Themes and Flux in British Politics: Evolution, Change and Turbulence 9781138298354, 9781138298378, 9781351580939, 9781351580922, 9781315098715

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Themes and Flux in British Politics

Themes and Flux in British Politics provides readers with an engaging and informative overview of the development, change and turbulence in British politics today. It explores the extent to which the ‘old approaches’ to politics and policy are becoming less relevant in the contemporary and emerging UK environment and makes sense of the most significant aspects of the moment: political and electoral alignment, referenda, Brexit and the EU, relationship between UK and devolved governments, and key impact-related developments internationally. As such, it is an essential read for students and observers of British political life who need pointed, expert coverage to help make sense of these exceptional political times. With a tripartite structure, the book first examines trends in political representation with changes in political engagement, party loyalties and electoral alignment, then places this within the turbulence and changing landscape of the policy/political environment, and finally contextualises the developments in British politics vis-à-vis international resonances and parallels. Case studies of the Scottish independence referendum, referendum to remain in or leave the EU and the EU withdrawal process are used to illustrate the key concepts and arguments advanced and to provide a sense of the current dynamic of British politics. Themes and Flux in British Politics represents a timely response to contemporary debates about the major shifts (perhaps crises) of political parties and representation and the turbulent landscape of public policy, and will be essential reading for British politics and government, Brexit, public policy and EU politics. Duncan McTavish was Emeritus Professor of Public Policy and Management at Glasgow Caledonian University, UK.

“This book is a complete and brilliant introduction to British politics. The distinctive angle of how the two referenda unfolded (on Scottish independence in 2014 and on leaving the EU in 2016) sheds additional light on key dynamics of politics in the UK provide a distinctive viewpoint which adds to the brilliance of the book. A must read.” – Edoardo Ongaro, The Open University, UK “This book is essential reading for anyone who wishes to properly understand the high drama of British politics today. McTavish’s contribution is to locate the big events of our time in larger historical and theoretical context and to allow the reader to understand them through a range of political science and public management perspectives. This is the book of an inter-disciplinary expert at the top of his game.” – Alastair Stark, University of Queensland, Australia “What we learn from history is that we do not learn from history. The book, Themes and Flux in British Politics, provides exceptional historical insights to understanding contemporary political issues and policy disjuncture’s such as Brexit. The book is a de force of British politics and a must-read. There is a valuable analysis of key political developments to transformative events such as decline of Empire, the UK entry to the European Community, to major shifts in social and economic policy by successive UK governments. The book contextualises current political polarities and disenchantment with mainstream politics, parties, media and political representation concluding with valuable insights about the rise of populism and nationalism, and the future of a turbulent political landscape.” – Karen Johnston, University of Portsmouth, UK “This book provides a clear, insightful and yet scholarly overview of the British constitutional order in the age of Brexit and at a time when political polarisation and other centrifugal forces is threatening the very existence of the UK. An important book that deserves a wide readership beyond academia.” – Matt Qvortrup, University of Coventry, UK “During times of political crisis, it is important to take a step back and consider its wider context. McTavish does it admirably by situating key events – referendums on Scottish independence and Brexit – in a wider context. His analysis of economic shocks and ‘wicked’ problems reminds us of a world beyond short term and adversarial politics.” – Paul Cairney, University of Stirling, UK

Themes and Flux in British Politics Evolution, Change and Turbulence

DUNCAN MCTAVISH

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Duncan McTavish The right of Duncan McTavish to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Names: McTavish, Duncan, author. Title: Themes and flux in British politics : evolution, change and turbulence / Duncan McTavish. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018048648| ISBN 9781138298354 (hardback) | ISBN 9781138298378 (pbk.) | ISBN 9781351580939 (epub) | ISBN 9781351580922 (mobipocket/kindle) | ISBN 9781315098715 (ebk.) Subjects: LCSH: Great Britain—Politics and government. Classification: LCC JN238 .M39 2019 | DDC 320.941—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018048648 ISBN: 978-1-138-29835-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-138-29837-8 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-09871-5 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by Swales & Willis Ltd, Exeter, Devon, UK

Duncan McTavish 1951–2018 This was his final book. It will help others to reflect on the continued influence of history in today’s political landscape. Looking back to help us understand the present, and structure a better tomorrow for everyone.

Contents

List of tables List of appendices

viii ix

Introduction

1

1

Defining Britain: home and away

4

2

Politics and representation

31

3

Scottish independence referendum case study

66

4

Brexit referendum case study

84

5

Politics and policy

104

6

Some international comparisons

125

7

UK departure from the EU case study

147



Conclusion: British politics in a changing and turbulent environment

179

Appendices 186 Index 229

Tables

1.1 2017 general election: political representation (no. of MPs) in England by region 2.1 National government and Labour opposition parliamentary seats and votes, 1931 and 1935 elections 2.2 Impact of occupational class on Labour support 2.3 Impact of occupational class on Conservative support 2.4 Percentage of popular vote and number of parliamentary seats 2.5 Manufacturing share of output, labour and capital in the UK economy 2.6 Trends in national identity in Scotland 1997–2012 3.1 UK general elections 1979–1997: party representation in Scotland 4.1 Voting and turnout in the EU referendum 2016 4.2 The EU referendum 2016: voting turnout by age 4.3 The EU referendum 2016: voting in 30 UK cities with a population of 100,000 or more (listed by number of votes cast in descending order) 4.4  The EU referendum 2016: support for remain by educational attainment 4.5 The EU referendum 2016: support for remain by perceptions of the consequences of leaving for immigration 7.1 Share of ten leading EU countries in EU GDP (2016) 7.2 Comparative defence spending of UK, France and Germany (2016)

6

33 36 36 37 39 49 69 96 96

97 101

101 147 148

Appendices

1 Definition of class by occupation 2 Extracts from the Calman Commission (2009) and government response 3 Extracts from Choosing Scotland’s Future: A National Conversation (2009) 4 Extracts from Scotland’s Future (2013) 5 Scottish independence referendum result (result and turnout by council area) 6 Extracts from EU reform negotiations (2016) 7 Competences of selected autonomous communities, Spain 8 Extracts from The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and the European Union (2018) 9 Glossary of EU and Brexit terms

186 187 189 194 211 212 218 221 223

Introduction

This book identifies and analyses key developments, change and, in no small measure, turbulence in British politics. While the book is not historical, it is important to give some backdrop to understanding many of the issues confronting a serious study of British politics as we approach the end of the second decade of the 21st century. By comparison with the last twenty years or so, the period from 1945 to the 1980s can be thought of as a period of relatively slow change in the political landscape, with a two party system producing in the main stable majority governments in a way understood across most of the UK. This is not to say changes in this period were not significant – they were – or that there were no dramatic or transformative events or policy disjunctures (the Suez Crisis leading to the fall of a government and strong arm tactics from a major ally the USA, entry to the European Community, recurrent balance of payments and other economic problems attest to this). Change though did accelerate from the late 1970s, with a range of external shocks (including major increases in oil prices) and political turbulence caused by a major shift in social and economic policy by governments from that date. And so it has continued to the present.

Themes explored in the book The book is contextualised around some leading themes. The first of these is to analyse longer term ‘slow burn’ (evolutionary) changes against shorter range more recent developments. For example, the gradual erosion of class alignment as the major explanatory framework for voting behaviour as against the more recent evacuation of many working class

2 Introduction

voters from participation in elections. Alongside this the more recent rise of multiparty politics, especially in the context of devolved legislatures underpinned by electoral systems more proportional than first past the post, is identified and assessed alongside the emergence of nationalism as a political force. Some changes in voting behaviour which have current salience are best seen as recent developments: for example age, gender, ‘metro location’, level of education. This explanatory framework can also be employed when examining Britain’s externally facing politics, mainly through foreign policy. There has been a long run decline of empire, with its constructions of the ‘Anglosphere’ and greater orientation towards Europe and transatlantic relationships; more recently the strains of trying to remain a global power; most recently the role of uncertainty occasioned by Brexit. The second theme is the operation of politics and policy at various levels including the macro, micro and meso. Macro level analysis examines how Britain has responded to the macro – international environment, increasingly internationalised and interdependent. Micro level looks at how the state has responded to the system’s demands: the requirements to approach policy to meet identified and defined public needs. Meso analysis views areas like the system of governance and the political lens through which policy is formed and implemented. The third theme is comparative and looks at some international comparisons and contrasts around some of the features identified in the book and in accordance with some salient aspects of the current international political environment. These include governance in pluri-national states, right wing populism and nationalism, voter disenchantment with mainstream political parties and the evisceration of working class representation. Under this theme (in Chapter 6) populism in British politics is explored.

Case studies Integral to the book are three major case studies: the Scottish independence referendum 2014, the referendum to remain in or leave the European Union in 2016, the current and ongoing UK–EU withdrawal process. These cases capture the dynamism and excitement of politics. The Brexit withdrawal case, unique as it is in UK and EU politics, nonetheless exemplifies how political and policy outcomes are rarely predictive but are subject to a set of contingent variables often highly political in nature. Many of the concepts and themes throughout the book are illustrated in these real political events.

Introduction  3

Structure of the book The book is structured as follows. Chapter 1 is about defining Britain, both at home and externally facing. The two dimensions to this are first, how the British state configures itself in a unified, unitary way (or otherwise) and second, how Britain positions itself in the wider world. Chapter 2 covers the important area of politics and representation and includes description and analyses of: the dominant two party system from 1945 to the late 1970s; the decline of the class based two party divide and includes information up to the 2017 general election; current polarities in UK politics – age, culture, education and nationalism, disenchantment with mainstream politics and parties, media and political representation. Many of the themes and concepts in Chapters 1 and 2 are seen through the case studies of the Scottish independence referendum, 2014 (Chapter 3) and the referendum to leave or remain in the EU, 2016 (Chapter 4). Chapter 5 uses some small case studies to illustrate the international interdependent context within which policy operates (the oil crisis in the 1970s and the global financial crash 2008), how policy is viewed through a political prism (politics and wicked problems, whether Brexit is stretching civil service capacity and the political consequences of not addressing housing). The chapter also examines attempts to depoliticise policy and the role of interest groups, media and public enquiries. Chapter 6 introduces some international comparisons, comparing British and other countries’ practice in: central–sub-state relationships in pluri-national states; aspects of political alignment and realignment, including the decline in support for left of centre parties, policy concerns of mainstream parties, gender, age and cultural divides, difficulty of democracies fulfilling promises, the context and features of populism with an assessment of populism in British politics. Chapter 7 is a detailed case covering the UK–EU withdrawal process, the outcome of which is highly dependent on the interplay of political forces (including career ambitions) within political parties. The concluding chapter makes brief and critical comments on the key dimensions of development and turbulence in British politics and how these might play out in a fluid and volatile environment. Each chapter will summarise the key themes covered and cross reference these to other content in the book.

Defining Britain

1

Home and away

There are two dimensions to defining Britain. First is how the British state configures itself at home in terms of government and governmental institutions: the degree of centralisation and relationships between the centre of government (at Westminster) and regions, nations and local government. What does ‘union’ in United Kingdom mean in reality? Second, is how the British state positions itself in the wider world: foreign policy, relations with other states and nations; British self-identity and how Britain projects itself. There are a number of contextual factors influencing this, ranging from economic performance, relative economic position internationally, defence and foreign policy, Britain’s role as an actor on the world and international stages. In both dimensions historical legacy is an influencing factor.

Dimension 1 Historical background Historically, England was early in developing a strong, powerful and centralised state, powerful enough to invade Scotland, Wales and Ireland in the Middle Ages. With the union of the Scottish and English crowns in 1603 and the ensuing shift of royal power to London, the use of ‘England’ and ‘Britain’ become synonymous. England in fact achieved centripetalism earlier than many of its European neighbours. Unlike England with a single language, at least 25 per cent of France’s inhabitants in the 1860s could not speak French (Colley 2014); in fact pre-industrial revolution,

Defining Britain  5

England was ‘bottom heavy’, with wealth and population concentrated in the south. London was almost a ‘city state’, key universities were located in Oxford and Cambridge, important Church of England Archbishoprics in Kent and Canterbury and so on (Colley 2014). Yet the actual operation of government and state indicates over time a degree of integration and compliance between peripheries and centre – this can be thought of as a form of indirect control from the centre with the use of key instruments of governance, patronage and statecraft. For example, Henry Dundas, an important Tory politician (representing Midlothian at Westminster from the mid-1770s), was a key player in Pitt’s government (as home secretary and war secretary), a main mover in the East India Company, whose use of patronage in Scotland gave him the commonly accepted ‘title’ of governor general of Scotland enabling him to tie many of the landed elite in Scotland to the British state – he ensured one third of all British sinecures were held by Scots. In addition British imperial expansion and endeavour offered opportunities for sections of Scottish society (for example running the expanding sugar and tea plantations often premised on slavery, as well as professional practitioners in areas like medicine and law), ensuring a level of commitment and lock in to opportunities provided by British state activity (Devine 2004). In the industrial era, similar unifying linkages can be seen, ranging from the importance of wartime industries to the British state’s war effort, much of this capacity located in Scotland.

Politico-economic regional imbalance In fact in England during the industrial period (including for much of the 20th century), the economic centre of gravity shifted north, yet despite the dominance of the south in governance terms there was a sort of maintenance of political power balance. From 1870–1914, local governments generated about 50 per cent of the money they spent through local taxation, giving a fiscal independence very unfamiliar in Britain now (the figure in the 21st century under different political administrations has consistently been about 20 per cent; see Wilson and Game 2011). Much of the political balance was maintained by the Liberal Party having a very strong presence in the northern industrial heartlands, later challenged by Labour, with Conservatives gaining in rural northern seats. However, important Conservative figures like Prime Minister Harold MacMillan represented a northern

6  Defining Britain

seat (Stockton), Winston Churchill enthused about the warm response he received in the north during the 1951 election and in fact the Conservatives won more votes there than Labour, almost unthinkable today (Economist 2013). Bulpit’s (1986, 1983) seminal works looking at territorial government in Britain in the post-war years and through the Thatcher era argued that a considerable degree of statecraft was employed to ensure power was retained at the centre through, for example, the retention of major powers in Westminster (e.g. foreign policy, macro-economic policy, most fiscal powers, even the delivery of some major services such as the NHS) and lower range powers left at local government level. This centre–periphery dynamic is likely to be a tension point within British politics in the coming years, for in addition to the presence of devolved polities there is a range of initiatives and pressures within current governance arrangements. Recent scholarship is addressing the extent to which initiatives such as elected mayors, devolution of resources to combined authorities and other instruments of governance at some remove from the centre seriously challenge Bulpit’s analysis (e.g. Ayers et al. 2017). There is a range of evidence, including the most recent general election in 2017, which indicates that contrast between political representation in the north on the one hand and, on the other, the south, east and south west of England is stark, with the governing Conservatives’ strength located in the latter, and the opposition Labour’s in the former (see Table 1.1).

Table 1.1 2017 general election: political representation (no. of MPs) in England by region Region

Labour

Conservative

Lib Dem

North West North East Yorkshire and Humberside East of England East Midlands West Midlands London South East South West

54 26 36  7 15 24 49  8  7

20  3 17 50 31 35 21 72 47

1

Source: House of Commons Library 2017

Other

1 1

3 2 1

2

Defining Britain  7

Excluding London, which in English, indeed UK, terms is very distinctive as a global city with a unique demographic, cultural and diversity profile, the only region approaching a balance of Conservative and Labour representation is the West Midlands, the region with a relatively strong active industrial profile; at the risk of over generalising, many northern regions have a preponderance of deindustrialised manufacturing areas which have become run down, while southern and eastern areas are those with large suburban locations often supporting service, financial or technological sectors. It must be stated that there are of course counter trend sub-locations within each region. Furthermore, researchers at Queen Mary University, London found that party members of all parties (excluding the Scottish National Party – SNP) don’t reflect this representation pattern – in fact they are much more likely to be London and south east based rather than in the Midlands or north, thereby adding another imbalance in the political system (Queen Mary University 2018). The imbalance is also reflected in the regional map of economic performance in England. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Britain has the most regionally imbalanced economy amongst all the major European countries; all but two of the core cities outside London are below the national average in output per head (productivity) and London has a productivity figure almost 40 per cent higher than for Wales as a whole – the productivity metric is particularly stark given Britain’s sluggish productivity level by international comparison (OECD 2017). These imbalances are clearly a symptom of unbalanced infrastructural development (with London’s infrastructure capital spending per head dwarfing anywhere else in the UK), alongside large parts of the north and west which have deindustrialised without sufficient or adequate economic replacement and renewal.

From statecraft to ‘constitutional moments’ These imbalances present actual or potential pressures in maintaining a degree of stability within the state governance system as a whole. Key developments and many of the themes running through this book indicate that analysis beyond the important issues of statecraft – as outlined by Bulpit a generation ago – is pertinent. It is important to study how developments and understandings of the British constitution contribute to how Britain presents itself as a nation state.

8  Defining Britain

The constitution and union Britain of course famously has an ‘unwritten constitution’. In reality, the British constitution is a series of legal precedents and conventions rather than a written foundational text. Although much has been written and stated over the years about the ‘flexibility’ and scope for organic development which this provides, Britain has been at the forefront in writing constitutions for former colonies, helped to write the post-Second World War German constitution and more recently a constitution for Iraq (Colley 2014). Constitutions can underpin political settlements and agreements but can work effectively only if premised on trust by the population as a whole. Arguably the political–constitutional settlement of a unitary state (though this concept is challenged by the notion of the UK as a ‘union state’ – see concluding chapter) after the 1707 union of Scottish and English parliaments presided over by a Westminster based parliament and a constitutional monarch provided for a period of political and constitutional stability well into the 20th century, with the important exception of Ireland. Significant constitutional revisions took place with the setting up of devolved institutions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the last of these involving a multi-governmental agreement with another sovereign state, Ireland. Although there was broad agreement for these constitutional changes, differing perspectives at the time of the devolved institutions’ establishment perhaps indicated possible fault lines in the future. For example, as leader of the opposition Labour Party, John Smith a long time supporter of devolution stated this was ‘the settled will of the Scottish people’ – whether he meant this was ‘settled’ in the sense of ‘no turning back’ or ‘content for Scotland to remain within a British state’ is a moot point (Elrick 2014). Within his own party, leading figures saw this in rather more tribal political terms. George Robertson (future UK defence secretary, now Lord Robertson) saw this as ‘killing off the Scottish nationalists stone dead’, while Tam Dalyell, an independently minded but highly respected Labour MP, saw devolution as leading inevitably to the break up of the UK; the Scottish National Party was a supporter of devolution (albeit not initially) and the party’s aim was an independent Scotland. In Northern Ireland, although loyalist and nationalist parties supported the Good Friday Agreement and the establishment of a devolved power sharing assembly within the UK, nationalist parties, especially Sinn Fein, have the objective of a united Ireland, with loyalists implacably opposed to this. And the electoral system – necessary as part of the power sharing agreement – has tended to solidify, not transgress, traditional political and social divisions and loyalties.

Defining Britain  9

Europe and the British constitution The European dimension and Brexit add another layer to the constitutional mix pressurising the trust and stability required to underpin popular support for existing constitutional arrangements (see Chapter 7 and Conclusion). This springs from various sources. First, the UK’s membership of the European Union (EU) has altered the British constitution. Domestic courts interpret acts of parliament in the light of EU legislation, giving precedence to the latter when conflict arises. For instance, courts under the Human Rights Act 1998 interpret acts of parliament to make them compatible with human rights. In other areas such as consumer protection, workers rights, environmental control, climate change etc. there has been a process of institutional dialogue with supranational EU bodies. This is, in effect, the principle of modern constitutionalism in a rights based constitutional democracy: engaging with European legislation and case law, interpreting diverse legal sources, applying the idea of certain fundamental legal principles often limiting the control of government against individuals (Letsas 2017). However, this can run up against the principle and doctrine of absolute parliamentary sovereignty which states that parliament can make or unmake any law and that the role of the courts is to give effect to its will. Much of the pro leave (Brexit) leaders have sought to frame the debate in this way, though with a majoritarian overtone headlining the belief that ‘the courts should follow the people’s judgment’ based on a 52 per cent majority vote to leave the EU. Ironically, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, which apparently underpins much of the leavers’ ideology (‘taking back sovereignty’), should privilege parliamentary reflection and action rather than a referendum electoral result or electoral majoritarianism per se. The extent to which all this contributes to a ‘constitutional moment’ resulting in a major questioning and revision of constitutional arrangement remains to be seen and will depend on any continued cooperation between British and international (including European) judicial systems and institutions. A second aspect of the EU exit process is the extent to which this could unsettle in different ways the devolution arrangements in Scotland and Northern Ireland (see also Chapter 7). In the case of Scotland, although the UK government would wish the support of the Scottish Parliament and Government to the EU withdrawal legislation for political reasons, it is unlikely that any Scottish Government position is legally or constitutionally enforceable. The UK Supreme Court’s judgement on Article 50 (i.e. on whether the UK Government needs parliamentary

10  Defining Britain

approval to initiate EU exit) was unanimous in its decision that the Sewell convention, by which Scotland usually has to give legislative consent to any Westminster legislation affecting devolved matters, did ‘not in this case give rise to a legally enforceable obligation’, on the grounds that EU and other foreign affairs matters were reserved to the UK Government. Therefore, a key tension point is with matters which have been devolved (substantial legislation in policy areas including agriculture, fishing, aspects of education etc.) and are repatriated from the EU into UK law. Do these return in the main to Holyrood or Westminster, which then decides on the degree and extent of transference to Holyrood – in effect unilaterally rewriting the devolution agreement? Key tension points undermining constitutional stability will occur if the trend is to centralise repatriated powers in Westminster under the cloak of ‘the coherence and integrity of the UK’. Northern Ireland presents another tension point. Here, the devolved agreement involves another state, Ireland. As part of the Good Friday Agreement, the Irish Government via a referendum removed from its constitution a claim to the territory of all of the island, agreeing that any united Ireland would require a majority for such in the north (with the UK Government agreeing to abide by the result). In the EU exit process, any deal with the EU which privileged the North with continued benefits of single market membership (as the language so far used on ‘regulatory alignment’ could do) would clearly incentivise Scotland to claim the same on the basis of that nation’s remain vote being stronger than Northern Ireland. In fact, Northern Ireland’s relationship with the EU could already be considered favoured: those born in Northern Ireland are allowed to claim either British or Irish citizenship (or both), and since Ireland is an EU member this gives those in the North many of the rights EU citizens have. An additional element of instability is that the current UK Government is dependent on support from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) at Westminster to give a working majority, and since there is currently no assembly in place to control legislation and resource allocation, the present form of direct rule from Westminster can easily have the appearance of over influence by the DUP, not representative of the population as a whole, thereby undermining the entire power sharing fundamentals of the Good Friday Agreement. Third, it can be argued a point has been reached where there appears to be a fault line in the modern constitutional environment and the constitutional diversity now found in Britain. Traditionally, the hallmark of the British constitution has been its flexibility in a sense an informality – while retaining a strong state with centralised institutions working

Defining Britain  11

through parliament, nationally organised political parties and an independent judiciary protecting civil liberties, yet keeping issues like citizenship, identity and the political configuration of various parts of the system (at least until devolution in the 1990s) off the main agenda and in a sense hidden in the undergrowth. Yet what has developed in the constitutional environment, certainly in Europe, has been what the constitutional theorist Alexander Somek (2014) has called ‘cosmopolitan constitution’. By this, he means the nation state working in a context of open international engagement with global markets rather than the nation state considered as the natural form of association with the emergence of a post-national citizenship with the right to equal treatment irrespective of nationality. Arguably this protects and privileges those of value in the global economy (both at the high or scarce skill end as well as low paid migrant labour), prioritising economic over political freedoms. It has been argued that Britain’s traditionally open and flexible constitutional arrangements have proven conducive for cosmopolitan constitutionalism to find traction in the UK: witness the UK’s fast adoption of free movement rights of EU nationals and ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights (Loughlin 2016). This has undoubtedly been questioned by the Brexit result and the kickback against such cosmopolitanism was outlined by Prime Minister May in her speech to the Conservative Party conference in October 2016: But today, too many people in positions of power behave as though they have more in common with international elites than with the people down the road, the people they employ, the people they pass in the street. But if you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere. You don’t understand what the very word ‘citizenship’ means. Just listen to the way a lot of politicians and commentators talk about the public. They find your patriotism distasteful, your concerns about immigration parochial, your views about crime illiberal, your attachment to your job security inconvenient. They find the fact that more than seventeen million voters decided to leave the European Union simply bewildering. But let’s state one thing loud and clear: we are not leaving the European Union only to give up control of immigration all over again. And we are not leaving only to return to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. That’s not going to happen. (May 2016)

12  Defining Britain

The current position in the UK is that there is a considerable degree of constitutional flux, indeed divergence in thinking and practice in constitutional matters. This can be presented briefly as a series of constitutional scenarios or constitutional futures.

Constitutional scenarios Scenario one is represented by the system shock which occurred with the referendum vote to leave the EU. The UK electorate was presented with the main UK party leaders in favour of remain, despite lack of enthusiasm from Labour and a highly vociferous leave group of MPs in the ruling Conservative Party. Yet the clear majority of the UK voted leave. Though the majority was small, the message was clear – a lack of confidence and belief in the messages of the main UK political parties. This was also a challenge to the constitutional cosmopolitanism referred to above. The simple but clear message of national sovereignty, UK control of borders and so on, can be seen in speeches from leading leave supporters which still have resonance, such as that by Michael Gove: I believe that the decisions which govern all our lives, the laws we must all obey and the taxes we must all pay should be decided by people we choose and who we can throw out if we want change. If power is to be used wisely, if we are to avoid corruption and complacency in high office, then the public must have the right to change laws and governments at election time. But our membership of the European Union prevents us being able to change huge swathes of law and stops us being able to choose who makes critical decisions which affect all our lives. (Gove 2017) The control over borders and immigration figured significantly in the leave campaign (and still carries weight), with Nigel Farage of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) one of the loudest campaigners. UK parliamentary sovereignty was strongly prioritised by figures such as Daniel Hannan. Somewhat ironically, Hannan and Farage have only ever been elected to the European Parliament. This scenario of prioritising UK Westminster parliamentary sovereignty of course runs up against other scenarios, in particular scenario three.

Defining Britain  13

Scenario two regards the position of the remain group. Some have indicated support for measures to prevent Britain’s withdrawal from the EU, though this position is generally considered unsustainable and lacking in democratic legitimacy by some constitutional experts (e.g. Vernon Bogdanor 2016). Others support the idea of a second referendum when the exit deal and withdrawal agreement with the EU are known. A third grouping appears to accept that the UK is leaving the EU but wishes for a pragmatic positioning on trade and single market access. This appears to be the current Labour opposition position and is the position of leading business interests who require a degree of labour movement flexibility and strong market access (e.g. in the Confederation of British Industry – CBI). However, there are some complexities and possible tensions with certain interpretations of scenario one: control over borders may not be compatible with what business perceives its interests to be in terms of labour supply; protection of workers and consumer rights is recognised as stronger in the European constitutional-legal context than many proponents of scenario one (those on the deregulatory right of the political spectrum) are likely to support. Scenario three concerns the devolved governments, particularly Scotland, given its significant majority to remain (62 per cent to 38 per cent leave) and the Scottish Government being the most proactive of all the devolved governments in calling for the closest possible alignment with the EU post-withdrawal (including single market and customs union membership). Mainstream political opinion in Scotland from all parties (with no significant tensions within any of the parties) was and has generally remained either neutral or pro European. The SNP position during the independence referendum was for Scotland to have a written constitution and remain a member of the EU, placing the country in the European constitutional mainstream. Yet, it is estimated up to one third of SNP supporters voted to leave the EU and some of the wider concerns in other parts of the UK over immigration are not absent in Scotland – though polling shows there is broad support for a Scottish specific immigration policy separate from the UK as a whole and controlled by Holyrood, with significantly greater support than the rest of the UK for the notion that ‘free movement is a price worth paying in return for a favourable trade deal’ (Holyrood 2018). Given the challenges to constitutional practice presented by Brexit, as well as the overcentralised nature of the UK (or rather England, given the existence of devolved government), perhaps Britain is due a ‘constitutional moment’. Some thought in fact has gone into this, most notably by ex-Prime Minister Gordon Brown who has indicated the dangers of

14  Defining Britain

further centralisation of power in the UK, as well as the sense of injustice felt if some regions or nations of the UK receive extra powers but others do not. His plans for a redistribution of power in Britain would involve a ‘Council of the North’ and his analysis concludes by stating: ‘Nearly 30 years on from initial thinking [about new constitutional arrangements in Scotland], a UK-wide constitutional convention may be the best starting point for building consensus around a much needed redistribution of power’ (Brown 2017). Top down constitutional revisions of such magnitude are indeed rare. And such a planned systemic approach is not common (perhaps unprecedented) in UK constitutional development, quite the reverse – perhaps a reason these ideas were not advanced when Gordon Brown was in power. Yet in recent memory, constitutional change has occurred when there is a political will and pressure for change, as witnessed by the very different processes of power sharing in Northern Ireland signalled in the Good Friday Agreement and the creation of a devolved parliament in Scotland.

Dimension 2 Imagined communities and foreign policy How Britain interacts internationally with other countries depends very much on the government of the day’s perception of the national interest, its view of Britain’s role in the world, the extent to which it can achieve its objectives and pursue national and strategic interests in partnership with others. This of course occurs within a framework of economic and other capacities. In some cases a strictly ‘rational’ approach can be compromised and foreign policy may be driven by notions of identity, how actions are perceived by other players and so on. Benedict Anderson’s (1991) concept of ‘imagined communities’ (based on his research on the driving force of nationalism in developing countries in South East Asia) introduced the concept of communities being constructed or imagined around notions of shared history, destiny, myth-making, language and culture, distinguishing the community in question from others (perhaps for example other countries, communities, ethnic or religious groups) that were out-with these constructed parameters. In particular, he viewed the nation as ‘an imagined political community’ (Anderson 1991). All nations display constitutive elements of an imagined community. In Britain (though this may be contested with distinctive elements of a separate Scottish imagined community given more focus with the rise of Scottish nationalism), these include the historical force of Britain as a key

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leader of the English speaking peoples, with language, culture, religion and political history as key driving forces in world politics and civilisation, in no small measure responsible for the victory of democracy in the western world and a managed exit from empire. This powerful aspect of imagined community (covering a period from Caesar’s invasion of Britain to 1914) was mainly influenced (arguably constructed) through Churchill’s authorship of A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, writing which commenced in 1936 and was published in 1956. This view of Britain’s role in the world has a ring of exceptionalism, in other words Britain at the centre and core of the ‘English speaking peoples’ is more than simply one nation amongst many others with distinguishing, indeed some unique, features. This idea is given refreshment through the writings of some historians (e.g. Roberts 2010) and political protagonists writing history (e.g. Hannan 2013) and had much to do with Michael Gove’s attempts as education secretary to introduce a more patriotic syllabus. It should of course be stated that Gove was unable to persuade the teaching profession – in fact had a very hostile relationship with it – and was sacked by Prime Minister David Cameron; and such views of history are not representative of mainstream academic historians. Other elements of the construction include the powerful myth of ‘Britain standing alone’ in World War Two against Germany (prior to US involvement) after most governments of mainland Europe collapsed under German aggression. In fact right up to the summer of 1944, there were more Commonwealth troops fighting than Americans, 2.5 million from the Dominions, 2 million Indians, 700,000 from African colonies, excluding South Africa, and 160,000 from the Caribbean (Colley 2014). Yet another narrative is the notion that Britain, though a small player compared to the biggest superpower (especially the US), can still play a brokerage role much valued by the superpower. In a much cited quotation from 1943, Harold MacMillan, who would become UK prime minister in 1956 said: ‘These Americans represent the new Roman empire and we Britons, like the Greeks of old, must teach them how to make it go’ (MacMillan 1945). There is no evidence at all that the Americans took advice or teaching from Britain on the main thrust of their foreign policy. Another element of imagined community and identity may include perceptions of empire. A generally benign view of the British empire, or at least a form of cost– benefit analysis concluding that the alternative to empire may or could have been worse for the affected countries, has been advanced by some historians (e.g. Ferguson 2003), though this is a contested area and particularly so when a generation of scholars, with differing views and perspectives on empire (often sceptical or more negative about imperial legacy), challenge this. All of these views and positions are well

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researched, but often ideas of empire and its legacy have produced an imagined community and identity which produce strong springboards for perception and action (Thompson 2012). A final element in this constructed narrative is a pragmatic approach to politics and an understanding of ‘realpolitik’. That is to take a position or implement a policy not necessarily in line with the ideals or views of the political agent but considered necessary to capture a middle ground (or at least a large body of support), thereby retaining some power and control over the environment. There are many examples of this in British politics, including the Conservatives in the 1950s and 1960s retaining most of the Labour government’s post-1945 radical social programmes and economic measures creating a mixed economy; Labour governments in the 1960s and 1970s with little intention of nationalising commanding heights of the economy despite the party’s Clause 4 clearly stating this very aim; Churchill’s wartime support for the Soviet Union in World War Two (and direct involvement with Tito’s communist partisans in Yugoslavia), despite his anti-Bolshevik past and continuing anti-Communist views; many leading political figures who supported remain in the EU referendum, yet are supportive now of Brexit and the Brexit process – not least of whom is Prime Minister May. So, notions of imagined community can provide a strong backdrop to what governments and states actually do or try to do through their foreign policy and interactions in the international arena. A brief definition of foreign policy is given by Professor William Wallace of the London School of Economics: Foreign policy is in many ways a transactional process, built around the rational calculation of national interests and the delicate – though sometimes violent – manoeuvring among multiple actors with different strengths and weaknesses. Domestic politics however, set limits to the rational calculations of statesmen and diplomats: national pride, myths of history and identity, concerns about sovereignty. International politics are, therefore, shaped by emotion and imagination as well as by interests and calculation: by claims about a country’s ‘place in the world’, ‘independence’, ‘sovereignty’, even ‘honour’. The tension between rational interests and emotional attitudes is fundamental to understanding foreign policy and international relations. Governing ideas and concepts, dominant narratives of historical development and current friends and enemies shape the way in which foreign policy actors define their national interests and the success or failure of their efforts to gain popular consent. (Wallace 2017)

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While it is beyond the scope of this chapter and book to explore the origins of such imagined communities, it is possible to analyse the significant role which some aspects of Britain’s past or imagined community plays in explaining much more recent behaviour. Chief amongst these must be the hegemonic position Britain achieved by the early years of the 20th century and how this formed a path dependency in the tumultuous first half of that century – many years beyond Britain’s hegemonic status.

Britain as the world’s leading power By 1870, Britain was indeed the great power of the age. Having been the first country to mass industrialise, it possessed about 45 per cent of the world’s industrial potential (and around 60 per cent of Europe’s); Britain’s exports accounted for 17 per cent of total world trade with a merchant fleet representing 40 per cent of the world total, with a healthy balance of payments surplus and sterling the world’s major trading currency. All this and only 2 per cent of the world’s population. Despite growing competition, in 1900 Britain was the unrivalled global financial centre. Its navy at that time was stronger than the next three or four combined (Self 2010; Kennedy 1989). Britain also had the largest empire in the world, in fact the largest the world has ever seen, comprising 20 per cent of the world’s surface (12 million square miles) and 400 million subjects (Hyam 1976). The map of the world was truly pink.

British world power and the effect of war Economically, Britain took a heavy hit as a result of World War One. The government was forced to sell overseas assets as well as borrow heavily. By the war’s end, Britain’s overseas debt was £1,241 million, around 80 per cent of which was owed to the US Government. Britain struggled to pay this, yet received little of the £1,534 million she had lent to the Allies. Consequently, the US replaced Britain as the world’s greatest financial power (Self 2010; 2006). However Britain’s inability to exert international economic heft was not replaced by US willingness to accept the role of hegemon to intervene in markets with currency flows to stabilise the system. Indeed the UK tried to regain this role by adopting the gold standard in 1925, unsustainable after the 1929 financial crash, leading to Britain’s exit from the gold standard in 1931. This led to the loss of a stabiliser and facilitator of world trade. Britain was simply not able to provide this role. It had expanded imperial commitments after

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World War One (e.g. in Palestine, Iraq and south west Africa), thus undermining sterling; other countries’ industrialising led to competitive pressures on British exports and greater availability of imports, so governments had to use up reserves to shore up the value of sterling. These constrained circumstances were of course accentuated after World War Two (Gaskarth 2013). A significant issue for Britain after 1945 was to retain imperial interests – not an issue for much of Europe. A problem which Britain did share with Europe as a whole was the shortage of dollars to pay for much needed imports as well as capital goods. In Britain food was rationed until well into the 1950s; bread which had not been rationed during the war was rationed after. With Marshall aid through the Economic Recovery Plan (the ‘Marshall Plan’) from the USA, in excess of $12 billion was provided. This of course was not motivated by altruism: most of the dollar aid provided was used to purchase American produced goods and investment; Britain, the largest recipient, used almost all of it to repay wartime loans from the US. Initially the Marshall Plan was to be used to lever the creation of a European customs union (the logical starting point for greater integration in Europe, though actual moves in that direction came from joint Franco-German initiatives in coal and steel production). Britain however did not see this to be in the national interest: apart from hostility to closer political ties or greater integration with Europe, it was felt it could lead to damaging competition, preventing independent British action and accentuating the dollar gap (Kershaw 2015). Two leading American policy makers, William Clayton (a senior diplomat close to the Marshall Plan) and Marshall himself saw it thus: ‘The trouble with the British is that they are hanging on by their eyelashes to the hope that somehow or other with our help they will enable to preserve the British Empire and their leadership of it’ (Clayton, cited in Kershaw 2015); ‘[Britain wishes to] benefit fully from a European program – while at the same time maintaining the position of not being wholly a European country’ (Marshall, cited in Kershaw 2015). Yet in the early years of the emerging Cold War, Britain’s imperial interests and US policy were useful (to the US), congruent with her policy aims, particularly where there were fears of Russian advance in Europe. An early example of this was Greece. The Greek insurgency commenced early 1946 and the ensuing civil war seemed to provide an opportunity for Stalin. Greece, previously considered by Stalin during the war to be within Britain’s sphere of influence, was considered vulnerable by the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin who told the Americans that Britain in its straightened circumstances could no longer provide military aid to Greece: within the year, military aid and training was

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provided by the US, thought to be responsible for securing the victory of the anti-Communist and anti-left forces (Kershaw 2015).

Continued ambition as a world power So although economic enfeeblement was the rationale behind Britain’s call for American involvement in Greece, it clearly signposted willingness to sit squarely with the major power in the coming Cold War. Churchill’s view of Britain as a continuing world power, expressed postwar and in Cabinet in 1951 (see Self 2010) was based on having international interests in three interlocking circles as 1) the major power in Europe, 2) its relationship with empire and the Dominions and 3) a special relationship with the US encapsulated (he felt) through his relationship in wartime with US President Roosevelt, participation in each circle reinforcing influence in the other two (McIntyre 1998). Much of this was focused on the immediate or the past with little forward vision. However, Churchill and his Conservatives were not alone in seeing continued great power status for Britain. For example, although Attlee’s post-war Labour government started to retreat from empire, most notably in India, empire was still seen as a symbol of greatness. The former colonies were expected to grow into a British Commonwealth of Nations, eventually supporting the mother country’s international prestige (Kent 1993; Fieldhouse 1984); added to this the post-war Labour government was instrumental in the decisions that would make Britain a power with atomic nuclear weapons. There is in fact lots of evidence in the post-war decades that ‘great power’ thinking was very much part of British policy makers’ mind set. Sir Oliver Franks, a key figure in the British foreign policy community, UK ambassador to the USA 1948–1952, later remarked that in the mid-1950s the assumption Britain should be a great power ‘was a part of the habit and furniture of our minds’ (cited in Darby 1973). However, it is important to note that such a world view of Britain’s great power paradigm was not always shared by others. Some US scepticism has been outlined above. The West German Chancellor Adenauer noted after the joint French-British venture in Suez and their subsequent humiliation, speaking to the French foreign minister: France and England [Britain] will never be powers comparable to the United States. Not Germany either. There remains to them only one way of playing a decisive role in the world: that is to unite Europe . . . We have not time to waste; Europe will be your revenge. (cited in Younge 2018)

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Clearly, Adenauer’s perspective on British action was not one necessarily shared by Britain at the time, despite the UK joining the European Community in the early 1970s.

Great power role under pressure from economic reality The idea of Britain as a great power took a major dent during the Suez conflict. The Suez Canal, jointly owned by the British and French was nationalised by President Nasser in Egypt. British action under Prime Minister Eden was not entirely explained by imperial bombast: a quarter of British imports and a third of its shipping passed through the canal so this was considered a material threat to Britain’s economic interest; Eden also believed Nasser to be a dictator and he had an aversion to appeasing dictators – having resigned from Chamberlain’s government over the appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s. But the prelude to hostilities was manufactured. Britain and France colluded with Israel to create a pretext for their joint invasion of Egypt – it was agreed Israel would attack Egypt, thereby creating a situation where France and Britain would invade to protect their interest. The USA was furious at this military adventure and used its power to block Britain’s attempt to use drawing rights from the International Monetary Fund. Britain therefore was forced to use its currency reserves to counter speculation. The economic pressures were too great and Britain withdrew. Not only did this episode show that Britain’s influence in the transatlantic concentric circle was vacuous, but it soured relations with France, a significant player in the European circle too. The wider point to be made, encapsulated by Suez, is that currency crises and domestic economic problems which they created have been largely attributed to British foreign policy: the desire for sterling as a reserve currency driven by the need to fund Britain’s overseas commitments as a symbol of its status as a leading power. As one leading authority puts it: ‘Without the massive deficit on capital account and on the government account, the British economy would not have suffered the balance of payments problems in any of the years that sparked sterling crises in the 1950s and 1960s’ (Gamble 1994).

Europe as a means of retaining influence However, although it may well have been economically rational for Britain to scale back global power ambitions, historically and culturally

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ingrained path dependencies make it incredibly difficult for any nation to do this. History provides precious few examples (out-with defeat in war) of states doing such on a voluntary basis. In the years following Suez there were other issues questioning Britain’s great power status, for example the abandonment of Britain’s Blue Streak missile on financial and technical grounds and the purchase of the American Skybolt system as a replacement (a policy repeated later with the initial deployment of the US Trident nuclear submarine fleet, the renewal of which was agreed by Britain in 2016). The logical policy option was for the UK to join the European Economic Community (EEC) (a policy option strongly supported by the US), but clearly this was from a position of weakness; furthermore average gross domestic product (GDP) growth in EEC countries from 1950–1970 was about double that of Britain (Sanders 1990). Britain’s first two applications (1961 and 1966) were vetoed by the French, but the third application (1971) led to Britain’s entry in 1973. However, if seen as a route to Britain retaining influence on the world stage, it was never enthusiastically supported by either main political party despite some enthusiasts in both – notably the Conservative leader and Prime Minister Edward Heath and some senior Labour figures such as Roy Jenkins and Denis Healey – or, according to opinion polling at the time, by the general public, despite a referendum in 1975 on whether Britain should retain membership returning a comfortable yes remain vote.

Britain in the world: contemporary perspectives Copeland (2009) has presented a model of diplomacy which claims to be more sensitive to a globalised technologically interconnected world than a view of international relations and diplomacy grounded on state to state and power block to power block interaction practised during the Cold War (and preceding) eras. It is not the purpose here to discuss the merits of such an approach. However, there are certain aspects of his typology which can help locate British interactions with the world. The model consists of the: A or advancing world, which controls the wealth and whose economic and political advantage is growing; C or contingent world, whose prospects are uncertain and will be determined by future developments, which could tip in either direction; T or tertiary world, characterised by endemic poverty and whose relative position is subservient or dependent; and E or excluded world, which is for the most part outside of globalisation’s matrix (Copeland 2009).

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Britain is located in the C world whose prospects are uncertain and will be determined by future developments. But crucially this has to be seen in the context detailed above, that is of an imagined community with a historical backdrop of a great power no longer of such standing but still a significant country by size, economy and military capacity. It is the 6th largest economy by GDP measure (accounting for 3.9 per cent of world GDP), 9th by purchasing power parity measure and 19th by GDP per capita. For defence spending (2 per cent of GDP), it is one of the largest spenders among small–medium size countries, except for a small number of exceptional countries (like Israel) facing very specific circumstances; in Europe only France matches Britain’s commitment to defence spending. British responses have been various. There has been recognition by some policy makers of a relative declinism. For example, Gordon Brown in 2006 stated ‘Britain is losing confidence in itself with institutions that never change’ (Brown 2006). Margaret Thatcher some 27 years earlier just before election as prime minister spoke of decline too, in characteristic terms: When I first entered the House of Commons twenty years ago this autumn, we were second in the European league. Now we are in the relegation zone. Our comparative national decline was officially confirmed at the European Council meeting in December when the new monetary system was under discussion. Britain had difficulty in joining the scheme because she was – to use Europe’s chilling new name for us – an ‘LPC’, a Less Prosperous Country. I don’t begin by claiming that Britain could have stayed ‘top nation’ for ever, or that we can realistically aspire to that position today. But we should be able to hold and develop the place that we used to have before the rise of the Empire – a place once described as that of ‘the smallest of the great powers and the greatest of the small’. To lead Britain’s successful fight back . . . we must look to our defences. The condition to which Labour has reduced them can only comfort those who wish Britain ill – and those whose ambition is to break up the Western Alliance. A household which finds itself short of money, and then goes and cancels its insurance policies, courts disaster. So a nation which skimps on its defences is playing with fire. We shall rebuild our defences and in so doing strengthen the alliance. That must be a prime task for the new Conservative Government in the years which lie ahead. Most of these things the great majority of our people believe.

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Four centuries ago Sir Walter Raleigh wrote on the window pane ‘Fain would I climb, yet fear I to fall’. The first Queen Elizabeth wrote below these words: ‘If thy heart fails thee, climb not at all’. . . . [this is our] programme for the rebirth of our country. We offer a clean break with the recent past. We offer hope for despair, confidence for doubt resolve for weakness. We offer a new beginning. (Margaret Thatcher 1979) Despite some fundamental ideological differences between Conservative and Labour administrations (and these were significant) from the 1980s – and noting too that the above speech was rhetorically charged with the speaker in full election mode – Britain has continued to attempt to play a world role. Another renewal, but with the same aim of playing a world role, took place with the election of New Labour in 1997. Then the emphasis was on Britain as a leading force driving liberty, liberal values and promoting diversity and in the early years of New Labour discussions of an ethical foreign policy. Under Robin Cook as foreign secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office produced a mission statement with the objective ‘to make Britain once again a force for good in the world with a sincere national interest in the promotion of its values and confidence in our identity’ (cited Self 2010). Other elements of the statement included: • To make the United Kingdom a leading player in a Europe of independent nation states • To strengthen the Commonwealth and to improve the prosperity of its members and co-operation between its members • To use the status of the United Kingdom at the United Nations to secure effective international action to keep the peace of the world and to combat poverty on the world • To strengthen our relationships in all regions of the world. (FCO 1998) There has been a considerable degree of continuity with Conservative and New Labour governments both seen as leading cheerleaders for a global order based on trade liberalisation and growth, deregulated financial and other markets, initially led by Thatcher and Reagan, then under governments led by Blair and Brown. The UK’s role as a global coordinating power attempting to use its ‘soft’ power (that is power based on influence, involvement in multi-lateral international fora, thought leadership and cultural reach, rather than conventional benchmarks of power like defence and military capacity) on the world stage displayed

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continuities too, first with Thatcher and Reagan (later Bush) reaching rapproachment with the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) over nuclear arms limitation and later Blair’s speech in Chicago (the Chicago doctrine) setting out the terms of the new international order with globalisation at the forefront rather than national interest. Blair’s critique of existing arrangements stated they were ‘the structures of 1946 trying to meet the challenges of 2006’ (Blair 2006) and went almost uncontested by mainstream parties on the left and right, though this globalisation narrative is now being politically challenged. Britain has continued to play a leading role in international bodies from the G8/G20 to the United Nations (UN), and despite some aberrations (e.g. in Iraq and Libya) has been a strong supporter of the ‘rule of law’ in international relations. Recently (2018), the (now ex) UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, despite his penchant to go off message, strongly supported the UN position against US President Trump’s unilateral declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, with resulting movement of the US embassy there from Tel Aviv.

Key themes and imagined communities: still in existence? Several of the outlined themes still appear to play a part in any analysis of British foreign policy. First is the tension between ambition and resource constraint. New Labour’s interventionist approaches clearly strained UK military capacity, and it has been argued that not only politicians but senior military figures were also over confident about the UK’s capacity to sustain the number of simultaneous combat operations at this time (Williams 2006). After the 2010 Strategic Defence Review in the overarching governmental policy of austerity the limitations placed on foreign policy were clearer perhaps than had been the case for some time. The Review called for Britain to ‘focus on areas of comparative advantage’ (HM Government 2011). Amongst other defence economies, planned aircraft carrier construction was rescheduled and delayed, the number of newly built frigates reduced in number, Nimrod surveillance aircraft were scrapped, and according to some the 2010 Review signalled a recognition that the UK could no longer play a great power role: the ability to now only deploy a ‘brigade rather than a division overseas meant Britain leaving the elite club of great powers’ (King 2011). Second, other familiar themes in Britain’s foreign policy are in question. The position of Britain’s special relationship with the US either as an alliance in its own right or Britain acting as a European transatlantic bridge between mainland Europe and the US has become something of

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a trope. Highlighted in one way or another by most prime ministers and presidents, it has looked somewhat threadbare in the last decades. Tony Blair’s attempt to provide a supporting bridge between the EU and US post 9/11 and the pre-invasion of Iraq proved unsuccessful, opposed particularly by the French and caused lasting political damage to Blair. Furthermore, there is little evidence that there was much influence exerted by Britain on US policy over Iraq (Greenstock 2016). It is unlikely that Prime Minister May’s hurried attempt to build a special relationship with newly elected US President Trump in the pro-Brexit environment will provide evidence of any more substance; and any notion of Britain acting as a bridge between the US and Europe is clearly highly unlikely, given the current US president’s scepticism or hostility to alliances and multi-lateralism. Third, there are some unresolved tensions in Britain’s imagined community, with some dilemmas arising from the current political climate. All leading figures in government, none more so than the prime minister (but ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Brexiteers alike), are very keen to stress that postBrexit Britain will remain a global player: We are all united in our belief that that world will be built on the foundations of free trade, partnership and globalisation. The forces of liberalism, free trade and globalisation that have had – and continue to have – such an overwhelmingly positive impact on our world, that have harnessed unprecedented levels of wealth and opportunity, that have lifted millions out of poverty around the world, that have brought nations closer together, broken down barriers and improved standards of living and consumer choice, forces that underpin the rules-based international system that is key to our global prosperity. (Theresa May 2018) However, there has undoubtedly been a political kickback against aspects of globalisation which, in the context of the prime minister’s speech – is a concept the Davos summit has come to symbolise. The movement of labour which has been enabled by globalisation (bifurcated at both ends of the labour market, with the highly technically and professionally skilled as winners of this global movement, but much migrant labour seen as pressurising the circumstances of less well off communities who have often suffered economic dislocation) has led to a widening gap between rich and poor in many developed societies. It is argued that without some management and moderation of these global market strategies, national and community cohesion is compromised,

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weakening solidarity and democratic structures (Rodrik 2011; Putnam 2007). This was undoubtedly a factor in the Brexit referendum vote (see Chapter 4). Yet this presents political ambiguity apparent in Britain’s globalised ambitions. There does seem to be an appreciation by the prime minister that some modifications, regulations and protections are necessary for a globalisation environment to gain national popular legitimacy, though this is yet to be articulated into a coherent policy initiative. But if we are to make the case for free markets, free trade and globalisation, as we must, those of us who believe in them must face up to and respond to the concerns people have . . . we must work together to shape new policies and approaches that demonstrate their capacity to deliver for all of the people in our respective countries . . . and for business, it means doing even more to spread those benefits to more people. It means playing by the same rules as everyone else when it comes to tax and behaviour, because in the UK trust in business runs at just 35% among those in the lowest income brackets. And it means putting aside short-term considerations and investing in people and communities for the long-term. (Theresa May 2018) But many of the main drivers in the Brexit debate, particularly within the governing Conservative Party, appear to be focusing on the high politics aspects of future trading arrangements with the EU and others, and not on social, economic and political concerns over globalisation per se. The final unresolved tension is about Britain’s global power status set against a defence budget which can only reflect the size of the UK economy. At one level the Defence Review of 2015 rowed back from some of the cutbacks of the 2010 Review. In the earlier Review the defence budget was cut by 8 per cent in real terms, but the 2015 Review envisaged a real terms increase of 5 per cent per annum until 2020–2021. The response to this from key stakeholders was generally supportive (e.g. from the Royal United Services Institute policy think tank (see RUSI 2015), the International Institute of Strategic Affairs and past senior military figures, though Chatham House considered it to be more ‘political’ than militarily strategically significant. It was claimed by some that this put Britain firmly back into the role of global power (e.g. Economist 2016). However, it is unlikely that this will bring into congruence policy ambition and capacity. It can be argued that Britain has a modest defence budget for its current ambitions, in some areas increased to counter ‘cyber warfare’, jihadi and other threats. There will be a permanent UK military presence in the Persian Gulf, including a

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new naval base in Bahrain (HMS Jaffair), establishment of a new British Defence Staff in the Middle East as well as Asia Pacific and Africa and continuation of spend on international development at 0.7 per cent of GDP. In addition there is the escalating cost of the Trident nuclear deterrent. Bearing in mind this Defence Review was conducted prior to the Brexit referendum, it has been argued that the new ‘east of Suez’ policy meant Britain now has two major areas of commitments (Europe and east of Suez) that are unsustainable in resource terms (Longinotti 2015). According to this line of thinking, sustainability could become theoretically possible if UK resource commitment in one of the theatres, i.e. Europe, was reduced in relative terms and aligned more with EU members’ military capabilities there. This however is very uncertain due to Britain’s departure from the EU. This was not entirely unseen before the referendum (Keohone 2016).

Summary of chapter themes • Centralised power and the British state; • Constitutional implications of devolution in different nations of the UK; • Parliamentary sovereignty and alternative readings of constitutional arrangements; • Imagined communities; • Historical legacy and Britain’s role in the world: imperialist, transatlanticist, Europeanist; • Great power status and economic reality; • Globalisation and challenges to this.

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Brown, G. (2006) The Future of Britishness, 14 January, www.fabians.org.uk/ events/speeches/the-future-of-britishness (accessed 12 September 2017). Brown, G. (2017) Brexit is an opportunity to make a federal United Kingdom, Financial Times, 28 March, www.ft.com/content/c4658ba8-130a-11e7-b0c137e417ee6c76 (accessed 20 April 2017). Bulpit, J. (1983) Territory and Power in the UK. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Bulpit, J. (1986) The discipline of the new democracy: Mrs Thatcher’s domestic statecraft, Political Studies 34:1, 19–39. Colley, L. (2014) Acts of Union and Disunion. London: Profile Books. Copeland, D. (2009) Guerrilla Diplomacy. London: Lynne Rienner. Darby, P. (1973) British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947–1968. London: Oxford University Press. Devine, T.M. (2004) Scotland’s Empire 1600–1815. London: Penguin. Economist, The (2013) Diverging politics of the Labour north and Conservative south make England look even more like two nations. Reuniting them will be hard, The Economist, 18 September. Economist, The (2016) Britain re-asserts itself as a world power, The Economist, 19 September. Elrick, M. (2014) John Smith: Labour’s lost leader, Scotsman, 27 April. FCO (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) (1998) Departmental Report. London: The Stationery Office, www.fco.gov.uk/directory/dynpage.asp.page=26:Cm3903 (accessed 8 November 2017). Ferguson, N. (2003) Empire: How Britain Made the World. London: Allen Lane. Fieldhouse, D.K. (1984) The Labour government and the empire-commonwealth 1945–51, in Ovendale, R. (Ed.) The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments 1945–51. Leicester: Leicester University Press. Gamble, A. (1994) Britain in Decline (fourth edition). Basingstoke: St Martins Press. Gaskarth, J. (2013) British Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Polity. Gove, M. (2017) Brexit: quotes from and viewpoints on Britain’s great debate, The Irish Times, www.irishtimes.com/news/world/uk/brexit-quotes-from-andviewpoints-on-britain-s-great-debate-1.2695076 (accessed 4 January 2017). Greenstock, J. (2016) Iraq: The Cost of War. London: Heinemann. Hannan, D. (2013) Inventing Freedom: How the English Speaking Peoples Made the Modern World. New York: Harper Collins. HM Government (2011) Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cmnd 7948. London: Stationery Office. Holyrood (2018) Poll: Scots oppose separate immigration deal from rUK, 10 January 2018, www.holyrood.com/articles/news/poll-scots-oppose-sepa rate-immigration-deal-ruk (accessed 10 January 2018). House of Commons Library (2017) General Election 2017: Full Results and Analysis, https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/ CBP-7979 (accessed 9 October 2017).

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Hyam, R. (1976) Britain’s Imperial Century 1815–1914. London: Batsford. Kennedy, P. (1989) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500–2000. London: Fontana. Kent, J. (1993) British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War 1944–49. Leicester: Leicester University Press. Keohone, D. (2016) Is Britain back? The 2015 UK Defence Review, CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 185, February. Kershaw, I. (2015) To Hell and Back: Europe 1914–1949 (The Penguin History of Europe). London: Perguin. King, A. (2011) Having brigades will never deliver the same punch as a division, Parliamentary Brief Online No. 27, 27 October. Letsas, G. (2017) Brexit and the constitution, London Review of Books, 16 March. Longinotti, E. (2015) ‘For God’s sake, act like Britain’: lessons from the 1960s for British defence policy, History & Policy, 9 September, www.historyandpolicy. org/policy-papers/papers/for-gods-sake-act-like-britain-lessons-from-the1960s-for-british-defence) (accessed 22 November 2017). Loughlin. M. (2016) The end of avoidance, London Review of Books, 28 July. MacMillan, H. (1945) https://anthonywindram.wordpress.com/tag/haroldmacmillan/ (accessed 12 November 2017). May, T. (2016) PM’s speech to Conservative Party Conference, www.telegraph. co.uk/news/2016/10/05/theresa-mays-conference-speech-in-full/ (accessed 4 November 2016). May, T. (2018) Davos address, speech at World Economic Forum, Davos, 19 January, www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/theresa-may-davos-address/ (accessed 21 February 2018). McIntyre, W.D. (1998) British Decolonisation 1946–1997. London: MacMillan. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2017) OECD Economic Survey. UK. October, www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/econom ic-survey-united-kingdom.htm (accessed 28 October 2017). Putnam, R.D. (2007) E Pluribus Unum: diversity and community in the 21st century, Scandinavian Political Studies 30:2, 137–174. Queen Mary University (2018) Survey of Britain’s Party Members Reveals Glaring Contrasts Between Tories and Other Parties, www.qmul.ac.uk/media/ qmul/media/publications/Grassroots,-Britain’s-Party-Members.pdf (accessed 12 January 2018). Roberts, A. (2010) History of the English Speaking Peoples Since 1900. London: Orion Books. Rodrik, D. (2011) The Globalisation Paradox. New York: Norton. RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) (2015) 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, https://rusi.org/SDSR2015 (accessed 8 May 2017). Sanders, D. (1990) Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy Since 1945. London: MacMillan. Self, R. (2006) Britain, America and the War Debt Controversy: The Economic Diplomacy of an Unspecial Relationship 1917–1941. London: Routledge.

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Self, R. (2010) British Foreign and Defence Policy Since 1945. London: Palgrave. Somek, A. (2014) The Cosmopolitan Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Thatcher, M. (1979) Speech to Conservative Central Council, 24 March, www. margaretthatcher.org/document/103980) (accessed 8 May 2017). Thompson, A. (Ed.) (2012) Britain’s Experience of Empire in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wallace, W. (2017) Losing the narrative: the United Kingdom and the European Union as imagined communities, International Relations 3:2, 192–209. Williams, P. (2006) British Foreign Policy Under New Labour 1997–2005. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. Wilson, J. and Game, C. (2011) Local Government in the United Kingdom (fifth edition). London: Palgrave MacMillan. Younge, G. (2018) Britain’s imperial fantasies have given us Brexit, The Guardian, 3 February.

Politics and representation

2

Consolidation of the two party system from 1945 to mid-1960s For the three decades or so after World War Two, class and the pursuit of class interests were seen as the key explanatory and analytical driver of British politics, with the two main parties Conservative and Labour seeing their core support grounded in middle class (Conservative) and working class (Labour) bases, though both parties clearly attempted to reach across these broadly defined constituencies of support. Much academic writing reflected this too, in particular research into the working class (e.g. Goldthorpe et al. 1969; Jackson and Marsden 1966; Wilmott and Young 1960; Hoggart 1957). The political representation of class division was, on the one hand, a large and – so it was perceived – mainly uniform working class and, on the other hand, a relatively small middle class. This was politically articulated through a two party system. Duverger’s ‘law’ (Duverger 1954) at its core indicates plurality based voting systems, like the UK’s first past the post inevitably leading to a two party system minimising the impact of other contenders for electors’ votes, since voters perceive support for other parties being in effect a wasted vote due to difficulties the electoral system creates for smaller parties. Although this rather oversimplifies matters (e.g. there is greater complexity in some local council representation patterns, voting at sub-state level, even with plurality based systems, can at times run counter to Duverger’s law) it does have strong explanatory value. Subsequently, social and related political change has altered this bifurcated dual class with corresponding political party representation to a more contemporary understanding: that is a much larger group of

32  Politics and representation

middle class(es) and a correspondingly smaller working class (Evans and Tilley 2017), though this has not necessarily diminished the importance, if not always the dominance of, a two party system. And of course the plurality based voting system now resides in a more diverse and complex political ecosystem which includes forms of proportional representation in devolved polities (e.g. combining plurality and proportional voting in Scotland and Wales, single transferable voting in Northern Ireland), mixed plurality and proportionality for the London Assembly, single transferable voting in Scottish local council elections, as well as directly elected mayors and police and crime commissioners in England and Wales. Police and crime commissioners and elected mayors (which exist only in England, though the legislation which applies to England and Wales permits these in Wales too) are elected by plurality voting and candidates often stand with party labels. Scotland elects local councils through single transferable voting. The articulation of national political life in Britain through a two party system is of course not a phenomenon exclusive to the modern era with full franchise rights and a developed Labour Party representing working class interests. Prior to the rise of working class representation through a trade union led Labour Party, British politics appeared to be dominated by two main parties, Liberals and Conservatives.

Two party system: some nuances The two party depiction is something of a simplification which can obscure some real complexities. These included inter party divisions, leading to something of a major realignment in the Liberals due to Irish home rule and Liberal Unionism in the late 19th century. In Scotland, the Scottish Unionist Party, affiliated to but quite separate from the Conservatives, had for many years a stance on Scotland’s status (similar to independent dominion status, albeit within the context of the British Empire) somewhat different from today’s successor, the Scottish Conservatives, who are indistinguishable from the UK Conservatives on constitutional matters. The Liberals in Scotland were at times seriously challenged (and sometimes unseated) in their Highland strongholds by the Highland Land League and the Crofters Party. And when the financial crash and ensuing depression overwhelmed the minority Labour government (elected in 1929 under the leadership of Ramsay Macdonald) leading to an election of a National government in 1931, Labour was decimated to 50 seats at Westminster (now as the opposition), with ‘National Labour’ only winning 13 seats for

Politics and representation  33 Table 2.1 National government and Labour opposition parliamentary seats and votes, 1931 and 1935 elections Year

National government parties seats and votes

Labour opposition

1931

Conservative: 470 Liberal: 32 Liberal National: 35 National Labour: 13 National: 4 Total National government: 554 Total votes: 13,902,232 Conservative: 387 Liberal National: 33 National Labour: 8 National: 1 Total National government: 429 Total votes: 11,183,408

Labour: 46 Independent Labour Party (ILP): 3 Other unendorsed Labour: 3 Total Labour: 52 Total Labour votes: 6,395,065

1935

Labour: 154 Other opposition: 32 (Liberal, Independent Labour, others) Total opposition: 186 Total Labour votes: 7,984,988

Source: Compiled from material in Smart (1999) and Thorpe (1992)

the winning National government (Table 2.1). Clearly the two party system was not operating (and in fact though the National government parties obtained almost 14 million votes, Labour in opposition, gained just over 6 million); the same could be said of the National government elected in 1935, though with Labour led by Clement Attlee the seeds of the rebirth of the two party system can be seen.

Normalisation and re-establishment of two party politics post-1945? With the establishment of two party control from 1945, there are three broad reasons to resist a temptingly glib and superficial ‘back to normal, re-establishment of two party politics’, which sees a progression from Liberal-Conservative in the 19th and early 20th centuries then the birth of Labour and, after some system shocks, the establishment of a LabourConservative two party stability. First, the normalisation thesis underplays the salience of the demands and the desirability for the social and political changes represented at the time by the election of a post-war Labour government. Significantly perhaps, the obvious need for improved services for the population as a whole, ranging from health to education

34  Politics and representation

and housing, was in a sense a nation (re)building project after the economic destruction of war and dismal periods of economic and social privation of the 1930s depression for large swathes of the country. It is well evidenced that military personnel still awaiting demobilisation and therefore voting overseas had majorities for Labour in excess of those voting in Britain, though opinion polling prior to the election indicated the likelihood of a clear Labour majority. Serving soldiers’ support for Labour has been attributed to educational engagement and debate undertaken by the Army Bureau of Current Affairs (ABCA), and from time to time the ABCA had been ‘accused’ by politicians, some as recent as former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, of propagandising in favour of Labour (Thatcher 1995). More likely is the determination for the post-World War One situation – still alive for many serving in the military, either themselves or through family members – not to be repeated, when conscripted soldiers were promised jobs, prosperity and ‘homes fit for heroes’, only to experience rather different realities in the post-1918 years (Lynch 2008). Second, although it can be demonstrated that large parts of Labour’s programme had support beyond Labour (e.g. the Beveridge Report was largely accepted by Churchill’s Conservatives, though with the strong caveat about lack of affordability), many established political figures and other interests saw Labour’s policy commitments as a radical departure from the norm. While Churchill’s (in)famous first radio broadcast after the 1945 Labour victory, referring to the government’s programme (‘they would have to fall back on some form of Gestapo, no doubt very humanely directed in the first instance’ – cited in Toye 2010), can be considered a piece of political hyperbole or an inability to detach the requirements of political leadership from the cruder aspects of party political gaming (Toye 2010), there are other instances where the implications of Labour’s election was seen in terms of disruption. For example one of the new government’s flagship policies, the creation of the National Health Service (NHS) was strongly resisted by parts of the medical profession, seeing this as state intrusion (with arguments redolent in parts of the USA in the 21st century when healthcare reform is considered); many local authorities and voluntary sector organisations saw the embryonic NHS as a danger to their own healthcare provision – e.g. London County Council strongly campaigned against the absorption of its hospitals into a state run NHS (Harris 1995). Third, the normalisation thesis perhaps underestimates the longer term active role played by Labour in gaining media support (which at the time meant newspapers, then the main means of communication outwith the BBC) to an extent unrecognisable in the period of minority

Politics and representation  35

Labour governments in the 1920s. Then the anti-Labour, pro-Conservative partisanship of much of the media (especially that part largely controlled by Northcliffe, Rothermere and Beaverbrook) best typified by the scandal of the ‘Zinoviev letter’ (subsequently shown to be a forgery written by MI6 agents) purporting to come from Zinoviev, chairman of the Comintern, stirring Communist supporters in Britain to sedition and by some form of association Labour led by Ramsay MacDonald, would be the vehicle to implement this revolution. The letter was ‘leaked’ before the 1924 election, contributing to the Labour minority government’s heavy loss, and subsequent research has shown the strong possibility of collusion between secret security services, leading newspaper owners/ editors and parts of Conservative Head Quarters (HQ). The blatant partisanship of much of the press – especially the Daily Mail – was then more akin to the current environment, though presently press influence is a shadow of its former self and such collusion with the security services highly unlikely. Labour’s reaching out to the newspaper media from the late 1920s was significant: in addition to a Labour movement supporting the Daily Herald (published from 1912–1964 and at its height selling 450,000 papers daily in the mid-1920s, significant by today’s standards but much smaller than the mainstream titles at the time), Labour gradually won over support from Britain’s largest circulation tabloid the Daily Mirror, which strongly supported Labour’s 1945 campaign (Beers 2010).

Decline of the class based two party divide There has been a slow burn (but steady and accelerating rapidly from the mid-1990s) decline in Labour-Conservative class based voting, as depicted above. There has also of course been changes in class and occupational structures upon which these depictions and definitions are based, as outlined in Appendix 1. Based on Gallup, British Election Survey (BES) and British Social Attitudes (BSA) surveys working class support for Labour was at 58–60 per cent in 1945, about the same in 1960, dropped to 40 per cent by 1990 and around 38 per cent by 2005. Junior middle class support for Labour in 1945 was around 38 per cent, old middle class c. 22 per cent, new middle class much the same; by 1960 old middle class support had dropped to about 10 per cent, junior middle class c. 23 per cent, new middle class about 20 per cent. In 1990, old middle class support for Labour showed little change from 1960 but by 2005 had about doubled to 20 per cent; new middle class support in 1990 had increased to around 30 per cent, dipping back to 20 per cent by 2005; junior middle class support showed little change from 1960 to 1990 to 2005.

36  Politics and representation

In the same period there were also changes in support for the Conservatives. Working class support for the Conservatives stood at 20 per cent in 1945, much the same in 1960, slightly higher in 1990 but dropping to about 10 per cent in 2005. Old middle class voting for the Conservatives at 50 per cent in 1945 increased to 60 per cent in 1960, remained there in 1990, reducing to 40 per cent by 2005. New middle class voting was barely distinguishable from old middle class support for the Conservatives in 1945 (50 per cent) but had reduced to 40 per cent by 1960, remaining there in 1990, but then almost halving to 22 per cent by 2005. Junior middle class Conservative voting, at 40 per cent in 1945, barely shifted in 1960 and 1990 but declined significantly to 25 per cent by 2005 (these figures are widely cited and are based on Gallup 1945–1968, British Election Studies 1964–2015 and British Social Attitudes Surveys 1983–2015). A broader analysis of the impact of occupational class on Labour and Conservative support based on data for averages over decades from 1960s to 2010s is outlined in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.

Table 2.2  Impact of occupational class on Labour support Labour

1960s % 1970s % 1980s % 1990s % 2000s % 2010s %

Old middle class New middle class Junior middle class Working class

12 22 25 51

11 19 22 39

 9 15 18 36

22 32 31 46

26 35 29 41

18 23 22 25

Source: Adapted from Evans and Tilley (2017) based on data from British Election Studies 1964–2015

Table 2.3  Impact of occupational class on Conservative support Conservative

1960s % 1970s % 1980s % 1990s % 2000s % 2010s %

Old middle class New middle class Junior middle class Working class

64 53 50 27

67 48 46 29

63 47 50 31

44 30 31 17

47 33 33 20

49 40 35 21

Source: Adapted from Evans and Tilley (2017) based on data from British Election Studies 1964–2015

Politics and representation  37

All this of course is not to say that class is no longer an important signifier in electoral behaviour, rather that the configuration of class support for the two main parties has changed. The importance of this in the most current election of 2017 is outlined in some detail below. Along with this change in the class based core support for Labour and Conservative parties has been a decline in the proportion of members of parliament (MPs) from the two parties (masked by the plurality voting system) and a steep decline in the percentage of total votes cast for them and a corresponding increase in votes cast for other parties (see Table 2.4) – though with something of a slight reversal of this in the latest (2017) election, more of which later. A number of explanations are given for this developing reconfiguration of class based party support amongst the two mainstream parties. The first of these is a broad explanation through exploring partisan alignment and identification with political parties. Until the 1970s much of the writing in this area saw voters’ identification with parties as fairly stable, with a relative small number of ‘floating voters’ willing to switch allegiance at elections. Early work in the USA (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960) reckoned that

Table 2.4  Percentage of popular vote and number of parliamentary seats General election

% votes for Con / Lab

% votes all others

Total no. Conservative/ Labour MPs

Total no. all other parties

1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 - Feb 1974 - Oct 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010

89.6 96.8 96.1 93.2 87.5 89.8 89.4 75.0 75.0 80.8 70.0 73.1 76.3 73.9 72.4 67.5 65.2

10.4 3.2 3.9 6.8 12.5 10.2 10.6 25.0 25.0 19.2 30.0 26.9 23.7 26.1 27.6 32.4 34.8

613 616 621 623 621 616 617 598 596 608 606 605 607 584 579 554 565

12 9 9 7 9 14 13 37 39 27 44 45 44 75 80 92 85

Source: Based on data from Butler and Butler (2000, 2006), Kavanagh and Cowley (2010)

38  Politics and representation

attachments to parties were formed in early years, through family socialisation and carried on into later life, these loyalties and allegiances often being multi-generational. Studies in Britain (e.g. Butler and Stokes 1969) found similar trends: well over 90 per cent of voters surveyed identified with a political party (and this at a time when electoral turnout was high) and of those, over 80 per cent identified either ‘very strongly’ or ‘fairly strongly’ with their political party. However, importantly for the future, the proportion of those most likely to turn out to vote for the party dramatically reduced from the very strong to the fairly strong identifiers.

Cross class voting As indicated, underlying these traditional partisan identifications was class. While this explains core party support it does not account entirely for overall voting behaviour or indeed electoral outcome. For example, class explanation alone would have guaranteed Labour victories throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s since in these decades the manual working class accounted for about 60 per cent of the electorate. In some areas, religious identification superceded class in voting. For instance in parts of Scotland where strong Labour voting amongst relatively poor Irish originated migrant communities, mainly Roman Catholic in religious affiliation, can be defined as class based voting, the significant vote amongst many skilled and semi-skilled working class Protestants for Conservatives cannot (Devine 2016). Elsewhere there was working class Conservative voting based on ‘deference’, where Conservative elites were considered by some working class voters as the natural party of government – most significant in rural areas (Newby 1979; Jessop 1974; McKenzie and Silver 1968). Other working class Conservative voters based their electoral choice on a more personal evaluation of how the party performed or might perform in government (McKenzie and Silver 1968). Nonetheless the accepted alignment based cleavage (class) was recognised as significantly changing by the early 1970s (e.g. Crewe et al. 1977). Trends in the Alford Index, a measurement showing a pattern of ‘perfect’ class voting against actuality, showed a drop in every decade since the 1960s: in 1964, 63 per cent of voters voted for their ‘natural’ class party but by 2005 only 41 per cent did. Studies by Goldthorpe (Goldthorpe et al. 1969) showed that although class identification was still strong, as was working class Labour voting, much of this particularly amongst younger Labour voters was on instrumental grounds based on perceptions of Labour’s ability to deliver what these voters wanted. Modern terminology would now state that this support is conditional and ‘soft’. On the other side of the class cleavage there were shifts

Politics and representation  39

in middle class alignment. The growth in middle class professional jobs in the public sector, either in central or local government (and much of the growing ‘welfare state’ was delivered through local councils), thereby created a new set of political identities (Dunleavy and Husbands 1983) with many of these more likely than private sector equivalents to vote Labour.

Some explanations for decline in class and partisan alignment: underlying socio-economic change Some underlying socio-economic developments behind changes in class structure were significant in long term class cleavage and partisan alignment. Three of these will suffice: 1) the longer term decline in traditional industry and manufacturing employment, with the concomitant decline (and structural change) in trade union membership, the class based institutional bedrock of Labour support; 2) changes in housing tenure also traditionally aligned with class and voting; and 3) expansion of higher education, another traditional class identifier. Decline in traditional and manufacturing industries Manufacturing’s share of total UK output in 1951 was 35.7 per cent (share of labour 35.1 per cent); in 1979 the figures were 29 per cent and 23.7 per cent respectively, and dramatically reduced to 12.4 per cent and 9.5 per cent by 2007 (Broadberry and Leunig 2013, see Table 2.5). Table 2.5 Manufacturing share of output, labour and capital in the UK economy Share of output at current prices, % 1924 1937

30.9 31.3

1937 1951 1964

29.5 35.7 33.6

Share of output at constant prices, % 1924 industrial classification 30.9 34.8 1958 industrial classification 29.5 34.6 37.0

Share of labour, %

Share of capital, %

32.9 32.9

20.3 19.0

30.4 35.1 36.1

19.5 23.8 25.5 (continued)

40  Politics and representation Table 2.5  (continued) Share of output at current prices, %

Share of output at constant prices, %

Share of labour, %

Share of capital, %

1973

30.1

34.7

22.8

1973 1979 1990 2000 2007

31.9 29.0 22.8 17.3 12.4

38.2 1995 industrial classification 31.9 28.7 25.7 21.3 18.7

26.1 23.7 16.3 13.0 9.5

14.5 12.9 10.0 8.7 6.7

Sources: For 1924–1973, Matthews et al. (1982); for 1979–2007, O’Mahoney and Timmer (2009) cited in Broadberry and Leunig (2013)

Shipbuilding and mining showed deep decline in employment, the rate of change accelerating from the 1980s. Some areas experienced greater proportionate decline in traditional industrial and manufacturing employment. For example, in Scotland manufacturing employment declined from 604,000 in 1979 to 354,000 in 1994, a decrease of 41 per cent (Brown et al. 1998). Trade union membership was 9 million in 1946, 10 million in 1969, with trade union density (that is the proportion of the workforce unionised) increasing from 43 per cent in 1946 by just one point above this at 44 per cent in 1969, though white collar density was 34 per cent, a significant increase from 1946; by 1979, membership rose to 13 million, density up to 54 per cent and white collar density 44 per cent; by 1995 trade union numbers were down to 8 million with only 30 per cent density. Membership stabilised in the 2000s but has declined somewhat since 2010 and in 2016 stands at 6 million. Density has fallen steadily and in 2016 was 23.3 per cent (52.7 per cent in public sector and 13.4 per cent in private sector). Highly educated employees and those in professional occupations are more likely to be trade union members (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 2016). Changes in housing tenure In terms of housing tenure, in the late 1940s through to the 1970s, owner occupation was a key (middle) class marker. In England in 1953, 30 per cent of housing was owner occupied, 50 per cent privately rented and 20 per cent social renting. By 1971 – after house building drives by Conservative and Labour governments – both

Politics and representation  41

owner occupation (53 per cent) and social renting (30 per cent) had increased, accompanied by a dramatic decrease in private renting (to 17 per cent). In 1991, owner occupation (including sale of council housing at discounted prices to sitting tenants) had increased, with reductions in both private (10 per cent) and social renting (22 per cent). Twenty or so years later in 2013–2014, owner occupation had dipped to 63 per cent, social renting to 17 per cent, with a doubling of private renting to 20 per cent, largely due to low or no growth in average family incomes and inability to afford house price inflation, caused in part by lack of supply and also failure to replace social housing withdrawn from the social housing pool due to council house sales. So the class markers represented by housing tenure are vastly different from the 1950s and 1960s (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2009). Some of these markers in terms of housing were more pronounced in Scotland. For example between 1945 and 1965, some 86 per cent of all houses built in Scotland were in the public social housing sector. In large swathes of Scotland this has been linked to a working class Labour voting power base (see Hassan and Shaw 2012, cited in McTavish 2016) and conversely the loss of this power base with the decline of council housing through ‘right to buy’ legislation, thereby, it is argued, fracturing the housing tenure–class marker–Labour voting link (Hassan and Shaw 2012). However, in Scotland care must be used with this argument: the sale of council housing was as popular in Scotland as elsewhere in the UK, yet the peak years of council house sales (the 1980s and early 1990s) were halcyon days for Labour support in Scotland. Expansion of higher education As with other modern economies in Europe, the US and elsewhere, there has been a substantial increase in higher education provision, making a university degree a very different class and electoral identifier than previously. In 1960, fewer than 22,500 full-time students obtained first degrees in the UK. By 2011 the figure had risen to 350,800 (THES 2013). Most major cities in the UK have at least three universities and in 2015– 2016, there were 1.75 million students studying at undergraduate and 532,970 at postgraduate levels (Universities UK 2017).

Non-class based explanations of electoral support As traditional conceptions of class and the underlying signifiers have become less relevant in understanding the links between partisan loyalty,

42  Politics and representation

ideological alignment and voter choice, other explanations for electoral behaviour have been offered. A major alternative to the idea that voting is determined by people’s social background is grounded in rational choice theory. The American political scientist, Anthony Downs, in the 1950s saw voters as making the same sorts of decisions as consumers do when they decide which product to buy (Downs 1957). Voters have preferences as to what policies they want. These may be the policies that most benefit them personally or policies they might believe in strongly, or more general notions of party or leadership competence and performance. Consequently, they will look at what the parties are offering and choose the party that most closely matches their preferences.

Explanations based on valence politics There is strong supporting evidence for explanations based on valence. Performance of the economy or notions of economic competence often feature high in explanations based on valence (e.g. Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000); there is often a negative effect, that is voters will punish government for poor economic performance to a greater extent than rewarding good economic weather (Brug et al. 2007). Other factors are important too. Notions of leadership competence are significant and can have important effects independent of other indicators of party loyalty and support (e.g. Bartle and Crewe 2002; Clarke et al. 1997, 1998, 2004). For example it is recognised that Tony Blair was a key part in Labour’s success in 1997 and Alex Salmond in the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) successes in 2007 and 2011 (though the popularity of both has dimmed somewhat). Salmond’s presence was particularly significant, gaining an overall majority of seats for his party in the devolved Scottish legislature whose proportional electoral system was designed to be different to Westminster in order to make it very difficult for overall single party control to emerge. There are instances of course where the received wisdom (often polling research based) on notions of leaders’ affinity with the electorate do not square with reality. Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership ratings were consistently low prior to the 2017 UK general election, yet his performance during that election confounded these. Such mismatches between accepted understanding and actuality may be due to sampling errors (with over or under sampling certain groups) or that political researchers are failing to understand the support which leaders have. Some politicians are often accused of habituating a ‘bubble’,

Politics and representation  43

isolating them from broader reality and perspectives. Perhaps there are times when political scientists and researchers can be similarly criticised (Curtice 2017)! Other valence issues of importance which affect party choice can include perceptions of how key public services or areas of policy are operating, for example the NHS, pensions or crime (Clarke et al. 2004). A range of other representational and political issues are considered below, for example the role played by the media, nationalism in various parts of the UK, the rise of ‘outsiderism’ and the response of mainstream parties, and the significance of specific issues like immigration. However as will be seen, many of these are strongly overlaid and contextualised by the concept of valence.

The decline of the working class representation There are other interpretations which look at the relationship between class – particularly working class – political alignment over this entire post-1945 period through a different analytical perspective. It is argued that occupational class has of course changed significantly from 1945, but to say that class as such no longer has meaning or significance is extremely wide of the mark. There is a plethora of evidence indicating that pay levels, unemployment levels, educational attainment and health outcomes are all related to class (Gallie 2015; Crawford 2014; House of Commons 2014; White et al. 2003) and based on British Social Attitudes Survey data most still express class identities, with those in middle class jobs likely to see themselves as working class (see Evans and Tilley 2017). Data show that levels of class voting were relatively static from the 1940s to the mid-1990s and then showed a dramatic weakening (Heath et al. 2001; Weakliem and Heath 1999). Working class voters were as likely to vote in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s as middle class voters but this altered significantly after the 1997 election – by the 2015 UK general election there was a marked ‘hierarchy’ of not voting from 19 per cent amongst the old and new middle class (see Appendix 1 for definitions), 26 per cent amongst junior middle class and 35 per cent among working class (from British Election Survey 2015 and British Social Attitudes Survey 2015, cited in Evans and Tilley 2017). Evans and Tilley link this to New Labour’s specific targeting of middle class voters and the perception of working class interests not being represented by mainstream parties. The authors claim this top down party change resulted in lowering of participation by working class voters:

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By 2015, the social composition of Labour’s voters was not terribly dissimilar to the Conservatives. Why did Labour change? . . . the shifting shape of the class structure. The transition from a big working class to a big middle class . . . the decisions made by parties then constrained voters’ choices. (Evans and Tilley 2017) Intriguingly, in Scotland, the SNP bucked this trend in the 2015 UK general election by wiping out all but one of Labour’s Scottish MPs, arguably based on the mobilisation of many working class communities on the ‘yes’ side of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. Yet the SNP, though a left of centre party, is not especially aligned to representing working class interests, so it remains to be seen how the constitutional issue in Scotland interacts in the future with class voting and wide disparities in participation rates between different occupational and class groupings.

The 2017 UK general election The most recent electoral information available is that relating to the 2017 UK general election. This gives an indication of current divides in British politics and representation. Based on an extensive post-election survey by YouGov in 2017 (with a sample size of around 50,000), the following points can be made.

Age In electoral terms, age seems to be a significant dividing line in British politics. The starkest way to show this is to note that amongst first time voters (those aged 18 and 19), Labour was 47 percentage points ahead. Amongst those aged over 70, the Conservatives had a lead of 50 percentage points. But despite an increase in youth turnout, young people are still noticeably less likely to vote than older people. While 57 per cent of 18 and 19 year olds voted, for those aged 70+ the figure was 84 per cent.

Class and voting As outlined above, the class divide in British politics seems to have closed and it is no longer a very good indicator of voting intention. Despite dramatic voter movements towards Labour over the last few weeks of the campaign this theme held reasonably consistent: Labour was 4 per cent behind

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amongst ABC1 (AB = professional and managerial; C1 = supervisory/ clerical) voters and 2 per cent behind amongst C2DE (C2 = skilled manual; DE = unskilled manual/welfare dependent) voters. The picture was a bit more mixed if this is disaggregated, with Labour doing best amongst DE voters and the Tories doing best amongst C2 voters.

Education and voting Education was a key electoral demographic dividing line – as it was in the leave/remain EU referendum (see Chapter 4). In the general election, while the Conservatives’ support decreased the more educated a voter was, the opposite was true for Labour and the Lib Dems. Amongst those with low educational qualifications (defined as GCSE or equivalent or below) the Conservatives beat Labour by 22 per cent. However, amongst those with high level educational qualifications (defined as degree level or above) Labour led by 17 percentage points. Part of this may be explained by age – the expansion of education means that, on average, the young have more qualifications than the old, although the Conservatives still have a ‘graduate problem’, even after accounting for this.

Gender and voting There was only a small gender gap between men and women, with women being equally split between Labour and the Conservatives (43 to 43 per cent), and men slightly more likely to have backed the Tories (45 to 39 per cent).

Employment status and voting Given the importance of age and voting it was not surprising that there was also a link between people’s employment status and voting. The Conservatives were 39 points ahead amongst retirees and Labour were 45 points ahead amongst full-time students. Labour was in fact ahead amongst those in work: 4 points ahead amongst those working part time and 6 points ahead amongst those working full time. The change in support for the two main parties in 2017 compared with the 2015 election reveals some interesting shifts. Using an average of post-election surveys by Ashcroft, Ipsos Mori and YouGov polls (Ipsos Mori 2017, Lord Ashcroft 2017, YouGov 2017 cited in Political Insight 2017) along socio-occupational metrics, data indicate:

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• Professional and managerial occupations: Conservative support increased by 3 per cent, Labour increased by just over 9 per cent • Supervisory and clerical occupations: Conservative support up 4 per cent, Labour up almost 12 per cent • Skilled manual occupations: Conservative support increased by 12 per cent, Labour by 9 per cent • Unskilled manual/welfare dependent: Conservatives up by 12 per cent, Labour 7 per cent. And on age: • 18–24: Conservatives down 4 per cent, Labour up 22 per cent • 18–29: Conservatives down 10 per cent, Labour up 27 per cent • 25–34: Conservatives decrease 6 per cent, Labour increase 20 per cent • 30–39: Conservatives decrease 7 per cent, Labour increase 21 per cent • 35–44: Conservatives up 3 per cent, Labour up 14 per cent • 40–49: Conservatives increase 6 per cent, Labour increase 11 per cent • 45–54: Conservatives up by 9 per cent, Labour increase 7 per cent • 50–59: Conservatives increase 11 per cent, Labour increase 5 per cent • 55–64: Conservatives up by 13 per cent, Labour up 4 per cent • 60+: Conservatives increase 17 per cent, Labour down 1 per cent • 65+: Conservatives up 13 per cent, Labour up 2 per cent.

Some current polarities in UK politics A number of more general observations can be made on emergent and current polarities in UK politics. Some of these are overlapping and are not seen to have obvious impacts in individual elections (in fact some can be seen in clearer focus in the two referendum case studies in Chapters 3 and 4) but there are longer term effects on the political representative environment of British politics. Some key polarities include education, age and a quasi-cultural polarisation around the axes of communitarian and cosmopolitan attitudes. There are strong indications (from both referendum and general election results) that these will have continued impact on politics and representation into the future.

Age In terms of the polarity of age, the distinctive voting pattern of those 50 and over (and especially those over 65) has been well outlined in some

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detail, as has their participation rate. Over 65s’ participation rate is at least 10 percentage points above the average for the population as a whole. This no doubt accounts for the balance of policy priorities (e.g. guarantees on the level of the basic state pension, exemption from the ‘bedroom tax’) that have reduced the number of older people living in low income households (clearly a good thing). Over 65s are less likely to be graduates than younger generations. Voting polarisation was especially marked in the 2016 Brexit referendum with 90 per cent of over 65s voting and they were twice as likely as under 25s to have voted leave.

Labour market and economic status Changes in the labour market with associated prospects for non-graduates have in the main been moving in an adverse direction since the late 1970s with income stagnation. Alternatively, for periods of time since the 1970s globalisation has increased opportunities in technology driven and public sectors for those with graduate level education. This group therefore has been much more at ease with many of the features of globalisation: feeling less threatened by immigration and an open economy than many others. Their prospects though have been much dented by the post-2008 financial crash and subsequent austerity dominated policies (which in turn have driven much of the support from graduates for anti-austerity policies, particularly in Labour’s 2017 general election manifesto).

A cultural divide A third polarity can be seen on a cosmopolitan–communitarian divide, using data based on surveys (England only) seeking responses to statements and categorising these as left or right along an economic dimension (attitudes on economic policy issues like tax, privatisation of the NHS etc.) and ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘communitarian’ on a cultural dimension (using culturally based statements on immigration, same sex marriage, EU membership). Conservative supporters stand to the right of the political spectrum in economic terms and Labour and the Greens on the left, as traditionally envisioned. Out-with the mainstream parties the UK Independence party (UKIP) is important and though its supporters are marginally to the left of centre (indeed slightly to the left of Liberal Democrat supporters) their position on the cultural dimension puts them

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to the ‘right’ – anti-immigration, anti-EU, more English nationalist. This is important of course given the fear of the Conservatives and Labour that UKIP will successfully target their supporters. The data show a greater propensity to the ‘cosmopolitan’ among Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters, while Conservative supporters occupy a ‘middle of the road’ position on the cultural scale and right of centre on the economy scale – though not particularly far to the right. This suggests the logic of Labour inhabiting a left of centre niche economically but moving a bit in the communitarian direction to keep it closer to mainstream opinion. The evidence of this research appears to show that the electors are expressing views more complex than left and right. If the mainstream parties addressed their messages and policy priorities only along a left– right dimension, they would fail to address this important political reality. Those expressing a position economically on the left are not necessarily cosmopolitan and those on the economic right are not necessarily communitarian.

Some other aspects of political and electoral representation Finally there are a number of issues which display increasing salience in any analysis of British politics and representation. Amongst the most important of these – and this is not an exclusive list by any means – are: a) expression and representation of nationalism (especially in Scotland and England); b) politics as a reaction to discontent with the prevailing mainstream, including the increased visibility and support for ‘outsiders’; c) (foregrounded by Brexit) the rising significance of immigration as a longer term key political issue; and d) the role played by the media in expressions of support for political parties. All of these issues of course are home to an extensive research and literature base in their own right, so the purpose in this book is more limited: to give an overview of current thinking on the impact of these issues on British politics.

Nationalism in British politics The significance of nationalism in British politics is worth exploring. The apparent absence of nationalism as a mainstream driver of politics throughout Britain for many of the post-1950 decades (with the exception of Northern Ireland where ‘loyalist’, nominally Protestant, or ‘nationalist’, nominally Catholic, communities’ support for rival nationalisms

32 35 22 3 4

37 31 21 3 4

36 30 24 3 3

31 34 22 4 4

32 32 22 4 5

33 32 21 4 5

27 30 28 5 6

27 31 26 4 4

Source: 1997 Scottish Election Study and 1999–2012 Scottish Social Attitudes cited in NatCen Social Research (no date)

Scot not Brit 23 More Scot than Brit 38 Equal Scot and Brit 27 More Brit than Scot 4 Brit not Scot 4

28 30 26 4 4

29 33 23 5 5

23 30 30 5 6

1997, % 1999, % 2000, % 2001, % 2003, % 2005, % 2006, % 2007, % 2009, % 2010, % 2011, % 2012, %

Table 2.6  Trends in national identity in Scotland 1997–2012

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has long been the defining factor in political loyalties and representation) is probably best explained by employing Billig’s (1995) concept of banal nationalism. According to Billig, nationalism is expressed often at the symbolic level like national anthems at sporting events, state occasions etc., in the public conscience at an almost subliminal level. Billig argues that by focusing on extreme expressions of nationalism or xenophobia (which, as with other countries, have always been present in parts of Britain), academics and other commentators miss its hidden presence, making it a potentially powerful ideology and one which is not necessarily exclusionary or negative towards others (which is a key feature of extreme forms of nationalism). The rise in the political significance of nationalism in Scotland provides an interesting case. The SNP has long espoused that a form of civic nationalism (rather than any notions of ethnic nationalism) be injected into the political mainstream. In fact after its first major success at political representation beyond by-election triumph (when in the 1970s it captured 11 parliamentary seats on just over 30 per cent of the popular vote), the party’s leader at the time analysed the failure to capitalise on this and argued it was due to the SNP MPs reducing the party ‘to [in the electorate’s eyes] a fundamentalist nationalist image’, losing the ‘social democratic middle ground’ (cited in McTavish 2016). Both the current and previous SNP leaders (i.e. the current and preceding first minister of Scotland) have eschewed exclusionary notions of nationalism, instead favouring citizenship and inclusionary definitions. Interestingly, during the major presence of electoral support for the SNP since the establishment of devolution in Scotland, there has been no marked difference in how Scots feel about Scottish and/or British identities – and (unlike Northern Ireland) they seem comfortable carrying both Scottish and British identities, though as indicated in the concluding chapter, SNP supporters post-independence and Brexit referendums may feel more ‘strongly Scottish’ than the figures in Table 2.6 suggest. As far as Scotland’s nationalist party the SNP is concerned, its policies seem to reflect such nuanced approaches to nationalism. While few in the SNP would dispute Gellner’s definition of nationalism (Gellner 1983) as a principle holding that the political and national units of expression should be congruent and symmetric, the stress placed by the SNP government’s independence white paper on Scotland’s integration and interdependence with a range of international bodies (especially the EU) at the core rather than independence for Scotland per se was significant (Scottish Government 2013).

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Analysing English nationalism has long been problematic, given the confluence between notions of the British state, British nationalism and (at least for many in England) the interchangeability of concepts of ‘British’ and ‘English’. There is a certain inevitability about this given the population dominance of England (around 85 per cent of the UK population lives in England) and, pre-devolution, the strong centralisation of UK state governance (Scotland’s relative administrative and professional/ civil society autonomy notwithstanding) (Bulpitt 1983). With the creation and greater visibility of devolved polities (particularly Scotland), and over the longer term, questions of relative British economic decline and Britain’s role in the world, there has been a discernible growth of English nationalism since the beginnings of the 21st century. Like many nationalisms, English nationalism is complex and multi-layered (see Kenny 2014) but has received recognition politically. Notably in the immediate aftermath of the Scottish referendum Prime Minister David Cameron’s statement from the steps of 10 Downing Street was to recognise ‘millions of English voices . . . must now be heard’; the Conservative campaign in the 2015 general election played on (or tried to create) England’s fear of a minority Labour government kept in power by the SNP. English nationalism was seen as a key factor manifesting itself during the Brexit referendum (see Chapter 4 and concluding chapter). Recently published research (Henderson et al. 2017) has shown that the vote in England was driven significantly by those prioritising English national identity, and English national identity is seen as a focal or cluster point for other attitudes and concerns, including hostility to European integration, concerns over not being heard by mainstream political parties, lack of political voice, concern over immigration and support for parties of the right. However, the research also shows that the narrow or exclusive images of English nationalism should not be overstressed. For example though the research found some anti-immigration attitudes based on a fear of English/British culture being diluted, statistically more significant were economic concerns or worries over adverse impacts on public services not properly resourced; this bears out other findings outlined in the Brexit referendum case study (see Chapter 4).

Immigration as a salient issue? Notwithstanding the above comments on the nuances of views on immigration, it does appear to be a salient political issue in large areas of Britain. Evidence taken before and after the Brexit vote indicated that

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public support for Brexit was strongest in areas experiencing higher rates of ethnic change in the years prior to 2016. Most of those voting for Brexit were aware and felt negatively about unprecedented levels of immigration and its impact on the economy, welfare state services and culture (Goodwin and Milazzo 2017). Immigration has previously had episodic salience in the mainstream party platforms, though rarely in a sustained or comprehensive fashion, arguably due to the overall positive impacts of immigration for the economy and also the toxic nature of the issue, often captured by the far right. Given that the argument and debate over labour movement as Britain negotiates and then transitions to non-EU status is likely to be a key political issue over the short to medium term then as recent research shows [many] voters will remain supportive of a policy that distances Britain from the EU . . . [and] due to past migration flows, a significant section of the electorate will likely remain dissatisfied not only with future freeform of free movement, which is unlikely to yield the dramatic reductions in immigration that some of these voters desire, but also with how ethnic change more generally is impacting the country. (Goodwin and Milazzo 2017) However, it must be stressed that this is not to say a rise in intolerance, xenophobia and so on is the key explanatory driver either of Brexit or of more general political movement, attitudes and behaviour (Hopkin 2017). What is undeniable is a discontent with much of mainstream politics as represented through mainstream political parties and ‘political elites’.

Disenchantment with mainstream politics Disenchantment with mainstream politics is not quite as straightforward as explanations or commonly heard statements imply. For example ‘they’re all the same’, ‘they’ being politicians or ‘political elites’, the latter term fast becoming a cliche. There are political differences, some quite significant between the main parties, but the notion does have some resonance. In terms of political personalities, there is a body of evidence showing a form of commonality in the backgrounds of MPs from all parties: the growing professionalisation of politics has led to the dominance of ‘career politicians’ who have entered politics through roles such as political or policy advisers and have rarely had careers beyond politics (see e.g. King 2015; Riddell 2011; House of Commons 2010), though what these career

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‘politicians’ do after leaving politics or what they develop alongside their political career as a future prospect, may be another matter and an area requiring research. Politicians are therefore easily derided as a ‘political class’ much ‘out of touch with wider reality’. This has been a strong slogan often used effectively by the populist right (who rarely turn their ire on other unrepresentative elites, for example in professional and business life), with more positive balancing arguments for such professionalisation of politics rarely aired. For example, there may be democratic value of a political class which, though unrepresentative of the population as a whole in descriptive or numerical terms, may actually be able to improve substantive representation (that is representing the interests of specific groups in society if they possess policy or political processing, advocacy or other skills; Saward 2010). But antipathy towards politicians has undoubtedly been a feature of the recent political environment. Discontent does have a deeper context, related to politics and policy. Despite Labour’s landslide victory in 1997, there were large areas of policy, especially economic policy, which represented continuity with the preceding Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s. There was a strong accommodation with the finance sector (especially around light touch regulation and internationalisation, competitiveness and the globalised market economy). Tony Blair after his third election victory was using the language of depoliticisation, in the sense that there were very constrained circumstances where government and the state could or should intervene in the onward march of the global economy: I hear people say we have to stop and debate globalisation. You might as well debate whether autumn should follow summer . . . the temptation is to use government to try to protect ourselves . . . to think we protect a workforce by regulation, a company by government subsidy, an industry by tariffs, it doesn’t work. (Tony Blair, Labour Party Conference speech, 27 September 2005, cited in Richards 2017) This is not to say Labour in government was entirely ignoring its historical belief in using the levers of state power for desired (even redistributive) political ends. But much of its activity in this area (e.g. the use of redistribution through tax credits) was done by stealth; some commentators suggest this was not to upset ‘middle England’ voters and elements of the news media, with the result that Labour’s connection with its traditional support base was compromised – this apparently was the view held by Robin Cook, Labour’s former foreign secretary (Richards 2017).

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The context then of Labour’s power in government after 1997 was as a proponent of a globalised market economy, lightly regulated to make the UK competitive (especially in financial services) and in political terms, declining support and engagement from its traditional support base. This provides the backdrop to the watershed event of the financial crash in 2007–2008. But this crash resulted in a major Labour government led state support package to prevent the complete collapse of the banking system (supported by the Conservatives) and an economic stimulus package to avoid the worst of any ensuing recession. There is an undoubted irony here. The political outcome of the 2008 crash was (until around 2015) a broad consensus held by both major parties (despite some contrary rhetoric) that the dynamic behind policy should be continued global free trade, no major return to heavier economic or business regulation (despite moves to shore up bank liquidity and reserves) and deficit reduction programmes; yet many of the measures actually put in place immediately after 2008, including bank nationalisation, fiscally driven anti-recessionary initiatives and so on, had all the hallmarks of a traditional left Keynesian approach. However, Labour rarely made a sustained case for this, either to its traditional support base or anyone else – a stronger case being made by academic economists and economic journalists. Arguably the logic of Labour’s political positioning since the 1990s made advancing such a case difficult. So ‘business as usual’ in the circumstances was hardly a ground breaking appeal designed to re-engage voters. As for the Conservatives, their position is rather different, though disengagement with voters applies here too. Given Labour’s comfort and acceptance of pro-market, pro-competition and economic deregulation policies, it is easy to understand much of the political and policy consensus shared by a centre right party. And much of the Conservative response during the financial crash was not opposed to Labour’s actions. David Cameron’s initial moves before and after becoming leader were to model himself (apparently) on Tony Blair; certainly his modernisation of the Conservatives (e.g. the advancement and promotion of more female Conservative candidates) was to make sure the modernisation narrative was not exclusively held by Labour. However, Conservative policy since entering government in 2010 has resembled traditional Thatcherite inspired reductions in spending (‘austerity’) with dual purpose, that is an attempt to reduce spending and the size of the state, as well as transferring some services to the ‘big society’ where it was argued society as a whole through communities, third sector and voluntary organisations would replace the state as deliverers of many public services. This dual purpose big society initiative has

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largely withered – in fact substantial investment and capacity building is required for such initiatives to have any purchase and meaning and this is unlikely in times of fiscal consolidation – so what has continued is the pressure on public service spending without any significant scale transference to the ‘big society’. Yet despite a greater degree of congruence with traditional Conservative ideas of a small(er) state, distinction between state and individual initiative, lower tax and spend policies, voter disengagement with Conservatives is in evidence. Some of this has been articulated through a long term discontent with Britain’s membership of the EU amongst some Conservative MPs and party members and a fear that anti-EU feeling in parts of the country was articulated by the outsider voice of UKIP, directly threatening the Conservative vote where the party leadership was seen as comfortable with EU membership – this largely drove David Cameron towards an EU referendum (see Chapter 4). As seen elsewhere in this chapter (and in Chapter 4), voter behaviour has shown disengagement with the Conservatives as extensively as with Labour. A particular aspect to this disengagement has been that parties, and by extension the political class or elite, are not speaking to the ‘left behind’ – those individuals, groups and communities who have benefited less than others from the globalised environment of the last three decades or so. Although there are longer term trends at play here with evidence of reduced engagement and involvement with mainstream parties (ranging from party membership to voting at elections; see Mair 2013), in the more immediate term it is the generally insipid response from the main parties to the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis which has failed to engage an electorate faced with a longer than promised period of austerity and fiscal consolidation and the impact this has on real life issues of public services, jobs and living standards (for international illustration of this see Chapter 6). Recent information (e.g. the November 2017 UK budget) shows that despite some initiatives which could boost economic growth (e.g. £2.3 billion for research and development in 2021 and £7 billion for a productivity fund in 2022), the economic forecast for the short to medium term is gloomy, meaning a continuation of flat-lining living standards and pressure on public services (whether or not this is labelled as ‘austerity’). The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) projects a very modest 1.4 per cent economic growth over 2017– 2021; productivity levels already well below the UK’s main competitors have been revised downwards, all mitigating against any government expenditure initiatives to boost growth or invest in public services. Added to this are the unknown costs of Brexit, estimated at £15 billion per annum by 2020–2021 (OBR 2016).

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Mainstream parties’ responses to disenchantment Some initial brief comments can be made on the ways in which the mainstream parties are attempting to address the consequential disengagement and disenchantment with politics. Labour after its failure to win, or at least have a stronger showing in the 2015 UK general election, moved to the left, choosing a leader, Jeremy Corbyn, on a left wing anti-austerity platform through a much expanded party membership (over 0.5 million), the result of reforms under Ed Miliband, creating a category of ‘registered supporter’, able to cast a vote for leader and deputy for a very modest fee. After a particularly tumultuous 18 months under Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership (including a challenge to his leadership and considerable hostility from large numbers of sitting Labour MPs, not to mention much of the press media), Labour entered the 2017 election on an anti-austerity, statist programme proposing spending and investment (including (re)establishing areas of state control) as the key to economic management. Labour ran a successful campaign, confounded many opinion polls and made significant gains in the 2017 election. However, where this leaves Labour’s response as a potential party of government and therefore the driver of national policy is at present unclear. Labour’s electoral coalition is more variegated than its traditional working class base or indeed its centre ground coalition sought in the New Labour years, and despite Momentum’s role in increasing numbers and engagement of members, it has not created a new ‘social movement’ rooted in civil society. Indeed some commentators have argued that Jeremy Corbyn has consolidated a middle class capture of Labour, started by Tony Blair: ‘nowhere is this better expressed than in Labour’s [2017] manifesto promise to abolish student tuition fees and re-introduce maintenance grants while declining to unfreeze welfare benefits on the grounds that this would be unaffordable’ (Gray 2017). Despite its increased support in the UK as a whole, Labour is still unable to effectively engage with the politics of nationalism or nationalist parties throughout the UK – indeed in Scotland it appears to be the Conservatives who are posing a greater electoral challenge to the SNP than Labour. As for the Conservatives, the election of Theresa May as leader by Conservative MPs in the wake of David Cameron’s post-Brexit referendum resignation, saw various attempts to indicate a recognition that preceding Conservative governments’ austerity policies had squeezed living standards and opportunities for a sizeable part of the population. Theresa May coined the phrase ‘just about managing’ to articulate the position of many low to middle income families feeling insecure in their economic position. Her speech on becoming prime

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minister formed the basis of an attempt to form a coherent form of Conservatism markedly post-Thatcher and post-New Labour– Conservative consensus: That means fighting against the burning injustice that, if you’re born poor, you will die on average 9 years earlier than others. If you’re black, you’re treated more harshly by the criminal justice system than if you’re white. If you’re a white, working-class boy, you’re less likely than anybody else in Britain to go to university. If you’re at a state school, you’re less likely to reach the top professions than if you’re educated privately. If you’re a woman, you will earn less than a man. If you suffer from mental health problems, there’s not enough help to hand. If you’re young, you’ll find it harder than ever before to own your own home. (Theresa May 2016) It has also been indicated that the 2017 Conservative manifesto was an attempt to put the state centre stage, for example proposals on social care (the so called ‘dementia tax’ presentationally botched and quickly over turned), proposals for ‘fair corporate pay’ and more stakeholder inclusive corporate governance arrangements. Subsequent statements by the prime minister on mental health, race and crime have also implicitly called for a redefinition of state political action at odds with previous Conservative approaches. Whether such aspirations have any material substance on policy remains to be seen (there has been little as yet) and of course the government is somewhat consumed by Brexit negotiations, conducting government with no overall majority in the House of Commons, dependent on support from a small number of Northern Irish Democratic Unionist MPs as well as managing the tensions over EU withdrawal within the Conservative Party.

The media and political representation Finally, the role played by the media, particularly the non-broadcast news media in support for political parties, should be mentioned. There is a strong tradition of political partisanship among newspapers in the UK, with this largely favouring (but not without exception) the Conservatives. Apart from the Daily Mirror, most tabloids have been more often in favour of the Conservatives than not – though with some notable years which reversed this trend, as we will see below. Broadsheets or the so called ‘quality’ press (other than The Guardian and Observer) are similarly supportive

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of the Conservatives, but perhaps less consistently than the tabloids. There are some interesting aspects of political partisanship and politicians’ relationships with newspapers. Scotland displays a different picture with its leading tabloids. Daily Record is consistently pro-Labour and the Scottish Sun in the last decade has supported the SNP on and off (but when sympathetic to the Conservatives, never as pro-Conservative as The Sun in the rest of the UK). Despite long term falls in circulation, all of the mainstream parties have made efforts to gain support from the newspapers (so they clearly think these media outlets have influence on voters). Well recognised were the sustained attempts Tony Blair and New Labour made to gain support from Rupert Murdoch’s titles (principally The Sun); these attempts were successful – whether of course Murdoch saw a winning horse he then wished to back and therefore maintain a good connection with, rather than being persuaded by New Labour programmes and personalities per se, is a moot point. The apparent reluctance of the UK government to proceed to Part 2 of the Leveson Inquiry into newspaper conduct is regarded by some as a fear of adversely upsetting newspaper proprietors: the second part of the Leveson Inquiry was to deal specifically with phone hacking against the backdrop of significant costs involved and the failure of Operation Elveden – the investigation into the payment of public officials by journalists – to secure a single conviction. Relationships between specific politicians and newspaper proprietors or editors can make for interesting and sometimes surprising reading. For example given the Daily Mail’s partisanship (always pro-Conservative, usually rather right wing), it is not surprising that UK Prime Minister May attended the anniversary dinner for Mail editor Sir Paul Dacre. Not surprising either were Ed Miliband and Alastair Campbell’s (Tony Blair’s director of communications and strategy) criticisms of the event, with Campbell reportedly criticising the prime minister’s attendance at the event of ‘a hard right sociopathic hypocrite’. Perhaps of most surprise was Gordon Brown’s tribute video at the event – apparently there is a close relationship between Dacre and Brown (Di Stefano 2017). Discounting political partisanship, one significant feature of the 2017 UK election was that the newspaper media, both those supporting and not supporting the Conservatives, got it wrong. According to a pro-Conservative title: Corbyn’s Marxist masterplan is to transform Britain. And transform it he certainly would . . . into a crumbling ruin of a country where aspiration is crushed and success punished by massive tax rises . . . we believe the verdict will be merciless on June 8. (The Sun 2017)

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In the pro-Conservative Telegraph claims included: ‘Labour to hammer workers on £80000; Corbyn’s manifesto to take Britain back to the 1970s; Corbyn engulfed in IRA furore; Labour’s secret plan to increase migration; Corbyn ducks terror charge’ (cited in Crewe 2017). The left leaning Observer and The Guardian were clearly not confident of Labour progressing. ‘Labour had little to say about growing economic and social inequalities that characterise Britain [and there would be] few opportunities to debate key questions about the shape and size of the state’ (Observer 2017, cited in Crewe 2017). In The Guardian: ‘It seems there is no platform Labour could adopt that would address the doubt in many voters’ minds about Mr Corbyn’s credibility as a potential Prime Minister’ (The Guardian 2017). Arguably the newspaper media’s political messaging and communication networks are a mirror reflection of a mainstream set of assumptions which is – similar to the analysis of mainstream parties’ approach to politics and policy as outlined in this chapter – somewhat ‘disengaged’ and therefore not addressing or reflecting large swathes of opinion ‘out there’. Of most significance though is the changing landscape of the news media. Newspaper circulation has fallen dramatically. For example, The Sun’s circulation has declined by 1.5 million since 2003 and sales were down 10.5 per cent in 2016; the Daily Mail has dropped 1 million in the same period and its sales are down 6.7 per cent in 2016 (Crewe 2017). These declines are nowhere near compensated by online reader subscriptions. There has been an explosion in social media and this has both qualitative and quantitative dimensions. The traditional news media is monovocal, where journalists gather information from various sources, package this into a story for editorial control and approval and then present it to their audience with a degree of legitimacy. Polyvocality, by contrast, opens up the information communication system to a much wider variety of voices, picking and choosing sources and information in a way difficult to control (Carlson 2017). Polyvocality thrives in the realm of social media through a variety of digital platforms. In quantitative terms, the speed of messaging can easily involve many people in a communication or conversation. Notifications signalling new followers on Twitter or other platforms, or new emails invite participation and ‘pull to refresh’ features on smartphones make this very quick and easy. People can then post ‘likes’ (i.e. indicating they support the message), messages can be shared, retweeted with the potential of capturing an enormous audience, for example if an item, story or message goes viral, in a very short period of time. Qualitatively, this can induce people to view or digest like minded opinion with the obvious benefits for political and other forms of campaigning and advocacy.

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However, the quantity of information demanding attention has an impact on the quality of the ensuing deliberative process. It has long been known that an over abundance of information can create a poverty of attention (Simon 1971), with some claiming that digital technologies increasingly inhibit our ability to pursue properly considered democratic politics. Social media companies using appropriate algorithms will have a good understanding of the sort of messages which will go viral and capture a large audience, and they can and do sell this to political clients. This is an under researched area (and a rather grey area in terms of regulation of permitted financial support for elections), but it is generally recognised that the Trump campaign and Leave campaigns during the Brexit referendum used social media effectively, and perhaps illegally. There is clearly a dynamic in the use of social media as described, so the imperative then is to keep this audience engaged with what it likes or supports: logic suggests this is a driver towards political polarisation. This polarisation is magnified through a supportive ecosystem. For example in the US, Breitbart (a publication run by Steve Bannon, ex-adviser to President Trump) aggregates a range of other online sites, all right wing and some including conspiracy theorists and white supremacists. Also, in the US, the Federal Communications Commission which previously imposed some neutrality on television has seen these powers reduced as a result of deregulation, meaning some television channels (like Fox News) can be considered a ‘soft’ part of this ecosystem – in a way unseen with UK broadcasters normally bound by political impartiality and balance. This use of social media seems to have been used to some effect by Labour’s campaign in 2017. The ‘Angry Voice’ page on Facebook, run by a blogger, was some of the most viewed material during the election. One viral article, ‘How many of Jeremy Corbyn’s policies do you actually disagree with?’, was seen by as many people as buy The Sun. A post-election analysis found that this blogger’s output along with two other pro-Corbyn sites (The Canary and Evolve Politics) massively out-performed online all material produced by the press and BBC (Crewe 2017). Labour though did not win the election.

Summary of chapter themes • The two party system and its underpinning by plurality voting; • Class based partisan alignment; changes to this based on socioeconomic structural shifts and the impact on voter behaviour;

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• Policy and political consensus (mainly around economic policy) between main parties from the 1980s. Some thematic link can be seen with material on the disillusion with mainstream parties, a theme also addressed in Chapter 6; • Diminishing working class electoral participation. This theme is also addressed in Chapter 6 and is contrasted to an extent with participation in both Brexit and Scottish independence referendums; • Policy stasis and irony post-financial crash 2008; • Current polarities and divides in UK politics including age, cultural-locational factors, education and nationalism. These polarities are addressed in the Brexit referendum and Scottish independence referendum chapters (Chapters 3 and 4) and also in the international comparisons chapter (Chapter 6); • Salience of specific policy areas (e.g. immigration). The political impact of this specific policy area is also addressed in the Brexit referendum and UK–EU withdrawal chapters (Chapters 4 and 7) as well as the international comparisons chapter (Chapter 6); • The role played in the political process by media, including social media. This theme is also explored in Chapter 5 and Chapters 3, 4 and 6.

References Bartle, J. and Crewe, I. (2002) The impact of party leaders in Britain: strong assumptions, weak evidence, in King, A. (Ed.) Leaders’ Personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Beers, L. (2010) Your Britain: Media and the Making of the Labour Party. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Billig, M. (1995) Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. Broadberry, S. and Leunig, T. (2013) The Impact of Government Policies on UK Manufacturing Since 1945. London: Government Office for Science. Brown, A., McCrone, D. and Paterson, L. (1998) Politics and Society in Scotland. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Brug, W. van der, Eijk, C. van der and Franklin, M. (2007) The Economy and the Vote: Economic Conditions and Elections in Fifteen Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bulpitt, J. (1983) Territory and Power in the United Kingdom. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Butler, D. and Butler, G. (2000) Twentieth Century British Political Facts 1900–2000. Basingstoke: MacMillan. Butler, D. and Butler, G. (2006) British Political Facts Since 1979. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

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Butler, D. and Stokes, D. (1969) Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice. London: Macmillan. Campbell, A., Converse, P., Miller, W. and Stokes, D. (1960) The American Voter. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Carlson, M. (2017) Journalistic Authority: Legitimating News in the Digital Era. New York: Columbia University Press. Clarke, H.D., Stewart, M.C. and Whiteley, P.F. (1997) Tory trends: party identification and the dynamics of Conservative support since 1992, British Journal of Political Science 27, 299–331. Clarke, H.D., Stewart, M.C. and Whiteley, P.F. (1998) New models for New Labour: the political economy of Labour party support, January 1992–April 1997, American Political Science Review 92, 559–575. Clarke, H.D., Sanders, D., Stewart, M.C. and Whiteley, P. (2004) Political Choice in Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Crawford, C. (2014) Socio Economic Differences in University Outcomes in the UK: Drop Out, Degree Completion and Degree Class. IFS Working Paper W14/31. Crewe, I., Särlvik, B. and Alt, J. (1977) Partisan dealignment in Britain, 1964–1974, British Journal of Political Science 7, 129–190. Crewe, T. (2017) A new deal: Tom Crewe on politics and the press, London Review of Books, 17 August, pp. 15–17. Curtice, J. (2017) Politics, polling and potatoes. Interview with John Curtice, Society Now 29, 22–24. Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2016) Trade Union Membership 2016. Statistical Bulletin. London: Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. Devine, T.M. (2016) Independence or Union: Scotland’s Past and Scotland’s Present. London: Penguin. Di Stefano, M. (2017) Gordon Brown made a tribute video for Daily Mail editor Paul Dacre’s anniversary dinner, 10 November, www.buzzfeed.com/markdistefano/dacre-and-the-brown-nosing?utm_term=.ej8gMNl03#.itynzdY1V (accessed 3 December 2017). Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. Dunleavy, P. and Husbands, C. (1983) British Democracy at the Crossroads: Voting and Party Competition in the 1980s. London: George Allen and Unwin. Duverger, M. (1954) Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State. London: Methuen. Evans, G. and Tilley, J. (2017) The New Politics of Class. The Political Exclusion of the British Working Class. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gallie, D. (2015) Class inequality at work: trends to polarisation? in Felstead, A., Gallie, D. and Green, F. (Eds) Unequal Britain at Work. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. Goldthorpe, J.H., Lockwood, D., Bechhofer, F. and Platt, J. (1969) The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Goodwin, M. and Milazzo, C. (2017) Taking back control? Investigating the role of immigration in the 2016 vote for Brexit, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19:3, 450–464. Gray, J. (2017) Populism for the middle classes, New Statesman, 16–20 June, pp. 35–37. Guardian, The (2017) Editorial, The Guardian, 9 May. Harris, K. (1995) Attlee. London: Weidenfield and Nicholson. Hassan, G. and Shaw, E. (2012) The Strange Death of Labour in Scotland. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Heath, A.F., Jowell, R.M. and Curtice, J.K. (2001) The Rise of New Labour: Party Politics and Voter Choices. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Henderson, A., Jeffery, C., Wincott, D. and Jones, R.W. (2017) How Brexit was made in England, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19:4, 631–646. Hoggart, R. (1957) The Uses of Literacy. London: Chatto and Windus. Hopkin, J. (2017) When Polanyi met Farage: market fundamentalism, economic nationalism, and Britain’s exit from the European Union, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19:3, 465–478. House of Commons (2010) Speakers Conference (on Parliamentary Representation). Final Report. London: Stationery Office, https://publica tions.parliament.uk/pa/spconf/239/239i.pdf (accessed 3 December 2017). House of Commons (2014) Education Committee Report, www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm2011415/cmselect/cmeduc/142/142.pdf (accessed 3 December 2017). Jackson, B. and Marsden, D. (1966) Education and the Working Class. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Jessop, B. (1974) Traditionalism, Conservatism and British Political Culture. London: Allen and Unwin. Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2009) Growing Up In Social Housing in Britain. A Profile of Four Generation 1946 To Present, www.jrf.org.uk/ sites/default/files/jrf/. . ./files/social-housing-britain-FULL.pdf (accessed 7 October 2017). Kavanagh, D. and Cowley, P. (2010) The British General Election of 2010. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. Kenny, M. (2014) The Politics of English Nationhood. Oxford: Oxford University Press. King, A. (2015) Who Governs Britain? London: Penguin. Lewis-Beck, M. and Paldam, M. (2000) Economic voting: an introduction, Electoral Studies 19, 113–121. Lynch, M. (2008) The Labour Party in Power 1945–51. Access to History. London: Hodder Headlines. Mair, P. (2013) Ruling the Void. The Hollowing of Western Democracy. London: Verso. Matthews, R.C.O., Feinstein, C.H. and Odling-Same, J.C. (1982) British Economic Growth 1856–1973. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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May, T. (2016) Statement from Prime Minister Theresa May, www.gov.uk/gov ernment/speeches/statement-from-the-new-prime-minister-theresa-may (accessed 20 July 2017). McKenzie, R. and Silver, A. (1968) Angels in Marble: Working Class Conservatives in Urban England. London: Heinemann. McTavish, D. (2016) Political parties in Scotland, in McTavish, D. (Ed.) Politics in Scotland. Abingdon: Routledge. NatCen Social Research (no date) Devolution: identities and constitutional preferences across the UK, www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/latest-report/british-social-atti tudes-30/devolution/trends (accessed 1 December 2017). Newby, H. (1979) The Deferential Worker: A Study of Farm Workers in East Anglia. Harmondsworth: Penguin. OBR (Office for Budget Responsibility) (2016) Economic and Fiscal Outlook, Cmnd 9346. London: The Stationery Office. O’Mahoney, M. and Timmer, M. (2009) Output, input and productivity measures at industry level: the EU KLEMS Data Base, Economic Journal 119. F374–F403. Political Insight (2017) General Election 2017: A New Two Party Politics? Political Insight, September, pp. 4–8. Richards, S. (2017) The Rise of the Outsiders. How Mainstream Politics Lost Its Way. London: Atlantic Books. Riddell, P. (2011) In Defence of Politicians in Spite of Themselves. London: Biteback. Saward, M. (2010) The Representative Claim. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Scottish Government (2013) Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland, www.scot.gov/resource/0043/00439021.pdf (accessed 12 August 2017). Simon, H. (1971) Designing organisations for an information rich world, in Greenberger, M. (Ed.) Computers, Communications and the Public Interest. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press. Smart, N. (1999) The National Government 1931–40. Aldershot: MacMillan. Sun, The (2017) Editorial, The Sun, 17 May. Thatcher, M. (1995) The Path to Power. London: HarperCollins. THES (Times Higher Education Supplement) (2013) Increase in graduates: figures, 25 July, THES, London. Thorpe, A. (1992) Britain in the 1930s. The Deceptive Decade. Oxford: Blackwell. Toye, R. (2010) Churchill’s Empire: The World That Made Him and the World He Made. New York: John Macrae /Henry Holt. Universities UK (2017) Higher Education in Numbers, www.universitiesuk.ac. uk/facts-and-stats/Pages/higher-education-data.aspx (accessed 12 August 2017).

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Weakliem, D. and Heath, A.F. (1999) The secret life of class voting: Britain, France and the United States since the 1930s, in Evans, G. (Ed.) The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press. White, C., van Gallen, F. and Chow, Y.H. (2003) Trends in social class differences mortality by cause 1986–2000, Health Statistics Quarterly 20, 25–37. Wilmott, P. and Young, M. (1960) Family and Class in a London Suburb. London: Mentor. YouGov (2017) How Britain Voted at the 2017 General Election, www.yougov. co.uk/news/2017/06/13/how-britain-voted-2017-generalelection (accessed 12 August 2017).

Scottish independence referendum case study

3

Historical backdrop to the 2014 Scottish independence referendum From the late 19th century to around the end of the second decade of the 20th, unionism was a key dividing line in British politics. This related to Ireland, not Scotland, and was a consequence of Gladstone’s attempts to get Irish home rule legislated through Westminster. This created a fissure in the Liberal Party, one of the main forces in British politics, leading to the split with Liberal Unionists who found common cause with the Conservatives on an anti-home rule, pro-unionist platform (as well as in other areas, including support for empire).

Unionism, home rule and Scotland’s main political parties One consequence of this did have direct impact in Scotland. The Tories in Scotland threw in their lot with the Liberal Unionists: in fact until the mid-1960s the Tory party in Scotland was known as the Unionist Party, before formally linking with the Conservatives in England. Any idea of home rule or devolving of power was clearly alien, as this was a party bound by its strong unionist beliefs. There was however some distinctive Scottish shading to the Unionists, formed through business, political and commercial elite networks tying closely to the British state. This could be through Scottish landowning and aristocratic interests with political influence in the state, for example Sir Alec Douglas-Home (Baron Home of the Hirsel), a member of Chamberlain’s pro-appeasement government in the 1930s, later became British prime minister. Perhaps of more impact were the industrialists who ventured into state level politics in

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the years up to World War Two. Lord Weir (of the Weir engineering business) was wartime air minister, Sir James Lithgow (Lithgow Shipbuilding) wartime controller of shipbuilding and later adviser to the Bank of England, Lords McLay and Inverforth were wartime controllers of shipping, Sir Andrew Duncan wartime controller of steel and Bank of England adviser and Sir Eric Geddes with extensive railway interests was a key figure in post-World War One governments (McTavish 2016). Yet while the Scottish–British state nexus was fairly clear, there was some mild questioning of whether the linkage of unionism was maximising Scottish interests. For example some leading Scottish Tories bemoaned the post-1945 Labour government’s nationalisation programme as a form of Whitehall centralism not attuned to Scottish needs; such a complaint of course did not extend to a commitment to home rule (Cameron 2010). But for the Unionist, later Conservative, Party in Scotland, the position to any form of home rule was unenthusiastic, often responding only under threat of a nascent political pressure from nationalists (e.g. in the Scottish Conservatives’ ‘Declaration of Perth’, an intention stated at their conference, to set up a constitutional committee after considerable pressure from the UK leader Ted Heath in the 1970s) or bowing to the inevitable if there was seen to be substantial support in the country for devolution or home rule (as with the 1997 referendum). Even as late as 2011, the Scottish Conservatives’ media friendly leader spoke of a ‘line in the sand’, indicating there should be no more powers for the devolved Scottish Parliament, though post-referendum the political weather has changed somewhat. Yet it is clear that the party is most comfortable when taking a strident pro-unionist position, for example when the 2016 Holyrood and 2017 UK general elections saw the party’s single message campaign (‘no to independence, no to indyref 2’) achieved some success (see below). Labour has had a more mixed relationship to unionism and home rule. Although there was a House of Commons Speakers’ Conference in 1920 to consider a form of home rule for each part of the UK (no doubt in line with the international interest in national self-determination in the wake of World War One), there was little interest in Scottish home rule until the emergence of a Scottish National Assembly in 1947. This was a cross party body calling for a separate Scottish Parliament with tax raising powers and within the framework of the UK. The signing of a Covenant was organised and gained 2 million signatures. This however was not considered seriously by the post-war Labour government and the idea of political devolution was opposed by leading government figures (including successive secretaries of state for Scotland) (see Walker 2010). The idea ran counter to policies of UK wide welfare and public service provision strongly supported by

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Labour (understandable given Scotland’s considerably higher than average unemployment at the time). The Scottish Council of the Labour Party in fact dropped its commitment to Scottish home rule in 1958. Thereafter much of Labour’s policy on home rule or devolution has been framed in response to fear of Scottish nationalists – the Scottish National Party (SNP) – capturing electoral support. In the wake of rising support and by-election victories for both Scottish and Welsh nationalists, Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson set up the Kilbrandon Royal Commission on the Constitution in 1969. Progress towards devolution as Labour policy was either imposed by UK leadership or supported by those not always considered as being in the party mainstream (e.g. important figures like Richard Crossman, Cabinet member in the late 1960s’ Labour governments, and Scottish member of parliament (MP) and academic John Mackintosh); in 1972 a Scottish Assembly was organised to discuss the implications of upper Clydeside shipyard closures, but it was convened not by Labour but by the Scottish Trades Union Congress with strong representation from civic Scotland as well as business interests. After a significant rise in support for the SNP in the mid-1970s, gaining 11 MPs and just over 30 per cent of the popular vote, Labour supported and brought forward legislation for a referendum in Scotland for the establishment of a devolved assembly with some legislative but no tax raising powers. Yet it was a backbench Labour MP, a Scot representing an English seat, who introduced the amendment requiring support of 40 per cent of the electorate before the Assembly could be legislated for at Westminster. The referendum resulted in a slim majority in support of a devolved Assembly, but did not pass the 40 per cent threshold. Labour’s position did change after the 1970s when it found itself in opposition at Westminster, despite increasing its political support in Scotland. Throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s, Scotland never elected a majority of Conservative MPs, eventually electing none at all (see Table 3.1) while Conservative governments were in power at Westminster and often implementing policies which were deeply unpopular in Scotland. This led to claims of a ‘democratic deficit’. In 1980 a Campaign for a Scottish Assembly was set up, publishing a ‘Claim of Right’ based on the notion of popular sovereignty. The Claim of Right was signed by all Scotland’s Labour and Liberal MPs (except Tam Dalyell) – at this stage the SNP’s ambivalence was evident, seeing devolution as a diversionary alternative to independence. This in turn led to the formation of the Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC), comprising the afore mentioned political parties and a wide range of civic groups, including

Scottish independence referendum  69 Table 3.1  UK general elections 1979–1997: party representation in Scotland Year

Conservative

Labour

SNP

Liberal

1979 1983 1987 1992 1997

23 21 10 11  0

44 41 50 49 56

2 2 3 3 6

 3  8  9  9 10

Source: McTavish (2016)

churches and trade unions. SCC published Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right in 1995, which provided much of the context of Labour’s devolution plan when elected in 1997. The Scottish Parliament with (minimal) tax varying powers was agreed by a significant majority in a referendum in 1999. Although the SNP by this time supported and actively campaigned for the devolved Parliament, it was largely seen as a Labour creation.

Devolved Parliament at Holyrood: a game changer Devolved Parliament and Conservatives It is undoubtedly the case that the creation of the devolved Parliament at Holyrood has been the main game changer in Scottish politics and, over the medium term, the key driver in the Scottish independence referendum taking place in 2014. This can be briefly seen through the experiences of the main parties at Holyrood. The Conservatives have consistently been uneasy with devolution and home rule, out of sync with public opinion which favoured devolution in the late 1990s. They have found it difficult to have a meaningful voice at Holyrood and until recently the scale of the party’s representation scarcely altered since the creation of the devolved Parliament. Ironically of course it is the proportional representation system (generally opposed by the Conservatives) which gave the party a voice and presence at Holyrood. The electoral system used is the additional member system, combining constituency seats based on first past the post, and regional ‘list’ seats based on a closed party list used to top up the constituency representation and gain a degree of proportionality in MSP (member of Scottish parliament) representation. Until recently the Conservatives rarely won many

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constituency seats – normally gaining less than 20 per cent of the popular vote – but did gain representation through regional list seats. However, although the Scottish Conservatives were not leading players in the dynamic towards the 2014 referendum, as will be seen later the post-referendum situation has seen some change: recent gains by the party (in 2016) have certainly not been on an anti-devolution platform – a devolved Parliament being a reality supported by the electorate – but undoubtedly in a pro-union, anti-independence comfort zone (some would say), capitalising on elements of the majority ‘no’ vote in the 2014 referendum. Shades of ‘back to the future’.

Devolved Parliament and Labour Labour’s position in Scotland at first blush seemed unassailable after it delivered on devolution. It was the leading party at Holyrood, a position mirrored by its dominance of Scottish seats at Westminster (and leading role in local councils too, at least until the introduction of single transferable voting there). Labour in Scotland showed all the characteristics of ‘job done’ with little realisation of what to do with their hold on office. Labour in Scotland did not buy into much of the New Labour policy agenda (e.g. rejecting foundation hospitals and maintaining the position of comprehensive schools in the education system) and in some areas where it did try to sketch policy differences with UK Labour it ran into difficulty (e.g. higher education student tuition fees and free personal care for the elderly), often clashing directly with leading UK Labour government figures, creating some embarrassment for Labour at Holyrood (McTavish 2016). It has been suggested the ‘deal’ with Gordon Brown, one of the most senior figures in UK politics, conceded that much of the New Labour agenda would not be ‘forced’ on Scotland, in return for Scottish Labour not decoupling from UK Labour (Hopkin and Bradbury 2006) – though the evidence to suggest a desire to decouple from the UK party in any way is rather scant. After the SNP formed a minority government in 2007, the short serving Labour leader Wendy Alexander attempted to call the SNP’s bluff and ‘bring on an independence referendum’ in 2008 (BBC 2008) but was slapped down by Gordon Brown (though the slap down was denied). Labour’s response to the SNP victory and calls for further devolution or beyond was to create the Calman Commission (2009) which subsequently led to the Scotland Act 2012. As can be seen from the extracts in Appendix 2, the thrust of this was to give some limited tax raising powers to Holyrood but with a very clear understanding that this would be with UK Treasury oversight;

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some limited borrowing powers were to be permitted, specifically to be within European Union (EU) guidelines on state aid. There was also a clear message that social rights were to be considered within a broad framework prevailing across the UK.

Devolved Parliament and the SNP The devolved parliament provided an opportunity structure for the SNP, as indeed devolved or federal structures have for many sub-state parties in Europe and elsewhere (Detterbeck 2012). The electoral system adopted, partly based on a proportional geographically based regional list, meant that the SNP, not yet dominant in constituency seats, had a strong representation geographically across the country. In the first devolved election Labour won 56 seats in total, with 53 of these being constituency seats. The SNP won 35 seats, only 7 of which were constituency seats (McTavish 2016). Though not in government, the SNP could claim to have a voice across much of Scotland. Added to this, the SNP had changed its position on the route to independence: the party’s position traditionally was that a majority of SNP MPs elected to Westminster would be considered a mandate for independence, but in the late 1980s it changed its position in favour of a referendum and reinforced this after the creation of Holyrood (see Mitchell 2016), though clearly it would require a majority in the Scottish Parliament to agree this. This was to have an important signalling effect to Scottish voters, indicating the possibility of voting SNP without necessarily supporting a quick road to independence. The SNP was in fact elected as the largest party (but without a majority) in the Holyrood election 2007, and formed the government. It launched a White Paper, Choosing Scotland’s Future: A National Conversation (2008) (see Appendix 3), setting out options, which included independence (foregrounding many of the features later to appear in the referendum White Paper) but also spending considerable space on extending devolution and fiscal autonomy. Whether this was an incremental approach to independence or an attempt to appeal to a broader support out-with the core support for independence is a point of debate. It was certainly not a call for ‘independence heavy’ or ‘independence now’. In 2011, the SNP won an outright majority in the Holyrood election – an extremely difficult task given the electoral system (which was in fact designed to ensure no party would easily gain an outright majority). There is little evidence this was a direct result of the National Conversation, which did not elicit a particularly strong response from the public; all the research indicates the electorate felt the

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SNP was the party most capable of delivering on a range of policy issues of concern to them (Carman et al. 2014), an illustration of valence politics at work. The Scottish Government was committed to holding a referendum sometime during the Parliament elected in 2011. The Scottish Government brought forth its proposal in some detail with the publication of Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland (Scottish Government 2013), outlining its proposals, including protection of pensions, existing levels of welfare benefits, Scotland’s participation in a range of UK programmes and bodies (e.g. BBC, research councils), international bodies including membership of the EU and membership of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) as a non-nuclear country, retention of the pound and the Bank of England as lender of the last resort, with the monarch retained as head of state (see excerpts from Scotland’s Future and the summary in Appendix 4). The Edinburgh Agreement was signed by the UK prime minister and Scotland’s first minister, both agreeing to abide by the result of the single question referendum (though Scotland’s first minister had entertained the idea of more than one question on the ballot paper) and the question on the ballot paper (‘Should Scotland be an independent country?’, inviting a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response) agreed by the Electoral Commission. The referendum was set for September 2014. The main parties in Scotland went into the campaign with a variety of offers. The SNP led Scottish Government was for independence based on Scotland’s Future. Both Labour and the Conservatives had appointed commissions (which reported during the campaign), considering some devolution measures beyond those of Calman and the Liberal Democrats’ Commission reported in 2012 and 2014, favouring a federal approach.

The referendum campaign The campaign was a long one. After the formation of a majority SNP government in 2011, the intention to hold a referendum was stated. A consultation on a referendum bill was published in 2011. The UK Government accepted the principle of the Scottish people having the right to determine their own future, though the legal right to hold a referendum was more contentious since the constitution is a matter reserved to Westminster under the devolution agreements: the legal competence of this was not tested and the UK and Scottish Governments signed the Edinburgh Agreement in October 2012. Part of this Agreement was to set out an Order under section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998 – in effect a transference of legal authority from Westminster to Holyrood to hold a

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referendum no later than 31 December 2014. This in effect meant an 18–24 month campaign period. The Scottish Government set out its plans in the White Paper, Scotland’s Future (Scottish Government 2013, see above and Appendix 4). There were also reports by the Fiscal Commission Working Group while the UK Government published a series of 15 Scotland Analysis papers. There was therefore a huge range of detailed (sometimes contentious) information from both sides of the debate, a notable contrast with the Brexit referendum (which only had some Treasury forecasts in support of remain). The campaign itself was conducted in terms of the feasibility and practicalities of independence and not on ‘identity politics’ (Mullin 2016) – though as seen below, this is not to say notions of identity had no impact on how people voted. There were divisions of opinion – inevitable in a closely fought referendum by the very nature of referendums – and social media abuses of individuals (suffered by those on both sides and often targeted at women) but the sociocivic tensions which some individuals have retrospectively mentioned in the post-referendum environment are lacking in any real evidence either in independent comment during the referendum or official reports after the event (see contemporary comments from The Spectator and Economist, cited in McWhirter 2014; comments from the chair of the Scottish Police Federation during the referendum campaign responding to claims of campaigners intimidating opponents – see BBC 2014; and the post-referendum report by the Electoral Commission in 2014). The campaigning was focused around two umbrella groups, Yes and Better Together. While the SNP was the dominant organisation on the Yes side, Yes Scotland was looser and contained Greens, radical left groups, Women for Independence and others. Better Together brought groups and individuals campaigning for the union together and its key force was in attempting to coordinate Labour and Conservatives in Scotland. It was led by former Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling. However, this became a major tension and rather problematic (for Labour especially) given the voters’ traditional understanding of Labour and Conservative as opponents, as well as much of Scotland’s dominant political narrative for many years being somewhat negative towards the Tories. The Yes campaign did not get off to an auspicious start with personnel and staffing problems. Better Together had its problems too. In terms of membership and campaigning capacity, it was probably assumed this would be founded on Labour (estimates have indicated that at this time, Conservative membership in Scotland was very low and somewhat quiescent – see McTavish 2016 – so any campaign would have to fall heavily on Labour) but the capacity of Labour to fight a referendum was over estimated. What is now clear though is that there

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was a significant increase in voter engagement compared to ‘normal’ political events like elections – this was true also to an extent with the Brexit referendum 2016 but nowhere near as significantly as in 2014 in Scotland. Not only was the turnout very high (85 per cent) but post-referendum studies have indicated increases in political engagement, though disproportionately amongst ‘yes’ voters (50.4 per cent of which said they had become more involved in politics, against 24.7 per cent of ‘no’ voters – see ESRC 2014).

Key issues during the campaign The salient issues during the campaign were in fact bread and butter ones, not about national identity nor, in the narrow sense, constitutional politics. Economics, welfare, currency, public services and the EU. The European dimension was a regular feature in the campaign, not about the advantages or disadvantages of EU membership but rather, it was about the ease or difficulties of an independent Scotland retaining (or quickly gaining) membership. The assumption of the Yes campaign was that membership would not be problematic. Statements from a former European Commission president that Scotland ‘would have to join the queue’ or discouraging statements from the Spanish premier Rajoy (with an obvious eye on Catalonia) were quickly seized on by Better Together. The underlying premise of both sides was that EU membership was a positive thing which independence could damage. The irony of this in the light of the Brexit referendum and the political aftermath is obvious. Currency and the economy proved to be very divisive issues. Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) calculations that on independence Scotland would have a deficit (6 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP)) requiring significant tax increases and/or public service expenditure reductions were based on robust analysis but assumptions (and counter assumptions) which were contested. Other areas of difference and nuance did not prove so divisive. For example, the Bank of England governor’s measured and nuanced comments about currency unions and the compromising of sovereignty were considered politically neutral and balanced. However, not so the debate around the currency and the objective of Yes to retain the pound in an independent Scotland. Chancellor George Osborne took a very partisan position, basically stating that it would not be possible for an independent Scotland to retain the pound (polling evidence suggests this failed to undermine the existing support for independence, but this does not tell us about the impact on undecided or soft ‘no’ voters). However, the hard line approach involved the publication of

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Treasury-Civil Service advice from the Permanent Secretary Sir Nicholas McPherson which breached the Civil Service Code on political neutrality (this agreed in a subsequent Public Administration Committee Report), in his opinion justified because of the ‘exceptional circumstances  .  .  .  when people are seeking to destroy the fabric of the state and impugn its territorial integrity’ (see Rentoul 2015, cited in Mitchell 2016). After this signal from Chancellor Osborne with Treasury civil service support, other anti-independence politicians piled in, including the Liberal Democrats’ Danny Alexander as chief secretary to the Treasury and former Labour Shadow Chancellor Ed Balls. Some aspects of public service provision and welfare were also significant issues. If Better Together’s position, especially on currency, aspects of economic policy and Europe were easily categorised as ‘project fear’, the Yes campaign was itself not devoid of some negativity and fear tactics. This was especially so when criticising some UK welfare policies like the ‘bedroom tax’ and the dangers to the National Health Service (NHS) if subject to UK government spending priorities and threats of privatisation – using the example of the 2012 Health and Social Care Act passed at Westminster, introducing general practitioner (GP) commissioning and choice of healthcare provider (including private for profit firms). Other issues, though part of the debate, failed to ignite, for example defence.

Role of the media The role of the media during the referendum has been the subject of some debate and controversy. An obvious point to make is that the print media has less of an impact than previously due to long term decline in circulation and readership. Nonetheless the media can to an extent dominate and set agendas, or at least attempt to, and so may have some impact. Traditional newsprint media as a whole did not present a balanced or indeed particularly diverse picture. There were no independence supporting papers – no daily papers and only one Sunday paper. The Sunday Herald (circulation 25,000) took up a pro-independence position during the campaign. The largest ‘no’ supporting circulations were the Sunday Post, the Daily Mail and the Daily Express, and the largest of those stating a neutral editorial policy were The Sun, Daily Record, Sunday Mail, and The Sun on Sunday. However research has indicated that coverage even amongst the neutral papers was skewed, sometimes heavily, towards ‘no’ (see Mitchell 2016). Broadcast media – especially the BBC – presents a different picture given its responsibility for ‘balance’. There were some well documented differences between

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some BBC coverage and the Yes campaign, mostly notably when BBC’s Nick Robinson and the SNP leader Salmond clashed at a press event (initially on the matter of Royal Bank of Scotland relocation in the event of independence) and then over the BBC’s alleged failure to accurately report the detail and context of Salmond’s response in the subsequent BBC report; this led to Yes supporters demonstrating outside BBC Scotland head quarters (HQ), some demanding Robinson’s sacking. The episode as well as wider claims of intentional BBC bias were probably overblown – though perceived to be real enough at the time. Some rather exaggerated accounts from well experienced journalists were used to defend/attack either party’s position, for example, Alastair Campbell’s (former political editor of The Mirror and Tony Blair’s director of communications) comparison of a demonstration at BBC Scotland HQ to ‘Putin’s Russia’ (Independent 2014) and Paul Mason’s (former BBC Newsnight editor) comment about the BBC: ‘Not since Iraq have I seen BBC News working at propaganda strength like this. So I’m glad I’m out of there’ (cited in Guardian 2014). The perspective of time probably indicates two broad themes. First, it is unrealistic to imagine BBC news audiences out-with Scotland as engaged with the same level of intensity in the independence referendum as its Scottish audience, so neither would be the BBC news and editorial operation. Consequently it would be less attuned to the political dynamic occurring in Scotland; and BBC Scotland news was not resourced to handle this on its own. Second, BBC responsibility for balance does not necessarily sit easily with referendums. For example, as highlighted in the Brexit referendum, equal time and balance for each political party or player does not necessarily mean equal time for each side of the referendum campaign. But if traditional media, especially print media, did not give balanced coverage to the Yes campaign (either perceived or real), this was compensated by newer media forms. Yes was much more strongly represented in social media. Unlike traditional media, social media tends to be self-generated and is editorially unmediated, in a sense communication generated bottom up rather than top down. Like some traditional media – particularly some newspapers – it does not provide balance (see also Chapter 2 for a more detailed account of this). Research undertaken on the use of social media (monitoring Yes Scotland and Better Together Twitter and Facebook accounts) from August 2013 to referendum day, has shown that online enthusiasm for Yes pulled away from Better Together and that this increased exponentially from November 2013 (the publication date of the Scottish Government White Paper). This also preceded increases in offline support in the closing weeks of the campaign (Quinlan et al. 2015).

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The significant polling lead which supporters of the union had at the start of the campaign was gradually eroded. A poll published in the final week showed Yes narrowly in the lead – confirmed apparently by Downing Street’s own polling. What followed had the appearance of panic. At former Labour Prime Minister Brown’s instigation, all the main party leaders (David Cameron, Nick Clegg and Ed Miliband) signed up to the ‘vow’ in the event of a ‘no’ vote – a joint statement committing all parties to extending the powers of the Scottish Parliament, with the retention of the Barnett formula to calculate moneys from the UK Treasury to all devolved parliaments in the UK, with an outlined timetable for delivery. Significantly the ‘vow’ was published on the front page of Scotland’s large circulation tabloid Daily Record – although with slightly lower circulation figures than the Scottish Sun, the Daily Record was traditionally a Labour supporting paper.

The result and immediate aftermath The vote resulted in ‘no’ gaining 55 per cent and ‘yes’ 45 per cent on an 85 per cent turnout. An analysis of the result is detailed below. To fulfil the ‘vow’, a commission was set up with representation from the main parties in Scotland under the chairman Lord Smith, a well respected cross bench peer and Scottish business figure who had chaired Glasgow’s successful Commonwealth Games bid. An early criticism of the Commission was that this was a rather traditional approach, with representatives from mainstream political Scotland failing to capture the civic engagement exhibited throughout the referendum (though submissions and representation to the Commission were made by some voluntary and third sector organisations). Its recommendations formed the basis of the Scotland Act 2016. In terms of the structure of relationships between Holyrood and Westminster, the fundamental devolved–reserved powers remained intact, though it was recommended that UK laws should state that the Scottish Parliament was a permanent institution and should have all powers over elections and electoral processes and systems, including number of MSPs. Scotland should have powers over certain existing UK social security benefits (e.g. to ‘top up’) and create new benefits in devolved areas. On finance, income tax was to be shared with Westminster, Holyrood able to set rates and bands but tax free threshold and reliefs retained at Westminster. Value added tax (VAT) was to remain reserved, though the first 10 per cent of receipts raised in Scotland to be assigned to the Scottish Government’s budget; and air passenger duty to be devolved. The Barnett formula was to be retained though the amount allocated to Scotland reduced to reflect Holyrood’s additional

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income tax take. Several important taxes in terms of macro-economic policy were retained at Westminster, for example national insurance, savings, inheritance and capital gains taxes, corporation tax and petroleum revenue tax. In all, this represented an increase in devolved powers but claims made that this was ‘the most powerful devolved legislature in the world’ (e.g. said by, amongst others, Scottish Secretary David Mundell in May 2016 – BBC 2016) were wide of the mark. After the 2016 Act, the Scottish Government is responsible for raising around 40 per cent of devolved expenditure and 15 per cent of benefit spend (Thompson and Gunson 2016).

Analysis of the result The referendum result was a comfortable victory for those opposed to independence. However, the apparently unassailable lead which ‘no’ had at the outset was significantly reduced and leading ‘no’ figures (at Scottish and UK levels) were distinctly uncomfortable in the closing stages. Turnout was high at 85 per cent, dramatically so by Scottish and UK general election standards but also by UK referendum standards too – the largest turnout there being 70 per cent at the Brexit referendum 2016. As can be seen from Appendix 5, only four local authority areas had a majority for independence, with a fifth showing an almost even split. In crude terms, relatively well off and ‘comfortable’ Scotland voted ‘no’, particularly marked the further from the central belt, and conversely those areas with the highest proportion voting ‘yes’ were areas with high levels of poverty and deprivation. However, the picture is more complex and nuanced than this, as illustrated by detailed post-referendum survey research. The resulting analysis shows the following key features of voter behaviour (Fraser 2015; ESRC 2014): • Gender. A higher proportion of women than men voted ‘yes’ – 53.2 per cent women against 43.4 per cent men. • Age. As a determining factor this was more nuanced than either the Brexit referendum or the 2017 UK general election. Only one third of over 70s voted ‘yes’, compared with a majority (62 per cent) in the 25–29 age range; however a majority (54 per cent) of 16–24 year olds voted ‘no’. • Income and socio-economic status. Generally, those earning over £30,000, taken as whole annum, were evenly split. More finely granulated, the upper three quartiles (i.e. above £30,000) of the income range broadly reflected the outcome of the vote: 55 per cent in favour of ‘no’, with little variation between the quartiles. Those under £20,000 voted 53 per cent for ‘yes’.

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• Country of birth. A small majority of voters born in Scotland voted ‘yes’ (52.7 per cent); those born elsewhere in the UK were very unlikely to vote ‘yes’ (27.9 per cent); of those born outside the UK, 43 per cent chose ‘yes’. • Identity. While identity was not the focus of the campaign, it does seem to have been a factor in voters’ decision making, with 86 per cent describing as ‘Scottish not British’ voting ‘yes’ and 61 per cent as ‘more Scottish than British’ voting similarly. ‘British not Scottish’ and ‘equally British and Scottish’ seem to have been a proxy for voting ‘no’ with 87.6 per cent and 81.4 per cent identifying in these categories respectively voting against independence. • Main reasons given for voting the way they did. ‘Yes’ voters responded ‘to ensure Scotland gets the government it wants’ (24.8 per cent), ‘the whole Westminster system is rotten’ (24.1 per cent), ‘independence is the natural state for a nation like Scotland’ (21.8 per cent) and ‘Scotland would be better off economically’ (20.1 per cent). For ‘no’ voters reasons were ‘feeling British and believing in the union’ (29.5 per cent), ‘too many unanswered questions’ (27.8 per cent) and ‘independence would leave Scotland worse off economically’ (26.3 per cent).

Impact of the referendum on Scottish politics One of the immediate impacts of the referendum was a massive surge in membership of the SNP and the Scottish Greens. At the end of 2013, SNP membership was 25,000, by the end of 2016, 119,000; the respective figures for the Scottish Greens (SG) were 1200 and 8120 (Mitchell et al. 2017). At first glance this may seem odd given that both parties were on the losing side. However, what it indicated was that the referendum campaign, especially on the ‘yes’ side with its civic inclusion and aspects of street/carnival politics had energised those supporting independence. The influx of members has not fundamentally altered the age profile or ideological position of either party, though the proportion of women members has increased to 38 per cent for the SNP and 49 per cent for SG; and the new members are generally inactive (Mitchell et al. 2017). In large measure Yes campaign support carried over to support for the SNP at the 2015 UK general election, resulting in SNP taking 56 of Scotland’s 59 Westminster seats. This was aided by the collapse of the Labour vote, damaged by the party’s cooperation with the Conservatives in Better Together, and the first past the post electoral system. Nonetheless to achieve just over 50 per cent of the popular vote in Scotland on a high turnout of 71.1 per cent (against a UK figure of 66.1 per cent) and increase

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the number of MSPs from 6 to 56 was a remarkable result from which future results, however good, would be considered a loss. The SNP’s position did experience losses both at Holyrood elections in 2016 (losing its overall majority, though still the largest party). There is still an independence supporting majority in the Scottish Parliament when SNP and Greens are combined; however further losses in the next Holyrood election could mean loss of an independence supporting majority. The Westminster election in 2017 saw a reduction in SNP MPs (down to 35), an increase in Conservatives (13) and smaller increases for Labour (7) and Liberal Democrats (4). SNP had more seats than all others combined on 37 per cent of the popular vote. To a large extent, lack of desire for a second independence referendum (at the time, SNP Deputy Leader John Swinney stated this as a factor) and a very focused ‘no to indyref 2’ campaign, especially from the Conservatives, accounted for much of the SNP loss. However as leading pollster and academic John Curtice indicates, with Labour and Conservatives presently on about 23–25 per cent (the Conservatives having slipped since the 2017 election), the SNP is likely to remain a major force in Scotland’s politics (Curtice 2017). That the referendum result would settle the constitutional position of Scotland in the UK has proven not to be the case. This was apparent the morning after the referendum when Prime Minister Cameron announced his desire for ‘English votes for English laws at Westminster’ (EVEL) ‘now that Scotland has had its say’. This in effect kept the constitutional issue alive by excluding Scottish MPs from certain stages of UK legislation deemed to be covering English only matters. Then Brexit occurred. This has added another layer of constitutional complexity given Scotland’s very different voting pattern from the rest of the UK in the Brexit referendum (62–38 per cent in favour of remain, against 52–48 per cent for leave). Scotland’s first minister stated this provided ‘material change’, meriting the possibility of another independence referendum and the move to seek UK government approval for a referendum (timing as yet unspecified) was passed by the Scottish Parliament in 2018. The UK Prime Minister Theresa May refused to give her assent ‘at this time’. The Brexit process is a source of tension between the Scottish and UK governments (see Chapter 7). The EU withdrawal process has all EU legislation transferred to Westminster (including areas of devolved competence), pending a decision on how or to what extent these devolved areas will be passed to devolved legislatures. Scottish Government calls for greater involvement in the process (with similar calls from the Welsh) have not been fully resolved. Scottish Office representation at Westminster has been ineffectual and more recently even Scottish Conservative MSPs at Holyrood initially expressed ‘disappointment’ that the EU Withdrawal Bill was not amended as

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promised to ensure greater devolved institutional involvement, though some subsequent movement from the UK Government satisfied the Scottish Conservatives, who alone in Holyrood refused to support the Scottish Government’s Continuity Bill (see Chapter 7 and concluding chapter). As things stand it is unlikely the Scottish Parliament will pass a ‘Sewel Motion’ (the legislative instrument permitting Westminster to act for the devolved government in devolved areas) agreeing to EU withdrawal legislation. While this is unlikely to derail UK withdrawal legislation (though it is being legally tested at the UK Supreme Court), it will not improve Scottish–UK political relationships. Furthermore, the Scottish Government’s Continuity legislation (initially mirrored by the Welsh Government but later dropped in Cardiff) to retain existing powers, in effect a complete transfer of EU law and regulation in areas of devolved competence thereby giving these devolved institutions a continued relationship, in effect a regulatory alignment with the EU, has raised political if not constitutional tensions with the UK Government. Whether the Brexit withdrawal leads to impetus for a second independence referendum remains to be seen. The Scottish Government’s argument is that Brexit, especially a ‘hard Brexit’, will be damaging to the Scottish and UK economies and it has produced some economic modelling and impact studies of various scenarios – which the UK Government has markedly declined to do despite earlier comments to the contrary. Currently, Scotland’s first minister has not committed to a specific time for a referendum vote, simply stating that Scotland should have the opportunity to do so when the picture of the post-EU settlement is clear. Any timing (or any referendum at all) will depend on a judgement – by the SNP first minister and Scottish Government – of public mood for a referendum outcome different to the last. While the 45 per cent figure for ‘yes’ voting has stood up well (and in some polls, increased slightly), Brexit has raised a degree of uncertainty: polling in 2017 indicated some ‘no’ voters in 2014 who were remain voters in the Brexit referendum have changed opinion to support independence, but this is more than compensated by movement in the other direction, that is ‘yes’ supporters who voted leave now turning away from independence (Curtis 2017).

Summary of chapter themes • Background of unionism as a feature of British politics; • Political pressure as a driver of constitutional change. This theme is also addressed in the Brexit referendum case study (Chapter 4), in Chapter 7 and the concluding chapter. It also connects with the

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theme (outlined in the concluding chapter) of the ad hoc nature of constitutional change in Britain; • Trajectory of Scottish support for a referendum. There are interesting comparisons and contrasts with the Brexit referendum (Chapter 4); • Conduct of the campaigns and the main players, including use of media. Comparison and contrasts with Chapter 4 can be seen; • Detailed data on support for and against independence: determining issues; • Referendum outcome and implications for relationship between the Scottish and UK governments. There is resonance with similar themes outlined in Chapter 7 and the concluding chapter.

References BBC (2008) ‘Bring on’ referendum – Alexander, 8 May, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/ hi/scotland/7383035.stm (accessed 5 August 2017). BBC (2014) Scottish independence: vote disorder reports ‘exaggerated’, 17 September, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-29235197 (accessed 1 July 2017). BBC (2016) Powerhouse parliaments – is Holyrood the most devolved?, www.bbc. co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-35716653 (accessed 3 June 2016). Calman Commission (2009) Scotland’s Future in the UK. Building on Ten Years of Scottish Devolution, Cmnd 7738. London: Stationery Office. Cameron, E.A. (2010) Impaled Upon a Thistle: Scotland Since 1980. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Carman, C., Johns, R. and Mitchell, J. (2014) More Scottish Than British. London: Palgrave MacMillan. Curtice, J. (2017) Blog, blog.www.whatscotlandthinks.org/2017/10/how-muchdifficulty-are-the-snp-in/ (accessed 22 January 2018). Curtis, C. (2017) Brexit, politics, Scotland, Scottish Independence, YouGov, January, https://yougov.co.uk/news/2017/01/27/why-have-polls-not-shownshift-towards-scottish-in/ (accessed 27 February 2017). Detterbeck, K. (2012) Multi Level Party Politics in Western Europe. London: Palgrave MacMillan. Electoral Commission (2014) Scottish Independence Referendum. Report on the Referendum Held on 18 September 2014, www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__ data/assets/pdf_file/0010/179812/Scottish-independence-referendum-report. pdf (accessed 3 March 2016). ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council) (2014) Scottish Referendum Study, ES/MOO3418/1, https://esrc.ukri.org/research/our-research/scottishreferendum-study-2014/ (accessed 4 July 2017). Fraser, D. (2015) Study examines referendum demographics, BBC, 18 September, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-34283948 (accessed 21 September 2016).

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Guardian, The (2014) Scottish referendum campaign posed challenges for media, 19 September, www.theguardian.com/media/2014/sep/19/scottish-ref erendum-campaign-media) (accessed 21 September 2016). Hopkin, J. and Bradbury, J. (2006) British state wide parties and multi level politics, Publius, The Journal of Federalism 36, 135–152. Independent (2014) Scottish independence: BBC Scotland’s referendum coverage ‘institutionally biased’, Alex Salmond claims, 14 September, www.independent. co.uk/news/media/bbc-scotland-protests-scottish-independence-referendum-cov erage-institutionally-biased-salmond-9732095.html) (accessed 2 October 2016). McTavish, D. (2016) Political parties in Scotland, in McTavish, D. (Ed.) Politics in Scotland. Abingdon: Routledge. McWhirter, I. (2014) Disunited Kingdom. How Westminster Won A Referendum But Lost Scotland. Glasgow: Cargo Publishing. Mitchell, J. (2016) The referendum campaign, in McHarg, A., Mullen, T., Page, A. and Walker, N. (Eds) The Scottish Independence Referendum: Constitutional and Political Implications. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mitchell, J., Bennie, L. and Johns, R. (2017) Referendum as platform: the SNP and Scottish Green membership surge, Political Insight, December. Mullin, T. (2016) Introduction, in McHarg, A., Mullen, T., Page, A. and Walker, N. (Eds) The Scottish Independence Referendum: Constitutional and Political Implications. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Quinlan, S., Shephard, M. and Paterson, L. (2015) Online discussion and the 2014 Scottish independence referendum: flaming keyboards or forums of deliberation?, Electoral Studies 38, 192–205. Rentoul, J. (2015) Why the Treasury backed the no vote in the Scottish referendum: its top mandarin speaks, Independent, 20 January. Scottish Government (2009) Choosing Scotland’s Future: A National Conversation: Independence and Responsibility in the Modern World, Scottish Government, www.gov.scot/Publications/2007/08/13103747/0 (accessed 4 April 2018). Scottish Government (2013) Scotland’s Future. Your Guide to an Independent Scotland, www.gov.scot/resources/0043/00439021pdf (accessed 15 February 2017). Thompson, S. and Gunson, R. (2016) New Power, New Scotland?, IPPR, www. ippr.org/publications/new-powers-new-scotland (accessed 22 December 2016). Walker, G. (2010) Scotland, Northern Ireland and devolution: past and present, Contemporary British History 24:2, 236–256.

Brexit referendum case study

4

2016 referendum on UK membership of the EU: an overview As indicated in some detail below, anti-European Union (EU) feeling had been a significant force within the Conservative Party. This had significant impact in the party under David Cameron, first elected as a member of parliament (MP) in 2001, succeeding Michael Howard as leader in 2005. In 2007, two years into his leadership, Cameron promised his party that under his leadership as prime minister a national referendum would be held on the Lisbon Treaty – disliked by many ‘Eurosceptics’ since it: (amongst other provisions) attempted to bolster the EU’s international voice through the creation of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy supported by a new European External Action Service; increased the scope of the European Court of Justice (ECJ); strengthened powers of the European Commission (EC) to issue warnings to member states whose economic policies are deemed to be out of alignment with the thrust of EU economic policy or against the interests of economic and monetary union; and introduced a Charter of Fundamental Rights (e.g. citizenship and workers’ rights) into primary EU law. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) appeared to be growing in strength as an anti-EU party and just two years after Cameron’s promise of a referendum a number of significant events occurred. First, UKIP demanded a referendum and made a significant showing in the European elections, winning 12 seats to the Conservatives’ 27 and Labour’s 19 (albeit on a turnout of under 35 per cent – hardly a ringing endorsement of any party). Second, later that year Cameron ruled out a referendum

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on the grounds that the Lisbon Treaty had been ratified in the time since his promise was made. The backdrop was therefore created for an emboldened anti-EU pressure within the Conservatives. This manifested itself fairly soon after the 2010 election failure to achieve an overall Conservative majority (though the Conservative Party was the largest in the Commons) and the formation of a formal Conservative led coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. Just one year into government there was a significant whip defying rebellion among over 80 Conservative MPs who backed an EU in/out referendum. Subsequently, Cameron promised to win fundamental reform of Britain’s relationship with the EU, after which he would call an in/out referendum. Nervousness in Conservative ranks was intensified when, during the period of coalition government, UKIP won over 25 per cent of the vote in European elections, Labour on 24 per cent, leaving the Conservatives trailing in third place with 23 per cent (again, on a turnout barely over 35 per cent). Shortly after there were defections of two Conservative MPs (Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless) to UKIP.

Prime Minister Cameron’s reform proposals The prime minister’s reform proposals to the EU were structured around four key objectives: 1) rejection of the idea of ‘ever closer union’, and privileging the notion of UK national sovereignty; 2) (since the UK was not in the eurozone) eurozone integration must not disadvantage those countries not in the single currency; 3) welfare incentives, if they act as a magnet for EU citizens coming to Britain, must be tackled; and 4) the need to maintain competitiveness, jobs and growth (for more details see Appendix 6). David Cameron’s achievement of these objectives was patchy. In terms of objective 1, the prime minister had secured a commitment to exempt Britain from ‘ever closer union’, to be written into the treaties. He also negotiated the inclusion of a ‘red card’ mechanism, a new power. If 55 per cent of national parliaments agreed, they could effectively block or veto a commission proposal. The likelihood of this ‘red card’ system being used was a moot point. A much weaker ‘yellow card’ was only used twice. And the mechanism depended crucially on building alliances. The sceptics said it did not come close to winning the UK back control of its own affairs. Some key areas also appeared to be have been dropped along the way. There was to be no repatriation of EU social and employment law – this was a 2010 manifesto commitment. There would be no changes to the working hours directive.

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With respect to objective 2, the prime minister won guarantees that countries outside the eurozone would not be required to fund euro bailouts and would be reimbursed for any central EU funds used to prop up the euro. The deal also provided a right for any member state to escalate concerns about the impact of eurozone decisions for urgent discussion in the European Council. But the UK’s position ran into resistance from France on financial regulation. The French wanted to underline that Britain would not win any ‘exceptions to the rules of the EU’ – particularly in relation to regulation in the City. Objective 3 was the subject of much media, especially tabloid newspapers’, attention. The UK had to compromise on this aspect of the deal in the face of strong opposition from Poland and other central European countries. Cameron got the four year ‘emergency brake’ on in work benefits he had set such store by – but new arrivals would have their tax credits phased in over four years. The brake could be in place for a maximum of 7 years, rather than the 13 years Mr Cameron wanted, but the EU agreed it would be ‘justified’ to trigger it without delay after the referendum if the UK voted to stay in the EU. The prime minister failed in his original demand to ban migrant workers from sending child benefit money back home. Payments were to be linked to the cost of living in the countries where the children lived. The new rules would apply immediately for new arrivals, and for existing claimants from 2020. The UK Government had already reached an agreement on out of work benefits. Newly arrived EU migrants were/are banned from claiming jobseeker’s allowance for three months. If they have not found a job within six months they would be required to leave. EU migrant workers in the UK who lost their job, through no fault of their own, are entitled to the same benefits as UK citizens, including jobseeker’s allowance and housing benefit, for six months. Finally, objective 4 which was uncontroversial and appeared to be a Cameron win. He received promises and indeed targets to cut red tape. Such promises were made before with little apparent effect. The actual referendum was fought only tangentially and peripherally around the government’s reform package. The main campaign issues coalesced around immigration – its perceived or real costs and welfare implications (with some reference here to sovereignty about ‘control of borders’) – and the economic issues surrounding remaining or leaving the EU, as explored in some detail below.

Leave and remain campaigns Various campaigns, for and against membership of the EU were formed: Aaron Banks’ (UKIP’s main supporter) funded campaign Leave.EU,

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supported by his close colleague Nigel Farage (wealthy ex-stockbroker, member of European parliament (MEP), UKIP leader again after a three day resignation following his electoral defeat in the UK general election in the South Thanet seat), Conservatives for Britain, Labour In For Britain, Vote Leave and Britain Stronger in Europe; the last two of these were officially designated by the Electoral Commission as the official campaigns. The prime minister suspended collective cabinet and ministerial responsibility, enabling members of the government to campaign for leave or remain. It was generally recognised that Labour had a relatively low key campaign, the party’s position being remain, with a small number of Labour figures prominent in leave (e.g. MPs Gisela Stuart and Kate Hoey); both party leader Jeremy Corbyn and the head of Labour’s remain campaign Alan Johnson were far from prominent throughout the campaign period, the former having a historical background of unenthusiasm (if not hostility) to many EU initiatives. The referendum resulted in leave winning over remain by a margin of 52–48 per cent on a turnout higher (72 per cent) than the preceding general election of 2015 (66 per cent), but much lower than the Scottish independence referendum in 2014 (85 per cent). However there were considerable variations across the UK. England voted leave, Scotland remain, Northern Ireland remain, Wales leave. There were also other substantial geographic and demographic differences in voting.

Context of referendums about the UK’s relationship with Europe Given the referendums we have seen in the UK since the late 1970s (Scotland twice for devolution once for independence, Wales once for devolution, Northern Ireland for the ‘peace process’ settlement, Europe twice, once for considering – rather half heartedly – a move to a mild form of proportional representation), it is worth remembering that the referendum as an instrument of popular representation has not been commonly favoured in UK constitutional practice, unlike some other European democratic jurisdictions. The concept of parliamentary representation sees Parliament in Britain with its elected MPs as the forum for representing the public. This has been well documented historically from Edmund Burke writing as an MP in the 18th century and A.V. Dicey in 1915 to constitutional academic Vernon Bogdanor in the 21st century (Bogdanor 2009). Britain’s engagement with membership of the European Community after initial entry in 1973 (at the third time

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of asking) saw a politically opportunist use of the referendum by Prime Minister Harold Wilson in 1975. Somewhat ironically, Wilson and the other main party leaders had only recently spoken against the use of the referendum in principle at the 1970 UK election – and in Wilson’s case much later than this (see Qvortrup 2016). The circumstances of the deployment of a referendum in 1975 are worth recalling given the circumstances of the 2016 leave/remain referendum. The British Government under Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath (and the same could be said of previous applications for membership – see Self 2010) approached European membership from a position of both weakness and the sense of an opportunity to redefine Britain’s role in the world: Britain’s average annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth in 1950–1960 was 2.3 per cent, as against the Economic Coal and Steel Community’s (ECSC)/European Economic Community’s (EEC) 4.08 per cent; in 1960–1970 UK growth was 2.3 per cent, with ECSC/EEC at 4.2 per cent (Sanders cited in Self 2010). Britain in the 1960s had suffered traumatic balance of payments problems and currency devaluations. In October 1966, the head of the UK delegation to the European Communities stated: for the last 20 years this country has been adrift . . . we do not know where we are going and have begun to lose confidence in ourselves. Perhaps the point has now been reached when the acceptance of a new goal and a new commitment could give the country as a whole a focus around which to crystallise its hopes and energies. Entry into Europe might provide the stimulus and target we require. (Young 1998) The decision to hold a referendum in 1975 was a way in which Prime Minister Wilson (who, though broadly supportive of staying in, remained above the battle rather than a protagonist of either continued membership or withdrawal) squared his party and would not alienate a largely hostile (or at best indifferent) party membership nor some hefty senior remain (e.g. pro-European Community membership Roy Jenkins) or anti (e.g. Tony Benn, Barbara Castle) members of his government. Trade unions were institutionally very important to Labour in the 1970s and many of these were unenthusiastic about membership. Europe has been an increasingly salient issue for the Conservatives probably from Thatcher’s British rebate battles (to in effect reduce the UK’s net contribution to the EU budget), with her use of hostile and belligerent language, to post-1992 when Prime Minister John Major faced rebellion from three cabinet members (referred to as ‘the bastards’ – these

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were Michael Howard future party leader, Peter Lilley and Michael Portillo – in what was mistakenly thought to be an off air interview with the BBC) over ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. This episode highlighted the strength of hostility to the EU within the party. The rebels – all right wingers – would have (presumably) supported Major’s opting out of the ‘social chapter’ provisions of Maastricht, but critically the treaty laid the foundations for currency and monetary union. So unlike the contextual backdrop surrounding UK entry to Europe, which was about economic development and forward pathways for the UK, this signalled a political Euroscepticism with little in the way of alternative forward vision.

How the 2016 referendum played out A key contrast with the previous European referendum (and indeed the Scottish independence referendum) was an absence of consensual symmetry between mainstream figures in the two main UK parties. Although David Cameron deflected some Labour hostility by agreeing not to seek repatriation of key social rights in his reform proposals (Labour with some justification feared a UK Conservative government would dilute these rights guaranteed at EU level), many key EU enthusiasts and supporters of the government’s remain stance from Labour were seen as closely aligned with New Labour (Blair, Mandelson, Will Straw, son of Jack Straw former foreign secretary), not highly regarded by the party leadership under Corbyn. Several of Corbyn’s advisers, most notably Seumas Milne and Andrew Fisher, were hostile to the EU remain campaign; Gordon Brown, while aligned with remain would not share a platform with David Cameron. Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn did not present a high profile Labour campaign, his evident campaigning strengths subsequently much more apparent on issues like anti-austerity. Indeed one senior Labour figure, Charlie Falconer stated: Jeremy came in for very substantial criticism within Labour during the campaign for not doing enough . . . but the problem was it was never part of his crusade . . . his political views had been clear all along. His decision to agree to remain was a purely tactical one to form a shadow cabinet. (cited in Shipman 2016) Added to this, many Labour strongholds in the north of England had a rather weak constituency base, leading to a relatively ineffective campaign, thereby vacating much of this territory to UKIP.

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Leadership of the campaigns There were clearly a number of leadership difficulties, indeed failings, within the remain campaign. Some of these preceded the referendum itself. Cameron’s withdrawal of the Conservatives from the main centre right grouping in the European Parliament, the People’s Party (PP, with 217 members), isolated the Conservatives from alignment with several key EU players, most significantly Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU), led by Angela Merkel – much to Merkel’s disappointment at the time of the UK Conservatives leaving the PP. Instead, UK Conservatives were aligned with the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR, 74 members) composed largely of Eurosceptic and (increasingly) politically illiberal (though economically liberal) parties, including the Polish Law and Justice Party and the Alternative for Germany party. The other large political grouping in Europe was the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D, 190 members). UK Conservatives therefore were part of the third largest grouping, but substantially behind the main two party groups. This lack of association with the mainstream power brokers, added to the UK’s initial hostility and opposition to Jean-Claude Juncker’s (also a member of the PP) appointment as president of the European Commission, was hardly a portent for close relationship building with key EU power holders. In fact, Cameron’s inability to stop the appointment of Juncker (initially believing he had Merkel’s support in this – see Paterson 2016) led him to warn that this appointment would, in the context of Cameron’s promised referendum, lead to UK withdrawal from the EU, and forced Merkel to issue a warning to him ‘not to threaten her’ (see Swinford 2014); this then led to vacillation in Cameron’s approach to leading EU power brokers (Thompson 2017). Also, during the UK government’s reform negotiations with the EU, Cameron wobbled or was silent on issues previously deemed important. For example, no demand was made for smaller EU budgets or specific reductions in regulations; Cameron’s plan for a four year ban on benefits for new EU arrivals was altered to a slower taper; no discussion was had on the role of the ECJ; a proposal to ban child benefits for children of EU migrants not resident in UK was changed to index linking in line with local living costs, with a continuation of full payment for a transitional period until 2020. Perhaps most importantly, given the prominence of immigration and ‘control of borders’ as issues during the campaign, was the fact that Cameron apparently never raised the possibility of the EU compromising on Britain’s borders, faced with a real threat of Britain leaving the EU. There were other instances which indicated early difficulties for the Conservative leadership of the remain campaign. The early launch in

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June 2015 of the Conservatives for Britain by Conservative MP Steve Baker pre-empted government plans. The Electoral Commission ruling on the referendum question in September 2015 was thought to be a victory for leave. The government’s initial intention was for a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ option (‘should the UK remain a member of the EU?’), probably basing this on a belief that pro-independence support in the Scottish referendum had gained traction from having the ‘yes’ positive option. The Electoral Commission’s view was that the ‘yes’/‘no’ option was unbalanced since it only explained the remain option in the question. This decision may have been significant since polling had indicated up to 4 per cent could be affected by this (cited in Shipman 2016). The government’s plan to scrap or severely modify purdah rules, that is the period during an election campaign when official government announcements are forbidden on the grounds that it may unfairly impact the result due to the government’s control of civil service and information levers, was unsuccessful – that is purdah was to be in place during the referendum campaign similar to the practice in elections. There were other factors making it difficult for the leadership’s ability to drive the campaign. The Conservative Party would remain neutral on the referendum, in effect denying the government use of and funding from its political machine; and there would be no collective cabinet responsibility, thereby enabling even the most senior members of the government to take and promote a position opposed to the government’s remain view. Finally the populist presence of Nigel Farage created difficulties for the government and remain to gain sustained presence in the political debate. Leave, with its non-designated rival campaigns (Leave.EU and Grassroots Out) was far from united and at times farcical – platforms shared by the likes of Farage and George Galloway (this actually occurred more than once) may be entertaining but hardly credible as a symbol of consistent political purpose. Though Farage was considered toxic especially for floating voters, he spent some time appearing at media events in northern cities where the government led leave campaign had little impact. Farage’s anti-elite message (though how consistent or coherent is questionable) chimed with many struggling areas.

The emergence of new issues in electoral politics? New issues in electoral politics: anti-elitism There has been some debate about the sense in which the referendum signified some aspects of ‘new politics’ or at least novel approaches to politics.

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In some ways this is a truism, since the prevailing democratic mode in Britain is (notwithstanding the recent referendum experience) representative politics through a parliamentary system based on parties and party elites wielding power. In addition Conservative Party and governments have often been able to rely on support from business elites. At times the remain campaign did not appear to believe that breaking from this mould of politics was required in a referendum. Although there were a large number of Tory backbench MPs backing leave, most of the Cabinet supported remain and in late February, 200 business leaders, many from FTSE 100 companies, signed a letter arguing that leaving the EU would harm investment and jobs in UK. Thirteen retired military commanders argued that staying in the EU provided better protection against the twin threats of Islamic State and Putin’s Russia (cited in Shipman 2016). Undoubtedly much of the leave campaign played to an anti-elite (to be more precise, usually anti-political elite) agenda and the extent to which the referendum leave support had resonance among individuals and communities feeling left behind by political power structures and established practices is outlined below. Yet, political convenience rather than political symmetry with anti-elitism rhetoric is more persuasive in accounting for some leading leave supporters’ allegiances. Most memorable was Michael Gove’s comment when asked about business opposition to leave: ‘I think the people of this country have had enough of experts . . . I’m afraid it’s time to say you’re fired’ (cited in Shipman 2016). This was somewhat surprising for a former education secretary with a reputation in some quarters as an intellectual. The statement ran counter to his use of expert advice when in government and can really only be explained by political calculation. Nigel Farage, despite the cultivated image of improvising politician, bloke in the pub etc. made considerable use of advisers prior to media and other events (Shipman 2016). The ‘leak’ from a royal gathering that the Queen was pro-Brexit (widely thought to be a newspaper story generated by Gove) and the Brexit celebration party in the Ritz hosted by Farage and UKIP funder Aaron Banks were hardly symbolic of anti-elitism! This though did not deter the use of the rhetoric against ‘the political elites’. New issues in electoral politics: significance of Englishness Other aspects of the new dimension to politics thesis should be considered. For example the significance of ‘Englishness’ as an identity marker influencing voting behaviour. The very different results in (particularly) Scotland and Northern Ireland on the one hand and England

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on the other (Welsh voting in percentage terms mirrored the overall UK result) indicate some significance here. Poll findings indicated 86 per cent of those defining themselves as ‘English’ voted leave, while 80 per cent of those identifying as British voted remain (Lord Ashcroft Polls 2016). The growth of Englishness as a relatively new but growing political factor is analysed elsewhere in this book (in Chapter 2 and the concluding chapter).

New issues in electoral politics: use of social media and data modelling A key feature of both the remain and leave campaigns was the use of social media and data modelling. Use of data modelling was not of course new and had been used in general elections. But data modelling in general elections had tended to focus on a relatively small number of swing voters in a small number of marginal constituencies. This effort had to be scaled up for the referendum. Both sides used data modelling, rather differently from previous elections. For example Vote Leave ran an online lottery offering large prizes for those who could predict the outcome of every match in the 2016 football Euro championship, in the process collecting data from participants. Similarly, Britain Stronger in Europe devised a social media exercise allowing football fans to work out who in their team might be affected if immigration rules came in force; the worst hit clubs were then targeted for advertising. Facebook ads were used to locate people who would ‘click on’ and invite a ‘like’ response, thereby identifying a support base. The use of provocative headlines through social media – much used by the Trump campaign in the USA – was employed by leave, notably on the official Leave.EU Twitter feed on Remembrance Day, linking remembrance of wartime sacrifice with voting to leave the EU; even more controversially Leave.EU sought out racist and extreme right websites. The Stronger In campaign highlighted the setting up of false profiles for far right extremists, finding that Leave.EU adverts were deliberately sent to supporters of the British National Party and Britain First. When caught, Leave.EU stopped. But Leave.EU’s use of social media, which was run by a US expert Gerry Gunster who had directed over 30 successful referendum campaigns in America, had a large reach (reckoned to be up to 20 million people), with a massive amount of data on the population used for identifying, segmenting and targeting people with appropriate messages for the demographic. This despite not being the designated campaign.

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Key issues in the campaign: the economy and immigration Key issue: the economy The key issues in the referendum boiled down to two: immigration and the economy. The conventional wisdom, with much supporting evidence, is that elections, even referendums, are won on the economic issue. That is, current economic performance, perceptions of the government’s (or opposition’s) ability to manage economic affairs and future economic prospects presented by the alternative offers on display. The remain side played the economy card with some force. The Treasury calculation that each household would be worse off by £4300 a year should Britain vote to leave was widely publicised and disseminated. The government and remain also tried to make the case that leave campaigns had not been at all clear about the country’s trading position on leaving the EU, thereby trying to exploit numerous issues: leave’s lack of a consistent view and no detail on the feasibility of a Canada–EU style trade deal; the UK’s relationship to the European single market (ironically, some subsequently in the ‘hard Brexit’ camp supported the single market ‘but not political union’, apparently unaware during the referendum that single market membership also included free movement of labour which leave campaigns were against); and leave’s inability to address the European Economic Area (EEA) option – favoured by some leavers as an alternative to EU membership – which would mean acceptance of financial contributions to the EU, being subjected to single market rulings including free movement of labour but with no seat at the negotiating table. As Chapter 7 indicates, Brexit supporting MPs do now realise this and though not acknowledging previous lack of awareness (perhaps politicians of all colours rarely do), they now campaign against the EEA and single market and for good measure customs union too. Remain also tried to use to its advantage President Obama’s blunt statement that the UK would be at the end of the queue for any trade deal with the USA post-Brexit, as well as the International Monetary Fund’s factoring of Brexit as a ‘major global risk factor’ and Mark Carney, Bank of England governor’s comments to a House of Lords select committee that Brexit would have an adverse impact on economic growth, investment and the value of sterling. Several factors perhaps conspired to diminish the impact of the above. First at a critical point, the murder of MP Jo Cox by a supporter of a far right political party. According to a leading well regarded journalist, most newspapers were due to lead with a headline showing ‘leave’ with a 5 per cent polling lead, which would most likely have led to market turmoil and/or a significant push by the

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government leading to a surge in support for remain (see Shipman 2016) (as happened in the Scottish independence referendum after an opinion poll showed ‘yes’ to independence leading for the first time one week out from the referendum date). In the event the headlines were about the murdered MP. Second, George Osborne’s announcement that in the event of Brexit there would be an emergency budget outlining specific measures to raise income tax, inheritance tax and slash spending not only proved counterproductive and stretched credibility but fatally smacked of punishing errant voters, never a clever move for a politician. Finally, much of the remain side’s concentration on economic risk factors (‘project fear’) did not resonate with many in the parts of the country who subsequently voted leave – the view from there was often that the economy was neither designed nor working for them, so much of the remain arguments carried little weight or threat and therefore had minimal impact. Key issue: immigration The second key issue was immigration, which at times was conflated with sovereignty in that ‘control of borders’ and immigration were presented as an issue which undermined UK sovereignty since free movement of labour within the EU was part and parcel of EU and single market membership which national governments could not unilaterally control. Immigration was undoubtedly an area where the government led remain side felt weak or vulnerable. The government, like others before, had set a target figure for net migration which it failed to meet by a large margin. Consequently the prime minister was unwilling to engage. Other members of the remain campaign (e.g. Peter Mandelson) attempted to create an ‘immigration plan’ to include a support fund for local authorities where services were pressured by immigration, but this was vetoed by Cameron. Post-referendum surveys (of both remain and leave voters) have shown that voters wished for more reasoned debate and discussion on immigration (see below), so it seems likely that remain’s reticence in effect vacated the issue for the leave side to dominate.

The result The referendum resulted in a majority for leave, by 51.9 to 48.1 per cent. The turnout was higher than the previous general election, but there was variation across the nations (and regions) of the UK (Table 4.1).

96  Brexit referendum Table 4.1  Voting and turnout in the EU referendum 2016

UK England Northern Ireland Scotland Wales

Leave %

Remain %

Turnout %

51.9 53.4 44.2 38.0 52.5

48.1 46.6 55.8 62.0 47.5

72.2 73.0 62.7 67.2 71.7

Source: Electoral Commission 2016

Who voted? There were substantial differences in voter turnout and in the results for remain and leave represented by age, educational background and type of location (e.g. city, rural, suburb). There are also some differences in voting masked by the aggregated overall result recorded in the electoral recording unit (region or constituency) with some instances of very similarly profiled areas showing different results as well as significant findings on voters’ views of the referendum campaign. Constituencies held by the main political parties in the preceding general election did not display equal proportions of remain and leave voting. Voting was significantly higher than previous general elections (2015 = 66.1 per cent, 2010 = 65.1 per cent, 2005 = 61.4 per cent, 2001 = 59.4 per cent). It is estimated that leave won in large part by the expansion of the electorate; many people cast their first ever vote in the referendum, or their first vote for a very long time. Based on post-referendum survey research carried out by Bruter and Harrison for Opinium Polling, voting was not uniformly expressed across the age range: fewer younger people voted than older (Table 4.2). Table 4.2 The EU referendum 2016: voting turnout by age Age

% voting

18–24 25–39 40–54 55–64 65 and over

64 65 66 74 90

Source: Op (no date)

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The result: some data Educational attainment All the data collected since polling have indicated that the result was strongly associated with the educational attainment of voters. Areas where populations had lower qualification levels were significantly more likely to vote leave – this finding is based on analysis of ward level data and 2011 census data (see Rosenbaum 2017). Regression analysis also shows that isolating and controlling for other factors, a 10 per cent increase in the share of graduates is associated with an 11 per cent reduction in the leave vote. There is a similarly strong correlation between voting outcomes and educational qualification, whether based on graduate and equivalent qualifications or lower level ones. But while educational attainment may be the single most important factor, it is clearly not a sufficient explanation (bearing in mind too of course that we are analysing trends in data, there were many well educated and qualified people who voted for leave and the converse is also true) (Langella and Manning 2016). Other factors mediated the vote for leave – one in four of the electorate have degrees, but these generally will be younger people; older people without a degree or other qualification may have had other factors accounting for their voting behaviour. There were also differences in voting patterns between cities and rural areas, the former being remain, the latter leave. Some geographical data Table 4.3 The EU referendum 2016: voting in 30 UK cities with a population of 100,000 or more (listed by number of votes cast in descending order) City

Voting region

% remain

% leave

Greater London Birmingham Leeds Sheffield Glasgow Edinburgh Bradford

London West Midlands Yorks/Humberside Yorks/Humberside Scotland Scotland Yorks/Humberside

59.9 49.6 50.3 49.0 66.6 74.4 45.8

40.1 50.4 49.7 51.0 33.4 25.6 54.2 (continued)

98  Brexit referendum Table 4.3  (continued) City

Voting region

% remain

% leave

Bristol Liverpool Manchester Wakefield Cardiff Belfast Coventry Brighton Leicester Sunderland Plymouth Newcastle on Tyne Nottingham Derby Swansea Wolverhampton Stoke on Trent Kingston upon Hull Salford York Southampton Aberdeen Portsmouth

South West North West North West Yorks/Humberside Wales Northern Ireland West Midlands South East East Midlands North East South West North East East Midlands East Midlands Wales West Midlands West Midlands Yorks/Humberside North West Yorks/Humberside South East Scotland South East

61.7 58.2 60.4 33.6 60.0 59.9 44.4 68.6 51.1 38.7 40.1 50.7 49.2 42.8 48.5 37.4 30.6 32.4 43.2 58.0 46.2 61.1 41.9

38.2 41.8 39.6 66.4 40.0 40.1 55.6 31.4 48.9 61.3 59.9 49.3 50.8 57.2 51.5 62.6 69.4 67.6 56.8 42.0 53.8 38.9 58.1

Source: Electoral Commission 2016

Out of over 33.5 million valid votes cast across the UK, over 8.8 million, or just over one quarter, were cast in the above 30 major cities that each gathered 100,000 votes or more. In those cities, votes to remain outnumbered those to leave by over 900,000 (4,872,810 to 3,955,595 or 55.2 to 44.8 per cent). If we take the ten or so cities often thought of as having the most cosmopolitan profile, with large university populations and having a multicultural and culturally diverse profile (London, Birmingham, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Bristol, Liverpool, Manchester, Cardiff, Belfast, Brighton, York), the figures are more marked: the remain percentage is significantly higher than the 30 cities’ average and as Table 4.3 indicates, majorities for remain here are in excess of 60 per cent. The broad pattern of many deprived urban areas, particularly white working class communities in housing estates towards the urban periphery,

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voting leave has been well documented. Many parts of England and Wales that have seen decline in traditional extractive and manufacturing industries voted leave, some by a very large margin (Katwala et al. 2016). Age and ethnicity Age and ethnicity were important factors in voting, with older populations more likely to vote leave – in fact education and age combined accounted for nearly 80 per cent of variation between voting in ward by ward analysis (Rosenbaum 2017). In some places ethnicity was significant, with ethnic minority areas generally more likely to back remain, though there were some significant variations: some London wards with mainly Asian ethnic minority voters, for example Ealing and Hounslow, displayed a higher leave vote (Rosenbaum 2017). Rural areas In general, rural areas (including some very prosperous locations) voted leave. Significantly in the voting areas out-with the cities, the votes to leave outnumbered those to remain by nearly 2.2 million (13,455,147 to 11,268,431, or 54.4 to 45.6 per cent) (Electoral Commission 2016). This includes towns and villages in the Fens at the agricultural heart of England, outer-city suburbs and prosperous rural shire counties (large parts of prosperous rural Dorset, Devon, Wiltshire, Herefordshire, Shropshire and Northamptonshire voted leave, in some cases by very large majorities) (Katwala et al. 2016).

Some explanations for voting behaviour There were of course many variations in voting patterns within areas and it is often at micro level study that reasons behind some voting can be discerned: binary explanations like city vs rural, pro- vs anti-immigration, dispossessed vs the comfortable are on their own rarely helpful. For example, immigration was a key campaign issue – and in some instances polarising, bordering on the unsavoury – but post-referendum analysis gives some idea of the complexity of the issue and what this says about attitudes to immigration amongst the electorate. Based on a large sample (2400) of post-referendum attitudes, the majority wished for greater management of immigration and its impact and well over 80 per cent

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across both leave and remain thought it vital that EU nationals know they are welcome to stay in Britain. Over two thirds of people (including majorities of leave voters and UKIP supporters, larger majorities of remain voters) were concerned about the tone of the debate during the campaign, especially the (unfounded) warnings about Turkish immigration (made by several in the leave campaign) and in particular the ‘breaking point’ poster (championed by Nigel Farage and condemned even by some other prominent leave campaigners at the time) (based on ICM poll, see Katwala et al. 2016). In the Fens, large increases in immigration (largely to service the agricultural sector) appear to be associated with large leave majorities. These increases, EU migrants increasing in some areas from 1 per cent of the local population to 12 per cent in 2001–2011, thereby pressurised key public services. A Migration Impacts Fund to help services cope with this was implemented from 2008–2010, but was generally recognised as inadequate (at only £50 million, it ended in 2011 and in its later period of operation set a threshold level for payment so high that only four local authorities could trigger support). So in this illustration a link between EU immigration and voting leave can be seen. However, parts of North East England had large leave majorities, yet amongst the lowest levels of EU immigration in the country (Katwala et al. 2016). Significant differences in voting between very similar areas also provide much ground for future research and policy action – for example significant differences in the leave vote between (a) South Holland – 73.6 per cent for leave and South Kesteven – 59.9 per cent for leave (neighbouring areas in the Fens) and (b) Knowsley – 51 per cent for leave and Stoke on Trent at 69.4 per cent for leave (both very similarly profiled areas in the West Midlands). Wallman’s concept of place based capability suggests different responses to international migration can be partly explained by those living in ‘open’ or more resilient communities (at varying points in the prosperity spectrum), finding it easier to accommodate than those in ‘closed’ communities, the former including good transport links within and outwith the area, mixed economies and a mix of housing types, social networks spanning dissimilar groups and the latter relative absence of these factors (Wallman 2010). Katwala et al. (2016) provide supporting evidence for this concept in the above instances.

The result in Scotland Scotland requires some specific mention given the substantial difference in voting there, with every local authority area registering majorities for remain.

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Despite the overall result there is some evidence of poorer voters supporting leave, though the correlation is nowhere as high as in England (e.g. Glasgow North constituency with 22 per cent leave, against Glasgow East 44 per cent – see Glasgow City Council 2016). The support for remain accounted for by educational qualification is not as significant as in England but a similar pattern is detectable (Table 4.4). The significance of attitudes to immigration in voting for leave is difficult to detect to the extent found in parts of England. The numbers of those who thought Brexit would reduce immigration yet still voted remain was 43 per cent in Scotland against 29 per cent in England (Table 4.5). One can speculate on the reasons for this. The Scottish National Party (SNP) government was pro-EU and pro-remain (as were most political elites in Scotland, even the Scottish Conservatives in the main), was generally pro-immigration with arguments based on the positives (i.e. based on needs of the Scottish economy). UKIP had little representation in Scotland (with only one MEP who was rarely seen and had little profile, no MPs and no MSPs) and was also absent during the referendum campaign. However, there were some areas which went against trend in Scotland and these are worth mentioning. Although all local authority counting areas voted remain, a cluster of six wards in the Banff and Buchan area in north Aberdeenshire had a leave majority of 61 per cent – there is much local hostility in this fishing area to the EU’s Common Table 4.4  The EU referendum 2016: support for remain by educational attainment % vote remain

No qualification

Standard/ Higher/ Degree equivalent grade equivalent grade

Scotland England/and Wales

41 26

47 36

63 54

74 64

Source: British Election Study (2016)

Table 4.5 The EU referendum 2016: support for remain by perceptions of the consequences of leaving for immigration % vote for remain

Expect Brexit to mean lower immigration

Expect Brexit to mean higher immigration

Scotland England and Wales

43 29

80 78

Source: British Election Study (2016)

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Fisheries Policy; similarly a small geographical area of Shetland, Whalsey and South Unst had a very high leave vote of 81 per cent, though this polling district had only 567 votes – EU fishing rules have been unpopular here with skippers heavily fined in 2012 for major breaches of fishing quotas (Rosenbaum 2017).

Summary of key chapter themes • Ad hoc, pragmatic and opportunistic nature of deciding to hold a referendum, driven by political party needs. This theme can be compared to the Scottish independence referendum (Chapter 3); • Political logic of referendum campaigns and differences to electoralrepresentational politics. This theme is addressed in Chapters 2 and 3 and the concluding chapter; • Nuancing of a range of issues (notably, but not exclusively, immigration) and voter behaviour, a theme also addressed in Chapter 2; • Voter behaviour and polarities in British politics. This theme is addressed in Chapters 2, 3 and 6 and the concluding chapter. The theme is also highlighted in the UK–EU withdrawal case (Chapter 7).

References Bogdanor, V. (2009) The New British Constitution. London: Bloomsbury. British Election Study (2016) British election internet panel, www.britishelec tionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/ (accessed 4 December 2017). Electoral Commission (2016) EU referendum result, www.electoralcommission. org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-elec tions-and-referendums/eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-information (accessed 19 February 2017). Glasgow City Council (2016) European referendum 2016 Glasgow results, www.glasgow.gov.uk/index.aspx?articleid=19666 (accessed 4 December 2017). Katwala, S., Rutter, J. and Ballinger, S. (2016) Disbanding the Tribes: What The Referendum Told Us About Britain (And What It Didn’t). London: British Future. Langella, M. and Manning, A. (2016) Who voted leave: the characteristics of individuals mattered, but so do those of local areas, LSE, http://lse.ac.uk/pol iticsandpolicy/explaining-the-vote-for-brexit/ (accessed 16 February 2017). Lord Ashcroft Polls (2016) How the United Kingdom voted on Thursday . . . and why, 24 June, http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-king dom-voted-and-why/ (accessed 8 February 2017).

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Op (no date) Did young people bother to vote in the EU referendum?, Opinium, https://opinium.co.uk/did-young-people-bother-to-vote-in-the-EU-referen dum/ (accessed 6 August 2016). Paterson, J. (2016) Juncker’s political European Commission and an EU in crisis, Journal of Common Market Studies 49, 57–75. Qvortrup, M. (2016) Referendums on membership and European integration 1972–2015, The Political Quarterly 87:1, 1–129. Rosenbaum, M. (2017) Local voting figures shed new light on EU referendum, BBC, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-38762034 (accessed 6 February 2017). Self, R. (2010) British Foreign and Defence Policy Since 1945. London: Palgrave MacMillan. Shipman, T. (2016) All Out War: The Full Story of How Brexit Sank Britain’s Political Class. London: Collins. Swinford, S. (2014) Don’t threaten me over Juncker appointment, Angela Merkel warns David Cameron, Daily Telegraph, 10 June, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ politics/david-cameron/10888727/don’t-threaten-me-over-juncker-appointmentangela-merkel-warns-david-cameron.html (accessed 1 March 2017). Thompson, H. (2017) Inevitability and contingency: the political economy of Brexit, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19:3, 434–449. Wallman, S. (2010) The Capability of Places. London: Pluto Press. Young, H. (1998). This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair. London: Papermac.

Politics and policy

5

Public policy is a manifestation of the very real and practical way in which government and politics relate to the public; it is influenced by the wider political environment and so subject to the fluctuations and turbulence identified throughout this book; it deals with the services, rules and regulations which have a direct impact on the public; it is considered a real world study and practice and it is no coincidence that some of the leading scholarly works of public policy have ‘real world’ or similar terms in their title (e.g. Policy Making in the Real World, Evidence for Real World Politics, Public Policy for Managers) and many journals in the policy field have similar practical or practitioner audiences (e.g. Public Money and Management, Evidence and Policy, Public Management Review). Typical concerns of public policy are about how preferences are chosen, or not chosen, by governments. Or about how political systems in democracies – in this case the UK – articulate and prioritise public demands on the system. For example, the inputs into Easton’s (1965) black box of the policy system (to use one conceptual model) leading to the governmental system’s outputs (i.e. policies).

Interdependencies in the policy system There is a general consensus, long held, that the public policy environment has for some time been characterised by increasing complexity, greater dependency and interdependency between governments and other actors (e.g. King 1975; La Porte 1975). Given such dependencies, especially those which are international and global, disruption resulting from economic and related shocks can occur with amazing rapidity. Two cases can illustrate this.

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Case 1: the 1970s oil crisis The 1973 oil crisis began in October of that year when the members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) led by major Middle East producers proclaimed an oil embargo targeted at nations perceived as supporting Israel during the Yom Kippur War. The initial nations targeted were Canada, Netherlands, Japan, the UK and the US, with the embargo also later extended to some others. By the end of the embargo in March 1974, the price of oil had risen from US$3 to nearly $12 per barrel, with US prices significantly higher. The embargo caused an oil crisis, or shock, with many short and long term effects on global politics and the global economy. It was later called the ‘first oil shock’, followed by the 1979 oil crisis termed the ‘second oil shock’. Events in the international economy, where destabilising forces were at play during the 1970s, provided context for the crisis. The oil crisis of 1973 generated inflationary forces, increasing energy and commodity prices. At the same time, the world economy was in recession. The Bretton Woods international monetary system was formally ended in 1973, and currencies were now free to float independently. The international recession was reflected in Britain’s economy. It was a period of ‘stagflation’, in which recession combined with inflation. Retail price inflation reached 27 per cent per year in August 1976. Inflationary wage increases were accompanied by a rise in unemployment, which reached 1 million in early 1976. High unemployment required increased government expenditure and borrowing. The Labour Party was elected to government in February 1974 without an overall majority. The Labour election campaign was conditioned by the perceived need to cooperate with the trade unions, and was based upon commitment to the ‘social contract’ and sustaining or expanding public spending. An international loss of confidence in sterling soon occurred due to the combination of recession, instability and commitment to social expenditure. This led to the devaluation of sterling. Labour gained a tiny majority in a further election in October 1974. In his budget of April 1975, Chancellor Denis Healey attempted to decrease the deficit by increasing the basic rate of taxation to 35 per cent, reducing the rate of growth of public expenditure and restricting the supply of money. Nevertheless, the budget provided for a record public borrowing requirement of £9 billion. Although it marked a shift away from the social contract towards the control of inflation, Healey’s budget was viewed critically in the financial sector. Many believed the economy was out of control and the Wall Street Journal advised against investment in sterling. (continued)

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(continued) By mid-1975 an exchange crisis appeared to be an immediate threat and in 1976 an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan was negotiated with Cabinet members considering counter-inflationary measures, including limiting wage increases through negotiation with the unions. In December 1975 the Cabinet agreed to Healey’s proposals for limiting public expenditure, which were incorporated into the Public Expenditure White Paper of February 1976. From then until 1979 key features of the British economy included attempts to curb inflation through wage restraint, leading to industrial relations conflicts. A number of national and international interdependencies are evident in this case. The most obvious is the link between international political and diplomatic policies and alliances, dependence on oil imports, risk from international economic movements and fractured socio-political-economic relationships domestically. Less well recognised perhaps is that by the 1970s London was playing a key role in international capital movement out-with the regulated control of capital movement. For example in 1957 the Bank of England sanctioned business being executed by UK banks on behalf of non-resident counterparties in foreign currencies not subject to UK regulation, stimulating the developments of Euromarkets and providing a conduit for money to circumvent exchange controls (Woodward 2018). Conservative governments’ policies in the 1980s had the effect of diminishing some domestic dependencies, most notably through trade union legislation weakening union power and state controlled industries being sold off. However deregulation of financial services led to the UK becoming a very significant player in global banking, financial and related services, placing the UK at a nexus of international finance. Somewhat ironically given the 1970s oil crisis, significant oil production in the North Sea off Scotland produced major windfalls for the UK Treasury (in some years Britain being a net oil exporter). This in effect was used to pay for the social and economic costs of a deindustrialising economy, thereby underwriting the growth in a globally performing financial services sector.

Case 2: global financial crisis 2008 From the late 1970s, Britain’s financial services sector centred in London experienced significant deregulation, resulting in substantial growth and internationalisation. In 1979 exchange controls were abolished and in 1986

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major deregulatory reforms and restructuring were set in train (‘The Big Bang’). These reforms included the abolition of minimum fixed commission on trades, ending the separation between those who traded stocks and shares and those who advised investors, allowing foreign firms to own UK brokers. This resulted in increased competition, encouraged mergers and takeovers and opened up the London market to international banks. Subsequent governments (both Conservative and after 1997 New Labour) did not return to significant regulation, but continued with ‘light touch’ approaches. Over a generation, the balance of the UK economy shifted considerably towards financial services. In 1979, 17.62 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) was accounted for by manufacturing, in 1990 it was 15.18 per cent and by 2010 it was 9.68 per cent. In much the same time period, the financial sector increased in importance. In 1971–1996, financial services’ gross value added (GVA) to the UK economy grew at an annual rate of 2.7 per cent (GDP growth was 2.2 per cent). In 1997–2008, financial services’ GVA growth was 6.1 per cent and GDP growth 3.0 per cent (Bank of England 2011). Much of New Labour’s growth and investment in public services was predicated on taxation from a profitable financial service sector, a sector which was interdependent within a global financial system. Yet much of this growth (not just in the UK) was based on financialisation, that is the creation of products not necessarily clearly related to other aspects of economic activity in other sectors (like manufacturing, for example); much was based on subprime lending, often in property and often leveraged by individuals through accumulation of private debt. In addition much of this activity was beyond the (already light touch) regulatory system, a form of shadow banking, where financial products were bundled, securitised, collateralised and sold on to other parts of the financial system. Aspects of these practices were clearly unsustainable (some may say reckless) creating a bubble effect – anything happening to deflate the bubble (like the collapse in personal credit worthiness or falls in property prices) could quickly cause panic and over correction in the system; since the system was interconnected this would create shock waves. So the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the US, pressure on Merrill Lynch and other US banks and in the UK, HBOS, RBS and Northern Rock – the latter a bank in the UK exposed with high numbers of home owner based mortgage holders amongst its customer base – saw depositors queuing to withdraw their funds. Governments were compelled to act as the system as a whole faced meltdown. The response was a combination of government (continued)

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(continued) taking a major shareholding in some banks (in effect nationalisation), injecting capital to create liquidity and other supports, including quantitative easing and buying up bad debts. This came at a significant cost to the public sector, increasing public debt substantially (by around £500 billion). The nine largest banks in the UK in 2007 had a market capitalisation of £316 billion, reduced in 2009 to £138 billion, with a loss in jobs too as well as declines in property prices (HCTC 2009). The political and policy impacts were both short and long term. Attempts were made to take account of some of the risks on interdependencies – for example by creating some boundaries between relatively ‘safe’ retail banking and other more risk carrying activities, by increasing liquidity holdings by banks, though underlying levels of personal debt have not improved and many features of financialisation are still in place. The economic recession which followed the financial crash was addressed by the New Labour government in the UK (and by the US Government) through an economic stimulation package. The political narrative and policy drive in the UK altered to one of deficit reduction with the incoming Conservative led coalition in 2010 calling an emergency budget and leading a programme of fiscal and financial austerity. This has largely driven government policy right up to the present.

What both these cases show is first the range of interrelated connections and interdependencies in the UK policy environment, second the extent to which events can quickly send shocks through the system and third the long term policy implications. Case 1 in the 1970s sent a policy reform trajectory not only in the UK but internationally and case 2 is similar in that regard, though in both instances Britain appears to have accepted these reforms to a greater extent than many others.

Politics and public policy This chapter focuses on the strong relationship between politics and public policy, while still employing many of the usual concepts of public policy analysis. It concentrates on several of the leading issues in the current political landscape. First, the relationship between the political environment and public policy will be illustrated through ‘wicked policy problems’, very much a feature of contemporary politics and policy and an illustration of the complexities of modern perspectives on public policy.

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Second, the problem of system ‘overload’ is set out, indicating how many long standing issues as well as more recent turbulence in the environment (e.g. the long overhang of austerity post-2008, Brexit and its aftermath) have defined and framed political demands on the policy system. Third, and related to the overload thesis, is an evaluation of attempts to distance government from aspects of public policy and delivery through independent depoliticised bodies. Fourth, the significant changes in UK politics through the emergence and existence of a multi-level government political environment (specifically devolution) will be seen to have impact on the politics–policy interface in UK governance, particularly when one considers the UK to be a traditionally centralised polity. Fifth, some comment is made on how the politics–policy prism is influenced by the role of the media (especially social media). Sixth, a reminder and updating is given on the political influence of interest groups on policy. Finally an assessment is made of the increasing use of public enquiries by governments as a means of responding to political pressures for independent and transparent examination of policy, often policy failure. This approach is in keeping with general trends in the study of public policy which are often impacted by the prevailing surroundings and themes of the time: from an age of technocratic planning and rational approaches to policy from the 1950s which focused on policy sciences, believing that scientific methods should be applied to policy analysis in an objective way (Radin 2000; John 1998; Parsons 1995; Lerner and Lasswell 1951) to the post-1980s proliferation of studies on the public policy and management interface, including how public institutions create, produce and manage their outputs (e.g. Hood 2007; McTavish 2005; Hood et al. 1999; Alford 1998 – plus a range of specialist academic journals like Public Management Review and Public Money and Management).

Wicked policy problems Viewing public policy primarily through a political prism, though never far from the mainstream, is currently receiving increased attention in much of the literature (e.g. McConnell 2017; Howlett et al. 2015; Peters 2015; Stone 2012; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). It is perhaps particularly noteworthy that one of the key analytical concerns which has drawn attention from public policy scholars and practitioners, that is ‘wicked problems’ can be seen in their broad political context (see McConnell 2018). Wicked problems (defined through the seminal work of Rittel and Webber 1973) were those which cannot be clearly labelled within definitional boundaries

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of problem, outcome or solution; there is no definite formulation. These problems could cut across traditional institutional boundaries which perceived and defined problems and solutions in specific ways, courses of action could have consequences impacting on other problems etc. Archetypal wicked problems include many issues familiar in contemporary life, for example poverty, climate change and child protection. Much of the debate has been on whether, or the extent to which, these problems are wicked per se due to their complexity or whether the multi-actor collaboration required in modern complex societies is at the root of this ‘wickedness’ (e.g. Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). Yet, examining wicked problems in their political context offers new insights.

Case 3: politics and wicked problems Government may respond to wicked problems to avoid damaging its reputation and for electoral advantage. Responses may be used to enable government to retain control of its political agenda. Governments may also wish to respond in such a way that is congruent with its political or ideological belief system. Some approaches may be high risk and depend on strong leadership, other approaches based on risk assessment or risk avoidance, yet others may be merely tokenistic or symbolic. Source: Adapted from McConnell (2018)

So viewing aspects of public policy primarily through a political lens can provide some useful insights. A recurring concern is that governments often find it difficult to strike a balance between policy decisions which will be of benefit in the long term if these clash with shorter term political gains. For example, a key writer on industrial strategy has suggested that the UK Government’s latest approach to this (as set out in a 2017 Green Paper) may be compromised by ‘firms queuing up to extract subsidies from government in return for not moving their investments to countries inside the EU single market, as the unedifying examples of Nissan and Vauxhall remind us’ (Crafts 2018). Of particular interest is to analyse some of the political forces making demands and attempting to impact the policy system and the way in which government attempts to address this through a range of mechanisms, including depoliticisation (by establishing ‘independent’ or arms length instruments) and exiting specific policy areas (e.g. Moran 2018; Flinders and Wood 2015).

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Political demands on the policy system and the overloading of government The thesis that there is an overburdening of inputs into the governmental and policy system has been around for some time. King wrote of overloaded government in the 1970s, stating that the increasing responsibilities of government were outstripping governmental ability to respond satisfactorily both in governance and policy terms (King 1975). More recently, King and Crewe (2014) also wrote of a new type of overload in terms of policy blunders and (in)competence – but a form of overload nonetheless. Behind this thesis is the belief that governments are attempting to do too much and/or they are not competent or skilled enough to implement policy as effectively as they might do. The overloading thesis can be applied in many sectors. For example, a strong argument can be made (see Chapter 1) that Britain’s foreign and defence policy has at times been overloaded due to an overstretching of foreign policy goals beyond the capacity to deliver, sometimes due to historical legacy. It may be that the proliferation of news (the 24 hour news cycle) and the increased variety of platforms where news is offered (including social media) place a particular type of pressure on governments and their policy actions. There has been a growing mediatisation of politics and policy (defined as the process in which organisations and institutions adapt themselves to some extent to the rules, norms and values of the media) and it is now recognised that policy actors need to govern with the news (Cook 2005), especially in the arena of ‘new public management’ where issues of league tables, competition, transparency and performance targeting are considered particularly hazardous (Bevan and Hamblin 2009). And significantly it is the direct representative elected part of government rather than the arms length or depoliticised agencies which have to be more responsive (Alon Barkat and Gilad 2016). This is somewhat ironic or unintended since these agencies were thought of as a way to depoliticise the delivery of policy at one step removed from the front line of government. The concept of government and policy system overload could be seen against an ideational or ideological backdrop or in the context of governmental policy capacity. Right and right of centre party ideologies (from the Thatcher and Major governments in the 1980s and 1990s) did attempt some state and policy unloading, mainly in the area of ending state ownership of commercially oriented enterprise, utilities etc. through a programme of privatisation. There was also the stated intention of exiting from the arena of industrial relations driven by a legislative programme curbing trade union power. The achievement of this involved

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direct government action in major industrial relations disputes, first with printers then with coal miners in the mid-1980s. The Conservative led coalition elected in 2010 with a strong drive for deficit reduction also planned state roll back, envisaging a significant reduction in public sector resource as a percentage of GDP, and significantly withdrawing from higher education funding, transferring this to students – though the introduction of student fees was introduced earlier by New Labour. Attempts at unloading the state and reducing spend have had mixed success. The Thatcher and Major governments did not reduce state spend as a proportion of national income, largely due to the high welfare costs incurred by other policies, though they did unload some key policy areas (e.g. utilities, rail transport, social housing). But as will be seen shortly, this does not necessarily lead to a permanent reduction in overload or in political pressures demanding action from the system. Theresa May’s initial comments as prime minister appeared to indicate some revision to such downloading ambitions, seeing a role for the state in helping achieve greater equity and opportunities for ‘those just managing to get by’. It remains to be seen if government actions reflect this stated ambition, or if the uncertainties and instabilities of a minority government alongside a policy overhang of Brexit crowd out significant developments here. The policy system may of course be overloaded not so much as a consequence of trying to do too much, but in terms of its capacity to handle the business of policy.

Case 4: is Brexit stretching the capacity of the civil service? Whitehall is muddling through by relying on its worst instincts, to keep its head down (why bother speaking truth to power, when power is a bunch of squabbling, self-centred ideologues?). Don’t blame us, says the First Division Association (FDA), the union for senior civil servants, blame austerity, significant levels of job cuts. Whitehall doctrine says civil servants can only ever be as good as the ministers they serve and when the cabinet is riven, uncertain, duplicitous, why should officials try to hold things together or cover the yawning gaps in policy. . . . the most trenchant criticism of lack of strategy in Whitehall has come from an MP, Bernard Jenkin, who is one of the leading Brexiteers . . . [he speaks of] a Whitehall mind set frustrating the leave process. Legislative cover is patchy; ministers are close to the edge. The Institute for Government warns they [ministers] may be tempted into short circuiting

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due process. In such circumstances [the civil service’s] permanent secretaries must seek letters of direction, to alert the National Audit Office. So far they have been extraordinarily reluctant to blow the whistle in this way. Some have shown limited candour. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs’ [HMRC] Jon Thompson admitted the big tax transformation project would have to be shelved so he could cope with Brexit. David Bolt, chief inspector of borders and immigration, told MPs the Home Office simply had to get more bodies in if the task of registering EU nationals were to get anywhere near accomplishment. But such instances are rare, showing how the civil service has not really come to terms with the recent improvement in scrutiny by parliament. Are tight-lipped performances by permanent secretaries really serving the public interest? . . . Brexit shows it’s time for a radical rethink of Whitehall duties and responsibilities. Source: Adapted from Walker (2017)

Diminished capacity to address policy issues could also be accentuated by personal leadership styles at the head of government. A full and comprehensive analysis of this has not been undertaken in the UK (or elsewhere) but there are known to be a number of senior political figures who take a very close interest in policy and its implementation. For example, Donald Rumsfeld was known to be a very proactive leader when at the US Department of Defence during the George W. Bush presidency. It is widely recognised that Gordon Brown, when UK chancellor of the exchequer, ensured that the Treasury ranged over most areas of UK domestic policy. ‘Over-meddling’ of course or wider political aims (e.g. positioning vis-à-vis personal ambition) may nullify advantages of having the most senior figures fully engaged in policy. Political leaders’ over confidence (perhaps some with hubristic overtones) in their preferred policy path may limit a realistic risk assessment of failure to achieve and/or preparation for an alternative course of action. Dame Margaret Beckett, former UK (and first woman) foreign secretary is clear for example in her own mind where the lack of planning for Brexit originates: ‘I mean, there are many things that to my mind David Cameron should be blamed for, but of all of them, the worst was to get us into this position because there was no plan’ (Beckett 2018). The post-Brexit referendum experience would indicate some validity for this view about a lack of planning. Although, it should be said that the governor of the Bank of England appeared to have a contingency plan – and a

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smoothing presence – to assure currency markets immediately post-referendum; one presumes such planning took place at the highest political level in the Treasury. Nonetheless, according to Beckett, there was a sort of ‘inglorious’ track record here from Prime Minister Cameron: I’m not entirely surprised that they made no preparations because a long time ago, probably two or three years ago, maybe more, Cameron gave evidence to the select committee I chair and George Foulkes was on the committee at that time and he asked him about the Scottish referendum, because this is the committee that looks at the national security strategy, and there was nothing in the national security strategy about the potential impact of a Scottish yes vote to independence. So, George asked him about it and he said, ‘No, there isn’t anything’ and ‘No, we haven’t made any preparations because you don’t plan for things you don’t want to happen’. (Beckett 2018)

The use of ‘depoliticisation’ to unload Part of the policy dilemma for governments is that the various attempts to unload (that is by simply withdrawing from various areas of policy activity) or depoliticise (in effect, taking politics out of policy through the creation of arms length quasi independent bodies, or simply closing off political discussion and deliberation) simply do not have the desired effect. For example the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), initially pioneered by the Conservatives and then progressed by New Labour, was in many ways a recognition that the resources required for public infrastructure could not be raised through increased taxation since that was considered to be politically off limits and bound to be a vote loser. PFI was an initiative which sought private sector investment for public sector infrastructural developments up front, in return for lengthy contractual payments over the lifetime of the asset; it was also aimed at transferring risk from public to private sectors. This has not been an unalloyed success and has often proven more expensive than traditional public sector methods of procurement (NAO 2018), and far from depoliticising policy can come back to hit politicians. For example, failed attempts to introduce private investment into London Underground adversely affected New Labour (King and Crewe 2014); conversely ‘deprivatising’ unpopular PFI deals can gain political advantages for politicians, for example when the Skye Bridge in Scotland was brought into public ownership and bridge tolls removed in the early 2000s. Opinion

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polling suggests that the Corbyn led Labour Party’s plans to nationalise railways is popular. In other parts of Europe deprivatisation of some utilities has also proven popular, a particular case being the remunicipalisation of water supply in Berlin. Some policy areas from which governments have migrated can later return and require direct political commitment and policy intervention. A case in point is the withdrawal from social housing accelerated from the 1980s with right to buy legislation with no accompanying stock replacement (and in fact financial mechanisms to ensure councils were not resourced to build new stock). When a specific area loses political salience then the policy gaze and the regulatory environment will not be prioritised, even though many citizens still may be impacted by what occurs in this policy field. The Grenfell fire in 2017, where a high rise block of council owned flats in London caught fire killing and leaving homeless many tenants, is at the time of writing the subject of a public enquiry but some aspects of the disaster are already clear. Writing about Grenfell, a former head of housing at the Audit Commission stated: Unlike the healthcare, social care and education sectors, social housing in England no longer has an inspection regime that assesses the performance of landlords delivering services to the 4 million households living in housing association or local authority housing. Between 2000 and 2010 the Audit Commission carried out 1,400 housing inspections of housing associations and local authorities, but when the commission was abolished by the coalition government these inspections stopped. The current social housing regulator – the Homes and Communities Agency – focuses its resources on the ‘financial viability’ and ‘governance’ of housing associations; its interest in service delivery is almost non-existent. (Jarman cited in Guardian 2017) Currently, decades after the deprioritisation of social housing as a policy plank of government, a housing shortage – particularly a scarcity of social and affordable housing in some parts of the UK – is proving very difficult for policy makers and politicians to ignore. The UK Government appears to have accepted that 300,000 new homes of all types are required per year and that social housing is a very important element of this: the government has lifted local authorities’ Housing Revenue Account borrowing cap on some councils in ‘areas of high affordability pressure’ enabling them to bid for up to £1 billion by 2021–2022 (Local Government Association 2018).

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The political consequences of failing to address social and other affordable housing needs has been set out rather starkly by the former head of the UK civil service.

Case 5: the political consequences of not addressing housing [Regarding] potential impact of the housing crisis on voters, some might go to the far right. It could be exploited against migrants and others, and that has happened. There’s an equal chance they will become organised and vociferous within the mainstream political system, I would guess towards the left. The political impact is magnified because of its disproportionate effect on younger voters. Only 38% of 25 to 34-year-olds are homeowners, down from 57% 10 years ago. Younger people historically vote less than their elders, but the fact that so few can afford to buy could energise a larger turnout in future elections. [In the recent past] government policies tended to be assessed on how they would affect older voters, because they voted more and they were more likely to vote Conservative [the 2017 election] changed that. For the first time you saw young people being organised and exercising their vote in a very defined direction. That shifted all the political parties. A consequence of not addressing this issue will be more people feeling like they are losing out from the UK economy. [Some in] the Conservative party saw social housing as toxic and some at a very senior level thought that it was synonymous with sink estates and some saw it as synonymous with Labour voters. Either way, it wasn’t very popular. But housing has become the most important policy issue at Westminster after Brexit, because it symbolises some of the big divisions in this country. [For example] the generational divide. We know that so-called baby-boomers have half the assets of the country and millennials have nearer 2%, and a big part of that is housing. We know there are huge income divides, the Grenfell Tower fire highlighted that. We also know there are big geographic differences. Whilst London property prices are 50% above the pre-crash price level, some parts of the country haven’t even returned to those levels. Source: Interview of Lord Kerslake, former Head of UK Civil Service, adapted from Booth (2017)

A final way of delimiting policy is for governments to simply not entertain certain policies or courses of action; to state that ‘there is no alternative’ to the policies governments are pursuing because investing in other

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policies is inappropriate or doomed to fail with adverse effects on economic and political wellbeing. British governments, especially post-2010, have continually reiterated that the overriding economic and fiscal policy, with no alternative, is debt reduction with subsequent austerity programmes and painful consequences impacting most areas of policy. Against this, significant numbers of academic economists and financial journalists have indicated that alternative policy formulations are possible: these range from suggesting that over tight fiscal consolidation is limiting growth opportunities, especially when borrowing levels for potential government investments have been at historic lows, to focusing on more radical reversals of longer term structural and politico-economic factors which have led to imbalances and long term stagnation or decline in living standards. In fact government itself has introduced its own alternatives, ranging from extension of its debt reduction period to a widely predicted easing in some areas of spending (most probably in healthcare, given stated government commitment). Such thinking is not confined to governments, but also can be seen in non-governmental policy bodies. The IMF admitted in its World Economic Outlook of 2017 to being blind sided to the gathering storm clouds prior to the global financial crash in 2008 (consequently severely damaging the organisation’s reputation) due to a form of ‘group think’ where it thought the immediate pre-2008 years of rapid expansion, the strongest since the 1970s, provided (despite downward trends in US property markets) evidence of sustained economic and financial growth. This was a result of conventional thinking about the self-correcting sustainability of global economic market growth rather than sensing a harbinger of the worst recession since the 1930s brought on by reckless under regulated financialisation activity.

Politics and multi-level government in the UK and policy A particularly significant and important political dimension to policy in the UK is the multi-level government environment represented since the late 1990s through the establishment of devolved governments and administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This can mean key policy differences throughout the UK in devolved policy areas. Most notably this is found in healthcare where for example in Scotland there are no National Health Service (NHS) Trusts, no general practitioner (GP) commissioning (the 2012 Health and Social Care Act did not cover Scotland), single tier geographically based NHS boards, less intrusion from private healthcare providers (though there are private social care providers) and

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greater emphasis on partnership working, especially in health and social care where there are local authority–local NHS institutional partnership structures in place throughout Scotland. Other areas of political and policy differentiation are found in higher education where higher education free from fees for Scottish students is more in line with European practice and a major divergence from practice in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. In addition to specific policy differences, some have written of a specific Scottish policy style which accentuates partnership and collaborative working between main players and agents in Scottish national and local governments and parts of civic society, particularly professional interests (Cairney et al. 2009; Cairney 2008). What makes the British multi-level government dimension especially interesting is that the devolution model (more accurately models, plural, since the arrangements between Westminster and Holyrood, Cardiff and Belfast are different) is neither the ‘type 1 nor type 2’ of the Hooghe and Marks typology (Hooghe and Marks 2003). Type 1 is consistent with federal type structures with a clearly defined distribution of authority across jurisdictions, type 2 more fluid with authority usually being task or policy specific across overlapping jurisdictions. The Westminster sovereignty principle and the UK wide scope of much social policy (e.g. large swathes of welfare and social policy) rules out type 1 as an overarching explanatory framework. Type 2 does not provide a comprehensive explanation either since overlapping boundaries of state, non-state and devolved actors may operate at different spatial levels with different interests and with asymmetrical degrees of power. For example, agricultural support for hill farming, if actioned at state level in the UK, may not be a priority for support by farmers’ representatives in England but probably will be by Scottish farming interests and the devolved government at Holyrood. The devolved policy arrangements can (and have) worked relatively smoothly due to political (self) constraint on the Westminster sovereignty principle, operating on the understanding that while the British Parliament is constitutionally supreme it would probably be politically unfeasible to challenge a devolved government, and also due to the fact that much European policy can in effect by-pass state level and be implemented by regional or devolved arms of government. There is institutional machinery in place to ensure the multi-level intergovernmental system works, with provision for meetings between Westminster and devolved governments through Joint Ministerial Committees (JMCs) since 1999, but these have met only sporadically, the most frequent being the JMC on Europe. It is the issue of UK exit from the EU which is placing greatest strain on devolved–central state relations over the extent to which repatriated competencies from Europe

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should be retained at Westminster or devolved (see also Chapter 7). Compounded with this uncertainty – or threat – to relationships and policy interface between devolved and central state governments is the almost non-existent political relationship over policy thinking or development between parliaments, despite some attempts by think tanks, academics and some parts of the civil service to study the potential for policy learning with devolution (e.g. see Paun et al. 2016). There are other dimensions relevant to this chapter’s focus on viewing policy through a political context which can be overviewed. These are: the perennial issue of the political influence of interest groups on policy; an outline of the role played by the media; and the growing use of public inquiries by elected governments to scrutinise aspects of policy, usually policy failure.

Political influence of interest groups and policy Interest groups are important to democratic politics, acting as a means by which individuals with specific interests can articulate these through the political system and thereby try to influence the policy making process. It is estimated there are about 8000 of these registered in various directories (2009 figures). The number of interest groups (i.e. non-trade groups) has proliferated since the 1970s, with professional groups increasing by 93 per cent, general interest groups by 117 per cent and campaigning groups by 117 per cent (Jordan and Greenan 2012). Lobbying – where interest groups may try to influence policy makers, is governed by the 2014 Lobbying Act which introduced a register of paid lobbyists operating with MPs and Whitehall departments; the lobbying industry though (estimated to be worth about £3 billion) is self-regulated. Interest groups are clearly not equally influential; lobbying in the UK is traditionally focused on private individual links with ministers, MPs and civil servants, and since MPs are allowed external jobs and payment concurrent with their MP employment (as well as potential or prospective opportunities after their time in Parliament) there is the scope for powerful (often corporate) interests to have more favoured access. Corporate influence, especially the finance sector, in the policy process has been evident prior to and after the 2008 financial crash, in addition to which large corporations’ and wealthy individuals’ tax practices (including transfer pricing and domicile arrangements) have caused comment and some action amongst even right of centre parties. However, rather unusually for a right of centre party, large sections of the governing Conservative Party currently seem unmoved, if not hostile, to corporate

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interests’ pressure for as smooth an alignment as possible with EU trading and market arrangements (articulated by groups like the Confederation of British Industry, UK Chambers of Commerce and the Institute of Directors) as the Brexit negotiation unfolds (see Chapter 7). Alternative perspectives on the role of interest groups on policy are presented by the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier and Weible 2007; Sabatier 1988) which posits the notion that networks of interests can bring along public views, media influences and voters’ preferences to make impacts on policy through the institutions of government (long term shifts in government tobacco policy being an example); the role of epistemic communities, consultation processes and reliance on research based evidence provide other frameworks for explaining the relationship between interests and policies – some aspects of health policies could also provide other examples.

Media, politics and policy The role of the media in politics and policy is worth mentioning. The political and policy positioning of the newspaper media in Britain is well known. It is in the main, though not exclusively, right wing and supportive of Conservative and right of centre political and policy positions; this relative lack of diversity is unusual by international comparison. However, its impact on either public opinion or policy positioning of government is less easy to demonstrate. Newspaper circulation is falling, there is public reluctance to go for online paid for copy and the newspaper media’s impact on the 2017 UK general election was less than significant: the hostility shown to Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn did not markedly impact on Labour’s vote which actually increased (see Chapter 2). Added to this, there is a healthy public sector broadcasting infrastructure in the UK (including an online presence), which has an obligation to provide political balance. There is however a growing range of media outlets, largely using social media run by political interest groups seeking to manipulate or at least set the terms of the political and policy debate. Both ‘alt left’ and ‘alt right’ use data mining methods to target key voters/members of the public and present paid for Facebook and Twitter news generation – which bypasses the usual journalistic or editorial controls. The ‘alt left’ (e.g. the Canary and Evolve Politics) claimed success in the 2017 UK general election and the ‘alt right’ possibly linked to US owned Breitbart (or it is supposed or alleged, supported by the Russian intelligence services or other Russian interests) may have swayed the EU referendum result (Taylor 2017).

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Increasing use of public inquiries The growing use of public inquiries has become a key part of the political policy environment. Public enquiries are not the only means of addressing a matter of policy out-with the routine parliamentary process (which is seen anyway as over-dominated by the executive), but with the decline in use of royal commissions (the last was in 2000 looking at House of Lords reform) and the limited nature of an inquest (which is coroner led), the inquiry has come to be seen as the gold standard of investigations (Institute for Government 2017). Although the terms of reference will vary from inquiry to inquiry, the broad purpose is ‘to establish disputed facts, determine accountability, restore public confidence and . . . prevent recurrence of events and taking forwards public policy’ (House of Lords Select Committee 2014). The increased use of inquiries is evident. There have been 68 since 1990, but in the 30 years before this only 19. Public inquiries have achieved some successes including the ownership of handguns, improved safety on offshore oil platforms, oversight of medical professionals, creation of the Rail Accident Investigation Branch. Yet given the use of inquiries initiated by the elected government of the day in some key areas of policy, there are significant criticisms impacting on the political–policy interface. Governments receive little formal scrutiny in the aftermath of an inquiry; there is indeed no process for holding government to account. Since 1990, only six public inquiries received full scrutiny by a select committee to hold the government to account for whatever it has done with recommendations. Added to this the timescale between inquiry commencement and reporting must be realistic to ensure accountability for policy, where possible within appropriate political timescales and cycles. Since 1990, nine inquiries have taken five years or more to produce a final report. The Chilcot Inquiry, investigating aspects of British involvement in Iraq, is amongst the worst examples in this respect: it took eight years to report and three new governments had been formed since the inquiry’s start (Institute for Government 2017).

Summary of key chapter themes • Complex interdependencies, national and international, affecting politics and policy. This complements themes in Chapter 1 analysing Britain’s interactions with the world and configuration of polities in the UK. Theme is also seen in Chapter 6;

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•

Politics–policy interface; political lens of policy; wicked policy problems; system overload through long term and more recent events – and political and policy responses including attempts at depoliticisation, austerity and exit from certain policy areas; • Politics of multi-level government and policy – tension and turbulence in the UK’s traditionally centralised system of government. This theme is seen in Chapters 1, 2 and 7; • Media, politics and policy. This is addressed in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 7.

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Hood, C. (2007) Public service management by numbers, Public Money and Management 27:2, 95–102. Hood, C., Scott, C., James, O., Jones, G. and Travers, T. (1999) Regulation Inside Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2003) Unravelling the central state but how? Types of multi level governance, American Political Science Review 97:2, 233–243. House of Lords Select Committee (2014) The Inquiries Act 2005: post-legislative scrutiny, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldselect/ldinquiries/143/143.pdf (accessed 14 March 2018). Howlett, M., Ramesh, M. and Wu, X. (2015) Understanding the persistence of policy failures: the role of politics, governance and uncertainty, Public Policy and Administration 30:4, 209–220. IMF (International Monetary Fund) (2017) World Economic Outlook of 2017, www.imf.org/en/publications/weo (accessed 2 February 2018). Institute for Government (2017) How Public Inquiries Can Lead to Change. London: Institute for Government. John, P. (1998) Analysing Public Policy. London: Continuum. Jones, B.D. and Baumgartner, F.R. (2005) The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritises Problems. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Jordan, G. and Greenan, J. (2012) The changing contours of British representation: pluralism in practice, in Halpin, D. and Jordan, G. (Eds) The Scale of Interest Organisation in Democratic Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. King, A. (1975) Overload: problems of governing in the 1970s, Political Studies 23:2–3, 284–296. King, A. and Crewe, I. (2014) The Blunders of Our Governments. London: One World Publications. Koppenjan, J. and Klijn, E.-H. (2004) Managing Uncertainties in Networks. London: Routledge. La Porte, T. (Ed.) (1975) Organised Social Complexity: Challenges to Politics and Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lerner, D. and Lasswell, H. (1951) The Policy Sciences. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Local Government Association (2018) Debate on the construction of council housing – House of Commons – 27 March 2018, www.local.gov.uk/parlia ment/briefings-and-responses/debate-construction-council-housing-housecommons-27-march-2018 (accessed 24 April 2018). McConnell, A. (2017) Policy success and failure, in Peters, B.G. (Ed.) Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McConnell, A. (2018) Rethinking wicked problems as political problems and policy problems, Policy and Politics 46:1, 165–180. McTavish, D. (2005) Business and Public Management in the UK 1900–2003. Aldershot: Ashgate. Moran, M. (2018) Whatever happened to overloaded government?, The Political Quarterly 89:1, 29–37. NAO (National Audit Office) (2018) PF1 AND PF2. HC718, www.nao.org.uk/ wp-content/uploads/2018/01/PFI-and-PF2.pdf (accessed 12 June 2018).

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Parsons, W. (1995) Public Policy. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. Paun, A., Rutter, J. and Nicholl, A. (2016) Devolution as a Policy Laboratory: Evidence Sharing and Learning Between the UK’s Four Governments. Alliance for Useful Evidence. Carnegie UK Trust and Institute for Government. Peters, B.G. (2015) State failure, governance failure and policy failure: exploring the linkages, Public Policy and Administration 30:3–4, 261–276. Radin, B. (2000) Beyond Machiavelli: Policy Analysis Comes of Age. Washington: Georgetown University Press. Rittel, H.W.J. and Webber, M.M. (1973) Dilemmas in a general theory of planning, Policy Sciences 4:2, 155–169. Sabatier, P. (1988) An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy oriented learning therein, Policy Sciences 21:2–3, 129–168. Sabatier, P. and Weible, C. (2007) The advocacy coalition framework: innovations and clarifications, in Sabatier, P. (Ed.) Theories of the Public Policy Process. Boulder: Westview Press. Stone, D. (2012) Paradox (third edition). New York: W.W. Norton. Taylor, R. (2017) How well does the UK’s media system sustain democratic politics? 2017 audit of democracy, www.democraticaudit.com/2017/08/04/ audit-2017-how-well-does-the-uks-media-system-sustain-democratic-politics (accessed 29 November 2017). Walker, D. (2017) This Brexit chaos may be the new norm for Whitehall, The Guardian, 6 December. Woodward, R. (2018) UK governance: from overloading to freeloading, The Political Quarterly 89:1, 56–64.

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6

It is important to note some of the international comparisons and contrasts, thereby placing the contemporary British political themes and developments outlined in this book in some international context. It must be stressed that this is not a comprehensive comparative study outlining common and/or differentiated trends across a variety of national political systems and polities (many books and journals are devoted to this as well as sub-genres in the field like federal, European or regional studies); rather it is an illustration of the way in which some key themes and developments in Britain have important international resonance.

Central state–sub-state relationships As outlined in earlier chapters Britain has traditionally had a relatively centralised political system with weak (or at best centrally controlled via resourcing arrangements) regional and local government. This has changed somewhat post-devolution, with strong – in British terms – devolved government, especially in Scotland, less so in Wales and Northern Ireland but not much at all in England. Constitutional developments have occurred haphazardly (or ‘organically’ as some may describe it) as a result of ‘constitutional moments’ brought about by electoral pressure and/or the management needs of one or other of the UK’s main parties. This was certainly the case with Scottish devolution and with both European referendums in the 1970s and 2016. Britain’s governing system currently has a measure of devolution to reflect a pluri-national state. This devolution of power from the centre

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usually means a stronger centre and weaker sub-state entities than some federal systems. Three interesting comparisons can be found in Spain, Germany and the USA.

Spain Spain, like the UK, has a system of asymmetric devolution. As will be seen below, the Statute of Autonomy gives constitutional underpinning to a range of powers in the Autonomous Regions (Communities). There are 17 Autonomous Communities (Andalusia, Catalonia, Community of Madrid, Valencia, Galicia, Castile and Leon, Basque Country, Castilla-la Mancha, Canary Islands, Region of Murcia, Aragon, Extramadura, Balearic Islands, Asturias, Navarre, Cantabria and La Rioja) but with a very variegated range of competencies, so much so that the description ‘quasi federation’ (Agranoff 2010) requires modification. As for the pluri-nationalism of the state, while many in some parts of Spain would agree with the pluri-national definitions of the state (e.g. in Catalonia and the Basque Country), this does not appear to be universally accepted. As will be seen below, Spanish central government until recently under the leadership of Partido Popular’s (PP) Mariano Rajoy, has focused much more on legality and the ‘indivisibility’ of the Spanish state, especially in its dealings with Catalonia. Two other countries used to illustrate the operation of central–sub-state relationships are unequivocally federal: Germany and the United States.

Germany Germany’s federalism, as a result of its post-war constitution, is very much based on strong regionalism. Before statehood in 1871 ‘German’ had more meaning culturally than politically (at least until 1934 when ‘German’ was used in passports as previously Prussian, Bavarian, Saxon etc. would be used). The federal constitution sets out areas of exclusive federal responsibility (defence, foreign affairs, immigration, transportation, communication and currency standards), shared responsibility between federal government and the Lander (these are: BadenWurttenberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Mecklenberg-Vorpommem, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhine Land-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, SchlieswigHolstein and Thuringia) including civil law, refugees, public welfare, land management, consumer protection, public health, higher education, regional economic development and agricultural reform. There are also

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areas where federal power is restricted. Fiscal responsibilities are shared between federal and Land governments: Lander total tax revenue is about 50 per cent of general government total tax revenue, while Lander autonomous own tax revenue is about 7 per cent of general government total tax revenue (Stegarescu 2005). The governmental-institutional framework indicates the importance and power of Lander. The bi-cameral system gives the Lander important representational clout in the Bundesrat (which is in effect the council of the Lander) and in instances where government action affects the interests of the Lander (e.g. in finance), the Bundesrat has to approve the legislation in question (Lever 2017; Umbach 2002). The importance of the Lander and sub-state politics is underlined by the fact that until Angela Merkel, all German chancellors had been presidents of a Land or were prominent local politicians.

USA By contrast the USA has long had a political debate on ‘state rights’ (especially contentious around the issue of slavery, and later, desegregation) and often with an anti-Washington narrative – either anti-federal government or anti-government per se. The very framing of the American constitution with its division of political power and representation can be seen as designed to constrain government reach, often to counterbalance forces of popular sovereignty. Leading scholarship on the US Constitution puts it thus: The Founders struck this balance by granting the new national government only limited and enumerated powers and leaving the regulation of intrastate commerce to the states. State legislative powers were almost exclusively limited by their own constitutions. Federalism at the Founding can therefore best be described as ‘Enumerated Powers Federalism.’ The national government was conceived as one of limited and enumerated powers. The powers of states were simply everything left over after that enumeration. This is expressed in the first words of Article I, which created Congress: ‘All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.’ The Tenth Amendment reinforces this principle: ‘The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.’ State power, then, was protected not by affirmatively shielding state power, but by limiting the ability of the federal government to act in the first place. (Barnet and Gerken 2016).

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Currently, the pressures to constrain federal power come from those opposed to federal owned and protected land, restricting the rights of those – both individuals and businesses – living in the affected states, often in the Midwest. Somewhat ironically though, federal driven or judicial power is being used to override locally sensitive environmental protection (over gas line construction) and Native American land rights. There are some interesting comparisons on how central state and substate polities hold together, converge and/or diverge. Countries like the US and Australia have systems designed to ensure central state and substate polities operate as independently as possible so the central government has its own capacity at sub-state level to carry out its operations (or else fund the sub-state body to do this) (Dardanelli and Kincaid 2016). Germany provides a contrast to this: even in cases where federal government has responsibility, the actual administration often lies with officials working for the Land (Lever 2017). Germany would clearly be a ‘holding together’ arrangement (to use Stepan’s (1991) concept) as are the classic federations built as unions from previously independent or autonomous parts (e.g. the US, Australia, Canada, Switzerland). However arrangements arising from unitary systems which then decentralise, devolve or federalise can be considered attempts to hold together to prevent centrifugal forces from disaggregating the state – these systems may have disruptive tensions and pressures requiring political will and statecraft to achieve state/sub-state congruence. Examples would be Spain and Belgium. All these present in different ways interesting contrasts or comparisons with the United Kingdom.

United Kingdom Here, a traditional unitary system prevailed yet with considerable autonomy permitted to Scotland since the 1707 Act of Union. The entrenching of devolution to Scotland, with the increased powers of the Scottish Parliament in the 2016 Scotland Act can at one level be thought of as a holding together ‘agreed union’ model. There are though key tension points to be considered before such a bold assertion can be made: the European Union (EU) withdrawal process has caused tensions between Scottish and UK Governments, largely over the extent to which a centralised Westminster controlled government approach is adopted (the same tensions apply with Wales). Beyond the EU issue, the very asymmetrical nature of devolution (with no devolution for England) and the lack of attention given to coordinating mechanisms between devolved and central state legislatures (e.g. joint ministerial committees have rarely

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met except, ironically, for those on EU matters pre-Brexit referendum). Northern Ireland’s devolved Assembly is currently suspended. Rule and funding directly from Westminster are in a sense the ultimate ‘holding together’, though this is hardly sustainable given that those not supporting loyalist parties are unlikely to assent to this over the longer term.

Political parties as brokers in state–sub-state relations Using Canada and the UK, there are some interesting comparisons and contrasts in how political parties can act as brokers in the system of state–sub-state relations. One of these is the territorial concentration of party support. In Canada, the electoral system and the relative dispersion of electors across several provinces means that for parties to have a national majority, they require diffuse support with a majority virtually impossible if support is only concentrated in small territories. Another is inconsistent party identification across Canada, with voters often supporting different parties at provincial and federal elections. Yet another is that the coordination of party organisation across provinces is light (with the exception of the New Democrats (NPD); see Thorlakson 2015). In the UK, the dominance of England in electoral terms (with around 85 per cent of the UK population) means that a UK Government can gain a majority without significant support levels out-with England; this has been a feature of UK politics in much of the 1980s and 1990s and from 2010, though after the 2017 general election the Westminster government requires support from the Northern Irish Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) to sustain a majority. For some years in Scotland there have been examples of voters having different party loyalty at devolved and UK level elections, though since 2008 and the formation of a Scottish National Party (SNP) led government, voter loyalty has started to swing towards some greater congruence to the advantage of the SNP. Most commentators agree that there is a separate and distinct Scottish political system, pre-dating the most recent independence debates (e.g. Cairney 2011; Flinders 2009; Keating 2009; Mitchell 2005); in fact Kellas (1989) indicated distinctiveness many years prior to devolution. As distinctiveness has accelerated, the strong British wide party coordination system (traditionally salient with the Labour Party due to its traditionally strong support in Scotland) has not been able to sensitise itself to the accelerating change in Scottish circumstances and therefore play a brokerage role. This was seen during the 2015 UK general election when Labour’s leader (Ed Miliband) was unwilling to work with the SNP. Corbyn’s Labour leadership has shown little enthusiasm to play the brokerage role either.

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Nationalism(s) There are plenty of ‘nationalisms’ influencing politics to provide comparison and contrast with British developments. Yet despite the force of nationalism, from the self-determination drive of nationalism post-World War One to the negative (and for Europe, disastrous) nationalism of the 1930s, according to some academic authorities, nations and nationalism were not often mainstream concerns of social and political theorists or thinkers for much of the 20th and into the 21st centuries (Ozkirimli 2017), with debate only accelerating at the point of emerging decolonisation struggles in the 1960s. There are some obvious exceptions and indeed some nationalist scholars have stated that nationality is almost an inherent attribute of organised society, with the nation as the most obvious and relevant level of political representation (e.g. Gellner 1983). It is now well accepted that there is a wide diversity of nationalisms. These include ethnic nationalism, based around an ethnic or racial group, civic nationalism premised on values around inclusive citizenship, nationalism based on territorial expansion, nationalist based liberation or anti-colonial movements, pan-nationalism where the ‘nation’ is formed around a cluster of ethnic groupings and cultures (like pan-Slavism or pan-Africanism), cultural nationalism defined around a shared culture and diaspora nationalism of people with a national, ethnic or racial identity but located ‘far from home’ (Anderson 2006). Much will be said later about populism and its overlay with some forms of nationalism. But contemporary instances of nationalism are not difficult to find. Radical right parties – at times xenophobic – have made electoral gains and become key in government or governing coalitions in Europe. In Hungary, President Orban’s electoral power has been premised on hostility to immigration, seeing this as a dilution of Hungary’s native population, while Poland’s Law and Justice Party sees ‘liberal elites’ in other parties standing for pluralism as ‘robbing the people of their own country’ (Muller 2017). More prosperous and comfortable countries have similar parties and political voices ranging from Hofer’s Austrian Freedom Party which narrowly lost the presidential election and is currently in coalition with the more mainstream Austrian People’s Party. Marine Le Pen’s Front Nationale in France had a strong showing in the 2017 French presidential election until the very final stage. In Finland the Finn’s Party was part of the ruling coalition in 2015 and the Sweden Democrats continue to perform strongly electorally, achieving 18 per cent of the popular vote in Sweden’s general election in 2018. There are also strong right wing

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populist voting constituencies in the Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland. Although these parties have their differences, they all have anti-immigration, anti-Islamic strands in their support base. It should be noted that differing conceptions of nationalism and identity as political forces, even those based on ethnic or racial groupings, do not necessarily read over directly to extreme right wing politics. German nationality for instance is defined through the bloodline rather than the place of birth. This can be explained by history: unlike other major European countries (e.g. Britain, France, Spain), Germany has only had geographically defined areas since nationhood in 1871 (and of course these borders changed in the course of the 20th century). German nationality law indicates that a person can only have one nationality – the only form of dual nationality permitted is where one is born with it (with some exceptions for those non-Germans who have nationality in another country which permits dual nationality); Chancellor Schroeder’s attempt to introduce a dual nationality bill in 1999 experienced strong public opposition and had to be withdrawn (Lever 2017). The concept of British nationalism is not well articulated. In Scotland, nationalism has been defined politically and culturally with a residential citizens based rights approach (civic nationalism). In England, a variety of conceptions have recently been highlighted and debated (see e.g. Kenny 2014) but there continues to be a conflation of English nationalism with notions of England, Britain and the UK. As for an underlying narrative for British nationalism, there is no real consensus on what this is or might be. The ‘imagined community’ of the ‘anglosphere’ appears to have a historical narrative, indeed often a sense of loss, but little cohesion with the present or future trajectory of the nation. Nigel Farage, ex-leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), who would consider himself a British nationalist, has a backward reflecting perspective, stating in a recent interview ‘Britain lost the Second World War because the nation had been bankrupted . . . our big imperial possessions started to disappear . . . we were the ones who lost everything’ (cited in Elgot 2018).

Pluri-national states: the cases of Britain–Scotland, Spain–Catalonia Within pluri-national states with different national identities some interesting comparisons exist, none more so than how the state and sub-state entities face each other. An interesting comparison is Spain and Catalonia on the one hand and Britain and Scotland on the other.

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The relevant conceptions of nationalism to define Scotland and Catalonia would be civic and cultural nationalism. Both nations have elements of both, arguably Scotland more civic than cultural, Catalonia the reverse. Civic nationalism can be thought of as a political identity built around shared citizenship in a liberal or social democratic state. Civic nationalism tends not to be defined by its language or culture but its political institutions and liberal principles (Stilz 2009). Membership of the nation is open to everyone within its geographical boundaries who shares these values. Like cultural nationalism it is a non-xenophobic form of nationalism compatible with liberal values of freedom, tolerance, equality and individual rights, tracing its origins to 19th century philosophers like Mill ([1861] 2001) and Renan ([1882] 1990). With cultural nationalism, the nation is defined by a shared culture and (usually) distinctive language, though not ethnicity or race (Neilson 1999). Catalonia has invested considerable time and resource from the last decades of the 20th century to nation build via the linguistic and cultural promotion of an already historically distinct (from other parts of Spain) identity, including codification of a national Catalan dictionary and immersion language teaching. There are elements of civic nationalism too through the promotion of representative institutions (e.g. Parliament de Catalunya) and the attempt to align with European (and EU) institutional values and norms in parallel with the Spanish state, albeit with little support and at times hostility from the state. While Scotland has a distinct culture especially in literature, music and other art forms, Scotland’s nationalist (SNP) government has not used language as a cultural or national marker. The vast majority of Scotland’s population speak English; the Gaelic language though promoted by the SNP and previous Labour led governments in the devolved Parliament is very much a minority language (with native speakers concentrated in the Hebrides and including some former islanders and descendents located elsewhere in Scotland) and likely to remain so and recognised as such; the other non-English language is the Doric, found in the north east of Scotland, but of even less significance in the linguistic mainstream than Gaelic. Although there is provision for Gaelic medium schools, a Gaelic broadcasting channel and joint English/Gaelic road and transport signage, language does not have the same significance as a nationalist or nation building project as it does in Catalonia (or for that matter amongst a larger section of the population in Northern Ireland). Rather, nationalists’ initiatives have been around Scotland’s representative institutions enhancing the powers of the Scottish Parliament or progressing the political-institutional independence of the Scottish Parliament and other Scottish institutions from the UK state.

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The greatest contrast is in the way these sub-nations’ respective states have tried to manage the politics of pluri-nationalism. In the case of Spain, recent history (that is in the last 70–100 years) has seen very disruptive relationships between Spain and Catalonia. Like other parts of Spain (notably the Basque Country) there was considerable hostility shown by the Francoist forces during the civil war and the Spanish government led by him. In Catalonia the president of the Catalan government during the civil war was tortured and executed by Franco in 1940. After the restoration of democracy in the 1970s there was an Autonomy Statute established for all regions, renegotiated in 2003 and again in 2010. With the 2003 and 2010 Statutes, disagreement between Spanish and Catalan governments has tended to be stronger (at state level) with the Partido Popular (whether in opposition or in government), a party with some lineage to the Francoist regime. Statutes of Autonomy display an asymmetric relationship between state and regions and this has been a major point of contention in Catalonia (for a summary of the diversity and asymmetries across Spain, see Appendix 7). It has considerably less power (e.g. over fiscal matters including tax raising) than the Basques (a comparator region/nation) do and especially after the global financial crash in 2008, Catalonia – the richest autonomous region outside Madrid, the state capital – has aired the fact that it pays considerable sums it raises through taxation to Spain’s central government, receiving considerably less in resource flows back from the centre. The current situation, still unresolved at the time of writing, is that the Catalan government’s independence referendum call of 2017 which was declared unconstitutional and illegal, therefore delegitimising the result (in favour of independence), saw a symbolic use of force by Spanish troops stationed in a large ship off shore, seizing ballot boxes then the exiling (in some cases incarcerating) of government and political leaders (including the Catalan president), threatening criminal charges on return to Spain with prosecution carrying potentially very lengthy custodial sentences. Added to vocal support for this action from the Spanish monarch, this was an unedifying scene for a democracy. Whatever the short term outcome, this is unlikely to produce a sustainable way of managing the politics of a pluri-national state. The British–Scottish case is somewhat different. From the mid-18th century there has not been political hostility between Scotland and the British state; Scotland was very much part of the union project, with Scottish economic and business interests both contributing to and benefitting from the growth of British imperial ambitions. These joint interests ranged from managing the slave trade, tobacco, sugar and cotton production to growing industrialisation of the economy and a wide range of British military and empire building activities until well into the

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20th century. The British state’s response to political pressure in Scotland for greater political autonomy has been one of reacting to pressure and going some way towards Scottish accommodation, from the granting of referendums (1970s and 1990s) to the post-referendum creation of a Scottish Parliament in 1999; and after an independence referendum in 2014 the promise, in return for a ‘no’ vote, giving the Scottish Parliament enhanced powers through legislation in 2016. The flow of resources between the central British state and Scotland was a salient issue prior to the 1970s referendum on political devolution, with the discovery and commencement of oil and gas production from the North Sea off Scotland, resulting in significant revenues flowing directly to the UK Treasury (‘It’s Scotland’s Oil’ was a nationalist political slogan of the time). This however was less of an issue in subsequent campaigns and referendums, with economic arguments – especially in the 2014 independence referendum – becoming more nuanced on political and fiscal terms, especially around future currency arrangements in an independent Scotland. The obvious contrast with the Spanish–Catalan case then is that the UK state has opted for a political solution, although like Spain, Britain holds the legal and constitutional power at the centre (the constitution is considered a reserved matter in the UK’s devolution legislation). For example, the UK Parliament temporarily ceded to the Scottish Parliament the right to hold a legally binding referendum on independence in 2014, which the government of Spain resolutely refuses to do in Catalonia, claiming this goes against the letter and spirit of the Spanish constitution. However, though the contrast in approach between Spain and Britain is clear, there are tensions in the politically accommodative approach Britain has adopted, surfacing over the EU withdrawal process. The SNP government believes the Brexit referendum and resulting events have given them the political legitimacy to hold an independence referendum, on the grounds that: 1) the EU referendum resulted in a significant remain majority in Scotland, though the UK wide vote means the UK government is pursuing withdrawal; 2) the Brexit referendum result presents ‘materially changed circumstances’ from the 2014 independence referendum (which voted ‘no’), which the SNP manifesto prior to the 2016 Holyrood election claimed would justify another referendum; and 3) there has been a failure to reach an agreement on how repatriated EU powers in areas of devolved competencies would be handed down from Westminster to Holyrood. The situation in 2018 is that Holyrood has approved legislation for another independence referendum and presented this to the UK Government; the latter’s position is ‘not now’ – so conceivably this could lead to a legal-constitutional impasse, making political accommodation less likely going forward than hitherto.

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Aspects of political alignment and realignment Questions of political (re)alignment in the most western democracies have considerable currency and many of the pertinent issues form much of this book’s content. In some respects this may amount to a reimagining of democratic politics which has a number of interrelated elements including: very significant decline in support bases of major political parties, especially a reduction in working class support for left of centre parties; broad consensus since the 1980s and 1990s among mainstream parties of the left and right on pro-market policies (with light touch or self-regulation), global trade and concomitant international trading arrangements; post-financial crash, the prevalence of fiscal consolidation and austerity programmes slanted towards a conservative-right agenda; some reconfiguration of voting behaviour with younger, more educated, metropolitan city based voters trending towards the left, and older people and those living in suburban and rural areas towards the conservative right. There are a number of important contextual factors including the apparent inability of democracies to deliver on promises made or beliefs popularly held, and especially with regard to EU countries and the EU, the indirect nature of representative democracy, with the ‘constrained’ democratic nature of some EU political institutions. It is suggested by a range of commentators that all this provides the groundwork for the growth of populist politics (e.g. see Muller 2017; Richards 2017; Achen and Bartels 2016; Norris 2016).

Decline in support base, particularly from the working class, for centre left parties In the 2017 federal elections in Germany the Social Democratic party (SPD) secured just over 20 per cent of the popular vote, its worst since 1945 and its fourth Bundestag defeat in a row. In the Netherlands, France, Austria and Spain centre left parties have shown similar declines since the early 2000s, though the Socialist Party in Portugal’s and Labour in Britain’s most recent elections have run counter to this trend. In 2017 only one quarter of the working class vote went to the SPD in Germany; this has been a developing picture for a number of years with the SPD losing working class votes to both left (Die Linke) and right (AfD). Chapter 2 showed a similar decline in working class support for Labour in Britain, with non-voting from the working class electorate significant. Similar trends can be seen in US politics: voter participation

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in Congressional elections from 1947–1949 to 2015 declined from 48 to 42 per cent; in the 2014 Congressional elections non-voters numbered 128 million adults (i.e. a majority of eligible voters) – the vast majority of these middle–lower income working class electors (US Election Project 2016).

Broad policy consensus and lack of differentiation between mainstream parties The broad policy consensus of Conservatives and New Labour in economic and fiscal policy has been well documented, at times almost appearing as a conventional wisdom. In Britain this made it difficult for Labour, as a traditional social democratic party having some affinity with redistributive policies favouring its support base, to headline such ideals, even when there were policies in place to achieve such policy ends. For example, Gordon Brown and Tony Blair’s tax credit policies favouring lower income people in work have been described as redistribution by stealth, lest ‘middle England’ would be unimpressed (Richards 2017). A similar inability to claim political credit for a range of policies has been identified with the SPD in Germany, who for much of the 2000s were in coalition with Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) (Bremer 2017). In particular given the medium to long term convergence of centre left and centre right economic, trade and fiscal policies, the post-2008 global financial crisis environment has made it difficult for left of centre parties to articulate a differentiated policy from mainstream parties of the right. The situation is somewhat different in the US where a political cleavage has opened but not in a way directly recognisable in European politics. President Obama’s support for an international open trading regime, typified by support for the TransPacific Partnership (TPP), was not in fact enthusiastically supported by Democrats in the Senate or House (in fact 70 per cent in the Senate and over 80 per cent in the House opposed giving Obama fast track authority to negotiate the TPP); yet hostility to open international trading became a key rallying point around Trump and the Republicans’ campaign in 2016, and the vow to represent ‘forgotten Americans’ was undoubtedly a factor in Democratic losses to Republicans in some key locations. There is strong evidence that perceptions of the Democrats’ failure to address wider concerns of the US economy beyond initial banking rescue and support for large corporations (e.g. in the car industry) lost them voter loyalty from much of their usual support base from 2010 (Greenberg 2017).

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Political configuration around metropolitan location, education and age Considerably more research is required around the importance of these factors as key identifiers of political allegiance. Certainly, and most recently, in Britain, these have been shown to be important determinants of electoral behaviour. In the Brexit referendum, age and education as well as location were all shown to be as important as more conventionally accepted socio-economic indicators. While this was less dramatic in the 2017 general election it was still an important overlay on exclusively socio-economic explanations (with younger, more educated, more metropolitan based voting more for left parties). Evidence can be cited internationally to show that rural vs urban/metropolitan liberal, age and level of education are key divides explaining left and right political support. For some time now US politics has seen large coastal states on the east and west of the country with large globally successful metropolitan areas (typified by New York and California) trending to the Democrats and landlocked Midwestern and Southern states being more Republican. This trend has more explanatory value than socio-economic background as an indicator of left/right political allegiance. In the 2016 presidential election, those who were less advantaged and relatively isolated from metropolitan global economic growth supported Trump: he carried white voters without a college degree by 37 point majorities in Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania (CNN 2017). Although Clinton won the popular vote nationally (by about 2 million votes), 1.5 million of that was accounted for by her margin over Trump in New York County; majorities in the coastal states of California and New York by themselves accounted for more than her majority (New York Times 2016). There are other international comparators. At the last general election in Spain, the PP lost 50 per cent of its youth vote with 20 per cent of those over 65 stating they would always vote for the PP. The PP was strongest in central and north west Spain, especially in the countryside. Socialist and leftist parties (especially Podemos) had successes in cities like Barcelona and Madrid at local and national elections (Balfour 2015). In Austria’s presidential election of December 2017, Alexander Van der Bellin, the Green candidate, triumphed narrowly over Norbert Hofer of the far right Freedom Party after getting a majority in Austria’s ten largest cities, with Hofer winning most of the rural districts. The support base for Marine Le Pen’s Front Nationale is similar. However, this entire area requires more research, for example, research into the extent to which older demographics and those out-with metropolitan areas are kicking back against media driven modernistic social trends

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perceived to be leaving them behind; and into the extent to which some of this is may be superficial or episodic, the voting alignment may change again – as seems to have occurred to some degree in the first general election in Britain after the Brexit referendum. It may also be the case that a country’s representation-electoral system favours rural areas and/or specific demographics. For example rural over representation is the case in Spain. The over representation argument can be made for England too, where boundary changes, if implemented, reduce the number of metropolitan members of parliament (MPs) (particularly in London) to the advantage of rural-suburban areas. In addition, large metropolitan areas with higher numbers of young people and more transient demographics tend to have lower electoral registration proportions (therefore reduced voter eligibility) than other parts of the country. Government policies and resourcing priorities may favour or privilege certain areas or groups. For example in many Latin American countries (e.g. Argentina) voters in outlying provinces receive massive cash transfers from the federal government even in years of fiscal challenge (Ocantes et al. 2014). Some countries too have taken the choice to protect income levels of pensioners above others (e.g. Britain). In such cases, voting in a certain way may be rational choice rather than ideological affinity. Finally, a country’s political system may have regional or sub-state dimensions which impact the metropolitan, age, education identifiers. These may overlay, interact with, underplay or indeed diminish the effect of such identifiers. For example, in Catalonia and Scotland the national or independence issue remains dominant, and in the case of Scotland, city location, age and level of education have some limited explanatory value when analysing political allegiance. In Northern Ireland, loyalist and nationalist affinities remain a key driving force in political support – yet even here, surveys indicate that younger people who support loyalist parties strongly oppose the outlying socially conservative views of these same loyalist parties on issues like same sex partnerships and abortion.

Inability of democracies to fulfil promises Pluralist democracies operate on the assumption not so much that winner takes all, but that the winning party or coalition forming a government through legitimately fought elections has the right to take authoritative decisions; the losers give their consent in the knowledge that they will win at some point in the future. There is some evidence that this idea has been diluted. The decline in electoral turnout and

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particularly in working class turnout in support for left of centre parties (see e.g. Evans and Tilley 2017) has been evident in a number of western democracies and this has been explained in terms of a belief that the electoral system is not performing for this voter group. There is a wider argument here about the impression that the promises of democracy are not being fulfilled for a large part of the population (Muller 2017). Or indeed, promises are being made (either officially or tacitly, the ‘folk theory of democracy’) that cannot be fulfilled (Achen and Bartels 2016). One such might be that ‘each generation will be better off than the preceding one’, held by many to be a truism, simply because it has occurred in the past few generations, but which is under strain at the moment due to issues of intergenerational wealth and significant structural changes in labour market conditions and associated public policies. System disillusion has been accentuated by the aftermath of the financial crash where parties have been seen as powerless and/or failing to tell the truth about what they can do. For example, UK Chancellor George Osborne’s claim to wipe out the deficit within one parliament was to say the least highly ambitious – and was then quietly dropped; at the same time the main opposition led by Ed Miliband refused to commit to more countercyclical spending, fearing accusations of irresponsibility (Richards 2017). Whether Labour’s rather different plans at present (including infrastructure spend, a greater role for the state in areas like transport, housing and student debt), if elected to government, would be implemented is a matter for speculation. The same point, about unfilled promises (at least in the short to medium term), has been made about some claims made by advocates of ‘leave’ during the Brexit referendum (see Chapters 4 and 7).

The context of populism Much of the above provides a context for understanding the growth of populism. In Europe especially Britain, EU institutions are also an important factor. EU institutions are not directly elected, with the exception of the European Parliament. However, even this body could best be described as operating in an environment of constrained democracy, at best sharing power (through co-decision making post-Lisbon Treaty) with the Commission (appointed) and Council of Ministers (representing their respective national interests). This clearly modifies ‘first principles’ of democratic accountability at national or popular levels – and of course was conceived and born as such in the wake of World War Two. In challenging situations therefore tensions can arise

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over ‘national democratic’ versus ‘European technocratic or unaccountable supra-national body’. Much of the eurozone currency crisis or immigration pressures have taken on this tone. Significantly many of the populist criticisms have been of the eurozone (e.g. from the AfD in Germany and the Five Star Movement and the League, formerly Northern League, in Italy) rather than the EU itself, though there is a dynamic which could tip political argument to a more direct criticism of the EU, especially over the issue of immigration from non-EU countries. In the UK, criticism of the EU by leading leave supporters, some of whom could be described as populist to a greater or lesser extent, privileges arguments of direct UK national sovereignty (pitched against the EU and its institutions) over and above economic, business or technocratic issues.

Key features of populism The chapter will conclude by outlining some of the key features of populism, with some international illustrations, and will then add some brief comments about the extent of populism in Britain. At the present time in Europe and the US, populism has tended to be right wing, suffused with exclusionary rather than civic notions of nationalism and with a conception of who the ‘real actors’ are in the nation, with the implication that others are ‘less real’, less important or even considered to be ‘the other’. There is also a notion of the importance of the ‘leader’ and how he or she can embody the aspirations of the ‘real people’. This conception has not always been an entirely accurate way of describing populism. For example in the USA from the 1890s a progressivist movement primarily of farmers, later supported by those against big business and the ‘robber barons’, large railroad owners, bankers and others ‘acting against the interests of the people’, was suffused more with notions of popular sovereignty, though there were shades of opinion more nativist than progressive, including the ‘Know Nothing’ party’s anti-Catholicism within the populist cause. Nonetheless there was a serious candidate for president (William Jennings Bryan) espousing this progressive populism (Postel 2007; Kazin 1998; Canovan 1981). However, currently in America as well as in Europe it is not difficult to illustrate some outlines of the contemporary measures of populism. ‘America First’ encapsulates nationalistic views of America, excluding at least some immigrants, especially the most numerous group from Mexico and central America, notions of support for ‘real forgotten Americans’ – lightly coded language for white Americans. Policy to date has followed a right wing

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agenda, especially with tax cuts (although these apply to all income groups, only corporate and those wealthier tax payers receive cuts which are not time limited), healthcare reform and some areas of welfare and social spending. ‘America First’ also underlies presidential action on increasing tariffs on a range of imported goods, though the impact of this on the economy and the American population is unclear. It remains to be seen if Trump’s promised large scale infrastructure spend materialises and if it provides policy outcomes more associated with centrist politics. The president clearly embodies notions of the ‘populist leader’, with an unprecedented churn of personalities at the centre of executive political power. Examples of populism in the politics of Europe are not difficult to find. Most populist parties have restrictive policies on immigration from beyond Europe – restricting movement within the EU is difficult given the conditions of single market membership. Hungary under the presidency of Viktor Orban, Poland under the governing Law and Justice Party, France’s Front Nationale, Germany’s AfD and others all have hostile attitudes to immigration; in particular immigrants from Islamic countries are often depicted as diluting existing national interests. Orban’s government in Hungary has challenged the ability of non-governmental organisations to operate in the country, seeing these as a threat to his elected government. In both Hungary and Poland the governments have opposed post-Communist liberal elites, accusing them of subverting ‘the nation’ in favour of an open liberal society rather than supporting the nation and promoting cultural nationalism (see Muller 2017). In some instances (e.g. in Poland with the governing Law and Justice Party) the power of the judiciary has been limited in order that it conforms more readily with the governing party’s conception of the nation and where power should lie. On the left–right axis of politics and policy, the position is somewhat more nuanced. In Poland and Hungary both governments have openly criticised the power of German economic interests and have used this in a form of anti-capitalist rhetoric (see Muller 2017); Le Pen in France has proclaimed a policy of more generous social transfers for the French working class and in Denmark the populist Danish People’s Party has similar policies.

Populism in Britain Finally some very brief comments can be made on the extent of populism in Britain. There is a need for some circumspection here in that the party

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most easily associated with populism in Britain, UKIP, has had an almost total focus on leaving the EU and it may be the case that its current electoral diminution reflects the fact that its objective was achieved in the Brexit referendum result. The party has had a recognisable media personality in leader in Nigel Farage (having now resigned permanently after two periods as leader); other leaders have been short lived, unsuccessful and in some instances mired in scandal and fractious relationships with party members. The party’s position is difficult to define, though given the background of leading financial supporters (e.g. Aaron Banks, a wealthy insurance entrepreneur) and others, likely to be right wing. Started by academics (like AfD in Germany) it has not had a coherent policy on fiscal and tax matters, the National Health Service (NHS) (very important politically in Britain) or most other policy areas except the EU and immigration. Based on a large survey in 2014, those most likely to vote UKIP were those self-identifying as ‘very or fairly right wing’, working class voters who had previously voted Conservative and men over the age of 60; those least likely to vote UKIP were those earning over £30,000 a year, university graduates and voters under the age of 40 (YouGov 2014). However, UKIP is likely to have had an impact on the Brexit referendum. Its greatest electoral success ironically was becoming the second largest UK party in the European Parliament elections in 2014 and this is generally thought to have emboldened (or frightened) significant numbers of Conservative MPs to adopt an anti-EU, pro-referendum position (Shipman 2016). Although UKIP at the time eschewed some extreme anti-immigration feeling, the nationalistic tone of some of the Brexit referendum debate, in particular the poster of Nigel Farage heading (and presumably stopping) queuing migrants wishing to enter Britain with the headline ‘Breaking point. The EU has failed us all’, led to anti-immigration feeling amongst some and a rise in race related incidents in the aftermath of the result. Alternatively, more recent research based on an analysis covering two time points (2010 and 2015 and based on British Election Studies) concludes that UKIP has positioned itself as the only electorally viable option for British extreme right voters, while also making serious inroads into more traditional Conservative voters who are Eurosceptic but not extreme. The research argues that this bridging position between mainstream and extreme makes UKIP distinctive from other British parties and has parallels with anti-establishment parties elsewhere in Europe (Widfeldt and Brandenburg 2018). The moot point is not the direct impact of a populist party, which currently has very little electoral support, but the impact it may have on mainstream parties; a range of interesting research is now appearing on this too (e.g. Pirro and Taggart 2018).

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Arguably, other aspects of populism can be identified in British politics. Anti-elitism has been a clarion call against political elites (or in the US, the ‘Washington Swamp’, often used by the Trump election campaign). A form of this was evident, again during the Brexit referendum, when a leading leave supporter, Conservative MP Michael Gove, stated that the British people had had quite enough of experts; a rather odd or disingenuous statement from a recent education secretary. Some other evidence of populism having impact on British politics also exists, from Nigel Farage’s ‘victory for the real people’ after the Brexit referendum result was declared, to Conservative MP and EU leave supporter Jacob Rees-Mogg in May 2018 claiming that the House of Lords amendment to the EU Withdrawal Bill (to enable Parliament to reject and suggest renegotiation of the final exit deal between the UK and the EU) was acting against ‘the people’; again, like the former education secretary’s case cited above, this was rather odd from someone supporting EU withdrawal on the grounds of enhancing UK parliamentary sovereignty. So evidence of populism in British politics seems to be concentrated on the EU issue and related to this immigration. The related right–left nexus is placed quite markedly on the right, with the leading arguments of those most enthusiastic about leaving Europe more aligned with a national neoliberalism than with the left (Mason 2017). All that said, although elements of populism can be seen, it would not be accurate to suggest populism is at the moment a main current in UK politics. It is difficult to imagine Gove, Rees-Mogg and others as populists out-with the European issue. There is no over-riding ‘nation ideology’ (difficult in a pluri-national state) or labelling of ‘the other’, as found in other populist environments, though immigration policy has the potential to lead this way. There is no attempt to reformulate the independent judicial system (despite ‘judges versus the people’ headlines from sections of the anti-EU press), nor to diminish or attack the role of civil society organisations. And the position that populist ideology gives to strong leaders is nowhere on the horizon of British politics.

Summary of key chapter themes • Relationship between state and sub-state bodies in a variety of federal and other settings. This theme is illustrated in Chapters 1, 2, 3, 5, and the concluding chapter; • Different varieties of nationalism. This theme is addressed in the concluding chapter;

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• Political alignment and realignment across a range of countries. The themes here are addressed in Chapter 2; • Disengagement with mainstream political parties. This theme is addressed in Chapter 2 and the Brexit referendum chapter (Chapter 4); • Features and examples of populism, its international traction; British politics and populism. This is addressed in Chapter 2.

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Thorlakson, L. (2015) Multi level party systems, Proceedings of Royal Society of Edinburgh Joint Event With Royal Society of Canada on Constitutional Change in Canada and UK. Challenges to Devolution and Federalism, 15 September. Umbach, M. (2002) German Federalism: Past, Present and Future. London: Palgrave. US Election Project (2016) United States Election Project, www.electproject. org/2016g (accessed 2 March 2018). Widfeldt, A. and Brandenburg, H. (2018) What kind of party is the UK Independence Party? The future of the extreme right or just another Tory Party?, Political Studies 66:3, 577–600. YouGov (2014) Where UKIP gets its support, https://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/ 02/24/where-ukip-gets-its-support/ (accessed 12 December 2016).

7

UK departure from the EU case study

Introduction and overview Britain as a leading European power By any reckoning, Britain’s departure from the European Union (EU) is of great significance for both the UK and the EU. In 2016 the gross domestic product (GDP) of the EU was €14,800 billion; half of this was generated by three countries (Germany, UK and France), 16 per cent by the UK (see Table 7.1). The UK is also a significant player in defence and security matters and like other EU countries is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Table 7.1 Share of ten leading EU countries in EU GDP (2016) Country

% of EU GDP

Germany UK France Italy Spain Netherlands Sweden Poland Belgium Austria

21.1 16.0 15.0 11.3 7.5 4.7 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.4

Source: Eurostat (2017)

148  UK departure from the EU case study Table 7.2  Comparative defence spending of UK, France and Germany (2016) Country

% national GDP spent on defence

Total defence spending (US$)

UK France Germany

2.1 1.8 1.2

56.2 billion 46.8 billion 36.7 billion

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (2016)

Organization (NATO). It has traditionally had a global defence role with strong security and intelligence linkages with the US and, along with France, has a nuclear weapons capacity and permanent membership of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. UK defence spending is significant amongst EU members both in cash terms and as a proportion of GDP (see Table 7.2). However, in some significant areas, the UK has been somewhat out of step with significant developments in the EU. In addition to its various opt outs in several areas of legislative and regulatory activity, the greatest of these is Britain’s absence from the single currency, the euro. Although Britain is not the only EU member not in the single currency, many of the others have a legal obligation to join (e.g. Poland and Hungary) or else have their monetary policy linked closely to the European Central Bank (ECB) (e.g. Denmark and Sweden). The UK has not been a participant in debates about whether the euro should be the single currency for the entire EU – as outlined by Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker or the French idea (recently espoused by President Macron) of a hierarchy, with an inner core in the eurozone (driven by Germany and France) and an outer core of non-eurozone members, thereby establishing the principle of moving resources between the core states for fiscal and banking purposes. All this is compounded by the fact that the UK should logically have a key role in these debates since London is the financial centre of euro denominated financial activity – giving a highly anomalous situation where a key instrument (the jewel some would say) of the EU (the Single Market) is to a great extent financially facilitated by a country which is not a member of the eurozone and furthermore is now negotiating its departure from the EU itself (Thompson 2018).

Brexit within and beyond the EU Brexit clearly has resonance within the EU and beyond, which is not to say there is a cause–effect or isomorphic relationship. The referendum

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result in large parts of the UK was seen in some measure as a rebuttal of mainstream politics with elements of right wing populism and, in parts of England (as shown in Chapter 6) an expression of nationalism. This has had some similarities – though there are significant differences – with the success of Donald Trump in the US presidential election in the same year as the Brexit referendum. There are linkages and connections, sometimes informal, between key figures in the successful Brexit and presidential campaigns: one of the earliest photo opportunities after Trump’s election was a smiling Nigel Farage with the newly elected president in Trump Tower (with Farage touted somewhat ridiculously by UK tabloid media – and himself – as a potential UK ambassador to the US). Within Europe there has been a similar growth in support for right wing populist parties (as indicated in Chapter 6), with Steve Bannon a former adviser to Trump and key figure in the ‘alt right’ in the US having a supporting presence for right wing populists, most recently for the League in Italian elections. Notably in Europe this populism, though nationalistic in tone, has not consistently attempted to articulate around an anti-EU position per se, though hostility to the EU’s policies on immigration has been commonplace. In mainstream EU politics, Brexit of course resonates. EU negotiators are clear in their view that the UK’s exit deal must not ‘cherry pick’, for example establishing a favourable trade deal with the EU without bearing regulatory and other costs and burdens of such market access, lest this gives incentive to others. EU countries have shown solidarity with this negotiating position.

The impact of Brexit on UK politics There has been impact too on the UK’s body politic. There are strains between the devolved governments (especially Scotland and Wales) and UK Government over the issue of transfer of EU competencies to Westminster rather than to Holyrood or Cardiff, and more generally over lack of consultation and involvement in the negotiating process. This is compounded in the case of Scotland which voted to remain in the EU by a substantial majority and which has a government with a parliamentary mandate to hold a referendum on Scottish independence. There have been issues too over parliamentary sovereignty, about the extent to which the executive and Cabinet should control the process or be subject to parliamentary oversight – including a scrutiny role by the House of Lords. One of the ironies is that many of those strongest in support of Brexit argued on the grounds of UK parliamentary sovereignty, yet many of the same individuals have urged that the executive drive the process,

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citing the referendum majority for leave as support for their case, in a sense this over-riding full parliamentary scrutiny and sovereignty. In reality of course many supporting this view do so in the knowledge that pressurising a divided Cabinet is likely to yield more results (from their perspective) than permitting the legislature a stronger role, given that majority support for a ‘hard’ Brexit or ‘no deal’ with the EU does not appear to exist in the UK Parliament. Finally there are effects within political parties. The Conservative Party is deeply divided. Calling the Brexit referendum was seen by David Cameron as a way of managing party politics and reducing the impact of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) on the Conservative vote. The referendum result and subsequent developments may have taken away UKIP’s immediate raison d’être for the time being and led to its electoral wipeout, but it has not led to the EU being eliminated as a toxic issue for the party, notably at its most senior level, with some clearly having leadership ambitions as their key driver. David Cameron is no longer there, having resigned shortly after the referendum, and the leader and Prime Minister Theresa May was a ‘silent remainer’ during the referendum. She called a general election in May 2017, hoping for an increased majority to give her personal legitimacy and a more unified party and country behind her in the upcoming negotiations with the EU. She got neither: no overall majority, only able to form a government due to a deal with the 10 Democratic Unionist members of parliament (MPs) from Northern Ireland, a weakened position in her Cabinet, attempting to hold it together with no clear consensus on its negotiating position with the EU and enough potentially rebel Conservative backbench MPs to make it difficult at times to guarantee a majority in the Commons. That said, despite some predictions, her government has not fallen and despite an openly divided Cabinet, some of whom have broken the spirit if not the letter of collective responsibility, the Conservatives are neck and neck in the polls with Labour. It is unclear if the White Paper of July 2018, now Cabinet policy (having led initially to the resignations of two senior ministers), will provide sustained Cabinet unity as the UK–EU negotiations over an exit deal continue. Labour has also been impacted by Brexit. Jeremy Corbyn has historically been sceptical if not opposed to the EU, seeing this as a barely democratic construct operating more in the interests of corporate and financial bodies than for the population as a whole. He voted remain in the referendum but did not take a leading position in the campaign. Labour’s position therefore has been to agree to exiting the EU since this reflects the majority position in the referendum, while supporting a postBrexit access to EU markets, some controls on immigration and the

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maintenance of employee rights and other regulatory protections currently provided by EU membership. The trades union official position is strongly in favour of market access and other arrangements which will protect jobs. While Labour’s position is not to support a second referendum on the terms of the negotiated deal with the EU (though the leadership wishes ‘to keep all options on the table’), some in the parliamentary party strongly support this. Opinion polls suggest that Labour Party members are strongly in favour of the party having greater consultation on Brexit (consistent with consultations in other policy areas) and are generally thought to be more in favour of the EU (especially in London and other big cities) than the leadership. However, traditional Labour voting areas, especially those in the north of England experiencing challenges of deindustrialisation, returned strong leave majorities in the referendum and, contrary to trends elsewhere in the 2017 general election, some of these areas saw swings to the Conservatives (see Chapter 2). Therefore Labour too has challenges posed by Brexit. The Liberal Democrats, though small in number, have few internal party problems, having been consistently pro-EU for some time. In some senses, despite party unity, debate on Europe has bypassed the Lib Dems. The party supports a second referendum, but while opinion polls appear to be shifting somewhat towards the Lib Dems in some areas, this appears to have little to do with Europe. The Scottish National Party (SNP) is the third largest party at Westminster with 35 seats, but can only have impact there if its voting block is combined with the opposition. However it is the largest and the governing party in Holyrood and the impact of Brexit on the SNP can be seen there. The SNP claims that the Brexit referendum result in Scotland (62 per cent remain) against the UK government’s mandate to leave (52 per cent over the UK as a whole voted leave) represents a ‘material change’ to the circumstances pertaining to when Scotland’s independence referendum returned a majority vote to stay part of the UK (55 per cent ‘no’ to independence), on the grounds that a vote for ‘no’ was stated by all the pro-‘no’ parties (Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat) to be a major requirement for Scotland to remain in the EU. Subsequently, Holyrood has voted in favour of an independence referendum but this has been rejected ‘for the time being’ by the UK Government. In addition the SNP government has been in disagreement with the UK Government over the return of EU legislative competencies in devolved areas and lack of consultation between the UK and Scottish Governments. While the SNP has been remarkably united in its strong criticism of the UK Government’s negotiating position to exit the EU, preferring single market and customs union membership (with only a very small and

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marginalised number of SNP figures opposing this), the first minister has had pause for thought. Up to one third of SNP supporters are thought to have voted for Brexit; some in the SNP wish for another independence referendum sooner rather than later; and the opinion polls in favour of independence have moved very little since the 2014 result.

The broad strategies of the EU and the UK in the withdrawal process The EU’s approach From the early stages, the EU has shown a determination to control the negotiation process and timetable. For example, once the UK had triggered the Article 50 process (i.e. the clause in the EU’s Lisbon Treaty which outlines the process for a member country to commence withdrawal from the Union), Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief negotiator, was determined to ensure that the UK could not unilaterally suspend or stop the process and then restart it in order to extend talks. His intensive lobbying of EU institutions appears to have been successful (see Boffey 2017), though it is a moot point whether the UK prime minister would have been able to do this given the divisions in her own party. There is also some evidence that the EU has attempted to exclude the UK from any sensitive trade talks with other countries (e.g. with Australia) lest UK and EU interests may differ as withdrawal approaches (Beesley and Parker 2017). The EU strategy is clearly and unexpectedly driven by the need to disincentivise others who may wish to emulate Britain and leave. The EU therefore does not wish to concede to an easy or over generous deal; some in the UK Government have gone further and claimed that this translates into a need to punish Britain (Oltermann 2018). The EU has been remarkably united behind the process, despite some deep divisions in significant policy areas between member states (e.g. on immigration) and successful in early process gains, for example in agreeing the principle of UK’s ongoing payments post-membership prior to commencement of trade discussions, support of Ireland’s position on border and trade controls, and some commitments from the UK on EU citizen rights. However, the EU has some key vulnerabilities evident at the early stages of negotiations. For instance the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework covering the budgets from 2021–2027 will be missing around €94 billion from British contributions while at the same time the European Commission has a draft plan envisaging increased expenditure and overall contributions. This has not been universally supported

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by member states and in addition it is proposed at the same time to cut the cohesion budget which adversely impacts Eastern European states (Thompson 2018). It appears that the UK has not been able to lever advantage from this potential vulnerability, for example by gaining support for a generous UK contribution in return for highly favourable arrangements in other areas.

The UK’s approach The British Government’s strategy has been difficult to discern, until the publication of the July 2018 White Paper, except for the fact that there has been a consistent attempt to control the process by the executive arm of government, particularly Downing Street – difficult though this is, given Cabinet divisions and voluble Brexit voices within the Conservative Party. Theresa May’s call for a general election in 2017, despite already having a working majority, was partly to give her personal electoral legitimacy (since she fell heir to party leadership and prime ministerial appointment after Cameron’s rapid departure, without a general election or indeed an election by Conservative Party members) but also – as she openly stated – to give her a larger majority to serve as a political statement to strengthen her negotiating hand with Brussels. This seemed a reasonable calculation, given that opinion polls showed the Conservatives about 20 points ahead of Labour, continuing divisions between the Labour leadership and many in the parliamentary party and a very unfavourable tabloid media position on Labour and in particular its leader. A very poor campaign from the Conservatives and a resurgent Labour (to the surprise of both parties) led to a reduction in Conservative MPs and loss of an overall majority. Theresa May formed a government with 10 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) MPs. Such parliamentary arithmetic never augers well for strong central control, since it gives power and voice both to opposition and backbenchers within the governing party. And since the EU had been a divisive issue for the Conservatives for some time, there was ample opportunity for division, fractious politics and rebellion. Nonetheless, attempted centralisation and executive control have been evident in the entire negotiation process. This was apparent in the attempt to trigger Article 50 without parliamentary approval – a matter which was legally challenged all the way to the Supreme Court. It is also apparent in the repatriation of EU powers in areas of devolved competence to Westminster rather than Holyrood or Cardiff (the Northern Ireland Assembly is centralised by default, with direct control from Westminster due to its increasingly lengthy suspension after DUP

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and Sinn Fein’s (SF) failure to agree to reconvene). There has also been the creation of a Europe unit in Downing Street and the relocation of Olly Robbins, after leaving his position in the Department for Exiting the EU; Robbins appears to be driving the government and civil service machinery from there (Blitz and Parker 2017). Without exception, centralisation and executive control have been under severe and sustained pressure, such push back resisted where possible by the executive. The Supreme Court ruled that Parliament had a role to play in Article 50. There was some movement on devolved competences being repatriated to Holyrood and Cardiff (though still not in agreement with the Scottish Government) which came only after jointly pressed positions by the Scottish and Welsh Governments and the threat to pass (in Scotland’s case, actual passage of) ‘continuity legislation’ at Holyrood and Cardiff, designed to ensure the maintenance of the status quo in EU related devolved competences post-Brexit. This issue is far from resolved, with a Supreme Court hearing on the constitutional legality of Scotland’s continuity legislation. A form of parliamentary approval of the final withdrawal deal was only conceded after considerable opposition to the lack of such from the House of Lords and a number of senior Conservatives in the Commons. However, despite the opposition to executive centralisation, the UK system of government has a strong bias towards executive, particularly prime ministerial, sway. Yet if the attempt to centralise the process has been a clear aim of government, the lack of preparedness and indeed awareness of the challenges have been evident amongst many leading actors, indeed in some cases embarrassingly so. According to David Davis, secretary for exiting the EU on 4 July 2016 ‘Within two years before the negotiation with the EU is likely to be complete . . . we can negotiate a free trade area massively larger than the EU’ (Davis 2016). Other statements are equally remarkable: ‘The day after we vote to leave, we hold all the cards and we can choose the path we want’ (Michael Gove, 9 April 2016); ‘The free trade agreement that we will have to do with the European Union should be one of the easiest in human history’ (Liam Fox, 20 July 2017); ‘The idea that we’ll do a transitional arrangement where you’re still in, paying money, still with free movement of people – that we’ll do the long term deal in slow motion . . . that is plainly not what we’re after’ (David Davis, 15 March 2016); ‘Leaving the EU means we will take back full control of our territorial waters and for the first time in 50 years will be able to grant fishing access for other countries on our terms’ (Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 3 August 2017) (quotations cited in Henley and Roberts 2018.)

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It is hardly surprising then, according to the National Audit Office, that some key government departments (notably the Department for International Trade) have failed to build up the capacity and are behind schedule in several areas in preparation for Britain’s EU departure (NAO 2018). In this environment, Britain’s strategy around the negotiation process has been overlaid, sometimes conflated, with long simmering battles in the Conservative Party over Europe, accentuated by the Conservatives’ tenuous hold on a majority in the Commons; but also, sometimes hidden from view, an ideological battle over what post-Brexit Britain may look like (it may also be added given the prime minister’s position that a succession battle is being played out with the personal ambitions of some leading figures rather transparent). So while Jacob Rees-Mogg’s European Research Group has been stridently pressing for as clear a break with the EU as possible, there has also been an unusual anti-business rhetoric from leading Conservatives (notably Boris Johnson and Liam Fox) because business, through representative organisations like the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and Chambers of Commerce and some large companies, are seeking clarity and cautioning against the adverse impact of potential exclusion from existing European trade and supply chain arrangements, as a ‘no deal’ with the EU would imply. But the ideological struggle for the direction of the Conservative Party goes deeper. Theresa May, when appointed party leader, stated a position for the state having a role in helping certain groups in society (those ‘just about getting by’) and she has outlined her view that there should be no bonfire of EU guaranteed social, labour and other standards and rights post-Brexit. How deeply this runs within the government remains to be seen, as some leading Brexiteers appear to favour a further acceleration of economic deregulation. There appears to be considerable pressure group activity by leading right wing, pro-market, anti-regulation supporting think tanks focused around the Cato Institute and the Heritage Foundation in the USA and in Britain the Initiative for Free Trade (IFT – set up by hard Brexit campaigner Daniel Hannon, Conservative member of the European Parliament) lobbying hard for a US–UK free trade deal premised on a softening of existing EU standards prevailing in Britain (Savage 2018). There is particular irony in the IFT since it does not appear to be an enthusiastic supporter of continuing existing free trade arrangements with the EU. How successful such under the radar activity will be is yet be determined, since the debate and discussion on Brexit has shifted in the context of the first real systematic attempt to get UK Cabinet agreement for a negotiating strategy early in July 2018 (accompanied by a White Paper, see UK Government 2018b) (see Appendix 8). Key features of this

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position seek inter alia to establish a customs arrangement, with a ‘common rule book’, for EU–UK trade in goods and agri goods, with roles for both UK courts and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in supervision, and an arrangement for the UK to gather EU tariffs on behalf of the EU for goods passing through and some changes to freedom of movement. The extent to which this position will hold up amidst divisions within the Conservative Party (within days of the Cabinet agreement, two senior ministers had resigned) and divisions in the Commons both within and between parties (let alone the response of the EU of course) will unfold towards the final quarter of 2018.

Key issues in the withdrawal process The key issues have been trade, market access arrangements and related economic matters; Northern Ireland and in particular border arrangements with the Irish Republic; citizenship rights; governance and parliamentary sovereignty; impact on the union (especially Scotland); military and security issues and underlying this, notions of Britain’s place in the world.

Trade, market access and related economic matters There are broadly four areas where argument and analysis has focused: the various options which the UK has in trade with the EU and the rest of the world; the existing reality of Britain’s trading position and related to this, the necessity of a continued positive trading relationship and access to EU markets; and the impact of Brexit on the UK economy. Proposals by the UK Government were initially around a customs partnership involving the UK acting on the EU’s behalf when imports arrive from the rest of the world, with UK customs officials collecting the money due and passing it on to Brussels. Another proposal (known as maximum facilitation or max-fac) aimed to create a frictionless customs border employing new technologies and automation to streamline procedures and remove the need for physical customs checks wherever possible. The EU reckoned this was not feasible or practical and the situation has now moved on, to an extent, with the July 2018 White Paper. An important aspect of such proposals is that the UK economy is very dependent on services, around 80 per cent of GDP, and these are not covered by a customs arrangement, nor by the UK Government’s White Paper where there is only a commitment to work with the EU to

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agree a common set of standards. The UK has a very large trade deficit with the EU on traded goods, only partially balanced by a surplus on services: the trade deficit for goods and services combined is 4 per cent of GDP and rising – a situation partly due to successive UK Governments’ policy decisions and in some cases policy failures, leading to dependence on services, especially financial services. Other possible options are not straightforward. Negotiating a Canada style deal (see Appendix 9) would be long and difficult. The Swiss model of cooperation with the EU (see Appendix 9) is another option. Switzerland is not a member of the single market and instead has a large number of bilateral deals with the EU. It is complex and features endless negotiations – at present it is doubtful if the machinery of the UK Government has such capacity. The Norway model involves accepting freedom of movement so in many ways is a non-starter for the UK Government. Presumably, Norway as a major non-EU member of the European Economic Area (EEA) would have some influence on the UK’s entry to the latter. There is some evidence that Norway’s ability to keep the European issue off the political agenda, despite little EU enthusiasm there, would make the country fearful of the UK toxifying Norwegian politics on this issue (Fossum and Graver 2018). The alternative to these models is the World Trade Organization (WTO) arrangement (see Appendix 9). If the UK leaves the EU without concluding a trade deal, it will be treated the same as any of the 164 WTO members. This means tariffs on trade and the full range of non-tariff barriers. Few mainstream economists or trade experts think this a sensible option. Despite the overall deficit which Britain has with the EU, most marked in goods, the country’s overall configuration of trade suggests that at least over the medium term, if not longer, Britain needs to maintain existing EU trading patterns. Britain does £235.8 billion of trade annually with the EU (including 43 per cent of UK exports, as against 18 per cent to the next most important market, the US). Trade with the rest of the world amounts to £284.1 billion. Evidence over time suggests that distance and size are key factors when determining which countries trade most with each other (Lowe 2018). Notions that the Commonwealth or the US could compensate for some loss of EU trade are over optimistic and perhaps fanciful: exports to Commonwealth countries account for 8.9 per cent and imports 7.9 per cent of UK total trade in goods and services (Hennig 2018). The volatility of the current US trading environment allied to President Trump’s ‘America First’ initiatives make any hope for significant growth here at best high risk and/or likely to come with costs and subject (as current experience shows) to unilateral action by the US in areas such as

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tariff controls. In this context it is not surprising that organised business has consistently called for arrangements to ensure continuity of European market access. As early as July 2017, Carolyn Fairbairn, director general of the CBI said: This is a time to be realistic, instead of a cliff edge, the UK needs a bridge to the new EU deal. Even with the greatest possible goodwill on both sides, it’s impossible to imagine the detail will be clear by the end of March 2019. (cited in Roberts 2017) This thinking has continued with leaders of large companies, ranging from Airbus to Jaguar, making somewhat less ameliorative and more belligerent statements in mid-2018. Interestingly a series of ‘partnership papers’ published in early 2018 by the Department for Exiting the EU in fact argues the case for retention of EU links, not the advantages of bilateral deals often advanced by more strident Brexit champions in the governing Conservative Party (UK Government 2018a). Furthermore at a speech to business leaders in Vienna in February 2018 David Davis outlined that post-Brexit Britain would not use deregulatory leverage to undercut EU business, indicating that the UK as an EU member helped create the current rules based system. It was also clear that the UK had not carried out detailed sectoral impact assessments of Brexit as promised (or at least as indicated), though the Scottish Government did so for the Scottish economy. In fact, as the UK Government has slowly attempted to progress its negotiations with the EU, made more difficult by the need to attempt to accommodate ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Brexiteers, it is very difficult to discern any plan – at least in terms of trade – from those who appear the most recalcitrant on reaching agreement with the EU on customs and market access. Perhaps this is revealed in the foreign secretary’s resignation from Cabinet on 9 July, three days after his agreement to a UK negotiating strategy. His resignation speech mentions areas where he disagrees fundamentally with EU membership, issues of legislative sovereignty and ‘rule taking’ and some talk of a lack of national confidence and self-belief and the Brexit dream dying, but very little on economic, business and trading policy plans post-EU. Such announcements are hardly the substance of pragmatic politics or public policy making, and Boris Johnson’s resignation letter states: Brexit should be about opportunity and hope. It should be a chance to do things differently, to be more nimble and dynamic, and to maximise the particular advantages of the UK as an open,

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outward-looking global economy. That dream is dying, suffocated by needless self-doubt . . . we seem to have gone backwards since the last Chequers meeting in February. It is also clear that by surrendering control over our rulebook for goods and agrifoods (and much else besides) we will make it much more difficult to do free trade deals . . . In that respect we are truly headed for the status of colony – and many will struggle to see the economic or political advantages of that particular arrangement. This is already how we see the end state for the UK – before the other side has made its counter-offer. It is as though we are sending our vanguard into battle with the white flags fluttering above them. Indeed, I was concerned, looking at Friday’s document, that there might be further concessions on immigration, or that we might end up effectively paying for access to the single market. (Johnson 2018) The impact of Brexit on the economy is an important issue, notwithstanding the above comments on (lack of) official government published analyses. Inevitably any analysis of impact will be somewhat asymmetrical. Existing trade patterns and flows and the degree of disruption or enhancement are possible to model (this is not the same as ‘accurately predict’) and the consequent impact on the economy suggested with a reasonable degree of rigour. Similarly the impact of labour flow disruption into the country and how this may affect certain business sectors can be reasonably determined. It is almost inevitable that such analyses will show adverse impact of disruption to existing trading agreements with the EU. This no doubt helps explain government reluctance to publish research, since it is committed to exiting the EU and is negotiating with the EU over withdrawal terms. But what cannot be done with the same rigour is analysis of how alternative approaches to economic and trading relationships out-with the EU might operate: this will be subject to political and policy variables including the capacity and ability of the UK to strike trade deals, the policy and political response of the EU and other international bodies and so on. This is similar to the situation faced by those supporting independence during the Scottish referendum in 2014. Inevitably independence is an unknown, responses of other actors (including the UK Government and the EU) are not known for definite, while the ‘remain with the union’ side could produce a series of analyses based on models used by the UK Treasury. There is a difference with Brexit though. As Chapter 3 indicates, the Scottish Government produced a detailed White Paper outlining its plans for an independent Scotland, though the inevitable uncertainty still existed.

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So it is not surprising that many analyses indicate adverse impact of Brexit. The Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD) is clear that the Brexit process has caused disjuncture in the UK’s economic performance: economic performance was solid until the end of 2016, stimulated by a strong business-friendly environment, very supportive and reactive monetary policy, and a flexible approach in meeting fiscal goals. The pace of economic expansion has been steady and gross domestic product (GDP) is about 9% above the peak just before the global crisis, but the economic consequences of the planned exit from the European Union (EU) in March 2019 (Brexit) cut growth to the lowest annualised rate in the G7 in the first half of 2017. (OECD 2017) According to a Rand Corporation report in 2017, almost all the possible trading relationships between Britain and the EU following Brexit would be less favourable than staying in the EU, with the worst option being a ‘no deal’, leaving the UK economy 4.9 per cent poorer by 2029 (according to the report a no deal would have a relatively minor impact on the EU (Rand Corporation 2017). A leaked UK Government analysis in early 2018 (leaked by Buzzfeed News) researches the impact of three scenarios: first that the UK will agree a trade deal with the US; second it will continue with a range of the EU’s current trade agreements; and third it considers loosening regulations after Brexit. It concludes almost every sector of the economy included in the analysis would be negatively impacted in all three scenarios, with chemicals, clothing, manufacturing, food and drink, and cars and retail the hardest hit; every UK region would also be affected negatively in all the modelled scenarios, with the North East, the West Midlands and Northern Ireland facing the biggest falls in economic performance, and a risk that London’s status as a financial centre could be severely eroded. The analysis also assumes that a trade deal with the US will be concluded and it would benefit GDP by about 0.2 per cent in the long term. Trade deals with other non-EU countries and blocs, such as China, India, Australia, the Gulf countries and the nations of Southeast Asia would add, in total, a further 0.1 per cent to 0.4 per cent to GDP over the long term. If this leak is ‘real’ (and evidence suggests it is), it is not difficult to understand why it has not been made public (Buzzfeed News 2018).

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In addition the Scottish Government has published analyses of the adverse effect of Brexit on the Scottish economy (if this is without appropriate access to the Customs Union and Single Market) (Scottish Government 2018b). Independent research from the Fraser of Allander Institute estimates that 134,000 jobs in Scotland are supported by demand from the EU. There is no suggestion these would all be lost but that a considerable number would be uncertain until there is more clarity on the UK’s exit deal; the report also indicates there are sectoral differences when compared to the UK, with food and drink and fish exports much more significant to the Scottish than UK economy, with implications for Scottish Government input on UK negotiations (Fraser of Allander Institute 2017).

Northern Ireland and border arrangements with the Irish Republic Northern Ireland presents a particular problem in the withdrawal process. The island of Ireland is divided between the Irish Republic in the south, which will remain in the EU and so be part of the continuing EU customs union and single market, and the north which as part of the UK which will form the only land border between the UK and an EU country. Theresa May’s agreement with the EU reached at the end of 2017 (which was a conditional requirement before discussions on future trading arrangements could commence) included a UK commitment to a ‘back stop’ regulatory alignment, with EU regulations remaining in place in Northern Ireland should no suitable alternative be agreed, along with the continued absence of a hard border between north and south. The possibility of this leading to divergence between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK is anathema to the DUP, whose support is vital to maintain a Conservative majority in the Commons and who argue that Northern Ireland is an indivisible part of the UK, therefore having common laws. It should be added that the DUP’s insistence is somewhat disingenuous given the party’s support for Northern Ireland’s existing divergence on Corporation Tax (to make it more competitive with the south) and headline variations on key aspects of healthcare and social policy, most notably abortion and gay marriage, with those variations also supported by the DUP. As a backdrop to this entire issue, it is important to note the context of the political settlement in Northern Ireland and the peace process there. Europe has added to the multi-layered north–south politics generally in a

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positive way and has reinforced the peace process, bringing some peace and stability to a conflicted society. Unionist politicians have seen advantages to the northern economy from easier trade links with the south and elsewhere underpinned by EU market access and a presence of northern Irish participation in European political forums. The margins of unionism which saw the European project as a satanic conspiracy, keeping a Catholic dominated market together (as espoused by Reverend Ian Paisley in the 1970s) are long since gone. So too with nationalist politics. Sinn Fein’s view of Europe as a club of former colonial powers (expressed as such at the time of Britain and Ireland’s entry to the European Community) has been transformed to one of broad support for Europe (in its activities both in the north and south of Ireland, though less unequivocally in the south). There has been a degree of Europeanisation of Irish politics, with politicians north and south seeing the existence of common agricultural and other interests, as well as the deployment of substantial EU peace funding on cross border and community building initiatives (Utz 2018). This realignment has shown some fissures, with some in the unionist community having found resonance with a British nationalism at times showing hostility to the government in the south, conflated with hostility to Europe. This has occurred at the same time as a number of pro-Brexit UK politicians, presumably seeing the Irish issue as a stumbling block to withdrawal, have suggested the Northern Irish peace process has outlived its usefulness (e.g. Owen Paterson, Conservative, and Kate Hoey, Labour, though neither are particularly influential in their respective parties). A border between the north and south of Ireland is understandably a key issue. For obvious reasons, if one side of the border is in a single market and customs union agreement with the EU and the other is not, then there is a requirement for customs checks. Suggestions of technological ways to do this do not appear to be persuasive. Moreover, the south would be in the free movement of people zone with the EU and the north not, this too requiring some form of border control and policing. An arrangement to have the border along the Irish Sea (in effect meaning the entire island of Ireland is aligned to Europe while the UK is not) appears unacceptable to the DUP and Theresa May has said this is unacceptable to her too. Nonetheless, both the UK Government and the EU have consistently stated there should be no hard border between north and south since this would be highly disruptive to northern and southern economies and also thought to be a flashpoint for nascent paramilitary or terrorist activity. Interestingly, opinion polling suggests that both loyalist and nationalist communities in the north wish to retain free movement of people and goods across the north–south border, though support was less strong amongst loyalists and supporters of leaving the EU than

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amongst nationalists and supporters of remain (Garry and Coakley 2017). The UK Government’s White Paper of July 2018, suggesting a ‘common customs rule book’ for goods and agri-products may obviate the need for a hard border.

Military and security cooperation Agreement and cooperation between the EU and the UK over military and security matters is clearly of importance to both parties. Much of this has not received public scrutiny since the headline negotiations (indeed the substance of negotiations) has been around trade and the related Irish border issue, citizen rights and the funding implications of exit and UK commitments to programmes and funding periods agreed prior to the Brexit withdrawal process. The UK has stated its desire for a comprehensive security treaty, a commitment to remain part of Europol, the European policing agency, maintaining UK’s extradition capabilities post-Brexit and retaining access to sources of EU data on crime, criminals and criminal activity. However according to the Commons Home Affairs Committee, there is a serious lack of clarity over continued participation in the European Arrest Warrant (some EU countries will not participate in this with non-EU members), the UK’s access to data for the use of the security services and whether the UK as a third party country will have access issues over data exchange (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2018). In terms of military cooperation it is unlikely that UK commitment to European defence and security will diminish, since Britain cannot play a role as a global power on its own and it seems the current US administration apparently has a more shallow commitment to Europe than any previous administrations, compounded by a president with a rather volatile approach and eccentric, perhaps disruptive, view of allies and alliances. However, while Britain has been ambivalent towards the EU for some time and is now preparing to exit, the EU has been centralising and coordinating its military support structures. Developments include Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO, involving all but three of the EU member states, these being the UK, Denmark and Malta), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the European Defence Fund (EFD – worth up to €1.5 billion by 2021) and an EU military headquarters. While the EU will wish for access to UK capabilities it will be reluctant to give a non-member a key role in formulating its foreign and military policy lest this gives incentive to others. The options then seem to be first that UK–EU cooperation is provided through NATO, though

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this is not without risks given the above comments regarding its largest member the USA – a risk which may carry long term implications for European defence; second some negotiated UK involvement in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); third a range of bilateral deals with major EU military powers (France and Germany being the most obvious). A good outline of these options can be found in Martill and Sus (2018). But it would seem that any agreement on UK–EU military and security cooperation is some way off.

Citizenship The issue of citizenship rights of EU nationals living in the UK, and conversely UK citizens resident in EU countries, is a significant one given the numbers involved and the human dimension to this. According to Oxford University Migration Observatory an estimated 3 million EU nationals reside in the UK and just over 1.3 million UK citizens in EU countries, placing the UK fifth among EU countries for the size of their expat populations after Poland, Romania, Germany and Italy (Migration Observatory 2015). Citizenship is of some salience given the overlap and sometimes conflation with concerns over immigration, seen as a major factor in the referendum vote in many parts of the UK. Agreement with the EU has been reached on the following basis, also including citizens of non-EU EEA countries (Switzerland, Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway): EU citizens and family members who have been in the UK for five years by the end of 2020 will be able to apply for ‘settled status’, meaning they are free to go on living and working in the UK indefinitely, while those who have arrived by 31 December 2020 but do not have five years’ residence can seek to stay until they have that time, at which point they can seek settled status. Applicants will be asked to provide their biographical information, declare whether they have any criminal records, with applicant identity verified using a passport, ID card or other valid document and checked against existing data bases. There is some scepticism over the Home Office’s ability to operate this scheme as smoothly as suggested given its track record in other related areas, plus possible questions over the status of less straightforward cases like those wishing to bring relatives and those with a sketchy employment record (who may therefore have difficulty being matched in government data bases etc.). In the case of the UK exiting without a deal, the status of UK expats is unclear, presumably a matter for individual countries to decide.

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The UK Government wishes to be seen responding to concerns over immigration and although this is a potent (sometimes toxic) issue in many EU countries, there are differences in the political traction which the topic has in the UK. In the EU it is focused around immigration from out-with the EU, primarily those arriving from areas with conflict and other challenges, primarily the Middle East and North Africa, but in the UK the political debate has centred around movement of labour from the EU and the inability under EU rules to restrict this (the reality on the ground is somewhat more complex where immigration policy has borne down on immigrants from other areas as seen in the ‘Windrush’ episode). This runs up against policy pressures relating to business and economic needs. There are certain sectors of the economy suffering or projected to suffer from the uncertainty caused by the downturn in migrant labour from some EU countries, which is partly accounted for by lack of clarity over future status, partly by economic upturn in their home economies and the value of sterling, but also due to the (as yet) failure of government initiatives to compensate for the reduction in EU immigrant labour. For instance, the National Farmers Union (NFU) has been pressurising Michael Gove, claiming that the shortage of seasonal labour for the vegetable and fruit sector is now ‘mission critical’ and while conceding that this is partly due to more favourable environments in their home economies, there is strong criticism of the absence of a seasonal worker’s scheme for hiring non-EU workers (which was scrapped by the UK in 2013 with no replacement) as a result of UK Government inaction (O’Carroll 2018). In addition, the current quota and work system in the UK is suffering strains with increasing costs and minimum salary requirements making it difficult to attract skilled staff in key areas and sectors (BBC 2018). Some parts of the UK, due to demographic or structural characteristics, have greater requirements for immigration than others. The Scottish Government has called for immigration to be devolved, indicating that Scotland’s population is forecast to see more deaths than births until 2040, therefore requiring immigration into Scotland to a extent greater than may be politically feasible for the UK Government to permit for the UK as a whole (Scottish Government 2018a).

Governance and parliamentary sovereignty The assertion of UK parliamentary sovereignty vis-à-vis the multinational or supranational EU was part of the argument used by those supporting leave in the referendum. There are of course complexities and

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nuances here, including the role of devolved parliaments, the capacity of Parliament to assert sovereignty and the strength of representative democracy in the process of assertion. There is also a broader governance issue about the extent to which Brexit is crowding out other issues of policy in the UK legislature. In the foreword to the Command Paper on the Great Repeal Bill, the prime minister stated that when Brexit happens, it will ‘be for democratically elected representatives in the UK to decide on any changes to that [EU-derived] law’ (Department for Exiting the European Union 2017). This begs rather a large number of questions. A convincing argument has been made that Parliament may not have the capacity to exercise sovereignty in any meaningful way over matters previously subject of EU law, despite repatriation (see Chalmers 2017). Over a lengthy time period, the vast majority of measures transposing EU directives into UK law employed statutory instruments which are not amended or repealed by statute but by other statutory instruments; and parliamentary oversight of these instruments is very weak – only five have been blocked between 1997 and 2015 (see Chalmers 2017). Parliamentary capacity to achieve scrutiny and oversight would be theoretically possible but would take time, and in any case it has been made clear that the vast majority of transposition will be done via statutory instruments rather than primary legislation. An unanswered question is the extent to which all this – as a direct result of EU presence in members’ (including the UK’s) legislative activity – represents a hollowing out of parliamentary sovereignty. Does it ‘technocratise’ matters which are non-contentious (e.g. aspects of market regulation)? Does it give force to policies best dealt with across national legislative boundaries (e.g. like aspects of data protection or environmental protection)? It is difficult to identify any real debate on these key questions and their important implications to date; rather, the narrative and headlines have been dominated by polarised arguments, particularly within the governing Conservative Party, over the extent to which the UK should continue to be aligned or disassociated from the EU. Given the media headline dominance of Brexit there is a prima facie case that the EU withdrawal process is having an impact on other areas and aspects of governance and policy. It has been claimed for example that the process has been captured by ‘a remain leaning’ civil service. Such claims have been made by prominent Brexit supporters such as Steve Baker (at the time a government minister, forced by the prime minister to apologise), Jacob Rees-Mogg and others. Nigel Farage specifically targeted Olly Robbins, the prime minister’s chief adviser on Brexit and the senior civil servant dealing with the UK–EU negotiation. Such hostility to the permanent institutions of government is not unusual from right

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wing populist figures in the UK and elsewhere, but more serious is the claim by Bernard Jenkin, Conservative MP and chair of the Commons Public Administration Committee, of a ‘Whitehall mind set’ (specifically in the Treasury) favouring a continued relationship with the EU after Brexit. This appears to contradict his earlier writings and speeches rejecting such a concept (see Walker 2017). More likely, if it is reasonably felt that the civil service is not giving strong enough support to the Brexit process then this is due to the government itself not having a clear or unified direction of travel – not unexpected in a country with a politically neutral civil service like the UK’s. It is also claimed that the dominance of Brexit is not leaving space for other policy matters. There is a prima facie case for this. The first nine months of a government is often the most active in terms of policy and legislative initiative, but analysis of the current government shows that the number of votes held in this nine month period was less than either Cameron or Blair’s governments (Balls 2018). In addition, a range of government plans, including those for social care, the return of grammar schools in England and revisions to the winter fuel allowance, have been abandoned. This though may be more a feature of minority government (entirely unanticipated by the Conservatives when an election was called in 2017) than policy or legislative paralysis. However, it is true that the media and political agenda have been focused on Brexit. Even other initiatives (like increased funding for the National Health Service announced in July 2018) have been prefaced by the prime minister, placing this in the context of ‘a Brexit dividend’. It is perhaps worth noting that a political discussion where issues generally are overshadowed by Brexit may not resonate with the wishes of the electorate. When Theresa May called an election in 2017 her intention was to contextualise this around the EU – to give her a strong mandate to strengthen her bargaining position with the EU. In the event, the election was fought on a range of other issues too, and this appears to have played against the Conservatives. Perhaps this is a salutary note for all politicians.

Impact on the UK union The pressures on the UK being able to act as a political entity in a reasonably unified way is be found in the three way relationship between governments and administrations in Westminster and Northern Ireland, Westminster and Scotland and Westminster and Wales. The first of these is described above and for the time being the Northern Ireland Assembly is suspended and so a non-player. It is not surprising that the Westminster– Holyrood nexus would produce the greatest tension given the large

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remain majority in Scotland (though Northern Ireland produced a small remain majority too). Added to this is the fact that continued membership of the EU was part of the pro-union parties’ stance when urging a ‘no’ to the independence vote during the Scottish independence referendum and the willingness of an SNP government at Holyrood to use the UK Brexit result as ‘changed circumstances’, thereby putting a second independence referendum on the political agenda (a majority in favour of another referendum has passed this in Holyrood, but the prime minister has refused consent on the basis that ‘now is not the time’). However, while there does not appear to be a pro-independence surge in Scotland, the mechanics of EU withdrawal have introduced another dimension which is bringing into play the devolved government in Cardiff. This is understood through the interplay between the UK Withdrawal Bill (specifically Clause 11), the Sewel Convention and the transfer of EU law into UK legislation. When the devolved institutions were created in the 1990s, EU legislation was embedded in UK statutes. The UK’s Withdrawal Bill has repatriated all EU legislation to Westminster, with the intention of transferring those statutes and laws in areas of devolved competence at the appropriate time. The argument used was that this would ensure the integrity of the UK internal market (which would also be an objective of both the Welsh and Scottish Governments). The normal political practice would be to use the Sewel Convention – that is to say, the devolved government must give its approval for matters of devolved competence to be legislated at Westminster. Both the Scottish and Welsh Governments have made it clear they would not give approval for such a repatriation of powers without formal consultation between Westminster and the devolved governments. While the UK government would have wished for approval of the Withdrawal Bill from Holyrood and Cardiff, it is clear that the Sewel Convention as an instrument of political practice has no legal standing and so is not binding on the UK Government. The Scottish and Welsh Governments both introduced Continuity Bills (to guarantee continuation of EU legislation competency, without a Westminster by-pass) in their respective legislatures, in effect seeing this as an alternative to Sewel consent. Negotiation followed with the number of areas to be held at Westminster reduced (with a sunset clause of seven years before passing on to devolved government). The Welsh Government withdrew support for continuity legislation and it was voted down 46 to 9, supported only by Plaid Cymru. However, the Scottish Parliament approved the Scottish Government’s bill by 93 to 30, opposed only by the Scottish Conservatives (though whether this legislation is within the competence of Holyrood will be tested in the UK Supreme Court). This is perhaps unsurprising since the

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Scottish Government and Parliament have considerably more power than Wales, therefore more at stake, and the areas of continued contention with Westminster are in fishing, agriculture and the environment – of particular importance to the Scottish economy. The joint action of the Welsh and Scottish devolved governments opposing Westminster could have long term implications for the union: this is the first concerted action of this nature since devolution and is particularly significant since it saw cross party unity between SNP and Welsh Labour administrations. The Scottish Parliament has not given consent to the UK Withdrawal Bill which has become law, the Sewel Convention has been by-passed and the legality of the Scottish Government’s action is subject to UK Supreme Court deliberation and decision. However, while the UK Government, it seems, can legally ignore devolved government, there could be long term consequences that put a strain on the union. The Withdrawal Bill is not the end of Brexit legislation, there will be many more instruments which will affect devolved competence. These would require the consent of the devolved legislatures, and the Withdrawal Bill experience of ignoring the Scottish Parliament (and questioning its status) may have created an environment unamenable to cooperative working. This could lead to constitutional argument and conflict. Removing the umbrella of EU regulations means a greater complexity in multi-level government coordination over what is reserved and what is devolved. Sour relations between the UK and devolved governments in these circumstances will not be conducive to smooth and effective governance and will require the UK and devolved governments to cooperate more routinely and systematically than was envisaged when devolution was introduced. Added to this, the July 2018 White Paper arrangements envisage a range of sectoral bodies and agencies to foster UK–EU cooperation in a wide range of areas, with no specific mention of how devolved institutions may participate in such structures beyond consultation.

Concluding comments This case illustrates that for much of the exit period, the EU withdrawal process has been disruptive and turbulent. In some ways, this is inevitable. The UK has been a member of the EU and its predecessors since the 1970s. This has led to involvement in EU institutions, agencies and regulatory bodies, election of MEPs, membership of the single market and customs union underpinning Britain’s international trading; and although not a member of the common currency a special relationship between the UK’s

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financial services sector and the EU, giving UK banks passporting rights allowing operations in other EU countries. Obviously, a decision to leave the EU, never made before by a member state, puts much of this in question; so disruption is inevitable and this was underlined by the referendum result showing a disjuncture between majority opinion in favour of leave, despite the leadership of mainstream political parties supporting remain. Indeed these party leaders having had a consensus on membership of the EU, though the Conservatives have had a voluble anti-EU element since the 1980s, are increasing in strength and voice to the present day. In reality, there is a ‘Brexit dilemma’, requiring a political trade off between sovereignty (moving away politically from the EU) and market access to Europe. In the world of real politic, this means for Brexiteers achieving a balance or trade off between sustaining economic growth vs control of immigration, and for remainers a weakening of UK parliamentary control vs staying in a form of market arrangement with Europe (Wincot 2017). Rarely in politics is the outcome of ‘having your cake and eating it’ feasible. Yet the key political forces do not appear to be consistently or openly addressing the requirements of this trade off. Arguably the July 2018 White Paper as the government’s negotiating starting point attempts to do this but does not command support either from a large group of Brexiteers (seeing it as too close to the EU and ‘Brexit in name only’) or a large group of remainers who argue either that much of the contents will be rejected by the EU (some Brexiteers argue this too in a somewhat contradictory fashion) or that it amounts to accepting trade and regulatory rules (rule taking) without having the rule making capacity of membership. Whether political support for a negotiated deal involving trade offs will emerge in the Commons as negotiations proceed remains to be seen. In this environment of polarisation and disruption, political outcomes are difficult to read and any prognosis requires some circumspection. In the wake of the White Paper’s publication, there was a stalemate with the government narrowly winning votes on key amendments on trade and customs bills (in preparation for trade and customs arrangements in the event of a no deal) – in one case only winning after accepting an amendment from the hard Brexit European Research Group, headed by Jacob Rees-Mogg.

Outcome dependent on some contingencies The political uncertainty and flux highlighted by the withdrawal process actually highlights a series of contingent variables, the interplay of which

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will determine the final outcome. ‘Messy’ policy and political problems, involving uncertainty, political power play amongst key actors, short vs long term objectives, suboptimal or unclear outcomes are meat and drink for political scientists and political analysis. What makes the EU withdrawal process significant and rather different from other political or policy areas is the highlighting and headlining of these contingent variables in a single policy over a protracted time period. There is no clear consensus on the approach to withdrawal from the EU and consequently no firm idea of the shape of the final outcome. While it would be a brave analyst who would suggest what this might be (and academics in particular are usually cautious about ‘prediction’, this one no different), it can be said with some confidence that whether there is: a) a deal with the EU prior to withdrawal in 2019; b) a transitional period but with no deal (or a variant of this with an ‘emergency’ minimal agreement on security and some trade for a short defined period); c) a break with EU arrangements and an adoption of WTO rules; d) Norway status with the intention of a Canada or Canada plus deal longer term; e) a deal based on the White Paper; or f) a reversal of Brexit, all depend on some broad contingencies. The presentation of the withdrawal arrangement is also important. The political declaration to be presented to the UK and EU parliaments will outline areas which have been agreed, plus some statement about timing and forward movement alongside Britain’s longer term relationship with the EU. There is negotiation about the scope and extent of detail included in this statement with both the EU and UK negotiators striving to write a declaration acceptable to both sides, or at least sufficient to command support in both parliaments.

Some contingencies: Conservative Party A key contingency is the balance of strength (especially in the governing Conservative Party) between ideational opposition to the EU on the one hand and pragmatism on the other. Those most opposed to the EU, generally from the right of the party, have tended to focus on a reliance on WTO rules on EU departure. In the short to medium term this raises problems for the pragmatic pursuit of smooth trading arrangements. Although the UK is a member of the WTO in its own right, various procedures are needed to re-establish autonomy from the rest of the EU. In particular, an agreement is required on ‘schedules’ for tariffs on goods. The government has stated that in the short term it would simply replicate the schedules of the EU to smooth the UK’s transition. There are some more problematic areas, such as agreeing on the division of quotas

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for goods where the EU currently has agreed quotas at EU level. It would also be necessary for the UK to negotiate with other countries with which the EU has free trade agreements; this might be more problematic. Under WTO rules, each member must grant the same ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) market access to all other WTO members, meaning that exports to the EU would be subject to the same customs checks, tariffs and regulatory barriers that the UK and EU currently charge on trade with countries such as the US. The UK’s exports to the EU and other WTO members would also be subject to the importing countries’ MFN tariffs. The imposition of tariffs on trade with the EU would increase costs for both UK importers (and hence consumers) and exporters. The average EU tariff rate is low – around 1.5 per cent. However, at a sectoral level, the impacts would be much larger: for example, for cars and car parts the tariff rate is 10 per cent. Since most UK based car production is exported, and uses imported parts, the impacts would be magnified. The impacts would also be large on agriculture, where EU tariffs and quotas remain high; this would result in significant food price inflation for British consumers. Perhaps the most significant risk for a post-EU Britain relying on WTO rules is the threat of President Trump to withdraw the USA from the WTO, his particular contention being the WTO’s appeals system if a bilateral agreement cannot be reached by the countries in dispute. It is felt by President Trump that this appeals system gives power to judges on the panel rather than nation states; as judges have ended their terms (four years), the USA has blocked new appointments. If the USA’s hostile position to this international rules based system intensifies, then this arguably poses a risk to the UK, dependent on WTO rules and no longer within a large trade and market union with the considerable economic and negotiating heft which the EU provides. Safe to say, a pragmatic approach will be very wary of the WTO as the main trade policy lever for Britain out-with the EU. A Norway type option is unlikely to be welcomed by the ‘ideologists’ since this is (correctly) typified as remaining within EU trading rules but without having any seat at the negotiating table framing the rules. The key variable then is how strong the pragmatists are vis-à-vis those ideationally or ideologically opposed to the EU. An interesting study by Politico Europe argues there are 62 ‘militant Brexiteers’, 48 ‘careerists’ (those both remain and leave supporting) unhappy with the government’s approach but who prefer to stay inside government), 50 ‘pragmatists’, 12 ‘soft Brexit rebels’, 4 who support a second referendum and 56 ‘agnostics’ (Politico Europe 2018). How these figures play out will be a crucial contingency determining the final outcome. Sub-variables will include fear of rising anti-EU populism, fuelled by a fear of the Conservatives losing votes to

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a resurgent UKIP and also fear of collapsing the government with a resulting election if opinion polls are close.

Some contingencies: Labour Party The second set of contingencies revolves around opposition parties, mainly the two largest, Labour and the SNP. Labour’s stated position is to support withdrawal, but to remain closely tied to the EU customs union. Although key members of the Labour leadership have an anti-EU past (especially the leader and shadow chancellor), the party’s position is ‘to keep all options on the table’ (including a second referendum on any deal the government strikes with the EU) but with a stated preference for a general election. There are however members of the parliamentary party who wish to retain as close a relationship as possible to the EU – if not continued membership – and are very supportive of a second referendum. Like the Conservatives, Labour’s position will ultimately be determined by the relative strength of forces within the party, though it is probably safe to say that, notwithstanding divisions within the parliamentary party, there is greater strength behind the leadership than is the case with the Conservatives.

Some contingencies: Scottish National Party The SNP’s position is to retain membership of the EU single market and customs union and to retain maximum control of devolved legislative competences in devolved policy areas as soon as these are repatriated from Brussels to the UK. Neither of these outcomes is likely. The SNP leadership appears agnostic on a second referendum on EU withdrawal, though it has not ruled out supporting one. The party’s policy is for a Scottish independence referendum but the leadership is cautious on the timing, ‘waiting to see how the Brexit deal breaks’, but in reality willing to push for one when opinion polls move more strongly and decisively in favour of independence which has not happened hitherto. A consensus may arise as the Article 50 time period marking Britain’s exit gets closer (March 2019), with the likely timetable for UK agreement being the end of 2018. Possibly sufficient numbers of MPs (both Conservative and Labour) fearing no deal will sign up to what has been agreed at that point, breaking the stalemate, though perhaps not. And given the parliamentary arithmetic, the SNP’s 35 MPs may be crucial if any deal does not acknowledge a strong role for devolved institutions.

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A continued stalemate could lead to calls for another referendum (the prime minister has recently ruled this out) or a general election, perhaps after a vote of no confidence in the government. Conservative MPs will be very wary of this outcome given Labour and the Conservatives’ close proximity in opinion polls and the possibility of the Conservatives being far from united in any campaign. And although Labour’s stated position is for an election as soon as possible, there will be cautionary voices given that they do not have a significant polling lead over a bitterly conflicted and disunited government. The Conservatives will also be wary of a possible UKIP resurgence, given voter volatility.

Brexit and UK constitutional practice Finally, there is a sense in which by their very nature both the Brexit referendum and the ensuing withdrawal process have highlighted a range of constitutional practices, tensions and conflicts which appear to be a direct result of Brexit but are actually more systemic. Arguably Brexit may give the opportunity to address these, otherwise tension and conflict will continue or may be reinforced. Two examples can illustrate this. First, it is argued that over a lengthy period of time a range of constitutional changes (including devolution, Lords reform, directly elected mayors and police and crime commissioners in England, the use of referendums) have been implemented in an ad hoc way and on the basis of short term political advantage with little thought for overall consequence of constitutional design or democratic disengagement. Brexit has exposed this ‘hollowing out of the constitution’ and is not itself a sole or prime cause (Matthews 2017). There is little indication of any appetite to address these matters irrespective of Brexit outcome. Second, EU membership has given devolved governments a range of powers and discretions hidden from view. Agriculture presents an interesting case. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has both provided greater per capita support in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland than in England (based on need) and enabled devolved governments there to develop flexible policies different to England (e.g. capping support for the wealthiest farmers). The UK Government has guaranteed continued levels of CAP subsidies until 2022, but the position beyond then is unclear. Possibly, agricultural support could be driven more by England’s needs, which are different from the devolved governments – for example 85 per cent of farm land in Scotland is in ‘areas of natural constraint’, 81 per cent in Wales, 70 per cent in Northern Ireland but only 17 per cent in England (Keating 2018). Assuming that agriculture in the devolved

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nations would continue to get higher support post-2022, a key issue would be to ensure this higher support was not seen to unfairly advantage farmers in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in a UK single market. One solution suggested is a form of federalism for agricultural support, with an arbitration mechanism to regulate competition, pricing and financial support across the UK (Hornsby 2018). This sounds remarkably like an example of the constitutional design for which UK governments in the past have shown little appetite. More generally, there has been no appetite at all from the UK for a federal styled approach (rather than a uniform UK policy) which recognises asymmetries of the devolved arrangements across the UK; Scottish Government proposals for such (e.g. Scotland retaining a form of EU single market membership or having a differentiated immigration policy to reflect an economic structure divergent from other parts of the UK) have been given short shrift by the UK Government. There is however some support from outwith the devolved governments for a differentiated approach. In his evidence to the Lords European Union Committee, Lord Peter Hain, former secretary of state for both Wales and Northern Ireland, stated: I do not see why there could not be different solutions for each of Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland appropriate to their interests and their needs . . . I think we should start from the presumption that there is not a uniform, one-size-fits-all approach to this. It has to be tailored to the particular needs of each of the nations. (European Union Committee 2017) Whether this view, from someone with very senior experience in devolved government, gains wider traction is of course a moot point.

Summary of key chapter themes • Britain as a leading European power. This theme addressed in Chapter 1; • Impact of the European issue on the main political parties. This theme is also addressed in Chapter 2; • Negotiation strategies of the EU and UK; • Key issues in the withdrawal process: trade and market access; impact on the relationship with devolved governments (this is addressed in Chapters 1, 2 and 5); military and security issues (also addressed in Chapter 1); and sovereignty and parliamentary authority (addressed in Chapter 1 and the concluding chapter);

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• Brexit dilemmas (this theme is addressed in Chapters 2 and 4); • Withdrawal agreement as dependent on some contingent – mainly political – variables; • Brexit as a focal point – but not sole determinant of – constitutional issues and aspects of democratic disengagement (this theme is addressed in Chapters 2, 4, 5, 6 and the concluding chapter).

References Balls, K. (2018) Brexit is masking the government’s complete paralysis, The Guardian, 13 March. BBC (2018) Britain’s work permits force hard labour, 8 May, www.bbc.co.uk/ news/uk-scotland-scotland-business-44041680 (accessed 3 June 2018). Beesley, A. and Parker, G. (2017) Brussels wants to shield sensitive trade talks from Britain’s prying eyes, Financial Times, 7 April. Blitz, J. and Parker, G. (2017) Whitehall battles for Brexit aides, Financial Times, 7 October. Boffey, D. (2017) Barnier ‘lobbied to stop May withdrawing article 50 in two years’, The Guardian, 7 April. Buzzfeed News (2018) This leaked government Brexit analysis says the UK will be worse off in every scenario, www.buzzfeed.com/albertonardelli/the-gov ernments-own-brexit-analysis-says-the-uk-will-be?utm_term=.tlR2Q7QxK8#. uyK69j9yZ2 (accessed 2 March 2018). Chalmers, D. (2017) Brexit and the renaissance of parliamentary authority, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19:4, 663–679. Davis, D. (2016) David Davis: trade deals. Tax cuts. And taking time before triggering Article 50. A Brexit economic strategy for Britain, www.conserva tivehome.com/platform/2016/07/david-davis-trade-deals-tax-cuts-and-tak ing-time-before-triggering-article-50-a-brexit-economic-strategy-for-britain. html (accessed 10 October 2017). Department for Exiting the European Union (2017) Legislating for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (Cm 9446), www.gov.uk/ government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/604516/Great_ repeal_bill_white_paper_accessible.pdf (accessed 19 May 2018). European Union Committee (2017), Brexit: Devolution, Fourth Report, House of Lords. HL 9, London: HMSO. Eurostat (2017) Share of member states in EU GDP, http://eceuropa.eu/eurostat/ web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20170410-1 (accessed 3 February 2018). Fossum, J.E. and Graver, H.P. (2018) Squaring the Circle on Brexit: Could the Norway Model Work? Bristol: Bristol University Press. Fraser of Allander Institute (2017) Brexit and the Sectors of the Scottish Economy: A Report for GMB Scotland. https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/62470/1/FAI_2017_ Brexit_and_the_sectors_of_the_Scottish_economy_a_report_for_GMB_ Scotland.pdf (accessed 30 November 2017).

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Garry, J. and Coakley, J. (2017) The UK in a Changing Europe. Kings College, London: ESRC. Henley, J. and Roberts, D. (2018) Brexit promises the government quietly dropped, The Guardian, 28 March. Hennig, B.D. (2018) Could Brexit be a boon for British trade with the Commonwealth?, Political Insight June, 24–25. Hornsby, S. (2018) A federal future for farming?, www.centreonconstitutionalchange. ac.uk/blog/federal-future-farming (accessed 24 March 2018). House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2018) UK-EU Security Co-operation After Brexit, Fourth Report of Session 2017-19 HC 635, https:// publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmhaff/635/63503.htm (accessed 17 July 2018). International Institute for Strategic Studies (2016) The Military Balance 2016. London: Routledge. Johnson, B. (2018) Boris Johnson’s resignation letter, The Spectator, https:// blogs.spectator.co.uk/2018/07/read-boris-johnsons-resignation-letter/ (accessed 10 July 2018). Keating, M. (2018) The Repatriation of Competences in Agriculture after Brexit. Research Briefing. Edinburgh: Centre on Constitutional Change, www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/sites/default/files/papers/Keating%20 Agriculture%20Report.pdf (accessed 19 July 2018). Lowe, S. (2018) Global Britain? The trade debate, Political Insight, April. Martill, B. and Sus, M. (2018) Known Unknowns: EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after Brexit, Dahrendorf Forum. London: LSE Ideas, www. dahrendorf-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Martill-Sus-KnownUnknowns.pdf (accessed 2 June 2018). Matthews, F. (2017) Whose mandate is it anyway? Brexit, the constitution and the contestation of authority, Political Quarterly 88:4, 603–611. Migration Observatory (2015) Number of UK born people living in EEA countries, 2015, http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/charts/numberuk-born-people-living-eea-countries-2015/ (accessed 17 June 2018). NAO (National Audit Office) (2018) Implementing the UK’s exit from the EU: the Department for International Trade, www.nao.org.uk/report/ implementing-the-uks-exit-from-the-european-union-the-departmentfor-international-trade/ (accessed 13 April 2018). O’Carroll, L. (2018) Farmers tell Gove: lack of migrant workers now ‘mission critical’, The Guardian, 20 February. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2017) OECD economic surveys United Kingdom, www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/ United-Kingdom-2017-OECD-economic-survey-overview.pdf (accessed 22 June 2018). Oltermann, P. (2018) Hammond: EU leaders ‘paranoid’ that other nations will leave after Brexit, The Guardian, 13 January. Politico Europe (2018) What the 8 Tory Brexit tribes want, www.politico.eu/ article/brexit-8-tory-tribes-conservative-party/ (accessed 10 September 2018).

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Rand Corporation (2017) Economic implications of Brexit, www.rand.org/ran deurope/research/projects/brexit-economic-implications.html (accessed 18 November 2017). Roberts, D. (2017) UK business leaders call for indefinite delay in leaving the single market, The Guardian, 6 July. Savage, M. (2018) Right wing think tanks lobbying for de-regulation and lowering of standards, Observer, 17 February. Scottish Government (2018a) Scotland’s population needs and migration policy. Edinburgh, www.gov.scot/Publications/2018/02/5490 (accessed 12 June 2018). Scottish Government (2018b) Scotland’s place in Europe: people, jobs and investment, www.gov.scot/Resource/0053/00530160.pdf (accessed 15 April 2018). Thompson, H. (2018) Will it hold?, London Review of Books, 21 June. UK Government (2018a) The United Kingdom’s Exit from and New Partnership with the European Union White Paper, www.gov.ukexit+partnership+papers (accessed 14 May 2018). UK Government (2018b) The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and the European Union. Cmnd 9593, London: The Stationery Office. www. gov.uk/government/publications/the-united-kingdoms-exit-from-and-newpartnership-with-the-european-union-white-paper (accessed 16 July 2018). Utz, P. (2018) How the EU has changed politics in Northern Ireland, www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/blog/how-eu-has-changed-politics-northern-ireland (accessed 16 July 2018). Walker, D. (2017) Bernard Jenkin’s attack on the Treasury, The Guardian, 10 October. Wincot, D. (2017) Brexit dilemmas: new opportunities and tough choices in unsettled times, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19:4, 680–695.

Conclusion British politics in a changing and turbulent environment The preceding chapters in this book have detailed key elements and developments in British politics in a sometimes turbulent and volatile environment. Across the chapters and through recent and ‘live’ case studies, some of the key issues affecting politics internationally have been analysed through this study of Britain’s political life: global presence, politics and representation, ‘state of the (UK) union’, nationalism and aspects of policy making provided the scholarly platform for this study of British politics. It is useful to appraise what sort of statement each of these analysed issues makes about British political life at present. Chapter 1 made clear that Britain’s role as an international player is unquestioned. Different conceptions of this are constructed and played out from time to time ranging from the ‘anglosphere’ (with imperial antecedents and overtones) to trans-Atlanticism, to Europeanism and global power player (but with severe economic constraints in this role). Currently, as Chapters 4 and 7 make clear, the European role is troublesome. The reality of global Britain today is through its European links: deregulation of financial services in the 1980s led to Britain being a very significant financial services provider for Europe; privatisation in the same era resulted in major investment and important infrastructure in Britain being foreign, often European, owned (e.g. in energy and transportation); key multinational companies have invested in Britain as a business friendly entry point for not only British but wider European markets (e.g. in cars and aerospace). Britain is an important member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and given geographical proximity and (at the moment) uncertain US commitment, Europe is likely to remain an important and more reliable partner for defence, security and foreign policy purposes than the US. What is missing is a

180 Conclusion

serious debate (see Chapter 7) and any political consensus about the maintenance and enhancement of Britain’s trading and other links beyond EU membership. Many aspects of politics and representation (Chapter 2) can be considered to be at a crossroads. Britain’s two main parties are experiencing different types of development and turbulence, with no clarity yet on outcome over the medium or longer term. Labour under a radical left wing leader has increased membership substantially by around 600,000, helped by a loose membership organisation, Momentum, consisting of left wing activists. Many of the new members are young and total Labour membership is probably six times that of the Conservatives. All this has consolidated the left’s position in the Labour party machine and leadership in a way reminiscent of New Labour’s leadership hold under Blair and Brown. In some respects, Labour has viewed its role as creating a movement to mobilise people with areas of policy (beyond a policy of house building and rail nationalisation) not yet fully developed. The notion of Labour under Corbyn creating a social movement is contested, as Chapter 2 indicates. The absence of detailed policies is not unusual for a party in opposition. What is less usual and must be concerning for Labour is that with the governing party bitterly divided and barely functional at times, Labour has been running neck and neck in the polls, only taking a small lead at some polling dates; and with a prime minister not considered to be a strong Commons performer, the Labour leader fails to consistently get the better of her in the showpiece Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQ). Yet there is historical precedent for surprise: the importance of PMQ may be overstated as Mrs Thatcher as Conservative leader and prime minister rarely got the better of Labour leader Michael Foot from 1980–1983, yet went on to win a landslide victory in 1983, and she won her first general election by a fairly narrow margin though with a comfortable majority of seats and then consolidated her hold on British politics for most of the 1980s. The Conservative Party is especially divided and conflict ridden over Europe, way beyond differences of opinion and alternative perspectives found normally in political parties. This conflict and division has been steadily growing since the 1980s, actually made worse by the calling of a referendum which the then leader David Cameron thought would both cut back electoral support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and ease conflict in his own party. What happens to the Conservative Party post-European Union (EU) membership is of interest. Younger leaders, like Ruth Davidson, leader of the Scottish Conservatives, appear to acknowledge that the Conservatives are not appealing to people under the age of 45, with a membership that is elderly, rather socially illiberal,

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often backward looking and unable to articulate or understand many common day problems like housing and job insecurity (and policies for their solution). Much of this is confirmed by academic research (Bale et al. 2018). It is interesting to see where and how the Conservatives evolve after the all enveloping European issue diminishes. There appear to be three possibilities: a continuation of appeal to voters aligned to the values of the existing membership base in addition to attracting older, poorer (and whiter) parts of the country (which it did to some success at the 2017 election); a reinvention of deregulated market focused global policies and approaches, a kind of Thatcherism reborn and resurrected; and incremental modernisation capturing elements of state interventionism (not unlike Theresa May’s speeches early in her premiership) – this approach is being developed by the creation of a new think tank called Onward, funded with some support from sympathetic business figures and (for the time being at least) openly supported by Michael Gove and Ruth Davidson. Chapter 2 also analysed in the medium to longer term range changes in political alignment according to age, education, geography (specifically big metropolitan centres vs suburban, rural and other areas) and a withdrawal of large numbers of working class people from electoral participation. The chapter also examined disenchantment with mainstream parties and also the significance of new forms of media communication in the political process. Chapter 6 indicated similar international trends, particularly the decline in mainstream left wing parties. However, some of these indicators require circumspection in light of Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 showed that to a large extent the higher than anticipated ‘yes’ vote in the Scottish independence referendum was explained by working class participation, as was the general election result one year on. The 2015 election saw turnout in Scotland higher than the UK as a whole; Labour was reduced to one member of parliament (MP) in Scotland, with working class voters supporting the Scottish National Party (SNP). Chapter 4 indicated an overall turnout for the Brexit referendum of around 72 per cent, and this included many who had never voted before or had not voted for some time, but as the chapter indicates, age and education were far greater determinants of voting turnout than class. In fact, the Scottish independence referendum had a turnout of 85 per cent, 14 percentage points above the Brexit vote. This gives rise to an interesting statistic. The percentage of those eligible to vote who voted to leave the EU (37) was slightly less than the percentage of those eligible to vote who cast a vote for Scottish independence (38). With regard to the broader profile of politics in Britain, Chapter 6 explored the rise of populism and extreme right wing populist parties

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seen in parts of Europe (with an attempt to downplay pluralism, focus on anti-immigration messaging and initiatives, privileging the ‘home’ or ‘native’ community, sometimes limiting the independence of the judiciary and other instruments of governance, rubbishing mainstream parties and much of the mainstream media) showing these to be largely absent in Britain, with the exception of aspects of the Brexit referendum process and aftermath. That said, some recent research on UKIP has shown that the party has at times had some success in bridging the electoral positions of the extreme right with those of more traditional conservative voters, a bridging which has parallels with the more electorally significant anti-establishment right wing populist parties in Europe. The UK– EU withdrawal process (Chapter 7) has an unknown and unpredictable final outcome: some outcome scenarios could be accompanied by an increasing attraction of populist approaches by sections of the population. Recent years in Britain have seen the use of referendums. In addition to those analysed in Chapters 3 and 4, there was a referendum on voting reform for UK elections, specifically the adoption of the ‘alternative vote’. There may or may not be future referendums on Scottish independence or on any UK–EU withdrawal deal. Referendums can be problematic for representative democracies. Referendums often involve a binary choice (though they can have several questions which may then be confusing with the result difficult to interpret) and this may not provide the nuance and debate which an issue may require and could be exposed to in a representative body (e.g. a parliament) with full and proper debate – especially if the referendum campaign does not air debates openly or if based on false premises. However, many criticisms about lack of debate and nuance can be made on the way representative institutions operate at times. The main problem of referendums in representative democratic systems is that the forms of accountability are very different for each. A referendum is very often not strictly associated with a single political party, since there may be umbrella campaigns involved with a wide range of actors, whereas in an election campaign a party will stand on a platform of proposals and policies and of course will be identifiable and held accountable for this by the electorate at the next election. A challenge for a referendum often is this: who is accountable if the agents in the successful campaign are difficult to identify or if there are no mechanisms for them to be held to account (see Runciman 2018)? The UK–EU withdrawal case, outlined in some detail in Chapter 7, is obviously unique for both the UK and the EU. Yet the case shows there is a deep context at play. There has been considerable foregrounding, especially within the Conservative Party, of anti-EU feeling and the fear of being outflanked on the issue from the right. Yet some debates and positions

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of various players, though focused around EU withdrawal, have a much longer and varied gestation. For example, differentiated approaches to politics and policies between devolved governments (especially Scotland) and Westminster may appear stark over EU withdrawal, but differences have developed over a longer time period and over a variety of issues. Much working class disengagement with the mainstream political parties (especially Labour) has been highlighted over Brexit, with many working class areas voting leave, yet this has been evolving for some time – but Brexit appears to have provided voice to the concerns of many in such communities. As Chapter 7 shows, the actual outcome of the withdrawal process will depend on the interplay of a range of forces within the main political parties. These forces include ideology vs pragmatism; strength of party leadership; political calculation and interpretation of public mood and opinion; and individual political ambition. The state of the UK union is likely to remain an important matter for British politics in the future. The idea of the UK as a unitary state underpinned by executive government and parliamentary sovereignty at Westminster has legal and constitutional standing. But the political and working reality is rather different, more meaningfully defined as a union state. There are different elements of the UK settlement between nations and the central state, the most obvious being Scotland’s maintenance, since its incorporation in the British state in 1707, of separate and quasiindependent legal, educational and administrative systems. Subsequent developments have introduced constitutional practices, in effect by-passing Westminster, the most significant being EU law (and as Chapter 7 indicates, not surprisingly the repatriation of this is a matter of conflict between the Scottish and UK governments) and the creation of devolved legislatures. Northern Ireland too has a separate set of arrangements within the UK; most notably the Good Friday Agreement set in train a devolved consociational system designed to ensure that major change happens only with broad support in both parts of the community. This is very different from the concept of the UK as a unitary state, as is the Good Friday Agreement’s role for the Republic of Ireland and the possibility of a majority vote in Northern Ireland to become part of a united Ireland. Chapter 7 shows the pressure on this governing arrangement caused by Brexit (specifically the issues of a hard border between north and south and an alignment between north and south according to EU regulations, effectively isolating Northern Ireland from the UK). The fundamental fault line lies in the union state governance arrangements. The model adopted is one of devolution, with a range of powers reserved to the centre (Westminster). So although the Scotland Act 2016 and the Wales Act 2017 indicate the permanence of the devolved institutions, these

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devolved bodies do not have the protection which federalism would provide, thereby leading to actual or potential instability and conflict between devolved and UK state governments. Any forward movement to a federal structure in Britain is unlikely any time soon. Nationalism is now seen as a force in British politics – or to be more precise nationalisms. Northern Ireland displays two distinct, often opposing nationalisms, one a loyalist (to the UK) identity in the Protestant community and the other in the Catholic community, identifying as Irish, traditionally seeking unification with the Irish Republic. Both are strongly represented in the Northern Ireland Assembly when it is not suspended. Northern Irish MPs elected to Westminster are dominated by unionists and nationalists, though the latter do not take up their seats. Scottish nationalism as a political force has had a growing strength since the creation of the Scottish Parliament and the SNP has formed a government in Holyrood since 2008; the SNP has a strong representation in Westminster, currently having more MPs from Scotland than the other parties combined. Nationalism in England is more problematic. Given England’s dominance in the UK’s population (85 per cent) there has been a tendency there to conflate ‘British’ and ‘English’ as a national identity. Added to this, there is no separate English parliament or assembly, like there is in the other nations of the UK; nor is there a mainstream political party articulating English nationalism. Nonetheless there has been a growth in English nationalism around the feeling that England is not getting a ‘fair deal’, particularly in relation to the real or perceived advantages which the Scots have; and all the evidence indicates that in the Brexit referendum those most likely to vote leave were those who self-identified as English over and above being British (Kenny 2016). However, it is also suggested the roots of English nationalism run somewhat deeper than this (Kenny 2014). Differences between English and Scottish nationalism and its relationship with British identity may be significant in future British politics. Recent polling by the BBC (early 2018) suggests only 59 per cent of people in Scotland feel ‘strongly British’, whereas the figure in England is 82 per cent (Wales 79 per cent); 61 per cent in Scotland say they feel ‘strongly Scottish’, in England ‘strongly English’ 54 per cent (Wales ‘strongly Welsh’ 41 per cent). The differing views of those who can be identified as Scottish nationalists (for the survey, that is those who voted SNP at the 2017 UK general election) and English nationalists (for the survey those who said they were strongly English rather than British) shows how different both nationalisms are: 70 per cent of English nationalists said that ‘England was better in the past’ (only 16 per cent

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of Scottish nationalists thought ‘Scotland was better in the past’); only 13 per cent of English nationalists thought England’s ‘best years are still in the future’, while 64 per cent of Scottish nationalists felt Scotland’s best years are yet to come. While these findings may be significant, they must be treated with some circumspection if trying to infer the impact on British politics. Nationalism may or may not be considered a salient issue for electors when making political choices. In England in particular, the views and interests of nationalists may be articulated through mainstream British political parties, as has happened in Scotland – but through the SNP and not the main British political parties. And of course, the profile and nature of nationalism in both countries may change over time, this survey being a contemporary snapshot (BBC 2018).

References Bale, T., Webb, P. and Poletti, M. (2018) Grassroots. Britain’s Party Members: Who they are, what they think and what they do. Mile End Institute, Queen Mary, University of London, www.qmul.ac.uk/media/qmul/media/publica tions/Grassroots,-Britain’s-Party-Members.pdf (accessed 20 April 2018). BBC (2018) Scottish nationalism is a very different and a better thing than English/British nationalism and, at last, BBC Scotland seems to have faced up to the fact, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-44300916 (accessed 1 February 2018). Kenny, M. (2014) The Politics of English Nationhood. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kenny, M. (2016) The genesis of English nationalism, Political Insight, September. Runciman, D. (2018) Too few to mention, London Review of Books, 10 May, 23–26.

Appendices

Appendix 1: definition of class by occupation Socio-economic group classifications

Traditional jobs

Newer jobs

Old middle class: managers, self-employed with employees, self-employed professionals, farmers

Managers, small business owner with employees, shopkeeper, barrister, farmer

Self-employed website designer, human resources manager

New middle class: employed professionals, intermediate non-manual

Architect, teacher, university lecturer, nurse, social worker

Occupational therapist, dietician, paramedic, dental hygienist

Junior middle class: junior non-manual

Bank cashier, clerk, secretary, typist

Legal assistant, dispatch technician

Own account: selfemployed without employees

Shop owner with no employees, self-employed own account plumber

Personal service: personal service workers

Nursery assistant, assistant, chauffeur

Personal care assistant, tour guide

Foreman: foreman and supervisors

Lead hand, production supervisor, construction foreman

Packing manager

Working class: skilled manual, semi-skilled manual, unskilled manual, farm worker

Machine operator, seamstress, warehouseman, quarry worker, miner, farm labourer

Packer, order picker, HGV driver, gardener, waste treatment officer

Source: Based on socio-economic group (SEG) classifications, Evans and Tilley (2017) The New Politics of Class. The Political Exclusion of the British Working Class. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 4

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Appendix 2: extracts from the Calman Commission (2009) and government response The Government sees these plans as part of a coherent package for refreshing devolution in Scotland. Changes to the powers and financial accountability of the Scottish Parliament will require legislation. The Government envisages introducing legislation as soon as possible in the next Parliament. The legislation will require the consent of the Scottish Parliament under the Sewel Convention. The Government welcomes the commitment of the UK Parliament and the Scottish Parliament to take forward work on those of the Calman Commission’s recommendations which are for them, and will continue to be involved in those discussions where they consider it helpful for us to do so. We believe that these changes, once implemented, will provide a strong foundation for building . . . to refresh devolution and reinvigorate Scotland’s place at the heart of the United Kingdom. The Government is supportive of both Parliaments, and the other legislatures across the United Kingdom, giving consideration to and agreeing upon those elements of common social rights and responsibilities that make up the social union. Part of the Budget of the Scottish Parliament should now be found from devolved taxation under its control rather than from grant from the UK Parliament. The main means of achieving this should be by the UK and Scottish Parliaments sharing the yield of income tax. 1. Therefore the Scottish Variable Rate of income tax should be replaced by a new Scottish rate of income tax, collected by HMRC, which should apply to the basic and higher rates of income tax. 2. To make this possible, the basic and higher rates of income tax levied by the UK Government in Scotland should be reduced by 10 pence in the pound and the block grant from the UK to the Scottish Parliament should be reduced accordingly. 3. Income tax on savings and distributions should not be devolved to the Scottish Parliament, but half of the yield should be assigned to the Scottish Parliament’s Budget, with a corresponding reduction in block grant. 4. The structure of the income tax system, including the bands, allowances and thresholds should remain entirely the responsibility of the UK Parliament. The Government accepts the recommendation that part of the budget should now be found from devolved taxation under its control rather than from grant from the UK Parliament.

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Stamp Duty Land Tax, Aggregates Levy, Land ll Tax and Air Passenger Duty should be devolved to the Scottish Parliament, again with a corresponding reduction in the block grant. The Government will carefully consider any taxes proposed by the Scottish Parliament that could be introduced alongside the proposals above as part of the proposed package of devolved taxes, subject to European state aids clearance. The Government agrees that a block grant should continue to make up a substantial proportion of the Scottish budget, and that the Barnett formula should continue to be used to determine it. The Government has no plans to review the Barnett formula itself, but will continue to keep all aspects of public spending including the Barnett formula under review, and it will continue to keep the Barnett formula up to date. This system will require a strengthening of the intergovernmental arrangements to deal with finance. 1. The present Finance Minsters Quadrilateral Meeting should become a Joint Ministerial Committee on Finance (JMC(F)), and should meet regularly on a transparent basis to discuss not just spending but taxation and macro-economic policy issues. 2. HMRC should advise Scottish Ministers in relation to those devolved taxes it is tasked with collecting and their responsibilities in relation to income tax and should account to them for the operation of these Scottish taxes. Scottish Ministers should be consulted on the appointment of the Commissioners of HMRC. 3. All the relevant spending or grant calculations done by HMRC and HM Treasury should be audited by the National Audit Office which should publish an annual report on the operation of the funding arrangements, including reporting to the new JMC(F) and to the Scottish Parliament. Scottish Ministers currently have a power under the Scotland Act to borrow for short-term current spending, although this power has not yet been used. The Government proposes to maintain the existing borrowing power and keep the borrowing limit under review. Furthermore, the Government considers that when greater tax devolution is introduced, it will be appropriate to introduce a new capital borrowing power to enable Scottish Ministers to borrow from the National Loans Fund at normal rates and terms to fund increases in agreed categories of capital investment. Such borrowing would be subject to limits set by the Treasury. Source: Calman Commission (2009) Scotland’s Future in the UK. Building on Ten Years of Scottish Devolution, Cmnd 7738. London: Stationery Office (italics in original)

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Appendix 3: extracts from Choosing Scotland’s Future: A National Conversation (2009) This paper is the first step in a wide-ranging national conversation about the future of Scotland. This conversation will allow the people of Scotland to consider all the options for the future of the country and make informed decisions. This paper invites the people of Scotland to sign up for the national conversation and to suggest how the conversation should be designed to ensure the greatest possible participation. Significant powers are currently reserved to the United Kingdom Parliament and the United Kingdom Government. Further devolution in these important areas would allow the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government to take their own decisions on these issues in the interests of Scotland and reflecting the views of the people of Scotland. In some areas, further devolution could also provide greater coherence in decision-making and democratic accountability for delivery of policy. Some reserved matters could be regarded as fundamental to the United Kingdom as a state, and therefore difficult to devolve to the Scottish Parliament while Scotland remains within the United Kingdom. These include: foreign affairs and defence; borders and citizenship; the United Kingdom Parliament; the currency and central bank. However, many of these are today affected by international treaties and membership of international organisations, particularly the European Union, showing that responsibility for these matters can be pooled and shared by governments. Other reserved areas are not constitutional in nature, but are central to economic and social policy in Scotland: taxation, fiscal and economic policy; trade and industry, including employment; social security and pensions; energy; transport; equal opportunities; broadcasting; and other societal issues such as abortion and misuse of drugs. Further devolution to the Scottish Parliament of individual reserved areas would enable the Parliament to come to its own decisions on each, better reflecting any differences in views between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom – and within Scotland – on important policy areas. This chapter examines possible further devolution to the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government, and how additional responsibilities might be used to make practical changes for Scotland in current areas of strategic priority. However, the main outcome of further devolution would be to allow future Scottish Parliaments, of whatever political complexion, to pursue policies and legislation that they considered to be in the best interests of Scotland. Extending devolved powers could also clarify responsibilities and improve the effectiveness and accountability of government in delivering

190 Appendices

its policies. In some areas, the division of responsibility between the Scottish and United Kingdom Governments is complex, and can lead to difficulties in effective delivery of policy. It can also lead to confusion over accountability for outcomes. For example, climate change, one of the most important issues of the day, involves both devolved and reserved responsibilities across the economy, environment, energy, transport and housing. Extending and clarifying the responsibilities of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government could therefore increase their effectiveness in achieving results for Scotland. The Scottish Government would have more flexibility, and greater opportunity to pursue policies which require powers across a wide range of governmental functions. The Scottish Parliament could hold the Scottish Government to account for delivering these policies. There would remain a need for the Scottish and United Kingdom Governments to work closely together on a wide range of issues, with the other devolved administrations, with other national governments, and with the European Union institutions where appropriate. Joint working in this way would be helped by clear responsibility and accountability for well-defined areas of policy. The major consequence of independence would be the assumption by the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government of responsibility for those areas reserved to the United Kingdom Parliament and the United Kingdom Government. The significance of this change would depend on the extent to which further responsibility had previously been devolved to the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government in the areas discussed in the last chapter. However, an independent Scotland would have responsibility for macro-economics, defence and foreign affairs in a way that would not be possible while Scotland remains within the United Kingdom. An independent Scotland would be recognised as a state in its own right by the international community. It would be able to develop its own foreign policy to promote Scotland’s interests internationally, and engage with other states as an equal partner. It would be able to negotiate memberships of international organisations, or enter or withdraw from such bodies, in the same way as other independent nations. An independent Scotland would continue in the European Union and bear the burdens and fulfil the responsibilities of membership. Following negotiations on the detailed terms of membership, Scotland would be in a similar position to other European Union member states of a similar size. As a full member of the European Union, Scotland would have the normal rights of representation in its institutions, with an equal status to the other member states. For example, Scotland would expect representation in the

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European Parliament nearer to that of Denmark, which has 14 members, rather than the current seven members that represent Scotland (which may be reduced to six). Scotland would be bound by the laws of the European Union, but on a level playing field with other full member states. The distinctive interests of Scotland as a member state would be properly represented through the Council of Ministers and the European Council, and the required transposition of European directives and regulations into domestic law would be done with due regard to their effect in Scotland. With independence, Scotland would become a full member of the United Nations and other international bodies, such as the Commonwealth, the World Health Organization, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World Trade Organization. This would give Scotland its own voice on the international stage, allow the distinctive views of its people to be expressed on the range of issues facing the world today, and allow Scottish Ministers to argue for Scottish interests in international negotiations directly affecting the interests of the nation (for example, on international trade). An independent Scotland could also develop its own voice, and its own distinctive contribution, in the area of defence. Scotland has a proud military tradition, which was represented in the historic Scottish regiments, and the naval, army and air force bases that have for many years provided a home in Scotland for the armed forces of the United Kingdom. With independence, Scotland could decide to continue with membership of current international defence alliances, principally NATO, or could opt, like Ireland and Sweden, for a defence posture outside a nuclear-armed alliance but within other co-operation bodies, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Western European Union and the Partnership for Peace programme. An independent Scotland would also have to consider the role and scale of its armed forces, and might choose to emphasise international peacekeeping and disaster relief missions. Independence would allow the people of Scotland, the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government to have the final say in all of these matters, and in whether Scottish armed forces participate in military actions, such as Iraq. An independent Scotland could accede to the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state, as have other successor states to nuclear weapon states. Scotland could not then possess nuclear weapons. The nuclear-armed submarines of the Royal Navy would have to be removed from Scotland, and based elsewhere. Whether the remainder of the United Kingdom continued to retain a nuclear deterrent would be a matter for that state to decide.

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On independence, Her Majesty The Queen would remain the Head of State in Scotland. The current parliamentary and political Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland would become a monarchical and social Union – United Kingdoms rather than a United Kingdom – maintaining a relationship first forged in 1603 by the Union of the Crowns. Within this relationship, a broad range of cultural, social, and policy initiatives would continue and it is likely that both an independent Scotland and the remainder of the United Kingdom would seek to maintain a series of cross-border partnerships and services. As members of the European Union, both would enjoy full access to each other’s markets. An independent Scottish Government could also look to build on the existing close working relationships within the current United Kingdom and with the Republic of Ireland, and could maintain partnership and co-operation through an effective British-Irish Council (further discussion of the British-Irish Council is in the next chapter). Independence for Scotland in the 21st century would reflect the reality of existing and growing interdependence: partnership in these Islands and more widely across Europe. A further consideration is the development of the European Union, in which sovereign states ‘pool’ elements of their sovereignty for particular purposes, for example a single market. This analysis can also be applied to federal states, where constituent parts of the federation have agreed on the powers of the central government. This analysis has not generally been applied to the institutions of the United Kingdom, that is England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have not been regarded as pooling their sovereignty, on a continuing basis, to form the United Kingdom Government and Parliament. Instead, the process of decentralising powers and responsibility in the ‘incorporating union’ which created the United Kingdom has been regarded, and described, as devolution. It might be that the concept of pooling sovereignty becomes more applicable as more responsibility is devolved within the United Kingdom, or if the United Kingdom were to develop as a looser association of states (and regions) on the islands of Britain and Ireland. Independence for Scotland would involve a fundamental change in the country’s constitutional status, with implications for partner countries in the present United Kingdom. It is generally accepted that the full consent of the people of Scotland would be required by way of a referendum. The timing and question of the referendum would need to be considered, as would the legislative basis. There are several possible questions that could be asked in a referendum on independence, for example, agreement to the principle of independence, agreement to negotiate, or

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agreement to a concluded Act or Treaty with the United Kingdom Government. Some of these could only be asked at a particular time: agreement to negotiate would need to be sought before any negotiations; agreement to a Treaty or Act of Independence could only take place after the terms of the Treaty had been negotiated or the Act had been passed. The devolution referendum provides a useful comparison for other referendums, including one on independence. That referendum gave the people of Scotland the opportunity to vote on the principle of devolution based on the proposals set out in a white paper, before the detail of the Scotland Act was established. It provided a clear mandate for the Labour Government to proceed with the Scotland Act 1998 and the establishment of the Scottish Parliament. It would be possible to design a referendum with more than one option, to give Scottish electors the choice between independence, the status quo, and significant additional devolution. However, there is not a sufficiently well developed proposal for further devolution to make such a multi-option referendum a realistic proposal at this stage. The design of such a referendum would also raise technical issues on how support for each option is to be judged – for example, whether there would be ranking of options. Despite these considerations, proposals for a multi-option referendum might well be developed into a feasible option during the national conversation. It is now ten years since the referendum on devolution, and eight years since the Scottish Parliament was established. As discussed in this paper, there have been significant recent constitutional developments in Wales and Northern Ireland, and the United Kingdom Government has recently made its own proposals for change. Most importantly, the majority of Members of the Scottish Parliament elected at the Scottish Parliamentary elections this year stood on manifestoes advocating further devolution of responsibilities to Scotland. Events since those elections have illustrated the limitations of the current constitutional settlement, for example the conduct of the elections themselves. The Scottish Government envisages a national conversation which will consider the entire range of possible changes to the current constitutional settlement for Scotland. The national conversation will allow an informed choice about independence, or other forms of constitutional change. The Scottish Government would intend to make the case for independence, and seek support for a referendum, but also to put to the Scottish people the arguments for other forms of further constitutional change through a programme of events in which the benefits of the options can be fully tested. Other political parties, groups and individuals with different views would also play a full part in the conversation.

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At the end of the conversation, the Scottish Government foresees a choice facing Scotland of: continuing with the current constitutional settlement with: no or minimal change; extending devolved responsibilities to Scotland in areas identified during the national conversation; or taking the steps to allow Scotland to become a fully independent country. Source: Scottish Government (2009) Choosing Scotland’s Future: A National Conversation: Independence and Responsibility in the Modern World, Scottish Government, www.gov. scot/Publications/2007/08/13103747/0

Appendix 4: extracts from Scotland’s Future (2013) Part one: the case for independence Independence is not an end in itself. The central purpose of independence is to make life better for people living in Scotland. Only a Scottish Parliament and Government will always be able to put the interests of the people of Scotland first. We only have to look at the track record of devolution since 1999 to know this is the case; these powers have been good for Scotland, but in those areas still controlled by Westminster there have been many costs for families and communities in Scotland. Democracy, prosperity and fairness are the principles at the heart of the case for independence. Independence means that the people of Scotland will take responsibility for our future into our own hands. It will also give us the economic and social powers that any country needs to build a more prosperous and fairer society. Crucially, these principles work in harmony. If we transfer decisionmaking powers from Westminster to Scotland we are more likely to see policies that are in tune with the values of the people of Scotland, that close the gap between rich and poor, and provide greater opportunities for everyone in Scotland regardless of their background. We can build a fairer society. And in doing so we can create a more prosperous country because we know that successful countries are more equal and cohesive. They make full use of everyone’s talents and have a sense of shared national purpose. There are three over-riding reasons for Scotland to become an independent country. These are: 1. To create a more democratic Scotland The Scottish Government beleves that the people of Scotland are the ones who will do the best job of running our country. We will

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not get every decision right, but more often than not the choices we make for our economy and our society will be better for Scotland than those made at Westminster. A Scottish Parliament with limited powers has already shown what is possible. Since 1999, the Scottish Parliament has been responsible for devolved matters, including health, education, justice, housing, farming, fisheries and some aspects of transport. It has delivered free personal care for the elderly, kept our NHS in the public sector and restored free education for our students. Under independence, with full powers over our tax system, welfare, immigration, foreign affairs and defence, the Scottish Parliament will also be able to make better choices for Scotland on these issues. Policies are imposed on Scotland even when they have been opposed by our elected Westminster MPs. Under the current Westminster Government this democratic deficit has resulted in: • • • •

the privatisation of the Royal Mail unfair welfare changes such as the ‘bedroom tax’ cuts in capital spending, harming economic recovery a commitment to spend as much as £100 billion on the lifetime costs of a replacement nuclear weapon system.

Being able to decide our own government really matters. The costs of decisions being made at Westminster are being paid by families and communities across Scotland. Many of the consequences will be long-lasting: as a direct result of the Westminster Government’s welfare changes, the child poverty rate in Scotland is predicted to rise to 22.7 per cent, equivalent to an additional 50,000 children by 2020. None of this needs to happen. These consequences are a direct result of Scotland getting governments we did not vote for. 2. To build a more prosperous country Both before and after devolution, the key economic powers necessary to deliver growth and prosperity have remained with Westminster. Control of taxation, public spending limits, regulation of business and industry, and competition policy all rest in London. Successive devolved Scottish governments have had considerable success in reducing unemployment, increasing employment and promoting inward investment. But the fundamental economic decisions that affect Scotland are taken in Westminster, often by governments that have no popular mandate in

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Scotland, and in the interests of an economy and society with different priorities from Scotland. Scotland is blessed with a range of economic strengths and advantages: substantial natural resources, a strong international brand, world-class universities and research, and a range of world-leading industries including food and drink, life sciences, the creative industries, energy, tourism, insurance, wealth management and engineering. Because of those strengths and advantages, our national output per head of population puts us near the top of the OECD – the association of the wealthiest countries in the world. Even without North Sea oil, Scotland’s economy produces almost exactly the same amount of output per head as the rest of the UK. With oil and gas, we produce nearly a fifth more. Scotland can afford to be independent. However, despite all of Scotland’s strengths, over the past 30 years our economic growth rate has been lower than the UK average and lower than that of comparable nations across Europe. That reflects a number of factors, including lower population growth. Our economic output is the product of our collective hard work and ingenuity as a nation, and reflects the many advantages we enjoy. Yet life expectancy is lower in Scotland than in similar countries, and poverty levels are too high. Nations that are similar to Scotland – such as Norway, Finland, Denmark and Sweden – sit at the top of world wealth and wellbeing league tables. Unlike Scotland, they are independent and are able to take decisions in the best interests of their own economies. They do not leave the important decisions about their economy to parliaments whose interests necessarily lie elsewhere. That is their independence advantage and they have used it to build societies that deliver a higher quality of life for their citizens. If Scotland moved from the rates of growth it has experienced in the past to instead match the levels of growth of other small European countries, the benefits for people in Scotland in terms of prosperity and employment would be significant. 3. To become a fairer society Within the UK, Scotland is part of an increasingly unequal society. The UK ranks 28th out of 34 nations in the OECD on a measure of overall inequality. OECD analysis shows that since 1975, income inequality among working-age people has increased faster in the UK than in any other country in the organisation. This is not

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the result of the policies of one government, but of almost 40 years of decisions at Westminster. Seeking to become a more equal society is not just the right thing to do. It also makes sense for the economy. We know that the most equal societies also have the highest levels of wellbeing and are most prosperous. They are also, more often than not, nations like Scotland; the fairest and most successful countries in the world are independent European nations of similar size. We want the powers of independence so that we can build a different and better Scotland, where the many benefits of a rich and active society are cherished and where we work together to advance our nation as a whole. Progress under devolution has shown us what is possible, but it is not enough. Rather than remaining a peripheral concern for Westminster governments that we did not elect and do not necessarily support, we can forge our own path. With independence we can create a social nation: a country that acts and feels like a community, a vibrant society where we know the benefits of looking out for each other. Independence is about empowering the people and communities of Scotland as much as it is about empowering our Parliament and government. It will give us the ability, collectively, to choose the path ahead that is right for us and for those we work with and live beside. Driving our ambition is the firm knowledge that Scotland, and all of the people who live here, should be enjoying the benefits of higher levels of sustainable economic growth. There is so much more we can achieve with all the advantages that we enjoy.

Part two: Scotland’s national finances Over each of the last 32 years, estimates show Scotland has contributed more tax per head of population than the UK as a whole. Total Scottish tax receipts in 2011/12 (the latest year for which figures are available) were equivalent to £10,700 per head. This compares to a figure of £9,000 per head in the UK as a whole. Over the period from 2007/08 to 2011/12 the ratio of public spending to GDP was estimated to be lower for Scotland than in the UK as a whole. Taking tax and spending together, over the last five years Scotland’s public finances have been stronger than the UK as a whole by a total of £12.6 billion – almost £2,400 per head.

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Part three: the opportunities of independence Economy Even without North Sea oil and gas, GDP (national economic output) per head in Scotland is virtually identical to that of the UK as a whole. With oil it is almost one-fifth bigger. Under the Westminster system Scotland is treated as a regional economy within the UK. Our ability to meet future challenges and seize opportunities is constrained and many major decisions are taken by Westminster. Currently, the Scottish Parliament is responsible for just 7 per cent of taxes raised in Scotland; new tax powers will only increase this to around 15 per cent. With independence Scotland will control 100 per cent of our resources. Under the Westminster system, Scotland is also locked in to one of the most unequal economic models in the developed world: since 1975 income inequality among working-age people has increased faster in the UK than in any other country in the OECD. The increasing geographical imbalance concentrates jobs, population growth and investment in London and the South East of England, but no action has been taken to address this by successive Westminster governments. The UK economic model is also vulnerable to instability. The UK recession and recovery has been more prolonged and damaging than first thought and debt levels remain amongst the highest in the developed world. The gap between rich and poor, the increasing concentration of economic activity in one part of the UK and the imbalances in the structure and composition of the UK economic model all suggest that continuing as a regional economy will hamper job creation in Scotland and reduce economic resilience and security in the long-term. The Scottish Government believes that Scotland needs to become independent to address these issues. Only independence provides the opportunity to build an economy to take advantage of our unique strengths and size, and to deliver a more prosperous, resilient and fairer Scotland, fully engaged in Europe and the wider world. Our priorities would include: • increasing female and parental participation in the workforce through a transformational expansion in childcare provision • giving Scottish businesses a competitive edge by providing a clear timetable for reducing corporation tax by up to three percentage

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points; and improving international connectivity by cutting Air Passenger Duty by 50 per cent • introducing a package of employment measures designed to improve company performance and develop a greater sense of cohesion and opportunity in the workplace, including employee representation and greater female participation on company boards • examining how to help small businesses, for example with their national insurance contributions. Currency The pound is Scotland’s currency just as much as it is the rest of the UK’s. The expert Fiscal Commission Working Group concluded that retaining Sterling as part of a formal Sterling Area with the UK would be the best option for an independent Scotland and the rest of the UK. The Scottish Government agrees with that view. Using Sterling will provide continuity and certainty for business and individuals, and an independent Scotland will make a substantial contribution to a Sterling Area. We will therefore retain the pound in an independent Scotland. Taxation With independence the Scottish Parliament will make decisions about all aspects of taxation. Independence will provide an opportunity to design a Scottish tax system based on specific Scottish circumstances, preferences and principles. Tax rates and allowances will be set by future governments in an independent Scotland. As Scotland’s public finances are healthier than those of the UK as a whole, there will be no requirement for an independent Scotland to raise the general rate of taxation to fund existing levels of spending. As well as the changes to business taxation outlined above, the current Scottish Government would make the following changes to personal taxation during the first term of an independent Scottish Parliament: • we will ensure that the personal tax allowance and tax credits increase in line with inflation • we will end the proposed tax allowance for some married couples which does not help all families and parents

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• we will abolish the Shares for Rights scheme which offers tax incentives to those giving up employment rights, creating tax avoidance opportunities and risks to employees • we will simplify the tax system to reduce compliance costs, streamline reliefs and help to reduce tax avoidance, with a target revenue gain of £250 million a year by the end of the first term. Transport Scotland’s geographical position makes strong international and cross-border transport links vital for our economic success and our social wellbeing. Within the UK, Westminster focuses on the transport needs of London and the South East, as the plans for high-speed rail demonstrate. Independence will provide us with more choices for our transport system, and we will be able to decide our forward investment based on our own finances rather than within boundaries set by Westminster. We will be able to consider options such as different ownership models for the rail network, and address Scotland’s international connections to the global marketplace, developing our air and sea access to the most important markets. We will also be able to consider tax measures to help transport in Scotland, like reducing Air Passenger Duty and examining the benefits of a Fuel Duty Regulator mechanism to stabilise prices for business and consumers. Early years Parents in the UK face some of the highest childcare costs in Europe. Parents in Scotland spend around 27 per cent of household income on childcare, compared to the OECD average of 12 per cent. Independence will give us the opportunity to make a transformational change to the way that Scotland provides childcare services, which will allow parents, in particular women, to choose to work without worrying about the cost of looking after their children. With independence the benefits of their work – in economic growth and tax revenues – will stay in Scotland, contributing over time to the costs of this provision. This Government plans a universal system of high quality early learning and childcare for children from the age of one to when they enter school. By the end of the first independent Scottish Parliament, every three and four year old and vulnerable two year old will be entitled to

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1,140 hours of childcare a year. This is the same amount of time as children spend in primary school in a year (the equivalent of 30 hours per week over 38 weeks). This extension in the provision of early learning and childcare will be achieved in a way that is affordable and sustainable. It will include investment in training and require a substantial increase in the workforce. We estimate that it will create around 35,000 new jobs. The additional investment will also cover regulation, inspection and quality through Education Scotland, the Care Inspectorate and the Scottish Social Services Council. Schools and universities In Scotland’s secondary schools, attainment levels have increased yearon-year. Substantial programmes of investment in new schools and teacher numbers have also been put in place. Scotland’s schools are now implementing the Curriculum for Excellence to equip young people with the skills they need for the 21st century. However, Scotland still has a long-standing problem with equality of attainment in our schools. Pupils from the most deprived 20 per cent of areas leave school with significantly lower qualifications than those in the least deprived 20 per cent. That gap is greater than most of the developed nations against which we measure ourselves. Independence gives us the opportunity to address this gap and the wider issues of deprivation and poverty which lie behind it. Independence will also allow Scotland to protect the principle of free education, and the current Scottish Government guarantees that, on independence, Scottish students will continue to have free access to higher education. We plan to continue to participate in the current common research area ensuring that Scotland’s research continues to be available across the UK to benefit both Scotland and the rest of the UK. Scotland will pay our way within the common research area, and contribute to arrangements for research funding through the existing Research Councils. State pensions The proportion of tax revenues taken up by social protection (including state pensions) is lower in Scotland than the UK, so these benefits are currently more affordable here.

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We will ensure that current pensioners will receive their pensions as now, on time and in full. All accrued rights will be honoured and protected, and planned reforms will be rolled out, including the single-tier pension. While we accept that the State Pension Age should rise to 66 according to the existing timetable, the Westminster Government’s plan for a rapid move to 67 is a concern. The timetable is significantly faster than that announced by the previous Westminster Government and it fails to take account of the fact that, due to lower life expectancy, Scots currently enjoy fewer years, on average, in receipt of state pensions than pensioners elsewhere in the UK. This Scottish Government plans to: • set up an Independent Commission on the State Pension Age to consider the appropriate State Pension Age for Scotland over the long term • uprate the State Pension by the triple lock from 2016. This means that pensions increase by average earnings, CPI inflation, or 2.5 per cent – whichever of these is highest – and provides protection for the value of pensions over time • ensure that from 6 April 2016, new pensioners will receive a Scottish single-tier pension, set at the rate of £160 per week – £1.10 a week higher than the rate currently expected for the UK • retain the Savings Credit (the full Savings Credit payment is currently £18 per week for a single person) benefiting around 9,000 low income pensioners. Private and public service pensions This Scottish Government supports the continued roll-out of automatic enrolment, introduced last year, to help address the historic decline in private pension saving. With independence, we would establish a Scottish Employment Savings Trust to provide a workplace pension scheme focused on people with low to moderate earnings, which will accept any employer wishing to use it. In an independent Scotland, all public service pension rights and entitlements will be fully protected and accessible. The organisation and infrastructure needed to pay state and public sector pensions is already in place in Scotland, through the pensions centres in Motherwell and Dundee, the Scottish Public Pensions Agency and the local authority teams that manage public sector pensions.

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Social protection In an independent Scotland we envisage a welfare system based on clear principles and values: support for people who work; a safety net for people who cannot work; and a climate of social solidarity. Following independence, the immediate priorities will be to reverse the most damaging and counterproductive of the UK welfare changes. On independence the current Government will: • abolish the ‘bedroom tax’ within the first year of the first year of the independent Scottish Parliament • halt the further roll-out of Universal Credit and Personal Independence Payments in Scotland • ensure that benefits and tax credits increase at least in line with inflation to avoid the poorest families falling further into poverty. If there is a vote for independence in the referendum, the Scottish Government will ask the Westminster Government to stop the roll-out in Scotland of Universal Credit and Personal Independence Payments immediately. This will give the Scottish Government elected in 2016 maximum flexibility to reform the welfare system in line with Scotland’s priorities. Health In an independent Scotland, we will continue to provide high quality, world-leading health and social care in a way that reflects the founding principles of the NHS and our social care services. Scotland faces long-standing challenges in health outcomes which are strongly associated with economic and social disadvantage. With independence, Scotland can work towards a fairer society that will address these health inequalities. Independence will not affect the day-to-day management of the NHS in Scotland, nor how people access NHS services. Similarly, it will not mean ending current cross-border arrangements with health services in the rest of the UK, which have continued even though the NHS in Scotland already operates independently. International relations An independent Scotland will have a firm commitment to international partnership and co-operation, not only in these Isles, but also in the EU

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and other international organisations, to secure shared interests and protect Scotland’s people and resources. Scotland and the rest of the UK will have a close and constructive relationship both at home and on many foreign policy issues. The current Scottish Government would intend to support the rest of the UK in maintaining its seat on the UN Security Council. We plan to establish a network of overseas embassies and consulates to represent Scotland’s interests internationally. We estimate that the running costs of our initial proposed network of 70 to 90 overseas missions will be £90–120 million. This is expected to be below Scotland’s population share of the UK’s total expenditure on overseas representation in 2016/17, giving opportunities for savings. Scotland would also be entitled to a fair share of the UK’s assets. European Union The Scottish Government, supported by the overwhelming majority of Members of the Scottish Parliament, believes that membership of the EU is in the best interests of Scotland. It is our policy, therefore, that an independent Scotland will continue as a member of the EU. We will approach EU membership negotiations on the basis of the principle of continuity of effect. That means that Scotland’s transition to independent membership will be based on the EU Treaty obligations and provisions that currently apply to Scotland under our present status as part of the UK. It will avoid disruption to Scotland’s current fully integrated standing within the legal, economic, institutional, political and social framework of the EU. While the Scottish Government recognises the political and economic objectives of the Eurozone, an independent Scotland will not seek membership. Scotland’s participation in the Sterling Area will not conflict with wider obligations under the EU Treaties. Nor will we seek membership of the Schengen area. Instead, an independent Scotland will remain part of the Common Travel Area (CTA) with the rest of the UK, Ireland, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. The CTA, which dates back to the early 1920s, is part of the broader ‘social union’ that is the expression of the close economic, social and cultural ties across the nations of these islands. International development Part of being a good global citizen is a commitment to international development. In line with the target recognised by the United Nations as

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long ago as 1970, we plan to spend 0.7 per cent of Gross National Income on Official Development Assistance, and to enshrine it as a binding, statutory commitment. Defence By removing nuclear weapons and maintaining defence forces appropriate to our circumstances, we can save a substantial proportion of Scotland’s current defence contribution to the UK, while still having levels of defence spending that allow us to deliver the capabilities we need and make a significant investment in procurement, supporting key Scottish industries including the shipbuilding industry. Following a vote for independence, we would make early agreement on the speediest safe removal of nuclear weapons a priority. This would be with a view to the removal of Trident within the first term of the Scottish Parliament following independence. Following a vote for independence in 2014, the Scottish Government will notify NATO of our intention to join the alliance and will negotiate our transition from being a NATO member as part of the UK to becoming an independent member of the alliance. Scotland would take our place as one of the many non-nuclear members of NATO. The current Scottish Government has identified five defence priorities for an independent Scotland: • maintaining the commitment to a budget for defence and security in an independent Scotland of £2.5 billion • securing the speediest safe withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Scotland • building a focus on maritime capabilities, such as air and sea-based patrol, and specialist forces able to operate around our coasts, protecting Scotland’s maritime assets and contributing to collective security in the North Atlantic • progressively building to a total of 15,000 regular and 5,000 reserve personnel following independence • reconfiguring the defence estate inherited at the point of independence to meet Scotland’s needs, including the transition of Faslane to a conventional naval base and joint headquarters of Scottish defence forces. We are prepared to negotiate arrangements for the continued use of defence infrastructure in Scotland by UK forces and vice versa, at least

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for a transitional period. Such arrangements could be carried forward into the longer term, where both the countries consider them the most effective means of delivering defence capabilities. Security An independent Scotland will have national security arrangements that reflect Scotland’s needs, values and the risks and threats we face, based on a full review of security requirements and a regular cycle of threat assessments. A new security and intelligence agency will have a range of responsibilities focused on intelligence-gathering, analysis and reporting, assessment of risk and threat, cyber security and protection of critical infrastructure. Although independent, it would work closely with Police Scotland. Given the interest of both Scotland and the rest of the UK in our mutual security, the Scottish Government will work closely with the current UK security and intelligence agencies both to ensure that there is a seamless, secure transition and for the continuing security of both countries. Immigration Scotland’s differing demographic and migration needs mean that the current UK immigration system has not served our interests. This Government plans, following independence, a points based immigration system, targeted at particular Scottish needs. The system will enable us to meet the needs of Scottish society with greater flexibility. For example, it could provide incentives to migrants who move to live and work in remoter geographical areas – assisting with community sustainability, or adding new categories of skills. We will also reintroduce student visas removed by Westminster to encourage more talented people from around the world to further their education in Scotland, providing income for Scotland’s education institutions and contributing to diversity.

Citizenship and passports In taking forward the result of a vote for independence, we will ensure that British citizens ‘habitually resident’ in Scotland on independence

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will automatically be considered Scottish citizens. This will include British citizens who hold dual citizenship with another country. Scottishborn British citizens currently living outside of Scotland will also automatically be considered Scottish citizens. Other people will be able to register or apply for Scottish citizenship on independence based on clear criteria. All Scottish citizens will have the right to acquire a Scottish passport, although there will be no requirement to hold one. We plan that citizens will be able to apply for Scottish passports from the date of independence. As an independent Member State, Scotland will be negotiating as one of the foremost and most respected fishing nations in Europe. This status will give Scotland the opportunity to take a leadership role in reforming the Common Fisheries Policy to deliver fisheries management at regional and Member State level and to keep Scottish quota in Scotland. Food and drink Scotland’s Food and Drink sector contributes 18 per cent of our overseas exports, but less than 1.5 per cent of overseas exports for the UK as a whole. Scotland’s food and drink industry does an excellent job promoting the Scottish brand, but Scotland is constrained by the current constitutional settlement from directly engaging on a level footing with other countries. Independence will boost Scotland’s international profile, delivering new opportunities for food and drink exports, as well as attracting new visitors to our country to enjoy our produce. Energy Scotland is an energy-rich nation. We have the largest oil reserves in the EU as well as huge renewable energy potential. But under successive Westminster governments our energy wealth has not been invested, instead it has gone straight to the UK Treasury. Independence gives Scotland the opportunity to harness this energy wealth for the people of Scotland. With independence we can ensure that taxation revenues from oil and gas support Scottish public services, and that Scotland sets up an Energy Fund to ensure that future generations also benefit from our oil and gas reserves. The principles of stability and certainty that will guide this Government’s approach will

208 Appendices

guarantee new investment in energy: we have no plans to increase the overall tax burden on the oil industry and no changes will be made to the fiscal regime without consultation. A well-functioning energy market, delivering the best outcome for consumers, is a prerequisite for a flourishing economy and society. With our plans for independence, Scotland’s substantial energy resources and balanced generation mix will provide enhanced security of supply, greater long-term stability in energy prices, decarbonisation of electricity generation, the protection and creation of jobs and further community empowerment. We propose that a single GB-wide market for electricity and gas will continue, helping the rest of the UK secure its supply and meet its renewables obligations, provided that the system also meets Scottish requirements for security of supply. Culture An independent Scotland will enjoy increased opportunities to build our international reputation for culture, heritage and creativity. The development of a Scottish overseas diplomatic and trade network will provide Scotland with the opportunity to promote and share our culture and traditions with nations across the world. Broadcasting Alongside the commercial channels serving Scotland, we plan to create a new public service broadcaster, the Scottish Broadcasting Service (SBS), which will initially be based on the staff and assets of BBC Scotland. Over time the SBS would develop services to reflect the broad interests and outlook of the people of Scotland. Broadcasting on TV, radio and online, the SBS will be funded by licence fee, which on independence will be the same as the UK licence fee. All current licence fee payment exemptions and concessions will be retained. We propose that the SBS enters into a new formal relationship with the BBC as a joint venture, where the SBS would continue to supply the BBC network with the same level of programming, in return for continuing access to BBC services in Scotland. This will ensure that the people of Scotland will still have access to all current programming, including EastEnders, Dr Who, and Strictly Come Dancing and to channels like CBeebies.

Appendices  209

Part four: transition Between the referendum in 2014 and independence in 2016 The period between the referendum and independence will see negotiations with the rest of the UK, represented by the Westminster Government, and with the EU and other international partners and organisations. Following these preparations and negotiations, Scotland will assume our status as an independent country on 24 March 2016. Following a vote for independence in 2014, agreements will be made between the Scottish and Westminster Governments, in the spirit of the Edinburgh Agreement, setting the parameters for Scotland’s transition to independence. These will: • set out the precise timetable towards independence day in 2016 • determine the principles, process and timetable for the negotiation and conclusion of the agreements which will form the final independence settlement • provide the Scottish Government and Scottish Parliament with the legal powers they need to prepare for independence. Soon after a vote for independence, we will seek a transfer of the necessary powers to the Scottish Parliament so that it can establish the constitutional platform for an independent Scotland – the laws and administrative arrangements to establish Scotland as an independent state. The over-riding priority will be the seamless delivery of public services to citizens of both countries. The apportionment of the UK national debt will be negotiated and agreed. The national debt could be apportioned by reference to the historic contribution made to the UK’s public finances by Scotland, or on the basis of our population share. We may choose to offset Scotland’s share of the value of UK assets against our inherited debt. On any realistic calculation Scotland’s inherited debt is projected to be a lower proportion of GDP than is the case for the UK as a whole. Government and civil service Independence will see the Scottish Government develop new functions as it takes on the responsibilities of serving an independent country. Scotland already has a civil service that is politically impartial, appointed on merit and supports the elected government of the day. If the present

210 Appendices

Scottish Government is re-elected we plan to spread government jobs and decision making, delivering the direct economic benefits of independent government to more parts of Scotland. The Westminster Government employs nearly 30,000 civil servants in Scotland at present. On independence many will transfer to the employment of the Scottish Government and its agencies. We will work with the Westminster Government to preserve continuity of employment for all staff, either by transfer to the Scottish Government or through continued employment by the Westminster Government where it still requires their skills. A modern constitution Independence provides an opportunity to modernise Scottish democracy on the basis of a written constitution setting out the way the country is governed and the rights of its citizens. The Scottish Government believes a constitutional convention will ensure a participative and inclusive process by which the people of Scotland, as well as politicians, civic society organisations, business interests, trade unions, local authorities and others, can have a direct role in shaping the constitution. The Scottish Government will be just one of many voices contributing to the debate and helping to shape Scotland’s written constitution. However, there are certain provisions that the Government believes should be considered by the constitutional convention, such as equality of opportunity and the right to live free of discrimination and prejudice, a constitutional ban on nuclear weapons being based in Scotland, and certain social and economic rights, such as the right to education, the right to healthcare and protections for children. The Monarchy and the Crown On independence Scotland will be a constitutional monarchy, continuing the Union of the Crowns that dates back to 1603, pre-dating the Union of the Parliaments by over one hundred years. On independence in 2016, Her Majesty The Queen will be head of state. Earlier in 2013, the rules on succession to the Crown (as they affect Scotland and elsewhere) were amended to remove outdated gender discrimination. This Government intends to support, and promote amongst the other Commonwealth States with the Queen as head of state, a similar measure to remove religious discrimination from the succession rules. Source: Scottish Government (2013) Scotland’s Future. Summary. Edinburgh: Scottish Government (bold in original)

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Appendix 5: Scottish independence referendum result (result and turnout by council area) Council

No (%)

Yes (%)

Turnout (%)

Aberdeen Aberdeenshire Angus Argyll and Bute City of Edinburgh Clackmananshire Comhairle Nan Eileanan Sair Dumfries and Galloway Dundee City East Ayrshire East Dunbartonshire East Lothian East Renfrewshire Falkirk Fife Glasgow City Highland Inverclyde

58.5 60.3 56.3 58.5 61.0 53.8 53.4 65.6 42.6 52.7 61.1 61.7 63.1 53.4 55.0 46.4 52.9 50.1

41.3 39.6 43.6 41.4 38.8 46.2 46.5 34.3 57.3 47.2 38.8 38.3 36.8 46.5 44.9 53.4 47.0 49.9

81.7 87.2 85.7 88.2 84.4 88.6 86.2 87.5 78.8 84.5 91.0 87.6 90.4 88.7 84.1 75.0 87.0 87.4

Midlothian

56.2

43.7

86.8

Moray

57.5

42.4

85.4

North Ayrshire North Lanarkshire Orkney Islands Perth and Kinross Renfrewshire Scottish Borders Shetland Islands South Ayrshire South Lanarkshire Stirling West Dunbartonshire West Lothian Scotland

51.0 48.9 67.1 60.1 52.8 66.5 63.6 57.8 54.6 59.7 46.0 55.1 55.3

48.9 51.0 32.8 39.8 47.2 33.4 36.3 42.1 45.3 40.2 53.9 44.8 44.7

84.4 83.7 86.9 87.3 87.4 84.4 86.1 85.3 90.1 87.9 86.2 89.2 84.6

Source: Adapted from Electoral Commission (2014) Scottish Independence Referendum. Report on the Referendum Held on 18 September 2014, www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/179812/Scottish-independencereferendum-report.pdf

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Appendix 6: extracts from EU reform negotiations (2016) Summary The Prime Minister, David Cameron, has on various occasions over the last few years set out proposals for EU reform which he maintains would benefit the UK and the EU as a whole. They can be summarised as follows: • No to ‘ever closer union’ and decisions taken far from people; • Eurozone integration must be fair to those inside and outside the single currency; • Welfare incentives encouraging EU citizens to seek work in Britain must be tackled; • Need to maintain competitiveness, jobs, growth, innovation and success. He pledged to hold an in-out referendum on continued EU membership by 2017 following a successful reform negotiation. In a statement on 4 September 2015 David Cameron described the four broad areas in which the Government is seeking reform as ‘competitiveness, sovereignty, social security and economic governance’. Mr Cameron presented his reform agenda to the European Council on 25–26 June 2015 and this triggered a process of ‘technical talks’ on what might be feasible, with or without Treaty change. These talks have been held in camera between EU and UK officials, with very little publicly available information. Since the summer David Cameron, Chancellor George Osborne, Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond, Europe Minister David Lidington, and other ministers, have held bilateral talks with other EU governments. These continued up to the December European Council meeting, at which the UK proposals were discussed over dinner. The continuing economic problems in Greece and elsewhere affecting the stability of the Eurozone, and mounting pressure from refugees, asylum seekers and migrants from the Middle East and Africa arriving at the borders of the EU, may have had an impact on the negotiations. The election in September of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour Party leader resulted in some uncertainty about Labour’s position on Europe, although since becoming leader Mr Corbyn has said he supports EU membership in a reformed EU. In November the Prime Minister set out in detail his proposed reforms in a letter to European Council President Donald Tusk. The pro- and anti-EU membership campaigns began in

Appendices  213

October. Opinion polls in December 2015 indicated that pro- and anti-membership supporters were roughly balanced. The Commons European Scrutiny Committee published a Report on the negotiations and proposed reforms on 14 December 2015. The Lords European Union Committee has opened an Inquiry on Visions of EU reform. This note looks at the Prime Minister’s proposed reforms, the level of support from other EU Member States, EU institutional initiatives of relevance to the Government’s reform agenda, the role – if any – of the devolved administrations in the negotiations, public opinion, the referendum campaigns and other recent developments, with reference where applicable to the European Scrutiny Committee report on the reform negotiations and its conclusions.

What are the Government’s proposed reforms? Bloomberg speech and other outlines David Cameron has on various occasions over the last three years presented a general reform agenda of what he maintains are benefits for the UK and the EU. He identified areas for reform in his January 2013 Bloomberg Speech, which he consolidated in an article in the Telegraph, 15 March 2014. They can be summarised as follows: • No to ‘ever closer union’ and decisions taken far from people; • Eurozone integration must be fair to those inside and outside the single currency; • Welfare incentives encouraging EU citizens to seek work in Britain must be tackled; • Need to maintain competitiveness, jobs, growth, innovation and success. David Cameron pledged to hold an in-out referendum on continued EU membership by 2017 following a successful reform negotiation. The European Union Referendum Bill 2015–16 was introduced in the House of Commons on 28 May 2015 to provide for this. The Bill received Royal Assent on 17 December and is now law. The continuing economic problems in Greece and elsewhere affecting the stability of the Eurozone, and mounting pressure from refugees, asylum seekers and migrants from the Middle East and Africa arriving at the borders of the EU, may have had an impact on the pace and nature of the negotiations. The Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond told the BBC: ‘This migration crisis has thrown into stark relief some

214 Appendices

of the issues the EU has to deal with – and that plays directly into some of the issues we are raising in our renegotiation proposition’. But he conceded he did not know whether or not this would end up helping the UK’s case ahead of the referendum. November 2015 letter to Donald Tusk It was not until early November 2015 that more details of the UK proposals emerged in a letter from David Cameron to European Council President Donald Tusk. The letter, ‘A new settlement for the United Kingdom in a reformed European Union’, was made public on 10 November. On the same day the Prime Minister made a speech at Chatham House on ‘The Future of Britain’s Relationship with the EU’. The letter provided more detail on the four broad areas of UK reform: economic governance, competitiveness, sovereignty and immigration. David Cameron was confident of ‘an agreement here that works for everyone’. However, the European Scrutiny Committee (ESC) pointed out on several occasions in its December 2015 report that the letter does not address the question of a ‘fundamental change in the UK’s relationship with the EU’, which is distinct from reform of the EU because it concerns UK national sovereignty. Economic governance Recognition that: • The EU has more than one currency. • There should be no discrimination and no disadvantage for any business on the basis of the currency of their country. • The integrity of the Single Market must be protected. • Any changes the Eurozone decides to make, such as the creation of a banking union, must be voluntary for non-Euro countries, never compulsory. • Taxpayers in non-Euro countries should never be financially liable for operations to support the Eurozone as a currency. • Just as financial stability and supervision has become a key area of competence for Eurozone institutions like the ECB, so financial stability and supervision is a key area of competence for national institutions like the Bank of England for non-Euro members. • And any issues that affect all Member States must be discussed and decided by all Member States. The ESC concluded that there was a genuine possibility of Eurozone caucusing in decisions taken by qualified majority, which could directly affect the UK, although the

Appendices  215

extent to which this might happen in single market and other policy areas was not clear. The Committee thought only Treaty change would provide the security needed to ensure ‘in a manner that provides legal certainty, a double majority system in relation to economic governance’ and that any measure to protect UK national interests would have to be made available in all policy areas. Competitiveness The EU needs: • A target to cut total burden on business • To fulfil commitment to free flow of capital, goods and services • A clear long-term commitment to boost the competitiveness and productivity of the EU and to drive growth and jobs for all. The ESC noted the Commission’s efforts to date and general EU-wide agreement to ‘further work on better regulation and on lessening the burdens on business while maintaining high standards’. This is not an area of contention, but, as the Committee points out, the necessary changes to EU legislation are not likely to be adopted before the UK referendum, which causes ‘uncertainty’. Sovereignty • End Britain’s obligation to work towards ever closer union ‘in a formal, legally-binding and irreversible way’. • Enhance the role of national parliaments in the EU, with a new arrangement where groups of national parliaments, acting together, can stop unwanted legislative proposals. • Full implementation of EU’s commitments to subsidiarity. • Confirmation that EU will fully respect purpose of Justice and Home Affairs Protocols in future proposals dealing with JHA matters, ‘in particular to preserve the UK’s ability to choose to participate’ (UK opt-in arrangement). • National Security must be sole responsibility of Member States. The ESC considered different expert opinions on the meaning and implication of ‘ever closer union’: is it integrationist and centralising or a commitment to devolved, democratic and transparent decisionmaking? Would its removal with regard to the UK have any significant effect other than at a symbolic or political level? The ESC noted the view of some experts that ‘the concept is of limited legal importance, is largely symbolic and that UK disengagement would fall short of the fundamental change in the existing relationship of the UK to the

216 Appendices

EU to which the Prime Minister aspires’. It also emphasised that any redrafting of the Treaty to disapply the concept with regard to the UK should not ‘undermine other concepts associated with “ever closer union” such as democratic accountability of the EU and citizens’ rights’ or risk the UK being marginalised. On an enhanced role for national parliaments, the proposed ‘red card’ mechanism for preventing unwanted EU legislation or strengthening the subsidiarity reasoned opinion procedure, the ESC noted that the ‘red card as it is proposed represents a practical threat to the exercise of UK parliamentary sovereignty as it makes the will of the UK parliament in a particular case subordinate to the differing collective view of a group of parliaments’. It concluded that ‘any red card procedure must not be limited in its scope to subsidiarity alone and must have thresholds and deadlines that would enable it to become an effective too’. Immigration •

When new countries are admitted to the EU in the future, free movement will not apply to them until their economies have converged much more closely with existing Member States. • Crack down on abuse of free movement, e.g. tougher and longer re-entry bans for fraudsters and those involved in sham marriages, stronger powers to deport criminals and stop them coming back. • EU citizens coming to Britain must live here and contribute for four years before qualifying for in-work benefits or social housing. • End the practice of sending child benefit overseas. The ESC emphasised the inconclusive debate over the scale and motivation of EU immigration to the UK, the high complexity of the issues and the lack of clarity about the negotiations and the need for Treaty change. But the Committee felt Treaty amendment would be needed to make the outcome of the renegotiation ‘judge-proof’. The ESC concluded that even if Treaty change were not needed (unlikely), changes to EU legislation would be. This would be difficult to negotiate and secure agreement on from other Member States, for whom commitment to the principles of free movement and non-discrimination are fundamental. On 26 December there were reports that the German and French leaders were prepared to allow a ban on in-work benefit claims for three years, as long as it also covered Britons aged 18 to 21, so as not to discriminate against non-UK EU citizens. The Prime Minister hoped the letter would ‘provide a clear basis for reaching an agreement that would, of course, need to be legally-binding and irreversible – and

Appendices  217

where necessary have force in the Treaties’. Giving evidence to the ESC on 16 September, David Lidington envisaged that ‘the eventual package, if we are successful, would include various instruments and processes’. These included ‘treaty changes, protocols, declarations at European Council or other level, legislation at EU level, possibly involving some legislation at national level as well’. The Foreign Secretary told the Commons on 20 October (c800) that the Government expected some of the UK reforms to require Treaty change and that ‘none of our partners welcomes the idea of treaty change, but all of them accept that this is something we have to do if we are going to carry the British people with us’. The experts giving evidence to the ESC considered what a binding and irreversible agreement might look like, given that it is not yet clear where Treaty change will be needed and that it is highly unlikely that any Treaty change would be achieved before the UK referendum. Based on precedents (e.g. Maastricht, Lisbon), the possible options included an international agreement in the form of a ‘Decision of the Heads of State and Government Meeting within the European Council’ and a ‘legally binding and irreversible agreement to ratify Treaty amendment sometime in the future’. Simple clarification or supplementation of the existing Treaties could be achieved by an international agreement. This would be consistent with EU law but its limited nature is not compatible with realisation of ‘the opportunity to reform the EU and fundamentally change the UK’s relationship with it’ envisaged by the Prime Minister in his statement to the House of 23 March 2015. The deliberate distinction the Prime Minister made between EU reform and fundamental change to the UK’s relationship with the EU is important. The latter is a matter of constitutional significance such as to justify in itself the forthcoming referendum. However, this fundamental change is not now on the Government’s agenda. Therefore voters faced with the question whether to remain in or leave the EU will not have the choice of remaining in an EU with which the UK’s relationship is fundamentally changed. The Committee also pointed out that change that could be achieved through amendments to EU legislation ‘is unlikely to be fully in place before the referendum and, in any case, is unlikely to cover all the areas of renegotiation’ and might not be supported by the Commission and EP. Source: Miller, V. (2016) EU Reform Negotiations: What’s Going On? Briefing paper 7311. London: House of Commons Library

Law, order and justice Police Public safety (civil protection, firearms, gambling) Civil and administrative law (justice, registries, judicial appointments) Child and family protection Consumer protection Data protection Civil registry and statistics Health, welfare and social policy Social welfare Equality Social security Employment Healthcare Benevolent/mutual societies Partial Shared Exclusive Exclusive Exclusive Exclusive Exclusive Shared Shared Shared Administrative

Exclusive Exclusive Exclusive Shared Exclusive Exclusive Shared Shared Shared Administrative

Galicia

Partial Shared

Basque Country

Appendix 7: competences of selected autonomous communities, Spain

Exclusive Exclusive Shared Shared Shared Shared

Exclusive Exclusive Shared Exclusive

Exclusive

Partial Shared

Catalonia

Exclusive Exclusive Shared Shared Shared Shared

Exclusive

Exclusive Exclusive

Exclusive

Partial Shared

Others

Economy, transport and environment Public infrastructure (roads, highways) Public infrastructure (rail, airports) Environment (nature, contamination, rivers, weather) Economic planning and development Advertising, regional markets and regional controlled origin designations Professional associations Workplace and industrial safety Financial (regional cooperative banks and financial markets) Press and media Water (local drainage basin) Regional development (coast, housing, rural services) Public sector and cooperative banks Energy and mining Competition Agriculture and animal welfare Fisheries Hunting and fishing Local transport and communications (road transport, maritime rescue) Tourism Shared Exclusive Exclusive Exclusive Exclusive Partial Exclusive Shared Exclusive Exclusive Shared Exclusive Partial Exclusive Shared Exclusive Exclusive

Exclusive Shared Exclusive Exclusive Exclusive Exclusive Partial Exclusive Shared Exclusive Exclusive Shared Exclusive Partial Exclusive Shared Exclusive Exclusive

Exclusive

Shared Shared Partial Exclusive Shared Exclusive Exclusive

Shared Exclusive Exclusive

Exclusive Partial Shared

Shared Exclusive

Shared Shared

Exclusive

Exclusive

Shared Shared Partial Exclusive Shared

Shared Exclusive Exclusive

Exclusive Partial Exclusive

Exclusive

Shared Shared

(continued)

Shared Exclusive Exclusive

Exclusive Shared

Shared Exclusive Exclusive

Exclusive Shared

Yes Yes No Convergence funds Co-payments (health Co-payments (health and education) and education) 100% 60% 36% (average for all autonomous communities)

Shared

Galicia

Shared

Basque Country

Yes Convergence funds Co-payments (health and education) 60%

Yes Convergence funds Co-payments (health and education) 60%

Shared

Exclusive

Exclusive Exclusive Shared

Exclusive Exclusive

Shared

Shared

Others

Exclusive Exclusive

Exclusive

Shared

Catalonia

Source: Adapted EU Committee of the Regions (2012) Division of power, https://portal.cor.europa.eu/divisionpowers/countries/MembersLP/Spain/Pages/default. aspx and Ministerio de Politica Territorial y Administration Publica (2009) Modeol de Financiacion de las Communidades Autonomas de Regimen Comun. Liquidacion Definitava. Madrid: Spanish Government

Resources Devolved spending as % of total public spending

Culture and education Culture (libraries, museums, film industry, arts and crafts) Culture (language promotion, R&D projects) Culture (sports, leisure, events) Education (primary, secondary, university, professional and language) Religious organisations Cultural, welfare and education associations regulation International relations (culture and language, cross border relations) Resources and spending Own tax resources Allocation by central government Other resources

(continued)

Appendices  221

Appendix 8: extracts from The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and the European Union (2018) This proposal underpins the vision set out by the Prime Minister at Lancaster House, in Florence, at Mansion House and in Munich, and in doing so addresses questions raised by the EU in the intervening months – explaining how the relationship would work, what benefits it would deliver for both sides, and why it would respect the sovereignty of the UK as well as the autonomy of the EU. A principled Brexit means respecting the result of the referendum and the decision of the UK public to take back control of the UK’s laws, borders and money – and doing so in a way that supports the Government’s wider objectives across five key areas of the UK’s national life. •

developing a broad and deep economic relationship with the EU that maximises future prosperity in line with the modern Industrial Strategy and minimises disruption to trade between the UK and the EU, protecting jobs and livelihoods – at the same time making the most of trading opportunities around the world. • addressing specific concerns voiced in the referendum by ending free movement and putting in place a new immigration system, introducing new independent policies to support farming and fishing communities, using the Shared Prosperity Fund to spark a new wave of regeneration in the UK’s towns and cities, and keeping citizens safe. • meeting commitments to Northern Ireland by protecting the peace process and avoiding a hard border, safeguarding the constitutional and economic integrity of the UK, and devolving the appropriate powers to Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast – while • leaving the EU’s institutions and reclaiming the UK’s sovereignty, ensuring the laws people live by are passed by those they elect and enforced by UK courts, with clear accountability to the people of the UK. • the UK leave the Single Market and the Customs Union to seize new opportunities and forge a new role in the world, while protecting jobs, supporting growth and maintaining security cooperation. In designing the new trading relationship, the UK and the EU should therefore focus on ensuring continued frictionless access at the border to each other’s markets for goods. To deliver this goal, the Government is proposing the establishment of a free trade area for goods. This free trade area would protect the uniquely integrated supply chains and ‘just-in-time’ processes that have developed across the UK and the EU over the last 40 years, and the jobs and livelihoods dependent on them, ensuring businesses on

222 Appendices

both sides can continue operating through their current value and supply chains. It would avoid the need for customs and regulatory checks at the border, and mean that businesses would not need to complete costly customs declarations. And it would enable products to only undergo one set of approvals and authorisations in either market, before being sold in both. The Government wants to minimise new barriers to trade between the UK and the EU, and hopes that both sides will work together to reduce them further over time – but acknowledges that there will be more barriers to the UK’s access to the EU market than is the case today. Finally, a relationship this deep will need to be supported by provisions giving both sides confidence that the trade that it facilitates will be both open and fair. So the Government is proposing reciprocal commitments that would ensure UK businesses could carry on competing fairly in EU markets, and EU businesses operating in the UK could do the same. On this basis, the Government’s vision is for an economic partnership that includes: • a common rulebook for goods including agri-food, covering only those rules necessary to provide for frictionless trade at the border – meaning that the UK would make an upfront choice to commit by treaty to ongoing harmonisation with the relevant EU rules, with all those rules legislated for by Parliament or the devolved legislatures; • participation by the UK in those EU agencies that provide authorisations for goods in highly regulated sectors – namely the European Chemicals Agency, the European Aviation Safety Agency, and the European Medicines Agency – accepting the rules of these agencies and contributing to their costs, under new arrangements that recognise the UK will not be a Member State; • the phased introduction of a new Facilitated Customs Arrangement that would remove the need for customs checks and controls between the UK and the EU as if they were a combined customs territory, which would enable the UK to control its own tariffs for trade with the rest of the world and ensure businesses paid the right or no tariff, becoming operational in stages as both sides complete the necessary preparations; • in combination with no tariffs on any goods, these arrangements would avoid any new friction at the border, and protect the integrated supply chains that span the UK and the EU, safeguarding the jobs and livelihoods they support; • new arrangements on services and digital, providing regulatory freedom where it matters most for the UK’s services-based economy, and

Appendices  223

•

•

•

•

so ensuring the UK is best placed to capitalise on the industries of the future in line with the modern Industrial Strategy, while recognising that the UK and the EU will not have current levels of access to each other’s markets; new economic and regulatory arrangements for financial services, preserving the mutual benefits of integrated markets and protecting financial stability while respecting the right of the UK and the EU to control access to their own markets – noting that these arrangements will not replicate the EU’s passporting regimes; continued cooperation on energy and transport – preserving the Single Electricity Market in Northern Ireland and Ireland, seeking broad cooperation on energy, developing an air transport agreement, and exploring reciprocal arrangements for road hauliers and passenger transport operators; a new framework that respects the UK’s control of its borders and enables UK and EU citizens to continue to travel to each other’s countries, and businesses and professionals to provide services – in line with the arrangements that the UK might want to offer to other close trading partners in the future; and in light of the depth of this partnership, binding provisions that guarantee an open and fair trading environment – committing to apply a common rulebook for state aid, establishing cooperative arrangements between regulators on competition, and agreeing to maintain high standards through non-regression provisions in areas including the environment and employment rules, in keeping with the UK’s strong domestic commitments.

Source: UK Government (2018) The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and the European Union. Cmnd 9593. London: The Stationery Office. www.gov.uk/government/ publications/the-united-kingdoms-exit-from-and-new-partnership-with-the-europeanunion-white-paper

Appendix 9: glossary of EU and Brexit terms European Single Market and European Economic Area The principles of the European single market (ESM) were set out in the Rome Treaty of the European Economic Community in 1957. It was amended in 1986 and there were plans to complete the single market by the end of 1992. But it was never really completed and remains an ongoing project of the European Commission. An integral part of the ESM is

224 Appendices

the foundational ‘four freedoms’, that is free movement for labour, capital, goods and services. Being part of the single market gives UK businesses access to 500 million consumers across the EU. According to research by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the EU single market has increased the trade in goods by 60 per cent compared to trading using World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. It is recognised that despite the four freedoms, the single market is much more highly developed for goods than services. Importantly, the rules of the single market are policed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). There has also been an agreement since 1994 on a European Economic Area (EEA), including EU member states and three others (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway), sometimes referred to as the internal market. The EEA agreement guarantees equal rights and obligations within the internal market for EEA members, including the four freedoms. The EEA Agreement does not cover the following EU policies: Common Agriculture and Fisheries Policies (although the Agreement contains provisions on various aspects of trade in agricultural and fish products); the Customs Union; Common Trade Policy; Common Foreign and Security Policy; Justice and Home Affairs; and European Monetary Union (EMU). Switzerland is not part of the EEA Agreement, but has a set of bilateral agreements with the EU (more on the Swiss position below). EEA members who are not EU members are not involved in the creation of legislation, rules, policies and guidelines relating to the single or internal market.

Customs union A customs union is an arrangement between several countries (members of the union) not to impose tariffs on imports from member countries. They decide not to impose tariffs (taxes on imports) on each other’s goods and agree to impose common external tariffs on goods from countries outside their customs union. A free trade area is a ‘softer’ option, permitting individual countries in the free trade area to set their own tariffs with other countries out-with the area. Based on the output of all members, the EU customs union is the largest customs union in the world. In effect it means goods entering any EU country from another EU country can move without customs checks.

Appendices  225

There can be customs union agreements with third party countries, which will vary in scope according to each agreement (e.g. on type of goods covered). The EU for example has a customs union agreement with Turkey. But, since Turkey is not signed up to the ‘four freedoms’, this involves customs checks, substantial documentation for goods exiting Turkey for the EU and the EU being able to agree trade deals with third parties, allowing their goods to enter EU and Turkish markets, but without a guarantee that Turkish goods could enter these same third party countries tariff free without a separate Turkey–third party country agreement. The customs union is the instrument which achieves one of the ‘four freedoms’ (free trade in goods). Trade in services requires application to a greater or lesser extent of the other freedoms (movement of goods, capital and people). It is important to note that the UK economy is more dominated by services than most other large European countries – services make up around 80 per cent of the UK economy. The customs union is one tool to help achieve one of the four freedoms of the EU, namely free trade in goods between member states. The remaining three freedoms – free movement of services, capital and people – help tackle non-tariff barriers, which is vital in boosting trade, particularly in services. A particular issue for the UK is Northern Ireland which, although part of the UK, will continue to have a border with an EU country, the Irish Republic, potentially requiring customs checks and increases in transactional costs of doing business between the north and south of Ireland. In the absence of a UK–EU customs agreement some form of border checks will be required, a particularly sensitive issue given past security issues and terrorist activity at the north–south border, not to mention smuggling.

Customs partnership and maximum facilitation (max-fac) The customs partnership involves the UK applying the EU’s own tariffs and rules of origin regulations to all goods arriving in the UK and then handing over what is owed for goods that subsequently end up in the EU. The practicalities of this have been questioned. Maximum facilitation, or max-fac, would aim to employ new technology to remove the need for physical customs checks where possible. It is considered that the technology to implement this is many years off. Added to this, without sufficient lead times, the experience of government use of leading edge technology on this scale, without considerable prior testing and serious teething problems, is mixed to say the least.

226 Appendices

The Norway model The main element of the Norway model is the EEA Agreement signed in 1994 with the EU (the other signatories being Iceland and Liechtenstein), giving access to the EU’s internal market but not part of the supranational political union. The Norway model goes further than this and is in fact made up of 120 different arrangements beyond the scope of the EEA. Norway is an affiliated member of Schengen and also asylum control since this was the only feasible way of maintaining free movement of people between Sweden and Norway, a long held practice in both countries. There are also agreements with the EU on police and security cooperation and foreign and security policy. Experience has indicated a degree of flexibility on agreements between Norway and the EU, evidence of the political willingness on both sides to have good relationships. However, the Norway model does not allow for an independent trade policy. While there has never been support for EU membership in Norway, there is broad agreement on the value of EEA membership. As a corollary of EEA membership, other EU links and agreements and access to some EU programmes, Norway contributes to the EU budget and is not involved in the formation of EU trade or other policies. Norway therefore is a rule taker not a rule maker.

The Switzerland model Although a free trade agreement was signed with Europe in 1972, some 20 years later the Swiss rejected EEA membership in a referendum. Switzerland is therefore out-with the EEA internal market arrangements and its relationship with the EU is governed by a series of bilateral agreements, including in 1999 agreements on free movement of people, technical trade barriers, public procurement, agriculture and transport and scientific research programmes. This was extended with another set of agreements in 2004 covering Schengen (easing border controls and movement among signatories), asylum, agreements on taxation of savings and combating fraud, amongst others. In excess of 100 bilateral agreements exist. This partial integration to the EU single market comes with a Swiss contribution to EU funding (particularly to the cohesion fund for new EU member states). Key to these agreements is their management through a series of joint committees, which inevitably involve Swiss–EU negotiation and considerable bureaucratic engagement.

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A particular challenge to this framework came in 2014 with a referendum giving victory to those supporting a cap on EU migration and calls for a renegotiation of the EU–Swiss agreement on the free movement of people. This was a clearly in breach of one of the single market’s foundational principles. The EU indicated that planned amendment to the Swiss federal constitution to restrict freedom of movement would exclude Switzerland from the EU single market and many other bilateral agreements. Compromise was reached when the Swiss Parliament passed an immigration law which avoided outright quotas on EU immigrants, which the referendum had demanded, but instead prioritises Swiss job seekers over EU citizens. On the same day, the Swiss Federal Council ratified the Protocol providing for Croatia’s accession to the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons with the EU. Switzerland, not being in the EEA, has bilateral trade agreements of its own out-with EU arrangements (e.g. with China and Japan), usually within the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) framework. These are unlikely to be more beneficial to Switzerland than agreements struck with the EU.

Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (Canada–EU) The agreement struck between the EU and Canada, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), removes over 90 per cent of tariffs on imports between the EU and Canada, and is a significant move towards freer trade. It is thought by some as a basis for agreeing a postBrexit trade deal between the EU and UK. It does not, however, significantly reduce non-tariff barriers and rules-of-origin regulations would apply for the UK’s exports to the EU under such a deal. If the non-EU import content of a UK export was too high, for example, there would be a loss of duty free access for particular sensitive industrial goods, notably cars. A lack of regulatory harmonisation for medicines, automobiles and aircraft equipment would also require products being checked at the border. A deal similar to CETA would offer little to the UK’s financial services sector post-Brexit, when businesses located in the City will lose their automatic right to offer their services across the EU (‘passporting’). In addition, CETA took over 10 years to negotiate (such timescales are not uncommon in trade negotiations). It has also been made clear – at least initially – by EU negotiators that any such deal would need to be

228 Appendices

under European supervision which in effect means the jurisdiction of the ECJ, and this is considered unacceptable to the UK government. At early stages in the negotiations some in the UK team (notably David Davis, former secretary for exiting the EU) indicated that what was wanted was a ‘Canada plus plus deal’.

World Trade Organization The WTO currently has 164 members which between them are responsible for 95 per cent of world trade. It is a negotiating forum for its members to create international trade rules, and an organisation to oversee how they put the rules into practice. For example, WTO agreements place limits on tariffs (which tax imports) and prevent the spread of disease by establishing sanitary standards on agricultural products. The UK is a member of the WTO in its own right but at present operates in the WTO under the EU’s set of ‘schedules’ – a list of commitments that sets the terms of the EU’s tariffs, quotas and subsidies. The UK will need to agree its own set of schedules at the WTO. The Government plans to replicate the UK’s existing trade regimes as far as possible in new schedules, involving minimal disruption so as to reduce the scope for other WTO members to object to the UK’s new schedules. Copying and pasting EU tariffs means that the UK will have the same, or lower, tariffs as it does now. A key principle of the WTO is that countries do not discriminate against one another. If the UK does not have a free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU, the EU will have to treat the UK in the same way that it treats all other WTO members in that position, such as Russia, the US or Brazil. This means that EU tariffs would have to apply to the UK. It would be WTO-illegal for the EU not to place tariffs on the UK after Brexit if there was no FTA. The same is true on the UK side. If it wants to apply any tariffs on any country, these will also have to apply to the EU if there is no deal.

Index

Note: references in bold are to tables, those in italics are to the glossary of EU and Brexit terms. Achen, C.H. 139 additional member electoral system 69 Adenauer, Konrad 19–20 age: and Brexit referendum 96, 99, 137; and election voting 44, 46–7 Agranoff, R. 126 agriculture 172, 174 Alexander, Danny 75 Alexander, Wendy 70 Alford Index 38 Anderson, B. 14, 130 anti-elitism 91–2, 143 Army Bureau of Current Affairs (ABCA) 34 Ashcroft, Lord (2017) 45 Attlee, Clement 19 Audit Commission 115 Australia: central state–sub-state relationship 128 Austria: political allegiance 130, 135, 137 Baker, Steve 91, 166 Balls, Ed 75 Banks, Arron 86–7, 91, 142 Bannon, Steve 60, 149 Barnet, R.E. 127

Barnier, Michel 152 Bartels, L.M. 139 BBC 73, 75–6 Beaverbrook, Sir Maxwell Aitken, 1st Baron 35 Beckett, Margaret 113, 114 Benn, Tony 88 Beveridge Report 34 Bevin, Ernest 18 ‘big society’ 54–5 Billig, M. 50 Blair, Tony: and Britain’s role in the world 23, 24, 25; and Cameron 54; and depoliticisation 53; leadership 42, 58; and New Labour 56, 58, 89, 136 Bogdanor, Vernon 87 Bolt, David 113 Booth, R. 116 Breitbart 60 Bretton Woods international monetary system 105 Brexit case study 3, 181, 182–3; Brexit within and beyond the EU 148–9; Britain as leading European power 147, 147–8; EU approach to withdrawal 152–3; impact on UK

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politics 112–13, 149–52; UK approach to withdrawal 80–1, 153–6, 221–3; see also Brexit case study: key issues in withdrawal process; Brexit case study: concluding comments Brexit case study: key issues in withdrawal process 156; citizenship and immigration 164–5; governance and parliamentary sovereignty 165–7; impact on UK union 167–9; military and security cooperation 163–4; Northern Ireland and border with Irish Republic 161–3; trade, market access and economic matters 156–61 Brexit case study: concluding comments 169–70; Conservative Party 171–3, 174; Labour Party 173, 174; outcome dependent on contingencies 170–5; Scottish National Party 173–4; UK constitutional practice 174–5 Brexit referendum: Cameron’s reform proposals 85–6, 212–13; context of UK–EU referendums 87–9; leave and remain campaigns 86–7; see also Brexit referendum campaign; Brexit referendum result Brexit referendum campaign: key issues 94–5; leadership of the campaigns 90–1; leave campaign 86–7, 91, 92, 93, 94; new issues in electoral politics 91–3; remain campaign 87, 90–1, 92, 93, 94, 95 Brexit referendum result 12, 87, 95; age 96, 99; educational attainment 97, 101; England 87; ethnicity 99; explanations for voting behaviour 51, 99–100, 137; geographical data 97–8, 97–9; rural areas 99; Scotland 3, 13, 80, 87, 100–2, 128, 134; support for remain and immigration 101; voter turnout 96, 96

Britain 3, 4, 179; anti-elitism 91–2, 143; constitutional scenarios 10–14; constitution and union 8; continued ambition as world power 19–20; Europe and the British constitution 9–12; Europe as means of retaining influence 20–1; historical background 4–5; imagined communities and foreign policy 14–17; key themes and imagined communities 24–7; nationalism 130–1; political allegiance 137; politico-economic regional imbalance 5–7, 6; populism 141–3; statecraft to ‘constitutional moments’ 7; in the world: contemporary perspectives 21–4, 179; world power and effect of war 17–19; as world’s leading power 17; see also England; Scotland; Wales Britain First 93 Britain Stronger in Europe 87, 93 British Commonwealth of Nations 19 British constitution 8; and Europe 9–12 British Election Survey (2015) 43 British empire 15–16, 19 British National Party 93 British Social Attitudes Survey (2015) 43 Brown, Gordon: and Brexit 89; and Britain’s role in the world 22, 23; and New Labour 58, 113, 136; and power 13–14; and Scotland 70, 77 Bryan, William Jennings 140 Bulpit, J. 6, 7 Burke, Edmund 87 Bush, George H. W. 24 Bush, George W. 113 Buzzfeed News 160 Calman Commission (2009) 70–1, 187–8 Cameron, David: and Blair 54; and Brexit campaign 55, 89, 90, 95,

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113, 150, 180; EU reform proposals 84–6, 212–14; and Gove 15; resignation 56; and Scotland 51, 77, 80 Campbell, Alastair 58, 76 Canada: CETA 157, 227–8; political parties as brokers 129 CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) 174 CARD (Coordinated Annual Review on Defence) 163 Carney, Mark 94 Carswell, Douglas 85 case studies 2; see also Brexit case study; Brexit referendum; Scottish independence referendum Castle, Barbara 88 Cato Institute 155 CBI see Confederation of British Industry CETA see Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) 164 Chamberlain, Neville 20, 66 Chambers of Commerce 120, 155 Charter of Fundamental Rights 84 Chatham House 26 Chilcot Inquiry 121 Choosing Scotland’s Future: A National Conversation (2009) 71, 189–94 Churchill, Winston 6, 15, 16, 19, 34 citizenship 10, 11, 164–5 civic nationalism 132 civil service 112–13 class 1–2; cross class voting 38–9; decline of class-based two-party divide 35–8, 36; definitions by occupation 186; political representation of 31; UK general election (2017) 44–5; working class representation 43–4 Clayton, William 18 Clegg, Nick 77

Clinton, Hillary 137 Coakley, J. 163 Coalition Government 85 Cold War 18–19 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 174 Common Fisheries Policy 101, 102 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 164 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 164 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 157, 227–8 Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 13, 120, 155, 158 Conservative governments 16, 19, 23, 106; and Maastricht Treaty 88–9 Conservative Party 5, 6; 1945–mid-60s 31, 32; 2016 responses to disenchantment 56–7; 2017 general election 6, 7, 37, 44; and Brexit 84–5, 120–1, 150, 153, 155, 156, 171–3, 174, 180–1; economic and fiscal policy 136; in European elections 85; impact of occupational class on support 36, 38; number of parliamentary seats 37; percentage of total votes cast 37, 37; in Scotland 32, 67, 68, 69, 69–70, 80, 101, 180–1 Conservatives for Britain 87, 91 Cook, Robin 23, 53 Cook, T. 111 Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) 163 Copeland, D. 21 Corbyn, Jeremy: and Brexit 87, 150; and EU membership 212; leadership 42, 56, 59, 60, 89, 115, 120, 129, 180 ‘cosmopolitan constitution’ 11 cosmopolitan–communitarian divide 47–8 Cox, Jo 94–5 Crafts, N. 110 Crewe, I. 111

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Crewe, T. 59 Croatia 227 Crofters Party 32 Crossman, Richard 68 CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) 164 cultural nationalism 132 currency: crises 20; EU single currency (euro) 148 Curtice, John 80 customs partnership 225 customs union 224–5 Dacre, Sir Paul 58 Daily Express 75 Daily Herald 35 Daily Mail 35, 58, 59, 75 Daily Mirror 35, 57 Daily Record 58, 75, 77 The Daily Telegraph 59 Dalyell, Tam 8, 68 Darby, P. 19 Darling, Alistair 73 data modelling 93 Davidson, Ruth 180–1 Davis, David 154, 158, 228 defence budget 26–7 defence spending 148, 148 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 10, 129, 150, 153, 161, 162 Denmark 131, 141, 148 Department for Exiting the EU 158, 166 Department for International Trade 155 Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 154 depoliticisation 53, 114–17 devolution models 118, 183–4 Dicey, A.V. 87 disenchantment with mainstream politics 52–5; mainstream parties’ responses 56–7 Douglas Home, Sir Alec 66 Downs, Anthony 42

Duncan, Sir Andrew 67 Dundas, Henry 5 DUP see Democratic Unionist Party Duverger’s law 31 ECB (European Central Bank) 148 ECJ see European Court of Justice Economic Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 88 economic status and labour market 47 economy: Brexit campaign issue 94–5; impact of Brexit on 159–60; proposed EU reform 214–15; regional imbalance 7; and UK referendum to join EU 88 ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists) 90 Eden, Anthony 20 education: and Brexit referendum 97, 101, 137; and election voting 45; higher education expansion 41; Scotland 118 EEA see European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement (1994) EEC see European Economic Community EFTA (European Free Trade Area) 227 Egypt: Suez conflict 20 Electoral Commission (2014) 73 Electoral Commission (2015) 91 electoral support, non-class based 41–2; decline of working class representation 43–4; valence politics 42–3 Elgot, J. 131 Elrick, M. 8 employment status: UK general election (2017) 45–6 England: Brexit referendum result 87; nationalism 51, 131, 184–5; political allegiance 138; UK general election (2017) 6 Englishness 51, 92–3 ESM (European Single Market) 223–4

Index  233

EU reform negotiations (2016): Government’s proposed reforms 213–17; summary 212–13 European Arrest Warrant 163 European Central Bank (ECB) 148 European Commission 84 European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) 90 European Convention on Human Rights 11 European Council 212 European Court of Justice (ECJ) 11, 84, 90, 156, 224 European Defence Fund 163 European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement (1994) 94, 157, 164, 224, 226 European Economic Community (EEC) 21, 88; Rome Treaty (1957) 223 European External Action Service 84 European Free Trade Area (EFTA) 227 European Parliament 90, 139, 142; European Conservatives and Reformists 90; People’s Party 90; Progressive Alliance for Socialists and Democrats 90; UKIP 142 European Research Group 155, 170 European Single Market (ESM) 223–4 European Union (EU): approach to UK withdrawal 152–3; and the British constitution 9–12; British discontent with 55; Common Agricultural Policy 174; Common Fisheries Policy 101, 102; Common Foreign and Security Policy 164; Common Security and Defence Policy 164; as means of retaining influence 20–1; single currency (euro) 148 European Union Referendum Bill (2015–16) 213

Evans, G. 43–4 exceptionalism 15 Fairbairn, Carolyn 158 Falconer, Charlie 89 Farage, Nigel: and Brexit 12, 87, 91, 100, 143, 166; and Trump 149; and UKIP 87, 131, 142 Finland: Finn’s Party 130 First Division Association (FDA) 112 Fisher, Andrew 89 Foot, Michael 180 Foreign and Commonwealth Office 23 foreign policy 2, 24–5; and currency crises 20; defined 16; and imagined communities 14–17 Foulkes, George 114 ‘four freedoms’ 225 Fox, Liam 154, 155 France: decline in support for centre left 135; defence spending 148; Front Nationale 130, 141; and Suez conflict 20 Franks, Sir Oliver 19 Fraser of Allander Institute 161 free trade agreements (FTA) 228 free trade areas 224 The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and the European Union (2018) 221–3 G8/G20 24 Galloway, George 91 Gamble, A. 20 Garry, J. 163 GDP measures 22 Geddes, Sir Eric 67 Gellner, E. 50 gender: UK general election (2017) 45 Gerken, H. 127 Germany: Alternative for Germany party (AfD) 90, 141; Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 90, 136; decline in support for centre left

234 Index

135; defence spending 148; federal vs. Land governments 126–7, 128; nationality 131; Social Democratic party (SPD) 135, 136 Gladstone, William Ewart 66 global financial crisis (2008) 106–8 globalisation 24, 25–6 glossary of EU and Brexit terms 223–8 Goldthorpe, J.H. et al. 38 Goodwin, M. 52 Gove, Michael 12, 15, 91, 143, 154, 165, 181 Grassroots Out 91 Gray, J. 56 Greece 18–19 Grenfell fire 115 The Guardian 59, 76, 115 Gunster, Gerry 93 Hain, Lord Peter 175 Hammond , Philip 212, 213–14 Hannan, Daniel 12, 155 Healey, Denis 21, 105 Health and Social Care Act (2012) 75, 117 Heath, Edward 21, 67, 88 Henley, J. 154 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 113 Heritage Foundation 155 High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 84 Highland Land League 32 Hitler, Adolf 20 Hoey, Kate 87, 162 Hofer, Norbet 137 Holyrood (2018) Poll 13 Hooghe, L. 118 House of Commons: European Scrutiny Committee (2015) 213; Home Affairs Committee (2018) 163 House of Lords: European Union Committee (2017) 175, 213; Select Committee (2014) 121

housing 40–1, 115–16 Howard, Michael 84, 89 Human Rights Act (1998) 9 Hungary 130, 141, 148 Iceland 224, 226 imagined communities and foreign policy 14–17 IMF see International Monetary Fund immigration: Brexit campaign issue 95, 99–100, 113, 164, 165; populism 143; proposed EU reform 216–17; as salient issue? 51–2; Scotland 165 Independent 76 industrial decline 39–40, 39–40, 107 industrialists in politics 66–7 Initiative for Free Trade (IFT) 155 Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) 74 Institute of Directors 120 interest groups 119–20 internal market see European Economic Area international comparisons 2, 3, 125, 181–2; central state–sub-state relationships 125–35; political alignment and realignment 135–43 International Institute of Strategic Affairs 26 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 20, 94, 106, 117 international relations 24 Inverforth, Lord 67 Ipsos Mori (2017) 45 Iraq War 25 Ireland: and devolution of N. Ireland 10; home rule 66; and N. Ireland border 161–3; unionism 66 Israel and Suez conflict 20 Jenkin, Bernard 112, 167 Jenkins, Roy 21, 88 Johnson, Alan 87 Johnson, Boris 24, 155, 158–9

Index  235

Joint Ministerial Committees (JMCs) 118 Juncker, Jean-Claude 90, 148 Katwala, S. et al. 100 Kellas, J. 129 Kershaw, I. 18 Kerslake, Lord 116 Kilbrandon Royal Commission on the Constitution (1969) 68 King, A. 24, 111 Labour governments 16, 19, 23, 42, 53–4, 88, 105–6 Labour In For Britain 87 labour market and economic status 47 labour, movement of 25 Labour Party 5, 6; 1945–mid-60s 31, 32, 33–5; 2015 general election 56; and Brexit 87, 89, 150–1, 173, 174; in European elections 85; general election (2017) 6, 7, 37, 44, 56, 60; impact of occupational class on support 36, 38; membership 180; New Labour 23, 89; number of parliamentary seats 37; percentage of total votes cast 37, 37, 135 Latin America 138 Le Pen, Marine 130, 137, 141 leadership 42 Leave.EU 86–7, 91, 93 Leveson Inquiry 58 Liberal Democratic Party 6, 80, 85, 150–1 Liberal Party 5, 32; and Irish home rule 66; in Scotland 32, 69 Liberal Unionists 66 Lidington, David 212 Liechtenstein 224, 226 Lilley, Peter 89 Lisbon Treaty 84, 85; Article 50 9–10, 152, 153, 154, 173

Lithgow, Sir James 67 Lobbying Act (2014) 119 Maastricht Treaty 88–9 McConnell, A. 110 MacDonald, Ramsay 32, 35 MacKintosh, John 68 McLay, Lord 67 MacMillan, Harold 5–6, 15 McPherson, Sir Nicholas 75 Macron, Emmanuel J.-M. 148 McTavish, D. 50 McWhirter, I. 73 Major, John 88–9, 111, 112 Mandelson, Peter 89, 95 Marks, G. 118 Marshall, George C. 18 Marshall Plan 18 Martill, B. 164 Mason, Paul 76 Matthews, F. 174 maximum facilitation (max-fac) 225 May, Theresa: and Brexit 11, 16, 150, 153, 166, 167, 221; and globalisation 26; and Ireland 161, 162; and media 58; as Prime Minister 56–7, 112, 115, 180, 181; and Scotland 80; and Trump 25 media: and political representation 57–60; politics and policy 75–7, 111, 120 Merkel, Angela 90, 127, 136 Migration Impacts Fund 100 Milazzo, C. 52 Miliband, Ed 56, 58, 77, 129, 139 military cooperation 163–4 Mill, J. S. 131 Milne, Seumas 89 Mitchell, J. 75 Momentum 56, 180 Muller, Jan-Wener 130 Mullin, T. 73 Mundell, David 78 Murdoch, Rupert 58

236 Index

Nasser, Gamal Abdel 20 National Audit Office 155 National Farmers Union (NFU) 165 National government (1931; 1935) 32–3, 33 National Health Service (NHS) 34, 75, 142, 167 nationalism(s) 130–1; in British politics 48–51, 49, 131, 138, 184–5; civic nationalism 132; cultural nationalism 132; pluri-national states 131–4; in Scotland 49, 50, 131, 132, 133–4, 138, 184–5 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 147–8, 164, 179 Netherlands: decline in support for centre left 135; nationalism(s) 131 New Labour 23, 58, 107, 108, 113, 136, 180 newspaper media 57–9 NFU (National Farmers Union) 165 NHS see National Health Service Northcliffe, Alfred Harmsworth, 1st Viscount 35 Northern Ireland: Assembly 10, 129, 153–4, 167; ‘back stop’ 161; and border with Irish Republic 161–3; and Brexit process 153–4; Brexit referendum result 87; citizenship 10; and customs union 225; Democratic Unionist Party 10, 129, 150, 153, 161, 162; devolution 8, 10, 129; Good Friday Agreement 8, 10, 14, 183; nationalisms 48, 50, 138, 184; referendums 87 Norway model 157, 172, 224, 226 nuclear arms limitation 24 Obama, Barack 94, 136 The Observer 59 Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) 55 oil crisis (1970s) 105–6 Onward 181 Operation Elveden 58

Opinium Polling 96 Orbán, Viktor 130, 141 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 7, 160, 224 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 105 Osborne, George 74–5, 95, 139, 212 Oxford University Migration Observatory 164 Paisley, Ian 162 parliamentary representation 87 parliamentary sovereignty 9, 12, 143, 149–50, 165–7, 215–16 Paterson, Owen 162 People’s Party (PP) 90 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) 163 PFI (Private Finance Initiative) 113 Plaid Cymru 168 pluri-national states 131–4 Poland: in the EU 148; Law and Justice Party 90, 130, 141 political (re)alignment 1–2, 135; broad policy consensus and lack of differentiation 136; decline in support for centre left parties 135–6; inability of democracies to fulfil promises 138–9; multiparty politics 2; political configuration re location, education and age 137–8; populism 139–43 Political Insight (2017) 45–6 politico-economic regional imbalance 5–7, 6 Politico Europe 172 politics and public policy 2, 3, 104, 108–9; interdependencies in the policy system 104–8; interest groups 119–20; and multi-level government in UK 117–19; political demands and overloading of government 111–13; role of the media 111, 120; use of

Index  237

‘depoliticisation’ 114–17; use of public inquiries 121; wicked policy problems 109–10 politics and representation 3, 180–1; current polarities 46–8; decline of class-based two-party divide 35–41, 36; disenchantment with mainstream politics 52–5; immigration as salient issue? 51–2; mainstream parties’ responses to disenchantment 56–7; and the media 57–60; nationalism 48–51, 49; non-class based electoral support 41–4; two-party system 1945–mid-1960s 31–5; UK general election (2017) 44–6 politics in changing environment 3, 179–85 populism: in Britain 141–3; context 139–40; in Europe 149, 181–2; key features 140–1; in USA 140–1 Portillo, Michael 89 Portugal: Socialist Party 135 PP (People’s Party) 90 Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQ) 180 Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 113 Progressive Alliance for Socialists and Democrats 90 proportional representation system 69 public inquiries 121 public policy 104 Rajoy Brey, Mariano 74, 126 Raleigh, Sir Walter 23 Rand Corporation 160 Reagan, Ronald 23, 24 ‘realpolitik’ 16 Reckless, Mark 85 Rees-Mogg, Jacob 143, 155, 166, 170 referendums in UK 87, 182; on UK–EU relationship 87–9; see also Brexit referendum; Scottish independence referendum

Renan, P. 131 Rentoul, J. 75 Richards, S. 53, 136 Rittel, H.W.J. 109–10 Robbins, Olly 154, 166 Roberts, D. 154, 158 Robertson, John (later Lord) 8 Robinson, Nick 76 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 19 Rothermere, Harold Harmsworth, 1st Viscount 35 Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 26 rule of law 24 Rumsfeld,Donald 113 Salmond, Alex 42, 76 SCC (Scottish Constitutional Convention) 68–9 Schröder, Gerhard 131 Scotland: Act of Union (1707) 128; and Brexit process 80–1, 149, 153, 154, 158, 161; Brexit referendum result 3, 13, 80, 87, 100–2, 128, 134; Claim of Right 68; Conservative Party 32, 67, 68, 69, 69–70, 80, 101, 180–1; Continuity Bill 168–9; devolution 8, 9–10, 125, 128, 134, 175; healthcare 117–18; higher education 118; housing tenure 41; immigration 165; impact of Brexit on 168; Labour Party 67–8, 69, 70–1, 80; Liberal Democrats 80; Liberal Party 32, 69; manufacturing employment 40; media and politics 58; National Assembly 67, 68, 69; nationalism 49, 50, 131, 132, 133–4, 138, 184–5; referendums 87, 134; Sewel convention 10, 168, 169; Trades Union Congress 68; UK general elections 1979–1997 69; see also Choosing Scotland’s Future: A National Conversation (2009); Scotland’s Future: Your

238 Index

Guide to an Independent Scotland (2013); Scottish independence referendum (2014) Scotland Act (1998) 72–3 Scotland Act (2012) 70–1 Scotland Act (2016) 128, 183–4 Scotland Analysis (UK Government papers) 73 Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland (2013) 72, 73; 1: the case for independence 194–7; 2: Scotland’s national finances 197; 3: opportunities of independence 198–208; 4: transition 209–10 Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right (1995) 69 Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC) 68–9 Scottish Greens 79, 80 Scottish independence referendum (2014) 3, 66–9, 134, 151, 159, 168, 181; devolved Parliament and Conservatives 69–70; devolved Parliament and Labour 70–1; devolved Parliament and the SNP 71–2; unionism, home rule and political parties 66–9; see also Scottish independence referendum campaign; Scottish independence referendum result Scottish independence referendum campaign 72–4; key issues 74–5; role of the media 75–7 Scottish independence referendum result 77, 211; analysis of the result 78–9; immediate aftermath 77–8; impact on Scottish politics 79–81 Scottish National Party (SNP) 7, 42, 44, 69; and Brexit 101, 151–2, 173–4; and devolution 8, 69, 71–2, 129; in government 70, 101; impact of Scottish referendum on 13, 79–80, 181; and nationalism 50, 68, 132, 184; at Westminster 184

Scottish Sun 58, 77 Scottish Unionist Party 32, 66 security 163, 215–16 Self, R. 23 Sewel Convention 10, 168, 169 Sewel Motion 81 Shipman, T. 89, 91 Sinn Fein 8, 162 Smith, John 8 Smith, Lord 77 SNP see Scottish National Party social media 59–60, 76, 93, 120 socio-economic change 39; decline in traditional/manufacturing industries 39–40, 39–40; expansion of higher education 41; housing tenure 40–1 Somek, A. 11 Spain: asymmetric devolution 126; Catalonia 131–2, 133, 134, 138; civil war 133; competences of selected autonomous communities 218–20; decline in support for centre left 135; nationalism(s) 131–2; Partido Popular (PP) 126, 137; political allegiance 137, 138; Statutes of Autonomy 133, 218–20 Stalin, Joseph 18 state–sub-state relationships 125–6; Germany 126–7, 128; nationalism(s) 130–1; plurinational states 131–4; political parties as brokers 129; Spain 126, 131–2, 133; UK 128–9, 131–2, 133–4; USA 127–8 Stewart, Gisela 87 Strategic Defence Review (2010) 24 Straw, Will 89 Suez conflict 19, 20 The Sun 58, 59, 60, 75 The Sun on Sunday 75 Sunday Herald 75 Sunday Mail 75 Sunday Post 75 Sus, M. 164

Index  239

Sweden 130, 148 Swinney, John 80 Switzerland: agreements with EU 157, 224, 226–7; nationalism(s) 131 Thatcher, Margaret 6, 22–3, 24, 34, 54, 88, 111, 112, 180 themes 1–2 Thompson, Jon 113 Tilley, J. 43–4 Toye, R. 34 trade and market access 156–9, 160, 171–2; customs union 224–5; ‘four freedoms’ 225; free trade areas 224 trades unions: membership 40; and membership of EU 88, 150–1; Scotland 68 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 136 Trump, Donald: America first 140–1, 149, 157; anti-elitism 143; and Israel 24; and May 25; and security 163; and social media 60, 93; support for 137; and trade 136, 157, 172 Turkey 225 Tusk, Donald 212, 214 two-party system: 1931, 1935 elections 32–3, 33; 1945–mid-1960s 31–5; cross class voting 38–9; decline of class-based two-party divide 35–8, 36, 37, 39; normalisation and re-establishment post-1945? 33–5; nuances 32–3 UK: Act of Union (1707) 128; constitutional practice and Brexit 174–5; defence spending 148, 148; general election (2017) 6, 44–6; impact of Brexit on union 167–9; parliamentary sovereignty 9, 12, 143, 149–50, 165–7, 215–16; political parties as brokers 129; state of the union

183; state–sub-state relationships 128–9, 131–2, 133–4; union and devolution 128–9; Withdrawal Bill 168, 169 UK departure from the EU case study see Brexit case study UK Supreme Court: on Article 50 9–10, 153, 154 UKIP (UK Independence Party) 12, 47–8, 55; and Brexit 84, 142, 150, 174, 180; in European elections 85; in European Parliament 142; in Scotland 101 UN (United Nations) 24; Security Council 148 unionism 66, 67 USA: ‘America First’ 140–1, 157; Cold War 18–19; Federal Communications Commission 60; federalism vs. state rights 127–8; Marshall Plan 18; political allegiance 137; political cleavage 136; populism 140–1; and Suez conflict 20; Trident nuclear submarine fleet 21; voter participation 135–6; world’s financial power 17 USSR: nuclear arms limitation 24 valence politics 42–3 Van der Bellin, Alexander 137 Vote Leave 87, 93 voting behaviour 2; and age 44, 46–7, 96, 99, 137; and class 44–5; and ‘Englishness’ 92–3 Wales: and Brexit process 149, 153, 154; Brexit referendum result 87, 128; Continuity Bill 168, 169; devolution 8; impact of Brexit on 168; nationalism 184; referendums 87 Wales Act (2017) 183–4 Walker, D. 112–13 Wall Street Journal 105

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Wallace, William 16 Wallman, S. 100 Webber, M.M. 109–10 Weir, Lord 67 Wilson, Harold 68, 88 World Trade Organization (WTO) 157, 171–2, 224, 228

World War One 17–18 World War Two 15, 16, 18, 19 YouGov (2017) 44, 45 Young, H. 88 Younge, G. 19 Zinoviev, Grigory 35