The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, vol. 6 [6]

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Bibliotheca Britannica Philosophica

The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne Volume Six

Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne Edited by

A A Luce and T E Jessop

Volun1e Six Passive Obedience Advice to Tories who have taken the Oaths An Essay towards preventing the Ruin of Great Britain The Querist A Discourse addressed to Magistrates Two Letters on the Occasion of the Jacobite Rebellion 1745 A Word to the Wise Maxims concerning Patriotism Edited by

T E Jessop

Ferens Professor of Philosophy in the University College of Hull

NELSON

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EDITOR'S PREF ACE Tms volume, like the one in which Berkeley himself reprinted some of its contents, could be called a ' miscellany.' But it has a unity. All the pieces except the first and the last are direct, and those two indirect, comments on particular social situations. The reader will bear in mind that in one tract the situation is English and in another Irish, and that ' this kingdom ' means England or Ireland but not both, the designation for both being ' these kingdoms.' As addressed to '--'g-iven situations, these writino-s b are documents of fact and impression for the social historian of the period, conspicuously the Essay on the Ruin of Great Britain, on the aftermath of the South Sea Bubble, and The Q,uerist, on the economic state and prospects of Ireland. For the estimation of Berkeley as thinker, man, and writer this collection is of considerable importance. (a) The comments are those of a philosophical and religious moralist: he descends on fact from a high standpoint, arguing in every circumstance that social being, and a fortiori social well-being, are impossible without a widely spread spirit of morality, and without religion as both the psychological and the logical foundation of this. In the early Pmsive Obedience he expresses this attitude in his weightiest philosophical manner. The same attitude, without any vesture of philosophy, comes out in a realistic manner in The Q,uerist, in which he reveals an intimate acquaintance with econo­ mic fact and a remarkably prescient grasp of economic principle. That this interest in economic matters was neither a passing nor a lately acquired one is evident from some of the constructive proposals he made in the Essay on the Ruin of Great Britain. The epistemological and metaphysical theory for which he is famous does not appear in any of the tracts in the present volume. ( b) The rumour that Berkeley was an unpractical dreamer is falsified by these tracts, as it is by the story of his life. He here steps forward as a man of the world, in the sense of having a close knowledge of its human detail, the fruit as much of his observant travelling as of his topical reading. He was at court and in hovels, seeing the politicians at the top and the results of their mistakes at the bottom. Although close to politics, he detached V

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

himself from its passions, denouncing the party spirit in Tories and Whigs alike. He was able, even in his day and his position, to speak of 'the vulgar, whether they go in coaches or walk on foot.' The passion he retained was a quick sympathy for the unfortunate, making him one of the forerunners of the age of philanthropy; he found the spectacle of poverty almost as intolerable as that of moral slackness or vice. On the matter of national loyalty, we hear him in these pages confessing a double patriotism-as con­ sciously an Irishman through birth and domicile as an Englishman by recent descent. (c) As a writer he proves himself, in this volume as in the preceding ones, a master of sentence and phrase, in a style that is always clean and clear, usually unemphatic, often picturesque (' in every road the ragged ensigns of poverty are displayed '), occasionally mordant (landlords could be ' vultures with iron bowels '), and in The Q,uerist pointing itself in hundreds of epigrams. The writings are arranged in chronological order. They extend over nearly the whole of Berkeley's life as an author. Two of them, Advice to the Tories and The Irish Patriot, here appear for the first time among his works; hitherto the only reprint of the former has been in a German philosophical periodical, and of the latter in an English Literary weekly. The texts of every known edition issued during his lifetime have been thoroughly collated. This drudgery, which I hope no one will have to do again, has not resulted in any noteworthy discoveries, but it has purged Berkeley's compositions of Fraser's grammatical and stylistic alterations, as well as of his pardonable oversights. Fraser's work needed to be revised. Yet I must take this opportunity­ the last I have in these volumes-of acknowledging my respect for the magnitude and general accuracy of it, and for the ex­ tensive and curious learning which he poured into it. Only occasionally has Berkeley's (or his printer's) spelling had to be modernized; more frequently the punctuation. The queries omitted in all editions after the first edition of The Q_uerist arc reprinted with the original spelling and punctuation. T.E.J.

CONTENTS PASSIVE OBEDIENCE Editor's Introduction Text

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•

I

3 15

ADVICE TO THE TORIES \VHO HAVE TAKEN THE OATHS Editor's Introduction Text

47 49 53

AN ESSAY TOWARDS PREVENTING THE RUIN OF GREAT BRITAIN Editor's Introduction Text

61 63 69

THE QUERIST AND OTHER WRITINGS ON ECONOl\1ICS Editor's Introduction . Text The Quer�st • Queries omitted • Letter on the Project of a National llank The Irish Patriot, or Queries upon Queries .

87 89 105 154185 189

A DISCOURSE ADDRESSED TO MAGISTRATES • Editor's Introduction • Text

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193 1 95 201

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CONTENTS

TWO LETTERS ON THE OCCASION OF THE . JACOBITE REBELLION, 1745

223

Editor's Introduction A Letter to his Clergy

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225 227

A Letter to the Roman Catholics of his Diocese

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229

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23 I

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2 33

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235

A WORD TO THE WISE Editor's Introduction Text MAXIl\-1S CONCERNING PATRIOTISM

Passive Obedience Or the Christian Doctrine of not resisting the Supreme Power, proved and vindicated upon the principles of the Law of Nature. In a Discourse delivered at the College Chapel .Nee vero aut per senatum aut per populum salvi /we lege J1ossumus Cicero, Fragm. de republica

First printed in 17 u

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION FouR editions were published by Berkeley-the first in 1712 in Dublin; another in the same year in London, probably simul­ taneously; a ' second edition,' also in 1712 and in London; and, again in London, a ' third edition, corrected and enlarged,' in 1713. The text of this last is printed in the following pages, with Berkeley's solid sections sometimes broken into paragraphs and the punctuation somewhat modernized. Except for the addition of a footnote and of Sect. 53, it is virtually identical with the text of the preceding issues; the few differences in these have been indicated (A=Dublin edn., B=second edn.). The only posthumous reprint outside editions of the collected Works is styled The Afeasure of Submission to Civil Government (1784, London), the anonymous editor of which has taken liberties with the text as with the title. The British Museum has a MS. of the entire piece in Berkeley's hand (Add. MS. 39304). It was described by Dr. Luce in our joint Bibliograpky of Berkeley (Oxford, 1934), pp. 81f It is an untidy thing, hastily written and with many erasions, additions and alterations. My first impression, that it might well be transcribed in full for this volume, passed when I had made a detailed collation of it with the printed text. It is the latter unpolished. Only a few points of difference are of enough interest to warrant notice in locis. Passive Obedience originated in three discourses (perhaps re­ flected in its three divisions) delivered in the chapel of Trinity College, Dublin, where Berkeley was still in residence. They had brought upon him the suspicion that he was a Jacobite, and it was to dispel this that they were fused and published. The suspicion, nevertheless, persisted, and delayed his advancement after the Whigs came into power in 1714. In I 7 I 6, for instance, he was denied even a modest living in Dublin, although re­ commended for it by the Prince of Wales: someone, he wrote at the time, had 'wronged my character,' 1 which would be very hard to do except by political rumour. That may have been the 1

Letter of 26 May 1716 to Percival. 3

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occasion of an undated incident reported by his early biographer Stock1 : the Prince, having sent a recommendation to Lord Galway and received the objection that Berkeley was a Jacobite, was shown by his own secretary, to refute the allegation, a copy of Passive Obedience. The charge was repeated as late as I 732, when Berkeley was a candidate for the Deanery of Down, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland reporting to London that he was ' dis­ agreeable to all the King's friends in Ireland '; on hearing of which Viscount Percival pointed out in high places that shortly after the accession of George I Berkeley had published a pamphlet, Advice to the Tories who have taken the Oaths ( I 7 I 5 : in this volume), ' wherein he laid it on the conscience to acquiesce in the present government, and be dutiful subjects. ' 2 This was the year of the first Jacobite rebellion, on the checking of which Berkeley remarked that ' the enemies of our Constitution hang down their heads.' 3 During the second rebellion ( I 745), besides publishing two letters against it, he raised and equipped a troop of horse. He was plainly no Jacobite in practice; and that he was not one in theory will be evident to all but hasty readers of Passive Obedience.

Whether any particular event led Berkeley to choose passive obedience as the subj ect of his three discourses is not known. He may have been admonishing the Jacobites to keep the peace, but the printed essay is clearly an argument against the Whig theory of limited or conditional loyalty, and a warning against its possible practical consequences. The subject \Vas a matter of contemporary debate. In I 709 William Higden's View of the English Constitution argued for passive obedience, and Berkeley had expressed broad agreement with it in a letter ( 2 I October) to Percival. In I 7 1 o there had been the notorious Sacheverell affair, the impeachment of this divine by the \Vhig ministers for a sermon preached in St. Paul's Cathedral in the previous year, 4 denouncing toleration from above and the alleged right of resistance from below-the trial resulting in his suspension and the public burning of his sermon. Berkeley's contemporary correspondence has several references to the affair, on the whole sympathetic to Sacheverell, but with a note of reservation, occasioned, probably, by Sachcverell's extremism. By this 2 B. Rand, Berkeley Memoirs of Berkele)' ( I 77G ; p . 5 of 1 784 edn . ) . 3 Letter of 3 November 1 7 1 5 to Percival. and Percival ( 1 9 1 4) , p. 283. 4 Immediately published under the title The Perils of False Brethren, both in Church and State. 1

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTI ON

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time t �e advocacy of passive obedience was toiling in its last campaign. It had punctuated the preceding century. Arch­ bishop Ussher, for example, one of the original students of Berkeley's college, had urged the doctrine in 1 64 1. In 1 670 something like it was re-affirmed by Samuel Parker (later Bishop of Oxford) in his Discourse of Ecclesiastical Polity : in public matters individuals are to be guided not by their own judgment but by the command of the ruler, ' and if there is any sin in the command, he that imposed it shall answer for it.' Here there is a sliding towards active obedience, which is sharply mirrored in Shakespeare's Henry V (ACT 1v, sc. 1 ) : HENRY l\1ethinks I could not die anywhere so contented as in the King's company, his cause being just and his quarrel honourable. WILL That's more than we know. BATES Ay, or more than we should seek after, for we know enough if we know we are the King's subjects. If his cause b e wrong, our obedience to the King wipes the crime of it out of us. Passive obedience is different from this. It faces in two directions : against resistance to the ruler, because loyalty is a duty of con­ science, and against absolute positive obedience to him, because conscience has other duties as well. To this balance Luther comes fairly near ( Von weltlicher Oberkeit, I 523) , and Jeremy Taylor (Ductor Dubitantium, BK. m, c. 3). St Thomas Aquinas (De regimine principum, I, 6) and the unknown author of the Vindiciae contra tyrannos ( 1 5 79) cannot be brought into this line, for they sanction rebellion, provided it be collective and under the lead of magistrates. Calvin vacillates. In a sermon on Dan., ch. vi, he speaks in his best-known voice : ' We must obey our princes who are set over us ; but when they rise against God they must be put down and held of no more account than worn-out shoes. ' But in his Institutes ( 1v, 2 0, xxix) he writes in Berkeley's strain : ' If we are cruelly vexed by an inhuman prince, or robbed and plundered by one avaricious, or left without protection by one negligent, or even if we are inflicted by one sacrilegious and unbelieving . . . it is not for us to remedy these evils : for us it remains only to implore the aid of God, in whose hands are the hearts of kings and changes of kingdoms.' .Berkeley handles passive obedience neither as an expedient nor as a prescription of revealed theology, but as a doctrine of

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political philosophy, that is, as arising out of the consideration on a rational footing of ' the virtues and duties which are equally binding in every kingdom or society of men ' (Sect. 1). The end of society is the good of its members; the fundamental rational means thereto is subjection to an accredited ruler or ruling body; therefore, the individual subject has no rational right to resist such an authority. Further, since reason establishes the existence of a benevolent God, that rational means (like the end) indicates His will, so that any violation of that is also dis­ obedience to this. Reason and religion thus concur. Since this position can be easily misunderstood, a few comments may be in place. ( 1 ) Berkeley isolates a single aspect of the problem of rule and subjection. To x, he contends, unexceptionable passive obedience is due, defining x only formally as the rightful ruler, admitting that the definition and identification of the rightful ruler constitute another aspect of the problem. 1 ( 2) Unlike, for instance, Bossuet, he does not rest non-resistance on a theory of the divine right of kings ; he expounds it as the condition of political order, and this as the condition of life at the truly human level. Loyalty limited by private judgment opens the door to anarchy, than which nothing can be worse. (3) The loyalty enjoined does not demand of a subject the fulfilment of laws that are against his conscience. In such instances it takes the form of ' a patient submission to whatever penalties the supreme power hath annexed to the neglect or transgression ' of the laws. That is, passive obedience is possible and right when active obedience would be wrong. (4) Although it follows that against a rightful ruler who turns tyrant subjects have no redress, they have at least a bu ffer, for the tyrant's magistrates, like everybody else, are under an absolute obligation not to do wrong, and there­ fore not to execute wicked decrees (Sect. 49) -which means that they too should then resort to merely passive obedience. Berkeley acknowledges that oppression can become intolerable; but he In the letter of 1 709 on Higden's English Constitution he refers to t he difficulty : ' When I consider what the difference is between a king de Jure and a king de facto, I cannot easily find it. ' He then suggests that when the English line is examined, ' we are forced to place the right of kings in the con­ sent and acquiescence of the people. ' He dismisses heredity as a ground of right : ' As for the right of inheritance, to me i t seems a kingdom is not a pro­ perty but a charge ; it is not therefore necessary that it go by the same rule as an estate or goods and chattels.' In Passive Obedience, however, he will not have rulers regarded as deputies, and refuses any place to the idea of a social contract (Sects. 23 /. ) . 1

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

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accepts this not as an exception to the moral law of obedience, but simply as a psychological limit, a natural obstacle to its full realization. In thus championing unresisting loyalty in the face of a genera­ tion that was becoming used to the idea of limited obedience, Berkeley, a young clergyman and as yet an unsuccessful author, with his career still to make, was exhibiting moral courage. He was throwing out a challenge to the Whigs, who had the famous Locke as their theorist, and who were to enter into their long power in 1714. That he was aware of his daring is doubtful : he ,vas probably aware only that he was quietly reasoning with students who were entitled to be reasoned with, and on an issue that deserved to be reasoned about. Being a philosopher, he must, it is assumed, have had an ethical system, and his Passive Obedience, along with his Alciphron, has been examined to find it. The usual conclusion is that he was a utilitarian. He does, indeed, declare in his Discourse to Afagistrates that the general good of mankind is the criterion of moral truth, and in the present essay that it is the moral end. But I cannot find anything sufficiently developed to be called a system; and his utilitarianism was a current thought­ form, which he qualified heavily. He was certainly not a hedonist; he did not regard happiness as the essence of the moral life; and he did not make the moral quality of all actions depend on their consequences. So far as he pressed the idea of a bliss hereafter he might be called with Paley a theological utilitarian; but this misses the peculiar intention of piety (cp. end of Sect. 6, and my note on Alciphron, v, 5) , such bliss being the fruition of righteousness, not of any natural satisfaction-li,·ing in the presence of God could bring no bliss to the unregenerate. He is as uncompromising as Butler in insisting on the absoluteness of conscience, which, also like Butler, he opposes both to the regular calculation of consequences and to the natural impulse of bene­ volence (Sect. 1 3) . What conscience desideratcs positively is ideal, not capable of perfect realization in the sorry circumstance of present life, in this respect being analogous to the forms and laws of geometrical reason (Sect. 53; cp. 45, and Q,uerist, qu. 343); and is also various, a multiplicity of goods, which of these is to be sought in a given situation not being immediately evident, so that the positive moral inj unctions leave some room for choice in the light of empirical considerations. The negative moral injunctions, however, since they forbid what is bad, and since

PASSIVE OBEDIENCE

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what is bad is ex definitione what is never to be done, are without exceptions, qualifications, or deferment. These are the ethica l notions which Berkeley brought to bear on the problem of political loyalty, unfolding them no further than was required for his immediate purpose. AN AL YSIS OF THE ARGUMENT

I. Non-resistance to the sujmme civil power is an absolute obligation. Sects. 4-3 2.

(i) Civil loyalty is a moral duty. Sects. 4-25. (a) The moral end-Sects. 4-7. The moral rules or laws of Nature are to be discovered by reason. Reason proves the existence of God, and it follows from His nature that His will is our law. Since the purpose of His will cannot be His own good, it must be the good of man, of all men every-where and in all ages. This, then, is the moral end. (b) The means to it-Sects. 8-1 4. That end is not of itself a sufficient guide to action_, for none of us has enough knowledge or wisdom to foresee what particular decisions would lead to it. Even our best impulses cannot be trusted uncontrolled. The means to the moral end can be certainly known only as general rules, discoverable by reason, and never to be deviated from by private judgment of the relation of the particular case to that end. (c) Loyalty is such a rule of reason-Sects. 1 5-20. Like justice, chastity, etc., it has a necessary connection with the moral end; it is, indeed, the fundamental rule or duty, since it is the condition of ordered society, within which alone the remaining moral duties can be discharged. The relation of subject to law, being thus not accidental but essential and therefore universal, needs to be governed by a general moral l aw. (d) Three objections against loyalty as a moral duty-Sects. 2 1 -5. First, civic disobedience is not felt with the repugnance which moral vices evoke. True; but feelings, being the result of the accidents of our upbringing, are not the criteria of what is morally good or bad. Secondly, civic obedience rests on a social contract, the breach of which by the ruler makes rebellion la,vful. No; such a contract is not expressed or implied in any constitution, nor is it involved in the notion of political society; and in practice the regarding of rulers as deputies would lessen respect for law and tend to destroy the social tie. Thirdly, political govern ment (835)

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is man-made, so that the measure of submission to it is an affair not of moral but of civil law. No ; loyalty to an institution that, though man-made, makes man, is not a merely conventional obligation. (ii) Negative moral precepts are absolute-Sects. 26-32. Positive moral precepts, not all being applicable in a given situation, and often not one of them being fully applicable, leave room for discretion; but negative precepts can in fact always be obeyed, and ought to be, since vice is unconditionally wrong. The moral order, like the physical, would not be an order mthout general laws. It cannot be objected that even so private judgment must still come into play, in judging the criterion and content of moral laws-for these are matters of reason ; or that the moral end, in instances where a general precept would have consequences inconsistent mth it, should itself be made the direct rule of action-for what makes an action ob­ ligatory is not its probable tendency to the general good, but its being in accordance with a law that is necessarily implied by the concept of the general good, and therefore a law of Nature, and therefore an expression of the will of God, and therefore unequivocally binding. II. The grounds and reasons of the contrary view. Sects. 33-40. (i) Self-preservation is the first law of Nature. Yes, but as a law of fact only, not of duty. I f it were the latter, it would sanction all sins-which is absurd; and no negative precept is to be broken to observe a positive one, z.e. evil may not be committed to produce good. (ii) The public good is the measure of civic obedience. This point has already been answered. tiii) No civil power can rightly have unlimited control over the life of any man. True; but it follows only that resistance to an unjust ruler does not wrong the ruler. A wrong is done to God, since a negative rational law is broken. (iv) Non-resistance would be slavery. No ; no more than is the subjection of our passions to reason, this and civic obedience being the condi tion of our humanity. (835)

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(v) Tyrants are wicked. Of course ; but the purpose of passive obedience is to honour not them but a law of God. (vi) Since active obedience is limited, why not passive obedience also ? Because positive and negative precepts are not on the same footing : the former can commit us to a wrong act, and the latter cannot. I I I. Objections against non-resistance on tlze ground of its supposed consequences. Sects. 4 1 -56. (i) A law that brings suffering on the innocent cannot be God's law. But such an effect is not a necessary one, the purpose and natural tendency of the law being otherwise; but an accidental one, due to the violation by the ruler of other moral laws. Besides, God rights the wrong in the next life. (ii) Unfailing submission would only encourage tyranny. No; if a ruler is good, he will not become a tyrant, and if bad, being ruled by self-interest he will be aware that his subjects would be goaded by excesses into defending their interests­ a lesser crime all but necessitated by his greater one. (iii) By precluding redress the law of non-resistance makes oppression all the more intolerable. But rebellion, whether successful or no, produces enormous suffering; and it ignores the possibility that, under ProYidence, the tyrant will be either converted or removed by death. (iv) Are there not exceptional instances in which rebellion 1s right ? No; rebellion is a sin, and a sin can never be right. If exceptional oppression should occur, the ruler's ministers would be morally obliged not to execute the decrees. (v) The only obedience incumbent on rational beings is rational obedience, resting on the recogni tion of the suitability of the laws to the public good. But most men are not qualified to examine and judge the laws.

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

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(vi) Complete submission would place men in a position worse than the anarchy from which politically organized society is the rational escape. No ; anarchy is worse. (vii) Must we submit even to usurpers and madmen ? No ; this is excluded. The law of non-resistance applies only where there is a rightful ruler. This is a limitation of the law only in the sense of being a definition of it. Like all other negative moral laws, once the sphere of its application is defined, it allows of no exceptions under calculation of inconvenient conse quences.

Passive Obedience The Text To the Reader T ex t .

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TO THE READER Tlzat an absolute passive obedience ought not to be paid mry civil power, but that submission to government should be measured and limited by the public good of the society ; and that therefore subjects may lawfully resist the supreme authority in those cases where the public good shall plainly seem to require it ; nay, that it is their duty to do so, inasmuch as they are all under an indispensable obligation to promote the common interest : these and the like notions, which I cannot help thinking per­ nicious to mankind, and repugnant to right reason, having of late years been industriously cultivated, and set in the most advantageous lights by men of parts and learning, it seemed necessary to arm the youth of our 1 0 University against them, and take care they go into the world well­ principled. I do not mean obstinately prejudiced in favour of a party, but, from an early acquaintance with their duty, and tlze clear rational grounds of it, determined to such practices as may speak them good Christians and l oyal subjects. In this view, I made three discourses not ma1ry months since in the College-chapel, which some who heard them thought it might be of use to make more public : and, indeed, the false accounts that are gone abroad concerning them have made it necessary. Accordingly, I now send them into the world under the form of one entire discourse. 20 To conclude : as in writing these thoughts it was my endeavour to preserve that cool and impartial temper which becomes every sincere inquirer after truth, so I lzearti{)' wish they may be read with the same disposition.

/ 23 witlz-(A) in.

PASSIVE OBEDIENCE \Vhosoever resisteth the power, rcsisteth the ordinance of God.-Rom. , xiii.2. I It is not my design to inquire into the particular nature of the government and constitution of these kingdoms ; much less to pretend to determine concerning the merits of the different parties now reigning in the State. Those topics I profess to lie out of my sphere, and they will probably be thought by most men improper to be treated of in an audience almost wholly made up of young persons, set apart from the business and noise of the world for their more convenient instruction in learning and piety. But surely it is in no respect unsuitable to the circumstances of this place to inculcate and explain every branch of the law of 1 0 Nature ; or those Yirtues and duties which are equally binding in every kingdom or society of men under heaven; and of this kind I take to be that Christian duty of not resisting the supreme power implied in my text -' "Whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God.' In treating on which words I shall observe the following method. 2 First, I shall endeavour to prove that there is an absolute unlimited non-resistance or passive obedience due to the supreme civil power, wherever placed in any nation. Secondly, I shall inquire into the grounds and reasons of the contrary opinion. 2 0 Thirdly, I shall consider the objections drawn from the pretended consequences of non-resistance to the supreme power. In hand­ ling these points I intend not to build on the authority of Holy Scripture, but altogether on the principles of reason common to all mankind; and that because there are some very rational and learned men who, being verily persuaded an absolute passive subjection to any earthly power is repugnant to right reason, can never bring themselves to admit such an interpretation of Holy Scripture (however natural and obvious from the words) as shall make that a part of Christian religion which seems to them in 30 Text ( MS. ) Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, or For they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation, or Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. 17

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itself manifestly absurd, and destructive of the original inherent rights of human nature. 3 I do not mean to treat of that submission which men are, either in duty or prudence, obliged to pay inferior or executive powers; neither shall I consider where or in what persons the supreme or legislative power is lodged in this or that government. Only thus much I shall take for granted, that there is in every civil community, somewhere or other, placed a supreme power of making laws, and enforcing the observation of them. The ful1 0 filling of those laws, either by a punctual performance of what is enjoined in them, or, if that be inconsistent with reason or con­ science, by a patient submission to whatever penalties the supreme power hath annexed to the neglect or transgression of them, is termed loyalty ; as, on the other hand, the making use of force and open violence, either to withstand the execution of the laws, or ward off the penalties appointed by the supreme power, 1s properly named rebellion. Now, to make it evident that every degree of rebellion is criminal in the subject, I shall, in the first place, endeavour to 20 prove that loyalty is a natural or moral duty ; and disloyalty, or rebellion, in the most strict and proper sense a vice or breach of the law of nature. And, secondly, I propose to show that the prohibitions of vice, or negative precepts of the law of nature, as, ' Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not forswear thy­ self, Thou shalt not resist the supreme power, ' and the like, ought to be taken in a most absolute, necessary, and immutable sense : insomuch that the attainment of the greatest good, or deliverance from the greatest evil, that can befall any man or number of men in this life, may not justify the least violation of them. 30

First, then, I am to show that loyalty is a moral duty, and dis­ loyalty or rebellion, in the most strict and proper sense a vice, or breach of the law of nature.

4 Though it be a point agreed amongst all ·wise men, that there are certain moral rules or laws of nature, which carry with them an eternal and indispensable obligation ; yet, concerning the proper methods for discovering those laws, and distinguishing them from others dependent on the humour and discretion of men, there are various opinions. Some direct us to look for them in the divine ideas ; others in the natural inscriptions on the 40 mind : some derive them from the authority of learned men, and

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the universal agreement and consent of nations. Lastly, others hold that they are only to be discovered by the deductions of reason. The three first methods must be acknowledged to labour under great difficulties ; and the last has not, that I know, been anywhere distinctly explained, or treated of so fully as the im­ portance of the subject doth deserve. I hope therefore it will be pardoned if, in a discourse of passive obedience, in order to lay the foundation of that duty the deeper, we make some inquiry into the origin, nature, and obligation of moral duties in general, and the criteria whereby they are to be known. IO 5 Self-love being a principle of all others the most universal, and the most deeply engraven in our hearts, it is natural for us to regard things as they are fitted to augment or impair our own happiness ; and accordingly we denominate them good or evil. Our judgment is ever employed in distinguishing between these two, and it is the whole business of our lives to endeavour, by a proper application of our faculties, to procure the one and avoid the other. At our first coming into the world, we are entirely guided by the impressions of sense ; sensible pleasure being the infallible characteristic of present good, as pain is of evil. But, by 2 0 degrees, as we grow up in our acquaintance with the nature of things, experience informs us that present good is afterwards oft attended with a greater evil ; and, on the other side, that present evil is not less frequently the occasion of procuring to us a greater future �ood. Besides, as the nobler faculties of the human soul begin to display themselves, they discover to us goods far more excellent than those which affect the senses. Hence an alteration is wrought in our judgments ; we no longer comply with the first solicitations of sense, but stay to consider the remote conse­ quences of an action, what good may be hoped, or what evil 30 feared from it, according to the wonted course of things. This obliges us frequently to overlook present momentary enjoyments, when they come in competition with greater and more lasting goods, though too far off, or of too refined a nature, to affect our senses. l 1 1 Self-love . . . avoid the other (not in MS.) . l 25 Besides . . . the senses (not in MS. ) . l 35 (MS. adds) And as the [word illegible] of sense are abated and those of reason cultivated and ripen'd, our prospect becomes proportionably larger, remote advantages being brought near by the mind and viewed in their just dimensions. This is the victory of reason over sense : 'tis what only can make our elections wise and not to be reverted. In fine this is that which justifies these rebukes to flesh and blood, these self-denials and mortifications which to some shortsighted and narrow minds appear most absurd and unnatural.

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6 But as the whole earth, and the entire duration of those perishing things contained in it, is altogether inconsiderable, or, in the prophet's expressive style,1 ' less than nothing ' in respect of eternity, who sees not that every reasonable man ought so to frame his actions as that they may most effectually contribute to promote his eternal interest ? And since it is a truth evident by the light of nature, that there is a sovereign omniscient Spirit, who alone can make us for ever happy, or for ever miserable; it plainly follows that a conformity to His will, and not any prospect 1 0 of temporal advantage, is the sole rule whereby every man who acts up to the principles of reason must govern and square his actions. The same conclusion doth likewise evidently result from the rela­ tion which God bears to his creatures. God alone is maker and preserver of all things. He is, therefore, with the most undoubted right, the great legislator of the world; and mankind are, by all the ties of duty, no less than interest, bound to obey His laws. 7 Hence we should above all things endeavour to trace out the divine will, or the general design of Providence with regard to mankind, and the methods most directly tending to the 20 accomplishment of that design; and this seems the genuine and proper way for discovering the laws of nature. For laws being rules directive of our actions to the end intended by the legislator, in order to attain the knowledge of God's laws we ought first to inquire what that end is which He designs should be carried on by human actions. Now as God is a being of infinite goodness, it is plain the end He proposes is good. But, God en­ joying in Himself all possible perfection , it follows that it is not His own good, but that of His creatures. Again, the moral actions of men are entirely terminated within themselves, so as to 30 have no influence on the other orders of intelligences or reasonable creatures; the end therefore to be procured by them can be no other than the good of men. But, as nothing in a natural state can entitle one man more than another to the favour of God, except only moral goodness; which, consisting in a conformity to l 1 2 The same . . . His laws (not in MS. ) . l 2 1 ( MS. adds here) Now the will of God cannot otherwise be deduced than from the consideration of his attributes and the relation he bears to his creatures, together with a comprehensive view of human nature, the visible operations of Providence in the government of the world, the various ryes and mutual respects between man and man, as well as the structure, government and disposi­ tion of the visible system of beings and the dej,endencies of human nature on the several parts thereof, and those many distinct interests passions and inclinations wlrich do thence arise. 1

[Isaiah, xi. I 7.-Ed.]

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the laws of God, doth presuppose the being of such laws, and law ever supposing an end, to which it guides our actions ; it follows that, antecedent to the end proposed by God, no distinction can be conceived between men ; that end therefore itself, or general design of Providence, is not determined or limited by any respect of persons. It is not therefore the private good of this or that man, nation, or age, but the general well-being of all men, of all nations, of all ages of the world, which God designs should be procured by the concurring actions of each individual. Having thus discovered the great end to which all moral 1 0 obligations are subordinate, it remains that we inquire what methods are necessary for the obtaining that end. 8 The well-being of mankind must necessarily be carried on one of these two ways. Either, first, without the injunction of any certain universal rules of morality, only by obliging every one upon each particular occasion to consult the public good, and always to do that which to him shall seem, in the present time and circumstances, most to conduce to it. Or, secondly, by enjoining the observation of some determinate, established laws, which, if universally practised, have, from the nature of things, an essential 2 0 fitness to procure the well-being of mankind; though in their particular application they are sometimes, through untoward accidents and the perverse irregularity of human wills, the occasions of great sufferings and misfortunes, it may be, to very many good men. Against the former of these methods there lie several strong objections. For brevity I shall mention only two. g First, it will thence follow that the best men, for want of judgment, and the wisest, for want of knowing all the hidden circumstances and consequences of an action, may very often be 30 at a loss how to behave themselves, which they would not be in case they judged of each action by comparing it with some parti­ cular precept, rather than by examining the good or evil which in that single instance it tends to procure ; it being far more easy to judge with certainty, whether such or such an action be a trans­ gression of this or that precept, than whether it will be attended with more good or ill consequences. In short, to calculate the events of each particular action is impossible ; and, though it were not, would yet take up too much time to be of use in the a ffairs of life. 40 Secondly, if that method be observed, it will follow that we can have no sure standard to which comparing the actions of

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another, we may pronounce them good or bad, virtues or vices. For, since the measure and rule of every good man's actions is supposed to be nothing else but his own private disinterested opinion of what makes most for the public good at that juncture; and since this opinion must unavoidably in different men, from their particular views and circumstances, be very different : it is impossible to know whether any one instance of parricide or perjury, for example, be criminal. The man may have had his reasons for it, and that which in me would have been a heinous 1 o sin may be in him a duty. Every man's particular rule is buried in his own breast, invisible to all but himself, who therefore can only tell whether he observes it or no. And since that rule is fitted to particular occasions, it must ever change as they do : hence it is not only various in different men, but in one and the same man at different times. 1 o From all which it follows, there can be no harmony or agreement between the actions of good men; no apparent steadi­ ness or consistency of one man with himself; no adhering to principles : the best actions may be condemned, and the most 20 villainous meet with applause. In a word, there ensues the most horrible confusion of vice and virtue, sin and duty, that can pos­ sibly be imagined. It follows therefore, that the great end to which God requires the concurrence of human actions must of necessity be carried on by the second method proposed, namely, the observation of certain, universal, determinate rules or moral precepts, which, in their own nature, have a necessary tendency to promote the well-being of the sum of mankind, taking in all nations and ages, from the beginning to the end of the world. 1 1 Hence, upon an equal comprehensive survey of the general 30 nature, the passions, interests, and mutual respects of mankind, whatsoever practical proposition doth to right reason evidently appear to have a necessary connexion with the universal well­ being included in it is to be looked upon as enjoined by the will of God. For he that willeth the end doth will the necessary means conducive to that end; but it hath been shewn that God willeth the universal well-being of mankind should be promoted by the concurrence of each particular person ; therefore, every such practical proposition necessarily tending thereto is to be esteemed a decree of God, and is consequently a law to man. l 2 7 !aking- (A) taken. l 39 ( MS. adds) though it were ever possible that by being practised by some only they should Offasion as much vice as they wou' d good if they were all of them practised by all.

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These propos1t10ns are called 'laws of nature ' because they are universal, and do not derive their obligation from any civil sanction, but immediately from the Author of nature himself. They are said to be 'stamped on the mind,' to be ' engraven on the tables of the heart,' 1 because they are well known to mankind, and suggested and inculcated by conscience. Lastly, they are termed ' eternal rules of reason,' because they necessarily result from the nature of things, and may be demonstrated by the in­ fallible deductions of reason. I 3 And, notwithstanding that these rules are too often, either 1 0 by the unhappy concurrence of events, or more especially by the wickedness of perverse men who will not conform to them, made accidental causes of misery to those good men who do, yet this doth not vacate their obligation : they are ever to be esteemed the fixed unalterable standards of moral good and evil; no private interest, no love of friends, no regard to the public good, should make us depart from them. Hence, when any doubt arises concerning the morality of an action, it is plain this cannot be determined by computing the public good which in that particular case it is attended with, but only by comparing it with 2 0 the eternal law of reason. He who squares his actions by this rule can never do amiss, though thereby he should bring himself to poverty, death, or disgrace : no, not though he should involve his family, his friends, his country, in all those evils which are accounted the greatest and most insupportable to human nature. Tenderness and benevolence of temper are often motives to the best and greatest actions; but we must not make them the sole rule of our actions : they are passions rooted in our nature, and, like all other passions, must be restrained and kept under, otherwise they may possibly betray us into as great enormities as any other un- 30 bridled lust. 2 Nay, they are more dangerous than other passions, insomuch as they are more plausible, and apt to dazzle and corrupt the mind with the appearance of goodness and generosity. 1 4 For the illustration of what has been said, it will not be amiss, if from the moral we turn our eyes on the natural world. Homo ortus est (says Bal bus in Cicero 3 ) ad mundum contemplandum, et imitandum. And, surely, it is not possible for free intellectual agents to propose a nobler pattern for their imitation than nature, I2

2 [An anticipation of Bishop Butler's ethical [Jeremiah, xvii. 1 .-Ed.] depreciation of benevolence as an impulse (Fifteen Sermons, 1 -3, and ' Diss. on Virtue,' 5th point, in Analogy of Religion ) . For another similarity with Butler 3 De liatura deorum, LI B . II [l·. xiv.-Ed . ] see VOL. m, p. 7n.-Ed .] 1

PASS IVE OBEDIENCE

which is nothi ng else but a series of free actions produced by the best and wisest Agent. But it is evident that those actions are not adapted to particular views, but all conformed to certain general rules, which, being collected from observation, are by philosophers termed laws of nature. And these indeed are excellently suited to promote the general well-being of the creation : but, what from casual combinations of events, and what from the voluntary motions of animals, it often falls out that the natural good not only of private men but of entire cities and nations would be 1 0 better promoted by a particular suspension, or contradiction, than an exact observation of those laws. Yet, for all that, nature still takes its course; nay, it is plain that plagues, famines, inundations, earthquakes, with an infinite variety of pains and sorrows, in a word, all kinds of calamities public and private, do arise from a uniform steady observation of those general laws, which are once established by the Author of nature, and which He will not change or deviate from upon any of those accounts, how wise or benevolent soever it may be thought by foolish men to do so. As for the miracles recorded in Scripture, they were 20 always wrought for confirmation of some doctrine or mission from God, and not for the sake of the particular natural goods, as health or life, which some men might have reaped from them. 1 From all which it seems sufficiently plain that we cannot be at a loss which way to determine, in case we think God's own methods the properest to obtain His ends, and that it is our duty to copy after them, so far as the frailty of our nature will permit . 1 5 Thus far in general, of the nature and necessity of moral rules, and the criterion or mark whereby they may be known. As for the particulars, from the foregoing discourse the 30 principal of them may without much difficul ty be deduced. It hath been shewn that the law of Nature is a system of such rules or precepts as that, if they be all of them, at all times, in all places, and by all men observed, they will necessarily promote the well-being of mankind, so far as it is attainable by human actions. 2 Now, let any one who hath the use of reason take but l 3 general rules- ( MS. and A ) general stated. l I g As for . . . from them (not in MS.) . 1 [Miracles are possible because natural laws are only empirical unifor­ mities, not necessities (Principles, Sects. 62-5, 1 05-9) . Their actuality is a matter of historical inquiry (Alciphron, v1, Sects. 3of) . Their purpose is to be ' evidences ' of the divine origin or quality of some particular activity.-Ed.] 2 [In calling moral laws laws of nature, Berkeley was using the still widely current termi nology of the Stoics. Cp. below, Sects. 27 (note) and 33 .-Ed.]

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an impartial survey of the general frame and circumstances of human nature, and it will appear plainly to him that the constant observation of truth, for instance, of justice, and chastity, hath a necessary connexion with their universal well-being ; that, there­ fore, they are to be esteemed virtues or duties; and that ' Thou shalt not forswear thyself,' ' Thou shalt not commit adultery,' ' Thou shalt not steal,' are so many unalterable moral rules, which to violate in the least degree is vice or sin. I say, the agreement of these particular practical propositions with the definition or criterion premised doth so clearly result from the 1 0 nature of things that it were a needless digression, in this place, to enlarge upon it. And, from the same principle, by the very same reasoning, it follows that loyalty is a moral virtue, and ' Thou shalt not resist the supreme power ' a rule or law of nature, the least breach whereof hath the inherent stain of moral turpitude. I 6 The miseries inseparable from a state of anarchy are easily imagined. So insufficient is the wit or strength of any single man, either to avert the evils or procure the blessings of life, and so apt are the wills of different persons to contradict and 2 0 thwart each other, that it is absolutely necessary several inde­ pendent powers be combined together, under the direction (if I may so speak ) of one and the same will : I mean the law of the society. Without this there is no politeness, no order, no peace, among men, but the world is one great heap of misery and confusion; the strong as well as the weak, the wise as well as the foolish, standing on all sides exposed to all those calamities which man can be liable to in a state where he has no other security than the not being possessed of anything which may raise envy or desire in another-a state by so much more ineligible than 30 that of brutes as a reasonable creature hath a greater reflexion and foresight of miseries than they. From all which it plainly follows, that loyalty, or submission to the supreme civil authority, hath, if universally practised in conjunction with all other virtues, a necessary connexion with the well-being of the whole sum of mankind ; and, by consequence, if the criterion we have laid down be true, it is, strictly speaking, a moral duty, or branch of natural religion. And, therefore, the least degree of rebellion is, with the utmost strictness and propriety, a sin : not only in Christians, but also in those who have the light of reason alone 40 for their guide. Nay, upon a thorough and impartial view, this submission will, I think, appear one of the very first and (835)

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PASSIVE OBEDIENCE

fundamental laws of nature ; inasmuch as it is civil government which ordains and marks out the various relations between men, and regulates property, thereby giving scope and laying a founda­ tion for the exercise of all other duties. And, in truth, whoever considers the condition of man will scarce conceive it possible that the practice of any one moral virtue should obtain in the naked, forlorn state of nature. 1 7 But, since it must be confessed that in all cases our actions come not within the direction of certain fixed moral rules, 1 0 it may possibly be still questioned, whether obedience to the supreme power be not one of those exempted cases, and conse­ quently to be regulated by the prudence and discretion of every single person rather than adjusted to the rule of absolute non-resistance. I shall therefore endeavour to make it yet more plain, that ' Thou shalt not resist the supreme power ' is an undoubted precept of morality ; as will appear from the following considerations. First, then, submission to government is a point important enough to be established by a moral rule. Things of insignificant 20 and trifling concern are, for that very reason, exempted from the rules of morality. But government, on which so much depend the peace, order, and well-being of mankind, cannot surely be thought of too small importance to be secured and guarded by a moral rule; government, I say, which is itself the principal source under heaven of those particular advantages for the procurement and conservation whereof several unquestionable moral rules were prescribed to men . 1 8 Secondly, obedience to government is a case u niversal enough to fall under the direction of a law of nature. Number30 less rules there may be for regulating affairs of great concernment, at certain junctures, and to some particular persons or societies, which, notwithstanding, are not to be esteemed moral or natural laws, but may be either totally abrogated or dispensed with ; because the private ends they were intended to promote respect only some particular persons, as engaged in relations not founded in the general nature of man, who, on various occasions, and in different postures of things, may prosecute their own designs by different measures, as in human prudence shall seem convenient. But what relation is there more extensive and universal than that 40 of subject and law ? This is confined to no particular age or climate, but universally obtains, at all times, and in all places, l 8 (In Af-�. Sects 1 7-24 are at the end, marked ' Inso mcla ') .

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wherever men live in a state exalted above that o f brutes. I t is, therefore, evident that the rule forbidding resistance to the law or supreme power is not, upon pretence of any defect in point of universality, to be excluded from the number of the laws of nature. I g Thirdly, there is another consideration which confirms the necessity of admitting this rule for a moral or natural law, namely, because the case it regards is of too nice and difficult a nature to be left to the judgment and determination of each private person. Some cases there are so plain and obvious to judge of that they may safely be trusted to the prudence of every 1 0 reasonable man. But in all instances to determine whether a civil law is fitted to promote the public interest; or whether submission or resistance will prove most advantageous in the consequence ; or when it is that the general good of a nation may require an alteration of government, either in its form, or in the hands which administer it : these are points too arduous and intri­ cate, and which require too great a degree of parts, leisure, and liberal education , as well as disinterestedness and thorough know­ ledge in the particular state of a kingdom, for every subject to take upon him the determination of them. From which it follows 2 0 that, upon this account also, non-resistance, which, in the main, nobody can deny to be a most profitable and wholesome duty, ought not to be limited by the judgment of private persons to particular occasions, but esteemed a most sacred law of nature. 20 The foregoing arguments do, I think, make it manifest, that the precept against re hellion is on a level with other moral rules. Which will yet farther appear from this fourth and last considera­ tion. It cannot be denied that right reason doth require some common stated rule or measure, whereby subjects ought to shape their submission to the supreme power; since any clashing or 3 0 disagreement in this point must unavoidably tend to weaken and dissolve the society. And it is unavoidable that there should be great clashing, where it is left to the breast of each individual to suit his fancy with a different measure of obedience. But this common stated measure must be either the general precept forbidding resistance, or else the public good of the whole nation; which last, though it is allowed to be in itself something certain and determinate, yet, fora�much as men can regulate their conduct only by what appears to them, whether in truth it be what it appears or no; and since the prospects men form to 40 themselves of a country's public good are ccmmonly as various as its landscapes, which meet the eye in several situations : it clearly

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follows, that to make the public good the rule of obedience is, in effect, not to establish any determinate, agreed, common measure of loyalty, but to leave every subject to the guidance of his own particular mutable fancy. 2 1 From all which arguments and considerations it is a most evident conclusion that the law prohibiting rebellion is in strict truth a law of nature, universal reason, and morality. But to this it will perhaps be objected by some that, whatever may be concluded with regard to resistance from the tedious deductions 1 0 of reason, yet there is I know not what turpitude and deformity in some actions, which at first blush shews them to be vicious; but they, not finding themselves struck with mch a sensible and immediate horror at the thought of rebellion, cannot think it on a level with other crimes against nature. To which I answer that it is true, there are certain natural antipathies implanted in the soul, which are ever the most lasting and insurmountable; but as custom is a second nature, whatever aversions are from our early childhood continually infused into the mind give it so deep a stain as is scarce to be distinguished from natural comAnd as it doth hence follow, that to make all the 20 plexion. inward horrors of soul pass for infallible marks of sin were the way to establish error and superstition in the world; so, on the other hand, to suppose all actions lawful which are unattended with those starts of nature would prove of the last dangerous consequence to virtue and morality. For these pertaining to us as men, we must not be directed in respect of them by any emo­ tion in our blood and spirits, but by the dictates of sober and impartial reason. And if there be any who find they have a less abhorrence of rebellion than of other villainies, all that can be 30 inferred from it is that this part of their duty was not so much reflected on, or so early and frequently inculcated into their hearts, as it ought to have been; since without question there are other men who have as thorough an aversion for that as for any other crime. 1 2 2 Again, it will probably be objected that submission to government differs from moral duties in that it is founded in a Il di �ait ordinaireme� t qu'il avait un aussi grand eloignement pour ce , peche-la que pour assassmer le monde, ou pour voler sur les grands chemins et qu'enfin ii n'y avait rien qui fut plus contrairc a son nature!.' He ( i\fr: Pascal ) used to sa y he had as great an abhorrence of rebellion as of murder or robbing on the way, and that there was nothing more shocking to hi; nature.- Vie de Al. Pascal, p. 44.

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contract,1 which, upon the violation of its conditions, doth of course become void, and in such case rebellion is lawful : it hath not therefore the nature of a sin or crime, which is in itself absolutely unlawful, and must be committed on no pretext whatsoever. Now, passing over all inquiry and dispute con­ cerning the first obscure rise of government, I observe its being founded on a contract may be understood in a twofold sense : either, first, 2 that several independent persons, finding the in­ sufferable inconvenience of a state of anarchy, where every one was governed by his own will, consented and agreed together to 1 0 pay an absolute submission to the decrees of some certain legis­ lative, which, though sometimes they may bear hard on the subject, yet must surely prove easier to be governed by than the violent humours and unsteady opposite wills of a multitude of savages. And, in case we admit such a compact to have been the original foundation of civil government, it must even on that supposition be held sacred and inviolable. 2 3 Or, secondly, it is meant that subjects have contracted with their respective sovereigns or legislators to pay, not an absolute, but conditional and limited, submission to their laws, 2 0 that is, upon condition, and so far forth, as the observation of them shall contribute to the public good, reserving still to them­ selves a right of superintending the laws, and judging whether they are fitted to promote the public good or no; and (in case they or any of them think it needful) of resisting the higher powers, and changing the whole frame of government by force, which is a right that all mankind, whether single persons or societies, have over those that are deputed by them. But, in this sense, a contract cannot be admitted for the ground and measure of civil obedience, except one of these two things be clearly shewn : 30 [The theory that society originated in or morally presupposes a volun­ tary compact was ' in the air.' It had been urged by Hobbes (De cive, 1 642 ; Leviathan, 1 65 1 ) , Milton ( Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, 1 649) , and Locke (second Treatise of Government, 1 690) . The Parliament of 1 688 ha� declare ? _ ' that King James I I, having endeavoured to subvert the Constitution of this kingdom by breaking the original contract between king and people . . . has abdicated the government.' The theory is ancient : Plato writes of avv0Ea0aL µ� TE a8LKELV µ� u d8tKEta0at (Republic, n, 359A), and E�icurus of a avv0�KYJ TLS' V1T€p TOV fL� /311.a11T€LV µYj 8€ /3Aa1TT