TheLanguage Difference: Language and Development in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region 9781847693419

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The Language Difference

MULTILINGUAL MATTERS Series Editor: John Edwards, St. Francis Xavier University, Canada Multilingual Matters series publishes books on bilingualism, bilingual education, immersion education, second language learning, language policy, multiculturalism. The editor is particularly interested in ‘macro’ level studies of language policies, language maintenance, language shift, language revival and language planning. Books in the series discuss the relationship between language in a broad sense and larger cultural issues, particularly identity related ones. Full details of all the books in this series and of all our other publications can be found on http://www.multilingual-matters.com, or by writing to Multilingual Matters, St Nicholas House, 31-34 High Street, Bristol BS1 2AW, UK.

MULTILINGUAL MATTERS Series Editor : John Edwards, St. Francis Xavier University, Canada

The Language Difference Language and Development in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region Paulin G. Djité

MULTILINGUAL MATTERS Bristol • Buffalo • Toronto

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. Djité, Paulin G., 1956– The Language Difference: Language and Development in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region/Paulin G. Djité Multilingual Matters: 144 Includes bibliographical references. 1. Language acquisition–Mekong River Region. 2. Language policy–Mekong River Region. 3. Mekong River Region–Languages. I. Title. P119.32.M5D55 2010 306.44’959–dc22 2010041364 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue entry for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN-13: 978-1-84769-340-2 (hbk) Multilingual Matters UK: St Nicholas House, 31-34 High Street, Bristol BS1 2AW, UK. USA: UTP, 2250 Military Road, Tonawanda, NY 14150, USA. Canada: UTP, 5201 Dufferin Street, North York, Ontario M3H 5T8, Canada. Copyright © 2011 Paulin G. Djité. All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the publisher. The policy of Multilingual Matters/Channel View Publications is to use papers that are natural, renewable and recyclable products, made from wood grown in sustainable forests. In the manufacturing process of our books, and to further support our policy, preference is given to printers that have FSC and PEFC Chain of Custody certification. The FSC and/or PEFC logos will appear on those books where full certification has been granted to the printer concerned. Typeset by Datapage International Ltd. Printed and bound in Great Britain by the MPG Books Group Ltd.

Contents Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv 1 Language and Development in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Language and Development in Cambodia. . . . . . . Language and Development in the Lao PDR. . . . . Language and Development in Myanmar . . . . . . . Language and Development in Viet Nam . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2 Language and Education in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Language and Education in Cambodia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Language and Education in the Lao PDR . . . . . . . . . . . . . Language and Education in Myanmar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Language and Education in Viet Nam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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3 Language and Health in the Greater Mekong Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Language and Health in Cambodia . . . . . . Language and Health in the Lao PDR . . . . Language and Health in Myanmar . . . . . . Language and Health in Viet Nam . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Sub-Region . .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... ..........

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4 Language and the Economy in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Language and the Economy in Cambodia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 v

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Language and the Language and the Language and the Conclusion . . . . .

Economy in the Lao PDR . Economy in Myanmar . . . Economy in Viet Nam . . . .....................

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5 Language and Governance in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Language and Governance in Cambodia . . . . . . Language and Governance in the Lao PDR . . . . Language and Governance in Myanmar . . . . . . Language and Governance in Viet Nam . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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6 The Language Difference. . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . Separating Facts from Fiction Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

Acknowledgements I am deeply indebted to Sirixay Chanthathone (Toon), for introducing me to this most fascinating part of the world, and continuing to teach me about its intricacies. Her counsel has been most valuable in putting this book together. I draw great strength and inspiration from Paul-Simon, Bruce and Sidney, who have always spurred me on in my work by volunteering to read and critique my writings. Their realisation and amazement at how much their father is actually aware of his surroundings, and of the issues that matter, is a source of motivation, just as was the innocence of my nephew, Sahatsawat Chanthavong (XQ), who could not understand why his uncle had to spend so much time in front of the computer. I am also grateful for the assistance I received from Grace Wei Tang and De´sire´e Billon, my two Research Assistants from the University of Western Sydney. They have taken this project to heart and shown a level of dedication that I will never forget. Dr Joel Dehe´, as always, has afforded me his advice and critical analysis; I shall be indebted to him for his insights. However, the standard caveats always apply. My thanks also go to all those colleagues, throughout the Greater Mekong Sub-Region and mainland southeast Asia generally, who were generous in sharing information and relevant documents on their respective areas of expertise, including those who may have thought that I was on a political mission that could jeopardise their positions. I hope they find in this book confirmation that the most searching questions are not always politically motivated and that the aim of my research was to gain a better understanding of the complex sociolinguistic situations of their countries. Let us never be afraid of the lies in our own hearts. Finally, I must thank my mother, who has taught me that languages are miracles to behold.

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Preface It is implicit that to speak is to exist absolutely for the Other (Fanon, 1967: 17). Language is at the nexus of marginalisation and vulnerability. Only through language can we hope to reduce poverty in real terms. Nonrecognition of the languages in which people organise their everyday life and socialise with their children means that these people are denied the tools to make their voices heard and the opportunity to shape their own destiny. It is also language that provides the critical means of ensuring control and coordination of all development activities. This defining role of language in capacity and nation building has caused nation-states to appropriate it, wherever possible, in order to articulate varying socioeconomic and political objectives. Therefore, language cannot be allowed to be viewed as peripheral to the development needs of emerging nations, and it is crucial for language policies to be grounded in a concern for inclusion and quality for all. Language as a factor of vulnerability has a direct effect on education, health, the economy and governance. It plays an important role for equitable and participative access to valuable socioeconomic and political spaces (real and virtual). Hence, rather than a distraction from the core issue of economic development, the language question is integral to the socioeconomic, political and cultural realities of many within the nation, and brings to the fore the significance of the local context and the necessity of local participation in the development process. I have made this argument at length elsewhere, in the case of Africa, but I had to pause for reflection when looking at countries in southeast Asia, where the issue of the national language seems to have been resolved, but where development issues remain a major concern, and ask whether language is indeed at the heart of development. Are students of language being too precious about the place and role of language in society? ix

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Fences to Take Down The development process in a country is often predicated on the assumption that we know what its economic and political realities are, and the literature dealing with development pays little attention to the language question. There is a general lack of interdisciplinarity between economists, educationists and sociolinguists, whose respective research tends to focus on one area, rather than look at the interrelationships and attempt to understand the interplay between language and issues of development. Economic studies aspire to a status of pure science and are expressed in the cloak of the ‘fetishism’ that figures bring; the more ‘specialised’ they are, the more credible they look. Such a bias obfuscates the possibility of a realistic, holistic approach to the actuality of everyday life that can help in the formulation of practical solutions to the challenges of development. Especially so when economic growth and free-market economics, regarded as the backbone of development in the new world order, have shown their limits with the latest economic downturn (2008
2009), and demystified pseudo-scientific and unsocial economics that worship figures and the maximisation of profits at all cost as the be-all and end-all of human endeavour. There is no doubt that economic growth and poverty reduction are linked, but no consistent relationship exists between the two, as economic growth approaches to development have, to date, failed to alleviate poverty. Although a country’s average per capita income may rise, the benefits are not necessarily proportionally distributed, and the population of poor people often remains unaffected by such growth. Corrupt and inefficient officials aggravate the lot of such people. Indeed, according to the UK Department for International Development (DFID, 1997; Paragraph 1.9), globalisation has left some 1.3 billion people in extreme poverty (i.e. with less than US$1 a day). This lack of interest in language is reciprocated, with educationists and sociolinguists showing a complete disregard for development economics (Williams & Cooke, 2002: 298), at least until the early 1990s (Arcand, 1995; Coulmas, 1992; Bruthiaux, 2000; Bunyi, 1999; Djite´, 1993; Grin, 1996; Rassool, 1999; Robinson, 1992; Wagner, 1995; Webb, 1999). This compartmentalisation has been all too prevalent in the analysis of development in Third World countries around the world, with the economy always edging out all other factors. No single index can capture all of the issues involved in development, and everyone is agreed that development should expand the capabilities, choices and quality of life of all its actors and agents. These capabilities, choices and quality of life

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lie in much more than economic growth alone; they also lie in the level and quality of education, the availability and quality of health care services and the ability for all to take an active part in public life. Economic growth that does not lead to meaningful and sustainable improvements of this kind in people’s lives and does not solve real life problems cannot be called development. Hence, education, health, the economy and good governance interact in complex ways, and the complexities of social sciences transcend disciplinary categories and ultimately require an understanding of all the factors that impact on the process of development and on economic growth itself. Therefore, the challenges every student of language is presented with are epistemologically and pedagogically profound and call for a fundamental rethinking of our discipline. There are a myriad of ways in which language and development are connected, and the broader socio-political context in which language issues are debated need to be fully examined. Language, education, health, the economy, governance and development are therefore intimately related, even though the nature of the relationships is rarely examined.

The Sociolinguistics of Development in a Needed Time This is the gap that the Sociolinguistics of Development aims to fill. The Sociolinguistics of Development is an attempt to look into and beyond the economic problems faced by developing countries and understand the dynamics of education, health and governance in terms of how they interrelate. Indeed, development is itself a dynamic and multidimensional paradigm, which requires a multidisciplinary approach. Economic growth, levels of literacy and education, status of health and quality of governance are all part-and-parcel of a development that is human and sustainable in the long term. In this context, the use of local languages is not necessarily a self-aggrandising political statement. It only seeks to enhance the self-confidence and skills that people need to initiate and manage practical change in their lives and own space. In the history of developed countries, the consolidation of the state and the economy, and the development and spread of the national/ official language seem to have occurred almost simultaneously. Hence, most developing countries have sought to replicate this model. The promotion of a single national language has marginalised other language varieties within the polity; and, sure enough, the same is occurring in those developing polities that have sought to copy what happened 200 years ago, when the relationship between language and development

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economics was even less understood, and when the notion of ‘One Nation  One Language’ was the overriding equation. The marginalisation of these language varieties has meant the consequent marginalisation of their speakers from socioeconomic betterment and from power. The language needs of others are not always considered a key element of communication. Is the price of development the denial of distinctiveness (linguistic, cultural or otherwise) and the discounting of local knowledge? Must all others sacrifice their linguistic and cultural uniqueness for the sake of economic growth? The national/official language, and often the sole language of education and administration, divides those in the country who have access to it and those who do not. Hence, far from being a source of unity, it becomes a source of national disunity; far from being a bridge to endogenous and sustainable development, it becomes a major stumbling block to such development. If attempts to communicate across languages can appear at first as an obstacle, having a shared language of governance or administration does not necessarily guarantee that meaningful communication takes place. Language can be both a facilitator and an impediment to effective communication. It is all a matter of how it is strategically managed and used. It can give some sections of society the power to act as gatekeepers. In this role, they can facilitate communication or, in what Myers (1993) refers to as ‘elite closure’, play the counter-productive role of deliberately filtering or distorting and even blocking information transmission. Many developed countries, especially within the European Union, are now rediscovering the value of the richness embedded in language diversity and are trying to right the wrongs of this monolingual ethos. Languages should therefore be viewed in strategic terms, because they affect the ability of the nation to build an inclusive knowledge society and achieve its development goals. Combating communicable diseases like malaria and pandemics like HIV/AIDS requires the use of the languages of the target populations concerned for any measure of success to be achieved. Language is the vehicle for the transfer of knowledge, and this transfer of knowledge is conditional on the efficiency of communication. Hence, the Sociolinguistics of Development is an approach anchored on the premise that language is not neutral, and that the discipline of sociolinguistics itself only makes sense within the relevant socio-political and economic constraints of a polity. The Sociolinguistics of Development emphasises local participation in the process, at every level, and argues that language is an explicit contributing factor to development with a human face. Language-related issues in education are relevant to health, and both of

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these have a direct flow-on effect on the economy and the mode of governance. Indeed, good education, health, economy and governance are all conditional on efficient communication. Language, in this sense, constitutes a key ingredient in creating a favourable context for sustainable and long-term endogenous development and, ultimately, the development of the nation-state. Multilingualism already exists in the societies of the Greater Mekong Sub-Region. Colonisation and neo-colonialism have also impacted negatively on the survival of many languages, and globalisation in the 21st century is putting even more pressure on speech communities to assimilate. Most governments are resisting the implementation of multilingualism in education, health and governance, thereby increasing the poverty gap, the school dropout rate and the worsening of the health status for the ethnic minorities they purport to try to lift out of poverty. Language policy that embraces and encourages the use of minority languages can bring about better efficiency and profitability in the utilisation of human resources. The demands of a modern, skilled labour force does not run counter to such a policy. On the contrary, it makes it even more necessary and urgent. Capacity building for public management and community development in a multilingual context requires innovative approaches to leverage the existing knowledge base and great human potential of minority ethnic groups. There is strong international evidence that investment in people, in all people
including ethnic minorities
pays off, and that it is preferable for investment in human resources to lead, rather than lag behind, other investments and development initiatives (ADB, 1997; Birdsall et al., 1995). The challenge of inclusiveness is in the promotion and maintenance of the active participation of all citizens in the running of the public affairs of the nation-state, for development cannot and will not occur suspended from existing sociolinguistic realities. When all are seen as actors and agents of development, rather than subjects or obstacles to development, including minority ethnic communities, then language becomes uncontroversial and cannot be overlooked as a means of achieving the ultimate goal of endogenous and sustainable development. In saying this, I realise that there is no single path forward. No one event, in and by itself, can define success; but implementing multilingualism where it already exists will help expand civil society and improve economic and educational opportunities for all, and provide a better approach to deal with the issues of participatory government, national security, peace and prosperity. Divisive and dysfunctional language policy can only lead to alienation and disintegration (Williams, 2008: 75).

Introduction Does language make a difference when it comes to development, or is there a perceptible difference in development between countries that is attributable to their choice of language? In The Sociolinguistics of Development in Africa, I argued that African languages are the missing link in the continent, and proceed to show their place and role in the areas of education, health, the economy and governance. I conclude that no economic development can occur in Africa outside the linguistic, social and cultural contexts of its speech communities. Language is a most sensitive issue in the developing world, because language choice and behaviour are integral to the social, economic and political stability of multicultural societies. To what extent does this argument hold? Economists, politicians and various social commentators often claim that African countries could or should emulate the development performances of Asian countries. By Asian countries, they often mean the east Asian Tigers (i.e. Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea); however, the historical, economic and linguistic backgrounds of these countries are vastly different from those of African countries. A closer examination of the facts suggests that only a few countries in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) (mainland southeast Asia), namely, Cambodia, the Lao PDR (formerly Laos), Myanmar (formerly Burma, and part of British India) and Viet Nam share similarities with African countries in their colonial past and linguistic make-up. The British expanded their southeast Asian interests into Myanmar in the 19th century, while the French were penetrating into the delta areas of southern Viet Nam (Cochinchina). The second and third opium wars of 1856
1860 led to the military conquest of Saigon, followed by the establishment of protectorates over Cambodia and six Vietnamese provinces. The French expanded their protectorate over Annam and Tonkin later in the century, to cover all of today’s Viet Nam. At the turn of the century, as Viet Nam and Cambodia were brought together in 1887, the Lao PDR was added in 1893, forming what became known as the Union Indochinoise or French Indo-China, covering a territory of 740,000 km2, with 10
11 million inhabitants (present-day Viet Nam, Cambodia xv

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and Lao PDR). All these countries happen to have a national language: Khmer for Cambodia, Lao for the Lao PDR, Myanma for Myanmar and Vietnamese for Viet Nam. Indeed, the link between development and a national language runs very deep in the GMS, and the colonial legacy inherited by all these countries in the area of language planning has further entrenched this link. While there are still questions as to whether education in the native languages can be a viable alternative to education in the languages of the former colonisers in the case of Africa, Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam have answered these questions in the positive. Their national languages are used as the main tools of education, up to university level, and for health, the economy and governance. However, except for Viet Nam, Cambodia, the Lao PDR and Myanmar are classified by the United Nations as ‘least developed countries’ (LDC). An LDC is defined by low levels of per capita income, low levels of human resource development and lack of economic diversification. Likewise, except again for Viet Nam, Cambodia, the Lao PDR and Myanmar are all on the International Development Association’s (IDA) list of Fragile States (2007), with Cambodia and Myanmar making the 2008 list of Conflict-affected Fragile States. Fragile States are countries that lack the capacity or will to safeguard their citizens’ human rights and security, and to provide basic services, such as health and education. Their ‘governments cannot or will not provide an environment for their citizens to reduce, mitigate or cope with poverty and other risks to wellbeing’ (UK Department for International Development, cited in the UNU Research Brief, No. 3, 2008: 1). Some common features of Fragile States are: (1) lower life expectancy; (2) higher child mortality; (3) unstable political institution and poor governance; (4) violent conflict or its aftermath; (5) inability to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015; and (6) potential for adverse impacts on political and economic developments in neighbouring countries, with possible global spill over. Myanmar, in particular, faces serious challenges of nation building and presents a dismal picture of political instability and economic impoverishment. So, to what extent is the claim about the centrality of language
national or otherwise
true, when it comes to the issue of development? Does development automatically follow from having adopted (a) local (national) language(s)? How valid are the comparisons between African countries and countries in the GMS in terms of development performances? This book sets out to answer these questions by investigating how language has been and is being used in these polities, especially in the

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critical areas of education, health, the economy and governance, with a view to finding out whether there is any evidence that the language policies of these countries contribute in some discernible way to development. The book is divided into six chapters, the first five of which cover the areas of (1) language, (2) education, (3) health, (4) the economy and (5) governance in each of the four polities (Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam). Chapter 1 provides an up-to-date description of the language situations in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam. It shows that, although each has an established national language, the sociolinguistic make-up of these countries is not only just as complex as that of other multilingual settings (e.g. Africa), but it also raises difficult issues of language management, socioeconomic and political equity and justice. These issues call into question the capacity of governments in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam to effectively face up to and reduce poverty in the foreseeable future. Language-in-education policies and their impact on development in the GMS are discussed in Chapter 2. One would be wrong to assume that literacy or education alone can cause development to occur, or that education will necessarily lead to economic success (Azariadis & Drazen, 1990; Djite´, 2008; Graff, 1995: 19
22). For instance, the experimental World Literacy programme, organised by UNESCO in 11 countries from 1967 to 1972 (Algeria, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Guinea, India, Iran, Madagascar, Mali, Sudan, Syria and Tanzania), provided evidence that large-scale literacy with no immediate socioeconomic functions is likely to fail (Lind & Johnson, 1990: 71). Although quality education is not a sufficient condition for rapid economic growth and development, education is still regarded as a priority sector, essential for human resources development and capacity building. It plays a central role in educational delivery and is intended to promote the imparting of information and the creation and spreading of knowledge. It is also crucial in developing and maintaining cultural and linguistic diversity, and in converting this diversity from a barrier to communication into a source of mutual enrichment and understanding. Literacy and education in local languages are critical for the most essential kinds of development: basic education, nutrition, health and meaningful enhancement of living conditions (Haq, 1995; Haq & Haq, 1998). Therefore, education can help eradicate poverty. It enhances economic opportunities through easier access to jobs and income and empowers people to take an active part in the exercise of participatory democracy. Social and linguistic equality is a prerequisite for this sort of inclusive process of decision making. That is why literate

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societies are better able to meet the pressing development challenges, as good quality education equips their population with functional skills for life. No country in which the threshold level of educational quality is lacking can manage to achieve rapid growth. Amartya Sen (1982), who defines poverty as ‘capability deprivation’, sees education as an enabling factor, and illiteracy as a significant obstacle to economic opportunities. Decisions about which language(s) to use in education in a multilingual context are not always straightforward. Countries have to consider whether and when it is strategically and economically feasible to introduce a national or minority language into their educational systems. These decisions are a matter of long-term political choice that determines who has access to education and the quality of such education. However, research on the quality and effectiveness of formal education has shown that much of the potential is not being realised in developing countries, even for those children who attend school, if only because much of the educational provision is carried out in a language that the children have little exposure to and do not understand. Lack of language competence short circuits the school experience. In other words, education is rendered ineffective when students have insufficient understanding of the medium of instruction. As Benson puts it: Some argue that just changing the language of teaching will not solve all the problems of an education system. However, a change in the medium of instruction also brings about other changes: It makes the home culture visible, it allows learners to talk about their prior knowledge and experience and link them to new information, it brings the home and the school closer together, it opens up communication between families and teachers, it facilitates communication and participation in the classroom, it helps learners gain selfesteem and a stronger sense of identity . . .in sum, using the learner’s language goes a long way toward resolving many of the access and quality issues that would lead us closer to reaching Education for All goals. (Benson, 2008a: 1) We now have enough evidence to show that education is unlikely to be effective when schools impose an unfamiliar language as the sole medium of instruction. Far from being a bridge to quality education, the imposition of any language on speech communities can be a barrier to their socioeconomic well-being and political integration. Education in a language that few learners master detracts from quality and compounds the other socio-political and economic problems.

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This why the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO, 1953) supports the view that education in a language already known to the learners, typically their mother tongue, is more likely to succeed than education in a language that the children come across for the first time in the formal setting of a classroom. Better education delivers a decent life and strengthens the roots of democracy, and multilingual policies in education give the best chance to all learners to gain basic skills in their own language and learn the languages they need to access wider horizons. However, as is shown in this chapter, the language policy practices in the GMS show that the preoccupation of governments with nation building and the homogenising demands inherent to the concept of development take precedence over the awareness of the existence of ethnic minorities, overshadowing the need for a linguistic space and opportunities for minority languages, and generating much frustration. Formal schooling in the national language continues to be seen as the only reasonable approach to education, with countries like the Lao PDR and Myanmar being particularly wedded to this notion. For literacy and the resultant education to effect change that may lead to development, it must be linked to changes in other fields, including the health sector. It is well known, for instance, that educated people tend to be healthier, and that healthier people tend to be better educated. It is also well known that illness of the workforce reduces productivity, households’ standards of living and their capacity to keep children in school (UNDP, 2006: 9). Chapter 3 looks at the status of health in the GMS. The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity’.1 Health is fundamental to the attainment of sustainable development. Language is an essential element of an effective public health and health care delivery system in multilingual contexts. The inability to understand and/or speak the official language creates a barrier and negatively affects the quality of care for minority language groups. It directly impacts their access and use of primary and preventive care in public health services, because of misunderstanding, misdiagnosis, inappropriate treatment and lack of compliance. Delaying a correct diagnosis because of the language barrier can have devastating consequences for the patient. In emergency room situations, language barriers can have disastrous outcomes for the patients. Overcoming language barriers to health care is therefore critical to the well-being of the population of a nation. This means that the provision of preventive,

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The Language Difference

curative, promotive and rehabilitative health services cannot be done in a linguistic vacuum, and that communication barriers can unnecessarily complicate the delivery of health care. Effective communication between health care providers and patients is essential to facilitating access to care, reducing health disparities and medical errors, and assuring the patients’ ability to follow prescriptions and treatment plans. Therefore, the health care system has to find ways of handling language diversity. National language policies in the GMS appear to contribute to the quarantining of public health services to first language speakers of the national language, in the urban areas, leaving minority language groups, who are in much greater need of such services, to fend for themselves and, at the same time, negating the stated aim of governments to reduce poverty in these very language groups. Reducing the burden of disease in minority populations improves their chances for education and full participation in other socioeconomic and political activities. An acceptable level of health for all cannot be achieved by the health sector alone, as there are many interactions and synergies between health status and education, between health and the economy (i.e. poverty), and between health and good governance. The intimate and complex relationship between health and socioeconomic development is most readily demonstrated in the causal relationship between improvements in a country’s socioeconomic status and gains in health status and life expectancy (Safman, 2005: 117, citing Folch et al., 2003; Bhagava et al., 2001; Price-Smith, 2001; Watts, 1997). The example of Cambodia demonstrates that the school-health-based approach to public health is an effective tool for the promotion of preventive health measures in schools and in the community. In Chapter 4, the analysis of the economies of the GMS shows that the formal economy is far from meeting the needs of the populations. Even in Viet Nam, where there is a relatively strong economic performance, economic growth still has a long way to go to achieve the goal of reducing poverty. The analysis in this chapter goes beyond the formal economy, which only requires the use of the official language, and asks how the majority of the labour force, employed in the informal economy, conducts its everyday business in terms of communication. The informal economy has grown worldwide, especially in developing countries, as a result of liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation and globalisation, which pushed out millions of workers from the formal economy. In Asia, and the GMS in particular, the informal economy now provides the majority of non-agricultural employment (65%) (Chen, 2008), and the World Bank estimates that it generates 40% of the gross national product

Introduction

xxi

(GNP) of developing countries and 17% of the GNP of developed countries. The size of the informal economy in multilingual settings is usually an indication of the continued relevance and use of minority languages as is shown in this sub-region, especially in the Lao PDR and Myanmar. It is also an indication that the population cannot and does not rely on the formal economy, and therefore on government policies, to earn a living. At the same time, a large and pervasive informal economy does not bode well for the economic growth and development targets of the countries in the sub-region. Businesses in the informal economy operate, partially or wholly, outside the law, by under-reporting employment, avoiding taxes, ignoring product quality and safety regulations, infringing copyright, and even failing to register as legal entities. As a result, activities in the informal economy are not regulated and protected, and informal workers are left outside the legal framework; in other words, they are not entitled to legal or social protection under the labour legislation. The relevance of language in the critical area of governance in the GMS is examined in Chapter 5. The World Bank defines governance as: the set of traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (3) the respect of citizens and state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.2 Good governance is defined in terms of legitimacy and inclusiveness. It is not only the ability of people, all people, including ethno-linguistic minorities, to voice their choice of community, regional and national leaders through elections, it is also the existence of an elected legislature, an independent judiciary, a free press and media, a free civil society, an impartial, free, independent, qualified and effective civil service and judiciary and justice system, the absence of corrupt practices and the ability of citizens to gather together in groups and express their common concerns. At first glance, it looks as though the adoption of a national language in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam has done little to improve governance. The governments of these countries do not seem willing to engage in the politics of recognition and treat all their citizens equally, thus making it difficult for their own people, and especially their ethnic minorities, who are in dire need of basic services in health and education, to receive the aid and support they deserve.

xxii

The Language Difference

The last chapter, Chapter 6, entitled ‘The Language Difference’, seeks to separate facts from fiction. It begins with a comparative analysis of language policy in the four polities and contrasts them in terms of management of local languages, assessing the extent to which the use of these languages has the potential of reducing the vulnerability of populations in the GMS to ‘things they do not control’ (Goulet, 1971). Having explored the same issues in the case of Africa (Djite´, 2008), I close this chapter with an attempt at addressing the central questions of this inquiry: are there fundamental differences in the implementing of multilingualism between countries of the GMS and African countries? Is there a perceptible difference in development between the GMS and Africa that is clearly attributable to their choice of (national/official) language? What lessons can language planners draw from any differences or similarities that may emerge from this comparison? Notes 1. Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organisation as adopted by the International Health Conference, New York, 19
22 June 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61 States (Official Records of the World Health Organization, no. 2, p. 100) and entered into force on 7 April 1948. 2. On WWW at http://info.Worldbank.org, Government Matters III, IV, V. Accessed 22.6.07.

Chapter 1

Language and Development in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region Introduction At first glance, there is a language difference between African countries and the country of the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS). In contrast with the former, language issues in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam seem to have been successfully resolved via the adoption of a national language, suggesting some degree of ‘language uniformity’ (Djite´, 2008). When interpreted through the prevailing theories of language policy and planning and language and development of the last decades (Coulmas, 1992: 25; Fasold, 1984: 7; Gellner, 1983: 35; Pool, 1972: 213), one is tempted to conclude that the issues of development plaguing African countries (i.e. national unity, political stability, economic growth and good governance) would not stand in the way of countries that have made the pragmatic choice of ‘instrumental and operational efficiency’ (Fishman, 1968
Fishman’s concepts of ‘nationalism’ and ‘nationism’ are discussed in Chapter 6). What follows suggests that the linguistic picture of the GMS is a complex one. This complexity goes a long way in providing some of the answers to the reasons why the countries in this sub-region continue to grapple with the same issues of development that African countries are faced with, especially in the areas of education, health, the economy and governance.

Language and Development in Cambodia Cambodia is bordered by the Gulf of Thailand on the southwest, the Lao PDR on the northeast, Thailand on the northwest and west, and Viet Nam on the southeast and east (see Map 1.1). Its population was estimated at 14.8 million people in 2010. Some 22 languages are spoken in the country. Khmer, the national and official language, has its own script, aˆkkhaˆraˆkraˆm khe´maˆraˆ phe´asa, informally known as ‘aksar Khmer’, a segmental writing system based on consonants, with obligatory vowel notation. Although it has 1

2

The Language Difference

Map 1.1 Map of Cambodia

influenced and been influenced by neighbouring languages, such as Thai, Lao and Vietnamese, due to Sanskrit and Pali influences, Khmer differs from the latter in that it is not a tonal language. Estimates of the ethno-linguistic groups living in the country vary between 20 and 40. Apart from the Muslim Cham
also referred to as ‘Khmer Islam’
and the Chinese and the Vietnamese, whose populations are in the hundreds of thousands (Kosonen, 2005, 2007; Leclerc, 2009a; Neou Sun, 2009), all other ethno-linguistic groups are small. Statistics place the number of Vietnamese in Cambodia at 2 million or 5% of the total population, while the Chinese make up only 1% of the population. All other ethnic groups put together represent 4% of the population. A significant number of Cambodia’s minority groups live in remote highland provinces, where the literacy rate is estimated at only 5.3%. Some of these, such as the Brao and the Kraveth in the Ratanakiri province, are related to those living in southern Lao PDR, and were artificially separated from the latter by the border demarcation imposed by the French colonisers in 1903. Other

Language and Development in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region

3

indigenous people, such as the Khmer Leu or Choncheat (also known as hill tribes or highlanders. They call themselves ‘Choncheat’, hence my preference for this term), living in the northeast highland area and other areas of the country, are mostly illiterate and poor. As in the Lao PDR, education and economic development programmes have been aimed at settling the Choncheat outside their original villages and transforming their methods of agriculture and their general lifestyle, which was seen as backward (White, 1996). Two new provinces, Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri, were created in 1959 and 1960, respectively, in pursuance of a general policy of integration of the Choncheat into Khmer society.1 The government then started introducing Khmer culture to the indigenous people, as part of a five-year development plan. Then came the Khmer Rouge, who simply banned their cultural practices and language altogether. Khmer is the dominant language, comprising approximately 90% of the population, making it one of the least diverse polities in southeast Asia. Cambodians are 95% Theravada Buddhists, but have Animist, Christian and Muslim minorities (5%).

Language and Development in the Lao PDR Once known as Lan Xang or ‘the Kingdom of a Million Elephants’ (founded in the 13th century), the Lao PDR is a small, landlocked and ethnically diverse country of 6.32 million people. Expanding at average growth rates of between 2% (World Bank, 2005) and 2.8% per year (GoL, 2005), one of the highest in southeast Asia, the population of the Lao PDR is expected to double by 2024. The country has a total land area of 236,800 km2, stretching more than 1700 km from north to south, 100
400 km east to west, at the centre of the GMS. Bordering China and Myanmar in the north, it sits between Thailand (on the other side of the Mekong River) in the west, Myanmar in the northwest and Viet Nam in the east. More than two-thirds of the country (70%) is mountainous, with 47% forest cover (see Map 1.2). The population of the Lao PDR is 85% Buddhist and 15% Animist, 23% urban and 77% rural. As in Cambodia, Myanmar and Viet Nam, poverty in this country is mainly regional, rural and ethnic related, raising issues of equity and justice. Almost 70% of the total population and 90% of the ethnic minorities live in rural areas (eStandardsForum, 2008: 1). They are mainly subsistence farmers (83%) and poor (46%). Four major ethnic minority groups are found in the Lao PDR:

4

The Language Difference

Map 1.2 Map of the Lao PDR

(a)

The Lao Tai (formerly Lao Loum) occupy the lowland plains and the Mekong river valley and constitute 66.7% of the population. This group, which comprises the Lao, the Lue, the Phou Ta`y and the Tai, has historically enjoyed a dominant position in society in the Lao PDR. (b) The Mon-Khmer (formerly Lao Theun), comprising about 20.6% of the population, occupy the lower mountain slopes and are thought to have been the first inhabitants of the Lao PDR. This group

Language and Development in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region

5

includes the Brao, the Katang, the Katu, the Khmou, the Lamet, the Loven, the Makong, the So and the Ta Oy. (c) The H’Moˆng-lu Mien (formerly Lao Soung) occupy the higher mountain slopes and make up 8.4% of the population, include the Huoay, the H’Moˆng and the Yao. (d) The Chine-Tibet (formerly Lao Soung) occupy the higher mountain slopes, constituting about 3.3% of the population. This group comprises the Akha, the Lahu and the Sila. Together, these ethnic groups are said to make up 48% of the total population and live largely in rural areas. There are several other marginal ethnic minorities in the Lao PDR, also living in rural areas, as well as the Chinese, Vietnamese and other south Asians, concentrated in urban areas. The number of languages spoken in the Lao PDR is a matter of debate and estimates range from 132 (Chaze´e, 1999) to 86 (Ethnologue, 2005; Kosonen & Young, 2009), and 82 (UNESCO, 2008) down to 49 (Lao PDR 2007) or even 47 (National Statistical Centre, 1997). Enfield (2006b: 698) believes that there are ‘around 70 [ethnic groups] and around 120 distinct languages’, with Mon-Khmer languages being the oldest to have been spoken in the country. The dominant language, Lao, with more than 3 million first language speakers, is the official language. Lao (or Laotian) belongs to the TaiKadai language family, which also includes Thai, Shan and languages spoken by smaller, related ethnic groups in Laos, Thailand, Burma, southern China and northern Viet Nam. Lao is a concise language. Most of its basic words have only one syllable. Prefixes and combinations of basic words are used to make more complex meanings. Multisyllable words, mainly originating from Sanskrit, are generally used in religious, academic and government texts. The sentence structure is also quite simple. The Lao script, introduced during the time of the Angkor Empire, is based on Sanskrit, through Khmer, and the lexicon shows considerable borrowings from Pali and Sanskrit, through Buddhist philosophy and religion (Kosonen, 2005). Lao is spoken not only in the Lao PDR, but also by some 20 million residents of northeast Thailand, in an area called ‘Isaan’, where some differences, mainly tonal, have developed over the course of history. Khmu is by far the largest ethno-linguistic minority with some 11% of the national population, followed by H’Moˆng, with around 8% of the total population (Lao PDR, 2007). Khmu and H’Moˆng have officially sanctioned Lao-based scripts, both of which have not been widely used.

6

The Language Difference

Both languages also have Roman orthographies. While the H’Moˆng actively use the Roman orthography in the community in the Lao PDR and especially overseas, the Khmu tend to use both orthographies (Laobased and Roman-based) side by side (Enfield, 2006b: 485). Kosonen (2005: 128) suggests that ‘the number of different ethno-linguistic groups may actually be higher than what the Ethnologue (2005) states’, and believes that there are at least nine other languages, each spoken by more than 100,000 people or around 2% or more of the total population. The population speaking minority languages throughout the country constitutes about half of the total population (National Statistical Centre, 1997; UNFPA, 2001), and some suggest that the dominant language group, Lao, may in fact be spoken by less than half of the population, depending on the definition of ethnic minority and the interpretation of statistical data (Chaze´e, 1999; Kosonen, 2005, 2007). Chaze´e (1999: 7, 14) claims that only 35% of the Lao population are first language speakers of Lao Loum or the lowland Lao variety of the language. As is usually the case in other multilingual contexts, speakers of minority languages in the Lao PDR, especially the upland peoples, tend to be multilingual, while lowland-dwelling people, speakers of the majority language, tend to be monolingual. This is compounded by widespread internal migration, resulting in a shift to Lao. In 2001, the Lao National Literacy Survey (LNLS, 2001) found that 71.1% of the total population spoke Lao at home, while 27.3% spoke different minority languages. The Lao PDR has not named one variety of Lao as the official language of the country (as in Thailand where Central Thai is the official language); however, the Vientiane variety is becoming the unofficial national language. Lao citizens of non-Lao or other Tai ethnic groups who study or work in the capital often try to speak Lao with a Vientiane accent. Other languages with a significant presence in the Lao PDR are Thai and Vietnamese, as the country’s longest borders are with Thailand to the west (1800 km) and Viet Nam to the east (2130 km). The most serious challenge that the Lao PDR faces is human resource development. In the Annex to a letter dated 2 June (E/2008/78), addressed to the President of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, Mr Kanika Phommachanh, Permanent Representative of the Lao PDR to the United Nations, writes that the Lao government considers five areas crucial. These are: poverty eradication, education, health, gender equality and sustainable development (Phommachanh, 2008: 2). Thus, the Lao PDR cannot afford to ignore its ethnic minorities, especially not when these minorities make up at least 48% of the total

Language and Development in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region

7

population. There needs to be significant upgrading of the skills of all the people across the country, through improvements in the enrolment, retention and quality of education in the Lao language and in the languages of the ethnic minorities.

Language and Development in Myanmar Political events or non-events and natural disasters are the enduring images through which we tend to perceive developing countries like Myanmar, in what we otherwise believe to be a globalised world. Hence, many people will perhaps have heard about Pyidaungsu Thamada Myanmar Naing-Ngan Daw, or the Union of Myanmar (formally the Union of Burma)2 only after the 1988 uprising, the ‘stolen’ multiparty legislative elections of 1990 (see Chapter 5 for further details), the brutal suppression of demonstrations in September 2007
when activists and Buddhist monks took to the streets in protest after unexpected increases in the price of fuel and other basic commodities
or the 2008 cyclone3; all of which are a poor reflection of the scholarly and media attention afforded this country over the last four decades. Taylor (2005: 1) writes that ‘to understand modern Myanmar, one needs to appreciate the various pathways to the present that have come together to create the country’s current condition’. This section aims to do exactly that, in order to get a clear understanding of the underlying issues facing Myanmar, at least insofar as the question of language is concerned, and in terms of how it affects the critical areas of education, health, the economy and governance. In saying that, I wish to point the reader to the usual caveat in discussing Myanmar. Indeed, the literature is replete with warnings on the paucity of reliable data to study Myanmar. In Perry’s words (2007: 13), ‘the problem of the unrecorded is generally more important than that of the misrecorded’. Myanmar is a country where one is confronted with serious restrictions when attempting to collect data of any kind; whatever data are made available need to be treated with extreme caution. Ironically, I have found language, or the lack of proficiency in the local languages, to be part and parcel of this limited capacity to understand the people, the place, and the socio-political and sociolinguistic realities of Myanmar. Located on a strategic crossroads in Asia, Myanmar is a diverse country of 50.02 million inhabitants, growing annually at a rate of 0.8% in 2008 (World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2008). Covering a total area of 678,500 km2, the Union of Myanmar (henceforth Myanmar)

8

The Language Difference

is the creation of British imperialism (see Chapter 5 on ‘Language and Governance’ for further details on the creation of present-day Myanmar). Bordered by the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal in the south and southwest (2300 km), Myanmar shares common borders with Bangladesh (271 km) on the west, India (1338 km) on the northwest, China (2107 km) on the north and northeast, the Lao PDR (238 km) on the east and Thailand (2107 km) on the south and southeast (see Map 1.3) (figures based on Han, 2004). The population of Myanmar is estimated at about 30% urban and 70% rural. Most people in Myanmar are Theravada Buddhists (90%). Christians and Muslims are equally represented in the population (4% each), while Hindus represent about 2% of the population. Many members of these religious denominations, some 12.6% of the population, still practice traditional beliefs. It is not clear exactly how many languages are spoken in Myanmar, in part because no formal linguistic survey has ever been carried out in the country. Estimates vary between 100 languages (Kosonen & Young, 2009) and 200 languages. Gordon (2005) lists 108 languages in the country, many of which are also spoken in neighbouring countries. Quoting Ethnologue 2004, Taylor (2005: 2) concurs, suggesting that ‘there are more than a dozen linguistically distinct ethnic groups with perhaps as many as 100 different dialects and sub-groups’. However, according to Ang Cheng Guan (2007: 124), Myanmar has eight major ‘ethnic races’ (i.e. the Kachin, Kayin, Kayah, Chin, Mon, Rakkhine, Shan and Bamar) and ‘some 135 minorities’. The majority language group, the Bamar, accounts for 70% of the total population. The Shan make up more than 10% of the population. Other important language groups are the Arakanese, the Karen (Sgaw, Pwo and Pa’o), the Mon and the Jingpho (Leclerc, 2009c). A number of large ethnic groups live in States named after their group (e.g. the Chin State, the Mon State and the Shan State). Altogether, ethnic minorities are believed to constitute about 30% of the total population of Myanmar. The official language of the country is Myanmar (see Chapter XV, Paragraph 450 of the Constitution), the language of the majority Bamar (68
70%). Other important language communities comprise the Han Chinese (3%), the Indians (2%), the Karen (7%), the Rakhine (4%), the Shan (9%), the Mon (2%), the Yangbye (2.2%) and the Kacin (1.5%). Until colonial times, only Bama/Myanmar, Mon, Shan and the languages of the ancient Pyu kingdom of northern Myanmar were written. However, writing systems have now been developed for the languages of the Karen, Kachin and Chin peoples.

Language and Development in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region

Map 1.3 Map of Myanmar

9

10

The Language Difference

Of all the polities discussed in this book, Myanmar is an excellent example of how ethnic discord can ravage a country and its people. Indeed, ethnic peace, and political compromise and inclusiveness in Myanmar are part and parcel of its struggle to achieve economic growth and sustainable development. Since 1992, the country has had a Ministry for the Progress of Border Areas and National Races, upgraded from what was known as the Border Areas Development Programme (BADP), a programme instituted under the SPDC in 1989. Geographical complexities, inherited from its colonial past, place ethnic and nationality issues in Myanmar at the heart of its development challenges, as mistrust pervades relationships at personal, ethnic, religious and political levels. For example, the armed Karen National Union has long claimed the identity of a separate nation and is still seeking the right to selfdetermination. According to Smith (2005: 61 and Appendix), ‘there are over twenty-five armed groups still representing different ethnic minority designations’ in Myanmar today. He adds that ‘ethnic conflicts should not be perceived as simply a Bamar majority versus ethnic minority question’ or purely ‘political or ideological’ as, over the years, local economic and territorial disputes have inflated these conflicts and made them much more complex (this is the case of the armed conflicts between the Mon and the Karen or the Shan and the Wa). Callahan (2003: 149) agrees and suggests that ‘ethnic conflict in Myanmar should not be seen as simply inter-group struggle, but rather as struggles over identity, wealth, status privilege and power’. Ang Cheng Guan (2007: 121) also acknowledges that ‘many of Myanmar’s problems are connected to the ethnic minorities and can only be resolved with their cooperation and support’ for ‘the history of Burma [Myanmar] after independence is the history of rebellion among the minority groups’ (Takano, 2002: 51). After decades of conflicts and division, Myanmar has yet to resolve issues of ethnic and political inclusiveness and openness over many aspects of its diversity and future. If the country’s primary challenge is poverty alleviation, the centrality of ethnic issues dictates that it finds unity of voice for a lasting compromise and reconciliation in the future.

Language and Development in Viet Nam Once known as the ‘Pearl of the Orient’, Viet Nam (Vieˆt Nam) is a ˙ colonisanarrow stretch of land, which fought its way through Chinese tion (it regained independence from China in 938 AD, after the famous victory at the battle of Bach Ða`˘ ng River), then three long decades of ˙

Language and Development in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region

11

bitter wars against France, and another 16 years (1959
1975) against the USA, Australia and New Zealand, before becoming a unified country in 1976 under the name of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, when the armed forces of the communist north seized the south of the country in 1975. Coˆng ho`a xa˜ hoˆi chuc nghia Vieˆt Nam or the Socialist Republic of Viet ˙ ˙ Nam is˙a densely populated, developing country of 85.78 million people. In 2009, Viet Nam was the thirteenth most populous country in the world. Extending 1650 km north to south (only 50 km across at its narrowest point), with a total surface of 4639 km2 and a coastline of 3444 km along the Gulf of Tonkin, the South China Sea and the Gulf of Thailand, Viet Nam is the easternmost country of the GMS. It shares long land boundaries with China to the north (1281 km), the Lao PDR to the northwest (2130 km) and Cambodia to the southwest (1228 km) (see Map 1.4). There is no agreement as to the exact number of languages that exist in Viet Nam, because estimates are not based on empirical data. Official figures on languages are given in absolute numbers, with no lists of names and numbers of speakers of individual languages, criteria of categorisation, etc. Research on the number of ethnic groups in the country was carried out from 1958 to 1979, but the issue of the exact number of ethno-linguistic groups remains unresolved. Hence, while the government officially recognises 54 ethnic groups, unofficial estimates put this figure at 100 different languages (Bui Thi Ngoc Diep & Bui Van Thanh, 2009; Leclerc, 2009d). The Kinh people (ngu’o’ı´ kinh), otherwise known as the Viet (ngu’o’ı´ Viet), make up 86.2% of the total population, and ethno-linguistic minorities make up the remaining 14% (1.9% of Ta`y, 1.7% of Thai, 1.5% of Muong, 1.4% of Khome, 1.1% of Hoa, 1.1% of Nun, 1% of H’Moˆng, and 4.1% of other smaller ethnic groups, according to the 1999 census). Several minority language groups, such as the Ta`y, the Thai, the Muong, the Hoa (i.e. Chinese) and the Khmer, have large populations (more than 1 million each), while up to 18 ethnic minorities, such as the Nung, the H’Moˆng, the Dao, the J’rai and the Ede, are believed to have populations in the hundreds of thousands. The five smallest ethno-linguistic groups are the Brau, O-du, Pu Peo, Ro-man and Si La (see Dang Nghiem Van et al., 2000: 266
275). Thus, bilingualism and multilingualism are widespread in Viet Nam, and ethnic relations are not structured along linguistic lines. In contrast with countries like the Lao PDR and Myanmar, some 80.8% of the population declare having no religion at all, and only 9.3% of the population is Buddhist, with another 6.7% Catholic. Other religious

12

Map 1.4 Map of Viet Nam

The Language Difference

Language and Development in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region

13

groups are the Hoa Hao (1.5%), Cao Dai (1.1%), Protestants (0.5%) and Muslims (0.1%) (see 1999 census). The spoken languages and writing systems of Viet Nam were heavily influenced by China and India, as the Viet used Chinese characters as the basis for their writing system, while the Thai and Cham used Sanskritbased characters. This situation remained unchanged during the French occupation (1861
1945), when limited autonomy was granted to some ethno-linguistic minorities, in an attempt to co-opt these minorities into the French colonial system and divide the local people. However, this policy suddenly changed when the French, in an effort to eliminate the Chinese influence over Viet Nam (linguistic, cultural and religious), abolished all previous writing systems and introduced the Romanised system of writing (De Francis, 1977). As a result, four major writing systems evolved in the country over time, namely: (1)

(2)

(3)

The Chinese writing system, during the first Chinese occupation (111 BC to 939 AD). The use of Chinese continued until the first part of the 20th century, sustained in part by the adoption of Confucianism as the state’s ideology. Although Chinese fulfilled high language functions in society, it was never spoken and/or written colloquially by the Vietnamese. Nom, a Chinese character-based writing system developed in the 13th century (used by the San Chay, Ta`y, the Viet and the Yao). The earliest Nom inscription on a temple stele dates back to 1209 and was found in the north of the country, at Bao An. Nom came to serve the functions of vernacular expression and bridged the official script barrier. As a result, Viet Nam had two languages
Vietnamese and Chinese
and two writing systems: Nom or ideographic Vietnamese, and Sino-Vietnamese (Chinese). Much of the Nom writing was destroyed during the Ming invasion in the 15th century (1407
1427). Quoˆ´c ngu˜’, a Romanised system of writing, was introduced to Viet Nam in the mid-17th century by French Catholic missionaries mainly to sever Viet Nam’s cultural connections with China and bring the Viet into the French linguistic and cultural spheres of influence4 (used by the Bahnar, the E-de, the Gia-Rai, the J’ru, the Muong, the Ta`y, the Viet, etc.). Thus, there were two languages
Vietnamese and Chinese
and three writing systems: Nom, Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ and Sino-Vietnamese (Chinese); Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ was extended to school use in a limited way from 1861 under the French colonial administration.

14

The Language Difference

(4)

French, the language of the French coloniser. Hence, during the French occupation, Viet Nam had three languages
Vietnamese, Chinese and French
and four writing systems: Nom, Quoˆ´c ngu˜’, Sino-Vietnamese (Chinese) and French.

Although not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the national language and official language of Viet Nam is Vietnamese. It is spoken by 90% of the population as a first or second language (Kosonen, 2004; Leclerc, 2009d; Vu Thi Thanh Huong, 2008), due in part to the large number of urbanised ethnic groups (e.g. the Hoa, the Muong and the Ta`y) who speak Vietnamese. Most of the remaining ethnic minorities, however, are not exposed to the Vietnamese language (Kosonen, 2004; Tran Kieu, 2002). From the 10th to the early 19th century (the dynastic period), the Viet court ruled minority areas indirectly, by and large administering the people in their own languages. No detailed research has been undertaken on the spoken and written languages of the ethno-linguistic minorities in Viet Nam, and it is not clear how many of these languages have a writing system. The Research Centre for Minority Education (RCEME) lists 24 languages as having writing systems (Hoang, 2004), while the Institute of Linguistics estimates that some 30 languages have some kind of writing system (Kosonen, 2004; Leclerc, 2009d; Lo Bianco, 2002; UNESCO, 2008; Vu, 2008). However, a number of major ethno-linguistic minority groups did have their own writing systems, four of which used non-roman scripts (i.e. Cham, Hoa, Khmer and Thai). Some of these were the Sanskrit-based writing system (used by the Khmer, the Cham and the Lao), and the writing system based on ancient scripts (used by the Thai, who recorded their history in two masterpieces, Ta`y Pu Soc and Quam To Muong, and the Lo Lo).

Conclusion All indications are that, like other economies in southeast Asia, Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam have being making steady progress in terms of economic growth (Table 1.1), leading to improved rankings in the Human Development Index,5 adult literacy rates, life expectancy and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (Table 1.2). However, these figures do not tell the whole story. Cambodia, the Lao PDR and Myanmar also have the highest infant mortality rates in southeast Asia, with 95 children dying between birth and one year of age for every 1000 live births in Cambodia, 88 in the Lao PDR and 75 in

Language and Development in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region

15

Table 1.1 Human development index in the GMS (2007/2008) HDI rank (value 2007)

Adult literacy (% aged 15 and older)

Life expectancy (2005)

GDP per capita (PPPUS$) 2005

Cambodia

137

76.3

60.6

1802

Lao PDR

133

72.7

64.6

2165

Myanmar

138

89.9

61.2

904

Viet Nam

116

90.3

74.3

2600

Source: Adapted from the UNDP’s Human Development Report (2009)

Table 1.2 Annual real GDP rates in the GMS (% change year-on-year) 2008

2009

2010e

2011F

Cambodia

6.7


2.0

4.4

6.0

Lao PDR

7.5

6.7

7.0

7.5

Myanmar

3.6

4.4

5.2

5.5

Viet Nam

6.2

5.3

6.5

6.8

Source: Adapted from The World Bank East Asia and Pacific Update (2010) and the ADB (2010) Asian Development Outlook 2010 e: Estimate; F: Forecast

Myanmar. Additionally, these three countries have the highest under-five mortality rates in southeast Asia, with over 100 children for every 1000 newborns not reaching the age of five. It is interesting to note that countries with reportedly high literacy rates, as is the case in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Viet Nam and especially Myanmar, should have such high levels of fertility rate. This, at the very least, raises the issue of the reliability of the figures. At worst, it brings into question the definition and/or the tools used to measure literacy. Furthermore, except for Viet Nam, Cambodia, the Lao PDR and Myanmar are on the United Nations’ List of Least Developed Countries. Viet Nam also outperforms the other three countries in the Human Poverty Index6 (Table 1.3). Finally, as the next chapters show, except for Viet Nam, Cambodia, the Lao PDR and Myanmar show low levels of education, persistent health problems, lack of an integrated national economy and weak infrastructure, all issues that continue to impede their competitiveness and stand in the way of

97. Cambodia (24.1)

83. Lao PDR (16.6)

91. Myanmar (21.0)

38. Viet Nam (6.7)

88. Cambodia (28.9)

89. Lao PDR (31.0)

76. Myanmar (21.0)

53. Viet Nam (12.5)

45. Viet Nam (9.7)

47. Myanmar (10.1)

87. Lao PDR (27.5)

79. Cambodia (24.4)

Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and above) 2006

Source: Adapted from the UNDP Human Development Report (2007/2008)

Probability of not surviving past age 40 (%) 2005

Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) 2006

Table 1.3 Human poverty index in the GMS

35. Viet Nam (8)

71. Myanmar (20)

100. Lao PDR (40)

94. Cambodia (35)

People without access to an improved water source (%) 2006




101. Viet Nam (25)

115. Myanmar (32)

128. Lao PDR (40)

119. Cambodia (36)

Children underweight for age (% ages 0 5) 2006

16

The Language Difference

Language and Development in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region

17

their governments’ proclaimed objective of significantly reducing poverty by 2015. What these figures do instead is go a long way to confirming the notion that development is not necessarily tied to income and economic growth alone. Trade and economic growth do not automatically guarantee meaningful improvements in people’s lives; in fact, they have the potential, instead, to widen existing inequalities between the rich and the poor, between urban and rural areas, between men and women. Development has to be seen in terms of an array of complex and interdependent factors
such as education, health, the economy and good governance
which combine to produce the outcome sought. I submit that language is one of the undergirding and crucial elements that run through each and every one of these factors. A closer look at the sociolinguistic make-up of all four countries reveals a pattern of great language diversity, showing that multilingualism in this part of the world is not outside anybody’s experience. However, everywhere, language and ethnicity are sensitive political issues, probably because it is not lost on anyone that language can help change participation in power, wealth and status. Political expediency under the guise of ‘nationism’ has pushed assimilationist policies, with nationalist cultural agendas, promoting one national language
and sometimes one religion
at the expense of other languages and religions. As a result, cultural and linguistic diversity are seen as undesirable characteristics of societies, and are regarded as potential sources of conflict and obstacles to development. Linguistic otherness is made into something abnormal, something to be feared and a target of existential anxieties. Ethno-linguistic minorities are the most vulnerable and susceptible groups, as their speakers are perceived as a threat to social peace. This, in turn, has given rise to a myopic view of the nation-state, which has become the property of one single ethnic group, alienating the Karen and the Shan in Myanmar, frustrating the H’Moˆng in the Lao PDR, and estranging the Vietnamese and the Hill tribes in Cambodia, and the Montagnards in Viet Nam. Various schemes of ‘resettlements’, sometimes referred to as ‘land allocation’, ‘promotion of permanent land use’ or ‘sedentarisation’ have been pursued in the Lao PDR and Viet Nam for instance, with the aim of ‘domesticating’ highland people to the practices of lowland people, thereby disrupting the socio-cultural and linguistic practices of the former (see Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of resettlement and land allocation in Cambodia, the Lao PDR and Viet Nam). At the same time, the languages of ethnic minorities are invisible

18

The Language Difference

in schools, because it is believed that they cannot be used for any meaningful purpose. The status of ethnic minorities is further complicated by the fact that many state authorities essentially regard them as ‘trans-national’, therefore susceptible to divided national loyalties. Due to the mobility of peoples in the past for various reasons, the territories of all these nationstates cannot objectively or exclusively accommodate a single ‘pure’ ethnic group. Hence, all four countries, just like most of the rest of the world, were populated by many ethnic groups. Indeed, it is difficult to determine the exact territorial distribution of a number of ethnolinguistic minorities within and across countries in this part of the world. Owing to colonisation and/or immigration, many languages, such as Cham, spoken in Cambodia, Thailand and Viet Nam; Lao, spoken in the Lao PDR, northern Myanmar, northeastern Thailand, and the Yunnan and Guangxi provinces of China; Khmu, spoken in China, the Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam; and H’Moˆng, spoken in the Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam. Languages in multilingual contexts are not bounded and delimited systems that occupy equally bounded and delimited spaces and functions. As a result, in all four countries, ethnic minorities are overrepresented among the poor, due to limited and unequal access to education, health, economic and other basic, necessary resources. Ethno-linguistic minorities bear the brunt of illiteracy in these societies with a long literary tradition. Needless to say, linguistic and cultural discrimination are central to illiteracy and education failure, disempowerment and poverty. The large-scale illiteracy and lack of education of ethnic minority groups leads to voicelessness and impedes economic development. They have the highest fertility rate and the lowest life expectancy, because they have no or limited access to health services. Although the greatest challenges facing these countries, as professed in all the available policy documents, are poverty reduction and human resource development, incremental economic growth or lack thereof in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam is marked by great inequalities between members of the dominant language group and those of the ethno-linguistic minorities. Inclusive multilingualism is about equally empowering all the production forces of the nation. A country with a truly global ambition needs all its human resources, in all the languages spoken on its territory; and the challenge in the GMS is to ensure that all languages play their role in expressing identity and optimising communication for their speakers, giving them effective access to information and full participation in education, the economy and the political process. Development is

Language and Development in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region

19

when societies open up, celebrate their ethnic diversity and seek to achieve much more than just ensuring security from poverty and disease. Notes 1. In March 1955, Prince Samdech Norodom Sihanouk established what he called the popular socialist society or Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Sangkum for short), meaning ‘the society that people like’. This era extended from 1955 to 1970. During this period, 20% of the national budget was spent on education, an expenditure that caused the education system to expand considerably by 25% a year. 2. The country was known under the official English name of Burma since 1885. The name of the country was changed to Myanmar in 1989. At the time, a government spokesperson stated that ‘The term ‘‘Myanmar’’ has been used as the name of the nation and the people for years countable by the thousands’ (quoted in Tekkatho Myat Thu, 2000). Mranma Pran˜ or Myanma was the written term used to refer to the domain of the kings at Pagan, Pegu and Mandalay in the 12th century. In modern usage, ‘Mranma’, ‘Myanma’ or ‘Myanmar’ is the formal literary term for the territory. The change of the country’s name from ‘Burma’ (given by the British) back to the original name ‘Myanmar’, was said to have been carried out in order ‘to provide a feeling of release from the British colonial past and to give a previously divided and fractious country a sense of national unity’ (see Political Situation of Myanmar and Its Role in the Region, Office of Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, Union of Myanmar, 27th edition, Revised and Updated, May 2001. On WWW at www.myanmar-information.net. Accessed 27.5.07), has generated much debate. Even though the United Nations accepts that a country has a right to call itself as it wishes, and uses Myanmar, Great Britain, Ireland and the USA, who do not recognise the legitimacy of the government, like the exiles from the country, continue to use Burma exclusively. The European Union prefers to sit on the fence, and refers to the country as Burma/Myanmar. Both versions of the name have linguistic legitimacy in the Burmese language as a formal term (Myanmar) and an informal term (Burma) (Deutsche Welle, 2007). ‘Ma’ means ‘the land of’, and the majority of the people of the nation refer to themselves as ‘Myen’; hence, ‘Myanmar’ for ‘the land of the Myen’; but, as Taylor (2008: 220) remarks: ‘The use of Burma or Myanmar has become an issue greater than its analytical value’. Callahan (2003: 169) rightly points out that it is confusing ‘that the language of the ‘‘Bamar’’ was renamed the ‘‘Myanma’’ language, [ . . . ] given that it was (and is) the first language of only one particular ethnic group and not of the ‘‘Myanmars’’’. By all accounts, the government of General Saw Maung changed the name of the country in 1989 in a conciliatory gesture towards the non-Bamar ethnic groups. The names of a number of cities and towns, including Rangoon (now Yangon), were also changed at this time. Regardless, considering the historical evidence, and for the sake of consistency, I have decided to use the term ‘Myanmar’ and its various derivatives throughout this book. In 2006, the administrative capital of Myanmar was moved to Nay Pyi Taw, in the Pyinmana area, 400 km north of Yangon.

20

The Language Difference

3. Cyclone Nargis made landfall on 2 May 2008. The ICRC suggested the number of fatalities to be as high as 128,000, while the United Nations estimated that 2.5 million people had been affected by the ensuing disaster. 4. Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ is believed to have been created by the French Jesuit priest, Alexandre de Rhodes. Although there already existed a Latin-Vietnamese dictionary written in a Romanised system of writing at this time, Alexandre de Rhodes improved it with the publication in 1651 of his Dictionarium Annamaticum, Lusitanum et Latinum, along with a Catechism. It is also believed that the Foundation of the Society of Foreign Missions contributed to this effort, when it published a Portuguese-Latin-Vietnamese dictionary in 1664, in order to facilitate the preaching of the gospel. Further reforms were made to the system by the Apostolic Vicar, the Bishop d’Adran, and through the publication of a new Latin-Vietnamese dictionary by Father Jean-Louis Taberd (Marr, 1981: 167). 5. The Human Development Index (HDI) provides a composite measure of three aspects of human development, namely: (1) life expectancy, which looks at the extent to which people live a long and healthy life; (2) education, which measures adult literacy, as well as primary, secondary and tertiary levels of education in a polity; and (3) the standard of living, which looks at the income and purchasing power parity (PPP). Like any other measures, the HDI does not purport to be a comprehensive measure, but provides a wider understanding of human progress, in terms of the complex relationship between income and wellbeing. 6. The Human Poverty Index for developing countries (HPI-1) is a composite non-income measure of poverty comprised of three basic dimensions: a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living, which translate as four variables: (1) adult literacy rate, (2) infant mortality rates, (3) underweight children and (4) lack of potable water. Most interestingly, Myanmar is holding its own, not only doing much better in the overall HPI-1 than both Cambodia and the Lao PDR, which currently receive much more foreign aid, but also outscoring these two countries in the areas of adult literacy, access to drinking water and children underweight under the age of five.

Chapter 2

Language and Education in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region Introduction This chapter provides an overview of language and education in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS). It argues that the imposition of the national language as the sole medium of education in each of the polities concerned contributes to the unequal provision of education, as well as to the lack of quality and efficiency. The ability of a country’s citizens to enhance their know-how has a direct impact on the survival and prosperity of that country (Drucker, 1993; Ohmae, 1990). It is no surprise, therefore, that Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam have signed up to the Education for All (EFA) initiative and are committed to ensuring that all children have an equal opportunity to access basic education and participate in at least nine years of free basic education of good quality. They all hold the belief that their future depends on the quality of education offered to all school-aged children, which will lead to capacity building and human resources development. Although education does not directly generate economic growth, there are still considerable economic advantages attached to investing in it, as it is inextricably interrelated with health and economic development strategies. The returns of investing in education are high, in terms of fewer and healthier children. Children of educated parents take more advantage of educational opportunities. Education prepares them for citizenship by inculcating civic values. It is the main tool for social and economic development, and therefore the centre of human resource development (HRD).

Language and Education in Cambodia Historical background The Khmer language has a literary tradition dating back to the 7th century (attested in the early Khmer inscriptions at Ak Yom in 609 AD, Angkor Borey in 611 AD, Prast Toch in 620 AD and Kdei Ang 21

22

The Language Difference

Chumik in 629 AD). Over the centuries, and well before European colonisation, it was influenced by the Pali and Sanskrit languages, through Buddhism, and from the 7th century AD until the apogee of the Angkor Wat temple complex, existed side by side with Sanskrit (built between the 9th and 13th centuries by Khmer Kings and abandoned in the 1440s, the temple complex is a UN heritage site and a big draw for international visitors). Pali then replaced Sanskrit in the 13th century, as a result of the spread of Theravada Buddhism. As a consequence, the Khmer alphabet was borrowed from Pali and is currently used in three different forms: (1) the italic type, (2) the straight type and (3) the round script type. While the latter is used for transcribing religious texts of the Pali language and capital letters in general, the other two are used for handwriting and printing. Buddhist monks operated monastery schools (wats) in these mediaeval times, and education, which was open to boys only, was mostly carried out in Pali. From the 14th to the 16th century, the kingdom was placed under the domination of the Siamese Empire and lost its western and northwestern provinces to Siam (present-day Thailand), and the delta of the Mekong River to Viet Nam, and the Khmer language came under the strong influence of the Thai language. The king of Cambodia agreed to the establishment of a French protectorate over his country in 1863, in part because he wanted to thwart the military campaigns of the Siamese Empire and Viet Nam. Hence, by the 1950s, as a result of these historical events, three main languages were used in Cambodia: Khmer, the native language of the majority of the people; Pali, the language of Buddhism; and French, the language of the new coloniser. With the arrival of the French, and the introduction of a western school system, the French language became the dominant medium of instruction at all levels of education. The first public primary school was opened in Phnom Penh in 1873, and a school for interpreters in 1885. The French education system operated side by side with the monastery school system, which was well established in most of the villages, teaching Pali to novice Buddhist monks. A high school using Pali as a medium of education was opened in Phnom Penh in 1914 and a Buddhist University in the 1960s. The Buddhist monks and the monastery school system also promoted the use of Khmer as a medium of instruction from the early 20th century and, in 1911, a Royal Decree ordered the teaching of Khmer throughout the kingdom, but this was followed in 1917 by a colonial law on education, introducing primary and secondary schooling based on the French system, and aimed at training civil servants for colonial service throughout French Indochina. At a workshop in 1921 attended by

Language and Education in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region

23

members of the colonial administration and the Buddhist diocese, it was decided that the teaching of Khmer would be allowed in traditional education only, and entrusted to Buddhist monks, under a system called the ‘renovated monastery schools’. These monastery schools operated until independence in 1953. From 1954, the monastery schools became public primary schools and were allowed to expand into high schools. In other words, Khmer as a language of instruction was being extended to secondary and some parts of tertiary education, even though French was the exclusive language of instruction at a number of higher education institutions. Therefore, the whole education system became the main agent in promoting the Khmer language as a medium of instruction. By the 1950s, a push to use the Khmer language for prayers and chants, instead of Pali, in religious circles won favour over the conservatives, who wanted to continue using Pali. The translation into Khmer of the book of Buddhist doctrine and teaching, the Tripitaka, was also a major step in the ‘Khmerisation’ of the education system. While this process of ‘Khmerisation’ was growing steadily in the primary and secondary schools, the medium of instruction at a number of vocational and tertiary institutions, such as the School of Health, the Royal School of Administration, the College of Education, the National School of Commerce, the National Institute of Judicial, Political and Economic Studies and the Royal University of Phnom Penh, formerly the Khmer Royal University (founded in January 1960 with the Faculty of Letters and Humanities, and the Faculty of Science and Technology), was French. French was also the medium of instruction at other tertiary institutions established in the early 1960s: The Royal Technical University, The Royal University of Fine Arts, the Royal University of Kompong Cham, The Royal University of Takeo, The Royal University of Agronomic Sciences, the Popular University and the Royal University of Battambang (established in 1968). The status quo remained in the 1970s, when this institution became the Phnom Penh University. By the 1970s, language and education in Cambodia had settled around the Khmer and the French languages as media of education, when civil war engulfed the country and the Khmer Rouge burst onto the scene, launching a campaign of systematic closure and/or destruction of all schools, putting an end to all forms of formal education, seeking out and exterminating teachers and any educated person they could find. The universities, along with other institutions of learning, were closed and did not reopen until 1981. When they did, other languages, such as Russian and Vietnamese, were introduced into the education system, in addition to French,

24

The Language Difference

although most students in these programmes later transitioned to Khmer. As a consequence of the Vietnamese intervention and occupation in the 1980s, the education system came under the strong influence of the Vietnamese language and curriculum, followed by the resurgence of the Khmer and French languages, after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in October 1991. Clayton (2000) argues that, rather than pushing their own language agenda in Cambodia, the Vietnamese adopted what he calls ‘linguistic pragmatism’ or a ‘flexible language policy’, in that they used whatever language resources they had at their disposal. Hence, taking advantage of the few French-speaking teachers and advanced students who had survived the Khmer Rouge era, they offered higher education in French, in the first instance, adding Russian, Vietnamese and even Spanish and German, once these resources were exhausted. In other words, the ‘Khmerisation’ of the educational system was never out of the question, but had to be put off until a sufficient number of trained and qualified Khmer were available to take up teaching positions. To date, French continues to be taught as a second language in secondary school, and some 3000 students follow a French-Khmer bilingual programme beginning in primary school. It is primarily used as the medium of instruction at some higher education institutions, such as the Institute of Technology, the University of Health Sciences, the Faculty of Law and Economics, the Royal Institute of Agriculture, the Royal University of Fine Arts and the Royal University of Phnom Penh (Clayton, 2002). In the meantime, thanks in part to the involvement of the United Nations, through the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which supervised the disarmament and demobilisation of the warring parties and repatriated refugees, between 1991 and 1993, the English language steadily carved itself a niche in the country’s educational system, especially at the tertiary level, as a number of tertiary institutions or faculties within these institutions began introducing English as the primary medium of instruction (see, developments in this area at the Faculty of Business of Phnom Penh as described by Thong Iv, 1995). In practice, therefore, a number of urban schools teach in English, French, Vietnamese and Chinese, and many tertiary institutions teach in English and French. The Malay language is also used as a medium of instruction in a number of districts to teach Muslim ethics and religious doctrine to students of Muslim Cham background. Students of language would be concerned to find that under the guise of ‘development aid’, some of these agencies are surreptitiously reintroducing colonial language policies in Cambodia, directly

Language and Education in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region

25

undermining the stated policy of multilingualism. This is especially regrettable, as the Cambodian government and people are not in a position to refuse aid. However, it would be considered a ‘sacrilege’, were it to happen in a country like France, where the official language policy is very particular on the principle of the country’s ‘exception culturelle’! Clayton (2007: 102) argues that international aid agencies, including UNTAC and the various foreign companies that have set up business in the country since 1993, ‘have influenced the context in which Cambodians make language choices’, as these require virtually all employees to know the preferred language of the employer (e.g. Chinese, English, French). Clayton goes on to say that ‘Cambodian administrators have had to struggle to grant status to Khmer, the native language of most students’, and suggests that ‘Cambodian educational administrators and policymakers have made language policy decisions in response to pressures brought by assistance actors’ and that, in part because of these ‘pressures’, and because of lack of resources (books, professors, etc.), the ‘language used for some or all instruction’ at a number of tertiary institutions, such as the Ecole Royale d’Administration, the Institut de Technologie du Cambodge, the Royal University of Agriculture, the Royal University of Fine Arts, the Royal University of Law and Economics, the Royal University of Phnom Penh and the University of Health Sciences, is not exclusively Khmer, but also French (Clayton, 2007: 106). Although the approach from Anglophone aid agencies in Cambodia is slightly different
they support English-as-a-foreign-language classes, rather than English-medium content education
it basically amounts to the same thing in practice, especially when English is the required language for private-sector jobs in the country. Surely, aid agencies would be asking themselves about the long-term sustainability of this type of externally driven language policy that only caters for the comfort zone of the ‘temporal’ outsider. Is international aid meant to make things easier for the donors or for the recipients? What happens in the medium term, when the aid programmes end? Current state of affairs The Khmer Rouge devastated the Cambodian education system in just four years, from 1975 to 1979. In addition to the destruction of the infrastructure and teaching materials, the government estimates that 75% of teachers, 96% of university students and 67% of all primary and secondary school pupils were killed during that period (Clayton, 1998).

26

The Language Difference

Then, political instability over the following decades stalled most education reforms, and the education system was not operating fully until 1998. As recently as 2000, the Cambodian education system was ranked among the weakest in the world (World Bank, 2002). Education reform did not begin until 2001, when the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MoEYS) developed the first Education Strategic Plan (ESP). Since then, there have been three ESPs: ESP 2001
2005, ESP 2004
2008 and ESP 2006
2010 (MoEYS, 2001, 2004, 2005) (Tan, 2007). The three main education priorities outlined in the ESP for 2006
2010, like the previous ones, were to ensure equitable access to education services, increase quality and efficiency and promote institutional development and capacity building for decentralisation [emphasis added]. However, other priorities, such as increased enrolment and reduction of dropout rates remain to be dealt with. The MoEYS has identified other priorities, such as increasing teachers’ salaries, improving pre-service and in-service teacher training, implementing curriculum standards and decentralising school leadership. In other words, practically everything remains to be done. Although the student-teacher ratio is the largest in east Asia, with 51:1 at the primary school level, and 32:1 at the lower secondary school level, 11% of children do not attend school in Cambodia and only 30% of the adult population has completed some school level, which explains the high illiteracy rate (World Bank, 2005). Cambodia also has one of the lowest primary school completion rates (B 50%). The tertiary education sector covers only 1.4% of adults aged 19
22, and just 5% of the tertiary age population is in tertiary institutions. Primary enrolments in Cambodian schools were reported to have increased from 84% in 2000 to 90% in 2004, but have since levelled off at about 80% due to weaker transition rates. In 2005
2006, the average net admissions rate, among the lowest in southeast Asia, has remained unchanged at 82.6%, against a target of 95%. While most children spend some time in primary school, a significant proportion of them drop out before completing it. The two most common reasons for dropping out of school are (1) the parents’ inability to afford school fees and (2) the cost of sending children to school in the first place. Even though primary school fees have been abolished since 2001, leading to a boost in primary school enrolments, secondary school is not free, causing parents who cannot afford the tuition fees to withdraw their children. Hence, a high dropout rate during the transition from primary to secondary school. The survival rate from grade 1 to grade 9 fell from 33% in 2001 to 19.3% in 2005, as against a target of 52% (UNDP 2007). There are many over-aged children stuck at the primary school level due to late school entry, slow

Language and Education in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region

27

progression through school (repetition rates) or both, as is indicated by the gap between the primary school enrolment rate (91.9%), the lower secondary enrolment rate (26.1%) and the upper secondary level (9.3%) (MoEYS, 2005). Approximately 72% of children who enter school for the first time in the country are older than six, with 40% of the children being eight years old and above. Indeed, the dropout and repetition rates are so high that Thomas (2002), among others, estimates that it may take a student an average of 19 student years to complete primary school (also see Tan, 2007). These poor results are, in part, due to a very low level of education expenditure. Although the education sector accounts for 59.4% of all civil servants in the country, education expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) is very low. Until the late 1990s, external financing of education surpassed government spending. In 1997, education expenditure increased from 0.9% to 1.5% or 18.9% of government spending in 2006, but remaining below the regional average of 4.4%. Between 1993 and 2005, external donors such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, UNICEF and the International Red Cross, provided US$5 billion to the country, increasing total government spending on education from between 8.4 and 9.6% in the 1994
1997 period to 12% in 2002 (World Bank, 2005: 71
72). In 2005, external assistance to education spending was approximately US$40 million, and the amount budgeted for 2006 was US$63 million (Education Sector Working Group, 2006). In 2008, there were 113 organisations supporting 233 education projects, helping to rebuild thousands of educational institutions and train thousands of teachers across Cambodia (only 36% of all teachers in Cambodia have attended upper secondary school or higher) (MoEYS, 2005; UNICEF, 2005). While public education struggles to find its feet, there has been an explosion in private education provision. In 2004, Cambodia had six state universities and five state institutes, but 10 private universities and 13 higher education institutes recognised by the MoEYS (Samean, 2003). In 2007, Cambodia had a total of 57 higher education institutions, 21 of which were public and the remaining 36 were private. However, the poor results are mainly because the fundamental issues of equitable access to education, and progression and survival within the educational system, especially among the ethnic minorities in the northeast of the country, whose level of literacy in Khmer is well below the national average, remain unaddressed. Rural gross enrolment is approximately half of urban lower secondary (47
88%) and one-third of upper secondary gross enrolment (14
51%). The gap widens for rural net

28

The Language Difference

enrolment, where it stands at one-third (13
35%) and one-fifth (5
25%) of urban lower and upper secondary net enrolment, respectively (Benveniste et al., 2008: 4). According to the UNDP, this is essentially due to child labour (23%) and the high direct and indirect costs of education (school fees, uniforms, lack of teaching staff, lack of teaching materials and cost of tuition). Despite dropping registration fees, some hidden charges and cost were reported to be on the rise (UNDP, 2008: 28). Schools in remote and ethnic minority areas do not cover all basic education, forcing those who insist on attending school to endure long trips to distant locations, a particular disincentive to sending girls and children with disabilities to school. This results in higher levels of repetition and dropout in remote areas. Large numbers of rural children drop out of school after completing one to three years of schooling (UNDP, 2008: 99). For instance, the average primary dropout rates in Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri are 27 and 22%, respectively, compared to a national average of 12% (MoEYS, Cambodia, 2004: section 2.2). When they do get the chance to attend school, most schools in these areas are incomplete, students who wish to continue their study up to grade 6 have to travel very long distances to the nearest district centre or town by roads that are in poor condition. Pupil/teacher ratios exceed 50:1, with wide national variation. Less than 10% of 3
5 year olds are in organised learning centres (Bernard, 2005: 3), while grade 5 retention is only 70% (Ordonez & Sack, 2005). Only half the villages have primary schools; even fewer have secondary schools. There are shortages of classrooms, equipment and teaching and learning materials. The quality of education is poor and, although they are in short supply, teachers are badly paid with salaries below the GDP per capita average. Indeed, in a survey of 61 countries, Cambodia ranks last, in terms of primary and lower secondary schoolteachers’ salaries (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2006). Cambodian schoolteachers received approximately US$44 per month in primary schools in 2007 (base salary) and US$65 in upper secondary schools, when a teacher needs a minimum salary of US$150 to support a typical Cambodian family of five members (World Bank, 2005; European Commission, 2006). Worse yet, three out of every four teachers report having to pay a ‘facilitation fee’, approximately 2% of their base salary, to receive their salary (Benveniste et al., 2008: 53). As a result, 68% of primary schoolteachers and 50% of lower secondary schoolteachers have to resort to moonlighting to supplement their income (Benveniste et al., 2008). The low pay of teachers leads to widespread corrupt practices in the school environment, such as charging students informal

Language and Education in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region

29

fees; a practice that impacts on the quality and efficiency of the education services provided. Article 65 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia (1993) stipulates the right to quality education in the following terms: ‘The State shall protect and upgrade citizens’ rights to quality education at all levels and shall take the necessary steps for quality education to reach all citizens’. Article 66 defines the role of the State in establishing ‘a comprehensive and standardised educational system throughout the country that shall guarantee the principle of educational freedom and equality to ensure that all citizens have an equal opportunity to earn a living’, and Article 68 makes it plain that the State must provide mandatory public education for free: ‘Citizens shall receive education for at least nine years’ and ‘free primary and secondary education to all citizens in public schools’. Most importantly, the 1993 Constitution committed the nation to safeguarding, protecting and promoting both the dominant and minority cultures, while confirming the status of the Khmer language in Article 69: ‘the State shall protect and promote the Khmer language as required’ and Article 5: ‘The official language and script are Khmer’, thereby making them the official language of instruction in all government institutions and throughout the education system, from primary schools to tertiary institutions. The Constitution also recognised minority cultures and promised protection to minority languages and cultures (Article 31), and the official policy of multiculturalism was spelt out in the following terms: Every Khmer citizen shall be equal before the law, enjoying the same rights, freedom and fulfilling the same obligations regardless of race, colour, sex, language, religious belief, political tendency, birth origin, social status, wealth or other status. This commitment logically followed Cambodia’s ratification of the United Nations Declaration of Minority Rights (1992) and the World Declaration of Education for All (1990), which put special emphasis on the right of all children, including minority children, to receive education in their own language(s). As well, the priorities of the most recent Education Sector Strategic Plan (2006
2010) include: (1)

(2)

Ensuring easy and equitable access to basic education, especially to the poor and those living in remote areas, including by increasing [the] number of primary and lower secondary schools. Enhancing the quality and efficiency of education services.

30

The Language Difference

These various steps have led to a genuine lift in the status of some minority languages, such as Chinese, which is now used for business communication in some sectors of the economy (Gray, 2000: 12). In practice, however, having resolved to dedicate its resources to Khmer, the Cambodian government has left the maintenance and development of the languages of the ethno-linguistic minorities to bilateral agencies, regional organisations, international non-governmental agencies (NGOs) and international organisations. Some of these are: the Coope´ration franc¸aise, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the Asian Development Bank, Care International, Me´decins Sans Frontie`res, Concern, the United Nations Agencies and the European Union. This essentially means that the government runs all formal education and the sole medium of instruction therein is the Khmer language. Education provision to indigenous communities in their own languages has become the preserve of these international aid organisations, which are predominantly involved in non-formal and largely uncoordinated bilingual education programmes. There was no explicit policy in favour of minority languages in education in Cambodia until the publication of the Education Law in 2007. Even though there is discrepancy between the rhetoric and the practice, in that this law makes no specific reference to the large ethnolinguistic minorities in the country (the Cham, Chinese, Lao and Vietnamese, whose languages are perceived as immigrant languages and therefore generally overlooked), it is still seen as quite progressive and gives education authorities the right to choose the language(s) of instruction in areas where minority Khmer-related languages (Khmer Lue) are spoken (Neou Sun, 2009; Thomas, 2008; UNESCO, 2008). Initiatives on the use of minority languages in education in Cambodia preceded written policies to this effect. For instance, Cambodians of Chinese descent, who had been forbidden from using their mother tongue for a long time, saw these restrictions progressively lifted, and regained the confidence and freedom to learn Chinese. The number of Chinese-language schools had grown steadily and, by 2000, some 50,000 students were attending primary and secondary Chinese-language schools in the country (Marks, 2000). This is not the case for Vietnamese, which was taught as a foreign language in high schools and at the Institute of Foreign Languages, as well as in some higher education institutions (e.g. the Economics Institute, the Teachers’ Training College) when the country was under Vietnamese occupation (1979
1989).

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31

Vietnamese lost ground soon after the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. According to Clayton (2007: 112), this was due in part to historical animosity towards the Vietnamese community. The Vietnamese language is now only taught in private schools, where students receive content instruction in Vietnamese and only five hours per week of Khmer language and culture. Although there are no known Cham-Khmer bilingual programmes in Cambodia, Muslim Cham children benefit from Islamic education, thanks to international support from Malaysia, Thailand and the Middle East. Arabic is the language of instruction in most Islamic schools, especially for the learning of the Koran, but Arabic and Cham are both taught at some schools (Blengsli, 2003). The first pilot project for bilingual instruction in Cambodia started in 1997 in non-formal education, while the first bilingual project in formal education began in 2002. A number of approaches have been used over the last decade, from total immersion of minority students into the Khmer language, partial translation of new concepts in grades 1 and 2 as a transition to the full use of Khmer language, to the use of the local language as medium of instruction in grade 1, then transition to the Khmer language in grade 2 (Sokhom, 2004: 145). These approaches are being used because, in remote areas such as the Ratanakiri province in the northwest of the country, the majority of government schools are not accessible to minority groups. Ratanakiri province has approximately 100,000 inhabitants, 65% of whom speak the local languages (i.e. Brao, J’rai, Kachok, Kavet, Kreung and Tampuan). In February 2003, a total of 280 students enrolled in six community schools. When government schools are accesible to minority groups, the language of instruction is Khmer, a language that the majority of children do not understand or speak. Conversely, most teachers do not understand or speak any of the minority languages. As a result, the enrolment and retention rates of the local people are among the lowest in the country, and their illiteracy rates are the highest (Noorlander, personal communication). Recently, under the initiative of various NGOs, such as the International Cooperation for Cambodia (ICC), the Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFP) and CARE International, in close cooperation with the Cambodian education authorities, a number of minority languages have been introduced as media of instruction, especially in the area of non-formal education, in the eastern highlands of the country. In January 2002, CARE International established a participatory community school model of bilingual education, the Highland Children’s Education Project (HCEP),1 on six project sites (Seung, Paor Lung Kung, Paor Kei Chong

32

The Language Difference

for the Tampuen language, and Mais, Team Leu and Krola for the Kreung language), in the eastern highland provinces of Mondulkiri (the languages spoken in this province are Bunong and Stieng) and Ratanakiri, in which children are taught primarily in their mother tongue at first (Tampuen and Kreung), and the Khmer language is progressively introduced over three years (Kosonen, 2005, 2007; Kosonen et al., 2007; Neou Sun, 2009; Noorlander et al., 2003; Noorlander & Ven, 2008; UNESCO, 2007b, 2008). These pilot projects were initiated in close collaboration with the government by NGOs, such as the Coope´ration Internationale pour le De´veloppement et la Solidarite´ (CIDSE), the ICC, the NTFP and CARE International. Students in these pilot projects learn to read in their first languages, as well as in Khmer. The programme involves adapting the national curriculum and teaching the first three years of primary school education in the children’s mother tongue, after which a transition is made to Khmer, the national language, as the primary language of instruction, in order to enable the children to integrate into the national school system. Approximately 80% of instruction is in the students’ mother tongue (Kreung or Tampuen) in grade 1. Then, in grade 2, instruction in and about Khmer is increased to 40%. In grade 3, 70% of the curriculum is taught in Khmer, in order to prepare students for 100% instruction in Khmer in grade 4. Materials are developed in Tampuan and Krueng. From an initial enrolment of 278 students, 45% of whom were girls, the total enrolment grew to 801 students in 2008 (44% girls). The initial success of the project saw it extended as HCEP II from 2006 to 2008, taking the first cohort of students to completion of grade 6. With the support of UNICEF, the MoEYS is currently replicating this education model in five state schools and 15 community schools in Ratanakiri and two neighbouring provinces (Mondulkiri and Stung Treng). The number of ethnic languages was expanded to four from the original two in the HCEP project. The School Boards, the Ministry and the Royal Academy have approved 12 new books, five of which were being printed by UNICEF, for a total of 15 books in various stages of production. The MoEYS has also approved Khmer-based writing systems for five minority languages spoken in the eastern highland provinces in 2003 (Kosonen, 2005; Middelborg, 2005). Overall, educational attainment in Cambodia remains low, especially for the ethnic minorities, and the country faces significant challenges in reaching the goal of universal basic education by 2015.

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Language and Education in the Lao PDR Historical background Although the foundations for a national language were laid down in the 1930s, the creation of a national language in the Lao PDR is a recent event, because of French colonial rule between 1893 and 1954 and its particular approach to the language question, as well as the internecine political division and civil war in the country between 1954 and 1975. Moreover, national language policy in the Lao PDR was always a complex matter for a number of reasons: The first being the existence of three distinct writing systems for the Lao language: (1)

(2) (3)

‘Tua Wiang’, the orthography of the court, derived from the system devised in Sukhothai (Thailand), and ancestor to the system that became the official form of written Lao. ‘Tua Tham’ (dhammic writing), the orthography used for Buddhist texts. ‘Tua Khoˆm’, a system derived from old Khmer and also used for Buddhist texts.

There were two schools of thought about the creation of a writing system for the Lao language.2 While some scholars proposed that an established elite version of written Thai be used as a basis for standardised Lao language
one that later became the basis of the Thai national language
others, wary of Thai influence, wanted to devise a different writing system. Serious attention was not accorded this issue again until the 1930s, when the French colonial administration set up the Buddhist Institute of Phnom Penh, in order to separate Lao and Khmer Buddhism from Thai Buddhism. In 1935, the Institute sponsored the publication of the first Lao grammar and orthographic system (written by Maha Sila Viravong), based on the study of Buddhist texts in the Lao language. This system placed emphasis on retaining spellings and grammatical forms derived from Pali and Sanskrit, the sacred languages of Lao Buddhism. A number of French officials opposed the use of this system, finding it far too ‘complex’. Instead, they proposed the adoption of a ‘simplified’ system that would be easier to learn for those who do not speak Lao dialects or follow Buddhism. A Commission set up in 1938 to fix the official orthography and writing system of the Lao language came down in favour of a ‘simplified’ orthographic system based on representation of sounds, rather than the preservation of the spelling of borrowed Pali and/or Sanskrit words.

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The Language Difference

As had been the case until then, the official system was in competition with the other writing systems, including the ‘complex’ system. This situation was further complicated by the fact that the Lao language was not used in official domains until after independence in 1954. Indeed, up until 1939, government schools, which began in 1917, only had 6700 students enrolled in primary education, while Buddhist schools, where the so-called ‘complex’ writing system was being used, had many more students enrolled. Indeed, prior to the Second World War, the only secondary school that used a curriculum in French, the Colle`ge Pavie de Vientiane, enrolled few Lao students and did not offer full secondary education until 1947. Only a handful of elite Lao went beyond secondary school education. The Lao alphabet has since been reformed several times, and the number of consonant letters has been reduced, so that words can be read phonetically. This was done so that non-Lao ethnic groups could read the language more easily. As a result, the Lao system does not follow Sanskrit as closely as Thai in the spelling of high-level (religious, academic) words, and the Sanskrit origin cannot be spotted as easily as used to be the case. However, following the Thai military incursion of 1941, the French colonial administration embarked on a campaign to ensure that the Lao people would see themselves as distinct from the Thai. The school system was expanded to teach a distinctive Lao history using the ‘simplified’ system as a medium of instruction. This resulted in the doubling of enrolments in government primary schools from 6700 to 14,700 students, between 1939 and 1946, even though the French colonial administration did not intend to build schools for all, and many of those who made it through the strict selection process studied in France for their secondary and higher education. When the Lao PDR became nominally independent in 1949, a Royal Ordinance (No. 10) was issued, decreeing that words in standardised Lao be spelt according to the way they sound (Keyes, 2003: 202). The ‘simplified’ writing system was resisted for a long time, especially by Buddhist monks, who wanted the language to show the Indic origins of Lao words and, in practice, both the ‘complex’ and the ‘simplified’ systems continued to be used side by side; the former for religious and literary purposes, and the latter for official publications. The ‘simplified’ system was instituted throughout the country after the People’s Revolutionary Party seized power in 1975 and founded the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Even then, poor transportation and communication infrastructure, limited government resources and the growing influence of the Thai language and culture hindered the ability

Language and Education in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region

35

of the authorities to invest more effort in modernising and standardising the national language. The severe lack of formally trained schoolteachers was also a major obstacle. The government continued to rely on Buddhist monks to teach the ‘simplified’ system, even though some of these Buddhist monks preferred using the older, ‘complex’ system. Over time, however, the writing systems used for various Thai languages (i.e. Lue, Tai Dam and Tai Neua) and other languages in the country (e.g. the H’Moˆng language) lost ground to the official ‘simplified’ system, or simply disappeared (Smalley et al., 1990). Today, only a few monks are still able to demonstrate knowledge of ‘Tua Tham’. Current state of affairs The Lao PDR was one of the signatories of the World Declaration on Education for All in 1990, bringing Lao educators into the mainstream of world thinking on educational development. Its EFA policy objectives were summarised in 11 basic points, including the expansion of education into rural areas and, especially, the focus on girls, the disadvantaged, ethnic minority groups and the disabled. In October 1995, a HRD policy was launched, followed by an operational plan in 1998. The HRD policy (1998
2001) focused on capacity building for public management and community development, with 32.5% of the total expenditure, two-thirds of which was externally funded, allocated to education in general. A new education law was adopted in 2000, and the government initiated a series of reforms aimed at achieving the goals of the national strategy for HRD by 2020. In 2004, the MoE approved an Education for All National Plan of Action and began major education programmes to (1) improve access and expand education, (2) improve quality and relevance of education and (3) strengthen management and administration of education. With the technical assistance of the Asian Development Bank and AusAID, the Ministry of Education also embarked on developing a 10-year Educational Sector Development Framework (ESDF) for the 2008
2018 period, in order to enable a comprehensive projection of education sector resource requirements, better coordinated external assistance and more balanced sector development. Subsequent reforms have stressed the importance of education for human and economic development. These instruments notwithstanding, Lao educational attainment lags behind the thresholds identified in international research, and behind a number of other Asian countries, including Viet Nam. While the EFA National Plan of Action projected that all children in the Lao PDR

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The Language Difference

would be able to complete a full course of primary schooling by 2015, the reality on the ground does not make for pleasant reading. The Lao education sector remains inadequately planned, under-financed and under-professionalised. School attendance is sporadic for most children, especially in remote areas. The quality of instruction is poor, and nearly half the children who enter school do not complete the primary cycle. All educational indicators are low. Although the net enrolment in primary schools increased to 83.9% in 2005/2006 (World Bank, 2005 Census), compared to a regional average of 99%, primary school completion rates were low and repetition rates were high, especially in grades 1 and 2. According to the UNDP (2006: 9), net enrolment ratio in primary schools reached 86% in 2005, but only 62% of students entering grade 1 completed full primary school. The repetition rate is a serious problem in primary school (35% in grade 1 and 20% in grade 2), where almost one-fifth of students are held back one or more grades and, on average, need 10 years to complete 5 years of primary schooling. According to UNESCO (2008), in 2005/2006, the repetition rate in grade 1 was 32.9% and 18% in grade 2, while the completion rate in grade 5 was only 4.5%. Dropout rates are also high. Primary completion rates are around 33%, meaning that only one-third of students who entered grade 1 completed all five grades in primary schooling (Benveniste et al., 2008: 14). The average years of schooling stood at 2.9 years and the literacy rate in the national language at 72.7%, the lowest in the GMS. In 2005, only 4% aged six and over had completed primary and secondary school. Less than 10% of 3- to -5-year-old children were in organised learning centres (Bernard, 2005: 3). The pupil/teacher ratio was 30:1 in 2002/2003, with wide national variation, and the completion rates at primary level were less than 50% and Year 5 survival was only 62%. Only 33% of Lao women have completed six or more years of education, and these figures were significantly lower for women living in rural areas. International research suggests that six to eight years of education is the minimum threshold necessary for changes in women’s status, fertility decline, improvements in infant and child health and future educational attainment of children (Hill & King, 1993). According to recent Lao literacy survey data, current primary school leavers relapse into illiteracy at greater rates than those who left earlier, a trend in part related to the deteriorating quality of primary education in the country (Tschanz, 2005: 20). Although some 60% of all civil servants in the Lao PDR work for the Ministry of Education, budgetary allocations to the education sector are widely insufficient. While the education budget represented more than

Language and Education in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region

37

15% of the national budget in the mid-1990s, it dropped to 6% in 1998. In 2005, it was close to 14%, below the Asia-Pacific average of 16%. In 2005
2006, some 60% of the total education budget was externally funded (Phommachanh, 2008: 8). In 2006
2007, it briefly recovered to the level of 1995, in relation to GDP and as a proportion of total public expenditure, thanks essentially to external aid from development partners who financed some 61% of it (MoE, 2007). In fact, since 2004
2005, development partners have been contributing the bulk of educational investment. Nevertheless, at about 3.2% of GDP, the education budget is also below the average of around 4.7% in other Asian countries. The Lao PDR spent just above 2% of GDP on primary schooling and less than 3% on lower secondary schooling, when other Asian countries spent 7
14% of GDP per capita on primary schooling and 20
24% of GDP per capita on lower secondary schooling in 2004. Beyond budgetary issues, there are wide disparities in education attainment in rural areas compared to urban areas. Although 84% of the Lao PDR population lives in a village with a primary school, only 44% of the 8573 schools in the country are complete schools. In other words, they offer less than the five grades required for a full primary education programme, making progression and access to lower secondary schools and upper secondary schools difficult. As a result, ‘poor, non Lao-Tai rural youth have the least access to education’, especially at the lower secondary (only 5.2%) and upper secondary level (1.9%) (Benveniste et al., 2008: vi, 9). Children living in highlands are 7% less likely to be in school than children living in lowlands (Benveniste et al., 2008: 13). Distance from school, lack of paved roads or poor infrastructural facilities increase the likelihood of dropping out of school; it is also estimated that fewer than 15% of classrooms have electricity. In mountainous areas, participation in schools serving ethnic minority groups is particularly low, and it is estimated that, throughout the country, less than half the total population have access to education in their first language. These disparities are clearly due to Lao being the official language of the country and the language of literacy and instruction at all levels of education, without adaptation to the language learning needs of the students. Children of minority language background are expected to learn in Lao, and many do not perform to their potential in school. At best, they are provided with classes in Lao as a second language, using an approach called the Concentrated Language Encounter (CLE), which bases literacy instruction in the second language on oral skills (Souvanvixay et al., 2002). Literacy rates compiled by the Lao National Literacy Survey in 2004 show lower tested basic and

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The Language Difference

secured functional literacy rates for the minority language groups (e.g. the H’Moˆng-Yao). ‘Basic literacy skills’ means a minimum score of 8 on every test (reading, writing, numeracy), while ‘secured functional literacy skills’ means a minimum score of 22 on every test (see the Lao National Literacy Survey, 2004, for further details). A UNESCO (2003) report states that ‘a much higher percentage of ethnic minority children have never enrolled in, or attended school than children who have Lao as their first language’. Hence, the enrolment, retention, survival and achievement rates of children and adult literacy rates among all ethnic minorities are much lower than the national average (ADB, 2000; Lao PDR, 2004; Sisouphanthong & Taillard, 2000). There are insufficient classrooms and a lack of textbooks, educational supplies, teachers’ books and libraries. Even when the physical structures are provided, educational achievement among the ethnic minority groups is impeded by many factors in the standard curriculum, which is not designed to meet the needs of people in remote areas, and the national language, which in the best of cases, is a second language for ethnic minorities. The results are poor attendance, low attainment and high repetition and dropout rates. A report by the Ministry of Education (1999: 78) reads: ‘in an ethnically diverse country like the Lao PDR, language can be an important constraint for students to learn, especially at an early age’. The wide disparity in education along ethno-linguistic lines is generally acknowledged; and yet, language issues seem to be mostly ignored in this country. In recognition of the inadequacy of the formal curriculum and methodology in relation to the rural population, the Ministry of Education established the Department of Non-Formal Education (NFE) (1991) as a supplement to
and, in some areas, as a substitute for
formal education. The NFE topics are connected to rural life, encompassing health and agricultural subjects, various incomegenerating activities, e.g. chicken raising, as well as literacy classes. Although the rural communities are involved in the planning of the NFE activities, the status of education and literacy for members of the various ethno-linguistic minorities remains well below that of the Lao-speaking population, with enrolment, retention and achievement rates of children, and adult literacy rates, among these ethnic minorities being much lower than the national average (ADB, 2000; Lao PDR, 2008). As a result, the Lao PDR is confronted with relatively large numbers of under-educated youth migrating to urban areas, and even overseas (mainly Thailand), in search of work for which they lack the requisite skills. Only 14% of workers have completed lower secondary school

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39

(UNDP, 2006: 8). Nationally, 68% of the workforce have no education; of these, 43% have never been to school and 25% have not completed primary level education (Fox, 2003: 405). As lower education attainment levels translate into lower overall productivity, agricultural productivity in the country, for instance, stands at a very low US$0.13 per hour worked (UNDP, 2006: 8). A 1992 ‘Resolution of the Party Central Organisation Concerning Ethnic Minority Affairs in the New Era’ signed by the former President, Kaysone Phomvihan, states: The network of formal primary education should be expanded to guarantee that all children of school age attend school. In addition, the policy calls for a revival of the ‘‘ethnic youth’’ schools in mountainous areas, which were in place in liberated zones during the war, with the condition that quality should be emphasised. It is also emphasised that minority children have the same rights to education as the other children in the lowlands and the cities. A detailed plan for teacher training is called for, directed at the ethnic minorities in remote areas, together with a policy and the personnel for its realisation. Here, most importantly, the mandate is given for the relevant organisation to urgently research the writing systems of the H’Moˆng and Khmu using the Lao alphabet,3 as was formerly used in the old liberated zones, for use in areas occupied by these ethnic minorities, to be studied together with the Lao language and alphabet. (cited in Enfield, 2006a: 484) [emphasis added] Recent laws and decisions, such as the educational development plan for 2001
2005, the 6th National Socio-Economic Development Plan (NSEDP) 2006
2010, Decree No. 192/PM, Regulation No. 2432/STEA on Compensation and Resettlement (2005), suggest that the government has become increasingly aware of ethnic issues in the development process. The 2006 NSEDP explicitly calls for the use of minority languages that already have an orthography (estimated to be less than 20), and encourages the development and maintenance of these languages in an effort to alleviate poverty in remote areas of the country. The amended Constitution goes even further. Article 89 (Chapter 10) (the amended Constitution entered into force on 28 May 2003) states that ‘The Lao language and Lao script are the language and script officially used’. Article 1 proclaims the Lao PDR as a ‘unified country belonging to all multi-ethnic people’ [emphasis added]. Article 2 emphasises the fact that ‘all powers are of the people, [and are exercised] by the people and for the interests of the multi-ethnic people of all social strata’ [emphasis

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The Language Difference

added]. Article 3 refers to ‘The rights of the multi-ethnic people to be the masters of the country’ [emphasis added]. Article 8 stipulates that ‘The State pursues the policy of promoting unity and equality among all ethnic groups’ and that ‘All ethnic groups have the right to protect, preserve and promote the fine customs and cultures of their tribes and of the nation’ [emphasis added]. Article 8 also makes it clear that ‘All acts creating division and discrimination among ethnic groups are prohibited’ [emphasis added]. Most importantly, Article 22 stipulates that ‘The State and society attend to developing high quality national education, to create opportunities and [favourable] conditions in education for all people throughout the country, especially people in remote areas, ethnic groups, women and disadvantaged children’ [emphasis added]. In a similar vein, Article 23 states that ‘The State promotes preservation of the national culture which is representative of the fine tradition of the country and its ethnic people’. Finally, Article 35 states that ‘Lao citizens are equal before the law irrespective of their gender, social status, education, beliefs and ethnic group’ [emphasis added], while Article 38 stipulates that ‘Lao citizens have the right to receive education and upgrade themselves’. Expressions such as ‘multi-ethnic Lao people’ are used twice in the Preamble of the amended Constitution and six times in the text proper. The words ‘ethnic groups’ or ‘ethnic people’ also occur six times in the text of the Constitution. Therefore, the Lao PDR has drafted some of the most progressive policy documents in favour of ethnic minorities in southeast Asia, at least on paper; yet, it is one of the very few countries of the region where minority languages are not used in education and where there is no project in mother tongue-based education (others are Brunei Darussalam and Singapore). In practice, the Lao authorities continue to try to standardise and spread features of Lao culture and society to all nonLao citizens (Evans, 1999: 23, 26), and the language-in-education policy in the country basically expects all minority groups to learn to speak and read Lao; a process in which the ethnic minorities, some 48% of the total population, must adapt or disappear. It is no wonder that HRD is the most serious challenge facing the Lao PDR. What needs to be done to enable ethnic minorities to play a part in the development of a new society in the Lao PDR? In his report of 2 June 2008 to the President of the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council, the Permanent Representative of the Lao PDR to the United Nations noted that ‘Education is an important pillar to the Government’s poverty reduction strategy’ (Phommachanh, 2008: 6)

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[emphasis added]. The report focused on enrolments at primary school level. Although it acknowledged that, if the current trends are maintained, the Lao PDR will not reach the Millennium Development Goal for education in 2015, the report made no mention of the language of instruction, especially insofar as ethnic minorities are concerned. One sentence (p. 8) stated that ‘The Government of Lao PDR has instituted some pro-poor policy incentives to encourage teachers to teach in rural and remote areas and in multigrade schools’, without any further details. Yet, the 2006
2010 NSEDP identified three areas of educational development: (1) equity and access; (2) quality and relevance; and (3) strengthened administration and management (GoL, 2006a). It is not clear how the objectives of equity and access, and quality and relevance are to be achieved, when the children in the classrooms are expected to learn in a language they do not understand. Although the Constitution and other policy documents stipulate that ethnic minority groups ought to receive special government attention, there are no explicit policies relating to the use of minority languages in education in the Lao PDR. The language of instruction at all levels of education is Lao, the official language, and the same curriculum and materials are used nationwide, irrespective of students’ linguistic and cultural backgrounds. The 2000 Education Law only refers to the use of Lao in education. No other language is specifically mentioned (Lao PDR, 2008). As a result, no minority languages are currently being used in education, even though these languages are actually used orally in classrooms where teachers speak the learners’ language(s) to help children of minority language backgrounds understand the curriculum contents (Kosonen & Young, 2009; Lao PDR, 2008; UNESCO, 2008). Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that the H’Moˆng, one of the largest ethnic groups, teach their children H’Moˆng literacy informally (Kosonen, 2005). The only other languages taught in the Lao education system are French and English, both of which have been designated official foreign languages. English is, by far, more popular than French, even though a Francophone Institute for Tropical Diseases (Institut de la Francophonie pour les maladies tropicales, IFMT) was set up in Vientiane a decade ago (February 2000). Russian and Vietnamese, both of which were in great demand after 1975, dropped from favour in the 1980s; so much so that teachers of Russian have been retrained, many as teachers of English, especially after the break-up of the former USSR. Although publications in Thai were legally prohibited from being sold in the country for almost two decades, Thai is the most widely known foreign language in the Lao PDR, and many Thai publications (technical manuals, textbooks,

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The Language Difference

magazines, etc.) are in circulation.4 Thai television is watched widely throughout areas bordering Thailand, probably more so than the local television programmes. In 1990, a national seminar was convened to reconsider language policy in the Lao PDR, but did not examine how non-Lao languages might be accorded greater value. In 2003, a ‘Symposium on Minority Language Education’, bringing together social researchers and development workers to discuss the use of minority languages in primary education was cancelled by the Lao authorities at the last minutes. While most other countries in the sub-region (e.g. Viet Nam and Cambodia) were studying and organising mother tongue-based pilot projects, the Lao PDR chose to undertake a study on Lao language teaching for ethnic minority children in three provinces (NRIES, 1996
2001), through three models of CLE techniques. A single set of Lao language materials was designed to this effect and disseminated throughout the country. Five years later, the results of this pilot testing revealed that student learning outcomes had improved, but that this improvement could not rely on a single CLE technique. Since then, in the course of the implementation of the Basic Education Project for girls and ethnic minority children, CLE techniques have been combined with other techniques of language teaching. These are currently being used in 11 provinces. Another study of teaching and learning Lao for ethnic minority students was also carried out from 2006 to 2007. The outcomes of this study have yet to be made public. Other experiments have been carried out using, in each case, different language teaching approaches to teach Lao to non-Lao-speaking students. It is clear that mother tongue-based instruction has not come into the realm of non-formal or formal education in the Lao PDR. Local languages are therefore not used in education officially, although they are often resorted to in many classrooms, when teachers do speak the students’ languages (Phommabouth, 2004). Language policy in the Lao PDR is therefore overshadowed by fundamental issues of infrastructure and politics of language. The ambitious development goals set by the Lao government demand a modern, skilled labour force. More importantly, the Lao PDR has a very young population, and its chances for economic and social development depend on this section of the population attaining sufficient skills in order to be productive. The Lao authorities acknowledge that HRD is dependent on good and efficient basic education (Eighth Lao People’s Revolutionary Party Congress, 2006), regardless of language and ethnic backgrounds. Therefore, one way of resolving this conundrum is to invest much more in literacy and mother tongue-based bilingual

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education. In order for the minority groups to have equal opportunities, master their own development and make choices, the curriculum ought to be better adapted to rural life in terms of topics and language, and the teaching methods should be more learner-centred. Non-formal education should be strengthened, and representatives from the ethnic communities should be involved in education planning at all levels.

Language and Education in Myanmar Historical background The Myanma language has a long literary tradition. Nicolo Mannuci, a Venetian traveller of the 18th century, is reported to have written that ‘No one could go from one village to another without a paper or writing’ in Myanmar (cited in Han, 2000: 136). Until colonial times, the languages of the Bamar, H’Moˆng, Shan and those of the ancient Pyu kingdom in the north of the country were written and used as a media of instruction. The Buddhist monkhood, the sangha, traditionally provided moral and literary education to the young, especially young men. For a long time, the monastery served as the centre of education and culture, significantly raising the literacy rate throughout the country. During the colonial era, the British educational policy, which viewed the function of education as primarily secular, actively undermined this long-held practice and replaced it with an elitist system. Even though there is evidence to suggest that the British planned for Myanma to be the language of education, at least at primary school level, the two languages (i.e. English and Myanma) did not receive equal treatment, and English was designated the language of governance and administration, as well as the medium of education. An interesting decision, since British colonial administration, as opposed to French colonial administration, is often credited with promoting and developing local languages. It also shows that locally developed literacy was always perceived as a threat by the invading forces. From then on, it became the most important language in the country, because, as in most colonised countries, socio-historical and structural factors made it plain that an English education was more likely to bring about greater social and economic advantages. English was quickly adopted, under the oft cited pretext that ‘the reason for paying for their children to attend school . . . was to make money, and English was the key to the world in which money was to be made’ [emphasis added] (Quoted in Allot, 1985: 138). The British colonial language-in-education policy in Myanmar was not consistent however, as the media of instruction in Frontier Areas were

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The Language Difference

both the local language and English. For instance, in Karen State, the media of instruction and examination in state schools were both Karen and English. The Karenni language is recorded in at least three scripts: (1) the Roman alphabet; (2) the Myanma script; and (3) a script created in 1994, by the then Karenni Prime Minister, Bu Phe. Indeed, as part of a strategy to fight the Japanese during the Second World War and subjugate the majority Bamar, who had embraced the Japanese during the 1942
1945 occupation of their country, the British, playing on historical grievances, endeavoured to co-opt the ethnic minorities of the Frontier Areas to turn them against the Bamar, thereby hardening the ethnic divide. Acting on the basis of colonial assumptions about indigenous people in a country they no longer had control of, they went as far as promising the ethnic minorities of the Frontier Areas post-war autonomy5; a policy which contributed to these minorities being seen as ‘outsiders’ at best, and ‘collaborators’ of British imperialism at worst. The dissatisfaction of the majority Bamar was almost immediate and led to student strikes, which laid the foundations for a movement to establish national schools in which the medium of instruction would be the dominant language of the people of Myanmar. The national language campaign became a major rallying point in the struggle against British colonialism, as its proponents were convinced that ‘The dissemination of modern knowledge through a foreign tongue [i.e. English] is abnormal and detrimental to society; [and that] only the usage of the mother tongue can really help the nation forward’ (see Minn Latt Yekhaun, 1966: 31). Within a few years, Myanma gained some status at the university, thanks mainly to U Pe Maung Tin, who took upon himself to write new school readers in Myanma for pre-university and university students, focusing primarily on the study of inscriptions from the 11th and 12th centuries. Some of his students later created a new style of writing called hkit-san, which emphasised shorter sentences and simple prose. The national language campaign was closely associated with the nationalist mobilisation of the Dobama Asiayone (Our Burma Association), founded in 1930. This Association launched a campaign to denounce and repudiate all foreign influence on the Myanma language (and clothing). Revealing lines in the motto of the Association, slightly amended versions of which became the national anthem during the Japanese occupation of the country and at independence in 1948, were ‘Burmese language is our language . . .Respect our language’ (see Khin Kyi,1988, for the full text of the motto). The campaign targeted those ethnic minorities or any indigenous person who took an English name, wore western clothes and served the interests of the British against those of the country.

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When the time came to incorporate the Frontier Areas
some 40% of the landmass of the country
into a new, single political entity at independence in 1948, the seeds of hatred sown by the British colonial master came to the fore. As attempts to accommodate the demands of the Frontier Areas in the 1947 Constitution failed, insurgencies escalated, ethnic rebellion erupted and threats to the government’s survival led to a military clampdown throughout the country. In the meantime, the Constitution had established that ‘the official language of the Union shall be Burmese’ and the government was sponsoring programmes to spread the use of what was now being referred to as the national language. Contrary to Faingold’s (2004: 14) assertion,6 the tide turned against English on independence in 1948 (Allott, 1985: 140) and Myanma became the de facto official language (Wong, 2005), even though the use of English continued. The same year, the Burma Translation Society was founded, followed by the opening of a Department of Translation and Publications at the University of Yangon. The government began funding language modernisation activities, including lexification, standardisation and translation. Vocabulary committees and sub-committees were formed in different subject areas, such as history, arts, education and science, to cover new terminology and add to the word bank of the language. From 1948 to 1988, the government recognised only seven major ‘minorities’ in the country; however, no effort was made to collect information on the languages of these minorities and their speakers, perhaps in an effort to de-emphasise the separate interests of the various ethno-linguistic minorities and encourage national unity, or for fear of drawing attention to the size of the different ethnic groups within the country (Allott, 1985: 13), or quite simply because the government could not afford such an undertaking. In the early 1960s, a Burmese Encyclopaedia started being published volume by volume. In 1963, plans to establish Myanma as the national language accelerated with the appointment of 30 scholars to a Literary and Translation Committee, created with the urgent task of publishing a standard monolingual dictionary, reference books and periodicals. In 1964, the Revolutionary Council announced that every university subject would be taught in Myanma, and English would only be taught as a foreign language. Indeed, from 1964, Myanma was the sole medium of instruction at all levels in state-run schools, and the teaching of English began only from grade 5. Translation of important foreign works into Myanma and a literacy campaign in the national language were initiated in 1948 and 1964, and

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the Academy for the Development of National Groups was founded in Sagaing Division in 1964, in order to extend the teaching of Myanma to non-Myanma-speaking ethnic groups. After the Ne Win 1962 coup d’e´tat, all private schools, where it was still possible to teach other ethnic languages, were abolished and although some of these minority languages remained in the curriculum at primary school level (e.g. Karen), they effectively ceased being used as media of instruction in schools. By way of retort, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) controversially declared English as the sole language of further education in July 2001, restricting the teaching of Bamar to primary schools. From 1962 to 1988, the main priority was to reduce the influence of the ethno-linguistic minorities. This manifested itself in a language policy emphasising the new status of Myanma and seeking to establish a monolingual public sphere while exacerbating the minority threat elsewhere in the country. Illiteracy having been identified as a major obstacle to the successful spread of socialist ideology, literacy programmes in Myanma were expanded, especially in the areas where the language was spoken as a first language. This expansion was extended to other areas (i.e. the Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Kayah and Shan States) in the 1970s and 1980s. Minority languages were not used after grade 4 in the Frontier Areas, and Myanma became the sole language of instruction thereafter. Teachers of minority languages and literature were dismissed in some minority regions, such as the H’Moˆng areas. By 1966, the H’Moˆng language, in the south of the country, was no longer taught in schools, and villagers had to hire H’Moˆng teachers at their own expense to teach their children. This coincided in 1972 with the creation of language committees in every township, to work on taxonomies of words and phrases used at the local level. The Literary and Translation Committee was supposed to take these taxonomies into consideration when deciding what to include in the dictionary and in manuals on grammar and spelling. In 1978, a spelling handbook was published, followed soon after (1978
1980) by a five-volume Myanma abidan akyin-gyok, the Official Myanma Dictionary. Work on a Myanma grammar came to fruition in the 1990s. Publication in a language other than Myanma was made practically impossible due to press nationalisation laws, and the works of minority authors had to be translated into Myanma, while translations into minority languages were disallowed. As a result, almost all minority publications disappeared. Mother tongue-based education was briefly allowed on the basis of the 1974 Constitution, which provided for the right of minority ethnic

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groups to be taught in their own languages along with Myanma and, up until the late 1980s, those States who could afford it provided basic education in the most dominant language of the region (Leclerc, 2009c); but the government again halted the teaching of languages other than Myanma in schools and universities, an action that further fuelled ethnic separatist tensions. Language issues were again brought to the fore in the late 1980s and early 1990s as part of a new nationalist campaign by the then government, seeking to rewrite the history of the nation and put forward a single national race. The Myanmasa Ahpwe (The Myanma Language Commission) was ordered to revise the monolingual Myanma dictionary and remove all socialist and English loan words where possible. An Adaptation of Expressions Law was adopted in June 1989 with a view to standardising the terms used in the language to discuss public identities, and regulate what non-native speakers of Myanma may call the country and create a new Romanised orthography. From 1992, just as central policy insisted that Buddhism be prioritised in all parts of the country, central policy mandated that Myanma be the medium of instruction in schools at all levels. Only the government’s incapacity to fully implement the policy caused it not to happen in many ethnic subregions. In 1998, the government shut down 120 H’Moˆng schools. These were reopened, following negotiations between the government and the New Mon State Party’s Education Committee. Yet, the H’Moˆng language is reputed to be the language through which Buddhism was introduced to Myanmar (Thein Lwin, 2000). While the use of other languages as media of instruction (especially the Indian and Chinese languages) had at times been tolerated in some private schools, and a number of newspapers were published in minority languages (Smith, 1994), the push for national identity focused around the standardisation of Myanma implied that other ethno-linguistic groups had to leave their own languages behind, in order to become true believers in the political order of the day. This view was deeply disturbing to the Shans, Kachins and other language groups. Feeling threatened in their own ethnic and linguistic spaces, the intelligentsia of these minority language groups embarked on language development of their own, publishing books and magazines, and began forging a pan-ethnic movement to challenge the intrusion on their land and into their language (e.g. the Shans and the Karens), especially when the government decided to abolish their autonomy, and establish greater control over their territory. Language became not only a tool of group identity, but also a

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tool of resistance against government soldiers deployed from other parts of the country, who did not speak the local languages.

Current state of affairs Myanmar is keen to reform and enhance its educational system, in order to update and increase the skill level of its workforce, rebuild its economy and attain results comparable to those of other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in this crucial sector for development and growth.7 The Basic Education Law spells out five goals: (1) to enable every citizen to be well-equipped with basic education, good health and moral character; (2) to prepare for vocational education; (3) to give precedence to the teaching of science; (4) to develop productive forces and arts for the preservation and development of culture, fine arts and literature; and (5) to provide a firm foundation for pursuing university education. Education in Myanmar is therefore seen as a key sector for development, and enhancing access to and improving its relevance will strengthen the skills level and productivity of the population. The challenge in Myanmar, as in other countries in the GMS, is whether policy statements are followed through and implemented, in order to ensure that the education targets the government has set are realised in practice. The data available on education in Myanmar suggests that, while education has a long history in the country and has always been highly regarded, the current state of affairs is failing the nation. Indeed, education only receives 0.9% of GDP, and only three out of four children enter primary school in Myanmar. Of those, only two out of five complete the full five years; in other words, only 30% of Myanmar children get proper primary school education (UN Country Team, 2000). For these children, completion rates at primary level are less than 50%, and Year 5 survival rate is 59.9% (Ordonez & Sack, 2005). This is, in part, because Myanmar’s education system has degraded to such an extent that illiteracy in rural areas is now twice as common as it was back in the time of colonisation. Secondary schools have become the preserve of the children of the well off, while universities, when they are allowed to open, are almost entirely dedicated to members or children of the elite (Council on Foreign Relations, 2003). It is also because ethno-linguistic minorities make up around one-third of the total population, and some 30% of children in Myanmar do not speak Myanma when they start school.

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Furthermore, many children are taken out of school early, either because their parents cannot afford the ever-increasing unofficial fees, or because of falling family incomes. Additionally, the educational infrastructure is crumbling, and the education system itself is rapidly deteriorating. In 2005/2006, enrolments at primary school level were equivalent to 100% of children in this age bracket, while enrolments in secondary schools were equivalent to 40% of children in the relevant agegroup, compared with an average of 71% in other parts of east Asia and the Pacific. Nevertheless, the adult literacy rate reached 89 to 91% in 2003 (Ministry of Labour, 2003: 19) and stood at 90% in 2004, although some sources suggest that this is an overestimate (see EIUCR, 2004: 17). Indeed, a 1999 UNICEF survey found that the real functional literacy rate was only 53%. Anecdotal reports from community leaders estimate illiteracy rates to be as high as 90% in several border areas (Smith, 2005: 59). Pedersen (2005: 165) also suggests that hardly anyone can read and write in northern Rakhine State and eastern Shan State. Over the last two decades, higher education has frequently been disrupted due to socio-political instability, and universities were closed down for most of the 1990s, only reopening in mid-2000. According to World Bank figures, only 1.3% of GDP was invested in education in 2002, well below the average of 3.2% of GDP for other low-income countries in Asia. Teachers are poorly paid, and the quality of teaching is often low (refer to James, 2005, for a detailed discussion of education in Myanmar). The politics of language in Myanmar has two facets: (1) containing the complex linguistic and political demands coming from the ethnolinguistic minorities in the frontier regions; and (2) developing, promoting and standardising Myanma, the language of the majority ethnic Bamar, in a cultural homogenisation programme aimed at imposing uniformity and erasing differences among the peoples of Myanmar. According to the 2008 Constitution, the main language of instruction is Myanma, the official language; and the only languages taught at the basic education level are Myanma and English. These languages are compulsory subjects from kindergarten, with Myanma being the sole medium of instruction up to grade 8. In ninth and tenth grade, English is used as the medium of instruction for science subjects. However, since the late 1970s, concern over the declining standards of English made the Myanmar authorities realise that it was necessary for every citizen to be proficient in both Myanma and English and for most university postgraduate departments to carry out their work in English (Allott, 1985: 142). In 1981, the introduction of the New Education

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The Language Difference

Programme (NEP) aimed at upgrading the standard of education, with English being taught as a compulsory subject from kindergarten and used as a medium of instruction at the upper secondary level for science and economics subjects. Despite the political and socio-economic changes in the country, recent reforms show the rising importance of English in Myanmar
the only language taught as a compulsory subject at all levels
as the country tries to engage with its neighbours (Wong, 2005). The medium of instruction for higher education is English, even though foreign students can study Myanma as a foreign language at different institutions. English for Occupational Purposes is also offered at undergraduate and postgraduate levels, and the Global English Course offered by the English Department of Yangon University is a popular one. Other foreign languages taught in Myanmar’s higher education are Chinese, French, German, Japanese, Korean, Russian and Thai. Of late, there has been undue concentration of schooling in the hands of private entrepreneurs, catering for the wealthy and focusing on English and computing. School attendance levels are low at primary, secondary and tertiary levels, in part because of the frequent school closures. Together with UNESCO and the UNDP, the Ministry of Education carried out a review of the educational system in the 1990s, leading to a number of reforms. The latest thrust of these reforms was initiated in 2001
2002 through the 30-Year Long Term Education Development Plan, which identified a number of objectives (see Ministry of Education, 2001: 18
19), including the setting up of multimedia classrooms and interactive language laboratories to ‘promote English language proficiency’ (Ministry of Education, 2002: 6). There is an increased number of private schools offering English courses, and proficiency in English is now seen as a prerequisite for the hospitality and management courses, which are conducted entirely in English (The Myanmar Times, November 2003: 2
3). However, these can only be found in urban areas and are only accessible to the relatively well-off. The overall standard of education, especially in rural areas, has sharply declined in recent years (EIU, 2007). As a member of ASEAN, whose working language is English, Myanmar has taken steps to improve the English proficiency of its senior officials, as well as its future generation of leaders. Government officials from various ministries participate in workshops and courses conducted by agencies such as the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO) from Singapore. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) undertake programmes for the tourism industry. A Talented Students Training Programme was introduced at 38 schools across the

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country, with two additional periods of Information and Communication Technology, Mathematics and Science, and English, while English for Occupational Purposes is offered at undergraduate and postgraduate levels. As is the case in the Lao PDR, Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution begins with an acknowledgement of the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the nation and goes on to stipulate that [all emphases added hereinafter]: The Union shall: earnestly strive to improve the education and health of the people; enact the necessary law to enable all its citizens to participate in matters pertaining to their education and health; implement a free, compulsory primary education system. (Chapter I, Paragraph 28) The Constitution further states that ‘The Union shall not discriminate against any citizen of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar on the basis of race, birth, religion, official position, status, culture, sex and wealth.’ (Chapter VIII, Paragraph 348). It also proclaims that: Every citizen shall be at liberty to develop their language, literature, culture, religion and customs, without prejudice to relations between one national race and another, or among national races and other faiths. (Paragraph 354d) This paragraph is reinforced by Paragraph 365, which reads as: Every citizen shall, in accordance with the law, have the right to freely develop the literature, culture, customs and traditions they cherish. In the process, they shall avoid any act detrimental to national solidarity. Moreover, any particular action which might adversely affect the interests of one or several other national races shall be taken only after coordinating with and obtaining the approval of those who could be affected. Likewise, sub-paragraph (a) of Paragraph 366 states that: Every citizen, in accordance with the educational policy laid down by the Union:has the right to education; Finally, Paragraph 368 stipulates that ‘The Union shall honour and assist citizens who are outstanding in education, according to their qualifications, irrespective of race, religion and sex’. Therefore, although the 2008 Constitution reaffirms the ethnic minorities’ right to use and develop their languages, as did the 1948 and the 1974 Constitutions, the government does not have the means, and is not showing any willingness, to support this policy. As a result,

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The Language Difference

non-dominant languages are not used in government schools and all government-sponsored non-formal education, including literacy classes, is conducted in Myanma (Education for All
Myanmar, 1999, 2007; Kosonen, 2005; Leclerc, 2009c). About 2300 bilingual preschools are believed to be currently operating in the country, using non-dominant languages and Myanma (Myanmar, 2007). There is evidence, however, that Chin, Karen and Jingpho are being taught in certain remote elementary schools. Only civil society organisations, language and religious communities use local languages in non-formal education, especially in the northern states. According to Kosonen (2005) and Owen (2008), the Karenni, the H’Moˆng, the Palaung, the Shan, the Tai Khuen and other Karen communities use their own languages in Buddhist monastic education; Sgaw Karen, for example, is widely used in nonformal community schools and in churches, in border areas. There is no official use of minority languages in education, and very limited use of these languages on regional radio stations. Most importantly, it is impossible to use minority languages for functional learning in Myanma, without political implications (Irrawaddy, 2008).

Language and Education in Viet Nam Historical background Education and schooling were domains that France struggled to control during its colonial presence in Viet Nam, mainly because of the language issue. In 1864, the colonial administration established Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ as the medium of instruction in primary schools. In 1865, Chinese examinations were formally repealed in Cochinchina, though they continued in the central and northern parts of the country until 1879, just before the extension of French rule into these regions. French was not officially introduced in Conchinchina until 1884. The first schools were aimed at training interpreters and Catholic priests. Soon after, the use of the French language as a medium of instruction was made compulsory. However, the policy of imposing French in education soon proved to be an utter failure and, with only 1% of the school population studying French at the time, the colonial administration had to be content with their language coming a distant second behind Quoˆ´c ngu˜’. Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ enjoyed a period of rapid growth and spread in the early decades of the 20th century (1905
1945) as it became associated with the sentiment of modernisation. But, as education policy became a matter of ‘colonial survival’ (Kelly, 1978: 102), a Conseil pour l’ame´lioration de l’e´ducation indige`ne (i.e. Council

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for the Improvement of Native Education) met in 1906 to implement an educational programme for all Indo-China. The use of Chinese characters and Nom were formally abolished, together with the final tertiary examination in Hanoi in 1916 and in Hue in 1918, making French and Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ the sole media of instruction. From then on, everything was done to expand the influence of French in the country. In 1917, despite the resistance of the local population, the Governor General of Indochina, Albert Sarraut, decided to impose the compulsory and exclusive use of French as the medium of instruction in all schools throughout Viet Nam, and put a stop to all traditional forms of teaching (either in Chinese or in Quoˆ´c ngu˜’). Faced with continued resistance from the local population, his successor, Alexandre Varenne, tried to mitigate the policy by introducing a ‘humanist’ approach and establishing an education system that tried to accommodate the local languages. Meanwhile, in accordance with the Code of Public Instruction, a Native Education System was set up (1917), followed by strict regulation of non-government schools in 1924. These measures led to some 1835 non-government schools being closed, and the enforcement of a strict segregation of Vietnamese and colons children, whereby the Vietnamese were orientated towards subservience-type studies under French tutelage (e.g. subsistence rice growing, rural vocationalism, interpreters and administrative assistants), and only the colons children were allowed to undertake full and ‘proper’ studies. French remained the main medium of instruction throughout the country until 1945, when the Vieˆt-Minh took over Hanoi. Vieˆt-Minh or `ˆ ng Minh Hoˆ i stood for ‘The League or the Front for Viet Nam Ðoˆ c Laˆp Ðo ˙ ˙ the independence of Viet Nam’. A˙ government of national liberation was `ˆ Chı´ set up on 29 August in the same year, under the leadership of Ho Minh, who declared the independence of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam on 2 September 1945. Language policy under French colonial rule was not a straightforward proposition. Some French officials advocated a form of simplified French being taught to Vietnamese children in the first instance, with the standard or classical form of the language to be introduced at later stages, when the learners would have been more able to understand and appreciate the more refined features of the language. Others were of the view that Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ was much more appropriate as a medium of instruction. Yet others proposed the transitional use of the learners’ mother tongue for initial literacy. All the while, there were those who had utter contempt for the Vietnamese language, rooted in the belief that it could not be used as a

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The Language Difference

vehicle of abstract thought and scientific reasoning,8 while they revered and feared Chinese, which they regarded as a formidable cultural force that had to be opposed by all means and defeated at all costs. To those who held this belief, Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ was a politically and culturally dangerous option that would only encourage the Vietnamese people to identify with their own language, culture and institutions, much more so than they would with the French language and culture (DeFrancis, 1977: 87). Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ was also rejected by those who saw it as the language of collaboration with the French occupier (DeFrancis, 1977: 148), those Vietnamese who were literate in Chinese and those who simply preferred using French. Indeed, the French colonial administration did not allow publication of the first major Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ publication, Nong Co Minh Ðam, until 1901. After all, cultural assimilation had always been the mantra of French colonisation. In the end, a variety of practices were implemented, according to practical realities on the ground, chief among which were teacher availability and skills, and the availability of teaching materials. Considering the small number of children available for French-run schools, the general pattern resulting from this was the use of the mother tongue in the first few years of schooling, followed by the exclusive use of French as the medium of instruction. High school or technical education, on the other hand, was provided only in French. The French colonial language policy also pushed for the Romanisation of Vietnamese and other languages in the country, including Nung, E-de, Bahna and J’rai, and these systems were taught in the early years of primary school. Various works were produced, including a FrenchNung-Chinese Dictionary, the first book of its kind, and many textbooks using the writing systems devised for these languages. Since then, a series of books and dictionaries have been published; e.g. Ta`y-Nung Grammar (1971), Ta`y-Nung-Viet (1974) and Viet-Ta`y-Nung (1984). As a result of French colonial policy, the 20th century saw classical spoken and written languages (i.e. Chinese, Nom, the Sanskrit- and ancient scripts-based writing systems) disappear from the country. Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ rose to prominence as the main medium of spoken and written communication, although the French intended for it only to serve as a bridge to enable the Vietnamese to learn French. Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ was taught only in the first three years of primary school, after which French became the medium of instruction. The new writing system was developed during the anti-colonial struggle and spread primarily through the mass media by Vietnamese intellectuals and anti-colonial `ˆ Chı´ Minh in the 1920s, and later consolidated revolutionaries, such as Ho

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(1930s) through literary channels, such as the Tu’ Lu’c Va˘n Ðoa`n (Self˙ used Quoˆ´c ngu˜ to Strengthening Literary Group), a group of writers˙ who ’ write popular short stories and novels. Founded by Nguyen Tuong Tam, also known as Nha˜t Linh, in 1932, Tu’ Lu’c Va˘n Ðoa`n was a literary club ˙ ˙ to use literature as a means of of well-known writers, whose goal was bringing about profound literary and social changes in colonial Viet Nam. The club resolved to write original works, not to translate foreign authors, and to write simply, using pure Vietnamese language while at the same time applying western methodologies to Vietnamese literature. The club aimed at improving society and encouraging patriotism by emphasising the beauty and distinctive character of Viet Nam in literature. It published two magazines, Phong Hoa (Customs) and Ngay Nay (Today), which attracted a wide readership. It also managed a publishing house named Doi Nay (Modern Life), which produced some 60,000 copies of novels and poetry collections, from 1933 to 1936. Other associations were created for the spread of Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ among the masses. The Vieˆt-Minh themselves were calling for the teaching and study of Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ in the 1940s, as Vietnamese was considered an important symbol of national identity and independence. Even the Vietnamesestaffed government, installed during the Japanese occupation (after the coup d’e´tat of March 1945), undertook to replace French with Vietnamese as the medium of instruction at all levels of education. Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ also benefited from the intellectual and patriotic input of energetic ‘educated collaborators’, journalists, novelists and poets, who were committed to the development of a standard vehicle to modernise the Vietnamese language. After independence in 1945, Viet Nam began to move towards the adoption of a national language (Vietnamese) with one writing system (Quoˆ´c ngu˜’). In what some interpreted as a continuation of the French policy, efforts were also made to develop writing systems for major minority languages and promote them as regional languages. But the motivation for these efforts had more to do with the political importance of these minorities, especially those in the northern provinces (Ta`y, Thai, Nung and Yao), where the Vieˆt-Minh were based during the war of resistance against the French (re)-occupation of the country (1946
1954). Likewise, minorities in the central highlands and the Tru’o`’ng So’n ˙ mountain range played an important strategic role after the country was partitioned, as thousands of Hre, J’rai and Bahna joined the Vieˆt-Minh in the late 1950s and early 1960s to fight the south Vietnamese government which, contrary to that of Hanoi, was closing down schools

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The Language Difference

where local languages were used as media of instruction and putting them under its direct jurisdiction.9 During this period of progressive shift away from colonialism, Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ steadily spread to all primary education and, after the Japanese capitulation, it also gained access to the secondary school system, while French was confined to technical and tertiary education. When the French colonisers were finally expulsed from the country in 1954, Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ had expanded to the entire education system. By 1946, university examinations in north Viet Nam were being set in Quoˆ´c ngu˜’, while French was being taught as a foreign language, and progressively supplanted by Russian in the north and English in the south. In 1946, the use of Vietnamese was extended to the last three years of primary school and French designated as a foreign language to be taught only if teachers were available. In 1948, it was declared the language of instruction at all levels. However, as the Vietnamese lexicon was seen as under-developed to cover all areas of study, including, especially, mathematics and science, it took until the mid-1950s to fully implement these changes. After a presence of 100 years in the country, the French left Viet Nam in 1954, after their defeat at Dieˆn Bieˆn Phu`. From that date, the French language lost its privileged position as a medium of instruction, especially in north Viet Nam, where the government set in train an education reform based on socialist ideology. Russian and Chinese became the only foreign languages taught in this part of the country, and several thousand students and civil servants were sent to China and Russia to study or for professional training, while several hundred Chinese and Russian technical experts were sent to Viet Nam. By 1975, French had been completely supplanted by these other languages in north Viet Nam. Even in south Viet Nam, Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ had become the official medium of instruction at all levels in public schools, and French was relegated to the status of second foreign language,10 especially in secondary schools, although it was the preferred medium of instruction in private and catholic schools (some 15,000 pupils were enrolled in private schools in 1956). French progressively lost its pride of place in primary, secondary and tertiary education, and retreated to the status of a foreign language in south Viet Nam as well. Following the Geneva Agreements, the Vietnamese language was decreed the official language in 1954. And so it was that a code initially devised by the invading forces for the purpose of converting the local populations was adopted by the latter and converted into a tool of national and democratic liberation from language and cultural imperialism.

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The sole aim of language planning in Viet Nam, from colonial times until 1975, was for mass literacy in Quoˆ´c ngu˜’. By all accounts, only 10% of Vietnamese students continued their education beyond primary school in 1939, and another 2
3% went on to post-secondary education. Literacy rates were estimated to be between 5% and 20% (DeFrancis, 1977: 218). Considering illiteracy to be one of the worst problems of the country, the `ˆ Chı´ Minh, launched a series of Vieˆt-Minh, under the leadership of Ho literacy campaigns, with the aim of disseminating revolutionary ideology among the masses by teaching them how to read and write the new script. According to the 1984 UNESCO Country Report, some 70,000 people were rendered literate between 1938 and 1945, reaching its peak in 1948
1950, when 10 million Vietnamese citizens became literate, thanks to the literacy campaigns run by the Association for the `ˆ Chı´ Minh called for compulsory primary Dissemination of Quoˆ´c ngu˜’. Ho education and universal literacy in his Declaration of Independence in 1945, and in subsequent Orders (Orders No. 17, 19 and 20). The free and compulsory learning of the national script (i.e. Quoˆ´c ngu˜’) was at the heart `ˆ Chı´ Minh was credited with the following quote: of that call. Ho The literate husbands should teach their illiterate wives, the literate brothers should teach their illiterate sisters, the literate children should teach their illiterate parents, the literate masters should teach their illiterate servants, the rich should form classes at their private homes to teach the illiterates. (Cited in UNESCO, 1984: 3) After 1954, a three-year plan was devised to cement the levels of literacy achieved in the north from 1956 to 1958, with a record participation of almost two million learners. A further two-year literacy plan was undertaken from 1976 to 1977, resulting in 1.5 million additional people of both sexes becoming literate (UNESCO, 1984: 8). In four waves of such campaigns, a total of more than 15.5 million people were made literate throughout the country. Over time, the emphasis shifted from basic education to complementary education. Evening courses (after work) paved the way to tertiary education for thousands of Vietnamese, who would never have had this opportunity under the restricted and elitist French educational system of the colonial period. According to UNESCO, the exponential increase in literacy in the country allowed the Vietnamese to eliminate the vestiges of colonial and neo-colonial culture and bring about significant improvements in lifestyle, health education and general welfare for all. A final major push for universal literacy in the national language was made in the 1990s when provincial and commune-level literacy campaigns were launched.

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The Language Difference

In 1989, 86% of the population was literate and, according to official estimates, literacy in the country had increased to 90.3% by 2002. Although the claims of full literacy may have been exaggerated at the time, the literacy campaigns did achieve laudable results that are still perceptible in Viet Nam’s literacy rate today. In achieving such high levels of literacy, Viet Nam has firmly established the position of Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ as the official script, and Vietnamese as the official language. Both English and French took a back seat to Vietnamese at secondary and tertiary levels, while Chinese and Russian became the main foreign languages taught in high schools and universities. The number of students learning Russian is on a steady but continued decline. On the other hand, there was virtually no teaching of the Chinese language in Vietnamese schools by 1999
2000. From 1975 to 1985, most manuals and books available in the areas of science and economics were written in Russian or imported from the USSR. Russian had also become a compulsory second language at tertiary level. However, following the collapse of the former USSR in 1989
1990, Viet Nam opened up to the west; and when diplomatic relations between France and Viet Nam resumed in the 1990s, bilingual programmes were initiated in high school and university curricula. An Alliance Franc¸aise was opened in Hanoi in 1991. In 1994, the Ministry of Education and Training (MoET) signed a convention with the Agence universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF) for the teaching of intensive French courses, and the teaching of French in primary and secondary schools. Another Framework Agreement was signed on 3 May 1994 for the teaching of intensive French courses in Vietnamese general schools for a period of 12 years. In 1997, Hanoi hosted the Francophonie Summit, and the status of the French language in Viet Nam recovered some of its prestige. Viet Nam is now a member of the Francophonie Movement and French is occasionally used in dealings with foreigners, especially with the growing number of French tourists. Chinese also continues to hold strategic and economic importance in the country, not only because of the economic power of mainland China, but also because Taiwan and Hong Kong are among the largest investors in Viet Nam. English, however, remains the language in greatest demand, c because of Viet Nam’s avowed policy of Ðoˆi mo´’, or economic liberalisation, which has seen the country join major trading blocks in southeast Asia (e.g. the ASEAN) and on the global scale (e.g. the World Trade Organisation). In 1994, the government issued an official decree calling for managers and civil servants to learn a foreign language by 1997, with an emphasis on English. Indeed, in modern Viet Nam, there is no real

Language and Education in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region

59

hope of promotion to the higher echelons of public service, if one is not proficient in at least one foreign language. Language policy issues for ethnic minority languages took a backseat in the course of this massive effort to achieve popular literacy. However, in 1959, the government launched several minority-language projects. Writing systems were created for the H’Moˆng and Ta`y-Nung languages, and the Sanskrit-based Thai script was reformed in 1961. Books, textbooks and newspapers were published in these scripts, which were taught in primary schools. The 1960 Constitution stated that every ethnic group had the right to maintain its customs and use its spoken language and script. Consequently, 26 ethno-linguistic minorities of Viet Nam have their own writing systems. These including the Bahna, J’rai, Ko Ho, Bru, Hre, J’ru, Xo Dang, Pa Co, Xtieng and Cham in the south, and the H’Moˆng, Nung, Ta`y, Thai and the Viet in the north (Vasavakul, 2003: 237). Some of these languages and scripts are used in government and local media.

Current state of affairs Since independence, language-in-education policy in Viet Nam has been based on the Vietnamese language, and especially on the promotion and development of Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ as a national script and main medium of communication. In the 1950s, Chinese and French, which were used extensively in the past, were relegated to the status of foreign languages. In the early 1990s, Viet Nam signed up to the goals of Education for All by the year 2000, whereby 90% of children were to have completed grade 5, the rest grade 3 and no child was to be illiterate by age 15. The country’s education system was subsequently reformed in 1993. The new system consisted of five levels: (1) preschool (3
5 years old), which comprised early childhood and kindergarten; (2) general schooling (6
18 years old), which was divided into (a) primary school, (b) junior secondary school and (c) senior secondary school; (3) technical and professional secondary schooling; (4) tertiary education (i.e. after the High School Certificate), which could be short (2
3 years) or long (4
6 years); and (5) postgraduate education, which included a Master’s degree (2 years) and a Doctoral degree (2
3 years after the Master’s degree). Another education reform was signed into law on 9 December 2000 in Hanoi. In 2001, the Constitution was amended, establishing the goals of universal secondary education, more vocational and technical training, and easier access to education by the poor and handicapped.

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The Language Difference

With a total literacy rate of 90.3%, it could be argued that Viet Nam is well on its way to achieving its goal of universal education; however, educational attainment is less impressive than could otherwise be expected. Indeed, although 92% of eligible children were enrolled in primary school in 2000, only two-thirds completed the fifth grade. Enrolments in secondary school stood at just 62.5%. A huge disparity exists in primary school enrolment between the cities and rural parts of Viet Nam. Public spending on education stood at 9.73% of government expenditure, although the recent decline in public spending may affect the education budget. Viet Nam has been reducing school fees and charges for disadvantaged families over the past decade, but these are unevenly applied and substantial costs still fall on parents. Contrary to the cases of the Lao PDR and Myanmar, there is evidence that ethnic minority languages in Viet Nam were not systematically kept out of public schools. After reunification in 1975, a policy of teaching minority writing systems, although uneven, was applied throughout the country. As in the case of the Lao PDR and Myanmar, official discourse recognises the right of ethno-linguistic minorities to use their spoken and written languages and minority languages, which are said to be the cultural property of the nation. Indeed, since the 1920s, Viet Nam has had policies pertaining to the right of ethnic minorities to use their own languages in education, and minority languages have been taught in schools in Viet Nam for at least 50 years, usually as subjects, beginning at grade 3. Several minority languages, such as Khmer, Hoa, Cham, J’rai, H’Moˆng, Thai, Ta`y and Nung, have been used in pilot projects of mother tongue and bilingual education in kindergartens and primary schools, as well as in non-formal education. Local language materials have been developed in languages such as Bahnar, Ede, Raglai and Sedang. Literacy programmes in minority languages were first implemented from 1957 to 1960, when literacy classes in H’Moˆng and Ta`y were made available in the northwestern part of the country. Official statistics suggest that by 1976, some 27,000 speakers of H’Moˆng in La`o Cai, Ha Giang, Nghia Lo, Lai Chau and Nghe An provinces had become literate in their mother tongue. Importantly, these literacy programmes were integrated with the teaching of life skills, such as sanitation, disease prevention and household economy. Many policy documents, including the 1992 Constitution and the 2005 Education Law, are in favour of the use of minority languages in education (Kosonen, 2005; Vu, 2008). The 2005 Education Law (Article 7) stipulates that ‘Vietnamese is the official language used in schools and

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other educational institutions’ and affirms that [all emphases added hereinafter]: The State shall create favourable conditions for ethnic minorities to learn their spoken and written language, in order to preserve and promote ethnic cultural identity, to make it easier for ethnic minority students to learn subject matters in schools and other educational institutions. Article 15 of the first Constitution (1946) stated that: ‘Ethnic minorities have the right to receive compulsory and free primary and lowersecondary education in their languages’. Subsequently, Decree 206/CP of 27 November 1961 officially ratified the use of the Ta`y-Nung, H’Moˆng and Thai languages and the level of their use, including their teaching in kindergarten and primary school. This legal right was spelt out in Decision No. 153/CP of 20 August 1969, which called for the use of minority languages in all aspects of administration and education: Wherever ethnic minorities have writing systems, these writing systems are to be used to eliminate illiteracy and provide continuing education. Wherever people do not know or have limited knowledge of the national language, the minority language is to be taught, together with the national language, in primary [continuing] education. Wherever a minority wishes to and can learn in the national language, the national language should be taught for literacy and continuing education, but explanations must be provided in the minority language to help learners understand more quickly and grasp what they have learned, and, at the same time, the writing system of their mother tongue should also be taught, so that they can read books and newspapers written in that language. The minority languages should be taught together with the national language in kindergartens and primary schools, and children should be given the opportunity to become familiar with it as early as possible. The national language shall become the main language of instruction in secondary schools and the minority languages shall be taught as subjects. A decade later, this decision was followed by other important decisions, including decision No. 153/CP of 20 August 1976, which advocated the use of the mother tongue in teaching literacy and providing continuing education: ‘Wherever ethnic minorities have orthographies, minority language orthographies are to be used to eliminate illiteracy and provide continuing education’. Likewise, Decision No. 53/CP of 22 February 1980 on the development and use of minority languages in

62

The Language Difference

education stated: ‘The spoken languages of minority people in Viet Nam and their writing systems are their own precious treasure, as well as the common cultural heritage of the whole country. The minority languages and the national language are both used in minority areas’. Article 5 of the 1981 Constitution confirmed this principle and stated that: ‘Ethnic minorities have the right to use their own languages and scripts, maintain and develop their good traditions, practices, custom and culture’, and the Council of Ministers’ directives required Khmer and Cham provinces to strictly follow the policy of teaching the writing systems of minority languages, together with the national language, in 1981 and 1982, respectively. Article 4 of the Law on Universal Primary Education of 16 August 1991 was also clear on the role of minority languages as media of instruction: ‘The ethnic minorities have the right to use their own spoken and written languages together with the Vietnamese language to implement primary education’. In the same vein, Article 5 of the 1992 Constitution asserted that: ‘Every nationality has the right to use its own spoken language and system of writing, to preserve its national identity, and to promote its fine customs, habits, traditions and culture’. This policy statement was reinforced by the 1997 Circular No. 1/GDDT of the MoET on the teaching and learning of minority languages and Article 5 of the Education Law of 22 December 1998, which also reaffirmed the minority students’ right to study in their mother tongue: ‘The State gives ethnic minority people the right to study [in] their spoken and written language’. These decisions and education laws were accompanied by a raft of decrees, decisions and circulars, dating back to the early 1950s (see Kosonen, 2004, for full details). To ensure these decisions, decrees and laws are put into practice, the MoET comprises an Ethnic Minority Education Department, responsible for managing education in the minority languages, and a Research Centre for Ethnic Minority Education (RCEME), which carries out scientific research on minority ethnic groups, including research into language maintenance and development. Viet Nam is also the only country in the GMS, and maybe in the world, where various universities have been assigned different languages: the North West University is responsible for the H’Moˆng language, the Quy Nhon University is responsible for the Cham language, the Central Highland University is responsible for the J’rai, Ede and Bahnar languages, and the Can Tho University is responsible for the Khmer language (Bu`i Thi Ngoc Dieˆp & Bu`i Va˘n Tha`nh, 2009). ˙ ˙ ˙the government embarked on a policy of But, at the same time, internal migration for economic development, whereby the Viet were moved from the overcrowded lowlands to the sparsely populated

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63

uplands inhabited by the ethno-linguistic minorities. This policy increased the ethnic mix in most communities across the country, albeit to the advantage of the Viet. As a result, in 1980, Decision 53-CP was issued, mandating that the study of Vietnamese would be compulsory. Although Decision 53-CP endorsed bilingualism and called for improved proficiency in both Vietnamese and minority languages, the implementation of what was referred to as Song ngu˜’ va˘n hoc, or the study ˙ of two languages in schools and the ability to use them in written communication (literary bilingualism)
as opposed to Song ngu˜’ tu’ nhieˆn, ˙ or the use of two languages as a result of local settlement patterns (natural bilingualism)
became problematic, given the dominance of the Viet in the new ethnically mixed communities and classrooms. As the intent of the policy was to facilitate the study of Quoˆ´c ngu˜’, it became unclear how minority languages could be preserved and where they could be taught in the medium and long term. This policy was progressively abandoned by the early 1990s, as many children from ethnic minorities were leaving school at an earlier age or being forced to repeat grades, thereby increasing illiteracy rates amongst minority students, especially in isolated areas. As many minority children are not fluent in Vietnamese, their educational achievement is negatively impacted (UNICEF Viet Nam, 2004). Viet Nam is also known to have run a number of so-called ‘bilingual’ programmes, including four different models of bilingual education (Archibald, 2003; Hoang, 2004; UNICEF, 1998). In the 1960s and 1970s, the prevailing models were: (a) the exclusive use of the mother tongue for the first three years and the introduction of Vietnamese in grade 3; and (b) the use of both languages with an initial emphasis on the mother tongue, and the gradual introduction of Vietnamese. These two models were used from 1961 to 1978 in six northern provinces with Nung, Ta`y and H’Moˆng initially, then Thai (introduced in 1975). Two other models of bilingual education have been used: (a) instruction in Vietnamese, with minority languages being taught as subjects only, especially for languages that have a non-roman script; and (b) oral use of the mother tongue for 15
20% of grades 1 and 2 syllabi, then the teaching of reading in the mother tongue in grade 3, when the children have presumably acquired literacy in Vietnamese. This model is still used for most minority languages in Viet Nam. Bu`i Thi Ngoc Dieˆp and Bu`i Va˘n Tha`nh (2009: 85
86), on the other ˙ ˙ education models11 in which the first model is hand, speak of˙ three described as dividing teaching into two separate stages, whereby a minority language was used as the sole medium of instruction at Stage 1

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The Language Difference

(grades 1, 2 and 3) and Vietnamese was introduced at grade 3. Then, at Stage 2 (grades 4 and 5), Vietnamese was used as the medium of instruction to convey the national curriculum. This model was applied for the Thai, H’Moˆng and Ta`y-Nung languages in the Son La, Lai Chau, La`o Cai and Nghia Lo provinces and the autonomous northern regions in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It is on this basis that Diep and Thanh (in press) claim that Viet Nam has, in fact, been implementing bilingual education for well over 50 years. In the second model, the minority language was taught as a subject. Languages using a non-Roman orthography were taught from grade 1 through grade 5, and languages using Roman orthography from grade 3 through grade 5. The third model used was mother tongue-based bilingual education, in which the minority language was used as a medium of instruction in the early grades (grades 1 and 2), and Vietnamese and the minority language were taught as subjects in all grades. Vietnamese was gradually introduced as a medium of instruction from grade 3. Both languages were then used as media of instruction in later grades. In the mid-1980s, the MoET piloted a programme of teaching Vietnamese as a subject to ethnic minorities in government schools. This programme, also known as the 120-week programme, run by the RCEME, spent the entire first semester focusing on the teaching of Vietnamese in grade 1. It was abandoned when it was shown to have several shortcomings, one of them being the students’ inability to cope with the language requirement of junior secondary school. Kosonen (2004: 26) also makes mention of a bilingual education project in Thua Thien-Hue province, run by Nordic Assistance to Viet Nam (NAV), a Scandinavian NGO in which the learners’ mother tongues are used. The project uses three local languages, Katu (also spelt K’Tu), Bru Van Kieu and Pacoh (also spelt Pa Ko), in grades 1
3, to help children speaking these languages to learn Vietnamese better. Minority languages were taught as subjects in several areas of the country, at least 11 according to Archibald (2003: 103), and a number of textbooks and reading materials in minority languages were developed, especially in Bahnar, Cham, Hoa, H’Moˆng, J’rai and Khmer. Some of these were approved by the MoET and distributed to students and teachers free of charge, although it is not clear whether these materials were merely handed the target population or actually used by teachers and students (Archibald, 2003: 106
107). A number of grammars, glossaries, dictionaries and anthologies of minority languages have also been developed.

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65

Since 1991, UNICEF has supported a project on the development of teacher training modules and ‘localised bilingual literacy’ materials in H’Moˆng, Bahnar, Cham and Khmer through the Multigrade and Bilingual Education Project. In 1995, the World Bank, in cooperation with UNICEF, supported the MoET in its effort to experiment with mother tongue education in eight minority languages. In 1996, four localised bilingual literacy development centres were established in areas where the H’Moˆng, Bahnar, Cham and Khmer languages are predominant. According to a UNESCO report (2008: 107), materials have been developed for teaching in a number of languages, such as Ta`y, Nung, H’Moˆng, Thai, K’ho, Xodang, Bahnar, J’rai, Ede, Cham and Khmer, at primary school level. Viet Nam was also piloting a mother tongue-based literacy programme for the Bahnar people in Gia Lai province, with the support of UNESCO. Phase 1 of the project targeted literate Vietnamese-speaking civil servants learning Bahnar as a second language, and Phase 2 aimed at teaching reading and writing skills in the mother tongue, and prepare the learners to join other education programmes. According to Hang (2004), Viet Nam was expanding the provision of Community Learning Centres (CLC), where adults, adolescents and children-orientated literacy, life skills and basic education are taught throughout the country to advance life-long learning. Additionally, there are reports of increases in enrolment, largely attributable to rising parental awareness of the benefits of Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE) and the diversification of school types through semipublic and non-public provision (MoET, n.d.). A report on a five-province study of 1000 urban, rural and mountain children in Viet Nam found that 99.5% of these children were in school. This figure rises to 100% in some urban and rural areas, and is only slightly lower in the mountains (98%). A total of 99.6% of eight-year-old children in the five provinces were studying in schools (Tran, 2004). In 2000
2005, a J’rai-Vietnamese language transfer programme was piloted in the central highlands. Supported by the World Bank, this programme involved 12 classes in two schools and expected learners to transition to Vietnamese in grade 3. Besides the fact that this programme was on too small a scale, we now know that early transition of this kind to a second language does not allow students to fully develop the competence they need in either their mother tongue or the second language. Therefore, effective transfer of literacy and learning skills is almost impossible in such a programme (Heugh, 2006). A mother tongue-based bilingual pilot programme in H’Moˆng, J’rai and Khmer (each of which has its own orthography) was launched by

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The Language Difference

UNICEF and the MoET in Tra` Vinh, Gia Lai and La`o Cai provinces. Located in the Mekong Delta, Tra` Vinh province has a population of 1,015,800 inhabitants, mostly from the Khmer Krom ethnic group, but also from the Vietnamese and Hoa ethnic groups. With a population of 1,154,778 inhabitants, Gia Lai province is located in the central highlands of Viet Nam. It shares a 90-km border with Cambodia. The J’rai people account for 30.2% of the population in the province, and the Bahnar 12.4%. Other ethnic groups living in the region include the Ba Na, the Xo´’ Ða˘and and the Gie˘ Trieˆng. La`o Cai province is a mountainous region in the˙ northeast of Viet Nam, with a population of 565,700 inhabitants, composed mostly of Vietnamese, H’moˆng, Ta`y, Dao and Thai ethnic groups. This programme, based on the learners’ first language from preschool to the end of primary school (Benson, 2006; Vu, 2008) aims to (1) identify solutions for children of minority language background to learn better at preschool and primary school levels; (2) create favourable conditions for children of minority language backgrounds to be exposed to and learn Vietnamese better at primary school level; and (3) preserve the oral language and the orthography of the minority languages, in order to enrich the cultural identity of minority language groups (sic). The implementation phase of this pilot programme was to have been conducted from early 2008 to December 2014 in five select kindergartens and six primary schools in Gia Lai province, H’Moˆng in six kindergartens and six primary schools in Tra` Vinh province, and Khmer in five kindergartens and six primary schools in La`o Cai province (Benson, personal communication). The roll out classroom-based instruction was set to be at the beginning of the 2008
2009 school year, with the first cohort of five-year-olds to have started learning in all three provinces. The second cohort was to have begun at kindergarten level in all three provinces at the beginning of the 2009
2010 school year. According to this schedule, the second cohort of students will complete grade 5 in May 2014. The objectives and principles of the research design for this action research were outlined in the Annex of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the MoET and the United Nations Children’s Fund in Viet Nam (15 August, 2007),12 with the following expected educational outcomes: (1) (2) (3) (4)

Lower student repetition, failure and dropout rates. Higher student achievement rates in both languages and all subjects. Higher rates of transition to secondary education for all students. Greater participation and transition rates for girls.

Language and Education in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region

(5) (6) (7) (8)

67

Greater interaction between educators, parents and communities. Higher level of satisfaction with schooling on the part of students and their families. Development of human resources from within ethnic minority communities. Greater degree of bilingualism and bi-literacy on the part of all participants.

The official discourse on language policy in Viet Nam has always had three focal points: (1) (2) (3)

Respect the equality of languages. Support ethnic minorities and promote their languages and cultures. Encourage ethnic minorities to learn Vietnamese.

By all accounts, however, the third focus point, namely, ‘encouraging ethnic minorities to learn Vietnamese’, overrides all other professed priorities. In other words, despite an avowed strong support for the use of ethnic minority languages in education, there is still a discrepancy between policy and practice, in that actual implementation of the laws and policies remains a challenge. Indeed, more than 10 minority languages are used in education in some areas, although in practice, most of these programmes only teach the minority languages as subjects, possibly in part because the Education Law clearly states that Vietnamese is the official language of education in the country, while at the same time suggesting that minority languages can be used as the main languages of instruction in minority-area kindergartens. In practice, very few early childhood education institutions implement this policy. Bu`i Thi Ngoc Dieˆp and Bu`i Va˘n Tha`nh (2009: 87) see nothing wrong ˙ ˙ ˙and argue that it is not appropriate to implement a with this approach mother tongue-based bilingual education approach in Viet Nam, since ‘many ethnic groups often live together with other groups in the same villages and communes’ and ‘school classes often have students from various ethnic groups’. They also argue that Vietnamese teachers are not competent in minority languages, and that many teachers who are native speakers of the minority languages cannot write in their own mother tongues. Ðieˆu (2008: 7), Deputy Director of the RCEME, concurs and cites the disadvantages of carrying out such programmes as follows: (a) ethnic minorities in Viet Nam cohabit (sic); (b) there are very few minority language teachers; (c) the teachers’ competence in the minority languages (reading and writing) is poor; (d) there is no active mobilisation

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The Language Difference

of human resources; and (e) researchers and experts in the programme lack experience in action research and bilingual education methods. Some of these statements, such as (a), are truly disconcerting, as they reveal the assumptions that underlie the official approach to language diversity, and show the alarming degree to which multilingualism is misunderstood. But this is not so surprising, considering the reason cited in (e) (i.e. lack of experience in action research and bilingual education methods). The lack of qualified teachers alluded to in (b) and (c) is also often cited to argue for the teaching of the dominant language to ethnic minorities in remote areas as early as possible. Hence, despite the supportive policies, Vietnamese remains the de facto language of instruction at all levels of education, even in non-Vietnamesespeaking areas, and the potential of using minority languages in education is generally neglected. Current practice shows a preference for the predominant use of Vietnamese as soon as possible in most ethnic minority schools, presumably to ensure equal opportunities for all, but, in actual fact, increasing inequalities. Kosonen (2004: 17, 19) points to differences in interpretation and lack of consistency in the implementation of the various decisions, decrees, circulars, education laws and articles in the successive constitutions, and the resulting lack of balance between providing ethnic minorities equal opportunities and strengthening national unity through the widespread teaching of Vietnamese. Indeed, even though some schools teach minority languages as subjects, many do not, and the use of minority languages as media of instruction is ‘confined to a few pilot projects’ (Kosonen, 2004: 20). Kosonen also notes the lack of school facilities, appropriate materials and, most importantly, qualified teachers in minority languages prepared to work in remote areas. Benson (2008b: 8) suggests that Viet Nam’s language policy can be considered ‘enabling’, because it supports the use of the learner’s mother tongue in school, although, in actual fact, the mother tongue has yet to be used for classroom teaching and learning. In practice, ‘bilingual’ education in Viet Nam means the teaching of a few minority languages as subjects, starting from grade 3 or later. Aikman and Pridmore (2001: 528) actually refer to bilingual education in Viet Nam as ‘monolingual Vietnamese language policy’. For Archibald (2003: 104), ‘These policies go against the bulk of research in education (including in Viet Nam), showing that initial literacy is best acquired in the mother tongue and transferred to the second language’, since ‘the first principle of education is that the learner must move from the known to the unknown’ (Archibald, 2003: 105).

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Conclusion As can be expected in countries with a very long literary tradition such as those of the Greater Mekong area, the literacy rates, as shown in Table 2.1 are quite high, especially for Viet Nam and Myanmar. The literacy rate in Viet Nam is quite remarkable, in view of its difficult and tragic historical trajectory, not only in terms of the long colonial history, but also of the devastating conflict leading to the reunification of the country in 1975. In this respect, the same could be said of Cambodia and its recent emergence from the throes of death brought by the Khmer Rouge. From this perspective, the Lao PDR is doing very poorly in comparison to Cambodia and Viet Nam. But could the literacy rate in the Lao PDR be inversely proportional to the number of ethnic minorities in the country? Whatever the answer to this question, it is clear that the adult literacy rate is not a direct consequence of equity of access to education, or of the quality and efficiency of the educational system. Table 2.2 on education coverage and efficiency suggests that, while net primary enrolment rates look healthy enough in all four countries, these figures are disappointing when it comes to net lower secondary and upper secondary enrolments, with the margin being greater in Cambodia and smaller in Viet Nam. Enrolment ratios are important to examine here, because they provide a tool for monitoring two important issues for universal primary education: (1) whether a country is on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary completion by 2015, which implies achieving a net primary enrolment ratio of 100%; and (2) whether an education system has sufficient capacity to meet the needs of universal primary education, as indicated in part by its gross enrolment ratios. It is not good enough for children to enter primary school in large numbers, if they are only destined to relapse into illiteracy a few years later and not contribute to production and growth where the country Table 2.1 Adult literacy rates in the GMS (1995
2005) Country

Adult literacy rate

Cambodia

76.3

Lao PDR

72.7

Myanmar

89.9

Viet Nam

90.3

Source: Adapted from the UNDP Human Development Report (2007/2008)

The Language Difference

70

Table 2.2 Education coverage and efficiency in the GMS (2005/2006) Cambodia

Lao PDR

Myanmar

Viet Nam

86.2

83.9

85

88

Net lower secondary enrolment rate

24

28.5

37

69

Net upper secondary enrolment rate




15.7







Primary repeaters (% of primary cohort)

12.7

18.2

0.5

2.4

Primary completion rate (% of primary cohort)

87

75

95

96

Tertiary gross enrolment rate

4.5

9.1

12.0

9.5

Net primary enrolment rate

Source: Adapted from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics, World Education Indicators (2008)

needs them. In this connection, tertiary enrolments are especially poor for all these countries, considering all the policy documents produced over the years, focusing on capacity building. As has been shown for all four countries, the lack of equitable access, quality and efficiency, as well as the poor results of their educational systems, are due in part to low expenditure on education. Table 2.3 summarises government financing of education in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam. Not only is education expenditure as a share of GDP low in all four countries, especially in comparison with the rest of east Asia, but, in the case of Cambodia for example, this expenditure has decreased from 1.91% in 2003 to 1.7% in 2006/2007, while private education has grown exponentially, as the authorities seem to have relinquished the responsibility of HRD to the private sector. This is an alarming trend indeed for the ethnic minorities who can hardly afford public education. These trends are in direct contradiction with the avowed commitment of the respective governments of Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam. Table 2.4 shows that, although each of these countries has a national language, their constitutions and other policy documents acknowledge and support the emancipation of ethnic minorities and proclaim their readiness to see to it that the languages of these ethnic

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71

Table 2.3 Public education expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the GMS Country/year

2003

2006/2007

Cambodia

1.91

1.7

Lao PDR

2.26

3.2

Myanmar




1.3

Viet Nam

3.00

4.7

Source: Adapted from UNDP HDR (2009)

Table 2.4 Language-in-education policies in the GMS Country/policy

Cambodia Lao PDR Myanmar

Viet Nam

Official and/or national language

Khmer

Lao

Myanmar Vietnamese

Official language/national language in the Constitution

Yes (1993)

Yes (1991)

Yes (2008)a

No (1992)b

Use of minority languages stipulated in the Constitution

No

No

Yes

Yes

Language(s) in education ,stipulated in other law/act

Yesc

Yesd

Noe

Yesf

Use of minority languages as media of instruction allowed

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Source: Adapted from Kosonen and Young (eds) (2009) a This was already the case in the 1974 Constitution b Earlier constitutions did stipulate Vietnamese as the official language, but this was not the case for the 1992 Constitution c Khmer and other local languages are mentioned in the 2007 Education Law d Only Lao is mentioned in the 2000 Education Law e The provision to this effect in the 1974 Constitution was removed from the 2008 Constitution f Vietnamese and other local languages are mentioned in Article 7 of the 2005 Education Law

minorities are used as media of instruction. Nevertheless, there is a great difference between policy pronouncements and practice. It is significant to note that the least diverse of these four countries, namely, Cambodia and Viet Nam, are the most proactive in the area of language-ineducation policy. In the Lao PDR, where minorities make up at least 48% of the total population, and in Myanmar, where they represent 30%

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of the population, there is less enthusiasm in accommodating them. Furthermore, while Cambodia is happy to leave the initiatives of mother tongue instruction to development partners, the Lao PDR will not even consider such an alternative. The current state of affairs of language-in-education in the GMS is therefore unsustainable and needs to be improved, in terms of access, quality and efficiency. The language question is inextricably intertwined with the broader issue of reducing poverty and capacity building. Governments in the GMS may argue, and rightly so, that they hardly have enough resources to finance quality education in the national language, let alone in other languages, no matter how significant they are. Educational policy has a direct impact on the potential for economic growth, and for countries that stress the need for all citizens to participate in the development of the nation, both culturally and economically, and for all citizens to learn to respect each other regardless of ethnic and language backgrounds, there is a clear educational imbalance that needs to be addressed in order that all citizens have the opportunity to contribute to economic growth. The issues of equitable access to education, due in part to the language of instruction, as well as issues of quality and efficiency are serious and considerably disadvantage ethnic minorities educationally and economically. These issues will have to be resolved one way or another, if Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam are to achieve the targets of HRD that they have set themselves. It is doubtful, however, that the improvement sought will come from persisting with the current status quo and maintaining the national language as the sole medium of instruction at all levels of education. If ethnic minorities are to participate fully in the economic development of the nation, they will need to be actively involved in educational development as well. This can only occur if their languages are made part and parcel of the educational system. Notes 1. The main complementary project to the HCEP is known as ‘Bending Bamboo’. It focuses on the educational needs of girls and young mothers. 2. Before 1945, educational instruction was mostly the responsibility of Buddhist monks, who taught in the ancient Buddhist language, Pali. 3. Only the Lao script is officially sanctioned for the writing of any other language in the Lao PDR. Lao-based orthographies were developed for H’Moˆng and Khmu, the largest ethnic minority languages, in areas of the Liberated Zone of upland Lao PDR between the period of French colonial administration and the proclamation of an independent Lao PDR. The use of these scripts was very limited. According to Enfield (2006b: 485), H’Moˆng

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4. 5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10. 11.

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speakers widely use a Roman orthography for their language, rather than the official Lao-based script. Khmu, on the other hand, tend to use both Laoand Roman-based orthographies side by side. Having worked in the Lao PDR as a Technical Assistant or a Volunteer over the years, I have experienced first-hand the constant reference to Thai language publications, especially dictionaries. Assumptions and perceptions always tainted with some degree of disdain: ‘Peoples were different not only in appearance and culture but also in inherent capacities or potential . . . Some groups might eventually make it up the ladder of progress, but other peoples were destined to remain ‘‘primitive’’’, see Hirschman (1987: 568), quoted in Callahan (2003: 153
154). Unfortunately, these assumptions and perceptions are still very much alive in pronouncements such as ‘Africans are not ready for democracy’ (Jacques Chirac, President of France, 1995
2007), and Nicolas Sarkozy’s speech at the University of Dakar on 26 July 2007 in which he states: ‘Le drame de l’Afrique, c’est que l’homme africain n’est pas assez entre´ dans l’histoire. Le paysan africain, qui depuis des mille´naires vit avec les saisons, dont l’ide´al de vie est d’eˆtre en harmonie avec la nature, ne connaıˆt que l’e´ternel recommencement du temps rythme´ par la re´pe´tition sans fin des meˆmes gestes et des meˆmes paroles’. Basing himself on the 1974 Constitution, Faingold classifies Myanmar in Type 1 of his 24 classifications of nations with or without explicit language legislation in their constitutions. Type 1 stands for ‘No official language; no national language; no provisions’. The situation has changed since; Chapter XV, Paragraph 450 of the 2008 Constitution states that: ‘Myanma is the official language’. ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok by five original Member Countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined the Association on 8 January 1984, Viet Nam on 28 July 1995, the Lao PDR and Myanmar on 23 July 1997 and Cambodia on 30 April 1999. This was a pervading belief and a constant of French colonial administration everywhere, from southeast Asia to Africa. The so-called ‘universality’ of the French language always carried with it an ingrained contempt for other languages. Although after the fall of Saigon, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam briefly abolished the autonomous zones in north Viet Nam and imposed a socialist model of development in the country (1975
1979). There were also some problems between the socialist government and the central highlanders. In part because English had begun to challenge the predominance of French, as a result of the American presence in this part of the country. Archibald (2003) argues that there was a fourth model, which applied to languages with a Romanised orthography similar to Quoˆ´c ngu˜’, such as H’Moˆng. This model allowed the oral use of the minority language within a 15% component of grades 1 and 2, deliberately delaying teaching in the minority language until grade 3, when it was assumed that the learners had already acquired literacy in Vietnamese. The written system of the minority language was taught as a subject, rather than as a medium of instruction.

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12. The following are large extracts from Annex 1 of the said MOU: “

The mother tongue-based bilingual education approach allows for the use of the appropriate ethnic minority language (the mother tongue, or L1, of the learners) and Vietnamese (the second language, or L2) for teaching and learning. Both Vietnamese and the ethnic minority language are used in kindergarten for reading readiness in the mother tongue and developing oral competence in L2 Vietnamese. The skills and competencies developed in kindergarten prepare learners to enter the primary curriculum, which includes the teaching of both Vietnamese and the ethnic minority language, as subjects, from grades 1 through 5. Literacy skills are taught first in the L1 and are developed throughout primary schooling. Vietnamese continues to be taught as a second language during grades 1 and 2, when learners develop vocabulary and oral communication skills. Learners are exposed to the Vietnamese alphabet and word labels around the classroom, and begin to transfer literacy skills acquired in the L1 to Vietnamese at grades 3 and 4. It is expected that the reading and writing skills acquired in the L1 will transfer to an equivalent level in Vietnamese. The content areas of the primary curriculum are taught in the L1 during grades 1 and 2, when learners are still acquiring basic Vietnamese competence. Starting in grade 3, the use of side-by-side bilingual books (L1 on one side, Vietnamese on the other) makes it possible for both languages to be used for instruction through appropriate bilingual methodologies. As learners develop L2 competence, teachers’ use of Vietnamese for instruction increases, both to prepare learners for further education and develop their Vietnamese in academic domains. Meanwhile, the L1 continues to be used for instruction, allowing for bi-directional transfer of linguistic and academic skills. Learners are assessed in both languages and expected to meet the standards of the national curriculum by the end of grade 5.

Chapter 3

Language and Health in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region Introduction Hardeman et al. (2003) found that there are four major constraints to access to health care: financial, geographical, informational and intrahousehold. The overview of health care provision in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam provided in this chapter shows that the financial, geographical and informational aspects of these constraints are closely linked and reinforce each other. Indeed, one would have thought that the adoption of a national language in all countries of the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) should greatly facilitate health care delivery; but what we have learnt from the chapter on education, as well as what is outlined in the chapter on the economy, points not only to poor health literacy, but also to a growing divide between those who have access to health care and those who do not. In this sense, health is at the crossroads of issues pertaining to both education and the economy; and language is the common denominator running through all three sectors that intersect with one another and lead to the failure of health care to reach the most vulnerable (i.e. ethnic minorities and the poor) in almost all the countries of the GMS. Nearly two decades of research on the connection between literacy and health have shown that limited literacy creates challenges in health care, including lower health awareness and knowledge, inability to understand instructions from doctors and other health care professionals, inability to read and/or interpret prescriptions, and therefore lower receipt of preventive care services (Davis et al., 2006a, 2006b; Keller et al., 2008; Kripalani et al., 2006). In a Human Development Report on the Lao PDR, the UNDP acknowledged that: There are many interactions between health status and education, and between health and poverty. Persistent illness of adults reduces labour productivity, household standards of living, and household capacity to make social investments, such as keeping children in school. Malnutrition and ill health of children reduce school 75

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attendance, performance and increase repetition, desertion and failure. (UNDP, 2006: 9) Health literacy is defined as the capacity of individuals to obtain, process and understand the basic health information and services needed to make appropriate health decisions (Seldon et al., 2000; Kurtner et al., 2006). It includes tasks such as a patient’s ability to read and understand instructions on prescription drug bottles, appointment slips, medical education brochures, doctor’s directions and consent forms. Another aspect of health literacy is oral communication, or the ability to orally comprehend what a doctor, nurse or pharmacist says about what the health problem is, what to do about the problem and why it is important to take immediate action. What we know about the current status of education in the countries of the GMS suggests that many people face difficulties in understanding health and navigating the health care system. Education, particularly of women, improves adult and child health, and educated people tend to be healthier. Conversely, low literacy and language diversity can be barriers to effective health communication and make individuals with a different language background to the mainstream of society most vulnerable, when it comes to health care provision. Low health literacy or, in this case, the inability to understand and/or speak the language in which health care services are delivered, is an inhibiting factor in accessing health information, as patients are unable to read educational materials, directives, forms and informedconsent documents commonly used in the medical setting. Hence, the ability to read, write and understand the national language used in the health sector determines the degree to which individuals have the capacity to obtain, process and understand the basic health information and services needed to make appropriate health decisions (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2000).1 Health literacy must therefore be viewed in the context of language
and culture
(Institute of Medicine, 2004) as ethnic minorities are most likely to experience dissonance with western medical culture. Language and culture directly affect where and from whom health care is sought, how symptoms are described, how treatment options are considered, and whether medical treatment is chosen and/or adhered to (Andrulis & Brach, 2007: 123). Access to health care is not determined solely by peoples’ capacity to read and understand health information. It is also the product of the demands that the health care system places on individuals, in terms of their capacity to pay for health care services in the first place. In 1987, the World Bank published a seminal policy document entitled ‘Financing

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health services in developing countries: An agenda for reform’ (Akin et al., 1987), outlining a strategy that was part of a health policy package and a component of common macroeconomic structural-adjustment programmes for countries facing macroeconomic imbalances, economic stagnation and mounting debt in the mid-1980s, such as those of the GMS. The strategy of introducing user fees for public services soon became a sine qua non condition for the provision of loans and aid by international donors. The countries of the GMS had to comply with this condition, as public health expenditure became unsustainable and suffered shortages of all kinds, even though the majority of their own people were unable to pay the fees. Since then, the trend in market-orientated health-sector reform has been the promotion of the privatisation of health-care service providers and the increase of private financing of public providers via user fees. The official policy in each case was to exempt the poor from payment. In practice, however, exemption is notoriously inefficient, in part because the poor are largely unaware of their rights, an issue directly related to the language in which the information is disseminated, and because the powerful and the wealthy hijack the system through systemic corruption and nepotism (Creese, 1991; Gilson, 1997; Hardeman et al., 2004: 22). As a result, there has been a burgeoning of private medical practices, especially of an ambulatory kind, including private clinics, private pharmacies, informal drug sellers and traditional healers. Many of these, especially in the rural areas, are not qualified for independent practice, unlicensed, unregulated and unmonitored, and are practising illegally, often in an unlicensed capacity. It was believed that user fees would alleviate resource constraints, generate revenue to improve services and improve access to and use of essential health services for the poor. Those who can afford them would choose private health services, freeing up government public health services and essential clinical services for the poor (Chawla & Ellis, 2000; van der Geest et al., 2000). But the rich and powerful, through corrupt practices, often secure priority attention from health staff in the public health care system, for themselves, their family members or someone who knows them and uses connections to take advantage of the system ahead of those who really need it. Therefore, the health care most people receive is limited to what they can pay for. For the poor, this means pharmaceuticals alone, i.e. no examination, no diagnosis and only limited advice. User fees were also expected to increase the public’s appreciation of health services and curb overuse of these services (Akin

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et al., 1987). But what is the current state of affairs of health care provision in the GMS? How much of a factor is language in this process?

Language and Health in Cambodia Nearly 30 years of civil war have left Cambodia with a depleted human resource base and no functioning public infrastructure. Development and re-deployment of heath care services have been in progress for some two decades, and yet the health care system is still rudimentary. Therefore, Cambodia’s health indicators are among the worst in the world, even though, like education, the country has made significant headway in the health sector. The infant mortality rate was 58.45 per 1000 live births in 2007, the under-five mortality rate per 1000 live births was 82, while the maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births stood at 472 and life expectancy at birth is 62 years. Cambodia had a very low level of health care providers, with just two physicians per 10,000 people and nine nurses and midwives per 1000 people, and a very poor capacity in its health facilities, with just 1 hospital bed per 10,000 people (WHO, 2008). Major infectious diseases are food or water-borne diseases, such as bacterial and protozoan diarrhoea, hepatitis A and typhoid fever, because more than half the population does not have access to clean drinking water. It is estimated that 42.6% of the population had access to a safe water source in 2007. Only 55% of Cambodians have access to adequate sanitation facilities in urban areas, while a mere 17% do so in the rural areas. The country also harbours a number of vector-borne diseases, such as dengue fever, malaria and Japanese encephalitis. The government is responsible for providing public health care services and support, especially in the areas of disease prevention, and medical treatment. Yet, the spread and distribution of health care facilities and services are fundamentally inequitable for the people living in rural and remote areas. Although the health outreach appears impressive on paper, with more than 900 health centres and referral hospitals across the country, only a small proportion of the public expenditure reaches the peripheral level, with health centres or hospitals located in proximity to roads, while the population is spread according to the availability of agricultural land. Many of these health centres are several kilometres away from smaller villages, and access to these is often difficult, especially for people living in flood-prone areas during the wet season. The problem is particularly acute in the northeast, where the population is thinly spread. However, if and when remote commu-

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nities do have access to a health centre or hospital, the personnel, medicines and diagnostic facilities are often lacking. Hence, medical facilities and services in Cambodia do not meet international standards, and the country’s public health care system is unable to deliver an adequate level of services, in part because the government’s total expenditure on health, as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), is quite low (only 6% in 2006), a de-motivating factor for health care workers, who cannot afford to live on the salaries they are being paid, and for the patient population who choose to rely on private health care providers and traditional medicine. According to Soeters and Griffiths (2003: 74), ‘Most government health facilities in Cambodia perform poorly, due to lack of funds, inadequate management and inefficient use of resources, but mostly due to poor motivation of staff’. In 1997, Cambodia’s ranking on the WHO’s Health Systems Attainment and Performance Index was 166 and 174, respectively, out of a total of 191 countries. Following the World Bank’s and other international donors’ strategy of introducing user fees for public services, including the health sector (Akin et al., 1987), the Cambodian government initiated a Health Coverage Plan in 1996. The plan divided the country into 69 operational districts, each covering between 100,000 and 200,000 people, and consisted of a network of health centres that provided basic health care for 10,000 to 12,000 inhabitants, as well as one hospital and one health office per district. This plan was complemented with a National Charter on Health Financing, which officially introduced user fees in 1997, along the lines of the Vietnamese system installed in the 1980s (see discussion of user fees in Viet Nam in the Conclusion), with a view to: (1) reduce unofficial charges; (2) improve quality of care through increased and timely availability of medical supplies; and (3) motivate staff through performance-related payments funded by the user fees. Health care facilities were to retain and control 99% of all revenue generated from user fees (Thavaray et al., 2000). The Health Coverage Plan and user fees are supplemented in some cases by a third party payer, usually a Health Equity Fund, run by other entities, such as local or international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) (Hardeman et al., 2004). The shortcomings of this strategy quickly became evident, as user fees were far more than many households could afford and were driving many people into poverty
many patients or their families were forced to sell assets (usually land) to pay for health care bills (ADB, 2001; Oxfam, 2000). While poor households were supposed to have the fees waived, only about 18% of patients received fee waivers in Cambodia in

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1997 (World Bank, 1999b). Instead, patients from higher income households were getting the waivers that were meant for the poor. Consequently, years after the introduction of user fees, outpatient attendance in public health facilities in Cambodia was only 0.35 consultancies per capita per year (Soeters & Griffiths, 2003: 75), well below the WHO’s international standard of 0.60 (World Bank, 1999b). This fundamental flaw in the system forced poor households to rely on private health care providers for treatment. Unfortunately, treatment from private health care providers is often of very poor quality, as the latter only aim at maximising profits by selling whatever people are prepared to pay for. This, in turn, leads to a number of negative outcomes: (a) very high out-of-pocket expenditures on health that slips into catastrophic expenditure at times, causing indebtedness and even greater poverty (Kassie, 2000); and (b) inefficient use of private health services, as much of the expenditures are on purchases of pharmaceuticals for self-medication. These suggest that the management and provision of good health care services is not necessarily a matter of expenditure alone (i.e. user fees), whether or not people have the ability to pay, but is a function of health literacy as pointed out in the introduction to this chapter. User fees only exacerbate the lack of access to health care, especially for ethnic minorities and the poor, who now have to contend with the financial burden of seeking health care, in addition to the language barrier. Ethnic communities, which happen to be the poorest communities, must navigate the health care system in Khmer, the language generally used by most health care workers. A daunting task, in terms of doctor
patient communication, especially when one is suffering from ill health.

Language and Health in the Lao PDR Article 25, of the Amended Constitution of the Lao PDR reads as follows: The State attends to improving and expanding public health services to take care of the people’s health.The State and society attend to building and improving disease prevention systems and providing health care to all people, creating conditions to ensure that all people have access to health care, especially women and children, poor people and people in remote areas, to ensure the people’s good health. The State promotes private sector investment in public health services in accordance with the laws and regulations.

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All unlawful public health services are prohibited. (Lao PDR, 2003: Chapter 2) [Emphasis added] The 6th National Socio-Economic Development Plan (NSEDP 2006
2010) also identifies health as one of the four priority sectors for development, and one of the key objectives of the Health Strategy to the Year 2020 is ‘full health care service coverage and health care service equity’ [emphasis added]. But, once again, the official rhetoric is far from the reality. What exactly is the health status of the Lao PDR? The provision of health care services in the Lao PDR has followed the pattern of political and economic developments in the country and can be divided into two distinct periods: a period of communist selfsufficiency from 1975 to 1985 and a market-orientated period, starting from 1985. The first period started shortly after the Pathe¯t Lao swept to power and proclaimed the Lao PDR in 1975. The country underwent a decade of central planning, whereby the state provided free public health care services to all, following the national model of relative independence from the rest of the world. Each cooperative had a health centre, with an average of five beds and two to four non-salaried auxiliary nurses supported by the commune. The quality of the service provision under this regime was poor and its utilisation was low, because of the lack of qualified personnel (a great number of doctors and nurses had fled the country when the Pathe¯t Lao took over) on the one hand, and chronic shortages in supplies of essential pharmaceuticals and equipment due to severe economic constraints on the other hand. In 1986, with the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), and the gradual opening up to the market economy, the health care sector was liberalised and opened up to private operators. Revolving Drug Funds were put in place and user fees were introduced for specific services in public hospitals (Decree 52, in 1996). Hospitals were allowed to keep 80% of the fees, and pupils and students, monks and novices, as well as poor people were supposed to be exempt from paying these user fees. In practice, however, the implementation of exemptions was not a straightforward matter. Influence peddling and bribery dictated who got exempted and who did not. The number of private pharmacies jumped from 32 in 1986 to nearly 2200 in 2008, and private clinics, which were not allowed until 1986, increased to 484 in 2005 (WHO, 2006); the Revolving Drug Funds started in 86% of government health care facilities, with fees being levied for patient registration and for ancillary services. For instance, fees to patients for pharmaceuticals were set at cost plus 25% in order to ensure re-supply, administration and

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transport. In actual fact, pharmaceuticals are often charged at cost plus 40%, due to a lack of effective and adequate control. Village health care volunteers received training (over a period of five days!) on how to manage the Drug Revolving Funds. These village health care volunteers do not always examine patients and prescribe the pharmaceuticals they need, but provide the drugs that patients ask for, thereby encouraging a culture of self-medication. The Revolving Drug Funds were initially successful in increasing access to pharmaceuticals and financial sustainability and quickly became the major source of funding at health curative facilities, providing between 48 and 83% of the recurrent budgets of provincial and district hospitals (WHO, 2004). User fees were also implemented and generalised to all levels of health care facilities for a wide range of examinations and consultation fees (Article 381/PM; MoF, Decree 1646). In 1997, the Revolving Drug Funds were expanded (Decree 230). In the meantime, the coverage of health care services decreased, as many of the auxiliary nurses left the health sector to open their own private pharmacies. The number of positions for health care providers decreased from 1200 in the late 1980s to just under 500 in 1997 (Noel, 1999). Provision of health care services in the Lao PDR is complemented by traditional medicine. The Ministry of Health has set up a Traditional Medicine Research Centre (TMRC), with the aim of studying and incorporating the use of medicinal plants and traditional Lao medicines into western-style health care systems. The TMRC reportedly has 12 traditional medicine stations in 13 different provinces and is involved in field research, plant collection, identification and cataloguing of medicinal plants, and developing pharmaceuticals from traditional Lao medicinal plants (Libman et al., 2006). There are some 600 traditional medicine practitioners throughout the country (ILO, 2007). Chariyalertsak et al. (2001) suggest that there are 18,000 ‘traditional healers’ throughout the Lao PDR, one-third of whom are Buddhist monks. It is not clear whether by ‘traditional healers’ they mean ‘traditional medicine practitioners’. Like Myanmar, traditional medicine is deeply rooted in Lao society and easily accessible. It is usually the first point of contact for patients seeking medical care, especially in rural areas. Western medicine and pharmaceuticals are only considered when traditional medicine has not worked, and often when it is too late for a successful curative outcome. There is an overall lack of education and knowledge when it comes to health whereby, whether they are taking western medicine or traditional medicine, patients tend to self-medicate in the first instance (27%), or buy pharmaceuticals over the counter (35%), when they cannot afford to pay the charges at a public hospital (28%) or consult private

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practitioners (see Chariyalertsak et al., 2001: 12). This lack of education, coupled with the difficulty of access, the poor quality of public health services when these are available and the general lack of confidence of the patient population in their own health care services severely reduce the attractiveness, use and efficiency of the services. As a consequence, the use of public health care facilities and services is very low, especially in district hospitals and health centres. Health conditions in the Lao PDR are among the lowest in the GMS. Infant mortality rate was 59 per 1000 live births, compared with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 55 per 1000 by 2015, while under-five mortality rate, 38% of which is possibly associated with malnutrition, stood at 75 per 1000 live births. Mortality rates are much higher in the rural areas, particularly in the most remote districts, than in urban areas. According to a 2006 study of the United Nations Children’s Fund, 39% of children under five years of age were underweight. Maternal mortality ratio stood at 660 per 100,000 per live births, compared with the MDG of 185 per 100,000 live births in 2015 (UNDP, 2006: 9). Life expectancy, at 60 years, was still one of the lowest in the GMS, together with Myanmar (WHO, 2008). Only 37% of the population have access to clean water.2 Communicable diseases (i.e. malaria, dengue fever, diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections and measles) remained the biggest cause of preventable morbidity and mortality, which are characterised by diseases that can be substantially reduced by improved preventative care, basic health care and education, but face a number of obstacles (MoH, 2000: 8). Some of these obstacles are: . .

.

. .

the lack of qualified health professionals; the poor national coverage of basic health services (provision of health care services does not reach ethnic populations in remote areas, where the services are most needed); the general lack of medical equipment (where this equipment is available, it is either obsolete or dysfunctional); the inadequate supply of pharmaceuticals; the cost of health care.

The public health care system in the Lao PDR is designed to provide basic health services. With around 12 hospital beds per 10,000 population spread through four central hospitals and six special centres, 17 provincial and regional hospitals, 141 district hospitals, 740 health centres and around 5000 village drug kits (MoH, 2007), it employs a total of 18,000 public sector health workers, 70% of whom work for the Ministry of Health and 30% for the Ministries of Public Security and

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Defence. Staffing is urban based and only 63% of the medical staff work at health facilities. In 2005, the Lao PDR had four doctors and 10 nurses and midwives per 10,000 population (WHO, 2008; eStandards Forum Country Brief, 2008). The privatisation of health care services has also contributed to an exodus of health personnel, especially nurses, who, in view of the low salaries paid to public health workers, left the public sector to set up or work in private pharmacies and private clinics. Private pharmacies in the Lao PDR are classified into three categories, according to the qualification of the owner or manager of the pharmacy: Class I pharmacies are staffed by qualified pharmacists with a university degree; Class II pharmacies are staffed by Assistant Pharmacists or Technician Pharmacists; and Class III pharmacies are staffed by a nurse or other health workers who have received training in drug management (see Stenson et al., 1997). Owing to widespread corruption in the sector, this classification is not adhered to or properly regulated, raising further quality and safety issues about the issuing of prescriptions to and treatment of patients. It is an understatement to observe that patients buying pharmaceuticals in such a system are putting their lives at risk. Private pharmacies owned or managed by nurses account for 95% of all private pharmacies and clinics in the Lao PDR (Stenson et al., 2001)
at the last count, there were some 2000 private pharmacies and about 500 private clinics (ILO, 2007)
and most private pharmacies in rural areas and isolated districts are run by nurses, with 84% of these reported to be selling low-quality pharmaceuticals that are often inappropriately stored (Chariyalertsak et al., 2001: 13). The quality and availability of health care in the Lao PDR are not only limited by the lack of trained medical staff, but also by the poor national coverage of basic health services that fail to reach ethnic populations in remote areas where the services are most needed. Health care provision is not evenly distributed throughout the country because of poor logistical infrastructure and communication problems due to language and cultural differences. Ethnic minorities generally prefer to consult health staff who speak their language and understand their views (Health Sector Development Project
HSDP, 2007). This inequality is most profound in the rural areas. The two central, five regional and six specialised public hospitals, as well as the private clinics, are all located in large cities, such as Vientiane, Luang Prabang and Pakxe¯, and cater mainly for the middle class. In 2000, 80% of all the private clinics and private pharmacies were located in the capital, Vientiane, and other large cities (MoH, 2000). Smaller towns only have provincial (13 scattered around the country) and district hospitals.

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Although 80% of the Lao population still lives in rural areas, 20% of country people live more than 30 km from a hospital and 29% more than 10 km from the nearest health centre (UNDP, 2006: 9). In 2003, it took three hours on average to reach a health facility in the highlands, compared with an average of 48 minutes in the lowland areas. Most villages have neither a pharmacy nor a health worker, and hospitals are often at a considerable distance from the villages. This means that poor people, most of whom belong to ethnic minorities, often have access to substandard primary health care (ADB, 2006). Even when villagers do manage to reach a provincial or district hospital, they have to face the fact that, besides the communication issues with the poorly trained medical staff, the required medical equipment is not available or is dysfunctional, or the hospital has run out of pharmaceuticals. Hence, most people living in rural areas, being generally less educated about health matters, use health care services less, and prefer to turn to medicinal plants to treat all sorts of health conditions and ailments. The low health status of the Lao PDR is also due to severe underfunding of the health care system and inequity in its coverage. Although the Ministry of Health is the second biggest employer in the country, with 13% of all civil servants, health financing in the Lao PDR is below the desired level of funding and overly dependent on international aid and out-of-pocket household expenditure. Total health expenditure in 2006 was US$1.91 per capita or 3.6% of GDP, while private health expenditure was 79.4% and out-of-pocket expenditure was 92.70% (WHO, 2008). Due to the decentralised model of administration in the country, 75% of the health budget was provided by provinces and districts, but these contributions were insufficient to cover the costs of basic utilities, such as electricity. The contributions of international donors and NGOs made up as much as 41.3% of public health care expenditure. The level of contribution by international donors and NGOs leaves public health care expenditure in the Lao PDR very dependent on this assistance and at risk of collapse, should donor priorities change or should there be a global economic crisis forcing donors to attend to their own national priorities, as was experienced in 2008/2009. Low public health financing is not entirely the Lao government’s doing, as like other countries of the GMS, the government had to comply with the conditionality on loans. Hence, the Revolving Drug Funds and user fees have become the main funding sources for preventive or curative health services, causing a major issue of affordability for the majority of the population
and for ethnic minorities
whose income is less than US$2 a day (66%), and live mainly in rural areas (WHO, 2006).

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The cost of treatment has now climbed to an average total cost per person of US$15 at health centres and US$90 at central hospitals (WHO, 2004), and as high as US$150 for uninsured patients in non-rural areas (IHPPNIPH, 2007), while more than 80% of the Lao population mobilise less than US$10 per year for health care. Hence, the ability to pay for health care services has become a major barrier to using whatever health services there are. Schwartz and Viravong (2006) found that 34% of households sold assets, and 29% among the poorest quintile in the country borrowed from relatives in order to pay for hospital care. As a result, many delay or avoid treatment or resort to alternative treatments that often have catastrophic outcomes for their health. As in Cambodia, government policy (PM Decree No. 52 of 1995) stipulates that the poor, civil servants and their families, monks and students in government schools are to be exempt from paying out-of-pocket expenses at government health facilities; but in practice, almost no exceptions are made. It is up to individual health care facilities to decide whether or not to grant a fee exemption, and there are no mechanisms in place to protect the poor from unaffordable health care costs, leading Paphassarang et al. (2002: 72) to conclude that equity in health care remains a theoretical goal and that, in practice, the social goals of health care reform have not been achieved. A 2003 study by the Ministry of Health and the WHO indicated that exemptions at district hospitals ranged from 0.3 to 11.9% of total fee revenues. The government has been working towards putting in place some limited social safety net mechanisms through social protection schemes. Four main social protection schemes have been set up to alleviate the negative effects of out-of-pocket household expenditure for health services. These are: (1) the Social Security Organisation, (2) the Civil Servant Scheme, (3) the Community-Based Health Insurance and (4) Health Equity Funds. But health insurance, i.e. prepaying for future potential health problems, is a new concept for most Lao people and is having little or no real impact on improving the affordability of health care services, especially for the poor. The health care system of the Lao PDR was ranked 154 for attainment and 165 for performance, out of 191 countries surveyed (WHO, 2000). When it comes to health care, community participation is critical to early detection and preventive treatment. However, community participation does not exist where there is no communication taking place in the form of health education and cross-linguistic and cross-cultural interaction. The language barriers that exist between the bulk of health care workers, most of whom are native speakers of the dominant

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language, Lao, and the ethnic minorities, mean that the latter receive even less services in the health system. It is important, at this juncture, to remember that national averages always hide variations across the country and ethnic groups, as well as the very low percentages in regions inhabited by the ethnic minorities. If free treatment does not relieve all barriers to access to health services for the ethnic minorities and the poor, the provision of health care services cannot solely be seen in terms of cost recovery and physical infrastructure either. After all, health care is a public good, and ‘creating conditions to ensure that all people have access to health care, especially women and children, poor people and people in remote areas’ (Article 25, of the Amended Constitution of the Lao PDR, 2003, Chapter 2) and providing ‘full health care service coverage and health care service equity’ (NSEDP, 2006
2010) mean going beyond cost recovery strategies and looking at meeting the challenge of the language and cultural barriers that marginalise the ethnic minorities and the poor. Expanding the coverage of the health care network into remote areas will not of itself provide better and comprehensive services to all the people, if the target communities are not fully engaged and mobilised to take ownership and responsibility for their own health, and actively get involve in and contribute to the management, planning and delivery of health care services. Health information needs to be disseminated to all the people in the rural and remote areas, so that they are better able to understand and improve the quality of their health. This has not been and cannot be achieved in the Lao language alone, especially when it is clear that the vast majority of the people do not have the functional skills required in this language. Therefore, by necessity, and for the effectiveness of the services provided, the languages of these ethnic minorities will need to be used.

Language and Health in Myanmar Although Chapter 8 of the 2008 Constitution states that ‘Every citizen shall, in accordance with the health policy laid down by the Union, have the right to health care’ [emphasis added], decades of ethnic conflicts and internal displacements, militarisation and under-funding have severely affected the provision of health care services in Myanmar. As recently as 2000, the National Health Plan for 2001
2006 was aiming to provide ‘health for all’, in accordance with the international agenda. Crucial to the integrity of the National Health Plan were three key issues: (1) human resources and infrastructure development; (2) rural health development; and (3) quality of health care. Moreover, a key aim of the National Health

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Plan was to expand health services in the rural and border areas, where the majority of the population (70%) resides. This meant increasing the numbers and skills of those who provide basic health care in the rural health centres, and increasing and extending the reach of health education (e.g. maternal and child health) to populations in the rural and border areas. However, given the fragile economic condition of the country, the priority was to find alternative means of funding, in order to alleviate the burden that the cost of the health care system was placing on the national budget. Indeed, it is a well known fact that, as for education, Myanmar has the lowest per capita expenditure on health care in the whole of ASEAN
US$0.09 per capita per year
(WHO, 2008). Total expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP was only 3% in 2006, the smallest contribution of all other countries in the GMS, while foreign donor contribution, which stood at 82.03% of government health care expenditure in 2006, was the highest of all the countries of the GMS. This means that routine health care in Myanmar is unaffordable, and that the people of Myanmar have to spend a large amount of money when seeking health care, which, for all intent and purposes, has been left in the hands of private enterprise, and cost well above the official annual salary of most civil servants. This has led to increased private spending on a growing network of private hospitals and clinics, now estimated to supply more than 60% of Myanmar’s health care (Myat Thein & Khin Maung Nyo, 1999). The medical staff who work at these private hospitals and clinics also work in public hospitals, and it is anyone’s guess which sector takes up more of their time, given the low salary offered to public civil servants. Personal private expenditure on health in Myanmar in 2006 was 83.2% of total health expenditure, the highest in the GMS. On paper, in 2000, there were 30,868 beds in 745 government hospitals, 349 dispensaries, 84 primary and secondary health centres, 348 maternal and child health centres and 1,402 rural health centres. Of these, there were 49 hospitals, 78 clinics, 26 rural health centres and 43 sub-rural health centres in the border areas (James, 2005), with each of the 324 townships in Myanmar having a township hospital of 16
50 beds, depending on the size of the township, and one or two station hospitals and four to seven health centres being linked with each township. Voluntary and community health workers and auxiliary midwives provided primary health care in remote areas. Other health services were provided by the ministries of railways, mines, industry, energy, labour, transport and home affairs.

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As in the case of the Lao PDR, traditional medicine is popular and widespread in Myanmar, and not just in rural areas. In 2001, official traditional medicines were drawn from eight herbal gardens of 120 acres. A Department of Traditional Medicine was established in 1972 within the Ministry of Health, before being upgraded to a separate Ministry in 1989 and then expanded in 1998. This ministry is responsible for nine traditional medicine hospitals, 200 clinics and some 1200 qualified practitioners of traditional medicine. Two 50-bed traditional medicine hospitals were operating in Yangon and Mandalay in 1999
2000, and another four were located in Myitkyina, Pyay, Mawlamyaing and Sittwe. A further three 16-bed traditional medicine hospitals were also available at state/division level (James, 2005). Myanmar’s doctor to population ratio was four doctors per 10,000 population, and 10 nurses and midwives per 10,000 (WHO, 2008). Only one-third of all doctors in the country worked in public hospitals, while the majority worked for cooperative and private hospitals, an indication of the importance of the private health sector in the provision of health care services in Myanmar. The number of health professionals was supplemented by voluntary health workers, community health workers, auxiliary midwives and volunteers. Data on the health status of Myanmar, like most other socioeconomic data about this country, is scarce and often dated. However, a number of converging indicators suggest that the health conditions in Myanmar lag significantly behind those of other parts of southeast Asia. The maternal mortality ratio was 380 per 100,000 live births in 2000 (WHO, 2000), and life expectancy at birth stands at 60 years. Infant mortality was 74 per 1000 live births. Children were over-represented in the country’s total mortality rate (24%), in part because 10.9% of children born alive died before they turned five (UNDP, 2003). The under-five mortality rate stood at 104 per 1000 live births. Some 30% of children under three years old were underweight. In 2004, child mortality in Myanmar was two and half times the East Asia-Pacific mean (EIUCR, 2004: 15). According to Chelala (1998), child mortality in Myanmar was mostly attributable to malaria, diarrhoeal diseases, acute respiratory infections and measles. These preventable diseases were exacerbated by malnutrition, which was estimated to affect some 59% of children under five years old in the 1990s (Chandler, 1998), the paucity of trained health care providers and the low level of overall government investment in health and social services. According to a recent World Food Programme (WFP) report (August 2005), one-third of young children in Myanmar are malnourished. In some border areas, where there are armed conflicts between

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rival ethnic rebel groups and with government troops, the figure is believed to be as high as 60%. In October 2007, the WFP reported that it was able to assist 500,000 people out of a total of some 5 million who were suffering food shortages in the country. Although significant strides have been made with regard to malaria,3 the disease remains a major public health concern, especially in rural areas where the incidence of the disease is particularly high (80% of the population lives in malaria-prone areas). There are some 80,000 new cases of tuberculosis throughout the country each year, making this the second leading cause of death among the 15
54 age group. Myanmar is reported to have the highest incidence of snake bites in Asia. HIV/AIDS infections, mainly prevalent in the border areas with Thailand, the Lao PDR and China, are at a very high level by regional standards, due to the widespread use of syringe-injected opiates by drug addicts and sex workers in the northern mining regions. This disease is also known to be spreading into the heartland of the country and the main urban areas, via economic migrants. It was estimated that 440,000 persons were infected with HIV/AIDS at the end of 1997 and that there were some 100,000 cumulative AIDS cases, of which 86,000 resulted in death (UNAIDS/ WHO report, 2000). According to Safman (2005: 119), Myanmar has not yet undergone the epidemiological transition, which is often reflected in the availability of clean drinking water and sanitation, adequate nutrition and basic medical care, which accompanies modernisation. Needless to say, health care services in Myanmar are limited in coverage, sophistication and general development of infrastructure. The majority of health care professionals are concentrated in and around Yangon. In the rural areas, patients often have to walk several kilometres across fields, and in all weather conditions, to reach a health care centre. As a consequence, a significant proportion of the population’s health needs is attended to by traditional practitioners. Health indicators are lower in the Frontier Areas, where ethnic minorities live, and where the health outreach and provision is almost non-existent, due to the devastating impact of decades of ethnic conflicts. Maternal mortality ratios in these areas were reported to be over 500 per 100,000 live births in the northern and eastern Shan State. Access rates to improved sources of drinking water in the Chin, Karen and Rakhine States, were estimated to be between 42 and 47%, compared to a national average of 72% (UN Country Team, 2003: 32, 33, 41). According to the UN Country Team (2003: 13), ‘the populations living in the border areas tend to be more vulnerable to economic and social shocks, conflict and abuse’. Ethnic conflicts, and the ensuing humanitarian crises, have

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serious detrimental effects on the human and economic development of the country as a whole. In this instance, ethnic minorities are forced to continue to live on the edge of the so-called ‘Union’, and all the pledges about ‘every citizen’s right to health care’ and the provision of ‘health for all’ have thus far come to naught. In reality, when it comes to ethnic minorities, the policies applied in the education sector are replicated in the health sector. The onus is on those who do not speak Myanmar to navigate the public health care system, if and when they manage to have access to it; and access, in this instance, is not at all guaranteed for a host of other reasons, including language. For decades, Myanmar’s health care system was managing to cope with the provision of health services, thanks to large international aid. At least 50 domestic and international NGOs operated in the country, mostly in the health, health education and welfare sectors. These were complemented by United Nations Organizations, such as UNICEF, UNDP and WHO, and the overall health expenditure financed by aid was the highest in southeast Asia. However, because of the continuing political deadlock in the country, only a small number of NGOs currently operate in Myanmar, providing health, education and other services at a local level. Although, in an apparent change of policy, the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) announced in 2003 that it would contribute US$15.7 million over three years to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS in Myanmar, the UN Global Fund decided to terminate US$35 million of expenditure on HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria in the country in August 2005, and most other aid agencies disengaged themselves from Myanmar in March 2006. This turn of events will almost certainly worsen the health status of many Myanmars, especially that of the ethnic minorities in the Frontier Areas. Indeed, in the past, only foreign agencies took the trouble to provide health care relief to some isolated communities, especially at the border with Thailand. As things now stand, the regime has succeeded in making the plight of every citizen in the country a little worse than it was in terms of their access to health. It is therefore no surprise that Myanmar’s health system was ranked 175 and 190, out of 191 countries surveyed, for attainment and performance, respectively (WHO, 2000).

Language and Health in Viet Nam Viet Nam’s health system has been shaped by its history of struggle and war. In 1954, following socialist ideology, which called for equity, north Viet Nam established a comprehensive network of primary health

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care, providing free health care down to the smallest village. Patients only paid for pharmaceuticals, provided by the government, at a highly subsidised price, thanks to support from the former Soviet Union and other east European countries. Access to essential preventive and curative health care was relatively good throughout the country, even though private medical practice and the sale of pharmaceuticals were officially prohibited. The government funded the salaries of the health care personnel in mountainous areas inhabited by ethnic communities. After reunification in 1976, the government of north Viet Nam attempted to extend the provision of free health care for all to south Viet Nam, where there was no comparable health care network. But, this process coincided with adverse economic conditions, budgetary constraints and the withdrawal of most international support to Viet Nam, and saw the country’s limited resources for health care become overstretched, and the quality of health throughout the country decline. Government health expenditure collapsed, as Viet Nam’s economic difficulties grew, and its major international partner, the Soviet Union, disintegrated. The cost of pharmaceuticals rapidly increased, reaching market prices. Health facilities, including medical equipment, deteriorated, and health care staff, whose purchasing power was dramatically reduced, lost motivation. It is in this context that, as part of the multisectoral policy of c liberalisation and privatisation policies adopted in 1986 under Doˆi mo´’i, or renovation, a series of measures were initiated in the health sector, which aimed at mobilising more resources for health care, including (1) the introduction of user fees at district, provincial and national levels; (2) the legalisation of private medical practice; (3) the liberalisation of the pharmaceutical industry; and (4) the sale of medicines on the open market (World Bank, 1993). The Ministry of Health implemented these reforms, directing public hospitals to operate under a business model of cost recovery. By 1991, private medical practice and the retail sale of pharmaceuticals were officially sanctioned for university graduates in medicine and pharmacy and for traditional medical practitioners
pharmaceuticals were sold direct to the public with a mark-up of up to 15%
(Segall et al., 2000), although preventive services and treatment administered under national health programmes were supposed to continue to be free of charge. The commune health services became unviable, as the government sought to rationalise the number of commune health services’ staff, depending on the size of the commune, leaving the choice to individual communes to contract additional workers at their own expense. Implementation of a system

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of shared financial responsibility was slow and patchy, and by the 1990s, only one-third of commune health services were subsidised (World Bank, 1995). The state financed about 60% of the expenditure on the public health care service, and health insurance, direct user fees and international aid financed the rest almost equally. In 1993, as the economy recovered, the government took on all the commune health services’ staff as state health employees, stabilising the public primary health care system to some degree. However, by then, private medical and pharmacy practice had rapidly developed and spread throughout the country in the form of small clinics and retail drug outlets (Pham, 1996). Initially, the owners of these clinics and pharmacies were medical doctors and pharmacists practicing after-hours; but over time, other less qualified health workers joined their ranks, especially in the rural areas, many in an illegal and/or unlicensed capacity. The government also issued a decree on compulsory payroll-based social health insurance for all government employees and employees of state and private enterprises with at least 10 employees in the early 1990s (Ensor, 1995). The decree made provisions for the majority of workers in small businesses and agriculture. However, the initial hurdle of private health insurance in Viet Nam was that payroll taxes had a relatively narrow base, placing much of the burden on employers and employees in the formal sector. Most importantly, the scheme left out virtually all those not engaged in the formal sector, some 70% of economic activity in Viet Nam; in other words, the majority of the people in the country were not covered, thereby increasing inequities in the provision of health care. Since compulsory health insurance covered only 10% of the population, voluntary membership for the rest of the population was allowed in 2005. The voluntary system targeted students, those with temporary jobs, or poor families. But, many were reluctant to buy voluntary health insurance until they fell sick, and the uptake was slow.4 In four years, only 3 million people joined the schemes administered by Viet Nam Health Insurance (VHI) at the national level, against a predicted figure of over 50 million (VietNamNet, 2009). In theory, health insurance was supposed to cover the beneficiaries for the cost of inpatient and outpatient treatment in a specified state health facility; but in practice, insured patients still faced some charges. It was also assumed that reforms in the health sector would allow households to choose between the public health service and private health care consultations, and that the fees would be used to improve service delivery. Still, the private sector, virtually unregulated and unmonitored

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for quality, soon took on a life of its own, increasing the lack of access to health care services for the poor and the vulnerable. Poor access to health facilities is particularly greater in the remote mountain areas, and there are considerable disparities in health status between the rest of the country and the Mekong River Delta, the central highlands and the northern uplands, where ethnic minorities live. Maternal and infant mortality rates in these areas are much higher among these groups than the national averages. In an attempt to reduce these disparities, the Ministry of Planning and Investment launched the National Programme for Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction in Viet Nam in 1996, subsidising hospital costs for the poor. Yet, many of the poor were unaware of the scheme, in part because of the language in which information about the scheme was disseminated. In any event, the application procedure for the programme was long and complex, and it is not clear whether poor people would have wanted to avail of it. Deolalikar (1999) noted that, a few years after the introduction of private practice, there were inequities in the distribution of public health services. Richer provinces spent more per person on public health care than poorer provinces, and about half of public health expenditure was allocated to hospitals that were used much more by the urban rich than by the rural poor. The rich also had proportionally more access to higherlevel hospitals that received larger subsidies. This process deepened with the advent of health care insurance (Segall et al., 2000: 15). The rich consulted the private medical practitioners about twice as often as public providers, while the poor used the private practitioners about as often as public providers. Private health spending was nearly five times the health budget allocations, and households financed about 80% of total health expenditure. Nearly 60% of private health spending was for the purchase of pharmaceuticals (World Bank, 1995). In other words, not only did health care costs increase, self-medication also increased significantly with the introduction of private medical practice. The wealthy could shop around for the best health care service provider, while the poor could not afford health care, even at the local level, and were driven to use less formal health care. Their option of choice was self-medication, the cheapest of the cheaper options. According to Segall et al.: A significant minority of the population have benefited little, if at all, from reform, and they have been left in poverty. Poor households are burdened by debt, often incurred to meet basic consumption needs, and are vulnerable to economic shocks of all kinds, including family illness. (Segall et al., 2000: xi)

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Poverty and language barriers play a major role in preventive care. Ethnic minorities and poor households experiencing illness stretch their resources to obtain health care and spend a greater proportion of their income than others on curative care. According to Segall et al. (2000: xi), they spend as much as 21.9% of their income on health care, compared with 8.2% for the non-poor. In the process, they put their household economies under great strain, reducing essential consumption of food and selling assets, such as land. Segall et al. (2000: xi) conclude that for the poor in Viet Nam, the economic consequences of illness and health care costs are often a greater problem than access to health care as such. In its 10-year socioeconomic development plan stemming from the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (CPRGS), and in the strategy for people’s health care for 2001
2010, the government aims to improve the overall level of health and distribution of health among all the population, providing prevention and treatment to all people and increasing life expectancy to 70
75 years. The new health strategy is based on four principles: (1) equity and efficiency of the health sector; (2) fight against the broad social determinants of bad health; (3) integrate traditional and modern medicine; and (4) come up with an appropriate public
private mix, in order to protect the public interest. Critically, the strategy fails to provide specific solutions on how to ensure equal access to health. Viet Nam also has a health care fund for the poor (HCFP), which started in 2003 and uses government revenues to finance health care for the poor, the ethnic minorities living in selected mountainous provinces and households living in communes officially designated as highly disadvantaged (Wagstaff, 2009). Compared to Cambodia, the Lao PDR and Myanmar, however, Viet Nam is relatively successful in the provision of preventive health services, controlling the spread of communicable diseases and achieving good health outcomes for its population. The country boasts an extensive health care delivery network
some 9806 commune health centres and more than 600 district hospitals
with a very strong primary health care component. Although the country only had six doctors per 10,000 population and eight nurses and midwives per 10,000 in 2000, it had more than twice the number of hospitals (26 in 2004) of other countries in the region and a very well organised national public health programme, based on a large supply of health workers (WHO, 2003). In 2006, Viet Nam spent 6.6% of its GDP on health or US$8.17 per capita per year while receiving the least amount of foreign aid for this sector (6.33% in 2006).5

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Viet Nam’s vital health indicators are considered good. The maternal mortality ratio (150 per 100,000 live births in 2005) is relatively high, but the infant and under-five mortality rates (15 per 1,000 live births and 17 per 1000 live births, respectively, in 2006) are the lowest of the GMS countries, although these figures are much higher in ethnic minorities living in remote areas (WHO, 2008). Life expectancy at birth, at 72 years in 2006, is the highest of the region. The health situation of Viet Nam is characterised by a high prevalence of chronic malnutrition among the under-five population. According to the Ministry of Health, Viet Nam is among the top 20 countries in the world for malnutrition, with 32.6% of children suffering from malnourishment (underweight, stunted growth and shortness) in Viet Nam in 2008 (VietNamNet, 2009). Areas of particular concentration are the central highlands, the northwestern and the northern central regions. Almost half the population has no access to clean water, a situation that promotes infectious diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, typhoid and cholera. Since 1975, the worst year for malaria in Viet Nam was 1991, when close to 2 million cases and 4646 deaths were reported. In 2003, these numbers fell to 37,416 cases and 50 deaths. Other major infectious diseases are food or water-borne diseases, such as bacterial diarrhoea, hepatitis A and typhoid fever, and vector-borne diseases, such as dengue fever, malaria, Japanese encephalitis and plague. Viet Nam’s health situation is also known to have been heavily affected by the aftermath of ‘Agent Orange’, a chemical defoliant used by the US military during the Viet Nam war, which causes cancer, birth defects and other serious health problems. Between 1962 and 1971, the USA sprayed 77 million litres of chemical defoliants in south Viet Nam, especially along the long mountains and the border between Viet Nam and Cambodia. According to the Vietnamese authorities, some 4.8 million people were exposed to Agent Orange, resulting in 400,000 deaths and disabilities. Well over 500,000 children were born with all kinds of birth defects (see Globe and Mail, 12 June 2008). These factors, as well as the inequity in accessing the health care system, no doubt explain the health system of the country being ranked 140 for attainment and 160 for performance, out of 191 countries surveyed (WHO, 2000).

Conclusion The foregoing calls for at least two observations: (1) that public health care systems in most developing countries are unfair to poor people, in the sense that the poor have less access to preventive and curative public

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health care services, and especially hospital services, than those who are better off (Castro-Leal et al., 2000; Gwatkin, 2000; Gwatkin et al., 2004); and (2) that poverty and ill health are intertwined, and poor people are caught in a vicious circle wherein poverty breeds ill health, and ill health keeps people poor (Wagstaff, 2002: 97). It also shows that the large inequalities that exist in the health sector between the poor and the better-off are manifest in health outcomes and in the utilisation of health services (Gwatkin et al., 2000; Wagstaff, 2000). Things being worse by the general shift to cost recovery in the provision of health care services, the choice of health care providers in ethnic minorities depends very much on self-diagnosis first, then on household income. In other words, individuals or their carers make a determination as to how severe their illness is before seeking treatment. When they do, the quality of the treatment to be received is not necessarily the critical issue as much as the actual cost of the treatment, including at times the preparedness of providers to offer flexible terms of payment. This includes waiting for payment, being prepared to offer flexible payment terms over a period of time, accepting payment in kind or accepting collateral (e.g. land) until payment is eventually made. If arrangements of this kind can be made with private health care providers, they are not an option when it comes to public health services. Hence, the overwhelming preference for the mode of treatment they perceive as being more responsive to their needs. Responsiveness is also a significant criterion in selecting private care providers, because it affords patients the advantage of communicative convenience; that is to say, the ability to explain one’s illness and understand the health carer’s instructions regarding a proper course of treatment. Public health care services, on the other hand, have developed the reputation of being less caring and less communicative (Segall et al., 2000). This brings us to the key issues of the privatisation of health care systems and the implementation of user fees, which have often been put forward as strategies to alleviate resource constraints and generate revenue to improve health services. User fees in health services are a source of much debate because of their potential risk of negative effects on access to health care for the poor. The overall view is clouded by rhetoric based on assumptions and articles of faith about the economic merits of the policy. But this is not the first time market-orientated reforms have been sold to developing countries with no time having been taken to critically assess their validity. Although the World Bank is of the view that user fees could be a necessary evil in helping to subsidise those least able to afford care and would improve access to and use of

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essential health services for the poor (Gottret & Schieber, 2006; Shaw & Griffin, 1995; Audibert & Mathonnat, 2000), many studies have shown that the introduction of user fees in many low-income countries, such as those of the GMS, has rarely, if ever, been beneficial to the poor (Gilson et al., 2001, 2004; Gilson, 1997; Palmer et al., 2004). Creese (1991), McPake (1993) and Gilson et al. (2001) found that the poor tended to significantly decrease their use of health care services after the introduction or rise in user fees, while Whitehead et al. (2001) have argued that the resultant of the user-fee strategy has been that health care costs have fallen more directly on the sick, who are most likely to be poor, than on the healthy. User fees have been shown to contribute to the increase of private medical practice, the growth of private pharmacies and aggressive marketing of pharmaceuticals by unqualified vendors, who have financial incentives to over-prescribe, on an unregulated market. User fees also contribute to the rise in out-of-pocket expenses with catastrophic consequences for the poor, and the unhealthy and irrational use of pharmaceuticals
i.e. the inappropriate use of medicines, whereby patients are sold medicines they do not need, or part courses of pharmaceuticals, when they cannot afford the full course of the treatment. Finally, user fees are generally blamed for the inequitable and reduced access to health care services, both public and private, as those who cannot afford health care services delay seeking care until an emergency situation arises. A study of user fees by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development concluded that, of all the measures proposed for raising revenue from local people, user fees is probably ‘the most illadvised’ (UNRISD, 2000). WHO has suggested that out-of-pocket payments and payments towards protection schemes be linked to household income, because households should not have to spend more than a specific percentage of their income on health care, and health care costs should not drive households further into poverty (WHO, 2000). Meessen et al. (2006: 2254) argued that when most of the population is living in poverty, exemption for everyone is probably more effective than the administration of a user-fee system that entails screening large numbers of patients in order to determine who should receive a waiver. Health staff may also not have the expertise or the time to properly and objectively assess the patients’ ability to pay, and may be caught between granting exemptions and raising income for the health care facility and for topping up their own salaries. Yet, going along with the conditionality of foreign aid, all governments of the GMS have implemented the user-fee policy and now heavily rely

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on it to finance health services. Government funding of health care services, a public good, have been pulled right back to, and in some cases well below, the minimum required. Hence, total expenditure on health care services as a percentage of GDP stand at only 2.3 and 3.6% in Myanmar and the Lao PDR, respectively (Table 3.1), even though the former is known to have much greater revenues nowadays thanks to gas exports. Both countries rely heavily on foreign aid to pay for the health care of their own citizens, with 41.30% of the Lao PDR’s health expenditure financed by aid and 82.03% of Myanmar’s financed by aid (Table 3.2). In contrast with the last two, Cambodia, whose health expenditure is also financed by foreign aid to the tune of 41.30%, spends almost twice as much as the Lao PDR (6% of GDP) and three times as much as Myanmar Table 3.1 Total expenditure on health in the GMS (2006) Cambodia

Lao PDR

Myanmar

Viet Nam

Total expenditure per capita in US$

30

22

4

46

Total expenditure as a percentage of GDP

6.0

3.6

2.3

6.6

Source: Adapted from WHO’s national health accounts. On WWW at www.who.int/nha/ en/. Accessed 25.2.09.

Table 3.2 Government expenditure on health in the GMS (2006) Cambodia Lao PDR Myanmar Viet Nam Total government health expenditure (%)

26.1

20.8

16.8

32.4

Percentage of government health expenditure financed by aid

41.30

41.30

82.03

6.33

Government health expenditure minus aid (%)

15.3

21.0

3.0

30.3

Per capita government expenditure minus aid and social security in US$

4.59

1.91

0.09

8.17

Source: Adapted from WHO’s national health accounts. On WWW at www.who.int/nha/ en/. Accessed 25.2.09.

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on health care services. Once again, Viet Nam stands out as the exception, with very little foreign aid input to its health expenditure (only 6.33%), and yet a reasonable total expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP (6.6%). The figures are even more impressive from the perspective of what these percentages represent in terms of dollars per capita government expenditure. Viet Nam spends nearly twice as much as Cambodia (US$8.17, as against US$4.59), 4.27 times more than the Lao PDR and an amazing 90.7 times more than Myanmar. This discrepancy could have something to do with the place and role of traditional medicine in both the Lao PDR and Myanmar, where the practice is recognised and institutionalised at cabinet level and/or the lack of provision of health care services outside urban centres. This explains, in part, the marginalisation and neglect of the health care needs of ethnic minorities who live in the rural and remote areas and have little or no access to the public health care system. As a result, even though private expenditure on health is quite high in all four countries, it is significantly greater in Myanmar and the Lao PDR (83.2 and 79.20%, respectively) than in Cambodia and Viet Nam (73.90 and 67.60%, respectively) (Table 3.3). Overall, however, it is easy to understand why private expenditure on health is a major concern for ethnic minorities and the poor, because these are figures well above their earning capacity. It would be naı¨ve and simplistic to suggest that all inequalities in health care service provision in the GMS rest on the language issue alone, although the language barrier cannot be overlooked. However, it is clear that other variables, such as education, income and geographic location contribute to good or ill health. In this instance, both language and Table 3.3 Private expenditure on health in the GMS (2006) Cambodia

Lao PDR

Myanmar

Viet Nam

Private expenditure/total health expenditure (%)

73.90

79.20

83.20

67.60

NGO expenditure/private health expenditure (%)

15.61

5.95

0.20

0.27

Local private expenditure/ total health expenditure (%)

73.78

74.49

83.20

67.60

Source: Adapted from WHO’s national health accounts. On WWW at www.who.int/nha/ en/. Accessed 25.2.09.

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income combine to disenfranchise ethnic communities and the poor in general. Combating health sector inequalities must therefore include bridging the language gap in order to achieve health education, health awareness and health-specific knowledge in a language (or in languages) that the patient population understand and can use to explain their health problem, and in which they can be given a diagnosis and medical advice that they also understand. Recognising the interrelationship of literacy, culture, language and health will go a long way in finding better solutions for the health care of ethnic minorities and the poor. Otherwise, the vicious circle of ill health and poverty will continue to feed on each other, as ethnic minorities and the poor try to minimise health care costs by avoiding or delaying primary care treatment, risking serious health complications. If hospital admission is a serious economic event for any family, it can be devastating and catastrophic for ethnic minorities, who are often forced to disinvest and/or go into debt, when a member of the family is hospitalised. Governments in the GMS, and especially in the Lao PDR and Myanmar, need to realise that, even though ethnic minorities are small by definition, they have quite a few ethnic minorities that, when put together, represent a large proportion of the population (in the case of the Lao PDR, the largest proportion of the population). Such a large proportion of the population cannot be denied health care services without affecting the overall productivity of the nation. However, the efficiency and cost-effective provision of health to ethnic minorities cannot be achieved in a language they do not understand, albeit a national language. Notes 1. A five-year, US$14 million study of US adult literacy in 12 states, commissioned by the US government, showed that 21
23% of adult Americans are functionally illiterate and are not ‘able to locate information in text’, cannot ‘make low-level inferences using printed materials’, and cannot read well enough to hold a good job. The study estimates that up to 20% of adults in the USA lack basic reading and writing skills
ranging from signing one’s name to identifying basic information from a simple form
and an additional 2% are marginally literate, meaning they cannot fill out an application form or interpret instructions for an appliance (Kirsch et al., 1993). A follow-up study showed that there was no statistically significant improvement in these figures (Kutner et al., 2005, 2006). 2. Depending on the sources, this figure varies between 29% (Manivong, 2005) and 37% (GoL, 2005). 3. Major pharmaceutical firms (e.g. Zeneca), bilateral and multilateral donors (e.g. the Thai Ministry of Public Health, ODA, UNDP, WHO and the World

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Bank) and non-governmental organisations (e.g. Save the Children, World Concern) have provided technical and material support to this effort. 4. The rate of cover in 2009 was US$18 a year for residents in urban areas, and US$13 for those in rural areas. Students get a US$5.7 discount. 5. In Myanmar, 82.03% of government health expenditure is financed by aid, yet per capita government expenditure on health is US$0.09. In Cambodia and the Lao PDR, 41.30% of government health expenditure is financed by aid, yet per capita government expenditure on health in these countries is US$4.59 and US$1.91, respectively.

Chapter 4

Language and the Economy in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region Introduction There are numerous competing theories that inform the study of economic development. It is beyond the scope of this book to revisit all these theories. Suffice it to say that the relationship between economic growth and development is no longer a topic for debate. Most people assume that where there is economic growth, development will follow. Hence, figures on the economic performance of the countries in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) suggest that these countries have made significant headway in terms of development, as indicated in various reports by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). These figures on economic growth are impressive, considering that countries like Cambodia, the Lao PDR and Viet Nam have emerged from the tragedy of war (and genocide in the case of Cambodia) less than 40 years ago. Cambodia has the largest number of amputees in the world to show for its suffering, the Lao PDR on its part retains the unenviable record of having been the most bombarded country in the world, while Agent Orange has left Viet Nam with unspeakable birth defects. Our main concern here is to ask whether development comes about through economic growth alone. What happens when economic growth cannot reach its full potential? What happens when the fruits of economic growth are not equitably shared among the population? These are the questions explored in this chapter through the nexus of language.

Language and the Economy in Cambodia Although its economy has been one of the fastest growing in southeast Asia for a decade, with gross domestic product (GDP) averaging 9.1% from 1998 to 2008, Cambodia is the least developed and most aid-dependent country. More than one-third of Cambodians live below the extreme poverty line (less than US$1 a day). Poverty prevalence stood at 30% of the population in 2007, but has reportedly increased in recent years 103

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(ADB, 2010: 201). It was especially pervasive in the rural areas (up to 45.6%), where 90% of the poor live, and where access to most social services is low (USAID Cambodia, 2009). Recovering from a long period of political and social disruption dating back to the 1970s, Cambodia faced chronic post-war instability and serious human resource deficiencies. Then, when it emerged from the Khmer Rouge era in the 1980s, its economy came up against a development assistance embargo, imposed by the international community, to protest against the Vietnamese occupation of the country and to put pressure on the Communist government. The embargo was gradually lifted, following major political milestones, such as the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1991 and the 1993 elections. Cambodia has since moved away from a centrally planned economy to a free market. The transition to a market economy accelerated from 1993, growing at around 6% a year by 1996, led primarily by the service and industry sectors. In 1994, the Law on Investment provided ‘very generous. . . incentives to investors’ (IMF, 2003: 19) and ‘opened Cambodia for business’ (Curtis, 1996: 29), with an explosion of foreign direct investments (FDIs), more than 90% of which came from other Asian countries such as China, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. A National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS) was adopted in 2002, and a Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency1 was developed in 2004 as the framework for the country’s socioeconomic development. According to the Royal Government of Cambodia, the Rectangular Strategy is an integrated structure of interlocking rectangles, which include: Good governance focused on four reform areas: (i) anti-corruption, (ii) legal and judicial reform, (iii) public administration reform, including decentralisation, and (iv) reform of the armed forces. The environment for the implementation of Rectangular Strategy consists of four elements: (i) peace, political stability and social order; (ii) partnership in development with all stakeholders, including the private sector, donor community and civil society; (iii) favourable macroeconomic and financial environment; and (iv) the integration of Cambodia into the region and the world. The four strategic ‘‘growth rectangles’’ are: (i) enhancement of the agricultural sector; (ii) private sector growth and employment; (iii) continued rehabilitation and construction of physical infrastructure;

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and (iv) capacity building and human resource development. Each strategic ‘‘growth rectangle’’ has four sides: Rectangle 1: Enhancement of Agricultural Sector covers: (i) improved productivity and diversification of agriculture; (ii) land reform and clearing of mines; (iii) fisheries reform; and (iv) forestry reform;

.

Rectangle 2: Continued Rehabilitation and Construction of Physical Infrastructure, involves: (i) continued restoration and construction of transport infrastructure (inland, marine and air transport); (ii) management of water resources and irrigation; (iii) development of energy and power grids, and (iv) development of information and communication technology;

.

Rectangle 3: Private Sector Growth and Employment covers: (i) strengthened private sector and attraction of investments; (ii) promotion of Small and Medium Enterprises; (iii) creation of jobs and ensuring improved working conditions; and (iv) establishment of social safety nets for civil servants, employees and workers; and

.

Rectangle 4: Capacity Building and Human Resource Development comprises: (i) enhanced quality of education; (ii) improvement of health services; (iii) fostering gender equity, and (iv) implementation of population policy.

.

The Rectangular Strategy builds on key elements of Cambodia’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Cambodia Socio-Economic Development Plan 20012005 (SEDP2), the NPRS 2003 2005 and the various policies, strategies, plans and reform programmes, with the aim of promoting economic growth, generating employment, ensuring equity and social justice, and enhancing efficiency of the public sector through the implementation of the Governance Action Plan. This was recently followed by a National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) for 2006 2010, containing priority goals and strategies to reduce poverty and achieve the Cambodian MDGs and socioeconomic development goals. The Cambodian MDGs aim, among other things, to ‘Factor poverty reduction and gender concerns in all activities’ and ‘target [the] most needy and least served people and areas’. Cambodia’s major natural resources include timber, gemstones, iron ore, rubber, phosphate and manganese. The key drivers of the economy are agriculture (29% of GDP in 2007), the garments industry and tourism (71% of GDP in 2007). Cambodia’s major export commodities are timber, garments, rubber, rice and fish. Its major export partners in 2008 were the

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USA (54.4%), Germany (7.7%), Canada (5.9%), the UK (5.5%) and Viet Nam (4.5%). Major import partners in the same year were Thailand (26.8%), Vietnam (19%), China (14.5%), Hong Kong (8.1%) and Singapore (6.9%). Cambodia was admitted to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1999, and joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in late 2004. According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2007), Cambodia has witnessed robust and steady macroeconomic growth. The annual real growth of GDP was 10.8% in 2006 (National Institute of Statistics (NIS), 2007) and GDP per capita stood at US$591 (US$600, according to Economics@ANZ of April 2008). GDP growth was 9.6% in 2007 and has been running at an average 7% per annum over the last decade. It was expected to remain at such levels through to 2009, and inflation was also expected to be kept at 5%.2 Consumption by the poorest one-fifth of the population improved by 8% in 10 years (19942004), while that of the richest rose by about 45% (UNDP, 2008: 23). Overall, the economy expanded at an impressive pace, compared to that of Thailand (3.4%), the Lao PDR (6.3%) and Viet Nam (7.1%). However, with a predominantly rural population (85%), Cambodia largely remains an agrarian-based society. Agriculture is the largest sector of the economy, with the Mekong River, which flows nearly 500 km through the country, and Tonle´ Sap Lake at the centre of farming and fishing activities, engaging 76% of the total workforce in 1997. This figure was marginally reduced to 74% in 2004, and 70% in 2007 (UNDP, 2008: 16). The share of the agricultural sector in the GDP, which was more than 45% in the mid-1990s, shrunk significantly to 29% of GDP in 2007. Among the major crops grown are rice, corn, sugar and tapioca. Like its neighbours of the GMS, the most important agricultural product in Cambodia is rice. This sector employs 50% of the labour force (farming and marketing), accounts for 90% of the land under cultivation, and represents 34% of agricultural production (2003) and 9% of GDP. Approximately 80% of rural families are involved in growing rice, and production has seen large increases over the last decade. But the extensive floods of 2001 destroyed 15% of the country’s crop and made transportation of the remaining rice crop difficult, if not impossible. At this time, Cambodia’s rice yields were the lowest of the GMS, with an average of 2 tonnes per hectare. In 2007, rice production climbed by 5% to 6 million tonnes, of which 2 million tonnes were exported; but the fall in international prices for rice in mid-2008 dashed expectations that rice exports would boost economic growth. Signs of a return to growth

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emerged in late 2009, with recorded agribusiness exports in milled rice more than doubling (ADB, 2010: 201). In general, the performance of the agricultural sector is volatile and exposed to varying weather conditions, as well as to commodity prices, making it minimally value added. As in the case of the Lao PDR (see ‘Language and the Economy in the Lao PDR’ section), most farms are small scale with low productivity and little downstream processing industries to support the sector. The potential of the whole agricultural sector is further constrained by restricted access to land, as a result of some 6 million undetonated landmines strewn around the countryside, covering land that could be used for agriculture, and causing some 350 civilian casualties annually (Cambodia has the highest number of amputees per head of population in the world). As a consequence, arable land accounts for only 20.96% of the surface area of the country. Ethnic minorities in the western and northeastern provinces are particularly adversely affected by insecurity of land tenure, as well as by (forced) displacements. However, Cambodia has been trying to make the transition from a traditionally agrarian economy to one based on industry and services. The industrial sector has been expanding, thanks primarily to garments production, which grew from just over 1% of GDP to around 27% between 1995 and 2005 and now stands at 30% of GDP after weathering the ending of the Multifibre Agreement (MFA) in January 2005. The garment industry benefited most from the flow of investment in the midand late 1990s, with more than 200 factories opening across the country, employing up to 300,000 Cambodians, mostly young women, and becoming the country’s largest single export item (50% of all exports in 1999, 95% of all exports in 2002 and 69% of all manufacturing in 2005). Garments accounted for 72.9% of total exports in 2007, while imports associated with the garment sector were the largest, accounting for 26.8% of the total (petroleum had a 22.6% share). At its peak, the garment sector boasted almost 300 factories and employed 340,000 workers. Some 70% of these garments were sent to the USA, 25% to Europe, 15.2% to Hong Kong and the rest mainly to south Korea and Japan, bringing in US$2.78 billion in 2008. The Cambodian economy has a number of factors working in its favour, including a substantial hydropower potential, which is currently being developed (only about 20% of households have electricity at present). Longer term, Cambodia’s resources sector is also expected to experience significant expansion, following the discovery of major oil and gas reserves estimated at 700 million barrels and two to three trillion cubic feet (EIU, 2008),3 respectively. If the oil revenue exceeds US$1 billion a year, as some have estimated, it would add more

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than 12% to the GDP (IHT, 2006) and lead to a more balanced fiscal position and less reliance on external aid. It is estimated that government revenue from oil and gas will increase gradually from US$174 million in 2011 to a maximum of US$1.7 billion in 2021, before gradually declining. Cambodia could also benefit from the large amount of oil and gas reserves believed to be in 27,000 km2 of disputed waters off the Gulf of Thailand (both countries have been negotiating how to share profits from these reserves). Despite this strong growth, two decades of external aid and the promises of greater riches, Cambodia remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Exports dropped to 9.5% in 2007 (from 26.9% the previous year), while imports were at 14.1% (down from 20.9%), reversing the trend of previous years, when export growth was greater than imports, except in 2005, when export growth was a low 12.4%, while imports stood at 20.2%, leading to a large trade deficit (around 14.5% of GDP in 2007). The moderation in export growth was prompted by weakness in the US economy. GDP growth experienced a gradual deceleration and dropped to 6.5% in 2008, as external demand softened and private consumption eased. Having dipped sharply before, in 1997, 1998, 2001 and 2002, due to the Asian financial crisis, internal political disturbance and natural disasters, Cambodia’s was the only economy to have contracted in the GMS in the face of the global financial crisis of 2008/2009. As a result, garment exports dropped by about 30% in 2009, while exports to the US market alone dropped nearly 40% in January 2009, compared to the export volume in 2008. Many garment factories were forced to close (Asian Affairs, 2009). The country’s overall net exports dropped by 18.2%, or US$804.7 million in 2009, compared to 2008 (The Mirror, 2010). Similarly, tourism which had surged ahead, with visitor numbers to the temples of Siem Reap increasing by 43% in 2005 and 33% in 2006 and revenue estimated at US$1.194 billion (14.1% of GDP) in 2007 and projected to rise to US$1.412 billion for 2008, dropped by 2% in the first two months of 2009, compared to the same period in 2008 (Asian Affairs, 2009). Services slowed to 1.5%, construction by 10%, while industrial output fell by 13%. This economic slowdown was not limited to sectors exposed to the global economy; most small and medium businesses were also affected, including tuk-tuk drivers, small restaurants and other services (Asian Affairs, 2009). In other words, the latest downturn in the economy has had an important social impact, especially on the vulnerable population. Although only one-fifth of all households have a job in sectors directly affected by the crisis (e.g. garments, construction and tourism), the impact

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on incomes was greatest among poorer and rural households, for whom these jobs account for a larger share of income (World Bank, 2010: 40). To stimulate the economy, the government took measures, including temporary tax relief for the tourism and garment industries, spent US$10 million in retraining laid-off garment workers, removed tariffs on fertilisers and imports of agricultural machinery, increased locally financed spending on rural infrastructure and increased the wages of civil servants and military personnel. As a result, the wage bill rose to 4.4% of GDP in 2009, from 3.4% in 2008, and the fiscal deficit widened to 6% of GDP in 2009, from 2.8% in 2008, pushing up the overall budget deficit to an estimated 5.9% of GDP in 2009 (ADB, 2010: 200). Inflation, which had fallen from a very high 35.6% in May 2008 to around 5.3% in December 2009, and as low as 3.7% at the end of March 2010, rose to 6.9% in January 2010, the highest since December 2008 (UNESCAP, 2010). The current account deficit, which had improved slightly, US$-1.024 billion in 2009 from US$-1.06 billion in 2008, was projected to increase to 15.3% of GDP in 2010 from 11.5% of GDP in 2009 (World Bank, 2010: 39), then 16% for 2011 and 17% in 2012 (ADB, 2010: 202). The external debt also rose marginally to US$4.157 billion in 2009 from US$4.127 billion in 2008 (EconomyWatch, 2010). This means that the poverty rate in Cambodia has actually risen to 40 45%, placing Cambodia 152nd of the 179 nations and territories for which per capita data is compiled (UNDP, 2007). The persistence of extreme poverty in a country like Cambodia, after decades of strategic planning and policy formulation for economic growth, points to fundamental weaknesses, the first of which is the lack of diversity in the economic activities of the country. Even though it achieves the highest ranking of all GMS countries on the Index of Economic Freedom World Rankings (107 out of 179, with a score of 56.6), Cambodia’s economy is too narrowly focused, relying heavily as it does on garment exports and tourism, it is far too exposed to deteriorating external demand and highly vulnerable to external shocks. Economic growth has been focused on urban areas, while 91% of the poor live in rural areas. The gap between Cambodia’s urban dwellers and the poor in rural areas and especially in the plateau/mountain region is still growing. Poverty and destitution are increasing particularly among those communities whose livelihoods have traditionally been reliant on natural resources (e.g. agricultural land), which have become increasingly concentrated in the hands of a select few (see Chapter 5 for further discussion on landlessness in Cambodia). The incidence of poverty is also high among children, who constitute more than half the country’s population.

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Challenges to the Cambodian economy According to both the ADB (2010: 202) and the World Bank (2010: 39), Cambodia’s economy remains vulnerable to external shocks, in part because its market segment is too narrowly focused, with around 80% of its exports in 2008 bound for the USA and the European Union (EU), the most crisis-affected regions of the world (UNESCAP, 2010). Furthermore, more than two-thirds of its imports come from four countries in east Asia (Thailand, Vietnam, China and Hong Kong). Therefore, one of the key challenges for the country is its lack of diversity and the need to diversify its sources of growth. While the vibrant economic activity of previous years was underpinned by garments and rising tourist receipts, these two sectors have to contend with competition from the region and global consumer demand. The garment industry had begun to suffer from lower demand in the USA, well before the full effects of the global recession became apparent in 2008 and 71% of garment manufacturers have left the country over the years (IMF, 2003; Grumiau, 2005) leading to widespread unemployment (Asia Monitor, 2009). Furthermore, the boom in the tourism industry, which had already been affected by the 2001 events of 11 September in the USA, came to a sudden halt in July 2008, as a result of the decision by UNESCO to list Preah Vihear Temple as a World Heritage Site; a decision that led to a military stand-off between Cambodian and Thai forces. Cambodia also suffered a wave of cancellations of hotel reservations at the height of the tourist season in the wake of Thailand’s internal turmoil at the end of 2008, when anti-government protesters forced the closure of Bangkok’s international airport. These problems will persist in the foreseeable future, as Cambodia’s relationship with Thailand remains fragile, following the appointment of Thaksin Shinawatra, the controversial former Thai Prime Minister, as an economic adviser to Cambodia’s government in October 2009. In any event, when put together, the garment industry, tourism and public administration are not able to generate enough jobs to absorb the totality of the labour force in the country. Cambodia also suffers from a relatively high debt. The country is heavily reliant on external assistance to maintain domestic solvency and meet local development needs. FDI increased to US$395 million in 2005 and reached a high of 10% of GDP in 2007.4 Although FDI fell in 2008, foreign pledges for 2009 amounted to US$950 million in a budget of US$1.8 billion, an increase of almost US$300 million over pledges made in 2007. However, this level of FDI  about one-third of Cambodia’s

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public spending is financed by aid  was not high enough to offset the country’s current account deficit and reflects Cambodia’s low revenue raising capabilities. As of the end of 2007, the public external debt was $2.46 billion, or 31% of GDP, 32% of the exports of goods and services and 188% of budget revenue. About 60% of this debt is owed to Russia, and another 15% to the USA.5 These debts are not currently being serviced. Cambodia’s economy will also need to address issues of relatively low levels of monetisation and the high level of dollarisation, with more than 70% of broad money made up of foreign currency deposits, making inflation a constant danger, as the central bank has no control over local prices.6 According to Shinichi (2007: 1 2), the level of deposit dollarisation  a term used to refer to the use of the US currency for cash and deposits at the domestic level, in parallel with national currency cash and deposits  is 71% in Cambodia. De Zamaroczy and Sa (2003: 13) estimate that 96% of the total money supply of Cambodia in 19952000 was in American dollar cash and deposits, with the amount of cash dollars being 1016 times higher than dollar deposits (Cambodia’s national currency is the Riel). Lonh Hay (2002) points out that the operation of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in the early 1990s was a major factor in deepening the dollarisation of the Cambodian economy. Most importantly, the relatively low literacy rate of the country, the effect of drought and floods, the lack of irrigation and fertiliser, and the inadequate infrastructure and transport, all combine to limit economic performance as a whole, thereby making it almost impossible for Cambodia to achieve the poverty reduction targets it has set itself. With the general population lacking basic functional education and productive skills, especially in the poorer areas of the countryside, which suffers from an almost total absence of basic infrastructure and facilities, the most pressing challenge for Cambodia is to ensure that the rural areas, where most of the poor live, are actively brought into this process, through better education and health, and the creation of an environment in which the country can increase its pool of skilled and qualified human resources. Considering that more than 50% of the population is less than 21 years old, a good education and an effective health care system will be the keys to creating this environment. Language in the economy in Cambodia Perhaps the most severe challenge Cambodia faces is the risk of internal shocks, due to the low levels of human capital, particularly in the

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areas of formal education (low literacy) and skills, as well as the incidence of disability affecting the workforce, as a result of landmine injuries. The north Vietnamese (along the Thai border, during their 10year occupation of Cambodia), then the USA, then Lon Nol, then Pol Pot, then the government of post-1989 Cambodia, in their fight against the remaining Khmer Rouge, riddled the country with landmines that continue to hinder agricultural activities in the country. The Cambodian labour market lacks skilled workers, such as mechanics, electricians, machine repairers, skilled masons, and there are also too few engineers, architects, designers, software information technology personnel and physicians (UNDP, 2007: 99). This places a major constraint on productivity and economic growth and explains, in part, why economic growth is sectoral and uneven regionally (i.e. largely urban based). Indeed, the whole formal sector of the Cambodian economy is dwarfed by the informal sector, where the vast majority of Cambodians work and operate their businesses. The informal sector plays a major role in providing employment to 85% of the population and is contributing much to the economy as a whole. It is estimated that 76% of the Cambodian workforce in the agricultural sector is engaged in the informal economy, generating 62% of GDP, compared to 38% of GDP for the formal economy in 2005 (EIC, 2005). Most of the employment generated by the informal economy goes to the poor and the illiterate. It is at this juncture that the question of language and the facilitating role it plays in the informal economy become self-evident. Walking through the small towns and villages of Cambodia and visiting the market places, one is struck by the variety of languages that people speak as they carry out their everyday transactions. It looks as though each individual comes equipped with a speech repertoire that allows them the ability to interact in a number of languages, or ‘mix’ of languages, including some  albeit very little  ‘broken’ French and English, and sometimes including Khmer. Contrary to the education system, where the authorities can enforce the use of the national language as the sole medium of instruction, the national language does not determine what gets bought or sold. The initiation, process and outcome of a transaction depend on the linguistic ability and choice of the protagonists engaged in the transaction. Therefore, a closer look at the figures of economic growth in this ‘Kingdom of Wonder’, when compared to the reality on the ground, leaves the analysis wondering about development in Cambodia. Is development about compiling promising figures on the economy, or is

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it about affecting the living standards of the people and addressing the issues that affect their lives on a daily basis?

Language and the Economy in the Lao PDR Although situated within the Mekong basin, where major stretches of the river and its tributaries provide alluvial deposits for fertile plains, little of the land of the Lao PDR is arable (only 4%) for the key sector of the economy, agriculture (39.2% of GDP), which occupies 70% of the population, 60% of whom are engaged in subsistence farming on just 0.3% of land area devoted to crops (eStandardsForum, 2008: 1). Hence, when the Pathet Lao took over the reins of power in 1975, they inherited a war-torn and extremely underdeveloped economy. Faced with the formidable task of reconstruction and development, they embarked on a highly centralised and isolationist economic system, whereby factories were nationalised, private trade outlawed and agriculture collectivised, only to find that there was little respite from falling living standards and general economic uncertainty. Confronted with economic meltdown, and recognising the inadequacy and weakness of an ideologically driven economic framework, the government initiated a comprehensive restructuring of the economy in the mid-1980s, gradually abandoning the centrally planned system and moving to a market-orientated economy, with a number of economic reforms generally referred to as chintanakan mai (meaning ‘new imagination’ or New Economic Mechanism (NEM)) (Stenson et al., 1997). Private trade was allowed, private enterprise liberalised, and domestic and foreign investors were given a major role in the economy. In the 1990s, the government also introduced changes in its financial policy and adopted measures under the Medium Adjustment Programme of the IMF and the World Bank, with a view to establishing domestic and external financial stability. As a result of these reforms, macroeconomic performance improved in the early 1990s, with real growth of about 7%. The reforms were further accelerated from 2001, when the 7th Party Congress, followed by the National Assembly and the newly appointed government, declared a long-term policy objective of taking the Lao PDR out of the least developed country (LDC) status by 2020. The pace of economic growth picked up steadily, rising to 7.5% in 2007. Private investment rose to 11% of GDP and overtook public investment. The Sixth Socioeconomic Development Plan (2006 2010) prioritised the development of agriculture, infrastructure,

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education and health care, aiming to achieve an annual average GDP growth of 7.5 8% over the five-year period. As a consequence of the reforms, the Lao PDR became one of the most decentralised countries in the sub-region, improving revenue collection from 12.7% of GDP in 2005 2006 to approximately 13.8% in 20062007, thanks to a number of measures on the arrangements for remittance of tax revenues. Real GDP growth rates averaged 5.7% from 2001 to 2004, then rose to 7% in 2005, and increased to 7.3% in 2006 and 8% in 2007 and were expected to rise (ADB, 2008), until the global economic downturn hit in 2008/2009. Although its exports fell marginally, from US$1.163 billion in 2008 to US$1.104 billion in 2009, imports also fell from US$1.384 billion to US$1.308 billion. Hence, the current account balance improved from US$-52 million in 2008 to US$-23 million (CIA World Factbook, 2010). On the other hand, GDP growth, which had slowed to 6.7% in 2009, from 7.5% in 2007 and 2008 (World Bank, 2010: 51), was still the second highest in east Asia after China (Lao Voices, 2010a), in large part because the government increased public spending (around 21% of GDP) to cushion the economy from the impact of the global recession. This was done by boosting the construction of roads, sports facilities and hotels for two major events: the southeast Asian Games held in Vientiane in December 2009 and the 450th anniversary of Vientiane as the capital of the country, celebrated in November 2010. In addition, industrial production surged 17% in 2009, making it the best performing sector of the economy, thanks to continued demand for its main exports (i.e. mining, construction, hydropower and manufacturing). Hydropower output rose by 2%. Output of copper rose by about 40% to 121,560 tons in 2009 compared to 2008 levels, gold output rose by about 39% to 161,800 oz and silver production more than doubled to 496,000 oz. Growth in the services sector was moderate at 4.4%, and agriculture expanded by 2.3% (ADB, 2010: 208). GDP growth bounced back to 7.225% in the first quarter of 2010 (EconomyWatch, 2010). So, even though the budget deficit widened to 5.9% of GDP in 2009 from 5% in 2008 (ADB, 2010: 209), due to increased public spending, the current account deficit narrowed to 11.8% of GDP and inflation was curtailed, averaging 0.04%, compared with 7.3% from 2003 to 2008. Inflation rose to 4.5% in the first two months of 2010 and is expected to average about 5.6% in 2011 and 2012 (World Bank, 2010: 51 52). In other words, the Lao PDR came out of the global downturn relatively unscathed, due to the limited integration of its economy with global financial markets, protecting it from the economic downturn, but also to stable demand for Lao mining products in China. In its 2010 East Asia and Pacific Economic Update, the World Bank projected

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Lao economic growth to reach 7.7% in 2010, the third fastest rate in east Asia behind Indonesia and China, with the Nam Theun 2 (NT2) hydropower plant and other power plants and mining expansions expected to contribute about 3.6% of total economic growth. The ADB, for its part, expects growth to rise to 7.5% in 2011, with increases in investment and in the prices of export commodities, especially copper and gold, and the more than doubling of production of the 1088 MW NT2 plant in 2010 (ADB, 2010: 209210). As part of the change in its approach to economic management, the Lao PDR became a member of the Ayeyawady-Chao phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy Organisation (ACMECS), a trade and cooperation agreement among Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam. Under this agreement, Thailand agreed in 2004 to a ‘One Way Free Trade’ concession that applied a zero tariff rate on nine agricultural exports from the Lao PDR to Thailand, including feed corn, sweet corn, eucalyptus logs, cashew nuts, castor oil beans, soy beans, ground nuts, potatoes and pearl barley. The Lao PDR gained full membership of ASEAN, and joined the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in July 1997 (under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT), duties applicable to imports from AFTA members were to be reduced to 0% to 5% by 2008 and abolished by 2015). It also became an observer at the WTO in January 1998 and has entered the final round of negotiations to enter the WTO, with preparation of the Decrees on Import and Export Management and the Rules-of-Origin (Asian Affairs, 2010). The Lao PDR has expanded its trade relations with the USA, since normalisation of trade relations in 2004. A trade agreement, called the ‘Cua Lo Agreement’, covering bilateral preferential tax policies and providing for gradual tariff reductions, was signed with Viet Nam in 1999, followed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in July 2005, expanding the list of products eligible for 0% tariff and for a 50% reduction of the normal tariffs. Viet Nam also granted zero tariffs to Lao exports of glutinous rice, wood, wood products, some tobacco products and motorbike accessories. All these agreements significantly contributed to accelerating the pace of economic activity in the country, with exports increasing faster than imports. Many Lao exports benefit from regional trade agreements and trade preferences from Australia, China, the EU, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand and Viet Nam. In 2008, the main export destinations of the Lao PDR were Thailand (35.5%), Viet Nam (15.5%) and China (8.5%), and its main import partners were, again, Thailand (68.5%), China (10.5%) and Viet Nam (5.8%) (CIA World Factbook, 2010). Together, China, Thailand and

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Viet Nam absorb nearly 60% of Lao exports (35.5% for Thailand alone) and 84.8% of its imports, a concentration of trading partners that severely constrains the economy’s capacity to expand. The Lao PDR also exports its labour force. An estimated 200,000 Lao nationals work in Thailand, 55% of them women, with remittances back to their country estimated at US$100 million or 5% of GDP. Since 2002, products from the Lao PDR, except sugar, rice and bananas, are eligible for duty free export to all EU countries under the ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative for exports from the LDCs. Although the composition of these exports is beginning to change, with a shift to minerals and electricity, agriculture and forestry remain the largest sector of the economy, contributing 42% to the GDP in 2006 and growing by 2.7% in 2007. Despite notable increases in the exports of agricultural products, such as maize, coffee, rice, fruits and vegetables, the share of agriculture in the economy has declined over the years, from 61% in 1990 to 49% in 2003, in part as a result of a steady growth in the industrial and service sectors, especially power generation, tourism and transportation. The garment industry has also registered considerable growth in recent years. The share of the industrial sector has grown, from virtually nothing two decades ago, to nearly one-third of the economy, recording double-digit growth in seven consecutive years, rising by 14% in 2007 alone. The services sector also grew by 7.2% in 2007, as visitors’ arrivals rose by some 15% to around 1.4 million (eStandardsForum, 2008). The government’s strategy has also aimed at improving the country’s infrastructure and the development of hydropower for export. The new hydro and mining projects, including the four hydropower dams and a large copper plant, made a significant contribution to GDP growth in 2007. The NT2 hydroelectric project cost some US$1.2 billion and was financed through loans and equity participation. It is owned by a consortium of four equity holders: Electricite´ de France (35%), the government of the Lao PDR (25%), the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (25%) and Ital-Thai plc (15%). The European Investment Bank (EIB) lent the government of the Lao PDR US$55 million to help finance its equity contribution. Officially opened in November 2005, the NT2 was expected to produce 1070 MW in 2010 and generate an average of US$30 million in the first 10 years, rising sharply to US$110 million from 2020 to 2034, thus becoming the largest single contributor to the country’s budget. Most of the electricity (95%) will be exported to Thailand and only 75 MW of electricity will be produced for domestic consumption. The government is planning to extend electricity exports to Viet Nam, and possibly Cambodia and China. The mining sector has

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experienced remarkable growth in export earnings since 2005, with copper and gold accounting for about 60% of total exports. The Lao PDR has been working on improving its infrastructure as well. In 1994, an Australian-funded bridge was opened linking Vientiane with Nong Khai, in Thailand. Another bridge has since been built linking Ubon Ratchathani, in eastern Thailand, with Pa¯kxe¯, in the south. In 2007, a third bridge was opened, linking Savannakhe¯t to Mukdahan, Thailand. Part of the United Nations-backed Trans-Asian Railway, a rail link over the Mekong River, linking Thailand and the Lao PDR, was opened in March 2009 by the Thai Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn. The track over the Friendship Bridge was funded by Thailand at a cost of US$5.5 million and took 20 months to complete. This new link adds a vital 3.5 km to regional plans aiming to link Asia by rail. The network of continuous railway connecting Asia and stretching west to Turkey and Russia, and north and east to China, Viet Nam and south Korea was conceived in the 1960s. The Intergovernmental Agreement on the construction of the network was opened for signature on 10 November 2006 in Busan, Republic of Korea, and signed on that day by 18 member states. Another four states signed it in 2007 and 2008, and it came into force on 11 June 2009. Plans are also afoot to transform the Lao PDR into a land-linked country, with the construction of east-west and north-south corridors through the GMS. The east-west corridor will begin at Mawlamyine in Myanmar, on the Andaman Sea, cross Thailand, the Lao PDR, Viet Nam and end at Da Nang, on the south China Sea, in central Viet Nam. It will also have connections to the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville on the Gulf of Siam. The north-south corridor will connect Kunming, in China’s Yunan Province, with the Lao PDR and Thailand. It will also have a connection to the port of Sihanoukville, and will give access to a second east-west corridor, connecting Thailand and Cambodia to Ho Chi Minh City and the other southern provinces of Viet Nam. These roads projects will reduce income poverty by connecting previously isolated communities to health services, schools, employment and trade opportunities, and provide better access to markets. Challenges to the Lao economy Although its economic outlook looks favourable, the Lao PDR remains one of the least developed countries in the world, with 26% of the population living below the extreme poverty line, less than US$1 a day (43.9% in the uplands), and a further 74.1% living on less than US$2 a day. Illiteracy remains widespread. According to the World Bank, the Lao

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PDR is the LDC in southeast Asia. Economic and social inequalities are enormous and getting worse. The poorest 10% of the population receives less than 4% of national income, while the richest 10% takes over 30%. If its debt profile has improved in recent years, the Lao PDR still carries a high risk of debt distress (World Bank, 2010: 52) and is ranked 138 out of 179 on the Index of Economic Freedom World Rankings, with a score of 51.1 (Heritage Foundation, 2010). Overall, the capacity of the Lao economy to grow remains constrained by a number of factors, including a high population growth rate, poor physical infrastructure and low human resource skills, due in part to the neglect of the ethno-linguistic diversity in the country, and a lack of planning to take into account these differences in the education and health sectors. Having pledged over the last decade to ‘graduate’ the Lao PDR out of the low income countries by 2025, the government has now left it to the 7th Socio-Economic Development Plan for 20112015 to outline efforts to achieve the MDGs. Notable weaknesses in the economy are the small domestic market, the lack of skilled manpower, the low institutional capacities required to support a flexible economy, the dependence on subsistence farming by the majority of the population, the lack of physical infrastructure (roads and communication systems), the dependence on foreign aid to finance major public investment programmes, the concentration of trading partners (China, Thailand and Vietnam) and the vulnerability of the local currency (kip). The lack of roads in a landlocked country means high transportation costs for exports. The Lao PDR relies heavily on the cooperation of Thailand to facilitate transshipment of imported goods, although transit routes to Vietnamese seaports have also been negotiated. Although the Lao economy continues to be dominated by the agricultural sector in terms of labour force (77%), agriculture’s share in the economy has been declining in recent years, not only because of growth in other sectors of the economy, but also because 60% of the sector is dedicated to subsistence farming, i.e. not destined for the market. Agriculture also remains vulnerable to weather conditions and is heavily dependent on rainfall. The recent installation of irrigation water pumps from India may have improved agricultural production, particularly paddy cultivation during the dry season, but there is no evidence to confirm this as yet. Although the country boasts 30004000 different varieties of rice, less than 10% of this rice makes it to the marketplace, as most of it is consumed by the farmers who grow it. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Lao PDR only achieved national rice sufficiency for the first time in its history in 2000. Nevertheless, this does not mean that

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food is available everywhere, as food vulnerability remains a problem in the country, especially in upland communities. As in the case of Cambodia, a major stumbling block in improving this sector of the economy is the severe contamination of unexploded ordnances (UXO) in 10 out of the 18 provinces, affecting 37% of the land area, and up to 50% of arable land. In fact, the Lao PDR is one of the world’s most heavily UXO-contaminated nations, as a result of extensive aerial bombing and ground battles during the Second Indochina War (1957 1973). More than 2 million tons of ordnance were dropped on the country between 1964 and 1973, with up to 30% not exploding. In 2007, the Lao PDR had 100 reported casualties from UXO, including 31 people killed and 69 injured. The main activity at the time of the incidents was farming (25 casualties). Most casualties occurred in the Xieng Khouang and Savannakhet provinces, with 27 and 18 casualties, respectively. At least 47 casualties were already recorded by 26 June 2008. Clearance operators estimate that the country may have 1000 minefields. More than US$16.7 million was spent on UXO clearance for the construction of the NT2 hydroelectric dam, between February 2003 and October 2007. Perhaps similar amounts of money may have to be spent on reclaiming land for agriculture and returning to the people one of the assets they know best how to use, especially since some 70% of the rest of the country is mountainous and not suited for agriculture on a permanent basis. Due to these challenges, the Lao economy relies heavily on natural resource-based revenues in sectors such as hydropower, mining, wood products, timber and electricity, which account for 71% of total exports. A small number of large projects, including the NT2 dam and the gold and copper mines of Oxiana Resources and Pan Australian Resources contribute about one-third of the current economic growth, making the country’s terms of trade vulnerable to external shocks (e.g. the Asian financial crises of 19971999 and the world economic crisis of 20082009) and to fluctuations in world commodity prices. In 2004, for instance, the WTO textile quotas affected world prices for garments, and prices quoted to Lao firms in this sector fell by 2030%. In the first half of 2005, Lao garment exports fell by 10% compared with the same period in 2004. This industry is also affected by high and rising transportation costs for imported raw materials, and several factories were closed in 2007. The outlook for this industry in the Lao PDR is not promising. Excessive reliance on natural resources can also have adverse consequences for economic growth, employment generation and environmental preservation (UNDP, 2006: VII) and was shown in the 1997 1999 spill-over from the Asian economic crisis. During that period, the

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already low demand for Lao exports decreased further, FDI from other ASEAN countries fell and imports became more expensive. The Asian economic crisis occurred at a time when the Lao PDR was already in economic recession, due to years of a negative balance of trade (the last time the country had a positive trade balance was in 1928!). As a result, the local currency, the kip, which is basically pegged to the Thai baht and cannot be exchanged outside the country, depreciated sharply. Despite a marginal recovery in the region, the kip remained at a very low level of exchange (i.e. over 10,600 kips to a dollar, as compared to 900 kips to a dollar in mid-1997), leading to a significant loss in domestic purchasing power, as the consumer price index registered an increase of over 400% between June 1997 and June 2002. In any event, mining and metals processing industries and hydroelectric power plants are not sustainable in the long term, in part because of the unavoidable depletion of natural resources, and also because these industries have, until recently, heavily depended on high foreign investments. Therefore, the Lao government needs to shift the base of economic growth towards agricultural processing industries and services, including tourism, as well as development of human resources and improvements to the investment mechanism to facilitate business operations, because the country needs to generate more jobs to meet the needs of the growing labour force. Not surprisingly, the World Bank urged the Lao government to focus on breaking into manufacturing and becoming part of the global production chain to ensure sustainable economic growth in the future. The economy of the Lao PDR also suffers from the high circulation of the American dollar and the Thai baht, which limits the effectiveness of the central bank’s monetary policy (Shinichi, 2007). Everywhere in the Lao PDR, sizable amounts of cash American dollars and Thai baht are widely used as means of payment (Manodham, 2002; Pani, 2002), especially in the informal economy. According to the UNDP National Human Development Report for the Lao PDR (2006), geography, trade policies, tax policies, customs procedures, current business procedures and practices ‘go a long way in explaining why and how so much of international trade is informal’ and, ‘In general, the more restrictions, taxes, permits and licences are required, and the longer it takes to get them, the more likely economic activity will be informal’. The informal economy is quite high in the Lao PDR, with some 80% of it involving unlicensed individual traders using cash transactions in Chinese yuan, Thai baht, American dollars and Vietnamese dong at local markets, including markets in the border areas (according to the UNDP (2006: 25),

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more than 50% of the Lao population now lives in border districts). The smuggling of goods to and from Thailand and Viet Nam is by far the largest component of the informal economy. The amounts of merchandise sold in the informal economy are large for some categories of goods (e.g. motorcycles, electronic goods, consumer goods and cigarettes), some in excess of 80% of total sales or exports. According to government figures, the value of such smuggled goods was around US$10 million in fiscal year 2006/2007. The smuggling of illegal timber between the Lao PDR and Viet Nam is even more lucrative, amounting to US$250 million, according to some environmental organisations. The Lao PDR is also a major player in illicit drug trafficking (i.e. opium, methamphetamines and heroin); indeed, the country is believed to be the third largest producer of opium in the world, after Afghanistan and Myanmar (eStandardsForum, 2008: 3). According to Furukawa (2002), a survey conducted by the National Economic Research Institute showed the composition of the currencies used for settling trade as: Thai baht (34%), Lao kip (28%), US dollar (13%), Chinese yuan (13%) and Vietnamese dong (9%). However, the currencies used for daily transactions were: Thai baht (26%), US dollar (26%), Lao kip (21%), Vietnamese dong (16%) and Chinese yuan (5%). Remittances from Lao citizens working overseas are also a major source of the de facto dollarisation and bahtisation of the Lao economy. An estimated 200,000 Lao citizens work in neighbouring Thailand, and there is a large Lao Diaspora living in France, the USA, Canada, etc. Informal remittances from this Diaspora contribute to keeping the levels of cash and deposit dollarisation, as well as the size of the informal economy high. According to Shinichi (2007: 12), the level of deposit dollarisation in the Lao PDR is 61%. This weakens the incentives to create strong institutions to regulate the economy and overcome system-wide inefficiencies. Furthermore, financial governance in the Lao PDR is problematic, even though government revenue targets improved from 12.7% of GDP in 20052006 to 13.8% in 2006 2007. Provinces collect a substantial proportion of government revenues, but only remit a fraction of this to the central government. In many instances, because of the imposed charges on movement of goods across their borders, and because of the road conditions in the country, it was cheaper to buy imported goods than buy from distant Lao suppliers. Unfortunately, as the provinces lacked the administrative, legal and technical capacity to understand and execute expenditure priorities, provincial autonomy carried with it lack of accountability and hindered priority sector spending. This, in turn,

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affected the government’s ability to collect revenue. In 2004, total external debt stood at US$2 billion and recently climbed to US$3 billion or slightly higher than 70% of GDP. At the time of writing, more than half of this debt was owed to Russia and was not being serviced. In June 2003, the two governments agreed in principle to (1) write off 70% of the debt owed to the Russian Federation and (2) service the remaining 30% of the debt (US$380 million) over a 33-year period, at a preferential interest rate. Therefore, in nominal terms, the remaining debt amounts to US$1.2 billion. Nevertheless, the debt-to-export ratio remained high, as was the case for the ratio of debt to government revenue (debt is more than five times revenue). The servicing of this debt consumes about one-tenth of total government revenues. Until recently, this problem of fiscal management added to the Lao PDR’s reliance on external assistance, with public debt as high as 75% of GDP at the end of 2007, representing 135% of exports, or 377% of fiscal revenues, a percentage that is well above the sustainable thresholds and places the country at high risk of debt distress. A new Budget Law promulgated in early 2007 mandates the recentralisation of the Treasury, Customs and Tax Department, including a new revenue-sharing mechanism. The central government finally took control of border crossings, reducing the number of checkpoints from 16 in 2006 to three (immigration, customs and quarantine) in 2007 and increased control over major, provincial large taxpayers and the granting of tax exemption to investors. The centralisation of treasury operations in all provinces was completed in December 2009, while the implementation of the value-added tax law was promulgated in January 2009 and finally introduced in January 2010. Unsurprisingly, the Lao PDR also carries a large balance of payments deficit and a large fiscal deficit made up by FDIs and Official Development Assistance (ODA). In 2007, gross FDI increased by nearly 20% to US$770 million. The Lao PDR received approximately US$78 per capita in international financial assistance, more than 60% of its investment budget (Japan is the largest bilateral donor, followed by China). In its National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy (NGPES) and National Socio-Economic Development Plan (NSEDP), the government gives priority to the 47 poorest districts for special poverty reduction programmes in four priority sectors, namely, transport, agriculture, health and education, and outlines an ambitious programme of reforms aimed at sustaining economic growth and accelerating poverty reduction. The implementation of these programmes was extended to another 25 poor districts, based on income and adequacy of food supply, clothing,

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housing, schooling and health care. However, funding such a programme would require some US$357 million per year in ODA and around US$600 million per year in FDI, with national savings projected to cover only about 30% of the needs. But this sort of heavy reliance on external input and artificial propping up of the economy will have to be drastically revisited, and a critical shift made from a focus on a natural resource-based economy to a human resource-based economy. By all accounts, the Lao economy needs to sustain a growth rate of 7% per year up to 2020, if it is to overcome its poverty and social problems. How will this be achieved in the absence of education for all and good, equitable (universal) health care? If economic growth cannot be maintained through natural resources alone, how does the Lao PDR ensure longterm sustainable growth? Language in the economy in the Lao PDR More than 30 years after the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party seized power, and despite experiencing significant economic growth over the last two decades, the Lao PDR remains an LDC, facing considerable challenges to reach its stated objectives of increasing broad-based economic growth, eliminating poverty and meeting the MDGs. According to the 2007/2008 Human Development Report, the Human Development Index (HDI) for the Lao PDR is 0.601, giving the country a ranking of 130th out of 177 countries for which data is available (ahead of Cambodia at 131st and Myanmar at 132nd), while it scores a total of 34.5 on the Human Poverty Index for developing countries (HPI-1), coming 70th out of 108 developing countries for which the index had been calculated. Underlining the true status of the standard of living in the country, 80% of domestic energy consumption is based on fuel wood. The rural population (80% of the total population) relies heavily on the forests not only for fuel, but also for food, fibre and shelter, and an estimated 300,000 ha of forest are lost annually, together with the animal life living therein.7 To a large extent, the Lao economy is informal; that is to say, not controlled, not counted, not taxed and not generating government revenue. Estimated at 33.4% of GDP in 2002/2003, it is an important black market, with massive unrecorded cross-border trade activities, involving up to 80% of the Lao population in 2005. Needless to say, it is the poor and the near-poor who are involved in and benefit the most from the informal economy. Although poverty alleviation has long dominated national discourse, and various poverty reduction strategies have been outlined in several

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policy documents, e.g. The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (I-PRSP) of 2002, the 5th NSEDP, the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NPEP), the NGPES in 2004 and the 6th NSEDP (20062010) (GoL, 2006a), the Lao PDR remains poor, with the poorest of the poor heavily concentrated in upland areas inhabited largely by ethnic minorities. Indeed, poverty here has strong spatial, geographical and ethnic dimensions, meaning that ethnic minorities make up more than half the country’s poor (52.5%). The H’Moˆng-lu Mien and Chine-Tibet ethnic groups bear the brunt of this situation and are poorer than the other groups in the country, with the H’Moˆng and Yao minorities in particular being the most affected, followed by the Khmou and Tai minorities, not only because of their geographical remoteness, but also because of their socio-linguistic marginalisation. Not surprisingly, these ethnic groups, especially the H’Moˆng, also bear the brunt of all sorts of jokes, reflecting the low esteem they are generally held in. Yet, in its poverty reduction strategies outlined in the NGPES and NSEDP, the government makes no mention of language policy and the role to be accorded to the languages of the ethnic minorities of the country and the need to improve communication between the Lao and the non-Lao who, put together, actually constitute the majority in the Lao PDR. Ensuring continued economic growth and stability in the Lao PDR will require growth in other sectors, such as agriculture, education and health, which are central in supporting the majority of the population. It is generally acknowledged that agriculture, which is labour intensive, is the most important sector and holds the highest potential to enhance human development, while other exports, such as minerals, timber and electricity, use much less labour and pose serious threats to the environment (UNDP, 2006). The historical and current importance of agriculture in the Lao economy suggests that future growth survival will need significant improvements in the performance of this key sector and an upgrading of the skills of those who are so massively involved in it. The active participation of the latter will require efficient communication through a thoughtful and integrative language policy that does not continue to ignore their existence and the crucial importance of their languages in the process.

Language and the Economy in Myanmar The large-scale south Asian labour migration and the economic resources that Indian capitalists brought to the colony meant that the Myanmars were dislodged from control of the economy and even from

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ownership of agricultural land. For all intents and purposes, Yangon was an Indian city during British colonisation, where the indigenous population was being squeezed out. As early as the 1920s, the leaders of the General Council of Burmese Associations (Myanmar Athin Chokkyi) were drawing attention to the economic dominance of the Indian shopkeepers, moneylenders and landlords to the detriment of the Myanmars. Until the country became independent in 1948, Myanmar was perceived and used ‘as a source of food for India and a destination for Indian labour and capital’ and ‘a milk cow for the central Indian treasury’ (Taylor, 2005: 10). Considerably richer than other southeast Asian colonies in the previous century, especially on the basis of its large production of rice  Myanmar was famously known as ‘Asia’s rice bowl’  world class timber and diversified minerals resources,8 Myanmar was devastated by the Second World War and by the tragedy of a lost opportunity, due to internal conflict from the time of independence in 1948. Ethnic conflicts and the resulting political stand-off they generate have always been at the heart of Myanmar’s social and economic underachievement. Understandably, therefore, the original intent of economic reforms at independence was to wrestle control of the economy from the Indians and the British, and place it in the hands of the Myanmars. Hence, most major foreign and domestically owned businesses were nationalised, as well as many small shops and stalls. But the government’s plans were scuttled from the time of their inception, in part because of the lack of qualified personnel and the need to satisfy a number of interests, both local and foreign, and also because of arbitrary and ill-informed macroeconomic policies that led to significant shortcomings in key sectors of the economy, especially agriculture. Production soon declined in various sectors of economic activity. Myanmar was faced with food insecurity and electricity blackouts. By 1987, Myanmar was applying to the United Nations to be admitted to LDC status, so that it could receive more favourable loan rates, as well as debt relief, even though it did not qualify for that status, due to its high ‘official’ literacy rate. In 2007, 32.7% of its total population was believed to be living below the extreme poverty line, as the country’s HDI stood at 0.583, with a ranking of 132nd out of 177 countries. Hence, this once world leader in rice exports (1905 1939) entered the 21st century with much of the baggage of the 19th and 20th centuries, and now presents a picture of general economic decline. But, Myanmar is, first and foremost, a land of abundant human, natural and mineral resources, including rice, pulses, beans, sesame, groundnuts, sugarcane,

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hardwood, fish and fish products, precious stones (jade), timber (teak), oil, and especially natural gas, and also tin, antimony, zinc, copper, tungsten, lead, coal, marble, limestone and hydropower. Even though recent political events have tended to cloud the economic potential of the country, Myanmar underwent a major shift in 1988, taking the remarkable decision to abandon socialism and adopt the market economy. Paragraph 35 (Chapter I) of the Constitution stated that ‘The economic system of the Union shall be that of the market economy’. In August 1987, the government took steps to deregulate key sectors, such as agricultural crops. In OctoberNovember 1988, in an effort to attract foreign investment and rebuild foreign exchange reserves, the government issued new, relatively liberal foreign investment laws, and signed a number of deals with foreign governments and companies, including the sale of logging rights, and a number of concessions for fishing and oil and gas exploration rights in Myanmar waters (Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 February 1989: 11). Since 2007, the government has begun to privatise a number of state enterprises. The pace of this process of privatisation accelerated sharply at the beginning of 2010, with the auctioning of state assets ranging from airlines to residences in Yangon. For a country known not to listen to the rest of the world, and where politics takes precedence over economics, this was indeed a fundamental change that needs to be acknowledged, even if one must hasten to add that, contrary to Cambodia, the Lao PDR and Viet Nam (see ‘Language and the Economy in Viet Nam’ section), Myanmar’s reform programme was limited: prices remained fixed by the state, state-run industries were still subsidised, the exchange rate of the kyat was not changed, and control of industry and government remained centralised. A lack of understanding of macroeconomic forces and excessive central control, led to a drying up of foreign reserves, and a large foreign debt in the 1980s. Private foreign investment became hard to find, as a result of sanctions imposed by many western nations (see ‘Challenges to Myanmar’s economy’ section for a detailed discussion of the sanction regime). By December 2002, the country had only approved US$7.46 billion in FDI, of which a maximum of one-third was operational. According to available statistics, of the 372 foreign companies linked with Myanmar in 2003, the largest number was from Japan, the USA and Singapore. These observations, which leave out Chinese investment in Myanmar, are most probably not reflective of the real situation. Indeed, many commercial centres in cities across central and upper Myanmar are in the hands of Chinese interests. Furthermore, as discussed in the following section, these investments have been considerably undermined

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by the various sanctions imposed on Myanmar over the years, as well as by the internal unpredictability of government regulations. On the other hand, Myanmar engaged the international community, as it became a participating member of the GMS Economic Cooperation Program (GMS Program), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the WTO (January 1995) and signed the ASEAN’s founding Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a precursor to full membership. Myanmar gained full membership of ASEAN in July 1997.9 It also joined other regional and international bodies, such as the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the ADB and the Colombo Plan. At the bilateral level, Myanmar signed an agreement with China in May 1997 to establish a trade route through Myanmar and provide the Chinese province of Yunnan with access to the Indian Ocean. In the same year, the two governments signed a 30-year agreement allowing more than 200 Chinese fishing boats to operate in Myanmar waters. China also announced the construction of two liquefied petroleum gas plants in Myanmar in October 2000. A year later, the construction of a dry dock was announced and, in 2005, a 280 MW hydropower plant, financed by a Chinese company, was opened at Paung Laung. The same company was also involved in the construction of the 790 MW Yeywa hydropower station in Mandalay and the Shweli Hydel hydro-electric power project in northern Shan State, which was expected to generate 3042 million kWh annually. In December 2001, the then President of China, Jiang Zemin, paid a state visit to Myanmar, during which a number of bilateral agreements were signed. This was followed by a visit of the Chinese Vice-Premier, Wu Yi, in March 2004, when several agreements on economic and technical cooperation were also signed. The visit of the Chinese Vice-Premier was followed by that of the Myanmar Prime Minister Soe Win to Beijing in February 2006. According to official figures, two-way trade in 2009 totalled $2.9 billion, making China Myanmar’s second largest trading partner after Thailand. And as of January 2010, China had invested $1.8 billion in Myanmar, making it the third largest investor in the country after Thailand and Singapore (Magnier, 2010). On 3 June 2010, the Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, held talks with General Than Shwe and signed another series of bilateral agreements with the Myanmar government, including agreements on energy, hydroelectric projects and aid (BBC News, 3 June 2010). Like China, India and Thailand also have a stake in Myanmar, especially in the gas fields on the Rakhine coast of the Bay of Bengal

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and the Tanintharyi and Mouttama coasts in the Gulf of Martaban. India recently signed a deal worth US$150 million with the Myanmar authorities (see Lim, 2007).10 In April 2007, Myanmar and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea restored diplomatic ties, which had been severed in 1983, when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (north Korea) was held responsible for a bomb blast in Yangon during a visit by the President of the Republic of Korea (south Korea). As a result of these agreements and normalisation of relations, in 2008/2009, Myanmar’s main export partners were Thailand (52.3%), India (12.7%), China (8.9%) and Japan (4.4%). Her main import partners were China (31.9%), Thailand (21.2%), Singapore (20.7%), Malaysia (5.1%) and Indonesia (4%) (CIA World Factbook, 2010). Aid from and trade with Japan stood at US$453 million, and other countries, such as France and Russia, also maintained economic ties with Myanmar. Hence, the country’s economy is characterised by the changing relative importance of its trading partners, with (1) the growing importance of China (including Hong Kong); (2) the growing dependence on Thailand as the principal market for Myanmar’s exports, especially natural gas; (3) the strong but declining importance of Singapore; (4) the declining importance of Japan as a source of imports, largely in favour of China; and (5) the near-absence of western countries, in terms of sources of imports, and as markets for exports. From 1996 to 2006, it is estimated that the GDP per capita in Myanmar increased in real terms by an average of 8.9% per year, while overall GDP increased, in real terms, by an annual average of 11.3%. According to the ADB, real GDP expanded by 12.7% in 2006/2007. In 2006, Myanmar recorded a trade surplus of US$2,211.3 million and a surplus of US$802.0 million on the current account of the balance of payment. In 2007, the GDP per capita was estimated at US$1,900 and GDP, at a real growth rate of 3.8%, stood at US$91.13 billion,11 while tax revenue continued to rise (52% in fiscal year 2006/2007) (EIU, 2008: 4). The inflation rate dropped significantly from 26.8% in 2008 to 7.7% in 2009 and averaged 7.9% in 2009. It dropped again to 6.5% in March 2010, due to higher global commodity prices, but was expected to rise to 8.5 and 9% in 2011 and 2012, respectively, due to higher domestic demand and increased world prices for oil and foodstuffs (ADB, 2010: 216218). From 3.4% in 2008, the consolidated fiscal deficit widened to an estimated 3.7% of GDP in 2009, due in part to expenditure to repair the damage caused by cyclone Nargis, and public sector wage increases in January 2010. The current account balance fell from US$1.281 billion in 2008 to US$924

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million in 2009, and the external debt decreased from US$7.946 billion in 2008 to US$7.373 billion in 2009 (CIA World Factbook, 2010). Nevertheless, the fundamentals of Myanmar’s economy remain strong, with exports outpacing imports in 2007, rising by 35.1%. An important caveat is in order when it comes to analysis based on data provided in the context of Myanmar. Like China in the 1970s, the country’s official economic statistics are unreliable, incomplete and frequently subject to dramatic revision. The lack of reliable data makes an accurate assessment of the Myanmar economy almost impossible, as there is widespread dissatisfaction and distrust of any data that finally come to hand. Despite the optimistic figures sometimes provided by the government, it is painfully obvious to any visitor to this country that the people of Myanmar experience next to no improvement in their standard of living. Nevertheless, all indications are that demand from Myanmar’s main export markets, particularly China, Thailand and India will remain strong in the future. The turnaround in the current account position of the country owes a lot to falling imports and increasing exports. Myanmar has a broadly based agricultural economy (70% of the total labour force), contributing some 40% of the GDP, or one-fourth of total exports. Paddy production, for instance, was estimated to have increased by 2.5% in 2008 and 2.7% in 2009, even though it was affected by drought in the central region and residual soil salinity in the Irrawaddy Delta, due to cyclone Nargis. Myanmar is now the second largest exporter of beans and pulses in the world (11.6% of total exports) and the world’s largest exporter of teak and other hardwood (9.8% of total exports in 2006/2007). The reported value of Myanmar’s timber exports in 2007 2008 was $538 million (ADB, 2010: 216). Exports of pulses rose by 10.9% in 2007, owing to strong demand from India, while exports of hardwoods and teak rose by 7.4%. It is rich in natural resources, especially natural gas (9.1 trillion cubic feet of proved reserves  the world’s 10th largest natural gas reserves), gems and precious stones (jade and rubies), timber (75% of the world’s teak reserves) and also crude oil (Myanmar is almost self-sufficient in oil and natural gas). Myanmar is a principal source of jade, pearls, rubies and sapphires; its gem sector has become successful since it was opened up to private enterprise in the 1990s, when joint ventures were established (Themelis, 2000: 13, 7980). Industry, including mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities, expanded considerably in 2006/2007, with an increase of between 19.9 and 21.9%. According to the ADB, industrial GDP rose by 9.8% in 2007/2008. As metalliferous mining boomed

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globally, and as the Chinese drove up prices, Myanmar benefited from this boom. Myanmar has important offshore oil and gas deposits and has recently emerged as a major regional supplier of natural gas. The country’s gas exports come courtesy of its large fields of natural gas offshore in the Gulf of Martaban and in the Bay of Bengal. These fields have confirmed recoverable reserves of around 540 billion cubic metres  enough, at current prices and rates of production, to bring in annually around $US2 billion for the next 3040 years (Tin Maung Maung Than, 2005: 257292; also see British Petroleum, 2007).12 According to ERI (2008) however, the Yadana Project alone generated over US$3 million daily or US$1.1 billion annually at the end of 2007. ERI also estimated that, with the increased price of gas in 2008, the annual Yadana Project income would have been US$1.7 billion a year. In September 2009, ERI accused Total and Chevron, who are still operating in Myanmar, of ‘propping up’ the government, with the income coming from the Yadana gas project, reported to be worth nearly US$5 billion (ERI, 2009). In Australia, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) levelled the same accusation against Jetstar (28 September 2009), a Qantas budget airline that flies four times a week to Yangon. Two of the fields, the Yadana (meaning ‘jewel’ or ‘treasure’) fields off Mouttama, and the Yetagun (meaning ‘valiant banner’) fields off the coast of Tanintharyi, came on stream in 1988 and 2000, respectively, and are the main source of Myanmar’s current gas deliveries. The Yadana Project officially began in 1992 and is operated by a consortium of partners  Total (31.24% stake), Chevron (28.26%), the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTTEP, 25.5%) and the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE, 15%). The gas deposit holds approximately 5.3 trillion cubic feet. The Yadana pipeline carries natural gas from the Andaman Sea through southern Myanmar (60 km overland) and into Thailand. The Yetagun fields were developed by the MOGE, Premier Oil (UK) and Nippon Oil (Japan) (Tin Maung Maung Than, 2005: 265). The Yetagun Project is operated by a consortium comprising Petronas (Malaysia), Nippon Oil (Japan), the PTTEP and the MOGE. The gas from this project is also transported to Thailand through a pipeline. New fields in the Bay of Bengal, the ‘Shwe’ (meaning ‘gold’) fields, estimated to have the same gas reserves as the Yadana and Yetagun fields, an estimated 200240 million cubic metres, will soon come on stream, considerably increasing Myanmar’s potential in this area. Currently, Thailand is the primary customer of the output from the Yadana and Yetagun fields. The Shwe fields were discovered by a consortium of south Korean and Indian

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companies in the Gulf of Bengal, off the western coast of Myanmar, in January 2004, and the Shwe Project is operated by a consortium of four entities: Daewoo International (60% stake), the Korean Gas Corporation (10%), the Indian state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Videsh Ltd and the Gas Authority of India Ltd (GAIL) (30%). The ultimate customer of the gas from the Shwe fields will be China’s Yunnan Province, through a 2400 km pipeline running the length of Myanmar into Yunnan and coming ashore near the port of Sittwe (see Financial Express, 2007). Gas exports rose by 73.7% to Kt13.3 billion, as output grew by 8.5% year on year, accounting for 44% of all exports. In 2006/2007 alone, gas earnings were in the order of $US1.25 billion, making up some 0.6% of budget receipts (IMF, 2007: 9). Gas exports were expected to keep the current account in surplus, even if the import bill was likely to rise, due to the escalating cost of imports of petroleum products, machinery and materials. Export revenue from gas, as well as from mining, agriculture and forestry products to Thailand, China and India was also expected to remain buoyant in 2008/2009. Although Myanmar was not directly exposed by the global recession, the financial crisis of 2008 2009 caused exports and domestic consumer demand to drop slightly from US$6.677 billion in 2008 to US$6.504 billion in 2009, while imports increased from an estimated US$3.388 billion in 2008 to US$3.555 billion in 2009. Official figures for both exports and imports do not include the considerable value of products smuggled across the borders from/into Bangladesh, China, India, Malaysia and Thailand and sold/bought on the black market. However, the country’s export earnings from gas and oil are expected to at least double within five years, with the projected construction of dual pipelines from a port and pumping station on the Arakan coast, diagonally across the country to Yunnan province in China. One of these pipelines, already under construction, will carry gas from the Shwe fields, which are considerably larger than the Yadana and Yetagun fields (ADB, 2010: 218). The other will carry crude oil from sources in the Middle East and Africa. As of January 2009, proved oil reserves stood at 50 million barrels and proved gas reserves were estimated to be 283.2 billion cubic meters. Myanmar is also exploiting hydroelectric power, and more than 60 hydropower projects have been built, are under construction or are under contract with Chinese companies alone. Additional projects by Thai and Indian investors are said to be at various stages of completion. Growth slowed to an estimated 3.6% in the fiscal year ended 31 March 2009 (i.e. fiscal year 2008), from 5.5% in fiscal year 2007, as exports and

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private consumption were reduced, due to the economic slowdown in neighbouring countries and a collapse in commodity prices. Myanmar’s modest rates of growth reflect both policy weaknesses, the long-term effects of the damage caused to agriculture in May 2008 by cyclone Nargis and the global recession in 2009. In fiscal year 2009, economic growth picked up to an estimated 4.4% and was expected to be sluggish in 20102011, rising to 5.2% in 2011 and 5.5% in 2012 (EconomyWatch, 2010). With its revenue base remaining small, the government will run large fiscal deficits. However, the trade surplus will be large enough to offset the combined deficit on the services and income accounts, leaving the current account in surplus (EIU, 2010). Challenges to Myanmar’s economy Myanmar’s economy faces many challenges, including ‘misconceived’ macroeconomic policies, endemic corruption, a flourishing illicit economy, a dysfunctional financial system and critical infrastructure bottlenecks (Rieffel & Gilpin, 2010). Long-standing structural problems include a wide fiscal deficit due to poor public finance management, continuing losses by state-owned enterprises and underdeveloped legal and regulatory frameworks. Repressive governance interferes heavily with economic activity. The efficiency and overall quality of government services remain very poor (Heritage Foundation, 2010), and the average citizen does not enjoy the benefits accrued from the bountiful natural resources. Failure to address these problems will continue to frustrate and limit the effectiveness of peace-building efforts. The government’s tight control of the economy unwittingly promotes a very large black market (hmaung kho); and the reliance of the state, as well as the majority of the people of Myanmar, on this hmaung kho inevitably exposes the country’s economy to the pernicious effects of the informal economy. This explains, in part, why any published statistics and indicators on foreign trade (imports and exports) are greatly understated. The size of the black market and unofficial border trade is often estimated to be as large as the official economy itself. Despite recent efforts, the economy suffers from a poor record of privatisation, little foreign investment, an unrealistic exchange rate, a shortage of foreign exchange reserves, and is plagued by corruption and hidden subsidies to public sector enterprises. For instance, through the formation of the Myanmar Economic Holdings Corporation and the Myanmar Economic Corporation, the military engage in various economic activities, going into joint ventures with a dozen foreign firms. The Ministry of Defence

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runs a number of non-defence-related factories through its Directorate of Procurement. However, given the power and influence of the army, such initiatives raise questions about the existence of a genuine market economy in Myanmar (Steinberg, 2002). These practices come on top of woefully inadequate civil service salaries that further fuel widespread corruption, as the average citizen, public servants and ruling party officials alike depend heavily on bribes to afford a decent standard of living. In 2007, the country was judged by Transparency International as the second most corrupt in the world, behind Somalia (see Transparency International Corruption Index, 2007). According to Pedersen (2005: 169), the Myanmar government generates less than 3% of GDP in revenue, severely limiting the government’s ability to invest in social programmes, also contributing to corruption. Ethnic insurgents controlling the borders with Thailand, China, India and Bangladesh have become involved in illegal trafficking of all kinds, making these Frontier Areas a hmaung kho heaven. According to Smith (1999: 98), some US$3 billion, or 40% of the gross national product (GNP), changes hands annually on the black market, denying considerable and much needed revenue in import and export duties to the government. This explains, in part, why some observers are of the view that Myanmar is perhaps best described as an ‘un-developing’ country. Take a key sector of the economy, such as agriculture. Like her neighbours in the GMS, Myanmar’s economy is dominated by agriculture and extractive industries, as the share of manufacturing and services in GDP remains negligible. In economic terms, these are critical indicators of a country’s attainment of transformational growth. However, agricultural production is heavily dependent on normal weather and suffers from poor productivity. While Myanmar was the world’s largest rice exporter in the 1930s, the price of rice increased by 200 300% in 2002 alone. The rice sector rebounded in 19941995, then collapsed, then rose again, albeit to a lower peak, in 2001 2003, in part because of a decision that rice prices in the delta, where most of the crop is grown, would prevail throughout the country, regardless of transport costs. Production reached an estimated 25.2 million tonnes in 2006, but the price of rice increased by 50% as a result of the damage caused by cyclone Nargis in the rice-growing areas in 2008. Hence, rice has largely failed to resume its role as a reliable export, having collapsed in part because of the dominance of the sector by large numbers of foreign businesses, and the Myanmars being used essentially as cheap labour. In general, the agricultural sector is taxed heavily through a government procurement plan, and the private sector is subject to intense regulation

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and interference. Rural landlessness has increased rural poverty and acts as a push factor for an exodus to the cities. According to the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO), the 1997 Household Income and Expenditure Survey showed that nearly one in four households, or 22.86% of the population, have expenditures below the minimum subsistence level. In the forestry sector, concessions were granted to a number of Thai firms working near the shared border, reaching 1.2 million tonnes of logs, many of which were known to engage in indiscriminate felling. The teak trade was briefly affected by the 1988 uprising, as the government sold off assets in search of relief from the financial crisis; but although the concession boom came to an end in the early 1990s, it was reported in 2000 that exports in woods other than teak had grown threefold since the 1990s. Much of the timber trade to China is reported to be illegal. Annual agricultural GDP growth, which had been rising steadily (increasing by some 9.2% in real terms in 2007), fell to 3.3% in 2007/2008, leading some observers to say that: Burma’s [sic] economy is deeply troubled, plagued by rapid inflation*including rocketing food prices* and a plunging currency. In late March 2008, the local currency was worth 1,100 kyat to the dollar and was forecast to be 1,300 kyat to the dollar in 2009. (EIU, 2008: 67) Following its 2004 agricultural sector review of Myanmar, the FAO concluded that: Were markets to be truly liberalised (and directed production eliminated) there is little doubt that Myanmar would see a substantial and far reaching change in cropping patterns over the next decade . . .Farmers and exporters would rapidly respond to areas where Myanmar has a competitive advantage, as they have already done for pulses... Export earnings would rise substantially, more than compensating for increased imports of commodities for which the country has no competitive advantage . . .Farm incomes would rise and national growth would be accelerated. (FAO, 2004: 161) Just like state-owned enterprises and trade, agriculture needs further liberalisation, in order to increase employment and raise the standard of living. In addition to gradually opening the country to trade and investment, the government needs to improve and strengthen the institutional capacity of the central bank, address critical infrastructure bottlenecks (e.g. electric power in cities and towns) and devise revenue sharing with regions and states to ensure that the benefits of the extractive industries

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are fairly shared by all people through services that make the economy broadly more productive and competitive. Failure to address these problems will frustrate and limit the effectiveness of peace-building efforts. Another major challenge to the Myanmar economy is foreign aid. For many years, west Germany, Japan and the USA provided Myanmar with approximately 90% of its foreign exchange income and, for the best part of a decade, foreign assistance cloaked economic attrition from the government’s attention. Myanmar had an estimated external mediumand long-term public debt of US$5.4 billion at the end of 2000, but was unable to service that debt due to years of political and economic instability and a lack of foreign exchange reserves (Financial Times, 9 November 1989: 6; Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 December 1989: 22). Indeed, Myanmar’s currency, the kyat, was widely distrusted and traded via a variety of exchange rates, causing the country’s fiscal deficit to exceed 11% of GDP (IMF 2007: 8) and inflation to rise as high as 50% per annum. The government’s only response, thus far, has been to implement a series of demonetisation, whereby kyat banknotes were invalidated, without compensation. In this overall context, the gas windfalls of recent years are most probably masking an economy that is regressing in every respect, since, with fluctuating prices, unpredictable rates of resource extraction and variability in the timing of payments to states by project partners, natural resources and commodity exports are highly volatile earnings, and possession of lucrative natural resources is not necessarily a guarantee of economic stability or success. In fact, lucrative natural resources can undermine economic development. It is no exaggeration to say that despite Myanmar’s increasing hydrocarbons revenue, the social and economic environment has deteriorated, mainly because of mismanagement of the economy and corruption. The economy suffers from major imbalances, including unreliable statistics and indicators and an inability to reconcile national accounts to determine a realistic GDP figure (EconomyWatch, 2010). The business climate is widely perceived as opaque, corrupt and highly inefficient. Industrial manufacturing and services are struggling with inadequate infrastructure and facilities, unpredictable import/export policies, deteriorating health and education systems, and endemic corruption (including cronyism and nepotism). The most productive sectors will continue to be the extractive industries, especially oil and gas, mining and timber. However, manufacturing, tourism and services will continue to struggle, due to inadequate infrastructure and unpredictable trade policies (CIA World Factbook,

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2010). According to the 2010 Index of Economic Freedom, Myanmar’s economic freedom is ranked 175 out of 179, with a score of 36.7. Burma is ranked 40th out of 41 countries in the AsiaPacific region, and its overall score is much lower than the regional average (Heritage Foundation, 2010). Myanmar’s economy also has the unenviable distinction of being the world’s second largest producer of illicit opium (estimated to be 460 tonnes in 2007 or around 60% of the world’s heroin).13 According to the Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report (EIU, 1996 (1): 10 11), Myanmar was producing two-thirds of the world’s heroin in 1996, and the government of the country was itself suspected of involvement in the drug trade. It must be said that reports such as these are made even less credible when, at the same time, Afghanistan was also being reported to produce 90% of the world’s opium. Difficulties in accessing data and problems with the data reliability and analysis clearly make it hard to understand what is really going on in the country; but that is no excuse to write in broad terms, knowingly letting objectivity give way to activist ‘imagined’ facts. The objective reader must be asking how this country and its people continue to exist, when there is so much going wrong in Myanmar, from the insurgencies to the military dictatorship, the corruption and violence to the complete collapse of the economy, the scarcity of the most basic commodities of everyday life (i.e. shortage of rice, lack of clean water, unreliable power supply, etc.) to the apocalyptic proportions of opium production and the epidemic of AIDS. However, most notable among the challenges facing Myanmar’s economy is the country’s troubled relations with the rest of the world, and the ‘battery’ of economic sanctions that have ensued, imposed by some of its most important trading partners, such as Canada, the EU, Japan and the USA. On 31 August 1988, the west German government, the second largest foreign aid donor to Myanmar after Japan, suspended all assistance to the country, on the grounds that the Myanmar government was violating basic human rights. On 23 September 1988, the USA suspended all arms sales and foreign assistance except humanitarian aid to Myanmar, and a scheduled delivery of ammunition for US-made carbines and M-79 grenade launchers to the Myanmar army was stopped (Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 November 1988: 17; CRS, 1992: 124). In 1989, the USA decertified Myanmar from the list of countries cooperating in efforts against narcotics and, as a result, Myanmar was denied American assistance, including access to anti-narcotics funds, and the USA also opposed aid and loans to Myanmar from multilateral development

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banks (International Trade Reporter, 6 March 1996: 370). This was followed in April of the same year by the suspension of Myanmar’s eligibility for benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), because Myanmar was deemed to have violated internationally recognised workers’ rights. On 22 July 1991, invoking Section 138 of the Customs and Trade Act of 1990, the USA refused to renew the bilateral textile agreement that had lapsed on 31 December 1990, due to lack of political reform and suppression of drug production (Associated Press, 22 July 1991; Independent, 22 July 1991: 8). This action was taken even further on 30 April 1994, when the US Congress placed Myanmar on the list of international ‘outlaw’ states  along with Libya, north Korea and Iraq  under the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Section 307). Consequently, no funds made available under the Foreign Assistance Act could be used towards financing the US share in international organisations for programmes for Myanmar (President’s Export Council 1997, I42). On 20 May 1997, a presidential executive order barred new US investments in Myanmar, while allowing existing contracts to be fulfilled but not to be modified or expanded (Financial Times, 25 April 1997: 16; Inside US Trade, 23 May 1997: 8). The USA later expanded these sanctions to include more Myanmar government and military officials and members of their families. On 11 June 2003, the US Senate passed the ‘Burmese [sic] Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003’. The Act was signed into law on 28 July 2003, banning all imports from Myanmar, freezing the assets of the Myanmar government and individuals associated with the government, and codifying the existing visa ban. The USA opposed loans to Myanmar from international financial institutions until Myanmar met several conditions, including measurable progress towards ending human rights abuses, end to violations of workers’ rights, release of all political prisoners, cooperation with American anti-narcotics efforts and transfer of power to a civilian government (Reuters, 11 June 2003; Financial Times, 16 July 2003: 7). In August 2003, new economic sanctions were imposed, including a ban on imports of all Myanmar products and a ban on the provision of financial services by American individuals. In September 1988, following the lead of the USA, Japan announced that it was reviewing its aid programme in Myanmar. The Japanese Ambassador to Myanmar, Hiroshi Otaka, confirmed the suspension of disbursement of aid to Yangon ‘until Myanmar attains liberty and democracy’, urging the Myanmar government to avoid further bloodshed and to pursue ‘democratic political settlement reflecting the general consensus of the Burmese [sic] people’ (Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 September 1988: 15). However, in March 1995, Japan released US$10

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million in agricultural assistance (Christian Science Monitor, 16 October 1995: 6), followed by a US$16 million grant, as part of ODA funds, which had been cut off in 1988 (Los Angeles Times, 8 January 1996: 5), and a ¥2.5 billion loan to Myanmar for emergency maintenance of Yangon’s international airport (BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 11 March 1998). In November 1999, following a meeting between Japanese Prime Minister, Keizo Obuchi, and General Than Shwe, Japan announced that it would consider funding projects in Myanmar on a case-by case basis (Financial Times, 29 November 1999: 2). It then resumed development aid to Myanmar in May 2001, and announced a US$28 million grant to modernise a power plant that supplies one-third of the country’s electricity (Financial Times, 4 May 2001: 4) and provided a total of US$69.9 million in aid to Myanmar in 2001 alone (Agence France Presse, 17 June 2003; Financial Times, 18 June 2003: 6). But, on 17 June 2003, Japan threatened to cut off aid if Aung San Suu Kyi was not released. This threat was carried out on 24 June 2003, when the Foreign Ministry announced: ‘We have decided to stop providing new ODA for Myanmar except for projects already under way. We are going to tell them that we cannot help but step up pressure on the country unless they release Aung San Suu Kyi’ (New York Times, 26 June 2003: 5; Financial Times, 3 July 2003: 6). The European Community joined in the actions of Germany, the USA and Japan, and suspended development aid to Myanmar. In 1996, the EU imposed a ban on visas for officials of Myanmar’s military elite, and placed a moratorium on high-level bilateral contacts (Financial Times, 26 27 October 1996: 3). EU-Myanmar trade totalled around US$47 million a year, and one-quarter of this trade was subject to the GSP benefits (Financial Times, 23 March 1997: 2). On 25 March 1997, EU foreign ministers voted to revoke Myanmar’s GSP benefits, after an EUsponsored study found that there were 800,000 forced workers in the country, accounting for 10% of its total output, and affecting about 5% of the country’s total exports (International Herald Tribune, 19 December 1996: 3; Financial Times, 19 December 1996: 6; Inside US Trade, 3 January 1997). The results of this study were later confirmed by another study, this time conducted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), which concluded that the practice of forced labour in the country was ‘widespread and systematic’ (Asian Wall Street Journal, 28 August 1998: 10). The EU sanctions were extended for another year in 2003, as it threatened to widen the list of individuals subject to the visa ban, freeze assets and further strengthen the arms embargo on or before 29 October 2003, if no substantive progress was made (Agence France Presse, 16 June 2003; EU General Affairs and External Relations Council Conclusions,

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14 April 2003). On 26 April 2004, EU foreign ministers extended the arms embargo imposed on Myanmar, as well as the travel sanctions and asset freeze. Non-humanitarian aid and high-level bilateral visits also remained suspended (Official Journal of the European Union, L125/61, Council Common Position 2004/423/CFSP, 26 April 2004). In October of the same year, the EU Council expanded the travel ban to lower ranking members of the Myanmar military and prohibited the granting of financial loans or credit to Myanmar state-owned enterprises. New investments in state-owned enterprises were also banned (Financial Times, 910 October 2004: 4; Official Journal of the European Union, L323/18, 26 October 2004). On 28 April 2006, the EU Council extended restrictive measures against Myanmar, including sanctioning visas and freezing the assets of lower-ranking members of the Myanmar military. The EU also continued to ban loans to or investment in state-owned companies (Agence Europe, 3 May 2006). In November 2007, the EU announced new sanctions banning investment and trade in Myanmar gems, timber and precious stones. Even individual multinationals operating in Myanmar got in on the act and started imposing sanctions of their own. Swedish telecommunications giant, Ericsson, decided to end all operations in Myanmar. Although Ericsson stressed that the decision was taken on commercial grounds, sales revenue of $2.5 million in the country in 1997 meant that Myanmar was too small a market for the multinational to risk a boycott from the USA (Financial Times, 2 September 1998: 16). Following in the footsteps of Heineken, Carlsberg, Kodak, Apple and Walt Disney, PepsiCo announced its complete withdrawal from Myanmar, on 28 January 1997, after having sold its 40% equity stake in its Myanmar bottler in May 1995 (Financial Times, 28 January 1997: 1). On 7 November 2003, BAT, the tobacco firm and the last UK multinational still investing in Myanmar at the time, pulled out of Myanmar, under pressure from the British government (Financial Times, 7 November 2003: 6). In November 2007, the EU announced new sanctions banning investment and trade (imports and exports) in Burmese gems, timber and precious stones, while the USA expanded its sanctions list to include more members of the Myanmar government and military officials and their family members, as well as prominent regime business cronies, their family members and associated companies. In July 2008, the President of the United States signed into law the Tom Lantos Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts (JADE) Act, imposing new targeted sanctions on the regime. Increasingly unwilling to underwrite a government with no capacity to reform itself, many more countries (e.g. Canada) and international

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institutions and donors joined in imposing similar measures. In September 1989, Australia suspended its aid programme (worth US$8 10 million) after the coup, but unfroze it within months, coming to the view that reports of torture were ‘exaggerated’ (Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 October 1989: 19). The World Bank ended all financial ties with the country in September 1998, because of Myanmar’s failure to repay past loans. As a result, Myanmar attracts little in the way of foreign investment even from non-sanctioning countries and has received less than US$1 per capita over recent years. Needless to say, the intent of these sanctions was to isolate Myanmar from the rest of the world and weaken the country’s economy; and weaken it, it has. The net effect of these concerted measures has been a further decline of investor confidence in Myanmar, and a deeper stagnation of the country’s economy. Myanmar currently receives the least foreign aid on a per capita basis in the GMS. The lack of international aid and the absence of foreign investment have not only constrained trade and investment, they have, in fact, disrupted trade, fuelling inflation and macroeconomic instability, and crippling the manufacturing sector, with significant job losses. The US July 2003 import ban alone is estimated to have cost 30,00050,000 jobs in the garment sector and associated industries, mainly unskilled young women, many of whom were the principal breadwinners in their families (Pedersen, 2005: 178). Garment exports fell by 98% year on year in the first 10 months of 2007 (EIU, 2008: 12, 13). Foreign visitor levels have fallen sharply and the tourism and transportation industry, which directly employs some 500,000 people, has suffered dramatic declines over the years (EconomyWatch, 2010). Other key sectors of the economy are struggling. The drying up of foreign trade and investment has led to high inflation rates (from 20 to 40% per year) as well, with food price inflation rising to an average of 36.9% (EIU, 2008: 12), seriously affecting the purchasing power of many households. In other words, human rights in the country have not improved. In the words of leading economist, Jeffrey D. Sachs: [S]anctions are mainly a symbolic stand for justice. But they are not symbolic in their effects. They are economically destructive and only occasionally politically productive. America’s misguided sanctions against Myanmar, for example, have done nothing in the past year to resolve the country’s political and economic crisis . . . Sanctions should be lifted because they do not work. (Financial Times, 28 July 2004: 17)

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Reiffel (2010: 2) also calls for a ‘more nuanced use of sanctions and effective collaboration with other actors in the region, particularly ASEAN’, and ‘more effective ways to encourage better governance than the sanctions and engagement of the past twenty years’. Indeed, members of ASEAN have for a long time avoided airing overt criticism of the government of Myanmar. Instead, they have offered support for efforts towards national reconciliation. Sachs and Reiffel may well have a point here, in that more political engagement with Myanmar will have to occur one day, if the current deadlock is to be resolved and if the people of Myanmar are really at the heart of the concerns of the international community. Gupta (2010) suggests that the real challenge for western powers is to find ways to support economic policy changes, not to stifle them, and argues that, to this end, western powers must heed the advice of experts who suggest that regional institutions such as ASEAN, ESCAP and the ADB should take the lead in the capacity-building effort in Myanmar, drawing more on Asian talent and models than on western ones. Gupta even takes issue with a number of presumptions in most western commentary on the status of Myanmar’s macroeconomy. For example, that (1) it is so rife with mismanagement, reducing the country to one of the most destitute states in the world; and (2) that before the rot set in, it was once southeast Asia’s most promising economy. Using the UNDP’s latest HDI rankings, he points out that the presumption that Myanmar is ranked among the lowest in the world by almost all socioeconomic indicators is at variance with the facts, and notes further that a reading of the 2010 Asian Development Outlook suggests that macroeconomic stability obtains in Myanmar, with policy trending towards prudent reform. Inflation has been on a downward trend, the deficit is under control and the differential between the official and market exchange rates has remained steady. In other words, Myanmar may not be as flagrantly misruled economically nor as economic discontent as the west may want to think or choose to believe. Gupta goes on to suggest that the second presumption, that of Myanmar’s ‘shining early economic prospects’, underwritten by agricultural and commodity exports, needs reassessing as well, since prior to independence, almost three-fourths of built-up property in the capital was owned by Indians, who made up more than half of Yangon’s population and supplied almost all the credit and management skills, while the Myanmars did not own or manage any businesses in the banking, insurance, shipping or export-import sector, and agriculture suffered from high casualisation of the workforce, and extremely low levels of productivity, with minimal exposure to external markets. Gupta (2010)

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goes as far as to suggest that Myanmar should mount a challenge within the trade body’s arbitral mechanism against the sanction provisions in the US Burma Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 and the EU’s Common Position of the 2007 trade sanctions, which stand in the way of real reform. While this approach may not be shared by some, the reality of economic opportunism from China, India, Japan, Singapore and Thailand and other ASEAN countries, has seen the government of Myanmar pursue an all-out exploitation of the country’s natural resources as a primary source of foreign exchange. Already in the mid-1990s, satellite surveys were showing Myanmar’s teak forests being felled at an alarming rate, with the area cut each year increasing fivefold since the military coup of September 1988 (Financial Times, 21 June 1990: 6). In recent years, Myanmar’s oil and gas have locked in major commercial deals; and once again, rather than investing in those sectors that will sustain and improve the economy in the long term (e.g. education and health), the self-aggrandising ideals of the military leaders have come to the fore, and it is white elephant-like projects, such as the creation of Naypyidaw, the new administrative capital, that have been given priority. Estimated to have cost around 2.4% of Myanmar’s GDP in 2005/2006, with ongoing costs of similar magnitudes in the coming years (IMF, 2007: 8), Naypyidaw is proof that profound changes to the political economy of the country, and not just macroeconomic policies, will have to be brought in, for any real gains to accrue to the average Myanmars. More recently, however, faced with the devastation caused by cyclone Nargis in 2008, a number of major donor countries reassessed their aid strategies when the country opened its doors to receive humanitarian assistance. In fact, even before the cyclone, a remarkable number of domestic and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were already engaged in low-profile humanitarian assistance activities in Myanmar. Faced with the intransigence of the Myanmar government, western governments have also begun to shift their policy from one of total isolation to one of tentative engagement. Rieffel (2010: 3) notes that this reassessment may have already begun with the Obama administration, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a review of US policy towards Myanmar on her first foreign trip in January 2009, noting that neither the sanctions imposed by western nations nor the engagement pursued by Asian nations had ended the country’s internal conflicts successfully or halted the population’s impoverishment. A few months later, a new policy of ‘pragmatic engagement’ was announced (September 2009), and the State Department’s assistant

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secretary for east Asia and the Pacific, Kurt Campbell, was able to visit Myanmar, the first such high level visit in many decades. In December 2009, the government of Myanmar agreed to host a day-long meeting in Naypyidaw, organised by UNESCAP, at which the principal speaker was the Nobel Prize-winning economist, Joseph Stiglitz (see UNESCAP Press Release). So, where does language fit in this context? How can one bring up language issues, when the very survival of the nation, economic and political, is at risk? Language in the economy in Myanmar How dare one bring up language issues in the context of Myanmar, when the nation is literally ‘up against it’?14 Language issues cannot be ignored, especially in the context of Myanmar, because, from the time of the birth of this nation, ethnicity and language have been the root cause of political and economic instability. Although the government managed to successfully negotiate an end to 17 of the 18 major armed insurrections, the lack of economic opportunities in the country is very much ethnically based, as it is in the crucial areas of education and health. The military and the elite control all the levers of the economy, while the dominance of some aspects of economic activity by Indians and Europeans in the colonial days is being replaced by the growing economic influence of the Chinese. Estimates of the number of recent immigrants from China range from around 100,000 to well over 2 million people. The extent to which these immigrants displace or complement the indigenous population is likely to create political problems in the near future, as the Myanmars are once again being pushed out to the margins of economic activity. Villagers in the Kokang, Shan and Wa borderlands are among the most impoverished in Asia, with estimates of per capita incomes of just US$100 per annum, probably less at a realistic exchange rate. According to a survey undertaken by the UNDP and the country’s own Central Statistical Organisation, over 30% of the population had incomes below what is necessary to provide for basic food and other needs. This ratio rises to over 50% in the Frontier States (UNDP 2006). And yet, language issues in Myanmar are trivialised and the national language treated as a shared heritage with a long tradition of literacy. There are, no doubt, pressing issues to attend to in this country, and it may on the surface look very much like their solutions lie in economic growth. But, as the foregoing suggests, there may not be any real and

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sustainable economic growth to be had as long as the nation’s human resources and their languages are marginalised.

Language and the Economy in Viet Nam Having had to recover from the ravages of the Second Indochina War (1954 1975), the inflexible economic measures introduced in its aftermath and the loss of financial support from the old Soviet Block in the last 30 years  aid from the former Soviet Union alone was 10% of GDP, but dropped to less than 1% of GDP in the late 1980s  Viet Nam managed to develop one of the most dynamic and influential economies in southeast Asia, and is touted as the ‘next Asian Tiger’. Faced with dire economic conditions in the 1980s, including famine in the north in 1988, limited trade and hyperinflation, the government was c forced to relax restrictions on private enterprise and launched the Ðoˆi mo´’i or (political and economic) ‘renewal’, in 1986 (the Fifth National Party Congress of 1982 had already sanctioned privately held small enterprises and the ‘family economy’ for agriculture). This new policy introduced reforms that facilitated the transition from a centralised economy to a socialist-orientated market economy, opened the country to foreign investments, abolished agricultural collectives, removed price controls on agricultural goods (enabling farmers to sell their goods in the marketplace) and allowed the establishment of private businesses, including foreign-owned enterprises.15 The 1992 Constitution recognised individuals’ ownership rights and again legitimised the private sector. By the late 1990s, more than 30,000 private businesses had been created, and the economy was growing at an annual rate of more than 7%. In 2001, the government reaffirmed its commitment to economic liberalisation and international integration, and moved to implement the structural reforms it felt were needed to modernise the economy further and produce more competitive, export-driven industries, while engaging the international community. The decision to open the economy to foreign investment and embark on ambitious structural reforms boosted inflows of FDI and helped raise fixed investment to 32% of GDP on average over the last decade. Viet Nam’s membership of ASEAN (28 July 1995) and AFTA, and the entry into force of the US-Viet Nam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) in December 2001, led to rapid changes in the country’s trade and economic regime. The country’s exports to the USA doubled in 2002, and again in 2003 (the US embargo was lifted in 1993). After a decade of negotiations, Viet Nam joined the WTO on 11 January 2007, a move that provided an important boost to the economy and

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provided an anchor to the global market, reinforcing the domestic reform process. WTO accession allowed Viet Nam to take advantage of the phase-out of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which eliminated quotas on textiles and clothing for WTO partners on 1 January 2005. Hence, in January 2009, the EU removed Vietnamese footwear from the Generalised System of Preference (GSP) and these products became subject to higher EU import duties. In February 2009, Viet Nam officially joined the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as an ‘associate member’. As a result of these reforms, Viet Nam’s economy made substantial progress from 1986 to 1997. The size of the economy roughly doubled between 1993 and 2002 (World Bank, 2004). Growing from an extremely low base, it has expanded considerably and, with a potential growth rate of almost 10% per annum in real dollar terms, may be the fastest growing of the emerging economies by 2025 (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2008). Growth averaged around 9% per year from 1993 to 1997, and 6.8% per year from 1997 to 2004, against the background of the Asian financial crisis. FDI ventures increased to 4100 in 2003, with a total capital of US$39.8 billion approved, of which 2100 projects had begun operations with more than US$23.5 billion of capital. The private sector accounted for more than one-quarter of all industrial output and was expanding more rapidly than the public sector (18.7 vs. 12.4% growth from 2002 to 2003). Economic growth hit 8% in 2005, before dropping slightly to 7.8% in 2006. By 2007, economic growth stood at 8.5%. According to the Asian Development Outlook Update 2007 (ADB, 2007), Viet Nam accelerated to a growth rate of 7.9% in 2007 (January to June), with 3.9% coming from industry, and 3.4% from services, on the production side. Investment also grew by 14% in the first half of 2007, with domestic private sector investment increasing to about 35% in the first half of 2007, due in part to Viet Nam’s entry into the WTO and in part to improvements in the business environment. Foreign investment also grew steadily. Viet Nam attracted a record US$60.3 billion in new licences for FDI projects in 2008 (3.4 times higher than it had achieved in 2007). Actual FDI disbursements reached US$11.5 billion in 200816 (The China Post, 2008; Reuters, 2009). The USA, of all countries, has become one of Viet Nam’s main trading partners (20.7% of all exports), following the entry into force of a BTA in 2001 and the granting of unconditional normal trade relations (NTR) by the USA in December 2006. Furthermore, the USA signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with Viet Nam in 2007, for future economic cooperation. Bilateral trade between the USA and Viet Nam rose from US$2.91 billion in 2002 to US$15.7 billion in 2008, as Viet Nam’s exports to the USA increased by

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900% from 2001 to 2007. Other main export partners in 2008 were Japan (13.6%), China (7.2%), Australia (6.7%) and Singapore (4.2%). Major import partners in the same year were China (19.4%), Singapore (11.6%), south Korea (8.8%) and Thailand (6.1%). Viet Nam is a major exporter of garments, light industrial products, wood products and agricultural products, with considerable employment benefits to the economy. In total, the country received US$62.9 billion from its exports in 2008 (exports were 68% of GDP in 2007) (Vietnews, 2009; HKTDC, 2009), although industry grew at a slower rate of 5.5% in 2009/2010, compared to 10% in most recent years (ADB, 2010: 233). The structure of the economy changed, along with further government reforms, with a steady increase in the share of industry in the GDP, and that of services, against a steady decline in the share of agriculture, including fisheries and forestry. Viet Nam’s trade ratio (i.e. exports plus imports over GDP) is one of the highest in the world. Growing at an annual rate of 4.1% over a decade, between 1994 and 2004, and occupying 55.6% of the employed labour force in 2005, agricultural production nearly doubled, accounting for 30% of exports and 20.3% of GDP in 2007, and transforming Viet Nam from a net importer to the world’s second largest exporter of rice; this, despite the fact that only 21% of the land is arable. One of the biggest export categories from Viet Nam is seafood, which expanded fourfold, from 1990 to 2002, to more than US$2 billion, driven in part by shrimp and catfish farms in the south. Coffee exports doubled as international prices increased, while exports of wooden furniture rose by 23%. Agricultural expansion was weaker in 2009/2010 (1.8%, compared to the average growth of about 4% in 20042008), because of poor summer and autumn rice harvests. Having grown at an average annual rate of 11.2% of GDP over the previous decade, industry and construction contributed 39.86% of GDP in 2008, and employed 18.9% of the workforce. Industrial production increased by 5.1% during the first seven months of 2009, reaching US$21.5 billion (Goliath, 2009). Manufacturing grew by 12.3% in 2008, textile and clothing rose by 25.9%, while services accounted for 39.91% of GDP. Designated the world’s fourth fastest-growing tourist destination by the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC), Viet Nam recorded some 4.25 million foreign visitor arrivals in 2008, an increase of around 2% on 2007 figures. Monetary policy was further loosened in December 2008 and mid2009, to mitigate the effects of the global economic downturn and shore up economic growth. The government launched a battery of measures

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totalling US$6.3 billion, including the slashing of the base rate by the State Bank of Viet Nam, reducing lending interest rates, as well as other expansionary fiscal measures, such as tax reductions and deferrals, financial assistance to poor households, a hike in capital expenditure, the devaluation of the dong by more than 5% in December 2009, and investments in schools, hospitals and rural infrastructure. These measures forced the fiscal deficit up to an estimated 11.8% of GDP in 2009, from 4.1% in 2008 (ADB, 2010: 234). Not only did Viet Nam navigate the global financial crisis better than could have been anticipated, the rebound from the global recession strengthened overseas demand for some aspects of the economy, such as the footwear industry, the third biggest export after garments and crude oil. Overall, exports decreased by 9.7% in 2009 to US$56.55 billion from US$62.69 billion the previous year, the first decline since the beginning of reforms two decades ago, but recovered by 12.6% to US$25.8 billion in the first five months of 2010, after two devaluations of the local currency, the dong, in November 2008 and February 2009. Exports in May 2010 totalled US$6.1 billion, up from US$5.33 billion a month earlier. Imports, which had also contracted by 14.7% in 2009, increased to US$6.85 billion in May 2010, up from US$6.49 billion in April 2010, narrowing the trade gap by 35% in May 2010 down to US$750 million, from a revised US$1.16 billion in April the same year Intellasia (2010b), and bringing the current account deficit down to about 7.8% of GDP, compared to 11.9% in 2008. Real GDP grew by 5.3% in 2009, led by a surge in construction. The recovery consolidated, with real GDP posting 6.9% growth in the last quarter of 2009 year on year, and growth of 6% was plausible for the first quarter of 2010. The target for real GDP growth of 6.5% in 2010 was therefore easily attainable, even though the budget plan for 2010 translated into an overall fiscal deficit of about 6.2% of GDP (World Bank, 2010: 7475). The external debt increased marginally, from US$25.89 billion in 2008 to US$26.06 billion in 2009, as did public debt (from 48.8% of GDP in 2008 to 52.3% of GDP in 2009). Nevertheless, Viet Nam’s debt remained sustainable with its current account balance improving by over US$1 billion, from US$10.71 billion in 2008 to US$9.17 billion in 2009. Inflation slowed to 6.5% in 2009, from a high of 23% in 2008, but started accelerating in the last quarter of 2009, and rose to 8.5% year on year in the first quarter of 2010. Although government authorities were planning on keeping it below 7%, it was forecast to average 10% in 2010, easing to about 8% in 2011 (Intellasia, 2010a). From a country that could not feed its own people in the early 1990s, Viet Nam has emerged as a big exporter of agricultural products.

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Although economic growth dropped to 6.2% in 2008 and slowed to 3.1% year on year in the first quarter of 2009, due to the global financial crisis, exports grew significantly, accounting for 72% of GDP (HKTDC, 2009). The economy picked up again towards the end of 2009, only to slow to 5.3% in the first quarter of 2010, as business shed labour. As a result of this remarkable growth, per capita income rose from US$220 in 1994 to US$1024 in 2008, and almost 95% of Vietnamese households have electricity connections. The poverty rate has declined from about 58% in 1993 to 14.8% in 2009 (VietnamNet, 2008). Challenges to Viet Nam’s economy Despite significant economic growth, Viet Nam still falls short of the average world standards and presents a number of weaknesses, the most important of which centre around its continued reliance on agriculture and its exposure to the US market. According to the ADB (2010: 237), the country needs to attend to shortages of foreign exchange in the formal market through a combination of monetary policy and increased exchange rate flexibility, as this undermines confidence in the currency, fuels inflation and hurts investment. State-owned enterprises that use a substantial proportion of resources in the economy, but do not always do so efficiently, will also need restructuring. Indeed, Viet Nam is ranked 144 out of 179 on the Index of Economic Freedom World Rankings, with a score of 49.8 (Heritage Foundation, 2010). Although its share of GDP has steadily declined over the last decade, agriculture, which still occupies over half of the labour force, is vulnerable to the weather (e.g. floods in 2007, 2008 and 2009, and droughts in 2002 and 2004) and animal health conditions (e.g. avian influenza in 20032004). In 2007, for example, it only contributed 0.5% to the economy, while seafood exports slumped, as a result of suspected contamination of shrimp by antibiotics. Viet Nam’s economy is also particularly exposed to the US market, which receives 22.6% of its exports (mainly consumer goods, such as textiles, footwear and apparel). However, exports to this market are expected to contract by 10% in 2009, due to the global financial crisis (Asia Monitor, February 2009). Indeed, Viet Nam’s GDP growth in the first nine months of 2008 was 6.3%, the lowest since 1999. The trade deficit increased by 66% in the first 10 months to US$16.3 billion, while the current account deficit rose to about 13% of GDP, compared with 9.9% in 2007, due to slowing industrial activity and investment. In the first half of 2007, the trade deficit widened sharply by US$4.8 billion and

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stood at a record US$17.5 billion or 20% of GDP in 2008. At about 40% of GDP and a nominal value less than US$15 billion, Viet Nam is the only one of the four countries under study here to have successfully concluded negotiations with Russia over its outstanding debt. The Russian government has agreed to discount its claims on Viet Nam by 70%. Of the remaining debt, 50% will be written off, and the balance of US$1.7 billion will be repaid over 23 years, 10% in cash and 90% in goods. As a result, Viet Nam’s external debt position has improved considerably since September 2000. Its public debt was estimated at 38.6% of GDP in 2008 (Asia Monitor, 2009a; CIA World Factbook, 2009). Although Viet Nam is said to have graduated from the HIPC and low income countries at the end of the 1990s  the GDP per capita (PPP) increased steadily from US$2700 in 2007, US$2800 in 2008 and US$2900 in 2009 (Viet Nam Economy 2010)  12.3% of its people were still living below the poverty line in 2009 (ADB, 2010: 233), and as many as 28 million people (almost twice the populations of Cambodia and the Lao PDR put together) still lack the minimum income necessary to provide a decent standard of living. The country also suffers from the effects of dollarisation, as unofficial foreign exchange markets are still quite liquid and handle large amounts of purchases and sales in cash American dollars (Duong Thanh Dung, 2002). Remittances through official and unofficial channels also contribute to this de facto dollarisation of the economy (Ngoc Bao, 2002; Nguyen Thi Nhung, 2002). Finally, it must be said that the disparity in wealth between urban and rural Viet Nam raises doubts about the ‘trickle-down’ theory of economic growth. It looks very much as though the World Bank’s (2004) prediction on increasing inequality in Viet Nam has come to pass. Even though Viet Nam has achieved a middle-income nation status, its HDI stands at 0.733, giving the country a ranking of 105th out of 177 countries for which data is available for analysis. In its 2004 Viet Nam Development Report, the World Bank warned that the next decade may well be characterised by increasing inequality, and that the gap in earnings between urban and rural areas, and skilled and unskilled workers, would increase. It also predicted that decentralisation would amplify the disparities between the rich and poor areas, and that increased reliance on market forces would raise the out-of-pocket cost of health and education, accentuating inequalities in the use of more advanced services, such as higher education or sophisticated medical procedures. Prosperity is largely confined to urban areas, while poverty is concentrated on the rural areas of the northwest, north-central coast, and central highlands provinces of Kon Tum and Gia Lai, where ethnic minorities

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make up between 77 and 80% of the total population, the rates of poor households are 1.72 times higher than the national average. Language in the economy in Viet Nam It would appear that Viet Nam has succeeded in keeping firm control over its development process and, unlike Cambodia and the Lao PDR, has been able to do so without too much reliance on external aid. Yet, despite this impressive growth, Viet Nam remains one of the world’s low-income countries. This is mainly because its regional and especially its minority ethnic groups are being left out or behind the development agenda. The main challenge therefore is to find ways to ensure that ethnic minorities in mountainous and remote areas participate in and gain from the development process. Otherwise, the country will find it hard to achieve higher levels of human development. Here again, the fundamental question is about how ethnic minorities can partake in the development process. As we have argued in the education and health sections of this book, the unpalatable truth is again that these minorities need to be empowered to take ownership of their own economic activities, especially if these are for commercial purposes. Local economic initiatives and mechanisms for service delivery have to be devised in a multilingual mode, if they are to have any chance of success. More active involvement and participation in economic activities by minorities can be achieved through linguistic measures to ensure easy access to business opportunities and information. After all, ethnic minorities are actively involved in the informal economy, which stood at 17.9% of GDP in 2002/2003 (ILO, 2007: 3) and generated a much larger number of new jobs than the formal economy.

Conclusion The foregoing suggests that the overriding challenge for Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam is to move away from dependence on agriculture, mining and informal services and into value-added manufacturing, in order to attain long-term growth. The current economic data suggest that industrial growth has tripled in Cambodia, and that Viet Nam has been able to make the link to production networks; however, productivity increases are still negligible. In Cambodia’s case, job creation in the garment sector is far too exposed to external shocks, as the impact of the latest global financial crisis has shown. While mining and hydropower boost growth, they add few jobs; yet job creation is sorely needed in the sub-region to absorb the growing

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labour force. Furthermore, too much reliance on mining and hydropower exposes the economy to price fluctuations on the global market. The prerequisite to addressing this challenge lies in upgrading their physical and human capital, something that cannot be achieved without investing in education and health. Another significant challenge to all four countries is their degree of economic freedom. The economic figures on the sub-region fail to show the significant constraints on business initiatives in places like the Lao PDR and Myanmar and Viet Nam. This Index of Economic Freedom shows that, despite the optimism of some economic figures and forecasts, Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam only rate as ‘repressed’ and ‘mostly unfree’. Together with the figures in Table 1.3 (Chapter 1), the figures in Table 4.1 further reinforce the point that development is not necessarily tied to income and economic growth alone, and that trade and economic growth do not automatically guarantee meaningful improvements in the lives of all the citizens of a country. Development does not necessary follow where there is economic growth, and economic growth has the potential to widen existing inequalities between the rich and the poor, between urban and rural areas, and between the majority and the ethnic minorities. As the population shifts from working mainly in the agricultural sector to others sectors of the economy, such as industry and services, they move out of their linguistic comfort zone and their language use also shifts dramatically, from the local to the regional and national language. The majority left behind in the development process, aspiring to lift themselves out of poverty, engage in unauthorized and unregulated commercial activities, commonly referred to as the black market or the informal economy. According to the ILO (2007: 3), informal work Table 4.1 Economic freedom in the GMS in 2010 Country

Ranking

Overall score

Cambodia

107

56.6

Lao PDR

138

51.1

Myanmar

175

36.7

Vietnam

144

49.8

Source: Index of Economic Freedom World Rankings Key: the range of economic freedom is as follows: 80 100 free; 70 79.9 mostly free; 60 69.9 moderately free; 50 59.9 mostly unfree, 0 49.9 repressed.

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involved 156 million people or 63.7% of total employment in ASEAN in 2006. The size of the informal economy is believed to play a major part in deposit dollarisation and in deterring financial development (Shinichi, 2002: 4, 8). Indeed, the level of dollarisation of a country’s economy is inversely proportional to the quality of governance; that is to say, the organisational capability of the government to enforce its own financial laws, protect its citizens and effectively reduce poverty. Highly dollarised economies, like those of Cambodia and the Lao PDR, also tend to have large ‘efficient’ informal foreign exchange markets and hence informal economies; in other words, a much greater tendency for tax evasion and system-wide inefficiencies that, in the end, affect those who are involved in the informal economy in terms of their working conditions and the overall sustainability of their source(s) of income. Furthermore, in Cambodia and the Lao PDR, foreign assistance, which also plays a part in the dollarisation of these countries  American dollars in the case of Cambodia, American dollars and Thai baht in the case of the Lao PDR  continues to cloak what are serious socioeconomic issues. As a result, both countries carry a large deficit in their balance of payments and a large fiscal deficit. Heavy reliance on foreign aid exposes these countries to external shocks, or at least a struggle in securing the same levels of the financial largesse of years gone by. Continued economic growth and progress in all four countries are also constrained by poor infrastructure, a difficult geographic environment, limited capacity at all levels of government, and significant issues of socioeconomic and political inequity and injustice based on ethnicity and language. Poverty reduction measures have not been broad based and sufficiently aimed at the rural areas and the poorest groups. Therefore, despite the high economic growth in recent years in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam, much work still remains to be done to achieve poverty reduction. Adelman and Morris write: we shall restrict the use of the term economic development to widespread, widely shared, sustainable economic growth accompanied by significant structural change in production patterns and in economic and political institutions and by generalized improvement in living standards. This definition distinguishes economic development from economic growth that is narrowly based; dualistic in production and distribution; cyclical; grounded in the exploitation of natural resources; and unaccompanied by systematic changes in

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production structure, institutional development or improvement in the living standards of the poor. (Adelman & Morris, 1997) Hence, governments in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam have to go beyond motherhood statements of intent on poverty reduction and understand that their own advantage grows with that of all the citizens of the country, not just the elite, the wealthy or the speakers of the national language, and that a country can only develop when all its people can take full advantage of opportunities to improve their lives. A nation cannot prosper long, when it favours only the rich and the powerful. The success of an economy depends not only on the size of the GDP, but also on the extent of the opportunities afforded to all and the reach of the prosperity generated by economic activities; not out of a benevolent sense of charity, but because it is the only way to attain and sustain economic development. A note of caution was raised earlier in presenting official data provided in the context of Myanmar. Anyone who has travelled extensively throughout the GMS and southeast Asia would probably run through the official data provided for Cambodia, the Lao PDR and Viet Nam with the same sense of scepticism, and wonder whether economists at the World Bank, the IMF and UNDP get the chance to walk the streets of the cities and travel the roads of the countryside in this part of the world, and meet the people. Clearly, the reality on the ground does not reflect the fetishism of the figures. And the prospects of continued economic growth and prosperity for all, as outlined in the glossy official publications, sound just as hollow as the military promising democracy in Myanmar. Indeed, one cannot help but note that it is practically impossible to reconcile all the official economic statistics with the plight of the people. This is not to say that there are no upper classes in the countries in question; but it is to underscore the large gap that exists between the ‘very rich’ and the ‘desperately poor’. Although most economic studies acknowledge the existence of the rich and the poor  and the extremely poor  in this part of the world, they fail to say whether there is a middle class in these countries. Notes 1. See relevant documents on WWW at http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/ 7cg_meeting/position_paper_eng2004/7cg_03.htm and http://www.phno mpenh.um.dk/en/menu/DevelopmentCooperation/RoyalGovernmentOf CambodiasDevelopmentStrategiesandPolicies/. Accessed 30.6.09. 2. Gale (2009: 16) believes that the economy grew by an average of 11.1% a year, between 2004 and 2007.

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3. According to Peak Oil, the reserves of natural gas are 10 trillion cubic feet. See Peak Oil, 4 September 2009. On WWW at http://peakoil.com/ modules.php?name  News&file  article&sid  22749. Accessed 4.9.09. 4. The majority of FDI in Cambodia comes from China, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand and Viet Nam and is focused on projects in the garments and tourism sectors. 5. Cambodia owes US$339 million, of which $154 million is in arrears. The USA and Cambodia are in negotiations to reach an agreement on paying off the debt. In 2008, the Cambodian government rebuffed Washington’s demand for settlement of the debt declaring through Mr Khieu Kanharith, a government spokesman: ‘We have many affairs to attend to’ (see Associated Press, 2008). 6. Broad money is the widest measurement of the money supply. It is defined by the OECD as sight deposits held by domestic non-banks, including time deposits, savings deposits at short-notice held by domestic non-banks, and currency in circulation (On WWW at http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/ detail.asp?ID  236; accessed 4.6.010). 7. Driving through the countryside of the Lao PDR, one is always struck by the eerie silence of the bushes lining the roads. There is no doubt that the overexploitation of the forest has dramatically affected the animal life as well. 8. Note in passing that the rice export trade was controlled by immigrants from India, while the timber industry was largely British owned. The exploitation of minerals was significantly dominated by the illegal trade, especially in gems and jade. After independence, and under an authoritarian government, control over these sectors of the economy was transferred to the military and the elite. Ethnic insurgents ran everything else that was outside government-controlled areas. 9. The ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok by the five original member countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January 1984, Viet Nam on 28 July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar on 23 July 1997 and Cambodia on 30 April 1999. Although it has a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of member countries, it maintains a policy of ‘constructive engagement’ in relation to Myanmar. 10. Lim refers to an article published in the South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) of 22 October 2007 entitled Delhi Trades its Soul for Myanmese Deals. 11. Unofficial sources put GDP growth in Myanmar in a range of about 0.9 2.0% for the 2008 fiscal year, after agriculture and manufacturing were hit hard by the devastating cyclone Nargis, and flooding, in May 2008. The EIU (2008: 14) estimated GDP per capita at US$421 in 2009 and real GDP at 3.6%, from 3.4% in 2008 (EIU, 2008: 7). 12. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2007. On WWW at B http://www. bp.com/statisticalreview/  . Accessed 13.8.09. 13. See CIA, The World Fact Book, Burma. On WWW at https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/bm.html (last updated on 6 November 2008). Accessed 19.11.08. Also see ‘‘Myanmar’’ A Dictionary of World History. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press (2000). On

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WWW at http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview Main&entry t48.e2519. Accessed 8.9.08. 14. Individuals in high government positions, of Bamar background, have asked us this question over and over again. Many simply fail to understand the relevance of the language issue to the plight of their country. 15. See Library of Congress  Federal Research Division. Country Profile: Viet Nam, December 2005: 8. 16. On 4 February 2009, Reuters was reporting that FDI in Viet Nam was projected to fall by up to 13%, compared with 2008 and that growth in 2009 was going to be around 5%. On 4 June 2009, quoted a state-run newspaper report, Reuters again confirmed that FDI in Viet Nam was predicted to fall by US$2.5 to US$9 billion, although the World Bank expected FDI in Viet Nam to total ‘just 4.5 billion’.

Chapter 5

Language and Governance in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region Introduction The goal of development is to achieve sustainable national capacity building through the provision of core public services that contribute to the long-term process of poverty eradication. Development efforts, however, are unlikely to succeed unless the issues that underlie governance problems are tackled head-on and resolved. Good governance is the state’s ability to provide these core services to all. The extent and reach of the opportunities afforded to all the citizens of a nation are keys to attaining and sustaining good governance. It is along these lines that this chapter explores the relevance of language to good governance and the state’s ability to provide and strengthen the availability and quality of core services to all. Theories on the centrality of language uniformity in the process of development will have us believe that language homogeneity is fundamental to good governance (Gellner, 1983: 35; Pool, 1972: 213). The question this chapter aims to answer is whether the adoption of a national language in each of the countries of the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) contributes to good governance in some discernible way. Understanding the undergirding reasons for language and governance in the GMS requires a good understanding of the history of the countries concerned. Hence, this chapter provides the historical background necessary to understand the language issues pertaining to governance in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam.

Language and Governance in Cambodia Most Cambodians consider themselves to be Khmers, descendants of the Angkor Empire, which reached its zenith between the 10th and 13th centuries. Negative contacts of war and subjugation between the Cambodians and the Thai and Vietnamese, marked by the latter taking turns at installing Khmer kings (with the Vietnamese actually appointing one of their own as monarch), forced the king of Cambodia to place his 156

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country under French protection in 1863. Cambodia subsequently became part of French Indochina in 1887. These initial negative contacts go a long way in explaining Khmer attitudes towards the Thai and the Vietnamese, as well as towards ethnic minorities. Ethnic violence, especially violence directed at the ethnic Vietnamese communities, is well documented in Cambodia. The Vietnamese are seen as the ‘natural enemies’, in part because of Viet Nam’s occupation of the country and, later, the installation of a Vietnamese-friendly regime in Cambodia. More positive events, such as the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime by the Vietnamese army, do not hold the same significance in the eyes of Cambodians. Like many other southeast Asian countries, Cambodia was briefly occupied by the Japanese during the Second World War before gaining full independence from France in 1953. A year later, the Geneva Conference on Indochina (July 1954) recognised Cambodia’s independence from France. Since then, Cambodia’s constitutional order has changed six times: from being known as the Kingdom of Cambodia (1953
1970), to Khmer Republic (from 1970 to 1975, under Lon Nol), to Democratic Kampuchea (from 1975 to 1979, under the Khmer Rouge), to the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (from 1979 to 1989, under the Vietnamese-backed government), to the State of Cambodia (from mid1989) and the Kingdom of Cambodia (since May 1993). The country experienced some level of prosperity from the 1950s to the mid-1960s, but quickly became embroiled in the escalating political turmoil across Asia. With a growing communist insurgency in the sub-region, and war raging in neighbouring Viet Nam, Cambodia started experiencing economic and political difficulties. Violence erupted in the late 1960s, when one faction of the Cambodian Communist Party, otherwise known as the Khmer Rouge, took control of the northeast region.1 Political instability deepened further when Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak and Lon Nol deposed Prince Samdech Norodom Sihanouk in March 1970 and proclaimed the Khmer Republic in October 1970.2 Perhaps inspired by General Charles de Gaulle of France, who rallied the French resistance after the German invasion in the Second World War, Prince Samdech Norodom Sihanouk went to Beijing, set up a government in exile and, with the help of communist forces in Cambodia and the support of north Viet Nam, mobilised forces under the name the National United Front of Kampuchea, to fight the new republican government of Lon Nol, which was supported by the USA. This started the first of two internal civil wars that marked the dark age of Cambodian history. The second civil war lasted from 1975 to 1979, after

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the Khmer Rouge forces captured Phnom Penh in April 1975, and established a new regime. Implementing a Maoist communist agenda of extreme collectivism, the Khmer Rouge, under the leadership of Saloth Sar, also known as Pol Pot or ‘Brother Number One’,3 abolished all forms of market economy and business activities, private ownership of any kind, and forcibly moved the urban population to rural areas to farm the land; but even though almost the entire population was involved in agricultural production, Cambodia still experienced food shortages. Public servants, the police, military officers, teachers, doctors, ethnic Vietnamese, Christian clergy, Muslim leaders, members of the Cham Muslim minority, members of the middle class and the educated were identified and executed. Even Buddhist monks were defrocked and forced into labour brigades. It is generally estimated that more than one million Cambodians died as a result of these forced relocations, forced labour, starvation and summary executions (Chandler, 1991), earning the country the unenviable tag of ‘killing fields’. At least another 200,000 people were executed in 1977 and 1978, when Pol Pot launched a purge against the ‘hidden enemies, burrowing from within’ and the Khmer Rouge cadres turned on themselves. Industry, money, private property and markets were abolished, and agriculture was collectivised. Cambodia emerged from the ashes of total destruction in January 1979, after the Vietnamese forces intervened in December 1978 and, with the help of Cambodian resistance forces, succeeded in driving the Khmer Rouge into the countryside (along the Thai-Cambodian border), thereby ending nearly a decade of civil war. Pol Pot and the defeated Khmer Rouge retreated to the remote western regions of the country from where they staged a guerrilla war that lasted a further 20 years. When they took to the forests in 1979, they left behind one landmine per head of population, adding to those of the American bombing raids. The People’s Republic of Kampuchea was established, and a 10-year Vietnamese occupation began, with the support of the Soviet Union. This period of Vietnamese occupation saw the country plunge into political uncertainty.4 On 22 June 1982, the Khmer Rouge, the KPNLF5 and the FUNCINPEC6 joined in the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea against the Vietnamese, following an agreement brokered by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Prince Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, who was chosen as the coalition’s President, later proposed a general election under United Nations supervision once the Vietnamese had withdrawn. The coalition was recognised by the United Nations as the lawful government of Cambodia and was funded by China, the USA and Thailand.

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Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the political factions sought a negotiated end to the deteriorating situation. Reconciliation between Prince Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and Hun Sen began in 1987, and the constitution was amended in 1989, as the final contingent of Vietnamese troops withdrew from the country. The State of Cambodia emerged. After more than 10 years of guerrilla warfare, the main political factions (i.e. the CPP, the BLDP,7 the FUNCINPEC and the Khmer Rouge) signed the 1991 Paris Peace Accords, mandating a ceasefire and democratic elections, and effectively ending decades of civil war in Cambodia. The Supreme National Council (SNC) was created, under the terms of the agreement, to represent Cambodian sovereignty. Prince Samdech Norodom Sihanouk was appointed as its President. The United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC) officially arrived in Cambodia in March 1992 and became heavily involved in supervising the disarmament and demobilisation of the former enemies, repatriating refugees and organising the 1993 elections, which helped restore some semblance of normalcy (claiming the Vietnamese were still covertly occupying the country, the Khmer Rouge boycotted the 1993 elections). With no single party winning the majority of votes, the CPP, the FUNCINPEC and two smaller groups were forced into a power-sharing arrangement to form a coalition government, with Prince Ranariddh as first Prime Minister and Hun Sen as second Prime Minister, and two coministers of the interior and defence. A new constitution was promulgated in 1993, establishing a liberal democracy and a market economy, as per Articles 51 and 56 of the constitution. The new constitution was adopted on 21 September 1993, ensuring a multiparty system of government, and guaranteeing the position of the king as official Head of State for life, without executive powers but acting as a symbol of unity. The constitution also recognises human rights as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, freedoms of expression, the press, publication and assembly, with every citizen equal before the law and having the same rights, freedoms and obligations, regardless of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political affiliation or social status. The adoption of the new constitution coincided with a dramatic increase in the number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which accounted for 30
50% of the technical assistance expenditure (some US$83 million). In 1998, 300 international and Cambodian NGOs were involved in more than 500 projects across the country. The country was beginning to find its feet when tension between the FUNCINPEC and the CPP reached a climax and, in July 1997, an armed conflict broke out. Hun Sen had enacted a coup d’e´tat and ousted his co-

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Prime Minister, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, who fled the country, as factional fighting among the armed forces raged. The first coalition government was ended, and foreign donors suspended or terminated most of their assistance programmes. Agreement was again reached in late 1997, and new national elections held in 1998, leading to the formation of a new CPP-FUNCINPEC coalition government in November of that year, with Hun Sen as the sole Prime Minister. A year later, the remaining elements of the Khmer Rouge surrendered, and in February 1999, the last remaining members of the Khmer Rouge were incorporated into the Cambodian armed forces. Relatively peaceful elections (by local standards) were again held in July 2003, and the contending political parties were able to form a coalition government after one year of negotiations. Since then, Cambodia has functioned much like a one-party system, with the CPP retaining control of all branches of government. This trend was reinforced with the result of the general elections held in July 2008, after which the CPP won an overwhelming majority, allowing it to form a government without any coalition partners, the first such government in post-civil war Cambodia. Although Cambodia has yet to fully recover from the years of civil war and political turmoil, the country has since enjoyed some degree of political stability and peace, even though the IMF (Article IV, July 2006) describes Cambodia’s political situation as ‘fragile’ (also see the EIU’s Index of Democracy, 2008: 4
8). According to the new constitution, the king is the Head of State, performing what is largely a ceremonial role, and the Prime Minister is appointed by the king, subject to approval by the representatives from the National Assembly, and exercises executive power in government. National elections have been held regularly, in 1993, 1998, 2003 and 2008, and have thus far generally been acknowledged as free and fair, leading some to conclude that Cambodia stands out among the countries of the GMS as having a dynamic civil society. However, lack of rule of law, lack of transparency, corruption and influence peddling, including on the part of the ruling party, have created a general culture of impunity in which it has become practically impossible to hold anyone accountable for their crimes. Cambodian politicians are putting their own interests and contradictory visions as to how peace building and reconciliation could be achieved ahead of the national interest, and a number of former Khmer Rouge leaders are already being seen as having been officially pardoned. Prime Minister Hun Sen and other members of the Cambodian elite led the debate as to whether a national and international Khmer Rouge Tribunal was the most efficient way to relieve the trauma of the atrocities inflicted on the

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nation. Well before the creation of the tribunal, Hun Sen was already on the record as saying that ‘The national reconciliation in Cambodia, [ . . .], had been fulfilled once for all’ (cited in Gellman, 2008: 44), and, in a speech delivered in 2001, Senior Minister Hor Namhong stated that ‘Cambodia has secured and maintained political stability through the concerted efforts of national reconciliation and coalition building’ (Gellman, 2008). Hun Sen and Hor Namhong, like other former Khmer Rouge leaders, were in favour of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission similar to the one set up in South Africa following the end of apartheid, rather than prosecution in a genocide tribunal. At that stage, only one former Khmer Rouge, Kaing Khek Iev (also known as Duch), the governor of the Tuol Sleng detention centre,8 was being held in detention awaiting trial for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Nevertheless, the Cambodian government passed legislation to set up a joint tribunal of local and international judges and prosecutors to try former leaders of the Khmer Rouge for genocide in August 2001. But, still fearing that the genocide tribunal as conceived by the Cambodian authorities could not guarantee independence, objectivity and impartiality, the United Nations pulled out of the negotiations in February 2002. In December, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution to rejuvenate negotiations on the genocide tribunal, and talks between the United Nations and Cambodia resumed in January 2003. An agreement was reached on 17 March and signed by the United Nations on 6 June of the same year; the tribunal was to be composed of both Cambodian and foreign prosecutors and judges, with a majority of Cambodians. The agreement was unanimously ratified by the Cambodian National Assembly on 4 October 2003, and later approved by the Cambodian Senate. Although no timetable is set for the commencement of proceedings, the tribunal is expected to run for three years and cost US$57 million. Progress was made in July 2005 with the swearing in of 17 Cambodian and 12 foreign jurists, and the United Nations announcement on 25 August 2005 of the appointment of Michelle Lee, a Chinese national, as the chief administrator for the tribunal. In 2007, based on the submission of a list of five former Khmer Rouge leaders to stand trial, Nuon Chea, ‘Brother Number Two’ (also known as Long Reth), an unrepentant supporter of Pol Pot, was arrested on 19 September and charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes, including murder, torture, extermination, deportation, enslavement and other inhumane acts.9 Both Ieng Sary10 and his wife, Khieu Thirith,11 were arrested on 12 November and charged with crimes against humanity. Ieng Sary was also charged with war crimes. Khieu Samphan12 was

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arrested on 19 November and charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes. Still, the CPP’s overwhelming and unchallenged control of all matters political and administrative across the country has also fuelled a high level of corruption, leading to poor implementation of existing laws and regulation, and weakening Cambodia’s fledgling institutions. If low civil service salaries are partly to blame for this state of affairs, the top-down decision-making process that dominates all of Cambodia’s administrative procedures, and the partisan and nepotistic nature of key senior appointments, whereby individuals are given positions that they are simply not qualified to hold, also encourage corruption. This situation compounds the difficulties facing all Cambodians, when it comes to dealing with the root causes of issues that affect the most vulnerable and the poor. While democratisation has seen some minority cultures gain status in national life, Cambodia remains a very challenging environment. Violence, especially political violence, is not rare in the country, and the denial of basic human rights to some sections of the population, usually ethnic minorities, is almost regarded as being a normal part of life. Landlessness was virtually unknown in Cambodia prior to the outbreak of the civil war in 1970. Indeed, in the Sihanouk era, entire villages of poor rural and ethnic communities living in remote areas were relocated along the roads and rivers, allocated land and introduced to lowland techniques of wet rice cultivation (as against practitioners of swidden agriculture) (Hammer, 2009). The situation has been dramatically altered by nearly two decades of conflicts. During the Khmer Rouge regime, all land was collectivised and the land administration, including cadastral maps and titles, were destroyed. The harsh legacy of Cambodia’s past endures through the issue of landlessness and is fuelled by market forces, as maximum demand has been placed on commercial, roadside, productive and urban lands. Landlessness is caused by (1) demographic pressures and external shocks, most often health problems, which drive the poor into debt and eventual dispossession; (2) concentration of 70% of the land in the hands of the richest 20% of the population and 64% of the land in the hands of the wealthiest 10% of the population; and (3) economic land concessions, which are granted to big investors under the assumption that commercial plantations will generate higher returns and create jobs. However, out of the 800,000 ha granted as concessions, only 72,000 are in production (UNDP, 2008).13 Much of the land owned by the rich remains unculti-

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vated and is used for speculative purposes. Rich land owners wait for the land to increase in value. According to Oxfam, although 85% of Cambodians depend directly on agriculture for their livelihood, 12% of Cambodian families are landless, 19% of women-headed families are landless, 5% of families are ‘landpoor’, 80% of landless families have never owned land and 91% of landless families are in debt, with average debts of US$117 per family (World Bank, 2004: 49
54; also see Bird, 2004). According to the World Bank (2006: 17), 91% of the poor live in rural areas and depend on land and agriculture for survival. In 2004, 20
30% of landowners held 70% of the land, while the poorest 40% occupied only 10% (World Bank, 2004: 60); 20% of rural families did not own any land, and 25% of these rural families did not have enough land to survive (less than 0.5 ha per household). Nearly 50% of all war widows did not have access to any land, and 84% of the remainder owned less than 0.5 ha per household. Landlessness is one of the main causes of widespread poverty and weak human development in rural Cambodia, in part because, for those rural poor, land is their most important asset (STAR Kampuchea Organisation, 2007). By 2006, landlessness in the country was estimated at between 15 and 20% and rising, with 46% of rural families without any land or owning less than 0.5 ha of land per household. While in 1983, landless families represented 3% of the total population, this proportion increased to about 12% in 1999, reaching 24% within fishing communities (Oxfam cited in USAID Cambodia, 2005). Rural families lose their land because of health care expenses (21% of cases) or general economic pressures related to poverty (13% of cases) that force them to sell their land. Others have simply lost their land through land grabbing by the rich and powerful elite. At the same time, a large section of the rural poor
some 80% of the population
is believed to occupy land without any legal documentation proving ownership, making them even more vulnerable to land grabbing. According to a Global Witness (2007: 6) report, ‘Cambodia is run by a kleptocratic elite that generates much of its wealth via the seizure of public assets, particularly natural resources’. As Cambodia does not have a culture of land titles and formal land distribution, bitter disputes over land ownership have arisen in various regions of the country, resulting, in some cases, in the confiscation of land by the military, former soldiers, and the rich and powerful. Overall, 4% of Cambodian households have been or are involved in land-based conflicts, most of which were instigated by the rich, the police, soldiers or government officials (Sithan Phann, 2006; UN Cambodia Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Report, 2007). These disputes

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have spread from traditional agricultural areas into lands that have recently been de-mined, as well as into former Khmer Rouge areas, where fighting continued until 1998. Hence, one of the most pressing governance issues is resolving disputes concerning access and tenure to land, as landlessness has a major incidence on poverty, particularly in the northwestern region. After the departure of the Vietnamese troops in 1989 and the 1991 Paris Peace Accords, Cambodia started a legal and regulatory framework for land management and administration from scratch. A national and equitable system of registering land and recognising land ownership rights was developed to replace the land tenure system that was dismantled between 1975 and 1979, but the issuing of formal institutional mechanisms in the form of land certificates has not kept pace with demand and, in many cases, the poor have become increasingly marginalised in the process. Only 600,000 parcels had been registered between 1989 and 2001 (Baars, 2005), and it is estimated that the systematic registration of land will take up to 15 years or more. A new land law took effect in August 2001. The law secures land ownership rights by allowing citizens to register the land they legally occupied before the promulgation of the law. It established the Cadastral Commission (2002) to investigate and resolve land disputes, before the land is registered and prohibits new occupation of land after the law took effect. It also created social concessions as a means of orderly distribution of land to the poor. Although the 2001 Land Law recognises the collective land rights of ethnic minorities, many are at risk of losing out because not a single minority has received title of ownership to its collective property, and because the judicial system and the Cadastral Commission structure are plagued by bureaucracy and corruption. In March 2006, the government created the National Authority for Land Dispute Resolution (NALDR) to solve land dispute cases and complaints that are beyond the jurisdiction of the National Cadastral Commission, another bureaucratic layer that does not guarantee efficiency. In the absence of a fair judicial system and access to justice, unfair practices are used to secure questionable land tenure claims due to corruption. Human rights activist, Guillermo Jover-Cataldi, contends that the new land law ‘has been taken hostage’ by Cambodia’s elite, who are guilty of ‘land-grabbing’ and ‘forced evictions’ (see Jover-Cataldi, 2009). For the minorities, the first hurdle is to be able to articulate their claims to land. As national life remains decidedly Khmer, these ethnic minorities, besides being unable to afford the process of conciliation in

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terms of time and money, simply do not have a voice and exist on the margins of Khmer society. In the words of Bit (1991): Other ethnic groups who have immigrated to Cambodia (i.e. Vietnamese, Chinese, Myanmars) do not have full access to the rights of Cambodian citizenship even though their families may have established continuous residence in the country for generations. In addition, ethnic groups distinct from the Cambodians such as the Cham (Moslem descendants of the ancient kingdom of Champa) and members of hill tribes are incompletely assimilated into Cambodian society. The Cham had been granted a measure of cultural selfdetermination until the Khmer Rouge period singled them out for enforced ‘‘Khmerisation’’ attempts to obliterate their cultural traditions. Hill tribes were traditionally targets of cultural chauvinism until they were actively recruited as participants in the Khmer Rouge regime. (Quoted in Santamaria, 2004: 28) Skilled human capital being very low in Cambodia, the country can ill afford to pick and choose among its people and continue practices that deepen the divide between the Khmer majority and the ethnic minorities, and increase the gap between the rich and poor. Despite some level of normalisation of socio-political participation, which has seen the country being considered a hybrid regime, with a ranking of 102 out of 167 nations (see the EIU’s Index of Democracy, 2008: 4
8). Cambodia scored 6 for political rights and 5 for civil liberties, on a scale of 1 (free) to 7 (not free) and, therefore, is not a free country (Freedom House Survey, 2009). Indeed, Cambodia still faces a number of serious challenges in the area of governance, in part because it lacks the qualified personnel to fill positions in virtually every area critical to sustainable development (i.e. education, health, etc.).

Language and Governance in the Lao PDR14 The valley of the Mekong River, to which the Lao PDR belongs, was inhabited as far back as 10,000 years ago. The Lao people, who probably came from south China in small groups as early as the 8th century AD, belong to the Thai-Kadai group, which extends from the Brahmaputra to the Gulf of Tonkin. The first well-known Lao political figure was the 14th century Muang leader, Fa Ngum, who captured Wieng Chan (now Vientiane), parts of northeast Thailand, the Shan States of Myanmar, and most of present-day Lao PDR, to set up one of the largest kingdoms in southeast Asia in 1353 AD, the Kingdom of Lane Xang, the Land of a

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Million Elephants. King Fa Ngum (1353
1373) is credited with establishing the kingdom and making Theravada Buddhism the religion of the new land. The capital of the Lane Xang monarchs was Luang Phraba¯ng (formerly Muang Xiang Dong Xiang Thong),15 until the middle of the 16th century, when it was shifted to Vientiane. Lane Xang had three successful monarchs in the 16th century, namely, Wisunarath (1501
1520), Photisarath (1520
1550) and Sai Setthathirat I (1550
1571). The latter’s mysterious death while campaigning in the south plunged the kingdom into a long war of succession that saw it relegated to the status of vassal kingdom. Order was not restored until King Suriyavongsa (1638
1690) ascended to the throne, bringing it to its zenith in the 17th century. The death of King Suriyavongsa was followed by yet more feuding, which caused the kingdom to break up into three smaller kingdoms: Luang Phraba¯ng, Vientiane and Champassak. All three states were later invaded and came under Siamese (Thai) influence,16 which installed the next few Lao kings until the early 19th century. Indeed, the southern province of Champassak, which had become a province of Siam following the death of King Pham Ma Noi in 1819, was administered on behalf of Bangkok by a succession of governors drawn from the former Champassak royal family from 1826 until 1893. In 1820, King Anou (Sai Setthathirat IV), who had been installed on the throne in 1805 by the Siamese, rebelled against his masters, annexed Luang Phraba¯ng and reestablished the Kingdom of Lane Xang. Attempting to invade Siam in 1827, he was defeated and captured. On the pretext that King Anou was being belligerent, the Siamese invaded and ransacked Vientiane in 1828, transporting most of the population of the central Mekong region across the river, into what was later to become northeastern Thailand, or Isaan, and putting an end to the short-lived attempt at independence.17 Hence, in the 1850s, when the French decided to annex the Lao territories, only Luang Phraba¯ng was a distinct sovereign entity in the former Kingdom of Lane Xang. France occupied the left bank of the Mekong and forced Siam to recognise the river as the boundary, then signed a treaty with Siam in 1886 and established a vice consulate in Luang Phraba¯ng. In the following year, it staked its claim to the kingdom, before bringing all of the Lao territories under a single administrative unit between 1893 and 1907, when it acquired parts of Sayaburi and Champassak provinces west of the Mekong from Siam. The province of Houaphanh was not added to Luang Phraba¯ng until 1933. The presence of the French in the country was essentially motivated by their belief that the former kingdom held deposits of precious metals and that the Mekong River would offer a ‘back door’ into south China. When they

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realised that there were too many rapids in the river to allow feasible communication and transport, the area was very much left to itself. France’s colonial administration of Laos (as it was then known) followed the perceived ethnic and social hierarchy that prevailed in its Indochinese policy at the time, with Viet Nam at the top of the ladder. For tax collection purposes for instance, a Lamet chief would report to the Tai Lue tax collector, who reported to a Lao canton chief, who himself reported to a Vietnamese civil servant, who was then responsible before the French official in charge of a given province. Discontent over tax collection caused the H’Moˆng revolt of 1919
1921, leading to some degree of autonomy for this ethnic group. However, when the Mekong proved not to be fully navigable, and the country itself was too mountainous for plantations or agricultural production, France did not find it profitable to develop the country commercially, but maintained its control over it as a buffer between Siam, British Burma and the economically important Annam and Tonkin regions. Siam (which had become Thailand in 1938) launched a military campaign against French colonial forces in 1941 and succeeded, with the help of the Japanese, in reclaiming two right-bank enclaves along the Mekong River that had been ceded as Lao territory in 1907. Then, like most of southeast Asia during the Second World War, the kingdom came under Japanese occupation. However, in a reversal of sorts, Siam supported Prince Phetxara¯t and his half-brothers, Prince Supha¯nuvong and Prince Suvannaphu¯ma¯, who had fled to Thailand at the time of the Japanese invasion, and played an active role in setting up a Lao Issara (Free Lao) government-in-exile. In the meantime, the Japanese pressured King Sisavangvong Vatthana to declare independence on 8 April; but Japanese occupation of the kingdom was short lived, as they surrendered five months later, in August 1945. On 27 August 1945, Prince Phetxara¯t took charge of Vientiane from the Japanese and tried to convince King Si¯sava¯ngvong to declare the treaty of the French Protectorate invalid, arguing that the French had failed to protect the Lao from the Japanese. Faced with the latter’s refusal to do so, Phetxara¯t unilaterally declared the unification of the country, nominally under the crown of Luang Phraba¯ng, and declared Lao independence. The Allied governments refused to recognise Phetxara¯t’s government. In October 1945, General de Gaulle asked the king to dismiss him as Prime Minister of Luang Phraba¯ng. In retaliation, Phetxara¯t declared the king deposed, placed him under house arrest and forced him to abdicate the throne. The idea of an independent Lao as advocated by Lao Issara, a small urban-based movement, failed to appeal to the masses. Just like the

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Japanese-controlled government it succeeded, the Lao Issara government was very short lived (October 1949), and its leadership fled into exile.18 In the meantime, the king was reinstated in March 1946, while France quickly re-established its protectorate in April 1946 and endorsed the idea of the unity of the kingdom as a constitutional monarchy within the French Union (August 1946). Elections were held a year later, leading to the appointment of the first Royal Lao government. In February 1950, the country was formally declared an independent state, and was recognised as such by the USA and the UK, although it essentially remained under French control; indeed, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Finance portfolios remained under de facto French control, while Justice was only slowly devolved to Lao nationals. This coincided with the establishment of the Lao Patriotic Front (Neo Lao Hak Xat) by Lao communists, which became known as the Pathe¯t Lao, and the formation of the ‘Resistance Government of the Lao Homeland’, which quickly established a firm foothold in the northeastern provinces of Houaphanh and Phongsali. Dependent on Viet Nam for arms, money and training, the objectives of the Pathe¯t Lao were simple: (1) evict the French colonial administration; and (2) establish socialism. By late 1953, with Vietnamese aid, the Pathe¯t Lao had gained control over a large area of territory, in the mountainous areas in the north, as well as in some areas in the south, advancing to within 30 km of Luang Phraba¯ng. In 1953, after the Franco-Lao Treaty was signed, France granted full sovereignty to the kingdom, leaving the issue of who would rule the country unresolved. When French forces suffered a humiliating defeat at Dieˆn Bieˆn Phuc in 1954, all French forces were swiftly withdrawn from the ˙ country, following the Geneva Conference. It was agreed to make Laos an independent, neutral country, with a coalition government representing all parties including the Pathe¯t Lao (whose armed wing was to disband), and organise free elections; an arrangement that raised the ire of anticommunist politicians and fuelled political turmoil and social unrest, with rumours of impending war. After a year of stalemate, the government went ahead with elections in December 1955. The same year, the Lao communist party, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party or Phak Paxa¯xon Lao (formerly the Lao People’s Party), was created and merged with the Pathe¯t Lao resistance movement. The years that followed were marked by increasingly bitter rivalry and political jostling between the royalists (backed by the French and Americans), who envisioned a system similar to that of Thailand, the neutralists, who did not want Lao territory to be used as a base for aggression against any of its neighbours, and the communists (backed by

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the Vietnamese, Russians and Chinese; at least for a brief period of time), who wanted to create a socialist state. Three successive ‘national unity’ governments were established and collapsed one after the other from 1958 to 1974. The constitution was suspended and emergency rule introduced in December 1958, as Pathe¯t Lao supporters began to be purged from the civil service, and some of their leaders were arrested. In July 1959, fighting broke out between the Royal Lao Army and the Pathe¯t Lao; the situation steadily deteriorated as the conflict increasingly became a focus for superpower rivalry. The US Department of Defence established a disguised military mission in Vientiane in December 1955, called the Programs Evaluation Office (PEO). This office immediately became operational and was working under the cover of a civilian aid mission, staffed by military personnel and headed by a general officer. The PEO gradually replaced the French military mission in providing equipment and training to the Royal Lao Army and the anti-communist H’Moˆng Tribe, from 1955 to 1961. On the other side, the Soviets and Vietnamese were supporting the Pathe¯t Lao in military equipment and training. In the 1960s, Soviet advisors appeared in the kingdom. For the USA, this was a signal for allout war. The Soviets and Vietnamese continued to openly provide aid to the Pathe¯t Lao, while the USA continued to arm and train H’Moˆng irregular forces in the Plain of Jars. The neutralist forces agreed to accept aid from the USA, causing a split in their ranks, and worsening the situation. By the end of 1963, fighting was widespread, the Pathet Lao was again advancing, and the neutralists were being squeezed out as a political and military force. Attempts to bring the warring parties to the negotiation table failed, as each believed they were on the verge of victory. In 1968, the north Vietnamese army brushed the Pathe¯t Lao forces aside, and took matters into their own hands. Between 1968 and 1973, divided into two zones, one controlled by north Viet Nam and the other controlled by the USA, the kingdom became a battlefield in the war between the USA and north Viet Nam, and effectively ceased to exist as an independent state. It was during this period that, like Cambodia, the Lao PDR was subjected to heavy bombing, as the USA sought to destroy `ˆ Chı´ Minh Trail, a 16,000 km network of tracks, roads and the Ho waterways built along the border, from north to south Viet Nam, to provide logistical support to the Vieˆt coˆ ng and the north Vietnamese ˙ were ˙ Army. Over 580,000 bombing missions launched on the Lao PDR, and more than 2 million tonnes of ordnance dropped on the country, with up to 30% not exploding. The bombing campaign increased in intensity in 1969 and 1970, as the USA tried to force north Viet Nam into

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submission and bring the war to an end. The north Vietnamese advance deep into Lao territory forced the Royal Lao Army to re-enter the conflict. An estimated 200,000 people died, most of them Lao civilians and ethnic minorities, who mainly populated the mountains of the Pathe¯t Lao, as a result of the US air raids. The majority of the Lao Tai people in the Mekong Valley towns were somewhat spared the horrors of the war. Indeed, this was a time when Lao generals and politicians enriched themselves, as corruption, drug dealing, prostitution and smuggling were rife, particularly in the capital, Vientiane, on the back of the influx of US personnel and money, estimated at US$500 million in aid alone, creating service industries to meet the demands of the war and the large resident American civilian population in the towns of the Mekong Valley, and especially in Vientiane. The two sides in Laos signed a ceasefire and announced an Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and National Reconciliation in 1973, and during 1974 and 1975 the balance of power in the country shifted steadily in favour of the Pathe¯t Lao, as the USA disengaged itself from the region. The Pathe¯t Lao forces entered Vientiane in August 1975. In December 1975, King Si¯sava¯ngvong Vatthana abdicated, and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic was proclaimed on 2 December 1975. Much of the country was in ruins after 20 years of political struggle, civil war and bombing. Non-communist newspapers were closed, and a large-scale purge of the civil service, army and police was launched. Thousands were sent to so-called ‘re-education’ camps in remote parts of the country, and 30,000
160,000 people were imprisoned for ‘political crimes’. This prompted an exodus of educated people, including most of the business class; anecdotal estimates are that well over 10% of the population left the country to resettle overseas, mainly in Australia, France, Thailand and the USA. To cope with this brain drain, the government sent many young Lao to universities in Viet Nam, the Soviet Union or eastern Europe. On their return, the qualifications and skills of many were found wanting, and some had to re-train over the years to become fully operational (e.g. those who were trained as Russian language teachers). The country also came across a few bumps in the road, with Thailand imposing a trade embargo in 1975 and 1976, making economic conditions very difficult. Economic conditions worsened further when aid from the Soviet Union was cut off completely in 1990, forcing the Lao PDR to seek emergency assistance from France and Japan, as well as from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). For quite a while, Thailand was suspected of actively supporting the Lao opposition in exile and the H’Moˆng resistance in central Lao,

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responsible for occasional attacks in the capital, Vientiane, and on some roads. In 1984 and 1987, there were a few brief border clashes between Thai and Lao forces, in a disputed territory in Xainyaburi province. Apart from these incidents, the Lao PDR has been at peace with all its neighbours. Civil society is generally kept in check in the Lao PDR; and although some international NGOs are progressively being allowed to operate in the country, the government is not open to the idea of having local NGOs, except for Champa, an NGO that works on health issues, and Padek Lao, which is involved in community-based agricultural issues. The most recent national legislative elections took place on 30 April 2006. Although independent candidates are able to stand for elections every now and then, candidates normally have to be Party members to stand for election. Viet Nam remains Lao PDR’s political reference point, although China has increased its political influence in the country over the last few years. Nevertheless, the government adopted a Governance Reform Programme in 2003, and attempts are being made to strengthen participation and encourage local empowerment. Although the Lao PDR is a signatory of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, which makes giving and accepting bribes a criminal act punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment, a key governance constraint in the Lao PDR is corruption, which is pervasive in the country. The politically powerful, lower-level civil servants and the average citizen alike supplement their income through similar behaviour, seriously affecting state revenue, as it leads to complete avoidance of charges, duties and taxes in many instances, and the misuse of state property. Corruption and nepotism also weaken capacity building, in that it encourages the rapid promotion of those close to the politically powerful (mainly family members), despite the fact that these individuals are not qualified for the positions they are offered. Admittedly, severe wage restraint is a major contributor to the widespread practice of relying on bribes to afford a decent standard of living,19 however, greed cannot be excluded either, since those who tend to initiate and encourage the corrupt behaviour are often the rich and powerful. It is also difficult to speak of good governance in a system where the press, television and radio are state owned and state controlled. Even though the constitution also purports to guarantee freedom of speech, the ruling party maintains strict control over the press media, and the government owns all newspapers and broadcast media, which consist of a daily newspaper in Lao and a news service issuing bulletins in Lao, English and French, but not in any other local language. Only a radio service and the television station broadcast in Lao and some local

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languages. The authorities have demonstrated that they will not tolerate any challenges to their exercise of power, and any public dissent is dealt with harshly. As a result, the media only puts out news that is favourable to the regime (Reporters Without Borders, 2008). Furthermore, due to the mountainous terrain (two-thirds of the country is mountainous), more than half the Lao rural population lives outside the broadcasting range and does not have access to the media in their own country. However, the proximity of Thailand and the language similarities between the Lao and Thai languages have proven to be a blessing of sorts, as many Lao people living near the border of Thailand, especially the Lao Tai, get their news from Thai radio and television. Because of the variety of choices available on Thai television (i.e. number of channels freely viewable), the latter tends to be more popular than Lao television. With regard to language, culture and governance, it is important to note that the Lao PDR has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). The constitution of the country, which frequently uses the term ‘multi-ethnic’, proclaims that the State ‘shall respect the principle of equality among ethnic tribes [sic]’, which have the right to maintain and promote ‘their fine customs and culture’. The constitution also commits the State to upgrading the ‘socioeconomy of all ethnic groups’. In theory, therefore, all ethnic groups have equal rights and access to all parts of the new nation. This official discourse is not entirely surprising. After all, the communist bases in the hot years of the struggle were mainly located in ethnic minority areas. A number of ethnic minority leaders, including Faida¯ng Loˆbliayao, a leader of the H’Moˆng people of the north, and Si¯thon Kommadam, a leader of the southern Mon-Khmer, were promoted to leadership positions in the Pathe¯t Lao in order to shore up support in the upland areas. Ethnic minorities provided a substantial number of members for the movement and the troops for the Pathe¯t Lao army. Paradoxically, however, the key leaders of Pathe¯t Lao since the end of the war have been Lao Tai, and most ethnic minority leaders are confined to symbolic roles in front organisations, rather than admission into the inner circle of the party leadership. The Pathe¯t Lao made no effort to adopt or encourage the use of any of the languages of the ethnic communities they relied on for their very survival in the early years of their political and military struggle, perhaps in part because the H’Moˆng also played a historical role in supporting the American and Lao Royalist forces during these difficult `ˆ years. This is in sharp contrast with what happened in Vietnam under Ho Chı´ Minh, who saw to it that the languages of the ethnic communities, who helped in the resistance to French occupation and subsequently

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against the USA, were developed. Hence, even though the official discourse purports to de-emphasise ethnic differences through a new linguistic classification, which has moved away from simplistic geographical divisions to better reflect linguistic and cultural features (i.e. the Lao Tai (formerly lowland Lao Loum), the Mon-Khmer (formerly upland Lao Theun), the H’Moˆng-lu Mien and Chine-Tibet (formerly highland Lao Soung), respect for ethnic differences does not mean exclusive right to territory, as the authorities insist on linguistic and cultural unity centred on the language and culture of the Lao Tai. This makes the Lao PDR, next to Myanmar (discussed in the following section), one of the clearest cases, where language and governance issues pose, and will pose, a major stumbling block to development. Especially, because the country has adopted a decentralised system of governance, where the village is the central implementation unit for all socioeconomic and political activities, and because almost all government documents always refer to the need for full community participation, ownership, capacity building and selfreliance. How can this sort of empowerment be achieved when speech communities are being engaged in a language they do not understand? Given the linguistic diversity in the country
40
70% of the population could be classified as non-Lao Tai (Fox, 2003: 402)
one would think that it is almost axiomatic that ethnic languages will have to play a crucial role in opening up communication, disseminating information and facilitating governance. This is all the more crucial considering the lack of human resources (i.e. skilled personnel) and institutional capacity. Too few officials possess the expertise and language skills necessary to work efficiently, at the national level, in the pivotal areas of education and health. There is even less expertise to implement and follow up the various regional and international covenants (e.g. ASEAN) that the Lao PDR is party to, seriously affecting the country’s institutional capacity. As a consequence, the Lao PDR was ranked 157 out of 167 nations on the 2008 Democracy Index and scored 7 for political rights and 6 for civil liberties, on a scale of 1 (free) to 7 (not free) (EIU, 2008).

Language and Governance in Myanmar Myanmar is the only southeast Asian major country that has not fully integrated the breadth of its territory under the authority of the state and brought it under complete central control, because it has yet to resolve significant conflicts stemming from its colonial past. Indeed, pre-colonial Myanmar was not a unified and coherent state and, for expediency, the

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British colonial administration foisted a state structure on the majority Bamar of the valley, leaving the people in the hills (i.e. the Kachin, Chin, Shan and Karen) to live outside the new state (Ang Cheng Guan, 2007: 125). So, here is a country very much in the throes of ethnic disunity, with little in the way of cross-ethnic empathy (Callahan, 2004: 226
228). For as long as we can all remember, Myanmar has presented a dismal picture of turmoil and decline, political instability, general economic impoverishment and widespread international condemnation and exclusion, as the legacy of civil war and separatism have plunged this land of plenty into a poverty-stricken society. Although most media reports on Myanmar focus on the fate of Aung San Suu Kyi, who has spent more than a decade under house arrest,20 and the trials and tribulations of her political party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), the struggle of the NLD is far from being the only socio-political issue in Myanmar. Citing Takano (2002: 154), Ang Cheng Guan (2007: 122) suggests that ‘the biggest source of anxiety in Myanmar ever since independence is not Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, but the ethnic minorities’. While the current situation remains complex and quite fluid, no observer will leave this country without the realisation that, even though the ethnic minorities of Myanmar are prepared to give Aung San Suu Kyi the benefit of the doubt, they are not so predisposed towards the rest of the NLD leadership. Yet, many do not realise that linguistic and cultural diversity has shaped the history of Myanmar in more ways than one, from the colonial name of the country, Burma, to any other references pertaining to language and ethnicity. Taylor (2005: 3) notes that, ‘language and ethnicity here are still couched in terms of ‘‘nationalities’’ and ‘‘national races’’, harkening back to discourse which was introduced into Myanmar during the colonial era’. Since independence, up to 1 million people have died in the jungles of Myanmar and millions more are suffering as a direct consequence of ethnic insurgencies. Smith (1999) lists 34 main armed ethnic opposition groups in the country in 1998. In 1999, the Karen alone were represented by four different armed groups; of these, 23 had reached ceasefire agreements with the Yangon government between 1989 and 1995. Therefore, there is no doubt that many of the country’s difficulties are directly connected to ethnic minority issues and the ensuing lack of legitimacy of the state in the eyes of those minority groups. Yet, for well over 60 years now, the political leadership has decided on a military solution to social unrest and insurgency, refusing to heed the call of one of their own who said: ‘In trying to build up a strong union, our greatest challenge will be to win

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the confidence of those who have only known repression and discrimination’ (Aung San Suu Kyi, quoted in Fink, 2001: 13). It is therefore an understatement to say that Myanmar faces challenges of nation building. But, what exactly are the facts about governance in Myanmar? What are the root causes of the internal conflicts in the country? In trying to answer these questions, one must not lose sight of the different strands of history that have brought the country to this crossroads. Thus, understanding the history bequeathed by Myanmar’s colonial and post-colonial governments, and that of its present status, is critical to getting a better grasp of the country’s current tribulations.

Imperialism and the colonial legacy Originally the home of a Mon Kingdom, Prome, dating back to the 5th century, present-day Myanmar is characterised by a history of shifting alliances and periods of conflict. The arrival of the Bamar in the 9th century plunged the country into hostilities, before the Bamar of Pagan attempted to unify it under Kublai Khan, circa 849
1287. It was King Anawrahta (1044
1072 AD) who established the first Myanmar Empire (see Han, 2004). The second Myanmar Empire was established by King Bayintnaung in 1551 and the third Empire by King Alaungpaya in 1752. The kingdom waged wars against the Siam and Lao Kingdoms in the 16th century, during the reign of the Toungoo, and these continued under the Konbaung dynasty (1758), the last known dynasty of this land. Myanmar repelled a Chinese invasion in 1770, only to be invaded by the British early in the 19th century, a conquest that lasted 62 years (1824
1886). The first war against British India (1824
1826) resulted in the latter gaining the coastal regions of Tenasserim and Arakan, with a province established in the north of the country. The second war against British India (1851
1852) saw the British gain control of the Irrawaddy delta. The annexation of Myanmar was completed in 1885
1886, and the British called the country ‘Burma’
the country of the Bamar
despite the fact that the people of the country referred to themselves and their homeland as ‘Myanmar’. There is no doubt that the riches of Myanmar were behind the conquest, and that the British had too little time to get to know the country and its people. Soon after the conquest in 1886, David Sime Cargill founded the Burma Oil Company, investing up to £18 million. He was later joined by the American Standard Oil Company (1901). By 1888, Myanmar was producing some 70,000 barrels of crude oil, and by 1910,

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5 million barrels. In 1915, Myanmar was the 14th largest producer of crude oil in the world. Colonial hostility began soon after, coming from the Young Buddhist Association in 1906 in the first instance, then from the General Council of Burmese Associations, and from student opposition, culminating in a student strike in 1920, and, in 1931, a two-year uprising by the peasantry, while the Dobama Asi-ayone (Thakin) Party was demanding independence. Student strikes occurred again in 1936 and 1938. Despite these manifestations of discontent, the British declared the whole country a Crown colony in 1937 (with some degree of autonomy from India, as per the Government of Burma Act). Most of the nationalist movement in Myanmar was led by the People’s Revolutionary Party (PRP), until a strike by oil workers in 1938 led to the formation of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in 1939. The Second World War exacerbated these developments. General Aung San, leader of the National Army, sought to take advantage of the situation to evict the British from the country and formed an alliance with the Japanese when the latter moved into Malaya in 1942. The Japanese invaded the country, briefly replacing the British who, underscoring the economic rationale for their presence in Myanmar, destroyed some £40 million of oil-related machineries, including two oil refineries, when they realised that they would be forced out of the country. As they did in other GMS countries (i.e. Viet Nam and the Lao PDR), the Japanese immediately granted nominal independence to Myanmar, with a government of anti-British nationalists. But the Japanese reign over Myanmar turned out not to be any better than that of the British. The PRP and CPB came together to form the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) in 1944, under the leadership of General Aung San, who orchestrated an anti-Japanese uprising and directed the National Army to switch allegiance and facilitate the return of British troops in 1945 (General Aung San was assassinated in 1947 and succeeded by General U Nu). Myanmar gained full independence a few years later, on 4 January 1948, with General U Nu as the first Prime Minister, albeit with a legacy of deep racial divisions as a result of the policy of ‘divide and rule’ of the British colonial administration, which discriminated against the majority Bamar in favour of some minority ethnic groups, invidious policies that have led to intense and enduring distrust between the different ethnic groups. Myanmar’s independence was almost immediately followed by decades of insurrection by at least 18 ethnically based armies. Many would prefer that the colonial era not be made part of an analysis of the current situation in Myanmar, or that it be kept to a simple

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reference. Colonialism, they argue, cannot be blamed for the 60 years of continuous disputes and conflicts that have arrested development in Myanmar. Yet, ethnic conflict in Myanmar cannot be explained without referring to the role of British colonial rule that, while focusing on the Bamar core in the country, accorded the Shan, the Karen and other groups a certain degree of sovereignty and autonomy. So, the politicisation of language and ethnicity, from the early days of colonisation, was at the roots of very complex negotiations between various ethnic groups and the fundamental cause of the unsteady start of the Myanmar nation at the time of independence in 1948. As a result, the legal framework, laid down in the 1947 Constitution, also contained the seeds of disharmony, and set the tone for ethnic and social conflict, in part as a result of compromises actively encouraged by the British. The Shan and the Karenni were allowed the right to secede from the federal system, while the Kachin State was not accorded the same privilege, and no provision was made for a Karen State. It is also colonialism that aided and abetted the domination by foreign traders, European and Asian, who supplanted the Myanmars and made them poor in their own country. It is also an inescapable reality that the current international borders of modern Myanmar are the result of British imperial interests at the height of that empire’s power (Taylor, 2005: 4), in the sense that the map of Myanmar was redrawn by the British, leaving out territories that once belonged to the previous empires, including Manipur and Assam, while extending the country’s boundaries to the north, south and east, into areas that would otherwise have been claimed by Thailand and China. Myanmar’s Frontier Areas, largely acquired under British rule, make up around half of its total landmass. These have all been the scenes of long-running insurgencies initially fuelled by the usual approach of ‘divide and rule’ of the colonial power. While the British inverted the old social order in some parts of the country (e.g. central and southern Myanmar), they gave the imprimatur of authority to the sawbwas and duwas, traditional headmen, chieftains and local lords in the northern and eastern areas (highlands), using the latter as potential recruits in what was known as the British Indian army, to guard against the potential threat of the king’s armies, mainly composed of the Bamar populations of the lowlands, a situation that largely prevails to this day. The Karenni were given a special ‘independent’ status within the colonial state, a status they still claim. On the other hand, the Kayin base their claim on a mythical belief that they are the lost tribe of Israel, who had the book restored to them by the White missionaries. For their part, the Shan claim that they are fighting to re-establish their pre-independence political autonomy (see

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Taylor, 2005: 8). In 1921, parliamentary constituencies for the first legislative assembly were based on ethnicity and religion, and ethnic differences were fully incorporated into the representative structures of the colonial state until the 1951 elections. The British were also imbued with the arrogance of power and what some have called the ‘high imperialist notions of Caucasian racial superiority’ (Taylor, 2005: 10; Smith 2005: 64) and, in particular, their contempt for the Buddhist faith and customs, which they did not just denigrate, but went so far as to disestablish as the religion of the State, hence undermining its role in the education of the young. This sort of contempt has led some to suggest that Buddhism may be responsible for the people of Myanmar continuing to endure the abuses of successive military regimes, having being taught by Buddhist philosophy not to take action against their abusers and waiting for things to be set right in the next world (see Perry, 2007). Therefore, the seeds of uncompromising nationalism were sown through a reification of ethnicity, which created a pattern of ethnic antagonism, giving rise to multiple nationalisms and becoming the hallmark of Myanmar society and politics. The State the British had bequeathed to the Myanmars was ill-equipped to face up to the challenges of a modern nation, and the current demands and expectations of the various parties in present-day Myanmar are mainly ethnically based. Once the architects of the scorched earth policies were gone, the list of grievances remained and still had to be resolved, and the Myanmars then turned onto each other.21 Post-colonial history The post-colonial history of Myanmar can be divided into three major periods: (1) a parliamentary period, from independence in 1948 to the first military coup d’e´tat in 1962; (2) a socialist period, from 1962 to 1988; and (3) the current period, from 1988 to the present. 1948
1962: The democratic experience

Myanmar was briefly a democratic State (1948
1962) under the leadership of Premier U Nu, who was also known to have promised to make Buddhism the State religion during his 1960 election campaign, in part as a result of the pernicious role of British colonialism in this regard, and as a continuation of the struggle to protect Buddhism and its fundamental role in indigenous education, as Aung San and Thakin Than Tun had done before him. However, Myanmar’s parliamentary system proved very fragile, because, on independence, a virtual civil war erupted owing to disagreements between the majority Bamar, the CPB

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and various ethnic separatist guerrilla groups, such as the Kayin of the Irrawaddy Delta and the Chin, Kayah and Kachin, all of whom wanted political autonomy as promised by General Aung San. In actual fact, General Aung San was aware that the British had promised a number of ethnic minorities an autonomous future before the Second World War. The February 1947 Panglong Agreement, signed by the British government and representatives of the Bamar (headed by Thakin Aung San), Chin, Kachin and Shan peoples, formally recognised some of the autonomy claims for some of the hills peoples and all agreed to unite as partners in the new Union on the basis of Thakin Aung San’s pledges of ‘unity in diversity’. The issue of autonomy for some of these ethnic groups then became the source of serious political contention in the 1950s as civil war broke out in the hills, and was the critical trigger for the 1962 military coup (see Naw, 2001, for a full discussion). U Nu resigned in 1958, after a split within his party, the AFPFL (the ‘Clean’ AFPFL and the ‘Stable’ AFPFL), and asked the Army Chief of Staff, General Ne Win, to head a caretaker government and re-establish order. Civilian rule returned in 1960, when U Nu won the ensuing elections and resumed office in April of that year. Despite its popularity, the U Nu administration was ineffective in the face of actions led by the Federal Movement made up mainly of representatives of the Frontier Areas, seeking to replace the ‘union’ constitutional framework with a federal one and devolve political and economic power to minority constituencies. The insurgencies grew stronger. As a result, the U Nu government succumbed to a coup d’e´tat led by General U Ne Win on 2 March 1962. General U Ne Win was to rule the country for the next 26 years. The Federal Movement was crushed by the army and the voices from the Frontier Areas were silenced. From that time onwards, the history of Myanmar was to be marked by the prominence of the army in all spheres of life, with the latter seeing its role as defender of national integrity. 1962
1988: The socialist experience

General U Ne Win suspended the 1947 Constitution, set up a revolutionary council through the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) and proclaimed what he called the ‘Burmese way to socialism’, nationalising businesses, fixing agricultural prices and cutting off the country from the rest of the world, with the exception of China. All other political parties were outlawed in March 1964. A new constitution was approved by national referendum in December 1973 and proclaimed in January 1974, providing for a highly centralised form of government,

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with the BSPP as the sole authorised political party. In January 1974, U Ne Win who, in the meantime (1972) had become a civilian, together with other senior army officers, was elected President of the newly created State Council, and the military regime was formally ended, with the proclamation of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. A new constitution was proclaimed on 4 January 1974, introducing the notion of ethnic symmetry and representation in the national framework, with the creation of seven divisions (where the Bamar majority live) and seven ethnic minority states: the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon, Rakhine and Shan States. The new constitution was said at the time to be ‘democratic’ and to have greater legitimacy compared to the 1947 Constitution. However, despite the call for national unity in the 1974 Constitution, the actions of the military government continued to divide the people and, as a result, most of the minority groups continued their insurgent activities against the government. In 1975, nine of these ethnic minority groups came together and formed the National Democratic Front (NDF), a coalition of guerrillas, in order to coordinate their military struggles against the central authorities; but the NDF was never able to effectively challenge the military forces of the central government and functioned essentially as an information-exchange liaison office. Most of the grievances of the minority groups have to do with land confiscations, forced labour, forced relocations, discrimination and human rights abuses. The economy continued to deteriorate, and there were riots over food shortages in 1974, followed by student demonstrations in 1976, ushering in new government offensives, especially against ethnic insurgencies near the eastern borders. These offensives caused great numbers of people, estimated to be 828,000 Karen, Karenni, Shan, Tavoyan and Mon, to be internally displaced and the majority of these to flee to neighbouring countries, such as Thailand, China, India and Bangladesh (UNHCR Global Appeal 2008
2009). Thousands of Shan people retreated to the jungles of the Shan State and across the border to Thailand. Some 200,000 Rohingya people, a Muslim minority from southeastern Myanmar, fled to Bangladesh. Many hundreds of thousands of Karen and Mon people also fled from eastern Myanmar into Thailand, after the military offensives of 1994. Some 40,000 Chin sought refuge in the northeast Indian State of Misoram. A smaller number of refugees fled into China. It is also believed that there is a considerable number (many thousands) of internally displaced people within Myanmar proper, especially in the Karen, Karenni and Shan States.

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Adherence to any form of minority cultural or linguistic right during these years was seen as an attempt to adversely affect the unity of the Union and tantamount to subversion of the nation (Article 21 of the 1974 Constitution). Nevertheless, U Ne Win was ‘re-elected’ in January 1978 for a further four years and again re-appointed Chairman of the BSPP in August 1985. However, following a number of unpopular decisions owing to the country’s increasing economic problems, such as the withdrawal from circulation of high-denomination banknotes and rice shortages, General U Ne Win was forced to resign in June 1988. U Sein Lwin, who had presided over the suppression of the August 1988 uprising, replaced U Ne Win as Chairman of the BSPP, Chairman of the State Council and State President, only to resign, in turn, in August 1988, after only 17 days in office. Dr Maung Maung, hitherto the Attorney General, replaced U Sein Lwin and revoked martial law. The Burmese way to socialism was abolished, giving way to the Burmese way to capitalism, albeit a military-dominated capitalist economy. As demonstrations22 continued, it was decided to hold free elections within three months. 1988 to the present: When uniformity is cause for disunity

General Saw Maung seized power on 18
19 September 1988, restored military rule, established the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and the National Unity Party (NUP), in lieu of the BSPP (the only official party from 1964 to 1988 under previous military rule), annulled the 1974 Constitution, abolished the presidency, State Council, Council of Ministers and People’s Assembly, and re-imposed martial law (see Europa World online, 2008). This military coup caused many western governments, Japan, the World Bank, the IMF, and the ADB to suspend all aid programmes to the government of Myanmar. In a conciliatory gesture towards the non-Bamar ethnic groups, Saw Maung’s government changed the official name of the country from Burma to ‘The Union of Myanmar (Myanma Naing
Ngan)’, on the grounds that the previous name conveyed the impression that the population consisted solely of ethnic Bamar. The names of many other cities and regions were also changed to correspond more closely with their pronunciation. The new government also launched ceasefire negotiations with ethnic rebel groups, resulting in ceasefire agreements with 17 of the 21 major antigovernment forces. Some of these groups were allowed to keep their arms and police their own territory. However, the most important insurgents, the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Shan State Army (SSA) remained active. Also looking to appease the international

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community, the government promised to return Myanmar to constitutional reform, encouraged new political parties to register for general elections to a new legislative assembly and organised multiparty legislative elections on 27 May 1990. By all accounts, Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD won the 1990 elections (Tonkin, 2007), despite the fact that, in January 1990, Aung San Suu Kyi was barred from contesting the election, in part because, married to a British citizen, she was ‘entitled to the privileges of a foreigner’, and also because she was believed to be involved with the insurgents. The NLD, which was only formed shortly after the 1988 Uprising, was reported to have won 396 (59.9%) of the 485 seats contested. Saw Maung and the SLORC refused to accept the outcome of the elections and did not allow the Assembly to meet. A stand-off ensued between the SLORC and the NLD, and Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest. In April 1992, Saw Maung was replaced by his deputy, General Than Shwe, who, in January 1993, called for a National Convention to coordinate the drafting of a new constitution. The NLD of Aung San Suu Kyi boycotted the National Convention and was formally expelled from it by the SLORC. The Convention was nevertheless convened, with hand-picked participants. It was reconvened in January 1994, and adjourned in April of that year, after adopting guidelines for three significant chapters of the future constitution. It then reconvened again in November 1995, only to be adjourned in March 1996.23 The country enjoyed some relative tranquillity between 1992 and 1996, as Lt General Khin Nyunt negotiated ceasefires and had 15 guerrilla groups agree to ceasefires by mid-1995. Callahan (1998: 17) has suggested that these ceasefire agreements were not ‘a step toward enduring reconciliation and compromise’ and were ‘nothing more than temporary, ad hoc answers to complex century-old structural problems’. Indeed, despite the agreements, the government continued to forbid the ethnic groups to lobby alliances and coalitions. The ethnic groups were simply allowed to retain their arms and run their own territories, continuing to treat the Myanmar army as enemy combatants and occupying forces. The Kayin and the Mon Tai armed groups continued to fight government forces. Furthermore, Lt General Khin Nyunt was imprisoned by Prime Minister Than Shwe in 2004, for advocating that the regime enter into a dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD. On 15 November 1997, the SLORC was dissolved and replaced by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), a body that based its authority on the 1974 Constitution. After much harassment and

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persecution of political opponents, the SPDC unexpectedly authorised the NLD to hold a party congress in May 1998, to celebrate the eighth anniversary of the general elections. It also allowed universities to reopen and students to resume their education in July 2000, after having relocated undergraduate universities away from city centres. But universities were again closed down indefinitely in 2003. In August 2003, the SPDC announced that it planned to reconvene the National Convention in 2004, in order to commence the drafting of a new constitution. The National Convention met in mid-May 2004 and was adjourned in July 2004. It reconvened again in mid-February 2005 and in October 2006, and several times thereafter, before the final session commenced in July 2007. It formally came to a close on 3 September 2007, when the new Prime Minister, Thein Sein, formally appointed in late October 2007, following Soe Win’s death, announced that the Convention had adopted detailed principles for the new constitution. The SPDC then appointed a 54-member Commission in October 2007 to draft the new constitution. The Commission commenced work in December 2007, without the participation of the opposition. Meanwhile, in mid-August 2007, substantial increases in fuel prices led to a series of anti-government protests across the country. The protests escalated in September 2007, with the involvement of Buddhist monks. On 18 September 2007, tear gas was used to disperse a rally by civilians and monks in the western town of Sittwe, starting six consecutive days of demonstrations in several other cities, including Yangon and Mandalay. Anti-government protests continued on 27
28 September, when they were violently suppressed. On this occasion, in a rare departure from ASEAN policy of non-interference in member states’ internal affairs, ASEAN ministers for foreign affairs issued a statement expressing their ‘revulsion’ over reports of the violent suppression of anti-government protests. A year before this event, in July 2006, the Malaysian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Syed Hamid Albar, had declared that ASEAN’s development was being impeded by Myanmar, and that ASEAN could no longer defend Myanmar, as it was ‘not making an attempt to co-operate or help itself’. This was not all that surprising since in July 2005, ASEAN leaders had become so uncomfortable with the idea that Myanmar might chair the regional grouping, when its turn came up by rotation in 2006
2007, that they pressured the SPDC into waiving that right (Financial Times, 27 July 2005: 6). In February 2008, the SPDC announced that a completed draft of the constitution was ready to be put to a referendum in May. The draft

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constitution was officially published in April 2008. Although the southern part of the country had been devastated by a major cyclone in early May, a national referendum was held on 10 May 2008 and enacted on 29 May 2008, although it was postponed until 24 May in regions seriously affected by the cyclone. According to the SPDC, the new constitution was approved by 92.48% of eligible voters. The constitution can be amended with the approval of 75% of parliamentarians and one-half of the eligible voters. The SPDC also announced plans to organise multiparty elections again in 2010. At the time of writing, no date had been announced for these elections. In any event, the country’s new election laws have reserved one-fourth of the new Parliament for military officials. With a number of military leaders resigning their posts in order to run as civilians in the upcoming elections, it is a foregone conclusion that the military will be taking most, if not all of the parliamentary seats left (iNewp.com, 2010). What is more, Aung San Suu Kyi and other leaders of the NLD have been forced not to register for the elections. In Aung San Suu Kyi’s case, this makes her ineligible, as does the provision according to which persons married to a foreign national are barred from holding political office. Although the military still believe in their own capacity to run the government and the economy, half a century of dismal failure suggests that the very nature of military regimes in this country, characterised by a high degree of centralisation, emphasis on authority and a deep distrust of civilian politicians and technocrats, runs counter to the essence of good governance. Successive governments have mainly been preoccupied with preserving a unitary state and containing civil unrest, and little has been done to promote social harmony and peace. Since independence, the national debate continues to focus on the struggle between the government and the insurgents, and more recently, the political opposition. Myanmar is exceptional in the extent, depth and durability of its authoritarian rule.24 In 2009, the country was ranked 163 out of 167 nations on the 2008 Democracy Index (EIU, 2008) and scored 7 for political rights and 7 for civil liberties, on a scale of 1 (free) to 7 (not free). Where then can we point to examples of good governance? The Preamble of the 2008 Constitution states that the people of Myanmar have been ‘living in unity and oneness’ and promises to ‘uphold racial equality’, ‘live eternally in unity’ and ‘uphold the principles of peaceful co-existence’. Paragraph 3 (Chapter I) states that ‘The State is where multi-National races collectively reside’, while Paragraph 22 reads:

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The Union shall assist: (a) to develop language, literature, fine arts and culture of the National races; (b) to promote solidarity, mutual amity and respect and mutual assistance among the National races; (c) to promote socio-economic development, including education, health, economy, transport and communication, so forth, of lessdeveloped National races. [Emphasis added] However, these pledges are severely constrained by the overall objective of the constitution to ‘steadfastly adhere to the objectives of non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of National Solidarity, and perpetuation of sovereignty’. A point again underlined in the Basic Principles of the constitution (Chapter I, Paragraphs 6a and 6b) and in Paragraph 10, which reads: ‘No part of the territory in the Union, such as Regions, States, Union Territories and Self-Administered Areas shall ever secede from the Union’. According to Holliday (2007: 374), such ‘demands for the nation to cultivate a narrowly conceived and centrally imposed unity make this a degenerate case of governance for harmony in which militaristic calls for discipline, strength, and vigilance hold sway’. Indeed, despite official pronouncements, the history of the country thus far makes it hard to assert that there is any degree of inter-ethnic concord between the majority Bamar and the ethnic minorities. On the contrary, as a result of attempts to impose a heavy-handed uniformity on all the peoples, considerable numbers of members of these minorities continue to flee armed conflicts and flood into refugee camps in Thailand and other neighbouring countries. The objectives of ‘non-disintegration of the Union’ and ‘non-disintegration of National Solidarity’, which are so vigorously and intensely pursued and leave little space for genuine political debate about the fundamental socioeconomic and sociolinguistic rights of the diverse peoples inhabiting this nation, do not just sound hollow, they pay lip service to freedom and equality and real national solidarity. All the foregoing belies the claim made by successive governments to have achieved national unity in Myanmar, as the ethnic and development challenges the founders of Myanmar were discussing in the mid1940s remain unresolved and cry out for some level of imagination. Ethnic minority issues, including language issues, need not be perceived in terms of ethnic separation and territorial disintegration, but must be addressed with a focus on social inclusion. If the process of resolving the ethnic conflicts in Myanmar has as yet a long way to run, achieving a

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positive and lasting outcome will require flexibility and vision. Hence, in 2005, a report entitled ‘Threat to the Peace: A call for the UN Security Council to act in Burma’, commissioned by Vaclav Havel and Desmond Tutu and prepared pro bono publico by Piper Rudnick Gray, a leading New York law firm, called for reconciliation, democratic institutions, unhindered access and unconditional release of political prisoners in Myanmar. The leaders of modern Myanmar will do well to read General Aung San’s Blueprint for a Free Burma again, especially when he writes: ‘we must bridge all gulfs now existing through British machinations between the major Burmese race and the hill peoples, the Arakanese, the Shans, and unite all these peoples into one nation with equal treatment’ (quoted in Smith, 2005: 62). Armed conflicts and violent repression of demonstrations and civil unrest have thus far been the primary means for the pursuit of power and the settling of differences in Myanmar. However, the number of ceasefires the government has managed to achieve thus far
some 20 insurgent groups have agreed to the cessation of hostilities
is an indication that compromise does make communication among longstanding foes possible, and that engagement and dialogue do offer a way of breaking the enduring political deadlock. Multiparty elections, which are perceived by some as the indicator of democracy, actually say nothing about the quality of governance, and are no guarantee of overcoming political tensions. However, building on the richness embedded in the ethnic and linguistic diversity and pluralism can help address the broader issue of empowerment of the most vulnerable groups in society and the development of the country as a whole. Good governance is the pursuit of a truly inclusive system, one that gives all the citizens of the nation a voice in the running of their own lives. Ethnic, cultural and political rights, ethnic inclusiveness and equality of opportunity are required to move the development process forward, and make it possible for all to coalesce around common national goals. While the right to autonomy put forward by the insurgents is articulated in such uncompromising terms that it threatens the very integrity of the state, the government’s inflexibility only serves to exacerbate the problems, making it hard to reach a compromise (Taylor, 2005: 2). The absence of a compromise and the apparent lack of desire to reach a compromise are most puzzling for a country that is so overwhelmingly dominated by Buddhist philosophy. Previous attempts at reaching a compromise have led to military coups or to those found to be working to achieve such a compromise ending up in jail. Yet, a compromise is what Myanmars need more than anything else in order to

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resolve the current stalemate. A close look at the territorial claims of many of the ethnic groups shows that many of these grievances are not as straightforward as they seem. Indeed, the ethnic leaders of the Chin State are not prepared to accept the non-inclusion of the adjoining Kale-Kabaw valley in the Sagaing division, while those of the Kayin State would like to see the seaport included in their state, together with linkages to other Kayin populations in the country. Going back to the pre-independence negotiations, Kayin and Mon leaders had proposed a joint Mon-Karen State, which would have included Mawlamyine, while the territories that included the current Tanintharyi division and the Mon and Kayin States used to be one geopolitical region. Finally, the Kokang, Wa, Pao and Palaung, like many other local communities in the Frontier Areas, would also like to be accorded some degree of autonomy within their own territories.

Language and Governance in Viet Nam Viet Nam has emerged from many external influences, including 1000 years of Chinese rule, which ended in the 10th century, followed by a tributary relationship with China, which lasted 900 years (ADB, 2000). Successive dynasties flourished along with geographic and political expansion deeper into the south from 111 BC to 939 AD, a time during which the Chinese occupied virtually all powerful and official domains. In more than 1000 years of Chinese domination, the numbers of Vietnamese who were proficient in Chinese and held similar powerful positions could be ‘counted on the fingers of one’s hands’ (DeFrancis, 1977: 11). In 939, the Vietnamese finally wrested political control from the Chinese and established an indigenous monarchical system, which prevailed until the invasion by France in the 19th century. The first period of French political control
from 1861 to 1879
just like Chinese colonial power, was direct. Frustrated by the lack of cooperation from King Gia Long, whom they had helped accede to the throne, the French military commenced a conquest of the whole country. However, formal French rule was not established over all the country until 1885, when the court of Hue capitulated, and the Chinese tributary relationship with the north and centre was terminated. Then, to the horror of many Vietnamese, their country was carved up into three main regions: Tonkin or Ba˘`c Boˆ (north), ˙ 25 with Annam or Trung Boˆ (centre) and Cochinchina or Nam Boˆ (south), ˙ ˙ Tonkin and Annam becoming protectorates, while Cochinchina became a French colony (1862
1948). Insurrection and resistance to the French ensued and continued until about 1896, despite brutal repression.

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In March 1945, the Japanese disarmed the French forces and occupied Viet Nam, installing a provisional government. Japanese occupation here, as in many other southeast Asian countries, was brief, as Japan `ˆ surrendered five months later. Immediately after Japan’s capitulation, Ho Chı´ Minh and the Vieˆt Minh took Hanoi and then Hue, the seat of the ˙ Bac o Ðai to abdicate. Ho `ˆ Chı´ Minh declared the imperial court, forcing ˙ independence of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam on 2 September 1945. Although France recognised the government of national liberation `ˆ Chı´ Minh, and despite the Vieˆt Minh winning the majority set up by Ho ˙ in January of the following of seats in the subsequent legislative elections year, Admiral Thierry d’Argenlieu set up an interim government for Cochinchina on 1 June 1946. In response, the Vieˆt Minh launched their ˙ first attack against the French in Hanoi and later against the French garrisons in the south. The Franco-Vietnamese war began in December `ˆ Chı´ Minh proclaimed the Democratic Republic 1946. In January 1950, Ho of Viet Nam as the only legal government of Viet Nam. The new republic was recognised by China a few days later. In February of the same year, the USA and the UK recognised, in turn, Bac o Ðai’s26 State of Viet Nam as ˙ of that year, President the legitimate government of Viet Nam. In June Harry Truman announced that the USA was sending US$15 million in military aid to the French, for the war against the Vieˆt Minh. By 1954, the USA was shouldering 75% of the cost of the war and˙ contributing US$2.6 billion to the war effort. Meanwhile, the French troops had mounted a vigorous counter-attack to retake the country and regained control of the south. Nine years of struggle ensued between the French and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, resulting in the defeat of the French at Ðieˆn Bieˆn Phuc in 1954, when some 40,000 Vieˆt Minh forces overran ˙ 13,000˙ French troops. France was forced to completely relinquish control of the country, and finally recognised the independence of Viet Nam. On 21 July 1954, delegates from nine nations convened in Geneva to sign the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet Nam. As part of the agreement, a provisional demarcation line was drawn at the 17th parallel, dividing Viet Nam into north and south, with the Democratic `ˆ Chı´ Minh, Republic of Viet Nam in the north, under the leadership of Ho and the Republic of south Viet Nam, with Prime Minister Ngoˆ Ðı`nh Dieˆm and the ex-Emperor, Bac o Ðai, at the helm, until nationwide ˙ ˙ elections were held in 1956. France also proposed the ex-Emperor, Bac o Ðai, as Head of State; a proposal that was rejected by the Vieˆt-Minh. The ˙ USA, which had begun sending military aid directly to the Bac o Ðai ˙ government in Saigon, and Bac o Ðai’s government, did not accept the ˙ agreement. Various other agreements had been signed in the meantime,

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which had not been implemented. Key among those were the Halong Bay Agreements (Accords de la baie d’Along), which provided for the creation of a unified State of Viet Nam replacing the Tonkin (north Viet Nam), Annam (central Viet Nam) and the Republic of Cochinchina (south Viet Nam), geographical divisions established by the French. The last French troops left Viet Nam in 1956; by which time, the USA had taken responsibility for the war out of the hands of the French, and US military advisors were being ordered to Viet Nam to provide training for the south Vietnamese infantry, artillery, armoured and marine forces. A ceasefire agreement established a provisional demarcation line 5 km wide at the 17th parallel, and provided for unified national elections to be held in 1956. The proposed elections never took place, as the USA and Prime Minister Ngoˆ Ðı`nh Dieˆm reneged on the Geneva Agreements. With continued support from ˙the USA, the provisional government in the south proclaimed independence and became the Republic of Viet Nam in 1955, a decision that escalated the armed struggle between the north and the south and led to ‘a civil war’ (the Viet Nam War), as the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and Vietnamese patriots from the south decided to remove the government of the Republic of south Viet Nam by force and re-unify the country.27 A peace agreement was signed in 1973, and the USA withdrew from Viet Nam in 1975. A unified communist-led government took control of the country in 1976, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam was established. Viet Nam is a one-party communist state led by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) that continues to reject calls for political pluralism. Viet Nam struggled to find its feet at the end of three decades of war, while trying to apply a strict communist ideology that bore little fruit. The country remained cut-off from most of the rest of the world, and the economy was in the doldrums. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the shift to a market economy in China, the government decided to follow suit and introduced elements of private enterprise in the midc 1980s (Ðoˆi mo´’i). A major aspect of this political and economic renewal, which has directly affected the people of Viet Nam, is the government’s decision to move away from collective farms and direct local authorities to re-allocate the land within each community. Because of its relative scarcity, land is one of the most valuable assets in Viet Nam, and the allocation of land titles to rural households constitutes a considerable transfer of wealth to these households. The administrative process of land redistribution left a number of inefficiencies, with some households having received too much land, while others had been given too little. The process was taken one step

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further, whereby people could sell or acquire land; therefore, land laws were reformed in 1993, and official land titles were introduced, to allow for land transactions to take place (Ravallion & van de Walle, 2003). The aims of the land laws were for (1) the initial inefficiencies of land allocation to be redressed, and for (2) land re-allocation to ensure higher agricultural output. However, there were concerns that local officials, and the e´lite, would take advantage of the process through corrupt practices. There were also concerns about rising inequality, due to reports of rising landlessness, notably in the south (de Mauny & Vu, 1998; Lam, 2001), where there was ‘a greater concentration of land ownership, a greater disparity in wealth throughout the rural community and a possible increase in the phenomenon of landlessness’ (Smith & Binh Tran Thanh, 1994: 17). While some observers argue that this is a ‘harmless byproduct of a more efficient economy’ (Ravallion & van de Walle, 2008), others are of the view that it affects the rural poor in much greater proportion than anyone else, signalling a return to the traditional class structure that existed before colonisation and lasted up until full independence in 1976. Ravallion and van de Walle (2008: 208) take issue with this conclusion and reject the idea that rising landlessness has increased poverty in rural Viet Nam as a whole. Instead, they suggest that, although landlessness among the poor is rising, the landlessness rate tends to be higher among the rural non-poor. Beyond the academic argument over the finer point regarding landlessness in this country, no one can deny the basic fact that, overall, the issue of landlessness has resurfaced in Viet Nam, not only because of the market economy, but also because of the inequities in the process of redistribution of the common good, due to an overwhelming climate of rampant corruption. In part fostered and encouraged by the low salaries of public servants, who look for every means to supplement their income, corruption in Viet Nam is at the source of many complicated administrative procedures and regulations, long delays, bureaucratic red-tape and an opaque decision-making process. Both individuals and businesses acknowledge the existence of many types of corrupt activities, including ‘speed money’, or payments made to move matters more rapidly through the bureaucratic system, embezzlements through falsification of records, paying bribes to delay investigations or dismiss complaints, and selling of choice positions. As in the feudal times, even the appointment of judges is sometimes based on patronage, affecting the credibility of the whole justice system. Corrupt activities in the realm of land redistribution and land disputes tend to be initiated by the wealthy, in an attempt to grab land from the poor who, often, cannot afford long

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litigation. More importantly, and especially for the ethnic minority groups, such as the Montagnards (or Hills Tribes), they do not have a voice because they do not speak Vietnamese. Thousands of Montagnards have had to flee their homes in the central highlands, where their land has been confiscated by government authorities, forcing many of them to seek refuge across the borders in Cambodia and the Lao PDR.28 Over the years, many have been charged under Viet Nam’s penal code for ‘undermining the unity policy’, ‘disrupting security’ and ‘causing public disorder’. The country is also accused of routinely suppressing political dissent and curbing religious freedom, and has a patchy record on press freedom. The government has shut down several publications for violating the limits on permissible reporting, and journalists face large fines for so-called ‘reactionary ideology’. As a result, Viet Nam was ranked 149 out of 167 nations on the 2008 Democracy Index (EIU, 2008) and scored 7 for political rights and 6 for civil liberties, on a scale of 1 (free) to 7 (not free). Through doan ket dan toc or ‘ethnic solidarity’, an idea according to which all ethnic groups on the land as Viet Nam’s children, deserved `ˆ Chı´ Minh ensured that their languages and cultures were respect, Ho treated equally. It is well known that many ethnic minorities sided with `ˆ Chı´ Minh during the wars against France and the USA, because he Ho advocated respect for minority ethnic groups and emphasised equality for all. Memories seem to have faded since the time of the struggle for national liberation. The concomitant development of Quoˆ´c ngu˜’ as the national language and script, its historical role as a rallying point for independence when the country needed a powerful symbol of unity, and the dominant position of the majority nguo´’i Vieˆt or nguo´’i Kinh, have all ˙ conspired to relegate all other languages to virtual non-existence, and considerably weaken the multilingual and multicultural character of the nation.

Conclusion The ADB (2001) defines governance as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s social and economic resources for development’. Looking at the GMS from the outside, at least from a language point of view, one would assume that the national language will go a long way in helping Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam manage their respective social and economic resources and resolve governance issues. Nevertheless, the relationship

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between the national language and good governance is not clear-cut, as shown in the 2008 EIU Democracy Index (Table 5.1) and the 2009 Freedom House Survey (Table 5.2) of the GMS. On every measure, be it the electoral process, civil liberties, the functioning of government, political culture or political participation, all four countries have quite a long way to go. If the EIU (2008) considers a country like Cambodia a hybrid regime, Freedom House does not share that optimism and puts all four polities in the ‘not free’ category. It would appear, therefore, that good governance is much more than having a national language, especially when that national language, as is shown in each country of the GMS, is a factor of marginalisation, notably in the extreme cases of the Lao PDR and Myanmar. Table 5.1 2008 Democracy Index for the GMS Cambodia* Regime

Hybrid regime

Lao PDR

Myanmar*

Viet Nam

Authoritarian Authoritarian Authoritarian

Rank (out of 167)

102

157

163

149

Overall score (out of 10)

4.87

2.10

1.77

2.53

Electoral process/pluralism (out of 10)

6.08

0.00

0.00

0.83

Functioning of government (out of 10)

6.07

3.21

1.79

4.29

Political participation (out of 10)

2.78

1.11

0.56

1.67

Political culture (out of 10)

5.00

5.00

5.63

4.38

Civil liberties (out of 10)

4.41

1.18

0.88

1.47

Source: Adapted from EIU’s Index of Democracy (2008: 4
8) *Cambodia and Myanmar were also identified as ‘countries with a high or very high risk of social unrest’ (EIU, 2008: 14)

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Table 5.2 2009 Freedom Survey for the GMS Countries

Cambodia

Lao PDR

Myanmar

Viet Nam

Political rights*

6

7

7

7

Civil liberties*

5

6

7

6

Not free

Not free

Not free

Not free

Free, partly free, not free

Source: Adapted from the 2009 Freedom House Survey *On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 free and 7 not free

Improving governance is central to achieving development objectives and reducing poverty. However, reducing poverty starts with providing core services and critical information to the most vulnerable in society in a language they understand. Ethnic minorities and the poor do want information on the policies and programmes that affect their everyday lives. They also want to be able to influence these policies and programmes. This two-way communication is made difficult or impossible when there is a language barrier, whether that is a national language or a foreign (official) language. More equitable access for a more inclusive process of development is predicated on the efficient and effective dissemination of information that can lead to full and active community participation in the decision-making process. Participation is not just attending community gatherings and being spoken to by some government representative or bureaucrat from the city. Participation is empowering speech communities to engage the authorities, provide them with feedback and share ideas and initiatives. This cannot be achieved without a language-sensitive approach to participation. Full and active community participation is therefore a prerequisite to local capacity building and a pathway to taking ownership of the development process. Political leaders need to understand that commitment to engaging ethnic minorities and addressing issues of poverty is more than statements of intent and has to be demonstrated by actions and tangible, measurable results. Notes 1. As part of its wide-ranging effort to contain the advance of the communists in southeast Asia, and its war in Viet Nam, the US Air Force began the massive bombing of the northeast region. Some 539,129 tons of ordnance were dropped on the country, from March 1969 to 1973, much of it in indiscriminate B-52 carpet-bombing raids. The tonnage was about three and

194

2.

3.

4. 5.

The Language Difference a half times more than that dropped on Japan (153,000 tons) during the Second World War. Lon Nol served successively as Army Chief of Staff (1955), Commander-inChief of the armed forces (1960), Deputy Prime Minister (1963), Prime Minister of Cambodia (twice) and several times as Defence Minister. He proclaimed himself President of the newly formed Khmer Republic after he deposed Prince Samdech Norodom Sihanouk. Major-General Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak was a cousin of Prince Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, who appointed him Defence Minister in the interim government set up after independence in 1954, then Ambassador to China, the Philippines and Japan. He was later appointed Lon Nol’s deputy, when the latter became Prime Minister in 1969. Born on 19 May 1925, Saloth Sar (Pol Pot) briefly studied radio electronics in Paris in the late 1940s and joined the French Communist Party around that time. He later joined the Cambodian unit of the Indochinese Communist Party, the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP), later renamed the Workers’ Party of Kampuchea (WPK). Saloth Sar became the Secretary General of the WPK in 1963. The WPK was renamed the Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP), although by then its members were commonly known as the ‘Khmer Rouge’. Saloth Sar and the Khmer Rouge established the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea in January and launched an insurgency campaign. Changing allegiance in the 1970s, the Khmer Rouge accepted military aid and training from the north Vietnamese and China, and expanded from less than 5000 armed men to an army of 100,000 in a matter of months. They were able to launch attacks against the Khmer Republic troops, taking control of nearly 60% of Cambodia’s territory. After taking Phnom Penh, Saloth Sar declared ‘Year Zero’ and set out to purge Cambodian society of capitalism, western culture, religion and all foreign influences in favour of a self-sufficient Maoist agrarian state. He officially resigned as commander of the Khmer Rouge military forces in 1985 and went into hiding, continuing to lead the insurgency against the government. He was subsequently arrested and put on trial on 25 July 1997, when a ‘peoples’ tribunal’ sentenced him to life imprisonment. Saloth Sar died on 15 April 1998. China launched a limited and unsuccessful invasion of Viet Nam in February and March 1979 in retaliation for Viet Nam’s incursion into Cambodia. The origins of the Cambodian People’s Party (formerly known as Kanakpak Pracheachon Kaˆmpuche´a or the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party) go back to French colonial times (founded in September 1951). It took its current form in early 1979, as the sole legal party in the country, at the time of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (1981
1989) and during the first two years of the State of Cambodia (1989
1991), when it was known as the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party. The party was renamed the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) in 1991, during the United Nationssponsored peace and reconciliation process. In the 2008 elections, the CPP won 90 seats in the National Assembly election with 58% of the vote, its biggest margin ever.

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6. The Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Inde´pendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coope´ratif (FUNCINPEC)
note the French name!
or the United National Front for an Independent, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia, in English, now led by Prince Ranariddh, was originally formed by Prince Samdech Norodom Sihanouk in 1982 with the support of ASEAN, China and western countries, to oppose the Vietnamese occupying forces and the Vietnamesebacked government in Phnom Penh. Under the leadership of Prince Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, the FUNCINPEC took an active part in the peace negotiations that led to the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991. The leadership of the FUNCINPEC was transferred to Prince Norodom Ranariddh, when the father of the latter became the President of the SNC, and led the FUNCINPEC in the United Nations-sponsored elections in 1993. 7. The Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party, formerly the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF), is a non-communist resistance movement that was created by Son Sann, in October 1979, to oppose the Vietnamese occupying forces and the Vietnamese-installed government in Phnom Penh. It was registered under its new name of the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party at the 1993 United Nations-sponsored elections, in an attempt to broaden its appeal to the Cambodian voters. The KPNLF joined the FUNCINPEC and the Khmer Rouge in the early 1980s, to set up a socalled Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea with Son Sann as Prime Minister. Having won 10 seats in the 1993 elections, the BLDP joined forces with the FUNCINPEC and the CPP to form a coalition government. The party then split into two factions: Son Sann’s faction and Ieng Mouly’s faction. This led to its eventual demise in 1997, with Son Sann’s faction becoming the Son Sann Party, while Ieng Mouly’s faction became the Buddhist Liberal Party. Both contested the 1998 general elections, but failed to win any seats in the National Assembly. 8. Ta Mok, the military commander who arrested Pol Pot in 1997, was the second former Khmer Rouge senior commander held in detention; he died on 21 July 2006 while awaiting trial. Kaing Khek Iev or ‘Duch’ was the governor of Phnom Penh’s Tuol Sleng detention centre, or S-21, where thousands of Cambodians were tortured before being sent to Choeung Ek for execution. In 1999, Duch was tracked down in Battamabang, where he had been working under an alias for three years for an NGO. A born-again Christian, Duch confessed his crimes to the media and offered to cooperate with the international tribunal. He was formally charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes on 12 August 2007. His trial began on 17 February 2009 with an opening procedural session. When the trial resumed on 30 March, he accepted responsibility for his crimes. 9. Also known as Long Bunruot, or ‘Brother Two’, Nuon Chea was educated in French, Khmer and Thai (he studied at Thammasat University) and worked part time for the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1940s. He was Deputy General Secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea in the 1960s. Nuon Chea surrendered to the authorities and expressed deep sorrow for the suffering that he and other Khmer Rouge inflicted on the Cambodian people. He lived for years as a free man, before he was arrested and charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity.

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10. Born Kim Trang in southern Viet Nam, Ieng Sary held several senior positions with the Khmer Rouge, including Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Democratic Kampuchea (1975
1979), until his defection to the government in 1996. He joined the Workers’ Party of Kampuchea in September 1960. Together with Pol Pot, Ieng Sary was sentenced to death in absentia after the Khmer Rouge had been overthrown in 1979, but was officially pardoned by King Samdech Norodom Sihanouk in 1996. 11. Known as the ‘Khmer Rouge First Lady’, Khieu Thirith, e´pouse Ieng Thirith, was the wife of Ieng Sary, the Prime Minister of the Khmer Rouge regime of Democratic Kampuchea. The first Cambodian to hold a degree in English literature, having majored in Shakespeare at the Sorbonne in Paris, she returned to Cambodia in 1957 and worked as a professor of English, before founding a private English school in 1960. A senior member of the Democratic Kampuchea, she became Minister of Social Affairs and Action and Head of the Democratic Kampuchea’s Red Cross Society. 12. Khieu Samphan was the President of the State Presidium of Democratic Kampuchea; in other words, one of the most powerful state officials, from 1976 until 1979. Having studied economics and politics in Paris in the 1950s, and holding a doctoral thesis (1959), he held a faculty position at the University of Phnom Penh on his return to Cambodia in the early 1960s. Khieu Samphan’s economic theories won over Prince Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and were put into practice in an extensive nationalisation programme from 1963. After the overthrow of the government of Sihanouk in 1970, he joined the Khmer communists and the deposed Head of State in establishing the Gouvernement Royal d’Union Nationale du Kampuche´a (GRUNK), an anti-government coalition, in which he served as Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the GRUNK military forces. After the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the subsequent fall of the Khmer Rouge in 1979, Khieu Samphan led a rebel government that was accorded international recognition until 1982. In 1982, he was appointed Vice President in charge of foreign affairs of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. In 1985, he officially succeeded Pol Pot as leader of the Khmer Rouge, and served in this position until he surrendered to the Cambodian government in 1998. From 1991 to 1993, he served on the Supreme National Council as Khmer Rouge representative. Khieu Samphan first appeared before the tribunal in April 2008. 13. According to STAR Kampuchea Organisation (2007: 2), 5.2% of the land was granted as economic land concessions and 21% as forest concessions (see STAR Kampuchea Organisation, 2007). On WWW at www.landcoalition.org/pdf/07_r%5Bt_land_cambodia.pdf. Accessed 15.8.09. 14. The historical account of governance in the Lao PDR provided in this section is in part based on Laos Cultural Profile (Lao Ministry of Information and Culture). On WWW at http://www.culturalprofiles.net/Laos/Directories/ Laos_Cultural_Profile/-1062.html. Accessed 5.12.08. It is also based on Stuart-Fox’s (1997) A History of Laos. 15. The king changed the name of Xiang Dong Xiang Thong to Luang Phraba¯ng (Royal City of the Pha Bang), in honour of the sacred pha bang, the sacred golden Buddha image sent over by the Khmer King in 1358 to establish the Buddhist sangha.

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16. At this stage, the sacred pha bang was moved to Vientiane (1707). 17. The sacred pha bang was again taken to Bangkok until 1867, before being returned to Luang Phraba¯ng. 18. Faced with a blowout in fiscal expenditure and inflation, the Lao Issara’s Minister of Finance, Katay Don Sasorith, issued new money in early 1946, which became known as ‘Katay’s dried banana leaves’ for the poor quality of the paper on which it was printed. 19. The civil service employs about 100,000 people, but the salary range is between US$50 and US$90 a month, barely enough to afford many basic necessities. Recent salary increases (2009 and 2010) have done little to alleviate this long-standing problem. 20. Aung San Suu Kyi has been placed under house arrest on numerous occasions: “

“ “

“ “ “

20 July 1989: house arrest in Yangon under martial law that allows for detention without charge or trial for three years (released on 10 July 1995). 23 September 2000: house arrest (released on 6 May 2002). 30 May 2003: arrested following the Depayin massacre and held in secret detention for over three months before being returned to house arrest. 25 May 2007: house arrest extended by one year. 27 May 2008: house arrest extended for another year. 11 August 2009: house arrest extended for a further 18 months due to a May 2009 trespass incident and was not released until 13 November 2010. She was awarded the Rafto Prize and the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought in 1990 and the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. She was also awarded the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding by the government of India in 1992.

21. In 2007, the combined armed services of Myanmar, the Tatmadaw, were believed to be around 400,000 personnel. These were almost uniformly Bamar. 22. Taylor (2005: 21) suggests that the origins of most of these demonstrations are ‘more inchoate than this ideologically and Western-centric description suggests’. 23. On 13 October 1996, President Clinton barred Myanmar’s government leaders from entry into the USA (New York Times, 4 October 1996, A6). Myanmar reciprocated the very next day (14 October 1996) barring US officials from entering Myanmar (International Herald Tribune, 5
6 October 1996: 4). 24. See Perry (2007: 3). Perry has particularly harsh words for the Myanmar government and, at times contemptuous words for the people of Myanmar and their religion. I do not wish to associate myself with his tone and/or style, because I strongly believe that one must not lose sight of the fact that the struggle for freedom in Myanmar since the early 1930s was to end the humiliation the British imposed on the country. I agree with Taylor (2005: 1), who suggests that those who perceive the solutions to the issues confronting the citizens of Myanmar ‘as simple’, and to be solved quickly by the mere introduction of a democratically elected civilian rule, ‘are in danger of

198

25. 26.

27.

28.

The Language Difference deluding themselves’. I also agree with Smith (2005: 61), who writes about ‘the ways that journalists can come to write of divisions in ‘‘immutable’’ terms rather than questioning how they have come about’. In my view, only the Myanmar people, and they alone, will eventually resolve the issues that are currently holding them back. The friends of Myanmar and her people can only make suggestions, not patronise them. Perry (2007: 10) does acknowledge that ‘Everything possible ought to be looked at and nothing excluded on a priori grounds’, especially when the quality of the data from or on Myanmar preclude any definitive conclusions about the country and its people. Anyone who has studied Myanmar will associate himself/herself with that statement of fact. This region has successively been called Gia Ðinh (1779
1832), Nam Ky` ˙ 1956), Nam Vieˆt (1956
(1834
1945), Nam Boˆ (1945
1948), Nam pha`ˆn (1948
˙ use. 1975) and, currently,˙ Mie`ˆn Nam. However, Nam Boˆ is still in unofficial c ˙ Bao Ðai ascended to the throne in 1924 at age 12, studied in France, then ˙ to Viet Nam in 1932, where he cooperated with the occupying returned Japanese forces during the Second World War. He then briefly joined forces `ˆ Chı´ Minh and the Vieˆt Minh, before fleeing to Hong Kong and then with Ho ˙ back to France. To the rest of the world, and especially to the USA and her allies, Australia and New Zealand, the Viet Nam War was much more than a civil war (see the Truman doctrine (1947) and the Domino theory). At a press conference on 7 April 1954, President Dwight Eisenhower defined the Domino Effect in the following terms: ‘Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the ‘‘falling domino’’ principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences’. The Viet Nam War also impacted on Cambodia and the Lao PDR in significant ways, as the USA sought to cut off the supply route from north `ˆ Chı´ Minh Trail. to south Viet Nam, known as the Ho See Vietnam: Indigenous Montagnards face religious, political persecution. On WWW at http://www.galdu.org/web/index.php?odas1241&giella1 eng. Accessed 24.8.09.

Chapter 6

The Language Difference Introduction The premise of this book was to find out whether the adoption of the national language in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) afforded Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam a much better chance of achieving their development goals compared to, say, African countries that are known for adopting the languages of the former coloniser. Having argued elsewhere (Djite´, 2008) that local languages, rather than European languages would improve the quality of education, the status of health, the performance of the economy and the mode of governance in Africa, I thought the countries of the GMS offered a point of comparison that was worth investigating. Indeed, Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam, having gone through a colonial history similar to that of many African countries, have all chosen a different path when it comes to language policy, opting against retaining English or French as their official languages, and choosing instead Khmer, Lao, Myanma and Vietnamese, respectively, as their national languages. Therefore, the obvious question is whether this choice has been vindicated in terms of their access to modernisation. In other words, does the national language make a difference when it comes to development? Is there a perceptible difference in development between these countries and African countries that can essentially be attributable to their choice of language? Are there fundamental differences in the implementation of multilingualism between the countries of the GMS and African countries?

Separating Facts from Fiction The evidence on the ground in all four countries suggests that: (1) (2)

all four countries embrace a mixture of ethnic groups and languages, some of which are spoken across various borders; the incremental economic growth that has characterised the subregion is marked by great inequalities between peoples and geographic areas; 199

200

(3) (4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

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everywhere, language remains a sensitive issue; the dominant language group of each country exerts power through the imposition of its language as the sole medium of education, administration and governance; ethnic minorities across all four countries are invited to participate in the process of development, provided they leave behind their languages and cultures; ethnic minorities are overrepresented among the poor in all four countries, due to systemic inequities in education, health and economic resource allocation; the status of ethnic minorities is further complicated by the fact that many state authorities regard them essentially as ‘transnationals’, and therefore susceptible to divided national loyalties.

Indeed, despite a long history of literacy and education, it is not clear to what extent today’s GMS countries value language and education in their relentless pursuit of economic growth. The available data indicate that, although they still have relatively high levels of official literacy, countries like Cambodia and the Lao PDR only achieved a low EDI of 0.778 and 0.753, respectively, and were ranked 104 and 108 out of 129 countries on UNESCO’s EFA Development Index (EDI) in 2009 due to their low primary education enrolments, adult literacy and gender parity rates1 (UNESCO, 2008a). This is not particularly surprising for the Lao PDR, considering that in 2006/2007 alone, more than 50,000 elementary and secondary Lao students dropped out of school (PonNgern, 2007). Cambodia, on the other hand, is at serious risk of not attaining universal literacy by 2015. While the country’s net primary school enrolment ratio reached 93.3% in 2008, the survival or retention rate was only 52.5%, falling short of the 100% Millennium Development target for 2010. Its net enrolment rate for secondary school in the same year was even worse, reaching only 34.8%, or less than half the 2010 target of 75% (Boulet, 2009). Around 40% of Cambodians do not complete primary school, and the quality of education in the country is quite low: primary education is ranked 122nd out of 134 countries, while higher education and training is ranked 127th (UNDP, 2009), leading the UNDP, in its 2009 Country Report, to urge Cambodia to reform its education system urgently, if it wanted to improve its workforce productivity (UNDP, 2009). Viet Nam experienced a significant drop in its net enrolment ratio in primary education, from 96% in 1999 to 93% in 2004, and with its recent decision to introduce monthly tuition fees in kindergarten, high school, teacher training colleges and universities, it is feared that these levels of

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education will also experience a decrease in enrolments. Part of the 2008 education reforms, the implementation of tuition fees was scheduled to start in the 2010
2011 academic year. The fees, which will apparently not exceed 6% of average household income, will vary from US$10 a month to around US$45 a month, depending on geographical location (i.e. urban versus rural versus remote areas), levels (i.e. kindergarten, secondary, tertiary) and subjects at tertiary level (i.e. law, medicine). Although it achieved a medium EDI of 0.895 and was ranked 84 out of 129, Myanmar’s official literacy rate of 89.9% is not reflected by the reality on the ground. Together with Viet Nam, whose official literacy rate is 90.3%, it was among the 28 developing countries with over 500,000 children out of school in 2007/2008. This is so, in part, because parents are routinely expected to make donations on various pretexts, despite the official policy proclaiming that primary schooling is exempt of fees, and these costs simply put schooling out of reach of many families. Overall, each of the four countries spent less than 6% of gross domestic product (GDP) on education, as recommended by UNESCO. Thus, there are serious systemic problems in the educational systems of the GMS, and it is not surprising that the language-in-education policies of the countries concerned should point to some glaring language-based inequities. The languages of ethnic minorities are virtually invisible in the schools in this part of the world, not only because the socialist ideology of ethnic equality (especially in the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam) is misinterpreted as ethnic unification, but also because it is wrongly believed that these languages cannot be used for any meaningful purpose and are not adapted to the most recent information technology. This belief is reinforced by the objective of growth-influenced education and linguistic homogenisation in the name of economic development. Hence, the standard curricula in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam are designed for the dominant language groups and, in most cases, do not attempt to meet the needs of ethnic minorities living in rural and remote areas. Although the use of the languages of ethnic minorities has increased in Cambodia over the last decade, making this the only country in the sub-region that is closest to having a mother tongue-based bilingual education for some ethnic minorities, mother tongue-based bilingual education is still not part of public language-in-education policy and is essentially left to international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for experimentation. Even when they do exist, literacy programmes in minority languages are only transitional and are meant to build on the first language to teach the national language. Hence, while people from the dominant language

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group can easily succeed in mainstream schooling, ethnic minorities carry the burden of undergoing extra schooling to prepare for mainstream education in another language. Their children are not able to perform to their full potential in the school system, because the language of instruction does not support their learning. These inequities in education directly influence and compound inequities in the health status of the peoples of the GMS, because, although, officially at least, they enjoy relatively high literacy rates in all four countries (76.3% for Cambodia, 72.7% for the Lao PDR, 89.9% for Myanmar and 90.3% for Viet Nam), they have a low health status, which translates, notably, into high fertility rates (Table 6.1). Although official figures for literacy are based on national averages that hide variations across regions, the non-economist may find the following interesting. If the results of a 2001 Tested Literacy Quality survey conducted in the Lao PDR (Table 6.2) are anything to go by, the official literacy rates are not just misleading, they could simply be wrong. Carried out by the Ministry of Education of the Lao PDR, and calibrated Table 6.1 Total fertility rates in the GMS (2000
2005) Country

Total fertility rate

Cambodia

4.8

Lao PDR

4.8

Myanmar

2.9

Viet Nam

2.3

Source: Adapted from the UNDP Human Development Report (2007/2008)

Table 6.2 Tested literacy quality in the Lao PDR Males (%)

Females (%)

Total (%)

77

60.9

68.7

(a) Basic

53.7

36.9

45.2

(b) Functional

45.2

30.3

37.7

(c) Secure

37.4

24.5

30.8

Reported rates Tested rates

Source: Ministry of Education, Lao PDR (2004b: 45, 55)

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according to its implied value to learners, the Tested Literacy Quality survey showed significant gaps between the ‘reported’ and ‘tested’ rates of literacy for both males and females over the age of 15, with the total ‘secure’ literacy rate less than half the reported rate (30.8 as against 68.7). The ‘secure’ literacy level is the level capable of being sustained and improved through independent learning. These findings underscore the links between language, literacy, education and health. Should the Tested Literacy Quality survey in the Lao PDR be replicated with similar results in the other countries, then the poor health status in the GMS would directly correlate with the prevailing low functional and secure literacy rates. The equivalent literacy rates for females, both reported and tested, which are well below those of males, strongly suggest that this could indeed be the case, considering the sex ratio in all four countries. According to the Global Gender Gap Report (2008), the sex ratio for Cambodia was 0.95, the most female-biased sex ratio of the sub-region, and 0.98 for Viet Nam. The CIA World Factbook estimated the sex ratio of the Lao PDR and Myanmar to be 0.98 each in 2009. This does not bode well either for the women of the sub-region or the children they tend to have in such large numbers, especially for those who live in rural and remote areas, and have limited access to health care services. The results of the Tested Literacy Quality survey also bring into focus the practice of most governments, international agencies and bilateral donors, who insist on literacy in the national and/or official language, and highlight the critical importance of literacy programmes in the languages of ethnic minorities. Poverty is not alleviated by compounding the injustice of marginalisation through discriminatory language policies. Poor literacy and education and poor health lead to inequities in economic opportunities. This state of affairs is partly the result of significant socio-political inequities and injustice based on ethnicity and language, and partly because the economies of the GMS are characterised by the export model, leaving the sub-region vulnerable to external shocks. The prevailing development model in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam is very much about ‘market-building’ and, despite all the official proclamations, not so much about ‘capacity- or state-building’ (Hammer, 2009), an area many will do well to invest in to boost their competitiveness in the global economy. As it happens, skilled human resources, or the lack thereof, is the common Achilles’ heel of all four countries. However, in the name of economic growth, the multilingual realities within these countries have been pushed to the backburner.

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Education and health are starved of resources, and the world is being told to hold off until ‘things get better’, until development is actually ‘achieved’ and governments are again able to invest in ‘the things that matter’. In other words, equal opportunities may only be extended to ethnic minorities when all else has been done. The pursuit of economic growth has also meant that each of these four countries now carries a significant external debt as a percentage of GDP (Table 6.3), with the Lao PDR not only carrying significant external debt as a percentage of GDP (84% in 2010), but also relying on development assistance for more than 60% of its investment budget (UNDP, 2006: 10). Although it has dropped slightly in Cambodia and the Lao PDR, external debt has steadily increased in Viet Nam, as a percentage of GDP. At the same time, countries like Cambodia and the Lao PDR have highly dollarised economies and large ‘efficient’ informal foreign exchange markets, serving as hot beds for tax evasion. According to the ILO (2007: 3), 156 million people, or 63.7% of total employment in ASEAN, were active in the informal sector in 2006. The predominance of the informal economy in Cambodia, the Lao PDR and Myanmar, and its relative importance in Viet Nam, poses major obstacles to the fight against poverty in these countries, as the informal sector is a pole of attraction for the poor and the very poor. People in the informal economy do work hard, but generally remain vulnerable, marginalised and poor, because they engage in activities that are not recognised, recorded, protected or regulated, and are therefore exposed to a variety of labour and social issues, including poor working conditions and child labour. Table 6.3 External debt in the GMS as a percentage of GDP Cambodia

Lao PDR

Myanmar

Viet Nam

2010F

31.8

84




36.5

2009e

31.8

93




36.0

2008

37.8

93




33.0

2007

40.4

101




33.4

2006

45.1

97




31.5

2005

50.4

113




32.7

Source: Adapted from the World Bank East Asia and Pacific Economic Update (2010, Vol. 1, pp. 41, 52, 76)

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The lack of vision in addressing these issues is made evident in the poor quality and inefficiency of governance in the sub-region. The countries of the GMS all have a poor record in this area, and are found wanting on all six dimensions of governance: (a) voice and accountability, (b) political stability and absence of violence, (c) government effectiveness, (d) regulatory quality, (e) rule of law, (f) and control of corruption (Kaufmann et al., 2008). Corruption, in particular, is known to have a significant impact on the economy and society, directly affecting the rule of law and government effectiveness, and therefore political stability and issues of voice and accountability. Corruption and inefficiency in Cambodia, the Lao PDR and Viet Nam, and corruption and chronic civil conflict in Myanmar, aggravate the debt situation and help expand the informal sector, while deepening its negative effects on the economy. The rich and powerful are often the ones with the means to engage in corrupt behaviour and manoeuvre to obtain bribes and/or embezzle funds meant to pay for basic services. In so doing, they weaken the ability of governments to provide public services to those who need them the most. The UNDP stigmatised corruption as a scourge that: undermines democratic institutions, retards economic development and contributes to government instability. It attacks the foundation of democratic institutions by distorting electoral processes, perverting the rule of law and creating bureaucratic quagmires whose only reason for existence is the soliciting of bribes. (UNDP, 2008: v) The 2007 aggregate governance indicators for Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam showed that Myanmar had the lowest ‘control of corruption’ indicator (
1.46), faring the worst on all counts, while Viet Nam, with the lowest corruption indicator (
0.69), showed the best results on four indicators (political stability and absence of violence, governance effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law) (Table 6.4). Similarly, the Lao PDR, with the next best result in control of corruption (
1.00), showed better results in the areas of political stability and absence of violence, governance effectiveness and rule of law. Cambodia outdid the other three countries in the area of voice and accountability, no doubt because it is the only country to have been able to organise elections generally seen as ‘free and fair’ over the last decade, despite the level of violence in the country before 1993. Hence, viewed in material terms, and excluding any role for language and culture, development in the GMS is severely constrained, not only by poor infrastructure and a difficult geographic environment, but also by low levels of education, persistent health problems, weak infrastructure,

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Table 6.4 Governance indicators in the GMS in 2007 Indicators/countries

Cambodia

Lao PDR

Myanmar

Viet Nam

Voice and accountability


0.87


1.66


2.16


1.61

Political stability and absence of violence


0.43

0.00


1.22

0.31

Government effectiveness


0.82


0.81


1.67


0.41

Regulatory quality


0.51


1.08


2.23


0.43

Rule of law


1.06


0.96


1.41


0.53

Control of corruption


1.08


1.00


1.46


0.69

Source: Adapted from Kaufmann et al. (2008: 79
96)

lack of integrated national economies, limited human resource capacity and lack of skills at all levels of government. History and experience since independence in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam show that pushing on with one single agenda has unnecessarily complicated and delayed the objective of lifting the majority of the people out of poverty. Poverty continues to be widespread, and it is not clear whether the countries of the GMS will be able to maintain their current pace of economic growth. Much work remains to be done in education, health and governance to overcome persisting exclusionary practices, starting with the use of local languages. The principle of equal participation by all in all spheres of society on a multidimensional basis can only be achieved through a radical turnaround. Given the low social indicators in education and health, many, if not all of these countries, will find it difficult to reach all the other Millennium Development Goals by 2015. These weaknesses will continue to impede the competitiveness of all four countries, unless poverty reduction measures are broad based and sufficiently aimed at the rural areas and the poorest groups. This goes to show that trade and economic growth alone do not automatically translate into meaningful improvements in people’s lives. In fact, they have the potential, instead, to widen existing inequalities between the rich and poor, between urban and rural areas, between men and women, between the national language majority and ethnic minorities. Reality on the ground in the GMS countries suggests that development is not just about roads, dams and factories, nor is it solely about the GDP or the trade balance. Beyond these economic measures of development, we need to ask what happens to the education and health

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of those who are the ‘working ants’ of economic performance, and especially those who are least able to change their own circumstances. Economic growth and governance are the intrinsically related dimensions of a single socio-political reality. Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam are no exception to this rule. The economic situation in each of these countries is largely due to the choice of governance made by their respective governments. Although the latter have used economic performance and/or quashing insurgencies to justify their legitimacy for decades, the development model they adopted has real limits. Although many are still attached to the ‘trickle-down’ theory of development, measurable and measured only in terms of economic growth (Arndt, 1987), the rise in a state’s average per capita income does not necessarily mean that the benefits of such a rise are evenly distributed throughout the population. Economic growth approaches to development have repeatedly proven to be unsustainable and have failed to alleviate poverty in the GMS (DFID, 1997). Increases in education, the level of health, economic activity and democratic participation provide much more than a trickle of prosperity and allow people to thrive and generate a level of productivity that is more widely spread and sustainable in the long term. Therefore, development depends on the interplay of an array of key factors, such as education, health, the economy and good governance, which combine to produce a sustainable outcome. Even though this outcome is often expressed in figures, development is first and foremost about people; and the history of nation-states teaches us that people are diverse in essence, and that languages are one of the undergirding reasons for this diversity. Languages are also the common denominators that run through and connect each and every one of the key factors that are crucial to development. Therefore, in defining development, one must ask what it is that development is seeking to achieve, and for whom? One also needs to ask whether economic growth does trickle down to all the citizens of the state, and bring tangible improvements in their daily lives (e.g. good housing, potable water and clean sanitation), and whether all are given the opportunity to have their views heard and taken into account in the running of the public affairs of their country. Socioeconomic vulnerability in the GMS is mediated by how the linguistic capital is distributed in society and accessed by different segments of the population. As a result, large numbers of ethnic minorities are marginalised, illiterate and poor, especially in the Lao PDR and Myanmar. Given that language is the enabling factor for access to quality education and good health, the participation of ethnic

208

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minorities in economic growth hinges on harnessing their potential in a different manner than is currently the case in the GMS. Equitable growth and equal opportunities will only be extended to the ethnic minorities when their languages are fully taken into account, so they can understand and share in the task of nation-building. It is both naı¨ve and dangerous to leave a sizeable proportion of the people on the margins of the development process, especially when those who are being marginalised could, in fact, turn out to be the majority when put together. Fox (2003: 402) believes that this is definitely the case for the Lao PDR, where ethnic minorities arguably make up between 40 and 70% of the population. Economic growth in pursuit of development should aim to achieve prosperity for all. However, for economic growth to be inclusive and strengthen the capacities of all citizens, the latter must be given access to quality education, good health care and an open system of governance. One of the challenges in the GMS is to ensure that all languages play their role in expressing identity and optimising communication for their speakers, giving them effective access to information and full participation in the development process. An articulate multilingual citizenry is a prerequisite for development, and a country may not be able to develop until all its people can take full advantage of opportunities to improve their lives. Policy is not practice Facing up to the challenge of a monolingual ethos in the GMS will require acknowledging the gap between policy and practice with regard to language in general, and language-in-education in particular. Examples abound of constitutional clauses, education laws and policy documents, across the sub-region, acknowledging the existence of ethnic minorities, encouraging the use of their languages and the promotion of their cultures in every sphere of life. The multitude of country reports, development strategies and studies in all these countries is quite remarkable. Indeed, many government officials and their advisers have excelled in the use of ‘buzz’ words in policy documents to obtain funding for various projects, promising to take language and cultural diversity into account, but there is an obvious lack of implementation of these pronouncements. While portraying themselves as active agents of social change engaged in positive multilingual policies, they manoeuvre to make linguistic otherness into something abnormal and problematic, something to be feared, and a target of existential anxieties in need of a

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nationalist approach. Instead, ‘assimilationist’ policies are strengthened, with nationalist cultural agendas, promoting one national language, and sometimes one religion (as is the case in the Lao PDR and Myanmar), at the expense of other languages and religions. International donors, who have their ‘own agendas of linguistic imperialism’ (Phillipson, 1992), go along with this ‘charade’, and turn a blind eye to this pretence, even forcing their own languages into the equation. The never-ending development of educational and other training facilities in English and French in Cambodia and the Lao PDR are cases in point. This then becomes a sorcerers’ dance, in which the participants try to outdo one another. Meanwhile, the key issue of local languages remains unresolved, and the goals set with great ambition and hope, slowly move out of focus. Over time, development is no longer a goal, but becomes an ideal to be pursued by successive and equally hypocritical governments. Acknowledging diversity is not coterminous with respecting and building on the rich linguistic and cultural foundations of the people, as the rhetoric is never put into practice. National language promotion in the GMS is argued for by governments, not as a sociolinguistic theory advocating a nationalist approach to language policy, but under the guise of ‘nationism’ (Fishman, 1968), that is to say, the need to deal with the practical concerns of governance. Indeed, since the shift to the market economy in the GMS, the emotional attachment to language and the promotion of national identity have given way to an emphasis on governance and the practical concerns of running the nation’s public affairs. Hence, Fishman’s (1968: 43) dichotomy in seeking to separate the functional and symbolic aspects of language has been reversed here, with economic growth serving as the reason for the exclusive development and promotion of the national language. However, evidence on the quality of education, or lack thereof, the status of health, the state of the economy and governance strongly suggests that efficiency in governance does not necessarily flow from the exclusive use of a national language in the countries of the GMS, for their own citizens are clearly not proficient, let alone efficient, in what amounts to a second or a third language for them. If efficiency in governance includes active participation and capacity building for all, then surely, a national language policy in a multilingual context is a most unnatural and irrational way to address the practical concerns of governing a nation and achieving growth and development goals. The most natural and effective way of transferring knowledge and skills to the masses is to do so not only in a language they understand, but also in the language in which they can better express their creative abilities.

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Therefore, nationism requires better management of linguistic pluralism, rather than the elevation of one language over and above all others. A multilingual policy is not so much about preserving and valorising the local languages as it is about maximising capacity building for minority language groups and empowering them to participate fully in all aspects of development.

Conclusion Apart from the similarity of colonial occupation, Africa and the countries of the GMS have travelled along what, at first glance, looks like diverging paths when it comes to language policy. Indeed, it is remarkable that, while most African countries opted to keep the language of the former coloniser and have yet to reconsider this choice, all the countries of the GMS instead decided to part ways with English and French, as soon as they became independent. In fact, during colonisation, the languages they later adopted as national languages were used alongside the language of the colonial administration. This is no doubt because they had a long tradition of literacy in those precolonisation languages. Although there is documented evidence that a number of African languages had written scripts and were used for literary activity among some groups before colonisation (e.g. Akan, Bambara, Bamoun, Efik Hausa, Yoruba and Amharic), the evidence of language scripts and language development in Africa is not as strong or as pervasive compared to Cambodia with Khmer, the Lao PDR with Lao, Myanmar with Myanma and Viet Nam with Vietnamese, where young men were taught the principles of Buddhism and initiated in the rudiments of the written scripts of these languages in Buddhist temples for centuries before western colonisation. There are also similarities between Africa and the GMS with regard to the introduction of forms of speech that became the new norms for colonially imagined speech communities (e.g. the Lao PDR and Viet Nam). The colonial administration engaged in the engineering and codification of previously undistinguished languages, using them as markers of previously non-existent ethnic differences (e.g. the Lao language and script in the Lao PDR as opposed to the Thai language and script) that effaced and supplanted previous social formations up to colonial times (Errington, 2001: 26). This brings us to another point of similarity, the descriptive objectification of imagined speech communities, which has led to a plethora of reified languages. Indeed, as in the case of the African continent, there is

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no general agreement on the number of languages or ethnic minorities in the GMS. Discussions about language in this part of the world are based on population censuses at best, even when these did not specifically set out to ask about language, and at worst on the educated guesses of colonial and post-colonial bureaucrats, local political authorities, with their own, often conflicting, agendas of political manipulation, or descriptive linguists, whose sole aim is to discover new languages everywhere they go. Hence, hundreds of ‘ethno-linguistic groups’ have been created, even though no comprehensive language mapping has been undertaken and the very concepts of what constitutes an ethnic group, a language or a dialect still remain to be resolved. Lists of ‘languages’ spoken in each country are published by linguists and nonlinguists alike, without serious consideration of the meanings and/or implications of the concept of ‘language’, in terms of an objective description of the sociolinguistic reality within polities. While academic knowledge of human language diversity owes a great deal to descriptive linguistics, colonial language projects are still alive and well. These ‘simple views of enormously complex situations’ (Errington, 2001: 20) have not only to be acknowledged for what they are: ‘fantasmatic representation[s] of authoritative [linguistic] certainty in the face of spectacular ignorance’ (Greenblatt, 1991: 89), they have to be challenged, with an eye to the social injustice they introduce in what are otherwise normal, multilingual sociolinguistic situations. The colonial legacy of language classification is also seen in the emphasis placed on the national language, seeking to erase ethnic and linguistic diversity. The linguistic models popularised during colonial times, and the notion of a homogeneous national language and culture, also sought to link languages and territories (nationalism), and therefore create some types of imagined speech communities. There is no doubt that counting languages is difficult. It is a major challenge to find out how closely languages are related to each other. Languages in multilingual contexts are not necessarily bounded and delimited systems that occupy equally bounded and delimited spaces and functions, and it is difficult to specify the exact territorial distribution of a number of languages within and across these countries for, owing to colonisation or immigration, a number of languages are spoken in more than one geographical area and/or country. The discrepancies are also due to the differential treatment or marginalisation of various ethnic minorities from power in colonial and post-colonial times (e.g. the Frontier Areas in Myanmar). As Mignolo suggests (1996: 9), language classification, based on the method of the biological sciences, aimed at

212

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capturing the unique characteristics of individual languages, but, in the process, created gaps between language groups based on racial rather than linguistic opposition.2 Needless to say, governments in the GMS were only too happy to go along with these classifications, so long as these could be used to justify their policies of national unification. Under the pretext that cultural and linguistic diversity is undesirable and represents potential threats to social peace and obstacles to development, the governments of Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam, like those of African countries, have used language to consolidate new national identities and as a means to facilitate their access to power and wealth. This monolingual policy has been implemented through the retention of European languages in most African countries and the adoption of a national language in the GMS, leaving parts of the population without a voice. However, neither choice resulted in the expected outcomes in terms of human development or the level/quality of governance. Indeed, according to the Human Development Index compiled on the basis of data from 2007 and included in the 2009 UNDP Report covering 180 United Nations member states (UNDP HDR, 2009: 167
174), Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam have not made great strides in terms of development (see Table 6.5). All the countries of the GMS are ranked in the ‘medium human development’ category, alongside 25 other African countries, and well behind Libya (55th), Seychelles (57th) and Mauritius (81st), who are listed in the high human development category. In fact, in the areas of public expenditure on health and education, they do not perform better than most African countries in the medium human development category, as shown in their results for healthy life expectancy at birth and unhealthy life expectancy as a percentage of total life expectancy (Table 6.5). Apart from Cambodia, public expenditure on health in the GMS is particularly low. Only Viet Nam manages to obtain a reasonable result in terms of healthy life expectancy at birth, in part because of its relatively developed health care service outreach. Similarly, there is no evidence that the adoption of a national language has put any of the countries of the GMS in a much better position, compared to African countries, when it comes to good governance (Table 6.6). While Cambodia, ranked 102nd, is listed as a ‘hybrid regime’, the Lao PDR (ranked 157th), Myanmar (ranked 163rd) and Viet Nam (ranked 149th) are all listed as ‘authoritarian regimes’, behind African countries like Liberia (ranked 98th), in the case of Cambodia, and Sudan (ranked 146th) and Zimbabwe (ranked 148th) for the rest. Liberia, Sudan and

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Table 6.5 Education and health in the GMS Cambodia

Lao PDR

Myanmar

Viet Nam

137

133

138

116

2007 Score

0.593

0.619

0.586

0.725

Public expenditure on education as a percentage of total government expenditure 2007

12.4

14.0

18.1




Public expenditure on health as a percentage of total government expenditure 2006

10.7

4.1

1.8

6.8

Healthy life expectancy at birth (years) 2007

55

54

52

66

Unhealthy life expectancy as a percentage of total life expectancy

9

16

15

11

Rank

Source: Adapted from the UNDP HDR (2009)

Table 6.6 Comparative democracy index for Africa and the GMS (2008) Countries

Rank

Overall score

98

5.25

Cambodia

102

4.87

Sudan

146

2.81

Zimbabwe

148

2.53

Viet Nam

149

2.53

Lao PDR

157

2.10

Myanmar

163

1.77

Chad

166

1.52

Liberia

Source: Adapted from the EIU Index of Democracy (2008)

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The Language Difference

Zimbabwe are not exactly shining examples of democracy and no country in the world would consider being ranked behind them an achievement. Despite recent changes in Liberia and Zimbabwe, the world has yet to see concrete evidence of good governance in both countries. Significantly, Myanmar, the lowest ranked country of the GMS, sits above only one African country, Chad (ranked 166th), on the Democracy Index. Even more significant here is the fact that the Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam are listed well behind Iraq (116th) and Afghanistan (138th) on the Democracy Index. Therefore, our knowledge of language needs to be rearticulated and updated based on the actual language practices of speech communities, rather than conceived in terms of neo-colonial control of the communication patterns within the national space. Such a rearticulation will ultimately fracture and demystify language classifications that only fit the inventing of languages and theoretical models with a particular agenda (theoretical or political). Governments may not want to empower ethnic minorities for fear of inciting secessionist aspirations, but failing to do so defeats the purpose of trying to lift their own people out of poverty. The objective of poverty reduction can only be achieved through quality education, good health, a prosperous economy and good governance, none of which is possible without an appropriate means of effective communication. Conflict is inherent in language issues, because language is part and parcel of ways of exerting and legitimising power; indeed, language is power to confer or deny opportunities and privileged access to unequally distributed resources, making linguistic and cultural discrimination central to disempowerment and poverty. It is therefore disingenuous to claim that any language is neutral and try to disconnect it from what it actually does, especially in the context of developing countries. As there is no circumventing the language issue, one should seek to include ethnic minorities in the development process, for what hurts part of the people will ultimately hurt all the people in the nation. Managing linguistic and cultural diversity will always be predicated on why we think pluralism has value. According to UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001): ‘Respect for the diversity of cultures, tolerance, dialogue and cooperation, in a climate of mutual trust and understanding, are among the best guarantees of international peace and security’. Inclusive multilingualism is therefore about equally empowering all the productive forces of a nation. Nations with a truly global ambition need all of their human resources, in all the languages spoken within their territory.

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215

Many economic benefits have already accrued to those nations that have taken full advantage of the varied language skills at their disposal. This book has argued that development challenges are complex and cannot be explained by one single issue, either economic or linguistic. However, it has also stressed the importance of linguistic pluralism, while attempting to show that language is not neutral. Therefore, governments and civil societies alike should seek to establish open societies that celebrate their ethnic diversity and look to ensure security from poverty and disease for all their people through all the communicative means at their disposal. Languages have a multiplier effect when it comes to education, health, the economy and good governance. Developing countries and emerging economies have the opportunity, and a special duty, to develop their language potential to the fullest and not repeat the errors of the old nations of the world that are only now rediscovering the cultural and economic value of language diversity.3 Languages exist for very good reasons, least of which is the pleasure of being different. Notes 1. Viet Nam was not listed in the 2009 EDI ranking. However, in 2007, this country achieved a medium EDI of 0.910, and was ranked 70th. The following year, its EDI dropped to 0.899 and its rank to 79th. 2. See Renan’s (1863) Histoire ge´ne´rale et syste`mes compare´s des langues se´mitiques. Paris: Imprimerie Impe´riale, in which he talks about the ‘monstrous’ and ‘backward’ character of Semitic languages as opposed to the perfection of European languages. 3. The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages now gives language rights to groups that were previously discriminated against. Australia has made considerable strides in the areas of language policy and language planning, especially between 1987 and 1996, accommodating Aboriginal and immigrant languages and promoting multilingualism and multiculturalism, without sacrificing national cohesion (see Council of Europe, 2008; Grin et al., 2003).

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