preferences. Criminals seek to achieve their goals by a mindful and calculated pro­ cess, whereby they review their goals against the means of attaining them, and decide the best way to proceed in order to optimize the odds of success relative to the odds of being caught (Elster, 1986, p. 13; Scott, 2000, p. 2). In a criminological context, this means offenders are looking to benefit themselves from their criminal behavior, and they make decisions accordingly (Cornish & Clarke, 1987, p. 935). Even though both defensible space and CPTED consider the linkage between crime and security by examining the setting or the context of crime more than considering those committing the criminal act. However, each of these theories assumes that offenders are rational actors. Hence, a discussion on rational choice theory is necessary. 4.5.1 Rational choice and terrorism Rational choice theory is a foundation of the study of terrorism (Anderton & Carter, 2005).6 Under rational choice theory, terrorists are considered rational actors. This means that terrorists weigh the costs and benefits of an action before engaging in their crimes. Said differently, terrorism is mindful, not accidental. Terrorists also plan their attacks carefully, even low-level offenses (Rossmo & Harries, 2011), with the aim of making a relevant political or symbolic statement (Kiltz & Ramsay, 2012). Thus, ter­ rorism seems to fit the rational choice theory of crime which finds that “specific crimes are chosen and committed for specific reasons” (Cornish & Clarke, 1987, p. 935). Generally speaking, under rational choice theory, rational actors can be deterred through the threat of punishment. The fear of punishment, insofar as it is swift, cer­ tain and severe in its application, is effective in deterring criminals because they typi­ cally seek to avoid pain and punishment (Bailey & Smith, 1972; Kiltz & Ramsay, 2012). However, it is unclear whether terrorists can be deterred. Some scholars suggest pun­ ishment doesn’t have the same deterrent effect on terrorists (when acting as rational criminals) as it does on other types of criminals (Kiltz & Ramsay, 2012). One source of evidence is this phenomenon is suicidal terrorism (Caplan, 2006, p. 92). As a rational actor, the terrorist willing to commit suicide has theoretically conducted a cost–benefit analysis and determined their death was a cost worthy of the benefit. This decision was likely made because terrorists are known to hate their enemy more than they love themselves (Caplan, 2006). Indeed, one study of jihadist suicide attackers showed they were driven by “the anticipation of future self-gratifying benefits” (Freilich & LaFree, 2014, p. 3; Perry & Hasisi, 2014). However, some scholars think that terrorists can be

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deterred through the threat of punishment even though millions of people believe they will be rewarded in the afterlife if they engage in a suicide attack, relatively few of these believers commit the crime (Caplan, 2006, p. 92). Another reason terrorists may not be deterred by punishment is that punishment is uncertain to occur subse­ quent to committing the act, and therefore punishment is neither “swift, certain nor severe”. There is a known difficulty in punishing transnational terrorists under U.S. law (Kiltz & Ramsay, 2012). There is also evidence to suggest that increasing the costs of crime doesn’t necessarily discourage offending behavior (Fussey, 2009 Deterrence is not always straightforward. For example, some believe that terrorists who are deterred from one target will instead select another one, in a move known as displacement (Cornish & Clarke, 1987; Fussey, 2009). Although displacement is diffi­ cult to measure, there is enough evidence to suggest it happens. One study showed the deployment of airport metal detectors reduced skyjackings, while hostage attacks and assassinations increased (Cauley & Im, 1988; Fussey, 2009). However, it is also possi­ ble that displacement can result in no crime occurring at all, which is obviously the most desirable outcome (Cornish & Clarke, 1989). For example, a potential terrorist might become frustrated with an inability to penetrate a specific target and simply give up, ceasing to commit their intended bad act. While that outcome is possible given the strong motivations most terrorists seem to have, it is theoretically less likely to happen than it would with other types of criminals. There is also evidence that terrorists have made rational choices to abandon crimes. One major terrorist plot in New York City was deterred due to increased security. In 2011, the news media disclosed that a major attack on the Brooklyn Bridge, planned by an Al Qaeda operative, had been thwarted (Weiser & Baker, 2011). Following the September 11 attack, vulnerabilities were noted in this geographic area. Subsequently, the local security presence was increased to include continuous monitoring and physi­ cal surveillance (Weiser & Baker, 2011). It was reported that once the would-be terror­ ist visited the area, he decided to call off his operation. Notably, his statement ending the attack was “the weather is too hot” (Weiser & Baker, 2011). Clearly, this was a rational choice on the part of the terrorist—one which magnified the value of height­ ened security measures such as target hardening and CPTED. Criminologist such as Clarke and Newman find that terrorism prevention should be focused on situational crime prevention (Perry & Hasisi, 2014). They believe that terrorists are exercising rational choice in selecting targets, which if those targets can be defended through var­ ious efforts, despite strong motivation to commit the act, the rational decision maker would be more likely to call off such an attack on the grounds that the costs outweigh the benefits (Perry & Hasisi, 2014). One example of how rational choice theory is used to explain criminal behavior is in the case of suicidal terrorists. These criminals exer­ cise a rational choice when pursuing their crimes. They seek to maximize perceived personal benefits, when they are ultimately victims (Perry & Hasisi, 2014). Scholars have argued that these terrorists are like any other criminals—motivated by “ego and hedonism” (Perry & Hasisi, 2014). However, since they are unable to perceive them­ selves as victims, situational crime prevention is required to thwart this sort of actor because they are less capable of ordinary logical reasoning (Perry & Hasisi, 2014). As such, these potential terrorists are more likely to be deterred when the execution of the crime becomes impractical due to target hardening (as in the case of the Brooklyn Bridge bomber) rather than abandoning the crime because they changed their mind

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for altruism, or any other reason. This reiterates the value of target hardening when it comes to terrorists as well as the need to lean on multiple theories of crime prevention. 4.5.2 Rational choice and policy There are several policy implications of the research on rational choice theory. It is important for policy makers to know that despite the stated shortcomings, deterrence is a viable antiterrorism strategy. Under rational choice theory, counterterrorism methods are required to address the “four pillars of terrorist opportunity” (targets, weapons, tools and facilitating conditions) (Perry & Hasisi, 2014). Researchers have found that a good way to apply rational choice theory to terrorism prevention is by focusing on simultaneously reducing opportunities and increasing the resiliency of the physical environment (Clarke & Newman, 2006; Fussey, 2009).

4.6 Routine activity theory Routine activity theory was developed by Cohen and Felson (1979). The theory reflects a departure from traditional criminological theory which focuses on the offender or crime setting. Here, Cohen and Felson focus on criminal events and activities known as routine activity. There are three key elements to routine activity: the offender, the tar­ get and the guardian, collectively known as the crime triangle (Kleemans et al., 2012). Under routine activity theory, crimes require the convergence of a motivated offender, a suitable target (victim), and need to take place in circumstances where the target lacks protection of a capable guardian. Felson found that “routine activity patterns” can influence crime rates by creating conditions were motivated offenders were with a suitable targets who were without capable guardians (Cohen & Felson, 1979). In the 1990s, Felson expanded on his original concept, analyzing how crime rates are influenced by people’s lifestyles (Felson, 1994). Eck et al (2006) believed that social phenomena such as growing and developing cities, decreasing school size, prolifera­ tion of people working at home, and localization of social and economic environments acted collectively to increase guardianship and potentially decrease crime. Further, Felson ultimately concluded that crime could be discouraged by the mere presence of guardians (1995). The convergence of time and space is important in understanding the routine activ­ ities leading to crime (Felson, 1994). Per routine activity theory, offender and target must come together at the “right” time and place in the appropriate environment for crime to occur Rossmo & Harries, 2011). Routine activity theorists ask probing ques­ tions such as, “How do potential participants in crime move about over space and time in the course of the day? and “which hours of the day produce more of the routine activities leading to crime?” (1994, p. 147). On the subject of terrorism, they would ask questions such as “what routine activities surrounding a target are jihadists likely to exploit during their attack planning? (Rossmo & Harries, 2011). Through this line of inquiry, tactics can be developed to prevent and detect terrorism. 4.6.1 Routine activity and terrorism Routine activities theory can be used to focus on the locations where terrorists may commit their crimes because of their focus on the geography of crime. As discussed

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above, terrorists are often rational actors who plan their crimes mindfully (Rossmo & Harries, 2009). Analysis of past crimes has revealed that terrorists are careful and mindful of security and concealment (Rossmo & Harries, 2009). Thus, there is likely to be a geographic relationship between the terrorists and their chosen target loca­ tion. For example, terrorists have been known to select targets influenced by their activity space and home base (Rossmo & Harries, 2009). In one study of U.S. terror­ ism cases, it was determined that approximately half of the terrorists prepared for their attacks within a 30-mile radius of their targets (Cothren et al., 2008; Rossmo & Harries, 2011) and that most terrorist acts have been committed in highly populated areas (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2006). For terrorist acts, symbolism is also important. Scholars who study symbolism say that a function of terrorism is to send a message to a target audience (Matusitz, 2015). Targets have included airports, office buildings, pipelines, embassies, naval vessels, theaters, the United Nations, world leaders, sub­ ways, churches, federal buildings, tunnels and landmarks (McGee, 2001; Rossmo & Harries, 2009). Research on the routine activities of terrorists informs policy making toward crime prevention. Per routine activity theory, for crime to occur several conditions must be present including: the presence of a motivated offender, suitable target and insufficient supervision (aka guardian)—all within the optimal time and space. This means that if not all of these conditions are present, then the crime is much less likely to occur. As a result, crime can be prevented by inhibiting one or all of these factors (Kleemans et al., 2012). 4.6.2 Routine activity and policy According to Felson, security presence alone can thwart an attack (1995). This means, theoretically speaking, that increasing such presence has the potential to reduce the crime rates in each area. It can also mean that terror attacks can be thwarted by a physical security presence. In key areas, such as major landmarks and critical infra­ structure locations, this theory is advanced through the employment of private secu­ rity guards, who are viewed as a “… necessary supplement to the counterterrorism activities of public law enforcement agencies, who have limited resources and broad responsibilities” (CRS, 2004, p. 5). While this seems like an easy solution, it is cost prohibitive or otherwise unfeasible for some areas and is thus not a definitive security solution in all cases. Policymakers can also use routine activities theory to understand victim behavior in order to help reduce the potential number of crime victims. In one notable study on criminology and terrorism, Parkin and Freilich (2014) found the routine activities of crime victims impacted their exposure to danger. This implies that the routine activ­ ities of victims can inform policy and programs aimed at crime prevention. Routine activity theory says suitable targets are required for crime to occur. Public outreach is aimed at educating citizens to increase their overall resiliency, making them less likely targets for crimes such as terrorism. One example is in the area of active shooter edu­ cation. For example, several federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, offer active shooter workshops, vid­ eos and other materials to educate the public. In the DHS training materials, they advise citizens to “run, hide and fight” when confronted with an active shooter situ­ ation (2017).

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4.6.3 Situational crime One concept that developed independent of defensible space, CPTED and routine activity, but nonetheless is closely related to each, is called “situational crime pre­ vention”. As a facet of routine activity theory, research on situational crime preven­ tion has advanced the understanding of crime prevention efforts. Situational crime analysis research seeks to identify criminogenic conditions and methods to reduce the opportunity for crimes such as terrorism Kleemans Soudijn & Weeninik, 2010). Situational crime prevention attempts to analyze specific incidents and activities— rather than focus on offenders—to determine ways of preventing crime. In other words, context is more important than the offender or the motivation of the offender. Some methods advanced by Clarke include the following techniques: increasing the effort the offender takes to commit the crime, increasing the risks the offender takes when carrying out the crime, reducing the rewards (or the benefits) the offender expects to receive from the crime and removing excuses offenders use to justify their actions (Felson & Clarke, 1998; Kleemans et al, 2012). Examples of successful situa­ tional crime prevention measures include surveillance cameras in parking facilities, defensible space architecture in public housing and target hardening of apartment blocks (Clarke, 1995). In these examples, one can see the overlap between situational crime prevention, defensible space theory, CPTED and routine activity.

4.7 Summary and conclusions HLS is a complex metadiscipline, a discipline of disciplines. As such, HLS relies on the theory, structure and logic of a variety of disciplines. Crime and criminology are clearly integral aspects of the strategies, operations and structures in the HLS enter­ prise. Theories and concepts from Criminology and Criminal Justice, particularly defensible space theory, CPTED, rational choice theory, routine activity theory as well as situational crime prevention, provide yet another foundation, or pillar, of HLS theory. The theories discussed in this chapter provided many important takeaways for researchers, policy makers and program practitioners while also fermenting fur­ ther theoretical formation. For example, that buildings and other public spaces can be designed in such a way as to best encourage inhabitants to secure their space and deter crime; that community involvement is an important crime preventative and that engaging the community early in the planning process of new endeavors can help improve their security posture; that terrorists are known to be rational actors who execute with purpose; that routines are important and should be studied toward crime prevention efforts; that security presence can reduce the instance of terrorism; that citizens can conduct their daily activities in such a way as to avoid being a crime vic­ tim and that terrorists prepare for their crimes, which are usually conducted in highly populated areas, within a close proximity to their targets. While this chapter is an important contribution to the overall, or grand theoretical base of HLS, more research is needed to fully understand the applications of these and other criminological theories and concepts toward this complex metadiscipline of HLS. This work also identified important gaps and criticisms that serve to contribute to our general knowledge of how theories may inform but cannot always fully explain the phenomenon of crime prevention and detection and serve as a roadmap for further research leading to the development of a unique HLS theory.

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4.8 Discussion questions 1. Under Defensible Space Theory, can a terrorist be deterred? 2. Compare and contrast Defensible Space Theory and CPTED. What is their importance to the study of terrorism? 3. Under Rational Choice Theory, is terrorism considered a rational choice? Why or why not? 4. Why is security presence important to terrorism prevention, under Routine Activity Theory?

Notes 1. In criminology, the fear of crime is a significant problem which has been extensively researched. See for example Ditton and Farrall (2017) and Hale (1996). 2. Note that, euphemistically, all terrorism is considered criminal. 3. See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of terrorist target selection. 4. Critical infrastructures are systems and assets which are so important to the United States, that their incapacitation would have a “debilitating impact” (NIHS, 2019). 5. See Chapter 8 for a discussion of the application of rational choice theory as it applies to nation-states. 6. See Chapter 5 for an alternative discussion on rational choice and terrorism.

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Newman, O. (1972). Defensible space. New York: Macmillan. Newman, O., & National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. (1973). Architectural design for crime prevention (pp. 2700–00161). Washington, DC: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. Newman, O. (1975). Reactions to the “defensible space” study and some further findings. International Journal of Mental Health, 4(3), 48–70. Newman, Oscar. (1996). Creating defensible space. BiblioGov Project. Newmann, W. W. (2002). Reorganizing for national security and homeland security. Public Administration Review, 62, 126–137. Nunn, Sam. (2005). Preventing the next terrorist attack: The theory and practice of homeland security information systems. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 2(3), https://doi.org/10.2202/1547-7355.1137 NYC.Gov. (n.d.). Active design supplement: Promoting safety. https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doh/ downloads/pdf/environmental/promoting-safety.pdf Olajide, S. E., Lizam, M., & Adewole, A. (2015). Towards a crime-free housing: CPTED versus CPSD. Journal of Environment and Earth Science, 5(18), 53–63. Ostrom, Elinor. (1998). A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action: Presidential address, American Political Science Association, 1997. American Political Science Review, 92(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.2307/2585925. Parkin, W. S., & Freilich, J. D. (2014). Routine activities and right-wing extremists: An empir­ ical comparison of the victims of ideologically-and non-ideologically-motivated homicides committed by American far-rightists. Terrorism and Political Violence, 27(1), 182–203. Perry, Simon, & Hasisi, Badi. (2014). Rational choice rewards and the jihadist suicide bomber. Terrorism and Political Violence, 27(1), 53–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.962991 Reese, S. (2012). Defining homeland security: Analysis and congressional considerations. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Relyea, H. C. (2002, August). Homeland Security: Department Organization and Management. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. Reynald, Danielle M., & Elffers, Henk. (2009). The future of Newman’s defensible space the­ ory. European Journal of Criminology, 6(1), 25–46. https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370808098103 Reynald, Danielle M. (2010). Translating CPTED into crime preventive action: A critical exam­ ination of CPTED as a tool for active guardianship. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 17(1), 69–81. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-010-9135-6 Rossmo, D. Kim, & Harries, Keith. (2011). The geospatial structure of terrorist cells. Justice Quarterly, 28(2), 221–248. https://doi.org/10.1080/07418820903426197 Row, Arthur T., & Jacobs, Jane. (1962). The death and life of great American cities. The Yale Law Journal, 71(8), 1597. https://doi.org/10.2307/794509 Rutgers and U.S. DOT (Department of Transportation). (2017). Employing crime prevention through environmental design in the NJ safe routes to school program: A review of literature and recommendations, Nov. 2017. http://www.saferoutesnj.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ SRTS-CPTED-Topic-Report.pdf Schneider, Richard H. (2003) American anti-terrorism planning and design strategies: Applications for Florida growth management, University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy, 15, 129. Scott, John. (2000). Rational choice theory. In Understanding contemporary society: Theories of the present (pp. 126–138). https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446218310.n9 Shearing, C. D. (1989). Decriminalizing criminology: Reflections on the literal and topological meaning of the term. Canadian Journal of Criminology, 31, 169. Smith, R. W. (2005). What is homeland security? Developing a definition grounded in the cur­ ricula. Journal of Public Affairs Education, 11(3), 233–246.

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Stark, Rodney. (1987). Deviant places: A theory of the ecology of crime. Criminology, 25(4), 893–910. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.1987.tb00824.x St. Petersburg Police Dept. (n.d.). CPTED brochure. https://police.stpete.org/crime-prevention/ brochures/cpted-brochure.pdf Vito, G. F., & Maahs, J. R. (2015). Criminology. Jones & Bartlett Publishers. Weiser, Benjamin, & Baker, Al. (2011). A bridge under scrutiny, by plotters and the police. The New York Times. Yancey, William L. (1971). Architecture, interaction, and social control. Environment and Behavior, 3(1), 3–21. https://doi.org/10.1177/001391657100300101

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5

Terrorism: origins,

ideologies and goals

Kyle W. McDonnell and Keith Cozine

Description: It is imperative that security policy makers, practitioners and researchers understand the political historical, and social theoretical underpinnings of interna­ tional and domestic terrorism. While there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, this chapter nonetheless attempts to define terrorism. Next it examines the various social theories of terrorism and how they contribute to the development of the different types of terrorism. Finally, the chapter explores how these theories might help develop an estimation of what the terrorism will look like in the future so that effect policy and strategies to counter terrorism can be developed. Upon completion of this chapter, students will be able to: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Define terrorism. Achieve an understanding of several social theories of terrorism. Be able to analyze terrorism through the lens of rational choice and game theory. Examine terrorists’ goals from a theoretical perspective. Construct an analysis of the future of terrorism. Describe how terrorism integrates with the structure, operations and strategy of homeland security.

5.1 What is terrorism? To quantify something as nebulous as terrorism which is, in purely reductionist terms, a tactic of fear and wanton violence, is to delve into questions of political, moral, reli­ gious and legal affiliation. It is a term at once amorphous and unquantifiable, yet it is a fixture of the modern lexicon of global life. It is also something that begs for expo­ sition, if we are to study, understand and confront the threat imposed by it. To better understand what we today consider terrorism in a homeland security context, we must first understand the origins of the term, and the tactic. The noted political scientist and academic Walter Laqueur (1996) defines terrorism as: “The substate application of violence or threatened violence intended to sow panic in a society, to weaken or even overthrow the incumbents, and to bring about political change” (p. 24) This application of the definition of terrorism, however, is often contentious and sub­ ject to endless debates among academics, policy makers and practitioners. The oft recited cliché “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” can be reduc­ tive and over simplistic. Since terrorism has traditionally been defined by the broad

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“state”, it is a subjective term, influenced by any number of factors from religious affiliation (more specifically discrimination or oppression thereof), local politics, to moral norms and cultural mores. The terms terrorism and terrorist as we use them today have their roots in a period in France known as the “Reign of Terror” (1793–94), whereby those with the temer­ ity to oppose the French monarchy and participate in the French Revolution were branded with the appellation. Modern terrorism has morphed from this period and its other historic antecedents, which ran the gamut from anarchist attacks and polit­ ical violence, to assassinations of world leaders, including the assassinations of the 25th US President, William McKinley (Hoffman, 2006), and the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, the latter of which would be the “spark” that ignited the First World War. In a temporal context, these events constitute a small substratum of the intermi­ nable arc of terrorism, which spans from the first century to the modern day, all leading up and contributing to the modern “Wave Theory” of terrorism that has scourged both the 20th century and continues on in the 21st, with no cessation in sight. First posited by political scientist David C. Rapoport, these “waves” of ter­ rorism ebb and flow in increments of 40-year iterations. The different “waves” are products of the conditions and climate of the times in which they occur; driven by myriad factors that compel terroristic actors to heed the clarion call of violence in action (Rapoport, 2004). Terrorism is coming in different forms, and not always from abroad. There is trans­ national terrorism, which is terrorism that abounds from places other than the bor­ ders of a sovereign state, such as the September 11 attacks or July 7, 2005, London bombings. Then there is domestic terrorism, where the attack or plot was planned, financed and carried out within the borders of a single sovereign state and without influence from a foreign terrorist organization. Examples of this type of terrorism include the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the 2011 Norway attacks carried out by Anders Behring Breivik. It is also important to understand that terrorism had both long-term as well as short-term objectives. According to Tavares (2004), the three main short-term, or tac­ tical, goals of terrorism are gaining publicity and media attention, destabilizing polity and damaging economies. The main long-term goals of terrorism include redistribu­ tion of power, influence and wealth or the wholesale overthrow of a government or regime (Frey & Luechinge, 2005). We cannot ascertain where terrorism will end up unless we understand where it has been, and in doing so, it is imperative that we examine the body of social sci­ ence theory that explains why terrorist movements occur, why individuals gravitate toward terrorism, and give substance to the profession and scholarship of homeland security. 5.1.1 Theories of terrorism It can be a Herculean—if wholly unfeasible—endeavor to try to ascribe a single factor or causation to the “whys” and “hows” that allow a seemingly “normal” person to become a terrorist. It is more prudent than to try to pair the theoretical framework of established social science theory to ascertain how a person develops into a fullfledged terroristic actor. This section will attempt to delve into, in detail, the complex

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theoretical considerations that induce a seemingly “normal” person to become a ter­ rorist, and by extension, allows terrorism to thrive. In her book about the trial of infamous Nazi Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem, writer and political theorist, and philosopher Hannah Arendt (1963) coined the term the “banality of evil” to describe the blasé attitude Eichmann exuded during his trial, specifically how he described designing the mass murder of over six million people as just a function of “doing his job”. Eichmann, who was one of the main architects of the Holocaust and a high-ranking Nazi official, was greatly responsible for one of the worst atrocities the world had ever witnessed. During his trial for war crimes, Eichmann callously claimed that he was, in essence, just a simple bureaucrat doing the work his government appointed him to do. Essentially, Eichmann claimed that by blindly accepting and following the group think that was imposed on him by the Third Reich, he was incapable or unwilling to act or think for himself, because his orders were paramount to his own conscience. This “good soldier” excuse for the horrors committed by Eichmann does not fully account for what allowed him to turn a blind eye to one of history’s greatest atrocities, however, it is essential to understand how ideas and philosophies that run contrary to the acceptable moral and social norms of the time propagate, and how seemingly “normal” individuals can personally justify acts of incredible violence and devastation. The same could be said when discussing modern terrorists. Martha Crenshaw (1981) once stated that “the outstanding characteristic of terrorists is their normality” (p. 390). It is easy to ascribe over simplistic and pejorative terms like “psychopath” and “insane” to describe a terrorist, especially due to the chaos and carnage that they sow with their deeds. But by doing so, we tend to overlook the fact that a very complex and prolonged series of religious, familial and sociologic factors (amongst others) are responsible for the creation of a terrorist. That it is to say that while an individual terroristic actor may have a predilection to violence, or may indeed have a mental or behavioral disorder, terroristic ideation does not begin in a vacuum; it is borne from myriad inputs that all have sway in the process of radicalization and extremism. This all constitutes the popular axiom in the field of terrorism and security studies that a terrorist is “made, not born”. In Samuel Huntington’s (1996) polemic The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, he [Huntington] portends a world where the inexorable clash of two civilizations—the “West” and “the rest”—is brought about due to irrec­ oncilable cultural and religious issues that cannot be reconciled. He [Huntington] posits that social movements are formed and centered on these differences in cul­ ture and religion, and the animus between the two diametrically apposing cultural movements breed the kind of animus that allows terrorism to incubate and flourish. Huntington’s Clash thesis is a direct reaction to Samuel Fukuyama’s idealistic proc­ lamation that Western liberal democracy has prevailed in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union and through the triumph of Western capitalism in the early 1990s. Huntington’s treatise directly refutes Fukuyama’s position that all future conflict will emanate from clashes over “economic and technical problems” (Kellner, 2002). Similarly, Benjamin Barber (1996) describes a conflict of cultures that is brought about by the modernizing forces of secular globalization, which stands in direct contrast to the religious world, which is fundamentalist, premodern and deeply conservative.

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5.2 Social theories of terrorism Jackson (2006) refers to as Social movements as “a group of people with a common ideology who try together to achieve certain general goals” (p. 248). It is these social movements where many terrorists and terrorist ideologies are born. Whether it is the unity found amongst people in a virtual realm (e.g., Twitter, message board, etc.) or in person (e.g., student groups, political rallies, etc.), human beings seek out and crave the connectivity that is vital to the human experience. The perceived shared experi­ ence of a group or a culture forms inextricable bonds between its members, and the structure of a shared faith or political philosophy give a sense of purpose and duty to a life that can often be marred by chaos and uncertainty. It is not surprising then, that when these bonds are threatened, and the sense of purpose and stability is encroached upon, individuals tend to act to restore the balance that they feel that they have lost. Many times, the individuals or groups resort to tactics and means that are considered to be terroristic to achieve this renewed social symbiosis. It is important then, for us to deeply understand the social causalities and relevant theories that lead a group or individual down a path toward terror. 5.2.1 Social movement theory Since it is important to understand the causations that lead to the formation and recruitment of individuals into terrorist groups, or to act as lone terroristic actors, it is important that we examine one of the social incubators that allow this type of ideology to flourish. To give a generalizable framework for how the process of mobilization of terroristic actors in a social context occurs, one of the schools of thought that has been proposed and discussed in the field is called Social Movement Theory or SMT (Beck, 2008). A social movement organization is vital to SMT. According to Anja Dalgard-Nielsen (2008, p. 3), a social movement organization is “generally conceived as self-conscious group acting in concert to challenge the existing social order by confronting existing authorities. Social networks, accord­ ing to SMT, are the key vehicle for transmission of grievances, for recruitment, and for mobilization” (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008; Porta, 1992; Post, McGinnis, & Moody, 2014). Typically, internal and external strains on society that erode established institutions and create political instability lead to the coalescence of an already marginalized group to coalesce around a social movement that gives a sense of both stability and purpose to a fractious and oppressive existence. According to Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen (2008), joining social movements provides these disaffected individuals or groups’ out­ lets to alleviate their experienced psychological strain. Social movement theory is not homogenous, meaning that the causations and “symptoms” that create a social movement cannot always be predicted and accounted for. Many of the early research on terrorism causation centered on the idea that ter­ rorists were psychological deviants, or were driven to join the social movements of terrorism due to deeply entrenched systemic inequalities. Tarrow (1998) defines a social movement as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social soli­ darities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (p. 9). To this end, the framework of social movement theory is applicable to the study of terrorism, specifically because it cuts to the heart of what fuels terrorism in the first place. It can

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be said then, that terrorism is a byproduct of an organic social movement against oppression and societal inequality, real or perceived. Despite similarities between more traditional social movements and movements that spark terrorists, in much of the literature on global civil society and social movements, there has been a reluctance to include terrorism in the discussion. Many authors feel that social movements and global civil society must be benevolent in nature; however, who is to say what is benevolent? (Langhorne, 2006; Schock, 2005; Tarrow, 2002). Not all authors wish to exclude CTAs from discourse on social move­ ment organizations. Adamson (2005) views actors who use tactics of terrorism, insur­ gency and other forms of violence within their “repertoires of contention” as one subset of the broader category of “nonstate political entrepreneurs” who engage in transnational political mobilization (p. 32). Terrorist organizations view their griev­ ances as legitimate and the goals of these organizations are similar to organizations traditionally considered part of global civil society. The main difference between terrorists and other social movement organizations accepted as part of global civil society is that terrorists use violence as a means to achieve their goal of social change (Cozine, 2010). 5.2.2 Social network theory For as long as terroristic networks have been around, social science has tried to ascer­ tain what factors contrite to the formation, cohesion and continuation of these net­ works. They have often looked to the broader field of social network theory, which has been used to explain how social networks operate in fields as diverse as psychology to economics (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass, & Labianca, 2014). Social networks in soci­ ology are examined in terms of “nodes”, which are tightly coupled groups of people that coalescence around complex—yet understandable—relationships (Perliger & Pedahzur, 2011 Ressler, 2006). The pioneering work in social science surrounding social network theory relating to terrorism was brought about in the 1980s, when academics began to begin to widen their scope of the causations of political violence from the traditional explorations into individual and group accountability (Crenshaw, 1981; Granovetter, 1973). This theoretical frame has brought about a specific form of intelligence analysis in the field of homeland security: Social Network Analysis or SNA. The typography of this par­ ticular method of analysis delves deeper into these nodes to understand who anything from networks, people and even things like events are linked. It looks at not only the inextricable links that bond together religious, familial or cultural groups but also the fluid and dynamic groupings that are more prevalent in a global society where transi­ ence and rootlessness in both the physical and digital world has become de rigueur for denizens of the new global society. Modern social network analysis is a direct descendent of the work of Stanley Milgram, whose famous experiment conducted in 1967 sought to understand how people were connected to others. His experiment asked random people to take a package and pass it on to an individual whom would be most likely to reach a certain target individual (Milgram, 1967). What resulted was the infamous “six degrees of separation”, which has leeched into the pop culture lexicon. In a global context, Milgram’s work was expanded upon by DJ Watts, who argued that most networks in both the physical and natural world are made up of large quantities

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of clusters that are far reaching, all radiating out of a clustered center. From this clustered center and extending outward, there are many smaller clusters, or nodes, which are tightly interconnected. These tightly clustered nodes also have extra­ neous weak ties that can connect to any other node in the network in a few short connections (Ressler, 2006). Unlike social identity theory (discussed below), which favors the characteristics of the individual versus the group, these connections and nodes are useful for predict­ ing, understanding and accounting for group behavior. The way a clustered network is structured determines whom the network can reach, which has a direct impact on the recruitment efforts of a terrorist network. In this theoretical model, the individual is not eschewed entirely; rather they are central in understanding how their actions affect both their tightly clustered node, and how their actions impact the other nodes closely intertwined in their networks (Perrow, 1986). That makes this type of frame ideal for examining the salient factors that allow terrorist groups to thrive, and how to approach for mapping their networks. Marc Sageman (2004), in his book Understanding Terror Network examines the terrorist networks that make up al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations. Sageman traces the roots of these organizations to the “Afghan Arabs”—the name given to Muslims from around the world that went to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. The end of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan eliminated the legitimacy of jihad in the traditional sense. As a result, the hardcore leadership of some of the Afghan Arab groups decided to establish a base (or al-Qaeda, whose name in Arabic literally translates to “the base”) for a social movement to carryout worldwide jihad (36). After the Soviet occupation, the members of these groups returned to their home countries but remained part of the overall movement providing a foundation for a global network. This network gave al-Qaeda a global reach to allow the organization to recruit, train, plan finances and carry out attacks both toward “near enemy”—pagan states within the Islamic world that do not follow true Islamic principles, and the “far enemy”—those states outside the Islamic world whose actions cause harm to Muslims and the Islamic world, such as the United States and many Western European nations (44–5). While the Afghan Arabs provided a base for a global network in order to grow their movement, they would need to add new members to the jihad. However, join­ ing the jihad was not a single decision, but rather a process. New potential members must not only have an ideology that is in line with those espoused by the Salafi jihad but also have a means by which to join. Joining the network was a bottom-up pro­ cess rather than a top-down process. Motivated individuals who want to be part of the movement looked to join rather than waiting to be asked. But sharing the ideol­ ogy, a desire to join the movement and a willingness to attend training is not enough to become part of the network. Many motivated individuals want to join but do not know how to get in touch with an organization to do so. In order to join, one must first have a link to the network and finding a link was often a chance Finding a link to a Salafi jihad network is often a chance phenomenon. This link usually occurs through four key social affiliations: friendship, kinship, discipleship and worship (Sageman, 2004). Friends often decide to join jihad as a group rather than as individuals. If one per­ son in a group of friends is able to find a link to the network, he can share that link with the others in his group. In addition, by joining as group, it allows the friends to

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rely on each other for support as they go through the process. Kinship can provide a link if a family member is able to give access to networks. This link can be found in one’s immediate, extended or expanding family that resulted from a marriage where new in-laws provide access that did not previously exist. Links through discipleship accord through loyalty to a leader, who is in most cases, was an “Afghan Arab” dur­ ing the Soviet occupation, which provides access to the link to the network. Finally, places of worship can provide a link to the network. They provide a place where peo­ ple of like ideas may congregate. This interaction between individuals with like ideas allows for these ideas to intensify and create a bond between the individuals in a group (Sageman, 2004). Sageman (2004) points out that links are not just important for gaining access to the network, they are also crucial to maintaining the networks viability. As stated above, friends often attend training camps together were they not only learn terroristic skills but also build confidence among the groups and forge an “esprit de corps” among the friends, cementing their identity as global Salafi jihadists (p. 121). When these cliques leave their training, and return home, they become nodes in a global network. Sageman points out that terrorist networks are not static; rather they develop and can expand and grow over time. The member of one node can break away and create a new node. In doing so, he not only creates a new node but also acts as the link between the two nodes. As the process continues outward and more links are established and individual or group node can become a hub. 5.2.3 Conflict theory One of the most prevalent causes of friction in the modern world has to do with a clash of the “old ways” versus the on-going march toward modernity and increased globalization. The preservation of traditional ways of life is often diametrically opposed to the rapidity of modernization, which has ultimately been sped up by the break-neck pace of technological advancement. Most of the conflict that creates is attributed to the phenomena of “Westernization”, which stands in direct contrast to older, more established, and most consequentially, more conservative ways of life. This narrative is most exemplified by how the encroachment of Westernization into certain societies is perceived to bring with it the kind of secularization that directly impugns on the religious hegemony, history and culture that defines that society (Huntington, 1996). Conflict also exists in Western countries where the “old ways” seem to be under assail, according to a fringe part of the populous. Very thinly veiled racist viewpoints cloak the disdain that a certain subset of the population holds for immigrants, whom they see as destroying the very fabric of the society that they see them as being outside of. This takes the form of violent terrorism on the part of actors who indiscriminately target others they perceived being on the fringe of the “in-group” of their national identity, and whose only crime is their perceived encroachment upon this sacrosanct sense of national identity. Take for example the massacre at a Walmart in El Paso, Texas, which occurred on August 3, 2019. The shooter was disaffected with the state of immigration in the United States, so much so that he drove over eight hours from his home to execute a shooting spree on the predominantly Mexican patrons of that particular Walmart. This case shows the sense of disillusionment that a perceived conflict on the part of an isolated actor can have in action, whereby the security of the

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homeland is not/threatened from actors abroad who want to commit acts of terror as a retaliatory reaction to globalization or any number of injustices, but by the flagrant rhetoric that is pervasive and sows conflict at home. If we are to understand the root causes of conflict that lead individuals to become terroristic actors, then we can ameliorate many of the root causes of terrorism. It will take prolonged sociological examination and rigorous exploration to help demystify the causes of societal conflict, but a solid theoretical framework within the practice of homeland security can help bring about a sea change that reduces the incipient cul­ tural agitators that cause terrorism to bloom domestically. 5.2.4 Social identity theory One of the major criticisms levied against Westerners trying study terrorism is that their viewpoints tend to be antagonistic (Schwartz, Dunkel, & Waterman, 2009), and they don’t tend to empathize or attempt to understand cultural-specific identity or culturally specific viewpoints held by the terrorist. That is not to imply that one should sympathize with a person who willfully and deliberately propagates avarice and vio­ lence as a means of existence; rather, it means that one who is attempting to study the phenomenon of terrorism needs to be attuned to the societal, political and cultural identities of the individuals they seek to quantify. It is imperative, however, that we understand the role that cultural, social and personal identities shape and define mod­ ern terrorism. Social identity represents the self-ascribed significance attached to the social groups or communities to which one belongs, and with which one interacts directly, along with the feelings associated with participation in these groups’ activities (Jensen, 2003; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This gap in the study of how terrorists form their close relationships is bridged by seeking to understand that human beings are formed in the incubator of the societies and culture from which they are reared. Individual social identity is a complex broth of factors, and while it is true that human beings seek acceptance and solace in social groups, they also are not monolithic in their individual stock just because they subscribe to the ethos of one group versus another. Their core values are intractable to who they are as not only a member of society but at the core of their person as a human being. Take the example of the Boston Marathon Bombing and the case of the terror­ ists the Tsarnayev brothers is a perfect example of the terrorist identity based on the “imagined communities”. These terrorists had no discernable connection to any larger or established organizations, and even the proposed motivation that posited that they attacked the marathon to protest injustices visited on Chechnya holds no water, considering that the United States had never wronged the country. They were, however, seeking to be a part of a larger subset of terrorists that strike out inde­ pendently, in order to further a goal or aim shared only (in this case) by the individ­ uals perpetrating the attack. In this case, it is important to realize that the perceived cultural identity of the brothers was impetuous, regardless of the disconnect from true nature of their reality. The exploration into the theory of social identity is a step toward the demystifi­ cation of certain outlier groups for those in the field of terrorism studies, especially considering that they may have very little to no frame of reference into the worlds that make a terrorist. Subsequently, as Schwartzet al. (2009) point out, it is “considerably

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harder to demonize the ‘other’ when one has had the opportunity to meet, play, and work together for a substantial length of time”.

5.3 Terrorism and rational choice 5.3.1 Rational choice theory Rational choice theory contends that individuals use rational calculations to achieve out­ comes that align best with their own self-interests. This is why it is so confusing to many that something as seemingly random and senseless as terrorism could be a “rational choice”. When looking at terrorism from the lens of the rational actor, we must under­ stand that terrorists are, in most cases, acting quite rationally. That is to say that they have a set of goals or aims, be they political, personal and any innumerable reasons to employ terrorism as a means to achieve these goals. The terrorist or terrorist groups carefully weigh their choices and actions in order to most expeditiously and completely gain whatever it is that they seek to achieve in undertaking terrorism as a tactic in the first place (Crenshaw, 1990). William Riker contends that rational choice “assumes that the individual is the most appropriate judge of what is best for him or her… The individual has the freedom, as well as the responsibility, to shape his or her own life” (Riker, 1995). In the milieu of economics, where the idea of the rational actor model was con­ ceived and codified, six key considerations were identified and enumerated that one would have to consider in making a “rational” choice (Kreps, 1990). In his work on rational choice in economics, Frank Cowell (1985) laid out these considerations in detail. The considerations he identified are: 1. Collective economic phenomena (prices, national accounts, production efficiency) are the result of the individual decisions of autonomous decision makers; 2. Individuals have full knowledge of their preferences; 3. Individuals have full knowledge of the resources they have to satisfy their desires; 4. Individuals maximize their satisfaction, or utility, by allocating their scarce resources to alternative ends optimally; 5. Individuals possess all the capabilities for calculating how to allocate their resources optimally and 6. Individuals are concerned only with maximizing their own utility; they are unconcerned with how poorly or well others are doing. While Kreps and Cowell were both concerned with economics when they ascribed these characteristics to the Rational Actor Model, the transposition still seems to work in other social science realms, and in our case, the study of terrorism as it per­ tains to homeland security.1 Cowell’s list of factors for optimal rational choice is not without criticism. It is implied that in many of these assumptions, the individual actor has the prescience to know all of the factors present to make an optimal choice. The counter to this criticism is that based on all things being equal, an actor makes the optimal choice at the time, based on the best information available. This means that terrorists, when confronted by all possibilities and outcomes of their actions, will ulti­ mately choose the path that they believe will effectuate the best possible outcome for furthering their goals, whether they are political, cultural or any other factors that are the stated aim for using terrorism as a discretionary tactic.

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For example, terrorists may choose a target for maximum impact, and because their aims are political, those terrorists choose a target that has significance to the further­ ance of their aims, and will utilize the most limited resources possible in order to further these aims. In this sense, the rational choice is made by the terroristic actor utilizing a cost–benefit analysis. Besides the outliers where no real motive can be discerned as to why a terroristic actor chose a specific course of action (see the 2017 Las Vegas Massacre), it is generally assumed that even the most seemingly random attacks have some sort of deliberate strategy ascribed to them, no matter how obfuscated that strategy or moti­ vation may be. To this end, the Rational Actor Model makes three central assumptions: The first assumption is that the individual terrorist is motivated by relatively stable and consistent set of goals, which are at the heart of the terrorist organization or ter­ roristic movement. Terrorists, if their goal is the overthrow of a particular government, will utilize what they deem the most prudent and effective tactics and means to continue to attempt to overthrow said government, and they will not stop until this goal is met. The second assumption is that terrorism is a “calculated course of action” and that “efficacy is the primary standard by which terrorism is compared with other methods of achieving political goals” (McCormack, 2003). The rational choice model assumes that terrorist groups weigh their all of their options, and resort to violence only after determining that all political avenues are exhausted. The third and final assumption of the rational actor model (as it pertains to ter­ rorism) assumes that the decision to use terrorism is based on “the logic of conse­ quence”, that is, its political effectiveness relative to alternative options. Specifically, it is assumed that terrorist organizations achieve their political platforms at least some of the time by attacking civilians; that they possess “reasonable expectations” of the polit­ ical consequences of using terrorism based on its prior record of coercive effectiveness; and that they abandon the armed struggle when it consistently fails to coerce policy concessions or when manifestly superior political options arise. It is the expressed pol­ icy of the government of the United States to not enter into negotiations with terror­ ists specifically because of this assumption. If the United States were to bend to the violence of terrorists, they would lose any of the protection (real or assumed) that this policy affords (Abrahams, 2008; US Department of State, 2002, p. xii). 5.3.2 Game theory The idea of choice is extremely prescient when we are looking at how terrorists (or potential terrorists) select targets for attack. As far back as the early 1980s, scholars have tried to apply modeling to discern what makes terrorists more, or conversely, less likely to choose certain targets over others. Several scholars believe that Game theory is an appropriate tool for examining terrorism.2 An examination by Daniel Arce and Todd Sandler and (2003) proposes six distinct applications of how game theory trans­ poses to the study of terrorism: 1. Game theory captures the strategic interactions between terrorists and a target government, where actions are interdependent and, thus, cannot be analyzed (the concept of passivity); 2. Strategic interactions among presumed rational actors, that is, those who are trying to act according to how they think their counterparts will act and react, characterize the interface among terrorists (e.g., between hard-liners and

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3. 4.

5. 6.

moderates) or among alternative targets (e.g., among targeted governments, each of which is taking protective measures); Situationally, each side issues threats and promises to gain a strategic advantage (terrorist vs. target); Terrorists and governments abide by the underlying rationality assumption of game theory, where a player maximizes a goal subject to constraints. Empirical support for terrorists’ rationality is given credence by their predictable responses to changes in their constraints; Game-theoretic notions of bargaining are applicable to hostage negotiations and terrorist campaign-induced negotiations over demands; Uncertainty and learning in a strategic environment are relevant to all aspects of terrorism, in which the terrorists or government or both are not completely informed (Enders & Sandler, 1993, 1995; Sandler & Enders, 2004).

According to Sandler and Arce (2003), a “careful cooperative game-theoretic analysis of terrorist groups can provide some useful insights in assessing the true threat of terrorism. Terrorists’ cooperation allows them to prod government defensive measures to uncover the weakest link, to which they dispatch their best-shot team to create maximum damage”.

5.4 Goals of terrorism Most of the terrorism that occurs in a modern context can be identified as having one or more of three distinct factors, or goals, known as the strategic model of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1988, 1990). According to Max Abrahams (2008), the strategic model rests on three core assumptions: 1. terrorists are motivated by relatively stable and consistent political preferences; 2. terrorists evaluate the expected political payoffs of their available options, or at least the most obvious ones and 3. terrorism is adopted when the expected political return is superior to those of alternative options. According to Hirschman (2000), the five motives for modern terrorism can be buck­ eted as: 1. Ideological Terrorism: A desire for (revolutionary) changes in political or social structures; 2. Ethno-Political Terrorism: The longing of ethnic or political minorities in exist­ ing states for their own state or at least a certain political and cultural autonomy; 3. Religious Terrorism: A desire to impose religion-based norms of conduct, but also apocalyptic fanaticism; 4. Single Issue Terrorism: Extremist militancy of groups or individuals protest­ ing a perceived grievance or wrong usually attributed to governmental action or inaction, for example, the fight for animal rights, environmentalism and the fight against abortion; 5. Lone Wolf Terrorists/Mentally Disturbed/Deranged Actors: Single persons with a certain mission or social philosophy whose planning of terrorist attacks is fundamentally rational but who work without network or group support.

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A closer look into the “Four Waves” of modern terrorism reveals that one or more of these motivating factors are omnipresent in each successive wave as well. By exam­ ining the disparate time periods that shaped and were affected by these waves, we can begin to dissect their causes, motivations and outcomes. Not only does that make us more adept at understanding the underlying causes that allow modern terrorism to manifest, thrive and fester but also gives us a unique window into the future; a future where the next wave of terrorism is lurking ominously to inflict its particular brand of panic and violence upon the world. As far as homeland security is concerned, we must be aware of the history and intricacies of these motivations, if we are to better understand, plan and brace for the eventualities that this insidious menace imperils upon the safety and security of society. 5.4.1 Religiously motivated terrorism As previously touched upon, a conflict regarding religion is one of the major causes of consternation and grievance on the part of those who turn to terrorism for remedy what they believe is encroaching on their religious identity. This conflict is most often framed in the context of the Western secular world encroaching on traditionally Islamic coun­ tries (i.e., the “Clash of Civilizations”, see Huntington, 1996). This precept obfuscates the fact that terrorism in the name of religion is far more complex and spans the entire spectrum of world religions. Conflicts between sects of some religions account for far more of the terrorism than any one religion against another, yet this is never the picture that is portrayed to the public. Fundamentalist exist in Christianity, Judaism and even Buddhism, and they all have utilized terroristic tactics to further their aims. Groups like the Aryan Nation, who view their Christian identity as one of the core precepts of their identity, are willing to commit acts of despicable—and indiscrimi­ nate—violence upon person that run anathema to their idealized version of what the populous should be. By this very definition, the Aryan Nation is a terrorist organization. Monotheism in both Western and Eastern religions, no matter how much they pro­ fess to be bastions of peace have run contrary to this idea since their inception. It shows no discernable signs of abatement, and as such, it is vital to consider how all of the world’s religions prove to still be a constant driver of terrorism all over the globe. 5.4.2 Political terrorism According to Anthony Oberschall (2004), terrorism is “an extreme, violent response to a failed political process engaging political regimes and ethnic and ideological adver­ saries over fundamental governance issues”. Therefore, Oberschall (2004) further state that terrorism is “not the act of madmen or of political and religious sociopaths but of political agents who choose covert, violent means to achieve political goals, be they ethnonational, religious, or ideological”. To that end, terrorism forms as organically as any other political movement, which in its essence, is a form of collective action. And just like any other political movement or collective action, several constant factors or “dimensions” must be present in order for the political movement of terrorism to fully form. Taylor and Quayle (1994) com­ ment that “political violence is a learned behavior”. This means that all political terror and the violence that it creates can be attributed to the “perfect storm” of factors or dimensions, combined with the learned behavior of a group.

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While it is the aim of every moralistic society to be just and moral, certain injus­ tices and oppressive tendencies sometimes prevail over best intentions. When these injustices are visited upon the populous of said society, grassroots campaigns often coalesce with that aim of swinging the pendulum back to the side of righteousness and virtue (Zutlevics, 2002). One of the byproducts of the belief or feeling that one is being oppressed may be the result of the feeling that someone (or something) is extricating the sovereignty that is bestowed upon an individual as part of their being a part of, or belonging to, a nation or culture. This oppression does not end when the subject of the oppression flees; rather it may actually intensify. Take for example the on-going war in Syria, and the resultant flow of migrants into Europe. Many of those who have left their home country have done so because they were seeking solace and refuge from the ravages of ISIS. Scattered amongst that diaspora are disaffected persons who seek to stoke their national and cultural bonds and identities, rather than assimilate into a new culture. This conflict of identity may be the exact fissure that terroristic propaganda and indoctrination preys upon, seeking to utilize the confusing cultural conundrum of the refugee to take up terrorism to assuage their conflicted conscience. The stark reality is that many sovereign states are actually sponsors of terrorism, endorse and promote terroristic acts, or finance both domestic and international terrorism. At times where the politics and rhetoric of a nation or culture are inflamed, adherents on any side of an issue or cause may use terrorism to justify or achieve favorable ends for their cause. The common denominator is that no matter what side of an issue or the political spectrum they may fall, the idea of their perceived righteous in forwarding the best for their nation or culture through their actions is what war­ rants the deviousness terrorism they engage in. 5.4.3 Single issue terrorism Single Issue Terrorism, defined as “extremist militancy of groups or individuals pro­ testing a perceived grievance or wrong usually attributed to governmental action or inaction. Some of the more salient issues in this category of terrorism consist of the fight for animal rights, environmentalism and the fight against abortion (Smith, 1998). Single issue terrorism is usually a byproduct of the clash of societal or political issues of the time, whereby the terroristic actor seeks remedy for an ill that society or politi­ cians are unwilling, unable or intransigent on changing. They then, by rote, believe it a necessary and justified means of action to resort to terrorism to try to change a deeply entrenched issue than they would otherwise try to find a peaceful resolution to. While they believe that they are activists, the line between that and terrorist becomes blurred on occasion, much like the freedom fighter vs. terrorist conundrum. Some of the issues that these activists are engaged in protesting are contentious, and have the propensity to turn violent. The vast majority of these “activists” operate within the rule of law, but, in some instances, just like terrorists who commit violence in the name of religious, ideological or political reasons, a fraction of the extremist activist minority cross over to become terrorists. Smith (1998) states that “legitimate and traditionally moderate organizations such as animal welfare societies have for years achieved notable results on behalf of the cause for which they lobby”. But, as the world has become more politicized and the Internet made it easier to lobby a cause and rally people, some of these issues have “attracted radical elements that now form

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an extremist militant core prepared to resort to threats, violence and destruction to achieve their aims. In the case of the abortion issue, this has included murder…the definition of terrorism … fits perfectly (Hirschmann, 2000). It can also be argued that all terrorism is political terrorism. The goal of terror­ ists is to facilitate some sort of change in society in alignment with their ideological belief. This is the case whether the ideology is based on religion, revolutionary change (extreme right-wing or left-wing), ethno-supremacy or single issue. Like in the discus­ sion above regarding social movement, terrorism is just politics by other means where violence and fear substitutes “legitimate” political action. In fact, in the eyes of terror­ ists, they view fear and violence as legitimate political action.

5.5 The future of terrorism If we were to dissect terrorism in its most modern incarnation (what Rapoport (2004) would consider the “Fourth Wave”), it could be argued that it takes three forms: The first involves a group or a tightly coupled group that follows a hierarchal chain of command where all strategic, operational and tactical decisions are made and then funneled down to the operatives on the ground that will carry out the orders. The second involves an amorphous amalgam of individual actors or coupled networks that are somewhat more decentralized, eschewing the larger terroristic unit in favor of their own ipseity, but who still remain ardent supporters of, and adherents to a larger group’s identity and ideological dogma. Finally, a loosely coupled movement where individuals can act on their own without any tactical or operational guidance in fur­ therance of the ideology to which they identify (Jackson, 2006). Some would contend that we have reached the apogee of the “Fourth Wave”, where groups like ISIS have all but been completely crushed, and other terroristic groups like al-Shabab and al-Qaeda only hold small, centralized swaths of territory in specific geographic regions. Other academics and theorists posit that we are in the neo-fourth wave, not still mired in the second decade of the two decades of the Fourth Wave that Rapoport prognosticated, whereby the confluence of the return of foreign fighters displaced from the routing of ISIS, the increase of online terroristic propaganda, and the overflow of any number of civil conflicts abroad has created a new leviathan in the milieu of global terror (Braithwaite & Chu, 2018; Gibbs, 2018). In Europe, and more specifically France, events such as the terrorist attacks on the Bataclan and the truck assault in Nice, we are seeing that the combination of return­ ing fighters into Europe from far away battlefields are targeting civilian populations going about their routine lives in order to sow mass chaos and incite fear and panic (Braithwaite & Chu, 2018; Neiberg, 2017). Online mediums, such as message boards, e-magazines and social media platforms spew a toxic mix of vitriol and operational knowledge (e.g., Dabiq, Inspire, Twitter, etc.) are arming the curious and motivated not only with invective but also with the technical skills to wreak havoc on unassuming members of the public. Considering that returning fighters from these far away battlefields have come from most every demographic and social strata of society, the threat now comes from a potential adversary who is hiding in plain sight: innocuous and unassuming, waiting for the motive, means and opportunity to reveal themselves in an explosion of vio­ lence that is the earmark of a new “Fifth Wave” of terrorism in America, Europe and beyond. The real targets of terrorism are our political institutions, which in this case

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becomes carried out on the denizens of the towns and cities in the West by proxy, all in the fulfillment of a political philosophy which declares that we must cease our per­ ceived meddling in any number of arenas where we are perceived to be exerting undue control or influence, lest we value peace and seek to see an end to terroristic violence of this kind. To this end, the intrinsic nature of globalization has made this an impos­ sibility. We in the West are so firmly ensconced in the economies and global affairs as a whole, that extricating ourselves would prove impossible. Hence, we are doomed to suffer through this next iteration, or “Fifth Wave” of terrorism. Some contemporaneous academic works have explored the idea that the fourth wave will end as scheduled, that is, with the 40-year cycle that Rapoport suggests. What can be gained from these works is that there is mounting evidence that indicates the Fourth Wave of modern terrorism may be the wane (Weinberg & Eubank, 2010) Groups like ISIS have largely been rooted out the territories that they have held, and traditionally violent groups such as al-Gamma al-Islamiyah, which has been responsible for major terror­ ist attacks, have publicly claimed that they are eschewing future violence. This down­ ward trend coupled with the ability of domestic and international authorities to monitor, detect and prevent terrorist attacks has signified that the end of the fourth wave is nigh. These proclamations, however, should be cautiously considered. Since the fall of the Islamic State in recent years, floods of battle-hardened fighters and refugees from the failed Caliphate into Western Europe has been precipitous and constant, and the result­ ant series of terrorist attacks since (specifically lone wolf attacks) makes the pronounce­ ment of the end of the Fourth Wave seem premature and ill conceived. It was clearly written in support of the generational aspect of wave theory, but it only muddles the case. Weinberg (2012) is optimistically enthusiastic that his prognostication of the end of the Fourth Wave of terrorism is truly coming to fruition, we would then enter a period whereby terrorism may unceremoniously evaporate altogether; returning to the fringes of the kind of political violence that was emblematic of terrorism in the 20th century. Martin Gallagher on the other hand, is less optimistic. He sees the end of the Fourth Wave breaking, and states that: “we may be seeing an evolution to per­ haps a new and even more dangerous wave”, which he ominously likens to a tsunami (Gallagher, 2017). With the meteoric rise of social media in the last decade, and the ubiquity of personal communications devices that link all four corners of the globe seamlessly and instantly, a new, disturbing phenomenon is emerging in the annals of modern terrorism, which quite possibly is the beginnings of a new, “Fifth Wave” of terrorism. While the fact remains that no academic theory is able to capture the full scope of any issue in the social sciences, Wave Theory remains a catalyst for further academic pursuits insofar as terrorism and homeland security studies are concerned specifically because of the malleability of its premise. Terrorist groups and terroristic actors con­ tinue to defy simplistic classifications, and are adept at adapting to the fluctuating circumstances of the world around them. The ascendency of the nascent Fifth Wave, if it truly is upon us, only further underscores the organic nature of Wave Theory, and its subsequent usefulness to academia precisely because it doesn’t put any constraints on or assume any predictive control over the future of terrorism. One of the major threats facing homeland security today is the issue of “Lone Wolf” terrorism. It is a form of terrorism that is usually purely a domestic threat, even though the causes and the actors may be from abroad. It is also a type of terrorism that is markedly more dangerous than organized terrorism (i.e., terrorist groups), because the threat is often so far ranging, and from every point on cultural, religious and

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political spectrum. Former President Obama once remarked that lone wolf terrorism is more likely to cause harm than organized terrorism would as we move further into the 21st century. This prognostication by the leader of the free world was both valida­ tion and a signifier that we have entered into a new generation of terrorism, and that threat is both hard to account for, and lacking the unifying factors that were, until very recently, the hallmark of modern terrorism. If the end of the fourth wave of ter­ rorism is truly coming to an end, will the lone wolf terrorist become the paradigm for the fifth wave? What will the overarching ideology of a fifth wave? 5.5.1 “The fifth wave of terrorism” Predictions about a coming fifth wave of terrorism go back over a decade. Kaplan (2007) suggested the fifth wave would centralize around the concept of “new tribalism”. The goal of those who adhere to a new tribalism movement dream of the creation of a new utopian society within their lifetime that is uncontaminated by any semblance of the old world. To achieve these goals killing on a massive scale is not only condoned; it is a desired means to a glorious end. He argues that this fifth wave terrorism would have all of the following characteristics: 1. Radicalize and break away from established terrorist wave; 2. Born of hope expressed at the extremes: some emerge after all hope has been lost, others because the dream has been realized; 3. Physical withdrawal into wilderness areas; 4. Claim to establish some form of a new calendar (“the Year Zero”); 5. Radical quest for purity—racial, tribal, ecological, etc.; 6. Internal compromise impossible resulting in deadly schisms and constant inter­ nal violence; 7. Belief in human perfectibility and chiliastic utopia in this lifetime; 8. Emphasis on creating new men and women makes old models expendable; thus the logic of genocidal violence; 9. Obsession with creating new race places tremendous emphasis on women, who are both subject and object of fifth wave violence; 10. Children are the vanguard of the fifth wave as they are the least contaminated by the old society (not to mention the old STDs, HIV and other remnants of the old societies); 11. Rape is the signature tactic of the fifth wave; 12. Violence is so pervasive in the fifth wave that it loses its message content beyond the simple assertion that “we exist”; 13. The effects of rituals of rape and killing, especially for newly abducted ”recruits”, has the liminal effect of binding the killers to the group while closing the doors for all group members to a return to family, the old society, and previous ways of life; 14. Fifth wave groups are localistic and particularistic, having turned their backs on the international waves from which they emerged; 15. Nonetheless, if needed for survival, foreign allies will be cultivated and the fifth wave groups will often live in exile in neighboring states; 16. Authoritarian in nature with charismatic leadership patterns; 17. Chiliastic in nature, deeply religious with eclectic or syncretic religious tropes assembled and interpreted by the leaders in support of a millenarian dream to be realized through a campaign of apocalyptic violence (p. 548).

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He puts forth the Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda, a nationalist group centered around an Acholi ethnic identity operating on the borders of the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and South Sudan. Similarly, Honig and Yahel (2019) argue that the fifth wave will be characterized by the emergence of terrorist semistates where groups have control over portions of a weak state’s terri­ tory, maintaining governance there while simultaneously launching terrorist attacks against third-party states. Celso (2015) views the Islamic State and Boko Haram as organizations that are within Kaplan’s fifth wave rather than the religious fourth wave. Kaplan’s fifth wave theory theme to buck the trend of lone wolf terrorism as the organi­ zations viewed as part of this fifth wave appear to reflect a typology of Jackson’s Tightly Coupled Groups rather than the Loosely Coupled Movements that more closely resem­ ble lone wolf terrorism. In addition, Kaplan’s fifth wave is not global, as was the case with Rapoport’s with new tribalism semistates existing only in Asian and Africa. Simon (2010) takes another approach to predicting what the fifth wave will be. He argues that the fifth wave will have no predominate ideology, group or movement but rather it will be technology that will be the dominating characteristic of the fifth wave with the Internet serving as the energy that fuels the “technology wave” (p. 45). The reality is that technology had a great impact on all of the first four waves of ter­ rorism whether it be dynamite in the anarchist wave, images of the war in Vietnam and attacks beamed around the world spurring the new left wave, or the Internet and social media that have played such a prominent role in the religious wave over the past 20 years. Post et al. (2014) offer another take on the fifth wave, one where lone wolf ter­ rorism and technology collide. Lone wolf terrorists who through the Internet are rad­ icalized feel they belong to the virtual community of hatred. They can comb through seemingly endless array of radical websites while trolling social media seeking out “radicalizers” and like-minded alienated individuals offer a “sense of belonging and significance” (p. 329). The 2011 Norway attacks carried out by Anders Breivik, and more recent attacks in 2019 such as the Christchurch, New Zealand, carried out by Brenton Tarrant; Patrick Crusius’s attack on a Walmart in El Paso Texas; and the January 2020 attack by David Anderson and Francine Graham on a Kosher supermar­ ket in Jersey City, New Jersey, seem to add a great deal of support to Post, McGinnis, and Moody’s assertions. This combined with other more organized ethic-based groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army suggest there may be an emerging ideological trend that revolves around an ethno-centric ideology that will fuel the next wave. Are we on the cusp of an Ethno-supremacy Wave of Terror? Regardless of the answer to this question, one is clear; technology will play a major role in shaping the next wave regardless of what shape that wave takes. 5.5.2 Technology & terrorism Another portent of the looming fifth wave of terrorism concerns technology, more specifically technology being used as a means of recruitment, indoctrination and even as a mechanism to inflict terror. According to Sebastian Wojciechowski (2017), tech­ nical progress has an indisputable influence on the majority of social phenomena and processes in the modern world, including terrorism. Take for example social media, which less than a decade ago was decidedly not a ubiquitous part of modern life as it is today. Platforms like Twitter and Instagram allow terroristic actors to easily source like-minded ideologies and people who subscribe to

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the same brand of extremism that they do. They can, in real time, interact with terrorists around the globe to plot, coordinate and direct attacks. They can also use computers to infiltrate their way into systems that control vital infrastructure, crippling whole munic­ ipalities, states or even nations, with a few strokes of the keyboard (Post et al., 2014). The insouciance of many of the older generations of politicians to heed this pres­ cient threat do so at our collective peril; it is here, it is real and it is knocking at our door. It is the wave of the future, a purely 21st century threat model that continues its expanse in such rapidity that policy makers, practitioners and academics struggle to stay ahead of the curve, or even take an anticipatory stance as to not only what the next threat will be but also how to mitigate against it.

5.6 Summary and conclusions Regardless of what the Fifth Wave of terrorism looks like, it is imperative that security policy makers, practitioners and researchers understand the historical and social theo­ retical underpinnings of terrorism. Social science theory can help explain why terrorist movements occur, why individuals gravitate toward terrorism, and gives substance to the profession and scholarship of homeland security. Terrorist and terrorist organiza­ tions after all are part of movements seeking social change in line with their particularly ideology. What separates them from other movements is their use of violence as a tool to initiate change. Therefore, social movement theory can help explain why individuals take action around particular ideological belief. Like with other movements, terrorist groups can be considered social movement organization, meaning that social network theory and social network analysis can lead to a better understanding of these groups in terms of structure, operations and membership. Conflict Theory and Social Identity Theory help explain why individual gravitate toward a terrorist group, or in the case of lone wolves, carry out attacks in the furtherance of a movement. Rational choice and game theories help better understand terrorists’ strategic and tactical decision-making. Using these theories and in combination of an examination of the motivating ideo­ logies that shape the goals of terrorists, a better understanding of the threat from terror­ ism can be developed. As with all waves of terrorism, technology is an important variable that must be considered, particularly the use of the Internet and social media as a means of recruitment and dissemination of propaganda. Through much of this chapter, spe­ cific examples of terrorism were cited to help better explain these theories and concepts. Likewise, by applying these theories and concepts to the new act of terrorism and emerg­ ing trends, more sound terrorism policies and strategies can be developed while continu­ ing to guide further research into terrorism to help influence those policies and strategies.

5.7 Discussion questions 1. How can social movement theory help explain why terrorist movements form around a specific ideology? 2. How can social network theory and the command and control approach help analyze the structure of terrorist movements and groups? 3. How does conflict theory and social identity theory help explain why individual gravitate toward terrorism? 4. How does rational choice theory and game theory apply to terrorist strategic and tactical decision-making?

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Kyle W. McDonnell and Keith Cozine 5. What theories and variable must be considered when predicting what the fifth wave of terrorism will look like? 6. How do the strategies, operations and structure of the modern homeland secu­ rity enterprise support the fight against terrorism?

Notes 1. See Chapter 4 for a discussion on rational choice as it relates to crime and security. 2. See Chapter 8 for a description of game theory in terms of nation-state decision-making.

References Abrahams, M. (2008). What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy. International Security, 32(4), 78–105. Adamson, F. B. (2005). “Globalisation, Transnational Political Mobilisation, and Networks of Violence” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1 April 2005. Arce M, D. G., & Sandler, T. (2003). An evolutionary game approach to fundamentalism and conflict. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 132–154. Arendt, H. (1963). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil. New York, N.Y., U.S.A: Penguin Books. Barber, B. (1996). Jihad vs. McWorld. New York: Ballantine Books. Beck, C. J. (2008). The contribution of social movement theory to understanding terrorism. Sociology Compass, 2(5), 1565–1581. Borgatti, S. P., Mehra, A., Brass, D. J., & Labianca, G. (2009). Network analysis in the social sciences. Science, 323(5916), 892–895. Braithwaite, A., & Chu, T. S. (2018). Civil Conflicts Abroad, Foreign Fighters, and Terrorism at Home. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62(8), 1636–1660. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0022002717707304 Celso, A. N. (2015). The Islamic state and Boko Haram: Fifth wave jihadist terror groups. Orbis, 59(2), 249–268. Cowell, F. (1985). Microeconomic Principles. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cozine, K. (2010). Transgovernmental networks as a tool to combat terrorism: How ICE attachés operate overseas to combat terrorist travel (Doctoral dissertation, Rutgers UniversityGraduate School-Newark). Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism. Comparative Politics, 13(4), pp. 379–399. Crenshaw, M. (1988). Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches. Inside Terrorist Organizations. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 13–31. Crenshaw, M (1990). The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 7–24. Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2008). Studying violent radicalization in Europe I: The potential contribu­ tion of social movement theory. Danish Institute for International Studies. Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (1993). The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A VectorAutoregression-Intervention Analysis. American Political Science Review, 87(4), 829–844. doi:10.2307/2938817 Enders, W., Sandler, T. (1995). Terrorism: Theory and applications. Handbook of Defense Economics, 1, 213–249. Frey, B. S., & Luechinger, S. (2005). Measuring terrorism. L aw and the State: A Political Economy Approach: New Horizons in Law and Economics, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 142–181.

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Gallagher, M. J. (2017). The 2016 ‘lone wolf’tsunami-Is Rapoport’s ‘religious wave’ending?. Journal of Strategic Security, 10(2), 60–76. Gibbs, J. (2018) Terrorist attacks targeting the police: the connection to foreign military pres­ ence, Police Practice and Research, 19:3, 222–240, DOI: 10.1080/15614263.2017.1295245 Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78, 1360–1380. Hamm, M. S., & Spaaij, R. (2017). The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism. La Vergne: Columbia University Press. Huntington, Samuel. “P,(1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.” Simon and Schuster: New York. Hirschmann, K. (2000) The Changing Face of Terrorism. International Politik und Gesellschaft. No. 3. pp 299–310. Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside terrorism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Honig, O., & Yahel, I. (2019). A fifth wave of terrorism? The emergence of terrorist semi-states. Terrorism and Political Violence, 31(6), 1210–1228. Huntington, S. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Touchstone Books. Jackson, B. A. (2006). Groups, networks, or movements: A command-and-control-driven approach to classifying terrorist organizations and its application to al-Qaeda. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29(3), 241–262. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100600564042 Jensen, L. (2003). Coming of age in a multicultural world: Globalization and adolescent cul­ tural identity formation. Applied Developmental Science, 7(3), 189–196. Kaplan, J. (2007). The fifth wave: The new tribalism? Terrorism and Political Violence, 19(4), 545–570. Kellner, D. (2002). September 11, social theory and democratic politics. Theory, Culture & Society, 19(4), 147–159. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276402019004011 Kreps, D. (1990). A course in microeconomic theory (p. 480). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Langhorne, R. (2006). Global civil society. In The essentials of global politics, London, United Kingdom: Hodder Arnold. Laqueur, W. (1996). Postmodern terrorism. Foreign Affairs, September/October 1996, pp. 24–36. McCormack, W. (2003). The Military-Judicial Nexus in Response to Terrorism: KKK and AlQaeda. bepress Legal Series, 46. McEvily, B., Brass, D. J., Labianca, G., Mehra, A., Halgin, D. S., & Borgatti, S. P. (2014). Do you know my friend? Attending to the accuracy of egocentered network data. Contemporary perspectives on organizational social networks, 40, 295-313. Milgram, S. (1967). The small world problem, Psychology Today, 60–67. Neiberg, M. (2017). No more elsewhere: France faces the new wave of terrorism, The Washington Quarterly, 40(1), 21–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302736 Oberschall, A. (2004). Explaining terrorism: The contribution of collective action theory. Sociological Theory, 22(1), 26–37. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3648957 Perliger, A., & Pedahzur, A. (2011). Social network analysis in the study of terrorism and political violence. PS: Political Science and Politics, 44(1), 45–50. Perrow, C. (1986). Complex organizations: A critical essay New York, NY: Random House. Porta, D. d. (1992). Introduction: In individual motivations in underground political organizations. In Dontaella della Porta (Ed.). Social movements and violence. London, United Kingdom: JAI Press. Post, J. M., McGinnis, C., & Moody, K. (2014). The changing face of terrorism in the 21st century: The communications revolution and the virtual community of hatred. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 32, 306–334. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2123

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Rapoport, D. C. (2004). The four waves of modern terrorism. Attacking terrorism: Elements of a grand strategy (p. 54, 3–11). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press 2004. Ressler, S. (2006). Social network analysis as an approach to combat terrorism: Past, present, and future research. Homeland Security Affairs, 2. Riker, W. (1995). The political psychology of rational choice theory. Political Psychology, 16(1), 37. Sageman, Marc, (2004). Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Sandler, T. & Enders, W. (2004). An economic perspective on transnational terrorism. European Journal of Political Economy. 20. 301–316. 10.1016 Schock, K. (2005). Unarmed insurrections: People power movements in nondemocracies. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Schwartz, S., Dunkel, C., & Waterman, A. (2009). Terrorism: An identity theory perspective. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 32(6), 537–559. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100902888453 Smith, G. D. (1998). Single issue terrorism. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Commentary No. 74. Simon, J. (2010). Technological and lone operator terrorism. In Rosenfeld, J., Rasler, K., Thompson, W., et al. (Eds.). Terrorism, identity and legitimacy: The four waves theory and political violence. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In The Psychology of Intergroup Behavior (pp. 7–24). Chicago, IL: Nelson Hall. Tarrow, S. G. (1998). Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Tarrow, S. (2002). The New Transnational Contention: Organization, Coalition. Mechanisms. Presentation at the Panel on “Social Movements and Transnational Social Movements” American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, September 1, 2002, Chicago. Tavares, J. (2004). The open society assesses its enemies: Shocks, disasters and terrorist attacks. Journal of Monetary Economics, 51, 1039–1107. Taylor, M. & Quayle, E. (1994). Terrorist lives. London, United Kingdom: Brassey’s Defence Publishers. US Department of State. (2002). Patterns of global terrorism, Washington, DC: US Department of State. Weinberg, L. (2013). The end of terrorism?. London Routledge. Weinberg, L. &Eubank, W. (2010). An end to the fourth wave of terrorism? Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(7), 594–602. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.483757 Wojciechowski, S. (2017). Reasons of contemporary terrorism: An analysis of main deter­ minants. In Sroka, A., Garrone, F., & Kumbrián, R. (Eds.). Radicalism and terrorism in the 21st century: Implications for security (pp. 49–70). Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Peter Lang AG. Zutlevics, T. L. (2002). Towards a theory of oppression. Ratio, 15(1), 80. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/1467-9329.00177

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Interagency collaboration John Comiskey

Description: From its inception, homeland security was a collaborative national effort to protect the homeland from all hazards. Indeed, the set of agencies, organizations and levels of government that collectively describe the homeland security mission is referred to as the homeland security enterprise. Planning and acting in unison, the homeland security enterprise, is greater than the sum of its parts and is also referred to as the “all of nation” approach to homeland security. The homeland security enterprise depends, almost totally, on collaboration and the orchestration of each member of the enterprise working together to accomplish the larger mission. This chapter examines the evolution of interagency collaborations as well as their theoretical underpinnings in the homeland security domain. Together, interagency collaboration is not only crit­ ical but also supports the strategies and operations of homeland security as well as represents the structures of homeland security. Upon completion of this chapter students will be able to: 1. Identify and describe the U.S. homeland security threat landscape. 2. Identify and describe the tenets of interagency collaboration. 3. Identify, describe and evaluate the consensus-seeking process inherent to the interagency process. 4. Describe the theoretical components of interagency collaborative capacity and their implications for homeland security. 5. Apply interagency collaborative capacity theory and associated theories such as craftsmanship theory, resource dependence theory and network theory to a homeland security problem.

6.1 Introduction Interagency collaboration is a homeland security imperative. The homeland security enterprise evolved as a direct response to the interagency shortcomings associated with the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Hurricane Katrina (2005) and other events were created and tasked to collaboratively protect the nation from all hazards (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004; U.S. Senate, 2006). The homeland security enterprise (hereafter “the enterprise”) was defined as “the collective efforts and shared responsibilities of Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmen­ tal and private sector partners—as well as individuals, families and communities—to maintain critical homeland security capabilities” (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2010a). “All hazards” refer to natural disasters, accidental/technical catastrophes

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and adversarial/human-caused threats such as hurricanes and wildfires, critical infra­ structure and cyber threats, terrorism, transnational crime and active shooters (DHS, 2011a,b; FEMA, 2019; White House, 2002, 2007). On the surface, the notion of collaboration is simple—people and organizations work together to accomplish a common goal. They sense or know that they can achieve more together than they can alone. In practice, however, this is not always the case for two reasons. First, organizations like individuals naturally focus on their self-interests and sometimes to their detriment. Meadows (1986) referred to this phenomenon as bounded rationality, that is, logic that leads to decisions or actions within a broad sense within one part of a system, but which may not be reasonable within a broad context or when seen as a part of a wider system. Second, while stakeholders may have common goals and understand the need to collaborate with others to achieve their goals, they are likely to have different ideas about how the goals and objectives should be achieved. The 9/11 Commission raised these issues during its investigation of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. They found that while the U.S. agencies cooperated some of the time, cooperation was not the same as “joint action;” instead, cooperation was more about defining the problem and seeking assistance while joint action was more concerned about individuals from different backgrounds defining the problem and providing options for action with plans for its management. A unity of effort, that is working together collaboratively, was needed to protect the nation from terrorist attacks. Theories about interagency collaboration provide a framework to understand and propagate the “unity of effort” mantra to protect the nation. The precepts of collabo­ rative governance and interagency mechanisms for collaboration (IMC) that the enter­ prise uses to protect the nation as well as the theories that underlie those efforts are examined in this chapter. Collaborative governance is a type of governance in which public and private actors work collectively in distinct ways, using particular processes, to establish laws and rules for the provision of public goods (Ansell & Gash, 2005; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). IMCs are arrangements or applications that can facili­ tate collaboration among agencies, including interagency offices, groups, task forces, councils, conferences and communities of practice, collaborative technology and sim­ ilar constructs (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2012). 6.1.1 Chapter outline This chapter begins with a brief history of the enterprise and an overview of the enter­ prise’s IMCs and follows with an analysis and synthesis of the collaborative govern­ ance policy frameworks and theories that underpin the IMCs. Next, the collaborative governance synthesis is compared and contrasted to the enterprise’s IMCs real-world practices. The chapter concludes with a finding that the organizations that comprise the enterprise have, in large part, embraced collaborative governance as a means to protect the nation from all hazards, and offers recommendations to build on the suc­ cesses of the enterprise’s IMCs.

6.2 History and evolution of the homeland security enterprise The 9/11 terrorist attacks brought about the greatest reorganization of the U.S. gov­ ernment since the National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense

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(DOD), the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency to protect the nation in the Cold War era. The USA Patriot Act (2001), the Homeland Security Act (2002) and the Intelligence Reform and Prevention of Terrorism Act (2004) enhanced the information collecting and sharing authorities of the U.S. intelligence community. The legislation created, respectively, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and restructured the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to protect the nation in the homeland security era. The U.S. Intelligence Community was entrusted with enhanced authorities that facilitated the collection and sharing of terrorism, criminal and other information internally as well as with their partners as appropriate. DHS incorporated 22 agencies to prevent terrorism and to serve as the federal focal point for natural and manmade crises and emergencies. DHS’ seal pictured below is symbolic of the interagency and collaborative nature of homeland security. The eagle’s outstretched wings break through the inner circle to the outer circle suggesting that DHS will break through traditional bureaucracies, and the 22 stars on the eagle’s shield represent the original 22 entities that came together to form the Department (DHS, 2003). Figure 6.1 below is the DHS logo that represents this. In addition, the ODNI was established to lead and coordinate the activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, and the FBI was restructured to include the Directorate of Intelligence to coordinate all of the bureau’s intelligence programs. In the years that followed, a series of disasters and crises including climate change threats, critical infrastructure failures, cyber-attacks, election tampering, mass shoot­ ings, natural disasters and pandemics expanded the homeland security threat land­ scape (Coates, 2019; Comiskey & Larrañaga, 2019; DHS, 2011a,b, 2015a, 2015b, 2017, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c; FEMA, 2019; GAO, 2018a; Mueller, 2019; National Intelligence

Figure 6.1 The US DHS logo.

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Council, 2017; Sekar & Cornell, 2020; White House, 2010, 2015, 2017, 2020). The disasters and crises served as focusing events that initiated overlapping and multiple iterations of the issue-attention cycle that drove homeland security policy. Focusing events are sudden, unpredictable and harmful events that gain the attention of pol­ icy makers and the public and drive national policy more so than other similar events (Birkland, 1997). The issue-attention cycle describes the ascension of issues to the top of the national policy agenda followed by declining public interest and the fading of the issue from the center of public attention (Downs, 1972). Throughout the evolution of the field, one theme persisted: homeland security problems were wicked problems that required a collaborative whole-of-community effort. Wicked problems refer to issues that are difficult or impossible to solve because of incom­ plete or contradictory information, rapidly shifting environments and complex interdependencies (Rittel & Webber, 1973). The major disasters/focusing events that helped drive homeland security policy since the events of September 11, 2001, are depicted in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Homeland security focusing events Event

Impacts

Anthrax attacks (2001)

Biological as well as chemical, radiological and nuclear threats included in homeland security mission space U.S. Intelligence Community intelligence analysis and reporting reforms, especially with regard to information sharing and vetting and identification of sources Mandated North American Electric Reliability Corporation standards for all the U.S. electricity providers DHS reorganized: FEMA’s National Preparedness Directorate established; all-hazards approach to homeland security Enhanced federal and state bridge safety regulations; federal grant-in-aid enhancements Federal regulations to promote financial stability; awareness of fiscal limitations and programmatic retrenchment (de-funding) of some homeland security programs Revised information sharing for the U.S. Intelligence Community Public health recognized as a significant homeland security threat; enhanced all-hazards national public health response and surveillance capabilities Enhanced cyber security policies for federal, state and local governments and private sector agencies using the network Federal risk management strategies and mandates to mitigate climate change impacts; See United Nations (1992) Oil well infrastructure monitoring and repairs regulations; limits to oil exploration on the outer continental shelf; increased funding of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (Continued)

Faulty weapons of mass destruction intelligence tied to invasion of Iraq (2003) Northeast Blackout (2003) Hurricane Katrina (2005) I-35W Bridge Collapse (2007) Financial Crisis (2007–8)

Flight 253: Underwear Bomber (2009) H1N1 pandemic (2009) Homeland Security Information Network hack (2009 & 2011) Climate change (2010) *reflects DHS’ explicit climate change policy. See DHS (2010a, 2012) Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (2010)

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Table 6.1 Homeland security focusing events (Continued) Event

Impacts

Superstorm Sandy (2012)

FEMA acknowledged that large-scale incidents would stress the agency’s response and recovery capacity. FEMA and the enterprise must rise to this challenge State and local gun control legislation, school safety and mental health care initiatives U.S. intelligence reforms including enhanced intelligence community information sharing with state and local partners Federal and state chemical regulatory changes

Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting (2012) Boston Marathon terrorist attack (2013) West Fertilizer Company Fire (2013) Ebola pandemic (2013–6). Zika outbreak (2014–6) Office of Personal Management cyber breach (2015) Russian interference with U.S. elections (2016) Hurricanes Maria, Irma, & Harvey. California Wildfires (2017)

Equifax Cyber Breach (2017) Marjory Thomas H.S. and Santa Fe H.S. school shootings (2018) COVID-19 (2019–20) pandemic

Increased the U.S. medical surveillance and information sharing among all members of the enterprise and their international partners Enhanced cybersecurity policies and practices to identify vulnerabilities and countermeasures impacting all members of the enterprise Voting systems designated as critical infrastructure to facilitate federal cybersecurity assistance to state and local governments FEMA’s 2018–22 Strategic Plan goals include building a culture of preparedness, readying the nation for catastrophe, and reducing the structural complexity of FEMA Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 required FEMA to complete a national preparedness assessment of capability gaps at each level based on tiered, capabilityspecific performance objectives to enable prioritization of grant funding. Review of the Federal Trade Commission’s powers to regulate businesses’ cyber security practices Interagency threat assessments, mental health services and active shooter preparedness Declaration of National Emergency; implementation of National Emergency Act of 1950: Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act

Throughout the evolution of homeland security, DHS has called for a unity of effort throughout the Department and the enterprise generally. In his 2004 testimony to the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, former DHS Secretary Thomas Ridge told Congress that “homeland security is about the integration of a nation.” The newly minted DHS had and would continue to integrate national efforts to pro­ tect the Nation (Ridge, 2004). Ridge and his successors, Michael Chertoff and Janet Napolitano employed the term “One DHS” to describe the organization’s initiatives (Chertoff, 2009; Napolitano, 2019; Ridge, 2009). In a 2014 memorandum to senior DHS officials, former DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson called for a “strengthening of DHS’ unity of effort”. Notwithstanding, the resource constraints that DHS faced, they would build and mature the organization into one that was greater than the sum of its parts-one that operates with much greater unity of effort (Johnson, 2014, April 22). In

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the March 2019 State of Homeland Security Address, former DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen called for a “whole of society” approach to homeland security. The enterprise must adapt to combat terrorism and homeland threats, define the U.S. borders and sovereignty, secure cyberspace and critical infrastructure, and respond to disasters. The DHS enterprise is maturing to expand “unity of effort” through joint planning, analysis and operations to counter the threats and hazards of the 21st Century (DHS, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c; FEMA, 2019; Nielsen, 2019).

6.3 Homeland security’s IMC As identified in the introduction of this chapter, IMCs are arrangements or appli­ cations that can facilitate collaboration between agencies. Typically, IMCs are governed by centralized referent organizations that formalize institutions, establish ground rules for membership and consensus-building, and organize the system­ atic mobilization of resources (Kaiser, 2011; Trist, 1983). In response to terrorist threats, natural disasters, public health crises, cyber-attacks and intrusions, mass shootings, technological advancements and climate change threats, the enterprise built upon previously established IMCs and/or established the following IMCs to protect the nation collaboratively. The IMCs below were arranged alphabetically and chronologically. 6.3.1 All-hazards The term all-hazards can be traced to a National Governor’s Association call for a Federal Emergency Management Agency in support of comprehensive emergency management—a state’s responsibility and capability for managing all types of emer­ gencies and disasters by coordinating the actions of numerous agencies (National Governor’s Association, 1979). In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terror­ ist attacks Congress and the White House called for a new department of home­ land security to consolidate existing federal government emergency response plans into one genuinely all-discipline all-hazards plan (Homeland Security Act, 2002, P.L. 107-296; White House, 2002). The human suffering and staggering destruction from Hurricane Katrina in 2005 further evolved the homeland security paradigm— the nation faced the dual challenges of preventing terrorist attacks and strengthening the Nation’s preparedness for natural and manmade disasters: homeland security was about all-hazards (DHS, 2008; White House, 2007). Building on earlier efforts to ensure the Nation’s ability to prepare for all-hazards, the National Preparedness Goal (2015) called for a capabilities-based approach to preparedness—identifying and applying distinct critical elements such as planning, public information and warning, and operational coordination to prevent, mitigate, protect, respond and recover from the effects of all-hazards (DHS, 2005a, 2013, 2015a, 2015b). Exemplary all-hazard IMCs include: • •

FirstNet (2012): A public–private partnership established to develop and operate a national interoperable public safety network. National Emergency Family Registry (2007): A FEMA-led initiative developed in coordination with the Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services,

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•

• • •

the American Red Cross, and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children to help family members separated after a disaster reunite.1 National Integration Center (2006): A FEMA center tasked to ensure ongo­ ing management of the National Information Management System and the National Response Plan in consultation with the National Advisory Council, the Corporation for National and Community Services and other federal agencies. Center for Faith & Opportunity Initiatives (2006): A DHS-based initiative to engage and coordinate faith and community-based groups for disaster prepara­ tion and response and to counter human trafficking initiatives. National Incident Management System (2004): A management and command structure designed to provide a common, nationwide approach to enable the whole community to work together to manage all-hazards. Citizen Corps (2002): A FEMA-coordinated coalition of organizations that help communities prepare for and respond to all hazards, including: • • •

•

•

•

105

Fire Corps (2004): A FEMA-funded and National Volunteer Fire Councilcoordinated initiative to enhance the capacity of resource-constrained fire and rescue departments to respond to all-hazards. Community Emergency Response Teams (1993): A FEMA-sponsored groups of citizen volunteers that are trained to respond to disasters in their communities. Corporation for National and Community Service (1993): A DHScoordinated coalition of nationwide service programs such as Americorps, Senior Corps, and Learn and Serve America that provide preparedness and crime-prevention training and information delivery systems for neighbor­ hoods, schools and businesses. National Neighborhood Watch (1972): A DOD funded, and National Sherriff’s Association-coordinated initiative that unites law enforcement, private organizations, and individual citizens to reduce crime, prevent ter­ rorism, protect their communities and prepare for emergencies and disasters. Volunteers in Police Service (1972): A DOD-funded, and International Association of Police Chiefs-coordinated initiative to enhance state and local police capacity to utilize volunteers.

Emergency Management Assistance Compact (1996): Legal foundation for fed­ eral and intrastate mutual-aid agreements for the sharing and deployment of resources and personnel during emergencies.

6.3.2 Climate change The National Climate Program Act of 1978 established the U.S. national climate pro­ gram to understand and respond to natural and human-induced climate process. Since that time, the federal government established the U.S. Global Change and Research Program (USGCRP) as well as numerous collaborative mechanisms to support the nation’s response to global climate change. The USGCRP com­ prises 13 federal departments and agencies and is led by the National Science and Technology Council’s Committee on Environment, Natural Resources and Sustainability. The federal government established numerous collaborative mechanisms to confront the complex and crosscutting issues inherent to climate

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Figure 6.2 US federal government interagency collaborations regarding climate change.3

change. Figure 6.2 demonstrates several Federal interagency collaborations and ties focused on climate change.2 In 1998, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, an intergovernmental body of the United Nations was established to provide the world with an objective and scientific view of climate change; its natural, political and economic impacts and risks; and possible response options. Exemplary climate change IMCs include: • •

• •

Climate Action 100 (2017): A coalition of over 360 investors with over $34 trillion in assets collectively that are engaging companies to take necessary action on climate change. 350.org (2007): An international environmental organization addressing the climate crisis. Its goal is to end the use of fossil fuels and transition to renewable energy by building a global, grassroots movement. 350.org claims to have mobi­ lized thousands of volunteer organizers in over 188 countries. University Climate Change Coalition (2006): Coalition of North American research universities committed to acting on climate change including helping local com­ munities achieve their climate goal of transitioning to a low-carbon future. C40 (2005): Network of the world’s megacities committed to addressing climate change. The network supports cities to collaborate effectively, share knowledge, and drive meaningful, measurable and sustainable action on climate change.

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6.3.3 Critical infrastructure Critical infrastructure includes assets, systems and networks, whether physical or vir­ tual, so vital to the U.S. that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debil­ itating effect on security, national economic security, public health or safety, or any combination thereof (DHS, 2010b). The National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002 & 2007), the Interim National Infrastructure Plan (2005), the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (2013), as well as the most recent National Security Strategy (2018) made clear the notion that our society and modern way of life are dependent on net­ works of infrastructure that are vulnerable to terrorist and criminal attacks and natural and manmade disasters. Emphatically, each of the strategies and plans is focused on public–private partnerships to protect the Nation’s critical infrastructure (DHS, 2005b, 2013; White House, 2002, 2007, 2018a). Exemplary critical infrastruc­ ture IMCs include: •

• •

•

NGA Chair’s Initiative, Infrastructure: Foundation for Success (2019–20): National Governors Association (NGA) initiative to bring together thought lead­ ers from government, business and academia to work with the nation’s governors to advance the repair, enhancement and modernization our nation’s infrastruc­ ture through innovative fixes to bottlenecks, creative partnerships with pri­ vate investors, streamlined project review, smarter technologies and improved cyber-defenses. Election Infrastructure Subsector Government Coordinating Council (2017): A DHS-led initiative that facilitates intergovernmental information sharing to counter threats to the nation’s election infrastructure. Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Councils (2009): A designation of one or more federal agencies to coordinate each of the United States’ 16 criti­ cal infrastructure sectors in coordination with a Partnership Advisory Council, which consists of state and local governments and the private sector to promote critical infrastructure efficiency, effectiveness and resilience. Electric Reliability Organization (2005): North America Electric Reliability Corporation-led coalition of electric utility industry leaders that established voluntary technical and safety standards to ensure the reliability of the North America bulk power system.

6.3.4 Cyber security Cyberspace and its underlying infrastructure are vulnerable to a wide range of risk stemming from both physical and cyber threats and hazards. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2002, awakened the U.S. concerns about the vulnerabilities inher­ ent to cyberspace and particularly cyberterrorism (Homeland Security Act, 2002, P.L. 107-296; White House, 2002). Since that time, a number of cyberattacks includ­ ing the breaching of the Office of Personnel Management datacenter (2015), Russian hacking of the Democratic National Committee (2016) and the WannaCry ransomware attack (2017) led to the establishment of DHS’ Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) in 2018. CISA was tasked to improve cybersecurity across all levels of government and coordinate cybersecurity programs with states. Exemplary cybersecurity IMCs include:

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108 •

•

•

•

•

John Comiskey National Institute of Science and Technology Cybersecurity Framework Working Group (2014): A coalition of public- and private-sector stakeholders that design and certify cybersecurity guidelines and assessment tools to prevent, detect and respond to cyberattacks. Cybersecurity Risk Information Sharing Program (2014): A public–private part­ nership, co-funded by the Department of Energy and industry and managed by the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center. The program facilitates interagency information sharing and the development of situational awareness tools. U.S. Cyber Command (2009): One of ten DOD combatant commands established to direct, synchronize and coordinate the department’s planning and operations to defend and advance the national interests of the United States in collaboration with domestic and international partners. National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (2009): A DHSbased national hub for cyber and communication information, technical exper­ tise and operational integration with all levels of the government and the private sector. National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (2008): An FBI-led law enforce­ ment, intelligence and defense task force established to coordinate and share information to thwart the cyber threat to the nation.

6.3.5 Mass shootings On Tuesday April 20, 1999, two students at Columbine High School in Jefferson County Colorado unleashed a furry of gunfire and explosives at the school, killing 12 students and one teacher before killing themselves. The mass shooting was the impetus for the Safe School Initiative, a Secret Service and Department of Education collaboration that sought to identify the underlying causes of school shootings. They found that there is no accurate profile of a targeted school violence actor. The Safe School Initiative recommended school threat assessments—fact-based investiga­ tive and analytical tool that focuses on what a student is doing and saying, and not whether the student looks like those who have attacked schools in the past (U.S. Secret Service and Department of Education, 2004). In addition, the mass shooting jettisoned new State gun and anti-bullying laws, new police active shooter tactics, enhanced school security measures and mental health initiatives. Since that time a litany of mass shootings at schools, government offices, workplaces and public spaces including Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut (2012), Pulse Nightclub in Orlando, Florida (2016), Route 91 Harvest Fest in Las Vegas (2017) and Marjory Stoneman Douglass High School in Parkland Florida (2018) led to addi­ tional State gun and anti-bullying laws, enhanced police de-escalation and active shooter training, school security measures and mental health initiatives. Exemplary mass shooting IMCs include: •

Federal Commission on School Safety (2018–19): A Departments of Education, Homeland Security, and Health and Human Services, and Attorney General investigative body that recommends additional federal assistance to states and local governments for mental health and threat assessment programs to help prevent and mitigate school violence.

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Sandy Hook Promise (2012): A community-based organization that advocates gun violence prevention policies including awareness, information sharing and security programs and firearms regulations. Mayors against Gun Violence (2006): A coalition of over 1,000 current and former mayors who advocate at all levels of government for stricter gun legislation. Safe School Initiative (2004): A joint Secret Service and Department of Education initiative to prevent school violence. National Instant Criminal Background Check System (1998; amended 2004 and 2014): A federally run database that facilitates intergovernmental information sharing for background investigations used to screen prospective firearms pur­ chasers to prevent illegal sales and acquisitions.

6.3.6 Public health crises The October 2001 Anthrax attacks as well as concerns about chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks and pandemics elevated public health concerns to the top of the homeland security policy agenda. Other public health events including the H1N1 pandemic (2009), the Ebola pandemic (2013–6), Zika outbreak (2014–6) and the current opioid and COVID-19 crises ensured that public health continued to earn relevancy in the homeland security mission space (Center for Disease Control, 2020, February 7; DHS, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c; Homeland Security Act, 2002, P.L. 107-296; White House, 2002, 2018c, 2020). Exemplary public health IMCs include: •

•

•

•

President’s Coronavirus Task Force (2020): Chaired by the Vice President of the United States and composing the National Institutes of Health and especially the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, the Center for Disease Control, the Surgeon General and to some extent every federal Department. The Task Force was tasked to monitor, contain and mitigate the spread of COVID-19. Prescription, Interdiction and Litigation Task Force (2018): A U.S. Attorney General-led initiative that combines the civil and criminal arms of the DOD with the Food and Drug Administration, Internal Revenue Service and federal and state and local law enforcement agencies to combat the prescription opioid crisis. National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (2003): A Center for Disease Control data processing system that facilitates near-real-time reporting and sharing of infectious disease information by federal, state and local public health officials. The system works with the World Health Organization’s Strategic Health Operations Centre and the U.S. Armed Forces Health Surveillance Unit, which provide global health surveillance, reporting, and information-sharing services. National Disaster Medical System (1984): A Department of Health and Human Services-coordinated program that facilitates the organization and deployment of teams of medical, veterinarian and mortuary professionals and para-professionals from all levels of government and the private sector to provide rapid-response medical, veterinarian, and mortuary care during terrorist attacks and natural disasters.

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6.3.7 Terrorism and intelligence Terrorism was the primary reason for the creation of the DHS and arguably the evo­ lution of homeland security as a field of practice or discipline. Terrorism remains to be DHS’ number one mission. Intelligence and particularly the failure to share intelligence between agencies also found its way to the top of the homeland security policy agenda (DHS, 2019b; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). Terrorist attacks on the homeland and particularly the Boston Marathon bombing (2013), the San Bernardino terror attack (2015) and the New York City West Side Highway truck attack (2017) as well as a number of thwarted terrorist plots ensured that terrorism and intelligence remain as homeland secu­ rity priorities (White House, 2018b). Exemplary terrorism and intelligence IMCs include: •

•

•

•

• •

•

National Network of Fusion Centers (2014): A coalition of 78 pre- and post-9/11 state, local, tribal and territorial fusion centers established to coordinate their col­ lective initiatives. A fusion center is a collaborative effort of two or more, federal, state, local or tribal agencies that combine resources, expertise and information with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, inves­ tigate, apprehend and respond to criminal and terrorist activity (Department of Justice & Department of Homeland Security, 2006). Countering Violent Extremism Task Force (2011): Interagency task force that includes DHS, the Department of Justice (DOJ), FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center and nonsecurity agencies to coordinate and dissemi­ nate violent extremism countermeasures and initiatives to state and local govern­ ments, the private sector, and faith-based and community groups. America’s Waterways Watch (2005): The U.S. Coast Guard program that enlists the participation of those who live, work or play around America’s waterfront areas to raise awareness and to share information critical to maritime security and safety. National Counterterrorism Center (2004): An interagency center established to bridge the foreign-domestic intelligence divide. Federal agencies include the Central Intelligence Agency, the DOJ, DOD, DHS that work together to produce interagency-coordinated analytic assessments on terrorism and published warn­ ings alerts. National Council of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (2003): Membership-led coordinating bodies designed to maximize information flow across the private sector critical infrastructures and all levels of government. National Joint Terrorism Taskforce (2002): An FBI-led IMC that coordinates the activities of the nation’s 100-plus Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF); JTTFs are intergovernmental law enforcement and intelligence teams that investigate terror­ ist and related threats. President’s Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons: White House-led Interagency Task composed of the Secretaries of State, Labor, and Health and Human Services, the Attorney General, the Directors/Administrators of the Attorney General’s Office, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Management and Budge, and U.S. Agency for International Development, and others as designated by the President to combat trafficking in persons.

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Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (2001) program: A Customs and Border Protection program that works with industry partners to facilitate legitimate trade while focusing resources on high-risk shipments and terrorism threats.

While DHS or another federal agency or department served as the referent organi­ zation for the majority of the above-listed IMCs, the arrangements and applications comprise and serve the broad needs of the enterprise and the nation as a whole. Moreover, DHS has long celebrated public–private partnerships and the notion that homeland security is essentially about hometown security. The Department recognizes that communities are the first line of defense in keeping the public safe and secure (DHS, 2016; See also Chertoff, 2009 Comiskey, 2017; Napolitano, 2019; Nielsen, 2019; Ridge, 2004). In addition, state and local level governments and their associations, including the National Governors Association, National Association of Counties, National League of Cities and National Congress of American Indians as well as professional associations and nongovernmental organizations often serve as referent organizations.

6.4 Theoretical and policy underpinnings of interagency collaboration The primary purpose of any organization is the furtherance of the common interests of the individuals that comprise the assembled body. Coalitions, networks, task forces and unions extend that notion to the common interests of multiple organizations. Indeed, the United States of America’s federalist form of government was predicated upon a union of states that governed in concert with the federal government. This sec­ tion examines the theoretical and policy underpinnings of collaborative governance and IMCs related to the enterprise. The examination begins with the findings and rec­ ommendations of the 1955 Commission on Intergovernmental Affairs and continues with a collaborative federalism recommendation. What follows is an examination of the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) and Congressional Research Service’s (CRS) analyses and recommendations for interagency collaboration and academic theories and frameworks related to collaborative governance. The Commission on Intergovernmental Affairs (1955) analyzed the role of the federal government in relation to the states and their political subdivisions with respect to fields that may be the primary interest and obligation of the states. The commission identified federal entrance into states’ fields that ranged from agricul­ ture and transportation to social security and natural disaster relief; these fields had been the responsibility of the states since the formation of the nation. Once considered the purview of states and local governments, these diverse fields were now the subject of federal regulations and programs. The commission attributed the expansion of the federal government to the cultural, economic, intellectual, physical, political, population and technological changes that came over the United States since 1787. Organizational governance—that is, the act of governing within and across organizations—dictates some form of authoritative or shared governance structure whereby the business of the entity is identified and acted upon to produce products/ services. Typically, multiorganizational federations and coalitions such as the enter­ prise are served by a referent organization that organizes the interagency body. This

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aligns with Clovis’s (2006) recommendation for a collaborative federalism approach to homeland security. He argued that homeland security was a “national” problem that required “national” solutions; Congress and its executive agent DHS should provide leadership and appropriate funding. DHS should be an agent of subnational levels of government, and states and local governments should collaborate with jurisdictions both vertically and horizontally. Their collaborative efforts should aggregate, coordi­ nate and integrate their homeland security capabilities. Thus, the nation will achieve the best possible level of homeland security preparedness. The GAO (2005) found that the federal government faced a series of challenges in the 21st century that would be difficult, if not impossible, for any single agency to address alone. Many issues such as public health cut across more than one agency and those agencies’ actions were not well coordinated. The growth and changing nature of gov­ ernmental responsibilities, political and economic pressures to cut federal expendi­ tures, and the urgency of several notable cases including the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina engendered interagency collaboration. The GAO also found that several fac­ tors, including organizational culture, heritage, jurisdictional rivalries, legacy rules and regulations, and inadequate training, could impede interagency collaboration efforts (see also Dale, 2012; GAO, 2009, 2012, 2018b, 2018c, 2019; Kaiser, 2011). Similarly, many academics and industry experts found that the growth and changing roles of business and government fostered interagency collaboration, and that organizational cultures, business and jurisdictional rivalries, legacy rules and regulations, and inadequate train­ ing could impede interagency collaboration (Agranoff, 2005; Behn, 2014; Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989; Kamarck, 2002; Kettl, 2003; Morton, 2012; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). In response to the interagency shortcomings identified above, the GAO (2005) identified eight key practices of effective IMCs: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

define and articulate a common outcome; establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; identify and address needs by leveraging resources; agree on roles and responsibilities; establish compatible policies, procedures and other means to operate across agency boundaries; 6. develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate and report on results; 7. reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports and 8. reinforce individual accountability through performance management.

Building upon the precepts of managerial reform that stressed interagency collaboration and managing for results, Bardach (1998) examined nine cases of interagency collabora­ tion across a range of policy sectors. He compared the interagency collaborative capacity (ICC) of organizations to that of craftsmen building houses harmoniously. ICC was the result of a process that takes bits and pieces of existing organizations and somehow gets them to cohere and create a functioning entity that is better than the sum of its parts. The success of an ICC was the function of the skills and purposiveness of craftsmen interact­ ing with available materials and their ability to fashion protections against environmen­ tal forces such as personnel turnover and the erosion of political alliances. Bardach (1998) found that craftsmen identify and utilize smart practices to accom­ plish their goals and objectives and to overcome interagency obstacles. Smart practices

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are distinguished from best practices in that smart practices describe interesting and creative ideas embedded in some practice, while best practices suggest that research and empirical evidence have proven that the practices are “best”. The term best is defined as “excelling all others” and “most productive of good: offering or producing the great­ est advantage, utility, or satisfaction” (Merriam-Webster, 2005, p. 116). Smart practices challenge the subjectivity inherent to best practices. Smart practitioners seek innova­ tive means to accomplish policy goals in a practical and cost-effective manner. Smart practices are adaptable to various conditions, have many operational features, and can employ similar but diverse ways to achieve their goals (Bardach, 1998). Bardach (1998) also noted that previous theories of interagency collaboration such as resource dependency theory and network theory focused on collaborative behavior rather than capacity but were nonetheless useful in understanding ICC. Resource dependency theory holds that a focal agency will be more likely to collaborate with an agency that controls resources that the focal agency needs (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Bardach (1998) used network theory to describe capacities that facilitate efficient com­ munications between agencies and individuals for particular purposes such as deliv­ ering services to citizens and seeking out partners with complementary resources (see also Knoke, 1990; Powell, 1990). Foster-Fishman, Berkowitz, Lounsbury, Jacobson, and Allen (2001), Ansell and Gash (2005), Imperial (2005), Bratton and Tumin (2012) and Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) also analyzed interagency collaboration across a range of policy sectors. Collectively they examined more than 230 cases of interagency collaboration. As was the case of Bardach (1998), they found that the growth and changing roles of gov­ ernment and business fostered interagency collaboration; collaboration depended on iterative cycles of discovery, definition, deliberation and determination that helped develop trust and a shared sense of purpose; and that organizational cultures and rivalries, regulations and inadequate training could impede interagency collaboration. The literature suggests that interagency collaboration is about time, trust and interde­ pendence and their ancillaries: communication, education and training, engagement, information sharing, leadership, reciprocity and social capital as well as consensus building. Ansell and Gash’s (2005) virtuous cycle of collaboration embodies the essence of interagency collaboration: collaboration tends to develop when organiza­ tions focus on small wins that deepen trust, commitment and shared understanding. The “sweet rewards” of collaborative governance—cost savings, enhanced demo­ cratic participation, profit maximization and even rational public management—can be the products of effective collaborative governance if the agencies involved take the necessary time to understand interagency processes and their partners’ cultures, act in a trustworthy manner, and understand and appreciate the interdependent nature of their relationship. Conversely, skipping or avoiding any part of the time, trust and interdependence process can impede effective interagency collaboration.

6.5 Strategic collaboration McChrystal, Collins, Silverman, and Fussel (2015) found that encouragement to collaborate tends to be more of a bumper sticker slogan than an actual managerial practice. In an interdependent environment, however, collaboration may be neces­ sary to survive. Pelfrey (2005) found that collaboration would be a key element in preparing the enterprise to protect the nation. Collaboration for homeland security

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was about “agencies, organizations, and individuals from many tiers of public and private sectors, working, training, and exercising together for the common purpose of preventing terrorist threats to people and property” (p. 7). He proposed a cycle of preparedness, a four-phase cycle of prevention, awareness, response and recovery by which the enterprise would synergistically adapt to threats and reallocate resources and responsibilities to meet those threats. Building on Pelfrey’s (2005) definition of collaboration as well as other conceptual­ izations of interagency collaboration, Hocevar, Thomas, and Jansen (2006) argued that developing a capacity for interagency collaboration was critical for efficiently conduct­ ing routine tasks and for innovatively responding and improvising in the face of ter­ rorist threats and natural disasters. They surveyed 51 homeland security leaders and administrators participating in the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) Master of Arts in Homeland Security at the Naval Postgraduate School to learn about their agency’s collaborative efforts and found that collaborative capacity was an intui­ tively appealing construct that lacks clear operationalization. Homeland security col­ laboration was occurring in the context of underdesigned institutional relationships. Interagency collaborative teams must therefore work to create novel processes, systems, protocols and networks. Successful collaboration factors included shared purpose, trust, social capital, effective communication, incentives and leadership that expressed support to the collaboration. Barriers to collaboration included lack of familiarity with other organizations, inadequate communication and information sharing, distrust and competition for resources (see also Hocevar, Thomas, & Jansen, 2011). Pelfrey and Kelley (2013) also sought the insights of CHDS masters’ students. They surveyed 382 graduates of the master’s program as well as faculty from that program and subject matter experts to score the objectives and capabilities associated with the multitude of disciplines associated with homeland security and found that stra­ tegic collaboration was the most important attribute of a graduate degree dedicated to homeland security. Strategic collaboration included the ability to coordinate, col­ laborate and communicate across agencies; improve efforts for information-sharing; develop social capital; assess the opportunities and impediments to collaboration among the various disciplines; and foster and reward communication and collabora­ tion across agency boundaries at all levels. Graduates of the CHDS program found that interagency collaboration was an integral component of homeland security. They concluded that the attributes of interagency collaboration contributed to the effectiveness/efficiency of artic secu­ rity (Marie, 2010); capabilities-based training (Bradley, 2015); catastrophic inci­ dent search and rescue (Bleakney, 2009; Duggan, 2011); confronting climate change (Schaffer, 2018); combating human-trafficking (DiGiacomo, 2010); counterterrorism and intelligence (Gomez, 2013; Rodriguez, 2011); disaster management and response (Esposito, 2011; Fahey, 2012; Hall, 2011; Harrington, 2014; Philips, 2012); education and training (Church, 2010); event planning (Shannon, 2010); information and intel­ ligence sharing (Alexander, 2012; Wade, 2010; Werner, 2008); national guard support to civilian authorities (Stevenson, 2008); preparedness (Campasano, 2010; Kirk, 2014; Pilkington, 2014); maritime security (Billeaudeaux, 2007; Cromwell, 2018; Wesling, 2010); and other policy areas. Interagency collaboration is about time, trust and interdependence and their ancillaries. The homeland security enterprise and its composite organizations are learning organiza­ tions that identify and apply smart practices to secure the nation and must continue to

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do so. The enterprise and its composite organizations must not guess what the future will bring. Rather, it must imagine a range of possible futures and seek solutions that work regardless of which ones come to pass. They must secure the nation collaboratively.

6.6 Summary and conclusions Homeland security is a massive undertaking. The enterprise’s threat landscape and mul­ tiple missions warrant the judicious use of resources if lives are to be saved, property pro­ tected, and the American way of life preserved. Interagency collaboration is an effective way to manage and accomplish the enterprise’s multiple missions. The IMCs identified in this chapter personify, albeit to varying degrees, the virtuous cycle of time, trust and inter­ dependence in the homeland security domain. Many of the IMCs such as the National Joint Terrorism Taskforce and the Emergency Management Assistance Compact are built upon the enterprise’s legacy collaborative constructs to meet the challenges of the 21st cen­ tury. Others, including the Election Infrastructure Subsector Government Coordinating Council and the Prescription, Interdiction, the Litigation Task Force and the President’s Coronavirus Task Force are relatively new and demonstrate the enterprise’s ability to cre­ ate new IMC’s to meet the challenge of a rapidly developing threat landscape. The evolution of the legacy interagency constructs and the establishment of the new IMCs demonstrates, perhaps, the enterprise’s greatest strength, that is its contingent coordination capability. Contingent coordination is a managerial approach that builds upon existing administrative structures and policy capacities and pulls them together when they are needed as they are needed (Kettl, 2003). As we have seen in this chapter, myriad organizations from all levels of government, the private sector, and the American people somehow manage to cohere and manage the many challenges inherent to homeland security collaboratively. Lessons learned from the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Hurricane Katrina as well as the many other focusing events that helped define homeland security demand the resources and benefits of inter­ agency collaboration. Moving forward, the enterprise and academics should continue to explore and apply innovative, best and smart practices to homeland security and related problems; identify, develop and catalog smart interagency collaborative prac­ tices and theories; and integrate smart collaborative practices and theory into homeland security pedagogy and curricula. The enterprise must forever learn to trust and value the worth of each member and the enterprise as a whole.

6.7 Discussion questions 1. Why is interagency collaboration a homeland security imperative? Describe the his­ torical backdrop that helped foster homeland security interagency relationships. 2. What are the challenges and opportunities inherent to interagency collabora­ tion in the homeland security domain? 3. Identify and describe the roles of federal government, states, local governments, the private sector and volunteer agencies in homeland security. How does each contribute to homeland security? What is the role of referent organizations in interagency collaboration? 4. How might technology both enhance and impede interagency collaboration? 5. Apply craftsmanship theory, network theory, resource dependency theory to a homeland security problem such as cyber security, information sharing, tech­ nology, mass shootings and climate change?

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Notes 1. The registry has been replaced by the American Red Cross Safe and Well, Facebook Safety Check, and Google Person Finder. FEMA maintains a “How Do I Find My Family” webpage https://www.fema.gov/how-do-i-find-my-family. 2. For an example of the breadth of such interagency collaborations, the reader is referred to the Government Accountability Office (2012). Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency Collaborative Mechanisms. GAO-12-1022. Washington, DC. Government Printing Office. 3. Source: Government Accountability Office (2012). Managing for Results: Key Con­ siderations for Implementing Interagency Collaborative Mechanisms. GAO-12-1022. Washington, DC. Government Printing Office.

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Esposito, J. (2011). New York City Fire Department chief officer’s evaluation of the citywide incident management system as it pertains to interagency emergency response (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Fahey, M. J. (2012). Understanding “swift trust” to improve interagency collaboration in New York City (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2019). National Threat and Hazard Assessment (THIRA). Washington, DC: Author. Foster-Fishman, P.G., Berkowitz, S. L, Lounsbury, D. W., Jacobson, S., & Allen, N. (2001). Building collaborative capacity in community coalitions: A review and integrative framework. American Journal of Community Psychology, 29(2). Gomez, D. (2013). Should cops be spies? Evaluating the collection and sharing of national security intelligence by state, local, and tribal law enforcement (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Government Accountability Office. (2005). Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. Results-oriented government: Practices that can help enhance collaboration among federal agencies (GAO-06-15). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Government Accountability Office. (2009). Report to Congressional committees, Interagency collaboration: Key issues for congressional oversight of national security strategies, organizations, workforce, and information sharing (GAO-09-904SP). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Government Accountability Office. (2012). Managing for results: Key considerations for implementing interagency collaborative mechanisms (GAO-12-1022). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Government Accountability Office. (2018a). National security: Long-range emerging threats facing the United States as identified by federal agencies (GAO-19-204SP). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Government Accountability Office. (2018b). Managing for results: Government-wide actions needed to improve agencies’ use of performance information in decision making (GAO-18-609SP). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Government Accountability Office. (2018c). Clearer roles and responsibilities for the office of strategy, Policy, and Plans and workforce planning would enhance its effectiveness. Report to the subcommittee on oversight and management efficiency, committee on homeland security, house of representatives (GAO-18-590). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Government Accountability Office. (2019). High-risk series. Substantial efforts needed to achieve greater progress on high-risk areas (GAO-19-157SP). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Hall, R. D. (2011). Smart practices in building interorganizational collaborative capacity to strengthen the Florida comprehensive disaster management enterprise (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Hamel, G., Doz, Y. L., & Prahalad, C. K. (1989). Collaborate with your competitors and win. Harvard Business Review (January–February), 133–139. Harrington, M. (2014). New York City’s first responders: Enhancing collaboration between NYPD and FDNY (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Hocevar, S. P., Thomas, G. F., & Jansen, E. (2006). Building collaborative capacity: An innova­ tive strategy for homeland security preparedness. In Beyerlein, M., Beyerlein, S., & Kennedy, F. Innovation through collaboration, Advances in Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams (Vol. 12, pp. 255–274). Amsterdam: Elsevier Ltd. Hocevar, S. P., Thomas, G. F, & Jansen, E. (2011). Inter-organizational collaboration: Addressing the challenge. Homeland Security Affairs, 7, (September, the 9/11 essays). Homeland Security Act. (2002). Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2136. Retrieved from http://www .dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf

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Imperial, M. (2005). Using collaboration as a governance strategy: Lessons from six watershed management programs. Administration and Society, 37(3), 281–320. Intelligence Reform and Prevention of Terrorism Act. (2004). Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638. Johnson, J. (2014, April 22). Memorandum for DHS leadership. Washington, D.C: Author. Retrieved from file:///C:/Users/john/Downloads/805139%20(1).pdf Kaiser, F. M. (2011). Interagency collaborative arrangements and activities: Types, rationales, con­ siderations (CRS Report No. R41803). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Kamarck, E. C. (2002). Applying 21st century government to the challenge of homeland security. The Forum, 1(2). Kettl, D. F. (2003). Contingent coordination: Practical and theoretical puzzles for homeland secu­ rity. American Review of Public Administration, 33(3). https://doi.org.10.1177/0275074003254472 Kirk, P. (2014). Community preparedness: Alternate approaches to citizen engagement in homeland security (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Knoke, D. (1990). Political networks: The structural perspective. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Marie, C. (2010). Arctic region policy: Information sharing model options (Master’s thesis), Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. McChrystal, S., Collins, T., Silverman, D., & Fussel, C. (2015). Team of teams: New rules of engagement for a complex world. New York, NY: Penguin. Meadows, D.H.(2008). Thinking in systems: A primer. White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing. Merriam-Webster. (2005). Merriam-Webster’s dictionary (11th ed.). Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster. Morton, J. F. (2012). The next-generation homeland security: Network federalism and the course to national preparedness. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. Mueller, R. (2019). Report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election (Vol. I). Washington. DC: Special Counsel Robert Mueller. Napolitano, J. (2019). How safe are we? Homeland security since 9/11. New York, NY: Hachette Book Group. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. (2004). The 9/11 commission report: Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Washington, DC: Author. National Governor’s Association. (1979). Comprehensive emergency management. Washington, DC: Author. National Intelligence Council. (2017). Global trends. Paradox of progress. Washington, DC: Author. Nielsen, K. (2019). State of homeland security. Washington, DC: George Washington University. Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T.A. (1992). Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the public sector. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Pelfrey, W. V. (2005). The cycle of preparedness: Establishing a framework to prepare for terrorist threats, Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 2(1). Pelfrey, W. V., & Kelley, W. D. (2013). Homeland security: A way forward. Homeland Security Affairs, 9(3). Retrieved from http://www.hsaj.org/?article=9.1.3 Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations: A Resource depend­ ence perspective. New York, NY: Harper and Row. Philips, S. C. (2012). Rethinking disasters: Finding efficiencies through collaboration (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Pilkington, W. F. (2014). Risk, politics, and money: The need for a value-based model for financing public health preparedness and response (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Powell, W. W. (1990). Neither market nor hierarchy: Network forms of organization. Research in Organizational Behavior, 12, 295–336. Ridge. T. (2004). Remarks by Secretary Ridge to National Press Club. Retrieved from http:// www.crime-research.org/library/DHS.html

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Ridge, T. (2009). The test of our times: America under siege….and how we can be safe again. New York, NY: Thomas Dunn Books. Rittel, H. W. &Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy Science, 4, 155–169. Rodriguez, G. A. (2011). Creating domestipol; increasing national resilience by reflect­ ing on the NYPD counterterrorism model (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Schaffer, P. A. (2018). Climate security threat—America’s Achilles’ heel (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Sekar, K. &Cornell, A.S. (2020). Domestic public health response to COVID-19: Current status and resource guide. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Shannon, T. (2010). Leveraging successful collaborative processes to improve performance outcomes in large-scale event planning: Superbowl, a planned homeland security event (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Stevenson, W. H. (2008). Enhancing the effectiveness of National Guard support of civil authorities by improving interagency coordination (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Trist. E. (1983). Referent organizations and the development of interorganizational domains. Human Relations, 36(1), 269–284. United Nations. (1992). Framework convention on climate change. Secretary-General of the United Nations [Depository]. Retrieved from https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdfe U.S. Secret Service and Department of Education. (2004). The final report and findings of the safe school initiative: Implications for the prevention of school attacks in the United States. Washington, DC: Authors. U.S. Senate. (2006). Hurricane Katrina: A nation still unprepared. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. USA Patriot Act. (2001). P.L. 107-56 (October 26, 2001). Wade, C. L. (2010). The California law enforcement community’s intelligence-led policing capacity (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Werner, A. (2008). The potential transformative impact of web 2.0 technology on the intelligence community (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Wesling, J. C. (2010). Securing the northern maritime border through maritime domain awareness (Master’s thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. White House. (2002). National strategy for homeland security. Washington. DC: Author.

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White House. (2010). National security strategy. Washington. DC: Author. Retrieved from http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf White House. (2015). National security strategy. Washington. DC: Author. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_ strategy_2.pdf White House. (2017). National security strategy. Washington. DC: Author. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017- 0905.pdf White House. (2018a). National security strategy. Washington, DC. Author. White House. (2018b). National strategy for counterterrorism of the United States of America. Washington, DC: Author. White House. (2018c). National biodefense strategy. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Biodefense-Strategy.pdf White House. (2020). Proclamation on declaring a national emergency concerning the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak.

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7

Emergency management—theories of preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery Irmak Renda-Tanali

Description: The theory of being a “secure nation” does not mean that adverse events never occur. Clearly, emergency management plays a central role in homeland secu­ rity. Emergency management can be defined as: Emergency management is the man­ agerial function charged with creating the framework within which communities reduce vulnerability to hazards and cope with disasters.1 As such, the hallmark of a secure nation is marked by the resilience and preparedness capabilities and its ability to with­ stand and recover from adverse events. Existing theories from both emergency man­ agement and security help explain U.S. disaster preparedness. The field of emergency management plays a critical role in supporting and sustaining a national workforce capable of accomplishing the National Preparedness Goal (U.S. DHS, 2015). This chapter provides a brief history of the events that led to emergency management oper­ ations, policy and law. It also provides a basis for including emergency management into a more inclusive concept of human and homeland security and as a necessary basis for a more complete model of national security. Upon completion of this chapter, the student will be able to: 1. Examine the main functions and components of FEMA and how emergency management law and policy and practice relate to Homeland Security. 2. Discuss the U.S. regulatory authority for emergency management that encom­ passes likely hazard scenarios and includes exercises/drills to prepare for and respond to the selected hazards. 3. Describe the theoretical components and contributions to emergency prepar­ edness, policy and response of the Incident Command System (ICS) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS). 4. Discuss, identify and explain the various types of emergencies faced by the private and public sectors including, but not limited to natural disasters, pan­ demic, terrorism, CBRNE, cyber-crimes and terrorism. 5. Discuss and be able to interrelate the core components of disaster planning, mitigation, response and recovery. 6. Relate the concepts of risk to the operations and strategies of emergency management. 7. Tie the role and function of emergency management to overall operations and strategy of homeland security.

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7.1 Introduction and the origins of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) FEMA’s mission is to “lead America to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from disasters with a vision of “A Nation Prepared” (FEMA, 2019a, 2019b).2 FEMA is just one of several federal agencies that take part in the overall emergency manage­ ment enterprise. As Rubin (2020)3 notes, federal emergency management existed in the United States long before FEMA was founded. It had many predecessors before it took the role of the lead agency in disaster and emergency management. There are other agencies such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) that includes the National Weather Service (NWS) that share special administrative powers in the mit­ igation, preparedness, response and recovery activities. Let us take a brief look at the history of emergency management in the United States: 7.1.1 19th Century—the first disaster legislation signed While in the early years of the Republic, people mostly relied on their own resources to deal with natural hazards that would wreak havoc on their communities. With the growth of the U.S. population and the technological advances, and the forma­ tion of urban land use and settlement patterns, the disasters and their effects have followed an escalating pattern, which necessitated the formation of more organ­ ized responses. As noted by Rubin4 (2014, p. 27), modern emergency management organizations evolved as a response to changing attitudes toward disasters and the increased scientific understanding of natural and manmade disasters that gave way to proactive approaches such as fire alarms, fireproofing, zoning restrictions and civil engineering solutions for flood mitigation. For example, a series of large-scale fires and failed private and charitable relief efforts in New Hampshire in the early 19th century led to the Congressional Act of 1803. Prior to the Act, disaster response and recovery were limited to local governments and private interests (FEMA, 2019a, 2019b). Other disasters including the Chicago Fires of 1871 and the Johnstown Flood in 1889 led to the “chartering” of the American Red Cross. Today, the American Red Cross Charter provides FEMA with dedicated funding sources for large-scale disaster relief (Figure 7.1). 7.1.2 20th Century: 1st half—natural disasters, flood control and earthquake code development Later, in the early twentieth century, the Galveston Hurricane of 1900 and the San Francisco Earthquake of 1906 caused catastrophic losses garnering the focus of public and government attention on the need to develop formal emergency man­ agement arrangement structures at the local, state and federal levels. It was not until the Great Mississippi Floods of 1927 that President Calvin Coolidge appointed Herbert Hoover, his Secretary of Commerce as the director of flood response or the “Recovery Czar” (Hoover would later become the President) to coordinate federal flood relief efforts and started government’s expansion on flood control by channeling

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Figure 7.1 The aftermath of the Johnstown Flood. “Ruins from Site of the Hulburt House”. In: “History of the Johnstown Flood”, by Willis Fletcher Johnson, 1889, p. 181. Library call number M79.4 J71h. 1889 June. Photographer: Archival photograph by Mr. Steve Nicklas, NOS, NGS. Image source: Flickr.com5

federal capital resources in large flood control structures including dams and levees and their associated power generation mechanisms (Kosar, 2005). Also during the same time, two parallel efforts emerged: (a) the state of California began its earth­ quake mitigation programs after experiencing the Long Beach Earthquake of 1933, where such programs included zoning, and building code development for earth­ quake resistant structures; and (b) a series of large-scale dust storms and droughts devastated large swath of the American and Canadian prairies in the 1930s. Known as the Great Dust Bowl, the events led to an increased involvement of the state and federal government in land use management (Rubin, 2014, p. 27). One related major development was the designation of the Bureau of Public Roads (later to become Federal Highway Administration) as the authorized agency for funding the repair and reconstruction of highways and bridges damaged by natural disasters (FEMA, 2019a, 2019b) (Figure 7.2). Rubin (2014) contends however that with the exception of flood mitigation efforts, which were primarily on the Mississippi River, almost all levels of government limited their involvement to post-disaster assistance during the first half of the 20th century, failing to develop either legal structures or formal systems to deal with pre-disaster mitigation and post-disaster recovery. Until around the second half of the 20th cen­ tury, the notion remained that mitigation and recovery were local and state govern­ ment responsibilities and the federal government’s role were limited to the provision of disaster relief (Figure 7.3).

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Figure 7.2 Galveston, Texas hurricane devastation and destruction, image source: pixabay.com6

Figure 7.3 The great dust bowl, image source: pixabay.com7

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7.1.3 20th Century: 1st half—industrial disasters, existential threats and civil defense It was not just natural disasters that began to focus the nation’s attention on the need for emergency management. The first half of the 20th Century also saw the expansion of the disaster concept to include industrial accidents in most part due to the explo­ sions of munitions and cargo ships, as well as intentional or manmade disasters due to the existential threats or threats to the human security emanating from the horrors of World War II. Thus, the federal government’s role was expanded to develop dualuse civil defense systems to cover the natural, industrial and security threats (Rubin, 2014, p. 28). Even after WWII, the threats remained valid due to the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons pressuring the public demand for emergency management at the federal level (Figure 7.4). 7.1.4 20th Century: 1950s—civil defense act and the introduction of federal disaster act In 1950, with the Civil Defense Act, Public Law (PL) 920,9 the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) was established for the purpose of coordinating the civil defense efforts by local, state and federal governments. The same year, the Federal Disaster Relief Act (PL 81-875) was also passed, which resided the authority for fed­ eral response inside the Office of the President, and the administrative control of relief inside the Housing and Home Finance Administration (later to become the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development). The Federal Disaster Act gave local and state governments the primary responsibility for natural and unintentional disaster consequence management and gave the federal government a supplemen­ tal role in the disaster relief process (Rubin, 2014, p. 29). As Cold War escalations

Figure 7.4 Washington, D.C. World War II memorial. Image source: pixabay.com8

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126 Irmak Renda-Tanali continued with the Soviet Union, civil defense spending increased disproportionately as compared to relief spending for natural disasters (Rubin, 2014, pp. 29–32). 7.1.5 20th Century: 1960s–70s—flooding legislation, presidential disaster declaration and disaster relief acts introduced The 1960s and 1970s brought the challenge of effectively balancing the efforts for civil defense and natural and technological disasters. A series of large-scale disasters including the Alaska earthquake (1964), Hurricane Betsy (1965), Hurricane Camille (1969), Hurricane Agnes (1972) and the Three Mile Island nuclear scare (1979) revealed major weaknesses in the Nation’s emergency management system and structure. Piecemeal legislation and policy began to foster national efforts to effectively manage large-scale disasters, but still included 100s of federal agencies. The Flood Control Act (1965) provided the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers with greater authorities to coordi­ nate national flood control projects and the Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973 created the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration with the Department of Housing and Urban Development to coordinate federal disaster relief (Figure 7.5). In 1968, the National Flood Insurance Act11 was passed that created the Federal Insurance Administration under FEMA (later to be named Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration) and made flood insurance available for the first time to homeowners (FEMA, 2019a, 2019b). Later, the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 197312 made the purchase of flood insurance mandatory for the protection of property located in Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA) (FEMA, 2019a, 2019b). Another major milestone legislation happened in the year following, where the Disaster Relief Act (1974), Public Law 93-28813 was passed into law establishing the process of Presidential

Figure 7.5 Flooding after Hurricane Betsy, 1965, Image source: flickr.com10

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Disaster Declarations (PDDs). PDDs function as “national shock absorbers” as noted by Sylves (2020). PDDs authorize the President to provide federal assistance for disasters caused by a natural event or manmade event that exceed the community’s or state’s capability to respond. In those cases, the President can determine whether fed­ eral assistance is needed, and if so, declares the event a “disaster” thus releasing federal monies and resources to assist in the response and recovery efforts. There are two types of PDDs: major disaster declarations and emergency declarations. A major disaster declaration is issued by the President after a state governor seeks assistance and where the President deems that the disaster exceeds the combined capabilities of state and local governments to respond. A major disaster declaration opens a wide range of individual and public assistance programs for relief and recovery. An emergency dec­ laration is, on the other hand, can be issued for any occasion where the President deter­ mines that federal assistance is needed. The aid is capped at $5 million per single event. Emergency declarations supplement state and local preparedness, response or relief efforts including protection of lives, public health and safety provisions. Additional assistance beyond the $5 million aid requires Congressional approval (Sylves, 2020). 7.1.6 20th Century: 1970s—creation of FEMA Still well into the 1970s emergency and disaster management activities were still frag­ mented. Nuclear power plants and the transportation of hazardous substances posed manmade hazards, which added to natural disasters, and more than 100 federal agen­ cies were involved in some aspect of disasters, hazards and emergencies with many parallel programs and policies at the state and local levels (FEMA, 2019a, 2019b). Especially following the (near miss) incident at Three Mile Island, mounting pressure from the NGA led to a redesign of federal emergency management systems, simplify­ ing the complexity of federal disaster relief efforts and simplifying the federal agency structure that is engaged following a disaster. The National Governors Association (NGA)14 called for the establishment of one federal agency to consolidate the federal government’s disaster management and comprehensive emergency management at the state level (NGA, 1978). Subsequently, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created in 1979 during the Jimmy Carter Administration through Congressional approval and reorganization of several agencies and initiatives, for the purpose of consolidating mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery lead authorities under one federal agency that directly reported to the President. The civil defense and disaster pre­ paredness and response missions of several federal departments including the Civil Preparedness Agency of the Department of Defense and the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Federal Disaster Assistance Administration were placed under the FEMA Administration. The dual use15 was resurged during the early years of FEMA (Rubin, 2014, p. 33). 7.1.7 20th Century: 1980s–1990s—oil spills and terrorism and the rise of FEMA During the 1980s and especially after 1990s, there was an expansion in the concept and practice of emergency management due to the shifting nature of the threat spectrum given the collapse of the Soviet Union, and subsequent fall of the Berlin

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128 Irmak Renda-Tanali Wall, and from Cold War Diplomacy to a the risk-based “all-hazards” planning and response, with catastrophic manmade and natural disasters such as the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in 1989, Hurricane Andrew in 1992, World Trade Center Bombing in 1993 and Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995. Thus, more money from the federal government earmarked for the civil defense was shifted to all-hazards demands (Rubin, 2014, p. 33, Ramsay & Renda-Tanali, 2018). After FEMA’s poor performance with hurricanes in Puerto Rico and South Carolina and then Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the pub­ lic pressure regarding FEMA’s involvement called for change, which was reflected in the studies by the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA),16 the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the Inspector General of FEMA. Following his election, President Clinton appointed James Lee Witt as the FEMA Administrator. Witt vowed to address and improve emergency management at all lev­ els (Rubin, 2014, pp. 33–34). For example, interagency cooperation, customer service and a deeper commitment to an all-hazards approach to emergency management were highlighted. Naturally these efforts moved emergency management away from a purely civil defense focus and instead, embraced both “bad guys” and “bad weather”. This led to the creation of new authorities within FEMA including preparing state and local first responders for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents, and the develop­ ment of all-hazard preparedness plans at the federal level. During this period, three factors contributed to the expansion of the federal role in emergency management: (1) growing support for all-hazards approach from emergency managers, (2) growing harmonious interactions among all levels of the government and (3) increasing pro­ fessionalism in emergency management (Rubin, 2014, p. 34). FEMA’s reputation grew increasingly positive among the public and the Congress as a “competent” and “profes­ sionally run federal emergency management program” (Rubin, 2014, p. 34). 7.1.8 21st Century: September 11 attacks, shifting threat spectrum and rise of homeland security FEMA enjoyed being the lead federal agency and achieved organizational maturity and stability, until the events of September 11, 2001. Just one year before the attacks, the Disaster Mitigation Act (2000) (DMA) was passed, which repealed the previous provisions for mitigation activities, The DMA replaced those with new requirements that emphasize the closer collaboration of State, local and Indian Tribal entities in the coordination of mitigation planning and implementation efforts. The DMA was an amendment the Stafford Act.17 The 9/11 attacks changed the threat spectrum—and therefore both the attitude toward and the focus of emergency management. The changing attitudes toward emergency management were reflected in the 9/11 Commission Report, as well as in numerous White House and CRS reports. Motivated by the attacks on 9/11, and the fact that the newly minted Department of Homeland Security was somewhat ill-defined, the White House issued the first-ever National Strategy for Homeland Security in 2002, the stated purpose of which was “to mobilize and organize the Nation to secure the U.S. homeland from terrorist attacks” (White House, 2002). Thus, the 9/11 terror attacks lead the policymakers to create a departmental level organization in order to better prepare better for the sudden onset of disruptive events through the absorption of the

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Figure 7.6 Days after Sep. 11 terrorist attacks, fires still burn amidst the rubble of the World Trade Center. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 2nd Class Jim Watson. (RELEASED) Source: flickr.com 20

specialized powers of 22 agencies including FEMA, in its body. In 2003, in accordance with the Homeland Security Act of 2002,18 FEMA became an agency under the newly founded Department of Homeland Security (DHS),19 assumed a homeland security mission and was given responsibility for helping to ensure that first responders from all levels of government were prepared for terrorist incidents as well as natural disas­ ters (Figure 7.6). 7.1.9 21st Century: Hurricane Katrina disaster and the rising importance of the federal role in emergency management In 2005, Hurricane Katrina tested how thoughtful and robust the emergency response and recovery functions were inside both DHS and FEMA. Sadly, most agreed FEMA’s response (and in fairness, the White House response as well) was not very robust severely damaging the reputation of FEMA. To this day, Hurricane Katrina remains the most devastating disaster in U.S. history. Hurricane Katrina revealed the gaps in the national emergency management system, which led to a major reforming act called the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act (PKEMRA) of 2006.21 In accordance with PKEMRA, FEMA assumed substantial new authorities and responsibilities including assuming the federal government’s lead in disaster preparedness, response and incident management. Today, FEMA maintains its status as a departmental-level agency and an operational and support component with DHS, tasked with building, sustaining and improving the Nation’s capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and miti­ gate all hazards. FEMA’s organizational chart is shown below in Figure 7.7. FEMA’s relative position within DHS is shown in Figure 7.8.

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Figure 7.7 FEMA leadership organizational structure. Image source: FEMA22

Figure 7.8 Organizational chart of DHS and FEMA’s position. Image source: DHS23

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7.2 Theories of emergency preparedness and FEMA’s statutory authority in disasters Today, Emergency Management deals mainly with the preparedness and response aspects of the disasters regardless of who or what caused them. This focus is also known as consequence management. The emphasis is less on the prevention of an event, and instead more on the preparedness side as well as on effective response and recovery. Therefore, it goes without saying that “being prepared” or “preparedness” is the main theoretical component of emergency management. Here, the assumed the­ ory can be stated as follows: If we can prepare for known or suspected emergencies ahead of time, our response and recovery operations can be more effective, can take a shorter period, and with much less funding, hence be cost-effective. Thus, FEMA is the federal agency that is tasked with the function of the preparedness side of home­ land security. In 1988, Congress passed the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, (aka Public Law 100-707; Robert, 1988). The Stafford Act amended the earlier Disaster Relief Act (1974) signed by President Nixon. To this day, the Stafford Act maintains its status as the most critical legislative foundation for modern emer­ gency management structure and function as it gives FEMA the authority to pro­ vide financial and physical assistance to the disaster-stricken communities through a PDD.24 It also authorizes FEMA to coordinate government-wide relief efforts (FEMA, 2013) anywhere in the U.S. or her territories. The Stafford Act has been used not only to aid communities after natural catastro­ phes but after terrorist attacks as well. They include the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, September 11, 2001 attacks to the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, and the 2013 Boston Marathon Attack (CRS, 2019). To sum up, emergency management is indeed a local function. However, some disasters are so complex, large, expensive, etc that local or even state governments may be unable to respond adequately. If the local response capacity is exceeded, then requests are made by the local authorities to the state and neighboring authorities to augment their response. When state and local capacities are exhausted or incapable of responding, the federal government is able to step in through a Presidential Disaster Declaration enabled by the Stafford Act. PDDs empower the U.S. President to assist the affected state’s governor to respond to and recover from a disaster.25 7.2.1 The National Incident Management System (NIMS) While the Stafford Act created a legislated and policy foundation for emer­ gency management, it was less helpful in guiding how best to organize the actual response. The 9/11 attacks illustrated painfully and clearly, that the U.S. was unpre­ pared to respond to a large scale, multijurisdictional disaster. A profound, legis­ lative response to this realization was the National Incident Management System (NIMS; U.S. FEMA, 2017). NIMS was created as a result of the 9/11 attacks and was issued originally in 2004 and later revised in 2008, and 2017 with updates and lessons learned from real incidents. Its basis is the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) which relies on the organizing protocol of the revised Firescope Incident Command System (ICS) used and accepted by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group26 starting with the year 1982. NIMS “provides a

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common, nationwide approach to enable the whole community to work together to manage all threats and hazards. NIMS applies to all incidents, regardless of cause, size, location or complexity”.27 Thus, NIMS provides a consistent operational framework regardless of the size of the incidents. ICS is the core of the NIMS framework which allows consistency in managing all domestic incidents. Today, all government officials are encouraged to adopt NIMS as their jurisdiction’s incident management system; and train, and conduct exercises pertaining to the hazards and risks within their own jurisdiction using the NIMS framework. While most states and local governments comply, fund­ ing shortages are the main impediments against full NIMS implementation. State, local and tribal Emergency Operations Plans (EOPs) mostly use ICS and multiagency coordination system (MAC) as a common operating framework, for a seamless inte­ gration of all of the response organizations from the incident command post to the emergency operations centers (EOCs) at the departmental, local, state, to regional and national-level entities. MACs ensure the communications are interoperable, accessible and redundant across the horizontal and vertical response units (CPG 101, 2010, pp. 2-2). The National Response Framework (NRF), formerly the National Response Plan is the basis for national-level planning for large scale emergencies regardless of threat or hazard origin. Since each federal agency virtually possesses resources that a jurisdic­ tion may need when responding to an incident, federal agencies have delineated roles as either the primary or support agencies depending on their specialization areas and the resources they possess. For example, FBI plays a key role in homeland security by its role as the lead agency for terrorism-related emergencies since it is the federal law enforcement agency; USACE is the lead agency for dam collapse incidents, and EPA is the lead federal agency for environmental disasters and HAZMAT remediations. All federal departments and agencies are required to by law to develop plans, policies and procedures that govern for effective housing and provision of resources as part of a coordinated federal response (CPG 101, 2010, pp. 2-2). 7.2.2 National preparedness goal and FEMA’s role Preparedness and resilience are central themes in current homeland security ide­ ology. The Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (2003), which was released under President George W. Bush in 2003, served the purpose of establishing policies to strengthen the U.S. local, state and federal governments’ preparedness capabili­ ties against both the threatened or actual domestic terror attacks and other major disasters including those from natural hazards, by establishing a national domestic “all-hazards” preparedness goal.28 The Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) that was issued in 2011 by President Barack Obama evolves from and supersedes HSPD-8 (Brown, 2011). It places the functions of Emergency Management and Homeland Security under the same “preparedness for resilience” umbrella. The Interim National Preparedness Goal issued in 2005 was later replaced by the National Preparedness Goal (NPG; U.S. DHS 2015)29 through the PPD-8. PPD-8 also calls for a National Preparedness System, and a National Preparedness Report to be issued annually. Specifically, the PPD-8 policy evolves from HSPD-8 by expanding the scope of the National Preparedness Goal to include (a) mitigation as a key mis­ sion area, in addition to prevention, protection, response and recovery; (b) highlights

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Figure 7.9 National preparedness system, Source: FEMA.32

the capabilities-based planning approach instead of national planning scenarios and (c) directs the creation of National Planning Frameworks for all mission areas of national preparedness.30 National preparedness is based on core capabilities that support “strengthening the security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of ter­ rorism, cyberattacks, pandemics and catastrophic natural disasters”.31 PPD-8 placed the responsibility of national preparedness to all levels of government, the private and nonprofit sectors and individual citizens, which means that everyone can contribute to safeguarding the Nation from harm. Figure 7.9 depicts the National Preparedness System within the notion of “whole community”. National Exercise Program.33 Part of the preparedness effort is training and exer­ cising the plans in place. Training, testing and exercises serve as the foundation for preparedness. At the national level, this is achieved through the National Exercise Program (NEP; FEMA 2018b). The core capabilities outlined in the NPG are tested and validated through the NEP, which is a mechanism for doing it nation­ wide across all preparedness mission areas. The NEP essentially consists of a twoyear, progressive cycle of focused exercises across the whole community tied to a common set of strategic objectives that culminates in a biennial National Level Exercise (NLE). The NLE serves as the capstone event of the two-year NEP cycle, and is congressionally mandated in the PKEMRA of 2006, which states that “the Administrator [of FEMA] shall periodically, but not less than biennially, perform national exercises … to test and evaluate the capability of Federal, State, Local and Tribal governments to detect, disrupt and prevent threatened or actual cata­ strophic acts of terrorism, especially those involving weapons of mass destruction”, and “to test and evaluate the readiness of Federal, State, local and tribal govern­ ments to respond and recover in a coordinated and unified manner to catastrophic incidents” (United States Code, Title 6, Chapter 2, Subchapter II, Part A, Section 748(b)(3)) (Figure 7.10). After the Hurricane Sandy disaster that affected more than 24 states and inflicted widespread damage to the communities on the east coast resulting in more than $70 billion in damages in 2012, President Barack Obama signed into law the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act (SRIA, 2013) and the accompanying Disaster Relief

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Figure 7.10 Aerial views of the damage caused by Hurricane Sandy to the New Jersey coast taken during a search and rescue mission by 1-150 Assault Helicopter Battalion: New Jersey Army National Guard: Oct. 30: 2012. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Mark C. Olsen/ Released) Source: Wikimedia34

Appropriations Act of 2013. The passage of SRIA is considered to be the most signif­ icant legislative change to FEMA’s substantive authorities since the enactment of the Stafford Act. It not only authorized several significant changes to the way FEMA may deliver federal disaster assistance to survivors but also allowed for more flexibility in distributing public assistance funds to individuals by shortening delivery of recovery aid and capping the expenses.35 SRIA authorized a new Emergency Relief Program within the Federal Transit Administration and provided $50.5 billion to those federal agencies that play a supporting role in disaster recovery and assistance. The law also authorized much-needed reforms and streamlined existing disaster assistance pro­ grams authorized by the Stafford Act. The main reforms included expedited debris removal, expedited public assistance, alternative procedures for better federal assis­ tance to individuals and households, and streamlined procedures for environmental review of hazard-mitigation projects.36 7.2.3 Threat and hazard characteristics As indicated above and in the various parts of this book, the PPD-8 is aimed at “strengthening the security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyberattacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural dis­ asters”. Threats and hazards that pose a significant challenge to Homeland Security or National Security can be characterized by utilizing a set of common charac­ teristics. They include: (a) the time factor that includes the speed of onset, which means whether the event was sudden and with no time to warn such as the terror attacks; or the event was slow onset and long-lasting such as a chemical release from

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Table 7.1 Hazard types based on originating source Natural

Technological

Adversarial or human caused

These events are emergencies These are disasters created by These events are emergencies caused by forces extraneous to that involve materials created man, either intentionally or by accident. Examples of such man in elements of the natural by man and that pose a hazards are acts of terrorism, environment. Natural hazards unique hazard to the general public and environment. The school violence and cyber cannot be managed and are jurisdiction needs to consider events. often interrelated. Natural events that are caused by hazards can occur and cause accident (e.g., mechanical no damage to humans or the failure, system or process built environment; however, breakdowns) or result from when a hazards and an emergency caused by development intersect, significant damage to the built another hazard (e.g., flood, environment occurs, causing a storm) or are caused intentionally. natural disaster. Source: CPG 101, p. 1-8

a factory; (b) the scope and scale in terms of how much is affected; (c) location of the incident including specific, indeterminate or diffuse such as the cyberspace; (d) magnitude of the physical force; (e) intensity in terms of the level of expected harm; (f) the impacts including primary, secondary and cascading effects; and (g) threat predictability in terms of probability or frequency of occurrence, including an expec­ tation that new threats may arise such as spear-phishing attacks.37 Table 7.1 is a sample characterization of hazards based on their origin; whereas Table 7.2 is a sample list of hazards based on the originating source. Emergency management is based on the process of risk analysis,38 and planning for, and the execution of all managerial functions necessary to protect, mitigate, prepare for, respond to and recover from all-hazards. Risk assessment is the basis for preparedness. A How-to guide for risk mitigation39 was published by FEMA right after the passage of The Disaster Mitigation Act (2000), which provides state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) governments a step-by-step guide for determining Table 7.2 Sample List of hazards based on originating source Natural hazards

Technological hazards

Human-caused hazards

• • • • • • • • • • • • •

• • • • • • •

• • • • •

Avalanche Disease outbreak Drought Earthquake Epidemic Flood Hurricane Landslide Tornado Tsunami Volcanic eruption Wildfire Winter storm

Airplane crash Dam/levee failure HAZMAT release Power failure Radiological release Train derailment Urban conflagration

Civil disturbance Cyber events Terrorist acts Sabotage School violence

Source: CPG 101, p. 4-10

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136 Irmak Renda-Tanali “(1) which natural hazards could affect a jurisdiction; (2) what areas of the jurisdiction are vulnerable to the hazards; (3) what assets will be affected; and (4) to what degree they will be affected, as measured through dollar losses”.40 Later, with the PPD8 and the NPG, the risk-based planning principle continued for all-hazards emergency plan­ ning as stated in the CPG 101. Rather than planning for every possible threat and hazard, capabilities-based planning took the center stage as it involves building and sustaining core capabilities against multiple threats and hazards. Capabilities-based planning allows for a more efficient use of resources, eliminating redundancies and spending less. Capabilitiesbased planning became the foundation of the National Preparedness System espe­ cially after the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA) which was enacted after the 2017 hurricanes and the 2018 California wildfires.41 DRRA requires FEMA to assess the capability gaps based on tiered, capability-specific performance objectives in order to prioritize grant funding.42 Therefore, FEMA has developed the National Risk and Capability Assessment (NRCA) products that are intended to measure risk and capability across the Nation through a standardized and coordinated process. 7.2.4 From comprehensive emergency management to whole of community preparedness The term “Comprehensive emergency management” (CEM) was coined before the for­ mation of FEMA by the National Governors Association and it refers to a “state’s responsibility and capability for managing all types of emergencies and disasters by coordinating the actions of numerous agencies throughout the four stages of emergency activity: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. It applies to all risks: attack, man-made, and natural, in a federal-state-local partnership”.43 Later, CEM evolved into the “whole of community” approach in the emergency management doctrine. The “whole of community” approach to modern Emergency Management prac­ tice includes the role of all levels of government, the private sector and the public in all-hazards disaster management. The four phases of disaster management (also the five mission areas in the NPG): prevention, protection/response, recovery and mitigation are a shared doctrine between and across the Emergency Management and Homeland Security communities. The vertical coordination across the gov­ ernments and integrated planning for hazards makes up the core of the Emergency Preparedness Plans. Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG; FEMA 2018a) 101, issued by the DHS in 2010, provides Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the emergency and homeland security managers guidance on (1) how to engage the whole community in addressing all risks that might impact their juris­ dictions; and (2) the fundamentals of planning and developing emergency operations plans (EOPs; FEMA 2010a), which are connected to planning efforts in the five mis­ sion areas of prevention, protection, response, recovery and mitigation.44 Later, in May of 2018, CPG 201 (3rd edition) was issued to provide guidance to con­ duct threat and hazard identification and risk assessment (THIRA) and Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR). CPG 201 describes a standard process for identifying community-specific threats and hazards and setting targets for each core capability identified in the National Preparedness Goal with resource estimates.45 In July of 2019, FEMA released THIRA that provides an in-depth description of FEMA’s approach to completing a national-level risk assessment.46 “[t]he THIRA includes standardized

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language to describe threat and hazard impacts and capability targets. This allows communities to collect more specific, quantitative information while also providing contextual data. Through the updated SPR process, since 2012, communities have been collecting more detailed and actionable data on their current capabilities and identified capability gaps. Communities then indicate their intended approaches for addressing those gaps and assess the impact of relevant funding sources on build­ ing and sustaining capabilities”. (CPG 201, p. 5). The 2019 National THIRA applies an updated THIRA methodology and a standardized language at the National level. FEMA, through its 2019 National THIRA, developed a preliminary list of 59 threats and hazards, 29 standardized impacts, and 22 specific, quantifiable capability targets representing “the most critical and measurable elements of selected core capabilities”.47 The 2019 THIRA remains an initial effort to identify the greatest threats and hazards to the Nation, the potential impacts to life and property, and the capabilities needed to address those impacts. It is a work in progress, which will continue to evolve and improve.48 The current definition of FEMA’s key areas of emergency management and planning are described below in Table 7.3. Table 7.3 FEMA’s current definition of key planning areas49 “Emergency planning includes the key areas involved in addressing any threat or hazard: prevention, protection, response, recovery and mitigation. Integrating the key areas as part of the overall planning effort allows jurisdictions to produce an effective Emergency Operations Plans (EOPs) and advance overall preparedness. Prevention consists of actions that reduce risk from human-caused incidents, primarily terrorism. Prevention planning can also help mitigate secondary or opportunistic incidents that may occur after the primary incident. Incorporating prevention methods into the comprehensive planning process also helps a jurisdiction identify information or intelligence requirements that support the overall planning process. Protection reduces or eliminates a threat to people, property, and the environment. Primarily focused on adversarial incidents, the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) is vital to local jurisdictions, national security, public health and safety and economic vitality. Protection planning safeguards citizens and their freedoms, critical infrastructure, property, and the economy from acts of terrorism, natural disasters or other emergencies. It includes actions or measures taken to cover or shield assets from exposure, injury or destruction. Protective actions may occur before, during, or after an incident and prevent, minimize, or contain the impact of an incident. Mitigation, with its focus on the impact of a hazard, encompasses the structural and non-structural approaches taken to eliminate or limit a hazard’s presence; people’s exposure; or interactions with people, property, and the environment. The emphasis on sustained actions to reduce long-term risk differentiates mitigation from those tasks that are required to survive an emergency safely. Examples of mitigation activities include: • Complying with National Flood Insurance Program floodplain management regulations. • Enforcing stringent building codes, floodproofing requirements, seismic design standards and wind-bracing requirements for new construction or repairing existing buildings. • Adopting zoning ordinances that steer development away from areas subject to flooding, storm surge or coastal erosion. • Retrofitting public buildings to withstand ground shaking or hurricane-strength winds. • Acquiring damaged homes or businesses in flood-prone areas, relocating the structures, and returning the property to open space, wetlands or recreational uses. • Building community shelters and tornado safe rooms to help protect people in their homes, public buildings and schools in hurricane- and tornado-prone areas. (Continued)

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Table 7.3 FEMA’s current definition of key planning areas50 (Continued)

Response embodies the actions taken in the immediate aftermath of an incident to save and sustain lives, meet basic human needs, and reduce the loss of property and the effect on critical infrastructure and the environment. Following an incident, response operations reduce the physical, psychological, social and economic effects of an incident. Response planning provides a rapid and disciplined incident assessment to ensure a quickly scalable, adaptable and flexible response. It incorporates national response doctrine such as the one presented in the U.S. National Response Framework (NRF), which defines basic roles and responsibilities for incident response across all levels of government and the private sector. Recovery encompasses both short-term and long-term efforts for the rebuilding and revitalization of affected communities. Recovery planning builds stakeholder partnerships that lead to community restoration and future sustainability and resiliency. Recovery planning must provide for a nearseamless transition from response activities to short-term recovery operations—including restoration of interrupted utility services, reestablishment of transportation routes, and the provision of food and shelter to displaced persons. Planners should design long-term recovery plans to maximize results through the efficient use of resources and incorporate national recovery doctrine.” (Source: Comprehensive preparedness guide 101, FEMA.gov, pp. 1-8 and 1-9)

7.3 What does FEMA do to support homeland security? It is important to examine the FEMA’s role in the making of a “secure nation” through its role in the provision of preparedness capabilities and resiliency. FEMA’s role is significant in helping the Nation withstand and recover from adverse events. It cer­ tainly plays a critical role in supporting and sustaining a national workforce capa­ ble of accomplishing the National Preparedness Goal and complements human and homeland security. To summarize FEMA’s operational support position to the DHS during events that threaten the security of the homeland, five different disasters are examined very briefly below. They are: (1) cyberattacks; (2) explosives terrorist attacks, (3) major storms and severe weather events, (4) pandemics and (5) political conventions. 7.3.1 Cyber attacks50 The United States depends on its critical infrastructures to support the well-being of its citizens. In today’s increasingly interconnected physical and cyberinfrastructure, cyberattacks to the critical systems that support public health, defense, economy and other systems that support social well-being may threaten homeland security. In the case of severe disruptions or damage to the critical infrastructure, NIMS is activated designating the leadership role to the DHS Secretary who becomes the Federal Officer for Domestic Incident Management and “coordinates the Federal Government’s resources to be uti­ lized in response to, or recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters or other emergen­ cies”.51 The supporting agency is designated as the National Protection and Programs Directorate with its National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) and Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS­ CERT). U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Secret Service (SS) serve as the operational agencies that actively participate in the intelligence gathering and processing that lead to the apprehension of attackers.

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Figure 7.11 Cyber-attack. Source DHS.gov52

As can be seen from Figure 7.11, FEMA does not have a designated support or an operational role in cyber incidents. 7.3.2 Explosives terrorist attacks When an actual or a threatened incident occurs that involve explosives attacks by terrorists or a hostile nonstate actor(s) in the U.S. against crowds and/or critical com­ mercial or government facilities, transportation systems or critical infrastructure sites resulting at least one fatality or injury, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)53 as the nation’s lead federal law enforcement agency assumes the lead position for the investigations.54 DHS Secretary would assume the role of Federal Officer for Domestic Incident Management. Together with the Attorney General, they advise the President. FEMA’s role in this scenario is operational along with ICE, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and/or USSS depending on the origin and nature of the attack. “FEMA activates the appropriate Regional Response Coordination Center to monitor response operations in the event federal assistance becomes necessary”.55 Figure 7.12 highlights the active agencies under DHS including when an explosives terror attacks happen against the United States. 7.3.3 Major storms and severe weather events One of the most frequent events that devastate communities is major storms like hur­ ricanes and other severe weather events such as tornadoes, and floods. FEMA plays an active role in assisting with disaster relief and recovery operations. Once a disaster is declared through the President upon the request from the governor(s) of the affected state(s), [t]he FEMA Administrator activates the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), FEMA’s facility for coordinating all disaster relief efforts and pro­ viding assistance for required emergency measures to save lives and protect property, public health and safety.

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Figure 7.12 Explosives terrorism attack. Source: DHS.gov56

•

• • • •

Works closely with state and local partners to identify and address the needs of affected communities. Based on the identified needs of the affected commu­ nities, FEMA refers those individuals to its local, state and nonprofit partners for the immediate needs that it is not authorized to provide, such as emergency medical assistance, emergency shelters and other immediate needs. FEMA sends resources and FEMA Corps Response Teams into affected areas to help with federally authorized individual assistance including housing assistance not covered by private homeowners’ insurance, temporary housing assistance, low-interest small business loans through its partnership with the Small Business Administration Deploys point of distribution (POD) sites, centralized points where supplies are delivered and where the public travels to pick up commodities following a disaster or emergency. Depending on the severity of damage caused on land, may leverage its network of Search and Rescue teams to affected areas. Assists affected communities in finding temporary housing and getting grants to assist with necessary repairs, among other types of aid. Opens Disaster Recovery Centers in the hardest-hit areas, where affected citizens met with officials and apply for disaster assistance”.57

Figure 7.13 highlights the active agencies under DHS including FEMA in the event of a major storm or a severe weather. 7.3.4 Pandemics A pandemic (i.e., COVID-19) is an infectious disease that turns into a global epidemic. “DHS activates the plans to mitigate the impact of a pandemic on homeland security, health and safety, critical infrastructure and the basic functions of American soci­ ety”.58 FEMA, being one of DHS’s three operational agencies, “[a]ctivates its network of Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCCs) to coordinate federal emer­ gency management operations.

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Figure 7.13 Major storms/severe weather event, source: DHS.gov59

•

Supports the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (that is the Public Health system) in immunization and vaccination efforts, particularly through providing logistical support for vaccine distribution and administration”.60

Figure 7.14 highlights the active agencies under DHS including FEMA in the case of a pandemic. 7.3.5 Political conventions In the 2016 elections, the Republican and Democratic National Conventions were des­ ignated as National Security Special Events (NSSEs) by the Department of Homeland Security. Because of this special designation, were staffed by close to 3,000 Homeland Security personnel, in conjunction with other federal agencies.61 FEMA, in accordance

Figure 7.14 Pandemics, source: DHS.gov62

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Figure 7.15 National political conventions, source: DHS.gov

with their consequence management mission within the Department of Homeland Security, has an operational role in these conventions. It is tasked with the provision of planning support to the federal, state and local partners in their preparation for the political conventions. FEMA stands ready to mobilize disaster response teams, capabilities and assets if requested.63 Figure 7.15 highlights the active agencies under DHS including FEMA in the case of political conventions. 7.3.6 Summary and conclusions This textbook covers the core disciplines and doctrines that make up the homeland security enterprise. Hence, it goes without saying that one of the main objectives of homeland security is the assurance of human security by mitigating (that is reducing the frequency or severity, or both) of the threats/hazards that can impact the well-being of society. The professional overlap and complementarity between the homeland secu­ rity and emergency management fields have well established. Both homeland security and emergency management academics as well as both practice communities see such overlap as an indisputable fact.64 65 66 Emergency management plays a critical role in the larger human security mission, primarily through preparation and consequence management which provides federal relief to disaster victims and communities. Like homeland security, emergency management is a risk-based enterprise that uses an “all hazards approach” to planning, preparing and responding to disasters which provides governments with valuable agility and flexibility depending on the origin, scope, the extent of damage and/or affected sectors. Hazards and threats to society are dynamic and are of the wicked in their nature. For example, extreme weather events emanat­ ing from climate change have cascading consequences on both social mobility and on social structure. As a result, national preparedness capabilities are themselves dynamic, which in turn requires a legal and policy infrastructure to match. At the end of the day, the hallmark of a secure nation relies on not only its preparedness and response capabilities, but its ability to withstand and recover from adverse events— that is, its resilience—as well. That is, the quality of a nation’s emergency management function is central to its safety and security.

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7.4 Discussion questions 1. Given the current threat spectrum against the U.S., how does the emergency management function of the government tie to the way modern U.S. homeland security efforts are strategized? 2. Discuss how THIRA helps to improve the function of emergency management in state, local, territorial and tribal governments. 3. Discuss the pros and cons of the “dual-use” function in the case of terrorist attacks. 4. What is the “whole of community” approach as described by FEMA? What are the ostensible benefits of such an approach? What are the limitations? 5. Describe three ways FEMA supports homeland security operations and structures.

Notes 1. Drabek (1989). FEMA. See https://training.fema.gov/hiedu/docs/emprinciples/0907_176% 20em%20principles12x18v2f%20johnson%20(w-o%20draft).pdf 2. See https://www.fema.gov/about-agency 3. Rubin, C. B. (Ed.). (2020). Emergency management: The American experience (3rd ed.). Routledge. 4. Rubin, C. B. (2014). Local emergency management: Origins and evolution. In W. Waugh, & K. Tierney (Eds.). Emergency management: Principles and practice for local government (2nd ed., pp. 25–37). Washington, DC: ICMA Press. 5. https://www.flickr.com/photos/noaaphotolib/5424752205/in/photolist-9gngQr-jkBvHJ­ JTHCoz-c5YhCL-24cFvzR-qsvMtP-e3kEaT-4vFgcG-c5YeCf-c5YgrW-XXZdi7-aLzzbBc61cEJ-F8MDz-Xmr5BB-28hKCGC-5i3X1g-ap3jpd-prnFvi-YPPyTr-hnbtR1-WQApZk­ 5i8gvA-8MK8sr-8kELj7-owhKTB-j7N7Dx-8ydXAL-53TZBH-gH8hZs-7thR5w-21obJih­ 8MNeWJ-224QA8J-dLTq92-pySNRs-WVppEA-bVVh7M-icWsDM-GFZ7TE-DDxRCr­ WYXTm4-pEm9TG-24PF7w1-cuR7Jm-X7Z58x-nPCASC-5i8gjs-7a8sNf-fqVr94 6. https://pixabay.com/photos/hurricane-devastation-destruction-60550/ 7. https://cdn.pixabay.com/photo/2012/10/26/01/08/buried-62989_960_720.jpg 8. https://cdn.pixabay.com/photo/2015/04/03/20/16/wwii-705767_960_720.jpg 9. See https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=456688 10. https://www.flickr.com/photos/keyslibraries/2846421152/in/photolist-6zaTiT-6zaTh4­ fakDkg-faA2Nh-5kwDQL-5kso7Z-mf8et-SDzGdR-TTi9CZ 11. See https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/21010; National Flood Insurance Act. (1968a). Flood disaster protection Act of 1973. FEMA. https://www.fema. gov/media-library/assets/documents/7277; National Flood Insurance Act. (1968b). As amended, and Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 4001 et. seq. FEMA. https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/21010 12. See https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/7277 13. See https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=458661 14. NGA was founded in 1908 as a bipartisan organization to “share best practices, speak with an informed voice on national policy and develop innovative solutions that improve citizens’ lives through state government and support the principles of federalism” (Source: https://www.nga.org/about/). 15. John Macy, who was the Director of the Civil Service Commission under Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson, was appointed as FEMA’s first Director. He “recog­ nized the commonalities between natural hazards preparedness, civil defense activities, and what would come to be known as the “dual-use approach” to emergency prepared­ ness planning and resources” (FEMA, 2010b, p. 7). 16. NAPA was congressionally chartered in 1967 as a non-partisan nonprofit academy. It “has provided expert advice to government leaders in building and managing more effec­ tive, efficient, accountable and transparent organizations” (Source: https://www.nap­ awash.org/about-us/who-we-are).

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144 17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24.

25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

Irmak Renda-Tanali See https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/4596 See https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nat-strat-hls-2002.pdf Today the DHS consists of 22 agencies with a federal workforce of around 240,000 people. See https://www.flickr.com/photos/slagheap/243442250/in/photolist-nvGUb-nvGU7­ 5kVU2c-cWrpXW-gUPpD-cF7cz-cF7Ae-cWrq1m-amhJd6-cWrq2o-cWrqYA-5yLUxd­ es3skw-cWrpeY-cWrqdf-cWrq4Q-cWrq8Q-cWrpp5-cWrpC3-cWrqmw-cWrqHj-cWrqw7­ 8B1wJa-8zkiXr-8zJi1X-8B1zEg-VmEQVh-cWrqJA-cWrrh9-es3r5Y-cWrr7L-cWroVjcWrre1-cWrqFS-cWrr35-cWrrTf-cWrrHN-cWrqtU-cWrq6U-q5SWn-cWrrJJ-cWrp­ FJ-cWrrUq-cWrrGq-cWrrPw-cWrrBd-cWrpto-dapurN-8BtuGa-cWrpiS See Post Katrina Emergency Reform Act (2006) https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th­ congress/senate-bill/3721 See https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1571336142501-c914622674a919294dd2a964 aaeda0d1/FEMA_Org_Chart.pdf https://www.dhs.gov/publication/department-homeland-securitys-strategic-plan-fiscal­ years-2020-2024 “Stafford Act is designed to bring an orderly and systemic means of federal natural dis­ aster assistance for state and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to aid citizens. Congress’ intention was to encourage states and localities to develop com­ prehensive disaster preparedness plans, prepare for better intergovernmental coordi­ nation in the face of a disaster, encourage the use of insurance coverage, and provide federal assistance programs for losses due to a disaster. This Act constitutes the statutory authority for most federal disaster response activities especially as they pertain to FEMA and FEMA programs” (FEMA, 2019, 2019b); see also: Robert T. (2016). Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, and Related Authorities as of August 2016. FEMA. https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/15271. Two main challenges were observed concerning Stafford Act Assistance and the acts of terrorism where the tactics used in the post 9-11 incidents such as the 2015 San Bernardino, California, the 2016 Orlando, Florida mass shootings and the 2016 Ohio State University vehicular and knife attack (CRS, 2019): (a) According to the Stafford Act, the major dis­ aster definition lists specific incident types that are eligible for federal assistance where there is fire and explosions. It is still unclear whether incidents without a fire or explosion would fit under a major disaster, and (b) FEMA’s recommendation to the President to issue a major disaster declaration is based on the damage on public infrastructure as compared to the population of the state. Hence, the numbers affected and the public infrastructure damage are limited in terrorism cases. See the CRS report on Stafford Act Assistance and Acts of Terrorism (2019) regarding this debate. See National Wildfire Coordinating Group. (2018). Mission. https://www.nwcg.gov/ See https://www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system See https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-8.html See https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1443799615171-2aae90be55041740f97e8532fc 680d40/National_Preparedness_Goal_2nd_Edition.pdf See CRS Report on PPD-8 and NPS https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42073.pdf U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2011). The strategic national risk assessment in sup­ port of PPD 8: A comprehensive risk-based approach toward a secure and resilient nation. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-strategic-national-risk-assessment-ppd8.pdf See https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1487864847326-9b0a1ce43c03c8b7aaf084f­ d4ea84266/NPS_Graphic_large.png See https://www.fema.gov/national-exercise-program https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/bd/Hurricane_Sandy_dam­ age_Long_Beach_Island.jpg/800px-Hurricane_Sandy_damage_Long_Beach_Island.jpg See https://www.fema.gov/sandy-recovery-improvement-act-2013 See https://www.hsdl.org/c/tl/sandy-recovery-improvement-act-2013/ CPG 101, 2010, pp. 4-8 and 4-9. against impacts on the human, health, economic, social, political, environmental, etc. which are commonly considered as components of an “all-hazards approach” See https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/4241 Ibid.

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Emergency management 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66.

145

THIRA 2019. See https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/181470 Ibid. See https://training.fema.gov/hiedu/docs/comprehensive%20em%20-%20nga.doc See https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1443799615171-2aae90be55041740f97e8532fc 680d40/National_Preparedness_Goal_2nd_Edition.pdf See https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1527613746699-fa31d9ade55988da1293192f­ 1b18f4e3/CPG201Final20180525_508c.pdf THIRA 2019. THIRA 2019. See https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/181470 Ibid. source: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, FEMA.gov, pp. 1-8 and 1-9. See https://www.dhs.gov/what-dhs-does-during-cyber-attack Ibid. See https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/images/opa/What-DHS-Does-During-Cyber­ Attack_0.jpg Note that FBI is agency located within US Attorney General’s Office not within DHS. FBI partners with the Director of National Intelligence and other U.S. intelligence agencies to collect and analyze intelligence involving terrorism-related offenses. See https://www.dhs.gov/what-dhs-does-during-explosives-terrorist-attack See https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/images/opa/What-DHS-Does-During-A-Terrorist­ Incident.jpg See https://www.dhs.gov/what-dhs-does-during-major-storms-and-severe-weather-events See https://www.dhs.gov/what-dhs-does-during-pandemics See https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/images/opa/What-DHS-Does-During-Major­ Storm.jpg Ibid. See https://www.dhs.gov/what-dhs-does-during-political-convention See https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/images/opa/What-DHS-Does-During-Pandemics. jpg Ibid. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/images/What%20DHS%20does%20during%20 National%20Conventions%20Slide_4.jpg The Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management has its mission to bridge the gap between the two disciplines. McCreight (2009, 2011), Renda-Tanali (2013) and Kahan (2015). Ramsay and Renda-Tanali (2018); Blanchard (2005); Feldman-Jensen (2017).

References Brown, J. T. (2011). Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the National Preparedness System: Background and issues for Congress. CRS Report R42073. Federation of American Scientists. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42073.pdf Congressional Research Service. (2019). Stafford Act and acts of terrorism. Federation of American Scientists. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R44801.pdf Disaster Mitigation Act. (2000). Public Law 106-390. FEMA. https://www.fema.gov/ media-library/assets/documents/4596 Disaster Relief Act. (1974). Public Law 93-288. Homeland Security Digital Library. https:// www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=458661 Drabek, T. E. (1989). Emergency management, definition, vision, mission, principles. Emergency Management Institute, FEMA. https://training.fema.gov/hiedu/docs/emprinciples/0907_176% 20em%20principles12x18v2f%20johnson%20(w-o%20draft).pdf Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (2010a). Developing and maintaining emer­ gency operations plans: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101 (2nd ed.). https://www. fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1828-25045-0014/cpg_101_comprehensive_prepar­ edness_guide_developing_and_maintaining_emergency_operations_plans_2010.pdf

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FEMA. (2010b). Publication 1. https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1823-25045­ 8164/pub_1_final.pdf FEMA. (2013). The Stafford Act: Robert T Stafford disaster relief and emergency assistance act, as amended. Federation of American Scientists. https://fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/fema/ stafford.pdf FEMA. (2018a). Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201: Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR) Guide. https:// www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/165308 FEMA. (2018b). National exercise program. https://www.fema.gov/national-exercise-program FEMA. (2019a). About the agency. https://www.fema.gov/about-agency FEMA. (2019b). 2019 National threat and hazard identification and risk assessment (THIRA)— Overview and methodology. https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/181470 Flood Control Act. (1965). Public Law 89-298. Cornell University. https://www.law.cornell. edu/topn/flood_control_act_of_1965 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8. (2003). FAS. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/ hspd-8.html Kahan, J. (2015). Emergency management and homeland security: Exploring the relationship. Journal of Emergency Management, 13(6), 483–498. https://doi.org/10.5055/jem.2015.0258 Kosar, K.R. (2005). Disaster response and appointment of a recovery czar: The Executive Branch’s response to the Flood of 1927. CRS Report RL 3326. Federation of American Scientists. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33126.pdf McCreight, R. (2009). Educational challenges in homeland security and emergency man­ agement. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 6(1). https://doi.org/ 10.2202/1547-7355.1576 McCreight, R. (2011). Introduction to the journal of homeland security and emergency man­ agement special issue. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Article 5. National Governors Association. (1978). Emergency preparedness project: Final report. NGA. Post Katrina Emergency Reform Act. (2006). 6 U.S.C. Ch.2, Subch. II, Part A, §748(b)(3) (2006). U.S. Congress. https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/senate-bill/3721 Ramsay, J., & Renda-Tanali, I. (2018). Development of competency-based education standards for homeland security academic programs. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 15(3). https://doi.org/10.1515/jhsem-2018-0016 Renda-Tanali, I. (2013). Higher education in Homeland Security: Current state and future trends. In D. G. Kamien (Ed.), McGraw-Hill homeland security handbook: The definitive guide for law enforcement, EMT, and all other security professionals (2nd ed., pp. 917–935). McGraw-Hill. Robert, T. (1988). Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988, Public Law 100-707. Homeland Security Digital Library. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=806354 Rubin, C. B. (2014). Local emergency management: Origins and evolution. In W. Waugh & K. Tierney (Eds.) Emergency management: Principles and practice for local government (2nd ed., pp. 25–37). ICMA Press. Rubin, C. B. (Ed.). (2020). Emergency management: The American experience (3rd ed.). Routledge. Sandy Recovery Improvement Act. (2013). Public Law 113-2. FEMA. https://www.fema.gov/ sandy-recovery-improvement-act-2013 Sylves, R. (2020). Federal emergency management comes of age, 1979–2001. In C.B. Rubin (Ed.) The American experience (3rd ed., Chapter 5). Routledge. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2011). The strategic national risk assessment in support of PPD 8: A comprehensive risk-based approach toward a secure and resilient nation. http:// www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-strategic-national-risk-assessment-ppd8.pdf

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U.S. DHS. (2015). National preparedness goal (2nd ed.). FEMA. https://www.fema.gov/media­ library-data/1443799615171-2aae90be55041740f97e8532fc680d40/National_Preparedness_ Goal_2nd_Edition.pdf U.S. DHS. (2016a). What DHS does during steady-state. https://www.dhs.gov/what-dhs-does­ during-steady-state U.S. DHS. (2016b). What DHS does during a cyber attack. https://www.dhs.gov/what-dhs-does­ during-cyber-attack U.S. DHS. (2016c). What DHS does during an explosives terrorist attack. https://www.dhs.gov/ what-dhs-does-during-explosives-terrorist-attack U.S. DHS. (2016d). What DHS does during major storms and extreme weather events. https:// www.dhs.gov/what-dhs-does-during-major-storms-and-severe-weather-events U.S. DHS. (2016e). W hat DHS does during pandemics. https://www.dhs.gov/what-dhs-does­ during-pandemics U.S. DHS. (2016f). What DHS does during political conventions. https://www.dhs.gov/what-dhs­ does-during-political-convention U.S. DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (2017). National Incident Management System (3rd ed.). https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1508151197225­ ced8c60378c3936adb92c1a3ee6f6564/FINAL_NIMS_2017.pdf White House. (2002). National Strategy for Homeland Security. Office of Homeland Security. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nat-strat-hls-2002.pdf

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8

Global governance and the relationships between nations Keith Cozine

Description: This chapter explores how International Relations theory explains why nations do or do not cooperate with other to address issues that are transnational in nature. Global governance theory tries to explain the mechanisms used to facilitate this cooperation. The chapter first defines global governance in terms of the concept of governance in the absence of government and how this approach is used to address the natural and man-made security threats faces today. Key theories and concepts explored in the chapter include theory of the State, Anarchy, Multilateralism, hard and soft law, international norms, regime theory and network theory. Various tools of global governance will be discussed in terms of how they are used to combat various natural and man-made threats to security. Upon completion of this chapter, students will be able to: 1. Define the global governance. 2. Develop an understanding of the need for governance in a state centric, anar­ chical global system. 3. Compare and contrast various theories and concepts of global governance. 4. Identify and distinguish between the various tools of global governance. 5. Analyze how the concepts and tools of global governance are applied to specific security problems. 6. Describe connections between global governance structures or functions and homeland security operations.

8.1 Introduction The globalized world seems to continually shrink to a point where time and space are less and less important. Advancement and innovation in shipping allow for goods to be loaded onto ships, cross vast oceans, and then be unloaded and delivered to markets in days. Air travel, which not long ago was available only to the elite, is now affordable to all but the world’s poorest. Communication has moved from traditional hardwire lines to smart phones that transfer voice, video and other data over cellu­ lar or Wi-Fi networks. Even the internet has transformed from a place where users passively search for content to Web 2.0, that allows users to interact and collaborate with each other in a social media dialogue as creators of user-generated content in a virtual community and information. It is a world where communications, transac­ tions and interactions occur in electronic form of zeros and one across mostly unseen networks. With this globalization, the security threat faced by much of the world’s

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population has shifted from military action by nation-states to trans-border issues such as financial collapse, climate change, pandemics, natural disasters and threats from a variety of non-state actors. Globalization has facilitated the advance of a global economy that profoundly affects the economic health of individual states. The interconnectivity of these individual states’ economies to those of other states has created an environment where small changes can have a ripple effect around the globe. The use military power against another state may no longer be the most prac­ tical option if these two opponents are both militarily and economically powerful. The cost of war can become a high one, not just in the cost of lives but also the harm done to both nations’ economy, as well as the global economy. Inter-state military conflict would have a devastating effect on not just the parties involved, but also all their trading partners. Advancements in technology and transportation that facilitate trade and travel have not been exclusively to the benefit of legitimate transnational actors; they have also benefited international criminals and their organizations (Rees, 2006). The bar­ riers lifted by the end of the Cold War and the openness of globalization have not just benefited those operating legitimately in the global economy. It has created an environment in which the illegal trade of drugs, arms, intellectual property rights and money is booming, and has allowed for terrorist organizations and cyber criminals to operate globally as well. Governments, in an attempt to control these illicit markets and harmful organizations, are pitted not against the armies and navies of another nations, but stateless and resourceful networks that have no central government that can be engaged (Naim, 2003). Adding to this complex global security environment is the shift from inter-state conflict to intra-state conflict. Today, most wars are fought either within states or between state and non-state actors (Carment, 2003). Ethnic, national and religious military conflict within countries continues to grow, and often threatens to or spills across borders. In extreme cases, this has led to state failure, which has not only threatened regional security and stability but global security as well as we have seen in places such as Syria, Yemen and North Africa to name a few. This explosion of intra-state conflicts has coincided with the growth of non-state actors, such as international criminal organizations and international terrorist organ­ izations who use violence to achieve their goals. While September 11th brought the dark side of globalization to the forefront of the debate about the globalization phenomenon; non-state actors, operating across national borders in violation of law and evading law enforcement efforts—those whom Peter Andreas calls clandestine transnational actors (CTAs)—have long benefited from the ever-increasing openness and interconnectivity of the world (Andreas, 2003). Their illicit trade of drugs, arms, intellectual property, people and money has been booming for quite some time. The organizations that engage in this illicit trade as well as terrorist organizations are networks of agile, stateless, resourceful actors, empow­ ered by globalization. The impact of globalizations is not limited to intentional manmade threats but has increase the vulnerability from natural threats as well. Invasive species arriving into a port on a shipping container can wreak havoc on a country’s ecosystem. Advancement in transportation has allowed for infectious diseases to spread rapidly from one hemisphere to the other as we saw in the 2014 U.S. Ebola cases or on a much grander scale, COVID-19 virus in 2020. Globalizations have even been blamed to contribution to global warming and climate change. Dealing with this wide variety of natural and man-made threats that do not recognize international border

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150 Keith Cozine requires cooperation between and among nation-states. This chapter will address the nature of global governance as a pillar of homeland security theory and integrates with homeland security operations and strategies.

8.2 Defining global governance As described above, many of the man-made and natural threats that the world faces are not confined within the borders of a single nation-state. The problem is there is no single international government with sovereignty of the entire planet that can deal with any of these threats unilaterally. Rather, the world is made up of approximately 200 separate nation-states each with their own set of problems, institutions, beliefs and interests. The closest thing that exists to a government above the nation-state is the European Union (EU) which is comprised of nation-states and is only give power over those issues that member-states yields to the EU. As Brexit has shown us, an institution like the EU remains vulnerable to political and social pressures in terms of both its membership and powers. In a way, the world operates in what Hedley Bull (2012) termed an anarchical society where there is no hierarchically superior, coercive power that can resolve disputes, enforce law, directly and unilaterally deal with the various threats and hazards that plague the world today. In the last quarter of the 20th century, the concept of global governance began to emerge where various transnational actors respond to problems that affect more than one state or region in absence of a hierarchically superior, coercive power (i.e., a global government). The 1995 Commission on Global Governance defined governance as “the sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse inter­ ests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken” (as cited in Karns & Mingst, 2010, pp. 3–4). The United Nations describes governance (2014, p. 3) “the reg­ ulation of inter-dependent relations in the absence of overarching political authority, such as in the international system. It encompasses the institutions, policies, norms, procedures and initiatives through which states and their citizens try to bring more predictability, stability, and order to their responses to transnational challenges”. Young (1997, pp. 3–4) states: Governance arises as a matter of public concern whenever the members of a social group find that they are interdependent: the actions each individual impinges on the welfare of the others. Interdependence gives rise to conflict when the efforts of indi­ vidual actors to achieve their goals interfere with or thwart the efforts of others to pursue their own ends. It emerges as a basis for cooperation, however, when opportu­ nities arise to enhance the social welfare by acting to coordinate the activities of the individual members of the group. Global governance occurs when the governance approach is utilized to address areas or issues of concern that affects more than one state or region and the actors involved in the process are transnational. Global governance includes “systems of rule at all levels of human activity, spanning from the family to international organizations, in which the pursuit of goals by the exercising of control has transnational repercus­ sions” (Rosenau, 1995 p. 13). The various approaches to global governance are carried out several transnational actors including nation-states, international governmental

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organizations (IGOs) and variety of non-state actors. When it comes to issues of security, it is the nation-state that plays the dominate role. First, nation-states have a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (military or police action), even when authorized by an IGO, the action is carried out by nation-states. Second, nationstates have inherent sovereignty over their territory and a right to non-interference from outside sources. Only the nation-state can relinquish some level of sovereignty to an outside body. Likewise, nation-states can restrict who and what enters its ter­ ritory, making border security and integrity an important component of sovereignty. While some would argue that IGO are best positioned to deal with security issues on a regional or global scale, their membership is comprised of nation-states, and have only those powers granted to it by its members. Despite the dominance of nationstates, on many issues, cooperation with other nation-states and institutions is pre­ ferred to go it alone. This idea of international security cooperation long pre-dates the formal concept of global governance. However, interestingly, such past cooperation among states has laid the foundation of the pillars to support the global governance structures and policies of today. 8.2.1 Need for governance in a state centric, anarchical global system It can be argued that security cooperation is as old as society itself. Even in huntergather societies people often banded together to provide extra protection from external threats both natural and man-made. The birth of what could be considered international security cooperation today comes out of the ashes of the Thirty Years War. Fought between 1618 and 1648, the Thirty Years War was a series of wars principally fought in Central Europe, involving most of the countries of Europe. It was one of the longest and most destructive conflicts in European history, and one of the longest continuous wars in modern history. Beyond the human death toll, the Thirty Years War led to widespread famine and disease and left most of the com­ batant powers bankrupt. The War ended with series of peace treaties drafted from 1646 to 1648 and ratified on May 15th and October 24th of 1648 in what became known as the Peace of Westphalia. The Peace of Westphalia is important in mod­ ern international relations theory and is often characterized the beginning of the international system as it not only ended the Thirty Years War but also established many of the concepts within international affairs and global governance today. Concepts like the sovereignty of nation states, non-intervention within another nation’s domestic affairs, a balance of power among nation states and the ideas of self-determinations find their origins within principles developed at Westphalia (Watson, 2002). Westphalian Sovereignty assumes of international law that a nation-state has sov­ ereignty over its land and internal affairs, to the exclusion of all external powers, on the principle of non-interference in another country’s internal affairs, and that each state is equal in the eye of international law. Sovereignty enables a people who live in a distinct territory to decide their own destiny and way of life in conformity with its own genius, interests, traditions and needs. State sovereignty guarantees the political independence of a nation-state and creates conditions for its members to assure their right to self-determination. A nation has inherent right to govern one’s lands and populous as it has the right and responsibility to self-determine what is the best for its people. In turn, that’s county must respect the right to sovereignty and

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152 Keith Cozine self-determination of other nations and adopt the concept of nonintervention and allow those other nations to handle their own domestic affairs within its territory without the interference. As was the case with the Peace of Westphalia, modern international cooperation and security theory often rises from the ashes of war, the same is true of the Concerts of Europe. From the outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars in 1792 to the exile of Napoleon to Saint Helena in 1815, Europe had been almost constantly at war. As a result, the leaders of the great powers of Europe met in Vienna with the objective of try to maintain peace on the continent. This resulted in the redrawing of the continent’s political map and stipulated that the boundaries established could not be altered without the consent of those nations involved. The foundational principles produced in these negotiations are known as the “Vienna System”, and while produced only a small portion of the rules that came to be the Vienna System and conference fostered much of the “spirit” that led to the remarkable instances of cooperation in the decades afterwards. Vienna was the first of a series of international meetings that came to be known as the Concerts of Europe, which was an attempt to forge a peaceful balance of power in Europe. Balance of power is the theory that security is enhanced when military capabilities are distributed so that no one state is strong enough to dominate all others. If one state gains too much power in relation to its neighbors, the theory predicts that it will take advantage of its strength and attack those weaker neighbors thus providing an incentive for those threatened to unite in a defensive coalition. In terms, of the balance of power, there was also a recognition among the Concert partic­ ipants recognized the special roll of great powers and differentiated them from other states in maintain a balance of power and peace. Chief principles arising from the Concert of Europe included: great powers are designated special status, great powers pledge to uphold territorial status quo in concert and refrain from unilateral territo­ rial opportunism, great powers agree to keep their collectivity together through peri­ odic future meetings where necessary, and great powers privilege non-revolutionary conservative regimes as the most legitimate polities worthy of autonomy and protec­ tion (Lascurettes, 2017). The Concerts of Europe had no written rules or permanent institutions but at times of crisis any leader could propose a conference. If conflicts arose, the great powers would meet and then negotiate among themselves to reach some resolution, resorting to the use of force only as agreed to together and only when necessary to contain a larger disruption to the status quo. The Concerts began to weaken as the common goals of the Great Powers were gradually replaced by growing political and economic rivalries that ultimately led to the outbreak of World War I. Although the Concerts were not institutionalized and has no mechanism for implementing collective action, they became the model for the procedures and practices still used in diplomacy today such as the designation of great powers as scene today in the permanent membership in the United Nations’ Security Council. The Concerts of Europe also are a starting point to the study of the major theories of security cooperation. These theoretical dis­ ciplines can be broadly divided into four camps; realists, who emphasize the primacy of international power distributions and states’ national self-interests; liberals, who focus on the abilities of international organizations to mitigate the effects of interna­ tional anarchy described by Bull emphasized by realists and help even selfish states achieve common goals; and constructivists, who point to the importance of transna­ tional collective identities that purportedly form between states as a product of their

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interactions (Lascurettes, 2017). The fourth emerging camp is transgovernmentalism which examines cooperation outside traditional diplomacy. Even while Bull (2012) put forth the concept that the current system of states is anarchical in that there is no higher level of authority over states, each state having ultimate sovereignty over its citizens within its borders; and the system forms a society in that there are certain “common rules and institutions” (p. 25) which provides order to the international arena. In fact, it has been widely accepted that how states cooperate in an anarchical system that is the starting point for international relations theory (Milner, 1991). This notion of common rights and systems will form the basis of global governance theory described next.

8.3 Theories and concepts of global governance Over the years, scholars have tried to develop a variety of theories to predict and explain various aspects of international relations and global governance. These the­ ories attempt to answer the questions; who governs, how does governance occur and how effective is it? Each theory is based on key ideas about; the nature and role of individuals, the concept of the state, sovereignty, interaction among states, interaction among other actors and concepts about the international system. Four major theories have developed directly from attempts to examine the questions posed above. These theories include liberalism, realism, constructivism and transgovernmentalism. These theories are often very broad and cannot fit every type of interaction so within each theory there are sub-disciplines that are more specific to various types of interaction. While most of these theories have been created to explain international relations the­ ories and diplomacy, as we will see they also serve as theoretical pillars to explain international cooperation on security and the global governance of the various threats and hazards that would be considered to fit within the umbrella of what in the United States would term homeland security issues. That is, many aspects of these theories come into play as we understand more about how US homeland security is organized, how it is executed and funded, and how it derives strategy that allows it to answer policy imperatives. 8.3.1 Liberalism Liberalism is the classic theory that holds human nature is basically good, social progress is possible and human behavior is malleable and perfectible through institutions. Liberalism posits that injustice aggression and war are products of inad­ equate or corrupt institutions or misunderstanding among leaders and therefore that injustice, aggression and war are not inevitable but can be eliminated by collective action and institutional reform (Karns & Mingst, 2010). Liberalism as a practice is put based on the belief that individuals are rational beings, democracies perpetuate peace, modernization promotes free trade, free trade and democracy creates interde­ pendence, interdependence make conflicts costly and rewards cooperation with peace prosperity and greater justice. While many tenants of liberalism can be seen in action during the Vienna System and the Concerts of Europe; Liberalism as a modern theory was first really prac­ tice after World War I and was institutionalized by the Treaty of Versailles and US President Wilson’s “14 points”. Wilson believed that creating an international system

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154 Keith Cozine of collective security, promoting self-determination of people and eliminated power politics could prevent war; and the League of Nations would be an international organ­ ization for collective problem solving for achieving this. Students of the Liberalism believe that human beings are the key actors, but states serve as their collective actors and function with moral and ethical principles of the people. Like people, as states interact with one another cooperation will grow over time and will begin to develop common norms, consent to common rules and institutions and recognition of com­ mon interests (Karns & Mingst, 2010). One of the subsets of Liberalism is what is labeled Neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is based on the idea of anarchy discussed above. There is thus no hierarchically superior, coercive power that can resolve disputes, enforce law, or order the system like there is in domestic politics. Neoliberalism is a state centric approach. Like people in liberal­ ism, states are rational actors in a generally anarchical world. States are at least should be, concerned first and foremost with absolute gains rather than relative gains to other states. However; at the same time states recognize that they have an incentive to coop­ erate because it will help them maximize absolute gain because it allows them to solve problems that they could not solve on their own. As a result, cooperation becomes a common occurrence. One way to explain this need for cooperation is through game theory, particularly the “Prisoners’ dilemma”. On version of the prisoners’ dilemma has two members of a criminal gang arrested and imprisoned. Each prisoner is in solitary confinement with no means of speaking to or exchanging messages with the other. The police admit they don’t have enough evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge, so they plan to sentence both to a year in prison on a lesser charge. Simultaneously, the police offer each prisoner a bargain. Each prisoner is given the opportunity either to betray the other by testify­ ing that the other committed the crime, or to cooperate with the other by remaining silent. Here’s how it goes: If A and B each betray the other, each of them serves 2 years in prison. If A betrays B but B remains silent, A will be set free and B will serve 3 years in prison and vice versa. If A and B both remain silent, both will only serve 1 year in prison on the lesser charge (Wyckoff, 2014). It is implied that the prisoners will have no opportunity to reward or punish their partner other than the prison sentences they get, and that their decision will not affect their reputation in the future. Because betraying a partner offers a greater reward than cooperating with them, all purely rational self-interested prisoners would betray the other, and so the only possible out­ come for two purely rational prisoners is for them to betray each other. While going it alone may appear to be the best route to take initially in reality cooperation is better. Students of the Neoliberalism school believe as states use a strategy of reciprocat­ ing each other’s cooperation, they are more likely find this approach mutually bene­ ficial over the long term. Continued interaction also provides the motivations to for states to create international institutions which moderate states’ behavior and provide framework for interactions. Individual states thus increase their absolute gains by participating in these institutions because it always them to accomplish things that they could not do unilaterally. Another of the subsets of liberalism is what is labeled functionalism. The root of functionalism is the idea that governance arises out of the basic need of the people and the state. International economic cooperation and social cooperation must occur before there can be political cooperation and eliminate conflict whose causes are ignorance poverty, hunger and disease. Rather than the self-interest of nation-states

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functionalists focus on common interests and needs shared by states but also by nonstate actors in a process of global integration. Increase interaction and cooperation will begin to build common values and common identity. Since functionalism is issue based approach to governance there is an increasing weight on knowledge and hence of scientists and experts are incorporated into the process of policymaking. These sci­ entist and experts begin to establish an identity closer to similar like-minded individ­ uals and their allegiance lay with these individuals rather their nation. As this process of interaction, common bond and common identity build eventual formal organiza­ tion form around the issue being address. One of the major criticisms of functionalism is that it underestimates the strength of state sovereignty and national loyalties (Karns & Mingst, 2010). International regime theory is another subset of liberalism is actually the theoreti­ cal backbone of one of the tools of global governance that will be discussed below. The thought behind regime theory is that rules that govern behavior are not just comprised of formal international laws that reward and punish behavior but also informal norm rules of behavior. Over time, these rules and norms may become codified or insti­ tutionalized around a specific issue. When this occurs regimes form (Young, 1997). Regimes are more specialized arrangements that pertain to well-defined activities, resources, or geographical areas from security issues such as weapons non-proliferation or collective defense, to trade, finance and investment, information and communica­ tion, human rights, the environment and management of outer space. States create regimes to coordinate their actions with those of other states if and when it is neces­ sary for achieving objectives in their national interest. Regimes are social structures that have limited power to impose rules. Rather, members become tied to formalized patterns of behavior in which they feel obligated to cooperate so as not to be viewed as untrustworthy. As a result of the social structure of regimes, they tend to develop between states with shared norms and values and between whom a tradition of coop­ eration already exists, especially when that cooperation is centralized around a given issue (Rees, 2006). While it is the state that is the catalyst behind the establishment of regimes it often turns to existing international organizations as way be tasked with maintaining the regime with such activities as rules enforcement, dispute settlement or operational support. The final subset of liberalism is Collective or Public Good Theory. This theory is based on the idea that there is a natural common, meaning that societal assets are shared by all. Such shared assets can range from tangible, such as the high seas, to the more intangible such as the Internet. In these areas, the decision of one state has an effect on the other states, meaning that those states may experience unantic­ ipated consequence based on the actions of other states, and ultimately the original state States that individuals acting independently and rationally according to each’s self-interest, behave contrary to the best interests of the whole group, by depleting some common resource. The “Tragedy of the Commons” is an example that is often used to illustrate this problem. This example holds that herders sharing a common parcel of land on which they are each entitled to let their animal graze. As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain by adding additional animals as he receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal. The negative com­ ponent of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal and the negative effects of overgrazing however are shared by all the herdsmen. The rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal

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156 Keith Cozine to his herd, and another, and another. Tragically, this same conclusion is reached by each rational herdsman sharing the commons. Each herder is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited. If all herders made this individually rational economic decision, the common could be depleted or even destroyed, to the detriment of all (Hardin, 1968). Protecting the col­ lective good involves choices and activities that are related to interdependency of the resource on multiple actors. Without some sort of collective action mechanism, the collective good will be maintained and all will suffer. For example, public good theory is often used to argue for the need for collective action by states to protect the atmos­ phere as it relates to climate change and global warming. 8.3.2 Realism The second classic traditional theory of international relations is realism. Realism is a theory that has emerged gradually over time but shares some important concepts that explain the behavior within the international arena These concepts include: the international system is anarchic; there is no actor above states capable of regulating their interactions; therefore, states must arrive at relations with other states on their own, rather than having it dictated to them by some higher controlling body. Adding to this anarchy is the idea that the international system exists in a state of constant antagonism. Since there is no higher controlling body, states are the most important actors in the international system. All states within the system are unitary, rational actors that tend to pursue self-interest and strive to attain as many resources as possi­ ble. The primary concern of all states is survival so they build up military to survive, which may lead to a subsequent security dilemma (Donnelly, 2000). Realists believe that sovereign states are the principal actors in the international system, and special attention is afforded to large powers as they have the most influ­ ence on the international stage. International institutions, non-governmental organ­ izations, multinational corporations, individuals and other sub-state or trans-state actors are viewed as having little independent influence. This is not to say that Realists do not believe in the utility of the various tools of global governance, rather they are viewed as tools of the state to be used when desired and are therefore more susceptible to great power manipulation. Realists believe that there are no universal principles with which all states may guide their actions. Instead, a state must always be aware of the actions of the states around it and must use a pragmatic approach to resolve problems as they arise. Security is achieved by deterrence and balance of power. It is though these lenses that international cooperation occurs. A good example of this was the “mutually assured destruction” doctrine between the US and the USSR toward the end of the cold war. One of the subsets of realism is neorealism, also sometimes referred to as struc­ tural realism. Neorealist focuses on the structure of the international system. They hold that the nature of the international structure is defined by its ordering princi­ ple, anarchy, and by the distribution of capabilities measured by the number of great powers within the international system. The international structure is decentralized, meaning there is no formal central authority; every sovereign state is formally equal in this system. States seek their own interest and will not subordinate their interest to the interests of other states. This is not to say that there is no need for cooperation with other states. States will cooperate with one another when there is a common

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interest and they can maximize absolute gain. Neorealism or structural realism is first and foremost a theory about outcomes of international interaction in two arenas of relevance: opportunity and preferences. The one explicit assumption that neorealism makes about states’ preferences above all is self-preservation. Neorealism assumes only that all states seek self-preservation, it also assumes that states have other prefer­ ences, which may differ from one state to another. States seek to maximize influence, not power. States seek to maximize opportunities for implementing their preferences whatever these preferences may be (Telbami, 2002). Rational Choice Theory is another subset or realism. The foundation of the theory is that states will engage in multinational cooperation even though they may prefer to go it alone or the status quo. States will jump on the cooperation bandwagon out of fear they will get left behind, or not having a say in any agreements or rules that they may be subject. Rational choice theorist also believe that international institutions exist only to produce self-interested cooperation, to reduce uncertainty and stabili­ zation of the system and to further states national goals in response to a problem. Institutions are designed as a place for rational negotiations to determine a collective response to a specific problem that these various states face. The theory sees deci­ sions on membership rules, scopes of issues covered, and rules for controlling the institution, and flexibility arrangements as rational design consideration (Karns & Mingst, 2010). 8.3.3 Constructivism The third classic traditional theory of international relations is constructivism. Constructivism is formed by two-basic tenets: (1) that the structures of human asso­ ciation are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, which is often referred to as an idealist approach to social life and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature which is seen as holistic or structuralist approach that emphasizes the power of social structure as opposed to individualism (Wendt, 1999). Social con­ structivists believe that ideas, values, norms and shared beliefs matter. It is humans that shape the interest of states and that state interests are not a given. The core aspects of international relations are, contrary to the assumptions of realism and lib­ eralism, include the notion that states, and international institutions are both socially constructed. That is, they are given their form by ongoing processes of social practice and interaction. According to social constructivists, among the norms that have changed in states is multilateralism, meaning that they cannot go it alone, nor should they. Social constructivists do not believe that intergovernmental organizations are tools of the state but rather they along with Non-governmental organizations serve as agents of social construction that teach and create norms which socialize states to accept new values and political goals. In social constructivism, international institutions have real power in constructing a social world where cooperation takes place and helps define the interests of states and other actors rather than be used to promote the states’ own interest. As a result, intergovernmental organizations have the ability to socialize policy makers and individual states where the norms of the institution become deeply rooted and changing actor’s perception of their identity and inter­ ests (Karns & Mingst, 2010).

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158 Keith Cozine 8.3.4 Transgovernmentalism While liberalism, realism and constructivism are considered pillars of international relations theory, they are usually used to explain and explore traditional means of international interaction, like diplomacy and treaties. The shrinking of time and space resulting from globalization has allowed non-state actors who threaten global security to expand their areas of operation and influence and carry out activities with a speed and effectiveness not seen before in history. As a result, traditional means of international interaction, like diplomacy and treaties, seem less effective in dealing with today’s threats to international security as they may be too slow and cumbersome to combat certain problems in a globalized world as they were in dealing with past threats. Today’s threats require the development of relationships between similar agen­ cies across governments, rather than dealing exclusively through foreign ministries. Just as terrorists, arms dealers, money launderers, drug dealers and human smugglers all operate through global networks, increasing, so do governments. Governments operate internationally through transgovernmental networks comprised of govern­ ment officials from various nations, forming both formal and informal global net­ works that reach out to their foreign counterparts to help address the problems that arise when national actors or issues spill beyond their borders (Slaughter, 2004). The value of transgovernmental relationships of this nature is not new in global governance literature (see Keohane & Nye, 1974); however, as transgovernmental net­ works have emerged as a key feature of global governance in the 21st century, so to their presence in the global governance literature (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005; Pawlak, 2007; Slaughter, 2004; Slaughter & Zaring, 2006). Keohane and Nye (1974) define transgov­ ernmental relations as, “sets of direct interactions among subunits of different gov­ ernments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinet or the chief executives of those governments” (p. 43). They found that as the agendas and problems facing domestic bureaucracies broadened, they needed to deal directly with their foreign counterparts, rather than indirectly through their foreign ministries, in order to effectively cope with the issues that faced them. Communications among governments increased with international conferences and organizations facilitated direct contact among officials from what were once considered primarily domestic agencies. As the meetings and contact between foreign officials begin to recur, a sort of bond begins to develop. This bond reinforces the idea that they share membership in a common profession. Individuals may even begin to define themselves as part of this professional group, rather than in purely national terms. As this practice becomes widespread, transgovernmental networks are created, linking officials in various gov­ ernments to one another by ties of common interest, professional orientation, and even personal friendship (Keohane & Nye, 1974). But how is transgovernmentalism and these other theories discussed above applied in order implement some level of governance to deal with the variety natural and man-made threats and hazards the impact what would be termed in the United States as homeland security.

8.4 Tools of global governance While the various international relations theories and global governance theories try to explain why international cooperation occurs, who are the actors involved in the cooperation, and what level of influence they exert; it does not explain how the

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cooperation occurs from a functional standpoint. As previously stated, global govern­ ance can be carried out by nation-states, intergovernmental organizations, non-state actors; or any combination of these. However, all global governance actors utilize a variety of tools to achieve their collective goals. These include bilateral and mul­ tilateral agreements, regimes, intergovernmental organizations, transgovernmental networks and nongovernmental organizations and transnational advocacy networks. Each tool is described below. 8.4.1 Bilateral and multilateral agreements Mutual interests are motivating factors that encourage states to cooperate and to develop and sustain international institutions that facilitate such cooperation (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006). The desire to prevent terrorism, fight transnational crime, miti­ gate cyber-threats and even combat the spread of infectious diseases are in fact viewed as types of mutual interests. Entering into bilateral and multilateral agreements with one’s neighbors or other interested states as a means of governance around a specific issue is one-way states cooperate around areas of concern. Often a state will agree to cooperate or enter into a formal agreement with another state in return for some sort of preferential treatment. It is considered bilateral when the agreement is between two parties. Multilateral agreements can be between three or more states. These agree­ ments usually occur between states with similar language, religion, culture of political ideologies or institutions; however, some multilateral agreements are truly global in nature. These agreements can take the form of international rules and laws, or inter­ national norms or soft law. International rules and laws include treaties, conventions, customary practices, writings of legal scholars, judicial decisions and general princi­ ples of law. These rules and laws only apply to states that are party to the agreement and are not binding on other states. International norms or soft law on the other hand are shared expectations or understanding of appropriate behavior and norms between parties when dealing with specific issues. These include conventions or agreements that are nonbinding and that are used when former agreements cannot be reached or are not desirable. These types of agreements easier to negotiate, more flexible and may over time may serve as platform for more formal agreements (Karns & Mingst, 2010). Case Study 8.1 highlights the nature of nonbinding bilateral agreements. Case Study 8.1 Nonbinding Bilateral Agreements Governance in Practice An example of bilateral agreements that can be categorized as soft law; Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness. The Beyond the Border Accord announced in 2011 by former President Barack Obama and former Prime Minister Stephan Harper articulates the shared approach for security under which both countries work together to address threats within, at, and away from their shared borders. Key areas of cooperation included: (1) addressing threats early, (2) trade facilitation, (3) economic growth and jobs, (4) integrated cross-border law enforcement, (5) critical infrastructure and (6) cyber security (The White House, 2011). Since the 2011 signing of the Beyond the Border Accord, the United States and Canada have had near-seamlessly aligned with respect to their customs and immigration (Continued)

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160 Keith Cozine management systems—to allow for the rapid, monitored and highly secure trans-border movement of people and goods (Cozine, 2016). Key steps taken under Beyond the Border Accord include; automated sharing of biographic and biometric information, joint entry/ exit records program and joint patrol of shared waterways to detect and prevent crimi­ nal activity such as smuggling, trafficking and terrorism.

8.4.2 Regimes Regimes can best be defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international concern” (Krasner as cited in Koslowski, 2008: 2). For a regime to exist there needs to be a set of issues that require collective action. Members must act together consistently by rules and agreements they’ve drawn up together. They must act within the constraints of the regime and there needs to be a mechanism to resolve conflicts between members should disputes arise (Rees, 2006). Regimes are social structures that have limited power to impose rules. Rather, members become tied to formalized patterns of behavior in which they feel obligated to cooperate so as not to be viewed as untrustworthy (Rees, 2006). As a result of the social structure of regimes, they tend to develop between states with shared norms and values and between whom a tradition of cooperation already exists, especially when that cooper­ ation is centralized around an issue. When disputes do arise, the parties that took part in the negotiations often turned to intergovernmental organizations with expertise in the given area to resolve the dispute. For example; in the years after the September 11th there was a much greater emphasis placed on border security and the need to cooperate with foreign partners. As a result, a transatlantic regime began to emerge around biometric entry-exit systems, electronic passports. Issues arose around how to implement bio­ metric identifiers into travel documents as well a means for sharing data while comply­ ing with strict privacy law, especially among EU members. When biometric standards for new passports were being negotiated, the parties to the negotiation allowed the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to set these standards. 8.4.3 Intergovernmental organizations The term intergovernmental organization (IGO) refers to a formal entity formed by an intergovernmental agreement such as a treaty, charter or statute that involves two or more nations working in good faith, on issues of common interest. In the absence of a treaty charter or statue, an IGO does not exist in the legal sense Membership includes at least three states, but in the case of the United Nations approach as many as close to 200 and has activities in more than one state. IGOs may deal with many issues or are specialized around on issue or small group of related issues. They may be regional or global in nature. The main purposes of IGOs are to create mechanisms for states to work more successfully together in the areas of peace and security, and to deal with economic and social questions as well. In this current era of increasing glo­ balization and interdependence of nations, IGOs have come to play a very significant role in international political systems and global governance (Harvard Law School, 2019). Activities that IGOs engage in include; collect and disseminate information on a variety of issues, deliver services and assistance, provide forums for international

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bargaining, and adjudicate disputes to name a few. Such intergovernmental disputes are highlighted below in Case Study 8.2. Case Study 8.2 Issues Specific IGOs Governance in Practice As described above, when disputes arose around the implementation of biometric iden­ tifiers into passports, the United States deferred to ICAO, a specialized UN agency that, among other things, establishes security and safety standards for the global civil aviation system. ICAO was established in 1944 to manage the administration and gov­ ernance of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, which establishes rules of airspace, aircraft registration and safety and details the rights of the signatories in relation to air travel. There are currently 193 signatory states to the Convention. ICAO works with member states and industry groups to reach consensus on international civil aviation Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and policies in support of a safe, efficient, secure, economically sustainable and environmentally responsible civil aviation sector. ICAO also coordinates assistance and capacity building for States in support of numerous aviation development objectives; produces global plans to coordi­ nate multilateral strategic progress for safety and air navigation; monitors and reports on numerous air transport sector performance; and audits states’ civil aviation oversight capabilities in the areas of safety and security (ICAO, 2009).

8.4.4 Transgovernmental networks Transgovernmental networks are comprised of government officials from various nations, forming both formal and informal global networks that reach out to their for­ eign counterparts to help address the problems that arise when national actors or issues spill beyond a nation’s borders (Slaughter, 2004). These networks can be comprised of officials at the highest level of government that are directly responsible to the national political process, officials at the higher levels of their respective ministry, or low-level officials such as desk officers. The members of these networks communicate and inter­ act amongst themselves in order to share information, collect and disseminate best practices and provide technical assistance and training to those officials who have less experience in specific areas than their network colleagues. These networks can be spon­ taneous, informal, flexible and of varying membership or the network may be insti­ tutionalized within the auspices of international organizations. Transgovernmental interaction usually occurs between officials from the executive branch of governments from their respective countries. These officials may range from heads of states to lowlevel bureaucrats who share common roles and problems within their respective gov­ ernments. Transgovernmental networks are not international organizations established by treaties but are informal in nature. They often have no legal standing and operate without formal headquarters; as such they allow government officials to address prob­ lems which are increasingly international in scope and they allow for interaction and cooperation through informal agreements, such as memorandums of understanding or even less formal initiatives. Spontaneous networks are able to respond to needs and coordinate activities quickly, as opposed to the lethargic pace of traditional treaties,

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162 Keith Cozine and do not require the time-consuming process of legislative approval to act (Slaughter & Zaring, 2006. Members of these networks communicate and interact amongst them­ selves in order to share information, collect and disseminate best practices and provide technical assistance and training to those officials who have less experience in specific areas than their network colleagues (Slaughter, 2004). An example of substate global governance networks is highlighted in Case Study 8.3. Case Study 8.3 Substate Global Governance Networks Governance in Practice Global governance of security is not limited to nation-states. One of the best exam­ ples is the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and their development of a transgovernmental law enforcement network. In 2003, the Intelligence Bureau of the NYPD established the International Liaison Program that posts NYPD personnel in law enforcement agencies in major cities around the world. Established in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks the overseas personnel were tasked with gather infor­ mation on terrorist attacks to send back to New York City, including tactics, names of people suspected of terrorism, their potential connections to the five boroughs and even technical details about homemade bombs. Since then the mission of these officers has shifted to intelligence gathering and investigative assistance on a whole host of crimes, as well as providing situational awareness and exchanging best-practices related to policing with local agencies. Consequently, there are currently NYPD officers stationed in 16 cities around the world. The program itself is funded by private donations from the nonprofit New York City Police Foundation (Winston, 2018).

8.4.5 Nongovernmental organizations (NGO) While the primary players in global governance of security are nation-states and their agents, most who and what needs to be protected is outside the institutions of government. Because of this, non-state actors also play an important role in global governance security. Non-state actors often act collectively through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Members of NGOs are individuals or groups but not states, though sometime NGOs may be sponsored or supported by states. They can be small with just a few members or extremely large institutions with membership and infra­ structure spread across the globe. They can be not for profit organizations that usually center around a given issue with membership comprised of experts from government agencies, private industry, universities and think tanks, as well as celebrities and other well know people use their notoriety to call attention to a particular cause. This mem­ bership allows the NGO to serve as a key source of information, technical specialized expertise and knowledge around the issue (Karns & Mingst, 2010). NGOs can also be for profit organizations such as multinational corporations (MNCs) that oper­ ate in three or more countries. MNCs too have an interest in working with other to maintain security if for no other reason that insecurity can have a negative impact on profitability. When it comes to security and safety, perhaps no NGO is better known than International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, a global humanitarian network of 80 million people that helps those facing disaster, conflict and health and social problems (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2019).

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8.4.6 Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) Just as advancements in communication, information technology and transportations has benefited terrorist, criminal organizations and other non-state actors that pose a risk to security, it has also benefited non-state actors who want to tackle these secu­ rity risks and issues. The Internet and advancements in information technologies and telecommunications are enabling ideas, values and political persuasion of people to be transmitted around the globe (Wapner, 1995). It is this phenomenon that has led to the establishment of transnational advocacy networks (TANs). These networks are constructed of “nodes” of individuals or groups which utilize modern technology to connect with other “nodes” around the globe who share their ideals or beliefs. Through their collective action, the nodes of the network can turn their attention to problems and issues of a global scale. These networks include those relevant actors working globally on specific issues, who brought together shared values, a common discourse, and a dense exchange of information and services. TANs are characterized by their voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal patterns of communication between committed and knowledgeable actors working in a specific issue area. They organize to promote causes, principled ideas and norms. They may include a wide array of actors from individual activists, to domestic or international NGOs, to international organizations to members of governments. The shared values and frequent exchanges of information and services among the actors in the network reveal a dense web of connection among these groups (or nodes, in network terminology) which is both formal and informal in nature. In addition, they work to create categories or “frames” that generate and organize information on which to base their campaign (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). These networks have played a particularly important role in framing problems related to human trafficking and have helped in the development, acceptance and implementa­ tion of anti-trafficking norms The strategies employed by these combat human traffick­ ing networks are known as the “3Ps”—prevention, protection and prosecution—and the “4Rs”—rescue, rehabilitation, repatriation and reintegration (Bertone, 2008).

8.5 Summary and conclusions The globalized world continues shrink to a point where time and space are less impor­ tant, and as a result the security threats faced by much of the world’s population has shifted from military action between peer nation-states to that of trans-border issues such as financial collapse, climate change, cybersecurity intrusions, pandemics and threats from a variety of non-state actors (i.e., ISIS, al Qaeda, transnational crime groups, etc.). Advancements in technology and transportation that facilitate trade and travel have not been exclusively to the benefit of legitimate transnational actors; they have also benefited international criminals and their organizations. Many of these man-made and natural threats that the world faces are not confined within the borders of a single nation-state, but rather exist within an anarchical society where there is no hierarchically superior, coercive power that can resolve disputes, enforce law, directly and unilaterally deal with the various threats and hazards that plague the world today. As a result, nation-states have had to take a global governance approach to dealing with these transnational threats to security. Global governance occurs when nation-states work in concert to address areas or issues of common concern that affect more than one state or region, and that can

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164 Keith Cozine trace its roots back to the Treaties of Westphalia which ended the Thirty Years War, or the Concerts of Europe. But why are nation-states compelled to cooperate with each other even today? Over the years, there have been a number of theories that have tried to answer this question. Each theory is based on key ideas about; the nature and role of individuals, the concept of the state, sovereignty, interaction among states, interaction among other actors and concepts about the international sys­ tem. These include, liberalism, realism, constructivism and Transgovernmentalism. Liberalism holds that human nature is basically good, social, progress is possible, and human behavior is malleable and perfectible through institutions. In liberal­ ism, that human beings are the key actors, but states serve as their collective actors and function with moral and ethical principles of the people. Realism draws on the concept of the (inherent) anarchy of the international system where there is no actor above states capable of regulating their interactions. All states within the interna­ tional system are unitary, rational actors that tend to pursue self-interest. Security is achieved by deterrence and balance of power and it is these two concepts though which international cooperation occurs. Constructivism is basses on the idea that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas and identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas as opposed to individualism. It is humans that shape the interest of states, and international institutions are socially constructed to promotes these human inter­ ests. Transgovernmentalism development of relationships between similar agencies across governments, rather than more traditional theoretical schools that explain cooperation through formal diplomacy and transnational institutions. It explains how transgovernmental networks comprised of government officials from various nations develop to form both formal and informal global networks that reach out to their foreign counterparts to help address the problems that arise when national actors or issues spill beyond their borders. These theories seek to explain is why cooperation on global security threats occurs but not how it occurs. Cooperation occurs through a variety of tools of global governance including bilateral and multilateral agreements, regimes, inter­ governmental organizations, transgovernmental networks and nongovernmental organizations and transnational advocacy networks. Bilateral agreements arise when a state will agree to cooperate or enter into a formal agreement with another state in return for some sort of preferential treatment. When this cooperative agreement expands beyond more than two stated, multilateral agreements develop and are put in place. Often transnational cooperation is much less formal and take the shape of regimes where nation-states tackle specific issues based on a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. The main purposes of IGOs were to create a mechanism for states to work more suc­ cessfully together in the areas of peace and security, and also to deal with economic and social questions. However, nation-states and sometimes levels of government below the state level work outside the formal institutions of diplomacy through both formal and informal transgovernmental networks that reach out to their foreign counterparts to help address the problems that arise when national actors or issues spill beyond their borders. But much of what and who need protection from a vari­ ety natural and man-made threat is outside the direct control of state institutions, and therefore non-state actors play an important role as well. These non-state

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actors often act collectively through NGOs that usually focus around a given issue or problem. Non-state actors also form transnational advocacy networks constructed of “nodes” of individuals or groups who share their ideals or beliefs and turn their attention to global scale problems and issues they feel need to be addressed such as human trafficking. Regardless of the theories, actors of tools of global governance, the reality is today’s diverse global threat environment requires cooperation across all levels of government, national boundaries and the public/ private sector divide. Modern homeland security theory is an amalgamation of many theories as seen throughout this text. However, the contribution of globalization theories is replete and profound when one considers how the US currently structures its domestics security strategy, how the US DHS tends to operate and even how its budgeted. Yet this need to cooperate international on the various natural and man-made threats and hazard to the security and safety of its citizens goes beyond the US. Many other nations have adopted similar strategies of cooperation both independent of and in cooperation with the US. As a result, international relation and global governance theories serve as the pillars through which an understanding of, and practical application, that sound policies of security and safety among likeminded nations and their partners can be put in place/At the same time these pillars serve as part of the foundation on which a grand homeland security theory can be built.

8.6 Discussion questions 1. What is meant by globalization and global governance, how are they related to today’s threat environment? 2. What are the various theories and concepts of global governance? 3. What are the various tools of global governance and how can they be applied to specific security problems? 4. How do global governance structures affect or interact or support homeland security strategies, operations or structures?

References Andreas, Peter. (2003). Redrawing the line: Borders and security in the twenty-first century, International Security, 28(2), 78–11. Andreas, P., & Nadelmann, E. (2006). Policing the globe. In Criminalization and crime control in international relations. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Bertone, Andrea M. (2008). Combating Human Smuggling: Transnational Advocacy Networks between Thailand and the United States. Presented at the 49th Annual International Studies Association Convention, March 24–28, 2008. Bull, H. (2012). The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics. Macmillan International Higher Education. Carment, D. (2003). Assessing state failure: Implications for theory and policy. Third World Quarterly, 24(3), 407–427. Cozine, K. (2016). Fragmentation and interdependency: Border security intelligence in North America and Europe. The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, 18(3), 175–197.

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166 Keith Cozine Donnelly, J. (2000). Realism and international relations. Cambridge University Press. Hajer, M., & Versteeg, W. (2005). Performing governance through networks. European Political Science, 4(3), 340–347. Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243–1248. Harvard Law School. (2019). Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs). Retrieved from: https:// hls.harvard.edu/dept/opia/what-is-public-interest-law/public-service-practice-settings/ public-international-law/intergovernmental-organizations-igos/ International Civil Aviation Organization. (2009). Strategic objectives for ICAO. Retrieved from: http://www.icao.int/icao/en/strategic_objectives.htm International Committee of the Red Cross. (2019). What we do? Retrieved from: https://www .icrc.org/en/who-we-are Karns, M. A., & Mingst, K. A. (2010). International organizations: The politics and processes (2nd ed.). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders. Cornell University Press. Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1974). Transgovernmental relations and international organizations. World Politics, 27(1), 39–62. Koslowski, R. (2008). Global Mobility and the Quest for an International Migration Regime. Presentation at Conference on International Migration and Development: Continuing the Dialogue – Legal and Policy Perspectives, the Center for Migration Studies (CMS) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), New York, New York, January 17–18, 2008. Revised April 2008. Lascurettes, K. (2017). The concert of Europe and great power governance today: What can the order of 19th-century Europe teach policymakers about international order in the 21st century. RAND National Defense Research Institute Santa Monica United States. Milner, H. (1991). The assumption of anarchy in international relations theory: A critique. Review of International Studies, 17(1), 67–85. Naim, M. (2003). Five wars of globalization: The illegal trade in drugs, arms, intellectual property, people, and money is booming, Foreign Policy, 134, 28–37. Pawlak, P. (2007). From hierarchy to networks: Transatlantic Governance of homeland security, Journal of Global Change and Governance, 1(1). Rees, W. (2006). Transatlantic-counterterrorism cooperation: The new imperative, London, UK: Routledge. Rosenau, J. N. (1995). Governance in the twenty-first century, Global Governance, 1. Slaughter, A. (2004). A new world order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Slaughter, A., & Zaring D. (2006). Networking goes international: An update. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 2, 211–229. Telbami, S. (2002). Kenneth Waltz, neorealism, and foreign policy. Security Studies, 11(3), 158–170. United Nations. (2014). Global governance and global rules for development in the post-2015 era. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/cdp_publications/ 2014cdppolicynote.pdf Wapner, P. (1995). Politics beyond the states: Environmental activism and world civic politics. World Politics, 47(3). Watson, A. (2002). Evolution of international society. London, UK: Routledge. Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. White House. (2011). Beyond the border: A shared vision for perimeter security and eco­ nomic competitiveness, Declaration by President Obama and Prime Minister Harper of Canada—Beyond the Border, Office of the Press Secretary. Retrieved from: https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-off ice/2011/02/04/declaration-president­ obama-and-prime-minister-harper-canada-beyond-bord

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Winston, A. (2018). Stationed overseas, but solving crimes in New York City. The New York Time (August 21, 2018). Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/nyregion/ terrorism-nypd-intelligence-crime.html Wyckoff, J. (2014). The prisoner’s dilemma, 1000-Word Philosophy. Retrieved from: https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/24/the-prisoners-dilemma/ Young, O. R. (Ed.). (1997). Global governance: Drawing insights from the environmental experience. MIT Press.

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9

Intelligence and the theory of preventive action Erik J. Dahl

Description: Intelligence, in its most basic definition, is about providing decisionmakers with knowledge or foreknowledge of the world around them. Good intelli­ gence is essential to developing policies and strategies to deal with the wide range of threats and hazards faced by security professionals today. Theories of intelligence and its use date back to the 5th century BCE and Sun Tzu’s Art of War. While Sun Tzu’s theory focused primarily on intelligence for military conquest, the uses of intelligence have expanded greatly, and so too have theories about how intelligence can be used more effectively. This chapter examines these theories and proposes a theory of home­ land security intelligence that can be applied to today’s diverse homeland security threat environment. Upon completion of this chapter, students will be able to: 1. Examine the lessons in Chapter 13 of the Art of War and their application today. 2. Deconstruct Kent’s Analytic Doctrine. 3. Compare and contrast theories of Strategic Intelligence versus tactical Intelligence. 4. Develop an understanding of the theories of surprise. 5. Examine changes in intelligence theory in a post-9/11 world. 6. Describe how intelligence integrates with the operations, structure and strategy of homeland security.

9.1 Introduction In recent decades, and especially since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the subject of intel­ ligence has become more widely discussed and studied than ever before. As one text put it, “Once lurking in the shadows of academe, this subject of intelligence is now centre-stage” (Andrew, Aldrich, & Wark, 2009, xvii). But there is little agreement over what role theory might play in helping us understand how intelligence works—or fails to work. And even more fundamentally, much like the continuing debate in terrorism studies over the definition of terrorism, there is a debate among intelligence scholars over how to define “intelligence”. Nonetheless, most intelligence experts agree that the job of intelligence is to pro­ vide decision-makers with knowledge or foreknowledge of the world around them. And many argue this knowledge should be intended to reduce the level of uncertainty felt by the decision maker (Wheaton & Beerbower, 2006, p. 329). Good intelligence is recognized as essential to developing policies and strategies to deal with the wide

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Theory of preventive action 169 range of threats and hazards faced by national and homeland security professionals today. Theories of intelligence and its use date back to the 5th century BCE and Sun Tzu’s Art of War. But while Sun Tzu’s theory focused primarily on intelligence for military conquest, the uses of intelligence have expanded greatly, and so too have the­ ories about how intelligence can be used more effectively. This chapter will examine these theories and their application to today’s diverse threat environment and propose a theory of homeland security intelligence that can be useful for homeland security professionals and decision makers.

9.2 What do we mean by “intelligence”? It might seem surprising, but among intelligence experts there is a great deal of disa­ greement over just what is meant by the term “intelligence”. To some, the term refers to the type of information that nation-states collect and analyze about other states. This is what is typically intended by the concept of “national security intelligence”. To others, however, intelligence has a broader meaning, applying not just to nationstates, but also to non-state actors such as terrorist groups and multinational cor­ porations, and to organizations below the nation-state level such as cities and police departments. This is often what scholars and intelligence professionals have in mind when they talk about “homeland security intelligence”. And to still others, the very term “intelligence” has a negative connotation, meaning a form of government power used to control citizens and maintain the power of regimes. This is often the definition implied with the term “security intelligence”. These debates over definition are more than mere arguments over semantics, because they raise important questions about what intelligence systems, agencies and personnel should do. Wheaton and Beerbower, for example, argue that without a common understanding of what intelligence is, “The intelligence community, quite literally, does not know what it is doing” (2006, p. 320). Even the general definition of intelligence provided above—to provide decision-makers with knowledge or fore­ knowledge of the world around them—raises important questions, such as about what kinds of decision makers should intelligence support. National security intelligence agencies have typically focused either on supporting senior government leaders or providing support to military forces, but homeland security intelligence organizations today find themselves supporting a much wider customer base. And although it might seem self-evident that intelligence agencies would attempt to provide foreknowledge of events and threats, many experts argue that it is too much to expect intelligence to peer into the future—and when consumers have that expectation, they are bound to be disappointed. Another important definitional debate is over the question of whether intelligence is largely a passive process of collecting and analyzing information about others, or whether it has a more active role in helping to make policy or in directly affecting those that it analyzes. In particular, debates within the American intelligence community often consider whether the role of intelligence should include covert action, which is usually defined as secret government activities intended to influence conditions in other countries. In the United States the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has his­ torically had primary responsibility for covert action, but this may be one area where intelligence for homeland security differs from intelligence for national and interna­ tional security. Although covert action abroad may be necessary and useful, many

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doubt whether intelligence agencies should be involved in covert action within the nation’s borders. A RAND workshop set out a useful list of questions concerning how intelligence should be defined (Treverton, Jones, Boraz, & Lipscy, 2006, pp. 7–8): •

• • •

Must intelligence be secret? Some experts argue that if the definition of intelli­ gence is broadened widely enough to include all types of information sources and analysis, then the word will mean little. As Philip H.J. Davies has argued, “Governments do not need intelligence agencies to read newspapers, journals, or the like” (Treverton et al., 2006, p. 20). Should the definition only apply to nation-states? Or, should activities by nonstate actors such as terrorist groups, businesses and others, be included? Should covert action, and other efforts to influence activities elsewhere, be con­ sidered part of intelligence, or are they better considered as elements of policy execution? Can the definition include domestic intelligence and security functions, or must intelligence be directed outward, against foreign threats? It is often said that “intel­ ligence is about understanding your adversary” (e.g., Treverton et al., 2006, p. 14), and if that is the case, then is there a role for intelligence in developing an under­ standing of ourselves?

These definitional debates continue among intelligence scholars and practitioners, and it is unlikely there will ever be consensus on all of these questions. But the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent focus on homeland security have moved our understanding of intelligence firmly toward a definition that is not restricted to secret (or classified) information, that includes multiple actors beyond nation-states, and that is focused inward as much as outward.

9.3 From definition to theory Intelligence scholars have lamented this failure to agree on a definition of the subject at hand (Marrin, 2014, p. 5). And Michael Warner writes (2002), “Without a clear idea of what intelligence is, how can we develop a theory to explain how it works?” This may in part explain why no generally accepted theory of intelligence has yet been developed. As Klaus Knorr noted in 1964, “there is no satisfactory theory of intelligence—neither a descriptive theory that describes how intelligence work is actu­ ally performed nor a normative theory that attempts to prescribe how intelligence work should be conducted” (cited in Marrin, 2007, p. 824). But there is another reason why little progress has been made in developing theo­ ries of intelligence. Marrin notes that “intelligence is an applied field and its practi­ tioners have a distaste for theorizing” (2007, p. 824). As Rogg puts it, “practitioners who are burdened by the daily demands of the job seldom stop to consider a theory of intelligence” (2018, p. 542). Some intelligence experts argue that this inattention to theory may be a good thing. Davies, for example, writes that theory “is all too easily a slippery slope into metaphorical speculation, woolly reasoning and disingen­ uously-packed dogma” (2009, p. 200). Davies argues that grand theories, those that attempt to explain great swaths of history and society, are of little use to intelligence professionals, although he acknowledges there may be value in shorter-range theories.

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Theory of preventive action 171 Another difficulty with creating any theory of intelligence, and especially a theory of homeland security intelligence, is that it is notoriously difficult to measure the value of intelligence (Treverton et al., 2006, pp. 26–29). One senior military officer once complained to this author: “What’s a pound of intelligence worth?” The senior officer explained that he knew how much aviation fuel his airplanes needed to fly, how many hours of flight training his pilots required to be proficient, and how many spare parts were needed to meet the needs of routine maintenance. But he did not know how much intelligence he needed, and how much value any additional amount of intelligence would provide to his squadrons—and until he knew that, he would always prioritize intelligence last.

9.4 Why do we need a theory of intelligence? Despite these difficulties and occasional skeptics, many intelligence scholars argue that a theory of intelligence is needed for the same reason we need theories in other areas of study: theories help us understand how the world works, and how we may be able to do things better. As Peter Gill writes, theories help us “develop useful generalizations that assist understanding” (Gill, 2010, p. 54). Loch Johnson argues that a good the­ ory of intelligence should help leaders determine “how much intelligence is enough?” (Johnson, 2003). Steven Marrin puts it a little more plainly: “Without that theory, intelligence agencies will inevitably shift resources to the highest threat and reduce the resources devoted to other targets. In other words, to borrow an analogy, they will approach the subject matter of intelligence analysis in the same way that five-year-olds play soccer; everybody runs to the one spot on the field where the ball is, with no thought given to what happens when the ball moves to another spot on the field” (2007, p. 823). There is another reason, however, why intelligence scholars, in particular, argue that theories of intelligence are important: they can help elevate the study of intelli­ gence from a primarily practitioner-focused area of study to one that is more widely recognized as a scholarly field of study or discipline. Often intelligence studies is seen alongside security studies as a sub-field of international relations, using the methods and approaches of political science but also incorporating other disciplines such as history (Scott & Jackson, 2004). In the past few decades it has gained considerable stature in the academic world, with several highly regarded peer-reviewed journals focusing on intelligence studies and papers on intelligence topics presented at major academic conferences around the world. But much of the intelligence studies literature still tends to be more descriptive than theoretical and speaks to a relatively narrow audience of intelligence specialists rather than the broader audience that mainstream political science and international relations journals seek to attract. Gartzke and Lindsay have this to say about the limitations of intelligence studies: Intelligence studies, a subfield of strategic studies, have tended to focus on histor­ ical operations or bureaucratic explanations for the behavior of intelligence agencies or political explanations for the use of intelligence by policymakers. There is compar­ atively little scholarship on the conditions under which intelligence influences policy outcomes, for better or worse, or the conditions that contribute to reliable intelligence advantage (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015, p. 347 n. 89). Although they do not say so explicitly, they are calling for a more theoretical approach to intelligence studies, one in which theories can help explain how and when intelligence makes a difference.

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9.5 What kind of a theory do we need? Theories come in many shapes and sizes. For example, they can be either descriptive, or normative; as a RAND workshop noted, this choice comes down to the question, should intelligence theory “explain what is or describe what ought to be”? (Treverton et al., 2006, p. 9). The workshop participants could not agree over whether a theory of intelligence could be developed at all, especially as theories are often considered to apply across various times and contexts. But they expressed concern that a the­ ory developed for the post-9/11 context, in which the primary threat is transnational terror, might not apply at some other time (Treverton et al., 2006, p. 10). Theories can also be big—attempting to explain a great deal—or they can be nar­ rower in scope. Hillebrand and Hughes support efforts aimed at the former, arguing that although it seems unlikely that any grand unifying theory of intelligence can ever be built, efforts should continue to develop “a rudimentary unifying theory of intelli­ gence” (2017, p. 17). Such a theory, they argue, could help policy makers make better use of intelligence, and help the public understand and ultimately trust it (2017, p. 18). Marrin, on the other hand, suggests a more modest, shorter term goal: just as international relations theory includes a number of competing theories and schools of thought, the field of intelligence studies should develop schools of thought, built around key ques­ tions and inspiring debates over how to answer those questions (Marrin, 2018). Gentry makes the same argument, noting that “There is no single theory of physics or chem­ istry or political science. Instead, different perspectives, or paradigms, and families of theories address aspects of issues that comprise still larger, more formal academic disciplines” (2016, p. 488). Scholars have attempted to apply theories from other fields of study to help us understand intelligence. Examples include the use of international relations the­ ory (Phythian, 2009) and theories of organization and bureaucracy (Hastedt & Skelley, 2009; Zegart, 2007). But some of the most interesting work has been done in search of theories that apply specifically to the field of intelligence. Theories of intelligence that have been proposed in recent years typically fall into one of two categories: they either attempt to explain the nature of intelligence systems and pro­ cesses, or to explain the quality of the intelligence provided by those organizations and how it is received and used. To put it another way, theories have been used to attempt to explain what intelligence is (how it is defined, how it is organized, etc.), or what it does (the nature and quality of its products, how well it is used, and whether is of any value). The first approach has been often taken by scholars who have compared national intelligence systems, although a few such as Gentry (2016) have attempted to cre­ ate theories to explain how non-state actors use intelligence. Marrin offers such a theory, arguing that one of the key factors in determining how much intelligence a country will need, and what problems it will focus on, is the foreign policy pri­ orities established by that country’s government. “In other words, the mission and targets of the American intelligence community will depend upon the foreign policy of the US, and it will be possible to explain and predict intelligence analysis coverage given US foreign policy priorities and the mix of power applied” (2007, pp. 832–833). Loch Johnson developed a similar theory that argues a nation’s intelligence system is largely determined by internal factors. The more affluent and globally oriented a nation is, Johnson writes, the larger its intelligence agenda and organization is

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Theory of preventive action 173 likely to be, and “effective collection and analysis is, above all, a function of national wealth” (Johnson, 2010, p. 22). Sims takes the second approach, offering a theory based on four components or factors that determine the quality (rather than the size or structure) of an intelligence service: intelligence collection, transmission to policy makers, anticipation or the capacity to warn, and denial and deception to protect one’s own secrets. She argues that “An intelligence service that optimizes all four will enable the side it supports to prevail” (2014, p. 46). But she cautions that there is no guarantee that a more capa­ ble intelligence service can avoid being surprised by a less capable opponent, as the United States was on 9/11 (pp. 46–47). Another common type of explanatory theory is the use of a typology or model to explain how intelligence systems function. One such typology was first developed by Roy Godson to describe intelligence as involving four core functions: collection, anal­ ysis, counterintelligence and covert action (Marrin, 2018, p. 484). Another even more common model is the intelligence cycle—which Gregory Treverton calls the “infa­ mous intelligence cycle” (2018, p. 477)—and which is often used to describe how the typical intelligence process works. The cycle normally is seen as beginning with policy makers (consumers) who decide what intelligence they need (i.e., “intelligence require­ ments”), followed by collectors who gather raw data, analysts who try to make sense of that data, and a dissemination system that provides intelligence to the consumer—at which point the cycle starts over again. The intelligence cycle has been criticized for not representing how intelligence actually works, such as that in practice the various steps do not actually happen in such a logical, ordered sequence (Hulnick, 2006). But more important for our pres­ ent discussion is that the intelligence cycle is not a theory, at least not in the way theories are usually described by social scientists. In the social sciences, theories are often intended to explain the relationship between variables, and they are frequently expressed in terms of hypotheses, such as “the more this condition holds, then the greater the likelihood of a certain outcome”. Put another way, this kind of theory states that given the presence of certain conditions or factors (often called independ­ ent variables), we can predict with some likelihood that certain outcomes (or depend­ ent variables) will result. Because this type of theory is likely to be most useful for homeland security pro­ fessionals and scholars, this chapter adopts the social science definition of theory. Such a definition is in line with Marrin’s argument that “the purpose of theory is to construct simple but powerful explanations for why things are the way they are” (2018, p. 479). And Warner, too, appears to have such a meaning of theory in mind when he writes that “‘theory’ is our label for the notion that we can explain events in terms of replicable causes and effect” (2014, p. 25). If we accept Loch Johnson’s comment that the central issue of intelligence studies is understanding “when intel­ ligence is likely to succeed or fail” (2003, p. 1), then the most useful theory of home­ land security intelligence would tell us that when certain actions occur or conditions hold, success (or failure) is more likely to happen. Such a theory would—at least in theory!—enable intelligence agencies and systems to do their jobs better and help prevent, or at least respond more effectively to, terrorist attacks and other harmful events. The next sections will examine several of the most prominent theories of intelligence, in an effort to help us understand how intelligence can be used to help ensure homeland security.

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174 Erik J. Dahl 9.5.1 Sun Tzu’s art of war One of the most concise theories of intelligence—and almost surely the longest-lasting— is that of the 5th century BCE Chinese general and strategist Sun Tzu, who wrote “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril” (Griffith, 1963, p. 84). Although this famous saying might be considered little more than an aphorism, it fits our definition of a theory, as it tells us that higher values on the independent variables of knowledge of the enemy and of oneself will lead to the dependent variable we are looking for—success in battle. Sun Tzu’s most detailed discussion of intelligence comes in Book 13 of his classic The Art of War, where he writes that “the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is fore­ knowledge” (Griffith, 1963, p. 144). Michael Warner notes that Sun Tzu exaggerates the impact of intelligence in appearing to claim that foreknowledge is always possible, and that it assures the ruler of victory. According to Warner, “we modern students of intelligence know better than that, and so we might wish to set aside Chapter 13 with an amused smile and call it an artifact” (2006, p. 489). The real message Sun Tzu is trying to relate, argues Warner, is that the use of spies can increase the chance of victory, and that to neglect intelligence is a false economy. Although we might agree that Sun Tzu exaggerates the capabilities of intelligence, he clearly places a great deal of importance on intelligence systems and officials. This high estimation of intelligence is often contrasted with the more critical view of another much later general and theorist, the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz, who famously wrote that “Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain” (cited in Kahn, 1986, p. 117). These two thinkers’ differing views on intelligence have led to two schools of thought, one associated with Sun Tzu that sees knowledge and intelligence as critically important, and the other associated with Clausewitz, which sees issues such as leadership and battle power as more important. Despite his disparaging comment about intelligence reports, there is a debate among scholars over just how negatively Clausewitz felt about intelligence. For David Kahn, the answer is clear: “Carl von Clausewitz disdained intelligence” (1986, p. 117). Hughes and Koutsoukis, on the other hand, write that “contrary to popular misconceptions Clausewitz was intensely aware of the value of intel­ ligence at all levels, but he was famously also highly skeptical of the accuracy of a large proportion of military intelligence” (2018, p. 7). Michael Handel argues that the two thinkers are not as opposed as they might appear, because Sun Tzu was writing about intelligence from the strategic level, where it has a considerable impact, while Clausewitz was mainly writing about the tactical and operational levels of war. And as Handel writes, “the lack of real-time communications and the fluid nature of battle in his time did make intelligence unreliable in most cases” (Handel, 2001, p. 166). A related debate has engaged intelligence scholars and military historians over the question of whether intelligence on its own can be decisive in warfare (Ferris, 2018). On the one side are those such as Gregory Elder, who argue that intelligence can indeed be decisive, under the right circumstances. Elder examines five key battles in history and argues that “it was neither technology nor material superiority that won

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Theory of preventive action 175 the day, but accurate, timely, actionable intelligence, combined with leaders willing to treat intelligence as a primary factor in deciding outcomes” (Elder, 2006). Taking the other side is renowned military historian John Keegan, who takes aim at what he describes as “the currently fashionable view” that intelligence can be the key to success in war. Not so, he argues, writing that “intelligence may be usually necessary but is not a sufficient condition of victory” (Keegan, 2004, p. 334). Only force, he believes, can be decisive, because “War is not an intellectual activity but a brutally physical one” (2004, p. 321). Critics have pointed out that Keegan is attacking something of a straw man, as few intelligence professionals would claim that their work alone can be decisive. Michael Herman writes, “We all know that intelligence in war is secondary but counts for something. We want better ways of assessing how much, and in what circumstances” (Herman, 2005, p. 454; see also Warner, 2004). What Herman is asking for here is a theory of intelligence to help us assess when and why intelligence counts. Kahn takes a middle ground in this debate, suggesting we begin by establishing three principles about intelligence, the first being that the fundamental purpose of intelligence is to “optimize one’s resources”. The second is that intelligence is an aux­ iliary, but not a primary, element in war. And finally, he argues that military history shows that “intelligence is essential to the defense but not the offense” (2001, p. 85). Kahn is optimistic about the future of intelligence, making an argument that might be considered a theory about the long-term health of intelligence. He predicts intelli­ gence will continue to grow in importance as a result of humankind’s desire to know things, and because of what he calls “the universal tendency toward least effort”, which will always encourage leaders to seek out intelligence as a way of optimizing their resources (2001, p. 89). Overall, it can be difficult to see Sun Tzu’s theory as something that can be easily adopted by today’s intelligence analyst or homeland security official to fit a specific sit­ uation. Terrorism expert Brian Jenkins notes that “Sun Tzu offers inspiration, not pre­ cise instructions” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 5). And Sun Tzu’s emphasis on espionage and the use of spies may seem a bit archaic to a modern reader in the age of cyber intelligence and social media. But espionage, whether through cyber means or of the old-fashioned shoe leather kind, is clearly a continuing concern within the American homeland. And more importantly, Sun Tzu took a broad approach to defining intelligence, writing that such different functions as foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and covert action must be coordinated together (Treverton et al., 2006, p. 3). Considering the wide variety of threats and challenges facing the US homeland today, a homeland security professional would do well to heed Sun Tzu’s advice and attempt to learn everything possible about not only those threats, but also about our own capabilities to deal with them. 9.5.2 Kent’s analytic doctrine The father of American intelligence analysis is Sherman Kent, a long-time leading fig­ ure at the CIA and the namesake of its Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis. Kent’s book Strategic Intelligence for American Foreign Policy (1949) is considered one of the seminal works in the field of intelligence studies. Kent provided a definition of intelligence that has remained useful to this day, writing that intelligence consists of three things: knowledge, process and organization.1 Philip H. J. Davies summed up

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176 Erik J. Dahl the view of many intelligence experts when he wrote, “Virtually all intelligence theory could be considered a footnote to Kent” (2002, p. 62). Kent saw intelligence as applied scholarship: a profession guided by scientific prin­ ciples, and which stayed out of substantive and policy debates, because its mission was to tell truth to power—but not to decide what should be done about that truth. In Kent’s view, in order for intelligence to be scientific and objective, there needs to be a strict separation between intelligence and policy.2 That did not mean that intelli­ gence officials should be disconnected from policy makers, and Kent recognized that analysts must be close enough to policy to have the confidence of those who received their analysis. But intelligence, he cautioned, should take care not to be too close: “Intelligence must be close enough to policy, plans, and operations to have the great­ est amount of guidance, and must not be so close that it loses its objectivity and integ­ rity of judgement” (cited in Davis, 1992, p. 93). This view of how intelligence works has been the dominant one in American intel­ ligence, but there has been an opposing view, arguing that intelligence needs to be closer to policy makers in order to be understood and used. This view was expressed initially by Willmoore Kendall, who warned in 1949 that under Kent’s view of the relationship between intelligence and policy, “The role of the intelligence agencies becomes … that of mere research assistants to the George Kennans” (1949, p. 550). Although the argument over how close intelligence should be to policy has become known as the “Kent-Kendall debate”, Davis has pointed out that the two men did not actually have much, if any, of a debate themselves (1992, p. 96). Kent’s view of a firm separation between intelligence and policy can still be con­ sidered the mainstream in American intelligence, and Mark Lowenthal expresses it this way: “In the ethos of U.S. intelligence, a strict dividing line exists between intel­ ligence and policy… . Intelligence has a support role and may not cross over into the advocacy of policy choices” (2017, p. 4). But in recent years the Kendall school has been gaining, especially as leading intelligence thinkers advocate for concepts such as “opportunity analysis”, which argue that intelligence professionals should do more than to throw intelligence over the transom and hope that policy makers will do something with it. In the U.S. military, the emphasis has been in recent years to move intelligence and operations more closely together, such as in Joint Intelligence Operations Centers, called JIOCS (Builta & Heller, 2011, p. 10; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). At the domestic and homeland security level, this closer relationship between intelligence and policy can be seen in the development of state and local fusion centers, which are often managed by state or local law enforcement agencies (Lewandowski & Guidetti, 2018). There is also a debate among intelligence experts about whether Kent’s view of intelligence as an objective, scientific enterprise, modeled especially on social science, is still appropriate. This view of intelligence as a science has continued to find sup­ port, and much of the effort to improve the work of intelligence analysis since the 9/11 attacks has been to increase the rigor of analysts’ work and encourage them to think more like scientists (National Research Council, 2011). But other experts disa­ gree. Carmen Medina, for example, argues that “analytic detachment and neutrality are values bred of the Cold War”, but in the future they may only make intelligence irrelevant (2002). And some have suggested that intelligence work is more an art than a science, because the world being studied is not just the physical world where scien­ tific principles may hold true, but the world of people, politics and human behavior,

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Theory of preventive action 177 where the “right” answer (according to scientific logic) may not actually be correct. To understand that world and anticipate what will happen, some critics such as New York Times columnist David Brooks argue that the intelligence community should hire fewer number-crunching scientists and more “intuitive generalists” (Brooks, 2005; see also Colby, 2007).

9.6 Strategic intelligence vs. tactical intelligence The conventional view among intelligence scholars and practitioners has been that strategic intelligence, generally meaning intelligence about the most important issues and intended for the most important consumers, is more important than intelligence directed to support tactical-level consumers. On the need to give priority to strate­ gic intelligence, Kent and Kendall were in agreement. Kent, after all, wrote his book about strategic intelligence, which he defined as “knowledge vital for national sur­ vival” (1949, p. vii). And Kendall also argued for the importance of strategic intelli­ gence, writing that intelligence should aim to influence and inform top-level (that is, decision-making) officials. 9.6.1 Strategic intelligence There is no single accepted definition of strategic intelligence. John Heidenrich, for example, defines it as intelligence needed to support national-level strategies, and he argues that it has been neglected in favor of current and tactical intelligence (2007). But a useful distinction can be made between strategic intelligence, defined as longterm, broad in focus, and of interest to senior level officials, and tactical intelligence, which tends to be shorter-term, more narrowly focused, and more likely to be used to support individual plans or operations rather than supporting longer-term strategy (Dahl, 2013, p. 22). Experts have described the challenges of strategic intelligence analysis (Hedley, 2009) and warned of “a decline in the U.S. intelligence community’s commitment to strate­ gic analysis” (MacEachin, 2005, p. 117). But the focus of attention is often on strategic warning, and on what happens when strategic warning is either unavailable or not listened to: strategic surprise. Strategic warning is often described as the most critical product of the intelligence process. As Mark Lowenthal writes, a primary mission of any nation’s intelligence community is to avoid strategic surprise: “to keep track of threats, forces, events, and developments that are capable of endangering the nation’s existence” (2017, p. 2). And a number of experts argue that the United States needs to do better at strategic warning; Gentry and Gordon, for example, write that the United States has “a deeply flawed U.S. strategic warning system” (2018, p. 20; see also Davis, 2009; Gentry & Gordon, 2018). But this conventional wisdom about the relative importance of strategic intelligence may be incorrect, especially concerning the problem of homeland security. For one thing, as I have argued elsewhere, although senior leaders often say they want more and better strategic intelligence, in fact they are more likely to respond to specific, tactical-level intelligence and warning (Dahl, 2013, p. 22). And in addition, in the postCold War and post-9/11 era, the nature of the threat has changed, and intelligence priorities must change as well. Nations and communities now face many threats that may not directly threaten their survival in the way that nuclear weapons can, but

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Erik J. Dahl

which must nonetheless be addressed. Terrorism, for example, is largely a tactical level threat, which can be best addressed through high quality tactical level intelligence. 9.6.2 Tactical intelligence Terrorism and other homeland security threats, such as from transnational criminal organizations, public health, or natural disasters, differ from traditional national security threats in another important way: dealing with these threats is not solely, or even primarily, the job of the national government. Local governments, law enforcement agencies, emergency managers, and many others are involved in plan­ ning for and responding to homeland security threats. On traditional national secu­ rity issues, decision-making authority is typically reserved for only the most senior officials; but when it comes to homeland security, decision makers can be found at any level, both inside and outside of government. For this reason, it is no longer suf­ ficient for intelligence to focus the bulk of its attention upward toward senior lead­ ers. Today intelligence needs to reach not only upward, but outward and downward toward a much broader customer base than ever before—and intelligence officials must remember that these new customers need intelligence that tends to be much more tactical than strategic.

9.7 Theories of surprise and failure The problem of intelligence failure to prevent surprise—and in particular strategic-level surprise—has been one of the most important issues studied by intelligence scholars. Scott and Jackson have noted that “Providing warning against surprise is central to both official and public perceptions of the fundamental role of intelligence services” (2004, p. 153). Lowenthal writes that “The foremost goal of any intelligence commu­ nity must be to keep track of threats, forces, events, and developments that are capable of endangering the nation’s existence” (2017, p. 2). Inspired to learn the lessons of disasters such as Pearl Harbor, intelligence scholars have developed a relatively sophisticated understanding of the problem of surprise attack. James Wirtz argues (2003) that our understanding has advanced enough to constitute a theory of surprise. Surprise attacks tend to be successful because the riskier the attack may appear, especially to the weaker side in a contest that typically employs surprise, the less likely a surprise attack will appear to the stronger side. As a result, the victim becomes complacent, so paradoxically the less risky the attack will be for the attacker (Handel, 1984, p. 244; Wirtz, 2003, pp. 105–106). But there is a second side to the theory of surprise, for as Wirtz has written, “Surprise attacks often produce spectacular results temporarily or locally, but surprise rarely wins wars” (2003, p. 108). This feature of surprise, that it produces an initial advantage but does not produce long-term success, has been seen in such famous cases as Pearl Harbor and 9/11. Another widely accepted finding about surprise is that true “bolts from the blue” attacks, where there is no warning, are rare. As Richard Betts puts it, “There is always some warning; there is usually some response; yet surprise seldom fails” (1980–81, p. 553). Wirtz has called this the “first law of intelligence failure” (2006, p. 51). America’s recent history of domestic terrorist attacks and mass shootings suggests that this law applies to homeland security intelligence today, as most attackers have

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Theory of preventive action 179 been found to have displayed concerning behaviors or warning signs that were either not noticed or not acted upon (e.g., United States Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center, 2019). Research on surprise attack has been very useful in helping us understand the persistence of surprise despite the tremendous effort and resources that the United States and other nations put into developing their intelligence systems, which are intended largely to avoid such surprises. This suggests that theories of intelligence to date have been mostly useful in the first role of theory: to help us understand why things are the way they are. They appear to have been less useful, however, in helping us learn how to make intelligence agencies more effective at avoiding such surprises. As Wirtz writes, echoing Michael Handel, these theories have been “better at explaining, rather than preventing, disaster” (2003, p. 113). Thomas Copeland agrees, writing that “intelligence failure theory has proven quite successful at describing and explaining failures. However, scholars have been unable to generate a predic­ tive approach for understanding where and when future failures are likely to occur” (Copeland, 2017, p. 2). The failure to anticipate or prevent a surprise attack is not, however, the only type of failure that can occur despite the great effort and expense devoted to intelligence today. Other examples of recent major intelligence failures include the inability of American intelligence agencies to anticipate the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, their misunderstanding of Iraq’s progress in developing weapons of mass destruc­ tion before 2003, and their failure to anticipate the rise of ISIS in 2013 and 2014 (Dahl, 2018; Jervis, 2010). Critics often complain about the frequency of intelligence failure, and Jervis writes that “there is no reason to believe that they have become less frequent over time” (2010, p. 5). An observer might ask, how can this be? How is it possible that intelligence failures can be just as prevalent today as in the past, despite the billions of dollars spent on intelligence each year in the United States alone, and the existence of a network of intelligence agencies and organizations that has grown since the 9/11 attacks to become what Priest and Arkin have called (2011) a “Top Secret America”? Honig (2007) has called for more research into intelligence success and failure, and such theories would see intelligence failure as the dependent variable—the out­ come we are trying to understand. Factors such as the amount of intelligence avail­ able, the skill of analysts, and the nature of the relationship between intelligence analysts and decision makers, would be the independent variables, with the goal of research being to determine what, if any, independent variables tend to produce the outcome on the dependent variable we are looking for—intelligence success, rather than failure. Intelligence failures can stem from many causes, including organizational problems, psychological challenges to analysis, the quality and amount of warning information available, and the actions or inactions of policy makers who receive intelligence warn­ ings. In fact, intelligence failure appears to be overdetermined—there are so many potential causes of failure, with multiple causes intersecting and interacting, that it can be difficult to isolate and address any individual causes (Copeland, 2017, p. 17). But scholars and intelligence practitioners have studied this larger problem of intelli­ gence failure and developed three general schools of thought that offer different expla­ nations for why intelligence failures remain so persistent, and whether or not anything can be done about the problem.3

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180 Erik J. Dahl 9.7.1 Traditional school The first and most prominent school of thought is the Traditional school, which makes the pessimistic argument that intelligence failures are largely unpreventable. Richard Betts provided the most extensive explanation of this view in a seminal 1978 article, in which he wrote that “Intelligence failures are not only inevitable, they are natural” (1978, p. 88). Intelligence failures, according to this school, stem mostly from fail­ ures of analysis, and not collection; this thinking is captured in the commonly heard complaint that intelligence fails to “connect the dots” of the available intelligence— implying that the problem is in the analysis phase, and not in the collection of intel­ ligence in the first place. And why does intelligence analysis continue to be lacking? Because despite advances in information technology, the task of analysis remains fun­ damentally a human one, which is bound by the limitations of human psychology and cognition. 9.7.2 Reformist school A second broad school of thought is the Reformist school, which offers a more opti­ mistic theory about intelligence failure. These thinkers argue that the main problem leading to intelligence failure is that agencies and analysts do not share intelligence sufficiently. Amy Zegart, for example, argues (2007) that the primary failure leading to the 9/11 attacks was the inability of the CIA and FBI to share the information they had available. The good news, according to this school of thought, is that these prob­ lems can be addressed through structural and organizational changes to encourage greater sharing and coordination. 9.7.3 Contrarian school And there is a third, smaller school of thought, the Contrarians, who argue that intelligence failures are more often the result of failures of collection, than of fail­ ures of analysis or sharing. The Economist expressed this view, writing that in the case of 9/11, “there were too few useful dots” (2003). These thinkers tend to be pes­ simistic about the possibility of significant improvement, because they believe that intelligence agencies are resistant to change, and thus unlikely to develop the new types of collection methods and technologies needed to address today’s threats and challenges. It should be noted that although studies of intelligence failure abound in the lit­ erature on intelligence, some scholars and practitioners—especially serving intelli­ gence professionals who perhaps understandably resist the implication that failure is such a common phenomenon—argue that theories of intelligence must encom­ pass more than just failure. As one CIA analyst wrote, “intelligence as an object of academic study should be far more dynamic and richer than just examination of failure” (Webb, 2009). If failure is overdetermined, then intelligence success is under-examined, and more work in this area is clearly needed (Copeland, 2017). This need is felt especially strongly in the area of homeland security, and this chapter’s concluding section offers a theory of intelligence that may help ensure homeland security today.

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Theory of preventive action 181

9.8 Summary and conclusions As we have seen in this chapter, there have been several notable attempts in recent years to create a theory—or at least the beginnings of a theory—of intelligence. The most interesting developments in intelligence theory, however, have come as authors have wrestled with the challenges that the post-9/11 era has brought for intelligence. This new era for intelligence, in which intelligence has been adapted to meet the demands of homeland security, has brought about several significant changes in the way we think about and “do” the job of intelligence. For one thing, it has firmly nudged the debate over the definition of intelligence toward a broader, more inclu­ sive definition than was commonly seen only a few years ago. It would be difficult to imagine an intelligence officer assigned to a homeland security portfolio today agreeing with the definition that Michael Warner offered shortly after the 9/11 attacks (Warner, 2002): “Intelligence is secret, state activity to understand or influence foreign entities”. Today, intelligence is often open source rather than secret, conducted by private, state, and local organizations rather than just nation-states, and it is designed to understand and influence a nation’s own citizens and legal residents as much as foreign entities. When Sherman Kent wrote about intelligence, he specifically excluded domestic intelligence from consideration; the strategic intelligence he was discussing “is not concerned with what goes on in the United States or in its territories and possessions” (Kent, 1949, p. 3). Today homeland security intelligence is directly concerned with understanding what goes on within the nation’s borders. And although in the imme­ diate post-9/11 world the focus was on terrorism, today homeland security addresses a much broader range of threats and challenges.4 Although the search for a comprehensive theory of intelligence will no doubt con­ tinue and spur further debate, perhaps the best approach might be to seek two dif­ ferent theories, operating at two different levels. At the tactical level, the most useful theoretical approach may be what I have elsewhere termed the theory of preventive action. This theory argues that in order for intelligence to be useful in preventing terrorist attacks and other specific (tactical-level) occurrences, there must be “precise, tactical-level warning, and it must be combined with a high level of receptivity toward that warning on the part of policymakers who will decide how and whether to use it” (Dahl, 2013, p. 23). This argument might seem obvious, but it runs counter to much of the conventional wisdom about intelligence, which as we have seen earlier in this chapter typically assumes that strategic intelligence, rather than tactical, is the most important. And this theory places a great deal of importance on the role of the policy maker or consumer of intelligence, who after all is ultimately the one who must decide what, if anything, should be done as a result of the intelligence warnings. An example that demonstrates the value of the theory of preventive action, and which is also notable as an example of an intelligence success, is the decade-long search by American intelligence and national security agencies for Osama bin Laden. The search was ultimately successful and resulted in the al Qaeda leader’s death because American intelligence was able to painstakingly develop very precise intel­ ligence on the house where they believed bin Laden was living. But the intelligence, although precise, could not be confirmed, and the raid on the compound by U.S. Navy SEALs was only conducted because President Barack Obama trusted his intelligence

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182 Erik J. Dahl advisors—that is, he was receptive (Dahl, 2013, p. 179). The killing of bin Laden was also an example of how American intelligence has changed since the 9/11 attacks, as the success was the result of the integration of several of the new features of intelli­ gence that have been discussed in this chapter, including the use of open source infor­ mation and the close relationship between intelligence and policy (Dahl, 2014). At the strategic level, one of the most important lessons about intelligence in the age of homeland security is an old lesson, because we may never develop a theory of intelligence much better than Sun Tzu did thousands of years ago. His advice about knowing oneself is even more important in the area of homeland security, in which threats—but also the capabilities to counter those threats—are likely to develop within our own countries and communities. Therefore, some have encouraged greater use of the concept of net assessment in homeland security, which requires an understanding of one’s own capabilities as well as those of the threat (Dahl, 2015). As Handel noted, when Sun Tzu wrote “know your enemy and know yourself”, he was providing a definition of net assessment that still holds true today (Handel, 2001, p. 182). As our requirements for intelligence continue to evolve, so too will the search for bet­ ter theories to help us use intelligence more effectively. New challenges will undoubt­ edly inspire new theories and new ways to provide decision makers with knowledge or foreknowledge of the world around them. But for this moment, when homeland secu­ rity threats and challenges are increasing, the best approach appears to be to combine something old with something new, incorporating the classical thinking of Sun Tzu with the modern theory of preventive action.

9.9 Discussion questions 1. How can the tools and processes of intelligence be turned inward toward a nation’s own citizens without those tools being abused, leading to what some might call a police state? 2. Should American intelligence agencies be allowed to conduct covert operations within the United States? 3. Who should be in charge of homeland security intelligence within the United States? Would a new domestic intelligence agency be more effective, and more able to protect civil rights, than the existing agencies, most of which focus abroad, on international threats? 4. How can we do a better job of preventing mass shootings and domestic terrorist attacks? Should domestic intelligence efforts be increased in an effort to detect concerning behaviors or other warning signs that attackers often exhibit? 5. Do you agree with Sun Tzu’s advice to “know the enemy and know yourself”? How does that apply in a homeland security context? 6. How does the discipline of intelligence support the structure, strategy or opera­ tions of the homeland security enterprise?

Notes 1. Mark Lowenthal offers a similar definition, writing that intelligence can be thought about as the process by which information is gathered, analyzed, and disseminated; the products of the intelligence community; and the organizations that make up the IC (Lowenthal, 2017, p. 11).

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Theory of preventive action 183 2. For a concise discussion of Kent’s view of intelligence analysis, see Davis (2002). 3. I discuss these three schools in more detail in my book (Dahl, 2013), upon which this section is drawn. 4. Useful discussions of homeland security intelligence include Burch (2007), Logan (2018) and Steiner (2015).

References Andrew, C., Aldrich, R. J., & Wark, W. K. (2009). Secret intelligence: A reader. New York, NY: Routledge. Betts, R. K. (1978). Analysis, war, and decision: Why intelligence failures are inevitable. World Politics, 31(1), 61–89. Betts, R. K. (1980–81). Surprise despite warning: Why sudden attacks succeed. Political Science Quarter, 95(4), 551–572. Brooks, D. (2005). The Art of Intelligence. New York Times, April 2. Builta, J. A., & Heller, E. N. (2011). Reflections on 10 years of counterterrorism analysis. Studies in Intelligence, 55(3), 1–15. Burch, J. (2007). A domestic intelligence agency for the United States? A comparative analysis of domestic intelligence agencies and their implications for homeland security. Homeland Security Affairs, 3(2), 1–16. Colby, E. A. (2007). Making intelligence smart. Hoover Institution Policy Review, August and September. https://www.hoover.org/research/making-intelligence-smart Copeland, T. E. (2017). Intelligence failure theory. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies. http://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001. 0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-27 Dahl, E. J. (2013). Intelligence and surprise attack: Failure and success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and beyond. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Dahl, E. J. (2014). Finding Bin Laden: Lessons for a new American way of intelligence. Political Science Quarterly, 129(2), 179–210. Dahl, E. J. (2015). A homeland security net assessment needed now! Strategic Studies Quarterly, 9(4), 62–86. Dahl, E. J. (2018). Not your father’s intelligence failure: Why the intelligence community failed to anticipate the rise of ISIS. In al-Istrabadi, F., & Ganguly, S. (Eds.). The Future of ISIS: Regional and international implications (pp. 41–65). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Davies, P. H. J. (2002). Ideas of intelligence. Harvard International Review, 24(3), pp. 62–66. Davies, P. H. J. (2009). Theory and intelligence reconsidered. In Gill, P., Marrin, S., & Phythian, M. (Eds.). Intelligence theory: Key questions and debates (pp. 186–207). London, UK: Routledge. Davis, J. (1992). The Kent–Kendall debate of 1949. Studies in Intelligence, 36(5) 91–103. Davis, J. (2002). Sherman Kent and the profession of intelligence analysis. Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis Occasional Paper, 1(5). https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center­ occasional-papers/vol1no5.htm Davis, J. (2009). Strategic warning: Intelligence support in a world of uncertainty and sur­ prise. In Johnson, L. K. (Ed.). Handbook of intelligence studies (pp. 173–188). New York, NY: Routledge. Elder, G. (2006). Intelligence in war: It can be decisive. Studies in Intelligence, 50(2). https:// www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/ studies/vol50no2 Ferris, J. (2018). Intelligence in war. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies. http://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/ acrefore-9780190846626-e-405

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184 Erik J. Dahl Gartzke, E., & Lindsay, J. R. (2015). Weaving tangled webs: Offense, defense, and deception in cyberspace. Security Studies, 24(2), 316–348. Gentry, J. A. (2016). Toward and theory of non-state actors’ intelligence. Intelligence and National Security, 31(4), 465–489. Gentry, J. A., & Gordon, J. S. (2018). U.S. strategic warning intelligence: Situation and prospects. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 31(1), 19–53. Gill, Peter. (2010). Theories of intelligence. In Johnson, L. K. (Ed.). The Oxford handbook of national security intelligence (pp. 43–58). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Griffith, S. B. (1963). Sun Tzu the art of war (translation). London, UK: Oxford University Press. Handel, M. (1984). Intelligence and the problem of strategic surprise. The Journal of Strategic Studies, 7(3), 229–281. Handel, M. (2001). Masters of war: Classical strategic thought (3rd ed.). London, UK: Routledge. Hastedt, G. P., & Skelley, B. D. (2009). Intelligence in a turbulent world: Insights from organ­ ization theory. In Gill, P., Marrin, S., & M. Phythian, Intelligence theory: Key questions and debates (pp. 112–130). London, UK: Routledge. Hedley, J. H. (2009). Analysis for strategic intelligence. In Johnson, L. K. (Ed.), Handbook of intelligence studies (pp. 211–226). New York, NY: Routledge. Heidenrich, J. G. (2007). The intelligence community’s neglect of strategic intelligence. Studies in Intelligence, 51(2), 15–26. Herman, M. (2005). Review of John Keegan. Intelligence in War. War in History, 12(4), 453–485. Hillebrand, C., & Hughes, R. G. (2017). The quest for a theory of intelligence. In R. Dover, H. Dylan, & M. Goodman (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of security, risk and intelligence (pp. 1–24). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. Honig, O. R. (2007). A new direction for theory-building in intelligence studies. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 20(4), 699–716. Hughes, R. G., & Koutsoukis, A. (2018). Clausewitz first, and last, and always: War, strategy and intelligence in the twenty-first century. Intelligence and National Security, 34(3), 438–455. Hulnick, A. (2006). What’s wrong with the intelligence cycle. Intelligence and National Security, 21(6), 959–979. Jenkins, B. M. (2006). Unconquerable Nation: Knowing our enemy, strengthening ourselves. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Jervis, R. (2010). Why intelligence fails: Lessons from the Iranian revolution and the Iraq War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Johnson, L. K. (2003). Preface to a theory of strategic intelligence. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 16(4), 638–663. Johnson, L. K. (2010). Bricks and mortar for a theory of intelligence. Comparative Strategy, 22(1), 1–28. Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013). Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Intelligence. Washington, DC. Kahn, D. (1986). Clausewitz and intelligence. The Journal of Strategic Studies, 9(2–3), 117–126. Kahn, D. (2001). An historical theory of intelligence. Intelligence and National Security, 16(3), 79–92. Keegan, J. (2004). Intelligence in war: The value—and limitations—of what the military can learn about the enemy. New York, NY: Vintage Books. Kendall, W. (1949). The function of intelligence. World Politics, 1(4), 542–552. Kent, S. (1949). Strategic intelligence for American World Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lewandowski, C., & Guidetti, R. (2018). The role of fusion centers in homeland security. In Logan, K. G. (Ed.), Homeland security and intelligence (2nd ed., pp. 173–192). Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. Logan, K. G. (Ed.). (2018). Homeland security and intelligence (2nd ed.). Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.

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Theory of preventive action 185 Lowenthal, M. M. (2017). Intelligence: From secrets to policy (7th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press. MacEachin, D. (2005). Analysis and estimates: Professional practices in intelligence production. In Sims, J. E., & Gerber, B. (Eds.). Transforming U.S. Intelligence (pp. 115–133). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Marrin, S. (2007). Intelligence analysis theory: Explaining and predicting analytic responsibilities. Intelligence and National Security, 22(6), 821–846. Marrin, S. (2014). Improving intelligence studies as an academic discipline. Intelligence and National Security, 31(2), 266–279. Marrin, W. (2018). Evaluating intelligence theories: Current state of play. Intelligence and National Security, 33(4), 479–490. Medina, C. (2002). What to do when traditional models fail: The coming revolution in intelligence analysis. Studies in Intelligence, 46(3). https://www.cia.gov/library/ center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no3 National Research Council. (2011). Intelligence analysis for tomorrow: Advances from the behav­ ioral and social sciences. Committee on behavioral and social science research to improve analysis for national security. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. Phythian, M. (2009). Intelligence theory and theories of international relations: Shared world or separate worlds? In Gill, P., Marrin, S., & Phythian, M. (Eds.), Intelligence theory: Key questions and debates (pp. 54–72). London, UK: Routledge. Priest, D., &Arkin, W. M. (2011). Top secret America: The rise of the new American security state. New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company. Rogg, J. P. (2018). ‘Quo Vadis?’ A comparatist meets a theorist searching for a grand theory of intelligence. Intelligence and National Security, 33(4), 541–552. Scott, L., & Jackson, P. (2004). The study of intelligence in theory and practice. Intelligence and National Security, 19(2), 139–169. Sims, J. (2014). The theory and philosophy of intelligence. In Dover, R., Goodman, M. S., & Hillebrand, C. (Eds.), Routledge companion to intelligence studies (pp. 42–49). London, UK: Routledge. Steiner, J. E. (2015). Homeland security intelligence. Los Angeles, CA: CQ Press. The Economist. (2003). America needs more spies. The Economist, July 10. Treverton, G. F. (2018). Theory and practice. Intelligence and National Security, 33(4), 472–478. Treverton, G. F., Jones, S. G., Boraz, S., & Lipscy, P. (2006). Toward a theory of intelligence: Workshop report. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. United States Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center. (2019). Protecting America’s Schools: A U.S. Secret Service Analysis of Targeted School Violence. Washington, DC. Warner, M. (2002). Wanted: A definition of ‘intelligence’. Studies in Intelligence, 46(3). https:// www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/ studies/vol46no3/article02.html Warner, M. (2004). Review of intelligence in war: Knowledge of the enemy from Napoleon to al-Qaeda. Studies in Intelligence, 48(2), 67–69. Warner, M. (2006). The divine skein: Sun Tzu on Intelligence. Intelligence and National Security, 21(4), 483–492. Warner, M. (2014). Theories of intelligence: The state of play. In Dover, R., Goodman, M. S., & Hillebrand, C. (Eds.), Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies (pp. 25–32). London, UK: Routledge. Webb, J.M. (2009). Review of intelligence theory: Key questions and debates. Studies in Intelligence, 53(2). https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi­ publications/csi-studies/studies/vol53no2/intelligence-theory-key-questions-and-debates.html Wheaton, K. J., & Beerbower, M. T. (2006). Towards a new definition of intelligence. Stanford Law and Policy Review, 17, 319–330.

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186 Erik J. Dahl Wirtz, J. J. (2003). Theory of surprise. In Betts, R. K. & Mahnken, T. G. (Eds.), Paradoxes of strategic intelligence: Essays in honor of Michael I. Handel (pp. 101–116). New York, NY: Routledge. Wirtz, J. J. (2006). Responding to surprise. Annual Review of Political Science, 9, 45–65. Zegart, A. B. (2007). Spying blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the origins of 9/11. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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10 Human and environmental security theory James D. Ramsay and Terry O’Sullivan

Description: The concept of national security (which would include domestic or “home­ land security”) has long been primarily about protection of the nation-state at all costs, even over the needs or security of the individual. Such a Westphalian1 principle originally held that other nations should not interfere in the affairs of others and that sovereign nation states act unilaterally in their own best interests. However, and some­ what ironically, modern globalization and international institutionalism has shown that noninterference at the expense of basic human rights and exclusive of a larger global context undercuts any nation’s ability to thrive. In contrast to Westphalian thinking, the United Nations Commission on Human Security defines human security as a means of protecting fundamental freedoms that constitute the essence of life. This means protecting people from fundamental, severe and pervasive threats to quality of life, and devising processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations work to secure the nation. This chapter describes the dimensions of human security and highlights climate change as an exemplar of environmental insecurity. Further, that climate change itself presents a set of highly complex “wicked problems”, that would be impossible to manage successfully without global partnerships and cooperation, which would suggest a deeper commitment to human security. Ultimately, the need to better integrate principles and practices that optimize human and environmen­ tal security are key to sustainable and effective homeland security operations and strategy. Upon successful completion of this chapter, student should be able to: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Describe each dimension of human security. Distinguish human security from national/homeland security. Compare and contrast human vs. national “security threats”. Identify and describe human security threats in both more developed and less developed countries. 5. Discuss the key components to anthropomorphic climate change and how it is related (may relate) to dimensions of human security, including environmental security. 6. Describe environmental security and contrast it with national and homeland security. 7. Describe how human and environmental security theory supports the opera­ tions and strategies of the homeland security enterprise.

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“It is evident that incremental changes will not be enough and there is a need for rapid and transformational action”, the report states. “By necessity, this will see profound change in how energy, food, and other material-intensive services are demanded and provided by governments, businesses, and markets”.2 “Our house is on fire… I don’t want your hope, I want you to panic, I want you to feel the fear… and act”.3

10.1 Introduction The United Nations (UNEP) 2019 Emissions Gap Report (quoted above) articu­ lates well the dire state of the climate emergency, as well as the implications for economic and societal development, a classic yet unprecedented human security imperative, and climate change. Climate is the most vexing, complex environmental security challenge in human history, and yet, the political and societal understand­ ing of this seems entirely inadequate to magnitude of this existential crisis. As the United Nations and now countless science-informed authorities (from civilian to military) assert, nothing short of a rapid, massive, revolutionary mobilization to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions would be required to prevent catastrophic tipping points, and 4°C of heating by 2100 (UN Environment Programme, 2019); and as climate youth leader, Greta Thunberg, passionately asserted in 2019, the time to act is now. Climate scientists many years ago reached a scientific consensus that anthropogenic global warming and climate change, largely caused by human GHG emissions, is occurring (Cook, 2016). Essentially, global warming is the build-up of heat trapped in the atmosphere, land and oceans as the direct result of a magnified “greenhouse effect” that traps more solar energy than normal in the lower atmosphere.4 Climate change is the often disruptive and regionally variable result of that build-up of heat. In turn, global warming contributes to changes in extreme weather events and general exacerbation of natural weather cycles such as long-range precipitation, heat waves, cold waves, ocean level rise and growing carbon-related ocean acidity, melting of mas­ sive polar ice reservoirs and frozen permafrost, and a host of other effects.5 Climate scientists have also been increasingly able to directly tie the severity of specific recent extreme weather events (like the trio of catastrophic Atlantic hurricanes in 2017) to climate change.6 Given the scope of its implications and the international nature of both its driv­ ers and solutions, climate change is an existential threat to humanity. And as both United Nations and climate scientists now warn, it is certainly among the most important issues in human history (Cai & Lontzek, 2019). And yet the scientific climate consensus among experts faces ideological and political resistance that has paralyzed most significant GHG reduction policy measures in countries like the United States and Australia—both major fossil fuels (coal, gas and oil) exporters. Even as current climate patterns and studies are leading many scientists, govern­ ments, analysts and climate activists to declare a “climate emergency” (Watts, 2019), some of the biggest polluters and their political allies continue to resist climate miti­ gation policies, exemplified by the Trump administration’s departure from the Paris Accords (Dennis, 2019). One does not have to look far these days to find media headlines that illustrate the intertwined nature of today’s major climate crises. What may not be so obvious

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from such headlines is that the confluence of human- and environmental security is a common underlying thread—one which ultimately also poses complex national- and homeland security threats to every nation on earth in the form of terrorism, crtical infrastructure failures, water, food and energy security to name a few.

10.2 Describe each dimension of human security, a complex system of systems Human security includes political, economic, health, gender, community and envi­ ronmental security dimensions (or aspects) and various overlapping threats to these aspects abound across the globe. Human insecurity exists not just in poorer, less devel­ oped countries (LDCs), but everywhere. Among other transnational human security threats (i.e., threats that cross national borders) arise from infectious diseases such as AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, pandemic flu and Ebola; air and water pollution; climate change/global heating—and its role as a threat multiplier that disrupts both natu­ ral and human systems; substance abuse problems such as the U.S. opioid epidemic; social injustice and poverty; oppression toward women, religious, ethnic and other minorities; civil conflicts, including civil war, and the persistence of both domestic and transnational terrorism; food, water and other vital resource shortages. The United Nations Commission on Human Security defines human security as a means of protecting fundamental freedoms that constitute the essence of life. It means protecting people from fundamental, severe and pervasive threats to quality of life, and devising processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. A human security agenda creates “political, social, environmental, economic, military and cul­ tural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity” (CHS, 2003). That said, as with other definitions of security, human security is a complex, dynamic and value-laden construct (i.e., something conceptual or theoretical, with contested definitions). Moreover, and conceptually, human security appears to function as a complex adaptive system (see, for example, Preisser et al., 2018) that gives rise to net­ works or tools which help people interact with, modify or influence the “system” which would be their immediate environment. Technology provides one common adaptation tool to manage complexity among human security systems and social networks. For example, smart phones have greatly enhanced social networks and other social media communication platforms, and the internet is now integrated into virtually every other critical human infrastructure system in the developed world—including supply chain management, transportation, commerce, education and national security. But like other large systems of systems that are so complicated they give rise to wicked problems,7 many of the above elements of human security also tend to exemplify such issues. As a value-laden system that evolves over time, about which there is considera­ ble disagreement, solving human security crises can defy easy solutions.

10.3 Describe the scope, definition and strategic context of environmental security (ES), and contrast it with national and homeland security This is particularly true when human cognitive reasoning failings may not even recognize the scope or even existence of a problem, as the worsening existential

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threats from climate disruption demonstrate all too well. Many of the world’s leaders (particularly as of this writing in the United States and Australia) remain either willfully or unwittingly ignorant of the severity and thus urgency of the cli­ mate emergency, depending on their self-interest in complacency or denial, or lack of exposure to credible voices expressing alarm (Cook, Supran, Lewandowsky, Oreskes, & Maibach, 2019). Add to this a natural variability in the willingness of nations to cooperate due to either their internal politics, or short or long-term global aspirations, etc., determines how well we can confront the “wickedness” of certain threats to humanity. Thus, we posit that environmental security, epitomized by human-caused global heating/climate change is the biggest wicked problem ever, with predictable and catastrophic implications. Only a massive global mobilization toward zero carbon emissions, including renewable energy and storage, and energy efficiency would offset future disaster. Humanity is performing a complex, uncertain, and unprecedented human geoengineering experiment to which planetary ecosystems are being subjected. Globally, unintended GHG pollution as a result of human activities causes damage to both people and ecosystems as well as infrastructure. Such damage is labeled by economists as a negative externality. But a more granular way of assessing climate change impacts can be found in the social costs of carbon (SCC) emissions among regions, societies and nations (Ricke, et al., 2018). Not surprisingy, damage from cli­ mate change is known to vary considerably among regions and countries, as do the relative SCCs, which are unequally weighted and distributed between the wealthy and less wealthy nations (Ricke et al., ibid). Environmental security is thus critical to overall human security, and because of the complex, contextual interaction of human systems, it is critical to national and homeland security decision-making as well. While these connections are discussed later in the chapter, the stage must first be set by describing the concept of environ­ mental security as it will be used here. Central to the world’s future safety, stability and prosperity is whether and how U.S. and other major GHG emitters incorporate threats to climate/environmental security, human security, homeland security and national security into a more com­ prehensive, integrated domestic and international security model or strategy. In this chapter we primarily profile the United States, but due to the wicked nature of cli­ mate change, no single superpower can adequately solve or offset the consequence of a rapidly warming Earth. And, we would expect nothing to change unless most of the world unifies around a comprehensive and cooperative strategy. Therefore, from a policy and decision science perspective, environmental security is arguably a more vexing wicked problem than any other human security issue. ES issues are interdisci­ plinary in nature, value-laden, exhibit complex interdependencies, are global in scope, and dynamic and complex to solve, increasingly creating human misery and political instability—with much more to come. 10.3.1 A working definition of environmental security Environmental Security is a component of human security. There is no gold standard definition of ES, just as there is none for HLS, but we believe good social scientific analysis of such a contested concept, as a sub-category of other theoretical constructs, should offer a working definition—rather than assume a term’s meaning is well-known

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or well-established. We would offer the following definition of ES, from an academic or practice analytical perspective: Environmental security is a process for understand­ ing how extreme environmental or climatic events, acting locally or trans-nationally, can destabilize countries or regions of the world, resulting in geopolitical instability, resource conflicts, and subsequently enhanced risk to critical infrastructure, or a combination of these. To define ES in this way requires an appreciation of the intersection of human security, well-being and human activity as they interact with the global environment and become both the causes and effects of environmental degradation. Hence, ES would integrate climate science, critical infrastructure protection, emergency man­ agement, public health and the resulting impact on the political economies, gov­ ernments and societies around the world. In her dissertation research, Elizabeth Chalecki (2002) suggests ES is “the ability of a nation or a society to withstand envi­ ronmental asset scarcity, environmental risks or adverse changes, or environmentrelated tensions or conflicts”. Though somewhat dated now, the Millennium Project surveyed many of the competing global versions of ES in a late 1990s, looking at var­ ious ways the term has been used by experts, national governments and international organizations.

10.3.2 Broader conceptions of security: compare and contrast non-traditional human and environmental security with more traditional national- and homeland security concepts.8 The traditional national security framing is more oriented toward the state (nations) and militaries—and survival in the face of existential internal and/or external risks to national interest (Waever, 1995). In contrast, non-traditional human security approach focuses on individual and community-centered wellbeing, that is, “free­ dom from fear, from want and [the right to] to live with dignity” (Estrada-Tanck, 2016)—It embraces an ethos of societal security (see Chapter 3 of this). ES challenges certain traditional notions of national security and homeland security because of the complex nature of the issues it incorporates (some of which are described above). By necessity American ES must include many non-traditional security stakeholders, just at the national level alone—including US agencies such as the Environment Protection Agency (EPA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Department of Agriculture, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Energy, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Public Health Service, as well as many independent and government scientists doing research on climate change-related issues, technologies, etc.9 Meanwhile, thanks to the structure of American constitutional federalism, states such as California, Massachusetts and New York have for example independently (or in some instances collectively) enacted climate security-related legislation and nego­ tiated regional plans to reduce GHG emissions through regulation and tax incentives (Gilmore & St. Clair, 2018; Samet & Woodward, 2018). And at the local level, hundreds of American cities (also in nations around the world) have also moved aggressively toward the goal of achieving zero carbon emissions, including pledges to reach 100% renewable energy (Kirsten, 2016).

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All conceptions and definitions of security—national-, homeland-, environmental and health- and human security, etc.—are contested (those with a lack of consensus/ uniform definition or understanding of the term) and dynamic (can change in mean­ ing over time and in different contexts), complex (indicating there are several types and levels of security), and value-laden (meaning different things to different people). For instance, security can be addressed as a wide spectrum of levels of analysis and developed in a variety of policy and decision-making environments. As noted, human security is a continually emerging lens or paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities, and the role individual security plays in broader universe of collec­ tive security and insecurity—from individual and local levels to international and transnational. At the broadest, most complex end of the spectrum is global security, or transna­ tional security, which includes the issues and challenges of all people, including gov­ ernments and nation-states, but also non-governmental actors (individuals, groups and organizations) within and transcending national borders (Caballero-Anthony, 2015). Transnational security includes the highly complex issues that transcend artificial national borders, including global climate change and other environmental issues such as ozone depletion, fisheries loss, acid rain, etc.). This can also encompass glo­ balized norms of economic integration (exemplified by the World Trade Organization, the European Union, etc.), global terrorism, organized crime and a host of other sim­ ilar issues. International security as conceived by scholars and policy analysts has evolved since the end of the Cold War conflict between the Soviet and American superpowers, and the rapid rise of globalized economic and political cooperation and integration, to include many more issues and actors.10 In the twenty-first century, traditional security notions now include not just militaries and related diplomatic entities, but other political, economic and even social institutional actors. This evolution has significantly changed the strategic thinking behind international security, particu­ larly among Western nations, even as the “realist” model of zero-sum power politics between competing, even hostile nations remains highly relevant in many parts of the world. A related term, national security, refers to the security of nation-states, or coun­ tries as they are commonly known.11 In the United States during the Cold War, for instance, traditional national security definitions were oriented and aligned more with military operations and objectives, though of course sometimes with overlap­ ping strategic political-economic initiatives such as the famous U.S. Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after WWII. However, over the twenty years after the 1990 fall of the Soviet Union, the national security concept widened over the breadth of “securitized” additional issues that could be included alongside traditional national security defi­ nitions (Buzan, Wæver, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998). Thus, for example, Figure 10.1 shows hypothesized connections between extreme environmental events and national security: 10.3.2.1 Homeland security13 Many authors have written about the meaning, components of, or the varied definitions of homeland security.14 Extracted from the literature as a whole and bearing in mind they are not the only knowledge domains that comprise the HLS construct, Table 10.1

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Figure 10.1 Theoretical example of how environmental security may be tied to national security12

demonstrates the breadth of component knowledge domains of the Homeland Security construct. That is, the larger construct of homeland security is effectively a composite of many complex sub-dimensions. In this sense, homeland security can be considered a “meta-discipline”, or discipline of disciplines. As such, and like environmental secu­ rity, Homeland Security is a complex, value-laden, dynamic construct that is in fact a composite of many other complex, value-laden, dynamic disciplines in much the same way as modern medicine, and the even broader public health system are organized as complex composites of many sub disciplines and systems. It is inside of this context that we define environmental security (see above). The totality of all the sub-dimensions displayed in Table 10.1 is important to the overall scope of both environmental security and a more comprehensive concept of homeland security. For example, following Hurricane Katrina and the resultant rise in gas prices, shortage of building materials, and the clear need in large disasters for federal assistance, Americans began to realize that natural disasters could be so Table 10.1 Suspected knowledge domains of homeland security Law & Policy Emergency Management Risk Analysis Critical Infrastructure Security & Resilience Physical Security Public Health Organizational & leadership theory Politics and international relations Science and technology

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Terrorism and Political Violence Environmental Security Intelligence Studies Strategic Planning Public Administration Communications Systems engineering Economic analysis Public opinion & social psychology

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traumatic, expensive, and so disruptive that they could be considered threats to local and even regional, stability and security (Ramsay & Kiltz, 2013). The scope of humancaused (e.g., anthropogenic) global warming is addressed in more detail below.

10.4 Outline how anthropogenic climate change is a security driver15 Why has environmental security become part of the national security and homeland security agendas of all nations, if decidedly not most recently that of the United States government under the Trump administration? Prior to the 1990s, numerous US gov­ ernment reports and efforts documented the science of climate change and reflected the growing consensus (Lewandowsky, Pilditch, Madsen, Oreskes, & Risbey, 2019). During the George W. Bush and Donald Trump administrations, however, although scientific US government reports explicitly tied other non-traditional threats to national security, the two GOP-led White Houses made sure federal mention or stra­ tegic integration of climate change risk was minimized (Jotzo, Depledge, & Winkler, 2018; Tankersley & Hart, 2009; Townsend & Harris, 2004)—and by 2020 severely curtailed. The security implications of climate change were highlighted in former U.S. President Obama’s (2015) NSS, which emphasized the need to confront climate change to establish a stable national security strategy. For example, the 2015 NSS states: “… the increasing interdependence of the global economy and rapid pace of technolog­ ical change are linking individuals, groups, and governments in unprecedented ways. This enables and incentivizes new forms of cooperation to establish dynamic security networks, expand international trade and investment, and transform global communi­ cations. It also creates shared vulnerabilities, as interconnected systems and sectors are susceptible to the threats of climate change, malicious cyber activity, pandemic diseases, and transnational terrorism and crime” (pg 4)—Nevertheless, as noted, this broader integrated direction was at least in large measure reversed later by the Trump admin­ istration (Mattis, 2018). 10.4.1 Relating human activity to greenhouse gas emissions that affect the climate and hence security Since the early industrial age, increasing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations (GHC) have been linked to the rise in the Earth’s average surface temperatures— and in more recent history to increasing ocean heating, cryosphere (glacial ice) melt and other variables. Most industrial age GHGs have been released into nature from human combustion of fossil fuels (and to a lesser extent, agriculture, deforestation, cement manufacture, etc.).16 Given that until recently fossil fuels have been the pri­ mary lynch pin for modern economic growth, as consumption, production, manu­ facturing and lifestyles have modernized, those activities have exacerbated climate change. Population and development are also both directly correlated with carbonand other GHG emissions. Currently, ten nations contribute 80% of the total carbon emissions on earth, among them the United States, China and Russia. These trends are expected to massively accelerate by 2030, given commonly projected increases in Earth’s population and consumption patterns. And as LDCs modernize each year more completely, the rate of fossil fuel consumption worldwide has been increasing, confounding the Paris Accord emissions targets (UNEP, 2019).

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Unfortunately, recent evidence suggests that scientific climate models have been too conservative in their published projections regarding the severity of global heating and the coming disruptions in climate and weather. Just one element is worsening news almost every year about the far faster than predicted observed and projected increases in sea level from glacial ice melting in Greenland and the Antarctic (South Pole)—which collectively hold frozen almost 99% of the earth’s fresh water (Mann, Lloyd, & Oreskes, 2017). Greenland alone holds enough ice to raise global seas over 25 feet, were it all to melt. In addition to observed changes in the environment, the social impacts of climate change have been increasingly monitored as well. Estimates two decades into the 21st century show that global warming/climate change is responsible for around 400,000 deaths per year and over $1.2 trillion in damage—equivalent to 1.6% of global GDP. Although estimates vary, both resultant fatalities and economic damage are expected to increase significantly toward the middle of the century (Jay et al., 2018). Separate from (though correlated with) GHGs, surface air pollution from combus­ ting fossil fuels is estimated to cause 4.5 million deaths per year (ibid.). These con­ nections have caused the topic, writ large, to be highly politicized and controversial. But controversy over the social and economic consequences of global environmental change aside, it is increasingly clear to the scientific and military communities, as dis­ cussed below, that there are profound security implications as well.

10.5 Climate security—the major expression of environmental and human security There is a direct connect among the evolving realms of environmental security, home­ land security and national security (NS), which, while contested in both practice and theory, possess growing overlapping missions and domains. Comparing and contrast­ ing these unique securities promotes the development of more comprehensive and sustainable security policy and strategy. Such an effort represents a clear tie between climate change and both national- (overseas, primarily) and domestic, homeland- and human security, giving rise to an integrated concept of “climate security” (O’Sullivan and Ramsay, 2014). As far back as the 1950s, thanks to extensive scientific research on carbon dioxide (including ground-breaking civilian studies17 as well as military research), the basic facts about the effects of accumulated of carbon dioxide (CO2) due to human activities were already established. Even the Pentagon knew that atmospheric CO2 and water vapor blocked heat (thus agreeing with the notion of CO2 as a “greenhouse gas”) and that such gases could impact the effectiveness of heat-seeking missiles (Alley, 2011). And analysis of the composition of Earth’s principal greenhouse gas—carbon dioxide—has clearly shown that the majority of atmospheric CO2 is comprised of par­ ticular isotopes derived from the human burning of fossil fuels, and not from natural sources.18 10.5.1 How the scientific and governmental security communities have suggested ties to security The gold standard for (albeit historically cautious and conservative, by nature) cli­ mate science consensus reports is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

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(IPCC). The IPCC has released four (going on five) major Climate Assessments from 1998 and on. As noted elsewhere, the fourth National Climate Assessment (NCA-4) (Jay et al., 2018) and other US-based climate change reports have highlighted both the scope and criticality of climate change and related drivers. One previous study had similarly concluded: … more record high temperatures; fewer but stronger tropical cyclones; wider areas of drought and increases in precipitation; increased climate variability; Arctic warm­ ing and attendant impacts; and continued sea level rise as greenhouse warming con­ tinues and even accelerates. These changes will affect water and food availability, energy decisions, the design of critical infrastructure, use of the global commons such as the oceans and the Arctic region, and critical ecosystem resources. They will affect both underdeveloped and industrialized countries with large costs in terms of economic and human security… [with] specific regional climate impacts—droughts and desertification in Mexico, Southwest Asia, and the Eastern Mediterranean, and increased flooding in South Asia—that are of particular strategic importance to the United States. (Harvard 2012) The NCA-4 laid out the likely implications to the US economy and to society attrib­ utable to climate change, and, like other institutions such as the IPCC, likely social impacts based on low, medium and high GHG emissions scenarios (Jay et al., 2018) observed that climate change is not a uniformly distributed phenomenon and occurs faster in some places than others. For example, some top ice experts believe the Arctic region, where temperatures have risen much faster than the global average, could soon be almost ice-free in the summers—and almost definitely so in the next early mid-century—with major Northern Hemispheric climatic and weather disruptions already being felt because of it (USGCRP, 2017; Vidal, 2012).19 Thus, along with Canada, the United States, the largest per-capita global emit­ ter of greenhouse gases, has been experiencing among the greatest early impacts of weather and climate disasters of any nation in the world given the idiosyncrasies of North American geography. Average temperatures in the United States have risen around 1.5°F since 1895—with over 80% of that increase since 1980. Hotter weather and drought will become much more common, and even the norm in the American Southwest, with average US temperatures likely to rise another 2–4°F over the next few decades, and from 4 to 10°F by 2100 (USGCRP, 2017). These estimates carry staggering implications and uncertainties which will affect health, agriculture, energy, transportation, water and food supply and countless other critical infrastructure sectors—and thus human security. For instance, rising sea levels will worsen storm surge—as dramatically demonstrated by the impact of 2012s “Superstorm” Sandy and 2017s most expensive and deadly hurricane season up to then—with hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria (with over $350 billion in U.S. losses alone) devastating the Caribbean and United States. This will also increasingly threaten coastal cities and communities with regular flooding, and saltwater intrusion into water supplies and farmland, along with the aforementioned severe storm surge damage that will radically change coastal regions’ economic security. Because of the quirks of geography and a warming-related slowdown of Gulf Stream ocean cur­ rents, the over 600-mile-long American Atlantic coast, a stretch reaching from North Carolina north to New York City and Boston, is experiencing some of the largest sea

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Figure 10.2 Relationships between homeland, national and environmental security.20

level increases (Poloczanska, Mintenbeck, Portner, Roberts, & Levin, 2018). Finally, one group of scientists, using IPCC Special Reports data from 2018 and 2019, made clear that even in the 1.5–2.0°C global atmospheric warming scenarios (the stated goal of the 2015 Paris Climate Accords) irreversible tipping points could be exceeded (Lenton et al., 2019). The world is already averaging past 1°C, and all too rapidly approaching 1.5°C. The numerous and compelling relationships among homeland, national and envi­ ronmental security are illustrated in Figure 10.2. These relationships contextualize national security strategy and the degree to which environmental imperatives, such as climate change, should be a critical component of both domestic and national security strategic planning, as the next section introduces. 10.5.2 US National Security Buy-In: Pentagon and intelligence community assessments In addition to early Cold War military greenhouse gas research, noted above, US national security institutions by the end of the Obama administration had acknowl­ edged and begun strategic planning based on the scope and implications of climate change. Among them, the Pentagon acknowledged the potential impacts of the com­ bination of climate change and looming energy supply shortages as articulated in both the 2010 and 2014 Defense Department Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). These reports reassessed strategic priorities and spurred new efforts to find both alterna­ tive energy technologies and improved energy efficiency in order to reduce military dependence on foreign oil/energy sources. The 2014 QDR regarded climate change as a dangerous “threat multiplier”, and pointedly rejected any notion of conflict between the use of renewable energy-plus-storage and national defense. To wit, it embraced the dual (and more directly beneficial) purpose that energy independence (via solar and wind) would play in improved forward operating base resiliency and protecting troops. Such renewable energy would reduce the need for vulnerable fuel convoys— one of the biggest sources of casualties in overseas ground operations, primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, though “[t]he impacts of climate change may increase the

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frequency, scale, and complexity of future missions … Our actions to increase energy and water security, including investments in energy efficiency, new technologies, and renewable energy sources, will increase the resiliency of our installations and help mitigate [negative climate change] effects” (quoted in Snell, 2018). Affirming links to US national- and ultimately human and environmental secu­ rity, the US intelligence community (IC) early-on detailed potential implications in its Global Trends 2030 (NIC, 2012), including resource shortages, internal (in disrupted nations) and international migration problems, and increased political conflict. Among projected “megatrends”, the NIC forecast global increases in water, food and energy demands (40, 35 and 50%, respectively, by 2030) due to popula­ tion increases and demands for improvements in standard of living (consumption patterns) among the growing global middle classes. This as climate change effects reduced the supply of those resources. The report observed: “the decline in precipi­ tation will occur in the Middle East and northern Africa as well as western Central Asia, southern Europe, southern Africa, and the U.S. Southwest”, and warns about the likelihood of entirely unexpected “black swan” events that could trigger danger­ ous crises and tipping points. Thus, “rapid changes in precipitation patterns—such as monsoons in India and the rest of Asia—could sharply disrupt that region’s abil­ ity to feed its population” by disruptions in water access, soil quality, and reduced capacity to produce food (ibid.). Comparatively, Africa, Asia and the Middle East will be most affected because of the combination of wide-spread poverty, lack of critical infrastructure, and a greater reliance on agriculture, and thus experience far greater vulnerability to extreme weather, including heat disasters, drought and catastrophic floods. The Center for American Progress concurs with the NIC assessment about poten­ tial catastrophic cascading events—in particular that south Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc.) is expected to be more severely affected by climate change than most other areas. It noted the large regional populations (and anticipated population growth) characteristic of the region, a relatively underdeveloped infrastructure, and limited governmental ability to respond to and recover from larger scale disasters. Magnifying this will be the unique combination of geographic vulnerabilities, including rising sea levels and coastal flooding, and worsening tropical cyclones from the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. And critical river system water supplies will shrink with receding Himalayan glacier water and disruption of seasonal monsoons, ironically alternating with catastrophic river. And, as any student of geopolitics is aware, this region is already subject to radicalization and significant security tensions, particularly between nuclear-armed enemies Pakistan and India. But water resource conflicts are also already starting to emerge between India, Bangladesh and China to the north, over the critical Brahmaputra River, the headwaters of which are in China’s Himalayan Tibetan Plateau. For example, the Brahmaputra River flows through all three countries which include the two most populous nations in the world, and all nations are under tremendous resource pressures to keep up with pop­ ulation growth and rising standards of living (Bhattacharyya & Werz, 2012). Thus, in the context of demands for increasingly scarce water supplies for both consumption and hydroelectric power generation, Chinese plans to divert upstream river flows, including building a 1000-km long tunnel to do so, are enflaming regional diplomatic relations (Wirsing, 2012).

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10.5.3 Climate / environmental security in both MDCs and LDCs21 Climate change-related events are often closely spaced in time and can directly lead to cascading failures and crises in global food, water, trade, commodities, public health, economic and political systems (Steinbruner, Stern, & Husbands, 2013). But this is particularly true in less developed or war-torn countries and regions that are already fragile, poorly resilient and societally stressed—and often neglected historically by some of the wealthier nations (Sen, 2018). While not intended to be exhaustive, Figure 10.3 represents the general structure of the environmental security construct, along with many of its dimensions, drivers, consequences, feedback loops and inherent relationships integral to the ES construct and pertinent to strategic security planning. It is important to recall the proposed definition of ES when considering Figure 10.1 in that ES is suspected of acting differ­ entially across More Developed Countries (MDCs) such as the U.S., versus LDCs such as Mali. As such, it is worthy to note that even the wealthiest nations of the world—the United States, Scandinavia, Germany, Switzerland, Japan, etc.—are also vulnerable to major environmental disasters stemming from extreme weather events, such as the 2017 U.S./Caribbean hurricane season, as well as global public health and related eco­ nomic shocks, as from the catastrophic 2020 COVID pandemic. Given the extensive interdependencies of energy, water and food security, and the economic impacts from large-scale natural disasters, global climate change imparts an important range of security and policy challenges. In sum, climate-related crises exacerbate existing societal challenges such as polit­ ical instability, poverty, resource competition, health and migration, ultimately act­ ing as catalyst for political unrest and reduced government legitimacy in the eyes of

Figure 10.3 General structure of the environmental security construct, drivers and consequences22

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an effected nation’s populace. Therefore, avoiding or offsetting catastrophic environ­ mental changes would result in significantly less future economic fragility/poverty, disruptive migration of refugees, and thus mitigate broader regional destabilization. For example, it is increasingly clear that environmental disasters were associated with the so-called Middle East “Arab Spring”, around 2010–11. These variables played a significant role in at least some of the triggering events of the now-famous series of political upheavals, linked to sharp spikes in global food prices. The first manifesta­ tions occurred in Tunisia, where food protests led to the fall of the Tunisian govern­ ment, and this cascaded into similar mass protests that brought down the Mubarak government in Egypt (Baragona, 2011; Breisinger, Ecker, & Al-Riffai, 2011. The trig­ gering events to all of this were climate-linked drought and subsequent crop failures in Russia in 2010, which led to the global food price increases. This instability then undermined these government’s political legitimacy. Numerous estimates suggest countries like Bangladesh and India (the second most popu­ lous country on Earth), and much of the rest of the Asian subcontinent, as well as Africa, will be among the most effected by global heating (Eckstein, Hutfils, & Winges, 2018). Short- and long-term climate- and weather-related problems will become threat multi­ pliers, negatively interacting with existing human security dilemmas such as overpop­ ulation, poor resource management, pollution (aside from greenhouse gases), extreme heat, droughts and floods, internal sectarian conflict and border tensions with its neighbors. These problems will damage agriculture, water and industry, cause ris­ ing resource insecurities (including famine), suppress economic growth, and without climate change mitigation, regional coordination, and outside assistance to effected nations to help with climate adaptation, will eventually severely affect every region of the world.

10.6 Summary and conclusions Ultimately, the complex and dynamic threats posed by transnational global warm­ ing teaches us that just as homeland security doesn’t end at the U.S. border, neither does national security start at the border. As exemplified by anthropomorphic climate change, if the US government is to optimize its national security strategy, it needs to better integrate both human- and environmental security concepts, principles and goals. However, changes in traditional modes of thought and culture are never easy to accomplish as John Maynard Keynes reminds us: The idea of the future being different from the present is so repugnant to our conven­ tional modes of thought and behavior that we, most of us, offer a great resistance to acting on it in practice (quoted in NIC, 2012) As documented in this chapter, there is no doubt that the principles and lessons ES/ climate security offers are much more acceptable now to traditional national security analysts and institutions than has ever been the case. As the National Intelligence Council (2012) observed: We are at a critical juncture in human history, which could lead to widely contrast­ ing futures. It is our contention that the future is not set in stone, but is malleable,

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the result of an interplay among megatrends, game-changers and, above all, human agency. Our effort is to encourage decision-makers—whether in government or outside—to think and plan for the long term so that negative futures do not occur, and positive ones have a better chance of unfolding. The risks associated with extreme weather and longer term climate disruption neces­ sitate sustained and strengthened critical infrastructure, and a national strategy to improve scientific and technical situational awareness—particularly in the ability to better track key variables like greenhouse gases; atmospheric, land, ice and ocean changes; Arctic, Greenland, permafrost and Antarctic ice melt; species decline and extinction; ocean acidification and coral reefs; decline and collapse of entire ecosys­ tems); and any variables that might enable better advanced warning about interna­ tional security threats arising from changing climate. “Our critical observational infrastructure is at risk from declining funding… Without that knowledge, the needs of civil society and national security for mitigation and adaptation will go unmet” (McElroy & Baker, 2013). As the 2020 coronavirus tragically illustrates, without such preparation and scientifically grounded situational awareness, both slow and fast nat­ ural disasters can be vastly compounded into security catastrophes. Climate security, with its fundamental human security core, has become a com­ ponent of homeland security and overall national security interests for all nations, developed and not, if for no other reason than environmental and vital resource access issues can be tied directly to emergence of broader political disruption, vio­ lence and ultimately even terrorism, as well as rapidly growing threats to critical infrastructure protection. It challenges traditional notions of national security because military prowess and HS counterterrorism are not be the best instruments of national power to adapt to—and particularly to prevent the wicked problems posed by global environmental and resource threats that emanate from climate change. Further, ES/CS broadens and enriches an emergent and evolving definition of homeland security as well as influence its mission . Ultimately, in the face of international and domestic challenges that require new models of comparative risk analysis, budgeting, interdisciplinary policy and interagency and international col­ laboration, an expansive, globally integrated approach to human and environmen­ tal security, as well as resilient, sustainable solutions to climate change, are urgently needed now.

10.7 Discussion questions 1. What are the dimensions of human security and can you think of exam­ ples where these dimensions might be lacking in an LDC? What about in America? 2. What is the main difference between “national security” and “human security”? 3. What are the consequences to civil society when basic human insecurities exist? 4. How might climate change create instabilities in a government’s ability to care for and protect its citizens? 5. How might extremes in climate impact national security? 6. Describe how environmental security could modify or support the operations, strategies or structures of the homeland security enterprise.

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Notes 1. The so-called “Westphalian System” is a global system of norms predicated on the inter­ national legal principle that each nation has sovereignty over its own territory and its own domestic affairs; that external powers should not interfere in another nation’s domestic affairs; and that every nation has a similar right to sovereign domestic self-determination under international law. The doctrine is named after the 1648 Peace Treaty of Westphalia. 2. UNEP (2019). 3. Greta Thunberg (2019). 4. Many people are unaware that simply measuring atmospheric heat buildup is wholly inadequate for assessing the scope of the problem. According to the IPCC, the oceans have absorbed more than 90% of the additional trapped heat. This is good for the shortterm atmospheric implications, but very bad for the long-term overall climate change, fisheries, ocean currents, etc.—since that stored energy will change ecosystem dynam­ ics radically. For a good graph of the IPCC data, see http://www.skepticalscience.com/ graphics.php?g=12 5. Both global warming and climate change beget each other in the end—see, for instance, Shi, Wang, and Yang (2010). For a thorough timeline of climate change science over the last 150 years, see Mason (2013) at http://www.skepticalscience.com/history-climate­ science.html 6. Previously cautious about tying specific extreme weather to climate, scientists are much more confident about calculating the weight and import of the connection. See, for instance, Lloyd and Oreskes (2019). 7. Wicked problems are problems that exhibit the following characteristics: the solution depends on how the problem is framed, stakeholders vary considerably in how they define and understand the problem, the constraints and resources available to address the problem change over time, the problem is never (totally) solved. See Tom Ritchey (2013), Wicked Problems (Swedish Morphological Society, 2005, revised 2013), http:// www.swemorph.com/pdf/wp.pdf 8. The following sections are adapted from O’Sullivan and Ramsay (2012) and Ramsay and O’Sullivan (2013). 9. See for example, http://www.cdc.gov/climateandhealth/publications.htm; the Environ­ mental Protection Agency at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/; and the U.S. Depart­ ment of Agriculture at http://www.usda.gov/oce/climate_change/. 10. “International security” is also a contested concept, and the most orthodox (Cold War-era especially) definitions addressed primarily military issues. But many schol­ ars and analysts now advocate far broader definitions that include other, non-military, threats to the security of nations. For a discussion of this evolving thinking, see Buzan and Hansen (2009) and Buzan et al. (1998). 11. A review of policies and acts related to the design and production of US national security varies depending on the context. See, for example, Maier’s (1990) definition: “National security... is best described as a capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its own selfdetermination or autonomy, prosperity and wellbeing”. 12. Adapted from Lanicci, Ramsay, and Murray (2017). 13. This section adapted from Ramsay and O’Sullivan (2013). The reader is also referred to Ramsay and Renda-Tenali (2018) in the fall issue of the Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management or a more complete treatment of homeland security knowl­ edge domains. 14. See Homeland Security Affairs VI, no. 2 (May 2010) special issue dedicated to home­ land security program development. Specifically, Ramsay, Cutrer, and Raffel (2010), Moore, Hatzodony, Cronin, and Brekenridge (2010), Polson, Persyn, and Cupp (2010) and Bellavita (2008). 15. Adapted from Ramsay and O’Sullivan (2013). 16. Though if tipping points are reached in sub-Arctic permafrost deterioration, or melting of deep ocean Arctic frozen methane, this could lead to a rapid, massive “carbon bomb” that would rival human emissions, according to experts.

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17. The seminal article at the time, demonstrating that human carbon emissions were not just being absorbed by the oceans, was Revelle and Suess (1957). 18. The lighter carbon-12 from fossil fuels burning is contrasted with heavier, natural carbon-13 (Cook, 2010). 19. Decline in arctic ice keeps breaking records and exceeding the models (USGCRP, 2017; Vidal, 2012). 20. From O’Sullivan, T. M., & Ramsay, J. (2015). Defining and distinguishing homeland from national security and climate-related environmental security, in theory and practice. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 12(1), 43–66. 21. Adapted from Ramsay and O’Sullivan (2013). 22. Ibid.

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204 James D. Ramsay and Terry O’Sullivan Cook, J. (2016). Countering climate science denial and communicating scien­ tific consensus. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Climate Science. https:// ox for d r e.c o m /c l i m at e s c i e n c e / v i e w/10.10 93/a c r e for e /978 019 022 862 0.0 01.0 0 01/ acrefore-9780190228620-e-314?print=pdf Cook, J., Supran, G., Lewandowsky, S., Oreskes, N., & Maibach, E. (2019). America misled: How the fossil fuel industry deliberately misled Americans about climate change. Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Center for Climate Change Communication. Dennis, B. (2019). Trump makes it official: U.S. will withdraw from the Paris climate accord. Washington Post (November 4, 2019). https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/ 2019/11/04/trump-makes-it-official-us-will-withdraw-paris-climate-accord/ Eckstein, D., Hutfils, M.L., & Winges, M. (2018). Global climate risk index 2019: Who suf­ fers most from extreme weather events? Weather-related loss events in 2017 and 1998 to 2017. Germanwatch Nord-Süd Initiative eV. Estrada-Tanck, 2016 Human Security and Human Rights under International Law: The Protections Offered to Persons Confronting Structural Vulnerability. London, Hart Publishing, 360 pp. ISBN 9781509902385 Gilmore, E. A., & St. Clair, T. (2018). Budgeting for climate change: Obstacles and opportuni­ ties at the US state level. Climate policy, 18(6), 729–741. Jay, A., Reidmiller, D., Avery, C., Barrie, D., DeAngelo, B., Dave, A. & Dzaugis, M. (2018). The Fourth National Climate Assessment: Summary findings and overview. https://doi.org/10.1002/ essoar.10500761.1 Jotzo, F., Depledge, J., & Winkler, H. (2018). US and international climate policy under President Trump. Kirsten, H. E. (2016). Climate change federalism. In Elgar encyclopedia of environmental law (pp. 337–347). Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Lanicci, J., Ramsay, J., & Murray, E. (2017) Reconceptualizing environmental security as resil­ ience: Strategic planning for human and national security. Journal of Human Security and Resilience, 1(1). Lenton, T. M., Rockström, J., Gaffney, O., Rahmstorf, S., Richardson, K., Steffen, W., & Schellnhuber, H. J. (2019). Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against. Nature, 575, 592–595. Lewandowsky, S., Pilditch, T. D., Madsen, J. K., Oreskes, N., & Risbey, J. S. (2019). Influence and seepage: An evidence-resistant minority can affect public opinion and scientific belief formation. Cognition, 188, 124–139. Lloyd, E. A., & Oreskes, N. (2019). Climate change attribution. Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, 56(1), 185–201. Maier, C. S. (1990). Peace and security for the 1990s. Unpublished paper for the MacArthur Fellowship Program, Social Science Research Council (June 12, 1990). Mann, M. E., Lloyd, E. A., & Oreskes, N. (2017). Assessing climate change impacts on extreme weather events: The case for an alternative (Bayesian) approach. Climatic Change, 144(2), 131–142. Mason, J. (2013). The history of climate science. Skeptical Science (April 7, 2013). http://www. skepticalscience.com/history-climate-science.html Masson-Delmotte, V., Zhai, P., Pörtner, H. O., Roberts, D., Skea, J., Shukla, P. R., … &Connors, S. (2018). Summary for policymakers. Global warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change. https://www.ipcc.ch/2018/10/08/summary­ for-policymakers-of-ipcc-special-report-on-global-war ming-of-1-5c-approved-by­ governments/ Mattis, J. (2018). Summary of the 2018 national defense strategy of the United States of America. Department of Defense Washington United States.

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McElroy, M. B., & Baker, D. J. (2013). Climate extremes: Recent trends with implications for national security. Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, 15, 727. Millennium Project. (n.d.). Environmental security definitions. http://www.millennium-project .org/millennium/es-2def.html Moore, G., Hatzodony, J., Cronin, K., & Brekenridge, M. (2010). Homeland security-related education and the private liberal arts college, Homeland Security Affairs, VI(2). http://www. hsaj.org/?article=6.2.4 Moulson, G. (2012). Japan tsunami pushes 2011 into record for insurance losses. Associated Press (January 8, 2012). http://www.tulsaworld.com/business/article. aspx?subjectid=51&articleid=20120108_51_E2_CUTLIN520922 Munich RE. (2019). The natural disasters of 2018 in figures (last updated January, 2019). https://www.munichre.com/topics-online/en/climate-change-and-natural-disasters/natural­ disasters/the-natural-disasters-of-2018-in-figures.html National Intelligence Council (NIC). (2012). Global trends 2030: Alternative worlds (December 2012). https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf Obama, B. (2015). 2015 US National Security Strategy. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf O’Sullivan, T.M., & Ramsay, J. (2012). Environmental security and public health, In Keith Logan &James Ramsay, (Eds.). Introduction to homeland security. Westview Press. O’Sullivan, T. M., & Ramsay, J. (2014). Defining and distinguishing homeland from national security and climate-related environmental security, in theory and practice. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 12(1), 43–66. Pew Project on Energy, Security and Climate. (2010) Pew Project on National Security, Energy and Climate Reacts to Department of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review, Press Release (February 3, 2010). http://www.pewtrusts.org/news_room_detail. aspx?id=57140. Poloczanska, E., Mintenbeck, K., Portner, H. O., Roberts, D., & Levin, L. A. (2018, February). The IPCC special report on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate. In 2018 Ocean Sciences Meeting. AGU. Polson, C., Persyn, J., & Cupp, S. (2010). Partnership in progress: A model for development of a homeland security graduate degree program, Homeland Security Affairs, VI(2). http://www .hsaj.org/?article=6.2.3 Preiser, R., Biggs, R., De Vos, A., & Folke, C. (2018). Social-ecological systems as complex adaptive systems: Organizing principles for advancing research methods and approaches. Ecology and Society, 23(4). Ramsay, J. D., & O’Sullivan, T. M. (2013). There’s a pattern here: The case to integrate environ­ mental security into homeland security strategy. Homeland Security Affairs, 9(6). Retrieved from https://commons.erau.edu/db-security-studies/10 Ramsay, J., & Renda-Tenali, I. (2018) Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. https://doi.org/10.1515/jhsem-2018-0016 Ramsay, J., Cutrer, D. & Raffel, R. (2010). Development of an outcomes-based, undergrad­ uate curriculum in homeland security. Homeland Security Affairs, VI(2). http://www.hsaj. org/?article=6.2.4; Ramsay, J., & Kiltz, L. (2013). Critical issues within the homeland security enterprise: A casebook. Boulder, CO: Westfield Press, Praeger Publications. Reese, S. (2013). Defining homeland security: Analysis and congressional considerations (Congressional Research Service, January 8, 2013). Revelle, R., & Suess, H. E. (1957). Carbon dioxide exchange between atmosphere and ocean and the question of an increase of atmospheric CO2 during the past decades. Tellus, 9(1), 18–27. Ricke, K., Drouet, L., Caldeira, K. et al. Country-level social cost of carbon. Nature Clim Change 8, 895–900 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0282-y

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Romm, J. J. (1993). Defining national security: The nonmilitary aspects (p. 5). New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. Rosenthal, E. (2012). Race is on as ice melt reveals Arctic treasures. New York Times (September 18, 2012). http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/science/earth/arctic-resources­ exposed-by-warming-set-off-competition.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 Ritchey, T. (2013). Wicked problems. Swedish Morphological Society (2005, revised 2013). http:// www.swemorph.com/pdf/wp.pdf Samet, J. M., & Woodward, A. (2018). National government denial of climate change and state and local public health action in a federalist system. American Journal of Public Health, 108(S2), S112–S113. ScienceDaily. (2011). Climate change threatens global security, warn medical and military leaders. From the British Medical Journal as cited at ScienceDaily (April 5, 2011). http://www. sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/04/110405194110.htm Sen, B. (2018). The brutal racial politics of climate change and pollution: Trump administra­ tion policies are systematically making natural disasters more harmful for the poor and people of color. Indigenous Policy Journal, 28(3). Shi, W, Wang, S, & Yang, Q. (2010). Climate change and global warming, Reviews in Environmental Science and Bio/Technology, 9, 99–102. Snell, M.B. (2018). Unlikely Ally: How the military fights climate change and protects the environment. Heyday Press. Steinbruner, J. D., Stern, P., & Husbands, J. L. (2013). Climate and social stress: Implications for security analysis. National Academies of Science Report (p. 1). Tankersley, J., & Hart, A. C. (2009). Bush-era EPA document on climate change released. Los Angeles Times (October 1, 2009). http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/14/nation/ na-epa-climate14 Thunberg, Greta (2019). Our house in on fire: Greta Thunberg, 16, urges leaders to act on climate. The Guardian (January 25, 2019). https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/ jan/25/our-house-is-on-fire-greta-thunberg16-urges-leaders-to-act-on-climate Townsend, M., & Harris, P. (2004). Now the Pentagon tells us: Climate change will destroy us. The Guardian UK (February 21, 2004). http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2004/feb/22/ usnews.theobserver UN Environment Programme. (2019). Emissions gap report 2019. United Nations (26 November). https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2019 United Nations Human Security Unit. (2009). Human security in theory and practice. United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security. http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HS_ Handbook_2009.pdf US Department of Defense. (2011). The quadrennial defense review (May 2011). http://www .defense.gov/qdr/ USGCRP. (2017). In D. J. Wuebbles et al. (Eds.), Climate science special report: Fourth national climate assessment (NCA4) (Vol. 1, 470 pp). U.S. Global Change Research Program. https:// doi.org/10.7930/J0J964J6 Vidal, J. (2012). Arctic expert predicts final collapse of sea ice within four years. The Guardian UK (September 17, 2012). http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/sep/17/ arctic-collapse-sea-ice Waever, Ole. (1995). Securitization and desecuritization. In Ronnie Lipschutz (Ed.), On security (pp. 46–86). New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Watts, J. (2019). ‘No doubt left’ about scientific consensus on global warming, say experts. The Guardian (July 24, 2019). https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019/jul/24/ scientific-consensus-on-humans-causing-global-warming-passes-99 White House. (2006). United States National Security Strategy of 2006. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/USnss2006.pdf

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Wirsing, R. G. (2012). The Brahmaputra: Water hotspot in Himalayan Asia. Global Water Forum (June 2, 2012). http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2012/06/02/the-brahmaputra­ water-hotspot-in-himalayan-asia/ World Bank (2012). Turn down the heat: Why a 4°C warmer world must be avoided (World Bank Report, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics, November 2012). Yale Global Online. (2012). Climate skeptic reverses course (August 1, 2012). http://yaleglobal .yale.edu/content/koch-funded-climate-change-skeptic-reverses-course

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11 Public health security Terrence M. O’Sullivan and James D. Ramsay

Description: Public health (PH) is a critical pillar of homeland security operations and strategy. When public health is assured, the free flow of people and commerce is robust. When public health is threatened, both commerce and liberty are curtailed in the larger interests of society—as is the case with COVID-19, the devastating coronavirus pan­ demic and economic downturn afflicting most of the Earth at the time of this writing. Although the Healthcare and Public Health Sector is among the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s official 16 Critical Infrastructure Sectors, public health security risk for populations should be distinguished from private, individual health. Public health security exemplifies numerous challenges posed by large, complex (and variably adaptive), fragile organizational, infrastructure, research and surveillance, and supply chain systems. PH encompasses a broad range of hazards/threats—both physical- and mental health-related, such as infectious disease outbreaks; food and water safety; the health effects of natural disasters, accidents, and political violence/terrorism/war and domestic gun violence. But neither U.S. public health nor its medical systems have been truly tested to the breaking point in generations—since the Spanish Flu—until the recent COVID-19 pandemic. This chapter defines public health and epidemiology, and what each contributes to US homeland security. Upon completion of this chapter, students will be able to: 1. Define public health, and describe the public health mandate, systems, and methods. 2. Recognize and describe infectious disease risks and homeland security. 3. Describe various preparation and response dilemmas facing the public health sector. 4. Describe pertinent laws and policies that guide or direct the public health infra­ structure in emergencies. 5. Describe how public health supports the homeland security enterprise in term of its operations, structure and strategy.

11.1 Introduction and overview During Australia’s 2019–20 summer (North America’s winter), record-breaking drought and heat led to the worst wildfire season on record. By early January, with out of control wildfires still growing, over 12 million acres had burned—more than six times the size of California’s disastrous (2-million-acre loss) 2018 fire season and growing. Dozens directly perished in Australia’s fires, but the tally of indirect

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premature respiratory and cardiac deaths and hospitalizations from smoke inhalation would take many months to assess in the aftermath, as smoke reached hundreds of times higher levels than is deemed safe, even in areas far from the burning land. The combination of heat, drought, and fire created the foundation for a massive public health crisis, and exemplified the deep connections between public health, climate security and homeland security. This chapter discusses what public health is, the historic and current threats to public health as a key component of homeland security, as well as the ways it overlaps with the human- (and in worst case scenarios, national-) security realm. In addition, it briefly addresses the current realities around and future needs for adequate, coor­ dinated societal and organizational preparation and response in order to support the primary objectives of the homeland security enterprise as describe in chapter 1.

11.2 What is public health, and what is its mandate? As wide scale droughts and events such as the Australia wildfires illustrate, public health is far more than the monitoring of and response to both chronic- and infec­ tious disease patterns and problems—though the latter have been throughout human history the most disruptive and deadly threats to populations, and even empires. PH encompasses any threat to human well-being, but in the case of homeland security, particularly disasters that could cause large-scale injury, disease, or disruption of essential resources or social functioning. Public health can be defined as “the science of protecting and improving the health of people and their communities… achieved by promoting healthy lifestyles, research­ ing disease and injury prevention, and detecting, preventing and responding to infec­ tious diseases” (CDC Foundation, 2019). Public health is thus primarily broader and population-related, in contrast to healthcare, which is oriented toward an individual’s health. In the United States,1 the largest portion of these two overlapping systems is dedicated to private prevention- and treatment-oriented healthcare (healthcare providers, hospitals, clinics, etc.), and even public health in wealthy Western nations is more oriented toward tracking and preventing chronic diseases (diabetes, cancer, heart disease, neurological syndromes, etc.). But in this chapter, we will focus more on the elements of public health most relevant to homeland security such as infectious and communicable disease, whether accidental, naturally occurring, or via the grow­ ing risk of bioterrorism risk. 11.2.1 The public health mandate Despite many shortcomings in the U.S. healthcare and public health systems (PH/HC) discussed in this chapter, the United States and most western countries are far better prepared for certain risks—particularly infectious disease outbreaks—than develop­ ing nations. For example, the devastating 2013–14 West African Ebola epidemic was never a major threat to any nation with reasonably robust response capabilities, even as it was disastrous for poor countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea. But the U.S. PH/HC has not been truly tested for generations against a major, acute, highly transmissible epidemic, on a scale like the 1918 “Spanish” Influenza2 or even the far less widespread or deadly 2002–2004 SARS-CoV3 outbreak. Even epidemics such as HIV-AIDS and antibiotic-resistant tuberculosis challenged these systems in the 1980s

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210 Terrence M. O’Sullivan and James D. Ramsay and 1990s, but not at an overwhelming system-wide level. But even as advances in medical science continue to keep pace, significant broad threats to populations in all countries lie on the horizon. Included are the disease-magnifying dynamics of glo­ balization’s vastly expanded trade and travel, rising antimicrobial resistance to com­ mon drugs, deteriorated global research and surveillance systems, and the various rising environmental results of the world’s climate emergency. Figure 11.1 presents the “Infectious Disease Triangle” as described by the CDC. The Infectious Disease Triangle demonstrates the interconnectedness of the environment, the host and the pathogen in disease propagation and transmission. 11.2.3 Public health methods and approaches to disease Epidemiology is the cornerstone of public health, and the branch of medicine that deals with the incidence, distribution, and possible control of diseases and other health threats (such as poisoning, injuries, gun deaths, and even stress). “Epi” helps inform public policy decisions and evidence-based health practices by identifying risk factors for diseases, and ideal methods of preventive healthcare—which is almost always far cheaper than treatment and response.4 Public health also identifies causes of new, emerging infections (e.g., new flu strains, HIV, “mad cow” disease, SARS, etc.); performs surveillance of existing infectious diseases (seasonal influenza, childhood diseases such as measles and pertussis, foodborne infections like E. coli and salmo­ nella, etc.) and food, water, and other environmental safety; identifies hazard sources (people, food, water, animal or insect vectors, plants, pollution, etc.); studies disease history; finds new methods to prevent future public health risk; analyzes causal mech­ anisms between disease agents and humans, and solicits information from healthcare

Figure 11.1 Infectious disease triangle, Terrence M. O’Sullivan, adapted from CDC (2012)

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systems (e.g., hospitals) to discover and respond to unusual incidents before they spread further. In addition to the above, among the most important of PH/Epi infectious disease-fighting tools are medical-countermeasures (MCMs) and infection control/ prevention and non-medical countermeasures. Infection Control/Prevention and Non-Medical countermeasures: • •

•

Sanitation and hygiene—Even before the causes of disease were known, the centuries-old sanitation movement cleaned up sewage and protected water sources, helping to curtail many diseases of urban life such as cholera outbreaks. Contact tracing—tracking the sources of disease outbreaks and identifying those (directly) exposed in order to both help prevent further disease spread and future outbreaks. Contact tracing has, for example, become an ubiquitous tool in the fight against COVID-19. Disease control measures—to manage the sick, suspected exposures, and reduce the incidence of exposure and spread of disease. •

Quarantine: The voluntary or forced separation and restriction of movement of persons who, while not yet ill, might have been exposed to a transmissible/ infectious agent, and therefore might become ill and contagious themselves. Quarantine of the healthy can be envisioned as a public health police power in order to limit contagious disease spread.

Nevertheless, exercising involuntary quarantine poses very delicate, unpredictable compliance issues, and should be used sparingly in contrast to the voluntary version. Especially if not seen to be fair, or well organized, or putting healthy individuals at risk of becoming sick from those around them, people may rebel—either not comply, or hide possible exposure from authorities to avoid quarantine, and thus these types of measures could backfire. It can also be very expensive, since people will be asked to avoid job expo­ sure (absent telecommuting), and authorities would reasonably be expected to financially if not materially, support the citizenry—especially working class or poor—for the dura­ tion of the outbreak. Adding to potential concern is the fact that the U.S. legal system has not been robustly tested in longer-term, large scale emergency situations. • •

•

Isolation refers to the separation of persons who have a specific infectious dis­ ease from those who are healthy and the restriction of their movement to stop the spread of that illness. Social distancing is a voluntary recommendation to the public, to reduce the risk of a population’s exposure to infectious disease. Examples include: Avoiding crowded places (movie theatres, malls and sporting events); Working from home; Changing work schedules and patterns to minimize contact. Community Containment: This would involve temporary closing of schools, uni­ versities, businesses, factories, and places of worship; and limiting mass transpor­ tation (buses, trains, airports)—either voluntarily, or by government mandate, depending on the severity of the epidemic.

Medical countermeasures: Biologics, drugs, or devices that may be used in the event of a potential public health emergency, regulated in U.S. by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (see Figure 11.2), which coordinates with all levels of

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212 Terrence M. O’Sullivan and James D. Ramsay

Figure 11.2 Medical Countermeasures (MCMs) used for Public Health Emergency/Disaster Response (graphic by FDA, 2019)

government, and via the federal interagency Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE) (FDA, 2019). •

• •

Vaccines—Childhood diseases (polio, pertussis, measles, etc.), smallpox, hepa­ titis A and B, and influenza, among many other historic human scourges. After sanitation and hygiene, probably the single greatest categories of disease preven­ tion, but not available for all infectious agents. Vaccines have prevented 100s of millions of deaths over the last century (the smallpox vaccine alone has likely saved more than 500 million since the middle of the 20th century). Other Biologics—blood products (e.g., serum) and antibodies. Drugs •

• •

Antimicrobial drugs—Since the invention of penicillin in the early 20th century, antibiotics (anti-bacterial), antivirals, and antifungals, among others. These also have saved countless millions of lives and improved quality of life for many more, despite the disturbing rise in antimicrobial resistance (see below). Chemical threat antidotes (such as atropine, for nerve agents like sarin) Treatments for radiation exposure (e.g., Potassium iodide, Prussian blue).

Devices—including diagnostic tests to identify threat agents, and per­ sonal protective equipment (PPE), such as gloves, respirators (face masks), and ventilators—all critical for reducing exposure to airborne or surface contamination. Beyond hospitals, these devices might be required for even business continuity, and protection of essential services workers (grocery store clerks, e.g.) from exposure.

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11.3 Elements and organization of the public health system Public health systems in most countries are totally controlled by their national gov­ ernments with very little private sector engagement. In contrast, the U.S. PH/HC is far more fragmented and diffused—despite well-known federal agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), both of which function primarily in an advisory or research capacity, the results of which support regulatory and policy formulation. But other federal and state government and private sector entities also form part of this complex system. Thus, the U.S. public health system of systems includes (CDC, 2018): • • • • • • • •

Public health agencies at state and local levels Healthcare providers Public safety agencies Human service and charity organizations Education and youth development organizations Recreation and arts-related organizations Economic and philanthropic organizations Environmental agencies (U.S. EPA, etc.) and organizations

The U.S. federalist system gives states power to control and administrate these sys­ tems. Specifically, note that while primary PH authority is vested in the states except in times of national emergency (major pandemic, bioterrorism or other WMD attack), the federal government provides substantial funding and other resources to the states’ PH systems. And since private, individual healthcare (HC) tends to be delivered and managed entirely locally, it is not surprising that public health management varies from state to state, with a mix of centralized (28%), decentralized—county and/or local levels (37%), or joint authority (35%) (Hyde & Shortell, 2012). As with the federal gov­ ernment, various state agencies can be responsible for food, water, and environmental safety, and related areas. And while this mosaic of relatively independent state PH systems can allow for innovative organization, it also results in nonuniformities across states which can complicate coordination in larger cross-border and national-level public health policies and crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Government, including state PH, safety, and homeland security agencies, as well as federal National Institutes of Health and CDC, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) all share disaster-specific missions, capabilities and training. 11.3.1 State level Public Health States are the principal governmental entity responsible for protecting the public’s health in the United States. They “conduct a wide range of activities in health. State health agencies collect and analyze information; conduct inspections; plan; set policies and standards; carry out national and state mandates; manage and oversee environmen­ tal, educational, and personal health services; and assure access to health care for underserved residents; they are involved in resources development; and they respond to health hazards and crises” (IOM, 1988). States have the legal authority to create and enforce public health and emergency laws—including strategies such as infectious disease

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quarantine of suspected exposed individuals, and isolation of the sick, curfews and lockdowns. 11.3.2 Federal level Public Health The United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has the central responsibility for national-level public health and medical services and surge capacity support, including related disaster public health preparation and response. Among homeland security relevant entities under HHS are the Public Health Service, CDC, National Institutes of Health (NIH), and Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Other federal departments that have public health roles include the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Even with day to day state-based public health, the U.S. federal government plays a large role in PH, constitutionally empowered by its duty to regulate interstate commerce and ability to raise taxes to spend on services and programs designed to enhance or sustain the country’s general welfare. Key federal contributions include surveying national health status and needs, promoting education, common policies, standards, laws and regulations, and funding. The U.S. federal government is a “pub­ lic goods” provider of critical laboratory infrastructure and diagnostic expertise, through its Laboratory Response Network (LRN),5 biomedical and health services research,6 general technical assistance and resources to state and local health systems, and surveillance and response to international infectious disease threats to domestic and global health. Federal agencies also regulate food safety, drug safety, hazardous substances transportation, storage, labeling and cleanup, and offer individual healthcare through Medicaid and Medicare (IOM, 1988). 11.3.3 Homeland security and public health disasters Disasters occur when events overwhelm local or state government response capabil­ ities and budgets. However, due to the wide variations in structure and funding from state to state as eluded to above, while one jurisdiction or region might have greater capabilities than another to respond to the same event, and hence avoid disaster, another might be overwhelmed.7 In the case that a locality or region is overwhelmed, a state’s governor may request Federal assistance to collaborate or even coordinate with the affected local jurisdiction (i.e., Local, State or Tribal government). The Stafford Act8 allows the U.S. President to “provide financial and other assistance to State and local governments, certain private nonprofit organizations (i.e., the American Red Cross), and individuals to support response, recovery, and mitigation efforts following Presidential emergency or major disaster declarations”. (HHS, 2019a, 2019b) The scale of the disaster is also integrated into the jurisdictional response and the degree to which the President authorizes relief. For example, following the events of 9/11, the U.S. National Response Framework (NRF) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) were both activated. Further, in a substantial disas­ ter, the NRF describes numerous issues that are public health/safety and economic security-related within their seven basic “community lifelines”9 each of which is deemed essential for community functioning and resilience: (1) Safety and Security; (2) Food, Water, Sheltering; (3) Health and Medical; (4) Energy (Power & Fuel);

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(5) Communications; (6) Transportation and (7) Hazardous Material—most of which, ultimately, are related to public health security and wellbeing. Specifically, the NRF describes sector-specific Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) that local, state or federal agencies can leverage during disaster response and recovery. Specifically, ESF #8: Public Health & Medical Services, encompasses “health and medical support to communities, and coordination across capabilities of partner agencies”. (FEMA, 2019) Critical infrastructures are those “whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that their incapaci­ tation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof”.10 Not surpris­ ingly, American public health and health care (PH/HC) is one of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) designated critical infrastructure (CI) sectors. And as with all CI sectors, PH/HC is enmeshed with and dependent on numerous other critical systems, including the energy/power sector, emergency services, information technology, food and agriculture (food safety), water and wastewater systems, com­ munications, transportation and many others. 11.3.4 U.S. strategic stockpile and the cities readiness initiative (CRI) Medical countermeasures might be available through private or public facilities, but in a major (large scale) emergency, the U.S. Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) pro­ gram works in tandem with the Cities Readiness Initiative (see below) to ship quantities of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies for use in a public health emergency severe enough to cause local supplies to run out. The SNS is overseen by the HHS Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), or through state and local stock­ piles or other pharmaceutical caches. MCMs are usually dispensed or administered by health care workers and public health responders under official federal, state, and/or local emergency response plans (HHS ASPR, 2019a, 2019b). But as the COVID-19 pandemic confirmed, the SNS was not designed to deal with a massive national-level public health disaster. The Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) began in 2004 by the CDC, under Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreements. Covering almost 60% of the US population, this federally funded program facilitates large cities’ public health departments to develop specific plans, based on community needs, for rap­ idly dispensing large amounts of pharmaceutical (antibiotics, vaccines, etc.) and other medical countermeasures and supplies. MCM stockpiles are kept in secret SNS loca­ tions around the country, to be shipped to (also secret) local warehouse distribution centers in major metropolitan areas, within 48 hours. The CRI created implementation, training, and exercise disaster plans for shipment of supplies to either prearranged Points of Dispensing (PODS) such as schools, con­ vention centers, or other centralized locations where the general public would be told to go to receive drugs or vaccines. Pharmaceutical countermeasures could help pro­ tect such PODS following a bioterrorism attack, or a pandemic, and even be poten­ tially distributed to individual households via commercial shipping companies such as UPS, Fedex, etc., or through the U.S. Postal Service, particularly in the event a short reaction time frame is warranted. As a consequence of the 2001 U.S. anthrax attacks, the ability to dispense antibiotics within days was given top priority because,

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216 Terrence M. O’Sullivan and James D. Ramsay for example, a larger scale attack using inhaled anthrax as the biological agent had the potential for causing disease symptoms within a little as 36 hours after exposure, and any symptomatic victims had rapidly deteriorating chances of survival even with antibiotic treatment. By 2006, the CRI had expanded to 72 metropolitan areas, some in every state, and included more than 500 counties and cities covering 57% of the US population. The current SNS contains four classes of assets: (1) a large inventory of pharmaceuti­ cals and medical supplies to match specific threats and diseases; (2) 12-hour “Push Packages”, which contain 50 tons of prepackaged generic, broad-ranging medi­ cal supplies (including the much discussed COVID-related N-95 respirator masks); (3) CHEMPACKs, or containers of medications to treat specific nerve agent exposure and (4) Federal Medical Stations, which contain a reserve of beds, supplies, and med­ icines providing equipment to care for 50–250 displaced persons with special health needs, including chronic health conditions, limited mobility, or other requirements exceeding services available in shelters for the general population during an incident (HHS, 2019a, 2019b). Another important but challenged U.S. federal public health disaster effort has been the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) (HHS, 2019a, 2019b). BARDA is an effort to encourage and fund development of new med­ ical countermeasures against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terror­ ism and naturally occurring severe disease threats. BARDA now manages more than 70 such contracts and grants with the hope of building a sustainable medical coun­ termeasure pipeline for Project BioShield, its late-stage counterpart. BARDA has “stockpiled 14 medical countermeasure products against 4 CBRN threats”, including a new post-exposure prophylactic anthrax vaccine, anthrax treatments, a new small­ pox vaccine and smallpox antiviral drug, a botulinum antitoxin, and radiation coun­ termeasures (HHS, 2019a, 2019b). The National Syndromic Surveillance (formerly BioSense) Program began in 2003 under the CDC, aiming to create an integrated public health surveillance system, par­ ticularly for “early detection and assessment of potential bioterrorism-related illness” (Gould et al., 2017). Since then, it has focused on developing integrated syndromic surveillance infrastructure at the state and local levels, in particular—since all disease is local, as such. It has also expanded beyond just bioterrorism-related illness sur­ veillance and alerts to now include broader hazardous events and disease outbreak situational awareness and response, and continues to improve its technological and organizations capacities (Gould et al., 2017). 11.3.5 National disaster medical system (NDMS) Health professionals trained and deployed under the NDMS program help “protect health and augment healthcare systems to stabilize patients and save lives” after (during) major natural disasters like Hurricanes Sandy and Maria, tornado disas­ ters in places such as Joplin, MO, and massive 1000-year flooding events across the country (HHS ASPR, 2019a, 2019b). NDMS supplements overwhelmed state, local, tribal and territorial resources systems, providing patient care and movement/ transport, veterinary services, fatality management support, etc. (HHS ASPR, 2019a, 2019b).

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11.3.6 GOARN: International syndromic surveillance The World Health Organization runs the GOARN program—a global partnership of national public health institutions, and those with public health capacity, conducting daily rapid risk assessment (every weekday morning). The information is collected from both formal country reports and informal data from established public health institutes and laboratories. For example, during the 2003 SARS outbreak GOARN “established three virtual networks of technical experts: one of field epidemiologists working at outbreak sites; one of virologists working in laboratories around the world to identify the cause; and one of clinicians who were managing patients… [and s]tand­ ardised information from these three networks was provided daily to the GOARN secretariat on secure websites, with frequent telephone and video conferences” (Heymann, 2017). For the first time ever, this information gathering enabled WHO to make outbreak control guidelines based on real time evidence that was provided to countries via the WHO website (ibid). Public health must always account for factors such as the disease agent (organisms) characteristics, including infectivity (how easily is it transmitted, if exposed?), virulence (how much can it cause severe disease or death?). Some diseases are easily transmit­ ted, but have lower virulence (common cold viruses),11 versus other pathogens with relatively low or moderate infectivity and high virulence (e.g., Ebola). The greatest dangers to societies of course are those with higher transmission and severity (plague, smallpox, possible bioweapons, etc.), some of which are discussed below, which could be particularly disruptive and/or deadly. 11.3.7 Climate-change induced emergencies as a PH threat magnifier It is logical to assert that climate change can induce environmental emergencies that in turn pose significant risk to public health. Climate change increases the disease survivability and range of water- and vector-born (e.g., mosquitoes, ticks) diseases that thrive in warmer climates. The increased prevalence of dengue fever in the south­ ern US (and to some degree around the world) is evidence of the northern migra­ tion of a mosquito-borne illness previously limited to warmer, more southern climes (Georgetown University Medical Center, 2019). The combined effects of both “host factors” (e.g., aging, malnourished populations) and “host environment” variables (e.g., increasing economic/resource and mental health stressors, civil conflict, and consumption/pollution patterns) create greater infectious and other disease vulner­ abilities. Dangerous heat, drought, flooding, sea level rise, and wildfire events dis­ rupt ecosystems and critical human systems, can led to climate refugees, or those populations escaping war, drought, or other instability due to climate change. In this sense, climate change is a threat multiplier, contributing to many millions facing famine, water stress, conflict, drought, natural disasters, or homes literally under­ water (UNHCR, 2019; see also McLeman, 2019). The main result of such dramatic change due to climate extremes is mass migration. Estimates vary, given the difficulty of “refugee” definitions and circumstances, but the World Bank predicts “without urgent global and national climate action, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America [alone] could see more than 140 million people move within their countries’ borders by 2050” (World Bank, 2018). Further, and potentially more alarming, such

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mass migrations can create economic instability, enhanced poverty, and cause eco­ system damage as evidenced in Yemen and Syria. Indeed, the Environmental Justice Foundation estimates that 720 million people risk falling into poverty due to climate change (EJF, 2020).

11.4 Infectious disease risk and response as homeland security Aside from other types of disaster threats, historically the most significant risk to pub­ lic health-related homeland security is infectious diseases—either naturally occurring or manmade (accidents or biological terrorism). The risk (remember that in security, risk is a composite of threats, vulnerabilities and consequences) of epidemics and their larger siblings, pandemics,12 pose some of the most challenging “wicked problems” (discussed elsewhere in this volume) for homeland security. Historically, infectious diseases have brought empires to their knees, and killed the wealthy and privileged, often as easily as the lowly and poor. 11.4.1 Globalization: A double-edged sword Among the ironies of modern global disease susceptibility is that one of the essential engines of late 20th and early 21st century economic growth, and indeed of the entire Industrial Revolution—globalized trade, migration, and other travel, has increased the speed and breadth with which infectious agents and/or their vectors13 can spread (see for instance Charrel et al., 2007 and Memish et al., 2015). A sick and contagious individual or hitchhiking disease vector can travel to almost anywhere in the world in less than 48 hours—less than the incubation period14 of most infectious diseases. This aspect, plus the rapid urbanization and globalization of humanity has put millions of people in very close contact, and subsequently has enhanced the ease with which infections can spread. Because of this, the response times for highly transmissible dis­ eases must be very, very quick in order to avoid the possibility of runaway “wildfire” epidemics or even global pandemics. Aside from the human suffering and death, in even otherwise better-prepared, wealthy post-industrial countries, these events have to potential to impede com­ merce, air travel and other transportation, and disrupt critical public and private just-in-time supply chains essential for societal functioning - making epidemics or pandemics serious homeland security issues. Most countries are neither prepared to thwart such fast spreading of disease agents, nor are they unaccustomed to dealing with major epidemics. Consequently, many of the healthcare and public health sys­ tems, legal, medical or governmental leadership systems are vulnerable to large scale, public health issues. 11.4.2 Examples of potential disruptive infectious diseases and future threats15 Historically, naturally occurring infectious disease disaster scenarios were frequent and were therefore leading causes of death before modern medicine and public health systems and structures. Examples include numerous deadly 18th and 19th century pandemics like cholera and yellow fever, or the infamous bubonic plague (aka the “black death”) which wiped out as much as half the population of the known world in the 14th century.

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11.4.2.1 Flu (aka Influenza) The modern threat currently most feared in global public health circles is a new pandemic influenza viral strain (i.e., variation) that spreads easily, quickly and that causes severe disease in a large percentage of cases (including a high case-fatality/ mortality rate). Historically, pandemics have varied widely in severity, from relatively mild (2008) to severe (1918 H1N1 “Spanish” Flu). Thus, there can be no single response plan, although any flu pandemic would provide only weeks of advanced warning, can potentially last more than a year,16 and demonstrate widely varying infection and death rates (for a history, see Barry, 2004, and Taubenberger & Morens, 2006). The flu is a significant global infectious disease risk for several reasons. It can be (though not always) easily transmissible through contaminated inhaled air—by aerosols (unlike Ebola, for instance), or on contaminated surfaces, and the varieties of flu humans are most susceptible to are almost always carried by birds (avian flu) and pigs—both of which are capable of passing on or acquiring versions of each other’s’ species-specific influenzas. The biggest challenge with a truly new, potentially worst-case scenario flu strain would be the expected lack of any mass-produced vaccine. Depending on the cir­ cumstances, vaccine development can take as much as a year or more after an initial breakout. On top of that, a pandemic could easily lead to a significant shortage of all MCMs including influenza anti-viral drugs (e.g., Tamiflu)—which might also may not be useful with any given pandemic strain (Knobler et al., 2005). Such a pandemic would severely disrupt every day societal functions, including supplies of basic neces­ sities like food and sanitation. And the only public health tools available would be non-pharmaceutical countermeasures such as those mentioned above (quarantine, isolation, social distancing, etc.). In other words, PH methods predating vaccines and antivirals. The good news is that there have been promising advances in development of “universal vaccines” for flu—the holy grail of public health—that would hypo­ thetically provide immunity (however temporary) for any strain of influenza virus (Paules & Fauci, 2019). The need for and use of vaccines is perhaps best exemplified by the current COVID-19 pandemic discussed in more detail below. 11.4.2.2 Severe acute respiratory syndrome-coronavirus (SARS-CoV-1) Before the enormity of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic was its cousin, the original SARS coronavirus. Globalization had already generally—and specifically, because of global trade and travel—helped make outbreaks of contagious diseases such as SARS (2003), Ebola (2014–), and MERS (2012–) relatively disruptive. In some instances, these pathogens sparking near panic, and prompted then-extraordinary measures such as large-scale quarantine and isolation, screening of air travelers at airports, and other restrictions.17 In the cases of SARS and MERS, both drove home the importance of “super-spreaders”—small numbers of those infected who nonetheless for various rea­ sons had an inordinate impact in infecting others (see Cooper et al., 2019). The impact of super spreading is exemplified in the case of one infected SARS victim who was a traveler in Hong Kong, and who was eventually linked to more than twenty other vic­ tims in Canada, Singapore, and Vietnam (McGill, 2015; Wong et al., 2015). SARS was a previously unknown virulent coronavirus that first emerged in late 2002 in Asia from nature, though initially traced to animals sold in Chinese markets,

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and led to a severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS-CoV). It was not controlled for almost a year after, but by the time it disappeared, SARS had killed an average of 11–12% of its victims, and had significantly disrupted international travel and national economies in places as diverse as Hong Kong and mainland China, and Toronto Canada—even though the United States (in part through sheer luck) avoided any outbreak (Knobler et al., 2004). At its height, SARS raised fear it would turn into a global pandemic. One study found that around 75% of the Hong Kong and Singapore SARS infections were linked to super-spreader cases, underscoring the critical role of both early diagnosis and proper isolation and infection control measures play (Li et al., 2004). 11.4.2.3 Middle eastern respiratory syndrome (MERS) Another relatively recent coronavirus that caused great international concern was Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS-CoV), which originated in Saudi Arabia in 2012. Ironically, MERS was limited to a few hundred cases in its region of origin until May 2015, when a single traveler returning from the Middle East sparked a major outbreak centered in South Korea healthcare facilities. The outbreak struck panic into much of the population for several weeks, and in retrospect was made worse because of a combination of poor preparedness, slow response, government secrecy, and poor public health and medical practices (Jack, 2015). Like SARS, MERS required intimate contact with people or bodily fluids, and was not passed via aerosols (WHO June 20, July 28, 2015). As with similar situations during SARS in 2003, South Korea’s MERS outbreak featured one key “super-spreader” who was forced to wait days in a hospital emergency room (ER), and thereby infecting dozens of others before being isolated. This phenomenon of superspreaders also became a significant variable in 2020’s COVID transmission dynamics as people infected with COVID-19 could be contagious yet asymptomatic for up to two weeks. 11.4.2.4 Other emerging or reemerging disease threats Absent vaccine-based herd immunity, measles is among the most contagious (trans­ missible) diseases known to humanity, with one infected person passing it on, on average, to around 15–18 others. And after years of declining cases, measles made a significant comeback in the United States in recent years—partly because of cases imported from abroad, and more importantly because of reduced childhood vacci­ nation rates tied to unsubstantiated fears of childhood vaccines (Roberts, 2019, Park et al, 2015). Among the greatest threats to modern public health today is ballooning anti-microbial resistance. By the early “teens” bacterial “superbugs” resistant to all existing classes of antibiotics emerged in Europe, China, and other nations, reaching the United States by 2016 (Wappes, 2016). In United States alone there are around 2 million illnesses and 23,000 deaths caused by resistant fungi and bacteria—E. coli, tuberculosis (TB), salmonella, Pseudomonas, and Klebsiella pneumonia, among others, for which some of all classes of antibiotics no longer work. Antibiotic-resistant microbes have become a genuine global emergency (Olaitan et al., 2016). Globally, there has been the emergence of even totally drug-resistant (TDR-)TB (Parida et al., 2015). The economic burden of these resistant infections has reached $20 billion in

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additional annual U.S. healthcare costs, and more than $35 billion in lost economic/ business productivity (CDC, 2013). Newly emerging and “re-emerging” infectious disease (EID) agents are a growing problem around the world, especially as climate change disrupts ecosystems and entire continents. Even a relatively small infectious disease outbreak can cause fear and threaten to overwhelm public health and medical systems “surge” capacities to absorb abnormal demand for beds, treatment, and personnel. And an often-under-valued variable in infectious disease incidents and disasters is public risk perception, which sometimes significantly diverges from experts’ assessments of threats. Two such recent examples were the 2001 anthrax attacks and the 2014 U.S. Ebola scare. Anthrax response to a few grams of bacteria sent in the mail cost billions of dollars in response, for only five deaths and 11 cases.18 Similarly, the 2014–15 West African Ebola epidemic demonstrated the inadequacy of international public health response capabilities. Interestingly, rapid public health disaster preparation and response capabilities, akin to wildfire response, can mean the difference between a small, brief “brush fire” out­ break and one that is out of control and spreading, like Australia’s 2019–20 wildfires, rapidly through human populations. 11.4.2.5 COVID-19 Dramatically proving the importance of public health for homeland security, and the general security dynamics of major infectious disease outbreaks, in December 2019 a novel (new) type of zoonotic19 coronavirus outbreak emerged in China’s city of Wuhan.20 It then rapidly spread throughout China in the months after, despite often draconian mandatory government quarantine measures and a halt to transportation and commerce effecting hundreds of millions of its citizens. By late April of 2020, the Coronavirus Disease-2019 (COVID-19) disease outbreak— caused by the novel SARS-CoV-2, had developed into a disruptive global pandemic that effected every country in the world. Over 3 million and counting had been infected, 200,000 dead, and medical and public health infrastructures in numerous locations around the world overwhelmed.21 Aside from China, among the hardest-hit locations were northern Italy, Spain, and in the United States Washington state, the New York City region, Detroit/Michigan and southern Louisiana. Most coun­ tries had by then suspended schools and universities, restricted large public gather­ ings, including sports events, and in some implemented draconian social-distancing lockdowns. COVID-19 triggered a significant drop in global financial markets, and, while esti­ mates varied, some economists predicted substantial economic damage, an interna­ tional recession, and even the possibility of an economic depression from the overnight unemployment of tens of millions in the United State alone, and disruption of global trade and commerce—“…by directly affecting production, by creating supply chain and market disruption, and by its financial impact on firms and financial markets”.22 By March the outbreak had already cost an estimated $4 trillion in market value glob­ ally, including among hard-hit hospitality and travel-related businesses, and those reliant on international supply chains.23 In the United States, the U.S. Federal Reserve significantly lowered federal bank interest rates, and the U.S. Congress passed at least three massive multi-$trillion federal stimulus programs. to address business and job losses, shortages of critical

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222 Terrence M. O’Sullivan and James D. Ramsay medical supplies and testing kits, to compensate state governments for a surge in costs, fund research and development of vaccines and treatments, and fund CDC/NIH response and assistance to states. The CDC also emphasized that public response and cooperation was necessary to help reduce the rate of spread—via “nonpharmaceu­ tical interventions” that included (and in some states mandatory) business closures, home isolation of ill persons and quarantine of exposed household members; social distancing (including school closures, social distancing in workplaces, and postpon­ ing or canceling mass gatherings); and preventive measures such as routine cleaning of frequently touched surfaces and objects (like cell phones). Domestic U.S. and interna­ tional shortages and hoarding of N95 respirator masks (including among healthcare providing institutions), alcohol hand sanitizer, and even surface cleaning products quickly developed.24 These events demonstrate that infectious disease disasters can be among the most damaging economic, political, and societal security threats, in large measure because they can undermine the structure of international and domestic trade and commerce. However, when possible, prevention is far more cost-effective than response (Pike et al., 2014). Public health surveillance infrastructure and personnel at the source of potential pandemics, in even remote location around the world, was once robust. But in recent decades it has become a neglected public good, as budget cuts and austerity eliminate what appears to be unnecessary caution—much like good fire prevention can lead to cuts, under the false assumption that if there are few fires, the service is no longer needed. Overall, domestic and international global public health and dis­ aster preparedness, despite the growing risk from novel diseases such as HIV-AIDS, SARS, MERS, and Zika virus, and the spread in range and severity of old pathogens like tuberculosis and malaria, is likely not as fully funded, or supported as it should be given the gravity of the impact such disease outbreaks can have. And while the deadly and disruptive 2014–15 West African Ebola epidemic demonstrated that the international public health system had too long let down its guard, it also showed that a terrifyingly deadly disease was eminently controllable (only a handful of cases, with all but a few imported from the West African hot zone) in Western nations with favorable doctor-to-population ratios and extensive infrastructure, given it was not spread by aerosol means (Ebola manifests at only a moderate to low level contagiousness).

11.5 Biological terrorism threats and the “Dual-Use” biotech dilemma For Western nations in particular, but also ultimately for the rest of the world, there is a growing threat from use of biological weapons. The threat has often been over-estimated especially after the 2001 anthrax attacks. In 2008, for example, the U.S. Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction issued a report claiming the most likely serious global or U.S. WMD threat would come from biological weapons and that an attack would most likely occur by 2015 (WMD Report, 2008).25 Even though such an attack has not yet happened, the threat is a growing one in large measure because of the pace of advances in biological technology26 that will increas­ ingly enable easy manipulation and production of biological agents. For example, development of biological-nanotechnology (B-N) weapons among both sovereign nations as well as sub-state terrorist groups (Suk et al., 2011). Nonetheless, critics

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Table 11.1 CDC select category a bioagents and public health characteristics Characteristics of category a bioagents

Agent

1. 2. 3. 4.

Bacillus anthracis Yersinia pestis Variola major Francisella tularensis

Easily transmitted or disseminated from person to person Significant mortality, large public health impact Public panic and social chaos Specific action needed for public health preparedness, response, recovery

Disease Anthrax Plague Smallpox Tularemia

continue to be concerned about the many $10s of billions that have been spent on preparedness and response programs for low probability bioterrorism events, to the detriment of higher probability naturally occurring pathogenic events (Shelton et al., 2012). The CDC lists current bioweapons threats by the relative level of risk they impart. Category A bioagents are considered the highest risk biological agents and include anthrax, botulin toxin, plague, smallpox, tularemia, and viral hemorrhagic fevers, such as Ebola (see Table 11.1). Category A infectious disease agents are believed to be the most likely to cause significant public health system disruption, either because of their own characteristics (such as virulence) and/or their potential comparative ease of availability and/or production (particularly anthrax). Except for smallpox, all could be harvested from nature for development into bioweapons. Categories B and C bio­ agents are considered lesser threats, but all have the potential for use in deliberate outbreaks with varying degrees of ease (Adalja et al., 2015; Suk et al., 2011). Among the scenarios that have been of particular concern since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the so-called “Amerithrax” anthrax incidents soon thereafter included a large-scale outdoor aerosol attack with anthrax, or more focused contamination using large building HVAC air circulation systems. Another significant feared scenario arises from the now-infamous Wein and Liu (2005) botulism/milk bioterrorism article,27 which posited that bioterrorists could contaminate large quantities of milk after heat pasteurization, but before packaging, and thus distribute the lung-paralyzing agent to 1000s of consumers drinking milk every day before it could be discovered. These cases would likely overwhelm local critical care facilities to the point where life-saving supportive respiratory care equipment (mechanical ventilators) might be unavailable to the many victims. Again, a situation repeated in reality with the current COVID-19 pandemic (Silverman, 2020). But not all infectious disease outbreaks must derive from natural or deliberate bioterrorism. Increasingly, concern has arisen over biological security research that could itself become dangerous. In late 2011 the scientific world was roiled by a con­ troversy over the planned publication of research by two groups—one in the United States, the other The Netherlands—on H5N1 influenza, a deadly strain of flu that emerged over a decade ago in Hong Kong. While not highly transmissible, H5N1 flu may have killed a majority of those infected,28 and the respective “gain of function” research would publicly discuss methods for increasing the transmissibility of the deadly virus. Low-to-medium transmissible pathogens could naturally become more so, and the research sought to determine how and if that might occur—but by deter­ mining that, two possible downsides arose: (1) the potential creation of a far more dangerous pathogen, and (2) offering a public blueprint for ill-intended genetic manip­ ulation of those and other bugs that might be used for bioweapons.

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Coincidental with the H5N1 research controversy, in October 2011 the Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center released a report that gave a “report card” grade for various aspects of U.S. biosecurity preparation and capabilities, and based on broad, scaled scenario types, from smaller to larger. “Today we face the very real possibility that outbreaks of disease, naturally occurring or man-made, can change the very nature of America—our economy, our government, and our social structure” they began. Yet with the exception of “communication”, each of the assessed catego­ ries was given D and F grades (WMD Report, 2008). This, like the Wein and Liu botulism article, raised concerns about both poten­ tial use by would-be bioterrorists, as well as the potential for accidental release of laboratory-enhanced influenza “supervirus” that might itself create the pandemic it was attempting to preempt. This debate occurred in the context of several promi­ nent previous lapses in biosecurity research labs. In an unprecedented move, the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) recommended that science journals not publish the details of the research because it believed that the benefits were outweighed by the risks of the information being used to engineer a biological weapon (Brown, 2011). Then, in June 2014, as many as 75 CDC scientists were acci­ dentally exposed to anthrax, and weeks later the U.S. Food and Drug Administration discovered 16 vials of smallpox virus (dating back to the 1950s) in a storage room on the National Institutes of Health campus, during a routine lab cleanup, that had been forgotten in storage. By fall 2014, the U.S. health infrastructure announced final pol­ icy guidelines on dual-use research on any of 15 different human pathogens.29 Also announced that October was a temporary moratorium on pathogen gain of function study federal funding, and launched a detailed review of all research that involved laboratory manipulation of the capabilities of infectious disease agents such as MERS, SARS, Ebola, and influenza. U.S. NIH had funded such studies to try to better estab­ lish the mechanisms of human-pathogen interactions with an eye to anticipating future pandemic risk from recent emerging or new diseases, but that it was clear the biosecu­ rity/safety risks were also poorly understood. The rules were intended to “…preserve the benefits of life science research while minimizing the risk of misuse”. (NIH, 2011) These issues are not new, although their salience has been steadily rising. In 2006 and 2007, respectively, two National Institutes of Health (NIH) National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) reports analyzed the risks from both dualuse and synthetic biology—the latter the de novo (from scratch) synthesis of select agents. “Converging” biological- and nanotechnology (B-N) advances will be one of the great change variables in the twenty-first century—producing amazing scientific advances with a variety of beneficial applications, as well as substantial traditional and non-traditional security risks (Tucker, 2004). Already, these technologies are being broadly disseminated around the world—most notably outside the Western industrialized countries, and among less developed nations intent on using these vari­ ous related high-tech industries as engines of rapid growth and power. The risks have as much to do with the scope and unpredictability of B-N tech proliferation as they do with the fact that, increasingly, the sources of such converging technology are trans­ national—with converging mutual need among disparate civilian and military actors and institutions to better oversee—or even control B-N proliferation (Suk et al., 2011). This potential has been highlighted in numerous government and academic studies and reports over the last twenty years or more, in numerous government and academic studies (e.g., Tucker & Zilinskas, 2006).

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11.6 Summary and conclusions Public health and related health management is a facet of every civilian element of homeland security but is especially relevant to preventing and responding to natural disasters and infectious disease outbreaks, natural or manmade (terrorism). The many complex systems involved play a critical role in maintaining community and individ­ ual well-being before and after such events. But this is clearly an area which, despite substantial investments and organization, requires more and better capacity to deal with the rising threat portfolio for U.S. and global populations. Public health is not only a critical infrastructure sector, it is also tied intimately to the concepts around human and environmental security. Indeed, as this and the last chapter have argued, a more robust and sustainable national security model logically needs to situate both public health and human security firmly in the center of its strategies, operations and structures in order to foresee, respond to and become resilient to the most wicked and prevalent security challenges facing the world today.

11.7 Discussion questions 1. How is public health different than other central aspects of homeland security? 2. How does PH manage, reduce, and respond to infectious disease threats— current and future? 3. What are some of the most specific infectious disease threats PH has confronted in the past? Now? 4. How do changes in the “host environment” and host behavior effect the suscep­ tibility of people, animals, and plants to infectious agents? How does climate change factor into this? 5. What are the prospects for anti-microbial resistance or biological terrorism/ warfare, based on past experience and changes occurring in public health/ medical practices and research/technology? 6. Discuss possible roles public health plays in national and international security.

Notes 1. In contrast to the rest of the Western nations, all of which have some variation on univer­ sal healthcare systems. 2. The 1918–1919 Flu is estimated to have killed between 50 and 100 million people worldwide. 3. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome—Coronavirus, which spread to at least two dozen countries on 4 continents. https://www.cdc.gov/sars/index.html 4. See for instance Maciosek et al. (2010). Vaccines, for instance, are almost universally cost effective from a societal perspective, compared to the diseases they prevent. 5. The federally coordinated Laboratory Response Network (LRN) is a network of lab­ oratories that can respond to biological and chemical threats and other public health emergencies, and now includes state and local public health, veterinary, military, and international labs. https://emergency.cdc.gov/lrn/index.asp 6. Research funding and support for biomedical and health services exists and is admin­ istered through entities such as the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and the CDC. 7. For instance, given a certain situation, a more rural area or state might experience an overwhelming disaster, where an urban area with better resources would not. 8. https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/authority/Pages/default.aspx#stafford

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9. The lifelines are basic services categories “designed to enable emergency managers, infra­ structure owners and operators, and other partners to analyze the root cause of an inci­ dent impact and then prioritize and deploy resources to effectively stabilize the lifeline… This construct maximizes the effectiveness of federally supported, state managed, and locally executed response.” (FEMA, 2019) 10. See Department of Homeland Security, https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/critical-infrastructure­ sectors 11. See Delamater et al. (2019) for further discussion of virulence and reproductive rates of selected pathogens (i.e., Ro). 12. Epidemics are any unusual disease outbreak, and pandemics are epidemics covering multiple countries or continents. 13. Vectors are disease transmitters such as mosquitoes, flies, fleas, snails, and ticks. Vector-borne diseases such as malaria, dengue, yellow fever, Chagas disease, leishmaniasis and schisto­ somiasis account for more than 17% of all infectious diseases, causing more than 700,000 deaths annually. Malaria alone causes up to 400,000 of those deaths. (WHO, 2017) 14. The incubation period is the time between infection of the host and evident manifesta­ tions of disease. 15. The following is partially adapted from O’Sullivan (2017). 16. The 1918 Influenza lasted more than 18 months, and passed in a series of waves that went from weeks to months at a time. 17. Once again, however, nothing compared to the global “lock-downs” that occurred in virtually every country in the world after SARS-CoV-2, COVID-19 disease appeared. 18. The anthrax attacks were thus dubbed “5/11” by many public health analysts. 19. Zoonotic diseases are those transmitted across species, as happens with avian (bird) or swine (pig) influenzas that can become infectious to humans. The SARS-COV2 virus was identified as a bat coronavirus likely transmitted via another animal to humans at one or more of the live animals “wet markets” in Wuhan. 20. Huang, C., Wang, Y., Li, X., Ren, L., Zhao, J., Hu, Y., ... & Cheng, Z. (2020). Clinical features of patients infected with 2019 novel coronavirus in Wuhan, China. The Lancet, 395(10223), 497–506. 21. LiveScience S taff (6-March-2020). Coronavirus cases top 100,000: Live updates on COVID-19. LiveScience. https://www.livescience.com/coronavirus-updates.html?utm_ source=Selligent&utm _ medium=email&utm _campaig n=14899&utm _content= 20200306_LS_Essentials_Coronavirus+-+adhoc+&utm_term=3699115&m_i=Mf2Mi ExrM9m6gA4rLTkYlHBvVMSB1WUPt02_HwZzvC0hElSMXmSXMRtM2GYQjLRq YRMxhfbFYoc%2BQbdhtmWAb6a1zYceNAzyMU 22. Daniel Bachman (March 3, 2020). The economic impact of COVID-19 (novel coronavirus). Deloitte Insights. 23. Andy Sullivan and Richard Cowan (March 6, 2020). After U.S. Congress and Fed’s quick coronavirus response, next steps likely tougher for Washington. Reuters. https://www. reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-politics-idUSKBN20T2W5 24. James Hamblin (January 30, 2020). We don’t have enough masks. The Atlantic. https:// www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/01/viral-masks/605761/ 25. It went on to note that American policy should be aimed at developing a new plan for bioweapons proliferation and bioterrorism prevention, emphasizing renewal of the neglected and insufficient 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The Commission also urged renewed efforts to evaluate domestic sources of dangerous disease agents, and improved oversight for research labs from which germs might be stolen or accidentally released (WMD Report, 2008). 26. Such as CRISPR gene editing (Jiang & Doudna, 2017), and high throughput Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) gene copying technologies (NCBI, 2017). 27. Which was criticized because of fears it presented a “how-to” level of published detail. 28. According to the WHO, H5N1 has a mortality rate of about 60%, but a lack of thorough population sero-surveys of previous exposure in the countries most affected may have missed subclinical survivors or cases that were missed by the medical system; hence, the fatality rate could be much higher. See for example: https://www.who.int/influenza/ human_animal_interface/avian_influenza/h5n1_research/faqs/en/

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29. Though as one Harvard epidemiology noted, by limiting the research restrictions to the 15 specific agents, would-be bioterrorists could simply work around it by manipulating other agents not on the list (Akst, 2014b).

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Fouchier, R. A., García-Sastre, A., Kawaoka, Y., Barclay, W. S., Bouvier, N. M., Brown, I. H., & Cox, N. J. (2013). Transmission studies resume for avian flu. Science, 339(6119), 520–521. Georgetown University Medical Center. (2019, March 28). Science news. Retrieved from https:// www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/03/190328150856.htm (Accessed March 2020). Gould, D. W., Walker, D., & Yoon, P. W. (2017). The evolution of BioSense: Lessons learned and future directions. Public Health Reports, 132(suppl. 1), 7S–11S. Graham, B., Talent, J., Larsen, R., & Kidder, L. (2011). Bio-response report card. WMD Center. Hampton, T. (2013). Report reveals scope of US antibiotic resistance threat. Journal of the American Medical Association, 310(16), 1661–1663. Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of (HHS). (2019a). Emergency preparedness and response. Retrieved from https://www.hhs.gov/programs/emergency-preparedness/index.html (Accessed January 2020). Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of (HHS). (2019b). Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threat programs. Retrieved from https://www.medicalcountermeasures.gov/BARDA/CBRN.aspx (Accessed January 2020). Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of (HHS), Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR). (2019a). Strategic national stockpile. Retrieved from https://www.phe .gov/about/sns/Pages/default.aspx (Accessed December 2019). HHS, Office of Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response (ASPR). (2019b). National disaster medical system. Retrieved from https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/responders/ ndms/Pages/default.aspx Heymann, D. L. (2017). Global health security: The global outbreak alert and response network. Hyde, J. K., & Shortell, S. M. (2012). The structure and organization of local and state public health agencies in the US: A systematic review. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 42(5), S29–S41. Institute of Medicine (US) Committee for the Study of the Future of Public Health. (1988). The Future of Public Health. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US). Appendix A, Summary of the Public Health System in the United States. Retrieved from https://www.ncbi. nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK218212/ Jack, A. (2015). Why the panic? South Korea’s MERS response questioned. British Medical Journal, 350, h3403. Jiang, F., & Doudna, J. A. (2017). CRISPR – Cas9 structures and mechanisms. Annual Review of Biophysics, 46, 505–529. Knobler, S. L., Mack, A., Mahmoud, A., & Lemon, S. M. (2005). Summary and assessment. In The threat of pandemic influenza: Are we ready? workshop summary. National Academies Press (US). Knobler S, Mahmoud A, Lemon S, et al., eds. (2004). Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak. Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats, Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US). DOI: 10.17226/10915 Lee, A. (2003). Will the SARS epidemic recur? Host and environment are key factors. Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health, 57(10), 770–771. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/jech.57.10.770 Maciosek, M. V., Coffield, A. B., Flottemesch, T. J., Edwards, N. M., & Solberg, L. I. (2010). Greater use of preventive services in US health care could save lives at little or no cost. Health Affairs, 29(9), 1656–1660. McLeman, R. (2019). International migration and climate adaptation in an era of hardening borders. Nature Climate Change, 9(12), 911–918. McGill, N. (2015). Public health looks to lessons from past in MERS outbreak: Experience with SARS offers insights. Memish, Z. A., Assiri, A., Turkestani, A., Yezli, S., al Masri, M., Charrel, R., … & Gautret, P. (2015). Mass gathering and globalization of respiratory pathogens during the 2013 Hajj. Clinical Microbiology and Infection, 21(6), 571–e1.

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United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR). (2019). Climate Change and Disaster Displacement. UNHCR website. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/climate-change-and-disasters.html (Accessed December 2019). Walker, B. (1989). The future of public health: The Institute of Medicine’s 1988 report. Journal of Public Health Policy, 10(1), 19–31. Wein, L. M., & Liu, Y. (2005). Analyzing a bioterror attack on the food supply: The case of botulinum toxin in milk. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102(28), 9984–9989. Wong, G., Liu, W., Liu, Y., Zhou, B., Bi, Y., & Gao, G. F. (2015). MERS, SARS, and Ebola: The role of super-spreaders in infectious disease. Cell Host & Microbe, 18(4), 398–401. World Health Organization (WHO). (2017). Vector-borne diseases. WHO (October 31, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/vector-borne-diseases (Accessed June 20, July 28, 2015). World Health Organization (WHO). (2015) Intensified public health measures help control MERS-CoV outbreak in the Republic of Korea. World Health Organization (July 28, 2015). Retrieved from http://www.wpro.who.int/mediacentre/releases/2015/20150728/en/ World Bank (2018). “Climate Change Could Force Over 140 Million to Migrate Within Countries by 2050: World Bank Report.” Retrieved from: https://www.worldbank.org/en/ news/press-release/2018/03/19/climate-change-could-force-over-140-million-to-migrate­ within-countries-by-2050-world-bank-report, Accessed September 20 2020. Wappes, John. (2016). Highly resistant MCR-1 ‘superbug’ found in U.S. for first time. CIDRAP (May 26, 2016). http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2016/05/highly-resistant-mcr­ 1-superbug-found-us-first-time

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12 Homeland security law and policy theory Michael McDaniel

Description: This chapter provides an overview of key legal, policy and ethical issues and the legal and policy bases to modern Homeland Security. The chapter examines legal concepts regarding constitutional rights of individuals, the legal process, access to courts, the law(s) of war and national security principles as they relate to home­ land security legislation and policy initiatives. Legal principles of due process, habeas corpus, search and seizure, compulsory process and international agreements are explored in greater depth. The law of war is examined in the context of preemptive war and the current National Security Strategy, as well as issues involving the status of combatants and detention. Elements of national security law, including intelligence collection and sharing, the USA PATRIOT Act, FISA and military–civilian relations are also discussed. United States Supreme Court decisions relating to some of these concepts and legal principles are examined and discussed. Upon completion of this chapter, students will be able to: 1. Compare and contrast sources and types of law, including criminal law, consti­ tutional law, contract law, administrative law and precedential law, executive orders, policy and decision directives, etc. 2. Examine and discuss Constitutional law principles and their relationship to Homeland Security law & policy. 3. Discuss principles of international law (law of war; Geneva Conventions) and their relationship to Homeland Security efforts within and outside of the U.S. 4. Discuss and analyze US legislative authority regarding Homeland Security efforts, with emphasis on the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act and related legislation, and the Foreign Surveillance Act (FISA). 5. Demonstrate knowledge of case law and court decisions relating to and influ­ encing Homeland Security law and policy. 6. Describe how law and policy supports homeland security structure, strategy and operations.

12.1 Introduction In response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress created a cas­ cade of new legislation. Just as terror attacks were found to have cascading, tertiary effects on sectors of infrastructure not expressly targeted by the terrorists, so, too, legislation passed in response to those attacks has affected areas of government,

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business and society in unanticipated ways. Consider also how the Congress has aggregated enforcement and regulatory functions in to a single, new agency. The purpose of the creation of such a department is to assure the prevention of terror attacks upon industries, services, transport, commercial operations, government and public facilities. The thousands of separate governmental decisions and actions that collectively comprise our governmental response to terror related issues will all affect the businesses and individuals in the U.S. Homeland security professionals, and those who study the field, then must understand the interrelationships of the laws of Homeland Security, and to do so, must study and practice in those laws collectively. It is not just the acts of Congress that we need to consider when developing an understanding of the laws and policies of homeland security. The “homeland secu­ rity enterprise” is a federal government agency, a portfolio of programs and an academic discipline. It was created by the actions of all branches of government, state and federal: by executive orders and directives, by congressional activity and state legislation, and by judicial decisions. The breadth and the depth of the legis­ lation1 passed since 9/11 has had a direct substantial impact on most businesses, and on every citizen and on every level of government. Many of the laws passed rather quickly in the first 12 months have had lasting effects on our government and our society. For example, Congress created the third-largest federal agency by re-organizing 22 distinct agencies by legislation that must be balanced against the constitutional limits of federal authority and the recognition of state sovereignty. Indeed, even at the tactical level, every first responder’s actions are both authorized and delimited by laws. What laws, then, must the student/practitioner of homeland security study? Every governmental official, whether civilian or military, homeland security or national secu­ rity, local law enforcement or state senator, is required to swear an oath to support the Constitution of the United States. This oath is found in the Constitution itself,2 and applies to all officials, both state and federal, of all three branches of government.3 It is fitting therefore that we use the framework of the Constitution to consider the laws of Homeland Security, and their impact on policy making. But it is not enough to just focus on the laws that created the Homeland Security Enterprise and to scrutinize their constitutional basis. As students and practitioners of Homeland Security we must also understand the relationship between homeland security policy and law. There is a “chicken and the egg” quality to this discussion: Because Congress acted quickly and strongly in response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, many of the legal provisions were not first thoroughly considered for the policy implications. One of the recurring questions to consider then was the underlying policy to be enforced or the law itself determined first? To state it succinctly, did the policy drive the law, or did the law create the policy?

12.2 What is policy? The goals of the federal government are broadly stated in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution and includes, “to establish justice” and to “promote the general Welfare”. Federal and state governments make policy, enact laws and allocate public resources

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to achieve these goals. Public policies and laws are interconnected but serve two dif­ ferent functions. A policy is a statement of what the government intends to do or not to do and why. It is a statement of intention, and of the underlying principles, and may state the reasons, which form the basis for a law. A policy is a framework for achieving a goal. It is the government’s end state. The law is then enacted as the means to affect that end, by either encouraging certain actions or prohibiting others. Birkland (2015) suggests that all definitions of public policy contain the following factors: (1) it is made on behalf of the people; (2) it is generally made or initiated by a government; (3) it states what the government intends to do; (4) it states what the government chooses not to do and (5) it is implemented and interpreted by both state and private actors. Our analysis requires more than just defining a policy and determining the appli­ cable policy goals for an event or problem. A general understanding of the policy process is also necessary. The response by state and federal government to Hurricane Katrina is discussed below, so it will be used now to discuss the public policy process. The first step is to identify the problem. The people do not expect the government to prevent hurricanes (although this is an expected goal for other disasters such as wildfires) but they do expect a prompt and full response. The next step is to develop the policy. Policy formulation often begins in the Executive branch, by those agencies with expertise and responsibilities in the problem area. It could involve more than one federal agency, the White House, legislative staff, think tanks, special interest and advocacy groups. As a result, there will likely be conflicting points of view and draft policies. Frequent and conflicting viewpoints assure consideration of the poten­ tial impact of the policy upon the public. This evolution of a policy is a result of a series of steps, over time, by potentially many different viewpoints. At some point, there will be a majority consensus of decision-makers on a given policy. The policy may be implemented administratively by an agency or department or, particularly where there are conflicting viewpoints or impacts, a law may be created to enforce the policy. The policy then could be adopted by Congress enacting a law, by the President issuing an Executive Order or by the judicial system ruling on a major case. Public policy is often implemented by the agencies and departments of the executive branch. The people’s desire to limit wildfires can result in legislation, such as Congressional funding to the US Forest Service through the Wildfire Management Account for preparedness and suppression. The Forest Service then interprets that policy goal to include education and prevention and then seeks out partners to do so. (Consider the long-running campaign, “Only you can prevent wildfires”.) The last step is to evalu­ ate the policy to see if the means employed to reach the policy goal are effective and whether the goal itself is still salutary. The policymakers, most often in the executive and legislative branches must reassess and reevaluate the policy, usually in conjunc­ tion with the stakeholders. To summarize then, the typical steps involved in the creation of public policy include: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Identify the problem. Policy development. Create the policy. Implement the policy. Continuous reevaluation of the policy.

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The application of these policy development steps should be reviewed as you consider the background for each law and analyze each Case Study herein. 12.2.1 Homeland security policy example Many of the policies devised after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 became law without a thorough policy development. Compare the more deliberate policy considerations by the Executive and Legislative branches in analyzing FEMA’s per­ formance, post-Katrina. Criticism of FEMA included the lack of a prompt provision of resources, lack of communications with other levels of government, the lack of, or substandard, temporary housing. Rather than absorb FEMA wholly within DHS or otherwise dissolve the agency, Congress considered the causes of the deficiencies in performance and sought to resolve them. FEMA had been created by a series of Presidential orders and then restructured by Congress through the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA), the law which created the organizational structure and functions of DHS. Congress appears to have concluded that while the HSA vested responsibilities of leading and supporting a national emergency management pro­ gram in FEMA, the assignment of authorities and the organization of the agency divided responsibilities into other sub-agencies, such as a separate Preparedness Directorate. In enacting the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (2006), Congress must have noted the DHS focus on countering terrorism and con­ cluded that FEMA should remain the lead agency for the coordination of emergency management. To assure that FEMA’s focus remained on emergency management, it was accorded status as an independent agency within DHS, similar to the U.S. Coast Guard or Secret Service. Congress addressed FEMA’s lack of agency-wide planning and preparedness by placing the Preparedness Directorate within FEMA. They addressed the lack of coordinated planning with state and local governments by creating regional administrators.

12.3 U.S. Constitution Any discussion of Homeland Security law must begin with the U.S. Constitution. All three branches of government, as well as the States, are involved in the homeland security enterprise, with separate powers and roles. Congress has enacted a significant number of laws to protect the U.S., its sovereignty, its interests, assets and people, both here and abroad and to deter and disrupt terrorist attackers. Most of the laws created post-911 authorized (even demanded) the Executive branch4 act by the direction or delegation in those laws. Finally, the judicial branch, the Supreme Court and other courts, have sought to find the balance between the important governmental interest in national security and the equally compelling need to safeguard the Constitutional rights of its citizens. 12.3.1 Preamble The Preamble is more than an introduction—it exists to broadly state the purpose and scope of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has observed that the Preamble’s authorship is ascribed to the People.5 Thus, the Preamble is the People’s statement of the need for, and the breadth of, the Constitution. It grandly states the duty to

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protect the general public: “to provide for the common defense and to promote the general welfare”. Interestingly, this is expressly acknowledged as the reason for giving Congress the power to collect taxes “...to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general Welfare of the United States”. The courts look to the Preamble to discern the intent of the Framers in using certain terms in the Constitution. “Its true office”, wrote Joseph Story (1833) in his Commentaries, “is to expound the nature and extent and application of the powers actually conferred by the Constitution, and not substantively to create them” (p. 462). The Preamble of that grand document then contains our “Mission Statement” for homeland security. The statement to “establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common Defence,6 promote the general Welfare, and secure the bless­ ings of Liberty to ourselves and our children” explains the basis of authority behind how the U.S. government designs and executes homeland and national security law and policy. In addition, the Constitution states that all senators and representa­ tives and judges and state representatives and all federal officials “shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution” which binds elected officials to the homeland and national security laws, imperatives and doctrines contained in the Constitution. Those two sections of the Constitution, one at the very beginning, and one almost at the end, must be read together as bookends; they were intended to be the alpha and omega of the document. The Preamble provides “our mission statement” but does so by stating a series of duties. The body of the document then apportions responsibility: first, between state and federal governments, and then between the three co-equal branches of government. It is also evident from the inherent purpose of the Constitution that it transfers sov­ ereignty from a King to its people and it transferred the property of the government from its King to its people. So, it is evidence of a recognition of collective self-interest, but more, much more than simply collective self-interest because that is shared by all political associations. The second point is perhaps more subtle, but no less fundamental. Remember that the Framers were very suspicious of sovereignty by Man; especially one called a King and asserted that the true sovereign was the collection of people. The Constitution therefore is a document of prescription, in that it prescribes exactly what the federal government may do, leaving to the several states and or to the People, all other duties.7 Even without the specific litany of individual rights added by the Bill of Rights, the Constitution sought to protect the individual and his rights. 12.3.2 Federalism The Constitution was not simply creating a democracy—for a democracy would rely on majority rule. It created a Federalist system, that is, an anti-majoritarian system, to assure that minority views, whether of the states or individuals, were preserved. There is a dynamic, a tension, in need for balance in America, which is both a great attainment and potential downfall. One important concept in our federalist system of governments to recall is that state governments predated our federal government. Under our first system of national gov­ ernment, the States were predominant over the national government. The Revolutionary

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War came to an end with General Cornwallis’ defeat at Yorktown, Virginia in October 1781. The colonies which became sovereign states officially gained their independ­ ence with the Treaty of Paris, signed in 1783, and ratified by the U.S. Congress on January 14, 1784. Our Founding Fathers gathered in Philadelphia and began to draft the Constitution in 1787, which was not ratified by the states until 1789. That short historical timeline provides two key points: (1) that state governments existed prior to the Constitution, and (2) by ratifying the Constitution, the states were acced­ ing to the establishment by the People of another sovereign, our federal govern­ ment. No single governmental entity had, or would have, all the power. Sovereignty, which emanated from the People, could assign power to, or retrieve it from, discrete units of government (Amar, 2005, p. 106). The people, then, could apportion power between state and the federal government, or reserve it to themselves. A federalist form of government then is a sharing of governmental duties between the state and federal governments. As John Marshall, our longest-serving Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court observed, when considering the proper role between the state and federal governments, “the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist (McCulloch v. Maryland, 1819). 12.3.3 Article I—Congressional power At the time of the United States Constitutional Convention in 1787, the assembled delegates faced two competing points of public opinion: as a result of the colonial rule by King George III, characterized by onerous taxes and military rule, the cit­ izens were distrustful of strong (and remote) monarchical rule. But for the immedi­ ately preceding 6 years, the new country’s government had labored under the Articles of Confederation. This document created a government where the several States remained in control of almost every important issue of governance: taxation, trade, the raising of an Army. At the same time, the federal government lacked a chief execu­ tive, a national courts system, and its key powers were limited to foreign relations and the declaration of war and the appointment of officers.8 The Constitution addresses these shortcomings by creating a strong legislature in a two-house Congress, albeit with expressly delineated powers and a President as chief executive with broad implied powers. As a result, the President can act independently of the Congress when s/he believes it in the national interest. Congress, however, can impose limits on the power of the Presidency, (and can delegate congressional power to the executive) as will be discussed in the next section. There are two underlying principles that generate policy “heat” here. First, note that the powers of the Congress were described as “express” and “delineated” while Presidential powers are “broad” and “implied”. This is more evident when one com­ pares the first sentence of Section 1 of Article I (Congressional Powers) with the first sentence of Section 1 of Article II (Presidential Powers.) The first sentence of Article I, Section 1, provides: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States…” The first sentence of Article II, Section 1, provides: The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America”. What differences do you note between the grant of power to the Congress and the President? The provision of Presidential authority lacks the words “herein granted”.

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The inclusion of those words to the Congress and the specific delineation of certain powers to the Congress at Article I, Section 8, clauses 1–18 and the following limi­ tations on the Congressional power in Article I, Section 9, means that Congress is limited by the powers outlined in the Constitution, and the President is NOT limited by the powers outlined. 12.3.3.1 Compare the powers of the President with the powers of Congress. Why did the Drafters leave the powers of the President undefined? Unsurprisingly, there has been considerable debate over the Presidential “vesting clause”. One theory is that the Drafters intended the powers outlined in Article II to be read as parallel to Article I, not in comparison. President William Howard Taft (1916) said that there is no undefined residuum of power in Article II of the Constitution. The other, constructionist, theory is that the drafters knew what they were doing—they were creating capacity for the President to act. The President needed to have implied powers so that s/he could act quickly and decisively if circumstances required. Think of the need to declare a national emergency; the President needs the inherent power to mobi­ lize the US military, DHS or other agencies, without awaiting Congressional authoriza­ tion. This will be discussed further in the following section. Congress’ power, however, is exceedingly broad, both due to the defined author­ ity provided in the Constitution and the rulings by the judicial branch, particularly in declaring that the Congress has implied and dormant powers. In Section 8, the Constitution provides the following powers to the Congress: • • • • • • • • • • • •

Clause 1. The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; Clause 2. To borrow Money on the credit of the United States; Clause 3. To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; Clause 4. To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization; Clause 8. To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries; Clause 10. To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations; Clause 11. To declare War; Clause 12. To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; Clause 13. To provide and maintain a Navy; Clause 14. To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; Clause 15. To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; Clause 16. To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia;

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238 •

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Michael McDaniel Clause 17. To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District… as may…become the seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State…; Clause 18. To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carry­ ing into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

The above powers of Congress seem like quite a laundry list but take a moment and determine how each listed power may shape and mold the homeland security enterprise. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Congress has aligned implied powers as needed to carry out those express powers.9

12.4 Congress enacts homeland security laws The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, is commonly known as the USA PATRIOT Act (2001). The Act was intended to provide greater tools to law enforce­ ment and to federal agencies to fight terrorism within the continental United States. Those tools include, inter alia, authorizing the Attorney General to share grand jury information that involves foreign intelligence with national security officials including the intelligence, national defense and immigration communities (18 U.S.C. § 2517), authorizing the Attorney General to seek and obtain Department of Defense assis­ tance from criminal violations involving weapons of mass destruction (18 U.S.C. § 2517(6)); providing for roving electronic surveillance (50 U.S.C. § 1805) under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq); increasing the permissible length of FISA surveillance for non-U.S. Citizens who are agents of for­ eign power (50 U.S.C. § 1805; 50 U.S.C. § 1824); expands, subject to conditions, the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices; (18 U.S.C. §§ 3123–3124) may require reports of under $10,000.00 in currency or coins for specified reportable transactions (31 U.S.C. § 5326); provides for mandatory disclosure of specified information for cer­ tain financial accounts (31 U.S.C. § 5318A) and amends the Right to Financial Privacy Act to permit the transfer of financial records to other agencies upon certification that the records are related to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities (31 U.S.C. § 5318A). The Homeland Security Act. In 2002, Congress established the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (Homeland Security Act, 2002). The Act contains a broad range of other provisions, including the training of airline flight and cabin crews in self-defense and in conducting cabin searches (49 U.S.C. § 44918), for deputizing qualified pilots as Federal flight deck officers and thereby authorizing them to carry firearms and to use force when confronted with acts of air piracy or other criminal violence (49 U.S.C. § 44921); provides law enforcement authority to designated officers of the Department of Homeland Security (40 U.S. C. § 1315); provides authority for sharing information acquired through electronic surveillance (50 U.S.C. § 1806) and tightens the criteria for purchasing, shipping, handling or transporting explosives (18 U.S.C. § 842).

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12.4.1 Examples for discussion Many of the USA PATRIOT Act’s most controversial provisions involve investiga­ tive powers that are by definition secret, making it literally impossible for abuses to be uncovered. For example, the act expanded the authority to conduct wiretaps and searches under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) without having to show probable cause of criminal activity. We know from a government report that the number of FISA searches has dramatically increased since the USA PATRIOT Act was passed, and for the first time now exceeds the number of conventional wire­ taps authorized in criminal cases (USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Authorities, 2005). Yet that’s all we know, because everything else about FISA searches and wiretaps is secret. For example, the target of a FISA search is never notified, unless evidence from the search is subsequently used in a criminal prosecution, and even then, the defendant cannot see the application for the search, and therefore cannot test its legality in court. When the attorney general uses conventional criminal wiretaps, he is required to file an extensive report listing the legal basis for each wiretap, its duration, and whether it resulted in a criminal charge or conviction. But no such information is required under FISA. The annual report detailing use of the criminal wiretap authority exceeds one hundred pages; the report on the use of FISA is a onepage letter. By way of another example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in 2010 that users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails stored by their internet service provider (United States v. Warshak, 2010). The court ruled that the Stored Communications Act10 provision, which permitted the Government to secretly obtain the contents of email messages, was unconstitutional as emails are entitled to the same protections as telephone conversations and that a federal law permit­ ting warrantless secret searches of e-mail violates the Fourth Amendment. The court ruled that there was a difference between the so-called meta-data stored by the ISP about each e-mail—the addressee, time of transmission and so forth—and the con­ tent of the e-mail message itself. The U.S. government argued that there could be no reasonable expectation of privacy, because e-mail is sent via a third party, but the court held, “Where the third party is not expected to access the e-mails in the normal course of business … the party (sending them) maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy”. While this holding is now generally accepted, the courts have held that the to/from addresses of e-mail messages, the IP addresses of websites visited, and the total amount of data transferred to or from an account are not protected by the Fourth Amendment (United States v. Forrester, 2007). Another provision of the USA PATRIOT Act radically expands the government’s ability to obtain personal business records without showing probable cause. Before the USA PATRIOT Act was passed, the government had to limit its inquiries to a specific set of financial, phone and travel records, and these could be obtained only if the target was an “agent of a foreign power”. The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the definition of records that may be seized, so that it now includes, among other things, library and bookstore records and medical files. And it eliminated the requirement that the person whose records are sought be an “agent of a foreign power”. Thus, the government can now obtain anyone’s records. But here, too, the authority is veiled in secrecy. The USA PATRIOT Act makes it a crime for the person or organization

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ordered to produce records to tell anyone about the request. The Act does not require the government to notify people whose records have been reviewed and does not require that any report of its activities be made available to the public (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). 12.4.2 Legislative delegation Although Congress has the plenary power to create laws, it may delegate rulemaking power to executive branch agencies. The Courts have held that this is con­ stitutionally permitted so long as Congress articulates an “intelligible principle” to guide the agency and limit agency discretion. It is clear how legislative delegation impacts homeland and national security law, as different Presidential administrations may leverage this power differentially to enact laws to please their constituents.

12.5 Article II—Presidential power We discussed above the broad powers of the President contained in the Article II vesting clause; language without the limitation11 contained in the Congressional vesting clause in Article I. As we shall shortly see, however, the U.S. Supreme Court placed some limits on Presidential power in the (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer, 1952) case. First, though, we should note three of the sources of Presidential power relevant to homeland security. These take the form of “clauses” as follows: 1. Commander in Chief Clause: “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States”. For the United States to engage in war requires the powers of both the legislative and executive branches. As has been said, “It takes two keys to start the engine of war” (Dolan, 2006). But there is no clear legal standard as to the boundaries of the war making power. In Korea, President Truman acted when the United Nations Security Council authorized action but without congressional approval. Truman con­ tended that the United States’ involvement in Korea was not actually war—it was a “police action” instead. During the Korean War, President Truman issued an Executive Order which granted the Secretary of Commerce the power to take possession of certain steel companies—specifically those that were about to start union strikes. President Truman believed that he had the power as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to seize private property that he deemed necessary to support the war efforts in Korea. So, Truman ordered the seizure of the steel plants, intending to run them with soldiers to keep production flowing. The steel companies (led by Youngstown Iron Sheet and Tube Company) sued and requested the federal court to enjoin the administration from the seizure. The US Supreme Court ultimately found that the President did not have the authority to issue such an order. The Supreme Court delineated Presidential authority in three circum­ stances: when the President acts with the support of Congress, (2) when the President acts and Congress has not weighed in, and (3) when the President’s actions are directly contrary to the policy enacted by Congress. In situations

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like Youngstown, where the President ignores the policy created by Congress,12 his power is said to be at its lowest ebb. 2. The Executive Clause states that the office “Take care that the Laws be faith­ fully executed…”. This clause requires the President, as the Nation’s Chief Executive Officer, to assure that the Executive Branch enforces the laws. Thus, the President has a duty to assure that not just private individuals, but state and local governments are in compliance with federal law. 3. The Opinion Clause provides that the President “may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices…” (U.S. Const. art. II, § 2). Chief Justice John Marshall noted in Marbury v. Madison (Marbury v. Madison, 1803), “To aid [the President] in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders”. The Opinion Clause is one of only two references, and only by implication, in the Constitution to an Executive support system for the President. The other is in the Appointments clause, which immediately follows, giving the President the power to appoint, among others, “public ministers and Consuls” and “all other Officers if the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for…” (U.S. Const. art II, § 2). It certainly seems to presume a Cabinet as it notes the need for specialized areas of knowledge which the President may call upon. The appointments section gives the Congress the authority to appoint “such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone…or in the Heads of departments” (U.S. Const. art II, § 2). Thus, the President is given broad discretionary authority in not just the cabinet members selected, but in deciding the composition of the executive branch. The approval of a Cabinet secretary is subject to Senate approval and the creation of a department requires Congressional approval, both in the appointment of other officers of the department, but also through its Spending Power. When the department of homeland security was created, it was proposed by President George W. Bush, but it required an act of Congress to enact it.

12.5.1 Executive orders—the creation of FEMA The power of the President to act through its executive powers in extremely broad and is only limited by the Constitution or by the power of Congress to constrain the President in areas of shared responsibility. An interesting example of the depth and breadth of the executive order is the creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The agency was created by executive orders which were acknowl­ edged by Congress through subsequent legislation. FEMA has been charged with car­ rying out activities that enable the federal, state and local governments to address a wide range of emergency management functions. In carrying out its mission, FEMA has (1) funded and coordinated emergency preparedness activities, (2) provided and coordinated immediate federal response to save lives and property, (3) funded the reconstruction of damaged homes and infrastructure to help stricken families and communities recover and (4) supported hazard mitigation activities to ensure that future disasters do not recur, or are less destructive in the future.

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242 Michael McDaniel The agency was created by Executive Order 12127, Federal Emergency Management Agency, dated March 31, 1979, which transferred the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration and the National Academy for Fire Prevention and Control from the Department of Commerce; the National Flood Insurance Program from the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Emergency Broadcast System from Executive Office of the President. Very soon thereafter, Executive Order 12148, Federal Emergency Management, of July 20, 1979, transferred the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency from the Department of Defense; the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration from the Department of Housing and Urban Development; the Federal Preparedness Agency from the General Services Administration and the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program from the Office of Science and Technology in Executive Office of the President. Another Executive Order, in 1988, started to truly shape FEMA conceptually towards its continuing role of coordination of federal government response. FEMA was given responsibility for emergency preparedness at the national security level by Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, of November 18, 1988. The purpose of this Executive Order was to provide for the continuity of government, with lines of succession to assure that federal depart­ ments and agencies would continue to operate during emergencies if senior officials become incapacitated. Executive Order 12656 assigned the federal departments with specific primary responsibilities, consistent with their authorities and purposes, during a national security emergency. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services is responsible for the mobilization of the health industry and health resources to ensure health, mental health, and medical services during the emergency. Congress has the power under the Constitution to ratify or amend the actions of the President, particularly in domestic affairs, as discussed in the Youngstown case. While FEMA was created by Executive Order, Congress has acted on two occasions to substantially alter its structure and functions in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (2006). 12.5.2 State sovereignty and police power While Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution specifies many powers given to the fed­ eral Congress, previously held by the states, and the Supreme Court has recognized that the Congress has aligned implied powers as needed to carry out those powers (McCulloch v. Maryland, 1819), the “police power” is not expressly included and has been largely left to the states. The police power is the power of a government to reg­ ulate activities for the protection of the people’s health and safety. The state police power derives from the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, which gives states the rights and powers “not delegated to the United States”. States are thus granted the power to establish and enforce laws protecting the welfare, safety and health of the public. In an early case, the Supreme Court seemed content to simply note the implicit reservation of the police power to the states, without attempting to define its content or scope. In Gibbons v Ogden, the Court characterized the states’ police powers as “that immense mass of legislation, which embraces everything within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government” (Gibbons v Ogden, 1824, p. 203). The Court continues, describing such police powers as including “Inspection laws,

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quarantine laws, health laws of every description as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a state…” (p. 203). When catastrophic natural disasters occur, the principal federal statute providing assistance to state and local governments, as well as to individuals, is the Stafford Act. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA is the federal agency principally charged to care for Americans who are victims of natural disasters. But because the “police power” is reserved to the states in the Constitution, FEMA’s role is to assist and support the states. Note carefully the verbs used in the Stafford Act. The structure of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 (Stafford Act, 1988) exemplifies the recognition that the states’ police powers include primary authority over natural disasters and emergencies within their state. The mission of FEMA as set forth in the Stafford Act is to assist the efforts of the states “in expediting the rendering of aid, assistance, and emergency services, and the reconstruction and rehabilitation of devastated areas” (Stafford Act, 1988). FEMA assists state and local governments ”in carrying out their respon­ sibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage“ that result from major disasters and emergencies (Stafford Act, 1988). FEMA provides federal assistance programs for public and private losses and needs resulting from disasters (Stafford Act, 1988). This recognition of the states’ authority is also embedded in the emergency declaration process. Before FEMA can render assistance, with few exceptions,13 a governor of a state must first request that the President declare the existence of a major disaster or emer­ gency in the area (Stafford Act, 1988). The governor’s request must be based on a deter­ mination that “the disaster is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State”, and local governments affected by the disaster and that ”federal assistance is necessary” (Stafford Act, 1988). Based on that request, the President may declare that a major disaster or emergency exists, which then trig­ gers the provision of FEMA assistance. If the President declares a major disaster or emergency, then FEMA may also (1) direct federal agencies to use their authorities and resources granted under federal law to support state and local assistance efforts; (2) coordinate all disaster efforts between federal agencies and state and local govern­ ments; (3) provide technical and advisory assistance to state and local governments; (4) help state and local governments distribute medicine, food, other consumables and emergency assistance and (5) provide “accelerated” federal assistance and support (Stafford Act, 1988). 12.5.3 Tension between federal and state sovereignty: Hurricane Katrina case study Hurricane Katrina struck Louisiana and its neighboring states at the end of August 2005, followed within weeks by Hurricanes Rita and Wilma. The emergency manage­ ment response by all levels of government revealed failures in planning, execution, communications and organizational structure. The public observed days of suffering by the residents of New Orleans accompanied by attempted blame deflection by the city and state governments and FEMA and the White House. Mayor Ray Nagin com­ plained that federal officials “don’t have a clue what’s going on down here”. President Bush and Governor Blanco could not come to agreement concerning the scope of the involvement of the federal government. Governor Blanco wanted to lead the response

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244 Michael McDaniel efforts, but realized the State needed massive federal resources. Meanwhile FEMA Director Michael Brown blamed Nagin and Blanco, believing that their disagree­ ments were slowing state decision-making and thus, FEMA’s provision of resources. Louisiana Governor Blanco had requested “emergency protective measures, [in par­ ticular] direct Federal Assistance” (Bier, 2006). The governor was frustrated that FEMA Director Mike Brown was slow to act, as he followed the National Incident Management System and the FEMA practice of requiring itemized requests. She complained that she could not get the “feds” to respond. Her appeal: “Mr. President, we need your help. We need everything you’ve got”. FEMA Director Mike Brown blamed the delay on the mayor and the Governor, as they squabbled over issues such as if and when a mandatory evacuation should be ordered. Despite her request for an overwhelming federal response, Governor Blanco appeared reluctant to permit the Louisiana National Guard to be “federalized”, that is, to be called into federal service where the President, not the Governor, would be its Commander in Chief (Bier, 2006). President George W. Bush was also frustrated. His aides urged him to federalize the Louisiana National Guard, placing them under federal military command, and therefore assuring unity of command with a single command and control structure from the President to the troops on the ground. The President refused to do so without the Governor’s acquiescence: “If I invoked the Insurrection Act against her wishes, the world would see a male Republican president usurping the authority of a female Democratic governor by declaring an insurrection in a largely African American city” (Allan, 2017).

12.6 Fourth amendment The American people have two protections from excessive federal power in the 4th Amendment: the warrant requirement, and the much broader and flexible edict that people have the right: “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures…” This broadly worded prohibition against unreasonable governmental intrusions is a main basis for the assertion of the right to privacy, but the First, Fourteenth and other amendments contribute to the restriction on governmental intrusions as well (Griswold v Connecticut, 1965). The simplicity and flexibility of the 4th Amendment has permitted jurists to balance the government’s needs against the individual rights to privacy, as only unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited. Technological advances have been met in the past and solutions crafted by both the Congress and the Courts, but the speed of technological advancement, now coupled with the political urgency of the war on terror, are testing the 4th Amendment’s ability to protect individual privacy from the rapid evolution of computer technology. The Supreme Court described, in Katz v. United States (Katz v. United States, 1967), the test for determining whether law enforcement efforts to obtain evidence constitute a Fourth Amendment “search” by creating a two-pronged test. The first prong requires “[t]he person must have had an actual or subjective expectation of privacy”. The second prong demands that this subjective “expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”. Both elements must be present for the 4th Amendment to be triggered. Absent a “reasonable expectation of privacy” then there is no 4th Amendment protection or other limitation on governmental

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action. For example, would a phone call or email constitute a type of private mes­ sage? Of course, if it is a privately-owned phone. What if the call occurs at work? The workplace is an obvious situation where there is a diminished expectation of privacy. What about other public venues, such a store, sidewalk or movie theater? Is there an expectation of privacy? Perhaps. Is it reasonable to expect that such messages be pri­ vate? What of the person that always sits behinds me at the theatre and gives a play by play of the plot on his cell phone to his girlfriend because he is too cheap to take her on a date? The context of the call matters. Even though the Court in Katz said that the expectation of privacy was subjective, the definition of reasonableness also requires some form of objective standard. Consider Kyllo v. United States (Kyllo v. United States, 2001) where law enforce­ ment used a thermal imaging device to detect indoor marijuana cultivation. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, recognized that a visual observation of a house that is in plain view is “no ‘search’ at all”. Scalia, applying the Katz test, then found that there is an inherent expectation of privacy of the interior of a home that is per se reasonable. A thermal imager, Scalia pointed out, revealed intimate details about the interior of a home, even though it was only how warm, or relatively warm, Kyllo was heating his residence. “In the home”, Scalia wrote, “all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes”. The use of thermal imaging to scan a home constituted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it allowed law enforcement to obtain information regarding “the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion …” Kyllo represents a clear example of an advanced technology that triggers Fourth Amendment protections because it reveals inti­ mate details.14 In attempting to apply the reasonable expectation of privacy standard to email, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, in United States v. Maxwell15 (United States v Maxwell, 1996), analogized e-mail to both first class mail and tele­ phone calls. The court ruled that e-mail was similar to first class mail in that “if a sender of first-class mail seals an envelope and addresses it to another person, the sender can reasonably expect the contents to remain private and free from the eyes of the police absent a search warrant founded upon probable cause”. The court addi­ tionally ruled e-mail maintained some qualities of telephone calls as “the maker of a telephone call has a reasonable expectation that police officials will not intercept and listen to the conversation”. Based on these similarities, the court found “the transmit­ ter of an e-mail message enjoys a reasonable expectation that police officials will not intercept the transmission”. The court, however, noted that, like a letter, the privacy expectation can be lost “once the [e-mail] is received and opened, the destiny of the letter then lies in the control of the recipient of the letter, not the sender, absent some legal privilege”. The Maxwell court also narrowed its holding, due to the unique prop­ erties of email: Expectations of privacy in e-mail transmissions depend in large part on the type of e-mail involved and the intended recipient… [E]-mail that is “forwarded” from corre­ spondent to correspondent lose[s] any semblance of privacy. Once these transmissions are sent out to more and more subscribers, the subsequent expectation of privacy incrementally diminishes”. Other cases have noted that participants in chat rooms, for example, lack the expectation of privacy that an email recipient enjoys. For purposes of this discussion, though, emails and phone calls, even internationally, when they

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emanate from the US, or are to a recipient in the US, enjoy an expectation of privacy and thus, are afforded the protections of the 4th Amendment (p. 419), Computers record virtually everything we do these days—whom we call or e-mail, when and for how long, our opinions on social media, what Web sites we search, where we travel, and everything we buy by credit card or check. “The prospect of the military and civilian security agencies constantly trolling through all of this information about innocent citizens in hopes of finding terrorists led Congress to ban spending on the Total Information Awareness program in 2003” (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). While that program was stopped, one must wonder whether the programs were killed by privacy concerns or by bad marketing. Congress has, after all, directed the Department of Homeland Security to develop “data mining and other advanced analytic tools…to access, receive and analyze data, detect and identify threats of terrorism against the United States”. Data mining, the analysis of extensive electronic databases on private individuals to discover patterns of suspicious activity, is but one example of the threats to pri­ vacy that Americans have faced following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. “Since then, through the USA Patriot Act, FISA amendments, and various execu­ tive initiatives, the government has authorized official monitoring of attorney—client conversations, wide-ranging secret searches and wiretaps, the collection of Internet and e-mail addressing data, spying on religious services and the meetings of political groups, and the collection of library and other business records. All of these activities can be done without a demonstration of probable cause that the people being inves­ tigated are engaged in criminal activity, the constitutional and customary threshold that must be passed before the government may invade the privacy of its citizenry” (Cole & Dempsey, 2006). 12.6.1 TSA and the fourth amendment With the creation of the Transportation Security Agency, and the implementation of processes and technology to prevent terrorists from repeating the method of attack used on September 11, 2001, Constitutional issues of whether their methods violate the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment or the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment have been plentiful. While for the most part their processes have been upheld by the Courts, consider whether TSA’s reputation for service and efficiency would have been higher if there had been a full discussion or balancing of the often-contradictory issues of national security versus individual rights. Based on the language of the Fourth Amendment, any searches of people or their property must be reasonable. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States v. Davis, a case decided more than thirty years before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the creation of the TSA, that the United States government was sufficiently involved in airport screenings to require that the screenings comply with the Fourth Amendment (United States v. Davis, 1973). Because airport searches and screenings must comply with the Fourth Amendment, the searches and screen­ ings must be reasonable (p. 910). Davis was caught trying to board an aircraft while carrying a concealed weapon (p. 895). Security found the weapon during a routine search of the passenger’s carry-on luggage. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the airport screenings were administrative searches. The courts have held that

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administrative searches did not require probable cause, so long as the searches were “conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose. (p. 896)”. The court held that the purpose of the regulatory scheme in the case of airport searches was to deter people from taking weapons or explosives onto airplanes. The court cautioned that if airport screenings and searches become gen­ eral searches for evidence of a crime, courts will have to exclude the evidence found because it would no longer be an administrative search. Since there was no proof that the purpose of the searches was to find evidence of crimes, the court applied a reason­ ableness test (pp. 909–910). The court held that pre-boarding screenings of passengers and carry-on luggage was reasonably necessary to meet the need of preventing attacks on airplanes. In the Davis case and in Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc., the court created a test to determine the reasonableness of airport searches. An airport search is rea­ sonable if “[1] it is no more extensive or intensive than necessary, in light of current technology, to detect weapons or explosives, [2] it is confined in good faith to that pur­ pose, and [3] passengers may avoid the search by electing not to fly” (Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc., 2002). The United States Supreme Court has held that the country has a right to protect itself by stopping and inspecting people and items crossing into the country (United States v. Ramsey, 1977). The Court has held that searches at the national border were reasonable solely because they occurred at the border. The view that searches at national borders are reasonable dates back to 1789, when Congress passed a stat­ ute that “gave customs officials ‘full power and authority’ to enter and search “any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or other merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed” (United States v. Ramsey, p. 616). In Carroll v. United States, the Supreme Court held that border searches were not subject to the warrant provisions of the Fourth Amendment (Carroll v. United States, 1925). There was a long history of the United States Supreme Court viewing searches at borders differently than searches of a person or his or her home inside the United States. Let us consider the case of Dr. Rahinah Ibrahim who successfully sued the DHS to be removed from the TSA No-Fly list. Despite a conceded lack of evidence that she was a terrorist or belonged to a terrorist organization, and the federal govern­ ment’s refusal to explain what familial or other connection she might have to a terror­ ist organization, Dr. Ibrahim has been unsuccessful in returning to the United States (Rahinah Ibrahim v Dept. of Homeland Security et al., 2019). 12.6.2 Fourth amendment case study Rahinah Ibrahim was a graduate student in engineering at Stanford University and a Malaysian citizen. She arrived, on January 2, 2005, at San Francisco International Airport. Rahinah needed wheelchair assistance due to a recent operation. She was headed back to Malaysia after a stopover in Hawaii where she intended to present her doctoral research at a conference sponsored by Stanford. Police placed her in a hold­ ing cell for two hours until an official from DHS arrived. He apologized to Ibrahim for her arrest and told her that she had been removed from the TSA no-fly list and was now free to fly. It was the first time Ibrahim knew she was on the no-fly list. On March 10, 2005, 10 weeks after her encounter at the San Francisco airport, Ibrahim was set to fly from Malaysia to Stanford to finalize her doctoral thesis. She was asked to step

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out of line and, five minutes before her flight was to depart, she was advised that her F1 student visa had been revoked. She was barred from re-entering the United States. Her January detention came just days after she was interviewed by a San Jose-based FBI agent. The agent testified that he intended to place Ibrahim on a “selectee list that leads travelers to receive additional scrutiny but is not a flat-out bar on air travel”. In 2014, the federal government at last conceded that she posed no threat to our safety or national security, had never posed a threat to national security, and should never have been placed on the No-Fly list. After nine years of litigation, the Court ordered the federal government to remove her from the Terror Screening Database and from any other lists. One year later, however, when Ibrahim, now a fully tenured professor in Malaysia, again applied for a visa to visit Stanford, the State Department again denied her, stating that a family member was a member of a terrorist organization (Sinnar, 2016).

12.7 Fifth amendment due process of law The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the federal gov­ ernment from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law”.16 The Fifth Amendment has been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court to embody a substantive, as well as a procedural, liberty interest in due process. Substantive due process is not limited to the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights and its penumbras. The liberty interests accorded strongest protection under substantive due process are those found to be fundamental. In defining what constitutes a fundamental liberty interest, the Court looks at whether the right in question is deeply rooted in our history, traditions and evolving collective conscience, such that it is implicit in the Anglo-American concept of ordered liberty. If the right is found to be a fundamental liberty interest under this “deeply rooted” test, statutes or other government actions that infringe upon it are presumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny (Calabresi & Agudo, 2008).

12.8 Fourteenth amendment Our discussion of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments has centered on how these amendments limit the actions of the federal government. The Fourth Amendment prohibits the federal government from unreasonably searching or seizing private per­ sons or their property and requires that warrants be issued only where the govern­ ment demonstrates probable cause. The Fifth Amendment requires that the federal government act with due process of law. The first ten amendments, commonly known as the Bill of Rights, were added to protect the right of citizens from the newly cre­ ated federal government. The 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1868, was one of three amendments created post-Civil War to abolish slavery and establish civil and legal rights for black Americans. The Amendment wrought seis­ mic changes in American society, as it granted citizenship to all persons, including former slaves, born or naturalized in the United States, guaranteed all persons due process and equal protection of the laws, and empowered the federal government to protect those rights from infringement by the several States. State and local gov­ ernments must assure that their actions, in creating or enforcing their laws, do not violate the due process and equal protection rights of persons within their State. The

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first section of the Fourteenth Amendment discussed citizenship and then used the word “persons” when referring to those to be accorded due process and equal protection. Thus, these constitutional protections are not limited only to citizens, but apply, generally, to all those residing within the United States.17 The Fourteenth Amendment also altered the balance of power between the federal and state gov­ ernments by giving Congress the power to pass laws to safeguard the provisions in Section 1 of the 14th Amendment. 12.8.1 Due process of law case study On September 30, 2011, Anwar al-Aulaqi and Samir Khan, both American citizens, along with a few other individuals, were killed by CIA-operated drones. The strike was the culmination of investigative efforts spanning more than a decade. Officials had been looking at al-Aulaqi because of his radical sermons and close ties to extremists. Following Farouk Abdulmutallab’s failed attack on Christmas Day 2009, it was dis­ covered that al-Aulaqi was the individual that had sponsored the Abdulmutallab plot. After the failed Christmas Day bombing, the Department of Justice (DOJ) was tasked with determining whether the United States could constitutionally target and kill al-Aulaqi, despite his citizenship, without judicial process. The initial conclusion by DOJ was that “based on the evidence available at the time, that Mr. al-Aulaqi was a lawful target because he was participating in the war with Al Qaeda and also because he was a specific threat to the country”. The process for adding an individual to the US “kill list” required analysis by the CIA that an individual posed a cur­ rent and ongoing threat to the US and thus met the criteria for lethal action. The CIA director had to approve all individuals added to the kill list. For US citizens, the President had to approve their inclusion and thus, sign their death warrant. Applicable Congressional leadership was informed after the strikes occurred. “The overlapping reasoning justified a strike either by the Pentagon, which generally operated within the Congressional authorization to use military force against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), or by the CIA, a civilian agency which generally operated within a ‘national self-defense’ framework deriving from a president’s security powers”. In response to a lawsuit filed by al-Aulaqi’s father (al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 2014), the Government argued that al-Aulaqi’s placement on the “kill list” was justified because he “pledged an oath of loyalty to AQAP …, and is playing a key role in setting the strategic direction for AQAP”. Additionally, the Government charged “that al-Aulaqi personally instructed Abdulmuttalab ‘to detonate an explosive device aboard a U.S. airplane,’ as part of a larger shift toward an operational leadership role with AQAP” (Sampaio & Vedovato, 2015). Many legal analysts challenged the legal authority to order the targeted killing of an American citizen without any judicial process. One contended due process was necessary “[f]or thorough truth-finding, one could say, or to uphold the pageantry of constitutional justice, which is a crown jewel of our democracy. To lend unques­ tioned legitimacy to the ultimate sentence, even if its death, so the world does not look upon America with repugnance. To keep the trappings of civilized order so that we do not become a vigilante state”. Following the targeted killing, many journalists and activist groups, like the ACLU (Ito, 2011), filed FOIA requests with the DOJ and CIA for the legal justification for targeted killing, but both agencies denied the requests.

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250 Michael McDaniel Regarding the 5th Amendment guarantee of due process, the DOJ attorneys con­ cluded that based on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 5th Amendment, prior judicial approval was not necessary because al-Aulaqi posed a significant wartime threat. If he had taken up arms against the US, or assisted others to do so, then he lost his protections as a US citizen. Supporters of the targeted killing believed that the Government was able to jus­ tify it because Al-Awlaki was located, purposefully, in a place where neither the host-state government (Yemen) nor the United States had a plausible opportunity to capture him (combined with his asserted operational role and the resultant premise that he posed an imminent threat to life) (Chesney, 2011). The tipping point vali­ dating the killing of al-Aulaqi, was most likely his involvement in the instruction of Abdulmuttalab in the Christmas Day operation. There has been no similar indica­ tion, however, that Samir Khan was involved in operations but was prized for his obvious fluency in American dialect and culture and his ability to recruit on behalf of AQAP. Finally, the al-Aulaqi scenario encompassed exactly the sort of complex military, intelligence and policy judgments that often remain the province of the Executive Branch because the underlying reasons are considered nonjusticiable, that is, there were no judicially manageable standards for reviewing these sorts of decision made by the National Security Council and the President.

12.9 Other applicable homeland security-related laws When Emergency Management and Homeland Security officials think of the bestknown laws in this discipline, chances are they will recall the Stafford Act and the Insurrection Act. Tellingly, US policy prior to the attacks on 9/11 was focused on our response to natural or manmade events. The Stafford Act, as discussed above, is the primary mechanism in which federal and state governments coordinated their response to natural, or sometimes manmade, disasters. The Insurrection Act author­ ized the President to use military troops to respond to intentional manmade events, including rebellion, riots, breaches of the peace that overwhelmed state resources, and organized violence which threatened the Constitutional rights of groups of its citizenry. After the events of 9/11, the policy focus shifted to prevention of terrorist attacks and preparedness for the eventuality of another attack. Accordingly, and in an attempt to show the American people that Congress understood the risks facing the nation, Congress in very short time frame passed the PATRIOT Act, Homeland Security Act, the Critical Infrastructure Information Act, the Maritime Security Act, the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, among others. 12.9.1 Insurrection Act In response to Shay’s Rebellion in the winter of 1786 and to the rise of the Ku Klux Klan after the Civil War, Congress passed certain measures giving extraordinary powers to the President to suppress rebellions. Those authorities have been codified as the Insurrection Act of 1807.

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There are three principle provisions in the Insurrection Act pertinent to homeland security theory: 1. Under Section 331, upon a request from the State’s legislature or of the State’s governor if the legislature cannot convene, the President could call on the armed forces to suppress an insurrection. This section essentially reflects the Insurrection Act of 1807. Note that the State authorities first must make their own determination as to whether or not they needed or wanted federal assistance. The initial decision therefore belonged to the state rather than the President. This section reflects the recognition of strong state sovereignty, even after ratification of the U.S. Constitution. Congress acknowledges that the fed­ eral government should not act militarily within a state, without the invitation of the state itself. 2. Section 332 permits the President to act without a request from a state. The President may call for the use of the armed forces to enforce the laws of the United States or to suppress a rebellion where unlawful obstructions, combi­ nations or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States made it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. This provision is markedly different—it author­ izes the President to use the federal military when he or she determines it neces­ sary to enforce federal law or to suppress unlawful assemblage when the federal courts are incapable of so doing. The authority to so act lies in President’s con­ stitutional duty under Article II, Section 3, to “take care that the laws be faith­ fully executed”. 3. Section 333 is the successor to the Civil Rights Act of 1871. This section also permits the President to act without a request from a state. It recognizes two circumstances where the President may use military force: a. Where an insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or con­ spiracy hinders the execution of the laws of a state and the laws of the United States to the extent that the people are deprived of a right, privilege or immunity, or other named constitutional right, and where the author­ ities of the state failed, or were unable to protect that right, privilege or immunity. b. The second is where the insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combi­ nation, or conspiracy opposed or obstructed the execution of the laws of the United States. Note the difference in the wording of Section 333, enacted after the Civil War. The first condition applies when a state denies, by failing to act to protect, rights, privileges or immunities under the laws. It was intended to have the same broad scope as the Fourteenth Amendment. The second condition applies to situations which exhibit a more direct opposition or resistance to federal authority. 12.9.2 Posse Comitatus Act Following the Civil War, use of military assets in local law enforcement became a concern. The Posse Comitatus Act (1878) (PCA) was one response to this. The PCA states: Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the

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Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or impris­ oned for not more than two years, or both” (18 U.S.C. § 1385). Note the first clause—it expressly authorizes those law enforcement activities that either the Constitution or Congress authorize the military to engage in. Although the law predates the Steel Seizure case by decades (it was passed in the Reconstruction Era to limit US troops occupying the former Confederate states) the language closely follows both in wording and intention, Justice Jackson’s description therein of when the Executive Branch is at its maximum authority. Congress subsequently directed the Secretary of Defense to prescribe regulations “to prohibit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless … otherwise author­ ized by law” (10 U.S.C. § 375). In addition, the Department of Defense passed regulations which prohibited direct cooperation with civilian law enforcement officials. Such prohibited direct assistance expressly included search and seizure, the arrest, apprehension or “stop and frisk” of individuals, interdiction, or surveillance, pursuit or interrogation of personnel. Working undercover, as an investigator, or running confidential sources were also prohibited law enforcement activity.18 Congress intended, “according to the legislative history… to eliminate the direct active use of federal troops by civil law enforcement officers. The preven­ tion of the use of military supplies and equipment was never mentioned in the debates, nor can it reasonably be read into the words of the Act” (United States v. Red Feather, 1975). While the military has traditionally and rightfully been cautious not to engage in civilian law enforcement activity, the military can provide a wide range of support to law enforcement, including equipment, personnel, facilities, training, that would be of use to civilian law enforcement, particularly for such missions as surveillance and communications. Given the expansion of technology in these areas, is there a danger that the military could be perceived as, or engaged in, an activity that the public would perceive as law enforcement?

12.10 Summary and conclusions The focus of this chapter was two-fold: to analyze the interrelationship of homeland security policy and law and to consider how the Constitution informs the roles and duties of all players in the Homeland Security field—that is, to demonstrate how law and policy support homeland security institutional structure, operations and strategy. The homeland security enterprise is comprised of many different federal agencies and all levels of government. All branches of government are involved in the creation of both law and policy, through the legislative enactment of statutes, President execu­ tive orders and administrative regulation and through judicial decisions limiting or endorsing the policy decisions of the other two branches. Therefore, through case studies and through the discussion of selected laws, we have explored the concept of federalism and the roles of the state and federal governments as separate sover­ eigns with different authorities and duties. While the phrase “separation of powers” is nowhere to be found therein, our exploration of the Constitutionally proscribed roles of the executive and legislative branches explained the concept. The implied powers

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accorded the President reflect the Constitution’s recognition of the need for discretion in decision-making and agile problem-solving as the executive branch confronts com­ plex or unforeseen national events. We also considered, through the case studies, how homeland security policies differ from other exercises of police power or the health and welfare protection, as many of the laws post 9/11 were enacted without broad con­ sideration from the full spectrum of stakeholders. By application of the steps in public policy development, we observed where the laws compelled the policy, rather than the policy development informing the laws and how both law and policy guide homeland security operations and strategy.

12.11 Discussion questions 1. What is meant by a posse comitatus? 2. What do you think are the policy reasons that support posse comitatus? Can you think of a constitutional basis for the prohibition? 3. Can you think of an example in the Twentieth Century where a President might send in federal troops to assure equal protection of the laws and where the State refused to act to protect the rights of its citizens? 4. Were the actions of the US government unconstitutional, as Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, both American citizens, were killed without due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution? 5. Did FEMA Director Brown suffer from a “failure of imagination”, as he was unable to envision the scope of human suffering, media coverage, and inter­ governmental rancor to follow, as a result of his reliance on the stage by stage response approach inherent in the National Incident Management System? Or, is NIMS designed to assure that FEMA did not unduly interfere with state sovereignty?

Notes 1. Consider the laws passed just in the first 12 months, post 9/11: USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub.L. 107-56, 115 Stat 272 (2001); Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat 2135 (2002); Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act of 2002, Pub.L. 177-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002); The Aviation and Transportation Secu­ rity Act of 2001, Pub.L. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597(2001); Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002, Pub.L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002); The Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 131–134 (2002); The Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 657 (2002); The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub.L. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064–2134 (2002); The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002). 2. See U.S. Constitution, Art VI, §1, cl. 3. 3. “The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States”. 4. See for example The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, 46 U.S.C. § 70102 (2002) (requiring the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security “to identify those vessel types and United States facilities that pose a high risk of being involved in a transportation security incident”.

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5. See for example: McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 6. Note that spelling and grammar as used in the US Constitution have been preserved. 7. The 10th Amendment to the US Constitution provides that: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”. U.S. Const. amend. X. 8. Without the power of the purse, that is, the ability to raise revenues to fund a military expedition, the power to declare war is almost meaningless. An oft-noted example of the frailty of the central government was its inability to timely seat a quorum to ratify the Treaty of Paris, marking its independence or to pay the expense of sending the ratified treaty to England. See, e.g., U.S. Code 1952 Edition, Articles of Confederation—1777. 9. The implied powers of Congress were first recognized by the US Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 10. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 addresses voluntary and compelled disclosure of “stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records” held by third-party internet ser­ vice providers. It was enacted as Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. 11. “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress….” U.S. Const. art. 1, § 1. 12. Congress, through the Taft-Hartley Act, had created a mechanism to resolve such labor disputes, which would have prevented the ensuing United Steel Workers Union strike. 13. See discussion of the Insurrection Act. 14. Unfortunately, the Court also included a poorly phrased methods-based caveat to the test, adding “at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use”. 15. The Maxwell decision will seem quaint today in its discussion of the applicable technol­ ogy. But the Court’s continuing struggle, well-demonstrated in this case, to balance the 4th Amendment promise of a reasonable expectation of privacy with law enforcement needs to combat technology-facilitated crimes may serve as the basis of another case study. The Court’s application of the “Third Party Doctrine”, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in data held by a third party, should be explored simultaneously. See Smith v Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), and Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018). 16. While the Fifth Amendment is directed at the federal government, the Fourteenth Amendment has a parallel limitation on state and local governments, also requiring that an act by the government against its people must be undertaken with due process of law. 17. The U.S. Supreme Court case in Plyer v. Doe, involved the State of Texas’ revision of its laws to exclude the children of undocumented immigrants from being eligible to attend K-12 school. The Court held that the children of undocumented immigrants are “people” as stated in the 14th Amendment, and under the Equal Protection clause one’s immigra­ tion status is not a sufficient rational basis for denying benefits afforded to other residents. 18. DoDD 5525.5, DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.

References Anonymous. (2006). 10 U.S.C. § 275. Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta. (2014). 35 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D.D.C. 2014). Allan, H. K. (2017). Paradoxes of sovereignty and citizenship: Humanitarian intervention at home. CUNY Law Review, 20(2), 389. Amar, A. R. (2005). America’s constitution, a biography. New York, NY :Random House. Bank Secrecy Act. (2012). 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5338. Bier, V. (2006). Hurricane Katrina as a bureaucratic nightmare. On Risk and Disaster. https:// doi.org/10.9783/9780812205473.243 Birkland, T. A. (2015). An introduction to the policy process: Theories, concepts, and models of public policy making. New York, NY: Routledge.

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Calabresi, S. G., & Agudo, S. E. (2008). Individuals rights under state constitutions when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868: What rights are deeply rooted in American history and tradition? Texas Law Review, 87(1), 7. Carroll v. United States. (1925). 267 U.S. 132. Chesney, R. (2011). Who may be killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a case study in the international legal regulation of lethal force. Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, 13, 3–60. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-811-8_1 Cole, D. (2004). Uncle Sam is watching you. Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works. 1. David Cole. New York Times Review of Books (November 18, 2004). Cole, D., & Dempsey, J. X. (2006). Terrorism and the constitution: Sacrificing civil liberties in the name of national security. New York, NY: New Press. Dolan, C. J. (2006). In war we trust: The Bush doctrine and the pursuit of just war. Aldershot: Ashgate. Electronic Communications Privacy Act. (2002). 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, et seq. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. (2019). 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801, et seq. Gibbons v Ogden. (1824). 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1. Griswold v Connecticut. (1965). 381 U.S. 479. Halchin, E., Hogue, H., Kaiser, F., Love, N., McCarthy, F. X., Reese, S., & Schwemle, B. (2007). Federal emergency management policy changes after Hurricane Katrina: A summary of statutory provisions, congressional research service. Keith Bea, Coordinator Specialist, American National Government, Government and Finance Division, Government and Finance Division. Congressional Research Center (CRS Report RL33729). https://fas.org/ sgp/crs/homesec/RL33729.pdf Homeland Security Act. (2002). 6 U.S.C. §§ 101–557 (2002), 49 U.S.C. § 44918 (2019). Insurrection Act. (n.d.). 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335. Ito, S. (2011, October 3). After Al-Aulaqi’s killing, why due process matters. ACLU. https:// www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/targeted-killing/after-al-aulaqis-killing-why­ due-process-matters Katz v. United States. (1967). 389 U.S. 347. Kyllo v. United States. (2001). 533 U.S. 27. Laurie, C. D., & Cole, R. H. (1997). The role of federal military forces in domestic disorders, 1877–1945. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army. Marbury v. Madison. (1803). 5 U.S. 137. McCulloch v. Maryland. (1819). 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316. Posse Comitatus Act. (1878). 18 U.S.C. § 1385. Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. (2006). Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143–164 (2006), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121 et seq. Rahinah Ibrahim v Dept. of Homeland Security, et al. (2019). No. 14-16161; 14-17272 (9th Cir. 2019). Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. (1988). 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5170. Sampaio, A. A., & Vedovato, L. R. (2015). With the stroke of a pen: Legal standards for add­ ing names to government kill lists. International Human Rights Law Review, 4(2), 194–221. https://doi.org/10.1163/22131035-00402001 Sinnar, S. (2016). Rule of law tropes in national security. Harvard Law Review, 129, 1566. Story, J. (1833). Commentaries on the constitution of the United States: With a preliminary review of the constitutional history of the colonies and states, before the adoption of the Constitution. Boston: Hilliard, Gray, and Company. Sylves, R., & Cumming, W. R. (2004). FEMA’s Path to Homeland Security: 1979–2003. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 1(2). https://doi.org/10.2202/1547-7355.1023 Taft, W. H. (1916). Our chief magistrate and his powers. Columbia University Press. Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc. (2002). 298 F.3d 1087, 1089. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.

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USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Authorities. (2005, April 27). https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/usa-patriot-act-amendments-to­ foreign-intelligence-surveillance-act-authorities USA PATRIOT Act. (2001). Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.

United States v. Davis. (1973). 482 F.2d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 1973).

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13 Cybersecurity policy and theory Maeve Dion

Description: Both modern lifestyles and modern concepts of national security are dependent on a safe, stable and resilient cyberspace. However, to create and sustain a safe and secure cyberspace is itself a wicked problem as the threat environment is dynamic, complex and policy responses untested and value laden. This chapter provides a survey of the broad and emergent field of cybersecurity and information assurance and how it is critical to preparedness and resilience of modern govern­ ments and private industry. Specifically, topics include a definition of information security, the concept of threat vectors, offensive and defense policies and strate­ gies, ethical and legal issues that surround the practice environment, risk manage­ ment strategies planning and information security technology. The role of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, other Federal agen­ cies, State and Local government and the private sector in securing the cyberspace and the nation’s information-related infrastructures are also explored. The complex international milieu of accords, policies, laws, treaties that currently govern cybersecurity are discussed. Upon completion of this chapter, students will be able to: 1. Explain the history and evolution of information security, key terms and con­ cepts and the role of public and private sector stakeholders in cybersecurity. 2. Identify key aspects of modern cybersecurity policy and theory as they pertain to protecting information assets, responding to attacks and sustaining organi­ zational preparedness/resilience. 3. Describe current threat vectors (i.e., asymmetric threats, the Internet of Things, the “advanced persistent threat”, etc.) and best practices for defense policies, theories and strategies in cybersecurity. 4. Discuss the need for information security practices within an organization, including legal and ethical aspects and compliance to Federal (i.e., NIST) and international standards (i.e., ISO). 5. Explain the current state of international accords, treaties and laws that govern cyberwarfare, and public–private sector information protection. 6. Outline how risk management, planning and technology can be used for imple­ menting information security policies. 7. Describe how cybersecurity risk management supports the mission, strategy and operations of the homeland security enterprise.

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13.1 Introduction Both modern lifestyles and modern concepts of national security are dependent on secure and resilient uses of information and communications technologies. However, products and services are often inherently insecure, threats are dynamic and com­ plex, and we are typically all too happy to start using the latest application or device that promises to make our work and home lives more efficient, effective, exciting and easier. With such increasing vulnerabilities and constantly changing threats, organizations must maintain security and resilience measures that provide sufficient protection yet still permit our profitable and productive uses of technological advancements. These measures—involving a mix of technical, behavioral and administrative controls— must therefore be customized to the contexts, goals and priorities of each organization. As this chapter will show, the dominant Western approach for achieving such cybersecurity is based on related concepts of risk management, security in depth and an all-hazards approach. This chapter delves into cybersecurity policy and theory and discusses how cybersecurity risk management (incorporating security in depth and all hazards) is criti­ cal to the preparedness and resilience of modern governments and private industry. Specifically, topics include definitions of cybersecurity, risk management and resil­ ience; along with some technological history and context within the homeland secu­ rity enterprise. The rules that govern cybersecurity (from standards to self-regulation to government regulation) are surveyed; and concepts of security-in-depth and all hazards are introduced. The chapter concludes with an examination of what cyberse­ curity risk management should look like in practice, including a brief overview of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.

13.2 A homeland security context for cybersecurity policy and risk management Discussions on “cybersecurity” are found in numerous academic disciplines, govern­ ment agencies, industries and professional associations. We can find a variety of lexi­ cons and perspectives across—and within—these areas. This section therefore begins by clarifying what is meant by “cybersecurity policy and theory”. The context is then further established with some notes on history, infrastructure and the homeland secu­ rity perspective. 13.2.1 Terminology Cybersecurity is a general concept that can embody different meanings depending on the context. For this chapter, the cyber part indicates those processes, data and services that are enabled by computing, control and communications technologies. These cyber assets and services underlie most of our economic, governmental and societal activities. We depend on such advanced technologies for everyday business, government, community and individual needs and aspirations. Our systems are often interconnected and can be dependent on each other. Due to these interconnections and dependencies, our cyber infrastructure can act as a conduit—or facilitator of actions—that can result in harm to both cyber and physical domains.

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Continuing our definition, security can be defined as a state of being free from dan­ ger or harm, and the measures or actions taken to achieve that state (Security, n.d.). This state of security is one fundamental basis of our western democratic societies (an obligation of the government) and is a condition precedent for the exercise of our freedoms. Security is also a component in the success or failure of our goals; that is, the existence of danger or harm can impact our ability to succeed, and the actions taken to achieve security can increase the costs of obtaining our goals. Combining these two terms, we can say that cybersecurity is • •

the state of having our technological systems and related organizations and soci­ eties free from danger or harm; and also the actions needed to maintain such a state while facilitating the use of these sys­ tems to achieve our objectives.

For homeland security and national security, our objectives include maintaining that state of being free from danger or harm, while also supporting other national objectives such as innovation and economic growth, a healthy and educated popu­ lace, etc. Elements of this chapter’s cybersecurity definition can be seen in U.S. national strategy (Department of Homeland Security, 2018) and in similar documents of numerous other countries (e.g., Commonwealth of Australia, 2016; Finland, 2013; Italy, 2013; People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2014; Republic of Austria, 2013; Switzerland, 2018; The Danish Government, 2018). It should be emphasized, though, that “cybersecurity” is not a uniquely defined term of art; therefore coun­ tries, agencies, businesses and academic programs often differ in their definitions (see Schatz, Bashroush, & Wall, 2017). To achieve security, we typically develop norms of behavior (rules) and policies to guide the implementation and ongoing improvement of such rules. Policy can be defined as a method or course of action that guides present and future decisionmaking (Policy, n.d.). Thus, cybersecurity policy indicates a focus on plans, methods and best practices for how a country or organization can achieve and sustain accept­ able levels of cybersecurity. This definition is reflected in a government report ordered by President Obama in 2009 (Greenwald, 2010). In this Cyberspace Policy Review (The White House, n.d.), the report explained our national “cybersecurity policy” as constituting: strategy, policy, and standards regarding the security of and operations in cyber­ space, [to] encompass[] the full range of threat reduction, vulnerability reduction, deterrence, international engagement, incident response, resiliency, and recov­ ery policies and activities, including computer network operations, information assurance, law enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions as they relate to the security and stability of the global information and communica­ tions infrastructure. (p. 2) Policy is typically based on one or more theories. A theory can be defined as a set of principles that provides the basis for explaining something or for justifying a chosen action (Theory, n.d.). For example, our governments, businesses and other organi­ zations are structured around principles chosen by the founding and contemporary

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leaders. These principles can explain why our nations and organizations are run a certain way, and the principles also justify the choice of certain policies and practices. Based on this definition of theory, we can say that cybersecurity theory is the set of principles that explains why we choose certain approaches for achieving and main­ taining acceptable levels of cybersecurity. Pulling all of these definitions together, cybersecurity policy and theory are those principles, plans and methods that explain and guide our decisions for keeping sys­ tems and organizations free from danger or harm while also facilitating the use of these systems to achieve our goals. 13.2.2 History In order to understand our contemporary discussions of cybersecurity policy and theory, the historical context of cybersecurity must be understood. At the dawn of electronic computing, the equipment was quite large, and it was not networked across distances. Security involved locking physical doors to prevent unauthorized access to the equipment itself and to printed schematics. The concerns here were theft of ideas or sabotage, both of which required physical access. Security also involved making sure that the equipment could be used at the times that it was needed. This meant assuring a regular power supply, having repair parts and specialists on hand, and maintaining the necessary physical environment for optimal equipment use. These concerns relate to three fundamental concepts in cybersecurity: confidentiality, integrity and availability (colloquially known as the CIA triad). Organizations wanted to preserve the proprietary or secret nature of their work and their ideas (thus main­ taining confidentiality). They also wanted to make sure no unauthorized change or damage was made to the system and its components (thus maintaining integrity). And they wanted to keep the computing equipment and data in good working order and accessible when and where it was needed (thus maintaining availability). However, in the excitement and profit of creating operating systems and software to run on computers, the CIA triad was not integral to the development process or product lifecycle. Rather, developers focused on achieving the desired functionali­ ties—to make these computers do what we wanted them to do (and do it better than a competitor’s product). The hardware designers had a similar focus on functionality and efficiency. Even as engineers and technicians created the code, technical rules and hardware components to facilitate the networking of remote computers across geo­ graphical distances, security was not a motivating factor. Significantly, security was not part of the initial design concept for the internet. Today’s internet started with small groups of researchers who knew each other and who had the goal of making a limited number of their remote computers com­ municate and work together. In this context, even though the early Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) started as a Department of Defense initiative, security was not an essential criterion. General Michael Hayden (former director of the National Security Agency) once asked Vinton Cerf— one of the acknowledged founders of the internet and a researcher who worked on ARPANET—why security was not integrated into the ARPANET design. According to Hayden, Cerf responded that “it wasn’t in the statement of work” (The Institute of World Politics, 2016, 11:43). Even our defense agencies were not mandating cybersecurity at that time.

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As Hayden also noted, these early designers of hardware, software and communi­ cations protocols did not anticipate the speed with which their concepts of limited, controlled networks would evolve into the internet of today (The Institute of World Politics, 2016). The design of these early networks underlies our internet, and this design is not based on a foundation of security. Similarly, most of our software, hard­ ware and operating systems also were not designed with security in mind. In business and society, we were happy to innovate and adopt these technologies that could help make our lives more efficient, effective, exciting and easier. In the rush to gain advantages from technology, organizations and individuals did not require security to be designed into these new tools and capabilities. Security was an after­ thought. And so, we began to depend more and more on technological systems that unfortunately were not grounded in the concepts of confidentiality, integrity and availability. 13.2.3 Homeland security As our society and economy increasingly relied on such inherently insecure computing, control and communication technologies—and as more and more computers and networks became connected—issues of confidentiality, integrity and availability became a more pressing business and governmental concern. In the 1980s, the federal government established a computer security center within the National Security Agency; passed legislation mandating the development of secu­ rity guidelines for federal government computers and supported the formation of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) at Carnegie-Mellon University (Brown, 2006). The government also was concerned with the degree of vulnerabilities in vital societal services such as water, power, health and transportation. Such “critical infrastructure” services and assets had similarly become increasingly dependent on advanced computing technologies, electronic communications and control systems. In the 1990s, an inter-agency presidential commission studied our U.S. critical infra­ structure and recommended that federal government policy should not mandate cybersecurity with broad regulations but rather should continue a public–private partnership approach, including the facilitation of voluntary information sharing (President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection [PCCIP], 1997). This policy is partly premised on a principle that too much regulation can stifle innovation (PCCIP, 1997). For example, the more that security is mandated, the more expensive it can be to research and develop new products and services; overbearing security regulations could hinder new innovations and new entrants to the market. The PCCIP report also acknowledged that privately-owned businesses and critical infrastructures could better understand their own vulnerabilities and security needs than could the government. Thus, the recommended policy also incorporated a prin­ ciple that security decisions are best made by those closest to the situation (e.g., the business owners and operators). These principles have continued to underlie governmental policy toward cybersecurity. In recent years, the private sector has largely been regulated under either a hands-off or a sectoral approach. The government has been leery of stifling innovation with broad security restrictions (thus being more “hands off” and permitting security rules to evolve from the market rather than from the government). And where the

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government has decided to implement cybersecurity mandates, many of these regu­ lations have been targeted toward specific sectors or industries where rules could be more particularized to the types of businesses. These rules often allow a degree of flexibility in how the business owner/operator can apply the security requirements, thus aligning with the principle that security decisions are best made by those man­ aging the systems. In terms of responsibility, the Department of Defense (DOD) is the lead agency for protecting its own networks, and together the DOD and National Security Agency are responsible for protecting the national security systems in the federal government. (This chapter does not provide detail on cybersecurity policy for national security systems.) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the lead for the other federal networks (non-national security systems) and for developing policy and partnerships to support cybersecurity efforts of privately managed critical infrastructures. DHS facilitates the sharing of information regarding cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities and best practices. And DHS also provides incident response and investigation sup­ port to all civilian federal agencies and to private organizations, U.S. states and other entities when requested. This structure of responsibility also aligns with the PCCIP’s principle of developing public–private partnerships and facilitating voluntary infor­ mation sharing. The PCCIP report also recommended that the federal government lead by example (1997), but it is beyond this chapter to thoroughly critique federal agencies’ efforts to make their systems secure and resilient. However, as noted below, Congress tasked the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) with developing stand­ ards and best practices for cybersecurity. Established in 1901, NIST has become a world-class measurement and standards laboratory for all sorts of mechanical, engineering and industrial needs (National Institute of Standards and Technology, n.d.). NIST’s standards-making skill sets and processes have been applied to con­ cepts of cybersecurity and risk management, and the resulting standards and best practices are openly available and free to use. In this way, the government could be seen as encouraging the development and dissemination of accessible cybersecurity standards.

13.3 Standards, regulations and guidelines for cybersecurity With this common context regarding terminology, history and the role of cybersecu­ rity in homeland security, we can better discuss the related rules and requirements. Rules can be technical, such as standards for encryption and protocols for secure communication. Some rules may be required by an industry group as mandatory for doing business. Other rules have been established by law. This section gives an overview of how these different kinds of rules interweave to support our needs for cybersecurity. 13.3.1 Standards Generally, a standard can be defined as an accepted or authoritative set of procedures for accomplishing something (Standard, n.d.). Standards may be established by indus­ try organizations, national governments or international groups. Within the area of

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cybersecurity, there are innumerable standards and best practices, some of which are touched on here. For example, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has pub­ lished standards relating to security techniques and the management of security for information systems. The NIST, part of the U.S. Department of Commerce, has also published standards to guide the federal government’s efforts to secure its systems. Both the ISO and NIST standards approach cybersecurity from a risk management perspective (discussed below). Other cybersecurity standards include the COBIT framework that integrates security with information technology governance (an initi­ ative from ISACA, a nonprofit professional association); the ISA99 series of standards for securing industrial control systems (from the International Society of Automation, another nonprofit professional association); the CIS Controls, a collection of 20 impor­ tant technical, management and governance measures to secure against the most common cybersecurity problems (formerly called the SANS Top 20 Critical Security Controls, from the Center for Internet Security, a nonprofit organization); and the OWASP Top 10, guidance for securing web applications against the ten most criti­ cal risks (from the Open Web Application Security Project, a not-for-profit charitable organization); among others. Standards can be mere guidance—a best practice that is recommended by experts in the area—or standards can be required by statute, regulation or contract. Even if a standard is not required by law, market and industry pressure can make following a standard a de facto requirement. Examples are provided below. 13.3.2 Self-regulation Government can use regulations to control behavior and activities within its con­ stituency, but we also have self-regulation processes. In contrast to external govern­ mental regulation, self-regulation is generally understood as policies and methods for controlling from within (Self-regulation, n.d.)—for example, a person or indi­ vidual organization establishing policies for itself, or an industry setting rules for organizations within that industry. Governments generally regulate to help solve a particular problem; self-regulation can have a similar purpose, but it can also have the goal of trying to pre-empt governmental regulation. If businesses are concerned about the potential for new governmental regulations that could be costly and not the businesses’ preferred solution, those organizations could try to remedy the prob­ lem through self-regulation that solves the problem in a different way. If they are successful in mitigating the problem, then the self-regulation would not only have helped substantively, it also may deter governmental regulations and the attendant bureaucratic costs. It is generally considered in organizations’ best interests to secure their valuable assets and services. However, some organizations may prioritize profit-making activ­ ities (research and development, marketing, etc.), over security activities not directly related to profit. This is especially true for organizations that fail to consider cybersecurity as a mechanism to manage risks and reduce costs.1 Those organizations may not choose to implement certain cybersecurity measures unless required by regula­ tion, contract or industry self-regulation. In our globalized and interconnected world, we have a web of services that support business offerings and capabilities. Business relationships can be quite complex, and

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they are typically governed by contracts or service agreements. At the choosing of the contracting parties, requirements for cybersecurity could be mandated within such agreements. This is one example of self-regulation. When an industry group requires these efforts, though, self-regulation can have a larger impact. One example of industry self-regulation is the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). The PCI DSS is one of a group of standards promulgated by an industry council in order to improve cybersecurity measures by vendors and processors of payment cards, such as credit cards, debit cards, prepaid cards, etc. (PCI Security Standards Council, 2018a). As the Council (2018a) explains, the founding members—American Express, Discover Financial Services, JCB International, MasterCard and Visa Inc.— use the PCI DSS in their own cybersecurity programs, and they also require those who use their brands (e.g., merchants and processing services) to comply with this standard as well. Industry self-regulation with the PCI DSS was intended to improve the secure storage, processing and transmission of sensitive data used to conduct payment card transactions; and by adopting this one standard across all five major card brands, the PCI Security Standards Council intended to make PCI-related cybersecurity meas­ ures more consistent around the world (PCI Security Standards Council, 2018b). This standard’s core components include requirements to “build and maintain a secure network and system, protect cardholder data, maintain a vulnerability management program, implement strong access control measures, regularly monitor and test net­ works, [and] maintain an information security policy” (2018b, p. 5). As the Council (2018a) notes, enforcement measures are incorporated into the business agreements for using each respective payment brand. A different example of self-regulation can be seen in the growth of bug-bounty pro­ grams and related services to control the behavior of both white-hat hackers and the product developers to which a bug is reported. Ethical considerations recommend several key principles of behavior, including: 1. When researching for weaknesses or flaws (vulnerabilities) within software or hardware, the researcher should “do no harm” (e.g., should not degrade the availability of the system nor compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the hardware/software or resident data, and should not inadvertently cause any vio­ lations of cybersecurity requirements in the researched system or product). This is important because the hunt for vulnerabilities should not itself cause harm to the developer’s system, product or organization. We have a large cybersecurity community of interest; the more researchers coordinating the hunt for vulnera­ bilities, the more likely that flaws will be found and patched before they can be exploited. Some companies have offered bounties, or rewards, to encourage eth­ ical research and private disclosure of vulnerabilities; but many organizations have not. The inherent value of such work, though, is tarnished when rogue researchers act unethically and cause harm; developers are then less likely to support the community’s white hat hacking of its products. This “do no harm” precept encourages the use of a large community of researchers in the safe, respectful and lawful hunt for vulnerabilities. 2. When a vulnerability is discovered, the researcher should quietly (non-publicly) disclose the vulnerability to the responsible product developer (of that software/

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hardware). This allows the vulnerability to be worked on without the public knowing about the vulnerability. This is important because public disclosure of an active flaw (before it is fixed) could result in exploitation of the weakness to the detriment of the numerous organizations and individuals using the flawed product. While this principle thus protects end users, it also benefits product developers (whose reputations could be harmed by public disclosures prior to remediation). 3. When a vulnerability is disclosed, the product developer should respond promptly by investigating and remediating the flaw and disseminating the patch or updated version to those entities who use the software/hardware. This is important because exploited vulnerabilities typically harm the interests of end users—e.g., flaws in a retailer’s website software that allow hackers to access your personal and financial information and commit identity fraud. End users (and governments) want to have confidence that product developers are expe­ ditiously working to remedy flaws once they are reported. However, rogue developers may disregard unsolicited vulnerability disclosures, or they may get lost in the deluge of everyday business communications and other priori­ ties. Developers also may not have the capacity to promptly create patches for reported vulnerabilities. When this happens, the lone ethical researcher is left to consider whether a public announcement of the vulnerability is the best option (to at least warn the end users, and to put pressure on the developer to create a solution), even though such an announcement violates the second principle above. In such cases, a big development company could blame the lone ethical researcher for improper disclosure, without acknowledging that the researcher had first tried to do the right thing. However, not all researchers follow such ethical precepts; nor do all development teams or companies. Some sort of third-party oversight of these disclosure and remediation communications could help regulate for more ethical behavior on both sides. That precise concept lies behind some efforts to organize and self-regulate for more ethical behavior on both sides. For example, Bugcrowd and HackerOne are companies that facilitate ethical vulnerability hunting and disclosure, as well as prompt vulnerability remediation. These organizations sign up client organizations (developers of products), encourage security researchers to discover and report vul­ nerabilities in clients’ products, and then work on quickly investigating and crafting solutions to remediate the discovered vulnerabilities (Bugcrowd, n.d.; HackerOne, n.d.-a). Both Bugcrowd and HackerOne self-regulate based on the key principles outlined above. For example, HackerOne’s Vulnerability Disclosure Guidelines (n.d.-b) explicitly reinforce all three principles; in addition, the organization acts as a “safe harbor” for security researchers, sets up more detailed guidelines for initiat­ ing public disclosure, and encourages whistleblowers to report violations of its code of conduct. A third example of self-regulation can be seen in the complementary private- and public-sector efforts to encourage broad implementation of more secure commu­ nications over the internet. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) is a standard that facilitates authenticity of information in transit over the internet. It does not provide complete protection, but it does at least verify that the website you’re requesting is indeed run by the purported owner (rather than an imposter).

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The previous communication standard of Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), on which the World Wide Web was founded, did not incorporate such security rules. As explained in a memorandum from then—U.S. Chief Information Officer Tony Scott (2015): The unencrypted HTTP protocol does not protect data from interception or alteration, which can subject users to eavesdropping, tracking, and the modifi­ cation of received data. … Data sent over HTTP is susceptible to interception, manipulation, and impersonation. This data can include browser identity, website content, search terms, and other user-submitted information. … [In contrast, the use of HTTPS] prevents unknown or untrusted websites from masquerading as a Federal website or service. (pp. 1–2) The memorandum required that all federal agencies deploy HTTP on their domains by the end of 2016. The shift from HTTP to the more secure HTTPS had been sup­ ported and endorsed by organizations that create technical standards for the internet, including the World Wide Web Consortium’s Technical Architecture Group and the Internet Engineering Task Force (U.S. Chief Information Officer & the Federal CIO Council, n.d.). The memorandum, though, only regulated U.S. federal agencies. To encourage the deployment of HTTPS more broadly, the main internet browsers began to explic­ itly highlight HTTP sites as insecure (Gebhart, 2018). Browsers such as Chrome and Firefox are tools for accessing websites, and as such, they can inform users—to some degree—of the security measures used. Google also amended its search rank­ ing algorithm to increase the visibility of sites using HTTPS, which resulted in the down-ranking of those using the less secure HTTP (Bahajji & Illyes, 2014). While Google and Mozilla Corporation (the owners of Chrome and Firefox) cannot by con­ tract or service agreement force domain owners to use HTTPS, they can emphasize those that don’t—and those that do—in the hopes that industry and consumer pres­ sure would force the shift to HTTPS. In this way, both economic and social interests can be a part of self-regulation. In the eighteen months between January 1, 2018 and July 1, 2019, the default use of HTTPS increased from 26.9% of websites to 53% (W3 Techs, 2019). The U.S. federal government had mostly already shifted by then, so this increase was likely primarily in the private sector. According to Google (n.d.), in those same eighteen months, the percentage of pages loaded over HTTPS via the Chrome platform increased from 76% to 92%, and 90 of the 100 most popular non-Google websites (constituting 25% of global website traffic) deployed HTTPS by default. No new laws or regulations mandated HTTPS deployment in this timeframe, so the uptake in using HTTPS likely resulted from organizations choosing to be more secure by deploying this standard … perhaps with the help of some of the self-regulating forces discussed here. 13.3.3 Government regulation The development of voluntary standards and self-regulation are a softer, more coop­ erative approach to improving cybersecurity; another approach involves the issuing of mandatory rules (i.e., regulations). Several cybersecurity-related rules have been promulgated by law in the United States, but we do not have one overarching federal

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law on cybersecurity for all organizations; nor is there a single, applicable international law. Rather, rules have been developed in a more ad-hoc manner, typically based on the type of systems or data we want to secure, the responsibilities of organizations to respond to and report a cybersecurity failure or incident, and other requirements related to consumer protection.2 Outside of these types of regulation, the federal gov­ ernment still promotes the principles of public–private partnership and voluntary information sharing, along with the belief that owners of systems are best situated to make specific decisions regarding security, and a concern that increased regulation could stymie innovation. The following sections provide examples (non-exhaustive) of government regulations in effect; practitioners must research in much more detail their cybersecurity obligations (which vary by geographical jurisdiction, industry and consumer base). 13.3.3.1 Federal computer systems (non-national security) For several decades now, the U.S. federal government has been active in regulating the security of its own networks. With the Computer Security Act (1987), Congress made the NIST responsible for developing cybersecurity standards for federal, non-national security systems. Eight years later, the Office of Management and Budget was initially made responsible for creating cybersecurity policies for federal agencies (under the Paperwork Reduction Act, 1995), but this responsibility is now shared with DHS (pur­ suant to the Homeland Security Act, 2002). Today, federal policies for cybersecurity are still based on NIST standards. Since the Clinger-Cohen Act (1996), the head of each federal agency has been responsible for having good cybersecurity policies and procedures, and for installing a chief information officer position. This 1996 law also authorized the Secretary of Commerce to decide if certain NIST standards should be mandatory for federal agen­ cies, although this authority was later moved to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) by the Federal Information Security Management Act (2002) (FISMA). This statutory attention to the security of federal networks reflects the recognition that our government and homeland security is reliant on vital cyber infrastructures that must be kept secure, reliable and resilient. By law, federal agencies must follow a general NIST framework for improving cybersecurity based on overarching theories of risk management (discussed below). Agencies also utilize other NIST standards for more detailed guidance, such as NIST SP 800-53r4 on Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, NIST SP 800-39 on Managing Information Security Risk, and NIST SP 800-34, a Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems. The suite of the NIST special publications (SP) 800 series can be fully accessed from the NIST website, as all of these standards and guidelines are openly available. This openness encourages the private sector to take advantage of the NIST standards and to be a part of the standards development process (draft publications are available for public comment and for review of concerns such as technical patent claims). When Congress updated FISMA with the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (2014), DHS was explicitly authorized to manage the implemen­ tation of cybersecurity policies across all federal non-national security systems. DHS also provides continuous monitoring of these networks, and it can help with incident response and other operational and technical assistance (at an agency’s request). The

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revised FISMA also requires agencies to report significant incidents to Congress as they occur, and to also deliver an annual report on cybersecurity incidents and on the adequacy of the agency’s cybersecurity policies, procedures and practices. 13.3.3.2 Example sectors (finance, healthcare, utilities) In addition to rules protecting federal networks, Congress and the executive branch have placed certain cybersecurity requirements on private organizations in particular industries. For example, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999) requires financial insti­ tutions (and now their third-party service providers) to store nonpublic, personally identifiable financial information securely, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is authorized to implement and enforce this law. Pursuant to these responsibilities, the FTC promulgated the Safeguards Rule, which requires these institutions to have a written cybersecurity plan “appropriate to the company’s size and complexity, the nature and scope of its activities, and the sensitivity of the customer information it handles” (Federal Trade Commission [FTC], 2006). As the FTC (2006) notes, this includes having dedicated staff for the cybersecurity plan, choosing and effectively applying security measures appropriate to the infor­ mation and system, monitoring and testing the controls, making sure that contracted service providers have similarly appropriate controls and monitoring solutions, and re-assessing the overall cybersecurity plan in light of the testing results or any changes to the institution. Although such technical, behavioral and administrative security measures are all required, the choices of how to implement the requirements is left up to the organizations that own/manage the systems (e.g., choosing appropriate controls to match the sensitivity of information and system, types and frequency of monitoring solutions, security staff structure and job functions, etc.). Congress and regulators in the financial sector also instituted a Red Flags Rule that requires certain organizations to create and manage programs to prevent identity theft. This rule applies not only to financial institutions but also to any business that maintains transaction accounts that facilitate multiple payments or transactions—for example, credit cards, loans or bank accounts (FTC, 2013). The financial sector has numerous regulators, and many have created some degree of cybersecurity require­ ments; a full examination is beyond the scope of this chapter, but a brief mention of a few more can help show the variety. For example, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the main regula­ tor for stock exchanges and securities markets. By regulation, the SEC requires that entities such as trading systems have enough integrity, availability and resilience to sustain their operations; these entities are also required to test their cybersecurity controls and to report significant cybersecurity incidents to the SEC within 24 hours of the event (Mauck & Rady, 2017). Also, pursuant to the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002), publicly traded companies must test the veracity of their accounting and recordkeep­ ing and make regular reports to reassure investors and regulators of their financial situations, including any material events and risks to the soundness of a company. In 2018, the SEC emphasized that this includes cybersecurity incidents and risks; compa­ nies are thus required to implement measures that enable such evaluation and report­ ing (SEC Statement, 2018). Similar to these rules in the financial sector, the federal government has estab­ lished cybersecurity authority in other sectors—for example, in health care, the

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electric utility industry, telecommunications and transportation. With the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (1996) (HIPAA), Congress authorized the Department of Health and Human Services to promulgate and enforce regula­ tions to ensure the security and privacy of certain health information. The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (2009) (HITECH) extended these provisions to third-party service providers and business associates. In the electricity industry, bulk power system providers must comply with the North American Energy Reliability Corporation’s (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection guidelines, which mandate requirements for both physical security and cybersecurity. The Federal Communications Commission regulates for cybersecurity and privacy in the telecommunications industry (which includes internet service pro­ viders). And the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has authority to promote safety and to protect the public from the consequences of vulnerabilities in their cars’ internet-connected software or hardware (e.g., related to embedded systems for global positioning, safety communications, entertainment, etc.). 13.3.3.3 Consumer protection & state laws In addition to such sector-specific regulations, cybersecurity rules can be found in federal and state consumer protection efforts, which have expanded to include enforcement of rules related to cybersecurity. When it comes to the average, individ­ ual citizen, we actually do not have contracts with many of the organizations that control digital information about us (i.e., third-party organizations that exchange information about us). An example is a credit reporting agency such as Equifax, which collects a lot of information about us and sells that information to other parties. In these kinds of situations, when we cannot rely on contracts nor individually negotiate with such large companies, public laws for “consumer protection” may help. These laws are typically enforced by attorneys general at the state level, and by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) at the federal level. Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 makes “unfair or decep­ tive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” unlawful. This law defines “unfair practice” as something that “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consum­ ers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition” (Sec. 45 part N). The FTC has interpreted this authority to regulate “unfair and deceptive” cybersecurity prac­ tices—for example, failures of cybersecurity that unreasonably expose consumers’ personal data to potential theft—and this interpretation has been upheld in court (Appeals court upholds, 2015). In addition to the laws already mentioned, the FTC has authority to enforce other consumer protection laws, some of which impose cyberse­ curity-related obligations; for example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (1970) mandates that organizations must secure any credit reporting information in their possession, and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (1998) requires that personal infor­ mation collected from children under 13 years old must be protected. Beyond these examples of federal agency regulations, sector-specific federal rules and federal consumer protection efforts, we can find governmental regulation of cybersecurity at the state level as well. Following California’s data breach notifica­ tion law in 2002 (SB-1386 Personal Information: Privacy, n.d.), most states similarly enacted rules that require organizations to report significant cybersecurity breaches

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to state authorities, and to also notify any potentially impacted customers who reside in that state. Over 40 states had promulgated cybersecurity breach notification laws by 2017 (Aisenberg, 2018). In addition, the state of New York’s Department of Financial Services has promulgated regulations similar to those of the SEC and FTC. The New York rules require, among other things, that financial institutions establish cybersecurity programs, monitor their networks, report the status of system integrity and confidentiality and disclose cybersecurity-related risks (Capezza, 2017). Thus, depending on the applicable geographic jurisdictions, an organization expe­ riencing a cybersecurity breach may have a complex medley of notification rules to follow. Further, as demonstrated by the examples discussed above, depending on the industry or consumer protection concern, an organization may also be required to plan for cybersecurity, implement appropriate security measures, decide on contin­ gencies and test and revise all these plans and procedures. 13.3.3.4 Foreign & international law It should be noted that other countries and regions have different approaches to cybersecurity regulation. For example, the European Union has the more broadbased General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation [EU] 2016/679, 2016), which is focused on consumer protection, as well as its Network and Information Security Directive (Directive [EU] 2016/1148, 2016), which addresses minimum national capa­ bilities, enhanced protection for critical sectors and infrastructure, and cross-border collaboration. These laws apply not only to E.U.-based organizations, but also to U.S. companies and other foreign organizations that are active within the European Union or that process data related to goods or services offered to individuals or entities in the European Union (including the monitoring of user/consumer behavior). There is also a question of international rules related to cybersecurity. However, no treaty or international obligation creates specific rules for cybersecurity. There are agreements that support harmonization of national penal codes related to cybercrime and also cooperation among different countries’ law enforcement agencies, and there are treaties that enable effective cross-border operations of telecommunications ser­ vices, but neither of these rulesets reach the cybersecurity concerns discussed in this chapter. Public international law is a collection of principles, policies and rules primarily regarding the behavior and relationships of countries and international organizations with each other, as well as with persons or entities. The focus is on rules and codes of conduct for nation states and international organizations, and the primary goal is to maintain peace and minimize the likelihood of conflict. Military power must be wielded lawfully; and once engaged in conflict, combatants also must conduct them­ selves lawfully. Peaceful intelligence operations, on the other hand, are not specifically proscribed in international law.3 To help keep the peace among and within nations, and to promote justness in con­ flicts, an international body of law has arisen in which nations cede some degree of sovereign decision-making in return for a framework of legal behavior to help improve the likelihood of peace and allow societies to flourish. The law creates obligations and expectations that establish a baseline environment of predictability, and states may assess the likely actions and reactions of other nations based on their propensities to respect and observe international law. Such law relates to conduct in both peacetime

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and warfare and is more broadly referred to as public international law and interna­ tional humanitarian law. Within this structure, international law experts have been studying aspects of cyber warfare and cyber operations for many years. While clarity is lacking as to specific application in the cyber context, it is generally accepted that international law for keeping the peace is applicable to cyber activities (see, e.g., International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], 2011; The White House, 2011; United Nations General Assembly, Group of Governmental Experts [U.N. GGE], 2015). As the ICRC (2011) noted, the “means and methods of warfare which resort to cyber technology are sub­ ject to [international humanitarian law] just as any new weapon or delivery system has been so far when used in an armed conflict by or on behalf of a party to such conflict” (pp. 36–37). The U.N. GGE (2015) emphasized that in the cyber context, countries “must observe … principles of international law, State sovereignty, sovereign equal­ ity, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States … [as well as] obligations under international law to respect and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms” (pp. 24–29). A thorough analysis of nation-state exertion of cyber power is beyond the scope of this chapter. For purposes of this section, it suffices to say that while no inter­ national law specifically speaks to cybersecurity, we should interpret existing international law to apply to cyber-enabled activities. Thus, for example, Ecuador withheld internet access from asylee Julian Assange after interpreting his social media and internet activities as interference in Ecuador’s relationships with other countries. While ensconced in the Ecuadorean Embassy in London, Assange used Ecuadorean networks to access the internet and leak documents intended to impact the U.S. presidential election, as well as to disparage diplomatic and criminal com­ plaints by the United Kingdom against Russia; and Ecuador subsequently barred Assange from accessing the internet via the embassy’s systems (Kennedy, 2018). Such activities, emanating from the Ecuadoran embassy, could be interpreted as violating the principle that countries should not intervene in the internal affairs of other coun­ tries, and in order to protect its interests in the international community, Ecuador disabled Assange’s ability to use the Ecuadoran networks. As cybersecurity concerns have increased in the international arena, a num­ ber of countries and organizations have begun discussing norms of behavior for the cyber domain. Cybersecurity-related norms, codes of behavior and statements of principle have been encouraged and included in bilateral and multilateral meet­ ing notes, press releases and conference proceedings, including the 2009 Shanghai Cooperation Organization Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security; the 2014 Fortaleza Declaration of the 6th BRICS Summit; the 2015 Russia-China Cybersecurity Agreement; the 2016 Organization of American States Declaration Strengthening Hemispheric Cooperation and Development in Cybersecurity and Fighting Terrorism in the Americas; and the 2017 G7 Declaration on Responsible States Behavior in Cyberspace (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, n.d.). These are just example statements; there are numerous more. Helpfully, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace collects such statements in its online Cyber Norms Index, which covers important documents from 2007 through 2017. Dialogue on international cybersecurity norms is continuing. For example, the United Nations General Assembly has established two task forces to continue such analysis during 2019–21: An Open-ended Working Group and another Group of

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Governmental Experts (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, n.d.). So far, however, much of the work of these various countries and organizations is embodied in aspirational statements and the recognition and recommendation of various best practices and standards. Cybersecurity-specific, binding international commitments are still lacking, but all of these efforts may lead to such agreements one day.

13.4 Policy and theory in practice Understanding our cybersecurity context and history, standards, self-regulation mechanisms, laws and processes of international norm development is important. Equally important is analyzing our lessons learned and establishing priorities based on our chosen principles and theories for cybersecurity. In the field of Homeland Security, theory impacts our plans and procedures; but equally, the practices and les­ sons learned of the component professions impact our analyses and explorations of theory. From our earlier definitions, we see that policy is a method or course of action that guides decision-making; and theory is a set of principles that explains something or justifies the chosen actions. Cybersecurity policy and theory was thus defined as the principles, plans and methods that explain and guide our decisions for keeping sys­ tems and organizations free from danger or harm while also facilitating the use of these systems to achieve our goals. Some important cybersecurity-related precepts discussed so far include the principles that: too much regulation can stifle innova­ tion; security decisions are best made by those closest to the situation; and effective cybersecurity requires public–private partnerships that facilitate information shar­ ing. Cybersecurity policies can involve the proliferation of and adherence to stand­ ards; self-regulation by individual entities or industry groups and also government regulation. From professional practice and strategic design, we can also distill several more core principles and theories important to developing our concepts of cybersecurity theory: security in depth, all hazards, resilience and risk management. These con­ cepts, combined with those previously discussed, help to round out our understand­ ing of cybersecurity policy and theory. This section addresses these issues—showing the interlacing of professional and theoretical knowledge-building and providing an example of cybersecurity policy and theory in practice: the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. 13.4.1 Security in depth The early years of cybersecurity focused on protection concepts and the periphery— or outer edges—of a system. Have a strong firewall and plug all unnecessary open points in the boundary of the network; and monitor incoming traffic for signals of attempts to get into the system. The goal was to build bigger, stronger walls to keep out the hackers and highlight their attempts to enter so that the security staff could intervene and stop such wrongful access as soon as possible. In those days, compli­ cated and sneaky malicious software was the purview of researchers with extensive knowledge and technical capabilities. However, big, strong walls do not necessarily protect us from insider threats, which have propagated in parallel with advancing globalization, increased offerings

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of managed services and cloud solutions and our growing utilization of these out­ sourced—but interconnected—services. Further, our interconnected systems have also become more complicated. With the Internet of Things and the proliferation of “smart” gadgets, appliances, cars and homes, we face a vastly larger attack sur­ face populated by insecure personal, corporate and industrial devices that can inde­ pendently communicate and coordinate with each other. In such interconnected, dynamic systems, there is not always a clear periphery, and we also have learned to protect against human error by our employees and service providers, not just against malicious outsiders. By exploiting a vulnerability in one of our many trusted devices or human assets, a threat can arise from within our networks (not just from without). As situational awareness of vulnerabilities and threats is becoming harder, cybersecurity incidents are more a matter of when than if. Consequently, the focus has been expanding to emphasize measures for early detection of other potential indi­ cators of compromise. Early awareness of intrusions is still important, but so is an employee’s download of customers’ sensitive information and the inadvertent attachment of such information to an email. Larger organizations may need to auto­ mate situational awareness of security configurations and activity by all devices on the networks. For almost all systems, there is a need to automate certain aspects of incident response. And in contrast with the earlier era of technological development, the deployment of sophisticated malware is no longer the sole domain of those with advanced techni­ cal skills. The black market for stolen information and credentials has expanded into a robust underground market for malware products and services as well. As the globe becomes more interconnected, a botnet can consist of zombie computers physically located in different countries, and control of such botnets does not require permanent investment—rather, it can be rented instead (along with the skills of a bot herder to manage the preferred attack). Organized crime has infiltrated not only the black mar­ ket in cybercrime loot, but also the market for malware products and services. Such services include the customization of tools to attack a specific target and produce a particular result. In today’s economy and ecosystem, a lot more people have access to the tools and knowledge that can inflict harm; and they are communicating and working with each other. Sophisticated multi-stage attacks have become more common; these attacks, also called advanced persistent threats (APT), are increasingly being used, especially by nation states (or at least, these APTs are increasingly being discovered). APTs are often targeted, can constantly evolve their attack steps (to evade pattern- or signaturebased detection), repeat their attempts and stages of effort and try to sustain surrep­ titious access with the target network for long periods of time (Parrend, Navarro, Guigou, Deruyver, & Collet, 2018). Today’s cybersecurity experts require the fore­ sight, knowledge and tools to detect and interrupt such attacks along their various stages (e.g., reconnaissance, delivery, exploit or command and control), and in the face of their various evolutions. Our vulnerable systems have become more complex, and they must regularly adapt to changes in the environment (technological changes, business changes, political changes, etc.) as well as to dynamically evolving threats. Big, strong walls are no longer enough to protect nations or organizations; cybersecurity also must emphasize detection and consequence management (response). A parallel can be made to the traditional military strategy of “defense in depth” whereby security forces establish

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layers of defensive tactics so that should one fail, the others remain to provide protec­ tion and hinder the attack (McGuiness, 2019). Sociological and engineering concepts based on systems theory encourage us to study all the component parts of a system and how those parts interact with each other and with the differing environments (Gibson, 2016; Young & Leveson, 2014). Combining this understanding of systems theory with our understanding of the tech­ nological, business and human complexities of cybersecurity, we can parse some important principles of “security in depth”. For example, security in depth should incorporate physical measures that prevent actual access to the physical component of a system (e.g., guards, fences and locked rooms), technical measures that prevent access to the contents of a system (e.g., hard­ ware and software such as biometric security devices and encryption), technical and administrative measures that maintain situational awareness necessary to timely detect and prioritize vulnerabilities and threats (e.g., inventorying and monitoring solutions, and practices that improve an organization’s cybersecurity culture), and administrative measures that ensure the organization’s cybersecurity commitment and preparedness efforts (e.g., developing a cybersecurity program, training and rais­ ing awareness of cybersecurity and creating and exercising plans for incident response and for contingencies/disasters). We must think about our systems and defenses holistically, understanding how the components interact with each other and with the environment, and recognizing impacts from change and adaptation. Cybersecurity is focused on the protection and resilience of our computing, control and communications systems. These systems are not just technological in nature. As exemplified in this chapter so far, such systems involve software, hardware, data, people and processes; and our security measures must address all such aspects of a system. Principles of security in depth, based on systems theory, thus encourage organizations to develop plans, tools and procedures that can support cybersecurity against a multitude of different types of threats and against evolving threats, while being sure to address the whole of the system. 13.4.2 All hazards & resilience Security in depth is intimately related to principles of all hazards and resilience. The phrase “all hazards” is commonly found in Emergency Management and Homeland Security. An all-hazards perspective acknowledges that threats and vulnerabilities can result from a variety of sources—technical and mechanical failures, human error, administrative and planning failures, natural disasters, criminal and terrorist actions, espionage or other acts by non-friendly countries, etc.—and that organizations should maintain awareness of this premise while also prioritizing protections against those hazards that are more likely to result in significant harm to your particular organ­ ization. This approach is important in cybersecurity. We cannot become so overly focused on malicious actors that we forget to protect against mistakes or failures by our employees or service providers. We cannot get so absorbed in the everyday, com­ mon problems that we fail to sufficiently plan for the less-common but potentially high-consequence scenarios. An all-hazards focus supports the idea of resilience. Resilience is “the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions” (Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21, 2013, p. 115). If we concentrated

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all of our security measures on only one or two types of threats or vulnerabilities, then we might not be prepared for a different hazard and could have trouble bouncing back from it. As discussed above, with the vulnerabilities in our technological and human resources, combined with the complexities of our interconnected systems and business environments, plus the dynamically evolving threat landscape … our cybersecurity measures will inevitably be insufficient, and an incident will occur. When this happens, our organizations need to be able to respond and recover in a timely man­ ner and fashion that supports our goals and organizations’ missions. Resilience is an inherent principle underlying our cybersecurity policy and theory. 13.4.3 Risk management Security in depth, resilience and an all-hazard approach require leadership, govern­ ance, planning and processes. One concept that helps tie all this together is “risk management”—arguably the most fundamental component of effective cyberse­ curity. Revisiting and integrating our earlier terminology, it could be said that risk management is a mindset and leadership approach that uses commitments and policy to establish the necessary resources, structure and processes for directing an organi­ zation’s decisions and actions that minimize negative impacts to the organization and maximize opportunities for achieving its goals. In this way, risk management incorporates both policy (a method that guides pres­ ent and future decision-making) and theory (set of principles that justifies a chosen action). Risk management reflects a value choice that decisions will be based on cer­ tain principles; and risk management also provides processes and guidelines for mak­ ing decisions and accomplishing objectives (Power, 2007). Risk management for cybersecurity and resilience typically involves an ongoing cycle of three groups of activities. The first phase, “preparedness”, includes the activi­ ties to be taken in advance of a potential problem, such as actions to identify and pre­ vent a potential problem or to protect against harmful consequences, and also actions to establish relationships of trust with individuals or organizations which may pro­ vide necessary help when a problem occurs. The second phase, “incident response”, includes all the activities to respond to a problem, with the twin priorities of minimiz­ ing harm and restoring normal operations (maintaining continuity). The third phase, “recovery”, includes any activities necessary for longer-term recovery from a problem, including priorities for repair or reconstitution of any assets or services damaged by the problem. All three phases are discussed further here, specifically in the context of cybersecurity. Preparedness regarding cybersecurity risks relies on cooperation among public and private entities. As mentioned above, sometimes a vendor (or an ethical hacker) may discover a post-market fault in its hardware or software that puts systems at risk for failure or exploitation. At that time, it is important to coordinate information sharing and tools for fixing the fault so as to not overly-publicize the details before the relevant critical infrastructures can mitigate the vulnerability (patch the software, replace a hardware component, etc.). Cybersecurity risk management thus requires communities of information sharing among trusted entities (industry partnerships and public–private partnerships that the PCCIP report recommended). It is important to identify trusted partners and build those relationships so that a business or government can trust that the vulnerability or

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276 Maeve Dion mitigation information comes from a reliable source. Governments have established trusted structures for gathering and disseminating information on cyber threats and vulnerabilities; some private businesses and industries/sectors also have their own structures. Without going further into detail about the many ways such trusted information-sharing communities and structures may be formulated, it is important to emphasize two points. First, because interconnectedness creates the potential for cascading effects, infor­ mation sharing structures should not only have intra-industry components, it should also facilitate cross-industry cooperation. Second, these structures should not be overly burdened with too many bureaucratic procedures that could delay the con­ veyance of threat and vulnerability information. Technical developments can happen quickly, heightened by the sophistication of online communities for the design and black market of vulnerabilities, malware and other tools necessary for exploitation. The time between discovery of a cyber vulnerability and the development and deploy­ ment of an exploit may be very short. Thus, information sharing should be timely. Sharing information regarding an ongoing incident is also important, especially given the speed with which harm may spread through interconnected and dependent systems. Preparedness regarding cybersecurity also requires cooperation in other aspects. For incidents necessitating response actions beyond one organization, it is important to practice the response plans with the various entities who may be involved (and who may each have their own internal response plans in addition to an industry-wide or governmental plan). This not only familiarizes those involved with the implementa­ tion of these plans and how they should be coordinated, but also helps discover gaps or conflicts with the response plans at a “safe” time: during practice rather than dur­ ing a real incident. Cybersecurity preparedness efforts also should address practical aspects of recov­ ery and should regularly review and make necessary revisions to the plans and proce­ dures in all phases of cybersecurity risk management. During recovery, prioritization of activities is required, but such repair or rebuilding efforts may be frustrated by improper planning or inadequate resources. Such frustrations are worsened when equipment is provided just-in-time to market, with little stored in warehouses (as may be the case, for example, with certain components of industrial control systems). When human resources are limited, or equipment is in short supply, recovery plans may be stymied. A facility or company may design its recovery plan and prioritization orders based on estimations of how an incident would affect that particular organization. However, for cybersecurity incidents that cascade upstream or down, or that cross industries or geopolitical boundaries, the resulting harms to multiple entities may demand more resources than anticipated by any one of the organizations’ respective recovery plans. For cybersecurity incidents involving critical infrastructure, governments may there­ fore need to coordinate prioritization of recovery supplies and efforts across industries or jurisdictional borders. Such coordination benefits from early planning and commu­ nication during the preparedness phase, hopefully well before an incident occurs. Prior planning for cybersecurity incident response and recovery efforts also involves understanding potential legal obligations effected by cyber incidents. Some legal obligations may arise during incident response (e.g., contractual obligations or other requirements to render assistance, and duties to immediately report incidents

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to regulators or to law enforcement authorities), and other legal obligations or rem­ edies may impact recovery (e.g., duties to report incidents to clients or to other par­ ties, contractual obligations regarding compensation for losses, and opportunities to recover incident costs through the courts or from administrative departments). Such legal obligations and remedies may be found in tort, contract law (pertaining to rela­ tionships with partners, clients, vendors, etc.), or in administrative or other areas of domestic public law (pertaining to relationships with regulators, law enforcement entities, other domestic agencies or other countries and international organizations). Reviewing these obligations during the preparedness phase can clarify expectations of assistance for incident response. It also helps to identify potential conflicts (e.g., between contract confidentiality clauses and regulations requiring notification or reporting), familiarizes an organization with reporting processes and best practices for breach notifications, and allows for drafting of templates or checklists that can save time and facilitate efforts during recovery. As both public law and private con­ tracts may change over time, it is important to regularly review these legal obligations and remedy options. Similarly, plans for all phases of critical infrastructure protection—preparedness, incident response and recovery—should be regularly reviewed and updated. Changes in business relationships, technological advancements and regulatory expectations may alter assessments of risk and options for managing those risks. As information is shared, new vulnerabilities may come to light. When an organization shares its after-action report from a cyber incident, other entities may benefit from the lessons learned. Thus, preparedness may be seen as an ongoing phase that incorporates improvements, changes and new understandings. Inevitably, cybersecurity incidents will occur despite our protection and prepared­ ness efforts. The occurrence of an incident should trigger the incident response phase of cybersecurity risk management. Now the affected organizations must put into action the plans established in the preparedness phase. This may involve identification and segregation of potentially compromised system components, to lessen the impact of the incident to not-yet-harmed components. The system may be forensically analyzed to determine if the incident had any broader impacts (i.e., changes that could result in harm later) or surreptitiously installed any hidden or “sleeping” malware that may later activate and cause further damage. Corrupted software or hardware may need to be discarded and replaced. Operations may shift to backup equipment and data that were not affected by the incident. Now, too, begins the forensic exploration of both the vulnerability and the incident details (i.e., the event that resulted in harm), and the sharing of this information to help limit similar incidents in other systems. The police may be notified of poten­ tial unlawful activity. Depending on the degree to which operations were affected, or whether national-security-related information was wrongfully accessed, the govern­ ment may need to coordinate mitigation measures at a wider scale, so that the incident in this link does not damage other parts of the national security chain. Speedy com­ munications about an incident may be especially important in assessing the potential of imminent harm beyond the entity initially experiencing the cyber incident. Basically, the key incident response guidelines are to: contain the harm, verify integ­ rity, sustain operations, initiate investigation of the event and communicate about the incident. The actions to follow these guidelines may of course differ depending on the type of harm (e.g., disclosure of sensitive information, compared with degradation or

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278 Maeve Dion unavailability of emergency services communications, compared with physical dam­ age to industrial control systems). However, the basic guidelines are the same, no mat­ ter the type of cybersecurity risk. Once an incident has been contained—the threat is no longer causing new harm, and the harm that was caused is no longer spreading—then the process of recovery can begin. Elements of recovery naturally involve prioritization of repairs to a sys­ tem, including replacement of components. Other recovery efforts may include the continued verification of data and software in order to discover potential alterations during the incident. This effort may be so complex that rather than look for potential changes, instead everything may be overwritten with older versions of the data and software (presuming it can be ensured that these versions had been backed-up before the incident occurred), or impacted components and devices may be removed from the system and replaced by new, “clean” ones. During the recovery phase, a company may need to fulfill legal obligations, such as incident reporting to the government or to customers. Also, relevant contracts may dictate liabilities to customers or vendors if operations were affected. If a cause of the incident can be identified, and if the perpetrator or any person at fault for an exploited vulnerability can be held legally liable, remedies may be pur­ sued. The company may sue for restitution; law enforcement agencies may criminally prosecute; or other regulatory bodies may levy fines or institute legal processes for other civil penalties. However, challenges here include both identification of wrong­ doers and enforcement of legal remedies. Primarily these challenges relate to the abil­ ity to hide or disguise online activity, and the ability to conduct harmful acts from different geographical and legal jurisdictions that may not be cooperative or support­ ive of attempts to purse remedies. It can be problematic to prosecute or enforce legal remedies on defendants in foreign countries who conduct their wrongful activities via the internet. 13.4.4 The NIST cybersecurity framework These phases of preparedness, incident response and recovery can be seen in most cybersecurity standards and frameworks based on risk management. From our ter­ minology discussion, a standard is an accepted or authoritative set of procedures for accomplishing something. A framework can be considered a collection of principles and guidelines presented in a structured manner to enable duplication and customi­ zation of the ideas and practices within the framework. This framework could incor­ porate standards; and a framework could be considered a standard, depending on the context. This section presents the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (2018), also called the NIST Cybersecurity Framework4 (NIST CSF). This framework incorporates numerous standards and best practices; and the frame­ work is itself a flexible standard that guides organizations of all types and sizes to improve their respective cybersecurity postures. We can see our cybersecurity defi­ nitions, policies and theories reflected throughout the NIST CSF. For example, as the framework notes, “[b]ecause each organization’s risks, priorities, and systems are unique, the tools and methods used to achieve the outcomes described by the Framework will vary” (p. 2). The NIST CSF thus requires that each organiza­ tion develop a clear understanding of its overall mission and goals, as well as any

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enterprise-level risks related to the organization’s use of and dependence on comput­ ing, communications and control technologies. This framework can help an organization to (i) characterize its existing cybersecu­ rity risk management approach, (ii) elucidate its cybersecurity goals (depicting an ideal target state of cybersecurity); (iii) run a gap analysis to identify areas for improvement between the existing steady-state and the ideal state of cybersecurity; (iv) evaluate its progress toward that ideal state and (v) communicate important aspects of is organi­ zational cybersecurity with internal and external entities that may have a stake in the organization’s cybersecurity risk management. Thus, there are various functionalities and ways to use the NIST CSF. One main component—the Framework Core—exhibits a close relationship with the definition of risk management presented here and the phases of cybersecurity risk management. The Framework Core provides a set of recommended best practices organized around ongoing and concurrent functions that NIST labels as Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover. Target outcomes within these functions span all three types of measures for security-in-depth (physical, technical and administrative). Identify, Protect and Detect are constituent preparedness activities, so with “respond” and “recover”, the three phases of risk management are strongly echoed here. Within the Core, the NIST CSF pairs the target outcomes with cross-references to control measures in various other standards documents, such as COBIT, the ISA99 series and the CIS Controls, which makes the NIST CSF a handy reference guide for analyzing how the different standards align with this risk management approach, and for finding specific controls to help achieve the desired outcomes. For example, the Identify functions includes outcomes that “Threats, both internal and external, are identified and documented” (ID.RA-3) and “Potential business impacts and likelihoods are identified” (ID.RA-4); alongside those outcomes are related references to corresponding sections in five different cybersecurity stand­ ards documents (p. 27). Under U.S. law, federal agencies are required to use the NIST CSF for the manage­ ment of cybersecurity risks (Executive Order No. 13,800, 2017). Private organizations are encouraged to use the NIST CSF as well.

13.5 Summary and conclusions This chapter explains what cybersecurity is and offers some underlying policy and the­ ory regarding our business, societal and homeland security initiatives for improving and sustaining cybersecurity. Concerned that unnecessary regulation could hinder innovation and recognizing that owners of systems are best situated to make specific decisions regarding security, the United States does not have broad laws mandating detailed cybersecurity rules for everyone. Rather, federal and state regulations are based on the type of systems or data we want to secure, and on the desire for consumer protection. The government supplements this regulatory environment with support for public–private partnerships, voluntary information sharing and the dissemination of accessible cybersecurity standards and best practices. As part of its mission, the DHS facilitates numerous initiatives for cybersecurity­ related information sharing and public–private partnerships, and DHS also is the lead agency for the security of federal, non-national security systems. Federal agencies are required to use a risk management approach toward securing their systems. Since

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2017, federal agencies have been required to specifically use the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. Cybersecurity risk management includes a leadership commitment, plans, tools and processes for all aspects of preparedness, incident response and recovery. The NIST CSF incorporates many of the principles, policies and theories discussed in this chapter, such as an all hazards approach, attention to resilience and implementa­ tion of security in depth principles and processes. The framework helps governments and private organizations to arrange their cybersecurity risk management efforts into decisions and solutions customized to each system and organization. It also encour­ ages involvement in information-sharing efforts (staying abreast of new vulnerabili­ ties, threats and best practices). Our everyday work and home lives, as well as our national and homeland security, are dependent on secure and resilient uses of computing, communications and control technologies. Policies and theories discussed in this chapter can help us achieve our desired cybersecurity objectives. However, as the risk management process directs, we must remain vigilant regarding evaluation and reassessment of our chosen principles, processes and best practices for cybersecurity. The following items are therefore sug­ gested for further discussion and consideration.

13.6 Discussion questions 1. One of the concerns of government is that too much regulation can stifle innovation. In this context, how should the government consider the balance between the interests of security regulation and the freedom to innovate? 2. Cybersecurity consists of ad-hoc federal statutes, international law, regula­ tions and rules as well as consumer protection and citizen privacy. How should organizations approach their preparedness planning considering such a com­ plex regulatory environment? 3. Think about your home as a system; make analogies to the “software, hardware, data, people and processes” that make up your home. Now, utilizing the prin­ ciple of security in depth, along with concepts of all hazards and risk manage­ ment, explain some of the plans and processes that you would put into place to ensure the security and resilience of your home. 4. Security and safety concerns relate to the protection of nations, people, things and our way of life. What can we learn from and further explore to improve our approaches to cybersecurity? 5. Given the principles, policies and theories discussed in this chapter (and other chapters), what advice would you give DHS regarding using artificial intelli­ gence to help fulfill its missions? 6. How would you describe cybersecurity risk management to non practitioners? In your own words, how would you explain the principles behind our cyberse­ curity policy and theory?

Notes 1. That is, even though it may not draw a profit itself, cybersecurity can help lessen the likelihood of an incident and can help mitigate the harm/costs that could result from an incident.

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2. Rules have also been established to deter cybercrime behavior, but these laws are not central to maintaining confidentiality, integrity, availability, or resilience; such aspects of our criminal and civil code are not discussed in this chapter. It should be noted that such rules generally prohibit the security concept of “hacking back” by victim organizations against a perceived aggressor (Cook, 2018). 3. Rather, most national governments outlaw other countries’ intelligence operations on domestic soil. This is a matter of national law, not international law. 4. Although the title invokes an emphasis on critical infrastructure, this framework is suita­ ble for all types of organizations, from businesses to non-profits to government agencies. NIST also provides some more particularized framework guidance for certain sectors, such as manufacturing, and for organizations concerned about the security and resilience of industrial control systems.

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Parrend, P., Navarro, J., Guigou, F., Deruyver, A., & Collet, P. (2018). Foundations and appli­ cations of artificial intelligence for zero-day and multi-step attack detection. EURASIP Journal on Information Security, 2018(4), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13635-018-0074-y PCI Security Standards Council. (2018a). About us. Retrieved from https://www.pcisecurity­ standards.org/about_us/ PCI Security Standards Council. (2018b, May). Payment card industry (PCI) data security standard: Requirements and security assessment procedures, version 3.2.1. Retrieved from https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/document_library People’s Republic of Bangladesh. (2014). The national cybersecurity strategy of Bangladesh. Retrieved from Department of Printing and Publications: http://www.dpp.gov.bd/upload_ file/gazettes/10041_41196.pdf Policy. (n.d.). In Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary. Retrieved from https://www.merriam­ webster.com/dictionary/policy Power, M. (2007). Organized uncertainty: Designing a world of risk management. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. (1997). Critical foundations: Protecting America’s infrastructures. Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21. (2013). Critical infrastructure security and resilience. Pub. Papers 106-115 (February 12, 2013). Regulation (EU) 2016/679. (2016). Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the process­ ing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/ EC (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 1–88). Republic of Austria, Federal Chancellery, Department IV—Coordination, Division IV/6— Security Policy Affairs. (2013). Austrian cyber security strategy. Retrieved from the Federal Ministry of Interior: https://www.bmi.gv.at/504/files/130415_strategie_cybersicherheit_en_ web.pdf Sarbanes Oxley Act. (2002). Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). SB-1386 Personal Information: Privacy. (n.d.). Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.29; 1798.82 et seq (as revised). Schatz, D., Bashroush, R., & Wall, J. (2017). Towards a more representative definition of cyber security. Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 12(2), 53–74. https://doi.org/10.15394/ jdfsl.2017.1476 Scott, T. (2015, June 8). Policy to require secure connections across federal websites and web services (Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-15-13). Retrieved from https:// www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2015/m-15-13.pdf SEC Statement. (2018). SEC Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures, 17 C.F.R. pts. 229 & 249. Security. (n.d.). In Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary. Retrieved from https://www.merriam­ webster.com/dictionary/security Self-regulation. (n.d.). In Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary. Retrieved from https://www.merriam­ webster.com/dictionary/self-regulation Standard. (n.d.). In Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary. Retrieved from https://www.merriam­ webster.com/dictionary/standard Switzerland, The Federal Council. (2018). National strategy for the protection of Switzerland against cyber risks (NCS) 2018-2022 [SN002]. Retrieved from the Federal IT Steering Unit: https://www.isb.admin.ch/isb/en/home/ikt-vorgaben/strategien-teilstrategien/sn002­ nationale_strategie_schutz_schweiz_cyber-risiken_ncs.html The Danish Government, Ministry of Finance. (2018). Danish cyber and information security strategy. Retrieved from https://uk.fm.dk/publications/2018/danish-cyber-and-information­ security-strategy

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284 Maeve Dion The Institute of World Politics. (2016, May 27). Cyber security: Why is this (still) so hard? [Video file]. Retrieved from https://youtu.be/47zJPU0VHSQ The White House, U.S. Government. (n.d.). Cyberspace policy review: Assuring a trusted and resilient information and communications infrastructure. Retrieved March 11, 2019 from the Department of Energy: https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/cioprod/documents/ Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf The White House, U.S. Government. (2011, May). International strategy for cyberspace. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/05/16/launching-us-international­ strategy-cyberspace Theory. (n.d.). In Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary. Retrieved from https://www.merriam­ webster.com/dictionary/theory United Nations General Assembly, Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. (2015, July 22). Report of the group of governmental experts on developments in the field of infor­ mation and telecommunications in the context of international security (A/70/174). Retrieved from http://undocs.org/A/70/174 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. (n.d.). Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security. Retrieved from https://www. un.org/disarmament/ict-security/ U.S. Chief Information Officer & the Federal CIO Council. (n.d.). Why HTTPS for everything? Retrieved from https://https.cio.gov/everything/ W3 Techs. (2019, July 1). Historical trends in the usage of site elements for websites. Retrieved from https://w3techs.com/technologies/history_overview/site_element/all/y Young, W., & Leveson, N. G. (2014). Inside risks: An integrated approach to safety and security based on systems theory. Communications of the ACM, 57(2), 31–35. https://doi .org/10.1145/2556938

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14 Theoretical underpinnings of homeland security technology Michael D. Larrañaga and Patrick K. Smith

Description: From its inception, the homeland security community recognized the integral and vital role of science and technology in protecting the Nation. This chapter examines the evolution and role of technology and its theoretical underpinnings in the homeland security domain. Upon completion of this chapter student will be able to: 1. Identify and describe the role of technology in society and homeland security. 2. Identify and describe the tenets of diffusion of innovations theory, technology acceptance models, adaptive structuration theory and socio-technical systems theory. 3. Understand basic technological theories, frameworks and models and their application to homeland security problems. 4. Identify and critically evaluate technology’s impact on the homeland security ecosystem. 5. Critically evaluate the design, selection and/or use of a specific technology to facilitate critical homeland security processes. 6. Describe several roles technology serves that support homeland security strate­ gies, operations and structures.

14.1 Introduction Technological advances are shaping the human experience at an exponential rate. Indeed, we may be entering what noted economist and founder of the World Economic Forum, Klaus Schwab referred to as the Fourth Industrial Revolution wherein break­ throughs in emerging technologies such as the Internet, robotics, artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, genetic sequencing and repair, data processing and analytics and 3D printing advance society to unprecedented heights. At the same time, emerg­ ing threats including pandemics, terrorism, a resurgence of nation-state threats, cli­ mate change, transnational crime and cyber vulnerabilities threaten humanity and the World Order. Homeland security professionals are charged with preventing terrorism; secur­ ing the Nation’s borders; administering immigration laws; safeguarding and securing cyberspace; ensuring resilience to disasters and workforce development (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2011, 2019a). New and emerging tech­ nologies must be suited to homeland security’s volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) threat environment. Science and technology play a large role

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in securing our Nation, our communities and our families from a broad spectrum of threats. As seen in the COVID-19 pandemic, the scientific community, technolo­ gists, innovators and practitioners were called upon to identify, develop and manu­ facture vaccines and antivirals as well as ventilators, personal protective equipment and other critical medical supplies rapidly and in masse. Underlying those efforts were theories, frameworks and models as well as innovative best practices that pro­ vided evidenced-based guidance, assisted in predicting outcomes and explained processes and phenomenon. This chapter examines a multitude of existing and emerging technological theories and examples of their applications to the homeland security ecosystem. Theory used throughout this chapter refers to systematic and evidenced-based approaches to processes and phenomena and include models, frameworks and similar constructs (Bothamley, 2002; Comiskey, 2018). The chapter begins with an analysis of the role of technology in society and homeland security followed by a historical overview of technological policies and innovations in the homeland security domain. The chapter continues with analyses of technological theories, frameworks and mod­ els including diffusion of innovation theory, technology acceptance model, adap­ tive structuration theory, unified theory of acceptance and socio-technical systems theory.

14.2 The relationship between technology and society Technological advancements from the management of fire and the invention of the wheel to space exploration, the Internet and sequencing of the human genome have improved the human condition in ways that were once unimaginable. They are the products of human need, want, curiosity and science. Technology helped develop today’s global economy that offers longer and healthier lives, instantaneous personal and business communications, mass production of food and manufactured goods, international trade and travel and other opportunities. Accompanying those techno­ logical advancements are societal disruptions such as disaffected local and regional economies and displaced workers, military conflicts over limited resources and envi­ ronmental degradation such as pollution and climate change. Technological advancements tend to build upon each other. The fundamental logic and the laws of physics behind the prehistoric wheel that moved primitive carriages are now used in modern engines that power automobiles and airplanes. Similar tech­ nological advancements that built upon previous inventions and innovations include the internal combustion engine, trains, nuclear power, satellites, printing press, tele­ phone, autonomous vehicles (cars, trucks, construction equipment) and drones, home DNA test kits, Internet of things (IoT), vaccinations, penicillin and numerous other medical treatments, as well as the evolution of the iPhone and its many applications that are detailed in this section. Underpinning these technological advancements are novel and evolving theories embedded in scientific and professional communities. Prevailing theories gain support from what Kuhn (1962) referred to as paradigms, scientific practices including theo­ ries, laws, application and instrumentations that are generally accepted by scientific communities. When confronted with anomalies or crises, scientists and practitioners reexamine existing paradigms and theories. Untenable paradigms often result in sci­ entific revolutions which produce new ways of thinking, methodologies, novel theories

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and technological advancements. However, new ways of thinking, novel theories and new technologies challenge the status quo and may be resisted by those committed and invested in legacy institutions, systems and beliefs. The future may produce what Toffler (1970) referred to as future shocks, a dizzying disorientation brought upon by the premature arrival of the future. Today, billions of smart phones and smart devices embedded in household appliances, automobiles and workplaces are connected via local networks and the IoT. Many of these devices collect and share real-time data that is aggregated and analyzed for proactive customer support, data-enriched products, marketing campaigns and workflow optimization. In 2017, there were about 27 billion devices connected to the IoT, and that number is expected to increase to 125 billion devices by 2030. This is the new normal for technology and society—the collection, storage and algorithmic analysis of massive amounts of data. In 2019, only half of compa­ nies can detect security breaches in their IoT devices, and by 2030, it is estimated that the average person will have at least 15 IoT devices, presenting significant privacy and security concerns (Heslop, 2019, March 4; Ranger, 2018, February 3). These advances, while overwhelmingly positive to society, have increased the com­ plexity of the homeland security threat landscape exponentially, requiring the use of specialized and adaptive technologies that are well suited to an emerging threat environment. Due to these advances, a single person has more power than ever to do harm and to wreak havoc on society; and a single networked group of people have expo­ nentially more power. Non-state actors now have previously unfathomed levels of power, as the global stage can now be accessed from most places in the world through the use of technology, computing power and the Internet (Coats, 2019; Lewis, 2014). The Cold War arms race has transformed into a technology arms race that includes the use of hacking, information warfare, Deepfake manipulation, elec­ tion interference, miniaturization and critical infrastructure attacks in which attribu­ tion of attacks and manipulation is difficult to ascribe to a specific actor. Deepfake is a technology that uses AI to produce or edit contents of a video or an image to show something that may never have happened or did happen but in a different context (Pitt, 2019, February 19). These leaps in technology, from robotics, nanotechnology, computing power, advances in communications and data transfer, to life-extending advances in medicine, the 21st century promises to present both danger and opportu­ nity for technology-based solutions (Coates, 2019; Lewis, 2014). Technological discoveries and innovations such as the Internet, social network plat­ forms, software and smart devices, provide society with the opportunity to link or chunk data together by reducing meaningless noise, removing redundancy, identi­ fying and prioritizing trends or patterns of interest in extremely large sets of data. The advent of social networking and online communities have replaced the public square, increases in computing power have resulted in more computing power in a mobile phone than was available to anyone 50 years ago, electronic miniaturization has increased the number and types of electronic devices in which we rely, and access to the Internet has provided nefarious actors and individuals alike with tremendous power. Data minus noise and redundancy is information stripped of embellishment and duplication, and the cognitive processing of relevant and useful information per­ mits the recognition of patterns from large data sets (Lewis, 2014). These patterns and the information obtained from large data sets impart knowledge, providing

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tremendous power to those with access to both data and tools for filtering noise asso­ ciated with large data sets. In 2007, Apple unveiled the iPhone, a telephone that was a powerful handheld computer, which gave consumers portable computing capability that created a never before witnessed era of both societal independence and societal dependence on technology. Apple sold 1.9 million iPhones in 2007, earning a dominant market position in only a few years and selling almost 217 million iPhones in 2017. Apple then introduced the iPod Touch in 2007 followed by the iPad in 2010 and the iWatch in 2015 (Merchant, 2017; Silver, 2018, June 29). The introduction of these products and others has spurred innovation in the market (such as devices using the Android platform) and has fundamentally changed the global technology landscape and the relationship between technology and society. This has allowed for individual consumer access to the Internet on a powerful handheld computing device, lead­ ing to new ways of interacting with computers including texting and emailing by phone; the development of the Application (App) and developer ecosystem; eCom­ merce and eLearning platforms; wearable technologies and fitness trackers; the exponential growth of social media platforms such as Twitter, Instagram, Grindr, Foursquare, Facebook, FaceTime, Reddit, Flickr, Tumblr, Pinterest, WhatsApp, Snapchat, TikTok and many others (Kelly, 2012, June 30). The next wave of inno­ vation in computing will likely come from advances in Quantum computing, which is predicted to further advances in AI and allow for other previously complex computing problems to be solved quickly and efficiently (International Business Machines, 2020).

14.3 Evolution of homeland security technology American history provides cogent insights into the evolution of homeland security’s technological history. Starting with the Continental Army’s mandatory smallpox inoculation policy during the American Revolution to the chartering of the National Academies of Science during the Civil War to enlist the scientific community to serve the government’s wartime and other needs to the Manhattan Project that produced the world’s first atomic bombs during World War II and the post-Sputnik (1957) establish­ ment of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to formulate and execute technological and scientific research and development projects for military and other government uses. Military conflicts and other crisis served as technological focusing events. Focusing events are sudden, unpredictable and harmful or potentially harmful events that gain the attention of policy makers and the public simultaneously and drive national policy more so than other policy areas (Birkland, 1997). As was the case of 20th century military and other crises, homeland security events and crisis such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Hurricane Katrina (2005), the I-35 Mississippi River Bridge collapse (2007), the Underwear Bomber (2009), the H1NI flu pandemic (2009), the Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill (2010), the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) and most recently the 2019–20 COVID-19 pandemic drove technological inno­ vation. Future focusing events will undoubtedly be borne from pandemics, non-state actors and consequences associated with a warming climate. The 9/11 terrorist attacks resulted in the greatest reorganization of the U.S. govern­ ment since the National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense, the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency to secure the Nation in

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a post-World War II threat landscape. The Homeland Security Act (2002) established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with the stated purpose of preventing terrorism, minimizing the damage for terrorist attacks that did occur in the U.S; act­ ing as a focal point for natural and manmade crisis and emergency planning; ensuring that the economic security of the U.S. was not diminished by efforts to secure the homeland, monitoring and coordinating efforts to counter illegal drug trafficking con­ nected to terrorism; and to investigate and prosecute terrorism except as prohibited by law. Specific to technology and science, the Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) was established in DHS to develop a national policy and strategic plan that would identify, promote and help develop critical homeland security technical needs and standards (Homeland Security Act, 2002, P.L. 107-296). Included in the Directorate’s strategic objectives was partnering with the homeland security enter­ prise (hereafter the enterprise) and energizing the homeland security industrial base (HSIB). The enterprise refers to the collective efforts and shared responsibilities of those involved in maintaining critical homeland security capabilities. The enterprise describes the collective efforts and shared responsibilities of Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental and private sector partners—and includes individuals, families and communities—to maintain critical homeland security capabilities.” The enterprise is synonymous with “whole-of-community” and “all­ of-nation” approaches to homeland security (Comiskey & Larrañaga, 2019; DHS, 2010, 2014a, 2015a). DHS, acting as an agent for the enterprise, fosters the devel­ opment, adaptation and market delivery of new technologies to provide solutions for the homeland security threat landscape environment. HSIB refers to a highly fragmented federation of products and service providers that serve the enterprise’s technical needs (DHS, 2019b). Additional homeland security-related science and technology initiatives and programs can be found throughout DHS, the federal gov­ ernment and the enterprise. The Directorate of Science and Technology was created with the stated purpose of working with the appropriate executive agencies to develop a national policy and stra­ tegic plan for identifying priority goals, objectives and policies to coordinate the fed­ eral government civilian efforts to identify counter measures to terrorism and related threats; identifying, promoting and facilitating the long-term research and develop­ ment needs and capabilities for DHS; coordinating the dissemination of research con­ ducted or sponsored by DHS (Homeland Security Act, 2002, P.L. 107-296). 14.3.1 Technology adaptation and smart scavenging Homeland security policy makers, professionals and academicians attempt to keep pace with the rapidly evolving threat landscape using various technologies. Professional practice requires the development of new technologies and use of exist­ ing technologies that are available in the market or that can be modified to satisfy a need, or the development of completely new technologies as may be required. DHS and the enterprise employ a method of smart scavenging called tech foraging, which is a process of discovering what other research and technologies exist for solving similar types of problems in order to avoid duplication of effort. DHS collaborates with fed­ eral, industry and academic partners to repurpose existing technologies and develop new technologies that assist the nation in achieving the homeland security mission

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(DHS, 2013; Hopmeier, 2012). Although DHS has developed completely new technol­ ogies, most technology development projects modify an existing technology for use in the DHS mission space. Examples of tech foraging successes are abundant. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard requested DHS assistance in tracking dark vessels, anonymous boats, rafts or other watercraft that transport illegal contraband. Dark vessels operate in the vastness of the ocean and are difficult to discriminate from legitimate boat traffic. A DHS tech forager learned that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) operated radar to monitor ocean current and wave action along the nation’s coasts. DHS collaborated with NOAA and subsequently developed software to modify the coastal-weather radar system to detect, identify and describe dark vessels (DHS, 2013). Another example is a collaboration with NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory when DHS was tasked with seeking or developing disaster victim detection technologies. NASA had developed a technology that detects human heartbeats and began work­ ing with DHS to modify the technology for use in search and rescue operations. The interagency team found similar research was completed in the 1990s at Michigan State University under a grant from the National Science Foundation. The DHS First Responders Group and NASA used the results of the Michigan State research to verify technical assumptions and approaches, saving time, resources and avoiding the duplication of research. DHS contacted the original Michigan State researcher, who although now retired, was willing to help the team to improve the technology for victim detection. One year later, the DHS and NASA team delivered a Finding Individuals for Disaster and Emergency Response (FINDER) prototype. Field tested that same year, FINDER showed extremely promising test results. In less than a min­ ute, FINDER detected 3 heartbeats of people hidden in test rubble in a real-world rubble pile (DHS, 2013). Technology foraging, like research and development (R & D), is about moving life-saving inventions into the hands of front-line operators (DHS, 2013). To aid in technology development, market delivery and consumer acceptance, various theo­ retical models are used to develop new technologies or to adapt existing technolo­ gies. Technology foraging for use in the COVID-19 Pandemic is perhaps the greatest smart scavenging effort in history, with governments around the globe, individuals, industry, business, academia and researchers all working to modify existing technolo­ gies for use in preventing human exposure to the new novel virus strain Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Corona Virus-2 (SARS-CoV-2), facilitating and adapting clin­ ical treatments, and employing various pre-existing technologies to aid in fighting the epidemic. The United States enacted its Emergency Use Authorization authority to facilitate fast-track approvals of medical devices and equipment, treatments and decontamination methods, many of which were previously approved for some other purpose (Food and Drug Administration, 2017). The White House (2020) declared a National Emergency and enacted the Defense Protection Act to keep scarce medical resources within the U.S. and for the accelerated manufacture of personal protective equipment such as air-purifying respirators, surgical masks and surgical gloves. In addition, private industry has responded to the effort to re-purpose existing technolo­ gies. For example, Apple and Google, who are competitors in technological equipment teamed up to develop automated contact tracing for those who may come into close contact of a person with of COVID-19. Contact tracing is an effort that identifies and alerts people who have come into contact with a person infected with SARS-Cov-2.

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Smartphones and AI are utilized to determine whether somebody has been in contact with an infected person (Kellon, 2020). Ventilators have been created by manufacturers in multiple industries using parts from other products such as automobiles, fitness equipment and vacuums (Ward, 2020, March 27).

14.4 Theoretical models of technology adoption and use Technology development and acceptance theories and socio-technical theories help us understand and predict how new technologies may spread through the homeland security domain and society in general. The theories provide cogent insights into the evolution of technological ideas from conceptualization to drafting rooms and labs to the marketplace and practitioner adoption and use. This chapter provides a general overview of diffusion of innovation theory, technology acceptance model, adaptive structuration theory, unified theory of acceptance and socio-technical systems theory and their use in homeland security. Constant technological change provides a continuous threat environment to the homeland security threat landscape, while at the same time, providing opportunities for achieving the homeland security missions. With regards to technology of home­ land security, the speed at which consumers accept and adopt these technologies depends largely on the availability of a technology, its convenience and market need, and personal, national and homeland security considerations (Lai, 2017). The rate at which technologies are adopted is a constant struggle between technological change and barriers to new or modified technology product acceptance. Various models of technology innovation and adoption exist that help to describe how technologies are introduced and distributed into a specific market. Several of the most common models of technology adoption and use are briefly discussed. 14.4.1 Technology acceptance models Diffusion of innovation theory (DOI) is one of the oldest social science theories. DOI describes the process by which an innovation moves from an idea through diffusion of the technology into the market with the result being the adoption of the idea or prod­ uct, a change in behavior, or the spreading of an idea. The premise is that one must perceive the idea or product as a new or innovative such that diffusion can be possible (Rogers, 1962; Ryan & Gross, 1943). The essence of DOI is that technology usage dif­ fuses into the market and classifies adapters as innovators, early adopters, early major­ ity adopters, late majority adapters and laggards (Rogers, 1962; Ryan & Gross, 1943). Innovators are those who want to be the first to try the innovation. They are adventur­ ous, willing to take risks and are often the developers of new ideas. Early Adopters are those who represent opinion leaders, maintain leadership roles and embrace change. Early Majority Adopters are rarely leaders and adopt new ideas, behaviors or technol­ ogies before the average person. Typically, they require evidence that the innovation works before adoption. Late Majority Adopters are skeptical of change and will only adopt an innovation after it has been tried by the majority. Laggards are bound by tradition and very conservative. They are very skeptical of change and are the hardest group to bring on board. Strategies to appeal to this population include statistics, fear appeals and pressure from people in the other adopter groups. DOI has been used successfully in many fields including communication, agriculture, public health,

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criminal justice, law enforcement, social work and marketing, and is especially useful when used to accelerate changes in the behaviors of a social system (Comiskey, 2010; Lai, 2017; LaMorte, 2018). Interestingly, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to innova­ tion and early adoption of medical, public health, surveillance (infrared scanning for fevers), handheld devices (global positioning used to identify persons in proximity to an infected person), data analytics and personal protective devices and equipment to fight human infection from the new and novel SARS-CoV-2 virus. For example, the citizen supply chain has utilized 3D printing, individuals and businesses to create PPE because the traditional supply chain was unable to meet the demands of healthcare workers and individuals (Kleinman, Z., 2020, April 10). Technology readiness (TR) refers to one’s propensity to embrace and use new tech­ nologies. Technology consumers can be classified as: explorers, pioneers, skeptics and laggards, which are like the DOI innovator classification scheme (Lai, 2017). The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM 1989) was originally used for products already in the marketplace and has been typically used for modeling a user’s accept­ ance of information systems or technologies by end users (Davis, 1989; Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989). TAM first explained computer usage behaviors by asserting that users must perceive two specific beliefs, perceived usefulness (PU) and perceived ease of use (PEU), before the technology is accepted and external variables such as social influ­ ence, years of user experience with technology, system familiarity and job function. PU refers to the subjective likelihood that the use of a certain technology will improve the user’s ability to complete a specific action (perception that a particular technology is useful) and PEU refers to the user’s expectation that the use of the technology be effortless (ease of use) (Davis, 1989). The power of the TAM model is to predict usage of a particular technology and ultimately the acceptance (actual use) of a technology by users (Hubona & Whisenand, 1995). Figure 14.1 depicts the original TAM Model. If a user maintains a poor PEU (product is perceived difficult to use) and a poor PU (product is perceived as not useful), then no matter how useful the technology might be, it will be difficult for the product to be successful in the marketplace. The Technology Acceptance Model 2 (TAM2) provided more detailed explana­ tions to describe why users found a given technology useful at three points in time:

Figure 14.1 Technology acceptance model (TAM)

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pre-implementation, one-month post-implementation and three months postimplementation. The TAM2 theorized that a user’s mental assessment of the match between a specific goal and the consequence of performing job tasks using the tech­ nology serves as a basis for forming perceptions regarding the usefulness of the system (Lai, 2017; Venkatesh & Bala, 2008; Venkatesh & Davis, 2000; Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003). The TAM2 model can be used to predict the time span between an introduction of a technology and actual use and acceptance of the technology in the marketplace. Early models such as DOI, TAM and TAM2 were studied and a new unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT) was developed to assess the user’s behavioral intention while at the same time assessing expectations of technology performance, effort, social influence and facilitating conditions based on PU/PEU, extrinsic motivation, job-fit, relative advantage and outcome expectation (Lai, 2017; Venkatesh et al., 2003). The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM3) combined TAM2 and the PU/PEU models to integrate a model of technology acceptance to account for individual differences, system characteristics, social influence and facilitating condi­ tions together to assess PU and PEU (Lai, 2017; Venkatesh & Bala, 2008). 14.4.2 Socio-technical based models Adaptive Structuration Theory (AST) refers to the production and reproduction of the social systems through members use of rules and resources in interaction. AST assumes that individuals are relatively free to act with free will (Poole, 2008). AST is a theory of group communication where group members affect outcomes. AST is adaptive because group members can intentionally adapt and adopt rules and resources to accomplish goals. AST seeks to understand the types of commu­ nication structures that are provided by advanced technologies and the emergent communication that develop in human action as people interact with these technol­ ogies. Essentially, AST asserts that technology has structure but that social prac­ tices moderate the technology’s effects on human behavior. AST facilitates analysis of between-group differences, accounts for the structural potential of technology and provides a general approach to study how groups organize themselves, a pro­ cess that is critical in assisting groups in achieving specific outcomes (Poole, 2008; Sinclair, & Vogus, 2011). Socio-Technical Systems Theory (STS) refers to a set of interacting socio-technical aspects including goals/metrics, people, infrastructure, technology, culture and pro­ cesses/procedures; any organization employs people with capabilities, who work to achieve goals, follow processes, use technologies, operate within some sort of infra­ structure and share cultural assumptions and norms (Cartelli, 2007). The main tenet of STS is that the design and performance of any complex organizational system can only succeed if the social and technical aspects are treated as interdependent parts of a complex system. Due to the complex nature of homeland security threats, STS can be used to solve problems and develop technologies in a variety of overlapping domains such as computer technologies, crowd behavior modification, sustainabil­ ity, social networks, engineering design, risk analysis and simulation modeling. STS assists in merging people and technology, viewing the integration of computing and information technology into societal systems as the next evolutionary step of human­ ity (Appelbaum, 1997; Eason, 2009).

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The in-depth review of the theoretical models is beyond the scope of this chapter, and homeland security professionals intending to assess the movement of a technol­ ogy solution from an idea to market acceptance and saturation can use one or more of these models to assist in acceptance of a technology innovation. There is no specific theory for the development and user acceptance for technologies in homeland secu­ rity, but rather established general theories are used in the development and adoption of technologies that are used in the homeland security space. Like homeland security technology development, the field of homeland security itself is an evolving discipline (Comiskey, 2018). This is largely because homeland security is a meta-discipline, a discipline of disciplines, with different functions and specialties ranging from counter terrorism to national security, border security to intelligence and critical infrastruc­ ture protection to environmental and climate security (Comiskey 2018; Comiskey & Larrañaga, 2019; Ramsay, 2012). Perhaps in the future, a theory of technology for homeland security will emerge to become part of the common lexicon. A unifying theory of homeland security itself and homeland security technology development is especially evasive because the meta-discipline’s cumulative knowledge, inquiry methods and resources that previously existed in other disciplines (Bellavita, 2012; Pelfrey & Kelly, 2013: Reese, 2014). 14.4.3 Technology development, adaptation and adoption for homeland security Included in the Directorate of Science and Technology’s initiatives is the First Responders Group (FRG). The FRG is a DHS-first responder partnership that iden­ tifies, validates and facilitates first-responder needs through the use of existing and emerging technologies. The FRG work with the homeland security community to identify and develop customer driven innovative tools and technologies to help solve real-world problems. FRG partners include academic institutions, industry and the national laboratories. FRG members are drawn from a broad range of disciplines (law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical service, emergency management, etc.) and sectors (local, state, tribal and federal government, professional associations, the private sector) (DHS, 2016, 2019b). The FRG’s primary role is to (a) identify high priority capability gaps in the first responder community and (b) define operational requirements for technologies and knowledge products that will fill these gaps. The FRG’s starting point for technol­ ogy development is Project Responder (PR), a multi-year effort that identifies and pri­ oritizes gaps between current first responder capabilities and those required for the safe and effective response to potentially catastrophic incidents. The FRG is part of DHS Science & Technology’s solution development program, which subjects all pro­ jects to rigorous and transparent validation to ensure projects meet first responder needs and that the deliverables are highly likely to be transitioned into the market for first responder use (DHS, 2019b). PR develops technologies, knowledge products and standards for the nation’s first responder community. PR surveys, collects and prior­ itizes nationwide capability needs based on feedback from professionals from across the U.S. A brief summary of Project Responder Projects one through five follows. In April 2001, The Oklahoma City Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) and the Department of Justice commissioned PR in an effort to improve the capabilities of local, state and federal emergency responders. The program focused on

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identifying the capability needs, shortfalls and priorities needed to respond to cata­ strophic incidents to develop a technology investment plan for mitigating capability deficits. Shortly after the inception of PR, the focus was shifted by September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. PR defined 12 capability areas that, as a whole, defined and described the requirements for response to a catastrophic terrorist event, which became known as National Terrorism Response Objectives (NTRO). The NTROs were used to inform a national agenda with input from national laboratories, academia and private industry for research and development and a corresponding set of roadmaps detailing new initiatives designed to close gaps in emergency response capabilities. The output of Project Responder became the Project Responder—National Technology Plan for Emergency Response to Catastrophic Terrorism (DHS, 2012). Table 14.1 lists PR capa­ bility priorities that remain relevant. The second Project Responder—Review of Emergency Response Capability Needs (PR2) was initiated in 2007 by the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to examine changes in emergency response efforts since the first report and iden­ tify new and enduring technology development priorities. PR2 focused on an allhazards focus to homeland security and found significant changes to responder capability needs and related priorities, due in large part to the effects of the failure of large-scale natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina (2005), the I-35 bridge collapse (2007) and the H1N1 pandemic influenza outbreak (2009) and the evolution of national response policy with the release of the National Incident Management System (2004) and the National Response Plan (2004). The PR2 report was released in 2008 and included a list of 15 capability priorities (DHS, 2017; See also Baggett, Foster, & Simpkins, 2017). Table 14.1 lists Project Responder capability priorities over time. Project Responder 3—Toward the First Responder of the Future (PR3) looked for­ ward with the goal of identifying the highest priority capabilities to ensure that first responders can effectively and safely respond to and manage catastrophic incidents with a forward-thinking approach. Published in 2012, PR3 came on the heels of The Financial Crisis of 2007–2008, which was, at the time, the longest economic downturn in the U.S. since World War II (Rich, 2013, November 22). The Crisis led to cuts in government spending at all levels, resulting in declines in baseline emergency response capabilities and decreases in specialized capabilities necessary during catastrophic incident responses (DHS, 2012; National Homeland Security Consortium, 2010). Major homeland security and related incidents that occurred between the publi­ cation of PR2 and PR3 showed an increased diversity of incident types, including catastrophic industrial accidents including the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (2010) and the natural gas line rupture in San Bruno, California (2010); severe tornadoes in Joplin, Missouri (2011) and Tuscaloosa, Alabama (2011); record flooding on the Mississippi river (2011); wildfires in Texas, Oklahoma and California; an earthquake near Washington, DC (2011) and several lone wolf terrorist attacks/plots. Both 2010 and 2011 were record breaking years for Presidential disaster declarations in the U.S. In addition, earthquakes in Haiti (2010) and Japan and the Fukushima nuclear inci­ dent (2011) strained U.S. responder capabilities and redefined potential worst-case scenarios used for planning and mitigation. Table 14.1 illustrates the breadth and scope of DHS capability domains in Project Responder, from 2004 to 2016 and highlights technology needs for first responders across a wide array of crises.

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Table 14.1 Capability domains and priorities Capability Domains and Priorities 2004–16 PR5 Capability Domains A. Situational Awareness F. Casualty Management B. Communications & Information Sharing G. Training and Exercise C. Command, Control and Coordination H. Risk Assessment and Planning D. Responder Health and Safety I. Intelligence & Investigation E. Logistics and Resource Management Capability Priorities Over Time (DOMAIN) PR 1 PR 2 PR 3 PR 4 1. 2004 2. 2008 3. 2011 Priorities 4. 2014 Priorities Priorities Priorities Body protection Command & Virtual simulation All-environment from all hazards management (C) training (G) communications (D) (B) On-scene Communications Responder geolocation (A) Responder detection (A) (B) geolocation (A) Remote & standoff detection (A) Responder geolocation (A) Seamless connectivity & integration (A) Mass victim decontamination (F) Risk awareness & assessment (H) Mass medical prophylaxis (F)

Seamless data integration (B)

All-environment communication (B)

Full-body personal protection (D) Logistics support (E)

Remote tactical Monitoring (A)

Mass prophylaxis distribution

PPE integrated communications (B)

Training & exercise programs (G) Mass victim decontamination (F) Responder respiratory protection (D) Responder geolocation (A)

Threat detection & monitoring (A)

Mass casualty medical care management (F) Individual & collective protection (D) Surveillance & Prioritization & information dissemination integration (A) (H) Logistics Credentialing (E) information systems (E) Threat assessment/ data collection/ analysis (H)

Body protection from all hazards (D)

Resource availability (E)

PR 5 5. 2016 Priorities Joint command* (C)

Responder geolocation (A) Threat detection Integration of & monitoring digital (A) information (I) Hazard Integration of identification (H) social media feed data (I) Remote tactical Information Monitoring (A) sharing* (B) Body protection from all hazards (D) PPE integrated communications (B) Resource availability (E)

Trend & pattern identification (H)

Casualty location (F)

Hazard identification (H)

Trend & pattern identification (H)

On-scene resource status (E)

On-scene resource status (E)

Casualty location (F)

Virtual simulation Training (G)

Integration of disparate data sources (A) Creation of actionable intelligence (I) Integration of images and video (A)

All-source information integration (I) Software application assessment (E)

*Note that Joint Command and Information Sharing are not solvable by technology alone but can be facilitated using technology.

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Table 14.1 Project Responder priority needs over time. Capability needs identified across multiple iterations are color coded across iterations. Capability needs that are not color coded indicate that the need did not occur in multiple PR iterations. Adapted from (DHS, 2017). Project Responder 4—2014 National Technology Plan for Emergency Response to Catastrophic Incidents (PR4) conducted a longitudinal assessment of 11 years of enduring gaps and needs and identified a set of both enduring and emerging capabil­ ity needs along with technology objectives and assessments of the state of science and technology to meet those needs. PR4 identified 14 capability needs for improving the first responders’ ability to respond to catastrophic incidents along with 42 response technology objectives (RTOs) to address the capability needs. Each RTO identifies a high-level technology solution designed to improve the capabilities of the response community. PR4 presented a plan with technology road maps to illustrate project timelines and resource requirements such that DHS, academia and private indus­ try could make investment decisions and proceed with acquisitions to address both enduring and emerging response needs (DHS, 2014b). The fifth Project Responder (PR-5), examined emergency response capability needs for large-scale incidents in light of changes to the response environment (threats, hazards and risks), including the increase in incidence and severity of natural disas­ ters and weather-related events, an increase in the number of civil disorder incidents and attacks on and targeting of emergency responders (DHS, 2017). PR-5’s findings inform DHS decision-making about investments in programs that promote capabil­ ity enhancement through technology development and the prioritizations of research projects. The highest capability needs over time for PRs 1-5 are listed in Table 14.1 and fall within the nine (9) capability domains (A-I) listed in Table 14.1. The domains are broad operational categories in which similar needs are consistently identified and provide an organizational construct for research and discussion. As shown in Table 14.1, PR5 prioritized eight capability needs out of a total of 37. Those needs were the ability to: 1. Quickly establish joint command between jurisdictions and agencies. 2. Geolocate responders on the incident scene including latitude, longitude and altitude/depth. 3. Capture, process, integrate and manage raw and digital information related to incident response, operations or an investigation. 4. Isolate and extract critical information from social media feeds and electronic communications of individuals on the scene during response operations. 5. Share incident-related information among agencies and disciplines during response operations. 6. Merge and synthesize disparate data sources in real time to support situational awareness. 7. Create actionable intelligence based on data and information from multiple sources. 8. Access, integrate, share and display images and video pertinent to the incident scene for the responder and incident command. When considering homeland security capability priorities over time, one can see that the capability needs transition to data driven needs requiring data-driven

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technology solutions, as PR5 capability needs highlight the increasing priority for integration of data from multiple sources for increased situational awareness, communications/information sharing, command and control and intelligence and investigation. The only priority consistent through all Project Responder iterations is the need for the ability to geolocate responders on the incident scene in threedimensional space (latitude, longitude, altitude/depth) indoors, outdoors and below grade, in itself a grand technology challenge. Five of the eight highest priority needs in PR5 describe the need to integrate data, images or video. Homeland security pro­ fessionals have access to increasing amounts of data, and real-time access the right data, in the right format and at the right time, could provide significant advance­ ments in situational awareness, responder safety and the ability to conduct investi­ gations (DHS, 2017). There are five different data integration capability needs listed among the highest priorities, all of which represent a distinct need and potentially different technology solution. Accessing, integrating and displaying images and video requires a different solution than displaying and integrating text data. As evidenced by the priority given to these capability needs, responders are anxious to integrate and access critical data feeds in real time (DHS, 2017). The COVID-19 pandemic will likely result in drastic changes to technology solu­ tions required to address capability gaps highlighted during the pandemic response. The sixth Project Responder (PR-6), the next iteration of PR, will almost certainly maintain a heavy focus on pandemic response and associated technology gaps. In addition, Hurricanes Harvey, Maria and Dorian, all of which resulted in historic flooding and associated damages will have a great impact on the capability gaps iden­ tified during PR-6. 14.4.4 Technology breakdowns as drivers for technology development and adaptation Two salient examples where the intended relationship between technology and the corresponding usage of the technology broke down were during Hurricane Katrina (2005) and Harvey (2017). During Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans (2005), there were over six hundred 911 calls pending at one time, and dispatchers and first respond­ ers were not able to service the majority of those calls. During Hurricane Harvey (2017), the Houston Emergency Center received 120,000 911 calls during a 6-day period, with emergency services being unable to respond to most of those calls, even with assistance from the Texas National Guard and U.S. Coast Guard, and support­ ing volunteer organizations such as the Cajun Navy from surrounding communities (Harden, 2018, June 8). During the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, examples of technology breakdowns have been observed in rush to adopt video conferencing platforms in an effort for schools and businesses to socially distance while maintaining operations. Many organizations adopted Zoom as their video conferencing platform of choice. With the increase in popularity came an increase in attention from hackers and so-called Zoombombers who crashed meetings. After several Zoombombings raised security concerns, many customers left Zoom for other platforms touting better security protocols, and com­ petitors launched rival apps, such as the Facebook Messenger Rooms, in an attempt to adapt and capitalize on the issues faced by Zoom (Bond, 2020, April 24).

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Breakdowns in cyber-security are not uncommon and have resulted in billions of dollars in losses and economic disruptions (Harris, 2019, June 26; White House, 2018). It is critical that we continue to update existing technologies and develop new tech­ nologies that meet the demands of the VUCA homeland security threat landscape. The complex homeland security mission space that requires the use of a wide array of technologies. New and emerging technologies are well suited to allow homeland secu­ rity professionals to meet the challenges faced. This chapter examined a multitude of existing and emerging technological theories, frameworks and models and their applications in the homeland security ecosystem. 14.4.5 Non-cooperative and unconstrained biometrics1 A profound example of technologies developed or adapted for use by DHS include non-cooperative and unconstrained biometrics for the prosecution of offenders and recovery of victims of child trafficking and exploitation. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) assists law enforcement by serving as a repository for images and videos of child sexual assault and exploitation. Since 2002, the NCMEC has received over 165 million image and video files from law enforcement with an average of 500,000 new submissions each week. There are over 50 Darknet boards with over 100,000 members with the sole purpose of facilitating the exchange of child exploitation materials. In 2015, there were five petabytes (six million gigabytes) of data related to child abuse and exploitation cases seized by DHS Immigrations and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations, C3-Cyber Crimes Center and Child Exploitation Investigation Units, with that number increasing at exponen­ tial rates. In order to efficiently search Darknet imagery, DHS required the use of facial detec­ tion and pattern recognition systems that would: (a) provide associations between materials or images not otherwise detected; (b) automatically cluster queries where the same victims/suspects are detected: (c) provide workload reductions across large data seizures by identifying new productions of material when a new face is encoun­ tered and (d) develop quicker leads for improved law enforcement response. Previously existing and commercially available face detection/recognition algo­ rithms work best on cooperative subjects and therefore were inadequate to this task. Non-cooperative biometrics seeks to identify faces, patterns (tattoos, fingerprints) from still and video imagery of child exploitation datasets from non-cooperative and unconstrained imagery. Non-cooperative subject imagery may be obscured, off-angle, off-perspective, of varying resolutions and have poor lighting. In the unconstrained case, the subject may have aged, be upside down, ball gagged, caged, drugged, exhibiting extreme expressions. The non-cooperative and unconstrained subject imagery presented challenges for law enforcement to use existing facial rec­ ognition technologies. DHS developed functional requirements for this technology in 2013 and success­ fully deployed this technology to facilitate search and identification of digital infor­ mation based on visual attributes. A DHS investigation into a child pornographer led to imagery that was used to match the skin patterns on the knuckle on a perpetrator’s hands to those that were shown in seized images. In this case, a U.S. federal court held that the use of the pattern recognition was valid. The conviction was upheld by the

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U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit (United States. v. Merrell, 2016). In addition, fingerprint patterns from photographs, tattoos and patterns from other body parts such as the pronasale of the nose have been used to identify and successfully prosecute offenders. Advances in this area continue with the development of technologies such as the algorithms used by Clearview AI, which is able to perform facial recognition on a database of over 3 billion images collected from social media websites (Clearview AI, 2020). 14.4.6 First responders group technology development Based on the results of PR5, examples of technologies under development with vari­ ous partners highlight the both the diversity of homeland security application and the collaboration needed for development and commercialization of these technologies: • •

•

•

•

•

Activation of Body-Worn Cameras that can activate without the user manually turning on the camera is being developed by the DHS S&T along with Hitron Technologies, Inc. The Enhanced Dynamic Geo-Social Environment (EDGE) Virtual Training technology developed by S&T using U.S. Army technology creates a virtual envi­ ronment that provides realistic, customized training scenarios and allows online cross-jurisdiction and cross-agency training. This technology allows for cost effective training among various response agencies. The QuickRoute Mobile Emergency Routing Services for First Responder Vehicles is being developed by S&T and Azimuth1, LLC to improve the routing system for emergency vehicles. The system accounts for a variety challenges, including inclement weather, road conditions, vehicle characteristics and department-level protocols for handling vehicle usage. The technology will ensure emergency vehi­ cles have priority traffic in all areas of travel during an emergency response. The Wearable Smart Chemical Sensor is being developed by DHS and TDA Research, Inc. (TDA) through a Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) award to develop a simple, inexpensive, wearable smart chemical sensor badge that has high sensitivity and selectivity to multiple chemicals at trace (low parts per million or ppm) concentrations, and that triggers alarms at permis­ sible exposure limits, short-term exposure limits and time weighted average concentrations. The Wildland Firefighter Respiratory Protection is being developed by DHS, TDA Research and Avon Protection to create a scarf-type respiratory protection system. They envision that this system will be used instead of bandannas but will provide respiratory protection for firefighters against chemical vapors, carbon monoxide and particulate hazards for over 12 hours during wildland firefighting operations. The Response and Defeat Operations Support (REDOPS) system is being designed to render improvised explosive devices (IEDs) safe when they are dis­ covered. While detection technologies and strategies have received considerable attention, until recently the homeland security enterprise lacked an integrated program for developing the countermeasures public safety bomb squads can use to safely and efficiently dispose of IEDs.

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Technologies that have been commercialized based on previous Project Responder iterations include: •

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

The ViSi Mobile® System developed by DHS and Sotera Wireless, Inc. can monitor vital signs without connecting wired sensors from the patient to other equipment. This technology provides paramedics, clinicians and other med­ ical personnel with a hands-free, wireless device to monitor a patient’s vital signs, creating a safer environment for both EMS personnel and patients. This project generated a new technology in widespread use in the field. The Electronic Recovery and Access to Data (ERAD) Prepaid Card Reader is a small, handheld device that wirelessly allows law enforcement officers in the field to identify and check the balance of suspicious cards, and to put a temporary hold on the linked funds until a full investigation can be com­ pleted. This project has successfully allowed law enforcement to hold linked funds generated by illegal activity until such time that the courts permit sei­ zure of the funds. This is an important tool for combating human trafficking, sexual exploitation and the drug trade. The First Responder Support Tools (FiRST) App is a simple yet power­ ful bomb and chemical release response tool that puts key decision-making data—such as safe standoff distances, damage and injury contours, nearby areas of concern and suggested roadblocks—directly at responders’ fingertips. This App was successfully used by first responders during the Arkema fire and blast that occurred during Hurricane Harvey in 2017 to route emergency traffic and evacuate the area due to an explosion and resulting toxic release. The Radio Internet-Protocol Communications Model (RIC-M) is an after-market technology solution that allows agencies to easily upgrade and reconfigure legacy systems at a low cost. RIC-M allows many older base sta­ tion systems to be used for another 10–20 years, providing significant eco­ nomic benefits to local governments. The Semi-Autonomous Pipe Bomb End Cap Remover (SAPBER) removes end caps and collects video and physical evidence from pipe bombs while keeping operators at a safe standoff distance, while at the same time preserv­ ing the bomb components for use as evidence for the identification and pros­ ecution of the bomber(s). The Wildland Firefighter Advanced Personal Protective System (WLFF­ APPS) is a suite of personal protective equipment that reduces wildland fire­ fighter heat stress injuries. The garment system improves radiant thermal protection and has increased form, fit and function, including specific gar­ ments designed for women, a first in the firefighting field. The Social Media Analytics and Reporting Toolkit (SMART) is an interactive web-accessible system that provides users with aggregated social media data for analysis and visualization. SMART has been deployed to multiple realtime events to augment emergency responder situational awareness, helping scientists, engineers and first responders collaborate directly with each other in real time. The Lost Person Locator provides guidance, protocols and strategies responders can employ while searching for lost individuals. Called the Lost Person Locator, these guidelines and data sets will be readily available in

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14.5 Summary and conclusions Members of the homeland security enterprise are charged with preventing terrorism, securing the nation’s borders, enforcing and administering immigration laws, safe­ guarding and securing cyberspace, ensuring resilience to disasters and workforce development. Technology plays a major role in all aspects of homeland security and will continue to do so far into the future. Although the focus of this chapter is tech­ nology, we must remind ourselves of the people that use the technology, those affected by the use of the technology, and the laws and policies underlying the use of those technologies. The theoretical underpinnings for technology use in homeland security are heavily borrowed from other disciplines largely because homeland security is a meta-discipline with different functions and specialties ranging from counter terrorism to national security, border security to intelligence and critical infrastructure protection to envi­ ronmental and climate security. DHS has identified five visionary goals to direct future implementation of technology, which are: 1. Aviation Checkpoint of the Future—Airport screening at speed. 2. Trusted Cyber Future—a self-detecting, self-protecting and self-healing cyber infrastructure to increase barriers for criminal activity in the IoT. 3. Enable the Decision Maker through the use of proactive, advanced and realtime predictive analytics, risk analysis and simulation systems. 4. Responder of the Future—a protected, connected and fully aware first responder that with a high level of situational awareness, is physically protected with interoperable tools, and maintains networked threat detection and mitiga­ tion capabilities. 5. Resilient Communities—development of infrastructure that will withstand nat­ urally occurring and man-made disasters (DHS, 2015b). Despite our best efforts and predicting future technology needs, technology develop­ ment models are based on knowledge of contemporary problems, and it is extremely difficult to predict Homeland security technology needs 10, 20 and 30 years into the future. Focusing events over the next several decades will continue to act as drivers for innovation. Given the multi-disciplinary and VUCA nature of homeland security and the difficulty conceiving future hazards and threats, a focus on technological solutions to current problems may be shortsighted. As a meta-discipline, creating a unifying theory of homeland security technology development is difficult to achieve. As the largest consumer of homeland security technologies, DHS plays a large role in defin­ ing and directing the technology market. DHS defines what functions products must perform and encourages the adoption of standards to ensure reliable, interoperable and effective technologies (Baggett et al., 2017).

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Emerging homeland security threats and technology advances have increased the complexity of the homeland security landscape exponentially, requiring the use of specialized and adaptive technologies. Due to these advances, a single person has more power than ever to inflict harm on society; and a single networked group of peo­ ple have exponentially more power. Non-state actors now have previously unfathomed levels of power and influence as the global stage can be accessed from most places in the world via a powerful handheld computer. The Cold War “arms race” has evolved into a technology arms race in which attribution of attacks and manipulation is dif­ ficult to ascribe to a specific actor. These leaps in technology present both danger and opportunity for technology-based solutions to homeland security challenges. As technology continues to advance, new challenges and opportunities will be presented to the homeland security enterprise and a theory of homeland security technology may develop.

14.7 Discussion questions 1. Identify and discuss the ways in which technology has affected your life. Are the impacts mostly positive or negative? 2. As a student studying homeland security, your professor asks you to define the theory of homeland security technology development in a project. How would you approach this assignment and how would you define homeland security technology development based on this chapter? 3. Identify and discuss the privacy concerns posed by certain homeland security concerns. How should policy makers and practitioners address those concerns? 4. What are the biggest current and future homeland security problems and how might science and technology help policy makers and practitioners deal with those problems?

Note 1. Unless otherwise cited, the information contained in section 14.4.5 (Non-Competitive and Unconstrained Biometrics) derives from the personal involvement of the author in technology-development initiatives for DHS. See the National Institute of Standards and Technology (2019) Chexia Face Recognition webpage listed in this chapter’s reference section for additional resources on this topic.

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Index

academic conceptions beyond traditional security 49

access control strategy 64

adaptive structuration theory (AST) 286,

291, 293

advanced persistent threats (APT) 273

Advanced Research Projects Agency

Network (ARPANET) 260

age (generation) 43–44

al-Aulaqi, Anwar 249–250

all-hazards 104–105; approach in

cybersecurity policy 274–275; defined 274

al Qaeda 39, 46, 69, 83, 91, 163, 181, 249

al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

(AQAP) 249

Amerithrax 223

Anarchy 148, 152, 154, 156, 164

Andreas, Peter 149

antimicrobial drugs 212

Apple 48, 288, 290

Arab Spring 200

Arkin, W. M. 179

Art of War, The (Sun Tzu) 168, 169, 174–175

balance of power 49, 151, 152, 156, 164, 249

Bardach, E. 112–113

basic human needs 40

Beerbower, M. T. 169

Betts, Richard 178, 180

Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness 159–160 bilateral agreements 159–160, 164; nonbinding 159–160

Bill of Rights 235, 248

bin Laden, Osama 181–182

biological terrorism see bioterrorism

biologics 212

Biomedical Advanced Research and

Development Authority (BARDA) 216

bioterrorism 50, 209, 215, 216, 222–224

Body-Worn Cameras 300

Brexit 150

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BRICS Summit 271

Brooks, David 177

Brown, Michael 244

Bull, Hedley 150, 152, 153

Bush, George W. 1, 47, 132, 194, 241, 243, 244

capabilities-based planning 34

Carroll v. United States 247

CDC see Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Center for American Progress 198

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

(CDC) 191, 210, 213, 214, 215, 222, 223

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 101, 110,

169, 175, 180, 249, 260, 288

Chalecki, Elizabeth 191

CHEMPACK 216

Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 269

choice and uncertainty: decision-making

theory 26

CIA see Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) 215–216 Civil Defense Act 125–126 civil liberties: Constitutional 45, 47; and use

of security as government leverage and

control 47–48

clandestine transnational actors (CTAs)

82, 149

class: disparities and economic security 41;

issues 41

class divide 45

climate change 105–106; anthropogenic 188,

194–195; induced emergencies 217–218; as

public health threat magnifier 217–218;

social impacts of 195

climate disruption as a threat multiplier 49–51 climate emergency 43, 188, 190, 210

climate mistrust, and democratic

dysfunction 47

climate security 191, 195–200, 201; in less developed countries (LDCs) 199–200; in more developed countries (MDCs)

11/11/20 4:20 PM

308

Index

199–200; role of governmental security communities in 195–200; role of scientific security communities in 195–200; see also environmental security (ES) Clinger-Cohen Act 267 COBIT 263, 279 Cold War era: and Central Intelligence Agency 101; Department of Defense (DOD) 100–101; high politics in 48–49; and National Security Council 101 collective theory 155, 156 Commentaries (Story) 235 Commission on Global Governance 150 Committee of Sponsored Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Framework 32–33 community containment 211 community preparedness 136–138 comprehensive emergency management 136–138 Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) 261 Computer Security Act 267 conceptual issues posed by wicked problems 17–18 Concert of Europe 152 conflict theory 84–85 constructivism 153, 157, 158, 164 contact tracing 211 contrarian school 180 Convention on International Civil Aviation 161 Copeland, Thomas 179 cost-benefit analysis 21–22 COVID-19 pandemic 39, 41, 44, 51, 103, 109, 140, 149, 199, 208, 211, 213, 215, 219, 220, 221–222, 223; and homeland security 51 crime and security: combining defensible space theory and CPTED 67–68; crime prevention through environmental design 63–67; defensible space theory 60–63; description 58; overview 58–60; rational choice theory 68–70; routine activity theory 70–72; security synergy 67–68 crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) 63–67; access control strategy 64; activity support 65; as crime preventive theory 63–64; defensible space theory and 67–68; first generation of 64–65; implementation 65–66; mainte­ nance 65; second generation of 65; surveillance strategies 64; target hardening in 64; territories 64; and terrorism 66–67 crime preventive theory and CPTED 63–64 critical infrastructure 107 Critical Infrastructure Information Act 250

BK-TandF-RAMSAY_9780367201692-200178-Index.indd 308

Critical Infrastructure Protection guidelines 269 cyber attacks 138–139, 139 cybersecurity 51, 107–108; defined 258–259 cybersecurity policy 257–280; all-hazards approach in 274–275; consumer protec­ tion and 269–270; defined 259, 260, 272; ethical considerations 264–265; federal computer systems for regulating 267–268; in finance sector 268–269; foreign law and 270–272; government regulation for 266–272; in healthcare sector 268–269; history 260–261; homeland security and 261–262; international law and 270–272; NIST framework 278–279, 280; overview 258; preparedness in 275–278; resilience in 258, 274–275; risk management in 275–278; self-regulation for 263–266; standard for 262–263; state laws and 269–270; and theory in practice 272–279; in utilities sector 268–269 cybersecurity theory, defined 260, 272 Cyberspace Policy Review 259 Davies, Philip H. J. 170, 175–176 decision-making theory 25–28; choice and uncertainty 26; risk communication 27–28; risk management process 26–27 deepfake 287 Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill 288 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 288 defensible space and policy 63 defensible space theory 60–63; and CPTED 67–68; defensible space and policy 63; target hardening 62–63 democratic dysfunction and climate mistrust 47 demographic variables: age (generation) 43–44; class 43–44; ethnicity 43–44; gender 43–44; religion 43–44 DHS see U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) diffusion of innovation theory (DOI) 291–292 Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) 289, 294, 300 Disaster Relief Acts: introduced 126–127 disasters: catastrophic 35, 40, 128; environmental 199–200; FEMA’s statutory authority in 131–138; industrial 125; man-made 24, 107, 128; natural 122–124, 123, 124, 133–134, 149, 178; technological 126; wide-reaching disease 44 distrust: of government 45; racial and class divide 45

03/11/20 5:44 PM

Index DNA test kits 286

DOJ see U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)

Early Majority Adopters 291

Ebola pandemic 103, 109, 149, 189, 209, 221, 222, 223, 224 economic security and class disparities 41 The Economist 180 Elder, Gregory 174–175 election security 47 electricity grid collapse 51 Electronic Recovery and Access to Data (ERAD) Prepaid Card Reader 301 emergency management: description 121; Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), origins of 122–130; FEMA’s statutory authority in disasters 131–138; FEMA supporting homeland security 138–142; and homeland security 274; Hurricane Katrina disaster 129–130; and rising importance of federal role in 129–130; theories of emergency preparedness 131–138 emergency preparedness: comprehensive emergency management 136–138; National Exercise Program 133; National Incident Management System (NIMS) 131–132; threat and hazard characteristics 134–136; whole of community preparedness 136–138 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) 215 Emissions Gap Report 188 Enhanced Dynamic Geo-Social Environment (EDGE) Virtual Training 300 Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 32–35; capabilities-based planning 34; Committee of Sponsored Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Framework 32–33; COSO on 32; defined 32; risk measurement fundamentals 33–34; Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) 34–35 Environmental Justice Foundation 218 environmental security (ES) 187–201; anthropogenic climate change in 194–195; climate security and 195–200; definition 190–191; vs. homeland security 191–194; in less developed countries (LDCs) 199–200; in more developed countries (MDCs) 199–200; vs. non-traditional environmental security 191; vs. non-traditional human security 191; overview 187–189; scope of 189–190; vs. traditional national security 191–192; U.S. National Security 197–200; see also climate security EPA see U.S. Environment Protection Agency (EPA)

BK-TandF-RAMSAY_9780367201692-200178-Index.indd 309

309

epidemiology 9, 208, 210 ethnicity 43–44 European Union (EU) 40, 150, 270 executive orders 242–243 explosives terrorist attacks 139, 140 Facebook 48, 288, 298 FaceTime 288 Fair Credit Reporting Act 269 FBI see Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) FDA see U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 101, 108, 110, 139, 180 Federal Communications Commission 269 federal disaster act 125–126 Federal Disaster Relief Act (PL 81-875) 125 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 50, 104, 213, 241–242; Civil Defense Act and introduction of Federal Disaster Act 125–126; creation of 127, 241–242; criticism of 234; cyber attacks 138–139, 139; explosives terrorist attacks 139, 140; first disaster legislation signed 122; flooding legislation, presidential dis­ aster declaration and Disaster Relief Acts introduced 126–127; Hurricane Katrina disaster 129–130; industrial disasters, existential threats and civil defense 125; major storms and severe weather events 139–140; national preparedness goal and role of 132–134; natural disasters, flood control and earthquake code development 122–124; oil spills and rise of 127–128; origins of 122–130; pandemics 140–141, 141; political conventions 141–142, 142; rising importance of federal role in emer­ gency management 129–130; September 11 attacks 128–129; shifting threat spectrum and rise of homeland security 128–129; statutory authority in disasters 131–138; terrorism and rise of 127–128 Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) 267–268 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 268, 269–270 FEMA see Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) FEMA supporting homeland security 138–142 fifth amendment 248 fifth wave of terrorism 93–94 First Responders Group (FRG) 290, 294, 300–302 First Responder Support Tools (FiRST) App 301

03/11/20 5:44 PM

310 Index FISA see Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Flickr 288 flooding legislation 126–127 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 231, 238, 239 “4Rs” 163 Foursquare 288 “14 points” 153–154 Fourteenth Amendment 248–250 Fourth Amendment 244–248; case study 247–248; Transportation Security Agency (TSA) and 246–247 Fourth Industrial Revolution 285 French Revolutionary Wars 152 FRG see First Responders Group (FRG) FTC see Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Fukushima nuclear disaster 288 future shocks 287 game theory and terrorism 87–88 Gartzke, E. 171 gender 43–44 General Data Protection Regulation 270 Gentry, J. A. 172, 177 geographic (regional, national, international) variations on security concerns 40–41 GHG see greenhouse gas (GHG) Gibbons v. Ogden 242–243 Gill, Peter 171 global governance 148–165; anarchical system and 151–153; concepts of 153–158; defining 150–153; need in state centric 151–153; overview 148–150; theories of 153–158; tools of 158–163 globalization 41, 149, 187, 219; era of economic and political 49; infectious disease risk and 218, 219 Global Trends 2030 198 GOARN program 217 Godson, Roy 173 Google 48, 266, 290 Gordon, J. S. 177 government institutions 46 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 268 great powers 51, 152, 156 greenhouse gas (GHG) 43, 188, 190, 191, 194–195, 196, 197, 201 Grindr 288 H1NI flu pandemic 288 H5N1 influenza 223–224 Handel, Michael 174, 179, 182 Hayden, Michael 260–261 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) 269

BK-TandF-RAMSAY_9780367201692-200178-Index.indd 310

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 269 Herman, Michael 175 HHS see U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) high politics: and academic debate on security 48–49; in Cold War era 48–49; in post-World War II 48–49 Hillebrand, C. 172 Himalayan Tibetan Plateau 198 HIV-AIDS 209, 222 homeland security 191–194; COVID pan­ demic 51; cybersecurity 51; cybersecu­ rity policy and 261–262; electricity grid collapse 51; enaction of laws 238–240; vs. environmental security 191–194; evolution of technology 288–291; FEMA supporting 138–142; IMC 104–111; infectious disease risk and response as 218–222; institutional risks 20; knowledge domains of 193; oper­ ational risks 20; other public, practitioner and academic security viewpoints 50–51; policy 232–234; public health and 214–215; September 11 attacks and 128–129; shifting threat spectrum and rise of 128–129; stra­ tegic risks 19; strategic risks, identifying 19–22; technological advances in 285–303; technology and society 286–288; theoreti­ cal models of technology adoption in 291–302; theory of 8–9; U.S. Constitution and, law 234–238; weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 50–51; working definition for 7–8; see also human security Homeland Security Act 101, 109, 129, 234, 238, 242, 250, 289 homeland security enterprise: cost-benefit analysis 21–22; history and evolution of 100–104; risk analysis 20–21; risk exposure 22; risk parameters of 20–22 homeland security problem set: wicked vs. tame problems and 7–8 homeland security risk: institutional risks 20; operational risks 20; risk management tools in assessing 18–19; strategic risks 19 homeland security theory and goal of theory development 5–7 Honig, O. R. 179 Hughes, R. G. 172 human needs, basic 40 human security 187–201; climate security and 195–200; definition of 187; dimension of 189; non-traditional 191; overview 187–189; see also homeland security Hurricane Dorian 298 Hurricane Harvey 103, 196, 298, 301 Hurricane Irma 103, 196

03/11/20 5:44 PM

Index Hurricane Katrina 40, 99, 102, 104, 112, 115,

129–130, 193, 233, 243–244, 288, 295, 298

Hurricane Maria 103, 196, 216, 298

Hurricanes Rita 243

Hurricanes Wilma 243

hygiene 211

Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) 265–266 I-35 Mississippi River Bridge collapse 288

Ibrahim, Rahinah 247–248 ICAO see International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) ideological and political variations in risk perception 41–43 IGOs see intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) incident response, in cybersecurity

policy 277

industrial disasters: and civil defense 125;

and existential threats 125

infectious diseases 218–222; bioterrorism threats 222–224; control measures 211; Coronavirus Disease-2019 (COVID-19) disease outbreak 221–222; emerging threats 220–221; examples of potential 218–222; influenza 219; medical countermeasures 211–212; middle eastern respiratory syndrome (MERSCoV) 220; reemerging threats 220–221; risk and response as homeland security 218–222; severe acute respiratory syndrome-coronavirus-1 (SARS-CoV-1) 219–220 infectious disease triangle 210

infectivity 217

influenza 212, 219; H1N1 pandemic 295;

H5N1 223; pandemic 219; “Spanish”

Influenza 209; “supervirus” 224

Instagram 94, 288

institutional risks 20; identifying 19–22 Insurrection Act 250–251 Intelligence 168–182; contrarian school and

180; defining 169–171; overview 168–169;

reformist school and 180; strategic vs.

tactical 177–178; terrorism and 110–111;

theories of surprise and failure 178–180;

theory of 170–177; traditional school

and 180

intelligence failure 178–180 interagency collaboration: description 99; evolution of homeland security enterprise 100–104; history of homeland security enterprise 100–104; homeland security’s IMC 104–111; overview 99–100; strategic collaboration 114–115; theoretical and policy underpinnings of 111–113

BK-TandF-RAMSAY_9780367201692-200178-Index.indd 311

311

interagency mechanisms for collaborations (IMCs): all-hazards 104–105; climate change 105–106; critical infrastructure 107; cyber security 107–108; mass shootings 108–109; public health crises 109; terrorism and intelligence 110–111 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)

150–151, 160–161

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

(IPCC) 106, 195–196, 197

International Civil Aviation Organization

(ICAO) 160, 161

International Committee of the Red Cross

(ICRC) 271

International Organization for

Standardization (ISO) 263

International Red Cross 162

international security 192

Internet of things (IoT) 273, 286,

287, 302

IoT see Internet of things (IoT)

IPCC see Intergovernmental Panel on

Climate Change (IPCC)

ISIS 46, 90, 91, 92, 179

isolation 211

Jenkins, Brian 175

Jervis, R. 179

Johnson, Loch 171, 172–173

Joint Intelligence Operations Centers

(JIOCS) 176

Kahn, David 174, 175

Katz v. United States 244

Keegan, John 175

Kendall, Willmoore 176, 177

Kennans, George 176

Kent, Sherman 175–177, 181

Keynes, John Maynard 200

King George III 236

Knorr, Klaus 170

Kuhn, T. S. 286

Ku Klux Klan 250

Kyllo v. United States 245

Laboratory Response Network

(LRN) 214

Laplace’s principles and risk measurement

23–25

Laqueur, Walter 78–79

LDCs see less developed countries (LDCs)

League of Nations 154

less developed countries (LDCs) 189, 194,

199–200

liability as risk 19

liberalism 153–156, 157, 158, 164

Lindsay, J. R. 171

03/11/20 5:44 PM

312 Index Liu, Y. 223, 224

Lost Person Locator 301–302

Lowenthal, Mark 176, 177, 178

Marbury v. Madison 241

Marrin, S. 170, 171, 172, 173

Marshall, John 236, 241

Marshall Plan 48, 192

mass shootings 108–109 MDCs see more developed countries (MDCs) Medicaid 214

Medicare 214

Medina, Carmen 176

middle eastern respiratory syndrome

(MERS) 219–220, 222, 224

middle eastern respiratory syndrome-

coronavirus (MERS-CoV) 220

Millennium Project 191

more developed countries (MDCs) 199–200 Mozilla Corporation 266

multilateral agreements 159–160 multilateralism 148, 157

Nagin, Ray 243

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA) 191, 290

National Center for Missing and Exploited

Children (NCMEC) 105, 299

National Climate Assessment (NCA-4) 196

national disaster medical system

(NDMS) 216

National Exercise Program 133

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration 269

National Incident Management System

(NIMS) 105, 121, 131–132, 214, 244, 295

National Institutes of Health (NIH) 109, 213,

214, 224

National Intelligence Council 200

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA) 122, 191, 290

national preparedness 133; FEMA’s role in 132–134; goal 132–134 national security 187, 191, 192; agencies 181;

external national interest 39; intelligence

169; traditional 39

National Security Act 100, 288

National Security Agency 261, 262

National Security Council 101, 250, 288

National Security Special Events (NSSEs)

141, 194

National Syndromic Surveillance

Program 216

National Terrorism Response Objectives

(NTRO) 295

natural disasters, flood control and earthquake code development 122–124

BK-TandF-RAMSAY_9780367201692-200178-Index.indd 312

negative externality 190

neoliberalism 154

New York City Police Department

(NYPD) 162

New York Times 177

NGOs see nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) NIH see National Institutes of Health (NIH) NIMS see National Incident Management System (NIMS) NIST see U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) NIST Cybersecurity Framework (NIST

CSF) 278–279, 280

non-cooperative biometrics 299–300 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 162

non-traditional human security 39, 191

North American Energy Reliability

Corporation (NERC) 269

Obama, Barack 42, 50, 93, 132, 133, 159,

181–182, 194, 197, 259

Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA) 214

oil spills and rise of FEMA 127–128 operational risks 20; identifying 19–22 organizational governance 111–112 pandemics 140–141, 141

paradigms 104, 172, 192, 286

Paris Accords 188, 194

Payment Card Industry Data Security

Standard (PCI DSS) 264

Peace of Westphalia 151–152, 164

Pearl Harbor 178

Pentagon 50, 131, 195, 197, 249

personal risks 19

Pinterest 288

PKEMRA see Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) planning, capabilities-based 34

Points of Dispensing (PODS) 215

policy: defined 259, 272; rational choice

and 70; routine activity and 71

political conventions and FEMA 141–142, 142

political terrorism 89–90 Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) 251–252 post-9/11 attacks: and American institutional and public views of security 44–45; as a threat multiplier 49–51 post-Cold War era: academic conceptions

beyond traditional security 49; era of

economic and political globalization, and

terrorism 49; and securitization 49

Post-Katrina Emergency Management

Reform Act (PKEMRA) 129, 234, 242

03/11/20 5:44 PM

Index post-World War II high politics 48–49 preparedness: in cybersecurity policy 275–278; in homeland security 104 presidential disaster declaration 126–127 Presidential power 240–244; executive orders and 242–243; police power and 242–243; state sovereignty and 242–243 President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) 261, 262 Priest, D. 179 prisoner’s dilemma 154 private sector institutions 46 Project Responder (PR) 294–298 Project Responder (PR-5) 296, 297–298, 300 Project Responder 3—Toward the First Responder of the Future (PR3) 295, 296 Project Responder 4—2014 National Technology Plan for Emergency Response to Catastrophic Incidents (PR4) 296, 297 Project Responder—National Technology Plan for Emergency Response to Catastrophic Terrorism (PR1) 295, 296 Project Responder—Review of Emergency Response Capability Needs (PR2) 295, 296 property risks 19 public good theory 155, 156 public health 208–225; Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) 215–216; climate change as threat magnifier 217–218; definition 209; disasters 214–215, 216; elements of system 213–218; federal level 214; GOARN program 217; homeland security and 214–215; infectious disease risk and 218–222; methods and approaches to disease 210–212; national disaster medical system (NDMS) 216; need for 209–210; organization of system 213–218; overview 208–209; state level 213–214; U.S. Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) program 215–216 public health crises 109 Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE) 212 Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreements 215 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 50, 197 quarantine 211 QuickRoute Mobile Emergency Routing Services 300 racial divide 45 radical violence and societal trust 46–47 Radio Internet-Protocol Communications Model (RIC-M) 301 RAND 170, 172

BK-TandF-RAMSAY_9780367201692-200178-Index.indd 313

313

rational choice: and policy 70; and terrorism 68–70; terrorism and 86–88 rational choice theory 59, 68–70, 69, 70, 157; rational choice and policy 70; rational choice and terrorism 68–70; terrorism 86–87 realism 153, 156–157, 158, 164 recovery, in cybersecurity policy 278 Red Crescent Movement 162 Reddit 288 Red Flags Rule 268 Reformist school 180 regimes 51, 152, 155, 160 religion 43–44, 80, 89, 91, 159 religiously motivated terrorism 89 resilience: in cybersecurity policy 258, 274–275; defined 274; in homeland security 18, 28, 132 Response and Defeat Operations Support (REDOPS) system 300 risk(s): analysis 20–21; assessing seriousness of 29–32; defined 18; institutional 20; lia­ bility 19; operational 20; personal risks 19; property risks 19; strategic 19 risk assessment and homeland security enterprise: conceptual issues posed by wicked problems 17–18; decision-making theory 25–28; description 16; DHS risk management process 28–32; Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 32–35; identifying homeland security strategic risks 19–22; identifying operational and institutional risks 19–22; overview 16–17; risk management tools in assessing secu­ rity risk 18–19; risk measurement 22–25; wicked problems and risk landscape 17–18 risk communication 27–28 risk exposure 22 risk management 25; in cybersecurity policy 275–278; defined 275; process 26–27; tools in assessing homeland security risk 18–19 risk measurement 22–25; fundamentals 33–34; Laplace’s principles 23–25; risk management 25; risk perception 25 risk parameters of homeland security enterprise 20–22 risk perception 25; environmental, ideologi­ cal, and generational intersections 42–43; ideological and political variations in 41–43; shootings and gun control fears 43 routine activity theory 70–72; routine activity and policy 71; routine activity and terrorism 70–71; situational crime 72 sanitation 211 Sarbanes Oxley Act 268 SARS-CoV-1 see severe acute respiratory syndrome-coronavirus-1 (SARS-CoV-1)

03/11/20 5:44 PM

314 Index SARS-CoV-2 see severe acute respiratory syndrome-coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) Schwab, Klaus 285

scientific consensus 188

securitization 49

security: and climate disruption as a threat multiplier 49–51; defined 259; election 47; geographic (regional, national, interna­ tional) variations on 40–41; as government leverage and control 47–48; post-9/11 attacks 49–51; varying conceptions of 49–51 Security and Exchange Commission (SEC)

268, 270

security theory: description 1; goal of theory development 5–7; homeland security problem set 7–8; overview 1–3; rise of homeland security theory 5–7; theory 3–5; theory of homeland security 8–9; wicked vs. tame problems 7–8; working definition for homeland security 7–8 Semi-Autonomous Pipe Bomb End Cap

Remover (SAPBER) 301

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 1–2,

39–40, 69, 79, 100, 102, 104, 128–129, 162,

231, 232, 234, 246, 288, 295; and rise of

homeland security 128–129; shifting threat

spectrum 128–129

severe acute respiratory syndromecoronavirus (SARS-CoV-1) 219–220 severe acute respiratory syndrome­ coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) 40, 221,

290, 292

severe weather events 139–140 Shah of Iran 179

shootings and gun control fears 43

Single Issue Terrorism 90–91 situational crime 72

smart scavenging 289–291 Snapchat 288

social costs of carbon (SCC) 190

social distancing 211

social identity theory 85–86 social media: influence on security views 46; platforms 91; and terrorism 94–95 Social Media Analytics and Reporting

Toolkit (SMART) 301

social movement theory 81–82 social network theory 82–84 social theories of terrorism 81–86; conflict theory 84–85; social identity theory 85–86; social movement theory 81–82; social network theory 82–84 societal security 44–48; civil liberties 47–48; climate mistrust and democratic dysfunc­ tion 47; defined 44; distrust of government 45; election security 47; post-9/11 institu­ tional and public views of security 44–45;

BK-TandF-RAMSAY_9780367201692-200178-Index.indd 314

racial and class divide 45; societal trust and radical violence/terrorism 46–47; traditional and social media and security views 46; trust in government and private sector institutions 46; use of security as government leverage and control 47–48 societal trust and radical violence/terrorism 46–47 sociology of security: and climate disruption as a threat multiplier 49–51; description 38; high politics in post-Cold War era 48–49; high politics in post-World War II era 48–49; overview 38–39; post-9/11 attacks and 49–51; societal security 44–48; terrorism and the 21st century 39–44; varying conceptions of security 49–51 socio-technical systems theory (STS) 293–294 Spanish Flu 208

S&T see Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) Stafford Act 131, 214, 240

Standards and Recommended Practices

(SARPs) 161

state sovereignty 242–243; tension between federal and 243–244 Stored Communications Act 239

storms 139–140 Story, Joseph 235

strategic collaboration 114–115 strategic intelligence, vs. tactical intelligence

177–178, 181

Strategic Intelligence for American Foreign

Policy (Kent) 175

Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) 34–35 strategic risks 19

strategic surprise 177

strategic warning 177

Sun Tzu 168, 169, 174–175, 182

Superstorm Sandy 103, 196

surveillance strategies and CPTED 64

tactical intelligence: vs. strategic intelligence

177–178, 181; terrorism and 178

Taft, Howard 237

TAM see technology acceptance model (TAM) TAM2 see technology acceptance model 2

(TAM2)

TANs see transnational advocacy networks (TANs) target hardening 62–63; in CPTED 64

tech foraging 289–290 technology acceptance model (TAM) 291–293 technology acceptance model 2 (TAM2) 292–293 technology and terrorism 94–95 technology readiness (TR) 292

03/11/20 5:44 PM

Index

315

terrorism: biological 50, 209, 215, 216, 223;

and CPTED 66–67; description 78; fifth

wave of 93–94; future of 91–95; game

theory 87–88; goals of 88–91; and intelli­ gence 110–111; political terrorism 89–90;

and post-Cold War era 49; rational choice

and 68–70; rational choice theory 86–87;

religiously motivated terrorism 89; and

rise of FEMA 127–128; routine activity

and 70–71; Single Issue Terrorism 90–91;

social theories of terrorism 81–86; societal

trust and 46–47; tactical intelligence and

178; technology and 94–95; terrorism and

rational choice 86–88; theories of 79–80;

Walter Laqueur on 78–79

terrorism and 21st century 39–44; basic human needs 40; economic security and class disparities 41; geographic variations on security concerns 40–41; ideological and political variations in risk perception 41–43; other demographic variables 43–44 theories: of emergency preparedness 131–138; of terrorism 79–80

theory, defined 259, 272

theory of homeland security 8–9

Thirty Years War 151, 164

“3Ps” 163

TikTok 288

Toffler, A. 287

Top Secret America (Priest and Arkin) 179

Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc. 247

traditional media and security views 46

traditional national security: vs. environ­ mental security (ES) 191–192; vs. nontradi­ tional human security 39; threats 178

traditional school 180

tragedy of the commons 155

transgovernmentalism 153, 158

transgovernmental networks 161–162

transnational advocacy networks (TANs) 163

transnational security 192

Transportation Security Agency (TSA) 139,

246–247, 250

Treaty of Versailles 153

Treverton, Gregory 173

Truman, Harry S. 240

Trump, Donald 42, 49, 51, 188, 194

trust: in government institutions 46; in

private sector institutions 46

TSA see Transportation Security

Agency (TSA)

Tumblr 288

Twitter 94, 288

United Nations Commission on Human

Security 187, 189

United Nations General Assembly, Group of

Governmental Experts (U.N. GGE) 271

United Nations Security Council 152, 240

United States v. Davis 246

United States v. Maxwell 245

USA Patriot Act 47, 101, 231, 238, 239–240,

246, 250

U.S. Commission on Weapons of Mass

Destruction 222

U.S. Constitution 234–238; Article I— Congressional power 236–238; Article II—Presidential power 240–244; enac­ tion of homeland security laws 238–240; Federalism 235–236; legislative delegation 240; Preamble to 234–235 U.S. Constitutional Convention 236

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 191,

214

U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) 100–101,

238, 252, 257, 260, 262, 288

U.S. Department of Energy 108, 191

U.S. Department of Health and Human

Services (HHS) 109, 141, 214, 242, 269

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) 2, 21, 208, 213, 215, 238, 246, 257,

259, 262, 289–290, 299–300, 302; assessing

the seriousness of risks 29–32; Homeland

Security Act 238, 289; risk management

process 28–32

U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 110, 249, 250

U.S. Environment Protection Agency (EPA)

122, 132, 191, 214

U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

109, 211–212, 214, 224

U.S. Forest Service 233

U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 262; framework for cybersecurity policy 278–279, 280; responsibility in federal security systems 263, 267–268; responsibility in non-national security systems 267–268 U.S. National Response Framework (NRF) 214–215 U.S. National Science Advisory Board for

Biosecurity (NSABB) 224

U.S. National Security 2, 197; environmental security 197–200 U.S. Postal Service 215

U.S. Public Health Service 191, 214

U.S. Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) program 215–216

unconstrained biometrics 299–300

Underwear Bomber 102, 288

United Nations 71, 106, 150, 160, 188, 189

vaccines 212

Vienna System 152, 153

virulence 217

BK-TandF-RAMSAY_9780367201692-200178-Index.indd 315

11/11/20 4:20 PM

316 Index ViSi Mobile® System 301

von Clausewitz, Carl 174

Warner, Michael 170, 173, 174, 181

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 50–51

Wearable Smart Chemical Sensor 300

Wein, L. M. 223, 224

Westphalian Sovereignty 151, 187

WhatsApp 288

Wheaton, K. J. 169

WHO see World Health Organization (WHO)

whole of community preparedness 136–138

wicked problems: conceptual issues posed

by 17–18; and risk landscape 17–18; vs.

tame problems and homeland security

problem set 7–8

BK-TandF-RAMSAY_9780367201692-200178-Index.indd 316

Wildland Firefighter Advanced Personal

Protective System (WLFF-APPS) 301

Wildland Firefighter Respiratory

Protection 300

Wilson, Woodrow 153–154

Wirtz, James 178, 179

working definition for homeland security 7–8

World Bank 217

World Health Organization (WHO) 109, 217

World War I 152, 153

Young, O. R. 150

Zegart, Amy 180

Zika virus 103, 109, 222

Zoombomers 298

03/11/20 5:44 PM