Theophrastus: His Psychological, Doxographical, and Scientific Writings (Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities) [1 ed.] 0887384048, 9780887384042

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THEOPHRASTUS

Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities Series Editor:

W illiam W. Fortenbaugh

Advisory Board:

D im itri G utas Pam ula M. H uby Eckart Schutrum pf R obert W. Sharpies

On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus, volum e I Theophrastus o f Eresus: On His Life and Work, volum e II Theophrastean Studies: On Natural Science, Physics and Metaphysics, Ethics, Religion, and Rhetoric, volum e III Cicero’s Knowledge of the Peripatos, volum e IV Theophrastus: His Psychological, Doxographical, and Scientific Writings, volum e V

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN CLASSICAL HUMANITIES Volum e V

THEOPHRASTUS His Psychological, Doxographical, and Scientific Writings

Edited, by

William W. Fortenbaugh and

Dimitri Guías

First published 1992 by Transaction Publishers Published 2017 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 ThirdAvenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Copyright © 1992 by Taylor & Francis All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Catalog Number: 91-27281 ISSN: 0732-9814 Library of Congress Cataloging-in Publication Data Theophrastus: his psychological, doxographical, and scientific writings / edited by William W. Fortenbaugh and Dimitri Gutas. p. cm. - (Rutgers University studies in classical humanities ; V.

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Includes index. ISBN 0-88738-404-8 I. Theophrastus--Knowledge-Science. 2. Theophrastus-KnowledgePsychology. I. Fortenbaugh, William W. 11. Gutas, Dimitri. III. Series. 91-27281 QI43.T46T44 1991 CIP 500-- TcporeOévxoç 7ipopA,fjpaToç is too limited (“troppo limitativo”, p. 311; his reference to K.G. I, 631 ff. is rather puzzling). I find neither argument very compelling: dialectic reasoning is primarily about problemata (Top. 1.4, 101M6 f.) and Alexander (pp. 5-7) seems to use the two phrases as equivalent expressions (which also seems to be indicated by, e.g., Soph.El. 183a38, Tiepi xox> TüpopXrjOévToç). The twofold task as described here is also clear from the brief allusion in Rhet. 1.1, 1354a5, èÇexàÇeiv m i Xoyov urcéxeiv. Note that in this “catchword”-reference the mark of dialectic is not to syllogize, but to test; cf. infra n. 53. 14 Aristotle considered the elaboration o f the task of the answerer as his special contribution to the theory o f dialectic (cf. Top. VID.5, 159a32 ff., his boastful remark in Soph.El. 34 183b8-12, and the important responsibility of the task of the answerer in Top. V m . 11 , 161M6 ff.). 15 See for instance Top. VDI, 14, 163a36-b4; cf. 155M0-1. The possibility of interiorising the dialogue is also accepted (and clarified) by, e.g., L.H.G. Greenwood, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics vi (Cambridge 1909; repr. 1973, Amo Press, N.Y.), pp. 128-32; De Pater, Les Topiques d’Aristote et la dialectique platonicienne. La méthode de la définition (Fribourg, Suisse 1965), p. 78; P. Moraux in G.E.L. Owen (ed.), Aristotle on Dialectic. The Topics (Oxford 1968), p. 301, 311 n.; Galston, op.cit. (n. 10), p. 87 ff. 16 On the concept of what a theory should be or consist of according to Theophrastus and the (relative) lack of a concept among the Presocratics, see infra pp. 15-17. 17 èvTEu^eiç Top. 1.2, 101 a30.

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Theophrastus

The third and most important function18 of dialectic is the claim of its usefulness for philosophy. After his contention that dialectic is useful for the philosophical sciences, Aristotle goes on to say that it is useful: also with regard to the primary things of each science. For it is impossible to say anything about them on the basis of the principles that belong to the science at issue ... so it is necessary regarding these to go through the endoxa on each o f them. This then is the specific and most proper characteristic of dialectic: for being critical [or: investigative19] it forms the road to the principles o f all methods.

What Aristotle’s words indicate is this: dialectic provides the only method in which we can determine basic principles because these cannot be deduced from the principles proper to a science nor from even more primary ones. Our alternative source is a specific category of opinions, the endoxa, that is, the “accepted views held by every one or the majority or the most reputable persons ...” (Top. 1.1, 100b21-23).20 This description betrays his motive for choosing the endoxa: at the background is the argumentum e consensu omnium which serves as an ultimate limit against a regressus of proofs. Principles allow no proof and therefore we must try to find them by a discursive process scrutinizing the current views. This implies a strong position for opinion. Endoxa represent ‘qualified opinions’21 backed up, as it were, by the authority either of a majority or of specialists who are famous 18 Aristotle calls it the feature that is i5iov r\ jiaXiata oixeiov tt\x | ouxco 8e XrjTixeov o\)8e rcavxa voi>v, aX ka 8e! 8ietaiv. rioiok àei; "H 8ice tí XfjGrj Kai (X7iaTrj Kai | \j/e\>8o7co0eaei