Themistius Paraphrase of Aristotles Metaphysics 12 (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, 25) (English, Arabic and Hebrew Edition) [Critical - Multilingual ed.] 9004400435, 9789004400436

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Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12

Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus founded by H.J. Drossaart Lulofs is prepared under the supervision of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences as part of the Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi project of the Union Académique Internationale. The Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus project envisages the publication of the Syriac, Arabic and Hebrew translations of Aristotle’s works, of the Latin translations of these translations and the medieval paraphrases and commentaries made in the context of this translation tradition.

Volumes 1–4 have been published by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.

General Editors H. Daiber (Frankfurt) R. Kruk (Leiden)

Editorial Board T.A.M. Fontaine – J. Mansfeld – J.M. Van Ophuijsen H.G.B. Teule – Th.H.M. Verbeek

volume 25

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/asl

Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12 A Critical Hebrew-Arabic Edition of the Surviving Textual Evidence, with an Introduction, Preliminary Studies, and a Commentary

By

Yoav Meyrav

LEIDEN | BOSTON

The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2019020882

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill‑typeface. ISSN 0927-4103 ISBN 978-90-04-40043-6 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-40044-3 (e-book) Copyright 2019 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

For Anat

∵

Contents Acknowledgments xi List of Tables and Figures

xv

Introduction 1 1 Overview 2 2 Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12 before Themistius 3 3 Themistius on Metaphysics 12: Context and Scholarship 7 4 Themistius’ Paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 in the Arabic and Hebrew Traditions 13 5 Looking Forward 20 1 The Textual Tradition 24 1 Overview 24 2 The Arabic Textual Tradition 26 2.1 Bio-bibliographical Sources and Testimonia 27 2.1.1 Identity of the Arabic Translator 27 2.1.2 Ṯābit ibn Qurra as Reviser 30 2.2 Sources for the Complete Translation 31 2.2.1 MS Ẓāhiriyya 4871 (Damascus) 32 2.2.2 Pseudo-Al-ʿĀmirī, Kitāb al-Saʿāda wa-l-Isʿād 33 2.2.3 Anonymous Eleventh Century Philosophy Reader (MS Marsh 539) 35 2.2.4 Avicenna, Šarḥ Kitāb Ḥarf al-Lām 37 2.2.5 Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-Niḥal (1) 38 2.2.6 Averroes, Tafsīr Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa 39 2.2.7 ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī, Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa 39 2.2.8 Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāǧ al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya 48 2.3 Abridgment of the Paraphrase of Chapters 6–9: MS Ḥikma 6 (Cairo) 48 2.3.1 Connection to the Full Version 49 2.3.2 Analysis of the Abridgment 50 2.3.2.1 Approach to Form and Philosophical Interests 51 2.3.2.2 Technical Aspects 54 2.3.2.3 Authorship 60 2.3.3 Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-Niḥal (2) 62 2.4 Résumé 64

viii 3

4 5

contents

The Hebrew Textual Tradition 65 3.1 Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Translation 65 3.1.1 Description of Hebrew Manuscripts 66 3.1.2 Relationship between the Manuscripts 74 3.1.3 Summary 94 3.1.4 Analysis of the Work’s Title and Ending 96 3.1.5 Landauer’s Edition 97 3.2 Other Hebrew Sources 98 3.2.1 Averroes’ Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Hebrew Translation 98 3.2.2 Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh 98 3.2.3 Gersonides, Milḥamot ha-Šem 102 3.3 Résumé 105 Moshe Finzi’s Latin Translation 105 Principles of the Present Edition 107

2 Historical and Methodological Aspects of Themistius as Paraphrast of Metaphysics 12 110 1 Overview 110 1.1 The Paraphrase as a Method and as a Literary Genre in Antiquity 111 1.2 Paraphrase as Method 111 1.3 Paraphrase as Literary Genre 113 2 The Aims and Methodologies of Themistius’ Paraphrases 115 2.1 The Overall Aims of the Paraphrase According to Themistius 115 2.2 Themistius’ Explanation of His Methodology 121 3 Examples 124 3.1 Syntax 126 3.2 Addition and Its Meta-procedures 128 3.2.1 Simple Addition 128 3.2.2 Meta-Procedure: Elaboration 129 3.2.3 Meta-Procedure: Orientation 134 3.2.4 Meta-Procedures: Digression and Opinion 138 3.3 Subtraction 139 3.4 Substitution 140 3.5 Quotation 145 4 Conclusion 147

ix

contents

Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12: Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition Abbreviations Text

150

152

Commentary Introduction 325 Chapter 1 326 Chapter 2 351 Chapter 3 362 Chapter 4 380 Chapter 5 388 Chapter 6 396 Chapter 7 421 Chapter 8 452 Chapter 9 464 Chapter 10 484 Conclusion 502 Appendix A: Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn’s Arabic Translation of Metaphysics 2 and Its Abridgment in MS Ḥikma 6—Text and Notes 509 Appendix B: Two Versions of the Hebrew Translation of the Themistius Quotations in Averroes’ Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics—A Preliminary Edition 514 Appendix C: Matter and Element—Case Study 527 Hebrew–Arabic Lexicon 541 Arabic–Hebrew Lexicon 595 Bibliography 628 Index of Names and Places 643 Index of Subjects 647

Acknowledgments The present book is an adaptation of my PhD dissertation submitted to the School of Philosophy, Linguistics, and Science Studies at Tel Aviv University in 2017. It was revised, updated, corrected, somewhat shortened, and prepared for publication in the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies at Univesität Hamburg, which has been my academic home since 2018. Looking back from the endless hours of solitude dictated by a study of this nature, it warms my heart to realize just how fortunate I was to have benefitted from the wisdom, generosity, and support of so many people in so many contexts. First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my PhD supervisors, Prof. Ilai Alon and Prof. Carlos Fraenkel, each of whom made his own distinctive mark on my career development. Ilai took me under his wing when I was a clueless undergraduate student, throughout my MA studies, and up until the completion of my doctorate studies. The first thing he ever told me and my classmates, in the first session of his Introduction to Medieval Philosophy, was “I will teach you nothing!” How wrong he was. An ever-flowing source of inspiration, Ilai had taught me that there is no difference between teacher and student, that no idea is too farfetched, and that risk-taking is an integral part of rigorous scholarship. Without Ilai I would have never found my independent scholarly voice. Carlos is the “efficient cause” of the present study, which stems from his suggestion, years ago, to translate together Themistius’ paraphrase into English. An exemplar of balance between philological precision and philosophical broadmindedness, Carlos guided me through the complex and confusing world of philology and taught me how to use Hebrew and Arabic manuscripts. What is more, his unique perspective about the philosophical importance of the history of philosophy and its relevance to contemporary cross-cultural discourse inspired me to think of the present project as something whose significance goes beyond the mere “stuff of academia.” Carlos and Ilai, together and apart, were always extremely responsive to my questions, deliberations, and concerns, with endless patience, generosity, and encouragement. I will forever cherish their presence in my academic life. Several other people have helped me tackle many different philosophical, philological, and historical issues, kindly sharing their knowledge, allowing me to draw from their mastery, and occasionally offering much needed criticism.

xii

acknowledgments

Orna Harari, forever my Greek teacher and now a close friend, was always readily available to discuss whatever Greek term or philosophical issue was on my mind at any given moment, preferably over coffee. István Bodnár, with whom I was lucky enough to study when he spent a semester in Tel Aviv, offered me valuable, ongoing advice in matters of causation and astronomy in Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition, much beyond what would be expected. A lively correspondence between Richard Sorabji, Devin Henry, James Wilberding, and myself about Themistius’ metaphysics prompted some significant breakthroughs in my attempt to penetrate what our protagonist is actually up to. Chiara Ferella guided me through the problematic use Themistius makes of Anaxagoras. Special thanks are due to Nadav Ratzabi, with whom I read many Greek philosophical texts. His help with the Latin translation of Themistius was also indispensable. On the Arabic side of things, I would like to extend my warmest gratitude to Eric van Lit, who meticulously read through the entire edition of the Arabic text, saving me from many embarrassing errors. My friend Ahmad Ighbariya lent me invaluable advice on many issues in medieval Arabic grammar and philosophical terminology. My dear friend and colleague Michael Engel read through the entire Hebrew edition and also gave me important comments on matters of methodology and approach. Reimund Leicht’s penetrating observations about my analysis of the Hebrew manuscript tradition were eye-opening, thought provoking, and invaluable. Warm thanks are due to Gad Freudenthal, who offered me priceless advice, constructive criticism, support, and encouragement. Hagar Kahana kindly shared with me important, surprising, and yet unpublished findings of her own work about Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translations. Our discussions were stimulating and rewarding, opening many avenues which merit future research. Yossi Schwartz, head of the School of Philosophy, Linguistics, and Science Studies at Tel Aviv University, offered me, besides valuable scholarly advice and orientation, enormous help at critical junctions. Tzvi Langermann offered comments and suggestions that were of considerable aid for paving the way in the early stages of the present project. Finally, Yehuda Halper and Resianne Fontaine offered me a wealth of advice concerning the project as a whole and its various parts. I was fortunate to be able to present different parts of this study, in various stages of work, with fellow scholars in the following venues: Medieval Hebrew Philosophical Terminology in The Making (The Institute for Advanced Studies, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, December 2011); KNAW/OIKOS master class “Expanding the Canon of Ancient Philosophy” (Amsterdam, February

acknowledgments

xiii

2012); Corpus Christi College (Oxford, June 2015); Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies (Central European University, Budapest, February 2016); First conference of the Officina Philosophica Hebraica (OPH I): Themes, Terminology, and Translation Procedure in 12th Century Jewish Philosophy (Universität Hamburg, April 2016). I would like to extend my gratitude to the organizers and participants of these different settings for their hospitality, comments, questions, suggestions, and criticisms. Thanks are due in this respect to István Bodnár, Daniel Davies, Michael Engel, Gad Freudenthal, Pieter d’ Hoine, Reimund Leicht, Anna Marmodoro, Marije Martijn, Richard Sorabji, Giuseppe Veltri, and Irini Fotini Viltanioti. I would like to warmly thank the Brill publishing house and the Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus editorial board for a smooth and professional publication process. Hans Daiber and Jaap Mansfeld read through the entire manuscript and offered many comments and suggestions. Teddi Dols oversaw the publication of the book with efficiency and care. Finally, thanks are due to Johannes Rustenburg and Cas Van den Hof for their professional and highly intelligent typesetting. Needless to say, whatever errors and misfortunes remain in the present study—and doubtlessly there are plenty—are entirely my own. It would have been impossible for me to undertake this study without the generous financial aid of the following sources: The School of Philosophy, Linguistic, and Science Studies (Tel Aviv University); The Department of Philosophy (Tel Aviv University); The Dan-David Foundation; The Ignatz Bubis Fund in Jewish Studies; and the Switzerland–Israel Philosophy Foundation, KKL. I hope I did justice to their faith in my abilities. I would like to thank the staff of the Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscript at the National Library of Jerusalem for their professional help during the long hours I spent there. Thanks are also due to the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Leipzig Universitaetsbibliothek, and Biblioteca nazionale universitaria di Torino, all of which granted me permission to photocopy microfilms of Hebrew manuscripts belonging to them. Several people helped me track down materials that I had trouble finding. In this avenue I would like to thank Peter Adamson, Amos Bertolacci, Jonathan Greig, Antonia Kakavelaki, Jamil Ragep, Alexander Treiger, and John Watt. On a personal note, it is very important to me to thank the Department of Philosophy and the School of Philosophy, Linguistics, and Science Studies at Tel Aviv University for being my home for many years. It is here that I was first given the opportunity to learn, interact, teach, and flourish. I would like to thank my

xiv

acknowledgments

teachers, colleagues, and students for years of intellectual stimulation, warmth, and collegiality. Many of them have become close friends. Special mention is owed to Nehama Verbin, for our fascinating conversations on various themes in philosophical theology, and to Ilit Ferber, a model scholar and a genuine friend. Since 2018 I have been a research associate at the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies at Universität Hamburg, where I found a vibrant research community, an ideal working environment, and endless opportunities to brainstorm my ideas with brilliant people. I would like to thank Giuseppe Veltri, the director of the Centre, as well as Racheli Haliva and Stephan Schmid, its co-directors, for setting up such a magnificent enterprise and making me feel at home from the moment I set foot in the door. In Hamburg I benefit every day from the wisdom, friendship, and patience of my colleagues Daniel Davies, Michael Engel, Anne-Sarah Fiebig, Libera Pisano, José María Sánchez de León Serrano, Ze’ev Strauss, Michela Torbidoni, and Maria Wazinski. Finally, my family. Here I am at a loss for words. Studies of this nature tend to take a tremendous toll out of the author’s proximate environment, and my own was no exception. My parents, Nurit and Shmuel Meyrav, besides offering endless love and support, did everything they could, as committed grandparents, to offer me time and space whenever I needed them. The same holds for my mother in law, Lea Shavit, who was always readily available, patient, and kind. This project grew alongside my children; Romi got things going, and Adam joined us as things began to take shape. Although too young to understand what it was that their father was doing, they completely understood the importance I attached to it, uttering the expression “daddy’s doctorate” with a charming blend of reverence and mystique. In full objectivity I declare that they are the best children in the world. To properly describe the part Anat, my companion, the love of my life, played in this adventure would demand a separate volume, much longer than this one. I could have never, ever, done this without her. Anat, this book is dedicated to you.

Tables and Figures Tables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Chapter distribution of main Arabic sources for Themistius’ paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12 26 Themistius’ paraphrase in pseudo-Al-ʿĀmirī’s Al-Saʿāda wa-l-Isʿād 33 Themistius’ paraphrase in MS Marsh 539 35 Themistius’ paraphrase in Avicenna’s Šarḥ Kitāb Ḥarf al-Lām 37 Themistius’ paraphrase in Šahrastānī’s Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-Niḥal 38 Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa (1) 41 Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa (2) 41 Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa (3) 42 Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa (4) 42 Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa (5) 44 Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa (6) 44 Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa (7) 45 Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa (8) 46 Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa (9) 46 Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa (10) 47 Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa (11) 47 Themistius’ paraphrase—complete version vs. abridgment 50 Themistius ‫יא‬19–23—full version in Hebrew and Arabic abridgment 51 Themistius ‫יא‬23–33—full version in Hebrew and Arabic abridgment 52 Themistius ‫יא‬23–‫יב‬4—full version in Hebrew and Arabic abridgment 53 Themistius ‫יג‬19–24—full version in Hebrew and Arabic abridgment 55 Themistius ‫כג‬6–7—full version in Hebrew and Arabic abridgment 56 Themistius ‫כד‬27–30—full version in Hebrew and Arabic abridgment 57

xvi 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

tables and figures Themistius ‫ל‬9–10—full version in Hebrew and Arabic abridgment 58 Themistius ‫יז‬2–10—full version in Hebrew and Arabic abridgment 58 Themistius ‫יז‬9–13—full version in Hebrew and Arabic abridgment 60 Abridgment of the paraphrase and Šahrastānī’s Kitāb al-Milal wa-lNiḥal (1) 63 Abridgment of the paraphrase and Šahrastānī’s Kitāb al-Milal wa-lNiḥal (2) 64 Terminological differences between Versions I and II (partial list) 77 Terminological differences between Version III and other versions (partial list) 80 Gloss in ‫א‬7 81 Gloss in ‫טז‬5–7 82 Error and correction in translating lā budda min (1) (‫יב‬3–4) 83 Error and correction in translating lā budda min (2) (‫ח‬10–11) 84 Dead horses and bulls (‫ז‬29–30) 84 Misreading the Arabic and subsequent correction (‫כא‬22–24) 85 Scribal chain of errors (‫ז‬6) 87 Possible counterexample at ‫לב‬11 88 Active editing in Version III (1) (‫ג‬29–30) 89 Active editing in Version III (2) (‫ג‬21–22) 90 Active editing in Version III (3) (‫ב‬2–4) 91 Did Version III have access to the Arabic? (‫י‬2) 92 Additions in Version III 93 Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh, fragment 1(a) 99 Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh, fragment 1(b) 101 Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh, fragment 2 101 Themistius’ paraphrase and Gersonides’ Milḥamot ha-Šem 103 Moshe Finzi’s Latin translation and the Hebrew manuscript tradition 106 “Syntax” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 127 “Addition” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 128 “Elaboration” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (1) 129 “Elaboration” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (2) 131 “Elaboration” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (3) 132 “Orientation” in the paraphrase of the Physics 135 “Orientation” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (1) 136 “Orientation” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (2) 136 “Orientation” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (3) 138 “Subtraction” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 140 “Substitution” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (1) 141 “Substitution” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (2) 142

tables and figures 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

xvii

“Substitution” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (3) 142 “Substitution” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (4) 143 “Substitution” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (5) 144 “Substitution” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (6) 145 “Quotation” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 146 Overall distribution of the terms “matter” and “element” according to language/version 527 Examples of translations of “matter” and “element” according to language/Hebrew MS 528 ‫היולי‬, ‫חומר‬, and ‫—יסוד‬instances per Hebrew MS 530 ‫ عنصر‬in Averroes’ middle commentary on On the Soul 535 ‫ عنصر‬in Averroes’ epitome of the Metaphyics 535

Figures 1 2

Themistius’ paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12—history of translation and transmission 25 Relationship between the Hebrew manuscripts 76

Introduction It is more of a business to interpret the interpretation than to interpret the text. There are more books on books than on any other subject … All is a-swarm with commentaries: of authors there is a dearth.1

∵ This is a study of a translation of a translation of a book about a book. Aristotle wrote what has come to be known as the 12th book of his Metaphysics in Athens in the latter third of the fourth century BCE. Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12—the book about the book—was probably written in Constantinople (561 kilometers northeast of Athens) some time in the middle of the fourth century CE, roughly 680 years after the composition of the book it paraphrases. Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn’s Arabic translation—the translation of the book about the book—was probably composed in Baghdad (1,608 kilometers southeast of Constantinople) some time in the latter half of the ninth century, around 500 years after Themistius’ paraphrase and roughly 1,180 years after Aristotle had written his book. Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation of Isḥāq’s Arabic version—the translation of the translation of the book about the book—was completed in Provence (about 3,500 kilometers northwest of Baghdad) in 1255, about 400 years after Isḥāq’s translation, 900 years after Themistius’ paraphrase, and nearly 1,600 years after Aristotle’s work.2 Aristotle’s Greek is extant, as is Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew. Between them, Themistius’ Greek is lost, and fragments of Isḥāq’s Arabic are scattered in different versions among different sources. The huge distance of time and space (and culture, and language) between all these sources, copies of which are just a few centimeters away from each other on the scholar’s desk—764 years after Moshe ibn Tibbon published his translation—is as difficult to grasp as it is easy

1 Montaigne, “On Experience,” 1212. 2 Moshe Finzi’s Latin translation of the Hebrew translation—a translation of a translation of a translation of a book about a book—published in 1588, was made more than 300 years after Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation, more than 700 years after Isḥāq’s Arabic translation, more than 1,200 years after Themistius’ paraphrase, and more than 1,900 years after Aristotle composed Metaphysics 12.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400443_002

2

introduction

to forget. In this state of affairs, to declare that the object of the present study is to bridge these gaps would be naïve, if not foolish. The best one can hope for is to provide a better view.

1

Overview

The main objective of the present study is to provide solid grounds for the study of Themistius’ paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12 as a philosophical, interpretative, historical, and linguistic document. As the acknowledgment of its importance grows, so does become apparent the need for a systematic analysis of the work in its most basic form, namely a work that operates in different constellations directly upon Aristotle’s text and adopts its voice. In order to study Themistius’ paraphrase properly we must be able to isolate Themistius’ voice. But in order to isolate Themistius’ voice within Aristotle’s we must understand Themistius’ methodology and agenda. However, since the text does not survive in its original form, but only in translation(s), the most pressing need is for a new edition of the Hebrew and Arabic based on a fresh systematic analysis of all the material that has come down to us. This being the case, this book contains a parallel Hebrew-Arabic critical edition of Themistius’ paraphrase, enveloped by a historical introduction, two preliminary studies, a detailed commentary on the text, a comprehensive lexicon, and 3 appendices containing additional material and discussions. In what follows, I survey the history of Aristotle’s Metaphysics up to and including Themistius, offer context and the scholarly state of affairs concerning Themistius’ paraphrases, map Themistius’ presence in medieval Arabic and Hebrew philosophy, and suggest pointers for future study. Chapter 1 treats Themistius’ paraphrase as a linguistic unit and its main end is to accumulate enough information and tools in order to produce a satisfactory text (or at least provide enough material for evaluating my editorial decisions). Through a systematic analysis of all available textual sources, I map the relationship between the various Arabic fragments—including the methodology of an anonymous abridger of the paraphrase of chapters 6–9—and identify three slightly different versions of the Hebrew translation, the disentanglement of which facilitates a clearer understanding of the translation process. Chapter 2 treats Themistius’ paraphrase as a literary unit. Its main aim is to highlight the function, context, and methodology of Themistius’ paraphrases as they are expressed in his paraphrase of Metaphysics 12. In the course of the chapter I analyze Themistius’ direct and indirect remarks about his paraphrases in order to arrive at a clearer picture of what he set out to achieve

introduction

3

by writing them. I also situate Themistius’ paraphrases within the rhetorical tradition to which the elementary exercise paraphrasis originally belongs and suggest that it is transformed from a literary exercise to a literary genre. Finally, I identify the main methodological and interpretative devices, of increasing levels of complexity, which Themistius employs upon Aristotle’s text, generating a set of indicators for distinguishing Themistius’ voice from Aristotle’s as well as additional practical pointers for the establishment of the text. The edition, whose principles are explained in detail at the end of Chapter 1, is followed by a detailed Commentary, in which I attempt, besides explaining my editorial choices and sharing my deliberations, to place Aristotle and Themistius side by side, extract Themistius’ approach to Aristotle’s text on a microscopic scale, and study and clarify his arguments. The structure and methodology of the Commentary are explained in its introduction. The Commentary is followed by a short Conclusion, in which I share my thoughts about Themistius’ approach to Aristotle’s text on a macroscopic level, attempt to extract a coherent Themistian position from his paraphrase, reflect on its philosophical implications, uncover the narrative that it attempts to communicate, and speculate about the manner in which it expresses Themistius’ fundamental ideas about philosophy and its role. Whereas this book cannot avoid being heavy in Hebrew and Arabic philology and terminology, it still contains philosophical and historical discussions that are friendly to scholars of other traditions. To this effect, the present Introduction, Chapter 2, and the philosophical portions of the Commentrary (sections 1 and 2 for each of Aristotle’s chapters)—as well as the Conclusion—do not assume knowledge of Arabic or Hebrew and include English translations of all the relevant passages.

2

Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12 before Themistius

Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12 is as fascinating as it is enigmatic. Attractively referred to as “Aristotle’s Theology,” but, for some, anticlimactic—maybe even disappointing3—there is scholarly disagreement about nearly every aspect of the text, including its dating, its topic, its structure, its relation to other Aris-

3 Menn puts it nicely: “The deeper reasons why most scholars have not been interested in Λ are the same as the deeper reasons why they do not think it is the promised culmination of the Metaphysics: they think the book is a disappointment, both in form and in content” (Menn, Aim, IIIβ1, 2).

4

introduction

totelian works, and obviously many key arguments in it.4 Oddly composed and sometimes hastily argued, it spirals up from the lowest parts of nature, to the heavens (including a detailed astronomical discussion which many think is out of place), to the highest principle of the cosmos, an immaterial and immovable self-intelligizing intellect, on account of which it enjoys eternal bliss, which moves the celestial bodies because they desire it, and is in some way the ultimate good according to which all things orientate themselves. It is God, but is not an object of prayer, sacrifice, or prophecy. It does not punish or reward. It has neither a history, nor a narrative, nor holy writ. As its own exclusive object of intelligizing, it is unclear if it has any relationship to the world, whether it knows it, or whether it somehow oversees it. It is meant to explain why there is order and movement in the cosmos, but not why it exists or how it was created or made. This “theology” had left even Aristotle’s most devoted followers at unease. Theophrastus (c. 371–287BCE), Aristotle’s nephew and immediate successor as the head of the Lyceum, a talented philosopher in his own right, expressed his discomfort with many of Aristotle’s theological ideas, probably directly to his master. In his treatise On First Principles, a collection of 25 aporiai, Theophrastus presents several difficulties with the cosmological scheme of Metaphysics 12, wondering, for example, about the nature of the first principle, the function of desire, why celestial perfection is achieved by movement rather than by rest, how the division between matter and form comes about, and what is the precise causation of the celestial bodies with respect to the sub-lunar realm.5 Of the ancients’ engagement with Aristotle’s Metaphysics before the time of Alexander of Aphrodisias (late second–early third century CE) not much has survived. In her entry on the Greek commentating tradition of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in the Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, Luna mentions a few au4 Many scholars maintain that it is an early independent treatise that was later inserted into the Metaphysics (see, e.g., Frede, “Introduction,” 2–3, and Menn’s response in Aim, IIIβ1, 10– 11). There are also arguments, for instance, that chapter 8 in Metaphysics 12 was written at a different time than the other chapters and is an artificial insertion (see, e.g., the arguments in Ross, Metaphysics, 384, and again Menn’s response in Aim, IIIβ2b, 23–29). There is also a controversy about the topic of the book—is it a book about substance (as maintain, e.g., Lang, “Stucture,” and Frede, “Metaphysics Λ 1,” 57), Theology (Elders, Aristotle’s Theology, 71– 72), principles (Menn, Aim, IIIβ1, 11), or causes (Berti, “Program,” 68). Countless questions surround its content, and they are also present in Themistius’ paraphrase: is the first mover a final cause or an efficient cause? What is the status of the plurality of unmoved movers? Is the divine intellect a narcissistic being or does it care in any way about the world? Is it even aware of it? 5 For text and study see Gutas, Theophrastus. See 3–9 for a discussion of the relationship between this work and Aristotle’s corpus and its ramifications for its dating.

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thors who are credited with discussions of the work by later commentators,6 but to which it is difficult to ascribe commentaries in the traditional sense. These are Eudorus (first century BCE), Aspasius (second century CE),7 and Aristotle of Mytilene (second century CE).8 The few surviving reports of their views about the Metaphysics do not deal with issues discussed in book 12. Survive, however, does a discussion of the astronomical account in Metaphysics 12.8 composed by the Peripatetic philosopher Adrastus (second century CE), in which he attempts to update Aristotle’s views to the prevalent astronomical models of his time.9 The first philosopher to which a commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (including book 12) can safely be ascribed is Alexander of Aphrodisias.10 However, there are numerous problems associated with his commentary. There is general consensus that of the complete commentary ascribed to Alexander, only the commentary on books 1–5 is authentic, whereas the remaining books are the work of a later author, generally referred to as pseudo-Alexander and usually considered to be the work of Michael of Ephesus (mid-eleventh century), which was done on the basis of an anonymous commentary composed later than Syrianus (first half of fifth century).11 Recently, Golitsis investigated the textual tradition of the first five books, whose authenticity is not disputed, and concluded that during the modern critical editing procedure an independent commentary on the work—composed by “a professor who gives or, rather, prepares his lecture on the Metaphysics while using Alexander’s commentary as a working tool”12—was mistakenly taken to be an alternate recension (the recensio altera) of Alexander’s commentary. Golitsis further argues that the commentary on book 6, traditionally taken to be the work of Michael of Ephesus (despite Michael’s own testimony that his commentary starts from book 7, which was dismissed as a “memory lapse” or a later interpolation), should also be attributed to the author of the newly found commentary. Golitsis believes that the author is Stephanus, a sixth century Christian Alexandrian philosopher 6 7

8 9 10 11 12

Luna, “Métaphysique.” See the skeptical remarks about Eudorus and Aspasius in the present context in Fazzo, “Metaphysics,” 65–66. Alexander of Aphrodisias reports Aspasius’ discussions related to the Metaphysics as (a) an account of Pythagorean theory of number; (b) a critical discussion of Plato’s Ideas; and (c) a discussion of Aristotle’s concept of the differentia. Syrianus reports Aristotle of Mytilene’s (“the younger”) discussion about the ontological status of mathematical objects. This account is preserved in Theon of Smyrna’s Mathematics Useful for Understanding Plato. It is presented and analyzed in detail by Petrucci, “Adrastus.” Fazzo, “Metaphysics,” 66–67. Luna, Trois études, 1–32. Golitsis, “Who Were the Real Authors?” 569.

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who is known to have written commentaries on several of Aristotle’s works.13 Golitsis also claims that Michael had in fact no knowledge of Alexander’s commentary, and that his project was meant to supplement the newly discovered commentary which Golitsis attributes to Stephanus; in book 7 and onwards, Michael based himself upon the sixth century commentary by Asclepius.14 The claim that the surviving Greek commentary ascribed to Alexander of Aphrodisias (from book 7 onwards) is inauthentic especially holds in the case of book 12, as the Greek text bears no resemblance to the fragments from Alexander’s authentic commentary on book 12, which are preserved—in Arabic—in Averroes’ long commentary on the Metaphysics. However, this part of the puzzle has also been somewhat problematized lately. Di Giovanni and Primavesi, although seeing no reason to deny that the sources quoted by Averroes ultimately trace back to Alexander of Aphrodisias (but not in uniform fashion or necessarily to the same work), have nevertheless shown that the text quoted in Averroes underwent significant adaptations and alterations in the Greek and Syriac traditions.15 However, there are additional ways to assess Alexander’s relationship to Metaphysics 12. Central themes in Alexander’s On Fate, On Providence (surviving only in Arabic), and On Principles (in Arabic, assuming it can confidently be traced back to Alexander) seem as careful attempts to expand the role of Aristotle’s God and restore Its relevance to the world while remaining faithful to Aristotle’s texts, whereas a work like Quaestio 1.1 has been shown to contain an exegesis of sorts of Metaphysics 12.16 As Plotinus’ (204/5–270 CE) version of Platonism gradually gained steam, it seems as if Aristotle’s theology had been superseded. In his Enneads, Plotinus engages with Aristotle’s Metaphysics frequently and polemically—although not in the form of commentary—to the point that Porphyry maintained that the entirety of Aristotle’s Metaphysics is contained in them. Plotinus argued that Aristotle’s first principle, a self-intelligizing intellect, involves plurality, as it implies a distinction between subject and object.17 Therefore, he maintained, it is necessary to posit an absolutely simple principle, namely the transcendent “One,” over and above Aristotle’s God. Hence Aristotle’s God was

13 14 15 16 17

Golitsis, 583. For Stephanus see now Roueché, “A Philosophical Portrait,” esp. 552–560 for his commentaries. Golitsis, “Who Were the Real Authors?” 582. Di Giovanni & Primavesi, “Who Wrote Alexander’s Commentary?” See also Fazzo & Zonta, “The First Account.” See for example the discussions of Sharples, “Alexander,” and Fazzo, “L’ exégèse.” For a useful overview see Gerson, Aristotle, 205–208.

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identified with the Intellect and relegated to the rank of the second principle. What is more, Plotinus’ theology offered not only a principle of movement, but also a principle of existence, which is an explanation analogous to creation. The One’s complete otherness shed any remnants of anthropomorphism from the philosophers’ God (unlike Aristotle’s divine intellect’s affinity to the human intellect), opening the door to apophasis and mystical experiences, some of which were utilized by later authors as occasions for prayer, rite, and magic. It is difficult to see how the Aristotelian God could elicit this kind of reaction. As can be seen from its subsequent reception in medieval philosophy, Plotinian theology (in its various recensions) was considerably more appealing than Aristotle’s in an era in which revealed religion gradually gained eminence over classical paganism. Thus absorbed in Plotinus’ metaphysics, Aristotle’s standalone theology naturally lost much of its relevance. In short, Plotinus’ philosophical activity, even without offering a traditional commentary on Metaphysics 12, dramatically conditioned the manner in which the work was read. As regards to Porphyry (234?–305? CE), Plotinus’ most famous student and the editor of the Enneads, he is credited with a commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, to which the sole testimony is Simplicius. In his commentary on On the Heavens, Simplicius reports Porphyry’s brief remarks on counting the celestial spheres and the history of astronomical observations in the latter’s commentary on the Metaphysics.18

3

Themistius on Metaphysics 12: Context and Scholarship19

Enter Themistius (317–c. 390 CE). “One of the most important individuals in the fourth century,”20 Themistius was perhaps the embodiment of the philosophical relationship between theory and practice. Born in Paphlagonia (in the northern part of Asia Minor) and spending most of his adult years in Con18 19

20

Simplicius, On the Heavens 2.10–14, 503,22–34 (pp. 42–43); 506 (p. 45). The history of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Greek after Themistius is beyond the scope of this study, as there is no tangible evidence of Themistius’ paraphrase having ever been utilized by later Greek authors. According to Luna (“Les commentaires,” 252–258), the surviving late commentators on the Metaphysics (besides pseudo-Alexander discussed above) are Syrianus (d. 437) on books 3–4 and 13–14; Asclepius of Tralles (sixth century) on books 1–7 (based on the lectures of his teacher Ammonius); pseudo-Philoponus (thirteenth–fourteenth centuries), complete; and pseudo-Herrenius (fifteenth century), complete. Finally, the author of a sixth century commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul known as pseudo-Simplicius mentions his non-extant commentary on the Metaphysics in this treatise. Vanderspoel, Themistius, vii.

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stantinople, where he also ran a successful school of philosophy, Themistius occupied different political functions in the Eastern capitol.21 Managing to remain a relevant political figure under five different emperors, he was also one of the finest orators of his time. Sometimes dismissed (by ancient and modern authors) as a flatterer, a sophist, or a spin doctor—and being no stranger to subtle manipulation, white lies, and a tendency for self-aggrandizing disguised as humility—Themistius was nevertheless able to play an important role in shaping imperial policies on religious toleration and freedom of speech, and his core political-philosophical views as expressed in his orations remained consistent throughout his career.22 Besides a few exceptions, Themistius’ corpus falls into two groups: his orations (public and private), which were delivered throughout his career, and his paraphrases of Aristotle’s works,23 which are usually taken to belong to an early period.24 Despite various efforts, it is difficult to place Themistius within one of the traditional schools of thought in antiquity. His paraphrases of Aristotle’s works are presented as pedagogical texts aimed at clarifying Aristotle’s argument, and except for a few cases, it is difficult to distill their apologetic, critical, or dogmatic elements and attribute them consistently to a certain tradition.25 Themistius studied philosophy under his father Eugenius—whose own philosophical orientation is debated26—who himself had learnt from Themistius’ grandfather. In other words, Themistius is a part of an idiosyncratic legacy which had no formal ties to any of the established schools. Whether considered 21 22 23 24

25 26

For a detailed biography of Themistius see Vanderspoel. For a thorough discussion see Heather, “Themistius.” For a detailed discussion of Themistius’ philosophical corpus with its medieval translations, along with further references, see Meyrav, “Themistius,” 10–18. See for example Vanderspoel, Themistius, 37. As I try to show below (Chapter 2, n. 21), there are no real grounds for this assumption. There has been some debate over the question whether Themistius wrote “traditional” commentaries on Aristotle besides his paraphrases, mainly because of the ninth century Patriarch Photius, whose report on Themistius in his Bibliotheca ascribes him commentaries. Steel (“Des commentaires”) adopted this view and attempted to provide additional support for it. However, Blumenthal’s (“Photius”) reply to Steel, in which he shows that there are no real grounds for this assumption, seems to me conclusive. Vanderspoel’s suggestion (“The ‘Themistius Collection’,” 163–164) that Photius is referring to books that Themistius helped to acquire for a library, a project mentioned in Oration 4, rather than books authored by Themistius, is far-fetched. Capone Ciollaro’s clever contention (“Osservazioni,” 91–92) that Photius is referring to two distinct procedures that Themistius employs within the confines of the same work is also something of an overreach. A large part of Chapter 2 below discusses Themistius’ style and interests. Ballériaux, “Eugénios,” describes him as a Neoplatonist, but this depends on how one reads Themistius’ account in Oration 20 (see below, Chapter 2, n. 23).

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a Neoplatonist, a middle Platonist, a Peripatetic, an eclectic, or a freethinker, most of the scholarly arguments surrounding Themistius’ scholastic affiliation draw from his paraphrase of Aristotle’s On the Soul or from his orations.27 Only a handful of scholars, whom I discuss below, employ the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 to support their position on this matter. As we have seen, no complete interpretative work about Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12 before Themistius had survived. Given the immense historical importance as well as puzzling content of Aristotle’s composition, one would expect modern scholars to benefit as much as possible from the earliest surviving account of the work in order to get a better grasp of how Aristotle’s ideas were understood and received, and perhaps even gain some philosophical insights from Themistius’ approach. But in fact, no systematic study of Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 has ever been undertaken, and rarely can one find fresh discussions of the work that go beyond themes that Pines had discussed in his groundbreaking study of the work, which I discuss below.28 In Sorabji’s massive three-volume sourcebook of passages from the ancient commentators on Aristotle, published in 2005, only four passages from Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 are included.29 In a recent collection of essays edited by Horn, besides frequent mentions of Themistius in lists, only

27

28

29

See for example Blumenthal, “Themistius”; Ballérieux, “Thémistius”; O’Meara, Platonopolis, 206–208. Todd’s remark about this issue should always be kept in mind: “Themistius’ relationship to the twin pillars of the ancient philosophical tradition is … unusually free from scholasticism. In this we can perhaps detect the intellectual independence of an aristocrat whose involvement with teaching was a relatively brief prelude to a public career and not a lifelong professional commitment” (Schroeder & Todd, Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators, 34). Somewhat bizarrely, for several years the only use that scholars of ancient philosophy found in Themistius’ paraphrase was for the sake of textual criticism of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12. Despite the fact that the available material was so far removed from the Greek original, Themistius has enjoyed—and still enjoys—frequent presence in critical editions of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Bonitz (1848) employed Finzi’s Latin translation for control; Ross (1924) states that he made use of the Hebrew; Jaeger (1957) uses variants of Themistius recorded by other editors; and recently, Alexandru made use of material preserved in Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin (2014). In his detailed commentary on Metaphysics 12, Elders mentions Themistius’ name ten times: six references to matters of textual criticism, one reference to Themistius as a source for Theophrastus, and only three brief references to Themistius’ philosophical understanding of Aristotle, which together amount to less than four sentences (see index in Elders, Aristotle’s Theology). In the highly influential collection of essays on Metaphysics 12 edited by Frede and Charles and published in 2000, Themistius is only mentioned twice, and both mentions deal with textual issues (Frede, “Metaphysics Λ 1,” 73; 78). Sorabji, Philosophy.

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Berti’s contribution about the program of Metaphysics 12 treats Themistius as a legitimate source for interpreting the text.30 Recent introductory discussions of Themistius as a reader of Aristotle are also for the most part neglectful of his paraphrase of Metaphysics 12. In her book about the ancient commentators, Tuominen devotes generous space for discussing Themistius’ paraphrases of On the Soul and the Posterior Analytics, whereas the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 is only mentioned, but not discussed, in the biographical introduction to Themistius.31 In Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity, published recently (2016), Zucker’s sixteen-page contribution about Themistius includes nothing about his paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 besides acknowledging its existence and a brief reference in a footnote.32 An important exception is Kupreeva’s contribution to the Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, which is significantly more generous, devoting 6 pages to Themistius’ paraphrase and presenting the themes of spontaneous generation, cosmic law, and God’s self-intelligizing.33 Slowly but surely, owing much to Brague’s French translation34—the first translation of the work into a modern Western language—the importance of Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 and its philosophical richness are acknowledged, followed by a growing body of scholarship.35 The first serious discussion of Themistius’ paraphrase is Shlomo Pines’ groundbreaking paper on the text, published in 1987.36 Pines’ study exhibits Themistius’ significant expansion of Aristotle’s laconic remarks about God’s self-intellegizing in the Metaphysics. According to Pines, Themistius takes Aristotle’s rather straightforward remarks about God’s self-intellegizing and expands them consider-

30 31 32 33 34 35

36

Berti, “The Program.” I discuss some of Berti’s remarks in the Commentary. Tuominen, The Ancient Commentators, 26. Zucker, “Themistius,” 370n53. This contribution incorporates much of the author’s material presented in his “Qu’est-ce qu’une paraphrasis?” Kupreeva, “Themistius,” 411–416. Brague, Thémistius. Themistius’ paraphrase of Aristotle’s On the Heavens, surviving only in Hebrew, has recently gained some momentum thanks to the work of Zonta (“Hebraica”), which clarified the complex situation of the textual tradition, and Coda, who published a series of studies devoted to different philosophical themes in the paraphrase and contextualized them within the commentary tradition (see Coda, “Alexander”; “Reconstructing”; “Un fragment”). Coda is also preparing a new critical edition and English translation of the text. One should probably acknowledge a curious short piece by Schedl (“Die Findung des Seins”) from 1962 as the first paper devoted to Themistius’ paraphrase, in which the author offers very broad observations on some Hebrew terms he encounters in Themistius’ text and their occurrence in the Bible without saying anything about Themistius’ discussion or context.

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ably. He shows that Themistius interprets the idea of God as a principle using three meanings of what it is to be a principle, namely God as a formal cause, God as a final cause, and God as the universal principle of movement. This interpretation enables Themistius first to devise an ontological link between God and the rest of the existents and argue that “they are Him,” and then to devise an epistemic link and transform the notion of God’s self-intelligizing into the intelligizing of all the existents. Moreover, Pines shows that according to Themistius, God’s intelligizing of everything, as a formal cause, renders God as the principle of the cosmic order, thus adding an ethical-political dimension to God as the world’s nomos. According to Pines, this interpretation enables Themistius to argue that when God intelligizes everything he does not intelligize anything exterior; quite the contrary: God’s intelligizing of everything is nothing but God’s self-intelligizing. In this manner, Pines argues, Themistius attempts to retain correspondence to Aristotle’s original position of God as an exclusively self-centered existent, who intelligizies nothing but itself and is completely exterior to the cosmos. Pines takes Themistius’ view as an unprecedented departure from Aristotle’s text, and is confident that it is influenced by Plotinus’ notion of the Intellect, which intelligizes all things while intelligizing itself.37 In the latter part of his paper, Pines outlines the historical reverberations of these ideas in the Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin traditions, arguing that their lasting influence could be extended as far as to Hegel.38 Pines’ paper opened many opportunities for future scholarship, and it is baffling that almost no one continued the promising leads he offered. A happy notable exception is Carlos Fraenkel, who showed how Themistius’ revision of Aristotle’s theology is reflected in Maimonides, and through Maimonides—in Spinoza.39 Of much value to the scholarship of Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 are the studies of Guy Guldentops, whose synoptic approach not only calls attention to passages in the paraphrase hitherto unexplored, but also examines them in light of passages from Themistius’ other paraphrases and even the orations. Thus, for example, Guldentops shows the consistency of Themistius’ view on evil as an effect of privation (rather than of matter, as in Plotinus) in

37

38 39

Pines, “Distinctive,” 189. This interpretation of Aristotle’s Deity has been challenged on different occasions, with some modern scholars advocating views that come close to Themistius’ interpretation (see for example De Koninck, “Aristotle on God”). This does not diminish the value of Pines’ study, of course, but only calls for softening the contention that Themistius is distorting Aristotle’s position or deviates from it and for expressing a more neutral view according to which this is how Themistius interprets Aristotle. Pines, “Distinctive,” 202–204. Fraenkel, “Maimonides’ God.”

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his paraphrases of the Physics and Metaphysics 12.40 In his study of Themistius’ view of the possibility of a supreme science, Guldentops discusses and elaborates upon many of the salient theological features of Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12, contextualizes them and stresses the connection between this work and Themistius’ orations on the subject of political science, which is, in a way, coextensive with theology.41 This is an extremely important issue, and as I argue in the Conclusion, can perhaps be seen as the raison d’être of the entire paraphrase. Another significant contribution to the study of Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 is Devin Henry’s philosophical discussion of Themistius’ employment of the phenomenon of spontaneous generation in his response to Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s Ideas.42 Henry’s paper (originally published in 2003) was recently published in a significantly revised form, refining his argument according to an updated understanding of Themistius’ text, based (among others) upon my own philological analysis.43 Besides calling attention to an important and influential part of Themistius’ paraphrase hitherto known mainly to scholars of Arabic philosophy, Henry is perhaps the first scholar since Averroes(!)44 who goes beyond presenting or contextualizing Themistius’ ideas and actually engages with them philosophically, critically evaluating his arguments and confronting them with several Aristotelian passages. In short, despite its modest intention and focused topic, Henry’s discussion demonstrates how fruitful an encounter with Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 can be when treated as a serious philosophical text and not only as a historical document. Recent discussion of Themistius’ scholastic affiliation have also began to take the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 into account, most notably in the work of I. Hadot, where she defends her view that Themistius is a Neoplatonist.45

40 41 42

43 44 45

Guldentops, “Themistius,” 189–192; 196. Guldentops, “Science,” 108–114; 118–119. Henry, “Themistius and Spontaneous Generation,” revised and expanded in his “Themistius and the Problem.” See my discussion of this in the Commentary, and the consequences of Themistius’ discussion in the Conclusion. It is important to acknowledge Genequand’s discussions of spontaneous generation in the introduction to his translation of Averroes’ long commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12 (Genequand, Ibn Rushd, 27–29), as he was the first to notice the explosive implications of Themistius’ view and its reverberation in Averroes and other Arabic philosophers. For my own contribution to the understanding of Themistius’ argument, see Meyrav, “Spontaneous Generation.” And, derivatively, Thomas Aquinas. See below, 23. Hadot, Athenian, 75–88.

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Whereas I disagree with Hadot’s analysis,46 she is (to the best of my knowledge) the first author to include a detailed discussion of Themistius’ paraphrase in this context.47 Twetten, in his massive study of the history of Arabic Aristotelian cosmology, argues that Themistius identifies Aristotle’s prime mover with the Plotinic “One.”48 I address these issues in the course of the Commentary.

4

Themistius’ Paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 in the Arabic and Hebrew Traditions

The perplexity with which Aristotle’s Metaphysics was met in the formative period of Arabic philosophy (and beyond) is well-documented.49 One of the main sources of confusion was the question of the proper relation between metaphysics and theology, in which book 12 of the Metaphysics, where the two coincide, played an important role. According to the testimony of al-Fārābī, whose short treatise On the aims of the Metaphysics had a crucial impact on its reception,50 the only works about Metaphysics 12 available to the Arabs were Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary, which was incomplete,51 and Themistius’ paraphrase.52 These two works served as roadmaps for the Arabs in their attempts to penetrate the text, whose early Arabic translations were sometimes incomprehensible, reflecting the opaque style of the Greek original. Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn’s Arabic translation of Themistius’ paraphrase, analyzed in Chapter 1, was a professional translation of a text whose original Greek was doubtlessly considerably clearer than Aristotle’s.

46 47

48 49 50

51

52

See below, esp. Commentary on ‫ח‬5 and ‫לה‬9. Pines’ suggestions of Plotinian influence on Themistius and Brague’s frequent references to Plotinus in his translation are important forerunners (see Pines, “Distinctive,” 187; 190), though their discussions do not revolve around the question of Themistius’ philosophical adherence. Twetten, “Aristotelian Cosmology,” 329–330. The most comprehensive accounts are Bertolacci, Reception, 65–103; Gutas, Avicenna, 270–288. Recall Avicenna’s well-known anecdote in his autobiography that he had read Aristotle’s Metaphysics forty times without understanding what it was about until he stumbled into al-Fārābī’s Aims. See discussion in Gutas, Avicenna, 270–275, and Bertolacci, Reception, 44. The fullest analysis of al-Fārābī’s Aims is Bertolacci, Reception, 66–88, to which Martini Bonadeo, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, 269–275, is an important addition. The last fragment of Alexander’s commentary is included in Averroes’ discussion of Metaphysics 12.7.1072b18–19, and this is in tune with Averroes’ remark that only two thirds of Alexander’s commentary had survived. Al-Fārābī, “Fī Aġrād,” 34,14–15.

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Themistius was known to the Arabs as a commentator on Aristotle and as a secretary for Julian the Apostate—a detail that ibn al-Nadīm cares to mention twice in the Fihrist—whom the Muslim philosophers lauded as the apostate of Christianity and the reviver of philosophy.53 Themistius’ impact on Arabic and subsequently Hebrew philosophy was long and lasting, and to these two medieval traditions, in different capacities, we owe the survival of several of Themistius’ writings and ideas lost in Greek. With no knowledge of the circumstances, functions, or philosophical preoccupations of Themistius’ paraphrases, the Arabs read the book perhaps as it should be initially read, without any baggage of preconceptions, as a legitimate and well-put option for understanding Aristotle’s text. Many of them liked what they found. Themistius’ paraphrase contains many philosophical elements that go significantly beyond what Aristotle explicitly writes and interpret the Aristotelian God in terms that exhibit some affinity to the God of the revealed religions: Themistius’ version of Aristotle’s God is a principle of existence as well as a mover; He has knowledge of the existents; He is understood in terms of a political legislator and ruler; and so forth. In what follows I provide a short and by no means exhaustive overview of cases where ideas in Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 are either explicitly discussed or clearly implicated in the Arabic and Hebrew worlds. The implicit presence of Themistian ideas in these traditions is a subject beyond the scope of the present study, although some preliminary directions are put forth in the concluding part of this Introduction. Here I offer a skeleton, which will hopefully be fleshed out and refined in future studies. The textual evidence is presented and analyzed in chapter 1. The earliest surviving Arabic text about Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Ṯābit ibn Qurra’s Concise Exposition of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, reflects the blend of metaphysics and theology that was commonplace in early Arabic philosophy. Ṯābit, who reportedly had a hand in refining Isḥāq’s Arabic translation of Themistius’ paraphrase,54 does not mention Themistius’ name in his short essay, but Reis53

54

See ibn al-Nadīm, Fihrist, 253,25–27; 241,22–23. Themistius managed to retain a good standing both with Muslims and with Syriac Christians, for opposite reasons: the Muslim philosophers held him in high esteem because of their admiration of Julian and his antiChristian/pro-philosophical approach, whereas the Syriacs admired him because they believed that he convinced Julian to stop persecuting Christians. See Watt, “Themistius and Julian.” Muslim philosophers frequently held a negative view about the impact of Christianity upon philosophy. For instance, Stroumsa shows that “the period between the rise of Christianity and the rise of Islam is described by al-Fārābī as the dark age of Aristotelian teaching” (Stroumsa, “Al-Fārābī,” 267). See below, 2.1.2.

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man and Bertolacci, its modern editors and translators, make some suggestions for his utilization of Themistius’ paraphrase.55 As we have seen, al-Fārābī reports his acquaintance with Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12. It is therefore odd that his laconic comments on book 12 in his Aims were never examined (to the best of my knowledge) in light of Themistius’ paraphrase. Here is al-Fārābī’s complete account: The eleventh56 treatise deals with the Principle of all substance and existence, with establishing His existence, with the fact that He knows by essence and true by essence, with the existents separate [from matter] that come after Him, and with the way according to which the existence of the existents [that have their origin] from Him is ordered.57 Druart, for example, maintains that al-Fārābī substitutes Aristotle’s unmoved mover with a principle of existence, and argues—in light of her general thesis about al-Fārābī’s dissatisfaction with Aristotle’s metaphysics—that this reflects his preference of Neoplatonic metaphysics of emanation.58 However, the matter seems more straightforward to me: al-Fārābī is not attempting to substitute Aristotle’s text; he simply reads it through Themistius’ eyes. All the components of al-Fārābī’s account are present in Themistius’ paraphrase.59 Besides his aforementioned comment, al-Fārābī nowhere else in his writings mentions Themistius by name, but Janos traces three conversion points in the two authors’ respective cosmologies. First, both acknowledge the mutual productive relationship between metaphysics and astronomy.60 Second, both al-Fārābī and Themistius ascribe matter to the celestial bodies homonymously and stress that it is different from the matter of the existents in the natural world.61 And third, al-Fārābī borrows from Themistius his opinion that

55

56 57 58 59 60 61

See Reisman & Bertolacci, “Thābit ibn Qurra.” For an overview see Twetten, “Aristotelian Cosmology,” 362–363. For Themistius’ possible influence see Reisman & Bertolacci, “Thābit ibn Qurra,” 720; 756; 760; 762; 768; 770; 771; 776. Book 12 is presented as the eleventh book because al-Fārābī did not know book 1 and thought that the work commences with what is now known as book 2. Al-Fārābī, “Fī Aġrād,” 34,14–15 (translated in Bertolacci, Reception, 71). Druart, “Al-Farabi,” 28–29. It should be noted that al-Fārābī’s report does not necessarily imply emanation. See ‫י‬12; ‫כג‬4–13; ‫כט‬23–24. Janos, Method, 79. This is a key point in Themistius’ paraphrase. See, for example, ‫ד‬16–21 and the Commentary for further reference. Janos, 215; 224.

16

introduction

God knows all the effects that proceed from God’s essence.62 The relationship between Themistius’ and al-Fārābī’s political thought has been explored by Watt, although his analysis does not draw upon the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 but through the penetration of the political ideas of the orations into the Arabic world.63 Avicenna devoted a commentary entitled Šarḥ Kitāb Ḥarf al-Lām to the latter half of Metaphysics 12.64 Pines was the first to point to Avicenna’s debt to Themistius’ paraphrase, especially concerning the idea that God’s self-intelligizing entails God’s intelligizing of all the other existents. Avicenna explains that these are not two distinct processes (which would necessitate ascribing plurality to God) and that the intelligizing is not the result of an encounter with external existents (which would mean that God has a passive relation to something and would also undermine God’s simplicity).65 However, as Pines shows, Avicenna does not present these ideas as if they were Aristotle’s. On the contrary, he stresses the difference between Themistius and Aristotle on this point, effectively utilizing Themistius to criticize Aristotle’s insufficient understanding of God’s self-intelligizing. This Avicennian idea recurs in detail in the Ilahiyāt section of al-Šifāʾ.66 Bertolacci adds that in the Ilahiyāt Avicenna employs Themistius’ idea that each movement corresponding to a given celestial sphere has two principles, one internal and one external.67 Both Pines and Bertolacci cite Avicenna’s critique of Themistius’ explanation for the assertion that God does not grow weary from continuous intelligizing. According to Themistius, God does not become tired because the activity of intelligizing is identical to God’s existence, and nothing grows tired from being itself. Avicenna thinks that there is a different explanation for this; God does not grow weary not because He is His own object of intelligizing, but because there is no discordance between Him and his object of intelligizing.68 62 63

64 65 66 67

68

Janos, 186. Watt, “From Themistius to al-Farabi.” It will be highly productive, in my view, to complement Watt’s study with an examination of the presence of the political aspects of the paraphrase in al-Fārābī’s political thought. See below, 2.2.4. For study see Janssens, “Avicenne.” Pines, “Distinctive,” 191. See also Bertolacci, Reception, 449; Janssens, “Avicenne,” 413–415 and the references there. Pines, “Distinctive,” 193. This is not explicated in Themistius but can be plausibly gathered from his discussion at ‫כא‬9–29. For Themistius the internal principle would presumably be the sphere’s intellect and the external principle would be God as an object of desire. For Avicenna the internal principle is the soul of the sphere and the external principle is the sphere’s separate intellect (See Bertolacci, Reception, 448–449). Pines, “Distinctive,” 192–193; Bertolacci, Reception, 450.

introduction

17

Whereas Avicenna employs Themistius’ paraphrase to “correct” Aristotle’s views, Averroes repeatedly expresses his dissatisfaction with Themistius’ “misunderstanding” of Aristotle, to the point that he relegates Themistius’ paraphrase to a mere attempt at epitomizing Alexander’s commentary.69 Nearly all the references to Themistius in Averroes’ long commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics are critical. For example, Averroes refuses to accept Themistius’ doctrine according to which God’s self-intelligizing is tantamount to God’s intelligizing of everything, the very idea that Avicenna was happy to adopt. According to Averroes, Themistius did not understand Aristotle, as this idea contradicts Aristotle’s statement that God only thinks Himself. Averroes adds that to accept Themistius’ idea is basically to accept God’s ignorance of individuals,70 probably employing Aristotle’s idea that intelligizing is only of form, which would mean that God would know only the forms of things, which is universal rather than particular knowledge. As Averroes puts it, because of this argument people claimed that “He knows what is here by means of general rather than particular knowledge.”71 In other words, for Averroes, Themistius’ (and Avicenna’s) idea not only contradicts Aristotle, but also fails to achieve its purpose. Averroes’ critique notwithstanding, Themistius was held in high regard in the Jewish world even before the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 was translated into Hebrew. Maimonides, in his famous letter to Shmuel ibn Tibbon in which he offers advice about philosophers to read, names Themistius’ paraphrases alongside the commentaries by Alexander and Averroes as indispensable aids for reading Aristotle’s books and recommends to disregard other commentators.72 Fraenkel has shown that in the Guide of the Perplexed, Maimonides employed (whether directly or indirectly) Themistius’ argumentation to promote a view of God as an immanent cause, “a cause that produces its effects inside itself,” an idea which renders Spinoza’s identification of God with Nature many years later as a development rather than a “fundamental break” with the “medieval doctrine of the Aristotelian God.”73 A curious example of a reference to Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 in the Arabic speaking Jewish world is found in the twelfth (or thirteenth)

69 70 71 72 73

Averroes, Tafsīr, 1413,15–17. This warrants further study because Averroes himself sees that in many cases Themistius and Alexander offer different explanations to Aristotle’s views. Pines, “Distinctive,” 194n66 claims that Averroes is unclear here, as Avicenna’s argumentation does not permit conclusions which Averroes ascribes to it. Averroes, Tafsīr, 1707,6–7. Harvey, “Maimonides’ Letter,” 53. Fraenkel, “Maimonides’ God,” esp. 185–187, 203.

18

introduction

century Sevillan philosopher Moshe Ha-Levī’s Metaphysical Treatise, quoted in full in its original Arabic by the Kabbalist ibn Waqar (c. 1340), and also extant in an anonymous Hebrew translation.74 One of the fascinating aspects of Moshe’s treatise is that it is a rare case of a Jewish author from Andalusia criticizing Averroes and advocating a return to Avicennan metaphysics.75 According to Moshe, Themistius, along with Muslim philosophers such as al-Fārābī and Avicenna, concluded from the first cause’s complete unity and ultimate perfection that it is different from the prime mover, which is its effect.76 Since Themistius actually does equate the prime mover with the first cause, Moshe either read the text differently, or was confused by some report he had read about Themistius’ text. Given the authority Maimonides ascribed to Themistius, it is no wonder that his paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 was translated into Hebrew, as the Hebrew translation project often followed Maimonides’ lead.77 The translator was Moshe ibn Tibbon, a third generation translator of the celebrated Tibbon family,78 one of the main protagonists of the present study. Moshe translated several philosophical and scientific works, and one of his crowning achievements was a systematic translation of all Averroes’ epitomes of Aristotle’s works about philosophy of nature, appended by the translation of the epitome of the Metaphysics. The fact that Moshe translated Themistius’ paraphrase in 1255, after he had completed his translations of the physical epitomes and before his translation of Averroes’ epitome of the Metaphysics (1258), may be of some significance. Moshe’s translation is analyzed in detail in Chapter 1 and throughout the Commentary.

74

75 76

77 78

For Moshe in general see Vajda, Recherches, 133. Ibn Waqar’s chief work is the treatise Al-Maqāla al-Ǧāmiʿa bayn al-Falsafa wa-l-Šarīʿa (“The Treatise of Reconciliation between Philosophy and the Revealed Law”), extant only in one manuscript (MS Vat.ebr. 203), in which he attempts to reconcile philosophy and astrology with the revealed law, or more precisely, with the religious tenets of Judaism which he identifies completely with the Kabbalah. Besides the quotation of Moshe’s work in ibn Waqar, three manuscripts of the anonymous Hebrew translation survive (I consulted MS St. Petersburg—Russian National Library Evr. I 471). Moshe’s treatise is translated into French in Vajda, “Un Champion.” Wolfson also studied the work in an attempt to reconstruct Averroes’ lost treatise on the prime mover, which Moshe criticizes (see Wolfson, “Averroes”). See Freudenthal & Zonta, “Avicenna,” 232. Arabic, MS Vat.ebr. 203, 83r2–5; Hebrew: MS St. Petersburg—Russian National Library Evr. I 471, 52b1–5. Ibn Waqar, following Moshe, also attributes to Themistius the distinction between the first cause and the first mover (Vajda, Recherches, 136). See Harvey, “Maimonides’ Letter,” for a general discussion. For Moshe ibn Tibbon and his translations see Freudenthal, “Les sciences,” 61–63; Zonta, La filosofia, 182–186; Robinson, “Ibn Tibbon,” 220–222.

introduction

19

In his Moreh ha-Moreh (1280), a commentary on selected passages of Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed, the philosopher and translator Šem Ṭob Falaquera (c. 1220–after 1290) translates into Hebrew a few passages from Themistius’ paraphrase,79 and refers to other passages to provide more context and justification to Maimonides’ arguments.80 The most notable explicit employment of Themistius’ paraphrase in its Hebrew translation as part of philosophical argumentation is found in Gersonides’ (1288–1344) Wars of the Lord (Milḥamot ha-Šem; 1329).81 Pines was the first to discuss the presence of Themistius’ paraphrase, although he offers only preliminary comments about Gersonides’ adoption of Themistius’ idea of God as the nomos of the world.82 Gersonides frequently mentions Themistius’ paraphrase in the Wars of the Lord, referring to his ideas in the course of elaborate discussions of Averroes and other philosophers. I will demonstrate this by a short analysis of Gersonides’ interpretative employment of Themistius’ discussion of spontaneous generation. In his discussion of spontaneous generation, Themistius’ attempts to promote the idea that the forms of individuals are not transferred to them by their parents, but owing to logoi, formative principles in nature that are activated by the soul in the earth.83 Gersonides maintains that this causation suggests the existence of a “separate agent that is an intellect,” namely the agent intellect.84 In this manner Gersonides exploits Themistius’ discussion—which in the present context never mentions the intellect—for supporting the popular medieval claim that the agent intellect is a supranatural cause for the coming to be of natural forms in the sub-lunar realm. Gersonides refers to Aristotle and Themistius collectively in the present context, and he does not hesitate to substitute the concepts of “soul” and “intellect” to justify his cause. According to Gersonides, “Aristotle calls it ‘the soul that emanates from the heavenly bodies,’ which, he says, is a divine power, and an intellect. Many of the modern philosophers have called it ‘the Agent Intellect.’”85 The apparent identification of the world-soul (or, in Themistius’ paraphrase, “the soul in the earth”) with the agent intellect seems to me like an original idea of Gersonides. In Themistius’ paraphrase of On the Soul, which was translated

79 80 81 82 83 84 85

See below, 3.2.2. See discussion in Shiffman, Falaquera, 39–42. Gersonides’ lengthy quotation of Themistius is discussed below, 3.2.3. Pines, “Distinctive,” 199–200. See below, Commentary on chapter 3, section 2, appendix. Gersonides, Milḥamot, 236,12 (Feldman, Gersonides, vol. 3, 106). Gersonides, 41.2–4 (Feldman, vol. 1, 152). See Davidson, “Gersonides,” 216–218.

20

introduction

into Arabic but not into Hebrew—although widely addressed in Averroes— the agent intellect is understood as a separate entity which is responsible for human intelligizing, but not as an efficient cause of coming to be (this is the responsibility of the world-soul).86 The functional unification of “giving forms” and “actualizing the intellect” is present, of course, in the Arabic tradition at least since al-Fārābī,87 but here Gersonides imposes this explanation onto Themistius, effectively (but without foundation) bridging a historical gap in the continuum of ideas since Aristotle to his own time, as well as syncretizing Themistius’ paraphrases of On the Soul and Metaphysics 12. Finally, the Provençal philosopher and translator Qalonymos b. Qalonymos (1286–after 1328), a contemporary of Gersonides, published in 1318 a public “answer” (Tešuvah) to Yosef ibn Kaspī’s (1279–1340) Book of Secrets (Sefer haSodot). Qalonymos complains that not only did Kaspī commit many errors; he also publicly revealed metaphysical “secrets,” defying the Maimonidean and Averroistic tradition of withholding such information from the multitude.88 In the course of his onslaught on Kaspī, Qalonymos refers to Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 as corroboration for Averroes’ arguments for equating of the actuality of the intellect with the conceptualization of the world order and the arrangement of its parts, from which he concludes that the essence of the agent intellect is precisely this conceptualization in the human mind.89 Although Qalonymos does not explain what passage in Themistius’ paraphrase he is referring to, he seems to understand Themistius’ discussion of God’s intellection in the paraphrase as referring to the agent intellect rather than to God, expressing, like Gersonides had, some kind of syncretism between distinct arguments in Themistius’ respective paraphrases of On the Soul and Metaphysics 12.

5

Looking Forward

Assuming that the edition presented here is satisfactory, and that Themistius’ philosophical engagement with Aristotle’s text has been adequately presented, the door is open for the next step, namely situating Themistius’ paraphrase in different contexts in a critical and informed manner. In other words, how does 86 87 88 89

See Davidson, Alfarabi, 33. See survey in Davidson, “Gersonides,” 218–239. Qalonymos b. Qalonymos, Tešuvah, 3. Qalonymos b. Qalonymos, 20,25–29. Qalonymos is quoting from Averroes’ epitome of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (see Arnzen, Averroes, 159).

introduction

21

one incorporate Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 into the history of metaphysics? The open questions fall into three groups: 1. The relationship between Themistius’ paraphrase and other authors in antiquity, especially discussions of Metaphysics 12. This question is difficult to address for two main reasons. First, as I have shown above, is the dearth of surviving materials pertaining to Metaphysics 12 in antiquity. Second, unlike other paraphrases—where Themistius frequently reports other views and also engages in polemics with various authors—in his paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 no authors other than Aristotle and thinkers that Aristotle explicitly refers to in the text are mentioned. But whereas it is clear that Themistius is working intimately with Aristotle’s text, he is certainly not operating in a vacuum and clearly holds strong opinions on various topics. Whether these opinions are inherited, or the result of engagement with previous commentators, or even a response to current philosophical trends, requires further study. For example, in order to evaluate Themistius’ famous characterization as “the last Peripatetic,”90 it would be useful to compare relevant portions of his paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 with the surviving fragments of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary—their shaky history as discussed above notwithstanding—which should give us an idea about his relation to “orthodox” Peripatetic doctrine. On the other side of the street, some scholars have labeled Themistius as a Neoplatonist, or at least tried to uncover Plotinian influence on some of the themes in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12.91 There are also instances where Themistius can be taken to be implicitly replying to Plotinian critiques of Aristotle.92 (One should keep in mind that Themistius never mentions Plotinus in any of his surviving works.) But what about Porphyry and Iamblichus, both of whom he mentions and criticizes in different contexts in other works? Are they present in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12, and if so— how? Pushing even further back—what about Plato? Themistius’ political use of Plato’s writings in his orations has been very well-documented.93 His admiration for Plato and belief in the harmony between Plato and Aristotle are also

90 91 92 93

See Blumenthal, “Themistius,” who besides a brief note (119n23) does not discuss the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 in his paper. For example, Pines, “Distinctive,” 187; 190; Hadot, Athenian, 92–95; Brague, Thémistius, includes numerous allusions to Plotinus in the notes for his translation. See, e.g., ‫ל‬23–24. Blumenthal, “Themistius,” 114–115; O’Meara, Platonopolis, 206–208.

22

introduction

well-known.94 Does Themistius’ admiration of Plato have anything to do, for instance, with his demiurgic conception of Aristotle’s God, or for the introduction of a political dimension to Metaphysics 12? Pushing forward, is there any evidence that someone in late antiquity was actually familiar with Themistius’ paraphrase? Whereas an initial evaluation of pseudo-Alexander’s commentary reveals no apparent similarities,95 Syrianus’ discussion of spontaneous generation in his commentary on Metaphysics 13 seems very close to Themistius’ view.96 Could there have been a connection here? 2. The relationship between Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 and his other paraphrases (especially On the Soul, Physics, and On the Heavens). Do Themistius’ paraphrases of Aristotle’s works add up to a coherent whole, or do they merely provide ad hoc solutions to local problems? In the Conclusion of this study I try to argue that in the case of the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12, at least, a coherent world view can be extracted. But can this be extended to the other paraphrases? For instance, how do the material and agent intellects in Themistius’ paraphrase of On the Soul coincide with Themistius’ reimagination of Aristotle’s Nous-God in Metaphysics 12? And why is the theological argumentation in the paraphrase of the Physics so brief? Is Themistius making room for an exclusive discussion in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12? And what does Themistius have to say about Aristotle’s denial of the createdness of the cosmos in On the Heavens 1.9, assuming that he is advocating some sort of demiurgic ontological dependency of the world, as well as the heavens, upon the first cause? Further, how do the orations, if considered as philosophical works (or at least containing philosophical discussions), fit in this picture? In one respect at least, namely the politicization of the cosmos, there seems to be harmony between the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 and Themistius’ orations. But what about all

94 95

96

I. Hadot takes this as evidence for his Neoplatonism (see Hadot, Athenian, 75–88). This warrants a separate study, but none of the distinctive elements identified by Sharples, “Pseudo-Alexander,” at least, have anything in common with Themistius’ understanding of Aristotle’s text. See Syrianus’ defence of the logoi: “Yet, in not admitting the reason-principles in the universe, how he will be able to maintain this doctrine I do not know. For what will he say about animals which come from putrefaction? And about trees or bushes or herbs which grow spontaneously? For we will assume that, in these cases also, there pre-exists in the nature of the universe the reason-principles productive of these things” (Dillon & O’Meara, Syrianus, 175).

introduction

23

the theological discussions and allusions they contain? Can they be dismissed as mere religious rhetoric, or do they bring something new to the table?97 3. The relationship between Themistius’ paraphrase and later thinkers in the Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin traditions. While Chapter 1 in this study includes a detailed survey of the textual presence of Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 in Arabic and Hebrew, a complementary study of the presence of his philosophical ideas in Arabic and Hebrew authors is needed. The “big” question is this: what was the part that Themistius’ paraphrase played in the Arab and (then) Hebrew philosophers’ understanding of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and the shaping of their own philosophical ideas? It was, after all, the only complete work about Metaphysics 12 that was available to them. In the course of the Introduction I have already mentioned some examples (and some oddities) of this presence, but they were mostly cases in which Themistius’ paraphrase was explicitly mentioned. There are numerous other more subtle cases waiting to be explored. For instance, were there any reverberations of Themistius’ politicization of the cosmos? AlFārābī seems like a possible candidate. And what was the dialectic between Themistius’ paraphrase and the so-called Theology of Aristotle, which is in a way a “competing” (or perhaps “complementary”) work? What was the effect of Themistius’ “demiurgic” discussion in his paraphrase of chapter 2, given that it was not part of the traditional “theological” scope of chapters 6–10? And how did the Arabic and Hebrew philosophers view the relationship between the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 and the paraphrase of On the Soul? Finally, since some of Themistius’ ideas were available to the Latins thanks to Michael Scot’s translation of Averroes’ long commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (early twelfth century), which contains a few lengthy quotations of Themistius’ paraphrase, and we know that Thomas Aquinas, at least, engaged with them,98 it would be interesting to track down other examples. Themistius’ presence in Early Modern philosophy after the publication of Finzi’s Latin translation of the paraphrase in 1558, is, as of now, complete mystery. 97

98

This also raises questions about the dating of the paraphrases, especially concerning the generally accepted view that Themistius wrote his paraphrases early in his career, about which I show below that there is no real reason to retain. See, for instance, his discussion of spontaneous generation and its force as a response to the critique of the Platonic Ideas, which seems as directly derived from Themistius’ argument quoted in Averroes (see Henry, “Themistius and Spontaneous Generation,” 201–204, and 202n25).

chapter 1

The Textual Tradition You ought to know that no one language exactly corresponds with another language in all respects, or has conterminous properties in its nouns, verbs, and particles, in its mode of composition, arrangement, employment of metaphor and of exact expression, duplication and simplification, copiousness, poverty, verse, prose, rhyme, metre, tendency, and other things too numerous to mention. Now no one, I fancy, will object to this judgment, or question its correctness, at least no one who relies on any fragment of intelligence or morsel of justice. How, then, can you rely on any work which you know only by translation, after this account?1

∵ 1

Overview

The original Greek text of Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 is lost. The paraphrase was translated into Arabic probably by Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn (c. 830– 910/11), although some sources ascribe it to Abū Bišr Mattā (c. 870–940). It is likely that Ṯābit ibn Qurra (d. 901) revised the translation. Moshe ibn Tibbon (fl. second half of the thirteenth century), a third generation of the celebrated family of translators, translated the Arabic into Hebrew in 1255. The Hebrew translation, in turn, was translated into Latin during the sixteenth century by the little known Moshe Finzi, whose translation was published in 1558 in Venice. Only the Hebrew and Latin versions have survived in their entirety. The Arabic translation did not come down to us in its entirety, but parts of it have survived in different forms, which are discussed in detail below. In the present chapter I discuss and analyze all the surviving material in Arabic and Hebrew.2 Each source is contextualized and evaluated concerning its contribution to the study of the text, along with an explanation if and how it is used in the critical edition included in this study. The chapter ends with a 1 Al-Sirāfī to Abū Bišr Mattā; in Margoliouth, “The Discussion,” 118. 2 The discussion of the Latin version will be kept to the minimum for reasons I explain below, p. 105.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400443_003

figure 1

Themistius’ paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12—history of translation and transmission

the textual tradition

25

26

chapter 1

presentation of the principles of the critical edition, which were decided upon based on the conclusions gathered while exploring the source material. For orientation purposes, figure 1 offers a general sketch of the textual history of the paraphrase.

2

The Arabic Textual Tradition

Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 was translated into Arabic probably but not certainly by Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn. It is likely that Ṯābit ibn Qurra revised the translation. The Arabic translation has not survived in its entirety, and the material preserved can be divided into 5 groups: (1) The beginning of the original complete Arabic translation; (2) an abridged version of the Arabic translation of the paraphrase of chapters 6–9, whose author is not mentioned; (3) lengthy quotations from the complete translation, by Averroes and ibn Taymiyya; (4) quotations, allusions and paraphrases deriving (directly or indirectly) from the complete translation; and (5) a quotation deriving from the abridgment. Table 1 shows how the main surviving portions of the Arabic text (groups 1–3) are distributed in different languages among Themistius’ paraphrase of different chapters of Metaphysics 12:3 table 1

Chapter distribution of main Arabic sources for Themistius’ paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12

Paraphrase chapter

Main Arabic sources

12.1

MS Ẓāhiriyya 4871 (Damascus)—complete chapter Averroes, Tafsīr Mā Baʿd al-Ṭabiʿa—corresponding to ‫א‬5–13 MS Ẓāhiriyya 4871 (Damascus)—terminates at ‫ד‬13 Averroes, Tafsīr Mā Baʿd al-Ṭabiʿa—corresponding to ‫ז‬27–‫ח‬26 Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāǧ al-Sunna—starts at ‫ט‬24 Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāǧ al-Sunna—terminates at ‫יא‬4 MS Ḥikma 6 (Dār al-Kutub, Cairo)—abridgment

12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6

3 The division of the books of the Metaphysics into chapters did not exist in antiquity and was introduced into editions of Aristotle’s text during the sixteenth century. As most contemporary scholars, I retain the division for the sake of convenience, but it is important to keep in mind that Themistius treats the text as a single continuous unit.

the textual tradition Table 1

27

Chapter distribution of main Arabic sources (cont.)

Paraphrase chapter

Main Arabic sources

12.7

MS Ḥikma 6 (Dār al-Kutub, Cairo)—abridgment Averroes, Tafsīr Mā baʿd al-Ṭabiʿa—corresponding to ‫כב‬11–29 MS Ḥikma 6 (Dār al-Kutub, Cairo)—abridgment MS Ḥikma 6 (Dār al-Kutub, Cairo)—abridgment N/A

12.8 12.9 12.10

In what follows I offer a systematic investigation of all the surviving sources in Arabic, beginning with the reports on the paraphrase in the Arabic biobibliographical literature and moving, chronologically, to the quotations and fragments, first from the complete version and then from the abridgment. I assess each source’s contribution to the establishment of the text and its history, and explain if (and how) it is used in the present edition. My work builds and expands upon the pioneering efforts of Badawī, Frank, and Brague, who first detected and gathered the information about the various sources, and other scholars who located new Arabic fragments and offered insights and context, acknowledged in the relevant places. 2.1 Bio-bibliographical Sources and Testimonia The principal bio-bibliographical sources about the Arabic translation of Themistius’ paraphrase are two: al-Masʿūdī’s Kitāb al-Tanbīh wa-l-Išrāf and ibn al-Nadīm’s Kitāb al-Fihrist.4 Additional information is found in the title of the fragment of the complete translation in manuscript Ẓāhiriyya 4871 of Damascus (see below, 2.2.1) and in some of the manuscripts of the Hebrew translation (see below, 2.1.2). 2.1.1 Identity of the Arabic Translator Three of the surviving accounts on the Arabic translation of Themistius’ paraphrase ascribe the translation to Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn: the title of what survives of the complete translation (‫ ;)مقالة اللام شرح ثامسطيوس ترجمة إسحق بن حنين‬the title of the Hebrew translation (‫ ;)העתקת אסחק בן חנין‬and al-Masʿūdī’s report. Alternatively, ibn al-Nadīm seems to ascribe a translation to Abū Bišr Mattā, and

4 Ibn al-Nadīm’s account is copied in al-Qifṭī, Taʾrīḫ, 42.

28

chapter 1

perhaps also to Šamlī, which obviously raises difficulty. Unlike the straightforward information in the manuscripts, al-Masʿūdī’s and ibn al-Nadīm’s respective reports are not without problems, and I examine them in the present section to see if they can somehow be harmonized. Al-Masʿūdī’s Kitāb al-Tanbīh wa-l-Išrāf (c. 950) is the earliest surviving report about Themistius’ paraphrase. He writes: ‫ذكر أرسطوطاليس ترتيب العوالم في كتابه فيما بعد الطبيعة في الحرف المعروف باللام وغيره‬ 5‫من الأحرف فيما فسره طامستيوس وترجمه إلى العر بى إسحاق إ بن حنين‬ Aristotle discussed the order of the worlds in his book about metaphysics, in the letter known as Lām and other letters, which Themistius commented upon, and Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn translated it into Arabic. Scholars have taken this testimony to mean that al-Masʿūdī ascribes the translation of Themistius’ paraphrase to Isḥāq, but it should be noted that the sentence could just as well be read as if al-Masʿūdī ascribes to Isḥāq the translation of Aristotle’s text rather than Themistius’ (if we take ‫ فسره‬and ‫ ترجمه‬to be referring to the same object). If this is the case, then there is no real contradiction between al-Masʿūdī and ibn al-Nadīm, since al-Masʿūdī is not discussing the identity of the translator of Themistius at all, and ibn al-Nadīm credits Isḥāq with a translation of “a few treatises” of (apparently) Aristotle’s Metaphysics.6 So far, we have either (i) al-Masʿūdī and the manuscripts on one side, and ibn al-Nadīm on the other, or (ii) the manuscripts on one side, ibn al-Nadīm on the other, while al-Masʿūdī does not give information about Themistius’ translator. Another point that should be kept in mind is that al-Masʿūdī writes about “Lām and other letters,” and it is possible to understand from the text that he took Themistius to have commented on more than one book of the Metaphysics. Taking a closer look at ibn al-Nadīm’s account of Metaphysics 12, things get more complicated: ‫ونقل أبو بشر متى مقالة اللام بتفسير الإسكندر وهي الحادية عشرة من الحروف إلى العر بي‬ ‫ونقل حنين بن إسحاق هذه المقالة إلى السر ياني وفسر ثامسطيوس لمقالة اللام ونقلها أبو بشر‬ ‫متى بتفسير ثامسطيوس وقد نقلها شملى ونقل إسحاق بن حنين عدة مقالات‬

5 Al-Masʿūdī, Kitāb al-Tanbīh, 163,5–8. This is briefly discussed in Brague, Thémistius, 25–26. 6 This holds if we read ibn al-Nadīm in the traditional way, but his text can also be understood differently. See the immediately following discussion.

the textual tradition

29

Abū Bišr Mattā translated treatise “L”—namely the eleventh letter—with Alexander’s commentary into Arabic. Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq translated this treatise into Syriac. Themistius commented on treatise L. Abū Bišr Mattā translated it with Themistius’ commentary. Šamlī also translated it. Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn translated a number of treatises.7 Setting aside some confusing wordings,8 it is clear that ibn al-Nadīm ascribes the Arabic translation of Themistius’ paraphrase to Abū Bišr Mattā, and a case could also be made that he is ascribing one to Šamlī (or does the text mean that Šamlī translated Lām itself?). Genequand thinks that ibn al-Nadīm’s report is simply wrong, as he seemed to confuse between Themistius and Alexander of Aphrodisias. Ascribing to Abū Bišr Mattā a translation of Aristotle with Themistius’ commentary, he writes, “does not make sense as Themistius’ paraphrase is self-sufficient and cannot have been translated ‘with’ (or whatever the meaning of bi may be here) Aristotle’s text.”9 This is an attractive explanation, but perhaps there is another way to read ibn al-Nadīm’s text that can be harmonized with the other testimonies without compelling us to conclude that someone is mistaken. Ibn al-Nadīm’s remark about Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn in the end of the quotation is usually taken to refer to a few treatises of the Metaphysics. This is a natural understanding of the text, but not the only one possible. A few lines earlier, when discussing Metaphysics 2, ibn al-Nadīm mentions that it was translated into Arabic by Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn.10 That would seem to be the appropriate place to mention other books of the Metaphysics that Isḥāq translated, rather than a passing mention near the end of the passage. Furthermore, ibn al-Nadīm’s standard procedure (which he usually but not always follows) is to survey the translators of Aristotle’s works before the commentators about them, unless the translations include commentaries (this is apparent in the reference to Abū Bišr Mattā in the present passage). If this is so, it is uncharacteristic of him to place a reference to Isḥāq as a translator of Aristotle’s text where he had. And finally, the Arabic word ‫ مقالة‬need not be taken automatically as referring to a certain book of an Aristotelian work; it can also refer to a section within a work. This, I believe, leads to a possibility that ibn al-Nadīm’s reference to Isḥāq at the end of our passage means that Isḥāq translated “a number of trea7 8 9 10

Ibn al-Nadīm, Al-Fihrist, 251,28–31. English translation (slightly modified) taken from Bertolacci, “Arabic Translations,” 244. See Bertolacci, 245n9. Genequand, Ibn Rushd, 9–10. Ibn al-Nadīm, Al-Fihrist, 251,25–26.

30

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tises” of Themistius’ commentary rather than of Aristotle’s text. But even if we understand ‫ مقالة‬as referring to a book of the Metaphysics, it is possible that ibn al-Nadīm’s text ascribes to Themistius a commentary on more than book Lām of the Metaphysics. This would fit well with the option I offered above to understand al-Masʿūdī as ascribing to Themistius a commentary about more than one “letter” of the Metaphysics, so perhaps ibn al-Nadīm and al-Masʿūdī are drawing upon the same source about this matter, without actually having seen the work. If this possibility holds water, then it is easier to be harmonized with the commonplace understanding of al-Masʿūdī’s account—as well as the testimonies of the manuscripts. It is possible that all the sources ascribe a translation to Isḥāq. A conclusive answer to the question of the identity of the translator would require an in-depth analysis of Abū Bišr Mattā and Isḥāq’s respective styles and terminology, which is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. My working hypothesis when preparing the present edition was that Isḥāq is the translator, and this has been helpful when tackling various textual and terminological issues which have parallels in his other translations, most notably of Themistius’ paraphrase on Aristotle’s On the Soul, Theophrastus’ On First Principles, and Aristotle’s Metaphysics 2. 2.1.2 Ṯābit ibn Qurra as Reviser Two Hebrew manuscripts, B and R (which stem from the same source),11 report in their titles that Isḥāq’s translation was corrected by the celebrated polymath Ṯābit ibn Qurra (826–901):12 ‫העתקת אסחק בן חנין ותקון תאבת בן קרא אל חראני‬

Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn’s translation and Ṯābit ibn Qurra of Ḥarrān’s correction The claim that Ṯābit ibn Qurra corrected Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn’s Arabic translation of Themistius’ paraphrase is nearly impossible to prove, since we possess no examples of the methodology of correction (foer example: what was the focus of these corrections? Were they always based on a comparison to the original text? How thorough were they?). However, there is plenty of circumstantial evidence that does not leave much reason not to trust these reports. 11 12

See below, 75–76. For Ṯābit’s life see Rashed, “Thābit ibn Qurra: From Ḥarrān to Baghdad”; for his intellectual activity see Rashed, “Thābit ibn Qurra, Scholar.”

the textual tradition

31

Looking at the bio-bibliographical sources, it appears that Ṯābit’s “revising” (iṣlāḥ) of Isḥāq’s translation was common practice. Ṯābit, an accomplished translator in his own right,13 is credited with a correction of the following translations by Isḥāq, with whom he was intellectually associated: Ptolemy’s Almagest;14 Euclid’s Elements15 and Data;16 and Nicolaus of Damascus’ (pseudo-Aristotle) On Plants.17 He is also said to have corrected Ḥunayn’s translation of Autolycus’ On the Moving Sphere.18 Besides translating, correcting translations, and his elaborate scientific oeuvre, Ṯābit commentated quite a bit on Aristotle’s logical works,19 Physics,20 and also wrote an extant “precise exposition” (talḫīṣ) on the Metaphysics, which exhibits influence by Themistius.21 Ṯābit’s habit of correcting Isḥāq’s translations, his active commentary on Aristotle’s works—including the Metaphysics—and his apparent familiarity with Themistius’ paraphrase add credibility to the claim that he had in fact corrected Isḥāq’s translation.22 2.2 Sources for the Complete Translation I now turn to examine all the extant Arabic sources which can be shown to stem from the original full translation, starting with MS Ẓāhiriyya 4871 (Damascus) and moving chronologically to all the other sources.

13

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

According to ibn al-Nadīm, Ṯābit translated part of Proclus’ commentary on the Golden Testaments of Pythagoras (Kitāb Tafsīr Waṣāyāt Pīṯāġūras al-Ḏahbiya), but died before completing it (ibn al-Nadīm, Al-Fihrist, 252,16–18); Epaphroditus’ commentary on Aristotle’s account of the halo of the moon (Tafsīr Kalām Arisṭūṭālīs fī al-Hāla wa-Qaws Quzaḥa) (ibn al-Nadīm, 254,15–16); the last three sections of Apollonius’ Conics (Kitāb alMaḫrūṭāt) (ibn al-Nadīm, 267,6); Eutocius’ Two Lines (Kitāb fī al-Ḫaṭṭayni) (ibn al-Nadīm, 267,17); Menelaus’ Elements of Geometry (Kitāb Uṣūl al-Handasa) (ibn al-Nadīm, 267,21– 22); Ptolemy’s Geography (Ǧuġrāfiyā fī al-Maʿmūr wa-Ṣifat al-Arḍ) (ibn al-Nadīm, 268,12– 13); Galen’s On Good and Bad Juices (Kitāb al-Kīmūs) (ibn al-Nadīm, 290,95); and Galen’s On My Own Opinions (Kitāb mā Yaʿtaqiduhu Raʾyān) (ibn al-Nadīm, 291,5). Ibn al-Nadīm, 268,3–4. Ibn al-Nadīm, 265,22. Steinschneider, Hebräischen Übersetzungen, §315. Steinschneider, §66. Steinschneider, §311. Al-Qifṭī reports that Ṯābit wrote iḥtiṣārs on the Categories, De Interpretatione, and the Prior Analytics (al-Qifṭī, Taʾrīḫ, 120,7–8). According to ibn al-Nadīm (Al-Fihrist, 250,4–25), Ṯābit commented on a part of Physics I. See above, Introduction, n. 55. Another point that should be considered is that, to the best of my knowledge, Ṯābit is nowhere reported to have corrected one of Abū Bišr Mattā’s translations, so accepting Ṯābit as the corrector of the text goes hand in hand with the claim that the translation that he is correcting belongs to Isḥāq rather than to Abū Bišr Mattā.

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2.2.1 MS Ẓāhiriyya 4871 (Damascus) The beginning of a copy of the complete Arabic translation of Themistius’ paraphrase survives in a single manuscript, Ẓāhiriyya 4871 from Damascus. This is the only surviving evidence for the complete standalone translation, not as quoted from another source. Manuscript Ẓāhiriyya 4871 was thoroughly studied by Ragep and Kennedy,23 who report that it was probably copied by a single, anonymous copyist, in Baghdad, over the span of at least 8 years (the works whose copies are dated range between the years 1155–1163). This long period suggests that the copying “may have been done by the owner, slowly obtaining access to works he wished to have for himself.”24 The manuscript originally contained 80 works, of which 42 have survived (in complete or incomplete form), but the original running order has changed. Nearly all the works it contains are philosophical (in the broad sense) or scientific, by Greek and Arabic authors.25 In some cases, the number of folios of a given treatise is indicated, as in the case of Themistius’ paraphrase. The beginning of Themistius’ paraphrase, the sixth item in the manuscript, is found in pages 38r–38v, under the title ‫مقالة اللام شرح ثامسطيوس ترجمة إسحق بن حنين‬. This title is the strongest direct piece of evidence for Isḥāq’s authorship of the translation. The surviving portion of the text contains the complete paraphrase of Metaphysics 12.1 and the beginning of the paraphrase of 12.2. It terminates at the point which corresponds to p. ‫ד‬13 in Landauer’s edition of the Hebrew translation with the words ‫)על צד ההתנגדות =( على جهة المقابلة‬. Moshe ibn Tibbon’s literal style of translation makes it clear that the text he is translating is the same text whose beginning we possess in manuscript Ẓāhiriyya 4871. Since the scribe indicates that the number of folios comprising the paraphrase is 14, of which only the first has survived, a quick calculation makes it evident that the manuscript originally contained the translation in its entirety, as its stated length corresponds to the length of the Hebrew translation we possess. Themistius’ text in this manuscript has been published by Badawī in 1947.26 Badawī’s edition is of great importance, but contains some noticeable errors, most of which have already been recorded by Richard Frank, whose notes on the text, comparing Badawī’s edition with the Hebrew of Moshe ibn Tibbon and

23 24 25 26

Ragep & Kennedy, “Description,” esp. 88–89; the entry about Themistius is at 92–93. Ragep & Kennedy, 89. See the contents in Ragep & Kennedy, 86–87. Badawī, Arisṭū, 329–333.

33

the textual tradition

the Arabic quotations in Averroes and Šahrastānī, are indispensable.27 For the sake of the present edition I consulted a photocopy of the manuscript alongside Badawī’s edition and the Hebrew version. 2.2.2 Pseudo-Al-ʿĀmirī, Kitāb al-Saʿāda wa-l-Isʿād Kitāb al-Saʿāda wa-l-Isʿād (Book of Happiness and Causing Happiness), a compilation of ethical and political material from Greek and Arabic sources, was long thought to be the work of Abū al-Ḥassan al-ʿĀmirī (d. 992).28 Wakelnig has shown that there is in fact no reason to ascribe the work to al-ʿĀmirī, and all that can be said about it is that it was compiled in the mid-tenth century or afterwards.29 The fragment from Themistius’ paraphrase featured in this work was first reported by Ghorab, who did not realize that it was actually longer than he thought.30 Wakelnig recognizes that the fragment is longer, but still falls one line short.31 Here is the complete fragment, alongside the parallel texts from the Arabic abridgment and the complete Hebrew translation:32 table 2

Themistius’ paraphrase in pseudo-Al-ʿĀmirī’s al-Saʿāda wa-l-Isʿād

Pseudo-Al-ʿĀmirī, al-Saʿāda wa-l-Isʿād (182, 12–18)

Themistius Arabus (abridgment)

Themistius Hebraicus

‫האל נימוס והיקש וסבת יושר‬

‫الناموس هو الل ّٰه قال وأنه السبب لنظام‬ a‫الأشياء الموجودة ولترتيبها‬

‫الل ّٰه ناموس وسبب نظام الأشياء‬ ‫الموجودة وترتيبها‬

(12‫הדברים הנמצאים וסדרם )כא‬

‫قال وأنه ناموس حي‬

‫وهو ناموس حي‬

(13‫אבל הוא נימוס חי )כא‬

a Reading ‫ ولترتيبها‬for ‫والتر بيتها‬.

27 28 29 30 31 32

Frank, “Notes.” (Pseudo-)Al-ʿĀmirī, Kitāb al-Saʿāda. Wakelnig, Philosophy Reader, 41–42. Ghorab, “Greek Commentators,” 82–83. Brague’s report takes after Ghorab (Brague, Thémistius, 26). Wakelnig, Philosophy Reader, 353n2. In the following tables, all quotations from the Arabic text of Themistius are based on the text of the present edition, in which the Hebrew and Arabic face each other and the pagination and line division correspond exactly to Landauer’s edition. Therefore, wherever the Arabic is extent, the cited page/line number in Hebrew has its Arabic counterpart directly facing it in the edition.

34

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Table 2

Themistius’ paraphrase in pseudo-Al-ʿĀmirī’s al-Saʿāda wa-l-Isʿād (cont.)

Pseudo-Al-ʿĀmirī, al-Saʿāda wa-l-Isʿād (182, 12–18)

Themistius Arabus (abridgment)

Themistius Hebraicus

‫ואולם במקום אשר יהיה הנימוס‬ ‫ומניחו חיי חיים תמידיים הנה‬ ‫ההדרכה גם כן תמידית ההשארות‬

‫وحياته أفضل حياة وهو حياة دائمة‬

‫وحياة هذا الناموس ليس هى حياة‬ ‫دائمة لا أول لها ولا انقضاء فقط لـكن‬ ‫على غاية الفضيلة وذلك أن أفضل‬ ‫الحياة العقل‬

‫וחיי זה המניח לנימוסים אינם חיים‬ ‫תמידיים אין התחלה להם ולא‬ ‫תכלית לבד אבל על תכלית המעלה‬ ‫וזה כי היותר נעלה מן החיים השכל‬

(21–18‫)כא‬ ‫ وناموس‬b‫وفي حرف اللام الل ّٰه قدرة‬ ‫ وأنه حق‬c‫وسبب لنظام العالم وترتيبه‬ ‫وأنه عقل‬

‫وهو عقل وحق‬

(25‫זה העולם וסדרו ושכל ואמת )יז‬

‫وأنه الخـير على الحقيقة‬

‫فهو إذن على الحقيقة الخـير‬

‫הנה הוא אם כן לפי האמת הטוב‬

‫האל ית׳ יכולת ונימוס וסבה ליושר‬

(30‫)טז‬ ‫قال وهو مبدأ والـكمال فإن الناموس هو‬ ‫المحرك للسياسات والمحركون بالسياسة‬ ‫إلى الناموس يتحركون‬

‫هو مبدأ وكمال بذاته‬

‫הוא התחלה ושלמות בעצמותו‬ ‫וכמו כן נמצא הענין בנימוס וזה כי‬ ‫הנימוס ג״כ יניע ההדרכה וממנו‬

(18–17‫תהיה )יז‬ b Reading ‫ قدرة‬for ‫قدوة‬. c Reading ‫ وترتيبه‬for ‫وتر بيته‬.

As can be seen from the text, the fragment is based on parts of the paraphrase, all of which deal with the identification between God and the Law—one of Themistius’ distinctive themes in his paraphrase—which serves to explain how God is the origin of the cosmological order. It is clear that pseudo-al-ʿĀmirī’s fragment is not based on the abridgment, as the former contains text absent from the latter. It is difficult to tell whether the reworking of Themistius’ passages in the present fragment was done by the compiler on the basis of direct access to the full translation, or whether he is drawing upon an intermediate source. Pseudo-al-ʿĀmirī’s fragments are not helpful in establishing Themistius’

35

the textual tradition

text (it is rather the other way around, given the scribal errors in pseudo-alʿĀmirī), but it does reflect an interest in Themistius’ idea of God as the Law of the cosmos, an interest shared by the next fragment. 2.2.3 Anonymous Eleventh Century Philosophy Reader (MS Marsh 539) Elvira Wakelnig has recently edited and translated MS Marsh 539 from the Bodleian Library in Oxford.33 According to Wakelnig, “the text is a compilation of philosophical material taken from various Greek and Arabic authorities quoted either by name or anonymously … The subjects dealt with are metaphysics, psychology, natural sciences in the guise of physiology, ethics and politics, in other words most of the late antique branches of philosophy.”34 Among the texts quoted in the compilation is Themistius’ paraphrase, in the part dedicated to God.35 I present the quotation alongside the parallel passages in the Arabic abridgment and the Hebrew version: table 3

Themistius’ paraphrase in MS Marsh 539

MS Marsh 539 Wakelnig §17 (pp. 74–76) ‫وقال ثامسطيوس‬ ‫إن الل ّٰه تعالى هو علة نظام العالم وترتيبه‬ ‫وحق أول في الغاية القصوى‬

Themistius Arabus (abridgment)

Themistius Hebraicus

‫האל ית׳ יכולת ונימוס וסבה ליושר‬

‫وهو عقل وحق أول فى الغاية‬

‫זה העולם וסדרו ושכל ואמת ראשון‬

(26–25‫בתכלית האחרון )יז‬ ‫وهو المبدأ الأول وأنه يعلم ذاته وجميع‬ ‫الل ّٰه هو المبدأ الأول وأنه يعلم ذاته‬ ‫وجميع الأشياء التى هو لها مبدأ معا ًوأنه الأشياء التى هو لها مبدأ معا ًوأنه مالك‬ ‫لذاته ومالك لجميع الأشياء التى قوامها به‬ ‫إذا كان مالكا ًلذاته فهو أيضا ًمالك‬ ‫والقول أيضا بً أنه يرى و يعقل ذاته قول‬ ‫لجميع الأشياء التى قوامها به‬ ‫صواب‬

‫האל הוא ההתחלה הראשונה‬ ‫ושהוא ידע עצמותו וכל הדברים‬ ‫אשר הוא להם התחלה יחד ושהוא‬ ‫אם היה מולך בעצמותו הנה הוא‬ ‫אם כן מולך בכל הדברים אשר‬ ‫עמידתם בו והמאמר גם כן בשהוא‬ ‫חזק וישכיל עצמותו מאמר אמתי‬

(26–23‫)כט‬

33 34 35

Wakelnig, Philosophy Reader. Wakelnig, 1–2. See the analysis of the contents of the compilation in Wakelnig, 10–17.

36

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The present quotation has a providential undertone and focuses on how God’s governance (or kingship) of the cosmos proceeds from His characterization as the cause of the world’s order and its first truth and His knowledge of all things. Wakelnig has already analyzed it thoroughly in her edition of the Marsh 539 manuscript,36 and the following remarks serve as a supplement to her discussion. As Wakelnig points out, there is some affinity between the present quotation and the fragment in pseudo-al-ʿĀmirī concerning its first part. However, the present quotations in Marsh 539 are considerably more accurate. The first part of the quotation is taken from a part of the translation that was heavily abridged in the abridgment, and the second part contains text that is omitted from the abridgment, so it is apparent that it is not based on it. The last sentence, as Wakelnig remarks, shows that the Hebrew translation ‫ חזק‬is a mistranslation of ‫ يرى‬, probably misread as ‫قوى‬.37 This is corroborated by a parallel occurrence of this expression in ‫כא‬14 (‫)ידע בעצמותו וישכיל בעצמותו‬, of which we possess the Arabic (‫)يرى ذاته و يعقل ذاته‬,38 and is therefore reflected in the critical apparatus. I am somewhat hesitant concerning Wakelnig’s claim that the present passage was “censored” by the compiler. She claims that the compiler selects a quotation which “is devoid of any indication of Aristotle’s and Themistius’ identification of the intellect with the first cause” and also “does not refer to Themistius’ peculiar doctrine according to which the intellect, as the first cause, not only knows itself—as in Aristotle—but also knows all intelligibles, because they are in it.”39 But while the quotation indeed omits the word “intellect” in the beginning of the passage, its ending is quite explicit about God’s self-intelligizing, which would imply that God is either an intellect or has an intellect. As for the remark about the omission of intelligizing of intelligibles, it also seems inexact to me, since the text in the quotation says that God knows all the things to which He is a principle “together” (ً ‫معا‬/‫)יחד‬, and this departure from Aristotle’s “official” position comes very close to the statement Wakelnig claims that the compiler omits. But even if the latter part of the argument is valid, that would still not be sufficient support for the censorship claim; there are many novel ideas in Themistius’ paraphrase that depart from Aristotle’s text and are obviously not included in the present, brief quotation. Should all of them be taken to be censored? This could also be simply a matter of what is 36 37 38 39

Wakelnig, 353–354. Wakelnig, 353n33. For a different problem of incompatibility between the Arabic and Hebrew here see the notes for ‫כא‬14 in the Commentary. Wakelnig, Philosophy Reader, 353.

37

the textual tradition

expected to be gained from the text. The technical question of the location of the intelligible is not the focus of the quotation, which is more concerned with the governing aspect of God that Themistius adds to Aristotle’s discussion. As I show throughout the Commentary, this aspect is central for Themistius. 2.2.4 Avicenna, Šarḥ Kitāb Ḥarf al-Lām Avicenna’s fragments are taken from his Šarḥ kitāb Ḥarf al-Lām, a commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12, chapters 6–10, which was part of his Kitāb al-Inṣāf. Janssens, in his study of this work, maintains that it was influenced by Themistius, and gives a few examples of Avicenna’s tackling of ideas in Themistius’ paraphrase.40 table 4

Themistius’ paraphrase in Avicenna’s Šarḥ Kitāb Ḥarf al-Lām

Avicenna, Šarḥ Kitāb Ḥarf al-Lāma

Themistius Arabus (abridgment)

‫فالعقل الأول يعقل العالم وذلك أنه إن المبدأ الأول يعقل ذاته ثم من ذاته‬ ‫تكثر إذا عقل ذاته عقل أنه ما هو فقد يعقل كل شىء فهو يعقل العالم العقلي‬ (24–23 ,26) ‫تعقل من ذاته أنه علة جميع الأشياء‬ ‫ومبدؤها‬

Themistius Hebraicus

‫כי השכל הראשון ישכיל העולם‬ ‫השכלי וזה שהוא אם היה כאשר‬ ‫השכיל עצמותו השכיל שהוא מה‬ ‫שהוא הנה כבר השכיל מעצמותו‬

–10‫סבת כל הדברים והתחלתם )ל‬ (12 ‫لـكنهكما أن محبة الإنسان لنفسه لا شبع فأنه يقول إنه إنما لا يتعب لأنه يعقل‬ ‫ذاتهكما أن الشىء لا يتعب من أن يحب‬ ‫فيهكذلك عقله لذاته لا شبع منه‬ (6–4 ,31) ‫ذاته‬

‫אבל כמו שאהבת אדם לנפשו לא‬ ‫תמנע גם כן השכילו לעצמו לא‬

(16–15‫ייגעהו ולא ימנע ממנו )כח‬

a I verified Badawī’s reading against MS Ḥikma 6.

Although both fragments in Avicenna are paraphrases rather than direct quotations of Themistius’ text, it is likely that Avicenna used the complete translation rather than the abridgment. In the first fragment, Avicenna uses the term ‫العالم‬ ‫العقلى‬, reflected in the Hebrew (‫)העולם השכלי‬, whereas the abridgment omits ‫العقلى‬. In the second fragment, Avicenna uses the verb ‫يتعب‬, whereas the abridgment uses the verb ‫شبع‬. The full version, reflected in the Hebrew, has both: ‫תמנע‬

40

Janssens, “Avicenne,” esp. 406; 411n49; 414–415.

38

chapter 1

for ‫ يتعب‬and ‫ יגע‬for ‫شبع‬. Avicenna, paraphrasing the text, adhered to the first, while the abridgment preferred the second verb. 2.2.5 Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-Niḥal (1) Two quotations from Themistius’ paraphrase have been identified in the Persian polymath Šahrastānī’s (1086–1153) Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-Niḥal (Book of Religions and Sects). One quotation is more of a paraphrase, and the other one is the only testimony we possess of a direct quotation from the abridgment of the Arabic translation. I quote and discuss the first fragment here.41 The present fragment is part of Šahrastānī’s general description of Themistius and his thought in the chapter devoted to him in the Kitāb al-Milal wa-lNiḥal, which includes brief remarks on several of his doctrines, most of which are difficult to distinguish from Aristotle’s.42 table 5

Themistius’ paraphrase in Šahrastānī’s Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-Niḥal

Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-Niḥal

Themistius Arabus (in Averroes, Tafsīr Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa)

‫قال ثامسطيوس قال أرسطوطاليس فى مقالة اللام إن‬ ‫الطبيعة تفعل ما تفعل من الحكمة والصواب وأن لم يكن‬ (4–2 ,344) ‫حيوانا ًإلا أنها ألهمت من سبب هو أكرم منها‬

‫إذ ]الطبيعة[ كانت لا تدرى ولا تفكر فى فعل ما تفعل وهذا‬ ‫مما يدلك على أنها قد ألهمت إلهاما تً لك النسب من سبب هو‬ (4–2 ,1494) ‫أكرم منها‬

Although Šahrastānī’s fragment is based on the Arabic translation of Themistius—of which this part is also quoted in Averroes—it is more of a paraphrase that reflects a distortion or misunderstanding of what Themistius is trying to say,43 and therefore unhelpful as control for the Arabic text. Šahrastānī’s misunderstanding is apparent with regards to nature, as well as with regards to the function of inspiration (‫)إلهام‬. Themistius’ point about nature is that its teleological activity is unconscious, while Šahrastānī ascribes to it activity according to wisdom and truth, leaving out the unconscious part. As regards the function of inspiration, Šahrastānī has Themistius say that no animal can exist unless it is inspired by a higher cause, whereas the object of inspiration is not the ani41 42 43

For the other fragment see below, tables 27 and 28. See Jolivet & Monnot’s notes to this chapter, Shahrastani, 349–351. For the context and an elaborate discussion see below, Commentary on chapter 3, section 2, appendix.

the textual tradition

39

mal but the logos (‫ ;نسبة‬the formative principle in nature).44 This manner of presentation of Themistius does not seem to result from direct access to the text.45 Since the other quotation in Šahrastānī is based on the Arabic abridgment, from which he is doubtlessly quoting directly, I believe that the present quotation—not part of the abridgment or of what was abridged—is based on second hand testimony rather than on the examination of the full Arabic translation of Themistius’ text; it does not reflect a different textual tradition which should be taken into account in the present edition. 2.2.6 Averroes, Tafsīr Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa Averroes quotes from the complete Arabic translation of Themistius’ paraphrase at length three times in his long commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Tafsīr Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa), and discusses Themistius’ views, usually critically, on several occasions. The first quotation overlaps with the surviving fragment from the complete Arabic translation which was published by Badawī, with no significant differences.46 The second quotation is taken from a part of the complete Arabic translation that otherwise has not come down to us.47 The third quotation is the only instance where we have an overlap between the complete and abridged versions.48 These quotations are included in their entirety in the present edition, and their fourteenth century Hebrew translations, which help with textual problems in Averroes, are quoted and discussed in Appendix B. Besides relying on Bouyges’ masterful edition of the Tafsīr, I consulted a digital copy of the Arabic manuscript (Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek, Or. 2074). 2.2.7 ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī, Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī, philosopher and polymath (1162–1231),49 wrote his Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa (Book on the Science of Metaphysics)50 as an alternative to the philosophy of Avicenna and his tradition, which al-Baġdādī

44 45 46 47 48 49

50

See previous note. Jolivet & Monnot remark (Shahrastani, 351n15) that it also differs from Avicenna’s vocabulary in Kitāb al-Inṣāf. Averroes, Tafsīr, 1410,4–15, corresponding to ‫א‬5–13 in the Hebrew/Arabic edition. Averroes, 1492,3–1494,14, corresponding to ‫ז‬27–‫ח‬27 in the Hebrew version. Averroes, 1635,4–1636,13, corresponding to ‫כב‬11–29 in the Hebrew version and overlapping the abridgment at ‫כב‬12–15. For a detailed study of his life see Martini Bonadeo, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, 107–208. The importance of Martini Bonadeo’s book for the study of Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa cannot be overemphasized. For a description of the surviving manuscripts see Martini Bonadeo, 211–216.

40

chapter 1

thought had strayed away from the “real” Aristotelian path.51 This work, an abridgment of an earlier lengthy book52 and probably modeled according to al-Fārābī’s philosophical program (as al-Baġdādī understood it),53 is composed of three divisions: beings and their attributes (chapters 1–4); principles of definition and demonstration (chapters 5–12); and the hierarchy of intelligible existents up to and including God (chapters 13–24).54 The first part of the final section, namely chapter 13, entitled Fī mā Tataḍammanuhu Maqālat alLām, is a paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12, and it makes heavy use of Themistius’ paraphrase.55 It has been edited together with a few other chapters from Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa by Angelika Neuwirth in 1976, and upon her edition56—along with important textual variants supplied by Gutas in his review article of Neuwirth’s study57—the present analysis relies. Neuwirth writes that al-Baġdādī used Themistius’ paraphrase occasionally for chapters 1–5 and extensively for chapters 6–9 (for chapters 1–6 he relied mainly on Alexander, whose commentary—or rather collection of glosses— she maintains did very likely not go beyond chapter 6). Her contention that it is “very likely” that her author used the unabridged version of Themistius (the same used by Moshe ibn Tibbon) is corroborated by the analysis below, and his treatment—although I would not go so far as to say is a “second abridgment” of Themistius’ text—is helpful in emending some passages of which we have Arabic, as well as some of which only the Hebrew survives.58 I will now analyze al-Baġdādī’s use of Themistius’ paraphrase and then explain how it is incorporated in the new edition of Themistius’ text. First, it is important to notice that there is a fundamental difference between al-Baġdādī’s use of Themistius at chapters 1–5 and at chapters 6–10. The paucity of material from Themistius used in al-Baġdādī’s treatment of chapters 1–5

51 52 53 54 55 56 57

58

See Gutas, “Editing,” 215–216. Janos, Review, 277–278, stresses that although critical of Avicenna, al-Baġdādī owes him quite a bit philosophically. Martini Bonadeo, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, 214. Martini Bonadeo, 269–275. Martini Bonadeo, 275; for a discussion of the work’s structure and the sources upon which each section relies see 275–305. For an overview of al-Baġdādī’s thematic employment of Themistius see Martini Bonadeo, 231–233 (see also 219–220 for Themistius in general). Neuwirth, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf. Gutas, “Editing,” 220–222. In general, Gutas’ variants in his review should be consulted when working with Neuwirth’s edition. Genequand, Review, also makes an important point about Neuwirth’s tendency to attribute Neoplatonic influences to doctrines wellrooted in the Aristotelian tradition. Neuwirth, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, 172–175.

41

the textual tradition

(only four passages), and the fact that the passages are very different from Themistius’ text we possess—differences that are well-beyond questions of scribal transmission—suggest that they are part of a source used by al-Baġdādī that integrated material from Themistius in a highly paraphrased fashion. The idea that al-Baġdādī did not know that Themistius is the ultimate source behind these passages should not be discarded. In any case, these passages do not contribute to the establishment of the text. I will now quote them and offer a few notes. table 6

Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd alṬabīʿa (1)

ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī (7,11)

Themistius Hebraicus (‫ד‬24–25)

‫ויציאת מה שהוא סקראט בכח אל מה שהוא סקראט בפועל כי ومن الإنسان بالقوة التى بالنطفة إلى الإنسان بالفعل‬ ‫הזרע אשר היה ממנו סקראט כבר היה בכח סקראט‬

Note: the present allusion is highly paraphrastic. Besides abridging Themistius’ text, it also replaces Socrates with “man.” It is worth noting that the word ‫نطفة‬ (“sperm”) is different from the word used to translate σπέρμα in the Arabic text we have, which is ‫( منى‬see ‫ח‬2; ‫ח‬4). table 7

Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd alṬabīʿa (2)

ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī (9,9–11)

Themistius Hebraicus (‫ז‬29–30)

‫وما يتكون من العفونة فمن حرارة‬ ‫ملائمة مثل تكون الزنابير من‬ ‫لحوم الخيل والنحل من لحوم‬ ‫البقر‬

‫הנה נראה סוג מן הצרעה יתילד מן גופות‬ ‫הסוסים המתות ונראה הדבורים יתילדו‬ ‫מגופות השוורים המתים ונראה הצפרדע‬ ‫יתילד מן העפוש‬

Themistius Arabus (Averroes, Tafsīr, 1492, 5–6) ‫فإنا قد نرى جنسا ًمن الزنابير يتولد من‬ ‫أبدان الخيل الميتة ونرى النحل ٺتولد‬ ‫من أبدان البقر الميتة ونرى الضفادع‬ ‫ٺتولد من العفن‬

Note: this again is a highly condensed and paraphrased text, which is also different from what we have in Themistius. ‫ لحوم‬replaces ‫أبدان‬, and the example of “appropriate heat” (‫ )حرارة ملائمة‬is not part of Themistius’ text, but perhaps alludes to ‫عنصر ملائم‬, a few lines later (‫ח‬7).

‫‪42‬‬

‫‪chapter 1‬‬ ‫‪Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al‬‬‫)‪Ṭabīʿa (3‬‬

‫‪table 8‬‬

‫)‪12–14; 30–31‬ו( ‪ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī (11,4–5) Themistius Hebraicus‬‬ ‫ולך שתחלק העצם המוחש המקבל ההפסד אל שלשה עצמים אחד כמו‬ ‫היסוד ר״ל הגשם המקבל הצורה והאחד כמו הצורה והשלישי המורכב‬ ‫משניהם… והיותר קודם מכל העצמים להיות הדבר הרמוז אליו בנפשו‬

‫والجواهر ثلاثة المادة ولصورة والمركب‬ ‫منهما وهو أحق بالجوهر لأنه قائم بنفسه‬ ‫تام‬

‫העצם המורכב‬

‫‪Note: here there are both paraphrase and difference of terminology. For al‬‬‫قائم بنفسه تام ‪,59 and the expression‬العنصر ‪, the Arabic definitely had‬المادة ‪Baġdādī’s‬‬ ‫‪(= τόδε τι) is most likely different from the expression which was translated into‬‬ ‫‪15). Also, al‬ו ‪; see below, Commentary at‬مشار إليه بنفسه ‪ (probably‬רמוז אליו בנפשו‬‫والأولى ‪, which probably translated‬והיותר קודם ’‪ for Themistius‬أحق ‪Baġdādī has‬‬ ‫‪5 for a similar problem).‬א ‪ (see Commentary at‬والأقدم ‪or‬‬ ‫‪Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al‬‬‫)‪Ṭabīʿa (4‬‬

‫‪Themistius Arabus‬‬

‫فلا بد من أن تكون إنساب وصور‬ ‫قد جعلت فى الطبيعة عليها تعمل‬ ‫ما تعمل من ذلك أن الإنسان وإن‬ ‫كان إنما يتولد عن إنسان فإن الأب‬ ‫ليس له صنع فى تركيبه… وإنما يصير‬ ‫بهذه الحال لما قد جعل فى طبيعة‬ ‫كل واحد من الجواهر من النسب‬ ‫والصور… والجسم ليس له عمل فى‬ ‫الجسم إلا فى نهايته فقط فأما الطبيعة‬ ‫فتعمل في جثة الجسم بأسره وليس‬

‫)‪10–18‬ח( ‪Themistius Hebraicus‬‬

‫‪table 9‬‬

‫‪ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī‬‬ ‫)‪(15,2–6‬‬

‫ولا بد من نسب وصور مركبة‬ ‫ואי אפשר מבלתי שיהיו יחסים וצורות‬ ‫مركوزة فى جبلة الطبيعة عليها‬ ‫כבר הושמו בטבע עליהם יעשה‬ ‫يعمل ما يعمل فإن الأب يعمل‬ ‫מה שיעשה מזה כי האדם ואם היה‬ ‫مثله لا بإرادة بل بما جعل الل ّٰه‬ ‫מתילד מאדם הנה האב אין לו אומנות‬ ‫בהרכבתו… ואמנם יהיה בזה הענין בעבור سبحانه فى طبيعته من النسبة‬ ‫والكلمة الفاعلة والجسم ليس له‬ ‫שכבר הושם בטבע כל אחד מן העצמים‬ ‫מן היחס והצורות… והגשם אין לו מעשה عمل فى الجسم إلا فى سطحه‬ ‫فقط وأما الطبيعة فتغوز إلى‬ ‫בגשם אלא בתכליתו לבד ואולם הטבע‬ ‫הנה יעשה בגוף הגשם בכללו ואינו בפלא باطنه وتصوره إلهاما ًمن غير‬ ‫راية ولا فكرة‬ ‫שיהיה הטבע והוא לא יבין מוליך מה‬

‫‪See Appendix C for a general discussion of these terms.‬‬

‫‪59‬‬

43

the textual tradition Table 9

Themistius’ paraphrase in Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa (4) (cont.)

ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī (15,2–6)

Themistius Hebraicus (‫ח‬10–18)

Themistius Arabus

‫שיעשהו אל הכונה המכוונת אליה כי היה‬

‫بعجب أن تكون الطبيعة وهى لا تفهم‬ ‫سواقة ما تعمله إلى الغرض المقصود إليه בלתי חושב ומשכיל בפועל מה שיעשה‬ ‫וזה ממה שיורה אותך על שהם כבר‬ ‫إذ كانت لا تدرى ولا تفكر فى فعل ما‬ ‫تفعل وهذا مما يدلك على أنها قد ألهمت התפעמו התפעמות אותם היחסים‬ ‫الهاما تً لك النسب‬

Note: this quotation is far removed from Themistius’ original text.60 Not only is it a paraphrase with different terminology, it also has a monotheistic undertone, ascribing the instilling of the activity of the logoi in nature to God and His “Active Word.”61 Moving to al-Baġdādī’s treatment of chapters 6–10 of Metaphysics 12, it is obvious that he makes extensive use of the full version of Themistius’ paraphrase, amounting to what Neuwirth takes to be a “second abridgment” of the text. The fragments from this part are closer to the text that we have, and this strengthens the assumption that the quotations from chapters 1–5 derive from an indirect source. It is possible that al-Baġdādī only used Themistius’ paraphrase directly from chapter 6 onwards as a substitute to Alexander’s commentary. If this is the case, then either al-Baġdādī had the complete paraphrase and only used it directly from chapter 6 onwards, or that this part of the paraphrase circulated as an independent unit.62 Analyzing all of al-Baġdādī’s allusions and quotations from Themistius’ text would be tantamount to quoting nearly his entire discussion of books 6–9, which is already available in Neuwirth’s edition.63 Instead, I discuss a few examples that exhibit the main features of his text and then explain how I benefit from them in the present edition.

60 61 62

63

See the discussion in Neuwirth, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, 130–132. Neuwirth (ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, 131, §30) suggests parallels in the Plotiniana Arabica. The same holds for Avicenna’s Lambda portion of Kitāb al-Inṣāf, which also covers only chapters 6–10 of Metaphysics 12 and refers directly to Themistius’ paraphrase. See Janssens, “Avicenne.” See Neuwirth’s list at ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, 195.

‫‪44‬‬

‫‪chapter 1‬‬ ‫‪Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al‬‬‫)‪Ṭabīʿa (5‬‬

‫‪Themistius Arabus‬‬

‫يعقل جميع الموجودات لا على أنها‬ ‫خارجة عن طبيعته أو أفعال غريبة له‬

‫‪Themistius Hebraicus‬‬ ‫)‪10–11‬כא(‬

‫‪table 10‬‬

‫‪ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī‬‬ ‫)‪(43,1–2‬‬

‫ישכיל כל הנמצאות לא על דרך שהם و يعقل الموجودات لا على أنها خارجة‬ ‫عنها أو أنها أفعال غريبة منه‬ ‫חוץ מטבעו או פעולות נכריות לו‬

‫‪Note: here we encounter a quotation from Themistius’ paraphrase which is‬‬ ‫‪nearly identical to the Arabic text we possess (and which the Hebrew mirrors),‬‬ ‫‪).‬طبيعته ‪ and‬جميع ‪except for minor abridgments (e.g., omitting‬‬ ‫‪Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al‬‬‫)‪Ṭabīʿa (6‬‬

‫‪Themistius Arabus‬‬ ‫)‪(abridgment‬‬ ‫فنطلب هل يمكن أن يكون‬ ‫جوهر لا يبليه الزمان ولم يقبل‬ ‫الاستحالات والتغايير لـكن يبقى‬ ‫على حاله الدهر كله‬ ‫وليس يمكن أن يقام على هذا‬ ‫المبدأ برهان فإن البرهان لا يكون‬ ‫إلا من علل ومبادئ والعلة الأولى‬ ‫التى هى المبدأ الأول لا توجد لها‬ ‫علة قبلها‬

‫‪Themistius Hebraicus‬‬ ‫)‪22–26; 27–29; 31–33‬יא(‬ ‫והנה נחקור מעתה ונבקש אם אפשר‬ ‫שיהיה עצם לא יבלהו הזמן ולא יקבל השנוי‬ ‫וההשתנות אבל ישאר על ענינו החלד כלו‬ ‫וכבר אמרנו פעמים רבות שהוא בלתי אפשר‬ ‫שיעמוד על ההתחלה הזאת מופת כי המופת‬ ‫לא יהיה כי אם מסבות והתחלות והסבה‬

‫‪table 11‬‬

‫‪ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī‬‬ ‫)‪(21,3–7‬‬ ‫فنطلب هل يمكن أن يكون‬ ‫جوهر لا يبليه الزمان ولا يقبل‬ ‫الاستحالات والتغايير‬ ‫وما هو بهذه الصفة فلا يمكن أن‬ ‫يقام عليه برهان إذ لا علل له ولا‬ ‫مبادئ‬

‫הראשונה כלומר ההתחלה הראשונה אי‬ ‫אפשר שתמצא לה סבה לפניה ולא התחלה‬ ‫…מפני שאנחנו סוברים בהתחלה הראשונה‬ ‫לכל הדברים הנמצאים שהוא מן הראוי‬ ‫שימצאו בה שני ענינים אחד מהם שתהיה‬ ‫נצחית והאחר שתהיה בלתי מתנועעת הנה‬

‫لـكن لما كان هذا المطلوب أزليا ً‬ ‫وغير متحرك وجب أن نفرد كل‬ ‫واحد من هذين المعنيين على حالة‬ ‫ونبحث عنه مفردا ً‬

‫ראוי שנפריד כל אחד משני אלו הענינים‬

‫ונחקור עליו ביחוד…‬ ‫כי חקירתנו תהיה על דרך מי שכיון לשאת‬ ‫דבר כבד ולא יוכל שאתו וחלקהו והיה לו כח‬ ‫לשאת אותו וכן יקל מאתנו כובד החקירה‬ ‫אם הלכנו הדרך הזאת‬

‫فنكون بمنزلة من عجز عن حمل‬ ‫ثقيل فقسمه فسمين فسهل عليه‬ ‫حمله‬

45

the textual tradition

Note: in this passage it is apparent that al-Baġdādī has different editorial considerations than the Arabic abridger when deciding which parts of Themistius’ text to use. Whereas the abridger tends to stick to the essentials and systematize Themistius, al-Baġdādī has no problem with retaining Themistius’ similes and methodological discussion. Passages like these also exhibit beyond any doubt that al-Baġdādī had access to the complete translation (at least of chapters 6– 10). Herein lies al-Baġdādī’s main value for the establishment of the text, as he occasionally provides missing Arabic. table 12

Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd alṬabīʿa (7)

ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī (25,5–6)

Themistius Hebraicus (‫יג‬22–24)

‫والمحرك لهذه الحركة الدور ية‬ ‫ויתחייב מזה שיהיה מניע זאת התנועה נצחי‬ ‫וזה כי הוא בלתי אפשר שיהיה דבר שאינו נצחי أحق بالأزلية لأنه سببها والسبب‬ ‫أشرف مما هو سبب له‬ ‫סבה לתנועה נצחית כי לא ימצא משום דבר‬ ‫יותר פחות יהיה סבה למה שהוא יותר נכבד‬

Themistius Arabus (abridgment) ‫فيجب أن يكون محرك هذه‬ ‫الحركة أزليا ًلأن علة الأزلية‬ ‫يجب أن تكون أزلية إذ لا يكون‬ ‫ما هو أخس علة لما هو أفضل‬

Note: the present example shows that al-Baġdādī’s text should be used cautiously, as his manner of abridgment—similar to the case of the anonymous Arabic abridger (see table 21 below for this passage)—can sometimes alter Themistius’ argument. Here, Themistius explains that it is impossible for something finite to be the cause of something infinite, because it is never the case that an inferior thing will be a cause for a superior thing. Al-Baġdādī changes the argument, arguing that the mover of the circular motion is more worthy of eternity than the latter because it is its cause, and the cause is superior to its effect. This is misrepresenting Themistius, whose argument was premised on the difference between the eternal and the finite and was meant to show that the mover cannot be finite, not to compare between an infinite cause and an infinite effect.

46 table 13

chapter 1 Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd alṬabīʿa (8)

Themistius Hebraicus (‫ל‬21–23; 25–26)

ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī (57,8–9; 10–11) ‫[ كذلك أيضا الل ّٰه سبحانه إنما يحرك‬2] ‫الموجودات كما يحرك سائس المدينة‬ ‫[ والخـير فى العسكر‬1] …‫الأفاضل من الناس‬ ‫هو الترتيب والنظام الذى استفاده من الملك‬

‫[ כי הטוב גם כן בחיל הוא הסדר‬1] ‫והאל הסדר לכלם בדרך החיל‬ ‫והיושר וכל אחד מהכתות גם כן טוב ויותר מזה זה האיש כי האחד‬

…‫הנרמז אין הויתו בסבת היושר והסדר אבל היושר והסדר בסבתו‬ ‫[ והאל יניע הדברים הנמצאים כמו שיניע מה שתצוה בו הנהגת‬2] ‫המדינות לבעלי המעלה מן האנשים‬

Note: this example is the only known piece of evidence for an Arabic author’s access to Themistius’ paraphrase of chapter 10 of Metaphysics 12. Although al-Baġdādī changes the order of presentation and makes some changes to Themistius’ argument, he still offers valuable terminology, and perhaps its greatest importance stems from its very existence. As can be seen from the previous examples, much can be benefitted from al-Baġdādī’s text if used carefully (see the important part he plays, e.g., at ‫יא‬28, ‫יא‬29, ‫ל‬4, ‫יד‬19, and ‫יד‬31). Accordingly, I rely on it in different ways in the present edition. Sometimes al-Baġdādī is given in the body of the text, sometimes he is relegated to the critical apparatus to justify (or dispute) a certain reading, sometimes I am content with including him in the lexicon (marked by a subscript ġ), sometimes I only discuss his contribution in the Commentary, and sometimes—when there is sufficient data without him or when his use of Themistius is too far removed from the original—I disregard him completely. To end this part I provide three examples for employment of al-Baġdādī’s text in the present edition. table 14

Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd alṬabīʿa (9)

ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī (27,4–5) ‫فإن ما بالقوة طبيعة ضعيفة تستكمل بغيرها‬

Themistius Hebraicus (‫יד‬3–4)

‫כי מה שהוא בכח אמנם הוא טבע חלוש בלתי שלם בעצמותו ואולם‬ ‫יקרה לו השלמות כאשר יהיה בפועל‬

47

the textual tradition

In the first example, al-Baġdādī’s reliance on Themistius’ text is clear, but his contribution is too short and too paraphrastic to be included in the body of the Arabic text. However, the string ‫ بالقوة طبيعة ضعيفة‬is valuable terminology and therefore each of its terms has been included in the lexicon. table 15

Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd alṬabīʿa (10)

ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī (55,12) ‫وذلك أن العقل الأول إذا عقل‬ ‫ذاته عقل أنه علة جميع الأشياء‬ ‫ومبدأ لها‬

Themistius Hebraicus (‫ל‬11–12)

Themistius Arabus (abridgment)

‫וזה שהוא אם היה כאשר השכיל עצמותו‬

‫وذلك أنه إن تكثر إذا عقل ذاته‬ ‫عقل أنه ما هو فقد يعقل من ذاته השכיל שהוא מה שהוא הנה כבר השכיל‬ ‫מעצמותו סבת כל הדברים והתחלתם‬ ‫أنه علة جميع الأشياء ومبدؤها‬

In the second example, since we already possess the Arabic in the abridgment, there is no need for the inclusion of al-Baġdādī’s text in the edition. However, his quotation is valuable for two reasons: first, it strengthens the assumption that ‫ إن تكثر‬in the Arabic abridgment is a gloss; and second, it reinforces the preference of adopting the Arabic ‫ فقد يعقل من ذاته أنه علة جميع الأشياء‬over the Hebrew ‫הנה כבר השכיל מעצמותו סבת כל הדברים‬, a difference that has bearings on the way Themistius’ concept of God’s self-intelligizing should be understood (see Commentary ad loc.). table 16

Themistius’ paraphrase in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd alṬabīʿa (11)

ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī (29,4–7)

Themistius Hebraicus (‫יד‬28–‫טו‬1)

‫[ و بلغ من قوة الحق أن جميع من جعل‬1] ‫[ וכפי זה נמצא יגיע מכח האמת כי כל מי ששם ההיולי יותר‬1] ‫الهيولى أقدم مضطرون إلى الإقرار بالعلة التى هى‬ ‫קודם מן הנמצאות כלם יצטרכו להודות בסבה אשר היא בפועל‬ ‫[ مثل من خلط‬2] ‫[ אולם לוקוש בערבו בחלקים אשר לא יתחלקו بالفعل وإن لم يصرحوا بذلك‬2] ‫ואם לא ירצו זה‬ ‫[ ومثل من‬4] ‫بالأجزاء التى لا تتجزأ حركة دائمة‬ ‫[ ואולם אפלטון בהעמידו קודם ענין האל ית׳‬3] ‫תנועה תמידית‬ ‫[ وحركات‬3] ‫[ أو العقل‬5] ‫[ فرض المحبة والغلبة‬5] ‫[ ואולם אנדקליס בתארו האהבה והנצחון‬4] ‫תנועה מבולבלת‬ ‫مضطر بة‬ ‫ואולם אנכסגוריש במאמרו בשכל‬

48

chapter 1

Finally, there are cases where although al-Baġdādī makes changes in the arrangement and wording of the text, his employment of Themistius’ text is nevertheless valuable enough to be included in the body of the edition, as in the above example. Although al-Baġdādī omits the names of the thinkers whom Themistius mentions, and although he changes the order (see numbering), his allusion is rich in technical terminology and also shows receptiveness to polemic passages that the Arabic abridgment tends to avoid. However, since al-Baġdādī’s style of allusion and abridgment is much freer than the Arabic abridger, who is very close to the original text, whenever al-Baġdādī is used in the body of the edition, the text is printed in red to underscore al-Baġdādī’s distance from the text he is using. 2.2.8 Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāǧ al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya Geoffroy reported that a long quotation from the paraphrase of chapter 4 of the complete Arabic version was located in the famous theologian ibn Taymiyya’s (1263–1328) work Minhāǧ al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya, ascribing the finding to M. Taïeb Farhat.64 While unable to access Farhat’s study, I managed to find this lengthy quotation—attributed to Aristotle and without mention of Themistius’ name—not only of the ending of the paraphrase of chapter 4, but also more than half of chapter 5.65 Needless to say, this quotation is of considerable importance. It is plain that the text quoted in ibn Taymiyya is the same text that Moshe ibn Tibbon translated into Hebrew. Accordingly, it is included in its entirety in the present edition. 2.3 Abridgment of the Paraphrase of Chapters 6–9: MS Ḥikma 6 (Cairo) An abridged version of the Arabic translation of the paraphrase of chapters 6– 9 survives in MS Ḥikma 6 of the Dār al-Kutub Library in Cairo. Gutas, in his detailed study of this manuscript, maintains that it was probably written in Buchara in the first half of the twelfth century.66 The scribe is ʿAbd al-Razzāq alṢiġnāḫī, a third generation student of Avicenna and a renowned librarian and scholar.67 The manuscript contains many works by Avicenna and his school, as well as versions of Aristotelian works and other related texts. According to Gutas, it is very likely that the texts by Avicenna in the manuscripts “derive from autographs or first copies,”68 hence its immense importance. 64 65 66 67 68

Geoffroy, “Remarques,” 420. Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāǧ, 243,3–246,5, corresponding to ‫ט‬24–‫יא‬4 in the Hebrew version. Gutas, “Notes,” 10. See also Reisman, Avicennan Tradition, 77–78. Gutas, “Notes,” 8–9. Gutas, 9.

the textual tradition

49

The abridgment of the Arabic translation of Themistius’ paraphrase appears at 206v16–210r7 under the title ‫من شرح ثامسطيوس لحرف اللام‬, without naming the translator or the person who is responsible for the abridgment. The continuity within the manuscript and the fact that no pages are missing suggest that the abridgment of chapters 6–9 is all that was copied, or perhaps all that had been done in the first place. According to Pines, the abridgment “denotes considerable skill: the text is pared down to essentials, none of the main doctrines is omitted, and in some passages the shorter text is more coherent than the longer one.”69 The text has been edited and published by Badawī in 1947.70 In the following sections I discuss to some detail the relationship between the abridgment and the full version, the abridgment’s style and agenda, and the question of its authorship. 2.3.1 Connection to the Full Version Scholars are mostly in agreement that the abridgment is based on the original Arabic translation and not independent of it.71 Pines acknowledges this possibility, but also suggests two other options: first, that Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn is responsible for the long version and Abū Bišr Mattā is responsible for the short version; and second, that there were two Greek versions—a short version and a long version—both translated by the same person.72 Reisman and Bertolacci, as well as Martini Bonadeo, suggest that Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn made the long version, and Abū Bišr Mattā made the abridgment, but do not provide evidence.73 The only reason to maintain this idea is for the sake of harmonizing the different accounts in the bio-bibliographical literature (see above, 2.1). Since I have shown other ways which would reconcile the accounts (and, of course, the possibility that one of them is simply wrong), I explore an alternative approach at 2.3.2.3 below. Since each of the Arabic versions pertains to a different part of the text, in most cases they cannot be compared without the mediation of the Hebrew version. However, there is one instance where a quotation in Averroes—who uses

69 70 71

72

73

Pines, “Distinctive,” 130n3. Badawī, Arisṭū, 12–21. Badawī, Arisṭū, XVI ff., suggests this. Genequand (Ibn Rushd, 10) thinks that this is beyond question, and Frank builds his entire set of notes around this assumption (Frank, “Notes,” 216). Pines, “Distinctive,” 130n3. It is important to stress that Pines’ remarks were not based on an in-depth study of this question, as his aim was plainly to lay out the various options. He also did not seem to be aware of Frank’s study. Reisman & Bertolacci, “Thābit ibn Qurra,” 722; Martini Bonadeo, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, 43n215.

50

chapter 1

the complete version—overlaps with a portion of the text that also appears in the Arabic abridgment. As can be seen, the texts are practically identical: table 17

Ḥikma 6, 209r7–9

Themistius’ paraphrase—complete version vs. abridgment

Averroes, Tafsīr, 1635,6–9

Themistius Hebraicus, ‫כב‬12–15

‫فأما القوة التى فى الـكواكب وهى‬ ‫כי הכח אשר בכוכבים והוא אשר אין لأن القوة التى فى الـكواكب وهى‬ ‫التى لا نهاية لها ليست طبيعية فيها ولا التى لا نهاية لها فليست بطبيعية فيها‬ ‫תכלית לו אינו טבעי בהם ולא לפי‬ ‫على أنها أجسام لـكنها إما معلقة بالعلة ولا على أنها أجسام لـكنها إما معلقة‬ ‫שהם גשמים אבל הוא אם נתלה‬ ‫الأولى وإما بالنفس فيها من تلك القوة بالعلة الأولى وإما لنفس فيها من تلك‬ ‫בעלה הראשונה או הנפש בהם‬ ‫التى ليست بجسم وذلك أن العلة الأولى القوة التى ليست بجسم وذلك أن العلة‬ ‫מאותו הכח אשר אינו בגשם וזה‬ ‫الأولى هى التى تديرها زمانا ًلا نهاية له‬ ‫כי הסבה הראשונה היא אשר תסבב هى التى تديرها زمانا ًلا نهاية له‬ ‫אותם זמן אין תכלית לו‬

In the next section I explore several technical aspects of the abridgment, based on a systematic comparison with the Hebrew. In the course of the discussion it will become even more apparent that the abridgment is based on the original full translation. 2.3.2 Analysis of the Abridgment The Arabic abridgment of Themistius’ paraphrase is essentially a selective copy of chapters 6–9 of the full version according to what its author seeks to gain from the text. Besides selecting the portions of the text that interest him, the author has a habit of rendering some of the text he chooses more economical by skipping unnecessary (for him) words and occasionally restructuring sentences to shorten them. When the gaps become wide, the author contextualizes the condensed version by adding transitional expressions. In other words, the author is not content with simply copying the parts of the text that interest him, but also has considerations of space and style, as well as retaining a coherent text. Since Themistius occasionally repeats his main ideas within the paraphrase, the result of the abridgment is a compact and focused product that expresses many of the paraphrase’s main themes without losing sight of its overall structure. But it also tends to paraphrase Themistius. The abridgment is undoubtedly the work of a highly trained scholar with an in-depth understanding of the text accompanied by sensitivity and elegance, who knew exactly what he wanted to extract from it.

the textual tradition

51

In the following discussion I explore the author’s core considerations while abridging Themistius’ text from two points of view: (i) what he chose to include in the abridgment; (ii) how he abridged the text. The first point of view deals with the author’s philosophical interests, a better understanding of which will, I hope, support the assumption that chapters 6–9 were all that was abridged in the first place. The second point of view deals with the author’s technique; besides appreciating his editorial virtuosity, an analysis of the author’s technique will prove useful in the attempt to establish the text itself. In many cases, differences between the abridgment and the Hebrew text can be accounted for by the abridgment technique rather than by assuming a difference in the underlying Arabic. A better understanding of the abridgment technique helps distinguish between material differences and differences that are the product of the abridgment process. I close this section with a short discussion about the identity of the abridgment’s author. 2.3.2.1 Approach to Form and Philosophical Interests The first part of the paraphrase of chapter 6, which opens the abridgment, is indicative of the author of the abridgment’s agenda and style. Putting the full text and the abridgment side by side, it is easy to see how the abridgment condenses the text and reflects its author’s interests:74 table 18

Themistius ‫יא‬19–23—full version in Hebrew and Arabic abridgment

‫الجواهر ثلثة منها جوهران طبيعيان وثالث‬ ‫הנה כבר אמרנו כי כל העצמים שלשה ושמהם שנים עצמים טבעיים‬ ‫جوهر غير متحرك ونحن الآن فى طلب‬ ‫והעצם השלישי בלתי מתנועע והנה שני העצמים הטבעיים כבר‬ ‫هذا الجوهر الذى لا يتحرك ولم يزل كذلك‬ ‫התבארו במה שעבר וכבר חקרנו מהם חקירה מופלגת במה שקדם‬ ‫فنطلب هل يمكن أن يكون جوهر لا يبليه‬ ‫מדברינו ואולם עתה הנה אנחנו בבקשת העצם אשר לא יתנועע ולא‬ ‫יסור כן והנה נחקור עתה ונבקש אם אפשר שיהיה עצם לא יבלהו הזמן الزمان ولم يقبل الاستحالات والتغايير لـكن‬ ‫يبقى على حاله الدهر كله‬ ‫ולא יקבל השנוי וההשתנות אבל ישאר על ענינו החלד כלו‬

In the full version, the inquiry starts by referring back to the earlier threefold division of substance and clarifying that the first two kinds have already been sufficiently explored. The investigation of the immovable, indestructible substance is presented as the next stage of inquiry. In the abridgment, all references

74

The edition of the text reflects the abridgment visually.

52

chapter 1

to earlier parts of the paraphrase are omitted; the text states that there are three kinds of substances, two of which are natural, and makes known that the present inquiry is about the third kind of substance, which is immovable and indestructible. Nothing is said about the investigation of the other kinds of substance having been carried out. Since the author of the abridgment retains references in the text which point to discussions in chapter 6 and afterwards,75 it can be plausibly maintained that the abridgment should be treated as an independent unit rather than a part of an abridgment of the whole work. This is also supported by the abridger’s philosophical interests, which are discussed below. Themistius proceeds to explain that since the first principle cannot be demonstrated, an alternative approach should be taken: table 19

Themistius ‫יא‬23–33—full version in Hebrew and Arabic abridgment

‫وليس يمكن أن يقام على هذا‬ ‫المبدأ برهان فإن البرهان لا‬ ‫يكون إلا من علل ومبادئ‬ ‫والعلة الأولى التى هى المبدأ‬ ‫الأول لا توجد لها علة قبلها لكنا‬ ‫ننظر هل يمكن أن يكون جوهر‬ ‫ما أزليا ًثم نبحث هل يمكن أن‬ ‫يكون جوهر غير متحرك وهاتان‬ ‫صفتان للمبدأ الأول‬

‫וכבר אמרנו פעמים רבות שהוא בלתי אפשר שיעמוד על ההתחלה הזאת מופת‬ ‫כי המופת לא יהיה כי מסבות והתחלות והסבה הראשונה כלומר ההתחלה‬ ‫הראשונה אי אפשר שתמצא לה סבה לפניה ולא התחלה אבל אולי יהיה‬ ‫אפשר לנו שנשיג כונתנו מן האופן הזה והוא כי מפני שאנחנו סוברים בהתחלה‬ ‫ אחד מהם‬,‫הראשונה לכל הנמצאים שהוא מן הראוי שימצאו בה שני ענינים‬ ‫שתהיה נצחית והאחר שתהיה בלתי מתנועעת הנה ראוי שנפריד כל אחד משני‬ ‫אלו הענינים ונחקור עליו ביחוד ונחקור תחלה אם אפשר שיהיה עצם מה נצחי‬ ‫ואחר כן נחקור אם אפשר שיהיה עצם בלתי מתנועע וכאשר הלכנו הדרך הזאת‬ ‫הנה נשיג הכונה אשר כוננו אליה בקלות כי חקירתנו תהיה על דרך מי שכיון‬ ‫לשאת דבר כבד ולא יוכל שאתו וחלקהו והיה לו כח לשאת אותו וכן יקל מאתנו‬ ‫כובד החקירה אם הלכנו הדרך הזאת‬

Themistius, in the full version, reminds the reader that the fact that the first principle cannot be demonstrated was already repeated many times and explains why. He then suggests that since there are two characteristics appropriate for the first principle, namely eternal and immovable, there should be a “division of labor” between two questions—the existence of an eternal substance, and the existence of an immovable substance—offering an analogy to splitting a heavy load so that it is easier to carry. The author of the abridgment,

75

See for example the backwards reference from the beginning of chapter 7 to the beginning of chapter 6.

53

the textual tradition

again, omits the reference to an earlier discussion, and after retaining the explanation for the impossibility of a demonstration for the first principle, proceeds directly to introduce the division into two inquiries, but without Themistius’ meditations on method, repetitions, or analogy. The result is a more straightforward text, without Themistius’ similes. The two characteristics of the first principle are paraphrastically added to the end of the passage (‫وهاتان صفتان للمبدأ‬ ‫)الأول‬, slightly altering the original sequence of the text. Themistius then opens the first discussion, namely the question of the existence of an eternal substance: table 20

Themistius ‫יא‬23–‫יב‬4—full version in Hebrew and Arabic abridgment

‫فنقول إن كانت الجواهر كلها‬ ‫تقبل الفساد والجواهر قبل‬ ‫جميع الأشياء الموجودة لزم أن‬ ‫تكون جميع الأشياء الموجودة‬ ‫تقبل الفساد لـكنه لا بد من أن‬ ‫يكون للموجودات جوهر دائم‬ ‫الوجود عنه وجودها‬

‫ונאמר אם היו העצמים כלם מקבלים ההפסד והעצמים כלם הם קודם כל הדברים‬ ‫הנמצאים התחייב מזה שיהיו כל הדברים הנמצאים מקבלים ההפסד ואם היה‬ ‫הענין כמו שאמרנו במה שעבר מהיות הכל מתאחד היה או היתה עמידתו על‬ ‫המשך היושר וסדר הנה שרשו ועקרו ותחלת חלקיו הוא העצם ואם היה שיפסד‬ ‫כל עצם הנה מן הראוי שיתחייב שלא יהיה דבר מכל הדברים שהם תלויים בו‬ ‫נשארים ומי שהנהיג הענין הזה ואפילו מעט מן ההנהגה מצא העצמים וזולתם מן‬ ‫הנמצאות אי אפשר מבלתי שיהיה להם עצם מתמיד המציאות ממנו מציאותם‬

Themistius starts by arguing that without assuming an eternal substance, nothing would be eternal, quoting the beginning of the paraphrase,76 where it was explained that among all existents, substance is the first, stating that this should be obvious to anyone who inquires into this, however lightly. This claim paves the way to ground the existence of an eternal substance upon the demonstrable eternity of time and motion, which are ontologically dependent upon substance, an argument that I analyze in the Commentary. The author of the abridgment retains the beginning and the ending of the passage, but omits the reference to the beginning of the text, as well as Themistius’ closing statement about the impossibility to avoid this conclusion even after brief reflection. This short presentation of the relationship between the full text and the abridgment of the beginning of the paraphrase of chapter 6 already exhibited three instances where a reference to an earlier part of the discussion is omitted, and two instances where parts of the texts that are not integral to the argument are discarded. This approach to form is apparent throughout the

76

See ‫א‬3–5.

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chapter 1

abridgment, and the result is a condensed text, almost free from passing comments, examples, or repetition. It is also self-sufficient, as all the references to earlier discussions are removed. Concerning content, it is clear that the abridger’s philosophical agenda is “theological” in a specific sense. He is most interested in God’s existence as an immovable, eternal substance; all things’ ontological and teleological dependency upon Him; God as the primary object of desire; God as the efficient cause of the world; God’s self-intelligizing; and God’s attributes (like knowledge, life, law, oneness, and uniformity). There are many discussions in the text that the author of the abridgment has little to no interest in. Besides omissions of examples and emotive remarks, most of the historical discussions are omitted from the abridgment, like presentations and critiques of the ancients’ views (for example, ‫ יד‬18–24; ‫יד‬28–‫טו‬15; ‫כא‬26–‫כב‬3; ‫כו‬11–20), with the exception of references to Plato’s doctrines, which are sometimes retained (for example, ‫כב‬32–34); political allusions and discussions, which play an important role in Themistius’ paraphrase, are also omitted almost in their entirety (for example, ‫יז‬17–25; ‫יז‬31–‫יח‬9; ‫כא‬14–19; ‫כה‬21–‫כו‬10). Aristotle’s lengthy astronomical discussion in chapter 8, which Themistius quotes almost word for word in his paraphrase, is omitted in its entirety, besides its conclusion about the number of spheres (‫כג‬18–‫כד‬25), and general cosmological discussions about celestial bodies which do not pertain directly to the first unmoved mover are omitted as well (e.g., ‫יח‬25–‫יט‬2; ‫כד‬29–‫כה‬12).77 Even when discussing God’s cognition, the abridger omits Themistius’ comparative remarks to human cognition and capacities, which serve as clarification for the discussion of God (for example, ‫כח‬22–26; ‫כח‬29–‫כט‬5; ‫כט‬9–23; ‫כט‬28–‫ל‬9). The philosophical agenda reflected in the abridgment of chapter 6–9 of Themistius’ paraphrase supports the idea that it is an independent unit and was not taken from an abridgment of the entire work. chapters 1–5 contain nearly no theological discussions that would be of interest to the abridger, and Themistius’ paraphrase of chapter 10 expands upon the already historicalcritical dimension of Aristotle’s text—which is systematically omitted from the other chapters—as well as political leanings, also of no interest to the abridger. 2.3.2.2 Technical Aspects I now turn to discuss features of the abridgment technique, starting with relatively simple cases, and moving to more complex one. 77

Another notable omission is Themistius’ discussion of the source of power in the celestial bodies (‫כב‬11–29), which Averroes quotes in its entirety. The abridger retains only the passage which connects it to the first cause (‫כב‬12–15).

55

the textual tradition table 21

Themistius ‫יג‬19–24—full version in Hebrew and Arabic abridgment

‫[ فيجب من ذلك‬1] ‫أن تكون الحركة متصلة‬ [2] ‫[ فإن كانت الحركة المستديرة هى وحدها متصلة‬3]

‫[ והנה יתחייב גם כן מזה שנאמר‬1] ‫כי התנועה גם כן מתדבקת‬ ‫[ כי היה הזמן התחדש מן התנועה‬2] ‫[ ואם היתה התנועה על הסבוב היא לבדה זולת שאר‬3] ‫התנועות מתדבקת‬

‫[ فيجب أن تكون هى الأزلية‬4] ً ‫[ فيجب أن يكون محرك هذه الحركة أزليا‬5] ‫[ لأن علة الأزلية يجب أن تكون أزلية‬6]

‫[ הנה ראוי שנשים התנועה על הסבוב היא הנצחית‬4] ‫[ ויתחייב מזה שיהיה מניע זאת התנועה נצחי‬5] ‫[ וזה כי הוא בלתי אפשר שיהיה דבר שאינו נצחי סבה‬6] ‫לתנועה נצחית‬

‫[ إذ لا يكون ما هو أخس علة لما هو أفضل‬7]

‫[ כי לא ימצא משום דבר דבר יותר פחות יהיה סבה למה‬7] ‫שהוא יותר נכבד‬

In table 21 we find a number of typical abridgment techniques. In this passage Themistius infers that since the circular motion (which is the only kind of continuous motion) of the heavens is everlasting, its mover should be everlasting as well. In the beginning of this passage, [1] the abridgment omits, for the sake of economy, two instances where the Hebrew has ‫גם כן‬, translating ً ‫أيضا‬, as well as ‫)أن نقول( שנאמר‬, effectively shortening the sentence without losing any substance. The omission of these two expressions is commonplace within the abridgment. The author then proceeds [2] to omit the explanation for the claim that motion is continuous (‫)כי היה הזמן מתחדש מן התנועה‬, since it is not part of the argument and was also explained earlier (at ‫יב‬7–8). The tendency to omit explications of grounds for propositions within an argument, especially when repetitive, is also a feature of the abridgment. In the next sentence [3], after omitting the non-necessary ‫( זולת שאר התנועות‬since we already have ‫;לבדה‬ ‫)وحدها‬, the abridgment becomes more paraphrastic [4], replacing ‫נשים התנועה‬ ‫( על הסבוב‬probably ‫ )نجعل الحركة المستديرة‬with ‫تكون‬, substituting the first person verb and the noun with a third person verb implicitly predicated of the noun, shortening the text, again without losing any important information. The following sentence [5] omits the unnecessary ‫)من ذلك( מזה‬. Next [6], the author paraphrases a sentence with a double negation (‫וזה כי הוא בלתי אפשר שיהיה דבר‬ ‫ )שאינו נצחי סבה לתנועה נצחית‬into an affirmation (‫)لأن علة الأزلية يجب أن تكون أزلية‬, saving space and simplifying the expression. Finally [7], the last sentence of the passage omits ‫משום דבר‬, again shortening the text. The result of the abridgment, as can be seen from this analysis, is a compact text which retains the most important features of the argument, omits

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unnecessary elements (be it a repetitive statement or even a single word), and occasionally paraphrases the text for the sake of brevity. table 22

Themistius ‫כג‬6–7—full version in Hebrew and Arabic abridgment

‫[ و بعد ذلك المبدأ جواهر كثيرة حالها هذه الحال‬1] ‫[ ואולם היות אחר ההתחלה הזאת הראשונה עצמים רבים‬1] ‫ענינם הענין הזה‬

‫[ والقياس يوجب ذلك والحس يشهد عليه‬2]

‫[ הנה ההקש ימציא זה בהכרח והחוש יעיד עליו‬2]

Another example of the abridgment technique is found in table 22, where a single long sentence is split into two short sentences.78 This example is useful to show cases where a difference between the Arabic and the Hebrew can be explained by the abridgment process, and distinguish them from cases where another explanation is needed. The Arabic construction ‫ أما…ف‬is removed, and that is why the Hebrew at [2] has ‫ הנה ההקש‬while the Arabic has ‫والقياس‬ (and not ‫ ;)فالقياس‬it is not the case of different readings. The division into two sentences allows for the cancellation of the infinitive which is [1] translated into ‫( היות‬probably ‫)كون‬. The term ‫( הראשונה‬translating ‫ )الأول‬is removed, as it is evident that the principle discussed is the first one, so that need not be repeated. Finally, ‫( ימציא זה בהכרח‬translating ‫ )يوجد ذلك ضرورة‬poses a problem: is it paraphrased into ‫يوجب ذلك‬, saving a word, or was there a misreading between ‫ يوجد‬and ‫?يوجب‬79 Based only on Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew and the Arabic we have, there is no way to solve this. Thankfully, Falaquera translated this passage independently as ‫יחייב אותו בהכרח‬, making it clear that the text before Moshe ibn Tibbon read ‫ يوجد‬for ‫يوجب‬.80 The result of the abridgment, besides saving four words, is a text easier to digest, which expresses the main idea clearly without losing any important information.

78 79

80

See Frank, “Notes,” 224, §191. In the critical apparatus I only record instances where it cannot be determined with confidence whether a given case is the result of the abridgment or a different reading. If the difference can be shown conclusively to be the result of the abridgment process, I do not treat it as a variant. See below, table 46.

57

the textual tradition table 23

Themistius ‫כד‬27–30—full version in Hebrew and Arabic abridgment

‫[ إلا أن الحكم الضروري في ذلك فللذى يتنجم‬4] ‫⟩فهو⟨ أقوى على ذلك‬ ‫[ فيجب أن يكون عدد الحركات كعدد الأفلاك‬1] ‫المتحركة‬ ‫[ وأن يكون عدد العلل المحركةكعدد الحركات‬2]

‫[ וזה מפני שהוא מתחייב שיהיה מספר התנועות כמו מספר‬1] ‫הגלגלים המתנועעים‬ ‫[ ושיהיה מספר העלות המניעות כמו מספר התנועות‬2] ‫[ והנה ראוי שנגזור במאמר על כי זה ההמשכות כפי מה‬3] ‫שזכרנו ואולם המשפט על היות מספר אלו התנועות הוא זה‬ ‫המספר הנה אין ראוי לנו שנשפוט בו‬ ‫[ אבל נניח המשפט ההכרחי בו לאשר זה מלאכתם והם‬4] ‫יותר חזקים על זה‬

Occasionally the author of the abridgment changes the sequence of a few sentences of the full text. In the example shown in table 23, Themistius echoes Aristotle’s qualifying statement regarding the number of celestial spheres at Metaphysics 12.8. After arriving at the conclusion that the number of spheres is either 47 or 55, Aristotle states that the exact number should be left to “more powerful thinkers,” implying that his discussion should not necessarily be considered as a final statement on the topic. While Themistius’ paraphrase preserves Aristotle’s complete astronomical discussion, quoting it nearly word for word, the author of the abridgment omits it almost entirely, retaining only the conclusion, about the number of spheres (‫כד‬23–25). In the immediately preceding passage, Themistius reflects Aristotle’s clarification that what is important is the principle according to which the number of moving causes is identical to the number of celestial movements. The author of the abridgment recognizes the importance of this, and his mode of presentation amplifies this statement, along with the adherence to more powerful astronomers for arriving at a precise number. As a result, he reverses the order of presentation: Themistius, following Aristotle, first [1; 2] presents the general principle, then [3] qualifies the number (while maintaining the principle), and [4] finally refers to the astronomers as the authorities concerning the exact number. The author of the abridgment, since he omitted the entire astronomical discussion except for its conclusion, begins by [4] a short sentence about the appeal to astronomers (replacing ‫ לאשר זה מלאכתם‬with the more specific ‫فللذى‬ ‫يتنجم‬, in the singular, as well as slightly changing the syntax), omits [3] altogether, since it is repetitive, and only then copies the translation of the general principle [1; 2]. The resulting text is more clearly focused on the principle than on the astronomical aspect.

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table 24

Themistius ‫ל‬9–10—full version in Hebrew and Arabic abridgment

‫לא ימנע מונע משיהיה השכל והמושכל והמחשבה בהם דבר אחד בעינו والعقل والمعقول منه واحد‬

Sometimes the philosophical considerations of the author of the abridgment result in an alteration of the meaning of the text. As we have seen, the abridger is most interested in the theological aspect of Themistius’ paraphrase. This is apparent in table 24, where a general statement about immaterial beings is transformed into a specific statement about God. The complete text in this passage refers to immaterial objects, and Themistius says that in them, since they have no material constraints, intellect (substance), intelligible (object) and thinking (activity) are one and the same. The author of the abridgment skips quite a bit of text before arriving at this part, and since the preceding sentence in the abridgment (‫כט‬25) is specifically about God, he has the present sentence say that “in Him (i.e., God), intellect and intelligible are one.” As Frank already noticed,81 the abridgment omits “thinking.” My conjecture is that this omission can be explained as a consequence of the shift from a general proposition about immaterial substances to a specific proposition about God. The tripartite distinction into substance, object, and activity in an immaterial substance is turned into a dual distinction between substance and object, as substance and activity are no longer distinguishable in God (other immaterial substances do not only think, they also move). Other features of the abridgment of this sentence are less problematic. The abridger omits the unnecessary ‫( לא ימנע מונע משיהיה‬Arabic most likely ‫لا يمنع‬ ‫ )مانع من أن يكون‬and heads straight into the proposition, also shortening ‫דבר‬ ‫( אחד בעינו‬probably ‫ )شىء واحد بعينه‬into the more compact ‫واحد‬. table 25

Themistius ‫יז‬2–10—full version in Hebrew and Arabic abridgment

‫[ وأول المعقولات كلها الجوهر ومن‬1] ‫[ אבל כי ראשון המושכלים כלם העצם ומן העצם הפשוט ממנו אשר‬1] ‫الجوهر البسيط منه الذى هو بالفعل‬ ‫הוא בפועל‬ ‫[ الذى هو واحد‬4] ‫[ והוא אשר לא יתערב בו מה שהוא בכח‬2] ‫[ إذ ليس فيه تركيب مما بالفعل ومما‬5 ;2] ‫[ ואין דבר ינשא עליו ולא יונח תחתיו‬3] ‫بالقوة‬ (4–2‫[ אבל הוא באמת טבע אחד פשוט… )יז‬4]

81

Frank, “Notes,” 226, §261.

59

the textual tradition Table 25

Themistius ‫יז‬2–10—full version in Hebrew and Arabic abridgment (cont.)

‫[ والواحد بالحقيقة هو هذا‬6]

(6–5‫[ בו הרבוי וההרכבה… )יז‬5] (10‫[ כי זה הוא אשר יאמר בו לפי האמת שהוא אחד פשוט )יז‬6]

There are instances in which the author is interested in introducing a few features from a given passage without actually quoting the passage, so he builds upon a portion of the text, and then completes the account with a (sometimes highly) condensed paraphrase. The result is an aggressive interference in the text, as can be seen at the abridgment of ‫יז‬2–10 (table 25), which initially seems to pose a textual problem. While [1] is identical in the Arabic and the Hebrew, the rest of the passage seems to differ. It seems unclear where [4] ‫الذى هو واحد‬ comes from, and while it is obvious that ‫ إذ ليس فيه تركيب مما بالفعل ومما بالقوة‬is somehow built upon [2], the abridgment departs from the original text, while the ending [6] is also unclear. This passage has perplexed Frank, who notes the absence of [4] in the Hebrew and suggests that ‫ יתערב בו‬in [2] is a distortion of ‫יתרכב בו‬, which has led to the distortion of the rest of the sentence in the Hebrew.82 This is possible, but since the Hebrew, as it stands, makes sense, perhaps there is another way of resolving the issue.83 The Arabic abridgment is built upon ‫יז‬3–4, but then omits all the text until paraphrasing lines 9–10, here [6]. Within this space, Themistius explains systematically the meaning of oneness and simplicity, and also refers to composition in ‫יז‬6. If this is the case, perhaps the problematic portion of the Arabic, namely the expression ‫إذ ليس فيه تركيب مما بالفعل ومما بالقوة‬, is a paraphrastic construct built according to the syntax of the original translation, but infused with material from the omitted text (like [5]) for the sake of completion. Consequently, the enigmatic ‫ الذى هو واحد‬turns out to be an abridgment based on the next sentence [4]. While Frank’s explanation is just as valid as my own, my point here is to show that sensitivity to abridgment considerations can sometimes offer explanations for unclear phenomena in the text, which do not need to assume a problem in the textual tradition.

82 83

Frank, “Notes,” 222, §126. The expression ‫ לא יתערב בו מה שהוא בכוח‬is probably a translation of ‫لا يشو به ما هو بالقوة‬. In Theophrastus’ On First Principles, there is an instance where the word δυναμικάς is translated into ‫( أشبه بالقوة‬6b25).

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table 26

Themistius ‫יז‬9–13—full version in Hebrew and Arabic abridgment

‫[ ואמרך בו שהוא אחד לא יורה על השעור כמו‬1] ‫שיאמר אומה אחת ואצבע אחד‬

‫[ وسا ئر الأشياء فإن الموجود شىء والواحد شىء آخر‬3] ‫[ فنقول إنسان واحد وفرس واحدة‬2]

‫[ ולא כמו שנאמר אדם אחד וסוס אחד‬2] ‫[ כי אלו הדברים הנמצא בהם דבר אחד והאחד הוא‬3] ‫דבר אחר‬

‫[ وأما هذه الطبيعة فالموجود منها والواحد شىء واحد‬4] ‫بعينه‬

‫[ ואולם הטבע הזה הנמצא ממנו והאחד דבר אחד‬4]

(13–9‫בעינו )יז‬

A similar example can be seen at table 26, where the author combines a restructuring of the text with a contextualization, which connects the present portion of the text with the previous abridged part. The Arabic sentence before the one quoted here was about the oneness of the first principle. In the complete text, Themistius juxtaposes its oneness with the oneness of other existents, starting with examples [1–2]. The author opts to shorten the text and begin with the juxtaposition [3], so he replaces ‫ כי אלו הדברים‬with ‫وسا ئر الأشياء‬, explicating the context,84 and only then adds examples [2]. Since two examples are enough for him, he omits the first set of examples [1]. Since Themistius is denying the first principle’s type of oneness from horses and humans, his sentence [2] is a negation; but since the author of the abridgment uses them as examples of oneness of existents unlike the first principle, he turns the sentence into an affirmation. Both texts converge again at [4]. Analysis of the abridgment technique does not always provide solutions to textual problems. There are numerous places where differences between the Arabic abridgment and the Hebrew of the complete text cannot be resolved by recourse to the abridgment technique. However, in some places it contributes to the relief of tension, and helps establish with better precision the history of the text and its transmission. 2.3.2.3 Authorship The abridged version of Themistius’ paraphrase in manuscript Ḥikma 6 appears immediately after an abridgment of Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn’s Arabic translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 2 (see Appendix A), under the title ‫من حرف الألف‬

84

Here again Frank attempts to trace a difference in the original Arabic. See Frank, “Notes,” 222, §128.

the textual tradition

61

‫الصغرى من كتاب ما بعد الطبيعة لأرسطوطاليس الفيلسوف‬. Both works immediately follow the title ‫“( من جملة المجموع في الإلاهيات عن الشيخ أبي منصور بن ز يلة‬From ibn Zayla’s Compilation on Metaphysics”). Ibn Zayla (d. probably 1048) was a student and colleague of Avicenna.85 Gutas remarks that “either ʿAbd-ar-Razzāq [the scribe] had no text to go along with the title and neglected to cross the latter out, or, more plausibly, ibn Zayla’s ‘Compilation’ consisted, in effect, of the two next selections in the manuscript.”86 Corroborating circumstantial evidence for the latter option appears in the formal structure of this portion of the manuscript; after the title, the customary ḥamdalla appears, but the next one is found only before the beginning of Miskawayh’s Kitāb al-Saʿāda, the work copied after the abridgment of Themistius’ paraphrase. This suggests that the title, the abridgment of Metaphysics 2, and the abridgment of Themistius’ paraphrase all form a single unit. But there are additional reasons to assume that both texts are taken from ibn Zayla’s compilation. The very existence of a work entitled Maǧmūʿ fī alIlāhiyāt is attested elsewhere within Ḥikma 6, in two different places within its recension of Avicenna’s Al-Mubāḥaṯāt.87 First, there is Avicenna’s response to a question about the necessary existent. An early recension of the Mubāḥaṯāt, published by Bīdārfar, features the question as well as the answer. The later recension, in Ḥikma 6 (published by Badawī), has only the question, along with a remark that “the response is written in al-Maǧmūʿ al-Ilāhī.”88 In another part of al-Mubāḥaṯāt, under (Badawī’s) title al-Maymar al-Ḫāmis, there is a discussion of the Creator (al-Mubdiʿ), about which the scribe remarks that it is taken from a certain Kitāb al-Aṯlāṯ, that is written in Maǧmūʿ al-Ilāhiya.89 These two texts and the respective abridgments of Metaphysics 2 and Themistius’ paraphrase—both of which are done with a markedly theological emphasis90—all fit comfortably within the spectrum of the science of ilāhiyāt. There is good reason to believe that the Al-Maǧmūʿ fī al-Ilāhiyāt was, just as its title suggests, a collection of metaphysical works compiled by ibn Zayla. Ibn Zayla’s interest in all things Ilāhiyāt is documented through his questions to 85 86 87 88 89 90

Gutas, “Notes,” 13–14. On ibn Zayla see Reisman, Avicennan Tradition, 195–196; Al-Rahim, “Avicenna’s Immediate Disciples,” 14–16. Gutas, “Notes,” 13. Reisman, Avicennan Tradition, 156–157; 203. Reisman, 203, referring to Bīdārfar, Al-Mubāḥaṯāt, §§ 737–738, and Badawī, Arisṭū, 229 (§460). Reisman, 156–157, referring to Badawī, Arisṭū, 59n7 (Reisman’s reference to p. 57 should be corrected). For Metaphysics 2 see the notes in Appendix A. For the relation between books 2 and 12 see Bertolacci, Reception, 50–53.

62

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and correspondence with Avicenna, recorded in the various recensions of the Mubāḥaṯāt, notably several questions about Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Inṣāf, which includes a commentary on Metaphysics 12.91 I would further like to suggest the possibility that ibn Zayla himself is responsible for the abridgment. First, the fact that of all the fragments of the paraphrase we possess, only Šahrastānī quotes from the abridged version contained in Ḥikma 6,92 suggests a relatively late date. Second, an analysis of the abridgment technique shows that it is the work of a very well-trained philosopher, which ibn Zayla certainly was. Third, analysis of the abridgment’s philosophical agenda shows that the author of the abridgment renders Themistius’ text even more theologically oriented than it originally was, omitting virtually every discussion that is not strictly theological. Finally, there is a good chance that the author of the abridgment of Themistius’ paraphrase and the author of the abridgment of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 2 are one and the same person. Both abridgments share the same theological considerations and (as far as one can tell, since the abridgment of Metaphysics 2 is very short) technical features. This is of course speculative, but if ibn Zayla is known to have edited a metaphysical compilation, and if that metaphysical compilation contained abridgments of two texts that have probably been done by the same person, and if the abridgments reveal a philosophical agenda just like ibn Zayla’s, it should not be ruled out that ibn Zayla is in fact responsible for the abridgments of the texts that are included in his compilation. This suggestion requires further exploration, as ibn Zayla’s work as a philosopher has barely been explored. 2.3.3 Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-Niḥal (2) Šahrastānī’s quotation from the abridgment is divided into two parts, reflecting the abridgment of ‫יב‬22–‫יג‬32, skipping three sentences.93 It is part of Šahrastānī’s discussion of his “Eleventh Question” about Aristotle’s doctrines, concerning Aristotle’s claim that movement has neither a beginning nor an ending. Šahrastānī’s quotation is undoubtedly taken from the abridgment of the Arabic translation, and it is the only testimony for the abridgment besides the abridgment itself. It omits and paraphrases the same parts of the full version, and its additions are alien to the full text—probably either coming from the manuscript that Šahrastānī was using, or being of his own. Besides these, there 91 92 93

See for example Reisman, Avicennan Tradition, 201–203. See next section. ‫יג( ولا بد من أن يكون جسم من الأجسام هو الذى يتحرك‬3); ‫وإن كان العرض كذلك فبالأحرى أن‬

‫יג( يكون الجوهر كذلك‬12–13); ‫فيجب أن يحرك تحر يكا ًدائما ً فأنه إن كان محركا لً ـكن ليس تحر يكه‬ ‫יג( بدائم فتحر يكه لا يكون أزليا‬25–28).

63

the textual tradition

are a few glosses and cases of slight paraphrase. Šahrastānī’s text occasionally provides alternative readings, some of which are superior to the text in Ḥikma 6. Accordingly, they have been incorporated into the Arabic text and critical apparatus. It is interesting to note that there is no indication that Šahrastānī realizes that he is quoting from an abridgment. Earlier in the discussion, when he remarks that he intends to utilize Themistius’ paraphrase in his discussion— noting its influence on Avicenna—he simply refers to it as a šarḥ.94 Perhaps this is an indication that the abridgment of the paraphrase replaced the original translation in the Avicennan circle.95 table 27

Abridgment of the paraphrase and Šahrastānī’s Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-Niḥal (1)

Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-Niḥal

Themistius Arabus (abridgment)

‫الحركات لا يخلوا إما أن تكون لم تزل أو تكون قد حدثت‬ ‫الحركة لا تخلو أن تكون لم تزل أو تكون إن كانت حدثت‬ ‫[ موجودا ً بالفعل‬2] ‫[ وقد كان المحرك لها‬1]‫بعد ان لم يكن‬ ‫فقد كان قبلها المحرك لها فكيف يمكن أن نتوهم المحرك لها‬ ‫[ لم يكن عنه الدهر كله‬1]‫وهو أزلى‬ ً ‫قادرا‬ ‫ليس يمانعه مانع من أن يكون عنه ولا حدث حادث في‬ ‫وليس مانع يمنعه من أن يكون عنه ولا حدث حادث فى‬ ‫[ فرغنه وجعله على الفعل‬3] ‫حال ما أحدثها‬ ‫حال ما أحدثه‬ ‫إذ كان جميع ما يحدث أنها يحدث عنه وليس شي غيره‬ ‫إذ كان جميع ما يحدث إنما يحدث عنه وليس شىء غيره‬ ‫يعوقه أو يرغبه ولا يمكن أن نقول قد كان لا يقدر أن يكون يعوقه أو يرغبه ولا يمكن أن يقال قد كان لا يقدر أن يكون‬ ‫[ أو لم يرد فأراد أو لم يعلم فعلم‬4] ‫عنه فقدر‬ ‫عنه فقدر‬ ‫[ كله يوجب الاستحالة و يوجب أن يكون‬5] ‫فلأن ذلك‬ ‫لأن ذلك يوجب الاستحالة و يوجب أن يكون شىء آخر‬ ‫شىء آخر غيره هو الذى أحاله وإن قلنا أنه منعه مانع يلزم أن‬ ‫غيره هو الذى أحاله وإن قلنا أنه منعه مانع يلزم أن يكون‬ (16–10 ,320) ‫يكون السبب المانع أقوى‬ (29–22‫السبب المانع أقوى )יב‬ (17–16 ,320) ‫( والاستحالة والتغير عن المانع حركة‬2‫لأن الاستحالة والتغير والفتور إنما هى من أنواع الحركة )יג‬

Note: in this part, beyond the variant readings, which are recorded in the edition, there is one case of paraphrasing [1] and 4 glosses [2–5]. Gloss [4], for

94 95

Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal, 312,4. It is worth noting that Šahrastānī corresponded with Sayyid Šaraf al-Zamān al-Īlāqī (d. prob. 1141), a third generation student of Avicenna, who probably had access to Avicennan philosophical corpora similar to its contemporary manuscript Ḥikma 6, which contains the abridgment of Themistius we possess today. See al-Rahim, “Avicenna’s Immediate Disciples,” 24.

‫‪64‬‬

‫‪chapter 1‬‬

‫‪instance, adds will and knowledge to the example of the impossibility of God‬‬ ‫‪being unable to do something at one moment, and being able to do it at the‬‬ ‫‪next.‬‬ ‫)‪Abridgment of the paraphrase and Šahrastānī’s Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-Niḥal (2‬‬

‫)‪Themistius Arabus (abridgment‬‬

‫‪table 28‬‬

‫‪Šahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-Niḥal‬‬

‫ولو قيل إن ]‪ [1‬حامل الحركة وهو الجسم لم يحدث لـكنه‬ ‫فإن قلنا إن ]‪ [1‬ذلك الجسم لم يحدث لـكنه تحرك عن‬ ‫تحرك عن سكون وجب أن تعثر على السبب الذى يغير من‬ ‫سكون وجب أن نخـبر بالسبب الذى له تغير من السكون‬ ‫السكون إلى الحركة فإن قلنا إن ذلك الجسم تقدم حدوث‬ ‫إلى الحركة فإن قلنا إن ذلك الجسم حدث تقدم حدوث‬ ‫الجسم حدوث الحركة فقد بان أن الحركة ]‪ [2‬والمتحرك‬ ‫الجسم حدوث الحركة فإذ قد بان أن الحركة والزمان ]‪[3‬‬ ‫والزمان ]‪ [3‬الذى هو عاد إلى الحركة أزلية سرمدية )‪,321‬‬ ‫أزليان فالجسم أزلى )יג‪(12–3‬‬ ‫‪(8–4‬‬ ‫والحركات إما مستقيمة وإما مستديرة والاتصال لا يكون‬ ‫والحركات إما مستقيمة وإما مستديرة والاتصال لا يكون‬ ‫إلا ]‪ [4‬للمستديرة لأن المستقيم ينقطع والاتصال أمر‬ ‫إلا ]‪ [4‬فيها لأن المستقيمة تنقطع والاتصال أمر ضرورى‬ ‫ضروري للأشياء الأزلية فإن الذى يسكن ليس بأزلى‬ ‫للأشياء الأزلية فإن الذى سكن ليس بأزلى ونقول إن‬ ‫والزمان متصل لأنه لا يمكن أن يكون من ذلك قطع‬ ‫الزمان متصل لأنه لا يمكن أن يكون قطع منه مبتورة‬ ‫فيجب من ذلك أن تكون الحركة متصلة فإن كانت الحركة مبتورة فيجب من ذلك أن تكون الحركة متصلة وكانت‬ ‫المستديرة هي وحدها متصلة فيجب أن تكون هي أزلية‬ ‫المستديرة هى وحدها متصلة فيجب أن تكون هى الأزلية‬ ‫فيجب أن يكون محرك هذه الحركة أزليا ً]‪ [6‬لأن علة الأزلية فيجب أن يكون محرك هذه الحركة ]‪ [5‬المستديرة أيضا ًأزليا ً‬ ‫إذ لا يكون ما هو أخس علة لما هو أفضل )‪(13–8 ,321‬‬ ‫يجب أن تكون أزلية إذ لا يكون ما هو أخس علة لما هو‬ ‫أفضل )יג‪(24–15‬‬ ‫]‪ [7‬ولا فائدة فى محركات ساكنة غير محركةكالصور‬ ‫]‪ [7‬فيجب إذن أن لا ينتفع بجواهر أزلية ساكنةكالصور‬ ‫]‪ [8‬الأفلاطونية فلا ينبغي أن يضع هذه الطبيعة بلا فعل‬ ‫فإذن لا ينبغى أن نضع هذه الطبيعة بلا فعل ولا متعطلة‬ ‫فتكون متعطلة غير قادرة أن تحرك وتحيل )‪(15–13 ,321‬‬ ‫لـكن قادرة أن تحرك وتحيل )יג‪(32–28‬‬

‫‪Note: in the second part of the quotation, besides variant readings that are‬‬ ‫‪recorded in the edition, we find a few additions (1; 2; 8), paraphrases (3; 7), an‬‬ ‫‪abridgment (6), and also instances where the text is explicated (e.g., substitut‬‬‫‪ at [5]).‬المستديرة أيضا ً‪ at [4] or adding‬فيها ‪ for‬للمستديرة ‪ing‬‬ ‫‪2.4‬‬ ‫‪Résumé‬‬ ‫‪For the sake of the establishment of an edition of the surviving Arabic por‬‬‫‪tions of Themistius’ paraphrase, the following results emerge: all the fragments‬‬ ‫‪which contain direct quotations of the work ultimately come from the origi‬‬‫‪nal complete Arabic translation, probably the work of Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn, and‬‬

the textual tradition

65

plausibly revised by Ṯābit ibn Qurra. On the basis of the complete translation, an abridgment of chapters 6–9 was composed and circulated within the Avicennan school. There is no need to assume the involvement of any other version of the translation (or the Greek) for this process. The main sources, then, upon which the edition of the Arabic fragments is based, are (1) the beginning of the complete Arabic translation (chapter 1 and the few first sentences of chapter 2), preserved in MS Ẓāhiriyya 4871; (2) Averroes’ lengthy quotations (from chapter 1, the end of chapter 3, and the end of chapter 7); (3) ibn Taymiyya’s lengthy quotation (mid chapter 4–mid chapter 5); (4) the abridgment of chapter 6–9, preserved in MS Ḥikma 6, whose analysis above enables its employment to be more precise and efficient. Since it frequently skips words, sentences, and passages, these are reflected visually in the edition by gaps within the text which faces the complete Hebrew so that it is immediately clear what is abridged and what remains; (5) The quotations/allusions in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī for chapters 6–10, whose variance in proximity to the original Arabic it uses necessitates caution, are selectively included in the body of the text, but are printed in red to emphasize the fact that they involve some revision and paraphrase. Other Arabic sources are not part of the body of the text, but are sometimes represented in the critical apparatus, when they contribute to the understanding of the transmission process.

3

The Hebrew Textual Tradition

As already noted, Moshe ibn Tibbon translated Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 from Arabic into Hebrew in 1255. With the original Greek lost, and the Arabic evidence fragmentary and of uneven character, the study of the Hebrew text is highly important, but obviously poses many difficulties. In what follows I present all the available Hebrew evidence in a manner similar to the discussion of the Arabic sources, and explain how I employ them in the present edition. 3.1 Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Translation The Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscripts (IMHM) in Jerusalem holds microfilms of 10 extant manuscripts of Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation of Themistius’ paraphrase. In the course of studying them, assessing their value for editorial purposes and analyzing their mutual relations, I discovered that three slightly different versions of the Hebrew translation are reflected in the manuscript tradition: an early version, a revised version, and a further light revision. Study of these versions is important not only for producing a coherent edition,

66

chapter 1

but also for shedding light on the mechanics of the Hebrew translation process in the broader context of Hebrew intellectual history. I also survey Hebrew quotations from Themistius’ paraphrase in other authors and in each case explain if and how they are employed in the present edition. 3.1.1 Description of Hebrew Manuscripts96 In the present discussion, to avoid confusion, when available I follow Landauer’s abbreviations for the manuscripts he used in his edition.97 The data about the manuscripts is based on the information provided in the computerized catalog of the IMHM, consultation with the institute’s staff, and other sources which are noted where relevant. I have checked all the codices and revised the information given in the catalogs where it was necessary. The following list is arranged chronologically, but within a given century, an exact date will appear before a general dating (e.g., “1440” before “fifteenth century”). Each item is appended by its code in the IMHM in square brackets. [D] Paris—Bibliothèque Nationale heb. 894 [F 30349; F 31526]98 41a–47b (incomplete; ends at ‫יב‬17) Spanish (Provençal) Script / circa 1400 Title: ‫מאמר הנרשם באות הלמד באור תמסטיוס‬

Ending is missing The codex contains three philosophical works: Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On the Soul, Themistius’ paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12, and Averroes’ middle commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens. The first two works are copied by the same hand. The end of the codex has a colophon on a separate page, where a scribe identifies himself as ‫ קרשקאש קרישנט‬and states that he copied the text for personal use in ‫ =( שבט קצ״ה‬1435). This colophon is probably not connected to any of the works in the present codex, and certainly has nothing to do with the first two works. The computerized catalog of the IMHM and the online catalog of the Bibliothèque Nationale date the manuscript to the 96 97 98

For a more elaborate description of the manuscripts, including a detailed listing of the corpora, see Meyrav, “Themistius,” 63–74. See Landauer, Themistius, vi. Steinschneider, Hebräischen Übersetzungen, §89 (176–177); Zotenberg, Catalogue, 154. The IMHM holds two microfilms of this manuscript.

67

the textual tradition

fourteenth century. This dating should probably be modified to the late fourteenth/early fifteenth century; from considerations of handwriting and layout methods, I believe that the scribe of the first two works—including Themistius’ paraphrase—is Yehuda b. Shlomo b. Yaʿaqob of Nîmes, about whom nothing is known, except for the colophon of his copy of Qalonymos b. Qalonymos’ Hebrew translation of Averroes’ middle commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics and On Sophistical Refutations, in which he states that he copied the works in 1403 for personal use (MS Munich, BSB Cod. Hebr. 284 [F 1631]). [A] Munich—Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. hebr. 234 [F 1185]99 175b–204a (a single page is missing between pp. 187–188 = ‫יז‬3–‫יח‬10) Spanish script / First half of fifteenth century Title: ‫כבוד ה׳ הסתר דבר‬

Ending: ‫נשלם המאמר הנרשם באות הלמד מספר מהא]![ שאחר הטבע לארסטו באור‬ ‫תמסטיוס תהלה לאל והעתיקו מלשון קדר ללשון עברי החכם ר׳ משה בר׳ שמואל‬ ‫[ שנת‬Granada =] ‫בר׳ יהודה אבן תבון זק״ל ]= זכר קדוש לברכה[ מרמון ספרד‬ ‫[ לבריאת העולם ולבורא הכל העוז והגדולה‬1255 =] ‫חמשת אלפים וחמש עשרה‬ ‫יתעלה שמו‬

The codex contains three works: Averroes’ middle commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, al-Fārābī’s The Principles of the Existents, and our paraphrase. The latter two items were copied by the same hand. The computerized catalog of the IMHM dates the manuscript to the fourteenth century, but perhaps this dating should be ascribed only to the first item. I have modified the dating of the copying of Themistius’ paraphrase in consultation with Tamar Leiter of the Paleographical Institute in Jerusalem, who also suggests that it was copied in Province. The biblical verse that replaces the title, ‫כבוד ה׳ הסתר דבר‬, is taken from Proverbs 25:3. With the exception of this work in manuscript P, which was copied directly from the present manuscript (see the note in its description below), I have not been able to locate other manuscripts (of this work or other works) that open with this formula. The scribe is probably honoring 99

Steinschneider, Hebräischen Übersetzungen, §89 (176–177); Hebraeischen Handschriften, §234 (108–109).

68

chapter 1

the Maimonidean tradition of Metaphysics-as-secret doctrine that should be hidden from the masses.100 [B] Munich—Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. hebr. 108 [F 1623]101 80a–90b Spanish (Italian) script / 1441 (or earlier) Title: ‫המאמר הידוע באות הלמד מספר מה שאחר הטבע לארסטו פי׳ תמסטיוס העתקת‬ ‫אסחק בן חנין ותקון תאבת בן קרא אל חראני העתיקו שנית משה בן שמואל בן תבון‬ [‫צב״ה ]= צרור בצרור החיים‬

Ending: ‫נשלם המאמר הנרשם באות הלמד מספר מה שאחר הטבע לארסטו ביאור‬ ‫תמסטיוס ולאל האחד הנצחי התחלה בלי תכלית אין אדון זולתו התהלה והעתיקו‬ ‫מלשון הגרי ללשון עברי החכם ר׳ משה בן החכם הגדול ר׳ שמואל בן תבון ונשלמה‬ ‫[ בהל״כ ואע״י‬1255 =] ‫העתקתו בירח ניסן בי״א יום בו שנת ה׳ אלפים וט״ו ליצירה‬ ‫[ לק״י ]= לישועתך‬Isaiah 40:29 ;‫]= ברוך הנותן ליעף כח ולאין אונים עצמה ירבה‬ [Genesis 49:18 ;‫קוויתי ה׳‬

The codex contains Averroes’ epitomes of Aristotle’s physical and psychological works, followed by Themistius’ paraphrase and Averroes’ epitome of the Meta-

100

101

Maimonides uses this verse in a similar context in the Guide of the Perplexed: “Not everything mentioned in the Torah concerning the Account of the Beginning is to be taken in its external sense as the vulgar imagine. For if the matter were such, the men of knowledge would not have been chary of divulging knowledge with regard to it, and the Sages would not have expatiated on its being kept secret and on preventing the talk about it in the presence of the vulgar … One should not act like the wretched preachers and commentators who think that a knowledge of the interpretation of words is science and in whose opinion wordiness and length of speech add to perfection. On the other hand it is obligatory to consider them with what is truly the intellect after one has acquired perfection in the demonstrative sciences and knowledge of the secrets of the prophets … And they say explicitly: As from the beginning of the book up to here, the glory of God [requires] to conceal the thing … inasmuch as the divine commandment necessarily obliges everyone who has obtained a certain perfection to let it overflow toward others … every man endowed with knowledge who has come to possess an understanding of something pertaining to these secrets … must indubitably say something. It is, however, forbidden to be explicit about it” (Maimonides, Guide, II, 29, 346–347). Steinschneider, Hebräischen Übersetzungen, §89 (176–177); Die hebraeischen Handschriften, §108 (p. 65).

the textual tradition

69

physics, as well as Gersonides’ commentary on the Song of Songs and the beginning of Moshe Narboni’s commentary on Averroes’ Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect. Averroes’ works in this manuscript reflect what was perhaps a standardized edition of Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translations of his epitomes of Aristotle’s natural philosophy (see also notes for manuscripts R, O, and M). The entire codex was copied by a single scribe, who may have been a certain ‫ נתן‬whose name appears twice within the corpus. According to the paleographical institute, the manuscript has Ashkenazi as well as Italian features and was probably copied in Italy. The dating 1441 is based on the colophon at the end of Gersonides’ commentary on the Song of Songs, where the original year of writing (‫ = פ״ה‬1325) is replaced with the year ‫( ר״א‬1441), presumably the year of the present copy. If this is indeed the case, then Themistius’ paraphrase was copied the same year, or possibly slightly earlier, as it appears earlier in the codex, whose running order remains intact. The codex ends abruptly in the middle of a sentence in the middle of a page of Narboni’s work; space was also allocated for more decorative titles within Narboni’s text, which were not yet added as the copying ceased. The corpus remains as an unconcluded work in progress. [T] Torino—Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria Cod. AI 14 [F 34308]102 560a–567b Spanish Script / 1470 Title: ‫אות הלמד לארסטוטליס ממה שאחר הטבע ביאור תמאסטיוס‬

Ending: ‫נשלם המאמר הנרשם באות הלמד מספר מה שאחר הטבע לאריסטוטליס ביאור‬ ‫תמסטיוס תהלה לאל הנצחי הקיים בלי תכלית אין אדון זולתו והעתיקו החכם ר׳‬ ‫משה בן הפילוסוף האלהי ר׳ שמואל תבון ז״ל‬

This manuscript was known to Landauer, but it was unavailable for him when preparing his edition.

102

Steinschneider, Hebräischen Übersetzungen, §89 (176–177); Peyron, Codices, 10–21; Tamani & Zonta, Aristoteles, §114.

70

chapter 1

This massive codex, copied by a single hand, included several of Averroes’ middle commentaries on Aristotle’s works, two supercommentaries by Gersonides on Averroes, Averroes’ commentary on Plato’s Republic, pseudo-Aristotle’s On Plants, Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12, and Averroes’ long commentary on Metaphysics 12. It was commissioned by Rabbi Nathan Mordechai, a mid-fifteenth century French doctor and scientist from Avignon.103 Zonta noted that it is probably modelled according to the Latin corpora that were used at the schools.104 Unfortunately, the codex was severely damaged during a fire in the Turin library in 1904. As a result, several pages are lost and many surviving pages are partially burnt, with considerable portions of the text lost. A minor consolation, Peyron’s catalog of the Hebrew manuscripts of Turin, published in 1880, includes a detailed account of the codex and its contents, from which valuable information can be retrieved, such as the dating of the codex and the title of Themistius’ paraphrase in this manuscript, which is almost completely burnt. This manuscript, although damaged, is indispensable for the present edition, for reasons I discuss below. Throughout the edition, the parts of the texts that are missing due to the fire are marked in the critical apparatus by the signification T0. [R] Firenze—Biblioteca Medicea Laurentiana Or. 471 [F 19174]105 154a–179b Spanish Script / 1474 Title: ‫המאמ׳ הידוע הנרשם באות הלמד מספר מה שאחר הטבע לאריסטו פי׳ טמסתיוס‬ ‫העתקת אסחק בן חנן ותקון תאבת בן קרא אל חראני העתיקו שנית משה בן שמואל‬ [‫בין]![ תבון צב״ה ]= צרור בצרור החיים‬

Ending: ‫נשלם המאמ׳ הנרשם באות הלמד מספר מה שאחר הטבע לארסטו ביאור‬ ‫טמסתיוס ולאל האחד הנצחי התחלה בלי תכלית אין אדון זולתו התהלה והעתקו‬ ‫מלשון הגרי ללשון עברי החכם ר׳ משה בן החכם הגדול ר׳ שמואל בן תבון נשלמה‬

103

104 105

This was not the only codex Nathan is known to have commissioned. See Singer & Kahn, “Nathan Mordechai,” to which it should be added that Rabbi Nathan commissioned a copy of Meshulam b. Moshe’s Sefer ha-Hašlamah (and according to the copyist, paid in full!). See Meshulam b. Moshe, Sefer ha-Hašlama, xiv. Zonta, Filosofia, 150. See also 248. Tamani & Zonta, §16; Rigo, “De substantia orbis,” 208–217.

the textual tradition

71

‫[ בהל״כ‬1255 =] ‫העתקתו בירח ניסן בי״א יום בו שנת חמשת אלפים וט״ו ליצירה‬ [‫ולאע״י ]= ברוך הנותן ליעף כח ולאין אונים עצמה ירבה‬

This manuscript was unknown to Landauer. It includes several of Averroes’ epitomes of Aristotle’s physical and psychological works, his De substantia orbis, and our paraphrase. There are a number of complexities regarding the present codex. Copied by a single hand, its organization is akin to what is found in manuscripts B, O, and M, except that Averroes’ De substantia orbis replaces Averroes’ epitome of Aristotle’s Meteorology. The codex, which has been explored in detail by Rigo, includes two colophons. The first one appears at the ending of De substantia orbis, where the copy is attributed to a certain ‫ משה בכ״ר עובדיה‬and dated to 1474 (‫)רל״ד‬. The second colophon appears at the end of the epitome of Parva Naturalia, where the copyist is identified as ‫ ידידיה רפאל בה״ר אליעזר חיים‬of Strasburg. The first scribe is unknown outside of the present codex. The second scribe also copied a collection of Abraham ibn Ezra’s works (MS Breslau 53 [F 46894]) in 1476, when he was 49 years old, but the handwriting in the latter manuscript is different, so Rigo’s assumption that Moshe b. Obadya is the actual scribe, who happened to copy Yedidya’s colophon from an earlier codex he had copied, seems plausible. As for Themistius’ paraphrase, the present copy is nearly identical to the copy in manuscript B. Although it was not copied directly from it (in R the epitome of Parva Naturalia is complete), they both stem from the same source. However, the text, up to 163a (corresponding, roughly, to ‫יב‬25) includes fairly systematic, although non-comprehensive, marginal corrections which help underscore the problematic parts in the textual tradition from which B and R stem. A third hand adds occasional sporadic corrections as of 167a (= ‫יט‬14), and more intensively as of 175b (= ‫ל‬4), but these are less helpful. For the sake of the present edition, I recorded the readings in R almost solely in cases of marginal corrections that I considered valuable. [C] Leipzig—Universitätsbibliothek B.H. fol. 14 (Formerly in the Stadtbibliothek of Leipzig) [F 30745]106 234b–247a Byzantine script / fifteenth century Title:

106

Steinschneider, Hebräischen Übersetzungen, §89 (pp. 176–177); Fleischer & Delitzsch, Catalogus, 303–306.

72

chapter 1

‫המאמר הנרשם באות הלמד מהספר מה שאחר הטבע לארסטו באור החכם‬ ‫תאמסטיוס‬

Ending: ‫נשלם המאמר הנרשם באות הלמד מספר מה שאחר הטבע לאריסטו באור‬ ‫תמסטיוס ולאל האחד הנצחי התחלה בלי תכלית אין אדון זולתו‬

The codex is an assortment of twenty philosophical texts by Hebrew and Muslim authors, copied by at least four different hands (sometimes within the same item), at different times. Themistius’ paraphrase belongs to a group of four philosophical works copied by the same hand (the other works are an anonymous note about divine science, Averroes’ epitome of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and Gersonides’ supercommentary on Averroes’ epitome of On the Soul). Within this unit, in some items more than in others, a different hand compared the text to a superior manuscript and made corrections, marked by C1 in the present edition (see discussion below). [M] Moscow—Russian State Library, Ms. Guenzburg 271 [F 47889]107 63a–77b (beginning missing; starts at ‫ג‬14) Spanish Script / fifteenth century Title: [Missing] Ending: ‫נשלם המאמר הנרשם באות הלמד מספר מה שאחר הטבע לארסטוטליס באור‬ ‫תמאסתיוס ת״ל ]= תהלה לאל[ והעתיקו הר׳ משה בר׳ שמואל בר׳ יהודה אבן‬ [1255 =] ‫[ שנת חמשת אלפים וחמשה עשר‬Granada =] ‫תבון זצ״ל מרמון ספרד‬ ‫לבריאת עולם‬

This manuscript was known neither to Landauer nor to Steinschneider. The codex, copied by a single hand, features several of Averroes’ epitomes of Aristotle, alongside our work and al-Fārābī’s The Principles of the Existents, appended by brief snippets from Abraham b. Maimonides’ Servants of God and Al-Ġazālī’s Intentions of the Philosophers. It was probably arranged according to the standardized “textbook” sequence also found in manuscripts B, R, and O. Its present form does not retain the original running order, and several pages are missing, including the page which contained the ending of Averroes’ epitome of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and the beginning of our work. 107

Peretz, Günzburg, 58.

the textual tradition

73

[P] Paris—Bibliothèque Nationale heb. 1054 [F 33997]108 74b–82b Spanish Script / fifteenth century Title: ‫כבוד ה׳ הסתר דבר‬

Ending: ‫נשלם המאמר הנרשם באות הלמד מספר מה שאחר הטבע לארס׳ ]בי[אור‬ ‫תמסטיוס תהלה לאל והעתיקו מלשון קדר ללשון עברי החכ׳ ]מש[ה בר׳ שמואל‬ ‫[ שנת חמש ]אלפים[ וחמש‬Granada =] ‫בר׳ יהודה אבן תבון זק״ל מרמון ספרד‬ ‫[ לבריאת עולם ולבורא הכל העוז והגדולה יתעלה שמו‬1255] ‫עשרה‬

This manuscript was known to Landauer, who opted not to use it in his edition. For the title see note in manuscript A. The codex comprises of 19 items, divided into three units, each copied by a different hand. The first 16 items are an assortment of astronomical, medical, and mathematical works by various author. The following two items include al-Fārābī’s The Principles of the Existents and Themistius’ paraphrase, both copied directly from manuscript A, as they omit the text of the missing leaf in A. Part of the final page in the paraphrase is torn. The last item, Gersonides’ supercommentary on Averroes’ commentary on Aristotle’s Book of Animals, is standalone in this corpus. [O] Oxford—Bodleian Library MS Can. Or. 63 (Cat. Neubauer 1377) [F 22401]109 134a–151b Italian Script / First quarter of fifteenth century Title: ‫ספר מה שאחר הטבע‬

(another hand adds ‫ מאמר י״ב מ‬at the beginning)

108 109

Steinschneider, Hebräischen Übersetzungen, §89 (pp. 176–177); Zotenberg, Catalogue, 194; Munk, Manuscrits, §89BIS. Steinschneider, Hebräischen Übersetzungen, §89 (pp. 176–177); Neubauer, Catalogue, 492– 493.

74

chapter 1

Ending: ‫נשלם המאמר הנרשם באות הלמד מספר מה שאחר הטבע לארסיטוטל׳ ביאור‬ ‫תמסטיוס הלל האחד הנצחי התעלה]?[ בלי תכלית אין אדון זולתו והעתיקו החכם‬ ‫ר׳ משה תבון בן הפילוסוף האלהי ר׳ שמואל בן תבון ז״ל‬

Landauer knew about this manuscript but chose not to use it. This codex, copied by a single hand, was written in the house of an unidentified ‫יצחק הרופא‬. It contains Averroes’ epitomes on Aristotle’s physical and psychological works, as well as the epitome of the Metaphysics and Themistius’ paraphrase. The works are organized exactly according to the sequence in manuscript B, although Themistius’ paraphrase here shares the terminological peculiarities of manuscript C. As C also contains marginal corrections which sometimes bridge the gap between this version and the other versions of the text, there is no reason to use this manuscript as well. [N] Leiden—Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit Cod. Or. 4758 [F 17368]110 345a–353a / incomplete (ends at ‫יז‬15) Spanish Script / fifteenth–sixteenth century Title: ‫שער הלמד ממה שאחר הטבע נעתק מלשון הגרי ללשון עברי על ידי החכם ר׳ משה‬ [Granada =] ‫בן החכם ר׳ שמואל בן תבון זצ״ל מרמון ספרד‬

Ending: [missing] This manuscript was known to Landauer, who chose not to use it in his edition. The codex, written by a single hand, includes Yehuda b. Shlomo ha-Cohen b. Matka’s Midraš ha-Ḥokhma (The Exposition of Science), assorted biblical verse interpretations, Šem Ṭob Falaquera’s Deʿot ha-Filosofīm (Opinions of the Philosophers), and our work. It is probably the latest manuscript and contains the least reliable readings of Themistius’ paraphrase. 3.1.2 Relationship between the Manuscripts Due to the large amount of “contamination” characteristic of medieval Hebrew manuscripts, it is virtually impossible to create a stemma in the traditional

110

Steinschneider, Hebräischen Übersetzungen, §89 (pp. 176–177); Catalogus, 53–80 (esp. 79– 80); van der Heide, Hebrew Manuscripts, 29.

the textual tradition

75

sense without, sooner or later, moving in circles.111 However, analysis of the manuscripts using a more relaxed approach can result in an effective description of their family relations and inform us about translation and copying procedures. For the sake of the present discussion, as well as in the new critical edition of the Hebrew translation of Themistius’ paraphrase, I use the following manuscripts: A, B, C, D, M, T, and occasionally R with its marginal corrections (Landauer’s edition is recorded as L). The first four manuscripts were known to Landauer, and he justifiably used them in his own edition, although he did not study them systematically and his critical apparatus is economical (sometimes too economical). Landauer did not use M, T, or R; M and R were unknown to him, and he was unable to consult T. He chose not to use manuscripts P and N, and justifiably so. P is a direct copy of A, which can be clear from the fact that it omits the text that is missing due to the page lost in A. Manuscript N, besides being the latest and incomplete, is also by far the least reliable manuscript, full of scribal errors and chimerical constructs from all the above traditions (with the exception of T), hence it was also disregarded in the present study. Although Landauer used both, since O and C come from the same textual tradition and share all its important special features, one of them should suffice. None of them by itself is a very reliable manuscript, often due to scribal errors, but C should be preferred thanks to meticulous corrections made on it by a second hand (henceforth: C1), which in many cases bridge the gap between C’s textual tradition and the textual tradition reflected mostly in manuscripts D, B, and R (and sometimes also A and M). At the same time, C1 retains C’s independent terminology (also a feature of O). I will try to show that C preserves an early version (“Version I”) of the Hebrew translation, whose revision (and process of revision) is apparent in the other manuscript traditions (“Version II,” and—in manuscript T—“Version III”). The case of manuscripts B and R (the latter not recorded by Landauer) is somewhat similar; they both belong (independently of each other) to the same tradition, and there is no reason to use both, or prefer one over the other. I decided to continue Landauer’s path and focus on B, but occasionally added marginal corrections in R from two different hands (R1 and R2, respectively), when they shed light on the textual transmission. D is probably the oldest sur111

See Sirat, “Les éditions,” for an enlightening essay on this matter and the principles of critical editing of Hebrew texts. The critical editions of medieval Hebrew translations published in recent years reflect these concerns; many of them are eclectic, and stemmas are becoming less frequent, replaced by a less strict—although by no means less careful— analysis.

76

figure 2

chapter 1

Relationship between the Hebrew manuscripts

viving manuscript, and shows proximity to the traditions in B and R. It also displays the closest connection (albeit also minimal) to the version preserved in C and O. Unfortunately, only its first third survives. A and M (the latter unknown to Landauer) are closely linked to each other, but are not mutually dependent. They share many distinctive features (for example, the same lacunae and a somewhat more Hebraized syntax), but M is also sometimes close to the traditions exhibited in manuscripts B, R, and D. In this sense, it functions as a bridge between the manuscript traditions, and is a valuable aid in cases where the text could go either way. Manuscript T, which Landauer was not able to consult, is damaged, surviving the fire in the Biblioteca nazionale universitaria in 1904. Its edges are burnt, resulting in the loss of approximately 10% of the text. Still, it is a fascinating and valuable manuscript with many independent features that are discussed in detail below. T seems to reflect some kind of later edition of the text (“Version III”), which actively interferes with the received text in numerous cases, and is perhaps the outcome of some “critical” editing, choosing what it sees as the correct reading after consulting more manuscripts. As will become clear, it is possible that the author of the edition that T reflects compared Moshe’s translation with the Arabic. At its core—namely before the changes it makes to the text—it is close to the tradition mainly reflected in D, B, and R, but sometimes adopts superior readings also found in A and M, as well as remnants from the version reflected in C and O. Figure 2 above displays the relationship between the existing manuscripts as I have come to understand it. I will now present evidence for the hypothesis that three different versions of the Hebrew translation should be assumed: (I) an early translation, (II) a

77

the textual tradition

revised translation, and (III) a later edition, which is based on Version II.112 Version I is largely represented in manuscripts C, O, and the manuscript which C1 consulted when correcting C. Version II is represented in manuscripts A, B, D, M, and R. N, as I wrote, exhibits influence from both. Version III is represented in manuscript T. Unlike T, whose features set it apart from the rest, readings from Version I occasionally—but not often—find themselves also in manuscripts which represent Version II. This is not surprising, as both versions were in circulation and it is likely that they were occasionally compared to each other when producing new copies, a common practice of medieval Hebrew scholars and copyists.113 I will now present examples for different features I found among the manuscripts that support my hypothesis (and one that does not).114 table 29

Terminological differences between Versions I and II (partial list)

Arabic (where available)

Version I

Version II

‫مثال‬ ‫يتعر ّى‬ ‫يشهد‬ ‫فرق‬ ‫لما‬ – ‫نتوقى‬ – – ‫تخلو‬ ‫مبتور‬ – – ‫قائد‬

‫משל‬ ‫מופשט‬ ‫ישרו‬ ‫הבדל‬ ‫בעבור‬ ‫אומן‬ ‫נרחיק‬ ‫יסוד‬ ‫חשק הזריזות‬ ‫תחסר‬ ‫מושלך‬ ‫איש‬ ‫ממונה‬ ‫שליט‬

‫דמיון‬ ‫ערום‬ ‫יעידו‬ ‫הפרש‬ ‫מפני‬ ‫צורף‬ ‫נזהר‬ ‫עקר‬ ‫אהבת המלחמה‬ ‫תמלט‬ ‫נבדל‬ ‫אדם‬ ‫מתעסק‬ ‫שוטר‬

112 113 114

Hence, whenever T is not discussed explicitly, it can be taken to share the same features of Version II. See for example Beit-Arié, “Transmission,” 48–50. The specific difficulties surrounding the terms reflecting “matter” and “element” throughout the manuscripts are analyzed in detail in Appendix C.

78

chapter 1

Table 29

Terminological differences between Versions (cont.)

Arabic (where available)

Version I

Version II

‫خلاف‬ ‫أوقات‬ – – – –

‫הפך‬ ‫זמנים‬ ‫סדר‬ ‫יותר מדאי‬ ‫חטאו‬ ‫התעבות‬

‫חלוף‬ ‫עתים‬ ‫מדרגה‬ ‫שלא כשורה‬ ‫טעו‬ ‫קושי‬

In table 29 can be found a select list of different choices of Hebrew terms for translating various Arabic terms, presented where they are available. Some of these choices are more consistent than others, and a full picture sometimes requires analysis per occurrence rather than per term, but in aggregation they exhibit a useful starting point for distinguishing between two versions. All the terms in Version I appear in manuscript C, setting it apart from the rest of the manuscripts (D, A, B, M, and T). Occasionally a terminological choice in C finds its way into one of the other manuscripts, so it is not completely isolated from the rest of the traditions (unlike T, some of whose features are unique and are discussed below). This is one of the reasons I think that Version I is earlier (I will show examples when discussing, for example, tables 31 and 36). I believe that most of the terminological changes can be explained as attempts to improve the translation, either by providing a more exact term, or for the sake of maintaining consistent terminology, or by reading the Arabic differently. Other changes reflect matters of taste. Take the term ‫مثال‬, for instance. Version I translates it into ‫משל‬, while Version II translates it into ‫דמיון‬. But we also find that in Version I the term ‫ مثل‬is translated into ‫ משל‬as well. So when translating ‫ مثال‬as ‫משל‬, Version I masks the difference between the two Arabic terms. Version II rectifies this by replacing ‫ משל‬with ‫ דמיון‬when translating ‫مثال‬, effectively maintaining consistent terminology where ‫ مثل‬is ‫ משל‬and ‫ مثال‬is ‫דמיון‬. In other words, in this case, Version II revises Version I for the sake of terminological differentiation. Another example is the difference between ‫( אומן‬Version I) and ‫( צורף‬Version II). This occurs only in a specific context, where Themistius’ discussion has Platonic undertones.115 In this case we do not have the Arabic, but there is a pos115

See Commentary on ‫ה‬20–25.

the textual tradition

79

sible explanation for this. Frequently, Arabic manuscripts are written in skeletal scripts, omitting dashes, diacritical points, hamzas, etc. These are known as rasms (“outlines”), and may sometimes render the Arabic script ambiguous. The rasm of the terms ‫“( صانع‬artisan,” ‫ )אומן‬and ‫“( صائغ‬goldsmith,” ‫)צורף‬ is the same (‫)صاىع‬. Version I read the Arabic in the former sense throughout the text. Version II, while also sometimes reading ‫ صانع‬and translating ‫אומן‬, in the present context reads ‫صائغ‬. There are two supporting pieces of evidence for this: first, ‫ صائغ‬was occasionally used to translate Themistius’ usage of δημιουργός (“demiurge”),116 which fits the discussion here.117 Second, Version I seems to be at unease with the verb ‫صاغ‬, as in its translation of ‫ה‬24 it uses the root ‫חק״ה‬, which renders the text meaningless, perhaps reflecting the meaning of ‫ صاغ‬as preparing a thing “after the pattern of a right model.”118 Version II is consistent and uses the root ‫צר״ף‬. Another consideration for revising a certain passage could be technical issues, as can be seen in the case of the Arabic term ‫“( فرق‬difference”); Version I has ‫הבדל‬, while Version II has ‫הפרש‬. Both options are legitimate, but judging from the overall use of the root ‫ בד״ל‬throughout the manuscripts, it is almost exclusively used in the context of an actual ontological difference/separation, while in this case the discussion is about a difference between two types of inquiry.119 One final example I present here briefly is the case of ‫“( نتوقى‬we will beware”), which is translated as ‫( נרחיק‬Version I) and as ‫( נזהר‬Version II). While both options are valid, within the manuscripts the Hebrew root ‫ רח״ק‬is usually reserved for the Arabic root ‫بعد‬, so Version II also maintains terminological consistency.120

116 117 118 119

120

This can be gathered from Isḥāq’s Arabic translation of Themistius’ paraphrase of On the Soul (see Lyons, Arabic, 180,8). Themistius’ discussion in this passage alludes to “divine artistry,” reminiscent of the Demiurge of Plato’s Timaeus. Lane, Lexicon, s.v., ‫( صوغ‬1). The present example is taken from ‫ב‬9; in other instances where the root ‫ בד״ל‬is used in a non-ontological context there is confusion among the manuscripts (e.g., ‫ל‬19–20; ‫לג‬3). See for example in the present text ‫י‬32, ‫יא‬1, ‫יא‬4, ‫יז‬29.

80 table 30

chapter 1 Terminological differences between Version III and other versions (partial list)

Arabic (when available)

Version II (I)

MS T (= Version III)

‫أنحاء‬ ‫نظامه‬ ‫توهمنا‬ ‫نشوء‬ ‫المشاكلة‬ – – ‫حذق‬ – – ‫السماء‬ – – –

(‫דרכים )מינים‬

‫ענינים‬ ‫חבורו‬ ‫חשבנו‬ ‫צמיחה‬ ‫המשותפים‬ ‫על כל פנים‬ ‫בדברים‬ ‫בקיאות‬ ‫ברח‬ ‫נמשך אחר‬ ‫השמים‬ ‫גרעין‬ ‫המון‬ ‫צווי‬

‫ישרו‬ ‫דמינו‬ ‫ִגדוּל‬ ‫המתדמים‬ ‫באי זה ענין‬ ‫בטבעים‬ ‫ערמה‬ ‫רחק‬ ‫שם מגמתו‬ ‫הרקיע‬ ‫התחלה‬ ‫רעיה‬ ‫ענין‬

Moving to Version III (represented only in manuscript T), table 30 lists examples of cases where its terminology sets it apart from the rest of the manuscripts. These examples, along with the other peculiarities (more examples of which are discussed below), lead me to assume that it is a later redaction of the text. A corollary question is whether its editor compared the translation with the Arabic or just worked critically with the Hebrew material according to different terminological conventions. Looking at table 30, some of the cases indeed seem like matters of preference (‫השמים‬/‫ )הרקיע‬or nuance (‫בקיאות‬/‫ערמה‬ for ‫צמיחה ;حذق‬/‫ גדול‬for ‫)نشوء‬, while others demand a more thorough analysis. I discuss two examples here. The last entry in table 30 shows two different terms, with different meanings, in all the manuscripts but T on the one hand, and manuscript T on the other hand—namely ‫ ענין‬and ‫( צווי‬the full expression is ‫הצווי אשר יצוה המלך בו‬/‫)הענין‬. Although the Arabic here is lost, it is almost certain that the term translated is ‫أمر‬, which in the present context means either “thing” or “command.” While both alternatives are valid, the least we can say about the editor reflected in T is that he knew that ‫ ענין‬and ‫ צווי‬can translate the same Arabic word. It is not nec-

81

the textual tradition

essary to have access to the Arabic text to know this, or to decide to change the text accordingly. This can also be maintained about the term ‫רעיה‬, which T substitutes with ‫המון‬. Without the Arabic, the term ‫ רעיה‬is peculiar. ‫רעיה‬, of course, means “beloved companion,” but this is not what Themistius is talking about in the context of his discussion (the political authority of the king). ‫ רעיה‬can also mean “herding” in a political sense,121 but the term is used with reference to the object of the king’s governance rather than with reference to the king’s activity.122 Brague, in his French translation of Themistius’ paraphrase, suggests that it is a transcription of the Arabic word ‫رعية‬, which means “herd” or “flock,” but is also a collective noun for “subjects” or “citizens.”123 If Brague is correct—and I think he is—then the Hebrew of Versions I and II is an extrapolation from the root ‫ רע״ה‬based on a cognate in Arabic, a common method in Hebrew translations.124 T’s choice of ‫“( המון‬the multitude”) strengthens the position that the version T is based upon was made by someone who had access to the Arabic text. I return to this point later (below, table 42). table 31

Arabic CD ABLa

Gloss in ‫א‬7

‫…أو كان تأليفه من أشياء متفرقة كتأليف العسكر والمدينة‬ ‫…או יהיה חבורו מדברים נבדלים מפוזרים כחבור החיל והמדינה‬ ‫… או היה חבורו מדברים מפוזרים כחבור החיל והמדינה‬

a Manuscript T erringly omits this sentence.

So far, I discussed the terminological differences between different versions of the Hebrew translation. Now I move to examples where the deliberation within the translation procedure itself is revealed among the manuscripts. The first kind of phenomena I address is glosses within the text that exhibit different options for translating a given term. In table 31 we can see that the Arabic word ‫“( متفرقة‬dispersed”) is translated into two different words (‫ נבדלים‬and ‫)מפוזרים‬

121 122 123 124

See Ben Yehuda, Dictionary, s.v. ‫רעיה‬. I would like to thank Gad Freudenthal for this point. See, for example, ‫כה‬25–26: ‫כמו שהנימוס בהדרכת המדינות אחד וכן הענין במלך אחד ויהיה‬ ‫ההמון יתנועע בתשוקה מהם להמשך אחר אותו הנימוס‬/‫כל הרעיה‬ Brague based his translation upon Landauer’s edition and critical apparatus, so he was unaware of T. I would like to thank Yehuda Halper for this point.

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chapter 1

in C and D, whereas the rest of the manuscripts decide in favor of ‫מפוזרים‬. Very likely, ‫ נבדלים‬was changed into ‫מפוזרים‬, possibly in the margin, and some manuscripts transmitted both readings. table 32

Gloss in ‫טז‬5–7

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.1072a21–23

C

καὶ ἔστι τι ἀεὶ κινούμενον κίνησιν ἄπαυστον, αὕτη δ’ ἡ κύκλῳ (καὶ τοῦτο οὐ λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλ’ ἔργῳ δῆλον). There is something which is eternally moved with an unceasing motion, and that is circular motion. (This is evident not merely in theory, but in fact.) ‫ונאמר שהנה ימצא גשם יתנועע תנועה אין מנוחה לה והיא התנועה‬ C1 in) ‫על הסבוב ושהוא לא יתבאר במאמר לבד אבל בפועל בשכל‬ ‫ סא אין בו מלת בשכל( גם כן‬:marg.

AMT

‫ונאמר שהנה ימצא גשם יתנועע תנועה אין מנוחה לה והיא התנועה על‬ ‫הסבוב ושהוא לא התבאר במאמר לבד אבל בשכל גם כן‬

L

‫ונאמר שהנה ימצא גשם יתנועע תנועה אין מנוחה לה והיא התנועה על‬ ‫הסבוב ושהוא לא יתבאר במאמר לבד אבל בפועל גם כן‬

Another example with the same phenomenon can be found in table 32, in a passage where the Arabic is lost. As can be seen, manuscript C has two terms (‫בפעל‬ ‫)בשכל‬, while the rest of the manuscripts only have one (‫)בשכל‬. C1’s value here can be appreciated, as it notes in the margin of C “it [i.e., the manuscript which is compared to C] does not contain the word ‫בשכל‬.” The explanation for the confusion is probably a rasm in the Arabic, which could have been read either as ‫“( بالفعل‬in fact”; ‫ )בפעל‬or as ‫“( بالعقل‬in the intellect”; ‫;)בשכל‬125 both options were put forth, perhaps one in the margin as an alternative reading. The preference of ‫ בשכל‬was the wrong one; Themistius is very close to Aristotle own words here, and Aristotle writes ἔργῳ (“in fact”). Granted, there was no way that the translator could have known this, as the alternative, taken by itself, makes sense.

125

This is a recurring problem in the present text.

83

the textual tradition table 33

Error and correction in translating lā budda min (1) (‫יב‬3–4)

Arabic (abridgment) CD

‫لا بد من أن يكون للموجودات جوهر دائم الوجود عنه وجودها‬

(‫ סא שלא יהיה‬:C1) ‫העצמים וזולתם מן הנמצאות בלתי אפשר שיהיה‬ ‫להם עצם מתמיד המציאות ממנו מציאותם‬

A

‫העצמים וזולתם מן הנמצאות בלתי אפשר להם שיהיה להם עצם בלתי‬ ‫מתמיד המציאות ממנו מציאותם‬

MT

‫העצמים וזולתם מן הנמצאות צריך על כל פנים שיהיה להם עצם‬ ‫מתמיד המציאות ממנו מציאותם‬

BL

‫העצמים וזולתם מן הנמצאות אי אפשר מבלתי שיהיה להם עצם‬ ‫מתמיד המציאות ממנו מציאותם‬

If my hypothesis about an early and revised version is correct, and that the movement between the former and the latter (in the majority of the cases) is for the better, one would expect errors in Version I to be corrected in Version II. Indeed, there are some cases where this is apparent. One of these cases is the translation of the Arabic expression ‫لا بد من‬, which is a sort of double negation whose meaning is something like “cannot not,” or affirmatively, “necessarily.” Looking at the manuscripts, we can see that CD, which represent in this case Version I, are having trouble with the double negation, effectively turning it into a single negation (‫ )בלתי אפשר שיהיה‬and reversing the meaning of the sentence: instead of translating “the substances and the other existents cannot not have a perduring substance, from which they attain their existence,” Version I has “the substances and the other existents cannot have a perduring substance, from which they attain their existence,” which is an error. C1, characteristically meticulous, notes a correct alternative (‫)בלתי אפשר שלא יהיה‬, which is stylized in B (‫)אי אפשר מבלתי שיהיה‬. The original error is transferred onto manuscript A, which expresses the need for another negation somewhere, but puts it in the wrong place, consequently getting the translation wrong but at least retaining the spirit of the original sentence: “the substances and the other existents cannot have a non-perduring substance, from which they attain their existence.”126 126

This, of course, could also have been a simple scribal error (copying ‫ בלתי‬twice) rather than a conscious decision.

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This is not what Themistius is trying to say in this sentence, although he would agree with the proposition. Finally, M and T reflect a neat solution that turns the double negation into an affirmation, using the expression ‫צריך על כל פנים‬. This is less literal, but probably easier to digest. This solution may be the work of an intelligent scribe/editor. table 34

Arabic

Error and correction in translating lā budda min (2) (‫ח‬10–11)

‫فلا بد من ان تكون أنساب وصور قد جعلت فى الطبيعة‬

C

‫ משיהיו( יחסים וצורות כבר הושמו בטבע‬:C1) ‫ואי אפשר משהיה‬

D

‫ואי אפשר מבלתי יחסים וצורות כבר הושמו בטבע‬

AT

‫ואי אפשר מבלתי שיהיה יחסים וצורות כבר הושמו בטבע‬

BML

‫ואי אפשר מבלתי שיהיו יחסים וצורות כבר הושמו בטבע‬

Version I’s grappling with ‫ لا بد من‬can also be seen in table 34, where C repeats the failure to reflect the double negation, while the other manuscripts correct the error either clumsily (D) or elegantly (the rest). table 35

Arabic

Dead horses and bulls (‫ז‬29–30)

‫نرى جنسا ًمن الزنابير يتولد من أبدان الخيل الميتة ونرى النحل ٺتولد من أبدان البقر‬ ‫الميتة‬

C

‫ מן גופות( הבהמות ונראה כי הדבורים‬:C1) ‫נראה סוג מן הצרעה יתילדו מגופות‬ ‫יתילדו מגופות הבקר המתים‬

D

‫נראה סוג מן הצרעת יתילד בגופות הבהמות המתות ונראה הדבורים יתילדו‬ ‫מגופות השוורים המתים‬

AM B

‫ יתילדו( מגופות השוורים המתים‬:M) ‫נראה סוג מן הצרעה יתילד‬ ‫נראה סוג מן הצרעה יתילדו מגופות הסוסים ונראה דבורים יתילדו מגופות‬ ‫הבקר המתים‬

the textual tradition Table 35

85

Dead horses and bulls (‫ז‬29–30) (cont.)

T

‫נראה סוג מן הצרעה יתילד מגופות הסוסים המתות ונראה הדבורים יתילדו‬ ‫מגופות השורים המתים‬

L

‫נראה סוג מן הצרעה יתילדו מן גופות הבהמות ונראה כי הדבורים יתילדו‬ ‫מגופות השוורים המתים‬

Table 35 shows a case where one word (‫“ ;الخيل‬the horses”) is mistranslated and another (‫“ ;البقر‬the cattle”) is rendered clumsily in Version I. Both words are singular collective nouns which are grammatically treated as plural in the Arabic. Manuscripts C and D have ‫ الخيل‬translated as ‫“( הבהמות‬the beasts”), which manuscripts B and T correct to ‫( הסוסים‬A and M reflect an accidental scribal omission of this part of the sentence). Manuscripts C and B have ‫ البقر‬translated/transcribed into ‫הבקר‬, thus mixing singular and plural in the Hebrew (‫)מגופות הבקר המתים‬. Manuscripts D, A, M, and T have ‫השוורים‬, which is plural and fits better with the sentence. The dispersion of the variations among the manuscripts and their focus in C is strong support for the hypothesis that C is the testimony closest to Version I. It is also noteworthy that Version I (in C and B) omits the first occurrence of ‫“( الميتة‬the dead”), retained in D and T. table 36

Misreading the Arabic and subsequent correction (‫כא‬22–24)

Aristotle, Metaph., 12. 1072b26–28

Arabic

C

AMT

καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ’ αὑτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ἀΐδιος. Moreover, life belongs to God. For the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and the essential actuality of God is life most good and eternal. ‫هو الحياة بعينها لأنه هو الفعل والفعل حياة وكما أنه أفضل الأفعال كذلك هو‬ ‫أفضل الحياة وكما أنه فعل أزلى دائم كذلك هو حياة أزلية دائمة‬ ‫ החיים( ושלמותו‬:C1) ‫הוא החיים בעצמם כי הוא הפועל והפועל חיים‬ ‫ שלימות ונכבד מכל( הפעולות‬+ :C1) ‫( יותר נכבד מכל‬C1 del.) (‫)*وكماله‬ ‫ נכבד מאדוני החיים וכמו שהוא‬+ :C1) ‫ והוא( גם כן‬:C1) ‫( הוא‬C1 del.) ‫כן‬ ‫פועל נצחי מתמיד( חיים נצחיים תמידים‬

:MT) ‫ הפעל( והפועל‬:T) ‫ עצמם( כי הוא הפועל‬:T) ‫הוא החיים נפשם‬ :M) ‫והפעל( חיים וכמו שיש לו )*وكما له( היותר נכבדת מכל הפעלות‬

86 Table 36

chapter 1 Misreading the Arabic and subsequent correction (‫כא‬22–24) (cont.)

:T) ‫הפעולות( כן הוא גם כן היותר נכבד מאדני החיים וכמו שהוא פועל‬ ‫ חיים‬:MT) ‫ מתמיד( כמו כן הוא החיים הנצחיים‬:T) ‫פעל( נצחי המתמיד‬ ‫נצחיים( תמידיים‬ B

‫הוא החיים בנפשם כי הוא הפועל והפועל חיים ושלמותו )*وكماله( וכמו‬ ‫שיש לו )*وكما له( היותר מכל הפעולות כן ג״כ יותר נכבד מאדני החיים‬ ‫וכמו שהוא פועל נצחי מתמיד כמו כן חיים תמידיים נצחיים‬

L

‫הוא החיים בנפשם כי הוא הפועל והפועל חיים ושלמותו וכמו שיש לו‬ ‫היותר נכבד מכל הפעולות כן הוא גם כן היותר נכבד מאדני החיים וכמו‬ ‫שהוא פועל נצחי מתמיד כמו כן הוא חיים תמידיים נצחיים‬

Perhaps one of the best pieces of evidence that Version II is a revision of Version I can be found in table 36. Looking at the Arabic, we can see that after writing that God is life in itself and actuality (which for Themistius are virtually synonymous in this context), Themistius offers two comparisons with the same construction (…‫)וכמו שהוא… כמו כן הוא… ;وكما أنه… كذلك هو‬. In manuscript C we find, instead of the first part of the first comparison, the term ‫ושלמותו‬ (“and His perfection”). Manuscript B has both ‫ ושלמותו‬and a modified comparison particle (‫)ושלמותו וכמו שיש לו‬, while the other manuscripts (A, M, and T) drop ‫( ושלמותו‬C1 offers a strange construction, putting ‫ שלמות‬somewhere else in the clause). Although not easily noticed, this reflects a process similar to the ones encountered in tables 31 and 32: (a) Version I by itself (‫( ;)ושלמותו‬b) a manuscript containing Version I and Version II (‫ ;)ושלמותו וכמו שיש לו‬and (c) Version II by itself (‫)וכמו שיש לו‬. But how did this come about? Here is my conjecture. The word ‫ ושלמותו‬in Arabic is ‫وكماله‬, and the expression ‫ וכמו שיש לו‬is, in Arabic, ‫( وكما له‬the same sequence of letters divided into two words). Version I read it in the former sense, and Version II corrected it to the latter sense, which is truer to the text, but still not entirely correct, since ‫ وكما له‬is a distortion of ‫وكما أنه‬, which was in the original Arabic translation (but this distortion could have already been present in the Arabic manuscript from which the Hebrew was made). It is easier to explain the distortion of ‫ وكما أنه‬into ‫ ;وكما له‬the word ‫الأفعال‬ can mean either “actualities” or “actions.” The former meaning demands ‫وكما‬ ‫( أنه‬which would form “and just as He is the best of the actualities,” reflecting Aristotle’s ἐνέργεια), and the latter demands ‫“( وكما له‬and just as He has the best actions,” misunderstanding ‫ الأفعال‬as “the actions”).

the textual tradition

87

Concerning this example one should also note the different translations of ‫ بعينه‬as either ‫עצמם‬/‫( בעצמם‬C and T) or ‫נפשם‬/‫( בנפשם‬the rest) and the inversion ‫ תמידיים נצחיים‬in B, adopted by Landauer, instead of ‫)أزلية دائمة( נצחיים תמידיים‬. table 37

Scribal chain of errors (‫ז‬6)

C

‫ לא נברח( בקצתם שיהיו מופשטות מן‬:C1) ‫ואולם הצורות אשר בטבע לא נברא‬ ‫הגשם‬

D

‫ואולם הצורות אשר בטבע הנה לא נבראו קצתם שיהיו מן פשטות)!( מן הגשם‬

A

‫ואולם הצורות אשר בטבע לא נברא בקצתם שיהיו מופשטות מן הגשם‬

BM

‫ואולם הצורות אשר בטבע אשר נבראו הנה קצתם שיהיו מופשטות מן הגשם‬

T

‫ יותר ראוי( קצתם שיהיו מופשטות‬:in marg.) ‫ואולם הצורות אשר בטבע הנה נראו‬ ‫מן הגשם‬

L

‫ואולם הצורות אשר בטבע לא נברח בקצתם שיהיו מופשטות מן הגשם‬

The interplay within the different textual traditions can sometimes cause a chain of errors, which, as can be seen in table 37, may lead to rather dramatic places. In this case, a simple scribal error copied ‫ נברא‬instead of ‫נברח‬, rendering the sentence unintelligible (as can be seen in C and A), but nevertheless resulting in an apparent connection between forms and creation, a lead which is taken up in different manners in D on the one hand, and B and M on the other hand. D is a corruption of the claim that “some of the forms in nature were not created abstracted from the body,” while B and M state that “some of the forms in nature, which have been created, are abstracted from the body.” T reflects an ad hoc correction of ‫ נבראו‬into ‫“( נראו‬have been observed,” or “have been thought”), but the scribe seems to be uncomfortable with this formulation and suggests an alternative (‫ )יותר ראוי‬in the margin, having the sentence mean “it is better for some of the natural forms to be abstracted from the body.” C1, comparing C with a better manuscript of the same tradition, corrects the sentence to its original meaning: “we cannot avoid saying that some of the forms in nature are abstracted from the body.” This is how a simple scribal error amounts to a far-reaching metaphysical claim, namely that natural forms are created. Another point to notice in this example is Version I’s tendency not to strictly follow the translation of the Arabic construction …‫ أما… ف‬into ‫אולם…הנה‬.

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Oftentimes C, the most consistent expression of Version I, omits ‫הנה‬, as is the case here. This construction is usually more strictly followed in the other manuscripts. table 38

Possible counterexample at ‫לב‬11

Aristotle, … ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς κινῆσαν ἢ ὡς εἶδος Metaph., 1075b1 C AM

‫על צד השלמות או על צד המניע או על צד המין‬ ‫על צד השלמות או על צד המניע או על צד שום המין במקום הצורה‬

B

‫על צד המניע אם על צד השלמות או על צד הצורה‬

T

‫או על צד הצורה‬

L

‫על צד השלמות או על צד המניע או על צד הצורה‬

In this passage Aristotle discusses thinkers who recognize that the good is the first cause but do not explain in what manner it is a cause, bringing up three possible options, namely the final cause, the moving cause, and the formal cause. Themistius, in turn, quotes the list of options word for word. The Arabic is lost. As can be seen from table 38, C has ‫ המין‬for the third option, B and T have ‫( הצורה‬the first two options are burnt in T), and A and M have ‫שום המין במקום הצורה‬, which seems like instructions for revision which found their way into the body of the text. This example, taken by itself, would suggest that ‫ הצורה‬was the original translation that had been subsequently revised into ‫המין‬. In other words, it would reverse the sequence I have hitherto argued for. There is no easy way to explain this besides weighing the present example against the overwhelming amount of evidence that suggests the opposite. Since Aristotle’s Greek has εἶδος, which Themistius would have no reason to change, it would be natural to think that the underlying Arabic was ‫صورة‬. However, there are many documented cases for Isḥāq translating εἶδος as ‫نوع‬.127 Since genera and forms are basically the same thing in Aristotelian philosophy,

127

See for example Gutas, Theophrastus, Lexicon s.v. εἶδος.

the textual tradition

89

the preference of one over the other can depend on context, not only on a given term, so this may also be a scribal initiative. Be this as it may, it is also odd that B and T, which are generally closer to C than are A and M, do not share this feature with C whereas the other two do. Perhaps the version in A (which M follows) is the result of a scribe’s comparison between two Hebrew versions— one with ‫ הצורה‬and one with ‫—המין‬which was noted in the margins stating the scribe’s preference. table 39

Active editing in Version III (1) (‫ג‬29–30)

Arabic

‫وأما نحن فلما كان أكثر ما فينا مجبولا ًمن الجوهر المحسوس صرنا نتكلم فى هذا الجوهر‬ ً ‫أولا‬

C

‫ואולם אנחנו בעבור שהיה רוב מה שהיה לנו מוגבל מן העצם המורגש הלכנו‬ ‫לדבר )*تكلم( בו תחלה‬

DAM

‫ הוא( מוגבל מן העצם‬+ :M) ‫ שיהיה( בנו‬:A) ‫ואולם אנחנו מפני שרוב מה שהיה‬ ‫המוחש בחרנו לדבר בו תחלה‬

B

‫ואולם אנחנו בעבור שהיה בנו מוגבל מן העצם המוחש כוננו לדבר בו תחלה‬

T

‫ואולם אנחנו מפני שרוב מה שיהיה בנו מוצר מן העצם המורגש הנה נדבר‬ ‫)نتكلم( בו תחלה‬

L

‫ואולם אנחנו בעבור שרוב מה שיהיה בנו מוגבל מן העצם המורגש הלכנו לדבר‬ ‫בו תחלה‬

In the final five examples I highlight some distinctive features of manuscript T (= Version III), which exhibits some independent editorial decisions, some terminological innovations, and perhaps had access to the Arabic. In table 39 we find a case of clever terminological innovation in T, as well as an elegant editorial solution. In all the manuscripts but T, the Arabic term ‫مجبول‬ (“molded”; probably from the Greek verb πλάσσω) is translated with the opaque term ‫מוגבל‬, which seems like a loan translation, i.e., assigning a Hebrew word resembling an Arabic one a meaning derived from its Arabic counterpart.128 Brague, in his French translation, notes that ‫ גיבול‬in Rabbinic Hebrew means

128

I would like to thank Gad Freudenthal for this point.

90

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molding,129 and perhaps this was what Moshe ibn Tibbon aimed at (but then, perhaps, one would expect the form ‫)מגובל‬. T’s alternative, ‫מוצר‬, a passive participle of the verb ‫“( צר‬shaped”) is both innovative and a lucid reflection of the Arabic, and this decision seems to be based on an acquaintance with the Arabic. Another notable feature in this example is the treatment of the Arabic expression ‫صرنا نتكلم‬. Now ‫ صرنا‬is an auxiliary Arabic verb and as such does not always reflect an underlying Greek word,130 and the various Hebrew manuscripts are confused by it: C has ‫( הלכנו‬adopted by Landauer); D, A, and M have ‫ ;בחרנו‬and B has ‫כוננו‬. All these options necessitate turning the verb ‫ نتكلم‬into an infinitive (‫ )לדבר‬to retain proper Hebrew grammar (or perhaps read ‫ تكلم‬in the first place). T’s approach—‫—הנה נדבר‬is clever, since it uses ‫ הנה‬as the auxiliary and retains ‫ نتكلم‬as a verb. table 40

Active editing in Version III (2) (‫ג‬21–22)

Arabic

‫وأما الذين جعلوا الجوهر المعقول واحدا ً فمن ظّن أن الأبعاد التعاليمية هى الجواهر وألغى‬ ‫أمر الصور‬

C

‫ואולם אשר שמו העצם המושכל אחד הוא אשר חשב כי המרחקים הלמודיים‬ ‫ והניחו( ענין הצורה‬:C1) ‫הם העצמים והכחות‬

DAM

‫ואולם אשר שמו העצם המושכל אחד הוא אשר חשב כי המרחקים הלמודיים‬ ‫הם העצמים והכחות ענין הצורה‬

T

‫ואולם אשר שמו העצם המושכל אחד הוא אשר חשב כי המרחקים הלמודיים‬ ‫הם העצמים ובטלו ענין הצורות‬

L

‫ואולם אשר שמו העצם המושכל אחד הם אשר חשבו כי המרחקים הלמודיים‬ ‫הם העצמים והניחו ענין הצורה‬

Similar features of manuscript T can be found in table 40. First, there is an obvious corruption in the transmission of the Hebrew, where the verb ‫והניחו‬, translating ‫وألغى‬, turns into ‫והכחות‬, completely changing the meaning of the sentence. C1, as we have come to appreciate, corrects this. T, however, opts for

129 130

Brague, Thémistius, 53n6. Gutas, Theophrastus, Lexicon, s.v. ṣyr(c).

‫‪91‬‬

‫‪the textual tradition‬‬

‫‪—which is just as good. Interestingly, all the‬ובטלו—‪a different term altogether‬‬ ‫‪. T‬الصور ‪, in the singular, for the Arabic’s plural‬הצורה ‪manuscripts besides T have‬‬ ‫‪, and this again makes one wonder whether‬הצורות ‪independently has the plural‬‬ ‫‪this version worked with the Arabic.‬‬ ‫)‪2–4‬ב( )‪Active editing in Version III (3‬‬

‫‪table 41‬‬

‫لـكن إن الجوهر الواحد بعينه يوجد ثابتا ًولا ٺثبت فيه الأعراض بأعيانها لـكن ٺتبدل‬ ‫وٺتعاقب فبعضها يحدث و بعضها يبطل مثل المقادير والحالات والأفعال والانفعال‬ ‫والأماكن والأزمنة وسا ئر ما أشبه ذلك من الأجناس‬

‫‪Arabic‬‬

‫אבל העצם האחד בעינו ימצא קיים ולא יתקיימו מקרים אחדים בעינם אבל‬ ‫יומרו ויבאו זה בעקב זה ויתחדשו קצתם ויבטלו קצתם כמו השעורים והענינים‬ ‫והפעולות וההתפעלות והמקומות והזמנים )‪ + :C1‬ומה( שדומה לזה מן הסוגים‬

‫‪C‬‬

‫אבל העצם האחד בעינו ימצא קיים ולא יתקיים בו מקרים אחדים בעינם אבל‬ ‫יומרו ויבאו זה בעקב ויתחדשו קצתם ויתבטלו קצתם כמו השעורים והענינים‬ ‫והפעולות והמקומות והזמנים ומה שדומה לזה מן הסוגים‬

‫‪D‬‬

‫אבל העצם האחד בעינו ימצא קיים ולא יתקיימו בו מקרים אחדים בעינם אבל‬ ‫ילכו ויבאו בעקב זה ויתחדשו קצתם ויבטלו קצתם כמו השעורים והענינים‬ ‫והפעלות והתפעולות)!( והמקומות והזמנים ומה שדומה להם מן הסוגים‬

‫‪A‬‬

‫אבל העצם האחד בעינו ימצא קיים ולא יתקיימו בו מקרים אחדים בעינם אבל‬ ‫יומרנו)?( ויבואו זה בעקב זה ויתחדשו קצתם ויבטלו קצתם כמו השעורים‬ ‫והענינים והפעל וההפעלות והמקומות והזמנים ומה שדומה לזה מן הסוגים‬

‫‪B‬‬

‫אבל ]…[ ימצא קיים ולא יתקיימו בו מקרים אחדים ]…[ בעקב זה ויתחדשו‬ ‫קצתם ויבטלו קצתם ]…[ וההפעלויות והמקומות והזמנים ]…[‬

‫‪T‬‬

‫אבל העצם האחד בעינו ימצא קיים ולא יתקיימו בו מקרים אחדים בעינם אבל‬ ‫ילכו ויבאו זה בעקב זה ויתחדשו קצתם ויבטלו קצתם כמו השעורים והענינים‬ ‫והפעולות וההתפעלות והמקומות והזמנים ומה שדומה לזה מן הסוגים‬

‫‪L‬‬

‫‪In table 41 we can see Version III fine tuning the text, either for stylistic con‬‬‫‪siderations or based on an Arabic version. Before discussing this, it should be‬‬ ‫—الأعراض بأعيانها( ‪noted that the Hebrew and the Arabic differ in two places‬‬ ‫ٺتبدل ‪), and also that the Hebrew rendering of‬ומה—وسا ئر ما ;מקרים אחדים בעינם‬ ‫‪. B‬יומרו )ٺتبدل( ויבאו זה בעקב זה )وٺتعاقب( ‪ is inconsistent: C and D have‬وٺتعاقب‬

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corrupts ‫ יומרו‬and probably has ‫יומרנו‬, while A replaces it with ‫ילכו‬, probably an unconscious reference to the Hebrew expression ‫( ילכו ויבאו‬T is burnt in many parts of this sentence). An interesting feature here is the list of Aristotelian categories, all of which are introduced in the plural, except for the category of affection (‫)انفعال‬, which is in singular. In fact, this is also a conjecture since the Arabic manuscript has ‫والأفعال والأفعال‬, which has been tentatively corrected to ‫والأفعال والانفعال‬. The Hebrew manuscripts are confused by this; while C and B translate in the singular, A offers an unintelligible form (‫)והתפעולות‬, and D omits it altogether. Only T, either due to stylistic considerations or based on an Arabic version which contained ‫والانفعالات‬, aligns this category with the others and translates in the plural (see also Commentary on ‫ב‬4 below). table 42

Did Version III have access to the Arabic? (‫י‬2)

Arabic

‫( فليس‬see Aristotle, Metaph., 12.1070b24 ;Gr. *στοιχεῖον) ً ‫وما كان عنصرا‬ ‫مانع يمنع من أن يقال له مبدأ‬

C DAMB

‫ומה שיהיה חומר אינו נמנע שיקרא התחלה‬ ‫ שהוא( יסוד אינו נמנע שיקרא התחלה‬:AM) ‫ומה שהיה‬

T

‫ומה שיהיה יסוד אינו ימנע מונע שיאמרו בו התחלה‬

L

‫ומה שהיה יסוד אינו נמנע שיקרא התחלה‬

Table 42 seems to offer support to the assumption that the author of Version III had access to the Arabic. Besides the issue of the dual translation of ‫( عنصر‬see Appendix C), this sentence bears no challenges for the translator. While the Arabic has ‫فليس مانع يمنع‬, all the Hebrew manuscripts, except for T, read ‫אינו‬ ‫נמנע‬, probably reflecting a slightly different Arabic version, which omitted ‫مانع‬, and consequently reading ‫ يمنع‬as a passive verb. T, however, reflects the Arabic we have perfectly (‫—)ימנע מונע‬and I can see no explanation for this occurring without the involvement of an Arabic text, since the Hebrew of the other manuscripts, taken by itself, is unproblematic. What is more, the Arabic expression ‫ يقال له‬is frequently translated into ‫( יקרא‬in the passive), and this is the case in the present sentence as well. But T opts for ‫יאמרו בו‬, retaining the customary usage of the root ‫ אמ״ר‬to translate the root ‫قول‬.

‫‪93‬‬

‫‪the textual tradition‬‬ ‫‪Additions in Version III‬‬

‫‪Evidence in al-Baġdādī‬‬

‫ولا‬ ‫يمكن أن تكون مبادئ الحركات‬ ‫كثيرة الأولى* أن تكون الطبيعة‬ ‫الأولى واحدة منبثة فى جميع‬ ‫الأفلاك )‪(49,1–3‬‬

‫‪table 43‬‬

‫‪T‬‬

‫‪Edition‬‬ ‫ואולם לפי מה שיחייבהו המופת‬

‫ואולם לפי מה שיחייבהו המופת האמתי‬

‫האמתי מן הדברים הקודמים‬

‫מן הדברים הקודמים הטבעיים ר״ל מאשר‬

‫הטבעיים ר״ל מאשר הוא בלתי‬

‫הוא בלתי אפשר שיהיו התחלות התנועות‬

‫אפשר שיהיו התחלות התנועות‬

‫רבות הנה הקודם אחדות החיות בכל‬

‫רבות הנה הקודם* שיהיה הטבע‬

‫הדברים וההשארות והנצחות הם מזה‬

‫הראשון אחד קיים בכל הגלגלים‬

‫הראשון אשר איננו בגשם והחיות בדברים‬

‫)כה‪(25–22‬‬

‫מתחלף כפי שעור רחקם וקרבם מאותו‬ ‫הראשון הנה אותו העצם שיהיה הטבע‬ ‫הראשון אחד קיים בכל הגלגלים‬

‫‪ N/A‬וכאשר ספרנו כי בכאן גשם מונח‬

‫וכאשר ספרנו כי בכאן גשם מונח ושהשכל‬

‫ושהשכל תמיד בו מה הוא אשר‬

‫תמיד בו מה הוא אשר ימנע בשכל שלא‬

‫ימנע בשכל* שהפועל והתנועה‬

‫יהיה בפעל והתנועה מעצמו לפי שאנחנו‬

‫מעצמו הנה כבר התבאר מכל אלו‬

‫נראה שהתנועה מעצם קצת הגשמים‬

‫הדברים כי האל הוא ההתחלה‬

‫במדרגת הלהבת והרוח והנהרות אשר‬

‫הראשונה ושהוא ידע עצמותו וכל‬

‫אין ראוי שנרחיק שיאמר בשכל שהפועל‬

‫הדברים אשר הוא להם התחלה‬

‫והתנועה מעצמו הנה כבר התבאר מכל‬

‫יחד )כט‪(24–22‬‬

‫אלו הדברים כי האל הוא ההתחלה‬ ‫הראשונה ושהוא ידע עצמותו וכל הדברים‬ ‫אשר הוא להם התחלה יחד‬

‫والجواهر التى لها عنصر مثل‬ ‫الصناعات العملية إذا رفع‬ ‫العنصر منها )‪(55,6‬‬

‫והדבר הנמצא מהם יחד אמנם‬

‫והדבר הנמצא מהם יחד אמנם הוא אחד‬

‫הוא אחד* בלי יסוד כמו האומניות‬

‫יאמר בו שהוא מושכל ושכל ואינו מן‬

‫המעשיות כאשר הסתלק היסוד מן הפלא אם ילכו שני אלו כעצמים אשר‬

‫האומנות )ל‪(4–3‬‬

‫לא יתערב בהם יסוד אחד שכבר נמצא‬ ‫גם כן בעצמים אשר להם בלי יסוד כמו‬ ‫האומניות המעשיות כאשר הסתלק היסוד‬ ‫מן האומנות‬

‫‪On three different occasions, manuscript T inserts significant additions to the‬‬ ‫‪text, which at first glance at least seem to be an integral part of the text rather‬‬ ‫‪than a gloss (the location of the addition is marked by an asterisk in table 43,‬‬

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and the addition itself is marked in red). Since T has already exhibited several independent features—some of which hint at access to the Arabic text—it is at least theoretically possible that these additions were part of Themistius’ original paraphrase. However, a closer inspection and some help from al-Baġdādī suggest that they originate in the Hebrew tradition (or possibly an Arabic gloss in a manuscript from a different tradition than the one al-Baġdādī was using). The first case, which occurs at ‫כה‬24, is perhaps the most plausible, since it takes up the theme of celestial hierarchy that Themistius communicates elsewhere (e.g., ‫יז‬29; ‫כג‬19–21), and ignoring the obvious error in translating ‫الأولى‬ into ‫( הקודם‬see Commentary ad loc., as well as the problem of ‫ منبثة‬vs. ‫)קיים‬ amounts to a possible text. However, al-Baġdādī quotes this passage verbatim, and it corresponds exactly to the version we have without the addition, which significantly diminishes the possibility that something authentic is preserved. In the second case, which occurs at ‫כט‬23, we have no Arabic for comparison. However, the addition in T seems to distort Themistius’ argument. It has Themistius say that if natural things like fire, wind, and rivers can be selfmovers then there is no reason not to ascribe this ability to the intellect as well. However, this is not Themistius’ point, for he argues that the intellect—taken by itself—is naturally a mover and always in actuality. It is only prevented from being so in natural substances when present in a body. Finally, in the third case, which occurs at ‫ל‬4, we have some material from al-Baġdādī, but he is paraphrasing the text so nothing can be determined from the comparison. The addition seems to alter Themistius’ matter-of-fact restatement of Aristotle’s claim into something more rhetorical that diminishes its force. Themistius, following Aristotle, claims that in the arts, when abstracted from matter, there is no difference between intelligizing and being intelligized. The addition has him say that there is no wonder that the intellect and its object are immaterial, since there are other immaterial substances such as the arts. Besides making little sense, this is not Themistius’ point, since the argument is not about immateriality but about the distinction between the intellect and the intelligible—a point that is succinctly made in al-Baġdādī’s rendition. 3.1.3 Summary When investigating the Hebrew manuscript tradition of Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12, three challenges emerge: (1) identifying and distinguishing between different versions of the translation; (2) determining their chronological sequence; (3) determining the authorship and function of each version, especially which of them should be most properly ascribed to Moshe ibn Tibbon. As an aid for the reconstruction of Themistius’ text, which is what interests the scholar of late antique philosophy, it is sufficient to address the

the textual tradition

95

first question, because for the production of a usable edition one can be content with consistency of choices and not trouble oneself with questions of identity or chronological sequence. This question is answered in the preceding discussion; the distinction between three different versions of the Hebrew text, I believe, is well-established. The two remaining questions are more of an interest for the study of the Hebrew translation movement for its own sake, as well as for the development of Hebrew philosophical terminology. They are also relevant to the decision which version should be chosen as the basis for a critical edition. Here I am less confident with my conclusions. Concerning the question of chronological sequence, I believe that I have shown that the most plausible explanation is that Version II revises Version I, and that Version III is built upon Version II. However, I concede that a case can perhaps be made for arguing the other way around, namely that Version I revises Version II (see, for instance, the counterexample at table 38). Still, the majority of evidence points to the first option, where Version II emerges as an attempt to correct what it takes to be the shortcomings of Version I, for the most part consistently and systematically. Although there exists no “pure” copy of either Version I or Version II, and as Version III is testified by only one manuscript, it is possible to characterize each version’s salient features, based on the analysis given above, as well as further examples which the reader can find in the Commentary: Version I features occasional terminological inconsistency, occasional obvious errors, occasional grammatical errors, a tendency to disregard the Arabic dual form, a tendency to neglect gender shift / non-human plurality in the feminine, occasional over-transparent reflection of Arabic grammatical forms rendering the Hebrew unintelligible, and occasional neglect of Arabic grammatical particles which give a sense of structure to the text. Version II features relatively consistent terminology, better grammar, less errors, a somewhat Hebraized syntax, consistency in dual form / gender shift, transparent reflection of Arabic particles, and better readings (perhaps there was also a more convenient Arabic manuscript at hand). Version III is essentially a slightly modified edition of Version II, exhibiting a few different terminological preferences and editorial decisions, and some stylistic considerations. Its author may have had access to the Arabic when preparing the edition. This general characterization leads to the third challenge, namely the authorship and function for each version, for which there is the least available evidence and admittedly warrants future study which goes beyond the present text and draws upon the received corpus of Moshe’s translations as a whole. In other words, where and to what extent should one situate Moshe within the

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different versions, and to which version does the dating 1255 belong? Judging from the manuscripts themselves, a natural explanation would be that Version I is a preliminary or draft translation—or perhaps a “work in progress”131—and Version II is a thorough revision which has more of a mark of an “official” translation. In that case, Version III might be a subsequent light edit. It would be tempting to say that Version II is Moshe’s “official” version, building on an earlier draft (Version I). But are we not projecting our own preconceptions about Moshe’s merit as a translator into this state of affairs? Theoretically, he could have been responsible for all three versions; alternatively, it is also possible that he is only responsible for Version I and that all the revisions were made by someone else (and not necessary one person). This all depends on an adequate conception of Moshe as a translator, as well as on understanding his methodology. But at present, these are insufficiently studied, nor could they be studied without a cumulative systematic analysis of the manuscripts of his entire translation corpus. 3.1.4 Analysis of the Work’s Title and Ending The fullest surviving title of the Hebrew translation exists in manuscripts B and R, the only difference between which is the transliteration of Themistius’ name (B: ‫ ;תמסטיוס‬R: ‫ )טמסתיוס‬and the fact that R has ‫ הידוע הנרשם‬while B only has ‫הידוע‬. ‫ הידוע‬was probably an alternative to ‫ הנרשם‬which became a gloss, and was subsequently preferred by the copyist of B (or the manuscript from which it was copied). As can be seen from the colophon at the end of the work, the original title had only ‫הנרשם‬, which also reflects the standard title of book 12 in Arabic, as can be seen, for instance, in the title of Averroes’ long commentary on this book (‫)المقالة المرسوم عليها حرف اللام‬.132 This is also apparent in the shorter versions of the title in manuscripts D and C. The other manuscripts which have a title are either extremely short (O) or independent (N). It is unclear why the title in B and R has ‫ )פירוש =( פי׳‬while the ending has ‫באור‬, as this is inconsistent with the rest of the manuscripts as well as the ending. The full title of the original translation, then, was probably as follows: ‫המאמר הנרשם באות הלמד מספר מה שאחר הטבע לארסטו באור תמסטיוס העתקת‬ ‫אסחק בן חנין ותקון תאבת בן קרא אל חראני העתיקו שנית משה בן שמואל בן תבון‬ ‫צב״ה‬

131 132

It is not uncommon that Hebrew texts in different stages of composition circulated, sometimes despite the wishes of their authors. See Beit-Arié, “Transmission,” 34–37. Averroes, Tafsīr, 1393.

the textual tradition

97

The ending of the work is less problematic. The fullest version is in B (R is only slightly shorter), and nearly all the endings of manuscripts C, O, and T are based upon it (with some minor differences). The ending of A is also based on the full version but in a different manner; besides omitting the ending verses and the exact date, A shortens the praise to God and replaces ‫ הגרי‬with ‫קדר‬. It also adds Yehuda ibn Tibbon to the lineage and the origin of the family (‫רמון‬ ‫ספרד‬, i.e., Granada), which were probably an original part of the ending.133 The ending in M is similar to A but shares some of the shorter formulas in T. The full ending of the original translation was probably as follows: ‫נשלם המאמר הנרשם באות הלמד מספר מה שאחר הטבע לארסטו ביאור תמסטיוס‬ ‫ולאל האחד הנצחי התחלה בלי תכלית אין אדון זולתו התהלה והעתיקו מלשון הגרי‬ ‫ללשון עברי החכם ר׳ משה בן החכם הגדול ר׳ שמואל בר׳ יהודה אבן תבון זק״ל מרמון‬ ‫ספרד ונשלמה העתקתו בירח ניסן בי״א יום בו שנת ה׳ אלפים וט״ו ליצירה בהל״כ ואע״י‬ ‫לק״י‬

3.1.5 Landauer’s Edition As already mentioned, Samuel Landauer published a semi-critical edition of Themistius’ paraphrase as part of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca Series in 1903.134 It would be unfair to criticize Landauer for the shortcomings of his edition, which is a remarkable achievement given the dearth of the material that was available to him; he had none of the Arabic sources that we possess today, and some of the surviving Hebrew manuscripts were not available to him either. There is no point in providing a detailed critique here, as Landauer’s choices are discussed individually in the running textual commentary. The only fair complaint about Landauer’s edition is that his critical apparatus is too selective, occasionally not recording important variants.135 From the point of view of textual criticism, Landauer’s aim was modest: to provide a useable text based on what he saw as the best readings. In this, he succeeded, as more often than not his choices are correct. However, they are without justification, and his minimal critical apparatus does not always give the reader the opportunity to evaluate his choices. Moreover, Landauer

133 134 135

See also the end formula in Ḥoresh, “Averroes,” 82. Landauer, Themistius. Landauer thought that this was not necessary for his edition. See his note at VI. Some of Landauer’s editorial shortcomings in his edition of Themistius’ paraphrase are common to his edition of Saʿadya’s Kitāb al-Amānāt wa-l-Iʿtiqādāt (Landauer, Kitâb al-Amânât), which has been reviewed thoroughly first by Goldziher and then by Ben-Shammai. For an overview see Ben-Shammai, A Leader’s Project, 66–69.

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did not conduct a thorough analysis of the Hebrew manuscripts, but offered only a few general remarks,136 which are not completely accurate: he believed that manuscripts A and D belong to the same group, which is not an exact assessment. He correctly identified C and O as linked together, and placed B in the middle between the two groups. This placement would be correct if A and D had indeed belonged to the same group. In fact, B has greater proximity to D, some shared features with C, and is not so close to A (its proximity to A’s tradition is usually reflected through the mediation of M, unavailable to Landauer). Finally, Landauer’s edition does not clearly distinguish between the two versions of the Hebrew translation, and his choices sometimes reflect Version I and sometimes Version II, with no identifiable method or consistency. T being unavailable to Landauer, Version III is not reflected in his edition. 3.2 Other Hebrew Sources Although Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation is the main source of the present edition, especially once its different layers are uncovered and differentiated, there is something to be gained from the surviving Hebrew quotations with regard to controlling the text, as they sometimes display interesting readings and also reveal something about how the translation was used and how Themistius’ work was understood. 3.2.1

Averroes’ Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Hebrew Translation The history of the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ long commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics is complicated, and this complication is reflected in the manner in which it treats Averroes’ quotations of Themistius’ paraphrase. Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation plays a key part here, as it can be demonstrated to have been used in the revision process of the original Hebrew translation of Averroes’ text. Appendix B is devoted in its entirety to this issue, and the reader is referred there for a detailed discussion and preliminary edition. 3.2.2 Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh An interesting testimony of Themistius’ paraphrase in Hebrew is found in Falaquera, who quotes three passage of the paraphrase in his Moreh ha-Moreh (1280), a commentary on several chapters of Maimonides’ Guide for the Per-

136

Landauer, Themistius, VI–VII.

99

the textual tradition

plexed.137 The first two passages are quoted as one continuous text, and were copied by Yosef ibn Kaspī (1279–1340), directly from Falaquera, in his work Pillars of Silver, another commentary on Maimonides’ Guide.138 Falaquera translates Themistius’ text directly from the Arabic, and there are a few places where he provides better readings, which are noted here and reflected in the edition. It is unclear whether he knew about Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation, made 25 years earlier. I will now quote, side by side, Falaquera’s quotations, Moshe ibn Tibbon’s parallel translation, and the surviving Arabic. table 44

Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh, fragment 1(a)

Themistius Arabus (abridgment)

Themistius Hebraicus ‫יא‬22–29

Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh, 228,84–90

‫فنطلب هل يمكن‬ ‫נחקור מעתה ונבקש אם אפשר‬ ‫נבקש ונחקור אם אפשר‬ ‫[ يبليه الزمان‬1] ‫أن يكون جوهر لا‬ ‫ הזמן‬a‫[ יבלהו‬1] ‫ הזמן ולא שיהיה עצם לא‬b‫[ יבלהו‬1] ‫שיהיה עצם לא‬ ‫[ الاستحالات والتغايير‬2] ‫ولم يقبل‬ ‫[ השנוי וההשתנות‬2] ‫ולא יקבל‬ ‫[ השנויים‬2] ‫יקבל‬ ‫אבל ישאר על ענינו החלד כלו וכבר لـكن يبقى على حاله الدهر كله‬ ‫ לנצח וכבר‬c‫אלא ישאר ענינו‬ ‫وليس يمكن أن‬ ‫אמרנו פעמים רבות שהוא בלתי‬ ‫אמרנו פעמים רבות שאי‬ ‫אפשר שיעמוד על ההתחלה הזאת يقام على هذا المبدأ‬ ‫אפשר להביא על זו ההתחלה‬ ‫برهان فإن البرهان لا يكون إلا‬ ‫מופת כי המופת לא יהיה כי אם‬ ‫מופת כי מהעילות ומההתחלות‬ ‫من علل ومبادئ‬ ‫מסבות והתחלות‬ ‫יהיה המופת‬ ‫[ والعلة الأولى التى هى‬3] ‫[ והסבה הראשונה כלומר‬3] ‫[ והעלה הראשונה שהיא‬3] ‫المبدأ الأول لا‬ ‫ההתחלה הראשונה אי אפשר‬ ‫ההתחלה הראשונה אי אפשר‬ ‫שתמצא לה סבה לפניה ולא התחלה توجد لها علة قبلها‬ ‫שנמצא לה עלה קודמת לה ולא‬ ‫אבל אולי יהיה אפשר לנו שנשיג‬

‫התחלה אלא שאולי‬

‫כונתנו מן האופן הזה והוא כי מפני‬

‫נגיע לחפצנו מזה הצד והוא‬

a This is my conjecture, which is not supported by the manuscripts. See the discussion in the Commentary ad loc. b Ibn Kaspī miscopied ‫ יבלהו‬as ‫יכלהו‬. c Ibn Kaspī miscopied ‫ ענינו‬as ‫עצמו‬.

137 138

For a preliminary analysis see Brague, Thémistius, 31–32. For Themistius’ influence on Falaquera’s thought see Shiffman, Falaquera, 39–42. See ibn Kaspī, “Amudey Kesef,” 88,19–28. Since the text is identical, I do not quote it here. Scribal errors in ibn Kaspī are recorded in the footnotes.

100

chapter 1

Table 44

Themistius Arabus (abridgment)

Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh, fragment 1(a) (cont.)

Themistius Hebraicus ‫יא‬22–29

Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh, 228,84–90

‫שאנחנו סוברים בהתחלה הראשונה‬

‫כי מאחר שנחשוב בהתחלה‬

‫לכל הדברים הנמצאים שהוא מן‬

‫הראשונה לכל הנמצאים‬

‫הראוי שימצאו בה שני ענינים אחד‬

‫שיש בה שנים‬

‫מהם שתהיה נצחית והאחר שתהיה‬

‫ענינים האחד שהוא נצחי‬

[4] ‫בלתי מתנועעת הנה ראוי‬

‫והשני שאינו מתנועע‬

‫שנפריד כל אחד משני אלו הענינים‬

‫[ שנחקור כל אחד מאלה‬4] ‫צריך‬

‫ונחקור עליו ביחוד‬

‫השנים ענינים‬

Besides differences of style and a few small liberties Falaquera takes with the text, there are some points that should be addressed for the establishment of the text. First [1], Falaquera’s translation ‫ יבלהו‬corresponds to the Arabic ‫يبليه‬, strengthening the assumption that the term ‫ישיגהו‬, which appears in most of the manuscripts of Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation, is simply wrong. (My conjecture that Moshe ibn Tibbon’s original translation was also ‫ יבלהו‬is explained in the Commentary ad loc.) Second [2], where the Arabic has ‫الاستحالات والتغايير‬ (in the plural) and Moshe ibn Tibbon has ‫( השנוי וההשתנות‬in the singular), Falaquera has simply ‫( השנויים‬in the plural). It seems that he sides with the Arabic version, and that he saw no reason to translate both ‫ استحالات‬and ‫تغايير‬, which in this case are virtually synonymous. Third [3], Falaquera’s translation ‫והעלה‬ ‫ הראשונה שהיא ההתחלה הראשונה‬is an exact reflection of ‫والعلة الأولى التى هى المبدأ‬ ‫الأول‬, and reinforces the conjecture that Moshe ibn Tibbon’s ‫והסבה הראשונה‬ ‫ כלומר ההתחלה הראשונה‬is based on a corruption in the Arabic before him, probably having ‫ أعنى‬for the correct ‫التى هى‬.139 Finally [4], the difference in the last sentence between ‫( שנחקור‬Falaquera) and ‫( שנפריד‬Moshe ibn Tibbon) should not be taken as a difference in the Arabic source; Falaquera is simply integrating information from the latter part of the sentence for the sake of brevity (in Moshe ibn Tibbon: ‫)ונחקור עליו ביחוד‬. The next fragment comes immediately after the first one, forming a single unit:

139

From the point of view of philosophical analysis, Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation cannot be correct. See the discussion in the Commentary ad loc.

‫‪101‬‬

‫‪the textual tradition‬‬ ‫)‪Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh, fragment 1(b‬‬

‫‪Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh,‬‬ ‫‪228,90–93‬‬ ‫ואין תימה שיהיה בנמצאים‬ ‫עצם נצחי מאחר שנמצא דברים הם‬ ‫מטבע המקרים הנצחיים לא יפסדו כי‬ ‫התנועה אינה ]‪ [1‬טבע‪ a‬מופשט קמה‬ ‫בנפשה אלא היא לגוף‬

‫‪Themistius Hebraicus‬‬ ‫‪4–7‬יב‬

‫‪table 45‬‬

‫‪Themistius Arabus‬‬ ‫)‪(abridgment‬‬

‫وليس بعجب أن يكون فى‬ ‫ואינו מן הפלא שיהיה בנמצאות עצם‬ ‫נצחי כי הנה נמצא דברים מטבע המקרים الموجودات جوهر أزلى إذ‬ ‫كنا نجد أشياء من طبيعة‬ ‫נצחיים לא יפסדו הנה אם כן התנועה‬ ‫אינה ]‪ [1‬טבעית משוללת עומדת בנפשה الأعراض أزلية لا تفسد‬ ‫אבל היא בלא ספק לגשם‬ ‫‪.‬מבע ‪ as‬טבע ‪a Ibn Kaspī miscopied‬‬

‫‪ corroborates‬טבע ]‪In this part, with the Arabic absent, Falaquera’s translation [1‬‬ ‫‪ makes‬טבעית ‪ is incorrect, since‬טבעית ‪the suspicion that Moshe ibn Tibbon’s‬‬ ‫משוללת ‪. Perhaps‬طبيعية ‪ as‬طبيعة ‪no sense here and is probably a misreading of‬‬ ‫‪, translating the Greek‬مجردة ‪ are respective translations of the term‬מופשט ‪and‬‬ ‫‪ψιλός.140‬‬ ‫‪Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh, fragment 2‬‬

‫‪Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh,‬‬ ‫‪242,9–243,16‬‬

‫‪Themistius Hebraicus‬‬ ‫‪4–11‬כג‬

‫‪table 46‬‬

‫‪Themistius Arabus (abridg‬‬‫)‪ment‬‬

‫ההתחלה הראשונה אחת ושההיולי المبدأ الاول واحد‬ ‫ההתחלה הראשונה אחת ושלא‬ ‫יתערב בה החמר ושאינה גוף ושהיא לא יתערב בה ושאינה בגשם ושהיא وأنه‬ ‫يحرك الحركة الاولى الدائمة‬ ‫תניע התנועה הראשונה התמידית‬ ‫מניעה התנועה הראשונה‬ ‫הנצחית חוץ מכל תנועה ושנוי ואולם الأزلية‬ ‫הנצחית‬ ‫אבל אם אחר זו ההתחלה הראשונה היות אחר ההתחלה הזאת הראשונה و بعد ذلك المبدأ‬ ‫جواهر كثيرة حالها هذه الحال‬ ‫עצמים רבים ענינם הענין הזה הנה‬ ‫עצמים רבים ענינם זה הענין‬ ‫ההקש ]‪ [1‬ימציא זה בהכרח והחוש والقياس ]‪ [1‬يوجب ذلك‬ ‫ההיקש ]‪ [1‬יחייב אותו בהכרח‬ ‫والحس يشهد عليه وكل متحرك‬ ‫יעיד עליו וכל מה שיתנועע הנה‬ ‫והחוש יעיד עליו כי כל מתנועע‬ ‫فحركته من محرك فالعلة الأولى يجب‬ ‫תנועתו ממניע והעלה הראשונה‬ ‫תנועתו ממניע והעלה הראשונה‬ ‫ضرورة أن تكون واحدة‬ ‫יתחייב בהכרח שתהיה אחת‬ ‫יתחייב בהכרח שתהיה אחת‬

‫‪See the detailed explanation in the Commentary ad loc.‬‬

‫‪140‬‬

102

chapter 1

Table 46

Falaquera,Moreh ha-Moreh, fragment 2 (cont.)

Themistius Arabus (abridgment) ‫غير متحركة‬ ‫وأما الجواهر المحركة‬ ‫للأجسام التي بعدها فيجب‬ ‫ضرورة ان تكون كثيرة بحسب‬ ‫الأجسام المتحركة وأن تكون في ذاتها‬ ‫غير متحركة لـكن‬ ‫تتحرك بالعرض كما أوجبه‬ ‫القول في أمر النفس‬

Themistius Hebraicus ‫כג‬4–11

Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh, 242,9–243,16

‫בלתי מתנועעת לא בעצמות ולא‬

‫וזולתי מתנועעת לא בעצמה ולא‬

‫במקרה ואולם העצמים המניעים‬

‫במקרה אבל העצמים המניעים‬

‫לגשמים אשר אחריה הנה יתחייב‬

‫לגופים אשר אחריה יתחייב‬

‫בהכרח שיהיו רבים לפי‬

‫בהכרח שיהיו רבים כפי‬

‫הגשמים המתנועעים ושיהיו‬

‫הגופים המתנועעים ושלא יהיו‬

‫בעצמותם בלתי מתנועעים אבל‬

‫מתנועעים בעצמם אבל יהיו‬

‫יתנועעו במקרה כמו שיחייבהו‬

‫מתנועעים במקרה כמו שיתחיב‬

‫המאמר בענין הנפש‬

‫בנפש‬

Falaquera attributes this quote to Aristotle rather than to Themistius. Besides a few minor cases of phrasing and abridgments, it is clear that Falaquera and Moshe ibn Tibbon are translating the same text. However, Falaquera helps solve a small question regarding a difference between Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew and the Arabic abridgment [1], where the Hebrew has ‫ ימציא זה בהכרח‬while the Arabic has ‫يوجب ذلك‬. Falaquera’s translation ‫ יחייב אותו בהכרח‬makes it clear the Moshe ibn Tibbon misread ‫ يوجد‬for ‫( يوجب‬or was misled by a corruption in the Arabic manuscript from which he was translating) rather than this being a paraphrastic part of the abridgment.141 3.2.3 Gersonides, Milḥamot ha-Šem In the Introduction we have seen that Gersonides made frequent use of Themistius’ paraphrase in his Wars of the Lord. In this work, Gersonides quotes a lengthy passage from Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation of Themistius’ paraphrase, a copy of which he owned in his personal library.142

141 142

See above, table 22 for a more detailed explanation. Weil, Bibliothèque, 47‫כא‬. See discussion at 99–100.

‫‪103‬‬

‫‪the textual tradition‬‬ ‫‪Themistius’ paraphrase and Gersonides’ Milḥamot ha-Šem‬‬

‫‪10–23‬ח ‪Themistius Hebraicus‬‬

‫‪table 47‬‬

‫‪Gersonides, Milḥamōt ha-Šem, 224,20–225,1a‬‬

‫ואי אפשר מבלתי שיהיו ]‪[1‬‬

‫שאי אפשר מבלתי שיהיה ]‪ [1‬באלו הדברים אשר בכאן‬

‫יחסים וצורות כבר הושמו בטבע עליהם ]‪ [2‬יעשה מה‬

‫יחסים וצורות כבר הושמו בטבע לפנים בהם ]‪ [2‬יעשו‬

‫שיעשה מזה ]‪[3‬‬

‫מה שיעשו מזה ]‪ [3‬עם מצאם החמר הנאות וזה כי‬

‫כי האדם ואם היה מתילד מאדם הנה האב אין לו‬

‫האדם ואם היה מתילד מהאדם הנה האב אין לו אומנות‬

‫אומנות בהרכבתו זאת אשר אי אפשר שתהיה בענין‬

‫בהרכבתו זאת אשר אי אפשר שתהיה בענין אחר יותר‬

‫אחר הוא יותר טוב מענינו ואמנם יהיה בזה הענין‬

‫טוב מענינו ואמנם יהיו בזה הענין‬

‫בעבור שכבר הושם בטבע כל אחד מן העצמים מן‬

‫מפני מה שהושם בטבע כל אחד מהעצמים מן‬

‫היחס והצורות לא באומנות מן האב אבל מן היחס‬

‫היחס והצורות לא באומנות מן האב אבל מן היחס‬

‫והגשם אין לו מעשה בגשם אלא בתכליתו לבד ואולם‬

‫והגשם אין לו מעשה בגשם אלא בתכליתו לבד ואולם‬

‫הטבע הנה יעשה בגוף הגשם בכללו ואינו בפלא שיהיה‬

‫הטבע הנה יעשה בגוף הגשם בכללו‬

‫הטבע והוא לא יבין מוליך מה שיעשהו אל הכונה‬

‫והנה הטבע והוא לא יבין יוליך מה שיעשהו אל הכונה‬

‫המכוונת אליה כי היה בלתי חושב ומשכיל בפועל מה‬

‫המכוונת אליו כי היה בלתי חושב ומשכיל בפעל מה‬

‫שיעשה וזה ממה שיורה אותך על שהם כבר התפעמו‬

‫שעשה וזה ממה שיורה על שכבר‬

‫התפעמות אותם היחסים ]‪ [4‬מסבת מי שהוא יותר‬

‫נתפעמו אותם היחסים ]‪ [4‬ממי שהוא‬

‫נדיב מהם ויותר נכבד ומדרגתו יותר עליונה והיא הנפש יותר נדיב מהם ויותר נכבד ומדרגתו יותר עליונה והיא‬ ‫אשר בארץ אשר יראה אפלאטון שהיא‬

‫הנפש אשר בארץ אשר יראה אפלטון שהיא נתחדשה‬

‫נתחדשה ]‪ [5‬מן האלהים השניים ויראה‬

‫]‪ [5‬ממניעי הגרמים השמימיים ויראה ארסטו שהיא‬

‫אריסטוטליס שהיא נתחדשה מהשמש והגלגל הנוטה‬

‫נתחדשה מהשמש והגלגל הנוטה‬

‫ולכן ]‪ [6‬היה יעשה מה שיעשה והוא ]‪ [7‬משתוקק אל‬

‫ולזה ]‪ [6‬היתה הנפש תעשה פעולתה ]‪ [7‬מוליכה אל‬

‫הכונה ]‪ [8‬והוא לא יבין הכונה כמו שנראה‬

‫הכונה ]‪ [8‬והיא לא תכון הכונה כמו מה שכבר נראה‬

‫האנשים אשר יתפעמו שידברו הדבור ינבאו על מה‬

‫האנשים יתפעמו לדבר דבר וינבאו בו ממה‬

‫שיהיה והם לא יבינו מה שיאמרו‬

‫שיהיה והם לא יבינו מה שיאמרו‬

‫‪a The text quoted here was revised according to Feldman’s emendations in Levi Ben Gershom,‬‬ ‫‪vol. 3, 539.‬‬

‫‪This quotation also appears in Averroes, but a comparison between the vari‬‬‫‪ous Hebrew versions (see Appendix B) shows that it Gersonides takes it directly‬‬ ‫‪from Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation. Gersonides makes a few deliberate‬‬ ‫‪changes to the text, and also reflects a few differences in the manuscript tra‬‬‫‪dition. I discuss these here briefly.‬‬ ‫‪ clarifies that the discussion is about‬באלו הדברים אשר בכאן ]‪The addition [1‬‬ ‫‪logoi and forms in the natural world (perhaps to ensure that the discussion‬‬

104

chapter 1

is not taken to be about transcendent forms in the metaphysical realm). The addition [3] ‫ עם מצאם החמר הנאות‬is taken from the early part of Themistius’ discussion about logoi and forms (‫ח‬6–7), not included in Gersonides’ quote, and serves as an explanation for their function. Interestingly, the term [5] ‫ האלהים השניים‬is substituted by ‫מניעי הגרמים‬ ‫השמימיים‬. This is almost certainly deliberate, and maybe reflects religious “correctness” or an adoption of the scholastic rejection of the divine secondary causes in favor of a more neutral astronomical function.143 In one case Gersonides’ interference in the text amplifies a translation error in Moshe ibn Tibbon’s text, where [4] he shortens ‫ מסבת מי‬into ‫ממי‬, while the original Arabic has ‫من سبب‬. On the other hand, there is a curious place where Gersonides’ quotation corrects an error in Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation which is not supported by any of the existing manuscripts. All the manuscripts have [7] ‫( משתוקק‬or ‫ )משתוקקת‬erroneously translating ‫—مستاقة‬probably misreading ‫—مشتاقة‬while Gersonides has the correct ‫מוליכה‬. This error is corrected in the later version of the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ long commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics,144 but this could not have been the source for Gersonides. First, it is clear that he is quoting directly from Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation rather than through Averroes’ mediation; and second, the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ long commentary, about which Gersonides began to write a supercommentary, was available to him in the early version,145 which does not use Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation in the Themistius fragments and also contains the erroneous ‫( משותף‬perhaps misreading ‫ مشككة‬or ‫)مشتركة‬. This leads me to conjecture that the copy of the Hebrew translation of Themistius’ paraphrase from which Gersonides quotes already included this correction, and perhaps the same can be said about the same correction in the later version of the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ long commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Since it is unclear who is responsible for the correction and whether it was done on the basis of comparison with Themistius’ Arabic text or the fragment in Averroes in Arabic, I was hesitant to ascribe this correction to Moshe ibn Tibbon and did not include it in the Hebrew edition.146 Finally, there is confusion in Gersonides’ quotation about the division of labor between nature, the soul in the earth, and the logoi in the process of generation, a confusion that can also be found in the manuscript tradition of Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation and in both Hebrew versions Averroes’ long 143 144 145 146

See discussion in Schwartz, “Celestial Motion,” esp. 286–287. See Appendix B. Glasner, “Evolution,” 184 and n. 16. See the discussion in the Commentary ad loc.

the textual tradition

105

commentary. This confusion results from the fact that ‫نفس‬, ‫طبيعة‬, and ‫ نسبة‬are all in the feminine, and the Arabic is full of pronouns and particles which could be referring to any of them. The precise understanding of this division of labor depends on a philosophical analysis of the text, not only a philological one. This confusion is reflected, for example, in [2], and especially in [6] and [8], where the subject is explicated as the soul, whereas Themistius is actually referring to nature. This phenomenon can also be seen in manuscript T, and in the later version of the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ long commentary. 3.3 Résumé Having presented and analyzed all the available material in Hebrew, the present edition reflects (1) Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation, and occasionally uses (2) Falaquera’s independent translation of some parts for control purposes, as well as (3) a few reference to the quotations preserved in the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ long commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A detailed explanation of the principles of the new edition concerning the Arabic and Hebrew textual traditions appears in the final section of this chapter.

4

Moshe Finzi’s Latin Translation

Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation of Themistius’ paraphrase was translated into Latin during the mid-sixteenth century by Moshe Finzi, about whom little is known,147 and it was published in 1558 in Venice.148 Landauer’s Latin edition is a revision of Finzi’s translation.149 Frank contends that the Latin ver147

148 149

For the few known details about Finzi’s life see Deutsch & Elbogen, “Finzi,” 389, and Todd, “Themistius,” 91. Note that Deutsch & Elbogen’s identification of Moshe as the translator of abū Kāmil’s Algebra is wrong. The translator of that work is Mordekhai (Angelo) Finzi of Mantua, who was active between 1441–1473 (see Lévy, “Hebrew Mathematics,” 79–80). Moshe Finzi could be the same Moshe Finzi, son of Abramo Finzi of Reggio, who lived in Longiano, near Rimini, and who graduated in medicine at the University of Bologna, on April 30, 1543. See Bologna State Archive, notary Algardi Bartolomeo, port. 23, ll. 177r– 180v, 1543, April, 30. On the Jewish Students at the University of Bologna in this period see Arieti, “Medici ebrei” (I would like to thank Guido Bartolucci for this information). Finzi, Themistius. For details about this edition See Todd, “Themistius,” 90–91. Landauer, Themistius. Parts of Finzi’s Latin translation in Landauer’s revised version appeared in the Scholia of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12, divided according to corresponding sections in Aristotle’s text (Brandis, Scholia, 798–813; see also the table of contents at LI, which lists the omitted passages as well). Stegemann’s note (“Themistios,” 1654) that these scholia include also Greek excerpts is obviously false, the Greek having been lost; Watt (“Thémistios”), who echoes Stegemann, should be revised as well.

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sion “is poor, even as revised by Landauer, and affords virtually no control over the Arabic version.”150 Finzi’s translation was not made according to any of the known manuscripts, and it was probably based on a relatively late manuscript containing elements from all the manuscript traditions, except for T (= Version III), with whose independent features it almost never agrees.151 In table 48 there are a few examples of different cases where Finzi’s translation sides with different manuscripts against others. The table refers to manuscripts A, B, C, C1, D, and M. As can be seen, the Latin’s agreement or disagreement with the choices in the present edition is arbitrary; it rarely adds information for the establishment of the text and is of a very free style, so it was mostly disregarded in the editorial process. table 48

Moshe Finzi’s Latin translation and the Hebrew manuscript tradition

Finzi’s translation

Agrees with

Disagrees with

Present edition

Modis (1.7 = ‫א‬3) Separatis & disperses (1.13–14 = ‫א‬7)

D (‫)דרכים‬ CD (‫נבדלים‬ ‫)מפוזרים‬ ABD (‫)ערום‬ B (‫ ≈ ;)ויסודותיהם‬C1 (‫)ויסודם‬

ABC (‫)מינים‬ AB (‫)מפוזרים‬

‫דרכים‬ ‫מפוזרים‬

C (‫)מופשט‬ ACD (/‫ויסודם‬ /‫ויסודיהם ושתותיהם‬ ‫)ושתותם‬ BCD (‫)אל ההפכים‬ ABD (‫)והכחות‬ BD (‫)החומר‬ ACDM (‫)ערומה‬

‫ערום‬ ‫ויסודם ושתותיהם‬

Nudetur (1.36 = ‫ב‬1) Elementa (2.2 = ‫ב‬5)

N/A (3.17 = ‫ג‬33) Reiiciebant (3.4–5 = ‫ג‬22) Elementum (5.8 = ‫ו‬17) Seiuncta (5.24 = ‫ו‬32)

150 151

A C1 (‫)ובטלו‬ ACM (‫)היסוד‬ B (‫)מופשטת‬

‫אל ההפכים‬ ‫ובטלו‬ ‫היסוד‬ ‫ערומה‬

Frank, “Notes,” 216n4. 3 examples for this will suffice: Genera (1.25/L ‫א‬17) ≠ T ‫( הדברים‬the other manuscripts have ‫ ;)הסוגים‬Augmento (3.8/L ‫ג‬26) ≠ T ‫( בצמיחה‬the other manuscripts have ‫ ;)בגדול‬Non euadunt (5.30/L ‫ז‬6) ≠ T ‫( יותר ראוי‬the other manuscripts have ‫ לא נברח‬or a corruption of it).

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Principles of the Present Edition

The present edition of Themistius’ paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12 provides the complete Hebrew text as well as all the surviving Arabic material facing each other, with a critical apparatus recording not only the variants within each language, but also across languages. Besides offering a new text edited on the basis of transparent principles, it offers anyone who chooses to consult it enough material to evaluate the editorial decisions and overall analysis. The pagination and line breaks in the Hebrew and Arabic are identical, and are arranged according to Landauer’s edition. In other words, any given page number and line here and in Landauer’s edition are exactly the same. Landauer’s page numbers are listed in the margins on the right as L‫ א‬etc. both in the Hebrew and in the Arabic parts, for ease of orientation, and the lines break in exactly the same places. In cases where Landauer’s lines do not fit into the layout of the present version, the remaining text moves to a new indented line and counted with the previous line. When the Arabic text is abridged (especially in chapters 6–9), there are gaps of lines or even within lines that enable the reader to visualize what is abridged and what is retained. Occasionally there are empty pages on the right hand side. This means that there is no corresponding Arabic to the Hebrew text. I have done this in every chapter except for chapter 10, in which the Hebrew is continuous on both sides of the page, because this is the only chapter in which no Arabic is used in the body of the text. All the Arabic sources used in the body of the text (either printed editions or manuscripts) are cited on the right margins of the text when they enter and exit, and their line breaks and points of entry and exit are clearly marked in the body of the text (see the Abbreviations for the notations of this). In other words, in every given part of the text, all the Arabic sources used can be easily identified. When two Arabic sources overlap, this is reflected in a bold font. All the material from al-Baġdādī in the body of the text is printed in red, to emphasize that his text is not an exact quotation of the Arabic (see discussion above, 2.2.7). In any case, section 3 in the Commentary for each chapter explains exactly which sources are used for the Arabic text. Although Themistius’ paraphrase is continuous, I have divided the text into ten chapters corresponding to the common division of Metaphysics 12. Whereas this is not very elegant, I found it to be more useful for orientation within the text. On the left margins of the Hebrew translation the paraphrased passages in Aristotle are continuously listed, again for orientation purposes. This listing is also useful for visualizing the amount of space that Themistius allocates to each given passage, changes he makes in the order of presentation, and points in which he departs from Aristotle’s text. It should be kept in mind, however,

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that there are several instances where Themistius’ rearrangement of Aristotle’s text is so complex that the reference to the original passages should be only taken as a starting point. Most of these cases are discussed in the Commentary. According to the analysis of the Hebrew material conducted above, I have decided that the body of the Hebrew text should reflect, as much as possible, Version II. However, the comprehensive critical apparatus should enable the reader to clearly identify the salient features of Version I (mostly reflected in C) and Version III (mostly reflected in T). Hence, the order of the manuscript variants in the apparatus always starts with C and ends when T (wherever, of course, they differ from the text in the body). In order to evaluate Landauer’s choices independently of my own assessment, his edition is fully reflected in the critical apparatus and noted as L. When it differs from all the other manuscripts, it is recorded last. The order of the other manuscripts is according to their assumed chronology. In short, the variants are always presented in the following order: C-D-A-B-M-R-T-L. Whenever a variant is shared among two or more manuscripts, they are cited together and positioned in the entry for the earliest of them (e.g., CM, or BTL, or CAT). Concerning matters of Hebrew syntax and grammar that have no bearing on the understanding of the text, unless there is a good reason to act otherwise I follow the rule of the majority in order to avoid the apparatus being heavier than it already is.152 A special consideration regarding the present edition is the fact that the Hebrew translation is the earliest complete testimony of Themistius’ paraphrase, since the Greek is lost and the Arabic sources only cover some of the text, in different constellations. The case being so, the new edition bears a responsibility which goes beyond studying the history of Hebrew and Arabic philosophical terminology. It is up to this edition to facilitate the understanding of the text it translates and to be friendly to classicists. This sometimes results in an editorial dilemma: should the edition aim at reflecting the Hebrew/Arabic translations even when they are faulty, or should one attempt to “correct” the text and in doing so interfere in the edition’s coherence? Whereas I always stick to the principles of the edition, I indicate in the body of the text cases in which I believe an error has occurred (either due to transmission problems, or due to incorrect translation). The errors are marked by a circumflex (^), and the reader is invited to refer to the Commentary on the relevant passage for an explanation. 152

The main problem with variants of this sort it that it is virtually impossible to discern if they are the work of the translator or of the scribe. Ḥoresh’s edition of Moshe’s Hebrew translation of Averroes’ epitome of Aristotle’s On the Heavens is a good example for focus on matters of grammar and syntax (see Ḥoresh, “Averroes”).

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It is my hope that the present edition does justice to Themistius, Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn, and Moshe ibn Tibbon, representing each person’s mastery in his respective field. The wonderful journey that Themistius’ paraphrase has taken through time, space, and language is a powerful testament for the universality of the human mind, and for this author, at least, a source for faith in the human spirit.

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Historical and Methodological Aspects of Themistius as Paraphrast of Metaphysics 12 Aristotle wrote to be understood: if he could not manage it, still less will a less able man.1

∵ 1

Overview

The present chapter explores the origin, aim, scope, and methodology of Themistius’ paraphrasing project and how they are reflected in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12. In the first part of the chapter, I (a) present the dual function of paraphrasis as a rhetorical exercise and as a literary genre; (b) provide a fresh understanding of Themistius’ self-conception as a paraphrast; and (c) explain how Themistius’ method of paraphrasing can be seen as an appropriation of the traditional paraphrasis exercise to facilitate his pedagogic and hermeneutic aims. In the second part of the chapter, I present and analyze various examples of paraphrasing procedures from Themistius’ corpus of paraphrases, with special emphasis on the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12. An adequate understanding of the various aspects of Themistius’ paraphrase procedures is valuable for at least three reasons. First, it serves as an important counterpart to the philological discussion by providing tools to assess the textual transmission of Themistius’ paraphrase that go beyond what can be concluded from the recording of textual variants. Second, it enables to achieve a clearer picture of Themistius’ understanding of Aristotle’s text and his manner of teaching it. And finally, it puts us in a better position to identify Themistius’ independent philosophical voice, which is intertwined with his adoption of Aristotle’s voice throughout the paraphrases. The overarching metaphysical scheme that gradually emerges when carefully reading Themistius’ paraphrase

1 Montaigne, “On Experience,” 1210.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400443_004

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of Metaphysics 12 is one of significant drama, and its main points are presented and reflected upon in the Conclusion of the present study. 1.1 The Paraphrase as a Method and as a Literary Genre in Antiquity For the sake of the present discussion I distinguish between the paraphrase as a method and the paraphrase as a literary genre. The difference between the two is not of essence but of scope: whereas the paraphrase as a method is aimed at a specific portion of a given text (and can therefore be naturally utilized upon any meaningful lexical unit, regardless of its length), the paraphrase as a literary genre aims at applying the paraphrase method to a complete composition.2 However, the roots of each can be identified in different places: the paraphrastic method is located in the Greek rhetorical tradition, and the paraphrase as a genre is located in specific Greek authors, of which Themistius is the most notable (and perhaps the earliest) representative, at least in the context of philosophical works. The fact that Themistius had extensive and well-documented rhetorical training suggests organic continuity between the method and the genre.3 Whereas it is not my intention to prove that this is a conscious decision of Themistius, it seems to me that—if indeed Themistius’ paraphrastic style has its roots somewhere—it would be less difficult to defend the view that it is grounded in the rhetorical tradition than, say, to ascribe it to some literary tradition attached in one way or another to the Peripatetic school, for which there is little actual evidence, if at all. 1.2 Paraphrase as Method According to Kakavelaki, the paraphrasis was “one of the basic exercises that students had to undergo in the beginning of their studies of rhetoric.”4 Although this method is mentioned frequently in various rhetorical works,5 the only known systematic treatment of the paraphrase as an exercise is included in Aelius Theon’s (mid/end of first century CE, assuming that the work’s dating still holds6) Progumnasmata, a collection of preparatory exercises used for 2 Zucker (“Qu’est-ce qu’une paraphrasis,” §75) conveniently distinguishes between the paraphrase as a “microstructure” (method) and as a “macrostructure” (genre). 3 For Themistius’ education see Vanderspoel, Themistius, 34–40. 4 Kakavelaki, “Origin,” 269. Much of the present discussion is indebted Kakavelaki’s analysis. 5 See the examples provided in Zucker, “Qu’est-ce qu’une paraphrasis,” passim. 6 Heath has challenged the traditional dating and suggests to push the author and his work forward to as late as the fifth century CE (Heath, “Theon”), which is well after Themistius’ lifetime. Tackling this issue is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is worth mentioning that the fact that the paraphrase method appears systematically only in Theon works in favor of Heath’s position, as one of his arguments is that Theon’s composition is more elaborate

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teaching rhetoric, which were considered essential for the successful composition of different kinds of speeches and for the sake of acquiring proficiency and the ability to express oneself in the style of various poets, historians, and other authors.7 Theon’s account is valuable for understanding the paraphrase’s function, utility, and method.8 He opens his discussion by defining the paraphrase as “changing the formulation while retaining the same thoughts.” In other words, the paraphrase is understood as a method that does not affect the content of its object, but is only a means of expressing this content. It is a formal rather than a material procedure. Theon distinguishes between four main paraphrasing procedures, noting that they can be intermixed to generate various additional procedures. These procedures are: syntax; addition; subtraction; and substitution.9 Syntax involves keeping the same words but changing the structure of the sentence. Theon does not offer examples for this procedure. Addition involves introduction of more elements to the object without omitting anything from it. The example Theon provides is Demosthenes’ paraphrase of a sentence by Thucydides. Thucydides writes “opportunities for action do not wait,” and Demosthenes paraphrases: “opportunities do not wait for your delays and procrastination.” As can be seen from this example, the core meaning of the sentence remains the same, but its rhetorical effect is amplified. Subtraction is the than its parallels, and “one might think [that it is] more suggestive of the progressive elaboration of categories characteristic of late antique rhetoric” (Heath, “Theon,” 145). Nevertheless, for the sake of the discussion I am adopting the commonly accepted dating. If and when Heath’s new dating and attribution are accepted, this does not affect the distinction between paraphrase as method and paraphrase as genre, as various references to the paraphrase method appear much earlier. 7 As Kakavelaki notes (“Origin,” 270), these exercise corpora were very successful: “the Greek treatises of the Προγυμνάσματα that are still extant to us are numerous and are dated from the 1st century up to the 5th.” 8 As the chapter about the paraphrase is extant only in an Armenian translation, the following account relies on Patillon’s French translation, in Progymnasmata, § 15 (pp. 107–110). For Patillon’s overview of Theon’s account see Progymnasmata, CIV–CVII. See also Zucker, “Qu’est-ce qu’une paraphrasis,” §§4, 6, 16; Kakavelaki, “Origin,” 270. 9 This “quartet” is usually taken to originate from the Stoics, most notably Diogenes of Babylon (early second century BCE). In her discussion of the sources of this division, Desbordes has tantalizingly proposed that it is based upon Aristotle’s theory of change: addition and subtraction reflect change in quantity; substitution reflects change in quality; and syntax reflects change in place (Desbordes, “Le schema,” 27–29, admitting that her suggestion is not without difficulties and proposing to push even further back to Plato’s Cratylus). If this is true, then a Themistian paraphrase of Aristotle can be characterized as changes in the accidents of a given substance.

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opposite of addition and consists in saying the same thing with fewer words. Theon does not offer an example for this procedure, but it can be understood as rephrasing something more economically, or perhaps removing unnecessary elements from an utterance. Finally, Substitution consists of replacing one word with another without changing the meaning. Examples given for this are replacing the dated (according to Theon) δοῦλος with a more prevalent word like παῖς or ἀνδράποδον; replacing a metaphor with its reference (or vice versa); and replacing a single word with several (or vice versa). It is important to note that Theon stresses that the paraphrase should be used upon the text only where it is appropriate; sometimes it is preferable to keep the text intact. Hence a “non-procedure” labeled Quotation can be added to the list. Theon enumerates several benefits from the paraphrase method. It helps the student understand the meaning of the object paraphrased; it is useful for memorizing texts; it enables the student to express oneself in the manner of the ancients; and it renders texts clearer and more expressive. The end result of these exercises is the ability to express one author in the manner of another. As I show below, similar procedures are present in Themistius’ paraphrases, appropriated to philosophical considerations, and his rationale for paraphrasing echoes the benefits pointed out by Theon. 1.3 Paraphrase as Literary Genre According to Zucker, the two “canonical” authors of paraphrases are Themistius and Eutecnius (active some time between late third and late fifth centuries CE).10 Themistius, whose literary output earned him the designation ὁ παραφραστής by subsequent authors,11 was either the inventor of the philosophical paraphrase, or the earliest surviving representative of it.12 As will be shown below, 10 11 12

For Eutecnius, who wrote paraphrases of ancient zoological works, see Zucker, “Qu’est-ce qu’une paraphrasis,” §§42–45. Zucker, §40. In scholarly literature we find two recurring candidates for predating Themistius in composing philosophical paraphrases: Andronicus of Rhodes and Nicolaus (see for example Blumenthal, “Photius,” 175n28, and Ballériaux, “Thémistius,” 199 and 199n1), both as a result of comments made by Simplicius. Simplicius writes that Nicolaus “paraphrases” (as a verb) Aristotle in his work On Aristotle’s Philosophy (Περὶ τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους φιλοσοφίας), and explicitly mentions a “paraphrase” (as a noun) by Andronicus of Rhodes of Aristotle’s Categories, contrasting it with “Boethus the exegete” (see Griffin, Aristotle’s Categories, 127–128). In ancient sources, besides these two, no other philosophical work of an author before Themistius is described as a paraphrase. From the surviving portions of Nicolaus’ composition (published in Drossaart Lulofs, Nicolaus) it is clear that his work is a survey or epitome of Aristotle’s corpus rather than a paraphrase in the sense that is presently discussed (Zucker, “Qu’est-ce qu’ une paraphra-

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Themistius at the very least presents himself as the innovator of this style of commentating.13 Zucker suggests that the transformation of the paraphrase from a method into a genre was motivated by the need to mediate “what has ceased to be read-

13

sis,” §37, notes that Nicolaus uses paraphrasing as a technique within his composition, not as part of a genre, a sentiment shared by Ballériaux, “Thémistius,” 199n1). Fazzo (“Nicolas”) has recently argued that the author of On Aristotle’s Philosophy was not, as commonly thought, Nicolaus of Damascus of the first century BCE, but a certain “Nicolas the peripatetic” (“Nicolas,” 112–113), a contemporary of Themistius. If she is correct, then even if his work would have qualified as a paraphrase (as Fazzo seems to think—e.g., 117; 122–123), Nicolaus (or Nicolas) cannot be considered Themistius’ forerunner. The case of Andronicus is more complicated and cannot be easily dismissed, as does Reinhardt, “Andronicus,” 528n31, who remarks that “on any interpretation of Andronicus’ statements on Cat. his commentary was not in the modern sense a ‘paraphrase,’ despite Simplicius.” Sharples’ note (“Habent,” 276n17) that “Simplicius … describes Andronicus’ commentary as a paraphrase; but it is clear that Andronicus’ discussion … was a critical one” is problematic, since Sharples seems to assume that a paraphrase and a critical discussion are mutually exclusive, which is unwarranted; and Griffin’s remarks (Aristotle’s Categories, 231) that in the present context “paraphrase” is a “fairly generic term” is unexplained. Alternatively, Zucker, “Qu’est-ce qu’une paraphrasis,” § 41, cites Andronicus as evidence for his claim that Themistius did not invent the genre. Simplicius refers to Andronicus’ “paraphrase” twice in his commentary on the Categories: in the first case he discusses Andronicus’ transposition of a sentence from the Categories to the beginning of the text for the sake of context (Simplicius, in Cat. 21,21–24; translation in Simplicius, Categories, 36; see also 113n245), and in the second case discusses Andronicus’ alteration of Aristotle’s formulation of the text (Simplicius, in Cat. 26,17– 20; translation in Simplicius, Categories, 40; see also 116n289). Both cases exhibit paraphrasing practices that are also customary of Themistius (discussed below), hence either Simplicius—aware, perhaps, that Andronicus’ style is different than Boethus’ stricter commentary—is using the term “paraphrase” anachronistically, or Andronicus should indeed be regarded as the first known example of the philosophical paraphrase as a genre. One should keep in mind, however, that Simplicius is the only ancient author who describes Andronicus’ work as a paraphrase. Themistius’ only reference to Andronicus in his extant writings is in a different context in his paraphrase of On the Soul (granted, his own paraphrase of the Categories is lost), and it is possible that Andronicus’ work on the Categories was unknown to him (or perhaps not labeled as a “paraphrase”). Even if we do acknowledge Andronicus’ work as a paraphrase—which cannot be ruled out—there is no evidence for a continuous tradition of Aristotelian paraphrases which is somehow associated with the Peripatetic tradition, and to substantiate this claim one must also be able to show that Themistius actually belongs to the Peripatetic school, a position that is difficult to defend (on this general issue see Todd’s illuminating remarks at Themistius on Aristotle’s Physics 1–3, 3). I agree with Zucker’s contention (“Qu’est-ce qu’une paraphrasis,” § 41) that even if Themistius did not “invent” the paraphrase, he should be regarded as an innovator because of the systematic character of his paraphrases, which secured the paraphrases’ place as an independent genre within philosophical exegesis.

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ily accessible to the readers of an epoch.” The zoological works paraphrased by Eutecnius were written in verse and contained obsolete terminology and syntax. Likewise, Zucker argues that “Aristotle’s prose was no longer familiar with respect to form or easily intelligible,” so the problem was not only understanding the ideas—for which a traditional commentary would suffice—but also understanding the text in a more direct manner. Hence, the major feature of the paraphrases is “intellectual adaptation” and “re-actualization,” which enables a paraphrast to make a work available to a larger audience.14 Zucker concludes that the expansion of the paraphrase from a pedagogical exercise to a literary genre served a social function whose aim was to make a work that can no longer be self-sufficient (owing to the passage of time, cultural shifts, and likewise) available for a contemporary audience. This procedure “acclimatizes the text to the reception conditions by updating it, in order to make it intelligible (whether the difficulty is conceptual, lexical or linguistic).”15 In other words, the paraphrase is no longer regarded only as a procedure that is undertaken for the sake of the paraphrast’s training, but as a procedure that the paraphrast undertakes for the sake of a certain public. In Themistius’ case, as is shown in the next section, it is a tool for teaching Aristotle’s works, which centuries after having been composed—and objectively difficult in their own right—beg, as it were, for a mediator.

2

The Aims and Methodologies of Themistius’ Paraphrases

The present discussion moves from Themistius’ general remarks on his intellectual project as an interpreter (and a son of an interpreter) of Aristotle, to his more focused remarks on the pragmatic utility of his paraphrases, and then to his explanations of the methodology he uses to realize his aims. I argue that despite different changes in tone and language, Themistius’ message is essentially the same, and it is beneficiary to present his method as an extension and development of the paraphrastic modes discussed above. 2.1 The Overall Aims of the Paraphrase According to Themistius One of the most important testimonies that Themistius offers about his writings is included in his 23rd oration, also entitled The Sophist. Being the only explicit reference Themistius makes to his philosophical works in his orations

14 15

Zucker, §74. Zucker, §76.

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that have come down to us, this passage naturally received a great deal of attention, and has been used to promote arguments regarding Themistius’ corpus and philosophical orientation.16 I will now quote the relevant part, and then offer my own understanding of it: When I was young, I wrote certain treatises (συγγράμματα) in which I deposited and stored the legacy that I had received from my forefathers. These treatises have nothing original in them either from me or from anyone else. They only try to clarify Aristotle’s meaning (ἐμφανίζειν … τὸν νοῦν τὸν Ἀριστοτέλους) and to draw it out of the words (ἐξάγειν ἐκ τῶν ῥημάτων) in which he restricted and confined it so that it would be unintelligible to the utterly uninitiated. I never thought that these treatises would be of any use to anyone else or would be taken seriously, for I knew that they were not works of sufficient richness or boldness to elicit that kind of response. They were merely an aide-mémoire (μνημόσυνα) for me alone, a depository for what I had heard, so that, if something should escape my memory (ἀποφύγοι τι τὴν μνήμην), I could retrieve (λαμβάνειν) it, so to speak, from a safe storehouse, one that is unassailable by forgetfulness (ἀναλώτου ὑπὸ τῆς λήθης). So I feared for my treatises and kept watch over them lest they be spread abroad. But somehow or other these writings of mine escaped before I knew what was happening. They quickly passed from one person to another until they reached Sicyon.17 In order to analyze Themistius’ remarks here, one should keep in mind the context of his discussion and the narrative that he is attempting to establish. Oration 23 was delivered as Themistius’ response to the accusation that he is a sophist.18 In his reply, Themistius likens his audience to jurors in an imaginary trial and enumerates a set of activities that characterize a sophist, which he breaks into different “charges” to which he intends to respond. One of the main charges for being a sophist, according to Themistius, is being a “mercenary” who busies himself with “hunting down and attracting young men,” and the present discussion is part of his reply to this specific accusation. Time and again, Themistius notes the affinity between this accusation and the situation Socrates was facing in his own trial, and models his discussion according to what is found in Plato’s Apology. Just like Socrates, Themistius is 16 17 18

See, e.g., Blumenthal, “Photius,” 174–178, responding to Steel, “Commentaires,” 679–680. Themistus, Oration 23, 294d1–295a9 (Translated in Penella, Private, 121–122, slightly modified). See Penella, Private, 18–20 for an analysis of this oration.

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“compelled” to tell his jurors the story of how his accusations came about, and he urges the jurors not to make the mistake that Socrates’ jurors had made. Themistius’ account of his writings and their reputation is part of this story and is analogous to Socrates’ account of his wisdom and how word about it had spread. Socrates’ story in the Apology is a story of a person who thinks little of his philosophical ability (“I know that I have no wisdom, small or great”), but whose talent is recognized by a credible figure (Chaerephon, “a friend of mine, and also a friend of yours”). Chaerephon turns to Apollo’s Oracle to receive divine corroboration for Socrates’ wisdom (“The word which I will speak is not mine. I will refer you to a witness and that witness shall be the god of Delphi”), eliciting the famous response that no one is wiser than him. Socrates’ quest to make sense of the Oracle’s contention that he is the wisest of men is expressed in an activity (public discussions with people who presume to be wise). This activity is noticed by the young, who are so impressed with Socrates that they start following him around “of their own accord.” In short, Socrates presents himself as someone who does not hold himself in high regard, who had no hand in cultivating his reputation, and who made no conscious effort to attract followers. It is not difficult to see that Themistius’ account of his own rise to fame as a philosopher is modeled according to this story. Like Socrates, Themistius belittles himself (“I never thought that these treatises would be of any use to anyone else or would be taken seriously”), and his talent is recognized unintentionally by a credible figure (a man of Sicyon, a student of a Platonic philosopher from Chalcis who nonetheless adheres to the tradition of “the Academy and the Lyceum”19). This man urges his students to travel to Themistius and study with him, turning to the Oracle for divine corroboration and receiving “the same reply that Socrates had.” Themistius, then, did not think much of himself, had no hand in cultivating his reputation, and made no effort to attract the young. Hence, he argues, accusing him of being a “mercenary sophist” actively “hunting down and attracting young men” cannot be further from the truth. Framed within this context, it is now possible to distinguish between the part of this account fashioned to promote the narrative and therefore to be treated with suspicion, and the more reliable core of his account. Included in Themistius’ “mock-modest disclaimer”—to borrow Blumenthal’s expres-

19

It is unclear who this person was. Scholars have proposed to identify him with Celsus, a correspondent of Libanius; Hierius, a pupil of Iamblichus; and Euphrasius, also a pupil of Iamblichus. For discussion and references see Penella, Private, 122n25.

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sion20—are all the details that are meant to negate the accusation that Themistius is a sophist or are meant to liken him to Socrates’ self-depreciation. In other words, that the works were written for private use, had nothing original in them, and that Themistius attempted to prevent their circulation, should be filtered out of the analysis.21 What we are left with are compositions which help understand the meaning of Aristotle’s text, are useful for memorizing Aristotle’s arguments, and render Aristotle’s text clearer and more comprehensible— benefits that we have encountered when presenting Theon’s discussion of the utility of the paraphrasis method. These features are also found in Themistius’ proem to his paraphrase of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, which is perhaps the most trustworthy document about this issue. However, before turning to that text, it is worthwhile to take a look at Themistius’ Oration 20, which is his funeral oration in honor of his father Eugenius,22 a philosopher in his own right and Themistius’ teacher: Even during your sojourn here [on earth] you used to strive greatly to associate with Aristotle. Your physical body was unable to bar you from associating with him, even though your favorite [i.e., Aristotle] was then so very far away. O divine person, I imagine that the famous Aristotle now honors you and loves you more than he loves anyone else and is so full of joy that he does not know what to do with himself. He renders thanks to you for having been his interpreter (προεφήτευσας) … He is grateful to you 20 21

22

Blumenthal, “Photius,” 177. There is also no reason to assume on account of this testimony, as most scholars have, that Themistius’ paraphrases belong exclusively to his early career. The most one can conclude from Themistius’ comments, assuming that they can be trusted, is that some of the paraphrases that brought him fame were written when he was “young.” This does not mean that nothing was written in a later date, and it is also possible that they were subject to expansions and revisions as a result of classroom discussions. Libanius writes to Themistius in Winter 362/3 (well after his rise to fame and perhaps later than Oration 23, which Vanderspoel dates to 358/359 and Penella dates around 360) that “I firmly believe both now and for a long time since that you live as a philosopher, and although you’re perhaps writing more (πλείω συγγράφειν) at present, even before you maintained a conduct appropriate to that way of life” (Libanius refers to Themistius’ proconsulship, which was frowned upon by philosophers who thought that this was unworthy of a philosopher. At the time of Libanius’ writing Themistius had more leisure to be philosophically active since his proconsulship ended at late 359) (Bradbury, Selected Letters, § 3, p. 124). There is also no indication that Themistius stopped teaching philosophy. Two letters from Libanius—composed at 361 and 364—have him send students for Themistius to accept (See Cribiore, School, §§117–118, p. 364). For Eugenius See Ballériaux, “Eugénios.” See esp. 145–148 for an analysis of the present oration.

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for having explained the wisdom that he had discovered and cultivated but then concealed in darkness and wrapped in abstruseness. His intention had not been to grudge good men this wisdom; but he did not want to cast it out onto the streets either. You would determine who were worthy of his wisdom. You would remove the darkness and uncover Aristotle’s handiwork for them. Just as a person approached the inner sanctuary [of Aristotle’s works], he would be filled with awe and anxiety. He would be in distress and gripped by a sense of utter helplessness, unable to take a step, unable to embark on any path that would lead him into the sanctuary. Then that interpreter (ὁ προφήτης) [Eugenius] would open the gateway of the temple, clothe the god’s statue, and make it beautiful and clean on all sides. He would show the statue, now all sparkling and shining with a heavenly light, to the initiate. That fog and cloud would be completely broken up without delay. From the depths, meaning would emerge, full of light and splendor instead of the original darkness.23 Religious phraseology aside, Themistius’ account of Eugenius—which doubtlessly casts light on his own pedigree, following in his father’s footsteps as an interpreter of Aristotle24—is a useful description of what can be perhaps

23

24

Oration 20, 234d2–235b6 (translated in Penella, Private, 53–54). Later, Themistius remarks: “[Eugenius] always displayed the works of the great Plato right at the door [of Aristotle’s “temple”] and in the very temple precinct … he felt that Aristotle’s philosophy is an excellent preliminary rite to Plato’s frenzy and, at the same time, a defensive wall and safeguard for it. Plato’s philosophy is still too accessible, still assailable by sophists, he thought; Aristotle provided fortifications for him, fenced him in on all sides, and kept his teachings from being assailed by plots.” The manner in which one chooses to read this conditions one’s assessment of Eugenius’ philosophical affiliation. Ballériaux concludes from Themistius’ discussion that Eugenius did not regard the study of Aristotle as an end in itself, but as a necessary preliminary for the study of Plato (“Eugénius,” 147–148), which supports Ballériaux’s contention that Eugenius was a Neoplatonist. But this could be read the other way around, as Themistius clearly names Aristotle as Eugenius’ “favorite” (παιδικά). As Penella notes: “If Aristotle was in first place for him, Plato came a close second” (Private, 11; see 11n38 for a critique of Ballériaux’s argument and further references). From a logical point of view, from the statement that studying Aristotle’s work is necessary for studying Plato it does not follow that one should be preferred over the other. It is also perhaps worth mentioning that Themistius refers to Pythagoras and Zeno before addressing Plato. Vanderspoel suggests that “Eugenius’ ability to expound philosophy for a general audience, praised in Oration 20, was undoubtedly one factor that induced Themistius to pursue the same goal and, probably, to write Paraphrases of some works of Aristotle” (Vanderspoel, Themistius, 37). Penella adds that “several features of Eugenius’s paideia that Themistius celebrates in Oration 20 are also features of Themistius’ own intellectual cul-

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referred to as “interpretation as vocation.” Themistius’ description of a person’s helplessness when approaching Aristotle’s writing is all too familiar to anyone who attempts to read Aristotle’s works, and the impenetrability of Aristotle’s text (here presented as a conscious method to weed out the unworthy)—even on the surface level—demands a teacher. “The interpreter”—ὁ προφήτης—is presented as a person of rare and special talent. The metaphoric descriptions of Eugenius, who “would remove the darkness and uncover Aristotle’s handiwork,” transforming Aristotle’s terse and complex books into something “beautiful and clean on all sides … now all sparkling and shining with a heavenly light,” can be understood as successfully mediating a text that “has ceased to be readily accessible to the readers of an epoch,” as Zucker puts it, and “make a work available to a larger audience.” Moving on to less lofty discussions, Themistius’ proem to an anonymous addressee in the beginning of his paraphrase of the Posterior Analytics is more pragmatic in its presentation and hence is probably the most reliable account for understanding Themistius’ purpose in composing his paraphrases: I thought that for me to construct explications (ἐξηγήσεις) of Aristotle’s books in succession to so many great men was little short of futile ambition. Not much can be found that my predecessors omitted, and to attempt to construct exhaustive commentaries (πραγματείας) for the sake of some minor interventions would be like someone wanting to restructure the Athena of Pheidias because he thought that he could improve the tassel on her sandal. However, to extract the intentions (τὸ ἐκλαμβάνοντα τὰ βουλήματα) of what is written in his books, and report it quickly (σὺν τάχει τε ἐξαγγέλλειν) in line with the conciseness (τῇ συντομίᾳ) of the Philosopher, as best I could, seemed both novel (καινόν) and quite beneficial (ὠφέλειαν). For I believed that remembrance (ἀνάμνησιν) by such a method (τρόπου) would be convenient for those who had studied Aristotle’s [works] once, but who were unable to recollect them continuously (ἀναλαμβάνειν δὲ αὐτὰ συνεχῶς) because of the length of the [major] commentaries (ὑπομνημάτων).25

25

ture” (Penella, Private, 13). Both agree that “Themistius can advertise his own intellectual culture while commemorating that of his deceased father” (Penella, Private, 14, referring to Vanderspoel, Themistius, 91). Themistius, in An. Post. 1,2–12 (translated in Todd, On the Soul, 3). For analysis see Todd, On the Soul, 3–4; Kakavelaki, “Origins,” 274–275; Blumenthal, “Photius,” 174–178; Volpe Cacciatore, “Parafrasi,” 389–390.

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As can be seen from Themistius’ text, he believes that his approach is beneficial for communicating Aristotle’s ideas in a clear, accessible, and easy to remember way, and its intended audience is clearly demarcated as people who are familiar with Aristotle’s work but need a convenient reminder. Essentially, this is the type of text that Themistius had written about in his Oration 23, that we have already seen is in line with the benefits of the paraphrasis enumerated by Theon. But here, probably not worried lest his addressee regard him as a sophist, Themistius’ words are free from false modesty, and it is clear that he is keen on promoting his approach, which he regards as a first: In articulating the Posterior Analytics in this manner for the first time, our intention is to share this type of writing with you first, for the sake of accurate training and genuine friendship, and so that none of the things insufficiently stated [in Aristotle’s treatise] will evade you (οὔτε λήσεσθαί τί σε τῶν μὴ δεόντως εἰρημένων), and so that you will not remain silent after having relied [upon my composition].26 Here again, Themistius describes his project in public rather than private terms and has no hesitation about sharing it. His agenda aside, Themistius characterises his paraphrases as having the same goals that are found in Theon’s— most notably understanding, clarity, and ease of memory. In the next section I discuss Themistius’ methods for achieving these goals, which can perhaps be understood as appropriating the traditional paraphrasis procedure to Aristotle’s texts, namely expanding a set of exercises to a literary genre. 2.2 Themistius’ Explanation of His Methodology In the last part of his proem to his paraphrase of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, before beginning to paraphrase the text, Themistius provides valuable information on his methodology: Many of Aristotle’s books seem designed to be cryptic (ἔοικε … ἐπίκρυψιν μεμηχανῆσθαι), especially those before us, first, because of his usual brevity of speech (βραχυλογίαν), but also because the sequence of the main points is not separately identified (ἡ τάξις τῶν κεφαλαίων οὐ διακέκριται). For this reason you must excuse me if I appear to interpret (ἑρμηνεύοντες) some matters at rather great length (it was impossible to state

26

Themistius, in An. Post. 1,12–16 (my translation).

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them more clearly (σαφέστερον) in an equivalent number [of words]), and with others to make readjustments (μεθαρμοττόμενοι) and rearrangements (μετατιθέντες) so that each of the main points can be clearly demarcated (περιγεγραμμένα). Also, if I have brushed over (ἐπιδεδραμήκαμεν) some items more briefly (συντομώτερον), that does not merit complaint. It was not worth my spending time on matters that received specialized investigation without their particularly focusing on the theory of demonstration, since my intention was to devise an easy way of acquiring useful knowledge (ἐνδιατρίβειν τῷ ῥᾳστώνην ἐπινοῆσαι προελομένῳ τῆς κατανοήσεως τῶν χρησίμων).27 This passage maintains that Aristotle’s work calls for mediation for the same reasons that Themistius put forth in his eulogy to his father, minus the dramatic panache. Aristotle’s difficulty is not presented as a filtering process to the unworthy; it seems cryptic because the philosopher’s expression is brief and his text is not clearly organized. Without professional aid, it is difficult to understand what Aristotle is writing or to follow the sequence of ideas. As discussed earlier, Theon introduced four main paraphrasis procedures: syntax, addition, subtraction, and substitution. Themistius’ explanation of his methodology can be taken to apply these procedures in his own text. Syntax as “rearrangement”; Addition as “interpreting matters at rather great length”; Subtraction as “brushing over some items more briefly”; and Substitution as “readjustments.” But as will immediately become apparent, since the motivation for the paraphrase is teaching a text rather than training an orator, the application of these procedures is dependent upon what is demanded by the text instead of the author’s volition. What is more, the fact that a complete book is paraphrased warrants an expanded role to each procedure as well as a novel set of meta-procedures. Accordingly, in the next section I show how Syntax is expanded from changing the order of words to rearranging the sequence of the text at different levels of complexity; Addition will transform into elaboration, which will in turn branch out to different meta-procedures; Subtraction will turn into omission of unnecessary text; and Substitution will not be limited to words and expressions, but will also be applied to passages and arguments.

27

Themistius, in An. Post., 1,16–2,4 (translated in Todd, On the Soul, 3–4, slightly modified). Volpe Cacciatore (“Parafrasi,” 390) provides a short analysis of Themistius’ presentation of chapters 1, 2, 4, 7, 11, and 12 in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, in an attempt to “trace the specific modalities of Themistius’ paraphrase procedure.” Her work is also valuable for conveniently placing various Aristotelian and Themistian passages side by side, demonstrating the various procedures.

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Theon’s suggestion that sometimes the text should be left untouched is also frequently adopted by Themistius, who is content with quoting the text when it is clear enough on its own (or less interesting for him); hence Quotation is also discussed. If the paraphrase of the Posterior Analytics signals a movement toward pedagogy, the paraphrase of On the Soul signals a further outreach toward philosophy. In other words, from the voice of Themistius the teacher, the voice of Themistius the philosopher emerges. The introductory remarks in his paraphrase of Aristotle’s On the Soul introduce methods that are difficult to pinpoint: In this treatise we must try to follow Aristotle on everything that can be systematically understood (ἐπιστήμῃ) about the soul, and to elucidate (ἐκκαλύψαι), reconstruct (συστῆναι), and analyse (ἐπιστῆσαι) some [issues], and (if it is not tactless to say so) even fully elaborate (ἐξεργάσασθαι) still others.28 According to Todd, these methods “are unfortunately described in generic terms that cannot be easily attached to the content of the paraphrase, and may well refer to overlapping procedures.”29 Nevertheless, he suggests to understand elucidation as “the restatement, enlargement and rearrangement of texts, with some omissions of repetitive material, and the explication of terminology by glosses or substitutions”; reconstruction as “places where he presents Aristotelian ideas more schematically than in the text itself”; analysis as “the presentation of solutions to problems”; and full elaboration as “any discussion that goes significantly beyond a repetition of the Aristotelian text,”30 noting for instance Themistius’ independent discussion stemming from On the Soul 3.5, as well as discussions of Plato’s Timaeus and other polemical discussions. Capone Ciollaro, in her analysis of Themistius’ paraphrase of On the Soul, identifies four methodological devices, which incorporate meta-procedures: broader redactions, with transpositions of terms, as well as morphological and lexical changes;31 original additions to Aristotle’s text, for explanatory purposes;32 extensive digressions with references to earlier interpreters;33 and

28 29 30 31 32 33

Themistius, in De An. 1,2–5 (translated in Todd, On the Soul, 15). Todd, 4. Todd, 5. Capone Ciollaro, “Osservazioni,” 81–82. Capone Ciollaro, 82–83. Capone Ciollaro, 83–86.

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omissions, from single words to complete passages.34 Capone Ciollaro also notes that many of Themistius’ digressions in the On the Soul paraphrase have a polemical character (Andronicus; Alexander; Porphyry) and involve frequent citations of classical poets and philosophers.35 These procedures are broader in intention and scope than in Themistius’ paraphrase of the Posterior Analytics, and probably reflect a development in his paraphrasing technique, that allows extensive meta-procedures without undermining the overall sequence of the text, as well as Themistius’ own philosophical preoccupations.36 In other words, the paraphrase of On the Soul expands the intentions of the paraphrase genre from pedagogical utility to a way of philosophizing, and its scope approaches that of the commentaries that Themistius originally tried to avoid.37 It is only natural that within this development the core paraphrasing procedures become ever more complex and intertwined, and this reflects Theon’s original position that it is possible to arrive at new modes by combining the basic ones in various ways.

3

Examples

The examples presented and discussed below are arranged according to an expansive understanding of the four basic modes of Syntax, Addition, Subtraction, and Substitution, along with Quotation, which refers to places where Themistius leaves Aristotle’s text as it is. For the sake of the discussion I have

34 35 36

37

Capone Ciollaro, 86–90. Capone Ciollaro, 91. Todd presents a calculation of the ratio by word count of Themistius’s paraphrase against Aristotle’s text: in the eight books of the Physics, the ratios are 2.18, 1.84, 2.27, 1.99, 1.10, 1.12, 0.38, and 0.88; in the two books of the Posterior Analytics, the ratios are 0.99 and 1.06. For the three books of On the Soul the ratios are and 2.63, 2.21, and 2.91—but the ratio for On the Soul 3.5 is a staggering 27.18 (See Todd, Physics 4, 4n4). I conducted a rough calculation based on a draft English translation of Themistius’ paraphrase against Ross’ English translation of Metaphysics 12. The paraphrase is three times longer than Aristotle’s text, according to the following ratio distribution: 5.2 (chapter 1); 2.5 (chapter 2); 4.0 (chapter 3); 1.7 (chapter 4); 1.3 (chapter 5); 3.9 (chapter 6); 4.6 (chapter 7); 1.6 (chapter 8); 5.1 (chapter 9); and 3.3 (chapter 10). Capone Ciollaro notes that the long digressions, the frequent engagement with the various philosophical doctrines, and the previous exegetic tradition render the paraphrase exceedingly closer to the traditional commentary. This leads him to suggest a solution to the problem whether or not Themistius had written commentaries besides paraphrases: the distinction does not refer to different compositions, but rather to “two coexisting working methods in the same text” (Capone Ciollaro, “Osservazioni,” 91–92).

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included my own sub-division to the mode Addition, which reflects metaprocedures in which Themistius does not paraphrase the text but engages with it. These are Elaboration (adding examples or explanatory comments to the text), Orientation (instances where Themistius explains the context of a given discussion; refers forward and backwards to other discussions in the text; or systematizes structural aspects of the book), Digression (departing from the text to an independent discussion), and Opinion (instances where Themistius directly responds to Aristotle’s position). Naturally, these procedures frequently overlap each other.38 As noted earlier, one of the main purposes of the paraphrasis exercise is to teach students to express themselves in the manner of the ancients. This is reflected in Themistius, who—as Todd has already remarked39—speaks in Aristotle’s voice throughout his paraphrases, a habit that makes it difficult to identify the exact places where he does not interpret Aristotle’s views but presents his own. It is important to keep in mind that Themistius had a copy of Aristotle’s text in front of him when composing his paraphrases, and that they have often been used for control purposes in editions of Aristotle’s Greek texts, including Metaphysics 12 (despite the language barriers).40 The extent and manner in which one should employ Themistius’ paraphrases for controlling Aristotle’s text is conditioned by understanding his methodology—especially when referring to glosses, variants of single words, and ordering of words—and warrants a separate study. I occasionally address this issue in the discussion, and several instances in Metaphysics 12 are analyzed in the Commentary. Most of the examples below are taken from Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12, but I have occasionally included examples from other paraphrases when existing scholarship contributes to their analysis and when they shed interesting light on the paraphrase procedures. I will try to unravel the logic and considerations behind each given paraphrastic choice, and sometimes opine how it can affect the establishment of a textual tradition, which is important for the sake of textual criticism. In this respect, analysis of Themistius’ paraphrase methodology complements the textual analysis required for taking editorial decisions, which was presented in Chapter 1.

38

39 40

Here I should stress again that while a historical claim about the causal continuation between the exercise and the genre is attractive, I do not offer it at full force until further evidence is uncovered. Still, it is better to map methodological procedures according to some historical precedence than to rely solely on common sense. Todd, On the Soul, 4. See above, Introduction, n. 28.

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3.1 Syntax As we have seen, Theon defined Syntax as keeping the same words but changing the structure of the sentence. In more literal cases of Themistius’ paraphrases, this is sometimes encountered. For instance, Aristotle’s expression μεταβάλλοι ἂν τὸ μεταβάλλον τετραχῶς (“that which is transformed will be transformed in four ways”) in Physics 5.1.225a3 is reordered as τετραχῶς ἂν μεταβάλλοι τὸ μεταβάλλον in Themistius’ paraphrase (167,26–27), retaining the same words and the same meaning. This procedure in its basic form cannot be exemplified through Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12, since Greek and Arabic are grammatically different from each other. But in Themistius’ paraphrases, Syntax is also found in an expanded form. If we take a given argument, a given chapter, or even a whole book as points of reference, Syntax is transformed into a method that changes the order of different parts of the work rather than the order of different words in a sentence. Achard, for instance, shows how Themistius’ reorganization of Aristotle’s argumentative sequence in the Posterior Analytics, when responding to Meno’s paradox, reveals that Aristotle is actually tackling two distinct problems, something that is difficult to realize when reading Aristotle’s text in its original form.41 This is in line with Themistius’ declaration (discussed above) that he intends “to make readjustments and rearrangements so that each of the main points can be clearly demarcated.” Another example for the expansion of the Syntax procedure can be found in the opening of Themistius’ paraphrase of Aristotle’s On the Heavens, which has been analyzed by Coda.42 Themistius, before paraphrasing Aristotle’s opening remarks, begins by noting that according to Aristotle there are three meanings for the term οὐρανός—the sphere of the fixed stars; the whole of the divine revolving body; and the cosmos as a whole—stressing that in the present work the discussion focuses on the latter meaning.43 Themistius lifts this tripartite 41

42 43

Achard, “Themistius,” 19–21, notes that Themistius employs a number of complex paraphrastic procedures to show that the solution to Meno’s paradox in Aristotle deals with two distinct problems, namely the impossibility of knowledge and “the problem of validity of universal premises with regard to unknown instances,” which is known as the sophistic “veiled” argument (see Achard, “Themistius,” 32–33). See also Achard, “La paraphrase,” for a similar type of analysis, this time with respect to An. Post. 71a1–11. Coda, “Reconstructing.” Themistius’ Hebrew translation is corrupt, as it mentions that there are three meanings, but lists only two (in De Cael., ‫א‬5–7): ‫אמר כי הענינים המורה עליהם משם השמים אצל הקדמונים שלשה וזה שהוא יורה אצלם על‬ ‫גלגל הכוכבים הקיימים לבד ויורה על העולם בעצמו ולפי זה העניין השלישי נמצא‬ .‫אריסטוטליס יע״ש בזה הספר‬ This is obviously a transmission error, but the third meaning can be gathered from Aris-

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division from Aristotle’s discussion in chapter 9 of the first book (278b11–24), so here Syntax is employed for the sake of orientation. When Themistius’ reader arrives, many pages later, at Themistius’ actual paraphrase of 278b11–24, there is nothing but a brief note that this part had already been explained, after which Themistius proceeds to paraphrase 278b24 onwards.44 This example shows how far the Syntax procedure can be extended—to the point where parts of the text can migrate over nine chapters—and how consistent Themistius can be when he applies it. In his paraphrase of Metaphysics 12, Themistius occasionally applies Syntax to Aristotle’s argumentation sequences, for different reasons. For example, he changes the order of Aristotle’s discussion in his closing remarks about the unmoved mover at the end of chapter 7: table 49

“Syntax” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.7.1073a3–13 (tr. Ross)

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫כב‬3–11

[1] It is clear then from what has been said that there is a substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things.

[1] It has already been sufficiently clarified that there exists an eternal, immovable substance that is separate from the sensibles—not only in place, but by nature [as well].

[2] It has been shown also that this substance cannot have any magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible (for it produces movement through infinite time, but nothing finite has infinite power; and, while every magnitude is either infinite or finite, it cannot, for the above reason, have finite magnitude, and it cannot have infinite magnitude because there is no infinite magnitude at all).

[3] It is neither changed [into something else], nor changeable, nor a recipient of change [from the outside] in any manner.

44

[2] It has also been clarified that it is not a body, does not have a quantity, is deathless, and is indivisible. For it moves for an unlimited time, and there does not exist a limited magnitude who has power to move unlimitedly. We have already explained this in our treatise about physics, namely that every magnitude is either limited or unlimited. The claim that

totle himself. See the discussion in Coda, “Reconstructing,” 9, who argues that Themistius is following Alexander of Aphrodisias in this procedure. Themistius, In De Cael., ‫לה‬24–25.

128 Table 49

chapter 2 “Syntax” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (cont.)

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.7.1073a3–13 (tr. Ross)

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫כב‬3–11

[3] But it has also been shown that it is impassive and unalterable; for all the other changes are posterior to change of place.

it is limitless has already been invalidated, for no one agrees or admits that it is possible for the limited [magnitude] to have unlimited powers, all the more if they would have moved it as an ensouled body.

Other procedures Themistius applies on Aristotle’s text aside (see Commentary ad loc.), Syntax is used here to change the order of Aristotle’s conclusions, as the second and third conclusions trade places. Themistius does not do this for the sake of rendering Aristotle’s text clearer, as Aristotle’s main points in the present passage are already clearly demarcated, but because Themistius intends to depart from Aristotle’s second conclusion to a lengthy independent discussion (or “Digression”) about the source of the stars’ power to move infinitely, which also serves as a bridge to Aristotle’s astronomical discussion in chapter 8. Retaining Aristotle’s order would mean returning from the digression to the last item in Aristotle’s list, which would cause difficulty for establishing organic continuity between chapters 7 and 8. 3.2 Addition and Its Meta-procedures 3.2.1 Simple Addition There are several instances that can be labeled “Addition” in the straightforward sense within Themistius’ paraphrases. In the following example we find Themistius quoting from Aristotle and explicating some of his condensed style (the relevant parts of the text are italicized). table 50

“Addition” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.3.1070a24–27 (tr. Ross; modified)

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫ז‬14–17

But we must examine whether something also survives afterwards (εἰ δὲ καὶ ὕστερόν τι ὑπομένει). For in some cases there is nothing to prevent (οὐδὲν κωλύει); e.g., the soul may

We must reflect whether or not any of the forms eventually remains after the passing away of the composition. It seems among some of them there is no hindrance from remaining. The soul, for exam-

historical and methodological aspects Table 50

129

“Addition” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (cont.)

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.3.1070a24–27 (tr. Ross; modified)

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫ז‬14–17

be of this sort—not all of it but the intellect; for presumably it is impossible wholly (πᾶσαν γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἴσως).

ple, is perhaps so, and if not all of it, then out of it only the intellect, and it is presumably impossible for it to wholly remain.

As can be seen here, Themistius renders Aristotle’s text clearer by explicating some of his remarks, but leaving the argument fundamentally untouched. “Afterwards” is expanded to “after the passing away of the composition”; to “nothing to prevent” Themistius adds a prepositional object (“from remaining”); and “wholly” is completed by “remain.” However, it is important to note that in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 these minimalistic procedures cannot be confidently attributed to Themistius and might be the result of an explicating Arabic translation. This problem is especially apparent in cases of hendiadys translations—where a single Greek word is translated into two Arabic words—which are not always easy to detect (see Commentary for ‫ו‬32; ‫ט‬30–31; ‫י‬13–14). 3.2.2 Meta-Procedure: Elaboration More often than not, Themistius’ additions include an interpretative dimension, the logic behind which occasionally becomes apparent only when addressing other parts of the paraphrase. Take for instance Aristotle’s discussion of four kinds of change in the context of their respective contraries which matter receives: table 51

“Elaboration” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (1)

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.2.1069b9–15 (tr. Ross)

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫ד‬6–10

Now since changes are of four kinds—either in respect of the essence or of the quality or of the quantity or of the place—and change in respect to the

We have already enumerated there [i.e., in the Physics]— alongside what we have said about the types of changes—how many are there in this substance [i.e., the corruptible sensible substance] and mentioned that there are four: the change in the definition of the thing, through which what it is becomes known, e.g., man comes to be from [something] other than a man, or

130 Table 51

chapter 2 “Elaboration” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (1) (cont.)

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.2.1069b9–15 (tr. Ross)

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫ד‬6–10

‘this’ is simple generation and destruction, and change in quantity is increase and diminution, and change in respect of an affection is an alteration, and change in place is motion, changes will be from given states into those contrary to them in these several respects. The matter, then, which changes must be capable of both states.

water—from [something that is] not water, but from air. This is the change that we call once coming into being and once passing away. The second [type of] change is in the quality, and it is called alteration. The third is in the quantity, and is called once growth and once decline. The fourth is in the place, and it is the spatial movement from place to place. This latter, fourth type of changes we have mentioned—we do not posit it to be impossible for the celestial bodies, because they are also moved from place to place and, in a way, from contraries to contraries, for a type of contrariety is found in places as well—according to opposition—e.g., forward and backward movement. No spatial movement can avoid these directions. In this change, as well [as the other types of change], this pair of contraries is insufficient. It needs—just like it is needed in the rest of the changes—a body underlying the two contraries in order to be moved from one to the other.

Themistius makes several slight changes to Aristotle’s text, three of which I will note here. First, before turning to Aristotle’s enumeration of four types of change, Themistius employs the meta-procedure Orientation (see below) to explain that the list is not random but is based on a previous discussion and explanation in the Physics. Second, Themistius provides examples for changes in substance in which matter sheds and receives different forms of different things. And third, which for Themistius is the most important, is his elaboration upon change in place and its relationship to the celestial bodies, a problematic point which Aristotle only touches upon in the present text. Themistius addresses this issue on numerous occasions, to which he implicitly offers a solution by incorporation a distinction (absent in Aristotle) between “body” and “matter.” Another example of elaboration—that at first glance seems straightforward, but actually reveals Themistius’ interpretative strategy—is his manner of elaborating upon Aristotle’s discussion of the moving cause at chapter 5:

historical and methodological aspects table 52

131

“Elaboration” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (2)

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.5.1071a13–17 (tr. A. Code)

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫י‬30–‫יא‬4

[T]he cause of man is both its elements, fire and earth as matter, and the distinctive form, and furthermore some other external thing, i.e. its father, and beyond these the sun and the oblique course, which are neither matter, nor form, nor privation, nor the same in form, but rather are movers.

You should keep this in mind when you set out to investigate the first cause, [namely] that some of the moving causes have the same form as the moved thing [and] proximate to it, while some of them are farther from it. The proximate cause is e.g., the father [to the son], the sun is a farther cause, and [a cause] farther than the sun is the ecliptic. These things are causes of the created thing neither as matter, nor as form, nor as privation; rather, they are movers. And they are movers not by being of the same form [and] proximate like the father, but they are farther and are stronger— being in actuality—because they are also the principles of the proximate causes.

Aristotle’s discussion is meant to explain the difference between the moving cause and the formal and material causes. Themistius’ additions to the discussion underscore the crucial place the moving cause has for the transition between the physical and metaphysical realms, and also inserts new material to the discussion which appropriates Aristotle’s remarks to Themistius’ overarching metaphysical scheme (see Conclusion). First, Themistius makes it clear that the discussion of the moving cause lays the grounds for the discussion of the first cause (which Aristotle does not mention here), and this is part of his meta-procedure of orientation and his attempt to impose more structure on Aristotle’s overall argumentations. Next, in explicating the difference between a proximate and remote moving cause (which is implicit in Aristotle’s examples), Themistius distinguishes between the causality of the sun and the causality of the ecliptic, the latter described as being more remote. This separation, as I suggest in the Commentary, is part of Themistius’ effort to include all the celestial bodies (rather than only the sun) as contributing factors to the process of coming to be and passing away.45 Another important addition that Themistius introduces to the text is the notion of (eternal) actuality ascribed to the remote causes (i.e., the sun and the sphere of the ecliptic), which explains why they are “stronger” than the

45

See Commentary in ‫יא‬1–2.

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proximate causes. In other words, Themistius explains that whereas natural things can have a causal relationship among themselves, one being the mover of the other, in an absolute sense both are equally moved by the eternal moving causes, which are therefore considered their principles. A significant case of elaboration is found in Themistius’ treatment of Aristotle’s proof of the existence of an eternal substance in the beginning of chapter 6, which rests upon the proof of the eternity of time, which necessitates the eternity of movement, which necessitates the existence of an eternal moving substance. Themistius’ elaboration has two parts. First, he presents a fuller account of Aristotle’s explanation for his argumentative procedure and his telegraphic argument for the eternity of time:46 table 53

“Elaboration” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (3)

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.6.1071b6–10

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫יב‬4–20

But it is impossible that movement should either have come into being or cease to be (for it must always have existed), or that time should. For there could not be a before and an after if time did not exist. Movement also is continuous, then, in the sense in which time is; for time is either the same thing as movement or an attribute of movement.

There is nothing puzzling about there being an eternal substance among the existents, since we already find things accidental in nature that are eternal and do not pass away. For movement is not a self-subsisting abstract nature, but it undoubtedly [belongs] to the body or to the substance. And to an even lesser extent is time like this [i.e., a self-subsisting nature], since time is closely related to movement and cannot avoid being either its quantity or its modification. It is impossible to ascribe to time and movement neither coming to be nor passing away—not [even] for someone who has the utmost love for dispute and dialectics. For if we suppose that time comes to be, it follows that time would have existed before it came to be; and if we suppose that it passes away—it would have existed after its passing away. We have already said this earlier in the natural treatises, and we mention it [i.e., this argument] now because we specifically and necessarily need it in what we are about to inquire into regarding the things upon which the knowledge of the first principle relies. Movement and time neither come to be nor pass away, and reason does not have us suppose this. With regard to time this is very clear, for

46

For a discussion of Themistius’ argument and analysis of some fine points not mentioned here, see Commentary ad loc.

historical and methodological aspects Table 53

133

“Elaboration” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (3) (cont.)

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.6.1071b6–10

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫יב‬4–20

one’s sayings “there was a moment before which there was no time” and “there will be a moment after which there will be no time” are fundamentally contradictory utterances. For everything that is similar to these utterances, i.e., “when” and “was” and “will be” and “before” and “after,” which the author of this supposition cannot find a way to avoid making use of, are indeed parts of time, limits in it, or significations related to it. It is impossible for anyone who makes use of one of these names in order to affirm through it the createdness of time not to presume [the existence of] time before its creation; and whoever makes use of some of [these] utterances as something through which he intends to necessitate the passing away of time, necessitates—analogically to the first [example]—that time will endure after its passing away.

But Themistius does not stop here and notes that apart from time, movement itself should be examined, adding no less than three arguments for the eternity of movement, which do not depend on the concept of time.47 The function of this addition in the paraphrase is multifold: first, it reinforces Aristotle’s assertion that there exists an eternal body by supplying new arguments; second, it shows how to arrive at the same conclusion without using a key element in the original argument; third, it reveals the importance Themistius attaches to a discussion; fourth, it is suggestive of some kind of dissatisfaction with Aristotle’s minor (and perhaps too weak) treatment of a critical issue;48 and finally, the chosen arguments are telling with regards to Themistius’ own philosophical preoccupations.49 47 48

49

Themistius’ arguments are discussed and analyzed in the Commentary ad loc. There are a few ways to suggest this: first, time is ontologically dependent on movement, which is itself ontologically dependent upon substance, and perhaps Themistius thought that building a crucial argument on the basis of such an ontologically weak phenomenon (which is nothing but a modification of an accident) is not philosophically healthy. And second, from a logical point of view, what is proved in Aristotle’s argument is that the eternity of time dictates the eternity of motion, but one still has the prove that eternity of motion is in itself a sound idea free from self-contradiction. In the Commentary I show the affinity between the arguments Themistius chooses to add

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3.2.3 Meta-Procedure: Orientation One of the most significant meta-procedures in Themistius’ paraphrases can be labeled as “Orientation.” Instances of orientation are instances in which Themistius does not paraphrase the text directly but rather provides context, like explaining the object of the book, the function of a specific argument with reference to the whole, the methodology of the author (as the paraphrast understands it), forward and backward references, and so forth. Identification of this meta-procedure is valuable because it reflects Themistius’ understanding of the architecture of Aristotle’s text and its argumentation from a macroscopic level. A useful way to get acquainted with this meta-procedure is by examining Themistius’ opening remarks to some of his paraphrases, because they exhibit how Themistius eases the reader into a text that he is paraphrasing. Fragments of Themistius’ paraphrase of the Prior Analytics, lost in Greek and Arabic, survive in Hebrew and are included in the fourteenth century Provençal philosopher and translator Ṭodros Ṭodrosi’s compendium of logical and physical works.50 Among the fragments is Themistius’ introduction to his paraphrase of the second book of the Prior Analytics: Errors always occur in anything composite for two reasons: either because the composition itself is corrupted, or because the things from which it is composed are corrupted, for a house may be destroyed on account of the combination of its wood and stones, or on account of the stones themselves; or in the case of a garment, because of the weave or because of the wool or flax. The analogous situation applies in the case of the error, truth, and correctness of syllogisms, because they are composite, and not simple, utterances. This is so because syllogisms contain things which function as matter and things which function as form, for the premises are like matter and their composition like form. Truth and falsity arise in syllogisms from each one of these [i.e., from the premises and their composition]. Hence we should investigate if the matter is perfect and if the combination of the premises is correct.51

50 51

and the cosmogonic approach he advances at his paraphrase of Aristotle’s critical remarks about Anaxagoras at chapter 2. Themistius’ paraphrase is briefly discussed in Rosenberg, “Possible,” 68. For Ṭodros’ life and works see Elgrably-Berzin, Avicenna, 1–6. Rosenberg & Manekin, “Themistius,” 92. The Hebrew version appears Rosenberg & Manekin, “Japeth,” 268: ‫בעבור שהטעויות בכלל אמנם יפלו בכל מורכב על שני פנים אם מצד היות ההרכבה בעצמה‬ ‫ וזה כי הבית יגונה אם בסבת הרכבת‬.‫נפסדת ואם מהיות הדברים שהורכב מהם נפסדים‬

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Themistius orientates the reader by using familiar examples which make it easier to grasp the point of Aristotle’s discussion and the difference between the content of an argument and its structure. This short introduction enables the reader to know what to expect from the text. A similar method is apparent in the manner Themistius paraphrases Aristotle’s technical opening remarks to the Physics: table 54

“Orientation” in the paraphrase of the Physics

Aristotle, Physics, 1.1.184a10–16 Themistius, Paraphrase of Physics (tr. Todd, 19) (tr. Charlton) In all disciplines in which there is systematic knowledge of things with principles, causes, or elements, it arises from a grasp of those: we think we have knowledge of a thing when we have found its primary causes and principles, and followed it back to its elements. Clearly, then, systematic knowledge of nature must start with an attempt to settle questions about principles.

This work has the object of providing a science specific both to nature and to the things that come to be through its agency. Every human being easily comes to know these things without reasoning since all of us who have healthy sense-perception could say that water, a plant, and an animal are different things. But someone whose knowledge is going to be scientific must first get to know the principles of nature too. The arts that are more engaged in reasoning reveal this. For example, we say that experts in grammar are not those who hear words but those who can state the number of elements from which each word is composed, and again that experts in music are not those with an auditory perception of melodies but those who can separate melodies into tones and semitones.

Like in the previous example, Themistius explains exactly what Aristotle’s book is about, clarifying—with the use of easily digestible and efficient analogies— what scientific knowledge is and also providing examples for natural things (water, plants, animals) as contrasted to the arts. Themistius’ paraphrase of Aristotle’s opening passage makes it easier for the reader to understand the subject of the book, what method of inquiry it uses, and what it hopes to achieve.

‫ וככה הבגד אם מצד האריגה ואם מצד הצמר או‬,‫עציו ואבניו ואם בסבת האבנים עצמם‬ ‫ ככה הדמוי והטעות והאמת והיושר בהקשים באשר היו מאמרים מורכבים לא‬,‫הפשתים‬ ‫ וזה כי יש להם דברים במדרגת החמר ודברים במדרגת הצורה כי ההקדמות כמו‬.‫פשוטים‬ ‫ ולכן ראוי‬.‫ והאמת והשקר יתחדשו בהקשים מכל אחד ואחד מאלו‬.‫החמר והרכבתם כצורה‬ .‫שנחקור מן החמר אם הוא שלם ומהרכבת ההקדמות אם הם על נכון‬

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Turning to the beginning of the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12, Themistius’ subtle orientation procedure becomes apparent: table 55

“Orientation” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (1)

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.1.1069a18–19 (tr. Ross)

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫א‬3–5

Substance is the subject of our inquiry; for the principles and the causes we are seeking are those of substances.

Aristotle said: “existent” is said in many ways. But since we set out to inquire into the principles of the existents, we only set out to inquire into the principles of substance, because substance is of the highest degree among all of the existents herein.

Whereas Aristotle simply states that the text is about substance, he does not explain to the reader why he is inquiring into substance and what is to be gained from the inquiry.52 Themistius’ brief insertion of Aristotle’s dictum “existent is said in many ways” immediately makes clear to the reader what the text is actually about (or, to put it more precisely, what Themistius believes the text is about): the present inquiry is a part of the general inquiry into existents. Since the thing that is most worthy of the term “existent” is substance, investigating the principle of substance will result in the understanding of the principle of existence. At once the readers acquire a clear grasp of the sense of the entire discussion, and are in a better position to tackle the text. The meta-procedure Orientation is not limited to Themistius’ opening remarks in his paraphrases, but is found throughout. For example, here is how it is applied to the beginning of Metaphysics 12, chapter 6, where Aristotle’s discussion turns to the eternal unmovable substance: table 56

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.6.1071b3–5

“Orientation” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (2)

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫יא‬19–33

Since there were three kinds We have already said that all the substances are three, and that of substance, two of them two of them are natural substances and the third substance is physical and one unmovimmovable. The two natural substances have already been clar52

Modern scholarship is still struggling with this point. See above, Introduction, n. 4.

historical and methodological aspects Table 56

137

“Orientation” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (2) (cont.)

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.6.1071b3–5

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫יא‬19–33

able, regarding the latter we must assert that it is necessary that there should be an eternal unmovable substance.

ified earlier, and we have inquired into them sufficiently in our previous remarks. But at present we seek the substance that is immovable and that likewise does not cease [to exist]. From now on we will inquire whether it is possible for there to exist a substance unworn by time, and that is not a recipient of the changes and the alterations, but remains the same [throughout] all eternity. We have already said many times that it is impossible to put forth a demonstration for this principle, for the demonstration only rests upon causes and principles, whereas it is impossible for the first cause—which is the first principle—to have prior to it neither a cause nor a principle. But perhaps we can achieve our intention in the following manner: since we think that the first principle of all the existing things should have two attributes— one of them to be eternal, and the other to be immovable—we should separate each of the two attributers and inquire into it by itself. First we will inquire if it is possible for there to exist a certain eternal substance, and then we will inquire if it is possible for there to exist an immovable substance. When we proceed in this manner we will achieve our intention easily, for our inquiry will be is in the manner of someone who intends to carry a heavy thing but is unable to carry it, so he divides it and has the strength to carry it. The weight of the inquiry will be easier for us if we proceed in this manner.

Aristotle’s remarks briefly repeat the tripartite division of substance and state that what is left to accomplish is to prove the necessity of an eternal immovable substance (namely, the third kind of substance). Themistius presents Aristotle’s summary and intention in a manner which makes it easier for the readers to understand where they are in the text and how the argumentation is to proceed. Themistius first explains the previous discussion of the two natural substances, and then turns to explain in detail the properties of the third substance which is now being sought after, all of which will be addressed in time within the paraphrase. Afterwards he explains Aristotle’s methodology: since the first cause, being a principle, cannot be demonstrated, the discussion will

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proceed by two separate inquiries—first into an eternal substance, and then into an immovable substance—comparing it to dividing a heavy load into two lighter parts. This is exactly what Aristotle does, since chapter 6 focuses on proving the existence of an eternal substance, and chapter 7 proves the existence of an immovable substance, but reading Aristotle’s text without guidance makes it difficult to follow his sequence. Continuing his orientation procedure within the same context, Themistius alerts the reader in due course when the condition of eternity is satisfied, and when it is time to turn the discussion to immovability: table 57

“Orientation” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (3)

Aristotle, Metaph., 1072a21–24

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫טז‬8–10

There is, then, something which is always moved with an unceasing motion, which is motion in a circle; and this is plain not in theory only but in fact. Therefore the first heaven must be eternal. There is therefore also something which moves it.

If the movement is without rest, then that which is moved it [i.e., this movement] is eternal, and this is the first sphere. And if the movement of that which is moved is without rest, clearly the moving of its mover is without rest and uninterrupted. Now the fact that it is eternal and everlasting is clear, but we should [also] make clear that it is immovable according to what we had mentioned earlier.

3.2.4 Meta-Procedures: Digression and Opinion Digression, and its sub-genre Opinion (which is usually not clearly stated as such), are procedures in which Themistius departs from Aristotle’s text altogether for the sake of an independent discussion. These are the most convenient places to explore Themistius’ own voice and discover his philosophical preoccupations and interests when approaching Aristotle’s text. The polemical character of some of Themistius’ digressions in his other paraphrases (and in which his own voice is clearly distinguished from Aristotle’s)53 is mostly absent in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12, where Themistius’ independent voice is for the most part constructive and expansive. Digressions are mostly pedagogic or interpretative, except for the lengthy discussion of spontaneous generation appended to chapter 3, which is ostensibly presented as a response to Aristotle, and perhaps the cosmogonic discussion in chapter 2, which begins as an 53

See, for examples, Themistius’ critique of the notion of “ensoulment” frequent in contemporary Platonic philosophers in his paraphrase of On the Soul (Todd, On the Soul, 42–43); or his critique of Galen in his paraphrase of Physics 4 (Todd, Physics 4, 28–30).

historical and methodological aspects

139

elaboration upon Aristotle’s critique of Anaxagoras but ends up as an implicit rejection of Aristotle’s view in favor of Themistius’ own. Themistius’ digressions become lengthier and freer as he approaches advanced stages in Aristotle’s text. In many cases it seems that the digressions are not intended strictly for teaching Aristotle’s positions, but for promoting Themistius’ philosophical views. Every digression in Themistius’ paraphrase is presented and analyzed in its proper place in the Commentary below. The disjointed character of the digressions is somewhat misleading and stems from the fact that they are launched from different points in Aristotle’s text, of which Themistius never loses sight. Even when considerably going beyond the text, Themistius always returns to the point from which he departed, retaining Aristotle’s sequence. In this respect, the digressions are an organic part of the paraphrase procedure, perhaps even its casualties. As I argue in the Conclusion—taken together Themistius’ digressions in his paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 amount to a coherent whole of which Aristotle is the starting point and Themistius is the end, and which maximizes what can be plausibly exerted from Aristotle’s theology (generously construed). 3.3 Subtraction Cases in which Themistius subtracts significant portions of Aristotle’s text are rare in the present paraphrase.54 There are a few cases where an apparent omission is compensated in another part of the paraphrase, so should be regarded as instances of Syntax (for instance, the tripartite division of substance into matter, form, and privation at chapter 2 is pushed downwards to chapter 4, where it appears with examples). In chapter 2, the omission of the critical discussion of Empedocles, Anaximander, and Democritus (1069b20–24), retaining only Anaxagoras (which is pushed a bit down to ‫ה‬9 ff. for the sake of coherence) stresses the importance Themistius attaches to Anaxagoras’ view, which plays a crucial part in his own discussion,55 whereas the others, in the present context at least, play a negligible role. Perhaps the most curious omission is Themistius’ complete ignoring of Aristotle’s discussion of the cyclical nature of the sciences at the end of chapter 8 (1074b10–14), the reason for which I do not understand since he could have just as well simply quoted the text.

54

55

In his paraphrase of the Physics Themistius goes as far as completely omitting two whole chapters of the work (6.7 and 7.1). See also Capone Ciollaro’s systematic discussion of Themistius’ omissions in his paraphrase of On the Soul (“Osservazioni,” 86–90). Capone Ciollaro (91) believes that Themistius’ omissions in that text are mostly meant to avoid unnecessary repetitions. See below, Commentary on chapter 2, section 2.

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Occasionally there are cases where Themistius subtracts a word or an expression from the text in order to render it more focused. Here are two examples: table 58

“Subtraction” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12

Aristotle, Metaph., 12 (tr. Ross)

Themistius, Paraphrase

The subject of our inquiry is substance; for the principles and the causes we are seeking are those of substances (1.1069a18–19)

But since we set out to inquire into the principles of the existents, we only set out to inquire into the principles of substance (‫א‬3–4).

For one might raise the question whether the principles and elements are different or the same for substances and for relative terms, and similarly in the case of each of the categories (4.1070a33–35).

The first thing [i.e., question] that I should address preliminarily is the discussion [concerning] whether it is possible for the principle of all the existing things to be one and the same, so that that [same] principle is the principle of the substance, the principle of the relation, the principle of the quantity, and the principle of the quality[, etc.], or the principle of every genus is different from the principle of the other (‫ח‬30– 32).

In both of these cases, Themistius omits the term that accompanies “principle”—first “cause,” and then “element.” I believe that the reason for this, besides avoiding the understanding of these respective terms as if they were synonymous, is to maintain the prominence of the discussion of principles in the text. Here Themistius is perhaps more faithful to Aristotle than Aristotle himself, since his paraphrase is more consistent in making it clear that elements and causes are not identical to principles. It is important to note that cases of subtraction—especially of single words—should be treated carefully, since omissions are a common copyist error. 3.4 Substitution The procedure of substitution in Themistius’ paraphrase can be as minimal as to apply to a single word, but can also be used on blocks of text of different lengths, and even on philosophical arguments. The substitution of terms is sometimes tricky, because in certain cases it is unclear whether this is a con-

historical and methodological aspects

141

scious decision or a matter of the version of Aristotle’s text that was before Themistius, and this has bearings on matters of textual criticism. One of the most important instances of substitution of terms in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 is Themistius’ substitution of the term “matter” (doubtlessly ὕλη) for the term “body” (doubtlessly σῶμα), and sometimes “recipient” (probably ὑποκείμενον), as can be seen from the following example: table 59

“Substitution” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (1)

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.3.1069b35– 1070a4 (tr. Ross)

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫ה‬26–32

Note, next, that neither the matter nor the form comes to be—and I mean the last matter and form. For everything that changes is something and is changed by something and into something. That by which it is changed is the immediate mover; that which is changed, the matter; that into which it is changed, the form. The process, then, will go on to infinity, if not only the bronze comes to be round but also the round or the bronze comes to be; therefore there must be a stop.

We have already made it clear in the Physics along with the things we have mentioned, that the forms cannot come to be (i.e., be created by means of coming to being) by themselves, and neither can their recipient. For it is impossible for the round in the craftsman’s gold to come to be in itself; and neither is it possible for the gold in itself to come to be from the craftsman. Rather, the gold comes to be gold from the mineral, and comes to be round from the craftsman. However, whoever maintains the coming to be of each of the two by itself, his saying can be extended ad infinitum. For if the recipient body is created according to coming into being, evidently its coming into being would be from one recipient body, and its passing away, when it passes away, would be into another [recipient] body.

As can be seen, Themistius intentionally avoids the term “matter,” and opts for the terms “body” or “recipient” instead. This approach is deliberate, as it is consistent throughout the early stages of the paraphrase, until Themistius reaches Aristotle’s tripartite division of “substance” at the middle of chapter 3 (1070a9– 13), where the reason for this is revealed:

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table 60

“Substitution” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (2)

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.3.1070a9–12

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫ו‬12–14

There are three kinds of substance—the matter … the nature … and … the particular substance which is composed of these two.

You shall divide the sensible substance which is capable of passing away into three substances: one as matter, i.e. the body that receives the form; the second as the form; and the third—that which is composed of both.

From Themistius’ addition “i.e., the body that receives the form” and his contextualization of Aristotle’s discussion to “the sensible substance which is capable of passing away” it is clear that he prefers to relegate “matter” to the world of coming to be and passing away. This is part of Themistius’ overall attempt to create ontological distance between corruptible and eternal substances, but also means that Themistius’ discussion of substances until that point applied to sensible substances categorically, which suggests that he is advocating an ontological dependency of the celestial bodies upon God as part of his cosmogonic outlook.56 Themistius’ method of substitution applied to blocks of text can have different reasons. For instance, in the following passage he nearly completely rewrites the text in an attempt to restate Aristotle’s rejection of the option that all things have the same elements in a more systematically dialectical manner, and also to bring to the surface what he takes to be Aristotle’s main arguments: table 61

“Substitution” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (3)

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.1070a35– b6

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫ט‬4–13

But it would be paradoxical if they were the same for all. For then from the same elements will proceed relative terms and substances. What then will this common element be? For (1) (a)

But it would be incorrect to saya that the elements of all of them are one and the same, so that the elements of the substance, the relation, the quantity, and the quality are elements that are the same ones. Should anyone think so, we would ask him: what is this element (if it was one)—or what are these elements (if they were many)? And is it exter-

a Literally, “for it to be said.” 56

See the Conclusion for a more systematic discussion of this issue. Themistius offers a

historical and methodological aspects Table 61

143

“Substitution” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (3) (cont.)

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.1070a35– b6

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫ט‬4–13

there is nothing common to and distinct from substance and the other categories, viz. those which are predicated; but an element is prior to the things of which it is an element. But again (b) substance is not an element in relative terms, nor is any of these an element in substance. Further, (2) how can all things have the same elements? For none of the elements can be the same as that which is composed of elements, e.g., b or a cannot be the same as ba.

nal to the ten genera, or within some of them? If it is beyond them, it would have to be another genus, external to the ten, and it would necessarily be prior to the ten, for the element is prior to the things whose element it is; but no genus whatsoever is prior to the substance (we have already clarified this earlier in another place in our treatise). If he [i.e., the adversary] keeps away from this [i.e., from saying that the element is external to the genera], and posits the element under the [genus of ] substance, it necessarily follows that the element of substance is [also] the element of relation, quality, quantity, action, affection, and state [etc.]; another necessary consequent, that reason does not accept, is that the element of the substance is under the substance—but the elements are prior to and more simple than the things that are composed of them, just as the letters are prior to the word.

Another reason for substituting a complete passage is for the sake of orientation and imposing structure: table 62

“Substitution” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (4)

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.5.1071b1–2

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫יא‬17–18

We have stated, then, what are the principles of sensible things and how many they are, and in what sense they are the same and in what sense different.

We should first remember and retain all this, and afterwards proceed to inquire into the principle that we are seeking. [So] let us return to some of the things we have already mentioned so that they are assured.

Aristotle’s closing remarks of Metaphysics 12.5 are a summary of what has been accomplished in chapters 2–5. In other words, his text looks back. Themistius lengthy discussion about the distinction between “matter” and a “subject” in his paraphrase of the Physics (see Todd, Physics 1–3, 43–44).

144

chapter 2

substitutes this passage with a text that looks forward, making it clear that for him the preceding discussion is very much relevant to the remaining parts of Metaphysics 12. This procedure reflects Themistius’ unifying approach to Metaphysics 12. Perhaps the most significant type of substitution that Themistius employs is that of arguments, namely instances where Themistius replaces an argument that Aristotle provides with a different one. When paraphrasing Aristotle’s closing remarks of chapter 3, where Aristotle denies the Platonic Ideas in an abrupt fashion, Themistius replaces the text with an elaborate, well-constructed argument which is based on Aristotle’s critical discussions in Metaphysics 7.7–9: table 63

“Substitution” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (5)

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.3.1070a27–30 (tr. Ross)

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫ז‬17–27

Evidently then there is no necessity, on this ground at least, for the existence of the Ideas. For man is begotten by man, a given man by an individual father; and similarly in the arts; for the medical art is the formal cause of health.

But if the form that had existed before [its successor] is the agent for the formation of that [i.e., the succeeding] form— so that man is indeed created from man, and a horse is indeed created from a horse, and in every case the particular from a particular (for the universal does not beget and is not begotten, but that which begets and is begotten is indeed a “this” and a “that”), what need do we have, then, in coming to being, for the Idea Plato had talked about? And what need does the begetting form have for the other form [i.e., the Platonic Idea] as a model for it, given that it itself is a model for that which is created from it? For the name and the definition will be common to both, and their form is one, and it is of the nature of the begetting form that it beget another form like it. And we find that art does not need an Idea to be posited as a model for it in anything it does, so that, for example, when it sets out to make a chair, it is not be able to make it unless it has a model. For art in itself is the model for the chair, because the form of the chair stands in the thought of the carpenter who makes it, just as the medical art is form of health, and masonry is the form of the house.

Since Themistius’ aim is to respond to Aristotle’s critique of the Ideas and defend the necessity of a certain version of them (discussed at length in the

historical and methodological aspects

145

Commentary below)—a response that immediately follows the quoted passage—he makes sure that Aristotle’s argument is presented in the clearest possible way. In another instance, Themistius substitutes Aristotle’s argument for the existence of an immovable moving substance at chapter 7, with an argument he had already put forth in his paraphrase of the Physics.57 One cannot but admit that his version is an improvement: table 64

“Substitution” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 (6)

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.6.1072a24–26 (tr. Ross)

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫טז‬10–15

And since that which moves and is moved is intermediate, there is something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality.

We say: we have already explained that whatever is composed of two things, it is possible for one of the two to be found selfsubsisting separately; indeed, it is also possible for the other thing to be found self-subsisting separately. If a thing that both moves and is moved exists, and a thing that is only moved, without moving, exists [as well], it necessarily follows that there exists an immovable mover—and this is that which exists in the nature that is completely without matter and that whose essence is actuality.

3.5 Quotation There are several instances where Themistius quotes Aristotle’s text word for word—from short utterances to complete passages—in line with Theon’s remark that one should avoid paraphrasing a text when it is better to leave it intact. These instances, when properly identified, are useful for establishing Aristotle’s text as it was before Themistius, although since the practice of paraphrasing can be applied even toward a single word, there is still much need for caution. Here I only mention the most obvious example of a direct quotation of the text, which is Aristotle’s astronomical discussion in chapter 8, to which Themistius has nothing to add or to clarify, as it does not play any part in his interpretation and only retained for the sake of completion:

57

“In all case of things being combined from two [constituents] it could be learnt that if one of the things in the mixture can exist per se, then the other can exist per se too” (Themistius, in Phys., 223,1–3; translated in Todd, Physics 5–8, 83).

146 table 65

chapter 2 “Quotation” in the paraphrase of Metaphysics 12

Aristotle, Metaph., 12.8.1073b38–1074a14 (tr. Ross)

Themistius, Paraphrase, ‫כד‬15–24

But it is necessary, if all the spheres combined are to explain the observed facts, that for each of the planets there should be other spheres (one fewer than those hitherto assigned) which counteract those already mentioned and bring back to the same position the outermost sphere of the star which in each case is situated below the star in question; for only thus can all the forces at work produce the observed motion of the planets. Since, then, the spheres involved in the movement of the planets themselves are eight for some and twenty-five for the others, and of these only those involved in the movement of the lowest-situated planet need not be counteracted the spheres which counteract those of the outermost two planets will be six in number, and the spheres which counteract those of the next four planets will be sixteen; therefore the number of all the spheres—both those which move the planets and those which counteract these—will be fifty-five. And if one were not to add to the moon and to the sun the movements we mentioned, the whole set of spheres will be forty-seven in number.

It is necessary—if all of them are to be composed in a manner that accords with what is visible to the eye—that each of the planets have other spheres to counteract them (one sphere less [than has been previously assigned] for each of them), and that the star that is below [another star] be counteracted upon so that it always returns to the [same] place from which the first sphere [i.e., the sphere above the aforementioned star] started. For only in this manner is it possible for all of them to revolve according to the circulation of the sphere of the fixed stars. Since the spheres in which they [i.e., the planets] are moved are eight for some and twenty five for others—and indeed, only the spheres in which the lowest star is moved should not be counteracted—the spheres that counteract the first two are six, and those that counteract the remaining four are sixteen. The number of all the spheres— the movers [of the planets], and those who counteract these spheres—is fifty five. If you do not add to the sun and to the moon to the movements we have mentioned, the number of the spheres will be forty seven.

It is easy to see, even beyond the veil of translation, that Themistius is quoting the text word for word, and this raises a question about the only place in the passage where a difference is found. Aristotle’s “for only thus can all the forces at work produce the observed motion of the planets” is replaced by “for only in this manner is it possible for all of them to revolve according to the circulation of the sphere of the fixed stars,” reflecting a preference of metaphysical reasons (ensuring the “first” movement—which is eternal and uniform—is present in every cluster of spheres) over empirical reasons (saving the appearances).

historical and methodological aspects

4

147

Conclusion

An adequate understanding of Themistius’ paraphrasing techniques is an important aid for understanding how he read and interpreted Aristotle, as well as for identifying instances where Themistius the philosopher emerges from Themistius the paraphrast. For the present study, analysis of Themistius’ paraphrase procedures applied to Metaphysics 12 is an important counterpart to the study of its textual transmission, to which Chapter 1 was devoted, as it adds another set of considerations for the establishment of Themistius’ text.

Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12: Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition

∵

Abbreviations 1 ‫ע‬

A B C C1 C1⇄ D L Q R R1 R1⇄ R2 R2⇄ T T0

2 ‫ع‬ a ams b ġ

Hebrew Sources Hebrew text, present edition Munich: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. Hebr. 234 Munich: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. Hebr. 108 Leipzig: Universitätsbibliothek B.H. fol. 14 Corrections of MS C by other hand Corrections by C1 which agree with the variant selected for the body of the Hebrew text1 Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale Heb. 894 S. Landauer, Themistii in Aristotelis Metaphysicorum librum Λ paraphrasis. Hebraice et latine, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, v. 5, Berlin, 1903 Šem Ṭob ibn Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh (ed. Y. Shiffman, Jerusalem, 2001) Firenze: Biblioteca Medicea Laurentiana Or. 471 Marginal corrections of MS R by second hand Corrections by R1 which agree with the variant selected for the body of the Hebrew text Marginal corrections of MS R by third hand Corrections by R2 which agree with the variant selected for the body of the Hebrew text Torino: Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria Cod. AI 14 Burnt text in MS T

Arabic Sources Arabic text, present edition Averroes, Tafsīr Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa (ed. M. Bouyges, vol. 3, Beirut, 1948) Averroes, Tafsīr Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa, MS Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek, Or. 2074 ʿA.R. Badawī, Arisṭū ʿinda al-ʿArab, Cairo, 1947 ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī, Kitāb fī ʿIlm Mā baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa (ed. A. Neuwirth, Wiesbaden, 1976)

1 For example, in ‫כב‬32 all the manuscripts except for C have ‫אמרו‬, whereas C has ‫אמרנו‬. C1 corrects ‫ אמרנו‬to ‫אמרו‬, realigning the manuscript with the version chosen for the body of the Hebrew text. The notation C1⇄ in the critical apparatus reflects this state of affairs.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400443_005

abbreviations ġC,T ḥ m t ta ẓ

3 ∴ | // / ⟨⟩ ? ! * ^ corr. in marg.

151

Variants of ġ in (respectively) MSS Carullah 129 & Taimūr Pāšā: Ḥikma 117 (recorded in Gutas, “Editing,” 220–222) MS Ḥikma 6 (Dār al-Kutub, Cairo) MS Marsh 539 Philosophy Reader (ed. Wakelnig, 2014) Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāǧ al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya (ed. M. Rašad Sālim, Al-Riyāḍ, 1986) Ibn Taymiyya, alternate readings in Sālim’s footnotes MS. Ẓāhiriyya (Damascus) 4871

Misc. Pyramid found in ẓ noting section breaks2 Line break in primary Arabic source Beginning/ending of overlapping Arabic fragment Line break in overlapping Arabic fragment Conjectural addition Uncertain reading Sic Conjectural Arabic/Hebrew terms Conjectural error in Hebrew translation Corrupt text Text in margins

2 See also Brague, Thémistius, 41.

‫המאמר הנרשם באות הלמד מספר מה שאחר הטבע לארסטו באור תמסטיוס העתקת‬ ‫אסחק בן חנין ותקון תאבת בן קרא אל חראני העתיקו שנית משה בן שמואל בן תבון‬ ‫צב״ה‬

‫‪3‬‬

‫אמר ארסטוטליס הנה הנמצא יאמר על דרכים רבים אבל אנחנו כאשר כוננו לבקשת‬

‫‪L‬א‬ ‫–‪Λ.1.1069a18‬‬ ‫‪19‬‬

‫התחלות הדבר הנמצא אמנם נכון לבקשת התחלות העצם לבד כי העצם יותר‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫ראוי מכל הנמצאות בזה הענין וזה כי הכל מתאחד היה כהתאחדות האברים בגוף‬

‫‪1069a19–20‬‬

‫האדם והחלקים בגוף הצומח או היתה הרכבתו מדברים ימששו קצתם קצת כהרכבת‬ ‫הבית והספינה או היה חבורו מדברים מפוזרים כחבור החיל והמדינה הנה ראש חלקיו‬ ‫כלם הוא העצם ומקומו מן הכל מקום הלב מכלל גוף החי ואם לא יהיה ישרו‬ ‫על דרך‬ ‫מאלו הדרכים אבל כמו שימצא האחד במספר תחלה ואחר כן השנים ואחר כן השלשה‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫או כמו שימצא בתמונות ישרות הקוים המשלש ראשון ועוד אחריו המרובע הנה העצם‬ ‫על זה הדמיון ימצא תחלה עוד אחריו הענין והשעור ושאר מה שדומה לזה מפני‬

‫‪–1‬ג‪ 14‬המאמר…כל[ לית‪ 2–1 M :‬המאמר…תמסטיוס[ כבוד אלהים הסתר דבר‪) T0 | A :‬ביאור‬ ‫‪ 1 (ex.‬הנרשם[ הידוע‪ | B :‬הידוע ‪ +‬הנרשם‪ ‖ R :‬מספר[ מהספר‪ 2 L :‬באור‪ + [D :‬החכם‪| CL :‬‬ ‫פי׳‪ | B :‬ביאור‪ ‖ T :‬תמסטיוס‪ [B :‬תאמסטיוס‪ | CL :‬תמסתיוס‪ ‖ D :‬העתקת…צב״ה‪ [B :‬לית‪CDATL :‬‬ ‫‪ 3‬אמר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ארסטוטליס[ ארסטו‪ ‖ CB :‬הנמצא…על[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הנמצא[ נמצא‪ ‖ A :‬על[ לית‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫דרכים‪ [DR :‬מינים‪ | CABR1L :‬ענינים‪ ‖ T :‬רבים[ ‪ +‬כמו שספרנו‪ ‖ C1 :‬אבל אנחנו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬כוננו[ כוונו‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 4 A‬התחלות[ התחלת‪ | D :‬ההתחלות‪ ‖ B :‬נכון[ נכוין‪ ‖ DT :‬התחלות העצם[ ‪ ‖ T0‬התחלות‪:‬‬ ‫‪ [DA‬התחלת‪ | C :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬לבד[ ‪ +‬התחלות‪ 5–4 B :‬יותר ראוי מכל[ أول ‪ +‬وأحق‪ :‬ع ‪ 5‬בזה‬ ‫הענין[ בענין הזה‪ ‖ B :‬הכל[ כל‪ ‖ CB :‬כהתאחדות[ בהתאחדות‪ ‖ B :‬האברים‪ [DAT :‬האיברים‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 6 CBL‬היתה‪ [CD :‬היה‪ + | A :‬כונתו‪ | B :‬לית‪ ‖ T :‬קצת[ את קצתם‪ 7 BL :‬או…החיל[ לית‪‖ T :‬‬ ‫היה‪ [ABL :‬יהיה‪ ‖ CD :‬מדברים[ ‪ +‬נבדלים‪ ‖ CD :‬ראש[ ראשון‪ ‖ D :‬חלקיו[ לית‪ 8 C1 :‬כלם‪:‬‬ ‫‪ [CAT‬כולם‪ ‖ DB :‬הוא[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬העצם[ בעצם‪ ‖ B :‬מן הכל מקום[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬הכל[ ‪ +‬הוא‪‖ T :‬‬ ‫מכלל[ מכלכל)!(‪ ‖ B :‬גוף[ הגוף‪ ‖ D :‬ישרו[ חבורו‪ ‖ T :‬דרך[ מין‪ 9 CL :‬הדרכים[ המינין‪| CL :‬‬ ‫הסוגים‪ ‖ B :‬האחד במספר תחלה[ فى العدد الواحد‪ :‬ع ‖ ואחר כן)‪ [(1‬ואחר כך‪ | D :‬אח״כ‪ ‖ B :‬ואחר‬ ‫כן)‪ [(2‬ואחר כך‪ | D :‬ואח״כ‪ 10 B :‬כמו[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬שימצא[ לית‪ + | A :‬האחד במספר‪ | B :‬כשימצא‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ T‬המשלש[ המשולש‪ ‖ AB :‬ראשון[ הראשון‪ ‖ D :‬ועוד אחריו[ ואחריו עוד‪ ‖ B :‬הנה[ היה‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫העצם[ לית‪ 11 A :‬זה הדמיון‪ [BL :‬זה המשל‪ | CD :‬הדמיון הזה‪ ‖ AT :‬ימצא[ ‪ +‬העצם‪ ‖ A :‬תחלה[‬ ‫תחילה‪ ‖ B :‬הענין[ העניין‪ ‖ B :‬והשעור[ והשיעור‪ ‖ A :‬לזה[ ‪ +‬כי‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬מפני[ לית‪T :‬‬

‫‪1069a20–21‬‬

‫‪ẓ38r1‬‬ ‫‪b329‬‬

‫بسم الل ّٰه الرحمن الرحيم رب أعن مقالة اللام شرح ثامسطيوس ترجمة إسحق بن حنين ؞ |‬

‫‪ L‬א إن الموجود يقال على أنحاء شتى إلا أنا إذا قصدنا لطلب‬

‫‪3‬‬

‫مبادئ الشىء الموجود فإنما نقصد لطلب مبادئ | الجوهر فقط لأن الجوهر‬ ‫‪ ẓ38r3‬أول وأحق الموجودات بهذا المعنى ‪ //‬وذلك أن الكل متحدا ًكان كاتحاد الأعضاء فى | بدن‬ ‫‪a1410,5‬‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫الإنسان ‪ /‬والأجزاء فى بدن النبات أو كان تركيبه من أشياء يماس بعضها بعضا ً‪ /‬كتركيب‬ ‫البيت | والسفينة أو كان تأليفه من أشياء متفرقة كتأليف ‪ /‬العسكر والمدينة فأول أجزائه‬ ‫جميعا ًهو الجوهر | وموضعه من الكل ‪ /‬موضع القلب من جملة بدن الحيوان فإن لم يكن نظامه‬ ‫على نحو‬ ‫من ‪ /‬هذه الأنحاء ولـكن كما يوجد | فى العدد الواحد أولا ًثم الاثنان ثم ‪ /‬الثلثة‬ ‫‪ ẓ38r7‬أو كما يوجد فى الأشكال المستقيمة الخطوط المثلث أولا ًثم ‪ /‬بعده المر بع فإن | الجوهر‬ ‫‪a1410,11‬‬ ‫على هذا المثال يوجد أولا ًثم بعده الحال ‪ /‬والمقدار وسا ئر ما أشبه ذلك من قبل‬

‫‪ 3‬إن[ אמר ארסטוטלס הנה )*قال أرسطوطاليس إن(‪ :‬ע ‖ شتى[ ‪ +‬الموجود‪ 5 ẓ :‬أول[ יותר ראוי‬ ‫מכל )*أولى(‪ :‬ע ‖ وأحق[ לית‪ :‬ע ‖ متحدا ً‪a :‬ע[ متحد‪ ‖ b(?)ẓ :‬كان‪a :‬ע[ לית‪ ‖ ẓ :‬بدن‪a :‬ע[ البدن بدن)!(‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 6 ẓ‬أو كان[ أ كان‪ ‖ b :‬يماس[ ىماس‪ | ams :‬تماس‪a :‬ע ‪ 7‬والمدينة‪a(?)ẓ :‬ע[ والمدنية‪ 8 b :‬فإن[‬ ‫وإن‪ 9 a :‬فى العدد الواحد[ الواحد فى العدد‪a :‬ע ‖ أولا ً[ לית‪ ‖ a :‬الثلثة‪ [ẓa :‬الثلاثة‪ 11 b :‬ثم بعده[‬ ‫و بعده‪ ‖ a :‬من قبل‪a :‬ע[ من ٯىل‪ | ẓ :‬من مثل‪b :‬‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪154‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪12‬‬

‫כי מציאות העצם קודם למציאות כל מה שימשך אחריו כמו שיקדם האחד שאר‬ ‫המספרים ויקדם המשלש שאר התמונות וזה כי לא יתוארו כל הסוגים במציאות על‬

‫‪1069a21–22‬‬

‫דמיון אחד אבל היותר ראוי מהם בזה העצם ואולם שאר הדברים אמנם יתוארו‬ ‫‪15‬‬

‫במציאות להמצאם בעצם כי היו אם שעורים לו או ענינים או תנועות או זולת זה ממה‬ ‫שדומה לו וחלקם במציאות אמנם הוא בסמיכותם אל העצם ואנחנו ואם נתאר שאר‬ ‫הסוגים במלות אשר יורו על המציאות הנה אין זה פלא כי אנחנו אמנם נפיל המלות‬ ‫ההם על העצם דמיון זה אנחנו נאמר זה העץ הוא לבן הנה אמרנו הוא לבן^ מן‬ ‫המלות אשר יורו על המציאות ולא נפיל זאת המלה על הלובן מן העץ אבל‬ ‫על העץ‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫בעינו ועל זה הדמיון הנה נפיל דומה לאלו המלות על מה שנשלול אותו מן המקרים‬ ‫כל שכן על מה שנקיימהו וזה כי אנחנו נפילם על מה שאינו לבן דרך משל ונאמר‬

‫‪1069a22–24‬‬

‫זה אינו לבן ועל מה שאינו ישר ונאמר זה אינו ישר כמו שאנחנו כאשר‬ ‫אמרנו זה‬ ‫העץ אינו ישר אמנם נפיל אמרנו אינו על העץ בעינו כמו כן כאשר אמרנו‬ ‫זה העץ‬ ‫הוא ישר אמנם נפיל זאת המלה ר״ל הוא על העץ כי היה בלתי אפשר שנפריד דבר‬ ‫‪ 12‬כי[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬העצם[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬כל[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬שימשך[ שימשוך‪ ‖ L :‬האחד[ ‪+‬‬ ‫על‪A :‬‬

‫ع‬

‫‪ 13‬המשלש[ ‪ +‬על‪ | A :‬המשולש‪ ‖ B :‬כי[ ‪ +‬אנחנו‪ ‖ B :‬יתוארו[ יתארו‪ ‖ C :‬הסוגים[ الأشياء‪:‬‬

‫‪ 14‬אמנם[ לית‪B :‬‬

‫לית‪BR :‬‬

‫)⇄‪(R1‬‬

‫‪ 15‬להמצאם[ ‪ +‬בו‪ ‖ D :‬בעצם[ עצם‪ ‖ D :‬היו‪ [CDB :‬הם‪ | A :‬יהיו‪ ‖ T :‬לו[‬

‫‖ או ענינים[ אם ענינים ‪ +‬לו‪ + | D :‬לו‪ | AT :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬או)‪ [(2‬לית‪D :‬‬

‫‪ 16‬לו[ לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ C‬אמנם[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הוא[ הם‪ | A :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬ואם‪ [AT :‬אם ‪ +‬היינו‪ | C :‬אם‪ + | DL :‬היינו‪ | B :‬وإن كنا‪ :‬ع‬ ‫‪ 17‬הסוגים[ הדברים‪ ‖ T :‬במלות[ ‪ ‖ T0‬יורו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬המציאות[ הנמצא‪ 18 T :‬העצם[ الجواهر‪ :‬ع ‖‬ ‫זה[ ‪ +‬כי‪ ‖ C1 :‬אמרנו הוא[ ‪ ‖ T0‬לבן)‪ [(2‬לית‪ :‬ع ‪ 19‬זאת…על[ ‪ 20 T0‬בעינו[ בעצמו‪ ‖ C :‬ועל‬ ‫זה הדמיון[ ועל זה המשל‪ | C :‬על הדמיון הזה‪ ‖ A :‬הנה[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬נפיל דומה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬נפיל[ יפילו‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫דומה[ הדומים‪ ‖ B :‬לאלו[ ‪ +‬من‪ :‬ع ‖ אותו[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬מן[ על‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 21‬שנקיימהו‪ [CDL :‬שנקימהו‪:‬‬

‫‪ | A‬שנחסרהו‪ :C1 in marg. | T0 | B :‬סא כי אנו כאשר נאמר באינו או בהוא אמנם הוא על העץ או‬ ‫הדבר הרמוז אליו אי זה שיהיה לא על המקרה אשר הוא בו ‖ נפילם[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬לבן[ לובן‪‖ D :‬‬ ‫זה…מה[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫‪D‬‬

‫‪ 22‬לבן[ לובן‪ ‖ D :‬שאנחנו[ ‪ +‬זה‪D :‬‬

‫‪ 23‬אמרנו[ לית‪T :‬ع‬

‫זה‪ [DB :‬שזה‪CATL :‬‬

‫‪ 23–22‬אמרנו…אינו[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 24–23‬בעינו…העץ[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 22‬אמרנו[ נאמר‪:‬‬

‫‪ 23‬כאשר…העץ[ ‪ ‖ T0‬אמרנו[ לית‪‖ B :‬‬

‫‪ 24‬הוא)‪ [(1‬היה‪ ‖ B :‬ר״ל‪ [DT :‬כלו׳‪ ‖ CABL :‬כי…אפשר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬היה‪[CDB :‬‬

‫הוא‪ ‖ AL :‬בלתי[ לית‪B :‬‬

‫‪1069a24‬‬

‫‪155‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ẓ38r8‬أن وجود الجوهر متقدم ‪ /‬لوجود | جميع ما يتلوهكما يتقدم الواحد سا ئر‬

‫‪12‬‬

‫‪ a1410,15‬الأعداد و يتقدم المثلث ‪ /‬سا ئر الأشكال ؞ ‪ //‬وذلك أنه ليس تنعت جميع الأشياء | بالوجود‬ ‫على مثال واحد لـكن أولاها بذلك الجوهر وأما سا ئر الأشياء فإنما تنعت‬ ‫‪ ẓ38r10‬بالوجود لوجدانها فى الجوهر إذا كانت | إما مقادير له أو حالات وإما حركات وإما غير ذلك مما‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫أشبهه وحظها من الوجود إنما هو بإضافتها إلى الجوهر ونحن | وإن كنا ننعت سا ئر‬ ‫الأجناس بالألفاظ التى تدل على الوجود فليس ذلك بعجب إذ كنا إنما نوقع تلك الألفاظ‬ ‫على | الجواهر ومثال ذلك أنا نقول هذه الخشبة هى بيضاء فقولنا هى من‬ ‫الألفاظ التى تدل على الوجود ولسنا نوقع هذه اللفظة | على البياض من الخشبة لـكن‬ ‫على الخشبة‬ ‫‪ ẓ38r14‬بعينها و على هذا المثال قد نوقع أشباه هذه من الألفاظ على ما ننفيه من الأعراض |‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫فضلا ًعما نثبته وذلك أنا نوقعها على ما ليس هو بأبيض مثلا ًفنقول‬ ‫‪ b330‬هذا ليس هو بأبيض وعلى ما ليس هو | بمستقيم ⟩فنقول هذا ليس هو بمستقيم⟨ كما أنا إذا‬ ‫قلنا هذه‬ ‫الخشبة ليست بمستقيمة فإنما نوقع قولنا ليست على الخشبة بعينها كذلك أيضا ً| إذا قلنا إن‬ ‫هذه الخشبة‬ ‫هى مستقيمة فإنما نوقع هذه اللفظة أعنى هى على الخشبة إذ كان ليس يمكن أن نفرد | شيئا ً‬

‫‪* 16‬الوجود )המציאות(‪ :‬ע[ الموجود‪:‬‬

‫‪ 13‬الأشياء‪ [b(?)ẓ :‬הסוגים )*الأجناس(‪ :‬ע ‪ 14‬مثال[ مثل‪b :‬‬ ‫‪ 18 ẓ‬الجواهر[ העצם )*الجوهر(‪ :‬ע ‖ هى[ ‪ +‬לבן )*بيضاء(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫‪* ‖ b‬ننفيه )נשלול אותו(‪ :‬ע[ ىىفىه‪ | ẓ :‬تنفيه‪* 22 b :‬فنقول…بمستقيم )ונאמר זה אינו ישר(‪ :‬ע[ לית‪ẓ :‬‬ ‫‪* 23‬قولنا )אמרנו(‪ :‬ע[ לית‪ẓ :‬‬ ‫‪ 19‬الخشبة[ الخشب‪b :‬‬

‫‪ 20‬و[ أو‪:‬‬

‫‪156‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫מן המקרים מהעצם במחשבה כל שכן בעיון כמו שאפשר לנו שנפריד העצם מכל‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫הסוגים הנשארים לא שהעצם המוחש יהיה אפשר בו בשום ענין שיהיה ערום מן‬

‫‪L‬ב‬

‫המקרים אבל העצם האחד בעינו ימצא קיים ולא יתקיימו בו מקרים אחדים בעינם אבל‬ ‫יומרו ויבאו זה בעקב זה ויתחדשו קצתם ויבטלו קצתם כמו השעורים והענינים‬ ‫והפעולות וההפעלות והמקומות והזמנים ומה שדומה לזה מן הסוגים והתחלת כל אלו‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫הסוגים ויסודם ושתותיהם הוא העצם‬ ‫והנה יעידו הקודמים על אמתת מאמרנו זה וזה שהם כאשר כונו לבקש‬

‫‪1069a25–26‬‬

‫התחלות הדברים הנמצאים ויסודותיהם ושתותיהם^ כונו בבקשה להתחלות העצם‬ ‫וראשיותיו ולא יכונו כונת התחלות הענינים או התחלות השעורים או התחלות‬ ‫זולת זה ממה שדומה לו הנה כבר התבאר מזה המקום ההפרש בין שתי החקירות‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫ר״ל החקירה מסוגי הדברים הנמצאים כמה הם והחקירה מהתחלות הדברים הנמצאים‬ ‫כמה הם כי ההתחלות אמנם הם לעצם לבד וכל אחד מן העצמים אמנם יבוקש‬ ‫התחלתו על שהוא אחד במספר ואולם הסוגים אמנם עמדו במחשבה מהגעת מה‬ ‫‪ 1‬לא…יהיה[ ‪‖ T0‬‬

‫‪ 25‬מהעצם[ מן העצם‪ ‖ B :‬שכן…אפשר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬בעיון‪ [CD :‬בענין‪ABL :‬‬ ‫אפשר בו[ בו אפשר‪ ‖ B :‬בו[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬ענין[ פנים‪ ‖ DT :‬ערום[ מופשט‪CL :‬‬

‫‪ 2‬העצם…בעינו[‬

‫‪ ‖ T0‬יתקיימו[ יתקיים‪ ‖ D :‬בו[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬מקרים אחדים בעינם[ الأعراض بأعيانها‪ :‬ع‬ ‫‪ 3‬בעינם…זה)‪T0 [(1‬‬

‫‪–2‬‬

‫‪ 3‬יומרו‪ [CD :‬ילכו‪ | AL :‬יומרנו)?(‪ ‖ B :‬ויבאו[ ויבואו‪ ‖ B :‬זה)‪ [(1‬לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ A‬זה)‪ [(2‬לית‪ ‖ D :‬ויבטלו[ ויתבטלו‪D :‬‬

‫‪ 4‬והפעולות[ והפעלות‪:‬‬

‫‪ 4–3‬כמו…והפעולות[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ | A‬והפועל‪ ‖ B :‬וההפעלות‪ [B :‬וההתפעלות‪ | CL :‬לית‪ | D :‬והתפעולות)!(‪ | A :‬וההפעלויות‪‖ T :‬‬ ‫ומה…סוגים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ומה[ לית‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬وسا ئر ما‪ :‬ع ‖ לזה[ להם‪A :‬‬ ‫‪ 6–5‬הוא…הקודמים[ ‪T0‬‬

‫ושתותיהם[ ושתותם‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 5‬ויסודם[ ויסודותיהם‪‖ B :‬‬

‫‪ 5‬הוא[ לית‪CBD :‬‬

‫‪ 6‬והנה[ לית‪‖ C :‬‬

‫יעידו[ ישרו‪ | C :‬לית‪ ‖ C1 :‬הקודמים[ והקודמים ‪ +‬יעידו‪ ‖ C1 :‬מאמרנו‪ [AT :‬מאמרינו‪CDBL :‬‬ ‫‪ 7‬כונו…הדברים[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 6‬כונו‪ [DA :‬כוונו‪ ‖ CBL :‬לבקש[ בבקשת‪ | C :‬לבקשת‪D :‬‬

‫‪–6‬‬

‫‪ 7‬התחלות‪:‬‬

‫‪ [CD‬התחלת‪ ‖ ABL :‬הדברים…להתחלות[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הנמצאים[ לית‪ ‖ C1 :‬ויסודותיהם‪[BT :‬‬ ‫ויסודיהם‪ | AL :‬ויסודם‪ ‖ C1 :‬ושתותיהם[ לית‪ ‖ BC1 :‬ויסודותיהם ושתותיהם[ وأسبابها وأركانها‪ :‬ع ‖‬ ‫כונו[ כוונו‪L :‬‬ ‫התחלת‪C1 :‬‬

‫‪ 8–7‬בבקשה…וראשיותיו[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 7‬בבקשה[ לבקשת‪ | C1 :‬בבקשת‪ ‖ D :‬להתחלות[‬

‫‪ 8‬וראשיותיו[ וראשיותם‪ ‖ D :‬כונת‪ [DBT :‬כוונת‪ | CL :‬כונות‪ ‖ A :‬הענינים[‬

‫העניינים‪ ‖ B :‬השעורים[ השיעורים‪ ‖ B :‬או)‪…(1‬התחלות)‪ ‖ T0 [(2‬או התחלות)‪ [(2‬לית‪:R1) BR :‬‬ ‫או(‬

‫‪ 9‬זולת[ וזולת‪ ‖ B :‬כבר…ההפרש[ ‪ ‖ T0‬כבר[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬התבאר[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬ההפרש[‬

‫ההבדל‪ + | C :‬אשר‪DBA :‬‬ ‫מהתחלת‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 10‬ר״ל[ ר׳ ל׳‪ ‖ L :‬מסוגי…הם[ ‪ ‖ T0‬כמה[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬מהתחלות[‬

‫‪ 11‬כמה…הם)‪ ‖ T0 [(2‬מן העצמים[ מהעצמים‪DB :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬יבוקש‪ [DC1T :‬תבוקש‪AL :‬‬

‫‪ 12–11‬יבוקש…אמנם[‬

‫‪ 12‬במספר[ ‪ +‬לבד‪ ‖ C1L :‬הסוגים[ המינים‪A :‬‬

‫‪157‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ẓ38r18‬من الأعراض عن الجوهر في الوهم فضلا ًعن العيان كما يمكنا أن نفرد الجوهر عن جميع‬ ‫‪ L‬ב الأجناس الباقية | لا أن الجوهر المحسوس قد يمكن فيه في حال من الأحوال أن يتعرى عن‬

‫‪25‬‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫الأعراض لـكن إن الجوهر الواحد بعينه | يوجد ثابتا ًولا ٺثبت فيه الأعراض بأعيانها لـكن‬ ‫ٺتبدل وٺتعاقب فبعضها يحدث و بعضها يبطل مثل المقادير | والحالات‬ ‫والأفعال والانفعال والأماكن والأزمنة وسا ئر ما أشبه ذلك من الأجناس ومبدأ جميع هذه |‬ ‫‪ ẓ38r22‬الأجناس وركنها وأسها هو الجوهر‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫وقد يشهد القدماء على صحة قولنا هذا وذلك أنهم لما قصدوا لطلب |‬ ‫مبادئ الأشياء الموجودة وأسبابها وأركانها قصدوا بالطلب لمبادئ الجوهر‬ ‫وأوائله ولم يقصدوا قصد مبادئ | الأحوال أو مبادئ المقادير أو مبادئ‬ ‫غير ذلك مما أشبهه ؞ فقد بان من هذا الموضع الفرق بين البحثين |‬ ‫‪ ẓ38r25‬أعنى البحث عن أجناس الأشياء الموجودةكم هى والبحث عن مبادئ الأشياء الموجودة‬ ‫كم هى لأن المبادئ إنما هى | للجوهر فقط وكل واحد من الجواهر إنما يطلب‬ ‫مبدأه على أنه واحد بالعدد وأما الأجناس فإنما قامت فى | الوهم من تحصيل ما‬

‫‪* 1‬لا أن )לא ש(‪ :‬ע[ لأن‪ẓ :‬‬

‫‪ 2‬الواحد‪ [b :‬الوحد‪* ‖ ẓ :‬ثابتا ً)קיים(‪ :‬ע[ ثانيا‪ ‖ ẓ ً :‬الأعراض بأعيانها[‬ ‫‪* 4‬والأفعال والانفعال )והפעולות וההפעלות(‪:‬‬

‫מקרים אחדים בעינם )*أعراض واحدة بأعيانها(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫‪ 7‬وأسبابها‬ ‫ע[ والانفعال والانفعال)!(‪ | ẓ :‬والانفعال ]والانفعال[‪ ‖ b :‬وسا ئر ما[ ומה )*وما(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫وأركانها[ ויסודותיהם ושתותיהם )*وأركانها وأسها(‪ :‬ע ‪ 8‬يقصدوا[ يقصد‪ 12 b :‬مبدؤه‪ [b :‬مبداه‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ ẓ‬فإنما[ وإنما‪b :‬‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪158‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪13‬‬

‫שהתקבץ בה מדברים נפרדים כל אחד מהם כמו האחר אלא כי האנשים היום‬

‫‪1069a26–28‬‬

‫להתעסקם‬ ‫בחכמת ההגיון ישימו הדברים הכוללים יותר ראויים שיהיו עצמים מן הדברים הנפרדים‬ ‫‪15‬‬

‫עד כאלו הם ישימו הדברים הכוללים התחלות לדברים הנפרדים וזה שהם ישימו האדם‬ ‫הכללי התחלה לסקראט ואפלאטון והסוס הכולל התחלה לזה הסוס וזה הסוס ואולם‬ ‫מי שהיה מקדם היה נמשך אחר החושים כי הפילוסופיא בזמניהם היתה קרובת הזמן‬ ‫במציאות והיו משימים הדברים הנפרדים יותר ראויים להתחלות העצם ומפני ששמו‬ ‫הארץ והאש והמים והאויר התחלות העצם לא היו משימים האש הכוללת והארץ‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫הכוללת ולא הנשארים הכוללים יסודי הדברים הנמצאים אבל לא ישימו הגשם הכולל‬ ‫הוא היסוד לאש^ הזאת והארץ הזאת והמים האלו והאויר הזה וכבר הקדמנו העיון‬ ‫פעמים בענין אלו אי זה משתי הכתות מהם מאמרם יותר ישר אשר ישימו הדברים‬ ‫הכוללים יותר קודמים במציאות או אשר ישימו הדברים הנפרדים וכאשר אנחנו‬ ‫נטיב לעיין‬ ‫במה שכונו אותו הנה לא ימנע מונע מן החקירה על זה ואולם עתה כבר הזכרנו הזכרה‬

‫‪ 13‬שהתקבץ‪ [BL :‬שהתחבר‪ | CDT :‬שיתקבץ‪ ‖ A :‬בה[ בו‪ | A :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬אלא[ אבל‪ ‖ A :‬היום[ ההם‪:‬‬ ‫‪AB‬‬

‫‪ 14‬בחכמת[ סא במלאכת‪C1 :‬‬

‫‪ 15–14‬הדברים)‪…(1‬התחלות[ לית‪ẓ :‬‬

‫‪ 14‬ראויים‪[CAT :‬‬

‫ראוים‪ ‖ DBL :‬שיהיו[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬עצמים[ עצמיים‪ | B :‬בעצם‪ ‖ C1 :‬מן הדברים[ ‪ +‬הכוללים‪| (C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫מהדברים‪D :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C‬וזה[ ואם‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 15‬עד‪ [ABL :‬ועוד ‪ +‬שהם‪ + | C :‬שהם‪ ‖ DT :‬הם[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬לדברים[ הדברים‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 16‬ואפלטון[ ולאפלטון‪ | B :‬ואפלאטון‪ ‖ T :‬וזה[ ולזה‪D :‬‬

‫‪ 17‬מקדם‪T) AB :‬‬

‫‪ [(in marg.‬לפנים‪ ‖ CDL :‬הפילוסופיא[ הפלוסופיא‪ | A :‬הפילוסוף‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬קרובת[ קורבת‪D :‬‬ ‫‪ 18‬הנפרדים[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬ראוים[ ראויים‪T :‬‬ ‫ומהם‪ | A :‬ובעבור‪C1L :‬‬

‫‪ 19–18‬ומפני…העצם[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 18‬ומפני[‬

‫‪ 19‬הארץ והאש[ النار والأرض‪ :‬ع | הארץ…והאויר[ המים והאויר והארץ‬

‫והאש‪ | D :‬היסודות הארבעה‪ ‖ C1 :‬העצם[ לעצם‪ ‖ DABT :‬היו[ יהיה‪ | B :‬לית‪ :‬ع ‖ משימים[ שמים‪:‬‬ ‫‪CT‬‬

‫‪ 20–19‬האש הכוללת והארץ הכוללת‪C1 :‬ع[ הארץ הכוללת‪ | C :‬הארץ הכוללת והאש הכוללת‪:‬‬

‫‪DABTL‬‬

‫‪ 20‬ולא[ ‪ +‬שני‪T :‬ع ‖ אבל[ וכן‪ ‖ D :‬לא[ ‪ +‬לא‪ | (!)D :‬לית‪ ‖ C1 :‬הגשם[ הדבר‪AR1 :‬‬

‫‪ 21‬לאש הזאת[ לזאת האש‪ | C :‬لـكن هذه النار‪ :‬ع ‖ והארץ[ ולארץ‪ ‖ B :‬והמים[ ‪ +‬והמים)!(‪‖ B :‬‬

‫הזה[ מזה‪ 22 C :‬פעמים[ ‪ +‬רבות‪ | T :‬לית‪ :‬ع ‖ בענין[ בעניין‪ ‖ B :‬אלו[ כל‪ + | C1 :‬ר״ל‪ ‖ T :‬אי‬ ‫זה[ איזה‪ | A :‬אחד‪ | C :‬וזה‪ ‖ D :‬משתי[ משני‪ ‖ C :‬הכתות[ כתות‪ ‖ (C1⇄) CDA :‬מהם[ מה‪‖ C1 :‬‬ ‫מאמרם[ מאמריהם‪ ‖ C :‬ישר[ ‪ +‬אם‪ | ATL :‬לית‪ 23 B :‬קודמים[ קדומים‪ ‖ D :‬אנחנו‪C :‬ع[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ DABTL‬נטיב‪ [DT :‬נמאן‪ | C :‬תיטיב‪ | A :‬נשיב‪ | B :‬ניטיב‪ ‖ L :‬לעיין[ לית‪ 24 C :‬שכונו[ ‪‖ T corr.‬‬ ‫עתה‪C :‬ع[ לית‪ + | DAL :‬הנה‪B :‬‬

‫‪1069a28–30‬‬

‫‪159‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ẓ38r27‬اجتمع فيه من أشياء مفردةكل واحد منها مثل الآخر إلا أن الناس اليوم‬

‫‪13‬‬

‫لاستعمالهم‬ ‫الر ياضة بالمنطق | يجعلون ⟩الأشياء العامية أولى أن تكون جواهر من الأشياء المفردة‬ ‫‪ ẓ38r28‬حتى كأنهم يجعلون الأشياء العامية مبادئ⟨ للأشياء المفردة وذلك أنهم يجعلون الإنسان‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫الكلى مبدأ لسقراط وأفلاطون والفرس العامى | مبدأ لهذا الفرس وذلك الفرس فأما‬ ‫من كان قبل فكان يتبع الحواس لأن الفلسفة في زمانهم كانت قر يبة | العهد‬ ‫بالوجود فكانوا يجعلون الأشياء المفردة أولى بمبادئ الجوهر ولما جعلوا‬ ‫النار والأرض والماء والهواء | مبادئ الجوهر لم يجعلوا النار العامية ولا الأرض‬ ‫‪ ẓ38r31‬العامية ولا الباقيين العاميين أركان الأشياء الموجودة بل | لم يجعلوا الجسم العامى‬ ‫هو الركن لـكن هذه النار وهذه الأرض وهذا الماء وهذا الهواء وقد قدمنا النظر‬ ‫‪ b331‬فى أمر | هؤلاء أى الفر يقين منهم أصوب قولا ًالذين يجعلون الأمور‬ ‫العامية أولى بالوجود أم الذين يجعلون الأمور المفردة وإذا نحن‬ ‫أمعنا‬ ‫فيما قصدنا له فليس مانع | يمنع من البحث عن هذا وأما الآن فقد أذكرنا إذكارا ً‬

‫‪ 14‬الر ياضة بالمنطق[ בחכמת ההגיון )*بعلم المنطق(‪ :‬ע ‪* 15–14‬الأشياء)‪…(1‬مبادئ‪ :‬ע[ לית‪ | ẓ :‬الأمور‬ ‫العامية مبادئ‪* 15 b :‬للأشياء )לדברים(‪ :‬ע[ الأشياء‪ 19 ẓ :‬النار والأرض[ הארץ והאש )*الأرض‬ ‫والنار(‪ :‬ע ‖ لم[ ‪ +‬היו )*كانوا( ‖ ولا الأرض[ והארץ )*والأرض(‪ :‬ע ‪ 20‬العامية‪ 21 corr. ẓ [b :‬لـكن‬ ‫هذه النار[ לאש הזאת )*لهذه النار(‪ :‬ע ‖ النظر[ ‪ +‬פעמים )*كثيرا ً(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫‪160‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫מופלגת כי הוא ראוי בהכרח על מי שיבקש התחלות הדברים הנמצאים שיבקש‬ ‫התחלות העצם‬ ‫והעצמים כלם שלשה אבל כי שנים מהם יסכימו עליהם כל האנשים וזה כי הם‬

‫‪1069a30–33‬‬

‫מורגשים נופלים תחת חוש הראות אחד מהם מתמיד ההשארות על ענינו‬ ‫והאחר ישתנה אולם המתמיד ההשארות הוא עצם הגשמים השמימיים ואולם המקבל‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫ההפסד הוא עצם מה שיהיה בארץ מן הצמחים ובעלי חיים וזה העצם לבד הוא העצם‬ ‫אשר היו יסודיו ושתותיו יבוקשו במאמרים הקודמים וענינו מבואר שהוא מורכב‬ ‫מדברים‬ ‫רבים ר״ל מן האש והארץ ושאר הארבעה ומדברים^ אחרים יותר פשוטים מאלו‬ ‫ויותר מעט מספר או מדבר אחד על הפחות שבענינים יתפשט פעם וירך ויקוץ פעם‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫אחרת ויתקשה ואלו השנים שני עצמים מן העצמים השלשה אשר לא יצא מהם‬

‫‪L‬ג‬

‫דבר מן העצמים ואולם העצם השלישי הוא עצם בלתי מתנועע נצחי מתמיד לא‬

‫‪1069a33‬‬

‫יקבל דבר כלל מן השנוי לא ממה שיקבלוהו הגשמים אשר בארץ מן הצמחים ובעלי‬ ‫חיים עד שיצאו מטבעם כלל אל שיפסדו ולא מן השנוי אשר יהיה במקום והוא אשר‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫בו לבד ישתתפו אלו הגשמים עם אותם הגשמים השמימיים וזה כי עצם הגשמים‬ ‫‪ 25‬מופלגת[ מפלגת‪ ‖ L :‬ראוי[ ‪ +‬הוא‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 27‬כלם[ כולם‪ + | B :‬بالجملة‪ :‬ع ‖ שנים[ השנים‪D :‬‬

‫‪ 28‬ההשארות[ ההישארות‪ ‖ C :‬ענינו[ עניינו‪ | B :‬حالة ‪ +‬واحدة‪ :‬ع‬

‫‪ 29‬והאחר[ והאחד‪‖ L :‬‬

‫ישתנה[ משתנה‪ ‖ A :‬אולם[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬אולם[ ואולם‪ ‖ DBT :‬המתמיד ההשארות[ לית‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫הוא…השמימיים[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הוא[ והוא‪ ‖ C1 :‬עצם[ גם‪ ‖ D :‬הגשמים[ הגרמים‪ ‖ D :‬השמימיים[‬ ‫שמימיים‪ | D :‬השמימים‪ ‖ A :‬ואולם המקבל[ ויקבל ההויה‪C1 :‬‬

‫‪ 30‬ההפסד[ הפסד‪ | CL :‬וההפסד‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ C1‬הוא)‪ [(1‬והוא‪ ‖ C1 :‬ובעלי חיים[ וב״ח‪ ‖ D :‬וזה[ ‪ +‬כי‪ ‖ D :‬לבד[ בלבד‪ ‖ B :‬הוא)‪ [(2‬והוא‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C‬העצם)‪ [(1‬עצם‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫ועניינו‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 31‬אשר[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬היו[ לית‪ ‖ AD :‬יבוקשו[ יבקשו‪ ‖ D :‬וענינו[‬

‫‪ 32‬רבים[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬האש והארץ[ الأرض و النار‪ :‬ع ‖ והארץ‪ [DABT :‬ומן הארץ‪‖ CL :‬‬

‫ומדברים‪ [ABC1L :‬מדברים‪ | CD :‬או מדברים‪T :‬ع ‖ יותר פשוטים[ هى البسيط‪ :‬ع ‖ מאלו[ מאלה‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ 33‬הפחות[ הפשוט‪ ‖ B :‬שבענינים[ שבעניינים‪ ‖ B :‬וירך[ לית‪ ‖ CD :‬ויקוץ[ ויתקווץ‪ | D :‬ויקווץ‪‖ A :‬‬

‫פעם)‪ [(2‬לית‪T :‬ع ‪ 1‬אחרת[ אחת‪ ‖ C :‬השניים[ ‪ +‬ר״ל‪ ‖ AL :‬עצמים)‪ [(1‬עצמיים‪ ‖ C :‬העצמים‬ ‫השלשה[ העצמיים השלשה‪ | C :‬השלשה עצמים‪ ‖ A :‬יצא מהם[ לית‪ | C :‬יצא‪C1 :‬‬ ‫השנוי[ השינוי‪ ‖ D :‬שיקבלוהו[ שיקבלהו‪ 4–3 DB :‬ובעלי חיים[ וב״ח‪ 4 A :‬חיים[ הצמחים‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫עד שיצאו[ אשר הם יצאו‪ ‖ C :‬מטבעם[ من طبائعها‪ :‬ع ‖ כלל אל‪ [AL :‬אל‪ | CB :‬כלל או‪ | D :‬לגמרי‬ ‫עד‪ ‖ T :‬מן[ לית‪ :‬ع ‖ במקום[ ‪ +‬הנמצא לגשם הגשמי‪ 5 C1 :‬השמימיים[ שמימיים‪ ‖ D :‬עצם[‬ ‫גרם‪D :‬‬ ‫‪ 3‬כלל[ לית‪ :‬ع ‖‬

‫‪161‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ẓ38r34‬بالغا بً أن قد يجب ضرورة على من طلب مبادئ الأشياء | الموجودة أن يطلب‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫مبادئ الجوهر ؞‬ ‫والجواهر كلها بالجملة ثلثة إلا أن اثنين منها يتفق عليهما جميع الناس | وذلك أنهما‬ ‫محسوسان واقعان تحت حس البصر أحدهما دائم البقاء على حالة واحدة‬ ‫والآخر يتغير أما | ⟩دائم البقاء⟨جوهر الأجسام السماو ية وأما القابل‬ ‫‪ ẓ38r37‬للفساد فهو جوهر ما يلى الأرض من النبات والحيوان وهذا الجوهر | خاصة هو الجوهر‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫الذى كانت عناصره وأركانه تطلب بالأقاو يل الأول وأمره بين ⟩أنه⟨ مركب‬ ‫من أشياء |‬ ‫كثيرة أعنى من الأرض والنار وسا ئر الأر بعة أو من أشياء آخر هى البسيط من هذه‬ ‫‪ ẓ38v1‬وأقل عددا ً أو من شیء واحد || على أقل الأمور تنتشر مرة فترق وتنقبض‬ ‫‪ L‬ג أخرى فتكتنز فهذان جوهران من الجواهر الثلثة التى لا يخرج عنها‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫⟩شیء⟨ | من الجواهر فأما الجوهر الثالث فجوهر غير متحرك أزلى أبدى لا‬ ‫يقبل شيئا ًمن التغير لا مما تقبله الأجسام | التى تلى الأرض من النبات والحيوان‬ ‫حتى تخرج من طبائعها أصلا ًإلى أن تفسد ولا التغير الذى يكون ⟩فى⟨ | المكان وهو الذى‬ ‫‪ ẓ38v4‬فيه وحده تشترك هذه الأجسام تلك الأجسام السماو ية وذلك أن جوهر الأجسام |‬

‫‪ 27‬بالجملة[ לית‪ :‬ע ‖ ثلثة[ ثلاثة‪ 28 b :‬حالة[ ענינו )*حاله(‪ :‬ע ‖ واحدة[ לית‪ :‬ע‬ ‫)]ה[מתמיד ההשארות(‪ :‬ע[ ⟩الأول⟨‪⟩ ‖ b :‬فهو⟨[ ‪ +‬القابل‪ ‖ b :‬الجوهر[ لجوهر‪b :‬‬ ‫ע | לית‪ | ẓ :‬أ هو‪ 32 b :‬الأرض والنار[ האש והארץ )*النار والأرض(‪ :‬ע ‖ أو من أشياء[ ומדברים‬ ‫)*ومن أشياء(‪ :‬ע ‖ هى البسيط[ יותר פשוטים )*أبسط(‪ :‬ע ‪ 33‬وتنقبض[ ‪ +‬פעם )*مرة(‪ :‬ע ‪ 1‬الثلثة[‬ ‫الثلاثة‪* ‖ b :‬عنها )מהם(‪ :‬ע[ عن… )‪ | ẓ :(corr.‬عنه ‪ +‬بها‪ 2 b :‬شیء‪ 3 (ẓ corr.) b :‬شيئا ً[ ‪ +‬כלל‬ ‫)*أصلا ً(‪ :‬ע ‖ تلى[ هى‪ 4 b :‬طبائعها[ טבעם )*طبيعتها(‪ :‬ע ‖ ولا[ ‪ +‬מן )*من( ‖ ⟩فى⟨‪b :‬ע‬ ‫‪*⟩ 29‬دائم البقاء⟨‬

‫‪*⟩ 31‬أنه⟨ )שהוא(‪:‬‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫‪162‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪6‬‬

‫השמימיים הושם נמנע שיהיה בעתים המתחלפים בענינים מתחלפים ולא ימנע שיהיה‬ ‫בעתים המתחלפים במקומות מתחלפים ועל זה נבנה ענין הטבע ואולם העצם‬

‫‪1069a33–34‬‬

‫אשר הוא בלתי מתנועע ולא יתערב בו דבר מן הגשמות הנה הוא היוצא מכל שנוי ולכן‬ ‫נאמר בזה העצם שהוא נפרד מן העצם המוחש ולא נכון שהוא נפרד ממנו במקום‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫וזה כי הוא מן השקר שיפרד במקום העצם אשר אין מקום לו כלל ולא יקיפוהו‬ ‫תכליות הגשם כמו שיקיפו כל הדברים אשר במקום אבל אנחנו כאשר אמרנו כי זה‬ ‫העצם נפרד מן העצם המוחש אמנם נורה על חלוף מה שבין שני העצמים וזה‬ ‫כי אנחנו מפני שדמינו אחד משני העצמים בלתי מתנועע ולא משתנה כלל ולא יקבל‬ ‫בשום פנים דבר מן השנוי לא מזולתו ולא מעצמותו ומצאנו כל אלה הדברים אשר הם‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫מן העצם המוחש פעם יהיו בענין אחד ופעם יהיו בענין אחר היה מן היושר שנחשוב‬ ‫כי אותו העצם המושכל נפרד מן העצם המוחש עד שלא ימצא בינו ובינו שתוף לא‬ ‫בטבע ולא בחדוש מן החדושים וכונתנו בזה המאמר אמנם הוא הדבור בזה העצם‬ ‫הראשון אשר לא יתנועע ושנספר כל מה שחשבו בו מי שהיה לפנינו ואשר‬

‫‪1069a34–36‬‬

‫חשבוהו האנשים ההם בו כי קצתם חלק זה העצם הראשון לשני חלקים וקצתם שם‬

‫‪ 6‬השמימיים[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬הושם‪ [DBT :‬לית‪ | C :‬היה‪ ‖ AL :‬בענינים[ במקומות‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬בעניינים‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫מתחלפים‪ [CDT :‬המתחלפים‪ ‖ ABL :‬ולא[ אך לא‪ ‖ T :‬ימנע[ היה נמנע‪ | DA :‬נמנע‪ ‖ T :‬שיהיה[‬ ‫שיהיו‪D :‬‬

‫طبيعته‪ :‬ع‬

‫‪ 7‬המתחלפים[ מתחלפים‪ ‖ DA :‬מתחלפים[ המתחלפים‪ ‖ C :‬זה[ ‪ +‬הוא‪ ‖ CBL :‬הטבע[‬ ‫‪8‬‬

‫ולא[ לא‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫שינוי‪ ‖ D :‬ולכן[ ולזה‪D :‬‬

‫‖ דבר[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬הנה‪ [DT :‬לית‪ ‖ CABL :‬הוא[ ‪ +‬הוא)!(‪ ‖ D :‬שנוי[‬

‫‪ 9‬בזה העצם[ לית‪ ‖ (R1⇄) BR :‬נפרד)‪ [(1‬הנפרד‪ ‖ B :‬מן…נפרד[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫)⇄‪ ‖ (C1‬נכון‪ [DT :‬נאמר‪ | ABL :‬לית‪ ‖ C1 :‬שהוא[ שיהיה‪C1 :‬‬

‫‪ 10‬השקר[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬במקום‪[DAT :‬‬

‫מן המקום‪ ‖ CBL :‬מקום לו[ לו מקום‪ ‖ AT :‬ולא[ לא‪ ‖ B :‬יקיפוהו‪ [DL :‬יקיפהו‪ | (C1⇄) CA :‬ויקיפהו‪:‬‬ ‫‪B‬‬

‫‪ 11‬הגשם[ ‪ +‬כלל‪ ‖ B :‬כל[ שאר‪ ‖ B :‬אנחנו[ לית‪DA :‬‬

‫יודה‪A :‬‬

‫‪* 12‬נורה )ندل(‪ :‬ع[ נודה‪| CDBTL :‬‬

‫‪ 13‬מפני[ בעבור‪ | C :‬סא כאשר‪ ‖ C1 :‬שדמינו‪ [DAB :‬שדימינו‪ | CL :‬דמינו‪ | C1 :‬שחשבנו‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ T‬אחד[ אשר‪ + | (C1⇄) C :‬هذين‪ :‬ع ‖ משני[ מן שני‪A :‬‬

‫‪ 14–13‬ולא…מעצמותו[ לית‪A :‬‬

‫ולא‪ ‖ D :‬מעצמותו‪ [DT :‬מעצמו‪ ‖ CABL :‬ומצאנו[ وجدنا‪ :‬ع ‖ אלה[ אלו‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 14‬לא[‬

‫‪ 15‬בענין)‪ [(1‬בעניין‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ B‬אחד[ לית‪ :‬ع ‖ בענין)‪ [(2‬בעניין‪ ‖ B :‬ופעם[ ופעמים‪ ‖ A :‬שנחשוב[ שנחשב‪ | D :‬נחשוב‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ 16‬כי אותו[ שאותו‪ | D :‬כי אותה‪ ‖ M :‬העצם[ לית‪ :‬ع ‖ המוחש[ המורגש‪ + | C :‬مبا ين له‪ :‬ع ‖ שתוף[‬

‫שותפות‪ + | C :‬البتة‪ :‬ع‬

‫‪ 17‬וכונתנו‪ [AT :‬וכונתינו‪CBDL :‬‬

‫‪ 18‬הראשון[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬לא[ לית‪‖ B :‬‬

‫ושנספר[ ונספר‪ ‖ B :‬שחשבו[ ‪ ‖ T corr.‬בו[ ‪ +‬כל‪ ‖ T :‬מי[ מן‪ ‖ D :‬לפנינו[ ‪ +‬מי שהיה לפנינו‪(!)D :‬‬ ‫‪ 19‬חשבוהו‪ [C :‬חשבו‪ ‖ DAMT :‬האנשים[ אנשים‪ | (R1⇄) BR :‬לית‪ :‬ع ‖ ההם[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬בו‪[CDT :‬‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ ABML :‬כי[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הראשון[ לית‪ :‬ع ‖ לשני‪ [ADT :‬אל שני‪CBL :‬‬

‫‪163‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ẓ38v5‬السماو ية جعل ممتنعا ًأن يكون فى الأوقات المختلفة فى أحوال مختلفة ولم يمتنع أن يكون‬

‫‪6‬‬

‫فى الأوقات المختلفة | فى مواضع مختلفة وعلى هذا مبنى أمر طبيعته وأما الجوهر‬ ‫الذى ليس بمتحرك ولا يشو به شئ من الجسما⟩نية⟨ | فهو الخارج عن كل تغير ولذلك‬ ‫نقول في هذا الجوهر إنه مفرد عن الجوهر المحسوس وليس يزعم أنه مفرد | عنه فى المكان‬ ‫‪ ẓ38v8‬وذلك أنه من المحال أن يفرد فى المكان الجوهر الذى لا مكان له أصلا ًولا تحو يه‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪ b332‬نهايات | الجسم كما تحوى سا ئر الأشياء التى هى فى المكان لكنا إذ قلنا إن هذا‬ ‫الجوهر مفرد عن الجوهر المحسوس فإنما | ندل على اختلاف ما بين الجوهر ين وذلك‬ ‫أنا لما توهمنا أحد هذين الجوهر ين غير متحرك ولا متغير أصلا ًولا | يقبل‬ ‫بوجه من الوجوه شيئا ًمن الاستحالة لا من غيره ولا من ذاته وجدنا جميع هذه الأشياء التى هي‬ ‫‪ ẓ38v11‬من الجوهر | المحسوس مرة تكون بحال ومرة تكون بأخرى كان من الصواب أن نتوهم‬ ‫أن ذلك الجوهر المعقول | مفرد عن المحسوس مبا ين له حتى لا توجد بينه و بينه مشاركة البتة لا‬ ‫فى طبع ولا فى عرض من الأعراض | وغرضنا فى هذا القول إنما هو الكلام فى هذا الجوهر‬ ‫الأول الذى لا يتحرك وأن نقتص جميع ما توهمه | فيه من كان قبلنا ؞ والذى‬ ‫توهمه أولئك فيه أن بعضهم قسم هذا الجوهر قسمين و بعضهم جعله‬

‫‪ 6‬فى[ وفى‪ 7 b :‬طبيعته[ הטבע )*الطبيعة(‪ :‬ע ‖ الجسما⟩نية⟨‪ 9 b :‬يزعم[ נכון )*نزعم(‪ :‬ע ‪* 10‬يفرد‬ ‫)יפרד(‪ :‬ע[ ىفرد‪ | ẓ :‬نفرد‪ 13 b :‬هذين[ לית‪ :‬ע ‪ 14‬وجدنا[ ומצאנו )*ووجدنا(‪ :‬ע ‖ الجوهر‪b :‬ע‬ ‫)העצם([ الجواهر‪ 15 ẓ :‬بحال[ ‪ +‬אחד )*واحدة(‪ :‬ע ‖ بأخرى[ בענין אחר )*بحال أخرى(‪ :‬ע ‪ 16‬عن[‬ ‫‪ +‬העצם )*الجوهر(‪ :‬ע ‖ مبا ين له[ לית‪ :‬ע ‖ البتة[ לית‪ :‬ע ‖ أولئك‪b :‬ע )ההם([ اولك‪ + | ẓ :‬האנשים‬ ‫)*الناس(‪ :‬ע ‪ 19‬الجوهر[ ‪ +‬הראשון )*الأول(‪ :‬ע ‪ 20–19‬جعله طبيعة[ جعلوا طبيعته‪ 19 b :‬قسمين[‬ ‫לית‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫‪164‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬

‫אותו טבע אחד ואולם אשר חלקוהו הם אשר אמרו כי הצורות והמרחקים הלמודיים‬ ‫הם העצמים קודם העצמים המוחשים ושהם התחלותם ואולם אשר שמו העצם המושכל‬ ‫אחד הוא אשר חשב כי המרחקים הלמודיים הם העצמים והניחו ענין הצורה^ ואולם‬ ‫העצם המוחש הנה היה הצורך בו אל החכמה הטבעית כי העצם ההוא בכללו לא‬ ‫ימלט מתנועה ואולם זה העצם מן הדומה שהוא יצטרך אל חכמה יותר נכבדת מן‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫החכמה הטבעית וזה כי אין בין שני העצמים שתוף בדבר מן הדברים כלל לא בחדוש‬ ‫ולא בגדול ולא‬

‫מן החדושים ולא במקום‬ ‫בחסרון ואין לשניהם גם כן התחלה אחת‬

‫התחדשו ממנה אבל הראשון אין לו התחלה כלל והשני אמנם התחלתו העצם‬ ‫הראשון ולא‬ ‫יודעו בסברא אחת כי היה אחד מהם מוחש והאחר מושכל והעצם אשר לא יקבל השנוי‬ ‫ולא יתנועע ראשון בטבע לעצם המשתנה הרץ כמו שירוץ הדבר הנגר ואולם אנחנו‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫מפני שרוב מה שהיה בנו מוגבל מן העצם המוחש בחרנו לדבר בו תחלה להתיחסו‬ ‫אלינו והתדמותו בנו‬ ‫‪ 20‬חלקוהו[ ‪ +‬قسمين‪ :‬ع‬

‫‪ 21‬העצמים קודם[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬העצמים )‪ [DAB :(1‬עצמים‪+ | CL :‬‬

‫אשר‪ + | T :‬المعقولة‪ :‬ع ‖ העצמים )‪ [DABT :(2‬העצמיים‪ ‖ CL :‬ושהם[ והם‪ ‖ M :‬העצם[ הגשם‪BR :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪(R1‬‬

‫‪ 22‬הוא[ הם‪ ‖ L :‬חשב[ חשבו‪ ‖ L :‬והניחו‪ [C1L :‬והכחות‪ | CDABM :‬ובטלו‪ ‖ T :‬הצורה[‬

‫הצורות‪T :‬ع‬

‫‪ 23‬המוחש‪ [DA :‬המורגש‪ ‖ CBTL :‬הנה היה הצורך‪ [DB :‬הנה הוא מצטרך‪| CL :‬‬

‫אמנם היה הצורך‪ | AM :‬אמנם יצטרך‪ ‖ T :‬בכללו[ ובכללו‪D :‬‬

‫‪ 24‬ימלט[ ימנע‪ ‖ C :‬מתנועה[ من‬

‫الحركة‪ :‬ع ‖ ואולם[ ואמנם‪ ‖ A :‬שהוא[ לית‪ | D :‬הוא‪ ‖ B :‬יצטרך[ שיצטרך‪ ‖ D :‬חכמה[ החכמה‪:‬‬ ‫‪CM‬‬

‫‪ 25‬הטבעית[ הטבעים‪ | C :‬לית‪ ‖ M :‬כי[ أنه‪ :‬ع ‖ שתוף[ שותף‪ ‖ B :‬מן הדברים[ לית‪‖ AM :‬‬

‫לא‪ [DT :‬ולא‪CABL :‬‬

‫‪ 26‬ולא)‪ [BT :(1‬לא‪ + | CADML :‬فى زمان ولا فى تغيير من أنواع التغيير‪ :‬ع ‖‬

‫ולא)‪ [(2‬לית‪ ‖ (R1⇄) BR :‬בגדול‪ [CA :‬בגודל‪ | D :‬לית‪ | (R1⇄) BR :‬בצמיחה‪ ‖ T :‬לשניהם‪ [CT :‬להם‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ DABML‬גם כן[ לית‪ | C :‬ג״כ‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 27‬התחדשו ממנה‪ [DBT :‬ממנה התחדשו‪ | CL :‬יתחדשו ממנה‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ AM‬לו[ לית‪ ‖ CB :‬התחלה[ ‪ +‬לו‪ ‖ BC1 :‬אמנם התחלתו[ התחלתו אמנם‪BR :‬‬

‫)⇄‪(R1‬‬

‫‪ 28‬יודעו[‬

‫יודע‪ + | D :‬אלא‪ + | R1 :‬أيضا‪ ً :‬ع ‖ בסברא[ בסברה‪ ‖ A :‬אחת‪ [DAMT :‬לית‪ | C :‬אחד‪ ‖ BC1L :‬כי[‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ B :‬היה[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬והאחר[ והשני‪ ‖ AM :‬והעצם[ העצם‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 29‬המשתנה[ משתנה‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ M‬כמו[ או‪ ‖ B :‬הדבר[ דבר‪ 30 (C1⇄) C :‬מפני‪ [DAT :‬בעבור‪ ‖ CBL :‬שרוב…בנו‪ [D :‬שהיה רוב‬ ‫מה שהיה לנו‪ | C :‬שרוב מה שיהיה בנו‪ | ATL :‬שהיה בנו‪ | B :‬שרוב מה שיהיה בנו ‪ +‬הוא‪ ‖ M :‬מוגבל[‬ ‫מוצר‪ ‖ T :‬המוחש‪ [DAB :‬המורגש‪ ‖ CTL :‬בחרנו‪ [DAM :‬הלכנו‪ | CL :‬כוננו‪ | B :‬הנה‪ ‖ T :‬לדבר[‬ ‫נדבר‪T :‬ع )نتكلم( ‖ בו[ فى هذا الجوهر‪ :‬ع ‖ להתיחסו[ בהתיחסו‪ | C :‬להתיחס‪ 31 D :‬והתדמותו‪:‬‬ ‫‪ [DAMT‬והדמות‪ | C :‬והדמותו‪BC1L :‬‬

‫‪1069a36–b2‬‬

‫‪165‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ẓ38v15‬طبيعة | واحدة أما الذين قسموه قسمين فهم الذين قالوا إن الصور والأبعاد التعليمية‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫هى الجواهر المعقولة | قبل الجواهر المحسوسة وأنها مبادؤها وأما الذين جعلوا الجوهر المعقول‬ ‫واحدا فمن ظن أن الأبعاد | التعليمية هى الجواهر وألغى أمر الصور فأما‬ ‫الجوهر المحسوس فإنما كان يحتاج فيه إلى العلم الطبيعى | لأن ذلك الجوهر بأسره لا‬ ‫يخلو من الحركة وأما هذا الجوهر فكأنه يحتاج إلى علم أشرف من‬ ‫‪ ẓ38v19‬العلم | الطبيعى وذلك أنه ليس بين الجوهر ين مشاركة فى شىء من الأشياء أصلا ًلا فى حدث‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫من الأحداث | ولا فى مكان ولا فى زمان ولا فى تغيير من أنواع التغيير ولا فى نشوء ولا فى‬ ‫تنقص ولا لهما أيضا ًمبدأ واحد |‬ ‫عنه حدثا لً ـكن الأول لا مبدأ له أصلا ًوالثانى إنما مبدؤه الجوهر‬ ‫الأول ولا‬ ‫يعلمان أيضا ًعلما ًواحدا ً | إذ كان أحدهما محسوسا ًوالآخر معقولا ًوالجوهر الذى لا يقبل التغيير‬ ‫ولا يتحرك أول بالطبع للجوهر | المتغير الجارى كما يجرى الشیء السيال وأما نحن‬ ‫‪ ẓ38v24‬فلما كان أكثر ما فينا مجبولا ًمن الجوهر المحسوس | صرنا نتكلم فى هذا الجوهر أولا ًلمجانسته‬ ‫لنا ومشاكلته إ يانا‬

‫‪ 21‬المعقولة[ לית‪ :‬ע ‪ 22‬وألغى[ והניחו )*وألغوا(‪ :‬ע ‖ الصور[ הצורה )*الصورة(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫‪ 28‬أيضا ً[ לית‪ :‬ע‬ ‫‪ 26‬ولا)‪…(2‬أنواع[ לית‪ :‬ע‬ ‫‪ 25‬أنه[ כי )*أن(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫מתנועה )* من حركة(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫‪ 29‬أول[ أدل‪ 30 b :‬نتكلم[ לדבר )*تكلم(‪ :‬ע ‖ فى هذا الجوهر[ בו )*فيه(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫‪ 24‬من الحركة[‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫‪166‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪32‬‬

‫וכבר דברנו בו דבור מופלג בספר החכמה הטבעית וביארנו כי כל עצם מוחש לא‬

‫‪1069b3–5‬‬

‫ימלט מהיותו משתנה וששנויו יהיה מן ההפכים אל ההפכים‬ ‫ולא יהיה דבר מן השנויים‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫מכל ההפכים אבל מן ההפכים המתדמים הקרובים וזה כי הנה יהיה הלבן ממה‬ ‫שאינו לבן‬ ‫אבל לא יהיה מכל מה שאינו לבן כי לא יהיה מן הקול והקול‬ ‫אינו לבן אבל אמנם יהיה מן‬ ‫השחור או מן האדום או מזולתם ממה שהוא דומה להם מן המראים‬

‫‪ 32‬דברנו[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬בו[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) CB :‬וביארנו[ ובארנו‪DAM :‬‬

‫‪ 33‬מהיותו[ משהיה‪:‬‬

‫‪ | C‬מלהיותו‪ ‖ B :‬אל ההפכים‪ [CDT :‬לית‪ | AML :‬ואל ההפכים‪ ‖ B :‬השנויים[ השנוי‪ | C :‬השנוים‪:‬‬

‫‪ 1 D‬המתדמים[ המשותפים‪ ‖ T :‬הנה‪C :‬ع )قد([ לית‪ ‖ DABMTL :‬הלבן יהיה[ יהיה הלבן‪ | C :‬היה‬ ‫יהיה)!(‪ | B :‬הנה יהיה‪ :R1) R :‬לבן יהיה( ‪ 2‬אבל…לבן)‪ [(1‬לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬אבל לא‪ [DABT :‬ולא‪| C1L :‬‬ ‫אבל‪ ‖ M :‬יהיה)‪ [(1‬לית‪ ‖ C1L :‬מכל[ ‪ ‖ corr. T‬לבן)‪ [(1‬לית‪ ‖ T :‬כי[ ‪ +‬הנה‪ ‖ AM :‬אינו[ לא יהיה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 3 AM‬מן)‪ + [(1‬אור‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬או)‪ [(2‬לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬שהוא דומה להם‪ [AMT :‬שהוא מינם‪| C :‬‬ ‫שדומה להם‪ + | D :‬ממינם‪ | B :‬שהוא ממינם‪L :‬‬

‫‪L‬ד‬

‫‪167‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ẓ38v25‬وقد تكلمنا فيهكلاما بً الغا ًفى كتاب | العلم الطبيعى فبينا أن كل جوهر محسوس لا‬

‫‪32‬‬

‫يخلو من أن يكون متغيرا ً فإن تغيره يكون من الأضداد | إلى الأضداد‬ ‫وليس شىء من التغير يكون‬ ‫‪L‬‬ ‫‪b333‬ד من كل الأضداد لـكن من الأضداد المشاكلة القر يبة من ذلك | أنه قد يكون الأبيض مما‬

‫ليس هو أبيض‬ ‫ولـكن ليس يكون من كل ما ليس هو بأبيض إذ كان ليس يكون | من الصوت والصوت‬ ‫ليس هو بأبيض لـكنه إنما يكون من‬ ‫الأسود أو من الأحمر أو من غيرهما مما | هو نظيرهما من الألوان‬

‫‪ 33‬فإن تغيره[ וששנויו )*وأن تغيره(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬

‫‪168‬‬

‫ובארנו שהוא ראוי‬

‫‪3‬‬

‫‪L‬ד‬ ‫–‪Λ.2.1069b7‬‬ ‫‪9‬‬

‫בהכרח שיהיה תחת שני אלו ההפכים נושא אחר שלישי וזה כי אחד משני ההפכים‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫לא ישא האחר אבל אשר ישא שניהם הוא הטבע אשר יפשיט אחד משני ההפכים‬ ‫ויקבל האחר וכבר מנינו שם עם מה שספרנו ממיני השנויים כמה הם בזה העצם‬

‫‪1069b9–13‬‬

‫וזכרנו שהם ארבעה ושהשנוי אשר יהיה בגדר הדבר אשר בו יודע מה הוא כמו שיהיה‬ ‫אדם מזולת אדם ומים ממה שאינו מים אבל מאויר הנה שזה השנוי הוא אשר‬ ‫נקראהו פעם‬ ‫הויה ופעם הפסד ושהשנוי השני יהיה בענין ויקרא השתנות והשלישי‬ ‫יהיה בשעור‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫ויקרא גדול פעם וחסרון פעם והרביעי יהיה במקום והוא ההעתק ממקום אל מקום וזה‬ ‫השנוי האחרון הרביעי מן השנויים אשר זכרנו לא נשים הגרמים השמימיים נמנעים ממנו‬ ‫כי הנה יהיו מתנועעים הם גם כן ממקום אל מקום ומן ההפכים מפנים מה אל ההפכים‬ ‫כי הנה ימצא במקומות גם כן מין מן ההפוך על צד ההתנגדות כמו התנועה בהם‬ ‫לפנים ולאחור ולא תמלט משני אלו הצדדים תנועה מן התנועות אשר יהיו במקום‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫ולא יספיק בזה השנוי גם כן בשני ההפכים אבל יצטרך בו כמו שיצטרך בשאר השנויים‬ ‫‪ 3‬שהוא ראוי[ כי יתחייב‪ | CL :‬כי ראוי‪D :‬‬ ‫ההפכים[ הפכים‪D :‬‬ ‫‪ | B‬יפשוט‪T :‬‬

‫ع‬

‫‪ 4‬שני אלו[ אלו שני‪ ‖ A :‬אחר‪ [ABL :‬אחד‪‖ CDMT :‬‬

‫‪ 5‬אשר[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬ישא)‪ + [(2‬את‪ ‖ AM :‬שניהם[ שתיהם‪ ‖ T :‬יפשיט[ ישליך‪:‬‬

‫‪ 6‬עם[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫)⇄‪(C1‬‬

‫| על‪ ‖ AM :‬מה[ זה‪ ‖ M :‬ממיני[ מיני‪ ‖ CB :‬השנויים[ التغيير‪:‬‬

‫‪ 7‬יהיה[ לית‪ ‖ (R1⇄) BR :‬יודע[ נדע‪DT :‬‬

‫‪ 8‬אדם)‪ [(1‬אשר‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬ממה שאינו[ מזולת‪:‬‬

‫‪ | CL‬משאינו‪ ‖ A :‬ומים[ أو ماء‪ :‬ع ‖ אבל[ ‪ +‬גם‪ ‖ T :‬נקראהו[ يسمى‪ :‬ع ‖ הנה‪ [DAL :‬לית‪‖ CBMT :‬‬ ‫שזה‪ [BMT :‬הנהוה‪ | C :‬זה‪ | AL :‬וזה‪ | C1 :‬הוא[ לית‪D :‬‬

‫‪ 9‬ופעם[ ‪ +‬ופעם‪ ‖ B :‬ושהשנוי[ והשנוי‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ T‬יהיה)‪ [(1‬יקרא‪ ‖ A :‬בענין[ ענין‪ | A :‬סא באיכות‪ ‖ C1 :‬השתנות[ الاستحالة‪ :‬ع ‖ בשעור[ בשיעור‪:‬‬ ‫‪M‬‬

‫‪ 10‬ויקרא‪ [CTL :‬נקרא‪ | D :‬והוא הנקרא‪ | A :‬ויהיה‪ ‖ (R1⇄) BR :‬גדול פעם[ פעם גדול‪‖ AM :‬‬

‫וחסרון פעם[ ופעם חסרון‪ ‖ AM :‬אל מקום‪ [DAMT :‬למקום‪CBL :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬האחרון[ לית‪ :‬ع ‖ הרביעי[‬

‫הרביעיים‪ | D :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬השנויים[ השניים‪ ‖ D :‬השמימיים[ השמימים‪ ‖ A :‬ממנו[ ממנה‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫‪ 12‬הנה יהיו[ לית‪ ‖ ABM :‬מתנועעים הם גם כן‪ [CTL :‬מתנועעים והם ג״כ‪ | D :‬הם גם כן מתנועעים‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | AM‬הם ג״כ מתנועעים‪ ‖ B :‬אל מקום[ למקום‪ ‖ AM :‬מפנים[ מפני‪ | A :‬אל מקום‪ ‖ M :‬מה[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C‬ההפכים[ הפכים‪DB :‬‬

‫‪ 13‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ DB :‬מין[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬ההפוך‪ [AML :‬ההפך‪‖ CDBT :‬‬

‫ההתנגדות[ התנגדות‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬כמו[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬התנועה[ בתנועה‪ | C :‬תנועה‪ ‖ DT :‬בהם[ לית‪AM :‬‬ ‫‪ 14‬לפנים ולאחור[ מפנים לאחור‪ | M :‬לפנים ובאיחור‪ ‖ B :‬תמלט[ תמולט‪ ‖ T :‬הצדדים[ הצדדין‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ CL‬יהיו[ יהיה‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 15‬גם כן[ גם‪ | C :‬ג״כ‪ ‖ DB :‬בו[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫‪1069b13–15‬‬

‫‪169‬‬ ‫‪L‬ד‬ ‫‪ẓ38v30‬‬ ‫‪b333‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫و بينا أنه يجب‬

‫‪3‬‬

‫ضرورة أن يكون تحت هذين الضدين موضوع آخر ثالث | وذلك أن أحد الضدين‬

‫‪ ẓ38v31‬لا يحمل الآخر لـكن الذى يحملهما تلك الطبيعة التى تلفظ أحد الضدين‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫وتقبل الآخر | وقد عددنا هناك مع ما وصفنا من أصناف التغيير كم هى فى هذا الجوهر‬ ‫واذكرنا بأنها أر بعة | وأن التغير الذى يكون فى حد الشیء الذى به يعرف ما هو مثل أن يكون‬ ‫إنسان من غير إنسان أو ماء | من غير ماء بل من هواء فأن هذا التغير هو الذى‬ ‫يسمى مرة‬ ‫كونا ًومرة فسادا ً وأن التغير الثانى | يكون فى الحال و يقال له الاستحالة والثالث‬ ‫يكون فى المقدار‬ ‫‪ ẓ38v35‬و يقال له نمو مرة ونقصان مرة ؞ | والرابع يكون فى المكان وهو النقلة من مكان إلى مكان وهذا‬ ‫التغير الرابع من التغايير التى ذكرناها | لم نجعل الأجسام السماو ية ممتنعة منه‬ ‫إذ كانت قد تتحرك هى أيضا ًمن مكان إلى مكان ومن الأ⟩ضداد⟨ | من وجه ما إلى الأضداد‬ ‫فقد يوجد فى الأماكن أيضا ًضرب من التضاد على جهة المقابلة‬

‫‪ 8‬أو ماء[ ומים )*وماء(‪:‬‬

‫‪ 6‬مع ما[ معما‪ ‖ ẓ :‬التغيير[ השנויים )*التغايير(‪ :‬ע ‪ 7‬يعرف[ ىعرف‪ẓ :‬‬ ‫ע ‖ يسمى[ נקראהו )*نسميه(‪ :‬ע ‪ 9‬الاستحالة[ השתנות )*استحالة(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫‪ 11‬التغير[ ‪ +‬האחרון )*الأخير(‪ :‬ע ‖ ذكرناها[ זכרנו )*ذكرنا(‪ :‬ע ‖ *نجعل )נשים(‪ :‬ע[ ىجعل‪ | ẓ :‬تجعل‪‖ b :‬‬ ‫ذكرناها[ זכרנו )*ذكرنا(‪ :‬ע ‪ 12‬الأ⟩ضداد⟨‪b :‬ע )*ההפכים([ ‪corr. ẓ‬‬ ‫‪ 10‬مرة )‪ [(2‬أخرى‪b :‬‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪170‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪16‬‬

‫אל גשם מונח תחת שני ההפכים עד שיתנועע מאחד מהם אל האחר אבל כי זה‬ ‫הגשם השמימי זולת הגשם המונח לדברים אשר יתהוו ויפסדו וזה כי הגשם המונח‬ ‫לדברים אשר יתהוו ויפסדו ישתנה בכללו ואולם הגשם השמימי אמנם ישתנה במצב‬ ‫לבד ואולם כל הדברים אשר בהם עמידת טבעו וטבע כל אחד מחלקיו הם דברים בלתי‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫משתנים ובלתי מתנועעים ובו דמיון ואם הוא קטן במה שהוא בכח ומה שהוא בפעל‬ ‫וזה כי חלקיו יהיו בכח במקום מן המקומות תחלה ואחר יהיו בו בפועל וזה גם כן דבר‬

‫‪1069b15–18‬‬

‫כולל לכל העצמים המוחשים ר״ל היציאה ממה שהוא בכח אל מה שהוא בפועל כמו‬ ‫יציאת הלבן בכח אל הלבן בפועל ויציאת מה שהוא בכח שתי אמות אל מה שיהיה‬ ‫בפועל שתי אמות ויציאת מה שהוא סקראט בכח אל מה שהוא סקראט בפועל כי‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫הזרע אשר היה ממנו סקראט כבר היה בכח סקראט והספק המפורסם אשר היו‬

‫‪1069b26–27‬‬

‫מספקים‬ ‫כל הטבעיים איך יהיה הדבר הנמצא ממה שאינו נמצא מזה המקום יסור וזה כי הדבר‬

‫‪1069b18–20‬‬

‫אשר יהיה לא יהיה ממה שאינו נמצא במוחלט אבל יהיה ממה שאינו נמצא מפנים‬ ‫ונמצא מפנים וזה כי הדבר אשר יהיה ממנו מה שיהיה הוא בכח אותו הדבר אשר יהיה‬

‫‪ 16‬מונח[ ‪ +‬נושא‪ | D :‬נושא‪ ‖ T :‬תחת[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬ההפכים[ הפכים‪ ‖ A :‬כי[ לית‪DT :‬‬

‫‪ 17‬השמימי[‬

‫השמימיי‪ | DB :‬השמיימי‪ ‖ A :‬זולת[ ‪ +‬זה‪ ‖ D :‬המונח[ לית‪ | (R1⇄) BR :‬הנושא‪T :‬‬ ‫‪ 18‬וזה…ויפסדו[ הוא‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 18‬לדברים[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬ויפסדו[ ‪ +‬כי הגשם המונח‪ ‖ C :‬ישתנה[ ישתנו‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ B‬בכללו[ בכללן‪ ‖ C :‬השמימי[ השמימיי‪ | DB :‬השמיימי‪ ‖ A :‬אמנם[ לית‪ | CB :‬אולם‪D :‬‬ ‫‪ 20‬הדברים…ובו[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪–17‬‬

‫‪ 19‬כל אחד[ לית‪ | A :‬לאחד‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬מחלקיו[ חלקיו‪A :‬‬

‫‪–19‬‬

‫‪ 20‬משתנים[‬

‫משנים‪ ‖ D :‬ובלתי מתנועעים[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 21–20‬ואם…כי[ ‪T0‬‬

‫ומה[ ובמה‪ ‖ D :‬בפעל‪ [CL :‬בפועל‪DABM :‬‬

‫‪ 21‬מן…בו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מן המקומות[ מהמקומות‪:‬‬

‫‪ 20‬הוא[ היה‪‖ CB :‬‬

‫‪ ‖ D‬ואחר[ ואשר‪ ‖ D :‬יהיו‪ [B :‬ישובו‪ | CAML :‬יהיה‪ ‖ D :‬בפועל[ בפעל‪ ‖ T :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪:‬‬ ‫‪DB‬‬

‫‪ 22‬לכל…היציאה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬העצמים[ הגשמים‪ ‖ B :‬היציאה[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬ממה[ במה‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 23‬אל…ויציאת[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 23–22‬כמו…אל)‪T0 [(1‬‬

‫‪ 22‬בפועל[ בפעל‪T :‬‬

‫בפעל‪ ‖ T :‬מה)‪ [(2‬לית‪ ‖ CM :‬שהוא‪ [AT :‬שיהיה‪CDBML :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ T‬בפועל)‪ [(2‬בפעל‪T :‬‬

‫‪–22‬‬

‫‪ 23‬בפועל[‬

‫‪ 24‬בפועל)‪ [(1‬לית‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬בפעל‪:‬‬

‫‪ 25‬היה)‪ [(1‬לית‪ + | D :‬במין‪ ‖ B :‬סקראט)‪ [(1‬סקראטו)!(‪ | C :‬סקרט‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ D‬סקראט)‪ [(2‬סקרט‪ ‖ D :‬והספק[ ואספק)!(‪ ‖ A :‬אשר היו[ שהיו‪ ‖ M :‬מספקים[ מספיקים‪| C :‬‬ ‫מספיקים ‪ +‬בו‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 26‬יהיה[ שיה)!(‪ | D :‬היה‪ ‖ M :‬הנמצא[ נמצא‪T :‬‬

‫‪ +‬אמנם‪ ‖ AM :‬יהיה)‪ [(3‬לית‪ ‖ D :‬מפנים[ ‪ +‬והנה‪B :‬‬

‫‪28‬‬

‫‪ 27‬יהיה)‪ [(1‬לית‪ ‖ M :‬אבל[‬

‫ונמצא[ לית‪ | (C1⇄) CA :‬למצא‪ | D :‬נמצא‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ B‬מפנים[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) CA :‬אשר יהיה[ שיהיה‪ ‖ AM :‬שיהיה[ שהוא‪D :‬‬

Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition

171

‫‪172‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪29‬‬

‫ושאינו הוא בפועל וכל הדברים אשר ישתנו לא ימלט מהיות המקבל השנוי ההוא‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫גשם מן הגשמים עד שהעצמים המתמידים אשר לא יקבלו ההויה וההפסד מפני שהם‬

‫‪1069b24–26‬‬

‫משתנים במקום אינם נמלטים מגשם‬ ‫אבל כי מה שאינו נמצא על שלשה דרכים אחד מהם שיהיה בלתי נמצא כלל והאחר הוא ‪1069b27–28‬‬

‫ההעדר המונח מול הדבר המתהוה והשלישי מה שהוא בכח והנה על שני‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫הדרכים הראשונים אי אפשר שיהיה מה שיהיה וזה כי אי אפשר שיהיה מה שיהיה‬

‫‪L‬ה‬

‫ממה שאינו נמצא כלל ולא מן ההעדר והוא עומד ואולם מן הגשם המקבל לשנוי הנה‬

‫‪1069b28–29‬‬

‫אפשר שיתהוה המתהוה כאשר היה בכח הוא הדבר ההוה ובפועל אין הוא אלא‬ ‫שהוא ואם היה הדבר כן באי זה ענין שיהיה אין אי זה גשם שיקרה יתכן ממנו הוית‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫אי זה דבר שיהיה וזה כי הספינה לא יתכן שתבנה מאבנים ואי אפשר שיתילד אדם‬ ‫מכל דבר אבל הספינה אמנם יתכן שתבנה מן העצים והבית מהאבנים ומזרע האדם‬ ‫אדם ואין כל אדם מכל זרע אנושי אבל כל אחד מן האנשים מן הזרע אשר היה ממנו‬ ‫וכן הסוס מזרע הסוס ואלו היה הגשם אשר ממנו יתהוו הדברים ההווים אחד בעינו‬

‫‪ 29‬ואין הוא‪ [DB :‬ושאינו‪ | CML :‬לית‪ | A :‬ואיננו‪ ‖ T :‬בפועל[ בפעל‪ ‖ T :‬מהיות‪ [DAM :‬משיהיה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 30‬עד[ עם‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ CBTL‬המקבל[ מקבל‪ ‖ A :‬השנוי ההוא‪ [DA :‬לאותו השנוי‪ | CBL :‬השנוי‪MT :‬‬

‫‪ ‖ (R1⇄) BR‬המתמידים[ התמידים‪ ‖ B :‬ההויה[ ההוויה‪ ‖ B :‬מפני[ בעבור‪ ‖ CL :‬שהם[ שהיו‪CB :‬‬ ‫‪ 31‬אינם נמלטים[ לא יהיו להם המלט‪ | C :‬לא יהיה להם המלט‪ ‖ L :‬מגשם[ מן הגשם‪AM :‬‬

‫‪ 32‬אבל[‬

‫לית‪ ‖ T :‬שלשה[ ג׳‪ ‖ DB :‬דרכים[ מינים‪ | CL :‬חלקים‪ ‖ B :‬שיהיה[ שהיה‪ ‖ C :‬והאחר‪[DBMT :‬‬ ‫ואחד‪ | CL :‬והשני‪ ‖ A :‬הוא[ לית‪CBL :‬‬ ‫ב׳‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 33‬ההעדר[ העדר‪ ‖ M :‬המתהוה[ המתהווה‪ ‖ M :‬שני[‬

‫‪ 1‬הדרכים‪ [DA :‬מינים‪ | CBL :‬דרכים‪ ‖ MT :‬מה שיהיה )‪ [(1‬לית‪ ‖ C :‬וזה…שיהיה)‪ [(3‬לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ ABM‬אי)‪ [(2‬לית‪D :‬‬

‫‪ 2‬והוא[ ‪ +‬יהיה‪ ‖ B :‬ואולם[ אולם‪ ‖ D :‬מן)‪ [(2‬לית‪ ‖ M :‬לשנוי[ שנוי‪| DT :‬‬

‫השנוי‪ ‖ M :‬הנה[ ‪ +‬אי‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 3‬המתהוה)‪ + [(1‬ההוה‪ | C :‬ההוה‪ ‖ T :‬היה[ הוא‪ ‖ AL :‬הוא[‬

‫אותו‪ ‖ M :‬ההוה‪ [AMT :‬המתהוה ‪ +‬ההוא‪ | C :‬המתהוה‪ ‖ DBL :‬ובפועל[ ובפעל‪ | T :‬בפעל‪ ‖ A :‬אין[‬ ‫‪ +‬זה‪ | D :‬איננו‪ ‖ T :‬הוא)‪ + [(3‬הוא‪DBT :‬‬

‫‪ 4‬באי זה ענין שיהיה[ על כל פנים‪ ‖ T :‬ענין שיהיה אין[‬

‫עניין מין‪ ‖ B :‬אי זה‪ [ABC1T :‬זה‪ | CDM :‬איזה‪ ‖ L :‬שיקרה[ שקרה‪ | CB :‬שיהיה‪ ‖ A :‬הוית[ הוויית‪:‬‬ ‫‪B‬‬ ‫‪M‬‬

‫‪ 5‬אי זה[ איזה‪ | ML :‬לית‪ ‖ T :‬שיהיה[ שיקרה‪ ‖ T :‬הספינה[ אמנם)!(‪ ‖ D :‬ואי אפשר[ ואפשר‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 6‬מן העצים[ מעצים‪ ‖ DB :‬מהאבנים[ מן האבנים‪AMT :‬‬

‫‪7‬‬

‫מכל[ כל‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‖ זרע[ מזרע‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C‬אנושי[ האנושי‪ ‖ C :‬כל אחד מן[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מן)‪ [(2‬לית‪ ‖ C :‬הזרע[ מהזרע‪ ‖ C1 :‬אשר היה[‬ ‫אשר יתהוה‪ | D :‬שהיה‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 8‬וכן הסוס[ והסוס‪ ‖ AM :‬ואלו היה הגשם[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הגשם[ גשם‪‖ C :‬‬

‫יתהוו[ היו‪ ‖ (R1⇄) DBRT :‬ההווים[ המתהוים‪ | CBL :‬ההוים‪ ‖ T :‬אחד[ אשר‪D :‬‬

‫‪1069b29–31‬‬

Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition

173

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪9‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫‪174‬‬

‫בכל עניניו ולא יהיה בו בשרש בטבע יחס מתחלף לא היה אפשר שיתחדש ממנו‬ ‫רבוי אשר נראה שכבר נתחדש כי הדבר כאשר היה באמת אחד הנה אי אפשר שיקבל‬ ‫הרבוי אבל‬ ‫יצטרך שיהיה בו כח בשרש שיהיה אפשר בו שיהיה אחד ויקבל הרבוי ומה שלא יהיה‬ ‫מן המקבל אפשרות הרבוי אינו מן היושר שיאמר בבורא שהוא שם אותו בזה הענין‬ ‫ואחר כן אנס אותו שיוציאהו אל הרבוי כי זה אינו מדין החכם‬ ‫ואנכסגוריש יחשוב כי הבורא אחד ושהוא חכם אבל כאשר נשאל מפני אי זה דבר‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫בא הרבוי בדברים המתהוים אחר שהיה הבורא אחד והגשם אשר תהיה‬ ‫ממנו ההויה בלתי מקבל הרבוי אמר מחשבת הבורא בדרך בנאי או נגר או צורף יקח‬ ‫גשם מן הגשמים ויפרקהו הפרוק אשר יצטרך אליו ויחברהו ויצרפהו וירכיבהו בצורות‬ ‫מתחלפות לפי מה שיצטרך אליו ואנחנו לא נמצא הדבר כמו שאמר אנכסגוריש וזה‬ ‫שאנחנו נמצא הגשם כבר נשתנה בכללו תחלה אל היסודות הארבעה ועוד אל הצמחים‬

‫‪ 9‬בכל[ ובכל‪ ‖ A :‬עניניו[ ענינו‪ | C :‬ענייניו‪ ‖ B :‬ולא…בשרש[ ‪ ‖ T0‬יהיה[ יתכן‪ ‖ M :‬בו[ לית‪| A :‬‬ ‫כן‪ ‖ M :‬בשרש[ לית‪ | D :‬בשורש‪AB :‬‬

‫‪ 10‬רבוי…נראה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬רבוי[ ריבוי‪ ‖ B :‬שכבר[ ‪ +‬שכבר‪:‬‬

‫‪ | A‬כבר‪ ‖ B :‬נתחדש[ התחדש‪ | A :‬מתחדש‪ ‖ B :‬כאשר[ אשר‪ ‖ BL :‬הנה[ לית‪ ‖ CBL :‬אי אפשר‬ ‫שיקבל‪ [DBA :‬לא יקבל‪ | CL :‬אפשר שיקבל‪T0 | M :‬‬ ‫שיהיה)‪ [(2‬יהיה‪ + | CT :‬אי‪ ‖ (R1⇄) BR :‬אפשר…ויקבל[ ‪ ‖ T0‬אפשר בו[ בו אפשר‪ ‖ A :‬אחד[‬ ‫‪ 12‬מן המקבל[ במקבל‪ ‖ T :‬הרבוי[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הרבוי[ הריבוי‪ ‖ B :‬ומה[ כי מה‪T :‬‬ ‫‪ 13–12 D‬אינו…הרבוי[ לית‪ 12 A :‬אינו מן היושר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬שהוא שם[ שהושם‪ ‖ D :‬הענין[ העניין‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 13‬ואחר…שיוציאהו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ואחר כן[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬שיוציאהו[ שיוציאוהו‪ ‖ M :‬החכם[ חכם‪:‬‬ ‫‪B‬‬ ‫‪ 14 DT‬ואנכסגוריש[ ‪ +‬הנה‪ | CBL :‬ואין קסגוריש‪ ‖ D :‬יחשוב…הבורא[ ‪ ‖ T0‬אבל[ לית‪‖ M :‬‬ ‫‪ 14‬אי זה דבר[ מה‪ :B in marg.) BR :‬צ״ל אי זה‬ ‫‪ 15–14‬אי…בדברים[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫מפני[ בעבור‪DT :‬‬ ‫דבר; ⇄‪ 15 (R1‬בא[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬המתהוים[ המתהווים‪ ‖ B :‬אחר שהיה‪ [AMT :‬כאשר היה‪CDBL :‬‬ ‫‪ 16‬ממנו[ מאתו‪ ‖ A :‬ההויה[ הוויה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 15‬תהיה‪ [DAM :‬יהיה‪CBL :‬‬ ‫‪ 16–15‬אשר…ההויה[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫⇄‬ ‫⇄‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬מקבל[ מקבלה‪ + | (C1 ) C :‬ממנו‪ | BM :‬המקבל‪ ‖ T :‬הרבוי[ רבוי‪ ‖ (C1 ) C :‬אמר[ אבל‪| D :‬‬ ‫אמנם‪ ‖ B :‬בדרך…או)‪ ‖ T0 [(2‬בדרך‪ [CDAM :‬כדרך‪ ‖ BL :‬יקח[ ויקח‪ 17 A :‬הפרוק…ויחברהו[‬ ‫‪ ‖ T0‬הפרוק[ הפירוק‪ ‖ DB :‬אשר[ כאשר‪ ‖ D :‬ויצרפהו[ ויחזקהו‪ | CL :‬ויצרפיהו‪ ‖ D :‬וירכיבהו[‬ ‫וירכבהו‪ 18 D :‬לפי…אליו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬אליו[ לית‪ | C :‬לו‪ ‖ C1 :‬נמצא[ ‪ +‬בו‪ | A :‬בו‪ ‖ M :‬הדבר[ לית‪C :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ | (C1‬דבר‪ ‖ AM :‬כמו שאמר[ כאשר אמר‪ | CL :‬כמו שיאמר‪ 19–18 B :‬אנכסגוריש…נמצא[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫‪ 18‬אנכסגוריש[ אנקצגוריש‪ | D :‬אנכאסאגוריש‪ 19 A :‬הגשם[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬אל[ כל‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ 11‬בשרש[ שש‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬בשורש‪‖ DAB :‬‬

‫‪1069b20–21‬‬

Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition

175

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬

‫‪176‬‬

‫ובעלי חיים ורבוי הדברים המתהוים בא משני דברים ר״ל מן הבורא ברבוי מה שנתן‬ ‫לגשם מן הצורות ומן הגשם כי הגשם הושם מקבל כמו אלו תדמה אדם לקח שעוה‬ ‫ויעשה ממנה צורות רבות מצורות בעלי חיים והצמחים ומה שאין נפש לו כי הנה‬ ‫הרבוי יהיה באלו הצורות מפני שני דברים אחד מהם הצורף אשר יצרוף אותם והאחר‬ ‫השעוה אשר תצורף ואולם הצורף הנה הוא יצרוף צורות רבות ואולם השעוה מפני שהוא‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫אפשר בה לקבל הצורות הרבות‬

‫‪ 20‬ובעלי חיים[ לית‪ | D :‬וב״ח‪ ‖ AM :‬המתהוים…ר״ל[ ‪ ‖ T0‬דברים[ הדברים‪ ‖ M :‬ר״ל[ ר׳ ל׳‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ L‬מן הבורא[ כש)!(‪ | B :‬לית‪ :R1⇄) R :‬מן הב״י( ‖ ברבוי[ בריבוי‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 21‬מן…הגשם)‪‖ T0 [(2‬‬

‫הושם[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬אלו תדמה[ שתדמה‪ | C :‬שתדמה ‪ +‬אלו‪ ‖ A :‬אדם לקח[ לקח אדם‪A :‬‬

‫‪–21‬‬

‫‪ 22‬לקח…צורות[ ‪ 22 T0‬בעלי חיים[ ב״ח‪ 24–22 DBM :‬ומה…רבות[ ‪ 22 T0‬נפש לו[ הנפש‬ ‫לו‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬לו נפש‪ 23 D :‬יהיה[ יהיו‪ + | D :‬יהיה)!(‪ ‖ B :‬מהם[ מהן‪ + | C :‬מן‪ ‖ C1 :‬הצורף[ האומן‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 24‬תצורף[ תחקוה)!(‪| C :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ CL‬אשר[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬יצרוף[ יחקה‪ ‖ CL :‬אותם[ לית‪AM :‬‬ ‫תחוקה‪ ‖ C1L :‬הצורף…יצרוף‪ [DB :‬המחקה הוא יחקה‪ | CL :‬הצורף אשר הנה הוא יצרוף‪ | A :‬הצורף‬ ‫אשר יצרף‪ 25–24 M :‬בעבור…הרבות[ ‪ 24 T0‬מפני‪ [ABM :‬בעבור‪ ‖ CDL :‬שהוא[ שהיא‪| A :‬‬ ‫לית‪ 25 M :‬אפשר[ שאפשר‪ ‖ M :‬בה‪ [D :‬לית‪ | (C1⇄) CA :‬כח‪ | B :‬לה‪ ‖ L :‬הצורות‪ [CBM :‬צורות‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ DAC1L‬הרבות[ רבות‪C :‬‬

Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition

177

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪26‬‬

‫‪178‬‬

‫וכבר בארנו בספר החכמה הטבעית עם אלו הדברים אשר זכרנו כי הצורה אי‬

‫‪L‬ה‬ ‫‪Λ.3.1069‬‬ ‫‪b35–1070a4‬‬

‫אפשר שתתהוה ר״ל שתתחדש על דרך ההויה לבד ולא המקבל אותה כי העגול‬ ‫אי אפשר שיהיה בזהב מן הצורף לבד בעצמותה ולא הזהב בעצמותו אפשר שיהיה‬ ‫מן הצורף אבל יהיה הזהב זהב מן המחצב ויהיה עגול מן הצורף ואולם היות כל אחד‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫משניהם ביחוד הנה מי שאמר אותו הוציאהו מאמרו אל מה שאין תכלית לו וזה כי‬ ‫הגשם המקבל אם התחדש על דרך ההויה הנה הוא מן המבואר כי הויתו יהיה מגשם‬ ‫אחד מקבל ויהיה הפסדו כאשר נפסד אל גשם אחר‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫וכבר בארנו כי כל הדברים הטבעיים אמנם יהיה כל אחד מהם מדומה לו אשר יפול‬ ‫עליו שמו לבדו ואין זה נמצא בדברים אשר יהיו בטבע לבד כמו שהוית האדם‬ ‫יהיה מן האדם אבל פעמים ימצא בדברים אשר יהיו באומנות וזה כי הבית אמנם‬ ‫יתחדש מבית ר״ל הבית המוגשם מהבית הבלתי מוגשם והאומנות הוא התחלה‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫מאחד באחר והטבע הוא התחלה בדבר בעינו וכל מה שיתחדש בטבעים משנוי‬

‫‪ 26‬החכמה הטבעית[ ש״ט‪ =) D :‬שמע טבעי( ‖ הטבעית…כי[ ‪ ‖ T0‬עם[ על‪ ‖ DA :‬אלו[ לית‪‖ A :‬‬ ‫זכרנו[ ‪ +‬אותם‪ ‖ CL :‬הצורה[ הצורות‪ ‖ CDT :‬אי[ לית‪DAM :‬‬

‫‪ 27‬שתתהוה[ שיהיו‪ | C :‬שתהיינה‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ DT‬ר״ל[ ר׳ ל׳‪ ‖ L :‬שתתחדש…ולא[ ‪ ‖ T0‬שתתחדש[ שיתחדשו‪ | C :‬שתתחדשנה‪ ‖ D :‬ההויה[‬ ‫ההוה‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬לבד[ לבדה‪ ‖ BAM :‬אותה[ להם‪ | C :‬הם‪ ‖ BM :‬כי[ ‪ +‬צורת‪ ‖ AMC1 :‬העגול[‬

‫העגולה‪ 28 T :‬אי[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬שיהיה)‪ + [(1‬בהם‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬שתהיה‪ ‖ DT :‬בזהב[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬מן הצורף‬ ‫לבד[ ‪ 29–28 T0‬לבד…הצורף[ לית‪ 28 M :‬בעצמותו[ לבד‪ ‖ T :‬שיהיה)‪ + [(2‬בהם‪| (C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫לית‪ 29 T :‬מן הצורף[ מצורף‪ ‖ D :‬זהב[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬מן המחצב[ מהמחצב‪ ‖ CDL :‬עגול[ עגולי‪| B :‬‬ ‫העגול‪ ‖ AL :‬הצורף)‪ [(2‬המצורף‪ ‖ (R1⇄) BR :‬ואולם[ אולם‪ ‖ D :‬היות[ הוית‪ 30 M :‬אותו[ בו‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ (R1⇄) CBRL‬הוציאהו[ הוציאוהו‪ ‖ C :‬מאמרו[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬אל[ אלא‪ ‖ D :‬מה[ ‪ +‬שיהיה אל‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ D‬תכלית לו[ לא תכלית‪ | D :‬לו תכלית‪ ‖ M :‬כי[ לית‪ 31 (C1⇄) C :‬הגשם[ בגשם‪‖ (C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫התחדש[ תתחדש‪ ‖ (C1⇄) CM :‬מן המבואר[ מבואר‪ ‖ D :‬הויתו[ היותו‪ | C :‬הויותו‪ ‖ L :‬יהיה[‬ ‫תהיה‪ 32 A :‬הפסדו[ הפסד‪ ‖ D :‬כאשר[ ‪ +‬היה‪ + | A :‬יהיה‪ 1 M :‬כי[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬אחד[‬ ‫לית‪ 2 D :‬שמו[ ושמו‪ ‖ D :‬נמצא[ הנמצא‪ ‖ B :‬אשר יהיו[ שיהיו‪ ‖ A :‬לבד[ לבדו‪ 3 D :‬יהיה[‬ ‫תהיה‪ ‖ AM :‬פעמים[ הנה‪ ‖ C :‬אשר יהיו‪ [DBL :‬אשר יהיה‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬שיהיו ‪ +‬בדברים אשר יהיו)!(‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | A‬שהיו‪ | M :‬אשר הוא‪ 4 T :‬מבית‪ [DBT :‬לית‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬מן הבית‪ ‖ AML :‬ר״ל…מהבית[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ M‬ר״ל‪ [CAT :‬כלומר‪ | DB :‬ר׳ ל׳‪ ‖ L :‬המוגשם[ ‪ +‬מן המוגשם‪ ‖ B :‬מהבית[ מן הבית‪ | A :‬הבית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬הבלתי[ בלתי‪ ‖ CTL :‬הוא[ היא‪ 5 ABM :‬מאחד[ ‪ +‬בטבע‪ ‖ AM :‬באחר[ אחר‪ | C :‬אל אחר‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C1‬התחלה[ התחלת‪ ‖ C :‬וכל[ וחדוש‪ ‖ (R1⇄) CBRL :‬מה שיתחדש[ משיתחדש‪ ‖ B :‬בטבעים[‬ ‫בדברים‪ 6–5 T :‬משנוי…הטבעית[ לית‪ 5 C :‬משנוי[ ‪ +‬מן‪M :‬‬

‫‪L‬ו‬ ‫‪1070a4–9‬‬

Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition

179

‫‪180‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪6‬‬

‫התמונה הטבעית והריעועים אמנם יהיה כאשר יעיק הגשם אשר ממנו יתהוה ההוה‬ ‫מעיק‬ ‫מהיות הולך על דרכו וזאת הסבה בשתיוחס אל שהיא העדר להתחלה יותר ראויה‬ ‫משתקרא התחלה כמו מה שיראה יקרה בספינה מן הריעועים מחולשת המנהיג אותה‬ ‫מהנהגתה כאשר יעיקהו מעיק מן המעיקים‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫ועל זה הדמיון ימצאו כל העצמים שלשה והאחד מהם לא ישתנה ולא יתנועע כלל‬ ‫וזה העצם לא יושג בחושים אבל אמנם יושג בשכל ושני העצמים האחרים יפול‬ ‫עליהם החוש האחד מהם מתמיד ההשארות והאחר יקבל ההפסד ולך שתחלק העצם‬ ‫המוחש המקבל ההפסד אל שלשה עצמים אחד כמו היסוד ר״ל הגשם המקבל‬ ‫הצורה והאחד כמו הצורה והשלישי המורכב משניהם ואלו השלשה עצמים כאלו הם‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫יתהפכו אל אשר ימצאו דבר רמוז אליו בנפשו וזה יותר מיוחד מכל סגולות העצם בעצם‬ ‫כי אתה כאשר הורית על דבר משאר התארים לא תהיה הרמיזה אליו על זה והיותר‬

‫‪ 6‬הטבעית[ הטבעים‪ | B :‬בטבעים )⇄‪ ‖ (R1‬והריעועים‪ [BAT :‬מן הרעועים ‪ +‬והגנאי‪ | C :‬והרעועים‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ DM‬יהיה[ לית‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬יהיו‪ ‖ A :‬יעיק[ ימנע‪ | CR1L :‬יעיין‪ ‖ A :‬יתהוה ההוה‪ [B :‬ההויה‪| CL :‬‬ ‫יתהוה ההוא)!(‪ | D :‬יתהוה המתהוה‪ | A :‬יתהוה‪ | M :‬יתהוה ההווה‪ ‖ T :‬מעיק[ מונע‪CR1L :‬‬

‫‪ 7‬מהיות‬

‫הולך[ משילך‪ ‖ C :‬דרכו[ דרכיו‪ ‖ B :‬בשתיוחס‪ [CMT :‬שתיוחס‪ | D :‬כשתיוחס‪ ‖ ABL :‬אל[ אשר‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ A‬שהוא ‪ [DBT‬לית‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬היא‪ | A :‬שהיא‪ ‖ ML :‬העדר[ ההעדר‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 8‬משתקרא[ שתקרא‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C‬התחלה[ ההתחלה‪ ‖ D :‬שיראה‪ [DABM :‬שנראה‪ ‖ CTL :‬יקרה[ שיקרה‪ | C1R1T :‬לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬הריעועים‪ [ABT :‬לית‪ | C :‬הרעועים‪ | DM :‬ההפסדים‪C1 :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ | (R1‬יעיק‪ ‖ M :‬מעיק[ לית‪(R1⇄) BR :‬‬ ‫והאחד[ והא׳‪ | D :‬האחד‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 9‬יעיקהו‪ + [DA :‬ממנו‪CBRT :‬‬

‫‪ 10‬הדמיון[ המשל‪ ‖ CL :‬שלשה[ ג׳‪ | D :‬השלשה‪‖ AM :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬וזה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬העצם[ הגשם‪BR :‬‬

‫ואחד‪ | A :‬והאחד‪ ‖ BM :‬יקבל[ קבל‪ ‖ C :‬יקבל ההפסד[ ‪T0‬‬

‫)⇄‪(R1‬‬

‫‪ 12‬האחד‪ | DT :‬אחד‪| CL :‬‬

‫‪ 13‬המוחש[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬ההפסד[‬

‫להפסד‪ ‖ CDT :‬אל[ אבל‪ ‖ C :‬שלשה[ ג׳‪ ‖ B :‬עצמים[ העצמים‪ ‖ T0 | M :‬אחד[ האחד‪‖ T0 | A :‬‬ ‫כמו[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬היסוד[ ביסוד‪ ‖ C :‬ר״ל‪ [CDT :‬כלו׳ ‪ ‖ ABML‬הגשם[ ‪ +‬המוחש‪AM :‬‬

‫‪ 14‬הצורה[‬

‫לצורה‪ ‖ CBL :‬והאחר[ והאחד‪ | CL :‬והשני‪ ‖ A :‬כמו[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬הצורה[ בצורה‪ ‖ C :‬והשלישי‬ ‫המורכב[ ‪ ‖ T0‬המורכב[ הורכב‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬משניהם[ מהם‪ | AM :‬משתיהם‪ ‖ B :‬ואלו[ ועל‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫‪ 15–14‬ואלו…בנפשו[ סא ואלו השלש עצמים כאלו יתהפכו אל שיהיו עצם אחד רמוז לו בנפשו‪C1 :‬‬ ‫‪ 14‬השלשה[ ‪ +‬מינים‪D :‬‬ ‫סגלות‪D :‬‬

‫‪ 15‬אל…דבר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬שימצאו[ אשר ימצאו‪ ‖ CL :‬אליו[ עליו‪ ‖ D :‬סגולות[‬

‫‪ 16–15‬העצם…כי[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 15‬בעצם[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫)⇄‪(C1‬‬

‫‪ 16‬אתה[ לית‪ ‖ AM :‬הורית‪[ABT :‬‬

‫הוריתה‪ | CL :‬הוריאת)?(‪ | D :‬הורת‪ ‖ M :‬הרמיזה…זה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬אליו‪ [B :‬אלא‪ + | CDTL :‬בכל עת‪AM :‬‬

‫‪1070a9–13‬‬

Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition

181

‫‪182‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪17‬‬

‫רחוק מהעצמים מהיותו רמוז אליו בנפשו הוא היסוד וזה כי היסוד בלתי מצוייר בטבעו‬ ‫אלא שהוא ענין שישתוקק גם כן אל שיראה רמוז אליו בנפשו ואל שימנה עצם וכאלו‬ ‫הוא ימאן להראות כל זמן שהתמיד היותו ערום מן הצורה בוש מהראות דלותו ועניותו‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫ולא ישיגהו החוש עד שהוא לובש צורה אבל כי השכל בדרך ההקש ישיג היות הצורה‬ ‫נעדרת ממנו וידע שהוא מזוייף כלו׳ מתראה במה שאין בו מפני שאין לו צורה יסמך‬ ‫עליה אלא שהוא כאשר הסתלקו ממנו כל הצורות אז התגלגל אליו וכאשר התגלגל‬ ‫אל היסוד הראשון פעמים ימצא ביסוד הקרוב מכל אחד מן הדברים קורבת כח‬ ‫ההשגה כי זה היסוד יהיה רמוז אליו בנפשו וזה כי לו צורה כמו הנחשת לצלמים‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫והלוחות לספינה וכל שכן מה שיהיה מן היסוד מדברים נבדלים לא מדברים מתאחדים‬ ‫כמו הלבנים והאבנים לבית ועל זה הדמיון מן ההסתר והחולשה והרוחק יתהפך היסוד‬

‫‪ 17‬מהעצמים[ מן העצמים‪ ‖ ABM :‬מהיותו[ שיהיה‪ | C :‬משיהיה‪ ‖ C1L :‬אליו[ עליו‪ ‖ D :‬בנפשו…כי[‬ ‫‪ ‖ T0‬היסוד)‪ [(1‬החומר‪ ‖ DB :‬היסוד)‪ [(2‬החומר‪ ‖ DB :‬בלתי[ לית‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬הבלתי‪D :‬‬

‫‪ 18‬אלא[‬

‫ולא‪ ‖ A :‬ענין[ לית‪ | C :‬עניין‪ | B :‬בענין‪ ‖ T :‬ישתוקק…שיראה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬שישתוקק‪ [DAM :‬ישתוקק‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ CBTL‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬אל[ אלא‪ ‖ M :‬שיראה[ ‪ +‬ענין‪ ‖ A :‬ואל[ ולא‪ ‖ M :‬שימנה[ ‪ +‬בעצמו‪:‬‬

‫‪ 19‬הוא…זמן[ ‪ ‖ T0‬כל[ בכל‪ ‖ B :‬היותו[ היות‪ | D :‬היותר‪ ‖ M :‬ערום[ וערום‪ ‖ M :‬מן‬ ‫‪M‬‬ ‫הצורה[ מהצורה‪ ‖ B :‬מהראות…ועניותו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ועניותו[ ועניו‪ 20 D :‬ולא[ ‪ ‖ T0‬החוש[ ‪ +‬אלא‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ AM‬עד[ אלא‪ | D :‬אם לא‪ ‖ T :‬אבל…ישיג[ ‪ ‖ T0‬כי[ תי)!(‪ ‖ M :‬ההקש[ ההיקש‪ ‖ A :‬היות[‬ ‫‪ 21‬נעדרת ממנו[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬שהוא…לו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מזוייף[ מזייף‪:‬‬ ‫העדרו‪ ‖ C :‬הצורה[ מהצורה‪C1 :‬‬ ‫‪ | DM‬מזיוף‪ | B :‬תמה‪ ‖ C :‬כלו׳…בו[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬מפני[ בעבור‪ | CL :‬לית‪ ‖ (R1⇄) BR :‬שאין לו[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ (R1⇄) BR‬יסמך[ יסמוך‪ 22 AB :‬אלא שהוא[ אבל הוא‪ ‖ M :‬הסתלקו…אז[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הסתלקו[‬ ‫הסתלק‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬יסתלקו‪ ‖ D :‬אז[ אשר‪ ‖ M :‬התגלגל)‪ | D :(1‬יתגלגל‪ | CTL :‬תתגלגל‪‖ ABM :‬‬ ‫אליו…התגלגל[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬אליו[ ‪ +‬מיד‪ ‖ D :‬התגלגל)‪ [(2‬תתגלגל‪ 23 AM :‬היסוד[ החומר‪A) CL :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ (in marg.‬הראשון…ימצא[ ‪ ‖ T0‬פעמים[ פעם‪ ‖ C :‬ימצא[ נמצא‪ ‖ C :‬ביסוד[ בחומר‪‖ CL :‬‬ ‫‪ 24‬ההשגה[ השגה‪ ‖ D :‬היסוד[‬ ‫‪ 24–23‬קורבת…רמוז[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫מהדברים[ מן הדברים‪CML :‬‬ ‫החומר‪ ‖ CL :‬יהיה‪ [AD :‬לית‪ | CBL :‬היה‪ ‖ M :‬רמוז‪ [R :‬נרמז‪ | DABMR1L :‬רמז‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬בנפשו[‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ BR :‬כי[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬לו[ לא‪ + | (C1⇄) C :‬מפני כי זאת הצורה‪ | A :‬לית ‪ +‬מפני כי זאת‪–24 M :‬‬ ‫‪ 25‬כמו…לספינה[ ‪ 24 T0‬הנחשת[ הנחושת‪ 25 DAB :‬וכל[ כל‪ | A :‬ולבד‪ :C1) C :‬סא ולכל( ‖‬ ‫וכל שכן[ וכ״ש‪ ‖ MD :‬שכן[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬מה[ מן‪ ‖ D :‬שיהיה[ שהיה‪ ‖ DBM :‬היסוד[ החומר‪‖ CDL :‬‬ ‫מדברים…מתאחדים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מדברים[ לדברים‪ ‖ D :‬נבדלים‪ [DAM :‬מובדלים‪ ‖ CBL :‬מתאחדים[‬ ‫‪ 26‬לבית…ההסתר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הדמיון[ המשל‪ ‖ CL :‬והחולשה[ וההחולשה)!(‪| D :‬‬ ‫נאחדים‪C :‬‬ ‫והחלושה‪ ‖ M :‬והרוחק[ והדוחק‪ ‖ CDAT :‬היסוד[ החומר‪CBL :‬‬

Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition

183

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪27‬‬

‫‪184‬‬

‫אל שיראה דבר רמוז אליו בנפשו על שהוא עם זה יברח מן ההראות ולא יתקיים אפי׳‬ ‫זמן קצר עד שיושג לעין‬ ‫ואולם הצורה אשר תכסה היסוד ובה יצוייר הוא יותר ראויה שתהיה דבר רמוז אליו‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫בנפשו והיותר קודם מכל העצמים להיות הדבר הרמוז אליו בנפשו העצם‬ ‫המורכב הנפרד כמו פלוני ופלוני מן האנשים ושאר הנפרדים משאר הדברים‬ ‫ומזה המקום ראוי שנתחיל ונחקור ונבקש אם אפשר שתהיה צורה מהצורות ערומה‬

‫‪1070a13–17‬‬

‫מן הגשם או כל הצורות הם בגשם עד שהיא צורה לעצם המורכב ואולי הנה‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫אפשר בה שתחשב בדמיון ואי אפשר בה שתהיה נמצאת ביחוד ונאמר כי הצורות‬

‫‪L‬ז‬

‫המלאכותיות הם בזה הענין וזה מענינם מבואר וזה כי צורת המיטה דרך משל לא‬ ‫תמלט מהיות מציאותה אם בעץ או במחשבת הנגר וצורת הבריאות לא תמלט מהיות‬ ‫מציאותה אם בגוף או במחשבת הרופא ואלו הענינים אין להם הויה ולא הפסד אבל הם‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫אם שיהיו נמצאים ואם שיהיו בלתי נמצאים על פנים אחרים כמו שאמרנו פעמים רבות‬ ‫ואולם הצורות אשר בטבע לא נברח בקצתם שיהיו מופשטות מן הגשם כמו הנפש‬ ‫והשכל ולכן שם הצורות מי שאמר בהם צורות לדברים אשר בטבע ורחקו מהשים‬

‫‪ 27‬אל…על[ ‪ ‖ T0‬בנפשו[ ‪ +‬וזה‪ 30–27 D :‬על…בנפשו[ לית‪ 27 D :‬עם זה יברח[ יברח עם‬ ‫‪ 28‬שיושג[ שישוב‪ ‖ M :‬לעין[‬ ‫‪ 27‬אפי׳‪ [ABM :‬ולא‪CL :‬‬ ‫‪ 28–27‬ולא)‪…(1‬לעין[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫זה‪B :‬‬ ‫לעיון‪ :C1 | B :‬סא ולא יתקיים זמן קצוב עד שיראה לעין ‪ 29‬היסוד‪ [ABMT :‬החומר‪ ‖ CDL :‬הוא[‬ ‫היא‪ ‖ AM :‬יותר[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬שתהיה[ בשתהיה‪ | C :‬שיהיה‪ 30–29 B :‬דבר…להיות[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 29 (C1⇄) C‬הדבר[ דבר‪ ‖ C1 :‬רמוז[ הרמוז‪ 30 BR :‬והיותר‪ [AL :‬וזה יותר‪ | D :‬ויותר‪BRC1T :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ + | (R1‬להיות‪ ‖ M :‬קודם[ קדום‪ + | BR :‬אליו‪ ‖ C1 :‬להיות[ בשיהיה‪ ‖ C1 :‬הדבר[ דבר‪‖ C1 :‬‬ ‫הרמוז[ רמוז‪ ‖ C :‬בנפשו[ ‪ +‬הוא‪ 31 AL :‬פלוני ופלוני[ פלני ופלני‪ ‖ MT :‬הנפרדים[ הנפרדות‪CL :‬‬ ‫‪ 32‬ונחקור[ ונחקר‪ | CL :‬לית‪ ‖ D :‬שתהיה[ שתמצא[ ‪ ‖ CL‬מהצורות[ מן הצורות‪ ‖ MT :‬ערומה[‬ ‫מופשטת‪ 33 BT :‬הגשם[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬הצורות[ ‪ +‬אמנם‪ ‖ BMT :‬הם[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬שהיא[ שהוא‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ 1‬שתחשב[ שתחשוב‪ ‖ DAM :‬ואי אפשר[ ואפשר‪ ‖ M :‬שתהיה נמצאת[ שנמצאת‪ ‖ M :‬ביחוד[‬ ‫בייחוד‪ 2 B :‬המלאכותיות[ המלאכתות‪ | C :‬המלאכתייות‪ | B :‬המלאכתיות‪ ‖ C1L :‬הענין[ העניין‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬וזה[ ולזה‪ ‖ B :‬מענינם[ מענינהם‪ | C :‬מעניינם‪ ‖ B :‬צורת[ הצורות ‪ +‬המלאכותיות‪ ‖ D :‬משל[‬ ‫המשל‪ 3 D :‬מהיות)‪ [(1‬להיות‪ 4–3 CM :‬בעץ…אם[ לית‪ 3 A :‬או[ אם‪ ‖ DB :‬הנגר[ לית‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫לא תמלט‪ [DMT :‬לא ימנע‪ | CB :‬ולא ימנע‪ 4 L :‬בגוף[ בעץ‪ ‖ (R1⇄) BR :‬או[ אם‪ ‖ DT :‬הענינים[‬ ‫העניינים‪ ‖ B :‬ולא הפסד[ והפסד‪ 5 CL :‬בלתי[ לית‪ 6 M :‬בטבע[ ‪ +‬הנה‪ ‖ DT :‬לא נברח‪[C1L :‬‬ ‫לא נברא‪ | CA :‬לא נבראו‪ | D :‬אשר נבראו ‪ +‬הנה‪ | BM :‬נבראו‪ ‖ T :‬בקצתם‪ [CLA :‬קצתם‪‖ DBMT :‬‬ ‫מופשטות[ מן פשטות)!(‪ 7 D :‬שאמר[ שיאמר‪ ‖ CL :‬צורות[ צורת‪M :‬‬

‫‪1070a17–20‬‬

Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition

185

‫‪186‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪8‬‬

‫לדברים המלאכותיים צורות ורוב הצורות אשר בטבע הנה נראה אותם מסובכות‬ ‫בגשם כמו‬ ‫צורת האש וצורת הבשר ובכלל הנה צורת כל עצם נפרד נמצא בטבע כי הוא אי‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫אפשר שתעמוד בלעדי גשם ומה שהיה מן הצורות מניע פועל אינו מן השקר שיהיה‬

‫‪1070a21–24‬‬

‫נמצא קודם למה שהתחדש מאתו ואם היה בגשמים ועל זה הדמיון היה אבי סקראט‬ ‫קודם סקראט ותרח קודם הצלם אשר עשה ואולם צורות העצמים המורכבים הנה‬ ‫ראוי בהכרח שיהיו עמהם לא לפניהם דמיון זה כי בריאות סקראט עם סקראט לא לפניו‬ ‫ותמונת הכדור הזה עמו לא לפניו והנה ראוי שנעיין אם ישאר בסופו דבר מאלו‬ ‫‪15‬‬

‫‪1070a24–27‬‬

‫הצורות אחר הפסד ההרכבה אם לא ומן הדומה בקצתם שלא יהיה מונע ימנע‬ ‫מהשארותה דמיון זה הנפש אם היתה כן ואם לא תהיה כלה השכל ממנה לבדו ומן‬ ‫הדומה בכללה שלא יהיה אפשר בה ההשארות אבל אם היתה הצורה הנמצאת קודם‬ ‫היא הפועלת למה שציירתו הצורה ההיא עד שיהיה האדם אמנם יתחדש מאדם והסוס‬ ‫אמנם יתחדש מסוס והנפרד מכל אחד מהם כי הכללי לא יוליד ולא יולד אבל אשר‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫יוליד ויולד אמנם הוא פלוני ופלוני ומה צורך לנו בהויה אם כן אל הצורה אשר‬ ‫אמר בה אפלאטון ומה צורך הצורה המתילדת אל צורה אחרת תהיה לה דמיון‬ ‫‪ 8‬לדברים[ הדברים‪ ‖ DM :‬אשר[ שהם‪ ‖ A :‬המלאכותיים[ המלאכתיים‪ ‖ D :‬ורוב[ ורב‪ ‖ M :‬נראה‬ ‫אותם[ נראה‪ | CAL :‬נראם‪ ‖ C1 :‬מסובכות‪ [DT :‬מסובבות‪ ‖ CABML :‬בגשם‪ [DMT :‬לגשם‪CABL :‬‬ ‫‪ 9‬צורת)‪ [(1‬צורות‪ ‖ CL :‬האש[ הבשר‪ ‖ M :‬הבשר[ האש‪ ‖ M :‬צורת)‪ [(2‬צורות‪ ‖ CL :‬עצם[ גשם‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C‬אי[ לית‪(C1⇄) CM :‬‬

‫‪ 10‬שתעמוד[ שתעמד‪ ‖ AM :‬בלעדי[ בלתי‪ ‖ T :‬שהיה[ שיהיה‪| BM :‬‬

‫שהוא‪ ‖ D :‬מניע[ המניע‪D :‬‬ ‫סקראט[ סקאראט‪A :‬‬ ‫צורות[ צורת‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬למה[ מה‪ ‖ CD :‬שהתחדש[ שתתחדש‪ ‖ BM :‬אבי[ אבני‪‖ M :‬‬

‫‪ 12‬ותרח[ והכרח‪ ‖ M :‬הצלם[ הצלמים‪ ‖ CL :‬אשר עשה[ שעשה‪‖ AM :‬‬

‫‪ 13‬שיהיו[ שיהיה‪ ‖ M :‬דמיון[ ודמיון‪ ‖ D :‬סקראט)‪ [(1‬סקרט‪ ‖ DA :‬עם סקראט[‬

‫עם סקרט‪ | D :‬לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 14‬הזה[ הוא‪ ‖ CL :‬עמו[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬ישאר[ לית‪ | (R1⇄) BR :‬שאר‪| C :‬‬

‫נשאר‪ ‖ L :‬בסופו[ בסוף‪C1 :‬‬

‫‪ 15‬הפסד[ ההפסד‪ ‖ M :‬ההרכבה[ הארכבה‪ | B :‬המרכבה‪‖ (C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫בקצתם[ קצתם‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 16‬זה[ ‪ +‬כי אם‪ ‖ C :‬כן[ ‪ +‬ולא‪(C1⇄) CB :‬‬

‫‪ 17‬בכללה[ בכללם‪ ‖ T :‬יהיה[‬

‫‪ +‬אי‪ ‖ B :‬הצורה[ והצורה‪ + | D :‬ההיא עד שתהיה הצורה‪ + | A :‬ההיא עד שתהיה‪M :‬‬ ‫הוא‪ ‖ B :‬שציירתו[ שציירה‪ ‖ CDL :‬אמנם[ לית‪AM :‬‬

‫‪ 18‬היא[‬

‫‪ 19‬אמנם[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬מסוס[ מהסוס‪‖ DT :‬‬

‫והנפרד[ ונפרד‪ ‖ AM :‬הכללי[ הכלל‪ ‖ C :‬אשר[ מה שהוא‪A :‬‬

‫‪ 20‬יוליד[ ‪ +‬ואשר‪ ‖ M :‬ויולד[‬

‫ויוליד‪ ‖ D :‬אמנם[ לית‪ ‖ DT :‬פלוני ופלוני[ פלני ופלני‪ ‖ MT :‬צורך[ צרך‪ ‖ T :‬לנו[ אלינו‪ | C :‬לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ L‬אם כן[ א״כ‪DBM :‬‬

‫‪ 21‬אפלטון[ אפלאטון‪ ‖ CTL :‬צורך[ צרך‪ ‖ T :‬המתילדת[ המילדת‪‖ D :‬‬

‫אל צורה אחרת‪ [DT :‬לית‪ | CB :‬אל הצורה האחרת‪ ‖ AML :‬תהיה[ שתהיה‪ ‖ C1 :‬דמיון[ משל‪CR1L :‬‬

‫‪1070a27–30‬‬

Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition

187

‫‪188‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪22‬‬

‫והיא עצמה דמיון למה שיתחדש ממנה כי היה השם והגדר יכללו על שניהם וצורתם‬ ‫אחת ומטבע הצורה המולידה שתהיה מולידה לצורה אחרת כמוה והנה נמצא האומנות‬ ‫לא תצטרך אל צורה תשימה דמיון לה בכל מה שתעשה עד שתהיה כאשר כונה‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫לעשות כסא דרך משל לא תוכל שתעשהו אלא בדמיון וזה כי האומנות בעצמה היא‬ ‫דמיון הכסא כי היתה צורת הכסא עומדת במחשבת הנגר העושה אותה כמו‬ ‫שהרפואה היא‬ ‫צורת הבריאות והבנין היא צורת הבית וזה המאמר מספיק בסלק הצורה‬ ‫אבל כי בעליו יקשה עליו^ רוב מה שיתחדש מבעלי חיים מזולת דמיונו עם‬ ‫רבויו כי אנחנו‬ ‫הנה נראה סוג מן הצרעה יתילד מן גופות הסוסים המתות ונראה הדבורים‬ ‫יתילדו מגופות‬

‫‪ 22‬והיא[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬עצמה‪ [TD :‬נפשה‪ | CM :‬בנפשה‪ | C1L :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬דמיון[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬היה‪ [CRTL :‬היא‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | D‬היות‪ | A :‬היו‪BR1M :‬‬

‫‪ 23‬אחת[ לית‪ ‖ C1 :‬הצורה[ היצירה‪ ‖ C :‬המולידה[ המילדת‪‖ DR1L :‬‬

‫מולידה[ מילדת‪ ‖ DL :‬נמצא[ נמצאת‪ ‖ AM :‬האומנות[ המלאכה‪ | D :‬האמנות‪T :‬‬ ‫יצטרך‪ ‖ C :‬אל צורה[ לצורה‪ ‖ A :‬תשימה[ ישימה‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 25‬לא[ ולא‪ ‖ B :‬בדמיון[ דמיון‪‖ M :‬‬

‫כי[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬האומנות[ המלאכה‪ ‖ DT :‬עצמה‪ [DMT :‬בנפשה‪CABL :‬‬ ‫הכסא עומדת[ עומדת כסא‪ ‖ B :‬אותה[ לית‪ | A :‬אותו‪BM :‬‬

‫‪ 24‬תצטרך[‬

‫‪ 26‬הכסא)‪ [(1‬לית‪‖ T :‬‬

‫‪ 27‬צורת)‪ [(1‬צורך‪ ‖ B :‬והבנין[ והבניין‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ B‬היא[ הוא‪ ‖ DBT :‬צורת)‪ [(2‬צורך‪ ‖ (R1⇄) BR :‬הבית[ ‪ :C1 in marg.‬אמר המעתיק עד הנה דברי‬ ‫ארסטו ומכאן ואילך דברי תמשטיוס המפרש יקשה בו על זה המאמר אשר אמרו ארסטו על הצורות‬ ‫ואבן רשד התיר זאת הקושיא אשר יעשה במאמר הששי מזאת החכמה וזה דבר טומשטיוס אמר וזה‬ ‫המאמר וכו׳ ‖ מספיק‪ [C1T :‬פוסק‪ ‖ CDABML :‬בסלק‪ [AT :‬בחלק‪ | CDM :‬בסילוק‪ | B :‬בחלוק‪| C1 :‬‬ ‫בסלוק‪ ‖ L :‬יקשה עליו[ اغفل‪ :‬ع ‪ 28‬רוב…מבעלי חיים‪ [CL :‬רוב מה שיתחדש מב״ח ‪ +‬שיתחדש‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | D‬מהרבה מב״ח שיתחדשו‪ | A :‬הרבה מבעלי חיים יתחדשו‪ | B :‬הרבה מב״ח שיתחדשו‪ ‖ M :‬רוב‬ ‫מה שיתחדש מבעלי חיים ‪ +‬שיתחדשו‪ ‖ T :‬מזולת[ מבלתי‪ ‖ DT :‬דמיונו‪ [CL :‬דמיונם‪ | DAM :‬דמיון‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | B‬דמיונים‪ ‖ T :‬עם רבויו[ לית‪ | AMT :‬הרבה מאד‪ ‖ B :‬אנחנו[ ‪ +‬פעמים הרבה מאד‪ + | AM :‬פעמים‪:‬‬ ‫‪ + :R1) BR‬רבות( ‪ 29‬הנה‪ [CDL :‬לית‪ ‖ ABMT :‬צרעה[ צרעת‪ ‖ D :‬יתילד‪ [DAT :‬יתילדו‪CBRML :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ ‖ (R1‬מן)‪…(2‬יתילדו[ לית‪ ‖ AM :‬מן גופות[ מגופות‪ | (C1⇄) CBT :‬בגופות‪ ‖ D :‬הסוסים‪[BT :‬‬ ‫הבהמות‪ :R1) CDRL :‬השורים( ‖ המתות‪ [D :‬לית‪ | CBL :‬המתים‪ ‖ T :‬ונראה[ ‪ +‬כי‪ ‖ CL :‬הדבורים[‬ ‫דבורים‪B :‬‬

‫‪189‬‬

‫‪L‬ז‬ ‫‪a1492,3‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫هذا القول هو مقنع فى رفع الصور‬

‫‪27‬‬

‫إلا | أن صاحبه أغفل كثرة ما يحدث من الحيوان من غير مثله على‬ ‫كثرته | فإنا‬ ‫قد نرى جنسا ًمن الزنابير يتولد من أبدان الخيل الميتة ونرى | النحل‬ ‫ٺتولد من أبدان‬

‫‪ 27‬هو[ לית‪ :‬ע ‖ الصور[ *الصورة )הצורה(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫ע )יתילדו([ ىتولد‪ | ams :‬يتولد‪a :‬‬

‫‪ 28‬أغفل[ יקשה עליו‪ :‬ע )*يعترض عليه(‬

‫‪* 29‬ٺتولد‪:‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫‪190‬‬

‫השוורים המתים ונראה הצפרדע יתילד מן העפוש ונראה היתושים והוא מין אחד‬ ‫מן הזבובים‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫קטן הגוף יתילד מן היין כאשר יפסד ולא נמצא הטבע יברא אלו הדברים ממה שהוא‬ ‫דומה לו בצורה ואנחנו נדע כי בשכבת הזרע ובזרעים מכל אחד מבעלי החיים והצמחים‬ ‫יחס ייחד אותו בו היה מתילד מה שמתילד ממנו לבד מבעלי חיים והצמחים בלתי‬ ‫זולתו עד שלא יהיה מזרע האדם סוס ולא מזרע הסוס אדם ולא מזרע צמח‬ ‫מן הצמחים‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫צמח זולתו ואנה דמיוני היחסים האלו במה שיתילד ממנו זה החי לולי שהוא כבר‬ ‫הושם בטבע לפנים יחס מזומן מוכן לחדש אי זה מין שיהיה אפשר ממיני החי עם‬ ‫מצאו חומר נאות להתחדש חי מה ממנו לא היה יוצא אל הפועל ולא תזלזל‬ ‫לדמיוני‬ ‫זה מבעלי חיים אבל שים בדעתך שהוא פלא מן האומן ערמתו בעשיית מה שיעשהו‬ ‫מן הטיט יותר מערמתו במה שיעשהו מן הזהב והשן על שאתה כאשר הפלגת העיון‬ ‫‪ 30‬השוורים‪ [DAML :‬הבקר‪ | CB :‬השורים‪ ‖ T :‬יתילד[ תתילד‪ | AL :‬לית‪ ‖ C :‬מן[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬העפוש[‬ ‫מעפוש‪ | D :‬העפר)?(‪ ‖ T :‬ונראה[ ‪ +‬מין‪ ‖ M :‬היתושים[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬והוא[ לית‪ ‖ CT :‬מין[ מן‪‖ BD :‬‬ ‫אחד[ לית‪ :‬ع ‖ מן הזבובים[ מהזבובים‪ 1 B :‬יתילד[ מתילד‪ | C :‬יתילדו‪ ‖ L :‬יפסד[ ‪ +‬فإنا‪ :‬ع ‖ יברא‬ ‫אלו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬יברא[ נברא‪ 2 M :‬לו[ לית‪ 4–2 C :‬נדע…מזרע)‪ 2 T0 [(2‬כי[ ‪ +‬כי)!( בסבת‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫הזרע[ זרע‪ ‖ AB :‬והזרעים‪ [AM :‬ובזרעים‪ | CDL :‬בזרעים‪ ‖ B :‬מכל אחד[ לית‪ | AM :‬כל אחד‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫מבעלי חיים[ מב״ח‪ | AM :‬לית‪ 4–3 D :‬יחס…והצמחים[ לית‪ 3 M :‬יחס…בו[ نسبا تخصه بها‪ :‬ع ‖‬ ‫ייחד[ יחד‪ ‖ D :‬מה[ ‪ +‬שהיה‪ ‖ A :‬שמתילד[ שתילד‪* ‖ D :‬לבד[ ובפרט‪ | CL :‬בפרט‪ + | D :‬ממחל)?(‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | A‬בלבד‪ ‖ B :‬מבעלי חיים[ מב״ח‪ 4 D :‬סוס[ הסוס‪ ‖ A :‬הסוס[ סוס‪ ‖ CL :‬אדם[ האדם‪| D :‬‬ ‫לית‪ 5 M :‬צמח[ ‪ +‬אחר‪ | A :‬הצמח‪ ‖ M :‬מן הצמחים[ מהצמחים‪ ‖ D :‬ואנה‪ [DL :‬ואין‪| CBMT :‬‬ ‫ואין ‪ +‬ראוי‪ ‖ A :‬דמיוני[ דמיון ‪ +‬עם‪ :C1) C :‬סא זה( ‖ היחסים[ היחס‪ ‖ C :‬האלו[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬שיתילד[‬ ‫שתיליד‪ ‖ L :‬זה[ וזה‪ ‖ B :‬החי[ חי‪ 6–5 A :‬לולי…הושם[ ‪ 5 T0‬לולי[ לולא‪ ‖ DAM :‬שהוא[ ‪+‬‬ ‫הושם‪ 6 B :‬לחדש‪ [CL :‬להתחדש‪ ‖ DABMT :‬אי זה[ איזה‪ ‖ L :‬שיהיה‪ [DATL :‬היה‪ | C :‬שהיה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ BM‬אפשר[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬ממיני[ ‪ +‬זה‪ 7 C :‬חומר[ חמר‪ ‖ A :‬מה[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬היה[ יהיה‪ ‖ M :‬אל[‬ ‫אלא)!(‪ ‖ A :‬הפועל[ הפעל‪ ‖ T :‬תזלזל[ הבחינה‪ | C :‬יחברך ‪ +‬הבחינה‪ | D :‬يغرنك الاحتقار‪ :‬ع ‖‬ ‫לדמיוני[ ‪ :C1‬סא ודמיונם ‪ 8‬זה מבעלי[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬מבעלי חיים[ מב״ח‪ ‖ MD :‬חיים[ ח׳‪‖ A :‬‬ ‫שהוא[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬פלא[ يعجبنا‪ :‬ع ‖ ערמתו[ בקיאותו‪ ‖ T :‬בעשיית[ לית‪ | AT :‬בעשות‪ ‖ B :‬מה[‬ ‫במה‪ ‖ T :‬שיעשהו[ שיעשה‪ 9 A :‬הטיט…מן[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) CT :‬הטיט[ החמר‪ ‖ C1 :‬יותר[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬מערמתו[ לית‪ :‬ع ‖ במה[ ממה‪ ‖ D :‬מן הזהב[ מהזהב‪ ‖ D :‬והשן‪ [BMT :‬והשיש‪ ‖ CDAL :‬על[‬ ‫עד‪ ‖ DAM :‬הפלגת[ ‪ +‬זה‪ ‖ D :‬העיון[ לית‪ | C :‬העין‪A :‬‬

‫‪L‬ח‬

‫‪191‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ a1492,6‬البقر الميتة ونرى الضفادع ٺتولد من العفن | ونرى الجرجس وهو نوع‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫من الذباب‬ ‫‪ L‬ח صغير الجثة يتولد من الخمر | إذا فسدت فإنا لسنا نجد الطبيعة تنشئ هذه الأشياء مما هو‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫مثله | فى الصورة ونحن نعلم أن فى المنى والبزر من كل واحد من الحيوان | والنبات‬ ‫نسبا ًتخصه بها صار يتولد ما يتولد منه خاصة من | الحيوان والنبات دون‬ ‫غيره حتى لا يكون من منى الإنسان فرس | ولا من منى الفرس إنسان ولا من بزر نبات‬ ‫من النبات‬ ‫‪ a1492,13‬نبات غيره | فأ ين نظا ئر هذه النسب فيما يتولد منه هذا الحيوان لولا أنه قد |‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫جعل فى الطبيعة قبل نسب مستعدة متهيئة لإحداث أى نوع | أمكن من أنواع الحيوان مع‬ ‫‪ a1493‬وجودها عنصرا ً ملائما ًحدوث حيوان | ما عنه ⟩لا كان يخرج إلى الفعل⟨ ولا يغرنك الاحتقار‬ ‫لأشباه‬ ‫هذا من الحيوان لـكن أخطر | ببالك أنه يعجبنا من الصانع حذقه فى عمل ما يعمله‬ ‫من الطين | أكثر مما يعمله من الذهب والعاج على أنك أن دققت النظر‬

‫‪ 30‬الضفادع[ הצפרדע )*الضفدع(‪ :‬ע ‖ الجرجس‪a :‬ע[ לית‪ ‖ ams :‬نوع‪a :‬ע[ לית‪ + | ams :‬אחד )*واحد(‪:‬‬

‫ע‬

‫‪ 1‬يتولد‪ [a :‬ىتولد‪ ‖ ams :‬فإن ّا لسنا نجد[ ולא נמצא )*فلسنا نجد(‪ :‬ע‬

‫نتيقن‪ ‖ a :‬والنبات‪ [a :‬و ‪ +‬לית‪ams :‬‬ ‫‪a‬ע[ לית‪ams :‬‬ ‫תזלזל‪ :‬ע ‪ 8‬يعجبنا[ פלא )*عجب(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪* 2‬نعلم )נדע(‪ :‬ע[ לית‪| ams :‬‬

‫‪ 3‬نسبا ًتخصه بها[ יחס ייחד אותו בו )*نسبة تخصه بها(‬

‫‪ 4‬فرس‪:‬‬

‫‪* 7‬لا كان يخرج إلى الفعل‪ :‬ע )לא היה יוצא אל הפועל([ לית‪ ‖ a :‬يغرنك الاحتقار[‬

‫‪ 9‬مما[ מערמתו במה )*من حذقه فى ما(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪192‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫בענין החי אשר הוא יותר גדול מזה תמצא ילך הטבע בו זה המהלך בעינו ואי אפשר‬ ‫מבלתי שיהיו יחסים וצורות כבר הושמו בטבע עליהם יעשה מה שיעשה מזה‬ ‫כי האדם ואם היה מתילד מאדם הנה האב אין לו אומנות בהרכבתו זאת אשר אי‬ ‫אפשר שתהיה בענין אחר הוא יותר טוב מענינו ואמנם יהיה בזה הענין מפני מה שכבר‬ ‫הושם בטבע כל אחד מן העצמים מן היחס והצורות לא באומנות מן האב אבל מן‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫היחס והגשם אין לו מעשה בגשם אלא בתכליתו לבד ואולם הטבע הנה יעשה בגוף‬ ‫הגשם בכללו ואינו בפלא שיהיה הטבע והוא לא יבין מוליך מה שיעשהו אל הכונה‬ ‫המכוונת אליה כי היה בלתי חושב ומשכיל בפועל מה שיעשה וזה ממה שיורה אותך‬ ‫על שהם כבר הוזכרו הזכרה אותם היחסים מסבת מי^ שהוא יותר נדיב מהם ויותר‬ ‫נכבד ומדרגתו יותר עליונה והיא הנפש אשר בארץ אשר יראה אפלאטון שהיא‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫נתחדשה מן האלהים השניים ויראה אריסטוטליס שהיא נתחדשה מהשמש והגלגל‬ ‫הנוטה ולכן היה יעשה מה שיעשה והוא משתוקק^ אל הכונה והוא לא יבין הכונה‬

‫‪ 10‬בענין[ בעניין‪ ‖ B :‬בו זה[ בזה‪ ‖ D :‬אפשר[ ‪ +‬מין שיהיה‪D :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬מבלתי[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬שיהיו‪[BM :‬‬

‫משהיה‪ | C :‬לית‪ | D :‬שיהיה‪ | AT :‬משיהיו‪ ‖ C1 :‬יעשה מה שיעשה‪ [ABML :‬יעשו מה שיעשו‪CDT :‬‬ ‫‪ 12‬ואם[ אם‪ ‖ C :‬מאדם[ מהאדם‪ ‖ BD :‬האב[ האדם‪T :‬‬ ‫מעניינו‪ ‖ B :‬מפני מה[ בעבור‪CL :‬‬

‫‪ 13‬הוא[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬יותר[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬מענינו[‬

‫‪ 14–13‬שכבר הושם‪ [CL :‬שהושם‪DABMT :‬‬

‫‪ ‖ (R1⇄) BR‬מן העצמים[ מהעצמים‪ ‖ DB :‬באומנות[ האומנות‪B :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪(C1‬‬

‫‪ 15‬הנה[ הזה‪ + | D :‬הוא‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 14‬בטבע[ לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ 16–15‬בגשם…הגשם[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 16‬הגשם[ הטבע‪ ‖ C1 :‬בכללו[ ככללו‪ ‖ B :‬ואינו בפלא‪:‬‬

‫‪ [DT‬ואינו נפלא‪ | CL :‬ואין מן הפלא‪ | AM :‬ואינו מן הפלא‪ ‖ B :‬והוא לא[ ולא‪ ‖ D :‬מוליך‪ [C1L :‬לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | CD‬הולידו‪ | AM :‬הוליכו‪ + | B :‬אל‪ ‖ T :‬מה[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬שיעשהו[ מעשהו‪ + | D :‬מוליך‪ ‖ C1 :‬אל[ על‪:‬‬ ‫‪AM‬‬

‫‪ 17‬המכוונת[ המכונת‪ ‖ B :‬אליה‪ [BC :‬אליו‪ ‖ DAMTL :‬בפועל[ על‪ ‖ T :‬שיעשה[ שעשה‪| D :‬‬

‫שיעשהו‪ ‖ T :‬וזה[ זה‪ 18 AM :‬שהם[ שהוא‪ ‖ CDT :‬כבר[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬הוזכרו הזכרה‪ [B :‬נתפעמו‬ ‫התפעמות‪ | CD :‬התפעמו התפעמות‪ | AL :‬הזכרנו הזכרת‪ | M :‬הושפעה השפעה‪ ‖ T :‬מסבת מי‬ ‫שהוא[ من سبب هو‪ :‬ع ‖ מסבת[ מסבה‪ ‖ D :‬מי[ לית‪ | C :‬מה‪ ‖ DC1 :‬אפלטון‪ [DABM :‬אפלאטון‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 20 CTL‬נתחדשה[ התחדשה‪ ‖ T :‬ארסטו‪ [DABM :‬אריסטוטליס‪ ‖ CTL :‬מהשמש[ מן השמש‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 21 AM‬היה‪ [AR :‬היתה‪ | CDR1 :‬היא‪ | B :‬היה ‪ +‬כלומר‪ + | M :‬ר״ל הנפש‪ ‖ T :‬יעשה‪ [MR :‬תעשה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | CDAR1‬עושה‪ ‖ BTL :‬שיעשה‪ [BMR :‬שתעשה‪ | CDAR1 :‬שעושה‪ ‖ TL :‬והוא משתוקק‪[ABMR :‬‬ ‫והיא משתוקקת‪ | CDR1TL :‬مستاقة‪ :‬ع ‖ הכונה)‪ [(1‬הכוונה‪ ‖ D :‬והוא לא יבין‪ [AM :‬והיא לא תבין‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | CDRTL‬והוא לא תבין‪ ‖ B :‬הכונה)‪ [(2‬הכוונה‪D :‬‬

‫‪193‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ a1493,5‬فى أمر | الحيوان الذى هو أكبر من هذا وجدت ستسلك الطبيعة فيه هذا | المسلك بعينه فلا بد‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫من أن تكون إنساب وصور قد جعلت | فى الطبيعة عليها تعمل ما تعمل من ذلك‬ ‫أن الإنسان وإن كان | إنما يتولد عن إنسان فإن الأب ليس له صنع فى تركيبه هذا الذى | لا‬ ‫يمكن أن يكون بحال أخرى هى أفضل من حاله وإنما يصير بهذه | الحال لما قد‬ ‫جعل فى طبيعةكل واحد من الجواهر من النسب | والصور لا بصنع من الأب لاكن من‬ ‫‪ a1493,12‬النسب والجسم ليس له | عمل فى الجسم إلا فى نهايته فقط فإما الطبيعة فتعمل في جثة‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫‪ a1494‬الجسم | بأسره وليس بعجب أن تكون الطبيعة وهى لا تفهم سواقة ما | تعمله إلى الغرض‬ ‫المقصود إليه إذ كانت لا تدرى ولا تفكر فى | فعل ما تفعل وهذا مما يدلك‬ ‫على أنها قد ألهمت إلهاما تً لك النسب | من سبب هو أكرم منها‬ ‫وأشرف وأعلى مرتبة وهى النفس التى | فى الأرض التى يرى أفلاطون أنها‬ ‫‪ a1494,6‬حدثت عن الآلهة الثوانى و يرى | أرسطاطاليس أنها حدثت عن الشمس والفلك‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫المائل ولذلك صارت | تفعل ما تفعل مستاقة نحو الغرض وهى لا تفهم الغرض‬

‫‪ 11‬قد جعلت[ وقد جعل‪ams :‬‬

‫משתוקקת )*مشتاقة(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪ 12‬أن‪ams :‬ע )*כי([ فإن‪a :‬‬

‫‪ 15‬ليس‪a :‬ע[ לית‪ams :‬‬

‫‪ 21‬مستاقة[‬

‫‪194‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪22‬‬

‫כמו שנראה האנשים שיהיו מוזכרים שידברו הדבור ינבאו על מה שיהיה והם לא יבינו‬ ‫מה שיאמרו וכלל המאמר שהוא אי אפשר שלא יהיה בטבע יחסים וצורות כי היה‬ ‫צריך בהולדת הדבר אל דמיונו ולא ימצא לכל מה שיתילד דמיון יתילד ממנו אבל‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫אנחנו כאשר הוצרכנו אל צורה מן הצורות היה מאתנו פועל מה נדע שלא יתחדש‬ ‫בו לבדו הצורה ההיא^ ותתחדש^ אם כן הצורה ההיא כאלו היא היתה טמונה‬ ‫בדבר אחר‬ ‫והיא באמת טמונה בטבע המוליד‬

‫‪ 22‬שנראה‪ [AM :‬שיראו‪ | CDTL :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬האנשים[ אנשים‪ ‖ D :‬שיהיו מוזכרים‪ [B :‬אשר יתפעמו‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | CL‬אשר התפעמו‪ | D :‬שהיו מוזכרים‪ | AM :‬שיהיו מושקפים‪ ‖ T :‬שידברו[ ידברו‪ ‖ M :‬הדבור[‬ ‫הדברים‪ ‖ B :‬ינבאו[ ידברו‪ in marg.) A :‬ינבאו( | ‪ +‬به‪ :‬ع ‖ והם[ ואם‪M :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C1‬היה[ הנה‪AM :‬‬

‫‪ 23‬וצורות[ ‪ +‬מתחלפים‪:‬‬

‫‪ 24‬בהולדת[ בהולדה‪ ‖ D :‬אל[ על‪ ‖ T :‬דמיונו[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬יתילד[ יתילדו‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 25‬הוצרכנו[ הצרכנו‪ ‖ DM :‬צורה[ צורות‪ ‖ D :‬מן הצורות‪ [DAMT :‬מהצורות‪ ‖ CBL :‬היה[ והיה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C‬פועל[ פעל‪ ‖ AT :‬שלא[ שהוא לא‪ ‖ CAL :‬יתחדש[ נתחדש‪ | DAB :‬תתחדש‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 26‬הצורה‬

‫ההיא)‪ [(1‬לית‪ :‬ع ‖ ההיא)‪…(1‬הצורה)‪ [(2‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬ותתחדש[ נתחדש‪ ‖ D :‬אם כן[ א״כ‪ | M :‬בו‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 27‬והיא[ והוא‪ ‖ B :‬טמונה‪ [DAMT :‬לית‪ ‖ CBL :‬המוליד[‬

‫‪ ‖ C‬ההיא[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬אחר[ אחד‪D :‬‬ ‫המתילד‪ :in marg. C1 AM :‬עד כאן דברי תמשטיוס וטענתו ומהנה דברי ארסטו‬

‫‪195‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ a1494,8‬كما قد نرى | القوم الذين يلهمون أن يتكلموا الكلام ينبئون به عما يكون | وهم لا يفهمون‬

‫‪22‬‬

‫ما يقولون وجملة القول أنه لا بد من أن يكون فى | الطبيعة إنساب وصور إذ كان‬ ‫يحتاج فى تولد الشىء إلى مثله | وليس يوجد لجميع ما يتولد مثل يتولد منه لكنا‬ ‫‪ a1494,12‬متى احتجنا إلى | صورة من الصور كان منا فعل ما نعلم أنه لا يحدث‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫به وحده | فنجد حينئذ تلك الصورةكأنها كانت كامنة‬ ‫فى | شىء آخر‬ ‫وهى بالحقيقةكامنة فى الطبيعة المولدة‬

‫‪ 22‬يلهمون‪a :‬ע[ يٯهمون‪ ‖ ams :‬به[ לית‪ :‬ע ‪* 25‬يحدث[ ىحدث‪ | ams :‬تحدث‪a :‬ע‬ ‫‪ +‬تلك الصورة‪a :‬ע )הצורה ההיא( ‖ *فنجد[ ڡىحد‪ | ams :‬فتحدث‪a :‬ע‬

‫‪ 26‬وحده‪[ams :‬‬

‫‪196‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪28‬‬

‫ומפני שהיתה כונתנו לחקור על ההתחלה הראשונה לדברים הנמצאים היה מה‬

‫‪L‬ח‬

‫שיאות בזאת החקירה שנקדים תחלה שאלות על זה הדרך אשר אזכרהו‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫‪Λ.4.‬‬ ‫‪1070a33–35‬‬

‫ותחלת מה שראוי שאקדים אותו מן המאמר אם אפשר שיהיה התחלת כל הדברים‬ ‫הנמצאים אחת בעינה עד שתהיה ההתחלה ההיא היא התחלת העצם והתחלת‬ ‫ההצטרפות‬ ‫והתחלת הכמות והתחלת האיכות או ההתחלה לכל אחד מהסוגים זולת ההתחלה לאחר‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫והנה ראוי אם היתה ההתחלה נאמרת על פנים רבים מהם הדבר אשר ממנו התחלת‬

‫‪L‬ט‬

‫התנועה ומהם הדבר אשר בעבורו יהיה מה שיהיה ומהם היסוד שתהיה הכונה בשאלה‬ ‫תחלה כונת היסודות אם יסוד כל הדברים הנמצאים אחד או לכל אחד מהסוגים‬ ‫יסודות זולת היסודות אשר לסוג האחר אבל אינו מן היושר שיאמר כי היסודות לכלם‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫‪1070a35–36‬‬

‫אחדים בעינם עד שיהיה יסודות העצם וההצטרפות והכמות והאיכות יסודות אחדים‬ ‫בעינם ואם חשב זה חושב אמרנו לו מה זה היסוד אם היה אחד או מה אלו היסודות‬

‫‪1070a36–b4‬‬

‫אם היו רבים ואם הוא חוץ מן הסוגים העשרה או תוך קצתם ואם היה חוץ מהם הנה‬ ‫הוא יצטרך אל שיהיה סוג אחר זולת העשרה וראוי שיהיה קודם העשרה וזה כי‬

‫‪ 28‬ומפני[ ובעבור‪ ‖ CL :‬שהיתה[ שתהיה‪ ‖ B :‬כונתנו[ כוונתינו‪ | D :‬כונתינו‪ ‖ B :‬לחקור‪[DAMT :‬‬ ‫החקירה‪ ‖ CBL :‬ההתחלה[ התחלה‪ ‖ B :‬הראשונה[ ראשונה‪ ‖ B :‬הנמצאים[ הראשונים‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ 29‬בזאת[ אל‪ ‖ D :‬תחלה[ לפניה‪ ‖ CL :‬זה הדרך[ דרך הזה‪ | D :‬הדרך הזה‪ ‖ BT :‬אשר[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪B‬‬

‫‪ 30‬ותחלת[ ותחלה‪ ‖ D :‬אם[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬התחלת[ התחלה‪ | D :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬כל[ לכל‪D :‬‬

‫‪ 31‬כל…התחלת[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫לית‪AM :‬‬

‫‪ 32‬והתחלת)‪ [(2‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬האיכות[ והאיכות‪ ‖ B :‬ההתחלה)‪ [(1‬התחלת‪| (C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫התחלה‪ ‖ D :‬אחד[ ‪ +‬ואחד‪ ‖ C1 :‬ההתחלה)‪ [(2‬התחלה‪(C1⇄) CD :‬‬

‫‪ 1‬היתה[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬ההתחלה[‬

‫‪ 2‬הדבר[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬היסוד[ החמר‪:‬‬

‫התחלה‪ ‖ C :‬נאמרת[ תאמר‪ ‖ CL :‬אשר[ ‪ +‬תהיה‪A :‬‬ ‫‪CD‬‬

‫‪–30‬‬

‫‪ 31‬אחת בעינה[ אחד בעינו‪ ‖ BC1 :‬שתהיה[ שיהיה‪ ‖ D :‬היא[‬

‫‪ 3‬תחלה[ תחלת‪ ‖ B :‬כונת[ כונות‪ + | D :‬כל‪ ‖ A :‬היסודות[ החמרים‪ ‖ CDA :‬יסוד[ חומר‪:‬‬

‫‪ | CA‬חמר‪ ‖ D :‬מהסוגים[ מן הסוגים‪A :‬‬

‫‪ 4‬יסודות[ חמרים‪ ‖ CD :‬היסודות[ החמרים‪ | CD :‬יסודות‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ T‬היסודות[ החמרים‪ ‖ C :‬אבל[ ‪ ‖ T0‬לכלם[ לכולם‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ [CD‬אחרים‪ABML :‬‬

‫‪ 6–5‬עד…בעינם[ לית‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 6–4‬לכלם…חשב[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 5‬אחדים)‪:(1‬‬

‫‪ 5‬שיהיה[ שיהיו‪ ‖ MC1 :‬יסודות)‪ [(1‬חמרי‪:‬‬

‫‪ | CA‬היסודות‪ ‖ M :‬וההצטרפות[ ההצטרפות‪ ‖ D :‬והכמות[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬יסודות)‪ [(2‬חמרים‪‖ CD :‬‬ ‫אחדים)‪ [D :(2‬אחרים‪CAML :‬‬

‫‪ 6‬אמרנו…אלו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מה זה[ מזה‪ ‖ A :‬היסוד[ לית‪ | C :‬החומר‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ AC1‬מה אלו[ מאלו‪ ‖ A :‬היסודות[ החמרים‪CD :‬‬

‫‪ 8–7‬הוא…סוג[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 7‬הוא[ היו‪ ‖ M :‬חוץ[‬

‫לית‪ ‖ D :‬מן הסוגים[ מהסוגים‪ ‖ B :‬העשרה[ תעשה)!(‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬או תוך[ אותות)!(‪‖ D :‬‬ ‫תוך קצתם[ יכנס בקצתם‪R1 :‬‬

‫‪ 9–8‬קודם…היסוד[ ‪T0‬‬

Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition

197

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪9‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫‪198‬‬

‫היסוד קודם מן הדברים אשר הוא יסוד להם ואין סוג כלל יותר קודם מן העצם וכבר‬ ‫בארנו זה במה שקדם ממאמרנו בזולת זה המקום ואם רחק מזה ושם היסוד תחת העצם‬

‫‪1070b4–7‬‬

‫התחייב לו שיהיה יסוד העצם הוא יסוד ההצטרפות והאיכות והכמות והפועל וההפעלות‬ ‫והקנין‬ ‫ויתחייב לו עם זה מה שלא יקבלהו השכל שיהיה יסוד העצם תחת העצם והיסודות יותר‬ ‫קודמים ויותר פשוטים מן הדברים המורכבים מהם כמו שהאותיות יותר קודמות מן‬ ‫הדבור‬ ‫ונציע שהיסודות אינם תחת סוג מן הסוגים ונשאל בעל זה המאמר אם הם מן הדברים‬ ‫אשר‬ ‫‪15‬‬

‫יכלול התאר בהם כל הדברים הנמצאים כמו האחד ואם אמר כי דומים לאלה הם יסודות‬ ‫לכל הדברים אמרנו כי הדומים לאלו יותר ראויים שיתוארו בהם הדברים הפשוטים‬ ‫מן הדברים המורכבים ויתחייב ממנו שלא יהיו הפשוטים יסודות למורכבים כי היה‬ ‫המתואר באלה הם הדברים המורכבים אבל המורכבים יסודות לפשוטים ועם זה גם כן‬ ‫אם היה הנמצא והאחד התחלה לסוגים העשרה והיו ההתחלות זולת הדברים אשר‬

‫‪ 9‬היסוד[ החמר‪ ‖ CD :‬קודם[ קדם‪ ‖ CBL :‬יסוד[ חומר‪ ‖ CD :‬סוג…מן[ ‪ ‖ T0‬יותר[ ‪ +‬כולל‪A :‬‬ ‫‪ 10‬בארנו[ ביארנו‪ ‖ B :‬במה[ ממה‪ ‖ D :‬ממאמרנו‪ [AMT :‬במאמרנו‪ | CL :‬ממאמרינו‪ ‖ BD :‬בזולת[‬ ‫ובזולת‪ ‖ AM :‬זה המקום[ המקום הזה‪ ‖ DMT :‬ואם[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬רחק[ ברח‪ ‖ T :‬מזה[ זה‪| D :‬‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ B :‬היסוד‪ [MT :‬החמר‪ | C :‬החומר‪ | D :‬היסודות‪ | AL :‬היסודי‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬התחייב[ יתחייב‪‖ M :‬‬

‫שיהיה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬יסוד)‪ [(1‬חומר‪ | CA :‬יסודי‪ ‖ D :‬יסוד)‪ [(2‬חומר‪ | C :‬לית‪ ‖ D :‬והפועל[ והפעל‪‖ MT :‬‬ ‫וההפעלות[ וההתפעלות‪ ‖ DAM :‬והקנין[ והקניין‪ | D :‬והקניינין‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 12‬זה[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬השכל[ לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ D‬יסוד[ חומר‪ ‖ CA :‬תחת העצם[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬והיסודות[ והחמרים‪ ‖ C :‬קודמות[ קודמים‪‖ T :‬‬

‫מן הדבור[ מהדבור‪ 14 DAB :‬שהיסודות[ כי החמרים‪ | C :‬כי היסודות‪ ‖ DL :‬תחת סוג[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מן‬ ‫הסוגים[ מהסוגים‪ ‖ DT :‬הם[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬הדברים[ לית‪ 15 (C1⇄) C :‬התאר[ התואר‪ ‖ DMC1 :‬בהם‬ ‫כל[ ‪ ‖ T0‬האחד[ אחד‪ ‖ T0 | (C1⇄) CL :‬אמר[ אומר‪ ‖ CL :‬דומים[ דומה‪ ‖ C :‬לאלה[ הנה‪| D :‬‬ ‫לאלו‪ ‖ BMT :‬יסודות[ חמרים‪ | C :‬היסודות‪ 16 D :‬לאלו[ ‪ +‬היו‪ | T :‬אין‪ ‖ L :‬ראויים[ ראוי‪‖ CL :‬‬ ‫שיתוארו‪ [AMT :‬כשיתוארו‪ 17–16 CDBL :‬הדברים…המורכבים[ ‪ 16 T0‬הדברים הפשוטים‬ ‫מן[ לית‪ 17 M :‬ויתחייב[ וראוי‪ ‖ C :‬ויתחייב…למורכבים[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬ממנו[ מזה‪ ‖ CL :‬הפשוטים[‬ ‫פשוטים‪ ‖ T0 | (C1⇄) C :‬יסודות[ חמרים‪ ‖ CAM :‬למורכבים[ למורכבות‪ 18 T :‬באלה‪ [DT :‬בזה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | CAMT‬באלו‪ ‖ B :‬הם[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬יסודות[ חמרים‪ ‖ C :‬יסודות לפשוטים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬זה גם כן[ לית‪C :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ ‖ (C1‬גם כן[ וגם כן‪ | D :‬ג״כ‪ 19 B :‬היה[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬הנמצא והאחד[ האחד והנמצא‪ ‖ B :‬התחלה[‬ ‫התחלת‪ ‖ (C1⇄) CA :‬והיו[ יהיו‪ ‖ AM :‬ההתחלות[ התחלות‪D :‬‬

‫‪1070b7–8‬‬

Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition

199

‫‪200‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬

‫יתהוו מהם כמו שהנקודה זולת הקו והאחד זולת המספר והחדוש זולת הענינים‬ ‫המחודשים הנה אין הנמצא והאחד הוא עצמות העצם ולא עצמות הכמות ולא עצמות‬ ‫האיכות ולא הנמצא האחד שני נמצאים ועל זה הדמיון אי אפשר שיהיו יסודות כל‬

‫‪1070b9–10‬‬

‫הדברים יסודות אחדים בעינם‬ ‫ואולם על דרך היחס הנה ראוי בנו אם אנחנו המשכנו מה שכבר הצענו שנבאר כי‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫התחלות כל הדברים הנמצאים שלשה הצורה והיסוד וההעדר דמיון זה בעצם‬

‫–‪1070b11‬‬ ‫)‪13(b18–19‬‬

‫המוחש כי החום כנגד הצורה והקור כנגד ההעדר והיסוד הוא הדבר אשר לו אלו השנים‬ ‫בכח ובשער האיכות יהיה הלובן מן המראה כנגד הצורה והשחרות כנגד ההעדר‬

‫‪1070b20–21‬‬

‫והדבר הנושא אותם הוא השטח בהקש היסוד ויהיה האור כנגד הצורה והחשך כנגד‬ ‫ההעדר והגשם המקבל לאור הוא הנושא לשניהם‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫והנה אי אפשר במוחלט שנמצא יסודות הם בעינם יסודות לכל הדברים ואולם על‬

‫‪1070b16–19‬‬

‫דרך היחס וההקש הנה ראוי בהם שימצאו ואין בקשתנו עתה ליסוד הדברים‬

‫‪1070b22–25‬‬

‫הנמצאים אבל כונתנו אמנם היא לבקשת ההתחלה להם ושניהם סבה להם אבל כי‬ ‫‪ 20‬שהנקודה[ שהנקדה‪ ‖ DM :‬הקו[ קו‪ ‖ B :‬הענינים[ הדברים‪ | D :‬העניינים‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ | A‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬ולא עצמות הכמות[ לית‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 21‬הוא[ זולת‪:‬‬

‫‪ 22‬האיכות[ ‪ +‬ושאר המאמרות‪ ‖ C1 :‬ולא[ הנה אין‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ T‬האחד[ והאחד‪ ‖ T :‬שני[ ב׳‪ | L :‬לית‪ ‖ T :‬נמצאים‪ [DBT :‬הנמצאים‪ ‖ CAML :‬ועל[ על‪‖ M :‬‬ ‫יסודות[ חמרי‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 23‬יסודות[ חמרים‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 24‬על[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬בנו[ לנו‪ ‖ C :‬אנחנו[ אנו‪‖ D :‬‬

‫המשכנו[ המשלנו‪ | A :‬השלמנו‪ ‖ M :‬שכבר[ ‪ +‬המשכנו מה שכבר‪ | B :‬לית‪ :‬ع ‖ הצענו[ הצעדו)!(‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C‬שנבאר[ שנתבאר‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 25‬התחלות[ ההתחלות‪ ‖ MT :‬הדברים[ דברים‪ ‖ D :‬הנמצאים[ לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ C‬הצורה והיסוד[ היסוד והצורה‪B :‬ع ‖ הצורה[ צורות‪ ‖ M :‬והיסוד[ והחומר‪ ‖ CL :‬וההעדר[‬ ‫והעדר‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 26‬המוחש[ המוחשים‪ ‖ CAL :‬כי[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬החום[ החם‪ ‖ T :‬כנגד)‪ [(1‬דומה‪‖ T :‬‬

‫והקור[ ‪ ‖ T0‬כנגד)‪ [(2‬דומה‪ ‖ T :‬ההעדר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬והיסוד‪ [AMBT :‬והחומר‪ ‖ CDL :‬הדבר[ לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ 27‬בכח‬ ‫ع ‖ לו[ בו‪ | AM :‬לית‪ ‖ D :‬אלו השנים[ שני אלו‪ | C :‬לאלו השנים‪ | D :‬שני אלה‪L :‬‬ ‫ובשער[ ‪ ‖ T0‬יהיה[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬מן המראה[ לית‪ :‬ع | ‪ +‬יהיה‪ ‖ A :‬כנגד ההעדר[ ‪ 28 T0‬הנושא‬ ‫אותם[ המונח להם‪ ‖ CL :‬הוא[ והוא‪ ‖ C1 :‬השטח[ הקו‪ ‖ B :‬היסוד‪ [DAT :‬החומר‪ | CL :‬לית‪| B :‬‬ ‫היסודי‪ ‖ M :‬האור…הצורה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬והחשך[ והחושך‪ 29 B :‬לאור[ אותם‪ ‖ AM :‬הנושא לשניהם‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 30‬והנה אי[ ‪ ‖ T0‬שנמצא[‬ ‫‪ [D‬הנושא להם‪ | AM :‬המונח להם‪ | B :‬המונח לשניהם‪T0 | CL :‬‬ ‫שתמצא‪A :‬ع )أن تجد( ‖ יסודות)‪ [(1‬חמרים‪ ‖ C :‬יסודות)‪…(2‬הדברים‪ ‖ T0 :‬יסודות)‪ [(2‬חמרים‪C :‬‬ ‫‪ 31‬בהם[ ‪ ‖ T0‬בקשתנו[ בקשתינו‪ ‖ CL :‬עתה[ ‪ +‬طلب‪ :‬ع ‖ ליסוד[ לחומר‪ | C :‬שיסוד‪ | B :‬عنصر‪ :‬ع‬ ‫‪ 32‬אבל…היא[ ‪ ‖ T0‬כונתנו[ כונתינו‪ ‖ DB :‬היא[ הוא‪ ‖ AL :‬לבקשת‪ [CDT :‬לבקש‪ | AB :‬לבקשה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | M‬طلب‪ :‬ع ‖ ההתחלה[ התחלה‪ ‖ M :‬להם[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬ושניהם[ שניהם‪ 1–32 B :‬אבל…אפשר[‬ ‫‪T0‬‬

‫‪201‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪L‬‬ ‫‪t243,3‬ט وأما على طر يق المناسبة فأخلق بنا إن نحن اتبعنا ما وصفنا أن | نبين أن‬

‫‪24‬‬

‫‪ t243,5‬مبادئ جميع الأشياء الموجودة ثلاثة العنصر والصورة والعدم | مثال ذلك فى الجوهر‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫المحسوس أن الحر نظير الصورة والبرد نظير | العدم والعنصر هو الذى له هذان‬ ‫بالقوة وفى باب الـكيف يكون | البياض نظير الصورة والسواد نظير العدم‬ ‫والشىء الموضوع لهما هو | السطح فى قياس العنصر و يكون الضوء نظير الصورة والظلمة | نظير‬ ‫العدم والجسم القابل للضوء هو الموضوع لهما‬ ‫‪ t243,10‬فليس يمكن على | الإطلاق أن تجد عناصر هى بأعيانها عناصر لجميع الأشياء وأما على |‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫طر يق المناسبة والمقايسة فأخلق بها أن توجد | وليس طلبنا الآن طلب عنصر الأشياء‬ ‫الموجودة لـكن قصدنا | إنما هو طلب مبدئها وكلاهما سبب لها إلا أن‬

‫‪ 25‬العنصر والصورة[ הצורה והיסוד )*الصورة والعنصر(‬

‫‪ 24‬اتبعنا[ ‪ +‬שכבר )*قد(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫הדבר )*الشىء(‪ :‬ע ‪ 27‬البياض[ ‪ +‬מן המראה )*من اللون(‪ :‬ע ‪ 30‬تجد[ נמצא )*نجد(‪ :‬ע ‪ 31‬طلب[‬ ‫לית‪ :‬ע ‖ عنصر[ ליסוד )*لعنصر(‪ :‬ע ‪ 32‬طلب[ לבקשת )*لطلب(‪ :‬ע ‖ إلا أن‪t :‬ע[ لأن‪ta :‬‬ ‫‪ 26‬هو[ ‪+‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫‪202‬‬

‫ההתחלה הנה אפשר שתמצא חוץ מן הדבר כמו הסבה המניעה ואולם היסודות הנה אי‬

‫‪L‬י‬

‫אפשר שיהיו כי אם בדברים אשר הם מהם ומה שהיה יסוד אינו נמנע‬ ‫שיקרא התחלה‬ ‫ומה שהיה התחלה הנה אינו יסוד בלא ספק וזה כי ההתחלה המניעה הנה אפשר‬ ‫שתהיה חוץ מן המתנועע אבל המניע הקרוב בדברים הטבעיים הוא דומה‬

‫‪1070b28–32‬‬

‫בצורה וזה‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫כי האדם אמנם יולידהו אדם ואולם בדברים המלאכותיים המחשביים הנה הוא הצורה‬ ‫או ההעדר דמיון זה הרפואה או הסכלות בה והבנין או הסכלות בו ובהרבה מן הדברים‬ ‫תהיה הסבה המניעה היא הצורה מזה כי הרפואה מפנים מה היא הבריאות כי היא‬ ‫המניעה וצורת הבית מפנים מה היא הבנין והאדם אמנם יולידהו אדם ואין כונתנו‬ ‫לבקשת המניע הקרוב אבל כונתנו לבקשת המניע הראשון אשר ממנו יתנועעו‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫כל הדברים‬

‫‪ 1‬שתמצא‪ [C1 :‬שימצא‪ ‖ CDABMTL :‬מן הדבר‪ | ABT :‬מהדבר‪ | CDL :‬הדבר‪ ‖ M :‬המניעה…אי[‬ ‫‪ ‖ T0‬היסודות[ החמרים‪ ‖ C :‬אי[ לית‪(C1⇄) CM :‬‬

‫‪ 2‬אשר הם[ שהם‪ ‖ AM :‬מהם…אינו[ ‪‖ T0‬‬

‫שהיה‪ [DB :‬שיהיה‪ | CL :‬שהוא‪ ‖ AM :‬יסוד[ חומר‪ ‖ C :‬נמנע[ ימנע ‪ +‬מונע‪ | T :‬مانع يمنع‪ :‬ع ‖ שיקרא[‬

‫שיאמר בו‪ 3 T :‬ומה…יסוד[ ‪ ‖ T0‬שהיה‪ [ABM :‬שהוא‪ | CL :‬שיהיה‪ ‖ D :‬הנה[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬הנה‬ ‫אינו[ فليس له‪ :‬ع ‖ יסוד[ חומר‪ 4–3 C :‬אפשר…מן[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫المحرك‪ ‖ t :‬בדברים…בצורה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬בדברים[ לדברים‪ ‖ B :‬הטבעיים[ הטבעים‪ 5 B :‬אדם[ האדם‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ BD‬ואולם…המלאכותיים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬בדברים[ הדברים‪ ‖ B :‬המחשביים[ המחשבים‪‖ (C1⇄) CD :‬‬ ‫הנה הוא[ לית‪ 6 CB :‬ההעדר…הסכלות[ ‪ ‖ T0‬או הסכלות)‪ [(1‬والجهل‪ :‬ع ‖ והבנין או הסכלות[‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ B :‬או הסכלות )‪ [(2‬والجهل‪ :‬ع ‖ ובהרבה[ והרבה‪ 7–6 C :‬מן… המניעה[ ‪ 7 T0‬המניעה[‬ ‫המניע‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הצורה[ ‪ +‬ויראה‪ + | (R1⇄) BR :‬דמיון‪ ‖ C1 :‬מזה[ זה‪ ‖ C :‬הרפואה[ ‪ +‬היא‪‖ C1L :‬‬ ‫‪ 8–7‬הבריאות…מה[ לית‪C :‬‬ ‫‪ 7‬היא)‪ [(2‬לית‪CL :‬‬ ‫‪ 8–7‬מה…המניעה[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫מפנים[ לית‪A :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ 7 (C1‬כי[ כן‪ 8 D :‬המניעה[ המניע‪ ‖ D :‬הבית[ ‪ +‬היא‪ ‖ C1L :‬היא‪ [DA :‬לית‪ | CL :‬הוא‪‖ BMT :‬‬ ‫והאדם…כונתנו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬והאדם[ ואדם‪ ‖ CL :‬כונתנו[ כונתה‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬כונתינו‪ 9 DB :‬לבקשת)‪[(1‬‬ ‫לבקש‪ ‖ M :‬המניע[ ‪ +‬וצורת הבית מפנים מה היא הבנין והאדם אמנם יולידהו אדם ואין כונתינו‬ ‫לבקשת המניע‪ ‖ D :‬הקרוב…המניע[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬כונתנו[ כונתינו‪ 10–9 B :‬לבקשת)‪…(2‬הדברים[‬ ‫‪ 9 T0‬לבקשת)‪ [(2‬לבקש‪ | AM :‬לית‪ :‬ع ‖ המניע[ מניע‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬للمحرك‪ :‬ع ‖ אשר[ לית‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫יתנועעו[ יתנועע‪C :‬‬ ‫‪ 4‬מן[ ‪ +‬המניע‪ | D :‬לית‪ ‖ C :‬המתנועע[‬

‫‪1070b33–35‬‬

‫‪203‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪L‬‬ ‫‪t243,14‬י المبدأ قد يجوز أن | يوجد خارجا ًعن الشىء مثل السبب المحرك وأما العناصر فلا‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫يجوز أن | تكون إلا فى الأشياء التى هى منها وما كان عنصرا ً فليس مانع يمنع | من‬ ‫أن يقال له مبدأ‬ ‫وما كان مبدءا ً فليس له عنصر لا محالة | وذلك أن المبدأ المحرك قد يجوز‬ ‫أن يكون خارجا ًعن المتحرك | ولـكن المحرك القر يب من الأشياء الطبيعية هو مثل‬ ‫الصورة وذلك‬ ‫‪ t244‬أن | الإنسان إنما يلده إنسان وأما فى الأشياء الوهمية فالصورة‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫أو العدم | مثال ذلك الطب والجهل به والبناء والجهل به وفى كثير من الأمور |‬ ‫يكون السبب المحرك هو الصورة من ذلك أن الطب من وجه ما هو | الصحة لأنها‬ ‫المحركة وصورة البيت من وجه ما هى البناء والإنسان | إنما يلده إنسان | وليس قصدنا‬ ‫لطلب المحرك القر يب لـكن قصدنا للمحرك الأول | الذى منه يتحرك‬ ‫‪ t244,7‬جميع الأشياء‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪* 4‬المتحرك )המתנועע(‪ :‬ע[ المحرك‪‖ t :‬‬

‫‪ 2‬مانع[ לית‪ 3 ta :‬فليس له[ הנה אינו )*فليس هو(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫‪ 7‬والبناء والجهل به[ לית‪ta :‬‬ ‫‪ 6‬والجهل )‪ [(1+2‬או הסכלות )*أو الجهل(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫ولـكن[ لأن‪ta :‬‬ ‫‪ 8‬إنسان‪ta :‬ע[ الإنسان‪ ‖ t :‬قصدنا[ ‪ +‬לבקשת )*لطلب(‪ :‬ע ‖ للمحرك[ המניע )*المحرك(‬

‫‪204‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪11‬‬

‫‪L‬י‬ ‫‪Λ.5.1070‬‬ ‫‪b36–1071a3‬‬

‫והענין בו מבואר שהוא עצם וזה שהוא התחלת העצם ואי אפשר שיהיה התחלת‬ ‫העצם כי אם עצם והוא התחלת העצם והתחלת כל הדברים הנמצאים ולא‬ ‫תהיה העצלה מן הבאור בזה במה שקדם יושר באשר שאר הדברים אמנם הם חדושים‬ ‫וענינים לעצם ותנועות לו והנה ראוי שנחקור מזה העצם אשר יניע זה^ הגשם כלו מה‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫הוא ואם ראוי שנניח שהוא נפש או שהוא שכל או שהוא זולת שניהם אחר שנשמר‬ ‫ונזהר שנשפוט על ההתחלה הראשונה בדבר מן המקרים אשר יתחייבו לאחרים מן‬ ‫הדברים הנמצאים אבל הנה ימצא באחרים מן הדברים הנמצאים מה שהוא בכח‬

‫‪1071a5–7‬‬

‫ושיהיה הדבר בעתים המתחלפים על ענינים מתחלפים ושלא יהיה מתמיד על ענין‬ ‫אחד והדברים אשר יקבלו ההויה וההפסד הם אשר ימצאו בזה הענין כי אתה תמצא‬ ‫‪20‬‬

‫בהם הדבר בעינו פעם בכח ופעם בפעל דמיון זה כי היין פעם ימצא בפועל אחר‬ ‫שירתיח וינוח ופעם יהיה נמצא בכח בעת אחרת כאשר תהיה הלחות אשר יתילד ממנו‬ ‫אמנם הוא בנפש הכרם והבשר פעמים יהיה בפועל ופעמים יהיה בכח ביסודות אשר‬ ‫מהם יתילד וכאשר אמרנו בכח ובפעל הנה לא נרצה דבר זולת הצורה והיסוד ונרצה‬

‫‪ 12–11‬והענין…והתחלת[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫לית‪D :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬העצם[ עצם‪A :‬‬

‫‪ 13–12‬הנמצאים…יושר[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 12–11‬ואי…העצם)‪ [(2‬לית‪(C1⇄) CD :‬‬

‫‪ 12‬הנמצאים[ הנפרדים‪A :‬‬

‫‪ 12‬אם[‬

‫‪ 13‬הבאור[ הביאור‪ ‖ A :‬בזה‪:‬‬

‫‪ [CDB‬הזה‪ | AM :‬כזה‪ ‖ L :‬במה[ לית‪ ‖ AM :‬יושר‪ [AM :‬ישר‪ | CL :‬יותר‪ ‖ DB :‬באשר[ כאשר‪:‬‬

‫‪ | ML‬فإن‪ :‬ع‬

‫‪ 14–13‬אמנם…לעצם[ ‪T0‬‬

‫הגשם[ העצם‪ :C1) C :‬סא הגשם(‬

‫‪ 14‬ותנועות[ ותנועה‪ ‖ C :‬מזה…זה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬זה[ לית‪M :‬ع ‖‬

‫‪ 15‬הוא[ שהוא‪ ‖ M :‬שהוא)‪ + [(1‬גשם או‪ ‖ C1 :‬או)‪…(1‬שהוא[‬

‫‪ ‖ T0‬או שהוא שכל[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬אחר[ או‪ ‖ CD :‬שנשמר‪ [DTL :‬נשמר‪ | C :‬שנשמור‪ | AM :‬נשמור‪:‬‬ ‫‪B‬‬

‫‪ 16‬ונזהר[ ונרחיק‪ ‖ CD :‬שנשפוט[ שלא נשפוט‪ ‖ T :‬על[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬יתחייבו‪ [CDBL :‬יתחייב‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ AMT‬לאחרים[ לאחדים‪ 17 T :‬אבל…הנמצאים[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬הנמצאים)‪ + [(1‬והנה ימצא באחרים‬ ‫‪ 18‬בעתים[ בעיתים‪‖ D :‬‬ ‫מן הדברים הנמצאים‪ ‖ AM :‬באחרים[ באחדים‪ ‖ T :‬בכח[ לית‪A :‬‬ ‫המתחלפים‪ [CDB :‬מתחלפים‪ ‖ AMTL :‬מתחלפים[ המתחלפים‪ ‖ CL :‬ענין[ עניין‪ 19 B :‬הענין[‬ ‫העניין‪ 20 B :‬בהם הדבר[ الشىء فيها‪ :‬ع ‖ הדבר[ ‪ +‬האחד‪ ‖ C1 :‬בפעל[ בפועל‪ | ABM :‬בכח)!(‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ D‬פעם‪ [DAT :‬הנה‪ | CR1L :‬לית‪ | M :‬בעת‪ ‖ R :‬ימצא[ ‪ +‬פעם‪ | M :‬נמצא‪ ‖ B :‬בפועל[ בפעל‪T :‬‬ ‫‪ 21‬שירתיח[ שירתיע‪ ‖ C :‬וינוח[ וינוע‪ ‖ CL :‬ופעם[ והנה‪ ‖ CL :‬אחרת[ אחר‪ ‖ C :‬תהיה[ יהיה‪| AB :‬‬ ‫היה‪ ‖ M :‬יתילד[ תתילד‪ ‖ D :‬ממנה‪ [CL :‬ממנו‪ 22 DABMT :‬הוא[ ‪ +‬עדין‪ ‖ BT :‬יהיה[ ‪ +‬פעם‪D :‬‬ ‫‪ 23–22‬בפועל…יתילד[ בכח ביסודות אשר מהם יתילד ופעם יהיה בפועל‪ | AM :‬בכח ופעמים בפועל‬ ‫והיותה בכח ביסודות אשר מהם יתילד‪ 22 B :‬בפועל[ בפעל‪ ‖ T :‬ביסודות[ בחמרים‪ | C :‬כיסודות‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 23 D‬מהם[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬ובפעל[ ובפועל‪ ‖ DABM :‬הנה[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬והיסוד[ והחומר‪CDL :‬‬

‫‪1071a7–11‬‬

‫‪205‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪L‬‬ ‫‪t244,7‬י فالأمر فيه بين أنه جوهر وذلك أنه مبدأ | الجوهر ولا يجوز أن يكون مبدأ‬

‫‪11‬‬

‫الجوهر إلا جوهرا ً وهو مبدأ | الجوهر ومبدأ جميع الأشياء الموجودة ولم‬ ‫يكن التهيب من التصريح | بهذا فيما تقدم صوابا ًفإن سا ئر الأشياء إنما هى أحداث‬ ‫وحالات | للجوهر وحركات له و ينبغى أن نبحث عن هذا الجوهر الذى يحرك | الجسم كله ما‬ ‫‪ t244,13‬هو هل يجب أن نضع أنه نفس أو أنه عقل أو أنه | غيرهما بعد أن نحذر‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫ونتوقى أن نحكم على المبدأ الأول بشىء من | الأعراض التى تلزم الأواخر من‬ ‫الأشياء الموجودة ولـكنه قد يوجد فى | أواخر الأشياء الموجودة ما هو بالقوة‬ ‫وأن يكون الشىء فى الأوقات | المختلفة على حالات مختلفة وأن لا يكون دائما ًعلى حال‬ ‫واحدة | والأشياء التى تقبل الـكون والفساد هى التى توجد بهذه الحال فإنك | تجد‬ ‫‪ t245‬الشىء فيها بعينه مرة بالقوة ومرة بالفعل | مثال ذلك أن الخمر قد توجد بالفعل بعد‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫أن تغلى وتسكر وقد تكون | موجودة بالقوة فى وقت آخر إذ كانت الرطو بة التى فيها ٺتولد‬ ‫إنما هى | فى نفس الـكرم واللحم ور بما كان بالفعل ور بما كان بالقوة فى العناصر | التى‬ ‫عنها يتولد وإذا قلنا بالقوة أو بالفعل فليس نعنى شيئا ًغير الصورة | والعنصر ونعنى‬

‫‪ 11‬الجوهر‪ta :‬ע[ الجواهر‪t :‬‬

‫‪ 12‬الجوهر)‪ :(1‬ע )העצם([ الجواهر‪ ‖ t :‬الجوهر)‪ta :(2‬ע[ الجواهر‪t :‬‬

‫‪ 13‬فإن[‬

‫באשר )*فى أن(‪ :‬ע ‪ 14‬يحرك[ ‪* +‬هذا )זה(‪ :‬ע ‪ 20‬الشىء فيها[ *فيها الشىء )בהם הדבר( ‖ *قد‬ ‫)פעם(‪ :‬ע[ לית‪ ‖ t :‬بالفعل)‪ [(2‬بالعقل‪ 21 ta :‬إذ[ إذا‪ ‖ ta :‬فيها ٺتولد[ יתילד ממנה )*عنها ٺتولد(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬

‫‪206‬‬

‫‪24‬‬

‫בצורה הצורה אשר אפשר שתהיה נפרדת או המורכב מן הצורה והיסוד ואולם הנפרד‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫כמו האור והחשך אם היה אפשר בהם שיפרדו מן האויר ואולם המורכב מהם‬ ‫כמו הגוף הבריא והגוף החולה ורצוני ביסוד הדבר אשר אפשר בו שישא‬ ‫שני הענינים‬ ‫כמו הגוף כי הוא פעמים יהיה בריא ופעמים יהיה חולה וזה הדבר אשר הוא בפועל ואשר‬

‫‪1071a11–14‬‬

‫בכח פעמים יתחלף לא ביסודות הנמצאים בדברים המורכבים מהם ר״ל בצורה והיסוד‬ ‫לבד אבל בדברים גם כן היוצאים מן הדבר המניעים אותו אשר אולי לא יהיה יסודם‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫יסוד הדברים אשר יהיו ממנו ולא צורתם צורתם אבל זולתם וראוי שיהיה זה הדבר‬ ‫עומד במחשבתך כאשר תכון לחקור מהסבה הראשונה כי קצת הסבות‬ ‫המניעות נאותות‬ ‫בצורה לדבר המתנועע קרובות ממנו והיותר רחוקה^ רחוקה ממנו ואולם‬ ‫הסבה הקרובה‬

‫‪ 24‬אשר[ ‪ +‬אי‪ ‖ C1 :‬אפשר[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬שתהיה[ תהיה‪ ‖ M :‬נפרדת[ נפרד‪ ‖ B :‬או[ من‪ :‬ع ‖‬

‫או המורכב[ לית‪ :C1) C :‬סא המורכב ‪ | (in marg.‬או מהמורכב‪ ‖ D :‬מן הצורה והיסוד[ מן הצורה‬ ‫והחומר‪ | CL :‬מהחומר והצורה‪ ‖ D :‬הנפרד[ הנפרדת ‪ +‬הוא‪ | CL :‬לית‪ + | D :‬הוא‪ 25 B :‬כמו[‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬והחשך[ והחושך‪ ‖ DAB :‬היה[ יהיה‪ | A :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬האויר[ האור‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬מהם[ ‪+‬‬ ‫הוא‪ 26 B :‬כמו[ בדמיון‪ ‖ CL :‬הגוף[ גוף‪ ‖ D :‬והגוף‪ [CTL :‬וגוף‪ | D :‬או הגוף‪ ‖ ABM :‬ורצוני[ ורוצ׳‬ ‫לומ׳‪ ‖ B :‬ביסוד[ בחומר‪ ‖ CDL :‬הענינים[ ענינים‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬העניינים‪ + | B :‬كلتيهما‪ :‬ع ‪ 27‬כמו‬ ‫הגוף[ הגוף כמו‪ ‖ B :‬כי הוא[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬פעמים[ ‪ +‬יתחלף כי הוא פעמים‪ | C :‬לית‪ ‖ T :‬יהיה)‪ [(1‬לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ D‬יהיה)‪ [(2‬לית‪ ‖ CL :‬הוא[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬בפועל[ בכח‪ ‖ T :‬ואשר[ ‪ +‬הוא‪ 28 DM :‬בכח[ בפעל‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ T‬פעמים[ ופעמים‪ | M :‬כבר‪ ‖ T :‬ביסודות[ בחמרים‪ | C :‬סא בדברים‪ ‖ C1 :‬בצורה והיסוד‪[DBT :‬‬ ‫בצורה והחומר‪ | CL :‬ביסוד וצורה‪ 29 AM :‬לבד[ לית‪ :‬ع ‖ גם כן[ לית‪B :‬ع ‖ היוצאים[ הנמצאים‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬הדבר…אותו[ الأشياء المركبة ‪ +‬أيضا‪ ً :‬ع ‖ הדבר[ הדברים‪ ‖ DB :‬המניעים[ המניע‪ ‖ AM :‬אותו[‬ ‫לית‪ | D :‬אותם‪ ‖ AM :‬אולי[ לית‪ :‬ع ‖ לא[ לית‪ 30–29 B :‬יסודם יסוד‪ [B :‬חומרים)!( חומר‪| C :‬‬ ‫חומרם יסוד‪ | D :‬יסודות יסוד‪ | T0 | AM :‬חומרם חומר‪ 30 L :‬יהיו[ היו‪ ‖ M :‬צורתם)‪ [(1‬צורתו‪| C :‬‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ DB :‬צורתם)‪ [(2‬צורותם‪ ‖ T :‬זולתם וראוי[ ‪ ‖ T0‬זולתם[ זולתה‪ 31 C :‬תכון[ תנזק)?(‪:C1) C :‬‬ ‫נכון( | תכוין‪ ‖ DA :‬לחקור‪ [DAMT :‬החקירה‪ ‖ CBL :‬מהסבה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬כי[ לית‪ ‖ AM :‬נאותות‪[CAL :‬‬ ‫נאותה‪ | DBT :‬הנאותות‪ 32 M :‬בצורה[ לצורה‪ | M :‬לית‪ ‖ C :‬המתנועע[ ‪ ‖ T0‬קרובות‪ [CL :‬קרובה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ DABMT‬ממנו[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬והיותר רחוקה‪ [BT :‬ואחריהם‪ | CAML :‬והיותר רחוק‪ | D :‬بعضها‪:‬‬ ‫ع ‖ רחוקה ממנו‪ [DT :‬יותר רחוק )‪ :C1‬רחוקים( ממנו‪ | C :‬יותר רחוקה‪ | A :‬ממנו‪ | B :‬יותר רחוקה‬ ‫ממנו‪ | M :‬יותר רחוקות ממנו‪ ‖ L :‬ואולם[ אולם‪ 1–32 B :‬הקרובה…כמו[ ‪ 32 T0‬הקרובה[ ‪+‬‬ ‫ממנו‪AM :‬‬

‫‪1071a14–17‬‬

‫‪207‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ t245,6‬بالصورة الصورة التى يمكن أن تنفرد من المركب من | الصورة والعنصر فأما المنفرد‬

‫‪24‬‬

‫‪ t245,7‬فمثل الضوء والظلمة إذ كان يمكن فيها أن | تنفرد عن الهواء والمركب منهما‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫فمثل البدن الصحيح والبدن | السقيم وأعنى بالعنصر الشىء الذى يمكن فيه أن يحتمل‬ ‫الحالتين | كلتيهما‬ ‫مثل البدن فر بما كان صحيحا ًور بما كان سقيما ً| فهذا الشىء الذى بالفعل والذى‬ ‫بالقوة قد يختلف لا فى العناصر | الموجودة فى الأشياء المركبة منهما أعنى فى الصورة والعنصر‬ ‫لـكن | فى الأشياء الخارجة عن الأشياء المركبة أيضا ًالتى لم يكن عنصرها |‬ ‫‪ t245,14‬عنصر الأشياء التى تكون عنها ولا صورتها صورتها لـكن غيرها | فينبغى أن يكون هذا الأمر‬ ‫قائما ًفى وهمك إذا قصدت البحث عن | السبب الأول أن بعض العلل‬ ‫المحركة موافقة‬ ‫فى الصورة للشىء | المتحرك قر يبة منه و بعضها أبعد منه أما العلة القر يبة‬

‫‪ 25‬تنفرد[ تقرر‪ta :‬‬

‫‪ 26‬من[ או )*أو(‪ :‬ע ‖ والبدن السقيم[ والسقيم‪ ‖ ta :‬كلتيهما[ לית‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪ 28‬منهما[‬

‫منها‪ ‖ ta :‬فى‪ta :‬ע[ من‪ ‖ t :‬والعنصر[ ‪ +‬לבד )*فقط(‪ :‬ע ‪ 29‬الأشياء[ ‪ +‬גם כן )*أيضا ً(‪ :‬ע ‖ الأشياء‬ ‫‪ 32‬المتحرك[‬ ‫المركبة أيضا ً[ הדבר המניעים אותו‪ :‬ע )*الشىء المحركة له( ‖ التى[ ‪ +‬אולי )*ر بما(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫المحرك‪ ‖ ta :‬و بعضها[ *و بعدها )ואחריהם‪/‬והיותר רחוקה^(‪ :‬ע ‖ القر يبة[ לית‪ta :‬‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫‪208‬‬

‫היא כמו האב ואולם השמש הוא סבה יותר רחוקה ויותר רחוק מן השמש הגלגל‬

‫‪ L‬יא‬

‫הנוטה ואלו הדברים אינם סבות על דרך יסוד לדבר המתחדש ולא על דרך צורה‬ ‫ולא על דרך העדר אבל אמנם הם מניעים לא שהם נאותים בצורה קרובים‬ ‫כמו האב‬ ‫אבל הם יותר רחוקים ויותר חזקים בפועל כי הם היו התחלות הסבות הקרובות גם כן‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫ובחקירה מהסבה הראשונה יהיה עומד במחשבתך גם כן כי קצת ההתחלות כלליות‬

‫‪1071a17–22‬‬

‫וקצתם נפרדות פרטיות ושההתחלות באמת אינם הכלליות אבל הנפרדות הפרטיות‬ ‫כמו שזה התחלה לזה ושאדם מן האנשים הוא הסבה לאדם מן האנשים לא הכללי‬ ‫כי היה בלתי נמצא אבל זה אבי זה והמים האלה דרך משל סבה למים האלה‬ ‫ואולם הכללי אם הושם סבה אמנם יהיה סבה לכללי כמו העצם לעצם והכמה לכמה‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫‪1071a27–29‬‬

‫ואולם ההתחלות אשר הם באמת התחלות הנה ראוי שנבקשם בדברים הנפרדים כי‬ ‫היסוד אינו על דרך מוחלט יסוד האדם אבל יסודך יסודך ויסודי יסודי כמו שצורתך‬ ‫צורתך וצורתי צורתי לא הצורה הכללית אבל הנפרדת וכן אשר יניע וכבר בארנו‬ ‫‪ 1‬היא[ ‪ | DT‬הוא‪ | CAL :‬לית‪ | B :‬והוא‪ ‖ M :‬סבה[ הסבה‪ ‖ M :‬יותר[ היותר‪ ‖ M :‬רחוק[ רחוקה‪D :‬‬ ‫‪ 2‬הנוטה[ היוצא‪ ‖ D :‬הדברים[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬דרך[ צורך‪ ‖ C :‬יסוד‪ [B :‬החומר‪ | CL :‬חומר‪ | D :‬היסוד‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ AM‬לדבר…ולא[ ‪ ‖ T0‬צורה[ הצורה‪D :‬‬

‫‪ 3‬ולא[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬על[ ועל‪ ‖ B :‬העדר[ ההעדר‪‖ CDM :‬‬

‫אמנם[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬אמנם הם[ הם אמנם‪ ‖ T :‬מניעים…שהם[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מניעים[ ‪ +‬ולא הם מניעים‪ + | B :‬وهى‬ ‫محركة‪ :‬ع ‖ נאותים[ נאותיים‪ ‖ B :‬בצורה[ לצורה‪ ‖ M :‬קרובים[ קרובה‪ 4 CB :‬רחוקים…בפועל[‬ ‫‪ ‖ T0‬רחוקים[ רחוק‪ :C1) C :‬רחוקות( ‖ ויותר[ ‪ +‬חזק‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬חזקים[ חזקות‪ ‖ C :‬כי הם[ אחר‬ ‫שהם‪ ‖ T :‬הקרובות[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ 5 B :‬ובחקירה מהסבה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬עומד[ העומד‪ ‖ M :‬גם‬ ‫כן[ ג״כ‪ 6–5 B :‬כי…וקצתם[ ‪ 5 T0‬כי[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬קצת[ ‪ +‬כי קצת‪ ‖ A :‬ההתחלות[ התחלות‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 6 (C1⇄) CDB‬נפרדות[ נבדלות‪ | A :‬לית‪ ‖ M :‬ושההתחלות[ ושהתחלות‪ ‖ D :‬אינם…הנפרדות[‬ ‫‪ ‖ T0‬הנפרדות[ נפרדות‪ 7 A :‬התחלה[ ההתחלה‪ ‖ M :‬ושאדם[ שאדם‪ ‖ M :‬מן)‪…(1‬מן)‪‖ T0 [(2‬‬ ‫האנשים[ אנשים‪ ‖ D :‬הסבה[ סבה‪ ‖ D :‬הכללי[ הכלל‪ 8 AM :‬היה[ ‪ +‬הכללי‪ | CL :‬הוא‪‖ M :‬‬ ‫אבל…דרך[ ‪ ‖ T0‬אבי[ אם‪ ‖ B :‬זה)‪ + [(2‬וזה‪* ‖ D :‬והמים האלה[ ואלו המים‪ | CBL :‬המים האלו‪| D :‬‬ ‫והמים אלו ‪ +‬על‪ ‖ AM :‬למים האלה‪ [DAMT :‬לאלו המים‪ 9 CBL :‬ואולם…לכמה[ לית‪‖ (C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫ואולם[ ואולי‪ ‖ T :‬הכללי…יהיה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הושם[ הוא‪ ‖ D :‬יהיה[ הוא‪ ‖ C1 :‬סבה)‪ [(2‬לית‪ ‖ C1 :‬כמו[‬ ‫כי‪ ‖ C1 :‬העצם[ ‪ +‬סבה‪ 10–9 C1L :‬לכמה…אשר[ ‪ 10 T0‬ההתחלות[ התחלות‪ ‖ D :‬באמת[‬ ‫אמת‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬התחלות[ ההתחלות‪ ‖ D :‬שנבקשם[ שנקשם‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬בדברים הנפרדים[‬ ‫‪ 11 T0‬היסוד אינו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬היסוד[ החומר‪ ‖ CL :‬אינו[ לית‪ ‖ AM :‬על[ לית‪ ‖ L :‬יסוד[ חומר‪‖ CL :‬‬ ‫יסודך)‪…(1‬כמו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬יסודך)‪…(1‬יסודי[ חמרך חמרך וחמרי חמרי‪ 12 CL :‬וצורתי[ ויצורתי)!(‪‖ M :‬‬ ‫לא…וכן[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הכללית[ כללית‪ ‖ M :‬בארנו[ ביארנו‪B :‬‬

‫‪1071a29–b1‬‬

‫‪209‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ L‬יא‬ ‫‪ t246‬فمثل الأب | وأما الشمس فهى علة أبعد وأبعد من الشمس الفلك‬

‫المائل وهذه | الأشياء ليست عللا ًعلى طر يق عنصر الشىء الحادث أو على طر يق | صورة‬ ‫ولا على طر يق عدم لـكنها إنما هى محركة وهى محركة لا | على أنها موافقة فى الصورة قر يبة‬ ‫مثل الأب‬ ‫لـكنها أبعد وأقوى | فعلا ًإذا كانت هى ابتداء العلل القر يبة أيضا ً‬

‫‪ 1‬فهى[ فهو‪ta :‬‬ ‫الموافقة‪ta :‬‬

‫‪ 2‬الشىء[ *للشىء )לדבר(‪ :‬ע ‖ ولا‪ta :‬ע[ أو‪t :‬‬

‫‪ 3‬وهى محركة[ לית‪ :‬ע ‖ موافقة[‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪13‬‬

‫‪210‬‬

‫איך אפשר שיהיו התחלות כל הדברים אחדים בעינם ואיך אפשר שיהיו בלתי אחדים‬ ‫כי הנה אפשר שיהיו התחלות אחדים בעינם על שלשה אפנים אם על האופן הכללי‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫ואם על היחס וההקש ואם על כי התחלות העצם הם התחלות כל הדברים והנה הנמצא‬ ‫לשאר הדברים אמנם הוא מן העצם ואם היו מן העצם הנה כבר התבאר שהם מהתחלות‬ ‫העצם וכל אלו הדברים אמנם ראוי שנזכרם ונחזיק בהם תחלה ואחר כן נכון כונת‬ ‫ההתחלה אשר אנחנו מבקשים ונחזור במאמרנו ממה שכבר נזכר מעט כדי שיתברר‬

‫‪ 13‬איך[ אי‪ ‖ B :‬אפשר)‪…(1‬הדברים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬בעינם…אחדים[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬שלא יהיו[ שיהיו בלתי[‬ ‫שלא יהיו‪CL :‬‬

‫‪ 14–13‬בלתי…התחלות[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 14‬התחלות[ ההתחלות‪ ‖ AM :‬אחדים[ אחדות‪‖ T :‬‬

‫אפנים[ אופנים‪ ‖ DAM :‬על)‪ + [(2‬כן‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬האופן[ אופן‪M :‬‬ ‫‪ +‬כל‪ ‖ D :‬התחלות)‪ [(1‬ההתחלות‪D :‬‬

‫‪ 15‬על)‪ + [(1‬אופן‪ ‖ M :‬על)‪[(2‬‬

‫‪ 16–15‬והנה…הדברים[ לית‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 15‬הנמצא‪ [AM :‬נמצא‪:‬‬

‫‪ | CDL‬המציאות‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 16‬ואם היו מן העצם[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬היו[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬מהתחלות[ מהתחלפות‪:‬‬

‫‪ | B‬מההתחלות‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 17‬וכל[ ועל‪ ‖ C :‬בהם[ להם‪ ‖ B :‬כן[ לית‪ ‖ CDT :‬נכון[ נכוין‪‖ DABT :‬‬

‫כונת[ בעת‪AM :‬‬

‫‪ 18‬אנחנו[ אנו‪ ‖ T :‬מבקשים[ בבקשתה‪ ‖ CL :‬ונחזור[ ונשיב‪ | C :‬ונשוב‪‖ BL :‬‬

‫במאמרנו[ במאמרינו‪ | DA :‬למאמרנו‪ | B :‬במאמר‪ ‖ T :‬שכבר נזכר[ שנזכר כבר‪ | M :‬שכבר עבר‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C‬כדי שיתברר‪ [ATM :‬במה שיתאמת‪ | CL :‬לית‪ | D :‬וכדי שיתברר‪B :‬‬

Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition

211

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬

‫‪212‬‬

‫‪19‬‬

‫הנה כבר אמרנו כי כל העצמים שלשה ושמהם שני עצמים טבעיים והעצם השלישי בלתי‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫מתנועע והנה שני העצמים הטבעיים כבר התבארו במה שעבר וכבר חקרנו מהם‬ ‫חקירה מופלגת במה שקדם מדברינו ואולם עתה הנה אנחנו בבקשת העצם אשר‬ ‫לא יתנועע‬ ‫ולא יסור כן והנה נחקור מעתה ונבקש אם אפשר שיהיה עצם לא יבלהו הזמן ולא‬ ‫יקבל השנוי וההשתנות אבל ישאר על ענינו החלד כלו וכבר אמרנו פעמים רבות שהוא‬ ‫בלתי אפשר שיעמוד על ההתחלה הזאת מופת כי המופת לא יהיה כי אם מסבות‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫והתחלות והסבה הראשונה כלומר^ ההתחלה הראשונה אי אפשר שתמצא לה סבה‬ ‫לפניה ולא התחלה אבל אולי יהיה אפשר לנו שנשיג כונתנו מן האופן הזה והוא כי‬ ‫מפני שאנחנו סוברים בהתחלה הראשונה לכל הדברים הנמצאים שהוא מן הראוי‬ ‫שימצאו‬ ‫בה שני ענינים אחד מהם שתהיה נצחית והאחר שתהיה בלתי מתנועעת הנה ראוי‬ ‫שנפריד כל אחד משני אלו הענינים ונחקור עליו ביחוד ונחקור תחלה אם אפשר שיהיה‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫עצם מה נצחי ואחר כן נחקור אם אפשר שיהיה עצם בלתי מתנועע וכאשר הלכנו‬

‫‪ 19‬עצמים[ עצמיים‪ ‖ D :‬והעצם השלישי‪ [CDMT :‬והשלישי‪ABL :‬‬

‫‪ 20‬מתנועע[ מתנועעת)!(‪‖ D :‬‬

‫התבארו במה שעבר[ היו לנו קודם מבוארות‪ :C1) C :‬מבוארים( | התבאר במה שעבר‪ ‖ B :‬מהם[‬ ‫לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 21‬מופלגת‪ [DBT :‬מספוקת)!(‪ | C :‬מספקת‪ | AML :‬מסתפקת‪ ‖ R1 :‬שקדם[ שעבר‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ AR1‬מדברינו[ מדברנו‪ ‖ D :‬אשר[ אם‪ ‖ M :‬לא[ לית‪T :‬‬ ‫ולא‪‖ B :‬‬

‫‪ 22‬כן[ בו‪ ‖ B :‬נחקור[ נחקר‪ ‖ D :‬לא[‬

‫*יבלהו[ ילוה בו‪ | C :‬ישיגהו‪ | DAML :‬יגלהו‪ | (R1⇄) BR :‬ישיגנו‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 23‬השנוי וההשתנות[‬

‫الاستحالات والتغايير‪ :‬ع ‖ וההשתנות[ וההשארות‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬ענינו[ עניינו‪ ‖ B :‬החלד‪ [DBT :‬החדל‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | C‬תמיד‪AML :‬‬

‫‪ 24‬שיעמוד[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬ההתחלה[ התחלה‪D :‬‬

‫‪ 25‬והתחלות[ והתחלת ‪ +‬הסבה‬

‫מסבות והתחלות‪ | A :‬וההתחלות‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬והסבה[ הסבה‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬כלומר ההתחלה הראשונה[‬ ‫‪ 26‬שנשיג[ שנשיב‪‖ (C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫לית‪ ‖ C :‬כלומר[ כלו׳‪ ‖ A :‬שתמצא[ שימצא‪ ‖ CM :‬לה[ בה‪D :‬‬ ‫כונתנו[ כוונתינו‪ 27–26 DB :‬כי מפני שאנחנו[ מפני זה כי אנחנו‪ 26 M :‬כי[ שהוא‪ 27 C :‬מפני‬ ‫שאנחנו סוברים[ בעבור שהיינו חושבים‪ ‖ C :‬שהוא מן הראוי[ שהיא ראויה‪ ‖ C :‬שימצאו[ שימצא‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 28 C‬שתהיה)‪ [(1‬שיהיה‪ ‖ C :‬נצחית[ נצחי‪ ‖ A :‬והאחר[ והאחרת‪ ‖ A :‬הנה[ לית‪ | C :‬והנה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 29 BL‬הענינים[ העניינים‪ ‖ B :‬ביחוד[ ביסוד‪ ‖ DAM :‬אפשר[ לית‪ 30 B :‬עצם מה נצחי[ העצם‬ ‫מהנצחי‪ ‖ M :‬ואחר[ ואחרי‪ ‖ L :‬כן[ לית‪ | CA :‬כך‪ ‖ D :‬נחקור אם[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬עצם[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫‪ L‬יא‬ ‫–‪Λ.6.1071b3‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫‪213‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ḥ206v16‬‬ ‫‪b12‬‬

‫من شرح ثامسطيوس لحرف اللام‬ ‫الجواهر ثلثة منها جوهران‬

‫‪ L‬יא‬

‫طبيعيان وثالث جوهر غير‬

‫‪ ḥ206v17‬متحرك‬

‫‪19‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬

‫ونحن الآن فى طلب هذا الجوهر الذى‬ ‫لا يتحرك‬ ‫ولم يزل كذلك |‬

‫فنطلب هل يمكن أن يكون جوهر لا يبليه الزمان ولم‬

‫يقبل الاستحالات والتغايير لـكن يبقى على حاله الدهر كله‬ ‫وليس يمكن أن | يقام على هذا المبدأ برهان فإن البرهان لا يكون إلا من علل‬ ‫‪ ḥ206v19‬ومبادئ والعلة الأولى التى هى المبدأ الأول لا‬

‫توجد لها علة‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫قبلها |‬ ‫‪ ġ21,5–6‬لكنا‬

‫لما كان هذا المطلوب‬

‫أزليا ً‬

‫وغير متحرك وجب‬

‫أن نفرد كل واحد من هذين المعنيين على حاله ونبحث عنه مفردا ً ننظر‬

‫‪28‬‬

‫هل يمكن أن يكون‬

‫‪ ḥ206v20‬جوهر ما أزليا ًثم نبحث هل يمكن أن يكون جوهر غير متحرك‬

‫‪ 19‬ثلثة‪ [ḥ :‬ثلاثة‪ 22 b :‬فنطلب‪ḥ :‬ע[ فيطلب‪ 23 b :‬الاستحالات والتغايير[ *الاستحالة والتغير )השנוי‬ ‫וההשתנות(‪ :‬ע | *الاستحالات )השנויים(‪ ‖ Q :‬التى هى‪) Qḥ :‬שהיא([ *أعنى )כלומר(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪31‬‬

‫‪214‬‬

‫הדרך הזאת הנה נשיג הכונה אשר כוננו אליה בקלות כי חקירתנו תהיה על דרך מי‬ ‫שכיון לשאת דבר כבד ולא יוכל שאתו וחלקהו והיה לו כח לשאת אותו וכן יקל‬ ‫מאתנו כובד החקירה אם הלכנו הדרך הזאת ונאמר אם היו העצמים כלם מקבלים‬

‫‪1071b5–6‬‬

‫ההפסד והעצמים כלם הם קודם כל הדברים הנמצאים התחייב מזה שיהיו כל הדברים‬ ‫‪35‬‬

‫הנמצאים מקבלים ההפסד ואם היה הענין כמו שאמרנו במה שעבר מהיות הכל מתאחד‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫היה או היתה עמידתו על המשך היושר וסדר הנה שרשו ועקרו ותחלת חלקיו הוא העצם‬

‫‪ L‬יב‬

‫ואם היה שיפסד כל עצם הנה מן הראוי שיתחייב שלא יהיה דבר מכל הדברים שהם‬ ‫תלויים בו נשארים ומי שהנהיג^ הענין הזה ואפילו מעט מן ההנהגה^ מצא העצמים‬ ‫וזולתם‬ ‫מן הנמצאות אי אפשר מבלתי שיהיה להם עצם מתמיד המציאות ממנו מציאותם ואינו‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫מן הפלא שיהיה בנמצאות עצם נצחי כי הנה נמצא דברים מטבע המקרים נצחיים‬ ‫לא יפסדו הנה אם כן התנועה אינה טבעית^ משוללת עומדת בנפשה אבל היא‬ ‫בלא ספק‬ ‫לגשם או לעצם ויותר ראוי שלא יהיה כן הזמן כי הזמן מתיחס לתנועה יחס קרוב לא‬ ‫‪ 31‬הכונה[ הכוונה‪ ‖ B :‬בקלות[ בקולות‪ ‖ D :‬חקירתנו[ כונתנו‪ | C :‬חקירתינו‪ ‖ DB :‬על דרך[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C‬מי[ לית‪ :C1) C :‬כמי( | מה‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 32‬שכיון‪ | DB :‬משכיון‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬שיכוין‪ | AL :‬שיכון‪‖ T0 | M :‬‬

‫כבד[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬וחלקהו[ וחלקתהו‪ | D :‬נחלקהו‪ ‖ B :‬והיה[ ויהיה‪ ‖ BMT :‬לשאת[ ‪ ‖ T0‬וכן[ ולא‪:‬‬ ‫‪B‬‬

‫‪ 33‬כובד[ דובר‪ ‖ M :‬אם[ אשר‪ :C1) C :‬כאשר( ‖ הלכנו[ הלכו‪ ‖ B :‬הזאת[ הזה‪ ‖ C :‬ונאמר[‬

‫‪ ‖ T0‬כלם[ כולם‪ ‖ B :‬מקבלים[ יקבלום‪ :C1) C :‬יקבלו( | מקבילים‪D :‬‬ ‫כלם[ כולם‪ ‖ B :‬כל[ לכל‪DT :‬‬

‫‪ 34‬ההפסד[ הפסד‪‖ MT :‬‬

‫‪ 35‬מקבלים‪ [ATL :‬יקבלו‪ | CBM :‬מקבילים‪ ‖ D :‬ההפסד[ הפסד‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ D‬ואם היה[ כי‪ ‖ T :‬הענין[ העניין‪ ‖ B :‬כמו[ כפי ‪ +‬מה‪ + | C :‬מה‪ ‖ T :‬שאמרנו[ שאמ׳‪ ‖ M :‬במה[‬ ‫בשער‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 1‬היה[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬היתה[ היה‪ | C :‬תהיה‪ ‖ B :‬על[ ‪ +‬דרך‪ ‖ D :‬היושר[ ויושר‪ | CD :‬לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ BT‬וסדר[ לית‪ | C :‬יסוד‪ ‖ M :‬הנה[ לית‪ | D :‬היה‪ ‖ BL :‬ועקרו[ ויסודו‪ | C :‬ויסודה ‪ +‬הנה עקרו‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ D‬ותחלת[ והתחלת‪ ‖ TC1 :‬הוא[ והוא‪ 2 (C1⇄) C :‬הנה[ היה‪ ‖ A :‬שיפסד כל עצם[ כל העצם‬ ‫יפסד‪ | C :‬כל עצם יפסד‪ ‖ C1T :‬יהיה[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬מכל[ מן‪ 3 D :‬בו[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הענין[ העניין‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬ואפי׳[ אפי׳‪ | D :‬ואפילו‪ ‖ TL :‬ההנהגה[ המנהג‪ ‖ D :‬מצא[ מצד‪ 4 B :‬אי אפשר מבלתי‪[BL :‬‬ ‫צריך על כל פנים‪ ‖ MT :‬אי[ בלתי‪ ‖ CDA :‬מבלתי[ לית‪ ‖ CDA :‬אפשר[ ‪ +‬להם‪ ‖ A :‬שיהיה[ ‪ :C1‬סא‬ ‫שלא יהיה ‖ עצם[ ‪ +‬בלתי‪ 5 A :‬שיהיה[ אם יהיה‪ ‖ C :‬כי[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הנה[ היינו ‪ +‬כבר‪| C :‬‬ ‫‪ +‬כבר‪ ‖ BL :‬דברים[ ‪ +‬הם‪ ‖ T :‬המקרים[ ‪ +‬נמצאים‪ 6 C :‬הנה[ והנה‪ ‖ L :‬טבעית[ טבע )*طبيعة(‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ Q‬אם כן‪ [CAT :‬א״כ‪ | DBM :‬לית‪ ‖ L :‬התנועה‪ :C1 in marg.) L :‬סא והנה התנועה גם כן([ תנועתו‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ CDABMT‬אינה[ בלתי‪ 7 CD :‬ויותר ראוי[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬שלא יהיה‪ [CDBT :‬שיהיה‪ | AL :‬יהיה‪‖ M :‬‬ ‫כן[ בו‪ ‖ B :‬מתיחס[ יתיחס‪ 8–7 AML :‬יחס…מאתה[ לית‪B :‬‬

‫‪1071b6–9‬‬

‫‪215‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ḥ206v20‬وهاتان صفتان للمبدأ الأول‬ ‫‪ġ21,6–7‬‬ ‫عجز عن حمل ثقيل‬

‫فنكون بمنزلة من‬ ‫فقسمه قسمين فسهل عليه حمله‬ ‫فنقول إن | كانت الجواهر كلها تقبل‬

‫الفساد والجواهر‬

‫‪33‬‬

‫قبل جميع الأشياء الموجودة لزم أن تكون جميع الأشياء‬

‫‪ ḥ206v21‬الموجودة تقبل الفساد |‬

‫لـكنه لا بد من أن يكون للموجودات جوهر دائم الوجود عنه وجودها وليس‬

‫‪ L‬יב‬

‫‪27–28‬‬ ‫)‪(31‬‬

‫‪ ḥ207r1‬بعجب أن يكون فى الموجودات جوهر أزلى إذ كنا | نجد أشياء من طبيعة الأعراض أزلية‬ ‫لا تفسد‬

‫‪* 33‬والجاوهر )והעצמים(‪ :‬ע[ والجوهر‪ḥb :‬‬

‫‪35‬‬

‫‪4‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫‪216‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪8‬‬

‫ימלט אם שיהיה שיעור לה או חדוש מאתה ואי אפשר שיונח לזמן ולא לתנועה הויה‬ ‫ולא הפסד ולא מי שהוא בתכלית מאהבת המלחמה והנצוח וזה כי אנחנו אם הנחנו‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫הזמן הווה התחייב מזה שיהיה הזמן יותר קודם מהויתו ואם הנחנו שהוא יפסד שיהיה‬ ‫אחר הפסדו וכבר אמרנו זה במאמרים הטבעיים במה שעבר וזכרנוהו עתה מפני‬ ‫שאנחנו‬ ‫צריכים אליו ביחוד בהכרח במה שאנחנו עתידים לחקור בדברים אשר מהם תעמוד‬ ‫הידיעה בהתחלה הראשונה הנה אין לתנועה ולא לזמן הויה ולא הפסד ולא יניח לנו‬ ‫ההקש הנחתו וזה בענין הזמן מבואר מאד וזה כי מאמר האומר כבר היה עת לא יהיה‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫לפניו זמן ושיהיה עת לא יהיה אחריו זמן הם מלות סותרות שרשיהם כי כל מה‬ ‫שדומה לאלו המלות ר״ל מתי והיה ויהיה וקודם ואחר אשר לא ימצא בעל השורש‬ ‫הזה המלט מעשותם אמנם הם חלקי הזמן או גדרים בו או ראיות מחוברות בו ומי‬ ‫שעשה שם מאלו השמות כדי שיקיים בו חדוש הזמן אי אפשר מבלתי שישים הזמן‬ ‫יותר קודם מחדושו ומי שעשה מן המלות מה שירצה שיחייב בו הפסד הזמן התחייב‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫עליו על הדמיון הראשון שיהיה הזמן קיים אחר הפסדו ואם היה הזמן נצחי הנה‬

‫‪ 8‬ימלט[ יעדר‪ ‖ C :‬שיהיה[ יהיה‪ ‖ M :‬שיעור[ שעור‪ ‖ CMT :‬או[ ‪ +‬או‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬ואי[ אי‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫שיונח[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬לתנועה[ ‪ +‬לא‪ | T :‬לתנועע)!(‪B :‬‬ ‫באהבת המלחמה‪ ‖ D :‬וזה[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬אם[ ואם‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 9‬מאהבת המלחמה[ מחשק הזריזות‪| C :‬‬ ‫‪ 10‬הווה[ הוה‪ ‖ DAT :‬התחייב[ התחיב‪| AL :‬‬

‫יתחייב‪ ‖ D :‬מזה[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬מהויתו‪ [CAL :‬מן הויתו‪ | DB :‬הויתו‪ | M :‬מן הוייתו‪T :‬‬ ‫ונזכרנו בו‪ ‖ C1 :‬מפני[ כי‪ ‖ C :‬שאנחנו[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬וזכרנוהו[‬

‫‪ 12‬צריכים[ נצטרך‪ ‖ C :‬ביחוד[ בייחוד‪ | M :‬באמת‪:‬‬

‫‪ | C‬לית‪ ‖ DT :‬בהכרח[ והכרח‪ + | B :‬בחקירה‪ ‖ C :‬במה שאנחנו[ לית‪ | C :‬במה שאנו‪ ‖ T :‬עתידים[‬ ‫בעתיד‪ ‖ C :‬לחקור[ לחקרו‪ | B :‬לית‪ ‖ C :‬תעמוד[ יתקיים‪ | C :‬יעמוד‪ | D :‬יועמד)?(‪T :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ T‬ולא הפסד[ והפסד‪ ‖ C :‬יניח[ ירצה‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 13‬לזמן[ ‪ +‬לא‪:‬‬

‫‪ 14‬שהנחתו‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬הנחתו[ הנתנו)?(‪ ‖ B :‬מבואר[‬

‫המבואר‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬מאד[ לית‪ ‖ D :‬וזה[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬יהיה‪ [CDT :‬היה‪ | AML :‬לית‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 15‬הם[ לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ C‬מלות[ המלות‪ ‖ D :‬סותרות[ הסותרות‪ ‖ D :‬שרשיהם[ שרשיהן‪ ‖ DT :‬מה[ לית‪ 16 A :‬והיה‬ ‫ויהיה[ ויהיה והיה‪ ‖ A :‬וקודם[ קודם‪ ‖ M :‬אשר[ כאשר‪ ‖ AM :‬ימצא[ מצא‪ ‖ T :‬השורש‪[AML :‬‬ ‫השרש‪ 17 CDBT :‬מעשותם[ ‪ +‬מלהשתמש בהם בעשותם‪ + | D :‬ר״ל‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬אמנם[ לית‪C :‬‬ ‫| ר״ל‪ ‖ D :‬הם[ מהם‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬שהם‪ ‖ D :‬הזמן[ זמן‪ ‖ C1 :‬מחוברות[ מחברות‪ ‖ A :‬בו[ לית‪CD :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ 18 (C1‬שעשה[ שיעשה‪ ‖ C :‬שיקיים[ שיקים‪ ‖ B :‬אי…שישים[ לא ימצא מפלט מששם‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫אפשר[ ‪ +‬לו‪ 19 T :‬שעשה[ שיעשה‪ 20 C :‬עליו[ לית‪ | CB :‬לו‪ ‖ T :‬על[ כבר‪ ‖ T :‬הדמיון[ המשל‪:‬‬ ‫‪ + | C‬על‪ ‖ T :‬קיים[ קים‪ ‖ A :‬הפסדו[ ההפסד‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬הפסד‪ ‖ M :‬הזמן[ זמן‪C :‬‬

‫‪1071b9–10‬‬

‫‪217‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫فإن الحركة والزمان ليس يمكن أن نضع لهما كونا ً‬

‫‪ḥ207r2‬‬

‫وفسادا ً‬

‫‪8‬‬

‫فإنا إن وضعنا‬

‫الزمان كائنأ | لزم‬

‫أن يكون الزمان أقدم من كونه وإن وضعنا أنه يفسد تخلف‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫بعد فساده‬

‫‪ġ23,8–11‬‬

‫فليس للحركة ولا لزمان كون ولا فساد‬

‫‪13‬‬

‫فإن قول القائل قد كان وقت لم يكن‬ ‫‪ ḥ207r3‬قبله زمان | وسيكون وقت لا يكون بعده زمان هى ألفاظ تناقض أصولها لأن‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫معانى هذه الألفاظ‬ ‫إنما هى أجزاء الزمان أو حدود فيه | أو دلالات مقرونة به وكل من‬ ‫استعمل أسماء مثل متى وكان و يكون وأشباه ذلك ليثبت به حدوث الزمان‬ ‫وقد‬ ‫‪ḥ207r5‬‬

‫يثبت وجود الزمان واستمراره بعد انقطاعه فإن كان الزمان أزليا ً‬

‫‪ 8‬الحركة‪ [b :‬للحركة)?(‪ ‖ ḥ :‬نضع‪ [b :‬ىضع‪ | ḥ :‬يضع‪ :‬ע )יונח(‬

‫‪ 13‬ولا لزمان‪ġCT :‬ע[ والزمان‪ġ :‬‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪21‬‬

‫‪218‬‬

‫התנועה בלא ספק נצחית כי הנה הזמן אמנם הוא שעור לה או חדוש מאתה‬ ‫והנה ראוי לנו שנחקור מהתנועה בנפשה ונאמר כי התנועה לא תמלט אם שתהיה‬ ‫לא סרה‬ ‫או שתהיה מחודשת ואם היא מחודשת הנה כבר היה לפניה המניע אותה ואיך אפשר‬ ‫שידומה המניע והוא נצחי לא תהיה מאתו החלד כלו ואין מונע ימנע שתהיה מאתו‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫ולא יתחדש חדוש בענין מה שהיה עליו וחדש אותה כי כל מה שיתחדש אמנם יתחדש‬

‫מאתו ואין דבר זולתו יעיקהו או ירצהו ואי אפשר שהוא^ כבר היה בלתי יכול שיהיה^‬ ‫ואחר כן היה יכול כי זה יחייב בו השנוי ויחייב שיהיה דבר אחר זולתו הוא אשר שנה‬ ‫אותו ומי שאמר כי מונע היה מונעו הנה עם מה שיתחייב לו מן הגנאי בקיים דבר‬ ‫זולתו יוסיף גנאי עליו בסבת שהוא יתחייב לו שתהיה הסבה המונעת אותו יותר חזקה‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫ממנו ואיך אפשר לסבה ההיא מנעתהו חלד אין תכלית לו ואחר כן התירהו בסוף ואי‬ ‫אפשר שיהיה זה כי אם כשיהיה התחלף או השתנה ואי אפשר שיהיה אותו המונע‬

‫‪ 21‬נצחית[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬הנה[ היה‪ ‖ C :‬חדוש[ הדגש‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬מאתה[ לית‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬מאותה‪M :‬‬ ‫‪ 22‬לנו[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬מהתנועה[ מן התנועה‪ ‖ AL :‬תמלט[ תחסר‪ ‖ C :‬שתהיה[ שיהיה‪ ‖ C :‬לא סרה[‬ ‫נצחית‪CBT :‬‬

‫‪ 23‬או[ ואם‪ ‖ M :‬מחודשת)‪ [(1‬כבר נתחדשה‪ ‖ C :‬היא[ היתה‪ | B :‬היתה ‪ +‬שכבר‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ C‬מחודשת)‪ [(2‬נתחדשה‪ ‖ C :‬הנה[ לית‪ ‖ AMT :‬לפניה[ לו פניה‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬אותה[ לה‪ | C :‬אותם‪:‬‬ ‫‪B‬‬

‫‪ 24‬שידומה[ أن نتوهم‪ :‬ع ‖ המניע[ ‪ +‬لها‪ :‬ع ‖ והוא[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬נצחי[ הנצחי ‪ +‬היה לפניה המניע‬

‫לה ואיך‪ ‖ C :‬לא[ ולא‪ ‖ AL :‬תהיה[ יהיה‪ ‖ C :‬מאתו[ ממנו‪ +) C :‬התנועה‪ ‖ (C1 :‬ימנע‪ [CBT :‬שימנע‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ AML‬שתהיה[ שיהיה‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 25‬יתחדש[ התחדש‪ ‖ CT :‬בענין[ עניין‪ ‖ B :‬מה[ ‪ +‬חדשה‪+ | CB :‬‬

‫אחר‪ ‖ T :‬שהיה[ אותה‪ ‖ CB :‬שהיא[ ‪ +‬כלו‪ ‖ T :‬עליו[ אליו‪ ‖ CBMT :‬וחדש[ וחדוש‪ ‖ B :‬כי[ ‪+‬‬ ‫היה‪ | C :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬שיתחדש[ לית‪A :‬‬

‫‪ 26‬יעיקהו[ ימנעהו‪ ‖ C :‬ירצהו[ ירצה‪ ‖ T :‬אפשר[ ‪ +‬שנאמר‪:‬‬

‫‪T‬ع ‖ שהוא[ שהיא‪ | C :‬שיהיה‪ ‖ B :‬היה[ יהיה‪ ‖ AM :‬שיהיה‪ [BC :‬להיות‪ | AML :‬להוותה‪ + | T :‬عنه‪:‬‬

‫ع‬

‫‪ 27‬ואחר[ אחר‪ ‖ B :‬יכול[ ‪ +‬שיהיה ואחר כן היה יכול‪ ‖ B :‬יחייב[ יתחייב‪ ‖ AM :‬בו[ לית‪ :‬ع ‖‬

‫ויחייב[ וחייב‪ 28–27 M :‬הוא…מונע[ לית‪ 28 (C1⇄) C :‬כי מונע[ שהמונע‪ | B :‬במונע‪ ‖ C1 :‬היה‬ ‫מונעו[ ימנעהו‪ ‖ C :‬עם[ לית‪ ‖ AMC :‬שיתחייב[ שהתחייב‪ ‖ T :‬לו[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬בקיים‪ [MBT :‬בקיום‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | CL‬בקים‪ 29 A :‬יוסיף[ יתוסף‪ ‖ MBCT :‬גנאי[ הגנאי‪ ‖ MBCT :‬יתחייב[ יתחיב‪ ‖ M :‬המונעת‪:‬‬ ‫‪ [MT‬המניעה‪ | CA :‬המגיעה‪ | B :‬המנעת‪ ‖ L :‬חזקה[ רחוקה‪ 30 T :‬חלד[ החלד‪ ‖ M :‬התירהו‪[M :‬‬ ‫התיר‪ | C :‬התירוהו‪ | A :‬התירה‪ | BL :‬התירה ‪ +‬אותו‪ 31–30 T :‬ואי…השתנה[ ‪ +‬ואי אפשר שיהיה‬ ‫זה כי אם כשיהיה התחלף או השתנה‪ 31 B :‬שיהיה[ שתהיה‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬כשיהיה‪ [CBT :‬בשהיה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | AM‬כשהיה‪ ‖ L :‬אותו[ כי אם‪ ‖ AM :‬המונע‪ [BT :‬המניע‪ | CM :‬המניע ‪ +‬ההוא‪ + | A :‬ההוא‪L :‬‬

‫‪219‬‬ ‫‪ ḥ207r5‬فالحركة‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫أزلية إذ كان الزمان‬

‫مقدارا ً لها أو حدثا ًعنها‬

‫‪21‬‬

‫وأيضا فنقول إن الحركة | لا تخلو أن تكون‬ ‫لم تزل‬ ‫أو تكون قد حدثت إن كانت حدثت فقد كان قبلها المحرك لها فكيف يمكن‬ ‫‪ b13‬أن نتوهم المحرك لها وهو أزلى لم يكن عنه | الدهر كله وليس مانع يمنعه من أن يكون عنه‬ ‫أحدثها إذ كان جميع ما يحدث إنما يحدث‬

‫‪ ḥ207r7‬ولا حدث حادث فى حال ما‬

‫عنه وليس | شىء غيره يعوقه أو يرغبه ولا يمكن أن نقول قد كان لا يقدر أن يكون عنه‬ ‫فقدر لأن ذلك يوجب الاستحالة و يوجب أن يكون شىء | آخر غيره هو الذى أحاله‬ ‫وأنا وإن قلنا أنه منعه مانع‬ ‫يلزم‬

‫أن يكون السبب المانع‬

‫أقوى‬

‫‪ 22‬الحركة[ الحركات‪ ‖ š :‬تخلو[ يخلوا‪ 23 š :‬قد حدثت‪š :‬ע[ לית‪ ‖ ḥ :‬إن[ *وإن )ואם(‪ :‬ע ‖ إن كانت‬ ‫حدثت[ לית‪ ‖ š :‬قبلها[ לית‪ :‬ע ‪ 24‬نتوهم‪ [b :‬ىتوهم‪* | ḥ :‬يتوهم )ידומה(‪ :‬ע ‖ لها[ לית‪ :‬ע ‖ وليس‬ ‫مانع يمنعه[ ليس يمانعه مانع‪ 26 š :‬نقول[ يقال‪ | š :‬לית‪ :‬ע ‖ عنه[ לית‪ :‬ע ‪ 27‬يوجب[ ‪ +‬בו )*به(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫‪ 28‬وأنا‪ [ḥ :‬לית‪ 29 bš :‬السبب‪ [ḥš :‬سبب‪b :‬‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫‪220‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪32‬‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫קיים על ענינו והמניע פעם ימשוך ידו מן התנועה ופעם יניע וחדוש התנועה‬ ‫לא יהיה כי אם בתנועה הנה מאמר האומר בזה יחייב שיהיה כבר היתה התנועה קודם‬ ‫שתהיה התנועה כי ההתחלפות והשנוי והמנוחה אמנם הם מינים ממיני התנועה‬ ‫ונמשכים‬ ‫אחריה ואי אפשר מבלתי שיהיה גשם מן הגשמים הוא המניע^ ואם אמרנו כי הגשם‬ ‫ההוא לא התחדש אבל הוא התנועע ממנוחה התחייב עלינו שנספר הסבה אשר בעבורה‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫התנועע והשתנה מן המנוחה אל התנועה ואם אמרנו כי הגשם ההוא נתחדש הנה קדם‬ ‫לחדוש הגשם חדוש התנועה ואין זה דבר זולת כי התנועה קדמה לתנועה ואי אפשר‬ ‫שנניח חדוש לתנועה ממנוחה ואם שמנו הגשם שיהיה אפשר שיתחדש ממה שאינו‬ ‫נמצא כלל התקבצו שני הדברים יחד ויהיה התחלת חדוש הגשם הוא התחלת חדוש‬ ‫התנועה וכאשר היה זה בלתי אפשר ואין דבר יתחדש ממה שאינו נמצא כלל הנה‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫הוא בלתי אפשר שתצא התנועה מן המנוחה ואחר שהתבאר מענין התנועה שהיא‬ ‫נצחית ומענין הזמן אצל התנועה הנה יקל עלינו מה שימשך אחר זה והזכרון באלו‬ ‫הענינים בלבד והנה התנועה אם היתה נצחית הנה הגשם המתנועע נצחי ואם היה‬

‫‪ 32‬קיים[ קים‪ ‖ M :‬ענינו[ עניינו‪ ‖ B :‬ימשוך[ ימשך‪ ‖ C :‬מן התנועה[ מהתנועה‪‖ CMT :‬‬ ‫התנועה)‪ [(2‬לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫לית‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 1‬כי אם[ ‪ +‬כי אם‪ ‖ B :‬יחייב[ התחייב‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 2‬שתהיה[ שיהיה‪ ‖ A :‬והמנוחה[ והמרגוע‪CT :‬‬

‫‪ 2–1‬קודם…התנועה[‬

‫‪ 3‬אחריה[ בה‪ ‖ CB :‬ואי[ אי‪‖ C :‬‬

‫מבלתי[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬שיהיה[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬מן הגשמים[ מהגשמים‪ ‖ C :‬המניע[ מניע‪ | B :‬המתנועע‪| L :‬‬ ‫الذى يتحرك‪ :‬ع ‖ כי הגשם[ כי אותו גשם‪ | C :‬שהגשם‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 4‬ההוא[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬התחדש[ תתחדש‪‖ B :‬‬

‫התנועע[ יתנועע‪ | BT :‬יתנועע ‪ +‬ממנו‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬שנספר[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 5‬התנועע[ ההתנועה)!(‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ B‬ואם[ ‪ +‬ואם‪ ‖ C :‬כי[ ‪ +‬זה‪ | C :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬הגשם[ שהעצם‪ ‖ B :‬ההוא[ לית‪C :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬לתנועה[ למתנועע‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 6‬זה[ לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ 7‬שמנו[ שאמרנו‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הגשם[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬שיתחדש[ ‪ +‬הגשם‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 9‬התנועה‪) C1L :‬סא התנועה([ הזמן‪:‬‬

‫‪ 8‬התחלת[ התחלתו‪ ‖ B :‬הוא[ והיא‪ | B :‬היא‪M :‬‬ ‫‪B‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ CABMT‬זה[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬בלתי[ ‪ +‬התחלת חדוש הגשם היא התחלת חדוש הזמן וכאשר היה זה‬ ‫בלתי‪ ‖ A :‬אפשר[ ‪ +‬והנה בלתי אפשר‪ ‖ C1 :‬דבר[ לית‪ 10–9 B :‬ואין…אפשר[ לית‪ 10 C :‬ואחר‬ ‫שהתבאר[ וכאשר התבאר‪ ‖ C :‬מענין[ מעניין‪ 11 B :‬ומענין[ ומעניין‪ ‖ B :‬והזכרון[ ומהזכרון‪‖ C1 :‬‬ ‫באלו[ בכל‪ | C :‬מאלו‪ 12 M :‬הענינים‪ [CM :‬הדברים‪ | AL :‬העניינים‪ ‖ BT :‬בלבד‪ [BT :‬בפרט‪| CAL :‬‬ ‫לבד‪ ‖ M :‬והנה[ כי הנה‪ | BT :‬הוא כי הנה‪M :‬‬

‫‪ L‬יג‬

‫‪221‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫وحدوث الحركة‬

‫‪ḥ207r10‬‬

‫‪ L‬יג ليس يكون إلا | بحركة‬

‫فيجب أن يكون قبل الحركة‬

‫حركة لأن الاستحالة والتغير والفتور إنما هى‬

‫‪ḥ207r11‬‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫من أنواع الحركة‬

‫ولا بد من أن يكون جسم من الأجسام | هو الذى يتحرك فإن قلنا إن ذلك الجسم‬ ‫لم يحدث لـكنه تحرك عن سكون وجب‬

‫‪32‬‬

‫‪3‬‬

‫أن نخـبر بالسبب الذى له‬

‫تغير من السكون إلى الحركة | فإن قلنا إن ذلك الجسم حدث تقدم‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫حدوث الجسم حدوث الحركة‬

‫فإذ قد بان أن الحركة‬

‫‪ḥ207r12‬‬

‫والزمان أزليان‬ ‫فالجسم‬

‫أزلى وإن | كان‬

‫‪ 2‬لأن الاستحالة[ والاستحالة‪ ‖ š :‬من أنواع الحركة[ عن المانع حركة‪ 3 š :‬الذى[ לית‪ :‬ע ‖ يتحرك[ המניע‬ ‫)*المحرك(‪ :‬ע ‖ فإن قلنا[ ولو قيل‪ 4 š :‬نخـبر بالسبب[ تعثر على السبب‪ 5 š :‬حدث[ לית‪ 10 š :‬فإذ‬ ‫قد[ فقد‪š :‬‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪13‬‬

‫‪222‬‬

‫המקרה כן הנה יותר ראוי שיהיה העצם כן והנה היתה הראשונה מן התנועות התנועה‬ ‫במקום והתנועות השנית והשלישית התנועות בשאר התארים וכבר בארנו כי קצת‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫התנועות המקומיות יהיו על היושר וקצתם על הסבוב ואופן הדבקות לא יהיה כי אם‬ ‫בו כי התנועות האחרות הנשארות כלם יהיו נפסקות בעמידה אם היית זוכר מה שנאמר‬ ‫בשמע הטבעי בהכרח המופתי והדבקות ענין הכרחי לדברים הנצחיים וזה כי מה‬ ‫שישתנה ויעמד הנה בלתי אפשר לאומר שיאמר שהוא נצחי ונאמר גם כן מאופן אחר‬ ‫כי הזמן מתדבק כי הוא בלתי אפשר שנחשוב חתיכה ממנו נבדלת והנה יתחייב גם‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫כן מזה שנאמר כי התנועה גם כן מתדבקת כי היה הזמן התחדש מן התנועה ואם היתה‬ ‫התנועה על הסבוב היא לבדה זולת שאר התנועות מתדבקת הנה ראוי שנשים התנועה‬ ‫על הסבוב היא נצחית ויתחייב מזה שיהיה מניע זאת התנועה נצחי וזה כי הוא בלתי‬ ‫אפשר שיהיה דבר שאינו נצחי סבה לתנועה נצחית כי לא ימצא משום דבר דבר יותר‬ ‫פחות יהיה סבה למה שהוא יותר נכבד‬

‫‪ 13‬כן)‪ [(1‬לית‪ ‖ M :‬הנה[ כל שכן‪ | C :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬יותר[ לית‪ ‖ CB :‬ראוי[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬כן)‪ [(2‬לית‪‖ CBT :‬‬ ‫והנה[ הנה‪ ‖ M :‬היתה[ ‪ +‬התנועה‪ ‖ BC :‬מן התנועות‪ [ML :‬לית‪ | C :‬מן התנועה‪ | A :‬מהתנועות‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | B‬שבתנועות‪ ‖ T :‬התנועה[ תנועה‪ | (C1⇄) CM :‬לית‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 14‬השנית[ השניות‪ | CT :‬השנייות‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ B‬והשלישית[ והשלישיות‪ | CT :‬והשלשיות‪ ‖ B :‬התארים[ הדברים‪ ‖ C :‬בארנו[ ביארנו‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ 15‬המקומיות[ המחודשות‪ ‖ C :‬יהיו‪ [CB :‬תהיינה‪ | AL :‬יהיה‪ ‖ MT :‬היושר[ יושר‪ ‖ AM :‬וקצתם[ ‪+‬‬ ‫היו‪ + | C :‬יהיה‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 16‬בו‪ [ACT :‬בה‪ ‖ BML :‬כי[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬כלם[ כולם‪ | B :‬כלן‪ ‖ T :‬יהיו נפסקות[‬

‫יפסקו‪ ‖ CB :‬היית[ הית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) CB :‬זוכר[ וזכר‪ ‖ B :‬מה[ למה‪ | C :‬ממה‪ ‖ B :‬שנאמר[ שנ׳‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ 17‬ענין[ הענין‪ ‖ T :‬הכרחי[ ההכרחי‪ ‖ M :‬וזה כי[ והנה כל‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ 20‬אפשר…מתדבקת[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 19–18‬לאומר…אפשר[ לית‪A :‬‬

‫ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬מאופן[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬אחר[ לית‪CM :‬‬

‫‪ 18‬ויעמד[ ויעמוד‪MBT :‬‬

‫‪–18‬‬

‫‪ 18‬שהוא[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬גם כן[‬

‫‪ 19‬מתדבק[ המדבק‪ ‖ M :‬כי[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬שנחשוב[‬

‫שנדמה‪ | BM :‬يكون‪ :‬ع ‖ חתיכה[ חתכה‪ ‖ ABM :‬נבדלת[ מושלכת‪ ‖ C :‬יתחייב[ ראוי‪ + | C :‬ממנו‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 20‬מזה[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬כי התנועה[ שהתנועה‪ ‖ C :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪:‬‬

‫‪ 20–19‬גם כן[ לית‪CBM :‬‬ ‫‪M‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬כן[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬כי[ ‪ +‬כי‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הזמן[ ‪ +‬היה‪ ‖ B :‬התחדש[ יתחדש‪ ‖ T0 | AL :‬מן‬ ‫התנועה[ מהתנועה‪ ‖ T0 | CM :‬ואם[ לית‪ 21 (C1⇄) C :‬התנועה…סבוב[ ‪ ‖ T0‬לבדה[ לבד‪–21 T :‬‬ ‫‪ 22‬מתדבקת…הזאת[ ‪ 21 T0‬מתדבקת[ מתדבקות‪ ‖ A :‬התנועה)‪ [(2‬תנועה‪ + | (C1⇄) C :‬הזאת‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 22‬על הסבוב‪ [BT :‬הסבובית‪ ‖ CAML :‬היא[ לית‪ ‖ AML :‬נצחית‪ [CAML :‬הנצחית‪:‬‬ ‫‪AML‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ BT‬שיהיה…זאת[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מזה[ ‪ +‬מה‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬זאת התנועה[ התנועה הזאת‪ ‖ B :‬נצחי[ נצחית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 23 B‬שיהיה[ שתהיה‪ ‖ M :‬משום[ מזולת ‪ +‬זה‪ | C :‬מזולת‪ 24–23 B :‬דבר)‪…(2‬נכבד[ לית‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ 23‬דבר)‪ [(3‬לית‪CT :‬‬

‫‪1071b10–11‬‬

‫‪223‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ḥ207r13‬العرض كذلك فبالأحرى أن يكون الجوهر كذلك‬

‫‪ ḥ207r13‬والحركات‬

‫‪13‬‬

‫إما مستقيمة وإما مستديرة‬ ‫المستقيمة |‬

‫فيها لأن‬

‫والاتصال لا يكون إلا‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫تنقطع‬ ‫والاتصال أمر ضرورى للأشياء الأزلية فإن الذى‬

‫يسكن‬

‫بأزلى ونقول‬

‫ليس‬

‫إن الزمان متصل لأنه لا يمكن أن يكون قطع | منه مبتورة فيجب‬ ‫‪ ḥ207r15‬من ذلك‬

‫أن تكون الحركة‬

‫متصلة‬

‫الحركة المستديرة هى وحدها‬

‫فإن كانت‬ ‫متصلة فيجب أن تكون‬

‫هى أزلية | فيجب‬

‫أن يكون محرك هذه الحركة أزليا ًلأن‬

‫علة الأزلية يجب أن تكون أزلية إذ لا يكون ما هو‬ ‫أخس علة لما هو أفضل‬

‫‪ 16‬المستقيمة تنقطع[ المستقيم ينقطع‪š :‬‬ ‫ע ‖ قطع منه[ من ذلك قطع‪š :‬‬

‫‪ 18‬يسكن‪š :‬ע )יעמוד([ سكن‪ḥ :‬‬

‫‪ 20‬فإن كانت[ وكانت‪š :‬‬

‫‪ 19‬يكون[ *نتوهم )נחשוב(‪:‬‬

‫‪ 22‬أزلية‪ [š :‬الأزليه‪ḥ :‬‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫‪224‬‬

‫הנה כבר בארנו באור מספיק כי המניע הראשון נצחי ואחר שהיה כן הנה ראוי‬

‫‪1071b12–14‬‬

‫בהכרח שיניע הנעה תמידית ויעשה הפעל הזה וזה שהוא אם היה מניע אבל‬ ‫לא תהיה הנעתו תמידית הנה מן המבואר כי הנעתו גם כן לא תהיה נצחית וכבר בארנו‬

‫‪1071b14–16‬‬

‫כי זה בלתי אפשר שיהיה כי היה ראוי אם כן שלא יהיה תועלת בעצמים נצחיים‬ ‫אם אנחנו שמנו אותם כמו ששמו הם אשר אמרו בצורות שהם מונחות נפרדות‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫כדמיונות נחות אבל אם היו טבעיות נצחיות קודם המוחשות הנה אינו ראוי שנניח‬

‫‪1071b16–17‬‬

‫הטבע הזה בלא פעל בטל אבל יכול שיניע וישנה וכאשר אמרתי יכול הנה איני רוצה‬

‫‪1071b17–19‬‬

‫במאמרי יציאתו מן הכח אל הפעל אבל נרחיק ממנו לגמרי מה שהוא בכח ולא ימנה‬ ‫זה העצם במספר העצמים אשר בהם מה שהוא בכח ומה שהוא בפועל וזה שהוא בלתי‬ ‫אפשר שתהיה ההתחלה הראשונה נמצאת בטבע מה שהוא בכח כי היה מתחייב ממנו‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫שתצטרך ההתחלה ההיא אל התחלה אחרת היא בפועל עד שתהיה היא המוציאה לזאת ‪ L‬יד‬

‫מן הכח אל הפועל ואי אפשר שיהיה מה שהוא בכח יוצא מצד עצמו אל הפועל כי מה‬ ‫שהוא בכח אמנם הוא טבע חלוש בלתי שלם בעצמותו ואמנם יקרה לו השלמות כאשר‬

‫‪ 25‬באור[ ביאור‪ ‖ BT :‬כי[ לית‪ + | C :‬הנה‪ ‖ BL :‬המניע[ שהמניע‪ ‖ C1 :‬הראשון[ ‪ +‬הוא‪ ‖ B :‬ואחר‬ ‫שהיה[ וכאשר היה‪ 26 C :‬הנעה‪T :‬ع )تحر يك([ תנועה‪ ‖ CABML :‬ויעשה הפעל הזה[ לית‪‖ CT :‬‬ ‫הפעל[ הפועל‪ ‖ B :‬הזה[ לית‪ 27 AM :‬הנעתו[ תנועתו‪ ‖ BC1 :‬המבואר[ ‪ +‬גם כן‪ ‖ A :‬גם כן[‬ ‫לית‪ | A :‬ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬תהיה[ יהיה‪ ‖ C :‬נצחית[ ‪ +‬גם כן‪ 28 A :‬שיהיה[ שתהיה‪ ‖ B :‬כי היה[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 30–28 CT‬ראוי…נחות[ סא וראוי אם כן ש)‪ (?+‬תועלת עצמים נצחיים)?( שמנו אותם אנחנו כמו‬ ‫ששמו הם אשר אמרו בצורות שהם מונחות נפרדות כדמיונות נחות‪ 28 C1 :‬ראוי[ וראוי‪ ‖ C :‬אם‬ ‫כן[ א״כ‪ + | M :‬שיהיה אם כן‪ ‖ T :‬יהיה[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬בעצמים[ עצמים‪ ‖ C1 :‬נצחיים[ הנצחיים‪ABL :‬‬ ‫‪ 29‬אותם…אמרו[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬ששמו[ ששמנו‪ ‖ B :‬הם[ אותם‪ ‖ T :‬בצורות[ הצורות‪ ‖ C :‬שהם[‬ ‫אשר הם‪ 30 C :‬כמו דמיונות‪ [BMT :‬כדמיונות‪ | CL :‬בדמיונות‪ ‖ AC1 :‬היו[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬אינו[ אין‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 31‬בלא[ בל ‪ +‬ספק‪ ‖ C :‬פעל[ פועל‪ ‖ MB :‬בטל[ ובטל‪ ‖ M :‬בטל אבל[ אבל בטל‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫‪CB‬‬ ‫אמרתי[ ‪ +‬הנה‪ ‖ C :‬הנה[ אנה‪ | B :‬לית‪ ‖ T :‬איני[ אינו‪ 32 L :‬במאמרי[ במאמר‪ | M :‬באמרי‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ T‬מן הכח[ מכח‪ ‖ CT :‬הפעל[ הפועל‪ | MB :‬פעל‪ 33–32 (C1⇄) CT :‬ולא…בהם[ לית‪–33 B :‬‬ ‫‪ 34‬בהם…כי[ לית‪ :C1) C :‬בהם מה שהוא בכח( ‪ 33‬מה[ ומה‪ ‖ B :‬ומה שהוא[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬בפועל[‬ ‫בפעל‪ 34 T :‬ההתחלה[ התחלה‪ ‖ M :‬נמצאת[ נמצא‪ | AT :‬לית‪ ‖ M :‬בטבע[ فى طبيعته‪ :‬ع ‖ היה[‬ ‫הוא‪ | B :‬שהוא‪ ‖ C :‬מתחייב[ יתחייב‪ | CB :‬המתחייב‪ ‖ T :‬ממנו[ מזה‪ | C :‬לית‪ 1 B :‬שתצטרך[‬ ‫שיצטרך‪ ‖ C :‬אחרת[ האחרת‪ ‖ C :‬בפועל[ בפעל‪ ‖ CT :‬לזאת[ לה‪ 2 C :‬הפועל[ הפעל‪‖ CT :‬‬ ‫ואי[ והוא בלתי‪ | C :‬שהוא בלתי‪ ‖ T :‬שיהיה[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬יוצא[ יצא‪ ‖ CBT :‬עצמו[ נפשו‪ 3 CT :‬טבע‪:‬‬ ‫‪ [C‬הטבע‪ | ABML :‬לטבע‪ ‖ T :‬חלוש[ חלש‪ ‖ CT :‬יקרה[ יקנה‪ ‖ C :‬השלמות[ השלימות‪C :‬‬

‫‪225‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫فيجب‬

‫‪ḥ207r16‬‬

‫أن يحرك | تحر يكا ًدائما ً‬ ‫تحر يكه بدائم‬

‫ليس‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫فأنه إن كان محركا لً ـكن‬ ‫فتحر يكه‬

‫لا يكون أزليا ً‬

‫وهذا لا يمكن أن يكون فيجب إذن أن لا ينتفع بجواهر أزلية |‬ ‫ساكنةكالصور‬ ‫فإذن لا ينبغى أن نضع‬

‫‪ḥ207r18‬‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫‪ ġ25,7‬هذه الطبيعة بلا فعل ولا متعطلة لـكن قادرة أن تحرك وتحيل ولا نعنى بقولنا قادر‬ ‫أنه شىء يخرج من القوة إلى الفعل‬ ‫فأنه لا‬ ‫المبدأ | الأول موجود فى طبيعته ما هو بالقوة لأنه يلزم من هذا‬

‫يمكن أن‬

‫‪ L‬יד‬ ‫‪ ḥ207r19‬أن يحتاج ذلك المبدأ إلى مبدإ ٍ آخر هو بالفعل حتى‬

‫يخرجه‬

‫إلى | الفعل‬

‫‪* 28‬ينتفع )יהיה תועלת(‪ :‬ע[ ىىتفع‪ | ḥ :‬ننتفع‪b :‬‬ ‫لـكن[ غير‪š :‬‬

‫‪ 30‬فإذن لا[ فلا‪š :‬‬

‫‪ 34‬فى طبيعته[ *فى طبيعة )בטבע(‪ :‬ע ‖ هذا‪ + [b :‬هذا)!(‪ḥ :‬‬

‫‪ 31‬ولا[ فتكون‪ | š :‬לית‪ :‬ע ‖‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪4‬‬

‫‪226‬‬

‫יהיה בפועל והנה אפשר בענין מן הענינים שלא יהיה בפועל כי מה שהוא בכח יטה אל‬ ‫אחד משני הצדדים‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫המתנגדים והוא אם היה אל אחד משני הצדדים יותר נוטה הנה לא ימלט משיהיה‬ ‫בינו ובין‬

‫האחר יחס הנה ראוי אם כן שתהיה התחלה נמצאת בדברים הנמצאים אין עצם לפניה^‬

‫‪1071b19–22‬‬

‫וכאשר היה כן היה נצחי לא יתערב בו דבר מן ההיולי כי כל דבר יתערב בו דבר‬ ‫מן ההיולי‬ ‫הנה בטבעו מה שהוא בכח‬ ‫על שהוא הנה אפשר מי שיעשה דרך הדבור שיאמר כי מה שהוא בטבעו בכח‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫אינו יותר פחות בדבר מן הענינים ממה שהוא בפעל אבל ענין הדברים אשר‬ ‫הם בכח אצל הדברים אשר הם בפועל כענין מה שהוא יותר קודם אצל מה שהוא‬ ‫יותר חדש וכאשר היה דבר מן הדברים בטבעו בפועל הנה יש לו בלא ספק כח‬ ‫יותר קודם במציאות ממנו ואין כל מה שאפשר בו מן הדברים שיהיה בכח יתחייב בלא‬ ‫ספק שיצא אל הפועל אבל זה אמנם הוא ראוי בדברים המוחשים לבד והם אשר ימצא‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫בהם שני הדברים יחד ר״ל מה שהוא בכח ומה שהוא בפועל וזה כי הכח באלו הדברים‬

‫‪ 4‬בפועל[ בפעל‪ ‖ CT :‬שלא יהיה בפועל[ לית‪ ‖ AL :‬יהיה[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬בפועל[ בפעל‪ ‖ CT :‬יטה[‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ T :‬משני[ מן‪BT :‬‬

‫‪ 5‬המתנגדים…הצדדים[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬היה[ ‪ ‖ C1 corr.‬נוטה[ ייטה‪‖ M :‬‬

‫ימלט[ ימנע‪ | C :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬משיהיה[ מי שיהיה‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 6‬האחר[ אחר‪ ‖ AM :‬יחס[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הנה[ היה‪‖ B :‬‬

‫ראוי אם כן‪ [CT :‬אם כן ראוי‪ [AL :‬ראוי א״כ‪ ‖ BM :‬שתהיה[ שיהיה‪ ‖ C :‬התחלה[ ההתחלה‪‖ A :‬‬ ‫אין עצם לפניה[ الجوهر فعله‪ :‬ع ‖ אין[ לא‪ ‖ CB :‬עצם[ ‪ 7 T0‬כן היה‪ [B :‬לית‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬כן‪ | AML :‬זה‬ ‫היה‪ 8–7 T :‬מן)‪…(1‬הנה[ ‪ 7 T0‬ההיולי)‪ [(1‬לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬דבר )‪ [(3‬דברים‪ 8 AM :‬מה[ מן‪A :‬‬ ‫‪ 9‬על שהוא[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬הנה[ והנה‪ ‖ T :‬דרך[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬דרך הדבור[ ‪ 10 T0‬אינו[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬יותר‬ ‫פחות[ פחות יותר‪ ‖ B :‬פחות[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬מן…שהוא[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הענינים[ העניינים‪ ‖ B :‬בפועל[ בפעל‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 11–10 TL‬אבל…בפועל[ לית‪ 10 (C1⇄) C :‬ענין[ עניין‪ 11 B :‬הם)‪ [(1‬היו‪ ‖ M :‬אצל[ אל‪‖ C1 :‬‬ ‫הדברים…הם[ ‪ ‖ T0‬בפועל[ בפעל‪ ‖ T :‬כענין[ כמו עניין‪ | B :‬בענין‪ | M :‬כמו ענין‪ ‖ T :‬מה[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫‪ 12–11‬שהוא…חדש[ ‪ 12 T0‬חדש[ סא מתאחר‪ ‖ C1 :‬היה[ לית‪ 13–12 B :‬בטבעו…הדברים[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 12 (C1⇄) CM‬בטבעו[ ‪ +‬שיהיה‪ ‖ C1 :‬בפועל[ בפעל‪ ‖ T :‬הנה…כח[ ‪ 13–12 T0‬כח יותר[ ‪C1 corr.‬‬ ‫‪ 13‬ממנו[ ‪ ‖ C1 corr.‬ואין[ וכן‪ ‖ C1 :‬בו…שיהיה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מן[ ‪ ‖ C1 corr.‬בכח[ לית‪ 14 AL :‬הפועל[‬ ‫הפעל‪ ‖ BT :‬זה…בדברים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הוא ראוי[ יתאמת‪ 15 CB :‬הדברים…שהוא)‪ ‖ T0 [(1‬הדברים[‬ ‫דברים‪ ‖ C :‬יחד[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬בפועל[ בפעל‪ ‖ CT :‬הכח[ הכוח‪ 16–15 AML :‬הדברים…יקדם[ ‪T0‬‬

‫–‪1071b22‬‬ ‫–‪26+1072a3‬‬ ‫‪4‬‬

‫‪227‬‬

‫‪ḥ207r20‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫فيجب إذن أن يكون مبدأ موجود فى الأشياء الموجودة الجوهر فعله‬

‫‪6‬‬

‫فيكون أزليا ًولا يشو به شىء من الهيولى إذ‬

‫ليس | فى طبيعته ما بالقوة‬

‫‪ḥ207r21‬‬

‫‪8‬‬

‫ولا يجب أن نظن أن القوة قبل الفعل‬

‫‪ 6‬الجوهر فعله[ *لا جوهر قبله )אין עצם לפניה(‪ :‬ע‬

‫*‬

‫‪228‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪16‬‬

‫תמיד יקדם הפועל וכאשר הקשת הכח והפועל הקש מוחלט מצאת הפועל יותר קודם‬ ‫בטבע כי הפועל הוא המוציא למה שהוא בכח והמניע אותו ואמנם המאמר בהיות מה‬

‫‪1071b26–28‬‬

‫שהוא בכח יותר קודם ממה שהוא בפועל הוא מאמר האנשים אשר יסברו סברות מי‬ ‫שדבר מן‬ ‫הקודמים בחכמה האלהית והם אשר יולידו העולם מן החשך והאויר^ כמו שעשה סנדיס‬ ‫‪20‬‬

‫ומאמר הסוברים סברות הקודמים מבעלי הטבעים והם אשר שמו ההיולי יותר קודם‬ ‫מכל הדברים וזה כי המאמר בהיות כל הדברים נמצאים יחד כמו מאמר בחלקים אשר‬ ‫לא יתחלקו אין תכלית להם ושאר מה שאמר בו כל אחד מהם ואמנם הטעות הכולל‬ ‫בכל זה שהם שמו ההיולי ההתחלה הנכבדת והקודמת ואיך אפשר בהיולי שיתנועע‬ ‫מבלתי שתקדם לו סבה מן הסבות תניע אותו וזה כי אתה לא תמצא אחד מן החמרים‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫יתנועע בעצמותו אל הצורה אבל כמו שהעץ לא יתנועע מעצמותו אל צורת הדרגש‬ ‫אבל ממלאכת הנגר כן גם כן דם הנדות והארץ גם כן לא יהיה אפשר לה שתצמיח‬

‫‪ 16‬הפועל[ הפעל‪ | CT :‬בפועל‪ ‖ B :‬הכח[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬והפועל[ והפעל‪ ‖ CT :‬הקש[ היקש‪‖ AL :‬‬ ‫מוחלט…יותר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מצאת[ מציאות‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 17‬הפועל[ הפעל‪ ‖ CT :‬שהוא…אותו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ואמנם[‬

‫ואולם‪ | CB :‬אמנם‪ ‖ M :‬המאמר[ מאמר‪ ‖ AM :‬בהיות[ כי‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 18‬שהוא בכח‪ [CBT :‬שבכח‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ AML‬יותר‪ [CB :‬לית‪ ‖ AML :‬יותר…בפועל[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ממה‪ [CB :‬למה‪ ‖ AML :‬האנשים[ לית‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫‪ 19‬הקודמים[‬

‫סברות[ סברת‪ 19–18 CB :‬מי…בחכמה[ ‪ 18 T0‬שדבר[ שמגיד‪ ‖ B :‬מן[ לית‪B :‬‬ ‫הקדמונים‪ | C :‬בקודמים‪ ‖ B :‬החשך…סגדיס[ ‪ ‖ T0‬והאויר[ והאור‪ :in marg. C1) C :‬בביאור ן׳ רשד‬ ‫והתוהו( | والهاو ية‪ :‬ع ‖ שעשה[ שעושה‪ ‖ C :‬סנדיס‪ [AM :‬סוריס‪ | CB :‬סגדיס‪ 20 L :‬הסוברים[‬ ‫אשר יסברו‪ ‖ CB :‬סברות[ סברת‪ ‖ C :‬מבעלי…שמו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הטבעים‪ [CAM :‬הטבעיים‪‖ BL :‬‬ ‫‪ 21‬מכל[ בכל‪ ‖ C :‬וזה[ וכמו‪ ‖ C1 :‬כי…הדברים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬בהיות כל[ בשכל‪:‬‬ ‫ההיולי[ החומר‪C :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C‬יחד[ לית‪ :C1 in marg. | B :‬פי׳ שהם היו חושבים שכל הדברים היו מעורבים אלו באלו בתחלה‬ ‫והוא הנקרא בערבי אלקלוש)?( ‖ כמו[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬מאמר[ במאמר‪ :C1) C :‬ובמאמר( | המאמר‪M :‬‬ ‫‪ 23–21‬אשר…ההיולי[ ‪ 22 T0‬להם‪ [C1 :‬לו‪ | CAM :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬ואמנם[ ואולם‪ 23 CB :‬ההיולי[‬ ‫החומר‪ ‖ C :‬ההתחלה‪ [BT :‬להתחלת‪ | C :‬להתחלה‪ ‖ AML :‬הנכבדת…שיתנועע[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ואיך[ ואי‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ M‬בהיולי[ בחומר‪ 24 C :‬שתקדם[ שיקדם‪ ‖ B :‬לו[ בו‪ ‖ M :‬סבה…לא[ ‪ ‖ T0‬תניע[ יניע‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫אחד[ شىء‪ :‬ع ‪ 25‬יתנועע)‪ [(1‬יתנועעו‪ ‖ CM :‬בעצמתו…הדרגש[ ‪ ‖ T0‬בעצמותו[ בעצמותם‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫מעצמותו[ מעצמות‪ ‖ B :‬צורת[ צורות‪ ‖ C :‬הדרגש[ הדגש‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬הדרגשא‪ 26 B :‬ממלאכת[‬ ‫מלאכת‪ ‖ B :‬כן גם כן[ בו גם כן‪ | C :‬כן ג״כ‪ | B :‬כמו כן‪ ‖ MT :‬הנדות[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬והארץ…לה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬גם‬ ‫כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬יהיה[ תהיה‪ ‖ BL :‬לה[ להם‪ ‖ AM :‬שתצמיח[ שיצמיחו‪AMT :‬‬

‫‪1071b28–31‬‬

‫‪229‬‬ ‫‪ġ27,7–9‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫وإذا قايسنا بين القوة والفعل بإطلاق وجدنا الفعل يتقدم القوة‬ ‫وهو الذى يحركها و يخرجها إلى الفعل لأن الفعل هو المخرج لما‬

‫‪16‬‬

‫بالقوة إلى الفعل‬

‫فأما الذين جعلوا المبدأ الأجزاء التى‬

‫‪ġ29,1–4‬‬

‫لا تتجزأ والذين يولدون | العالم من الظلمة والهاو ية‬

‫وإن الخطأ العام‬

‫فى جميعهم أنهم | جعلوا الهيولى هي المبدأ الأشرف والأقدم وكيف يمكن الهيولى أن تتحرك |‬ ‫‪ b14‬من غير مبدأ محرك‬

‫‪ ḥ207v1‬تتحرك بذاتها إلى الصورة لـكن كما أن الخشب لا يتحرك من ذاته إلى صورة السر ير‬

‫‪ 16‬بإطلاق‪ [ġC :‬بالإطلاق‪ġ :‬‬

‫‪19/22‬‬ ‫‪23‬‬

‫شىء من المواد |‬

‫فإنه ليس‬

‫كذلك دم الطمث والأرض‬

‫‪21‬‬

‫لا‬

‫‪ 19/22‬والهاو ية‪ [ġ :‬והאויר )*والهواء(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫تنبت |‬

‫‪ 24‬شىء[ אחד )*واحد(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪27‬‬

‫‪230‬‬

‫דבר מן הצמחים מעצמותה ולא אחד מכל הזרעים אבל השמש תניע הארץ ושאר‬ ‫היסודות והזרעים להוית הצמחים וכפי זה נמצא יגיע מכח האמת כי כל מי ששם ההיולי‬ ‫יותר קודם מן הנמצאות כלם יצטרכו להודות בסבה אשר היא בפועל ואם לא ירצו זה‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫אולם לוקוש בערבו בחלקים אשר לא יתחלקו תנועה תמידית ואולם אפלטון בהעמידו‬

‫‪1071b31–33‬‬

‫קודם ענין^ האל ית׳ תנועה מבולבלת ואולם אנדקליס בתארו האהבה והנצחון ואולם‬

‫‪1072a5–7‬‬

‫אנכסגוריש במאמרו בשכל והנה היה היותר ראוי שנספר^ בסבת זאת התנועה הנצחית‬

‫‪ L‬טו‬ ‫‪1071b33–34‬‬

‫ומה ענין אמרם נצחית וזה כי אנחנו לא נמצא מכל התנועות יהיה אפשר בה‬ ‫שתהיה נצחית‬ ‫אלא התנועה המקומית אשר תהיה בסבוב לבד והסבה בזה שהיא לבדה זולת‬ ‫שאר התנועות‬ ‫מתדבקת ולא נמצא אחד ספר בתנועה הראשונה מתנועות הגשמים המתנועעים‬

‫‪1071b34–36‬‬

‫אם היא‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫טבעית או חוץ מן הטבע זה לפי שלא נמצא דבר מן הדברים יתנועע במקרה אבל אם‬ ‫בטבע ואם מן השכל ואם בהכרח כאשר היה ענינו הפך הענין ההוא ולא נמצאם גם כן‬

‫‪ 27‬מן הצמחים[ מהצמחים‪ ‖ T :‬מעצמותה‪ [B :‬בעצמותם‪ | AM :‬מעצמותם‪ | C :‬מעצמותו‪‖ T :‬‬ ‫מכל…השמש[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מכל[ מן‪A :‬‬

‫‪ 28‬להוית[ והוית‪ ‖ C :‬הצמחים[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬וכפי[ ולפי‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ T‬יגיע[ ‪ +‬מהיות‪ | B :‬יגע‪ ‖ M :‬מכח[ כח‪ ‖ B :‬האמת[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬מי[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬ששם[ ‪ +‬כח‪‖ B :‬‬

‫ההיולי[ החמרים‪ 29 C :‬קודם[ קרוב‪ ‖ AM :‬להודות[ לשער‪ ‖ C :‬אשר היא[ לית‪ :C1) CT :‬סא‬ ‫‪ 30‬אולם[ אם‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫בסבה אשר על דרך הפועל( ‖ בפועל[ בפעל‪ | C :‬לית‪ ‖ T :‬ירצו[ רצו‪C :‬‬ ‫לוקוש[ ]?[‪ :C1) C :‬לוקש( | לוקש‪ ‖ T :‬בערבו‪ [MT :‬עם ערבו‪ | C :‬בערכו‪ | AL :‬עריכו‪ ‖ B :‬ואולם[‬ ‫ואם‪ ‖ C :‬אפלטון[ אפלאטון‪ ‖ CT :‬בהעמידו[ בהעמיד‪ 31 AM :‬ענין[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬ית׳[ לית‪ | C :‬יתע׳‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ T‬תנועה[ תנועעה)!(‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬מבולבלת[ מסתערת‪ ‖ B :‬ואולם)‪ [BT :(1‬ואם‪ | C :‬אולם‪‖ AML :‬‬ ‫‪ 1‬אנכסגוריש‪ [CBT :‬אנכסאגוריש‪:‬‬ ‫אנדקליס[ אנקלדיס‪ | A :‬אנדקלוס‪ ‖ B :‬ואולם)‪ [(2‬ואם‪C :‬‬ ‫‪ | AL‬אנכסגוריס‪ ‖ M :‬במאמרו[ באמרו‪ | BT :‬מאמרו‪ ‖ M :‬והנה[ ‪ +‬זה‪ 2 AM :‬ענין[ לית‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫אמרם[ אמרנו‪ ‖ C1 :‬נצחית[ ניצחית‪ ‖ BL :‬מכל[ כל‪ ‖ CT :‬יהיה[ לית‪ ‖ AL :‬בה[ לית‪ | CB :‬בהם‪‖ T :‬‬ ‫שתהיה[ שתהיינה‪ ‖ T :‬נצחית[ נצחיות‪ 3 CT :‬אלא[ אבל‪ ‖ C :‬התנועה[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬לבד[ בלבד‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬לבדה[ ‪ +‬צורת‪ 4 B :‬ולא…המתנועעים[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬ולא[ לא‪ ‖ M :‬ספר[ יספר‪ ‖ L :‬בתנועה[‬ ‫התנועה‪ ‖ B :‬מתנועות[ מתנועת‪ 5 CM :‬זה[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬לפי[ ‪ +‬שהוא‪ | C :‬על‪ ‖ T :‬שלא[ לא‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫נמצא[ ימצא‪ ‖ C :‬אם[ לית‪ 6 T :‬בטבע[ בטבעו‪ ‖ CT :‬ואם[ או‪ ‖ A :‬מן[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬ואם[ לית‪C :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ | (C1‬או‪ ‖ AL :‬בהכרח[ בהכרת‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬היה[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬ענינו[ עניינו‪ ‖ B :‬נמצאם[ נמצא‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫גם כן[ ג״כ‪B :‬‬

‫‪1071b36–37‬‬

‫‪231‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ḥ207v2‬شيئا ًمن النبات من ذاتها‬

‫‪27‬‬

‫و بلغ من قوة الحق أن جميع من جعل | الهيولى‬

‫‪ġ29,4–7‬‬

‫أقدم‬

‫مضطرون إلى الإقرار بالعلة التى هى بالفعل وإن لم يصرحوا | بذلك‬

‫مثل من خلط بالأجزاء التى لا تتجزأ حركة دائمة‬ ‫ومثل من فرض | المحبة والغلبة أو العقل وحركات مضطر بة‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪7‬‬

‫‪232‬‬

‫אמרו אי זו מאלו התנועות היא התנועה הראשונה אשר בטבע או אשר מן השכל או‬ ‫אשר תהיה מוכרחת כי כל זה יתחלף חלוף חזק‬ ‫אבל אתה כאשר תתבונן מאמרם הנה הם ישימו התנועה הראשונה התנועה המבולבלת‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫–‪1071b37‬‬ ‫‪1072a3‬‬

‫אשר אין לה סדר עוד ישימו אחר זה התנועה המסודרת עם הנפש ועם הגלגל‬ ‫ועם סדר הדברים הנמצאים ולא נמצא דבר מן ההקש יחייב שיקדם מה שאינו על‬ ‫יושר מה שיש לו יושר וסדר וזה כי אנחנו נמצא גשם יש לו סדר ויושר יקדם על‬ ‫מה שאין לו יושר ונמצא הגלגל וכל הגשמים השמימיים יסבבו סבובים תמידים קצתם‬ ‫ארוכים וקצתם קצרי הזמן וישובו אל הנקדה אשר התחילו הסבובים ממנה על תכלית‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫האמתות והדקדוק ומה שהיתה תנועתו תמידית בענין אחד הנה ראוי שיושם הסבה בה‬

‫‪1072a9–10‬‬

‫העלה אשר ענינה בהקש הגשמים המתנועעים ענין אחד‬ ‫ואולם מה שתנועתו מתחלפת בעתים מתחלפים הנה ענין העלה המניעה אותו‬ ‫בהתחלפות‬ ‫כענין המתנועע בעינו ולא נמצא דבר מן הגשמים המקבלים להויה ולהפסד‬ ‫יתקיים עת אחת בענין אחד הנה יצטרך אם כן באלו הגשמים אל עלה תתחלף כפי‬

‫‪ 7‬אמרו[ יאמרו‪ ‖ AL :‬זו[ זה‪ ‖ ABM :‬היא[ לית‪ ‖ CB :‬אשר בטבע[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬השכל[ ‪ +‬או אשר‬ ‫‪ 9‬כאשר[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬תתבונן‪[CBT :‬‬ ‫‪ 8‬מוכרחת[ הכרחית‪ ‖ C :‬זה[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫בטבע‪B :‬‬ ‫תבין‪ 10–9 AML :‬התנועה)‪…(1‬ישימו[ לית‪ 9 (C1⇄) C :‬התנועה)‪ [(2‬לית‪ ‖ BC1 :‬המבולבלת[‬ ‫המסתערת‪ 10 BT :‬לה[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬אחר זה[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬המסודרת[ שיש לה סדר‪ ‖ C :‬עם[ על‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 11 M‬מן[ ‪ +‬הדברים‪ ‖ M :‬ההקש[ ההיקש‪ ‖ AL :‬יחייב[ יחיב‪ ‖ AL :‬שיקדם‪ [CT :‬שקדם‪| AM :‬‬ ‫‪ 12‬יושר)‪ [(1‬סדר‪ ‖ C :‬מה[ למה‪ ‖ C1 :‬שיש לו[ שהוא‪ + :C1) C :‬על( | לו[ ‪ +‬על‪:‬‬ ‫שיקדים‪BL :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬וזה…אנחנו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬וזה[ לית‪ | AM :‬וכן‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬סדר[ וסדר‪ | B :‬יושר‪ ‖ CT :‬ויושר[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | B‬וסדר‪ ‖ CT :‬על[ לית‪ | (C1⇄) CB :‬לו‪ 13 T :‬יושר[ סדר‪ ‖ C :‬ונמצא הגלגל[ ‪ ‖ T0‬השמימיים[‬ ‫השמימים‪ ‖ AL :‬תמידים[ תמידיים‪ ‖ CB :‬קצתם[ ‪ 14 T0‬קצרי[ צרי‪ | A :‬קצרו‪ ‖ B :‬הזמן[ זמן‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C‬הנקדה[ הנקודה‪ | MB :‬מקומם‪ ‖ C :‬הסבובים[ בסביבים‪ | B :‬בסבובם‪ ‖ T0 | C :‬ממנה[ מהם‪| C :‬‬ ‫‪ 15 T0‬האמתות והדקדוק[ השלמות והאמתות‪ ‖ C :‬שהיתה[ שתהיה‪ ‖ B :‬תמידית…אחד[ ‪‖ T0‬‬ ‫בה[ מזה‪ 16 B :‬העלה אשר[ על האמת‪ ‖ C :‬ענינה[ עניינה‪ ‖ B :‬בהקש‪ [C :‬בהקשת‪ | AL :‬בהיקש‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ T0 | MB‬הגשמים‪ [CB :‬גשמים‪ | AL :‬הענינים‪ 17 T0 | M :‬מתחלפת בעתים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ענין[ העניין‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬המניעה[ המניע‪ ‖ C :‬אותו[ אותה‪ 18–17 C :‬בהתחלפות…ענין[ ‪ 17 T0‬בהתחלפות[ ‪ +‬זמן‪:‬‬ ‫‪ + | AML‬באי)?(‪ 18 B :‬כענין‪C :‬ع[ ענין‪ ‖ ABML :‬הגשמים[ הדברים‪ ‖ M :‬המקבלים להויה[ ‪‖ T0‬‬ ‫ולהפסד[ וההפסד‪ 19 BC :‬אחד[ אחת‪ ‖ B :‬הנה…באלו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬יצטרך[ נצטרך‪ ‖ CB :‬אם כן[ א״כ‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ MB‬תתחלף[ מתחלפת‪ ‖ CB :‬כפי[ מפני‪C :‬‬

‫‪1072a10–12‬‬

‫‪233‬‬

‫‪ L‬טו‬ ‫‪ḥ207v2‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫وما كانت حركته دائمة‬

‫فينبغى أن يجعل السبب فيها‬

‫العلة التى حالها بالقياس إلى | الأجسام المتحركة حال واحدة‬ ‫فأما ما حركته مختلفة فى أوقات مختلفة فحال العلة المحركة له فى‬ ‫الاختلاف |‬ ‫كحال المتحرك بعينها‬

‫والأجسام‬

‫ٺثبت وقتا ًواحدا ً بحال واحدة فإذن تحتاج‬

‫‪* 15‬يجعل‪ :‬ע )יושם([ ىحعل‪ | ḥ :‬نجعل‪b :‬‬

‫الكائنة الفاسدة لا‬ ‫إلى علة | تختلف بحسب‬

‫‪ 16‬حال‪b :‬ע[ حالا‪ḥ ً :‬‬

‫‪ 19‬فإذن[ فإذا‪b :‬‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬

‫‪234‬‬

‫התחלפותם ומפני כי ההויה וההפסד מתמיד אין הפסק לו הנה תצטרך העלה הפועלת‬ ‫לו שתהיה עם התחלפותה תמידית ההשארות ויתחייב אם כן בהכרח שיהיה ההתחלפות ‪1072a12–15‬‬

‫בזאת העלה מצדה והתמידות מסבה אחרת והוא אם כן אם מן העלה הראשונה ואם מן‬ ‫עלה אחרת זולתה ואשר^ ראוי בהכרח שיהיה מן העלה הראשונה כי זאת העלה היא‬ ‫הסבה בהשארותה תמיד והשארות העלה השניה ולזאת הסבה הזאת היתה יותר נכבדת‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫‪1072a15–17‬‬

‫ויותר נשאת וזה שאתה לא תמצא התמידות וההשארות בענין אחד לדבר מן העלות‬ ‫כמו שנמצאה לעלה הראשונה וסגלת העלה השניה ההתחלפות וסגלת העלה‬ ‫הראשונה התמידות הנה בהכרח היו כלם סבת התמידות וההתחלפות התראה‬

‫‪1072a17–18‬‬

‫זה המאמר אמנם הוא דבור לבד מונח הנחה ומה שיעיד עליו החוש הפך זה‬ ‫ולא ימצא אחד יגיע מעורון חושו ושכלו שלא יראה ולא יבין כי הגלגל הראשון‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫המקיף כל הגלגלים יתנועע תמיד תנועה אחת בעינה והגלגלים אשר לכוכבים הנבוכים‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫יתנועעו תמיד תנועה מתחלפת יקדם קצתם קצת ויבדל קצתם מקצתם ויקבלו מהם כל‬

‫‪ L‬טז‬

‫הדברים המקבלים להויה ולהפסד ר״ל מן התנועה התמידית והתנועה המתחלפת‬ ‫וכאשר היה זה כן מה צרכנו לבקש התחלות אחרות‬

‫‪1072a18‬‬

‫‪ 20‬ומפני…וההפסד[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ומפני[ מפני‪ | M :‬ובעבור‪ ‖ C :‬מתמיד[ מתמידה‪ ‖ T :‬הפסק לו[ לו‬ ‫הפסק‪ | C :‬הפסק לה‪ ‖ T :‬תצטרך‪ [BTL :‬יצטרך‪ | CA :‬יצטרך ‪ +‬אל‪M :‬‬ ‫‪ 21‬לו[ ‪ +‬אל‪ ‖ CB :‬ההשארות[ השארות‪ ‖ C :‬ויתחייב…שיהיה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ויתחייב[ ויתחיב‪:‬‬ ‫‪T0‬‬ ‫‪ 22‬והתמידות…והוא[‬ ‫‪ ‖ A‬אם כן[ א״כ‪ ‖ BM :‬ההתחלפות‪ [TL :‬התחלפות‪(C1⇄) CAMB :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ T0‬והתמידות[ והתמדות‪ ‖ B :‬והוא[ והנה‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬אם כן[ לית‪ | C :‬א״כ‪ ‖ BM :‬אם‪[CM :‬‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ ABTL :‬מן)‪ [(1‬לית‪ ‖ T :‬העלה[ הסבה‪ | C :‬מהעלה‪ ‖ T :‬ואם[ או‪ 23 AL :‬אחרת…ראוי[‬ ‫‪ ‖ T0‬זולתה[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬ראוי[ לית‪ :C1) C :‬יתחייב( ‪ 24–23‬העלה…תמיד[ ‪ 23 T0‬היא[ ‪ +‬היא‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ 24‬בהשארותה[ בהשארותו‪ ‖ AM :‬השניה[ השנייה‪ ‖ CB :‬הסבה)‪…(2‬נכבדת[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הזאת[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 25 CM‬נשאת[ נשארת‪ ‖ B :‬וזה[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬שאתה[ כי אתה‪ | CT :‬ואתה‪ ‖ B :‬התמידות…לדבר[‬ ‫‪ 26 T0‬שנמצאה[ שנמצאהו‪ ‖ CBT :‬הראשונה…השניה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬השניה[ השנית‪ ‖ CB :‬וסגלת)‪[(2‬‬ ‫וסגולת‪ 27 B :‬התמידות…סבות[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הנה…וההתחלפות[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬סבת‪C :‬ع[ סבות‪+ | AML :‬‬ ‫גשמי‪ ‖ C :‬וההתחלפות[ והתחלפות‪ ‖ M :‬התראה[ ‪ +‬או תחשוב‪ | CL :‬התחשוב‪ 28 T :‬דבור[‬ ‫הדבור‪ ‖ A :‬לבד[ לדבר‪ ‖ B :‬הנחה[ הניחהו‪ | C :‬אניחהו‪ ‖ B :‬ומה[ מה‪ | CB :‬ושמה‪ ‖ T :‬שיעיד[‬ ‫שיעור‪ 29 B :‬ולא)‪ + [T :(1‬או‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬או ‪ +‬לא‪ | ABL :‬לא‪ ‖ M :‬יגיע[ יגע‪ ‖ A :‬ולא)‪ [(2‬ושלא‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 30 T‬המקיף[ מקיף‪ ‖ B :‬כל[ בכל‪ | CB :‬לכל‪ ‖ T :‬יתנועע[ ינוע‪ ‖ CB :‬והגלגלים[ ושהגלגלים‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ T‬לכוכבים[ לכוכבי)!(‪ 1 C :‬תנועה מתחלפת[ התנועה המתחלפת‪ ‖ AM :‬קצת[ לית‪:C1) C :‬‬ ‫לקצתם( | לקצת‪ | B :‬מקצתם‪ ‖ T :‬ויבדל[ ויבטל‪ ‖ B :‬מקצתם[ מקצת‪ 3 CB :‬כן[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬צרכנו[‬ ‫צרכינו‪ ‖ AL :‬לבקש[ לבקשת‪ ‖ C :‬התחלות[ ההתחלות‪CB :‬‬ ‫‪ 21–20‬העלה…שתהיה[‬

‫‪235‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ḥ207v5‬اختلافها ولأن الـكون والفساد دائم لا انقطاع له فقد تحتاج العلة الفاعلة‬ ‫له أن تكون مع | اختلافها دائمة البقاء فيجب‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫أن يكون الاختلاف‬

‫فى هذه العلة من قبلها والدوام من سبب آخر فهو إذن إما من | العلة الأولى وإما من‬ ‫علة أخرى غيرها و يجب ضرورة أن يكون من العلة الأولى فإن هذه العلة هى‬ ‫السبب فى | بقائها دائما ًو بقاء العلة الثانية‬

‫وخاصية العلة الأولى الدوام وخاصية العلة‬

‫‪ġ31,4–5‬‬

‫‪26‬‬

‫‪ ḥ207v8‬الثانية الاختلاف فبالواجب صارا جميعا علة فصار العلتان جميعا ًعلتا ًالدوام والاختلاف‬ ‫وهذا شىء شهد الحس عليه أيضا |‬ ‫إذ يرى أن الفلك الأول‬ ‫يتحرك دائما ًحركة واحدة بعينها وأفلاك‬

‫‪ḥ207v8‬‬

‫‪ L‬טז تتحرك دائما ًحركة مختلفة‬

‫‪ ḥ207v9‬فإذا كان كذلك فما | حاجتنا إلى طلب مبادئ آخر‬

‫‪ 21‬له[ לית‪b :‬‬

‫‪ 22‬إذن[ إذا‪ ‖ b :‬علتا ً[ علتى‪b :‬‬

‫المتحيرة‬

‫‪30‬‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫‪3‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬

‫‪236‬‬

‫ולעזוב אלו ההתחלות ולהתלות במה‬

‫‪3‬‬

‫‪ L‬טז‬ ‫‪Λ.7.‬‬ ‫‪1072a19–21‬‬

‫שיאמרוהו המשוררים ובהתחדש הדברים הנמצאים מן החשך והערוב המגונה ובכלל‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫מה שהוא בטבעו בכח לא בפועל הנה היותר ראוי שנפיל ממנו כל זה ונאמר שהנה ימצא‬

‫‪1072a21–22‬‬

‫גשם יתנועע תנועה אין מנוחה לה והיא התנועה על הסבוב ושהוא לא יתבאר‬ ‫במאמר לבד‬ ‫אבל בפועל גם כן ואם היתה התנועה אין מנוחה לה הנה המתנועע בה נצחי והוא‬

‫‪1072a23‬‬

‫הגלגל הראשון ואם היה המתנועע אין מנוחה לתנועתו הנה מן המבואר כי המניע‬

‫‪1072a23–24‬‬

‫אותו אין מנוחה להנעתו ולא הפסק אבל כי הענין בשהוא נצחי מתמיד ההשארות‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫מבואר ואולם שהוא בלתי מתנועע הנה ראוי שנבארהו ממה שהקדמנו זכרו ונאמר כי‬ ‫אנחנו כבר בארנו כי מה שהיה מורכב משני דברים היה אפשר באחד משניהם שימצא‬ ‫עומד בעצמותו נפרד הנה אפשר גם כן בדבר האחר שימצא עומד בעצמותו נפרד ואם‬

‫‪1072a24–26‬‬

‫היה כבר נמצא דבר מתנועע ומניע יחד ונמצא דבר מתנועע לבד מבלתי שיניע הנה‬ ‫יתחייב בהכרח שימצא מניע בלתי מתנועע וזה שהוא נמצא בטבע אשר לא יתערב בו‬ ‫‪15‬‬

‫דבר מן ההיולי והוא אשר עצמותו בפועל ואין ראוי להפלא מאשר היה מניע בלתי‬ ‫מתנועע כי כל מי שהיה חשוק יניע על הצד הזה וכל מה שהיה מושכל כאשר‬ ‫‪ 3‬ולעזוב[ ועזוב ‪ +‬לו‪ | B :‬ועזוב‪ ‖ CT :‬ההתחלות[ התחלות‪ ‖ C :‬ולהתלות‪ [T :‬ותלות‪ | C :‬והתלות‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | AML‬הנתלות‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 4‬שיאמרוהו[ שיאמרהו‪ | C :‬שיאמרו‪ | B :‬שאמרוהו‪ ‖ T :‬והערוב[ ומן הערוב‪:‬‬ ‫)⇄‪(C1‬‬

‫‖ לא[ ולא‪ ‖ C :‬בפועל[ בפעל‪ ‖ CT :‬ראוי[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬זה[ סא אלו‬ ‫‪ 5 CT‬שהוא[ לית‪C :‬‬ ‫הדברים‪ 6 C1 :‬אין[ או‪ ‖ B :‬יתבאר[ התבאר‪ 7 AM :‬בפועל‪ + [L :‬בשכל‪ C1) C :‬סא אין בו‬ ‫מלת בשכל( | בשכל‪ ‖ ABMT :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬ואם[ אם‪ ‖ A :‬התנועה[ תנועה‪ ‖ A :‬הנה[ היה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬המתנועע[ מתנועע‪ ‖ M :‬והוא[ ‪ +‬והוא)!(‪ 8 B :‬המתנועע[ מתנועע‪ 9 C :‬המניע[ ‪ +‬לו‪C :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ ‖ (C1‬להנעתו[ לתנועתו‪ | AL :‬له‪ :‬ع ‖ כי[ בו‪) C :‬לית‪ ‖ (C1 :‬הענין[ ענין‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬מתמיד[ תמיד‪C :‬‬ ‫‪ 10‬בלתי[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬ממה[ מה‪ ‖ B :‬כי[ לית‪ 11 CT :‬אנחנו[ שאנחנו‪ ‖ CT :‬בארנו[ ביארנו‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ BT‬מה[ מי‪ ‖ BT :‬שהיה‪ [CMT :‬שהוא‪ ‖ ABL :‬דברים[ ‪ +‬אם‪ ‖ C1 :‬היה אפשר[ ואפשר‪ | MB :‬יהיה‬ ‫אפשר‪ 12 T :‬הנה…נפרד[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬אפשר[ ימצא‪ ‖ C1 :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ BC1 :‬האחר[ אחר‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ A‬שימצא עומד[ לית‪ 13 C1 :‬היה[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬נמצא[ ימצא‪ ‖ CT :‬ונמצא[ וימצא‪ ‖ CBT :‬מבלתי[‬ ‫בלתי‪ 14 C :‬יתחיב‪ [AL :‬יתחייב‪ | CB :‬התחיב‪ | M :‬נתחייב‪ ‖ T :‬שהוא[ הוא ‪ +‬אשר‪ ‖ T :‬לא[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 15 B‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ ‖ T0 | C :‬עצמותו[ עצמו‪ ‖ CT :‬בפועל[ בפעל‪ | T :‬الفعل‪ :‬ع ‖ ראוי[ ‪ +‬לה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C‬להפלא[ להיפלא‪ ‖ BL :‬מאשר היה[ משיהיה‪ ‖ CBT :‬בלתי[ לא‪ 16 CBM :‬מתנועע[‬ ‫יתנועע‪ ‖ C :‬שהיה[ שיהיה‪ ‖ T :‬חשוק[ ‪ +‬ימצא‪ 17–16 C1 :‬וכל…לקצת[ לית‪ 16 (C1⇄) C :‬שהיה[‬ ‫שהוא‪C1T :‬‬

‫‪1072a26–27‬‬

‫‪237‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ L‬טז‬ ‫‪ḥ207v10‬‬

‫وترك هذه المبادئ‬

‫فإن كانت الحركة لا سكون لها فالمتحرك بها أزلى وهو‬

‫‪3‬‬

‫‪7‬‬

‫فالمحرك |‬

‫الفلك‬ ‫له لا سكون له ولا انقطاع لتحر يكه فقد تبين أن هذا المبدأ أزلى‬ ‫‪ḥ207v11‬‬

‫وأما أنه غير متحرك‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫فلأن ما كان مركبا ًمن شيئين يمكن فى أحدهما | أن يوجد‬ ‫قائما بً ذاته مفردا ً فقد يمكن أيضا ًفى الآخر أن يوجد قائما بً ذاته مفردا ً فإن‬ ‫كان يوجد شىء يتحرك و يحرك معا ً| و يوجد شىء يتحرك فقط من غير أن يحرك‬ ‫فيجب ضرورة أن يوجد محرك غير متحرك وهو فى الطبيعة التى لا يشو بها‬ ‫‪ḥ207v13‬‬

‫الهيولى | وهو التى جوهرها الفعل ولا يجب أن تعجب من‬

‫‪ b15‬يتحرك فإن كل‬

‫‪ 9‬أزلى[ לית‪b :‬‬

‫محرك لا‬

‫معشوق فإنه يحرك على هذه الجهة وكل معقول إذا |‬

‫‪ 15‬الفعل[ בפעל )*بالفعل(‪ :‬ע ‖ *تعجب‪ :‬ע )להפלא([ ىعجب‪ | ḥ :‬نتعجب‪b :‬‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪17‬‬

‫‪238‬‬

‫השכלנוהו יניענו לקצת הפעולות הנה הוא מניע על הצד הזה אבל כי הדברים החשוקים‬ ‫והדברים המושכלים מפני כי היו רבים בנו ובשאר בעלי חיים הנה לא ימצא החשוק‬ ‫והמושכל יתנועעו^ יחד וזה כי החשוק יניע החושק מבלתי שיתנועע ואין טבעו‬ ‫מטבע הדברים‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫המושכלים ואולם ההתחלות^ הראשונות אשר לא יתערב בהם דבר מן ההיולי הנה‬ ‫החשוק‬ ‫והמושכל יחד דבר אחד כי הוא מושכל והוא^ חשוק לא יתחלף זה רצו׳ לו׳ בעבור שהוא‬ ‫חשוק הוא מושכל והנה נמצא זה בעינו בדברים החשוקים הקרובים מאתנו אשר נראה‬ ‫אותם והם אשר נתאוה אליהם ונבחרם אולם אשר נתאוה אליהם הם הדברים הערבים‬ ‫ואולם אשר נבחרם הם הדברים אשר הם באמת טובים וזה כי אנחנו נתאוה‬ ‫הדברים אשר‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫נבחרם בעבור כי אנחנו נראה אותם טובים ואין אנחנו רואים אותם בזה הענין בעבור‬ ‫שאנחנו נכוין לבקשם אבל אמנם נכוין לבקשם מפני שאנחנו נראה אותם בזה הענין‬ ‫אבל כי הנה יקרה לנו הרבה באלו הדברים שיהיה מה שנראה אותם בו מתחלף‬ ‫למה שהם‬ ‫עליו בנפשותם ואולם בחשק הראשון ובראשון מן החשוקים הנה אינו מה שנראה‬

‫‪ 17‬הפעולות‪ [BMT :‬הפעלותיה‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬הפעלות‪ ‖ AL :‬כי[ לית‪ 18 BM :‬מפני[ בעבור‪ ‖ C :‬כי‬ ‫היו‪ [AL :‬שהיו‪ | CT :‬שהיה‪ ‖ B :‬בעלי חיים[ ב״ח‪ 19 AM :‬והמושכל[ ‪ +‬فينا‪ :‬ع ‖ יתנועעו‪[AM :‬‬ ‫תנועתם‪ :C1) C :‬סא יניעו( | יתנועע‪ | B :‬יניעו‪ | TL :‬يتحدان‪ :‬ع || כי[ ‪ +‬כל‪ ‖ M :‬החשוק[ החושק‪C :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ + | (C1‬فينا‪ :‬ع ‖ טבעו[ בטבעו‪ 20 AL :‬ההתחלות[ فى المبادئ‪ :‬ع ‖ אשר[ אם‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬בהם[‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ M :‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ + | C :‬בהם‪ 21 M :‬והמושכל[ ‪ +‬בם‪ ‖ C1 :‬מושכל[ המושכל‪ ‖ C1 :‬והוא[‬ ‫هو‪ :‬ع ‖ חשוק[ ‪ +‬והוא מושכל)!(‪ | B :‬החשוק‪ ‖ C1 :‬זה[ ‪ +‬כל‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬ר״ל[ רצו׳ לו׳‪ 22 AL :‬הוא[‬ ‫והוא‪ ‖ CB :‬זה[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬אשר[ ואשר‪ 23 T :‬אותם[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬והם[ הם‪ ‖ A :‬ונבחרם[ أو نختارها‪:‬‬ ‫ع ‖ ונבחרם…אלהים[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬אולם[ ואולם‪ + | M :‬הדברים‪ 24–23 B :‬הערבים…הדברים)‪[(1‬‬ ‫לית‪ 24 A :‬הם באמת[ באמת הם‪ 25–24 M :‬וזה…טובים[ לית‪ 25 (C1⇄) C :‬בעבור[ מפני‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬אנחנו[ ‪ +‬אמנם‪ ‖ C1 :‬ואין[ וזה כי‪ 26 B :‬נכוין)‪ [(1‬נכון‪ ‖ CM :‬לבקשם[ ‪ +‬בעבור‪‖ (C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫אבל…לבקשם[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬נכוין)‪ [(2‬נכון‪ ‖ CM :‬לבקשם)‪ [(2‬לבקש‪ ‖ A :‬מפני[ בעבור‪ ‖ T :‬אותם[‬ ‫אתם‪ 27–26 A :‬בזה…אותם[ לית‪ 26 M :‬הענין[ העין‪ 27 (C1⇄) CBT :‬כי[ לית‪ ‖ AML :‬בו[‬ ‫‪ +‬עליו‪ 28 B :‬בו‪ [AM :‬עליו‪ ‖ CBTL :‬בנפשותם[ בעצמם‪ ‖ C :‬בחשק[ בחשוק‪ ‖ T :‬מן[ מפני‪| C :‬‬ ‫משני‪ | B :‬ממיני‪ ‖ C1 :‬מה שנראה[ נראה מה‪M :‬‬

‫‪1072a27–31‬‬

‫‪239‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫إلا أن الأشياء المعشوقة‬

‫‪ ḥ207v15‬عقلناه يحركنا لبعض الأفعال‬

‫‪17‬‬

‫كثيرة فينا وفى سا ئر الحيوان فليس يوجد | المعشوق‬

‫والأشياء المعقولة‬

‫والمعقول فينا يتحدان معا ًفإن المعشوق فينا يحرك العاشق من غير أن يتحرك وليست طبيعته‬ ‫من طبيعة | الأشياء‬ ‫‪ ḥ207v17‬المعقولة فأما فى المبادئ الأولى‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫فالمعشوق‬ ‫والمعقول معا ًشىء واحد لأنه معقول هو معشوق لا بخلاف | ذلك أعنى لأنه‬ ‫معشوق هو معقول وقد نجد ذلك بعينه فى الأشياء المعشوقة القر يبة منا التى نراها‬ ‫وهى التى نتشوق | إليها أو نختارها‬

‫كاللذيذة‬ ‫والتى هى بالحقيقة حسنة‬

‫وفى العشق الأول وفى أول المعشوقين ليس ما نرى‬

‫‪ 19‬فينا)‪ [(1‬לית‪ :‬ע ‖ يتحدان‪ [ḥ :‬متحدين‪ | b :‬יתנועעו )*يتحركان(‪ :‬ע ‖ فينا)‪ [(2‬לית‪ :‬ע ‖ وليست‪ [b :‬وليس‪:‬‬ ‫‪ḥ‬‬

‫‪ 20‬فى[ לית‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪ 23‬أو نختارها[ ונבחרם )*ونختارها(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪28‬‬

‫‪240‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪29‬‬

‫מתחלף למה שהוא בו באמת אבל מה שנראה ממנו הוא מה שהוא בו באמת ומה‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫שיושכל ממנו הוא ענינו ואשר יושכל מענינו שהוא טוב הנה הוא אם כן לפי האמת הטוב‬ ‫והתחלת התשוקה הזאת אמנם הוא מה שנשכיל מן הסבה הראשונה כמו שהתאוה בנו‬ ‫אמנם התחלתה המחשבה והדמיון וכל שכל הנה תנועתו מן הדבר המושכל כמו‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫שהמחשבה גם כן תנועתה מן הדבר שחושבים בו והדמיון תנועתו ממה שידומה בו‬

‫‪ L‬יז‬

‫ומיני הדבר המושכל רבים אבל כי ראשון המושכלים כלם העצם ומן העצם הפשוט‬

‫‪1072a31–32‬‬

‫ממנו אשר הוא בפועל והוא אשר לא יתערב בו מה שהוא בכח ואין דבר ינשא עליו‬ ‫ולא יונח תחתיו אבל הוא באמת טבע אחד פשוט ואין דבר ממה שיתערב בו ההיולי‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫פשוט ולא אחד נפרד אבל באי זה מן הדברים נמצא מה שהוא בכח הנה בו הרבוי‬ ‫וההרכבה ואם אמרת בו שהוא אחד הנה אינו כן לפי אמתת מה שיורה עליו האחד‬ ‫ואעפ״י שאנחנו פעמים הרבה נאמר בו שהוא אחד ושהוא פשוט וזה שאנחנו נאמר אדם‬ ‫אחד ואומה אחת והקדמה פשוטה ויסוד פשוט אבל כי אתה כאשר הבנת לפי האמת‬ ‫תמצא אלו הדברים אשר יאמר עליהם כוזבים זולת העצם הראשון כי זה הוא אשר‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫יאמר בו לפי האמת שהוא אחד פשוט ואמרך בו שהוא אחד לא יורה על השעור‬

‫‪ 29‬מתחלף[ שמתחלף‪ ‖ M :‬באמת)‪ [(1‬לית‪ ‖ C :‬באמת)‪ [(2‬אמת‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬לית‪ :‬ع‬ ‫עניינו‪ | B :‬ما له‪ :‬ع ‖ מענינו[ מעניינו‪ ‖ B :‬הוא)‪ [(2‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬אם כן[ א״כ‪ ‖ BM :‬לפי[ ולפי‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ 31‬הוא[ היא‪ ‖ CB :‬שנשכיל[ يعقل‪ :‬ع ‖ כמו[ וכמו‪ ‖ B :‬שהתאוה[ שנתאוה‪ | M :‬שתאוה‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫‪ 30‬ענינו[‬

‫‪ 32‬התחלתה[ התחלת‪ ‖ T0 | A :‬המחשבה[ המחשב‪ ‖ T :‬וכל שכל[ וכל שכן‪ | (C1⇄) CA :‬וכ״ש‪M :‬‬ ‫‪ 1‬שהמחשבה[ שהמחשב‪ ‖ BT :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬תנועתה[ לית‪ | M :‬תנועתו‪ ‖ CBT :‬שחושבים[‬ ‫שחושב‪ ‖ CMT :‬בו והדמיון[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬שידומה[ שידמה‪ ‖ C :‬בו)‪ [(2‬לית‪CBT :‬‬ ‫ומן[ לית‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬ומין‪ ‖ B :‬העצם[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫בפועל[ בפעל‪T :‬‬ ‫בכח[ לית‪B :‬‬ ‫ממה[ ממנו‪B :‬‬

‫‪–3‬יח‪ 10‬והוא…וישכילה[לית‪A :‬‬

‫‪ 4–3‬ינשא…ולא[ לית‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 2‬כי[ לית‪‖ T :‬‬

‫‪ 3‬אשר הוא[ הוא אשר‪ | AM :‬והוא אשר‪‖ T :‬‬ ‫‪ 3‬והוא אשר[ ואשר הוא ‪ +‬בפועל הוא‪‖ M :‬‬

‫‪ 4‬ולא[ ‪ +‬דבר‪ ‖ CT :‬יונח[ ינוח‪ ‖ L :‬תחתיו[ לית‪‖ M :‬‬

‫‪ 5‬פשוט[ הפשוט‪ ‖ C :‬זה[ ‪ +‬דבר‪ ‖ T :‬נמצא[ ‪ +‬בו‪ ‖ T :‬מה[ ממה‪ ‖ M :‬בו הרבוי[‬

‫בוא הרבוי‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬הרבוי בו‪BL :‬‬

‫‪ 6‬אמתת[ האמת‪ ‖ C :‬מה…האחד[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬עליו[ ‪ +‬שם‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 7‬ואעפ״י[ ואע״פ‪ ‖ CM :‬שאנחנו פעמים הרבה[ שהרבה פעמים אנחנו‪ ‖ M :‬פעמים הרבה[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | C‬הרבה פעמים‪ ‖ T :‬נאמר[ ‪ +‬מה שיורה עליו האחר ואם היה הרבה מה שנאמר‪ ‖ C :‬אדם[ איש‪:‬‬ ‫‪C‬‬

‫‪ 8‬ואומה[ ואמה‪ ‖ M :‬כי[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬הבנת[ ‪ +‬זה‪ ‖ MC :‬האמת[ ‪ +‬בו‪M :‬‬

‫‪ + | M‬האחד‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 10–9‬עליהם…בו[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 9‬יורה[ ‪ +‬בו‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 9‬עליהם[ אליהם‪:‬‬

‫‪1072a32–34‬‬

‫‪241‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ḥ207v19‬بمخالف لما | هو عليه بالحقيقة لـكن ما بدا منه هو ما عليه‬

‫وما‬

‫‪ ḥ207v20‬يعقل منه هو ما له والذى يعقل من أمره أنه خير فهو إذن على الحقيقة | الخـير‬

‫‪29‬‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫وابتداء هذا العشق إنما هو ما يعقل من العلة الأولى كما أن ابتداء الشهوة فينا‬ ‫‪ ḥ207r1‬الظن والتخيل وكل عقل فحركته من | الشىء المعقول كما‬ ‫‪ L‬יז أن الظن حركته من المظنون والتخيل‬

‫من المتخيل‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫وأول المعقولات كلها الجوهر ومن الجوهر البسيط |‬ ‫منه الذى هو بالفعل الذى هو واحد‬

‫إذ ليس فيه تركيب مما بالفعل ومما بالقوة والواحد بالحقيقة هو هذا |‬

‫‪ 29‬عليه)‪* + [(2‬بالحقيقة )באמת(‪ :‬ע ‪ 30‬ما له[ *أمره )ענינו(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫)שנשכיל( ‪ 1‬من المتخيل‪ [ḥ :‬والمتخيل‪ ‖ b :‬بل[ לית‪b :‬‬

‫‪ 31‬يعقل‪ [b :‬ىعقل‪* | ḥ :‬نعقل‪ :‬ע‬

‫*‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪11‬‬

‫‪242‬‬

‫כמו שיאמר אומה אחת ואצבע אחד ולא כמו שנאמר אדם אחד וסוס אחד כי אלו‬ ‫הדברים הנמצא בהם דבר אחד והאחד הוא דבר אחר ואולם הטבע הזה הנמצא ממנו‬ ‫והאחד דבר אחד בעינו וכן ג״כ הפשוט ולא יאמר שהוא פשוט מפני שיתרכב ממנו‬ ‫דבר אחר ולא בהקש דבר אחר אבל כי לו בטבעו שהוא פשוט לא יתבאר בו דבר‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫מן ההרכבה ולא דבר מן הכפל ולא נמצא הטבע הזה בדרך המניע הראשון לדברים לבד‬

‫‪1072b1–3‬‬

‫אבל בדרך השלמות והדבר אשר בעבורו וזה כי הדבר אשר נבחר בסבת עצמותו ואשר‬

‫‪1072a34–b1‬‬

‫יפיו בעצמותו ואשר לו המעלה בתכלית האחרון בעצמותו אמנם הוא התחלה ושלמות‬ ‫בעצמותו וכמו כן נמצא הענין בנימוס וזה כי הנימוס ג״כ יניע ההדרכה וממנו תהיה כי‬ ‫הנימוס בסבתו בעצמותו יהיה נבחר ויפה ויאמר שהוא בתכלית המעלה ויושר ההנהגה‬ ‫‪20‬‬

‫יוליך ענין בעלי ההדרכה מעיונם ביושר הנימוס וסדרו ובזה ישלימו ההדרכה‬ ‫וישמרו אותה‬ ‫אבל כי הנימוס אינו עצם אבל הוא פועל מפעולות העצם יבטל ולא יעמד כי אם מדת מה‬ ‫ואולם החשוק הראשון והמניע הראשון הנה הוא עצם לא יתערב בו ההיולי דבק‬ ‫ההשארות פשוט טבעו בפועל כמו אלו נדמה הנימוס אשר תעמוד בו ההדרכה שהוא‬ ‫חי ישכיל עצמותו ובשכל ההוא יניע ההדרכה והניעו באמת תנועה בדרך החשוק הנה‬ ‫‪ 11‬אומה[ אמה‪ ‖ MT :‬אחד[ ‪ +‬על השעור‪ ‖ C :‬ולא[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 12‬הנמצא[ לית‪‖ (C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫בהם[ בה‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬אחד[ לית‪ ‖ MT :‬והאחד…אחר[ לית‪ :C1) C :‬והאחד אחר( ‖ הוא[ לית‪‖ M :‬‬ ‫הזה[ הוא‪ ‖ B :‬הנמצא[ הנה מה שנמצא‪M :‬‬ ‫וכמו כן‪ ‖ MT :‬מפני[ בעבור‪CT :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪(C1‬‬

‫‪ 15‬דבר[ לית‪‖ BL :‬‬

‫‪ 13‬בעינו[ בענינו‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬וכן ג״כ[ וכן גם כן‪| C :‬‬

‫‪ 14‬אחר[ לית‪ ‖ CT :‬לו[ לא‪ ‖ BL :‬לא[ ולא‪ ‖ BL :‬דבר)‪ [(3‬לית‪C :‬‬

‫הטבע[ טבע‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‖ הטבע הזה בדרך[ הדרך הזה בטבע‪ ‖ M :‬הזה[‬

‫לית‪ ‖ T :‬לדברים[ לית‪ 16 C :‬השלמות[ ‪ +‬פי׳ התכלית‪ ‖ M :‬עצמותו[ עצמות‪ 17–16 M :‬ואשר‬ ‫יפיו בעצמותו[ לית‪ 17 (C1⇄) C :‬יפיו[ יהיה‪ | B :‬יופיו‪ ‖ C1 :‬בעצמותו)‪ [ׁ(2‬בעצמו‪ ‖ C1 :‬ושלמות[‬ ‫ושלימות‪ 18 C :‬כן[ ‪ +‬גם כן‪ ‖ C :‬נמצא[ לית‪ ‖ BL :‬הנימוס[ הנמוס‪ 19–18 M :‬ג״כ…הנימוס[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 18 (C1⇄) C‬ג״כ[ גם כן‪ | MT :‬הוא‪ ‖ C1 :‬ההדרכה[ ההרכבה‪ ‖ T :‬כי[ לית‪ 19 B :‬הנימוס[ הנמוס‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ M‬המעלה[ לית‪ 20 B :‬ענין[ הענין ‪ +‬זה‪ ‖ B :‬ההדרכה[ הדרכה‪ ‖ BL :‬מעיונם[ מעניונם)!(‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫ביושר[ כאשר‪ ‖ B :‬הנימוס[ הנמוס‪ | M :‬בנימוס‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬וסדרו[ ובסדרו‪ 21 C :‬הנימוס[ הנמוס‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ M‬פועל[ פעולה‪ | C1 :‬פעל‪ ‖ T :‬מפעולות[ מפעלות‪ ‖ T :‬יעמד[ יעמוד‪ ‖ MT :‬מדת[ בזמן‪| C :‬‬ ‫זמן‪ 22 T :‬הראשון)‪ [(2‬לית‪ :C1) C :‬הראשון ‪ +‬אשר( ‖ הנה[ לית‪ ‖ CT :‬הוא עצם[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬בו[‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ B :‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ + | C :‬והוא‪ 23–22 T :‬דבק ההשארות[ סא הוא נצחי‪ 23 C1 :‬טבעו[‬ ‫טבעי‪ ‖ M :‬בפועל[ ‪ +‬כי‪ | C :‬בפעל‪ ‖ T :‬הנימוס[ הנמוס‪ ‖ M :‬בו[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬ההדרכה[ ההרכבה‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ 24–23‬שהוא…ההדרכה[ לית‪ 24 (C1⇄) C :‬והניעו[ והניעה‪C :‬‬

‫‪243‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ḥ208r3‬وسا ئر الأشياء فإن الموجود شىء والواحد شىء آخر‬

‫‪12‬‬

‫فنقول إنسان واحد وفرس واحدة وأما هذه الطبيعة فالموجود | منها‬

‫‪11‬‬

‫والواحد شىء واحد بعينه ولذلك نقول فيها أنها بسيطة لأنها لا يتركب منها‬

‫‪13‬‬

‫شىء‬

‫بل لأنه‬

‫‪ ḥ208r4‬من التركيب |‬

‫وليست‬

‫منها شىء‬

‫ليس‬

‫هذه الطبيعة بمنزلة المحرك الأول للأشياء فقط‬

‫بل و بمنزلة الـكمال والشىء الذى من أجله فإن‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫الذى نختار بسبب | ذاته والذى‬

‫حسنه بذاته والذى له الفضيلة فى الغاية القصوى بذاته إنما هو مبدأ وكمال‬ ‫‪ ġ37,1–4‬بذاته وله مثال من الناموس‬

‫فأنه يحرك السياسة‬ ‫مختار وحسن‬

‫إلا أن الناموس ليس هو جوهر بل‬

‫على أنه‬

‫وفى غاية الفضيلة‬

‫فعل من أفعال الجوهر‬

‫وأما المعشوق الأول والمحرك الأول فجوهر‬

‫‪21‬‬

‫متصل‬

‫البقاء‬

‫‪ 15‬وليست‪ [b :‬وليس‪ḥ :‬‬

‫‪* 16‬بمنزلة‪ :‬ע )בדרך([ و بمنزلة‪* ‖ ḥb :‬نختار )נבחר(‪ :‬ע[ ىختار‪ | ḥ :‬يختار‪b :‬‬

‫‪244‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫האל ית׳ יכולת ונימוס וסבה ליושר זה העולם וסדרו ושכל ואמת ראשון בתכלית‬ ‫האחרון וכל פועל יהיה מן השכל הנה הוא חכמה ומחשב ומי שיאמר בפועל‬ ‫השכל שהוא‬ ‫עצם הנה יתחייב א״כ שיהיה עצם הסבה הראשונה חכמה ומחשב ומאתה יהיה סדר‬ ‫הדברים הנמצאים וישרם והיא אשר יחשקו אליה מה שאחריה וקצת יקרב ממנה וקצת‬ ‫ירחק בדרך מה שימצא בהדרכת המדינות וזה כי קצת אנשי המדינה יקרב מן‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫השלמות וקצתם יקצר מזה והנה ראוי שנשים התשוקה הזאת בכאן בדרך מה שימצא‬ ‫לאדם אשר שם מגמתו פעולת הנימוס מתאותו אליו ולחיות בו וזה כי כל רדיפה‬ ‫והתעבדות‬ ‫תהיה ברצון והבחירה הנה היא לאהבה ותשוקה אל ההתחלה ההיא אשר שם מגמתו‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫לפעולתה ומי שהבין כי כל אהבת הסבה הראשונה שיקרבו ממנה הדברים ויהיו כמוה‬ ‫הנה כבר עבר השעור בהבנתו כדרך מי שאמר כי הוא כמו תאות החי למזון ואין‬ ‫הענין כן אבל מיני החשק רבים ומיני הדברים החשוקים הנאהבים ג״כ רבים וזה כי‬ ‫התאוה למזון הפך התאוה לחשוק והאהבה לבריאות הפך האהבה למעלה לדרך‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫הישר כי התאוה למזון אמנם הוא כדי שיתמלא ממנו ואמנם החשוק אמנם‬

‫‪ 25‬ית׳[ ‪ +‬וית׳‪ + | M :‬ויתעלה‪ ‖ C :‬ונימוס[ ונמוס‪ ‖ M :‬ראשון[ ‪ +‬ושכל‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 26‬פועל[ פעל‪ ‖ T :‬יהיה[‬ ‫‪ 27‬א״כ[ אם כן‪CT :‬‬

‫היה‪ ‖ C :‬ומחשב[ ומחשבה‪ ‖ T :‬ומי שיאמר[ وقد نقول‪ :‬ع ‖ בפועל[ בפעל‪T :‬‬ ‫‪ 28‬וישרם[ ויושרם‪ ‖ C :‬והיא[ והוא‪ 29 T :‬ירחק[ ‪ +‬ממנה‪ ‖ CL :‬בהדרכת המדינות[ בהדרכה‬ ‫המדינית‪ ‖ C1 :‬אנשי[ מאנשי‪ 30 T :‬השלמות[ השלימות‪ | C :‬השולטנות‪ ‖ B :‬וקצתם[ וקצת‪‖ T :‬‬ ‫יקצר‪ [CT :‬יקצרו‪ ‖ BML :‬התשוקה הזאת[ זאת התשוקה‪ ‖ C :‬בכאן[ הנה‪ 31 C :‬שם מגמתו[ שם‬ ‫מדרגתו‪ | B :‬נמשך אחר‪ ‖ T :‬פעולת‪ [M :‬ענין‪ | CL :‬בפועלת‪ | B :‬לית‪ ‖ T :‬מתאותו[ ותאותו‪‖ M :‬‬ ‫והתעבדות‪ [MT :‬והעבדות‪ | CL :‬וההתעבדות‪ 32 B :‬תהיה[ יהיה‪ ‖ MT :‬והבחירה[ ובבחירה‪‖ M :‬‬ ‫היא[ הוא‪ ‖ M :‬ותשוקה‪ [MT :‬ותשוקתה‪ | C :‬ולתשוקה‪ ‖ BL :‬ההיא[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬שם מגמתו[ מגמתו‬ ‫שם‪ | C :‬לית‪ 1 T :‬לפעולתה[ עניינו‪ | C :‬לפעלתה‪ ‖ T :‬שהבין[ ‪ +‬בו‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬אהבת[ לית‪C :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ ‖ (C1‬שיקרבו[ שיתקרבו‪ ‖ BL :‬ממנה[ ממנו‪ ‖ CB :‬הדברים[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬ויהיו[ והיו‪ | B :‬ויהיה‪‖ T :‬‬ ‫שאמר[ שיאמר‪ ‖ C :‬הוא[ זה‪ 3 CT :‬הנאהבים[ האהובים‪ ‖ T :‬ג״כ[ גם כן‪ 4 CM :‬לחשוק‪:‬‬ ‫‪ [ML‬אל החשוק‪ | CT :‬לחשוקי‪ | B :‬אל החשוק ‪ +‬והתאוה לחשוק זולת התאוה לבריאות‪–4 C1 :‬‬ ‫‪ 7‬האהבה…אותו[ ‪ 5–4 T0‬התאוה)‪…(1‬כי[ ‪ +‬התאוה…כי‪ 4 C :‬למעלה לדרך‪ [C :‬במעלת מה‬ ‫לדרך‪ | BL :‬במעלה דרך‪ 5 M :‬אמנם[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬הוא[ לית‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬היא‪ ‖ M :‬כדי[ ‪ +‬כדי‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫שיתמלא[ שימלא‪ | C :‬שתמלא‪ ‖ M :‬ואמנם[ ואולם‪ ‖ C :‬אמנם)‪ [(2‬הנה‪C :‬‬

‫‪ L‬יח‬ ‫‪1072b3–4‬‬

‫‪245‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫وهو عقل وحق | أول فى الغاية‬

‫‪ḥ208r6‬‬

‫وكل فعل يكون عن العقل وهو علم‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫وقد نقول فى فعل‬

‫العقل إنه‬ ‫جوهر فيجب‬

‫أن يكون جوهر العلة الأولى علم |‬

‫وعنها يكون ترتيب‬

‫الأشياء الموجودة ونظامها وهى التى يتشوق إليها ما بعدها فبعض يقرب منه و بعض‬ ‫يبعد كما | يوجد فى سياسة المدن فإن بعض أهل المدينة يقرب من‬ ‫‪ ḥ208r9‬الـكمال و بعض ينقص عنه‬

‫‪ 26‬فهو[ وهو‪ ‖ b :‬وقد نقول‪ [b :‬وقد ىقول‪ | ḥ :‬ומי שיאמר )*ومن يقول(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫ىتشوق‪ | ḥ :‬نتشوق‪ ‖ b :‬ما[ وما‪ 30 b :‬ينقص‪ḥ :‬ע[ ينفض‪b :‬‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫‪* 28‬يتشوق )יחשקו(‪ :‬ע[‬

‫‪246‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪6‬‬

‫יתאוה אליו כדי שיראהו ויקרב ממנו ואולם הבריאות הנה יתאוה אליו כדי שיקנה‬ ‫אותו ואולם הדרך הישר הנה נאמר שאנחנו הנה נתאוה אליו שאנחנו נרצה שנחיה על‬ ‫היושר וג״כ החיל הנה יתאוה אל המושל והמדינה אל המלך כדי שימשכו אחריו ויביטו‬ ‫ענינו וכדי^ שנעמוד על מה שבארנוהו בעלה הראשונה מאשר היא בלתי מתנועעת‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫אינו מן הפלא א״כ אם היתה עלה ראשונה שתהיה עצם ושכל ובהשכילה^ עצמותה‬ ‫יתאוו אליה כל הדברים הנשארים כדי שישימו מגמתם פעלת השכל ההוא ר״ל יושר‬ ‫הדברים הנמצאים וסדרם בדרך תאות האדם הדבק לנימוס אל החיים בו והאדם‬ ‫המתעסק בהדרכה האהבה שיהיה על הדרך אשר תורה אליו ההדרכה‬ ‫הנה הסבה הראשונה תניע כמו שיניע החשוק והראשון אשר יתנועע מאתה ויקרב ממנה‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫ויחשוק אותה וישתדל להדמות בה הרקיע הראשון וגלגל הכוכבים הקיימים בעבור כי‬ ‫היה קרוב ממנה כבר קנה מן היושר שלו^ אשר אליו יחשוק בתכלית מה שאפשר‬ ‫בדרך מה שיקנה אותו השוטר ממדרגת המלך כאשר היה קרוב ממנו לא במקום אבל‬ ‫בטבע עוד יבא אחר הרקיע ותנועתו ר״ל התנועה הראשונה התנועה אשר אחריה והיא‬

‫‪ 6‬יתאוה)‪ [(1‬התאוה‪ ‖ C :‬ממנו[ אליו‪ ‖ B :‬יתאוה)‪ [(2‬יתאוו‪ | M :‬התאוה‪ ‖ C :‬כדי[ במה‪:C1) C :‬‬ ‫בעבור(‬

‫‪ 7‬הנה)‪…(1‬שאנחנו)‪ ‖ T0 [(2‬הנה)‪ [(2‬לית‪ ‖ M :‬שנחיה[ שנבא‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 8‬וג״כ…המושל[‬

‫‪ ‖ T0‬וג״כ[ וכן גם כן‪ | C :‬וגם כן‪ ‖ M :‬הנה[ לית‪ ‖ CM :‬אל[ על‪ ‖ C :‬והמדינה[ והמדינות‪C :‬‬ ‫‪ 9‬ויביטו…שיעמוד[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ ‖ BL‬מתנועעת[ ‪ +‬נאמר‪C1 :‬‬

‫‪ 10‬מן[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬הפלא[ פלא‪ ‖ C :‬א״כ[ אם כן‪ ‖ CT :‬ושכל‪ [MT :‬לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ | C‬נשכל‪ ‖ BL :‬ובהשכילה[ ובהשכיל‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬שישימו[ שיעמדו‪ ‖ CB :‬מגמתם[ על ענין‪ ‖ C :‬פעלת[‬

‫לית‪ | C :‬פעולת‪ ‖ BM :‬השכל[ השכלי‪ ‖ A :‬ר״ל[ לית‪B :‬‬ ‫לנימוס[ הנמוס‪M :‬‬

‫‪–8‬‬

‫‪ 9‬ענינו[ עניניו‪ | C :‬עניינו‪ ‖ B :‬שבארונהו[ שנבארנוהו)!(‪ ‖ B :‬היא[ הוא‪:‬‬

‫‪ 12‬הנמצאים[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬בדרך[ כדרך‪‖ L :‬‬

‫‪ 13‬המתעסק[ מתעסק‪ | M :‬הממונה‪ ‖ C :‬בהדרכה האהבה[ להדרכת האוהב‪:‬‬

‫‪ | C‬בהדרכה האוהבה‪ ‖ T :‬שיהיה[ שיבא‪ | C :‬שיחיה‪ ‖ T :‬הדרך[ דרך‪ ‖ C :‬אליו[ עליו‪ | CT :‬לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪B‬‬

‫‪ 14‬תניע[ יניע‪ ‖ CBT :‬שיניע[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 15‬אותה[ אותם‪ ‖ M :‬להדמות[ להתדמות‪‖ BC :‬‬

‫הרקיע[ השמים‪ ‖ T :‬הקיימים‪ [CBT :‬הקימים‪ ‖ AML :‬בעבור[ לית‪ ‖ CT :‬כי[ לית‪AL :‬‬

‫‪ 16‬היה[‬

‫שהיה‪ ‖ AL :‬קרוב[ הקרוב‪ ‖ C1 :‬מן היושר[ מהיושר‪ ‖ C :‬היושר שלו[ نظامها‪ :‬ع ‖ אליו[ לית‪‖ T :‬‬ ‫בתכלית[ לית‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 17‬בדרך‪ [CAM :‬כדרך‪ ‖ BTL :‬מה[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬אותו[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬השוטר[ השליט‪:‬‬

‫‪ | C‬השטר‪ ‖ A :‬כאשר[ ‪ +‬בתכלית‪ ‖ B :‬אבל[ אלא‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 18‬יבא[ יבוא‪ ‖ CAL :‬הרקיע[ השמים‪| B :‬‬

‫‪ +‬الأولى‪ :‬ع ‖ ותנועתו‪ [CMT :‬ותנועתה‪ ‖ ABL :‬ר״ל[ לית‪ ‖ C1 :‬התנועה הראשונה[ לית‪‖ (C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫התנועה)‪ [(2‬והתנועה‪ ‖ B :‬אשר[ לית‪M :‬‬

‫‪247‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ L‬יח‬ ‫‪ ḥ208r9‬فليس بعجب‬

‫إن كانت علة أولى أن تكون | جوهرا ً وفعلا ًو بعقلها ذاتها‬

‫‪ b16‬ٺتشوق إليها جميع الأشياء الباقيةكما يقفوا أ ثر‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫ذلك العقل أعنى نظام‬

‫الأشياء الموجودة | وترتيبها‬

‫فالعلة الأولى تحرك كما يحرك المعشوق وأول ما يتحرك عنها و يقرب منها‬

‫‪14‬‬

‫‪ ḥ208r11‬و يعشقها و يحرض على | التشبه بها السماء الأولى وفلك الـكواكب الثابتة إذ‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫كان قر يبا ًمنها قد استفاد من نظامها الذى إ ياه يعشق على غاية | ما يمكن‬ ‫بمنزلة ما يستفيده القائد من مرتبة الملك إذ كان يقرب منه لا فى الموضع لـكن‬ ‫فى الطبيعة ثم ٺتبع السماء الأولى وحركتها |‬

‫التى بعدها وهى‬

‫‪ 10‬وفعلا ً[ ושכל )*وعقلا ً(‪ :‬ע ‖ *و بعقلها‪ :‬ע )ובהשכילה([ وىعقلها‪ ‖ ḥ :‬وتعقلها‪b :‬‬ ‫‪b‬‬

‫‪ 15‬إذ‪b :‬ע[ أو‪ḥ :‬‬

‫‪* 17‬القائد‪ :‬ע )השוטר([ الٯاىد‪ | ḥ :‬الفائد‪b :‬‬

‫)ותנועתו(‪ :‬ע[ وحركاتها‪ḥ :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬يقفوا[ يقفو‪:‬‬

‫‪ 18‬الأولى[ לית‪ :‬ע ‖ *وحركتها‬

‫‪248‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪19‬‬

‫תנועת גלגל הכוכבים הקיימים ותנועות גלגלי הכוכבים הנבוכים ושאר הדברים‬ ‫הנשארים אשר‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫יקבלו ההויה וההפסד והטבע רב התנועות אשר אין תנועתם במקום לבד בדרך‬ ‫האלהיות אבל כל טבעיהם ויתחייב אם כן שיהיה החלוף בין הדברים המתנועעים רב‬ ‫מאד ויהיה האפשרות בכל אחד מהם זולתו באחר ואם היתה התנועה כוללת כל מה‬ ‫שיתנועע כי האפשרות בנפש התנועה ותנועת קצתה תהיה במקום לבד וקצתה יתנועע‬ ‫בענינים ובעצם ובמה שדומה לו תנועות מתחלפות ולא נמצא האפשרות גם כן בכלם‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫אחד אבל הגשמים השמימיים אשר שנויים יהיה במקום לבד כאשר אמרנו שהוא‬

‫‪1072b4–7‬‬

‫אפשר בהם החלוף הנה לא נרצה בו דבר זולת שהוא אפשר שיהיה במקומות מתחלפים‬ ‫לא על שהוא אפשר שלא יהיה במקום אבל מה שיורה עליו מאמרנו שהוא אפשר אינו‬ ‫לפי האמת מה שיורה עליו זה השם ולא על צד מה שיטה אל שני הצדדים אבל‬ ‫על שהם אינם במקום אשר יתחייב בהכרח שיהיה בו כי אמתת מה שיורה עליו אמרנו‬ ‫‪30‬‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫אפשר אמנם יפול על זה הטבע החלוש המבולבל אשר יכנס האפשרות בו בשער‬ ‫הסתירה ואם היה המאמר באפשרות בגשמים השמימיים אין ענין לו והם אשר ישתנו‬

‫‪ 19‬הקיימים…הכוכבים[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הקיימים[ הקימים‪ ‖ M :‬ותנועות‪ [M :‬ותנועת‪| AC1TL :‬‬ ‫תנועת‪ ‖ B :‬הנשארים[ לית‪CL :‬‬

‫‪ 20‬רב[ רבי‪ | AM :‬ורב‪ ‖ T :‬תנועתם[ תנועותיו‪ ‖ C :‬בדרך‪:‬‬

‫‪ [CAM‬כדרך‪ | BL :‬במדרגת ‪ +‬הטבע‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 21‬האלהיות[ האלהי‪ ‖ T :‬טבעיהם[ טבעיו‪ ‖ C :‬ויתחייב[‬

‫יתחייב‪ ‖ MT :‬אם כן[ א״כ‪ ‖ BM :‬בין[ ‪ +‬כל‪A :‬‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ B :‬כוללת[ תכלול‪ ‖ C :‬כל[ לכל‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 22‬זולתו[ זולת‪ | C :‬זולת ‪ +‬האפשרות‪ ‖ T :‬היתה[‬ ‫‪ 23‬כי[ ‪ +‬היה‪ ‖ C :‬התנועה[ תנועה‪ ‖ B :‬ותנועת[‬

‫ותנועה‪ ‖ B :‬תהיה[ שתהיה‪ ‖ C :‬יתנועע[ לית‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 24‬בענינים[ בעניינים‪ ‖ B :‬ובמה[ ומה‪‖ A :‬‬

‫מתחלפות[ ‪ ‖ T0‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬בכלם[ בכולם‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 25‬אחד[ כאחד‪ ‖ C :‬השמימיים[ השמימים‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ C‬אשר[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 26‬בהם החלוף[ בו ההתחלפות‪ | C :‬בה הנמצא‪ ‖ T0 | B :‬בו[ בזה‪ | CT :‬לית‪‖ B :‬‬

‫דבר[ ‪ +‬בזה‪ ‖ B :‬שיהיה[ שיהיו‪ ‖ AM :‬מתחלפים[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 27‬על‪ [AMB :‬לית‪ ‖ CTL :‬שהוא)‪[(1‬‬

‫שלא‪ ‖ A :‬שלא…אפשר)‪ [(2‬לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬שלא יהיה במקום‪ [BTC1 :‬שיהיה בזולת מקום‪| AL :‬‬ ‫שיהיה במקום‪ ‖ M :‬אבל[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬שהוא אפשר)‪T0 [(2‬‬

‫‪ 28‬שיורה[ שיורו‪ ‖ B :‬השם[ לית‪‖ C :‬‬

‫מה[ לית‪ ‖ AL :‬מה…שני[ ‪ ‖ T0‬שני[ אחד משני‪ ‖ AL :‬הצדדים[ הצדדין‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 29‬על[ לית‪‖ M :‬‬

‫שהם[ השם‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬יתחייב[ יתחיב‪ ‖ M :‬בהכרח…בו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬אמרנו[ מאמרנו‪ + | CB :‬שהוא‪T :‬‬ ‫‪ 30‬יפול…הטבע[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הטבע[ בטבע‪ ‖ C :‬המבולבל[ והמבולבל‪ ‖ B :‬יכנס[ יפנה‪ ‖ A :‬בו[ לית‪T :‬‬ ‫‪ 1‬הסתירה…המאמר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬בגשמים[ הגשמים‪ ‖ AL :‬ענין[ עניין‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 2–1‬והם…השנוי)‪T0 [(1‬‬

‫‪ L‬יט‬

‫‪249‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ḥ208r14‬حركة فلك الـكواكب الثابتة وحركات أفلاك الـكواكب المتحيرة وسا ئر الأشياء‬

‫‪19‬‬

‫الباقية التى‬ ‫تقبل الـكون والفساد |‬

‫‪ḥ208r15‬‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫والحركات كثيرة مختلفة ليس‬ ‫واحدا ً لـكن الأجسام السماو ية‬

‫تغيرها فى المكان فقط‬

‫‪ 25‬واحدا ً‪ [b :‬واحد‪* ‖ ḥ :‬تغيرها )שנויים(‪ :‬ע[ ىغيرها‪ ‖ ḥ :‬كغيرها‪b :‬‬

‫الإمكان‬

‫فى جميعها‬

‫‪24‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫‪250‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪2‬‬

‫השנוי הראשון המתחדש במקום לבד מבלתי שימשש השנוי ההוא מטבעם מבפנים‬ ‫הנה אשר יניע הגשמים השמימיים זאת התנועה אשר אמרנו בה פעמים רבות שהיא‬

‫‪1072b7–10‬‬

‫הראשון מן השנויים בעבור שהוא בלתי מתנועע מכל הצדדים ובלתי משתנה ובלתי‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫נעתק אי אפשר שיהיה בו התחלפות לא בעצם ולא בדבר מן הדברים וזה כי ההויה‬ ‫וההפסד רחוקים ממנו מאד וכן גם כן התנועה אשר תהיה בתוספת והחסרון כי זה אמנם‬ ‫הוא ההליכה אל ההפסד וכן התנועה אשר במקום כי היא גם כן קצת שנוי הגשם‬ ‫ובו הנעה מבלתי שיתנועע ומה שלא יתנועע התנועה הראשונה הנה כל שכן שלא‬ ‫יתנועע אחת מן התנועות הנשארות הנה האפשרות אם כן רחוק ממנו מאד‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫והוא אם כן נמצא בהכרח וההתחלה אשר היא בהכרח בזה הענין היא ההתחלה וזה כי‬

‫‪1072b10–13‬‬

‫מה שאי אפשר בו מבלתי שיהיה היה משתנה או בלתי משתנה הנה זה ענינו בהכרח‬ ‫והוא נמצא וזה כי ההכרח יאמר על שלשה צדדים אחד מהם מה שיהיה מוכרח מפני‬ ‫שהוא חוץ מן המכוון ממנו והשני מה שאי אפשר הדבר שיהיה בענין היותר טוב רק‬ ‫ממנו והשלישי מה שאי אפשר שיהיה בחלוף מה שהוא בו במוחלט הנה בדמיון‬

‫‪ 2‬שימשש השנוי[ שישמש השמוש‪ | A :‬שישמש השנוי‪ ‖ T0 | C :‬ההוא[ לית‪ ‖ T0 | B :‬מטבעם[‬ ‫מטבע‪ | B :‬מטבעו‪ ‖ T0 | C :‬מבפנים[ בפנים‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 3‬הנה[ והנה‪ | B :‬לית‪ ‖ C :‬אשר)‪ [(1‬ואשר‪‖ C :‬‬

‫השמימיים…אשר)‪ 4–3 T0 [(2‬אשר)‪…(2‬השנויים[ לית‪ 3 C :‬שהיא[ שיהיו‪ | M :‬שהוא‪ + | T :‬أول‬ ‫الحركات‪ :‬ع‬

‫‪ 4‬הראשון[ وأول‪ :‬ع ‖ מן…בלתי[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מתנועע[ ‪ +‬מן הדברים‪ ‖ M :‬מכל[ בכל‪A :‬‬ ‫‪ 5‬שיהיה בו[ בו שיהיה‪ ‖ C :‬התחלפות[ ההתחלפות‪ ‖ T :‬לא[ לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ 5–4‬ובלתי)‪…(2‬שיהיה[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ | B‬ולא‪ ‖ C :‬בדבר מן הדברים[ בדרך מן הדרכים‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 6–5‬הדברים…וההפסד[ ‪T0‬‬

‫והפסד‪ ‖ C :‬וכן גם כן[ וכן ג״כ‪ | B :‬וגם כן‪ ‖ M :‬אשר…והחסרון[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫‪ 6‬והחסרון[ וחסרון‪AL :‬‬

‫‪ 6‬וההפסד[‬

‫‪ 7–6‬תהיה…אשר[ ‪in marg. A‬‬

‫‪ 7‬הוא[ היא‪ ‖ C :‬וכן…היא[ ‪ ‖ T0‬וכן[ ‪ +‬גם כן‪ ‖ C1 :‬התנועה[ תנועה‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C‬אשר[ ‪ +‬היא‪ ‖ M :‬כי[ בו‪ ‖ A :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬שנוי[ שנויי‪AT :‬‬

‫‪ 8‬ובו[ הנה בו‪‖ T :‬‬

‫הנעה[ התנעה)!(‪ | A :‬התנועה‪ ‖ B :‬מבלתי…יתנועע[ ‪ ‖ T0‬התנועה[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬הנה[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬כל שכן[‬ ‫כ״ש‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 9‬יתנועע…הנשארות[ ‪ ‖ T0‬יתנועע[ ‪ +‬תנועה‪ ‖ B :‬מן[ לית‪ ‖ CA :‬התנועות[ מהתנועות‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 10‬והוא…בהכרח)‪ ‖ T0 [(1‬אם כן[ אם‪| B :‬‬

‫‪ ‖ C‬אם כן[ א״כ‪ ‖ BM :‬ממנו מאד[ מאד ממנו‪C :‬‬ ‫א״כ‪ ‖ M :‬וההתחלה[ והתחלה‪ ‖ AL :‬היא)‪ [(1‬לית‪B :‬‬ ‫הוא‪ ‖ (C1⇄) CA :‬ההתחלה[ התחלה‪(C1⇄) CB :‬‬

‫‪ 12–10‬הענין…מוכרח[ ‪T0‬‬

‫לית‪ ‖ C1 :‬או[ לית‪ ‖ CB :‬בלתי משתנה[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬ענינו[ עניינו‪B :‬‬ ‫שהיה‪ ‖ AM :‬מפני[ בעבור‪CT :‬‬ ‫‪C‬‬

‫‪ 14–13‬טוב…אפשר[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 15–14‬במוחלט…הזה[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 10‬היא)‪[(2‬‬

‫‪ 11‬בו[ הוא‪ ‖ B :‬מבלתי‪ [B :‬לית‪ ‖ CAML :‬היה[‬ ‫‪ 12‬צדדים[ צדדין‪ ‖ B :‬שיהיה[‬

‫‪ 13‬שהוא…אפשר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מן המכוון[ מהמכוון‪ ‖ C :‬בענין[ בו ענין‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 13‬טוב[ יותר‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 14‬בדמיון[ אם כן‪C :‬‬

‫)⇄‪(C1‬‬

‫‪ 14‬שיהיה[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬בחלוף[ בהפך‪C :‬‬

‫‪1072b13–14‬‬

‫‪251‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ L‬יט‬ ‫‪ ḥ208r15‬فالذى يحرك الأجسام | السماو ية هذه الحركة التى قلنا‬

‫وأول التغا ير‬

‫إنها أول الحركات‬

‫غير متحرك من جميع الجهات وغير مستحيل وغير‬

‫‪ ḥ208r16‬منتقل | لا يمكن أن يكون فيه اختلاف لا فى الجوهر ولا فى شىء من الأشياء‬

‫وما لم يتحرك الحركة الأولى فبالأحرى أن لا‬ ‫يتحرك واحدة من الحركات | الباقية فالإمكان‬ ‫‪ ḥ208r18‬فهو إذن موجود ضرورة‬

‫بهذه الحال‬

‫‪ 4‬وأول[ הראשון )*أول(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫‪8‬‬

‫بعيد منه جدا ً‬

‫والضرورة فيه أنه لا يمكن أن يكون بخلاف ما هو عليه | مطلقا ًفبمثل‬

‫‪ 3‬أول الحركات[ לית‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪3‬‬

‫‪ 8‬ان[ לית‪b :‬‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪14‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬

‫‪252‬‬

‫ההכרח הזה אם כן השמים וטבע הכל תלויין ואולם ההשארות על תכלית המעלה‬

‫‪1072b14–17‬‬

‫והוא אשר ישלים לנו מדה מן הזמן הנה הוא לאותו העצם החלד כלו וזה כי עמידתנו‬ ‫בעבור שהיא מכחות מתחלפים היינו מוצאים מעט^ הדרך אל החכמה כי השכל שלנו‬ ‫ברוב העתים טריד אין פנאי לו עם שהוא ואם היה טריד בשאר הדברים מעורב בגוף‬ ‫הנה הוא פעמים ישליך מאתו ואפילו מדה קטנה שאר מה שימנעהו מן ההבנה וישכיל‬ ‫‪20‬‬

‫עצמותו מבלתי מונע ויתוכן לו בזה חדוה ושמחה תמידית לא יספר מרוב‬ ‫ואולם אשר טבעו לא ימלט כהרף עין מן החכמה הנה אין ההנאה לו נקנית אבל‬ ‫הוא ההנאה והוא יותר נכבד מכל הדברים ואם היתה היקיצה יותר ערבה מן‬ ‫השינה אצלנו כי הפעל יותר ערב מן הבטלה והחוש מהעדרו והשכל מן השכלות‬ ‫הנה הגעת תוספת השכל ההוא בכבוד ומעלת הסברא אין תכלית לו וזה כי מה שהוא‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫בפועל יותר ערב בכל הדברים ממה שהוא בכח ואליו ישתדל הטבע ובזאת הסבה‬ ‫היתה התקוה עריבה מאד מפני שהיא מקוה שישוב מה שהוא בכח בפעל והזכרון גם‬ ‫כן אינו למה שהוא בכח אבל למה שהוא בפועל וכאשר היה הדבר אשר ימצא בו מה‬

‫‪ 15‬אם כן[ א״כ ‪ +‬טבע‪ | M :‬א״כ‪ | B :‬אם‪ ‖ C :‬תלויין‪ [ABL :‬תלוים ‪ +‬עליו‪ | C :‬תלויים ‪ +‬בו‪ | M :‬תלויים‪:‬‬ ‫‪ :in marg. C1 | T‬בביאור בן רשד הלשון וכאשר היה זה כן הנה השמים אם כן וטבע הכל)?( תלוי‬ ‫בכמו זאת ההתחלה)?( ר״ל שאמנם נמצא לה ההכרח מפני זאת ההתחלה)?( לא בעבורם בעצמם ‖‬ ‫על…המעלה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ההשארות[ ‪ +‬الذى‪ :‬ع ‖ על תכלית[ בתכלית‪ | C :‬לית‪ 16 M :‬והוא[ הוא‪C :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ ‖ (C1‬ישלים[ לית‪ | C :‬ישלם‪ ‖ T :‬לאותו[ לזאת‪ ‖ C :‬העצם[ לית‪ :C1) C :‬ההתחלה( ‖ החלד[‬ ‫החלק‪ ‖ B :‬כלו[ לית‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬כולו‪ ‖ A :‬עמידתנו[ ‪ +‬نحن‪ :‬ع ‪ 17‬שהיא‪ [BTL :‬שהוא‪ | AM :‬שהיה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C‬מתחלפים[ מתחלפות‪ + | CT :‬منها‪ :‬ع ‖ מוצאים מעט[ מעט מה שנמצא‪ | C :‬מעט מוצאים‪T :‬‬ ‫‪ 18‬ברוב[ ברב‪ ‖ CB :‬העתים[ الأمر‪ :‬ع ‖ טריד)‪ [ABT :(1‬טרוד‪ ‖ CML :‬עם[ עד‪ ‖ AM :‬ואם[ ‪ +‬ואם‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C‬טריד)‪ [(2‬טרוד‪ ‖ CL :‬שאר[ ברוב‪ 19 AL :‬ישליך[ שישליך‪ ‖ M :‬ואפילו[ ואפי׳‪ ‖ BT :‬מדה‬ ‫קטנה[ זמן קטן‪ 20 T :‬מונע[ ‪ +‬בזה‪ ‖ B :‬ויתוכן[ ויתכן‪ | CT :‬ויתוקן‪ ‖ B :‬בזה[ לית‪ + | B :‬السبب‪:‬‬ ‫ع ‖ תמידית[ תמידיית‪ 21 T :‬ימלט[ יחסר‪ ‖ C :‬כהרף[ הרף‪ ‖ CT :‬עין[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬ההנאה[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 22–21 B‬לו…ההנאה[ לית‪ 22 M :‬יותר‪ [CMT :‬היותר‪ ‖ ABL :‬היקיצה[ בהקיצה)?(‪ ‖ C :‬ערבה[‬ ‫עריבה‪ 23 B :‬הפעל[ הפועל‪ ‖ CBM :‬והחוש[ ‪ +‬יותר‪ | AL :‬וההרגש‪ ‖ T :‬מן[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬השכלות[‬ ‫מהשכלות‪ | C :‬הסכלות‪ | T :‬המושכלות‪ 24 B :‬ההוא[ ההיא‪ ‖ B :‬ומעלת[ ובמעלת‪ ‖ B :‬לו[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 25 B‬בפועל[ בפעל‪ ‖ AT :‬ישתדל[ השתדל‪ ‖ B :‬ובזאת[ ולזאת‪ 26 B :‬עריבה[ ערבה‪‖ CAM :‬‬ ‫מפני[ בעבור‪ ‖ CT :‬שהיא[ שהוא‪ ‖ T :‬מקוה‪L :‬ع )يتوقع([ כפולה‪ :C1) C :‬הנעה( | מקרה‪| ABM :‬‬ ‫תוחלת מקרה‪ ‖ T :‬בכח[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬בפעל[ בפועל‪ ‖ CBM :‬והזכרון[ והתקוה‪ 27–26 T :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 27 B‬בפועל[ בפעל‪ ‖ T :‬בו[ לית‪T :‬‬

‫‪1072b17–18‬‬

‫‪253‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ḥ208r19‬هذه الضرورة إذا السماء وطبيعة الكل معلقان وأما البقاء الذى على غاية الفضيلة‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫وهو الذى يتم لنا مدة | من الزمان فهو لذلك الجوهر الدهر كله وذلك أن قوامنا نحن‬ ‫لما كان من قوى مختلفة منها بكد ما نجد السبيل إلى العلم لأن العقل | فينا‬ ‫فى أكثر الأمر متشاغل لا فراغ له على أنه وإن كان كذلك ومختلطا بً البدن‬ ‫فإنه قد يطرح عنه ولو مدة يسيرة سا ئر ما يمنعه | من الفهم و يعقل‬ ‫‪ ḥ208v1‬ذاته من غير مانع فيتهيأ له بذلك السبب سرور وفرح دائم لا يحصى‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫وأما الذى طبيعته لا تخلو طرفة | عين من العلم فليس اللذة له مكتسبة لـكنه‬ ‫هو اللذة وهو أفضل جميع الأشياء فإن كانت اليقظة ألذ من‬ ‫‪ b17‬النوم عندنا لأن الفعل | ألذ من البطالة والحس من عدمه والعقل من الجهل‬ ‫فمبلغ ز يادة ذلك العقل فى الشرف وفضيلة الرأى لا نهاية له وذلك | أن ما هو‬ ‫‪ ḥ208v4‬بالفعل ألذ فى جميع الأشياء مما هو بالقوه وإليه تبادر الطبيعة و بهذا السبب‬ ‫صار الرجاء لذيذا ً جدا ً لأنه يتوقع | لأن يصير ما بالقوة إلى الفعل‬ ‫فإذا كان الشىء الذى يوجد فيه ما‬

‫‪ 16‬نحن[ לית‪ :‬ע ‖ *نجد )נמצא(‪ :‬ע[ بجد‪ḥ :‬‬

‫‪ 15‬الضرورة[ الصورة‪ ‖ ḥ in marg. :‬الذى[ לית‪ :‬ע‬ ‫‪ 20‬السبب[ לית‪ :‬ע‬ ‫‪ 18‬الأمر[ *الأوقات )העתים(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫توقع‪b :‬‬

‫‪ 22‬اليقظة[ לית‪* ‖ b :‬يتوقع[ ىتوقع‪| ḥ :‬‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫‪254‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪28‬‬

‫שהוא בפועל עם מה שהוא בכח הערבות במה שהוא בפועל יותר הנה אשר טבעו פעל‬ ‫לבד יוצא לגמרי ממה שהוא בכח אי זה יחס ימצא לו אל השמחה אשר ישמח בה‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫כאשר עשה פעולותיו והשכיל עצמותו והנה הראות גם כן כאשר ראה הנכבד שבכל‬ ‫המראים כלם והיותר יפה מבלתי מעיק יעיקהו מזה שמח ממנו ושש בו שמחה חזקה‬ ‫והחיך כאשר‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫יטעם הטוב שבטעמים והיותר נכבד והשמע כאשר ישמע הטוב שבכל הקולות והיותר‬

‫‪L‬כ‬

‫ערב הנה מן המבואר כי השכל בששון ובשמחה יותר מאד כאשר השכיל מה שהוא‬

‫‪1072b18–19‬‬

‫יותר נכבד‬ ‫מכל המושכלות והיותר נכבד מכל המושכלות מה שישכיל עצמותו ומציאותו ולא‬ ‫יעיקהו זולתו או ימנעהו דבר או יפסיקהו מן החוש בדרך מה שימצא בדברים המושכלים‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫אשר יצויירו במחשב ריקים מן המוחשים אבל כי מה שיהיה בטבעו מושכל הנה לא‬ ‫יתערב עמו ההיולי ולא ישתנה ואולם עמידתו כשישכיל ויושכל ותחלת מה‬ ‫שישכילהו עצמותו עוד דבר אחר כי הוא אלו לא היה בזה הענין לא יהיה בטבעו‬ ‫מושכל אבל בטבעו אשר ישכילהו וזה ענין השכל האלהי אשר בתכלית המעלה מבלתי‬ ‫‪ 28‬ואשר[ אשר‪ ‖ M :‬בפועל)‪ [(1‬בכח‪ | C1 :‬בפעל‪ ‖ T :‬בכח[ ‪ +‬הפועל שהוא בכוח‪ :C1) C :‬פועל( ‖‬ ‫הערבות[ ערבות‪ ‖ C :‬בפועל)‪ [(2‬בפעל‪ ‖ T :‬הנה אשר‪T :‬ع )فالذى([ ואשר‪ | CABL :‬אשר‪‖ M :‬‬ ‫פעל[ לית‪ | M :‬פועל‪BC :‬‬

‫‪ +‬الل ّٰه‪ :‬ع‬

‫‪ 29‬לבד[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬לגמרי[ מכל וכל‪ ‖ C :‬בה[ בו‪ | C :‬אליה‪| T :‬‬

‫‪ 30‬עשה[ יעשה‪ ‖ ABM :‬פעולותיו[ פעלותיו‪ ‖ AL :‬והשכיל[ והשכל‪ ‖ B :‬והנה[ לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ C‬הראות[ והראות‪ ‖ C :‬גם…ראה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬שבכל[ לית‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 31‬המראים[ לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ | (C1⇄) C‬מהמראים‪ ‖ T :‬כלם[ כולם‪ | B :‬לית‪ ‖ C1 :‬יעיקהו מזה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬שמחה חזקה[ לית‪‖ L :‬‬ ‫והחיך[ והחך‪CM :‬‬

‫‪ 1‬יטעם[ ‪ ‖ T0‬שבטעמים[ שבמטעמים‪ ‖ B :‬ישמע[ שמע‪ ‖ C :‬הטוב שבכל[‬

‫‪ ‖ T0‬הטוב)‪ + [(2‬והיותר‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 2‬ערב[ ‪ +‬ונאה‪ ‖ C :‬בששון[ ‪ +‬יותר‪ ‖ T :‬ובשמחה…השכיל[‬

‫‪ ‖ T0‬יותר מאד‪ [BM :‬לית‪ + | CAL :‬من الحواس بمدركاتها‪ :‬ع ‖ מה[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 3‬מכל[ מן‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ T‬המושכלות)‪ [(2‬המושכלולת)!(‪ ‖ T0 | C :‬מה[ מי‪ ‖ T0 | B :‬שישכיל[ שהשכיל‪CB :‬‬

‫‪ 4‬יעיקהו[‬

‫يعقله‪ :‬ع ‖ ימנעהו…יפסיקהו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ימנעהו[ ימניעהו‪ ‖ B :‬יפסיקהו[ יפסקהו‪ ‖ C :‬בדרך[ כדרך‪AM :‬‬ ‫‪ 5–4‬המושכלים…יצויירו[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 4‬המושכלים[ מושכלים‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 5‬יצויירו[ יצוירו‪ | C :‬יציירו‪‖ M :‬‬

‫במחשב[ במחשבים‪ ‖ AM :‬ריקים‪ [CL :‬דקים‪ | AMT :‬רקים‪ ‖ B :‬כי[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬שיהיה[ שהיה‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫בטבעו…הנה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מושכל[ ומושכל‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 6‬עמו[ בו‪ ‖ T :‬עמו[ ‪ +‬דבר מן‪ ‖ AL :‬ההיולי[ החומר‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ C‬ואמנם‪ [BT :‬ואולם‪ ‖ CAML :‬כשישכיל ויושכל[ כשיושכל וישכיל‪T0 | AM :‬‬

‫‪ 7‬דבר[ ‪ +‬ר״ל‬

‫מעשהו כמו שאמרו שהשם פעם שם עצם ופעם שם תאר‪ ‖ B :‬אחר‪ [AT :‬אחד‪ | CML :‬לית‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫אלו…לא)‪ ‖ T0 [(2‬היה[ יהיה‪ ‖ AM :‬יהיה[ לית‪B :‬‬ ‫ענין[ הענין‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 8‬בטבעו[ בטבע‪ ‖ C :‬ישכילהו…האלהי[ ‪‖ T0‬‬

‫‪1072b20–23‬‬

‫‪255‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ḥ208v5‬بالفعل مع ما بالقوة اللذة فيما هو بالفعل أكثر فالذى طبيعته | فعل‬

‫‪28‬‬

‫فقط خارجة أصلا ًعما بالقوة أى نسبة توجد له إلى السرور الذى يسره الل ّٰه‬ ‫‪ ḥ208v6‬إذا هو فعل أفعاله وعقل ذاته‬

‫‪L‬כ‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫فبين | أن العقل فى سرور وفرح أكثر كثيرا ً من الحواس بمدركاتها إذا عقل ما هو‬

‫‪2‬‬

‫أفضل‬ ‫من جميع المعقولات وأفضل جميع | المعقولات ما عقل ذاته ووجوده ولم‬ ‫يعقله غيره أو يمنعه شىء أو يقطعه‬

‫وأول ما‬

‫‪ḥ208v9‬‬

‫يعقله ذاته ثم شىء | آخر لأنه لو لم يكن كذلك‬

‫لم يكن فى طبيعته‬

‫معقولا ً‬

‫‪ 29‬الل ّٰه[ לית‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪ 2‬من الحواس بمدركاتها[ לית‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪ 3‬يعقله‪ + [b :‬من‪* | in marg. ḥ :‬يعوقه )יעיקהו(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪6‬‬

‫‪256‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪9‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫שיהיה נחלק אחד מאלו השנים אליו אבל שניהם יחד בטבעו ר״ל שישכיל ושיושכל‬ ‫ואין המאמר בו אם כן שהוא מושכל בהקשנו אבל בהקשו בעצמותו כמו שהשכל גם כן‬ ‫מאתנו לא יאמר בו שהוא מושכל בהקשנו אבל בהקשו בעצמותו וכמו שהוא יותר‬ ‫נכבד מכל מה שישכיל כן גם כן הוא יותר נכבד מכל מה שיושכל וכמו שהוא השכל‬ ‫בתכלית האמת כן הוא גם כן המושכל בתכלית האמת וכאשר השכיל בדרך השכל‬ ‫היה מה‬ ‫שישכילהו פעלתו וכאשר היה בענין אשר ישכיל בו היה אז שכל ומושכל יחד הכל‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫ממנו לובש הכל לא בדרך הגשמים אשר ימששו קצתם את קצתם על השטח החיצון‬ ‫מכל אחד מהם לבד אבל כמו שיאמר בפרט בדברים המתמזגים כי הכל מהם ממשש‬ ‫לכל כן גם כן השכל לובש הכל ממנו הכל ויהיה אז שכל ומושכל יחד ואין כמו שהחוש‬ ‫אינו המוחש בעינו כאשר נחתמה^ צורתו ונשאר עצמו חוץ גם כן ענין‬ ‫השכל אצל‬ ‫המושכלות אשר הם לו מעצמותם אבל ישא כל הצורות מבלתי שישאר מהם חוץ ממנו‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫עצם יתערב בו ההיולי כי אין שם היולי אבל צורה מופשטת לא יתערב עמה ההיולי‬

‫‪ 9‬נחלק…אבל[ ‪ ‖ T0‬נחלק[ בחלק‪ ‖ AM :‬אליו[ אינו‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫א״כ‪ ‖ BM :‬בהקשו[ בהקש‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 11–10‬שהשכל…יאמר[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ ‖ C‬בהקשו[ בהקשתו‪ ‖ B :‬בעצמותו…יותר[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫הוא‪CT :‬‬

‫‪ 13–12‬כן)‪…(1‬האמת[ לית‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 10‬ואין…מושכל[ ‪ ‖ T0‬אם כן[‬

‫‪ 10‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬מאתנו[ שלנו‪:‬‬

‫‪ 12–11‬וכמו…שיושכל[ לית‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬כן)‪+ [(1‬‬

‫‪ 12‬גם כן[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬הוא[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬מכל)‪…(2‬השכל[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 13‬כן)‪…(1‬האמת[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ | B :‬לית‪ ‖ C1 :‬בתכלית)‪…(2‬השכיל[ ‪ ‖ T0‬בתכלית)‪[(2‬‬ ‫בדרך‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 14‬פעלתו[ פעולתו‪ ‖ BM :‬וכאשר…בו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬היה אז‪ [CT :‬אז היה‪ | AML :‬היה או‪‖ B :‬‬

‫ומושכל[ או מושכל‪ :C1) CB :‬או ומשכיל ומושכל(‬

‫‪ 15‬לובש…אשר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬בדרך[ כדרך‪ ‖ L :‬את[‬ ‫‪ 16‬מכל[ ‪ +‬אשר‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬כמו[ לית‪:‬‬

‫לית‪ ‖ CBT :‬קצתם[ בקצת‪ 16–15 C :‬החיצון…אבל[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C‬שיאמר[ שאמר‪ ‖ CM :‬בדברים[ ‪ +‬בדברים)!(‪ ‖ A :‬המתמזגים[ מתמזגים‪ ‖ M :‬מהם‬ ‫ממשש[ ממשש מהם‪ 17 A :‬כן)‪ [BT :(1‬לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) CAML :‬לובש[ מלבש‪ ‖ C :‬הכל[ לית‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫ואין[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬כמו[ וכמו‪ 18 B :‬המוחש[ מוחש‪ ‖ L :‬נחתמה[ ‪ +‬فيه‪ :‬ع ‖ עצמו[ עמו‪ ‖ AM :‬חוץ[‬ ‫כן‪ | B :‬חוש ‪ +‬כן‪ ‖ T :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ 19 B :‬לו[ לא‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬מעצמותם[ מעצמותו‪| CL :‬‬ ‫מעצמותיהם‪ ‖ B :‬כל[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬מהם‪T :‬ع[ ממנו‪ | CBM :‬לית‪ 20 AL :‬בו[ ממנו‪ | M :‬עמו‪‖ T :‬‬ ‫ההיולי‪ [MT :‬חומר‪ | C :‬היולי‪ ‖ AL :‬היולי[ חומר‪ ‖ C :‬מופשטת[ נפרדת‪ ‖ CB :‬עמה[ בה‪‖ CB :‬‬ ‫ההיולי)‪ [(2‬חומר‪C :‬‬

‫‪257‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫وكما أنه العقل‬

‫‪ḥ208v10‬‬

‫‪12‬‬

‫على غاية الحقيقةكذلك أيضا ًهو المعقول على | غاية الحقيقة‬

‫فهو عقل ومعقول معا ً‬

‫وليس كما أن الحس‬

‫‪ḥ208v11‬‬

‫‪14‬‬

‫‪17‬‬

‫ليس هو المحسوس بعينه إذا انطبقت فيه صورته | و بقى جوهره خارجا ًكذلك أيضا ًحال‬ ‫العقل عند‬ ‫المعقولات التى هى له من ذاتها لـكنه يحمل جميع الصور من غير | أن يبقى منها خارجا ًعنه‬ ‫‪ ḥ208v13‬جوهر تشو به الهيولى‬

‫‪ 18‬فيه[ לית‪ :‬ע ‖ خارجا‪ [b ً :‬خارج‪ḥ :‬‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫‪ 19‬خارجا‪ [b ً :‬خارج‪ḥ :‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪21‬‬

‫‪258‬‬

‫נמשכת למה שישכילה או מה שיחשבה מבלתי שתחלק או שירחק קצתה מקצתה‬ ‫כמו המוחשים אצל החוש אבל תקוע בשכל ובכללו הנה הוא השכל והמושכל יחד‬ ‫כמו שאמרנו פעמים רבות ואינו כדרך השכל שלנו אשר יעתק בעת אחר עת מדבר אל‬ ‫דבר וישכיל עתה מה שלא היה משכיל אותו לפני זה לרבוי מה שיתערב בו ממה שהוא‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫בכח ואולם השכל האלהי הראשון אינו כן אבל הוא ישכיל המושכלות אשר הם נמצאות‬ ‫בו מצוייר להם ובכלל אשר הם הוא וזה שהוא הוא מושכלותיו ואין השכילו אותם‬ ‫על צד ההעתק וההליכה בהם כמו שישכיל השכל שלנו אבל ישכיל כלם ברגע אחד‬ ‫הנה הוא מן המבואר כי הוא ישכיל כל הדברים הנמצאים כפי מה שהם עליו נמצאים‬ ‫וכמו ששם אותם נמצאים וכל הדברים אצלו נמצאים יחד הנה יתחייב אם כן שיהיה‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫משכיל כלם יחד ואם היה שאינו מן הפלא בשכל שלנו שיהיה הוא הדבר אשר‬ ‫ישכילהו^ כל שכן שראוי שנחשוב שהוא כן השכל^ הראשון ואמנם היה השכל אשר‬

‫‪1072b23–24‬‬

‫בנו אלהי מפני שהוא דומה לשכל ההוא האלהי ואם היה הדבר אשר בתכלית הערבות‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫ותכלית המעלה אמנם הוא בנו בידיעה כל שכן שהוא כן בעלה הראשונה וזה שהיא‬ ‫תראה עצמותה בתכלית המעלה ותשכיל עצמותה מבלתי שתצטרך בזה אל טבע מחוץ‬ ‫אבל אותו הטבע אשר תבקש אותו הוא בה והדבר אשר הוא בתכלית הערבות בפעלתה‬ ‫‪ 21‬שישכילה‪ [AMT :‬שישכילהו‪ | CL :‬שישכלה‪ ‖ B :‬מה[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬שיחשבה[ שיחשבהו‪‖ CL :‬‬

‫מבלתי[ בלתי‪ ‖ M :‬שתחלק[ שיתחלק‪ ‖ B :‬שירחק‪ [ABT :‬שתרחק‪ | CL :‬יתרחק‪ ‖ M :‬קצתה‬ ‫מקצתה[ קצת מקצת‪ 22 C :‬המוחשים[ החושים‪ ‖ C :‬ובכללו[ ובכלל‪ 23 CBT :‬כדרך[ בדרך‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ CB‬יעתק[ ינתק‪ | C :‬יעתיק‪ 24 T :‬וישכיל[ ישכיל‪ ‖ C :‬היה משכיל אותו[ ישכילהו‪ ‖ C :‬אותו[‬ ‫‪ 25‬בכח[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬האלהי[ האלוהי‪ ‖ B :‬המושכלות[ המושכליות‪ ‖ C :‬הם[ לית‪C :‬‬ ‫לית‪B :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ 26 (C1‬מצוייר[ מצייר‪ ‖ AMT :‬הם[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬וזה[ זה‪ :C1) C :‬מה( ‖ מושכלותיו[ מושכליות‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C‬השכילו[ השכל‪ ‖ C :‬אותם[ להם‪ 27 CB :‬ישכיל[ ‪ +‬אחד‪ ‖ B :‬השכל[ שכל‪ ‖ T :‬כלם[ כולם‪:‬‬ ‫‪ + | B‬بغته‪ :‬ع ‪ 28‬מן[ לית‪ ‖ AL :‬המבואר[ מבואר‪ ‖ AL :‬כי הוא[ שהוא‪ ‖ CBM :‬כל[ לכל‪ ‖ M :‬מה[‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ B :‬שהם[ שהיה‪ 29 M :‬וכמו[ וכפי‪ ‖ B :‬יחד[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬יתחייב[ נתחייב‪ ‖ B :‬א״כ‪ | B :‬אם‬ ‫כן[ גם כן‪ 30 M :‬משכיל[ ישכיל‪ ‖ CT :‬כלם[ כולם‪ ‖ BM :‬הדבר[ דבר‪ 31 (C1⇄) C :‬ישכילהו[‬ ‫نعقله‪ :‬ع ‖ כל שכן[ כ״ש‪ ‖ M :‬שראוי[ ראוי‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬השכל[ فى العقل‪ :‬ع ‖ היה[ שב‪ | C :‬לית‪T :‬‬ ‫‪ 32‬אלהי[ אלוהי‪ ‖ B :‬מפני[ בעבור‪ ‖ CT :‬לשכל ההוא[ לאותו השכל‪ ‖ CT :‬האלהי[ האלוהי‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫אשר[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬שהיא[ שהוא‪ 1 A :‬כל שכן[ כ״ש‪ ‖ M :‬שהיא[ לית‪ 2 B :‬בתכלית…עצמותה[‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬המעלה[ הפעלה‪ ‖ L :‬ותשכיל[ ‪ +‬فى‪ :‬ع ‖ שתצטרך[ שנצטרך‪ 3 B :‬הטבע[ טבע‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬תבקש[ נקש‪ :C1) C :‬נבקש( ‖ הוא[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬בה[ ‪ +‬בתכלית הערבות והמעלה‪ ‖ C1 :‬הערבות[‬ ‫ערבות‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬בפעלתה[ בפעולתה‪CB :‬‬

‫‪ L‬כא‬

‫‪259‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫وليس هو بمنزلة العقل منا الذى ينتقل فى وقت بعد وقت | من شىء إلى‬

‫‪ḥ208v13‬‬

‫‪23‬‬

‫شىء و يعقل الآن ما لم يكن يعقله قبل ذلك لـكثرة ما يختلط به مما‬ ‫لـكنه يعقل المعقولات التى هى | موجودة‬

‫‪ ḥ208v14‬بالقوة‬ ‫‪ ġ41,4–5‬فيه‬

‫على أنها هى هو وهو هى‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫ليس‬

‫‪ ġ41,5‬على جهات الانتقال والمرور بها كما نعقل نحن لـكنه يعقل جميعا بً غته فى دفعة واحدة‬ ‫وذلك أنه يعقل جميع الأشياء | الموجودة على ما هو عليه موجودة‬

‫‪ḥ208v15‬‬

‫وكما جعلها موجودة وجميع الأشياء موجودة عنده معا ًفيجب إذن أن | يكون‬ ‫‪ ġ41,7–9‬يعقل جميعها معا ًوإذا كان‬

‫العقل منا هو الشىء الذى‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫نعقله فكم بالحرى ينبغى أن نتوهم ذلك فى العقل الأول وإنما صار العقل الذى‬ ‫فينا الاهيا ًلأن له نسبة ما إلى ذلك العقل الإلاهى وإن كان الشىء الذى هو فى غاية اللذة‬ ‫‪ L‬כא وغاية الفضيلة إنما هو فينا بالعلم فكم بالحرى هو كذلك | فى العلة الأولى وذلك أنها‬ ‫ترى ذاتها فى غاية الفضيلة وتعقل فى ذاتها من غير أن تحتاج فى ذلك إلى طبيعة من خارج |‬ ‫لـكن‬

‫الذى تطلبه هو فيه‬

‫‪ 29‬جعلها‪ :‬ע[ ‪ +‬عليه‪* ‖ ḥb :‬عنده‪ :‬ע )אצלו([ לית‪ḥb :‬‬

‫‪* 30‬يعقل‪ :‬ע )משכיל([‬

‫‪ 27‬بغته[ לית‪ :‬ע‬ ‫ىعقل‪ | ḥ :‬تعقل‪ 31 b :‬نعقله[ ישכילהו )*يعقله(‪ :‬ע ‖ ينبغى أن‪ġCT :‬ע[ לית‪ ‖ ġ :‬فى العقل[ השכל‬ ‫)*العقل(‪ :‬ע ‪ 2‬فى)‪ [ḥ :(2‬לית‪b :‬ע ‪ 3‬تطلبه‪ :‬ע‪ [b‬طلبه‪ḥ :‬‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫‪260‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪4‬‬

‫אינו בדרך הדבר אשר יחסר בקצת העתים ולא בדרך מי שעשה זה כדי שישיג תכליתו‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫מדבר שאין לו כי כל אלו הדברים אמנם הם מקרים וחדושים יתחדשו בשכל שלנו‬ ‫אבל הוא בעצמותו הוא הדבר אשר בתכלית העריבות כמו שהוא גם כן בעצמותו‬ ‫הוא הדבר‬ ‫אשר בתכלית המעלה‬ ‫ואם היה ממה שהוא לאל תמיד בדרך מה שהוא לנו בקצת העתים הנה הוא פלא‬ ‫ואם היה יותר מזה הנה הוא פלאי פלאים והנה^ ברוב^ מבואר ברבויו כי הוא‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫נפרד בעצמותו פשוט לא יחלקו עליו החושים ולא דבר מן המקרים ישכיל כל‬ ‫הנמצאות לא על דרך שהם חוץ מטבעו או פעולות נכריות לו אבל הוא אשר יולידם‬ ‫ואשר הם הוא וזה כי האל נימוס והיקש וסבת יושר הדברים הנמצאים וסדרם ואינו‬ ‫בדרך הנימוס המונח בספרים אבל הוא נימוס חי כמו אלו היה אפשר שנחשוב הנימוס‬ ‫בעל נפש ידע בעצמותו וישכיל בעצמותו בדרך אפורגוש המניח הנימוס אלו נדמה‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫עצמו כאלו עומד על הנימוס מסודר עליו נשאר על ידיעת ההדרכה אשר הוא אדון לה‬ ‫ושהוא ישכיל בעצמותו המלכים והשרים והמזויינים ובעינו יקשור אותה‬

‫‪ 4‬העתים[ עתים‪ ‖ C :‬מי שעשה[ מי שיעשה‪ | BT :‬מה שיעשה‪ ‖ M :‬זה[ ‪ +‬כאלו‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 5‬כי[ לית‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 7–6‬העריבות…בתכלית[ לית‪(C1⇄) CAM :‬‬

‫‪ 6‬העריבות[‬

‫‪ 6‬הוא[ ‪ +‬הוא‪ ‖ T :‬אשר[ ‪ +‬הוא‪C :‬‬

‫הערבות‪ ‖ C1T :‬כמו[ לית‪ ‖ C1 :‬גם כן‪ [T :‬כן‪ | B :‬אם כן‪ | C1 :‬לית‪ ‖ L :‬המעלה[ ‪ +‬והשלימות‪C :‬‬ ‫‪ 8‬ממה[ ממנה‪ | B :‬ما‪ :‬ع ‖ תמיד[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬מה[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬הוא[ זה‪ 9 CB :‬פלאי פלאים[ הפלא‬ ‫ופלא‪ + | C :‬ברבויו‪ ‖ T :‬והנה…ברבויו[ وله أكثر والأمر فى كثرته بين‪ :‬ع ‖ והנה‪ [AM :‬לית‪ | CTL :‬ולו‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬ברוב‪ [AB :‬ולרוב ‪ +‬הדבר‪ | CL :‬ברב‪ | M :‬וברוב ‪ +‬הדברים‪ ‖ T :‬מבואר ברבויו‪ [ABM :‬ברבוי‬ ‫מבואר‪ :C1) C :‬סא והוא מבואר( | מבואר הרבוי לו‪ | T :‬ברבויו ומבואר‪ 10 L :‬יחלקו[ יחלוקו‪| AM :‬‬ ‫‪ 11‬על דרך[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬חוץ[ יוצאות‪ ‖ C :‬פעולות[ פועלות‪| C :‬‬ ‫יחלק‪ ‖ B :‬ישכיל[ שישכיל‪T :‬‬ ‫פעלות‪ ‖ AT :‬לו[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬הוא[ ‪ +‬הוא‪ ‖ CT :‬אשר[ ואשר‪ ‖ C :‬יולידם[ ‪ +‬و يحدثها‪ :‬ع ‪ 12‬הם[ הוא‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ T‬נימוס[ נמוס‪ ‖ M :‬והיקש[ והקש‪ ‖ CMT :‬יושר[ ‪ +‬כל‪ ‖ AL :‬ואינו[ אינו‪ 13 BT :‬הנימוס)‪[(1‬‬ ‫הנמוס‪ ‖ M :‬המונח[ הנמוח)!(‪ ‖ C :‬הוא[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬נימוס[ נמוס‪ ‖ MB :‬שנחשוב[ שנדמה‪ | T :‬أن‬ ‫يكون‪ :‬ع ‖ הנימוס)‪ [(2‬הנמוס‪ 14 M :‬ידע[ יחשוב‪ ‖ C :‬בעצמותו)‪ [(1‬ذاته‪ :‬ع ‖ וישכיל[ ויושכל‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬בעצמותו)‪ [(2‬ذاته‪ :‬ع ‖ אפורגוש[ אנפורגוש‪ ‖ M :‬המניח[ המוצא‪ ‖ B :‬הנימוס[ לנימוס‪| CB :‬‬ ‫הנמוס‪ 15 M :‬כאלו[ כלו‪ ‖ T :‬הנימוס[ הנמוס‪ 16 M :‬ושהוא[ והוא‪ ‖ B :‬והמזויינים[ והחמושים‪:‬‬ ‫‪ :C1) C‬סא והסגנים( | והחמושים ‪ +‬והמזויינים‪ [AL :‬והחמושים ‪ +‬והמזומנים‪ ‖ BMT :‬ובעינו[ ועיינו ‪+‬‬ ‫אותם‪ | C :‬ובעיינו ‪ +‬אותו‪ ‖ T :‬יקשור[ בקשר‪ | C :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬אותה[ לית‪ | CT :‬אותו‪B :‬‬

‫‪1072b24–26‬‬

‫‪261‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ḥ208v19‬فإن كان ما هو لل ّٰه دائما ًبمنزلة ما هو لنا فى بعض الأوقات فإذن ذلك لعجب‬ ‫‪b18‬‬

‫‪8‬‬

‫وإن كان أكثر | من ذلك فهو أعجب العجب وله أكثر والأمر فى كثرته بين لأنه‬ ‫‪ ḥ208v20‬مفرد بذاته بسيط لا تعانده الحواس ولا شىء من الأعراض | يعقل جميع‬ ‫الموجودات لا على أنها خارجة عن طبيعته أو أفعال غريبة له لـكنه هو الذى يولدها و يحدثها |‬ ‫والتى هى هو وذلك أن الل ّٰه ناموس‬

‫وسبب نظام الأشياء الموجودة وترتيبها‬ ‫وهو ناموس حى كما لو أمكن أن يكون | الناموس‬

‫‪ḥ209r1‬‬

‫متنفسا يً رى ذاته و يعقل ذاته‬

‫‪ 8‬ما)‪* [(1‬مما )ממה(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫)בעצמותו(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪ 11‬و يحدثها[ לית‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪ 14‬ذاته)‪* [(1‬بذاته )בעצמותו(‪ :‬ע ‖ ذاته)‪* [(2‬بذاته‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪17‬‬

‫‪262‬‬

‫הידיעה בחבל אחד בלתי מתנועע ולא סר אבל כי אפורגוש בטבעו מת וההדרכה אשר‬ ‫המציא אותה גם כן מתה ואולם במקום אשר יהיה הנימוס ומניחו חי חיים תמידיים‬ ‫הנה ההדרכה גם כן תמידית ההשארות וחיי זה המניח לנימוסים אינם חיים תמידיים אין‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫‪1072b26‬‬

‫התחלה להם ולא תכלית לבד אבל על תכלית המעלה וזה כי היותר נעלה מכל החיים‬ ‫השכל והיותר נכבד מכל מה שיש לו חיים וחייו אינם בעת זולת עת בענינים מתחלפים‬ ‫כמו חיינו אבל הוא החיים בנפשם כי הוא הפועל והפועל חיים וכמו שיש‬

‫‪1072b26–30‬‬

‫לו היותר נכבד מכל הפעולות כן הוא גם כן היותר נכבד מאדני החיים וכמו שהוא‬ ‫פועל נצחי מתמיד כמו כן הוא חיים נצחיים תמידיים והנה נאמר כי הנה האל ית׳‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫חיים נצחיים תמידיים בתכלית המעלה ויתחייב אם כן שיהיה לאל חיים והשארות‬ ‫מדבק נצחי מתמיד החלד כלו ואין ראוי לנו שנאמר לו כמו שאמרנו פעמים במה שקדם‬ ‫אבל כי האל ית׳ הוא החיים והוא ההשארות המתמיד‬ ‫וכבר ידומה כי מה שהוא בתכלית היופי ובתכלית המעלה לא היה כן מתחלת הענין‬ ‫כמו שדמו סיעת פיתאגורש וסנקופש כי התחלות בעלי חיים והצמחים אמנם הם‬ ‫‪ 17‬בלתי[ מבלתי‪ ‖ M :‬כי[ ‪ +‬אלו‪ | B :‬לית‪ | M :‬כאלו‪ ‖ T :‬בטבעו[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬וההדרכה[ וההרכבה‪C :‬‬ ‫‪ 18‬אותה[ אותו‪ ‖ B :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬במקום[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬יהיה[ ‪ +‬שם‪ ‖ C :‬הנימוס[ ‪ +‬חי‪ | B :‬הנמוס‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ M‬תמידיים[ תמידים‪AM :‬‬

‫‪ 19‬ההדרכה[ ההרכבה‪ ‖ C :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬לנימוסים[ לנמוסים‪:‬‬

‫‪ | M‬לנימוס‪ ‖ C1 :‬חיים[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) CM :‬תמידיים[ תמידים‪T :‬‬ ‫‪ +‬הם גם כן‪ ‖ C1 :‬על[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬מכל‪ [AM :‬מן‪CBLT :‬‬ ‫הם‪ | C :‬בעניינים‪ | B :‬ובענינים‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 20‬התחלה[ ההתחלה‪ ‖ T :‬אבל[‬

‫‪ 21‬עת[ העת‪ ‖ B :‬בענינים[ ובענינים ‪+‬‬

‫‪ 22‬בנפשם‪ [BL :‬בעצמם‪ | C :‬נפשם‪ | AM :‬עצמם‪ ‖ T :‬הפועל[‬ ‫‪ 23–22‬וכמו שיש לו[ לית‪:‬‬

‫הפעל‪ ‖ T :‬והפועל[ והפעל‪ ‖ MT :‬חיים[ ‪ +‬ושלמותו‪ | CBL :‬החיים‪C1 :‬‬ ‫‪ 22 C‬וכמו[ כמו‪ 23 T :‬היותר[ יותר‪ ‖ C :‬נכבד[ נכבדת‪ | AT :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬מכל[ ‪ +‬שלימות ונכבד‬ ‫מכל‪ ‖ C1 :‬הפעולות[ הפעלות‪ ‖ AT :‬כן)‪ [(1‬לית‪ ‖ C1 :‬הוא[ לית‪ | B :‬והוא‪ ‖ C1 :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫היותר[ יותר‪ 24–23 B :‬היותר…מתמיד[ לית‪ 23 (C1⇄) C :‬היותר[ לית‪ ‖ C1 :‬מאדני[ מאדוני‪C1 :‬‬ ‫‪ 24‬פועל[ פעל‪ ‖ T :‬כמו[ לית‪ | C :‬כן ‪ +‬גם‪ ‖ T :‬מתמיד[ המתמיד‪ ‖ AM :‬הוא[ לית‪ ‖ BC1 :‬חיים[‬ ‫החיים‪ ‖ A :‬נצחיים תמידיים‪ [MT :‬נצחיים תמידים‪ | C :‬הנצחיים תמידיים‪ | A :‬תמידיים נצחיים‪‖ BL :‬‬ ‫‪ 25‬חיים)‪ [(1‬לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬נצחיים[ נצחים‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫הנה[ לית‪ ‖ CT :‬ית׳[ ‪ +‬יתעלה‪ | C :‬וית׳‪M :‬‬ ‫תמידיים[ תמידים‪ ‖ C :‬ויתחייב[ יתחייב‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬אם כן[ א״כ‪ | B :‬גם כן‪ ‖ M :‬לאל[ לאלו‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫חיים)‪ + [(2‬נצחיים‪ 26 A :‬מדבק[ מדובק‪ ‖ BMT :‬לו[ לית‪ :C1 in marg. | (C1⇄) CB :‬פי׳ שנפיל עליו‬ ‫מלת לו וזה כאמרנו שיהיה לאל חיים או יש לו חיים אבל נאמר כי האל החיים ‖ שאמרנו[ ‪ +‬זה‪CT :‬‬ ‫‪ 27‬כי האל[ שהאל‪ ‖ M :‬ית׳[ יתעלה‪ ‖ C :‬והוא[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬ההשארות[ וההשארות‪ 28 C :‬ידומה[‬ ‫‪ +‬בו‪ ‖ T :‬כי מה[ שמה‪ ‖ T :‬היה[ יהיה‪ | CBT :‬לית‪ 29 M :‬פיתאגורש[ פיתגורש‪ | B :‬פיתאגוריש‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ T‬וסנקופש[ וסופקוס‪ | B :‬וסיקופש‪ | M :‬וסוקופש‪ ‖ T :‬התחלות[ התחלת‪ ‖ B :‬בעלי חיים[ ב״ח‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | M‬הבעלי חיים‪C1 :‬‬

‫–‪1072b30‬‬ ‫‪1073a3‬‬

‫‪263‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫وحياة هذا الناموس ليس هى حياة دائمة لا‬

‫‪ḥ209r2‬‬

‫أول لها ولا انقضاء فقط لـكن على | غاية الفضيلة وذلك أن أفضل الحياة‬

‫‪19‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬

‫العقل وأشرف جميع ما له حياة وحياته ليست فى وقت بعد وقت بأحوال مختلفة |‬ ‫مثل حياتنا لـكن هو الحياة بعينها لأنه هو الفعل والفعل حياة وكما أنه‬ ‫أفضل الأفعال كذلك هو أفضل الحياة وكما أنه |‬ ‫فعل أزلى دائم كذلك هو حياة أزلية دائمة وقد نقول إن الل ّٰه‬ ‫‪ ḥ209r5‬حياة أزلية دائمة فى غاية الفضيلة فيجب إذن أن يكون لل ّٰه | حياة و بقاء‬ ‫متصل أزلى دائم الدهر كله‬

‫‪ 25‬حياة)‪ :(2‬ע[ ‪ +‬أزلية‪ḥb :‬‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫‪264‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫סבות להויתם ואשר הוא בתכלית היופי ותכלית השלמות אינו בגרעין אבל בעת‬ ‫התכלית לא‬ ‫מצאו אמת במה שדמו אותו כי הנה היה מקבל תועלת בשרשים ואשר ימצא בו שני‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫הדברים יחד ר״ל מה שהוא בכח ומה שהוא בפעל הנה מה שהוא בכח יותר קודם‬

‫‪ L‬כב‬

‫בזמן ואולם במוחלט הנה מה שהוא בפועל יותר קודם ממה שהוא בכח והאדם יותר‬ ‫קודם מן הזרע כי הזרע מן האדם הנה כבר התבאר באור מספיק שהנה נמצא עצם‬

‫‪1073a3–5‬‬

‫נצחי בלתי מתנועע נבדל מן המוחשים לא במקום לבד אבל בטבע ושהוא לא ישונה‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫ולא ישתנה עמהם ולא יקבל השנוי בצד מן הצדדים והתבאר גם כן שהוא אינו גשם‬

‫‪1073a5–7‬‬

‫ואין לו שעור מן השעורים ושהוא אינו מת ולא מתחלק וזה שהוא יניע זמן אין‬

‫‪1073a7–8‬‬

‫תכלית לו ואולם שהוא בלתי נמצא גודל בעל תכלית יש לו כח יניע בו בלי תכלית‬ ‫הנה כבר בארנוהו במאמרנו בטבעיות וזה כי כל גודל הנה הוא אם בעל תכלית או בלי‬ ‫תכלית וכבר בטל המאמר שיהיה בלי תכלית ואולם בעל התכלית הנה אין אחד יסכים‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫ולא שיודה שהוא אפשר שיהיו לו כחות אין תכלית להם וכל שכן אם היתה הנעתם‬ ‫לו על שהוא גשם מתנשם וזה כי מי שאמר בשמש ושאר הכוכבים שהם בעלי תכלית‬ ‫ושיש להם כחות אין תכלית להם לא אמר אמת במאמרו כי הכח אשר בכוכבים‬ ‫והוא אשר אין תכלית לו אינו טבעי בהם ולא לפי שהם גשמים אבל הוא אם נתלה‬ ‫‪ 30‬להויתם[ הוייתם‪ ‖ C :‬ותכלית‪ [CT :‬לית‪ | ABL :‬ובתכלית‪ ‖ M :‬השלמות‪ [MCT :‬והשלמות‪‖ ABL :‬‬ ‫‪ 31‬מצאו[ ימצא‪ ‖ C :‬אמת[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬שדמו[ שדמה‪ ‖ C :‬מקבל[ המקבל‪‖ C :‬‬

‫בגרעין[ בהתחלה‪T :‬‬

‫תועלת[ עלה‪ | M :‬התועלת‪ + | C1 :‬בנו‪ ‖ T :‬ואשר[ כי אשר‪T :‬‬ ‫‪ 2–1‬הנה…והאדם[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 1‬ר״ל[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬בפעל[ בפועל‪BM :‬‬

‫‪ 2‬בפועל[ בפעל‪ ‖ AT :‬והאדם[ שהאדם‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 3‬כבר[ לית‪‖ M :‬‬

‫באור[ בביאור‪ ‖ B :‬שהנה נמצא[ שהוא כבר ימצא‪ | C :‬שהנה ימצא‪ ‖ T :‬עצם[ ‪ +‬נכבד‪C :‬‬ ‫ولا‪ :‬ع ‖ אבל[ לא‪ ‖ A :‬ושהוא[ שהוא‪ ‖ AM :‬ישונה‪ [CBT :‬ישנה‪AML :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ T‬השנוי[ التأثير‪ :‬ع ‖ גם כן[ ג״כ‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 5‬עמהם[ עצמו‪ | C :‬עמה‪:‬‬

‫‪ 6‬ואין[ ולא‪ ‖ C1 :‬לו[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬שעור[ שיעור‪ ‖ M :‬שעורים[‬

‫שיעורים‪ ‖ BM :‬ולא[ ואינו‪ ‖ B :‬וזה[‪ +‬וזה‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 7‬ואולם[ ‪ +‬שמות‪ ‖ C :‬בלתי נמצא[ לא ימצא‪CT :‬‬

‫‪ 8‬במאמרנו[ בדברנו‪ | M :‬בדברינו‪ ‖ BT :‬כל[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬גודל[ הגודל‪B :‬‬ ‫‪(C1⇄) C‬‬

‫‪ 4‬לא[‬

‫‪ 8‬או בלי תכלית[ ואם בלתי בעל תכלית‪C1 :‬‬

‫הנה[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬אחד[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬יסכים[ יאות‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 9–8‬או…תכלית)‪ [(2‬לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ 9‬שיהיה[ שהוא‪ ‖ C1 :‬בלי[ בלא‪‖ C1 :‬‬

‫‪ 10‬שיודה[ יודה‪ ‖ C :‬אפשר[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬שיהיו[‬

‫שיהיה‪ ‖ CB :‬להם…הנעתם[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬וכל שכן[ וכ״ש‪ ‖ B :‬היתה[ היה‪ ‖ C :‬הנעתם[ הנעתר‪C :‬‬ ‫)‪ :C1‬סא הנחתם(‬

‫‪ 11‬גשם[ ‪ +‬לא על שהוא‪ ‖ BT :‬מתנשם‪ [AMC1 :‬מתגשם‪ | CBL :‬בעל נפש‪‖ T :‬‬

‫וזה[ ‪ +‬הוא‪ ‖ B :‬שאמר[ שיאמר‪M :‬‬ ‫‪ 13‬אין[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 12‬להם[ לו‪ ‖ C :‬אמר אמת[ ימצא‪ ‖ C :‬במאמרו[ ‪ +‬ספק‪C1 :‬‬

‫‪1073a8–11‬‬

‫‪265‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ L‬כב‬ ‫‪ḥ209r5‬‬

‫أنه يوجد جوهر‬

‫فقد تبين‬

‫‪3‬‬

‫أزلى غير متحرك مبا ين للمحسوسات ولا فى الموضع | لـكن فى الطبيعة وأنه لا يستحيل‬ ‫‪ ḥ209r7‬ولا يتغير‬

‫ولا يقبل التأثير‬

‫وتبين أيضا ًأنه ليس بجسم‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫ولا له مقدار من المقادير وأنه ليس بمائت | ولا منقسم وذلك أنه يحرك زمانا ًلا‬ ‫نهاية له فإنه لا يوجد عظم متناه له قوة يحرك بها بغير نهاية‬

‫‪a1635,4‬‬

‫‪ //‬من قال فى الشمس ‪ /‬وسا ئر الـكواكب إنها متناهية‬

‫‪ ḥ209r7‬وأن لها قوى لا نهاية لها لم يصب فى ‪ /‬قوله لإن القوة التى فى الـكواكب |‬ ‫وهى التى لا نهاية لها ليست ‪ /‬طبيعية فيها ولا على أنها أجسام لـكنها إما معلقة‬

‫‪ 4‬ولا[ לא )*لا(‪ :‬ע ‖ *وأنه‪ :‬ע )ושהוא([ وفى أنه‪ 5 ḥb :‬التأثير[ השנוי )*التغيير(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫‪ 12‬لأن‪a :‬ע[ فأما‪ 13 ḥ :‬ليست‪a :‬ע[ فليست‪ ‖ ḥ :‬طبيعية‪a :‬ע[ بطبيعية‪ ‖ ḥ :‬النفس‪a :‬ע )הנפש([ لنفس‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | ḥ‬بالنفس‪ams :‬‬ ‫‪ 6‬أنه[ لأنه‪b :‬‬

‫‪11‬‬

‫‪266‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪14‬‬

‫בעלה הראשונה או הנפש בהם מאותו הכח אשר אינו בגשם וזה כי הסבה הראשונה‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫היא אשר תסבב אותם זמן אין תכלית לו כי הוא אלו היה מה שיש להם בכח כדרך‬ ‫מה שיש לגשם ולגודל ולא יהיה מתמיד בפעל היה בלא ספק יגע ויצטרך אל מנוחה‬ ‫וזה כי גשמי הכוכבים מפני שהיה בהם מה שהוא בכח היו כחותם לפי זה בעלי תכלית‬ ‫וזה שהם בכל אחד מן העתים במקום זולת המקום הראשון ופעם יהיו במקום אחד‬ ‫ופעם יהיו במקום אחר ואלו המקומות בדרך תכליות התנועות ואי אפשר במה‬ ‫שהוא בכח‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫כאשר יהיה שיבא אחריו מה שהוא בפועל והוא אשר כונתו אליו שלא יהיה לו‬ ‫תכלית וקצה ואולם העלה אשר אין בה כלל מה שהוא בכח אבל הוא תמיד בפועל‬ ‫ואין מדרכה שתתחלף בעת אחר עת איך אפשר שידומה לה גודל וגשמות‬ ‫בדרך אלו‬ ‫הדברים אשר יראה בהם תמיד מה שהוא בכח היו שיקבלו ההפסד או לא יקבלוהו‬ ‫ובכלל הנה הפעל הנפרד בעצמותו אפשר שיתמיד בלא תכלית עם תמידות הזמן ואולם‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫הפועל אשר יצא ממה שהוא בכח הנה הוא גמר אותו הדבר אשר הוא בכח ואי אפשר‬ ‫בכמו הפועל הזה שיתמיד זמן אין תכלית לו כי הנה כבר קדמו מה שהוא בכח והוא‬ ‫לפניו ויתחייב אם כן שיהיה הכח המניע אשר בכוכבים אין תכלית לו כי‬ ‫קנות הכוכבים‬

‫‪ 14‬או[ ואם‪ ‖ C :‬הנפש[ שהנפש‪ ‖ T :‬בהם[ מהם‪ ‖ C :‬מאותו[ מאתו‪B :‬‬ ‫מה[ שמה‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬להם[ לה‪ ‖ M :‬כדרך[ מדרך‪ | B :‬בדרך‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 15‬אותם[ אותה‪‖ B :‬‬

‫‪ 16‬ולגודל[ وما للعظم‪ :‬ع ‖ בפעל[‬

‫בפועל‪ ‖ CBM :‬היה[ הוא‪ + | M :‬לו‪ ‖ C1 :‬יגע‪ :C1) CAT :‬יגיעה([ יגיע‪ | BL :‬ייגע‪ ‖ M :‬מנוחה[ המנוחה‪:‬‬ ‫‪C‬‬

‫‪ 17‬וזה‪ [CL :‬מזה‪ ‖ ABMT :‬מפני[ בעבור‪ ‖ C :‬שהיה[ שיהיה‪ | C :‬שהם‪ ‖ T :‬שהוא[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫)⇄‪ + | (C1‬שהיו‪B :‬‬

‫התנועות[ الحركة‪ :‬ع‬

‫‪ 18‬מן העתים[ מהזמנים‪ ‖ C :‬אחד[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 19‬תכליות[ תכלית‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫‪ 21‬העלה[ ‪+‬‬

‫‪ 20‬יהיה[ ‪ +‬במה‪ ‖ B :‬בפועל[ בפעל‪ ‖ CT :‬כונתו[ כוונתו‪C :‬‬

‫הראשונה‪ ‖ B :‬בה[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬הוא[ היא‪ ‖ B :‬תמיד[ מתמיד‪ ‖ A :‬בפועל[ בפעל‪CT :‬‬

‫בלתי עת ועת‪ ‖ C1 :‬עת[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬איך[ ואיך‪ ‖ B :‬לה[ לו‪ ‖ T :‬וגשמות[ وجسما‪ ً:‬ع‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬מה שהוא בכח[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬היו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬לא[ שלא‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ 25‬הדבר[ דבר‪C :‬‬

‫‪B‬‬

‫‪ 26–25‬הפועל…והוא[ לית‪T0 :‬‬

‫‪C‬‬

‫‪ 27‬אם כן[ א״כ‪ ‖ BM :‬שיהיה…אין[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 22‬בעת[ ‪+‬‬

‫‪ 23‬תמיד[ לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ 24‬הפעל[ הפועל‪ ‖ BM :‬אפשר[ ואפשר‪:‬‬ ‫)⇄‪(C1‬‬

‫‪ 26‬בכמו[ בדמיון‪ ‖ C :‬הנה[ היה‪:‬‬

‫‪ 28–27‬הכוכבים…שהוא[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪267‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ḥ209r8‬بالعلة الأولى وإما ‪ /‬النفس فيها من تلك القوة | التى ليست بجسم وذلك أن العلة الأولى ‪/‬‬ ‫‪a1635,7‬‬

‫‪14‬‬

‫هى التى تديرها زمانا ًلا نهاية له فإنه لو كان ما لها بالقوة بمنزلة‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫ما للجسم وما للعظم ولم تكن دائما بً الفعل كانت لا محالة تستتعب ‪ /‬وتحتاج إلى راحة‬ ‫وذلك أن أجسام الـكواكب لما كانت فيها ما ‪ /‬هو بالقوةكانت قواها بحسب ذلك متناهية‬ ‫وذلك أنها فى كل ‪ /‬واحد من الأوقات فى موضع غير الموضع الأول فمرة تكون فى ‪ /‬مكان ما‬ ‫ومرة فى مكان آخر وهذه الأماكن بمنزلة نهايات الحركة ‪ /‬وليس يمكن فيما‬ ‫هو بالقوة‬ ‫‪ a1636‬إذا كان يأتى بعده ما هو بالفعل وهو ‪ /‬الذى مقصوده إليه إلا يكون له‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫نهاية وطرف وأما العلة التى ‪ /‬ليس فيها أصلا ًما هو بالقوة لاكنها دائما بً الفعل‬ ‫وليس من شأنها أن ‪ /‬تختلف فى وقت بعد وقت فكيف يمكن أن يتوهم أن لها عظما ً‪ /‬وجسما ً‬ ‫بمنزلة هذه‬ ‫الأشياء التى يرى فيها دائما ًما هو بالقوةكانت تقبل ‪ /‬الفساد أو لا تقبله‬ ‫و بالجملة فإن الفعل المفرد بذاته يمكن أن يدوم ‪ /‬بلا نهاية مع دوام الزمن فأما‬ ‫‪ a1636,7‬الفعل الذى يخرج عما هو بالقوة فهو ‪ /‬انقضاء ذلك الشىء الذى بالقوة وليس يمكن‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫فى مثل هذا الفعل أن ‪ /‬يدوم زمانا ًلا نهاية له إذ كان قد تقدمه ما هو بالقوة وهو‬ ‫قبله ‪ /‬فيجب إذا أن تكون القوة المحركة التى فى الـكواكب لا نهاية لها ‪ /‬لأن‬ ‫استفادة الـكواكب‬

‫‪ 15‬تديرها‪a :‬ע )תסבב אותם([ ىدىرها‪ | ḥams :‬تدبرها‪b :‬‬

‫)מה(‪ :‬א[ לית‪ | a :‬אחד )*واحد(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫)*وجسمانية(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪ 16‬وما للعظم[ ולגודל )*وللعظم(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪ 19‬الحركة[ התנועות )*الحركات(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪* 18‬ما‬

‫‪ 22‬وجسما ً[ וגשמות‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪28‬‬

‫‪268‬‬

‫הכח הזה אינו על צד מה שהוא בכח ואולם תנועתם במקום הזה הנה היא בעלת תכלית‬ ‫וזה כי מה שהוא בכח אמנם הוא בכוכבים לפי זה הענין‬

‫‪ 28‬הכח הזה[ הנה הוא‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫במקום הזה[ בזה המקום‪C1T :‬‬

‫الأحوال‪ :‬ع‬

‫‪ 29–28‬ואולם…בכח[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫‪ 29–28‬הנה…וזה[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 28‬תנועתם[ حركاتها‪ :‬ع ‖‬

‫‪ 28‬היא[ הוא‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 29‬זה הענין[ هذه‬

‫‪269‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫هذه القوة ليست هى على جهة ما بالقوة ‪ /‬وأما حركاتها فى هذا المكان فمتناهية‬ ‫وذلك أن ما هو بالقوة فإنما ‪ /‬هو فى الـكواكب بحسب هذه الأحوال ‪//‬‬

‫‪ 28‬حركاتها[ תנועתם )*حركتها(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪ 29‬هذه الأحوال[ זה הענין )*هذا الحال(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪28‬‬

‫‪270‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫‪ L‬כב‬ ‫‪Λ.8.‬‬ ‫‪1073a14–15‬‬ ‫‪1073a15–17‬‬

‫התראה שיהיה ראוי שיאמר באלו העצמים שהם אחד ושהם רבים והם אשר אין‬ ‫גודל להם ולא יתערב בהם ההיולי והנה ראוי שנחפש על זה כי אשר היו‬ ‫לפנינו מאשר אמרו בעצמים לא יתערב בהם ההיולי בלתי מתנועעים לא דברו ברבויים‬ ‫דבור מבואר ולא דברו גם כן דבור פרטי במספר העצמים אשר אמרו בהם וקצתם אשר‬

‫‪1073a17–21‬‬

‫אמרו בצורות וזה שהם יורו כי הצורות עצמים לא יתערב בהם ההיולי ולא יתנועעו אבל‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫שהם לא יגידו כלל ממספרם אבל הניחו הענין בהם בספק כדרך המספרים אשר‬

‫‪ L‬כג‬

‫לא נודע‬ ‫הגעתם שהם יאמרו גם כן בצורות שהם מספרים פעם יוציאו אותם אל מה שאין תכלית‬ ‫לו ופעם ישימו תכליתם העשרה‬ ‫ואולם אנחנו הנה ראוי שנניח מן הדברים שהקדמנו והגבלנו אותם כי ההתחלה‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫‪1073a22–25‬‬

‫הראשונה אחת ושההיולי לא יתערב בה ושאינה בגשם ושהיא תניע התנועה‬ ‫הראשונה התמידית הנצחית חוץ מכל תנועה ושנוי ואולם היות אחר ההתחלה הזאת‬ ‫הראשונה‬

‫‪7‬‬

‫עצמים רבים ענינם הענין הזה הנה ההקש ימציא זה בהכרח והחוש יעיד עליו‬ ‫וכל מה שיתנועע הנה תנועתו ממניע והעלה הראשונה יתחייב בהכרח שתהיה אחת‬ ‫‪ 30‬התראה[ לית‪ | C :‬ונראה‪ ‖ T :‬שיהיה[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬ראוי[ שראוי‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬שיאמר[ أن يبحث‪ :‬ع ‖‬

‫באלו[ אלו‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬שהם‪ [CABML :‬אם הם‪T :‬ع )أ هى( ‖ ושהם‪ [CAMBL :‬או שהם‪T :‬ع )أو‬ ‫هى( ‖ רבים[ לית‪ 31 B :‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ 32 C :‬אמרו[ אמרנו‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬בעצמים[ ‪ +‬אשר‪‖ C1 :‬‬ ‫לא[ ולא‪ | M :‬שלא‪ ‖ T :‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ ‖ C :‬בלתי[ ובלתי‪ ‖ T :‬ברבויים[ ברוביים ‪B‬‬

‫‪ 33‬דבור[‬

‫בדבור‪ | C :‬דבר‪ ‖ T :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬אמרו[ אמר‪ | C :‬לית‪ ‖ M :‬בהם…אמרו[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 34‬יורו‪:‬‬

‫‪ [TL‬יאמרו‪ | CB :‬יודו‪ ‖ AM :‬עצמים[ עצמיים‪ | C :‬לית‪ | B :‬עצמם‪ ‖ L :‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ ‖ C :‬יתנועעו[‬ ‫יתנועע‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 1‬יגידו[ יספרו‪ | C :‬יסופרו‪ ‖ B :‬כלל[ לית‪ ‖ AL :‬ממספרם[ ממספרים‪ ‖ C :‬אבל[ אשר‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ B‬בהם בספק[ בספק בהם‪ ‖ AM :‬כדרך[ בדרך‪ ‖ L :‬אשר[ אבל‪ :C1) C :‬סא אשר( ‖ נודע[ יודע‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 3–2‬תכלית לו[ לו תכלית‪:‬‬

‫‪T‬‬

‫‪ 2‬יאמרו[ אמרו‪ ‖ M :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬מספרים[ ‪ +‬והמספרים‪T :‬‬

‫‪C‬‬

‫‪ 3‬תכליתם[ להם‪ | M :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬העשרה[ העטרה‪ ‖ M :‬מעשרה‪C :‬‬

‫הדברים[ הדבר‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬שהקדמנו[ אשר הקדמנו‪ ‖ CT :‬אותם[ ‪ +‬אותם‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 4‬שנניח[ ونبين‪ :‬ع ‖‬ ‫‪ 5‬אחת[ לית‪‖ B :‬‬

‫ושההיולי[ ושהחומר‪ ‖ C :‬בה ושאינה[ בו ושאינו‪ ‖ C :‬ושהיא[ ושהוא‪ ‖ C :‬תניע[ יודע ‪ +‬תנועה‪C :‬‬ ‫‪ 6‬מכל תנועה[ מן התנועה‪ ‖ B :‬ואולם[ אולם‪ ‖ AM :‬אחר[ אחרי‪ | C :‬לית‪ ‖ M :‬הזאת‪:‬‬

‫)‪ :C1‬יניע(‬ ‫‪ [BMT‬לית‪ ‖ CAL :‬הראשונה[ ‪ +‬הזאת‪ 7 A :‬הענין[ בענין‪ ‖ M :‬הנה[ אשר‪| B :‬לית‪ ‖ M :‬ההקש‬ ‫‪ [BT‬לית‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬ההיקש‪ ‖ AM :‬ימציא[ ימצא‪ ‖ MT :‬עליו[ ‪ +‬כי‪ 8 C1 :‬וכל[ כל‪ | B :‬בכל‪| C :‬‬ ‫והעלה הראשונה[ ‪ +‬עצמים רבים‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬אחת[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫‪271‬‬ ‫‪ḥ209r9‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫و يجب أن يبحث عن هذه الجواهر أ هي واحدة | أو هي كثيرة أعنى هذه التي لا‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫عظم لها ولا يشو بها الهيولى فإن‬ ‫لم يتكلموا في كثرتها‬

‫المتقدمين‬

‫و بعضهم‬

‫كلاما ًبينا ً‬ ‫قالوا | بالصور‬

‫‪ L‬כג‬ ‫‪ḥ209r11‬‬

‫ونبين من الأشياء التي تقدمنا فحددناها أن المبدأ‬ ‫الأول واحد‬ ‫الأولى الدائمة الأزلية‬

‫‪ b19‬جواهر كثيرة حالها هذه الحال والقياس يوجب ذلك‬

‫‪4‬‬

‫وأنه يحرك الحركة‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫و بعد ذلك المبدأ |‬

‫والحس يشهد عليه‬

‫‪7‬‬

‫وكل متحرك فحركته من محرك فالعلة الأولى يجب | ضرورة أن تكون واحدة‬

‫‪ 30‬أن يبحث[ שיאמר )*أن يقال(‪ :‬ע ‪* 4‬ونبين[ وىىىن‪ | ḥ :‬وتبين‪ | b :‬שנניח )*أن نضع(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫הנה ההקש )*فالقياس(‪ :‬ע ‖ يوجب[ ימציא )*يوجد(‪ :‬ע ‖ يشهد[ شهد‪b :‬‬

‫‪ 7‬والقياس[‬

‫‪272‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪9‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫בלתי מתנועעת לא בעצמות ולא במקרה ואולם העצמים המניעים לגשמים אשר אחריה‬

‫‪1073a34–b3‬‬

‫הנה יתחייב בהכרח שיהיו רבים לפי הגשמים המתנועעים ושיהיו בעצמותם בלתי‬ ‫מתנועעים אבל יתנועעו במקרה כמו שיחייבהו המאמר בענין הנפש ואין ראוי שנניחם‬ ‫בלתי מתנועעים לבד אבל תמידיים גם כן וזה כי טבע הכוכבים עצם מן העצמים‬ ‫והמניע להם נצחי כי הוא יותר קודם מן הדבר המתנועע ומה שהוא יותר קודם מן‬ ‫העצם הנה הוא בלא ספק עצם אבל כי העמידה על רבוי הכחות ראוי שנכוין אל‬ ‫ידיעתו מן‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫החכמה המיוחדת בפילוסופיא ר״ל חכמת הכוכבים כי זאת החכמה היא אשר תשתדל‬ ‫שתבאר מספר התנועות אשר יתנועע אותם כל אחד מן הכוכבים הנבוכים ומספר‬ ‫הגלגלים אשר‬ ‫יניעוהו והנה נמצא מספר הגלגלים הנושאים לכוכבים ומספר הגלגלים המנהיגים להם‬ ‫אצל פליקס חלוף מה שאצל אודקסיס אלא שהוא ראוי שנגזור על כי מספר הכחות‬ ‫המניעים כפי מספר הגשמים המתנועעים וכי מן הכחות ראשון ושני על סדר הגלגלים‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫בעינו ושהחלוף ביניהם אינו במדרגה לבד אבל במציאות ובעצם בירידתם במדרגה‬

‫‪ 9‬בעצמות[ בעצמותה‪ ‖ BTL :‬אחריה‪ [BM :‬אחריהם‪(C1⇄) CT :‬‬ ‫ושהם‪ ‖ C1 :‬בעצמותם[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 10‬יתחייב[ יתחיב‪ ‖ M :‬ושיהיו[‬

‫‪ 11‬אבל[ ‪ :C1 in marg.‬יש בזה עיון אינו מועט ‖ שיחייבהו‪:‬‬

‫‪ [B‬שיחייב‪ | CAM :‬שחייבהו‪ ‖ T :‬ראוי[ לית‪ ‖ T0 | B :‬שנניחם[ ששנניחם)!(‪C :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ ‖ (C1‬תמידיים[ תמידים‪ ‖ B :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬טבע[ לית‪T0 :‬‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ C :‬ומה[ לית‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 12‬לבד[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 13‬יותר…מן)‪ ‖ T0 [(1‬הדבר…מן[‬

‫‪ 14‬הנה[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬הוא‪ [MT :‬והוא‪ | C :‬לית‪ ‖ ABL :‬בלא…עצם[ ‪‖ T0‬‬

‫עצם[ גשם‪ ‖ B :‬שנכוין[ שנכון‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 15–14‬מן החכמה[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 15‬החכמה)‪ [(1‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬בפילוסופיא‪:‬‬

‫‪ [BMT‬בפלוסופיא‪ | AL :‬בפילוסופיה‪ ‖ C :‬החכמה)‪…(2‬אשר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬תשתדל[ תחתום‪ | C :‬סא תחקור‪:‬‬

‫‪ 16 C1‬אשר[ אבל‪ ‖ B :‬יתנועע[ יתנועעו‪ ‖ B :‬אותם…מין[ ‪ ‖ T0‬אותם[ לית‪ ‖ AL :‬הנבוכים[ סא‬ ‫המתנועעים‪ 17 C1 :‬יניעוהו…נמצא[ ‪ ‖ T0‬והנה[ והיא‪ ‖ M :‬הגלגלים המנהיגים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬להם[ לית‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ 18‬פליקס‪ [AML :‬פליקיס‪ | C :‬פילקס‪ ‖ BT :‬שאצל[ אצל‪ ‖ B :‬אודקסיס[ אדקסיס‪ | B :‬אודקיסיס‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 19‬הגשמים המתנועעים[‬ ‫‪ ‖ M‬אלא…שנגזור[ ‪ ‖ T0‬שנגזור[ שנקצר‪ ‖ C :‬כי[ פי‪ | C :‬לית‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ T0‬וכי[ ‪ +‬מה‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬סדר הגלגלים[ הסדר הגלגלים‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬הגלגלים בסדרם‪–19 AM :‬‬ ‫‪ 20‬במדרגה)‪ [(1‬מן המדרגה‪ ‖ C :‬ובעצם…במדרגה)‪‖ T0 [(2‬‬ ‫‪ 20‬הגלגלים…ושהחלוף[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫במדרגה)‪ [(2‬במדרגתם‪AL :‬‬

‫‪1073b3–5‬‬

‫‪273‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ġ45,10‬غير متحركة لا بالذات ولا بالعرض وأما الجواهر المحركة للأجسام التي بعدها‬ ‫‪ ḥ209r13‬فيجب ضرورة أن تكون كثيرة بحسب الأجسام | المتحركة وأن تكون في ذاتها غير‬

‫‪9‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫متحركة لـكن تتحرك بالعرض كما أوجبه القول في أمر النفس‬ ‫وأن تكون أزلية‬

‫‪ḥ209r14‬‬

‫إلا أن الوقوف على كثرة | القوى نقصد إلى تعرفه من‬

‫علم النجوم‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫و يجب أن يكون عدد القوى‬

‫‪ḥ209r15‬‬

‫المحركة بحسب عدد الأجسام المتحركة‬

‫‪ 14‬كثرة[ كثيرة‪* ‖ b :‬نقصد )נכוין(‪ :‬ע[ ىقصد‪ | ḥ :‬يقصد‪b :‬‬

‫‪14‬‬

‫‪18‬‬

‫‪274‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪21‬‬

‫וחסרונם ולזאת הסבה היו מדרגותם ראשונה ושנית כי אשר ראוי שיתחייב לו וימשך‬ ‫אחריו בזה החלוף בעצם ואמנם אמרתי כי חכמת הכוכבים מיוחדת מאד בפילוסופיא כי‬

‫‪1073b5–8‬‬

‫היא לבד תחקור מענין העצם המוחש הנצחי ואולם שאר הלמודיות הנה חקירתן‬ ‫מן המקרים‬ ‫המשיגים לגשמים אולם התשבורת הנה תחקור על הכמות הנדבק ואולם החשבון הנה‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫יחקור על הכמות הנחלק ומי שהבין מחכמת הכוכבים מעט הבנה הנה הענין אצלו‬

‫‪1073b8–10‬‬

‫מבואר כי‬

‫כל אחד מן הכוכבים יתנועע תנועות רבות וכל אחד מן הגשמים המתנועעים מבואר^‬ ‫נראה‬ ‫ואולם כמה מספר כל אחד מהם וכמה מספר כל תנועות הכוכבים הנבוכים הנה אשר‬

‫‪1073b10–17‬‬

‫ראוי שנזכיר ממנו בזה המקום מה שאמרו קצת מאנשי חכמת התשבורת עד שיובן‬ ‫בו זה כדי שיהיה אפשר שיצוייר בשכלנו מספרו על ההגבלה ואולם שאר מה שאחריו‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫הנה ראוי שנחקור אנחנו על קצתו ונלמד הקצת ממי שיחקור על זה ואם מצאנו בו‬ ‫דבר יותר טוב ממה שכבר מצאו עד עתה מי שחפש וחקר על זה הבאנו כלם ונקבל‬ ‫ממי שהגדיל מהם לחקור ואומר כי אודקסיס שם תנועת כל אחד מן השמש והירח‬

‫‪ 21‬וחסרונם[ ובחסרונם‪ ‖ T :‬מדרגותם[ מדרגתם‪ ‖ B :‬ראשונה…ראוי[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 22‬בזה[ כי זה‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ C‬בעצם…כי)‪ ‖ T0 [(1‬מיוחדת[ מיוחד‪ ‖ M :‬בפילוסופיא‪ [BM :‬בפילוסופיה‪ | C :‬בפלוסופיא‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | A‬בפלסופיא‪L :‬‬

‫‪ 23–22‬בפילוסופיא…תחקור[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 23‬מענין[ לית‪ ‖ AB :‬העצם[ מעצם‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ A‬הלמודיות…חקירתן[ ‪ ‖ T0‬חקירתן[ חקירתם‪ ‖ BM :‬מן המקרים[ מהמקרים‪ ‖ CT :‬לגשמים[‬ ‫הגשמיים‪C :‬‬ ‫‪M‬‬ ‫‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 24‬התשבורת…הכמות[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הנה )‪ [(1‬לית‪ + | C :‬הנה‪ ‖ B :‬הנדבק[ המתדבק‪:‬‬

‫‪ 25‬על…שהבין[ ‪ ‖ T0‬שהבין[ שהיה כבר הבין‪ ‖ C :‬הנה[ לית‪C :‬‬ ‫‪ 25‬מבואר‪ [C :‬לית‪ABML :‬‬

‫‪ 27–25‬הענין…תנועות[‬

‫‪ 26‬מן הכוכבים[ מהכוכבים‪ ‖ BL :‬יתנועע[ יתנועעו‪ ‖ M :‬רבות[‬

‫לית‪ ‖ M :‬אחד[ אחת‪ ‖ A :‬מן הגשמים[ מהגשמים‪ ‖ B :‬נראה[ ונראה‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 27‬תנועות[ תנועת‪CB :‬‬

‫‪ 28–27‬אשר…המקום[ ‪ 28 T0‬שנזכיר‪ [AM :‬שנזכור‪ ‖ CB :‬מה שאמרו קצת[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬מאנשי‬ ‫חכמת‪ [CBT :‬מחכמי‪ 29–28 AML :‬התשבורת…כדי[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ M‬מספרו…מה[ ‪ 30 T0‬אנחנו[ ‪ +‬אצלו‪ ‖ B :‬ונלמד…ממי[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ונלמד[ ונדע‪ | C :‬ונלמוד‪‖ A :‬‬ ‫בו[ בה‪ 31 B :‬דבר[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬יותר[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬שכבר[ ‪ +‬עבר‪ ‖ T :‬מצאו[ מצאנו‪ ‖ B :‬מי[ ממי‪‖ T :‬‬ ‫שחפש‪ [CBL :‬שתפש‪ | AM :‬שיחפש‪ ‖ T :‬כלם[ כולם‪ 32 A :‬מהם[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬אודקסוס[ לית‪:C1) C :‬‬ ‫אודיקסיש( ‖ תנועת[ תנועות‪CT :‬‬ ‫‪ 29‬זה[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬בשכלנו[ בשכלו‪:‬‬

‫‪1073b17–32‬‬

Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition

275

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫‪276‬‬

‫משלשה גלגלים הראשון מהם גלגל הכוכבים הקיימים והשני גלגל המזלות והשלישי‬

‫‪ L‬כד‬

‫הגלגל הנוטה ברוחב המזלות ונטית הגלגל אשר יסוב בו הירח ברוחב יותר מנטיית הגלגל‬ ‫אשר יסוב בו השמש ואולם כל אחד מן הכוכבים הנבוכים הנה שם תנועתו בארבעה‬ ‫גלגלים והגלגל הראשון והשני מאלו הגלגלים הארבעה הם הגלגל הראשון והשני‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫מגלגל השמש והירח וזה כי גלגל הכוכבים הקיימים המניע לכל הגלגלים ואשר למטה‬ ‫מזה הגלגל ר״ל גלגל המזלות תנועתם משותפת לכל הגלגלים ואולם הגלגל השלישי‬ ‫הנה קטביו מיוחדים זולת שאר הגלגלים על אמצע גלגל המזלות ואולם הגלגל‬ ‫הרביעי הנה תנועתו על העגול הנוטה מאמצע הגלגל הזה וקטבי הגלגל השלישי לכל‬ ‫אחד משאר הכוכבים זולת נגה וכוכב חמה שני קטבים מיוחדים ואולם נגה וכוכב חמה‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫הנה קטביהם משותפים הנה זה מה שהניחו אודקסיס ואולם פילקס הנה שם הגלגלים‬ ‫ההנחה הזאת בעינה אשר שם אותה אודקסיס ר״ל מדרגת המרחק במה שביניהם‬ ‫והסכים עמו גם כן במספר הגלגלים בצדק ושבתאי אבל כי הוא חשב שהוא ראוי‬ ‫שיתוסף לכל אחד מן השמש והירח שני גלגלים כדי שיהיה זה נאות למה שיראה‬ ‫לעין מענינם ואולם שאר הכוכבים הנבוכים הנה דמה שהוא ראוי שיתוסף לכל‬ ‫‪ 1‬משלשה[ מג׳‪ ‖ B :‬גלגלים[ ‪ +‬מן‪ ‖ M :‬הקימים[ הקיימים‪CT :‬‬

‫‪ 2‬הגלגל[ גלגל‪ ‖ MT :‬ברוחב[‬

‫ברחב‪ ‖ T :‬המזלות[ ‪ +‬יותר‪ ‖ C :‬ונטית[ ונטיית‪ ‖ CT :‬יסוב בו‪ [ABL :‬יסבבהו גלגל‪ | C :‬יסובבו‪| M :‬‬

‫יסובב בו‪ ‖ T :‬ברוחב‪ [CBT :‬ברחב‪ ‖ AML :‬מנטיית[ מנטית‪ 3 BM :‬יסוב בו[ יסובבנו‪ | C :‬יסובב‬ ‫בו‪ ‖ T :‬הנבוכים[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הנה[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬בארבעה[ בארבע‪C :‬‬ ‫כמו‪ | C :‬כי‪ 5 B :‬מגלגל[ מגלגלי‪ ‖ CM :‬גלגל[ הגלגלים‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הקיימים[ הקימים‪ ‖ AM :‬המניע[‬ ‫לית‪ 6 B :‬משותפת[ משתתפם)!(‪ | A :‬משתתפת‪ ‖ M :‬לכל[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬ואולם…המזלות[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 7 (C1⇄) C‬קטביו[ קוטביו‪ ‖ C1 :‬מיוחדים[ לבד‪ ‖ C1 :‬הגלגל[ גלגל‪ 8 M :‬העגול‪ [CBT :‬העגולה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ AML‬הגלגל הזה[ זה הגלגל‪ ‖ B :‬הזה[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬וקטבי[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) CB :‬הגלגל[ והגלגל‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | C‬לית‪ 9 B :‬נגה)‪ [(1‬נוגה‪ ‖ T :‬חמה)‪ [(1‬וחמה‪ ‖ T :‬וכוכב)‪…(1‬חמה)‪ [(2‬לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬נגה)‪[(2‬‬ ‫נוגה‪ ‖ AT :‬חמה)‪ [(2‬וחמה‪ 10 T :‬אודקסיס[ אוקטיס‪ ‖ B :‬שם‪ [AL :‬הניח‪ | (C1 corr.) CBT :‬שם ‪+‬‬ ‫הנחת‪ 11 M :‬הזאת[ ההיא‪ ‖ CL :‬אותה[ אותם‪ | C :‬הנחת שם)!(‪ ‖ B :‬אודקסיס[ אורקטיס‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫ר״ל…שביניהם[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬המרחק[ הרוחק‪ | C :‬לית‪ 12 T :‬עמו גם כן[ ג״כ עמו‪ ‖ B :‬בצדק[ בכוכב‬ ‫חמה‪ ‖ C :‬ושבתאי[ ושבתי‪ ‖ B :‬הוא[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬שהוא ראוי[ שראוי‪ 13 B :‬שיתוסף[ שישותף‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 14–13 C‬מן השמש…לכל[ לית‪ :C1) C :‬חסר וכן יראה בעינו לכל אחד מהשמש והירח שתי תנועות‬ ‫נוספות ואולם לשאר הכוכבים הנבוכים הנה ראוי שישותף לכל‪ .‬אחר כן מצאתי הלשון מדויק בזה‬ ‫ראוי שיהיה לכל אחד מהשמש והירח שני גלגלים כדי שיהיה זה נאות למה שיראה לעין מענינם ואולם‬ ‫שאר הכוכבים הנבוכים הנה דמה שהוא ראוי שיתוסף לכל וכול׳( ‪ 13‬שיראה[ שיהיה נראה‪AL :‬‬ ‫‪ 14‬לעין[ ‪ ‖ T0‬דמה‪ [C1T :‬דומה‪ | AML :‬ממה‪ ‖ B :‬שיתוסף[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫‪ 4‬הארבעה[ הד׳‪ ‖ T :‬הם[‬

‫‪1073b32–38‬‬

Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition

277

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬

‫‪278‬‬

‫אחד מהם גלגל אחד ויתחייב בהכרח אם היה מדרך כלם כאשר הורכבו שיאות מה‬

‫–‪1073b38‬‬ ‫‪1074a4‬‬

‫שיראה לעין שיהיה לכל אחד מן הכוכבים הנבוכים גלגלים אחרים יסובבו אותם יחסר‬ ‫כל אחד מהם גלגל אחד ויסובב הכוכב התחתון עד שישוב תמיד אל המקום אשר‬ ‫התחיל ממנו הגלגל הראשון כי אמנם אפשר בכלם שיסובבו בסבוב גלגל הכוכבים‬

‫‪1074a4–14‬‬

‫הקיימים על זה הצד לבד הנה מפני כי הגלגלים אשר יתנועעו בהם אלו קצתם שמונה‬ ‫‪20‬‬

‫וקצתם חמשה ועשרים ואמנם אין ראוי שיסובבו לבד הגלגלים אשר בהם יתנועע הכוכב‬ ‫התחתון מהם כלם הנה הגלגלים אשר יסובבו השנים הראשונים יהיו ששה ואולם אשר‬ ‫יסובבו הארבעה האחרים הנה יהיו ששה עשר ויהיו מספר הגלגלים כלם המתנועעים‬ ‫מהם ואשר יסובבו אלו הגלגלים חמשה וחמשים ואם לא יוספו השמש והירח אותם‬ ‫התנועות אשר זכרנו אותם היה מספר הגלגלים שבעה וארבעים‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫ויהיו התנועות בזה המספר ויתחייב עם זה שנאמר כי מספר העצמים וההתחלות‬ ‫אשר יניעו‬ ‫אותם ואינם מתנועעים ומספר העצמים המוחשים כמו זה המספר וזה מפני שהוא‬

‫‪ 15‬ויתחייב[ ויתחיב‪ ‖ M :‬כלם[ כולם‪ ‖ BL :‬כאשר הורכבו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הורכבו[ הרכבו‪ ‖ M :‬מה[ במה‪C1 :‬‬ ‫‪ 16‬לכל[ כל‪ ‖ B :‬אחד[ ‪ +‬מהם‪ ‖ C :‬מן הכוכבים[ מהכוכבים‪ ‖ T :‬הנבוכים גלגלים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬אחרים[‬ ‫אחדים‪ ‖ C :‬אותם[ מה‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 17‬אחד)‪…(2‬הכוכב[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הכוכב[ הגלגל‪ ‖ B :‬התחתון[ תחתון‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 18‬ממנו הגלגל[ ‪ ‖ T0‬שיסובבו[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬בסבוב גלגל[ בסבובי גלגלי‪C :‬‬ ‫‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 19–18‬הכוכבים הקיימים[‬

‫‪ 19‬הקיימים[ הקימים‪ ‖ M :‬לבד[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬הנה מפני[ ובעבור כי‪ ‖ C :‬יתנועעו…קצתם[ ‪‖ T0‬‬

‫שמונה‪ [CAL :‬שמנה‪BMT :‬‬

‫‪ 20‬חמשה ועשרים[ כ״ה‪ ‖ M :‬ואמנם[ ואולם‪ ‖ B :‬אין…לבד[ ‪‖ T0‬‬

‫ראוי[ להם‪ ‖ B :‬בהם[ ‪ +‬לא‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 21‬כלם[ כי‪ | B :‬לית‪ ‖ L :‬הנה הגלגלים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ואולם…ששה[‬

‫לית‪ 22–21 (C1⇄) C :‬אשר)‪…(2‬האחרים[ ‪ 22 T0‬הארבעה…יהיו[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬הנה[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬ששה‬ ‫עשר[ י״ו‪ 23 T :‬מהם…הגלגלים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ואשר[ כאשר‪ ‖ AM :‬אלו[ מאלו‪ ‖ B :‬חמשה וחמשים[‬ ‫חמשה ועשרי׳‪ | B :‬כ״ה‪ ‖ T :‬יוספו‪ [B :‬תוסיף‪ | C :‬הוספנו‪ | AM :‬נוספו‪ 24–23 T :‬אותם…זכרנו[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫‪ 24‬שבעה וארבעים[ מ״ז‪ 25 T :‬התנועות…המספר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ויתחייב[ ויתחייב‪ ‖ M :‬כי מספר‪[CBT :‬‬ ‫שמספר‪ 26–25 AML :‬וההתחלות…ואינם[ ‪ 25 T0‬וההתחלות[ והתחלות‪ 26 B :‬אותם[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ CB‬המוחשים…המספר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מפני שהוא[ כי הוא‪C :‬‬

‫‪1074a14–16‬‬

‫‪279‬‬

‫‪ L‬כד‬ ‫‪ḥ209r15‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫والذي تدل عليه | النجوم من عدد الأفلاك المتحركة خمسة وخمسون‬

‫‪23‬‬

‫أو سبعة وأر بعون‬ ‫فلتكن الحركات هذا العدد‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪27‬‬

‫‪280‬‬

‫מתחייב שיהיה מספר התנועות כמו מספר הגלגלים המתנועעים ושיהיה מספר העלות‬ ‫המניעות‬ ‫כמו מספר התנועות והנה ראוי שנגזור במאמר על כי זה ההמשכות כפי מה‬

‫‪1074a16–17‬‬

‫שזכרנו ואולם‬ ‫המשפט על היות מספר אלו התנועות הוא זה המספר הנה אין ראוי לנו שנשפוט בו אבל‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫נניח המשפט ההכרחי בו לאשר זה מלאכתם והם יותר חזקים על זה ואם היה‬

‫‪1074a17–22‬‬

‫בלתי אפשר‬ ‫שתהיה תנועה לא תלך אל תנועת כוכב מן הכוכבים ואי אפשר שיהיה עצם וטבע‬ ‫אלהי בטל אין פועל לו כי כל עצם זה ענינו הנה הוא טוב לא יתרשל בפעולתו המיוחדת‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫בו הנכנסת בגדרו על תכלית המעלה אחר שכבר השיג בשלמות החיים התמידיים אם כן‬

‫‪ L‬כה‬

‫אי אפשר שימצא גשם אחר חוץ מאלה הגשמים בלתי מתנועע אבל ראוי שיהא מספר‬ ‫העצמים זה המספר וזה שהוא אם היו בכאן תנועות אחרות יהיו בכאן גם כן גשמים‬

‫‪1074a22–24‬‬

‫אחרים מתנועעים ואין בכאן גשמים יותר מאלו הגשמים אשר יראו הנה לא ימצא‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫אם כן לא תנועות אחרות ולא עלות אחרות מניעות יותר מאלו כי כל עלה מניעה אם‬

‫‪1074a25–28‬‬

‫היתה אמנם תהיה בסבת דבר מתנועע וכל תנועה הנה הויתה מן מניע הנה אי‬ ‫אפשר שתמצא תנועה בסבת עצמותה ולא בסבת תנועה אחרת אבל בסבת הכוכבים‬ ‫ואמנם אמרתי שהוא בלתי אפשר שתהיה תנועה בסבת עצמותה ולא בסבת תנועה‬ ‫‪ 27‬מתחייב[ מתחיב‪ ‖ M :‬מספר)‪ [(1‬המספר‪ ‖ T :‬התנועות…הגלגלים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מספר)‪ + [(2‬התנועות‪:‬‬ ‫‪(C1⇄) C‬‬

‫‪ 28–27‬המניעות…התנועות[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 28‬שנגזור[ שנספיק‪ ‖ C :‬זה…שזכרנו[ ‪ 29 T0‬היות[‬

‫כי‪ ‖ C :‬התנועות…ראוי[ ‪ ‖ T0‬התנועות[ ‪ +‬הנה‪ ‖ C :‬הוא[ לית‪ ‖ AM :‬לנו[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬בו[ ‪ +‬כי‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ 31‬כוכב[ הכוכב‪ ‖ A :‬שיהיה[ לית‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 32‬בטל[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬פועל[ פעל‪ ‖ T :‬ענינו[ עניינו‪‖ BL :‬‬ ‫‪ 1‬המעלה[ ‪ +‬אם‪ ‖ A :‬אחר שכבר השיג‪:‬‬

‫טוב[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬יתרשל[ יסור‪ ‖ C :‬בפעולתו[ בפעולתו‪T :‬‬ ‫‪ [BT‬כאשר היה כבר השיג‪ | C :‬אחר שהשיג‪ ‖ AML :‬בשלמות החיים התמידיים‪ [CT :‬השלמות‬ ‫הקים התמידית‪ | AM :‬בשלימות החיים התמידיים‪ | B :‬בשלמות החיים התמידים‪ ‖ L :‬אם כן[ א״כ‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 2 BM‬שימצא[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬מאלו‪ [BMT :‬מאלה‪ ‖ CAL :‬בלתי[ מבלתי‪ ‖ A :‬בלתי…העצמים[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C‬שיהא‪ [AC1 :‬שיהא‪ 3 BMT :‬העצמים[ הגשמים‪ ‖ C1 :‬זה[ ‪ +‬העצם‪ ‖ B :‬היו‪ [AL :‬היה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ CBMT‬אחרות[ אחדות‪ ‖ C :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ 4 B :‬בכאן[ הנה‪ ‖ CT :‬יותר[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬הגשמים[‬ ‫גשמים‪ ‖ M :‬ימצא[ ימצאו‪ 5 T :‬אם כן‪ [CT :‬לית‪ | A :‬א״כ‪ | BL :‬גם כן‪ ‖ M :‬לא‪ [BML :‬לית‪CT :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ | (C1‬לו‪ ‖ A :‬תנועות[ בתנועות‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬עלות[ בעלות‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬מניעה[ מניע‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 6 T‬דבר[ בדבר‪ ‖ A :‬הנה[ אמנם‪ ‖ T :‬מן מניע‪ [BL :‬בעבור מניע‪ | C :‬מן מניעה‪ | AM :‬ממניע‪‖ T :‬‬ ‫אי[ לית‪ 9–7 M :‬אבל…אחרת[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫‪1074a28–31‬‬

‫‪281‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫إلا أن‬

‫‪ḥ209r16‬‬

‫‪29‬‬

‫الحكم الضروري في | ذلك فللذى يتنجم ⟩فهو⟨ أقوى على ذلك‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫فيجب أن يكون عدد الحركات كعدد الأفلاك المتحركة وأن يكون عدد العلل المحركة‬

‫‪27‬‬

‫كعدد الحركات |‬

‫‪28‬‬

‫ولا يمكن أن يوجد جوهر وطبيعة‬

‫‪ġ47,1–3‬‬

‫‪31‬‬

‫إلاهية عطلا ًلا فعل لها لأن كل واحد منها جهاد لا يبخل بفعله الخاص‬ ‫‪ L‬כה به الداخل فى حده‬

‫إذقد فاز بالحياة الدائمة‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫ولا‬

‫‪ġ47,5–6‬‬

‫يمكن أن يكون حركة بسبب ذاتها ولا بسبب حركة أخرى‬

‫‪ 30‬فهو‪ [b :‬לית‪ḥ :‬‬

‫‪6‬‬

‫‪282‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪9‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫אחרת כי הטבע כבר מנע ורחק ממה שילך דרך הריק אשר אין ענין לו ומה שאין‬ ‫תכלית לו ואשר יקרה מהוית תנועה בסבת עצמותה מה שאין ענין לו ומהוית תנועה‬ ‫בסבת תנועה מה שאין תכלית לו ואחר שיהיה זה כן הנה נחקור על מה שימשך אחר‬

‫‪1074a31–33‬‬

‫זה המאמר‬ ‫ונאמר שהוא אם היה העולם יותר מאחד הנה יתחייב בלא ספק שיהיו העלות‬ ‫הראשונות גם כן יותר מאחת וכל שכן אם היו כלם תחת מין אחד כדרך‬ ‫‪15‬‬

‫האנשים וזה כי ההתחלות גם כן יהיו תחת מין אחד וכלם יכנסו במספר אחד אבל כי‬

‫‪1074a33–35‬‬

‫הדברים אשר צורתם צורה אחת ומספרם רב אמנם הסבה ברבויים החמר והיסוד וזה כי‬ ‫כל האנשים להם גדר אחד בעינו ואמנם ההבדל בין סקראט ואפלאטון מדרך החומר‬ ‫והצורה הראשונה והמניע הראשון לא יתערב בו החמר ואינו בעל גשם ויתחייב אם כן‬ ‫שיהיה‬ ‫המניע הראשון אחד בגדר והמספר והגשם המתנועע גם כן אם היה מתדבק התנועה‬ ‫‪20‬‬

‫הנה יתחייב שיהיה אחד הנה אין העולם אם כן לבדו בלבד אחד כמו שבארנו בטבעיות‬ ‫אבל העלה המניעה גם כן אחת כמו שבארנו בספרים אחרים הנה יתחייב במה שביארנו‬ ‫בדברים הטבעיים שלא יהיה חוץ ממנו גשם אחר לא קל ולא כבד ואולם לפי מה‬ ‫‪ 9‬מנע[ נמנע‪ ‖ CB :‬ממה‪ [CBT :‬מה‪ ‖ AML :‬ענין[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬ומה[ ממה‪ :C1) C :‬וממה( ‖‬ ‫שאין[ ‪ +‬לו‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 10‬תנועה )‪ [(1‬תנועת‪ ‖ C :‬מהוית‪ [CBL :‬מהירות‪ | AM :‬מהיות‪ ‖ T :‬ומהוית‪:‬‬

‫‪ [CBL‬ומהות‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬ומהירות‪ | AM :‬ומהיות‪ ‖ T :‬תנועה)‪ [(2‬התנועה‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬בסבת[ ‪C corr.‬‬

‫)‪ :C1‬בסיבת( ‖ תנועה[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬שאין[ ‪ +‬לו‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬ואחר שיהיה זה[ וכאשר היה‪| C :‬‬ ‫ואחר שהיה זה‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 13‬היה[ יהיה‪ | C :‬מן‪ ‖ B :‬בלא ספק[ לית‪M :‬‬

‫‪TL‬ع[ שיהיה העולם הראשון‪(C1⇄) CABM :‬‬

‫‪ 14–13‬שיהיו…הראשונות‪:‬‬

‫‪ 14‬גם כן‪ [ATL :‬לית‪ | CM :‬א״כ‪ ‖ B :‬מאחת‪[L :‬‬

‫מאחד‪ ‖ (C1⇄) CABMT :‬וכל שכן[ וכ״ש‪ ‖ BM :‬אם היו‪ [AML :‬אם יהיו‪ | C :‬אם היה‪ | B :‬כשיהיו‪‖ T :‬‬ ‫כלם[ כולו‪ ‖ B :‬מין[ מן‪B :‬‬ ‫התחלות‪ ‖ C :‬יהיו[ יהיה‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 15–14‬כדרך…אחד[ לית‪BM :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪(C1‬‬

‫| לית‪ ‖ A :‬מין[ מן‪C :‬‬

‫ברבוים[ בעבורם‪ ‖ M :‬החמר[ החומר‪ ‖ B :‬כי[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 15‬האנשים[ האדם‪ ‖ C :‬ההתחלות[‬ ‫‪ 16‬רב[ רבים‪ ‖ AM :‬אמנם[ ואמנם‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫‪ 17‬האנשים[ ‪ +‬יש‪ ‖ M :‬להם[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫)⇄‪ ‖ (C1‬ואמנם[ ואולם‪ ‖ CB :‬ואפלאטון[ ובין אפלאטון‪ | C :‬ואפלטון‪ ‖ BM :‬החומר‪ [CMT :‬החמר‪:‬‬ ‫‪ABL‬‬

‫‪ 18‬הראשונה[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬הראשון‪C1 :‬ع[ לית‪ ‖ CABMTL :‬יתערב[ יתערבו‪ ‖ B :‬החמר[‬

‫החומר‪ ‖ CM :‬אם כן[ א״כ‪ | B :‬גם כן‪M :‬‬ ‫‪ | C‬יהיה‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 19‬המתנועע[ המניע‪ ‖ C :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬אם היה[ היה‪:‬‬

‫‪ 20‬הנה[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬יתחייב[ ‪ +‬גם כן‪ ‖ M :‬אם כן[ א״כ‪ ‖ BM :‬בלבד אחד[ אחד בלבד‪:‬‬

‫‪ 21‬המניעה[ המניע‪C :‬‬

‫)⇄‪(C1‬‬

‫‪M‬‬ ‫בו כל זה‬ ‫ממנו[ ‪ +‬חוץ‪ ‖ B :‬גשם[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫‖ גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬במה[ מה‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 21‬בספרים…שביארנו[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬שביארנו[ שבארנו‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 22–21‬כמו…כבד[ ‪ :C1‬סא אין‬ ‫‪ 22‬יהיה[ יהא‪ | C :‬לית‪‖ B :‬‬

‫‪1074a35–38‬‬

‫‪283‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ḥ209r18‬ثم نقول إنه إن كان العالم أكثر من واحد فيجب‬ ‫الأولى‬

‫أن تكون العلل‬

‫‪13‬‬

‫أكثر من واحد‬

‫‪ ḥ209r18‬والأشياء التي صورتها واحدة وعددها كثيرة‬

‫يكون | السبب في كثرتها المادة والعنصر‬

‫والمحرك الأول لا يشو به الهيولى ولا هو ذو جسم فيجب‬

‫‪16‬‬

‫‪18‬‬

‫أن يكون‬ ‫المحرك الأول | واحدا ً فى الحد والعدد والجسم المتحرك أيضا ًإن كان متصل الحركة‬ ‫‪ḥ209r20‬‬

‫‪ġ47,12–13‬‬

‫يجب أن يكون واحدا ً فالعالم واحد‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫ولا يكون خارجا ًعنه جسم‬

‫‪* 13‬نقول‪ :‬ע )נאמר([ ىقول‪ | ḥ :‬يقول‪b :‬‬

‫‪19‬‬

‫لا ثقيل ولا خفيف‬

‫‪ 16‬كثيرة‪ [ḥ :‬كثرة‪b :‬‬

‫‪ 18‬يشو به‪ [ḥ :‬تشو به‪b :‬‬

‫‪22‬‬

‫‪284‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪23‬‬

‫שיחייבהו המופת האמתי מן הדברים הקודמים הטבעיים ר״ל מאשר הוא בלתי אפשר‬ ‫שיהיו התחלות התנועות רבות הנה הקודם^ שיהיה הטבע הראשון אחד קיים בכל‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫הגלגלים והוא החשק כמו שהנימוס בהדרכת המדינות אחד וכן הענין במלך אחד‬ ‫ויהיה כל הרעיה יתנועע בתשוקה מהם להמשך אחר אותו הנימוס וזה כי הענין כמו‬ ‫שאמרנו פעמים רבות כמו מה שימצא מן התשוקה כאשר יאהבו מן ההדרכה אשר‬ ‫תבא אליהם מצות המלך והנהגתו וזה כי אנחנו נמצא גם כן בזאת ההדרכה אשר‬ ‫אצלנו הדבר החשוק תחלה אחד אצל הכל והוא הנימוס או המלך ונמצא הגעת‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫הרעיה אל הקרוב מהשלמות הענין ההוא אשר יצוהו המלך לא תהיה מפעל אחד‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫מהם אבל קצתם בדרך הראשים וקצתם בדרך העבדים וקצתם בדרך שניהם יחד‬ ‫וקצתם בדרך הכתות‬ ‫וקצתם בדרך השכירים וקצתם בדרך המלחים וקצת הכתות בדרך הרגליים‬ ‫וקצתם בדרך‬ ‫הפרשים וקצתם בדרך הרובי קשת ונמצא הפעלות הרבות וההנהגה בחיים מתחלפים‬ ‫ונמצא גם כן התנועות מתחלפות מאד ופעמים היו מתהפכים אבל כי כלם כונתם‬

‫‪ 23‬שיחייבהו[ שחייבהו‪ | C :‬שיחיבהו‪ ‖ M :‬הדברים[ לית‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 24‬הקודם[ קודם‪ ‖ AM :‬אחד[ לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ + | M‬אחדות החיות בכל הדברים וההשארות והנצחות הם מזה הראשון אשר איננו בגשם והחיות‬ ‫בדברים מתחלף כפי שעור רחקם וקרבם מאותו הראשון הנה אותו העצם‪T :‬‬ ‫שהנמוס‪ ‖ M :‬במלך[ ‪ +‬שהוא‪ 26 C1 :‬ויהיה‪ [CT :‬ותהיה‪ ‖ ABML :‬הרעיה[ הרעייה‪ | B :‬ההמון‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ T‬יתנועע‪ [CT :‬תתנועע‪ ‖ ABML :‬מהם‪ [T :‬כמו ‪ +‬מהם‪ | C :‬ממנה‪ ‖ ABML :‬הנימוס[ הנמוס‪M :‬‬ ‫‪ 27‬כמו מה שימצא‪ [ABL :‬כאשר ימצא‪ | C :‬כמו שימצא‪ | M :‬כמו מה שתמצא‪ ‖ T :‬כאשר[ באשר‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ M‬יאהבו מן[ יאהב בעבור‪ 28 C :‬תבא[ באה‪ | C :‬הבא‪ ‖ B :‬מצות[ ענין‪ ‖ C :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ 29‬החשוק[ החושק‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬אחד אצל הכל[ אחר כל‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הנימוס[ הנמוס‪ ‖ M :‬ונמצא[‬ ‫‪ +‬כי‪ 30 B :‬הרעיה[ הרעייה‪ | B :‬ההמון‪ ‖ T :‬הקרוב[ הקורבה‪ ‖ C :‬מהשלמות‪ [BMT :‬משלימות‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | C‬מהשלמת‪ ‖ AL :‬הענין ההוא[ אותו ענין‪ :C1) C :‬אותו הענין( ‖ המלך[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬מפעל‪:‬‬ ‫‪ [AMT‬מפועל‪ | CL :‬מפועל ‪ +‬על‪ 1 B :‬יחד[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬וקצתם…הכתות‪ [CBT :‬לית‪ ‖ AML :‬הכתות[‬ ‫הפחות‪ 2 C1 :‬וקצתם בדרך השכירים‪ [BTL :‬לית‪ ‖ CAM :‬וקצת…הרגליים‪ :C1) C :‬וקצתם בדרך‬ ‫הרגליים([ וקצתם הכתות בדרך הרגליים ‪ +‬השכיריים | וקצתם הכתות בדרך הרגלים‪ | B :‬וקצתם‬ ‫בדרך כתות הרגליים‪ | MT :‬וקצתם הכתות בדרך הרגליים‪ 3 L :‬בדרך[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬הרובי[ רובי‪AC :‬‬ ‫)‪ :C1‬רובה( ‖ קשת[ קצת‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬ונמצא[ לית‪ | (C1⇄)C :‬נמצא‪ ‖ A :‬הפעולות‪ [CBL :‬הפעלות‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ AMT‬בחיים[ לית‪ 4 M :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬ופעמים[ פעמים‪ ‖ B :‬היו‪ [CBT :‬יהיו‪ ‖ AML :‬כונתם[‬ ‫כוונתם‪C :‬‬ ‫‪ 25‬שהנימוס[‬

‫‪ L‬כו‬

‫‪285‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫ولا يمكن‬

‫‪ġ49,1–3‬‬

‫‪23‬‬

‫أن تكون مبادئ الحركات كثيرة فالأولى أن تكون الطبيعة الأولى واحدة منبثة فى جميع‬ ‫الأفلاك وهى العشق كما أن الناموس فى سياسة المدينة واحد‬

‫‪ 24‬الحركات‪ [ġCT :‬الحركة‪ ‖ ġ :‬منبثة[ קיים )*مثبتة(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫‪286‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫שישלימו דבר אחד וכלם יתאוו אל דבר אחד בדרך החשוק והוא כדי שיהיו על הענין‬ ‫אשר יצוה המלך בו ויסדרהו וזה הענין אחד לא יתנועע ואין לו גודל ואולם על צד‬ ‫ההקש אל זולתו הנה הוא רב וזה כי התנועות אשר יכוין אליהם רבות והפעולות רבות‬ ‫והעצמים אשר ישיגו הפעולות ההם רבים אבל שהוא נכלל עליהם כלם וזה שהוא‬ ‫בלתי אפשר שיתאוו אליו כלם לולי כי הצורות המיוחדות בכל אחד מהם ופעלתם‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫המיוחדת תלויים בו והתלות כלם בו בסבת המשכם אחריו‬ ‫והנה יורה גם כן על שאנחנו כבר אמרנו יושר כאשר אמרנו שהנה ימצאו עצמים‬ ‫ראשונים מניעים לעולם ולגשמים השמימיים והודענו שהם בדרך קבוץ מן‬ ‫הטובים מה שלקחנו מן הקודמים כי הם גם כן העידו על שהם אמנם אמרו על דרך‬ ‫הרמז למי שיבא במה שאחר ר״ל שאלו הגשמים אלהיים ושהגשם האלהי ייוחד לכל‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫הטבע ואולם שאר מה שאחר זה הנה הושם על צד ההרחבה לספוק הבריאה ולסבת‬ ‫הנימוסים ומה שיהיה התועלת בו וזה שהם ישימו צורות אלו האלוהיים על צורות מיני‬ ‫בעלי חיים כמו טלה ודגים ואריה וקראום בזה אם לפי הכחות אשר ידמו שהם להם‬

‫‪ 5‬שישלימו[ שישלמו‪ ‖ CM :‬אל[ על‪ ‖ B :‬בדרך[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬החשוק[ החושק‪ | C :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬כדי[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ CB‬שיהיו[ שיבאו‪ ‖ T0 | C :‬הענין[ הצווי‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 6‬בו[ לית‪T :‬‬

‫לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬והפעולות‪ [BMT :‬והפעלות‪AL :‬‬

‫‪ 7‬אשר[ לית‪ ‖ CA :‬והפעולות רבות[‬

‫‪ 8‬ישיגו[ ‪ +‬אותם‪ ‖ C :‬הפעולות[ הפעלות‪‖ AM :‬‬

‫ההם[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬נכלל[ כלל‪ ‖ C :‬עליהם‪ [BT :‬אליהם‪ ‖ CAML :‬כלם‪ [MTC :‬כולם‪ABL :‬‬

‫‪ 9‬בלתי[‬

‫לא יהיה‪ ‖ C :‬לולי[ לולא‪ ‖ M :‬כי[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬מהם[ מה‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬ופעלתם‪ [AT :‬ופעולתם‪| CML :‬‬ ‫ופעולותם‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 10‬תלויים[ תלוי‪ | C :‬תלוים‪ ‖ B :‬והתלות[ לית‪ :C1) C :‬ותלות( | התלות‪ ‖ M :‬כלם בו[‬

‫לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬בסבת[ וסבת‪ ‖ A :‬המשכם אחריו[ השתדלותם בו‪C :‬‬ ‫אשר‪ ‖ B :‬שהנה ימצאו[ שהוא נמצא‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 12‬והודענו[ וכפלנו‪C :‬‬

‫‪ ‖ C‬כי הם[ מהם‪ ‖ C :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬אמרו[ נאמרו‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬יושר[‬ ‫‪ 13‬מן הקודמים[ מהקודמים‪:‬‬

‫‪ 14‬שיבא[ לית‪ :C1) C :‬שיבוא( ‖ שאחר[‬

‫‪ +‬הטבע‪ ‖ AM :‬אלהיים‪ [ATL :‬אלוהיים‪ | CB :‬האלוהיים‪ ‖ M :‬ייוחד[ יוחד‪ | (C1⇄) CT :‬ייחוד‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ 15‬הטבע[ הנודע‪ ‖ B :‬שאר[ שאחר‪ ‖ B :‬הושם[ הוא שם‪ ‖ A :‬צד[ שאר‪ | AM :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬ההרחבה[‬ ‫הרחבה‪ ‖ M :‬לספוק[ לספק‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 16‬הנימוסים[ הנמוסים‪ ‖ M :‬ומה[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬שיהיה[ שיקבל‪| C :‬‬

‫שתהיה‪ ‖ T :‬תועלת[ התועלת‪ ‖ BT :‬אלו[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬האלוהיים‪ [CBT :‬האלהיות‪ ‖ AML :‬מיני[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪M‬‬

‫‪ 17‬בעלי חיים[ ב״ח‪ ‖ M :‬וקראום‪ [AML :‬וקראם‪ ‖ (C1⇄) CBT :‬בזה[ ‪ +‬השם‪ ‖ C1 :‬אם[ לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ B‬ידמו[ דמו‪B :‬‬

‫‪1074a38–b14‬‬

Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition

287

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪18‬‬

‫‪288‬‬

‫ואם בסבת פעלתם ואם בסבת הדמותם לאלו המינים מבעלי חיים ואנחנו קבלנו תחלה‬ ‫זה הענין האחד והוא כי הקודמים היו חושבים כי העצמים הראשונים המניעים אלוהיים‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫כפי מה שירשנו אותו מהם ואמתו לנו מצאתי אותו מאמר אלהי‬

‫‪ 18‬פעלתם‪ [ATM :‬פעולתם‪ ‖ CBL :‬מבעלי חיים[ מב״ח‪ | M :‬מן בעלי חיים‪ ‖ T :‬ואנחנו[ ‪ +‬הקדמנו‪:‬‬ ‫‪M‬‬

‫‪ 19‬האחד[ אחד‪ ‖ A :‬הקודמים[ הקדמוני׳‪ ‖ B :‬אלוהיים‪ [C :‬האלהיים‪ | AMT :‬האלוהיים‪| B :‬‬

‫אלהיים‪L :‬‬

‫‪ 20‬כפי[ ‪ +‬מספר‪ ‖ T :‬אותו[ זה‪ ‖ B :‬ואמתו…אותו)‪ ‖ T0 [(2‬ואמתו[ ואמתן‪‖ C :‬‬

‫מצאתי[ מציאותי‪ ‖ C1 :‬אותו)‪ [(2‬זה‪ ‖ C :‬מאמר[ המאמר‪ ‖ C1 :‬אלהי[ האלוהי‪ | C :‬אלוהי‪B :‬‬

Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition

289

‫‪290‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪21‬‬

‫ובעבור שאנחנו אמרנו כי העלה הראשונה שכל וזה שהוא אי אפשר שייוחס אליה‬

‫‪ L‬כו‬ ‫‪Λ.9.‬‬ ‫‪1074b15–17‬‬

‫חיים יותר נכבדים ויותר יקרים מן החיים אשר ספרנו אותם הנה ראוי שנחקור‬ ‫ונעיין על אי זה צד היא בזה הענין ונשים ראשון מה שנתחיל בו קודם שאר הדברים‬

‫‪1074b17–18‬‬

‫העיון בזאת הסבה אחר שהיא שכל אם תעשה ותשכיל או היא בלתי פועלת ולא‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫תשכיל בדרך החכם אשר הוא ישן מבלתי שיתעסק בחכמתו וכן השכל הראשון יש לו‬ ‫זה הטבע מבלתי שישכיל ויעשה אבל כי המאמר בזה קרוב לשחוק ממנו וזה שהוא‬ ‫אם היה שכל לא ישכיל ולא יעשה דבר מן הפעלות מה אשר להתחלה הראשונה‬ ‫מן המעלה והכבוד בשיהיה כשקוע בשינה יניע הכל ויטה^ הדברים אליו על דרך מה‬ ‫שנראה בגשמים מהנעת החשוקים בעת השינה לחושקיהם והמאמר בסבה הראשונה‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫המניעה לכל הנמצאים התלוים בה כל הדברים שהיא בטלה לא תעשה דבר מן‬ ‫הפעולות ושהיא ריקה מן הפועל אשר יאות לה שתעשה אותו מאמר מי שימית התחלת‬ ‫החיים ומבועה הנה מן המבואר אם כן שהיא תשכיל בלא ספק אחר שהיא שכל‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫ושהיא תעשה וראוי שנחקור על פעלתה ונעיין מה היא וזה שהוא לא ימלט מהיות‬ ‫הפועל הזה אם שישכיל עצמותו ואם שישכיל זולתו והשכילו לזולתו אם שיהיה‬

‫‪ 21‬העלה[ הסבה‪ ‖ CBT :‬שכל[ ישכל‪ ‖ B :‬וזה[ זה‪ :C1) C :‬לית( ‖ שהוא[ ושהוא‪ ‖ C1 :‬אי[ לית‪CM :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ ‖ (C1‬שייוחס[ שיוחס‪ ‖ CB :‬אליה[ אליו‪CB :‬‬

‫‪ 22‬ויותר[ ולא יותר‪ ‖ CT :‬נכבדים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ספרנו‪:‬‬

‫‪ [CBT‬בחרנו‪ ‖ AML :‬ראוי[ ראינו‪ ‖ C :‬שנחקור[ ונחקור‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 23‬אי זה[ איזה‪ ‖ BT :‬היא…הדברים[‬

‫לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬היא‪ [AML :‬הם‪ | BC1 :‬הוא‪ ‖ T :‬ראשון[ תחילה‪ | B :‬תחלת‪ ‖ C1 :‬שנתחיל[ שראוי‪:‬‬ ‫‪BC1‬‬ ‫‪C‬‬

‫‪ 24‬הסבה[ העלה‪ ‖ M :‬אחר שהיא‪ [MT :‬אם היתה‪ | CAL :‬אחר שהוא‪ ‖ B :‬או)‪ [(1‬אם‪:‬‬

‫)⇄‪(C1‬‬

‫| אותו‪ ‖ M :‬ותשכיל‪T :‬ع[ או תשכיל‪CABML :‬‬

‫‪ 25‬שיתעסק[ שיעשה‪ ‖ C :‬בחכמתו‪:‬‬

‫‪ [BT‬חכמתו‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬בחכמות‪AML :‬‬

‫‪ 26‬זה[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬כי[ ‪ +‬לית‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬זה‪‖ M :‬‬

‫קרוב[ ‪ ‖ T0‬לשחוק‪ [ATL :‬לצחוק‪CBM :‬‬

‫‪ 27‬דבר מן[ سا ئر‪ :‬ع ‖ הפעלות‪ [ATL :‬הפעולות‪‖ CBM :‬‬

‫מה אשר‪ [BT :‬ומה שהוא )‪ :C1‬הוא( אשר‪ | C :‬מה הוא אשר‪ | L :‬מאשר‪AM :‬‬ ‫כשיהיה‪ ‖ CBM :‬ויטה[ ויבחן‪ ‖ M :‬הדברים אליו[ אליו הדברים‪A :‬‬

‫‪ 28‬בשיהיה‪[ATL :‬‬

‫‪ 29‬מהנעת‪ [AMTL :‬מתנועת‪:‬‬

‫‪CB‬ع ‖ לחושקיהם‪ [BMT :‬לחושקים‪ ‖ CAL :‬בסבה[ בסבת‪ | C :‬באשר הסבה‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 30‬המניעה[‬

‫המניע‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הנמצאים‪ [AML :‬הנמצאות‪ ‖ CBT :‬התלוים‪ [ATL :‬התלויים‪ ‖ CBM :‬מן[ לית‪C :‬‬ ‫‪ 31‬הפעולות‪ [BMT :‬מהפעולות‪ | C :‬הפעלות‪ ‖ AL :‬ריקה‪ [ABL :‬פנויה)?(‪ | C :‬רקה‪ ‖ MT :‬הפועל[‬ ‫הפעל‪ ‖ T :‬מי[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬שימית[ שיאות‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C corr. | B :‬התחלות[ ההתחלות‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 32‬ומבועה[‬

‫ומכוונם‪ ‖ AM :‬אם כן[ א״כ‪ ‖ BM :‬שהיא‪ [AL :‬שהיתה‪ | CBT :‬שהוא‪ 1 M :‬וראוי‪ [ABML :‬והנה‬ ‫ראוי‪ ‖ CT :‬פעלתה[ פעולתה ‪ +‬ובעין מה היא‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬פעולתה‪ ‖ M :‬ונעיין[ ועניין‪ | C :‬ונעין‪‖ T :‬‬ ‫היא[ שהיא‪ 2 B :‬הפועל[ הפעל‪ ‖ MT :‬לזולתו[ זולתו‪AT :‬‬

‫‪ L‬כז‬ ‫‪1074b21–23‬‬

‫‪291‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ L‬כו‬ ‫‪ ḥ209r20‬ولأنا قلنا إن العلة الأولى | عقل‬

‫‪21‬‬

‫فيجب أن‬ ‫ننظر‬ ‫هل تفعل وتعقل أم هى غير فاعلة ولا‬ ‫‪ ḥ209r21‬تعقل كالعالم النائم الذى لا يستعمل علمه‬ ‫إلا أن‬

‫‪24‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫ذلك‬

‫محال فإنه‬

‫إن | كان عقلا ًلا يعقل ولا يفعل سا ئر الأفعال فما الذى للمبدأ الأول‬ ‫من الشرف والحمد فى أن يكون كالغرق فى النوم يحرك الجميع وتحن | الأشياء إليه على سبيل ما‬ ‫نراه فى الأجسام من حركة المعشوقين فى وقت النوم لعشاقهم‬

‫والقول بذلك يميت مبدأ‬

‫‪ḥ209v2‬‬

‫الحياة | و ينبوعها فهى‬ ‫‪ L‬כז‬

‫‪31‬‬

‫إذن تعقل لا محالة‬

‫فيجب أن نبحث عن فعلها‬

‫ما هو وذلك أنه لا يخلوا‬

‫إما أن يعقل ذاته وإما أن | يعقل غيره وعقله لغيرة إما أن يكون‬

‫‪* 22‬ننظر )נעיין(‪ :‬ע[ ىىظر‪ | ḥ :‬ينظر‪ 27 b :‬سا ئر[ דבר מן )*شيئا ًمن(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫ע ‪* 1‬نبحث )נחקור(‪ :‬ע[ ىىحث‪ | ḥ :‬يبحث‪ ‖ b :‬يخلوا[ يخلو‪b :‬‬

‫‪ 29‬حركة[ הנעת )*تحر يك(‪:‬‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫‪292‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪3‬‬

‫תמיד לדבר אחד בעינו ואם לדברים רבים אבל שהוא אם היה שישכיל בכלל דבר‬

‫‪1074b18–21‬‬

‫אחר זולתו חוץ ממנו בדרך מה שיראה הראות הנראים והם חוץ מטבעו וישמע השמע‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫הקולות ולא יהיה הדבר ההוא אשר ישכילהו בו הנה אותו הדבר הוא השליט על‬ ‫שיעשה^ הפועל^ כמו שהדבר הנראה הוא המניע שיראה הראות והנשמע‬ ‫שישמע השמע‬ ‫ואין עצם השכל אז שכל בעצמותו ולא אותו השכל ממנו שליט כמו שבארנו במה שקדם‬ ‫אבל יש לו כח יכשר שישכיל בו מושכל אחר זולתו ויתחייב אם כן שלא יהיה‬ ‫עצם בתכלית המעלה וזה כי זה העצם אמנם היה בתכלית המעלה מפני‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫שהוא שכל ומשכיל ואמנם התחייב המעלה והגדולה לו מזה המקום ואם היה‬

‫‪1074b29–30‬‬

‫הדבר המושכל מחוץ ואינו בטבע השכל הנה מן המבואר כי זה הוא הנעלה‬ ‫והנכבד יותר כי הוא סבה ועלת מה אל שישכיל השכל וכמו שהראות אמנם הושם סבת‬ ‫המראים כדי שיכיר בהם והשמע סבת הקולות כן גם כן השכל הושם סבת המושכלות‬ ‫וכל מה שיהיה בסבת זולתו הנה הוא יותר פחות מן הדבר ההוא אשר הושם סבתו‬ ‫‪15‬‬

‫וכאשר היה זה כן היה השכל בכח ויהיה מן המחוייב שייגעהו וילאהו דבקות השכל‬ ‫ותמידותו כדרך מה שייגע וילאה הראות דבקות הנראים וייגע השמע תמידות הקולות‬

‫‪ 3‬תמיד[ ‪ ‖ T0‬אחד[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬דבר[ הדבר‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫ושישמע‪ ‖ B :‬השמע[ השומע‪B :‬‬ ‫לית‪A :‬‬

‫‪ 4‬בדרך[ כדרך‪ ‖ CA :‬הראות[ ‪ ‖ T0‬וישמע[‬

‫‪ 5‬הקולות[ קולות‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 7–5‬ההוא…בעצמותו[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 5‬הוא[‬

‫‪ 6‬שיעשה הפועל[ أن يعقل العقل‪ :‬ع ‖ הפועל[ הפעל‪ ‖ A :‬הוא[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬השמע[ לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ :C1) CB‬השמעי(‬ ‫שאמרנו‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 8–7‬השכל…לו[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 7‬שכל‪CB :‬ع[ לית‪ ‖ AML :‬שליט[ ببسيط‪ :‬ع ‖ שבארנו[‬

‫‪ 8‬יכשר‪ [CBT :‬ראוי‪ ‖ AML :‬בו[ לית‪ ‖ AL :‬מושכל…שלא[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מושכל[ המושכל‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ C‬אם כן[ א״כ‪‖ BM :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ CB‬מפני[ בעבור‪C :‬‬

‫יהיה[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 9‬וזה…היה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬וזה…המעלה[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬וזה[ והוא‪:‬‬

‫‪ 10‬ומשכיל[ ומושכל‪ ‖ BL :‬ואמנם[ אמנם‪ ‖ L :‬התחייב[ תתחייב‪‖ C1 :‬‬

‫והגדולה‪ [AB :‬והגדלה‪ | CTL :‬הגדולה‪ ‖ M :‬לו[ אליו‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬הדבר[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬המושכל[ מושכל‪| A :‬‬

‫‪ +‬אליו‪ ‖ C1 :‬בטבע[ בטבעו‪ ‖ AC :‬השכל[ והשכל‪ ‖ M :‬הנה[ ‪ +‬הוא‪ ‖ AL :‬הנעלה[ נעלה‪ | C :‬המעלה‪:‬‬ ‫‪T‬‬

‫‪ 12‬כי הוא[ בעבור שהוא‪ ‖ C :‬ועלת[ ועלה‪ ‖ AML :‬מה[ לית‪ ‖ AL :‬אל[ כדי‪C :‬‬

‫לסבת‪ ‖ C :‬כן)‪ [(1‬לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) CM :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬סבת)‪ [(2‬לסבת‪C1 :‬‬

‫‪ 13‬סבת)‪[(1‬‬

‫‪ 14‬שיהיה‪ [BT :‬שהיה‪| C :‬‬

‫שהוא‪ | AL :‬שהיתה‪ ‖ M :‬בסבת[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬זולתו[ ‪ +‬סבה‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הנה[ ‪ +‬ראוי הוא‪‖ M :‬‬ ‫הוא[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬סבתו[ סבה‪T0 | C :‬‬

‫‪ 15‬המחוייב[ המחויב‪ | M :‬המחייב‪ ‖ B :‬שייגעהו[ שיגיעהו‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ B‬וילאהו[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬דבקות[ דביקות‪A :‬‬

‫‪ 16‬ותמידותו[ ותמידתו‬

‫)⇄‪(C1‬‬

‫‖ שייגע[ שמיגע‪‖ AL :‬‬

‫וילאה[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬דבקות[ הדבקות‪ ‖ AM :‬הנראים[ הנראה‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הקולות[ הקול‪C :‬‬

‫‪1074b28–29‬‬

‫‪293‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ḥ209v4‬دائما لً شىء واحد بعينه أو أشياء كثيرة إلا أنه إن كان يعقل‬

‫شيئا ً‬

‫‪3‬‬

‫آخر غيره خارجا ًعنه |‬ ‫‪ḥ209v5‬‬ ‫‪b20‬‬

‫فذلك الشىء هو المتسلط على‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫أن يعقل العقل‬

‫وليس جوهر العقل حينئذ عقلا بً ذاته ولا ذلك العقل منه ببسيط‬

‫‪7‬‬

‫فيكون‬ ‫جوهرا ً | ليس فى غاية الفضيلة لأنه‬

‫إنما صار فى غاية الفضيلة لأنه‬ ‫فإن كان‬

‫‪ ḥ209v6‬عقل وعاقل‬

‫فذلك هو الأفضل |‬

‫معقوله من خارج‬ ‫والأشرف لأنه سبب وعلة‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫لأن يعقل العقل‬ ‫فيكون العقل سبب المعقولات‬

‫وكل ما كان بسبب غيره فهو أخس | من الشىء الذى جعل سببه‬ ‫فيكون العقل بالقوة و يكون من الواجب أن يتعبه اتصال العقل‬

‫‪ḥ209v8‬‬

‫ودوامه‬

‫‪ 4‬خارجا‪b ً :‬ע[ خارجة‪ 5 ḥ :‬أن يعقل العقل[ שיעשה הפעל )*أن يفعل الفعل(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫)*متسلط(‪ :‬ע ‪ 8‬فيكون[ و يكون‪ 15 b :‬العقل)‪ [(2‬الفعل‪b :‬‬

‫‪ 7‬ببسيط[ שליט‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪17‬‬

‫‪294‬‬

‫ודבקותם וזה שהוא ימצא בכל הענינים לדבר אשר יצא מן הכח אל הפועל יגיעה‬ ‫ורפיון מן‬ ‫הפועל ולזאת הסבה היתה השינה ענין הכרחי בבעלי חיים ואם היה גם כן השכל‬

‫‪1074b23–26‬‬

‫ישכיל דבר אחר הנה השכילו אותו אם למה שהוא בטבעו יותר נכבד בדרך הדברים‬ ‫‪20‬‬

‫הנאים והטוב ואם לדברים פחותים ומן המבואר כי הענין בפרטיות פחות וכל שכן אם‬ ‫היה בעל שכל קודם^ צורת הדבר המושכל והיה הוא ואותו הדבר המושכל דבר אחד‬ ‫בעינו ברוב הענין כמו שאמרנו וקבלנו הנה מן המבואר שהוא ראוי שיסולק ממנו כל‬ ‫הפעלות הפחותות ונאמר שהוא ישכיל הדברים על הדרך אשר יאות בו מי שהוא‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫בתכלית הגדולה ושהוא לא ישתנה בו ולא יתחלף וששנויו והעתקו יהיה אל מה‬

‫‪1074b26–27‬‬

‫שהוא יותר פחות ממנו ויהיה אז בדרך קצת התנועות ובכלל הנה אם היתה מעלתו‬

‫‪1074b31–33‬‬

‫וגדלתו מאשר הוא ישכיל והיה קונה השכל בדברים הפחותים הנה השכילו אם כן שכל‬ ‫אמנם הוא מפחותי הדברים ותהיה מעלתו אשר תהיה אליו מפעלתו מפחות שבדברים‬ ‫ואם היה ראוי שנברח מכל זה הנה הוא שלא יקנה הראות בדברים יותר נאות‬ ‫מאשר יראה הנה אינו ראוי שיונח העצם אשר הוא בתכלית המעלה והגדולה‬ ‫והכבוד שכל‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫מוחלט אבל שכל ישכיל היותר נכבד שבדברים כי אנחנו אם שמנו אותו כן היה מה‬

‫‪ 17‬הענינים[ העניינים‪ ‖ B :‬לדבר‪ [CMT :‬לית‪ ‖ ABL :‬הפועל[ הפעל‪ ‖ T :‬ורפיון[ וחולשה‪C :‬‬ ‫‪ 18‬הפועל[ הפעל‪ ‖ T :‬ולזאת[ ובזאת‪ ‖ BT :‬הסבה[ הסברא‪ ‖ M :‬היתה[ ‪ +‬ענין‪ ‖ M :‬בבעלי חיים[‬ ‫‪ 20‬הנאים[ הנראים‪ ‖ T :‬והטוב[‬

‫בב״ח‪ | M :‬בבעל חיים‪ ‖ T :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ 19 B :‬אחר[ אחד‪BM :‬‬ ‫והטובים‪ ‖ C1 :‬ואם[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬ומן המבואר[ ומהמבואר‪ ‖ C :‬פחות[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬וכל‬ ‫שכן[ וכ״ש‪ 21 BM :‬והיה[ והיא‪ ‖ B :‬ואותו[ ואותם‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬לאותו‪ ‖ M :‬הדבר)‪ + [(2‬דבר‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫אחד‪ [AMT :‬אחר‪ 22 CBL :‬ברוב[ ברב‪ | M :‬לית[ ‪ ‖ T‬הענין[ לית‪ ‖ BT :‬וקבלנו[ סא והשכלנו‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 23‬שהוא[ ‪ +‬שהוא‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬יאות[ תאות‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C1‬הנה[ והנה‪ ‖ CB :‬שיסולק[ שיסלק‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ 24‬הגדולה[ הגדלה‪ ‖ C :‬והעתקו[ והעתקתו‪ ‖ T :‬אל[ על‪ 25 C :‬אז[ ‪ +‬בהכרח‪ ‖ C :‬היתה[ יהיה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 26 T0 | M‬וגדלתו[ וגדולתו‪ ‖ MB :‬הוא[ לית‪ ‖ AL :‬והיה[ והוא‪ ‖ B :‬השכילו[ שכלו‪ ‖ C :‬אם כן[‬ ‫א״כ‪ 27 BM :‬הוא[ היה‪ ‖ B :‬מפחותי הדברים[ מפחותי שבדברי׳‪ | B :‬בפחות שבדברים‪‖ T0 | M :‬‬ ‫ותהיה…שבדברים[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬ותהיה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬תהיה[ שבה‪ ‖ B :‬מפעלתו[ מפעולתו‪ 28 M :‬ראוי[‬ ‫‪ ‖ T0‬שלא[ לא‪ ‖ C :‬בדברים[ ‪* ‖ T0‬יותר נאות‪ :‬ع )أولى([ הראשונים‪ | CB :‬הראשונים ‪ +‬יותר נאות‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 30‬מוחלט[‬ ‫‪ 29‬מאשר[ סא אשר‪ ‖ C1 :‬ראוי[ רואה‪ ‖ B :‬בתכלית המעלה[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫‪T0 | AML‬‬ ‫מופשט‪ ‖ B :‬היותר נכבד[ ‪ ‖ T0‬היותר נכבד שבדברים[ נכבדי הדברים‪C :‬‬

‫‪1074b33–35‬‬

‫‪295‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫فإنه يوجد فى جميع | الأشياء التى تخرج من القوة إلى الفعل تعب‬

‫‪ḥ209v8‬‬

‫‪17‬‬

‫واسترخاء عن‬ ‫و يكون العقل‬

‫الفعل‬ ‫يعقل‬ ‫‪ḥ209v9‬‬

‫ما هو من طبيعته أفضل‬ ‫أو أشياء | خسيسة‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫و يجب أن ينفى عن الأول‬

‫‪22‬‬

‫قبول صورة الأشياء الخسيسة ونقول إنه يعقل التى‬ ‫غاية فى الشرف‬ ‫فإنه إن كان |‬

‫‪ḥ209v10‬‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫يعقل الأشياء الخسيسة فهو يستفيد الشرف من أخس الأشياء‬

‫وذلك يجب أن يهرب منه فإنه ألا يستفيد البصر أشياء | أولى‬

‫‪28‬‬

‫‪ ḥ209v12‬من أن يبصر فيجب أن‬

‫يكون ما‬

‫‪ 19‬طبيعته[ طبيعة‪b :‬‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫‪296‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪31‬‬

‫שישכילהו הדברים אשר בתכלית המעלה ותכלית האלהות והיה בלתי משכיל דברים‬ ‫אחרים חוץ ממנו ומטבעו והמאמר אשר יתן העצם ויניח כי לפניו דבר אחר יותר נכבד‬ ‫ממנו ויותר נעלה בתכלית הדופי והגנאי וכאשר קבלנו גם כן זה אי זה משני המאמרים‬ ‫ראוי שנסבור הנאמר כי מה שישכילהו זה הדבר אשר בתכלית המעלה תמיד דבר אחד‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫בעינו או נאמר שהוא דברים רבים ואם היו דברים רבים אם השכילו אותם כלם יחד‬

‫‪ L‬כח‬

‫או בעברו על אחד אחד ועזבו אחד והקבילו אחר וזה שהוא ימשך אחר כל אלו השרשים‬ ‫דבה כי הוא אם היה משכיל תמיד דבר אחד בעינו לא ימלט משיהיה שישלים בזה‬ ‫שכלו או לא ישלימהו ואם היה משלים אותו בזה הנה הוא חסר ואם היה שלא‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫ישלימהו הנה אין שכל לו ולא ספוק ואם היו הדברים אשר ישכילם רבים והיה השכילו‬ ‫אותם בעברו על אחד אחד הנה יצטרך אל זכרון וקנית דבר שאין לו ואם היה השכילו‬ ‫לדברים ברגע בלא שיעור הנה יתחייב בזה השאלה בעינה אשר שאלנו אותה במושכל‬ ‫האחד ר״ל אם היה משלים שכלו בזה או לא ישלימהו ויעמוד בלתי שלם ועם זה הנה‬ ‫הוא בלתי אפשר בטבע שישכיל הדברים כלם יחד ואם היה אפשר בקצת הדברים‬

‫‪ 31‬שישכילהו הדברים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬והיה[ ויהיה‪ ‖ AL :‬משכיל דברים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬דברים[ הדברים‪M :‬‬ ‫ידע‪ ‖ B :‬יתן…כי[ ‪ ‖ T0‬העצם[ בעצם‪ :C1) C :‬עצם(‬

‫‪ 33‬ויותר…הדופי[ ‪ ‖ T0‬בתכלית[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫)⇄‪ ‖ (C1‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬זה)‪ [(1‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬זה אי[ מאי‪ :C1) C :‬זה הנה אי(‬ ‫‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 32‬יתן[‬

‫‪ 34–33‬זה)‪…(2‬שנסבור[‬

‫‪ 34‬שנסבור‪ [AM :‬שנקח‪ | C :‬שנזכור‪ ‖ BL :‬הנאמר‪ [AML :‬אם נאמר‪ :C1) CT :‬אם שנאמר( |‬

‫אם הנאמר‪ ‖ B :‬בתכלית…תמיד[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 1‬שהוא[ שהם‪ ‖ M :‬דברים רבים)‪ ‖ T0 [(2‬רבים[ ‪‖ A corr.‬‬

‫השכילו[ תשכיל‪ | C :‬השכיל‪ ‖ B :‬כלם[ לית‪ | C :‬כולם‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 2‬בעברו[ בהכרעה‪ :C1) C :‬בהעברה(‬

‫‪ +‬ממנו ‖ על…אחד)‪ ‖ T0 [(3‬על אחד[ לאחד‪ ‖ C :‬והקבילו‪ [BT :‬וקבלו‪ ‖ CAML :‬אחר)‪ [(1‬אחד‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ M‬וזה[ לית‪ | B :‬זה‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬שהוא[ ושהוא‪ ‖ B :‬ימשך[ נמשך‪BT :‬‬

‫‪ 2‬השרשים[ الأحوال‪ :‬ع‬

‫‪ 3–2‬אחר)‪…(2‬דבה[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 3‬דבה‪ [B :‬דבר‪ ‖ (C1⇄) CAML :‬הוא[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬היה[ היתה‪C :‬‬

‫משכיל[ שכיל‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬בעינו…שישלים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬לא[ ולא‪C :‬‬

‫)⇄‪(C1‬‬

‫‖‬

‫‪ 4‬ישלימהו[ ישלימוהו‪‖ (C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫ואם)‪…(1‬חסר[ ‪ 5–4 T0‬ואם)‪…(1‬ישלימהו[ לית‪ 5 B :‬ישלימהו[ ישלימוהו‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬אין שכל‬ ‫לו[ לא ישכיל אותו‪ | C :‬לא השכיל ‪ ‖ T :corr. +‬שכל[ שכלו‪ ‖ M :‬ולא…הדברים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ולא[ בלא‪‖ C1 :‬‬ ‫ספוק[ ספיק‪ ‖ AL :‬והיה[ יהיה‪ ‖ AM :‬השכילו[ השכיל‪ | M :‬השכילם‪ 6 (C1⇄) C :‬אותם[ אותו‪M :‬‬ ‫‪ 8–6‬בעברו…שלם[ ‪ 6 T0‬בעברו על[ בהעברה ממנו‪ ‖ C :‬אחד)‪…(1‬דבר[ לית‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬אחד)‪[(1‬‬ ‫‪ +‬מהם‪ | B :‬לאחד‪ ‖ C1 :‬הנה[ ‪ +‬הוא‪ ‖ C1 :‬אל זכרון[ הזכרון‪ ‖ B :‬השכילו[ השכלו‪ 7 B :‬ברגע[ ‪+‬‬ ‫واحدة‪ :‬ع ‖ שיעור[ שעור‪ ‖ CB :‬בעינה[ לית‪ 8 B :‬האחד[ האחר‪ | A :‬אחר‪ ‖ B :‬משלים[ ישלים‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ CB‬זה[ ‪ 9 T0‬אפשר)‪…(1‬יחד[ ‪ ‖ T0‬שישכיל[ ‪ +‬כל‪ ‖ C :‬כלם[ כולם‪ ‖ B :‬ואם…אי[ לית‪C :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ ‖ (C1‬היה[ ‪ +‬כבר‪ ‖ C1 :‬בקצת[ בין עת‪M :‬‬

‫‪297‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ ḥ209v12‬يعقله فى غاية الفضيلة والإلهية‬

‫‪ḥ209v12‬‬

‫‪ L‬כח‬

‫أفترى‬ ‫أو‬

‫‪31‬‬

‫دائما ًشىء واحد‬

‫ما يعقله‬

‫أشياء كثيرة | وإن كانت أشياء كثيرة فهل عقله لها كلها معا ً‬

‫‪34‬‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫أم بالتصفح منه لواحد واحد وتركه واحدا ً وإقباله على آخر فإنه ٺتبع | هذه الأحوال‬ ‫شناعة لأنه إن كان يعقل دائما ًشيئا ًواحدا ً بعينه‬

‫فإما أن يكمل بذلك‬

‫عقله أو لا يكمل فإن كان يكمل به فهو ناقص | وإن كان لا‬ ‫‪ ḥ209v16‬يكمله فلا عقل له ولا اكتفاء وإن كانت الأشياء التى يعقلها كثيرة وكان عقله‬ ‫بالتصفح لواحد واحد فيحتاج إلى | ذكر واستفادة شىء ليس هو له وإن كان عقله‬ ‫للأشياء فى دفعة واحدة بلا مدة‬ ‫فهل يكمل بها عقله أو لا يكمل فيلبث | غير تام ومع ذلك‬ ‫فليس يمكن فى الطبع أن يعقل الأشياء كلها معا ً‬

‫‪ 4‬يكمل)‪ [(1‬ישלימהו )*يكمله(‪ :‬ע ‖ يكمل)‪ [(2‬ישלים אותו‬ ‫‪ 2‬الأحوال[ השרשים )*الأصول(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫)*يكمله(‪ :‬ע ‪ 7‬واحدة[ לית‪ :‬ע ‪ 8‬يكمل[ ישלימהו )*يكمله(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫‪298‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫שישכיל יחד הנה אי אפשר זה בכלם הנה מכל אלו הדבות יתחייב הרחוק מן המאמר‬ ‫שהשכל הראשון יקנה השכל תמיד לכל הדברים או לדברים רבים אבל השכילו לדבר‬ ‫אחד לבד והדבר ההוא הוא בתכלית המעלה והגדולה ומפני שהוא הוא הדבר אשר‬ ‫בתכלית המעלה הנה השכילו אם כן לעצמותו ולא ישיגהו אם היה כן דבר מן העמל‬ ‫וזה כי כונתו ותכליתו אינו אל דבר אחר זולתי עצמותו ולא יצא גם כן ממה שהוא‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫בכח אל מה שהוא בפעל והוא אשר ימשך אחריו העמל והיגיעה אבל כמו שאהבת‬ ‫האדם לנפשו לא תמנע ממנו כן גם כן השכילו לעצמו לא ייגעהו ולא ימנע ממנו וכמו‬ ‫שאהבת‬ ‫האדם לנפשו תמצא תמיד לכל אחד מן האנשים כן גם כן ענין הדבר אשר ישכיל עצמותו‬ ‫כאשר ישכילהו וכמו שהחושק לנפשו כאשר היה הוא בנפשו יאהב נפשו ויחשוק‬ ‫אותה כן גם כן אשר יושכל וישכיל עצמותו הנה הוא נפשו מה שישכיל והשכל‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫הראשון הוא התחלת כל הדברים הנמצאים הידועים אצלו והשכילו אותם אינו על צד‬ ‫עברו על אחד אחד ולא כשיעזוב אחד ויקבל לאחר אבל בהשיגו אותם פתאום וזה‬ ‫כי השכל שלנו בסבת חולשתו לא יהיה אפשר בו בקלות שישכיל דברים רבים יחד ולא‬

‫‪ 10‬שישכיל…הנה)‪ ‖ T0 [(2‬שישכיל[ שישכילם‪ ‖ C1 :‬הנה)‪ [(1‬לית‪ ‖ L :‬אי[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬בכלם[‬ ‫בכולם‪ ‖ B :‬הדבות[ הדעות‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬الأشياء‪ :‬ع ‖ הרחוק[ המחוק‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬שהשכל)‪…(1‬יקנה[ ‪‖ T0‬‬

‫שהשכל[ הנה השכל‪ ‖ C :‬לכל[ ‪ +‬אלו‪ ‖ C :‬או לדברים‪T :‬ع[ והדברים‪ ‖ CABML :‬רבים[ הרבים‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫אבל[ ‪ +‬אמנם‪ ‖ T :‬השכילו[ שכלו‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 12‬לבד[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬והדבר ההוא הוא‪ [B :‬וזה הדבר הוא‪| C :‬‬

‫וזה הדבר אשר הוא‪ | AL :‬וזה הדבר שהוא‪ | M :‬והדבר ההוא‪ ‖ T :‬והגדולה[ לית‪ | B :‬והגדלה‪‖ T :‬‬ ‫ומפני[ ובעבור‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 13‬המעלה הנה[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬אם כן[ א״כ‪ ‖ BM :‬כן)‪ [(2‬כך‪B :‬‬

‫‪ ‖ B‬זולת[ זולתי‪ ‖ L :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 15‬מה[ ‪ +‬הנה‪C :‬‬

‫)⇄‪(C1‬‬

‫‖ שהוא[ הוא‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 14‬וזה[ והנה‪:‬‬ ‫)⇄‪(C1‬‬

‫‖ בפעל[‬

‫בפועל‪ ‖ CBM :‬והוא[ והנה‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬ימשך אחריו העמל והיגיעה[ ירדפהו היגיע‪ :C1) C :‬היגיעה( |‬ ‫ימשוך אחריו העמל והיגיעה‪ ‖ B :‬אבל[ לית‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 17–16‬לא)‪…(1‬לנפשו[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 16‬ממנו[ לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ AL‬כן גם כן‪ [T :‬גם כן‪ | AML :‬כן ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬לעצמותו‪ [BT :‬לעצמו‪ ‖ AML :‬לא)‪ [(2‬ולא‪ ‖ M :‬וכמו[‬ ‫כמו‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 17‬תמיד‪ [CB :‬לית‪ ‖ AMTL :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬עצמותו[ לעצמותו‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 18‬ישכילהו[ ‪+‬‬

‫לו‪ ‖ AM :‬וכמו‪ [BTL :‬כמו‪ ‖ (C1⇄) CAM :‬היה[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬לנפשו[ נפשו‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬בנפשו[ לית‪| C :‬‬ ‫נפשו‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 19‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬אשר[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬נפשו[ בנפשו‪ ‖ C :‬מה שישכיל[ אשר ישכיל‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 20‬הדברים[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬צד[ ‪ +‬עצמו‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 21‬עברו[ ההעברה‪ ‖ C :‬על[ לית‪ ‖ CBM :‬אחד)‪ [(1‬לאחד‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ C‬אחד )‪ [(2‬לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬אחד )‪ [(3‬לאחד‪ ‖ BM :‬לאחר[ על אחר‪ :C1) C :‬אחר(‬

‫‪ 22‬וזה[ ולזה‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ A‬כי[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬השכל[ ‪ +‬השכל)!(‪ ‖ B :‬שלנו[ מאתנו‪ ‖ CB :‬חולשתו[ חלשתו‪ ‖ L :‬בו[ לו‪CT :‬‬

‫‪1075a5–10‬‬

‫‪299‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫ففى جميع هذه الأشياء يجب البراء من القول‬

‫‪ḥ209v18‬‬

‫بأن العقل الأول | يستفيد العقل‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫بجميع الأشياء أو لأشياء كثيرة لـكن عقله لشىء‬

‫‪ ġ53,3‬واحد فقط وذلك الشىء هو فى غاية الفضيلة والشرف ولأنه هو الشىء الذى‬ ‫فى غاية الفضيلة فعقله إذن | لذاته وليس يلحقه إذا كان كذلك شىء من‬ ‫‪ḥ209v20‬‬ ‫‪b21‬‬

‫التعب لـكنهكما أن محبة‬ ‫الإنسان لنفسه لا شبع منهكذلك عقله لذاته‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫لا شبع منه | وكما أن‬

‫محبة‬ ‫الإنسان لنفسه‬

‫كذلك حال الشىء الذى يعقل ذاته‬

‫دائم‬

‫عندما يعقله وكما أن العاشق لنفسه إذا كان | هو نفسه يحب نفسه و يعشقها‬ ‫كذلك الذى يعقل وما يعقل ذاته فهو نفسه‬

‫يعقل والعقل‬

‫‪ ḥ209v21‬الأول هو مبدأ جميع الأشياء | الموجودة المعلومة عنده وعقله لها ليس على سبيل‬ ‫التصفح لواحد واحد ولا بأن يدع واحدا ً و يقبل على الآخر لـكن بإدراكه | معا ًودفعة‬

‫‪ 10‬الأشياء[ הדבות )*الشناعات(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫ע ‖ نفسه[ ‪ +‬מה )*ما(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪* 16‬منه‪ :‬ע )ממנו([ فيه‪ḥb :‬‬

‫‪ 20‬وعقله‪b :‬ע[ وعقلها‪ḥ :‬‬

‫‪ 19‬وما يعقل[ וישכיל )*و يعقل(‪:‬‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫‪300‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪23‬‬

‫שישליך כונתו אל דברים רבים יחד כמו שהגוף החלוש גם כן אי אפשר לו לשאת‬ ‫דברים רבים וכאשר חלק אותם הדברים היה נקל עליו לשאת אותם ולא הראות החלוש‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫אפשר לו גם כן שישיג מראים רבים יחד ואולם הראות החזק הנה אפשר לו השגת‬ ‫דברים רבים יחד ואולם השכל האלהי הנה בעבור שהוא בתכלית התמימות והשלמות‬ ‫הנה הוא‬ ‫בלתי צריך בשכל אל זמן אבל ישכיל כל הדברים יחד פתאום וכמו שהעין חדת הראות‬ ‫תראה דברים רבים יחד גם כן אבל מיותר מזה ישכיל השכל הראשון כל המושכלות‬ ‫יחד כאשר השכיל עצמותו ואלו הדברים הם אשר ילכו דרך שלמות וישרו וידיעתו‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫הכללית לא בזמן וזה שהוא יותר נעלה מכל השעורים והזמן אמנם הוא שעור התנועה‬ ‫והוא בלתי מתנועע ולא יסכול דבר וכמו שאתה כאשר תכה בכנור לא יהיה אפשר‬ ‫שתכה בנגונים כלם ואלו היה הכנור בעל נפש היה אפשר שישמיע קול ביותר חד‬ ‫שבקולות והיותר כבד מהם יחד כן האל אפשר לו בקלות שיקיף בדברים רבים יחד‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫וישכיל דברים רבים יחד ואלא מה זה שנפש המכרכר אפשר לה שתניע מן הגוף‬

‫‪ L‬כט‬

‫אברים רבים יחד כמו הידים והרגלים והראש ותניע כל אחד מאותם האברים בכללם‬

‫‪ 23‬רבים[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬כמו[ ‪ +‬כמו)!(‪ ‖ A :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ AMT‬ולא[ ולזה אותם)!(‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 24‬אותם הדברים[ הדברים ההם‪:‬‬

‫‪ 25‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬הראות[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬ואולם…יחד[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫)⇄‪(C1‬‬

‫‪ 26‬האלהי[ האלוהי‪ ‖ B :‬הנה[ לית‪ ‖ BL :‬שהוא בתכלית[ ‪ ‖ T0‬התמימות והשלמות[ الـكمال والتمام‪:‬‬ ‫ع ‖ התמימות[ התמידות‪ ‖ B :‬והשלמות[ והשלימות‪C :‬‬ ‫חדת‪ [AML :‬האחד‪ :C1) C :‬החד( | חד‪ | B :‬החד‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 27‬אבל ישכיל[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ישכיל[ לית‪‖ B :‬‬

‫‪ 28‬תראה[ יראה‪ ‖ CT :‬דברים…יחד[ ‪‖ T0‬‬

‫יחד[ ‪ +‬כן‪ + | C1 :‬הוא‪ ‖ T :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬מיותר מזה‪ [ABL :‬ביותר מזה‪ | CT :‬יותר מזה‪‖ M :‬‬ ‫השכל[ לית‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 29–28‬המושכלות יחד[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 29‬עצמותו[ לעצמותו‪ ‖ M :‬שלמות[ השלימות‪:‬‬

‫‪ + | C‬השלמות‪ ‖ T0 | B :‬וישרו[ ויושרו‪ ‖ T0 | C :‬וידיעתו[ וידעתו‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 30‬בזמן[ ‪ +‬אחר זמן‪‖ T :‬‬

‫יותר…מכל[ ‪ ‖ T0‬יותר[ לית‪ :C1) B :‬סא אין בו מלת יותר( ‖ השעורים[ השיעורים‪ ‖ BM :‬הוא‪[BTC :‬‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ AML :‬שעור[ שיעור‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 31‬מתנועע…דבר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬יסכול‪ [BL :‬נעתק‪ | C :‬ישכל‪ | A :‬יסכל‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ M‬דבר[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬כאשר[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) CT :‬תכה[ תהיה‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 32‬בנגונים…היה)‪ ‖ T0 [(1‬הכנור‪:‬‬

‫‪ [BMT‬הכינור‪ ‖ CAL :‬שישמיע[ שישמע‪ ‖ B :‬ביותר[ יותר‪ ‖ M :‬חד[ ‪ +‬מן‪T0 | B :‬‬

‫‪ 33‬שבקולות‬

‫והיותר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מהם[ לית‪ ‖ CB :‬יחד)‪…(1‬רבים[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬האל[ ‪ +‬ית׳‪ ‖ C1 :‬שיקיף[ שישקיף‪:‬‬ ‫‪C1‬‬

‫‪ 1–33‬בדברים…וישכיל[ ‪T0‬‬

‫הרץ‪ | CB :‬המכה‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 1‬וישכיל[ ויבדיל‪ ‖ C :‬ואלא[ ואל‪ ‖ B :‬זה[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬המכרכר[‬

‫‪ 2–1‬אפשר…אברים[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 2‬אברים[ איברים‪ ‖ B :‬כמו[ ‪ +‬השני‪ | C :‬השתי‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ B‬והרגלים[ והשתי רגלים‪ ‖ CB :‬והראש[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬ותניע…האברים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מאותם[ מאותן‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫האברים[ האיברים‪ ‖ BM :‬בכללם[ בכללותה‪ | B :‬בכללה‪L :‬‬

‫‪301‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫ولأنه على غاية الـكمال والتمام‬

‫‪ḥ210r2‬‬

‫فهو‬ ‫غير محتاج‬

‫إلى زمان‬

‫تبصر أشياء كثيرة دفعة‬

‫كما أن العين الحادة البصر‬ ‫بل على | أكثر من ذلك يعقل العقل الأول جميع المعقولات‬

‫معا ًإذا عقل ذاته‬

‫‪ 26‬الـكمال والتمام[ התמימות והשלמות )*التمام والـكمال(‪ :‬ע‬ ‫البصير⟩ة⟨‪b :‬‬

‫‪ 27‬العين الحادة البصر‪ḥ :‬ע[ العين‬

‫‪26‬‬

‫‪302‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪3‬‬

‫יחד ולא תניע קצת האברים בחלק ממנה וקצתם בחלק אחר ואיך יישר שיהיה השכל‬ ‫אשר לא ימלט ממנו מקום מן העולם לא יהיה אפשר לו שיניע כל העולם יחד ולא יהיה‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫אפשר לו שישכיל כל הדברים יחד עד שהניעו לדברים רבים יחד הוא תמה יותר גדול‬ ‫הנה אינו ראוי אם כן שנכחיש רבוי ההתרחבות והעושר מכח האל ולא שנקישהו בשכל‬ ‫שלנו החלוש וזה שהוא לא יצטרך בידיעת הדברים שיעבור על אחד אחד ולא יצטרך‬

‫גם כן אל ההרכבה ולא יצא מסכלות אל ידיעה ואין בו צורך שיוליד תולדות לא תהינה^‬ ‫מהקדמות מבוארות אבל כמו שהראות החד אין צורך בו בהשגת המראים אל זמן אבל‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫תכף יפול עליהם יראה אותם כלם בלא מתון כמו כן השכל האלהי ויותר מזה הרבה‬ ‫באשר הוא כיון למושכלות הבין בלא זמן העולם המושכל בלא יגיעה ואם רצית שתבין‬ ‫חדוד הראות מן השכל האלהי צייר במחשבתך השכל אשר באדם וגופו וכפי מה שזה‬ ‫השכל יותר מבין ויותר יודע מזה הגוף ויותר ממהר התנועות והפעולות ממנו כן תחשוב‬ ‫בשכל האלהי שהוא יותר ממהר להשיג ויותר קל להבין מושכלות ואם אתה תעתיק זה‬ ‫ההבדל במעלה‬

‫‪ 3‬האברים‪ [CAT :‬האיברים‪ ‖ BML :‬בחלק)‪…(1‬בחלק)‪ ‖ T0 [(2‬אחר[ אחד‪ + | C :‬אבל היא תניע כל‬ ‫אחת מהן בכללה‪ 4–3 T :‬ואיך…אשר[ ‪ 3 T0‬ואיך[ אבל איך‪ ‖ C :‬יישר[ יישיר‪A :‬‬ ‫ממנה‪ | AM :‬לית‪ ‖ B :‬מקום[ ממקום‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬במקום‪ ‖ M :‬אפשר…ולא[ ‪ 5–4 T0‬שיניע…לו[‬ ‫לית‪ 4 BM :‬יחד‪C :‬ع[ לית‪ 5 AL :‬עד…יחד)‪ ‖ T0 [(2‬עד[ עם כי‪ ‖ C :‬שהניעו‪ [AL :‬הניעו‪| C :‬‬ ‫שהניע‪ | B :‬שיניעו‪ ‖ M :‬יחד[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬יותר[ לית‪ 6 CB :‬הנה[ והנה‪ ‖ B :‬אינו[ אין‪ ‖ T :‬ראוי[‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ AL :‬אם…ההתרחבות[ ‪ ‖ T0‬אם כן[ לית‪ | M :‬א״כ‪ ‖ B :‬שנכחיש[ שנכחש‪ ‖ CB :‬רבוי[ דבור‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬מכח‪ [CBT :‬בכח‪ ‖ AML :‬שנקישהו‪ [CAT :‬שנקשהו‪ | BL :‬נקישהו‪ 7–6 M :‬בשכל…לא[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫‪ 7‬שלנו החלוש[ منه الضعف‪ :‬ع ‖ שיעבור[ שיעבר )⇄‪ 8–7 (C1‬על…גם[ ‪ 7 T0‬על[ עליהם‪CB :‬‬ ‫‪ 8‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬ידיעה…תולדות[ ‪ ‖ T0‬לא תהינה‪ [B :‬לא תהיו‪ :C1) C :‬לא יהיו( | לא יהיו‪| AL :‬‬ ‫ולא תהיינה‪ | M :‬לא תהיינה‪ + | T :‬ٺثبت له‪ :‬ع ‪ 9‬שהראות החד[ ‪ ‖ T0‬צורך[ צרך‪ ‖ M :‬בהשגת[‬ ‫בהשגות‪ 10 T :‬כלם[ כולם‪ ‖ B :‬מתון[ ‪ +‬בו‪ ‖ B :‬כמו כן[ גם כן‪ :C1) C :‬כן גם כן( | ג״כ‪ | B :‬כמו גם כן‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ T‬האלהי[ האלוהי‪ 11 BT :‬באשר[ כאשר‪ ‖ CT :‬כיון[ כון‪ | A :‬כוון‪ ‖ M :‬בלא[ ובלא‪ ‖ C1 :‬יגיעה[‬ ‫ידיעה‪ 12 (C1⇄) CM :‬חדוד[ חדות‪ ‖ M :‬האלהי[ האלוהי‪ ‖ T :‬השכל)‪ [(2‬לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬וגופו[‬ ‫גופו‪ 13 (C1⇄) C :‬התנועות[ התנועה‪ ‖ CBT :‬והפעולות[ ופעולות‪ | C :‬והפעלות‪ 14 AT :‬בשכל[‬ ‫השכל‪ ‖ AL :‬האלהי[ האלוהי‪ ‖ CB :‬שהוא[ הוא‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬להשיג[ השגה‪ | C :‬לית‪ ‖ M :‬ויותר קל‬ ‫להבין‪ [CBT :‬לית‪ ‖ AML :‬מושכלות‪ [CAL :‬למושכלות‪ | BT :‬המושכלות‪ ‖ C1M :‬ההבדל[ היתרון‪T :‬‬ ‫‪ 4‬ממנו[‬

‫‪303‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ L‬כט‬ ‫‪ġ55,1–2‬‬

‫وإذا كان يمكنه أن يحرك جميع العالم معا ً‬ ‫على أن تحر يكه لأشياء كثيرة معا ًأشد عجبا ً‬

‫‪ ḥ210r3‬ولا يجب أن ننكر ذلك كثرة الاتساع‬ ‫‪ġ55,3‬‬

‫من قوة الل ّٰه سبحانه ولا أن نقايسه بالعقل‬

‫منا الضعيف |‬ ‫ولا يخرج من جهل إلى معرفة ولا به حاجة أن ينتج نتائج لم تكن‬ ‫ٺثبت له من مقدمات بينة‬

‫‪ 4‬معا‪ġCT ً :‬ע[ לית‪ġ :‬‬ ‫نقاس‪b :‬‬

‫‪ 5‬تحر يكه‪ġCT :‬ע[ الحركة‪ġ :‬‬

‫‪ 7‬منا الضعيف‪ġ :‬ע[ منه الضعف‪ḥ :‬‬

‫‪ 6‬ننكر‪ġ :‬ע[ ىىكر‪ | ḥ :‬ينكر‪ ‖ b :‬نقايسه‪ġ :‬ע[ ىقاس‪| ḥ :‬‬

‫‪ 8‬ٺثبت له[ לית‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪4‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬

‫‪304‬‬

‫וקלות השגת השכל האלהי אל קלות סבוב העולם לא ירחק מן ההקש המחויב ואם שמת‬ ‫הקשך כמו כן בתמונה כמו שיעשו חכמי התשבורת ואמרת לפי מה שהגשם ההוא‬ ‫יותר בהיר מזה הגשם כמו כן השכל ההוא יותר בהיר מאד מזה השכל לא יהיה פלא‬ ‫שיהיה אפשר בו שיבין וישכיל דברים רבים יחד ואינו ראוי להפלא גם כן מאשר הוא‬ ‫אפשר בזאת ההתחלה הראשונה שיהיה השכל לה מעצמותה כי אתה אם הודית‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫בשהשכל האלהי לא יתערב בו ההיולי בצד מן הצדדים ושהוא סבת תנועת הגלגל‬ ‫כמו שאתה לא תראה שתהיה לתנועתו מנוחה כן גם כן לא תוכל שתאמר באל שהוא‬ ‫ינוח מפעלתו וכאשר ספרנו כי בכאן גשם מונח ושהשכל תמיד בו מה הוא אשר‬ ‫ימנע בשכל שהפועל והתנועה מעצמו הנה כבר התבאר מכל אלו הדברים כי האל הוא‬ ‫ההתחלה הראשונה ושהוא ידע עצמותו וכל הדברים אשר הוא להם התחלה יחד‬ ‫ושהוא אם‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫היה מולך בעצמותו הנה הוא אם כן מולך בכל הדברים אשר עמידתם בו והמאמר גם‬ ‫כן בשהוא חזק^ וישכיל עצמותו מאמר אמתי כי היה בזה יותר נכבד מכל הדברים‬ ‫ויותר נעלה‬

‫‪ 15‬וקלות[ בקלות‪ ‖ AL :‬האלהי[ האלוהי‪ ‖ CB :‬לא‪ [T :‬לית‪ ‖ CABML :‬המחויב[ המחוייב‪| CT :‬‬

‫המחיב‪ 16 B :‬הקשך‪ [AMT :‬הקישך‪ ‖ CBL :‬כמו)‪ [(1‬לית‪ ‖ C :‬התשבורת[ ‪ ‖ C corr.‬שהגשם‬ ‫ההוא[ שזה הגשם‪ 17 CB :‬מזה הגשם[ מן הגשם זה‪ :C1) C :‬מן הגשם הזה( ‖ כמו[ כן גם‪+ | C :‬‬ ‫גם‪ ‖ T :‬כן[ לית‪ + | M :‬זה‪ ‖ C1 :‬ההוא[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬בהיר מאד[ מאד בהיר‪ 18 AM :‬שיהיה[ אם‬ ‫יהיה‪ ‖ CB :‬שיבין וישכיל[ שישכיל ויבין‪ ‖ T :‬להפלא[ שיתמהו‪ ‖ C :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ 19 B :‬בזאת[ בה‬ ‫זאת‪ ‖ B :‬ההתחלה[ התחלה‪ ‖ B :‬הודית‪ [BMT :‬כפלת‪ | C :‬הודתה‪ | A :‬הודיתה‪ 20 L :‬בשהשכל‪:‬‬ ‫‪ [BL‬כשהשכל‪ | CT :‬בהשכל‪ ‖ AM :‬האלוהי‪ | CB :‬האלהי[ אלהי‪ ‖ A :‬לא יתערב בו ההיולי[ לא‬ ‫‪ 21‬שתהיה[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬לא תוכל[ אי‬ ‫ידמה בחומר‪ ‖ C :‬ושהוא[ ושהיא‪B :‬‬ ‫אפשר‪ ‖ B :‬שתאמר[ ‪ +‬שיש לפעולתו הפסק ולא‪ ‖ C1 :‬באל[ לית‪ ‖ C1 :‬שהוא ינוח[ שינוח‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 22 B‬מפעלתו[ מפעולותיו‪ | CB :‬מפעולתו‪ ‖ M :‬ספרנו[ תארנו‪ ‖ C :‬כי[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬תמיד‬ ‫‪ 23‬בשכל[ ‪ +‬שלא יהיה בפעל והתנועה מעצמו‬ ‫בו[ בו תמיד‪ ‖ B :‬מה הוא[ לההוא‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫לפי שאנחנו נראה שהתנועה מעצם קצת הגשמים במדרגת הלהבת והרוח והנהרות אשר אין ראוי‬ ‫שנרחיק שיאמר בשכל‪ ‖ T :‬שהפועל[ שהפעל‪ ‖ MT :‬מעצמו[ מעצמה‪ | A :‬מעצמותו‪ ‖ T :‬כבר[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 24 M‬הראשונה[ ‪ +‬לכל הדברים‪ ‖ T :‬ושהוא)‪ [(1‬לית‪ ‖ AL :‬ידע‪ [CBT :‬יודע‪ ‖ AML :‬עצמותו[‬ ‫עצמותה‪ ‖ A :‬התחלה[ התחלת‪ 25 B :‬אם[ גם‪ ‖ CM :‬אם כן מולך[ מולך ג״כ‪ | B :‬מולך‪‖ T :‬‬ ‫והמאמר[ המאמר‪ 26–25 M :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ 26 B :‬חזק )*قوى([‪ :‬يرى‪m :‬‬

‫‪305‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫وقد تبين من جميع ذلك‬

‫‪ḥ210r4‬‬

‫أن الل ّٰه هو‬

‫‪23‬‬

‫المبدأ | الأول وأنه يعلم ذاته وجميع الأشياء التى هو لها مبدأ‬ ‫معا ًوأنه إذا‬ ‫كان مالكا ًلذاته فهو أيضا ًمالك لجميع الأشياء التى قوامها | به‬

‫‪ 25‬قوامها به‪b :‬ע )עמידתם בו([ قوامه بها‪ḥ :‬‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫‪306‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪28‬‬

‫והנה נמצא הידיעה אמנם היא לדבר אחר ר״ל הדבר הידוע והחוש לדבר אחר והוא‬

‫‪1074b35–36‬‬

‫המוחש וכן גם כן המחשבה והשכל ואולם הדברים המושכלים לעצמותם אמנם‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫יושגו השגה בעבור כי האדם כאשר הרגיש הלובן הנה כבר הרגיש מיד בנפשו‬ ‫בשהוא כבר‬ ‫הרגיש הלובן וכאשר הבין כי הזויות מן המשולש שוות לשתי זויות נצבות הנה כבר‬ ‫הבין והשכיל גם כן שהוא כבר הבין והנה נאמר גם כן כי הידוע והמדע והמושכל‬

‫–‪1074b38‬‬ ‫‪1075a5‬‬

‫והשכל בקצת הדברים דבר אחד בעינו וזה כי החכמות אשר לא יתערב בהם היסוד‬ ‫אמנם הם היקש ושכל מבלתי שיהיה המושכל מהם דבר אחר ולא קצתם נבדל מקצתם‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫בסבת יסוד או שעור או מדה אבל צורת הדבר המושכל והשכל ילכו יחד והשכל אחד‬ ‫יתהפך על עצמותו ויאמר בשניהם יחד שהוא שכל ומושכל כי השכל אחד לא יצא מן‬ ‫הדבר המושכל אל זולתו ממה שאינו לטבעו אבל הוא יתהפך על עצמותו והדבר הנמצא‬ ‫מהם יחד אמנם הוא אחד בלי יסוד כמו האומניות המעשיות כאשר הסתלק היסוד מן‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫האומנות לא נמצא זולת צורת האומן ומעשהו כמו הכסא אשר אינו דבר אחר זולת‬ ‫אומנות הנגר וכמו שצורת הבריאות גם כן בלתי הגוף אינה דבר זולת מלאכת הרפואה‬ ‫וכאשר היה אפשר בדברים אשר להם היולי שתושג הידיעה מהם כי הצורה אשר‬

‫‪ 28‬היא[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬אחר)‪ [(1‬אחד‪ ‖ M :‬ר״ל[ רצוני לומר‪ ‖ C :‬אחר)‪ [(2‬אחד‪M :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ + | B :‬וכן‪ ‖ M :‬הדברים[ לדברים‪AM :‬‬

‫‪ 29‬וכן[ והוא‪:‬‬

‫‪ 30‬יושגו[ הושגו‪ ‖ B :‬כי[ לית‪‖ C :‬‬

‫הרגיש)‪ + [(1‬האדם‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬השיג‪ ‖ B :‬הנה[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬מיד‪ [CBT :‬לית‪ ‖ AML :‬בשהוא‪[CBT :‬‬ ‫‪ 31‬הבין‪ [ATL :‬הרגיש‪ | CB :‬תבין‪ ‖ M :‬זויות[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬המשולש[ המשלש‪CT :‬‬

‫שהוא‪AML :‬‬ ‫‪ 32‬הבין[ הרגיש‪ ‖ C :‬והשכיל גם כן[ גם כן והשכיל‪ | C :‬ג״כ והשכיל‪ ‖ B :‬הבין )‪ + [(2‬זה‪ ‖ C :‬גם‬ ‫כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬כי[ מן‪ 33 CT :‬היסוד‪ [BT :‬החומר‪ 34 CAML :‬היקש[ הקש‪ ‖ CAM :‬המושכל[‬ ‫המשכל‪ 1 T :‬יסוד‪ [T :‬חומר‪ | CB :‬היסוד‪ ‖ AML :‬שעור‪ [CMT :‬שיעור‪ ‖ ABL :‬הדבר[ לית‪‖ AL :‬‬ ‫והשכל ילכו יחד[ לית‪ 2 M :‬על[ לית‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬אל‪ 3–2 B :‬ויאמר…עצמותו[ לית‪ 3 B :‬על[‬ ‫אל‪ 4 C :‬אחד[ ‪ +‬יאמר בו שהוא מושכל ושכל ואינו מן הפלא אם ילכו שני אלו כעצמים אשר לא‬ ‫יתערב בהם יסוד אחד שכבר נמצא גם כן בעצמים אשר להם‪ ‖ T :‬בלי[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬יסוד[ חומר‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫האומנויות[ האמנויות‪ ‖ AL :‬המעשיות[ ‪ +‬כי‪ ‖ C1 :‬הסתלק‪ [CB :‬תחלק‪ ‖ AMTL :‬היסוד[ החומר‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 5 C‬האומנות[ האמנות‪ ‖ A :‬צורת[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬האומן[ האמן‪ 6 T :‬שצורת[ לית‪ :‬ع ‖ גם‬ ‫כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬בלתי‪ [BTL :‬מבלתי‪ | C :‬בבלתי‪ ‖ AM :‬אינה[ אינו‪ ‖ CBM :‬זולת[ זולתי‪ ‖ B :‬הרפואה[‬ ‫הרפואות‪ 7 C :‬אפשר[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬היולי[ החומר‪ | C :‬ההיולי‪ ‖ B :‬שתושג[ שיושג‪ ‖ C :‬מהם[‬ ‫‪ ‖ T0‬הצורה[ צורה‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪L‬ל‬

‫‪307‬‬

‫‪L‬ל‬ ‫‪ġ55,6–8‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫والجواهر التى لها عنصر مثل الصناعات العملية إذا رفع العنصر منها‬ ‫كانت صورة الصانع وعمله واحد مثل صورة السر ير‬ ‫وصناعة النجارة ومثل الصحة فإنها بغير بدن هى صناعة الطب‬

‫‪ 4‬ومثل[ ‪ +‬צורת )*صورة(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪4‬‬

‫‪308‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪8‬‬

‫למלאכה והמלאכה אחת בעינה הנה הדברים אשר לא יתערב בהם ההיולי והם אשר‬ ‫אין להם חלקים לעצמותם ולא קטרים לא ימנע מונע משיהיה השכל והמושכל‬ ‫והמחשבה‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫בהם דבר אחד בעינו הנה כבר התבאר מזה המאמר למי שיכוין ההבנה כי השכל‬ ‫הראשון ישכיל העולם השכלי וזה שהוא אם היה כאשר השכיל עצמותו השכיל שהוא‬ ‫מה שהוא הנה כבר השכיל מעצמותו סבת כל הדברים והתחלתם וההתחלה תאמר על‬ ‫הצורה ותאמר על הדבר אשר בגללו ועל אשר הוא התחלת התנועה כמו שהשכל גם‬ ‫כן מן האדם יאמר שהוא התחלה לו על שלשה דרכים כי הנה פעמים רבות שיהיו‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫אלו השלשה ענינים אשר יאמר עליהם ההתחלה בקצת הדברים הטבעיים ילכו על‬ ‫דבר אחד‬ ‫בעינו כמו מה שימצא בנפש האדם ואם היה האל ישכיל עצמותו על שהוא צורה‬ ‫לכל הדברים הנה הוא גם ההתחלה ליושר הדברים הנמצאים וסדרם והנה השגתו בלא‬ ‫ספק לדברים אשר הוא התחלה להם ולישרם וסדרם יחד‬

‫‪ 8‬אשר )‪ [(2‬לית‪ ‖ BM :‬ההיולי[ חומר‪ | C :‬החומר‪ ‖ B :‬והם…חלקים[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 9‬להם[ לית‪‖ B :‬‬

‫לעצמותם[ לעצמם‪ | BM :‬בעצמותם‪ ‖ T :‬קטרים[ ‪ +‬בו‪ ‖ C1 :‬לא[ ולא‪CM :‬‬

‫‪ 10‬הנה[ והנה‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ BT‬שיכוין[ שיבין‪ | C :‬שיכון‪ ‖ M :‬ההבנה[ ההנעה‪ :C1) C :‬סא ההבנה( ‖ השכל[ ‪ +‬השכל)!(‪:‬‬ ‫‪B‬‬

‫‪ 11‬הראשון[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬השכלי[ השכל‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 12–11‬עצמותו…השכיל[ לית‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬היה[ تكثر‪:‬‬

‫‪ 13‬ותאמר…בגללו[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 12‬שהוא[ הוא‪ ‖ C :‬מעצמותו[ ‪ +‬أنه‪ :‬ع ‖ תאמר[ יאמר‪T :‬‬ ‫ع‬ ‫)⇄‪ ‖ (C1‬ותאמר[ ויאמר‪ ‖ T :‬בגללו[ בכללו‪ + | M :‬ותאמר‪ ‖ C :‬על[ ‪ +‬דבר‪ :C1) C :‬הדבר( ‖ גם‬ ‫‪ 15‬השלשה[ הג׳‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 14‬שלשה[ ג׳‪ ‖ BT :‬דרכים[ מינים‪ ‖ CB :‬רבות[ רבים‪BMT :‬‬ ‫כן[ ג״כ‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ BT‬ענינים[ הענינים‪ ‖ T :‬יאמר‪ [CBT :‬תאמר‪ ‖ AML :‬עליהם[ להם‪ ‖ T :‬ההתחלה[ התחלה‪CT :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ ‖ (C1‬הטבעיים[ לית‪ ‖ AL :‬ילכו[ ילך‪ ‖ CBT :‬על[ אל‪ 16 T :‬מה[ לית‪ ‖ CT :‬ישכיל[ השכיל‪M :‬‬ ‫‪ 17‬הדברים…ליושר[ לית‪ | A :‬הדברים הנמצאים וסדרם הנה הוא גם כן התחלה ליושר‪ ‖ M :‬גם[ ‪+‬‬ ‫כן‪ ‖ T :‬והנה[ לית‪ | C :‬הנה‪ ‖ T :‬השגתו[ והשגתו‪ ‖ C :‬בלא[ בלי‪ 18 M :‬התחלה[ ההתחלה‪‖ AL :‬‬ ‫להם[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬וסדרם[ ולסדרם‪B :‬‬

‫‪309‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫والعقل والمعقول‬

‫‪ḥ210r6‬‬

‫منه‬

‫واحد‬

‫الأول يعقل العالم‬

‫فالعقل‬ ‫وذلك أنه إن تكثر إذا عقل ذاته عقل أنه‬

‫ما هو فقد يعقل | من ذاته أنه علة جميع الأشياء ومبدؤها‬

‫‪ 11‬تكثر[ היה )*كان(‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪* 12‬يعقل[ ىقعل‪ | ḥ :‬تعقل‪ | b :‬השכיל )*عقل(‪ :‬ע ‖ أنه[ לית‪ :‬ע‬

‫‪9‬‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪19‬‬

‫‪310‬‬

‫והנה ראוי שנעיין אם בין הטוב ובין מה שהוא בתכלית המעלה הבדל או‬ ‫כל אחד משניהם מוקף נפרד מחברו ואמנם^ ההבדל בין שניהם במדרגה‬ ‫והאל הסדר לכלם בדרך החיל כי הטוב גם כן בחיל הוא הסדר והיושר‬

‫‪L‬ל‬ ‫‪Λ.10.‬‬ ‫‪1075a11–13‬‬ ‫‪1075a13–15‬‬

‫וכל אחד מהכתות גם כן טוב ויותר מזה זה האיש כי האחד הנרמז אין הויתו‬ ‫בסבת היושר והסדר אבל היושר והסדר בסבתו ואין הטוב א״כ על מדרגה מן‬ ‫השכל אבל הוא בשניהם יחד ר״ל בסדר והיושר ובסבת הסדר ולא בשכונת השכל‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫והאל יניע הדברים הנמצאים כמו שיניע מה שתצוה בו הנהגת המדינות לבעלי המעלה‬ ‫מן האנשים וצווי המלך לרעיה ואולם היושר והסדר אשר נאמר באל שהוא סבתם הוא‬ ‫כפי מה שאספר אומר כי כל הדברים מסודרים ומיושרים יחד על צד מן הצדדים אבל‬ ‫שהוא אינו על דרך אחד בעינו כשט מן החי וכמעופף וכצמחים ואין ענין כולם ענין לא‬ ‫יתיחסו כל אחד מהם אל חברו אבל ביניהם יחס והוא כי סדר כולם יחד יצא במכוון‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫אל כונה אחת אבל שהוא כמו שהנהגת הבית לא יותר בו לנכבדים מן האנשים שיעשו‬ ‫דבר מן הפעולות שלא כשורה ואולם העבדים וקצת בעלי חיים הנה הפעלה אשר‬

‫‪ 19‬מה[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הבדל[ הפרש‪ ‖ B :‬או[ ר״ל אם‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 20‬אחד[ ‪ +‬מהם‪ ‖ T :‬משניהם[ ‪ +‬נפרד‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 21‬והאל[ או שהאל ית׳‪‖ T :‬‬

‫‪ ‖ A‬מחברו[ מחבירו‪ ‖ CB :‬ואמנם[ ואולם‪ ‖ C :‬ההבדל[ היתרון‪R2 :‬‬ ‫הסדר לכלם‪ [C1 :‬הנסתר מהם מכלם‪ | C :‬הנסתר מכלם‪ | ABML :‬על שני הענינים יחד‪ ‖ T :‬גם כן[ גם‬ ‫בין‪ :C1) C :‬גם כן בין( | ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬בחיל[ החיל‪ 22 C :‬אחד[ אחת‪ ‖ T :‬מהכתות[ מן הכתות‪ ‖ A :‬גם‬ ‫כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬ויותר[ יותר‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬זה[ לית‪ + | (C1⇄) C :‬הוא‪ ‖ T :‬אין[ מן‪ 23 B :‬אם כן‪ [CT :‬גם‬ ‫כן ‪ | A‬א״כ‪ ‖ BML :‬מדרגה[ הסדר‪ 24 C :‬בשניהם[ בהם‪ ‖ C :‬ולא[ לא‪ 25 B :‬והאל[ ואל‪| M :‬‬ ‫‪ +‬ית׳‪ ‖ T :‬הנמצאים[ לית‪ ‖ CT :‬שיניע[ שינוע‪ ‖ C :‬מה[ מי‪ ‖ T :‬שתצוה[ שיצוה‪ ‖ CT :‬בו[ לית‪‖ T :‬‬ ‫הנהגת[ הדרכת‪ ‖ CBT :‬לבעלי[ ‪ +‬המלאכה‪ 26 B :‬לרעיה[ לרעייה‪ | B :‬להמון‪ ‖ T :‬היושר והסדר[‬ ‫הסדר והיושר‪ 27 T :‬שאספר[ שאומר‪ ‖ C :‬מסודרים ומיושרים[ מסודרים מיושרים‪ | C :‬מיושרים‬ ‫ומסודרים‪ 28 AL :‬שהוא אינו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬שהוא[ כי זה‪ ‖ C :‬דרך[ מין‪ ‖ CB :‬כשט‪ [AL :‬בשט‪CM :‬‬ ‫)‪ :C1‬בשווי( | כשני‪ :in marg. + R2) BR :‬זאת המלה מספקת( | ‪ ‖ T0‬החי[ ‪ +‬השוחה‪ ‖ C1 :‬וכמעופף[‬ ‫ובמעופף‪ :C1) CM :‬והמעופף( ‖ וכצמחים[ ובצמחים‪ | CM :‬והצמחים‪ ‖ C1 :‬כולם[ כלם‪ ‖ MT :‬לא‪:‬‬ ‫‪ [T‬לית‪ 29 CABML :‬יתיחסו[ יתיחס‪ ‖ BM :‬אל[ ‪ +‬אל‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬חברו[ חבירו‪ ‖ B :‬יחס[ ‪ +‬מה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C1‬והוא[ וזה‪ ‖ C :‬כולם[ כלם‪ ‖ CAM :‬במכוון[ בכונה‪ 30 C :‬שהנהגת הבית[ הנהגת הבית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | M‬סא שהנדיבות‪ ‖ C1 :‬יותר[ יוחלט‪ ‖ CB :‬בו[ בה‪ ‖ TM :‬לנכבדים[ לבני חורין‪ | CB :‬לבני חורים‪R :‬‬ ‫‪ 31‬הפעולות[ הפעלות‪ ‖ TA :‬שלא כשורה[ יותר מדאי‪ ‖ C :‬העבדים[ העבד‪ ‖ C :‬בעלי חיים[ ב״ח‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ M‬הפעלה[ הפעולה‪ | CM :‬פעולה‪B :‬‬

‫‪1075a16–23‬‬

‫‪311‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫תהיה מאתם המעט מה שתכלול על הכל והרוב ממנו במקרה ר״ל טבע כל אחד‬

‫‪32‬‬

‫‪ L‬לא והתחלתו וכן גם כן הענין בעולם הזה וזה כי הנהגת הכוכבים והשארותם על יושר אחד‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫וסדר אחד וכן גם כן כל הגשמים השמימיים ואין בהם דבר בלתי מוגבל ולא בלתי‬ ‫מיושר ואולם החי אשר על פני הארץ והצמחים הנה תועלתם הכוללת מעטה ואולם‬ ‫‪ 1075a23–25‬יעשה כל אחד ויתפעל על הרוב במקרה וזה כי הפסדם כבר היה הפסד דבר כדי שיהיה‬ ‫דבר אחר זולתו כצורך מה שיזון אל מזון בלא ספק וצמיחת הדברים והגעתם אל‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫התכלית וחסרונם אחר כן וזולת זה ממה שדומה לו בהם תועלתות כוללות‬ ‫ואולם בעיטת החמור ברגלו ונשיכת הנחש ושפיכת החזיר לחמת המים וקצת הצמחים‬ ‫הממיתים‬ ‫הנה אין ממנו דבר יכנס בסדר והיושר ולאמר זה יותר ישר ויותר טוב משנמזג האל‬ ‫בהיולי ויושמו הדברים ההם משותפים לו עוד נבקש הדברים אשר נחשוב שאין יושר‬ ‫להם ולא סדר דברים אחרים מגונים ונבזים ואנחנו נוכל כאשר חייבנו טבע הדברים‬ ‫שנעמוד על היות העולם והנהגתו כדרך הנהגת המדינה אשר תלך בה מצות המלך על‬ ‫הטוב שבענינים כי כמו שאנשי זאת המדינה אם יצטוו לעשות בקצת העתים דמיון זה לא‬ ‫תעבור מצות המלך בכל חלקיה בענין אחד ולא ישתתפו הכל בצווי ההוא אבל הוא‬ ‫‪ 32‬המעט[ מעט‪ ‖ AM :‬מה[ ממה‪ ‖ B :‬שתכלול[ שיכלול‪ ‖ CT :‬והרוב ממנו[ ורבו‪ | C :‬והרב ממנו‪T :‬‬ ‫‪ 1‬והתחלתו…יושר אחד[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬וכן[ גם‪ | A :‬לית‪ ‖ ML :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬הזה[ לית‪CT :‬‬

‫‪ 2‬גם כן[‬

‫‪ 3‬הארץ[ האדמה‪ ‖ T :‬והצמחים[‬

‫ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬כל[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬השמימיים[ השמיים‪ ‖ A :‬ואין[ אין‪B :‬‬ ‫והצמחיים‪ ‖ C :‬תועלתם[ תועלתו‪ ‖ C :‬מעטה[ מעוטה‪ 4 C :‬על[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬הרוב[ הרב‪ ‖ T :‬על‬ ‫הרוב[ ברוב העניין‪ ‖ C :‬במקרה[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הפסד‪ [TAM :‬והפסד‪ 5 CBL :‬דבר[ הדבר‪‖ B :‬‬ ‫כצורך‪ [ABL :‬צורך‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬בצורך‪ | M :‬וצורך‪ ‖ T :‬מזון‪ [CBT :‬המזון‪ 6 AML :‬וזולת[ וזולתה‪C :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ | (C1‬זולת‪ ‖ M :‬ממה[ מה‪ ‖ C :‬תועלתות[ ‪ +‬גדולות‪ 7 AL :‬בעיטת[ משיכת‪ ‖ T0 | CB :‬ברגלו[‬ ‫ברגליו‪ ‖ B :‬המים[ מים‪ ‖ B :‬וקצת הצמחים הממיתים‪ [C1 :‬קצת מן הצמח‪ | C :‬קצת זה הצמח‪| AM :‬‬ ‫ויבש קצת הצמח‪ | BL :‬ויבש קצת זה הצמח‪ 8 T :‬הנה[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬אין[ אינו‪ ‖ M :‬ולאמר[ והמאמר‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C‬זה[ בזה‪ ‖ CT :‬ישר[ נכון‪ ‖ T :‬משנמזג[ משימזג‪ 9 CT :‬בהיולי[ בחומר‪ ‖ C :‬הדברים[ ‪‖ T0‬‬ ‫נבקש[ ‪ +‬אל‪ ‖ T :‬ויושמו[ ויישם‪ ‖ C :‬הדברים ההם[ אותם הדברים‪ ‖ C :‬נחשוב[ ‪ +‬שהוא‪‖ CB :‬‬ ‫שאין[ אין‪ ‖ CB :‬יושר[ יותר‪ 10 T0 | B :‬דברים אחרים מגונים ונבזים[ סבות אחרות מגונות ונבזות‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ T‬חייבנו[ חיבנו‪ 11 T0 | M :‬שנעמוד[ שנעמד‪ ‖ C :‬היות[ כי‪ | C :‬הוית‪ ‖ B :‬הנהגת[ ‪ ‖ T0‬תלך[‬ ‫ילך‪ 14–12 CT :‬שאנשי…ראשים[ ‪ 12 T0‬שאנשי[ אנשי‪ ‖ M :‬אם יצטוו[ אם צוו‪ | C :‬אשר נצטוו‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬לעשות[ לית‪ 13 C :‬תעבור[ תעברו‪ ‖ M :‬בכל[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬ישתתפו[ השתתפו‪ ‖ B :‬הוא[‬ ‫לית‪C :‬‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪312‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪14‬‬

‫ישים קצת האנשים ראשים וקצתם שוטרים לאותם הראשים וקצתם עבדים להם‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫וקצתם ישליטם על הפחותה שבפעולות אשר ישלם בה ענין ההדרכה וקצתם ישתתפו‬ ‫המלך במדרגת המלוכה יותר וקצתם פחות כן גם כן העולם והנהגתו הנה‬ ‫ידמה הממלכה אשר ימלוך אותה מלך אחד כל חלקיו אשר בו מסודר מיושר‬ ‫קצתם עם קצתם ר״ל החי והצומח והראיה על זה כי חדוש כלם בסבה אחת כי כלם‬ ‫מפני שהם יתאוו אל שיהיו בענין שהם עליו נמצאים היתה תאותם וחשקם אל הדבר‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫הנמצא לפי האמת והמשכם אל זה האחד יבקשו אותו ביחוד וילכו אצלו ואין אחד מן‬ ‫הנמצאות ירצה שיתחלק אל מספר רב ולא שיצא מן הענין אשר הוא בו אל ההפך‬ ‫ואשר חדושו גם כן מדברים רבים אמנם יבקשו וילכו אל דבר אחד וכן גם כן המדינה‬ ‫מפני^ שהיא מספר רב כונתה דבר אחד והחיל האחד אמנם כונתו מה שיראהו השר‬ ‫והקבוץ מן האנשים אמנם שמו כונתם הראש וכן גם כן פעולות המלאכה בדברים‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫המורכבים מדברים רבים כמו הספינה והבית כי שני אלו גם כן אמנם עמידתם כאשר‬ ‫התחדשו על היות כל אחד מהם אחד ואשר יתאוה גם כן אל הרבוי כמו המלך והמתנשא‬ ‫והמתגבר אמנם יתאוה אליהם כדי שישימם תחת אחד‬

‫‪ 14‬ישים[ תשים‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 15–14‬שוטרים…ישליטם[ ‪T0‬‬

‫האנשים‪ ‖ AM :‬להם[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ 14‬שוטרים[ פקידים‪ ‖ CT :‬לאותם[ ‪+‬‬

‫‪ 15‬ישליטם[ שליטים‪ | C :‬השליטם‪ ‖ B :‬הפחותה[ הפחות‪‖ C :‬‬

‫שבפעולות…וקצתם[ ‪ ‖ T0‬שבפעולות[ שבמעשים‪ | C :‬שבפעלות‪ ‖ A :‬בה[ בהם‪ ‖ CB :‬ישתתפו[‬ ‫נשתתפו‪ + | B :‬עם‪C1 :‬‬

‫‪ 16‬המלך[ במלך‪ ‖ L :‬במדרגת…כן)‪ ‖ T0 [(1‬יותר[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬כן)‪ [(1‬לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ AM‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬הנה[ אשר‪ | M :‬היה‪T :‬‬ ‫‪ [CBT‬חלקיו‪ ‖ AML :‬בה‪ [CBT :‬בו‪AML :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ M‬כלם[ כולם‪B :‬‬ ‫היתה[ אותה‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 17‬ידמה[ דמה‪ ‖ AM :‬הממלכה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬חלקיה‪:‬‬

‫‪ 18‬עם קצתם[ על קצת‪ ‖ T :‬ר״ל[ כל‪ ‖ C :‬בסבה[ סבה‪:‬‬

‫‪ 19‬מפני שהם[ בעבור שהיו‪ ‖ C :‬שהם[ אשר הם‪ ‖ CBT :‬עליו[ אליו‪‖ A :‬‬

‫‪ 20‬יבקשו[ יבקשהו‪ | B :‬יבקשוהו‪ ‖ C :‬אותו[ לית‪CBT :‬‬

‫‪ ‖ B‬שיצא[ יצא‪ ‖ CB :‬מן[ אל‪ ‖ A :‬אשר[ ‪ +‬בו‪C :‬‬

‫)⇄‪(C1‬‬

‫‪ 21‬שיתחלק[ שיתחלף‪:‬‬

‫‖ ההפך[ הפך‪C :‬‬

‫)⇄‪(C1‬‬

‫‪ 22‬חדושו[‬

‫חדשו‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬גם כן)‪ [(1‬ג״כ‪ ‖ BM :‬יבקשו וילכו[ יבקש וילך‪ | C :‬ילכו ויבקשו‪ ‖ M :‬אל[ אצל‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫אחד[ אחר‪ ‖ A :‬גם כן)‪ [(2‬ג״כ‪B :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪(C1‬‬

‫‪ 23‬מפני שהיא[ בעבור שהוא‪ | C :‬לית‪ ‖ AM :‬כונתה[ כונתו‪CT :‬‬

‫‪ 24‬מן האנשים[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬פעולות[ פעלות‪ | A :‬פעולת‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 25‬המורכבים[‬

‫הנרכבים‪ | C :‬מורכבים‪ ‖ B :‬רבים[ אחדים‪ ‖ A :‬הספינה והבית[ הבית והספינה‪ ‖ M :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪‖ B :‬‬

‫אמנם‪ [ABL :‬לית‪ 26 CMT :‬היות[ כי‪ ‖ CB :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬הרבוי[ הריבוי‪ 27–26 B :‬המלך‬ ‫והמתנשא והמתגבר[ זה‪ :C1) C :‬סא כמו המלך והממלכה( ‪ 26‬והמתנשא‪ [BM :‬ומתנשא‪| AL :‬‬ ‫המתנשא‪ 27 T :‬והמתגבר‪ [BT :‬ומתגבר‪ ‖ AML :‬כדי[ כמו‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬אחד[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪313‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫‪ 1075a25–27‬ולא נמצא אחד מן הקודמים אמר בהתחלה הראשונה אשר הוא ראשון לפי האמת‬

‫‪28‬‬

‫מאמר נמצא‬ ‫‪ 1075a28–32‬בו וראוי לשים עליו אבל עמדו אצל ההתחלה אשר עמה ההיולי והסכימו כלם‬ ‫על שחדוש‬ ‫הדברים כלם והויתם יהיה מן ההפכים והנה טעו בשני הדברים יחד וזה כי ההויה‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫אינה לכל‬ ‫הדברים כי הדברים הנכבדים מאשר הם בעולם אין הויה להם ואין הוית כל הדברים‬ ‫הנהוים‬ ‫‪ L‬לב בלא ספק מן ההפכים וזה כי ההפכים לא יקבל קצתם השנוי מקצתם אבל הוא צריך‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫‪ 1075a32–34‬עמהם אל דבר שלישי כמו שאמרנו פעמים רבות ר״ל ההיולי ואולם הקודמים הנה‬ ‫ישימו ההיולי אחד משני ההפכים כמו האנשים אשר שמו מה שהוא בלתי שוה תחת‬ ‫מה שהוא שוה ואשר שמו הרבוי תחת דבר אחד וסתירת הדעת הזאת תהיה גם כן‬ ‫על הצד ההוא וזה כי ההיולי לא ימצא הפך לדבר מן הדברים המתחדשים ממנו‬ ‫‪ 1075a34–37‬ואמנם תתחדש הצורה מן ההעדר אשר בו ומאשר הוא בלתי מצוייר וקצת הקודמים‬ ‫חלקו ההתחלות אל הטוב ואל הרע ושמו הרע ההיולי והטוב בדרך הצורה ושמו‬ ‫ההיולי תחת כל הדברים זולת אחד אם נמלט והיא הצורה הראשונה זה על שהוא מן‬

‫‪ 28‬אחד[ ‪ +‬מהם‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬אחר‪ ‖ AL :‬אמר[ אמרו‪ ‖ C :‬בהתחלה[ בו התחלה‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬לפי[‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ C :‬האמת[ באמת‪ | C :‬אמת‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 29–28‬נמצא…עליו[ יתקוף‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 28‬לשים[ ‪ +‬לו‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 29‬ההתחלה[ ההתחלק‪ | C :‬התחלה‪ ‖ B :‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ ‖ C :‬כלם[ כולם‪ ‖ B :‬טעו[ חטאו בדברים‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ C‬יחד[ לית‪ 31 C :‬הם[ לית‪ ‖ CBT :‬הנהוים‪ [CBT :‬הם הוים‪ 1 ABL :‬יקבל[ יקבלו‪ ‖ T :‬קצתם‬ ‫השנוי[ השנוי קצתם‪ ‖ A :‬מקצתם[ מקצת‪ ‖ CB :‬הוא צריך[ יצטרך‪C :‬‬ ‫ההיולי[ החומר‪ 3–2 C :‬הנה ישימו[ ‪ 3 T0‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ ‖ C :‬כמו[ בדרך‪ ‖ CT :‬האנשים‬ ‫אשר שמו[ אשר שמו האנשים‪ ‖ T :‬ההפכים[ הפכים‪ ‖ B :‬שהוא בלתי[ ‪ ‖ T0‬שהוא[ שהיה‪CB :‬‬ ‫‪ 4‬שהוא‪ [AML :‬שהיה‪ ‖ CBT :‬דבר…וסתירת[ ‪ ‖ T0‬תהיה גם כן‪ [AMT :‬גם כן תהיה‪ | CL :‬ג״כ תהיה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 5 B‬הצד[ צד‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ ‖ C :‬לא…הפך[ ‪ ‖ T0‬לא[ לית‪ ‖ MA :‬המתחדשים[‬ ‫המתחדש‪ ‖ CT :‬ממנו[ מהם‪ 6 CT :‬הצורה מן ההעדר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬מצוייר[ מצויר‪ 7 A :‬חלקו…אל[‬ ‫‪ ‖ T0‬ההתחלות[ התחלות‪ ‖ C :‬ואל הרע[ והרע‪ ‖ MT :‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ 8–7 C :‬הצורה…תחת[‬ ‫‪ 7 T0‬הצורה[ צורה‪ 8 M :‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ ‖ C :‬הדברים…מן[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬זולת…נמלט[ לית‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫אם נמלט[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬והיא[ והוא‪ 9–8 CB :‬זה…הדברים[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫‪ 2‬דבר שלישי[ ‪‖ T0‬‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬

‫‪314‬‬

‫‪9‬‬

‫הדברים הנודעים אצל כל האנשים שהטוב צורת ההתחלה הראשונה וקצת האנשים‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫כבר הטיבו למצוא בציירם ההתחלה הראשונה הטוב אבל שהם עזבו מלומר על אי זה‬

‫–‪1075a38‬‬ ‫‪1075b1‬‬

‫צד הוא‬ ‫התחלה אם על צד השלמות או על צד המניע או על צד הצורה ומן המגונה גם כן‬

‫‪1075b1–7‬‬

‫והנמאס ציור אבן דקליס האהבה טוב ואולם הוא התחלה בדרך המניע וזה‬

‫שהוא יתחבר^‬ ‫ממאמרו שיהיה בדרך ההיולי מפני שהוא חלק מן הערוב ולא יותר לנו המאמר‬ ‫בשנחשוב כי ההתחלה אשר עמה ההיולי היא ההתחלה המניעה בעינה אבל הגדר ומה‬ ‫‪15‬‬

‫הוא הדבר אינו אחד בעינו להתחלה אשר עמה ההיולי ולהתחלה המניעה הנה ממה‬ ‫שראוי לחקור עליו העמידה על האהבה ואי זה מאלו השנים היא ומן המגונה גם כן‬ ‫שיהיה הנצחון יפסד תכלית ההפסד והטבע הזה טבע האונס ואולם אנכסגוריש הנה‬ ‫חשב כי ההתחלה הוא הטוב המניע וזה כי השכל אצלו יניע אבל שהוא‬ ‫כבר נשאר עליו שיבאר מהסבה אשר בעבורה יניע וזה כי הדבר אשר יניע‬ ‫‪ 9‬כל[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬האנשים)‪ [(1‬החושים‪ + | (C1⇄) C :‬כי האנשים‪ ‖ A :‬שהטוב‪ [AML :‬כי הטוב‪‖ CBT :‬‬ ‫ההתחלה…האנשים)‪T0 [(2‬‬

‫‪ 10–9‬וקצת…הראשונה[ לית‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 10‬כבר[ כאשר‪ ‖ B :‬הטיבו[ לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ C‬למצוא[ מצא‪ | C :‬למצא‪ ‖ T :‬בציירם‪ [B :‬בציירו‪ | C :‬לית‪ | AML :‬בציורם‪ ‖ T :‬ההתחלה[ התחלה‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬הטוב…עזבו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬עזבו[ הניחו‪ :C1) C :‬פי׳ לא השלימו מאמרם אבל הניחו ממנו קצת( ‖ מלומר‪:‬‬ ‫‪ [BT‬שיאמרו‪ | C :‬לאמר‪ ‖ AML :‬אי זה[ איזה‪BL :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬התחלה[ ההתחלה‪ | A :‬לית‪ ‖ M :‬אם[‬

‫או‪ | B :‬לית‪ ‖ M :‬השלמות…המניע[ ‪ ‖ T0‬השלמות[ המניע‪ ‖ B :‬או)‪ [(1‬אם‪ ‖ B :‬המניע[ השלמות‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬צד)‪ + [(3‬שום המין במקום‪ ‖ AM :‬הצורה[ המין‪ ‖ C :‬גם כן[ לית‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 12‬והנמאס…האהבה[‬

‫‪ ‖ T0‬ציור[ צייור‪ ‖ C :‬אבן דקליס‪ [ABM :‬אבן דקלוס‪ [C :‬אבנדקליס‪ ‖ L :‬ואולם[ אמנם‪ | M :‬ואמנם‪:‬‬ ‫‪T‬‬

‫‪ 13–12‬וזה…ממאמרו[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 13‬שיהיה‪ [CBM :‬שיהיה‪ | AL :‬שהיה‪ ‖ T :‬ההיולי[ החומר‪‖ C :‬‬

‫מפני[ בעבור‪ ‖ C :‬העירוב…המאמר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הערוב‪ [CAM :‬העירוב‪ ‖ BL :‬יותר[ ישולח‪ :C1) C :‬סא‬ ‫יצלח( ‪ 14‬ההתחלה)‪ [(1‬התחלה‪ ‖ C :‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ ‖ C :‬היא…בעינה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬בעינה[ לית‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ 15–14‬בעינה…הנה[ לית‪ 14 C :‬אבל… המניעה[ ‪ +‬אבל…המניעה)!(‪ 15 A :‬הוא‪ [BMT :‬שהוא‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ AL‬הדבר[ מדבר‪ ‖ M :‬בעינו…ההיולי[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ולהתחלה[ וההתחלה‪ ‖ B :‬ממה‪ [AMT :‬וממה‪| C :‬‬ ‫מה‪ 16 BL :‬לחקור…האהבה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬לחקור עליו[ החקירה ממנו‪ ‖ C :‬מאלו השנים[ משני אלו‪‖ CB :‬‬ ‫היא[ הוא‪ ‖ M :‬ומן[ מן‪ 17–16 M :‬גם…יפסיד[ ‪ 16 T0‬גם כן‪ [C :‬לית‪ | AM :‬ג״כ‪ 17 BL :‬שיהיה[‬ ‫שתחשוב‪ ‖ C :‬הנצחון[ הנצחי‪ ‖ A :‬יפסד‪ [CA :‬יפסיד‪ | BC1L :‬לית‪ ‖ M :‬תכלית[ בתכלית‪–17 C :‬‬ ‫‪ 20‬האונס…הוא)‪ 17 T0 [(1‬האונס[ ההכרח‪ ‖ CB :‬אנכסגוריש[ אנכסאגריש‪ | C :‬אנכשגוריש‪M :‬‬ ‫‪ 18‬ההתחלה‪ + [CB :‬הראשונה‪ ‖ AML :‬הוא[ היא‪ ‖ C :‬שהוא[ הוא‪ 19 C :‬שיבאר‪ [CB :‬שנשאל‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ AML‬מהסבה[ מה הסבה‪ ‖ C1 :‬בעבורה[ בגללה‪M :‬‬

‫‪1075b8–10‬‬

‫‪315‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫נפשו הוא הדבר הראשון והוא זולת המניע כי הוא בלתי אפשר שתהיה הנעתו‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫‪ 1075b10‬בסבה כי אם על הצד אשר אמרנוהו אנחנו כי הרפואה גם כן התחלה מניעה אבל‬ ‫כי הנעתה תהיה כאשר יצריכהו אל זה הבריאות והבריאות גם כן רפואת מה הנה לא‬ ‫ימנע אם כן מונע משיהיה הראשון יניע ותהיה הנעתו בסבתו בעצמותו כאשר יחיבוהו‬ ‫‪ 1075b10–11‬התנאים אשר אמרנו אותם והסבה בכל אחד מאלו השנים אחת ויותר מגונה מזה מאמר‬ ‫אנכסגוריש חשבו‬ ‫כי התחלת הטוב והרע התחלה אחת בעינה עם היותו חושב כי השכל הוא ההתחלה‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫המניעה ויהיה ההיולי שומע מתרצה לשכל ומאין בא הרע אבל שיאמר אומר כי‬ ‫‪ 1075b11–13‬הרע בא מחולשת ההיולי ומן ההעדר אשר אמרנוהו אנחנו וכל מי שיאמר כי ההתחלות‬ ‫מתהפכות כמו הספוגות והקושי והקבוץ והפרוד לא יהיה אפשר לו שיעשה ההפכים‬ ‫למה שיראה מיושר המניע וסדרו וזה כי אתה לא תמצא דבר מן החמרים יספיק לו‬ ‫בהוית מה שיתילד מהם אבל הם צריכים אל סבה תניע אותם ותסדרם ותציירם‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫והיותר מכואר‬

‫‪1075b13–14‬‬

‫‪ L‬לג מכל מה שהתבאר בו מן המאמרים הקודמים בטבעיות מאמר מי ששם כל הדברים‬

‫‪ 20‬הוא)‪ [(1‬והוא‪ ‖ AM :‬הראשון…שתהיה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬זולת[ זולתי‪ ‖ M :‬הנעתו‪ [CBT :‬תנועתו‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 21‬על…הרפואה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הצד[ צד‪ ‖ L :‬גם כן[ ‪ +‬היא‪ | C :‬ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬מניעה[ מניע‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪AML‬‬

‫‪ 22‬הנעתה…זה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הנעתה‪ [CBL :‬התחלתה‪ | A :‬ההתחלה‪ ‖ M :‬יצריכהו[ יצרכהו‪ ‖ B :‬זה[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬רפואת‪ [AMT :‬רפואות‪ | C :‬רפואה‪ ‖ BL :‬מה[ מזה‪B :‬‬ ‫‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 23–22‬לא…משיהיה[‬

‫‪ 23‬אם כן[ א״כ‪ ‖ BM :‬ותהיה[ ויהיה‪ | CT :‬ושיהיה‪ ‖ B :‬כאשר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬יחיבוהו‪ [ML :‬יחייבהו‪:‬‬

‫‪ | CB‬יחיֻבהו)!(‪ | A :‬יחייבוהו‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 24‬אשר[ ‪ +‬אשר‪ ‖ C :‬אחת[ לית‪ ‖ AML :‬מאלו השנים‪[BT :‬‬

‫משנים אלו‪ | C :‬אלו השנים‪ ‖ AML :‬ויותר[ והיותר‪ ‖ B :‬מאמר‪ [MT :‬ממאמר‪ | C :‬לית‪ | AL :‬המאמר‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬אנכסגוריש‪ [CT :‬אנכסאגורש‪ + | AL :‬אותם‪ | B :‬אנכשגוריש‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 25‬התחלה[ התחלתה‪| B :‬‬

‫התחלת‪ ‖ C :‬היותו[ היות‪ ‖ C :‬חושב‪ [AML :‬לית‪ | CB :‬מודה‪ ‖ T :‬כי[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬ההתחלה[ התחלה‪:‬‬ ‫‪(C1⇄) C‬‬

‫‪ 26‬המניעה[ לית‪ | B :‬המניע‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬ויהיה[ והיה‪ | TB :‬והיות‪ ‖ C :‬ההיולי[ החומר‪‖ C :‬‬

‫שומע[ שומעת‪ ‖ C :‬מתרצה[ ומתרצה‪ ‖ BL :‬הרע[ יודע‪A :‬‬

‫‪ 27‬בא מחולשת[ כח משולשת)!(‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ M‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ ‖ C :‬ההעדר[ העדר‪ ‖ C :‬אנחנו[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬וכל מי[ ומי‪ ‖ T :‬שיאמר[ שאמר‪:‬‬ ‫‪AT‬‬

‫‪ 28‬והקבוץ[ והקיבוץ‪ ‖ B :‬והפרוד[ והפירוד‪CBM :‬‬

‫‪ 29‬למה[ ומה‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬וסדרו[ וסדר‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C‬כי אתה[ שאתה‪ ‖ B :‬החמרים[ החומרים‪ ‖ C :‬יספיק לו[ יסתפק‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 30‬הם צריכים[‬

‫הם מצריכים‪ :C1) C :‬סא אבל יצטרך( ‖ תניע[ יניע‪ ‖ C :‬אותם[ אותה‪ ‖ C :‬ותסדרם‪ [MT :‬ויסדרם‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | CB‬לית‪ ‖ AL :‬ותציירם[ ויצירם‪ | C :‬ושיצירם‪ ‖ B :‬מכואר‪ [B(?)T :‬מבואר‪CAML :‬‬

‫‪1‬‬

‫‪316‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪2‬‬

‫המקבלים להפסד ואשר לא יקבלוהו והמתהוים מהם ואשר אין הויה להם מן היסודות‬ ‫בעינם וזה שאנחנו כבר הבדלנו התחלות הגשמים השמימיים ולא ישתתפו עמהם‬ ‫הגשמים אשר סביב הארץ בהיולי אחד כי הכוכבים ותנועותיהם סבות פועלות מניעות‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫להיולי אשר תתחדש בו ההויה וכל שכן הכוכבים הנבוכים והשמש והירח כי הנה‬ ‫ראוי באלו‬ ‫אם שלא יאמר שיש להם היולי כלל ואם שיאמר כי ההיולי אשר להם זולת ההיולי‬ ‫אשר לדברים המקבלים ההויה וההפסד כמו שהשכל גם כן המניע לגוף אין ההיולי‬ ‫אשר לו ההיולי אשר לגוף ולא נמצא גם כן הקודמים תארו בעלה אשר בעבורה לא‬

‫‪1075b16–17‬‬

‫יפסקו ההויה וההפסד כמו שעשינו אנחנו בציירנו הסבה בזה קורבת הגשמים השמימיים‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫ורחקם וציירנו בעלה המתמדת המתחלפת תלויה בעלת המתמדת בענין אחד בעינו‬ ‫והנה נמצא רבים מן הקודמים עברו הדברים המושכלים והנודעים אצל כל האנשים‬

‫‪1075b14–16‬‬

‫בציירם ההויה אם ממה שאינו נמצא כלל ואם ממה שהוא נמצא בפועל וזה כי הדברים‬ ‫אשר לא יתחלקו אשר אמר בהם אנכסגוריש והיסודות אשר אמר בהם אנדקליס יחייב‬ ‫הוית הדברים הנמצאים ממה שהוא נמצא בפועל וזה מגונה נמאס ומן המגונה גם כן‬

‫‪ 2‬המקבלים[ המקבילים‪ ‖ B :‬יקבלוהו[ יקבלהו‪ ‖ B :‬והמתהוים[ והמתאוים‪ | C :‬המתהוים‪ ‖ B :‬אין[‬ ‫‪ +‬לו‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬היסודות[ יסודות‪ + | MT :‬אחדים‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 3‬וזה[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬שאנחנו‪+ [CBT :‬‬

‫בו‪ ‖ AML :‬הבדלנו[ הכרנו‪ | CR2 :‬קבלנו‪ ‖ BR :‬ולא‪ [CBT :‬לא‪AML :‬‬ ‫כי[ מן‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 4‬בהיולי[ בחומר‪‖ C :‬‬

‫‪ 5‬להיולי[ לחומר‪ ‖ C :‬תתחדש[ יתחדש‪ ‖ CBT :‬ההויה[ הויה‪ ‖ AM :‬וכל שכן[ וכ״ש‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ BM‬כי[ לית‪ ‖ CB :‬הנה[ והנה‪ ‖ C :‬באלו‪ [CBT :‬לית‪AML :‬‬

‫‪ 6‬אם[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬היולי[‬

‫חומר‪ ‖ C :‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ ‖ C :‬זולת[ זולתי‪ ‖ C :‬ההיולי‪ [B :‬החומר‪ | ACTL :‬החמר‪M :‬‬ ‫להויה‪ ‖ T0 | CB :‬וההפסד[ ולהפסד‪ ‖ CB :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬המניע[ מניע‪M :‬‬ ‫‪(C1⇄) C‬‬

‫‪ 7‬ההיולי[ החומר‪C1 :‬‬

‫‪ 7‬ההויה[‬

‫‪ 8–7‬אין…אשר[ לית‪:‬‬

‫‪ 8‬לו ההיולי[ ‪ ‖ T0‬ההיולי[ לית‪ | B :‬החומר‪ ‖ C1 :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ B‬בעלה[ הסבה‪ ‖ C :‬בעבורה‪ [CT :‬בגללה‪ABML :‬‬

‫‪ 9–8‬לא…ההויה[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 9‬יפסקו[ יפסק‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ C‬בציירנו[ בצירנו‪ ‖ B :‬הסבה[ התנועה והסבה‪ ‖ C1 :‬קורבת הגשמים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הגשמים[ הגרמים‪:‬‬ ‫‪CB‬‬

‫‪ 10‬וציירנו[ וצירם‪ ‖ B :‬בעלה[ הסבה‪ ‖ CT :‬המתמדת)‪ [(1‬לית‪ ‖ T :‬המתחלפת…המתמדת[‬

‫לית‪ ‖ AM :‬בעלת המתמדת[ ‪ ‖ T0‬בעלת‪ [BL :‬בסבת‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬עברו הדברים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הדברים[ דברים‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ M‬והנודעים[ הנודעים‪ ‖ CM :‬האנשים[ אנשם)!(‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫בפועל[ בפעל‪AT :‬‬

‫‪ 13–12‬כי…לא[ ‪T0‬‬

‫‪ 12‬אם…שאינו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬אם[ או‪‖ C :‬‬

‫‪ 13‬אשר)‪ + [(2‬לא‪ ‖ T :‬אמר[ יאמר‪ ‖ T :‬אנכסגוריש[‬

‫אנכסאגורש‪ | C :‬אנכשאגורש‪ ‖ M :‬אשר)‪…(3‬אנדקליס[ ‪ ‖ T0‬אנדקליס[ אנקקליס)!(‪| (C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫אמפדוקליס‪ ‖ B :‬יחייב[ יתחייב‪MT :‬‬

‫‪ 14‬הוית[ לית‪ | A :‬הויית‪ ‖ T :‬שהוא…מגונה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬נמצא[‬

‫לית‪ ‖ C :‬ומן[ מן‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪B :‬‬

‫‪1075b17–18‬‬

‫‪317‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫והנמאס מאמר מי שיחשוב כי ההתחלות רבות אם היו שלשה ואם היו ארבעה ואם היו‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫שנים וזה כי לאומר שיאמר איך אפשר שיסכימו כלם ולמה היו ההתחלות במספר‬ ‫ההוא לבד לא בזולתו ואם היה קצתם פועל וקצתם מתפעל מה הדבר אשר קבצם‬ ‫וחבר קצתם עם קצתם והסכים ביניהם כי הוא ראוי בהכרח שיאמר כי בכאן התחלה‬ ‫אחרת יותר נכבדת מהם ואם היו שנים לבד כמו האל וההיולי והקושי והספוגות וזה‬ ‫שהוא בלתי אפשר שיאמר כי שני אלו נתקבצו מצד נפשם והסכימו שיעשה אחד מהם‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫בחברו ויקבל האחר השנוי ואולם אנחנו מפני שכבר הנחנו התחלה אחת לא יתערב‬ ‫בה ההיולי ואינה בעל גשם כאשר הניעה על צד הנעת החשוק והאהוב היתה‬ ‫הנעתה לגרמים השמימיים ולמדנו כי ההויה וההפסד בתנועת אלו הגשמים התחייב‬ ‫שיהיה מאמרנו בטוח מזה הספק וזה כי אנחנו לא נשים ההיולי שוה במעלה והקדימה‬ ‫לסבה הראשונה ולא חברנו הטבע האחרון אל הטבע הראשון פתאום אבל שמנו ההיולי‬ ‫בדרך הנמשך ושמנו הגשמים השמימיים יתנועעו בסבת העלה הראשונה וההדמות בה‬ ‫ושמנו המקום אשר סביב הארץ המקום האמצעי בהכרח וזה שהוא בלתי אפשר במה‬

‫‪ 15‬והנמאס[ ונמאס‪ | M :‬הנמאס‪ ‖ (C1⇄) CT :‬מאמר…ההתחלות[ ‪ ‖ T0‬אם[ ואם‪ ‖ B :‬ואם היו)‪[(1‬‬ ‫‪ 16‬וזה…אפשר[ ‪ ‖ T0‬לאומר[ המאמר‪:‬‬

‫או‪ | M :‬לית‪ ‖ T :‬ארבעה[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬ואם היו)‪ [(2‬או‪M :‬‬ ‫‪ 17–16‬במספר…בזולתו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬במספר ההוא[ בזה‬ ‫‪ ‖ C‬שיאמר[ יאמר‪ ‖ C :‬כלם[ כולם‪BL :‬‬ ‫המספר‪ 17 CB :‬לבד[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬היה[ היו‪ ‖ C :‬פועל[ פועלים‪ ‖ C :‬מתפעל[ מתפעלים‪–17 C :‬‬ ‫‪ 18‬הדבר…עם[ ‪ 17 T0‬הדבר[ תדבר‪ | C :‬הוא‪ ‖ B :‬קבצם[ חברם‪ 18 AL :‬וחבר[ וקבץ‪ ‖ AL :‬עם‬ ‫קצתם[ עם קצת‪ | C :‬עמם‪ ‖ B :‬והסכים[ והפכים‪ ‖ C :‬הוא[ הנה‪ ‖ C :‬ראוי[ יתחייב‪ | C :‬לית‪–18 M :‬‬ ‫‪ 19‬שיאמר…אחרת[ ‪ 18 T0‬בכאן[ הנה‪ +| C :‬יש‪ ‖ B :‬התחלה[ ההתחלה‪ 19 C :‬כמו…והספוגות[‬ ‫‪ ‖ T0‬וההיולי[ והחומר‪ ‖ C :‬והקושי[ וההתעבות‪ 20 C :‬שיאמר[ ‪ +‬בו‪ ‖ C :‬שני…נפשם[ ‪‖ T0‬‬ ‫נתקבצו[ התקבצו‪ 21 CB :‬ויקבל…אנחנו[ ‪ ‖ T0‬האחר[ האחד‪ ‖ C :‬אנחנו[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬מפני[ בעבור‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C‬התחלה[ ההתחלה‪ 22–21 B :‬אחת…גשם[ ‪ 21 T0‬אחת[ אחרת‪ 22 AM :‬בה[ ‪ +‬דבר מן‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ AL‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ ‖ C :‬ואינה[ ואינו‪ ‖ CB :‬הניעה[ הניע‪ 23–22 CBT :‬והאהוב…השמימיים[‬ ‫‪ 22 T0‬היתה[ היה‪ 23 C :‬הנעתה[ הנעתו‪ ‖ C :‬ולמדנו[ וידענו‪ 24–23 C :‬בתנועת…שיהיה[ ‪T0‬‬ ‫‪ 24‬הספק[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬וזה[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ + | C :‬הנמשך שהוא‪ 25 C1 :‬האחרון[‬ ‫הראשון‪ ‖ M :‬הטבע)‪ [(2‬טבע‪ ‖ T :‬הראשון[ לית‪ :C1) C :‬האחרון( | האחרון‪ ‖ M :‬פתאום[ פתאם‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ 26 CB :‬בדרך[ דרך‪ | B :‬לית‪ ‖ C :‬הנמשך…יתנועעו[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הנמשך[‬ ‫המשך‪ ‖ B :‬הגשמים[ הגרמים‪ ‖ CM :‬וההדמות[ והתדמות‪ | M :‬והדמות‪ 27 L :‬המקום)‪ [(1‬מקום‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ C‬אשר[ לית‪ ‖ CB :‬וזה שהוא[ ושהוא‪ 28–27 A :‬במה…אפשר[ לית‪M :‬‬

‫‪25‬‬

‫‪318‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪28‬‬

‫שיסובב בסבוב שלא יהיה לו דבר כמו הארץ נח בטבע ומפני שהיה בלתי אפשר‬ ‫בדברים אשר באמצע העולם שיתקיימו תמיד במספר אחד כלה האל העולם והשלימו‬

‫‪30‬‬

‫על הצד האחד בששם ההויה תמיד כדי שיהיה ההיולי בדרך הנמשך לעלה הראשונה‬ ‫ואמנם‬ ‫לא יסתור זה המאמר מי ששם ההתחלות רבות בעלות גשמים לבד ולא מי ששם אותם‬ ‫גם כן האל וההיולי אבל מי ששם גם כן הצורות התחלות הדברים וזה כי הצורות גם‬

‫‪1075b18–20‬‬

‫כן יצטרכו אל התחלה אחרת יותר נכבדת מהם היא המהוה להם המחברת קצתם עם‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫קצתם ועם הדברים המקבלים להויה ולהפסד ויתחייב בהכרח על מי שאמר אלו‬

‫‪ L‬לד‬

‫הדעות וכל שכן אשר שמו הדברים מתהפכים שישימו להם התחלה אחרת תנגד אותם‬ ‫וזה כי ההפכים מתנגדים החום לקור והעב לספוגי והקבוץ לפרוד ואמנם נמלט מזאת‬

‫‪1075b21–22‬‬

‫הסתירה מאמרנו לבד וזה כי אנחנו לא נשים לעלה הראשונה דבר יתהפך לה כי כל‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫הדברים המתהפכים יתערב בהם ההיולי והם בכח דברים אחדים בעינם כי קצתם ישוב‬ ‫אל קצתם ואין אמנם ישיג מאמר מי ששם העלה הראשונה הפך אלו גנאי לבד כי‬ ‫היה בלתי משים אותה התחלה ראשונה אבל הוא משים עמה התחלה אחרת שוה לה‬

‫‪ 28‬יהיה[ היה‪ ‖ C :‬לו[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬דבר[ ‪ +‬אצלו‪ ‖ B :‬כמו[ אצל‪ ‖ C :‬נח[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 29‬ומפני[ בעבור‪:‬‬

‫‪ :C1) C‬ובעבור( | מפני‪ ‖ T :‬שיתקיימו[ לא יתקיים‪ :C1) C :‬להתקיים( | שיתקימו‪ ‖ M :‬אחד[ האחד‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 30‬הצד[ צד‪ ‖ B :‬בששם[ וששם‪ | A :‬ושם‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ A‬כלה[ כל‪ ‖ B :‬האל[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬והשלימו[ לית‪B :‬‬

‫‪ ‖ L‬תמיד[ תמידות‪ :C1) C :‬תמידית( ‖ כדי[ בדרך‪ | A :‬דרך‪ ‖ L :‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ ‖ C :‬בדרך[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪AL‬‬

‫‪ 31‬יסתור[ יסתיר‪ ‖ C :‬בעלות[ בעלי‪ | C :‬פעלות‪ ‖ B :‬אותם[ אחד‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 32‬גם כן)‪ [(1‬ג״כ‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ B‬וההיולי[ והחומר‪ ‖ C :‬גם כן)‪ [(2‬לית‪ | CT :‬ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬הצורות התחלות הדברים‪ | B :‬הצורות גם כן‬ ‫התחלות הדברים‪ | CT :‬התחלות הדברים הצורות‪ ‖ AML :‬וזה[ והם‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הצורות)‪ [(2‬צורות‪:‬‬ ‫‪(C1⇄) C‬‬

‫‪ 33–32‬גם כן[ ג״כ ‪ +‬הנה‪ + | B :‬הנה‪T :‬‬

‫המחברת[ המחבר‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 33‬אחרת[ אחת‪ ‖ B :‬היא[ הוא‪ | C :‬והוא‪‖ B :‬‬

‫‪ 1‬קצתם[ קצת‪ ‖ CB :‬ועם‪ [CAL :‬עם‪ ‖ BMT :‬המקבלים[ המקבילים‪‖ B :‬‬

‫מי[ מה‪ ‖ T :‬שאמר[ שיאמר‪ ‖ BM :‬אלו[ באלו‪CB :‬‬ ‫מתהפכים[ מתחדשים‪ | B :‬המתהפכים‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 2‬וכל שכן[ וכ״ש‪ ‖ BM :‬שמו[ כמו‪‖ M :‬‬

‫‪ 3‬וזה[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬החום‪ [CBM :‬החם‪ ‖ ATL :‬לקור[‬

‫לקר‪ ‖ AT :‬לפרוד‪ [CAT :‬לפרוד‪ ‖ BML :‬נמלט[ יראה‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 4‬מאמרנו[ ממאמרנו‪ ‖ B :‬לבד‪[B :‬‬

‫בלבד‪ ‖ CAMTL :‬לא[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬נשים[ נאמר‪ ‖ B :‬לעלה[ ‪ +‬הקבוץ‪ ‖ B :‬לה[ לו‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 5‬ההיולי[‬

‫החומר‪ ‖ C :‬והם[ וזה‪ ‖ B :‬דברים[ הדברים‪ | C :‬הפכים‪ ‖ R2 :‬אחדים[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) CB :‬בעינם[‬ ‫לית‪BT :‬‬

‫‪ 6‬קצתם[ קצת‪ ‖ CT :‬מאמר[ מאמרים‪ ‖ B :‬אלו[ ‪ +‬זהו‪ | B :‬לית‪ ‖ T :‬גנאי[ הגנאי ‪+‬‬

‫הזה‪ ‖ T :‬לבד[ בלבד‪B :‬‬ ‫הראשונה‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 7‬היה[ היא‪ ‖ C :‬בלתי…משים)‪ [(2‬לית‪ ‖ T :‬התחלה ראשונה[ ההתחלה‬

‫‪1075b20–21‬‬

‫‪319‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫במעלה והקדימה אבל הנה יתחייב ממנו גם כן שתהיה הידיעה אשר תכונה בחכמה‬

‫‪8‬‬

‫לה חכמה‬ ‫אחרת מתהפכת והיא ידיעת הדברים המתהפכים להם וכמו שהחום הפך הקור‬ ‫כן גם כן חוש‬ ‫‪ 1075b23–25‬החום הפך לחוש הקור כי היו צורות המוחשים יחתמו בחושים ואמנם יתחייב שנשים‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫‪ 1075b25–27‬הפך הידיעה הסכלות ואולם ידיעה אחרת לא ובכלל הנה ראוי שנדע כי האדם‬ ‫אם לא יניח‬ ‫חוץ מן המוחשים עצם אחר יותר נעלה מן החוש לא יהיה אפשר לו שימצא התחלה‬ ‫ראשונה וזה כי כל המוחשים מורכבים ואי אפשר לו גם כן שיעמוד על יושר וסדר ולא‬ ‫על הויה ולא שהתלות תנועות הגשמים השמימיים בהתחלה מחויב אבל אי זו התחלה‬ ‫גשמית שהניח הנה יתחייב לו שתהיה לה התחלה אחרת כמו שהתחייב למי שאמר‬ ‫מהמדברים בדברים האלוהיים כי הדברים הנמצאים נולדו מן הבוהו וזה שהוא יתחייב‬ ‫עליהם שיבקשו במציאות הבהו וכן גם כן יתחייב על מי שאמר מבעלי הטבעים כי‬ ‫חדוש הדברים מן המים ומן האויר והאויר והמים גשמים מורכבים לא פשוטים בתכלית‬

‫‪ 8‬אבל[ ‪ +‬בזה‪ | B :‬לית‪ ‖ M :‬הנה[ והנה‪ ‖ M :‬יתחייב[ התחיב‪ ‖ M :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬תכונה‪[ATL :‬‬ ‫הויתה)?(‪ | C :‬תכונתה‪ | B :‬הכונה‪ ‖ M :‬לה[ לית‪ ‖ AL :‬חכמה[ בחכמה‪ | C :‬לית‪AL :‬‬

‫‪ 9‬אחרת[‬

‫‪ +‬ידיעה‪ ‖ C1 :‬וכמו[ כמו‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הקור[ הקר‪ ‖ A :‬כן גם כן‪ [T :‬גם כן‪ | C :‬כן‪ | AML :‬כן ג״כ‪:‬‬

‫‪ 10 B‬החום[ החם‪ ‖ CA :‬הקור[ הקר‪ + | A :‬וחוש המתוק הפך חוש המר וחוש הלובן הפך חוש‬ ‫השחור‪ ‖ C1 :‬היו צורות[ ‪ ‖ T0‬יחתמו[ יתחממו‪ | B :‬יתחמו‪ 11 M :‬הפך…לא)‪ ‖ C corr. [(1‬לא)‪[(1‬‬ ‫לית‪ ‖ B :‬ובכלל[ תכלול‪ ‖ AM :‬הנה[ כי‪ ‖ B :‬שנדע‪ [CAM :‬לית‪ | BL :‬שתדע‪ 12 T :‬חוץ[ חוש‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C‬אחר…החוש[ ‪ ‖ C corr.‬התחלה[ ההתחלה‪ 13 BT :‬ראשונה‪ [AL :‬הראשונה‪CBMT :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ ‖ (C1‬מורכבים[ מרכבים‪ ‖ AL :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬שיעמוד[ משיעמוד‪ ‖ B :‬על יושר[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬ ‫‪ 14‬הויה[ ההויה‪ ‖ AM :‬שהתלות‪ [T :‬על שיתלו‪ [BL :‬שההתחלות‪ | A :‬שההתלות‪ ‖ M :‬תנועות[‬ ‫תנועת‪ ‖ C :‬הגשמים[ ‪ +‬כי‪ ‖ B :‬השמימיים[ השמימים‪ ‖ C :‬בהתחלה[ ‪ +‬הוא‪ ‖ B :‬מחויב[ מחוייב‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | BT‬מחוייבת‪ ‖ C :‬אי זו‪ [CA :‬איזה‪ | B :‬איזו‪ | ML :‬אי זה‪ ‖ T :‬התחלה[ ההתחלה‪ 15 M :‬שהניח[‬ ‫הניח‪ ‖ C :‬הנה[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬יתחייב[ התחייב‪ ‖ M :‬לו[ לית‪ ‖ T :‬לה[ לו‪ | CB :‬לית‪ ‖ M :‬שהתחייב[‬ ‫שיתחיב‪ ‖ AL :‬למי[ מי ‪ +‬מן‪ | C :‬מי‪ 16 B :‬מהמדברים[ המדברים‪ | C :‬מהדברים‪ ‖ B :‬האלוהיים[‬ ‫האלהיים‪ ‖ MT :‬נולדו‪ [CBT :‬נולדים‪ | AL :‬יולדו‪ ‖ M :‬מן[ מה‪ ‖ C :‬הבוהו[ הבהו‪ | AT :‬בוהו‪C :‬‬ ‫‪ 17‬שיבקשו[ ‪ +‬עלה‪ ‖ C1 :‬הבהו[ התוהו‪ | B :‬הבוהו‪ ‖ M :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬יתחייב[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬הטבעים[‬ ‫הטבעיים‪ 18 C :‬ומן האויר‪ [CBT :‬והאויר‪AML :‬‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬

‫‪320‬‬

‫‪19‬‬

‫ואם שם אחד חוץ מן המוחשים והגשמים התחלה אחרת לא יתערב בה ההיולי מושכלת‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫ושם אותם המספרים והצורות נטה במאמרו אל שיניח התחלות בטלות אין פועל להם‬

‫‪1075b27–28‬‬

‫וזה כי הצורות אמנם הם דמיונות ולא נמצא הברזל יתנועע אל הדמיון ולא האבן מבלתי‬ ‫שיניעהו האומנות ויתחייב מזה שתהיה בכאן גם כן סתירה אחרת למי ששם ההתחלות‬

‫‪1075b28–30‬‬

‫מספרים וזה שהוא מתחייב שיהיה הגודל מתחדש ממה שאין גודל לו והדבק מן‬ ‫הנפרד ולא תספיק לו העמידה על העלה המניעה לבד אבל יצטרך גם כן אל העמידה‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫על העלה אשר תתן הצורה ולא יחשבו שהיא היא המחדשת לצורה וזה שלא יוכל‬ ‫הטבע הנחלק שיחדש צורת הטבע המתדבק ומינו ובכלל הנה ציור ההתחלות‬

‫‪1075b30–32‬‬

‫הפכים אינו‬ ‫ראוי כי ההפך באי זה מן המקומות היה שם מה שהוא בכח הנה הפעל מתאחר נמשך‬

‫‪1075b32–33‬‬

‫אחריו ויתחייב אם כן שלא יהיו הדברים הנמצאים נצחיים נשארים כמו שבארנו פעמים‬

‫‪1075b33–34‬‬

‫רבות ויתחייב אם כן שידחה ההפך מן ההתחלות וכבר אמרנו מאמר מספיק בדחייתם‬ ‫‪30‬‬ ‫‪1‬‬

‫ומאי זה מן המקומות ראוי שנכוין אל זה והספק הכולל המתנגד לכלם וכל שכן למי‬ ‫ששם הרבוי בהתחלות זה הוא אומר שהוא ראוי שנחקור מן האחד מאין בא ממנו הרבוי‬

‫‪ 19‬חוץ[ לית‪ ‖ B :‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ ‖ CB :‬מושכלת[ מושכל‪CB :‬‬ ‫במאמרם‪ ‖ B :‬פועל[ פעל‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 20‬אותם[ אותו‪ ‖ T :‬במאמרו[‬

‫‪ 21‬הם[ לית‪ ‖ L :‬דמיונות[ דמיונים‪ ‖ AL :‬יתנועע[ יתנועעו‪M :‬‬

‫‪ 22‬שיניעהו[ שיניעה‪ ‖ AM :‬מזה[ ‪ ‖ T0‬בכאן[ הנה‪ ‖ T0 | C :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬ההתחלות[ התחלות‪:‬‬

‫‪ 23 (C1⇄) C‬מספרים[ המספרים‪ ‖ C :‬וזה שהוא מתחייב‪ [AML :‬לית‪ + | CB :‬למי ששם ההתחלות‬ ‫מספרים‪ ‖ T :‬מתחדש[ יתחדש‪ ‖ CT :‬שאין[ ‪ ‖ T0‬גודל לו‪ [BT :‬גודל‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬לו גדול‪‖ AML :‬‬ ‫והדבק[ והמתדבק‪ 24 T :‬הנפרד[ הנפסד‪ | B :‬המפוזר‪ ‖ T :‬תספיק[ יספיק‪ | C :‬הספיק‪–24 BT :‬‬ ‫‪ 25‬המניעה…העלה[ לית‪ 24 B :‬העלה[ הסבה‪ ‖ CT :‬יצטרך גם כן‪ [CT :‬גם כן צריך‪ [ABL :‬צריך‬ ‫גם כן‪ 25 M :‬על[ אל‪ ‖ AT :‬הצורה[ לית‪ ‖ T0 | (C1⇄) C :‬המחדשת[ המתחדשת‪ | B :‬מתחדשת‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 26 M‬הנחלק[ המפוזר‪ ‖ T :‬שיחדש[ שיתחדש‪ ‖ B :‬צורת[ הצורות‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬הטבע[ לית‪‖ C :‬‬ ‫המתדבק[ הנדבק‪ ‖ CB :‬ומינו‪ [CBT :‬לית‪ ‖ AML :‬הפכים[ ‪ ‖ T0‬אינו[ אלו‪ 27 B :‬מן המקומות[‬ ‫מקום‪* ‖ C :‬שם[ הנה‪ | CAL :‬הנה ‪ +‬שם‪ | BM :‬הנה ‪ +‬שמה‪ ‖ T :‬בכח[ ‪ ‖ T0‬הנה[ לית‪ ‖ CT :‬הפעל[‬ ‫בפעל על‪ | C :‬הפועל‪ | BM :‬והפעל‪ ‖ T :‬מתאחר[ מתאחד‪ ‖ M :‬נמשך[ ונמשך‪ 28 T :‬אחריו[ אליו‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ CB‬אם כן[ א״כ‪ ‖ BM :‬נצחיים[ נצחים‪ ‖ C :‬שבארנו[ שביארנו‪ 29 B :‬אם כן[ לית‪ | C :‬א״כ‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ BM‬שידחה[ שיראה‪ | C :‬שיסולק‪ ‖ T :‬ההפך[ ההפכות‪ ‖ T :‬וכבר[ לית‪ 30 AM :‬ומאי זה[ ‪+‬‬ ‫מקום‪ | B :‬ומאיזה‪ ‖ M :‬שנכוין[ שנכוון‪ ‖ M :‬והספק[ הספק‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬לכלם[ לכללם‪ | C :‬לכולם‪:‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬וכל שכן[ וכ״ש‪ 1 BM :‬הרבוי[ הריבוי‪ ‖ B :‬בהתחלות[ ההתחלות‪ ‖ C :‬הוא[ שהוא‪‖ M :‬‬ ‫אומר[ אמר‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬שהוא[ הנה‪ ‖ C :‬מן האחד[ לית‪(C1⇄) C :‬‬

‫‪ L‬לה‬ ‫‪1075b34–37‬‬

‫‪321‬‬

‫‪Parallel Hebrew/Arabic Edition‬‬

‫וזה נמצא הרבה במספרים כי צורת השלשה אמנם התחדשה מן האחד וכן הארבעה‬

‫‪2‬‬

‫והעשרה והגעת המספרים מה שתהיה אמנם תמצא ברבוים צורת האחד וכן גם כן‬ ‫הנפש והגוף שהוא אם לא תהיה ההתחלה לשניהם אחת לא יהיה לאחד מעשה ולא‬ ‫היה אפשר שיתחדש מהם יחד חי אחד ובכלל הנה הוא בלתי אפשר בצורה והיולי‬

‫‪5‬‬

‫שיתחברו יחד ויתחדש האחד צמח היה או חי מבלתי שיהיה האחד התחלה‬ ‫בתחלת הענין הנפרד ביחודו לא הרבוי ולא נמצא אחד מן הקודמים דבר בדבר מזה‬ ‫ואי אפשר גם כן לפי מחשבתי שיאמר בזה אלא כמו שאמרנו מהיות הטבע הראשון‬ ‫המניע נקי מזוקק אין חלקים לו ולא יתערב בו ההיולי ולא יתחלק אחד באמת יניע‬ ‫כל הדברים על יושר וסדר ותנועה אין הפסק לה ולא כליון החלד כלו וכונתם אל‬

‫‪10‬‬

‫האחד ההוא וישרם ממנו ואחדותו שם העולם אחד וכל אחד מבעלי חיים אשר בו‬ ‫אחד ושם אותו עם אחדותו גם כן נמצא וזה כי התכלית בכל אחד מן הדברים אמנם‬ ‫–‪ 1075b37‬הוא לפי מה שעליו האחד לבד ואולם אשר שמו ההתחלה הראשונה המספר הלמודי‬ ‫‪1076a3‬‬ ‫ואחר כן חברו ממנו השטח ומן השטח הגשם הנה התחלות הדברים הנמצאים במאמרם‬ ‫נכנסות לא יכנס בקצתם שנוי מקצתם ולא יתחבר קצתם בקצתם ומי שעשה זה שם עצם‬ ‫‪ 2‬במספרים[ במספרם‪ | (C1⇄) C :‬מספרים‪ ‖ T :‬השלשה[ שלשה‪ ‖ C :‬התחדשה[ תתחדש‪‖ CT :‬‬ ‫וכן[ וכזה‪T :‬‬

‫‪ 3‬שתהיה[ שהיה‪ ‖ C :‬תמצא[ יחזיק‪ ‖ C :‬ברבוים‪ [ML :‬לית‪ | C :‬ברביום‪ | A :‬ברבויים‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 4‬שהוא אם[ הנה‪ ‖ C :‬ההתחלה[ ‪ +‬בתחלת‪:‬‬

‫‪ | B‬רבויים‪ ‖ T :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬האחד[ לית‪A :‬‬

‫‪ ‖ A‬לשניהם[ להם‪ ‖ C :‬לא)‪ [(2‬ולא‪ ‖ C1 :‬יהיה[ תהיה‪B :‬‬ ‫יחד[ יחיד‪ ‖ B :‬וההיולי‪ [T :‬והחומר‪ | CB :‬והיולי‪AML :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ M‬שיהיה[ ‪ +‬זה‪ ‖ T :‬התחלה[ ההתחלה‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 5‬היה[ יהיה‪ ‖ C :‬מהם[ משניהם‪‖ T :‬‬ ‫‪ 6‬ויתחדש‪ [ATL :‬ויחדשו‪ | CB :‬ויתחדשו‪:‬‬

‫‪ 7‬בתחלת[ בהתחלת‪ ‖ BC1L :‬הנפרד[ נפרד‪‖ T :‬‬

‫ביחודו[ ביסודו‪ ‖ T :‬הרבוי[ הריבוי‪ ‖ BL :‬דבר[ שדבר‪ ‖ B :‬מזה[ לית‪ :C1) C :‬בזה(‬

‫‪ 8‬ואי[ לית‪C :‬‬

‫)‪ :C1‬אי( | אי‪ ‖ M :‬אפשר[ ואפשר‪ ‖ C :‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬כן[ לית‪ ‖ A :‬לפי[ במה‪ ‖ C :‬מחשבתי‪[AL :‬‬ ‫שאחשוב‪ | C :‬אמרם דעתי‪ | B :‬שחשבתי‪ | M :‬אומר דעתי‪ ‖ T :‬שיאמר[ שאמר‪ :C1) C :‬שנאמר( ‖‬ ‫אלא[ לא‪ ‖ C :‬מהיות[ כי‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 9‬אין[ ‪ +‬לו‪ ‖ ABL :‬ההיולי[ החומר‪ ‖ C :‬יתחלק[ ‪ +‬אבל הוא‪‖ T :‬‬

‫אחד[ האחד‪ + | B :‬מהם‪ + ) C :‬אחד‪ ‖ (C1 :‬באמת[ האמת והוא‪B :‬‬ ‫‪ | AM‬בכונתם‪ ‖ T :‬אל[ אבל ‪ +‬אותו‪ + | C :‬אותו‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 11‬ההוא[ לית‪ ‖ C :‬וישרם[ בישרם‪ ‖ A :‬אחד[‬

‫האחד‪ ‖ T :‬וכל אחד[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬מבעלי חיים[ מב״ח‪M :‬‬ ‫נמשך אליו( ‖ מן הדברים[ מהדברים‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 10‬וכונתם‪ [CBL :‬ובכונתם‪:‬‬

‫‪ 12‬גם כן[ ג״כ‪ ‖ B :‬נמצא[ לית‪:C1) C :‬‬

‫‪ 13‬הוא[ לית‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬לפי מה[ למה‪ ‖ M :‬לבד[ בלבד‪:‬‬

‫‪ ‖ B‬ואולם[ ואמנם‪ ‖ CB :‬התחלה[ ההתחלה‪ 14 B :‬ואחר[ ואחרי‪ ‖ ML :‬במאמרם[ מאמרם‪C :‬‬ ‫)⇄‪ 15 (C1‬נכנסות[ נכנסת‪ ‖ (C1⇄) C :‬לא[ ולא‪ ‖ M :‬בקצתם השנוי מקצתם‪ [BT :‬בקצת השנוי‬ ‫מקצת‪ | C :‬בקצתם שנוי מקצתם‪ ‖ AML :‬בקצתם)‪ [(2‬בקצת‪ ‖ C :‬ומי שעשה‪ [BMT :‬ומי שיעשה‪| C :‬‬ ‫והעושה‪ ‖ AL :‬זה[ לית‪ ‖ CB :‬שם‪ [AL :‬והשם‪ | C :‬שום‪ | B :‬לית‪ ‖ MT :‬עצם[ העצם‪ | A :‬שהעצם‪M :‬‬

‫‪15‬‬

‫‪322‬‬

‫‪Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12‬‬ ‫‪16‬‬

‫העולם כלו נכנס ואלא מה אשר יכלול התחלות המספרים והתחלות הגשמים הדבקים‬ ‫והתחלות אלו הגשמים והתחלות הצורות ואין מן הדברים הנמצאים דבר יחייב‬

‫‪1076a3–4‬‬

‫שילך הנהגתו‬ ‫על הטעות ואין טוב גם כן ברבוי הראשיות‬

‫נשלם המאמר הנרשם באות הלמד מספר מה שאחר הטבע לארסטו‬

‫‪20‬‬

‫ביאור תמסטיוס ולאל האחד הנצחי התחלה בלי תכלית אין אדון‬ ‫זולתו התהלה והעתיקו מלשון הגרי ללשון עברי החכם ר׳ משה בן החכם‬ ‫הגדול ר׳ שמואל בר׳ יהודה אבן תבון זק״ל מרמון ספרד ונשלמה העתקתו‬ ‫בירח ניסן בי״א יום בו שנת חמשת אלפים וט״ו ליצירה בהל״כ ואע״י‬ ‫לק״י‬

‫‪ 17–16‬ואלא…אלו‪ :‬לית‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 16‬ואלא[ ולא‪ | M :‬ואם לא‪ ‖ T :‬אשר יכלול[ שיכלול‪ ‖ AL :‬התחלות[‬

‫התחלת ‪ +‬הדברים‪ | A :‬התחלת‪ ‖ M :‬והתחלות[ התחלות‪ ‖ C :‬והתחלות הגשמים הדבקים[ ‪+‬‬ ‫והתחלות הגשמים הדבקים)!(‪ ‖ A :‬הדבקים[ מדבקים‪C :‬‬

‫‪ 17‬הגשמים[ ‪ +‬הדבקים‪ :C1) C :‬סא‬

‫והתחלות הגשמים והתחלות הצורות( ‖ והתחלות )‪ [(2‬וההתחלות‪ + | A :‬הגשמים‪ ‖ C :‬הצורות[‬ ‫בצורות‪ ‖ AM :‬ואין[ ואינו‪ ‖ C :‬יחייב[ יחוייב‪ | C :‬יתחייב‪M :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ B‬הראשיות[ הראשונות‪ | (C1⇄) CM :‬הראשית‪B :‬‬

‫‪ 18‬על[ אל‪ ‖ C :‬גם כן[ לית‪ | C :‬ג״כ‪:‬‬

‫‪ 23–19‬המאמר…לק״י[ לית‪L :‬‬

‫‪ 19‬מה[‬

‫‪ 20‬ביאור[ באור‪ ‖ CA :‬תמסטיוס[ טמסתיוס‪| R :‬‬ ‫מהא)!(‪ ‖ A :‬לארסטו[ לארסטוטליס‪MT :‬‬ ‫‪ 21–20‬ולאל…התהלה[ תהלה‬ ‫תמאסטיוס‪ ‖ M :‬ולאל…התחלה[ תהלה לאל הנצחי הקיים‪T :‬‬ ‫‪ 21‬התהלה[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 23–21‬התהלה…לק״י[ לית‪C :‬‬ ‫‪ 20‬הנצחי[ הניצחי‪R :‬‬ ‫לאל‪ | A :‬ת״ל‪M :‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ T‬מלשון…החכם[ לית‪ ‖ M :‬הגרי[ קדר‪ ‖ A :‬ר׳)‪ [(1‬הר׳‪ 22–21 M :‬החכם הגדול[ הפילוסוף‬ ‫האלהי‪ 22 T :‬בר׳ יהודה אבן[ בן‪ | BR :‬לית‪ ‖ T :‬זק״ל[ זצ״ל‪ | M :‬ז״ל‪ ‖ T :‬זק״ל מרמון ספרד[‬ ‫לית‪ 24–22 BR :‬מרמון…לק״י[ לית‪ 22 T :‬ונשלמה[ נשלמה‪ 23–22 R :‬ונשלמה…בו[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 23 A‬חמשת[ ה׳‪ ‖ B :‬וט״ו[ וחמש עשרה‪ ‖ A :‬וחמשה עשר‪ ‖ M :‬ליצירה[ לבריאת העולם‪AM :‬‬ ‫‪ 24–23‬בהל״כ…לק״י[ ולבורא הכל העוז והגדולה יתעלה שמו‪ | A :‬לית‪M :‬‬

Commentary

∵

Introduction The Commentary is divided according to the 10 chapters of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12, which are also separated in the edition. For an analysis of the work’s title and ending see above, 3.1.4. The commentary for each chapter is divided into four sections: 1. Aristotle. In this section the main ideas and arguments of Aristotle’s chapter are presented. Since there are numerous interpretations to nearly every sentence in Metaphysics 12, my presentation by no means aims at definitiveness or comprehensiveness. I try to offer a moderately neutral analysis and arrange it in a manner that will be useful as a backdrop to Themistius’ paraphrase. Accordingly, the text is divided into sections and sub-sections which reflect the logical sequence of Aristotle’s ideas as I understand them, also based upon scholarship on the text. 2. Themistius. This section includes a systematic account of Themistius’ paraphrase, arranged according to the sub-divisions presented in part 1. This is intended in order to supply convenient grounds for examining Themistius and Aristotle side by side, and is also useful for showing how Themistius employs his paraphrastic procedures when adopting Aristotle’s voice. The terms “addition” (along with its subdivisions), “subtraction,” “syntax,” “substitution,” and “quotation” are lifted from the procedures of the paraphrasis exercise discussed in Chapter 2 above. I use them for the sake of convenience without strong historical commitment (although I believe that there indeed is a connection). During this part, each of Themistius’ arguments and discussions are analyzed both with reference to Aristotle’s text and on their own terms. This section, then, is a roadmap for Themistius’ paraphrase that underscores Themstius’ central ideas and modes of interpretation set against Aristotle’s text. 3. Note on Sources. This section surveys the available sources in Arabic and Hebrew for each chapter with a short explanation how they are used in the edition (see Chapter 1 for a detailed analysis). Where available, I note the existence of modern translations of selected passages besides Brague’s French translation of the complete work. 4. Running Commentary. In this section I review problems, points of interests, and key arguments in Themistius’ paraphrase according to page and line numbers. The discussions contained in the running commentary are anything within the range of explaining transmission difficulties to reflecting about on arguments and sources.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400443_007

Chapter 1 1

Aristotle

The opening chapter of Metaphysics 12 serves as an introduction to the book, stating its intention, justifying it, offering preliminary divisions which take into account previous thinkers, and presenting a program of inquiry. It can be divided into four parts. [1] In the first part, having declared that substance is the subject of the present inquiry (1069a18–19),1 Aristotle offers justification by stating that substance ends up as the primary kind of being whether one takes the universe as a whole or as a series (1069a19–21). The other categories, e.g., quality and quantity,2 are ontologically dependent upon substance and are not to be seen as existents in an unqualified sense, since that would result in absurdities (1069a21–24); besides, none of the categories but substance can exist apart. [2] In the second part of the chapter, Aristotle distinguishes between past and contemporary thinkers, the former identifying substances as particulars (1069a25–26; 28–30), while the latter identifying substances as universals (1069a26–28). [3] In the third part of the chapter, Aristotle distinguishes between three kinds of substances: perishable sensible substances; eternal sensible substances (1069a30–33); and eternal unmoved substances, which various thinkers associate in different manners with the Ideas and/or the mathematical objects (1069a33–36). Both kinds of sensible substance belong to the science of physics, as they involve movement, while the unmoved substance belongs to “another” kind of inquiry (1069a36–b3). [4] In the final part of the chapter Aristotle starts to discuss the sensible substances, claiming that in all of them there is an underlying recipient of contraries (1069b3–7).3 This claim is continued in the opening sentences of chapter 2. 1 For the different ways the opening sentence of Metaphysics 12 can be read with regard to the book’s subject and scope see Menn, Aim, IIIβ1, 17–19. 2 Some scholars contend that Aristotle is not referring to the categories here but to the Platonic conception of the universe as a series, arguing that that view as well would necessitate the primacy of substance (see Berti, “Program,” 69–71). For the sake of the present outline I provide the “traditional” account because Themistius definitely understands Aristotle as referring to the categories here. 3 Today it is agreed upon that the last part of the chapter actually belongs to the discussion in chapter 2, as it already starts the inquiry into the principles of the sensible substance (Elders,

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400443_008

chapter 1

2

327

Themistius

Themistius opens his paraphrase by quoting Aristotle’s formula “ ‘existent’ is said in many ways” (‫א‬3), which is repeated in different forms within Aristotle’s Metaphysics4 but does not appear in book 12. This opening remark orientates the project of book 12, as Themistius understands it, within the broader project of the inquiry into being (see above, Chapter 2, table 55). [1] The study of the principles of existence—and here Themistius aligns with Aristotle’s text (1069a18–19)—is effectively the study of the principles of substance,5 given the latter’s primacy within existents (‫א‬3–5), as the following sentences will serve to prove. Themistius then proceeds to elaborate upon Aristotle’s brief comments in the first part of the chapters meant to assert substance’s primacy, starting with showing that this is the case whether the universe is taken as a whole or as a series (1069a19–21). The first option is elaborated upon (‫א‬5–8) to a presentation of three different kinds of unity, in all of which substance holds priority, offering an analogy between the place of substance in the whole and the place of the heart in the organism.6 To the second option (‫א‬8–13) two examples of series are added—polygons and numbers—in each of which there is a member which is prior to the others (respectively, the triangle and the number one).7 Aristotle’s remark (1069a21–24) about the ontological dependency of the other categories upon substance is repeated (‫א‬13–16) and then elaborated upon (‫א‬16–24) to a logical analysis of the copula (“is”), explaining that its existential import when applied to categories other than substance is owed to the former inhering in the latter. To use Themistius’ elaboration on Aristotle’s example, when we say “this piece of wood is white,” the “is” logically belongs to

4

5

6

7

Aristotle’s Theology, 88; Frede, “Metaphysics Λ 1,” 53–54; Alexandru, Metaphysics, 88, moves this part into chapter 2 of the text). The most famous example is the opening sentence of Metaphysics 4.2.1003a33, but Themistius seems to draw from 7.1.1028a10, as he expands upon Aristotle’s argument here according to the argumentation in the first part of 7.1. For others instances see 4.2.1004a22; 5.10.1018a35; 6.2.1026b2; 6.4.1028a5 (excised by some editors); 10.1.1052a15; 11.3.1060b32; 13.2.1077b17; 14.2.1089a7. Themistius amplifies this by only mentioning “principles” where Aristotle’s text has “principles and causes” (1069a18–19). He repeats this at ‫ב‬24–26 (see above, Chapter 2, table 58). Themistius’ approach accords with how Menn proposes to understand the project of Metaphysics 12 (see for example Menn, Aim, IIIβ1, 11). It is unclear how far one should take this analogy, as Aristotle (Gen. An. 2.4) posits the heart both as prior to the other organs owing to its status as necessary condition for the organism’s existence, and as the first organ that develops in the fetus. See Berti, “Program,” 69–70, for Themistius’ view and its responses.

328

commentary

the piece of wood (i.e., the substance), and not to its whiteness (i.e., the accident), and likewise concerning the negative copula. Aristotle’s (again brief) remark that none of the categories besides substance can exist apart (1069a24) is interpreted by Themistius (‫א‬24–‫ב‬4) to mean (roughly) that it is impossible to conceive or experience any accident as existing apart from a substance, while substance—although cannot be conceived completely without accidents— offers stable existence in which different accidents come and go (see Berti, “Program,” 72, who adopts Themistius’ interpretation). Themistius concludes this part by reiterating (‫ב‬4–5) that substance is the principle of all the categories. [2] Aristotle’s account of the “ancient” thinkers, maintaining that they also inquired into the principles of substance (1069a25–26), is repeated by Themistius, who adds a pedagogical point, namely, that one should distinguish between an inquiry into the number of the principles of existence—which is the present inquiry—and an inquiry into the number of the genera of the existents, which is achieved through induction from particulars which have something in common (‫ב‬6–13). This leads Themistius to Aristotle’s discussion of the “contemporary” thinkers, who turn things around and posit the universals as the principles of particulars (1069a26–28), which he repeats with little to no elaboration (‫ב‬13–16), before returning with Aristotle (1069a28–30) to the “ancients,” who saw particular substances as principles (‫ב‬16–21). At the end of this part (‫ב‬21–26) Themistius opines that he passed judgment elsewhere about which of the two groups is correct, and repeats his statement at the opening of his paraphrase, namely that the search for the principles of existents is essentially the search for the principles of substance. [3] To Aristotle’s threefold division of substances (1096a30–34), which again is brief, Themistius adds quite a few comments. The sensible substances which pass away are the ones on earth, and Themistius adds a note regarding the question of the number of material elements (whether four or less), alluding to Aristotle’s discussion of the subject elsewhere (‫ב‬29–‫ג‬1).8 Themistius explicates that the eternal sensible substances are the celestial bodies (‫ב‬29), and that the third substance is completely unchangeable (‫ג‬2). He elaborates that the three substances differ with respect to their susceptibility to change: the perishable sensible substances change with respect to coming to be and passing away; the eternal sensible substances change with respect to place (and that is the only kind of change they share with perishable substances); and the eter-

8 For example, On the Heavens, 3.5, where Aristotle discusses and dismisses thinkers who posit a single element with features similar to what Themistius describes here.

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nal unmoved substance admits no change whatsoever (‫ג‬3–8). Then, Themistius continues his reflection on the eternal unmoved substance, adding that it is incorporeal, and explaining how it should be understood to be distinguished from the sensible substance—not with respect to a certain kind of change, but comprehensively, given that it occupies no place whatsoever (‫ג‬8–11). Building on this observation, Themistius proceeds to say that there is nothing in common between the unmoved substance and the sensible substance, which is why they warrant separate discussions (‫ג‬11–19), a point to which he returns after more or less quoting Aristotle’s presentation of his predecessors’ subdivision of this substance (1069a34–36; ‫ג‬19–22). Themistius concludes this part by stating that since there is nothing in common between the sensible and unmoved substances, the study of the latter requires a science superior to physics (which studies the former). He offers a clever explanation as to why the two types of substances do not share the same principle: the unmoved substance is the principle of the sensible substance, and in itself has no principle (‫ג‬22–27).9 The need for different sciences for each is further reinforced by epistemological considerations, as the sensible substance is known through senses, whereas the unmoved substance is known by the intellect (‫ג‬27–29). Themistius concludes by saying that the sensible substances will be discussed first, owing to their resemblance to us. [4] Themistius embarks on the discussion of the sensible substance by repeating, with minimal elaboration, Aristotle’s claim (1069b3–5) that its change is from contrary to contrary of the same kind (‫ג‬29–‫ד‬3), though not yet introducing the underlying receptor of contraries, which is part of the immediately following discussion in chapter 2.

3

Note on Sources

As this is the only chapter of the paraphrase of which we possess the complete Arabic translation, presented in its original form and not quoted or abridged,

9 This assertion, I believe, has a moderating effect on the claim that there is nothing in common between the sensible substance and the metaphysical substance, which may be understood as advocating a conception of total equivocacy (this is how Brague interpreted this passage, likening it to Plotinus’ view; see Brague, Thémistius, 131, § 16). The fact that one is the principle of the other, and that both are substances, makes it easier—in my opinion—to understand the hierarchical structure of the universe in a way that avoids for the most part the need to appeal to transcendence, with the metaphysical and epistemological gaps that would entail.

330

commentary

its importance for the study of the paraphrase as a whole is immense, since in many ways it lays the ground rules for analyzing the other Arabic sources, as well as for controlling the Hebrew translation in cases of vocabulary, syntax, and style. For this reason my commentary for this chapter deals with these aspects in a somewhat more comprehensive fashion than in the rest of the chapters. The Arabic text of this chapter is based upon MS Ẓāhiriyya 4871 (Damascus), 38r1–38v30, which is discussed in Chapter 1, 2.2.1. It was published in Badawī, Arisṭū, 329–333, also consulted when preparing this edition and recorded in the critical apparatus. Another important feature of this chapter is that a moderate passage from it (corresponding to ‫א‬5–13) is quoted word for word by Averroes in his Tafsīr (1410,5–15 in Bouyges’ edition), proving that Averroes had basically the same translation that we possess before him (see Chapter 1, table 17), adding some variant readings which help improve the text. The quotations are translated into Hebrew in the two versions of the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ Tafsīr and are included in Appendix B as Text 1. The French translation of chapter 1 appears in Brague, Thémistius, 47–54. The quotations in Averroes are also available in English in Genequand, Ibn Rushd, 67, and in French in Martin, Averroès, 49.

4

Running Commentary

‫א‬3

‫)דרכים רבים( أنحاء شتى‬: ẓ adds ‫ الموجود‬after ‫شتى‬, probably as a result of a dittography (see Frank, “Notes,” 218, §1). This term translates πολλαχῶς (Metaph., 4.2.1003a33). This is an example of a term that sets Version I apart from Version II of the Hebrew. In the present text, as a rule of thumb, instances where C has ‫ מין‬and other manuscripts have ‫ דרך‬can be assumed to be translating ‫نحو‬ (‫א‬3, ‫א‬8–9, ‫ד‬32, ‫ה‬1, ‫ל‬14, ‫ל‬28). Instances of ‫ מין‬where there is agreement among all manuscripts reflect another term: usually ‫ז( نوع‬30, ‫ח‬6, ‫יג‬12), but also ‫صنف‬ (‫ד‬6) and ‫ד( ضرب‬13). T’s variant here, ‫עניינים‬, reflects the independent nature of Version III. ‫א‬4

‫نقصد‬: I am assuming the verb προτίθημι, which is occasionally used by Themistius in the context of what he sets out to investigate and translated into Arabic

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as ‫( قصد‬see, e.g., Themistius, in De an., 74,21, 117,27; corresponding, respectively, to the Arabic translation in Lyons, Arabic, 123,10, 216,7). ‫א‬5

‫أول وأحق‬: Heb. has ‫יותר ראוי מכל‬, most likely a translation of ‫( أولى‬see also 18‫)ב‬, and omits ‫وأحق‬. Frank (“Notes,” 218, §2) suggests that the Arabic ‫ أول‬is a corruption of ‫أولى‬, and subsequently ‫ وأحق‬was introduced to restore sense. Brague (Thémistius, 48) reflects this by putting ‫ وأحق‬in chevrons in his translation (“celui qui le mérite le plus”). I suggest a complementary explanation: assuming the Arabic originally had ‫( أولى‬so ‫ أول‬is a corruption) and the Greek μάλιστα (as, e.g., in the case below, ‫ב‬14, reflecting μᾶλλον in Metaph. 1069a28, where the Hebrew appropriately has comparative), we can see the Arabic ‫ أولى وأحق‬as a hendiadys translation of μάλιστα (“to the highest degree”; see Gutas, Theophrastus, s.v. μάλα (b) [p. 424]), with ‫ وأحق‬absent from the copy Moshe ibn Tibbon was using. On a side note, Frank mistakenly adds ‫—كل‬not in the text—to the Arabic superlative, reflecting the ‫ מכל‬in the Hebrew. This helps elucidate ibn Tibbon’s occasional translation device of adding ‫ כל‬to distinguish between comparative and superlative in the Arabic (see, e.g., ‫כא‬23; Ḥoresh, “Averroes,” 44,1–2; Kurland, Averrois, 144,38). Ibn Tibbon might be explicating an implicit ‫جميع‬, which sometimes accompanies the Arabic text and translated the same way (e.g., ‫יט‬22, ‫כ‬2–3; ‫כא‬21) Most of the cases in Hebrew do not have an Arabic parallel (‫ו‬15, ‫ו‬30, ‫יד‬25, ‫כ‬1, ‫כ‬11–12, ‫כט‬26, ‫לב‬30–‫לג‬1). ‫بهذا المعنى‬: this is a standard formula to translate τοῦτο. See Gutas, Theophrastus, s.v. maʿnan (p. 460). ‫ذلك أن‬: usually (but not always; see ‫ג‬25) translates γάρ, and in turn is translated into ‫זה כי‬. ً ‫ الكل متحدا‬etc.: This is an expansion upon Aristotle’s optional description of the universe as a “whole of some sort” (ὅλον τι; 1069a19). Brague (Thémistius, 123, §2) shows that Themistius is drawing upon the Stoic degrees of unity (see his references there), and perhaps this can be taken as a pedagogical occasion for Themistius to explain this notion. Plotinus (Enn. VI.9.i) uses the same examples, but seems to depart from Stoic terminology (See Meijer, “Stoicism,” esp. 62–73). ‫متحدا ً كان‬: reading with a. See Frank, “Notes,” 218, §§ 3–4.

332

commentary

‫بدن‬: b reads ‫البدن بدن‬, which certainly reflects a dittography in ẓ (see Frank, “Notes,” 218, §5). ‫א‬6

‫أو كان‬: b (‫ )أ كان‬misreads ẓ, hence the apparent discordance with a and ‫ע‬ recorded by Frank (“Notes,” 218, §6). ‫א‬7 ‫מפוזרים‬: see above, Chapter 1, table 31.

‫والمدينة‬: see Frank, “Notes,” 218, §7. ẓ in itself is inconclusive, but Badawī’s reading (‫ )والمدنية‬is less plausible in this context. ‫א‬8

ً ‫جميعا‬: I assume this translates ἀμφότερος, having Themistius say that in any of the aforementioned types of unity substance holds priority. An example for this translation is found in Themistius, in De an. 54,14 (Lyons, Arabic, 77,17). ‫فإن‬: a has ‫( وإن‬also recorded in Frank, “Notes,” 218, § 8). Moshe ibn Tibbon (‫)ואם‬ translates ‫ ف‬sometimes as ‫ ו‬and sometimes as ‫ و( הנה‬is always ‫)ו‬, so there is no way to know what he had in front of him. ‫א‬9

ً ‫فى العدد الواحد أولا‬: a and ‫ ע‬have ‫الواحد فى العدد‬, while a also omitsً ‫( أولا‬see Frank, “Notes,” 218, §§9–10; Frank erroneously (a) records ‫ العدد والواحد‬and ascribes the inversion to ‫ ע‬only, though it is also present in a, and (b) ascribes to a an omission of ‫ الواحد‬as well). Despite this discrepancy, there is no reason to emend the Arabic text. The difference is stylistic, and the format in ẓ is repeated in the next line (which is in agreement with a and ‫)ע‬:ً ‫فى الأشكال المستقيمة الخطوط المثلث أولا‬. ‫א‬11 ‫ועל זה הדמיון‬: There is a tendency in Version I (mostly in manuscript C but in this example also D) to translate the expression ‫ على هذا المثال‬into ‫על זה המשל‬, effectively unifying the terms ‫ مثال‬and ‫ مثل‬under the Hebrew ‫משל‬. Version II changes this by translating ‫ مثال‬into ‫דמיון‬. There are various examples of this throughout

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the text (e.g., ‫א‬11; ‫א‬20; ‫ו‬10; ‫ו‬26; ‫ז‬21; 20‫)יב‬, and the consistency of this revision is one of the key pointers for the existence of two versions of the Hebrew translation. ‫ثم بعده‬: Read with ẓ and ‫ע‬. See Frank, “Notes,” 218, § 11. ‫الحال والمقدار وسا ئر ما أشبه ذلك‬: At first impression, Themistius’ text here does not agree with one branch of the Aristotelian manuscript tradition which has εἶτα τὸ ποιὸν εἶτα τὸ ποσόν at 1069a21, a tradition suggesting that the order of the sequence of the categories (quality before quantity) is meaningful. This can be understood not so much from trying to roll back to the Greek, but more from the sense of Themistius’ text, which sets apart substance from the rest of the categories without further hierarchy (analogous to the triangle “and the other figures”). It can also be seen at ‫א‬5, where the order is reversed and quantity precedes quality. The alternative reading, adopted, e.g., by Frede (see his discussion at “Metaphysics Λ 1,” 66–67, also referring to Themistius at 67; cf. Berti, “Program,” 71) and Alexandru (Metaphysics, 87), is εἶτα τὸ ποιὸν ἤ ποσόν. Brague (Thémistius, 130n5) believes that this is the reading that Themistius adopts. Alexandru believes that since Themistius here has ‫( و‬or et in the Latin Alexandru uses for the apparatus), this is another variant that should be recorded. But the difference between “or” and “and” in this context is so slight, and Themistius is not quoting Aristotle verbatim here anyway, that assuming another variant reading in this case would be overdoing. However, a case could be made that the sequence of the categories does have some significance for Themistius (implying that he did read εἶτα τὸ ποιὸν εἶτα τὸ ποσόν). If we take Themistius’ analogy of numbers and shapes more seriously, it can be said that just as the correct sequence should be 1, 2, 3 … (or triangle, quadrangle, etc.), the order of the categories is indeed important. Like “1” and the triangle, substance is set apart from the rest, but nevertheless what follows it proceeds in a meaningful order. ‫من قبل‬: the apparent discrepancy between ẓ and a is the result of Badawī’s reading of the rasm ‫ ٯىل‬as ‫ مثل‬rather than ‫قبل‬. While it is theoretically possible— with a stretch—to retain ‫( مثل‬see Frank, “Notes,” 218, § 12 for an attempted explanation via a supposed distortion of the Greek ὥστε εἶναι), the reading ‫قبل‬ is natural and is shared by a and ‫ע‬.

334

commentary

‫א‬13

‫الأشياء‬: ‫ ע‬has ‫הסוגים‬, which probably translates ‫الأجناس‬. ẓ is difficult to decipher and Badawī’s reading is plausible, so I have not attempted to change it. However, the word is the last one in the line and it seems as if there is a ‫س‬ on the margin, so it is possible that it is ‫ الأجناس‬after all. Since Themistius is discussing the categories here, ‫ الأجناس‬would fit, although he also naturally refers to them as ‫( الأشياء‬i.e., πράγματα, as Brague notes at Thémistius, 48n2) and Themistius’ example (“white”) is of a specific quality and not of quality in general. Brague also raises the possibility of reading ‫الأنحاء‬, which in this case is graphically unlikely. See also ‫א‬17. ‫א‬14

‫مثال‬: Badawī’s reading ‫ مثل‬is not supported by ẓ. ‫א‬16

‫وحظها‬: Probably Gr. μοῖρα; cf. Themistius, in De an., 103,5 (Arabic in Lyons, Arabic, 187,3). ‫من الوجود‬: See Frank, “Notes,” 218, §13. I correct the Arabic ‫ من الموجود‬according to the Hebrew (‫)במציאות‬, as does Brague (Thémistius, 48: “l’ être”), who deviates from Badawī but does not note it. ẓ definitely has ‫“( الموجود‬the existent”), but this does not make much sense because the discussion revolves around the existential status of the categories in relation to substance as such—not the place they occupy in a given thing (whatever that would mean). ‫بإضافتها‬: I take ‫ إضافة‬here to translate σχέσις (e.g., Themistius, in De an., 60,22; Arabic in Lyons, Arabic, 92,12). ‫ואם נתאר‬: The dropping of ‫ )كنا( היינו‬from Version I (reflected in C and B) to Ver-

sion II seems like a stylistic decision to Hebraize the syntax by removing the redundant Arabic auxiliary verb. ‫א‬17

‫الأجناس‬: if indeed the version that T reflects consulted the Arabic, this could be another instance of confusion between ‫ الأجناس‬and ‫الأشياء‬, as T has ‫הדברים‬, setting it apart from the other manuscripts.

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‫فليس ذلك بعجب‬: assuming οὐ/οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν, which is an “expression used to disarm a problem,” according to Todd’s glossary (On the Soul, s.v. thaumastos; p. 239). In the Arabic of the paraphrase of On the Soul this expression is translated as ‫ليس ذلك بمنكر‬. ‫א‬18

‫الجواهر‬: Hebrew has singular (‫)העצם‬. Frank (“Notes,” 218, § 14) suggests that the Hebrew is correct, and I agree. Themistius’ point here, which can be seen from the immediately following examples, is that there is nothing problematic about using words with existential import when referring to categories other than substance, since the existential part is derived from the substance of which the categories are accidents. ‫فقولنا هى‬: Hebrew adds ‫( לבן‬See Frank, “Notes,” 218, § 15), which is incorrect, since the discussion is about the existential verb (Brague, Thémistius, 48, chooses to include the term in his translation but does not offer justification besides citing Frank). Themistius preludes a discussion of the “is” to his paraphrase of Aristotle’s remark at 1069a23 on “the non-white” (τὸ οὐ λευκὸν) and “the non-straight” (τὸ οὐκ εὐθύ). At ‫א‬23–24 the Hebrew is in tune with the Arabic. ‫א‬20

‫و‬: Badawī’s reading ‫ أو‬is incorrect. See Frank, “Notes,” 218, § 16. ‫أشباه هذه من الألفاظ‬: See Frank (“Notes,” 218, §17), but the Hebrew is missing ‫من‬, not ‫)דומה לאלו המלות( هذه‬. For examples of ‫ من‬translating the Greek partitive genitive see Gutas, Theophrastus, 472, s.v. min (c2). ‫ننفيه‬: Unlike the Hebrew (see Frank, “Notes,” 218, § 18; Brague follows suit), Badawī reads the rasm as second person singular (‫)تنفيه‬, which does not make much sense as the rest of the sentence is first person plural. ‫א‬22

‫فنقول…بمستقيم‬: This insertion, based on the Hebrew, is according to Frank’s suggestion at “Notes,” 218, §19 (Brague also adopts it). The Arabic is probably missing due to a homoeoteleuton (see the first part of the sentence for the proper formula).

336

commentary

‫א‬23

‫نوقع‬: Hebrew adds ‫( אמרנו‬probably ‫ ;قولنا‬see Frank, “Notes,” 218, § 20 and Brague, Thémistius, 49), similar to the formula at ‫א‬18. The Arabic can do without the addition. T omits the Hebrew addition, aligning with the Arabic we have (for analogous instances in T see above, Chapter 1, table 42 and the surrounding discussion). ‫זה העץ‬: C and its derivatives in this case (A and T, adopted by Landauer), representing Version I, probably read ‫“( أن‬that”), whereas Version II (in DB) read ‫إن‬ (introducing direct speech). ‫א‬25

‫العيان‬: There is a good chance that this is a translation of φαινόμενα. See, e.g., Themistius, in De an., 60,31: τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἀλήθειαν καὶ παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενα (“That conflicts both with the truth in reason, and with observations”; translated in Todd, On the Soul, 80), which Isḥāq translates as ‫( فان هذا القول خارج من الحق فى القياس وعما يظهر للعيان‬Lyons, Arabic, 93,3–4). This would have Themistius argue that the accidents can neither be thought to be separate from the substance, nor do we experience them in that manner. The Hebrew variant ‫( בענין‬adopted by Landauer) is not supported by the Arabic text and likely owes to a combination of (a) the affinity in the Hebrew meaning of ‫ מחשבה‬and ‫ עיון‬which would render the opposition in Themistius’ sentence strange; and (b) the graphical similarity between ‫ עיון‬and ‫( ענין‬it is unfortunate that we do not have T for this) would make a corruption easy to adopt. The resulting juxtaposition between ‫ מחשבה‬and ‫ענין‬, in itself, makes sense, and is also close to what Themistius is saying. Brague (Thémistius, 130, § 6) suggests τῇ ὑποστάσει, but I was not able to find supporting examples for this. ‫ב‬1

‫لا أن‬: ẓ (and Badawī) have ‫لأن‬, which is incorrect, as it renders the sentence selfcontradictory. The text should be ‫لا أن‬, as the Hebrew indeed translates. Frank (“Notes,” 218, §21) records the discrepancy, and Brague (Thémistius, 49) reads with the Hebrew.

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‫ב‬2

ً ‫ثابتا‬: ẓ (and Badawī) haveً ‫ثانيا‬. Heb. ‫ קיים‬translatesً ‫ثابتا‬, which makes much more sense (see Frank, “Notes,” 218, §22 and Brague’s translation along with his note at Thémistius, 49). ‫الأعراض بأعيانها‬: The Hebrew has ‫( מקרים אחדים בעינם‬see Frank, “Notes,” 218, § 23), which would translate ‫أعراض واحدة بأعيانها‬, paralleling ‫ الجوهر الواحد بعينه‬in the beginning of the sentence (Frank’s suggestion ‫ جزئية‬cannot be accounted for). The difference in meaning is insignificant. ‫ב‬3 ‫יומרו ויבאו זה בעקב זה‬: see above, Chapter 1, table 41. ‫ב‬4

‫والأفعال والانفعال‬: ẓ has ‫والانفعال والانفعال‬, which is a dittography. Badawī puts one of them in square brackets, which renders the text strange in that Themistius enumerates among other categories the category of affection without the category of action. The reading Frank suggests (‫ ;والأفعال والانفعالات‬218, § 24; adopted by Brague at 49 and n6 there) is desirable, but does not cooperate with the Hebrew (besides T, see below), which addresses all the categories listed in the plural, except for the category of affection which is given in the singular. It makes sense to revert from this translation to the Arabic, maintaining the odd grammar, and it is also graphically easier to emend the first ‫ والانفعال‬to ‫والأفعال‬. MS T takes the liberty of correcting the Hebrew text into ‫ ;וההפעלויות‬this could be a sensible editorial decision in the same vein of other decisions reflected in T, or the result of consulting a different Arabic manuscript. See also above, table 41. ‫ما أشبه ذلك‬: this is a translation of τοιοῦτος. ‫ב‬5

‫وأسها‬: Brague (Thémistius, 49n7) notes that the Arabic here is singular, and therefore maintains that there is a discrepancy between the Arabic and Hebrew not recorded by Frank. This is mistaken; ‫ أس‬is the plural of ‫أساس‬. There is a good chance that the text is a corruption of ‫“( أسبابها‬their causes”), as in ‫ב‬7.

338

commentary

‫ב‬7

‫مبادئ‬: Landauer reads ‫ התחלת‬with Mss AB (see Frank, “Notes,” 218, § 25 and Brague, Thémistius, 49n8), but Mss CD (‫ )התחלות‬reflect the Arabic. Themistius is clearly referring to ἀρχὰς at Metaph. 1069a26. ‫وأسبابها وأركانها‬: Frank notes at 218, §26 that the order is inverted in the Hebrew (‫ )ויסודותיהם ושתותיהם‬but oversimplifies the situation (see also Brague’s note at 49n9). Besides the inversion, the Hebrew reads ‫ وأسبابها‬as ‫( وأسها‬which appeared at ‫ב‬5 above along with ‫)ركن‬. The Arabic ‫( أسباب‬causes) is doubtlessly a reflection of the Greek αἴτια at Metaph. 1069a26. The reading ‫وأسها‬, without context, is not illogical; therefore assuming that ibn Tibbon is not responsible for the error, there was no reason for him to doubt the text (especially given ‫ב‬5, just two sentences earlier). ‫ב‬8

‫وأوائله‬: Brague (Thémistius, 49) translates ‫ أوائل‬as “choses primordiales.” This is probably a translation of τὰ πρῶτα. ‫يقصدوا‬: Badawī misreads ẓ as ‫ يقصد‬rendering the verb passive (“was set out”; see above, ‫א‬4). It is clear that the subject of the sentence is still the ancients. ‫ב‬12

‫بالعدد‬: Frank (“Notes,” 218, §27) notes that the Hebrew adds ‫ ;לבד( فقط‬Frank has the incorrect ‫)לבדו‬, and Brague reflects this in his translation (Thémistius, 50). But this is only the case in C1 (which Landauer adopts). The addition does not really contribute anything to the text. Perhaps the scribe of the manuscript that C1 is checking against C recopied the word ‫ לבד‬from the previous line (‫ב‬11). ‫ב‬13

‫قامت فى الوهم‬: I assume this translates ἐννοέω (cf. Themistius, in De an., 37,4). ‫ב‬13–14

‫الر ياضة بالمنطق‬: There is an important difference between the Arabic and Hebrew here, which is not noted by Frank. The Hebrew (‫ )בחכמת ההגיון‬is probably a translation of ‫( بعلم المنطق‬C1 has ‫)بصناعة المنطق—במלאכת ההגיון‬, but this is probably

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not what Themistius has in mind. Aristotle describes the inquiry method of his contemporaries as λογικῶς, meaning, to quote Elders, “an analysis of a notion without constant reference to concrete reality.” The term is used to describe the study methods of the Platonists (Elders, Aristotle, 79). Perhaps “logical exercise” (‫ )الر ياضة بالمنطق‬is Themistius’ explication of the pedagogical context of λογικῶς in the Platonic tradition. See the useful survey in Reeve, Metaphysics, 404–407, and the note in Elders, Aristotle, 79–80. ‫ב‬14–15

‫الأشياء…مبادئ‬: This insertion is based on Frank’s suggestion (“Notes,” 219, § 28; Brague adopts it at Thémistius, 50), with a few minor changes. The text is missing from ẓ probably as a result of a homoeoteleuton. Badawī’s original insertion (‫)الأمور العامية مبادئ‬, based on the Latin, is in itself incomplete (see Badawī, Arisṭū, 330n2). The minor confusion within the Hebrew manuscripts with regard to what was probably ‫ حتى كأنهم‬in the omitted Arabic seems to result from an attempt to harmonize the Hebrew translation of ‫ ;עד ש( حتى‬see, e.g., ‫ג‬4 below) with that of ‫)כאלו הם( كأنهم‬, which leads to the clumsy construction ‫ עד שהם כאלו הם‬in some of the manuscripts (ironically, this is helpful when reconstructing the Arabic). ‫ב‬15

‫للأشياء‬: ẓ has ‫الأشياء‬, which makes sense given the preceding omitted words. However, once the text is reconstructed the particle ‫ ل‬should be supplied to retain the format ‫ مبدأ ل‬in accordance with the Hebrew (‫ )לדברים‬and the succeeding part of the sentence. ‫ב‬16

‫العامى‬/‫الكلى‬: The difference between ‫( عامى‬κοινός; “common”) and ‫( كلى‬καθόλου; “universal”) here is probably the result of the Aristotelian text having τὸ κοινὸν σῶμα (probably echoing Plato; see Alexandru, Metaphysics, 116) at 1069a30 after having καθόλου at 1069a28. The Hebrew version preserves this difference on the terminological level employing ‫ כולל‬and ‫ כללי‬respectively. ‫ב‬18 ‫מפני‬: The preposition ‫( בעבור‬here in the apparatus) is one of the pointers for the transition from Version I to Version II of the Hebrew translation. Of its 39

340

commentary

occurrences in manuscript C, it is replaced 27 times, 23 of which to the preposition ‫( מפני‬five times translating ‫ ;لما‬three times translating ‫ ;لأن‬the rest without Arabic), two to the preposition ‫( מן‬no Arabic survives), once to ‫)لأن( כי‬, and once to ‫( בגלל‬no Arabic). Of the remaining twelve occurrences where the text does not change, six are without Arabic, three translate ‫لأن‬, one translates the particle ‫ل‬, one translates ‫لما‬, and one is part of the construction ‫الشىء الذى من‬ ‫أجله‬. To these should be added the following isolated incidents: at ‫לב‬19 only manuscript M has ‫ בגלל‬for ‫( בעבור‬no Arabic); at ‫ה‬16 only manuscript D has ‫ בעבור‬while the rest of the manuscripts (C included) have ‫ ;מפני‬at ‫טז‬25 only manuscript B has ‫ מפני‬for ‫ ;בעבור‬and finally, at ‫יח‬15 only C has ‫ כי‬while the other manuscripts have ‫( בעבור‬Arabic has ‫)إذ‬. It is difficult to make a pattern out of this, but I think it reflects a tendency to disperse the different meanings of ‫ בעבור‬into more distinctive prepositions, retaining ‫ בעבור‬for meanings associated with final causality. ‫ב‬19

‫النار والأرض‬: The order in the Hebrew is inverted. Not recorded in Frank or Brague. ‫ב‬21

‫لـكن هذه النار‬: The Hebrew translation ‫ לאש הזאת‬is erroneous (see Brague, Thémistius, 50 & n3), perhaps based on reading ‫ لهذه‬instead of ‫لـكن هذه‬. While Themistius says that the ancients did not posit the common body as the element, “but [rather] this fire, this earth, this water, and this air,” the Hebrew has him say that the ancients did not posit the common body as the element “of this fire, this earth, this water, and this air,” which would not be wrong as such but is not the point that he is trying to make here. C1 notices something is wrong in the Hebrew and tries to rectify the situation by deleting ‫ לא‬from the beginning of the clause, having Themistius say that the ancients did posit the common body as the element of “this fire” etc., which is the opposite of what he is trying to say. ‫ב‬22

‫أى‬: Badawī’s apparent correction of the text from ‫( أتى‬Badawī, Arisṭū, 330n5) is redundant, as ẓ clearly already has ‫أى‬.

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‫ב‬23

‫أولى‬: Frank (“Notes,” 219, §29) raises the possibility that the Hebrew (‫)יותר קודמים‬ is a translation of ‫( أقدم‬see also his remarks at 219n2). A simpler explanation is that ‫ יותר קודמים‬is a translation of ّ‫( َأَّول ِى‬see, e.g., Ḥoresh, “Averroes,” 4,3). ‫أمعنا‬: I assume ‫ أمعنا‬to be a translation of ἐπὶ πλέον (see Gutas, Theophrastus, 8b15–16). The Arabic translation amplifies the semantics. It seems that the Hebrew translation (‫ )נטיב לעיין‬reflects the verb in the imperfect tense, reading ‫ نمعن‬or ‫( تمعن‬in the case of A). B (‫ )נשיב‬is a corruption of ‫נטיב‬. C, which has ‫ נמאן‬and omits ‫לעיין‬, is unclear to me in the present context; perhaps it is a corruption of the transliteration ‫?נמען‬ ‫ב‬23

‫العامية…الأمور‬: This text is omitted from the body of ẓ, but is inserted in the margin by the same hand. The word ‫ يجعلون‬is corrupt and I adopt Badawī’s suggested reading, which is also in tune with the Hebrew (‫)ישימו‬. ‫ב‬27

‫بالجملة‬: Omitted in Hebrew (see Frank, “Notes,” 219, § 30; Brague, Thémistius, 51n1 has it accidentally the other way around so his text is somewhat misleading concerning the reflection of the Arabic/Hebrew relations). ‫ב‬28

‫على حالة واحدة‬: This is probably a translation of ταὐτός (“the same”; e.g., Gutas, Theophrastus, 10b20). Hebrew has ‫ ;على حاله( על ענינו‬see Frank, “Notes,” 219, § 31). The tāʾ marbūṭa is often not marked in Arabic manuscripts (ẓ is no exception), so my guess is that the Arabic manuscript ibn Tibbon worked with lacked ‫واحدة‬ and thus he read the rasm ‫ حاله‬as is rather than ‫حالة‬. ‫ב‬29

‫والآخر‬: Frank (“Notes,” 219, §32) reproduces Landauer’s (typographical?) error and notes an apparent discrepancy with the Hebrew manuscripts’ ‫והאחד‬, explaining it by stylistic considerations. In fact all the manuscripts have ‫;והאחר‬ there was no problem in the first place.

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commentary

‫أما…السماو ية‬: Frank (“Notes,” 219, §33) notes that Badawī’s conjectural ‫الأول فهو‬ in chevrons (which I adopt) does not match the Hebrew ‫המתמיד ההשארות הוא‬ and suggests that the complete Arabic clause should be ‫وأما الدائم البقاء فهو جوهر‬ ‫الأجسام السماو ية‬. Frank (n3) is correct that Badawī’s insertion is without reference to the Hebrew. However, this does not necessarily mean that Badawī was mistaken. At the beginning of line ẓ38r37, where the corrupt text is found, there is room for no more than two short words. ‫الدائم البقاء فهو‬, which is indeed an accurate reflection of the Hebrew, would never fit there. Therefore, the Arabic and Hebrew would not be in agreement even if the text had not been corrupt; Badawī’s conjecture is sensible and can be adopted within the available space for the text. Frank (and subsequently Brague at Thémistius, 51n3) is correct that Badawī’s ‫ القابل لجوهر‬following his suggested supplement is erroneous. It neither appears in ẓ, nor reflected in the Hebrew, and renders the text senseless. The word ‫القابل‬ should be deleted and ‫ لجوهر‬can safely be replaced with ‫جوهر‬. ‫ב‬30

‫ما يلى الأرض‬: Frank (“Notes,” 219, §34) seems to think that the Hebrew ‫מה שיהיה‬ ‫ בארץ‬is a translation of ‫ما فى الأرض‬, but then the Hebrew would be ‫מה שבארץ‬. It is possible that this is ibn Tibbon’s translation for ‫ يلى‬, which stands for the Greek περί (see Gutas, Theophrastus, s.v. wly, p. 479). Brague, with Frank, prefers reading with the Hebrew, but acknowledges the Arabic in a footnote (Thémistius, 51n4). ‫من النبات والحيوان‬: I understand ‫ من‬in the sense of “the definition or explanation of a general or universal by a special or particular term, the latter being one of several objects that go to make up the former” (Wright, Grammar, vol. 2, § 48(g), p. 137). This reading reflects Aristotle’s intention in the text (οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα; 1069a30–31) and avoids having Themistius say that sensible substances on earth are limited to living things, which would be an error. This structure is repeated at ‫ג‬3–4. ‫ב‬30–31

‫وهذا…تطلب‬: There is scholarly debate regarding the reference of Aristotle’s clause ἧς ἀνάγκη τὰ στοιχεῖα λαβεῖν, εἴτε ἓν εἴτε πολλά (“of which it is necessary to grasp the elements, whether one or many”) (1069a32–33; tr. Reeve). In the Aristotelian manuscript tradition, ἧς is referring to the eternal sensible substances,

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reflected in the preceding words ἡ δ’ ἀΐδιος, but most editors excise these words, following the tradition of Alexander of Aphrodisias, effectively having Aristotle say that the investigation is of the sensible substances in general (see the discussion in Fazzo, “Heavenly Matter,” 162–166, and cf. Frede, “Metaphysics Λ 1,” 78–80; Berti, “Program,” 77). Fazzo notes that the natural reading of the revised text (with which she disagrees) is that the investigation is of the sensible substance which is capable of passing away—not of sensible substance in general—and adds that this is how Averroes understands the text (Fazzo, “Heavenly Matter,” 163n7). It seems from Themistius’ discussion here that he also understood the text as referring exclusively to sensible substances which are capable of passing away, and this sets him apart from Alexander (and also may be the source for Averroes’ understanding). The options that Themistius immediately enumerates seem to refer to these kinds of substances, as well as his opening remark (“This substance alone”). ‫ב‬31

‫بالأقاو يل الأول‬: It is unclear what these “past discussions” are; is Themistius referring to the discussions of the ancients he introduced earlier, as Brague suggests in his translation (Brague, Thémistius, 51; but see his reservations in 130n11)? Perhaps Themistius is referring to discussions in the Physics? It is also possible that this sentence should be read in the present tense—“this substance alone is the substance whose elements are inquired into in the first discussions”— and that Themistius is referring to the first parts of Metaphysics 12, which almost exclusively deal with the sensible substance capable of passing away. This option is also closer to what is said in Aristotle’s own text. ‫أنه‬: This word is omitted by ẓ, but the omission is not recorded by Badawī, who inserts ‫ أ هو‬as if it was part of the text. I conjecture ‫ أنه‬based on the Hebrew ‫שהוא‬. This reading is in harmony with Brague’s note (Thémistius, 130–131, § 13), which builds on Badawī’s insertion (that he assumed was simply part of the text) that this sentence reflects the Greek construction εἴτε ἓν εἴτε πολλά at 1069a33, because my own insertion has no bearings on the disjunctive form of the present sentence. ‫ב‬32

‫هى البسيط‬: The Arabic here is strange (Frank, “Notes,” 217n3 suggests a Syriac intermediate to explain the grammatical peculiarity, but even then this seems

344

commentary

to him unconventional). Perhaps the text should be amended to ‫أبسط‬, reflecting the Hebrew ‫יותר פשוטים‬, which is unproblematic. ‫ב‬33

‫وتنقبض‬: Brague (Thémistius, 51n6) thinks that the Hebrew ‫ ויקוץ‬is a mistake and conjectures ‫ויקבץ‬. In fact, the root ‫ קו״ץ‬is a legitimate medieval form of the more frequent ‫כו״ץ‬. See Even Shoshan, s.v. ‫קוץ‬. ‫ג‬1–2

‫عنها شىء‬: ẓ is corrupt, and my insertion is based on the Hebrew ‫מהם דבר‬. Badawī has ‫عنه بها شىء‬, which he claims (331n2) is based on the Hebrew and the Latin, but only quotes the Latin. ‫ג‬3

ً ‫شيئا‬: Frank (“Notes,” 219, §36) remarks that the Hebrew hasً ‫ أصلا‬for the Arabic ً ‫شيئا‬, but is inaccurate. The Hebrew does translateً ‫)דבר( شيئا‬, but adds ‫כלל‬, which is not reflected in ẓ. The Arabic manuscript ibn Tibbon used probably hadً ‫شيئا‬ ً ‫أصلا‬. ‫تلى‬: Badawī’s reading ‫ هى‬is mistaken. See ‫ב‬30 above for the construction ‫يلى‬ ‫الأرض‬. ‫ג‬5

‫تشترك…السماو ية‬: Hebrew has ‫ישתתפו אלו הגשמים עם אותם הגשמים השמימיים‬. The preposition ‫ עם‬is not a translation of ‫( مع‬hence nothing is missing in ẓ), but part of a compound translation of ‫ تشترك‬as ‫ישתתפו…עם‬. ‫ג‬7

‫وعلى هذا مبنى أمر طبيعته‬: I take ‫ أمر طبيعته‬to translate τῆς φύσεως, rendering the meaning as “upon this its nature is founded.” Hebrew has ‫ )الطبيعة( הטבע‬for ‫طبيعته‬, and in that case I believe the meaning would be “upon this physics is founded” (analogous to Metaph., 12.7.1072b13–14), treated as a summary of sorts of the discussion of sensible (eternal or passing away) substances in the part, which would sit well with ‫ג‬23ff. and with Aristotle’s claim that they belong to

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physics at 1069a36–b1. However, since Themistius continues to discuss the eternal sensible substance, that would seem as an odd place for a closing remark. ‫ג‬8

⟨‫الجسما⟩نية‬: The text at the end of ẓ38v6 is corrupt. I adopt Badawī’s addition, which is in accord with the Hebrew. ‫الخارج عن‬: I take ‫ خارج عن‬here to translate ἔξω (“removed from”), as in Themistius, in De an., 22,2 (Lyons, Arabic, 5,2). ‫ג‬9

‫وليس يزعم‬: Frank (“Notes,” 219, §37) reads with L ‫( ולא נאמר‬the Hebrew reads first person plural against Badawī’s third person singular; here ẓ clearly dots the ‫)ي‬, and assumes that the Hebrew is mistakenly repeating the verb ‫نقول‬ from the beginning of the sentence (see also Brague, Thémistius, 52n2). However, this is not necessarily the case, for two reasons. First, ‫ زعم‬is a commonplace translation of λέγω and φημί, and is often used in the same meaning as ‫قال‬, and second—perhaps more importantly—the Hebrew manuscripts D (not recorded by Landauer, hence confusing Frank) and T have ‫נכון‬, that I adopt, which seems like an attempt to fine tune the initial choice. ‫ג‬10

‫أن يفرد فى‬: Badawī has ‫ نفُ رد‬for the rasm ‫ىفرد‬. Frank (“Notes,” 219, § 38) reads (with L) ‫ מן המקום‬and assumes the Hebrew translates ‫( أن ينفرد عن‬see also Brague’s translation at Thémistius, 52 & n3 there). But if we read ‫במקום‬, with manuscripts DAT (Landaeur recorded only the variant in A), the problem is eliminated. Themistius is not talking about separation from (which would be ‫عن‬/‫ )מן‬but about separation through (‫فى‬/‫)ב‬, i.e., what kind of separation is discussed. This is clear from the previous sentence, which also uses both types of separation. What is more, as can be seen from the previous sentence, the construction ‫مفرد…فى‬, is in the fourth form of the Arabic verb—hence here as well we can retain ‫ يفرد‬instead of correcting to ‫( ينفرد‬seventh form). ‫ג‬11

‫سا ئر‬: Frank (“Notes,” 219, §39) remarks an apparent discrepancy with the Hebrew ‫כל‬. Landauer did not document the variant ‫ שאר‬in B, which verifies the Arabic ‫سا ئر‬. The word ‫ سا ئر‬can also mean “all” in Arabic (See Wright, Grammar,

346

commentary

vol. II, 206–207 & Lane, Lexicon, s.v.), and perhaps the Hebrew understands that this is the meaning here, which also makes better sense. Another place where the Arabic ‫ سا ئر‬means “all” (although admittedly not understood that way in Hebrew), is ‫יח‬19. ‫ג‬12

‫ندل‬: All the Hebrew manuscripts have ‫( נודה‬A has the variant ‫)יודה‬, a corruption of the original ‫נורה‬. The error was probably never corrected since the Hebrew ‫נודה‬, if we disregard the Arabic, makes sense in this context. Neither Frank nor Brague record this. ‫ג‬14

‫وجدنا‬: Hebrew has ‫ומצאנו‬. It is likely that the Arabic originally had ‫ووجدنا‬. ‫אלה הדברים‬: here manuscript M begins, its first folio having been lost. ‫ג‬15

‫بحال…بأخرى‬: Hebrew adds ‫ )واحدة( אחד‬after ‫بحال‬. Frank (“Notes,” 219, § 40) explains this as a “stylistic addition in the Arabic archetype” of the Hebrew. This explanation makes sense but is incomplete; Frank does not note that the Hebrew also inserts ‫ بحال‬before ‫أخرى‬. Thus the Hebrew translates ‫بحال‬ ‫ )בענין אחד…בענין אחר( واحدة…بحال أخرى‬for the condensed ‫ بحال…بأخرى‬in ẓ (Brague translates according to the condensed Arabic). ‫ג‬16

‫مبا ين له‬: Absent in Hebrew. Frank (“Notes,” 219, § 41) suggests that this is a gloss on the Arabic, “giving the more ‘usual’ expression for ‫( ”مفرد عن‬see also Brague, Thémistius, 52n5). ‫البتة‬: Absent in Hebrew (should be ‫)כלל‬. Not recorded by Frank. Brague puts absolument in chevrons. ‫ג‬19

‫الجوهر‬: Hebrew adds ‫)الأول( הראשון‬. Frank (“Notes,” 219, § 42) suggests this is a gloss. Brague incorporates this addition in his translation (Thémistius, 52). It is possible that the Hebrew is repeating the formula ‫ هذا الجوهر الأول‬from ‫ג‬17–18,

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but it is also plausible that this was the Arabic in front of Moshe ibn Tibbon, since ‫ الجوهر الأول‬has much more than a mere nominal meaning. ‫ג‬19–20

‫جعله طبيعة‬: Badawī reads both these words erroneously as ‫جعلوا طبيعته‬, causing an apparent discrepancy with the Hebrew (See Frank, “Notes,” 219, § 43, who suggests that the Hebrew reflects ً ‫جعلوه طبيعة‬, and Brague, Thémistius, 52n8, who rejects Badawī’s Arabic in his translation). ‫ג‬20

‫قسمين‬: This is omitted from the Hebrew. Not recorded by Frank, but reflected in Brague, Thémistius, 53. ‫والأبعاد التعليمية‬: Aristotle has here τὰ μαθηματικά (1069a35), which is usually translated as “mathematical objects,” and in the Arabic translation of the Metaphysics: simply ‫( التعاليمية‬Averroes, Tafsīr, 1419; in the margins also the spelling ‫ التعليمية‬is found). Isḥāq has a tendency to add auxiliary words to abstract Greek constructions, but he would usually use ‫ شىء‬or ‫ أمر‬for this purpose, so it would be difficult to assume that he inserted ‫ الأبعاد‬as his own initiative (although this cannot be ruled out). Another option is that Themistius explicates Aristotle’s wordings and associates it with Plato’s successors’ terminology, most notably Speusippus (see Tarán, Speusippus, 30 ff.), by writing τὰ μαθηματικὰ μεγέθη (“mathematical magnitudes”; see e.g., Metaph. 1077a21 for Aristotle’s criticism of this notion). The problem here is that I could not find any instance of ‫ بعد‬translating μέγεθος in Isḥāq’s corpus. An analogous instance is found in the anonymous revision of Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭrīq’s translation of Aristotle’s On the Heavens (“Version C”; see Endress, “Averroes,” 47–48), where μεγέθη at 1.2.268b19 is translated as ‫( أبعاد‬see Endress & Gutas, GALex, s.v., bʿd § 7). ‫ג‬21

‫المعقولة‬: Omitted from Hebrew. Frank (“Notes,” 219, § 44) suggests this that is a gloss in the Arabic. Brague (Thémistius, 53n1) is unsure. If this is a gloss, then one should explain why ‫ المعقول‬just a few words later, which does appear in the Hebrew translation, is not. The introduction of the term ‫ معقول‬only in the context of the second group of thinkers (those who say that these substances are only mathematical objects—not forms) would make less sense than either retaining both appearances, or omitting both of them.

348

commentary

‫ג‬21–22

‫وأمأ…الصور‬: This sentence shifts from plural into singular halfway through the Arabic (and Hebrew; hence Landauer’s emendation ‫ חשבו‬for ‫ חשב‬in the manuscripts). The text is ungrammatical, but it seems to mean that one of the people who posited the intelligible substance as a single nature presumed that the mathematical dimensions are substances and relinquished the Ideas. This understanding reflects Aristotle’s own statement, since his division is threefold: (1) people who divide into two, mathematical objects and Ideas (= Plato); (2) people who think that both are of a single nature (= Xenocrates); and (3) people who only posit mathematical objects (= Speusippus) (See discussion in Elders, Aristotle’s Theology, 83–84; Reeve, Metaphysics, 513, § 1287). Another way to understand the text is to have Themistius say that the thinkers who thought that there is one nature to the unmoved substance all relinquish the Ideas in favor of the mathematical objects, but it is unlikely. ‫ג‬22 ‫והניחו‬: see above, Chapter 1, table 40. ‫ג‬24

‫يخلو‬: Reading with Badawī for ẓ’s ‫( يخلوا‬this occurs also at ‫ג‬33). It is possible that ẓ adds an alif otiosum here. See Wright, Grammar, vol. 1, 11. ‫فكأنه‬: Brague notes (Thémistius, 53n2) that the Arabic omits what the Hebrew translates as ‫מן הדומה‬, but this is incorrect. ‫ מן הדומה‬translates the particle ‫ك‬. ‫ג‬25

‫وذلك أنه‬: There is a textual problem in Aristotle here, where most manuscripts have εἰ, rendering 1069b1–2 a conditional sentence (“if no principle is common to them”) while others have ἐπεί, rendering it a causal sentence (“because no principle is common to them”). See the discussion in Frede, “Metaphysics Λ 1,” 73–74. In the present case, Themistius is in the latter camp, at least regarding how he presents the text. His own text could have actually contained ἐπεί, which Isḥāq sometimes translates as ‫( وذلك أن‬see Gutas, Theophrastus, 420, s.v. ἐπεί).

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‫ג‬26

‫(…التغيير‬2)‫ولا‬: Missing in Hebrew. Frank (“Notes,” 219, § 45) records only part of the missing text. Brague translates everything (Thémistius, 53 & n4). ‫ג‬27

‫الجوهر الأول‬: It is noteworthy that at such an early stage of his paraphrase Themistius posits the first substance as a principle of existence, a theme that runs throughout the text. ‫ג‬28

ً ‫أيضا‬: lacking in Hebrew. Not recorded by Frank. ‫ג‬29

‫أول‬: Badawī’s reading ‫ أدل‬is wrong, as ẓ clearly has ‫أول‬. Brague’s translation (“plus manifeste”; Thémistius, 53 & n5) follows Badawī (and should be rejected), although he is aware of the discrepancy with the Hebrew (already recorded by Frank, “Notes,” 219, §46). ‫الجارى…السثيال‬: The analogy between the sensible substance as a liquid, being in a state of flux, is ultimately Heraclitean and was commonplace in antiquity. Aristotle refers to this idea in Metaph., 1.6 and 13.4 as an explanation why Ideas were thought to be needed and why sensible substances were thought to be unfit for scientific study. For the terms ὕλη ῥευστή and οὐσία ῥευστή in antiquity see Decleva Caizzi, “La ‘Materia Scorrevole’.” ‫ג‬30

‫مجبولا ًمن الجوهر المحسوس صرنا نتكلم‬: see above, Chapter 1, table 39. ‫صرنا‬: As a rule of thumb, cases in Hebrew with no Arabic where there is disagreement within the manuscripts involving the variants ‫היה‬, ‫שב‬, ‫בחר‬, ‫כון‬, and ‫ הלך‬tend to reflect a grappling with the several senses of ‫صار‬. ‫لمجانسته‬: ‫ مجانسة‬is doubtlessly a translation of συγγένεια. See Themistius, in De an., 23,26 (Arabic in Lyons, Arabic, 9,14).

350

commentary

‫ג‬33

‫إلى الأضداد‬: Lacking in Landauer (hence Frank, “Notes,” 219, § 47), but should be supplied with most Hebrew manuscripts. ‫ג‬33–‫ד‬1

‫وليس…القر يبة‬: It is unclear whether Themistius follows Aristotle’s terminology (1069b4–5) in distinguishing between ἀντικείμενος (opposite) and ἐναντίος (contrary), the latter a kind of the former. If he does, the Arabic common translation ‫ ضد‬blurs this and the reflection of the distinction is in the qualification ‫ المشاكل القر يب‬for “contrary.” ‫ד‬3

‫نظيرهما‬: The transfer from ‫ ממינם‬in Version I to ‫ דומה להם‬in Version II is apparent in B, which includes both options. The form ‫ מינם‬is the most direct from Arabic, and was subsequently revised to ‫ ממינם‬to accommodate Hebrew syntax.

Chapter 2 1

Aristotle

According to the program expounded in the opening chapter, Aristotle begins to inquire into the principles of sensible substances. Since all sensible substances (perishable as well as eternal) are subject to change, and matter is the principle of change, chapter 2 can be described as a discussion of matter insofar as it is a principle of sensible substance.1 The chapter’s crowded argumentation can be roughly divided into six parts:2 [1] Aristotle begins by connecting matter and change: all sensible substances are subject to change, and matter is a principle of change, insofar as it is that which is constant throughout the change. Since change is from contrary to contrary, matter is that which is capable of changing from contrary to contrary (1069b7–9). [2] Aristotle proceeds to introduce four types of change, each of which has its corresponding type of contrariety, in which matter is the principle of change. Various changes from one state to its contrary reflect the four kinds of changes (1069b9–14). Matter, accordingly, should be capable of being in both contrary states (1069b14–15). [3] Afterwards, Aristotle addresses the question how things come to be from that which is, employing the division of being into two types—potentiality and actuality. Accordingly, change is from what is potentially to what is actually, thus matter can be understood as the principle of potentiality (1069b15–18). This explains how a thing can be from what is (1069b18–20). Aristotle maintains that this idea is implicit in earlier thinkers—citing Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Anaximander, and Democritus by name (1069b20–24). [4] Returning to his division of different kinds of change at [2], Aristotle claims that there are respective kinds of matter reflecting each (1069b24–25), and this enables him to identify where perishable and eternal substances differ: since the only change the latter admits of is change in place, its matter is only capable of receiving movement (“topical matter”), whereas perishable substances also have matter for coming into being (1069b25–26).

1 See Menn, Aim, IIIβ1, 19. Fazzo (“Heavenly Matter”) argues that the chapter is in fact about the principles of eternal sensible substance, based on her reading of 1069a32–33 in chapter 1 (See ‫ב‬30–31) and offering an alternative understanding of key passages within the text. 2 Here I follow, for the most part, the division offered by Charles, “Metaphysics Λ 2,” 82.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400443_009

352

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[5] Aristotle then addresses the question of coming to being again, this time as a mirror image of [3]: how can things come to be from that which is not (matter has already been explained to exist in one respect, and not exist in another). Since “not being” has three meanings (which he does not enumerate), Aristotle states that the relevant meaning for “not being” in matter is potentiality (1069b26–28). He further restricts the meaning of potentiality as to referring to something distinctive (1069b28–29), accommodating his position that there are different types of matter. This serves as a platform for criticizing Anaxagoras’ position that “all things were together,” which Aristotle takes to mean that all things have the same matter. Had that been the case, plurality would not be possible, as only one thing would have come to be, because Anaxagoras’ notion of Nous has already been posited as “one” (1069b29–32). [6] The chapter concludes with reiterating that there are three principles and causes of sensible substances: form, privation (which is contrary to form), and matter (1069b32–34).3

2

Themistius

[1] In the first part of his paraphrase of chapter 2, Themistius repeats Aristotle’s position that there must be an underlying substratum that receives contraries, but with two important substitutions (‫ד‬3–6). First, Themistius avoids using the term “matter,” here substituted by “nature” and afterwards by “body”—at least until the middle of chapter 3, where the term “matter” is properly defined (‫ו‬13; this issue is discussed above, Chapter 2, tables 59, 60). Second, Themistius substitutes Aristotle’s argument for the necessity of the substratum; while Aristotle justifies this by claiming that neither contrary can persist (1069b7–9), Themistius justifies this by claiming that neither contrary can carry the other. [2] Themistius then repeats Aristotle’s presentation (1069b9–14) of the first three kinds of change (in definition, quality, and quantity) with some elaboration (‫ד‬6–10), before devoting some space for explaining change in place with reference to the celestial bodies, especially regarding the question of contrariety in spatial motion (‫ד‬10–14). The question of contrariety leads back to the issue of the “body” as a receptor of contraries (1069b14–15), reflected in 3 Aristotle does not elaborate, but he probably means that each of the three is a principle that plays a different role in the changeability of sensible substances. Taken without qualification, privation is actually not being something, and is thus contrary to form, which is actually being the something which privation is not, while matter is the underlying constant, which is changed from the one to the other. See Rapp, “Principles,” 90–94 for further discussion.

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Themistius by a discussion of the difference between the “body” of the celestial bodies (changeable only with regards to position) and the “body” of perishable sensible substances (wholly changeable) (‫ד‬15–21), anticipating Aristotle’s discussion of this matter at 1069b25–26 (see part [4]). [3] Afterwards, Themistius repeats Aristotle’s position (1069b15–20) about matter as potentiality and its role in coming to being (again avoiding the term “matter”), adding a few examples (‫ד‬21–25) and then, applying “syntax” and “orientation” (‫ד‬25–29), presenting this position as a reply to the puzzle about how things can come to be from something that is not (which Aristotle raises later, at part [5], at 1069b26–28). Aristotle’s critical discussion of Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Anaximander, and Democritus (1069b20–24) is subtracted. The latter three philosophers are completely ignored, while Themistius devotes a special discussion to Anaxagoras at the end of the chapter, where Aristotle returns to his views (‫ה‬9 etc. see [5]). [4] Aristotle’s discussion of different kinds of matter for each kind of change, which results in his introduction of the celestial bodies’ “topical matter” (1069b24–26), was in a way already covered in Themistius’ paraphrase of part [2] (‫ד‬15–21), so here Themistius, in line with the “syntax” procedure, restricts his comments to a brief explanation why all sensible substances—eternal and perishable—must have a “body” (‫ד‬29–31). [5] Themistius skips Aristotle’s presentation of the question how a thing can come to be from something that is not (1069b26–28) since he already introduced it at [3] (‫ד‬25–29). Instead, he heads straight into an elaboration upon Aristotle’s undeveloped remark (1069b28–29) that non-existence is threefold, enumerating the three senses as (a) complete non-existence; (b) privation, as a contrary to that which comes to be; and (c) potentiality (‫ד‬32–33). Themistius clarifies why coming to be cannot proceed from the first two options (‫ד‬33– ‫ה‬2), and then—aligning himself again with Aristotle’s text (1069b28–29)— discusses the “body” as potentiality, i.e., the third option of non-existence (‫ה‬2– 4), adding examples to explain that each potentiality is restricted to its proper domain, as it is untrue that anything can come to be from anything (‫ה‬4–8). As we have seen, in his own text, Aristotle introduces the idea that anything can come to be from anything as a platform to criticize Anaxagoras’ view about “all things were together” (1069b26–32). Themistius starts his discussion by repeating this criticism, somewhat augmented (‫ה‬8–11), and then departs to an independent digression in which he seems to advocate some sort of cosmogony (‫ה‬11–25):4 first, Themistius argues that it is impossible to think that plurality is

4 See discussion in Guldentops, “La Science,” 112.

354

commentary

coerced by “the creator” (‫)הבורא‬, who originally devised reality as devoid of a potency for plurality, because that would be “unfitting of the wise” (‫ה‬11–14). In other words, Themistius situates the discussion within a cosmogonic framework and argues from the premise of the wisdom of the creator, which results in the necessity of “the body’s” natural susceptibility to plurality. (This is of course well-beyond Aristotle’s argument.) Second, Themistius proceeds to present Anaxagoras’ view, as he understands it. According to Themistius, Anaxagoras accepts “the creator”5 as one and wise, and the fact that matter is coerced into plurality does not undermine this. For Anaxagoras, the wisdom of the creator is expressed through the analogy of the craftsman. The creator, as craftsman, makes one body by disassembling another and rearranging its parts “in different forms, according to what he needs” (‫ה‬14–18).6 Themistius seems to be saying that for Anaxagoras the only principle of plurality is the creator’s thought, whereas matter is not susceptible to plurality by nature; rather, it is coerced by the creator’s action upon it, analogous to raw material for a craftsman. Themistius then proceeds to criticize Anaxagoras’ view (at least as he presents it), arguing that it does not reflect the manner in which “we” observe “the body” changing in nature, which is gradual: “first into the four elements, and then into the plants and the animals” (‫ה‬18–20). Themistius’ own opinion is

5 In Oration 26 Themistius credits Anaxagoras as being “the first to bring Mind and God into the creation of the world (κοσμοποιία)” (Penella, Orations, 147 = 317d1). According to Penella (147n14), the word “and” (καί) is epexegetical. 6 Themistius uses the expression ‫ ויפרקהו הפרוק‬and then ‫ויחברהו ויצרפהו וירכיבהו‬. With no Greek or even Arabic it is impossible to say anything certain about his terminology here, but there is a good chance that he is reproducing Anaxagoras’ technical terms ἀποκρίνεσθαι, προσκρίνεσθαι, συνκρίνεσθαι, and συμπήγνυσθαι (not necessarily in that order). In a private communication, Chiara Ferella indicates that Themistius’ remark about Anaxagoras is probably a unicum in the whole of Anaxagoras’ tradition, and it does not sit well with what we know about Anaxagoras’ philosophy. Themistius ascribes to Anaxagoras the idea of a Creator, who acts on the things “demiurgically,” and this is much more than we can infer from Anaxagoras’ surviving remarks about Nous. According to Ferella, while it is fairly clear that Nous is the moving principle responsible for the rotation of the mix (where “everything was together”) which caused the process of “separating off,” which subsequently resulted in the formation of our universe, there is no clear evidence that Nous was directly involved in the separating off process itself, and even less so in the various forms of conjunction. But perhaps Themistius is trying to bridge a gap in Anaxagoras’ thought, since the latter states that Nous knows everything and rules everything. Maybe Themistius takes this to mean that Nous governs the process all the way through, starting with the primary rotation, up until and including the various things in nature. Thus, Themistius fuses two aspects of Anaxagoras’ Nous, which begins and controls the rotation on the one hand, and has capacities for knowing and deciding on the other (for a detailed discussion of these matters in Anaxagoras and further references see Curd, Anaxagoras, esp. 192–205).

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that there are in fact two principles of plurality: “the body,” and the creator. “The body” is like a piece of wax that can be molded into a plurality of things, whereas the creator is like the person who makes many things from wax: “the plurality in these forms comes from two things: one of them is the craftsman who crafts them, and the other is the wax that his craft works upon; the craftsman, because he crafts many forms, and the wax, because it is possible for it to receive many forms” (‫ה‬20–25). As I understand it, Themistius is implicitly criticizing Aristotle along with Anaxagoras in favor of a third view: each thinker offers only one principle of plurality (Aristotle—matter; Anaxagoras—the creator), whereas in fact both are principles of plurality—one passively, and one actively. In short, Themistius utilizes Aristotle’s discussion of Anaxagoras as a means to introduce a cosmogonic dimension which is absent from Aristotle’s original discussion, and then retains this dimension despite the rejection of Anaxagoras’ view. [6] Themistius does not paraphrase the final part of chapter 2, which introduces a division of substance into form, privation, and matter (1069b32–34). Applying “syntax,” he postpones the discussion of this division to his paraphrase of chapter 4 (‫ט‬25 etc.), where it is reintroduced (1070b11ff.) as a subdivision of the corruptible substance within the original tripartite division of substance.

3

Note on Sources

Of this chapter, only the first few sentences survive in Arabic, terminating at ‫ד‬8 (‫)المقابلة‬. The Arabic portion of this chapter in the present edition is based on MS Ẓāhiriyya 4871 (Damascus), 38v30–38, which is discussed above, Chapter 1, 2.2.1. It was published in Badawī, Arisṭū, 333, also consulted when preparing this edition and recorded in the critical apparatus. The French translation of chapter 2 appears in Brague, Thémistius, 55–58.

4

Running Commentary

‫ד‬4–6

‫وذلك أن…وتقبل الآخر‬: This is a different argument than Aristotle’s, who maintains (1069b7–9) that matter must be postulated because neither contrary persists. Themistius’ argument is that neither contrary can carry the other, hence they both need a common substrate.

356

commentary

‫ד‬4

‫موضوع‬: Frank (“Notes,” 219, §48) writes that the text should perhaps be emended to ‫موضع‬, but there is no reason for that, as the translation of ‫ موضوع‬into ‫ נושא‬is reinforced also by ‫ט‬28 and ‫ט‬29, now with Arabic thanks to ibn Taymiyya. There is certain Hebrew inconsistency regarding the translation of this term, alternating between ‫ נושא‬and ‫מונח‬. It seems as if there is a tendency to move away from ‫ מונח‬to ‫ נושא‬when translating ‫موضوع‬, but not in all cases, and they often appear as variants of each other (see Lexicon), one case with a gloss (D in ‫ד‬16 has ‫מונח‬ ‫)נושא‬. In Isḥāq’s translation of Themistius, in De an., 57,25 (Lyons, Arabic. 85,11), ‫ موضوع‬reflects ὑποκείμενος. According to Themistius, in Phys., 26,9–10, this term is used for “matter.” ‫ד‬5

‫تلفظ‬: My guess is that this is a translation of the verb ὑπεξίστημι, which Themistius uses in his paraphrase of Aristotle’s Physics in the same context. See 24,29–31 (Tr. Todd, Physics 1–3, 42): “… when the transformation to being educated comes about, one opposite is displaced (ὑπεξίσταται) in the face of the incoming one and what is not in opposition remains.” ‫ד‬6

‫وصفنا‬: Badawī suggests that the text may be read ‫( وضعنا‬see also Frank, “Notes,” 220, §49). Hebrew ‫ ספרנו‬is a translation of ‫وصفنا‬. To the best of my judgment ẓ should indeed be read ‫وصفنا‬. ‫ד‬7–8

‫وأن التغير…هواء‬: Themistius is not talking about non co-specific generation, but rather that matter loses one form and receives another in the process of coming to be and passing away. This is evident in the example of water and air, since in Aristotle the elements change into one another. ‫ד‬10

‫مرة‬: Badawī’s reading ‫ أخرى‬is unfounded as ẓ clearly has ‫مرة‬.

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‫ד‬11

‫الأجسام‬: The Hebrew translation ‫ הגרמים‬does not necessary mean that Moshe ibn Tibbon read ‫ الأجرام‬in the Arabic. The term ‫ גרם‬in the text only appears in the expression ‫הגרמים השמימיים‬, which as Ḥoresh has shown (“Averroes,” ‫–לא‬ ‫)לב‬, is interchangeable with ‫הגשמים השמימיים‬. ‫ד‬12

ً ‫كانت قد تتحرك هى أيضا‬: The Hebrew translation of these words is a good example of a difference between slavishly following the Arabic syntax and grammar in Version I and a freer Hebraized style in Version II. CTL have ‫הנה יהיו מתנועעים‬ ‫הם גם כן‬, directly reflecting the Arabic, while ABM present a smoother Hebrew in ‫הם גם כן מתנועעים‬. D is caught in between with ‫מתנועעים והם ג״כ‬. ‫من وجه ما‬: This is probably a translation of πως (see below, ‫י‬7 etc., where Themistius quotes Aristotle, Metaph., 1070b33f., almost word for word). ‫ד‬13–14 ‫התנועה בהם לפנים ולאחור‬: At first glance it would seem odd to mention “forward”

and “backward” motion with relation to the celestial bodies, which only move in one direction. However, as can be seen from the next sentence, Themistius probably has in mind Aristotle’s explanation that the opposition between “forward” and “backward” (which is the fundamental opposition in locomotion that enables to talk about priority in movement) in circular motion is essential if one wants to say that the celestial bodies move in the better of the two possible directions around a circle, just like right is better than left and upwards is better than downwards. See On the Heavens, 2.5.288a3: “For if nature always does the best among the possibilities, and [if] just as the motion toward the upper region is, among rectilinear motions, more honorable (since the upper region is more divine than the lower), in the same way too forward motion is more honorable than backward motion, [then] it has, if both right and left as stated previously (and the difficulty just stated testifies that it has), front and back. In fact this explanation resolves the difficulty. For if it is the best it can be, this would be an explanation of what was said. For it is best to be moved in a simple and ceaseless motion, and this in the more honorable direction” (translated in Lennox, “De Caelo 2.2,” 211–212, and see his discussion at 212n37).

358

commentary

‫ד‬14

‫المقابلة‬: ẓ terminates here. ‫הצדדים‬: I take ‫ צד‬to translate ‫جهة‬, which here I assume translates τρόπος in the

sense of “direction.” ‫ד‬18 ‫מצב‬: This is the only occurrence of this word in the present text. ‫ מצב‬usually translates ‫ وضع‬in this context (see, e.g., Ḥoresh, “Averroes,” s.v. ‫מצב‬, p. 103), for

the Greek θέσις (see, e.g., Themistius, in De an. 25,2; Lyons, Arabic, 11,15). ‫ד‬20–21 ‫ובו…בפועל‬: This sentence is barely comprehensible in Hebrew. Themistius is try-

ing to show that since celestial bodies move from place to place, they have in them something that is similar—even if this is a slight similarity—to transferring from potentially (the place where they are about to arrive) to actuality (the place they have arrived at). ‫ד‬21

(2)‫יהיו‬: This is an instance when confusion in the manuscripts reveals the Arabic term translated. As was shown above (note to ‫ג‬30), the verb ‫ صار‬was tricky to translate, and the present deliberation between ‫ היה‬and ‫ שב‬can be also seen in ‫ח‬13 and ‫יט‬26. Goshen-Gottstein, Syntax, 418, ‫א‬b presents ‫ שב‬as ‫ صار‬and notes (n13) that Shmuel ibn Tibbon also corrected ‫ שב‬into ‫היה‬. ‫ד‬25–26 ‫והספק…יסור‬: This is the first step of Themistius’ reorganization of the sec-

ond half of chapter 2. See Elders, Aristotle’s Theology, 94 for the placement of 1069b26–28 in the text (Themistius repositions only the presentation of the problem, not the discussion of types of non-existents, so there is no need to assume that his reorganization reflects an alternative textual tradition).

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‫ד‬25 ‫ מספקים‬/ ‫והספק‬: ‫ ספק‬is usually a translation of the Arabic ‫( شك‬e.g., Blumberg, Parva Naturalia, 37,11), which is Isḥāq’s standard translation for ἀπορία (see, e.g., Gutas, Theophrastus, s.v., škk; Themistius, in De an., 35,36; Lyons, Arabic, 35, 4). ‫ד‬32–33 ‫אבל…בכח‬: Themistius’ division of the non-existent (complete non-existence; privation; potentiality) is different from the usual context given, namely Aristotle at 1067b25–30: the false; the contrary to what is; the contrary to what is something (the latter two are types of potentiality; see discussion in Charles, “Metaphysics Λ 2,” 89n2; see Brague, Thémistius, 132, § 7 for more references). ‫ה‬2 ‫והוא עומד‬: This Hebrew expression can be understood in different ways. ‫ והוא‬can refer either to the thing that comes to be or to the privation, and ‫ עומד‬can translate here (at least) ‫قائم‬, ‫ثابت‬, ‫واقف‬, or ‫ باقى‬if it refers to the thing that comes to be, or (at least) ‫ لابث‬or ‫ ساكن‬if it refers to the privation. If the clause is referring to the privation, then ‫ והוא עומד‬might be a repetition of sorts of ‫“( המונח‬which stands”), which describes the privation a few lines earlier and renders it static, which (perhaps) would explain why nothing can come to be from it (cf. ‫יג‬28–30, where the Ideas are rendered useless through similar argumentation). Brague in his translation (“et que celle-ci subsiste”) understands the texts as referring to the thing that comes to be and has Themistius say that it subsists, which (I assume) serves as an explanation why it cannot come to be from the completely non-existent and the privation, which do not subsist. This would go well with the term ‫ثابت‬. My own guess—which is close to Brague’s—is that the text is referring to the things that comes to be and that Themistius is referring to persistence (ὑπομένειν), one of the characteristics that distinguish matter from privation and enables to explain why (non-incidental) coming to being is from the former, not the latter (See Themistius, in Phys., 24,15–25,23; translated, in Todd, Physics 1–3, 41–43). Isḥāq’s translation of this verb in his Arabic Physics in a close context is the hendiadys ‫( ٺثبت وتعاضد‬See Badawī, Al-Ṭabīʿa, vol. 1, 73 = Phys. 1.9.191a13; Physics 1.7, which contains Aristotle’s original discussion of the term with reference to matter and privation, is absent from the manuscript that Badawī edited and is translated by Badawī himself. The other three instances of ὑπομένειν in the Arabic translations of the Physics—206b1; 208a21; 214b26— have ‫)باق‬.

360

commentary

‫ה‬3–4 ‫ובפועל אין הוא אלא שהוא‬: Brague (Thémistius, 57n2), following Landauer, notes that this whole formulation is obscure. I take Themistius to mean that once the thing that has come to be is actualized, there is no ontological gap between what it can be and what it actually is. ‫ה‬4 ‫אי זה גשם שיקרה‬: This perhaps should be understood as “any random body,” as ‫ שיקרה‬ultimately derives from τυγχάνω, probably via ‫( اتفق‬e.g., Themistius, in

De an., 23,26; Lyons, Arabic, 9,2). ‫ה‬9 ‫יחס‬: probably translates ‫ نسب‬or ‫نسبة‬, which in turn translates λόγος (as a for-

mative principle). Themistius is anticipating his discussion of the logoi as preexisting in matter in his appendix to his paraphrase of chapter 3 (especially starting from ‫ח‬2; see Brague, Thémistius, 132, §9, for reference to Stoic precedents). ‫ה‬10 ‫רבוי‬: Brague (Thémistius, 132, §10) maintains that the question of the origin

of plurality is not raised by Aristotle but by Plotinus, and refers to Enneads V.i.6, but besides raising the question there I do not see any connection to Themistius’ discussion. However, the question of plurality is in fact addressed by Aristotle, who writes: “Nor is it enough to say ‘all things were together,’ for they differ in their matter, since otherwise why did an unlimited number of things come to be and not one?” (1069a29–31; tr. Reeve). Themistius implicitly criticizes Aristotle’s answer (matter as the principle of plurality) when advancing his own at the end of the chapter. ‫ה‬15

The expression ‫“( אחר ש‬because”) usually revises Version I (in manuscript C, sometimes reflected in other manuscripts as well) when it has ‫ה( כאשר‬15; ‫יג‬10; ‫יג‬25; ‫כה‬1; ‫כה‬11; there is one occurrence of ‫אם‬: ‫כו‬24). There is only one place with variants where the Arabic exists for these examples, and there we have ‫إذ‬. According to Goshen-Gottstein, Syntax, 186‫ב‬, ‫ אחר ש‬is a standard translation

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for ‫إذ‬, and we can find it consistently, e.g., in Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation of Averroes’ epitome of On the Heavens (see Ḥoresh, “Averroes,” 2,6; 2,10, and passim), so a case could be made for this to be a standardization of translating this term when it has a causal meaning. There are only two cases of agreement about ‫ אחר ש‬among all the manuscripts. In the first case (‫י‬15) the Arabic has ‫بعد‬ ‫أن‬, meaning “after,” and the second (32‫ )כו‬probably reflects ‫إذ‬. ‫ה‬17 ‫ויפרקהו…וירכיבהו‬: It is impossible to say something certain about Themistius’

terminology here, but there is a good chance that he is reproducing Anaxagoras’ technical terms ἀποκρίνεσθαι (separate off), προσκρίνεσθαι (conjoin), συγκρίνεσθαι (connect), and συμπήγνυσθαι (compound), not necessarily in that order. See discussion in Curd, Anaxagoras, 192–205. ‫ויצרפהו‬: If the Greek indeed had a form of συγκρίνεσθαι here, it is possible that

Isḥāq’s Arabic translation was ‫( و يضيفه‬Glossarium Græco-Arabicum, s.v. συγκρίνω [4]). Perhaps, then, the version reflected in C misread ‫ و يحصنه‬or ‫?و يصوغه‬ ‫ה‬23 ‫הצורף‬: The Arabic here was most likely ‫الصائغ‬, translating δημιουργός. δημιουργέω is translated as ‫ صاغ‬at Themisitus, in De an., 99,25 (Arabic in Lyons, Arabic, 180,8) and is appropriate to the “demiurgic” description of the Divine Mind (see Twetten, “Aristotelian Cosmology,” 330). Version I of the Hebrew translation (in C) probably misread ‫الصانع‬, hence the initial ‫האומן‬. Version I exhibits unfamiliarity with the verb ‫صاغ‬, as can also be seen in ‫ה‬24, where it is initially translated into the root ‫חק״ה‬, perhaps reflecting the meaning of the verb as preparing a thing “after the pattern of a right model” (See Lane, Lexicon, s.v. ‫[ صوغ‬1]). ‫ה‬24 ‫תצורף‬/‫הצורף‬/‫יצרוף‬: see ‫ה‬23.

Chapter 3 1

Aristotle

The “ugly duckling” of Metaphysics 12 (to borrow Judson’s term1), chapter 3 is a somewhat disjointed series of terse arguments which revolve mainly around the question of the form as a principle (analogous to the treatment of matter in chapter 2), but also introduces the efficient cause into the discussion and asks about its relation to matter and form.2 The chapter contains reference to the Platonic Ideas and reflects about the possibility of a form existing over and above particular composite substances, ending with a claim that there is no need for the existence of Ideas insofar as they are agents of coming to be. The chapter can be divided into 6 segments:3 [1] The chapter opens with an argument (1069b35–1070a4) denying the coming to being of “ultimate” (ἔσχατα) matter and form,4 introducing the efficient cause into the discussion (1070a1). Aristotle apparently argues that if matter and form themselves were to come to be, each of them would have to have matter (and form), because matter is a principle of change, but if so, then that matter as well would have matter (and form), because it would also need a principle of change (i.e., matter), and so forth ad infinitum. [2] Aristotle then discusses the four manners of coming to be of substance (art, nature, luck, and spontaneity); in the first two the efficient cause is synonymous (i.e., is of the same form) with the product, whereas the efficient causes of the latter two are respective privations of the former two (1070a4–9).5 [3] In the next part, Aristotle offers a threefold division of substances into matter, form, and the composite of matter of form, analyzing them with respect to their being a “this-something” (τόδε τι):6 matter hardly qualifies, form is a this-something, as are particulars, since they are composed of matter and form (1070a9–13). 1 Judson, “Formlessness,” 111. 2 Menn, Aim, IIIβ1, 25, emphasizes the role of form as substance in this chapter, while Rapp, “Principles,” 94–97, underscores the importance of the introduction of the efficient cause. 3 Judson, “Formlessness,” 111. 4 Namely, the form or matter “that must already be there when a process of production of coming to be begins” (Reeve, Metaphysics, 515, §1296). 5 Although he does not elaborate, I take Aristotle’s claim here as tantamount to employing privation (which is the contrary to form), as a principle for coming to be in cases of spontaneity (in nature) and luck (in art). 6 For this term see Gill, “Individuals,” 68, and Wu, Structure, 123–124.

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[4] The next step of the discussion is exploring whether the form can exist over and above the particular substances, a possibility which is denied of artificial substances (1070a13–17), but is entertained concerning natural substances, acknowledging Plato (or “those who posited the forms,” depending on the textual tradition) for realizing this by only committing to Ideas of natural things (1070a17–21). [5] Aristotle then turns to discuss efficient causes and formal causes from a temporal point of view, noting that efficient causes exist before their effects come to be (1070a21–22), formal causes are concurrent to their effects (1070a22–24), and the question regarding the possibility of something remaining after the passing of the substance remains open, citing the intellect as a possible candidate for this (1070a24–27). [6] Aristotle concludes the chapter with a brief note about the Ideas being superfluous, explaining that in natural coming to be the efficient cause is a particular with the same form as its offspring, and in the arts—the form is the art itself (1070a27–30).

2

Themistius

[1] Themistius opens his paraphrase of chapter 3 reflecting Aristotle’s comments (1069b35–1070a4) denying coming to be from matter (here: “the recipient body”) and form with some elaboration (‫ה‬26–32), with two notable differences. First, Themistius qualifies the statement in a way that might be understood as implying that matter and from are created in another way (see ‫ה‬27 and ‫ה‬31), also substituting Aristotle’s “direct mover” with an artisan. Second, he (quite logically) extends Aristotle’s argument to passing away (‫ה‬31–32). [2] Themistius reflects Aristotle’s presentation of the four manners of coming to be with respect to the efficient cause (1070a4–9) faithfully, adding a few clarifying remarks about how it occurs concerning spontaneity and luck, accompanied by examples (‫ו‬1–9). [3] Applying orientation, Themistius first repeats Aristotle’s original threefold division of substance from chapter 1 (1069a30–33) with respect to the manner of their apprehension: perishable sensible substances and eternal sensible substances are apprehended by the senses, while the eternal unmoved substance is apprehended by the intellect (‫ו‬10–12). Only then does he align with Aristotle’s division of substance into matter, form, and composite (1070a9– 13), stressing that this is a subdivision within the perishable sensible substance (‫ו‬12–14). This is the first time in Themistius’ text that the term “matter” appears, and it is defined as “the body that receives the form” (‫ו‬13–14) within the

364

commentary

perishable sensible substance. Afterwards Themistius elaborates upon the term “this-something,” noting that it is the basic criterion for being a substance (‫ו‬14–16) and proceeding to apply it respectively to matter, form, and the composite (‫ו‬16–31), devoting most of the discussion to matter and its “shame” (‫ו‬16– 29), perhaps even alluding to the concept of “prime matter” (‫ו‬24). The form and the composite are only brushed upon, reflecting Aristotle’s position: while the former is a “this-something” (‫ו‬29–30), the latter is a “this-something” to the highest degree (‫ו‬30–31). [4] As to the question whether any form can exist apart, Themistius first introduces the question (‫ו‬32–‫ז‬1), and then explains that this is impossible for artificial things (‫ז‬1–5), more or less following Aristotle’s argumentation (1070a13–17). Turning to natural forms, Themistius substitutes Aristotle’s position with a stronger claim. While Aristotle suggests this as a possibility to be explored, Themistius (‫ז‬6–7) is emphatic about the soul and the intellect existing apart (reflecting Aristotle’s careful suggestion of intellect later on at 1070a25–27), and duly agrees (‫ז‬7–8) with Aristotle’s positive assessment of the Platonists who only adhered to Ideas of natural things (1070a17–21). Still, Themistius makes it clear that for the most part, natural forms cannot persist without matter, citing a few examples (‫ז‬8–10). [5] Regarding the temporal existence of forms, Themistius proceeds more or less along Aristotle’s line of argumentation (1070a21–27). The efficient moving cause, which has the same form as its effect, exists before it in nature (e.g., the father) as well as in art (e.g., the mind of the sculptor) (‫ז‬10–12); The form of composite substances is concurrent with the substances (‫ז‬12–14); and the question of what happens to the form after the substance perishes remains open with respect to the intellect (‫ז‬14–17). Here Themistius is somewhat contradicting himself, because a few lines earlier he was stressed soul and intellect’s separate existence (‫ז‬6–7). But the part of the text paraphrasing 1070a24–27 is almost a word-for-word quotation of the text, so perhaps it should be taken as expressing Aristotle’s view, where earlier Themistius’ own voice was heard. [6] The conclusion of this chapter, in which Aristotle offers a condensed argument refuting the Platonic Ideas (1070a27–30), is substituted by Themistius with a much more detailed argument (‫ז‬17–27), which is based on Aristotle’s discussions in Metaphysics Z 7–9.7 Themistius will respond to this argument in the immediately following digression, which is an appendix of sorts.

7 For a detailed discussion of this argument and the appendix following it see Meyrav, “Spontaneous Generation,” and Henry, “Themistius.”

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Themistius’ version of the argument against the Ideas is composed of three parts. The first part (‫ז‬17–21) addresses the possibility of the Platonic Idea as the active principle in the process of begetting of living things, and shows that there is no need for them, assuming that the parent already occupies this function (man from man, horse from horse, etc.). The second part (‫ז‬20–23) denies the need for Platonic Ideas as external models according to which living things are begotten, since the shared definition of maker and made (and, obviously, shared form) are sufficient to show that the individual form is its own model. The third part (‫ז‬23–27) denies the need for Platonic Ideas as models according to which the arts do their work, since artisans act according to the form of the product (chair; health; house) already present in their mind. Taken together, the first and second parts of the argument deal with natural coming to be, whereas the final part deals with artificial things. The first part criticizes Platonic Ideas as active principles, while the second and the third criticize Platonic Ideas as external models according to which things come to be. [Appendix] Themistius opines upon Aristotle’s critique with a lengthy digression in which he defends the existence of logoi, formative principles latent in matter that are actualized by a certain “soul in the earth” (‫ז‬27–‫ח‬27). Themistius begins his discussion by arguing that Aristotle’s critique only addresses cospecific generation, whereas spontaneous generation, in which the offspring and the “parent” do not share the same form (e.g., frogs from putrescence), serves as a counterexample (‫ז‬27–‫ח‬2). He then introduces the concept of logoi, which are formative principles in matter, noting that it is clear that they exist in cases of co-specific generation (‫ח‬2–5), only to argue that they must necessarily exist in the matter of spontaneously generated animals as well because without them the latter cannot be actualized (‫ח‬5–7). This, he maintains, is where our admiration towards “the Artisan” should lie, as (unlike co-specific generation) He enables a superior effect (e.g., frog) from an inferior cause (e.g., putrescence). And since this is where the Artisan’s work is apparent, the principle behind it should be the one we follow, and extend this explanation to all cases of natural generation (‫ח‬7–10). Co-specific generation also needs the aid of exterior causality besides the parents, because causality among bodies cannot be comprehensive. Only the causality of nature is able to instill the logos in the offspring (‫ח‬10–16). However, nature by itself is insufficient, as it is unconscious and thus cannot be taken to be a fully active agent. This necessitates an appeal to a higher cause, namely “the soul in the earth,” which “inspires” the logoi. The soul in the earth, Themistius explains, was created either by the “secondary gods” (according to Plato) or by the sun and the ecliptic (according to Aristotle) (‫ח‬16–23). He concludes the appendix by claiming that there must exist logoi latent in the begetting nature (‫ח‬23–27), effectively overriding Aristo-

366

commentary

tle’s critique, which revolved around the premise that the relation between the parent and the offspring is sufficient for explaining coming to be. It is important to note that Themistius’ response is not a return to the Platonic Ideas, but only an explanation that Aristotle’s biology cannot account for coming to be without appealing to a superior active agent, hence constituting formal continuity between the realm of nature and the metaphysical realm (see Conclusion).

3

Note on Sources

The appendix of the present chapter (‫ז‬27–‫ח‬27), which contains Themistius’ independent discussion about logoi as formative principles, is quoted in full by Averroes (Tafsīr, 1492,3–1494,13) and employed in the present edition (for the Hebrew see Appendix B, Text 2). Gersonides quotes from the same passage in Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation, with some revisions (see above, Chapter 1, 3.2.3). The French translation of chapter 3 appears in Brague, Thémistius, 59–64. An English translation of the appendix and the argument that precedes it (‫ז‬17–‫ח‬27) is incorporated into the discussion of Meyrav, “Spontaneous Generation,” 198– 208. Another English version of the appendix (‫ז‬27–‫ח‬27) appears in Genequand, Ibn Rushd, 105–107, subsequently revised in Sorabji, Philosophy, vol. 1, 259 (partial) and vol. 2, 42–43 (complete). Martin’s French version of the appendix is found in Averroès, 128–130.

4

Running Commentary

‫ה‬26 ‫בספר החכמה הטבעית‬: See Aristotle, Physics, 1.9. But the argument put forth here seems to be based on an argument at Metaph. 7.8, of which Aristotle’s discussion at 1069b35–1070a4 is an abbreviation (or the former is an expansion upon the latter, depending on the order of composition). The affinity between Metaph. 12.3 and 7.7–9 has long been noticed (See Judson, “Formlessness,” esp. 111–124, for a recent overview and discussion), so Themistius’ employment of them here is not unusual (see See Judson, “Formlessness,” 125–126, for the present passage).

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‫ה‬26–27 ‫הצורה…אותה‬: From the manuscripts it is apparent that the sentence was initially read in the plural (‫)הצורות‬, and then revised to the singular (‫)הצורה‬. Since the present edition attempts to reflect the revised version, I retained the plural, because there is no way to decide upon this matter with the Arabic absent. However, perhaps the plural should be preferred, if we take the present text as a direct continuation of the previous chapter, which had ended speaking about the plurality of forms. This does not affect the understanding of the argument. ‫ה‬27 ‫לבד‬: Brague (Thémistius, 59n1) suspects that this word should be excised as an erroneous copy of its next instance in the following line. This is possible, but perhaps the sentence can be understood as meaning that a form cannot participate in a process of coming to be without being accompanied by matter, as the immediately following example tries to show. ‫העגול‬: Brague (Thémistius, 59n2) thinks that the text should be read ‫“( העגוֹל‬the round”) rather than ‫“( הִﬠגּוּל‬the circle”), and I agree as this better reflects the Greek (στρογγύλον; 1070a3). This reading renders the gloss ‫ צורת‬in AMC1 redundant. ‫ה‬29 ‫הצורף‬: Themistius’ uses “craftsman” for the sake of continuity with the previous

discussion. Aristotle has “the direct mover” (τοῦ πρώτου κινοῦντος; see Reeve, Metaphysics, 515, §1297) at 1070a1 and 7.8.1033a34 refers to a producer. ‫ו‬1–2 ‫יפול עליו שמו לבדו‬: Assuming, with Brague (Thémistius, 59n3), ‫يوقع عليه اسمه فقط‬. Perhaps Themistius’ qualification here reflects Aristotle’s qualification about synonymous coming into being at 7.8.1033b30–32: “In some cases it is even evident that the begetter is of the same sort as the begotten (not that they are the same things, certainly, nor one in number, but one in form)” (tr. Reeve).

368

commentary

‫ו‬4–5 ‫והאומנות…בעינו‬: This was probably originally a literal (or almost literal) quotation of 1070a7–8 (ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ; “now art is a principle in another thing, whereas nature is a principle in [the thing] itself”). The Hebrew of the first half (‫ )התחלה מאחד באחר‬is confusing: ‫ אחד‬refers to the artificial product, ‫—אחר‬to the artisan. ‫ו‬6 ‫והריעועים‬: The noun ‫ ִרעוּ ַע‬literary means “breaking” (see Even Shoshan, Dictionary, s.v.), but in the present context is used more abstractly as something bad that happens. The term reflects Aristotle’s notions of privation within coming to be in the sphere of action, which is usually referred to as luck (τύχη; as in 1070a6; see discussion of Aristotle’s inner logic on the manner in Dudley, Aristotle’s Concept of Chance, 163–165, and his remarks on the present passage at 40–42; 98–99). τύχη in itself is a neutral term (it could just as well lead to welcome results), and if indeed this is the Greek term reflected in the Hebrew, perhaps the negative connotation carried on from the example was in some way expressed in the Arabic. ‫מעיק‬/‫יעיק‬: It is fairly clear that the Arabic has the verb ‫ يعوق‬and afterwards the participle ‫( معوق‬see, e.g., ‫יב‬26; ‫כ‬4). The revision from the original ‫מונע‬/‫ימנע‬, which in the present context is identical in meaning, seems to a preference to save the latter to the Arabic root ‫منع‬. The form ‫ יעיין‬in A is a corruption of ‫יעיק‬. ‫ו‬7 ‫בשתיוחס‬: The variation between ‫ בשתיוחס‬and ‫ כשתיוחס‬reflects a commonplace phenomenon in medieval Hebrew manuscripts of mixing up the prefixes ‫ כש‬and ‫ בש‬owing to their graphical similarity. See Goshen-Gottstein, Syntax, § 279‫ב‬, and n5 there. ‫ו‬8 ‫המנהיג‬: Brague (Thémistius, 133, §2) notes a similar example in Themistius’ paraphrase of the Physics, 45, 12. ‫מנהיג‬, translating ‫ مدبر‬or ‫ر بان‬, ultimately rolls back to κυβερνήτης.

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‫ו‬13 ‫היסוד‬: This was probably the first time the term ὕλη occurred in Themistius’ text, making clear his intention to relegate it to the corruptible sensible substance. Up to this point in the text, Themistius preferred either “body” or “recipient,” even when Aristotle’s text explicitly used the term “matter.” For the philosophical significance of Themistius’ terminological preferences in this context see above, Chapter 2, tables 59 and 60. For the terminological problem in the Arabic and Hebrew translations see the case study in Appendix C. ‫ו‬15 ‫רמוז אליו בנפשו‬: Brague remarks that ‫ רמוז אליו‬is “sans doute” the Arabic ‫مشار إليه‬.

The expression τόδε τι καθ’ αὑτήν in Themistius, in De an., 39,8 is translated into ‫( مشارا ًإليه بذاته‬Lyons, Arabic, 39,4), and reflected here in the Hebrew as ‫רמוז אליו‬ ‫בנפשו‬. ‫ו‬16 ‫כי אתה…על זה‬: The variations among the manuscripts make this sentence difficult to understand. It seems that the addition ‫“( בכל עת‬always”) in AM can be discarded, because it is unconnected to the argument, and also because the term ‫ בכל עת‬does not appear anywhere else in the text (which prefers ‫תמיד‬, or—on one occasion—‫כב ;בכל אחד מן העתים‬18). The question, then, remains regarding the variance between ‫( אלא‬in CDT, adopted by Landauer) and ‫אליו‬ (in ABM). ‫ אליו‬might be a corruption of ‫אלא‬, or a correction of a translation of ‫ إلا‬to ‫إليه‬. The first option would amount to this sentence: ‫כי אתה כאשר הורית על דבר משאר התארים לא תהיה הרמיזה אלא על זה‬

In this case, ‫ על זה‬complements ‫הרמיזה‬, and the meaning of the sentence would be something like “for you, when you point to one of the rest of the [substance’s] attributes, the reference is none other than to this [i.e., to its being a “this-something”],” or perhaps “for you, when you point to one of the rest of the [substance’s] attributes, the reference is only [made possible] because of this [i.e., the fact that the substance is a “this-something”].” Both options have some affinity with the logical consideration presented at ‫א‬11 ff., which argued that the categories owe their existence to the fact that the substance exists. If we follow ABM (without the addition ‫)בכל עת‬, the sentence will be read like this:

370

commentary

‫כי אתה כאשר הורית על דבר משאר התארים לא תהיה הרמיזה אליו על זה‬

In this case, ‫ אליו‬complements ‫הרמיזה‬, and ‫ על זה‬complements the construct ‫הרמיזה אליו‬, enabling two ways to understanding that sentence, depending on how we understand the expression ‫הרמיזה אליו‬. If we understand it as a translation of τὸ τόδε τι, then the sentence means something like this: “for you, when you point to one of the rest of the [substance’s] attributes, the ‘thissomethingness’ [that characterizes substance] is not on accord of that,” meaning, simply, that none of the other attributes a substance might have would suffice for it to a be a “this-something.” The other option would be to understand ‫ רמיזה‬as “reference,” amounting to the construction “you, when you point to one of the rest of the [substance’s] attributes, the reference to it is not due to it,” which I do not know how to explain. Since the term ‫ רמיזה‬appears in the text only in the present instance, I think it is plausible to see it with connection to the term ‫רמוז אליו בנפשו‬, so my guess is that the version in ABM should be adopted, where ‫ הרמיזה אליו‬ultimately translates τὸ τόδε τι, perhaps through ‫الإشارة إليه‬. ‫ו‬16–28

The present passage is Themistius’ explanation Aristotle’s curious words at 1070a9–11: ἡ μὲν ὕλη τόδε τι οὖσα τῷ φαίνεσθαι (ὅσα γὰρ ἁφῇ καὶ μὴ συμφύσει, ὕλη καὶ ὑποκείμενον) (“the matter, which is a this something [merely] in appearance (for whatever is by contact and not by natural unity is matter and underlying subject)”; tr. Reeve). Themistius’ understanding of this sentence should be added to the list of interpretations cited by Elders, Aristotle’s Theology, 102–103 and warrants further study. Themistius seems to be trying to settle an apparent contradiction in Aristotle’s writings, since Aristotle sometimes claims that matter can be a “this-something,” and sometimes that it cannot. See Judson, “Metaphysics Λ 3,” 128–129, for references and discussion of the problematic passages. ‫ו‬20 ‫ולא ישיגהו החוש עד שהוא לובש צורה‬: the expression ‫ עד ש‬is a translation of ‫حتى‬ (see below, Lexicon, s.v.), but the variant ‫ אלא‬seems to understand the term in

the present context as indicating an exception (Wright, Grammar, vol. 2, § 52, p. 146). The composite ‫אלא עד ש‬, in AM, is a gloss combining the two options with an accidental independent meaning, but it is not found anywhere else in the text. There are, then, two ways to understand the text: either “the sense

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does not apprehend it [i.e., matter] until it assumes a form” (as reflected in D), or “the sense does not apprehend it [i.e., matter] unless it assumes a form” (as reflected in CB and adopted by Landauer). This is a fine point; Themistius’ discussion offers a narrative which would accept the temporal sense for prosaic reasons, however taken logically the exclusive sense is perhaps more exact. Nevertheless, I adopt the reading ‫ עד ש‬as it is the common translation of ‫حتى‬, but hesitantly, as the distribution of the variants among the manuscripts suggests a revision in favor of ‫אלא‬. The independent version in T (‫ )אם לא‬is either a corruption, or opens the theoretical option that the Arabic had ‫إلا‬, but this perhaps would be reaching. ‫ו‬21 ‫מזוייף‬: If ‫ מזוייף‬here translates ‫زور‬, then Brague’s suggestion (Thémistius, 134, § 7) that it is connected to Plato’s “bastard” (νόθος) reasoning in the Timaeus can be reinforced, as this is precisely the connection Themistius makes in his paraphrase of On the Soul, which refers to “Plato’s claim that matter is ‘to be grasped by bastard reasoning,’ for it is precisely a ‘bastard’ activity of both the intellect and sense-perception in that it occurs not in respect of a [direct] impacting of form [on the intellect] but in respect of a process of withdrawal” (in De an., 111, 24–26, translated in Todd, On the Soul, 137). In this passage νόθος is translated into ‫( زور‬Lyons, Arabic, 203, 14; 15). The earlier option ‫ תמה‬in C is used here in the meaning of “dubious” which is less exact. Moshe ibn Tibbon uses this root to translate ‫“( عجب‬wonder”; in the present text, consistently, ‫ )פלא‬and ‫( استغراب‬puzzlement) in his translation of Averroes’ epitome of the Parva Naturalia (Blumberg, Averrois, 60,5; 68,6). In the present work the term ‫ תמה‬appears (in all manuscripts) at ‫כט‬5 of which the Arabic is unavailable, in the meaning of “puzzle” or perhaps even “absurdity.” ‫ו‬26 ‫והרוחק‬: I follow Landauer’s choice (also adopted by Brague) and take Themis-

tius to be talking about matter’s “remoteness,” preferring it over the variant ‫והדוחק‬, which could also fit in the sense of “poverty” or “want.” Doubtless one option is the corruption of the other; but since a few lines earlier (‫ו‬19) we already had ‫ דלות‬and ‫ עניות‬in a sense close to ‫דוחק‬, it seems more plausible from the point of view of vocabulary that a new term is not added in the same sense (unless, of course, there were three distinct synonymous Arabic terms).

372

commentary

‫ו‬32 ‫נחקור ונבקש‬: This is probably a translation of ‫نبحث ونطلب‬, a common hendiadys translation of the verb ζητέω (see Gutas, Theophrastus, s.v. ṭlb, 457). ‫ז‬3 ‫לא תמלט‬: The revision of ‫ מנע‬into ‫ מלט‬was already encountered in ‫ג‬24, and is repeated in ‫יד‬5, reflecting a preference for reserving the root ‫ מנ״ע‬for translat-

ing the Arabic root ‫منع‬. It seems that Version I, mostly reflected in manuscript C, was unsure how to translate the Arabic expression ‫( لا يخلو من‬literally “is not devoid of”) and its likes, offering other options besides ‫לא ימנע מן‬, such as ‫לא‬ ‫יב( יעדר‬8) and ‫יב( לא תחסר‬22; ‫יט‬21). All these are aligned to the root ‫ מל״ט‬in Version II. I found similar examples of this preference in Ḥoresh, “Averroes,” 50,13; 73,5. The other options in Version I, among others, can be found in different Hebrew translations from Arabic, as shown in the examples referred to in the index of Goshen-Gottstein, Syntax, s.v. ‫כ׳לו‬. ‫ז‬6 ‫נברח‬: see above, Chapter 1, table 37. ‫ז‬8 ‫מסובכות בגשם‬: The other option is ‫מסובבות לגשם‬, and it is clear that one option is a corruption of the other. The variant ‫ לגשם‬is linked to the option ‫מסובבות‬, and this would have Themistius saying that the forms in nature are causally dependent upon the body, but this is meaningless because matter and form do not cause each other but are both causes within the substance. The option ‫( מסובכות בגשם‬not even recorded by Landauer, although appearing in D, which was available to him) should be preferred, having Themistius say that the forms in nature are “attached to” or “involved in” the body, which is a logical contrast to the previous option, which presented forms as unattached to the body (‫ז ;מופשטות מן הגשם‬6). The underlying Arabic verb was probably ‫ٺتشبث‬, similar to Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation of Averroes’ epitome of On the Heavens, which reads ‫وإنما يعرض( ואמנם יקרה לאש שתאיר כאשר הסתבכה בחמרים אשר בכאן‬ ‫ ;للنار الاضاءة عندما ٺتشبث بالمواد التى ها هنا‬Ḥoresh, “Averroes,” 48,8–9). In our text, the particle ‫ ב‬in ‫ בגשם‬is a reflection of the particle ‫ب‬, which complements the verb ‫تشبث‬.

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‫ז‬12 ‫ותרח‬: Moshe ibn Tibbon replaces Themistius’ original example, which was probably Polycleitus or Phidias, with the biblical Teraḥ, Abraham’s father, who according to the Jewish tradition manufactured idols for a living (for discussion see Brague, Thémistius, 134, §12). ‫ז‬27 ‫מספיק‬: Except for C1 and T, all the manuscripts have ‫“( פוסק‬terminates”), hav-

ing Themistius say that the present account terminates by relinquishing the Ideas. This does not reflect the Arabic, which has ‫مقنع‬. The term ‫ مقنع‬can mean “sufficient” or “persuasive,” but in the present context the latter meaning is preferable, expressing the Greek πιθανόν (see, e.g., Themistius’ in De an., 61,24— Lyons, Arabic, 95,2—and further discussion in Meyrav, “Spontaneous Generation,” 200n12). It would be strange for Themistius to say about an argument that it is sufficient, only to attack it immediately afterwards. This understanding is reflected in the early translation of Averroes’ Tafsīr by the term ‫הלציי‬ (“rhetorical,” see Appendix B). The later translation of Averroes has ‫מספיק‬, and as it incorporates Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation of the Themistius quotation, can serve as another testimony for ‫ מספיק‬within the textual transmission of Themistius’ text. ‫ז‬28

‫أغفل‬: it is difficult to understand how the Hebrew translation ‫ יקשה עליו‬came about, as it does not reflect the Arabic (“overlooked”; “neglected”) even remotely. Perhaps there was another version reading ‫ يعترض عليه‬or something similar, having Themistius say that the great number of spontaneously generated animals challenges the person who claims that there is no need for Ideas. For example, in Averroes’ epitome of Aristotle’s On the Heavens, Averroes writes ‫ وثامسطيوس يعترض على أرسطو توفيه السبب فى جنب الإناء المحمى الماء‬and Moshe ibn Tibbon translates ‫ותאמסטיוס יקשה על ארסטו להבאת הסבה במשיכת הכלי אשר‬ ‫( התחמם‬Ḥoresh, “Averroes,” 80,1–2; Themistius’ involvement in this example is accidental), and similar examples are provided by Goshen-Gottstein, Syntax, s.v. ‫קשה‬. It is noteworthy that the revised version of the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ Tafsīr alters Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation, which it is using, in favor of ‫עזב‬, which is acceptable for ‫( أغفل‬the early Hebrew version of the Tafsīr skips the word altogether, some manuscripts leaving an empty space for later completion; see Appendix B). ‫ أغفل‬is used in a close sense in Themistius’ para-

374

commentary

phrase of On the Soul, translating ἀμελέω (in De an., 35,4; Lyons, Arabic, 33,9; See Todd’s translation, in On the Soul, 51–52: “those who produce the intellect and sense-perception from the elements, and believe that these capacities are quite unique to the soul, also neglect the vegetative faculty”). ‫ז‬30–‫ח‬1

‫الجرجس…الجثة‬: Since the Arabic manuscript in Averroes skips this word, I retain Bouyges’ conjecture at the critical apparatus of 1492,7, which admittedly is nothing more than translating the Hebrew ‫ היתושים‬back into Arabic. Martin, Averroès, 128n6, reports that according to Arabic lexicography ‫ جرجس‬is synonymous with the more familiar ‫ بق‬and ‫ بعوض‬and adds further lexical discussions from Hebrew and Syriac. The explanatory remark ‫وهو نوع من الذباب صغير الجثة‬, with its strange mixture of singular and plural, seems like a gloss as it is alien to Themistius’ style to define a species in the course of discussion. If this is indeed a gloss, it in a way reinforces Bouyges’ conjecture of ‫جرجس‬, because a more familiar Arabic term such as ‫ بق‬and ‫ بعوض‬would not require clarification. ‫ח‬2

‫نعلم‬: The Arabic text is missing in the manuscript of Averroes’ Tafsīr, and Bouyges’ conjecture ‫ نتيقن‬at 1492,9 is unfounded. The Hebrew has ‫ נדע‬universally (see also Appendix B), and at 1494,13, which is still part of the quotation from Themistius, there is a clear case of ‫ نعلم‬translated as ‫נדע‬. The root ‫ يقن‬is absent from the extant Arabic of Themistius’ paraphrase. ‫ח‬3

‫نسبا تخصه بها‬: There is a discrepancy between the Arabic and the Hebrew (‫יחס‬ ‫)ייחד אותו‬, the former has plural, and the latter—singular. The problem probably stems from the fact that ‫ نسب‬is singular when vocalized ‫( ن َس َب‬plural: ‫ )أنساب‬and plural when vocalized ‫( ن ِس َب‬singular: ‫)نسبة‬. Both are used in the same meaning (of λόγος) in the present passage. See Martin, Averroès, 129n7. ‫خاصة‬: The variation between ‫ בפרט‬and ‫ לבד‬in the Hebrew manuscripts is also found in ‫יג‬12, so there was probably some consideration behind this, the nature of which is unclear to me. Both are legitimate options and have been used widely. See Goshen-Gottstein, Syntax, §122‫ג–ב‬.

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‫ח‬5

‫فأ ين‬: according to Goshen-Gottstein (Syntax, §127), the Hebrew interrogative article ‫אנה‬, in the meaning of “where?” (also in the sense of the Aristotelian category), has become common owing to the influence of its Arabic counterpart ‫( أ ين‬see other examples in Efros, “Maimonides,” ‫מז‬8, and Ḥoresh, “Averroes,” 9,11; 28,17; 70,8; 70,14). The variant ‫ואין‬, if read ‫ ְוַא ִין‬, is also possible, but I have not found other examples of this in Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translations. ‫نظا ئر‬: The understanding of Themistius’ argument here has been affected by Genequand’s mistranslation of ‫ نظا ئر‬as “models,” which created the impression that Themistius is advocating a certain notion of Platonic Ideas (See Genequand, Ibn Rushd, 106, as well as Brague, Thémistius, 63, and subsequently Henry, “Themistius and Spontaneous Generation,” 185–186, later revised according to the correct reading in his “Themistius and the Problem of Spontaneous Generation,” 181 and nn. 6–7; for Hadot, Athenian, 88, this passage in its faulty translation is employed to reinforce the position that Themistius was a Neoplatonist). But ‫ نظير‬is here used for translating ἀνάλογος, as is commonplace in Isḥāq’s translation of Themistius’ paraphrase of On the Soul (See the glossary in Lyons, Arabic); Martin’s French “equivalents” (Averroès, 129) is a good translation. From the Arabic of the paraphrase available to us, ‫ نظير‬is never used in the meaning of model. The Hebrew ‫ דמיון‬is sometimes used in this sense, but in these cases it probably translates ‫( مثال‬as in ‫ז‬21, where the variant ‫ משל‬reveals the Arabic in the background). ‫ח‬7 ‫לא היה יוצא אל הפועל‬: These words are missing from Averroes’ quotation, and the Hebrew translation of Averroes (see appendix B) show that this omission is not the result of a single manuscript, but perhaps the text in front of Averroes. I have inserted the conjectured ‫ لا كان يخرج إلى الفعل‬into the Arabic edition. Without this text, Themistius would have been understood as stressing the existence of logoi of spontaneously generated animals and their location in matter. The missing text adds their role as the agents of actualization of these animals.

‫ولا يغرنك الاحتقار‬: The Hebrew reveals a problem either in the understanding or in the transmission of the Arabic text. The erroneous translation ‫ולא יחברך‬ ‫הבחינה‬, expressed in whole in D and in part in C, reflects, probably, a misreading of ‫ يغرنك‬as ‫ يقرنك‬and ‫ الاحتقار‬as ‫الاختبار‬. The eventual ‫ תזלזל‬relinquishes the verb ‫ يغرنك‬and transforms the maṣdar ‫ الاحتقار‬into a verb, perhaps because the

376

commentary

Arabic ‫ يغرنك‬was corrupt or impenetrable. The result is a slight change in meaning; the Arabic has Themistius say “do not be deceived by disdain …” and the Hebrew: “do not disdain …”. ‫ח‬8 ‫ערמתו‬: The variant ‫בקיאותו‬, supplied by T, is also found in the revised Hebrew translation of Averroes, which incorporated Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation (see Appendix B). ‫ח‬10

‫لا بد من‬: See above, Chapter 1, tables 33 and 34; For further examples—also in Moshe ibn Tibbon—see Goshen-Gottstein, Syntax, s.v. ‫)ג( אפשר‬. ‫ח‬16 ‫בפלא‬: ‫ נפלא‬in C, adopted by Landauer, is a corruption of ‫בפלא‬, which translates

‫من عجب‬. ‫)לא יבין מוליך מה שיעשהו( لا تفهم سواقة ما تعمله‬: There is confusion among the Hebrew manuscripts about the correct understanding of the word ‫سواقة‬. In Averroes’ manuscript, at least, we find ‫سواقه‬, which can be understood either as ‫( سواقة‬the directing of …) with an undotted tā marbūṭa (which is not uncommon), or as ‫ سواق‬with a possessive suffix (its director). The latter option is adopted in the form of ‫( הוליכו‬in B), of which ‫ הולידו‬in AM is a corruption, and the former is found in C1 as ‫מוליך‬, and adopted by Landauer (CD omit this word, making accidental sense). ‫ח‬18

‫)הוזכרו הזכרה( ألهمت إلهام‬: This expression, along with its recurrence at ‫ח‬22, is probably the most problematic in the entire text. Both the Arabic and the Hebrew pose us with some challenges, of different kinds. The Arabic is discussed in detail in Meyrav, “Spontaneous Generation,” 206n29, where it is suggested that the underlying Greek term is, following Wilberding (“The Neoplatonic Commentators,” 227), ἐμπνεῖσθαι. Isḥāq was perhaps working back from the verb with relation to the prophet (at ‫ח‬22), looking for a term which would work for both sides of the analogy between the inspiration of the logoi and the inspiration of the prophet. ‫ إلهام‬would thus be understood as an instance

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of divine inspiration aimed at a specific individual (as opposed to the ‫وحى‬, the higher form of revelation), analogical to ἐμπνεῖσθαι as a specific instance of actualizing the logoi and setting them to motion. The manuscript tradition of the Hebrew translation expresses recognition of the importance of this term for Themistius’ argument, as well as perplexity about what to do with it: there are three (or perhaps four) different options offered, to which the Hebrew translations of the quotation in Averroes’ Tafsīr add two more. The three options in our manuscripts are ‫נתפעמו התפעמות‬/‫התפעמו‬ (CDA; adopted by Landauer); ‫( הוזכרו הזכרה‬B; corrupt version in M); and ‫הושפעו‬ ‫( השפעה‬T). The repetition of the verb at ‫ח‬22 has the same distribution among the manuscripts, except that A here aligns with B and M, while T has ‫מושקפים‬, which I assume is a corruption of ‫מושפעים‬. These three options can each be ascribed to a different phase in the history of the translation: Version I had the root ‫ ;פע״ם‬Version II—‫ ;זכ״ר‬and T as usually in these cases reflects an independent trait. T’s option ‫ מושפעים‬is joined by the variant ‫ נאצלו‬in the later Hebrew translation of Averroes’ Tafsīr (see Appendix B; the earlier ‫ השיג השגה‬is unclear) of infusing the term with a Platonic-ontological connotation which is perhaps overdoing. The option ‫התפעם‬, from the perspective of Modern Hebrew at least, is a very good expression for inspiration. However the Tibbonic tradition usually treats the root ‫ لهم‬differently. The verb ‫ התפעם‬appears only once in the Bible, in Daniel 2:1: ‫ובשנת שתים למלכות נבכדנצר חלם נבכדנצר חלמות ותתפעם‬ ‫רוחו ושנתו נהיתה עליו‬.8 The expression ‫ ותתפעם רוחו‬is usually taken to mean something like “to be struck with fear,” and its suddenness sits well with the philosophical process of actualization at the right moment. However, from the traditional point of view, and if we here as well work back from the prophetic aspect to the object of the analogy, we should keep in mind that ‫ إلهام‬was understood as a lower form of prophetic revelation communicating knowledge from a divine source (see the discussion in Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy, 121–125, with many references to the history of this charged Arabic term in the Muslim and Jewish environments). Looking at the semantic field of ‫ إلهام‬and ‫ألهم‬ in ibn Tibbon’s translation tradition, at least the instances which I was able to locate, their respective Hebrew terms are not particularly dramatic. In Saʿadya’s Book of Beliefs and Opinions, Yehuda ibn Tibbon translates ‫ אלהאם‬as ‫הדרכה‬ (IV.6, p. ‫)קסו‬, whereas in Yehuda ha-Levī’s Kuzari we find ‫ אלהאם‬as ‫( למוד‬V.10; V.12; V.20) and ‫( דעת‬III.19), the verb ‫ ילהם‬as ‫( יורה‬V.10), and ‫ מלהם‬as ‫( מלומד‬I.81). Whereas ‫ הזכרה‬is not identical, it is much closer in meaning to these options

8 The same root appears also in Genesis 41:8. It appears to be in the third form (‫)ותפעם רוחו‬, but perhaps it could be an elided ‫( ת״ו‬I would like to thank Yehuda Halper for this point).

378

commentary

than ‫התפעמות‬, which does not have any immediate connotation of transmission of information or knowledge. From the grammatical point of view, it is worth mentioning that ‫ ألهم‬is a verb of the fourth form in Arabic, which is usually translated in this text into the forms ‫ הפעיל‬or ‫( הופעל‬depending on whether it is active or passive). The present form is passive, so the verb ‫ הוזכר‬accommodates this pattern. The verb ‫התפעם‬ is of the seventh form in Hebrew, and is often employed for verbs in the eighth form in Arabic. ‫ח‬21

‫)היה…יבין( صارت…تفهم‬: There is much confusion within the Hebrew manuscripts regarding the subject of this verb, since in Arabic both ‫ نفس‬and ‫ طبيعة‬are feminine nouns, whereas in Hebrew the gender shifts between ‫( נפש‬feminine) and ‫( טבע‬masculine). It seems that Version I thought that the subject of the sentence is the soul in the earth (as well as T, which glosses ‫)ר״ל הנפש‬, whereas Version II decided that the subject is nature, which is the correct understanding. The perplexity with which this passage was met is not limited to Moshe ibn Tibbon. Both versions of Averroes’ Tafsīr misunderstood it (see Appendix B); the early version seems to think that the subject is the sun and the ecliptic, whereas the later version—like T—explicates the soul as the subject, and we have already seen Gersonides’ ambivalent approach above (see Chapter 1, table 47). The Arabic authors used this part, but likewise understood it in different ways, as is clear from Šahrastānī’s misrepresentation of this argument (see Chapter 1, table 5) and al-Baġdādī’s restatement of it (see Chapter 1, table 7). ‫משתוקק‬: This is a mistranslation of the Arabic ‫مستاقة‬, reading ‫ مشتاقة‬instead, con-

tinuing the problem the Hebrew has with the root ‫سوق‬, as encountered above (‫ח‬16). The revised Hebrew translation of Averroes’ Tafsīr corrects Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation to ‫( מוליכה‬see Appendix B), whereas the original translation of the Tafsīr has ‫משותפת‬, probably misreading either ‫متساوقة‬, ‫مشككة‬, or ‫مشتركة‬. It is likely that the correction is not the work of the adaptor of the Hebrew translator of Averroes, but already present in the edition of the paraphrase he was using, since Gersonides already has a revised version, and he is not quoting from the Tafsīr (see Chapter 1, table 47). ‫ח‬22

‫)שיהיו מוזכרים( يلهمون‬: see above, ‫ח‬18.

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‫ח‬25–27

‫)אבל…המוליד( لكنا…المولدة‬: There are several problems in establishing the text of the final sentence of this chapter, which is probably corrupt. Genequand’s translation is: “But when we need any form, we act is such a way that we know that this form cannot be produced by this act alone; this form, then, is produced as if it had been latent in something else, and it was indeed latent in the begetting nature” (Genequand, Ibn Rushd, 106–107). This is faithful to the Arabic, and is also how Moshe ibn Tibbon translates, but the first half is unintelligible to me, and I believe there are grounds for reconstructing the text. First, it seems that despite Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation (‫)הוצרכנו‬, the Arabic ‫ احتجنا‬should be understood as translating a form of the verb ζητέω (this is what Isḥāq does, e.g., in his translation of Theophrastus’ On First Principles 7b6; see Gutas, Theophrastus, 132; 192). But more importantly, the string ‫لا يحدث به‬ ‫( وحده تلك الصورة فتحدث حينئذ تلك الصورةكأنها كانت كامنة‬as it appears in Bouyges), should be reconstructed. The Arabic manuscript reads ‫لا يحدث به وحده فىحد حينئذ‬ ‫تلك الصورة كأنها كانت كامنة‬, and note that (i) it has the rasm ‫ ڡىحد‬for Bouyges’ ‫( فتحدث‬which is taken from the Hebrew translations of the Tafsīr) and (ii) ‫تلك‬ ‫ الصورة‬appears twice in Bouyges but only once in the Arabic manuscript. The early version of the Hebrew translation of the Tafsīr reads ‫לא יתחדש בו אחד‬ ‫ותתחדש אז זאת הצורה כאלו היא נטמנת‬, (i) agreeing with Bouyges’ ‫ فتحدث‬but (ii) omitting, with the manuscript, the first occurrence of ‫تلك الصورة‬. Conversely, the revised version of the Hebrew translation of the Tafsīr, reading ‫לא יחודש בו‬ ‫לבדו הצורה ההיא ונמצא אז אותה הצורה כאלו היא היתה טמונה‬, (i) has ‫ונמצא‬, reflecting ‫( فنجد‬accommodating the rasm ‫ ڡىحد‬in the manuscript) instead of Bouyges’ ‫فتحدث‬, but (ii) agrees with Bouyges, who uses ‫ تلك الصورة‬twice (but this is circuitous, as Bouyges relies on the Hebrew to compensate for the corrupt Arabic). The reconstructed text, I believe, should combine both and arrive at ‫لا يحدث به‬ ‫وحده فنجد حينئذ تلك الصورةكأنها كانت كامنة‬. The resultant text, then, would be translated as follows: “but when we inquire into a certain [individual] form, from which a certain actuality arises, we know that it [i.e., the actuality] is not created only by it [i.e., the individual form]. This form [i.e., the actualized form], then, is created as if it had been latent in something else, and it is truly latent in the begetting nature.”

Chapter 4 1

Aristotle

Chapter 4 is the first of two chapters that inquire in what way the principles can be said to be the same for all things,1 first discussing “elements”2 (identified as form, privation, and matter) as principles, and then adding the efficient cause to the discussion. Denying that these principles can be common to all without qualification, Aristotle explains what he means by analogous similarity. [1] Aristotle opens the chapter by stating the view that he promotes throughout chapters 4–5; the causes and the principles of the sensible substances are different from each other in a certain respect, but in a way, analogically, they are the same (1070a31–33). [2] The first part of this investigation (1070a33–b21) zooms into the concept “element,” taken as a principle, specifically asking if elements can be different or the same for substance, relation,3 and the rest of the categories (1070a33–35). This questions is divided into [2.1] a critical part (1070a35–b10) which shows that the elements cannot be the same if taken unconditionally, and [2.2] a positive part (1070b10–21) which shows how they can be seen as the same if taken analogically. [2.1] In the critical part,4 Aristotle argues that if elements were the same for all, then the elements would be the same for relatives as well as substances, 1 Crubellier (“Metaphysics Λ 4,” 137) shows that the closing statement of chapter 5 corresponds to the opening statement of chapter 4, hence the chapters “form a distinct whole.” 2 There is agreement among scholars that στοιχεῖον here is used with a Platonic connotation. Crubellier argues that the present meaning of the term is exclusive to this chapter within Aristotle’s entire corpus, and is used to denote “immanent causes” (“Metaphysics Λ 4,” 144). Crubellier also remarks that this idiosyncratic use can serve to explain the division between chapters 4 and 5, which at first glance seems arbitrary: chapter 4 speaks in “Platonic idiom,” while chapter 5 moves to the “Aristotelian idiom of aitia” (Crubellier, 141–143). Elders (Aristotle’s Theology, 113) says that they are “intrinsic principles,” and Menn prefers the label “constituent principles” (Aim, IIIβ1, 36). 3 Elders (Aristotle’s Theology, 114) thinks that in the present context “relation” (πρός τι) is not the Aristotelian category but a concept used by Aristotle’s contemporary, the Platonist Hermodorus of Syracuse, who considers πρός τι as one of the subdivisions of being (see discussion in Dillon, Heirs, 200–203). While this interpretation adds another layer to the Platonic context of Aristotle’s discussion, Elders admits that adhering to it leads one to discard the remainder of Aristotle’s sentence, which refers to the rest of the categories, as a later addition to the text. However, there is no textual evidence to support this view. 4 For the sake of economy and purpose the present overview somewhat oversimplifies Aristotle’s argument, which warrants a much more delicate treatment, such as in Crubellier,

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400443_011

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which is unacceptable because there would be no consistent way to describe this common element (1070a35–b1). Aristotle’s justification for this is basically that categories have nothing in common, something that a common element would necessitate, as it is prior to the things of which it is an element (1070b1– 3), adding that no category can be an element in the others categories, as that would be the other logical possibility (1070b3–4). The idea that the common element is a certain notion which is predicated universally for everything (like being and unity) is also rejected, as it would be apply both to elements and to the things that are composed of elements, which would contradict the idea of priority of elements over composites, as well as the demand for their fundamental differentness (1070b8–9). Since the common element cannot be one of the categories, and the universal predicates cannot be elements, the idea of the elements being the same for all is rejected (1070b8–10). [2.2] In the positive part (1070b10–21), Aristotle shows that it is possible to say that all elements are the same if they are to be understood analogically, citing a few examples which lead to a generalization of three common elements—form, privation, and matter—which are analogous since they function in the same way in each class, but different because each class of things has its own (e.g., colors have white, black, and surface, while day and night have light, darkness and air). [3] Aristotle proceeds to remark that the notion of element does not exhaust the extension of principles, since there is a principle that is not an element (i.e., not “present” in things)—namely, the efficient cause—which is external to its effect, and also a substance (1070b22–25). [4] The preceding remark leads Aristotle to conclude that taken analogically there are altogether three elements (i.e., form, privation, matter) and four causes and principles (i.e., the three elements plus the efficient cause), stressing that although they are the same analogically, they are in fact different for different things. Aristotle is careful to note that the efficient cause he is referring to is the “proximate” one (πρῶτον in the sense of direct, or immediate5) (1070b25–27). Providing a few examples, Aristotle shows that in the case of the proximate cause, in a way, the principles can be reduced to three, because in both art and natural coming to be the efficient cause has the same form as the product, hence “form” has a dual causal function, both external and internal (1070b28–34).

“Metaphysics Λ 4,” 145–148. The presentation of Themistius’ version of the argument below bridges, in a way, the interpretative gap. 5 See Elders, Aristotle’s Theology, 120f.

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commentary

[5] The chapter ends with a brief note reminding that besides the aforementioned principles there is also the first thing that moves everyting (1070b34–35). As Crubellier notes, this is the first time that the first mover is mentioned in book 12.6

2

Themistius

[1] Themistius does not paraphrase Aristotle’s opening remarks in the opening of chapter 4 (1070a31–33), but instead orientates the discussion as concerning “preliminary problems” to the main inquiry of the book, namely “the first principle of the existing things” (‫ח‬28–29). Just as Aristotle’s opening remarks encompass chapter 5 as well, Themistius too discusses chapters 4 and 5 as a single unit, and therefore his preliminary statement here can be taken to also apply to chapter 5. [2] Before repeating Aristotle’s question whether the “elements” of existing things are the same or different (1070a33–35), Themistius asks this about “principles” (‫ח‬30–32), which can be seen in a way as incorporating part of Aristotle’s statement in [1] in the form of a question. Only after explaining that “element” is one kind of principle—an explanation that bridges the gap in Aristotle’s transition from principles to elements (‫ט‬1–2)—does Themistius state Aristotle’s question in its original form (‫ט‬2–4). [2.1] While Themistius broadly follows Aristotle’s argumentation against the claim that all things have the same elements, his train of thought and mode of presentation are not identical, and written as if he is debating an unknown interlocutor. In other words, Themistius basically rewrites this section. This part is an occasion for Themistius to exhibit his dialectical skill. Taking the

6 Crubellier, “Metaphysics Λ 4,” 142. The function of this brief remark within the narrative of Aristotle’s discussion is difficult to explain. Elders suggests that Aristotle “wants to intimate that this causality is of a different class” (Elders, Aristotle’s Theology, 121–122); Crubellier focuses on the perplexity this passage gives rise to, suggesting that “perhaps he [i.e., Aristotle] felt that it was important, at the close of the discussion about elements and causes, to underline that his own supreme principle is a moving cause, i.e. that it is definitely not an element” (Crubellier, “Metaphysics Λ 4,” 159). Rapp writes that Aristotle might be taking a shot at “Speusippus’ refusal to acknowledge one single principle of all levels of reality” (Rapp, “Principles,” 104n16) and notes that “perhaps the simplest explanation would be that in the present context, where Aristotle speaks of moving causes and, in particular, of synonymous moving causes, and where he gives, as it were, a causal profile of sensible ousia he just wants to remind us of the fact, that the list of pertinent principles and causes of sensible ousia is not complete” (Rapp, 104).

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presumption of the elements of existence being the same to mean that all the categories have the same elements (‫ט‬4–6), which roughly corresponds to the first part of Aristotle’s critical discussion (1070a35–b7), Themistius proceeds to show that this is impossible, as the common element (or elements) would either be one of the ten categories or beyond them. Assuming something beyond the categories which is also prior to the categories (as it is their element) is impossible, because that would contradict the priority of substance, which had already been established (‫ט‬6–10, referring back the beginning of the paraphrase for the sake of orientation). The other option also results in absurdities: if the common element is one of the categories it would have to be substance (owing to its priority), but that is impossible because it would mean that substance and the other categories have the same element (which I take to mean as undermining substance’s priority), as well as that substance would be its own element, which is impossible because the element is prior to that of which it is an element (and a thing cannot be prior to itself) (‫ט‬10–13). The part reflecting Aristotle’s laconic discussion of elements as universal predicates such as “being” and “unity” (1070b7–8) is considerably elaborated upon into a two-part discussion. After presenting this option (‫ט‬14–15), Themistius first responds that this would contradict the premise that elements are simpler than the things composed of them, as “one” (for example) would be predicated in the same manner to all. That would enable an absurd situation where not only simple things are elements of composites, but also the other way around (‫ט‬15–18). Themistius then adds another response (‫ט‬18–22), which I find difficult to understand. Perhaps he is arguing that since a principle is different than a thing for which it is a principle (e.g., the point and the line), it cannot be “one” or “existent,” because then existence and existing things, or unity and things that are one, would be predicates with two different meanings, which is absurd. Themistius realigns (‫ט‬22–23) with Aristotle’s text (1070b9–10) during the closing remarks of this part, concluding that all things cannot have the same elements. [2.2] Themistius reflects the positive part of Aristotle’s account (1070b10–21) first by stating the possibility of sameness through analogy, and then by stating what the common principles (in the sense of elements) of all are: form, matter, and privation (‫ט‬24–25),7 immediately followed by Aristotle’s proceeding examples (1070b11–13) as well as—applying syntax—examples lifted from the end of

7 These three principles have already been introduced by Aristotle at the end of chapter 2 (1069b32–34), but Themistius chose not to discuss them there, probably reserving the discussion to this part of the text.

384

commentary

Aristotle’s passage (1070b19–21), all of which Themistius presents in succession (‫ט‬25–29). [3] Repeating the conclusion (1070b16–19) that the elements can only be the same analogically (‫ט‬30–31), Themistius proceeds to clarify Aristotle’s retraction from elements back to principles (1070b22–25), arguing that since the efficient cause is also a principle, but not an element (as it is external), all elements are principles, but not all principles are elements, hence the search for elements is insufficient as a search for principles (‫ט‬31–‫י‬4) [4] Themistius subtracts the different ways the elements, causes, and principles can be counted (1070b25–27), focusing instead on the description (1070b28–34) of the proximate efficient cause as similar in form in natural and artificial things (the latter being also sometimes moved by privation), so that form can function as a (proximate) efficient cause as well (‫י‬4–8). [5] Regarding Aristotle’s statement about the first mover (1070b34–35), Themistius seems to understand it as a contrast to the discussion so far, saying that we are not seeking the proximate mover but the first mover, who moves everything (‫י‬8–10), anticipating the next chapter, where the discussion is extended to movers which do not share the form of their effects.

3

Note on Sources

Owing to the recently discovered quotation in ibn Taymiyya’s Minhāǧ al-Sunna (see above, Chapter 1, 2.2.8), we now possess the original Arabic text of the latter half of chapter 4 (starting from ‫ وأما على طر يق‬at ‫ט‬24) and the first half of chapter 5, besides ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation. The Arabic text in the present edition is based upon M. Rašad Sālim’s edition, 244,3–245,7. Concerning the textual problem of understanding ‫יסוד‬/‫( عنصر‬see Appendix C), all of its instances in the chapter are employed in the sense of “element” (= immanent principle), except for ‫ט‬25, ‫ט‬26, and ‫ט‬28. The French translation of chapter 4 appears in Brague, Thémistius, 65–67.

4

Running Commentary

‫ט‬15–17 ‫ואם…המורכבים‬: Landauer supplies ‫ אין‬after ‫ לאלו‬of his own initiative, unsup-

ported by the manuscripts. The result is having Themistius write that universal predicates such as “one” and “existing” should not be predicated of

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the simple things to a higher degree than to the composite things, implying that “one” and “existing” have the same meaning for simple things and the composite things. I think that the text as it stands should be retained as an expression of Themistius’ argumentation, saying that if these universal predicates are applied to composite things, all the more so are the simple things deserving of them. That would not mean that these predicates are used somewhat differently when applied to simple things, but is a device employed to stress that admitting elements as universal predicates such as “one” and “existing” would require these predicates to encompass both composite and simple things, which, as the rest of the argument shows, results in an absurdity. ‫ט‬22 ‫ולא הנמצא האחד שני נמצאים‬: This means either “otherwise one existent [would actually be] two existents”—perhaps because “existence” would be predicated differently of the categories in themselves and the things that partake in them—or “and the ‘one existent’ is not two existents,” perhaps because it would have rolled back to two common principles—“one” and “existing.” If we read with T we have the (maybe desirable) “the one and the existent are not two [different] existents” (‫)הנה אין הנמצא והאחד שני נמצאים‬, but it would be difficult to defend this reading. ‫ט‬24 ‫)وأما على طر يق المناسبة( ואולם על דרך היחס‬: This is the point where ibn Taymiyya starts quoting Themistius’ paraphrase, and also a point where Landauer (and a few Hebrew manuscripts) open a new paragraph. The structure is somewhat confusing, as it looks as if the Arabic opens an ‫ أمأ…ف‬construction in a new sentence, but I believe that ‫ وأما على طر يق المناسبة‬is in fact the ending of a sentence, whereas ‫فأخلق‬, immediately afterwards, is the beginning of a new sentence. ‫ وأما على طر يق المناسبة‬should be understood as “except analogically,” and the sentence ‫ועל זה הדמיון אי אפשר שיהיו יסודות כל הדברים יסודות אחדים בעינם ואולם על‬ ‫ דרך היחס‬should be understood thus: “Likewise, it is impossible for the elements of all the things to be one and the same, except analogically.” Otherwise Themistius would have been saying without qualification that it is impossible for the elements of all things to be the same, but this would run counter to his own argument in the chapter, as well as to Aristotle’s basic point.

386

commentary

‫ט‬26

‫)המוחש כי( المحسوس أن‬: C translated ‫ המוחשים‬and omitted ‫כי‬, but the rest of the manuscripts get it right (A has the hybrid ‫המוחשים כי‬, adopted by Landauer). My conjecture is that the version in C is a misreading of ‫ المحسوس أن‬as ‫المحسوسات‬, which was subsequently corrected. ‫)כנגד( نظير‬: The translation ‫ כנגד‬reinforces ‫ نظير‬as taken in the sense of an analogy. See above, ‫ח‬5. Note T’s independent variant ‫דומה‬. ‫ט‬30–31

‫)על דרך היחס וההיקש( على طر يق المناسبة والمقايسة‬: I take the original to be some adverbial form of ἀνάλογος (see ‫ט‬24) and the Arabic to be a hendiadys translation. ‫ט‬32

‫)אבל כונתנו אמנם היא לבקשת ההתחלה( لـكن قصدنا إنما هو طلب مبدئها‬: At this point “principle” and “element” (the latter as one of the meanings of former) cease to be used interchangeably as they were for the sake of Themistius’ discussion (reflecting what he takes to be Aristotle’s logic as of ‫ט‬1), and are differentiated anew. ‫י‬3

‫)הנה אינו יסוד( فليس له عنصر‬. The difference between the Arabic and the Hebrew is important, since the Arabic has Themistius say that that which is a principle does not have an element,8 whereas the Hebrew has Themistius say that that which is a principle is not an element. The latter is to be preferred, since Themistius is trying to explain the transition of the discussion from elements back to principles, arguing that the concept “element” cannot encompass the complete extension of the concept of “principle,” since there is also a principle that can be external, i.e., the efficient cause. In other words, every element is a principle, but not every principle is an element, therefore the principle is not the same as the element, or the principle “is not an element.” Perhaps ‫ له‬is a misreading of ‫هو‬. 8 Perhaps, even, an Arabic scribe understood ‫ عنصر‬here in the sense of matter, suggesting that principles are immaterial; this is absurd because one of the principles discussed in this chapter is matter.

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‫י‬4

‫)המתנועע( المتحرك‬: I have taken the liberty of emending the Arabic text, which originally had ‫المحرك‬, because it is certainly a copyist error. Retaining the Arabic would have Themistius maintain that it is possible for the moving principle to be exterior to the mover, but that would be self-contradictory, if not simply meaningless. The possibility of being exterior to the moved object is what enables Themistius to ascribe efficient causes different degrees of proximity to their effects. ‫)המניע הקרוב בדברים הטבעיים( المحرك القر يب من الأشياء الطبيعية‬: The Hebrew probably read ‫ فى‬for ‫من‬, but it is unclear which of the two is the correct option, as the difference of meaning is negligible: the Arabic has “among,” and the Hebrew has “in.” ‫י‬5

‫)המלאכותיים המחשביים( الوهمية‬: The Arabic ‫ الأشياء الوهمية‬reflects Aristotle’s τοῖς ἀπὸ διανοίας at 1070b31, which Themistius is quoting. The hendiadys ‫הדברים‬ ‫( המלאכותיים המחשביים‬literally: the artificial things which are products of calculation), whether originating in the Arabic or in the Hebrew, aims at stressing the text’s distinction between natural things and the products of the arts with regards to the conceptual relationship between form and proximate mover. ‫י‬6

‫)הרפואה או הסכלות בה והבנין או הסכלות בו( الطب والجهل به والبناء والجهل به‬: The relation between the examples of forms and their privations is presented by Aristotle as disjunctive rather than conjunctive, hence τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον at 1070b32–33, reflected in Themistius in an explicatory matter for privation as contrary in the expression ‫ )הצורה או ההעדר( الصورة أو العدم‬at ‫י‬4–5. The examples presented are conjunctive in Arabic (using ‫ )و‬and disjunctive in Hebrew (‫)או‬. The latter is more consistent with the mode of presentation and should be preferred. Emending the Arabic into ‫ الطب أو الجهل به والبناء أو الجهل به‬is perhaps the right course. ‫י‬9

‫)לבקשת המניע הראשון( للمحرك الأول‬: It seems that the Hebrew should be followed, because this runs parallel to the first half of the sentence (‫وليس قصدنا لطلب المحرك‬ ‫)ואין כונתנו לבקשת המניע הקרוב = القر يب‬.

Chapter 5 1

Aristotle

Chapter 5 is a direct continuation of chapter 4, dealing, disjointed as it is, with the question in what respect the principles of everything are the same, and in what respect different.1 It applies this question to the priority of substances over accidents [parts 1 & 4], the notions of potentiality and actuality [2], and the relation between individuals and universals [3], before [5] concluding with a summary of the inquiry of chapters 4–5 and closing remarks about the project of chapters 2–5 as a whole. [1] The chapter opens with another way in which the causes can be understood as the same for all. Aristotle claims that since substances (which are separable) are ontologically prior to modifications and movements (which cannot exist without substances), the causes of the former are also the causes of the latter (1070b36–71a2).2 Aristotle further suggests that these causes will either be soul and body, or reason, desire, and body, without further explanation (1071a2– 3).3 [2] Aristotle states that there is yet another way for the causes to be analogically the same for all, namely with reference to actuality and potentiality as principles, but their application as principles can be done in two different ways (1071a3–6): [2.1] In the first way the matter of the cause is the same as the matter of the effect, so that the thing exists potentially as its matter is capable of receiving its form, and actuality once it is realized as a compound of matter and form (or alternatively matter and privation) (1071a3–11); [2.2] The second way is when the matter is different in the cause and in the effect. This passage is unclear,4 but I take Aristotle to be applying actuality and potentiality with reference to the external efficient cause: if it is synonymous with the effect, then only the matter will differ (in its specific instantiations in two individual substances, like father and son), and if not (like in the case of the sun and the ecliptic as efficient causes of life), it will differ also in form (and, as a corollary,

1 See Code, “Metaphysics Λ 5,” 161; Rapp, “Principles,” 105–106; Elders, Aristotle’s Theology, 123. 2 Or, alternatively, substances are the causes of all things. This depends on whether to read ταῦτα or ταῦτά at 1071a1. See the discussion in Code, “Metaphysics Λ 5,” 161–165. 3 See Reeve, Aristotle, 518, §1315, for a useful elaboration on this. 4 For slightly different interpretations of this passage, which do not have bearings on understanding Aristotle’s overall course of argumentation, see Code, “Metaphysics Λ 5,” 171–173 and Rapp, “Principles,” 108–110.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400443_012

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in privation). In both cases the effect exists only potentially so long as the efficient cause, which is in actuality, does not actualize it (e.g., the son exists only potentially without the father acting as the efficient cause). This way of understanding potentiality and actuality also makes clear that there need not be any sameness between the efficient cause and its effect (1071a11–17). [3] Next, Aristotle explains in what way it is appropriate to express causes in universal terms. Since in specific instances the proximate principles are always a “this-something” (whether actual or potential), they are the truly existing causes. Universal causes do not really exist, but can only be used in a general sense. For example, while it is true in a way that man is the cause of man, what really happens is that, e.g., Peleus is the cause of Achilles (1071a17–24). [4] Aristotle proceeds to explain that the statement about the causes of the substances being the causes of all things can be harmonized with the fact that all things have different causes in two ways: if they are of a different class, like colors and sounds, their causes are the same only in an analogical sense. If they are of the same class, their causes are the same also in a universal sense, but different individually, namely each member’s individual instantiation of matter, form, and efficient cause are different (1071a24–29). [5] Approaching the end of the chapter, Aristotle summarizes the conclusions he arrived at during his inquiries in chapters 4–5, stating that it is permissible to say that principles and elements are the same for all in the following respects: [i] as matter, form, privation, and efficient causes; [ii] when causes of substances and causes of accidents are taken to be the same owing to the accidents’ ontological dependency on substances; [iii] with reference to the first actuality (1071a29–36). He adds that causes always differ with respect to specific instantiations of proximate efficient causes, reception of contraries (i.e., form and privation), and matter (1071a36–b1). The final sentence of the chapter (1071b1–2) concludes the discussion of chapters 2–5. Aristotle notes that he had identified the principles of sensible substances, stated their number, and explained in what respect they are the same and in what respect different.

2

Themistius

[1] Themistius’ opening remarks of chapter 5 are a direct continuation of chapter 4, which ended with a reference to the first mover. While Aristotle writes about the separability of substance as the reason for its priority over modifications and movements (1070b36–1071a2), with an intention to show that the causes of the former are also the causes of the latter, Themistius substitutes this by presenting the first principle as another ontological layer of the discussion,

390

commentary

using Aristotle’s argument to show that the priority of substance necessitates that the first principle, which is the principle of substance, be also a substance (‫י‬11–14).5 Accordingly, Aristotle’s suggestion about causes being soul, body, and so forth is substituted by the question whether the first principle is a soul, an intellect, or something else (the other options subtracted), adding a word of caution that it cannot share any accidents with other existing things (‫י‬14–17), which probably serves as a rationale of sorts for moving forward with another discussion of sensible substances. [2] Themistius continues to interpret the chapter with reference to the first principle by explaining the distinction between actuality and potentiality (which Aristotle introduces at 1071a3–6 as another means for showing that all causes are analogically the same) as a feature of perishing substances, focusing on the fact that (unlike the first principle) they have potentiality (‫י‬17–20). His text runs parallel to Aristotle’s, but without Aristotle’s underscoring of the different ways in which “potentiality” and “actuality” are employed. Consequently the various parts of Aristotle’s arguments function differently in Themistius. [2.1] The examples of wine and flesh (1071a6–7) are mentioned as general examples of transition from one state to another, without discussing the usage of the terms (‫י‬20–23). “Matter” and “form” (or contrarily, “privation”) are introduced as potentiality and actuality respectively, accompanied by Aristotle’s examples (1071a7–11, reflected in ‫י‬23–27). [2.2] The second part of Aristotle’s discussion of potentiality and actuality (1071a11–17) is not presented as a different understanding of them, but as a means to focus on the distinction between proximate efficient causes and remote efficient causes, the former sharing a form with their effects, the latter not. Themistius introduces this discussion as something that should be “kept in mind” when investigating the first cause (‫י‬27–32). Aristotle’s example of the father, the sun, and the ecliptic is then somewhat altered (‫י‬32–‫יא‬2; see above, Chapter 2, table 52), and Themistius adds a plausible remark that the remote causes are also principles of the proximate causes (‫יא‬2–4). [3] The next part is once again introduced by Themistius as pertaining to the investigation of the first cause (‫יא‬5), but besides this remark he paraphrases closely (‫יא‬5–9)—subtracting only the reference to actuality and potentiality— 5 This argument makes it impossible to conjecture whether Themistius read ταῦτα or ταῦτά at 1071a1 (see n2 above), because his formulation of Aristotle’s text combines, in a way, the claim that the causes of all things are substances and the claim that the causes of substances are the causes of everything, as they all converge in the first principle. Note, though, that Themistius does not talk about “causes” here, but about “principles.”

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Aristotle’s argument and examples (1071a17–24) about universals only being allowed to be used in a general sense, as the true causes are always individuals. [4] Themistius once again subtracts Aristotle’s discussion of similar causes with respect to analogy (1071a24–27), and connects Aristotle’s argument about particular efficient causes of different particular matter and form to the previous discussion, arguing that a universal can only be a cause of a universal (‫יא‬9), and then realigning himself (‫יא‬10–12) with Aristotle’s text (1071a27–29). [5] Aristotle’s closing remarks for the discussion of chapters 4–5 (1071a29– b1) are abridged, mentioning only principles and subtracting mention of elements or causes. Themistius also substitutes Aristotle’s tripartite division of how the principles can be the same with a different trio. While Aristotle has (i) matter, form, privation, and efficient cause; (ii) ontological priority of substances entails that its principles are also the principles of its accidents; (iii) with reference to the “first actuality,” Themistius has (i) universally; (ii) analogically; and (iii) due to the ontological priority of substance (‫יא‬12–17). In other words, Themistius adds the universal principle at the expense of the “first actuality.” Perhaps a case could be made for preferring Themistius’ analysis over Aristotle’s, as in a way the fact that the principle of substance is the principle of everything already suggests the existence of the first principle, something that Themistius himself mentions at the beginning of the chapter. What is more, one would expect a reference to the universal (in its proper use) in Aristotle’s summary of the argument. Be that as it may, Themistius subtracts Aristotle’s wrapping up of chapters 2–5, substituting it for a closing remark that the discussion up until now should be retained as we proceed to inquire into the principle that is sought after, i.e., the first principle (‫יא‬17–18).

3

Note on Sources

See chapter 4. The Arabic text in the present edition is based upon M. Rašad Sālim’s edition, 244,7–246,9, terminating at ‫יא‬4 (‫)גם כן‬. The distribution of the term ‫ عنصر( יסוד‬wherever the Arabic is available) in the chapter (see Appendix C) is as follows: all the instances, except for two, mean “matter.” The instance in ‫י‬22 means “physical element” and the first instance in ‫י‬28 means “element” as an immanent principle. The French translation of chapter 5 appears in Brague, Thémistius, 69–71.

392 4

commentary

Running Commentary

‫י‬12–13

ً ‫ולא תהיה העצלה מן הבאור בזה במה שקדם( ولم يكن التهيب من التصريح بهذا فيما تقدم صوابا‬ ‫)יושר‬: This clause is difficult for various reasons. First, thanks to the Arabic ‫ =( صواب‬ὀρθός) it is now clear that the Hebrew variant ‫ יותר‬is a corruption of ‫יושר‬, whereas ‫ ישר‬should be vocalized ‫ י ֶֹשׁר‬rather than ‫( ָיָשׁר‬see ‫כו‬11 for a similar construction; and cf. Brague’s conjecture ‫ ֻיַשּׁר‬at Thémistius, 69n2, which is unfounded). The translation of ‫( التهيب‬apprehensiveness) as ‫( העצלה‬laziness) is unclear, and Landauer’s conjectured emendation ‫ הצלה‬in his apparatus is not supported by the Arabic, which he did not possess (Brague’s Arabic guess ‫ بد‬at Thémistius, 69n1 is now unnecessary). Likewise, the translation of ‫ تصريح‬as ‫באור‬ is incorrect, as the meaning of the Arabic here is “claim” or “assertion.” All in all, the text means something like this: “The apprehensiveness in asserting this in the past was mistaken.” Themistius, I gather, is maintaining that there is no need for hesitance in saying that the substance is the principle of everything, because anything that is not a substance is ontologically dependent upon the substance. ‫י‬13–14

‫)חדושים ועניינים( أحداث وأحوال‬: I believe that Themistius is using Aristotle’s terminology at 1071a1 and that this is a hendiadys translation of πάθη, which here means, according to Code (“Metaphysics Λ 5,” 162), “modification.” πάθος occurs twice more in Metaphysics 12, each in a place where Themistius’ paraphrase is close to Aristotle’s text and in which we have both the Arabic and the Hebrew: 1069b12 and 1071b10. The first is translated into ‫ד ;ענין =( حال‬9) and the second into ‫יב ;חדוש =( حدث‬21), so in the present passage it was either a gloss or a hendiadys to widen the semantic field of the term. ‫י‬14 ‫מזה העצם אשר יניע זה הגשם כלו‬: This word ‫ זה‬is a mistake and probably a result of copying the Arabic ‫ هذا الجوهر‬twice. The second time was then replaced with ‫הגשם‬, but the second ‫ هذا‬was accidentally retained in the text. This process is apparent in C and D, both of which copied initially ‫מזה העצם אשר יניע זה העצם‬, and are physically corrected upon the text. The omission of ‫ זה‬in M is probably nothing more than a happy accident.

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‫י‬16 ‫ונזהר‬: The correction of ‫“( ונרחיק‬to stay away from”) to ‫“( ונזהר‬to be cautious of”) is a (slightly) more direct translation of ‫ نتوقى‬and also reflects a preference to save the root ‫ רח״ק‬for the Arabic root ‫( بعد‬see Lexicon). ‫י‬21–23

‫مثال…الـكرم‬: The meaning of ‫ تغلى‬here is “boils,” reflected in the Hebrew as ‫ירתח‬, and I conjecture that it translates ζέω, which means “to boil” as well as “to ferment,” which would explain the verb ‫ تسكر‬in the sense of “become intoxicating,” so I presume this is a hendiadys translation, but this is only a guess. Another meaning of the root ‫ سكر‬is the settling of a liquid after it has reached a boiling point (see Lane, Lexicon, s.v.), and that would explain the Hebrew translation ‫( וינוח‬of which ‫ וינוע‬in C, adopted by Landauer and Brague, is a corruption; Landauer’s conjecture ‫ ויבוע‬is unsupported by the Arabic but is in the right direction). Another option is that the Hebrew misread ‫ يسكن‬instead of ‫يسكر‬. ‫ לחות‬is, as can be seen, a translation of ‫( رطو بة‬moisture). Brague’s translation, ceps, reads the Hebrew as ‫( ֻלחוֹת‬boards, taken as the vines), and it is unfounded. Finally, the Hebrew ‫ יתילד ממנה‬is to be preferred over the Arabic ‫فيها ٺتولد‬, as this construction is echoed in the next example of the elements “from which it [i.e., flesh] is generated” (‫)التى عنها ٺتولد‬. Based on this analysis, I take Themistius to be saying that wine exists potentially in the moisture of the grapevine (i.e., the moist part from which the grape juice is produced) and in actuality once the fermenting process is done. ‫י‬24

‫من المركب من الصورة والعنصر‬/‫או המורכב מן הצורה והיסוד‬: The Hebrew ‫“( או‬or”) should be preferred over the Arabic ‫“( من‬from”), as it is clear from the proceeding examples (‫י‬24–26) that Themistius is presenting two options: the form which can exist apart, and the composite of matter and form. If this is the case, it is likely that Themistius reads ἤ for the traditional καί in Aristotle’s text at 1071a9 (see the apparatus in Alexandru, Metaphysics, 94). ‫י‬26

‫)הגוף הבריא והגוף החולה( البدن الصحيح والبدن السقيم‬: Themistius ignores “privation” altogether, although in Aristotle’s discussion it is rendered as a kind of actuality, and that is why Aristotle uses the example of a body which is “healthy”

394

commentary

(form as actuality) or “sick” (privation as actuality). Since privation is omitted from Themistius’ discussion, healthy and sick are relegated to contraries which matter is able to receive, effectively changing Aristotle’s argument. ‫י‬29

ً ‫אבל בדברים גם כן היוצאים מן הדבר( لـكن فى الأشياء الخارجة عن الأشياء المركبة أيضا‬ ‫)המניעים אותו‬: The Hebrew has Themistius say that things that are sometimes in actuality and sometimes in potentiality differ from each other not only with respect to their immanent elements (i.e., matter and form), but “also in [i.e., with respect to] external things that move it [i.e., the thing that is sometimes in actuality and sometimes in potentiality].” This is in tune with Aristotle, Metaph., 1071a14–15, who refers to “some other external thing” (τι ἄλλο ἔξω). The Arabic has Themistius say that the external things in which things differ are external to the “composite things as well,” which does not make sense. The explanation is that the Arabic is corrupt; ‫ الأشياء المركبة‬is a mistaken repetition of this expression in the previous line, andً ‫ أيضا‬was misplaced. ‫י‬32

‫)והיותר רחוקה( و بعضها‬: The Hebrew reads ‫ و بعدها‬for ‫( و بعضها‬this was perhaps a copyist error in the Arabic), creating confusion within the different manuscripts as to the contents of this sentence, moving from the literal, nonsensical ‫ואחריהם יותר רחוקה ממנו‬, to a more plausible (albeit tautological) solution ‫והיותר‬ ‫רחוקה רחוקה ממנו‬, namely “and the farther [efficient cause] is farther from it [i.e., from the thing that is moved].” This construction is not very far from the Arabic, which has “and some of them [i.e., the efficient causes] are far from it [i.e., from the thing that is moved].” ‫יא‬1–2

‫)ויותר רחוק מן השמש הגלגל הנוטה( وأبعد من الشمس الفلك المائل‬: Aristotle (1071a15–16) states the ecliptic and the sun as a joint cause. There are two ways to understands Themistius’ separation between them. Perhaps Themistius writes that the ecliptic is a cause farther away than the sun because among the sun’s spheres in Aristotle’s astronomy, the ecliptic course is the second, whereas the sun itself is in the fourth, hence the ecliptic is “farthest away” (See Beere, “Counting,” 6; 19). But here, I think, Themistius is not referring to the ecliptic in the sun’s spherical system, but to the outward sphere of the ecliptic, which is the first sphere below the sphere of the fixed stars. This is in tune with his identifica-

chapter 5

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tion of the cause of constant varying movement as the “spheres of the planets” rather than the sun, as is usually understood from Aristotle (see below, ‫טו‬29– ‫טז‬1). The motivation for this, I believe, is to include all the celestial bodies in the causality concerning nature, not just the sun. See discussion above, Chapter 2, table 52. ‫יא‬6 ‫הנפרדות הפרטיות‬: This expression (“particular individual”)—appearing twice in the present line—refers to the Greek τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον (“individual”) at 1071a20– 21, which Themistius here follows. There is a good chance that this reflects a hendiadys in the Arabic. ‫יא‬8 ‫והמים האלה דרך משל סבה למים האלה‬: Here there was confusion between ‫ماء‬

(water) and ‫( باء‬the second letter of the Arabic alphabet, translating B), since Aristotle’s example at 1071a22 is a particular instance of B as a principle of a particular instance of BA. ‫יא‬10–12 ‫ואולם…יניע‬: It seems fairly clear to me that Themistius talks about specific instantiations of forms rather than particular forms, a view that some scholars have ascribed to Aristotle. For an overview about the different positions on this subject see Konstan and Ramelli, “Aristotle,” 107–108.

Chapter 6 1

Aristotle

Chapter 6 signals the transition from the investigation of the principles of perishable substances to the investigation of the principles of eternal substances, and is traditionally seen as the first chapter in the more overtly “theological” part of Metaphysics 12. Aristotle attempts to prove the existence of an eternal unmoved substance—whose immovability will be proved in chapter 7— first by proving that there must be an eternal substance, and then by proving that the eternal mover must be pure actuality. Aristotle adds supporting discussions to clarify the relationship between potentiality and actuality—both historically and theoretically—as well as an account about the first and second movements which should suffice for the explanation of the variety of different changes in the cosmos. The chapter can be divided into five parts: [1] The introduction to the chapter repeats the threefold division of two perceptible substances and one unmoved substance, noting that the existence of the latter should be proven by combining two features: eternity and immovability (1071b3–5).1 This project is carried forward in chapters 6 and 7. [2] In the second part of the chapter Aristotle sets out to prove the existence of an eternal substance on the basis of two considerations: the ontological priority of substance and the eternity of movement and time. Aristotle argues that the priority of substance necessitates that nothing can exist if substances do not exist (1071b5–6). However, movement and time are eternal, says Aristotle, from which it can be inferred that an eternal substance must exist, as movement and time are ontologically dependent upon substance (1071b6–10). Aristotle adds that the only continuous movement is circular spatial movement (1071b10–11), which would explain why the eternal sensible substances are the celestial bodies. This part, then, proves that the celestial bodies are eternal, satisfying the condition of the existence of eternal substances, which are in continuous circular motion. [3] In the next part (1071b12–22), Aristotle discusses the function of producing motion, arguing that the eternal efficient cause’s essence must be actuality, in order to ensure that its moving ability is not only exercised, but exercised 1 Elders thinks that this is a later addition that should be treated not as a call back to the beginning of the book, but as a “new introduction to the treatise of the First Mover, independent of 12 1” (Aristotle’s Theology, 138); “the first three lines are likely an introduction added by a later editor to connect cc. 6 and 7 with the previous chapter” (139).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400443_013

chapter 6

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eternally. First he explains that having a potency to do something does not guarantee action, since potency can remain unexercised (1071b12–14). Platonic Ideas, for instance, are thought to be eternal substances, but without a principle of movement have no part in producing motion. Therefore, in themselves, they are useless with regard to movement (1071b14–17). But even acting and producing movement would not suffice, since if there is some potentiality in the substance that produces movement, that means that the movement would not be eternal (1071b17–19). Therefore, Aristotle concludes, there must exist a principle whose essence is actuality (1071b19–20). A corollary conclusion is that this substance must be without matter (1071b20–22), employing the idea that matter is the principle of potentiality. [4] This conclusion leads Aristotle to a discussion about the nature of actuality, or more precisely, on the question whether actuality is prior to potentiality, or vice versa (1071b22–1072a9). [4.1] The discussion begins by introducing the problem, presenting the idea that perhaps potentiality is prior to actuality, since not every potentiality is actualized (1071b22–24). [4.2] Aristotle’s initial response is that priority of potentiality undermines the idea of existence, since it would lead to the idea that existence taken as a whole is merely contingent (1071b25–26).2 [4.3] He then proceeds to criticize the theologians and physicists, whose cosmogony implies the idea of the priority of potentiality, arguing that if that were the case—and there was no prior actually existing cause—motion would be impossible (1071b26–29), adding a few examples (1071b29–31). [4.4] Leucippus and Plato are then introduced as adhering to eternal actuality and movement, but are criticized for failing to provide an account or explanation of this movement; Aristotle notes that the attempt to ascribe to Plato the idea that soul is the source of movement is unfounded, as for Plato the soul comes later and is not present in the beginning of the universe (1071b31– 1072a3). [4.5] Finally, Aristotle explains that it is permissible to say that potency is prior to actuality, referring to his discussion elsewhere (1072a3–4),3 but it can be understood from his remarks in the present chapter that in isolated instances of coming to be it is indeed the case that the potential is prior in time to the actual. However, taken universally this can be the case neither in nature nor in time, since otherwise there would have been neither movement (as in 4.3), nor (perhaps) existence (as in 4.2). In fact, Aristotle remarks, past thinkers adopt the priority of actuality even without noticing, such as Nous in

2 For a different understanding of this argument see Berti, “Unmoved Mover(s),” 193–194. 3 For the problem of Aristotle’s cross-reference here see Ross, Metaphysics, II, 371. Elders (Aristotle’s Theology, 153) thinks that it is “likely to be an addition by an editor or reader.”

398

commentary

Anaxagoras, love and strife in Empedocles, and eternal movement in Leucippus (1072a4–8). The idea of eternal existence of chaos or night, as the theologians claim, is rejected, and what remains is the constancy of reality (1072a8– 9). [5] The chapter ends with a discussion meant to explain that there is no need for other principles beyond the ones already discovered. Aristotle writes that there are two kinds of eternal movement—one which is constantly the same, and one which is constantly different, which would explain the eternal process of coming to be and passing away.4 The latter, then, has both constancy and variation. The variation comes of its own nature, so its constancy either comes from the constant uniform movement, or from a third one, different from both, but positing a third object would anyway eventually result in recourse to the first object, so the first object is to be considered the cause of the continuous factor in the constantly varying principle. Therefore, together motion in its entirely is explained, as constancy as well as variation are eternally provided, so there is no need for other principles (1072a9–18).

2

Themistius

As we have already seen, the paraphrase of chapters 1–5 was presented in a way that includes a process of gradual movement toward the metaphysical realm, rendering the transition from the “physical” part to the “theological” part more organic and seamless. As of chapter 6, Themistius’ paraphrasing style becomes lengthier, as he begins to address core theological issues in which he is interested and with which he takes many liberties. We have encountered some of these traits, e.g., in the cosmogonic discussion at the end of chapter 2, and the discussion of spontaneous generation at the end of chapter 3. In the following chapters the digressions will increase in frequency and volume, and Themistius’ independent voice will be heard even louder. [1] Themistius opens the chapter by repeating Aristotle’s own opening remarks at 1071b3–5 (‫יא‬19–23), and then proceeds to elaborate about the methodology of inquiry, stating that since it is impossible to provide a demonstration for the first principle (for first principles are the bases of demonstrations and

4 According to Berti, it is universally agreed upon that Aristotle refers, respectively, to the sphere of the fixed stars and to the sun, with the exception of Elders, who substitutes the sphere of the fixed stars with the first mover, and whom Berti criticizes (Berti, “Unmoved Mover(s),” 198–199, referring also to Elders, Aristotle’s Theology, 156).

chapter 6

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in themselves cannot be proved), maybe a “division of labor” is better. Analogous to dividing a heavy load into two, Themistius suggests first to explore the possibility of existence of an eternal substance, and then to explore the possibility of existence of an unmoved substance, thus lightening “the weight of the inquiry” (‫יא‬23–33). Themistius explicates in this way the respective programs of chapter 6 and 7, as he understands them, orientating the reader as to what to expect. [2] Themistius opens the discussion about the existence of an eternal substance by repeating Aristotle’s argument that the priority of substance necessitates that nothing can exist if substances do not exist (1071b5–6), reminding the reader of the very beginning of the treatise (‫א‬5–11), where Themistius elaborated on Aristotle’s description of the whole being either a unity or a series, and his claim that in either way substance is prior. He adds that even a brief reflection on the manner would produce obvious results (‫יא‬33–‫יב‬4). Themistius then elaborates at length on Aristotle’s argument for the necessity of the existence of an eternal substance based on the eternity of movement and time (1071b6–10), adding context as well as content. First, with Aristotle, he identifies movement and time as eternal accidents, with an internal hierarchy: movement belongs to bodies, and time belongs to movement (‫יב‬4–8). Themistius afterwards adds two arguments for the eternity of time. First, he writes, assuming that time comes to be or passes away is assuming that there was, respectively, a time before time and a time after time—both of which are absurd (‫יב‬8–11). Second, after stressing the importance of the issue (‫יב‬11– 14), he offers a parallel argument based on linguistic analysis, maintaining that sentences like “there was a moment before which there was no time” are selfcontradictory, as the words used in them are already temporally charged (‫יב‬14– 20). The short note (1071b9–10) where Aristotle deduces the eternity of movement from the eternity of time is paraphrased (‫יב‬20–21)5 as a starting point for a new, complex digression (‫יב‬22–‫יג‬13) that offers three new arguments for the eternity of movement, which are not based on the eternity of time. The three arguments put forth can be labeled with reference to the specific component of

5 Themistius changes the first part of Aristotle’s argument here, substituting Aristotle’s “identical” (1071b10) with “quantity.” In a way, Themistius limits the scope of Aristotle’s claim, which aims to show that movement is eternal whether it and time are the same—a position he does not adopt but ascribes to other thinkers, usually taken to be Plato (see Berti, “Unmoved Mover(s),” 184–185)—or time is its modification. In other words, Aristotle tries to make the point that the eternity of movement follows also from positions other than his own, whereas Themistius has Aristotle elaborating only on his own view.

400

commentary

movement upon which each is based, namely the mover, the concept of movement, and the moved object.6 The argument based on the concept of the mover (‫יב‬22–32) is fundamentally an argument based on the uniformity of the creator, similar in form to the argument that Themistius advanced earlier to criticize Anaxagoras’ cosmogony at the end of his paraphrase of chapter 2. Its main point is to show that assuming that movement is created leads to absurdities and therefore should be rejected in favor of the alternative, namely the eternity of movement. If movement is created, Themistius argues, then this implies a previously existing eternal creator or mover. A question already arises: how can it be that the creator is eternal whereas the movement which it produces is not? There is no external hindrance to prevent this, neither would it be plausible that there has come to be a “new accident” in the creator’s “state” (a statement that, I presume, means that no change occurs within the mover the result of which it begins to produce movement). An increase of power in the creator likewise cannot be assumed, since that would require alteration in the creator, which is not permissible, and neither is assuming another existent, exterior to the creator, which is capable of altering it. This last idea, Themistius says, is itself absurd, but it leads to an even greater absurdity; this exterior existent, if granted, will be more powerful than the creator. But it itself would also have to undergo alteration, since the moment it stops hindering the creator from creating movement would in turn warrant an explanation, and likewise ad infinitum. Therefore, the createdness of movement is to be rejected, and its eternity accepted. Themistius’ second argument, which analyzes the concept of movement (‫יב‬32–‫יג‬3), is somewhat analogous to his argument concerning the eternity of time. Movement, he writes, must be created by a movement; hence assuming that movement is created is assuming that there existed movement before movement, so we must conclude that movement is eternal. I take Themistius to mean that coming to be, since it is a genus of change, is a kind of movement, so it logically follows that the act of producing movement requires movement, or in other words movement needs movement to come to be. Finally, Themistius’ third argument (‫יג‬3–10) takes as its entry point the concept of a body, stating as fact that that which moves has to be a body. He aims to demonstrate how any assumption regarding the body from which the createdness of movement follows is incorrect. There are three options to be rejected: first, that the body was not created but was moved from a state of rest; second,

6 For an analysis of the argument for eternal motion see Adamson, “Last,” 467–468, as well as 472–474 for its reverberations in Arabic thought.

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that the body was created out of something; and third, that the body was created ex nihilo. The first option is denied according to the same logic of the first argument, namely that an account would be required for the change in the efficient cause (and we have seen that none can be given). The second has the fallacy of the second argument, because it would entail that the creation of the body is prior to the creation of movement, which is absurd. The third option should be rejected, Themistius says, because it combines the fallacies of the two earlier propositions. These two propositions are, I presume, that there is movement before movement (for creating the body) and that there is movement before rest (for moving the body from the state of rest). Having rejected creation ex nihilo, and having shown that movement cannot come to be from rest, the only alternative we are left to adopt is that there exists an eternal body that has always been in motion. This is what we find in Themistius’ concluding remarks of this lengthy digression (‫יג‬10–13).7 Aristotle’s closing remark about the circular spatial movement as the only continuous movement (1071b10–11) is elaborated upon by a description of types of movement (‫יג‬13–15) and an explanation of the importance of the concept of continuity as a necessary property of eternal things (‫יג‬15–18), which comes to explain Aristotle’s introduction of the term into the discussion. To end this part, Themistius offers an argumentative shift from the continuity of time, to the continuity of movement, to the latter’s manifestation in the eternal circular movement (‫יג‬18–22). A final shift, from the eternity of the movement to the eternity of the mover (otherwise the cause would be inferior to the effect, which is impermissible) (‫יג‬22–24), is Themistius’ way to bridge the gap between Aristotle’s proof for the existence of an eternal movable substance and his immediately following discussion of the substance which produces movement at 1071b12. [3] Themistius now proceeds to discuss Aristotle’s statement that the producer of eternal movement must be actuality in its essence. After an opening addition stressing the eternity of the first mover, which he had just established (‫יג‬25–26), Themistius somewhat restates Aristotle’s concern at 1071b12– 14, arguing that if the mover’s activity of moving would not be constant, neither would the moving be eternal (‫יג‬26). But this, Themistius says, has already been shown to be impossible, echoing Aristotle’s critique of the Platonic Ideas (1071b14–17), because that would render eternal substances stationary and useless. Themistius argues that the priority of eternal substances over perceptible

7 This also makes clear that for Themistius the discussion is about proving the existence of an eternal movable substance.

402

commentary

substances demands them to be capable of producing motion (‫יג‬30–31). The logic behind this assertion, if I understand correctly, is that assuming that eternal substances are incapable of producing motion—of which some sensible substances are capable (although not constantly or eternally)—would render them inferior from sensible substances in this respect, undermining the notion of their superiority. Themistius then elaborates upon Aristotle’s denial of any potentiality of the first mover, which would not enable movement to be eternal (1071a17– 19), explaining that ascribing power to the first mover is not the same as ascribing to it a transition from potentiality to actuality (‫יג‬31–32). Assuming some potentiality in the first mover, Themistius says, would require positing a higher principle above it, in actuality, which would be responsible for transferring it from potentiality to actuality (‫יג‬32–‫יד‬2). This is the weakness of things with potentiality; they are unable to move themselves to actuality. In things which have potentiality, perfection is dependent upon an external principle and is not always attained, and even a predominant inclination toward actuality would be insufficient, since a relation to potentiality would always exist. Themistius seems to mean that it would still be on the same axis as potentiality, whereas the first principle should be on a higher ontological level (‫יד‬2– 6). Themistius concludes the discussion by nearly quoting Aristotle’s conclusion from 1071b19–22: there exists a principle whose actuality is a substance, and its eternity and lack of potentiality also demands that it be without matter, which is the source of potentiality (‫יד‬6–8). [4] Moving to the discussion of the priority of actuality, [4.1] Themistius repeats Aristotle’s question (1071b22–24) about the possibility of potentiality being prior (‫יד‬9–12), because of its temporal priority and the fact that not every potentiality is actualized (‫יד‬12–14). Subtracting [4.2] Aristotle’s contingency remark at 1071b25–26, Themistius limits the temporal priority of potentiality to the sensible realm, claiming that absolutely actuality is prior by nature, since it is the mover of that which is in potentiality (‫יד‬14–17). This can perhaps be seen as an elaborate syntactical transposing of [4.5] (1072a3–4), which is not referred to in its original place. Aristotle’s critical account [4.3] of the theologians and the physicists (1071b26–29) is repeated (‫יד‬17–23) with some notable additions. Themistius identifies Hesiod as one of the theologians, adds the atomists to the list of erroneous thinkers, and grounds the discussion in the idea of the priority of matter, which he takes to be their “common error.” Matter is not mentioned by Aristotle in the present discussion, but Themistius’ addition of it renders Aristotle’s critique somewhat more technically sound. Matter is also added as

chapter 6

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the basic concept in Themistius’ repetition of Aristotle’s examples (1071b29– 31), as that which, in general, is the thing that is moved (‫יד‬23–26). Finally, it is noteworthy that Aristotle’s example of seed and semen is substituted by a different argument; whereas Aristotle maintains that the semen and the seed are the respective movers of the menstrual blood and earth (both as matter), Themistius has all of them moved by the sun as their efficient cause (‫יד‬26–28). This position is consistent with the position that Themistius advances in the appendix of chapter 3, and in tune with his solution to the problem of potentiality’s priority by adhering immediately to the first mover. The final part of this discussion is somewhat rearranged by incorporating some parts of [4.5] (1072a4–9) into [4.4] the critical discussion focusing on Leucippus and Plato (1071b31–1072a3). Themistius first declares that all the thinkers who posit matter as prior in fact acknowledge a cause which is in actuality (‫יד‬28–29), listing Leucippus, Plato, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras (‫יד‬29–‫טו‬1). Themistius, following Aristotle, notes that none of these thinkers explain what eternal movement actually is or why it is eternal. They do not say that it is continuous and in a circle, nor do they state if it is moved by nature, intellect, or coercion (‫טו‬1–8). Themistius continues by recounting Aristotle’s criticism against Plato—here without mentioning him by name—arguing that placing confused and disorderly movement as the first movement, only to be appended by the orderly movement, is unjustified and counterfactual (‫טו‬9–12). Paving the way to the final discussion in this chapter, Themistius takes Aristotle’s passing remark about cyclical movement (1072a9) as the basis for an account about the endless revolving perfect and exact movement of the celestial bodies (‫טו‬12– 15). [5] The last part of the chapter mostly repeats Aristotle’s argument for two kinds of movements and their origins—namely the constant uniform movement and the constant varying movement (1072a9–17). Themistius (‫טו‬15– 27) unfolds Aristotle’s argument somewhat more patiently and systematically, explaining the need for a cause for variation by the admitted fact of the constant change in bodies (‫טו‬18–20) and stressing that the cause of constant uniform movement is “better and nobler” than the cause of varying movement (‫טו‬24–25). Aristotle’s note about the reality of these movements is elaborated upon by Themistius, who explicates that the constant uniform efficient cause is the first sphere, and the constant varying cause is the spheres of the planets (‫טו‬29–‫טז‬1). This is surprising, as the cause of constant variation is usually taken to be the sun.8 But perhaps Themistius’ option is logical, because the explana-

8 See, e.g., Berti, “Unmoved Mover(s),” 198–199.

404

commentary

tion as he gives it situates the cause of constant variation as prior to the planets, hence also a part of the explanation of their own movements, which are not eternally the same but eternally varying. In this way Themistius ensures that the planets and the spheres are not left without a function in the cosmic order. Be that as it may, taken together they explain movement as a whole and there is no need for other principles (‫טז‬1–3).

3

Note on Sources

Besides the complete Hebrew text, the abridgment of the Arabic translations of chapters 6–9 starts in chapter 6, preserved in manuscript Ḥikma 6 (Cairo; chapter 6 at 206v16–207v9) and published by Badawī (chapter 6 at Arisṭū, 12–14). Since this is not always straightforward abridgment, but sometimes involves some paraphrasing to restore sense, for the sake of economy, or to compensate for omitted text, the relationship between the Hebrew and the Arabic should be sometimes carefully analyzed in order to determine whether discrepancies are the result of transmission issues or the mechanics of the abridgment, according to the principles established above (see above, Chapter 1, 2.3.2). An important testimony is a long quotation from the abridgment by Šahrastānī, which is analyzed above and can help sort out places where the text of the abridgment is uncertain (see above, Chapter 1, 2.3.3). Another valuable source is al-Baġdādī, who makes heavy use of Themistius’ paraphrase in its original full translation. However, since al-Baġdādī is appropriating the paraphrase for his own needs, using other sources as well, he takes many liberties with the text. His work is neither presented as nor intended to be a summary or reflection of Themistius (see above, Chapter 1, 2.2.7). Rather, Themistius’ text is one of his building blocks, dominant as it may be. Therefore, my use of al-Baġdādī is selective and sometimes ad hoc, with the aim of helping establish the Arabic text without using al-Baġdādī’s text at any cost. Finally, the present chapter benefits from Falaquera’s independent Hebrew translation of a few key passages (see above, 3.2.2), which add control to some choices made by Moshe ibn Tibbon. An English translation of ‫יב‬23–‫יג‬11 by G. Bos is included in Sorabji, Philosophy, vol. 2, 183–184. The French translation of chapter 6 appears in Brague, Thémistius, 73–82.

chapter 6

4

405

Running Commentary

‫יא‬19 ‫)وثالث جوهر( והעצם השלישי‬: The discrepancy is recorded by Frank, “Notes,” 222, § 54. The shorter ‫ והשלישי‬in AB adopted by Landauer is probably a matter of

style. The Arabic seems to reflect the tendency for compactness in the abridgment. Another theoretical option, although less likely, is that AB reflect an original ‫ושלישי עצם‬, where ‫ עצם‬was dropped. ‫יא‬21 ‫מופלגת‬: This is probably a translation of ‫بالغ‬, as in ‫ב‬25 and ‫ג‬32. The variant ‫מספקת‬

was perhaps meant to ensure that the connotation of the word is a positive one. ‫ بالغ‬is used as a translation of the adverb ἱκανῶς in Themistius, in De an., 56,36 (Lyons, Arabic, 83,14), as well as Theophrastus’ On First Principles (Gutas, Theophrastus, 9a18), both the work of Isḥāq. ‫هذا‬: Frank (“Notes,” 222, §55) reports that this is missing in Hebrew, but I think that the use of the demonstrative in the present context is the addition of the abridger, who omitted the reference to the two natural substance so must single out the unmoved substance instead of just listing it after the first two as in the full version. ‫יא‬22 ‫)ونطلب( נחקור מעתה ונבקש‬: ‫ נחקור ונבקש‬translates the Arabic ‫نبحث ونطلب‬, which is a hendiadys translation of ζητέω (see above, ‫ו‬32). The Arabic abridgment only retains ‫نطلب‬. The apparent discrepancy between the Hebrew ‫ נבקש‬and the Ara-

bic ‫ ي ُْطلب‬in Badawī, reported by Frank (“Notes,” 220, § 56), is in fact Badawī’s misreading of the manuscript. ‫)يبليه( יבלהו‬: This option exists only in Falaquera’s Hebrew translation of this passage (see above, Chapter 1, table 44), but I believe that Moshe ibn Tibbon translated it the same way and that ‫ יגלהו‬in B (and perhaps also ‫ ילוה בו‬in C) is a corruption of ‫יבלהו‬. The option ‫( ישיגהו‬or ‫ ישיגנו‬in T) is unclear; perhaps there was a different manuscript reading ‫?يناله‬

406

commentary

‫יא‬23

‫)השנוי וההשתנות( الاستحالات والتغايير‬: Frank (“Notes,” 220, § 57) only remarks about the plural form of ‫ تغايير‬and suggests that the Hebrew is translating ‫تغير‬. Isḥāq employs the plural form ‫ تغايير‬in the present text at ‫ד‬11, and I found another example in Theophrastus’ On First Principles 10b3. Falaquera only has ‫השנויים‬ (without ‫)השתנות‬, but this is, like the Arabic, in the plural, so perhaps there were two different versions of the text, one in singular (used by Moshe ibn Tibbon) and one in plural (used by the Arabic abridger and Falaquera). ‫)الدهر( החלד‬: The option in C, ‫החדל‬, is semantically close to ‫ החלד‬but uncommon (see Even Shoshan, Dictionary, s.v.). The option ‫ תמיד‬in AM, adopted by Landauer, seems like a scribal initiative because it is an adverb. The term ‫ )الدهر كله( החלד כלו‬appears also in ‫יב‬24, with no variation among the Hebrew manuscripts. The underlying Greek term is probably αἰών, and Aristotle uses it in a similar fashion in On the Heavens 2.1.283b28: “The heaven … is one and eternal, with no end or beginning of its total duration.” Another similar usage is in Metaph., 1075a10 (not paraphrased by Themistius), which reads τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα; see also Parts of Animals, 1.3.644b23, a chapter to which Themistius alludes in the appendix to chapter 3 (see Meyrav, “Spontaneous Generation,” 203). The term αἰών in the meaning of “eternal duration” is frequent in the pseudo-Aristotelian De Mundo. ‫יא‬25 ‫)التى هى( כלומר‬: there was probably a problem in the Arabic version that Moshe ibn Tibbon used, reading ‫أعنى‬. Falaquera’s ‫ שהיא‬agrees with the Arabic we have. ‫)لا توجد( אי אפשר שתמצא‬: Frank (“Notes,” 220, § 58) remarks that the Hebrew translates ‫لا يمكن أن توجد‬, as does Falaquera. The form ‫ لا توجد‬is an abridgment typical of the technique of the abridger. ‫יא‬28 ‫ענינים‬: Al-Baġdādī seems to be quoting this sentence directly, and has ‫المعنيين‬

(Neuwirth, al-Baġdādī, 21,6), while the Arabic abridgment adds ‫ صفتان‬at the end of the sentence to restore sense to the shortened part. ‫ معنى‬is translated into ‫ענין‬ elsewhere in the text (‫א‬5), although with a different meaning. Frank (“Notes,” 220, §60) suggests that the Arabic ‫ وهاتان صفتان للمبدأ الأول‬is a gloss, but in fact it is compensation for the compression of the sentence. The two “attributes”

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are eternity and immovability, as explained in lines 27–28, which the abridger skips. ‫יא‬29 ‫ביחוד‬: The variant ‫ ביסוד‬in DAM is the result of a scribal error (see also ‫ה‬30; ‫ז‬1). Thanks to al-Baġdādī we can see that the underlying Arabic is ً ‫مفردا‬. ‫תחלה‬: Frank remarks (“Notes,” 220, §59) that this is absent in Arabic, but this

is not a transmission issue but part of the abridgment procedure. Since the abridger omits the part where Themistius offers to divide the discussion into two, there is no need to state that the coming discussion is the first one. In any case, the omitted term isً ‫( أولا‬see, e.g., ‫א‬11; ‫ג‬30) and not Frank’s suggestionً ‫مبدءا‬. ‫יא‬33 ‫)إن( אם‬: manuscript C has ‫אשר‬, probably reading ‫ أن‬instead of ‫إن‬. See also ‫יב‬5 for this phenomenon. ‫יא‬34

‫)והעצמים( والجواهر‬: manuscript ḥ has ‫والجوهر‬, but I accept Frank’s suggestion (“Notes,” 220, §61) to correct the Arabic according to the Hebrew and the text of Metaph. 1071b5. The plural should be maintained also for the sake of the correct form of the syllogism that Themistius puts forth here. The omission of ‫كلها‬ is common abridgment practice in the present text. ‫יב‬1 ‫היושר וסדר‬: this is part of a general problem with the terms ‫ ترتيب‬and ‫نظام‬, both

of which can translate τάξις, whereas the latter can also translate εὐθύς (see, e.g., ‫טו‬12 for another instance of this), rendering it impossible to know whether there was a single Arabic term here, which was translated ‫ יושר‬and glossed ‫סדר‬ (as could perhaps be gathered from C), or the two Arabic terms were already present. ‫שרשו ועקרו‬: ‫ שרש‬is probably a translation of ‫( أصل‬see ‫יב‬12), whereas ‫ועקרו‬, as can be seen from the movement through D (‫)ויסודה הנה עקרו‬, is a revision of ‫( ויסודו‬in C). The underlying Arabic term is probably ‫( ركن‬see ‫ב‬5; ‫ב‬7; ‫ב‬20; ‫ב‬21), which—I presume—was replaced in the course of the translation from ‫ יסוד‬to

408

commentary

‫עקר‬, because of the problems associated with ‫ יסוד‬became more severe as the text progressed (see Appendix C). ‫יב‬3 ‫ומי שהנהיג הענין הזה ואפילו מעט מן ההנהגה‬: ‫ הנהגה‬is meaningless in the present context, and I agree with Brague (Thémistius, 74n4), who conjectures that the Arabic originally had ‫( تدبر‬reflection) which was misread as ‫تدبير‬. Themistius uses the verb ἐννοέω (“to reflect”) in his paraphrase of On the Soul (in De an., 36,33), and Isḥāq translates it into ‫( تدبر‬Lyons, Arabic, 37,7). ‫יב‬4

‫)אי אפשר מבלתי( لا بد من‬: See above, Chapter 1, tables 33 and 34. ‫)להם( للموجودات‬: The abridger explicates the object of the sentence to make up for the text he omitted. ‫יב‬5 ‫שיהיה‬: The variant ‫ אם יהיה‬shows that C read ‫ إن‬and the revision read ‫أن‬. For a similar confusion see ‫יא‬33. ‫יב‬6 ‫התנועה אינה טבעית משוללת‬: The only textual support for the reading ‫ התנועה‬is the marginal correction by C1, which was adopted by Landauer and is corroborated by Falaquera’s translation of this passage. The other manuscripts have ‫תנועתו‬, which is incorrect. Another problem occurs with ‫טבעית‬, which is probably consequent on the previous misreading, reflecting ‫ طبيعية‬rather than (probably) the original ‫—طبيعة‬this, again, we know thanks to Falaquera. The subject of the sentence is movement in general, not the movement of the eternal substance, and Themistius’ point, following Aristotle, is that movement is not an independent nature but is constituted upon a body. The term ‫ משוללת‬occurs only here within the Hebrew translation, but I assume that the Arabic was ‫مجردة‬, as in Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation of Maimonides’ Treatise on Logic (Efros, Maimonides, ‫סא‬2) and of Averroes’ epitome of Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia (Blumberg, Averroes, 16,11).

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‫יב‬7 ‫ויותר ראוי שלא יהיה כן הזמן‬: manuscript A, adopted by Landauer, has ‫( שיהיה‬of which M’s ‫ יהיה‬is a corruption). In a way, the affirmation and negation mean the same thing, namely that time is even less of an independent entity than movement. The negative statement would be “and even more so is time not like this,” and the positive would be “and even more so is time [i.e., not an independent entity].” ‫יב‬8 ‫ימלט‬: see ‫ז‬3.

‫)לתנועה( الحركة‬: Badawī already mentions in a footnote that the text in ḥ is unclear and perhaps has ‫للحركة‬, like the text the Hebrew reflects. In any case, this part of the text is somewhat reorganized by the abridger, and in the new format ‫ الحركة‬is more grammatical, so the difference between the Arabic and the Hebrew is not a matter of transmission. ‫)יונח( نضع‬: Badawī reads the rasm ‫ ىضع‬in first person, and is probably correct, as the next part of the argument is doubtless in first person (‫ وضعنا‬at ‫יב‬9). The reading in Hebrew, in third person singular, is possible, but can also arise some confusion (see next note). ‫יב‬8–9

ً ‫ليس يمكن أن نضع لهما كونا ً وفسادا‬: Frank (“Notes,” 220, § 62) thinks that this is a paraphrase of ‫יב‬13 (‫)אין לתנועה ולא לזמן הויה ולא הפסד‬, but the reference to possibility makes it clear that this text is actually derived from what was translated into Hebrew as ‫יב( ואי אפשר שיונח לזמן ולא לתנועה הויה ולא הפסד‬8–9). Once we realize that ‫ שיונח‬and ‫ نضع‬reflect the same text (see previous note), the relation between the abridgment and the full version in this passage becomes clearer. ‫יב‬15

‫)שרש( أصل‬: I assume from the context that this is a translation of ὑπόθεσις (cf. Themistius, in De an., 37,23; Lyons, Arabic, 39,5).

410

commentary

‫יב‬16

‫)שדומה לאלו המלות( معانى هذه الألفاظ‬: This is not a problem of transmission as suggested by Frank (“Notes,” 220, §63), nor should have Brague put the words “le sens” in chevrons (Thémistius, 75). The Arabic is not part of the original text, but a paraphrase which compensates for the abridger’s omission of the examples. ‫יב‬17–20 ‫ומי…הפסדו‬: This is quoted in al-Baġdādī (23.9–11), infusing some material from ‫יב‬16 and some paraphrasing:

‫فكل من استعمل اسما مثل متى وكان و يكون وأشباه ذلك ليثبت به حدوث الزمان واستمراره‬ .‫بعد انقطاعه‬ ‫יב‬18 ‫שעשה‬: at this point manuscript D is cut off. ‫יב‬21 ‫בלא ספק‬: Frank (“Notes,” 220, §64) suggests that the omitted Arabic here is ‫بلا‬ ‫شك‬, but in the present text ‫ בלא ספק‬is the standard translation of ‫( لا محالة‬see Lexicon) and there is no occurrence of the expression ‫بلا شك‬. ‫יב‬22

ً ‫وأيضا‬: This word is not a part of the Arabic translation, but a connector inserted by the abridger to bridge the gap created by the omitted text at the beginning of the line. ‫)لم تزل( לא סרה‬: This is a good example of the revision in the Hebrew tradition to maintain consistency. The original ‫ נצחי‬was replaced by ‫ לא סרה‬because ‫נצחי‬

has just been used to translate ‫( أزلى‬in the previous lines and passim), whereas ‫ סר‬is the translation of the verb ‫زال‬.

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‫יב‬24

‫)שידומה( أن نتوهم‬: This discrepancy is reported in Frank, “Notes,” 220, § 68. There is no way to know whether the verb should be in first person plural (as in the Arabic) or in third person singular passive (as in the Hebrew). The Arabic in ḥ has the skeletal ‫ىتوهم‬. ‫יב‬25 ‫ולא יתחדש חדוש בענין מה שהיה עליו וחדש אותה‬: Themistius’ point is that no change

occurs within the mover the result of which is that it starts to produce movement (see commentary above). The Hebrew manuscripts reflect confusion that results from two factors: first, the triple use of the root ‫ حدث‬in the present argument—(1) an accident; (2) the verb signifying the occurrence of the accident; (3) the verb signifying the mover’s act of producing movement. The other factor is the corruption of ‫( עליו‬probably translating ‫ عليه‬in the expression ‫ما كان‬ ‫ ;عليه‬see, e.g., Efros, Maimonides, ‫סא‬1) into ‫אליו‬, and subsequently adding ‫ כלו‬to the mix for reasons which I cannot understand (perhaps this is another corruption of ‫)עליו‬. The Arabic abridgment (‫ )ولا حدث حادث فى حال ما أحدثها‬somehow simplifies things by partly omitting the expression ‫ ما كان عليه‬and rendering the expression as meaning “no accident occurred in the state of that which made it [i.e., movement].” ‫יב‬26 ‫)ولا يمكن أن نقول( ואי אפשר שהוא‬: It is remarkable that manuscript T adds ‫שנאמר‬ after ‫שהוא‬, reflecting either late access to the Arabic or impressive editorial instincts. The fact that this line has another error in the Hebrew (see next note) suggests a problem (perhaps corrupt text?) in the Arabic manuscript from which the translation was made. Frank (“Notes,” 220, § 72) proposes that the Hebrew misread ‫ نقول‬for ‫ يكون‬, and this possibility is strengthened by the variant ‫ שיהיה‬in B. The difference in meaning is perhaps slight: the Arabic version has Themistius deny the possibility of saying something, whereas the Hebrew has Themistius deny the possibility that something is such. ‫)لا يقدر أن يكون عنه( בלתי יכול שיהיה‬: Themistius’ point is that it is impossible to say that at first it was not within the efficient cause’s power to have something proceed from it, and then it suddenly was. That is why ‫ عنه‬is an important part of the sentence. The omission in the Hebrew renders the sentence nonsensical, meaning roughly that it is impossible for the efficient cause first to

412

commentary

be unable to “be [something]” (or alternatively “exist”) and then able to, which would—at best—amount to a repetition of what has already been mentioned about the impossibility of change in the mover. The inconvenience is felt in T, which emends ‫ שיהיה‬into ‫( להוותה‬quite cleverly). This option explicates in a way Themistius’ position, having him say that it is impossible that at first the efficient cause did not have the ability to “generate it [i.e., movement],” and afterwards did. ‫יב‬28 ‫)وأنا وإن قلنا( ומי שאמר‬: Frank (“Notes,” 221, §76) already noticed that the Hebrew has third person while the Arabic has first person. I think that this is not a matter of different texts, but part of the abridgment technique. Since the abridger skips the next few lines almost completely, and the possibilities after that are presented in first person, perhaps he attempted some kind of stylistic uniformity. That this option was originally presented as a form of response to an unnamed interlocutor (as in the Hebrew ‫ )ומי שאמר‬is reinforced by the harsh tone at lines 29–30, and also by Themistius’ tendency for imaginary discussions with holders of absurd positions (see, e.g., ‫ט‬6–13). ‫יב‬29–30 ‫يلزم أن يكون السبب المانع( שהוא יתחייב לו שתהיה הסבה המונעת אותו יותר חזקה ממנו‬ ‫)أقوى‬: Frank notes the omission of ‫לו‬, ‫אותו‬, and ‫ ממנו‬from the Arabic (“Notes,” 221, §§77–79). The first omission makes sense given the change from third to first person that was discussed in the previous note, as ‫ לו‬refers to the interlocutor, which in the Arabic abridgment is no longer present. The two other omissions are part of the abridger’s tendency for economy in expression. Landauer’s conjecture ‫ המנעת‬for ‫ המניעה‬in CA (and its corruption ‫ המגיעה‬in B) proves to be successful, as now we have ‫ המונעת‬in manuscripts M and T, both of which were unavailable to him. The confusion between ‫ מניע‬and ‫ מונע‬is continued in the next line, at ‫יב‬31. ‫יג‬3 ‫ولا بد من أن يكون جسم من الأجسام( ואי אפשר מבלתי שיהיה גשם מן הגשמים הוא המניע‬ ‫)هو الذى يتحرك‬: Landauer, without access to the Arabic, correctly emends the manuscript to ‫המתנועע‬, as ‫ המניע‬is certainly wrong. I have retained it in the text because it is universally testified by all the manuscripts. There are two possible explanations for the origins of this error. Either there was some form

chapter 6

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of corruption, since the Arabic ‫ الذى‬should have been translated into ‫אשר‬, resulting as ‫יתנועע‬/‫הוא אשר יניע‬. An alternative explanation has to do with the Arabic expression ‫لا بد من‬, which caused confusion in the Hebrew manuscript tradition (see above, Chapter 1, tables 33–34). If it has been initially mistranslated as ‫—ואי אפשר שיהיה‬as we have seen happen—then some copyist would perhaps manually change ‫ המתנועע‬into ‫ המניע‬to render the sentence logical (“it is impossible for any body to be the mover”). Perhaps the expression was then corrected into ‫ואי אפשר מבלתי‬, without correcting ‫ המניע‬back to ‫המתנועע‬. ‫יג‬5 ‫)تغير( התנועע והשתנה‬: Frank records the difference at “Notes,” 221, § 83. This is a

matter of omission in the Arabic, not a gloss in Hebrew or problems in transmission. For a similar formulation see above, ‫יא‬23. ‫יג‬5–6 ‫)تقدم حدوث الجسم حدوث الحركة( הנה קדם לחדוש הגשם חדוש התנועה‬: The difference between ‫ לחדוש‬and ‫ حدوث‬determines the identity of the prior and posterior

in the text. According to the Hebrew, which is probably translating ‫لحدوث‬: the creation of movement is prior to the creation of the body; according to the Arabic, the creation of the body is prior to the creation of movement. From a logical point of view the difference is slight, since both possibilities would be equally absurd, but nevertheless the reason why each possibility is absurd is different. Movement cannot be created before the creation of the body because movement is a modification of a body. The body cannot be created before the creation of movement because coming to be is a genus of change, as is movement, so that would mean that there would be movement before movement. Since the latter is the argument Themistius puts advances for denying the possibility mentioned, the text should be probably read with the Arabic. ‫יג‬8–9 ‫ויהיה התחלת חדוש הגשם הוא התחלת חדוש התנועה‬: I take ‫ התחלה‬here not to mean “principle,” but in the sense of a concrete point of departure, perhaps translating ‫( إ بتداء‬see, e.g., ‫יא‬4).

414

commentary

‫יג‬10–11 ‫فإذ قد بان أن الحركة( ואחר שהתבאר מענין התנועה שהיא נצחית ומענין הזמן אצל התנועה‬ ‫)والزمان أزليان‬: Frank (“Notes,” 221, §85) thinks that the Arabic is an abridgment of ‫יג‬12 (‫ )והנה התנועה אם היתה נצחית‬and suggests that the original was ‫فإذا ً قد‬ ‫بان أن الحركة إن كانت أزلية‬. In fact, the reference should be to the present sentence, which has both ‫ שהתבאר‬and the allusion to time. The connection to ‫יג‬12 occurs only with the insertion of ‫فالجسم‬, which is presented as a continuation of the statement rather than a conclusion, saving space in the abridger’s familiar manner. ‫יג‬12 ‫והנה…נצחי‬: This is paraphrased in al-Baġdādī (25,2–3): ‫وإذا كانت الحركة أزلية‬

‫فالمتحرك بها أزلى كذلك‬. ‫יג‬15 ‫המקומיות‬: manuscript C has ‫המחודשות‬, and it is difficult to see how this could be a corruption of ‫ המקומיות‬or something accidentally copied from some proxi-

mate text. In the Arabic manuscript tradition of Averroes’ epitome of Aristotle’s On the Heavens we sometimes find the variant ‫ الكائنة‬for ‫( المكانية‬see, e.g., Ḥoresh, “Averroes,” 3,4, apparatus of the Arabic text), and perhaps this was the case here as well. ‫יג‬16

‫فيها‬: Šahrastānī’s ‫ للمستديرة‬is an explication of the object of ‫في‬, as he sometimes does (see above, Chapter 1, tables 27, 28). See Frank, “Notes,” 221, § 87, and Badawī’s footnote ad loc. ‫יג‬19 ‫שנחשוב‬: Whenever there is confusion in the manuscripts between the roots ‫ חש״ב‬and ‫( דמ״ה‬here at manuscripts BM; T would be probably join them were it

not corrupt), the root ‫ وهم‬is the Arabic background. But in the Arabic we have here ‫( يكون‬see Frank, “Notes,” 221, §19), which is not a matter of transmission but the abridger’s tendency to render the text impersonal and absolute (the exact same phenomenon occurs at ‫כא‬13).

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‫יג‬22–24

‫)והנה…נכבד( فيجب…أفضل‬: see above, Chapter 1, table 12. ‫יג‬25 ‫ואחר שהיה‬: The variant ‫ וכאשר היה‬in C also occurs above, at ‫יג‬10. ‫יג‬26 ‫ויעשה הפעל הזה‬: There are a few problems with this expression; its omission from both manuscript C and the Arabic abridgment—whose surrounding text remains intact—suggests that perhaps there was no abridgment here but a matter of textual transmission. If the version of C was revised according to a better manuscript—which cannot be ruled out—then this would explain the addition in the other manuscripts. However, AM have only ‫ויעשה הפעל‬, which changes the meaning of the sentence from a reference to a certain activity to a reference to activity in general. But since Themistius has already referred to activity in general earlier, the Hebrew ‫ ויעשה הפעל הזה‬seems to trace back to a positive formulation of ποιητικόν … ἐνεργοῦν δέ τι (“… acting on them, but that is not actively doing so”; tr. Reeve) at Metaph., 1071b12–13. If this is indeed the case, then Themistius’ point is, I think, that the first mover’s activity as a mover is always “active,” i.e., never stops. But this is an open question. ‫יג‬31

‫)בלא פעל בטל אבל יכול( بلا فعل ولا متعطلة لـكن قادرة‬: Frank reports the discrepancy between the Arabic and Hebrew (“Notes,” 221, § 101), and between the Arabic abridgment and Šahrastānī, who has ‫ §( بلا فعل فتكون متعطلة غير قادرة‬102). The discrepancy between the abridgment and Šahrastānī might reflect a problem of transmission. It is difficult to decide which text is correct. The Hebrew version has Themistius say that we cannot assume that this nature (i.e., the nature of the first principle) is inactive and idle, but it is rather able. The abridgment has Themistius say that we can assume this nature to be neither inactive nor idle, but it is rather able. Šahrastānī’s version is somewhat far-fetched, having Themistius say that we cannot assume this nature to be inactive, namely idle and inapt.

416

commentary

‫יג‬34

‫)בטבע( فى طبيعته‬: This discrepancy is not reported by Frank and is inverted in Brague, who translates “sa nature,” but puts only “nature” in bold, as if the possessive suffix is only in the Hebrew (but this is vice versa and therefore in this case cannot be expressed graphically according to Brague’s convention). I believe, but unsure, that the Hebrew should be followed here, because retaining the Arabic leaves us with a somewhat corrupt formulation which would roughly read “it is impossible for the first principle to be in its nature something that is in potentiality.” The Hebrew would have the sentence read “it is impossible for the first principle to be of the [same] nature of whatever is in potentiality,” which I think better expresses the main idea of Themistius’ remark here. If this is so, then the Arabic should be revised to ‫فى طبيعة‬. However, I am apprehensive, because below, at ‫יד‬8, there is a parallel case where the Hebrew has ‫בטבעו‬, which clearly reflects ‫فى طبيعته‬, despite the paraphrasing involved in the abridgment of this passage. Still, it seems to me that in the present passage Themistius denies that the first principle has a shared nature with whatever is in potentiality, whereas at ‫יד‬8 he is saying that any material thing “has potentiality in its nature.” ‫יד‬2 ‫ואי אפשר…הפועל‬: This is paraphrased in al-Baġdādī (27,2–3): ‫وإن الشىء لا يخرج‬ ‫نفسه من القوة إلى الفعل‬. ‫יד‬2–4 ‫כי מה…בפועל‬: This is paraphrased in al-Baġdādī (27,4–5): ‫فإن ما بالقوة طبيعة ضعيفة‬

‫( تستكمل بغيرها‬reading, with Gutas, ‫ طبيعة‬for Neuwirth’s ‫)طبيعته‬. ‫יד‬3 ‫יקרה לו‬: It is theoretically possible that the option ‫ יקנה‬in C is a translation of

‫ يستفيد‬, meaning that a thing acquires its perfection when it is in actuality, but I think this is just an explanation for why the corruption of the text survives. The option ‫יקרה לו‬, probably reflecting ‫يكون له‬, seems close to the argumentation about the contingency of transition from potentiality to actuality. Themistius maintains that perfection occurs only to whatever is already in actuality, and this is in accordance with the rest of the argument, where he explains that it is possible for something not to be actualized after all (this becomes clearer when recovering the text omitted by Landauer; see next note).

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417

‫יד‬4 ‫שלא יהיה בפועל‬: Landauer follows A and Finzi’s Latin translation by omitting these words, but this seems like some sort of error in transmission, as it is unsupported by any of the other manuscripts and—perhaps more importantly—because the possibility for something in potentiality not to be actualized is an integral part of Aristotle’s (and Themistius’) argument. ‫יד‬6

‫)אין עצם לפניה( الجوهر فعله‬: This should be read with the Arabic (“whose actuality is substance”). Brague (Thémistius, 79n3) and Frank (“Notes,” 221, § 103) think that the better reading is in Hebrew: ‫“( אין עצם לפניה‬to which no substance is prior”), but the Arabic is much closer to Aristotle’s Greek at 1071b20 (ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια; “whose substance/essence is actuality”), perhaps somewhat mistranslated. The Hebrew ‫ לפניה‬translates ‫قبله‬, whose skeletal form can easily be misread as ‫فعله‬, whereas the negation could have been inserted to restore sense. ‫יד‬7–8 ‫)فيكون…بالقوة( וכאשר…בכח‬: This is a good example of the Arabic abridgment technique. The full version in the Hebrew has a full argument, whereas the Arabic uses only a negative inversion of the conclusion as justification (“everything that involves matter has potentiality in its nature” is transformed into “its nature does not have potentiality”). The string ‫ כי כל…בכח‬is paraphrased in alBaġdādī (27,6–7): ‫فإن كل ما تشو به الهيولى ففيه ما بالقوة‬. ‫יד‬9 ‫על שהוא‬: This is probably a translation of ‫على أنه‬, reflecting the Greek καίτοι (“yet”; “however”) at Aristotle, Metaph., 1071b22. For this usage by Isḥāq see, e.g., Themistius, in De an., 22,20; 24,4 (Lyons, Arabic, respectively 6,4; 9,16). ‫יד‬17

‫ولا يجب أن نظن أن القوة قبل الفعل‬: This is not an abridgment of a text, but stating the main point of Themistius’ discussion at lines 9–17.

418

commentary

‫יד‬19

‫)האויר( الهاو ية‬: I follow Brague’s correction according to al-Baġdādī (see Brague, Thémistius, 80n1), and this is reinforced in the marginal note by C1, referring to ‫ והתוהו‬in Averroes. The Hebrew probably misread ‫الهواء‬. ‫יד‬20 ‫ההיולי‬: From this point onwards C consistently uses ‫ חומר‬instead of ‫היולי‬. This is the second phase of terminological unification, after ‫ عنصر‬was translated into ‫ חומר‬in the part of the paraphrase that focused on perishable substances. See discussion in Appendix C. ‫יד‬23 ‫)المبدأ( ההתחלה‬: The reading ‫ ההתחלה‬is corroborated by the Arabic quotation in al-Baġdādī. The option ‫להתחלה‬, adopted by Landauer, would have Themistius

write that the common error was saying that the first principle has matter, rather than saying that the first principle is matter. See also ‫יד‬28 for the argument. ‫יד‬29 ‫)إقرار( להודות‬: The root ‫ יד״י‬appears twice in the Hebrew text (here and at ‫כט‬19, see commentary ad loc.), and in both times it causes problems in C (see also below, ‫כו‬12). The verb ‫ أقر‬translates the Greek ὁμολογέω (“admit”); see

Themistius, in De an., 23,11; 26,25; 45,9 (In Lyons, Arabic, respectively 8,1 (n. 1); 15,5; 57,12). In the present case, based on the consistent infamiliarity with the root ‫ قرر‬reflected in C, I would not be surprised if the present variant ‫לשער‬ expresses an improvisation based upon misreading ‫ إقرار‬as ‫*إقدار‬, a theoretical fourth form maṣdar of the root ‫قدر‬, which means also “to assume.” ‫יד‬31 ‫ענין‬: I agree with Brague (Thémistius, 80n3) that ‫ ענין‬is probably a mistranslation

of the Arabic ‫أمر‬, which in the present context should have been understood as “command.” ‫מבולבלת‬: Here and at ‫טו‬9 there seems to be an attempt to introduce the term ‫ מסתערת‬for expressing the “confused” (‫ )مضطر بة‬movement; Themistius is expli-

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cating Plato’s “confused” (πλημμελῶς) movement at Timaeus, 30a4, alluded to in Aristotle’s text. ‫ תנועה מבולבלת‬was a standard term. See, e.g., Shiffman, Moreh ha-Moreh, Introduction, 153 (p. 117); Gersonides, Milḥamot, VI, i, 3, p. 296,15. I did not find other occurrences of ‫תנועה מסתערת‬. ‫הנצחון‬: Alexandru’s suggestion that Themistius had νῖκος (a later form of νίκη; “victory”) rather than the received νεῖκος (see the apparatus at 1072a6) is unfounded and is based on Finzi’s Latin mistranslation of the Hebrew ‫ נצחון‬as victoria. ‫ נצחון‬of course also means victory, but is also a standard term for strife (see Klatzkin, Thesaurus, s.v.) in medieval Hebrew terminology, and in the present context, as preserved in al-Baġdādī, is a translation of the Arabic ‫غلبة‬, itself a standard translation of νεῖκος. A good example for this usage is in Themistius’ paraphrase of On the Soul, where ‫ غلبة‬translates νεῖκος during a discussion of this principle in Empedocles (see in De an., 34,13–17; Lyons, Arabic, 31,15–32,2). ‫טו‬1 ‫שנספר‬: I assume the Arabic was ‫يخـبر‬, and the Hebrew read ‫نخـبر‬, which would

change the meaning from the critical “they should make known” to the intention “we should make known” etc. The Arabic, I conjecture, is closer to Aristotle’s critical remarks that Themistius is referring to, but both are possible. ‫טו‬5 ‫במקרה‬: I assume that this is translating ‫بالاتفاق‬, which is probably translating ἀπὸ τύχης. ‫טו‬8 ‫יתחלף חלוף חזק‬: Aristotle’s Greek has διαφέρει γὰρ ἀμήχανον ὅσον (1071b37; “This makes an enormous difference”—tr. Reeve), and the Arabic probably used ‫اختلاف‬, understanding the expression as roughly “the difference between them is very big,” referring to the different kinds of movement, whereas διαφέρει here is used in the impersonal sense of importance. ‫טו‬9 ‫המבולבלת‬: See above, ‫יד‬31.

420

commentary

‫טו‬17 ‫בהתחלפות‬: as already noticed by Frank (“Notes,” 221, § 105), the addition ‫זמן‬ in AM—adopted by Landauer—does not reflect anything in the Arabic and is simply an error (Brague retains it in the text but notes the problem at Thémistius, 81n1). Themistius’ point is that the state of the cause of the object whose movement varies at various times is the same as the state of the object itself, namely it also varies. ‫טו‬27

‫فبالواجب صارا جميعا علة فصار العلتان جميعا ً علتا ً الدوام والاختلاف‬: There is some overlap between al-Baġdādī’s somewhat paraphrastic quotation of the text and the Arabic abridgment here. ‫התראה‬: manuscript C has ‫התראה או תחשוב‬, adopted by Landauer and included

in Brague’s translation. However, as can be seen in the other manuscripts, there is no need to keep both, as ‫ תראה‬and ‫ תחשוב‬are two options for translating the same term, probably ‫ترى‬, which has this dual meaning (see Lexicon). Manuscripts ABM reflect the version that preferred ‫תראה‬, whereas T reflects the version that preferred ‫תחשוב‬.

Chapter 7 1

Aristotle

Chapter 7 is a direct continuation of chapter 6, completing the transition from the eternal sensible substances to the first unmovable mover, whose substantiality and pure actuality have been proved in chapter 6. The chapter discusses the immovability of the first mover, explains how it moves as an object of love,1 and adds several attributes to it which in a way constitute the theological core of the entire composition, bringing the discussion to a climax by identifying the first mover as God; owing to their shared attributes, they become co-extensive. After contrasting this conclusion with the positions of Speusippus and the Pythagoreans, the chapter ends with a set of closing remarks stating what has been established. The chapter can be divided into [1] an introduction, several discussions [2–6], and [7] a conclusion.2 [1] In the introduction, Aristotle first declares that the puzzles3 of the previous chapters have been resolved (1072a19–21), and then repeats the conclusion of chapter 6, where the unceasing circular movement of the first heaven certifies its eternity (1072a21–23). [2] The first discussion (1072a23–26) begins by supplying a corollary to the existence of the first heaven; since it is always in motion, there must exist something that moves it. Its mover must be unmoved, because the first heaven is in a medial position, being both a mover and something that is moved (1072a23– 25), suggesting that something medial is between two actual extremities.4 To this it would be plausible to add that the fact that the movement of the first heaven has been shown to be the first movement necessitates that its mover

1 There are many problems associated with this chapter, notably the question whether the first mover is a final cause or an efficient cause. For a summary of the controversies, see Ross, “Causality.” For studies see Kahn, “The Place”; Judson, “Heavenly Motion,” responding to Kosman, “Aristotle’s Prime Mover.” 2 Here I roughly follow Laks’ division (“Metaphysics Λ 7,” 210–211). 3 Reeve (Metaphysics, 524, §1343) thinks that since Aristotle in a way already resolved these problems earlier, he is referring mostly or only to his predecessors, who had already advanced by positing “eternal activity” (Plato and Leucippus) and “eternal coming to be and passing away” (Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Leucippus). Still, these were not enough to resolve all the problems they were meant to solve. 4 For an alternative reading of the text see Reeve, Metaphysics, 524, § 1347. For the textual problems associated with this sentence see Laks, “Metaphysics Λ 7,” 215–218. They are less relevant for Themistius, who prefers to substitute this argument.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400443_014

422

commentary

would not itself be another “medial” object, because then the movement of the heaven would not have been the first (Aristotle in fact uses this argument at 1072b7–10; see below). Therefore, the mover of the first heaven and the unmoved mover are one and the same entity. Aristotle characterizes the unmoved mover as eternal, substance, and actuality—the properties of the first principle that have been established in the previous chapter; immovability now joins them (1072a25–26). [3] The next part of the chapter (1072a26–b4) revolves around the question how the unmoved mover actually causes movement and is meant to present it as the joint supreme object of both intellect and desire. Aristotle first notes that objects of desire and objects of intelligizing both move without being moved (1072a26–27). He then provides an argument to prove that the primary object of desire and the primary object of intellect are one and the same. First, Aristotle defines the objects of appetite and wish (rational will) as the apparent noble and the real noble respectively (1072a27–28). Then he argues that since desire depends on what is apparent, and not the other way around, intellect is the starting point (1072a29–30), which means that, transitively, the primary object of intellect would be the primary object of desire. Moving to the objects of intellect, which are its movers, Aristotle notes that objects that are intelligible in themselves occupy the positive part of a “column” (συστοιχία)5 of opposite concepts. In this series, the primary concept is “substance,” and in its own subdivision the primary concepts are “simple” and “actuality” (1072a30–32). In other words, the highest point of intelligible objects is a simple substance in actuality, which is precisely what the first principle is, and thus it is effectively the highest unmoved mover.6 After a brief clarification of the difference between the terms “one” and “simple” (the former is a measure, the latter pertains to a thing’s nature; 1072a32–34), Aristotle adds the concepts “beautiful” and “desirable in itself” to the column of intelligibles. Alluding to the goodness of that which is primary (1072a34– b1) enables him, in a way, to justify from this angle the assertion that the

5 For discussions of this Pythagorean term and Aristotle’s employment of it in this context (and others) see Elders, Aristotle’s Theology, 166–170; DeFilippo, “Aristotle,” 401; Herzberg, “God,” 160. For the textual aspects see Laks, “Metaphysics Λ 7,” 224–226. My own exposition does not delve into this concept, as it is subtracted by Themistius in his paraphrase of the present passage. 6 This argument is what led Bordt to stress that the first principle’s function as an immovable mover is not part of its nature, but a result of its relation to the things whose intellect it is the object, noting that “relational properties never constitute the essence of a thing” (Bordt, “Aristotle’s God,” 91).

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primary object of desire and the primary object of intellect are one and the same.7 This part of the discussion is concluded (1072b1–4) by a distinction between two types of final causes, respectively that “for whom” and that “toward which” an action is performed. Of these, unmoved things belong to the latter, and perhaps this is Aristotle’s justification why the unmoved mover produces spatial movement, or in his words “it produces movement insofar as it is loved” (tr. Reeve). Besides it, all other things produce movement insofar as they are themselves being moved. [4] The next part of the discussion asserts the unmoved mover’s unchangeability, primacy, and necessity. Aristotle argues that since spatial movement is a kind of change, everything that is moved is subject to change. Even if this is not a change in its substance, it still changes insofar as it can be in a different place (this is Aristotle’s call back to the subject of “topical matter” in chapter 2). The primary moved substance has the primary kind of change, which is identified as the primary kind of movement in place, i.e., circular movement. Since no change is prior to this change, it can be concluded that the unmoved mover, as the cause of the first kind of change, is completely unchangeable (1072b4–10). From this Aristotle concludes that the primary unmoved mover exists necessarily. He adds that its necessity is of the best kind, enumerating the three kinds of necessity (as compelled contrary to nature, as required for the good, and as incapable of being otherwise; 1072b10–13). As all the conditions of being a first principle have now been satisfied, the unmoved mover—as the ultimate principle of movement and consequently the ultimate principle of change—can be considered as the principle on which heaven and nature depend (1072b13– 14).8 [5] The next part of Aristotle’s discussion is highly controversial, even by the standards of book 12, and I will try to follow the argument with minimum interference. Aristotle starts by stating some sort of affinity between the first principle’s pastime and the pastime of human beings. Pleasure is the common factor, but while in us it is only brief, for the first principle it is eternal and best (1072b14–17). The reason given is the conceptual connection between activity and pleasure, as becomes apparent by Aristotle’s examples (like wak-

7 Here I am following in the lines of DeFilippo’s interpretation (“Aristotle,” 401). Since Themistius does not repeat this argumentation in his paraphrase but works around it, I will not discuss Aristotle’s argumentation here, which is far from clear (See Laks’ uneasiness at “Metaphysics Λ 7,” 226 and n53). 8 Laks, “Metaphysics Λ 7,” 231 maintains that the conclusion “leads beyond itself,” anticipating inquiry into the divine.

424

commentary

ing, perceiving, and intelligizing), all pleasant activities whose pleasantness is derived from the very fact that they are activities (1072b17–18). Although Aristotle does not state this explicitly, his discussion is probably premised on his identification of the first mover as pure actuality. If this is so, then the next step of the argument, in which intelligizing is characterized as the best of the best (1072b18–19), is meant to show that the activity of the first principle is intelligizing; activity is the best pastime, as has just been shown, and of the activities—intelligizing is the best. Since the first principle is the best thing, and is pure actuality, it follows that its activity must be intelligizing. Aristotle then adds yet another layer to the discussion, noting that the first principle must also be an object of intelligizing (1072b20), based upon his general view about the identification between subject and object in the process of intelligizing (1072b20–21). As I understand it, Aristotle’s point is that the activity of intelligizing has an object of intelligizing that it intelligizes. Since in the process of intelligizing, the subject is identified with the object, it follows that the intellect, insofar as it is intelligizing, is itself an object of intelligizing. Since the first principle’s perpetual activity is intelligizing, it follows that it is perpetually an object of intelligizing as well. This argument can serve as justification for the fact that the first principle was presented as the highest object of intelligizing in the previous discussion, which explained that it causes movement as an object of love. Be this as it may, the question now arises which of these two features renders the first principle divine—its being an object of intelligizing, or its intelligizing activity. Aristotle argues for the latter option, stating that contemplation is the best thing (1072b22–24). The justification is somewhat unclear, but it seems fairly obvious that the active portion is better than the passive one. Returning to the comparison to human beings, Aristotle states that the activity of intelligizing, even given human limitations, is a wonderful thing, and when these limitations are removed and the intelligizing is eternal and unhindered, the wonder is multiplied plentifully (1072b24–26). Aristotle concludes the discussion by explaining why life is properly attributed to the first cause, as life is defined as the activity of intellect, which is the very activity identified with the first cause. Combining this concept leads us to conclude that the first principle is the best and eternal life (1072b26–28). This description, Aristotle notes, accommodates the definition of God, hence the first principle is to be identified as God (1072b28–30).9

9 It is important to note that this is the first time the word “god” appears in Metaphysics 12.

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[6] Aristotle criticizes the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, who maintain that beauty and nobility are not the starting point but the end result, a position which is at odds with his own position according to which the first principle is the best. The critique amounts to the notion of priority of the actualized substance (e.g., the plant) over the substance which is still in potentiality (e.g., the seed), which we have also seen in chapter 6 (1072b30–1073a3). [7] Aristotle ends the chapter (1073a3–13) by surveying what has been accomplished: first, that there exists an eternal, unmoved, and imperceptible substance (1073a3–5); second, that it is without magnitude, simple and indivisible (1073a5–11); and third, that it is wholly unchangeable (1073a11–12). The second part of the conclusion is constructed in a strange matter, since the question whether or not the first principle has magnitude was not discussed until this point (although one can perhaps maintain that this is a consequent of being immaterial and simple). Be this as it may, Aristotle provides an argument for this in the present passage, noting that if it had magnitude, it could only be finite (as infinite magnitude is impossible), but were it to have a finite magnitude it would not have been possible for it to produce movement forever, as “no finite thing has unlimited power” (1073a7–8).

2

Themistius

[1] Themistius moves from chapter 6 to chapter 7 mid-sentence, manifestly treating both as a continuous unit, and this is how the text should be read.10 He repeats Aristotle’s opening remarks (1072a19–23), stating that the previous problems have been resolved and denying the theologians’ options, which all amount to embracing potentiality as the starting point (‫טז‬3–5). Themistius likewise identifies the first moved object whose movement is uninterrupted and circular with the first sphere, which is also taken to be eternal by virtue of its unceasing movement (‫טז‬5–8). [2] Following Aristotle (1072a23–24), Themistius explains that the ceaselessness of the first moved object dictates the ceaselessness of the activity of its mover (‫טז‬8–9), adding a methodological, orientating note—alluding to his “division of labor” in the beginning of the paraphrase of chapter 6 (‫יא‬28–33)— that while the condition of eternity and everlastingness has been satisfied, the immovability factor needs now to be added (‫טז‬9–10). However, Themistius

10

The division within the present edition is done for the sake of consistency and perhaps not particularly elegant. Brague and Badawī divide the chapters slightly otherwise.

426

commentary

substitutes Aristotle’s argument for the existence of an unmoved substance (1072a23–25) with a different argument, a version of which is also found in Themistius’ paraphrase of the Physics:11 if something is composed of two things, both of them can exist separately; since there exists something that both moves and is moved, then there must exist something that only moves, without being moved (Themistius adds that something that is only moved also exists, but this is perhaps not necessary for the argument but should be treated as a counterpart conclusion) (‫טז‬10–14). This unmoved mover is now awarded the characteristics that Aristotle gave it at 1072a25–26, to which Themistius adds complete immateriality (‫טז‬14–15).12 [3] After remarking that the existence of an unmoved mover should not be surprising, Themistius repeats Aristotle’s claim (1072a26–27) that both objects of desire and objects of intelligizing move without being moved (‫טז‬15–17). He then sets out to explain how the two are united in the unmoved mover, via the priority of intelligizing over desire, substituting Aristotle’s argument at 1072a27–30 with a considerably more elaborate account. Themistius starts by stating that in human beings (and other animals), the objects of desire and intelligizing are numerous, remarking that there are instances where an object of desire that is not an object of intellect immovably moves us (‫טז‬17–20). This cannot be the case for the first principles (note the plurality), which are immaterial, in which the object of desire and the object of the intellect are united (‫טז‬20–21). They are objects of desire because they are objects of intellect, not the other way around (‫טז‬21–22). Returning to objects of desire and intellect which are “close to us,” Themistius distinguishes between objects of fancy— the pleasant things—and objects of choice—good things. The feeling of fancy we have toward what we choose arises from our perception of them as good. Therefore, they are not perceived as good because they are sought after, but the other way around (‫טז‬22–26). In cases where the perception differs from how the object really is, i.e., in cases where there is a difference between the apparent good and the good, choice and desire become divided (‫טז‬27–28), and this explains why they are not unified in us. But as regards the primary desire, there is no difference between appearance and truth, and the same holds for the primary object of goodness, where what we think is good is in fact good (‫טז‬28–30). Fittingly, the desire for the first cause is prompted by what is intelli11

12

“In all case of things being combined from two [constituents] it could be learnt that if one of the things in the mixture can exist per se, then the other can exist per se too” (Themistius, Physics, 223,1–3; tr. Todd, 83). See above, Chapter 2, table 64. The distinction between immateriality and incorporeality is significant. See above, Chapter 2, tables 59 and 60.

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gized of it, analogous to what happens to appetite with relation to opinion and imagination. In all cases (intellect, opinion, and imagination), the movement is caused by the object (‫טז‬31–‫יז‬1). Moving to Aristotle’s identification of the primary objects of intellect— which are derivatively the primary objects of desire—Themistius presents the position but subtracts the “column” argument (1072a30–32), simply stating instead that the primary intelligible is substance, and within it—the simple and actual, adding that it is without potentiality, does not receive predicates and is not predicated of anything. The cause for plurality and composition is matter and potentiality (‫יז‬2–6). Aristotle’s passing remark about the difference between “one” and “simple” (1072a32–34) is elaborated upon: properly understood, material things can never, in truth, be described as being “one” or “simple,” as these characterizations are exclusive to the first substance. It is “one” not as a quantity, but substantially, meaning that its oneness and its existence are the same thing.13 The same holds for its simplicity; it is not simple because something is composed of it, or in comparison to something, but as it is devoid of any composition or multiplicity (‫יז‬6–15). Next, Themistius condenses Aristotle’s inclusion of the primary objects of desire in the “column” of intelligibles and his discussion of the first principle as a final cause (1072a34–b3) to a short remark (‫יז‬15–18). He then (‫יז‬18–‫יח‬1) digresses to the first of a group of discussions that can collectively be labeled as “the politicization of the cosmos.”14 Themistius first observes that the law shares several features with the first principle: the first principle moves the cosmos, whereas law moves governance. Both are beautiful and chosen for themselves, as well as considered the uttermost excellence. The rulers perfect governance and conserve it by directing themselves according to the law. The 13 14

This remark causes Twetten to believe that Themistius is advocating the Plotinic One (see Twetten, “Aristotelian Cosmology,” 329). As Twetten (“Aristotelian Cosmology,” 330) and Guldentops (“La Science,” 113–114) have already noticed, Themistius’ politicization of the cosmos is a theme that connects the present paraphrase to his orations, in which this is a recurring theme. See, e.g., Oration 34 (216,13–14): “[T]he God who guides this whole cosmos and those [divinities] who make the rounds with him are devotees of a practical and political philosophy, who keep the whole of nature steady and unharmed through the course of time” (tr. Penella, Private, 213); The emperor expresses the “law animate” (Oration 5 64b4–8)—Just like God in the paraphrase. Schramm argues that “the rule of the emperor should be the image of the cosmic order of God” (Schramm, “Platonic Ethics,” 135). This of course warrants a detailed investigation, for both sides of the analogy (the king is likened to God, and God is likened to the king). For the political metaphor in ancient metaphysics and its inherent difficulties see Adamson, “State of Nature.”

428

commentary

main difference between the “law” (meaning, probably, the political or human law) and the first principle is that the latter is a substance and the former is an activity. Insofar as the law is an activity, it can come to be and pass away. The first principle can be understood as the law, assuming that is was alive, actual, persistent, and was able to intellect by itself. Unlike human or political law, which is dependent upon an external agent for its actualization (for instance, Lycurgus, the legendary lawgiver of Sparta), God and God’s activities are one and the same, so just as God is substantially cause, intellect, and truth, It is also substantially law, which amounts to the fact that God governs the world eternally. Now just like in the cosmos, where some objects are closer to the first principle and some are farther away from it, in the political order some people are close to perfection and some fall short of it. Since we have seen that the first principle is a mover insofar as it is an object of desire, the perfect state of the celestial bodies owes to the fact that in their desire for it they act according to its order and correctness, hence, in a way, they follow its law. This conceptual transformation is also apparent in human affairs, where people pursue lawful activities out of desire to the law and for living according to it. Human adherence to the law is voluntary and a matter of choice, so lawful conduct is in a way a form of love. This formulation enables Themistius to briefly return to Aristotle’s text (1072b3–4) and explain the love for the first cause in the terms of the traditional philosophical ideal of “likeness to God.” The love for the first cause comprises in being close to it and resembling it (‫יח‬1–2), which is markedly different from other species of desire, which are contrary to each other: food is desired for satiation; health—for possession; righteousness—for correct living; and the king—“to follow him and obey his commands” (‫יח‬2–9). Having established its meaning, Themistius turns to elaborate (‫יח‬9–13) upon how the love for the first cause as an object of proximity and assimilation is actually expressed: since the first cause is a substance and actuality, the rest of the things, when they intelligize its essence, pursue its activity, which Themistius understands as the correct order of the existing things, analogous—again, politically—to the law abiding citizen adhering to the law, or the governor’s adherence to what governance prescribes (‫יח‬9–13). The universal pursuit after the first cause’s activity is expressed differently in different beings: the first heaven, which is closest (like the commander’s proximity to the king), benefits the most, in its eternal continuous uniform circular movement; afterwards comes the movement of the spheres and planets (continuous but varying movement in place), and then the recipients of coming to be and passing away, which introduce new species of movement, e.g., in substance and in quality. The plurality of movements along with their variation leads to a wide range of

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movable thing, and a wide range of “possibilities” within each of them (‫יח‬14– 25). In a way, this passage is a mirror image of the passage at the end of the paraphrase of chapter 6, which showed how there is a sufficient explanation for all kinds of movements, but now grounding the entire system upon the concept of love, or more technically—the final cause. [4] Themistius’ discussion of the concept of possibility leads him to elaborate upon Aristotle’s next discussion, which moves from the possibility of change in movable substances to the absolute necessity of the first cause (1072b4–10). Themistius starts by explaining that the possibility to be otherwise in the celestial bodies is limited to the possibility of being in different places (‫יח‬24–27). He then turns to a side discussion of the term “possible” and the legitimacy of its employment with reference to the celestial bodies (‫יח‬27–‫יט‬2): “possible,” in the strict sense, should only be used with reference to perishable substances, whose nature is “weak and disordered,” approaching the “realm of contradiction” (I take this to mean that they can receive contraries in a stronger sense; cf. above, ‫ד‬10–21, where Themistius distinguishes between being changeable in place and being “wholly” changeable). This meaning of “possible,” which permits comprehensive change—“touching upon their nature from the inside”—does not apply to celestial bodies. Neither is the possibility of change in these bodies analogous to “that which inclines toward two sides,” alluding to the previous discussion regarding the contingency of transition from potentiality into actuality at ‫יד‬12–14. The only meaning of possibility regarding the celestial bodies is that “they are not in a place in which they necessarily must be,” meaning, from a logical point of view, that if something occupies different places at different times, the place it occupies in a certain time is not necessary. The clarification of the concept of possibility paves the way to a better understanding of the necessity of the first cause. As we have seen, the concept of possibility, in its weakest sense, was linked to the concept of spatial movement. The first cause, which has been shown to be an unmoved mover, proves to be completely devoid of movement, and since movement is the first kind of change, the first cause is consequently completely devoid of change. Since change was the agent of possibility, and change in place is its weakest form, an unmoved, unchanging substance is as remote from possibility as can be (‫יט‬3–9). Themistius’ argumentation here is somewhat different from Aristotle’s, although they both arrive at the same result. Aristotle does not elaborate upon the role of possibility but is content with explaining the ramifications of being prior to the primary kind of change. The introduction of the concept of possibility enables Themistius to make a logical connection to Aristotle’s next comments about the necessity of the first principle, and also to underscore

430

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again the ontological distance between the first principle and the rest of the existents. The move to Aristotle’s discussion of the first principle’s necessity (1072b10– 13) is effectively smoother, and Themistius’ paraphrase of this part (‫יט‬10–14) amounts to a repetition of Aristotle’s statements, making clear that the first principle is of the kind of necessity that is absolute, and upon it are dependent the heaven and nature (1072b13–14; ‫יט‬14–15). [5] It should not be surprising that Themistius’ discussion of this part goes well-beyond Aristotle’s opaque remarks. His presentation of the first principle’s pastime and the argumentation surrounding it make the most of the already theologically charged discussion by infusing Aristotle’s god with much more than Aristotle explicates, and maybe more than the Aristotle would be willing to commit to. Aristotle’s description of the first principle’s pastime (1072b14– 17), in Themistius, is plausibly explained as “constancy in the uttermost best” state, which he identifies as “wisdom” (Aristotle for the moment just mentions actuality). Themistius describes the difference between us and the first principle by our preoccupation and involvement with the body, which prevent us from enjoying our intellect except on rare occasions (‫יט‬15–20). These occasions are the most enjoyable and are accompanied by pleasure beyond measure. For the first principle this activity is perpetual and uninterrupted, hence “it is pleasure and is the best of things” (‫יט‬20–22). Aristotle’s examples of instances of actuality (1072b17–18) are now elaborated upon, and added to (‫יט‬22–‫כ‬2): they all reflect the general notion that actuality is more pleasant than idleness, and in the case of intelligizing, which is the best activity, its advantage in the case of the first principle is unlimited, expressing the idea that it is the best undertaking of the best activity. Themistius elaborates upon this idea, connecting it to the relation between actuality and potentiality with reference to pleasure, through which it is apparent that that which has no potentiality is the uttermost best and obviously enjoys the most pleasure. He compares it to the delight the senses enjoy when their objects are the best, thus returning the discussion to Aristotle’s characterization (1072b18–19) of the first principle as the best activity (intelligizing) toward the best object (itself) (‫כ‬2–3).15 Themistius proceeds to elaborate considerably upon Aristotle’s short discussion about the first principle being both an activity of intelligizing and an object of intelligizing (1070b20–23). He begins by explaining the various criteria for 15

As the argument continues, Themistius make plainer Aristotle’s reliance on his idea that the quality of pleasure is determined by three factors: the excellence of the subject, the excellence of the object, and the excellence of the medium of their relationship (see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10.5).

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being the best object of intelligizing: first, nothing interrupts it, as in the cases of sensation or objects of sensations. Further, it is unmixed with matter and unchangeable, therefore actual and constant. And finally, the first thing it intelligizes is itself, which ensures that it is an intellect by nature and not by virtue of its being an object of intellect. In other words, it does not have to be intelligized by something external to it in order to be an object of intellect (‫כ‬3–8). All these criteria are met by the first principle, now referred to as “the divine intellect.” Themistius makes sure to clarify that the fact that the divine intellect is both an activity and the object of its own activity does not imply a split within it. This is explained by the fact that any intellect is by its very nature an object of intelligizing, independently of what is intelligizing it. Even in us, our intellect is an object of our intelligizing not because we are the ones intelligizing it, but simply because it is an intellect. Accordingly, all the merits that the divine intellect enjoys can likewise be said of it insofar as it is an object of intellect; if it is the best insofar as it is the one, it is the best insofar as it is the other (‫כ‬8–13). When it intelligizes itself there is no gap to bridge between the subject and the object; it is simultaneously both, which are one and the same, and “everything in it is interwoven with everything,” like things that are thoroughly intermixed (‫כ‬13–17). Afterwards, Themistius turns to explain the difference between intelligizing and sensing. In the latter case, there is a difference between the sense and the object; the sense acquires its object’s form, but not the object itself, which stays outside. The intellect, on the contrary, can have all the forms just as they are, since there is no interference of matter to create separation between them and hence no need for abstraction (‫כ‬17–22).16 But the divine intellect’s superiority is not limited to its relation to sense; it should also be explained why it is superior to ours—and this Themistius does by explaining that while we, as involving potentiality, need to intelligize objects one at a time, the divine intellect actively intelligizes everything in a single instant. Making use of Aristotle’s principle of identity between the intelligizing subject and the objects of its intelligizing, Themistius can now make one of the boldest claims in the paraphrase, namely that the divine intellect’s intelligizing of itself amounts to the intelligizing of all the existents as they truly exist (i.e., their forms), “as it placed them as existents.” Just like our intellect is in a way identical to the objects it intelligizes, the divine intellect is in a way identical to everything (‫כ‬22–31). In other words, Themistius maintains that the idea of the first prin-

16

It is difficult to discern if “the intellect” here refers to the function of intellect in general or specifically to the divine intellect.

432

commentary

ciple as an intellect that intelligizes itself includes the idea that it intelligizes everything. The next parts of Aristotle’s argument, which deal, respectively with identifying the divine part of the first principle as the activity of intelligizing rather than being an object of activity (1072b22–24) and with comparing the intelligizing of the first principle—now finally identified as God—with our own (1072b24–26) are somewhat combined in Themistius. He subtracts the question which of the features of the first principle—intellect or object of intellect—is the divine part, and this is understandable as he had just labored to show that the two parts are not really distinct; repeating Aristotle’s question would be, perhaps, self-defeating. The comparison with the human intellect in the introduction of this part comes to show that if self-intelligizing is an accepted feature of the human intellect, there should be no reason to doubt it concerning the divine intellect. In fact, the whole point of rendering the intellect as the “divine” part of the human being is based on man’s affinity to the first principle precisely in this respect (‫כ‬30–32). This divinity in us is obviously inferior to the pleasure of the first principle, since the latter does not need an exterior nature to initiate this activity; furthermore, whatever is pleasant in itself and is the best pleasure is never absent, is never a means to an end, and is of the utmost excellence (‫כ‬32–‫כא‬7). Themistius then quotes (probably verbatim) Aristotle’s remark in 1072b24– 26 about God’s17 activity as “the most wonderful of wonder” (‫כא‬8–9) and afterwards combines everything that has been discovered by now about God, which is quite the expansion given Aristotle’s own remarks: God is simple, untouched by the senses, without accidents, and it intelligizes all the existents as immanent to him (‫כא‬9–12). Here for the first time since his discussion of Anaxagoras at chapter 2 does Themistius explicitly refer to the begetter (and perhaps also the creator) of existents, which expresses some kind of identity between him and the rest of the existents. The end of this discussion revisits the theme of the politicization of the cosmos (which first occurred at ‫יז‬18–‫יח‬1), equated with law, reason, and the principle of cosmic order. A comparison between God and Lycurgus as lawgivers enables Themistius to move the discussion from God as intellect to God as life, or more precisely, living law, whose governance is everlasting (‫כא‬12–19).

17

This is the first time Aristotle explicitly mentions the word “God” in the text, and only the second time Themistius does so, which exhibits some restraint from theological musings. The only “slip” is during the embarking of the first discussion of God as analogous to a political leader (‫יז‬25).

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Arriving at Aristotle’s discussion which equates God—“the lawgiver”—and life, with all its benefits (1072b26–28), the discussion is basically repeated, with some minor elaborations none of which are new (‫כא‬19–24), except perhaps stressing that God’s life is not constructed of different states at different moments, but is continuous. Aristotle’s concluding remark about God as the best living being, eternal and continuous (1072b28–30) is quoted (‫כא‬24– 26), and the final clause—τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός (“since this is the God”; 1072b30, tr. Reeve)—is for Themistius an occasion to call for exactness in expression: God does not “have” these properties; God “is” them (‫כא‬26–27). [6] Aristotle’s critique of the Pythagoreans and Speusippus (1072b30– 1073a3), who maintain that the best comes last, is now quoted almost word for word. The only contribution Themistius makes to the discussion here is an effective employment of the identity between the most beautiful, the best, and pure actuality, grounding Aristotle’s argument more firmly within his previous claim about the absolute priority of actuality over potentiality (‫כא‬28–‫כב‬3). [7] Aristotle’s concluding remarks for the present chapter were threefold: the unmoved mover exists; it is without magnitude; and it is unchangeable (1073a3–13). Themistius, applying syntax, changes the order of presentation; he repeats Aristotle’s first conclusion, adding only that the first mover is separate from the other existents not only in place, but in nature as well (‫כב‬3–4); he then repeats the third conclusion, stating that the first mover is unchangeable (‫כב‬4–5), but leaving out the reference to spatial movement as the first kind of change, probably because this has already sufficiently been discussed; finally, Themistius closes the chapter by a lengthy discussion designed to explain Aristotle’s claim that the first mover is without magnitude (‫כב‬5–29).18 The first part of this discussion (‫כב‬5–11) is a more or less exact repetition of Aristotle’s argument (1073a5–11), to which Themistius adds that this was explained in the Physics, probably in an attempt to clarify why Aristotle presents his view as something already established, though the question of the unmoved mover’s magnitude was not discussed in this chapter or in the whole of book 12. The second part of Themistius’ discussion (‫כב‬11–29) situates the argument in the context of celestial movement. Themistius starts by inferring that since it is impossible for a finite magnitude to have infinite power, it would be incorrect to say that the power which enables the sun and the other stars19 to move eternally is part of their nature insofar as they are ensouled bodies; it depends either on the first cause, or on their souls, whose power is of the same 18 19

See above, Chapter 2, table 49. Themistius means, collectively, the stars and the planets, and it would make sense to add the spheres.

434

commentary

sort of the first cause (the bodily element cannot be part of the explanation).20 Themistius explains that since the first cause governs21 the stars eternally, if the power in the stars was a power that naturally belongs to things with magnitudes, it would involve potentially just like any other body, and would therefore require rest. This is of course impossible, as the stars’ movement never ceases. After repeating the argument that explains the manner in which bodies have potentiality, whether they are eternal or not (they are always potentially in a different place), Themistius stresses that that which is eternally actual involves no potentiality whatsoever and hence cannot occupy space. The eternal actuality of the stars is always an actualization of a certain potentiality (it is actually in the place where it was potentially earlier), and in that sense they are not complete actuality, hence their power insofar as they are bodies is limited. Likewise, the power which enables the stars to move eternally is not a fulfillment of the potentiality, since that would render the infinite posterior to the finite. Hence, as Themistius stated in the beginning of the argument, the stars depend upon an immaterial cause for the possibility of their eternal movement. Themistius does not explain why he puts forward this argument. Since the main point is to deprive the celestial bodies of the ability to move eternally insofar as they are bodies, my conjecture is that Themistius is trying to ensure one (or both of the following): either to disprove the possibility that the stars are inanimate, or to deny the possibility that the eternal movement of the heavens does not need the first cause and is self-explanatory.

3

Note on Sources

Like the previous chapter, the main source for the text besides Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation is the Arabic abridgment (see note on sources in chapter 6). The Arabic abridgment of this chapter appears at MS Ḥikma 6 (Cairo), 207v10–209r9, published in Badawī, Arisṭū, 14–18. The final part of the chapter (‫כב‬11–29) also has the benefit of a full quotation in Averroes (Tafsīr, 1635,4–13), along with its own Hebrew versions (see Text 3 in Appendix B). In this chapter we also encounter the only passage where the Arabic abridgment and another Arabic text (Averroes) overlap, which proves that the abridgment is based on Isḥāq’s translation (see above, Chapter 1, 2.3.1).

20 21

Assuming the text is not corrupt, Themistius is probably looking forward to the plurality of unmoved movers in chapter 8, which he seems to take to be souls, or analogous to souls. Or rotates, depending on the text (see note for ‫כב‬15).

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Al-Baġdādī’s use of Themistius’ text in his own work, which gained some momentum in the previous chapter, is now in full force. Since al-Baġdādī seldom quotes Themistius verbatim, but mostly paraphrases Themistius’ text selectively with varying distance from the original text, his text should be used with caution, along the lines elaborated above (see Chapter 1, p. 107). His contribution to the establishment of the text, when properly identified, is valuable for reconstruction purposes and for the sake of terminology. Selections from this chapter are translated into English in Pines, “Distinctive,” 180–182. The French translation of chapter 7 appears in Brague, Thémistius, 83–97. Averroes’ quotation is translated into English in Genequand, Ibn Rushd, 167, and into French in Martin, Averroès, 254–255.

4

Running Commentary

‫טז‬7 ‫אבל בפעל גם כן‬: See above, Chapter 1, table 32. ‫טז‬9–10 ‫)فقد…أزلى( אבל…מבואר‬: The difference between the Arabic and the Hebrew is that the Arabic paraphrases the original translation for the sake of economy (as is customary; see above, 2.3.2). Brague thinks that the Arabic is an integral part of the text and adds it to his translation (Brague, Thémistius, 83 and n. 4). See al-Baġdādī’s paraphrase of this passage (33,2–3): ‫فقد تبين أن المحرك الأول أزلى دائم‬

‫البقاء و بقى علينا أن نبين أنه غير متحرك‬. ‫טז‬12–14

‫فإن…متحرك‬: This passage is quoted almost word for word in al-Baġdādī, 33,3–5. ‫טז‬14 ‫)وهو فى الطبيعة( וזה שהוא נמצא בטבע‬: The Arabic ‫ وهو‬is an abridgment, probably of ‫وذلك أنه‬, but ‫ נמצא‬is unexplained (Frank, “Notes,” 222, § 115 suggests ‫)موجود‬ and is maybe an error, because Themistius’ point is that the unmoved mover’s nature is immaterial, not that it “exists” in an immaterial nature. This does not have any stylistic parallel in the text, and does not make much sense. The

436

commentary

revision in T reads …‫וזה הוא אשר נמצא בטבע‬, which seems like an attempt to restore sense, identifying the unmoved mover as the existent which is immaterial. ‫טז‬15 ‫)الفعل( בפועל‬: This instance of discrepancy is much more complicated than

might initially seem, since there is a scholarly debate whether at 1072a25 Aristotle states that the unmoved mover is ἐνέργεια (“actuality”) or ἐνεργείᾳ (“in actuality”); we cannot simply rid ourselves of one of the options as mistaken. Fazzo, advocating for the less common reading ἐνεργείᾳ, argues that in general, since the subscript iota is not always present in the Greek manuscripts, “it is commonly admitted that changes in the subscript iota hardly count as emendations, both in general and especially when dealing with manuscripts from the Aristotelian tradition” (Fazzo, “Unmoved Mover,” 181, along with elaboration on the mechanical aspects of this). Therefore the textual evidence is indecisive and “the editorial choice … rests on a semantic basis” (Fazzo, 182). If this is so, the Hebrew version might be the correct one after all, but that would only mean that it represents a slightly different copy than the one abridged in the Arabic we have, not that there was an independent Hebrew tradition (hence Alexandru’s apparatus ad loc. is somewhat misleading). It should also be noticed that the Hebrew translation has problems with the concept of unqualified actuality, and this is not the only time where it is unsuccessful in reflecting this notion (see for example above, Chapter 1, table 36), so this might be a matter not of transmission, but of understanding the text. Pursuing this issue regarding Aristotle’s text is beyond the scope of the present edition, but perhaps it is worth noting that, for my mind at least, just like the unmoved mover is defined as life (and not as living), and as pleasure (rather than pleasant), to name two examples, it would make better sense—for Themistius, if not for Aristotle—to characterize the unmoved mover’s essence as “actuality” rather than “in actuality.” ‫טז‬19

‫)יתנועעו( يتحدان‬: The Arabic should be preferred, because Themistius is addressing the difference between objects of pleasure and objects of intellect, which are unified in the immaterial substances but differentiated among natural living beings. The process of transmission in the Hebrew manuscripts shows that ‫ יניעו‬is a later revision of the Hebrew ‫ יתנועעו‬in an attempt to restore sense to the sentence, and not the other way around (‫יניעו‬, adopted by Landauer, is only in

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C1, T, and the Latin). The Arabic, which has the correct ‫يتحدان‬, was probably misread (or miscopied) as ‫( يتحركان‬See Frank, “Notes,” 222 § 119, although contrary to my view, Frank thinks that the Arabic is corrupt, citing Metaph., 1072a26). ‫טז‬20 ‫)فى المبادئ( ההתחלות‬: The Hebrew is probably mistaken, as omitting ‫ فى‬causes syntactical problems in the sentence (see Frank, “Notes,” 222, § 121bis). ‫טז‬21 ‫)لأنه معقول هو معشوق( כי הוא מושכל והוא חשוק‬: The Hebrew ‫ והוא‬instead of the Arabic ‫ هو‬reflects a misunderstanding of the structure of the text. ‫ لأن‬points forward rather than backwards. Themistius is saying that “since it is an object of intellect, it is an object of desire.” The Hebrew understand this expression to mean that in the first principle, the object of desire, and the object of intellect are together one thing “since it [i.e., the first principle] is an object of intellect and an object of desire.” But this would render the reasoning circular, and would also miss the point of the priority of intelligizing over desire. This is apparent from the second part of the sentence (‫لا بخلاف ذلك أعنى لأنه‬ ‫)לא יתחלף זה רצו׳ לו׳ בעבור שהוא חשוק הוא מושכל ;معشوق هو معقول‬, which explains that this should not be taken the other way around, i.e., it would be incorrect to say that something is an object of intellect because it is an object of desire. ‫טז‬28 ‫)المعشوقين( מן החשוקים‬: It seems that initially ‫ المعشوقين‬was understood in dual form and translated as ‫( משני החשוקים‬as in B), which is corrupted in C (‫מפני‬ ‫ ;החשוקים‬C1’s ‫ ממיני‬is an attempt to restore sense), and subsequently revised to ‫מן החשוקים‬, now understanding ‫ المعشوقين‬as plural rather than dual, which is better given Themistius’ argument, which is referring to the primary object of desire among many, not just two. ‫טז‬30 ‫)ما له( ענינו‬: Frank (“Notes,” 222, §124) suggests that ‫ ما له‬is a corruption of

‫حاله‬, which would explain the Hebrew. This in itself seems plausible, although immediately afterwards we find ‫أمره‬, which is also translated as ‫ענינו‬.

438

commentary

‫טז‬31 ‫)يعقل( שנשכיל‬: The manuscript has ‫ىعقل‬, which the Hebrew probably read as ‫نعقل‬. Frank (“Notes,” 222, §125) thinks that the Arabic is preferable. I agree, and would like to add that Themistius’ argument here, following Aristotle, is relevant to anything that intelligizes the first cause, and more specifically the objects that are directly moved by it. Therefore it is mistaken to read the text as referring to what “we” intelligize of the first cause, but rather as what is intelligized of it in general. ‫יז‬2–13 ‫)وأول…بعينه( אבל…בעינו‬: See above, Chapter 1, tables 25 and 26. ‫יז‬14–15 ‫)لأنه ليس منها شىء من التركيب( לא יתבאר בו דבר מן ההרכבה‬: Frank (“Notes,” 222, § 131) thinks that the Arabic refers to ‫ ולא בהקש דבר אחר‬in the beginning of the sentence, and suggests there was some error in transmission. However, it is clear that the Arabic is paraphrasing the latter part of the sentence. ‫יז‬25 ‫האל…וסדרו‬: This is paraphrased and expanded for the sake of elevation in al-

Baġdādī, who remarks (37,5–6): 22‫والل ّٰه سبحانه قدوة القدوات وناموس النوامس وسبب‬ ‫لوجود العوالم وترتيبها ونظامها وز ينتها و بقائها‬. Al-Baġdādī probably misread ‫( قدرة‬here ‫ )יכלת‬as ‫قدوة‬. See Neuwirth’s remarks at ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, 139, § 62. ‫יז‬26 ‫)علم( חכמה ומחשב‬: This expression appears twice, here and in the following line, and in both cases the Arabic only has ‫علم‬. This initially seems common abridgment practice, but since al-Baġdādī’s reworking, based on the full text, also only has ‫( علم‬37,6), it becomes difficult to decide whether the Hebrew is based on two Arabic terms or ‫ ומחשב‬is a gloss (or a hendiadys). The term ‫ מחשב‬is employed as a variant of ‫ מחשבה‬at ‫טז‬32 and ‫יז‬1 to translate ‫ظن‬, and is not used anywhere else in the text as an attribute of the first cause. In fact, this is the only place in the

22

Reading with Gutas (TC) for Neuwirth’s ‫والسبب‬.

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Hebrew text where all the manuscripts are in agreement about ‫מחשב‬. Brague translates ‫ מחשב‬in the present passage as réflexion, but this does not seem right as the term reflects the semantic field between thought, opinion, and imagination. For this reason it would seem strange to attribute ‫ מחשב‬to the first cause in the first place, since the first principle has no need for the calculative sense of knowledge. I do not know how to resolve this. ‫יז‬28 ‫)وهى التى يتشوق إليها ما بعدها( והיא אשר יחשקו אליה מה שאחריה‬: Badawī’s misread-

ing ‫ وما‬for ‫ ما‬created an artificial break in the sentence and caused him to dot the ‫ ىتشوق‬in first person plural, because without ‫ ما بعدها‬the verb must contain its own subject. Frank (“Notes,” 223, §135) notices the problem in Badawī’s text and the solution he offers, without access to the manuscript, is adopted here. ‫יז‬30 ‫בכאן‬: ‫( בכאן‬or ‫ הנה‬in C) is doubtlessly a translation of ‫( هنا‬or ‫)هاهنا‬, reflecting the

Greek ἐνταῦθα. There are two ways to understand this sentence, based on what ἐνταῦθα means here. Themistius might be drawing an analogy between how the celestial bodies desire the first cause as law, which is the topic of the discussion, and a person’s adherence to the law. Alternatively, ἐνταῦθα may mean the natural world as opposed to the metaphysical realm. In that case Themistius makes a much stronger claim, namely that in this world, the desire for the first cause should be expressed as a desire for the correct political order. This reflects Themistius’ general attitude of the priority of the vita activa over the vita contemplativa (see discussion in Schramm, “Platonic Ethics,” 132–135, and the Conclusion below). ‫יז‬31 ‫)قفا أ ثره( שם מגמתו פעולת‬: This expression appears here and also in ‫יז‬32–‫יח‬1 and ‫יח‬11. The option in T, ‫נמשך אחר‬, is a stylistic choice. In some cases C has ‫ ענין‬for ‫פעולה‬. This could either be an early choice or a misreading of ‫ ا ثر‬as ‫امر‬. In ‫יח‬11 C has ‫ עמד‬for ‫שם‬, and this could perhaps reflect an early misunderstanding of

the verb ‫ قفا‬as if its root was ‫وقف‬.

440

commentary

‫יח‬9 ‫)وكما( וכדי‬: While ‫ כדי‬is sometimes a legitimate translation of ‫( كما‬see, e.g., below ‫יח‬11; Ḥoresh, “Averroes,” 39,1), here it is probably a mistake and the translation should have been ‫ וכמו‬because the present sentence is comparative. ‫יח‬10

ً ‫)ושכל( وفعلا‬: ‫ فعل‬and ‫ عقل‬are sometimes confused in Arabic manuscripts because of their graphical similarity when not dotted. In the present case it is difficult to decide which of the two should be preferred, as both “actuality” and “intellect” have already been established in the text as properties of the first cause. Perhaps some weight can be awarded to preferring the Hebrew text, as in the next sentence its activity of intelligizing is an object aimed at, but since intelligizing is the highest activity, both options can express the same sentiment. It is perhaps easier to show that the variant ‫נשכל‬, adopted by Landauer (and Brague, in his translation), is a corruption of ‫ושכל‬, because of the connective ‫ و‬in the Arabic, and also because the form ‫ נשכל‬is nowhere to be found in the rest of the text, which uses ‫ מושכל‬for “is intelligized” or “is an object of intellect.” However, there was no way for Landauer and Brague to know this, since all they had was manuscript B’s testimony; manuscripts M and T, with the correct option ‫ושכל‬, were not available to them, the text in A was absent due to a missing leaf, and the word was accidentally omitted in C. ‫)ובהשכילה עצמותה( و بعقلها ذاتها‬: If we read the text as Badawī does (dotting the rasm ‫ وىعقلها‬as ‫)وتعقلها‬, then Themistius is writing that the first cause’s intelligizing is its essence (this is also how Brague translates). This option is logically possible, but I think that Themistius’ point is still to explain how the first cause is an object of intelligizing. The same holds for the reading ‫و بعقلها‬, which I adopt; this option can be understood as either referring to the first principle’s intelligizing of its own essence, or to the other existents’ intelligizing of the first principle’s essence. The Hebrew understands the text in the first manner, translating ‫ ובהשכילה‬and not ‫ובהשכילם‬, but I am afraid that would leave Themistius’ explanation incomplete, as the whole discussion revolves around the justification of the first principle as the first object of intelligizing. The Hebrew understanding of the text will say that the first principle intelligizes its own essence, and by doing so the other things desire it, but that does not make much sense because intellectual desire arises when the subject intelligizes the object, not when the object is doing the intelligizing. Therefore, the option ‫ ובהשכילה‬seems to me incorrect.

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‫יח‬11

‫)שישימו( يقفوا‬: Frank (“Notes,” 223, §139) thinks that the variant ‫ שיעמדו‬should be preferred, because he follows Badawī’s misreading of the manuscript as ‫يقفو‬ (and actually assumes that ‫ يقفوا‬as a misreading can explain the “error” in the Hebrew). Things are the other way around, as the Arabic in fact does have ‫يقفوا‬. For ‫ שם מגמתו‬see above, ‫יז‬31. ‫יח‬14 ‫)فالعلة الأولى تحرك كما يحرك المعشوق( הנה הסבה הראשונה תניע כמו שיניע החשוק‬: The present sentence has been misused as support for preferring δή over δέ in Aristotle’s clause κινεῖ δὲ/δὴ ὧδε τὸ ὀρεκτόν, rendering Aristotle’s claim as a logical consequence rather than an addition to the preceding sentence. Whereas there are reasons independent from Themistius to support this reading (see Alexandru, Aristotle, 141, and also Laks, “Metaphysics Λ 7,” 220n24, who nevertheless prefers δέ), there are no grounds to conclude, as, e.g., Alexandru had, that Themistius’ text had δή (or δέ, for that matter). The Arabic particle ‫ف‬, translated into Hebrew as ‫הנה‬, and in turn to Latin as igitur (from which the discussion originally sprung), is used to translate both, as well as several other Greek words which would fit here (e.g., γε, γάρ, οὖν, etc.). The argument for δή functioning as a logical connection loses its force here too, as the present sentence in Themistius’ paraphrase comes after an independent discussion and is dissociated from its original positioning in Aristotle’s text. ‫יח‬15

(‫הרקיע הראשון וגלגל הכוכבים הקיימים )السماء الأولى وفلك الـكواكب الثابتة‬: If retained, this expression either contains an epexegetic καί, or reflects an actual distinction between the sphere of the fixed stars and the first heaven. If it is the latter case, then perhaps one can follow Janos’ suggestion that this is an expression of Themistius’ (or his Arabic translator’s) attempt to reconcile Aristotle’s astronomy with later developments (see Janos, Method, 154n129; see also ‫יח‬18– 19 below). Perhaps another option can be explored, namely emending ‫ الثابتة‬here and at ‫יח‬19 to ‫الثانية‬, which would understand the outer sphere of the planetary motion (the sphere below the sphere of the fixed star) as the collective sphere of the “secondary stars,” i.e., the planets.

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‫יח‬16 ‫)من نظامها( מן היושר שלו‬: There seems to be an error in the Hebrew translation, which translated ‫ שלו‬instead of ‫שלה‬. The word ‫ نظامها‬refers to the feminine ‫علة‬, whereas the verb is the masculine ‫استفاد‬, referring collectively to ‫السماء الأولى‬ ‫( وفلك الـكواكب الثابتة‬which reinforces the understanding of the expression as containing an epexegetic καί—see previous note). Thematically, too, the point is that the first heaven’s striving toward the first principle is what enables it to partake—as far as it can—in the first principle’s perfection. ‫יח‬17

‫)השוטר( القائد‬: I adopt Brague’s suggestion (Thémistius, 88n3) for correcting Badawī’s ‫( الفائد‬the manuscript has ‫)الٯاىد‬. This is also in accordance with alBaġdādī at 37,8. ‫יח‬18–19

‫)הרקיע…הקיימים( السماء…الثابتة‬: There are two textual problems associated with this part, and they may have a relation to the construction ‫السماء الأولى وفلك‬ ‫ )הרקיע הראשון וגלגל הכוכבים הקיימים( الـكواكب الثابتة‬encountered at ‫יח‬15. The first problem at first glance seems simpler; there is a discrepancy at ‫יח‬18 between the Arabic ‫ السماء الأولى وحركاتها‬and the Hebrew ‫הרקיע ותנועתו ר״ל התנועה הראשונה‬, which was already mentioned by Frank (“Notes,” 223, § 140). Frank suggests to follow the Hebrew and guesses that the original Arabic was ‫السماء وحركتها اعنى‬ ‫الحركة الاولى‬. If this is correct, then ‫ وحركاتها‬in ḥ should be corrected into ‫وحركتها‬, and the difference between the Arabic and the Hebrew should be attributed to the abridgment process. Accordingly I corrected the plural ‫ وحركاتها‬in ḥ— which would erroneously suggest that the heaven (here understood as the first heaven, i.e., the sphere of the fixed stars; see ‫יח‬15) has more than one movement—according to the singular in Hebrew. Here, as in ‫יח‬15, one should consider emending ‫ الثابتة‬to ‫الثانية‬. ‫יח‬19 ‫)وسا ئر( ושאר‬: Here ‫ سا ئر‬is probably in the meaning of “all” (See above, ‫ג‬11), or perhaps ‫ وسا ئر الأشياء الباقية‬can be understood as “the rest of the remaining things.”

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‫יח‬24

‫والحركات كثيرة مختلفة‬: This expression is the abridger’s summary of the text at ‫יח‬20–24 that he omits. ‫יח‬25 ‫)تغيرها( שנויים‬: Badawī’s misreading of the manuscript as ‫ كغيرها‬causes some con-

fusion. Frank notices that something is wrong (“Notes,” 223, § 147) and suggests correcting the text to ‫يغيرها‬. The manuscript in fact has the rasm ‫ىغيرها‬, of which I believe ‫ تغيرها‬is a better reading, as ‫ שנוי‬is the standard translation of ‫ تغير‬in the present text (see Lexicon). ‫יח‬27 ‫על שהוא‬: This is a translation of ‫على أن‬, probably a translation of ὅπως. For more

examples see Gutas, Theophrastus, s.v. ʿalā an. ‫יט‬3

‫أول الحركات‬: This is missing in the Hebrew (see Frank, “Notes,” 223, § 148) and might be a gloss. ‫יט‬11 ‫מה שאי אפשר בו מבלתי שיהיה‬: This is probably another reflection of the problem with ‫( لا بد من‬see above, chapter 1, tables 33 and 34). Following Brague, I understand the text as meaning “whatever cannot not exist.” ‫יט‬14

‫والضرورة‬: The abridger inserts this word into the text as a means to bridge the gap created by the text omitted. ‫יט‬15 ‫)إذا ً( אם כן‬: The variant ‫ אם‬in C is a reflection of confusing between ً ‫ إذا‬and ‫إذا‬.

‫الذى‬: Frank (“Notes,” 223, §152) mentions that this word is absent from the Hebrew. As the Hebrew is fine as it is, perhaps the word ‫ الذى‬was accidently copied from the next line.

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commentary

‫יט‬17

‫)היינו מוצאים מעט( بكد ما نجد‬: This expression has problems in the Arabic as well as in the Hebrew. The Arabic manuscript has ‫بجد‬, which would render the text repetitive as ‫“( جد‬effort”) has a very close meaning to ‫كد‬. Correcting the text to ‫ نجد‬accommodates the Hebrew ‫ מוצאים‬and renders the sentence intelligible, having Themistius say that since we have a differing faculty, it is only “with a certain effort that we find the path to wisdom.” This also has similar syntax to the early version ‫ מעט מה שנמצא‬which is found is C. However, why ‫ بكد‬is translated to the Hebrew ‫ מעט‬is unclear and seems like an error. Landauer, in his apparatus, suggests that the Hebrew read ‫( كاد‬an auxiliary verb with the meaning “almost” or “nearly”). If this is the case, then the meaning for the Hebrew would be something like “we [only] nearly find the path to wisdom” or perhaps we “just barely” find the path to wisdom. But ‫מעט‬, taken literally, has Themistius say that we find only a small part of the path to wisdom; perhaps the original translation was ‫כמעט‬. In any case, Themistius’ point is not about the quantity of knowledge, nor the unattainability of knowledge, but about the difficulty knowledge involves. The position is not skeptical regarding knowledge, but only stresses that acquiring knowledge, while easy for the first principle, is difficult for us. ‫יט‬18 ‫)الأمر( העתים‬: It is unlikely that ‫ העתים‬is a translation of ‫الأمر‬, as the former is

consistently used in the present text to translate ‫الأوقات‬. There are two options: either there was some transmission error and the Arabic in front of Moshe ibn Tibbon had ‫الأوقات‬, or that the Hebrew translation was ‫הענינים‬, which was corrupted into ‫העתים‬. I think the first option is preferable, because it fits better with Themistius’ argument; the intellect is preoccupied in two ways: because it has no leisure (a problem of time), and because it is mostly disturbed with bodily matters (a problem of corporeality). The Arabic abridger’s paraphrase somewhat misses the point here. ‫)متشاغل( טריד‬: This option (see Even-Shoshan, Dictionary, s.v. ‫ )ָט ֵרד‬should be preferred over ‫טרוד‬, because ‫ متشاغل‬is active and not passive.

‫)טריד בשאר הדברים( كذلك‬: Frank (“Notes,” 223, § 153) thinks that the Hebrew is a gloss, but this seems more like the abridger’s paraphrase technique.

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‫יט‬26

‫)מקוה( يتوقع‬: I adopt Landauer’s suggestion, which is in tune with the Arabic text. ‫ מקרה‬is a corruption of ‫מקוה‬, and the version in T (‫ )תוחלת מקרה‬is a bold attempt to salvage the text. I do not know how to explain C’s option ‫כפולה‬, which C1 corrects to ‫הנעה‬, in a different attempt to make sense of the text. ‫יט‬26–27 ‫והזכרון…בפועל‬: There is no reason to assume, as Frank (“Notes,” 223, § 156), that

the omission of this part in the Arabic is accidental rather than a part of the abridgment process. ‫יט‬29 ‫)السرور الذى يسره الل ّٰه( השמחה אשר ישמח בה‬: The Arabic has “the joy that God enjoys” (‫)السرور الذى يسره الل ّٰه‬, whereas most Hebrew manuscripts have ‫השמחה‬ ‫“( אשר ישמח בה‬the joy that it enjoys”), the subject being “that whose nature is

only in actuality.” Al-Baġdādī, in his paraphrase of this part, also has ‫( الل ّٰه‬39,8), but Neuwirth (ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, 140, §66) is uncomfortable with this, as is Brague (Thémistius, 91n3), who prefers reading with the Hebrew. I agree with both, and would like to add that inserting God into this sentence makes no sense for Themistius’ argumentation, because it would have him position God and pure actuality as if they were two different entities. Nor would it fit into the context of the discussion, which is meant to assert the superiority of intellectual pleasure over sensual pleasures. ‫ الل ّٰه‬here cannot be a result of the Arabic abridgment process, since the problem appears also in al-Baġdādī, who is using the full version. A clue to what transpired is found in manuscript T, which was unavailable to any of the previous studies. T has ‫ אליה‬for the other manuscripts’ ‫בה‬, reflecting the Arabic ‫ إليه‬that could have easily been corrupted to ‫الل ّٰه‬. This would, however, require a further amendment, namely replacing ‫يسره‬ with ‫يسير‬. ‫כ‬2

‫من الحواس بمدركاتها‬: As Frank remarks (“Notes,” 223, § 158), these words are not included in the Hebrew translation (he also notes about the absence of Hebrew for ً ‫ أكثر كثيرا‬in Landauer’s edition, but notices it can be retained by B—as I have done in the present edition—and this is also found in M). I think that the words ‫ من الحواس بمدركاتها‬were not part of the original Arabic translation, but

446

commentary

inserted by the abridger as compensation for his omission of the discussions of the different examples of senses at ‫יט‬30–‫כ‬1. ‫כ‬4

‫)יעיקהו( يعقله‬: Retaining the Arabic here creates a problem, because this would have Themistius argue that there is an epistemological problem intelligizing the first principle, something that he never says, and which would also be out of context. The addition ‫ من‬in the margins of ḥ seems like an attempt to change the argument into saying that the intelligizing will not be mediated, which is true, but also out of context. The more plausible option is that ‫ يعقله‬is a corruption of ‫يعوقه‬. ‫כ‬5 ‫ריקים‬: ‫ דקים‬in AMT is a corruption of ‫ ֵרקים‬. It is possible that this was retained, because ‫ דק‬can also be an adjective meaning “finer” or “refined,” which is incor-

rect here but in itself fits with the argument. ‫כ‬12–13

‫وكما…بالحقيقة‬: Frank dedicates a series of notes (Frank, “Notes,” 224, §§ 161–163) to this sentence, attempting to explain a discrepancy between the Arabic and Hebrew, but they are all based on the assumption that the Arabic corresponds to the Hebrew ‫כ‬8–9. Once the Arabic sentence is placed against its actual corresponding passage in the Hebrew, the discrepancies disappear. ‫כ‬17 ‫לובש‬: Thanks to al-Baġdādī’s employment of this passage (41,1), it is possible to

see that the Arabic was ‫ملابس‬, and this explains the somewhat strange form ‫ מלבש‬in C, reflecting the earlier version of the translation. ‫כ‬18

‫)נחתמה( انطبقت فيه‬: The Hebrew falls short of translating ‫فيه‬, which is important for the argument, because Themistius’ point is that the form of the object of the sense is imprinted in the sense, not imprinted in general.

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‫כ‬20 ‫מופשטת‬: The correction from ‫ נפרדת‬to ‫ מופשטת‬rules out the possibility that the Arabic had ‫ مفردة‬or some other form of the root ‫فرد‬. The root ‫ عرى‬can also be ruled out, as it has been previously corrected to the root ‫( ער״מ‬see above, ‫ב‬1). The present instance, along with other instance of ‫ מופשט‬in ‫ז‬6, leads me to conjecture that the term translated is ‫مجردة‬. The expression ‫ مجردة‬appears twice attached to ‫ صورة‬in Isḥāq’s translation of Themistius, in De an., 78,32 and 79,36 (respectively, Lyons, Arabic, 133,11 and 135,17), translating ψιλός (Todd: “mere form,” namely only the form, without matter). As part of the expression ‫מופשטת‬ ‫ מן הגשם‬in ‫ז‬6, ‫ מופשטת‬can also ultimately reflect ψιλός, as when it is accompanied by a noun in the genitive case its meaning is “bare of” or “separated from.” ‫כ‬29 ‫)جعلها( ששם אותם‬: The Arabic manuscripts adds ‫( عليه‬see Frank, “Notes,” 224,

§ 167), but this is probably a copyist error. The following word is ‫ موجودة‬and the combination ‫ موجودة عليه‬had just occurred in the previous line, probably causing the confusion. ‫)عنده( אצלו‬: I have adopted Frank’s suggestion (“Notes,” 224, § 168) and inserted

‫ عنده‬into the Arabic text, as its omission seems like an error rather than an abridgment procedure. Without ‫ عنده‬Themistius would be simply saying that “all the things exist together,” rather than “all the things exist in it together,” which is a necessary premise for his claim that the first principle intelligizes all things together. ‫כ‬30

‫)משכיל( يعقل‬: The Arabic manuscript has the rasm ‫ يعقل‬, which Badawī read as ‫تعقل‬, but this would be unorthodox as the fifth form of ‫ عقل‬is not used anywhere else in the present text (at least in the surviving Arabic). The Hebrew ‫ שיהיה משכיל‬is an adaptation of the original ‫שיהיה ישכיל‬, which is too literal and survives in C. This reflects the reading ‫ يعقل‬, which is suggested in Frank (“Notes,” 224, §169) along with the less plausibleً ‫عاقلا‬. ‫כ‬31

‫)ישכילהו( نعقله‬: This is an instance where al-Baġdādī (41, 7), who quotes the present passage literally and is incorporated in the Arabic text, proves valuable.

448

commentary

The form ‫ישכילהו‬, if maintained, would have Themistius say that our intellect intelligizes the first principle, whereas the form ‫ نعقله‬would have him say that our intellect is the object of our intelligizing. Since Themistius is drawing an analogy between our self-intelligizing and the first principle’s self-intelligizing, the Arabic is to be preferred and the Hebrew ‫ ישכילהו‬should be rejected as an error reflecting a misunderstanding of the text. ‫כא‬1

‫)כל שכן שהוא כן( فكم بالحرى هو كذلك‬: Frank (“Notes,” 224, § 170) suggests that ‫כל‬ ‫ שכן שהוא כן‬is repetitive, translating ‫ كذلك‬twice. However, ‫ כל שכן‬is a translation of the expression ‫فكم بالحرى‬, as is now apparent thanks to al-Baġdādī’s (41,8) quotation of the previous sentence, which has the same comparative structure. ‫כא‬2

‫)ותשכיל עצמותה( وتعقل فى ذاتها‬: Badawī unintentionally omitted the word ‫ فى‬from his edition, so before examining the manuscript it seemed that the Hebrew and the Arabic are in agreement, whereas they are not. It is difficult to decide which of the two options should be preferred. The Hebrew has Themistius say that the first cause intelligizes itself without external help, which is correct, and the Arabic has Themistius say that it is of the essence of the first cause to intelligize (hence it needs no external help), which is also correct. Since the first intellect is its own object, these remarks are logically equivalent. However, it seems from the context that the Hebrew should be preferred, as the present sentence serves as part of a comparison between the human intellect and the divine intellect, and at ‫כ‬30–31 the example of human self-intelligizing is brought up. ‫כא‬3 ‫)لـكن الذى تطلبه( אבל אותו הטבע אשר תבקש אותו‬: There is no reason to assume with Frank (“Notes,” 224, §171) that the words ‫ אותו הטבע‬are the result of a dittography, as they fit very well within Themistius’ argument. It is better in my opinion to see this as a result of the abridgment. ‫כא‬9 ‫)وله أكثر والأمر فى كثرته بين( והנה ברוב מבואר ברבויו‬: The corruption of the Hebrew

has already been noted in Frank (“Notes,” 224, §§ 172–173), and the different variants in the manuscripts—the original position is probably reflected in C’s

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‫ולרוב הדבר‬, which is a corruption of ‫ ;ולו רוב הדבר‬B retains ‫ וברוב ;ולו‬in turn is a corruption of ‫—ולרוב‬show that the Arabic text in front of Moshe ibn Tibbon was identical to the one we have, the only difference perhaps was that the ‫ و‬was omitted from ‫والأمر‬, and this was probably what caused the confusion. ‫ وله أكثر‬is a translation of Themistius’ reflection of Aristotle’s ἔχει δὲ ὧδε at 1072b26, which is an assertion that God is always in the best state to a higher degree than what we have sometimes. The problem is that the Hebrew translation seems to think that ‫ أكثر‬is looking forward toward ‫( الأمر‬hence my conjecture that the ‫ و‬was dropped) instead of backwards to ‫وله‬, reading “and he has most of the thing,” which leaves the remainder of the Arabic sequence impossible to understand. In fact there should be a full stop after ‫أكثر‬, rendering the sentence: “and he has more; the fact of his plentitude [in this context] is clear …” ‫כא‬11 ‫)لـكنه هو الذى( אבל הוא אשר‬: The version in CT (‫ )אבל הוא הוא אשר‬is in fact a more accurate reflection of the Arabic, but dropping one of the instances of ‫ הוא‬in

this case does not affect the meaning and is perhaps more elegant. ‫)יולידם( يولدها و يحدثها‬: The Hebrew reflects only ‫( يولدها‬see Frank, “Notes,” § 174), so there is a good chance that ‫ و يحدثها‬is a gloss. ‫כא‬14 ‫)يرى ذاته و يعقل ذاته( ידע בעצמותו וישכיל בעצמותו‬: Brague (Thémistius, 94n5) and Frank (“Notes,” 224, §177) prefer reading with the Arabic, which has Themistius saying that the law, had it been alive, would have “known itself and intelligized itself.” According to the Hebrew, Themistius is saying that had the law been alive, it would be able to know and intelligize. In other words, For the Hebrew Themistius offers to imagine the law as if it were able to have the cognitive faculties of the lawgiver, whereas the Arabic has him go one step further by saying that it would be able to intelligize itself. The example of Lycurgus shows a case where the lawgiver and the law are separate, the former knowing the latter. When Lycurgus dies, the law remains but will eventually also “die,” probably since nothing would be able to sustain it as no one knew it as well as Lycurgus had. If this is the logic, then the Arabic should be preferred, because the main point here would not be the law’s ability to know, but the law’s ability to know itself. To take things further to Themistius’ desired outcome—if the law is always alive, then lawgiving is always present, hence the cosmos never ceases to be ordered.

450

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‫כא‬16 ‫והמזוינים‬: My choice is a conjecture that does not appear in any surviving manuscript, although I believe it should be dictated by the narrative of the manuscripts. C reflects the original ‫והחמושים‬, which was later revised to ‫( והמזוינים‬visible in A)—which is completely synonymous—for reasons I do not know. The result, as we have seen many times, was that both options found themselves together in the body of the text, and from there the distortion of ‫ והמזויינים‬into ‫( והמזומנים‬BMT) is easy to see. In itself this would add another political function to the list, thus giving the reader no reason to suspect the text. ‫ המזומנים‬in this case would mean, I presume, something like “those who sit at the king’s table.” ‫כא‬19 ‫)حياة هذا الناموس( וחיי זה המניח לנימוסים‬: Frank (“Notes,” 224, § 178) remarks that

the difference between the Hebrew (writing about the life of the lawgiver) and the Arabic (writing about the law) stems from the abridgment’s omission of Lycurgus from the text, having the argument focus upon the concept of law rather than the concept of lawgiving. This somewhat weakens Themistius’ analogy between the cosmos and the political entity, because an integral part of Themistius’ argument is that we should try to live according to God’s law, which is the cosmic rule. ‫כא‬22–25 ‫)وكما…دائمة( וכמו…תמידיים‬: See above, Chapter 1, table 36. ‫כא‬23 ‫)الحياة( מאדני החיים‬: This is probably an elevation of the regular ‫ בעל החיים‬which

would otherwise have been used for ‫ الحياة‬in this context. I do not understand Brague’s translation of ‫ אדני החיים‬as les plaisirs de la vie. ‫כב‬5 ‫)التأثير( השנוי בצד מן הצדדים‬: See Frank, “Notes,” 224, § 184. The omission of ‫בצד‬ ‫ מן הצדדים‬is standard abridgment economy. Frank suggests that the Hebrew is

translating ‫التغيير‬, but this is not necessarily the case. ‫ التأثير‬here, I believe, is a part of the construction ‫ لا يقبل التأثير‬or some grammatical variant, as a translation

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of ἀπαθής, meaning “unaffected” (reflecting ἀπαθές at 1073a11; cf. also ἀπαθῆ at 1075a30, reflected in the present text at ‫לב‬1 as ‫)לא יקבל…השנוי‬. Moshe ibn Tibbon also translates ‫ تأثير‬as ‫ שנוי‬in his translation of Averroes’ epitome of On the Heavens (See Ḥoresh, “Averroes,” 29,12; 29,14). ‫כב‬11 ‫על שהוא גשם מתנשם‬: ‫ מתנשם‬is a translation of ‫متنفس‬, as can be gathered from

the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ epitome of On the Heavens (see Ḥoresh, “Averroes,” 41,8–14). T reflects a revision of ‫ מתנשם‬into ‫ ;בעל נפש‬the exact same variant occurs in Ḥoresh’s edition, in the passage referred to here. ‫כב‬12–15

‫)כי הכח…אין תכלית לו( لأن القوة…لا نهاية له‬: This is the only part in the text where Averroes’ quotation from the full Arabic version and the Arabic abridgment overlap. See above, Chapter 1, table 17. ‫כב‬12–13

‫)כי…אינו( لأن…ليست‬: The Arabic abridgment has ‫فأما…فليست‬, to bridge the gap created by its omission of the previous lines (see Frank, “Notes,” 224, § 185). ‫כב‬15 ‫)تديرها( תסבב אותם‬: There is uncertainty here, as the rasm in the Arabic manuscripts of the Arabic abridgment and Averroes has ‫تدىرها‬, which can be read either as ‫“( تديرها‬rotates them,” as Moshe ibn Tibbon and the early Hebrew translation of Averroes read, adopted by Bouyges; see Appendix B), or as ‫تدبرها‬ (“governs them,” as Badawī and Bouyges choose for their respective editions, as well as the later version of the Hebrew of Averroes, which has ‫)תנהיגם‬. Both options are legitimate, but perhaps the Hebrew should be preferred as the context is specific to the stars and their movements.

Chapter 8 1

Aristotle

Having established the identity and character of the unmoved moving substance in the previous chapters, the present chapter aims to discuss the question of the number of such substances. After introducing the question and criticizing his contemporaries for neglecting it, Aristotle justifies his claim for the plurality of the unmoved movers, explains what determines their number and how it should be calculated—for the sake of which he offers a detailed astronomical discussion—and argues why no further unmoved movers should be added, neither by adding them within our heaven, nor by assuming the existence of other heavens. The chapter ends with a show of reserved respect to the tradition of treating celestial bodies as divine. Accordingly, it can be divided into 6 parts: [1] In the first part of the chapter Aristotle asks whether “these substances” are one or many, and if so, what is their number (1073a14–15), noting that his contemporaries, who speak of Ideas, have not dealt with these questions properly: either they do not discuss the question at all, or—assuming that Ideas are numbers—sometimes say that they are infinite, and sometimes say that they are ten. But none of these positions is justified (1073a15–22). Therefore, Aristotle takes up this discussion himself, relying on what has already been accomplished (1073a22–23). The next parts of the chapter are presented according to this program: part [2] explains why there is a plurality of unmoved movers and what determines their number, part [3] is an attempt to calculate the actual number, and part [4] argues why no further unmoved movers beyond the number he explains how to calculate are needed. [2] The argument for the plurality of unmoved movers starts with a distinction between essential and accidental immovability, both of which are ascribed to the first unmoved mover (1073a23–25), perhaps suggesting that if there are others, they are unmoved only essentially but not accidentally, as in the case of souls. Aristotle proceeds to argue that since the first principle is responsible for the primary eternal movement of the universe, and since there are other eternal movements besides the first movement (i.e., planetary movement), each of these respective movements should have a cause which is in itself unmoved (although not, as the first principle, unmoved accidentally) (1073a25–34). The fact that the movers of the stars are substances is evident since insofar as the former are movers, they are prior to the stars, and since the stars are substances, whatever is prior to them must also be a substance (1073a34–36). In conclusion,

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400443_015

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the number of eternal unmovable substances must be the same as the number of eternal movements, and insofar as they are eternal, these movers must be without magnitude (1073a34–b1; alluding to the arguments at the end of chapter 7). Aristotle finally notes that this argument establishes the substantiality of the eternal unmoved movers, their plurality, and their hierarchy according to the order of celestial movements (1073b1–3). [3]1 In order to determine the number of movements, Aristotle suggests [3.1] to treat the question from an astronomical point of view, since astronomy is the branch of philosophy whose object is the eternal perceptible substance (1073b3–8). He then [3.2] notes that since the number of movements is larger than the number of celestial bodies (because their motion can be explained only by a combination of the number of circular movements set at certain relations to them), the investigation ought to take the opinions of the astronomers regarding the number of movements as the starting point from which to proceed (1073b8–17). Accordingly, Aristotle [3.3] surveys the opinions of Eudoxus (1073b17–32) and Callippus (1073b32–38), the difference between whom is that the latter adds more spheres to the former’s system to better explain the phenomena. Aristotle’s own view [3.4] is that the explanation provided by the aforementioned astronomers is insufficient, as each set of spheres corresponding to a given celestial body should enable the body’s movement to begin from the position of the outermost sphere. Therefore, he introduces the notion of counteracting spheres, which cancel the complicated movement produced by the combination of the spherical movements of the celestial body before it. Should one such sphere be added to counteract any sphere which contributes to the previous body’s complicated movement, we will arrive at the correct number of spheres (1073b38–1074a5). Adding these counteracting spheres to Callippus’ system will render the number 55, and if we disregard Callippus’ additions and adhere to Eudoxus, the number will be reduced to 47 (1074a6–14). [3.5] Aristotle concludes that since this is probably the number of movements, this should be the number of unmoved movers, leaving it up to the astronomers to eventually figure out what the “necessary” number actually is (1074a14–17). [4] After calculating the number of unmoved movers, or at least explaining how this should be calculated assuming that the data provided by the astronomers is correct, Aristotle wants to make sure that no other unmoved movers besides the ones argued for can exist, so that we can be sure that once the number of movements is ascertained, the count is final. In the present part 1 Since Themistius’ paraphrase of the more strictly astronomical discussions is mainly a repetition of Aristotle’s text, I did not go into detail about the actual analysis of the planetary movements. For useful discussions see Beere, “Counting”; Lloyd, “Metaphysics Λ8,” 255–263.

454

commentary

[4] of the chapter he argues against this within our heaven, and the next part [5] will show that ours is the only heaven. [5] Aristotle justifies his view by explaining first [4.1] that all the movements in the present context contribute to the movement of a star. Since these have been exhausted and all the celestial bodies have been accounted for, assuming any other spatial movement would be tantamount to assuming movement without a final cause (1074a17–22). The second argument [4.2] works the other way around, noting that assuming further unmoved movers would necessitate assuming further movements, as the former are final causes, but there would be no candidate left to be affected by them. In other words, there would be final causes without effects (1074a22–24). [4.3] Finally, Aristotle denies the possibility of the existence of movements for the sake of other movements, since if this is granted, as I understand Aristotle’s argument, that would open the door for the addition of celestial spheres whose movement is not concerned with a movement of a star. Aristotle argues that if this were permitted, and we allow movement for the sake of movement, it would lead to an infinite regress, since a given movement for the sake of which another given movement exists would itself have to exist for the sake of a third movement, and so forth. Hence each movement must be for the sake of a star, where the causal sequence terminates (1074a24–31). [6] Another logical possibility for adding further unmoved movers to the ones Aristotle had already counted would be assuming the existence of more than one heaven,2 which would obviously necessitate further unmovable movers to explain the movements in these other heavens. The problem with assuming a plurality of heavens is that it would basically undermine the idea of a first unmoved mover, whose oneness is not limited to its number, but is included in its definition. It would be a logical contradiction to assume that the number of substances that are essentially one be more than one, and consequently there could be no more than one primary movement, hence there can be no more than one heaven (1074a31–38). [7] The chapter ends with a show of respect to the ancients who noticed that the celestial bodies are divine, to which several other mythical ideas have been added from practical considerations in face of the multitude. Aristotle welcomes the inheritance of the divinity of the celestial bodies—which has persisted throughout the periodical rise and fall of the art and sciences in different times and places—but rejects the myths added later (1074a38–b14). 2 The problem of plurality of moving principles refers only to the possibility of many “first” unmoved movers, because they alone threaten to duplicate that which is in itself one. There should be no principal problem to ascribe a nominal identity to the other immovable movers in the plurality.

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455

Themistius

[1] Themistius opens the chapter by repeating Aristotle’s remarks and intentions, explicating Aristotle’s “these substances” as immaterial unmoved substances without magnitude. Themistius also repeats Aristotle’s critique of his predecessors’ inadequate discussion of the subject, only subtracting Aristotle’s remark about lack of clear justification at 1073a21–22 (‫כב‬30–‫כג‬3). [2] Themistius condenses Aristotle’s argument for the plurality of unmoved movers to its essentials, skipping most of Aristotle’s description of the nature of celestial movement (‫כג‬4–14). After repeating the main characteristics of the first principle—adding Themistius’ own distinction between being immaterial and being disembodied (‫כג‬4–6; cf. ‫כב‬14)—Themistius asserts that the need for positing many other unmoved movers is attested by sense and reason (‫כג‬6–7), as each movement needs to be caused by a mover, and there are many moving celestial bodies; accordingly the number of movers will correspond to the number of bodies. Themistius’ main contribution in this passage is to take Aristotle’s distinction between essential and accidental immovability a step further, perhaps explicating what is already suggested in Aristotle’s undeveloped remark. Themistius explains that while the first principle is movable neither essentially nor accidentally, the unmoved movers of the other celestial movements are unmoved essentially, but moved accidentally, comparing—perhaps even equating them—to souls (‫כג‬8–11). This part is concluded by repeating Aristotle’s claim that the celestial movers must be eternal substances, since the movement they cause is eternal, and according to the principle that whatever is prior to a substance must also be a substance (‫כג‬11–14). Aristotle’s note [3.1] about the need to turn to astronomy in order to determine the number of movements, which reflects the number of substances, is somewhat elaborated upon. First, it is noteworthy that here again Themistius refers to the causes of celestial movement as “powers” (‫כג‬14), linking the present discussion to his previous musings about the location of the stars’ powers of movement which concluded the paraphrase of chapter 7 (see above, ‫כב‬11–29). Like Aristotle, Themistius sees astronomy as the branch of philosophy to which we should turn to determine the number of movements of each of the planets, based on reducing each complex movement to a set of simple movements of spheres (‫כג‬16–17). Themistius first lets the reader know that there is a difference between Callippus and Eudoxus about this matter (‫כג‬17–18), and then elaborates on the nature of the differences between the different movements according to what seems as a descending ontological scale. Themistius explains that the difference between these “powers” is not only a difference of order, but also in “existence,” which reflects some kind

456

commentary

of ontological digression, the nature of which is unexplained (‫כג‬19–21). In a brief remark at the end of this part (‫כג‬21–22), Themistius notes that “difference in substance” follows, which I take to mean that once the differences in rank are exhausted—which would presumably take place in the lowest celestial sphere—the difference in substance is introduced, hence there are different kinds of substances in the sub-lunar realm. Finally, Themistius elaborates a bit about the difference between astronomy, geometry, and arithmetic (‫כג‬22– 25). As for the astronomical discussion itself, Themistius’ paraphrase is almost completely a direct quotation of Aristotle’s text (but see above, chapter 2, table 65). The [3.2] identification of the astronomers’ opinion regarding the number of movements as the starting point is quoted at ‫כג‬25–32; The [3.3] surveys of the opinions of Eudoxus and Callippus (respectively 1073b17–32; 1073b32–38) are quoted, respectively, at ‫כג‬32–‫כד‬10 and ‫כד‬10–15; and [3.4] Aristotle’s introduction of the counteracting spheres (1073b38–1074a5) and the resulting recount of movements (1074a6–14) are quoted at ‫כד‬15–19 and ‫כד‬19–24. Themistius concludes, with some elaboration upon Aristotle [3.5], that since the number of spheres is identical to the number of movements, and the number of unmoved substances is identical to the number of spheres, the number of unmoved substances is identical to the number of the spheres. It seems important for Themistius to note that the spheres are sensible substances (‫כד‬25–28). Finally, like Aristotle, Themistius leaves the necessary determination of the actual number to the astronomers, as this is their field of expertise (‫כד‬28– 30). [4] Moving to Aristotle’s arguments for the impossibility of further unmoved substances within our heaven, Themistius somewhat expands Aristotle’s first argument [4.1], arguing that assuming further substances beyond those counted would be assuming the existence of idle spheres. Themistius argues that since it is impossible for there to exist a movement which does not relate to the movement of a certain star (‫כד‬30–31); and since it is impossible for there to exist “an idle divine substance and nature with no activity” (for every substance of this sort is already in a good state, having fulfilled its special activity in the best manner, achieving perfection in its eternal life); it is impossible for there to exist any further body, since it would not be moved (‫כד‬31–‫כה‬3). Themistius, then, regards this argument as an argument denying the possibility of idle spheres. Aristotle’s second argument [4.2] is somewhat restated, subtracting the reference to the notion of finality. Themistius remarks (‫כה‬3–5) that if there were to exist further movements, that would necessitate the existence of further moving substances, but there are none of the latter to be observed, hence no further movements should be assumed. Aristotle’s final argument

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[4.3], about the infinite regress that would result from assuming the existence of a movement for the sake of another movement, is repeated by Themistius, who adds nothing but the grounding of the arguments within the principle that “nature does nothing in vain” (‫כה‬5–11). [5] After some passing remarks (‫כה‬11–12), Themistius turns to reproduce Aristotle’s argument against the possibility of the existence of other heavens, which would necessitate the existence of other first unmoved movers. Themistius essentially repeats Aristotle’s argument, with a few additions that are in tune with his general mode of paraphrasing. First, Themistius notes that the plurality of heavens would require a plurality of first causes, all of which would belong to the same genus, and hence all of them would be “one” (‫כה‬13– 15), which is the essence of the first principle. However, the plurality of things that are of the same form is caused by matter (‫כה‬15–17). The first mover—which is now identified also as the “first form”—is immaterial and does not have a body. Therefore it is one both and definition and in number, and accordingly, the moved body (which I take to be the heaven as a whole) is also one, hence the plurality of heavens is impossible (‫כה‬17–20). The present discussion leads Themistius to a digression in which he returns to the theme of the politicization of the cosmos, this time with reference to the hierarchy of the unmoved movers. Themistius starts by reiterating that there is only one heaven and only one first principle (‫כה‬21–24). If this is the case, then in order to avoid a plurality of principles of movement, there has to be a way in which the first principle extends to (or inheres in; see note on ‫כה‬24) all the spheres, and this, Themistius notes, is where desire comes in— probably alluding to the desire for the first principle as the cause of celestial movement (‫כה‬24–25). In order to explain this, Themistius revisits the notion of law: The law in political governance is one, and the king is one, but the citizens are moved by a desire to take after this law (‫כה‬25–26), and the desire to the king and to see his commands through comes from the love of the law and the love of governance (‫כה‬26–29). The citizens do not achieve the aim set up for it by the king in a uniform matter, but different parts of the kingdom have different functions (military functions, economic functions, etc.) (‫כה‬29–‫כו‬3). The political hierarchy is the result of the different kinds of actions needed to see the king’s commands through. Analogically, there are different celestial movements, some of which are contrary to each other, but all of them, taken together, aim at and desire the same thing, namely, to be in the manner that the king (i.e., God) commands (‫כו‬3–6; note how the two sides of the analogy are intermixed in this passage). Themistius adds that the cumulative end aimed at is “one, unmoved, and without magnitude,” but taken analogically it is manifold, because the actions it effects are many, as are the substances that execute

458

commentary

them. In this way its authority spreads over all, and the manifold expression of a single aim is in fact the thing that enables each of them to desire it in a way that is specific to it, rendering its form unique (‫כו‬6–10). Therefore, Themistius remarks, it was correct to say (now that the matter has been investigated from the point of view of governance and order) that there exist many “first” substances that move the heavens and the celestial bodies, and they are analogous to an aristocracy (‫כו‬11–13). [6] Finally, Aristotle’s qualified show of respect to the ancients is repeated (‫כו‬13–20), with a brief elaboration about the reason why people liken gods to animals (‫כו‬16–18). Themistius terminates the discussion before reaching Aristotle’s idea of the cyclical nature of the sciences, subtracting 1074b10–14 for reasons I do not understand.

3

Note on Sources

Like the previous two chapters, the main source for the text besides Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation is the Arabic abridgment (see note on sources in chapter 6). The Arabic abridgment of this chapter chops most of it out and appears at MS Ḥikma 6 (Cairo), 209r9–20, published in Badawī, Arisṭū, 18–19. Some of al-Baġdādī’s allusions are helpful for this chapter. The French translation of chapter 8 appears in Brague, Thémistius, 99– 105.

4

Running Commentary

‫כב‬30 ‫)و يجب أن يبحث( התראה שיהיה ראוי שיאמר‬: See Frank, “Notes,” 224, § 190. The Ara-

bic was probably ‫أفترى أن يجب أن يقال‬, which was shortened and somewhat paraphrased in the abridgment (see also ‫טו‬27). ‫כג‬2 ‫מספרים‬: T adds ‫והמספרים‬, which results in the division of the sentence into two: namely “… they also say that the Ideas are numbers. And [with regards to] the numbers …”. It should not be ruled out that this is not a homeoteleuton but actually the more correct reflection of the Arabic.

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‫כג‬6–7 ‫)و بعد…يوجب( ואולם…ימציא‬: Frank (“Notes,” 224, § 191) suggests that the original Arabic of the first part was ‫وأما كون جواهر كثيرة بعد ذلك المبدأ الأول‬. Assuming the order of the words was retained in the Hebrew and that the abridgment did not change it either, I would suggest that the Arabic was ‫وأما كون بعد ذلك المبدأ الأول‬ ‫جواهر كثيرة‬. The abridgment somewhat changes the meaning of the sentence, having Themistius say that “after this principle come many substances of the same sort. Reason necessitates this.” The Hebrew reflects what was probably of the ‫ أما…ف‬construction: “as for the existence, after this first principle, of many substances of the same sort, reason necessitates this …”. This also explains why the abridgment has ‫ والقياس‬whereas the Hebrew has ‫הנה ההקש‬. For ‫ ימציא‬and ‫ يوجب‬see above, Chapter 1, table 22. ‫כג‬17 ‫המנהיגים‬: This is perhaps a similar case where the Hebrew reads the root ‫دبر‬ for ‫ دور‬because of their identical rasms (see above, ‫כב‬15; in this case, perhaps that rasm was ‫)مدىرة‬, and it is possible that the text should be understood as referring to auxiliary spheres that rotate (rather than govern) the planetary spheres. ‫כג‬18 ‫שנגזור‬: The verb ‫ גזר‬appears twice in the present work (here and at ‫כד‬28), and from the context it has the same meaning as “determine.” In both cases, C has a variant which reflects either a misunderstanding or a misreading of the text. At the present instance, C has ‫“( שנקצר‬shorten”), and at ‫כד‬28 we find ‫שנספיק‬ (in the context, probably “suffice” in the meaning of “be content with”). The only Arabic term I can think of that would generate all these options is the verb ‫جزم‬, which can also mean “to shorten” for the first variant, and its conjugation ‫ نجزم‬could have been misread as ‫“( نجزى‬we suffice”) for the second option. ‫כג‬25 ‫מבואר‬: This word, surviving only in C, was probably miscopied in Version II and moved to the next sentence where we universally have the meaningless ‫מבואר‬ ‫נראה‬. ‫ מבואר‬reflects the original φανερόν at 1073b9, which Themistius is quoting. ‫ נראה‬should have remained by itself, reflecting Themistius’ elaboration that all

460

commentary

the movable bodies (meaning, in this context, the stars and the planets) are visible, for were it not the case, the calculation of the number of movements would have been impossible. ‫כג‬30 ‫ונלמד‬: Here the text clearly reflects Aristotle’s πυνθανομένους at 1073b14, and the variant ‫ ונדע‬in C probably misread ‫ نتعلم‬as ‫نعلم‬. The same variant appears at ‫לג‬23. ‫כד‬11 ‫שם‬: This is another instance of a correction that transforms into a gloss. The original ‫ הניח‬was corrected to ‫שם‬, and the corrupt construction ‫ שם הנחת‬in M (as well as the out of place ‫ הנחת שם‬in B a few words later) reflects the process. The Arabic probably had ‫ جعل‬and the original ‫ הניח‬was changed because the latter was assigned to the verb ‫وضع‬. ‫כד‬23

‫ والذى‬etc.: This is a paraphrase of the summary of the astronomical discussion that the Arabic abridgment skipped in its entirety. ‫חמשה וחמשים‬: The error ‫ חמשה ועשרים‬in B (and ‫ כ״ה‬in T) is probably a result of misreading the gematria ‫ נ״ה‬as ‫כ״ה‬. ‫כד‬25–26 ‫ויהיו…המספר‬: There are a few difficulties in the manuscript tradition of Aristotle’s Greek text at 1074a14–16 that are reflected in Themistius’ reworking of it here (see the critical apparatus ad loc. in Alexandru, Metaphysics, as well as his discussion at 145). First, at 1074a14 the accepted tradition has σφαιρῶν, having Aristotle sum up the previous calculation of the number of spheres. However, the other tradition has φορῶν, having Aristotle conclude the number of movements from the number of spheres he arrived at. To my judgment this option should be taken seriously with regard to Aristotle’s text, at least from the point of view of argumentative coherence, as the question originally introduced for Aristotle’s discussion (at 1073b3–4)—now answered—is about the number of movements. At 1074a16, there is a difference between two textual traditions, one that has καὶ τὰς αἰσθητὰς, and another that has καὶ οὐκ αἰσθητὰς (some editors omit this

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clause altogether). The former text is taken to mean the spheres, whereas the latter has the text refer to the unmoved movers. In Themistius’ text, then, a tradition is preserved according to which Aristotle first concludes the number of movements, from which he concludes the number of movers, and then turns back to refer to the spheres, but this time insofar as they are “the sensible substances” (explicating what is implicit in τὰς αἰσθητὰς) which are moved by the unmoved substances, explaining the logical sequence. ‫כד‬25

‫)ויהיו( فلتكن‬: It seems that this is a translation of οὖν … ἔστω at 1074a14. The prefix ‫ ف‬translates οὖν and the other prefix ‫ ل‬is added to reflect the third person imperative that does not have a corresponding form in Arabic grammar. The same construction appears below at ‫כד‬30. ‫כד‬27–30

‫)מתחייב…על זה( إلا أن… الحركات‬: See above, Chapter 1, table 23. ‫כד‬30

‫فهو‬: This addition, suggested by Badawī, renders the Arabic grammatical and also accommodates the Hebrew (except that the Hebrew is in the plural). ‫כד‬32 ‫יתרשל‬: The version in C, ‫יסור‬, is also possible as a translation for ‫( يبخل‬supplied by al-Baġdādī, 47,2), but was replaced by ‫ יתרשל‬probably because it is a better translation, and also because the root ‫ סר‬was already used to translate the root

‫( زال‬see Lexicon). ‫כה‬16

‫)רב( كثيرة‬: Badawī emends the text in the manuscript to ‫كثرة‬, acknowledging that the latter is also possible. As can be seen from the Hebrew, the original text was fine. In itself, Badawī’s emendation is unclear to me. ‫)החמר והיסוד( المادة والعنصر‬: This is the only time that the word ‫ مادة‬appears in the text (in the singular) and is probably a gloss. For a discussion see below, Appendix C.

462

commentary

‫כה‬24 ‫)الأولى( הקודם‬: The Hebrew translation here seems to me incorrect, as the meaning, if I understand Themistius correctly, is that it “would be the most fitting” if the first nature be one, etc. See the Lexicon for instances where ‫ أولى‬is translated as ‫ יותר נאות‬or ‫יותר ראוי‬, which would be better in the present context. For the addition in T see Chapter 1, table 43. ‫)منبثة( קיים‬: The Hebrew is probably reading the Arabic as ‫مثبتة‬. I think that the Arabic is preferable, and that Themistius is saying that the way in which the first principle retains its status as the only ultimate principle of movement is by extending itself (or being dispersed) as a collective object of desire. The logic behind this, I assume, is that the plurality of movements proceed from it because of the plurality of substances to which it is an object of desire, hence its own oneness is not compromised. The root ‫ بثث‬also appears in Isḥāq’s translation of Themistius’ paraphrase of On the Soul, where the participle διεσπαρμένα (“dispersed”; in De an., 109,13) is translated into ‫( مبثوثة‬Lyons, Arabic, 198,18), whose meaning is practically identical to the form ‫ منبثة‬in our text. ‫כה‬26 ‫רעיה‬: See above, Chapter 1, table 30. ‫כה‬28 ‫מצות‬: The variant ‫ ענין‬in C reflects the problem with the term ‫أمر‬, which can mean (among others) “thing” and “command.” ‫כו‬1–3 ‫קצתם…קשת‬: There is considerable confusion within the Hebrew manuscripts regarding Themistius’ list of functions in the city, which I have done my best to sort out in the body of the text. The first division is threefold, between (1) rulers; (2) subordinates; and (3) people who are both (see al-Baġdādī, 49,4: ‫فمنهم رؤساء‬ ‫)ومنهم عبيد ومنهم بين ذلك‬. The next division seems to be a subdivision of (3) into (a) army divisions; (b) various professions; and (c) sailors. The final division seems to be a further subdivision of (a) into (i) foot soldiers; (ii) cavalry; and (iii) archers. Besides various repetitions, omissions, and copyist errors, there seems to have been a confusion with regards to ‫ כתות‬and ‫הרגליים‬, because of the Hebrew expression ‫“( כתות רגליים‬laborious march”). The meaning of ‫כתות‬

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as military divisions is also seen at ‫ל‬22. For a similar list of military functions see Oration 5, 69c9–10: “some serve as infantry (ὁπλιτεύουσιν), others as cavalry (ἱππεύουσιν), some bear arms (ὁπλίζονται), others slings (σφενδονῶσι) …” (tr. Heather & Moncur, Politics, 169). ‫כו‬5 ‫הענין‬: See above, Chapter 1, table 30. ‫כו‬12 ‫והודענו‬: Judging from the variant ‫ וכפלנו‬at C, and the problem C has with the root ‫( قرر‬see above, ‫יד‬29 and below ‫כט‬19), I think that the present Hebrew verb ‫ והודענו‬is a corruption of ‫והודינו‬. The verb ‫ הודיע‬does not appear anywhere else in the present text, and ‫ הודינו‬as ultimately deriving from ὁμολογέω makes equal sense in the present context.

Chapter 9 1

Aristotle

Aristotle’s famous (or notorious) account of Nous, the divine intellect, is a set of progress-by-elimination arguments that ultimately arrive at a self-intelligizing substance, the coherence of which Aristotle attempts to defend. Against traditional expansive interpretations—Themistius’ being one of the earliest and maximalistic—some contemporary scholars adopted a minimalistic approach to Aristotle’s god as either a “narcissus” or a mere “thought experiment.”1 To this day it remains one of Aristotle’s most puzzling discussions. [1] In the opening remarks of the chapter, Aristotle introduces “intellect” and the aporiai it involves as the topic of the discussion. Since the intellect is considered to be the most divine phenomenon, its manner of existence must be explored to understand how, in fact, it meets the demands of being the most divine phenomenon (1074b15–17). The opening remark leads to a series of four aporiai and their respective solutions, which together result in Aristotle’s general view about the nature of the divine intellect. [2] Aristotle’s first aporia (1074b17–21) deals with the question whether the intellect intelligizes or not, and if so, how. The option [2.1] that the intellect thinks nothing is rejected, since that would contradict the demand that it be dignified, as it would be analogous to sleeping (1074b17–18). If I understand Aristotle’s argument here, he treats “intelligizes nothing” as a case of a potentiality (the ability to intelligize) not being actualized, and since potentiality is inferior to actuality, an intellect that is not actually intelligizing cannot be considered to be the most divine. Another option [2.2], likewise rejected, is that the intellect indeed intelligizes, but its intelligizing is dependent upon something else. But this option also undermines the notion of the intellect’s superiority, as it renders the intellect substantially in a state of potentiality (1074b18–20); the need for an exterior actualization would mean that the intellect, as a substance, could not actualize its essence by itself. But if intelligizing is the factor that renders it valuable, and at the same time cannot be carried out by itself, the intellect cannot be the best thing (1074b20–21). As I see it, the resulting inferiority can be understood in two ways: a thing that involves potentiality cannot be the best thing, since that must be pure actuality; and a thing’s need for an exterior cause to be actualized assumes that the actualizing cause is better; hence

1 See a convenient discussion of the controversy in Liatsi, “Aristotle’s Silence,” 231–233.

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it cannot be the best. Aristotle does not mention the result of rejecting these two options, but it can be inferred from what is denied that the intellect must be always actualized in and of itself. In other words, the intellect must always be actively intelligizing, and it is not dependent upon any exterior object for its intelligizing. [3] Aristotle’s next aporetic discussion (1074b21–35) asks about the object of the intellect’s intelligizing. He first [3.1] introduces the different options: it either (a) intelligizes itself; or (b) something else. If it (b) intelligizes something else, the latter is either (b1) always the same object; or (b2) alternating objects (1074b21–23). Before actually dealing with these options, Aristotle [3.2] notes that the object of intelligizing must be the most divine thing (1074b23– 26), which is an extension of the divinity criterion to the intellect’s object. This in itself makes sense, since Aristotle has already remarked that in intelligizing an object, the subject in a way identifies with it, so if the intellect does not intelligize the best thing, it cannot itself be the best thing. This consideration leads Aristotle to remark [3.3] that the intellect does not change, advancing two reasons: first, the change would be for the worse; and second, change is a movement (1074b26–27). This remark effectively eliminates option (b2), from two different angles. Since it has been established at [3.2] that the intellect intelligizes the best thing, if it intelligizes something else besides it, it would obviously be worse, but then it would no longer intelligize the best thing; hence it only intelligizes one thing, i.e., the best thing. Furthermore, if the intellect changes its object of intellect, then that would mean that the intellect itself admits change, but that which admits change cannot be the best thing, as the best thing is unchangeable. Aristotle’s next discussion [3.4] in this section is probably meant to eliminate option (b1). He offers two arguments for this. The first argument is difficult to understand. Aristotle explains that if intelligizing would be regarded as a potency, then the intellect would become weary of continuous intelligizing (1074b28–29). This means, as I see it, that for Aristotle assuming that the object of intelligizing is exterior to the intellect is tantamount to assuming that intelligizing is a potentiality that needs actualization. But in that case we would expect the intellect to grow wearisome, which would not enable it to continuously undertake intelligizing.2 The second argument seems more straightforward; if the intellect intelligizes the best thing, and the object of the intellect is some thing other than the intellect, it follows that the object of the intellect

2 Perhaps this is analogous to Aristotle’s claim that a finite substance cannot have infinite power.

466

commentary

is better than the intellect, hence the intellect is not the best thing (1074b29– 30). The option that the act of intelligizing itself—regardless of its object—is the best thing (an option which would eliminate the problem of a superior object of intellect, just presented) is rejected since the act of intelligizing can be abused into intelligizing bad objects (1074b31–33). The other options having been rejected, [3.5] Aristotle concludes that the intellect is its own object of intelligizing, being the best thing: its intelligizing is intelligizing of intelligizing (1074b33–35). [4] Aristotle’s third aporetic discussion deals with two potential problems that arise from the conclusion that the intellect intelligizes its intelligizing. First, he remarks [4.1] that the other known cognitive faculties (scientific knowledge, sensation, opinion, and understanding) have themselves as their object only derivatively (1074b35–36), i.e., only by encountering an external object are they aware of themselves. Second, [4.2] since there is a distinction between subject and object in intelligizing, it is unclear to which of the two the goodness should be ascribed (1074b36–38). In other words, is the intellect the best by virtue of its intelligizing activity or by virtue of its being the object of its own intelligizing? Aristotle’s response to the first question is [4.3] that there are indeed precedents to faculties knowing themselves directly— in productive sciences this is possible by omitting matter from the object, and exploring the thisness of a substance for itself, whereas theoretical sciences are self-contained as they deal with definitions and thought (1074b38–1075a3). As I understand this, Aristotle is mainly concerned in showing that it is possible for other faculties besides intellect to do their work without an external object present, which would only leave the internal aspect. Aristotle’s response to the second question [4.4] is that the distinction between subject and object in intellect appears only when matter is involved, hence there is no problem to say, in the present case, that to intelligize and to be intelligized are one and the same (1075a3–5). [5] Aristotle’s final question is if the object of intelligizing is composite. If it were the case, then intelligizing would require change, as the intelligizing process would comprise of intelligizing the whole part by part (1075a5–6). Obviously, since the object of the intellect is the intellect itself, the question is coextensive with the question whether the intellect is composite or not. Aristotle’s reply once again employs the concept of matter, maintaining that composition is not attributable to an immaterial being (1075a6–7). [6] The chapter ends with a continuation of the solution for part [5] in the form of comparison between intellect as it was presented in the present chapter so far and between the intellect of a human being, which is an example of a composite being. Whereas the human intellect attains the “good” only in given

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moments, since they are not the same, and it takes it time to attain it, being composite, the intellect that intelligizes itself is in the best state throughout eternity (1075a7–10).

2

Themistius

Themistius’ paraphrase of the present chapter is perhaps the most complex in this work. Themistius rearranges Aristotle’s text and adds to it considerably, reflecting three main objectives: to render Aristotle’s text more systematic; to explicate the theological dimension of the discussion; and to make room for Themistius’ own interpretation of Aristotle’s God, which reinforces God’s connection to the world as an object of intelligizing and action. [1] In his paraphrase of Aristotle’s opening remarks to the present chapter (1074b15–17), Themistius makes it clear that for him the chapter is about the divine intellect. Themistius orientates the reader by remarking that since it has been established that the first cause is an intellect and that its life is the best, the present chapter is concerned with exploring the manner in which this is so (‫כו‬21–23). [2] Themistius proceeds to paraphrase Aristotle’s discussions in the chapter, beginning with Aristotle’s claim [2.1] that the possibility of the intellect thinking nothing should be rejected, comparing it to sleeping (1074b17–18). Themistius unpacks Aristotle’s compressed remarks and offers a somewhat more elaborate discussion which is based on his understanding of the discussion as focusing on the divine intellect, hence evaluating the option that it intelligizes nothing based on its function as the first cause. After presenting the option of idleness in the terms of an intellect that does not actualize its ability (‫כו‬23–25), comparing it to a wise man who is asleep and hence does not exercise his intellect (‫כו‬25–26), Themistius dismisses this option as absurd, explaining—expanding upon Aristotle—that there would be nothing dignified about moving everything while sleeping (‫כו‬26–28), noting that only bodies are subject to desire while asleep, without offering an explanation (‫כו‬28–29). Assuming an idle first efficient cause, upon which all of the beings depend, is tantamount to “killing the principle and fountainhead of life” (‫כו‬29–30), hence the inquiry should be about the intellect’s activity insofar as it is an intellect in actuality (‫כו‬30–‫כז‬1). Before paraphrasing [2.2] (1074b18–21), Themistius applies syntax and reverses the order of presentation, introducing the different alternatives about the intellect’s object(s) of intelligizing put forth at [3.1] (1074b21–23 = ‫כז‬1–3). It seems that for Themistius, the question about the intellect’s dependency upon

468

commentary

something exterior is logically linked to the question about the object of its intelligizing. The sequence of discussion, then, is first [2.1] to eliminate the possibility of intelligizing nothing; then [3.1] to cast out the possible alternatives of its object; and only then to discuss [2.2] in the context of the possibility of it intelligizing an exterior object, and upon this discussion Themistius elaborates at ‫כז‬3–14. First, Themistius maintains that if the object of the intellect is external— like the objects of the senses—then the object is the cause (or “sovereign”) of intelligizing, just like the sensible objects are the efficient causes of the senses (‫כז‬3–6). But if this is the case, then the intellect cannot be an intellect per se, and neither does it occupy a “sovereign” role; it would be relegated to merely being able to intelligize something else, which means that it cannot be the best substance (‫כז‬6–9). However, the fact that the first cause is regarded as the best substance stemmed in the first place from its very nature as an intellect that is actively intelligizing (‫כז‬9–10). But—and here Themistius leaps to Aristotle’s second argument in [3.4] (1074b29–30)—an external object of intelligizing would be superior to the intellect, as it would cause the latter’s intelligizing. This is just like the superiority of the objects of the senses over the senses, since a cause is always superior to its effect (‫כז‬10–14). The comparison between intellect and the senses leads Themistius to the first part of [3.4], namely Aristotle’s argument “from fatigue” (1074b28–29), which Themistius explains by extending the comparison, stating how tiring it is for a given sense to persist in sensing a given object, and then expanding this to anything which involves transition from potentiality to actuality (‫כז‬15–18). In fact, Themistius argues, this is the reason why animals need sleep in the first place (‫כז‬18). Themistius continues to entertain the idea that the intellect intelligizes an external object, noting that if the intellect intelligizes something other than itself, it would do so either in the manner of good and superior things, or in the manner of inferior things, which are identified as the particular things (probably meaning particular natural substances) (‫כז‬18–20; probably based on a different reading of 1074b25–26 [3.2]). In the following sentence, that is apparently corrupt (see note on ‫כז‬21), Themistius probably explains that what is meant by an inferior intellect is an intellect that exists before receiving the form of its object, with which it is then identified to a large measure (‫כז‬20–22; I take this to mean that the time gap presumes the inferior intellect’s need to be actualized by its object). But since all the inferior activities should be denied of the divine intellect, it is more proper to say that it intelligizes in the manner fitting of that which is the utmost best (since this is what the divine intellect is, after all) (‫כז‬22–24). Accordingly—and here Themistius reflects [3.3] (1074b26–

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27)—when performing its activity it does not change (Themistius probably juxtaposes it with the “inferior” intellect, which has a before and after in intelligizing), since any change would be for the worse, and in any case change would mean movement (by which Themistius means, I suppose, that it would contradict the intellect’s status as an unmoved mover) (‫כז‬24–25). Aristotle’s argument at the end of [3.4] denying the possibility of the value of intellect consisting strictly of the act of intellect (as it is possible to intelligize bad things) (1074b31–33), is now quoted almost word for word (‫כז‬25–29), leading Themistius to conclude (‫כז‬29–30) that the utmost substance is not an intellect simpliciter, but is an intellect that intelligizes the best thing. Finally, Themistius reflects Aristotle’s sentiment at [3.5] and concludes that the best substance intelligizes the best things, none of which is external to it (‫כז‬30– 32). Themistius uses the occasion to digress and embark upon a hypothetical argument meant to show that assuming a better substance than the first principle is a reprehensible opinion (‫כז‬32–33). He starts by asking whether the best thing intelligizes one or many things, and if the latter, whether it intelligizes them together or one by one (‫כז‬33–‫כח‬2)—only to dismiss all these options. The option that it intelligizes only one thing is denied because that would mean that it either completes itself by intelligizing it, which would express deficiency, or not—which would mean that it would never acquire completeness (‫כח‬2– 5). If it intelligizes many things one at a time, it would need memory and that would also express deficiency. If it intelligizes many things at once—once again the question of whether or not this brings it to completion arises, both options resulting in absurdity (‫כח‬5–9). Finally, the theoretical option that it intelligizes only some of the things together (and the others probably one at a time) brings together all the resulting absurdities and is denied (‫כח‬9–10; this is an argumentative strategy akin to what was encountered at ‫יג‬3–10). Having demonstrated that any view which assumes that the first intellect intelligizes an exterior object results in absurdity, Themistius reminds the reader that this problem is avoided when one realizes that the first intellect intelligizes only one thing—which is the best thing—namely itself (‫כח‬10–13). Insofar as the intellect is its own object, it does not become weary (‫כח‬13–14), nor does it transfer from potentiality to actuality (which is what prompts weariness; ‫כח‬14–15); its self-intelligizing persists in a way analogous to a human being’s self-love (‫כח‬15–19).3

3 The love is not just for the sake of analogy, but enables to explain its own pleasure.

470

commentary

At this point Themistius reminds us that the first intellect is the principle of all existing things, and adds that they “are known in him” (‫כח‬19–20) and that it intelligizes all of them at once (‫כח‬20–21). Themistius notes that just as a weak body cannot carry many things at once, or weak vision cannot see many things at once, our human intellect is weak, hence it cannot intelligize many things at once (‫כח‬21–26). But the divine intellect, as it is in the uttermost perfect state, does not require time for intellection, as it intelligizes all things in an instant when intelligizing itself (‫כח‬26–29). Its intelligizing does not involve time, since time is the measure of movement and the divine intellect does not move (‫כח‬29–31). In order to explain how intelligizing everything at once is possible for the divine intellect, Themsitius draws a few comparisons. First, he explains that while a lyre player cannot play all the notes at once, it would be possible for the lyre if it had a soul; likewise, God can easily encompass and intelligize many things (‫כח‬31–‫כט‬1).4 I take this analogy to mean that the lyre contains—in a certain sense—all of its notes, so had it been endowed with a power to actualize itself, all the notes would have been available to it promptly. God, which contains all the intelligibles since as the first principle he is—in a sense—all of them, can (and does) intelligize all of them at once (as God is already actuality). The second analogy is to a dancer, whose soul enables him or her to move many different organs of the body together and apart. Now if this is true for a dancer, who can deny that the divine intellect, which presides over every place in the world (presumably, because it is the first principle), can move all the things in the world at once? Moreover, Themistius continues, if this holds for movement, surely this holds for intelligizing as well (‫כט‬1–6). One may contend that the last argument is a clear expression of Themistius’ view of God as the efficient cause of the world.

4 Sharples, “Alexander,” 9 and 15 maintains that Themistius’ description of the divine intellect renders it “supernatural” and something that “we cannot imagine,” which suggests a difference in kind (or ontological transcendence) between the human intellect and God’s intellect. If that were the case, Themistius’ metaphysical scheme would fall apart. However, I do not think this is how his remarks should be understood, as there is a logical difference between saying that one “cannot imagine” something and saying that it is incomprehensible or supernatural. To take a Cartesian example, it is easy to understand what a 1,000-sided polygon is, and although it is impossible for a human being to imagine it, it is possible to conceive an entity with powerful memory that could. Whereas Themistius employs metaphors to help his reader digest the idea of the divine intellect’s total intellection, I see no problem in understanding its logical structure. The only potentially logical problem would be to assume that the divine intellect collectively intellects an infinite number of things, but this is something Themistius never argues.

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Themistius stresses that the divine intellect should not be compared to the human intellect; to have knowledge of things it needs neither going over them one by one, nor composition, nor transferring from ignorance to knowledge, nor inferring from presuppositions (‫כט‬6–9). It is more like sharp vision that does not require time to perceive its objects, but to a considerably greater extent, as it intelligizes the entire intelligible world immediately and effortlessly (‫כט‬9–11). Themistius then suggests that the superiority of the divine intellect over the human intellect can be compared to the superiority of the human intellect over the human body: just as the human intellect acts much better and faster than the human body in their respective activities, so does the divine intellect act much better and faster than the human intellect (‫כט‬11–14). He then remarks that this comparison also holds concerning the first principle’s ease in causing/rotating (depending on how one understands ‫ סבוב‬here) the world (‫כט‬14–15). To end this series of analogies, Themistius compares the difference between the divine intellect and the human intellect to the difference in brightness (‫כט‬15–18, probably in the context of transparency and vision; see note to ‫כט‬17). Themistius proceeds to argue that the fact that the first principle is an intellect in its essence should come as no surprise; if one admits that the first principle is completely without matter, and is the cause of the movement of the sphere, and if the movement of the sphere never ceases, it is impossible to say that God rests from activity (‫כט‬18–22). At first glance this seems like a somewhat inelegant argument that disregards the first cause’s causality as an object of desire, having the first cause move solely as an efficient cause. However, this can be bypassed by noting that the reason that the first cause was an object of desire in the first place was its being the best being, which entails it being always in actuality. If it is not perpetually active, it is not the ultimate object of desire, hence it cannot cause unceasing movement as an object of desire. The final part of this clause is textually unclear, but Themistius seems to say that in the natural world the intellect is always present in a body, which inhibits its activity (‫כט‬22–23). To conclude his independent digression, Themistius again reinforces God’s connection to the world: God is the first principle and He knows His own essence as well as the essence of all things of which He is a principle collectively. Themistius adds that God is “a ruler” (‫ )מולך ;مالك‬in His essence, hence He is the ruler of all the things that depend upon Him. The truth of the fact that God knows and intelligizes His essence is derived from the fact that it is the best and noblest thing (‫כט‬23–27). Moving to Aristotle’s discussion of aporiai concerning the intellect intelligizing its intelligizing, Themistius repeats [4.1] Aristotle’s account of reflexiv-

472

commentary

ity of cognitive faculties as being only derivative in the course of perceiving or intelligizing an exterior object (‫כט‬28–30), adding two clarifying examples: when a person becomes aware of whiteness, he or she are aware that they are aware of whiteness; and when a geometrical theorem is understood, the fact of the understanding is perceived along with it (‫כט‬30–32). Subtracting [4.2] the question whether goodness should be ascribed to intelligizing or being intelligized, Themistius moves to reflect Aristotle’s answer of [4.1], presented in [4.3], devoting a separate discussion to theoretical sciences—which he calls “immaterial sciences” (32‫ל–כט‬3)—and productive sciences (‫ל‬3–10). Aristotle’s [4.4] elimination of the distinction between subject and object in intellect once matter is omitted is reflected separately in Themistius’ respective discussions of the theoretical sciences (at ‫ל‬1–4) and the productive sciences (at ‫ל‬9–10). Whereas Themistius adds nothing substantial to the discussion of theoretical sciences, he attempts to clarify Aristotle’s statements concerning the productive sciences by providing the examples of carpentry (the form of the chair is the art of carpentry) and medicine (which is the form of health) (‫ל‬5– 6). Themistius concludes this chapter with an attempt to provide a clearer explanation to his contention that when the first principle intelligizes itself, it intelligizes all the existents. He starts by maintaining that when it intelligizes its essence, it intelligizes what it is, hence it intelligizes that it is “the cause and principle” of everything (‫ל‬10–12).5 But there are three meanings of “principle”: (1) the form; (2) the “that-for-the-sake-of”; (3) the starting point of movement (‫ל‬12–13). These three meanings, however, are not necessarily separate, as it frequently happens in nature that they converge in one thing, as in the case of the human intellect and soul (‫ל‬13–16). Likewise, these meanings of “principle” converge in God’s intellect, so when God intelligizes itself as a form for everything (first meaning of principle), it intelligizes itself also insofar as it is their starting point and order (which probably reflects the two other meanings), hence his understanding extends to these as well (‫ל‬16–18). Themistius does not yet explain why the first intellect is the form of everything, nor does he explain how the cosmic order is a reflection of God as a final cause or as a starting point; his paraphrase of chapter 10 is meant to fill this gap.

5 The Hebrew is somewhat different. See note ad loc.

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473

Note on Sources

Like the previous three chapters, the main source for the text besides Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation is the Arabic abridgment (See note on sources in chapter 6). The Arabic abridgment of the present chapter becomes exceedingly thinner as the text progresses, and at the same time the abridgment itself becomes freer (as already observed by Frank, “Notes,” 230n1), before ending abruptly (but effectively) with God’s self-intelligizing as the principle and cause of the world. It appears at MS Ḥikma 6 (Cairo), 209v20–210r7, published in Badawī, Arisṭū, 19–21. In many passages we are left only with the Hebrew, but luckily there are a few cases where al-Baġdādī has important contributions to the establishment of the text. The French translation of chapter 9 appears in Brague, Thémistius, 107–115. Selections from this chapter are translated into English in Pines, “Distinctive,” 182–186.

4

Running Commentary

‫כו‬22 ‫ספרנו אותם‬: The variant ‫ בחרנו אותם‬in C probably reflects a misreading of ‫أخبرناها‬

as ‫اخترناها‬. ‫כו‬23 ‫ראשון מה שנתחיל בו קודם‬: The variant ‫ ראוי‬in C1 and B probably reflects an early confusion between the roots ‫( بدأ‬to begin) and ‫( بدو‬to seem; see, e.g., ‫טז‬29). Consequently, the adverbً ‫ أولا‬was probably revised from ‫( תחלה‬B and corrupted in C1) to ‫ ראשון‬for stylistic considerations. The text means something like “let us

begin first.” ‫כו‬25

‫)יתעסק בחכמתו( يستعمل علمه‬: The early version’s ‫ יעשה חכמתו‬follows the Arabic’s structure of direct object, whereas the revision ‫יתעסק בחכמתו‬, which I adopt, replaces the verb ‫ יעשה‬with ‫יתעסק‬, the standard translation of ‫استعمل‬. The tenth form of the Arabic verb is usually translated into the seventh form of the Hebrew verb, which in this case demands a preposition, hence ‫בחכמתו‬ (also adopted by Brague; see Thémistius, 107n1). From the Arabic it is clear that ‫בחכמות‬, adopted by Landauer, is a corruption.

474

commentary

‫כו‬27

‫)דבר מן( سا ئر‬. Frank (“Notes,” 225, §194) suggests that the Hebrew reflects ‫شيئا ًمن‬, and I agree. The difference of meaning is marginal. The Arabic has Themistius write about an intellect that neither intelligizes nor performs the rest of the activities, and the Hebrew has him write about an intellect that neither intelligizes nor performs any activity. ‫כו‬28

‫)ויטה הדברים( وتحن الأشياء‬: The Hebrew translation is mistaken and should have been ‫ויטו‬, as the subject of the verb ‫ تحن‬is not the first principle, but “the things.” In other words, the things incline toward the first principle, and this is in tune with its function as an object of desire. ‫כו‬29 ‫)من حركة( מהנעת‬: The Hebrew is correct, because Themistius is referring to sleeping living things that can nevertheless cause movement as objects of desire—not that the sleeping things themselves are in motion (which is also absurd in itself, because sleep is stationary). The text in the present Arabic manuscript is not a local problem, as the early version of the Hebrew translation (reflected at C and B) has ‫מתנועת‬, which is a translation of ‫من حركة‬. Whether the revision is based on a better text or common sense is an open question. Neither Frank nor Brague (who correctly follows the Hebrew) address this problem.

‫)לחושקיהם( لعشاقهم‬: The apparent discrepancy between the Hebrew and the Arabic recorded by Frank (“Notes,” 225, §195) and reflected by Brague (Thémistius, 107n3) is the result of Landauer’s incomplete critical apparatus. Landauer adopted the miscopied ‫ לחושקים‬at CA and did not record ‫ לחושקיהם‬in B, which is supported by M and T (the latter two unavailable to him). ‫כו‬32 ‫)و ينبوعها( ומבועה‬: The variant ‫ ומכוונם‬at AM (not recorded by Landauer) is a corruption.

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‫כז‬6 ‫)أن يعقل العقل( שיעשה הפעל‬: The Hebrew, probably read ‫أن يفعل الفعل‬, a common problem in the present text. The Arabic is better and is also preferred by Brague, since Themistius’ point is to compare between sensation (vision and hearing) and intelligizing with regard to the dominant factor in these respective faculties. ‫כז‬7

‫)שליט( ببسيط‬: Unlike Brague (Thémistius, 146, §3), who thinks that the Arabic should be preferred, calling back to chapter 7 where the first principle’s simplicity was asserted (hence ‫)כמו שבארנו במה שקדם‬, I think that the Hebrew should be preferred, translating ‫ متسلط‬as an ultimate reflection of Aristotle’s κύριον at 1074b19. The sentence is the counterpart to the question about the dominant factor in intelligizing presented at 5‫כז‬, which is immanent (unlike hearing and seeing), since the first principle is an intellect in itself, and therefore it is not “governed” by an outside object. The call back, accordingly, is to the first intellect as an intellect in itself (earlier in the same line), which had already been established, e.g., at ‫יז‬26–27. ‫כז‬8 ‫יכשר‬: I do not understand the nature of the change from ‫ יכשר‬to ‫ ראוי‬at AM (adopted by Landauer), nor did I find an occurrence of the root ‫ כש״ר‬in other

translations by Moshe ibn Tibbon, although the usage here seems plausible. According to Goshen-Gottstein, Syntax, s.v. ‫כשר‬, this verb was used by Shmuel ibn Tibbon to translate the verb ‫ يجوز‬in Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed. Brague follows the reading ‫ראוי‬, translating “doit” (Thémistius, 180), which probably means he understood ‫ ראוי‬to translate ‫يجب‬, as is frequent in the present text (perhaps as a corruption of ‫)?يجوز‬. However, that would make Themistius write about an intellect that has a power that necessitates it to intelligize a different object of intelligizing, which is a strange logical modality. The option ‫ יכשר‬has Themistius write about an intellect that has a power that enables it to intelligize etc., which seems more coherent. ‫כז‬13

‫فيكون العقل‬: Frank (“Notes,” 225, §198) correctly remarks that the Hebrew has ‫הושם‬, which reflects the verb ‫جعل‬. To be exact, the present expression para-

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phrases Themistius’ text to compensate for the omitted comparison between intelligizing on the one hand, and hearing and vision on the other. The formula with ‫ جعل‬is repeated in the Arabic in the next sentence (at ‫כז‬14). .

‫כז‬17 ‫)فى جميع الأشياء( בכל העניינים לדבר‬: Frank (“Notes,” 225, § 201) records a discrepancy with the edition, partly because Landauer did not include ‫ לדבר‬in his edition. The Hebrew is effectively translating ‫ الأمور للشىء‬/‫ فى جميع الأحوال‬of which the abridgment to ‫ فى جميع الأشياء‬seems common practice. The possibility that ‫ לדבר‬should be retained in the text is reinforced by the fact that the Hebrew verb following it is ‫יצא‬, which is singular rather than plural, which would be expected had the subject been ‫העניינים‬. If this is the case, then the Hebrew is translating ‫ يخرج‬and the abridgment reads it/alters it to ‫تخرج‬. ‫)واسترخاء( ורפיון‬: The original ‫וחולשה‬, reflected in C, was revised, and I can see two reasons for this. First, because the root ‫ חל״ש‬was already assigned the root ‫( ضعف‬see Lexicon), and second, because ‫ רפיון‬is somewhat more exact to express exhaustion as a result of effort. ‫כז‬21 ‫קודם צורת הדבר המושכל‬: The Hebrew, as it is, is unlikely. I conjecture that the

Arabic had ‫قبل قبول‬, which confused the reader or the copyist. In the abridgment we find ‫ قبول‬within the condensation of Themistius’ argument at ‫כז‬23. Themistius’ point seems to be that it is absurd to think that the object of the intellect’s intelligizing would be something inferior, especially if its possession of intellect antedates the reception of the form of the object of intelligizing, because the identification of intellect and intelligized in this case would dictate a decrease of value for the intelligizing agent. ‫כז‬22 ‫כמו שאמרנו וקבלנו‬: Brague (Thémistius, 147, §§6–7), thinks that this is a refer-

ence to Themistius’ philosophical family heritage, but this seems to me farfetched, as it is more reasonable to think that Themistius is simply referring to an opinion he accepts.

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‫כז‬28 ‫)أولى( יותר נאות‬: In his edition, where he adopted the reading ‫הראשונים יותר‬ ‫נאות‬, Landauer already expresses suspicion that this is a dual translation of ‫أولى‬. Brague, whom I follow, accepts this at Thémistius, 109n3. The revision ‫יותר נאות‬ had become a gloss that found its way into the text. That ‫ יותר נאות‬should be

preferred as the translation of ‫ أولى‬is attested by the fact that the text reflects Aristotle’s κρεῖττον at 1074b32–33. ‫כז‬32 ‫יתן‬: The root ‫ נת״ן‬appears three times in the present text. Besides this occurrence, the other two are in the context of God as the “giver of forms” (‫ה‬20 and ‫לד‬25), of which the term ‫ واهب الصور‬has become commonplace in Arabic philosophical literature. In the present example it makes sense to understand ‫وهب‬ as translating something like “relinquish.”

‫)דבר אחד( شىء واحد‬: Badawī wonders whether the text should be emended to ً ‫شيئا ً واحدا‬, but it seems to be fine as it is, because ‫ شىء واحد‬can refer to the subject rather than completing the adverb: “that which it always intelligizes is one thing” (rather than “that which it intelligizes is always one thing”). Cf. ‫כח‬2, where ً ‫ شيئا ًواحدا‬completes a verb (“had it always intelligized one thing …”). ‫כח‬2

‫)בעברו( بالتصفح منه‬: ‫ בהכרעה ממנו‬in C is a copyist error, which is corrected by C1 to ‫( בהעברה ממנו‬see also C at ‫כח‬6), which was probably the original translation as it reflects the Arabic formulation at the expense of clarity in Hebrew. The revision ‫ בעברו‬Hebraized the grammar. ‫)وإقباله على( והקבילו‬: This is a clever lexical novelty that reflects the Arabic verb ‫( أقبل‬here in the maṣdar) accompanied by ‫على‬. The meaning is active, of approaching or turning to—not the passive ‫קבל‬, which means to receive. This solution however, was inconsistent, and not employed in ‫כח‬22.

‫)השרשים( الأحوال‬: Frank (“Notes,” 225, §204) is probably correct in his suggestion that the Hebrew reflects ‫ الأصول‬in the sense of logical assumptions in an argument. Brague reads with the Hebrew, and I agree that it is preferable because Themistius is referring to assumptions that lead to absurdity (see for a similar usage above, ‫יב‬15).

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‫כח‬6 ‫בעברו על אחד אחד‬: see above, ‫כח‬2. ‫כח‬10 ‫)بجميع هذه الأشياء( מכל אלה הדבות‬. Frank (“Notes,” 225, § 208) remarks that the Hebrew probably translated ‫الشناعات‬. If this is the case, then perhaps the Arabic copyist was confused by the expression ‫ بجميع الأشياء‬a few words later. Another option is that ‫ الأشياء‬is a collective noun to express everything the abridger abridges at ‫כח‬9–10. ‫כח‬12

‫)והדבר ההוא הוא( وذلك الشىء هو‬: Frank’s query about the Hebrew adding ‫الذى‬, absent from the Arabic (Frank, “Notes,” 225, § 220), stems from Landauer’s adoption of the erroneous rendering ‫ וזה הדבר אשר הוא‬in A (and similarly ‫וזה‬ ‫ הדבר שהוא‬in M, unavailable to Landauer), which is probably confused by the occurrence of this construction a few words later. In actuality, there is no discrepancy between the Arabic and the Hebrew. ‫כח‬17 ‫)دائم( תמיד לכל אחד מן האנשים‬: The Arabic abridges this (see Frank, “Notes,” 225, § 212, who was misguided by Landauer’s omission of ‫ תמיד‬from his edition and critical apparatus), but the grammar is wrong as ‫ دائم‬refers to ‫محبة‬, which is in the feminine. The syntactical function is also different, as the Hebrew has ‫תמיד‬ as an adverb whereas ‫ دائم‬is an adjective. My guess is that the Arabic abridgment changedً ‫ دائما‬into ‫ دائم‬and forgot to adjust the grammar. The difference of meaning is slight: the Hebrew version has Themistius say that a person’s love for oneself “always exists for every person,” and the Arabic abridgment says that a person’s love for oneself “is constant.” ‫כח‬19

‫כן גם כן אשר יושכל וישכיל עצמותו הנה הוא( كذلك الذى يعقل وما يعقل ذاته فهو نفسه يعقل‬ ‫)נפשו מה שישכיל‬: There is confusion here among the Hebrew and the Arabic (see Frank, “Notes,” 225, §§214–215), which stems, as I understand it, from two reasons: (1) the different location of ‫ ما‬in each option; and (2) the ability to read

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the verb ‫ يعقل‬in either active or passive voice. The text in both the Arabic and the Hebrew seems somewhat corrupt. If one wishes to reflect the analogy to self-love presented as of ‫כח‬18, the correct statement should be something like “he who intelligizes himself is himself that which he intelligizes.” This could be achieved my removing ‫ ויושכל‬from the Hebrew, but even if it is retained, the ‫ ما‬in the Arabic should align with the Hebrew. Since this is not cast in stone, I have not attempted to revise the text (see also Brague, Thémistius, 111n4). ‫כט‬1 ‫המכרכר‬: The option ‫הרץ‬, which was revised, is unclear. The underlying Arabic is probably ‫ رقص‬which in its sporting context can (barely) be understood as “running.” ‫כט‬2 ‫הידים והרגלים‬: The early version, reflected in C and B, overdoes the translation by expressing the dual form in the Arabic, hence ‫השתי ידים והשתי רגלים‬/‫השני‬. This is of course redundant and was subsequently revised, as the natural plural Hebrew form of arms and legs is already in dual. ‫כט‬4 ‫)معا ً( יחד‬: This addition is crucial for Themistius’ argument, who wants to stress

that not only does God move the world, but God moves all of it at once. The only Hebrew sources for this are C (that has ‫ )יחד‬and A (that does not). Landauer chose to read with A, but thanks to al-Baġdādī we can see that C should have been preferred. B and M both accidentally omit the entire clause, and T is burnt. ‫כט‬7

‫)שלנו החלוש( منا الضعيف‬: the Hebrew reading—which was already preferred by Frank (“Notes,” 225, §220) and Brague (Thémistius, 112n4)—is corroborated by al-Baġdādī. The Arabic manuscript has the erroneous ‫منه الضعف‬. ‫כט‬8

‫ٺثبت له‬: The Hebrew omits this, as does al-Baġdādī, but this could be accidental, since al-Baġdādī’s quotation also abridges the text. The Arabic in ḥ is to be

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commentary

preferred, as the Hebrew in its present condition leaves the verb ‫ תהינה‬without an object. Themistius’ point is that unlike the human intellect, the first intellect does not need to produce conclusions that are not evident to it, since it intelligizes everything at once. ‫כט‬11 ‫שתבין‬: Brague translates comprendre, but I think that the Hebrew is mislead-

ing as it does indeed translate the verb ‫بين‬, but in the present case its meaning is “distancing” or “differentiating.” Themistius is accomodating the reader who wants a different example than sharp vision as an analogy to God’s intelligizing. ‫כט‬15 ‫העולם לא‬: The word ‫ לא‬was unavailable to Landauer in any manuscript, except

for the Latin translation (see Landauer’s critical apparatus), which Brague, I believe, was right in following (see Brague, Thémistius, 113n1). With T, we now have another testimony for this reading. Without adding ‫לא‬, the text would have Themistius contradicting himself by saying that God’s superiority in intellect is not analogous to God’s superiority and ease as a cause for the universe’s circular movement, only to draw this exact analogy just a few lines afterwards (at ‫כט‬20–21). ‫כט‬17 ‫בהיר‬: The context of Themistius’ discussion here is Aristotle’s contention that

the more a body is transparent, the more divine it is, since its causal function concerning actualizing vision is stronger (and that is why the celestial spheres are completely transparent). In employing this example, Themistius extends the comparison between intellect and light. He also discusses this point in his paraphrase of On the Soul: “the divine body is always actually transparent, since it also always has light, while air and the other [transparent bodies] are at different times potentially or actually transparent” (in De an., 59.26–31, translated in Todd, On the Soul, 79; cf. Aristotle, De an., 418b9). In Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation of Averroes’ epitome of On the Soul, the word ‫ בהיר‬translates ‫مستضيئة‬ (see Bibliothèque nationale MS Héb. 936, 88r18), only to explain that ‫ בהיר‬is ‫مشف( ספירי בפועל‬, ultimately translating διαφανής, also in Themistius’ paraphrase of On the Soul, quoted here).

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‫כט‬19 ‫הודית‬: The variant ‫ כפלת‬in C seems like a confusion between the root ‫( كرر‬see Goshen-Gottstein, Syntax, s.v. ‫ )כפל‬and the root ‫قرر‬. This also occurs at ‫יד‬29 and (perhaps) ‫כו‬12. ‫כט‬22 ‫ספרנו‬: C has ‫תארנו‬, suggesting that the original Arabic was ‫( وصفنا‬see, in the same context, above, ‫ד‬6, where ‫ وصفنا‬is translated to ‫)ספרנו‬. ‫כט‬23 ‫בשכל‬: For the addition in T see above, Chapter 1, table 43. ‫כט‬26

‫)חזק( يرى‬: The Arabic, lifted from MS Marsh 539 (for further discussion see above, Chapter 1, 2.2.3) is better and is in tune with the formula already encountered at ‫כא‬14 (‫)يرى ذاته و يعقل ذاته‬. ‫כט‬30 ‫הרגיש‬/‫הבין‬: The differentiation between these two verbs, I believe, reflects a

homonymous understanding of the same underlying Arabic verb, a thesis that is reinforced by C’s use of ‫ הרגיש‬throughout, which was consequently split into ‫ הרגיש‬and ‫הבין‬. In itself the revision is understandable, since attributing the verb ‫( הרגיש‬felt) to intelligizing is problematic, and Themistius is trying to introduce the reflexive aspect of different kinds of cognition. The most likely candidate capable of this expansion, I believe, is the root ‫( شعر‬see GoshenGottstein, Syntax, s.v. ‫)הרגיש‬, that at least in Themistius’ paraphrase of On the Soul translates ὑπείδομαι (see in De an., 37,25; Lyons, Arabic, 39,7), a verb that Todd understands as “to be basically aware” (see Lexicon in Todd, On the Soul). ‫ל‬4 ‫אחד‬: For the addition in T see above, Chapter 1, table 43. ‫)رفع( הסתלק‬: The Hebrew manuscripts exhibit the same phenomenon already observed at ‫ז‬27; here the root ‫ סל״ק‬in CB was corrupted into ‫חל״ק‬

482

commentary

(adopted by Landauer). The Arabic ‫ رفع‬is recovered thanks to the quotation in al-Baġdādī. ‫ל‬9–10 ‫)العقل والمعقول منه واحد( השכל והמושכל והמחשבה בהם דבר אחד בעינו‬: Frank had already noticed the difference between the tripartite division in the Hebrew and the dual division in the Arabic, as well as the overall abridgment of the text (Frank, “Notes,” 226, §§221–222). The reason for this is that the Hebrew is referring to arts when matter is removed from them, whereas the Arabic, after omitting a large portion of the text, is referring to the first principle (hence also the difference between plural and singular in each version). Whereas I essentially agree with Frank’s positioning of the Arabic against the present portion of the Hebrew text, one may make a plausible case for the Arabic abridgment here to be a general summary of the first principle whose attachment to a particular portion of the text is of a looser character. ‫ל‬11

‫)היה( تكثر‬: This difference, which seems important, is oddly not reported by Frank, and Brague also translates the Hebrew without mentioning the Arabic. The text in the Arabic seems to suggest that the first intellect “becomes many” (to use Pines’ term, although he is unsure what to make of it; see Pines, “Distinctive,” 185 and n37) when it intelligizes its essence. If this is the correct text, Themistius seems to allude to ‫כא‬9–11 where a similar argument is put forth to explain how the concept of plurality can be attributed to the first principle given that it is completely simple in and of itself. However, there still remains open the question of the difference between the Arabic and the Hebrew. The abridgment process can theoretically be held responsible, although an interference of this sort is alien to the general method of the abridger. Furthermore, it is hard to explain how ‫ تكثر‬and ‫( كان‬which is usually translated into ‫ )היה‬can be confused graphically. It is important to note that al-Bāġdādī, who quotes this text (see next note), also omits ‫تكثر‬, but this could be accidental. Assuming that the Arabic is sound, my guess—and this is strictly a guess—is that ‫ تكثر‬was translated into ‫ היה רב‬and that ‫ רב‬was at some point accidently omitted. ‫ל‬12

‫)מעצמותו סבת( من ذاته أنه علة‬: There is a difference between the Arabic and the Hebrew; according to the Arabic, the first intellect intelligizes from its essence

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that it is the cause and principle of all things. According to the Hebrew, the first intellect intelligizes from its essence the cause and principle of all things. In other words, the Arabic has the first intellect acknowledge its own function, whereas the Hebrew expands upon the first intellect as the object of its own intellect. I think the Arabic is to preferred, based upon the logical construction of the argument of which the present statement is the conclusion. Themistius concludes from the premise that when the first principle intelligizes its essence, it intelligizes that it is what it is (‫)שהוא מה שהוא ;أنه ما هو‬, so it makes better sense to read with the Arabic (al-Bāġdādī corroborates this reading at 55,12: ‫وذلك أن‬ ‫)العقل الأول إذا عقل ذاته عقل أنه علة جميع الأشياء ومبدأ لها‬. The philosophical significance of this reading, I believe, makes a stronger connection between God and the world, as it renders God’s self-knowledge aware of God’s causal function with relation to the existents.

Chapter 10 1

Aristotle

Aristotle’s theological journey ends with an inquiry about how goodness is contained in the universe, pointing to God as not only the highest being and the unmoved mover, but also as a final cause the attachment to which is expressed throughout the chain of beings in the physical and the metaphysical realms. In a way, Aristotle’s discussion in this chapter can be seen as the ultimate expression of how everything orientates itself towards to first principle, and in so doing contributes to the goodness of the world. The chapter is divided into 3 parts: [1] a description of the cosmic good; [2] a critique of previous views of first principles; and [3] a critique of thinkers who failed to account for a unifying factor in their theorizing. [1.1] Aristotle opens the chapter by asking whether the universe contains “the good and the best” as something that exists in itself or as its order, replying that both options are true1 and explaining this through an analogy with an army (1075a11–13). The good of the army is the general (i.e., a separate entity) as well as the army’s order. However, goodness is more deservedly awarded to the general, since he is the reason for the army’s order, or in other words, the reason for the goodness of the army as a whole (1075a13–15). [1.2] Concerning the order in the world, Aristotle maintains that everything takes part in it, but not in the same way, and that is how they are related. In other words, all thing are connected, and the manner in which they are connected is their relation to the good (1075a16–19). In an attempt to illustrate how the good functions as an organizing principle in the universe, Aristotle compares the world with a household, where activity becomes more and more random as its members (including beasts) decrease in rank, so that the freemen—somewhat paradoxically—have the least freedom to act randomly. Nevertheless, even the most inferior member of the household contributes something to the collective (1075a19–23). This analogy can be understood in two ways. According to the first option, the movement of the celestial bodies is necessary and orderly with nothing random about it, whereas things on earth have a large share in contingency. However, everything, in a way, orientates itself toward the good. 1 I adopt Menn’s reading that understands the ἢ at 1075a13 not as asking about another option but as introducing the solution (Menn, Aim, IIIγ3, 3n6). Horn seems to suggest this as well (“Unity,” 270–271), whereas Sedley retains the question form (“Metaphysics Λ 10,” 328) and Elders retains this as offering an alternative (Aristotle’s Theology, 270).

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The second option is to restrict the analogy to the natural world, since it may be argued that the celestial hierarchy has already been addressed; in this case the analogy and its object overlap, since the freeman is the highest both in the allegory and in reality. [1.3] To finish this part, Aristotle states that even the fact that all things in nature are dissolved is a reflection of their participation in the common good (1075a23–25).2 [2] Aristotle’s compressed positive account of the good having been presented, the remainder of the chapter deals with a critique of other views which he takes to be erroneous, occasionally adding some positive remarks to explain why his own view is better. The greater part of this discussion is devoted to the questions of identifying principles, while the last discussion [3] addresses the question of oneness. [2.1] After introductory remarks in which Aristotle announces his intention to criticize and assess other thinkers (1075a25–27), Aristotle first critiques other thinkers’ incorrect views about contraries, saying that whoever maintains that all things are made out of contraries errs both about “all things” (a remark that he does not explain) and about the contraries; this position fails to explain how this process actually occurs, as contraries in themselves do not causally act upon each other. Only Aristotle’s view, which posits a “third thing,” i.e., matter, which is receptive of contraries, can provide such an explanation (1075a28–32). [2.2] Thinkers who combine these views and hold that things are made out of contraries are likewise mistaken, he writes, probably meaning that if matter would be considered a contrary of something, then it would be subject to the same principal problem of inability of explaining coming to be without positing a third substance. Aristotle remarks that for his view no such problem arises, as he does not take matter to have a contrary (1075a32–34). [2.3] In his next argument, Aristotle assumes for the sake of discussion that the good has a contrary. But if this would be so, then all things (except “the one,” which is the good, contrary to the bad) would involve the bad in them, and worse yet, some thinkers do not treat the good (or the bad) as a principle in the first place (1075a34–37), which is untrue as it has already been established that the good is the highest principle (1075a37). Thinkers who acknowledge the good as a principle are pointing to the right direction, but they fail to explain how it functions as such (1075a38–b1).

2 There are different opinions about the meaning of this last remark, but I take it as echoing Aristotle’s view that even the elements take part in the divine by eternally transforming into each other.

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[2.4] Moving to Empedocles’ “absurd account,” Aristotle understands his notion of “love” as equivalent to the good, remarking that love functions as a principle both as a mover and as matter. Aristotle acknowledges the possibility of something to be a principle in both ways, but only accidentally, since essentially they are different things, so Empedocles would have to make up his mind whether “love” is a principle as matter or a principle as a mover (1075b1–6). Aristotle also renders absurd Empedocles’ notion of “strife”—identified with “the bad”—as imperishable (or perishable, depending on the manuscript tradition), but gives no argument for this (1075b6–7). [2.5] Anaxagoras is now discussed, and Aristotle understands him to take the good (to which Anaxagoras’ Nous is equated) as a moving principle. The problem in this view is that Nous moves things “for the sake of something,” which means that there is a good distinct from Nous, for the sake of which it moves things. The only way for this to work would be to adopt Aristotle’s outlook exemplified in the example of the medical art, which is in a sense health. Aristotle then adds a curious remark that not supposing a contrary to the good (or Nous) is absurd,3 and concludes that thinkers do not know how to use the contraries they posit and need their positions to be refined in order to work (1075b8–13). [2.6] Aristotle now turns to the problem of people who assume that all things are made out of the same principles. This causes three different problems; first, probably referring to thinkers who make everything out of the same matter, it would leave the difference between perishable and imperishable things unexplained (1075b13); another option of a common principle would be to say that everything is made of nothing, which Aristotle takes to be absurd (1075b14); a third option, presented as if it was meant to avoid the previous one, is to make all things one, another view that Aristotle rejects (1075b14–15). All these ways have a further problem, which is failing to explain why coming to be is eternal, and what causes coming to be (1075b16–17). In other words, these thinkers supply only material principles. [2.7] Next, Aristotle criticizes thinkers who posit two (first) principles, because that would necessitate a superior principle over and above the two (1075b17–18). Positing the Ideas would also end up with a need for a superior principle, but for a different reason, which is the need to explain the

3 This view is curious because Aristotle’s own position is that there is no contrary to the good. His point is probably that within Anaxagoras’ framework—as someone who makes everything from contraries—it would be inconsistent to not provide a contrary to the good (for this interpretation I follow Reeve, Metaphysics, 545, §1407).

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participation of things in Ideas (1075b18–20), presumably since Aristotle does not believe that this can be explained by the Ideas themselves. [2.8] Another critique that Aristotle mentions is that assuming a contrary to the good would necessitate “knowledge” which is contrary to wisdom, i.e., of ignorance. Since wisdom has the highest good as the object of its knowledge, if the highest good would have a contrary, it would be the object of the knowledge contrary to wisdom, hence ignorance would have an object and would be perhaps counted as some sort of knowledge. All this is avoided in Aristotle’s system, in which the first principle does not have a contrary. Aristotle reminds the reader that contraries have matter, hence contain potentiality, and that would be absurd for a first principle (1075b20–24). [2.9] Aristotle also criticizes the views of theologians and natural philosophers, according to whom all the principles are sensible. Adopting this position, for Aristotle, means relinquishing a first principle, order, coming to be, and celestial activity, since there will be an infinite regress toward an earlier principle (1075b24–27). [2.10] Assuming the Ideas or numbers as principles is not helpful either, because they do not have causal power, and especially cannot cause movement. And since Ideas and numbers have no magnitude, it is illogical to assume that they will be able to produce a continuum (1075b27–30). [2.11] The fact that a principle cannot have a contrary is also explained by the fact that it would contain potentiality, hence capable of not-being (since it has already been explained that a contrary must have matter). But this would create tension between the function of a principle as a mover and the fact that the universe is eternal. If a mover is capable of not being, it cannot be eternal, hence either the principle has no contrary, or the world cannot be eternal. Since the latter is false, the former must be true (1075b30–34). [3] In the final part of the chapter Aristotle criticizes his fellow thinkers for failing to explain how the form and the thing of which it is a form are unified, a problem that only Aristotle’s notion of a mover makes possible to solve (1075b34–37). Thinkers who distribute different principles to different things—like those who maintain mathematical numbers first, and then further substances—turn the universe into a series of unrelated episodes, which would demand a plurality of principles, which would reflect bad “government” of beings, to which they refuse. Aristotle’s implication that the only way to maintain the world’s order in a good manner is by positing only one principle, and fittingly, the book ends with a quote from Homer: “the rule of many is not good; one ruler let there be” (1075b37–1076a4).

488 2

commentary

Themistius

[1.1] The question that Themistius presents in the opening of the chapter suggests that he understood Aristotle’s text differently than is generally accepted today, or perhaps he had in front of him a slightly different text. Regardless of the textual problem in the Hebrew, which is discussed below, Themistius seems to be asking about “the good” and “the best” in the expression τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον (1075a11–12) as if they were two different concepts whose relationship needs to be assessed, rather than the collective subject of the chapter. Accordingly, Themistius does not ask how the universe contains them taken together, but rather if there is a difference between them and what is its nature (‫ל‬19– 20). The new concept introduced to the discussion is “the good,” as “the best” is taken to refer to God, which is used synonymously with “the intellect” (see the usage, e.g., at ‫ל‬24), which in a way fuses the beginning of this chapter with the concluding discussion of the previous one (as is customary of Themistius’ paraphrase). Themistius’ reply to the question about the relation between “the best” and “the good” realigns him with Aristotle’s text at 1075a13–15, employing the example of the army and its general to offer the possibility that “the good” is not a rank or a standing with regards to the intellect (taken as synonymous to “the best”), but is something contained both in the order and in God, namely both in the effect and in the cause. It is a unifying concept that originates in God and permeates everything (‫ל‬21–24). [1.2] Before quoting Aristotle’s description of the order of the world (1075a16–23) almost word for word (‫ל‬26–‫לא‬1), Themistius reminds the reader of the political aspect of all this, explaining—as he already had on different occasions—that God moves the existents in the same way political governance moves the aristocracy, and kingly edicts move the people. Themistius briefly extends Aristotle’s description of the arrangement of the things in the world— which only refers to the natural world—to the celestial realm, noting that it is reflected in the uniformity of the movement of the stars and the celestial bodies (probably meaning the spheres) (‫לא‬1–3). [1.3] Returning to the natural world, Themistius turns to Aristotle’s remark on the dissolving of inferior beings as conducive to the good (1075a23–25). He explains that when inferior beings pass away they contribute to the coming to be of something else, for examples as food for the sake of the growth of some other living being, and other general benefits (‫לא‬3–6). Conversely, there are things that cannot be regarded as parts of the general order, such as a donkey’s kick, a pig’s spilling of water, or some of the deadly poison in plants (‫לא‬7– 8). Themistius explains that it is better to deny phenomena of this sort a part

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of the universal arrangement, since had they been part of it, that would have necessitated God’s interaction with matter and regarding these reprehensible phenomena as if they had something common with God (‫לא‬8–10). Themistius does not explain these remarks, but the logic behind them seems to be reflecting Aristotle’s idea that accidental occurrences are the result of the privation of a principle from matter. Since in random occurrences there is no principle present except for matter, awarding them a place in the cosmic order necessitates, by process of elimination, that God is involved in some way in a situation whose only contributing factor is matter.4 Once this problem is out of the way, Themistius sets out on a digression in which he describes how he sees the cosmic order as a reflection of a political arrangement, providing one of his most elaborate reflections of what I have labeled as “politicization of the cosmos” within the paraphrase. The world— and it seems that here Themistius is referring more strictly to the natural world of coming to be and passing away—is ordered like a state, in which the king’s order is the good toward which everything it orientated. But the good of the state is not reflected in every citizen in the same way; rather, the king orders the state hierarchically, assigning different functions to different people. Even the most inferior activity is assigned, and in this way every member of the city participates in its good according to their capacity (‫לא‬10–16). Analogically, the world resembles a kingdom ruled by a king who arranges its parts— like the animals and plants—each in its proper state. Themistius continues that the fact that all of them originate from the same cause is apparent from each thing’s respective desire to remain in its own state, which for Themistius reflects their desire for actuality and for oneness. Nothing in this world wants to be divided or to transform into its contrary, and anything that is composed of many things strives for its own unity (‫לא‬16–22). Returning to the political analogy, Themistius remarks that the state, although it is a plurality, aims at one thing; its various branches (army, congress, arts) although pluralities, all aim at a single thing, like for example the many parts of the house which are united to create it. Even the desire for plurality, like the one evident in kings with imperial aspirations (presumably the desire to rule many nations), is actually a reflection of a desire to put many things under a single rule (‫לא‬22–27). [2] Moving to Aristotle’s critical discussion, Themistius briefly paraphrases Aristotle’s introduction (1075a25–27), reproaching all the other ancients for their failure to adequately explain the primacy of the first principle and their clinging to a first principle which involves matter (‫לא‬28–29).

4 See the discussion in Guldentops, “Themistius on Evil,” 196.

490

commentary

Themistius then repeats Aristotle’s [2.1] critique of thinkers who maintain that “all things come to be from contraries” (1075a28–32), adding to Aristotle’s comments an explanation why these thinkers err with regard to “all things”— something that Aristotle had left unexplained. According to Themistius, the error of this part stems from the fact that the superior things in the world (probably meaning the substances above the world of nature) do not come to be (‫לא‬29–‫לב‬2). Themistius also explicates Aristotle’s “third thing” beyond the contraries, which enables coming to be, as matter (‫לב‬2). With regards to [2.2] Aristotle’s critique of thinkers who maintain that matter is one of the two contraries (1075a32–34), Themistius essentially quotes the text (‫לב‬2–5), appending it with a clarifying remark about why matter does not have a contrary: the form comes to be from the privation, not from matter. Both the privation and the form—as contraries—inhere in turn in matter, as the substrate which receives them (‫לב‬5–6). With regards to [2.3] Aristotle’s critique of thinkers who saw the good and bad as contraries (1075a34–37), Themistius adds that these thinkers identify the good as the form and the bad as matter, the only thing completely exempt of matter being the primary form, meaning the that the good is the form of the first principle (‫לב‬6–9). He then quotes Aristotle’s commending of these thinkers as at least acknowledging that the primary form is the good, although they failed to explain in what sense (1075a38–b1 = ‫לב‬9–11). [2.4] The critique of Empedocles (1075b1–7) is now repeated with minimal additions (‫לב‬11–17), as is [2.5] the first part of the critique of Anaxagoras (1075b8–10 = ‫לב‬17–21). Themistius adds a clarification to Aristotle’s example of medicine which “is in a way health” (1075b10) by stating that identity between health and medicine enables the latter to be an efficient cause for the former without it being something else (‫לב‬21–22). Analogically, Themistius concludes that the first principle is a mover, and it exerts movement because of itself (‫לב‬22–24), which I take to mean that the first principle is both an efficient cause and a final cause. Themistius understands Aristotle’s short remark about the failure to posit a contrary to the good (understood as Anaxagoras’ Nous) (1075b10–11) as meaning that since Anaxagoras sees only Nous as the efficient cause and matter as directly subordinate to Nous, he does not provide a separate account for the bad, which amounts to accepting that the good and the bad have the same principle (‫לב‬24–26). “Our” view, Themistius reports on Aristotle’s behalf, is that the bad is the result of the weakness of matter and of privation (‫לב‬26–27). [2.6] Aristotle’s note on the failure to use contraries (1075b11–13) is also awarded an explanation; Themistius explains that contraries by themselves are insufficient for the arrangement of things which is evident to us; besides

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contraries, a mover is needed to set matter in motion to actualize a form (‫לב‬27– 30). Concerning Aristotle’s criticism of thinkers who make everything from the same things as ontologically unifying things that are capable of passing away and things that cannot (1075b13–14), Themistius reminds the reader that the stars and their movements—as well as the planets, the sun, and the moon— are efficient causes for the matter of things on earth, in which coming to be takes place, hence they cannot have the same matter.5 Either the celestial bodies have no matter at all, or they have a different matter than things that come to be and pass away, just as the intellect, which moves the body, has a different matter than the body (‫לב‬30–‫לג‬8). Themistius then applies syntax and skips forward to Aristotle’s critique of other thinkers’ failure to provide a cause for the eternity of coming to be and passing away (1075b16–17), adding a reminder to what has been established earlier (in chapter 6), namely the dependency of the constantly varying cause upon the constantly uniform cause (‫לג‬8–10). Moving back to Aristotle’s critiques of thinkers who make everything of nothing and those who make everything one (1075b14–16), Themistius does not supply a justification on Aristotle’s behalf. Instead, he presents the position that Aristotle opposes somewhat differently—substituting the position that all things are one with a more nuanced position that all things come to be from that which is in actuality, citing Anaxagoras’6 “indivisibles” and Empedocles’ elements as examples (‫לג‬11–14). If we combine these remarks with Themistius’ presentation of Aristotle’s claim about thinkers who posit that everything has the same principles as if Aristotle is writing about thinkers who posits that everything has the same matter, we can perhaps uncover Themistius’ considerations for these changes. In the beginning of his presentation of this part Themistius, as we have seen, chose to present the critical discussion as a whole as a discussion of thinkers who cling to a first principle as involving matter (‫לא‬29). The three positions he presents on Aristotle’s behalf reflect three misunderstanding of matter: the position that states that everything has the same matter fails to understand the proper relationship between matter and coming to be; the position that states that everything comes to be from nothing misunderstands the meaning of matter as non-being (matter is not actually, but is potentially); and the

5 It is important to note that Aristotle’s text does not refer to all things having the same matter, but to all things having the same principles. 6 It is possible that the textual tradition confused Anaxagoras with Leucippus or Democritus here.

492

commentary

position that states that everything comes to be from something actual misunderstands the meaning of matter as being (matter is potentially, but is not actually). [2.7] Aristotle’s short comment about the necessity of adding another principle for whoever posits two (1075b17–18) is significantly expanded to an elaborate discussion which is meant to explain the absurdities of positing a plurality of first principles and the advantage of positing one. Themistius’ first critique is that people who posit more than one principle fail to explain how they coincide, nor are they able to explain why their given number of principles is in fact the true one (‫לג‬14–16). Thinkers who divide first principles into active and passive ones do not explain what brings them together and connects them, and consequently have no choice but to accept an additional superior first principle (presumably, the force which combines them) (‫לג‬16–19). The same holds for thinkers who posit exactly two principles, like God and matter, or hardness and softness; Themistius writes that it is impossible that these principles would in and of themselves enable their counterparts to act upon them and change them (‫לג‬19–21). After criticizing these positions, Themistius turns to explain why the aforementioned problems are avoided in “our” (Aristotle and Themistius collectively) view, namely that there is only one first principle, which is immaterial and incorporeal (note, again, this distinction). The first principle causes the movements of the celestial bodies by being loved, and the latter, in turn, are the causes of coming to be and passing away (‫לג‬21–24). Unlike other thinkers— presumably because they posit the first principle and matter as contraries— “we” do not consider matter as equal to the first cause, which would amount to combining the “first” nature with the “last.” On the contrary, matter is something that is always acted upon, never active in itself. As Themistius understands the cosmos, the celestial bodies are moved by the first cause for the sake of being likened to it. The other important party is the earth, because circular movement must necessarily have a stationary middle point to surround. This is also where coming to be ceases (or conversely, God’s work is completed) since it is impossible for things in the middle of the world to always exist one in number (presumably as they are made of matter). God completed the world by making coming to be eternal, thus enabling matter to take after the first cause (‫לג‬24–30). In this short summary of his world view, Themistius brings his understanding of Aristotle’s ideas to a climax of sorts: he puts the entire cosmos as a process of ontological “dilution” which runs parallel to transition from absolute actuality to absolute potentiality, as well as transition from uttermost oneness (being completely one) to minimal unity (being “one” as a temporal instantiation of a certain form in matter), and from immaterial immovability

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to a material state of rest. All this, thanks to Themistius’ interference, is presented as God’s work. Themistius continues and remarks that this position does not contradict only thinkers who posit many bodily principles, or those who posit that the principles are god and matter (‫לג‬30–32), but—and here Themistius realigns with Aristotle at 1075b18–20—also thinkers who posited the Ideas as the first principles. Themistius substitutes Aristotle’s critique of participation in favor of a more standard observation that the advocates of Ideas would require a further, superior principle that would combine them among themselves and connect between them and the perishable things, adding that it would also generate them (‫לג‬32–‫לד‬1). A final observation on this issue, Themistius remarks that whoever posits as a first principle something that has a contrary necessitates the positing of a further opposing first principle, as contraries oppose each other, like coldness and heat or division and combination (‫לד‬1– 3). This observation brings Themistius back to [2.8] Aristotle’s text, which commends itself for having a first principle without a contrary (1075b21–22), explaining Aristotle’s remark about the connection between contrariety, potentiality, and matter by noting that contrary things involved with matter are potentially the same since they can transform into each other (‫לד‬3–6). He then reflects Aristotle’s observation about the need for contrary sciences to contrary principles equal in eminence (1075b20–21; 1075b23–25), noting the false equation that would occur between wisdom and a contrary science instead of simply understanding that the contrary to wisdom is ignorance (‫לד‬6– 10). [2.9] Next, Themistius essentially repeats (‫לד‬11–18) Aristotle’s criticism of thinkers who do not posit any existents besides the sensible things (1075b25– 27), adding three clarifying remarks. First, Themistius explains Aristotle’s saying that limiting existents to sensibles prevents the existence of a first principle by noting that all the sensibles are composites (probably presuming that the first principle must be simple) (‫לד‬12–13); second, Themistius explains that the infinite regress with regards to the theologians is the necessity to explain where the chaos comes from, and so forth (‫לד‬16–17); and third, explaining that the physicists assumed everything was made of water and air, both of which are composite bodies (which means that they are also made of something and so forth ad infinitum) (‫לד‬17–18). [2.10] Concerning Aristotle’s critique of thinkers who assume that the Ideas and numbers are the first principles (1075b27–30), Themistius essentially repeats it (‫לד‬19–26) with some elaboration, most notably illustrating the Ideas’ lack of causal power by remarking that neither the iron nor the stone would

494

commentary

move toward the model without the involvement of art (‫לד‬21–22). Numbers are even worse because they cannot even act as a formal cause for that which is continuous (‫לד‬25–26). [2.11] Aristotle’s final remark against assuming a principle with a contrary, connecting it to potentiality and the denial of eternity (1075b30–34), is now paraphrased by Themistius, who does not add anything to the argument (‫לד‬26– 29). [3] Turning to the final section of the book, Themistius notes that since the critique of thinkers who posited a plurality of principles has now been sufficiently undertaken, it is now time to ask how plurality proceeds from the one (‫לד‬29–‫לה‬1). He proceeds to paraphrase the first part of Aristotle’s discussion (1075b34–37) somewhat differently than Aristotle, adding a more elaborate positive account to the critical discussion of thinkers who failed to explain this point. To address this question, Themistius uses the example of numbers, all of which can be composed from the number 1 (‫לה‬1–3). With regard to body and soul, Themistius remarks that if they did not have a common principle they would not have been able to become unified as to produce life (‫לה‬3–5), and then extends this observation to any union of matter and form, which would not be possible without a prior principle that is one (‫לה‬5–7). Other thinkers, Themistius writes, have failed to provide this account, which he now summarizes: the first nature, which is pure, without parts, matterless and indivisible—or in other words truly “one”—moves everything in an uninterrupted, unceasing orderly movement throughout eternity. All things aim at it and attain their order from it. The first principle’s oneness makes the world as a whole one, as well as all the living things in it (presumably echoing the union of body and soul). Alongside its unity, the first principle renders every existing thing as existent (or as taking after it, depending on the text). Accordingly, the end of each thing in the world is to remain in its state of unity (‫לה‬7– 13). Moving to Aristotle’s final critique (1075b37–1076a4), Themistius more or less repeats the text, only explaining that the substances proceeding from the mathematical number would be the plane, and then the (three dimensional) body, each of which has its own principle, since the relationship between them is episodic. Hence we will find ourselves in a position in which there are principles of numbers, principles of planes, principles of bodies, and principles of forms, all of which would amount to bad governance (‫לה‬13–18).

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495

Note on Sources

Besides a few sentences alluded to in al-Baġdādī (see Chapter 1, table 13), there is no Arabic for this chapter and the present edition can only supply a Hebrew text. The French translation of chapter 10 appears in Brague, Thémistius, 117– 126.

4

Running Commentary

‫ל‬19 ‫בין הטוב ובין מה שהוא בתכלית המעלה‬: Themistius seems to be asking about “the good” and “the best” in the expression τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον (1075a11–12) as if they were two different concepts whose relationship needs to be assessed, rather than the collective subject of the chapter. See Brague, Thémistius, 149, § 1. ‫ל‬20 ‫ואמנם‬: I agree with Brague, who translates “si” (“if”) and assume that the Hebrew erroneously read ‫ وأما‬instead of ‫وإما‬. Otherwise Themistius would be contradicting himself just a few sentences later at ‫ל‬23, whether we read the text in its present form, or if we adopt Brague’s suggestion there (see note for ‫ל‬23). ‫ל‬21 ‫והאל הסדר לכלם‬: The option ‫והאל הנסתר מכלם‬, adopted by most manuscripts as well as Landauer, should be rejected as it makes no sense in the present context (nor does it express Themistius’ view in general; this misleads Guldentops, “La science,” 111), and the correction in C1—with which I agree, following Brague (Thémistius, 117n2)—is significantly better. Manuscript T has the variant ‫או שהאל ית׳ על שני הענינים יחד‬, which is very interesting. It presents this clause as an option rather than an assertion, in which case the response for the opening question is pushed further down to ‫ל‬23 (starting from ‫ ;)ואין הטוב א״כ‬this, as well as ‫על שני הענינים יחד‬, reflects Aristotle’s Greek precisely (ἤ ἀμφοτέρως at 1075a13), including the ambiguity of ἤ discussed above. I have no idea how this state of affairs came about.

496

commentary

‫ל‬22 ‫הכתות‬: There is no reason to assume with Landauer that the text is corrupt (see also Brague, Thémistius, 117n3). ‫ כתות‬means “military divisions,” as already seen at ‫כו‬1 etc. ‫ל‬23–24 ‫על מדרגה מן השכל‬: Brague conjectures that the Hebrew misread ‫ أعلى مرتبة‬as ‫على‬

‫( مرتبة‬Thémistius, 117n4) and that Themistius’ point is that the good is not superior in rank to intellect, as a critique of Plotinus (149, § 1). However, it would render Themistius’ text somewhat incoherent as it is unclear how this claim could be thematically followed by the claim that the good is included both in the arrangement and in the cause. Leaving the text as it is seems better, since one of the options Themistius presented was that the difference between the good and the best (= the intellect) is in rank, and now this option is denied. To follow from this to the option Themistius accepts is a natural consequent. ‫ל‬24 ‫בשכונת השכל‬: Brague, Thémistius, 117n5 suggests that the Arabic was ‫ مجاورة‬and

translates proximité. In the translation of Averroes’ epitome of the Parva Naturalia (Blumberg 9,12–13), Moshe ibn Tibbon uses ‫ שכונה‬for translating ‫تجاور‬, and Averroes refers the reader to Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption for coming to be ‫ ;على وجه التجاور( על צד השכונה‬Blumberg focuses the reference to I.10.328a5ff. at 76–77). In Averroes’ epitome ad loc. Moshe ibn Tibbon uses ‫( שכנות‬Kurland, 109, 49), again translating ‫تجاور‬, which to the best of my judgment here leads to Aristotle’s expression τεθῇ παρ’ ἄλληλα at 327b34 (usually translated as “juxtaposed,” or more literally “put side by side”). If something of this nature indeed takes place in the present text, then Themistius is denying the possibility that the intellect and “the good” are two entities that exist side by side. This is in tune with Themistius’ differentiation between “the good,” which is relegated to a predicate, and “the best,” which is the intellect. The intellect, which is God, is good, and the cosmic order is also good, due to God. ‫ל‬28 ‫לא‬: This word is missing from all the manuscripts except T, but it does appear

in the Latin translation, and Landauer suggests to accept it (Brague follows suit at Thémistius, 118n1). I agree with both. With the addition of ‫ לא‬the text prop-

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erly reflects Aristotle’s double negation at 1074a18, meant to deny the possibility that the things do not have a relation to one another. ‫ל‬30 ‫יותר‬: ‫ יוחלט‬in C and B probably represents a misunderstanding of the verb ‫ يطلق‬, because of expressions like ‫ على الإطلاق‬which is translated ‫במוחלט‬. ‫לנכבדים‬: Version I has ‫לבני חורין‬, probably translating ‫أحرار‬, reflecting the Greek ἐλευθεροῖ at 1075a19. ‫ לנכבדים‬in Version II is also a legitimate option, and probably coextensive with freemen in the present context, although Version I is perhaps more exact. ‫שלא כשורה‬: ‫ יותר מדאי‬in C suggests that the Arabic was ‫أكثر من اللازم‬, and perhaps the translation was revised for the sake of clarity. ‫ל‬31 ‫העבדים‬: ‫ העבד‬in Version I perhaps reflects a misunderstanding of ‫ عبيد‬as if it was

a noun in the singular. ‫לא‬1–2 ‫הנהגת הכוכבים…וכן גם כן כל הגשמים השמימיים‬: The word ‫ כל‬causes confusion, as it creates semblance of differentiation between ‫ הכוכבים‬and ‫הגשמים השמימיים‬.

Brague (Thémistius, 150, §3) suggests that the differentiation is either between the stars and the planets, or between the stars (including the planets) and the spheres. There is also the theoretical possibility that ‫ כל‬is an incorrect translation of ‫سا ئر‬, which sometimes means “all” in the present text (see, e.g., ‫ג‬11; ‫יח‬19). This is the most attractive option, as it eliminates the problem, but obviously cannot be proven. ‫לא‬7 ‫וקצת הצמחים הממיתים‬: I read, with hesitation, according to C1, although it seems

like some sort of paraphrase. There are many different options in the manuscripts, and the confusion arises from the term ‫ויבש‬, which—if accepted—does not fall in line with the other examples of the donkey’s kick and the pig’s spilling of the water vessel, which are unfortunate cases. The drying up of a plant seems more in line with the natural process of passing away. C1’s option, which sug-

498

commentary

gests poisoning from a plant, seems more plausible. A risky option, which has no textual basis but can perhaps be entertained, is that ‫ ויבש‬is a corruption of ‫וירש‬, a neologism derived from the word ‫רוש‬, which means poison. ‫לא‬12 ‫הטוב שבענינים‬: Brague (Thémistius, 119n1) suggests that the text is a corruption of ‫הרוב שבענינים‬, but it seems to me fine as it is. Themistius is explaining that the

world is governed like a state whose king governs it in the best way. This sharpens the point that the cosmos is not analogous to a state in a general sense, but to the best governed state. ‫לא‬18 ‫ר״ל החי והצומח‬: Brague (Thémistius, 150, §5) proposes that these words are a

gloss. ‫לא‬23 ‫מפני שהיא‬: The Hebrew in its present form does not represent the text properly, as it has Themistius say that the state aims at one thing because it is a plurality. The meaning should probably be that the state aims at one thing although it is a plurality. Landauer justifiably suspects the text, and offers that the underlying Arabic is ‫( مع أن‬also adopted by Brague, Thémistius, 119n3). However, this is unfounded, as the distribution among the manuscripts between ‫ מפני שהיא‬and ‫ בעבור שהיא‬leads to—as we have seen (where)—either ‫ لما‬or ‫( لأن‬the omission in A and M probably reflects discomfort rather than a copyist error). If this is the case, perhaps the error had already occurred in the Arabic translation, here by understanding a concessive participle as if it were a causal one. ‫לא‬30 ‫טעו‬: The variant ‫ חטאו‬in Version I reflects a too literal understanding of the root ‫ خطأ‬which was subsequently revised in Version II (cf. above, ‫יד‬22). ‫לב‬8 ‫אם נמלט‬: The root ‫ خلو‬in the present text is translated by the root ‫מל״ט‬, so the

meaning of this clause in the present context is the only thing that is “free” or “without” matter.

chapter 10

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‫לב‬11 ‫הצורה‬: see above, Chapter 1, table 38. ‫לב‬12 ‫וזה שהוא יתחבר‬: There is certainly a corruption in the Hebrew manuscript tradition here, omitting a word or two after ‫( שהוא יתחבר‬probably reflecting ‫يجتمع‬, which in turns reflects of Aristotle’s συνάγει at 1075b2), changing its meaning from “brings together” to “linked to.” This corruption renders the present text nonsensical, roughly translated as follows: “it is a principle as a mover, for it is connected to his account that it [is a principle] as matter.” Aristotle’s text, which Themistius seems to have originally reflected properly, says that for Empedocles love is a principle both as a mover and as matter. ‫לב‬13 ‫לא יותר לנו‬: Brague (Thémistius, 121n1) suggests that this reflects the expression ‫لا ردا لنا‬, but we have seen at ‫ל‬30 that ‫ יותר‬translated ‫يطلق‬, correcting the earlier ‫יוחלט‬. ‫ ישולח‬in C (corrupted to ‫ יצלח‬by C1) is sometimes used synonymously in medieval Hebrew writings (see Goshen-Gottstein, Syntax, 420). ‫לב‬17 ‫הנצחון‬: See above ‫יד‬31 as well as Brague, Thémistius, 121n2. ‫יפסד תכלית ההפסד‬: Brague, following Landauer, who suggests to negate the sen-

tence, remarks (Thémistius, 121n3) that the text is contrary to Aristotle’s Greek at 1075b6–7, which reads ἄφθαρτον. However, Alexandru’s critical apparatus ad loc. shows that the variant φθαρτὸν exists in some Greek manuscripts independently of Themistius, so perhaps he is reflecting an accepted tradition. The reading φθαρτὸν might be possible if we understand the argument as saying that since strife is a principle, it would be impossible to assume that it ever perished (since then it cannot function as a principle). ‫לב‬18 ‫ההתחלה‬: Manuscripts A and M add ‫הראשונה‬, adopted by Landauer and Brague,

but this is not supported by Aristotle’s text at 1075b8, which Themistius quotes verbatim.

500

commentary

‫לב‬19 ‫נשאר עליו‬: The word ‫ נשאר‬probably translated ‫ باق‬or something of the same root, and ‫ على‬completes the fourth form. It is possible that this is a translation of the verb παραλείπω in the sense of neglecting. ‫לב‬20 ‫הנעתו‬: Without the Arabic, the variant ‫ תנועתו‬is also logically possible, but ‫הנעתו‬ is to be preferred based on the analogy to medicine and its causing of movement (see ‫ הנעתה‬at ‫לב‬22). ‫לב‬22 ‫והבריאות גם כן רפואת מה‬: Brague (Thémistius, 121n4) has already shown that Aristotle’s text has the inversion at 1075b10 (medicine is in a sense health) ‫לב‬30 ‫מכואר‬: Although uncommon, this is a legitimate way of writing the more common ‫מכוער‬. Landauer suggests this reading, and Brague adopts it (Thémistius, 122n1). Most of the manuscripts have the corruption ‫מבואר‬, which makes no sense. It is possible that B transmits the correct reading (although visually uncertain), and in any case Landauer’s suggestion is reinforced by T, which clearly has ‫מכואר‬. ‫לג‬18 ‫בכאן‬: For the variant ‫ הנה‬in C see above, ‫כה‬3. ‫לג‬23 ‫ולמדנו‬: For the variant ‫ וידענו‬in C see above, ‫כג‬30. ‫לד‬5 ‫דברים אחדים בעינם‬: Alexandru believes that Themistius here (1075b23) reads ταὐτά against all the other testimonies—which have either ταυτά or ταῦτα— and adopts this reading (See Alexandru, Aristotle, 149). The following elaboration ‫ כי קצתם ישוב אל קצתם‬corroborates Alexandu’s understanding of how

chapter 10

501

Themistius read Aristotle’s text, although I can offer no judgment whether this reading should be in fact adopted. ‫לד‬22 ‫בכאן‬: For the variant ‫ הנה‬in C see above, ‫כה‬3 ‫לד‬27 ‫שם‬: This is my conjecture. The manuscripts have either ‫( הנה שם‬BM; or ‫הנה שמה‬ in T) or simply ‫( הנה‬CA; adopted by Landauer). My guess is that Version I mis-

read ‫ هناك‬as ‫هنا‬, and the subsequent revision became a gloss. ‫לה‬9 ‫אחד באמת‬: I. Hadot takes this expression to suggest that Themistius is referring

to the Plotinian One, to which he adheres (Twetten, “Aristotelian Cosmology,” 329 has a similar opinion). Her explanation for the general absence of the One in his paraphrase is that nothing in it “obliged Themistius to go beyond the ontological level dealt with in the book” (Hadot, Athenian, 95–96), but this argument is borderline petitio principii. Themistius’ expression ‫אחד באמת‬ echoes his general view that God is one both in number and in essence (hence there can only be one; see ‫יז‬6ff.; ‫כה‬13–19). ‫לה‬15–16 ‫נכנס ;נכנסות‬: Aristotle’s text which Themistius is paraphrasing has ἐπεισοδι-

ώδη (“episodic”; 1076a1). Isḥāq translated ἐπεισοδιώδης into ‫ مدخول‬in Theophrastus (see Gutas, Theophrastus, 169n7, and Crubellier, “La version arabe,” 27n15, who also points to the Hebrew ‫ נכנס‬at Averroes’ Tafsīr, 1722n20, which Bouyges conjectures translates ‫ داخل‬as the Arabic is missing). Since the verb ‫ دخل‬means “entered,” it could be easily seen, assuming that the Arabic was indeed ‫مدخول‬, how a Hebrew translator could have taken it to be an ism mafʿūl of this verb.

Conclusion Do we ever agree among ourselves that “this book already has enough glosses: from now on there is no more to be said on it”?1

∵ To conclude the present study I reflect upon the main argumentative thread of Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 and offer some unhinged speculation about its philosophical agenda and how it fits in with what we know about the author. My approach is consciously charitable and appreciative, as there will be plenty of occasion to address the numerous problems in the text as its study progresses. Looking at Themistius’ paraphrase from a bird’s eye view, it emerges as a much more tightly knit composition than may initially seem. This is evident, first and foremost, in his systematic attempt to situate all the discussions within Aristotle’s text under one overarching umbrella, namely the quest for the first principle. Whereas Metaphysics 12 can be taken to be composed of at least two separate units, one physical and one theological, Themistius makes it patently clear that he sees the work as theological throughout, and that the discussion of the natural substance is not a physical inquiry, but an inquiry aimed at demonstrating how the physical substances are ontologically dependent upon the first principle by means of a progressive spiraling argumentative movement “upwards.” The expressive indication for this is Themistius’ contention in his paraphrase of the first chapter that the sensible substances and the “intelligible” substance do not share the same science, as they have no common principle, and the fact that the materials for his discussions of the sensible substances are not presented as new inquiries but offered in past tense as results of physical inquiries already undertaken. Since the first principle is the principle of the sensible substances, the discussion of the latter is not standalone but for the sake of explaining the manner in which the first principle fulfills this function. Themistius is seeking ontological continuity between the first principle and the least existent.

1 Montaigne, “On Experience,” 1210.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400443_018

conclusion

503

Accordingly, in his paraphrase of every one of chapters 2–5 Themistius inserts various passing remarks and separate discussions that connect the world of coming into being to higher principles. In chapter 2 Themistius significantly expands Aristotle’s discussion of the matter of the celestial substances, into a discussion that will later fit in with the ontological hierarchy he finds in Aristotle’s cosmos. Moreover, Themistius transforms Aristotle’s naturalistic account of coming into being into a demiurgic cosmogony that ontologically links both matter and form to God, and also hints at the notion of forms as thoughts of God, an idea that is explicitly stated later in the paraphrase. In chapter 3 Themistius takes care to situate Aristotle’s division of substance into matter, form, and privation as a sub-division within the original tripartite division of substance into corruptible sensible substance (from which it stems), eternal sensible substance, and eternal intelligible substance. More importantly, he responds to Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s theory of Ideas not so much to defend Plato but as to strip natural substances of the ability to transmit forms from one another, necessitating appeal to supernatural causation which also (as I show below) plays an important role in the ontological continuity from God to matter. In other words, Themistius does not permit a causal account of forms that does not ultimately trace back to the first principle even in individual instances of coming to be, and in this respect this discussion can be seen as complimentary to the demiurgic discussion in chapter 2 (analogous to this is his refusal to allow the celestial bodies to be their own source of eternal movement in the end of chapter 7). One should also note Themistius’ confidence in the existence of forms without bodies (listing the soul and the intellect), which replaces Aristotle’s open question about the matter. This can be seen as making room for the immaterial substances that he discusses later on. Themistius also alters the subject of chapter 4: unlike Aristotle’s abstract inquiry into how principles and causes of things can be thought to be the same, Themistius presents a specific theological question, namely how the first principle can be the principle of all things. By the end of the chapter, when Aristotle states the existence of a first mover, Themistius stresses that the whole point of the discussion is to move from proximate movers to the first principle, which is the first mover, whose relationship to the natural substances is not one of proximity. As Themistius shows in his paraphrase of chapter 5, whereas there in fact exist causal relations between natural substances, taken collectively all of their efficient moving causes are remote causes. In other words, the entirety of nature is causally subordinated to the celestial realm, which itself is moved by the first cause. Another important factor in the discussion of chapter 5 is that Themistius’ interprets Aristotle’s denial of universality from principles to

504

conclusion

show that the first principle is an individual. In other words, in search for the ultimate principle of reality we are looking for a particular substance which can be individually identified. God. In sum, by the time he arrives at the more traditionally considered “theological” half of Metaphysics 12, Themistius had already securely causally linked every aspect of the natural world to God, well-beyond what Aristotle had offered, at least explicitly. Whether or not Themistius’ interpretations reflect Aristotle’s own intentions, the main point to realize here is just how much preliminary work Themistius has put into paving the road for the first principle within the discussion of nature. It also renders it certain that no complete account of Themistius’ understanding of Aristotle’s “theology” can be given solely on the basis of his paraphrase of chapters 6–10. Moving to the ontological hierarchy that is presented in Themistius’ paraphrase, the following items can be listed in descending order: God, intelligible substance, celestial bodies, natural composite bodies, and matter. The difference between them is with respect to Aristotle’s theory of types of change/ movement: God is unmoved neither accidentally nor essentially; the intelligible substances are (probably) accidentally moved spatially (spatial movement being the first kind of change); the celestial bodies are essentially moved spatially, in circular motion; the composite bodies are moved spatially (in various kinds of motion), quantitatively and qualitatively, and matter is moved substantially. All these existents have God as their moving principle, and a causal pattern follows. God is the final cause for the movement of the celestial bodies, whose eternal efficient causes are each celestial body’s respective intelligible substance, analogous to how a soul of a living natural body moves its body for the sake of some end. In this respect, the intelligible substances are moved accidentally although not essentially, just like in the case of soul. The movement of the celestial bodies, in turn, is the cause for all the other movements— the sphere of fixed stars is the principle of eternal orderly movement, and the spheres of the planets are the principles of the eternal varying movement. Hence, there is an explanation for uniformity as well as variation, and this accounts for all possible kinds of change. Since these principles have the first principle as the end of their own movement, a causal link of movement from the first principle to the natural world is achieved. The first principle, then, is the moving cause of everything. The same account can be given with respect to form. Themistius’ denial of the natural proximate mover’s (e.g., the parent) formal causality in the process of coming to be necessitates a different ontological source for the transmission of forms. This is the role of logoi, which are formal principles in matter that are ontologically dependant upon the metaphysical realm. Hence the mean-

conclusion

505

ing of matter as “potentially everything” is not something undetermined. On the contrary, matter is potentially every thing the form of which actually exists in God’s intellect. In other words, the logoi are “potential forms” and they determine the range of possibility for matter to become actualized. Matter, as a “not yet,” can become anything that it is potentially, every logos latent in it, and this mirrors all the forms that exist actually in God’s intellect. This is another route to explain how God and the existents are identical. God is fully what the existents are partially. Another important feature of the paraphrase is the distinction between matter and body. This is significant because it addresses Aristotle’s problem of “topical matter” and also adds another layer in the ontological hierarchy between the celestial and physical realms. Although not completely consistent, Themistius renders the body as the substrate for spatial change, and matter as the substrate for the reception of contraries. Hence the celestial body never changes substantially (but only in place), whereas natural substances are in constant state of flux. Since according to Themistius the celestial bodies are collectively the efficient causes of the coming to be of things on earth, they cannot logically have the same matter as natural substances, because then the account of coming to be would fall into infinite regress. So the efficient causality, the principle of which is the first principle, ends up explaining the process of coming to be and passing away; the fact that things become other things, but not what they become. The formal causality, as we have seen, is awarded a different explanation. The first principle is a final cause for the movement of the celestial bodies, as we have seen, but this finality is extended to natural beings as well, and even to matter, each striving to perpetuate its “thisness”—matter’s longing for the first principle is translated to its eternal longing for form; the composite substance longs for the stability of the celestial substances; and the celestial substances strive to remain as they are, close to the first principle. In this manner, God’s is the cosmic law, which is obeyed by each substance according to what it can achieve. And since this law applies both individually and collectively, its individual expression is individual activity, whereas its cumulative expression is the manner in which all the existents are ordered with respect to each other. Hence all the things in the world are mutually dependent, and even the most divine movement of the fixed stars needs the petty existence of the earth as a middle point around which it revolves in a perfect circle. This is where God’s work is complete. Throughout his discussion, whereas Themistius opposes creation in time or creation ex nihilo, he still stresses that God is the efficient cause of existents not merely as the source of motion, but as a principle of existence. The most radi-

506

conclusion

cal formulation of this is his contention that God is the existents and knows Himself as their principle. I would like to speculate about this and suggest that the distinction between maker and product, or deliberation and action, or premise and conclusion, should be understood as distinctions pertaining to corporeal constraints of which God is free. In other words, only when there is a gap between potentiality and actuality, which is due to the body (or—worse— matter, in natural substances), is completeness compromised. God’s ultimate perfection and immovability eliminates not only the division between intellect and intelligible, but also between maker and product, and agent and activity. From this point of view, God’s intelligizing, God’s making, and God’s action— are one and the same thing. Hence when God thinks about the world, God simultaneously makes the world and governs it eternally, without change. The gap between each of these pairs of cause and effect, in us, is merely an offshoot of our deficiency. The world, then, is a corporeal reflection of the inner logical soundness of God’s thought, actualizing all possibles together, and its inherent goodness comes very close to a conception of this world as “the best possible world.” As there is no ontological transcendence, Themistius’ cosmos approaches pantheism. Throughout his lifetime Themistius was compelled to defend himself against the claim that he was not a real philosopher because of his involvement in public affairs. This did not fit the prevalent ideal of the philosopher as someone who detaches oneself from the world as much as possible, away from human life, in the quest for divinity.2 Since After Plotinus, God was taken to be completely transcendent and alien to the world, the ideal of likeness to God was translated into alienation from human affairs. But Themistius’ God is as involved in the world as can be, as He is virtually identical to the existents, and every activity in the world that does not involve randomness reflects adherence to the divine order: unconsciously in cases of plants and animals, and consciously (either informed or uninformed) in the case of human beings. If I interpret Themistius’ notion of God correctly, in Him theory and practice coincide, as the cosmos is the productive expression of God’s self-intelligizing. In other words, He is intellect, law, and king. In this respect, an attempt to liken oneself to God which is limited to contemplation and does not involve life of practice is a theological error. Just as God, the best existent, is both Life and 2 These accusations were not met unanswered. See for instance Oration 34 (“In Reply to Those Who Found Fault with Him for Accepting Public Office,” translated in Penella, Private, 209– 230). Themistius’ negative remarks about his contemporary Platonists, whose ideal of “holiness” led them to relinquish human affairs, are discussed in Fowden, “The Pagan Holy Man,” 44; 56–59.

conclusion

507

Law, the intellectual attachment to God should be expressed both in intelligizing and in action, and the highest vocation of man would be to apply the divine law in the natural world in hope that it would better reflect the orderly perfection of the outer realm. Hence, in this world, theology is most highly expressed as politics, not contemplation; in involvement, not seclusion. In this respect, Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 ends up as his most political paraphrase, and perhaps the ultimate philosophical justification to the course of life he had chosen.

appendix a

Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn’s Arabic Translation of Metaphysics 2 and its Abridgment in MS Ḥikma 6—Text and Notes The following text is divided according to Averroes’ division of Aristotle’s text in his long commentary on the Metaphysics. Gutas remarks that this manuscript should be consulted for future editions of the Metaphysica Arabica.1 The text provided here can serve as an aid for such an undertaking. Each part is numbered according to Bouyges’ edition, from which the text is quoted. I only quoted texti that are also included in the abridgment, but noted omitted texti with a brief summary of their contents, to get a sense of what the author of the abridgment decided to omit. The abridger, after retaining chapter 1 as an introduction to the study of truth which leads to the search for eternal principles (Texti 1–4, omitting 2), proceeds to condense chapter 2 (Texti 5–13), leaving only the parts that focus on or add credibility to the notion of an eternal first cause (taken from texti 5–8 and 13), effectively “theologizing” the text. chapter 3, which deals with methodology, is omitted altogether. Vertical bars (|) indicate a line break in MS Ḥikma 6 (ḥ). Slashes (/) indicate a line break in Bouyges’ edition (a). Text in bold is common to the original text and the abridgment. Regular text in a smaller font is text omitted by the abridger. Variants in the abridgment are recorded in the footnotes, occasionally with some comments. Textus 1 (933a29–b11): ‫ والدليل على ذلك انه لم يقدر‬/ ‫[ ان النظر فى الحق صعب من جهة سهل من جهة‬a3,6; ḥ206r9]

2‫ ما يستحق ولا | ذهب على الناس كلهم لا كن واحد واحد‬/ ‫احد من الناس على البلوغ فيه بقدر‬ ‫[ من الحق شيئا واما ان‬a4] ‫ منهم اما ان يكون لم يدرك‬3‫ الناس تكلم فى الطبيعة وواحد واحد‬/ ‫من‬ ‫ جميع ما ادرك منه من جميع من ادرك ما ادرك منهكان‬/ ‫ فاذا‬4‫كان ادرك | شيئا منه فانما ادرك يسيرا‬ ‫ وهى الجهة التى من عادتنا‬/ ‫ من ذلك مقدار ذو قدر | فيجب ان يكون سهلا من هذه الجهة‬/ ‫للمجتمع‬

1 2 3 4

Gutas, “Notes,” 13–14. ‫لا كن واحد واحد[ لـكن كل واحد‬ ‫وواحد واحد[ وكل واحد‬ ‫ ; يسيرا[ اليسير‬cf. Averroes, Tafsīr, 4n8.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400443_019

‫‪510‬‬

‫‪appendix a‬‬ ‫ان نتمثل فيها بان نقول انه ليس احد ‪ /‬يذهب عليه موضع الباب | من الدار و يدل على صعو بته انه لم‬ ‫‪ /‬يمكن ان يدرك باسره ولا جزء عظيم منه واذا كانت الصعو بة من ‪ /‬جهتين فخليق ان يكون‪ | 5‬انما‬ ‫استصعب لا من جهة الامور باعيانها ‪ /‬لا كن‪ 6‬سبب استصعابها انما هو منا وذلك ان حال العقل فى‬ ‫النفس ‪ /‬منا | عند ما هو فى‪ 7‬الطبيعة فى غاية البيان يشبه حال عيون الخفاش ‪ /‬عند ضياء الشمس‬

‫‪Note: this part contains Aristotle’s famous general observation about the nature of‬‬ ‫‪truth.‬‬ ‫‪[Textus 2 (= 993b11–19) is omitted from the abridgment. In this part Aristotle acknowl‬‬‫]‪edges his debt to his predecessors, whether they were right or wrong.‬‬ ‫‪Textus 3 (993b19–23):‬‬ ‫]‪ [a11,2; ḥ206r15‬ومن الصواب ان تسمى معرفة الحق من الفلسفة | الفلسفة‪ / 8‬النظر ية لان‪ 9‬غاية‬ ‫المعرفة النظر ية الحق وغاية المعرفة العملية الفعل ‪ /‬فان اصحاب الفعل وان‪ 10‬كانوا ينظرون | فى حال‬ ‫الشىء الذى يفعلونه ‪ /‬فليس‪ 11‬بحثهم عن علة لها فى نفسها لا كن‪ 12‬لاضافتها الى الشىء الذى ‪ /‬يفعلونه‬ ‫‪Note: in this passage Aristotle distinguishes between theoretical and practical knowl‬‬‫‪edge, maintaining that only the former has truth as its end.‬‬ ‫‪Textus 4 (993b23–31):‬‬ ‫]‪ [a12,11; ḥ206r17‬ولسنا نعرف | الحق دون ان نعرف علته وكل واحد من ‪ /‬الاوائل‪ 13‬فهو خاصة‬

‫علة لما عليه سا ئر الاشياء من الامور التى‪ 14‬هى‪ [a13] 15‬متفقة بالاسم‪ [ḥ206v] 16‬والمعنى مثال ذلك‪17‬‬ ‫يكون[ تكونا‬ ‫لا كن[ لـكن‬ ‫‪; this seems like a transmission issue rather than an abridgment.‬فى[ לית‬ ‫‪; cf. Averroes, Tafsīr, 11n3.‬الفلسفة[ المعرفة‬ ‫لان[ وذلك ان‬ ‫‪; this seems like a transmission issue rather than an abridgment; cf.‬اصحاب الفعل وان[ לית‬

‫‪5‬‬ ‫‪6‬‬ ‫‪7‬‬ ‫‪8‬‬ ‫‪9‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫‪Averroes, Tafsīr, 11n5.‬‬ ‫فليس[ فانه ليست‬ ‫لا كن[ لـكن‬ ‫الاوائل[ الاشياء‬ ‫التى[ الذى‬ ‫هى[ ‪+‬به‬ ‫بالاسم[ فى الاسم‬ ‫‪; cf. Averroes, Tafsīr, 13n2.‬ذلك[ ‪+‬ان‬

‫‪11‬‬ ‫‪12‬‬ ‫‪13‬‬ ‫‪14‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬ ‫‪16‬‬ ‫‪17‬‬

‫‪511‬‬

‫‪isḥāq ibn ḥunayn’s translation of metaphysics 2‬‬

‫النار فى غاية الحرارة‪ 18‬فيجب من ‪ /‬ذلك ان يكون | اولى الاشياء بالحق الشىء الذى هو علة لحقيقة ‪/‬‬ ‫الاشياء التى بعده ولذلك قد يجب ضرورة ان تكون مبادى ‪ /‬الاشياء الموجودة | دائما هى دائما فى الغاية‬

‫من الحق وذلك انها ليست ‪ /‬انما هى حقيقة فى وقت دون وقت ولا يوجد لها علة فى انها حق ‪ /‬لا كن‪19‬‬ ‫| هى العلة فى ذلك لسا ئر الاشياء فيجب من ذلك ان يكون ‪ /‬كل واحد من الاشياء حاله فى الوجود‬ ‫حاله فى الحق‬ ‫‪Note: here Aristotle maintains that the knowledge of truth is the knowledge of causes,‬‬ ‫‪and most of all the knowledge of the principles of eternal things, for they are always‬‬ ‫‪true.‬‬ ‫‪Textus 5 (994a1–11):‬‬ ‫]‪ [a16,2; ḥ206v4‬ومن البين ان للاشياء | ابتداء وان علل الاشياء الموجودة ‪ /‬ليست بلا نهاية لا من‬ ‫طر يق الاستقامة ولا من طر يق النوع ‪ /‬ان تكون انواع العلل اكثر من ان تعد الى غير نهاية‪ 20‬وذلك‬ ‫انه ‪ /‬لا يمكن من طر يق | الهيولى ان يكون شىء من شىء الى ما لا ‪ /‬نهاية فيكون مثلا اللحم من الارض‬ ‫والارض من الماء والماء من ‪ /‬الهواء والهواء من النار و يمر ذلك الى غير نهاية فلا يقف عند شىء ‪ /‬ولا‬ ‫يمكن‪ 21‬ايضا من طر يق ما منه ابتداء الحركة فيكون مثلا ‪ /‬الانسان يتحرك من الهواء والهواء يتحرك من‬ ‫الشمس والشمس ‪ /‬تتحرك من الغلبة المداو ية ولا يكون لذلك نهاية وعلى هذا المثال ‪ /‬يجرى‪ 22‬فيما |‬ ‫بسببه يكون الشىء فانه لا يمكن فى هذا الطر يق‪ 23‬ايضا ]‪ [a17‬ان يجرى الامر الى ما لا نهاية‪ 24‬فيكون‬ ‫مثلا المشى لسبب الصحة ‪ /‬والصحة لسبب السعادة والسعادة لسبب شىء آخر غيره و يجرى ‪ /‬فى ذلك‬ ‫دائما بلا نهاية وكذلك يجرى الامر فيما هو الشىء ‪ /‬اى الذات‬

‫الحرارة[ ‪+‬وذلك انها هي العلة فى حرارة سا ئر الاشياء الحارة )‪(This seems to be a gloss‬‬ ‫لا كن[ لـكنها‬ ‫‪This part does not seem to be a matter of abridgment but of transmission, since it is not‬‬ ‫‪part of the original Greek and perhaps a later gloss that found its way into the text that‬‬ ‫‪Averroes is quoting.‬‬ ‫يمكن[ ‪+‬ذلك‬ ‫يجرى[ ‪+‬الامر‬ ‫‪ is a somewhat unusual‬فى هذا الطر يق ‪; this seems to be an abridgment.‬فى هذا الطر يق[ فيه‬ ‫‪translation of ὁμοίως.‬‬ ‫ما لا نهاية[ غيرة النهاية‬

‫‪18‬‬ ‫‪19‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬

‫‪21‬‬ ‫‪22‬‬ ‫‪23‬‬ ‫‪24‬‬

‫‪512‬‬

‫‪appendix a‬‬

‫‪Note: Aristotle introduces his thesis that there is a first principle, and denies infinite‬‬ ‫‪regress of each of the four causes. The abridgment leaves out the examples, and also‬‬ ‫‪features an omission from considerations of space.‬‬ ‫‪Textus 6 (994a11–19):‬‬ ‫]‪ [a18,11; ḥ206v7‬وذلك ان الاشياء | المتوسطة وهى الاشياء التى فيها‪ 25‬متقدم ‪ /‬ومتاخر يجب ضرورة‬

‫ان يكون المتقدم هو العلة لما بعده فانا اذا‪ / 26‬سئلنا اى‪ | 27‬علة‪ 28‬الثلثة قلنا الاول وذلك ان الاخير‪29‬‬ ‫ليس هو علتها من ‪ /‬قبل انه ليس‪ 30‬علة ولا لواحد منها وكذلك ايضا‪ 31‬المتوسط | ليس هو ]‪ [a19‬علتها‬

‫من قبل انه انما هو علة لواحد فقط ولا فرق بين ان يكون ‪ /‬متوسط واحد و بين ان تكون المتوسطات‪32‬‬ ‫اكثر من | واحد و بين‪ 33‬ان ‪ /‬تكون متناهية وبين ان‪ 34‬تكون غير متناهية واجزاء الاشياء غير ‪ /‬المتناهية‬ ‫التى تحتوى‪ 35‬على هذه الجهة و بالجملة | اجزاء غير المتناهى ‪ /‬كلها‪ 36‬متوسطة على مثال واحد الى هذا‬ ‫الوقت فيجب ان لم يكن ‪ /‬شىء من الاشياء اولا الا يكون بالجملة | علة اصلا‬ ‫‪Note: here Aristotle argues for the necessity of the existence of a first cause.‬‬ ‫‪From Textus 7 (of 994a19–b9, only 994b6–7 is included in the abridgment):‬‬

‫]‪ [a24,9; ḥ206v13‬ومع ذلك ‪ /‬ايضا‪ 37‬لا يمكن ان يكون الاول وهو ازلى يفسد‪38‬‬ ‫‪Note: in this part Aristotle denies the possibility of infinite progression (the opposite‬‬ ‫‪of infinite regression). The only part of the text that interests the abridger is that the‬‬ ‫‪first cause, which is eternal, is indestructible; the abridger also omits Aristotle’s justifi-‬‬

‫‪; cf. Averroes, Tafsīr, 18n2.‬فيها[ لها‬ ‫اذا[ ان‬ ‫اى[ انها‬ ‫‪; cf. Averroes, Tafsīr, 18n4.‬علة[ ‪+‬من‬ ‫الاخير[ الاخر‬ ‫ليس[ ‪+‬هو‬ ‫ايضا[ ‪+‬فان‬ ‫المتوسطات[ متوسطات‬ ‫و بين[ ولا بين‬ ‫و بين ان[ وان‬ ‫‪; cf. Averroes, Tafsīr, 19n6.‬تحتوى[ تجرى‬ ‫كلها[ ‪+‬هى‬ ‫ايضا[ ‪+‬فانه‬ ‫يفسد[ ففسد‬

‫‪25‬‬ ‫‪26‬‬ ‫‪27‬‬ ‫‪28‬‬ ‫‪29‬‬ ‫‪30‬‬ ‫‪31‬‬ ‫‪32‬‬ ‫‪33‬‬ ‫‪34‬‬ ‫‪35‬‬ ‫‪36‬‬ ‫‪37‬‬ ‫‪38‬‬

isḥāq ibn ḥunayn’s translation of metaphysics 2

513

cation for this claim. The result of the abridgment is a natural continuation of Textus 6, which asserted the existence of the first cause. [Texti 8–12 (994b9–27) are omitted from the abridgment; here Aristotle discusses the nature of the final cause as an end, and relates this to his rejection of the concept of actual infinity.] Textus 13 (994b27–31): ‫ يكن العلم ولا على‬/ ‫[ وايضا فان انواع العلل لو كانت غير متناهية | فى الاحصاء لم‬a41,2; ḥ206v13] ‫ اذا عرفنا العلل ولا يمكن المتناهى ان يجوز ما‬40‫ العلم‬/ ‫ نرى انا قد وصلنا الى‬39‫هذه الجهة وذلك انا انما‬

41‫لا نهاية | له‬ Note: here Aristotle denies the possibility of an infinite number of causes since it would make knowledge impossible. A stylistic abridgment/paraphrase is apparent; the sentence ‫ وذلك انا انما نرى انا قد وصلنا الى العلم اذا عرفنا العلل‬becomes ‫وذلك انا نرى انا قد علمنا اذا عرفنا‬ ‫العلل‬. [Texti 14–16 (= 994b32–995a20), which together comprise chapter 3, are not included in the abridgment. They discuss the methodology and appropriateness of different kinds of argumentations pertaining to different kinds of sciences.] 39 40 41

‫ ;انما[ לית‬this might be an abridgment. ‫وصلنا الى العلم[ علمنا‬ ‫على طر يق التز يد‬+ [‫ ;له‬cf. Averroes, Tafsīr, 41n6.

appendix b

Two Versions of the Hebrew Translation of the Themistius Quotations in Averroes’ Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics—a Preliminary Edition In what follows I quote, side by side, the early and revised versions of the quotations from Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12 included in the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ long commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. The texts here supplement the discussion of Averroes’ Arabic text in Chapter 1 (see above, p. 39). The first person to recognize the similarity between Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation and the quotations in Averroes was Jacob Freudenthal, in his pioneering work on the fragments of the Arabic translation of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on Metaphysics 12 preserved in Averroes’ long commentary on that work. Freudenthal quoted text from Themistius’ paraphrase in manuscript A (Landauer’s edition was yet to be published) alongside the first half of the second quotation in the Hebrew translation of Averroes to demonstrate the similarities,1 which show beyond any serious doubt that Moshe’s text was consulted. Scholarship on the textual tradition of the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ commentary, most notably the recent work of Yehuda Halper, has shown that there existed two versions of the Hebrew translation, both from the fourteenth century.2 The later version corrects the earlier one, standardizes its terminology according to the principles of the school of Qalonymos b. Qalonymos, and improves its grammar.3 Since Freudenthal’s quotations were taken from the later version, I was curious about what was initially done with the Themistius fragments and whether Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation was consulted from the get go. Examining the manuscripts, it immediately became clear that this was not the case; the original version of the translation translated Themistius in Averroes anew, its author unaware—or not in possession— of Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation. The reviser is responsible for the editorial procedure that resulted in the integration of Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation into the text.

1 Freudenthal, Averroes, 57–59. 2 For an overview of the complexity of the situation, including a discussion of the identity of the translator(s), see the account in Halper, “Revision,” 99–100. 3 For a rich discussion and examples see Halper, 100–132.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400443_020

two hebrew translations of averroes’ themistius quotations

515

It is important to note that this was done critically as well as selectively. The reviser did not simply substitute the original translation with Moshe ibn Tibbon’s, but used it in constant comparison with the Arabic in Averroes, did not force it on less crucial parts of the text, and sometimes made his own revisions. Since my intention in this appendix is limited to exhibiting this interesting dynamic—a thorough analysis would require a separate study based on the broader issue of the reviser’s technique not limited to these portions of the text (in line of what Halper has done with the translation of Averroes’ long commentary on Metaphysics 5)—I offer only a few notes to underscore key features of the editorial procedure, and mostly allow the text to speak for itself. The notes focus on the relation between Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation and the revised version of the Hebrew translation of the long commentary. The original version of the Hebrew translation of the fragments demands a separate study beyond the scope of the present inquiry and is only consulted when clarifying problems in the Arabic. Each fragment is quoted three times: the right column includes the text from the early version of the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ commentary; the middle column includes the text of Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation according to the present edition; and the left column features the revised version of the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ commentary. Examining the fragments side by side from right to left sheds light on how Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation bridges the gap between the earlier and later versions of the Hebrew translation of Averroes’ quotations from Themistius’ paraphrase. I have not conducted a systematic analysis of the manuscripts used for the text, which were chosen on the basis of Halper’s analysis.4 The abbreviations of the manuscripts also follow Halper.5 For quotations in the early version, three manuscripts were used: ‫י‬ ‫ט‬ ‫א‬

Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica ebr. 336 (fifteenth century; F 429 in the IMHM) Cambridge, University Library Add. 527 (ii) (fifteenth century; F 16817) Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale Heb. 886 (fifteenth century; F 31655)

For quotations in the late version, two manuscripts were used: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale Heb. 887 (fifteenth–sixteenth centuries; F 31656) ‫ ה‬Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale Heb. 888 (fifteenth century; F 31657) ‫ד‬

4 Halper, 191. 5 Halper, 193.

‫‪516‬‬

‫‪appendix b‬‬

‫‪My textual choices for the early version are mostly based on the rule of the majority,‬‬ ‫‪and for the late version—on common sense. Variants of significance are recorded at‬‬ ‫‪the bottom of each column. I did not record obvious errors or differences in spelling‬‬ ‫‪conventions without some explanatory value. Since the second and third quotations‬‬ ‫‪are lengthy, I divided them into numbered paragraphs for the sake of convenience.‬‬ ‫‪The text from Themistius in the middle column is taken from the present edition.‬‬ ‫‪Occasional variants from the critical apparatus are mentioned when they help estab‬‬‫‪lish the manuscript tradition from which the editor of the later version of Averroes has‬‬ ‫‪drawn in his revision.‬‬ ‫‪Text 1:‬‬

‫‪Averroes I‬‬ ‫‪: 174a1–7‬י‬ ‫‪: 147b36–148a5‬ט‬ ‫‪: 144b9–14‬א‬ ‫וזה שכל מתנועע היה‪ 1‬מתאחד‬ ‫מאברים בגוף האדם והחלקים בגוף‬ ‫הצמחים או יהיה‪ 2‬הרכבתו דברים‬ ‫ימששו קצתם קצת כהרכבת הבית‬ ‫והספינה‪ 3‬או הוא חבורו‪ 4‬מדברים‬ ‫נבדלים כחבור המדינה הקודם‬ ‫שבחלקיו כלל הוא עצם‪ 5‬והנחתו מן‬ ‫הכל הנחת הלב מכל גוף הב״ח ואם‬ ‫לא יהיה סדורו על צד מאלו הצדדים‬ ‫אבל כמו שימצא האחד במספר עוד‬ ‫השנים עוד השלשה או כמו שימצא‬ ‫בתמונות הישרות הקוים המשולש‬ ‫ראשונה עוד אחריו המרובע הנה‬ ‫העצם על זה המשל ראשונה ימצא‬ ‫ואחריו האיכות והשעור ושאר מה‬ ‫שדומה‪ 6‬לזה מפני שמציאות העצם‬ ‫קודם למציאות כל מה שימשך כמו‬ ‫קדימת האחד לשאר‪ 7‬המספרים‬ ‫ויקדם המשלש לשאר התמונות‬

‫‪Themistius Hebraicus‬‬ ‫‪5–13‬א‬

‫‪Averroes II‬‬ ‫‪: 294b11–19‬ד‬ ‫‪: 140b38–141a1‬ה‬

‫וזה כי הכל מתאחד היה כהתאחדות וזה שהכל בין שהיה מתאחד‪1‬‬ ‫האברים בגוף האדם והחלקים בגוף כהתאחדות האיברים בגוף האדם‬ ‫והחלקים בגוף הצמח או היתה‬ ‫הצומח או היתה הרכבתו מדברים‬ ‫ימששו קצתם קצת כהרכבת הבית הרכבתו מדברים ימששו קצתם‬ ‫לקצת כהרכבת הבית והספינה‬ ‫והספינה או היה חבורו מדברים‪1‬‬ ‫מפוזרים כחבור החיל והמדינה הנה או שהיה חבורו מדברים נפרדים‬ ‫ראש‪ 2‬חלקיו כלם הוא העצם ומקומו כחבור החיל והמדינה הנה ראשון‬ ‫שבחלקיו כלם הוא העצם ומקומו‬ ‫מן הכל מקום הלב מכלל גוף החי‬ ‫מן הכל‪ 2‬מקום הלב מכלל גוף החי‬ ‫ואם לא יהיה ישרו על דרך‪ 3‬מאלו‬ ‫ואם לא יהיה סדרו על צד מאלו‬ ‫הדרכים‪ 4‬אבל כמו שימצא האחד‬ ‫במספר תחלה ואחר כן השנים ואחר הצדדים אבל כמו שימצא האחד‬ ‫כן השלשה או כמו שימצא בתמונות במספר אחר כן השנים‪ 3‬אחר כן‬ ‫השלשה‪ 4‬או כמו שימצא בתמונות‬ ‫ישרות הקוים המשלש ראשון ועוד‬ ‫ישרות הקוים המשלש ראשונה‬ ‫אחריו המרובע הנה העצם על זה‬ ‫ואחריו המרובע הנה העצם על זה‬ ‫הדמיון‪ 5‬ימצא תחלה עוד אחריו‬ ‫המשל ימצא ראשונה ואחריו‪ 5‬הענין‬ ‫הענין והשעור ושאר מה שדומה‬ ‫והשעור ושאר מה שדומה לזה מפני‬ ‫לזה מפני כי מציאות העצם קודם‬ ‫שמציאות העצם קודם למציאות כל‬ ‫למציאות כל מה שימשך אחריו‬ ‫כמו שיקדם האחד שאר המספרים מה שימשך לו כמו שיקדם האחד‬ ‫לשאר המספרים ויקדם המשולש‬ ‫ויקדם המשלש שאר התמונות‬ ‫לשאר התמונות‬

two hebrew translations of averroes’ themistius quotations

517

(cont.)

Averroes II ‫ד‬: 294b11–19 ‫ה‬: 140b38–141a1

:‫ הכל[ כל‬2 || ‫ ה‬:‫ מתאחד[ המתאחד‬1 [‫ השלשה‬4 || ‫ ד‬:‫ השנים[ שנים‬3 || ‫ה‬ || *‫ ד‬:‫ איך‬+ [‫ ואחריו‬5 || ‫ ד‬:‫שלשה‬ *

Note: perhaps this is a gloss clarifying that ‫ הענין‬is the category of Quality (also ‫“ = איך‬the how”).

Themistius Hebraicus ‫א‬5–13

[‫ ראש‬2 || CD :‫ נבדלים‬+ [‫ מדברים‬1 || CL :‫ דרך[ מין‬3 || D :‫ראשון‬ B :‫ | הסוגים‬CL :‫ הדרכים[ המינין‬4 | CD :‫[ זה המשל‬BL :‫ זה הדמיון‬5 || || AT :‫הדמיון הזה‬

Averroes I ‫י‬: 174a1–7 ‫ט‬: 147b36–148a5 ‫א‬: 144b9–14 || ‫ ט‬:‫ יהיה[ היה‬2 || ‫ א‬:‫ היה[ הוא‬1 || ‫ י‬:‫ והספינה[ או הספינה‬3 :‫ עצם[ העצם‬5 || ‫ ט‬:‫ חבורו[ חבור‬4 || ‫ א‬:‫ שדומה[ שידומה‬6 || ‫ט‬ || ‫ י‬:‫ לשאר[ ושאר‬7

Note: It is difficult to establish with certainty whether the reviser consulted Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation in this passage. Some of the early version’s terminology persists (e.g., ‫ צד מאלו הצדדים‬or ‫סדורו‬/‫)סדרו‬, and other differences can be explained by correcting obvious mistakes in the early version (e.g., omitting ‫ ;מתנועע‬adding ‫;מתאחד‬ adding ‫)החיל‬. However, there are some hints that Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation was consulted (e.g., replacing ‫ הנחה‬with ‫ האיכות ;מקום‬with ‫ קדימת ;הענין‬with ‫הקודם ;שיקדם‬ with ‫)ראשון‬. If this is the case, then instances where there was no revision despite a difference between the earlier version and Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation were either unimportant for the reviser, or he thought that the earlier version was better. In one notable case the reviser substitutes the original ‫ נבדלים‬with ‫( נפרדים‬translating ‫)متفرقة‬. At least some of the manuscripts of Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation have ‫ נבדלים‬as an option next to ‫מפוזרים‬,6 so the reviser agreed neither with the original translation nor with Moshe ibn Tibbon on this matter—whatever version was in front of him.

6 See the textual Commentary on this matter.

‫‪518‬‬

‫‪appendix b‬‬

‫‪Text 2:‬‬

‫‪Averroes I‬‬ ‫‪: 183a1–22‬י‬ ‫‪: 154b9–29‬ט‬ ‫‪: 151b12–30‬א‬ ‫]‪ [1‬ותמסתיוס יאמר שזה המאמר‬ ‫הוא הלציי בדחיית הצורות אלא‬ ‫שבעליו* רוב מה שיתחדש מן הב״ח‬ ‫מזולת דומה לו על הרוב הנה כבר‬ ‫נראה קצת מן העכברים יתילדו מן‬ ‫העפר והדבורה מגוף הבקר המת‬ ‫והצפרדעים מן העפוש הנה אצל‬ ‫הטבע צמיחת אלו הדברים ממה‬ ‫שכמותם בצורה‬

‫‪Themistius Hebraicus‬‬ ‫‪27‬ח–‪27‬ז‬

‫‪Averroes II‬‬ ‫‪: 309a12–b13‬ד‬ ‫‪: 149a15–38‬ה‬

‫וזה המאמר ]‪ [1‬ותמסתיוס אמר שזה המאמר‬ ‫]‪[1‬‬ ‫הוא מספיק בסלוק הצורות אלא‬ ‫מספיק‪ 1‬בסלק‪ 2‬הצורה אבל כי‬ ‫בעליו יקשה עליו רוב מה שיתחדש שבעליו עזב רבוי מה שיחודש‬ ‫מבעלי חיים מזולת‪ 3‬דמיונו עם רבויו מהבעל חיים מבלתי‪ 1‬כמהו עם‪2‬‬ ‫כי אנחנו הנה נראה סוג מן הצרעה רבויו כי אנחנו כבר נראה סוג‬ ‫החי הנקרא אלזנאביר יתילד‪3‬‬ ‫יתילד מן גופות הסוסים המתות‬ ‫מגופות הסוסים המתים ונראה‬ ‫ונראה הדבורים יתילדו מגופות‬ ‫הזבובים יתילדו מגופות השורים‬ ‫השוורים המתים ונראה הצפרדע‬ ‫ונראה אלצפאדע‪ 4‬יתילדו מהטלאים‬ ‫יתילד מן העפוש ונראה היתושים‬ ‫והוא מין אחד מן הזבובים קטן הגוף השחוטים ונראה היתושים יתילדו‬ ‫יתילד מן היין כאשר יפסד ולא נמצא מהיין כאשר יפסד ואנחנו לא נמצא‬ ‫הטבע יצמיח אלו הדברים ממה‬ ‫הטבע יברא אלו הדברים ממה‬ ‫שהוא כמוהו בצורה‪5‬‬ ‫שהוא דומה לו בצורה‬

‫‪ 1 * Some manuscripts leave an‬מספיק‪ [C1T :‬פוסק‪|| CDABML :‬‬ ‫‪ 2 empty space here, probably real‬בסלק‪ [AT :‬בחלק‪ | CDM :‬בסילוק‪:‬‬‫‪ | B izing that a word is missing‬בחלוק‪ | C1 :‬בסלוק‪ 3 || L :‬מזולת[‬ ‫מבלתי‪|| DT :‬‬

‫‪ 1‬מבלתי[ מין בלתי‪ :‬ד || ‪ 2‬עם[ על‪ :‬ה ||‬ ‫‪ 3‬יתילד[ יתילדו‪ :‬ד || ‪ 4‬אלצפאדע[‬ ‫אלצפרדע‪ :‬ד || ‪ 5‬ואנחנו…בצורה[‬ ‫לית‪ :‬ה ||‬

‫]‪ [2‬ואנחנו נדע כי בשכבת הזרע‬ ‫ובזרעים מכל אחד מבעלי החיים‬ ‫והצמחים יחס ייחד אותו בו היה‬ ‫מתילד מה שמתילד ממנו לבד‬ ‫מבעלי חיים והצמחים בלתי זולתו‬ ‫עד שלא יהיה מזרע האדם סוס ולא‬ ‫מזרע הסוס אדם ולא מזרע צמח מן‬ ‫הצמחים צמח זולתו‬

‫]‪ [2‬ואנחנו נדע שבשכבת זרע‬ ‫והזרע מכל אחד מהבעלי חיים‬ ‫והצמחים‪ 1‬יחס ייחדהו בו יהיה‬ ‫מתילד מה שיתילד‪ 2‬ובפרט מהחי‬ ‫והצמח בלתי זולתו עד שלא יהיה‪3‬‬ ‫מזרע האדם סוס ולא מזרע הסוס‬ ‫אדם ולא מזרע צמח מהצמחים צמח‬ ‫זולתו‬

‫]‪ [2‬ואנחנו נדע שבזרעים מכ״א‬ ‫מן הב״ח והצמחים יחס ייחדהו‬ ‫בהם שב מתילד ממה שיתולד‪1‬‬ ‫ממנו בייחוד מן הב״ח והצמחים‬ ‫זולת אחרים עם‪ 2‬שלא יהיה מזרע‬ ‫האדם‪ 3‬סוס ולא מזרע הסוס אדם‬ ‫וכן בזרעים האחרים‪4‬‬

‫‪ 1‬שיתילד[ שידמה‪ :‬י || ‪ 2‬עם[ עד‪:‬‬ ‫ט || ‪ 3‬האדם[ אדם‪ :‬י || ‪ 4‬בזרעים[‬ ‫הזרעים‪ :‬י ||‬

‫‪ 1‬והצמחים[ לית‪ :‬ד || ‪ 2‬שיתילד[‬ ‫שמתילד‪ :‬ד || ‪ 3‬עד שלא יהיה[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫ה ||‬

‫‪519‬‬

‫‪two hebrew translations of averroes’ themistius quotations‬‬ ‫)‪(cont.‬‬

‫‪Averroes I‬‬ ‫‪: 183a1–22‬י‬ ‫‪: 154b9–29‬ט‬ ‫‪: 151b12–30‬א‬ ‫]‪ [3‬והוא מבואר‪ 1‬שכמו‪ 2‬שאלו‬ ‫היחסים שהם‪ 3‬יתילדו מהם הב״ח‬ ‫לפי שכבר הושם בטבע קודם‬ ‫היחס הכנה נאותה לחדוש במין‬ ‫מין מהמינים‪ 4‬עם מציאות‪ 5‬יסוד‬ ‫נאות בחדוש ב״ח מה ממנו‬

‫‪Themistius Hebraicus‬‬ ‫‪27‬ח–‪27‬ז‬

‫]‪ [3‬ואנה דמיוני היחסים האלו במה‬ ‫שיתילד ממנו זה החי לולי שהוא‬ ‫כבר הושם בטבע לפנים יחס מזומן‬ ‫מוכן להתחדש אי זה מין שיהיה‬ ‫אפשר ממיני החי עם מצאו חומר‬ ‫נאות להתחדש חי מה ממנו לא היה‬ ‫יוצא אל הפועל‬

‫‪ 1‬מבואר[ ‪ +‬בעצמו‪ :‬א || ‪ 2‬שכמו‬ ‫שאלו[ שבכמו אלו‪ :‬י || ‪ 3‬שהם[ בהם‪:‬‬ ‫י || ‪ 4‬מין מהמינים[ מן המינים‪ :‬ט ||‬ ‫‪ 5‬מציאות[ מציאת‪ :‬י ||‬

‫‪Averroes II‬‬ ‫‪: 309a12–b13‬ד‬ ‫‪: 149a15–38‬ה‬

‫]‪ [3‬ואנה דמיוני אלו היחסים במה‬ ‫שיתילד‪ 1‬ממנו זה החי לולא‪ 2‬שכבר‬ ‫הושם בטבע לפנים יחס‪ 3‬מזמן מוכן‬ ‫להתחדש איזה מין שיהיה אפשר‬ ‫ממיני החי עם מצאו חמר נאות‬ ‫להתחדש חי מה ממנו‬

‫‪ 1‬שיתילד[ שמתילד‪ :‬ד || ‪ 2‬לולא[‬ ‫אלא‪ :‬ד || ‪ 3‬יחס[ יחד‪ :‬ה ||‬

‫]‪ [4‬ולא יקשה עליך בדומה מאלו‬ ‫הב״ח לפי שיראה‪ 1‬פלא מהאומן‬ ‫וחדותו בעשות מה שיעשהו מן‬ ‫הטיט‪ 2‬יותר מחדותו במה שיעשהו‬ ‫מהזהב‬

‫]‪ [4‬ולא תזלזל לדמיוני זה מבעלי‬ ‫חיים אבל שים בדעתך שהוא פלא‬ ‫מן האומן ערמתו‪ 1‬בעשיית מה‬ ‫שיעשהו מן הטיט‪ 2‬יותר מערמתו‬ ‫במה שיעשהו מן הזהב והשן‪3‬‬

‫]‪ [4‬ולא תזלזל לדמיוני‪ 1‬זה מן החי‬ ‫אבל שים בדעתך שהוא פלא מן‬ ‫האומן‪ 2‬בקיאותו בעשיית מה‬ ‫שיעשהו מן העפר יותר ממה‬ ‫שיעשהו מהזהב והשן‬

‫‪ 1‬שיראה[ שיחזה‪ :‬י || ‪ 2‬הטיט‪ :‬י[‬ ‫הצור‪ :‬א | לית‪ :‬ט ||‬

‫‪ 1‬ערמתו[ בקיאותו‪ 2 || T :‬הטיט[‬ ‫החמר‪ 3 || C1 :‬והשן‪ [BMT :‬והשיש‪:‬‬ ‫‪|| CDAL‬‬

‫‪ 1‬לדמיוני[ דמיוני‪ :‬ה || ‪ 2‬האומן[ לית‪:‬‬ ‫ד ||‬

‫]‪ [5‬על שאתה אם שמת העיון בב״ח ]‪ [5‬על שאתה כאשר הפלגת העיון‬ ‫בענין החי אשר הוא יותר גדול מזה‬ ‫אשר הם יותר גדולים מזה מצאת‬ ‫מהלך הטבע בו‪ 1‬זה המהלך בעצמו תמצא ילך הטבע בו זה המהלך‬ ‫בעינו ואי אפשר מבלתי שיהיו‬ ‫אין ספק משיהיה יחסים וצורות‬ ‫יחסים וצורות כבר הושמו בטבע‬ ‫כבר הושמו בטבע עליהם יעשה‬ ‫עליהם יעשה מה שיעשה מזה כי‬ ‫מה שיעשה מזה שהאדם ואם‬ ‫האדם ואם היה מתילד מאדם הנה‬ ‫אמנם‪ 2‬יולד‪ 3‬מאדם הנה אין האב‬ ‫האב אין לו אומנות בהרכבתו זאת‬ ‫בלתי פועל בהרכבתו זולת אשר‬

‫]‪ [5‬על שאתה כאשר תדקדק העיון‬ ‫בענין החי אשר הוא יותר גדול מזה‬ ‫תמצא שילך הטבע בו זה המהלך‬ ‫בעצמו ואי אפשר שלא יהיו‪ 1‬לו‪2‬‬ ‫סבות וצורות כבר הושם בטבע‬ ‫עליהם שיעשה‪ 3‬מה שיעשה מזה כי‬ ‫האדם ואם היה מתילד מאדם הנה‬ ‫האב אין לו אמנות בהרכבתו זאת‬

‫‪520‬‬

‫‪appendix b‬‬

‫)‪(cont.‬‬

‫‪Averroes I‬‬ ‫‪: 183a1–22‬י‬ ‫‪: 154b9–29‬ט‬ ‫‪: 151b12–30‬א‬ ‫א״א שיהיה בענין אחר יותר מעולה‬ ‫מענינו‬

‫‪Themistius Hebraicus‬‬ ‫‪27‬ח–‪27‬ז‬

‫אשר אי אפשר שתהיה בענין אחר‬ ‫הוא יותר טוב מענינו‬

‫‪Averroes II‬‬ ‫‪: 309a12–b13‬ד‬ ‫‪: 149a15–38‬ה‬

‫אשר אי אפשר שתהיה בעניין אחר‬ ‫יותר חשוב מענינו‬

‫‪ 1‬הטבע בו‪ :‬י[ היו בטבע‪ :‬א | לית‪ :‬ט ||‬ ‫‪ 2‬ואם אמנם‪ :‬י[ והם אמנם‪ :‬ט | לית‪:‬‬ ‫א || ‪ 3‬יולד[ יוליד‪ :‬א ||‬

‫‪ 1‬יהיו[ יהיה‪ :‬ד || ‪ 2‬לו[ לית‪ :‬ד ||‬ ‫‪ 3‬שיעשה[ שיעשהו‪ :‬ד ||‬

‫]‪ [6‬ואמנם יהיה בזה הענין בעבור‬ ‫]‪ [6‬ואמנם ישוב בזה הענין כמו‬ ‫שכבר הושם בטבע כ״א מן העצמים שכבר הושם בטבע כל אחד מן‬ ‫מהיחס והצורות לא יופעלו מן האב העצמים מן היחס והצורות לא‬ ‫באומנות מן האב אבל מן היחס‬ ‫אבל מן היחס והגשם לא יעשה‪1‬‬ ‫והגשם אין לו מעשה בגשם אלא‬ ‫בגשם אלא באשיות‪ 2‬לבד ואמנם‬ ‫בתכליתו לבד ואולם הטבע הנה‬ ‫הטבעי‪ 3‬הנה יעשה הגשם בכללו‬ ‫יעשה בגוף הגשם בכללו‬

‫]‪ [6‬ואמנם יהיה זה העניין מפני מה‬ ‫שכבר הושם בטבע כל‪ 1‬העצמים‬ ‫מהיחסים והצורות לא באמנות‬ ‫מהאב אבל מהיחסים והגשם אין לו‬ ‫מעשה בגשם אלא בתכליתו לבד‬ ‫ואולם הטבע הנה בגוף הגשם בכללו‬

‫‪ 1‬יעשה[ עשה‪ :‬י || ‪ 2‬באשיות[‬ ‫בראשיות‪ :‬א || ‪ 3‬הטבעי[ הטבעו‪ :‬א ||‬

‫‪ 1‬כל[ לית‪ :‬ד ||‬

‫]‪ [7‬ואין פלא שיהיה הטבע והוא לא ]‪ [7‬ואינו בפלא שיהיה הטבע‬ ‫והוא לא יבין מוליך מה שיעשהו‬ ‫יבין יביא‪ 1‬מה שיעשהו אל הכונה‬ ‫המכוונת‪ 2‬אליו אחר שהיה לא ישיג אל הכונה המכוונת אליה כי היה‬ ‫בלתי חושב ומשכיל בפועל מה‬ ‫ולא יעיין‪ 3‬הנה בפעולתו יפעל וזה‬ ‫שיעשה וזה ממה שיורה אותך על‬ ‫ממה שיורה על שהוא כבר השיג‬ ‫שהם כבר הוזכרו הזכרה‪ 1‬אותם‬ ‫השגה ממנה‪ 4‬היחס בסבה יותר‬ ‫היחסים מסבת מי שהוא יותר‬ ‫מעולה ממנו במדרגה והיא הנפש‬ ‫נדיב מהם ויותר נכבד ומדרגתו‬ ‫אשר בארץ אשר‪ 5‬אמ׳ אפלטון‬ ‫שהיא תתחדש מן האלהיים השניים יותר עליונה והיא הנפש אשר‬ ‫ויראה ב״ס שהוא יתחדש מן השמש בארץ אשר יראה אפלאטון שהיא‬ ‫נתחדשה מן האלהים השניים ויראה‬ ‫והגלגל הנוטה‬ ‫אריסטוטליס שהיא נתחדשה‬ ‫מהשמש והגלגל הנוטה‬

‫]‪ [7‬ואינו בפלא שיהיה הטבע והוא‬ ‫לא יבין‪ 1‬מוליך מה שיעשהו‪ 2‬אל‬ ‫הכוונה המכוונת אליה אחר שהיה‬ ‫בלתי חושב ולא משכיל בפעל מה‬ ‫שיעשהו‪ 3‬וזה ממה שיורה אותך‬ ‫על שכבר נאצלו אותם היחסים‬ ‫מסבה יותר נכבדת מהם ויותר‬ ‫מעולה במדרגה והוא הנפש אשר‬ ‫בארץ אשר יראה אפלאטון שהיא‬ ‫נתחדשה מהאלהים השניים ויראה‬ ‫ארסטו שהיא נתחדשה מהשמש‬ ‫והגלגל הנוטה‬

‫‪521‬‬

‫‪two hebrew translations of averroes’ themistius quotations‬‬ ‫)‪(cont.‬‬

‫‪Averroes I‬‬ ‫‪: 183a1–22‬י‬ ‫‪: 154b9–29‬ט‬ ‫‪: 151b12–30‬א‬

‫‪Averroes II‬‬ ‫‪: 309a12–b13‬ד‬ ‫‪: 149a15–38‬ה‬

‫‪Themistius Hebraicus‬‬ ‫‪27‬ח–‪27‬ז‬

‫‪ 1‬יביא[ לית‪ :‬א || ‪ 2‬המכוונת[‬ ‫הראשונה‪ :‬י || ‪ 3‬יעיין[ יעוין‪ :‬י ||‬ ‫‪ 4‬ממנה‪ :‬י[ מה זה‪ :‬ט | מאשר‪ :‬א ||‬ ‫‪ 5‬אשר[ לית‪ :‬א ||‬

‫‪ 1‬הוזכרו הזכרה‪ [B :‬נתפעמו‬ ‫התפעמות‪ | CD :‬התפעמו‬ ‫התפעמות‪ | AL :‬הזכרנו הזכרת‪:‬‬ ‫‪ | M‬הושפעה השפעה‪|| T :‬‬

‫‪ 1‬יבין[ ‪ +‬שיעשהו‪ :‬ד || ‪ 2‬שיעשהו[‬ ‫לית‪ :‬ד || ‪ 3‬שיעשהו[ שעשהו‪ :‬ד ||‬

‫]‪ [8‬ולזה היו פועלים מה שיפעלו‬ ‫משותף אצל הכונה והוא לא יבין‬ ‫הכונה כמו שנראה אנשים אשר‬ ‫יתפעמו שידברו דבור נבואיי ולא‬ ‫יבינו מה שיאמרו‪1‬‬

‫]‪ [8‬ולכן היה‪ 1‬יעשה מה שיעשה‬ ‫והוא משתוקק אל הכונה והוא לא‬ ‫יבין הכונה כמו שנראה האנשים‬ ‫אשר יתפעמו שידברו הדבור ינבאו‬ ‫על מה שיהיה והם לא יבינו מה‬ ‫שיאמרו‬

‫]‪ [8‬ולכן היתה הנפש תעשה‬ ‫פעולתה‪ 1‬מוליכה‪ 2‬אל הכוונה והיא‬ ‫לא תבין הכונה כמו מה שכבר נראה‬ ‫האנשים שיתפעמו לדבר דבור‪3‬‬ ‫ינבאו בו ממה שיהיה והם לא יבינו‬ ‫מה שיאמרו‬

‫‪ 1‬שיאמרו[ יאמרו‪ :‬א ||‬

‫‪ 1‬היה‪ [AR :‬היתה‪ | CDR1 :‬היא‪| B :‬‬ ‫היה ‪ +‬כלומר‪ + | M :‬ר״ל הנפש‪|| T :‬‬

‫‪ 1‬פעולתה[ פעולותיה‪ :‬ד || ‪ 2‬מוליכה[‬ ‫ומוליכה‪ :‬ד || ‪ 3‬דבור[ דבר‪ :‬ה ||‬

‫]‪ [9‬וכלל המאמר שהוא אי אפשר‬ ‫]‪ [9‬וכלל אומר שהוא בלא ספק‬ ‫שלא יהיה בטבע יחסים וצורות‬ ‫שיהיו בטבע יחסים וצורות אחר‬ ‫שהוא‪ 1‬יצטרך אל הולדת הדבר אל כי היה צריך בהולדת הדבר אל‬ ‫דומה‪ 2‬לו ולא ימצא לכל מה שיתילד דמיונו ולא ימצא לכל מה שיתילד‬ ‫דמיון יתילד ממנו אבל אנחנו כאשר‬ ‫מכמוהו אבל כאשר הצטרכנו אל‬ ‫הוצרכנו אל צורה מן הצורות היה‬ ‫צורה מן הצורות היה ממנה‪ 3‬פעל‬ ‫מאתנו פועל מה נדע שלא יתחדש‬ ‫מה נדע שהוא לא יתחדש בו אחד‬ ‫ותתחדש אז זאת הצורה כאלו היא בו לבדו הצורה ההיא ותתחדש אם‬ ‫כן הצורה ההיא כאלו היא היתה‬ ‫נטמנת בדבר אחר והוא באמת‬ ‫טמונה בדבר אחר והיא באמת‬ ‫נטמנת בטבע המוליד‬ ‫טמונה בטבע המוליד‬

‫]‪ [9‬וכלל המאמר שאי אפשר שלא‬ ‫יהיו בטבע יחסים וצורות אחר‬ ‫שיצטרך בהולדת הדבר אל כמהו‬ ‫ולא ימצא לכל מה שיתילד דמיון‬ ‫יתילד‪ 1‬ממנו אבל אנחנו כאשר‬ ‫הוצרכנו אל צורה מהצורות יהיה‬ ‫מאתנו פעל מה נדע שהוא לא‬ ‫יחודש בו לבדו הצורה ההיא ונמצא‬ ‫אז אותה הצורה כאלו היא היתה‬ ‫טמונה בדבר אחר והיא באמת‬ ‫טמונה בטבע המוליד‬

‫‪ 1‬שהוא[ שהיה‪ :‬י || ‪ 2‬אל דומה[‬ ‫הדומה‪ :‬ט || ‪ 3‬ממנה[ ממנו‪ :‬י ||‬

‫‪ 1‬יתילד[ יתילדו‪ :‬ד ||‬

522

appendix b

Note: It is beyond doubt that the reviser makes heavy use of Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation in this lengthy quotation, especially as of section [2]. The reviser does not put much emphasis on aligning the text in the examples in section [1], but afterwards he follows Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation closely. However, he does not insert the text uncritically. He compares Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation to the Arabic in Averroes, and in most cases where they do not correspond to each other, he aligns the text according to Averroes. This is apparent, for instance, in the end of section [3], where the reviser refrains from inserting the words ‫לא היה יוצא אל הפועל‬, which are absent from Averroes’ text. This method enables the reviser to evade some of the errors in Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation, such as ‫ עזב‬instead of ‫ יקשה עליו‬for ‫ أغفل‬in section [1]; ‫ מוליכה‬instead of ‫ משתוקק‬for ‫ مستاقة‬in section [8];7 and ‫ ונמצא‬instead of ‫ ותתחדש‬in section [9], where the Arabic probably had ‫ونجد‬. The reviser also adheres to Averroes in less crucial instances, such as ‫ ממה‬instead of ‫ בערמתו במה‬in section [4], where the Arabic has only ‫ ;مما‬and ‫ ינבאו בו‬instead of simply ‫ ינבאו‬in section [8], where the Arabic has ‫ينبئون به‬. The reviser, as do some of the manuscripts, and as we have seen in Gersonides’ quotation, has some trouble discerning when Themistius is referring to nature and when he is referring to the soul in the earth. This is apparent at the beginning of section [8], where he erroneously explicated the subject as ‫הנפש‬, where Themistius is actually referring to nature (the Arabic just has ‫ صارت‬with an implicit subject).8 Concerning style and terminology, sometimes the reviser prefers his own over Moshe ibn Tibbon’s choices, such as ‫ כמהו‬for ‫ )مثله( דמיונו‬in sections [1] and [9]; ‫בקיאותו‬ for ‫ )حذقه( ערמתו‬in section [4]; ‫ העפר‬for ‫ )الطين( הטיט‬in section [4]; and so forth.

7 This example could have already been corrected in the manuscript of Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation that the reviser was using. 8 This example could also have already existed in the manuscript of Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation that the reviser was using; cf. the gloss in manuscript T, which also thinks that the soul is the subject. The reviser’s text’s affinity to the version in T should be explored further—as T also shares the revision ‫ בקיאותו‬at section [4].

‫‪523‬‬

‫‪two hebrew translations of averroes’ themistius quotations‬‬ ‫‪Text 3:‬‬

‫‪Averroes I‬‬ ‫‪: 197a37–n13‬י‬ ‫‪: 165b32–166a7‬ט‬ ‫‪: 163a2–14‬א‬ ‫]‪ [1‬תמסתיוס יאמר בזה המקום‬ ‫שמי שאמר בשמש‪ 1‬ושאר הככבים‬ ‫שהם בעלי תכלית‪ 2‬ושלהם כחות‬ ‫בלי תכלית‪ 3‬לא יצדק במאמרו‪ 4‬לפי‬ ‫שהכחות אשר בככבים והם אשר‬ ‫אין תכלית להם אינם טבעיים בהם‪5‬‬ ‫ולא על שהם גשמים אבל הם אם‪6‬‬ ‫נתלים בעלה הראשונה ואם בנפש‬ ‫בהם מזה הכח אשר אינו בגשם‬

‫‪Themistius Hebraicus‬‬ ‫‪11–29‬כב‬

‫‪Averroes II‬‬ ‫‪: 333b11–334a2‬ד‬ ‫‪: 162b32–163a9‬ה‬

‫]‪ [1‬מי ]‪ [1‬ותמאסתיוס יאמר‪ 1‬בזה המקום‬ ‫שאמר בשמש ושאר הכוכבים שהם שמי שאמר בשמש ושאר הכוכבים‬ ‫שהם בעלי תכלית ושיש לה כחות‬ ‫בעלי תכלית ושיש להם כחות אין‬ ‫תכלית להם לא אמר אמת במאמרו אין תכלית להם לא אמר נכונה‬ ‫במאמרו‪ 2‬לפי‪ 3‬שהכח אשר‬ ‫כי הכח אשר בכוכבים והוא אשר‬ ‫בכוכבים והוא אשר אין תכלית לו‬ ‫אין תכלית לו אינו טבעי בהם ולא‬ ‫לפי שהם גשמים אבל הוא אם נתלה אינו טבעי בם ולא על שהם גשמים‬ ‫אבל הוא אם נתלה בעלה הראשונה‬ ‫בעלה הראשונה או הנפש בהם‬ ‫ואם בנפש בם מאותם הכחות אשר‬ ‫מאותו הכח אשר אינו בגשם‬ ‫אינם בגשם‪4‬‬

‫‪ 1‬בשמש[ בשמים‪ :‬א || ‪ 2‬בעלי‬ ‫תכלית[ ב״ת‪ :‬א || ‪ 3‬בלתי תכלית[‬ ‫ב״ת‪ :‬א || ‪ 4‬במאמרו[ באמרו‪ :‬א ||‬ ‫‪ 5‬בהם[ להם‪ :‬י || ‪ 6‬אם[ אינם‪ :‬א ||‬

‫‪ 1‬יאמר[ אמר‪ :‬ד || ‪ 2‬במאמרו[‬ ‫במאמריו‪ :‬ד || ‪ 3‬לפי[ והוא‪ :‬ד ||‬ ‫‪ 4‬בגשם[ בגשמים‪ :‬ד ||‬

‫]‪ [2‬וזה שהעלה הראשונה היא אשר ]‪ [2‬וזה כי הסבה הראשונה היא‬ ‫אשר תסבב אותם זמן אין תכלית‬ ‫יסבבה זמן בלי‪ 1‬תכלית לפי שלו‬ ‫לו כי הוא אלו היה מה שיש להם‬ ‫היה מה שלו כח‪ 2‬במדרגת מה‪3‬‬ ‫שלגשם ומה שלגודל ולא יהיה תמיד בכח כדרך מה שיש לגשם ולגודל‬ ‫בפעל היה בלא ספק יצטרך אל* וזה ולא יהיה מתמיד בפעל היה בלא‬ ‫ספק יגע ויצטרך אל מנוחה וזה כי‬ ‫שגשמי‪ 4‬הככבים למה שהיה בהם‬ ‫גשמי הכוכבים מפני שהיה בהם‬ ‫מה שהוא בכח היה‪ 5‬כחתם לפי‬ ‫מה שהוא בכח היו כחותם לפי זה‬ ‫זה בעל תכלית וזה שהם בכ״א מן‬ ‫בעלי תכלית וזה שהם בכל אחד מן‬ ‫העתים במקומות‪ 6‬זולת המקומות‬ ‫העתים במקום זולת המקום הראשון‬ ‫הראשונים פעם יהיה במקום מה‬ ‫ופעם יהיו במקום אחד ופעם יהיו‬ ‫פעם במקום אחר ואלו המקומות‬ ‫במקום אחר ואלו המקומות בדרך‬ ‫במדרגת להם תכלית התנועה‬ ‫תכליות‪ 1‬התנועות‬

‫]‪ [2‬וזה‪ 1‬שהעלה הראשונה היא‬ ‫אשר תנהיגם‪ 2‬זמן אין תכלית לו‪3‬‬ ‫לפי שאלו היה מה שלהם בכח‬ ‫במדרגה מה שלגשם ומה שלגודל‬ ‫ולא יהיה תמיד בפעל היה‪ 4‬משיג‬ ‫אותם בלי ספק הלאות ויצטרכו‬ ‫אל מנוחה וזה‪ 5‬שגרמי הכוכבים‬ ‫למה שהיה בם מה‪ 6‬שהוא בכח‬ ‫יהיו כחותיהם כפי זה בעלות‬ ‫תכלית וזה שהם בכל עת מן העתים‬ ‫במקום בלתי המקום הראשון ואלו‬ ‫המקומות במדרגת תכלית התנועה‬

‫‪524‬‬

‫‪appendix b‬‬

‫)‪(cont.‬‬

‫‪Averroes I‬‬ ‫‪: 197a37–n13‬י‬ ‫‪: 165b32–166a7‬ט‬ ‫‪: 163a2–14‬א‬ ‫‪ 1‬בלי[ בלתי‪ :‬א || ‪ 2‬כח[ בכח‪ :‬י ||‬ ‫‪ 3‬מה[ אשר‪ :‬א || ‪ 4‬שגשמי[ שגשמים‪:‬‬ ‫א || ‪ 5‬היה[ היו‪ :‬י || ‪ 6‬במקומות[‬ ‫המקומות‪ :‬א ||‬

‫‪Themistius Hebraicus‬‬ ‫‪11–29‬כב‬

‫‪ 1‬תכליות[ תכלית‪|| C :‬‬

‫‪Averroes II‬‬ ‫‪: 333b11–334a2‬ד‬ ‫‪: 162b32–163a9‬ה‬

‫‪ 1‬וזה[ לפי‪ :‬ד || ‪ 2‬תנהיגם[ תניעם‪ :‬ד ||‬ ‫‪ 3‬לו[ לה‪ :‬ד || ‪ 4‬היה[ לית‪ :‬ה || ‪ 5‬וזה[‬ ‫ויתחייב מזה‪ :‬ד || ‪ 6‬מה[ כח‪ :‬ד ||‬

‫*‬

‫‪All three manuscripts leave an‬‬ ‫‪empty space here, probably real‬‬‫‪izing that a word is missing‬‬

‫]‪ [3‬וא״א במה שהוא בכח כשיבא‪1‬‬ ‫אחריו מה שהוא בפעל והוא אשר‬ ‫כוונו אליו לא יהיה לו תכלית הקצה‬ ‫ואמנם הסבה‪ 2‬שאין‪ 3‬בהם כלל מה‬ ‫שהוא בכח להיותם‪ 4‬תמיד בפעל‬ ‫ואין מדרכו שיתחלף בעת אחר עת‬ ‫הנה איך אפשר שיחשב שלהם‪5‬‬ ‫גודל וגשם במדרגת אלו הדברים‬ ‫אשר יראה בהם תמיד מה שהוא‬ ‫בכח היו מקבלי‪ 6‬ההפסד ובלתי‬ ‫מקבלים‬

‫]‪ [3‬ואי אפשר במה שהוא בכח‬ ‫כאשר יהיה שיבא אחריו מה שהוא‬ ‫בפועל והוא אשר כונתו אליו שלא‬ ‫יהיה לו תכלית וקצה ואולם העלה‬ ‫אשר אין בה כלל מה שהוא בכח‬ ‫אבל הוא תמיד בפועל ואין מדרכה‬ ‫שתתחלף בעת אחר עת איך אפשר‬ ‫שידומה לה גודל וגשמות בדרך אלו‬ ‫הדברים אשר יראה בהם תמיד מה‬ ‫שהוא בכח היו שיקבלו ההפסד או‬ ‫לא יקבלוהו‬

‫‪ 1‬כשיבא[ כשיביא‪ :‬א || ‪ 2‬הסבה[‬ ‫הסברא‪ :‬א || ‪ 3‬שאין[ אשר‪ :‬א ||‬ ‫‪ 4‬להיותם[ בהיותם‪ :‬ט || ‪ 5‬שלהם[‬ ‫שהוא‪ :‬י || ‪ 6‬היו מקבלי[ היה מקבל‪:‬‬ ‫א ||‬

‫]‪ [4‬ובכלל אם היה הפעל הנפרד‬ ‫בעצמותו‪ 1‬אפשר שיתמיד אל לא‬ ‫תכלית עם התמדת הזמן הנה אם‬ ‫הפעל אשר ייצא ואם הוא בכח‬ ‫הוא הפך זה הדבר אשר הוא בכח‬

‫]‪ [3‬ואי אפשר במה שהוא בכח‬ ‫אחר‪ 1‬שהיה מביא בזולתו מה שהוא‬ ‫בפעל והוא‪ 2‬אשר יכונו שלא יהיה‬ ‫לו תכלית וקצה ואמנם העלה אשר‬ ‫אין בה‪ 3‬כלל מה שהוא בכח אבל‬ ‫היא תמיד‪ 4‬בפעל ואין מדרכה עת‬ ‫אחר עת איך אפשר שידומה שיש‬ ‫לה גודל וגשם במדרגת אלו הדברים‬ ‫אשר יראה בם תמיד מה שהוא בכח‬ ‫היו מקבלים ההפסד או לא יקבלוהו‬

‫‪ 1‬אחר[ לית‪ :‬ד || ‪ 2‬והוא[ וזהו‪ :‬ד ||‬ ‫‪ 3‬בה[ בו‪ :‬ד || ‪ 4‬תמיד[ ‪ +‬בכח‪ :‬ד ||‬

‫]‪ [4‬ובכלל הנה הפעל הנפרד‬ ‫בעצמותו אפשר שיתמיד בלא‬ ‫תכלית עם תמידות הזמן ואולם‬ ‫הפועל אשר יצא ממה שהוא בכח‬ ‫הנה הוא גמר אותו הדבר אשר הוא‬

‫]‪ [4‬ובכלל אם היה הפעל הנפרד‬ ‫בעצמו אפשר שיתמיד באין תכלית‬ ‫עם תמידות הזמן ואמנם הפעל אשר‬ ‫יצא ממה שהוא בכח הנה כלות‬ ‫אותו הדבר אשר בכח ואי אפשר‬

two hebrew translations of averroes’ themistius quotations

525

(cont.)

Averroes II ‫ד‬: 333b11–334a2 ‫ה‬: 162b32–163a9

‫בכמו זה הפעל שיתמיד זמן אין‬ 1‫תכלית לו אם היה קדמוהו ממה‬ ‫שהוא בכח והוא לפניו הנה יחויב‬ ‫ המניע אשר‬2‫אם כן שיהיה בזה‬ 3‫בכוכבים אין תכלית לו לפי שקנות‬ ‫הכוכבים זה הכח אינו על צד מה‬ ‫שבכח ואמנם תנועותיהם בזה‬ ‫המקום הם בעלות תכלית וזה שמה‬ ‫ אמנם הוא בכוכבים‬4‫שהוא בכח‬ ‫כפי אלו העניינים‬ || ‫ ד‬:‫ קדמוהו ממה[ שיקדמנו מה‬1 ‫ ד‬:‫ שקנות[ שקניית‬3 || ‫ ד‬:‫ בזה[ לית‬2 || ‫ ד‬:‫ ואמנם…בכח[ לית‬4 ||

Themistius Hebraicus ‫כב‬11–29

‫בכח ואי אפשר בכמו הפועל הזה‬ ‫שיתמיד זמן אין תכלית לו כי הנה‬ ‫כבר קדמו מה שהוא בכח והוא‬ ‫לפניו ויתחייב אם כן שיהיה הכח‬ ‫המניע אשר בכוכבים אין תכלית לו‬ ‫כי קנות הכוכבים הכח הזה אינו על‬ ‫צד מה שהוא בכח ואולם תנועתם‬ ‫במקום הזה הנה היא בעלת תכלית‬ ‫וזה כי מה שהוא בכח אמנם הוא‬ ‫בכוכבים לפי זה הענין‬

Averroes I ‫י‬: 197a37–n13 ‫ט‬: 165b32–166a7 ‫א‬: 163a2–14 ‫וא״א בכמו זה הפעל שיתמיד זמן‬ ‫ קדם‬2‫אין תכלית לו אחר שכבר‬ ‫לו מה שהוא בכח והוא קודם לו‬ ‫יחוייב א״כ שיהיה הכח המניע‬ 4‫ בככבים אין תכלית להם‬3‫אשר‬ ‫ הככבים זה הכח אינו‬5‫לפי שקנית‬ ‫על צד מה שהוא בכח הנה אמנם‬ ‫הוא בככבים כפי אלו הענינים‬

‫ אחר‬2 || ‫ א‬:‫ בעצמותו[ בעצמו‬1 [‫ אשר‬3 || ‫ א‬:‫שכבר[ אשר כבר‬ [‫ שקנית‬5 || ‫ א‬:‫ להם[ לית‬4 || ‫ א‬:‫אין‬ || ‫ ט‬:‫שקנות‬

Note: In this quotation, the reviser makes heavy use of Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation, resulting in a virtually identical text. However, here again the reviser aligns with the Arabic in Averroes where there is no correspondence to Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew. This is most apparent in instances of discrepancy between the singular and plural. For example, ‫ מאותם הכחות‬for ‫ מאותו הכח‬in section [1] (although in this case the Arabic we have in Averroes sides with Moshe ibn Tibbon); ‫ תכלית התנועה‬for ‫תכליות התנועות‬ (the Arabic has ‫نهايات الحركة‬, mixing plural and singular; manuscript C has the opposite: ‫ )תכלית התנועות‬in section [2]; and ‫תנועותיהם‬, ‫ בעלות‬and ‫ העניינים‬for (respectively) ‫תנועתם‬, ‫בעלת‬, and ‫ הענין‬in section [4] (the Arabic in Averroes sides with the reviser). There are a few instances where it seems that the reviser read or understood the Arabic differently from Moshe ibn Tibbon. In section [2], Moshe ibn Tibbon reads ‫تديرها‬ (‫)תסבב אותם‬, whereas the reviser read ‫;)תנהיגם( تدبرها‬9 In section [3] Moshe ibn Tibbon reads ‫)יבא אחריו( ياتى بعده‬, agreeing with the Arabic we have in Averroes, while the

9 This is also how Badawī read the text. The Arabic manuscripts have the rasm ‫ىدىرها‬.

526

appendix b

reviser probably read ‫ ;)מביא בזולתו( ياتى بغيره‬and in section [4] there is one instance where Moshe ibn Tibbon reads ‫ن‬ ّ َ ‫ )הנה( فِإ‬whereas the reviser reads ‫)אם( فِإْن‬, and another where Moshe ibn Tibbon reads ‫( اذ‬like the Arabic we have) while the reviser again reads ‫)אם( ِإْن‬. Finally, the reviser retains some of his own terminological preferences, e.g., ‫אמר נכונה‬ for ‫ )يصب( אמר אמת‬in section [1]; ‫ במדרגה‬for ‫כדרך‬/‫ )بمنزلة( בדרך‬in sections [2] and [3]; and ‫ כלות‬for ‫ )انقضاء( גמר‬in section [4].

appendix c

Matter and Element—Case Study One of the most striking features that sets Version I (mostly reflected in manuscript C) and Version II apart from each other1 is the manner each of them handles the Arabic translation’s employment of ‫ عنصر‬as a homonymous translation for both στοιχεῖον and ὕλη. At the same time, the Arabic also adds the term ‫ هيولى‬as an occasional translation for ὕλη. The Arabic deviation from the Greek terms and the respective Hebrew responses can be seen in table 66: table 66

Overall distribution of the terms “matter” and “element” according to language/version

Aristotle, Metaph.

Element

Matter

στοιχεῖον

ὕλη

Them. Arabic Them. Heb. I Them. Heb. II

a‫هيولى‬

‫عنصر‬ ‫יסוד‬

‫חומר‬ ‫יסוד‬

‫היולי‬

a The vast majority of the uses of the term ‫ هيولى‬is within the expression ‫لا يشو به الهيولى‬, which probably translates μὴ ἔχουσιν ὕλην or ἄϋλος.

Table 67 contains typical examples that exhibit the distribution of the terms ‫ יסוד‬and ‫ חומר‬along with their Arabic and (Aristotle’s) Greek counterparts (when applicable) in Themistius’ paraphrase of Metaphysics 12.4:

1 The present example does not discuss Version III separately, as in this context it is in agreement with Version II.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400443_021

‫‪528‬‬

‫‪appendix c‬‬ ‫‪Examples of translations of “matter” and “element” according to language/‬‬ ‫‪Hebrew MS‬‬

‫‪Aristotle, Metaph. 12.4‬‬ ‫‪But the element (στοι‬‬‫‪χεῖον) is prior to the things‬‬ ‫‪of which it is an element‬‬ ‫)‪(στοιχεῖον) (1070b2–3‬‬ ‫‪N/A‬‬

‫‪Themistius Arabus‬‬

‫‪table 67‬‬

‫‪Themistus Hebraicus‬‬

‫‪ N/A‬היסוד]‪/[ABML‬החמר]‪ (T0) [CD‬קודם מן‬ ‫הדברים אשר הוא יסוד ]‪/[ABMTL‬חומר‬

‫]‪ [CD‬להם )ט‪(9‬‬

‫‪ N/A‬ויתחיב בו עם זה מה שלא יקבלהו השכל‬ ‫שיהיה חומר ]‪/[CA‬יסוד ]‪ [DBMLT‬העצם‬

‫תחת העצם )ט‪(12‬‬ ‫‪ There are three prin-‬مبادئ جميع الأشياء ثلاثة العنصر התחלות כל הדברים הנמצאים שלשה הצורה‬

‫‪ciples—the form, the‬‬ ‫‪privation, and the matter‬‬ ‫‪(ὕλη) (1070b19).‬‬ ‫‪This is like the perceptible‬‬ ‫‪bodies, that form is the‬‬ ‫‪hot, and in another sense‬‬ ‫‪the cold—the privation,‬‬ ‫‪and matter (ὕλη) is poten‬‬‫‪tially these (1070b11–13).a‬‬

‫והחומר ]‪/[CL‬והיסוד ]‪ [DABMT‬וההעדר‬

‫والصورة والعدم مثل ذلك فى‬ ‫الجوهر المحسوس أن الحر نظير‬ ‫الصورة والبرد نظير العدم والعنصر והקור כנגד ההעדר והחומר]‪/[CDL‬והיסוד‬ ‫]‪ [ABMT‬הוא הדבר אשר לו שני אלו בכח‬ ‫هو الذى له هذان بالقوة‬ ‫)ט‪(27–25‬‬

‫דמיון זה בעצם המוחש כי החום כנגד הצורה‬

‫‪ N/A‬وأما العناصر فلا يجوز أن تكون‬ ‫إلا فى الأشياء التى هى منها وما‬ ‫كان عنصرا ً فليس مانع يمنع من‬ ‫أن يقال له مبدأ وما كان مبدءا ً‬ ‫فليس له عنصر لا محالة‬

‫ואולם היסודות ]‪/[ABDML‬החמרים]‪[C‬‬ ‫)‪ (T0‬הנה אי אפשר שיהיו כי אם בדברים‬ ‫אשר מהם ומה שיהיה יסוד]‪/[ABDML‬‬ ‫חומר]‪ (T0) [C‬אינו נמנע שיקרא התחלה‬ ‫ומה שהוא התחלה הנה אינו יסוד‬

‫]‪/[ABDML‬חומר]‪ (T0) [C‬בלא ספק )י‪(3–1‬‬ ‫‪a Ross’ English translation is slightly modified.‬‬

matter and element—case study

529

Given the special meaning of the term στοιχεῖον in this chapter (see Commentary, chapter 4), and the fact that the chapter explicitly discusses ὕλη as well, it is not difficult to see why some of the occurrences of ‫ عنصر‬can be understood as referring to matter. For example, an expression like “the element/matter is prior to the thing of which it is an element/matter” is so abstract that it could really go either way, but C’s persistence on ‫ חומר‬here superimposes the term on the text, since (as can be seen in Aristotle’s original Greek) the term discussed was στοιχεῖον. Paradoxically, this inconsistency transforms the text from the homonymy of ‫ عنصر‬to the synonymy of ‫ יסוד‬and ‫חומר‬. As can be seen from the table above, Landauer was not consistent in his editorial decisions. Apparently, unifying the terms στοιχεῖον and ὕλη into the homonymous term ‫عنصر‬ was a well-known problem in Greek into Arabic translations. Al-Fārābī expresses his frustration about this in his Book of Letters (Kitāb al-Ḥurūf ): The philosophy that now exists among the Arabs has been translated for them from the Greeks. Those who translated it have endeavored, in naming the concepts present in it, to follow the courses that we have mentioned.2 We find some who exaggerate and go too far to express them all in Arabic. This leads them into homonymy. For example, they have given the following two concepts one word in Arabic: they have named al-usṭuqus [Greek στοιχεῖον] al-ʿunṣur, and they have also named al-hayūlā [Greek ὕλη] al-ʿunṣur. Al-usṭuqus in not named al-mādda or hayūlā. Sometimes they have used al-hayūlā, and sometimes they have used al-ʿunṣur in place of al-hayūlā.3 As seen above, given the importance of these terms in different contexts of Aristotle’s discussion, this problem affects the understanding of the text in many different

2 Al-Fārābī is referring to the previous section of his work, where he enumerated the different kinds of strategies one can employ when trying to translate a given philosophical concept from one language to another. See al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, § 155. An English translation of the second part of this work is available in Khalidi, Medieval, 1–26. 3 Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, §156. I quote from the English translation in Khalidi, Medieval, 25, slightly modified and with standardizing the transliteration. It is possible that al-Fārābī, who knew Themistius’ paraphrase, had it in mind when writing this passage. For the history of the Arabic term ‫ مادة‬and its relation to ‫( هيولى‬and, obviously, Aristotle’s ὕλη) see Wolfson, “Arabic,” 47–50. According to Wolfson, the term ‫ عنصر‬is not a direct translation of στοιχεῖον (or ‫ ;)أسطقس‬it is rather a translation of the Greek χυμός (humor), and its meaning as “element” derives from an analogy offered by Galen between στοιχεῖον in the world and χυμός in animals (Wolfson, “Arabic,” 56). It is unclear from Wolfson’s discussion how ‫ عنصر‬came to be understood as “matter” as well.

530

appendix c

instances throughout Themistius’ paraphrase. The terms ‫חומר‬, ‫יסוד‬, and ‫—היולי‬taken together—appear 127 times in the text.4 Of them, we have only 32 occurrences in the Arabic, many of them thanks to the quotation preserved in ibn Taymiyya (see above, 2.2.8). table 68

‫היולי‬ ‫חומר‬ ‫יסוד‬

‫היולי‬, ‫חומר‬, and ‫—יסוד‬instances per Hebrew MS

Landauer

C

D

A

B

M

T

49 30 48

3 110 14

– 21 39

47 15 62

45 14 64

49 9 64

41 6 47

Note: the total sum of occurrences in the manuscripts in not identical for the following reasons: in manuscript A, 3 instances are missing because one leaf is lost. In one case (180r19) there is an occurrence of ‫ היסוד‬which is corrected to ‫ החומר‬in the margin; In manuscript B, 4 instances are missing due to scribal errors; D is incomplete (see above, p. 66) and besides is missing 3 instances due to scribal errors. M’s beginning is missing (see above, p. 72); and 18 entries are burnt in T. Since in the Arabic of Themistius’ paraphrase the term ‫ عنصر‬is a homonymous translation for both στοιχεῖον and ὕλη, it is not surprising that many occurrences of the term without sufficient context left Moshe ibn Tibbon in the dark as to what meaning is intended. Isḥāq, at least, had the original text before him when he made his decisions, problematic as they may be. Since there are several instances where Themistius, following Aristotle, uses the term στοιχεῖον in a meaning that is in itself close to ὕλη, there could have been no way to be sure which term was intended. Furthermore, it is sometimes difficult to understand the logic behind the artificial difference between ‫( عنصر‬when denoting matter) and ‫ هيولى‬within the Arabic text. The term ‫أسطقس‬, which is a common translation/transliteration of στοιχεῖον, does not appear in the Arabic fragments, and I doubt if it was used in the Arabic translation at all. In addition, as far as I can judge, there is no reason to assume that the term ‫ مادة‬was used in the original Arabic translation either. Its only appearance in the singular is in the expression ‫المادة والعنصر‬, which is probably a later gloss on ‫כה( العنصر‬16; Aristotle, in the parallel passage, 1074a33–34, only has ὕλη). There are also two instances of ‫مواد‬

4 A similar statistic methodology for determining relations between different translation stages within a given text is found in Freudenthal, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon,” 33–34.

matter and element—case study

531

(= ‫יד ;החמרים‬24, ‫לב‬29), the former surviving in Arabic. In these instances, ‫ مواد‬functions as the plural of ‫هيولى‬. Aristotle’s standard definition for στοιχεῖον is “the first constituent from which something is composed (ἐξ οὗ σύγκειται πρώτου ἐνυπάρχοντος).”5 One of its most frequent applications is to denote the four physical elements (fire, air, water, and earth). Another frequent application of the term is to denote the various suggestions for the identity of the basic elements of reality in thinkers before Aristotle, whom he surveys (or hypothetical constructions in this vein that Aristotle seeks to explore). In Metaphysics 12.4—which Themistius is paraphrasing (and sometimes even quoting)6 in the examples given in table 67—Aristotle employs the term στοιχεῖον idiosyncratically, as an immanent cause which is “in some way conserved in the thing caused.”7 Aristotle hypothetically attributes this function to form, matter, and privation. Looking at the Hebrew manuscripts, two different strategies to deal with these problems emerge. Version I aspires to differentiate between ‫ عنصر‬as στοιχεῖον and ‫ عنصر‬as ὕλη, choosing ‫ יסוד‬and ‫ חומר‬per case according to what it takes to be the meaning of the term in each instance, where ‫ יסוד‬denotes “element” and ‫ חומר‬denotes “matter.” The counterpart of this process is suppressing the autonomy of the term ‫ هيولى‬by rendering it as ‫חומר‬. The result is a text aggressively leaning toward the term ‫חומר‬, blurring the transparent relation between the Arabic and the Hebrew. Version II relinquishes ‫חומר‬ in favor of the (by no means less accurate) ‫יסוד‬, retaining the homonymy in the Arabic, but at least reflecting it accurately. The same holds for the retention of ‫ היולי‬instead of ‫ חומר‬for ‫هيولى‬.

5 Aristotle, Metaph., 5.3.1014a26 (tr. Crowley). For a general discussion see Crowley, “On the Use,” 370–378. 6 In the present examples, there is no reason to assume that Themistius does not follow Aristotle’s terminology. Besides the fact that problem of ‫ عنصر‬for both στοιχεῖον and ὕλη is commonplace in Arabic translations (note al-Fārābī’s frustration with this above), in most cases, when Themistius changes Aristotle’s terminology it is not done in isolation but reflects some interpretative strategy. For example, up until chapter 3 Themistius consciously avoids the use of the term “matter,” substituting it with ‫جسم‬/‫( גשם‬reflecting σῶμα), in an attempt to restrict “matter” to substances that undergo generation and corruption (see above, p. 141). 7 Crubellier, “Metaphysics Λ 4,” 144. According to Crubellier, Aristotle’s usage of the term στοιχεῖον in this chapter is a “terminological innovation … this special use of στοιχεῖον cannot be found elsewhere in the Aristotelian corpus” (Crubellier, 144). The context is a critical discussion of Plato’s conception—or what could have been his conception—of στοιχεῖον. As Crubellier puts it: “Aristotle’s calling form, matter, and privation ‘elements’ is not to be taken as a straightforward account of Plato’s doctrine, nor as a positive part of Aristotle’s doctrine either. It is rather an ad hoc conceptual device, by means of which he reshapes Plato’s conceptions in order to refute them more effectively” (Crubellier, 144).

532

appendix c

Since there is no “ideal” manuscripts of either version, there are a few instances in manuscript C (the main source for Version I) where we have ‫ יסוד‬for “matter,” and even three instances of ‫היולי‬. The other manuscripts distribute the terms according to their respective affinity/distance to the tradition represented in C: A (and close to it, M) are the farthest away (although there are still a few instances where they agree), while D, B, and T are closer to A than to C, but occasionally share the latter’s strategies. Using ‫ יסוד‬in the sense of matter already had history in Hebrew translations and literature, most notably in texts with a Platonic flavor, and also in Yehuda ibn Tibbon’s translation of Yehuda ha-Levī’s Kuzari.8 However, Moshe’s employment of ‫יסוד‬ as “matter” in an Aristotelian text—especially a text that has explicit references to an element as a constituent or a physical entity (earth, fire, etc.)—is unorthodox, especially after his father Shmuel had standardized the Hebrew philosophical vocabulary. Furthermore, in no other translation by Moshe have I found ‫ יסוד‬in the sense of matter. I reviewed Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translations of philosophical works in an attempt to understand his approach to the technical use of the term ‫ عنصر‬and perhaps make some sense of the confusion in the various manuscripts of Themistius’ paraphrase.9 As it turns out, the term ‫ عنصر‬does not appear at all in Averroes’ epitomes of On the Soul (translated in 1244), Physics (1246), On the Heavens (1248?), On Generation and Corruption (1250), Meteorology (1252), and Parva Naturalia (1254)—all of which were translated before Themistius’ paraphrase (1255). Neither does the term appear in alFārābī’s Principles of the Existents (1248?). In al-Baṭalyawsī’s (d. 1127) Kitāb al-Dawāʾir al-Wahmiyya (The Book of Imaginary Circles),10 which Moshe translated c. 1250, the term ‫ عنصر‬appears four times, three times in the context of one of the four elements,11 and once in the sense of a constituting element12 (in most cases the author prefers to use the term ‫)ركن‬. It is always translated into ‫יסוד‬. A key encounter for Moshe ibn Tibbon was the case of Maimonides’ Al-Maqāla fī Ṣināʿat al-Manṭiq (‫ ;מלות ההגיון‬Art of Logic), which he translated in 1254. Maimonides writes:

8 9 10 11 12

See the useful survey in Davidovich, “Mystery,” 20–40. The dates of the translations are based on the information provided in Zonta, “Medieval,” 30–33. See a critical edition in Eliyahu, “Al-Batalyawsi,” vol. 2, 1–94. A (dated) critical edition of Moses ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation appears in Kaufmann, Die Spuren. Eliyahu, “Al-Batalyawsi,” §15, 2; §15,5; §47, 3 (Hebrew in Kaufmann, Die Spuren, respectively 5,19; 6,2; 19,2). Eliyahu, §47,3 (Hebrew in Kaufmann, 19,2).

matter and element—case study

533

[T]his thing which is common to the four elements (‫)היסודות ;الأسطقسات‬, which is necessarily intelligized [i.e., can be perceived only by the intellect as it is not available to the senses], is what we call the primary matter (‫החומר ;المادة الأولى‬ ‫)הראשון‬, and its name in Greek language is ‫)ההיולי( الهيولى‬, and frequently many physicians and philosophers call it ‫)אלענצר( العنصر‬.13 Moshe ibn Tibbon preserves a Hebrew transliteration of the Arabic for ‫العنصر‬, instead of translating it, since he understands that Maimonides is referring to a specific Arabic term.14 A definition of this sort makes clear that Moshe was aware of the possibility to understand ‫ عنصر‬as matter, although it may be significant that the precise understanding should not be just any matter, but prime matter, and this may have been a consideration against translation ‫ عنصر‬into matter in some contexts. These two examples show that (assuming that the dating is correct) by the time Moshe embarked upon translating Themistius’ paraphrase, he already had some experience with the term ‫ عنصر‬in both of its meanings as matter and element, but the appearances were sparse and did not occur in both meanings within the same text. However, his father, Shmuel ibn Tibbon, indeed had experience with this homonymy. In Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭriq’s (c. 800) Arabic translation/adaptation of Aristotle’s Meteorology,15 translated by Shmuel as ‫אותות השמים‬, there are nine occurrences of the term ‫عنصر‬. Shmuel translates the first eight occurrences into ‫יסוד‬, and the final occurrence into ‫חומר‬.16 The first eight occurrences clearly refer to one of the four elements (and occasionally to the fifth), and whenever there is correspondence between the Arabic text and the original Greek, the term translated is στοιχεῖον.17 But in the final occurrence, where the Arabic has ‫عنصر‬, the Greek passage on which it is based has ὕλη. It is remark-

13

14

15 16

17

Efros, Maimonides, 51; I have made some modifications to Efros’ English translation, rendering it more literal in some places (for terminological considerations), and also on the basis of comparison to the complete Arabic original unavailable to him, published by Türker, “Mûsâ ibn-i Meymûnʾun,” 52. Aḥiṭub (fl. thirteenth century) did the same in his Hebrew translation (Efros, Maimonides, 84,6). Yosef b. Yehoshuʿa b. Vivas (fl. fourteenth century) translates into ‫( יסוד‬Efros, 119,17). Anecdotally, Efros’ original English translation for ‫—אלעצנר‬on the basis of ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew, since he did not have the Arabic of this chapter—was “foundation.” See overview in Fontaine, Otot, iv–x and the Arabic-Latin edition by Schoonheim, Meteorology. Here are the references (line numbers in Schoonheim’s Arabic edition, followed by book and line numbers in Fontaine’s Hebrew edition in parentheses): 9, twice (I.74, twice); 25, twice (I.90, twice); 67 (I.139); 135 (I.251); 884, twice (III.17, twice); 1057 (III.296). See, e.g., Aristotle, Metaph., 1.1.338a22, corresponding to line 9 in the Arabic and I.74 in the Hebrew.

534

appendix c

able that Shmuel, who only had the Arabic, was aware enough to correctly read through the homonymous use of ‫ عنصر‬in a delicate context.18 There are two other texts that I would like to mention, namely Averroes’ epitome of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1258) and his middle commentary on On the Soul (1261), both of which Moshe translated after having translated Themistius’ paraphrase. Since they are later, it is interesting to see if the translation strategy they employ corresponds to one of the strategies employed in the paraphrase. The term ‫ عنصر‬appears once in Moshe’s translation of Averroes’ middle commentary on On the Soul, and is translated into ‫יסוד‬:19

18

Here is the relevant passage:

Shmuel ibn Tibbon III.295–297

Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭriq, 1055

‫ואמנם יהיו אילו הדברים‬ ‫وإنما صارت هذه الأشياء كالماء‬ ‫כמים ואחר כך יקפאו‬ ‫ثم يجمد من شدة البرد واليبس بعد‬ ,‫מחוזק הקור והיובש‬ ‫ אך‬,‫ والعنصر ואולי לא יהיו כמים‬.‫ ور بما لم تصر كالماء‬.‫ذلك‬ ‫החומר אשר יהיו ממנו‬ ‫الذى تصير منه هذه الأشياء لذلك‬ ‫אילו הדברים יש לו זה בכח‬ ‫כמו שנראה טבע המים‬ ‫بالقوةكما نرى طبيعة الماء‬

19

Aristotle, Meteorology, 3.6.378a31–34 (trans. E.W. Webster) Their dryness compresses it, and it congeals […] Hence, they are water in a sense, and in a sense not. Their matter (ὕλη) was that which might have become water, but it can no longer do so.

The use of ‫ יסוד‬here would have rendered the text incomprehensible as it would posit the existence of an element which is potentially like another element (namely, water), but in a sense different from the standard Aristotelian explanation of how the four elements can transform into one another. Incidentally, Gerard of Cremona’s twelfth century Latin translation from the Arabic was not as attentive, as he has elementum throughout. Gerard’s technique is discussed in detail in Schoonheim, Meteorology, xx–xxviii. Arabic original and English translation in Ivry, Averroës, 12 (I slightly modified the English translation). The context is Plato’s mathematical conception of the soul in his lost treatise On Philosophy. See Aristotle, On the Soul, 404b24–25: “The numbers are by him [Plato] expressly identified with the Forms themselves or principles, and are formed out of the elements (ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων)” (tr. J.A. Smith). For further discussion see Ivry, Averroës, 157.

535

matter and element—case study table 69

‫ عنصر‬in Averroes’ middle commentary on On the Soul

Hebrew

Arabic

‫סבר כי הנפש היא התחלות‬ ‫המספרים אשר הם צורות‬ ‫הדברים הכלליים ויסודותיהם‬

(I.188)

‫اعتقد ان النفس هى مبادئ‬ ‫الأعداد التى هى صور‬ ‫الأشياء الكلية وعناصرها‬ (12, 9–10)

English translation He [i.e., Plato] believed that the soul is [composed of] the first principles of numbers, which are the forms of universal things and their elements (12)

There is not much to gather from this, since the sense of ‫ عنصر‬here is the sense of a primary component and the term does not play any role in the text that requires deliberation. The more interesting example is Averroes’ epitome of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Here are all the appearances of the term ‫ عنصر‬in the text, along with their Hebrew translation and Arnzen’s English version: table 70

‫ عنصر‬in Averroes’ epitome of the Metaphyics

Ibn Tibbon Hebrewa

Averroes Arabicb

‫בעבור שהיה כל מתהוה אמנם‬ ‫יהיה דבר מה ר״ל בריאה וצורה‬ ‫מן דבר ר״ל חמר בדבר מה ר״ל‬ ‫הפעל‬

‫ואמנם יעשה המקובץ מן החמר‬ ‫והצורה כי הוא יעשה הצורה‬

‫لما كان كل متكون فإنما‬ ‫يكون شيئا ًما أعنى خلقة أو‬ ‫ أعنى‬,‫ ومن شىء ما‬,‫صورة‬ ‫ أعنى‬,‫عنصرا ً أو بشىء ما‬ (5–3 ,46)ً ‫فاعلا‬

English translationc each [thing] that comes to be is something (I mean form and natural disposition) and from something (I mean matter) and through something (I mean an agent).

‫ وإنما يصنع المجموع من المادة‬For he only produces that in which matter ‫ لأنه إنما يصنع‬,‫ والصورة‬and form are united because he produces

a The Hebrew text of Averroes’ epitome is collated from three different Hebrew manuscripts I examined: Paris—Bibliotheque Nationale Heb. 918 (118b–149a); Munich—Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. hebr. 108 (92a–115b); and Leipzig—Universitaetsbibliothek B.H. fol. 14 (250a– 281b). The latter two belong, respectively, to the same codices of manuscripts B and C of Themistius’ paraphrase, and in both cases the paraphrase and Averroes’ epitome are copied by the same hand. b Averroes, Talḫīṣ. c Arnzen, Averroes.

536 Table 70

appendix c ‫ عنصر‬in Averroes’ epitome of the Metaphyics (cont.)

Ibn Tibbon Hebrew

Averroes Arabic

‫בשנותו החומר עד שיתנהו‬ ‫הצורה‬

‫ונעיין מצורות הדברים‬ ‫המוחשים במוחלט ר״ל הבדלי‬

.‫החומר הראשון ומה חמריהם‬

‫ الصورة بتغيير العنصر إلى أن‬that which has a form simply by changing (3–2 ,50) ‫ يفيده الصورة‬the material in such a way that he gives the form to it ‫فلننظر ما صور الأشياء‬ ,‫المحسوسة على الإطلاق‬ ,‫أعنى فصول العنصر الأول‬ (2–1 ,62) ‫وما موادها‬

‫ולכן כל מה שאין לו יסוד אין‬

‫ولذلك جميع الأشياء التى‬ ‫ليس لها عنصر ليس فيها هذا בו ההרכבה הזאת ואין לו מניע‬ ‫التركيب ولا لها محرك أصلا ً כלל‬ (5–4 ,73) ‫ולכן היה המובן מן הגשם‬ ‫המושם מקום היסוד זולת‬ ‫המובן מן הגשם המושם מקום‬ ‫הצורה הכוללת וכבר נאמר‬ ‫בזולת המקום הזה בהפרש‬ ‫ והיסוד‬d‫אשר בין הגשם‬

English translation

‫ولذلك كان المفهوم من‬ ‫الجسم لمقام مقام العنصر غير‬ ‫المفهوم من الجسم المقام مقام‬ ‫الصورة وقد قيل في غير ما‬ ‫موضع الفرق بين الجنس‬ (5–3 ,77) ‫والعنصر‬

We thus shall consider [the question] what forms of sensible things as such are (I mean the differentiae of first matter), and what their matters are For this reason, there is neither such composition [as sought by them] in anything which has no matter, nor any moving [cause]. This is why the concept of body representing matter is different from the concept of body representing general form (the difference between genus and matter has been explained elsewhere.)

d The Arabic has ‫الجنس‬, whereas the Hebrew ‫ הגשם‬is translating ‫الجسم‬. Perhaps a case could be made for revising the text according to the Hebrew, having Averroes refer to the difference between body and matter.

As can be seen from the quotations, the term ‫ عنصر‬is treated as homonymous: the first three occurrences are translated into ‫חומר‬, while the last three—into ‫יסוד‬. (On a side note I think that this is a mistake, as all the instances should have been translated into ‫—חומר‬like in Arnzen’s English translation—but this is beside the point.) Ibn Tibbon’s translation here exhibits consciousness to the homonymy of the term ‫ عنصر‬and seeks to diffuse it in the Hebrew version. The precise relationship between the terms ‫ היולי‬and ‫ هيولى—חומר‬and ‫—مادة‬is not easy to pinpoint, as it is expressed differently in different texts. There are different approaches to this relationship reflected in the texts I have examined.

matter and element—case study

537

The first approach assumes a clear distinction between ‫ مادة‬and ‫هيولى‬, as matter and prime matter respectively. Shmuel ibn Tibbon, in his ‫פרוש המלים הזרות‬, lays down the ground rules for the translation of the terms ‫ هيولى‬and ‫مادة‬. In the respective entries for ‫ היולי‬and ‫ חומר‬he writes: ‫—היולי‬a name for prime matter; The Arab philosophers borrowed it in their language from Greek or a different language, as it is an ancient name, and we do not know from what language it originates […] I, as well as translators and authors before me, borrowed it from them, left it is at is in some places, and in [other] places we explicated it as ‫חומר ראשון‬. And now I should let you know about “matter” in general and specifically about “prime matter.” Know that the word we have translated into the word ‫ חומר‬signifies in Arabic a certain thing that receives forms that are divided by species or individuals—like the iron from which the blacksmith makes knives, swords, arrows […] and numerous tools; all of them are iron, but they are divided and differentiated by virtue of their forms or other accidents […] hence we lent the word ‫ חומר‬to anything that is prepared to receive forms. […]20 Prime matter is the thing that is thought or imagined to have received the forms of the four elements—which are fire, air, water, and earth—because the philosophers explained that there is one matter common to all of them, not that each of them has specific matter. The philosophers also coined [lit. made] ‫—היולאני‬I have translated it into ‫ חמרי‬or ‫בעל חומר‬. They have used it as an adjective to any thing that has primary or secondary matter, and I believe they have also done this with the word ‫—היולי‬using it instead of matter that is not primary, via extension.21 ‫—חומר‬a loaned name for what the existing body is made of when the form comes upon it and is attached to it, so that it is a body composed of matter and form. With regard to all the lower existents it is said that matter is the four elements from which they are composed; and its form is unique in every existent: In man— his intelligizing soul; and in the horse—its equestrian soul; and in the palm tree—its date soul. Furthermore there is proximate matter and remote matter, so that the proximate matter for all the animal genera is blood and the rest of the humors, and their forms are divided into species. ‫ חומר ראשון‬is called the matter that is common to the four elements, and it is the thing which has no form at all, but receives the four [respective] forms of the four elements.22

20 21 22

Shmuel also notes that the term is used homonymously to denote the “matter” of the celestial bodies, but I do not discuss this here. Shmuel ibn Tibbon, Peruš, 44–45. Shmuel ibn Tibbon, 53–54. It is interesting to note that Shmuel does not quite follow

538

appendix c

Shmuel’s account, even though attempting to preserve some consistency in the various usages of ‫ היולי‬and ‫חומר‬, nevertheless admits that even the most basic determination of ‫ היולי‬as prime matter is flexible and that ‫ היולי‬can stand for “matter” simpliciter as well. This flexibility is evident, for instance, in Maimonides’ Art of Logic, which Moshe ibn Tibbon translated, and from which I have already quoted earlier: Zayd’s proximate matter (‫ )مادته القر يبة‬is his limbs; and the matter which is more remote than it (‫ )المادة التى هي أبعد منها‬is his four humors, of which the limbs are composed. Now, it is known that the root of every organism is the earth’s vegetation; and the matter that is more remote than this is water, air, fire, and earth, out of the combination of which plants are formed. These four are called the elements (‫)الأسطقسات‬. And the matter that is more remote than these elements is the thing which these four have in common […] [T]his thing which is common to the four elements (‫)היסודות ;الأسطقسات‬, which is necessarily intelligized, is what we call the primary matter (‫)החומר הראשון ;المادة الأولى‬, and its name in Greek language is ‫)ההיולי( الهيولى‬, and frequently many physicians and philosophers call it ‫)אלענצר( العنصر‬.23 For Maimonides, matter (‫ )חומר ;مادة‬is defined as the substrate for the form (i.e., life is the matter and the power of speech is the form in man), which can be proximate (e.g., limbs) or remote (e.g., the four elements). The term ‫ هيولى‬is reserved for primary matter (‫)المادة الأولى‬, the most remote matter, which is the proximate matter of the elements. Its existence is not experienced empirically but inferred by the intellect from the fact that the elements all have something in common, as they transform into one another.

23

through these instructions in his translation of Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed. Maimonides uses the word ‫ היולי‬only four times—three of them as part of the term ‫العقل‬ ‫( الهيولانى‬twice in I.65 and once in I.72), and once by itself (I.75). In all these occurrences Shmuel uses the transliteration ‫ היולאני‬or ‫היולי‬. Contrary to what he claims in Peruš, in these instances he neither uses ‫חומר‬, nor ‫חומר ראשון‬, nor the adjectives ‫ בעל חומר‬or ‫חומרי‬. Turning to his translation of Aristotle’s Meterology, concerning the terms ‫ هيولى‬and ‫ مادة‬the state of play is as follows: all the occurrences of ‫ مادة‬are translated into ‫חומר‬. There are nine occurrences of the term ‫ هيولى‬and its derivatives, all of which appear in book 4. Of these, the first three (IV.72, 73, 75), which appear together in the same passage, are translated into ‫היולי‬, while the remaining six (IV. 288, 329, 340, 345 twice, 360), all of which appear later, are translated into ‫חומר‬. The Arabic original does not assign the term ‫ هيولى‬a special meaning as prime matter and it is used interchangeably with ‫مادة‬. This is similar to what is found in manuscript C of Themistius’ paraphrase, in which the first three occurrences retain ‫היולי‬, and all of the others prefer ‫חומר‬. Efros, Maimonides, 50–51 (modified).

matter and element—case study

539

Another representative of this approach, although with a more Platonic flavor, is al-Baṭalyawsī, whose distinction between ‫ مادة‬and ‫ هيولى‬plays an important part in his ontological hierarchy.24 This is well-reflected in Moshe ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation of the work, in which the terminology is consistent; in fact, this is the only translation of his in which ‫ مادة‬is always translated into ‫חומר‬, and ‫ هيولى‬is always translated into ‫( היולי‬for the sake of completeness let me repeat that ‫ عنصر‬is always translated into ‫)יסוד‬. Moshe ibn Tibbon’s own approach as an author seems similar. In his Answers to Queries on Physics25 he writes: ‫ והוא דבק אל ההעדר תמיד‬,‫ אין ביניהם כי אם הבדל בצורה‬,‫וההיולי הוא חמר לארבע יסודות‬ ‫ עד שיבא אליו שינוי אחר ויפשיט צורתו וילבש‬,‫יפשיט צורתו וילבש צורה אחרת ויחזיק בה‬ 26.‫צורת אחרת‬

The second approach is expressed in the writings of Averroes, who uses the terms ‫مادة‬ and ‫ هيولى‬completely interchangeably with all the possible combinations (e.g., ‫المادة‬, ‫المادة الأولى‬, ‫الهيولى‬, ‫الهيولانية‬, and even ‫)الهيولى الأولى‬. Accordingly, Moshe’s Hebrew translations of his epitomes have all sorts of combinations and do not seek consistency. I checked the following works: epitomes of the Physics, On the Heavens, On Generation and Corruption, Parva Naturalia, Metaphysics, and the middle commentary on On the Soul. The translation strategy he employs can be summed up as follows. Moshe always translates ‫ مادة‬into ‫( חומר‬never into ‫)היולי‬. He sometimes translates ‫ هيولى‬into ‫היולי‬, and sometimes into ‫חומר‬. When the discussion is more metaphysical (e.g., in On the Heavens) there is a tendency to keep ‫( היולי‬in nine out of eleven appearances), whereas when the discussion is concretely physical, there is a tendency to prefer ‫( חומר‬this is especially evident in the Parva Naturalia, where all thirteen occurrences of ‫ هيولى‬are translated into ‫)חומר‬. Ironically, this confusion is actually helpful when reconstructing the Arabic of Themistius’ paraphrase: in cases where there is disagreement within the manuscripts between ‫ חומר‬and ‫יסוד‬, it is virtually certain that the underlying Arabic term is ‫عنصر‬. When there is disagreement between ‫ חומר‬and ‫היולי‬, it is virtually certain that the underlying Arabic term is ‫هيولى‬.

24 25

26

See discussion in Eliyahu, “Al-Batalyawsi,” vol. 1, 82. See study in Kahana-Smilansky, “Moses Ibn Tibbon.” According to Kahana-Smilansky (232–234), this work was probably written some time between 1251 and 1259, and its addressee is most likely his nephew Yaʿaqob ibn Makhīr. The work is extant in a single manuscript, Biblioteca Palatina (Parma), MS 2620/10, 91b–99b. A transcription of this work was kindly supplied to me by Kahana-Smilansky. Moshe ibn Tibbon, Answers, §13 (according to Kahana-Smilanski’s division of the text).

540

appendix c

Taken by itself, this phenomenon points us to the existence of two different versions of Moshe ibn Tibbon’s translation, but since each strategy has its own inner logic, it is difficult to conclude from it which of them reflects the early version, and which reflects the revision. Fortunately, many other phenomena emerge during the analysis, which help establish the direction of the revision process.

Hebrew–Arabic Lexicon Entries are arranged alphabetically, except for verbs, which are listed according to their form within a given root. All instances are recorded according to the page and line numbers of the Hebrew edition, which the Arabic edition mirrors. If a given term occurs more than once in a line, the number of instances is indicated in superscript (e.g., 28‫ד‬ at ‫)אדם‬. Instances in which the Arabic term is taken from al-Baġdādī (see above, Chapter 1, 2.2.7) are marked by a subscript ġ (e.g., ġ31‫ יד‬at ‫)אהבה‬. Cases in which there is either a translation error, or a problem of transmission, or some other non-clarity are indicated by a circumflex (e.g., ^ġ19‫ יד‬at ‫)אויר‬. These cases are almost always discussed in the textual commentary on the relevant line. Instances without Arabic appear in parentheses, either by themselves (if there is no corresponding Arabic—e.g., ‫ ;)אבן‬or immediately after the list of entries with Arabic (e.g., ‫ ;)אב‬or—if there is more than one Arabic term for a given Hebrew entry—in a separate line (e.g., ‫)אומנות‬. Instances which reflect a variant in the critical apparatus that is of some significance (I have been very selective about these) appear in square brackets (e.g., 3‫ לא‬at ‫)אדמה‬.

‫א‬ (8‫ יא‬,11‫ )ז‬3‫ יא‬,1‫ יא‬,14‫ ח‬,12‫أب · ח‬ passim ‫إلا · لـكن )لاكن( · بل‬ (21‫ לד‬,26‫ ו‬,6‫ ה‬,5‫)ה‬ (12‫)לב‬ (3‫ כט‬,22‫ )כט‬5‫عضو · א‬ 2‫أحمر · ד‬ (15‫)כא‬ ,5‫ )ה‬30‫ כט‬,17‫ כח‬,16‫ כח‬,11‫ יז‬,28‫ י‬,25‫ י‬,212‫ ח‬,24‫ ח‬,28‫ ד‬,15‫ ב‬,6‫إنسان · א‬ ,12‫ כט‬,3‫ כב‬,2‫ כב‬,212‫ יח‬,31‫ יז‬,7‫ יז‬,11‫ יא‬,27‫ יא‬,218‫ ז‬,3‫ ו‬,2‫ ו‬,21‫ ה‬,27‫ ה‬,6‫ה‬ [15‫( ]כה‬11‫ לד‬,16‫ ל‬,14‫ל‬ [3‫]לא‬ 23‫حياة · כא‬ (27‫ )כה‬18‫حب · כח‬ (16‫ לב‬,12‫ לב‬,13‫ יח‬,24‫ יח‬,1‫ יח‬,32‫ יז‬,9‫ )יב‬16‫ כח‬,15‫ כח‬,ġ31‫محبة · יד‬ (22‫)לג‬ passim · ‫أو‬ (11‫ כד‬,10‫ כד‬,32‫ כג‬,18‫)כג‬ ,19‫ לא‬,9‫ כו‬,5‫ כו‬,7‫ יח‬,26‫ יח‬,25‫ טז‬,24‫ )טז‬11‫ יח‬,ġ8‫ יח‬,24‫تشوق · טז‬ (27‫ לא‬,26‫לא‬

‫אב‬ ‫אבל‬ ‫אבן‬ ‫אבן דקליס‬ ‫ֵאֶבר‬ ‫אדום‬ ‫אדון‬ ‫אדם‬

‫אדמה‬ ‫אדני החיים‬ ‫אהב‬ ‫אהבה‬ ‫אהוב‬ ‫או‬ ‫אודקסיס‬ (‫)אוי‬ ‫ִהְתַא ָוּה‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫אויר‬ ‫אולי‬ ‫אולם‬ ‫אות‬ ‫אז‬ ‫אומן‬ ‫אומנות‬

‫אומנות מעשית‬ ‫אומנות הנגר‬ ‫אור‬ ‫אותו‬ ‫אחד‬

‫אחדות‬ ‫אחור‬ ‫לאחור‬ ‫ַאֵחר‬

‫‪542‬‬

‫هواء · ב‪ ,19‬ב‪ ,21‬ד‪ ,8‬י‪) 25‬לד‪(218‬‬ ‫هاو ية · יד‪^ġ19‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,33‬י‪ ,29‬יא‪(26‬‬ ‫أما · ‪passim‬‬ ‫)ט‪(13‬‬ ‫حينئذ · כז‪) 7‬ו‪ ,22‬כ‪ ,14‬כ‪ ,17‬כז‪(25‬‬ ‫صانع · ח‪ ,8‬ל‪] ġ5‬ה‪[23‬‬ ‫صنع · ח‪ ,12‬ח‪14‬‬ ‫صناعة · ל‪ġ6‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,3‬ו‪ ,4‬ז‪ ,23‬ז‪ ,25‬ל‪ ,5‬לד‪(22‬‬ ‫صناعة عملية · ל‪ġ4‬‬ ‫صناعة النجارة · ל‪ġ6‬‬ ‫ضوء · ט‪ ,28‬ט‪ ,29‬י‪25‬‬ ‫تلك · ‪passim‬‬ ‫واحد · א‪ ,9‬א‪ ,12‬א‪ ,14‬ב‪ ,2‬ב‪ ,11‬ב‪ ,12‬ב‪ ,13‬ב‪ ,34‬ג‪ ,20‬ג‪ ,22‬ג‪ ,26‬ג‪ ,28‬ח‪,2‬‬ ‫ח‪ ,14‬י‪ ,19‬יא‪ ,ġ29‬טו‪ ,16‬טו‪ ,219‬טו‪ ,30‬יז‪ ,10‬יז‪ ,211‬טז‪ ,21‬יז‪ ,12‬יז‪ ,213‬יח‪,25‬‬ ‫יט‪ ,9‬כ‪ ,27‬כב‪ ,18‬כב‪ ,30‬כג‪ ,5‬כג‪ ,8‬כה‪ ,13‬כה‪ ,14‬כה‪ ,16‬כה‪ ,19‬כה‪,220‬‬ ‫כה‪ ,ġ24‬כה‪ ,ġ25‬כז‪ ,3‬כז‪ ,34‬כח‪ ,32‬כח‪ ,3‬כח‪ ,26‬כח‪ ,12‬כח‪ ,321‬ל‪10‬‬ ‫أحد · ב‪ ,28‬ג‪ ,13‬ג‪ ,28‬ד‪ ,4‬ד‪ ,5‬טז‪11‬‬ ‫)ב‪ ,2‬ג‪ ,15‬ד‪ ,16‬ד‪ ,19‬ד‪ ,32‬ה‪ ,7‬ה‪ ,8‬ה‪ ,10‬ה‪ ,11‬ה‪ ,14‬ה‪ ,15‬ה‪ ,23‬ה‪ ,29‬ה‪,32‬‬ ‫ו‪ ,1‬ו‪ ,5‬ו‪ ,10‬ו‪ ,12‬ו‪ ,13‬ו‪ ,14‬ו‪ ,23‬ז‪ ,19‬ז‪ ,23‬ז‪ ,30‬ח‪ ,31‬ח‪ ,32‬ט‪ ,23‬ט‪ ,25‬ט‪ ,6‬ט‪,15‬‬ ‫ט‪ ,19‬ט‪ ,20‬ט‪ ,21‬ט‪ ,22‬ט‪ ,23‬יא‪ ,213‬יא‪ ,14‬יא‪ ,28‬יד‪ ,4‬יד‪ ,5‬יד‪ ,22‬יד‪,24‬‬ ‫יד‪ ,27‬טו‪ ,4‬טו‪ ,15‬טו‪ ,25‬טו‪ ,29‬יז‪ ,4‬יז‪ ,5‬יז‪ ,26‬יז‪ ,7‬יז‪ ,28‬יז‪ ,10‬יז‪ ,211‬יז‪,12‬‬ ‫יח‪ ,22‬יט‪ ,12‬כ‪ ,9‬כ‪ ,16‬כא‪ ,17‬כב‪ ,9‬כב‪ ,18‬כג‪ ,16‬כג‪ ,226‬כג‪ ,27‬כג‪ ,32‬כד‪,3‬‬ ‫כד‪ ,9‬כד‪ ,13‬כד‪ ,215‬כד‪ ,16‬כד‪ ,217‬כה‪ ,14‬כה‪ ,215‬כה‪ ,17‬כה‪ ,21‬כה‪,25‬‬ ‫כה‪ ,29‬כה‪ ,30‬כו‪ ,25‬כו‪ ,6‬כו‪ ,9‬כו‪ ,19‬כז‪ ,21‬כח‪ ,8‬כח‪ ,17‬כט‪ ,2‬כט‪,27‬‬ ‫כט‪ ,33‬ל‪ ,1‬ל‪ ,2‬ל‪ ,4‬ל‪ ,8‬ל‪ ,15‬ל‪ ,20‬ל‪ ,222‬ל‪ ,28‬ל‪ ,29‬ל‪ ,30‬ל‪ ,32‬לא‪ ,1‬לא‪,2‬‬ ‫לא‪ ,4‬לא‪ ,13‬לא‪ ,17‬לא‪ ,18‬לא‪ ,220‬לא‪ ,22‬לא‪ ,223‬לא‪ ,226‬לא‪ ,27‬לא‪,28‬‬ ‫לב‪ ,3‬לב‪ ,4‬לב‪ ,8‬לב‪ ,15‬לב‪ ,224‬לב‪ ,25‬לג‪ ,4‬לג‪ ,10‬לג‪ ,20‬לג‪ ,21‬לג‪ ,29‬לג‪,30‬‬ ‫לד‪ ,5‬לד‪ ,19‬לה‪ ,1‬לה‪ ,2‬לה‪ ,3‬לה‪ ,24‬לה‪ ,5‬לה‪ ,26‬לה‪ ,7‬לה‪ ,9‬לה‪ ,311‬לה‪,212‬‬ ‫לה‪(13‬‬ ‫)לה‪ ,11‬לה‪(12‬‬ ‫)ד‪(14‬‬ ‫آخر · ב‪ ,13‬ב‪ ,29‬ב‪ ,32‬ג‪ ,1‬ג‪ ,15‬ג‪ ,28‬ד‪ ,4‬ד‪ ,5‬ד‪ ,6‬ח‪ ,13‬ח‪ ,26‬י‪ ,16‬י‪ ,17‬י‪,21‬‬ ‫יב‪ ,27‬יד‪ ,1‬טו‪ ,22‬טו‪ ,23‬טז‪ ,3‬טז‪ ,12‬יז‪ ,12‬כ‪ ,7‬כב‪ ,19‬כה‪ ,ġ7‬כז‪ ,4‬כח‪ ,2‬כח‪21‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,16‬ד‪ ,32‬ה‪ ,23‬ה‪ ,32‬ו‪ ,5‬ו‪ ,11‬ו‪ ,12‬ז‪ ,5‬ז‪ ,21‬ז‪ ,23‬ח‪ ,32‬ט‪ ,4‬ט‪ ,8‬יא‪ ,28‬יב‪,16‬‬ ‫יג‪ ,16‬יג‪ ,18‬יד‪ ,6‬יז‪ ,214‬יח‪ ,22‬יט‪ ,7‬כד‪ ,16‬כד‪ ,22‬כה‪ ,2‬כה‪ ,3‬כה‪ ,4‬כה‪,25‬‬ ‫כה‪ ,9‬כה‪ ,21‬כה‪ ,22‬כז‪ ,8‬כז‪ ,19‬כז‪ ,232‬כח‪ ,14‬כט‪ ,3‬כט‪ ,228‬כט‪ ,34‬ל‪,5‬‬ ‫לא‪ ,5‬לא‪ ,10‬לג‪ ,19‬לג‪ ,21‬לג‪ ,33‬לד‪ ,2‬לד‪ ,7‬לד‪ ,9‬לד‪ ,11‬לד‪ ,12‬לד‪ ,15‬לד‪,19‬‬ ‫לד‪(22‬‬

‫‪543‬‬ ‫ַאַחר‬

‫בא אחר‬ ‫נמשך אחר‬

‫אחר כן‬

‫אחרון‬ ‫אי זה‬ ‫איך‬ ‫איכות‬ ‫אין‬ ‫איש‬ ‫אנושי‬ ‫אנשים‬

‫ַא ְנֵשׁי‪-‬‬ ‫אנשי המדינה‬ ‫הקבוץ מן האנשים‬ ‫ֶאל‬

‫)ה(ֵאל‬ ‫אֹלהות‬ ‫אֹלהי‬ ‫גשם אלהי‬ ‫חכמה אלהית‬ ‫מדבר בדברים האלוהיים‬ ‫שכל אלהי‬ ‫השכל האלהי הראשון‬ ‫אלהיוֹת‬ ‫האלהים השניים‬ ‫ֵאלּוּ‬ ‫ִאלּוּ‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫بعد · א‪ ,10‬א‪ ,11‬י‪ ,20‬י‪ ,15‬יב‪ ,11‬יב‪ ,15‬יז‪ ,28‬יח‪ ,18‬כ‪ ,23‬כב‪ ,20‬כב‪ ,22‬כג‪,6‬‬ ‫כג‪ ,9‬כה‪ ,26‬כו‪ ,14‬כו‪) 15‬ד‪ ,21‬ה‪ ,15‬ז‪ ,15‬י‪ ,^32‬יב‪ ,20‬יג‪ ,10‬יג‪ ,25‬טו‪,10‬‬ ‫כג‪ ,22‬כג‪ ,29‬כה‪ ,1‬כה‪ ,11‬כו‪ ,24‬כו‪(32‬‬ ‫اتبع · יח ‪18‬‬ ‫تبع · א‪12‬‬ ‫تلا · ב‪ ,17‬כח‪2‬‬ ‫)יג‪ ,3‬יג‪ ,11‬יח‪ ,8‬כג‪ ,21‬כה‪ ,11‬כה‪ ,26‬כו‪ ,10‬כח‪ ,15‬לד‪(28‬‬ ‫ثم · א‪ ,29‬יא‪30‬‬ ‫ف · יב‪ ,27‬יב‪30‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,13‬יא‪ ,17‬יב‪ ,30‬לא‪ ,6‬לא‪(14‬‬ ‫َأقصى · יז‪) 17‬ד‪ ,11‬יז‪ ,26‬לג‪(25‬‬ ‫أى · ב‪ ,22‬ח‪ ,6‬יז‪ ,5‬יט‪) 29‬ה‪ ,24‬ה‪ ,5‬ה‪ ,14‬כו‪ ,23‬כז‪ ,33‬לב‪ ,10‬לב‪ ,16‬לד‪,27‬‬ ‫לד‪(30‬‬ ‫كيف · יב‪ ,23‬יד‪ ,ġ23‬כב‪) 22‬ד‪ ,26‬יא‪ ,213‬יב‪ ,30‬כט‪ ,3‬לג‪(16‬‬ ‫كيف · ט‪) 27‬ח‪ ,32‬ט‪ ,5‬ט‪ ,11‬ט‪] (22‬ד‪[9‬‬ ‫ليس · لا · ‪passim‬‬ ‫)ל‪(22‬‬ ‫)ה‪(7‬‬ ‫‪26‬‬ ‫ל‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪27‬‬ ‫ב‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪13‬‬ ‫ב‬ ‫·‬ ‫ناس‬ ‫‪ġ‬‬ ‫قوم · ח‪22‬‬ ‫)ג‪ ,19‬ה‪ ,7‬ו‪ ,31‬יא‪ ,27‬יד‪ ,18‬כה‪ ,15‬כה‪ ,17‬כח‪ ,17‬ל‪ ,30‬לא‪ ,14‬לב‪ ,3‬לב‪,29‬‬ ‫לג‪] (11‬לא‪[14‬‬ ‫)כג‪(28‬‬ ‫أهل المدينة · יז ‪) 29‬לא‪(12‬‬ ‫)לא‪(24‬‬ ‫إلى · ‪passim‬‬ ‫إ يا · יח‪16‬‬ ‫الل ّٰه · כא‪ ,8‬כא‪ ,12‬כא‪ ,24‬כא‪ ,25‬כט‪ ,ġ6‬כט‪ ,23‬ל‪) ġ25‬יד‪ ,31‬יז‪ ,25‬כא‪,27‬‬ ‫כח‪ ,33‬כט‪ ,21‬ל‪ ,16‬ל‪ ,21‬ל‪ ,26‬לא‪ ,8‬לג‪ ,19‬לג‪ ,29‬לג‪(32‬‬ ‫الهية · כז‪31‬‬ ‫إلاهى · כד‪) ġ32‬כ‪ ,232‬כה‪ ,214‬כו‪ ,16‬כו‪ ,19‬כו‪(20‬‬ ‫)כה‪(14‬‬ ‫)יד‪(19‬‬ ‫)לד‪(16‬‬ ‫العقل الإلاهى · כ‪) ġ32‬כ‪ ,8‬כח‪ ,26‬כט‪ ,10‬כט‪ ,12‬כט‪ ,14‬כט‪ ,15‬כט‪(20‬‬ ‫)כ‪(25‬‬ ‫)יח‪(21‬‬ ‫الإلهة الثوانى · ח‪20‬‬ ‫هؤلاء · هذه · ‪passim‬‬ ‫لو · כ‪ ,7‬כא‪ ,13‬כב‪) 15‬ה‪ ,8‬ה‪ ,21‬יז‪ ,23‬כא‪ ,14‬כח‪(32‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫ִאם‬ ‫אם כן‬ ‫ַאָמּה‬ ‫ֻאָמּה‬ ‫אמנם‬ ‫אמצע‬ ‫אמצעי‬ ‫ָאַמר‬

‫אמר אמת‬ ‫אמר דעתו‬ ‫ֶנֱאַמר‬ ‫אֶמר‬ ‫ֹ‬ ‫)אמת(‬ ‫ִאֵמּת‬ ‫התאמת‬ ‫אמת‬ ‫ֲאִמִתּי‬ ‫בתכלית האמת‬ ‫באמת‬ ‫לפי האמת‬ ‫אמר אמת‬ ‫ֲאִמָתּה‬ ‫ֲאִמתּוּת‬ ‫אנדקליס‬ ‫אנה‬ ‫אנחנו‬ ‫אנכסגוריש‬ ‫ָא ַנס‬ ‫א ֶנס‬ ‫ֹ‬ ‫אף‪-‬על‪-‬פי)אעפ״י(‬

‫‪544‬‬

‫هل · إن · إما · ‪passim‬‬ ‫إذن · ‪passim‬‬ ‫حينئذ · ח‪26‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,23‬ד‪(24‬‬ ‫)יז‪ ,8‬יז‪(11‬‬ ‫إنما · ‪passim‬‬ ‫)כד‪ ,7‬כד‪ ,8‬לג‪(29‬‬ ‫)לג‪(27‬‬ ‫قال · א‪ ,18‬א‪ ,21‬א‪ ,222‬א‪ ,23‬ג‪ ,9‬ג‪ ,11‬ג‪ ,20‬ח‪ ,23‬י‪ ,23‬יא‪ ,19‬יא‪ ,33‬יב‪,214‬‬ ‫יב‪ ,28‬יג‪ ,3‬יג‪ ,5‬יג‪ ,18‬יז‪ ,11‬יז‪ ,26‬יט‪ ,3‬כא‪ ,24‬כב‪ ,11‬כב‪ ,34‬כה‪ ,13‬כו‪,21‬‬ ‫כז‪) 23‬א‪ ,3‬ה‪ ,16‬ה‪ ,18‬ה‪ ,30‬ז‪ ,1‬ז‪ ,5‬ז‪ ,7‬ז‪ ,21‬ט‪ ,6‬ט‪ ,15‬ט‪ ,16‬יא‪ ,23‬יא‪,35‬‬ ‫יב‪ ,11‬יב‪ ,22‬יג‪ ,1‬יג‪ ,218‬יג‪ ,20‬יג‪ ,29‬יג‪ ,31‬יד‪ ,22‬טו‪ ,7‬טז‪ ,4‬טז‪ ,5‬טז‪ ,10‬יז‪,6‬‬ ‫יז‪ ,27‬יח‪ ,2‬יח‪ ,7‬יח‪ ,25‬כ‪ ,23‬כא‪ ,226‬כב‪ ,32‬כב‪ ,33‬כג‪ ,2‬כג‪ ,22‬כג‪ ,28‬כג‪,2‬‬ ‫כד‪ ,25‬כה‪ ,8‬כה‪ ,27‬כו‪ ,211‬כו‪ ,13‬כז‪ ,22‬כז‪ ,34‬כח‪ ,1‬כט‪ ,16‬כט‪ ,21‬כט‪,32‬‬ ‫ל‪ ,27‬לא‪ ,8‬לא‪ ,28‬לב‪ ,2‬לב‪ ,10‬לב‪ ,21‬לב‪ ,24‬לב‪ ,226‬לב‪ ,227‬לג‪ ,213‬לג‪,216‬‬ ‫לד‪ ,1‬לד‪ ,15‬לד‪ ,17‬לד‪ ,29‬לה‪ ,1‬לה‪] (8‬ג‪ ,9‬כב‪ ,34‬כז‪ ,7‬ל‪ ,27‬לד‪[4‬‬ ‫أصاب · כב‪12‬‬ ‫]לה‪[8‬‬ ‫قيل · א‪ ,3‬יז‪) 13‬ה‪ ,12‬ט‪ ,1‬ט‪ ,4‬יג‪ ,16‬יד‪ ,9‬יז‪ ,9‬יז‪ ,10‬יז‪ ,11‬יז‪ ,19‬יט‪ ,12‬כ‪,11‬‬ ‫כ‪ ,16‬כב‪ ,30‬ל‪ ,2‬ל‪ ,12‬ל‪ ,13‬ל‪ ,14‬ל‪ ,15‬ל‪ ,26‬לג‪ ,26‬לג‪ ,18‬לג‪ ,20‬לה‪] (8‬י‪[2‬‬ ‫قول · א‪ ,18‬א‪) 23‬טו‪ ,2‬יז‪ ,10‬יח‪(29‬‬ ‫)כו‪(20‬‬ ‫]יא‪ ,18‬יד‪[14‬‬ ‫حق · יד‪ ,ġ28‬יז‪) 25‬כא‪(31‬‬ ‫)כה‪ ,32‬כט‪(26‬‬ ‫على غاية الحقيقة · כ‪213‬‬ ‫بالحقيقة · ח‪ ,27‬טז‪ ,24‬טז‪ ,29‬יז‪) 10‬ה‪ ,10‬יא‪ ,6‬יא‪ ,10‬טז‪ ,29‬יז‪ ,4‬יז‪ ,24‬לה‪(9‬‬ ‫]יב‪[12‬‬ ‫على الحقيقة · טז ‪) 30‬יז‪ ,8‬יח‪ ,28‬לא‪ ,20‬לא‪(28‬‬ ‫أصاب · כב‪12‬‬ ‫صحة · ב‪) 6‬יז‪ ,6‬יח‪(29‬‬ ‫)טו‪] (15‬טו‪[15‬‬ ‫)יד‪ ,31‬לג‪(13‬‬ ‫أ ين · ח‪5‬‬ ‫نحن · ‪passim‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,14‬ה‪ ,18‬טו‪ ,1‬לב‪ ,17‬לב‪ ,24‬לג‪(13‬‬ ‫)ה‪(13‬‬ ‫)לב‪(17‬‬ ‫)יז‪(7‬‬

‫‪545‬‬ ‫אפורגוש‬ ‫אפלאטון‬ ‫ֲאִפלּוּ‬ ‫אֶפן‬ ‫ֹ‬ ‫אפשר )היה אפשר(‬

‫אי אפשר מבלתי‬ ‫אי אפשר שלא‬ ‫אפשרות‬ ‫אצבע‬ ‫אצל‬ ‫ארבעה‬ ‫אריה‬ ‫ָאר ְֹך‬ ‫ארסטוטליס‬ ‫ארץ‬ ‫הנפש אשר בארץ‬ ‫אש‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫)כא‪ ,14‬כא‪(17‬‬ ‫أفلاطون · ב‪ ,16‬ח‪) 19‬ז‪ ,21‬יד‪ ,30‬כה‪(17‬‬ ‫لو · יט‪) 19‬יב‪(3‬‬ ‫)יא‪ ,214‬יא‪ ,26‬יג‪ ,15‬יג‪(18‬‬ ‫يمكن )أمكن( · א‪ ,24‬א‪ ,25‬ב‪ ,1‬ח‪ ,6‬ח‪ ,13‬ט‪ ,30‬י‪ ,24‬י‪ ,25‬י‪ ,26‬יא‪ ,22‬יא‪,24‬‬ ‫יא‪ ,29‬יא‪ ,30‬יב‪ ,23‬יב‪ ,26‬יג‪ ,19‬יג‪ ,28‬יג‪ ,34‬יד‪ ,ġ23‬טז‪ ,11‬טז‪ ,12‬יח‪ ,16‬יט‪,5‬‬ ‫יט‪ ,14‬כא‪ ,13‬כב‪ ,19‬כב‪ ,22‬כב‪ ,24‬כב‪ ,25‬כד‪ ,ġ31‬כה‪ ,ġ7‬כה‪ ,ġ23‬כח‪,9‬‬ ‫כט‪ġ4‬‬ ‫يجوز )جاز( · י‪ ,1‬י‪ ,2‬י‪ ,3‬י‪11‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,21‬ה‪ ,3‬ה‪ ,5‬ה‪ ,9‬ה‪ ,10‬ה‪ ,11‬ה‪ ,25‬ה‪ ,27‬ה‪ ,228‬ו‪ ,32‬ז‪ ,21‬ז‪ ,10‬ז‪ ,17‬ח‪,30‬‬ ‫ט‪ ,22‬יא‪ ,213‬יא‪ ,14‬יא‪ ,25‬יא‪ ,26‬יב‪ ,8‬יב‪ ,330‬יג‪ ,6‬יג‪ ,7‬יג‪ ,9‬יג‪ ,10‬יג‪ ,18‬יג‪,23‬‬ ‫יד‪ ,2‬יד‪ ,4‬יד‪ ,9‬יד‪ ,13‬יד‪ ,26‬טו‪ ,2‬יח‪ ,226‬יח‪ ,227‬יח‪ ,30‬יט‪ ,13‬כב‪ ,10‬כג‪,29‬‬ ‫כד‪ ,18‬כד‪ ,30‬כה‪ ,2‬כה‪ ,8‬כו‪ ,9‬כו‪ ,21‬כח‪ ,9‬כח‪ ,10‬כח‪ ,22‬כח‪ ,23‬כח‪,225‬‬ ‫כח‪ ,31‬כח‪ ,32‬כח‪ ,33‬כט‪ ,1‬כט‪ ,5‬כט‪ ,18‬כט‪ ,19‬ל‪ ,7‬לב‪ ,20‬לב‪ ,28‬לג‪16‬‬ ‫לג‪ ,20‬לג‪ ,27‬לג‪ ,28‬לד‪ ,12‬לד‪ ,13‬לה‪ ,25‬לה‪(8‬‬ ‫لا بد من · ח‪ ,10‬יב‪ ,4‬יג‪) 3‬יב‪ ,18‬יט‪(11‬‬ ‫لا بد من · ח‪23‬‬ ‫إمكان · יח‪ ,24‬יט‪) 9‬ה‪ ,12‬יח‪ ,22‬יח‪ ,23‬יח‪ ,30‬יט‪(1‬‬ ‫)יז‪(11‬‬ ‫عند · יט‪ ,23‬כ‪ ,18‬כ‪ ,29‬כח‪) 20‬יג‪ ,11‬יד‪ ,211‬כ‪ ,22‬כג‪ ,218‬כג‪ ,25‬כה‪,229‬‬ ‫לא‪ ,20‬לא‪ ,29‬לב‪ ,9‬לב‪ ,18‬לג‪(11‬‬ ‫أر بعة · ב‪ ,32‬ד‪) 7‬ה‪ ,19‬כד‪ ,3‬כד‪ ,4‬כד‪ ,22‬לג‪ ,15‬לה‪(2‬‬ ‫)כו ‪(17‬‬ ‫)טו‪(14‬‬ ‫أرسطاطاليس · ח‪) 20‬א‪(3‬‬ ‫أرض · ב‪ ,219‬ב‪ ,21‬ב‪ ,30‬ב‪ ,32‬ג‪ ,3‬יד‪) 26‬יד‪ ,27‬לא‪ ,3‬לג‪ ,4‬לג‪,27‬‬ ‫לג‪(28‬‬ ‫النفس التى فى الأرض · ח‪19‬‬ ‫نار · ב‪ ,219‬ב‪ ,21‬ב‪) 32‬ז‪(9‬‬

‫ב‬ ‫ב…‬ ‫בא‬ ‫בא אחר‬ ‫בא זה בעקב זה‬ ‫הביא‬ ‫באור‬ ‫ֵבֵּאר‬

‫ب · فى · ‪passim‬‬ ‫أتى · כב‪) 20‬ה‪ ,15‬ה‪ ,20‬כה‪ ,28‬כו‪ ,14‬לב‪ ,26‬לב‪ ,27‬לה‪(1‬‬ ‫اتبع · יח ‪18‬‬ ‫تعاقب · ב‪3‬‬ ‫)כג‪(31‬‬ ‫تصريح · י‪) 13‬יג‪ ,25‬כב‪(2‬‬ ‫بين · ג‪ ,32‬ד‪ ,3‬ט‪) 24‬ה‪ ,26‬ו‪ ,1‬ט‪ ,10‬יא‪ ,12‬יג‪ ,14‬יג‪ ,25‬יג‪ ,27‬טז‪ ,10‬טז‪ ,11‬יח‪,9‬‬ ‫כב‪ ,8‬כג‪ ,16‬כה‪ ,20‬כה‪ ,21‬כה‪ ,26‬כז‪ ,7‬לב‪ ,19‬לד‪(28‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫התבאר‬

‫בגלל‬ ‫הדבר אשר בגללו‬ ‫העלה אשר בגללה‬ ‫)בדל(‬ ‫נבדל‬ ‫הבדיל‬ ‫בֹּהוּ‬ ‫בהיר‬ ‫בורא‬ ‫בוש‬ ‫בחינה‬ ‫בחירה‬ ‫בחן‬ ‫בחר‬

‫בטוח‬ ‫ָבַּטל‬ ‫ִבֵּטל‬ ‫ָבֵּטל‬

‫ַבָּטָּלה‬ ‫)בין(‬ ‫הבין‬ ‫הובן‬ ‫התבונן‬ ‫ֵבּין‬ ‫בית‬ ‫)בלי(‬ ‫ִבָּלּה‬ ‫בְּלֲﬠ ֵדי‬ ‫בלתי‬ ‫בן חורין‬

‫‪546‬‬

‫بان · ב‪ ,9‬יג‪10‬‬ ‫تبين · כב‪ ,3‬כב‪ ,5‬כט‪23‬‬ ‫)יא‪ ,16‬יא‪ ,20‬טז‪ ,6‬יז‪ ,14‬ל‪ ,10‬לג‪(1‬‬ ‫)ל‪(13‬‬ ‫]לג‪[8‬‬ ‫)טז‪] (1‬א‪[7‬‬ ‫)לג‪] (3‬כט‪[1‬‬ ‫)לד‪ ,16‬לד‪(17‬‬ ‫)כט‪(217‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,12‬ה‪ ,14‬ה‪ ,15‬ה‪ ,16‬ה‪(20‬‬ ‫)ו‪(19‬‬ ‫]ח‪[7‬‬ ‫)יז‪(32‬‬ ‫]כו‪[28‬‬ ‫صار · ג‪30‬‬ ‫اختار · טז‪ ,23‬יז‪16‬‬ ‫)טז‪ ,24‬טז‪] (25‬כו‪[22‬‬ ‫)לג‪(24‬‬ ‫بطل · ב‪) 3‬יז‪ ,21‬כב‪(9‬‬ ‫]ג‪[22‬‬ ‫متعطل · יג‪31‬‬ ‫عطل · כד‪ġ32‬‬ ‫)כו‪ ,30‬לד‪(10‬‬ ‫بطالة · יט‪23‬‬ ‫فهم · ח‪ ,16‬ח‪ ,21‬ח‪) 22‬טו‪ ,9‬טו‪ ,29‬יז‪ ,8‬יח‪ ,1‬כג‪ ,25‬כט‪ ,211‬כט‪ ,14‬כט‪,18‬‬ ‫כט‪ ,31‬כט‪(232‬‬ ‫)כג‪(28‬‬ ‫]טו‪[9‬‬ ‫بين · ב‪ ,9‬ג‪ ,12‬ג‪ ,216‬ג‪) 25‬יד‪ ,25‬יח‪ ,21‬כג‪ ,20‬כד‪ ,11‬כה‪ ,17‬ל‪ ,219‬ל‪ ,20‬ל‪,29‬‬ ‫לג‪(18‬‬ ‫بيت · א‪ ,7‬י‪) 8‬ה‪ ,6‬ו‪ ,3‬ו‪ ,34‬ו‪ ,26‬ז‪ ,27‬ל‪ ,30‬לא‪(25‬‬ ‫أبلى · יא‪22‬‬ ‫)ז‪(10‬‬ ‫غير · ‪passim‬‬ ‫دون · ח‪3‬‬ ‫]ל‪[30‬‬

‫‪547‬‬ ‫בנאי‬ ‫)בני(‬ ‫נבנה‬ ‫בנין‬ ‫בעיטה‬ ‫בעל‬

‫בעל הדרכה‬ ‫בעל טבעים‬ ‫בעל מעלה‬ ‫בעל נפש‬ ‫בעל תכלית‬ ‫בעל חיים‬ ‫בקיאות‬ ‫בקר‬ ‫)בקש(‬ ‫ִבֵּקּשׁ‬ ‫ֻבַּקּשׁ‬ ‫בקשה‬ ‫ברא‬ ‫ברזל‬ ‫ברח‬ ‫בריא‬ ‫בריאה‬ ‫בריאות‬ ‫)ברר(‬ ‫התברר‬ ‫בשר‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫)ה‪(16‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,5‬ה‪(6‬‬ ‫بناء · י‪ ,6‬י‪) 8‬ז‪(27‬‬ ‫)לא‪(7‬‬ ‫صاحب · ז‪28‬‬ ‫ذو · כה‪18‬‬ ‫)ט‪ ,14‬יב‪ ,16‬כז‪ ,21‬לג‪ ,22‬לג‪(31‬‬ ‫)יז‪(20‬‬ ‫)יד‪ ,20‬לד‪(17‬‬ ‫أفضل · ל‪25‬‬ ‫متنفس · כא‪) 14‬כח‪(32‬‬ ‫متناه · כב‪ 7‬כב‪ ,11‬כב‪ ,17‬כב‪) 28‬כב‪ ,8‬כב‪(9‬‬ ‫حيوان · ב‪ ,30‬ג‪ ,3‬ז‪ ,28‬ח‪ ,2‬ח‪ ,3‬ח‪ ,8‬טז‪) 18‬ה‪ ,20‬ה‪ ,22‬כא‪ ,29‬כו‪ ,17‬כו‪,18‬‬ ‫כז‪ ,18‬ל‪ ,31‬לה‪(11‬‬ ‫]ח‪[8‬‬ ‫]ז‪[30‬‬ ‫ب · ב‪ ,6‬ב‪ ,225‬יא ‪ ,10‬יא‪ ,18‬יא‪ ,22‬טז‪ ,3‬כא‪) ,3‬ו‪ ,32‬טז‪ ,226‬לא‪,9‬‬ ‫َطل َ َ‬ ‫לא‪ ,20‬לא‪ ,22‬לד‪(17‬‬ ‫ב‪ ,11‬ב‪31‬‬ ‫طل َب · א‪ ,3‬א‪ ,4‬ב‪ ,7‬ט‪ ,31‬ט‪ ,32‬י‪ ,29‬יא‪21‬‬ ‫َ‬ ‫أنشأ · ח‪1‬‬ ‫)לד‪(21‬‬ ‫هرب · כז‪) 28‬ו‪ ,27‬ז‪] (6‬ט‪[10‬‬ ‫صحيح · י‪ ,26‬י‪27‬‬ ‫)כו‪(15‬‬ ‫صحة · י‪ ,7‬ל‪) ġ6‬ז‪ ,3‬ז‪ ,13‬ז‪ ,27‬יח‪ ,4‬יח‪ ,6‬לב‪(222‬‬ ‫)יא‪(18‬‬ ‫لحم · י‪) 22‬ז‪(9‬‬

‫ג‬ ‫)גבל(‬ ‫הגביל‬ ‫ָגּדוֹל‬

‫ִגּדּוּל‬

‫حدد · כג‪4‬‬ ‫أكبر · ח‪10‬‬ ‫أشد · כט‪ġ5‬‬ ‫]לא‪[6‬‬ ‫نشوء · ג‪26‬‬ ‫نمو · ד‪10‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫)גדל(‬ ‫הגדיל‬ ‫ֹגּ ֶדל‬ ‫ְגּ ֻדָלּה‬ ‫גדר‬ ‫גוף‬

‫גזר‬ ‫)גלגל(‬ ‫התגלגל‬ ‫ַגְּל ַגּל‬

‫גלגל המזלות‬ ‫הגלגל הנוטה‬ ‫גם כן‬ ‫ְגָּמר‬ ‫לגמרי‬ ‫גנאי‬ ‫ֶגּ ֶרם‬ ‫גרם שמימי‬ ‫גרעין‬ ‫גשם‬

‫גשם אלהי‬ ‫הגשם הכולל‬ ‫גשם שמימי‬ ‫גשמות‬ ‫גשמי‬

‫‪548‬‬

‫)כג‪(32‬‬ ‫عظم · כב‪ 7‬כב‪ ,16‬כב‪ ,22‬כב‪) 31‬כב‪ ,8‬כו‪ ,6‬לה‪(223‬‬ ‫شرف · כז‪ ,24‬כז‪ ,26‬כח‪) ġ12‬כז‪ ,10‬כז‪(29‬‬ ‫حد · ד‪ ,7‬יב‪ ,17‬כה‪ ,ġ1‬כה‪ ,19‬לב‪) 14‬ז‪ ,22‬כה‪(17‬‬ ‫بدن · א‪ ,5‬א‪ ,6‬א‪ ,8‬ז‪ ,229‬י‪ ,226‬י‪ ,27‬יט‪ ,18‬ל‪ġ6‬‬ ‫جثة · ח‪ ,1‬ח‪15‬‬ ‫)ז‪ ,4‬כח‪ ,23‬כט‪ ,1‬כט‪ ,12‬כט‪ ,13‬לג‪ ,7‬לג‪ ,8‬לה‪(4‬‬ ‫)כג‪ ,18‬כד‪(28‬‬ ‫)ו‪(222‬‬ ‫فلك · טו‪ ,29‬טו‪ ,30‬טז‪ ,8‬יח‪ ,15‬יח‪ ,219‬כד‪ ,23‬כד‪ ,27‬כה‪) ġ25‬טו‪ ,10‬טו‪,13‬‬ ‫טו‪ ,30‬כג‪ ,16‬כג‪ ,217‬כג‪ ,19‬כד‪ ,31‬כד‪ ,32‬כד‪ ,44‬כד‪ ,35‬כד‪ ,46‬כד‪ ,37‬כד‪,28‬‬ ‫כד‪ ,10‬כד‪ ,12‬כד‪ ,13‬כד‪ ,15‬כד‪ ,16‬כד‪ ,17‬כד‪ ,218‬כד‪ ,19‬כד‪ ,20‬כד‪ ,21‬כד‪,22‬‬ ‫כד‪ ,24‬כט‪(20‬‬ ‫)כד‪ ,1‬כד‪ ,2‬כד‪ ,6‬כד‪(7‬‬ ‫الفلك المائل · ח‪ ,20‬יא‪) 1‬כד‪(2‬‬ ‫أيضا ً· ‪passim‬‬ ‫انقضاء · כב‪25‬‬ ‫أصلا ً· יט‪) 29‬יג‪] (32‬ג‪[4‬‬ ‫)יב‪ ,28‬יב‪ ,29‬כז‪ ,33‬לד‪] (6‬ו‪[6‬‬ ‫]ג‪[5‬‬ ‫جسم سماوى · ד‪) 11‬לג‪] (23‬לג‪ ,9‬לג‪[26‬‬ ‫)כא‪(30‬‬ ‫جسم · ג‪ ,3‬ג‪ ,5‬ג‪ ,11‬ח‪ ,215‬ח‪ ,16‬ט‪ ,29‬י‪ ,14‬יג‪ ,33‬יג‪ ,5‬יג‪ ,6‬יג‪ ,12‬טו‪ ,16‬טו‪,18‬‬ ‫כב‪ ,5‬כב‪ ,13‬כב‪ ,14‬כב‪ ,16‬כב‪ ,17‬כג‪ ,9‬כג‪ ,10‬כג‪ ,19‬כה‪ ,18‬כה‪ ,19‬כה‪,ġ22‬‬ ‫כו‪) 29‬ד‪ ,16‬ד‪ ,217‬ד‪ ,230‬ד‪ ,31‬ה‪ ,2‬ה‪ ,4‬ה‪ ,8‬ה‪ ,15‬ה‪ ,217‬ה‪ ,19‬ה‪ ,321‬ה‪,231‬‬ ‫ה‪ ,32‬ו‪ ,6‬ו‪ ,13‬ו‪ ,233‬ז‪ ,6‬ז‪ ,8‬ז‪ ,10‬ז‪ ,11‬יב‪ ,7‬יג‪ ,7‬יג‪ ,8‬טו‪ ,4‬טו‪ ,12‬טו‪ ,19‬טז‪,6‬‬ ‫יט‪ ,7‬כ‪ ,15‬כב‪ ,11‬כג‪ ,5‬כג‪ ,24‬כג‪ ,26‬כה‪ ,22‬כה‪ ,3‬כה‪ ,24‬כו‪ ,14‬כט‪ ,16‬כט‪,17‬‬ ‫כט‪ ,22‬לג‪ ,4‬לג‪ ,19‬לג‪ ,22‬לג‪ ,23‬לג‪ ,31‬לד‪ ,19‬לה‪ ,14‬לה‪ ,16‬לה‪] (17‬ד‪,22‬‬ ‫כג‪[14‬‬ ‫)כו‪(14‬‬ ‫الجسم العامى · ב‪20‬‬ ‫جسم سماوى · ב‪ ,29‬ג‪ ,25‬יח‪ ,25‬יט‪) 3‬ד‪ ,17‬ד‪ ,18‬טו‪ ,13‬יט‪ ,1‬כו‪ ,12‬לא‪ ,2‬לג‪,3‬‬ ‫לג‪ ,9‬לג‪ ,26‬לד‪(14‬‬ ‫جسمانيه · ג‪ ,8‬כב‪22‬‬ ‫)לד‪(15‬‬

‫‪549‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬

‫ד‬ ‫דבה‬ ‫דבור‬ ‫דבורה‬ ‫דבק‬ ‫דבקות‬ ‫ִדֵּבּר‬ ‫ָדָּבר‬

‫הדבר אשר בגללו‬ ‫הדבר אשר בעבורו‬ ‫דג‬

‫شناعة · כח‪) 3‬כח‪(10‬‬ ‫كلام · ג‪ ,17‬ג‪ ,32‬ח‪ ,22‬כב‪) 33‬ט‪ ,13‬יד‪ ,9‬טו‪ ,28‬כב‪(33‬‬ ‫نحلة · ז‪29‬‬ ‫متصل · יז‪) ġ22‬יח‪ ,12‬לד‪ ,23‬לה‪(16‬‬ ‫اتصال · יג‪ ,15‬יג‪ ,17‬כז‪) 15‬כז‪ ,16‬כז‪(17‬‬ ‫تكلم · ג‪ ,30‬ג‪ ,32‬ח‪ ,22‬כב‪) 32‬יד‪ ,18‬כב‪ ,33‬לה‪] (7‬ח‪[22‬‬ ‫شىء · א‪ ,4‬א‪ ,6‬א‪ ,7‬א‪ ,14‬א‪ ,24‬ב‪ ,7‬ב‪ ,210‬ב‪ ,13‬ב‪ ,214‬ב‪ ,215‬ב‪ ,18‬ב‪,20‬‬ ‫ב‪ ,25‬ב‪ ,31‬ב‪ ,32‬ב‪ ,33‬ג‪ ,2‬ג‪ ,3‬ג‪ ,8‬ג‪ ,11‬ג‪ ,214‬ג‪ ,225‬ג‪ ,29‬ג‪ ,33‬ד‪ ,7‬ח‪ ,1‬ח‪,24‬‬ ‫ח‪ ,26‬ט‪ ,25‬ט‪ ,28‬ט‪ ,30‬ט‪ ,31‬י‪ ,1‬י‪ ,2‬י‪ ,4‬י‪ ,5‬י‪ ,10‬י‪ ,12‬י‪ ,13‬י‪ ,16‬י‪ ,217‬י‪ ,18‬י‪,19‬‬ ‫י‪ ,20‬י‪ ,23‬י‪ ,26‬י‪ ,27‬י‪ ,28‬י‪ ,229‬י‪ ,30‬י‪ ,32‬יא‪ ,22‬יא‪ ,234‬יב‪ ,5‬יב‪ ,26‬יב‪,27‬‬ ‫יג‪ ,17‬יד‪ ,6‬יד‪ ,7‬יד‪ ,27‬טז‪ ,11‬טז‪ ,213‬טז‪ ,17‬טז‪ ,18‬טז‪ ,19‬טז‪ ,21‬טז‪ ,22‬טז‪,32‬‬ ‫יז‪ ,312‬יז‪ ,13‬יז‪ ,214‬יז‪ ,15‬יז‪ ,28‬יח‪ ,11‬יח‪ ,12‬יח‪ ,19‬יט‪ ,25‬יט‪ ,22‬יט‪ ,25‬יט‪,27‬‬ ‫כ‪ ,4‬כ‪ ,7‬כ‪ ,23‬כ‪ ,24‬כ‪ ,28‬כ‪ ,29‬כ‪ ,ġ30‬כ‪ ,32‬כא‪ ,10‬כא‪ ,12‬כב‪ ,23‬כב‪,25‬‬ ‫כג‪ ,4‬כה‪ ,16‬כו‪ ,28‬כז‪ ,33‬כז‪ ,5‬כז‪ ,14‬כז‪ ,17‬כז‪ ,20‬כז‪ ,23‬כז‪ ,26‬כז‪ ,28‬כז‪,34‬‬ ‫כח‪ ,21‬כח‪ ,3‬כח‪ ,5‬כח‪ ,6‬כח‪ ,7‬כח‪ ,9‬כח‪ ,311‬כח‪ ,12‬כח‪ ,ġ12‬כח‪ ,13‬כח‪,17‬‬ ‫כח‪ ,20‬כח‪ ,28‬כט‪ ,ġ5‬כט‪ ,24‬כט‪ ,25‬ל‪12‬‬ ‫أمر · ב‪ ,22‬ב‪ ,23‬י‪ ,6‬י‪30‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,17‬ד‪ ,18‬ד‪ ,219‬ד‪ ,21‬ד‪ ,226‬ד‪ ,228‬ד‪ ,29‬ד‪ ,33‬ה‪ ,3‬ה‪ ,4‬ה‪ ,5‬ה‪ ,6‬ה‪ ,8‬ה‪,10‬‬ ‫ה‪ ,14‬ה‪ ,15‬ה‪ ,18‬ה‪ ,220‬ה‪ ,23‬ה‪ ,26‬ו‪ ,1‬ו‪ ,3 ,2‬ו‪ ,5‬ו‪ ,15‬ו‪ ,16‬ו‪ ,23‬ו‪ ,225‬ו‪,27‬‬ ‫ו‪ ,28‬ו‪ ,30‬ו‪ ,31‬ז‪ ,7‬ז‪ ,8‬ז‪ ,14‬ח‪ ,28‬ח‪ ,30‬ט‪ ,1‬ט‪ ,3‬ט‪ ,9‬ט‪ ,13‬ט‪ ,14‬ט‪ ,15‬ט‪,216‬‬ ‫ט‪ ,17‬ט‪ ,18‬ט‪ ,19‬ט‪ ,23‬ט‪ ,26‬יא‪ ,10‬יא‪ ,13‬יא‪ ,15‬יא‪ ,16‬יא‪ ,17‬יא‪ ,21‬יא‪,27‬‬ ‫יא‪ ,32‬יב‪ ,22‬יב‪ ,12‬יב‪ ,28‬יג‪ ,6‬יג‪ ,8‬יג‪ ,9‬יג‪ ,323‬יד‪ ,27‬יד‪ ,210‬יד‪ ,11‬יד‪,212‬‬ ‫יד‪ ,13‬יד‪ ,14‬יד‪ ,215‬יד‪ ,221‬טו‪ ,25‬טו‪ ,211‬טו‪ ,18‬טו‪ ,25‬טז‪ ,2‬טז‪ ,4‬טז‪ ,12‬טז‪,15‬‬ ‫טז‪ ,20‬טז‪ ,23‬טז‪ ,224‬טז‪ ,27‬יז‪ ,1‬יז‪ ,2‬יז‪ ,3‬יז‪ ,4‬יז‪ ,5‬יז‪ ,9‬יז‪ ,14‬יז‪ ,15‬יח‪,1‬‬ ‫יח‪ ,3‬יח‪ ,21‬יח‪ ,26‬יט‪ ,13‬יט‪ ,18‬כ‪ ,4‬כ‪ ,16‬כא‪ ,3‬כא‪ ,4‬כא‪ ,25‬כא‪ ,26‬כב‪,1‬‬ ‫כג‪ ,13‬כג‪ ,31‬כה‪ ,6‬כה‪ ,22‬כה‪ ,23‬כה‪ ,29‬כו‪ ,25‬כו‪ ,23‬כו‪ ,27‬כו‪ ,230‬כז‪,5‬‬ ‫כז‪ ,6‬כז‪ ,11‬כז‪ ,219‬כז‪ ,221‬כז‪ ,227‬כז‪ ,30‬כז‪ ,231‬כז‪ ,32‬כז‪ ,34‬כח‪ ,9‬כח‪,14‬‬ ‫כח‪ ,22‬כח‪ ,23‬כח‪ ,224‬כח‪ ,26‬כח‪ ,27‬כח‪ ,29‬כח‪ ,31‬כח‪ ,33‬כט‪ ,1‬כט‪,5‬‬ ‫כט‪ ,7‬כט‪ ,18‬כט‪ ,23‬כט‪ ,26‬כט‪ ,328‬כט‪ ,29‬כט‪ ,33‬כט‪ ,34‬ל‪ ,1‬ל‪ ,23‬ל‪,5‬‬ ‫ל‪ ,6‬ל‪ ,7‬ל‪ ,8‬ל‪ ,10‬ל‪ ,15‬ל‪ ,217‬ל‪ ,18‬ל‪ ,25‬ל‪ ,27‬ל‪ ,31‬לא‪ ,2‬לא‪ ,4‬לא‪ ,25‬לא‪,8‬‬ ‫לא‪ ,29‬לא‪ ,210‬לא‪ ,19‬לא‪ ,222‬לא‪ ,23‬לא‪ ,24‬לא‪ ,25‬לא‪ ,230‬לא‪ ,331‬לב‪,2‬‬ ‫לב‪ ,4‬לב‪ ,25‬לב‪ ,8‬לב‪ ,9‬לב‪ ,15‬לב‪ ,19‬לב‪ ,20‬לב‪ ,29‬לג‪ ,1‬לג‪ ,6‬לג‪ ,11‬לג‪,12‬‬ ‫לג‪ ,14‬לג‪ ,17‬לג‪ ,28‬לג‪ ,29‬לג‪ ,32‬לד‪ ,1‬לד‪ ,2‬לד‪ ,4‬לד‪ ,25‬לד‪ ,9‬לד‪ ,216‬לד‪,18‬‬ ‫לד‪ ,28‬לה‪ ,7‬לה‪ ,10‬לה‪ ,12‬לה‪ ,14‬לה‪] (217‬א‪ ,17‬ב‪ ,20‬ו‪ ,5‬ט‪ ,20‬יג‪ ,14‬טו‪,18‬‬ ‫כא‪[9‬‬ ‫)ל‪(13‬‬ ‫الشىء الذى من أجله · יז‪) 16‬ט‪(2‬‬ ‫)כו‪(17‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫דומה‬

‫מן הדומה‬ ‫דחה‬ ‫דחיה‬ ‫די‬ ‫יותר מדי‬ ‫דין‬ ‫מדין החכם‬ ‫דלות‬ ‫דם הנדות‬ ‫)דמי(‬ ‫ָדָּמה‬ ‫ִדָּמּה‬ ‫ֻדָּמּה‬ ‫מה ש ְי ֻדֶמּה‬ ‫ִה ַדָּמּה‬ ‫דמיון‬

‫דמיון זה‬ ‫על דמיון אחד‬ ‫על זה הדמיון‬ ‫דעה‬ ‫דעת‬ ‫שם בדעת‬ ‫דּ ִֹפי‬ ‫דקדוק‬ ‫דרגש‬ ‫דרך‬

‫דרך הישר‬ ‫דרך משל‬ ‫בדרך‪/‬כדרך‬

‫‪550‬‬

‫أشبه · א‪ ,11‬א‪ ,16‬א‪ ,20‬ב‪4‬‬ ‫مثل · ח‪ ,2‬י‪4‬‬ ‫نظير · ד‪3‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,1‬ט‪ ,15‬ט‪ ,16‬יב‪ ,16‬יח‪ ,24‬כ‪ ,32‬לא‪(6‬‬ ‫ك‪ · -‬ג‪) 24‬ז‪ ,15‬ז‪(17‬‬ ‫)לד‪(29‬‬ ‫)לד ‪(29‬‬ ‫]ל‪[31‬‬ ‫)ה‪(13‬‬ ‫)ו‪(19‬‬ ‫دم الطمث · יד‪26‬‬ ‫)לא‪] (17‬כט‪[20‬‬ ‫توَ َه َم َ · ג‪) 13‬ה‪ ,21‬יז‪ ,23‬כא‪ ,14‬כא‪ ,29‬כא‪ ,31‬כד‪ ,14‬כו‪] (17‬יג‪ ,19‬כא‪[13‬‬ ‫توُ ُه ِم َ · יב‪ ,24‬כב‪) 22‬כא‪(28‬‬ ‫المتخيل · יז‪1‬‬ ‫تشبه · יח‪15‬‬ ‫تخيل · טז‪ ,32‬יז‪1‬‬ ‫شبه · ח‪7‬‬ ‫مثل · ז‪ ,28‬ח‪ ,224‬יט‪14‬‬ ‫نظير · ח‪5‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,20‬ז‪ ,1‬ז‪ ,21‬ז‪ ,22‬ז‪ ,24‬ז‪ ,25‬ז‪ ,26‬יב‪ ,20‬יג‪ ,30‬לד‪(221‬‬ ‫مثال ذلك · א‪ ,18‬ט‪ ,25‬י‪ ,6‬י‪) 20‬ז‪ ,13‬ז‪ ,16‬לא‪(12‬‬ ‫على مثال واحد · א‪14‬‬ ‫على هذا المثال · א‪ ,11‬א‪) 20‬ו‪ ,10‬ו‪ ,26‬ז‪ ,11‬ט‪(22‬‬ ‫)לד‪(2‬‬ ‫)לב‪(4‬‬ ‫خطر ببال · ח‪8‬‬ ‫)כז‪(33‬‬ ‫)טו‪(15‬‬ ‫سر ير · יד‪25‬‬ ‫نحو · א‪9‬‬ ‫سبيل · יט‪17‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,1‬יא‪ ,31‬יא‪ ,33‬יד‪ ,9‬יח‪ ,13‬כה‪ ,9‬כח‪ ,29‬ל‪(14‬‬ ‫)יח‪ ,4‬יח‪(6‬‬ ‫مثلا ً· א‪) 21‬ז‪ ,2‬ז‪ ,25‬יא‪(8‬‬ ‫بمنزلة · יז‪ ,15‬יז‪ ,16‬יח‪ ,17‬כ‪ ,23‬כא‪ ,8‬כב‪ ,15‬כב‪ ,19‬כב‪22‬‬ ‫ك‪ · -‬יז‪29‬‬

‫‪551‬‬

‫מדרך‬ ‫על דרך‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,16‬ו‪ ,20‬יז‪ ,24‬יז‪ ,30‬יח‪ ,2‬יח‪ ,12‬יח‪ ,20‬כ‪ ,4‬כ‪ ,15‬כ‪ ,13‬כא‪ ,24‬כא‪,13‬‬ ‫כא‪ ,14‬כג‪ ,1‬כה‪ ,14‬כו‪ ,41‬כו‪ ,42‬כו‪ ,3‬כו‪ ,5‬כו‪ ,12‬כו‪ ,25‬כז‪ ,4‬כז‪ ,16‬כז‪,19‬‬ ‫כז‪ ,25‬ל‪ ,21‬לא‪ ,11‬לב‪ ,7‬לב‪ ,12‬לב‪ ,13‬לג‪ ,26‬לג‪] (30‬יט‪ ,5‬כ‪[13‬‬ ‫من شأن · כב‪) 22‬כד‪ ,15‬כה‪(17‬‬ ‫على طر يق · ט‪ ,24‬ט‪ ,30‬יא‪ ,22‬יא‪3‬‬ ‫على نحو · א‪ ,3‬א‪8‬‬ ‫على أن · כא‪11‬‬ ‫على سبيل · כו‪28‬‬ ‫بمنزلة · יא‪ġ31‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,32‬ה‪ ,27‬ה‪ ,31‬ו‪ ,7‬ח‪ ,29‬יא‪ ,11‬כו‪ ,13‬כז‪ ,23‬ל‪(28‬‬

‫ה‬ ‫ה‪-‬‬ ‫הבדל‬ ‫הבנה‬ ‫הגיון‬ ‫חכמת ההגיון‬ ‫הגבלה‬ ‫הגעה‬

‫הדמות‪/‬התדמות‬ ‫הדרכה‬ ‫בעל הדרכה‬ ‫הדרכת המדינה‬ ‫ההם‬ ‫הוא‬ ‫ה ֶוה‬ ‫ֹ‬ ‫)הוי(‬ ‫התהוה‬ ‫הויה‬

‫מקבל‪/‬יקבל ההויה‬ ‫הזכרה‬ ‫היה‬

‫أ · ‪passim‬‬ ‫)כה‪ ,17‬כט‪ ,14‬ל‪ ,19‬ל‪] (20‬ב‪[9‬‬ ‫فهم · יט‪) 19‬יח‪ ,2‬כג‪ ,25‬ל‪(10‬‬ ‫الر ياضة^ بالمنطق · ב‪14‬‬ ‫)כג‪(29‬‬ ‫تحصيل · ב‪12‬‬ ‫مبلغ · יט‪24‬‬ ‫)כג‪ ,2‬כה‪ ,29‬לא‪ ,5‬לה‪(3‬‬ ‫مشاكلة · ג‪) 31‬כו‪ ,18‬לג‪(26‬‬ ‫سياسة · יז‪) ġ18‬יז‪ ,20‬יז‪ ,23‬יז‪ ,24‬יח‪ ,213‬כא‪ ,15‬כא‪ ,17‬כא‪ ,19‬כה‪ ,27‬כה‪,28‬‬ ‫לא‪(15‬‬ ‫)יז‪(20‬‬ ‫سياسة المدينة · יז‪ ,29‬כה‪ġ25‬‬ ‫تلك · ‪passim‬‬ ‫هو · ‪passim‬‬ ‫كا ئن · יב‪) 10‬ה‪ ,3‬ו‪(6‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,16‬ד‪ ,17‬ה‪ ,3‬ה‪ ,8‬ה‪ ,27‬ו‪ ,6‬ט‪(20‬‬ ‫كون · ד‪ ,9‬יב‪ ,8‬יב‪ ,10‬יב‪ ,ġ13‬טו‪) 20‬ה‪ ,4‬ה‪ ,16‬ה‪ ,27‬ו‪ ,2‬ה‪ ,231‬ז‪ ,4‬ז‪,20‬‬ ‫יד‪ ,28‬יט‪ ,5‬כא‪ ,30‬כה‪ ,6‬כה‪ ,210‬לא‪ ,22‬לא‪ ,230‬לא‪ ,231‬לב‪ ,30‬לג‪ ,2‬לג‪,5‬‬ ‫לג‪ ,9‬לג‪ ,12‬לג‪ ,14‬לג‪ ,23‬לג‪ ,30‬לד‪(14‬‬ ‫قابل‪/‬يقبل الـكون · י‪ ,19‬יח‪) 20‬ד‪ ,30‬טו‪ ,18‬טז‪ ,2‬לג‪ ,7‬לד‪(1‬‬ ‫إذكار · ב‪24‬‬ ‫إلهام · ח‪18‬‬ ‫كان · ‪passim‬‬ ‫صار · ח‪ ,3‬ח‪ ,13‬ח‪ ,21‬טו‪ ,26‬טו‪ ,27‬יט‪ ,26‬כו‪ ,ġ31‬כז‪9‬‬ ‫تخلف · יב‪10‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫היולי‬

‫)לא( יתערב בו דבר מן‬ ‫ההיולי‬ ‫מה שיתערב בו ההיולי‪/‬לא‬ ‫יתערב בו ההיולי‬ ‫שההיולי לא יתערב בו‬ ‫ֱהיוֹת‬ ‫הכרח‬ ‫בהכרח‬ ‫הכרח מופתי‬ ‫יתחיב בהכרח‬ ‫ראוי בהכרח‬ ‫הכרחי‬ ‫הכרעה‬ ‫ֻהֶלּ ֶדת‬ ‫הליכה‬ ‫הלך‬ ‫הוליך‬ ‫המון‬ ‫ִהָמְּשׁכוּת‬ ‫הנאה‬ ‫ִה ֵנּה‬ ‫ֵה ָנּה‬ ‫הנהגה‬ ‫הנהגת המדינה‬ ‫הנחה‬ ‫הנעה‬ ‫ֶהְסֵתּר‬ ‫העברה‬ ‫ֵהָﬠ ֵדר‬ ‫ֶהְﬠֵתּק‬

‫‪552‬‬

‫هيولى · יד‪ ,ġ223‬יד‪) ġ28‬כ‪ ,20‬ל‪ ,7‬יד‪ ,20‬לא‪ ,9‬לא‪ ,29‬לב‪ ,2‬לב‪ ,3‬לב‪ ,5‬לב‪,7‬‬ ‫לב‪ ,8‬לב‪ ,13‬לב‪ ,14‬לב‪ ,15‬לב‪ ,26‬לב‪ ,27‬לג‪ ,4‬לג‪ ,5‬לג‪ ,36‬לג‪ ,7‬לג‪ ,8‬לג‪,19‬‬ ‫לג‪ ,24‬לג‪ ,25‬לג‪ ,30‬לג‪ ,32‬לה‪(5‬‬ ‫)لا( يشو به شىء من الهيولى · יד‪ ,7‬טז‪) 14‬יד‪ ,7‬טז‪(20‬‬ ‫)لا( تشو به الهيولى · כ‪ ,20‬כב‪) 31‬יז‪ ,22‬כ‪ ,6‬כ‪ ,20‬כב‪ ,32‬כב‪ ,33‬כט‪ ,20‬ל‪,8‬‬ ‫לג‪ ,21‬לד‪ ,5‬לד‪ ,19‬לה‪(9‬‬ ‫)כג‪(5‬‬ ‫أن يكون · ג‪) 33‬ד‪ ,29‬ה‪ ,29‬ו‪ ,7‬ו‪ ,17‬ו‪ ,19‬ו‪ ,20‬ז‪ ,23‬יא‪ ,35‬יד‪ ,17‬יד‪ ,21‬כג‪,6‬‬ ‫כד‪ ,29‬כז‪ ,1‬לא‪ ,11‬לא‪ ,26‬לב‪ ,25‬לה‪(8‬‬ ‫ضرورة · יט‪ ,12/14‬יט‪15‬‬ ‫ضرورة ً · יט‪) 10‬יב‪ ,12‬טו‪ ,6‬טו‪ ,27‬יט‪ ,10‬יט‪ ,11‬כג‪ ,7‬לג‪] (27‬כז‪ ,25‬לב‪[17‬‬ ‫بالواجب · טו‪ġ27‬‬ ‫)יג‪(17‬‬ ‫يجب ضرورة ً · טו ‪ ,21‬טז‪ ,14‬כג‪ ,8‬כג‪) 10‬יח‪ ,29‬כד‪ ,15‬לד‪(1‬‬ ‫يجب ضرورة ً · ב‪ ,25‬ד‪ ,3‬יג‪ ,25‬טו‪) 23‬ז‪ ,13‬לג‪(18‬‬ ‫ضروري · יג‪ ,17‬כד‪) 30‬כז‪(18‬‬ ‫]כח‪[2‬‬ ‫تولدُ · ח‪24‬‬ ‫مرور · כ‪) ġ27‬יט‪(7‬‬ ‫سلك · ח‪) 10‬יא‪ ,30‬יא‪ ,33‬כד‪ ,31‬כה‪ ,9‬כח‪ ,29‬ל‪ ,1‬ל‪ ,15‬לא‪ ,11‬לא‪,20‬‬ ‫לא‪ ,22‬לה‪] (17‬ב‪ ,3‬ג‪[30‬‬ ‫)יז‪(20‬‬ ‫]כה‪ ,26‬כה‪ ,30‬ל‪[26‬‬ ‫)כד‪(28‬‬ ‫لذة · יט‪ ,21‬יט‪22‬‬ ‫إن · ف · فإن · قد · ‪passim‬‬ ‫]יז‪ ,30‬כה‪ ,4‬לג‪ ,18‬לד‪ ,22‬לד‪[27‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,9‬יב‪ ,3‬יז‪ ,19‬כה‪ ,28‬כו‪ ,3‬ל‪ ,30‬לא‪ ,1‬לא‪ ,11‬לא‪ ,16‬לה‪(17‬‬ ‫)ל‪ ,25‬לא‪(11‬‬ ‫)יב‪ ,14‬טו‪ ,28‬כד‪(11‬‬ ‫تحر يك · יג‪ ,26‬יג‪ ,227‬טז‪ ,9‬כט‪) ġ5‬יט‪ ,8‬כב‪ ,10‬כו‪ ,29‬לב‪ ,20‬לב‪ ,22‬לב‪,23‬‬ ‫לג‪ ,22‬לג‪(23‬‬ ‫)ו‪(26‬‬ ‫]כח‪ ,2‬כח‪[21‬‬ ‫عدم · ט‪ ,25‬ט‪ ,26‬ט‪ ,27‬ט‪ ,29‬י‪ ,6‬יא‪ ,3‬יט‪) 23‬ד‪ ,33‬ה‪ ,2‬ו‪ ,7‬לב‪,6‬‬ ‫לב‪(27‬‬ ‫نقلة · ד‪10‬‬ ‫انتقال · כ‪27‬‬ ‫)כז‪(24‬‬

‫‪553‬‬ ‫ִהפּוְּך‬ ‫)הפך(‬ ‫התהפך‬ ‫ֶהֶפְך‬

‫הפסד‬ ‫מקבל‪/‬יקבל להפסד‬ ‫הפסק‬ ‫ִהָפֲּﬠלוּת‬ ‫הפרש‬ ‫הצטרפות‬ ‫הקדמה‬ ‫הקש‬

‫ֵה ָראוּת‬ ‫הרבה‬ ‫הרגש‬ ‫הרחבה‬ ‫הושם על צד ההרחבה‬ ‫הרכבה‬ ‫הרף‬ ‫הרף עין‬ ‫השארות‬ ‫דבק ההשארות‬ ‫מתמיד ההשארות‬ ‫תמידי ההשארות‬ ‫השגה‬ ‫השפעה‬ ‫השתדלות‬ ‫השתנות‬ ‫התאחדות‬ ‫התחלה‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫تضاد · ד‪13‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,15‬ו‪ ,26‬ל‪ ,2‬ל‪ ,3‬לד‪(4‬‬ ‫ضد · ג‪ ,233‬ד‪ ,21‬ד‪ ,24‬ד‪ ,5‬ד‪) 212‬ד‪ ,15‬ד‪ ,16‬טו‪ ,6‬טו‪ ,28‬יח‪ ,24‬לא‪ ,21‬לא‪,30‬‬ ‫לב‪ ,21‬לב‪ ,3‬לב‪ ,5‬לב‪ ,28‬לג‪ ,26‬לד‪ ,3‬לד‪ ,6‬לד‪ ,9‬לד‪ ,10‬לד‪ ,11‬לד‪ ,27‬לד‪(29‬‬ ‫]יט‪ ,14‬לד‪[5‬‬ ‫فساد · ד‪ ,9‬יב‪ ,9‬יב‪ ,11‬יב‪ ,ġ13‬טו‪) 20‬ד‪ ,30‬ה‪ ,32‬ז‪ ,4‬ז‪ ,15‬יב‪ ,19‬יב‪ ,20‬יט‪,6‬‬ ‫יט‪ ,7‬לא‪ ,24‬לב‪ ,17‬לג‪ ,9‬לג‪] (23‬ו‪[8‬‬ ‫قابل‪/‬يقبل للفساد · ב‪ ,30‬י‪ ,19‬יא‪ ,34‬יא‪ ,35‬יח‪ ,20‬כב‪) 23‬ו‪ ,12‬ו‪ ,13‬טו‪,18‬‬ ‫טז‪ ,2‬לג‪ ,2‬לג‪ ,7‬לד‪(1‬‬ ‫انقطاع · טו‪ ,20‬טז‪) 9‬לה‪(10‬‬ ‫انفعال · ב‪) 4‬ט‪(11‬‬ ‫فرق · ב‪] 9‬ל‪[19‬‬ ‫)ח‪ ,31‬ט‪ ,5‬ט‪(11‬‬ ‫مقدمة · כט‪) 9‬יז‪(8‬‬ ‫قياس · ט‪ ,28‬טו‪ ,16‬כג‪7‬‬ ‫مقايسة · ט‪31‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,20‬יא‪ ,15‬יב‪ ,14‬יד‪ ,16‬טו‪ ,11‬יז‪ ,14‬כ‪ ,210‬כ‪ ,11‬כא‪ ,12‬כו‪ ,7‬כט‪ ,15‬כט‪,16‬‬ ‫כט‪(34‬‬ ‫)ו‪(27‬‬ ‫كثير · י‪) 6‬טז‪ ,27‬יז‪ ,7‬כט‪ ,10‬לה‪(2‬‬ ‫]יט‪[23‬‬ ‫)כו ‪(15‬‬ ‫تركيب · א‪ ,26‬ח‪ ,12‬יז‪ ,ġ6‬יז‪ ,15‬כט‪) ġ7‬ז‪] (15‬יז‪ ,18‬יז‪ ,23‬כא‪,17‬‬ ‫כא‪[19‬‬ ‫طرفة عين · יט‪21‬‬ ‫بقاء · טו‪ ,224‬יט‪ ,15‬כא‪) 25‬ז‪ ,16‬ז‪ ,17‬טו‪ ,25‬כא‪ ,27‬לא‪(1‬‬ ‫متصل البقاء · יז‪ġ23‬‬ ‫دائم البقاء · ב‪ ,28‬ב‪) 29‬ו‪(12‬‬ ‫دائم البقاء · טו‪) 21‬כא‪(19‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,24‬כח‪ ,25‬כט‪ ,9‬כט‪ ,15‬כט‪ ,30‬ל‪(17‬‬ ‫]ח‪[18‬‬ ‫]כו‪[10‬‬ ‫استحالة · ד‪ ,9‬יא‪23‬‬ ‫اتحاد · א‪5‬‬ ‫مبدأ · א‪ ,24‬ב‪ ,4‬ב‪ ,27‬ב‪ ,38‬ב‪ ,10‬ב‪ ,11‬ב‪ ,12‬ב‪ ,15‬ב‪ ,216‬ב‪ ,18‬ב‪ ,19‬ב‪ ,25‬ב‪,26‬‬ ‫ג‪ ,21‬ג‪ ,26‬ג‪ ,227‬ט‪ ,25‬ט‪ ,32‬י‪ ,1‬י‪ ,2‬י‪ ,3‬י‪ ,211‬י‪ ,212‬יא‪ ,24‬יא‪ ,25‬יד‪ ,21‬יד‪,6‬‬ ‫יד‪ ,ġ23‬טז‪ ,23‬יז‪ ,17‬כה‪ ,ġ24‬כח‪ ,20‬כט‪ ,24‬ל‪12‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬

‫התחלה מניעה‬ ‫ההתחלה הראשונה‬ ‫התחלפות‬

‫התעבדות‬ ‫התעבות‬ ‫ִהָתּלוּת‬ ‫התנגדות‬ ‫התפעמות‬ ‫התרחבות‬

‫‪554‬‬

‫ابتداء · יא‪ ,4‬טז‪ ,31‬טז‪32‬‬ ‫أول · כא‪20‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,4‬ו‪ ,5‬ו‪ ,7‬ו‪ ,8‬ח‪ ,28‬ח‪ ,30‬ח‪ ,331‬ח‪ ,432‬ט‪ ,21‬ט‪ ,219‬יא‪ ,5‬יא‪ ,6‬יא‪ ,7‬יא‪,210‬‬ ‫יא‪ ,13‬יא‪ ,14‬יא‪ ,215‬יא‪ ,16‬יא‪ ,18‬יא‪ ,26‬יג‪ ,28‬יז‪ ,32‬יט‪ ,210‬כא‪ ,29‬כד‪,25‬‬ ‫כה‪ ,15‬כו‪ ,31‬ל‪ ,12‬ל‪ ,13‬ל‪ ,14‬ל‪ ,15‬ל‪ ,17‬ל‪ ,18‬לא‪ ,1‬לא‪ ,29‬לב‪ ,7‬לב‪ ,11‬לב‪,12‬‬ ‫לב‪ ,14‬לב‪ ,15‬לב‪ ,18‬לב‪ ,225‬לב‪ ,27‬לג‪ ,3‬לג‪ ,15‬לג‪ ,16‬לג‪ ,18‬לג‪ ,21‬לג‪,31‬‬ ‫לג‪ ,32‬לג‪ ,33‬לד‪ ,2‬לד‪ ,7‬לד‪ ,214‬לד‪ ,15‬לד‪ ,19‬לד‪ ,20‬לד‪ ,22‬לד‪ ,26‬לד‪,29‬‬ ‫לה‪ ,1‬לה‪ ,4‬לה‪ ,6‬לה‪ ,14‬לה‪ ,216‬לה‪] (217‬כא‪[30‬‬ ‫مبدأ محرك · י‪) 3‬לב‪ ,14‬לב‪ ,15‬לב‪(25‬‬ ‫المبدأ الأول · י‪ ,16‬יא‪ ,25‬יא‪ ,27‬יג‪ ,34‬טז‪ ,20‬כג‪ ,4‬כג‪ ,6‬כו‪) 27‬יב‪ ,13‬כט‪,19‬‬ ‫כט‪ ,24‬לא‪ ,28‬לב‪ ,9‬לב‪ ,10‬לד‪ ,7‬לד‪ ,12‬לה‪(13‬‬ ‫استحالة · יג‪2‬‬ ‫‪26‬‬ ‫ו‬ ‫ט‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬ ‫ט‬ ‫י‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪27‬‬ ‫ו‬ ‫ט‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪221‬‬ ‫ו‬ ‫ט‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬ ‫ו‬ ‫ט‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪17‬‬ ‫ו‬ ‫ט‬ ‫اختلاف ·‬ ‫‪ġ‬‬ ‫]יח‪[26‬‬ ‫)יז‪(31‬‬ ‫]לג‪[19‬‬ ‫)כו‪ ,10‬לד‪(14‬‬ ‫مقابلة · ד‪13‬‬ ‫]ח‪[18‬‬ ‫اتساع · כט‪ġ6‬‬

‫ו‬ ‫ו…‬

‫و · ف · ‪passim‬‬

‫ז‬ ‫זבוב‬ ‫זה‬ ‫וזה ש…‬ ‫זהב‬ ‫זהר‬ ‫נזהר‬ ‫זוית‬ ‫זולת‬

‫ذبابة · ז‪30‬‬ ‫هذا‪ ,‬ذلك · ‪passim‬‬ ‫وذلك أن · ‪passim‬‬ ‫ذهب · ח‪) 9‬ה‪ ,228‬ה‪(229‬‬ ‫توقى · י‪16‬‬ ‫)כט‪(231‬‬ ‫غير · א‪ ,15‬ב‪ ,9‬ג‪ ,14‬ד‪ ,3‬ד‪ ,8‬ז‪ ,28‬ח‪ ,4‬ח‪ ,5‬י‪ ,15‬י‪ ,23‬י‪ ,30‬יב‪ ,26‬יב‪ ,27‬טו‪,23‬‬ ‫כ‪ ,4‬כב‪ ,18‬כז‪ ,22‬כז‪ ,4‬כז‪14‬‬ ‫بعد · כא‪21‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,15‬ח‪ ,32‬ט‪ ,4‬ט‪ ,8‬ט‪ ,10‬ט‪ ,19‬ט‪ ,320‬יב‪ ,3‬יב‪ ,29‬יג‪ ,6‬יג‪ ,21‬טו‪ ,3‬יז‪,9‬‬ ‫יח‪ ,22‬יח‪ ,26‬כד‪ ,7‬כד‪ ,9‬כו‪ ,7‬כז‪ ,8‬ל‪ ,3‬ל‪ ,25‬ל‪ ,6‬לא‪ ,5‬לא‪ ,6‬לב‪ ,8‬לב‪,20‬‬ ‫לג‪ ,6‬לג‪(17‬‬

‫‪555‬‬ ‫)זון(‬ ‫ִנזּוֹן‬ ‫)זכר(‬ ‫ָזַכר‬

‫נזכר‬ ‫הזכיר‬ ‫ֻה ְזַכּר‬ ‫ֵזֶכר‬ ‫זכרון‬ ‫זלזל‬ ‫זמן‬

‫זריזות‬ ‫זרע‬ ‫שכבת זרע‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬

‫)לא‪(6‬‬ ‫ذكر · ד‪11‬‬ ‫اذكر · ד‪7‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,26‬יא‪ ,17‬יב‪ ,11‬יג‪ ,16‬כד‪ ,24‬כד‪] (28‬כז‪[34‬‬ ‫)יא‪(18‬‬ ‫أذكر · ב‪) 24‬ח‪ ,29‬כג‪(28‬‬ ‫أله ِم َ · ח‪ ,18‬ח‪22‬‬ ‫)טז‪(10‬‬ ‫ذكر · כח‪) 6‬יג‪ ,11‬יט‪(26‬‬ ‫أغار · ח‪7‬‬ ‫زمان · ב‪ ,4‬ב‪ ,17‬יא‪ ,22‬יב‪ ,8‬יב‪ ,210‬יב‪ ,ġ13‬יב‪ ,215‬יב‪ ,17‬יב‪ ,ġ18‬יב‪ ,20‬יב‪,21‬‬ ‫יג‪ ,11‬יג‪ ,19‬יט‪ ,16‬כב‪ ,6‬כב‪ ,15‬כב‪ ,24‬כב‪ ,26‬כח‪27‬‬ ‫عهد · ב‪17‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,19‬ו‪ ,28‬יב‪ ,27‬יב‪ ,14‬יב‪ ,18‬יב‪ ,19‬יב‪ ,20‬יג‪ ,20‬טו‪ ,14‬כב‪ ,2‬כח‪ ,230‬כט‪,9‬‬ ‫כט‪] (11‬יג‪ ,9‬יז‪ ,21‬יט‪ ,19‬כב‪[18‬‬ ‫]יב‪[9‬‬ ‫بزرة · ח‪ ,2‬ח‪ ,4‬כב‪) 23‬ד‪ ,25‬ה‪ ,6‬ה‪ ,27‬ה‪ ,8‬יד‪ ,27‬יד‪(28‬‬ ‫منى · ח‪24‬‬ ‫منى · ח‪2‬‬

‫ח‬ ‫ִחבּוּר‬ ‫ֶחֶבל‬ ‫חבר‬ ‫ִחֵבּר‬ ‫התחבר‬ ‫ָחֵבר‬ ‫ַחד‬ ‫ִחדּוּד‬ ‫חדוה‬ ‫חדוש‬

‫חדש‬ ‫ִח ֵדּשׁ‬

‫تأليف · א‪] 27‬א‪[8‬‬ ‫)כא‪(17‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,17‬לג‪ ,18‬לג‪ ,25‬לג‪ ,33‬לה‪] (14‬לג‪[17‬‬ ‫)לב‪ ,12‬לה‪ ,6‬לה‪] (15‬ב‪[13‬‬ ‫)ל‪ ,20‬ל‪ ,29‬לג‪(21‬‬ ‫حاد · כח‪) 27‬כח‪ ,32‬כט‪(9‬‬ ‫)כט‪(12‬‬ ‫سرور · יט‪20‬‬ ‫ح َد َث · ג‪ ,25‬ג‪ ,26‬י‪ ,13‬יב‪21‬‬ ‫حدوث · יב‪ ,ġ18‬יב‪ ,32‬יג‪26‬‬ ‫حادث · יב‪25‬‬ ‫عرض · ג‪217‬‬ ‫)ט‪ ,20‬יב‪ ,8‬יב‪ ,19‬יג‪ ,7‬יג‪ ,28‬כא‪ ,5‬לא‪ ,18‬לא‪ ,22‬לא‪ ,29‬לד‪(18‬‬ ‫أحدث · יב‪ ,25‬ח‪) 6‬לד‪ ,25‬לד‪(26‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫התחדש‪/‬נתחדש‬

‫ָח ָדשׁ‬ ‫חוב‬ ‫ִח ֵיּב‬ ‫ִהְתַח ֵיּב‬

‫יתחיב בהכרח‬ ‫חולה‬ ‫חוץ‬ ‫מחוץ‬ ‫חוש‬

‫חושק‬ ‫חזיר‬ ‫)חזק(‬ ‫ִח ֵזּק‬ ‫החזיק‬ ‫חזק‬ ‫חזר‬ ‫חטא בדבר‬ ‫חי )פ׳(‬ ‫לחיות‬ ‫חי )ש״ע(‬

‫חיים‬ ‫אדני החיים‬ ‫חיל‬ ‫חיצון‬ ‫ֵחְך‬

‫‪556‬‬

‫ث · ב‪ ,3‬ג‪ ,27‬ז‪ ,28‬ח‪ ,7‬ח‪ ,220‬ח‪ ,25‬יא‪ ,2‬יב‪ ,325‬יג‪ ,4‬יג‪5‬‬ ‫ح َد َ َ‬ ‫)ה‪ ,9‬ה‪ ,10‬ה‪ ,27‬ה‪ ,31‬ו‪ ,4‬ו‪ ,5‬ז‪ ,11‬ז‪ ,18‬ז‪ ,19‬ז‪ ,22‬ח‪ ,26‬יג‪ ,7‬יג‪ ,9‬יג‪,20‬‬ ‫טז‪ ,4‬יט‪ ,2‬כא‪ ,5‬לא‪ ,26‬לב‪ ,5‬לב‪ ,6‬לג‪ ,5‬לד‪ ,23‬לה‪ ,2‬לה‪ ,5‬לה‪(6‬‬ ‫]לד‪[2‬‬ ‫)יד‪(12‬‬ ‫أوجب · יב‪ ,227‬כג‪) 11‬יב‪ ,19‬יג‪ ,1‬טו‪ ,11‬כה‪ ,23‬לא‪ ,10‬לב‪ ,23‬לג‪,13‬‬ ‫לה‪(17‬‬ ‫وجب · יג‪ ,4‬יג‪ ,19‬יג‪ ,22‬יד‪ ,13‬יז‪ ,27‬כ‪ ,29‬כא‪ ,25‬כא‪ ,27‬כד‪ ,27‬כה‪,13‬‬ ‫כה‪ ,18‬כה‪ ,20‬כח‪10‬‬ ‫لزم · י‪ ,16‬יא‪ ,34‬יב‪ ,10‬יב‪ ,29‬יג‪34‬‬ ‫)ט‪ ,11‬ט‪ ,12‬ט‪ ,17‬יב‪ ,2‬יב‪ ,19‬יב‪ ,28‬יח‪ ,21‬כג‪ ,21‬כד‪ ,25‬כה‪ ,21‬כז‪ ,8‬כז‪,10‬‬ ‫כח‪ ,7‬לג‪ ,23‬לד‪ ,8‬לד‪ ,10‬לד‪ ,215‬לד‪ ,16‬לד‪ ,17‬לד‪ ,22‬לד‪ ,23‬לד‪ ,28‬לד‪(29‬‬ ‫يجب ضرورة ً · טו ‪ ,21‬טז‪ ,14‬כג‪ ,8‬כג‪) 10‬יח‪ ,29‬כד‪ ,15‬לד‪] (1‬ד‪[3‬‬ ‫سقيم · י‪ ,26‬י‪27‬‬ ‫خارج · י‪ ,1‬י‪ ,4‬כ‪ ,18‬כ‪ ,19‬כא‪ ,11‬כה‪ ,ġ22‬כז‪) 4‬ט‪ ,27‬טו‪ ,5‬יט‪ ,13‬כג‪ ,16‬כה‪,2‬‬ ‫כז‪ ,4‬כז‪ ,32‬לד‪ ,12‬לד‪(19‬‬ ‫من خارج · כא‪ ,2‬כז‪11‬‬ ‫حس · ב‪ ,28‬טו‪ ,28‬יט‪ ,23‬כ‪ ,17‬כג‪7‬‬ ‫حاسة · ב‪ ,17‬כא‪10‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,11‬ו‪ ,12‬ו‪ ,20‬טו‪ ,29‬כ‪ ,4‬כ‪ ,22‬כט‪ ,28‬לד‪ ,9‬לד‪ ,210‬לד‪(12‬‬ ‫عاشق · טז‪ ,19‬כו‪ ,29‬כח‪18‬‬ ‫)לא‪(7‬‬ ‫]ה‪[17‬‬ ‫)יא‪] (17‬לה‪[3‬‬ ‫قوى · יא‪ ,4‬יב‪ ,29‬כד‪) 30‬טו‪ ,8‬יט‪ ,31‬כח‪ ,25‬כט‪(26‬‬ ‫)יא‪(18‬‬ ‫]לא‪[29‬‬ ‫)יח‪(7‬‬ ‫)יז‪(31‬‬ ‫‪2‬‬ ‫ח‬ ‫י‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬ ‫ח‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪7‬‬ ‫ח‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪6‬‬ ‫ח‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬ ‫ח‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪8‬‬ ‫א‬ ‫·‬ ‫ن‬ ‫حيوا‬ ‫‪ġ‬‬ ‫حي · כא‪13‬‬ ‫)יז‪ ,24‬כא‪ ,18‬ל‪ ,28‬לא‪ ,3‬לא‪ ,18‬לה‪ ,5‬לה‪(6‬‬ ‫حياة · כא‪ ,219‬כא‪ ,20‬כא‪ ,221‬כא‪ ,322‬כא‪ ,23‬כא‪ ,24‬כא‪ ,225‬כה‪ ,ġ1‬כו‪32‬‬ ‫)יח‪ ,12‬כא‪ ,18‬כא‪ ,27‬כו‪ ,3‬כו‪(222‬‬ ‫حياة · כא‪23‬‬ ‫عسكر · א‪ ,7‬יח‪ ,ġ8‬ל‪) ġ21‬ל‪ ,21‬לא‪(23‬‬ ‫)כ‪(14‬‬ ‫)יט‪(31‬‬

‫‪557‬‬ ‫חכם‬ ‫חכמי התשבורת‬ ‫מדין החכם‬ ‫חכמה‬ ‫החכמה האלהית‬ ‫חכמת ההגיון‬ ‫החכמה הטבעית‬ ‫ספר החכמה הטבעית‬ ‫חכמת הכוכבים‬ ‫חכמת התשבורת‬ ‫חלד‬ ‫חלוף‬ ‫חלוש‬ ‫)חלט(‬ ‫ֻהְחַלט‬ ‫)חלף(‬ ‫התחלף‬ ‫ָחַלק‬ ‫נחלק‬ ‫ִחֵלּק‬ ‫התחלק‬ ‫חלקים אשר לא יתחלקו‬ ‫ֵחֶלק‬

‫חלקים אשר לא יתחלקו‬ ‫ֻחְלָשׁה‬ ‫חם‬ ‫ֹ‬ ‫חמה‬ ‫כוכב חמה‬ ‫חמור‬ ‫חמוש‬ ‫חֶמר‬ ‫ֹ‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫عالم · כו‪) 25‬ה‪ ,13‬ה‪(14‬‬ ‫)כט‪(16‬‬ ‫)ה‪(13‬‬ ‫علم · ג‪ ,24‬יז‪ ,26‬יז‪ ,27‬יט‪ ,17‬יט‪ ,21‬כו‪) 25‬כג‪ ,215‬לד‪(28‬‬ ‫)יד‪(19‬‬ ‫الر ياضة^ بالمنطق · ב‪14‬‬ ‫العلم الطبيعى · ג‪ ,23‬ג‪25‬‬ ‫كتاب العلم الطبيعى · ג‪) 32‬ה‪(26‬‬ ‫علم النجوم · כג‪) 15‬כג‪ ,22‬כג‪(25‬‬ ‫)כג‪(28‬‬ ‫دهر · יא‪ ,23‬יב‪ ,24‬יט‪ ,16‬כא‪) 26‬יב‪ ,30‬לה‪(10‬‬ ‫اختلاف · ג‪) 12‬טו‪ ,8‬יח‪ ,21‬יח‪ ,26‬כג‪ ,18‬כג‪ ,20‬כג‪(22‬‬ ‫خلاف · יט‪14‬‬ ‫ضعيف · יד‪ ,ġ3‬כט‪) 7‬יח‪ ,30‬כח‪ ,23‬כח‪(24‬‬ ‫]ל‪[30‬‬ ‫اختلف · י‪ ,28‬טו‪ ,19‬כב‪) 22‬יב‪ ,31‬טו‪ ,8‬טז‪ ,21‬כז‪(24‬‬ ‫عاند · כא‪10‬‬ ‫)כ‪ ,9‬כ‪(21‬‬ ‫قسم · ג‪ ,19‬ג‪ ,20‬יא‪) ġ32‬ו‪ ,12‬כח‪ ,24‬לב‪(7‬‬ ‫)לא‪ ,21‬לג‪ ,12‬לה‪(9‬‬ ‫أجزاء التى لا تتجزأ · יד‪ ,ġ22‬יד‪ġ30‬‬ ‫جزء · א‪ ,6‬א‪ ,7‬ג‪ ,19‬יב‪] 17‬ד‪[32‬‬ ‫حظ · א‪16‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,19‬ד‪ ,21‬יב‪ ,1‬כט‪ ,23‬ל‪ ,9‬לא‪ ,13‬לא‪ ,17‬לב‪ ,13‬לה‪(9‬‬ ‫أجزاء التى لا تتجزأ · יד‪ ,ġ22‬יד‪ġ30‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,8‬ו‪ ,26‬כח‪ ,22‬לב‪] (27‬כז‪[17‬‬ ‫حر · ט‪) 26‬לד‪ ,3‬לד‪ ,9‬לד‪(10‬‬ ‫)כד‪(29‬‬ ‫)לא‪(7‬‬ ‫]כא‪[16‬‬ ‫مادة · יד‪ ,24‬כה‪16‬‬ ‫عنصر · ח‪7‬‬ ‫هيولى · כה‪18‬‬ ‫)כה‪ ,17‬לב‪] (29‬ו‪ ,217‬ו‪ ,23‬ו‪ ,24‬ו‪ ,25‬ו‪ ,26‬ו‪ ,29‬ח‪ ,9‬ט‪ ,2‬ט‪ ,23‬ט‪ ,34‬ט‪,25‬‬ ‫ט‪ ,26‬ט‪ ,29‬ט‪ ,10‬ט‪ ,211‬ט‪ ,212‬ט‪ ,14‬ט‪ ,15‬ט‪ ,17‬ט‪ ,18‬ט‪ ,22‬ט‪ ,23‬ט‪ ,25‬ט‪,26‬‬ ‫ט‪ ,28‬ט‪ ,230‬ט‪ ,31‬י‪ ,2‬י‪ ,3‬י‪ ,22‬י‪ ,23‬י‪ ,24‬י‪ ,26‬י‪ ,228‬י‪ ,29‬י‪ ,30‬יא‪ ,2‬יא‪,611‬‬ ‫יד‪ ,20‬יד‪ ,223‬יד‪ ,28‬טז‪ ,20‬יז‪ ,22‬כ‪ ,6‬כ‪ ,320‬כב‪ ,31‬כב‪ ,32‬כב‪ ,34‬כג‪,5‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬

‫חמת מים‬ ‫ָחַסר‬ ‫ָחֵסר‬ ‫חסרון‬

‫חפש‬ ‫)חקי(‬ ‫ִחָקּה‬ ‫ֻחָקּה‬ ‫חקירה‬ ‫חקר‬

‫ָחַשׁב‬

‫ֶנְחַשׁב‬ ‫הדבר שחושבים בו‬ ‫חשבון‬ ‫ָחשׁוּק‬ ‫חֶשְׁך‬ ‫ֹ‬ ‫ָחַשׁק‬ ‫ֵחֶשׁק‬ ‫חתיכה‬ ‫ָחַתם‬ ‫נחתם‬

‫‪558‬‬

‫כט‪ ,20‬כט‪ ,33‬ל‪ ,1‬ל‪ ,4‬ל‪ ,7‬ל‪ ,8‬לא‪ ,9‬לא‪ ,29‬לב‪ ,2‬לב‪ ,4‬לב‪ ,5‬לב‪ ,8‬לב‪,13‬‬ ‫לב‪ ,26‬לב‪ ,27‬לג‪ ,4‬לג‪ ,5‬לג‪ ,36‬לג‪ ,7‬לג‪ ,8‬לג‪ ,19‬לג‪ ,22‬לג‪ ,24‬לג‪ ,25‬לג‪,30‬‬ ‫לג‪ ,32‬לד‪ ,5‬לד‪ ,19‬לה‪ ,5‬לה‪[9‬‬ ‫)לא‪(7‬‬ ‫)כא‪ ,4‬כד‪] (16‬יב‪ ,22‬יט‪[21‬‬ ‫ناقص · כח‪4‬‬ ‫تنقص · ג‪26‬‬ ‫نقصان · ד‪10‬‬ ‫)יט‪ ,6‬כג‪ ,21‬לא‪(6‬‬ ‫)כב‪ ,31‬כג‪(31‬‬ ‫]ה‪ ,23‬ה‪[24‬‬ ‫]ה‪[23‬‬ ‫بح ْث · ב‪ ,9‬ב‪ ,210‬ב‪) 24‬ח‪ ,28‬ח‪ ,29‬יא‪ ,5‬יא‪ ,21‬יא‪ ,31‬יא‪ ,33‬כג‪(23‬‬ ‫َ‬ ‫ث · י‪ ,14‬י‪ ,31‬יא‪ ,ġ29‬יא‪ ,30‬כז‪1‬‬ ‫بح َ َ‬ ‫َ‬ ‫نظر · יא‪29‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,32‬יא‪ ,20‬יא‪ ,22‬יב‪ ,12‬יב‪ ,22‬כג‪ ,23‬כג‪ ,24‬כג‪ ,25‬כג‪ ,230‬כג‪ ,31‬כג‪,32‬‬ ‫כה‪ ,11‬כו‪ ,22‬לב‪ ,16‬לה‪] (1‬כג‪[15‬‬ ‫درى · ח‪17‬‬ ‫ظن · ג‪22‬‬ ‫‪31‬‬ ‫כ‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪19‬‬ ‫ג‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪18‬‬ ‫ג‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬ ‫توهم · ג‬ ‫‪ġ‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,14‬ט‪ ,26‬יג‪ ,19‬כ‪ ,21‬כא‪ ,13‬כד‪ ,12‬כו‪ ,19‬כט‪ ,13‬לא‪ ,9‬לב‪ ,14‬לב‪ ,18‬לב‪,24‬‬ ‫לב‪ ,25‬לג‪ ,15‬לד‪] (25‬ג‪ ,13‬יא‪ ,27‬טו‪ ,27‬כא‪[14‬‬ ‫)ז‪(1‬‬ ‫المظنون · יז‪1‬‬ ‫)כג‪(24‬‬ ‫معشوق · טז‪ ,16‬טז‪ ,17‬טז‪ ,18‬טז‪ ,19‬טז‪ ,20‬טז‪ ,21‬טז‪ ,222‬טז‪ ,28‬יח‪ ,14‬כו‪29‬‬ ‫)יז‪ ,22‬יז‪ ,24‬יח‪ ,3‬יח‪ ,4‬יח‪ ,5‬כה‪ ,29‬כו‪ ,5‬לג‪(22‬‬ ‫ظلمة · ט‪ ,28‬י‪ ,25‬יד‪) ġ19‬טז‪(4‬‬ ‫تشوق · יז‪28‬‬ ‫ق · יח‪ ,15‬יח‪16‬‬ ‫ش َ‬ ‫عَ ِ‬ ‫شق · טז‪ ,28‬כה‪) ġ25‬יח‪ ,3‬לא‪] (19‬יב‪[9‬‬ ‫عِ ْ‬ ‫قطع · יג‪19‬‬ ‫]כג‪[15‬‬ ‫انطبق · כ‪) 18‬לד‪(10‬‬

‫‪559‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬

‫ט‬ ‫טבע‬

‫בעל טבעים‬ ‫החכמה הטבעית‬ ‫ספר החכמה הטבעית‬ ‫טבעיות‬ ‫מאמרים טבעיים‬ ‫מאמרים בטבעיות‬ ‫השמע הטבעי‬ ‫טבעי‬ ‫טבעיים‬ ‫)טוב(‬ ‫היטיב ְלַﬠ ֵיּן‬ ‫היטיב למצוא‬ ‫טוב‬

‫יותר טוב‬ ‫טיט‬ ‫טלה‬ ‫טמון‬ ‫טעה‬ ‫טעות‬ ‫ָטַﬠם‬ ‫ַטַﬠם‬ ‫ָט ֵרד‬

‫طبيعة · ג‪ ,4‬ג‪ ,7‬ג‪ ,20‬ד‪ ,5‬ח‪ ,1‬ח‪ ,6‬ח‪ ,10‬ח‪ ,11‬ח‪ ,14‬ח‪ ,15‬ח‪ ,16‬ח‪ ,23‬ח‪,27‬‬ ‫יב‪ ,5‬יג‪ ,31‬יג‪ ,34‬יד‪ ,ġ3‬יד‪ ,8‬טז‪ ,14‬טז‪ ,219‬יז‪ ,15‬יח‪ ,18‬יט‪ ,15‬יט‪ ,21‬יט‪,25‬‬ ‫יט‪ ,28‬כ‪ ,7‬כא‪ ,2‬כב‪ ,4‬כד‪ ,ġ31‬כה‪ ,ġ9‬כה‪ ,ġ24‬כז‪19‬‬ ‫طبع · ג‪ ,17‬ג‪ ,29‬כח‪9‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,219‬ה‪ ,9‬ו‪ ,2‬ו‪ ,25‬ו‪ ,17‬ז‪ ,6‬ז‪ ,7‬ז‪ ,8‬ז‪ ,9‬ז‪ ,23‬יד‪ ,9‬יד‪ ,12‬יד‪ ,17‬טו‪ ,5‬טו‪ ,6‬טו‪,7‬‬ ‫טז‪ ,5‬יז‪ ,4‬יז‪ ,12‬יז‪ ,14‬יז‪ ,23‬יח‪ ,20‬יח‪ ,21‬יח‪ ,30‬יט‪ ,2‬כ‪ ,5‬כ‪ ,8‬כ‪ ,9‬כא‪ ,3‬כא‪,11‬‬ ‫כא‪ ,17‬כג‪ ,12‬כו‪ ,15‬כו‪ ,26‬כז‪ ,4‬כז‪ ,11‬כז‪ ,32‬ל‪ ,3‬ל‪ ,32‬לא‪ ,10‬לב‪ ,17‬לג‪,25‬‬ ‫לג‪ ,28‬לד‪ ,226‬לה‪(8‬‬ ‫)יד‪ ,20‬לד‪(17‬‬ ‫العلم الطبيعى · ג‪ ,23‬ג‪25‬‬ ‫كتاب العلم الطبيعى · ג‪) 32‬ה‪(26‬‬ ‫)כה‪(20‬‬ ‫)יב‪(11‬‬ ‫)כב‪ ,8‬לג‪(1‬‬ ‫)יג‪] (17‬ה‪[26‬‬ ‫طبيعى · י‪ ,4‬יא‪ ,19‬כב‪) 13‬ו‪ ,1‬ו‪ ,6‬יא‪ ,20‬יב‪ ,6‬יג‪ ,30‬טו‪ ,5‬כה‪ ,22‬כה‪ ,23‬ל‪(15‬‬ ‫)ד‪(27‬‬ ‫أمعن · ב‪23‬‬ ‫)לב‪(10‬‬ ‫خير · טז‪ ,230‬ל‪ġ21‬‬ ‫حسن · טז‪24‬‬ ‫)טז‪ ,25‬כ‪ ,21‬כד‪ ,33‬כו‪ ,14‬כז‪ ,20‬ל‪ ,19‬ל‪ ,22‬ל‪ ,23‬לא‪ ,12‬לב‪ ,27‬לב‪ ,9‬לב‪,10‬‬ ‫לב‪ ,12‬לב‪ ,18‬לב‪ ,25‬לה‪(18‬‬ ‫أفضل · ח‪) 13‬יט‪ ,13‬כג‪ ,31‬לא‪(8‬‬ ‫طين · ח‪8‬‬ ‫)כו‪(17‬‬ ‫كامن · ח‪ ,26‬ח‪27‬‬ ‫)לא‪(30‬‬ ‫خطأ · יד‪) ġ22‬לה‪(18‬‬ ‫)כ‪(1‬‬ ‫)כ‪(1‬‬ ‫متشاغل · יט‪18‬‬

‫י‬ ‫ָיאוּת‬ ‫יבש‬

‫)ח‪ ,29‬כו‪ ,31‬כז‪] (23‬כב‪[9‬‬ ‫]לא‪[7‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫יגיעה‬ ‫ָי ַגע‬ ‫ִי ֵגּ ַע‬ ‫יד‬ ‫משך ידו‬ ‫)ידי(‬ ‫הודה‬ ‫ידוע‬ ‫ידיעה‬

‫ָי ַדע‬

‫נוֹ ַדע‬

‫הודיע‬ ‫יוֹ ֵד ַע‬ ‫יוֹם‬ ‫ַהיּוֹם‬ ‫יוצא‬ ‫יותר‬ ‫יותר מאד‬ ‫)יחד(‬ ‫ִיֵחד‬ ‫ֻיַחד‬ ‫ַיַחד‬

‫יחוד‬ ‫ביחוד‬ ‫)יחס(‬ ‫ֻיַחס‬ ‫התיחס‬ ‫ַיַחס‬

‫‪560‬‬

‫تعب · כז‪ ,17‬כח‪) 15‬כט‪(11‬‬ ‫استتعب · כב‪) 16‬כז‪(216‬‬ ‫أتعب · כז‪) 15‬כח‪(16‬‬ ‫)כט‪(2‬‬ ‫)יב‪(32‬‬ ‫أقر · יד‪) ġ29‬כב‪ ,10‬כט‪] (19‬לב‪[25‬‬ ‫معلوم · כח‪) 20‬כט‪ ,28‬כט‪(32‬‬ ‫علم · כא‪1‬‬ ‫تعرف · כג‪14‬‬ ‫معرفة · כט‪8‬‬ ‫)יב‪ ,13‬כא‪ ,15‬כא‪ ,17‬כח‪ ,29‬כט‪ ,7‬כט‪ ,28‬ל‪ ,7‬לד‪ ,8‬לד‪ ,9‬לד‪(211‬‬ ‫علم · ח‪ ,2‬ח‪ ,25‬כט‪24‬‬ ‫رأى · כא‪14‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,21‬לד‪] (11‬כג‪[30‬‬ ‫ع ُل ِم · ג‪28‬‬ ‫ع ُر ِف · ד‪7‬‬ ‫)כג‪(1‬‬ ‫)כו‪(12‬‬ ‫)כט‪(13‬‬ ‫اليوم · ב‪14‬‬ ‫خارج · ג‪ ,8‬י‪ ,29‬יט‪) 29‬יד‪(2‬‬ ‫أكثر · ח‪ ,9‬יט‪ ,28‬כ‪ ,2‬כא‪ ,9‬כה‪ ,13‬כה‪ ,14‬כח‪) 28‬כד‪ ,2‬כה‪ ,4‬כה‪ ,5‬כט‪,10‬‬ ‫ל‪ ,22‬לא‪(16‬‬ ‫أكثر كثيرا ً· כ‪2‬‬ ‫خص · ח‪3‬‬ ‫)כו‪(14‬‬ ‫معا ً· טז‪ ,13‬טז‪ ,19‬טז‪ ,21‬כ‪ ,14‬כ‪ ,29‬כ‪ ,30‬כח‪ ,1‬כח‪ ,9‬כח‪ ,29‬כט‪ ,ġ25‬כט‪24‬‬ ‫دفعة · כח‪28‬‬ ‫)יג‪ ,8‬יד‪ ,15‬יד‪ ,21‬כ‪ ,9‬כ‪ ,17‬כ‪ ,22‬כב‪ ,1‬כו‪ ,1‬כח‪ ,10‬כח‪ ,22‬כח‪ ,23‬כח‪,25‬‬ ‫כח‪ ,26‬כח‪ ,27‬כח‪ ,233‬כט‪ ,1‬כט‪ ,2‬כט‪ ,3‬כט‪ ,18‬ל‪ ,1‬ל‪ ,2‬ל‪ ,4‬ל‪ ,17‬ל‪ ,24‬ל‪,27‬‬ ‫ל‪ ,29‬לא‪ ,30‬לה‪ ,5‬לה‪(6‬‬ ‫)לה‪(7‬‬ ‫مفردا ً· יא‪) ġ29‬ה‪ ,30‬ז‪ ,1‬יב‪ ,12‬לא‪(20‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,7‬כו‪(21‬‬ ‫جانس · ג‪) 30‬יב‪ ,7‬ל‪(29‬‬ ‫نسب · ח‪ ,3‬ח‪ ,5‬ח‪ ,6‬ח‪ ,11‬ח‪ ,14‬ח‪ ,15‬ח‪ ,18‬ח‪23‬‬

‫‪561‬‬

‫יין‬ ‫ָיכֹל‬

‫ְיכֶֹלת‬ ‫)ילד(‬ ‫נולד‬ ‫הוליד‬

‫התילד‬ ‫יסוד‬

‫)יסף(‬ ‫הוִֹסיף‬ ‫הוַּסף‬ ‫ִהתּוֵֹסף‬ ‫יפה‬ ‫י ִֹפי‬ ‫יצא‬ ‫הוציא‬ ‫יציאה‬ ‫)יצע(‬ ‫הציע‬ ‫יקיצה‬ ‫יקר‬ ‫ירח‬ ‫)ירי(‬ ‫הורה‬

‫ירידה‬ ‫ירש‬ ‫ישן‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫مناسبة · ט‪ ,24‬ט‪31‬‬ ‫نسبة · יט‪29‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,9‬יא‪ ,15‬יב‪ ,7‬יד‪ ,6‬ל‪(29‬‬ ‫خمر · ח‪ ,1‬י‪20‬‬ ‫قدر · יב‪ ,26‬יב‪ ,27‬יג‪31‬‬ ‫قادر · ג‪ ,31‬יג‪ġ31‬‬ ‫)ז‪ ,25‬לא‪(10‬‬ ‫قدرة · יז‪ġ25‬‬ ‫)ז‪ ,19‬ז‪ ,20‬לד‪(16‬‬ ‫ولد · י‪ ,5‬י‪ ,8‬כא‪ ,11‬יד‪ġ19‬‬ ‫أنتج · כט‪8‬‬ ‫)ז‪ ,19‬ז‪(20‬‬ ‫تولد · ז‪ ,229‬ז‪ ,30‬ח‪ ,1‬ח‪ ,23‬ח‪ ,5‬ח‪ ,12‬ח‪ ,224‬י‪ ,21‬י‪) 23‬ה‪ ,5‬ז‪ ,21‬לב‪(30‬‬ ‫عنصر · ב‪ ,31‬ט‪ ,25‬ט‪ ,26‬ט‪ ,28‬ט‪ ,230‬ט‪ ,31‬י‪ ,1‬י‪ ,2‬י‪ ,3‬י‪ ,22‬י‪ ,23‬י‪ ,24‬י‪,26‬‬ ‫י‪ ,228‬י‪ ,29‬י‪ ,30‬יא‪ ,2‬כה‪ ,16‬ל‪ġ24‬‬ ‫ركن · ב‪ ,5‬ב‪ ,7‬ב‪ ,20‬ב‪21‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,19‬ו‪ ,13‬ו‪ ,217‬ו‪ ,223‬ו‪ ,24‬ו‪ ,25‬ו‪ ,26‬ו‪ ,29‬ט‪ ,2‬ט‪ ,23‬ט‪ ,34‬ט‪ ,25‬ט‪ ,26‬ט‪,29‬‬ ‫ט‪ ,10‬ט‪ ,211‬ט‪ ,212‬ט‪ ,14‬ט‪ ,15‬ט‪ ,17‬ט‪ ,18‬ט‪ ,22‬ט‪ ,23‬יא‪ ,611‬יד‪ ,28‬יז‪ ,8‬כט‪,33‬‬ ‫ל‪ ,1‬לג‪ ,2‬לג‪] (12‬יב‪[1‬‬ ‫)יב‪(29‬‬ ‫)כד‪(23‬‬ ‫)כד‪ ,13‬כד‪(14‬‬ ‫حسن · יז‪) ġ19‬יט‪(31‬‬ ‫حسن · יז‪) 17‬כא‪ ,28‬כא‪(30‬‬ ‫خرج · ג‪ ,1‬ג‪ ,4‬ח‪ ,7‬יד‪ ,14‬כב‪ ,25‬כז‪ ,17‬כט‪) 8‬יג‪ ,10‬כח‪ ,14‬ל‪ ,2‬ל‪ ,29‬לא‪(21‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,13‬ה‪ ,30‬כג‪(2‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,22‬ד‪ ,223‬ד‪ ,24‬יג‪(32‬‬ ‫وصف · ט‪) 24‬ט‪(14‬‬ ‫يقظة · יט‪22‬‬ ‫)כו‪(22‬‬ ‫)כג‪ ,32‬כד‪ ,1‬כד‪ ,5‬כד‪ ,13‬כד‪ ,23‬לג‪(5‬‬ ‫دل · א‪ ,17‬א‪ ,19‬ג‪ ,12‬ח‪) 17‬ו‪ ,16‬יז‪ ,6‬יז‪ ,10‬יח‪ ,13‬יח‪ ,27‬יח‪ ,28‬יח‪ ,29‬כב‪,34‬‬ ‫כו‪(11‬‬ ‫)כג‪(20‬‬ ‫)כו‪(20‬‬ ‫نائم · כו‪25‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫ָיַשׁר‬ ‫י ֶֹשׁר‬

‫ַﬠל ַהיֶֹּשׁר‬ ‫ָיָשׁר‬ ‫דרך הישר‬ ‫יתוש‬ ‫יתכן‬ ‫יתרון‬

‫‪562‬‬

‫)כט‪] (3‬ב‪[6‬‬ ‫‪21‬‬ ‫ל‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪12‬‬ ‫א‬ ‫כ‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪16‬‬ ‫ח‬ ‫י‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪11‬‬ ‫ח‬ ‫י‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪28‬‬ ‫ז‬ ‫י‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬ ‫ז‬ ‫نظام · א‪ ,8‬י‬ ‫‪ġ‬‬ ‫‪ġ‬‬ ‫صواب · ג‪ ,15‬י‪13‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,12‬ט‪ ,4‬יב‪ ,1‬טו‪ ,312‬טו‪ ,13‬יז‪ ,19‬יז‪ ,20‬יח‪ ,8‬כו‪ ,11‬כח‪ ,29‬ל‪ ,17‬ל‪ ,18‬ל‪,223‬‬ ‫ל‪ ,24‬ל‪ ,26‬לא‪ ,1‬לא‪ ,8‬לא‪ ,9‬לד‪ ,13‬לה‪ ,10‬לה‪(11‬‬ ‫مستقيم · יג‪15‬‬ ‫مستقيم · א‪ ,10‬א‪ ,222‬א‪ ,23‬א‪24‬‬ ‫صواب · ב‪) 22‬לא‪(8‬‬ ‫)יח‪ ,4‬יח‪(6‬‬ ‫جرجس · ז‪30‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,5‬ה‪(6‬‬ ‫]כט‪ ,14‬ל‪[20‬‬

‫כ‬ ‫כ…‬ ‫כאן‬ ‫ָכֵּבד‬ ‫כֶֹּבד‬ ‫כבוד‬

‫כבר‬ ‫כאשר‬

‫כדור‬ ‫כדי‬ ‫כוזב‬ ‫כוכב‬ ‫חכמת הכוכבים‬ ‫כוכב חמה‬ ‫כוכב נבוך‬ ‫כוכב ַק ָיּם‬ ‫כולל‬ ‫הגשם הכולל‬ ‫ִכּ ֵוּן‬

‫ك · ‪passim‬‬ ‫)יז‪ ,30‬כה‪ ,23‬כה‪ ,4‬כט‪ ,22‬לג‪ ,18‬לד‪(22‬‬ ‫ثقيل · יא‪ ,ġ32‬כה‪) ġ22‬כח‪(33‬‬ ‫)יא‪(33‬‬ ‫شرف · יט‪24‬‬ ‫حمد · כו‪28‬‬ ‫)כז‪(29‬‬ ‫قد · ‪passim‬‬ ‫لما · ‪passim‬‬ ‫عندما · כח‪18‬‬ ‫متى · ח‪25‬‬ ‫)ז‪(14‬‬ ‫ل… · ‪passim‬‬ ‫)יז‪(9‬‬ ‫كوكب · כב‪ ,11‬כב‪ ,12‬כב‪ ,17‬כב‪ ,227‬כב‪) 29‬כג‪ ,12‬כג‪ ,17‬כג‪ ,26‬כד‪,9‬‬ ‫כד‪ ,17‬כד‪ ,20‬כד‪ ,231‬כה‪ ,7‬לא‪ ,1‬לג‪(4‬‬ ‫علم النجوم · כג‪) 15‬כג‪ ,22‬כג‪(25‬‬ ‫)כד‪(29‬‬ ‫كوكب متحير · יח‪ ,19‬טו‪) 30‬יז‪ ,30‬כג‪ ,16‬כג‪ ,27‬כד‪ ,3‬כד‪ ,14‬כד‪ ,16‬לג‪(5‬‬ ‫كوكب ثابت · יח‪ ,15‬יח‪) 19‬כד‪ ,1‬כד‪ ,5‬כד‪(18‬‬ ‫عامى · ב‪ ,14‬ב‪ ,15‬ב‪ ,16‬ב‪ ,19‬ב‪ ,220‬ב‪ ,23‬יד‪) ġ22‬ד‪ ,22‬לא‪ ,3‬לא‪ ,6‬לד‪(30‬‬ ‫الجسم العامى · ב‪20‬‬ ‫قصد · א‪ ,4‬ב‪ ,6‬ב‪ ,7‬ב‪ ,8‬ב‪ ,24‬י‪ ,31‬כג‪14‬‬ ‫زعم · ג‪9‬‬ ‫)ז‪ ,24‬יא‪ ,17‬טז‪ ,226‬כו‪ ,7‬כט‪ ,11‬ל‪ ,10‬לד‪(30‬‬

‫‪563‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬

‫כונה‬

‫قصد · ב‪ ,8‬ט‪ ,32‬י‪ ,8‬י‪9‬‬ ‫مقصود · כב‪20‬‬ ‫غرض · ג‪ ,17‬ח‪ ,16‬ח‪221‬‬ ‫)ח‪ ,28‬ט‪ ,2‬ט‪ 3‬יא‪ ,17‬יא‪ ,26‬יא‪ ,31‬כו‪ ,4‬כח‪ ,14‬כח‪ ,23‬ל‪ ,30‬לא‪ ,223‬לא‪,24‬‬ ‫לה‪] (10‬יא‪[31‬‬ ‫قصد · א‪) 3‬יא‪] (31‬ג‪[30‬‬ ‫قوة · יג‪ ,ġ32‬יד‪ ,ġ2‬יד‪ ,16‬יד‪ ,ġ28‬יט‪ ,17‬כב‪ ,7‬כב‪ ,212‬כב‪ ,14‬כב‪ ,17‬כב‪,28‬‬ ‫כג‪ ,14‬כז‪ ,8‬כז‪ ,17‬כט‪) ġ6‬ה‪ ,11‬ו‪ ,23‬יא‪ ,32‬יד‪ ,12‬יד‪ ,15‬כב‪ ,10‬כה‪ ,17‬כח‪(15‬‬ ‫بالقوة · ט‪ ,27‬י‪ ,17‬י‪ ,20‬י‪ ,21‬י‪ ,22‬י‪ ,23‬י‪ ,28‬יג‪ ,34‬יד‪ ,ġ3‬יד‪ ,8‬יד‪ ,17‬יז‪ ,3‬יט‪,25‬‬ ‫יט‪ ,26‬יט‪ ,28‬יט‪ ,29‬כב‪ ,15‬כב‪ ,17‬כב‪ ,19‬כב‪ ,21‬כב‪ ,23‬כב‪ ,225‬כב‪,26‬‬ ‫כב‪ ,28‬כב‪ ,29‬כז‪) 15‬ד‪ ,20‬ד‪ ,21‬ד‪ ,22‬ד‪ ,223‬ד‪ ,24‬ד‪ ,25‬ד‪ ,28‬ד‪ ,33‬ה‪ ,3‬יג‪,32‬‬ ‫יג‪ ,33‬יד‪ ,2‬יד‪ ,4‬יד‪ ,9‬יד‪ ,11‬יד‪ ,13‬יד‪ ,15‬יד‪ ,18‬טז‪ ,5‬יז‪ ,5‬יט‪ ,27‬כ‪ ,25‬כב‪,21‬‬ ‫כב‪ ,2‬לד‪ ,5‬לד‪(27‬‬ ‫ما يختلط به مما بالقوة · כ‪) 24‬יז‪(3‬‬

‫כּוֹ ֵנן‬ ‫כח‬ ‫בכח‬

‫לא יתערב בו מה שהוא‬ ‫בכח‬ ‫כח מניע‬ ‫)כחש(‬ ‫הכחיש‬ ‫כי‬ ‫כי אם‬ ‫כל‬ ‫כל שכן‬

‫מכל וכל‬ ‫ָכָּלה‬ ‫ִכָּלּה‬ ‫כליון‬ ‫ָכַּלל‬ ‫נכלל‬ ‫ְכָּלל‬

‫בכלל‬ ‫בכללו‬ ‫כללי‬ ‫כמה‬ ‫כמו‬ ‫כמות‬ ‫ֻכּ ָנּה‬

‫قوة محركة · כב‪ ,27‬כג‪18‬‬ ‫أنكر · כט‪6‬‬ ‫لأن · ان · اذ · ف · ‪passim‬‬ ‫إلا · ‪passim‬‬ ‫كل · جميع · ‪passim‬‬ ‫بالحرى · יט‪ ,8‬כ‪ ,ġ31‬כא‪1‬‬ ‫فضلا ً· א‪ ,21‬א‪25‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,25‬כב‪ ,10‬כה‪ ,14‬כז‪ ,20‬לג‪ ,5‬לד‪ ,2‬לד‪(30‬‬ ‫]יט‪[29‬‬ ‫)ז‪(16‬‬ ‫)לג‪(29‬‬ ‫)לה‪(10‬‬ ‫)ט‪ ,15‬יח‪ ,22‬ל‪ ,32‬לה‪] (16‬לד‪[11‬‬ ‫)ז‪(22‬‬ ‫أصلا ً· ג‪ ,4‬ג‪ ,10‬ג‪ ,13‬ג‪ ,25‬ג‪ ,27‬כב‪21‬‬ ‫جملة · א‪ ,8‬ח‪23‬‬ ‫)ג‪ ,3‬ד‪ ,32‬ה‪ ,2‬ו‪ ,10‬ט‪ ,9‬יג‪ ,8‬יג‪ ,9‬כג‪ ,1‬לג‪ ,6‬לג‪(12‬‬ ‫بالجملة · כב‪) 24‬ז‪ ,9‬טז‪ ,4‬כ‪ ,22‬כ‪ ,26‬כז‪ ,3‬כז‪ ,25‬לד‪ ,11‬לד‪ ,26‬לה‪(5‬‬ ‫بأسره · ג‪ ,23‬ח‪) 16‬ד‪ ,18‬ו‪ ,19‬ז‪ ,17‬כט‪(2‬‬ ‫كلى · ב‪) 16‬ז‪ ,19‬יא‪ ,5‬יא‪ ,6‬יא‪ ,7‬יא‪ ,29‬יא‪ ,12‬יא‪ ,14‬כח‪(30‬‬ ‫كم · ב‪ ,10‬ב‪ ,11‬ד‪) 6‬יא‪ ,29‬כג‪(227‬‬ ‫كما · كذلك · مثل · ك‪passim · -‬‬ ‫)ח‪ ,32‬ט‪ ,5‬ט‪ ,11‬ט‪ ,21‬כג‪ ,24‬כג‪(25‬‬ ‫)לד‪(8‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫כנור‬ ‫)כנס(‬ ‫נכנס‬ ‫כסא‬ ‫ִכָּסּה‬ ‫כפי‬

‫ָכַּפל‬ ‫ֶכֶּפל‬ ‫כרם‬ ‫כשורה‬ ‫שלא כשורה‬ ‫ָכַּשׁר‬ ‫כת‬

‫‪564‬‬

‫)כח‪ ,31‬כח‪(32‬‬ ‫)יח‪ ,30‬כה‪ ,15‬לא‪ ,8‬לה‪(15‬‬ ‫سر ير · ל‪) ġ5‬ט‪ ,25‬ט‪(226‬‬ ‫)ו‪(29‬‬ ‫بحسب · טו‪ ,19‬כג‪19‬‬ ‫على · כ‪28‬‬ ‫ك‪ · -‬כד‪28‬‬ ‫)יד‪ ,28‬כו‪ ,20‬כט‪ ,12‬ל‪(27‬‬ ‫]כו‪ ,12‬כט‪[19‬‬ ‫تضاعف · יז‪ġ15‬‬ ‫كرم · י‪22‬‬ ‫)ל‪(31‬‬ ‫)כז‪(8‬‬ ‫فر يق · ב‪) 22‬כו‪ ,1‬כו‪ ,2‬ל‪(22‬‬

‫ל‬ ‫ל…‬ ‫לא‬ ‫)לאי(‬ ‫ֶהְלָאה‬ ‫לב‬ ‫לבד‬

‫בלבד‬ ‫ָלָבן‬ ‫ֹלֶבן‬ ‫ְלֵב ָנה‬ ‫להפלא‬ ‫לובש‬ ‫לוח‬ ‫)לוי(‬ ‫ִנְל ָוה‬ ‫לולי‬

‫إلى · ل · ‪passim‬‬ ‫لا · لم · ليس · ‪passim‬‬ ‫)כז‪ ,15‬כז‪(16‬‬ ‫قلب · א‪8‬‬ ‫فقط · א‪ ,4‬ב‪ ,11‬ח‪ ,15‬טז‪ ,13‬יז‪ ,15‬יח‪ ,25‬יט‪ ,29‬כא‪ ,20‬כח‪12‬‬ ‫وحده · ג‪ ,5‬ח‪ ,26‬יג‪21‬‬ ‫خاصة ً · ב‪ ,30‬ח‪3‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,19‬ה‪ ,27‬ה‪ ,28‬ו‪ ,22‬ז‪ ,16‬י‪ ,29‬יד‪ ,14‬טו‪ ,23‬טו‪ ,28‬טז‪ ,6‬יח‪ ,20‬יח‪ ,23‬יט‪,2‬‬ ‫כ‪ ,16‬כב‪ ,4‬כג‪ ,12‬כג‪ ,20‬כג‪ ,23‬כד‪ ,19‬כד‪ ,20‬כה‪ ,20‬לג‪ ,17‬לג‪ ,19‬לג‪ ,31‬לד‪,4‬‬ ‫לד‪ ,6‬לד‪ ,24‬לה‪(13‬‬ ‫)יג‪ ,12‬כה‪(20‬‬ ‫أبيض · א‪ ,18‬א‪ ,21‬א‪ ,22‬ד‪ ,21‬ד‪) ,22‬א‪ ,18‬ד‪(223‬‬ ‫بياض · א‪ ,19‬ט‪) 27‬כט‪ ,30‬כט‪(31‬‬ ‫)ו‪(26‬‬ ‫تعجب · טז‪) 15‬כט‪(18‬‬ ‫ملابس · כ‪) ġ15‬ו‪ ,20‬כ‪(17‬‬ ‫)ו‪(25‬‬ ‫]יא‪[22‬‬ ‫لولا · ח‪) 5‬כו‪(9‬‬

‫‪565‬‬ ‫לוקוש‬ ‫לחוּת‬ ‫למד‬ ‫למודיות‬ ‫מרחק למודי‬ ‫מספר למודי‬ ‫לכן‬ ‫לפי‬ ‫לפי ש…‬ ‫לפי האמת‬ ‫לפני‬ ‫אשר היו לפנינו‬ ‫לפנים‬ ‫לקח‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫)יד‪(30‬‬ ‫رطو بة · י‪21‬‬ ‫)כג‪ ,30‬לג‪(23‬‬ ‫)כג‪(23‬‬ ‫بعُ ْد تعليمى · ג‪ ,20‬ג‪22‬‬ ‫)לה‪(13‬‬ ‫لذلك · ג‪ ,8‬ח‪) 21‬ז‪(7‬‬ ‫بحسب · כב‪ ,17‬כב‪ ,29‬כג‪) 10‬ה‪ ,18‬יז‪ ,6‬יז‪ ,10‬כה‪ ,22‬כו‪ ,17‬כט‪ ,16‬לה‪,8‬‬ ‫לה‪(13‬‬ ‫على أن · כב‪) 13‬טו‪(5‬‬ ‫على الحقيقة · טז‪) 30‬יז‪ ,8‬יח‪ ,28‬לא‪ ,20‬לא‪(28‬‬ ‫قبل · ג‪ ,18‬יא‪ ,26‬יב‪ ,15‬יב‪ ,23‬כ‪ ,24‬כב‪) 27‬ז‪ ,213‬ז‪ ,14‬יד‪ ,6‬כז‪] (32‬ח‪[29‬‬ ‫المتقدمين · כב‪32‬‬ ‫من قبل · ח‪) 6‬ד‪] (14‬ב‪[17‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,21‬כו‪] (13‬כז‪[34‬‬

‫מ‬ ‫מ…‪/‬מן‬ ‫מאד‬ ‫יותר מאד‬ ‫ֵמַא ִין‬ ‫אמר‬

‫מאמרים טבעיים‬ ‫מאמרים בטבעיות‬ ‫מאן‬ ‫ֵמֵאת‬ ‫ְמבָֹאר‬ ‫מן ַהְמּבָֹאר‬ ‫מבין‬ ‫ְמֻבְלָבּל‬ ‫ַמבּוּ ַע‬ ‫ֻמ ְגָבּל‬ ‫בלתי ֻמ ְגָבּל‬ ‫ְמ ַגָמּה‬

‫من · عن · ‪passim‬‬ ‫جدا ً· יט‪ ,9‬יט‪) 26‬יב‪ ,14‬יח‪ ,22‬יט‪ ,6‬כג‪ ,22‬כו‪ ,4‬כט‪(17‬‬ ‫أكثر كثيرا ً· כ‪2‬‬ ‫)לב‪ ,26‬לה‪(1‬‬ ‫قول · ב‪ ,6‬ב‪ ,22‬ב‪ ,31‬ג‪ ,17‬ז‪ ,27‬ח‪ ,23‬יב‪ ,14‬יב‪ ,22‬כב‪ ,12‬כג‪ ,11‬כו‪ ,31‬כח‪,10‬‬ ‫יג‪ġ32‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,30‬ח‪ ,30‬ט‪ ,10‬ט‪ ,14‬יא‪ ,18‬יג‪ ,1‬יד‪ ,17‬יד‪ ,18‬יד‪ ,20‬יד‪ ,221‬טו‪ ,1‬טו‪,9‬‬ ‫טו‪ ,28‬טז‪ ,6‬יח‪ ,27‬יט‪ ,1‬כ‪ ,10‬כב‪ ,9‬כד‪ ,28‬כה‪ ,12‬כו‪ ,20‬כו‪ ,26‬כו‪ ,29‬כז‪,32‬‬ ‫כז‪ ,33‬כט‪ ,25‬כט‪ ,26‬ל‪ ,10‬לא‪ ,28‬לב‪ ,213‬לב‪ ,24‬לג‪ ,1‬לג‪ ,15‬לג‪ ,24‬לג‪,31‬‬ ‫לד‪ ,4‬לד‪ ,6‬לד‪ ,20‬לד‪ ,29‬לה‪(14‬‬ ‫)יב‪(11‬‬ ‫)כב‪ ,8‬לג‪(1‬‬ ‫)ו‪] (19‬ב‪[23‬‬ ‫عن · ‪passim‬‬ ‫بين · ב‪ ,31‬י‪ ,11‬כא‪ ,9‬כב‪ ,33‬כג‪ ,26‬כט‪) 9‬ז‪ ,1‬יב‪ ,14‬טז‪(10‬‬ ‫بين · כ‪) 2‬ה‪ ,31‬יג‪ ,27‬טז‪ ,8‬כ‪ ,28‬כו‪ ,32‬כז‪ ,11‬כז‪ ,20‬כז‪(22‬‬ ‫)כט‪(13‬‬ ‫مضطرب · יד‪) ġ31‬טו‪ ,9‬יח‪(30‬‬ ‫ينبوع · כו‪32‬‬ ‫مجبول · ג‪30‬‬ ‫)לא‪(2‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫ָשׂם מגמתו‬ ‫ְמ ֻג ֶנּה‬ ‫ֻמ ְגָשׁם‬ ‫ְמ ֻדָבּק‬ ‫מדבר בדברים האלוהיים‬ ‫מדה‬ ‫מדינה‬ ‫הדרכת המדינות‬ ‫הנהגת המדינה‬ ‫אנשי המדינה‬ ‫מדע‬ ‫מדרגה‬ ‫מה‬ ‫מהוה‬ ‫מהלך‬ ‫ִמֵהר‬ ‫מוצר‬ ‫ְמֻח ַָדשׁ‬ ‫ֻמְחָלט‬ ‫ַבֻּמְּחָלט‬

‫על דרך ֻמְחָלט‬ ‫מוחש‬

‫מוכן‬ ‫מול‬ ‫מוליד‬ ‫מוליך‬ ‫מוֵֹלְך‬ ‫מונח‬ ‫מונע‬ ‫מופת‬ ‫הכרח מופתי‬ ‫מוציא‬ ‫מוקף‬ ‫)מור(‬ ‫הומר‬

‫‪566‬‬

‫قفا أ ثره · יח‪) 11‬יז‪ ,31‬יז‪(32‬‬ ‫)טז‪ ,4‬לא‪ ,10‬לב‪ ,11‬לב‪ ,16‬לב‪ ,24‬לג‪(214‬‬ ‫)ו‪(24‬‬ ‫متصل · כה‪19‬‬ ‫)לד‪(16‬‬ ‫مدة · יט‪ ,16‬יט‪) 19‬יז‪ ,21‬ל‪(1‬‬ ‫مدينة · א‪ ,7‬יח‪) ġ8‬לא‪(22‬‬ ‫سياسة المدن · יז‪) 29‬כה‪(25‬‬ ‫)ל‪ ,25‬לא‪(11‬‬ ‫أهل المدينة · יז‪) 29‬לא‪(12‬‬ ‫)כט‪(32‬‬ ‫مرتبة · ח‪ ,19‬יח‪) 17‬כג‪ ,220‬כג‪ ,21‬כד‪ ,11‬ל‪ ,20‬ל‪ ,23‬לא‪(16‬‬ ‫ما · ‪passim‬‬ ‫)לג‪(33‬‬ ‫مسلك · ח‪10‬‬ ‫)כט‪ ,13‬כט‪(14‬‬ ‫]ג‪[30‬‬ ‫كان حدث · יב‪) 223‬ט‪] (21‬יג‪[15‬‬ ‫)יד‪ ,16‬כז‪(30‬‬ ‫على الإطلاق · ט‪30‬‬ ‫مطلقا ً· יט‪14‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,27‬כב‪(2‬‬ ‫)יא‪(11‬‬ ‫محسوس · ב‪ ,1‬ג‪ ,9‬ג‪ ,12‬ג‪ ,15‬ג‪ ,16‬ג‪ ,21‬ג‪ ,23‬ג‪ ,28‬ג‪ ,30‬ג‪ ,32‬ט‪ ,26‬כ‪ ,18‬כב‪4‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,22‬ו‪ ,13‬יג‪ ,30‬יד‪ ,14‬כ‪ ,5‬כ‪ ,22‬כג‪ ,23‬כד‪ ,26‬כט‪ ,29‬לד‪ ,10‬לד‪ ,12‬לד‪,13‬‬ ‫לד‪] (19‬ו‪[13‬‬ ‫متهيئ · ח‪6‬‬ ‫)ד‪(33‬‬ ‫موالد · ח‪) 27‬ז‪(223‬‬ ‫سواق · ח‪16‬‬ ‫مالك · כט‪) 225‬לא‪(17‬‬ ‫ساكن · יג‪) 29‬ד‪ ,16‬ד‪ ,217‬ד‪ ,33‬טו‪ ,28‬כא‪ ,13‬כט‪] (22‬ט‪ ,28‬ט‪[29‬‬ ‫مانع · ב‪ ,24‬יב‪ ,24‬יב‪ ,28‬יב‪ ,29‬יט‪) 20‬ז‪ ,15‬יב‪ ,28‬יב‪ ,31‬ל‪ ,9‬לב‪] (23‬ו‪,6‬‬ ‫י‪[2‬‬ ‫برهان · יא‪) 224‬כה‪(23‬‬ ‫)יג‪(17‬‬ ‫مخرِج · יד‪) 17‬יד‪(1‬‬ ‫)ל‪(20‬‬ ‫تبدل · ב‪3‬‬

‫‪567‬‬ ‫מושל‬ ‫)מות(‬ ‫המית‬ ‫)מזג(‬ ‫נמזג‬ ‫מזון‬ ‫ְמ ֻז ָיּן‬ ‫ְמ ֻז ָיּף‬ ‫ְמ ֻזָמּן‬ ‫ְמ ֻזָקּק‬ ‫ְמֻחָבּר‬ ‫ְמֻח ָיּב‬ ‫מן ַהְמֻּח ָיּב ש…‬ ‫מחצב‬ ‫ְמַחֶקּה‬ ‫ַמְחָשׁב‬ ‫מחשבי‬ ‫מחשבה‬

‫ִמָטּה‬ ‫ַמָטּה‬ ‫למטה‬ ‫מי‬ ‫ְמ ֻיָחד‬ ‫ְמ ֻיָשּׁר‬ ‫מים‬ ‫חמת מים‬ ‫מין‬

‫ְמכָֹאר‬ ‫ְמַכ ֵוּן‬ ‫ְמֻכ ָוּן‬ ‫ִבְּמֻכ ָוּן‬ ‫ֻמְכ ָרח‬ ‫מכרכר‬ ‫)מלא(‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫قائد ·‬

‫יח‪ġ8‬‬

‫أمات · כו‪31‬‬ ‫)לא‪(8‬‬ ‫غذاء · יח‪) ġ2‬יח‪ ,4‬יח‪ ,5‬לא‪(5‬‬ ‫)כא‪(16‬‬ ‫)ו‪(21‬‬ ‫مستعد · ח‪6‬‬ ‫)לה‪(9‬‬ ‫مقرون · )יב‪(17‬‬ ‫)כט‪ ,15‬לד‪(14‬‬ ‫من الواجب أن · כז‪15‬‬ ‫)ה‪(29‬‬ ‫]ה‪[24‬‬ ‫)יז‪ ,26‬יז‪ ,27‬כ‪] (5‬טז‪ ,31‬יז‪[1‬‬ ‫وهمى · י‪5‬‬ ‫ظن · טז‪ ,32‬יז‪1‬‬ ‫وهم · א‪ ,25‬ב‪ ,12‬י‪31‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,16‬ז‪ ,3‬ז‪ ,4‬ז‪ ,26‬יא‪ ,5‬כט‪ ,12‬כט‪ ,29‬ל‪ ,9‬לה‪] (8‬יז‪[26‬‬ ‫)ז‪(2‬‬ ‫)כד‪(5‬‬ ‫من · ‪passim‬‬ ‫خاص · כד‪) ġ32‬ו‪ ,15‬כג‪ ,15‬כג‪ ,22‬כד‪ ,7‬כד‪ ,9‬כו‪ ,9‬כו‪(10‬‬ ‫)ל‪ ,27‬לא‪ ,2‬לא‪(17‬‬ ‫ماء · ב‪ ,19‬ב‪ ,21‬ד‪) 28‬יא‪ ,28‬לד‪(215‬‬ ‫)לא‪(7‬‬ ‫نوع · ז‪ ,30‬ח‪ ,26‬יג‪2‬‬ ‫صنف · ד‪6‬‬ ‫ضرب · ד‪13‬‬ ‫)יג‪ ,2‬יז‪ ,2‬יח‪ ,23‬כה‪ ,14‬כה‪ ,15‬כו‪ ,16‬כו‪ ,18‬לד‪] (26‬א‪ ,8‬א‪ ,9‬ב‪ ,12‬ד‪ ,32‬ה‪,1‬‬ ‫ו‪ ,14‬טז‪ ,28‬ל‪ ,14‬ל‪ ,28‬לב‪[11‬‬ ‫)לב‪(30‬‬ ‫]כו‪[32‬‬ ‫مقصود · ח‪) 17‬יט‪(13‬‬ ‫)ל‪(29‬‬ ‫)טו‪ ,8‬יט‪(12‬‬ ‫)כט‪(1‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫התמלא‬ ‫מלאכה‬ ‫מלאכותי‬ ‫מלאכת הרפואה‬ ‫מלה‬ ‫מלוכה‬ ‫מלח‬ ‫מלחמה‬ ‫)מלט(‬ ‫נמלט‬ ‫לא נמלט מ…‬ ‫ֶמֶלְך‬ ‫ממהר‬ ‫ממית‬ ‫ממלכה‬ ‫ָמ ָנה‬ ‫ִנְמ ָנה‬ ‫מנהיג‬ ‫מנוחה‬

‫אין מנוחה ל…‬ ‫מניח‬ ‫מניע‬

‫מניע בלתי מתנועע‬ ‫התחלה מניעה‬ ‫כח מניע‬ ‫מניע קרוב‬ ‫המניע הראשון‬ ‫סבה מניעה‬ ‫עלה מניעה‬ ‫מנע‬

‫‪568‬‬

‫)יח‪(5‬‬ ‫)יד‪ ,26‬כד‪ ,30‬ל‪ ,28‬ל‪] (24‬ב‪ ,14‬ז‪ ,23‬ז‪[25‬‬ ‫)ז‪ ,2‬ז‪ ,8‬י‪(5‬‬ ‫صناعة الطب · ל‪ġ6‬‬ ‫لفظة · א‪ ,217‬א‪ ,219‬א‪ ,20‬א‪ ,24‬יב‪ ,15‬יב‪) 16‬יב‪(19‬‬ ‫)לא‪(16‬‬ ‫)כו‪(2‬‬ ‫)יב‪(9‬‬ ‫)לב‪ ,8‬לד‪(3‬‬ ‫لا يخلو من · ג‪ ,24‬ג‪ ,33‬יב‪ ,22‬יט‪ ,21‬כז‪) ,1‬ד‪ ,14‬ד‪ ,29‬ד‪ ,31‬ז‪ ,23‬יב‪ ,8‬יב‪,17‬‬ ‫יד‪ ,5‬כח‪ ,3‬כט‪(4‬‬ ‫ملك · יח‪) 17‬יח‪ ,8‬כא‪ ,16‬כה‪ ,25‬כה‪ ,28‬כה‪ ,29‬כה‪ ,30‬כו‪ ,6‬ל‪ ,26‬לא‪,11‬‬ ‫לא‪ ,13‬לא‪ ,16‬לא‪ ,17‬לא‪(26‬‬ ‫)כט‪ ,13‬כט‪(14‬‬ ‫)לא‪(7‬‬ ‫)לא‪(17‬‬ ‫عدد · ד‪) 6‬יג‪(32‬‬ ‫)ו‪(18‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,8‬כג‪(17‬‬ ‫سكون · יג‪ ,4‬יג‪5‬‬ ‫راحة · כב‪16‬‬ ‫فتور · יג‪2‬‬ ‫)יג‪ ,7‬יג‪(10‬‬ ‫لا سكون ل… · טז‪ ,7‬טז‪) 9‬טז‪ ,6‬טז‪ ,8‬כט‪(21‬‬ ‫)כא‪ ,14‬כא‪ ,18‬כא‪(19‬‬ ‫محرك · י‪ ,8‬יא‪ ,3‬יב‪ ,23‬יב‪ ,24‬יג‪ ,22‬יג‪ ,26‬טז‪ ,13‬כג‪ ,8‬כג‪ ,9‬כג‪) 13‬ז‪ ,10‬י‪,29‬‬ ‫יב‪ ,32‬יג‪ ,2‬יג‪ ,^3‬יד‪ ,17‬טז‪ ,8‬טז‪ ,17‬כד‪ ,5‬כה‪ ,6‬כו‪ ,12‬כו‪ ,19‬כו‪ ,30‬כז‪ ,6‬לב‪,11‬‬ ‫לב‪ ,12‬לב‪ ,18‬לב‪ ,20‬לב‪ ,29‬לג‪ ,4‬לג‪ ,7‬לה‪(9‬‬ ‫محرك غير متحرك · טז‪14‬‬ ‫محرك لا يتحرك · טז‪15‬‬ ‫مبدأ محرك · י‪) 3‬לב‪ ,14‬לב‪ ,15‬לב‪(25‬‬ ‫قوة محركة · כב‪ ,27‬כג‪18‬‬ ‫محرك قر يب · י‪ ,4‬י‪9‬‬ ‫ألمحرك الأول · י‪ ,9‬יז‪ ,15‬כה‪ ,18‬כה‪) 19‬יג‪ ,25‬יז‪(22‬‬ ‫سبب محرك · י‪ ,1‬י‪7‬‬ ‫علة محركة · י‪31‬‬ ‫علة محركة · טו‪ ,17‬כד‪) 27‬כה‪ ,25‬כה‪ ,21‬לב‪ ,21‬לד‪(24‬‬ ‫منع · ב‪ ,24‬יב‪ ,24‬יט‪ ,19‬כ‪) 4‬ז‪ ,15‬יב‪ ,30‬כה‪ ,9‬כט‪ ,23‬ל‪ ,9‬לב‪] (23‬ו‪ ,6‬יב‪,26‬‬ ‫יד‪[5‬‬

‫‪569‬‬ ‫נמנע‬

‫ְמֻסָבְּך‬ ‫ְמֻס ָדּר‬ ‫תנועה ְמֻס ֶדּ ֶרת‬ ‫מספיק‬ ‫מספק‬ ‫מספר‬

‫מספר למודי‬ ‫מסתער‬ ‫מעופף‬ ‫מעט‬ ‫מעיק‬ ‫מעלה‬

‫בעל מעלה‬ ‫בתכלית המעלה‪/‬על תכלית‬ ‫המעלה‬ ‫ְמעֹ ָרב‬ ‫מעשה‬ ‫אומנות מעשית‬ ‫ְמֻפ ָזּר‬ ‫ְמֻפ ְרָסם‬ ‫ֻמְפָלג‬ ‫מפלט‬ ‫מפני ש…‪/‬כי‬

‫ֻמְפָשׁט‬ ‫מצא‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫إمتنع · ג‪6‬‬ ‫شبع · כח‪216‬‬ ‫)י‪] (2‬ג‪ ,24‬ז‪[3‬‬ ‫)ז‪(8‬‬ ‫)כא‪ ,15‬ל‪ ,27‬לא‪(17‬‬ ‫)טו‪(10‬‬ ‫مقنع · ז‪) 27‬יג‪ ,25‬כב‪ ,3‬לד‪(29‬‬ ‫]יא‪[21‬‬ ‫عدد · א‪ ,9‬א‪ ,13‬ב‪ ,12‬ב‪ ,33‬כג‪ ,18‬כג‪ ,19‬כד‪ ,24‬כד‪ ,25‬כד‪ ,327‬כד‪ ,28‬כה‪,16‬‬ ‫כה‪) 19‬ט‪ ,20‬יג‪ ,33‬כב‪ ,33‬כג‪ ,21‬כג‪ ,2‬כג‪ ,216‬כג‪ ,217‬כג‪ ,227‬כג‪ ,29‬כד‪,12‬‬ ‫כד‪ ,22‬כד‪ ,25‬כד‪ ,226‬כד‪ ,229‬כה‪ ,2‬כה‪ ,3‬כה‪ ,15‬לא‪ ,21‬לא‪ ,23‬לג‪ ,16‬לג‪,29‬‬ ‫לד‪ ,20‬לד‪ ,23‬לה‪ ,2‬לה‪ ,3‬לה‪(16‬‬ ‫)לה‪(13‬‬ ‫]יד‪ ,31‬יב‪[9‬‬ ‫)ל‪(28‬‬ ‫قليل · ב‪) 33‬יא‪ ,18‬יב‪ ,3‬יט‪ ,17‬כג‪ ,25‬ל‪ ,32‬לא‪(3‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,6‬ו‪ ,29‬יט‪(31‬‬ ‫فضيلة · יז‪ ,17‬יט‪24‬‬ ‫شرف · כו‪28‬‬ ‫)יח‪ ,4‬כו‪ ,28‬כז‪ ,10‬כז‪ ,25‬כז‪ ,27‬כט‪ ,14‬לג‪ ,24‬לד‪(28‬‬ ‫أفضل · ל‪ġ25‬‬ ‫فى‪/‬على غاية الفضيلة · יט‪ ,15‬כא‪ ,1‬כא‪ ,2‬כא‪ ,20‬כא‪ ,25‬כז‪ ,29‬כז‪ ,31‬כח‪ġ13‬‬ ‫)יז‪ ,19‬כ‪ ,8‬כא‪ ,7‬כא‪ ,28‬כה‪ ,1‬כז‪ ,29‬כז‪ ,34‬כח‪ ,12‬ל‪(19‬‬ ‫مختلط · יט‪18‬‬ ‫عمل · ח‪ ,15‬ל‪) ġ5‬לה‪(4‬‬ ‫صناعة عملية · ל‪ġ4‬‬ ‫متفرق · א‪] 7‬לד‪ ,24‬לד‪[26‬‬ ‫)ד‪(25‬‬ ‫بالغ · ב‪ ,25‬ג‪) 32‬יא‪(21‬‬ ‫]יב‪[18‬‬ ‫لما · ב‪ ,18‬ג‪ ,13‬ג‪ ,30‬ח‪ ,13‬כב‪17‬‬ ‫لأن · טו‪ ,20‬יט‪ ,26‬כז‪9‬‬ ‫من قبل أن · א‪11‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,30‬ה‪ ,14‬ה‪ ,24‬ו‪ ,21‬טז‪ ,18‬יז‪ ,13‬יט‪ ,12‬כ‪ ,32‬כד‪ ,19‬כח‪ ,12‬לא‪ ,19‬לא‪,23‬‬ ‫לב‪ ,13‬לג‪ ,21‬לג‪(28‬‬ ‫)ז‪ ,6‬כ‪] (20‬ב‪ ,1‬ו‪ ,32‬כז‪[30‬‬ ‫وجد · ג‪ ,14‬ח‪ ,1‬ח‪ ,7‬ח‪ ,10‬ט‪ ,30‬י‪ ,19‬יב‪ ,5‬יד‪ ,ġ16‬טז‪ ,22‬יט‪) 17‬ה‪ ,18‬ה‪,19‬‬ ‫ז‪ ,23‬יב‪ ,3‬יב‪ ,16‬יד‪ ,24‬טו‪ ,2‬טו‪ ,4‬טו‪ ,5‬טו‪ ,6‬טו‪ ,11‬טו‪ ,12‬טו‪ ,13‬טו‪ ,18‬טו‪,25‬‬ ‫טו‪ ,26‬יז‪ ,9‬יז‪ ,15‬יז‪ ,18‬יח‪ ,24‬כא‪ ,31‬כג‪ ,17‬כג‪ ,30‬כג‪ ,31‬כה‪ ,28‬כה‪ ,29‬כו‪,3‬‬ ‫כו‪ ,4‬כו‪ ,20‬כט‪ ,28‬ל‪ ,5‬לא‪ ,228‬לב‪ ,29‬לג‪ ,11‬לד‪ ,12‬לד‪ ,21‬לה‪] (7‬כא‪[14‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫היטיב למצוא‬ ‫נמצא‬

‫המציא‬ ‫מצב‬ ‫מצוה‬ ‫ְמֻצ ָיּר‬ ‫מציאות‬ ‫מקבל‬ ‫מקום‬

‫מקומי‬ ‫תנועה מקומית‬ ‫מקרה‬ ‫במקרה‬ ‫מראה‬ ‫מרגוע‬ ‫ֻמ ְר ָגּשׁ‬ ‫ְמ ֻרָבּע‬ ‫מרחק‬ ‫מרחק למודי‬ ‫ֻמ ְרָכּב‬ ‫משורר‬ ‫ַמִשּׂיג‬ ‫משיכה‬ ‫)משך(‬ ‫נמשך‬ ‫נמשך אחר‬

‫המשיך‬ ‫ֶמֶשְׁך‬

‫‪570‬‬

‫)לב‪(10‬‬ ‫جد َ · א‪ ,9‬א‪ ,10‬א‪ ,11‬א‪ ,15‬ב‪ ,2‬ג‪ ,16‬ד‪ ,13‬ח‪ ,24‬ט‪ ,31‬י‪ ,1‬י‪ ,17‬י‪ ,19‬י‪ ,20‬יא‪,25‬‬ ‫وُ ِ‬ ‫טז‪ ,11‬טז‪ ,12‬טז‪ ,213‬טז‪ ,214‬טז‪ ,18‬יז‪ ,29‬יט‪ ,27‬יט‪ ,29‬כב‪ ,3‬כב‪ ,7‬כה‪ ,ġ7‬כז‪17‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,2‬ו‪ ,3‬ו‪ ,10‬ו‪ ,15‬ו‪ ,23‬יא‪ ,27‬יג‪ ,23‬יד‪ ,14‬טו‪ ,29‬טז‪ ,5‬טז‪ ,14‬יז‪ ,5‬יז‪ ,30‬כ‪,4‬‬ ‫כא‪ ,31‬כה‪ ,2‬כה‪ ,4‬כה‪ ,27‬כו‪ ,11‬כח‪ ,17‬ל‪ ,16‬לב‪ ,5‬לג‪ ,8‬לה‪ ,2‬לה‪] (3‬א‪[17‬‬ ‫)כא‪ ,18‬כג‪(7‬‬ ‫)ד‪(18‬‬ ‫)כה‪ ,28‬לא‪ ,11‬לא‪(13‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,17‬כ‪ ,26‬לב‪(6‬‬ ‫وجود · א‪ ,212‬א‪ ,13‬א‪ ,15‬א‪ ,16‬א‪ ,17‬א‪ ,19‬ב‪ ,18‬ב‪ 23‬יב‪ ,24‬כ‪) 3‬ז‪ ,3‬ז‪ ,4‬יד‪,13‬‬ ‫כג‪ ,20‬לד‪] (17‬יא‪[15‬‬ ‫قابل · ב‪ ,29‬ט‪) 29‬ד‪ ,29‬ה‪ ,1‬ה‪ ,12‬ה‪ ,16‬ה‪ ,21‬ה‪ ,27‬ה‪ ,31‬ה‪ ,32‬ו‪ ,213‬טו‪,18‬‬ ‫טז‪ ,2‬כא‪ ,31‬לג‪ ,2‬לג‪ ,7‬לד‪(1‬‬ ‫مكان · ב‪ ,4‬ג‪ ,4‬ג‪ ,9‬ג‪ ,210‬ג‪ ,11‬ג‪ ,26‬ד‪ ,310‬ד‪ ,212‬ד‪ ,13‬יח‪ ,25‬כב‪ ,18‬כב‪,219‬‬ ‫כב‪28‬‬ ‫موضع · א‪ ,28‬ב‪ ,9‬ג‪ ,7‬יח‪ ,17‬כב‪ ,4‬כב‪218‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,14‬ד‪ ,221‬ד‪ ,26‬ד‪ ,31‬ו‪ ,32‬ט‪ ,10‬יג‪ ,14‬יח‪ ,20‬יח‪ ,23‬יח‪ ,26‬יח‪ ,27‬יח‪,29‬‬ ‫יט‪ ,2‬יט‪ ,7‬כא‪ ,18‬כג‪ ,27‬כד‪ ,17‬כז‪ ,10‬כט‪ ,4‬לג‪ ,227‬לד‪ ,27‬לד‪(30‬‬ ‫حركة مستقيمة · יג‪) 15‬טו‪(3‬‬ ‫عرض · א‪ ,20‬א‪ ,25‬ב‪ ,22‬י‪ ,16‬יב‪ ,5‬יג‪ ,13‬כא‪) 10‬כא‪ ,5‬כג‪] (23‬יט‪[26‬‬ ‫بالعرض · כג‪ ,ġ9‬כג‪) 11‬טו‪ ,5‬ל‪ ,32‬לא‪(4‬‬ ‫لون · ד‪) 3‬ט‪ ,27‬יט‪ ,31‬כז‪ ,13‬כח‪ ,25‬כט‪(9‬‬ ‫]יג‪[2‬‬ ‫محسوس · ב‪] 28‬ג‪ ,16‬ג‪ ,23‬ג‪[30‬‬ ‫مربع · א‪10‬‬ ‫)כד‪(11‬‬ ‫بعد تعليمى · ג‪ ,20‬ג‪22‬‬ ‫مركب · ב‪ ,1‬י‪ ,24‬י‪ ,25‬י‪ ,28‬טז‪) 11‬ו‪ ,14‬ו‪ ,31‬ו‪ ,33‬ז‪ ,12‬ט‪ ,13‬ט‪ ,217‬ט‪,218‬‬ ‫לא‪ ,25‬לד‪ ,13‬לד‪(18‬‬ ‫)טז‪(4‬‬ ‫)כג‪(24‬‬ ‫]לא‪[7‬‬ ‫)כ‪ ,21‬לא‪ ,20‬לג‪ ,26‬לג‪(30‬‬ ‫تبع · ב‪ ,17‬כח‪2‬‬ ‫تلا · א‪12‬‬ ‫)יג‪ ,3‬יג‪ ,11‬יח‪ ,8‬כג‪ ,21‬כה‪ ,11‬כה‪ ,26‬כו‪ ,10‬כח‪ ,15‬לד‪] (28‬יז‪[31‬‬ ‫اتبع · ט‪24‬‬ ‫)יב‪(1‬‬

‫‪571‬‬ ‫משכיל‬ ‫ֻמְשָׂכּל‬

‫העולם ַהֻמְּשָׂכּל‬ ‫ְמֻשָׁלּל‬ ‫משל‬ ‫דרך משל‬ ‫ֻמְשָׁלְך‬ ‫ְמֻשָׁלּשׁ‬ ‫משפט‬ ‫ִמֵשּׁשׁ‬ ‫משתוקק‬ ‫משתנה‬

‫ְמֻשָׁתּף‬ ‫מת‬

‫מתאחד‬ ‫מתאחר‬ ‫מתגבר‬ ‫מתדבק‬ ‫מתדמה‬ ‫מתהוה‬ ‫מתהפך‬ ‫ִמתּוּן‬ ‫מתחלף‬

‫מתחלק‬ ‫מתי‬ ‫מתמזג‬ ‫מתמיד‬

‫מתמיד ההשארות‬ ‫מתנגד‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫عاقل · כז‪10‬‬ ‫معقول · ג‪ ,16‬ג‪ ,21‬ג‪ ,28‬טז‪ ,16‬טז‪ ,18‬טז‪ ,19‬טז‪ ,20‬טז‪ ,221‬טז‪ ,22‬טז‪ ,32‬יז‪,2‬‬ ‫כ‪ ,22‬כ‪ ,8‬כ‪ ,13‬כ‪ ,14‬כ‪ ,19‬כ‪ ,25‬כז‪ ,8‬כז‪ ,11‬כז‪ ,13‬כח‪ ,28‬ל‪) 9‬יז‪ ,2‬כ‪ ,3‬כ‪,4‬‬ ‫כ‪ ,10‬כ‪ ,11‬כ‪ ,17‬כ‪ ,22‬כ‪ ,26‬כז‪ ,221‬כח‪ ,7‬כט‪ ,11‬כט‪ ,14‬כט‪ ,29‬כט‪ ,32‬כט‪,34‬‬ ‫ל‪ ,1‬ל‪ ,2‬ל‪ ,3‬לג‪ ,11‬לד‪(19‬‬ ‫)כט‪(11‬‬ ‫)יב‪(6‬‬ ‫مثلا ً· א‪) 21‬ז‪ ,2‬ז‪ ,25‬יא‪(8‬‬ ‫]יג‪[19‬‬ ‫مثلث · א‪ ,10‬א‪) 13‬כט‪(31‬‬ ‫حكم · כד‪) 30‬כד‪(29‬‬ ‫تماس · א‪) 6‬יט‪ ,2‬כ‪ ,15‬כ‪(16‬‬ ‫مستاق^ · ח‪21‬‬ ‫متغير · ג‪ ,13‬ג‪ ,29‬ג‪33‬‬ ‫مستحيل · יט‪4‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,20‬ד‪ ,31‬יט‪(210‬‬ ‫)כד‪ ,6‬כד‪ ,10‬לא‪] (9‬ד‪[1‬‬ ‫ميت · ז‪ ,29‬ז‪30‬‬ ‫بمائت · כב‪6‬‬ ‫)כא‪ ,17‬כא‪(18‬‬ ‫متحد · א‪) 5‬ו‪ ,25‬יא‪ ,35‬לד‪(27‬‬ ‫]יד‪[12‬‬ ‫)לא‪(27‬‬ ‫متصل · יג‪ ,19‬יג‪ ,20‬יג‪ ,21‬כא‪) 26‬טו‪ ,4‬לד‪(26‬‬ ‫مشاكل · ד‪1‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,34‬ה‪ ,3‬ה‪ ,15‬ה‪ ,20‬לג‪(2‬‬ ‫)כו‪ ,4‬לב‪ ,28‬לד‪ ,2‬לד‪ ,5‬לד‪(29‬‬ ‫)כט‪(10‬‬ ‫مختلف · ג‪ ,26‬ג‪ ,27‬י‪ ,218‬טו‪ ,217‬טז‪ ,1‬יח‪ ,24‬יט‪ ,17‬כא‪21‬‬ ‫بمخالف · טז‪29‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,9‬ה‪ ,18‬טז‪ ,2‬טז‪ ,27‬יח‪ ,26‬כו‪ ,2‬כו‪ ,3‬לג‪] (10‬ח‪[23‬‬ ‫منقسم · כב‪6‬‬ ‫متى · יב‪ġ16‬‬ ‫)כ‪(16‬‬ ‫دائم · י‪ ,18‬יב‪ ,4‬טו‪ ,20‬כא‪ ,24‬כא‪ ,26‬כב‪16‬‬ ‫أبدى · ג‪2‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,30‬טז‪ ,9‬כא‪ ,27‬לג‪(210‬‬ ‫دائم البقاء · ב‪ ,28‬ב‪) 29‬ו‪(12‬‬ ‫)יד‪ ,5‬לד‪ ,3‬לד‪(30‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫מתנועע‬

‫מניע בלתי מתנועע‬ ‫מתנשא‬ ‫מתנשם‬ ‫מתעסק‬

‫متحرك · ג‪ ,2‬ג‪ ,8‬ג‪ ,13‬י‪ ,4‬י‪ ,32‬יא‪ ,20‬יא‪ ,ġ28‬יא‪ ,30‬יג‪ ,ġ12‬טו‪ ,16‬טו‪ ,18‬טז‪,7‬‬ ‫טז‪ ,10‬יט‪ ,4‬כב‪ ,4‬כג‪ ,9‬כג‪ ,10‬כג‪ ,11‬כג‪ ,19‬כד‪ ,27‬כה‪) 19‬ד‪ ,20‬טו‪ ,4‬טז‪,8‬‬ ‫יח‪ ,9‬יח‪ ,21‬כא‪ ,17‬כב‪ ,32‬כג‪ ,12‬כג‪ ,13‬כג‪ ,26‬כד‪ ,22‬כד‪ ,26‬כה‪ ,2‬כה‪,4‬‬ ‫כה‪ ,6‬כח‪] (31‬כג‪[16‬‬ ‫محرك غير متحرك · טז‪14‬‬ ‫محرك لا يتحرك · טז‪15‬‬ ‫)לא‪(26‬‬ ‫)כב‪(11‬‬ ‫)יח‪(13‬‬

‫נ‬ ‫נאה‬ ‫ֶנֱאָהב‬ ‫נאות‬ ‫נאות בצורה‬ ‫יותר נאות‬ ‫ִנָבּא‬ ‫נבדל‬

‫נבוך‬ ‫כוכב נבוך‬ ‫נבזי‬ ‫ִנְבָחר‬ ‫)נבט(‬ ‫הביט‬ ‫נבנה‬ ‫ָנ ַגד‬ ‫הגיד‬ ‫ֶנ ֶגד‬ ‫כנגד‬ ‫ֹנ ַגהּ‬ ‫ִנגּוּן‬ ‫)נגע(‬ ‫הגיע‬ ‫ִנ ַגּר‬ ‫ַנ ָגּר‬ ‫אומנות הנגר‬ ‫מלאכת הנגר‬

‫‪572‬‬

‫)כז‪(20‬‬ ‫)יח‪(3‬‬ ‫ملائم · ח‪) 7‬כד‪(13‬‬ ‫موافق فى الصورة · י‪ ,31‬יא‪3‬‬ ‫أولى · כז‪28‬‬ ‫أنبأ · ח‪22‬‬ ‫مبتور · יג‪19‬‬ ‫مبا ين · כב‪4‬‬ ‫)ז‪ ,25‬כט‪] (34‬יא‪[6‬‬ ‫كوكب متحير · יח‪) 19‬יז‪ ,30‬כג‪ ,16‬כג‪ ,27‬כד‪ ,3‬כד‪ ,14‬כד‪ ,16‬לג‪(5‬‬ ‫)לא‪(10‬‬ ‫مختار · יז‪ġ19‬‬ ‫)יח‪(8‬‬ ‫مبنى · ג‪7‬‬ ‫)לד‪(2‬‬ ‫)כג‪(1‬‬ ‫نظير · ט‪ ,226‬ט‪ ,227‬ט‪228‬‬ ‫)כד‪(92‬‬ ‫)כח‪(32‬‬ ‫بلغ · יד‪ġ28‬‬ ‫سيال · ג‪29‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,16‬ז‪ ,3‬יד‪ ,26‬ל‪(6‬‬ ‫صناعة النجارة · ל‪ġ6‬‬ ‫)יד‪(26‬‬

‫‪573‬‬ ‫נדבק‬ ‫ִנ ָדּה‬ ‫דם הנדות‬ ‫נדיב‬ ‫נדיבות‬ ‫)נהג(‬ ‫הנהיג‬ ‫נהוה‬ ‫נוֹ ָדע‬ ‫)נוח(‬ ‫ֻה ַנּח‬ ‫הניח‬

‫נוטה‬ ‫הגלגל הנוטה‬ ‫)נוע(‬ ‫הניע‬

‫התנועע‬

‫נופל‬ ‫נושא‬ ‫ָנח )פ׳(‬ ‫ָנח )ש״ת(‬ ‫נחלק‬ ‫נחש‬ ‫חֶשׁת‬ ‫ְנ ֹ‬ ‫)נטי(‬ ‫נטה‬ ‫נטיה‬ ‫נימוס‬ ‫נכבד‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫)כג‪(24‬‬ ‫دم الطمث · יד‪26‬‬ ‫كر يم · ח‪18‬‬ ‫]ל‪[30‬‬ ‫)יב‪(3‬‬ ‫)לא‪(31‬‬ ‫)לב‪ ,9‬לג‪(11‬‬ ‫)יב‪ ,8‬יז‪ ,4‬כז‪(29‬‬ ‫ألغى · ג‪22‬‬ ‫وضع · י‪ ,15‬יב‪ ,9‬יב‪ ,10‬יג‪30‬‬ ‫)יב‪ ,13‬יג‪ ,7‬כג‪ ,1‬כג‪ ,4‬כג‪ ,11‬כד‪ ,210‬כד‪ ,11‬כד‪ ,30‬כז‪ ,32‬לד‪ ,11‬לד‪ ,15‬לד‪,20‬‬ ‫לד‪] (21‬לב‪[10‬‬ ‫)יד‪ ,5‬כד‪(8‬‬ ‫الفلك المائل · ח‪ ,20‬יא‪) 1‬כד‪(2‬‬ ‫حرك · י‪ ,14‬יג‪ ,26‬יג‪ ,31‬טז‪ ,13‬טז‪ ,16‬טז‪ ,17‬טז‪ ,19‬יז‪ ,ġ18‬יח‪ ,214‬יט‪ ,3‬כב‪,6‬‬ ‫כב‪ ,7‬כג‪ ,5‬כו‪ ,28‬כט‪ ,ġ4‬ל‪) ġ225‬יא‪ ,12‬יב‪ ,32‬יד‪ ,24‬יד‪ ,27‬טז‪ ,19‬יז‪,224‬‬ ‫כג‪ ,17‬כד‪ ,25‬כט‪ ,1‬כט‪ ,2‬כט‪ ,3‬לב‪ ,18‬לב‪ ,219‬לב‪ ,23‬לב‪ ,30‬לג‪ ,22‬לד‪,22‬‬ ‫לה‪(9‬‬ ‫تحرك · ג‪ ,18‬ג‪ ,29‬ד‪ ,12‬י‪ ,9‬יא‪ ,21‬יג‪ ,4‬יד‪ ,ġ23‬יד‪ ,225‬טו‪ ,30‬טז‪ ,1‬טז‪,213‬‬ ‫טז‪ ,19‬יח‪ ,14‬יט‪ ,8‬יט‪ ,9‬כג‪ ,8‬כג‪) 11‬ד‪ ,16‬ו‪ ,10‬יג‪ ,5‬טו‪ ,5‬טז‪ ,6‬יח‪ ,223‬יט‪,8‬‬ ‫כב‪ ,34‬כג‪ ,16‬כג‪ ,26‬כד‪ ,19‬כד‪ ,20‬כה‪ ,26‬כו‪ ,6‬לג‪ ,26‬לד‪(21‬‬ ‫واقع · ב‪28‬‬ ‫موضوع · ד‪ ,4‬ט‪ ,28‬ט‪) 29‬כג‪] (17‬ד‪[16‬‬ ‫سكر · י‪) 21‬כט‪(22‬‬ ‫)יג‪ ,30‬לג‪(28‬‬ ‫)כג‪ ,25‬לד‪(26‬‬ ‫)לא‪(7‬‬ ‫)ו‪(24‬‬ ‫حن · כו‪) 28‬יד‪ ,4‬יח‪ ,28‬לד‪(20‬‬ ‫)כד‪(22‬‬ ‫ناموس · יז‪ ,ġ18‬יז‪ ,ġ21‬יז‪ ,ġ25‬כא‪ ,12‬כא‪ ,213‬כא‪ ,19‬כה‪) ġ25‬יז‪ ,18‬יז‪ ,19‬יז‪,20‬‬ ‫יז‪ ,23‬יז‪ ,31‬יח‪ ,12‬כא‪ ,13‬כא‪ ,14‬כא‪ ,15‬כא‪ ,18‬כה‪ ,26‬כה‪ ,29‬כו‪(16‬‬ ‫شر يف · ג‪ ,24‬ח‪ ,19‬יד‪ ,ġ23‬כא‪ ,21‬כז‪12‬‬ ‫فضيل · יג‪ ,24‬יט‪ ,22‬כ‪ ,2‬כ‪ ,3‬כא‪ ,223‬כז‪19‬‬ ‫)טו‪ ,24‬יט‪ ,30‬כ‪ ,1‬כ‪ ,212‬כו‪ ,22‬כז‪ ,30‬כז‪ ,32‬כט‪ ,26‬ל‪ ,30‬לא‪ ,31‬לג‪ ,19‬לג‪(32‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫נכון‬ ‫)נכי(‬ ‫ִהָכּה‬ ‫נכלל‬ ‫נכנס‬ ‫)נכר(‬ ‫הכיר‬ ‫נכרי‬ ‫נמאס‬ ‫נמנע‬ ‫נמצא‬

‫נעדר‬ ‫נעלה‬ ‫נעתק‬ ‫ָנַפל‬ ‫ִהִפּיל‬ ‫נפרד‬

‫נפש‬ ‫בנפש‪-‬‬ ‫בעל נפש‬ ‫לנפש‪-‬‬ ‫נפשו‬ ‫רמוז אליו בנפשו‬ ‫הנפש אשר בארץ‬ ‫ִנָצּב‬ ‫ִנצּוּ ַח‬ ‫ִנָצּחוֹן‬ ‫נצחי‬

‫ְנֻק ָדּה‬ ‫נקי‬

‫‪574‬‬

‫]לא‪[8‬‬ ‫)כח‪ ,31‬כח‪(32‬‬ ‫)כו‪(8‬‬ ‫داخل · כה‪) ġ1‬לה‪ ,15‬לה‪(16‬‬ ‫)כז‪] (13‬לג‪[3‬‬ ‫غريب · כא‪11‬‬ ‫)לב‪ ,12‬לב‪ ,14‬לב‪(15‬‬ ‫ممتنع · ג‪ ,6‬ד‪11‬‬ ‫موجود · א‪ ,3‬א‪ ,4‬א‪ ,5‬ב‪ ,7‬ב‪ ,210‬ב‪ ,20‬ב‪ ,25‬ט‪ ,25‬ט‪ ,32‬י‪ ,12‬י‪ ,217‬י‪ ,21‬י‪,28‬‬ ‫יא‪ ,34‬יא‪ ,35‬יב‪ ,4‬יב‪ ,5‬יג‪ ,34‬יד‪ ,26‬יז‪ ,12‬יז‪ ,28‬יח‪ ,12‬יט‪ ,10‬כ‪ ,25‬כ‪,228‬‬ ‫כ‪ ,229‬כא‪ ,11‬כא‪ ,12‬כח‪ ,20‬ל‪) ġ25‬ד‪ ,226‬ד‪ ,227‬ד‪ ,28‬ד‪ ,232‬ה‪ ,2‬ז‪ ,1‬ז‪,25‬‬ ‫ז‪ ,9‬ז‪ ,11‬ז‪ ,17‬ח‪ ,28‬ח‪ ,31‬ט‪ ,3‬ט‪ ,15‬ט‪ ,19‬ט‪ ,21‬ט‪ ,222‬יא‪ ,8‬יא‪ ,15‬יא‪ ,26‬יג‪,8‬‬ ‫יג‪ ,9‬יד‪ ,21‬יד‪ ,28‬יד‪ ,29‬טו‪ ,12‬טז‪ ,4‬יז‪ ,12‬יט‪ ,12‬כו‪ ,30‬ל‪ ,3‬ל‪ ,17‬לא‪ ,19‬לא‪,20‬‬ ‫לא‪ ,21‬לג‪ ,212‬לג‪ ,214‬לד‪ ,16‬לד‪ ,28‬לה‪ ,12‬לה‪ ,14‬לה‪(17‬‬ ‫)ו‪(21‬‬ ‫فضيل · כא‪ ,20‬כז‪) 11‬כז‪ ,33‬כח‪ ,30‬כט‪ ,27‬לד‪(12‬‬ ‫منتقل · יט‪5‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,1‬ו‪ ,11‬יח‪ ,30‬כט‪(10‬‬ ‫أوقع · א‪ ,17‬א‪ ,19‬א‪ ,20‬א‪ ,21‬א‪ ,23‬א‪) 24‬טז‪(5‬‬ ‫مفرد · ב‪ ,13‬ב‪ ,14‬ב‪ ,15‬ב‪ ,18‬ב‪ ,23‬ג‪ ,29‬ג‪ ,12‬ג‪ ,16‬טז‪ ,212‬כא‪ ,10‬כב‪24‬‬ ‫منفرد · י‪24‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,231‬ז‪ ,9‬ז‪ ,19‬יא‪ ,26‬יא‪ ,10‬יא‪ ,12‬יג‪ ,29‬יז‪ ,5‬ל‪ ,20‬לד‪ ,24‬לה‪] (7‬כ‪[20‬‬ ‫نفس · י‪ ,15‬י‪ ,22‬כב‪ ,14‬כג‪) 1‬ה‪ ,22‬ז‪ ,6‬ז‪ ,16‬טו‪ ,10‬כט‪ ,1‬ל‪ ,16‬לה‪(4‬‬ ‫نفسه · כח‪) 18‬ז‪ ,25‬יב‪ ,6‬יב‪ ,22‬טז‪ ,28‬יח‪ ,23‬כט‪] (30‬ז‪ ,22‬ז‪[25‬‬ ‫بعينه · כא‪22‬‬ ‫متنفس · כא‪) 14‬כח‪(32‬‬ ‫لنفسه · כח‪ ,16‬כח‪ ,17‬כח‪18‬‬ ‫نفسه · כח‪ ,18‬כח‪) 19‬ז‪ ,22‬לב‪ ,20‬לג‪] (20‬יד‪[2‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,15‬ו‪ ,17‬ו‪ ,18‬ו‪ ,24‬ו‪ ,27‬ו‪ ,29‬ו‪(30‬‬ ‫النفس التى فى الأرض · ח‪19‬‬ ‫)כט‪(31‬‬ ‫)יב‪(9‬‬ ‫غلبة · יד‪) ġ31‬לב‪(17‬‬ ‫أزلى · ג‪ ,2‬יא‪ ,ġ28‬יא‪ ,30‬יב‪ ,25‬יב‪ ,20‬יב‪ ,21‬יב‪ ,24‬יג‪ ,11‬יג‪ ,ġ12‬יג‪ ,12‬יג‪,17‬‬ ‫יג‪ ,18‬יג‪ ,222‬יג‪ ,223‬יג‪ ,27‬יג‪ ,28‬יד‪ ,7‬טז‪ ,7‬טז‪ ,9‬כא‪ ,224‬כא‪ ,25‬כא‪,26‬‬ ‫כב‪ ,4‬כג‪ ,6‬כג‪) 13‬יג‪ ,25‬יג‪ ,30‬טו‪ ,1‬טו‪ ,22‬כג‪ ,23‬לד‪] (28‬יב‪ ,22‬יז‪[22‬‬ ‫)ט‪ ,20‬טו‪(14‬‬ ‫)לה‪(9‬‬

‫‪575‬‬ ‫ָנֵקל‬ ‫נקנה‬ ‫)נקף(‬ ‫הקיף‬ ‫)נקש(‬ ‫הקיש‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫)כח‪(24‬‬ ‫مكتسب · יט‪21‬‬ ‫حوى · ג‪ ,10‬ג‪) 11‬טו‪ ,30‬כח‪(34‬‬ ‫قاس · כט‪6‬‬ ‫قايس ·‬ ‫)כג‪ ,26‬כז‪ ,4‬כז‪ ,6‬כז‪(16‬‬ ‫יד‪ġ16‬‬

‫נראה‬ ‫נרמז‬ ‫האחד הנרמז‬ ‫ָנָשׂא‬

‫ִנָשּׂא‬ ‫ִנָשּׂא )ש״ת(‬ ‫נשאר‬ ‫)נש ֹג(‬ ‫ִהִשּׂיג‬

‫השיג בשלמות‬ ‫ֻהַשּׂג‬ ‫נשיכה‬ ‫נשמע‬ ‫נתלה‬ ‫נתן‬ ‫)נתר(‬ ‫התיר‬

‫)ל‪(22‬‬ ‫حمل · ד‪ ,25‬יא‪ ,ġ232‬כ‪19‬‬ ‫احتمل · י‪26‬‬ ‫)יא‪ ,32‬כח‪ ,23‬כח‪(24‬‬ ‫)יז‪(3‬‬ ‫)טו‪(25‬‬ ‫باقى · ב‪ ,1‬ב‪ ,20‬יח‪ ,11‬יח‪ ,19‬יט‪) 9‬יב‪ ,3‬יג‪ ,16‬לד‪(28‬‬ ‫أدرك · כח‪21‬‬ ‫لحق · כח‪13‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,220‬יא‪ ,26‬יא‪ ,31‬כא‪ ,4‬כו‪ ,8‬כח‪ ,25‬כט‪ ,14‬לד‪] (6‬יא‪[22‬‬ ‫فاز · כה‪ġ1‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,211‬ו‪ ,28‬כט‪ ,30‬ל‪(7‬‬ ‫)לא‪(7‬‬ ‫)כז‪(6‬‬ ‫معلق · כב‪13‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,20‬כז‪ ,32‬לד‪(25‬‬ ‫)יב‪(30‬‬

‫ס‬ ‫)סבב(‬ ‫ַסב‬ ‫ָסַבב‬ ‫סובב‬ ‫סבה‬

‫)כד‪ ,1‬כד‪(2‬‬ ‫)טו‪(13‬‬ ‫أدار · כב‪) 15‬כד‪ ,16‬כד‪ ,17‬כד‪ ,18‬כד‪ ,20‬כד‪ ,21‬כד‪ ,22‬כד‪ ,23‬לג‪(28‬‬ ‫علة · י‪ ,32‬יא‪ ,1‬יא‪ ,2‬יא‪ ,4‬יא‪ ,24‬יא‪ ,25‬יג‪ ,23‬יג‪ ,24‬יד‪ ,ġ29‬טו‪ ,22‬טו‪ ,27‬ל‪12‬‬ ‫سبب · ט‪ ,32‬יב‪ ,29‬טו‪ ,15‬טו‪ ,24‬יז‪ ,ġ25‬כא‪ ,12‬כה‪ ,16‬כז‪ ,12‬כז‪ ,13‬כז‪14‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,7‬יא‪ ,7‬יא‪ ,8‬יא‪ ,29‬יב‪ ,30‬יד‪ ,224‬טו‪ ,3‬כא‪ ,30‬כו‪ ,24‬כז‪ ,12‬כז‪ ,13‬כט‪,20‬‬ ‫ל‪ ,26‬לא‪ ,18‬לב‪ ,19‬לב‪ ,21‬לב‪ ,24‬לב‪ ,30‬לג‪] (9‬טו‪ ,22‬כו‪ ,21‬לא‪ ,9‬לג‪,8‬‬ ‫לג‪[210‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫בסבת‬ ‫לסבת‬ ‫מסבת‬ ‫ובזאת‪/‬ולזאת הסבה‬ ‫סבה מניעה‬ ‫סבה פועלת‬ ‫הסבה הראשונה‬

‫הסבה אשר בעבורה‬ ‫הסבה אשר בגללה‬ ‫סבוב‬ ‫על הסבוב‬ ‫סבובי‬ ‫סביב‬ ‫סבר‬ ‫סברא‬

‫ְס ֻגָלּה‬ ‫סגן‬ ‫ִס ֵדּר‬ ‫סדר‬

‫סוג‬ ‫סוס‬ ‫סוסים‬ ‫סוף‬ ‫ִסיָﬠה‬ ‫ָסַכל‬ ‫סכלות )שׂכלות(‬ ‫)סכם(‬ ‫הסכים‬ ‫)סלק(‬ ‫ֻסַלּק‬ ‫הסתלק‬

‫‪576‬‬

‫بسبب · יז‪ ,16‬כה‪ ,ġ27‬כז‪) 14‬יב‪ ,29‬טו‪ ,1‬יז‪ ,19‬כה‪ ,6‬כה‪ ,7‬כה‪ ,28‬כה‪,10‬‬ ‫כה‪ ,11‬כו‪ ,10‬כו‪ ,218‬כח‪ ,22‬ל‪ ,1‬ל‪ ,223‬ל‪ ,24‬לב‪ ,23‬לג‪(26‬‬ ‫)כו‪(15‬‬ ‫من سبب · ח‪18‬‬ ‫و بهذا السبب · יט‪) 25‬טו‪ ,24‬כג‪ ,21‬כז‪(18‬‬ ‫سبب محرك · י‪ ,1‬י‪7‬‬ ‫علة محركة · י‪31‬‬ ‫)לג‪(4‬‬ ‫العلة الأولى · יא‪ ,25‬טז‪ ,31‬יז‪ ,27‬יח‪ ,14‬כב‪14‬‬ ‫السبب الأول · י‪31‬‬ ‫)יא‪ ,5‬יח‪ ,1‬כו‪ ,29‬לג‪(25‬‬ ‫السبب الذى له · יג‪) 4‬לב‪(19‬‬ ‫]לב‪[19‬‬ ‫)טו‪ ,3‬טו‪ ,13‬טו‪ ,14‬כד‪ ,18‬כט‪ ,15‬לג‪(28‬‬ ‫مستدير · יג‪ ,15‬יג‪) 21‬יג‪ ,20‬טז‪(6‬‬ ‫]יג‪[22‬‬ ‫)לג‪ ,4‬לג‪(27‬‬ ‫رأى · כז‪) 34‬יא‪ ,27‬יד‪ ,18‬יד‪(20‬‬ ‫علم · ג‪28‬‬ ‫رأى · יט‪24‬‬ ‫)יד‪ ,18‬יד‪(20‬‬ ‫خاصية · טו‪) ġ226‬ו‪(15‬‬ ‫]כא‪[16‬‬ ‫)כו‪ ,6‬לב‪(30‬‬ ‫ترتيب · יז‪ ,ġ25‬יז‪ ,27‬יח‪ ,12‬כא‪ ,12‬ל‪) ġ21‬יב‪ ,1‬טו‪ ,10‬טו‪ ,11‬טו‪ ,212‬יז‪ ,20‬כג‪,18‬‬ ‫כט‪ ,17‬כט‪ ,18‬ל‪ ,21‬ל‪ ,223‬ל‪ ,224‬ל‪ ,26‬ל‪ ,29‬לא‪ ,2‬לא‪ ,8‬לא‪ ,10‬לב‪ ,29‬לד‪,13‬‬ ‫לה‪] (10‬ל‪[23‬‬ ‫جنس · א‪ ,17‬ב‪ ,1‬ב‪ ,4‬ב‪ ,5‬ב‪ ,10‬ב‪ ,12‬ז‪) 29‬א‪ ,13‬ח‪ ,32‬ט‪ ,3‬ט‪ ,4‬ט‪ ,7‬ט‪ ,8‬ט‪,9‬‬ ‫ט‪ ,214‬ט‪] (19‬א‪[9‬‬ ‫فرس · ב‪ ,316‬ח‪ ,24‬יז‪) 11‬ה‪ ,28‬ז‪ ,18‬ז‪(19‬‬ ‫خيل · ז‪29‬‬ ‫)ז‪ ,14‬יב‪(30‬‬ ‫)כא‪(29‬‬ ‫)כח‪(31‬‬ ‫جهل · י‪ ,26‬יט‪ ,23‬כט‪) 8‬לד‪(11‬‬ ‫اتفق · ב‪) 27‬כב‪ ,9‬כד‪ ,12‬לא‪ ,29‬לג‪ ,16‬לג‪ ,18‬לג‪(20‬‬ ‫ن ُفَِي · כז‪] 22‬לד‪[29‬‬ ‫رفع · ל‪) ġ4‬ו‪(22‬‬

‫‪577‬‬ ‫ַסֵלּק‬ ‫סמיכות‬ ‫)סמך(‬ ‫נסמך‬ ‫סנדיס‬ ‫סנקופש‬ ‫ספינה‬ ‫ספוגי‬ ‫ספוגות‬ ‫ִספּוּק‬ ‫)ספק(‬ ‫ִסֵפּק‬ ‫הספיק‬ ‫ָסֵפק‬ ‫בלא ספק‬ ‫ָסַפר‬ ‫לא יספר מר ֹב‬ ‫ִסֵפּר‬

‫ספר‬ ‫ספר החכמה הטבעית‬ ‫סקראט‬ ‫סר‬ ‫סתירה‬ ‫סתר‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫رفع · ז‪28‬‬ ‫إضافة · א‪16‬‬ ‫)ו‪(21‬‬ ‫)יד‪(19‬‬ ‫)כא‪(29‬‬ ‫سفينة · א‪) 7‬ה‪ ,5‬ה‪ ,6‬ו‪ ,9‬ו‪ ,25‬לא‪(25‬‬ ‫)לד‪(3‬‬ ‫)לב‪ ,28‬לג‪(19‬‬ ‫اكتفاء · כח‪) 5‬כו‪(15‬‬ ‫)ד‪(25‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,15‬לב‪ ,29‬לד‪] (24‬כד‪[28‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,25‬כג‪ ,1‬לג‪ ,24‬לד‪(30‬‬ ‫لا محالة · י‪ ,3‬כב‪ ,16‬כו‪) 32‬יב‪ ,6‬יב‪ ,21‬יד‪ ,12‬יד‪ ,13‬כג‪ ,14‬כה‪ ,13‬ל‪ ,17‬לא‪,5‬‬ ‫לב‪(1‬‬ ‫لا يحصى · יט‪20‬‬ ‫إقتص · ג‪18‬‬ ‫وصف · ד‪6‬‬ ‫خبر · יג‪4‬‬ ‫)טו‪ ,1‬טו‪ ,4‬כו‪ ,22‬כט‪ ,22‬ל‪] (27‬כג‪[1‬‬ ‫)כא‪ ,13‬כה‪(21‬‬ ‫كتاب العلم الطبيعى · ג‪) 32‬ה‪(26‬‬ ‫سقراط · ב‪) 16‬ד‪ ,224‬ד‪ ,225‬ז‪ ,11‬ז‪ ,12‬ז‪ ,213‬כה‪(17‬‬ ‫زال · יא‪ ,22‬יב‪) 22‬ד‪ ,26‬כא‪] (17‬כד‪[32‬‬ ‫)יט‪ ,1‬לב‪ ,4‬לד‪ ,4‬לד‪(22‬‬ ‫ناقض · יב‪) 15‬לג‪(31‬‬

‫ע‬ ‫עב‬ ‫עבד‬ ‫עבור‬ ‫בעבור ש…‬

‫)לד‪(3‬‬ ‫عبد · כו‪) ġ1‬ל‪ ,31‬לא‪(14‬‬ ‫لأن · טז‪ ,21‬כו‪ ,21‬כח‪26‬‬ ‫لما · יט‪17‬‬ ‫إذ · יח‪15‬‬ ‫)טז‪ ,225‬יט‪ ,4‬כט‪] (30‬ב‪ ,18‬ג‪ ,13‬ג‪ ,30‬ד‪ ,30‬ה‪ ,14‬ה‪ ,24‬ו‪ ,21‬ח‪ ,13‬ח‪,28‬‬ ‫טו‪ ,20‬טז‪ ,18‬יז‪ ,13‬יט‪ ,12‬יט‪ ,26‬כ‪ ,32‬כב‪ ,17‬כד‪ ,19‬כז‪ ,9‬כז‪ ,12‬כח‪ ,12‬לא‪,19‬‬ ‫לא‪ ,23‬לב‪ ,13‬לג‪ ,21‬לג‪[28‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫הדבר אשר בעבורו‬ ‫הסבה אשר בעבורה‬ ‫העלה אשר בעבורה‬ ‫עבר‬ ‫במה שעבר‬ ‫ִﬠגּוּל‬ ‫ָﬠֹגל‬ ‫עד ש…‬ ‫)עדר(‬ ‫נעדר‬ ‫)עוד(‬ ‫העיד‬ ‫עוד‬ ‫עולם‬

‫העולם ַהֻמְּשָׂכּל‬ ‫העולם השכלי‬ ‫עומד‬ ‫)עוק(‬ ‫העיק‬ ‫ִﬠ ָוּרוֹן‬ ‫עזב‬

‫עיון‬ ‫ִﬠ ֵיּן‬ ‫היטיב ְלַﬠ ֵיּן‬ ‫ַﬠ ִין‬ ‫בעינו‬

‫הרף עין‬ ‫מה שיראה לעין‬ ‫על‬ ‫על מה‬ ‫עלה‬ ‫עלה מניעה‬

‫‪578‬‬

‫الشىء الذى من أجله · יז‪) 16‬ט‪(2‬‬ ‫السبب الذى له · יג‪) 4‬לב‪(19‬‬ ‫)לג‪(8‬‬ ‫تصفح · כח‪ ,2‬כח‪ ,6‬כט‪) ġ7‬יח‪ ,2‬כח‪ ,21‬לא‪ ,13‬לג‪] (11‬יא‪[18‬‬ ‫)יא‪ ,20‬יא‪ ,35‬יב‪] (11‬יא‪[21‬‬ ‫)כד‪(8‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,27‬ה‪(29‬‬ ‫حتى · ג‪ ,4‬ג‪ ,16‬ח‪ ,4‬יד‪) 1‬ד‪ ,16‬ד‪ ,30‬ו‪ ,10‬ו‪ ,28‬ו‪ ,34‬ז‪ ,18‬ז‪ ,24‬ח‪ ,31‬ט‪ ,5‬כג‪,28‬‬ ‫כד‪ ,17‬כט‪(5‬‬ ‫]יב‪[8‬‬ ‫شهد · ב‪ ,6‬טו‪ ,28‬כג‪) 7‬כו‪(13‬‬ ‫ثم · א‪ ,10‬א‪ ,11‬יח‪ ,18‬כ‪) 7‬ה‪ ,19‬טו‪ ,10‬לא‪(9‬‬ ‫عالم · יד‪ ,ġ19‬יז‪ ,ġ25‬כה‪ ,13‬כה‪ ,20‬כט‪) ġ4‬כו‪ ,12‬כט‪ ,4‬כט‪ ,15‬לא‪ ,1‬לא‪,11‬‬ ‫לא‪ ,16‬לא‪ ,31‬לג‪ ,229‬לה‪ ,11‬לה‪(16‬‬ ‫)כט‪(11‬‬ ‫)ל‪(11‬‬ ‫قائم · י‪ ,31‬טז‪) 212‬ה‪ ,2‬ז‪ ,26‬יא‪ ,5‬יב‪ ,6‬כא‪(15‬‬ ‫عاق · יב‪) 26‬כ‪ ,4‬ו‪ ,6‬ו‪ ,9‬יט‪(31‬‬ ‫)טו‪(29‬‬ ‫ترك · טז‪ ,3‬כח‪2‬‬ ‫ودع · כח‪21‬‬ ‫)לב‪(10‬‬ ‫نظر · ב‪ ,21‬ח‪) 9‬יז‪ ,20‬כו‪(24‬‬ ‫نظر · כו‪) 23‬ז‪ ,14‬כז‪ ,1‬ל‪(19‬‬ ‫أمعن · ב‪23‬‬ ‫عين · כח‪) 27‬ו‪] (28‬טז‪ ,26‬כז‪[1‬‬ ‫بعينه · א‪ ,20‬א‪ ,23‬ב‪ ,22‬ח‪ ,10‬ט‪ ,30‬י‪ ,20‬טו‪ ,18‬טו‪ ,30‬טז‪ ,22‬יז‪ ,13‬כז‪ ,3‬כח‪3‬‬ ‫)כ‪ ,18‬ה‪ ,8‬ו‪ ,5‬ח‪ ,31‬ט‪ ,5‬ט‪ ,6‬ט‪ ,23‬יא‪ ,13‬יא‪ ,14‬כא‪ ,16‬כג‪ ,30‬כד‪ ,11‬כה‪,17‬‬ ‫כז‪ ,22‬כח‪ ,1‬כח‪ ,7‬כט‪ ,33‬ל‪ ,8‬ל‪ ,10‬ל‪ ,16‬ל‪ ,28‬לב‪ ,14‬לב‪ ,15‬לב‪ ,25‬לג‪,3‬‬ ‫לג‪ ,10‬לד‪(5‬‬ ‫طرفة عين · יט‪21‬‬ ‫)כד‪ ,14‬כד‪(16‬‬ ‫على · ‪passim‬‬ ‫على ما · عما · ‪passim‬‬ ‫علة · טו‪ ,16‬טו‪ ,19‬טו‪ ,22‬טו‪ ,223‬טו‪ ,24‬טו‪ ,ġ226‬כב‪ ,21‬כז‪) ,12‬טו‪ ,25‬טו‪,26‬‬ ‫לג‪ ,211‬לד‪] (25‬כו‪[24‬‬ ‫علة محركة · טו‪ ,17‬כד‪) ,27‬כה‪ ,25‬כה‪ ,21‬לב‪ ,21‬לד‪(24‬‬

‫‪579‬‬ ‫עלה פועלת‬ ‫העלה הראשונה‬ ‫העלה אשר בגללה‬ ‫עליון‬ ‫עם‬ ‫עמד‬

‫העמיד‬ ‫עמידה‬

‫עמל‬ ‫ֲﬠ ִניּוּת‬ ‫ענין‬

‫)עסק(‬ ‫התעסק‬ ‫ִﬠפּוּשׁ‬ ‫עץ‬

‫עצלה‬ ‫עצם‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫علة فاعلة · טו‪20‬‬ ‫العلة الأولى · טו‪ ,22‬טו‪ ,23‬יח‪ ,10‬כב‪ ,14‬כג‪ ,8‬כה‪ ,13‬כו‪) 21‬יח‪ ,9‬כא‪,1‬‬ ‫לג‪ ,26‬לג‪ ,30‬לד‪ ,4‬לד‪(6‬‬ ‫]לג‪[8‬‬ ‫أعلى · ח‪19‬‬ ‫مع · ‪passim‬‬ ‫قام · ב‪ ,12‬יא‪24‬‬ ‫سكن · יג‪18‬‬ ‫لبث · ח‪8‬‬ ‫)ז‪ ,10‬יב‪ ,12‬יז‪ ,21‬יז‪ ,23‬יח‪ ,9‬לא‪ ,11‬לא‪ ,29‬לד‪(13‬‬ ‫)יד‪(30‬‬ ‫قوام · יב‪ ,ġ1‬יט‪ ,16‬כט‪25‬‬ ‫وقوف · כג‪14‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,19‬יג‪ ,16‬כ‪ ,6‬לא‪ ,25‬לב‪ ,16‬לד‪(224‬‬ ‫)כח‪ ,13‬כח‪(15‬‬ ‫)ו‪(19‬‬ ‫حال · א‪ ,11‬א‪ ,15‬ב‪ ,1‬ב‪ ,3‬ב‪ ,8‬ב‪ ,28‬ג‪ ,6‬ג‪ ,15‬ד‪ ,9‬ח‪ ,313‬י‪ ,14‬י‪ ,218‬י‪ ,19‬י‪,26‬‬ ‫יא‪ ,23‬יב‪ ,25‬טו‪ ,216‬טו‪ ,17‬טו‪ ,18‬טו‪ ,19‬יט‪ ,10‬כו‪ ,18‬כא‪ ,21‬כב‪ ,29‬כג‪,27‬‬ ‫כח‪17‬‬ ‫أمر · ב‪ ,22‬ב‪ ,31‬ב‪ ,33‬ג‪ ,7‬ג‪ ,22‬ח‪ ,10‬י‪ ,11‬טז‪ ,30‬כג‪11‬‬ ‫معنى · א‪ ,5‬יא‪ġ29‬‬ ‫عيان · א‪25‬‬ ‫)ג‪ ,15‬ה‪ ,4‬ה‪ ,9‬ה‪ ,12‬ו‪ ,18‬ז‪ ,22‬ז‪ ,4‬ט‪ ,20‬יא‪ ,28‬יא‪ ,35‬יב‪ ,3‬יב‪ ,14‬יב‪ ,32‬יג‪,10‬‬ ‫יג‪ ,11‬יג‪ ,12‬יג‪ ,17‬יד‪ ,24‬יד‪ ,210‬יד‪ ,11‬יד‪ ,31‬טו‪ ,2‬טו‪ ,26‬טו‪ ,15‬טו‪ ,25‬טז‪,9‬‬ ‫טז‪ ,25‬טז‪ ,26‬טז‪ ,30‬יז‪ ,18‬יז‪ ,20‬יח‪ ,3‬יח‪ ,9‬יח‪ ,24‬יט‪ ,1‬יט‪ ,11‬יט‪ ,13‬כ‪ ,7‬כ‪,8‬‬ ‫כ‪ ,14‬כא‪ ,28‬כג‪ ,1‬כג‪ ,23‬כג‪ ,25‬כד‪ ,14‬כד‪ ,32‬כה‪ ,9‬כה‪ ,10‬כה‪ ,25‬כה‪,26‬‬ ‫כה‪ ,30‬כו‪ ,5‬כו‪ ,6‬כו‪ ,19‬כו‪ ,23‬כז‪ ,17‬כז‪ ,18‬כז‪ ,20‬כז‪ ,22‬ל‪ ,15‬ל‪ ,228‬לא‪,1‬‬ ‫לא‪ ,12‬לא‪ ,13‬לא‪ ,15‬לא‪ ,19‬לא‪ ,21‬לג‪ ,10‬לה‪] (7‬א‪ ,25‬ו‪ ,18‬טו‪[16‬‬ ‫استعمل · ב‪ ,13‬כו‪25‬‬ ‫عفن · ז‪30‬‬ ‫خشبة · א‪ ,18‬א‪ ,219‬א‪ ,323‬א‪24‬‬ ‫خشب · יד‪25‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,6‬ז‪(3‬‬ ‫تهيب · י‪13‬‬ ‫جوهر · א‪ ,24‬א‪ ,8‬א‪ ,10‬א‪ ,12‬א‪ ,14‬א‪ ,15‬א‪ ,16‬א‪ ,18‬א‪ ,225‬ב‪ ,1‬ב‪ ,2‬ב‪ ,5‬ב‪,7‬‬ ‫ב‪ ,211‬ב‪ ,14‬ב‪ ,18‬ב‪ ,19‬ב‪ ,26‬ב‪ ,27‬ב‪ ,29‬ב‪ ,330‬ג‪ ,21‬ג‪ ,32‬ג‪ ,5‬ג‪ ,7‬ג‪ ,29‬ג‪,10‬‬ ‫ג‪ ,312‬ג‪ ,13‬ג‪ ,15‬ג‪ ,16‬ג‪ ,17‬ג‪ ,19‬ג‪ ,321‬ג‪ ,22‬ג‪ ,223‬ג‪ ,24‬ג‪ ,25‬ג‪ ,27‬ג‪ ,28‬ג‪,29‬‬ ‫ג‪ ,30‬ג‪ ,32‬ד‪ ,6‬ח‪ ,14‬ט‪ ,25‬י‪ ,211‬י‪ ,312‬י‪ ,214‬יא‪ ,29‬יא‪ ,319‬יא‪ ,21‬יא‪ ,22‬יא‪,230‬‬ ‫יא‪ ,33‬יא‪ ,34‬יב‪ ,ġ1‬יב‪ ,4‬יב‪ ,5‬יג‪ ,13‬יג‪ ,28‬יד‪ ,6‬יז‪ ,22‬יז‪ ,ġ221‬יז‪ ,ġ22‬יז‪,227‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬

‫עצם ראשון‬ ‫עצמות‬

‫עקב‬ ‫בא זה בעקב זה‬ ‫ִﬠָקּר‬ ‫ֵﬠ ֵרב‬ ‫התערב‬ ‫לא יתערב בו דבר מן‬ ‫הגשמות‬ ‫)לא( יתערב בו דבר מן‬ ‫ההיולי‬ ‫מה שיתערב בו ההיולי‪/‬לא‬ ‫יתערב בו ההיולי‬ ‫שההיולי לא יתערב בו‬ ‫לא יתערב בו החמר‬ ‫לא יתערב בו היסוד‬ ‫לא יתערב בו מה שהוא‬ ‫בכח‬ ‫ָﬠ ֵרב‬ ‫ֲﬠ ֵרבוּת‬ ‫ֵﬠרוּב‬ ‫ערום‬ ‫ָﬠ ְרָמה‬ ‫עשה‬

‫‪580‬‬

‫יח‪ ,10‬טז‪ ,15‬יט‪ ,5‬יט‪ ,16‬כ‪ ,18‬כ‪ ,20‬כב‪ ,3‬כב‪ ,30‬כג‪ ,7‬כג‪ ,9‬כד‪ ,ġ31‬כז‪,7‬‬ ‫כז‪) 9‬ג‪ ,16‬ד‪ ,22‬ד‪ ,30‬ו‪ ,10‬ו‪ ,211‬ו‪ ,12‬ו‪ ,13‬ו‪ ,14‬ו‪ ,215‬ו‪ ,17‬ו‪ ,18‬ו‪ ,230‬ו‪ ,33‬ז‪,9‬‬ ‫ז‪ ,12‬ח‪ ,31‬ט‪ ,5‬ט‪ ,9‬ט‪ ,10‬ט‪ ,11‬ט‪ ,212‬ט‪ ,21‬יא‪ ,15‬יא‪ ,216‬יא‪ ,17‬יא‪ ,20‬יב‪,2‬‬ ‫יב‪ ,3‬יב‪ ,7‬יג‪ ,233‬יד‪ ,2‬יז‪ ,9‬יח‪ ,24‬כא‪ ,15‬כב‪ ,32‬כב‪ ,33‬כב‪ ,34‬כג‪ ,212‬כג‪,214‬‬ ‫כג‪ ,20‬כג‪ ,22‬כג‪ ,23‬כד‪ ,25‬כד‪ ,26‬כה‪ ,3‬כה‪ ,31‬כה‪ ,32‬כו‪ ,8‬כו‪ ,11‬כו‪ ,19‬כז‪,9‬‬ ‫כז‪ ,29‬כז‪ ,32‬כט‪ ,23‬לד‪ ,12‬לה‪] (15‬א‪ ,20‬ג‪ ,14‬יג‪ ,5‬טז‪ ,28‬יז‪ ,17‬כא‪ ,21‬כח‪,16‬‬ ‫ל‪[9‬‬ ‫)יז‪ ,9‬כו‪ ,12‬כו‪(19‬‬ ‫ذات · ג‪ ,14‬יד‪ ,225‬יד‪ ,27‬טז‪ ,212‬יז‪ ,16‬יז‪ ,17‬יז‪ ,18‬יח‪ ,10‬יט‪ ,20‬יט‪ ,30‬כ‪,3‬‬ ‫כ‪ ,7‬כ‪ ,19‬כא‪ ,22‬כא‪ ,10‬כא‪ ,214‬כב‪ ,24‬כג‪ ,ġ9‬כה‪ ,ġ7‬כז‪ ,2‬כז‪ ,7‬כח‪,13‬‬ ‫כח‪ ,16‬כח‪ ,17‬כח‪ ,19‬כח‪ ,29‬כט‪ ,24‬כט‪ ,25‬ל‪ ,11‬ל‪) 12‬ה‪ ,228‬ט‪ ,321‬יד‪,3‬‬ ‫יז‪ ,19‬יז‪ ,24‬כ‪ ,10‬כ‪ ,11‬כא‪ ,26‬כא‪ ,16‬כג‪ ,10‬כה‪ ,8‬כה‪ ,10‬כח‪ ,14‬כט‪ ,19‬כט‪,26‬‬ ‫כט‪ ,29‬ל‪ ,2‬ל‪ ,3‬ל‪ ,9‬ל‪ ,16‬לב‪] (23‬טז‪[15‬‬ ‫تعاقب · ב‪3‬‬ ‫)יב‪(1‬‬ ‫خلط · יד‪ġ30‬‬ ‫لا يشو به شىء من الجسمانية · ג‪8‬‬ ‫)لا( يشو به شىء من الهيولى · יד‪ ,7‬יד‪ ,ġ7‬טז‪ ,14‬יז‪) ġ4‬טז‪(20‬‬ ‫)لا( تشو به الهيولى · כ‪ ,20‬כב‪) 31‬יז‪ ,22‬כ‪ ,6‬כ‪ ,20‬כב‪ ,32‬כב‪ ,33‬כט‪ ,20‬ל‪,8‬‬ ‫לג‪ ,21‬לד‪ ,5‬לד‪ ,19‬לה‪(9‬‬ ‫)כג‪(5‬‬ ‫)כג‪(18‬‬ ‫)כט‪(33‬‬ ‫ما يختلط به مما بالقوة · כ‪) 24‬יז‪(3‬‬ ‫لذيذ · טז‪ ,23‬יט‪ ,22‬יט‪ ,23‬יט‪ ,25‬יט‪) 26‬כ‪(1‬‬ ‫لذة · יט‪ ,28‬כ‪) 32‬כא‪ ,3‬כא‪(6‬‬ ‫)טז‪ ,4‬לב‪(13‬‬ ‫تعرى · ב‪) 1‬ו‪ ,19‬ו‪(32‬‬ ‫حذق · ח‪) 8‬ח‪(9‬‬ ‫عمل · ח‪ ,8‬ח‪ ,9‬ח‪ ,211‬ח‪ ,15‬ח‪16‬‬ ‫فعل · ח‪ ,17‬ח‪ ,221‬יט‪ ,30‬כו‪ ,24‬כו‪27‬‬ ‫استعمل · יב‪ġ18‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,22‬ז‪ ,12‬ז‪ ,24‬ז‪ ,225‬ז‪ ,26‬יב‪ ,19‬יג‪ ,26‬יד‪ ,9‬יד‪ ,19‬כא‪ ,4‬כו‪ ,26‬כו‪,30‬‬ ‫כו‪ ,31‬כז‪ ,1‬כז‪ ,6‬כט‪ ,16‬ל‪ ,30‬לא‪ ,4‬לא‪ ,12‬לב‪ ,28‬לג‪ ,9‬לג‪ ,20‬לה‪(15‬‬ ‫]כו‪[25‬‬

‫‪581‬‬ ‫ֲﬠִשׂ ָיּה‬ ‫עֶֹשׁר‬ ‫עת‬

‫עתה‬ ‫עתיד‬ ‫)עתק(‬ ‫נעתק‬ ‫העתיק‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫عمل · ח‪) 8‬יב‪(17‬‬ ‫)כט‪(6‬‬ ‫وقت · ג‪ ,6‬ג‪ ,7‬י‪ ,18‬י‪ ,21‬יב‪ ,14‬יב‪ ,15‬טו‪ ,17‬טו‪ ,19‬כ‪ ,223‬כא‪ ,8‬כא‪ ,221‬כב‪,18‬‬ ‫כב‪ ,222‬כו‪29‬‬ ‫أمر · יט‪^18‬‬ ‫)כא‪ ,4‬כא‪ ,30‬לא‪(12‬‬ ‫الآن · ב‪ ,24‬ט‪ ,31‬יא‪ ,21‬כ‪) 24‬יא‪ ,22‬יב‪ ,11‬כג‪(31‬‬ ‫)יב‪(12‬‬ ‫انتقل · כ‪] 23‬כח‪[31‬‬ ‫)כט‪(14‬‬

‫פ‬ ‫פּוֵֹﬠל‬ ‫סבה פועלת‬ ‫עלה פועלת‬ ‫ָפּחוּת‬

‫ָפּחוֹת‬ ‫פילוסופיא‬ ‫פיתאגורש‬ ‫פליקס‬ ‫פנה‬ ‫פנוי‬ ‫ֵפּרוּק‬ ‫ֵפּ ֵרק‬ ‫פלא‬ ‫)פלג(‬ ‫הפליג‬ ‫פלוני‬ ‫פנאי‬ ‫פנים‬ ‫מבפנים‬ ‫)פסד(‬ ‫נפסד‬ ‫)פסק(‬ ‫נפסק‬ ‫הפסיק‬

‫فاعل · כו‪) 24‬ז‪ ,10‬ז‪ ,18‬לג‪(17‬‬ ‫)לג‪(4‬‬ ‫علة فاعلة · טו‪20‬‬ ‫خسيس · יג‪ ,24‬כז‪ ,14‬כז‪ ,20‬כז‪ ,23‬כז‪26‬‬ ‫قليل · ב‪34‬‬ ‫)יד‪ ,10‬כז‪ ,20‬כז‪ ,25‬כז‪ ,227‬לא‪(15‬‬ ‫)לא‪(16‬‬ ‫فلسفة · ב‪) 17‬כג‪ ,15‬כג‪(22‬‬ ‫)כא‪(29‬‬ ‫)כג‪ ,18‬כד‪(10‬‬ ‫]יח‪[30‬‬ ‫]כו‪[31‬‬ ‫)ה‪(17‬‬ ‫)ה‪(17‬‬ ‫عجب · א‪ ,17‬ח‪ ,8‬ח‪ ,16‬יב‪ ,5‬יח‪ ,10‬כא‪ ,8‬כא‪) 29‬כ‪ ,30‬כט‪(17‬‬ ‫دقق · ח‪9‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,231‬ז‪(220‬‬ ‫فراغ · יט‪18‬‬ ‫وجه · ג‪ ,14‬ד‪) 12‬ד‪ ,27‬ד‪ ,28‬ז‪ ,5‬ט‪ ,1‬י‪ ,7‬י‪] (8‬ב‪[1‬‬ ‫)יט‪(2‬‬ ‫فسد · ג‪ ,4‬ח‪ ,1‬יב‪ ,6‬יב‪) 10‬ד‪ ,16‬ד‪ ,17‬ה‪ ,32‬יב‪ ,2‬לב‪(17‬‬ ‫انقطع · יג‪) 16‬לג‪(9‬‬ ‫قطع · כ‪4‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫)פעל(‬ ‫ִהְתַפֵּﬠל‬ ‫ְפֻּﬠָלּה‬

‫ֹפַּﬠל‬

‫ָבֹּפַּﬠל‬

‫)פעם(‬ ‫התפעם‬ ‫פעם‬

‫פעמים‬

‫פקיד‬ ‫ֵפּרוּד‬ ‫)פרד(‬ ‫נפרד‬ ‫הפריד‬ ‫פרט‬ ‫בפרט‬ ‫פרטי‬ ‫ָפּ ָרשׁ‬ ‫פשוט‬ ‫)פשט(‬ ‫הפשיט‬ ‫התפשט‬ ‫פתאום‬

‫‪582‬‬

‫)לא‪ ,4‬לג‪(17‬‬ ‫فعل · ב‪ ,4‬טז‪ ,17‬יז‪ ,ġ21‬יט‪ ,30‬כא‪ ,11‬כא‪ ,23‬כד‪ ,ġ32‬כו‪ ,27‬כז‪) 1‬יז‪ ,31‬יח‪,1‬‬ ‫יח‪ ,11‬כ‪ ,14‬כא‪ ,3‬כו‪ ,3‬כו‪ ,7‬כו‪ ,8‬כו‪ ,9‬כו‪ ,18‬כז‪ ,23‬כז‪ ,27‬כז‪ ,31‬כט‪ ,13‬כט‪,22‬‬ ‫ל‪ ,231‬לא‪ ,15‬לא‪(24‬‬ ‫فعل · ח‪ ,7‬ח‪ ,25‬יג‪ ,31‬יג‪ ,ġ32‬יד‪ ,2‬יד‪ ,216‬יד‪ ,17‬יז‪ ,ġ21‬יז‪ ,226‬יט‪ ,23‬יט‪,28‬‬ ‫כא‪ ,222‬כא‪ ,24‬כב‪ ,24‬כב‪ ,25‬כב‪ ,26‬כד‪ ,ġ32‬כז‪ ,17‬כז‪) 18‬ט‪ ,11‬יג‪ ,26‬יד‪,2‬‬ ‫יד‪ ,14‬יד‪ ,16‬יד‪ ,17‬כה‪ ,30‬כו‪ ,31‬כז‪ ,2‬כז‪ ,6‬כט‪ ,23‬לד‪ ,20‬לד‪(27‬‬ ‫بالفعل · ח‪ ,17‬י‪ ,220‬י‪ ,22‬י‪ ,23‬י‪ ,27‬יד‪ ,1‬יד‪ ,ġ29‬טז‪ ,15‬יז‪ ,3‬יט‪ ,25‬יט‪,26‬‬ ‫יט‪ ,228‬כב‪ ,16‬כב‪ ,20‬כב‪21‬‬ ‫فعلا ً· יא‪4‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,20‬ד‪ ,21‬ד‪ ,22‬ד‪ ,23‬ד‪ ,224‬ד‪ ,29‬ה‪ ,3‬יג‪ ,33‬יד‪ ,24‬יד‪ ,10‬יד‪ ,11‬יד‪ ,12‬יד‪,15‬‬ ‫יד‪ ,18‬טז‪ ,5‬טז‪ ,7‬יז‪ ,23‬יט‪ ,27‬כב‪ ,1‬כב‪ ,2‬כח‪ ,15‬לג‪ ,12‬לג‪(14‬‬ ‫أل ْه ِم َ · ]ח‪ ,18‬ח‪[22‬‬ ‫مرة · ב‪ ,34‬ג‪ ,215‬ד‪ ,8‬ד‪ ,9‬ד‪ ,210‬י‪ ,220‬כב‪ ,18‬כב‪) ,19‬ב‪ ,34‬י‪ ,20‬י‪ ,21‬יב‪,232‬‬ ‫כג‪ ,2‬כג‪(3‬‬ ‫ر بما · י‪ ,222‬י‪227‬‬ ‫قد · י‪ ,28‬יט‪19‬‬ ‫)ב‪ ,22‬ו‪ ,3‬ו‪ ,23‬ז‪ ,5‬יא‪ ,23‬יז‪ ,7‬יט‪ ,3‬כ‪ ,23‬כא‪ ,26‬כה‪ ,27‬כו‪ ,4‬ל‪ ,14‬לב‪,2‬‬ ‫לד‪(28‬‬ ‫]לא‪[14‬‬ ‫)לב‪ ,28‬לד‪(3‬‬ ‫فرد · ג‪10‬‬ ‫انفرد · י‪ ,24‬י‪25‬‬ ‫أفرد · א‪ ,24‬א‪ ,25‬יא‪ġ29‬‬ ‫)כ‪(16‬‬ ‫)יא‪ ,26‬כב‪ ,33‬כז‪(20‬‬ ‫)כו‪(3‬‬ ‫بسيط · ב‪ ,32‬יז‪ ,2‬יז‪ ,13‬כא‪) 10‬ט‪ ,13‬ט‪ ,16‬ט‪ ,17‬ט‪ ,18‬יז‪ ,4‬יז‪ ,5‬יז‪ ,7‬יז‪ ,28‬יז‪,10‬‬ ‫יז‪ ,13‬יז‪ ,14‬יז‪ ,23‬לד‪] (18‬ב‪[33‬‬ ‫لفظ · ד‪5‬‬ ‫انتشر · ב‪34‬‬ ‫دفعة · כח‪) 21‬כח‪ ,27‬לג‪(25‬‬

‫‪583‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬

‫צ‬ ‫צד‬

‫מצד‬ ‫צדק‬ ‫ִצ ָוּה‬ ‫ִהְצַט ָוּה‬ ‫ִצוּוּי‬ ‫צומח‬ ‫צורה‬

‫הצורה הראשונה‬ ‫צוֹ ֵרף‬ ‫ציור‬ ‫)ציר(‬ ‫ִצ ֵיּר‬ ‫ֻצ ַיּר‬ ‫צלח‬ ‫ֶצֶלם‬ ‫)צמח(‬ ‫הצמיח‬ ‫צמח‬ ‫צמיחה‬ ‫צפרדע‬ ‫צריך‬ ‫צריך על כל פנים‬ ‫)צרך(‬ ‫הצריך‬ ‫ֻהְצ ַרְך‬ ‫הצטרך‬

‫جهة · ד‪ ,13‬טז‪ ,16‬יט‪ ,4‬כ‪ ,27‬כב‪28‬‬ ‫سبيل · כח‪20‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,14‬יד‪ ,4‬יד‪ ,5‬טז‪ ,17‬יח‪ ,228‬יט‪ ,12‬כב‪ ,25‬כד‪ ,19‬כו‪ ,6‬כו‪ ,15‬כו‪ ,23‬כט‪,20‬‬ ‫ל‪ ,227‬לב‪ ,5‬לב‪ ,10‬לב‪ ,311‬לב‪ ,21‬לג‪ ,22‬לג‪(30‬‬ ‫ل · טו‪) 22‬יד‪ ,2‬לג‪(20‬‬ ‫من قبِ َ ِ‬ ‫)כד‪(12‬‬ ‫)כה‪ ,30‬כו‪ ,6‬ל‪(25‬‬ ‫)לא‪(12‬‬ ‫)ל‪ ,26‬לא‪] (13‬כו‪[5‬‬ ‫نبات · א‪) 6‬לא‪(18‬‬ ‫صورة · ג‪ ,20‬ג‪ ,22‬ז‪ ,27‬ח‪ ,2‬ח‪ ,11‬ח‪ ,14‬ח‪ ,225‬ח‪ ,26‬ט‪ ,25‬ט‪ ,26‬ט‪ ,27‬ט‪,28‬‬ ‫י‪ ,4‬י‪ ,5‬י‪ ,7‬י‪ ,8‬י‪ ,23‬י‪ ,324‬י‪ ,28‬י‪ ,230‬י‪ ,32‬יא‪ ,2‬יא‪ ,3‬יג‪ ,29‬יד‪ ,225‬כ‪ ,18‬כ‪,19‬‬ ‫כב‪ ,34‬כה‪ ,16‬ל‪) ġ5‬ה‪ ,17‬ה‪ ,21‬ה‪ ,222‬ה‪ ,23‬ה‪ ,24‬ה‪ ,25‬ה‪ ,26‬ו‪ ,213‬ו‪ ,19‬ו‪,220‬‬ ‫ו‪ ,21‬ו‪ ,22‬ו‪ ,24‬ו‪ ,29‬ו‪ ,232‬ו‪ ,233‬ז‪ ,1‬ז‪ ,2‬ז‪ ,3‬ז‪ ,6‬ז‪ ,27‬ז‪ ,28‬ז‪ ,39‬ז‪ ,10‬ז‪ ,12‬ז‪ ,15‬ז‪,17‬‬ ‫ז‪ ,18‬ז‪ ,20‬ז‪ ,221‬ז‪ ,22‬ז‪ ,223‬ז‪ ,24‬ז‪ ,26‬ז‪ ,227‬ח‪ ,23‬ח‪ ,26‬יא‪ ,11‬יא‪ ,412‬כ‪,20‬‬ ‫כב‪ ,34‬כג‪ ,2‬כה‪ ,16‬כה‪ ,18‬כו‪ ,9‬כו‪ ,216‬כז‪ ,21‬ל‪ ,1‬ל‪ ,6‬ל‪ ,7‬ל‪ ,13‬ל‪ ,16‬לב‪,6‬‬ ‫לב‪ ,7‬לב‪ ,8‬לב‪ ,9‬לג‪ ,232‬לד‪ ,10‬לד‪ ,20‬לד‪ ,21‬לד‪ ,225‬לד‪ ,26‬לה‪ ,2‬לה‪,3‬‬ ‫לה‪ ,5‬לה‪(17‬‬ ‫)כה‪ ,18‬לב‪(8‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,16‬ה‪ ,22‬ה‪ ,24‬ה‪ ,28‬ה‪(229‬‬ ‫)לב‪ ,12‬לד‪(26‬‬ ‫)ז‪ ,18‬כט‪ ,12‬לב‪ ,10‬לב‪ ,12‬לב‪ ,30‬לג‪ ,9‬לג‪ ,10‬לג‪(12‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,29‬כ‪ ,5‬כג‪(29‬‬ ‫]לב‪[13‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,24‬ז‪(12‬‬ ‫أنبت · יד‪26‬‬ ‫نبات · ב‪ ,30‬ג‪ ,3‬ח‪ ,2‬ח‪ ,3‬ח‪ ,24‬ח‪ ,5‬יד‪) 27‬ה‪ ,19‬ה‪ ,22‬יד‪ ,28‬כא‪ ,29‬ל‪,28‬‬ ‫לא‪ ,3‬לא‪ ,7‬לה‪(6‬‬ ‫)לא‪] (5‬ג‪[26‬‬ ‫ضفدع · ז‪30‬‬ ‫احتاج · ח‪ ,24‬כח‪) 27‬יב‪ ,12‬לב‪ ,1‬לב‪(30‬‬ ‫]יב‪[4‬‬ ‫)לב‪(22‬‬ ‫احتاج · ח‪25‬‬ ‫‪7‬‬ ‫ט‬ ‫כ‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪6‬‬ ‫ח‬ ‫כ‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪2‬‬ ‫א‬ ‫כ‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬ ‫ו‬ ‫ט‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪19‬‬ ‫ו‬ ‫ט‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪1‬‬ ‫ד‬ ‫י‬ ‫احتاج · ג‪,24‬‬ ‫‪ġ‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬

‫צֹ ֶרְך‬ ‫היה צֹ ֶרְך בו‬ ‫ָצ ַרף‬ ‫צֹ ַרף‬ ‫צרעה‬

‫‪584‬‬

‫ا ُضطر · יד‪ġ29‬‬ ‫)כב‪ ,16‬ד‪ ,215‬ה‪ ,11‬ה‪ ,17‬ה‪ ,18‬ז‪ ,24‬ט‪ ,8‬כט‪ ,7‬לג‪ ,33‬לד‪(24‬‬ ‫حاجة · טז‪ ,3‬כט‪) 9‬ז‪ ,20‬ז‪ ,21‬כט‪ ,8‬לא‪(5‬‬ ‫احتاج فيه · ג‪23‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,17‬ה‪ ,23‬ה‪(24‬‬ ‫)ה‪(24‬‬ ‫زنبور · ז‪29‬‬

‫ק‬ ‫ִקבּוּץ‬ ‫קבוץ מן הטובים‬ ‫קבוץ מן האנשים‬ ‫ִקֵבּל‬

‫)קבץ(‬ ‫ִקֵבּץ‬ ‫התקבץ‬ ‫ְק ִדיָמה‬ ‫ָק ַדם‬

‫הקדים‬

‫ֶק ֶדם‬ ‫מי שהיה מֶק ֶדם‬ ‫קֹ ֶדם‬

‫)ה(קדמונים‬ ‫קו‬ ‫קוֹ ֵדם‬

‫יותר קוֹ ֵדם‬

‫)לב‪ ,28‬לד‪(3‬‬ ‫)כו‪(12‬‬ ‫)לא‪(24‬‬ ‫قبل · ג‪ ,23‬ג‪ ,13‬ג‪ ,28‬ד‪ ,6‬י‪ ,19‬יא‪ ,23‬יא‪ ,33‬יא‪ ,35‬יח‪ ,20‬כב‪ ,5‬כב‪ ,223‬כח‪,2‬‬ ‫כח‪) 21‬ד‪ ,30‬ה‪ ,10‬ה‪ ,11‬ה‪ ,25‬ו‪ ,12‬ט‪ ,12‬טז‪ ,1‬כב‪ ,31‬כו‪ ,18‬כז‪ ,22‬כז‪ ,33‬לב‪,1‬‬ ‫לג‪ ,2‬לג‪] (21‬כו‪ ,16‬לג‪[3‬‬ ‫)לג‪] (17‬לג‪[18‬‬ ‫اجتمع · ב‪) 13‬יג‪ ,8‬לג‪(20‬‬ ‫)לג‪ ,24‬לד‪(8‬‬ ‫تقدم · א‪ ,12‬א‪ ,13‬י‪ ,13‬יג‪ ,5‬כב‪) 26‬ט‪ ,10‬יא‪ ,21‬יג‪ ,6‬יד‪ ,16‬יד‪ ,24‬טו‪ ,11‬טו‪,12‬‬ ‫טז‪ ,1‬כא‪ ,26‬כז‪(7‬‬ ‫قدم · ב‪21‬‬ ‫تقدم · כג‪4‬‬ ‫)ח‪ ,29‬ח‪ ,30‬טז‪] (10‬טו‪[20‬‬ ‫ل · ב‪17‬‬ ‫من كان قب ِ‬ ‫قبل · ג‪ ,21‬יא‪ ,34‬יג‪1‬‬ ‫أول · ב‪31‬‬ ‫)ז‪ ,11‬ז‪ ,212‬ז‪ ,17‬ט‪ ,8‬יב‪ ,16‬יג‪ ,30‬יד‪ ,31‬כה‪ ,23‬כו‪ ,23‬כז‪ ,21‬לג‪(1‬‬ ‫]יד‪[19‬‬ ‫خط · א‪) 10‬ט‪] (20‬ט‪[28‬‬ ‫متقدم · א‪2‬‬ ‫أقدم · יד‪ġ23‬‬ ‫أولى · כה‪ġ24‬‬ ‫)ט‪(9‬‬ ‫أقدم · יב‪ ,10‬יד‪ġ29‬‬ ‫أولى · ב‪23‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,30‬ט‪ ,9‬ט‪ ,213‬ט‪ ,14‬יב‪ ,19‬יד‪ ,11‬יד‪ ,13‬יד‪ ,16‬יד‪ ,18‬יד‪ ,20‬כב‪ ,1‬כב‪ ,2‬כב‪,3‬‬ ‫כג‪(213‬‬

‫‪585‬‬ ‫הקודמים‬ ‫ִק ָוּה‬ ‫קול‬ ‫)קום(‬ ‫ִק ֵיּם‬ ‫ִהְתַק ֵיּם‬ ‫)קוץ(‬ ‫ִנְק ַוץ‬ ‫קֶֹטב‬ ‫קטן‬

‫קֶֹטר‬ ‫ַק ָיּם‬ ‫כוכב ַק ָיּם‬ ‫ַקל )פ׳(‬ ‫ַקל )ש״ת(‬ ‫קלות‬ ‫בקלות‬ ‫קנה‬ ‫ְק ִנ ָיּה‬ ‫ִק ְנ ָין‬ ‫קצה‬ ‫ָקַצר‬ ‫ִקֵצּר‬ ‫ָקָצר‬ ‫קצת‬

‫קֹר‬ ‫קרא‬ ‫נקרא‬ ‫ָק ַרב‬ ‫ֻק ְרָבה‬ ‫קרה‬ ‫קרוב‬ ‫מניע קרוב‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫القدماء · ב‪) 6‬יד‪ ,19‬יד‪ ,20‬כו‪ ,13‬כו‪ ,19‬לא‪ ,28‬לב‪ ,2‬לב‪ ,6‬לג‪ ,8‬לג‪ ,11‬לה‪(7‬‬ ‫توقع · יט‪26‬‬ ‫صوت · ד‪) 22‬כ‪ ,1‬כז‪ ,5‬כז‪ ,13‬כז‪ ,16‬כח‪ ,32‬כח‪(33‬‬ ‫יב‪ġ18‬‬

‫ثبت · א‪,21‬‬ ‫ثبت · ב‪ ,2‬טו‪) 19‬ו‪ ,27‬לג‪] (29‬יב‪[12‬‬ ‫انقبض · ב‪33‬‬ ‫)כד‪ ,7‬כד‪ ,8‬כד‪ ,9‬כד‪(10‬‬ ‫صغير · ח‪1‬‬ ‫يسير · יט‪19‬‬ ‫)ד‪(20‬‬ ‫)ל‪(9‬‬ ‫ثابت · ב‪) 2‬יב‪ ,20‬יב‪ ,28‬יב‪ ,32‬כה‪(24‬‬ ‫كوكب ثابت · יח‪ ,15‬יח‪) 19‬כד‪ ,1‬כד‪ ,5‬כד‪(18‬‬ ‫)יא‪ ,32‬יג‪(11‬‬ ‫خفيف · כה‪) ġ22‬כט‪(14‬‬ ‫)כט‪(215‬‬ ‫)יא‪ ,31‬כח‪ ,22‬כח‪(33‬‬ ‫استفاد · יח‪ ,16‬יח‪ ,17‬כז‪ ,26‬כז‪ ,28‬כח‪) 11‬יח‪(6‬‬ ‫استفادة · כב‪ ,27‬כח‪6‬‬ ‫)ט‪(11‬‬ ‫طرف · כב‪21‬‬ ‫نقص · יז‪30‬‬ ‫]כג‪[18‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,28‬טו‪(14‬‬ ‫بعض · א‪ ,26‬ב‪ ,23‬ג‪ ,219‬י‪ ,31‬טז‪ ,17‬יז‪ ,228‬יז‪ ,29‬יז‪ ,30‬כא‪ ,8‬כב‪) 33‬ז‪ ,6‬ז‪,15‬‬ ‫ט‪ ,7‬יא‪ ,5‬יא‪ ,6‬יג‪ ,14‬יג‪ ,15‬טו‪ ,13‬טו‪ ,14‬טז‪ ,41‬יח‪ ,223‬יט‪ ,7‬כ‪ ,215‬כ‪ ,221‬כא‪,4‬‬ ‫כג‪ ,28‬כג‪ ,230‬כד‪ ,19‬כד‪ ,20‬כו‪ ,41‬כו‪ ,42‬כו‪ ,3‬כז‪ ,25‬כח‪ ,9‬כט‪ ,23‬כט‪,33‬‬ ‫כט‪ ,234‬ל‪ ,15‬ל‪ ,31‬לא‪ ,7‬לא‪ ,12‬לא‪ ,314‬לא‪ ,215‬לא‪ ,16‬לא‪ ,218‬לב‪ ,21‬לב‪,6‬‬ ‫לב‪ ,9‬לג‪ ,217‬לג‪ ,218‬לג‪ ,32‬לד‪ ,1‬לד‪ ,5‬לד‪ ,6‬לה‪(415‬‬ ‫برد · ט‪) 26‬לד‪ ,3‬לד‪ ,9‬לד‪(10‬‬ ‫سمى · ד‪) 8‬כו‪(17‬‬ ‫قيل له · ד‪ ,9‬ד‪ ,10‬י‪) 2‬ו‪(8‬‬ ‫قرب · יז‪ ,28‬יז‪ ,29‬יח‪) 14‬יח‪ ,1‬יח‪(6‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,23‬לג‪(9‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,4‬ו‪ ,8‬יד‪ ,3‬טז‪ ,27‬כה‪(10‬‬ ‫قر يب · ב‪ ,17‬ד‪ ,1‬י‪ ,232‬יא‪ ,3‬יא‪ ,4‬טז‪ ,22‬יח‪ ,16‬יח‪) 17‬ו‪ ,23‬יב‪ ,7‬כה‪,30‬‬ ‫כו‪] (26‬יד‪[29‬‬ ‫محرك قر يب · י‪ ,4‬י‪9‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫)קשי(‬ ‫הקשה‬ ‫התקשה‬ ‫קִֹשׁי‬ ‫ָקַשׁר‬

‫‪586‬‬

‫أغفل · ז‪^28‬‬ ‫اكتنز · ג‪1‬‬ ‫)לב‪ ,28‬לג‪(19‬‬ ‫)כא‪(16‬‬

‫ר‬ ‫ָרָאה‬

‫ִנ ְרָאה‬

‫הראה‬ ‫ִהְת ָרָאה‬ ‫ראוי‬

‫יותר ראוי‬ ‫מן הראוי‬ ‫ראוי בהכרח‬ ‫ְראוּת‬ ‫ְרָא ָיה‬ ‫ראש‬

‫ראשית‬ ‫ראשון‬

‫رأى · ז‪ ,229‬ז‪ ,230‬ח‪ ,19‬ח‪ ,20‬ח‪ ,22‬טו‪ ,29‬טז‪ ,22‬טז‪ ,28‬כא‪ ,2‬כו‪29‬‬ ‫بصر · כז‪ ,29‬כח‪28‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,10‬ז‪ ,8‬טו‪ ,27‬טז‪ ,225‬טז‪ ,26‬טז‪ ,27‬יח‪ ,6‬יט‪ ,30‬כב‪ ,30‬כז‪ ,4‬כז‪ ,6‬כט‪,10‬‬ ‫כט‪ ,21‬לא‪(23‬‬ ‫بدا · טז‪29‬‬ ‫ر ُئى · כב‪23‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,9‬ו‪ ,18‬ו‪ ,19‬ו‪ ,27‬כא‪ ,23‬כה‪ ,4‬לב‪] (29‬י‪ ,7‬לד‪ ,3‬לד‪[29‬‬ ‫)ו‪(19‬‬ ‫)ו‪(21‬‬ ‫يجب · י‪ ,15‬יא‪ ,ġ28‬יג‪ ,21‬יג‪ ,28‬יד‪ ,6‬טז‪ ,15‬כב‪ ,30‬כג‪ ,18‬כו‪ ,22‬כז‪ ,1‬כז‪,22‬‬ ‫כז‪ ,28‬כז‪ ,29‬כט‪6‬‬ ‫أخلق · ט‪ ,24‬ט‪31‬‬ ‫‪31‬‬ ‫כ‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬ ‫ו‬ ‫ט‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪30‬‬ ‫ג‬ ‫י‬ ‫ينبغى · י‪ ,14‬י‪,30‬‬ ‫‪ġ‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,32‬ז‪ ,14‬ח‪ ,30‬ט‪ ,1‬ט‪ ,8‬יא‪ ,10‬יא‪ ,17‬יב‪ ,22‬יד‪ ,14‬טז‪ ,10‬יז‪ ,30‬כא‪ ,26‬כב‪,31‬‬ ‫כג‪ ,4‬כג‪ ,11‬כג‪ ,14‬כג‪ ,21‬כג‪ ,28‬כג‪ ,30‬כד‪ ,12‬כד‪ ,20‬כד‪ ,28‬כד‪ ,29‬כה‪,2‬‬ ‫כז‪ ,34‬כט‪ ,18‬ל‪ ,19‬לא‪ ,29‬לב‪ ,16‬לג‪ ,5‬לד‪ ,11‬לד‪ ,27‬לד‪ ,30‬לה‪] (1‬כו‪,23‬‬ ‫כז‪[8‬‬ ‫َأْول َى · א‪ ,14‬ב‪ ,14‬ב‪) ,18‬א‪ ,5‬ו‪ ,7‬ו‪ ,29‬ט‪ ,16‬יב‪ ,7‬טו‪ ,1‬טז‪(5‬‬ ‫بالأحرى · יג‪13‬‬ ‫)יא‪ ,27‬יב‪(2‬‬ ‫يجب ضرورة ً · ב‪ ,25‬ד‪ ,3‬יג‪ ,25‬טו‪) 23‬ז‪ ,13‬לג‪(18‬‬ ‫بصر · ב‪ ,28‬כז‪ ,28‬כח‪) 27‬יט‪ ,30‬כז‪ ,4‬כז‪ ,6‬כז‪ ,12‬כז‪ ,16‬כח‪ ,24‬כח‪,25‬‬ ‫כט‪ ,9‬כט‪(12‬‬ ‫دلالة · יב‪) 17‬לא‪(18‬‬ ‫أول · א‪7‬‬ ‫رئيس · כו‪ġ1‬‬ ‫)כט‪ ,2‬לא‪ ,214‬לא‪(24‬‬ ‫أول · ב‪) 8‬לה‪(18‬‬ ‫أولا · א‪ ,10‬ג‪ ,18‬ג‪ ,19‬ג‪ ,227‬ג‪ ,29‬טו‪ ,ġ27‬טו‪ ,29‬טז‪ ,228‬יז‪ ,2‬יז‪ ,ġ22‬יז‪,25‬‬ ‫יח‪ ,14‬יח‪ ,18‬יט‪ ,4‬יט‪ ,8‬כב‪ ,18‬כה‪ ,18‬כה‪ ,ġ24‬כח‪ ,20‬ל‪) 11‬ה‪ ,1‬ו‪ ,23‬ח‪,28‬‬ ‫יב‪ ,20‬יג‪ ,13‬טו‪ ,4‬טו‪ ,7‬טו‪ ,9‬טו‪ ,26‬טז‪ ,8‬יז‪ ,9‬יט‪ ,2‬כג‪ ,6‬כג‪ ,19‬כג‪ ,21‬כד‪,1‬‬ ‫כד‪ ,24‬כד‪ ,18‬כד‪ ,21‬כו‪ ,23‬לא‪ ,28‬לב‪ ,20‬לב‪ ,23‬לג‪ ,25‬לה‪] (8‬כז‪[28‬‬

‫‪587‬‬ ‫ההתחלה הראשונה‬ ‫המניע הראשון‬ ‫הסבה הראשונה‬

‫עצם ראשון‬ ‫הצורה הראשונה‬ ‫הרקיע הראשון‬ ‫השכל האלהי הראשון‬ ‫ַרב‬

‫ר ֹב‬

‫לא יספר מר ֹב‬ ‫ִרבּוּי‬ ‫רגל‬ ‫ַר ְגִלי‬ ‫רגע‬ ‫)רגש(‬ ‫הרגיש‬ ‫רדיפה‬ ‫רדף‬ ‫רוֶֹבה ַקָשּׁת‬ ‫ר ַֹחב‬ ‫רופא‬ ‫רחוק‬ ‫רחוק מן‬ ‫רחק‬ ‫הרחיק‬ ‫ר ַֹחק‬ ‫ֵריק‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫المبدأ الأول · י‪ ,16‬יא‪ ,25‬יא‪ ,27‬יג‪ ,34‬טז‪ ,20‬כג‪ ,4‬כג‪ ,6‬כו‪) 27‬יב‪ ,13‬כט‪,19‬‬ ‫כט‪ ,24‬לא‪ ,28‬לב‪ ,9‬לב‪ ,10‬לב‪ ,18‬לד‪ ,7‬לד‪ ,12‬לה‪(13‬‬ ‫ألمحرك الأول · י‪ ,9‬יז‪ ,15‬יז‪ ,ġ22‬כה‪ ,18‬כה‪) 19‬יג‪(25‬‬ ‫العلة الأولى · יא‪ ,25‬טז‪ ,31‬יז‪ ,27‬יח‪ ,14‬כב‪14‬‬ ‫السبب الأول · י‪31‬‬ ‫)יא‪ ,5‬יח‪ ,1‬כו‪ ,29‬לג‪(25‬‬ ‫)יז‪ ,9‬כו‪ ,12‬כו‪(19‬‬ ‫)כה‪ ,18‬לב‪(8‬‬ ‫السماء الأولى · יח‪15‬‬ ‫)כ‪(25‬‬ ‫كثير · ב‪ ,32‬טז‪ ,18‬כב‪ ,30‬כג‪ ,7‬כג‪ ,10‬כה‪ ,16‬כה‪ ,ġ24‬כז‪ ,3‬כח‪ ,21‬כח‪,5‬‬ ‫כח‪ ,11‬כח‪ ,28‬כט‪ġ5‬‬ ‫شتى · א‪3‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,22‬ה‪ ,24‬ה‪ ,25‬ז‪ ,5‬ט‪ ,1‬ט‪ ,7‬יא‪ ,23‬יז‪ ,2‬יח‪ ,23‬יח‪ ,20‬יח‪ ,21‬יט‪ ,3‬כ‪,23‬‬ ‫כג‪ ,26‬כה‪ ,27‬כו‪ ,3‬כו‪ ,37‬כו‪ ,8‬כח‪ ,22‬כח‪ ,23‬כח‪ ,24‬כח‪ ,25‬כח‪ ,26‬כח‪,34‬‬ ‫כט‪ ,1‬כט‪ ,2‬כט‪ ,18‬ל‪ ,14‬לא‪ ,21‬לא‪ ,22‬לא‪23‬לא‪ ,25‬לב‪ ,2‬לג‪ ,11‬לג‪ ,15‬לג‪,31‬‬ ‫לד‪(29‬‬ ‫أكثر · ג‪ ,30‬יט‪ ,18‬כא‪9‬‬ ‫كثرة · ז‪28‬‬ ‫)ז‪ ,8‬כז‪ ,22‬ל‪ ,32‬לא‪(4‬‬ ‫لا يحصى · יט‪20‬‬ ‫كثرة · ז‪ ,28‬כ‪ ,24‬כא‪ ,9‬כב‪ ,32‬כג‪ ,14‬כה‪ ,16‬כט‪) ġ6‬ה‪ ,210‬ה‪ ,11‬ה‪ ,12‬ה‪,13‬‬ ‫ה‪ ,15‬ה‪ ,16‬ה‪ ,220‬ה‪ ,23‬יז‪ ,5‬לא‪ ,26‬לב‪ ,4‬לה‪ ,21‬לה‪ ,3‬לה‪ ,7‬לה‪(18‬‬ ‫)כט‪ ,2‬לא‪(7‬‬ ‫)כו‪(2‬‬ ‫دفعة · כ‪ ,27‬כח‪7‬‬ ‫)כט‪] (230‬כט‪ ,31‬כט‪[32‬‬ ‫)יז‪(31‬‬ ‫]כח‪[15‬‬ ‫)כו‪(3‬‬ ‫)כד‪(22‬‬ ‫)ז‪(4‬‬ ‫بعيد · י‪ ,32‬יא‪ ,21‬יא‪) 4‬ו‪ ,17‬יט‪ ,6‬יט‪(9‬‬ ‫براء من · כח‪10‬‬ ‫بعد · יז‪) 29‬ז‪ ,7‬ט‪ ,10‬כ‪ ,21‬כה‪ ,9‬כט‪(15‬‬ ‫)יג‪] (32‬י‪[16‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,26‬לג‪] (10‬כד‪[11‬‬ ‫)כ‪ ,5‬כה‪ ,9‬כו‪(31‬‬

‫‪588‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫)רכב(‬ ‫הרכיב‬ ‫ֻה ְרַכּב‬ ‫התרכב‬ ‫)רכך(‬ ‫ֵה ַרְך‬ ‫רמוז אליו בנפשו‬ ‫ֶרֶמז‬ ‫על דרך הרמז‬ ‫רמיזה‬ ‫רע‬ ‫ִרעוּ ַע‬ ‫רעיה‬ ‫רפואה‬ ‫מלאכת הרפואה‬ ‫רפיון‬ ‫רקיע‬ ‫הרקיע הראשון‬ ‫ָרץ )פ׳(‬ ‫ָרץ )ש״ע(‬ ‫רצה‬

‫התרצה‬ ‫רצון‬ ‫רצוני ‪ /‬רצוני לומר ‪ /‬ר״ל ‪/‬‬ ‫כלומר‬ ‫)רשל(‬ ‫התרשל‬ ‫)רתח(‬ ‫הרתיח‬

‫)ה‪(17‬‬ ‫)כד‪(15‬‬ ‫تركب · יז‪13‬‬ ‫رق · ב‪33‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,15‬ו‪ ,17‬ו‪ ,18‬ו‪ ,24‬ו‪ ,27‬ו‪ ,29‬ו‪(30‬‬ ‫)כו‪(14‬‬ ‫)ו‪(16‬‬ ‫)לב‪ ,27‬לב‪ ,25‬לב‪ ,26‬לב‪(27‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,6‬ו‪(8‬‬ ‫)כה‪ ,26‬כה‪ ,30‬ל‪(26‬‬ ‫طب · י‪ ,6‬י‪) 7‬ז‪ ,26‬לב‪ ,21‬לב‪(22‬‬ ‫صناعة الطب · ל‪ġ6‬‬ ‫استرخاء · כז‪17‬‬ ‫سماء · יח‪18‬‬ ‫السماء الأولى · יח‪15‬‬ ‫جرى · ג‪29‬‬ ‫جارى · ג‪] 29‬כט‪[1‬‬ ‫رغب · יב‪26‬‬ ‫صرح · יד‪ġ29‬‬ ‫عنى · י‪ ,223‬יג‪ġ31‬‬ ‫)יב‪ ,19‬יח‪ ,7‬יח‪ ,26‬כט‪ ,11‬לא‪] (21‬יב‪[13‬‬ ‫)לב‪(26‬‬ ‫)יז‪(32‬‬ ‫أعنى · א‪ ,24‬ב‪ ,10‬ב‪ ,32‬י‪ ,26‬י‪ ,28‬טז‪ ,21‬יח‪) 11‬ד‪ ,22‬ה‪ ,20‬ה‪ ,27‬ו‪ ,4‬ו‪ ,13‬ו‪,21‬‬ ‫יא‪ ,25‬יב‪ ,16‬יד‪ ,15‬טז‪ ,2‬יח‪ ,18‬כ‪ ,9‬כב‪ ,1‬כג‪ ,15‬כד‪ ,6‬כד‪ ,11‬כה‪ ,23‬כו‪,14‬‬ ‫כח‪ ,8‬כט‪ ,28‬ל‪ ,24‬ל‪ ,32‬לא‪ ,18‬לב‪(2‬‬ ‫بخل ·‬

‫כד‪ġ32‬‬

‫غلى · י‪21‬‬

‫ש‬ ‫ש…‪/‬אשר‬ ‫שאל‬ ‫נשאל‬ ‫שאלה‬

‫أن · التى · الذى · عن · ‪passim‬‬ ‫)כח‪(7‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,14‬ט‪] (14‬לב‪[19‬‬ ‫)ח‪ ,29‬ט‪ ,2‬כח‪(7‬‬

‫‪589‬‬ ‫)שאר(‬ ‫נשאר‬ ‫שאר‬

‫שב‬ ‫שבתאי‬ ‫)שדל(‬ ‫השתדל‬

‫ָשׁ ֶוה‬ ‫שׂוֶֹחה‬ ‫שור‬ ‫שוטר‬ ‫שׁוּם‬ ‫)שוק(‬ ‫השתוקק‬ ‫ְשׂחוֹק‬ ‫קרוב לְשׂחוֹק‬ ‫חר‬ ‫ָשׁ ֹ‬ ‫ַשֲׁחרוּת‬ ‫ָשׁט‬ ‫שטח‬ ‫)ש ֹים(‬ ‫ָשׂם‬

‫שם בדעת‬ ‫שם מגמתו‬ ‫ֵהִשׂים‬ ‫הוַּשׂם‬ ‫שיש‬ ‫שכבת זרע‬ ‫ְשׁכוּ ָנה‬ ‫ָשִׂכיר‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬

‫بقي · יא‪ ,23‬כ‪ ,18‬כ‪) 19‬ז‪ ,14‬כא‪ ,15‬לב‪(19‬‬ ‫سا ئر · א‪ ,11‬א‪ ,12‬א‪ ,13‬א‪ ,14‬א‪ ,16‬ב‪ ,32‬י‪ ,13‬טז‪ ,18‬יח‪ ,19‬יט‪ ,19‬כב‪) 11‬ד‪,15‬‬ ‫ו‪ ,16‬ו‪ ,231‬יא‪ ,16‬יג‪ ,14‬יג‪ ,21‬יד‪ ,22‬יד‪ ,27‬טו‪ ,3‬יט‪ ,18‬כג‪ ,23‬כג‪ ,29‬כד‪ ,7‬כד‪,9‬‬ ‫כד‪ ,14‬כו‪ ,15‬כו‪] (23‬ג‪ ,11‬כו‪[15‬‬ ‫صار · יט‪) 26‬טו‪ ,14‬כד‪ ,17‬לד‪] (5‬ד‪ ,21‬יא‪[18‬‬ ‫)כד‪(12‬‬ ‫حرض · יח‪15‬‬ ‫تبادر · יט‪25‬‬ ‫)כג‪(15‬‬ ‫)כט‪ ,31‬לב‪ ,3‬לב‪ ,4‬לג‪ ,24‬לד‪(7‬‬ ‫]ל‪[28‬‬ ‫بقر · ז‪30‬‬ ‫قائد · יח‪) 17‬לא‪(14‬‬ ‫)‪ x :grammatical form‬من ال‪ · (x-‬ב‪ ,1‬ג‪) 14‬יג‪(23‬‬ ‫)ו‪(18‬‬ ‫محال · כו‪26‬‬ ‫أسود · ד‪3‬‬ ‫سواد · ט‪27‬‬ ‫)ל‪(28‬‬ ‫سطح · ט‪) 28‬כ‪ ,15‬לה‪(214‬‬ ‫جعل · ב‪ ,14‬ב‪ ,215‬ב‪ ,18‬ב‪ ,20‬ב‪ ,22‬ב‪ ,23‬ג‪ ,19‬ג‪ ,21‬ד‪ ,11‬יד‪ ,20‬יד‪ ,ġ23‬יד‪,ġ28‬‬ ‫כ‪) 29‬ה‪ ,12‬ז‪ ,7‬ז‪ ,24‬ט‪ ,10‬יב‪ ,18‬יג‪ ,7‬יג‪ ,21‬יג‪ ,229‬טו‪ ,9‬טו‪ ,10‬יז‪ ,30‬כג‪,3‬‬ ‫כג‪ ,32‬כד‪ ,3‬כו‪ ,16‬כו‪ ,23‬כז‪ ,30‬כט‪ ,15‬לא‪ ,14‬לא‪ ,24‬לא‪ ,27‬לא‪ ,29‬לב‪,23‬‬ ‫לב‪ ,4‬לב‪ ,27‬לג‪ ,1‬לג‪ ,24‬לג‪ ,25‬לג‪ ,26‬לג‪ ,27‬לג‪ ,30‬לג‪ ,231‬לג‪ ,32‬לד‪ ,22‬לד‪,4‬‬ ‫לד‪ ,6‬לד‪ ,10‬לד‪ ,19‬לד‪ ,20‬לד‪ ,23‬לד‪ ,27‬לה‪ ,1‬לה‪ ,11‬לה‪ ,12‬לה‪ ,13‬לה‪(15‬‬ ‫]כד‪[11‬‬ ‫خطر ببال · ח‪8‬‬ ‫قفا أ ثره · יח‪) 11‬יז‪ ,31‬יז‪(32‬‬ ‫جعل · ב‪ ,18‬ב‪) 19‬ז‪ ,7‬לד‪(27‬‬ ‫جعل · ג‪ ,6‬ח‪ ,6‬ח‪ ,11‬ח‪ ,14‬טו‪ ,15‬כז‪) 14‬ה‪ ,21‬יא‪ ,9‬כו‪ ,15‬כז‪ ,12‬כז‪,13‬‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫לא‪(19‬‬ ‫]ח‪[9‬‬ ‫منى · ח‪2‬‬ ‫)ל‪(24‬‬ ‫)כו‪(2‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫)שכל(‬ ‫ִהְשִׂכּיל‬

‫ֻהְשַׂכּל‬ ‫שכל‬

‫השכל האלהי‬ ‫השכל האלהי הראשון‬ ‫שׂכלות‬ ‫שליט‬ ‫)שלט(‬ ‫ִהְשִׁליט‬ ‫)שלך(‬ ‫השליך‬ ‫שלל‬ ‫)שלם(‬ ‫נשלם‬ ‫השלים‬

‫שלם‬ ‫ְשֵׁלמוּת‬ ‫השיג בשלמות‬ ‫ָשׁם‬ ‫ֵשׁם‬ ‫ָשַׂמח‬ ‫שמחה‬

‫‪590‬‬

‫عقل · טז‪ ,17‬טז‪ ,31‬יח‪ ,10‬יט‪ ,19‬יט‪ ,30‬כ‪ ,2‬כ‪ ,3‬כ‪ ,7‬כ‪ ,21‬כ‪ ,224‬כ‪ ,25‬כ‪,ġ27‬‬ ‫כ‪ ,27‬כ‪ ,28‬כ‪ ,30‬כ‪ ,ġ31‬כא‪ ,2‬כא‪ ,10‬כא‪ ,14‬כו‪ ,24‬כו‪ ,25‬כו‪ ,27‬כו‪ ,32‬כז‪,32‬‬ ‫כז‪ ,3‬כז‪ ,12‬כז‪ ,19‬כז‪ ,23‬כז‪ ,26‬כז‪ ,31‬כז‪ ,34‬כח‪ ,1‬כח‪ ,3‬כח‪ ,25‬כח‪ ,6‬כח‪,9‬‬ ‫כח‪ ,11‬כח‪ ,13‬כח‪ ,16‬כח‪ ,17‬כח‪ ,18‬כח‪ ,219‬כח‪ ,20‬כח‪ ,28‬כח‪ ,29‬כט‪,18‬‬ ‫כט‪ ,26‬כט‪ ,32‬ל‪ ,311‬ל‪12‬‬ ‫)כ‪ ,6‬כ‪ ,8‬כ‪ ,9‬כ‪ ,12‬כ‪ ,13‬כ‪ ,214‬כ‪ ,26‬כא‪ ,16‬כו‪ ,26‬כז‪ ,5‬כז‪ ,8‬כז‪ ,19‬כז‪,20‬‬ ‫כז‪ ,26‬כז‪ ,30‬כז‪ ,31‬כח‪ ,10‬כח‪ ,22‬כח‪ ,27‬כט‪ ,1‬כט‪ ,5‬ל‪(16‬‬ ‫فكر · ח‪17‬‬ ‫عقل · טז‪ ,230‬כח‪) 19‬כ‪ ,6‬כ‪ ,9‬כ‪(12‬‬ ‫عقل · י‪ ,15‬טו‪ ,ġ1‬טז‪ ,32‬יז‪ ,25‬יז‪ ,226‬יח‪ ,11‬יט‪ ,17‬יט‪ ,23‬יט‪ ,24‬כ‪ ,2‬כ‪ ,12‬כ‪,14‬‬ ‫כ‪ ,18‬כ‪ ,23‬כ‪ ,ġ30‬כ‪ ,ġ231‬כא‪ ,21‬כו‪ ,21‬כו‪ ,27‬כז‪ ,37‬כז‪ ,10‬כז‪ ,12‬כז‪ ,13‬כז‪,215‬‬ ‫כז‪ ,18‬כח‪ ,4‬כח‪ ,5‬כח‪ ,8‬כח‪ ,211‬כח‪ ,19‬כח‪ ,28‬כט‪ ,6‬ל‪ ,9‬ל‪) 10‬ו‪ ,11‬ו‪ ,20‬ז‪,7‬‬ ‫ז‪ ,16‬ט‪ ,12‬טו‪ ,6‬טו‪ ,7‬טו‪ ,29‬יז‪ ,24‬יח‪ ,10‬כ‪ ,10‬כ‪ ,13‬כ‪ ,217‬כ‪ ,222‬כ‪ ,27‬כא‪,5‬‬ ‫כג‪ ,29‬כו‪ ,24‬כו‪ ,25‬כו‪ ,32‬כז‪ ,11‬כז‪ ,21‬כז‪ ,226‬כז‪ ,29‬כז‪ ,30‬כח‪ ,22‬כח‪,27‬‬ ‫כט‪ ,3‬כט‪ ,12‬כט‪ ,13‬כט‪ ,217‬כט‪ ,19‬כט‪ ,22‬כט‪ ,23‬כט‪ ,29‬כט‪ ,33‬כט‪ ,34‬ל‪,21‬‬ ‫ל‪ ,22‬ל‪ ,13‬ל‪ ,224‬לב‪ ,18‬לב‪ ,25‬לב‪ ,26‬לג‪(7‬‬ ‫العقل الإلاهى · כ‪) ġ32‬כ‪ ,8‬כח‪ ,26‬כט‪ ,10‬כט‪ ,12‬כט‪ ,14‬כט‪ ,15‬כט‪(20‬‬ ‫)כ‪(25‬‬ ‫← סכלות‬ ‫متسلط · כז‪) 5‬כז‪] (7‬יח‪[17‬‬ ‫)לא‪(15‬‬ ‫اطرح · יט‪) 19‬כח‪] (23‬ד‪[5‬‬ ‫نفى · א‪20‬‬ ‫)לא‪(15‬‬ ‫كمل · כח‪ ,3‬כח‪ ,24‬כח‪ ,5‬כח‪28‬‬ ‫أتم · יט‪16‬‬ ‫)יז‪ ,20‬כו‪ ,5‬לג‪(29‬‬ ‫تام · כח‪) 8‬יד‪(3‬‬ ‫كمال · יז‪ ,16‬יז‪ ,17‬יז‪ ,30‬כח‪) 26‬יד‪ ,3‬כא‪ ,30‬כה‪ ,1‬כה‪ ,30‬כח‪ ,29‬לב‪(11‬‬ ‫]טו‪ ,15‬כא‪ ,7‬כא‪[22‬‬ ‫فاز · כה‪ġ1‬‬ ‫هناك · ד‪) 6‬כ‪ ,20‬לד‪(27‬‬ ‫اسم · יב‪) ġ18‬ו‪ ,2‬ז‪ ,22‬יח‪(28‬‬ ‫سر · יט‪) 29‬יט‪(31‬‬ ‫فرح · יט‪ ,20‬כ‪2‬‬ ‫سرور · יט‪29‬‬ ‫)יט‪(31‬‬

‫‪591‬‬ ‫שמים‬ ‫שמימי‬ ‫גרם שמימי‬ ‫גשם שמימי‬ ‫ָשַׁמע‬ ‫השמיע‬ ‫ֵשַׁמע‬ ‫השמע הטבעי‬ ‫שמר‬ ‫נשמר‬ ‫שמש‬ ‫)שני(‬ ‫ִשׁ ָנּה‬ ‫ֻשׁ ָנּה‬ ‫השתנה‬ ‫ִשׁנּוּי‬

‫ֵשׁן‬ ‫ֵשׁ ָנה‬ ‫שקוע בֵשׁ ָנה‬ ‫ַשֲׁﬠ ָוה‬ ‫ִשׁעוּר‬ ‫בלא שעור‬ ‫)שער(‬ ‫ִשֵׁﬠר ]יד‪[29‬‬ ‫שער‬ ‫שפט‬ ‫שפיכה‬ ‫)שפע(‬ ‫ֻהְשַׁפּע‬ ‫שקר‬ ‫)שקע(‬ ‫שקוע בֵשׁ ָנה‬ ‫)שקף(‬ ‫השקיף‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫سماء · יט‪] 15‬יח‪ ,15‬יח‪[18‬‬ ‫جسم سماوي · ד‪) 11‬לג‪] (33‬ב‪[29‬‬ ‫جسم سماوى · ב‪ ,29‬ג‪ ,25‬יח‪ ,25‬יט‪) 3‬ד‪ ,17‬ד‪ ,18‬טו‪ ,13‬יט‪ ,1‬כו‪ ,12‬לא‪ ,2‬לג‪,3‬‬ ‫לג‪ ,9‬לג‪ ,26‬לד‪(14‬‬ ‫)כ‪ ,1‬כז‪ ,4‬כז‪ ,7‬לב‪(26‬‬ ‫)כח‪(32‬‬ ‫)כ‪ ,1‬כז‪ ,4‬כז‪ ,7‬כז‪ ,13‬כז‪(16‬‬ ‫)יג‪(17‬‬ ‫)יז‪(20‬‬ ‫حذر · י‪15‬‬ ‫شمس · ח‪ ,20‬יא‪ ,21‬כב‪) 11‬יד‪ ,27‬כג‪ ,32‬כד‪ ,3‬כד‪ ,5‬כד‪ ,13‬כד‪ ,23‬לג‪(5‬‬ ‫أحال · יב‪ ,27‬יג‪31‬‬ ‫استحال · כב‪4‬‬ ‫تغير · ב‪ ,29‬יג‪ ,5‬כב‪) 5‬ד‪ ,218‬ד‪ ,29‬ה‪ ,19‬ו‪ ,10‬יב‪ ,31‬יג‪ ,18‬יט‪ ,1‬כ‪ ,6‬כז‪(24‬‬ ‫تغير · ג‪ ,3‬ג‪ ,4‬ג‪ ,8‬ג‪ ,28‬ג‪ ,233‬ד‪ ,6‬ד‪ ,7‬ד‪ ,8‬ד‪ ,9‬ד‪ ,211‬יא‪ ,23‬יג‪ ,2‬יח‪,25‬‬ ‫יט‪4‬‬ ‫استحالة · ג‪ ,14‬יב‪27‬‬ ‫تأثير · כב‪5‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,215‬ד‪ ,29‬ה‪ ,2‬ו‪ ,5‬יט‪ ,22‬יט‪ ,7‬כג‪ ,6‬כז‪ ,24‬לב‪ ,1‬לג‪ ,21‬לה‪(15‬‬ ‫عاج · ח‪9‬‬ ‫نوم · יט‪ ,23‬כו‪) 29‬כז‪(18‬‬ ‫غرق فى النوم · כו‪28‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,21‬ה‪(224‬‬ ‫مقدار · א‪ ,11‬א‪ ,15‬ב‪ ,3‬ב‪ ,8‬ד‪ ,9‬יב‪ ,21‬כב‪) 26‬יב‪ ,8‬יז‪ ,10‬יח‪ ,2‬כח‪ ,230‬ל‪(1‬‬ ‫]יז‪[11‬‬ ‫بلا مدة · כח‪7‬‬

‫باب · ט‪) 27‬יח‪(30‬‬ ‫حكم · י‪) 16‬כד‪(29‬‬ ‫)לא‪(7‬‬ ‫]ח‪[18‬‬ ‫محال · ג‪) 10‬ז‪(10‬‬ ‫غرق فى النوم · כו‪28‬‬ ‫]כח‪[33‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫ֻהְשַׁקף‬ ‫ַשׂר‬ ‫שׁ ֹ ֶרשׁ‬ ‫ָשׂשׂ‬ ‫ששון‬ ‫ָשׁת‬

‫שתוף‬ ‫)שתף(‬ ‫ֻשָׁתּף‬ ‫השתתף‬ ‫ֻשָׁתּפוּת‬

‫‪592‬‬

‫]ח‪[22‬‬ ‫)כא‪(16‬‬ ‫أصل · יב‪) 15‬ה‪ ,9‬ה‪ ,11‬יב‪ ,1‬יב‪ ,16‬כא‪(31‬‬ ‫حال · כח‪2‬‬ ‫)יט‪(31‬‬ ‫سرور · כ‪2‬‬ ‫أساس · ב‪5‬‬ ‫ركن · ב‪31‬‬ ‫)ב‪(7‬‬ ‫مشاركة · ג‪ ,16‬ג‪25‬‬ ‫]כד‪ ,13‬כד‪[14‬‬ ‫اشترك · ג‪) 5‬לא‪ ,13‬לא‪ ,15‬לג‪(3‬‬ ‫]ג‪[16‬‬

‫ת‬ ‫תאוה‬ ‫)תאר(‬ ‫ֵתֵּאר‬

‫תַּאר‬ ‫ֹ‬ ‫תַּאר‬ ‫ֹ‬ ‫תּהוּ‬ ‫ֹ‬ ‫תּוֶֹחֶלת‬ ‫תוך‬ ‫תולדה‬ ‫תוספת‬ ‫תועלת‬ ‫היתה תועלת ב…‬ ‫)תחל(‬ ‫התחיל‬ ‫תחלה‬

‫תחת‬ ‫תחתון‬

‫شهوة · טז‪) 31‬יז‪ ,31‬יח‪ ,2‬יח‪ ,24‬יח‪ ,5‬יח‪ ,12‬לא‪(19‬‬ ‫نعت · א‪16‬‬ ‫‪31‬‬ ‫فرض · יד ‪ġ‬‬ ‫)לג‪] (8‬כט‪[22‬‬ ‫ت · א‪ ,13‬א‪) 14‬ט‪ ,16‬ט‪(18‬‬ ‫نعُ ِ َ‬ ‫)ו‪ ,16‬ט‪ ,15‬יג‪(14‬‬ ‫]לד‪[17‬‬ ‫]יט‪[26‬‬ ‫)ט‪(7‬‬ ‫نتيجة · כט‪8‬‬ ‫ز يادة · יט‪) 24‬יט‪(6‬‬ ‫)כא‪ ,31‬כו‪ ,16‬לא‪ ,3‬לא‪(6‬‬ ‫انتفع · יג‪28‬‬ ‫)ו‪ ,32‬טו‪ ,14‬כד‪ ,18‬כו‪(23‬‬ ‫أولا ً· א‪ ,9‬א‪ ,11‬ג‪30‬‬ ‫أول · כ‪6‬‬ ‫)ד‪ ,21‬ה‪ ,19‬ח‪ ,29‬ח‪ ,30‬ט‪ ,3‬יא‪ ,17‬יא‪ ,29‬יב‪ ,1‬כא‪ ,28‬כה‪ ,29‬כו‪ ,18‬לה‪(7‬‬ ‫]כו‪[23‬‬ ‫تحت · ב‪ ,28‬ד‪) 4‬ד‪ ,16‬ט‪ ,10‬ט‪ ,12‬ט‪ ,14‬יז‪ ,4‬כה‪ ,14‬כה‪ ,15‬לא‪ ,27‬לב‪ ,3‬לב‪,4‬‬ ‫לב‪(8‬‬ ‫)כד‪ ,17‬כד‪(21‬‬

‫‪593‬‬ ‫תכלית‬

‫בעל תכלית‬ ‫אין תכלית לו‬ ‫בלי תכלית‬ ‫תכלית אחרון‬ ‫בתכלית המעלה‪ /‬על תכלית‬ ‫המעלה‬ ‫ֻתַכּן‬ ‫תכף‬ ‫תלוי‬ ‫תלות‬ ‫)תמד(‬ ‫התמיד‬ ‫ָתַּמהּ‬ ‫ֵתַּמהּ‬ ‫תמונה‬ ‫תמיד‬ ‫תמידות‬ ‫תמידי‬ ‫תמידי ההשארות‬ ‫תמימות‬ ‫תנאי‬ ‫תנועה‬

‫תנועה מקומית‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫غاية · ג‪ ,11‬יח‪ ,16‬כ‪ ,13‬כ‪ ,32‬כב‪ ,19‬כז‪ ,24‬כח‪26‬‬ ‫نهاية · ח‪ ,15‬כב‪24‬‬ ‫انقضاء · כא‪20‬‬ ‫)יב‪ ,9‬טו‪ ,14‬כא‪ ,3‬כא‪ ,4‬כא‪ ,28‬כא‪ ,330‬כג‪ ,3‬כז‪ ,31‬כז‪ ,33‬כח‪ ,14‬לא‪,6‬‬ ‫לב‪ ,17‬לד‪ ,18‬לה‪(12‬‬ ‫متناه · כב‪ 7‬כב‪ ,11‬כב‪ ,17‬כב‪) 28‬כב‪ ,8‬כב‪(9‬‬ ‫لا نهاية له · יט‪ ,24‬כב‪ ,6‬כב‪ ,12‬כב‪ ,13‬כב‪ ,15‬כב‪ ,21‬כב‪ ,26‬כב‪ ,27‬כה‪ġ10‬‬ ‫)ה‪ ,30‬יב‪ ,30‬יד‪ ,22‬כב‪ ,10‬כג‪ ,2‬כה‪(11‬‬ ‫بغير نهاية · כב‪) 7‬כב‪ ,8‬כב‪(9‬‬ ‫غاية قصوى · יז‪) 17‬יז‪(25‬‬ ‫فى‪/‬على غاية الفضيلة · יז‪ ,ġ19‬יט‪ ,15‬כא‪ ,1‬כא‪ ,2‬כא‪ ,20‬כא‪ ,25‬כז‪ ,29‬כז‪,31‬‬ ‫כח‪) 13‬כ‪ ,8‬כא‪ ,7‬כא‪ ,28‬כה‪ ,1‬כז‪ ,29‬כז‪ ,34‬כח‪ ,12‬ל‪(19‬‬ ‫تهيأ · יט‪) 20‬ה‪(4‬‬ ‫)כט‪(10‬‬ ‫معلق · יט‪) 15‬יב‪ ,3‬כו‪ ,10‬כו‪ ,30‬לג‪(10‬‬ ‫)טז‪(3‬‬ ‫دام · כב‪ ,24‬כב‪) 26‬ו‪(19‬‬ ‫]כט‪[18‬‬ ‫عجب · כט‪] ġ5‬ו‪[21‬‬ ‫شكل · א‪ ,10‬א‪) ,13‬ו‪ ,6‬ז‪ ,14‬כט‪(16‬‬ ‫دائما ً· טו‪ ,24‬טו‪ ,30‬טז‪ ,1‬כא‪ ,8‬כב‪ ,21‬כב‪ ,23‬כז‪ ,3‬כז‪ ,34‬כח‪) 3‬יד‪ ,16‬כד‪,17‬‬ ‫כח‪ ,11‬כח‪ ,17‬כט‪ ,22‬לג‪ ,29‬לג‪] (30‬יא‪[23‬‬ ‫دوام · טו‪ ,22‬טו‪ ,ġ27‬טו‪ ,27‬כב‪ ,24‬כז‪) 16‬טו‪ ,25‬כז‪(16‬‬ ‫دائم · יג‪ ,26‬יג‪ ,27‬יד‪ ,ġ30‬טו‪ ,15‬יט‪ ,20‬כא‪ ,19‬כא‪ ,24‬כא‪ ,25‬כג‪ ,12‬כה‪ġ1‬‬ ‫)טו‪ ,13‬טז‪ ,2‬כא‪ 18‬כג‪(6‬‬ ‫دائم البقاء · טו‪) 21‬כא‪(19‬‬ ‫تمام · כח‪26‬‬ ‫)לב‪(24‬‬ ‫حركة · א‪ ,15‬ג‪ ,24‬י‪ ,14‬יב‪ ,8‬יב‪ ,ġ13‬יב‪ ,21‬יב‪ ,22‬יב‪ ,32‬יג‪ ,21‬יג‪ ,22‬יג‪ ,5‬יג‪,6‬‬ ‫יג‪ ,10‬יג‪ ,ġ12‬יג‪ ,15‬יג‪ ,20‬יג‪ ,21‬יג‪ ,22‬יד‪ ,ġ30‬יד‪ ,ġ31‬טו‪ ,15‬טו‪ ,17‬טו‪ ,30‬טז‪,1‬‬ ‫טז‪ ,7‬טז‪ ,32‬יז‪ ,1‬יח‪ ,18‬יח‪ ,219‬יח‪ ,24‬יט‪ ,3‬יט‪ ,8‬יט‪ ,9‬כב‪ ,19‬כב‪ ,28‬כג‪,5‬‬ ‫כג‪ ,8‬כד‪ ,25‬כד‪ ,27‬כד‪ ,28‬כה‪ ,ġ27‬כה‪ ,19‬כה‪) ġ24‬ד‪ ,13‬ד‪ ,214‬ט‪ ,2‬יב‪,6‬‬ ‫יב‪ ,7‬יב‪ ,22‬יב‪ ,32‬יג‪ ,26‬יג‪ ,7‬יג‪ ,9‬יג‪ ,10‬יג‪ ,11‬יג‪ ,213‬יג‪ ,214‬יג‪ ,16‬יג‪ ,20‬יג‪,221‬‬ ‫יג‪ ,23‬טו‪ ,1‬טו‪ ,2‬טו‪ ,23‬טו‪ ,24‬טו‪ ,27‬טו‪ ,29‬טו‪ ,10‬טז‪ ,22‬טז‪ ,26‬טז‪ ,8‬יז‪ ,1‬יז‪,24‬‬ ‫יח‪ ,218‬יח‪ ,220‬יח‪ ,22‬יח‪ ,223‬יט‪ ,6‬יט‪ ,7‬כא‪ ,19‬כג‪ ,6‬כג‪ ,16‬כג‪ ,26‬כג‪,27‬‬ ‫כג‪ ,32‬כד‪ ,3‬כד‪ ,6‬כד‪ ,8‬כד‪ ,24‬כד‪ ,29‬כד‪ ,231‬כה‪ ,3‬כה‪ ,5‬כה‪ ,6‬כה‪,28‬‬ ‫כה‪ ,210‬כה‪ ,11‬כו‪ ,4‬כו‪ ,7‬כז‪ ,25‬כח‪ ,30‬כט‪ ,13‬כט‪ ,20‬כט‪ ,21‬כט‪ ,23‬ל‪,13‬‬ ‫לג‪ ,4‬לג‪ ,23‬לד‪ ,14‬לה‪] (10‬לג‪[9‬‬ ‫حركة مستقيمة · יג‪) 15‬טו‪(3‬‬

‫‪hebrew–arabic lexicon‬‬ ‫ִתְּק ָוה‬ ‫תקוע‬ ‫תקף‬ ‫תרח‬ ‫ִתְּשׁבּׂ ֶרת‬ ‫חכמי ַהִתְּשׁבּׂ ֶרת‬ ‫חכמת ַהִתְּשׁבּׂ ֶרת‬ ‫תשוקה‬

‫رجاء · יט‪26‬‬ ‫)כ‪(22‬‬ ‫]לא‪[28‬‬ ‫)ז‪(12‬‬ ‫)כג‪(24‬‬ ‫)כט‪(16‬‬ ‫)כג‪(28‬‬ ‫عشق · טז‪) 31‬יז‪ ,30‬יז‪ ,32‬כה‪ ,26‬כה‪(27‬‬

‫‪594‬‬

Arabic–Hebrew Lexicon All entries are arranged according to their root, and within the root—according to the verb form (although I have not been entirely systematic about this and have sometimes given preference to more “important” sub-entries). For the sake of convenience, entries that do not interfere with the alphabetical order of their root appear in their original form (e.g., ‫)أساس‬. All instances are recorded according to the page and line numbers of the Hebrew edition, which the Arabic edition mirrors. Cases where an Arabic term is not translated (as a result, e.g., of paraphrasing in the abridgment, or some transmission problem) are listed within braces (e.g., {16‫ }ג‬at ‫)البتة‬. If a given term occurs more than once in a line, the number of instances is indicated in superscript (e.g., 219‫ ב‬at ‫)أرض‬. Instances in which the Arabic term is taken from al-Baġdādī (see above, Chapter 1, 2.2.7) are marked by a subscript ġ (e.g., ġ7‫ כה‬at ‫)آخر‬. Cases in which there is either a translation error, or a problem of transmission, or some other non-clarity are indicated by a circumflex (e.g., 21‫ ח‬at ^‫)مستاق‬. These are usually discussed in the commentary.

‫ا‬ passim · …‫ה‬ 2‫מתמיד · ג‬ 3‫ יא‬,1‫ יא‬,14‫ ח‬,12‫אב · ח‬ 20‫בא · כב‬ 11‫שם מגמתו · יח‬ 5‫שנוי · כב‬ 16‫הדבר אשר בעבורו · יז‬ ,21‫ י‬,17‫ י‬,16‫ י‬,26‫ ח‬,13‫ ח‬,6‫ ד‬,5‫ ד‬,4‫ ד‬,28‫ ג‬,15‫ ג‬,1‫ ג‬,32‫ ב‬,29‫ ב‬,13‫ַאֵחר · ב‬ 21‫ כח‬,2‫ כח‬,4‫ כז‬,ġ7‫ כה‬,19‫ כב‬,7‫ כ‬,12‫ יז‬,12‫ טז‬,3‫ טז‬,23‫ טו‬,22‫ טו‬,1‫ יד‬,27‫יב‬ passim · ‫כי‬ 15‫בעבור ש… · יח‬ passim · ‫אם כן‬ 20‫ארסטוטליס · ח‬ 26‫ יד‬,3‫ ג‬,32‫ ב‬,30‫ ב‬,21‫ ב‬,219‫ארץ · ב‬ 19‫הנפש אשר בארץ · ח‬ ,17‫ יג‬,12‫ יג‬,ġ12‫ יג‬,11‫ יג‬,24‫ יב‬,21‫ יב‬,20‫ יב‬,25‫ יב‬,30‫ יא‬,ġ28‫ יא‬,2‫נצחי · ג‬ ,26‫ כא‬,25‫ כא‬,224‫ כא‬,9‫ טז‬,7‫ טז‬,7‫ יד‬,28‫ יג‬,27‫ יג‬,223‫ יג‬,222‫ יג‬,18‫יג‬ 13‫ כג‬,6‫ כג‬,4‫כב‬

‫أ‬ ‫أبدى‬ ‫أب‬ ‫أتى‬ (‫)أ ثر‬ ‫قفا أ ثره‬ ‫تأثير‬ (‫)أجل‬ ‫الشىء الذى من أجله‬ ‫آخر‬ ‫إذ‬ ‫إذن‬ ‫أرسطاطاليس‬ ‫أرض‬ ‫النفس التى فى الأرض‬ ‫أزلى‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫)أسر(‬ ‫بأسره‬ ‫أساس‬ ‫أصل‬ ‫أصلا ً‬

‫أفلاطون‬ ‫إلا‬ ‫التى‬ ‫)ألف(‬ ‫تأليف‬ ‫الل ّٰه‬ ‫الإلهة الثوانى‬ ‫إلاهى‬ ‫العقل الإلاهى‬ ‫إلهية‬ ‫إلى‬ ‫أما‬ ‫إما‬ ‫أمر‬

‫أن‬ ‫لأن‬

‫إن‬ ‫إن‬ ‫إنسان‬ ‫ناس‬ ‫إنما‬ ‫)أهل(‬ ‫أهل المدينة‬ ‫أو‬ ‫أول‬

‫בכללו · ג‪ ,23‬ח‪16‬‬ ‫ָשׁת · ב‪5‬‬ ‫שׁ ֹ ֶרשׁ · יב‪15‬‬ ‫ְכָּלל · ג‪ ,4‬ג‪ ,10‬ג‪ ,13‬ג‪ ,25‬ג‪ ,27‬כב‪21‬‬ ‫לגמרי · יט‪29‬‬ ‫אפלאטון · ב‪ ,16‬ח‪19‬‬ ‫אבל · כי אם · ‪passim‬‬ ‫אשר‪/‬ש… · ‪passim‬‬ ‫ִחבּוּר · א‪27‬‬ ‫)ה(ֵאל · כא‪ ,8‬כא‪ ,12‬כא‪ ,24‬כא‪ ,25‬כט‪ ,ġ6‬כט‪ ,23‬ל‪} ġ25‬יט‪{29‬‬ ‫האלהים השניים · ח‪20‬‬ ‫אלהי · כד‪ġ32‬‬ ‫השכל האלהי · כ‪ġ32‬‬ ‫אֹלהות · כז‪31‬‬ ‫ֶאל‪/‬ל… · ‪passim‬‬ ‫אולם · ‪passim‬‬ ‫אם · ‪passim‬‬ ‫ָדָּבר · ב‪ ,22‬ב‪ ,23‬י‪ ,6‬י‪30‬‬ ‫ענין · ב‪ ,22‬ב‪ ,31‬ב‪ ,33‬ג‪ ,7‬ג‪ ,22‬ח‪ ,10‬י‪ ,11‬טז‪ ,30‬כג‪11‬‬ ‫עת · יט‪18‬‬ ‫}כא‪{9‬‬ ‫כי ש…‪/‬אשר · ‪passim‬‬ ‫כי · ‪passim‬‬ ‫בעבור ש… · טז‪ ,21‬כו‪ ,21‬כח‪26‬‬ ‫מפני ש… · טו‪ ,20‬יט‪ ,26‬כז‪9‬‬ ‫אם · ‪passim‬‬ ‫הנה · ‪passim‬‬ ‫אדם · א‪ ,6‬ב‪ ,15‬ד‪ ,28‬ח‪ ,24‬ח‪ ,212‬י‪ ,25‬י‪ ,28‬יז‪ ,11‬כח‪ ,16‬כח‪ ,17‬כט‪30‬‬ ‫אנשים · ב‪ ,13‬ב‪ ,27‬ל‪ġ26‬‬ ‫אמנם · ‪passim‬‬ ‫אנשי המדינה · יז‪29‬‬ ‫או · ‪passim‬‬ ‫התחלה · כא‪20‬‬ ‫קֹ ֶדם · ב‪31‬‬ ‫ראש · א‪7‬‬ ‫ראשית · ב‪8‬‬ ‫תחלה · כ‪6‬‬ ‫}א‪{5‬‬

‫‪596‬‬

‫‪597‬‬ ‫الأول‬ ‫السبب الأول‬ ‫السماء الأولى‬ ‫العلة الأولى‬ ‫المبدأ الأول‬ ‫المحرك الأول‬ ‫أولا ً‬

‫أولى‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫}כז‪{22‬‬ ‫הסבה הראשונה · י‪31‬‬ ‫הרקיע הראשון · יח‪15‬‬ ‫העלה הראשונה · טו‪ ,22‬טו‪ ,23‬יח‪ ,10‬כב‪ ,14‬כג‪ ,8‬כה‪ ,13‬כו‪21‬‬ ‫הסבה הראשונה · יא‪ ,25‬טז‪ ,31‬יז‪ ,27‬יח‪ ,14‬כב‪14‬‬ ‫ההתחלה הראשונה · י‪ ,16‬יא‪ ,25‬יא‪ ,27‬יג‪ ,34‬טז‪ ,20‬כג‪ ,4‬כג‪,6‬‬ ‫כו‪27‬‬ ‫המניע הראשון · י‪ ,9‬יז‪ ,15‬יז‪ ,ġ22‬כה‪ ,18‬כה‪19‬‬ ‫ראשון · א‪ ,10‬ג‪ ,18‬ג‪ ,19‬ג‪ ,227‬ג‪ ,29‬טו‪ ,ġ27‬טו‪ ,29‬טז‪ ,228‬יז‪ ,2‬יז‪ ,ġ22‬יז‪,25‬‬ ‫יח‪ ,14‬יח‪ ,18‬יט‪ ,4‬יט‪ ,8‬כב‪ ,18‬כה‪ ,18‬כה‪ ,ġ24‬כח‪ ,20‬ל‪11‬‬ ‫תחלה · א‪ ,9‬א‪ ,11‬ג‪30‬‬ ‫יותר ראוי · א‪ ,14‬ב‪ ,14‬ב‪18‬‬ ‫יותר קוֹ ֵדם · ב‪23‬‬ ‫קוֹ ֵדם · כה‪ġ24‬‬ ‫יותר נאות · כז‪28‬‬

‫)أون(‬

‫الآن‬ ‫أى‬ ‫إ يا‬ ‫أيضا ً‬ ‫أ ين‬

‫עתה · ב‪ ,24‬ט‪ ,31‬יא‪ ,21‬כ‪24‬‬ ‫אי זה · ב‪ ,22‬ח‪ ,6‬יז‪ ,5‬יט‪29‬‬ ‫אל · יח‪16‬‬ ‫גם כן · ‪passim‬‬ ‫אנה · ח‪5‬‬

‫ب‬ ‫ب‬

‫ב… · ‪passim‬‬

‫)بتت(‬

‫البتة‬ ‫)بتر(‬ ‫مبتور‬ ‫ث‬ ‫بح َ َ‬ ‫َ‬ ‫بح ْث‬ ‫َ‬ ‫بخل‬ ‫)بدأ(‬ ‫مبدأ‬

‫المبدأ الأول‬ ‫مبدأ محرك‬ ‫إ بتداء‬ ‫)بدد(‬

‫}ג‪{16‬‬ ‫נבדל · יג‪19‬‬ ‫חקר · י‪ ,14‬י‪ ,31‬יא‪ ,ġ29‬יא‪ ,30‬כז‪} 1‬כב‪{30‬‬ ‫חקירה · ב‪ ,9‬ב‪ ,210‬ב‪24‬‬ ‫התרשל · כד‪ġ32‬‬ ‫התחלה · א‪ ,24‬ב‪ ,4‬ב‪ ,27‬ב‪ ,38‬ב‪ ,10‬ב‪ ,11‬ב‪ ,12‬ב‪ ,15‬ב‪ ,216‬ב‪ ,18‬ב‪ ,19‬ב‪,25‬‬ ‫ב‪ ,26‬ג‪ ,21‬ג‪ ,26‬ג‪ ,227‬ט‪ ,25‬ט‪ ,32‬י‪ ,1‬י‪ ,2‬י‪ ,3‬י‪ ,211‬י‪ ,212‬יא‪ ,24‬יא‪ ,25‬יד‪,21‬‬ ‫יד‪ ,6‬יד‪ ,ġ23‬טז‪ ,23‬יז‪ ,17‬כה‪ ,ġ24‬כח‪ ,20‬כט‪ ,24‬ל‪} 12‬טז‪{9‬‬ ‫ההתחלה הראשונה · י‪ ,16‬יא‪ ,25‬יא‪ ,27‬יג‪ ,34‬טז‪ ,20‬כג‪ ,4‬כג‪ ,6‬כו‪27‬‬ ‫התחלה מניעה · י‪3‬‬ ‫התחלה · יא‪ ,4‬טז‪ ,31‬טז‪32‬‬

‫‪598‬‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫لا بد من‬ ‫)بدر(‬ ‫تبادر‬ ‫)بدل(‬ ‫تبدل‬ ‫بدن‬ ‫)بدو(‬ ‫بدا‬ ‫)برأ(‬ ‫براء من‬ ‫برد‬ ‫برهان‬ ‫بزرة‬ ‫بسيط‬ ‫ب َص ُر َ‬ ‫ب َص َر‬ ‫بطل‬ ‫بطالة‬ ‫بعَ ُد َ‬ ‫بعيد‬ ‫بعَ ْد‬

‫بعُ ْد تعليمى‬ ‫بعض‬ ‫بغت‬ ‫)بغي(‬ ‫ينبغى‬ ‫بقر‬ ‫بقي‬ ‫باقي‬ ‫بقاء‬ ‫دائم البقاء‬ ‫متصل البقاء‬ ‫بل‬ ‫بلغ‬ ‫بالغ‬ ‫مبلغ‬

‫אי אפשר מבלתי · ח‪ ,10‬יב‪ ,4‬יג‪3‬‬ ‫אי אפשר שלא · ח‪23‬‬ ‫השתדל · יט‪25‬‬ ‫הומר · ב‪3‬‬ ‫גוף · א‪ ,5‬א‪ ,6‬א‪ ,8‬ז‪ ,229‬י‪ ,226‬י‪ ,27‬יט‪,18‬‬

‫ל‪ġ6‬‬

‫ִנ ְרָאה · טז‪29‬‬ ‫רחוק מן · כח‪10‬‬ ‫קֹר · ט‪26‬‬ ‫מופת · יא‪224‬‬ ‫זרע · ח‪ ,2‬ח‪ ,4‬יד‪ ,27‬יד‪ ,28‬כב‪23‬‬ ‫פשוט · ב‪ ,32‬יז‪ ,2‬יז‪ ,13‬כא‪} 10‬כז‪{8‬‬ ‫ָרָאה · כז‪ ,29‬כח‪28‬‬ ‫ְראוּת · ב‪ ,28‬כז‪ ,28‬כח‪27‬‬ ‫ָבַּטל · ב‪3‬‬ ‫ַבָּטָּלה · יט‪23‬‬ ‫רחק · יז‪29‬‬ ‫רחוק · י‪ ,32‬יא‪ ,21‬יא‪4‬‬ ‫ַאַחר · א‪ ,10‬א‪ ,11‬י‪ ,20‬י‪ ,15‬יב‪ ,11‬יב‪ ,15‬יז‪ ,28‬יח‪ ,18‬כ‪ ,23‬כב‪ ,20‬כב‪ ,22‬כג‪,6‬‬ ‫כג‪ ,9‬כה‪ ,26‬כו‪ ,14‬כו‪15‬‬ ‫זולת · כא‪21‬‬ ‫מרחק למודי · ג‪ ,20‬ג‪22‬‬ ‫קצת · א‪ ,26‬ב‪ ,23‬ג‪ ,219‬י‪ ,31‬טז‪ ,17‬יז‪ ,228‬יז‪ ,29‬יז‪ ,30‬כא‪ ,8‬כב‪} 33‬י‪{32‬‬ ‫}כ‪{27‬‬ ‫כ‪ġ31‬‬

‫ראוי · י‪ ,14‬י‪ ,30‬יג‪ ,30‬טו‪,15‬‬ ‫שור · ז‪30‬‬ ‫נשאר · יא‪ ,23‬כ‪ ,18‬כ‪19‬‬ ‫נשאר · ב‪ ,1‬ב‪ ,20‬יח‪ ,11‬יח‪ ,19‬יט‪9‬‬ ‫השארות · טו‪ ,224‬יט‪ ,15‬כא‪25‬‬ ‫מתמיד ההשארות · ב‪ ,28‬ב‪29‬‬ ‫תמידי ההשארות · טו‪21‬‬ ‫דבק ההשארות · יז‪ġ23‬‬ ‫אבל · ‪passim‬‬ ‫הגיע · יד‪ġ28‬‬ ‫ֻמְפָלג · ב‪ ,25‬ג‪32‬‬ ‫הגעה · יט‪24‬‬

‫‪599‬‬ ‫)بلو(‬ ‫أبلى‬ ‫)بني(‬ ‫مبنى‬ ‫بناء‬ ‫)بوب(‬ ‫باب‬ ‫)بول(‬ ‫خطر ببال‬ ‫بيت‬ ‫)بيض(‬ ‫بياض‬ ‫أبيض‬ ‫)بين(‬ ‫بان‬ ‫بين‬ ‫بين‬

‫مبا ين‬ ‫تبين‬ ‫بين‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬

‫ִבָּלּה · יא‪22‬‬ ‫נבנה · ג‪7‬‬ ‫בנין · י‪ ,6‬י‪8‬‬ ‫שער · ט‪27‬‬ ‫שם בדעת · ח‪8‬‬ ‫בית · א‪ ,7‬י‪8‬‬ ‫ֹלֶבן · א‪ ,19‬ט‪27‬‬ ‫ָלָבן · א‪ ,18‬א‪ ,21‬א‪ ,22‬ד‪ ,21‬ד‪22‬‬ ‫התבאר · ב‪ ,9‬יג‪10‬‬ ‫ֵבֵּאר · ג‪ ,32‬ד‪ ,3‬ט‪} 24‬כג‪{4‬‬ ‫ְמבָֹאר · ב‪ ,31‬י‪ ,11‬כא‪ ,9‬כב‪ ,33‬כג‪ ,26‬כט‪9‬‬ ‫מן ַהְמּבָֹאר · כ‪2‬‬ ‫נבדל · כב‪} 4‬ג‪{16‬‬ ‫התבאר · כב‪ ,3‬כב‪ ,5‬כט‪} 23‬טז‪{9‬‬ ‫ֵבּין · ב‪ ,9‬ג‪ ,12‬ג‪ ,216‬ג‪25‬‬

‫ت‬ ‫ت َب َِع‬ ‫اتبع‬ ‫تحت‬ ‫ترك‬ ‫تعَ َب‬ ‫أتعب‬ ‫استتعب‬ ‫تلك‬ ‫)تلو(‬ ‫تلا‬ ‫)تمم(‬ ‫تام‬ ‫تمام‬ ‫أتم‬

‫נמשך אחר · ב‪ ,17‬כח‪2‬‬ ‫בא אחר · יח‪18‬‬ ‫המשיך · ט‪24‬‬ ‫תחת · ב‪ ,28‬ד‪4‬‬ ‫עזב · טז‪ ,3‬כח‪2‬‬ ‫יגיעה · כז‪ ,17‬כח‪15‬‬ ‫ִי ֵגּ ַע · ז‪15‬‬ ‫ָי ַגע · כב‪16‬‬ ‫אותו · ההם · ‪passim‬‬ ‫נמשך אחר · א‪12‬‬ ‫שלם · כח‪8‬‬ ‫תמימות · כח‪26‬‬ ‫השלים · יט‪16‬‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬

‫‪600‬‬

‫ث‬ ‫ثبت‬ ‫ثابت‬ ‫كوكب ثابت‬ ‫ثبت‬ ‫أثبت‬ ‫ثقيل‬ ‫)ثلث(‬ ‫مثلث‬ ‫ثم‬

‫ִהְתַק ֵיּם · ב‪ ,2‬טו‪19‬‬ ‫ַק ָיּם · ב‪2‬‬ ‫כוכב ַק ָיּם · יח‪ ,15‬יח‪19‬‬ ‫ִק ֵיּם · א‪ ,21‬יב‪ġ18‬‬ ‫}כט‪{9‬‬ ‫‪22‬‬ ‫ה‬ ‫כ‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪32‬‬ ‫א‬ ‫י‬ ‫ָכֵּבד ·‬ ‫‪ġ‬‬ ‫‪ġ‬‬ ‫ְמֻשָׁלּשׁ · א‪ ,10‬א‪13‬‬ ‫אחר כן · א‪ ,29‬יא‪30‬‬ ‫עוד · א‪ ,10‬א‪ ,11‬יח‪ ,18‬כ‪7‬‬

‫)ثني(‬

‫الإلهة الثوانى‬

‫האלהים השניים · ח‪20‬‬

‫ج‬ ‫)جبل(‬ ‫مجبول‬ ‫جثة‬ ‫جدا ً‬ ‫جرجس‬ ‫جرى‬ ‫جارى‬ ‫جزء‬ ‫أجزاء التى لا تتجزأ‬ ‫جسم‬

‫جسم سماوى‬ ‫الجسم العامى‬ ‫جسمانيه‬ ‫لا يشو به شىء من الجسمانية‬ ‫جعل‬

‫جعل‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫)جمع(‬ ‫اجتمع‬ ‫جميع‬

‫ֻמ ְגָבּל · ג‪30‬‬ ‫גוף · ח‪ ,1‬ח‪15‬‬ ‫מאד · יט‪ ,9‬יט‪26‬‬ ‫יתוש · ז‪30‬‬ ‫ָרץ · ג‪29‬‬ ‫ָרץ · ג‪29‬‬ ‫ֵחֶלק · א‪ ,6‬א‪ ,7‬ג‪ ,19‬יב‪17‬‬ ‫חלקים אשר לא יתחלקו · יד‪ ,ġ22‬יד‪ġ30‬‬ ‫גשם · ג‪ ,3‬ג‪ ,5‬ג‪ ,11‬ח‪ ,215‬ח‪ ,16‬ט‪ ,29‬י‪ ,14‬יג‪ ,33‬יג‪ ,5‬יג‪ ,6‬יג‪ ,12‬טו‪ ,16‬טו‪,18‬‬ ‫כב‪ ,5‬כב‪ ,13‬כב‪ ,14‬כב‪ ,16‬כב‪ ,17‬כג‪ ,9‬כג‪ ,10‬כג‪ ,19‬כה‪ ,18‬כה‪ ,19‬כה‪ġ22‬‬ ‫גשם שמימי · ב‪ ,29‬ג‪ ,25‬יח‪ ,25‬יט‪3‬‬ ‫גרם שמימי · ד‪11‬‬ ‫הגשם הכולל · ב‪20‬‬ ‫גשמות · ג‪ ,8‬כב‪22‬‬ ‫לא יתערב בו דבר מן הגשמות · ג‪8‬‬ ‫ָשׂם · ב‪ ,14‬ב‪ ,215‬ב‪ ,18‬ב‪ ,20‬ב‪ ,22‬ב‪ ,23‬ג‪ ,19‬ג‪ ,21‬ד‪ ,11‬יד‪ ,20‬יד‪ ,ġ23‬יד‪,ġ28‬‬ ‫כ‪29‬‬ ‫ֵהִשׂים · ב‪ ,18‬ב‪19‬‬ ‫הוַּשׂם · ג‪ ,6‬ח‪ ,6‬ח‪ ,11‬ח‪ ,14‬טו‪ ,15‬כז‪14‬‬ ‫התקבץ · ב‪13‬‬ ‫כל · ‪passim‬‬

‫‪601‬‬ ‫جملة‬ ‫بالجملة‬ ‫جنس‬ ‫جانس‬ ‫جهل‬ ‫)جوز(‬ ‫يجوز )جاز(‬ ‫جوهر‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫ְכָּלל · א‪ ,8‬ח‪23‬‬ ‫בכלל · כב‪24‬‬ ‫סוג · א‪ ,17‬ב‪ ,1‬ב‪ ,4‬ב‪ ,5‬ב‪ ,10‬ב‪ ,12‬ז‪29‬‬ ‫התיחס · ג‪30‬‬ ‫סכלות )שׂכלות( · י‪ ,26‬יט‪ ,23‬כט‪8‬‬ ‫אפשר )היה אפשר( · י‪ ,1‬י‪ ,2‬י‪ ,3‬י‪11‬‬ ‫עצם · א‪ ,24‬א‪ ,8‬א‪ ,10‬א‪ ,12‬א‪ ,14‬א‪ ,15‬א‪ ,16‬א‪ ,18‬א‪ ,225‬ב‪ ,1‬ב‪ ,2‬ב‪ ,5‬ב‪,7‬‬ ‫ב‪ ,211‬ב‪ ,14‬ב‪ ,18‬ב‪ ,19‬ב‪ ,26‬ב‪ ,27‬ב‪ ,29‬ב‪ ,330‬ג‪ ,21‬ג‪ ,32‬ג‪ ,5‬ג‪ ,7‬ג‪ ,29‬ג‪,10‬‬ ‫ג‪ ,312‬ג‪ ,13‬ג‪ ,15‬ג‪ ,16‬ג‪ ,17‬ג‪ ,19‬ג‪ ,321‬ג‪ ,22‬ג‪ ,223‬ג‪ ,24‬ג‪ ,25‬ג‪ ,27‬ג‪ ,28‬ג‪,29‬‬ ‫ג‪ ,30‬ג‪ ,32‬ד‪ ,6‬ח‪ ,14‬ט‪ ,25‬י‪ ,211‬י‪ ,312‬י‪ ,214‬יא‪ ,29‬יא‪ ,319‬יא‪ ,21‬יא‪ ,22‬יא‪,230‬‬ ‫יא‪ ,33‬יא‪ ,34‬יב‪ ,ġ1‬יב‪ ,4‬יב‪ ,5‬יג‪ ,13‬יג‪ ,28‬יד‪ ,6‬יז‪ ,22‬יז‪ ,ġ221‬יז‪ ,ġ22‬יז‪,227‬‬ ‫יח‪ ,10‬טז‪ ,15‬יט‪ ,5‬יט‪ ,16‬כ‪ ,18‬כ‪ ,20‬כב‪ ,3‬כב‪ ,30‬כג‪ ,7‬כג‪ ,9‬כד‪ ,ġ31‬כז‪ ,7‬כז‪9‬‬

‫ح‬ ‫حب‬ ‫محبة‬ ‫حتى‬ ‫ث‬ ‫ح َد َ َ‬ ‫ح َد َث‬ ‫كان حدث‬ ‫حادث‬ ‫حدوث‬ ‫أحدث‬ ‫حدد‬ ‫حد‬ ‫حاد‬ ‫حذر‬ ‫حذق‬ ‫حر‬ ‫حرض‬ ‫حرك‬ ‫محرك‬ ‫ألمحرك الأول‬ ‫محرك غير متحرك‬ ‫محرك لا يتحرك‬ ‫محرك قر يب‬ ‫مبدأ محرك‬

‫אהב · כח‪18‬‬ ‫אהבה · יד‪ ,ġ31‬כח‪ ,15‬כח‪16‬‬ ‫עד ש… · ג‪ ,4‬ג‪ ,16‬ח‪ ,4‬יד‪1‬‬ ‫התחדש‪/‬נתחדש · ב‪ ,3‬ג‪ ,27‬ז‪ ,28‬ח‪ ,7‬ח‪ ,220‬ח‪ ,25‬יא‪ ,2‬יב‪ ,325‬יג‪ ,4‬יג‪5‬‬ ‫חדוש · ג‪ ,25‬ג‪ ,26‬י‪ ,13‬יב‪21‬‬ ‫ְמֻח ַָדשׁ · יב‪223‬‬ ‫חדוש · יב‪25‬‬ ‫חדוש · יב‪ ,ġ18‬יב‪ ,32‬יג‪26‬‬ ‫ִח ֵדּשׁ · יב‪ ,25‬ח‪} 6‬כא‪{11‬‬ ‫הגביל · כג‪4‬‬ ‫גדר · ד‪ ,7‬יב‪ ,17‬כה‪ ,ġ1‬כה‪ ,19‬לב‪14‬‬ ‫ַחד · כח‪27‬‬ ‫נשמר · י‪15‬‬ ‫ָﬠ ְרָמה · ח‪8‬‬ ‫חם · ט‪26‬‬ ‫ֹ‬ ‫השתדל · יח‪15‬‬ ‫הניע · י‪ ,14‬יג‪ ,26‬יג‪ ,31‬טז‪ ,13‬טז‪ ,16‬טז‪ ,17‬טז‪ ,19‬יז‪ ,ġ18‬יח‪ ,214‬יט‪ ,3‬כב‪,6‬‬ ‫כב‪ ,7‬כג‪ ,5‬כו‪ ,28‬כט‪ ,ġ4‬ל‪ġ225‬‬ ‫מניע · י‪ ,8‬יא‪ ,3‬יב‪ ,23‬יב‪ ,24‬יג‪ ,22‬יג‪ ,26‬טז‪ ,13‬כג‪ ,8‬כג‪ ,9‬כג‪13‬‬ ‫המניע הראשון · י‪ ,9‬יז‪ ,15‬יז‪ ,ġ22‬כה‪ ,18‬כה‪19‬‬ ‫מניע בלתי מתנועע · טז‪14‬‬ ‫מניע בלתי מתנועע · טז‪15‬‬ ‫מניע קרוב · י‪ ,4‬י‪9‬‬ ‫התחלה מניעה · י‪3‬‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫سبب محرك‬ ‫علة محركة‬ ‫قوة محركة‬ ‫تحر يك‬ ‫حركة‬

‫حركة مستقيمة‬ ‫تحرك‬ ‫متحرك‬ ‫)حري(‬ ‫بالأحرى‬

‫‪602‬‬

‫סבה מניעה · י‪ ,1‬י‪7‬‬ ‫עלה מניעה · טו‪ ,17‬כד‪27‬‬ ‫סבה מניעה · י‪31‬‬ ‫כח מניע · כב‪ ,27‬כג‪18‬‬ ‫הנעה · יג‪ ,26‬יג‪ ,227‬טז‪ ,9‬כט‪ġ5‬‬ ‫תנועה · א‪ ,15‬ג‪ ,24‬י‪ ,14‬יב‪ ,8‬יב‪ ,ġ13‬יב‪ ,21‬יב‪ ,22‬יב‪ ,32‬יג‪ ,21‬יג‪ ,22‬יג‪ ,5‬יג‪,6‬‬ ‫יג‪ ,10‬יג‪ ,ġ12‬יג‪ ,15‬יג‪ ,20‬יג‪ ,21‬יג‪ ,22‬יד‪ ,ġ30‬יד‪ ,ġ31‬טו‪ ,15‬טו‪ ,17‬טו‪ ,30‬טז‪,1‬‬ ‫טז‪ ,7‬טז‪ ,32‬יז‪ ,1‬יח‪ ,18‬יח‪ ,219‬יח‪ ,24‬יט‪ ,3‬יט‪ ,8‬יט‪ ,9‬כב‪ ,19‬כב‪ ,28‬כג‪,5‬‬ ‫כג‪ ,8‬כד‪ ,25‬כד‪ ,27‬כד‪ ,28‬כה‪ ,ġ27‬כה‪ ,19‬כה‪} ġ24‬יט‪ ,4‬כו‪{29‬‬ ‫תנועה מקומית · יג‪15‬‬ ‫התנועע · ג‪ ,18‬ג‪ ,29‬ד‪ ,12‬י‪ ,9‬יא‪ ,21‬יג‪ ,4‬יד‪ ,ġ23‬יד‪ ,225‬טו‪ ,30‬טז‪ ,1‬טז‪,213‬‬ ‫טז‪ ,19‬יח‪ ,14‬יט‪ ,8‬יט‪ ,9‬כג‪ ,8‬כג‪} 11‬יג‪{3‬‬ ‫מתנועע · ג‪ ,2‬ג‪ ,8‬ג‪ ,13‬י‪ ,4‬י‪ ,32‬יא‪ ,20‬יא‪ ,ġ28‬יא‪ ,30‬יג‪ ,ġ12‬טו‪ ,16‬טו‪,18‬‬ ‫טז‪ ,7‬טז‪ ,10‬יט‪ ,4‬כב‪ ,4‬כג‪ ,9‬כג‪ ,10‬כג‪ ,11‬כג‪ ,19‬כד‪ ,27‬כה‪} 19‬כד‪{23‬‬ ‫כל שכן · יט‪ ,8‬כ‪ ,ġ31‬כא‪1‬‬ ‫יותר ראוי · יג‪13‬‬

‫)حسب(‬

‫بحسب‬ ‫حس‬ ‫حاسة‬ ‫محسوس‬ ‫حسَن‬ ‫َ‬ ‫سن‬ ‫ح ْ‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫)حصل(‬ ‫تحصيل‬ ‫)حصو(‬ ‫لا يحصى‬ ‫حظ‬ ‫)حقر(‬ ‫احتقار‬ ‫)حقق(‬ ‫حق‬ ‫أحق‬ ‫بالحقيقة‬ ‫على الحقيقة‬ ‫على غاية الحقيقة‬

‫כפי · טו‪ ,19‬כג‪19‬‬ ‫לפי · כב‪ ,17‬כב‪ ,29‬כג‪10‬‬ ‫חוש · ב‪ ,28‬טו‪ ,28‬יט‪ ,23‬כ‪ ,17‬כג‪7‬‬ ‫חוש · ב‪ ,17‬כא‪} 10‬כ‪{2‬‬ ‫מוחש · ב‪ ,1‬ג‪ ,9‬ג‪ ,12‬ג‪ ,15‬ג‪ ,16‬ג‪ ,21‬ג‪ ,23‬ג‪ ,28‬ג‪ ,30‬ג‪ ,32‬ט‪ ,26‬כ‪ ,18‬כב‪4‬‬ ‫ֻמ ְר ָגּשׁ · ב‪28‬‬ ‫טוב · טז‪24‬‬ ‫יפה · יז‪ġ19‬‬ ‫י ִֹפי · יז‪17‬‬ ‫הגעה · ב‪12‬‬ ‫לא יספר מר ֹב · יט‪20‬‬ ‫ֵחֶלק · א‪16‬‬ ‫}ח‪{7‬‬ ‫אמת · יד‪ ,ġ28‬יז‪25‬‬ ‫}א‪{5‬‬ ‫באמת · ח‪ ,27‬טז‪ ,24‬טז‪29‬‬ ‫לפי האמת · טז‪30‬‬ ‫בתכלית האמת · כ‪21‬‬

‫‪603‬‬ ‫ح َك َم َ‬ ‫ح ُْكم‬ ‫حمد‬ ‫)حمر(‬ ‫أحمر‬ ‫حمل‬ ‫احتمل‬ ‫حن‬ ‫)حوج(‬ ‫حاجة‬ ‫احتاج‬

‫احتاج فيه‬ ‫)حول(‬ ‫حال‬

‫محال‬ ‫لا محالة‬ ‫أحال‬ ‫استحال‬ ‫استحالة‬

‫مستحيل‬ ‫حوى‬ ‫)حير(‬ ‫متحير‬ ‫كوكب متحير‬ ‫حينئذ‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫שפט · י‪16‬‬ ‫משפט · כד‪30‬‬ ‫כבוד · כו‪28‬‬ ‫אדום · ד‪2‬‬ ‫ָנָשׂא · ד‪ ,25‬יא‪ ,ġ232‬כ‪19‬‬ ‫ָנָשׂא · י‪26‬‬ ‫נטה · כו‪28‬‬ ‫צ ֹ ֶרְך · טז‪ ,3‬כט‪9‬‬ ‫הצטרך · ג‪ ,24‬יד‪ ,1‬טו‪ ,19‬טו‪ ,20‬כא‪ ,2‬כח‪ ,6‬כט‪ġ7‬‬ ‫ֻהְצ ַרְך · ח‪25‬‬ ‫צריך · ח‪ ,24‬כח‪27‬‬ ‫היה צ ֹ ֶרְך בו · ג‪23‬‬ ‫ענין · א‪ ,11‬א‪ ,15‬ב‪ ,1‬ב‪ ,3‬ב‪ ,8‬ב‪ ,28‬ג‪ ,6‬ג‪ ,15‬ד‪ ,9‬ח‪ ,313‬י‪ ,14‬י‪ ,218‬י‪ ,19‬י‪,26‬‬ ‫יא‪ ,23‬יב‪ ,25‬טו‪ ,216‬טו‪ ,17‬טו‪ ,18‬טו‪ ,19‬יט‪ ,10‬כו‪ ,18‬כא‪ ,21‬כב‪ ,29‬כג‪,27‬‬ ‫כח‪17‬‬ ‫שׁ ֹ ֶרשׁ · כח‪2‬‬ ‫קרוב לְשׂחוֹק · כו‪26‬‬ ‫שקר · ג‪10‬‬ ‫בלא ספק · י‪ ,3‬כב‪ ,16‬כו‪32‬‬ ‫ִשׁ ָנּה · יב‪ ,27‬יג‪31‬‬ ‫ֻשׁ ָנּה · כב‪4‬‬ ‫השתנות · ד‪ ,9‬יא‪23‬‬ ‫שנוי · ג‪ ,14‬יב‪27‬‬ ‫התחלפות · יג‪2‬‬ ‫משתנה · יט‪4‬‬ ‫הקיף · ג‪ ,10‬ג‪11‬‬ ‫נבוך · טו‪30‬‬ ‫כוכב נבוך · יח‪19‬‬ ‫אז · כז‪7‬‬ ‫אם כן · ח‪26‬‬

‫)حيي(‬

‫حي‬ ‫حياة‬ ‫حيوان‬

‫חי · כא‪13‬‬ ‫אדני החיים · כא‪23‬‬ ‫חיים · כא‪ ,219‬כא‪ ,20‬כא‪ ,221‬כא‪ ,322‬כא‪ ,23‬כא‪ ,24‬כא‪ ,225‬כה‪ ,ġ1‬כו‪32‬‬ ‫בעל חיים · ב‪ ,30‬ג‪ ,3‬ז‪ ,28‬ח‪ ,2‬ח‪ ,3‬ח‪ ,8‬טז‪18‬‬ ‫חי · א‪ ,8‬ח‪ ,5‬ח‪ ,6‬ח‪ ,7‬ח‪ ,10‬יח‪ġ2‬‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬

‫خ‬ ‫خبر‬ ‫خرج‬ ‫خارج‬ ‫من خارج‬ ‫مخرِج‬ ‫خسيس‬ ‫خشب‬ ‫خشبة‬ ‫خص‬ ‫خاص‬ ‫خاصة‬ ‫خاصية‬ ‫خطأ‬ ‫خطر ببال‬ ‫)خطط(‬ ‫خط‬ ‫خفيف‬ ‫خلط‬ ‫ما يختلط به مما بالقوة‬ ‫مختلط‬ ‫)خلف(‬ ‫خلاف‬ ‫بخلاف‬ ‫بمخالف‬ ‫تخلف‬ ‫اختلف‬ ‫مختلف‬ ‫اختلاف‬ ‫)خلق(‬ ‫أخلق‬ ‫)خلو(‬ ‫لا يخلو من‬ ‫خمر‬ ‫خير‬ ‫اختار‬ ‫مختار‬

‫ִסֵפּר · יג‪4‬‬ ‫יצא · ג‪ ,1‬ג‪ ,4‬ח‪ ,7‬יד‪ ,14‬כב‪ ,25‬כז‪ ,17‬כט‪} 8‬יד‪{1‬‬ ‫חוץ · י‪ ,1‬י‪ ,4‬כ‪ ,18‬כ‪ ,19‬כא‪ ,11‬כז‪4‬‬ ‫יוצא · ג‪ ,8‬י‪ ,29‬יט‪29‬‬ ‫מחוץ · כא‪ ,2‬כז‪11‬‬ ‫מוציא · יד‪17‬‬ ‫ָפּחוּת · יג‪ ,24‬כז‪ ,14‬כז‪ ,20‬כז‪ ,23‬כז‪26‬‬ ‫עץ · יד‪25‬‬ ‫עץ · א‪ ,18‬א‪ ,219‬א‪ ,323‬א‪24‬‬ ‫ִיֵחד · ח‪3‬‬ ‫‪32‬‬ ‫ד‬ ‫כ‬ ‫ְמ ֻיָחד ·‬ ‫‪ġ‬‬ ‫לבד · ב‪ ,30‬ח‪3‬‬ ‫ְס ֻגָלּה · טו‪ġ226‬‬ ‫טעות · יד‪ġ22‬‬ ‫שם בדעת · ח‪8‬‬ ‫קו · א‪10‬‬ ‫ַקל · כה‪ġ22‬‬ ‫ֵﬠ ֵרב · יד‪ġ30‬‬ ‫לא יתערב בו מה שהוא בכח · כ‪24‬‬ ‫ְמעֹ ָרב · יט‪18‬‬ ‫חלוף · יט‪14‬‬ ‫}טז‪{21‬‬ ‫מתחלף · טז‪29‬‬ ‫היה · יב‪10‬‬ ‫התחלף · י‪ ,28‬טו‪ ,19‬כב‪22‬‬ ‫מתחלף · ג‪ ,26‬ג‪ ,27‬י‪ ,218‬טו‪ ,217‬טז‪ ,1‬יח‪ ,24‬יט‪ ,17‬כא‪21‬‬ ‫התחלפות · טו‪ ,17‬טו‪ ,20‬טו‪ ,221‬טו‪ ġ26‬טו‪ ,27‬יט‪5‬‬ ‫חלוף · ג‪12‬‬ ‫ראוי · ט‪ ,24‬ט‪31‬‬ ‫לא נמלט מ… · ג‪ ,24‬ג‪ ,33‬יב‪ ,22‬יט‪ ,21‬כז‪1‬‬ ‫יין · ח‪ ,1‬י‪20‬‬ ‫‪21‬‬ ‫ל‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪230‬‬ ‫טוב · טז‬ ‫‪ġ‬‬ ‫בחר · טז‪ ,23‬יז‪16‬‬ ‫ִנְבָחר · יז‪ġ19‬‬

‫‪604‬‬

‫‪605‬‬ ‫خيل‬ ‫تخيل‬ ‫المتخيل‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫סוסים · ז‪29‬‬ ‫דמיון · טז‪ ,32‬יז‪1‬‬ ‫מה ש ְי ֻדֶמּה · יז‪1‬‬

‫د‬ ‫)دخل(‬ ‫داخل‬ ‫)درك(‬ ‫أدرك‬ ‫مدرك‬ ‫درى‬ ‫دفعة‬

‫دقق‬ ‫دل‬ ‫دلالة‬ ‫دم الطمث‬ ‫دهر‬ ‫)دور(‬ ‫أدار‬ ‫مستدير‬ ‫)دوم(‬ ‫دام‬ ‫دائم‬

‫دائم البقاء‬ ‫دائما ً‬ ‫دوام‬ ‫دون‬

‫נכנס · כה‪ġ1‬‬

‫ִהִשּׂיג · כח‪21‬‬ ‫}כ‪{2‬‬ ‫ָחַשׁב · ח‪17‬‬ ‫רגע · כ‪ ,27‬כח‪7‬‬ ‫יחד · כח‪28‬‬ ‫פתאום · כח‪21‬‬ ‫הפליג · ח‪9‬‬ ‫הורה · א‪ ,17‬א‪ ,19‬ג‪ ,12‬ח‪} 17‬כד‪{23‬‬ ‫ְרָא ָיה · יב‪17‬‬ ‫דם הנדות · יד‪26‬‬ ‫חלד · יא‪ ,23‬יב‪ ,24‬יט‪ ,16‬כא‪26‬‬ ‫סובב · כב‪15‬‬ ‫על הסבוב · יג‪ ,15‬יג‪21‬‬ ‫התמיד · כב‪ ,24‬כב‪26‬‬ ‫תמידי · יג‪ ,26‬יג‪ ,27‬יד‪ ,ġ30‬טו‪ ,15‬יט‪ ,20‬כא‪ ,19‬כא‪ ,24‬כא‪25‬‬ ‫מתמיד · י‪ ,18‬יב‪ ,4‬טו‪ ,20‬כא‪ ,24‬כא‪ ,26‬כב‪16‬‬ ‫}כח‪{17‬‬ ‫מתמיד ההשארות · ב‪ ,28‬ב‪29‬‬ ‫תמידי ההשארות · טו‪21‬‬ ‫תמיד · טו‪ ,24‬טו‪ ,30‬טז‪ ,1‬כא‪ ,8‬כב‪ ,21‬כב‪ ,23‬כז‪ ,3‬כז‪ ,34‬כח‪3‬‬ ‫תמידות · טו‪ ,22‬טו‪ ,ġ27‬טו‪ ,27‬כב‪ ,24‬כז‪16‬‬ ‫בלתי · ח‪3‬‬

‫ذ‬ ‫ذات‬

‫ذبابة‬

‫עצמות · ג‪ ,14‬יד‪ ,225‬יד‪ ,27‬טז‪ ,212‬יז‪ ,16‬יז‪ ,17‬יז‪ ,18‬יח‪ ,10‬יט‪ ,20‬יט‪,30‬‬ ‫כ‪ ,3‬כ‪ ,7‬כ‪ ,19‬כא‪ ,22‬כא‪ ,10‬כא‪ ,214‬כב‪ ,24‬כג‪ ,ġ9‬כה‪ ,ġ7‬כז‪ ,2‬כז‪ ,7‬כח‪,13‬‬ ‫כח‪ ,16‬כח‪ ,17‬כח‪ ,19‬כח‪ ,29‬כט‪ ,24‬כט‪ ,25‬ל‪ ,11‬ל‪12‬‬ ‫זבוב · ז‪30‬‬

‫‪606‬‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫ذ َكرَ‬ ‫ذِك ْر‬ ‫أذكر‬ ‫إذكار‬ ‫إذكر‬ ‫ذلك‬ ‫لذلك‬ ‫وذلك أن‬ ‫ذهب‬ ‫ذو‬

‫ָזַכר · ד‪11‬‬ ‫זכרון · כח‪6‬‬ ‫הזכיר · ב‪24‬‬ ‫הזכרה · ב‪24‬‬ ‫זכר · ד‪7‬‬ ‫זה · ‪passim‬‬ ‫לכן · ג‪ ,8‬ח‪21‬‬ ‫וזה ש… · ‪passim‬‬ ‫זהב · ח‪9‬‬ ‫בעל · כה‪18‬‬

‫ر‬ ‫)رأس(‬ ‫رئيس‬ ‫رأى‬

‫ر ُئى‬ ‫رأي‬ ‫)ر ب ب (‬ ‫ر بما‬ ‫)ر بع(‬ ‫مربع‬ ‫أر بعة‬ ‫)رتب(‬ ‫ترتيب‬ ‫مرتبة‬ ‫رجاء‬ ‫)رخو(‬ ‫استرخاء‬ ‫رطو بة‬ ‫رغب‬ ‫رفع‬ ‫ر َف ْع‬ ‫رق‬ ‫)ركب(‬ ‫تركيب‬ ‫مركب‬ ‫تركب‬

‫כו‪ġ1‬‬

‫ראש ·‬ ‫ָרָאה · ז‪ ,229‬ז‪ ,230‬ח‪ ,19‬ח‪ ,20‬ח‪ ,22‬טו‪ ,29‬טז‪ ,22‬טז‪ ,28‬כא‪ ,2‬כו‪29‬‬ ‫ָי ַדע · כא‪14‬‬ ‫סבר · כז‪34‬‬ ‫נראה · כב‪23‬‬ ‫סברא · יט‪24‬‬ ‫פעמים · י‪ ,222‬י‪227‬‬ ‫ְמ ֻרָבּע · א‪10‬‬ ‫ארבעה · ב‪ ,32‬ד‪7‬‬ ‫סדר · יז‪ ,ġ25‬יז‪ ,27‬יח‪ ,12‬כא‪,12‬‬ ‫מדרגה · ח‪ ,19‬יח‪17‬‬ ‫ִתְּק ָוה · יט‪26‬‬

‫ל‪ġ21‬‬

‫רפיון · כז‪17‬‬ ‫לחוּת · י‪21‬‬ ‫רצה · יב‪26‬‬ ‫הסתלק · ל‪ġ4‬‬ ‫ַסֵלּק · ז‪28‬‬ ‫ֵה ַרְך · ב‪33‬‬ ‫הרכבה · א‪ ,26‬ח‪ ,12‬יז‪ ,ġ6‬יז‪ ,15‬כט‪} ġ7‬יז‪{3‬‬ ‫ֻמ ְרָכּב · ב‪ ,1‬י‪ ,24‬י‪ ,25‬י‪} 28‬י‪{29‬‬ ‫התרכב · יז‪13‬‬

‫‪607‬‬ ‫ركن‬ ‫)روح(‬ ‫راحة‬ ‫)روض(‬ ‫الر ياضة بالمنطق^‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫יסוד · ב‪ ,5‬ב‪ ,7‬ב‪ ,20‬ב‪21‬‬ ‫ָשׁת · ב‪31‬‬ ‫מנוחה · כב‪16‬‬ ‫חכמת ההגיון · ב‪14‬‬

‫ز‬ ‫زعم‬ ‫زمان‬ ‫زنبور‬ ‫)زول(‬ ‫زال‬ ‫ز يادة‬

‫ִכּ ֵוּן · ג‪9‬‬ ‫זמן · ב‪ ,4‬ב‪ ,17‬יא‪ ,22‬יב‪ ,8‬יב‪ ,210‬יב‪ ,ġ13‬יב‪ ,215‬יב‪ ,17‬יב‪ ,ġ18‬יב‪ ,20‬יב‪,21‬‬ ‫יג‪ ,11‬יג‪ ,19‬יט‪ ,16‬כב‪ ,6‬כב‪ ,15‬כב‪ ,24‬כב‪ ,26‬כח‪} 27‬ג‪{26‬‬ ‫צרעה · ז‪29‬‬ ‫סר · יא‪ ,22‬יב‪22‬‬ ‫תוספת · יט‪24‬‬

‫س‬ ‫سبب‬ ‫السبب الأول‬ ‫السبب الذى له‬ ‫بسبب‬ ‫سبب محرك‬ ‫من سبب‬ ‫و بهذا السبب‬ ‫سبيل‬ ‫على سبيل‬ ‫سر‬ ‫سرور‬

‫سر ير‬ ‫سطح‬

‫סבה · ט‪ ,32‬יב‪ ,29‬יג‪ ,4‬טו‪ ,15‬טו‪ ,24‬יז‪ ,ġ25‬כא‪ ,12‬כה‪ ,16‬כז‪ ,12‬כז‪ ,13‬כז‪14‬‬ ‫}ב‪ ,7‬יט‪{20‬‬ ‫הסבה הראשונה · י‪31‬‬ ‫הסבה אשר בעבורה · יג‪4‬‬ ‫בסבת · יז‪ ,16‬כה‪ ,ġ27‬כז‪14‬‬ ‫סבה מניעה · י‪ ,1‬י‪7‬‬ ‫מסבת · ח‪18‬‬ ‫ובזאת‪/‬ולזאת הסבה · יט‪25‬‬ ‫דרך · יט‪17‬‬ ‫צד · כח‪20‬‬ ‫על דרך · כו‪28‬‬ ‫ָשַׂמח · יט‪29‬‬ ‫חדוה · יט‪20‬‬ ‫שמחה · יט‪29‬‬ ‫ששון · כ‪2‬‬ ‫כסא · ל‪ġ5‬‬ ‫דרגש · יד‪25‬‬ ‫שטח · ט‪28‬‬

‫)سعد(‬

‫مستعد‬ ‫سفينة‬

‫ְמ ֻזָמּן · ח‪6‬‬ ‫ספינה · א‪7‬‬

‫‪608‬‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫سقراط‬ ‫سقيم‬ ‫سكر‬ ‫سكن‬ ‫ساكن‬ ‫سكون‬ ‫لا سكون ل…‬ ‫)سلط(‬ ‫متسلط‬ ‫سلك‬ ‫مسلك‬ ‫سمى‬ ‫سماء‬ ‫السماء الأولى‬ ‫جسم سماوى‬ ‫)سود(‬ ‫سواد‬ ‫أسود‬ ‫)سوس(‬ ‫سياسة‬ ‫سياسة المدن‬ ‫)سوق(‬ ‫سواقة‬ ‫مستاق^‬ ‫)سير(‬ ‫سا ئر‬

‫סקראט · ב‪16‬‬ ‫חולה · י‪ ,26‬י‪27‬‬ ‫ָנח · י‪21‬‬ ‫עמד · יג‪18‬‬ ‫מונח · יג‪29‬‬ ‫מנוחה · יג‪ ,4‬יג‪5‬‬ ‫אין מנוחה ל… · טז‪ ,7‬טז‪9‬‬ ‫שליט · כז‪5‬‬ ‫הלך · ח‪10‬‬ ‫מהלך · ח‪10‬‬ ‫קרא · ד‪8‬‬ ‫רקיע · יח‪18‬‬ ‫שמים · יט‪15‬‬ ‫הרקיע הראשון · יח‪15‬‬ ‫גשם שמימי · ב‪ ,29‬ג‪ ,25‬יח‪ ,25‬יט‪3‬‬ ‫גרם שמימי · ד‪11‬‬ ‫ַשֲׁחרוּת · ט‪27‬‬ ‫חר · ד‪3‬‬ ‫ָשׁ ֹ‬ ‫הדרכה · יז‪ġ18‬‬ ‫הדרכת המדינות · יז‪,29‬‬

‫כה‪ġ25‬‬

‫מוליך · ח‪16‬‬ ‫משתוקק · ח‪21‬‬ ‫שאר · א‪ ,11‬א‪ ,12‬א‪ ,13‬א‪ ,14‬א‪ ,16‬ב‪ ,32‬י‪ ,13‬טז‪ ,18‬יח‪ ,19‬יט‪ ,19‬כב‪} 11‬ב‪,4‬‬ ‫יז‪ ,12‬כו‪{27‬‬

‫)سيل(‬

‫سيال‬

‫ִנ ַגּר · ג‪29‬‬

‫ش‬ ‫شأن‬ ‫من شأن‬ ‫شبع‬ ‫)شبه(‬ ‫شبه‬ ‫أشبه‬

‫מדרך · כב‪22‬‬ ‫נמנע · כח‪216‬‬ ‫דמיון · ח‪7‬‬ ‫דומה · א‪ ,11‬א‪ ,16‬א‪ ,20‬ב‪4‬‬

‫‪609‬‬ ‫تشبه‬ ‫شتى‬ ‫)شدد(‬ ‫أشد‬ ‫)شرف(‬ ‫شرف‬

‫شر يف‬ ‫)شرك(‬ ‫مشاركة‬ ‫اشترك‬ ‫)شغل(‬ ‫متشاغل‬ ‫شكل‬ ‫مشاكل‬ ‫مشاكلة‬ ‫شمس‬ ‫)شنع(‬ ‫شناعة‬ ‫شهد‬ ‫شهوة‬ ‫)شوب(‬ ‫)لا( تشو به الهيولى‬ ‫)لا( يشو به شىء من الهيولى‬ ‫لا يشو به شىء من الجسمانية‬ ‫)شوق(‬ ‫تشوق‬ ‫شىء‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫ִה ַדָּמּה · יח‪15‬‬ ‫ַרב · א‪3‬‬ ‫ָגּדוֹל ·‬

‫כט‪ġ5‬‬

‫כח‪ġ12‬‬

‫ְגּ ֻדָלּה · כז‪ ,24‬כז‪,26‬‬ ‫כבוד · יט‪24‬‬ ‫מעלה · כו‪28‬‬ ‫נכבד · ג‪ ,24‬ח‪ ,19‬יד‪ ,ġ23‬כא‪ ,21‬כז‪12‬‬ ‫שתוף · ג‪ ,16‬ג‪25‬‬ ‫השתתף · ג‪5‬‬ ‫ָט ֵרד · יט‪18‬‬ ‫תמונה · א‪ ,10‬א‪13‬‬ ‫מתדמה · ד‪1‬‬ ‫התדמות · ג‪31‬‬ ‫שמש · ח‪ ,20‬יא‪ ,21‬כב‪11‬‬ ‫דבה · כח‪3‬‬ ‫העיד · ב‪ ,6‬טו‪ ,28‬כג‪7‬‬ ‫תאוה · טז‪31‬‬ ‫מה שיתערב בו ההיולי‪/‬לא יתערב בו ההיולי · כ‪ ,20‬כב‪31‬‬ ‫)לא( יתערב בו דבר מן ההיולי · יד‪ ,7‬טז‪ ,14‬יז‪ġ4‬‬ ‫לא יתערב בו דבר מן הגשמות · ג‪8‬‬ ‫ִהְתַא ָוּה · טז‪ ,24‬יח‪ ,ġ8‬יח‪11‬‬ ‫ָחַשׁק · יז‪28‬‬ ‫ָדָּבר · א‪ ,4‬א‪ ,6‬א‪ ,7‬א‪ ,14‬א‪ ,24‬ב‪ ,7‬ב‪ ,210‬ב‪ ,13‬ב‪ ,214‬ב‪ ,215‬ב‪ ,18‬ב‪,20‬‬ ‫ב‪ ,25‬ב‪ ,31‬ב‪ ,32‬ב‪ ,33‬ג‪ ,2‬ג‪ ,3‬ג‪ ,8‬ג‪ ,11‬ג‪ ,214‬ג‪ ,225‬ג‪ ,29‬ג‪ ,33‬ד‪ ,7‬ח‪,1‬‬ ‫ח‪ ,24‬ח‪ ,26‬ט‪ ,25‬ט‪ ,28‬ט‪ ,30‬ט‪ ,31‬י‪ ,1‬י‪ ,2‬י‪ ,4‬י‪ ,5‬י‪ ,10‬י‪ ,12‬י‪ ,13‬י‪ ,16‬י‪,217‬‬ ‫י‪ ,18‬י‪ ,19‬י‪ ,20‬י‪ ,23‬י‪ ,26‬י‪ ,27‬י‪ ,28‬י‪ ,229‬י‪ ,30‬י‪ ,32‬יא‪ ,22‬יא‪ ,234‬יב‪,5‬‬ ‫יב‪ ,26‬יב‪ ,27‬יג‪ ,17‬יד‪ ,6‬יד‪ ,7‬יד‪ ,27‬טז‪ ,11‬טז‪ ,213‬טז‪ ,17‬טז‪ ,18‬טז‪ ,19‬טז‪,21‬‬ ‫טז‪ ,22‬טז‪ ,32‬יז‪ ,312‬יז‪ ,13‬יז‪ ,214‬יז‪ ,15‬יז‪ ,28‬יח‪ ,11‬יח‪ ,12‬יח‪ ,19‬יט‪ ,25‬יט‪,22‬‬ ‫יט‪ ,25‬יט‪ ,27‬כ‪ ,4‬כ‪ ,7‬כ‪ ,23‬כ‪ ,24‬כ‪ ,28‬כ‪ ,29‬כ‪ ,ġ30‬כ‪ ,32‬כא‪ ,10‬כא‪,12‬‬ ‫כב‪ ,23‬כב‪ ,25‬כג‪ ,4‬כה‪ ,16‬כו‪ ,28‬כז‪ ,33‬כז‪ ,5‬כז‪ ,14‬כז‪ ,17‬כז‪ ,20‬כז‪,23‬‬ ‫כז‪ ,26‬כז‪ ,28‬כז‪ ,34‬כח‪ ,21‬כח‪ ,3‬כח‪ ,5‬כח‪ ,6‬כח‪ ,7‬כח‪ ,9‬כח‪ ,311‬כח‪,12‬‬ ‫כח‪ ,ġ12‬כח‪ ,13‬כח‪ ,17‬כח‪ ,20‬כח‪ ,28‬כט‪ ,ġ5‬כט‪ ,24‬כט‪ ,25‬ל‪} 12‬טו‪,28‬‬ ‫כח‪{10‬‬

‫‪610‬‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫الشىء الذى من أجله‬ ‫)لا( يشو به شىء من الهيولى‬ ‫لا يشو به شىء من الجسمانية‬

‫הדבר אשר בעבורו · יז‪16‬‬ ‫‪4‬‬ ‫ז‬ ‫י‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪14‬‬ ‫ז‬ ‫ט‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪7‬‬ ‫ד‬ ‫י‬ ‫·‬ ‫י‬ ‫ל‬ ‫ו‬ ‫י‬ ‫ה‬ ‫ה‬ ‫)לא( יתערב בו דבר מן‬ ‫‪ġ‬‬ ‫לא יתערב בו דבר מן הגשמות · ג‪8‬‬

‫ص‬ ‫)صحب(‬ ‫صاحب‬ ‫)صحح(‬ ‫صحيح‬ ‫صحة‬

‫صرح‬ ‫تصريح‬ ‫صغير‬ ‫)صفح(‬ ‫تصفح‬ ‫صنع‬ ‫صانع‬ ‫صناعة‬ ‫صناعة الطب‬ ‫صناعة النجارة‬ ‫صناعة عملية‬ ‫صنف‬ ‫)صوب(‬ ‫صواب‬ ‫أصاب‬ ‫صوت‬ ‫صورة‬

‫موافق فى الصورة‬ ‫)صير(‬ ‫صار‬

‫בעל · ז‪28‬‬ ‫בריא · י‪ ,26‬י‪27‬‬ ‫ֲאִמָתּה · ב‪6‬‬ ‫בריאות · י‪ ,7‬ל‪ġ6‬‬ ‫רצה · יד‪ġ29‬‬ ‫באור · י‪13‬‬ ‫קטן · ח‪1‬‬ ‫כט‪ġ7‬‬

‫עבר · כח‪ ,2‬כח‪,6‬‬ ‫אומנות · ח‪ ,12‬ח‪14‬‬ ‫אומן · ח‪ ,8‬ל‪ġ5‬‬ ‫אומנות · ל‪ġ6‬‬ ‫‪6‬‬ ‫ל‬ ‫·‬ ‫ה‬ ‫א‬ ‫ו‬ ‫פ‬ ‫מלאכת הר‬ ‫‪ġ‬‬ ‫אומנות הנגר · ל‪ġ6‬‬ ‫אומנות מעשית · ל‪ġ4‬‬ ‫מין · ד‪6‬‬

‫ָיָשׁר · ב‪22‬‬ ‫י ֶֹשׁר · ג‪ ,15‬י‪13‬‬ ‫אמר אמת · כב‪12‬‬ ‫קול · ד‪22‬‬ ‫צורה · ג‪ ,20‬ג‪ ,22‬ז‪ ,27‬ח‪ ,2‬ח‪ ,11‬ח‪ ,14‬ח‪ ,225‬ח‪ ,26‬ט‪ ,25‬ט‪ ,26‬ט‪ ,27‬ט‪,28‬‬ ‫י‪ ,4‬י‪ ,5‬י‪ ,7‬י‪ ,8‬י‪ ,23‬י‪ ,324‬י‪ ,28‬י‪ ,230‬י‪ ,32‬יא‪ ,2‬יא‪ ,3‬יג‪ ,29‬יד‪ ,225‬כ‪ ,18‬כ‪,19‬‬ ‫כב‪ ,34‬כה‪ ,16‬ל‪} ġ5‬כז‪{23‬‬ ‫נאות בצורה · י‪ ,31‬יא‪3‬‬ ‫היה · ח‪ ,3‬ח‪ ,13‬ח‪ ,21‬טו‪ ,26‬טו‪ ,27‬יט‪ ,26‬כו‪ ,ġ31‬כז‪9‬‬ ‫בחר · ג‪30‬‬ ‫שב · יט‪26‬‬

‫‪611‬‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬

‫ض‬ ‫ضد‬ ‫تضاد‬ ‫ضرب‬ ‫مضطرب‬ ‫ضرورة‬ ‫ضرورة‬ ‫يجب ضرورة‬ ‫ضروري‬ ‫ا ُضطر‬ ‫ضعيف‬ ‫تضاعف‬ ‫ضفدع‬ ‫ضوء‬ ‫)ضيف(‬ ‫إضافة‬

‫ֶהֶפְך · ג‪ ,233‬ד‪ ,21‬ד‪ ,24‬ד‪ ,5‬ד‪212‬‬ ‫ִהפּוְּך · ד‪13‬‬ ‫מין · ד‪13‬‬ ‫ְמֻבְלָבּל · יד‪ġ31‬‬ ‫הכרח · יט‪ ,12/14‬יט‪15‬‬ ‫בהכרח · יט‪10‬‬ ‫יתחיב בהכרח · טו‪ ,21‬טז‪ ,14‬כג‪ ,8‬כג‪10‬‬ ‫ראוי בהכרח · ב‪ ,25‬ד‪ ,3‬יג‪ ,25‬טו‪23‬‬ ‫הכרחי · יג‪ ,17‬כד‪30‬‬ ‫הצטרך · יד‪ġ29‬‬ ‫חלוש · יד‪ ,ġ3‬כט‪7‬‬ ‫ֶכֶּפל · יז‪ġ15‬‬ ‫צפרדע · ז‪30‬‬ ‫אור · ט‪ ,28‬ט‪ ,29‬י‪25‬‬ ‫סמיכות · א‪16‬‬

‫ط‬ ‫طب‬ ‫صناعة الطب‬ ‫طبع‬ ‫طبيعى‬ ‫العلم الطبيعى‬ ‫كتاب العلم الطبيعى‬ ‫طبيعة‬

‫)طبق(‬ ‫انطبق‬ ‫)طرح(‬ ‫اطرح‬ ‫طرف‬ ‫طرفة عين‬ ‫)طرق(‬ ‫على طر يق‬ ‫ب‬ ‫َطل َ َ‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫طل َ‬

‫רפואה · י‪ ,6‬י‪7‬‬ ‫מלאכת הרפואה ·‬ ‫טבע · ג‪ ,17‬ג‪ ,29‬כח‪9‬‬ ‫טבעי · י‪ ,4‬יא‪ ,19‬כב‪13‬‬ ‫החכמה הטבעית · ג‪ ,23‬ג‪25‬‬ ‫ספר החכמה הטבעית · ג‪32‬‬ ‫טבע · ג‪ ,4‬ג‪ ,7‬ג‪ ,20‬ד‪ ,5‬ח‪ ,1‬ח‪ ,6‬ח‪ ,10‬ח‪ ,11‬ח‪ ,14‬ח‪ ,15‬ח‪ ,16‬ח‪ ,23‬ח‪ ,27‬יב‪,5‬‬ ‫יג‪ ,31‬יג‪ ,34‬יד‪ ,ġ3‬יד‪ ,8‬טז‪ ,14‬טז‪ ,219‬יז‪ ,11‬יז‪ ,15‬יח‪ ,18‬יט‪ ,15‬יט‪ ,21‬יט‪,25‬‬ ‫יט‪ ,28‬כ‪ ,7‬כא‪ ,2‬כב‪ ,4‬כד‪ ,ġ31‬כה‪ ,ġ9‬כה‪ ,ġ24‬כז‪19‬‬ ‫ל‪ġ6‬‬

‫נחתם · כ‪18‬‬ ‫השליך · יט‪19‬‬ ‫קצה · כב‪21‬‬ ‫הרף עין · יט‪21‬‬ ‫על דרך · ט‪ ,24‬ט‪ ,30‬יא‪ ,22‬יא‪3‬‬ ‫ִבֵּקּשׁ · ב‪ ,6‬ב‪ ,225‬יא ‪ ,10‬יא‪ ,18‬יא‪ ,22‬טז‪ ,3‬כא‪3‬‬ ‫ֻבַּקּשׁ · ב‪ ,11‬ב‪31‬‬

‫‪612‬‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫َطل َب‬ ‫)طلق(‬ ‫مطلقا ً‬ ‫على الإطلاق‬ ‫)طمث(‬ ‫دم الطمث‬ ‫طين‬

‫בקשה · א‪ ,3‬א‪ ,4‬ב‪ ,7‬ט‪ ,31‬ט‪ ,32‬י‪ ,29‬יא‪21‬‬ ‫ַבֻּמְּחָלט · יט‪14‬‬ ‫ַבֻּמְּחָלט · ט‪30‬‬ ‫דם הנדות · יד‪26‬‬ ‫טיט · ח‪8‬‬

‫ظ‬ ‫ظلمة‬ ‫ظن‬ ‫ظن‬ ‫المظنون‬

‫יד‪ġ19‬‬

‫חֶשְׁך · ט‪ ,28‬י‪,25‬‬ ‫ֹ‬ ‫ָחַשׁב · ג‪} 22‬יד*{‬ ‫מחשבה · טז‪ ,32‬יז‪1‬‬ ‫הדבר שחושבים בו · יז‪1‬‬

‫ع‬ ‫عبد‬ ‫عجب‬ ‫تعجب‬ ‫عدد‬ ‫عدد‬ ‫عدم‬ ‫عرض‬ ‫بالعرض‬ ‫ع ُر ِف‬ ‫معرفة‬ ‫تعرف‬ ‫)عري(‬ ‫تعرى‬ ‫عسكر‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ش َ‬ ‫عَ ِ‬ ‫عاشق‬ ‫معشوق‬ ‫شق‬ ‫عِ ْ‬ ‫عضو‬

‫עבד · כו‪ġ1‬‬ ‫פלא · א‪ ,17‬ח‪ ,8‬ח‪ ,16‬יב‪ ,5‬יח‪ ,10‬כא‪ ,8‬כא‪29‬‬ ‫ֵתַּמהּ · כט‪ġ5‬‬ ‫להפלא · טז‪15‬‬ ‫ָמ ָנה · ד‪6‬‬ ‫מספר · א‪ ,9‬א‪ ,13‬ב‪ ,12‬ב‪ ,33‬כג‪ ,18‬כג‪ ,19‬כד‪ ,24‬כד‪ ,25‬כד‪ ,327‬כד‪,28‬‬ ‫כה‪ ,16‬כה‪19‬‬ ‫ֵהָﬠ ֵדר · ט‪ ,25‬ט‪ ,26‬ט‪ ,27‬ט‪ ,29‬י‪ ,6‬יא‪ ,3‬יט‪23‬‬ ‫חדוש · ג‪217‬‬ ‫מקרה · א‪ ,20‬א‪ ,25‬ב‪ ,22‬י‪ ,16‬יב‪ ,5‬יג‪ ,13‬כא‪10‬‬ ‫במקרה · כג‪ ,ġ9‬כג‪11‬‬ ‫נוֹ ַדע · ד‪7‬‬ ‫ידיעה · כט‪8‬‬ ‫ידיעה · כג‪14‬‬

‫ערום · ב‪1‬‬ ‫חיל · א‪,7‬‬ ‫ָחַשׁק · יח‪ ,15‬יח‪16‬‬ ‫חושק · טז‪ ,19‬כו‪ ,29‬כח‪18‬‬ ‫ָחשׁוּק · טז‪ ,16‬טז‪ ,17‬טז‪ ,18‬טז‪ ,19‬טז‪ ,20‬טז‪ ,21‬טז‪ ,222‬טז‪ ,28‬יח‪ ,14‬כו‪29‬‬ ‫ֵח ֶ‬ ‫שׁק · טז‪ ,28‬כה‪ġ25‬‬ ‫תשוקה · טז‪31‬‬ ‫ֵאֶבר · א‪5‬‬ ‫יח‪ ,ġ8‬ל‪ġ21‬‬

‫‪613‬‬ ‫عطل‬ ‫متعطل‬ ‫عظم‬ ‫عفن‬ ‫)عقب(‬ ‫تعاقب‬ ‫عقل‬

‫ع ُق ِل‬ ‫عاقل‬ ‫معقول‬ ‫ع َْقل‬

‫العقل الإلاهى‬ ‫)علق(‬ ‫معلق‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫כד‪ġ32‬‬

‫ָבֵּטל ·‬ ‫ָבֵּטל · יג‪31‬‬ ‫ֹגּ ֶדל · כב‪ 7‬כב‪ ,16‬כב‪ ,22‬כב‪31‬‬ ‫ִﬠפּוּשׁ · ז‪30‬‬ ‫בא זה בעקב זה · ב‪3‬‬ ‫ִהְשִׂכּיל · טז‪ ,17‬טז‪ ,31‬יח‪ ,10‬יט‪ ,19‬יט‪ ,30‬כ‪ ,2‬כ‪ ,3‬כ‪ ,7‬כ‪ ,21‬כ‪ ,224‬כ‪,25‬‬ ‫כ‪ ,27‬כ‪ ,28‬כ‪ ,30‬כ‪ ,ġ31‬כא‪ ,2‬כא‪ ,10‬כא‪ ,14‬כו‪ ,24‬כו‪ ,25‬כו‪ ,27‬כו‪ ,32‬כז‪,32‬‬ ‫כז‪ ,3‬כז‪ ,12‬כז‪ ,19‬כז‪ ,23‬כז‪ ,26‬כז‪ ,31‬כז‪ ,34‬כח‪ ,1‬כח‪ ,3‬כח‪ ,25‬כח‪ ,6‬כח‪,9‬‬ ‫כח‪ ,11‬כח‪ ,13‬כח‪ ,16‬כח‪ ,17‬כח‪ ,18‬כח‪ ,219‬כח‪ ,20‬כח‪ ,28‬כח‪ ,29‬כט‪,18‬‬ ‫כט‪ ,26‬כט‪ ,32‬ל‪ ,311‬ל‪) 12‬כ‪} (4‬כז‪{6‬‬ ‫ֻהְשַׂכּל · טז‪ ,230‬כח‪19‬‬ ‫משכיל · כז‪10‬‬ ‫ֻמְשָׂכּל · ג‪ ,16‬ג‪ ,21‬ג‪ ,28‬טז‪ ,16‬טז‪ ,18‬טז‪ ,19‬טז‪ ,20‬טז‪ ,221‬טז‪ ,22‬טז‪ ,32‬יז‪,2‬‬ ‫כ‪ ,22‬כ‪ ,8‬כ‪ ,13‬כ‪ ,14‬כ‪ ,19‬כ‪ ,25‬כז‪ ,8‬כז‪ ,11‬כז‪ ,13‬כח‪ ,28‬ל‪9‬‬ ‫שכל · י‪ ,15‬טו‪ ,1‬טז‪ ,32‬יז‪ ,25‬יז‪ ,226‬יח‪ ,11‬יט‪ ,17‬יט‪ ,23‬יט‪ ,24‬כ‪ ,2‬כ‪ ,12‬כ‪,14‬‬ ‫כ‪ ,18‬כ‪ ,23‬כ‪ ,ġ30‬כ‪ ,ġ231‬כא‪ ,21‬כו‪ ,21‬כו‪ ,27‬כז‪ ,37‬כז‪ ,10‬כז‪ ,12‬כז‪ ,13‬כז‪,215‬‬ ‫כז‪ ,18‬כח‪ ,4‬כח‪ ,5‬כח‪ ,8‬כח‪ ,211‬כח‪ ,19‬כח‪ ,28‬כט‪ ,6‬ל‪ ,9‬ל‪} 10‬כז‪{6‬‬ ‫השכל האלהי · כ‪ġ32‬‬ ‫נתלה · כב‪13‬‬ ‫תלוי · יט‪15‬‬

‫)علل(‬

‫علة‬

‫العلة الأولى‬ ‫علة محركة‬ ‫علة فاعلة‬ ‫ع َل ِم‬ ‫ع ُل ِم‬ ‫عال ِم‬ ‫معلوم‬ ‫علم‬

‫العلم الطبيعى‬ ‫كتاب العلم الطبيعى‬

‫סבה · י‪ ,32‬יא‪ ,1‬יא‪ ,2‬יא‪ ,4‬יא‪ ,24‬יא‪ ,25‬יג‪ ,23‬יג‪ ,24‬יד‪ ,ġ29‬טו‪ ,22‬טו‪,27‬‬ ‫ל‪12‬‬ ‫עלה · טו‪ ,16‬טו‪ ,19‬טו‪ ,22‬טו‪ ,223‬טו‪ ,24‬טו‪ ġ226‬כב‪ ,21‬כז‪12‬‬ ‫העלה הראשונה · טו‪ ,22‬טו‪ ,23‬יח‪ ,10‬כב‪ ,14‬כג‪ ,8‬כה‪ ,13‬כו‪21‬‬ ‫הסבה הראשונה · יא‪ ,25‬טז‪ ,31‬יז‪ ,27‬יח‪ ,14‬כב‪14‬‬ ‫עלה מניעה · טו‪ ,17‬כד‪27‬‬ ‫סבה מניעה · י‪31‬‬ ‫עלה פועלת · טו‪20‬‬ ‫ָי ַדע · ח‪ ,2‬ח‪ ,25‬כט‪24‬‬ ‫נוֹ ַדע · ג‪28‬‬ ‫חכם · כו‪25‬‬ ‫ידוע · כח‪20‬‬ ‫חכמה · ג‪ ,24‬יז‪ ,26‬יז‪ ,27‬יט‪ ,17‬יט‪ ,21‬כו‪25‬‬ ‫ידיעה · כא‪1‬‬ ‫סברא · ג‪28‬‬ ‫החכמה הטבעית · ג‪ ,23‬ג‪25‬‬ ‫ספר החכמה הטבעית · ג‪32‬‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫علم النجوم‬ ‫عال َم‬ ‫بعد تعليمى‬ ‫)علو(‬ ‫أعلى‬ ‫على‬ ‫على أن‬ ‫على ما‬ ‫عما‬ ‫ل‬ ‫عمَ ِ َ‬ ‫عمَ َل‬ ‫صناعة عملية‬ ‫استعمل‬ ‫)عمم(‬ ‫عامى‬ ‫الجسم العامى‬ ‫عن‬ ‫عند‬ ‫عاند‬ ‫عندما‬ ‫عنصر‬

‫عنى‬ ‫معنى‬ ‫أعنى‬ ‫عهد‬ ‫)عوج(‬ ‫عاج‬ ‫)عوق(‬ ‫عاق‬ ‫عين‬ ‫بعينه‬ ‫طرفة عين‬ ‫عيان‬

‫‪614‬‬

‫חכמת הכוכבים · כג‪15‬‬ ‫‪4‬‬ ‫ט‬ ‫כ‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬ ‫ה‬ ‫כ‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪13‬‬ ‫עולם · יד‪ ,ġ19‬יז‪ ,ġ25‬כה‬ ‫‪ġ‬‬ ‫מרחק למודי · ג‪ ,20‬ג‪22‬‬ ‫עליון · ח‪19‬‬ ‫על · ‪passim‬‬ ‫כפי · כ‪28‬‬ ‫לפי ש… · כב‪13‬‬ ‫על דרך · כא‪11‬‬ ‫על מה · ‪passim‬‬ ‫על מה · ‪passim‬‬ ‫עשה · ח‪ ,8‬ח‪ ,9‬ח‪ ,211‬ח‪ ,15‬ח‪16‬‬ ‫מעשה · ח‪ ,15‬ל‪ġ5‬‬ ‫ֲﬠִשׂ ָיּה · ח‪8‬‬ ‫אומנות מעשית · ל‪ġ4‬‬ ‫התעסק · ב‪ ,13‬כו‪25‬‬ ‫עשה · יב‪ġ18‬‬ ‫כולל · ב‪ ,14‬ב‪ ,15‬ב‪ ,16‬ב‪ ,19‬ב‪ ,220‬ב‪ ,23‬יד‪ġ22‬‬ ‫הגשם הכולל · ב‪20‬‬ ‫מ…‪/‬מן · ֵמֵאת · ש…‪/‬אשר · ‪passim‬‬ ‫אצל · יט‪ ,23‬כ‪ ,18‬כ‪ ,29‬כח‪20‬‬ ‫ָחַלק · כא‪10‬‬ ‫כאשר · כח‪18‬‬ ‫יסוד · ב‪ ,31‬ט‪ ,25‬ט‪ ,26‬ט‪ ,28‬ט‪ ,230‬ט‪ ,31‬י‪ ,1‬י‪ ,2‬י‪ ,3‬י‪ ,22‬י‪ ,23‬י‪ ,24‬י‪,26‬‬ ‫י‪ ,228‬י‪ ,29‬י‪ ,30‬יא‪ ,2‬כה‪ ,16‬ל‪ġ24‬‬ ‫חֶמר · ח‪7‬‬ ‫ֹ‬ ‫רצה · י‪ ,223‬יג‪ġ31‬‬ ‫ענין · א‪ ,5‬יא‪} ġ29‬יב‪{16‬‬ ‫רצוני‪/‬רצוני לומר‪/‬ר״ל‪/‬כלומר · א‪ ,24‬ב‪ ,10‬ב‪ ,32‬י‪ ,26‬י‪ ,28‬טז‪ ,21‬יח‪11‬‬ ‫זמן · ב‪17‬‬

‫ֵשׁן · ח‪9‬‬ ‫העיק · יב‪26‬‬ ‫ַﬠ ִין · כח‪27‬‬ ‫בעינו · א‪ ,20‬א‪ ,23‬ב‪ ,22‬ח‪ ,10‬ט‪ ,30‬י‪ ,20‬טו‪ ,18‬טו‪ ,30‬טז‪ ,22‬יז‪ ,13‬כז‪,3‬‬ ‫כח‪3‬‬ ‫הרף עין · יט‪21‬‬ ‫ענין · א‪25‬‬

‫‪615‬‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬

‫غ‬ ‫غذاء‬

‫מזון ·‬

‫יח‪ġ2‬‬

‫)غرب(‬

‫غريب‬ ‫غرض‬ ‫غرق فى النوم‬ ‫)غفل(‬ ‫أغفل‬ ‫غلبة‬ ‫غلى‬ ‫)غور(‬ ‫أغار‬ ‫)غوي(‬ ‫غاية‬ ‫غاية قصوى‬ ‫فى‪/‬على غاية الفضيلة‬ ‫على غاية الحقيقة‬ ‫غير‬

‫تغير‬ ‫تغير‬ ‫متغير‬ ‫تغيير‬

‫נכרי · כא‪11‬‬ ‫כונה · ג‪ ,17‬ח‪ ,16‬ח‪221‬‬ ‫שקוע בֵשׁ ָנה · כו‪28‬‬ ‫הקשה · ז‪^28‬‬ ‫ִנָצּחוֹן · יד‪ġ31‬‬ ‫הרתיח · י‪21‬‬ ‫זלזל · ח‪7‬‬ ‫תכלית · ג‪ ,11‬יח‪ ,16‬כ‪ ,13‬כ‪ ,32‬כב‪ ,19‬כז‪ ,24‬כח‪26‬‬ ‫תכלית אחרון · יז‪17‬‬ ‫בתכלית המעלה‪/‬על תכלית המעלה · יז‪ ,ġ19‬יט‪ ,15‬כא‪ ,1‬כא‪ ,2‬כא‪,20‬‬ ‫כא‪ ,25‬כז‪ ,29‬כז‪ ,31‬כח‪13‬‬ ‫בתכלית האמת · כ‪213‬‬ ‫בלתי · ‪passim‬‬ ‫זולת · א‪ ,15‬ב‪ ,9‬ג‪ ,14‬ד‪ ,3‬ד‪ ,8‬ז‪ ,28‬ח‪ ,4‬ח‪ ,5‬י‪ ,15‬י‪ ,23‬י‪ ,30‬יב‪ ,26‬יב‪,27‬‬ ‫טו‪ ,23‬כ‪ ,4‬כב‪ ,18‬כז‪ ,22‬כז‪ ,4‬כז‪14‬‬ ‫השתנה · ב‪ ,29‬יג‪ ,5‬כב‪5‬‬ ‫שנוי · ג‪ ,3‬ג‪ ,4‬ג‪ ,8‬ג‪ ,28‬ג‪ ,233‬ד‪ ,6‬ד‪ ,7‬ד‪ ,8‬ד‪ ,9‬ד‪ ,211‬יא‪ ,23‬יג‪ ,2‬יח‪ ,25‬יט‪4‬‬ ‫משתנה · ג‪ ,13‬ג‪ ,29‬ג‪33‬‬ ‫}ג‪{226‬‬

‫ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫فإن‬ ‫فتور‬ ‫فرح‬ ‫فرد‬ ‫أفرد‬ ‫مفرد‬ ‫مفردا ً‬ ‫انفرد‬ ‫منفرد‬

‫ו… · הנה · כי · ‪passim‬‬ ‫אחר כן · יב‪ ,27‬יב‪30‬‬ ‫הנה · ‪passim‬‬ ‫מנוחה · יג‪2‬‬ ‫שמחה · יט‪ ,20‬כ‪2‬‬ ‫נפרד · ג‪10‬‬ ‫הפריד · א‪ ,24‬א‪ ,25‬יא‪ġ29‬‬ ‫נפרד · ב‪ ,13‬ב‪ ,14‬ב‪ ,15‬ב‪ ,18‬ב‪ ,23‬ג‪ ,29‬ג‪ ,12‬ג‪ ,16‬טז‪ ,212‬כא‪ ,10‬כב‪24‬‬ ‫ביחוד · יא‪ġ29‬‬ ‫נפרד · י‪ ,24‬י‪25‬‬ ‫נפרד · י‪24‬‬

‫‪616‬‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫فرس‬ ‫فرض‬ ‫)فرغ(‬ ‫فراغ‬ ‫)فرق(‬ ‫فر يق‬ ‫متفرق‬ ‫فسد‬ ‫فاسد‬ ‫فساد‬ ‫قابل‪/‬يقبل للفساد‬ ‫)فضل(‬ ‫فضلا ً‬ ‫أفضل‬ ‫فضيل‬ ‫فضيلة‬ ‫فى‪/‬على غاية الفضيلة‬ ‫ل‬ ‫فعَ َ َ‬ ‫فاعل‬ ‫علة فاعلة‬ ‫ف ِعْل‬

‫فعلا ً‬ ‫بالفعل‬ ‫انفعال‬ ‫فقط‬ ‫فكر‬ ‫فلسفة‬ ‫فلك‬ ‫الفلك المائل‬ ‫فهَ ِم َ‬ ‫فهَ ْم‬ ‫)فوز(‬ ‫فاز‬

‫סוס · ב‪ ,316‬ח‪ ,24‬יז‪11‬‬ ‫ֵתֵּאר · יד‪ġ31‬‬ ‫פנאי · יט‪18‬‬ ‫כת · ב‪22‬‬ ‫ְמֻפ ָזּר · א‪7‬‬ ‫נפסד · ג‪ ,4‬ח‪ ,1‬יב‪ ,6‬יב‪10‬‬ ‫}טו‪{18‬‬ ‫הפסד · ד‪ ,9‬יב‪ ,9‬יב‪ ,11‬יב‪ ,ġ13‬טו‪20‬‬ ‫מקבל‪/‬יקבל להפסד · ב‪ ,30‬י‪ ,19‬יא‪ ,34‬יא‪ ,35‬יח‪ ,20‬כב‪23‬‬ ‫כל שכן · א‪ ,21‬א‪25‬‬ ‫יותר טוב · ח‪13‬‬ ‫בעל מעלה · ל‪ġ25‬‬ ‫נכבד · יג‪ ,24‬יט‪ ,22‬כ‪ ,2‬כ‪ ,3‬כא‪ ,223‬כז‪19‬‬ ‫נעלה · כא‪ ,20‬כז‪11‬‬ ‫מעלה · יז‪ ,17‬יט‪24‬‬ ‫בתכלית המעלה‪ /‬על תכלית המעלה · יז‪ ,ġ19‬יט‪ ,15‬כא‪ ,1‬כא‪ ,2‬כא‪,20‬‬ ‫כא‪ ,25‬כז‪ ,29‬כז‪ ,31‬כח‪13‬‬ ‫עשה · ח‪ ,17‬ח‪ ,221‬יט‪ ,30‬כו‪ ,24‬כו‪27‬‬ ‫פּוֵֹﬠל · כו‪24‬‬ ‫עלה פועלת · טו‪20‬‬ ‫ֹפַּﬠל · ח‪ ,7‬ח‪ ,25‬יג‪ ,31‬יד‪ ,2‬יד‪ ,216‬יד‪ ,17‬יז‪ ,ġ21‬יז‪ ,226‬יט‪ ,23‬יט‪ ,28‬כא‪,222‬‬ ‫כא‪ ,24‬כב‪ ,24‬כב‪ ,25‬כב‪ ,26‬כד‪ ,ġ32‬כז‪ ,17‬כז‪18‬‬ ‫ְפֻּﬠָלּה · ב‪ ,4‬טז‪ ,17‬יז‪ ,ġ21‬יט‪ ,30‬כא‪ ,11‬כא‪ ,23‬כד‪ ,ġ32‬כו‪ ,27‬כז‪} 1‬יד‪,6‬‬ ‫יח‪{10‬‬ ‫ָבֹּפַּﬠל · יא‪4‬‬ ‫ָבֹּפַּﬠל · ח‪ ,17‬י‪ ,220‬י‪ ,22‬י‪ ,23‬י‪ ,27‬יד‪ ,1‬יד‪ ,ġ29‬טז‪ ,15‬יז‪ ,3‬יט‪ ,25‬יט‪,26‬‬ ‫יט‪ ,228‬כב‪ ,16‬כב‪ ,20‬כב‪21‬‬ ‫ִהָפֲּﬠלוּת · ב‪4‬‬ ‫לבד · א‪ ,4‬ב‪ ,11‬ח‪ ,15‬טז‪ ,13‬יז‪ ,15‬יח‪ ,25‬יט‪ ,29‬כא‪ ,20‬כח‪12‬‬ ‫ִהְשִׂכּיל · ח‪17‬‬ ‫פילוסופיא · ב‪17‬‬ ‫ַגְּל ַגּל · טו‪ ,29‬טו‪ ,30‬טז‪ ,8‬יח‪ ,15‬יח‪ ,219‬כד‪ ,23‬כה‪ġ25‬‬ ‫הגלגל הנוטה · ח‪ ,20‬יא‪1‬‬ ‫הבין · ח‪ ,16‬ח‪ ,21‬ח‪22‬‬ ‫הבנה · יט‪19‬‬ ‫השיג בשלמות ·‬

‫כה‪ġ1‬‬

‫‪617‬‬ ‫فى‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫ב… · ‪passim‬‬

‫)فيد(‬

‫استفاد‬ ‫استفادة‬

‫קנה · יח‪ ,16‬יח‪ ,17‬כז‪ ,26‬כז‪ ,28‬כח‪11‬‬ ‫ְק ִנ ָיּה · כב‪ ,27‬כח‪6‬‬

‫ق‬ ‫)قبض(‬

‫انقبض‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ق َب ِ َ‬ ‫قابل‬ ‫قابل‪/‬يقبل الـكون‬ ‫قبل قابل‪/‬يقبل للفساد‬ ‫قبول‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ق َب ْ َ‬ ‫م ِن قبل‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن‬ ‫م َن كا‬ ‫ِ‬ ‫ل‬ ‫من قبِ َ ِ‬ ‫مقابلة‬ ‫قد‬ ‫قدر‬ ‫قدرة‬ ‫مقدار‬ ‫قدم‬ ‫أقدم‬ ‫القدماء‬ ‫مقدمة‬ ‫تقدم‬ ‫متقدم‬ ‫المتقدمين‬ ‫قرب‬ ‫قر يب‬ ‫محرك قر يب‬ ‫)قرر(‬ ‫أقر‬

‫ִנְק ַוץ · ב‪33‬‬ ‫ִקֵבּל · ג‪ ,23‬ג‪ ,13‬ג‪ ,28‬ד‪ ,6‬י‪ ,19‬יא‪ ,23‬יא‪ ,33‬יא‪ ,35‬יח‪ ,20‬כב‪ ,5‬כב‪,223‬‬ ‫כח‪ ,2‬כח‪21‬‬ ‫מקבל · ב‪ ,29‬ט‪29‬‬ ‫מקבל‪/‬יקבל ההויה · י‪ ,19‬יח‪20‬‬ ‫מקבל‪/‬יקבל להפסד · ב‪ ,30‬י‪ ,19‬יא‪ ,34‬יא‪ ,35‬יח‪ ,20‬כב‪23‬‬ ‫}כז‪{23‬‬ ‫לפני · ג‪ ,18‬יא‪ ,26‬יב‪ ,15‬יב‪ ,23‬כ‪ ,24‬כב‪27‬‬ ‫קֹ ֶדם · ג‪ ,21‬יא‪ ,34‬יג‪1‬‬ ‫לפנים · ח‪6‬‬ ‫מי שהיה מֶק ֶדם · ב‪17‬‬ ‫מצד · טו‪22‬‬ ‫התנגדות · ד‪13‬‬ ‫הנה · כבר · ‪passim‬‬ ‫פעמים · י‪ ,28‬יט‪19‬‬ ‫‪31‬‬ ‫ג‬ ‫י‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪31‬‬ ‫ג‬ ‫ָיכֹל · יב‪ ,26‬יב‪ ,27‬י‬ ‫‪ġ‬‬ ‫ְיכ ֶֹלת · יז‪ġ25‬‬ ‫ִשׁעוּר · א‪ ,11‬א‪ ,15‬ב‪ ,3‬ב‪ ,8‬ד‪ ,9‬יב‪ ,21‬כב‪26‬‬ ‫הקדים · ב‪21‬‬ ‫יותר קוֹ ֵדם · יב‪ ,10‬יד‪ġ29‬‬ ‫קודם · יד‪ġ23‬‬ ‫הקודמים · ב‪6‬‬ ‫הקדמה · כט‪9‬‬ ‫הקדים · כג‪4‬‬ ‫ָק ַדם · א‪ ,12‬א‪ ,13‬י‪ ,13‬יג‪ ,5‬כב‪26‬‬ ‫קוֹ ֵדם · א‪2‬‬ ‫אשר היו לפנינו · כב‪32‬‬ ‫ָק ַרב · יז‪ ,28‬יז‪ ,29‬יח‪14‬‬ ‫קרוב · ב‪ ,17‬ד‪ ,1‬י‪ ,232‬יא‪ ,3‬יא‪ ,4‬טז‪ ,22‬יח‪ ,16‬יח‪17‬‬ ‫מניע קרוב · י‪ ,4‬י‪9‬‬ ‫הודה ·‬

‫יד‪ġ29‬‬

‫‪618‬‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫)قرن(‬ ‫مقرون‬ ‫قسم‬ ‫منقسم‬ ‫صد َ‬ ‫قَ َ‬

‫مقصود‬ ‫صد‬ ‫قَ ْ‬

‫ְמֻחָבּר · יב‪17‬‬ ‫ִחֵלּק · ג‪ ,19‬ג‪ ,20‬יא‪ġ32‬‬ ‫מתחלק · כב‪6‬‬ ‫ִכּ ֵוּן · א‪ ,4‬ב‪ ,6‬ב‪ ,7‬ב‪ ,8‬ב‪ ,24‬י‪ ,31‬כג‪14‬‬ ‫כּוֹ ֵנן · א‪3‬‬ ‫כונה · כב‪20‬‬ ‫ְמֻכ ָוּן · ח‪17‬‬ ‫כונה · ב‪ ,8‬ט‪ ,32‬י‪ ,8‬י‪9‬‬

‫)قصص(‬

‫اقتص‬ ‫)قصو(‬ ‫أقصى‬ ‫غاية قصوى‬ ‫)قصو(‬ ‫انقضاء‬ ‫ق َطََع‬ ‫ق ِْطع‬ ‫انقطع‬ ‫انقطاع‬ ‫قفا أ ثره‬ ‫قلب‬ ‫قليل‬ ‫)قنع(‬ ‫مقنع‬ ‫)قود(‬ ‫قائد‬

‫ִסֵפּר · ג‪18‬‬ ‫אחרון · יז‪17‬‬ ‫תכלית אחרון · יז‪17‬‬ ‫ְגָּמר · כב‪25‬‬ ‫תכלית · כא‪20‬‬ ‫הפסיק · כ‪4‬‬ ‫חתיכה · יג‪19‬‬ ‫נפסק · יג‪16‬‬ ‫הפסק · טו‪ ,20‬טז‪9‬‬ ‫שם מגמתו · יח‪11‬‬ ‫לב · א‪8‬‬ ‫מעט · ב‪33‬‬ ‫ָפּחוּת · ב‪34‬‬ ‫מספיק · ז‪27‬‬ ‫יח‪ġ8‬‬

‫מושל ·‬ ‫שוטר · יח‪17‬‬

‫)قول(‬

‫قال‬

‫قيل‬ ‫قيل له‬ ‫قول‬

‫ָאַמר · א‪ ,18‬א‪ ,21‬א‪ ,222‬א‪ ,23‬ג‪ ,9‬ג‪ ,11‬ג‪ ,20‬ח‪ ,23‬י‪ ,23‬יא‪ ,19‬יא‪ ,33‬יב‪,214‬‬ ‫יב‪ ,22‬יב‪ ,28‬יג‪ ,3‬יג‪ ,5‬יג‪ ,18‬יז‪ ,11‬יז‪ ,26‬יט‪ ,3‬כא‪ ,24‬כב‪ ,11‬כב‪ ,34‬כה‪,13‬‬ ‫כו‪ ,21‬כז‪} 23‬יב‪{26‬‬ ‫ֶנֱאַמר · א‪ ,3‬יז‪13‬‬ ‫נקרא · ד‪ ,9‬ד‪ ,10‬י‪2‬‬ ‫מאמר · ב‪ ,6‬ב‪ ,22‬ב‪ ,31‬ג‪ ,17‬ז‪ ,27‬ח‪ ,23‬יב‪ ,14‬יג‪ ġ32‬כב‪ ,12‬כג‪ ,11‬כו‪,31‬‬ ‫כח‪10‬‬ ‫אֶמר · א‪ ,18‬א‪23‬‬ ‫ֹ‬

‫‪619‬‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬

‫)قوم(‬

‫قام‬ ‫قائم‬ ‫قوام‬ ‫قوم‬ ‫مستقيم‬ ‫حركة مستقيمة‬ ‫قوى‬ ‫قوة‬ ‫قوة محركة‬ ‫بالقوة‬

‫ما يختلط به مما بالقوة‬ ‫)قيسم(‬ ‫قاس‬ ‫قياس‬ ‫قايس‬ ‫مقايسة‬

‫עמד · ב‪ ,12‬יא‪24‬‬ ‫עומד · י‪ ,31‬טז‪212‬‬ ‫עמידה · יב‪ ,ġ1‬יט‪ ,16‬כט‪25‬‬ ‫אנשים · ח‪22‬‬ ‫ָיָשׁר · א‪ ,10‬א‪ ,222‬א‪ ,23‬א‪24‬‬ ‫ַﬠל ַהיּ ֶֹשׁר · יג‪15‬‬ ‫תנועה מקומית · יג‪15‬‬ ‫חזק · יא‪ ,4‬יב‪ ,29‬כד‪30‬‬ ‫כח · יג‪ ,ġ32‬יד‪ ,ġ2‬יד‪ ,16‬יד‪ ,ġ28‬יט‪ ,17‬כב‪ ,7‬כב‪ ,212‬כב‪ ,14‬כב‪ ,17‬כב‪,28‬‬ ‫כג‪ ,14‬כז‪ ,8‬כז‪ ,17‬כט‪ġ6‬‬ ‫כח מניע · כב‪ ,27‬כג‪18‬‬ ‫בכח · ט‪ ,27‬י‪ ,17‬י‪ ,20‬י‪ ,21‬י‪ ,22‬י‪ ,23‬י‪ ,28‬יג‪ ,34‬יד‪ ,ġ3‬יד‪ ,8‬יד‪ ,17‬יז‪ ,3‬יט‪,25‬‬ ‫יט‪ ,26‬יט‪ ,28‬יט‪ ,29‬כב‪ ,15‬כב‪ ,17‬כב‪ ,19‬כב‪ ,21‬כב‪ ,23‬כב‪ ,225‬כב‪,26‬‬ ‫כב‪ ,28‬כב‪ ,29‬כז‪15‬‬ ‫לא יתערב בו מה שהוא בכח · כ‪24‬‬ ‫הקיש · כט‪6‬‬ ‫הקש · ט‪ ,28‬טו‪ ,16‬כג‪7‬‬ ‫הקיש · יד‪ġ16‬‬ ‫הקש · ט‪31‬‬

‫ك‬ ‫כ…‪/‬כמו · ‪passim‬‬ ‫כדרך · יז‪29‬‬ ‫כפי · כד‪28‬‬ ‫מן הדומה · ג‪24‬‬

‫ك‪-‬‬

‫)كبر(‬ ‫أكبر‬ ‫كتاب العلم الطبيعى‬ ‫)كثر(‬ ‫كثير‬

‫كثرة‬ ‫أكثر‬ ‫أكثر كثيرا ً‬

‫ָגּדוֹל · ח‪10‬‬ ‫ספר החכמה הטבעית · ג‪32‬‬ ‫ַרב · ב‪ ,32‬טז‪ ,18‬כב‪ ,30‬כג‪ ,7‬כג‪ ,10‬כה‪ ,16‬כה‪ ,ġ24‬כז‪ ,3‬כח‪ ,21‬כח‪ ,5‬כח‪,11‬‬ ‫כח‪} 28‬יח‪{24‬‬ ‫הרבה · י‪) 6‬טז‪ ,27‬יז‪ ,7‬כט‪ ,10‬לה‪(2‬‬ ‫ר ֹב · ז‪28‬‬ ‫ִרבּוּי · ז‪ ,28‬כ‪ ,24‬כא‪ ,9‬כב‪ ,32‬כג‪ ,14‬כה‪ ,16‬כט‪ġ6‬‬ ‫יותר · ח‪ ,9‬יט‪ ,28‬כ‪ ,2‬כא‪ ,9‬כה‪ ,13‬כה‪ ,14‬כח‪28‬‬ ‫ר ֹב · ג‪ ,30‬יט‪ ,18‬כא‪9‬‬ ‫יותר מאד · כ‪2‬‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫تكثر‬ ‫كد‬ ‫كذلك‬ ‫كرم‬ ‫كر يم‬ ‫)كسب(‬ ‫مكتسب‬ ‫)كفي(‬ ‫اكتفاء‬ ‫كل‬ ‫كلى‬ ‫)كلم(‬ ‫كلام‬ ‫تكلم‬ ‫كما‬ ‫كمل‬ ‫كمال‬ ‫)كمم(‬ ‫كم‬ ‫)كمن(‬ ‫كامن‬ ‫)كنز(‬ ‫اكتنز‬ ‫كوكب‬ ‫كوكب ثابت‬ ‫كوكب متحير‬ ‫)كون(‬ ‫كان‬ ‫أن يكون‬ ‫كا ئن‬ ‫كون‬ ‫قابل‪/‬يقبل الـكون‬ ‫مكان‬ ‫كيف‬

‫}ל‪{11‬‬ ‫}יט‪{17‬‬ ‫כמו · ‪passim‬‬ ‫כרם · י‪22‬‬ ‫נדיב · ח‪18‬‬ ‫נקנה · יט‪21‬‬ ‫ִספּוּק · כח‪5‬‬ ‫כל · ‪passim‬‬ ‫כללי · ב‪16‬‬ ‫דבור · ג‪ ,17‬ג‪ ,32‬ח‪ ,22‬כב‪33‬‬ ‫ִדֵּבּר · ג‪ ,30‬ג‪ ,32‬ח‪ ,22‬כב‪32‬‬ ‫כמו · ‪passim‬‬ ‫השלים · כח‪ ,3‬כח‪ ,24‬כח‪ ,5‬כח‪28‬‬ ‫ְשֵׁלמוּת · יז‪ ,16‬יז‪ ,17‬יז‪ ,30‬כח‪26‬‬ ‫כמה · ב‪ ,10‬ב‪ ,11‬ד‪6‬‬ ‫טמון · ח‪ ,26‬ח‪27‬‬ ‫התקשה · ג‪1‬‬ ‫כוכב · כב‪ ,11‬כב‪ ,12‬כב‪ ,17‬כב‪ ,227‬כב‪29‬‬ ‫כוכב ַק ָיּם · יח‪ ,15‬יח‪19‬‬ ‫כוכב נבוך · יח‪19‬‬ ‫היה · ‪passim‬‬ ‫ֱהיוֹת · ג‪33‬‬ ‫ה ֶוה · יב‪} 10‬טו‪{18‬‬ ‫ֹ‬ ‫הויה · ד‪ ,9‬יב‪ ,8‬יב‪ ,10‬יב‪ ,ġ13‬טו‪20‬‬ ‫מקבל‪/‬יקבל ההויה · י‪ ,19‬יח‪20‬‬ ‫מקום · ב‪ ,4‬ג‪ ,4‬ג‪ ,9‬ג‪ ,210‬ג‪ ,11‬ג‪ ,26‬ד‪ ,310‬ד‪ ,212‬ד‪ ,13‬יח‪ ,25‬כב‪ ,18‬כב‪ ,219‬כב‪28‬‬ ‫איך · יב‪ ,23‬יד‪ ,ġ23‬כב‪22‬‬ ‫איכות · ט‪27‬‬

‫ل‬ ‫ل‪-‬‬

‫لا‬

‫‪620‬‬

‫ל… · כדי · ‪passim‬‬ ‫לא · אין · ‪passim‬‬

‫‪621‬‬ ‫لأن‬ ‫لبث‬ ‫)لبس(‬ ‫ملابس‬ ‫لحق‬ ‫لحم‬ ‫لذة‬ ‫لذيذ‬ ‫لزم‬ ‫)لغو(‬ ‫ألغى‬ ‫لفظ‬ ‫لفظة‬ ‫لـكن )لاكن(‬ ‫لم‬ ‫لم ِ َا‬ ‫لما‬ ‫)لهم(‬ ‫أل ْه ِم َ‬ ‫إلهام‬ ‫لو‬ ‫لولا‬ ‫لون‬ ‫ليس‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫כי · ‪passim‬‬ ‫עמד · כח‪8‬‬ ‫לובש · כ‪ġ15‬‬ ‫ִהִשּׂיג · כח‪13‬‬ ‫בשר · י‪22‬‬ ‫הנאה · יט‪ ,21‬יט‪22‬‬ ‫ֲﬠ ֵרבוּת · יט‪ ,28‬כ‪32‬‬ ‫ָﬠ ֵרב · טז‪ ,23‬יט‪ ,22‬יט‪ ,23‬יט‪ ,25‬יט‪26‬‬ ‫ִהְתַח ֵיּב · י‪ ,16‬יא‪ ,34‬יב‪ ,10‬יב‪ ,29‬יג‪34‬‬

‫הניח · ג‪22‬‬ ‫הפשיט · ד‪5‬‬ ‫מלה · א‪ ,217‬א‪ ,219‬א‪ ,20‬א‪ ,24‬יב‪ ,15‬יב‪16‬‬ ‫אבל · ‪passim‬‬ ‫לא · ‪passim‬‬ ‫בעבור ש… · יט‪17‬‬ ‫מפני ש… · ב‪ ,18‬ג‪ ,13‬ג‪ ,30‬ח‪ ,13‬כב‪17‬‬ ‫כאשר · ‪passim‬‬ ‫ֻה ְזַכּר · ח‪ ,18‬ח‪22‬‬ ‫הזכרה · ח‪18‬‬ ‫ִאלּוּ · כ‪ ,7‬כא‪ ,13‬כב‪15‬‬ ‫ֲאִפלּוּ · יט‪19‬‬ ‫לולי · ח‪5‬‬ ‫מראה · ד‪3‬‬ ‫אין · לא · ‪passim‬‬

‫م‬ ‫ما‬ ‫متى‬ ‫م َث َل‬ ‫م ِث ْل‬ ‫مثلا ً‬ ‫على مثال واحد‬ ‫على هذا المثال‬ ‫مثال ذلك‬

‫מה · ‪passim‬‬ ‫כאשר · ח‪25‬‬ ‫מתי · יב‪ġ16‬‬ ‫דמיון · ז‪ ,28‬ח‪ ,224‬יט‪14‬‬ ‫כמו · ‪passim‬‬ ‫דומה · ח‪ ,2‬י‪4‬‬ ‫דרך משל · א‪21‬‬ ‫על דמיון אחד · א‪14‬‬ ‫על זה הדמיון · א‪ ,11‬א‪20‬‬ ‫דמיון זה · א‪ ,18‬ט‪ ,25‬י‪ ,6‬י‪20‬‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬

‫‪622‬‬

‫)مدد(‬

‫مدة‬ ‫بلا مدة‬ ‫مادة‬ ‫)مدن(‬ ‫مدينة‬ ‫أهل المدينة‬ ‫سياسة المدن‬ ‫مرة‬ ‫)مسس(‬ ‫تماس‬ ‫مع‬ ‫معا ً‬ ‫)معن(‬ ‫أمعن‬ ‫)مكن(‬ ‫يمكن )أمكن(‬

‫إمكان‬ ‫ملك‬ ‫مالك‬ ‫م َن‬ ‫م ِن‬ ‫الشىء الذى من أجله‬ ‫من قبل أن‬ ‫)‪ x‬من ال‪(x-‬‬ ‫منع‬ ‫مانع‬ ‫امتنع‬ ‫ممتنع‬ ‫منى‬

‫מדה · יט‪ ,16‬יט‪19‬‬ ‫בלא שעור · כח‪7‬‬ ‫חֶמר · יד‪ ,24‬כה‪16‬‬ ‫ֹ‬ ‫מדינה · א‪ ,7‬יח‪ġ8‬‬ ‫אנשי המדינה · יז‪29‬‬ ‫הדרכת המדינות · יז‪ ,29‬כה‪ġ25‬‬ ‫פעם · ב‪ ,34‬ג‪ ,215‬ד‪ ,8‬ד‪ ,9‬ד‪ ,210‬י‪ ,220‬כב‪ ,18‬כב‪19‬‬

‫ִמֵשּׁשׁ · א‪6‬‬ ‫עם · ‪passim‬‬ ‫ַיַחד · טז‪ ,13‬טז‪ ,19‬טז‪ ,21‬כ‪ ,14‬כ‪ ,29‬כ‪ ,30‬כח‪ ,1‬כח‪ ,9‬כח‪ ,29‬כט‪ ,ġ25‬כט‪24‬‬ ‫היטיב ְלַﬠ ֵיּן · ב‪23‬‬ ‫אפשר )היה אפשר( · א‪ ,24‬א‪ ,25‬ב‪ ,1‬ח‪ ,6‬ח‪ ,13‬ט‪ ,30‬י‪ ,24‬י‪ ,25‬י‪ ,26‬יא‪,22‬‬ ‫יא‪ ,24‬יא‪ ,29‬יא‪ ,30‬יב‪ ,23‬יב‪ ,26‬יג‪ ,19‬יג‪ ,28‬יג‪ ,34‬יד‪ ,ġ23‬טז‪ ,11‬טז‪ ,12‬יח‪,16‬‬ ‫יט‪ ,5‬יט‪ ,14‬כא‪ ,13‬כב‪ ,19‬כב‪ ,22‬כב‪ ,24‬כב‪ ,25‬כד‪ ,ġ31‬כה‪ ,ġ7‬כה‪ ,ġ23‬כח‪,9‬‬ ‫כט‪ġ4‬‬ ‫אפשרות · יח‪ ,24‬יט‪9‬‬ ‫ֶמֶלְך · יח‪17‬‬ ‫מוֵֹלְך · כט‪225‬‬ ‫מי · ‪passim‬‬ ‫מ…‪/‬מן · ‪passim‬‬ ‫הדבר אשר בעבורו · יז‪16‬‬ ‫מפני כי · א‪11‬‬ ‫שׁוּם · ב‪ ,1‬ג‪14‬‬ ‫מנע · ב‪ ,24‬יב‪ ,24‬יט‪ ,19‬כ‪4‬‬ ‫מונע · ב‪ ,24‬יב‪ ,24‬יב‪ ,28‬יב‪ ,29‬יט‪20‬‬ ‫נמנע · ג‪6‬‬ ‫נמנע · ג‪ ,6‬ד‪11‬‬ ‫זרע · ח‪24‬‬ ‫שכבת זרע · ח‪2‬‬

‫)موت(‬

‫أمات‬ ‫ميت‬ ‫بمائت‬ ‫)موه(‬ ‫ماء‬

‫המית · כו‪31‬‬ ‫מת · ז‪ ,29‬ז‪30‬‬ ‫מת · כב‪6‬‬ ‫מים · ב‪ ,19‬ב‪ ,21‬ד‪28‬‬

‫‪623‬‬ ‫)ميل(‬ ‫الفلك المائل‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬

‫הגלגל הנוטה · ח‪ ,20‬יא‪1‬‬

‫ن‬ ‫)نبأ(‬ ‫أنبأ‬ ‫)نبت(‬ ‫أنبت‬ ‫نبات‬ ‫)نبع(‬ ‫ينبوع‬ ‫)نتج(‬ ‫أنتج‬ ‫نتيجة‬ ‫)نجر(‬ ‫صناعة النجارة‬ ‫)نجم(‬ ‫تنجم‬ ‫علم النجوم‬ ‫نحلة‬ ‫نحن‬ ‫نحو‬ ‫على نحو‬ ‫)نزل(‬ ‫بمنزلة‬

‫نسب‬ ‫نسبة‬ ‫مناسبة‬ ‫)نشأ(‬ ‫أنشأ‬ ‫نشوء‬ ‫)نشر(‬ ‫انتشر‬ ‫)نطق(‬ ‫الر ياضة^ بالمنطق‬ ‫ن َظَر َ‬

‫ִנָבּא · ח‪22‬‬ ‫הצמיח · יד‪26‬‬ ‫צמח · ב‪ ,30‬ג‪ ,3‬ח‪ ,2‬ח‪ ,3‬ח‪ ,24‬ח‪ ,5‬יד‪27‬‬ ‫צומח · א‪6‬‬ ‫ַמבּוּ ַע · כו‪32‬‬ ‫הוליד · כט‪8‬‬ ‫תולדה · כט‪8‬‬ ‫אומנות הנגר ·‬

‫ל‪ġ6‬‬

‫}כד‪{30‬‬ ‫חכמת הכוכבים · כג‪15‬‬ ‫דבורה · ז‪29‬‬ ‫אנחנו · ‪passim‬‬ ‫דרך · א‪9‬‬ ‫על דרך · א‪ ,3‬א‪8‬‬ ‫בדרך‪/‬כדרך · יז‪ ,15‬יז‪ ,16‬יח‪ ,17‬כ‪ ,23‬כא‪ ,8‬כב‪ ,15‬כב‪ ,19‬כב‪22‬‬ ‫על דרך · יא‪ġ31‬‬ ‫ַיַחס · ח‪ ,3‬ח‪ ,5‬ח‪ ,6‬ח‪ ,11‬ח‪ ,14‬ח‪ ,15‬ח‪ ,18‬ח‪23‬‬ ‫ַיַחס · יט‪29‬‬ ‫ַיַחס · ט‪ ,24‬ט‪31‬‬ ‫ברא · ח‪1‬‬ ‫ִגּדּוּל · ג‪26‬‬ ‫התפשט · ב‪34‬‬ ‫חכמת ההגיון · ב‪14‬‬ ‫חקר · יא‪29‬‬ ‫ִﬠ ֵיּן · כו‪23‬‬

‫‪624‬‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫ن َظَر‬ ‫نظير‬

‫עיון · ב‪ ,21‬ח‪9‬‬ ‫כנגד · ט‪ ,226‬ט‪ ,227‬ט‪228‬‬ ‫דומה · ד‪3‬‬ ‫דמיון · ח‪5‬‬

‫)نظم(‬

‫نظام‬ ‫ت‬ ‫نعَ َ َ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫نعُ ِ َ‬ ‫نفس‬ ‫النفس التى فى الأرض‬ ‫نفسه‬ ‫لنفسه‬ ‫متنفس‬ ‫)نفع(‬ ‫انتفع‬ ‫نفى‬ ‫ن ُفَِي‬ ‫نقص‬ ‫ناقص‬ ‫نقصان‬ ‫تنقص‬ ‫)نقض(‬ ‫ناقض‬ ‫)نقل(‬ ‫انتقل‬ ‫منتقل‬ ‫انتقال‬ ‫نقلة‬ ‫)نكر(‬ ‫أنكر‬ ‫)نمس(‬ ‫ناموس‬ ‫نمو‬ ‫)نهي(‬ ‫نهاية‬ ‫بغير نهاية‬ ‫لا نهاية له‬ ‫متناه‬

‫י ֶֹשׁר · א‪ ,8‬יז‪ ,ġ25‬יז‪ ,28‬יח‪ ,11‬יח‪,16‬‬ ‫ֵתֵּאר · א‪16‬‬ ‫תַּאר · א‪ ,13‬א‪14‬‬ ‫ֹ‬ ‫נפש · ח‪ ,19‬י‪ ,15‬י‪ ,22‬כב‪ ,14‬כג‪1‬‬ ‫הנפש אשר בארץ · ח‪19‬‬ ‫נפשו · כח‪ ,18‬כח‪19‬‬ ‫בנפש · כח‪18‬‬ ‫לנפש · כח‪ ,16‬כח‪ ,17‬כח‪18‬‬ ‫בעל נפש · כא‪14‬‬

‫ל‪ġ21‬‬

‫היתה תועלת ב… · יג‪28‬‬ ‫שלל · א‪20‬‬ ‫ֻסַלּק · כז‪22‬‬ ‫ָקַצר · יז‪30‬‬ ‫ָחֵסר · כח‪4‬‬ ‫חסרון · ד‪10‬‬ ‫חסרון · ג‪26‬‬ ‫סתר · יב‪15‬‬ ‫נעתק · כ‪23‬‬ ‫נעתק · יט‪5‬‬ ‫ֶהְﬠֵתּק · כ‪27‬‬ ‫ֶהְﬠֵתּק · ד‪10‬‬ ‫הכחיש · כט‪6‬‬ ‫נימוס · יז‪ ,ġ18‬יז‪ ,ġ21‬יז‪ ,ġ25‬כא‪ ,12‬כא‪ ,213‬כא‪,19‬‬ ‫ִגּדּוּל · ד‪10‬‬

‫כה‪ġ25‬‬

‫תכלית · ח‪ ,15‬כב‪24‬‬ ‫בלי תכלית · כב‪7‬‬ ‫אין תכלית לו · יט‪ ,24‬כב‪ ,6‬כב‪ ,12‬כב‪ ,13‬כב‪ ,15‬כב‪ ,21‬כב‪ ,26‬כב‪,27‬‬ ‫כה‪ġ10‬‬ ‫בעל תכלית · כב‪ 7‬כב‪ ,11‬כב‪ ,17‬כב‪28‬‬

‫‪625‬‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬

‫)نور(‬

‫نار‬ ‫نوع‬ ‫نوم‬ ‫غرق فى النوم‬ ‫نائم‬

‫אש · ב‪ ,219‬ב‪ ,21‬ב‪32‬‬ ‫מין · ז‪ ,30‬ח‪ ,26‬יג‪} 2‬ג‪{26‬‬ ‫ֵשׁ ָנה · יט‪ ,23‬כו‪29‬‬ ‫שקוע בֵשׁ ָנה · כו‪28‬‬ ‫ישן · כה‪25‬‬

‫ه‬ ‫هذا‪/‬هذه‪/‬هؤلاء‬ ‫هرب‬ ‫هل‬ ‫هناك‬ ‫هو‬ ‫هؤلاء‬ ‫)هوى(‬ ‫هواء‬ ‫هاو ية‬ ‫)هيأ(‬ ‫تهيأ‬ ‫متهيئ‬ ‫)هيب(‬ ‫تهيب‬ ‫)هيل(‬ ‫هيولى‬ ‫)لا( تشو به الهيولى‬ ‫)لا( يشو به شىء من الهيولى‬

‫זה‪/‬הזה · זו‪/‬הזו · אלו‪/‬האלו · ‪passim‬‬ ‫ברח · כז‪28‬‬ ‫ִאם · ‪passim‬‬ ‫ָשׁם · ד‪6‬‬ ‫הוא · ‪passim‬‬ ‫ֵאלּוּ · ‪passim‬‬ ‫אויר · ב‪ ,19‬ב‪ ,21‬ד‪ ,8‬י‪25‬‬ ‫אויר · יד‪^ 19‬‬ ‫‪ġ‬‬ ‫ֻתַכּן · יט‪20‬‬ ‫מוכן · ח‪6‬‬ ‫עצלה · י‪13‬‬ ‫היולי · יד‪ ,ġ223‬יד‪ ,ġ28‬כה‪18‬‬ ‫מה שיתערב בו ההיולי‪/‬לא יתערב בו ההיולי · כ‪ ,20‬כב‪31‬‬ ‫)לא( יתערב בו דבר מן ההיולי · יד‪ ,7‬יד‪ ,ġ7‬טז‪ ,14‬יז‪ġ4‬‬

‫و‬ ‫و‬ ‫وجب‬ ‫يجب‬ ‫يجب ضرورة‬ ‫أوجب‬ ‫بالواجب‬ ‫من الواجب أن‬

‫ו… · ‪passim‬‬ ‫התחיב · יג‪ ,4‬יג‪ ,19‬יג‪ ,22‬יד‪ ,13‬יז‪ ,27‬כ‪ ,29‬כא‪ ,25‬כא‪ ,27‬כד‪ ,27‬כה‪,13‬‬ ‫כה‪ ,18‬כה‪ ,20‬כח‪} 10‬יג‪{23‬‬ ‫ראוי · י‪ ,15‬יא‪ ,ġ28‬יג‪ ,21‬יג‪ ,28‬יד‪ ,6‬טז‪ ,15‬כב‪ ,30‬כג‪ ,18‬כו‪ ,22‬כז‪ ,1‬כז‪,22‬‬ ‫כז‪ ,28‬כז‪ ,29‬כט‪6‬‬ ‫יתחיב בהכרח · טו ‪ ,21‬טז‪ ,14‬כג‪ ,8‬כג‪10‬‬ ‫ראוי בהכרח · ב‪ ,25‬ד‪ ,3‬יג‪ ,25‬טו‪23‬‬ ‫ִח ֵיּב · יב‪ ,227‬כג‪} 11‬כג‪{7‬‬ ‫בהכרח · טו‪ġ27‬‬ ‫מן ַהְמֻּח ָיּב ש… · כז‪15‬‬

‫‪626‬‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫وجد‬ ‫جد َ‬ ‫وُ ِ‬

‫موجود‬

‫وجود‬ ‫وجه‬ ‫جهة‬ ‫)وحد(‬ ‫واحد‬

‫على مثال واحد‬ ‫وحده‬ ‫أحد‬ ‫اتحد‬ ‫متحد‬ ‫اتحاد‬ ‫ودع‬ ‫)وسع(‬ ‫اتساع‬ ‫وصف‬ ‫صفة‬

‫מצא · ג‪ ,14‬ח‪ ,1‬ח‪ ,7‬ח‪ ,10‬ט‪ ,30‬י‪ ,19‬יב‪ ,5‬יד‪ ,ġ16‬יט‪ ,17‬טז‪} 22‬ח‪{26‬‬ ‫נמצא · א‪ ,9‬א‪ ,10‬א‪ ,11‬א‪ ,15‬ב‪ ,2‬ג‪ ,16‬ד‪ ,13‬ח‪ ,24‬ט‪ ,31‬י‪ ,1‬י‪ ,17‬י‪ ,19‬י‪,20‬‬ ‫יא‪ ,25‬טז‪ ,11‬טז‪ ,12‬טז‪ ,213‬טז‪ ,214‬טז‪ ,18‬יז‪ ,29‬יט‪ ,27‬יט‪ ,29‬כב‪ ,3‬כב‪,7‬‬ ‫כה‪ ,ġ7‬כז‪17‬‬ ‫נמצא · א‪ ,3‬א‪ ,4‬א‪ ,5‬ב‪ ,7‬ב‪ ,210‬ב‪ ,20‬ב‪ ,25‬ט‪ ,25‬ט‪ ,32‬י‪ ,12‬י‪ ,217‬י‪ ,21‬י‪,28‬‬ ‫יא‪ ,34‬יא‪ ,35‬יב‪ ,4‬יב‪ ,5‬יג‪ ,34‬יד‪ ,26‬יז‪ ,11‬יז‪ ,12‬יז‪ ,28‬יח‪ ,12‬יט‪ ,10‬כ‪ ,25‬כ‪,228‬‬ ‫כ‪ ,229‬כא‪ ,11‬כא‪ ,12‬כח‪ ,20‬ל‪ġ25‬‬ ‫מציאות · א‪ ,212‬א‪ ,13‬א‪ ,15‬א‪ ,16‬א‪ ,17‬א‪ ,19‬ב‪ ,18‬ב‪ 23‬יב‪ ,24‬כ‪3‬‬ ‫פנים · ג‪ ,14‬ד‪12‬‬ ‫צד · ד‪ ,13‬טז‪ ,16‬יט‪ ,4‬כ‪ ,27‬כב‪28‬‬ ‫אחד · א‪ ,9‬א‪ ,12‬א‪ ,14‬ב‪ ,2‬ב‪ ,11‬ב‪ ,12‬ב‪ ,13‬ב‪ ,34‬ג‪ ,20‬ג‪ ,22‬ג‪ ,26‬ג‪ ,28‬ח‪,2‬‬ ‫ח‪ ,14‬י‪ ,19‬יא‪ ,ġ29‬טו‪ ,16‬טו‪ ,219‬טו‪ ,30‬יז‪ ,10‬יז‪ ,211‬טז‪ ,21‬יז‪ ,12‬יז‪ ,213‬יח‪,25‬‬ ‫יט‪ ,9‬כ‪ ,27‬כב‪ ,18‬כב‪ ,30‬כג‪ ,5‬כג‪ ,8‬כה‪ ,13‬כה‪ ,14‬כה‪ ,16‬כה‪ ,19‬כה‪,220‬‬ ‫כה‪ ,ġ24‬כז‪ ,3‬כז‪ ,34‬כח‪ ,32‬כח‪ ,3‬כח‪ ,26‬כח‪ ,12‬כח‪ ,321‬ל‪} 10‬ב‪ ,28‬יז‪,3‬‬ ‫כח‪{27‬‬ ‫על דמיון אחד · א‪14‬‬ ‫לבד · ג‪ ,5‬ח‪ ,26‬יג‪21‬‬ ‫אחד · ב‪ ,28‬ג‪ ,13‬ג‪ ,28‬ד‪ ,4‬ד‪ ,5‬טז‪11‬‬ ‫}טז‪{19‬‬ ‫מתאחד · א‪5‬‬ ‫התאחדות · א‪5‬‬ ‫עזב · כח‪21‬‬ ‫התרחבות ·‬ ‫הציע · ט‪24‬‬ ‫ִסֵפּר · ד‪6‬‬ ‫}יא‪{27‬‬

‫כט‪ġ6‬‬

‫)وصل(‬

‫متصل‬

‫متصل البقاء‬ ‫اتصال‬ ‫وضع‬ ‫موضوع‬ ‫موضع‬ ‫)وفق(‬ ‫اتفق‬ ‫موافق فى الصورة‬

‫מתדבק · יג‪ ,19‬יג‪ ,20‬יג‪ ,21‬כא‪26‬‬ ‫דבק · יז‪ġ22‬‬ ‫ְמ ֻדָבּק · כה‪19‬‬ ‫דבק ההשארות · יז‪ġ23‬‬ ‫דבקות · יג‪ ,15‬יג‪ ,17‬כז‪15‬‬ ‫הניח · י‪ ,15‬יב‪ ,9‬יב‪ ,10‬יג‪30‬‬ ‫נושא · ד‪ ,4‬ט‪ ,28‬ט‪29‬‬ ‫מקום · א‪ ,28‬ב‪ ,9‬ג‪ ,7‬יח‪ ,17‬כב‪ ,4‬כב‪218‬‬ ‫הסכים · ב‪27‬‬ ‫נאות בצורה · י‪ ,31‬יא‪3‬‬

‫‪627‬‬ ‫وقت‬ ‫)وقع(‬ ‫واقع‬ ‫أوقع‬ ‫توقع‬ ‫)وقف(‬ ‫وقوف‬ ‫)وفي(‬ ‫توقى‬ ‫ولد‬ ‫موالد‬ ‫توَ َلدَ َ‬ ‫توَ َلدُ‬ ‫وهم‬ ‫وهمى‬ ‫توَ َه َم َ‬

‫توُ ُه ِم َ‬

‫‪arabic–hebrew lexicon‬‬ ‫עת · ג‪ ,6‬ג‪ ,7‬י‪ ,18‬י‪ ,21‬יב‪ ,14‬יב‪ ,15‬טו‪ ,17‬טו‪ ,19‬כ‪ ,223‬כא‪ ,8‬כא‪ ,221‬כב‪,18‬‬ ‫כב‪ ,222‬כו‪29‬‬ ‫נופל · ב‪28‬‬ ‫ִהִפּיל · א‪ ,17‬א‪ ,19‬א‪ ,20‬א‪ ,21‬א‪ ,23‬א‪24‬‬ ‫ִק ָוּה · יט‪26‬‬ ‫עמידה · כג‪14‬‬ ‫נזהר · י‪16‬‬ ‫הוליד · י‪ ,5‬י‪ ,8‬כא‪ ,11‬יד‪ġ19‬‬ ‫מוליד · ח‪27‬‬ ‫התילד · ז‪ ,229‬ז‪ ,30‬ח‪ ,1‬ח‪ ,23‬ח‪ ,5‬ח‪ ,12‬ח‪ ,224‬י‪ ,21‬י‪23‬‬ ‫ֻהֶלּ ֶדת · ח‪24‬‬ ‫מחשבה · א‪ ,25‬ב‪ ,12‬י‪31‬‬ ‫מחשבי · י‪5‬‬ ‫ִדָּמּה · ג‪13‬‬ ‫‪31‬‬ ‫כ‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪19‬‬ ‫ג‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪18‬‬ ‫ג‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬ ‫ָחַשׁב · ג‬ ‫‪ġ‬‬ ‫ֻדָּמּה · יב‪ ,24‬כב‪22‬‬

‫ي‬ ‫يسير‬ ‫يقظة‬ ‫)يوم(‬ ‫اليوم‬

‫קטן · יט‪19‬‬ ‫יקיצה · יט‪22‬‬ ‫ַהיּוֹם · ב‪14‬‬

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Index of Names and Places ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī 39–48, 65, 93–94, 107, 378, 404, 406, 407, 410, 414, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 435, 438, 442, 445, 446, 447, 448, 458, 461, 462, 473, 479, 482, 483, 495 Abraham ibn Ezra 71 Abraham, son of Maimonides 72 Abū Bišr Mattā 24, 27, 29–31, 49 Abū Kāmil 105n146 Achard, Martin 126 Achilles 389 Adrastus 5 Aḥiṭub 533n14 Alexander of Aphrodisias 4–6, 13, 17, 21, 29, 40, 43, 66, 124, 127n43, 343, 514 Alexandru, Stefan 9n28, 333, 419, 436, 441, 499, 500 Al-ʿĀmirī, see Pseudo-Al-ʿĀmirī Anaxagoras 134n49, 139, 351–352, 353–355, 361, 398, 400, 403, 421n3, 432, 486, 490–491 Anaximander 139, 351, 353 Andronicus of Rhodes 113n12 Apollonius of Perga 31n13 Aristotle passim Aristotle of Mytilene 5 Arnzen, Rüdiger 535–536 Asclepius of Tralles 6, 7n19 Asia Minor 7 Aspasius 5 Athens 1 Autolycus 31 Averroes 6, 12, 13n51, 17–20, 23, 26, 27, 33, 38, 39, 41, 49–50, 54n76, 65, 69, 96, 98, 103–105, 330, 343, 361, 366, 372–378, 434, 451, 480, 496, 501, 509–512, 514– 526, 532, 534–536, 539 Avicenna 13n50, 16–17, 18, 37–39, 40n50, 43n61, 48, 61–63, 65 Avignon 70 Badawī, ʿAbd al-Raḥman 27, 32, 33, 37, 39, 49, 61, passim in Commentary, 525n9 Baghdad 1, 32 Ballériaux, Omer 8n26, 114n12, 119n23 Bartolucci, Guido 105n146

Al-Baṭalyawsī 532, 539 Ben-Shammai, Hagai 97n134 Berti, Enrico 10, 328, 398n4 Bertolacci, Amos 15, 16, 49 Bīdārfar, Muḥsin 61 Blumenthal, Henry 8n24, 21n90, 117 Boethus of Sidon 113n12 Bonitz, Hermann 9n28 Bordt, Michael 422n6 Bouyges, Maurice 39, 374, 379, 451, 501 Brague, Rémi 10, 13n47, 21n91, 27, 28n5, 33n30, 81, 89, passim in Commentary Buchara 48 Callippus 453, 455, 456 Capone Ciollaro, Maria 8n24, 123–124, 139n54 Celsus (correspondent of Libanius) 117n19 Chaerephon 117 Charles, David 9n28 Coda, Elisa 10n35, 126, 127n43 Code, Alan 392 Constantinople 1, 7–8 Crubellier, Michel 380n1, 382, 501, 531n7 DeFilippo, Joseph G. 423n7 Democritus 139, 351, 353, 491n6 Demosthenes 112 Desbordes, Françoise 112n9 Di Giovanni, Matteo 6 Druart, Thérèse-Anne 15 Efros, Israel 533n13–14 Elders, Leo 4n4, 9n28, 339, 358, 370, 380n2–3, 382n26, 396n1, 397n3, 398n4, 484n1 Empedocles 139, 351, 353, 398, 403, 419, 421n3, 486, 490, 491, 499 Epaphroditus 31n13 Euclid 31 Eudorus 5 Eudoxus 453, 455, 456 Eugenius 8, 118–120 Euphrasius (pupil of Iamblichus) 117n19 Eutecnius 113, 115

644 Falaquera, Šem Ṭob 19, 25, 56, 98–102, 105, 404, 405, 406, 408 Al-Fārābī 13, 14n53, 15–16, 18, 20, 23, 40, 67, 72, 73, 529, 531n6, 532 Farhat, M. Taïeb 48 Fazzo, Silvia 5n7, 114n12, 343, 351n1, 436 Ferella, Chiara 354n6 Finzi, Abramo 105n146 Finzi, Moshe 1n2, 9n28, 23, 24, 25, 105–106, 417, 419 Finzi, Mordekhai (Angelo) 105n146 Fraenkel, Carlos 11, 17 Frank, Richard M. 27, 32, 49n70–71, 58, 59, 60n83, 105, passim in Commentary Frede, Michael 9n28, 333 Freudenthal, Gad 81n120, 89n127, 530n4 Freudenthal, Jacob 514 Galen 31n13, 138n53, 529n3 Al-Ġazālī 72 Geoffroy, Marc 48 Genequand, Charles 12n42, 29, 40n56, 49n70, 375, 379 Gerard of Cremona 534n18 Gersonides 19–20, 69, 70, 72, 73, 102–104, 366, 378, 419, 522 Ghorab, A.A. 33 Goldziher, Ignaz 97n134 Golitsis, Pantelis 5–6 Goshen-Gottstein, Moshe 358, 360, 375, 475 Griffin, Michael 114n12 Guldentops, Guy 11–12, 427n14, 495 Gutas, Dimitri 40, 48, 61, 509 Hadot, Ilsetraut 12–13, 22n94, 375, 501 Halper, Yehuda 81n123, 377n8, 514–515 Heath, Malcolm 111n6 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 11 Henry, Devin 12 Hermodorus of Syracuse 380n3 Hierus (pupil of Iamblichus) 117n19 Homer 487 Ḥoresh, Sasson 108n151, 357 Horn, Christoph 9, 484n1 Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq 31 Iamblichus 21, 117n19 Ibn al-Nadīm 14, 27–30, 31n13, 31n20

index of names and places Ibn Kaspī, Yosef 20, 99, 101 Ibn Rušd, see Averroes Ibn Sīnā, see Avicenna Ibn Taymiyya 25, 26, 48, 65, 385, 530 Ibn Waqar 18 Ibn Zayla 61–62 Al-Īlāqī, Sayyid Šaraf al-Zaman 63n94 Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn 1, 13, 14, 24, 25, 26–32, 49, 60, 64, 88, 109, passim in Commentary, 509–513, 530 Jaeger, Werner 9n28 Janos, Damien 15, 40n50, 441 Janssens, Jules 37 Judson, Lindsay 362 Julian the Apostate 14 Kahana-Smilansky, Hagar 539n25 Kakavelaki, Antonia 111, 112n7 Kennedy, Edward S. 32 Laks, André 421n2, 421n4, 423n7–8, 441 Landauer, Samuel 32, 33, 66, 69, 71– 76, 81n122, 87, 90, 97–98, 105–108, passim in Commentary, 514, 529, 530 Leiter, Tamar 67 Leucippus 397, 398, 403, 421n3, 491n6 Levī ben Geršom, see Gersonides Libanius 117n19, 118n21 Luna, Concetta 4, 7n19 Lyceum 4, 117 Lycurgus 428, 432, 449, 450 Maimonides, Moses 11, 17, 18, 19, 68, 98–99, 408, 532–533, 537n22, 538 Martin, Auber 374 Martini Bonadeo, Cecilia 13n50, 39n48, 49 Al-Masʿūdī 27–28, 30 Menelaus of Alexandria 31n13 Menn, Stephen 3n3, 4n4, 327n5, 362n2, 380n2, 484n1 Meshulam b. Moshe 70n102 Michael of Ephesus (pseudo-Alexander) 5– 6, 7n19 Michael Scot 23 Miskawayh 61 Moshe Ha-Levī 18

645

index of names and places Moshe ibn Tibbon passim Moshe b. Obadya 71 Narboni, Moshe 69 Nathan Mordechai 70 Neuwirth, Angelika 40, 43, 438, 445 “Nicolas” the Peripatetic, see Nicolaus of Damascus Nicolaus of Damascus (pseudo-Aristotle; “Nicolas” the Peripatetic) 31, 113n12 Paphlagonia 7 Peleus 389 Penella, Robert J. 118n21, 119n23–24, 354n5 Peyron, Bernandino 70 Phidias 120, 373 Photius 8n24 Pines, Shlomo 9, 10–11, 13n47, 16, 19, 49, 482 Plato 5n7, 12, 21–22, 23n98, 54, 78, 79n116, 112n9, 116, 119n23, 123, 144, 326n2, 339, 347, 348, 362–366, 371, 375, 377, 380n2–3, 397, 399, 401, 403, 419, 421, 503, 531n7, 534n19, 535 Plotinus 6–7, 11, 13, 21, 329n9, 331, 360, 427n13, 496, 501, 506 Polycleitus 373 Porphyry 6–7, 21, 124 Primavesi, Oliver 6 Proclus 31n13 Provence 1, 67 Pseudo-Al-ʿĀmirī 25, 33–35, 36 Pseudo-Alexander, see Michael of Ephesus Pseudo-Herrenius 7n19 Pseudo-Philoponus 7n19 Pseudo-Simplicius 7n19 Ptolemy 31 Pythagoras, Pythagoreans 5n7, 31n13, 119n23, 421, 422n5, 425, 433 Qalonymos b. Qalonymos 20, 67, 514 Al-Qifṭī 27n4, 31n19 Ragep, Jamil 32 Rapp, Christoph 362n2, 382n6 Reeve, C.D.C. 421n3, 421n4, 486n3 Reinhardt, Tobias 114n12 Reisman, David 15, 49 Rigo, Caterina 71 Ross, William David 9n28, 124n36

Saʿadya Gaon 97n134, 377 Šahrastānī 25, 33, 38–39, 62–64, 378, 404, 415 Šamlī 28–29 Schramm, Michael 427n14 Sedley, David 484n1 Sharples, Robert 22n95, 114n12, 470n4 Shmuel ibn Tibbon 17, 358, 475, 532, 533– 534, 537–538 Sicyon 116 Al-Ṣiġnāḫī, ʿAbd al-Razzāq 48, 61 Simplicius 7, 113n12 Al-Sirāfī 24n1 Sirat, Colette 75n110 Socrates 41, 116–118 Sorabji, Richard 9 Speusippus 347, 348, 382n6, 425, 433 Spinoza, Baruch 11, 17 Steel, Carlos 8n24 Stegemann, W. 105n148 Steinschneider, Moritz 72 Stephanus 5–6 Stoics 112n, 331, 360 Strasburg 71 Syrianus 5, 7n19, 22 Ṯābit ibn Qurra 14, 24, 25, 26, 30–31, 65 Teraḥ 373 Themistius passim Theon, Aelius 111–113, 118, 121, 122–124, 126, 145 Theon of Smyrna 5n9 Theophrastus 4, 9n28 Thomas Aquinas 12n44, 23 Thucydides 112 Todd, Robert 9n27, 114n12, 123, 124n36, 125, 481 Ṭodros Ṭodrosi 134 Turin 70 Twetten, David 13, 427n13–14, 501 Vanderspoel, John 8n24, 118n21, 119n24 Volpe Cacciatore, Paola 122n27 Wakelnig, Elvira 33, 35–36 Watt, John 16, 105n48 Wilberding, James 376 Wolfson, Harry 529n3

646 Xenocrates 348 Yaʿaqob ibn Makhīr 539n25 Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭriq 347, 533, 534n18 Yedidya Refael b. Eliezer Ḥayyim 71 Yehuda ha-Levī 377, 532 Yehuda b. Shlomo ha-Cohen b. Matka 74

index of names and places Yehuda b. Shlomo b. Yaʿaqob of Nîmes 67 Yehuda ibn Tibbon 97, 377, 532 Yosef b. Yehoshuʿa b. Vivas 533n14 Zeno of Citium 119n23 Zucker, Arnaud 10, 111n2, 113–115, 120 Zonta, Mauro 10n35, 70

Index of Subjects accident, accidental 112n9, 132, 133, 328, 335, 336, 388–391, 399, 400, 411, 432, 452, 455, 486, 489, 504, 537, see also modification action (category) 143, 337 actuality, actualization 20, 85–86, 94, 131, 145, 351, 352n3, 358, 360, 365, 375, 377, 379, 388–391, 393–394, 396–397, 401–403, 416, 417, 421, 422, 424–425, 427–431, 433–434, 436, 440, 445, 464– 465, 467–471, 480, 489, 491–492, 505, 506, 513 affection (category) 92, 337 alteration 128, 130, 137, 400 animals 22n96, 38, 135, 354, 365, 373, 375, 406, 458, 468, 489, 506, 529n3, 537 art, artisan 79, 94, 135, 144, 362–365, 368, 381, 387, 454, 482, 489, 494 bad, evil 11, 485, 486, 490 begetting 144, 365, 367, 379, 432 body 87, 94, 118, 126, 127, 128, 130, 132, 133, 141–142, 340, 352–354, 360, 363, 369, 372, 388, 390, 393, 400–401, 408, 413, 430, 434, 456, 457, 462, 470, 471, 480, 491, 494, 505, 506, 536, 537, see also celestial bodies; incorporeality categories 92, 140, 143, 326, 327, 328, 333, 334, 335, 337, 369, 380, 381, 383, 385, see also entries for specific categories cause 4n4, 17, 19, 36, 38, 45, 88, 104, 131–132, 135–137, 140, 327n5, 337, 338, 352, 365, 372, 380, 381, 382n6, 384, 388–391, 394, 397, 398, 401, 403–404, 420, 422–424, 427, 428, 434, 452, 455, 457, 464, 468, 472, 474, 480, 483, 486, 487, 488, 489, 491, 496, 503, 506, 511–513, 531, see also first cause efficient (moving) cause 4n4, 20, 54, 57, 88, 130–132, 362–364, 380, 381, 382n6, 384, 386, 387, 388–391, 394, 396, 401, 403, 411, 412, 421n1, 467, 468, 470, 471, 490–491, 503–505, 536 final cause 4n4, 11, 88, 340, 421n1, 423, 427, 429, 454, 472, 484, 490, 504, 505, 513

formal cause 11, 88, 131, 144, 363, 494, 504, 505 material cause 131 moving cause, see efficient cause celestial bodies 4, 15, 54, 142, 428, 434, 452– 455, 458, 484, 488, 491, 492, 504, 505, 537n20 fixed stars 126, 128, 146, 394, 398n4, 433, 434, 441, 442, 451, 452, 454, 455, 456, 460, 488, 491, 497, 504, 505 planets 146, 395, 403, 404, 428, 433n19, 441, 452, 453n1, 455, 459, 460, 491, 497, 504 spheres 7, 16, 54, 57, 126, 131, 138, 146, 394–395, 398n4, 403–404, 425, 428, 433n19, 441, 442, 453–457, 459, 460, 461, 471, 480, 488, 497, 504 see also moon; sun chance, see luck change, changeability 112n9, 127–130, 137, 141, 328–329, 351–353, 356, 362, 396, 400, 401, 403, 411–412, 413, 423, 429, 433, 465–466, 469, 492, 504, 505, 506, see also unchangeability coming to be 19–20, 104, 130–132, 141–142, 144, 328, 352–353, 356, 359, 362–363, 365–366, 367, 381, 397–398, 400, 413, 421n3, 428, 485–492, 496, 503–505, 531n6, see also begetting, creation, passing away contraries, contrariety 129–130, 326, 329, 350, 351–353, 355, 359, 387, 389, 390, 394, 428, 429, 457, 485–487, 489–494, 505, see also opposites corruption, see passing away; substance, corruptible cosmos 4, 10, 11, 22, 126, 396, 404, 472, 484, 489, 492, 496, 503, 506 political metaphor 23, 35, 36, 427–428, 432, 449, 450, 457, 489, 498, 505 creation, creator 7, 22, 61, 87, 131, 133, 141, 144, 354–355, 363, 365, 379, 400–401, 413, 432, 489, 505, see also artisan, demiurge

648 demiurge 22, 23, 79, 354, 361, 503, see also art, artisan, creation desire 4, 16n67, 54, 388, 422–423, 426–428, 437, 439, 440, 457–458, 462, 467, 471, 474, 489 earth 118, 328, 342, 403, 484, 491, 492, 505, 538 ecliptic 131, 365, 378, 388, 390, 394 element immanent component 135, 140, 142, 143, 342, 343, 380, 381–384, 385, 386, 389, 391, 394, 528, 531n7, 532, 534n19, 535 physical 131, 328, 340, 354, 356, 374, 391, 393, 434, 485n2, 531, 532, 533, 534n18, 537, 538 relationship with matter 527–540 essence, essential 15–16, 20, 85, 129, 145, 396, 397, 401, 417, 422n6, 428, 436, 440, 448, 452, 454, 455, 457, 464, 471–472, 482–483, 486, 501, 504, see also accident eternity 45, 53, 85, 131–133, 137–138, 146, 396–404, 406, 407, 421, 423, 424, 425, 428, 433–434, 456, 467, 485n2, 486, 487, 491–492, 494, 505, 509, 511, 512, see also substance, eternal evil, see bad first cause 18, 22, 36, 54n76, 88, 131, 137, 390, 424, 426, 428–429, 433, 438, 439, 440, 448, 457, 467, 468, 471, 492, 503, 509, 512–513, see also first intellect; first principle; first mover; God first intellect 448, 469–470, 472, 475, 480, 482–483, see also first cause; first principle; first mover; God; intellect, divine first principle 4, 6, 52–53, 60, 132, 137, 382, 389–391, 398, 402, 415, 416, 418, 422– 432, 437, 439, 440, 442, 444, 446, 447, 448, 452, 455, 457, 459, 462, 469–472, 474, 475, 482, 483, 484, 486–487, 489– 494, 502–505, 512, see also first cause; first intellect; first mover; God; principle first mover 13, 18, 54, 452, 454, 457, see also first cause; first intellect; first principle; God; mover fixed stars, see celestial bodies

index of subjects form 4, 17, 19–20, 87, 88, 103, 104, 128, 130, 131, 134, 139, 141, 142, 144, 347, 352, 355, 356, 362–365, 367, 371, 372, 379, 380, 381, 383, 384, 387, 388–391, 393, 394, 395, 431, 446, 447, 457, 458, 468, 472, 476, 477, 487, 490–491, 492, 494, 503, 504, 505, 528, 531, 535–538, see also cause, formal; logos; Ideas (Platonic) generation, see coming to be; spontaneous generation genus 88, 140, 143, 150, 328, 400, 413, 457, 536, 537 God 4, 6–7, 10–11, 14, 16–17, 19, 20, 22, 35–37, 40, 43, 47, 54, 58, 64, 68n99, 85–86, 97, 142, 354n5, 421, 424, 427n14, 428, 430, 432–433, 445, 449, 450, 457, 464, 467, 470–472, 473, 477, 479, 480, 483, 484, 488–489, 492–493, 496, 501, 503–507, see also first cause; first intellect; first principle; first mover as Law 19, 34–35, 428, 449, 432 as Life 54, 85–86, 424, 432–433, 436, 467, 506 as Pleasure 430, 436 secondary gods 104, 365 good, goodness 4, 88, 422, 423, 426, 466, 468, 472, 484–490, 495, 496, 506 governance 36–37, 81, 427–428, 432, 434, 451, 457–458, 459, 475, 487–488, 494, 498, 506, see also cosmos, political metaphor Ideas (Platonics) 5n7, 12, 23n98, 144, 326, 348, 349, 359, 362–366, 373, 375, 397, 401, 452, 458, 486–487, 492, 493, 503 immateriality 4, 58, 94, 145, 386n8, 397, 402, 425, 426, 431, 434, 435–436, 455, 457, 466, 471, 472, 492, 494, 498, 503 immovability 4, 52, 54, 138, 396, 407, 421, 422, 425, 426, 452, 455, 506 incorporeality 329, 457, 492, 426n12 inspiration 38, 365, 376–377 intellect 7, 16, 20, 36, 58, 68n99, 82, 94, 129, 329, 363, 364, 371, 374, 390, 403, 422–423, 424, 427, 428, 430–431, 432, 436–437, 440, 444, 445, 448, 464–469,

index of subjects 471–472, 474, 475, 476, 480, 488, 491, 496, 503, 506, 533, 538 agent 19–20, 22 divine 4n4, 7, 11, 16–17, 448, 464, 467– 468, 470–472, 505 human 7, 430–432, 448, 466, 470–472, 480 material 22 self-intelligizing 4, 6, 10–11, 16–17, 36, 47, 54, 424, 430–432, 448, 449, 464, 465– 470, 472–473, 506 intelligible 36–37, 40, 58, 94, 348, 422, 427, 470, 471, 502, 504, 506 knowledge, knowing 4, 14–17, 36, 54, 64, 68n99, 122, 126n41, 129, 132, 135, 329, 354n6, 377–378, 439, 444, 449, 466, 470, 471, 483, 487, 506, 510, 511, 513 life, living things 342, 365, 388, 424, 436, 450, 456, 467, 474, 488, 494, 504, 538 locomotion, see motion, spatial logos (formative principle) 19, 22n96, 39, 43, 103–104, 360, 365, 366, 375–377, 504–505 love 398, 421, 423–424, 428–429, 457, 469, 478–479, 486, 492, 499 luck 362, 363, 368 mathematical objects 5n8, 326, 347–348 matter 4, 11, 15, 77n113, 94, 129–131, 134, 139, 141–143, 351–355, 356, 359, 360, 362–365, 367, 369, 370–371, 372, 375, 380–381, 383, 386n8, 388–391, 393, 394, 397, 402–403, 417, 418, 427, 431, 447, 457, 466, 472, 482, 485–487, 489–494, 499, 503–505, 506 relationship with element 527–540 prime matter 364, 533, 537–538 topical matter 351–352, 353, 423 see also immateriality Meno’s paradox 126n41 modification 132, 133n48, 388, 389, 392, 399, 413, see also accident moon 146, 491 motion, movement 4, 7, 11, 16, 62, 127, 130, 132–133, 326, 351, 388–389, 396, 397, 398, 400–402, 408, 409, 411, 412, 413, 419, 422–425, 427, 429, 442, 452–457,

649 460, 461, 462, 469, 470, 471, 472, 474, 487, 490, 500, 504–505 circular 45, 55, 82, 138, 357, 396, 401, 403, 421, 423, 425, 428, 453, 480, 492, 504, 505 confused 403, 418–419 constant uniform 146, 398, 403, 428, 488, 494 constant varying 395, 398, 403, 404, 428, 504 eternal 53, 132, 133, 138, 396, 398, 399, 400n6, 401, 403, 421, 452–453, 503 spatial 130, 352, 357, 423, 428, 429, 433 see also celestial bodies, change, rest mover 138, 141, 146, 363, 367, 384, 387, 400–403, 411–413, 421–422, 425, 428, 452–453, 455, 461, 486, 490–491, 499, 503, 504 see also first mover; unmoved mover nature 4, 17, 19, 38–39, 43, 87, 104–105, 135, 354n6, 357, 364–366, 368, 372, 378, 379, 395, 403, 423, 427n14, 430, 457, 472, 485, 490, 503, 504, 522 Neoplatonism 8n26, 12, 15, 21, 22n94, 40n56, 119n23, 375 Nous (in Anaxagoras) 352, 354n6, 397, 486, 490, see also intellect numbers 452, 458, 487, 493–494, 534n19, 535 one, oneness 54, 59–60, 352, 354, 383, 384– 385, 422, 427, 454, 457, 462, 485, 486, 489, 491, 492, 494, 498, see also simplicity, unity in Plotinus 6, 13, 427n13, 501 opposite 130, 350, 356, 357, 422, 493 passing away 128–133, 141–142, 328, 343, 356, 363, 398, 421, 428, 489, 491, 492, 497, 505, 531n6, see also substance, corruptible paraphrasis 3, 110–114, 118, 121–122, 125, 325 Peripatetics 5, 9, 21, 111, 114n12 place (category) 375 planets, see celestial bodies plants 135, 354, 425, 488, 489, 497–498, 506, 538

650 pleasure 423, 424, 426, 430, 432, 436, 445, 469n3 potential, potentiality 351–353, 358, 359, 388–390, 393, 394, 396–397, 402–403, 416, 417, 425, 427, 429–431, 433–434, 464–465, 468, 469, 480, 487, 491–494, 505, 506, 528, 534n18 power 19, 54n76, 127–128, 400, 402, 411, 425, 433–434, 455, 465n2, 470, 475, 487, 493 prime mover, see first mover principle 4n4, 7, 11, 14, 15, 16, 36, 56, 131–132, 135–137, 140, 143, 326–329, 348, 349, 351–352, 354–355, 360, 362, 365, 368, 380–384, 385, 386, 387, 388–391, 392, 395, 396–398, 402, 404, 413, 419, 423, 432, 454n2, 457, 459, 467, 470, 472, 473, 483, 485–487, 489–494, 499, 502, 503, 506, 509, 511–512, 528, 534n19, 535, see also first principle privation 11, 131, 139, 352, 353, 355, 359, 362, 368, 380, 381, 383, 384, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 393, 394, 489, 490, 503, 528, 531 quality (category) 140, 142, 326, 333, 517 quantity (category) 140, 142, 326, 333 reason, reasoning 132, 135, 143, 336, 371, 388, 432, 455, 459 recipient 127, 137, 141, 326, 363, 369, see also body; matter relation (category) 380n3 rest 4, 138, 400–401, 434, 493, see also motion science 12, 61, 68n99, 135, 139, 326, 329, 454, 458, 466, 472, 493, 502, 513 senses, sense-perception 135, 329, 363, 370– 371, 374, 430–432, 446, 455, 468 simplicity 6, 16, 134, 143, 383, 385, 422, 425, 427, 432, 475, 482, 493, see also oneness, unity

index of subjects soul 16, 19, 123, 128, 138n53, 364, 374, 388, 390, 397, 433, 434n20, 452, 455, 470, 472, 494, 503, 504, 534n19, 535, 537 soul in the earth 19, 104, 365, 378, 522 World-soul 19–20 spheres, see celestial bodies spontaneity 362–363 spontaneous generation 10, 12, 19, 22, 23n98, 138, 365, 373, 375, 398 strife 398, 419, 486, 499 substance 4n4, 15, 51–53, 83, 112n9, 133n48, 136, 140, 142–143, 326–329, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 369–370, 383, 388, 390, 391, 392, 405, 417, 462, 464, 465n2, 466, 468, 485, 487, 490, 494, 502–506 corruptible sensible 94, 129–130, 136, 139, 141–142, 329, 342–344, 349, 351, 352, 353, 355, 362–364, 369, 372, 380–381, 389, 396, 418, 425, 531n6 eternal sensible 132–133, 136, 138, 329, 343, 344, 351, 396, 399–401, 402, 408, 421, 423, 429, 456, 461 eternal unmoved 54, 58, 127, 131, 136–138, 145, 329, 348, 349, 396, 402, 421, 422, 425–428, 436, 452–458, 459, 461, 464, 469 sun 131, 146, 365, 378, 388, 390, 394–395, 398n4, 403, 433, 491 time 53, 127, 132–133, 137, 396–397, 399–401, 409, 414, 427n14, 470–471, 505 tode ti (“this-something”) 362, 364, 369, 370, 389 unchangeability 328, 423, 425, 431, 433, 465 unity 18, 327, 332, 370, 381, 383, 399, 489, 492, 494, see also oneness; simplicity unmoved mover(s) 15, 54, 127, 421–423, 426, 429, 433, 434n20, 435–436, 452–457, 461, 469, 484, see also substance, eternal unmoved