The War Against Nonhuman Animals: A Non-Speciesist Understanding of Gendered Reproductive Violence 3031304292, 9783031304293

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The War Against Nonhuman Animals A Non-Speciesist Understanding of Gendered Reproductive Violence

Stacy Banwell

The War Against Nonhuman Animals

Stacy Banwell

The War Against Nonhuman Animals A Non-Speciesist Understanding of Gendered Reproductive Violence

Stacy Banwell School of Law and Criminology University of Greenwich London, UK

ISBN 978-3-031-30429-3 ISBN 978-3-031-30430-9 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30430-9

(eBook)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Elizabeth Hak/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Taylor and Francis for granting me permission to reproduce parts of my previously published work. Parts of Chapter 3 are based on the following article Banwell, S. (2016). Rassenschande, Genocide, and the Reproductive Jewish Body: Examining the use of Rape and Sexualized Violence against Jewish women during the Holocaust? Journal of Modern Jewish Studies, 15 (2), 208–227. This was published by Taylor and Francis. The journal’s website can be found here: www.tandfonline.com. I am grateful to Professor Joanna Bourke for her guidance when I first expressed an interest in writing a book about reproductive violence and nonhuman animals. I would like to mention and thank the 2021/22 cohort of students on Feminist Criminological Research for the debates we had about granting nonhuman animals legal personhood. Thanks also to colleagues and work-friends (Alex, Giulia and Helen) who have supported me throughout this process—at conferences where I presented themes from the book, in the office, chatting over computer screens, or during busy periods at work.

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Acknowledgments

For making the publication of this book possible, I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers who reviewed the book proposal and offered constructive feedback on the outline of the book. Thanks to the supportive team at Palgrave Macmillan, it has been a pleasure working with you all. My particular thanks to Uma Vinesh and Josie Taylor for their guidance and reassurance throughout this whole process. Thanks also to the individuals who provided endorsements for the book. Thank you to my wonderful group of friends (in particular Emma, Opi, Liz, Mel, and Ed) for your support and for checking in throughout this process. Thanks also to Norma Fiddler for alerting my attention to an article about squirrels being given oral contraceptives to render them infertile. This framed the discussion in the Conclusion of the book. I would like to give a special thanks to my niece and nephew, Jemima and Darcy Duncalf, for sending me useful resources throughout, and for your insightful comments on the two films discussed in the book: Cow and the Herd. Your dedication to the plight of nonhuman animals is inspiring. Jemima, as always, I am buoyed by your unwavering optimism and compassion. Most of all I would like to thank Michael Fiddler, not only for his support, advice, and encouragement throughout this process, but for reading through drafts of this book. I am grateful for the time you have invested in reading this book. Thank you for your honesty and for holding no punches when it came to providing feedback on early drafts of the various chapters of this book. I value and respect your judgment and, as ever, your suggestions for further reading made this a much stronger piece of work. I am blessed to have you on my team.

Contents

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Introduction: The War Against Nonhuman Animals

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Granting Nonhuman Animals Legal Personhood: The Implications for Human and Nonhuman Animals

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Assaults on Fertility and Motherhood: Gendered Reproductive Violence and Reproductive Coercion Against Human and Nonhuman Animals

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3

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Male-Directed Conflict-Related Sexual and Reproductive Violence Against Human and Nonhuman Animals

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5 The Nature, Motivations, and Consequences of the Animal-Industrial Complex

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6

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Conclusion

Index

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1 Introduction: The War Against Nonhuman Animals

Inspiration for Writing the Book Dr. Melanie Joy’s conversation about carnism on the Ezra Klein podcast in 2018 was the inspiration for writing this book. During her conversation with Ezra, Joy informs listeners that “…more farmed animals are slaughtered in one week than the total number of people killed in all wars throughout human history” (Klein, 2018). I had to stop and rewind the podcast. Had I misheard? Were these numbers correct? I was also interested in a broader question: how is the slaughter of nonhuman animals different from the violence(s) that take place during war and armed conflict?1 Put another way: are there grounds for placing the slaughter of nonhuman animals in the context of war? It is worth stating at the outset: the position taken in this book is that the violence(s) committed by humans against nonhuman animals need to be understood within the framework of war. How I have arrived at this conclusion will be discussed 1 Elsewhere I have provided a useful distinction between the terms war and armed conflict. See the Introduction to Banwell (2020) Gender the Violence(s) of War and Armed Conflict. The open access version of the book can be accessed at https://www.emerald.com/insight/publication/doi/ 10.1108/9781787691155.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Banwell, The War Against Nonhuman Animals, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30430-9_1

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in detail toward the end of this chapter. First, I want to briefly outline what the book is about, address some preliminary questions, and explain the terminology used in the book. The case studies chosen for analysis, the methodology, analytical framework, and the main arguments of the book, as well as its organization, will be presented at the end of the chapter. This book reviews historical and contemporary examples of reproductive violence and reproductive coercion committed against human and nonhuman animals during war, armed conflict, and peacetime societies. The specific War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (as listed in International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law)2 include rape, forced pregnancy, and other acts of sexual violence committed against human and nonhuman populations.3 The acts themselves, their aims, and their outcomes—all of which are discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4—are framed as the expressions and consequences of reproductive and genocidal violence. The latter only applies to human populations.

Setting the Scene This section provides readers with the latest figures on the global slaughter of nonhuman animals. I debated whether to include this section. In researching this book, I found that most authors included this information and did so in creative ways. For example, Joy (writing in 2010) informs us that US “agribusinesses slaughter ten billion animals per year.” This figure, she explains, does not include approximately ten billion fish and sea animals that are also killed each year. “That’s 19,011 animals per minute, or 317 animals per second. In the time it took you 2 Given the focus of this book—and based on my revised definition of armed conflict—we will be focusing primarily on IHL rather than ICL, as the latter focuses on individual criminal responsibility, whereas in this book we address the role of actors within the animal-industrial complex at the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels. 3 While the case studies in this book primarily address the experiences of cis gender populations, in Chapter 4 I suggest that we need to move beyond cis-gender bodies and address how reproductive violence is enacted against the following groups: persons capable of becoming pregnant—cis gender women and trans men; as well as persons capable of procreation through semen production—men and trans women.

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to read these three paragraphs,” she continues, “…nearly 60,000 more animals were killed” (Joy, 2010, p. 37). Joy (2010) offers alternative ways to comprehend the scale of this violence. One of which is a thought experiment that asks us to imagine a line of ten billion people. The line, she says, “…would be two million miles long. That’s long enough to reach the moon and back, four times. It’s also long enough to wrap around the entire circumference of the earth eighty times” (p. 38). Two things are worth pointing out at this stage. These figures presented by Joy are based on the slaughter of nonhuman animals in the US alone. They are based on the numbers of nonhuman animals killed each year, in 2010. For obvious reasons, the cumulative scale of this violence—from 2010 to the present time, 2023—is missing from these figures. Truthfully, I was not convinced of the value of providing such detailed statistical information. While I understood the importance of providing concrete or tangible evidence to support the arguments presented in this book, I worried that such an approach was counterproductive: would highlighting the sheer scale of the violence overwhelm readers? Would this have a similar effect as fears surrounding climate change in the form of eco-anxiety and climate anxiety which can leave people feeling disempowered and disengaged? However, given the central thesis of this book—that we are currently engaged in a war against nonhuman animals—I decided that it was important to record here the extent and nature of this violence. At the time of writing (January 2023), the figures—for the period up to 2022—are broken down by Viva! as follows: in the UK 1.2 billion animals, almost 1 billion fish, and 4.4 billion shellfish are killed every year. In terms of the land animals discussed in this book: annually, 1.1 billion chickens, 10.9 million pigs, and 2.7 million cattle are slaughtered in the UK. Globally, 78.7 billon land animals are slaughtered for meat consumption every year, while trillions of fish and shellfish are also killed (Viva!).4

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For a more detailed review of these figures, see Orzechowski (2022). Global Animal Slaughter Statistics & Charts: 2022 Update.

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Response to preliminary questions I anticipate that some readers will be asking: but don’t (wild) animals kill and eat other animals? Isn’t rape and sexual violence prevalent among animals? If animals can be victims, can they also be perpetrators? And even if you have not thought about these questions right at this moment, you might at some future point while reading this book. Therefore, I will respond to these pre-emptive questions at the outset.5 But don’t animals kill and eat other animals? Humans have a range of options available to them in terms of their diet and what they choose to consume. As Joy (2010, p. 30) explains in her book, Why We Love Dogs, Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows, carnism is a belief system in the same way that vegetarianism and veganism are. Carnism is a normative belief system whereby eating animals is viewed as ethical and acceptable. It is considered the opposite of veganism. Joy (2010, p. 30) explains: Carnists – people who eat meat - are not the same as carnivores. Carnivores are animals that are dependent on meat to survive. Carnists are not also merely omnivores. An omnivore is an animal – human and nonhuman – that has the psychological ability to ingest both plants and meat. But, like “carnivore”, “omnivore” is a term that describes one’s biological constitution, not one’s philosophical choice. Carnists eat meat not because they need to, but because they choose to, and choices always stem from beliefs.

My aim in pointing this out is to highlight the choices people make when they consume a meat-based diet. To argue that both human and nonhuman animals eat meat based on a biological, survival imperative does not consider the fact that, in general (although not always), when humans consume nonhuman animals, the decision is based, in part, on a perceived survival imperative. It is also rooted in a normative hierarchical judgment, which views the former as superior to the latter

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In response to questions about the killing and consuming of nonhuman animals for religious, cultural and survival purposes, for example, within Native and Indigenous populations, as well as the killing and ceremonial sacrifice of nonhuman animals, please see Deckha (2007) and Kim (2015) who tackle these thorny issues in a fluent and sensitive manner.

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(Kochi, 2009). In addition, the nature of the killing across these species is radically different. Nibert (2013, p. 12) uses the term domesecration (as a replacement for the term domestication) to describe “…the systemic practice of violence in which social animals are enslaved and biologically manipulated, resulting in their objectification, subordination, and oppression.” This process, he explains, “violates the sanctity of life of the sentient being involved.” For Nibert (2013), this form of factory farming can be referred to as the animal-industrial complex.6 Likewise, rape and reproductive violence (in the form of forced pregnancy) when committed by humans against nonhuman animals is a type of biopolitical violence (this is discussed below and in more detail in Chapter 5). This is not the case among nonhuman animals.7 If animals can be victims, can they also be perpetrators? Despite the case made in this book—that we are currently engaged in a war against nonhuman animals—nonhuman animals are not currently considered legal victims of crime (Flynn & Hall, 2017).8 Indeed, historically nonhuman animals were considered the perpetrators of crime and were put on trial for their ‘crimes’ (Beirne, 2018; Flynn & Hall, 2017).9 Referring to the work of Evans (1906), Flynn and Hall (2017, p. 300) note that these ‘animal trials’ involved either groups of nonhuman

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Noske (1997) coined this term to refer to the industrial domination and exploitation of nonhuman animals in capitalist societies. Factory farms are referred to as Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations in the US and mega farms in the UK, Europe, and the rest of the world. These are discussed in Chapter 5. 7 Please see the edited collection by Muller and Wrangham (2009), titled Sexual Coercion in Primates and Humans. The chapters in the volume draw on empirical data to examine sexual coercion (the term used for this population) among primates and other nonhuman animals, with individual chapters highlighting the evolutionary basis to this violence. Based on the work presented, comparisons can be drawn between the use of sexual coercion among nonhuman animals and rape and sexual violence among humans. 8 Please see Flynn and Hall’s (2017) article The case for a Victimology of Nonhuman Animal Harms where they put forward a compelling case for acknowledging the legal victimhood status of nonhuman animals. 9 Beirne (2018) provides a detailed review of this subject matter in a chapter called ‘On the Geohistory of Justiciable Animals: Was Britain a Deviant Case’ in his book Murdering Animals written with O’Donnell and Janssen.

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animals, such as rodents, who had compromised crops or individual nonhuman animals, such as dogs, pigs, and cows, who stood trial for crimes such as theft, murder, and infanticide. They note that these trials no longer take place and that “nonhuman animals are not seen to possess the moral agency to be criminally culpable” (p. 300). In the same way that infants and young children (those under 10 in the UK, for example) are not held criminally responsible, but are recognized as victims of crime, I believe we can apply the same principle to nonhuman animals. As will be discussed below, in relation to the notion of ‘animal soldiers,’ determining the agency and criminal responsibility of nonhuman animals is more contentious than proving they are sentient beings who have an interest and right not to be harmed. Indeed, making the case that nonhuman animals can suffer and feel pain, and therefore have a right not to experience such pain and suffering, is not the same as claiming nonhuman animals should have identical rights to humans. And to take this further, I do not believe nonhuman animals have the capacity to vote, but nor do they have the capacity to make moral decisions or engage in criminal acts. This does not negate their ability to feel pain and to be victims of various acts of violence. Motivation and context are key when discussing nonhuman animals who kill and eat other species of nonhuman animals. To reiterate, when nonhuman animals kill each other for food, this is based on a survival imperative. This is not biopolitical or sovereign violence (discussed below). It does not involve domesecration and the violence does not take place within the animal-industrial complex. And finally, this is not so much a question as it is an assertion: “but we have been killing and eating nonhuman animals for centuries” (Joy, 2010, p. 107). I will defer to Joy who responds to this statement with the following: while it is “true that we have been eating meat…for at least two million years…infanticide, murder, rape and cannibalism are at least as old as meat eating– and yet we don’t invoke the history of these acts as a justification for them” (Joy, 2010, p. 107).

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The Terminology Used in the Book The question of what terminology we should use when referring to animals is a contentious one (see Bourke, 2020; Nibert, 2013; Sollund, 2017; Twine, 2013). Not least, because, as I see it, the language we adopt has the dual task of both exposing and challenging normative hierarchical distinctions that are embedded within current discourses on human and nonhuman animals.10 As Carol Adams contends, society “…institutionalize[s] the oppression of animals on at least two levels: in formal structures such as slaughterhouses, meat markets, zoos, laboratories, and circuses, and through our language” (Adams, 2015, p. 48). She goes further and argues that “[n]ot only is our language male-centred, it is human-centred as well” (p. 45). The ongoing debates within the literature (both within and outside Critical Animal Studies), on how best to challenge anthropocentric discursive representations of nonhuman animals, are testament to the difficulties inherent in developing a non-speciesist language.11 For some, the short-term solution is to use single and/or double quotation marks around terms such as animals, humans, and livestock (Bourke, 2020; Nibert, 2013; Twine, 2013). As Twine (2013, p. 78) explains, with reference to the term ‘livestock,’ the use of quotation marks is twofold: it both challenges the naturalization of the commodification of nonhuman animals and provides a distance from the normative assumptions embedded within the term. Both Bourke and Twine acknowledge that these are tentative resolutions, and ultimately, Twine (2013, p. 78) concedes, “the discourse and binary of ‘human’ and ‘animal’ must be challenged in more satisfactory ways.” Throughout this book, I will use the term nonhuman animals to distinguish between animals and humans. For Beirne (2018, p. 10), the use of this term falls into the “clutches of speciesism.” He believes that the use of terms such as “nonhuman” or “other than human” forces 10 The ‘we’ I am referring to here does not simply refer to animal rights advocates. My hope is that this ‘we’ would encompass a wider community—a cross-section of society who will challenge human exceptionalism and recognize that nonhuman animals are sentient beings who suffer and feel pain. 11 See Bourke (2011) for a discussion of the legal definitions of animals.

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us “…to use humans as a yardstick.” He argues that “[t]o speak of ‘nonhuman animals,’ for example, involves the same sort of mistake as if we were to describe human females as nonmale humans” (p. 10). I disagree with Beirne’s comments about the term nonhuman animals. That said, the phrase “Other than humans” (Flynn & Hall, 2017) or “[O]ther than homo sapiens” (Ko & Ko, 2015/2020, p. 21) does not sit well with me either. The term ‘Other than’ typically translates as ‘less-than’ or ‘inferior.’ It reifies human as normative. I think it is important to acknowledge that animals are not humans while at the same time addressing the fact that humans are in indeed animals. I believe this is captured in the phrase nonhuman animals: it simultaneously captures what animals are—nonhuman—while also confirming what humans are: human animals. As I will demonstrate in this book, the phrase nonhuman does not have to carry negative connotations. It can be used to celebrate and accentuate difference, rather than imposing a hierarchical distinction. A discussion about how we should refer to nonhuman animals leads, in my mind, inexorably to a discussion about the meaning of the term human; what it means to be human and who is classified as human. Throughout this book as part of our examination of the war against nonhuman animals—and the argument that they should be granted legal personhood—we will also interrogate what it means to be human. The concepts of intersectionality and posthumanism will facilitate this discussion. This will be done in the following chapter.

The Violence(s) Discussed in This Book I use the term violence(s) to acknowledge the multiple and diverse types of violence that are committed during war and armed conflict. The various types of violence reviewed in this book are listed under War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. War Crimes—listed in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Criminal Law (ICL)—include rape, forced pregnancy, and “any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions” [emphasis added] (see element b of Article 8 of the Rome Statue of the

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International Criminal Court, 1998, p. 8). Crimes against Humanity refer to a range of acts that are committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” This includes, but is not limited to “rape, forced pregnancy… or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity” [emphasis added] (see Element g of Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, p. 4).

Reproductive Violence and Reproductive Coercion Our main focus throughout is on the nature and consequences of reproductive violence. Reproductive violence is a term coined by Grey (2017). It refers to violence that violates a person’s reproductive autonomy or violence that is directed against an individual due to their reproductive capabilities. Examples include forced impregnation, forced pregnancy, forced miscarriage, forced sterilization, and forced abortion. In the chapters that follow, we will review examples of reproductive violence committed against human and nonhuman populations. In some cases of intrahuman violence, these acts are genocidal in nature. Reproductive coercion can include “pressure…to become pregnant (pregnancy coercion),” “…interference with contraception (birth control sabotage),” and “threats related to pregnancy continuation or termination (control of pregnancy outcomes).” It is regarded as a type of intimate partner violence (Miller & Silverman, 2010, p. 512 as cited in McGirr et al., 2020, p. 2083). I will demonstrate that this type of violence is not limited to intimate partner violence, rather, as the case studies of this book will highlight, this type of violence is committed by the state (as was the case during the Nazi genocide and the 1971 Liberation War in Bangladesh) and by humans against nonhuman animals.

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The ‘Dreaded Comparisons:’ Atrocity and Slavery Analogies At this stage, I believe it is important to address head on any potential concerns readers might have with a book that chooses to address reproductive violence committed against human and nonhuman animals. I want to reassure readers from the outset that my intention is not to draw crude comparisons across the case studies chosen for analysis. Put simply, this book does not engage in a direct comparison between human and nonhuman animals. Rather, it argues that, in the context of the war against nonhuman animals, as civilians, nonhuman animals should have access to protections included in IHL, specifically War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. By way of illustration, the next section reviews the literature on ‘dreaded comparisons’ and the use of analogies within Critical Animal Studies and the animal rights movement more broadly. The examples I explore are atrocity analogies, slavery analogies and comparisons between violence against women and violence against nonhuman animals. The section ends with some suggestions on how we move forward. In 1988, Marjorie Spiegel published The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery.12 In it, as the title suggests, she draws parallels between the oppression of black people and the oppression of nonhuman animals. As Judith Hampson wrote in her review of the book in 1990: “[t]he thesis is not that the oppressions experienced by black people and animals have taken identical forms, the cases are very different, but the claim is that they have some things in common” [emphasis added]. (See also Ko & Ko, 2015/2020 who make a similar argument based on their black vegan activism.) A number of scholars, writers, and members of the animal rights movement move beyond simply highlighting common sources of oppression among human and nonhuman animals. Indeed some have used Holocaust analogies to highlight the violence and suffering of nonhuman animals. The earliest of these are the writings of Polish-born Jewish writer Isaac Bashevis Singer. Singer won the Nobel Prize for literature for his fictional accounts of Jewish life 12

The book has been expanded and revised since its original publication in 1988.

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in Poland and the US. In his work, Singer drew comparisons between the treatment of nonhuman animals and the treatment of Jews during the Holocaust (see Kim, 2011). Other more recent publications include Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust (Patterson, 2002) and The Holocaust and the Henmaid’s Tale: A Case for Comparing Atrocities (Davis, 2005). In Eternal Treblinka, Patterson (2002) argues that there are links between animal cruelty and genocide. He states: “[o]nce animal exploitation was institutionalized…it opened the door to similar ways of treating other human beings, thus paving the way for such atrocities as human slavery and the Holocaust” (Patterson, 2002, p. 12). And in The Holocaust and the Henmaid’s Tale, Davis (2005), founder and president of United Poultry Concerns, draws parallels between the forced labor of the concentration camps during the Holocaust and the forced labor of chickens on factory farms (Hawthorne, 2006). The book by Davis (2005) was inspired by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and their 2003 exhibit: The Holocaust on Your Plate. This installation—which included images of caged and deceased nonhuman animals alongside images of dead and confined bodies in the Nazi concentration camps—traveled across 70 US cities and 20 countries between 2003 and 2005 (Hawthorne, 2006; Kim, 2011). The text that accompanied these images read: “[d]uring the seven years between 1938 and 1945, 12 million people perished in the Holocaust. The same number of animals is killed EVERY 4 HOURS for food in the [US] alone” (as cited in Kim, 2011, p. 311). This and their second exhibit, Animal Liberation Project: We Are All Animals, are discussed at length by Kim (2011) in her article Moral Extensionism or Racist Exploitation? The Use of Holocaust and Slavery Analogies in the Animal Liberation Movement. Many condemned PETA’s first installation, The Holocaust on Your Plate. The news media featured articles denouncing the tactics used by the organization. For example, in an article in The Guardian titled, ‘Holocaust on a plate angers US Jews,’ Abraham Foxman, the national director of the Anti-Defamation League and a Holocaust survivor, agreed that the “abuse of animals should be opposed”; however, he described “the effort by [PETA] to compare the deliberate systematic murder of millions of Jews to the issue of animal rights [as] abhorrent’” (see Teather,

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2003). Another news article included the response from the chairman of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum who described the stunt as “a desecration of Holocaust memory” (see Kim, 2011, p. 312). And in the UK, Manchester City Council banned the exhibition (PETA UK, 2014). Similarly, many condemned their second installation Animal Liberation Project describing it as “racist, offensive and outrageous” (Kim, 2015, p. 283). This leads us on to our discussion of the use of slavery analogies to highlight the suffering of nonhuman animals.

Slavery There are two components to the discussion of human slavery and factory farming. The first focuses on the animalization of black slaves and their classification as sub- or not-quite human. Within this element, the emphasis is on the human slave who has been reduced to the status of the animal. The second involves comparing the exploitation and commodification of nonhuman animals with the treatment of slaves. Both elements are captured in the following passages: …with animals…defined as ‘lower life’ fated for exploitation and slaughter, the designation of ‘lesser’ humans as animals paved the way for their subjugation and destruction. (Patterson, 2002, p. 26) In slave societies, the same practices used to control animals were used to control slaves – castration, branding, whipping, chaining, ear cropping. (Patterson, 2002, p. 14)

The use of slavery analogies by animal rights campaigners was common in the early nineteenth century (Wrenn, 2014). Parallels were drawn between the property status and institutional economic exploitation of both slaves and nonhuman animals (Kim, 2011). As Kim (2011, p. 314) points out, given the comparison between slaves and nonhuman animals these analogies were not regarded as controversial. We can contrast this with PETA’s 2005 second traveling exhibit Animal Liberation Project (mentioned above). This exhibit compared images of nonhuman animals in factory farms and circuses with “the violence done to marginalized

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human others (slaves, lynching victims, subjects of the Tuskegee syphilis experiments, dis-placed Native Americans, force-fed suffragettes, and more) throughout [US]” (Kim, 2015, p. 283). Like The Holocaust on your Plate before it, this installation received widespread condemnation (see Kim, 2011 for a more in-depth discussion of this). We will return to the themes of racism and animalization in Chapters 2 and 3 as part of our discussion on posthumanism and dehumanization.

Violence Against Women Finally, I want to consider the comparisons that are drawn between the treatment of women and the treatment of nonhuman animals. For many, the exploitation of nonhuman animals is a feminist issue (see Brown, 2016; Cusack, 2013). Feminists have drawn attention “to the way in which being a woman was conflated with being a female farmed animal” (Kelty-Huber, 2015, pp. 12–13. See also Adams, 2015; Allcorn & Ogletree, 2018; Brown, 2016; Cusack, 2013; Twine, 2010). In her article, A Feminist Analysis of Animal and Human Oppression: Intersectionality Among Species, Brown (2016) argues that the interchangeable language used to describe women and nonhuman animals is degrading and maintains women’s subordinate position. In the article, she draws comparisons between the experiences of dairy cows and the treatment of black female slaves, arguing that the reproductive and dairy-producing bodies of both have been exploited. Others base their comparisons on the historical property status of women with the current property status of nonhuman animals, drawing parallels between animal husbandry13 and heterosexual marriage (see Kelty-Huber, 2015). Broadly speaking, this work can be situated within ecofeminist philosophy, which, among other things, concerns itself with addressing the commodification, exploitation, and degradation of women and nonhuman animals within patriarchal societies (Allcorn & Ogletree, 2018; Kelty-Huber, 2015; Narayanan, 2019; Twine, 2013). As Cusack 13

Common definitions of the term animal husbandry include: the management and care of domesticated animals; the science of breeding farm animals; a branch of agriculture involved in the production of farm animals. We will interrogate this in more detail in Chapter 3.

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(2013, p. 24) explains: “ecofeminism attempts to relate the exploitation and suffering of animals and women, while calling attention to the patriarchal attitudes embodied by the abuse of animals.” Added to this, ecofeminists challenge essentialist notions of women and nature and engage in an intersectional analysis of the term ‘woman’ and ‘nature’ (Kelty-Huber, 2015; Twine, 2010). This leads some to use the phrase ‘rape of the land’ to metaphorically describe the destruction of the earth (Cusack, 2013). Here, the goal is to draw attention to the interconnections between the exploitation of humans, nonhuman animals and the earth, while at the same time highlighting the perpetrator of these crimes. “Though the victims may change,” Cusack (2013, p. 33) argues, “the general infliction of domination by the ‘rapist’ remains constant between the metaphorical and the literal female and across species of female animals.” It is worth noting that not all of this work engages in crude comparisons between women and nonhuman animals. Wyckoff (2014), for example, puts forward the Linked Oppression Thesis which focuses on the shared sources of oppression between women and nonhuman animals rather than conflating their experiences. Within this thesis, the shared sources of oppression include capitalism, patriarchy, and hegemonic masculinity (Allcorn & Ogletree, 2018). In a similar vein, Carol Adams (2015, p. 27), in her ground-breaking book, The Sexual Politics of Meat, proposes “a cycle of objectification, fragmentation, and consumption, which links butchering and sexual violence in our culture.” She goes on to explain: “objectification permits an oppressor to view another being as an object. The oppressor then violates this being by object-like treatment.” According to Adams’ analysis, the shared foundation of this objectification, fragmentation, and consumption is patriarchal society that treats women and nonhuman animals both as objects rather than subjects. And finally, Twine (2010, p. 400) reminds us, when referring to the work of Carol Adams and Josephine Donovan, for example, that “the agenda of ecofeminists…in juxtaposing ‘animals’ and ‘women’ is not the debasement of women but the explication of relations of power that

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intersect gender and species.”14 Here, following Kelty-Huber (2015), we can draw on Kheel (2008, p. 208 as cited in Kelty-Huber, 2015, p. 7) who describes intersectional ecofeminist scholars as those “who focus on the parallel situations of ‘women’ and ‘nature’ to an emphasis on the shared ideologies that support multiple forms of domination, including those based on race, class, age, ethnicity, and sexual orientation” [emphasis added].

Moving Forward with a ‘Multi-Optic’ Vision My purpose in drawing attention to these analogies is to underscore that this book does not fall within this trend. While it does include the experiences of both human and nonhuman animals, it does not engage in a direct, hierarchical comparison between these groups. Rather, this book can be aligned with the work of those who seek to highlight the similarities in the shared sources of oppression. The book will also demonstrate how nonhuman animals meet the necessary criteria within IHL to be protected from the violence(s) of war. That said, given the controversial nature of these dreaded comparisons and the continued use/defense of such analogies, in this final section I want to think about how we can move beyond divisive and alienating tactics. I want to explore avenues that allow us to acknowledge the similarities that stem from the source of the oppression, while simultaneously respecting the distinct and unique experiences of the different groups experiencing such oppression. Because, as this book will demonstrate, humans and nonhuman animals alike have, and continue to be, oppressed, exploited, and denied basic rights vis-à-vis their personhood status. A good starting point would be to adopt Kim’s (2015) notion of a ‘multi-optic’ vision. This, as she explains, is “…a way of seeing that takes

14

Here, Twine is referring to the book by Adams and Donovan (1995), Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations, and the disgusted response he received from a feminist colleague when she saw him carrying the book. He attributes the response of his colleague to the book’s provocative title.

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disparate justice claims seriously without privileging any one presumptively” (p. 19). In contrast to a single-optic vision—which focuses on one form of injustice while obscuring others—a “multi-optic” vision moves us closer to an “ethics of mutual avowal” (Kim, 2015, p. 20). The aim is to embrace the existence of multiple forms of oppression and the interconnectedness between them. An ethics of mutual avowal can be contrasted with the process of disavowal. The latter involves closing off or moving away, while the former is based on recognition and turning toward (Kim, 2015. See also Deckha 2007 and her discussion of bell hooks and her radical openness of mind). This book is an example of what can be achieved when we employ a ‘multi-optic’ vision. First, by addressing War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity carried out against human and nonhuman populations, it engages with multiple forms of oppression. Second, it highlights the shared foundation of the reproductive violence(s) committed against these populations. Allied to this is the writing and digital activism of black vegan feminists Aph and Syl Ko. Their book, Aphro-ism: Essays on Pop Culture, Feminism, and Black Veganism from Two Sisters, challenges compartmentalized approaches to studying and combating oppression, specifically racism and speciesism. Through a series of blog posts, they offer a ‘new conceptual architecture’ for understanding the interconnections between these phenomena. For these sisters, combating racism requires addressing the oppression of nonhuman animals. In the words of Ko and Ko (2015/2020, p. 45): “[w]e think that something crucial has been missing from discussions about racism and from almost all strategies to resist or combat racism: the situation of animals.” Under white supremacy, Syl Ko explains, “‘the animal’ is regarded as sub and inhuman.” In turn, racism is premised on the notion of animality; therefore, as Aph and Syl Ko argue, ending racism requires challenging the status of the ‘the animal.’ These anti-racism and anti-speciesism projects involve reappraising the category human as a means of revaluing the nonhuman animal (Ko & Ko, 2015/2020). This can be achieved through decolonization. In her instruction on decolonization, Syl Ko is working on the understanding that we are decolonizing coloniality the knowledge system, rather than the literal colonial encounter. Decolonization in this context in not simply about including hitherto marginalized groups, it is about

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dismantling the system of power on which this exclusion is premised. It requires “undoing humanity as we know it” (Ko & Ko, 2015/2020, p. 116). Syl Ko draws on Jackson (2013 as cited in Ko & Ko, 2015/2020, pp. 116–117) to explain this in more detail: It is not that [racialized] critics [of posthumanism] simply sought admission into the normative category of ‘the human;’ rather, they attempted to transform the category from within…The hope was not that black people would gain admittance into the fraternity of Man - the aim was to displace the order of Man altogether. Thus, what they aspired to achieve was not the extension of…humanism to those enslaved and colonized, but rather a transformation within humanism.

As we will see, the ambition is not extensionist. We have to challenge binary and hierarchical distinctions between humans and nonhumans. Indeed, the “Eurocentric creation of ‘the human’ …and ‘the animal’” (Ko & Ko, 2015/2020, p. 117) emerges from the colonial project. Decolonization in this instance involves challenging the objectification, exploitation, and destruction of those rendered sub-, non- and inhuman (Ko & Ko, 2015/2020). It involves challenging human exceptionalism. This can be achieved by a radical undoing of racism, sexism, hetero- and anthropatriarchy (the latter is defined below), as well as speciesism which, among other factors, inform the violence(s) discussed in this book. Drawing on the work discussed above, the chapters in this book offer ideas on how to combat these forms of oppression. Now that we have established the terminology that will be used throughout, and I have outlined the intention of the book, let us now turn to the underlying argument of this book: the war against nonhuman animals.

The War Against Nonhuman Animals As noted above, to combat the violence(s) of war, the sources of such violence must be addressed. In the words of Nocella (2015, p. 133): “[t]o truly be against war, one must also be actively against [w]hite supremacy, patriarchy, capitalism and similar exploitative economic

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systems, normalcy, and speciesism.” The topics of white supremacy, patriarchy, and capitalism (discussed in relation to racism, sexism, and speciesism) will be addressed throughout this book. For now, let us focus on following part of the statement: “to truly be against war, one must be actively against speciesism.”15 In September 2021 the US withdrew its military forces in Afghanistan, thus marking the end of the war in Afghanistan. The social and political landscape (in the form of social media posts, newspaper articles, and late-night TV and radio talk shows) was dominated by stories outlining the failings of the US government and the human tragedy following the end of the conflict. Here, I want to focus on the debate surrounding Operation Ark—the rescue mission to evacuate nonhuman animals from Afghanistan following the withdrawal of US armed forces. Pen Farthing, the founder of an animal shelter in Kabul, was behind the campaign to have his staff, their family members, and a total of 200 dogs and cats evacuated from Afghanistan. In her article, Saving Pets Before People... Have We Gone Snarling Mad?, Charlotte Ivers explains that she felt part of her brain had melted after listening to callers discuss this topic on Tom Swarbrick’s late-night show on LBC.16 Ivers writes in her piece: Caller after caller declared that the animals should be saved even if that meant diverting resources away from rescuing people. I listened in astonishment. One thing I had always presumed that everyone could agree on was that a human life is worth more than an animal life. How wrong I was.

Not everyone shared this view. Newkey-Burden (2021), writing in The Independent, responded by stating: “[d]ogs and cats are sentient beings. They will already be feeling the trauma of what’s going on in Afghanistan and if they are not allowed to leave with Farthing and his team, they will almost certainly die.” The framing of Operation ark reminded me of a similar discussion that unfolded on an American HBO late-night TV show—Last Week 15 16

In simple terms, speciesism is the belief in human superiority over nonhuman animals. LBC is a British phone-in talk show radio station.

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Tonight with John Oliver. ‘Prison Heat’ was the title of the episode that aired on June 14, 2021. In the episode, John Oliver discusses the lack of air conditioning in prisons in the US and the impact this has on the physical and mental well-being of prisoners. Many may argue, as Oliver is quick to point out, that criminals should not be comfortable in prison. However, for Oliver, these are human beings who he argues “deserve humane treatment regardless of what they did.” During the episode, we learn that US prisons have spent $700,000 dollars on new climate-controlled housing facilities. These facilities are not for prisoners but are for prison in-house pig farms. Oliver reassures us that he has nothing “against pigs getting treated comfortably.” He loves pigs. Pigs, he explains, “are like big chubby dogs you can eat at Christmas. He just questions “prioritizing their comfort over humans.” As discussed above, this book avoids this type of hierarchical comparative analysis. Instead, it employs a ‘multi-optic’ lens which allows us to see and empathize with multiple forms of oppression simultaneously, without comparing or privileging one over the other. Nonhuman animals die in wars waged by humans. In this sense, one might argue that they are collateral damage. However, as Nocella (2015) argues, nonhuman animals are also “the casualties of an unspoken and unseen war that humans wage, and are winning, against nonhuman animals” (p. 129). Before we unpack the war against nonhuman animals in more detail, it is worth noting that existing research on the relationship between nonhuman animals and war has focused on the following issues: the use of nonhuman animals as vehicles to transport weapons and humans (Sorenson, 2015); the use of nonhuman animals as test subjects to test weapons and train humans to be violent (Goodman et al., 2015; Roscini, 2017); the exploitation and use of nonhuman animals as weapons (Morrón, 2015); the killing of nonhuman animals during war (Itoh, 2010); and finally, the aftermath and impact of war on nonhuman animals (Andrzejewski, 2015).

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Wadiwel (2015) The War Against Animals I am not the first person (and hopefully will not be the last) to acknowledge that we are engaged in a war against nonhuman animals. In his book, The War against Animals (2015), Dinesh Wadiwel makes a compelling and convincing case for this argument (see also Wadiwel, 2009). Drawing on his work and Kochi’s (2009) notion of Species War, this book offers a unique perspective on this proposition. I will review this work before outlining my own thesis on the war against nonhuman animals. We will start with the following from Wadiwel (2015, pp. 5–6): The scale by which we kill and harm animals would seem to confirm that our mainstay relationship with animals is combative or at least focused upon producing harm and death. Factory farming and industrialized slaughter technologies…enable a monstrous deployment of violence and extermination.

The argument Wadiwel (2009, 2015) advances is that the war against nonhuman animals is biopolitical in nature. In other words, it is a war about life and death. Relevant to my discussion of reproductive violence is the notion that the reproductive bodies of nonhuman animals are “central to the biopolitics of the whole [animal-industrial] complex, since large scale killing requires equally [large-scale] breeding” (Wadiwel, 2015, p. 15). I will return to this shortly. Wadiwel (2015) identifies three types of violence within the “totality of our war against animals” (p. 35). These are: inter-subjective (individual acts of violence against nonhuman animals), institutional, and epistemic. Below, I will address institutional violence (biopolitical and sovereign violence) and epistemic violence in more detail.

Institutional Violence In the book, On War, written by the military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, war is described as “an act of violence to compel our opponent

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to fulfil our will” (1968, p. 1). War from a Clausewitzean perspective is political violence enacted in the interests of the state (Kaldor, 1999). It offers “an understanding of war as a phenomenon of mass or corporate organized violence that aims at total domination” (Wadiwel, 2015, p. 16). Wadiwel (2015) believes that this understanding of war, which focuses on the objective of the violence (compelling the enemy to fulfill our will), rather than the means used to wage war, can be applied to our current treatment of nonhuman animals. Put simply, if we accept the Clausewitzean argument that the aim of war is the complete domination of the ‘opponent,’ then we might conclude that we are engaged in a war against nonhuman animals. To reiterate, for Wadiwel (2015), this total domination of nonhuman animals, i.e., the war against nonhuman animals, is biopolitical. Within this war, nonhuman animals are reduced to the status of property. It is their status as ‘things,’ rather than ‘persons,’ that permits the scale and impunity with which this violence is perpetrated. Wadiwel (2009, 2015) uses the concept of biopolitical violence to describe the violence that happens within the animal-industrial complex: industrialized killing and industrialized reproduction. Industrialized killing centers on “the power to make die.” But it also requires industrialized reproduction: “the ability to bring to life”; i.e., the “power to make live” (Wadiwel, 2015, pp. 27–28). Foucault’s notion of governmentality is used by Wadiwel (2009, 2015) to understand the conduct of this war. Specifically, he examines the organization and management of the animal-industrial complex at the macro- (state), meso- (institutions and corporations), and micro-levels (individual workers/farmers). Finally, within his analysis of state and institutional violence, Wadiwel (2015) offers a reinterpretation of sovereign violence as violence that involves human domination over nonhuman animals. Let us move on to the other type of violence identified by Wadiwel (2015) that takes place within the war against nonhuman animals, that of epistemic violence.

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Epistemic Violence Epistemic violence occurs when knowledge and discourse obscure the voices/experiences of the marginalized. Or, in this instance, when certain groups are discursively constructed as ‘Other/less-than.’ For Wadiwel (2015), epistemic violence emerges from the binary, hierarchical construction of human superiority versus nonhuman inferiority. In other words, epistemic violence obscures the violence perpetrated against nonhuman animals due to their status as ‘less-than.’ Through this “hierarchization of difference,” the war against nonhuman animals is normalized as a form of “legitimized sovereignty” (p. 36). To combat epistemic violence, we must, as Wadiwel (2015) advises, decenter the human perspective. Although he does not specifically refer to it as epistemic violence, it is possible to argue that Kochi’s (2009) thesis on Species War (discussed in more detail below) makes a similar claim. He states: “[t]he…violence of species war …takes place not… after the establishment of a regime of law. Rather, the violence of species war occurs at the beginning of law, at its moment of foundation, as a generator, as a motor” (p. 356). In his article, Kochi (2009) argues that the law of war encompasses a species war, a war that is carried out by humans against nonhuman animals. The central question of his article centers around the issue of what counts as legitimate violence. According to Kochi (2009), determining the legitimacy of war involves answering the following questions: (1) “what types of coercion, violence and killing may be included within the definition of ‘war’” (2) “who may legitimately use coercion, violence and killing…,” and (3) what are the reasons and circumstances under which certain “actors use coercion, violence and killing…?” (p. 354). Based on the content of this book, the answers I propose to these questions are as follows: (1) The types of coercion, violence, and killing perpetrated against nonhuman animals include reproductive coercion, reproductive violence (rape, forced pregnancy, castration), and mass slaughter. In agreement with Wadiwel (2009, 2015), I believe these are examples

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of biopolitical and sovereign violence (they are reviewed in Chapters 3 and 4). At this point, we will limit our focus to the biopolitical nature of this violence. In Chapter 5, where we delve into the analytical underpinning of the animal-industrial complex, I will extend the analysis to include thanatopolitics (the politics of death), Mbembe’s (2003) ‘necropolitics’ (death in life), and Stanescu’s (2013) ‘deading life.’ (2) Those who legitimately use this violence are actors at the state (macro-) and institutional (meso-)levels and individual actors within factory farming (at the micro-level). (3) The reasons for this violence include carnism, speciesism, and industrial capitalism within the food industry. The animal-industrial complex and factory farms are the circumstances required for such violence to take place. Anthropatriarchy17 —which refers the “the human, gendered oppression, exploitation, and control of nonhuman animals via their sexual and reproductive systems”— supports the conditions under which the violence(s) of this war take place. The commodification of nonhuman animals is the end result of these drivers. All of these will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 3–5. Echoing the work of Wadiwel (2015), Kochi (2009) notes that contemporary claims about the legitimacy of war (and the violence(s) it entails) are premised on the hierarchical valuation of human over nonhuman. Referring specifically to the distinction between bare life and the good life within Western political and legal theory, Kochi acknowledges a prior distinction, one that differentiates between the survival of humans and the survival of nonhuman animals. For Kochi (2009), the distinction between bare life and a good life can be mapped onto the human-animal distinction, where humans are afforded a good life, while nonhuman animals are attributed with bare life. It is worth pausing here to unpack the concepts of bare and good life in more detail. In his book Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Giorgio Agamben (1998) offers a different interpretation of sovereign power 17

This term was coined by Narayanan (2019, p. 2).

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based on the state of exception (see also Finlayson, 2010; O’Donoghue, 2015). According to Agamben, at the core of the biopolitical paradigm is the notion of bare life. Sovereign power within this context is achieved “through the production of a political order based on the exclusion of bare, human life” (O’Donoghue, 2015). Within this state of exception— where the law has been suspended—bare life is one without legal status, rights, and protections. Those who find themselves within the sovereign ban are excluded from the political community (Weheliye, 2014). “In this way, the sovereign decides which lives will be recognized as belonging to the community of political beings and which will be classified only in terms of biological fact” (O’Donoghue, 2015). The Ancient Greeks used two terms to distinguish between forms of life: bios (how life is lived) and zo¯e (the biological basis of life). For Agamben, these distinctions form the basis of sovereign power in the state of exception. Put simply, in the modern political context, according to Agamben’s analysis, bare human life is based on zo¯e , the biological component of a life (Agamben, 1998). Weheliye (2014, p. 33) identifies an important paradox within this biopolitical paradigm: The homo sacer’s ban from the political community facilitates a double movement that is contradictory but necessary: on the one hand, these subjects, by being barred from the category of the human, are relegated to bare or naked life, being both literally and symbolically stripped of all accoutrements associated with the liberalist subject. Conversely, this bare life stands at the center of the state’s exercise of its biopower, its force of legislating life and death, which, in this framework, provides one of the central features of the modern nation state.

While Weheliye (2014) is referring to the treatment of humans within the nation state, this process takes place within the animal-industrial complex. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, when we address the ‘industrialized reproduction’ of nonhuman animals (and the violence(s) this entails), despite being barred from the category human—and concomitantly, assigned a bare, or naked life—nonhuman animals are, paradoxically, at the center of the state’s biopolitical power. Weheliye’s (2014) analysis, particularly the notion of the ‘liberalist subject,’ will have

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further resonance for nonhuman animals if they are granted legal personhood status. This transformation from treating them as things/property, to regarding them as legal persons, will provide nonhuman animals similar rights and protections to other recognized legal persons. However, as noted above, this project is one of transformation and decolonization rather than an extensionist one. Key to Kochi’s (2009) argument about the legitimacy of this species war is the normative hierarchical life-value judgment that forms the basis of the violence inflicted upon nonhuman animals by humans within this war. Here, we can recall our earlier discussion about carnism. Kochi acknowledges that nonhuman animals kill and eat other nonhuman animals, as well as plants. However, this violence, he argues, is not informed by speciesism. Rather, it is based upon a biological/survival imperative.

My Thesis on the War Against Nonhuman Animals So far, we have considered the work of Wadiwel (2009, 2015) and Kochi (2009) and their perspectives on the war against nonhuman animals. For Wadiwel, this war is biopolitical, encompassing inter-subjective, institutional, and epistemic violence. For Kochi, the war is a species war, one that is justified by the hierarchical distinction between human and nonhuman, where the former is afforded a good life (bios) and the latter bare life (zo¯e ). The arguments of these writers are useful in so far as they outline the political and philosophical underpinnings of the war against nonhuman animals. However, at this point, it may feel as though the analysis of the war against nonhuman animals has been nothing more than a thought exercise. Below, I outline my practical, legal application of this thesis. My interpretation of the war against nonhuman animals will retain the meaning of the term war put forward by Clausewitz. That is, war involves complete domination. It will draw on Wadiwel’s configuration of this war: biopolitical and sovereign violence. And finally, it shares Kochi’s view that this is a species war. However, departing from this work, my

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thesis—through a reinterpretation of non-international armed conflict as outlined in IHL—will consider how we might protect nonhuman animals, in operational terms, from the violence(s) of this war. Before presenting my thesis, I will start by outlining some key international instruments within IHL.

International Humanitarian Law, the Geneva Conventions, and the Additional Protocols Put simply, the aim of IHL is to alleviate the impact of armed conflict by protecting civilians and by restricting the means and methods used during the conflict. The four Geneva Conventions (1949) and the Additional Protocols (1977) sit within IHL (International committee of the Red Cross, n.d. [ICRC]). In terms of wartime rape and sexual violence— the crimes focused on in this book—it is worth noting here that they are both prohibited under the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols. Relatedly, the International Criminal Court (ICC), created in 1998, forms part of the landscape of IHL (Canning, 2010; Dallman, 2009). It prosecutes genocide, other serious international crimes, as well as wartime rape and sexual violence (Dallman, 2009). To reiterate, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes are included, respectively, in Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute of the ICC (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998). The specific crimes we are interested in are rape, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and other acts of sexual violence. As outlined in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, Crimes against Humanity do not have to be carried out during an armed conflict. They can also occur in peacetime societies. Crimes against Humanity contain three key elements: the physical, contextual, and mental . Listed as a physical element, and relevant to our discussion here, is, “grave forms of sexual violence.” The contextual element refers to acts that are “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population,” while the mental element stipulates that: “the perpetrator must also act with knowledge of the attack against the civilian population and that his/her action is part of that attack” (UN

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Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect—Crimes against Humanity, n.d.). Historically, these crimes have only applied to cases of intrahuman violence; therefore, it is worth pausing here to outline how they can be applied to the situation of nonhuman animals. Indeed, throughout the pages of this book, I will demonstrate how the violence(s) inflicted on nonhuman animals, within the animal-industrial complex, meets the physical , contextual , and mental elements of Crimes against Humanity. Both the physical and contextual elements will become clear when we review the extent and nature of factory farming on Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations and mega farms. The mental element is best explored in relation to animal husbandry practices. This is the term used within the agricultural industry to describe the expressions and consequences of reproductive violence discussed in this book. The common definition of the animal husbandry practices was provided above (see footnote 13). I believe the use of the neutral term ‘animal husbandry practices’—which Cusack (2013) describes as a euphemism for rape and sexual violence—suggests prior knowledge of the attack. As noted above, epistemic violence, which is rooted in a hierarchical distinction between humans and nonhuman animals, mitigates the violence inflicted on nonhuman animals because of their property status. For example, the overuse of antibiotics in order to curtail disease and illness among nonhuman animals facilitates the industrialized reproduction of nonhuman animals. Put simply, the measures put in place to increase meat, egg, and dairy production, as well as minimize the risk of disease and illness, reveal knowledge of the attack. It is worth noting that while factory and slaughterhouse workers have knowledge of the violence carried out in their workplace, this book distinguishes between their involvement in the industry and the role of the state and organizations at the institutional level. This and the efforts made to justify and legitimize the violence(s) of the factory farm are unpacked in more detail in Chapter 5. Let us move on to consider War Crimes. Unlike Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes must take place in the context of either international or non-international armed conflict. War crimes violate international humanitarian law and constitute grave breaches of the 1949

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Geneva Conventions. In a similar way to Crimes against Humanity, they contain both a contextual element and a mental element. The former requires that “the conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international/non-international armed conflict,” while the latter requires knowledge and intent in relation to the individual act as well as the contextual element. The issues of prior knowledge and intent were discussed above. However, the stipulation that War Crimes “must always take place in the context of an armed conflict, either international or non-international” requires further exploration (UN Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect—War Crimes, n.d.).

Armed Conflict Two types of armed conflict are recognized within IHL: international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict (ICRC, 2008). The former involves two or more opposing states, while the latter involves governmental forces and non-governmental armed groups. As noted by the International Committee of the Red Cross: from a legal point of view, there is no other type of armed conflict. Yet, as they point out, “it is important to underline that a situation can evolve from one type of armed conflict to another, depending on the facts prevailing at a certain moment” (ICRC, 2008). This will be key to my revised understanding of armed conflict vis à vis the war against nonhuman animals. The Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols apply to both cases of armed conflict (ICRC, 2008). They “focus on the protection of persons not or no longer taking part in hostilities” (UN Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect—War Crimes, n.d.). In this book, I make the case for applying IHL, specifically the rules it sets out in relation to armed conflict, to the war against nonhuman animals. With reference to the criteria that need to be met for a non-international armed conflict, Kathleen Lawand (of the ICRC) notes: “…fulfilment of these criteria is determined on a caseby-case basis, by weighing up a number of factual indicators” [emphasis added]. The intensity, duration, and gravity of the violence, as well as the type of government forces, the weapons used, and the number of

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casualties incurred, are all considered (see ICRC, 2012). Please take a moment to refamiliarize yourselves with the facts regarding the global slaughter of nonhuman animals presented at the start of the chapter. Taking this information into account, our review of biopolitical and sovereign violence outlined above, as well as the criteria that need to be met for non-international armed conflict (see Lawand for the ICRC, 2012), I believe we can (indeed, should) revise the existing definition of non-international armed conflict. This is my reformulation: the war against nonhuman animals involves violence committed by government and non-governmental groups against non-armed, non-combatants (nonhuman animals) within a state. Based on the Clausewitzean prescription for war, as interpreted by Wadiwel (2015), the goal of the violence (compelling the enemy to fulfill our will) takes precedence over the means used to wage war. Therefore, unlike within the traditional definition of armed conflict—which involves armed government and nongovernmental forces—in this definition, how the state enacts violence is secondary. And while this violence takes place within states, the war against nonhuman animals is a global phenomenon. Let us return to the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols. Article 2 and Additional Protocol I apply to international armed conflict, while Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Article 1 of Additional Protocol II apply to non-international armed conflict (for a more detailed review, see ICRC, 2008). Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibits, among other acts, “violence to life and person…cruel treatment and torture,” as well as “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment” (American Red Cross, 2011). It is my suggestion that rape, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and other forms of sexual violence (also listed as Crimes against Humanity) are examples of violence that is cruel, degrading, and humiliating. Such violence is an attack upon the personal dignity of the victim. As such, I propose that War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity are committed during the war against nonhuman animals. This is based on my revised interpretation of non-international armed conflict. To unpack my reformulation in more detail, I will draw on the work of Nowrot (2015) and Roscini (2017). Roscini (2017) provides a detailed list of current laws that either protect nonhuman animals during armed

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conflict or have the potential to protect nonhuman animals (e.g., when they are used as a means of medical transport).18 So, while there is a precedent of applying IHL to nonhuman animals during armed conflict, this work is not reviewed in detail here. Rather, an overview is provided. This is because both Nowrot (2015) and Roscini (2017) base their analysis on the existing definition of armed conflict (both international and non-international) outlined above. My analysis is based on my revised definition of non-international armed conflict. Indeed, the key difference between the premise on which existing law operates and my thesis is that I posit that war itself is being waged against nonhuman animals. In other words, nonhuman animals are not the incidental victims of war; rather, they are the targets of the war. In her article, Roscini (2017) assesses whether current laws relating to armed conflict offer sufficient protection to nonhuman animals. She proposes three avenues for addressing the status of nonhuman animals during armed conflict. Two are relevant to the current discussion: (1) Nonhuman animals “fall under the same classification as humans (combatants/civilians) and constitute military objectives when they have combatant status” (p. 14). (2) Nonhuman animals “are ‘objects’ and are military objectives when the requirements of Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I are met” (p. 14). I will address these in more detail below.

Avenue 1: Nonhuman Animals as Combatants/Civilians Both Nowrot (2015) and Roscini (2017) consider whether nonhuman animals can qualify as combatants under IHL. For Roscini (2017), the

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Examples include the protection of livestock as indispensable to the survival of civilians and the protection of animals as elements of the natural environment. Here, I have used the language used within existing laws.

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use of nonhuman animals during war is not a form of warfare; therefore, nonhuman animals should not be classified as combatants. Nowrot (2015), on the other hand, believes that recognizing the legal status of “animal soldiers” is a valuable endeavor. I, on the other hand, am interested in the status of nonhuman animals as non-combatants/civilians in this war. This requires applying citizenship to nonhuman animals (see Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011; Ferdowsian & Choe, 2013). Currently, IHL protects nonhuman animals during armed conflict when they are classified as property. Article 53 of the Geneva Convention—The Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War —prohibits destruction to personal property of “protected persons.” This includes nonhuman animals (Roscini, 2017, p. 8). To put it another way, the destruction of nonhuman animals, when they are classified as the private property of protected persons, is considered a War Crime and a breach of the Geneva Conventions (Roscini, 2017). Rather than viewing nonhuman animals as property, I believe nonhuman animals should be treated as civilians and that existing protections within IHL should be applied to them as ‘protected persons’ not the property of ‘protected persons’ [emphasis added]. Part four of the 1977 Additional Protocols addresses the civilian population. Article 48 states: “[i]n order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants” (United Nations Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, p. 264). Additionally, following the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian objects—both during international and non-international armed conflicts—is prohibited under IHL (see Roscini, 2017). It is my argument that these provisions should apply to nonhuman animals who are victims during war.

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Avenue 2: Nonhuman Animals as Objects and Military Targets To reiterate, nonhuman animals “are [considered to be] ‘objects”’ and…military objectives when they meet the requirements of section 2 of Article 52 of Additional Protocol” (Roscini, 2017, p. 14). Before we unpack this statement, it is worth outlining parts 1 and 2 of Article 52 of the Additional Protocol. They are: (1) “Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives.” (2) “Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action” (United Nations Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, p. 266). With regard to the first point, within this framing, nonhuman animals are treated as things and as the property of protected persons. Therefore, they are only protected when they are viewed as an object of a civilian. In terms of the second, nonhuman animals will be targeted if they contribute to ‘military action.’ I take issue with this second approach for two reasons. Firstly, not all nonhuman animals will fall outside the remit of contributing to military action. That is, as noted above, nonhuman animals (without their consent) have been used during wars and armed conflict throughout history. And secondly, I believe we must challenge the anthropocentric nature of IHL and resist the classification of nonhuman animals as ‘things’ and ‘objects.’ I proceed on the basis that nonhuman animals should be treated as civilians in this war. Readers may have several questions at this point. I anticipate that the most pertinent of these will be: which nonhuman animals should be protected under IHL during this war? For those, such as Nowrot (2015)— who are addressing this question from the perspective of nonhuman animals as active participants during armed conflict (based on the existing definition of this term)—I believe that the question is harder to

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answer. This is because it is more challenging to determine and measure differential levels of agency within the nonhuman animal population. In terms of protections, I would argue that the question is easier to answer when we are simply addressing the victimization of nonhuman animals rather than the agency of ‘animal soldiers.’ To answer the question from this perspective, we must accept that nonhuman animals are sentient beings. Beyond this, we must accept that they are civilians in this war. Based on these criteria, we could argue that all nonhuman animals should be afforded protection under IHL. In either case, my revised understanding of armed conflict would require, to borrow from Nowrot (2015, p. 139), “a normative specification” of which nonhuman animals should be protected under IHL. I will refrain from providing a laundry list of which nonhuman animals should be included in this specification. Rather, I will interrogate the arguments for granting nonhuman animals legal personhood status in more detail in the following chapter.

A Criminology of War A Criminology of War? is the title of McGarry and Walklate’s 2021 book which, as the title suggests, reviews the feasibility of developing a criminology of war. To answer their question, they draw on Jamieson (2012) who states: “what it comes down to is not so much a question of what people call it…Rather it is a question of how the study of war is imagined and achieved ” (as cited in McGarry & Walklate, 2020, p. 166). I imagine the study of war to include nonhuman animals or a carnist battlefield. War in this context is based on my revision to noninternational armed conflict to accommodate the situation of nonhuman animals. I believe we can extend Flynn and Hall’s (2017) proposal for a victimology of nonhuman animals to include the victimology of nonhumans during war. To achieve this study of war, one must recognize animals as sentient beings and as a group who should be afforded legal personhood status. In doing so, we can then apply IHL to nonhuman animals who are subject to rape, forced pregnancy, and “any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions’ ” (see article 8 section 2b part 22 of the Rome Statue of the

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International Criminal Court, 1998). Or, to phrase this differently: by placing the violence committed by humans against nonhuman animals in the context of war, we can argue that War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity—rape, sexual, reproductive, and coercive violence—are being committed against this group. This understanding moves us a step closer toward the creation of a non-speciesist criminology. As we proceed, when referring to the war against nonhuman animals in the forthcoming chapters, this will be based on my revised understanding of non-international armed conflict.

The Case Studies and Populations Included in the Book The chosen case studies of intrahuman violence include The Holocaust, The 1971 Liberation War in Bangladesh, and the armed conflicts in Darfur and the former Yugoslavia. The book will also consider the genocidal and reproductive violence committed against the Uighur population in China. The experiences of cis gender human populations are addressed. This book will argue that these crimes are also committed during the war against nonhuman animals. As part of this war, female dairy cows and female pigs (sows) are subject to forced insemination through artificial insemination resulting in forced pregnancy. I will argue that not only is this forced insemination an act of rape (Gillespie, 2014; Kelty-Huber, 2015; Mackenzie, 2019); it is also an act of reproductive violence. Other nonhuman animals, for example, hens, male piglets, male calves, and bulls, are also subject to reproductive violence and reproductive coercion during this war. The specific War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity committed against male and female nonhuman animals are reviewed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4. With regard to intrahuman violence, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity are reviewed both within and outside the context of war and armed conflict. In some instances, the intrahuman violence is genocidal in nature. As mentioned above, this book will not draw analogies between the suffering of humans and nonhuman animals to support its central thesis. That said, it is still important to stress why I have

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chosen to include human populations in the discussion of the war against nonhuman animals. Extending beyond the Linked Oppression Thesis (Wyckoff, 2014), and its focus on the shared sources of oppression between human and nonhuman animals alike, it is also imperative to draw attention to the implications of speciesism for both groups. In the following chapters of this book, I will demonstrate how this preoccupation with species difference precludes an analysis that truly challenges what it means to be human. I will argue that in order to address the war against nonhuman animals we must reconstitute what it means to be human. As alluded to above, we need to defy the essentialism of humanism (Twine, 2010) and advocate for a posthumanist reimagining of the categories human and nonhuman. This will not be an easy task. It will, among other charges, require an examination of the violence(s) (in this case War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity) humans inflict on those deemed sub-, in-, or nonhuman. This includes humans and nonhuman animals. The case studies chosen for review involve situations where victims have been targeted based on their exclusion from the category human. In turn, the violence inflicted upon them denies their humanity, resulting in their exploitation and marginalization.

Methodology and Analytical Framework This book is eclectic in its approach. It adopts a multi-disciplinary approach and involves secondary-data analysis of theoretical and empirical research from a range of disciplines and sub-disciplines: Green, Feminist, and Critical Criminology; Critical Animal Studies; Philosophy and Social Criticism, as well as International Law and War Studies. To analyze the war against nonhuman animals, the book draws on data from the Global Animal Protection Index, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, as well as reports on factory farming and animal husbandry practices. It reviews the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court and lawsuits filed by the Nonhuman Rights Project. The book will offer a global analysis of the war against

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nonhuman animals. However, individual states and geographical locations will be specified as and when it is appropriate, for example, when referring to specific animal sentience laws. Engagement with this broad range of scholarship, including the broad range of case studies drawn upon, provides a more nuanced and enriched understanding of war, genocide, and reproductive violence against human and nonhuman animals. While various theoretical perspectives are explored throughout the book, Chapter 5—which unpacks the system within/upon which the war against nonhuman animals is facilitated and maintained—outlines the overarching analytical framework for understanding the commodification of nonhuman animals within the animal-industrial complex. Firstly, this relates to the nature of the violence(s) inflicted and, secondly, to the context and motivations behind such violence. Biopolitics (the production of life), thanatopolitics (the politics of death), Mbembe’s (2003) necropolitics (death in life), and Stanescu’s (2013) notion of ‘deading life’ (bodies that are already dead) are used to explain the former. All are inextricably linked to the notion of human exceptionalism. With regard to the latter, I draw on carnism, speciesism, and Marxist perspectives to explain the context and motivations behind the industrialized killing and industrialized reproduction of nonhuman animals within the meat, egg, and dairy industries. In terms of the shared sources of oppression between human and nonhuman animals, white supremacy, heteropatriarchy, anthropatriarchy and capitalism, and their relationship to racism, sexism, and speciesism form the backdrop to our review of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity throughout the book.

The Main Arguments of the Book 1. We are currently engaged in a war against nonhuman animals, this war involves industrialized slaughter as well as industrialized reproduction (this chapter/Introduction).

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2. Nonhuman animals should be granted passive legal personhood status; this will require a posthumanist reconstruction of what it means to be human (Chapter 2). 3. War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity—in the form of rape, forced pregnancy, and sexual violence (i.e., the acts and consequences of reproductive violence and reproductive coercion)—are committed against human and nonhuman animals (see Chapters 3 and 4). 4. Human exceptionalism informs the thanatopolitical violence that takes place within the animal-industrial complex. Factory farms provide the locus for the war, while industrial capitalism is the driving force behind it (Chapter 5). This carnist battlefield results in global negative public health and environmental outcomes (Chapter 5). 5. White supremacy, hetero- and anthropatriarchy and capitalism, and their relationship to racism, sexism, and speciesism inform the violence(s) experienced by human and nonhuman populations during war and armed conflict (All chapters).

Organization of the Book Following on from this Introduction, Chapter 2 reviews the philosophical literature on animal sentience and the animal rights literature on the legal personhood status of nonhuman animals. In the case of the former, and in alignment with ecofeminist scholarship, I argue that species difference needs to be incorporated into intersectional analyses of the oppression of nonhuman animals. With regard to the latter, criteria such as equal consideration and consciousness; autonomy and self-determination; the sameness argument; and Kurki’s (2021) bundle theory are examined to determine whether nonhuman animals should be granted legal personhood status. A review of the clients and real-world cases of the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) is included to illustrate how the debate around legal personhood works in practice. The NhRP describes itself as a civil rights organization. Based in the US, it was founded by Steven Wise in 1996. The aim of the organization is to protect the rights of nonhuman animals and replace their status as ‘things’ with their status as ‘legal persons.’ Proceeding from this analysis of the literature

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on legal personhood, as well as the work of the NhRP, this chapter poses and answers the following question: what does legal personhood achieve? Drawing on posthumanism, the chapter closes with a critique of human exceptionalism. It unpacks the implications of animalization and dehumanization for human and nonhuman animals and provides some suggestions on how we interrogate and move beyond the normative category human. Chapter 3 revisits the concepts of reproductive violence and reproductive coercion. It reviews the following War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: rape, forced pregnancy, and sexual violence. These acts are framed as the expressions and consequences of reproductive violence. They are explored in relation to female human and nonhuman animals. This chapter proposes revising the definition of forced pregnancy (as defined by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court) by replacing the term ‘woman’ with the more inclusive term ‘pregnant persons,’ thereby acknowledging the experiences of both human and nonhuman animals who are subject to this crime based on their (perceived) capability of becoming pregnant. Following on from Chapter 2, we proceed on the basis that nonhuman animals have been granted passive legal personhood. The first half of the chapter reviews cases of intrahuman reproductive violence and reproductive coercion during the Holocaust, the 1971 Liberation War in Bangladesh, and the genocide against the Uighur population in China. I review the following acts: rape, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, forced sterilization, the killing of newly born babies, and forced adoption. Drawing on the feminist literature relating to animal husbandry practices within agribusiness, the second part of the chapter reviews rape, sexual violence and forced pregnancy across the meat, egg, and dairy industries. The cases referred to in the first part of the chapter establish the nature (rape, forced pregnancy and assault on motherhood) as well as the targets of reproductive violence: persons with (perceived) reproductive capabilities. However, the examples discussed in second half of the chapter demonstrate how female nonhuman animals capable of becoming pregnant meet the criteria outlined in these War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.

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While the differing motivations and contexts across human and nonhuman populations are highlighted, with reference to the assault on motherhood and the woman/mother-as-nation thesis, I identify the following shared sources of oppression across the case studies reviewed: reproduction and motherhood, ethno-nationalism, hetero- and anthropatriarchy and the denial of personhood. Chapter 4 focuses on male-directed conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence against human and nonhuman animals: genital violence, forced ejaculation, castration, and enforced sterilization. These acts fall within the definition of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. The first half of the chapter reviews intrahuman reproductive violence during the 1971 Liberation War in Bangladesh and the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Darfur. With a particular focus on circumcision within Islam, I review the racialized and territorial nature of this violence. Here, we revisit the themes of animalization and dehumanization discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The chapter challenges existing explanatory frameworks of male-directed conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence. Drawing on queer interpretations of these phenomena (as they relate to intrahuman violence), it resists universal and essentialist assumptions regarding the motivations of perpetrators and the experience of victims. Specifically, the notions of emasculation, feminization, and homosexualization are replaced with Schulz’s (2018) notion of displacement from gendered personhood . I add to this literature by using gender-neutral language when discussing reproductive violence. Here, the focus shifts to the targets of the violence: persons capable of procreation through semen production. The positive implications of this shift for nonhuman animals are explored. The second part of the chapter reviews conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence against bulls and male calves within the meat and dairy industries, respectively. These are analyzed with reference to the vulnerability of the penis and displacement from gendered personhood . By revealing the vulnerability of male bodies capable of reproduction, this chapter broadens our understanding of the relationship between gender and vulnerability. The following sources of oppression are identified across all of the examples reviewed: the vulnerability of the penis, displacement from gendered personhood, as well as race, ethnopolitics, and animalization.

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Kim’s (2015) ‘multi-optic’ vision is used to complete our review of the shared sources of oppression between human and nonhuman animals (as discussed here and in Chapter 3). I demonstrate how discriminatory practices relating to race, gender, and speciesism inform the violence(s) reviewed across all case studies. The chapter closes with my proposal to revise the existing security paradigm with a more inclusive approach, one that protects human and nonhuman animals alike. To this end, I advocate replacing human security with personhood security. In Chapter 5, we return to the questions raised by Kochi (2009) in this chapter, namely: what types of violence are committed during the species war? And what is the context and motivation behind the war? The first part of the chapter focuses on the nature of the war against nonhuman animals: the violence(s) of “make live” as well as the violence(s) of “let die.” Here, we will extend our analysis of biopolitics. To this end, we will draw on the work of Stanescu (2013) who argues that the violence of the factory farm goes beyond biopolitics. Following on from this, I argue that the nature of the species war is thanatopolitical (i.e., concerned with the politics of death). Mbembe’s (2003) necropolitics, Esposito’s (2008) immunization paradigm, and Stanescu’s (2013) ‘deading life’ (the belief that nonhuman animals are already dead) are used to explore these ideas. The second part of the chapter addresses the driving force and locus of the violence(s) of this war. To this end, we will unpack Noske’s (1997) animal-industrial complex as well as industrial capitalism. Here, I will provide a critical analysis of Marxism, specifically ideas about wage labor, commodities, and alienation. In part three, we examine the sites of this thanatopolitical violence: Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations and mega farms. In this section, I review the impact and implications of factory farming for public health, for the environment, and for industry workers. Drawing on Mbembe’s (2003) necropolitics and Nixon’s (2011) concept of slow violence, I unpack the environmental impacts of these ‘death worlds.’ By outlining the consequences of factory farming—which leads to various types of environmental pollution; increases in the risk of disease, viruses, infections, and antibiotic resistance—this chapter confronts the central paradox of the ‘more than human’ biopolitical dream. To put it bluntly, it reveals that the status of the ‘living dead’ (currently afforded to nonhuman animals confined in

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CAFOs and on mega farms) will inevitably, become the reality for many human populations. To incentivize change—with the aim of reducing the impacts of climate change by suggesting more sustainable options—the final part of the chapter compares data on the environmental impacts of the meat and dairy industries with plant-based alternatives. It highlights the benefits of reducing our intake of meat and dairy products by shifting toward vegan alternatives. A non-capitalist and posthuman mode of existence is offered as a solution to the exploitation and commodification of all living beings. In sum, this chapter answers the following key questions: (1) what underpins and facilitates the war against nonhuman animals and (2) what are the global consequences of this war for human and nonhuman animals alike?

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2 Granting Nonhuman Animals Legal Personhood: The Implications for Human and Nonhuman Animals

Introduction This chapter reviews the literature on arguments that nonhuman animals should be granted legal personhood and given “fundamental rights such as bodily integrity and bodily liberty” (Varriale-Barker, 2020, p. 15). The aim of this chapter is twofold: (1) to familiarize readers with the arguments that nonhuman animals should be treated as sentient beings and granted legal personhood and (2) to set up the argument that War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (rape, forced pregnancy, and sexual violence) are being committed during the war against nonhuman animals. The ability of living creatures to truly feel – to have emotions based on an interest not to be harmed, tortured or killed – is one reason why they should be treated with care and respect. (Bourke, 2011, p. 130)

As we will see in this chapter, both within and outside academia, and across a range of disciplines, there is a consensus that nonhuman animals are sentient beings. However, there is discord when it comes to agreeing © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Banwell, The War Against Nonhuman Animals, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30430-9_2

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upon which nonhuman species this applies to. How do we decide which nonhuman animals feel pain? As a thought exercise, let us agree that all nonhuman animals can suffer, once we have established this, what measures should we take to eliminate their pain and suffering? In other words, what does treating nonhuman animals with care and respect look like? Or, to put it differently: does treating nonhuman animals with care and respect preclude us from treating them as resources? Part of what I want to interrogate in this chapter is what protections does sentience offer. That is, to ask: what is the relationship between sentience and legal personhood? Is an acknowledgment of sentience enough or does the problem lie with the continued property status of most nonhuman animals? And, related to this, I want to review debates about how and when these criteria are applied and to which nonhuman animals. The chapter will also address speciesism, anthropocentrism, and posthumanism. I will address the first of these below in relation to the concept of intersectionality.

Intersectionality and Species Difference The concept of intersectionality involves recognizing how multiple interlocking inequalities intersect to inform experiences and identities. Categories include, but are not limited to, age, race, class, gender identity, sexual orientation, and different types of disabilities. Scholars within Critical Animal Studies, as well as ecofeminists, have called for species difference to be incorporated into this analysis (Adams, 2015; Beirne, 1999, 2018; Brown, 2016; Deckha, 2008; Ko & Ko, 2015/2020; Twine, 2013). As Deckha explains (2008, p. 249): Our identities are not just gendered or racialized but are also determined by our species status and the fact that we are culturally marked as human. More importantly…experiences of gender, race, sexuality, ability…are often based on and take shape through speciesist ideas of humanness vis-à-vis animality.

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Species difference refers to the human-animal hierarchical binary referred to in the previous chapter. It forms the basis of the war against nonhuman animals. Adding species difference to intersectional analyses of oppression involves treating the nonhuman status of animals as a key element of their oppression, comparable to how race and gender identity, for example, are understood to inform experiences of marginalization and discrimination among humans. Reminiscent of the concerns that have been raised in the previous chapter around the ‘dreaded comparisons’ between intrahuman violence and violence against nonhuman animals, there are also objections to including nonhuman animals within the matrix of intersectionality. This resistance stems from fears that this will undermine efforts to address the oppression of marginalized human groups (Bourke, 2011). However, as writers have argued, there are interconnections between the sources of racism, sexism, and speciesism, and that addressing one cannot be done without addressing the other (Deckha, 2008; Jackson, 2020; Kim, 2011, 2015; Ko & Ko, 2015/2020). Using our ‘multi-optic’ vision (presented in the first chapter), we can trace the sources of these interconnected oppressions to the following: colonialism, white supremacy, hegemonic masculinity, and hetero- and anthropatriarchy. They have already been touched upon but will be explored in more detail in our review of posthumanism at the end of this chapter. Rather than viewing this as a zero-sum game where, to mirror Connell’s gender hierarchy, one category or group are considered marginalized more or less than the other—relative to their position within the hierarchy—we can see this as an opportunity to re-imagine the category human and, by extension, what it means to be human. In the previous chapter, I argued that using the term nonhuman to describe animals need not carry negative connotations. In a similar vein, Gruen (2015) has identified differences between inevitable and arrogant anthropocentrism. The former acknowledges that our experiences and perceptions are always and already human. How can they not be? The latter, however, as Gruen (2015, p. 24) argues, is a form of human chauvinism “…that not only locates humans at the center of everything…but elevates the human perspective above all others.” In a similar

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vein, Gillespie (2018) argues that traditional forms of anthropomorphism—which involved attributing human characteristics to nonhuman animals—are being replaced with an appreciation of the emotions and behavior of nonhuman animals in and of their own right. We will continue this discussion below once we have addressed speciesism and animal sentience.

Speciesism and Animal Sentience In simple terms, speciesism refers to perceived human superiority over nonhuman animals or discrimination based on species membership. Elaborating on this, Dunayer (2013, p. 34) defines speciesism as “…a failure, on the basis of species membership or species-typical characteristics, to accord any sentient being equal consideration and respect.” She uses the term ‘non-speciesist’ to refer to those who “reject human-biased criteria for rights and advocate rights for all sentient beings” (Dunayer, 2013, p. 34). Based on this definition, I would describe myself as a non-speciesist. To illustrate what non-speciesism would look like in practice, in her chapter, The Rights of Sentient Beings: Moving Beyond Old and New Speciesism, Dunayer (2013) provides a blueprint for a non-speciesist law. For our purposes here, a few examples will be recounted. Under this law, the following would be illegal: ● The intentional killing of nonhuman animals (exceptions would include euthanasia and self-defense). ● The killing of nonhuman animals for food or clothing (exceptions include situations where starvation is imminent and there is no access to plant food).1 1

Paradoxically, Dunayer (2013) appears to contradict her own thesis on non-speciesism. By including exceptions to the killing of nonhuman animals, which are based on preserving the life and interests of humans, Dunayer (2013) reproduces the hierarchal distinction between human and nonhuman animals. Her argument is that we should not kill nonhuman animals unless our own lives as humans are at risk. While this may be a valid argument to make, it seems especially at odds with her thesis on non-speciesism and to my mind, undermines the non-speciesist law she is advocating for.

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● The forced insemination of nonhuman animals. ● Extracting products such as milk from nonhuman animals. ● Destroying the habitats of nonhuman animals. In terms of protections, non-speciesist law would “accord all sentient beings a legal right to liberty – physical freedom and bodily integrity” (Dunayer, 2013, p. 37). Furthermore, nonhuman animals would be released from captivity. Put another way: it would be illegal to hold nonhuman animals captive. And in his article, For a Nonspeciesist Criminology, Beirne (1999) urges criminologists to develop and theorize the category of animal abuse. He concludes that “a criminology that ignores animal abuse will be a speciesist discourse utterly irrelevant to the understanding of much harm and suffering inflicted by humans on nonhuman, but nevertheless valuable, forms of life” (p. 140). I want to pick up on a key element of Dunayer’s (2013) non-speciesist law: namely that of sentience. To reiterate, Dunayer’s non-speciesist law would apply to all sentient beings. In the next section, we will review historical and contemporary debates about animal sentience, as well as the legal recognition of animal sentience. In Jeremy Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789/1823), on the subject of the humane treatment of nonhuman animals, Bentham infamously declared: “[t]he question is not, [c]an they reason? nor, [c]an they talk? but, [c]an they suffer?” (p. 144). And prior to this Thomas Young, in his publication, Essay on Humanity to Animals (1798), advocated for the ‘rights of animals’ based on arguments about sentience (Bourke, 2011). Sentience is operationalized by the Sentience Institute as “the capacity to have positive and negative experiences, usually thought of as happiness and suffering” (Anthis, 2018). This, they acknowledge, is a narrower definition of consciousness, one which does not concern itself with capacities beyond happiness and suffering (a detailed analysis of what constitutes consciousness is beyond the scope of this chapter; for a more detailed review, see Allen & Trestman, 2020). Prior to this, in 2010, the ‘Directive of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union,’ in their paper The Protection of Animals used for Scientific Purposes, noted:

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Animals have an intrinsic value which must be respected. There are also the ethical concerns of the general public as regards the use of animals in procedures. Therefore, animals should always be treated as sentient creatures…. The use of animals for scientific or educational purposes should therefore only be considered where a non-animal alternative is unavailable. Use of animals for scientific procedures in other areas under the competence of the Union should be prohibited.

The Parliament and the Council included cephalopods, as well as vertebrate animals, and cyclostomes,2 within their Directive noting that “there is scientific evidence of their ability to experience pain, suffering, distress and lasting harm.” And in 2012 a group of experts met at the University of Cambridge to discuss the subject of consciousness in human and nonhuman subjects. The group declared the following: [T]he weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Nonhuman animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates.3

We will now consider the legal recognition of animal sentience.

The Legal Context Space will not permit a detailed review of the legal recognition of animal sentience worldwide (for a more detailed global review and a review of Animal Welfare legislation in Europe, see, respectively, the American Bar Association, 2020; and Blattner, 2019). Drawing on the global Animal Protection Index (API), what follows is an overview of animal welfare policy and legislation as it relates to sentience. This index—carried out in 2014 and 2020—reviews the animal welfare policy and legislation of 50 countries across the globe. Each country is evaluated according to 2 These are a class of jawless, scaleless, and finless fish, comprised of the hagfish and the lamprey. They have long, slender bodies (see Britannica.com on cyclostome for more details). 3 The report was written by Philip Low and edited by Jaak Panksepp, Diana Reiss, David Edelman, Bruno Van Swinderen, Philip Low, and Christof Koch.

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ten indicators. These map onto 4 key goals (discussed below). For each indicator, a country is graded from A (the highest score) to G (the lowest score). They also receive an overall grade (it is worth noting that, when last reviewed in October 2022, none of the 50 countries had received an overall grade of A). The index is based on the following nonhuman animals: animals in captivity, farmed animals, ‘pets,’ wild animals, and animals used in research. For our purposes here, we will focus on goal 1 of the API: Recognition of Animal Sentience and Prohibition of Animal Suffering. This goal is measured by the following indicators: Indicator 1: legislation that formally recognizes animal sentience. To be awarded an A for this indicator a country must adopt legislation that includes: “[f ]ull formal recognition of sentience into law applicable to, at a minimum, all vertebrates, cephalopods and decapod crustaceans. Such a formal recognition of sentience should be enshrined in animal welfare legislation, as well as in the country’s Civil Code.” Indicator 2: animal protection laws that ban animal suffering. To achieve an A for this indicator, a country must adopt legislation that includes the following: a “[p]rohibition against causing physical and psychological suffering to animals, including suffering caused by failure to act by those responsible for animals.”

Below, I provide a snapshot of the results (as noted, these were last reviewed in October 2022). The aim is not to provide an exhaustive account of each country profile (this information can be found on the website). Rather, my intention is to provide readers with a sense of the different rankings worldwide, as well as highlight how individual countries can differ in terms of how they score across the 4 goals, thereby presenting a seemingly incompatible and incoherent approach to animal welfare. For example, while Switzerland receives an overall high score on the index (e.g., for legislation relating to protecting animals used in research and animals in captivity), its legislation does not explicitly refer to sentience, and therefore, it receives a lower score for this indicator. In addition, I want to underscore that the laws that recognize sentience are distinct from animal protection laws. As demonstrated by Switzerland, good practice with regard to the latter does not correspond with a country’s approach to the former.

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Several countries in Europe (e.g., Sweden, France, Austria, and the Netherlands) have formally recognized animal sentience in their legislation. This is not the case for African countries such as Morocco, Ethiopia, Niger, and Algeria. The US, Canada, China, Australia, and Russia have also failed to introduce legislation that fully recognizes animal sentience. Interestingly, while South American countries such as Argentina and Venezuela score badly when it comes to animal sentience legislation, Colombia, despite its overall ranking, through its National Statute of Animal Protection (NSAP) Law of 1989, acknowledges that nonhuman animals can feel pain. The lowest scoring country (in terms of its overall score and its score for goal 1) is Iran. The overall score for the UK in the API is B. And it is awarded C for its efforts to introduce legislation that recognizes animal sentience. It is possible to attribute this score to Brexit—the UK withdrawal from the European Union (EU). Prior to its withdrawal, the UK, as a member of the EU, was bound by the 2007 Lisbon Treaty known as the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Article 13 of this Treaty recognizes animal sentience. The aim of the Treaty was “to make it clear that even though animals are ‘goods’ for the purposes of EU economic law, their sentience means that their welfare needs should also be fully considered” (Animal Protection Index, n.d.). Following the 2016 EU referendum, the UK left the EU on January 31, 2020. As a result, the UK is no longer party to this legislation. When I first started writing this chapter—September 2021—The Animal Welfare (Sentience) Bill was at the report stage in the House of Lords.4 Since then, this bill has been approved by Parliament. The new UK law is now referred to as the Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022. By law, the UK government must acknowledge animal sentience when drafting legislation (Sachkova, 2022). It also requires the provision of an Animal Sentience Committee, appointed by the Secretary of State. The role of the committee will be to ask “whether, or to what extent, the government is having, or has had, all due regard to the ways in which [a] policy might have an adverse effect on the welfare of animals as sentient beings” (Animal Welfare Sentience 4

This stage allows members of the Lords another opportunity to review and make amendments to the bill (see UK Parliament Report State (n.d.)).

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Act, 2022). Historically, ‘animal,’ in this context, was limited to any “vertebrate other than homo sapiens.” This means fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals.5 The new legislation allows the Secretary of State to amend this section and incorporate “invertebrates of any description” within the definition of ‘animal’ (Animal Welfare Sentience Act, 2022). Invertebrates include, but are not limited to, crabs, lobster, squid, and jellyfish, as well as spiders, snails, insects, and clams.6 In terms of scholarly research, the edited collection by Corbey and Lanjouw (2013), The Politics of Species: Reshaping our Relationships with other Animals, reviews scientific evidence on the presence of sentience among nonhuman animals. For example, Marc Bekoff, in Who Lives, Who Dies, and Why? reviews research that proves octopi feel pain and that they “perform complex patterns of behavior that readily yield to cognitive explanations invoking sentience” (p. 19). Similarly, empirical research on fish reports that fish have long-term memories and are clearly sentient beings. Bekoff (2013) cites research by Victoria Braithwaite (2011) who writes: We now know that fish actually are cognitively more competent than we thought before – some species of fish have very sophisticated forms of cognition...In our experiments we showed that if we hurt fish, they react, and then if we give them pain relief, they change their behavior, strongly indicating that they feel pain. (as cited in Bekoff, 2013, p. 20)

Lori Marino in Human, Dolphins, and Moral Inclusivity reviews research on the emotional intelligence, self-awareness, and complex cognitive abilities of dolphins, which include understanding language, problemsolving, and the ability to imitate sounds and behaviors. Research also reveals that Dolphins have a sense of self and can recognize themselves in a mirror. They are also social beings who develop long-term collaborative relationships to support the societies in which they live. For Marino (2013), the results of this research “provide strong support for recognizing [Dolphins]… as individuals with basic rights comparable 5 6

For more details on these vertebrae groups, see John P. Rafferty in Britannica. For more, see the invertebrate section of Britannica.

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to those of humans. Yet, dolphins (and whales) continue to be treated as non-sentient objects, commodities, and resources” (p. 95). Part of the problem, as Marino (2013) sees it, is that, unlike other nonhuman animals, who display obvious signs of distress when in pain, Dolphins “smile” when they are being harmed. Moreover, only trained experts recognize the sounds of panic and fear exhibited by Dolphins. And finally in her chapter, The Rights of Sentient Beings: Moving Beyond Old and New Speciesism, Dunayer (2013) draws on scientific research that indicates that all vertebrates and all invertebrates with brains are sentient beings. “In sum,” she argues, “there’s strong evidence that all creatures who possess a brain are sentient and growing evidence that all creatures with a nervous system are sentient” (p. 35).

The New Speciesism One point of contention within these discussions about animal sentience is the ‘hierarchy of sentience’ (Bourke, 2011). That is the question of whether all nonhuman animals feel pain to the same degree and what criteria are used to measure this. Dunayer’s (2013) notion of ‘new speciesism’ touches upon this. New speciesism is the belief that moral and legal rights should apply to nonhuman as well as human animals. The premise of new speciesism is that it applies to nonhuman animals who share the most similarities with humans. This can be illustrated by the work of the Great Ape Project and the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP). By highlighting these organizations here, my intention is not to undermine their work; rather, my aim is to (1) highlight the tensions and disagreements that exist among animal rights advocates; (2) underscore the difficulties in agreeing which criteria should be used when recognizing animal sentience; and (3) review the criteria used to attribute legal personhood status to nonhuman animals. The Great Ape Project strives to defend the rights of what it refers to as the ‘great primates’: chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and bonobos. These primates are described as “our closest relatives in the animal kingdom” (Great Ape Project [GAP]). The main aim of the project is to “fight for the right for the basic rights to life, freedom and non-torture of the

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nonhuman great apes” (GAP, n.d.). It works in 13 countries across the globe in South America, Europe, Africa, Japan, and the UK. The GAP produced a document called the World Declaration of the Great Apes. It outlines the rights of these nonhuman animals. The principles outlined in this document include: the right to life, individual freedom, and protection and prohibition of torture (see GAP, n.d. for more details). While this is a commendable project, herein lies the problem: an underlying anthropocentric evaluation of the rights of nonhuman animals. Perhaps this is not quite the ‘arrogant anthropocentrism’ proposed by Gruen (2015) (see above), still, it is rooted in a belief that only those nonhuman animals who are most human-like are worthy of protection. Similarly, the NhRP—which aims to protect the rights of nonhuman animals and replace their status as ‘things’ with their status as ‘legal persons’—limits its focus to the common law status of great apes, elephants, dolphins, and whales (Nonhuman Rights Project). As noted, the NhRP was founded by Steven Wise in 1996. His book, Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals (2000), makes the case for granting chimpanzees and bonobos legal personhood status. He explains: “[w]ithout legal personhood, one is invisible to civil law. One has no civil rights. One might as well be dead” (Wise, 2000, p. 4). Therefore, the aim of the NhRP is to ensure that “a nonhuman animal has the common law capacity to possess at least one legal right, that she is a legal person” (Wise, 2013, p. 243). For me, these two examples (and the preceding discussion) illustrate that one cannot avoid addressing the question: which nonhuman animals are we advocating for? And perhaps the answer to this question depends upon what we want for nonhuman animals. If our aim is to remove their suffering, how do we define suffering in this context? If our goal is to end the exploitation of nonhuman animals, how exploitation is operationalized in this situation will determine to which nonhuman animals it applies. These questions are difficult. I will keep things simple and will proceed on the following basis: all vertebrate and invertebrate nonhuman animals with brains and nervous systems will be regarded as sentient beings. Based on this, they should all be granted legal personhood. Legal personhood in the context of our discussion here means treating nonhuman animals as civilians. This means

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that protections afforded non-combatants targeted during war should apply to nonhuman animals. In the previous chapter, I outlined my revision to non-international armed conflict to accommodate the situation of nonhuman animals within the animal-industrial complex. In this book, I focus on specific War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (rape, forced pregnancy, and sexual violence), as they relate to specific nonhuman animals: cows, calves, bulls, sows, piglets, and hens. However, the principle of the argument presented in this book should be applied to all nonhuman animals who are victims within this war.7 Before we address current arguments concerning the legal personhood status of nonhuman animals, it will be useful to situate these within historical and contemporary philosophical debates about the status of nonhuman animals.

Philosophical Discourses on Nonhuman Animals In the following section, I will sketch out the history and development of philosophical ideas relating to nonhuman animals. This is by no means an exhaustive account of the divergent perspectives, but for our purposes here, a summary of the main arguments will suffice (for the original works, see Regan, 1986; Wise, 2000 and for detailed reviews of this work see Beirne, 1999; Francione, 1997; Freeman, 2002; Gruen, 2017; Norcross, 2014). Despite Aristotle’s convictions regarding the superiority of humans over nonhuman animals, given his view that all living things have a purpose, it is reasonable to argue, as Freeman (2002) does, that Aristotle did not believe nonhuman animals should be treated badly. Rather, they should be treated differentially based on their inferior status. This human-animal binary that underpins his thinking is based on the belief that humans, unlike nonhuman animals, are rational, moral beings. 7 I recognize that not all nonhuman human animals are victims of the violence(s) of the war proposed in this book. However, not all humans are victims of war and armed conflict, but we still have measures in place to protect those who are.

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In a similar vein, Renne Descartes (1596–1650) regarded nonhuman animals as machines lacking reason and consciousness (Descartes, 1637/2006). While Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) challenged the notion that nonhuman animals were simply inanimate objects—by acknowledging their sentience—he did not regard this as an imperative for humans to treat nonhuman animals with dignity and respect.8 We can contrast the views of these rationalists with Jeremey Bentham who, advancing a utilitarian approach, advocated for the humane treatment of nonhuman animals precisely because of their ability to feel pain. Briefly, utilitarianism contains two moral principles: equality and utility (Regan, 1986). The former presupposes that everyone’s interests matter. As Regan explains, this means that “similar interests must be counted as having similar weight or importance [and that] everyone’s pain or frustration matter, and matter just as much as the equivalent pain or frustration of anyone else” (Regan, 1986, p. 183). The latter involves acting in ways that bring about the best outcome for everyone involved. Unlike his predecessors—who treated the differences between human and nonhuman animals as grounds for differential treatment—Bentham, while acknowledging these differences, pointed to one important similarity: the ability of human and nonhuman animals to feel pain. And, to paraphrase Francione (2004), it is this ability to suffer, and not the ability to reason, that should guarantee legal protections for nonhuman animals. Peter Singer (1975) adopts a revised version of utilitarianism referred to as preference utilitarianism. This is based on the idea that anyone who has an interest in not being harmed has the right to have this interest upheld (Gruen, 2017). In Animal Liberation, Francione (1997, p. 77) explains: “Singer argues that in assessing the consequences of our actions, it is necessary to take the interests of animals seriously” and ensure that the interests and actions of humans do not have an adverse effect on the interests of nonhuman animals. For Singer (1975), speciesism has precluded humans from achieving this. Following Bentham’s utilitarianism and Singer’s preference utilitarianism, Tom Regan’s, The case for Animal Rights (1986), represents yet 8 See Kant’s Lectures on Ethics written between 1760 and 1794 and edited by Heath and Schneewind 1997.

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another paradigm shift within philosophical discourses on the status and treatment of nonhuman animals (Freeman, 2002). Regan (1986) describes himself as an advocate of the animal rights movement which, he argues, is committed to the following goals: “the total abolition of the use of animals in science; the total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture”; and “the total elimination of commercial and sport hunting and trapping” (p. 179). The core of the problem from Regan’s perspective is the animal-industrial complex. While he does not use this term specifically, the system that he castigates—the system where nonhuman animals are reduced to resources—falls within Noske’s (1997) animal-industrial complex. The suffering of nonhuman animals notwithstanding, the fundamental wrong, according to Regan (1986), is the system that facilitates this violence. For Regan (1986) nonhuman animals have inherent value, and as such, they are subjects-of-a-life. He states: To be the subject-of-a-life… involves more than merely being alive and more than merely being conscious… [I]ndividuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them. (p. 243)

Based on his contention that nonhuman animals are subjects-of-a-life, Regan believed that we have a duty to treat them with respect rather than as resources to be exploited (Regan, 1986). His rights-based approach to the treatment of nonhuman animals can be contrasted with the utilitarian methodology applied by Singer. Granting legal personhood status to nonhuman animals forms part of the animal rights-based approach. This will be discussed in more detail below. First, I want to briefly outline the distinction between the animal welfare and animal rightsbased approaches. Animal rights groups can be divided into two board categories: the first, referred to as the welfarists, seek to improve the treatment and welfare of nonhuman animals. For example, we can align

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the work of Peter Singer with this approach. The second, the abolitionists—who contest the property status of nonhuman animals—believe that nonhuman animals should be granted legal personhood status and that all institutionalized violence and exploitation must be eradicated. Tom Regan, Steven Wise, and Gary Francione are all abolitionists. This distinction is captured by the NhRP who state: In short, animal welfare focuses on improving the ways we treat animals without necessarily changing their underlying situations or prioritizing their interests above human interests. For example, you might pass an animal welfare law that increases the size of an elephant’s enclosure in a zoo… The [NhRP] argue [that] the elephant shouldn’t be in the zoo, period. The fight for nonhuman rights focuses on the fact that nonhuman animals have their own inherent interests, just as humans do, and calls for these interests to be protected.9

We will now review the literature on the legal personhood status of nonhuman animals.

Animal Rights and the Legal Personhood Status of Nonhuman Animals Legal persons are individuals with legal rights. Historically, certain humans have been denied legal personhood status based on social constructions of race and gender. Today, legal personhood is not limited to humans. Corporations, ships, and rivers have also been granted legal personhood. To illustrate, in 2017, New Zealand’s Whanganui River was granted rights of personhood (Tanasescu, 2017), and in 2019, the River Turag in Bangladesh was recognized as a “living legal entity with rights” (ClientEarth, 2019). In the case of the former, granting the Whanganui River legal personhood means that the river is recognized as a legal person before the law and has a legal standing (Tanasescu, 2017). New

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See Kurki (2021) for a more critical discussion of this distinction.

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Zealand law also appoints two guardians to represent the rights and wellbeing of the river: one from the indigenous community and one from the Crown (Talbot-Jones, 2014). As Talbot-Jones (2014) explains: “[b]y giving the river legal standing, it recognizes the river as a living whole and enables the river to have an independent voice. Ownership of the river has been vested away from Crown title and placed in the name of the river itself.”10 At the time of writing, nonhuman animals are treated as ‘legal things’ rather than ‘legal persons.’ This is reflected in the property status of nonhuman animals. The goal of the animal rights-based approach is to “…to move at least some nonhumans from the ‘thing’ side of the ‘person/thing’ dualism over to the ‘person’ side” (Francione, 1997, p. 84). Francione (1997, p. 85) clarifies that: [W]hen we move…nonhumans from the ‘thing’ side over to the ‘person’ side, we have said nothing about the scope of the rights…they will have. All we have done… is… recognize that species alone is an insufficient justification for treating nonhumans as ‘things.’

Furthermore, granting nonhuman animals legal personhood does not require us, in Francione’s (2004) view, to treat them in the same way that we treat humans. Nor does their status as legal persons mean they become human persons. What is expected is that we “…stop using animals for food, entertainment, or clothing, or any other uses that assume that animals are merely resources, and that we ultimately prohibit the ownership of animals” (Francione, 2004, p. 42). For me, the expectation is that we use my revised understanding of non-international armed conflict to protect nonhuman animals from the violence(s) of war. At present, one of the most visible organizations advocating for the legal status of nonhuman animals is the NhRP in the US. Their goal is as follows:

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While completing the edits for this chapter, Spain’s senate ratified a law that recognizes Mar Menor (a saltwater lagoon) as a legal person. The law, which came into effect on September 21, 2022, aims to protect the polluted lagoon and its diminished ecosystem.

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To change the common law status of great apes, elephants, dolphins, and whales from mere ‘things,’ which lack the capacity to possess any legal right, to ‘legal persons,’ who possess such fundamental rights as bodily liberty and bodily integrity.

The NhRP uses the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of nonhuman animals. They “argue common law courts must recognize [their] nonhuman animal clients as legal persons with the fundamental right to bodily liberty protected by the writ of habeas corpus and then order their release to a sanctuary…” (FAQ NhRP. See also Varriale-Barker, 2020). Habeas corpus is Latin for ‘you shall have the body.’ It protects those who have been unjustly imprisoned and is used to rectify violations of personal liberty. It is used in common law (in countries of the AngloAmerican legal system) rather than civil law countries such as France and Germany (Lewis, n.d.). We will examine the clients and cases of the NhRP at the end of the chapter. For now, let us continue with our review of the criteria that are used to determine whether nonhuman animals should be granted legal personhood status. These include: ‘equal consideration,’ ‘consciousness,’ ‘autonomy and self-determination,’ and the ‘sameness argument.’

Equal Consideration and Consciousness As we have established, sentience is a characteristic shared by human and nonhuman animals. Both have an interest in avoiding pain and suffering. These interests should be given equal consideration. Equal consideration only works if nonhuman animals are recognized as equal to humans; as legal persons (Beirne with O’Donnell & Janssen, 2018; Black, 2019; Francione, 2004). In other words, if the interests of nonhuman animals are given equal consideration to human animals, why not grant them legal personhood? Similarly, can core consciousness be used to determine legal personhood? Francione (2004) draws on the work of neurologist Antonio Damasio who distinguishes between core consciousness and

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extended consciousness.11 While the former does not require memory, language, or reasoning, the latter is more advanced and involves, among other cognitive abilities, memory, reasoning, and an awareness of the future. There is scientific evidence to support the presence of core consciousness among nonhuman animals (Benvenuti, 2016. See also Favre, 2010). Based on this, it is argued that nonhuman animals should be granted legal personhood.

Autonomy and Self-Determination For Wise (2013), the most basic level of legal personhood recognizes a person’s right to bodily integrity and bodily liberty.12 A key element of liberty, Wise (2013) argues, is autonomy or self-determination. Ferdowsian and Choe (2013, p. 234) provide a useful definition of autonomy: Autonomy refers to the capacity for self-determination, or the ability of a rational individual to make informed decisions free of undue influence. Respect for autonomy requires that individuals, to the degree they are capable, be provided the opportunity to choose what will or will not happen to them.

Wise (2013) breaks this down further to distinguish between full and practical autonomy. Full autonomy is where individuals act rationally and are understood to be legal persons. And practical autonomy (conceived of as a lesser type of autonomy) is based on individuals acting in ways that fulfill their preferences, responding to changes in their circumstances, and possessing the ability to make choices (Wise, 2013).

11

According to Antonio Damasio, humans with neurological conditions that can cause brain damage, such as seizures, possess core consciousness. This type of consciousness does not rely on memory or language, for example. Nonhuman animals are believed to exhibit core consciousness. Conversely, extended consciousness involves complex reasoning, memory recall, and deduction. While this is mostly found in humans, Damasio believes that some nonhuman animals—chimpanzees, bonobos, baboons, and dogs—may possess extended consciousness (as cited in Wise 2000). 12 See Wise (2013) for a discussion of levels 2–4.

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The latter is sufficient for basic rights and level one of legal personhood (Wise, 2013), the ‘foundational quality’ of legal personhood (Wise, 2010).13 The NhRP believe that certain nonhuman animals possess practical autonomy. Ferdowsian and Choe (2013) concur: nonhuman animals possess some degree of autonomy; therefore, their interests should be protected through legal personhood (for a critique of liberalism’s understanding of autonomy as used in law, see Deckha, 2012). As a side note, not all humans possess full autonomy or self-determination. In these situations, certain provisions are provided to assist these vulnerable individuals (Ferdowsian & Choe, 2013). For Ferdowsian and Choe (2013), vulnerability is measured according to “one’s ability to provide informed consent; one’s ability to protect his or her own interests; and one’s chances of being wronged.” They believe that all of these can be applied to nonhuman animals used in invasive research (Ferdowsian & Choe, 2013, p. 236). I believe that nonhuman animals are a vulnerable war-affected population that should be protected under my reformulation of non-international armed conflict. Earlier, we discussed the GAP and the NhRP. Both rely on the sameness argument when advocating for the rights and legal personhood status of nonhuman animals. It will be useful to review this argument in more detail.

The Sameness Argument Similarity or Difference as a Basis for Justice: Must Animals be like Humans to be Legally Protected from Humans? This is the question that forms the title of the article by Bryant (2007). I will start by outlining the details of the similarity argument before reviewing its merits and shortcomings. The similarity argument, as Bryant (2007, p. 208) conceives of it, is as follows: “if animals are similar to humans as to capacities and characteristics of humans that define humans, then animals should receive protections equivalent to the protections of humans because a just society treats like entities 13

For a more detailed discussion of the different levels, see Wise (2010).

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alike.” Bryant further argues that both the welfare and abolitionist animal rights movements employ the similarity argument when advocating for nonhuman animals. Bryant (2007) identifies the following problems/limitations with regard to the similarity argument: first, not all nonhuman animals will meet the similarity criteria. This then creates a hierarchy where certain nonhuman animals are excluded and not afforded the same protections. Second, proving and measuring similarities is not that straightforward, questions arise such as how do we prove sufficient similarity and what is the basis for measuring similarity? Is it consciousness or sentience? And finally, the similarity argument may, paradoxically, serve to justify experimentation on nonhuman animals as their similarity to humans increases the validity and reliability of the results. To these reservations identified by Bryant (2007), I would add the following: the similarity argument reproduces human exceptionalism, speciesism, and anthropocentric thinking. As Gruen (2015 p. 36) states: When we assimilate other animals into our human-oriented framework, we grant them consideration in virtue of what we believe they share with us; we allow them to be seen through our distinctively human gaze. And in our magnanimous embrace of the other, we end up occluding an important part of what makes them, them.

The preceding section has arguably raised more questions than it has answered. I believe the work of Kurki (2021) and Fernandez (2019) will assist us in navigating our way through these thorny issues.

Challenging the Orthodox View of Legal Personhood In his article Legal Personhood and Animal Rights, Visa Kurki (2021) offers a critique of the NhRP and their employment of the “orthodox view of legal personhood” (p. 48). Drawing on Bundle Theory, he offers an alternative method for recognizing the rights and legal personhood

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of nonhuman animals. This theory works on the basis that legal personhood consists of numerous elements. For Kurki (2021), the issue is not so much the mission of the NhRP (outlined above), but rather the method employed to realize it and the implications of their strategy: the disruption of the entire fabric of the legal system. As he puts it, the stakes are incredibly high. Let us consider how Kurki arrives at this conclusion. Kurki (2021) argues that two assumptions are made in relation to the rights of nonhuman animals. The first is the belief that they currently do not have any legal rights. The second—the orthodox view of legal personhood—posits that only legal persons can and do hold rights. Conversely, a legal ‘thing’ is regarded as property and therefore does not hold any rights. Therefore, nonhuman animals, who are currently regarded as property, do not hold rights. As we know, the aim of Steven Wise and the NhRP is to change the status of nonhuman animals from ‘things’ to ‘legal persons.’ Kurki argues that this is based on the capacity-for-rights position. This falls within the orthodox view of legal personhood where rights and legal personhood are connected in an uncomplicated manner, captured by the dictum: “[o]ne can hold rights if and only one is a legal person” (Kurki, 2021, p. 51). According to Kurki herein lies the problem: the prescriptive relationship between rights and legal personhood. Problems also arise due to misunderstandings regarding the existing rights of nonhuman animals, as well as the problem of extension—of extending legal personhood status to nonpersons. I will explore this in more detail below. To reiterate, the general assumption is that nonhuman animals do not hold rights. Only born humans can and do hold rights (Kurki, 2021). Based on two contemporary theory of rights—Interest theory and Will theory—Kurki challenges these taken-for-granted positions. The former is of relevance to our discussion here. The interest theory of rights works as follows: nonhuman animals have rights if humans have a duty to engage in behavior that benefits them. As Kurki argues, nonhuman animals do hold rights as they are protected by animal welfare laws. In this sense then, they are legal persons. Going forward, Kurki (2021, p. 52) advises us to: “reconsider either the proper extension of legal personhood, our understanding of rights, or the equation of legal personhood with right-holding…” He believes that “the most fruitful approach is the

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last one” and urges us to resist conflating legal personhood with rightholding. He states: “legal personhood and right-holding should not be understood…in [a] simple black-and-white manner” (p. 52). In his own work, Kurki (2021) posits that legal personhood is a cluster property that consists of incidents of legal personhood that do not always fit neatly together. He draws on Naffine (2009) to explain a cluster property: Legal personality is made up of a cluster of things: specifically, it comprises single or multiple clusters of rights and/or duties, depending on the nature and purpose of a particular legal relation. Rights and duties [ ...] can come in thick and thin bundles, in larger and smaller clusters, which means that we are actually different legal persons in different legal contexts. (Naffine, 2009, p. 46 as cited in Kurki, 2019, p. 93)

While nonhuman animals may hold some incidents of legal personhood, through animal welfare statues for example, they are not regarded as full legal persons (Kurki, 2021). Incidents of legal personhood are divided into passive and active. Passive legal personhood contains three elements: “fundamental protections, the capacity to be a party to special rights, and the capacity to own property” (Kurki, 2019, p. 113). Conversely, active legal personhood is based on rights and duties. As Kurki (2019, p. 113) explains, active legal personhood consists of two incidents: “the capacity to perform acts-in-the-law (legal competences) and legal responsibility (onerous legal personhood).” Competent individuals of sound mind are held legally responsible for their actions. These criminal and civil responsibilities operate through duties. Failure to uphold such duties results in criminal and/or civil sanctions (Kurki, 2019). It is possible to argue that nonhuman animals should be granted certain incidents of passive legal personhood, specifically the right not to be harmed. Ascribing nonhuman animals with active legal personhood is more difficult as they do not have the capacity to fulfill duties. Indeed, Kurki (2021, p. 57) does not “see any moral reason for endowing all nonhuman animals with all of the incidents of legal personhood.” Rather, the goal should be to address a particular aspect of personhood (i.e., some incidents of legal personhood ). For example, the right

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to personal freedom, liberty, and bodily integrity. For Kurki (2021), the current method for securing legal personhood for nonhuman animals is undermined by its unnecessarily ambitious nature. Furthermore, the orthodox view fails to recognize, in any meaningful way, that nonhuman animals do hold some rights. He asks: “[w]hat if the stakes in the habeas corpus trials are not whether animals should be included in the community of legal right-holders, but rather whether certain animals should receive the right to personal freedom, protected by habeas corpus?” (Kurki, 2021, p. 55). Kurki (2021) is not alone in critiquing the either/or approach to securing legal personhood for nonhuman animals.14 Fernandez (2019, p. 157) also questions the utility of such dichotomous thinking and instead proposes we adopt the “category of quasi-property/quasi-persons as the legal status for nonhuman animals.” Fernandez (2019) believes that “quasi-property/quasi-person is a good temporary heuristic to help us organize our rapidly changing ideas about how to structure human relationships with nonhuman animals” (p. 158). The term quasi is a synonym for ‘almost,’ ‘nearly,’ and ‘kind of.’ Fernandez (2019) draws on the Oxford English Dictionary definition to reach a similar explanation of the term. Based on this, he believes that the term precisely encapsulates the conundrum we face when addressing the legal personhood status of nonhuman animals: nonhuman animals are not simply property, but nor are they persons. “They legitimately fall in between two categories, partaking in each and not reducible to either. Our legal way of thinking about nonhuman animals (not just the cognitively advanced nonhuman animals) should be able to capture that truth” (Fernandez, 2019, p. 159). It is important to acknowledge the two elements present here: quasi-person and quasi-property. The former acknowledges that nonhuman animals are not the same as humans and therefore should be afforded rights that are different from humans, but appropriate for them. The latter, quasi-property, recognizes that nonhuman animals are not simply inanimate objects (they are more than this) while, simultaneously, acknowledging the current property status of nonhuman animals (Fernandez, 2019). 14

This dichotomous thinking views nonhuman animals as either ‘things’ or ‘persons.’

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To summarize, both Kurki (2021) and Fernandez (2019) believe that the current project for granting nonhuman animals legal personhood is too ambitious. To redress this and some of the questions posed earlier, respectively, they believe that nonhuman animals should be granted passive legal personhood (based on their right to be protected) rather than active legal personhood and that nonhuman animals fit the category of quasi-property/quasi-persons rather than full persons. If we adopt their approach, the fact that nonhuman animals do not possess extended consciousness, full autonomy, or self-determination is of less concern, because, from the outset, we are not claiming that they are equal to humans. And in relation to the sameness argument, according to the logic of their theses, for as long as the criterion for sameness is not overly ambitious—that is, we are simply acknowledging that nonhuman animas have a right not to suffer, rather than pondering whether they can reason and/or carry out duties—then the task of granting legal personhood is made easier. Based on this work, my position is that nonhuman animals should be granted passive legal personhood status, rather than active legal personhood. This mirrors our earlier discussion about animal soldiers and the problems with determining the agency of nonhuman animals as combatants. Passive legal personhood is simply concerned with appropriate rights and protections, which should be granted to non-combatants/civilians during war and armed conflict. At this point, it will be useful to draw on the clients and current cases of the NhRP to examine how these debates work in practice (please note, the information provided is based on the most up-to-date information available for these cases at the time of writing, October 2022).

The Nonhuman Rights Project To date, the NhRP has secured habeas corpus hearings on behalf of chimpanzees and elephants in New York.15 To reiterate, the NhRP argues that the law must recognize (some) nonhuman animals as ‘legal persons’ 15

See also Benvenuti (2016) who discusses the US federal lawsuit filed against Sea World in 2012 to release five Orca’s from captivity.

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rather than as ‘legal things.’ They invoke the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of their nonhuman clients. As Varriale-Barker (2020, p. 15) explains: Under New York law, a habeas corpus petition may be brought by a person who is illegally imprisoned or otherwise restrained within the state…A writ of habeas corpus challenges the illegal detention or imprisonment of a person—and necessarily requires a determination that the one who is imprisoned is a ‘person.’

The Case of Happy the Elephant Since 2018, the NhRP has filed petitions “for a common law writ of habeas corpus in the New York Supreme Court… demanding recognition of Happy’s legal personhood and fundamental right to bodily liberty and her release to an elephant sanctuary” (NhRP, n.d.). In the Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., ex rel. Happy v. Breheny, Hon. Alison Y. Tuitt case, in 2020, Justice Alison Tuitt of the Bronx Supreme Court acknowledged that Happy is more than just a ‘legal thing.’ She described Happy as “an intelligent, autonomous being who should be treated with respect and dignity, and who may be entitled to liberty.” “Nonetheless,” she continues, “we are constrained by the caselaw to find that Happy is not a ‘person’ and is not being illegally imprisoned’” (as cited by Varriale-Barker, 2020, p. 38). Following this, in May 2021, a habeas corpus case was heard by the New York Court of Appeals. As the world’s first habeas corpus case filed on behalf of a nonhuman animal, this represents a milestone for questions about the legal personhood status of nonhuman animals and represents progress in the development of the case of Happy. Over a year later, in May 2022, arguments in Happy’s case were presented at the Court of Appeals in Albany, New York. The decision of the Court of Appeals was released in June 2022. The chief judge commented thusly: Because the writ of habeas corpus is intended to protect the liberty right of human beings to be free of unlawful confinement, it has no applicability to Happy, a nonhuman animal who is not a ‘person’ subjected to

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illegal detention. Thus, while no one disputes that elephants are intelligent beings deserving of proper care and compassion, the courts below properly granted the motion to dismiss the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and we therefore affirm. (emphasis added)16

In response to this decision, the NhRP noted that this was not just a loss for Happy, who, at the time, continued to be imprisoned in Bronx Zoo. The decision, they argue, is a “loss for everyone who cares about upholding and strengthening our most cherished values and principles of justice…autonomy, liberty, equality, and fairness” (NhRP, n.d.). Despite the decision of the court, the NhRP commended the powerful dissents of two of the five judges: the Honorable Judges Jenny Rivera and Rowan D. Wilson. The latter judge wrote: “[w]hen the majority answers, ‘No, animals cannot have rights,’ I worry for that animal, but I worry even more greatly about how that answer denies and denigrates the human capacity for understanding, empathy and compassion” (as cited by the NhRP, n.d.). In July 2022, the NhRP filed a motion to reargue the decision made in June 2022.

The Cases of Tommy and Kiko the Chimpanzees We have discussed the distinction between passive and active legal personhood. The latter, as noted above, is based on rights and duties. In 2014, in the case of Tommy the chimpanzee, the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, stated that “legal personhood has consistently been defined in terms of both rights and duties” (People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project v. Lavery, 2014, p. 4; as cited in Kurki, 2021, p. 53). As “chimpanzees can’t bear any legal duties, submit to societal responsibilities, or be held legally accountable for their actions,” the court decided it was not appropriate to afford them with “legal rights such as the fundamental right to personal freedom, protected by the writ of habeas corpus - that have been afforded to human beings” (People ex 16 The link to the transcript of the hearing can be found on the Happy client page of the NhRP webpage.

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rel. Nonhuman Rights Project v. Lavery, 2014, p. 4 cited in Kurki, 2021, p. 54). Later, when the court met in 2018, in the Court of Appeals of New York, in his concurring opinion in the Tommy case, Judge Fahey stated: The better approach in my view is to ask not whether a chimpanzee fits the definition of a person or whether a chimpanzee has the same rights and duties as a human being, but instead whether he or she has the right to liberty protected by habeas corpus. That question, one of precise moral and legal status, is the one that matters here…The reliance on a paradigm that determines entitlement to a court decision based on whether the party is considered a “person” or relegated to the category of a ‘thing’ amounts to a refusal to confront a manifest injustice. Whether a being has the right to seek freedom from confinement through the writ of habeas corpus should not be treated as a simple either/or proposition. (People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project v. Lavery; Fahey concurring opinion, 2018, pp. 1057–1059 cited by Kurki, 2021, p. 58)

As noted by the NhRP, while Judge Fahey did concede that nonhuman animals have inherent value and the right to freedom as dictated by writ of habeas corpus, he was, nevertheless, not convinced by the personhood argument (see also Fernandez, 2019 who reviewed this decision). Fahey noted: “[w]hile it may be arguable that a chimpanzee is not a ‘person,’ there is no doubt that it is not merely a thing” (as cited by NhRP, n.d.). Here, we can align the decision of Fahey with the quasi-property/quasiperson approach put forward by Fernandez (2019).

International Progress As well as their advocacy in the US, the NhRP works with legal teams in countries across the world, including in England, Europe, South America, Asia, and Australia. And countries have drawn on their work to secure rights and personhood status for nonhuman animals. For example, in Pakistan, the Islamabad High Court released elephant Kaavan from captivity. And in Argentina, a judge ruled that chimpanzee Cecelia was

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a “nonhuman legal person” with “inherent rights.” As a result, she was moved from a zoo to a sanctuary (Choplin, 2017).17

What Does Legal Personhood Achieve? Granting nonhuman animals legal personhood necessarily means ending all exploitation and violence committed against them. And short of ending the war against nonhuman animals, at the very least, nonhuman animals should be protected under IHL. However, I believe we should set our ambitious higher than this by accepting the following statement: “the use of animas for food or science or entertainment or clothing represents forms of institutionalized exploitation that are logically inconsistent with the personhood of animals” (Francione, 2008, p. 198). So far, we have discussed the arguments for and the implications of granting nonhuman animals legal personhood. For me, these arguments need to be placed within a broader discussion about humanity and what it means to be human. And part of this means acknowledging the contested and exclusionary nature of humanity. A few examples come to mind. In 1995, at the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, Hillary Clinton infamously declared that “women’s rights are human rights.” Sixteen years later, at a meeting with human rights advocates in Geneva, Secretary Clinton stated: “Like being a woman, like being a racial, religious, tribal, or ethnic minority, being LGBT does not make you less human. And that is why gay rights are human rights, and human rights are gay rights” (as cited by Bennet, 2011). And in 2007, Catherine McKinnon published a book called Are Women Human? In it, she reviews various examples of women’s oppression which underscore women’s status as less than human. These are just three examples, yet they reveal the precarious nature of what and who counts as human, and by extension, who is considered a legal person with access to rights and protections. In the next section, I will interrogate what is means to be human and who counts as human.

17

For more details of their collaborations, see their blog—Building an International Nonhuman Rights Movement. https://www.nonhumanrights.org/blog/international-work/.

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Posthumanism and What It Means to Be Human Several writers have questioned humanism, the category human, and what it means to be human (Beirne, 2018; Bourke, 2011; Corbey, 2013; Deckha, 2007, 2010, 2012; Jackson, 2013, 2020; Kim, 2015; Ko & Ko, 2015/2020; Smith, 2013; Weheliye, 2014; Wolfe, 2003). The overarching theme within this work maps onto the position taken in this book: the category human is discursively constructed along racial, gendered, and speciesist lines. Put another way: discussions about what it means to be human are inseparable from discussions about racism, sexism, and speciesism. In the words of Ko and Ko (2015/2020, p. 23): The domain of the ‘human’ or ‘humanity’ is not just about whether or not one belongs to the species homo sapiens. Rather, ‘humans’ means a certain way of being, especially exemplified by how one looks or behaves, what practices are associated with one’s community, and so on. So, the ‘human’ or what ‘humanity’ is, [is based on] the ideal way of being homo sapiens…This means that the conceptions of ‘humanity/human’ and ‘animality/animal’ have been constructed along racial lines. (See also Jackson, 2013, 2020)

And with reference to gender: “[m]an represents the western configuration of the human as synonymous with the heteromasculine, white, propertied, and liberal subject that renders all those who do not conform to these characteristics as exploitable nonhumans, literal legal no-bodies” (Weheliye, 2014, p. 135). The implications of this for both human and nonhuman animals will be addressed in the proceeding chapters. Some of this work falls within Critical Animal Studies. However, collectively, and broadly speaking, these writers can be placed within the discourse of posthumanism. For our purposes here, Deckha (2012, p. 20) provides a useful working definition of posthumanism: posthumanism can be understood “as the consolidation of those theoretical strands that question the traditional boundaries of the human subject, noting its mechanical, monstrous, and/or alien dimensions…Posthumanism questions the stability of the human subject that has been foundational to

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Western thought.” As well as challenging the hierarchal binary between humans and nonhumans, posthumanism offers a “counter-hegemonic ethic aimed at non-violence against and compassion and justice for humans and animals both” (Deckha, 2007, p. 229). Returning to the ‘monstrous’ and/or ‘alien’ dimensions of humanity/what it means to be human, specifically dehumanization and animalization, I want to use this posthumanist sensibility to critique these processes.

Animalization, Dehumanization, and (Non)human Animals The human specialness claim is a hierarchical one and relies on the figure of an Other—the subhuman and nonhuman—to be intelligible.18 It is important to recognize the difference between dehumanization and animalization. The former involves rescinding an individual’s humanity; it involves removal and subtraction. Animalization, on the other hand, involves attribution and denigration. It involves an affirmative categorization of the human as ‘animal.’ In the context of human exceptionalism and speciesism, the ‘animal’ is regarded in negative terms as less than, and as something brutal, primitive, and wild. Black(ened) people, to use Jackson’s (2020) phrase, have been subject to animalization throughout history (see also Trigg, 2021). And as Jackson (2020, p. 16) notes, their “humanity is a subject of controversy, debate, and dissension.” To paraphrase Ko and Ko (2015/2020), within the framework of white supremacy, the term ‘animal’ refers to something ‘subhuman,’ nonhuman,’ or ‘inhuman.’ This justifies violence against nonhuman animals and anyone referred to as an ‘animal.’ And given that racism is based on this notion of animality or, to put it another way, racism does not make sense without animality, to address racism, we also need to challenge the concept of ‘the animal.’ Put simply, white supremacy excludes black(ened) people and nonhuman animals. As Ko and Ko (2015/2020, p. 45) explain: 18

Deckha (2010, p. 47).

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‘White’ is not just the superior race; it is also the superior mode of being. Residing at the top of the racial hierarchy is the white human, where species and race coincide to create the master being. Resting at the bottom as the abject opposite of the human, of whiteness is the (necessarily) nebulous notion of ‘the animal.’

In sum, to animalize is to ‘subhumanize’ (Deckha, 2010). It is not just black(ened) people who are subject to animalization, Sunaura Taylor in Beasts of Burden: Animal and Disability Liberation (2017) traces the relationship between animality and different types of disabilities, exploring how animalization is used to denigrate individuals with disabilities. In doing so, Taylor (2017) examines the impact of ableism and speciesism for people with different disabilities and nonhuman animals, respectively. She highlights the importance of examining “the systems that degrade and devalue both animals and disabled people – systems which are built upon, among, other things, ableist paradigms of language and cognitive capacity” (p. 52). Linking Disability Studies with animal rights, Taylor (2017, p. xv) believes that if the sources of “animal and disability oppression are entangled” then surely “their paths of liberation are entangled as well.” At this point, it will be useful to return to our discussion on intersectionality and species difference. For Trigg (2021), utilizing an intersectional approach within Critical Animal Studies will assist us in understanding how animalization works in tandem with other forms of discrimination (based on race, gender, sexuality, and ability, for example) to worsen the treatment of human and nonhuman animals who are regarded as ‘Other-than,’ sub-, and nonhuman. Indeed, Trigg (2021) believes that the NhRP should employ an intersectional approach to help grant nonhuman animals legal personhood. She asserts “that deploying intersectional theory in the animal rights context will help to articulate and understand how different axes of oppression overlap and why recognition of this is crucial for fighting oppression in its many forms…” (p. 75). At present, Trigg (2021) believes that attempts to secure animal rights are precluded by anthropocentrism. For example, she argues that Wise and the NhRP engage in descriptive anthropocentrism. Descriptive

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anthropocentrism is a term coined by Ben Mylius. It comprises situations where the human standard becomes the yardstick against which all other animals are measured and compared (Mylius, 2018, pp. 168–169 as cited in Trigg, 2021, p 80). As Trigg (2021) explains: within descriptive anthropocentrism, “the human standards of cognition, intelligence, and autonomy are being used as though they are the benchmark, rather than just being the standard [that]some humans are capable of ” (p. 85). In contrast to the approach adopted by Wise and the NhRP, Trigg’s (2021) starting point is to ask: what protections are humans afforded by the law. Fundamentally, Trigg (2021) argues, the law is interested in protecting human sentience. If we accept that nonhuman animals are also sentient beings, then they too should be protected in law. However, animal sentience should not be measured by the same metrics as human sentience. As noted above with reference to Dolphins, nonhuman animals display emotions of pleasure and pain, for example, in ways that are not only different from humans, but different from other nonhuman animals. According to Trigg (2021), what is required is an approach based on differential rights rather than a hierarchy of rights. Rights and protections in this context should be differentiated based on the specific needs human and nonhuman animals require to live a flourishing and meaningful life (Trigg, 2021). Ultimately, Trigg (2021) urges us to rethink anthropocentric social and legal structures that view nonhuman animals in instrumental terms as mere resources. Employing an intersectional approach—which highlights how animality and other forms of oppression intersect with speciesism to discriminate against (certain) humans and (all) nonhuman animals—will assist us in achieving this.

Conclusion—The Way Forward In her book Becoming Human: Matter and Meaning in an Antiblack World (2020), Jackson asks: “[i]s the black a human being?” The answer, according to Jackson, is yes. She concedes, however, that “this… may be the wrong question as an affirmative offers no assurances” (p. 20). Instead, we should ask the following: “[i]f being recognized as human offers no reprieve from ontologizing dominance and violence, then

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what…might we gain from the rupture of ‘the human?’” (Jackson, 2020, p. 20). In this chapter, I have argued that nonhuman animals should be granted legal personhood. In this context, the legal category ‘person’ is not to be conflated with the biological category ‘human.’ That said, to assist in granting legal personhood to nonhuman animals, we must, from a posthumanist perspective, reconfigure what it means to be human. This “rupture of the human” (Jackson, 2020, p. 20) necessarily requires acknowledging the inherent racism, sexism, and speciesism embedded within human exceptionalism. More than that, to paraphrase Kim (2015), it means recognizing that the project before us is not an extensionist one; that is, it does not simply involve expanding the definition of the human to include those who have hitherto been excluded. Rather, the task is a reconstructive one, which will require “reimagining humans, animals, and nature outside of systems of domination…” (Kim, 2015, p. 287. See also Jackson, 2013, who talks about transforming rather than extending liberal humanism). To put it simply, we cannot have one without the other. We cannot seek legal personhood for nonhuman animals without reimagining the category human. And although what we are seeking is legal personhood status for nonhuman animals (to be clear, we are not asking that they be regarded as human), this can only happen if we rework what it means to be human. A more inclusive blueprint of what it means to be human is one that is more conducive to recognizing the legal personhood status of nonhuman animals. So, in response to Jackson’s (2020) question— ‘what might we gain from the rupture of the human?’ —the answer, from a posthumanist perspective, is: a reappraisal of the human and nonhuman animal aimed at non-violence against both. In the words of Deckha (2010, p. 47): Instead of fighting dehumanization with humanization, a better strategy may be to minimize the human/nonhuman boundary altogether. Discourses of anti-violence and dignity must shift from anthropocentric and hierarchical concepts to non-exclusive conceptual anchors. This will ensure a more stable foundation for anti-violence and justice-seeking projects.

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In the following chapter, we will return to our discussion of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.

References Adams, C. J. (2015). The sexual politics of meat. Bloomsbury Academic. Allen, C., & Trestman, M. (2020). Animal consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo. cgi?entry=consciousness-animal American Bar Association. (2020). Enshrining animal sentience into law: Global developments and implications. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/tort_t rial_insurance_practice/publications/committee-newsletters/enshrining_a nimal_sentience_into_law/ Animal Protection Index. (n.d.). https://api.worldanimalprotection.org/about Anthis, J. R. (2018). What is sentience? Sentience Institute. https://www.sentie nceinstitute.org/blog/what-is-sentience Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022. Retrieved from https://www.legislation. gov.uk/ukpga/2022/22/enacted Bekoff, M. (2013). Who lives, who dies, and why? How speciesism undermines compassionate conservation and social justice. In R. Corbey & A. Lanjouw (Eds.), The politics of species: Reshaping our relationships with other animals (pp. 15–26). Cambridge University Press. Beirne, P. (1999). For a nonspeciesist criminology: Animal abuse as an object of study. Criminology, 37 (1), 117–148. Beirne, P. with O’Donnell, I., & Janssen, J. (2018). Murdering animals: Writings on theriocide, homicide and nonspeciesist criminology. Palgrave Macmillan. Bennet, D. (2011, December 7). Watch Hillary Clinton’s speech declaring gay rights are human rights. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/intern ational/archive/2011/12/watch-hillary-clintons-speech-declaring-gay-rightsare-human-rights/334643/ Bentham, J. (1789/1823). An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/bentham1780.pdf Benvenuti, A. (2016). Evolutionary continuity and personhood: Legal and therapeutic implications of animal consciousness and human unconsciousness. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 48, 43–49.

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Black, V. (2019). Beastly dead. Canadian Journal of Comparative and Contemporary Law, 5 (1), 1–30. Blattner, C. E. (2019). The recognition of animal sentience by the law. Journal of Animal Ethics, 9 (2), 121–136. Booth, W. (2021, July 4). Lobsters’ feelings loom large as British Parliament debates animal welfare bill. The Washington Post. https://www.washingto npost.com/world/europe/animal-welfare-sentient-uk-parliament/2021/07/ 04/44593460-d8df-11eb-8c87-ad6f27918c78_story.html Britannica. (n.d.). Invertebrate. https://www.britannica.com/animal/invert ebrate Britannica. (n.d.). Cyclostome. https://www.britannica.com/animal/cyclostome Brown, K. (2016). A Feminist analysis of human and animal oppression: Intersectionality among species. Scholars Week. 2. https://cedar.wwu.edu/ cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1234&context=scholwk#:~:text=A%20Femi nist%20Analysis%20of%20Animal,oppression%2C%20all%20oppress ions%20are%20connected Bourke, J. (2011). What it means to be human? Reflections from 1791 to the present. Virago Press. Bourke, J. (2020). Loving animals: On bestiality, zoophilia and post-human love. Reaktion Books. Bryant, T. (2007). Similarity or difference as basis for justice: Must animals be like humans to be legally protected from humans. Law and Contemporary Problems, 70 (1), 207–254. Building An International Nonhuman Rights Movement. https://www.nonhum anrights.org/blog/international-work/ Choplin, L. (2017, April 20). Chimpanzee Cecilia finds sanctuary: An interview with GAP Brazil . https://www.nonhumanrights.org/blog/chimpanzeececilia/ ClientEarth. (2019, March 13). Legal rights of rivers—An international trend? Client Earth. https://www.clientearth.org/projects/access-to-justice-for-a-gre ener-europe/updates/legal-rights-of-rivers-an-international-trend/ Corbey, R. (2013). “Race” and species in the post-World War II United Nations discourse on human rights. In R. Corbey & A. Lanjouw (Eds.), The politics of species: Reshaping our relationships with other animals (pp. 67–76). Cambridge University Press. Corbey, R., & Lanjouw, A. (Eds.). (2013). The politics of species: Reshaping our relationships with other animals. Cambridge University Press.

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Dardenne, E. (2010). From Jeremy Bentham to Peter Singer. Open Edition Journals. https://journals.openedition.org/etudes-benthamiennes/ 204?lang=en Deckha, M. (2007). Animal justice, cultural justice: Posthumanist response to cultural rights in animals. Journal of Animal Law and Ethics, 2, 189–230. Deckha, M. (2008). Intersectionality and posthumanist visions of equality. Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender and Society, 23(2), 249–268. Deckha, M. (2010). The subhuman as a cultural agent of violence. Journal for Critical Animal Studies, 8(3), 28–51. Deckha, M. (2012). Critical animal studies and animal law. Animal Law Review, 18(2), 207–236. Descartes, R. A. (2006). Discourse on the method of correctly conducting one’s reason and seeking truth in the sciences (I. Maclean). Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1637). https://rauterberg.employee.id.tue.nl/lec turenotes/DDM110%20CAS/Descartes-1637%20Discourse%20on%20M ethod.pdf Directive of the European parliament and the council of the European Union - the protection of animals used for scientific purposes. (2010). Official Journal of the European Union. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri Serv.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:276:0033:0079:en:PDF Dunayer, J. (2013). The rights of sentient beings: Moving beyond old and new speciesism. In R. Corbey & A. Lanjouw (Eds.), The politics of species: Reshaping our relationships with other animals (pp. 27–39). Cambridge University Press. FAQ: Learn more about the NhRP and the fight for nonhuman rights. Nonhuman rights project. https://www.nonhumanrights.org/frequentlyasked-questions/ Favre, D. (2010). Living property: A new status for animals within the legal system. Marquette Law Review, 93, 1021–1070. Ferdowsian, H., & Choe, C. (2013). Extending human research protections to nonhuman animals. In R. Corbey & A. Lanjouw (Eds.), The politics of species: Reshaping our relationships with other animals (pp. 232–240). Cambridge University Press. Fernandez, A. (2019). Not quite property, not quite persons: A quasi approach for nonhuman animals. Canadian Journal of Comparative and Contemporary Law, 5, 155–232. Finlayson, J. G. (2010). Bare life and politics in Agamben’s reading of Aristotle. The Review of Politics, 72(1), 97–126.

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Francione, G. L. (1997). Animal rights theory and utilitarianism: Relative normative guidance. Animal Law, 3, 75–101. Francione, G. L. (2004). Animals—Property or persons? Rutgers Law School. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/76622908.pdf Francione, G. L. (2007). Reflections on animals, property, and the law and rain without thunder. Law and Contemporary Problems, 70 (1), 9–58. Francione, G. L. (2008). Animals as persons: Essays on the abolition of animal exploitation. Columbia University Press. Freeman, D. A. (2002). Violence against animals: An epistemological inquiry. The Social Science Journal, 39 (4), 527–538. Gillespie, K. (2018). Cow with ear tag #1389. University of Chicago Press. Great Ape Project. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.projetogap.org.br/en/ Gruen, L. (2015). Entangled empathy: An alternative ethic for our relationships with animals. Lantern books. Gruen, L. (2017). The moral status of animals. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/ Habeas corpus. (n.d.). Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/habeascorpus House of Lords. (2021). Animal welfare (sentience) bill [HL]. https://bills.parlia ment.uk/publications/41515/documents/260 Jackson, Z. I. (2013). Animal: New directions in the theorization of race and posthumanism. Feminist Studies, 39 (3), 669–685. Jackson, Z. I. (2020). Becoming human: Matter and meaning in an antiblack world . New York University Press. Kant, E. (1997). Lectures on ethics (P. Heath, Trans.). Cambridge University Press (Original work published between 1760 and 1794). https://cdches ter.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Lectures-on-ethics-Immanuel-KantPeter-Heath-Jerome-B.-Schneewind-eds.-Peter-Heath-trans..pdf Kim, C. J. (2011). Moral extensionism or racist exploitation? The use of Holocaust and slavery analogies in the animal liberation movement. New Political Science, 33(3), 311–333. Kim, C. J. (2015). Dangerous crossings: Race, species, and nature in a multicultural age. Cambridge University Press. Ko, A., & Ko, S. (2015/2020). Aphro-ism: Essays on pop culture, feminism, and black veganism from two sisters. Lantern Publishing and Media. Kurki, V. (2021). Legal personhood and animal rights. Journal of Animal Ethics, 11(1), 47–62. Kurki, V. (2019). A theory of legal personhood . Oxford University Press.

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Lewis, A. D. E. (n.d). Common law. https://www.britannica.com/topic/com mon-law Low, P. with Panksepp, J., Reiss, D., Edelman, B., Van Swinderen, B., Koch, C. (2021). The Cambridge declaration on consciousness. https://fcmconference. org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf McCulloch, S. (2021, August 5). Animal sentience bill is necessary for the UK to be a true world leader in animal welfare. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/animal-sentience-bill-is-necessary-for-theuk-to-be-a-true-world-leader-in-animal-welfare-165576 Marino, L. (2013). Humans, dolphins, and moral inclusivity. In R. Corbey & A. Lanjouw (Eds.), The politics of species: Reshaping our relationships with other animals (pp. 95–105). Cambridge University Press. Munro, C. (2021, July 26). Government set to ban boiling lobsters alive. PETA UK. https://www.peta.org.uk/blog/british-vets-lobster-ban/?utm_ source=PETA%20UK::Google&utm_medium=Ad&utm_campaign=1120:: gen::PETA%20UK::Google::s-grant-awa-dsa::::searchad&gclid=CjwKCA jwybyJBhBwEiwAvz4G766anHoSzKk8ESwgHFs3at16uOn_F9g_mj2Olxu0YYHJ-axf9h9DRoCkScQAvD_BwE Nibert, D. A. (2013). Animal oppression and human violence: Domesecration, capitalism and global conflict. Columbia University Press. Nonhuman Rights Project. https://www.nonhumanrights.org/ Noske, B. (1997). Beyond boundaries: Humans and animals. Black Rose Books. Norcross, A. (2014). Subjects of a life, the argument from risk, and the significance of self-consciousness. Sematic Scholar. https://www.semantics cholar.org/paper/Subjects-of-a-Life-%2C-the-Argument-from-Risk-%2Cand-%E2%80%9D-Norcross-Regan/fac55ebd8a17cfec990470e3f9130526c cb3fb82 O’Donoghue A. (2015). Sovereign exception: Notes on the thought of Giorgio Agamben. https://criticallegalthinking.com/2015/07/02/sovereignexception-notes-on-the-thought-of-giorgio-agamben/ Rafferty, J. P. (n.d.). Vertebrate groups. Britannica. https://www.britannica. com/list/5-vertebrate-groups Regan, T. (1986). A case for animal rights. In M. W. Fox & L. D. Mickley (Eds.), Advances in animal welfare science 1986/87 (pp. 179–189). The Humane Society of the United States. Sachkova, M. (2022). Huge milestone! UK law now recognizes animals as being sentient. PETA UK. https://www.peta.org.uk/blog/sentience/#:~:text= The%20Animal%20Welfare%20(Sentience)%20Bill,Welfare%20(Sentience )%20Act%202022

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Singer, P. (1975). Animal liberation: A new ethics for our treatment of animals. New York Review. Smith, D. L. (2013). Indexically yours: Why being human is more like being here than like being water. In R. Corbey & A. Lanjouw (Eds.), The politics of species: Reshaping our relationships with other animals (pp. 40–52). Cambridge University Press. Talbot-Jones. (2014). A river personified. https://crawford.anu.edu.au/news-eve nts/news/4098/river-personified Tanasescu, M. (2017, June 19). When a river is a person: From Ecuador to New Zealand, nature gets its day in court. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/when-a-river-is-a-person-from-ecuadorto-new-zealand-nature-gets-its-day-in-court-79278 Taylor, S. (2017). Beasts of burden: Animal and disability liberation. The New Press. Trigg, R. (2021). Intersectionality—An alternative to redrawing the line in the pursuit of animal rights. Ethics and the Environment, 26 (2), 73–118. Twine, R. (2013). Addressing the animal–industrial complex. In R. Corbey & A. Lanjouw (Eds.), The politics of species: Reshaping our relationships with other animals (pp. 77–91). Cambridge University Press. UK Parliament. (n.d.). Reporting stage (Lords). https://www.parliament.uk/ about/how/laws/passage-bill/lords/lrds-lords-report-stage/ Varriale-Barker, C. (2020). “A deep dilemma”: New York is poised to take another look at legal personhood status for nonhuman animals. American Bar Association: Animal Law. Retrieved from https://www.segalmccambr idge.com/wp-content/themes/paperstreet/assets/A%20Deep%20Dilemma. pdf Weheliye, A. G. (2014). Habeas viscus: Racializing assemblages, biopolitics and black feminist theories of the human. Duke University Press. Wise, S. M. (2000). Rattling the case: Toward legal rights for animals. Perseus Books. Wise, S. M. (2010). Legal personhood and the Nonhuman Rights Project. Animal Law Review, Lewis & Clark Law School, 17 (1), 1–11. Wise, S. (2013). The capacity of nonhuman animals for legal personhood and legal rights. In R. Corbey & A. Lanjouw (Eds.), The politics of species: Reshaping our relationships with other animals (pp. 241–245). Cambridge University Press. Wolfe, C. (2003). Animal rites: American culture, the discourse of species, and posthumanist theory. The University of Chicago Press.

3 Assaults on Fertility and Motherhood: Gendered Reproductive Violence and Reproductive Coercion Against Human and Nonhuman Animals

Introduction In February 2022, I watched two films: The Herd and Cow. The Herd , directed by Melanie Light, was released in 2014 (Light, 2014). Cow, directed by Andrea Arnold, was released in 2021 (Arnold, 2021). I will share my experience of watching both below. The tagline on the poster for The Herd —which depicts two women behind bars in squalid conditions, clinging onto one another—reads: You are a Product. The film is an unequivocal critique of the dairy industry and the animal husbandry practices endemic within it. It lays bare the sexual and reproductive violence—through nonconsensual artificial insemination—that is pervasive within the industry. The film begins with a woman lying on a trolley. She is handcuffed and her legs are in stirrups. She is being artificially inseminated without her consent. As the woman is taken back to her cage-like cell, we see milk being extracted from another woman who is also chained and in a cage. We see that the milk is being extracted via tubes that are attached to her

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breasts. In the next scene, we hear a woman screaming as she goes into labor. The agony she is experiencing is visceral. She too is chained and held down while she gives birth. One of the workers informs us that the baby is a boy. For a brief moment, the mother is relieved. Presumably, her relief stems from the fact that she has not given birth to a daughter who will share a similar fate to her own. However, she soon realizes the fate of her son. The baby is ripped from her and placed in a bucket. The implication is that it has been murdered. The woman weeps. Her desperation and sorrow are unbearable to watch. She begs the workers to kill her. She no longer wants to live now that her motherhood has been taken away from her. As the woman is taken back to her cell following her traumatic labor, we see the degradation and horror of the holding facility through her eyes. We witness torture and see the physical signs of abuse writ large on the bodies of the caged women. In a later scene, we witness a woman being killed. The implication is that she is ‘spent’ and is no longer of any use. After being dragged back to her cell following this harrowing experience, the woman manages to dupe one of the workers and steals his knife. She stabs him, takes his keys, and escapes. She hands the keys to the other women so they can unlock their cages and escape too. More workers are attacked and killed by the women. Interspersed with this, the viewer is confronted with other disturbing scenes. Again, we witness these through the eyes of the female protagonist. Only now does she realize the atrocities taking place at the facility. She looks in on a room where dozens of women are attached to milking machines. In another scene, she finds a female child. Toward the end of the film, the final female worker is brutally attacked. Her tongue is cut out. She can longer speak. Much like nonhuman animals, she does not have the ability to verbally communicate with the women who attacked her. The film ends with an advertisement for Lactose Vitae. We see the face of a beautiful woman. The clean and bright-faced woman in the advert offers a stark contrast to the soiled and filthy bodies of the women held captive. Music plays while the woman showcases the cream. The voiceover informs us: “[o]ur unique formula utilizes nature’s most nourishing ingredients creating an

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exclusive range of skincare and anti-ageing products with our patented colostrum proteins. Lactis Vitae, smooths, hydrates, firms, reduces wrinkles. Lactose Vitae: the milk of life.” During the closing credits, the women are replaced with real-life footage of dairy cows and calves who are tortured and sexually violated. The footage is distressing. No doubt this horror film is a powerful indictment of the dairy industry. However, the provocative nature of the film—the direct comparison between human suffering and the suffering of nonhuman animals—feels reminiscent of the ‘dreaded comparison’ trope discussed in the first chapter. Furthermore, I believe that the violence used by the women against their oppressors sends out the wrong message. It suggests that the only response is to act with brutal violence: the goal is one of retribution rather than a form of restorative justice. Furthermore, the nature of the violence evokes notions of animality, which hints at the perceived brutality and savagery of (certain) nonhuman animals. Ironically then, these women who are there to represent and highlight the violence committed against nonhuman animals become animalized in the process, thereby undermining the argument of the film. Surely, as we have discussed, our aim is nonviolence against humans and nonhuman animals alike. The documentary film Cow is narration-free. The film follows the life of one dairy cow: Luna. Cow number 1129 (this is the number we see branded onto her rear). The film starts with Luna in labor. She gives birth. We see this new mother lick her calf clean after it is born. At the risk of anthropomorphizing, she makes reassuring noises while she licks her offspring clean. The scene is one of affection. The calf moves under its mother as though trying to suckle on her teat. In the next scene, we see the mother without her calf. The noise the mother makes when her calf is taken from her is discernibly different from the noise we heard when she was licking her child. This sound is more distressing. The cow appears to bellow. And, as we stare into Luna’s eyes, we feel unsettled by the pain of her loss. Her suffering haunts us. The calf is barely able to walk when it is separated from its mother. It is taken to a tiny pen outside away from its mother, but remains visible to the mother from her indoor holding place. This adds another layer of cruelty to this forced separation. The grief and sadness the mother feels resulting from the forced separation

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are palpable. At times, we witness Luna lying down, listless as though she is no longer alive. Following this separation, Luna is sent to the milking parlor where she is hooked up to a milking machine. As she walks to the parlor, we can see her umbilical cord trailing behind. It has not been cut following the birth. The implication is that milking her is prioritized over cleaning her after she has given birth. Throughout the film, the calf does not receive milk from its mother. It is given milk from either a bottle or an apparatus that simulates a cow’s teat. The mother’s milk is reserved for human consumption. The documentary is disconcerting for a number of reasons. The playful manner of the farmers is at odds with the suffering of the cows. We hear them laughing and joking, while we witness the pain and suffering of the cows and their calves. The routinization of animal husbandry practices is laid bare. I was already familiar with many of the practices included in the film—the repeated pregnancies, the milking, and the selective breeding. However, there was one scene for which I was unprepared. At one point in the film, we are given a close-up of a cow having its hooves trimmed. We see blood dripping from the hoof. To carry out the procedure, the cow is held in machinery that presses down on them. To the onlooker, the cow appears to be crushed by the apparatus. I searched the internet for an explanation of what I had just witnessed. According to a number of sources, cows have their hooves trimmed in order to prevent lameness which can impact their reproductive capabilities and therefore their milk production. While the cows are in the milking parlor, we hear the radio. The incongruity of hearing this music while these cows stand for hours is not lost on the audience. Indeed, this dissonance is even more realized when, later on in the film, we hear Christmas music playing and a farmer trying to coax the cows while wearing a Christmas hat. In one powerful scene in the film, the camera zooms out, so we get a full view of the milking machines. We see that the individual milking stalls are set up in a circle. The circle of stalls rotates on a conveyer belt system. Here, I was reminded of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon. We discussed Bentham in Chapter 2 in relation to his philosophical ideas about animal sentience. Bentham, based on the ideas of his brother,

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Samuel Bentham, introduced the idea of a prison where the cells would be arranged in a circle with an inspector in the center who could continually watch the prisoners in their cells. This design was not limited to prisons. Jeremy Bentham believed that the Panopticon could be used to keep chickens. He referred to this as the Ptenotrophium (‘bird feeding place’) (Steadman, n.d.). Bentham listed the following requirements for the Ptenotrophium: “warmth, dryness, sufficiency of room’ and “prevention of fighting.” According to Steadman, in one of his unpublished manuscripts on the Ptenotrophium, Bentham considers efficient ways to clean the cells and “calculates the potential income from eggs and chickens and the optimal age to kill the birds” (Steadman, n.d.). The milking machines that we see in this film are designed to maximize profit. They do not convey warmth, dryness, or sufficiency of room. In fact, we often see cows sliding and slipping because the ground is so wet and muddy underneath them. The process of birth, separation, and milking is repeated in the film underscoring the relentlessness of this process for nonhuman animals. As the film shows, cows are given some respite from the physical and emotional toll they experience as commodities within the dairy industry. They spend time eating grass in open pastures where they have plenty of room to move around. These scenes are a stark reminder of the cruel and inhumane treatment they experience when they are housed indoors. The final scene is harrowing. We see Lunar—barely able to walk due to infection—being led to another indoor facility. She is given a bucket of food. She is then shot. This is the fate of dairy cows considered ‘spent.’ Both of these films, albeit in different ways, lay bare the reality of the reproductive violence and reproductive coercion nonhuman animals are subject to during routine animal husbandry practices.

Outline of the Chapter The chapter will begin by outlining the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity under consideration: rape, forced pregnancy, and sexual violence. It will then revisit the concepts of reproductive violence and reproductive coercion. The chapter examines cases where these crimes

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are committed against human and nonhuman populations. The first half of the chapter reviews sexualized and reproductive violence, including reproductive coercion, committed during the Holocaust and the 1971 Liberation War in Bangladesh (hereafter the 1971 Liberation War).1 This included rape, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, forced sterilization, the killing of newly born babies, and forced adoption. The discussion of reproductive violence and reproductive coercion against human populations will conclude with the forced sterilization of Uighur women in China. The aim of the first part of the chapter is to lay the foundations for the second half of the chapter where I argue that nonhuman animals are subject to these War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. Here, I provide a detailed account of reproductive violence and reproductive coercion committed against female nonhuman animals. It is argued that these crimes are carried out during the war against nonhuman animals. This understanding of war is based on my reformulation of non-international armed conflict. This involves violence committed by government and non-governmental groups against nonarmed, non-combatants (nonhuman animals) within a state (a more detailed discussion of this is provided in Introduction/Chapter 1). It is worth repeating, by including these examples in the same chapter my aim is not to engage in distasteful, hierarchical comparisons between human and nonhuman populations. Rather, the intention is to demonstrate, through the use of specific examples, how War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity are also a feature of the war against nonhuman animals. The cases referred to in the first part of the chapter—the Holocaust, the 1971 Liberation War, and the genocide against the Uighur population in China—establish the nature—rape, forced pregnancy, and assault on motherhood—and the targets of reproductive violence: persons with (perceived) reproductive capabilities. In the second half, we see how nonhuman animals, when granted passive legal personhood status (see Chapter 2), meet the criteria outlined in these War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. An additional goal is to underscore the shared 1

My analysis of the Holocaust draws on my previous work in this area. See Banwell (2016) and Banwell (2020).

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sources of oppression between human and nonhuman animals who are subject to reproductive violence and reproductive coercion. This is done with reference to the woman-as-nation thesis.

War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, and Reproductive Violence As a reminder, War Crimes are listed in International Humanitarian Law (IHL). They include rape, forced pregnancy, and “any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions” (see element b of Article 8 of the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, 2011, p. 7). Crimes against Humanity refer to a range of acts that are committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” This includes, but is not limited to, “rape, forced pregnancy… or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity” (see Element g of Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2011, p. 4). In this book, these crimes—rape, acts of sexual violence, and forced pregnancy—are regarded as the expressions and consequences of reproductive violence.2 Reproductive violence is violence that violates a person’s reproductive autonomy or violence that is directed against an individual due to their reproductive capabilities (Grey, 2017). The examples Grey (2017) offers include: forced impregnation, forced miscarriage, forced sterilization, and forced abortion (Grey, 2017, p. 907). In times of war and conflict, women and their bodies are regarded as the vessels through which national, racial, ethnic, and religious identities are reproduced (Cohn, 2013). Rape is used in this context, not only as an attack upon the individual female, but also as an attack upon the nation. Drawing on the Holocaust, the 1971 Liberation War, and the genocide against the 2

This book focuses on one example of the violence(s) inflicted on nonhuman animals—namely reproductive violence. For a broader discussion of the killing of nonhuman animals, see Beirne, Murdering Animals, 2018; the edited collection by Grandin and Cockram, The Slaughter of Farmed Animals: Practical Ways of Enhancing Animal Welfare 2020; and the collection by The Animal Studies Group, Killing Animals 2006.

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Uighur population in China, this chapter will demonstrate how women are targeted based on their (perceived) reproductive capabilities. With reference to nonhuman animals, Kelty-Huber (2015, p. 4) uses the term reproductive violence to refer to “the systematic exploitation; physical and mental violence, and trauma experienced by female farmed animals” whose reproductive systems are controlled within the animal-industrial complex. In terms of the consequences of reproductive violence for nonhuman animals, Adams (2015, p. 192) uses the term feminized protein—which includes eggs and dairy products—to refer to plant protein that is “…produced through the abuse of the reproductive cycle of female animals.” The intention is to highlight the violence inherent within the production and consumption of eggs and dairy products. As Adams explains: “[e]ven though the animals are alive, dairy products and eggs are not victimless foods” (2015, p. 192). Indeed, a theme that runs through this chapter is the assault on motherhood through various acts of reproductive violence. In her book, Unbearable Weight: Feminism Western Culture and the Body, Bordo (1993, p. 94) asks: Are Mothers Persons? This forms the title of her chapter which addresses reproductive rights and the politics of subjectivity. In it, she states: The nature of pregnancy is such, however, that to deprive the women of control over her reproductive life - whether by means of involuntary or coerced sterilization, court-ordered cesarean, or forbidden abortion - is necessarily also to mount an assault on her personal integrity and autonomy (the essence of personhood in our culture) and to treat her merely as pregnant res extensa, material incubator of fetal subjectivity.

In the pages that follow, I argue that reproductive violence is an attack upon the personal integrity and autonomy of human and nonhuman animals. With specific reference to pregnancy and motherhood, I use the more inclusive term pregnant persons (discussed in more detail below) to include the experiences of female nonhuman animals. If we return to our argument that nonhuman animals should be granted legal personhood, we can extend Bordo’s analysis presented above and offer the following response: mothers—which includes human and nonhuman animals—are subjective persons, not simply reproductive receptacles

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open to coercion and exploitation. Before we review the situation of human and nonhuman animals who experience this attack upon their reproductive autonomy, it is worth unpacking one of the examples of reproductive violence listed above in more detail, namely the crime of forced pregnancy.

Forced Pregnancy The International Criminal Court (ICC) defines forced pregnancy as: “the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law” (Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, 2011, p. 4). Forced pregnancy is a War Crime and a Crime against Humanity in both international and noninternational armed conflict. The definition of forced pregnancy contains three cumulative prerequisites: first, “…the victim must be unlawfully confined by the perpetrator…” Second, “…the victim must have been forcibly made pregnant.” And third, “the perpetrator acted with one of two specific intents: to affect the ethnic composition of a population, or to carry out other grave violations of international law” (Amnesty International, 2020, pp. 8–9. See also Boon, 2001). These three elements are explored in more detail below.

Unlawful Confinement Forced pregnancy, as outlined above, requires that a woman be both forcibly made and kept pregnant, often through confinement. The ICC Statute definition does not specify the exact duration of the unlawful confinement of the woman. So, while the Statute does not stipulate that a woman be confined at the time of her forcible impregnation, nor when she gives birth, as Boon (2001, p. 662) points out, “…forced pregnancy clearly operates within a timeframe of nine months.” Therefore, the critical period of confinement is between the time the woman is believed to be pregnant and the end of her pregnancy, “whether by giving birth,

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by miscarriage, by abortion, or by the limit permitted by local laws for obtaining an abortion” (Boon, 2001, p. 663). However, the definition excludes situations where a woman is forcibly impregnated but is not then subject to any form of unlawful confinement (Grey, 2017). As established in Chapter 2, under non-speciesist law (Dunayer, 2013), the confinement of nonhuman animals is illegal. Nonhuman animals are held in confinement during the timeframe outlined above. Therefore, I make the case that nonhuman animals meet the first criteria of the ICC definition of forced pregnancy.

The Forcible Impregnation of a Woman A recent analysis of the ICC Statute determines that the term ‘woman’ should be replaced with the term ‘pregnant persons’ in order to include all individuals capable of becoming pregnant. As pointed out by Amnesty International (2020, pp. 14–15), while the Statute uses the term ‘woman’ there is no evidence to suggest that this was intended “to exclude other pregnant persons from the scope of the crime, including girls of any age or transgender or intersex persons who are biologically capable of becoming pregnant.” They go on to state: “[i]ndeed, if the essence of the crime is the denial of autonomy over a pregnancy by means of unlawful confinement… then the crime must be applied to all pregnant persons subjected to such treatment. To do otherwise would be discriminatory.” They further argue that the definition must be used in line with “internationally recognized human rights” that should not discriminate on the basis of “age, gender or other status” (Amnesty International, 2020, pp. 14–15. Emphasis added). To avoid discriminating against nonhuman animals, I count speciesism as the ‘Other status’ that should be taken into consideration here. Based on the contention that nonhuman animals should be granted legal personhood (see previous chapter), I believe that they too, by virtue of being biologically capable of becoming pregnant, are ‘pregnant persons.’ As such, they are victims of this crime (this also applies to reproductive coercion). To exclude them is discriminatory. Based on this understanding, nonhuman animals meet the second criteria of the definition of forced pregnancy. To be clear, I am not

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equating the situation/experiences of nonhuman animals with transgender or intersex individuals, I am simply arguing that they can be counted as pregnant persons.

The Intention of the Perpetrator Forced pregnancy, like rape, can constitute the crime of genocide. Article 11(d) of the Genocide Convention involves “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group” (The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 2014). Forced pregnancy prevents women from carrying babies from their own ethnic group. And “[b]y preventing births within the target group, perpetrators of forced pregnancy are ‘deliberately inflicting’ on the target group conditions of life that will cause the destruction (i.e., weakening by de-population) of the target group” (Takai, 2011, p. 404). I want to emphasize the word can. Forced pregnancy can be genocidal, but as the definition states the intention can also be based on “carrying out other grave violations of international law.” It is the latter (other grave violations of international law) that I want to focus on. The ‘core’ crimes listed under International Law include the crime of Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity, and the Crime Aggression. Rape, sexual slavery, or any other form of sexual violence are listed as War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. Under article 7 of the Rome Statute, Crimes against humanity also refer to: “[o]ther inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health” (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2011, p. 3). Based on this, I propose the following revised definition of forced pregnancy: The unlawful confinement of a person forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of carrying out inhumane acts that cause great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. Rape, sexual slavery, and other forms of sexual violence are used in the commission of this act. All of which are grave violations of International Law.

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Drawing on this interpretation ‘of other grave violations of International Law,’ nonhuman animals meet this third criteria of forced pregnancy. Now that I have explained the term reproductive violence, and more specifically the example of forced pregnancy, let us move on to consider the concept of reproductive coercion.

Reproductive Coercion As noted in Chapter 1, reproductive coercion is a type of intimate partner violence. To reiterate, it can include (1) “pressure…to become pregnant” (this can include male partners’ attempts to impregnate their female partners without their consent, for example through forcing them to have unprotected sex); interfering with contraception, by sabotaging birth control; and threatening to continue or terminate a pregnancy without the woman’s consent. This is referred to as “control of pregnancy outcomes” (Miller & Silverman, 2010, p. 512 as cited in McGirr et al., 2020, p. 2083). Put simply, reproductive coercion involves power and control of the reproductive bodies of women and girls (see FleurySteiner & Miller, 2020 for a more detailed review of the terminology). With reference to Nazi eugenicist policies during the Holocaust, the 1971 Liberation War, and the forced sterilization of Uighur women in China, I will demonstrate how this type of violence is not exclusive to intimate partner violence; it is also committed by the state. Reproductive coercion, specifically pregnancy coercion (through artificial insemination) and control of pregnancy outcomes (the separation of mother and calf ), will also be discussed in relation to nonhuman animals. While reproductive coercion is not explicitly listed as a War Crime or a Crime against Humanity, I argue that the impact of this violence falls under “[o]ther inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health” (Crimes against Humanity, element k Article 7 of the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, 2011, p. 3). Before we proceed, a brief note on the woman-as-nation thesis is required.

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Woman-As-Nation3 According to the woman-as-nation thesis, women are understood as both symbolically and corporeally mothers of the nation. In terms of the latter, this coding views the “womb as a recruiting station in nationalist discourses.” Within this framework, “women serve their nation by ‘producing’ children/soldiers [preferably sons] of the nation” (Åhäll, 2017, p. 22). We will review the implications of this equation in relation to the Holocaust and the 1971 Liberation War. Both the regulation (as was the case in Bangladesh) and the destruction of motherhood (which occurred during the Holocaust) are examined. In the case of Bangladesh, state regulation of motherhood was an attempt to recuperate the post-war maternal body. In the case of the Holocaust, the attack upon the maternal body (and its reproductive capabilities) formed part of the genocidal campaign. Women were targeted by German men during the Holocaust precisely because of their Jewishness (race) and their reproductive (gender) capabilities. I replace woman-as-nation with the coding woman-as-Jew. This is because—I would argue that—in the case of Jewish women, Jews—along with Poles and Roma—would have been considered by the Nazis as a source of contamination to the German nation/bloodline and thus more likely regarded as a counternation. These historical case studies have been chosen because they both, albeit in different ways, exemplify the woman-as-nation thesis. They both highlight how women, as reproducers of the nation, are targeted during war/armed conflict (see Banwell, 2016, 2020). Both are examples of reproductive violence and reproductive coercion.

3 For a more detailed discussion of the woman-as-nation thesis, see Banwell (2016, 2020). What is included here is a shorter version of the original analyses.

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Sexual, Genocidal, and Reproductive Violence Against Jewish Women During the Holocaust4 The Holocaust—and the Final Solution in particular—was the first event that did not treat the female population as the inevitable spoils of war. Viewed as the carriers of the next generation of Jews, the Nazi eugenicist policy explicitly targeted pregnant women for death: women whose pregnancies were visible were killed immediately upon arrival at a concentration camp (Goldenberg, 1998, 2013; Horowitz, 1998; Katz, 2012; Patterson, 2013; Perl, 1984/1993; Weitzman & Ofer, 1998). It may seem illogical to focus on gender when Nazi ideology was premised on the status of Jews as Jews, and their genocidal policy targeted them based on their ‘race.’ Yet, it is clear from women’s testimonies that they experienced the Holocaust differently from men (Goldenberg, 1998; Horowitz, 1998; Weitzman & Ofer, 1998). Women were vulnerable to sexualized and reproductive violence in a number of ways: rape, forced abortion, forced sterilization, sexual abuse, and the killing of their newborns. They experienced these crimes as women and as Jews (Friedman, 2002).5 Lentin (1999) argues that the definition of genocide must be gendered in order to acknowledge that many of these political campaigns—aimed at the “alteration or elimination of a future ethnic group,” through sexual slavery, mass rape, and mass sterilization—are transmitted through and upon women’s bodies. Indeed, in the context of the Holocaust, the Nazi eugenic vision of German racial 4

The section on the experiences of women during the Holocaust is based on my previous work in this area. See Banwell (2016, 2020). The latter is an open access book and can be retrieved at https://www.emerald.com/insight/publication/doi/10.1108/9781787691155. In this work, I have drawn on the testimonies of survivors in my discussion of gendered violence during the Holocaust. I have also explained why a gendered analysis of the Holocaust is a legitimate focus of investigation. 5 It is important to note that Jewish men were also targeted and attacked as Jews and as men. Indeed, as Tec (2003) argues, given the Nazi emphasis on patriarchal values—which depicted men as rational, aggressive, and more powerful than women—Jewish men were regarded as a greater threat to the political system than women. Thus, the goal of annihilating the Jews began with the extermination of Jewish men. Men endured indignities and assaults on their biology, including sexual assault and rape (Friedman, 2002; Horowitz, 1998). And witness testimonies recount incidents of castration that took place in the men’s camps (see Grey, 2017). We will discuss the experiences of men and boys in the following chapter.

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superiority specifically targeted Jewish women as child-bearers (Bock, 1984/1993). The reproductive body of the Jewish woman became a “biological danger,” as their wombs would “bear future generations” of Jews (Levenkron, 2010, p. 15). To create a superior Aryan race, Nazi racehygiene policies demanded the elimination of inferior races. Women’s sexuality and their reproductive capabilities became integral components of this agenda. Indeed, if rape resulted in pregnancy, Jewish women and their fetuses were murdered (Banwell, 2016, 2020). Rape was committed by Germans and their Nazi collaborators, as well as by other Jews. This took place in the ghettos, in hiding, and in the concentration camps. In the ghettos, Jewish women were also vulnerable to murder, including the murder of their children, as well as forced abortions and a number of other sex-based violations. Women were also sexually assaulted while they were being transported from the ghettos to the camps (Aoláin, 2000; Katz, 2012). According to Katz (2012), while some similarities may be drawn, the rape of Jewish women during the Holocaust involved factors that complicate a comparison with wartime rape in other contexts. Two distinctive elements will be discussed here. First, we have the crime of Rassenschande. The law against Rassenschande (racial defilement) prohibited sexual relations between Aryans and non-Aryans. This involved all sexual relationships between Aryans and Jews, consensual or otherwise. Between 1935 and 1945, 2,000 cases were brought before the courts. Sentences for those found guilty of committing Rassenschande, averaged between four and five years (Katz, 2012). Second, as noted above, if rape resulted in pregnancy, both the female victim and her fetus would be killed. Unlike rape in other contexts, where the genocidal aim is to contaminate the bloodline by reproducing an ethnically mixed cohort of children, contamination of the German bloodline was antithetical to Nazi ideology. The requirement to kill Jewish women following the violation of Rassenschande—and its potential reproductive consequences—was particularly common in the Skarzysko-Kamienna concentration camp (see Banwell, 2020 for survivor testimonies). Fogelman (2012) argues that some acts of rape were committed clandestinely, whereas others were done in public to humiliate and dehumanize the victim. During their interviews, a number of survivors talked about women being dragged to

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the forest to be raped in secret. They discussed the methods guards used to conceal their crime of race defilement. For them, it was clear that these guards were aware of the law of Rassenschande. The way rape was carried out—and the actions taken thereafter to conceal the crime—underscores the following: these acts of violence were carried out against woman-asJew and against bearers of the next generation. Reproductive violence and reproductive coercion (controlling pregnancy outcomes) were also features of this genocidal campaign. They are discussed in more detail below.

Assault on Jewish Motherhood Through Forced Sterilizations and Forced Abortions Aoláin (2000, p. 61) argues that the separation of children from their mothers and the removal of their capacity to bear children count as explicit sexual harms. It is an assault upon a woman’s bodily integrity “both in its actual and symbolic manifestations.” As a symbolic function, she argues that this act communicates to the wider ethnic or cultural group that the destruction of mother and child denotes the achievement of broader military aims: the elimination of that particular group (Aoláin, 2000, p. 61). Forced sterilization was carried out on thousands of women without the consent, or often the knowledge, of the female victims (see Halbmayr, 2010). These genocidal experiments (which largely took place at Auschwitz, Ravensbrück, and other concentration camps) were conducted by means of X-ray, surgery, and drugs (Aoláin, 2000, p. 56). Forced abortions were also performed as part of the racist ideology. Indeed, abortions were forbidden for Aryan women who were considered to be the bearers of the future ‘master race’ (Halbmayr, 2010, p. 37). In many of the forced-labor camps and the concentration camps, abortion was not even an option: Jewish women were immediately condemned to death. In terms of contextualizing and interpreting the behavior of German men, sexualized violence was not enacted upon a dehumanized body. It was carried out on the reproductive bodies of Jewish women. It was,

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as Patterson (2013) has argued, an assault on Jewish motherhood, as the source of the Jewish people is the Jewish mother. The concentration camps were described as places that were the antithesis of the maternal. In the concentration camps, motherly love, pregnancy, and maternity itself were capital crimes, often resulting in women’s immediate death. Forced sterilization and forced abortion are acts of reproductive genocidal violence. Unlike the use of rape, they did not contradict the Nazi eugenic vision of creating an Aryan race. Their devastating genocidal logic is apparent. Both examples, however, benefit from an analysis which views Jewish women as an essentialized group: woman-as-Jew. According to Chirot and McCauley (2006), essentialization involves the reduction and denigration of a diverse group into a single, redundant category, attributing them all with the same negative characteristics. They state: The idea of essence … turns out to be a key psychological concept in examining violence against groups. Something about members of the targeted group is inherently disgusting – their habits … their appearance – and this justifies the violence against them because their disgusting characteristics threaten to pollute the environment and must be eliminated. (Chirot & McCauley, 2006, p. 81)

Drawing on the concept of essentialization allows us to understand the political, racial, and gendered dynamics (inter-subjective) and meanings (degradation/humiliation) behind this sexualized and reproductive violence. In the context of the Holocaust, I would argue that Jewish women faced a double jeopardy: first as women (as socially, economically, and politically subordinate to men) and second as Jews (as racially inferior to Germans). From a gendered perspective, both the feminine/feminized (through rape) and maternal Jewish body were attacked. Having considered sexual, reproductive, and genocidal violence against Jewish women during the Holocaust, we will now consider both phenomena against Bengali women and girls during the 1971 Liberation War.

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The 1971 Liberation War6 Following the partition from India during the 1940s, Pakistan was divided into West (now Pakistan) and East Pakistan. Following three decades of tension—stemming from the economic, political, and racial marginalization of East Pakistan by the West—in March 1971, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) declared its independence. This led to the 1971 Liberation War (Takai, 2011. See also Bose, 2007; Brownmiller, 1975; Mookherjee, 2006, 2007; 2015; Sharlach, 2000). It is estimated that 3 million people died during this nine-month war (Mookherjee, 2006, 2007, 2015; Sharlach, 2000). It is worth noting that genocide was a feature of this war. It was a genocide committed by West Pakistanis against East Pakistani Bengalis. West Pakistanis were an exclusively Muslim group, while East Pakistani Bengalis were an ethnic group comprised mainly of Hindus, as well as some Muslims. The former deemed the latter racially inferior (Sharlach, 2000; Takai, 2011). Responding to the genocide—and believing that non-Bengalis were supporting West Pakistan—the Bengalis attacked and murdered 150,000 non-Bengalis in East Pakistan (Sharlach, 2000). Over the course of the nine months, West Pakistani soldiers raided houses, killed men, and raped Bengali women of all castes and religions (Brownmiller, 1975; Sharlach, 2000). And while it is important to acknowledge that this was a genocide committed against the Bengalis as an ethnic group (see Beachler, 2007 for a detailed review of this genocide), gender played a significant role during this war. Gender-based violence (GBV) was committed against women and men during this war. While men and boys were executed and expelled during this genocide, regrettably there is a dearth of in-depth information about their experiences. Nevertheless, their experiences during this war will be discussed in the following chapter.

6

This section on the 1971 Liberation War is based on my open access monograph, Banwell (2020)—Gender and the Violence(s) of War and Armed Conflict.

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In a similar vein to the rape of Jewish women by German men, the genocide against the Bengali population was not carried out on a dehumanized group: it was carried out on an ethnic group deemed racially inferior.

Rape and Genocidal Violence It is estimated that between 200,000 and 400,000 women and girls were raped during the genocide (Mookherjee, 2007, 2015; Sharlach, 2000; Takai, 2011).7 In the words of a reporter: “[a] stream of victims and eyewitnesses tell how truckloads of Pakistani soldiers…swooped down on villages in the night, rounding up women by force. Some were raped on the spot. Others were carried off to military compounds” (war correspondent Joseph Fried as cited in Brownmiller, 1975, p. 79). This is corroborated by a survivor who—translating an excerpt from the book Ami Birangona Bolchi (The War Heroine Speaks)—states: women were “abducted, tortured and raped in concentration camps by the Pakistani army who set up rape camps in all towns and villages they went to. It was part of a systematic plan to disempower and destroy the vertebrae of Bengali society” (cited in Hossain, 2016). The assaults against women were widespread and systematic: the Pakistani army raped hundreds and thousands of Bengali women and girls leading, in part, to the “destruction of the Bengalis as a group” (Takai, 2011, p. 414). Rape, in this instance, was used as a weapon of war. According to Newsweek (1971), it was used as a “…calculated policy of terror amounting to genocide against the whole Bengali population” (as cited in Sharlach, 2000, p. 95). Indeed, when rape is used intentionally and systematically as a weapon of war, it can also be genocidal in nature. Genocide is defined in Article 2 of The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (2014) as:

7

Some have contested these figures. See Bose (2007) for a more detailed discussion.

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[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Based on this definition, rape can be, and is, used as a tool of genocide. This was the case in Bangladesh. The rapes involved sexual torture and gang rape. Women were often murdered after they were raped. Some women died from their injuries, and some died by suicide following the assault (Sharlach, 2000). According to a local newspaper, others “…fled to Pakistan with their Pakistani captors rather than face what awaited them in Bangladeshi society” (WMC, no date).

Forced Pregnancy There is evidence to suggest that forced impregnation was the aim behind the mass rape of Bengali women and girls of reproductive age (Takai, 2011). In the words of a Pakistani soldier: “[w]e are going. But we are leaving our seed behind” (as cited in Sharlach, 2000, p. 95). However, the claim of forced impregnation is hard to prove. With regard to rape, as outlined above, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that this was used as a genocidal tool. There is less support, however, for the case of forced impregnation. According to numerous sources, 25,000 babies were born as a result of the widespread use of rape during the 1971 war (Brownmiller, 1975; Takai, 2011). Viewed as a constant reminder of the assault on Bengali society, as well as its cultural identity, these war-babies were rejected by the Bangladeshi government. Female survivors were either forced to have abortions or give their babies up for adoption oversees (Brownmiller, 1975; Mookherjee, 2007). The former falls within the definition of reproductive violence, and the latter, however, is an example of reproductive coercion—‘control of pregnancy outcomes’—committed by the state.

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Despite the number of babies born as a result of the systematic rape of Bengali women, there are, Takai (2011) argues, problems in prosecuting forced pregnancy as a crime of genocide. In a very detailed article, Takai (2011) outlines the reasons for this. First, the perpetrators must be of a different ethnic group to the victims in order for it to contaminate the bloodline or to involve the “transferring of children” from one group to the other. Therefore, to paraphrase Takai (2011), as the Bangladeshi government can only prosecute Bengali nationals with this crime (whereby perpetrator and victim are of the same ‘bloodline’), forced pregnancy cannot be tried and charged in this case. The second relates to the requirement that the woman be unlawfully confined during her pregnancy. Despite evidence that rape camps did exist (Brownmiller, 1975), there is insufficient evidence to prove that victims were detained after being raped and forcibly impregnated (Brownmiller, 1975; Takai, 2011). There are two important issues here. The first is the assumption that forced pregnancy always constitutes the crime of genocide. As noted above, forced pregnancy can be genocidal, but it can also be rooted in ‘carrying out other grave violations of International law.’ The second relates to the issue of unlawful confinement. As highlighted above, while the ICC Statue does not outline the exact length of time that a person needs to be unlawfully confined, it does require that the victim be detained between the time they are thought to be pregnant and the end of the pregnancy (Boon, 2001). The legal requirements of forced pregnancy notwithstanding, these acts of sexualized violence committed during the 1971 Liberation War are examples of reproductive violence. Furthermore, pregnancies resulting from rape are a violation of women’s reproductive autonomy.

The Regulation of Women’s Post-War Reproductive Bodies Even if forced pregnancy cannot be proved as an act of genocide in the case of the 1971 Liberation War, it is still important to unpack the impact and implications these pregnancies had for female victims/survivors. In her research on raped Bengali women, and their

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‘war-babies,’ Mookherjee (2007) considers how the state attempted to rehabilitate these women and, in the process, regulate their reproductive bodies. Not only does this speak to Grey’s (2017) notion of reproductive violence, I believe it is also an example of state reproductive coercion. Following the war, the new government set up rehabilitation centers offering women abortions or adoption for those too far along in their pregnancies to undergo an abortion (Mookherjee, 2007, see also Brownmiller, 1975). During this time, the state lifted the ban on both of these practices to facilitate the removal of ‘war-babies,’ who brought with them painful memories of war (Mookherjee, 2007). Motherhood, in the immediate aftermath of the war in Bangladesh, was premised upon protecting raped women from “the emotions of motherhood” through the use of abortion and adoption (Mookherjee, 2007, p. 339). Furthermore, this construction of motherhood draws a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate motherhood “…and emphasizes a nationalist project that seeks to contain illegitimate motherhoods so that these same women might become available to nation-building programmes as legitimate mothers” (Mookherjee, 2007, p. 350). It can be argued that this removal of ‘war-babies’ (Mookherjee, 2007) was part of a cleansing ritual, designed to purify the abject, polluted woman. In the words of one survivor: “Bangladesh became a free nation and I a fallen woman” (Das, 2011). But more than that—and here we return to Cohn’s woman-as-nation thesis—these state policies restored national honor through the control/regulation of women’s sexual and reproductive bodies. In the context of the Indian subcontinent, we might think of Cohn’s phrase along these lines: nation-as-mother and women as mothers of the nation. This regulation of motherhood can be contrasted to the assault on Jewish motherhood (discussed earlier) in the following ways. In the context of the Holocaust, the separation of children from the mothers and the removal of their capacity to reproduce children from their own ethnic group (through forced abortion and forced sterilization) formed part of the Nazi genocidal campaign. In the case of Bangladesh, while the removal of ‘war-babies’—babies belonging to the ‘enemy’ group—was not done through explicit use of force, this was, nevertheless, a state-wide

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policy. A policy carried out in response to, rather than as a component of genocide. It was the antidote, rather than the annihilation. Below, we will consider our final example of reproductive violence and reproductive coercion in relation to intrahuman violence: the genocide against the Uighur population in China.

Reproductive and Genocidal Violence Against the Uighur Population in China Since 2017, over a million Uighurs and other Turkic Muslims have been detained in ‘education’ internment camps in the Xinjiang region of Northwest China (Finley, 2021; Turdush & Fiskesjö, 2021; Zenz, 2020). Alternatively, they have been subject to forced incarceration, in high-security prisons or subject to forced labor (Finley, 2021). This has been described as “the largest mass internment of an ethnic-religious minority group since World War II” (Kirby, 2020). The term genocide has been used to describe this campaign of violence against this ethnicreligious minority (see Finley, 2021; Turdush & Fiskesjö, 2021). Turdush and Fiskesjö (2021) and Zenz (2020) identify the following acts which map onto elements b, c, & d of Article 2 of the Genocide Convention outlined above. They are enforced sterilization and force abortions, as part of the Chinese Family Planning Policy; mass rape; forced family separations; and state-sponsored forced inter-racial marriages between Uighur women and Han Chinese men. As Turdush and Fiskesjö (2021, p. 29) explain: [I]n both Uyghur and Chinese patrilineal culture, forcing women to marry Han Chinese men means their future children will not belong to their mothers’ ethnic group. This represents one more measure intended to prevent Uyghur children from being born and reducing the Uyghur population as a result.

In relation to rape, there are numerous accounts from victims, survivors, and eyewitnesses that mass rape has taken place in these concentration camps. These rapes are “…centrally directed as part of the genocide plan

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to destroy the Uyghur people and nation.” This “…is evident through the horrific torture and systematic mass rape in Chinese concentration camps” (Turdush & Fiskesjö, 2021, p. 34). For our purposes here, our focus is on the reproductive violence, in the form of forced sterilization and forced abortion. As mentioned earlier, the former is listed as a Crime against Humanity. And, as outlined in Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute, it is not a requirement for Crimes against Humanity to take place during an armed conflict. In a similar way to genocide, they can also occur in so-called peacetime societies.

Chinese Birth Control Policies The Uighur population have experienced restrictions on their reproductive freedoms, through Chinese birth control policies, for several years. As Turdush and Fiskesjö (2021) note, any married Uighur woman living in East Turkistan, with one or no children, has had direct experience of either being forced to insert an IUD or forced to undergo sterilization. However, state control of reproduction increased following the mass interment of the Uighur population in 2017. Both inside and outside the camps, women have been subject to gynecological examinations; forced to take birth control medication; have IUDs inserted; or undergone forced sterilization (Turdush & Fiskesjö, 2021; Zenz, 2020). Data from a report published by Adrian Zenz reveals that “hundreds of thousands of Turkic Muslim women” have been forced to undergo these procedures (Finley, 2021). The information included in the report is based on empirical research with survivors and eyewitnesses as well as government documents and statistics. These documents reveal an increase in the insertion of IUDs in Xinjiang Province from 200,000 in 2014 to 333,000 by 2018. This is a 60% increase (Associated Press, 2020). Furthermore, this increase occurred during a time where in other parts of China, Han women were having their devices removed (see Zenz, 2020). To put it another way: despite Xinjiang comprising 1.8% of China’s entire population, by 2018, eighty percent of all IUD insertions were carried out in this region (Zenz, 2020). The report by Zenz (2020), and the article by the Associated Press (2020), also include details

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of how the Chinese government invested tens of millions of dollars into their birth control policy in Xinjiang. This included coercing women to get sterilized by offering them financial incentives. Survivors have also reported being subject to forced abortions (Associated Press, 2020; Halliday, 2020; Zenz, 2020). As Bumeryem Rozi (2021 as cited in Dalton, 2021) explains: The police came…They put me and eight other pregnant women in cars and took us to hospital…They first gave me a pill and said to take it. So I did. I didn’t know what it was. Half an hour later, they put a needle in my belly. And some time after that I lost my child.8

We began the analysis of these case studies with a discussion of the woman-as-nation thesis in relation to the holocaust and the 1971 Liberation War. With regard to the former, rape by German soldiers against Jewish women was not an official strategy of the war. In the latter, rape was used as a tool of genocide. However, in both examples, these acts of sexualized and reproductive violence were genocidal. They were used to attack the nation’s culture of women. Context-specific analyses reformulate the coding of woman-as-nation to woman-as-Jew, in the case of the Holocaust, and mother-as-nation, in the case of Bangladesh. In the case of the current genocide in China, ‘woman-as-Muslim/terrorist’ replaces the woman-as-nation thesis. In this instance, Uighur women, as mostly Muslim, would be considered a threat to the nation by the Chinese government who draw on Islamophobic and de-extremification rhetoric to target this group. Comparable with the genocides committed during the Holocaust and 1971 Liberation War, sexual and reproductive violence is a key feature of the Crimes against Humanity currently being committed against the Uighur population. In China, resonating with what occurred in Bangladesh, rape is being used as a weapon against Uighur women to destroy the ethnic and religious group to which they belong. This causes “serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.” Reproductive violence, in the form of forced sterilization and forced abortion, is also 8 This was reported by Dalton (2021) in an article called Uighurs Describe Forced Abortions and Torture in China.

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being deployed. This “prevents birth within the group” (elements b and d, respectively, of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 2014). In this instance, rape and reproductive violence are being carried out on the bodies of women deemed to pose a terrorist threat. Here, the intent—as part of the global war on terror—is to eradicate a group deemed as dangerous and extremist. The concept of essentialization, rather than dehumanization, offers a more nuanced understanding of this reproductive and genocidal violence. Echoing the sentiments of Turdush and Fiskesjö (2021), my intention in addressing the violence(s) committed against women is not to discount or downplay the abuse and violence inflicted upon men. As noted above, men have also been detained, tortured, and abused in the camps. Rather, my aim is to demonstrate how the reproductive bodies of women are subject to specific Crimes against Humanity, which also qualify as acts of genocide that are currently being employed as part of this ethno-religious and political campaign.

Summary In this section, we have reviewed examples of reproductive and genocidal violence against women and girls both within and outwith the context of war. My aim is not to compare the genocidal element of these cases with the violence(s) of the war against nonhuman animals. Rather, the purpose is to demonstrate that human and nonhuman animals have, and continue to be, victims of the expressions and consequences of reproductive violence: rape, sexual violence, and forced pregnancy. I identify the following as applying to the situation of female nonhuman animals across the meat, egg, and dairy industries: assault on motherhood, mother-as-nation, and violence that is carried out on a group deemed ‘Other,’ sub-, and nonhuman (violence that dehumanizes). The sources of these oppressions—which also apply to human populations— will be highlighted. I expand upon all of this during the latter part of the chapter. At the outset, I outlined how female nonhuman animals, capable of becoming pregnant, meet the three cumulative prerequisites of forced

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pregnancy. In the next section we will review rape, sexual violence, and forced pregnancy within the dairy industry. We will place this discussion within existing feminist literature on animal husbandry practices within agribusiness.

Patriarchy and Animal Husbandry Practices To review animal husbandry practices, we will draw on the work of Cusack and her article, Feminism and Husbandry: Drawing the Fine Line Between Mine and Bovine. It is worth noting at the outset, while Cusack’s (2013) work is important for highlighting the problems with the normative consummation of dairy, and the hierarchical nature of humans’ relationship toward nonhuman animals, at times her work falls into the domain of the ‘dreaded comparisons’ previously discussed. Let us not lose sight of our focus here: (1) an analysis of the shared sources of oppression between human and nonhuman animals, and (2) the application of existing legal remedies and treaties—in the form of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity—to the situation of nonhuman animals who meet the criteria of these crimes. Referring to animal husbandry practices in the US, Cusack (2013) argues that these practices are rooted in patriarchy, arguing that feminists who consume dairy products are complicit in maintaining “a patriarchal industry that subjugates femaleness” (p. 25). For Cusack (2013), the sexual exploitation and cruelty that takes place within the dairy industry is a feminist issue “…because cows suffer gender-based atrocities due to their sex, fertility, and status as mothers” (p. 25). Her article provides a critique of feminists’ consumption of dairy as well as a critical review of the terms rape, husbandry, and bestiality. We will return to her work in due course when we discuss reproductive violence within the dairy industry. For now, I want to focus on her arguments regarding animal husbandry practices in the US. As noted in the Introduction/Chapter 1 , the following definitions are provided for this practice: the science of breeding farm animals; a branch of agriculture involved in the production of farm animals; and the management and care of domesticated animals. For Cusack (2013, p. 25), animal husbandry—which stems

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from the normative consumption of dairy—is a euphemism for “…rape and sexual slavery/trafficking.” It involves repeated nonconsensual penetration, either with hands or with objects, of the nonhuman animal, and nonconsensual insemination for the purposes of reproduction (Bourke, 2020; Cusack, 2013). This is commonly carried out on cows, sows, sheep, and turkeys. According to Cusack (2013), the term rape describes these processes more accurately and should replace the euphemistic phrase ‘animal husbandry.’ She states: “[w]here husbandry romanticizes and softens the brutality, the word rape conjures an image of forced sexual penetration” (p. 32). However, she continues, even if we use the term rape, this does not capture “…all of the acts of defilement, deprivation, and objectification present in husbandry, such as milking, starving, and killing” (Cusack, 2013, p. 32). And in a similar vein, Pattrice Jones (2014 as cited in Kelty-Huber, 2015, p. 12) warns us against using term the ‘husbandry’ as a casual euphemism. Rather, she believes we should view it as an expression of patriarchal control. She explains: By becoming the “husbands” of farmed animals, men…arrogate to themselves the right to choose whether, when, and with whom the animals under their control will mate. Only by controlling every aspect of reproduction can people profit from the exploitation…Pregnancy means more property for people. They-the “husbands”- and not the mothers decided what will happen to calves, lambs, chicks, and piglets. Sound familiar? Yes, it’s patriarchy…

Cusack (2013) draws parallels between animal husbandry and bestiality. While the former is a legal practice, justified on clinical and scientific grounds, as per the ‘official’ definition provided above, the latter (bestiality) is prohibited in the US, either for the crime itself or under animal cruelty laws. Because animals cannot consent to sex with humans, sexual acts with nonhuman animals are considered cruel and violent (see also Bourke, 2020). Herein lies the paradox: the state both protects nonhuman animals from nonconsensual sexual activities (through bestiality and anticruelty laws), while simultaneously facilitating their sexual exploitation through animal husbandry practices. This

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as Cusack (2013, p. 34) notes “calls into question how society draws lines between husbandry, rape, and bestial sex.” While Cusack (2013) identifies the main difference between animal husbandry and bestiality, namely that of intent: the goal of animal husbandry is industrialized reproduction while bestiality is rooted in sexual desire (see also Bourke, 2020). Nevertheless, she maintains that both share a crucial similarity: the nonconsensual penetration of nonhuman animals “for the purpose of creating a sexual reaction in the animal… orgasm by the bull, or reproductive reaction by the cow” (Cusack, 2013, pp. 35–36). It is the pleasure that is gained from the act that deems one abusive and the other an accepted agricultural practice, explains Cusack (2013). The sexual exploitation and commodification of the nonhuman animal—through acts of nonconsensual penetration and masturbation; acts which also fall within bestiality—are not considered violent or cruel, because the farmer does not engage in these acts for sexual pleasure. In her book Loving Animals: On Bestiality, Zoophilia and Post-human Love, Bourke (2020, p. 54) highlights the tensions that arise when drafting legislation that criminalizes bestiality (as a form of animal abuse) without criminalizing animal husbandry practices, given that both involve sexual acts with nonhuman animals. Referring specifically to anti-bestiality laws in the US, she explains: …the difference between a bestialist and a farmer was a biopolitical one. The bestialist manipulated the sex organs of animals in the interests of personal gratification; in contrast, farmers similarly manipulated the animal’s sexual organs but in the interest of capitalist production. The first act was criminalized; the second, promoted as necessary to economic growth.

We will return to the point raised here by Bourke (2020) regarding the biopolitical nature of animal husbandry in Chapter 5. In doing so, we will also revisit Wadiwel’s (2009, 2015) work on biopolitical violence and the war against nonhuman animals. This will facilitate our analysis of the relationship between carnism, the commodification of nonhuman

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animals, and the industrialized meat, egg, and dairy industries. For now, let us continue with our discussion of the violence(s) inherent within the dairy industry.

Rape, Sexual Violence, and the Forced Impregnation of Dairy Cows The production of milk is the result of the repeated rape and forcible impregnation of dairy cows (Brown, 2016; Cusack,2013; Gillespie, 2014, 2018; Joy, 2010; Mackenzie, 2019). Nonconsensual invasive methods of penetration (both vaginal and rectal) are used to impregnate dairy cows (Cusack, 2013; Mackenzie, 2019). This includes the use of the ‘rape rack.’ This is the device used to forcibly restrain the cow with chains while she is forcibly impregnated artificially or by a bull (Bourke, 2020; Cusack, 2013; Shuchat, 2016). The process of artificially inseminating cows is referred to as recto-vaginal rape.9 During this process, the worker inserts one arm into the rectum of the cow in order to locate the cervix. The farmer then uses the other arm to insert the artificial insemination gun into the cow’s vagina. The cow is restrained by the rape rack during this process. The rod-like gun contains bull semen. It is forced into the cow until it reaches her cervix where the semen is injected into her uterus (Shuchat, 2016. See also Gillespie, 2014). And to reiterate, the nonconsensual forcible impregnation of the dairy cow, through artificial insemination, falls within routine/standard breeding practices. As Gillespie (2018) highlights, 80% of dairy cows in North America and Europe are subject to forced impregnation through artificial insemination. “Therefore, to speak about diary production is to speak primarily about artificial insemination” (p. 174). The term rape rack is used colloquially in the dairy industry to refer to the forced reproduction of nonhuman animals (Gillespie, 2014). Gillespie (2014, p. 1331) argues that when the term rape rack is used by people in the dairy industry, not only does it conceal the violence inflicted on the cow, through its “shock value and twisted humor,” it 9

Vandermark et al. (1951 as cited by Cusack, p. 27).

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also diminishes the seriousness of the violence because of the unusual association of the term rape with a nonhuman animal. And yet, Gillespie (2014, p. 1331) continues, the term rape rack does not serve as a metaphor in this context as the cows are literally raped. “Thus, rather than deflecting attention from the process with an unsavory joke, the misogyny of the system is, instead, revealed, and industry workers themselves unwittingly acknowledge that artificial insemination is a violation of the cow.” In a more recent statement, Katie Arth of People of the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) notes that “farmers are far more savvy about terminology” and do not use the term rape rack to describe the device that is used during the forced impregnation of dairy cows. “The industry now prefers to use euphemisms such as ‘breeding boxes’ to describe the boxes or chutes where female cows are restrained while a worker forcibly inseminates them” (as cited in Shuchat, 2016).

Why Use the Term Rape? Based on the legal definition of rape in various countries10 —some of which I will share below—it is possible to argue that nonhuman animals are victims of this crime. The revised FBI Uniform Crime Reporting definition of rape is: “[p]enetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or anus with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person, without the consent of the victim” (FBI: UCR, 2013). And under Australian law (which has been subject to extensions and modifications), the crime is now gender-neutral and refers to “penetration of the genitalia by a penis, object, part of a body or mouth” (Australian Government, 2010). Interestingly, if we look at the definition of rape used by EU member states, despite the variations in the terminology used (not all use gender-neutral language, for example), none refer to penile penetration. Conversely, non-EU members, such as the UK, refer to nonconsensual penetration with a penis. In this instance, we would use the term Assault by penetration. This is when a person penetrates another 10

These are the legal definitions used at the time of writing, October 2022.

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person’s vagina or anus with any part of the body other than a penis, or by using an object, without the person’s consent (Sexual Offences Act, 2003). The language of this offense assumes the perpetrator is male. Whichever definition or term we use—rape, assault be penetration— the insemination of the cow is nonconsensual. And as Cusack notes, “[n]onconsensual insemination is, quite simply, a species/gender/sex neutral term that identifies insemination that occurs without the victim’s consent” (Cusack, 2013, p. 31). Given the focus of this book—the war against nonhuman animals—it seems more appropriate to draw on definitions of wartime rape.

Wartime Rape In her article, War Rape: New Conceptualizations and Responses, Nancy Farwell draws on the definition of wartime rape included in the report presented to the UN Commission on Human Rights: ‘Rape’ should be understood to be the insertion, under conditions of force, coercion, or duress, of any object, including but not limited to a penis, into a victim’s vagina or anus; or the insertion, under conditions of force, coercion, or duress, of a penis into the mouth of the victim. Rape is defined in gender-neutral terms, as both men and women are victims of rape. (McDougall, 1998, p. 8 as cited in Farwell, 2004, p. 392)

To this, we can add that the gender-neutral language adopted in this definition also means that the perpetrator can be of any gender. In a more recent publication, Elvan Isikozlu and Ananda Millard (2010) provide a typology of wartime rape. Their Brief is based on a case study analysis of wartime rape in 12 countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Liberia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea/Bougainville, Peru, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste. Based on their analysis of these cases, Isikozlu and Millard (2010, p. 25) define wartime rape as a “forced or nonconsensual” act that “involves the penetration of the mouth, vagina or anus by any object or bodily part.” And finally, the definition of rape provided by the Rome Statute of the International

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Criminal Court (2011, p. 8) refers to penetration of any part of the victims’ body using a sexual organ or, “any object or any other part of the body.” All of these definitions can be applied to nonhuman animals who are subject to nonconsensual artificial insemination. Based on my amended definition of forced pregnancy provided above (please recall that this is informed by non-speciesist law, which regards the confinement of nonhuman animals as illegal), the animal husbandry practices described above fall within this definition. While the aim of animal husbandry practices is the forcible impregnation of the dairy cow, the act involves rape (through artificial insemination) and ‘other forms of sexual violence.’ These expressions and consequences of reproductive violence committed against dairy cows (respectively, rape, sexual violence, and forced pregnancy) fall within the definitions of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. With reference to Halbmayr’s (2010) notion of sexualized violence, I will unpack these ‘other forms of sexual violence’ in more detail below.

Separation of Mother and Calf In addition to this violence inflicted on the cow, she suffers further harm when her offspring are taken from her almost immediately after she has given birth. As Brown (2016) notes, within the first 12 hours of being born 97% of calves are taken from their mothers. Mothers will cry and bellow for days, sometimes weeks, after their calves have been removed from them (Cusack, 2013; Gillespie, 2014; Joy, 2010; Shuchat, 2016). To quote Brown (2016, p. 3): “[t]hey are forced to go through this process for three to five years until their body is too exhausted to produce any more milk or offspring, and they are sent to slaughter.” This separation of mother and child is seen as necessary within the dairy industry to meet the demands of consumers and ensure maximum profitability. Once the calf is removed, the milk can then be used for human consumption. I argue that this forced separation is an assault on motherhood. Aoláin (2000) argues that the separation of children from their mothers is a gender-based violation and an assault on the mother’s

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bodily integrity. I posit that dairy cows experience this destruction of motherhood. This assault is a form of reproductive coercion, where the involuntary separation of mother and child deprives the mother of her personhood and her inter-subjective relationship with her child. When using the term “control of pregnancy outcomes,” Miller and Silverman (2010, p. 512 as cited in McGirr et al., 2020, p. 2083) are referring to situations when male partners threaten to continue or terminate a pregnancy without the consent of their female partners. It is possible to argue that forcibly removing a child from their mother is another means of controlling pregnancy outcomes. In all of these situations, motherhood is either granted or denied on behalf of the mother. Her wishes are dismissed.

The Experience of Calves Like dairy cows, calves are treated as commodities. They form part of the dairy industry. After they have been separated from their mothers, they are either used for ‘veal’ or, depending on their sex, used for dairy (Joy, 2010). As Joy (2010, p. 62) explains, if they are not killed within the first few days, the lifespan of calves is short—around 16 to 18 weeks. During this time, they are restrained in stalls so small they are unable to move around or lie down. “And in order to produce the pale color that veal is known for, the animals are typically fed an unnatural diet lacking in iron, so that they are in a state of chronic borderline anemia” (see also Cusack, 2013). Kathryn Gillespie, author of the book The Cow with Ear Tag #1389 (2018) and the article Sexualized Violence and the Gendered Commodification of the Animal Body in Pacific Northwest US Dairy Production (2014), conducted fieldwork at dairy farms, auction yards, and sanctuaries in the US. This involved attending auctions, taking part in farm and sanctuary tours, as well as interviewing dairy farm and sanctuary workers. Accounts from this empirical research are included below. With reference to the life of the female calf, Gillespie (2014, p. 1326) notes:

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If the calf were female, she would be raised there on the dairy farm, sold to another dairy farm, or raised by a heifer-growing contractor off-site. She would be fed discarded milk or milk replacer and weaned at 6–8 weeks of age after which she would be group housed until she reached a reproductive age. Just before weaning, she would be dehorned, vaccinated, and have any extra teats removed. When she reached 15 months of age, she would be impregnated through artificial insemination for the first time.

Thus begins the cycle of reproductive violence.

Sexual Violations Within the Dairy Industry As noted above, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity encompass, among other crimes, any other form of sexual violence. Halbmayr (2010, p. 30) posits that “violent acts can be understood as sexualized if they are directed at the most intimate part of a person and, as such, against that person’s physical, emotional, and spiritual integrity.” Based on arguments presented in the previous chapter—that nonhuman animals should be granted legal personhoodI argue that the experiences of dairy cows can be placed within this framework of sexualized violence, specifically the impact on the physical, emotional, and spiritual integrity of these nonhuman animals. Drawing on a range of sources, I will unpack this in more detail below. In a bid to ‘lift the lid on cruelty in the dairy industry’ PETA included an advert in the Daily Post in March 2021 asking people to submit evidence of animal welfare violations. The advert asked: “[h]ave you witnessed animal suffering on a UK dairy farm?” The advert included examples of animal cruelty that individuals may have witnessed. The list includes but is not limited to: untreated mastitis,11 underweight calves, prolonged tethering in isolation, inappropriate housing for calves, distress in mother cows or calves after being separated, and mistreatment

11

Mastitis refers to the painful inflammation of the mammary glands.

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during artificial insemination (see Fluckiger, 2021). Based on the ecofeminist literature reviewed above—that artificial insemination involves nonconsensual penetration—one wonders to what additional mistreatment PETA are referring to. Despite calls such as this—to highlight the (sexualized) violence and brutality inherent within the dairy industry— information regarding the life of dairy cows varies considerably. Compare the following two extracts. The first is based on the field observations of Gillespie (2014, pp. 1326–1327). The second is taken from the site This is dairy farming.12

Gillespie Most dairy farms have shifted to the use of the milking machines, rather than milking cows by hand, in the squeeze for greater efficiency. Milking ‘parlors’ are the rooms or barns where the milking machines are housed…The cows are herded into the parlor in groups and human handlers clean each cow’s teats and attach teat cups to the cow’s nipples. The cups suction onto the nipples and the machine begins to pump milk out of the cow’s udders into a tube that feeds the milk into a collection vat where it begins the process of pasteurization and processing. This process is extremely painful if the cow has mastitis. About 60–90 days after the cow gives birth, she [is] artificially inseminated again and continuously milked through her pregnancy until 60 days before giving birth… This cycle of artificial insemination, birth, and milking would be repeated for several years until lameness, mastitis, infertility, and/or declining milk production set in. These conditions are common in cows used for dairy because of the immense physical strain and nutrient depletion… caused by the excessive milking and forced impregnation inherent in the industry. At this point, the farmer would

12

This is dairy is a website that claims to celebrate “all things related to the dairy farm.” It provides information on how milk is made and how dairy products get “from the farm to fridge.” It includes videos about the life of dairy cows as well as links to leading British farmers so visitors to the site can see what goes on at the farm. The website also includes a Farmer Diary. Dairy farming is described as an “exciting and rewarding profession.”

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make a careful calculation of her profitability as a milk producer weighed against the cost of maintaining her.

This Is Dairy Farming The milking parlour is a fascinating place, full of modern gadgets and shiny equipment. If you ever get a chance to see one in action you’ll definitely come away impressed. The frequency of milking varies from farm to farm and depends on the type of parlour used, the stage of lactation and milk yield. Most farmers milk their cows twice a day, but in a robotic milking system [,] cows sometimes choose to be milked four to five times a day. This doesn’t necessarily mean that they are producing more milk, nor is it uncomfortable for them - calves would naturally feed at four to six hourly intervals. (This is dairy farming, n.d. see also Heyden, 2015 emphasis added)

The account provided by Gillespie (2014) is corroborated by numerous other sources (see Clay et al., 2020; Compassion in World Farming, n.d.; PETA, n.d.; Shahbandeh, 2021; Humane League, 2021). In their assessment of the intensification of dairy farming in the UK, the EU, North America, Australia, and New Zealand, Clay et al. (2020) highlight the poor conditions under which cows are kept on dairy farms. Not only does this lead to lameness and disease, such as mastitis—thereby diminishing their productivity—it also causes them emotional harm. And in their articles, Animals Raised to Produce Milk, and Cow’s Milk: A Cruel and Unhealthy Product, PETA (n.d.) discuss the strain of reproductive violence on dairy cows and how, once their productivity begins to wane, they are sent to slaughter. The Humane League (2012) also recounts the “chronic and debilitating pain” dairy cows experience as a result of modern-day farming practices that have been introduced to meet the increased demand for milk. They argue that the milk produced for human consumption far outweighs the milk cows would produce for their calves (Humane League, 2021). This is illustrated by Compassion in World Farming who explain: “[i]n the US, the average dairy cow produces more than 7.5

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gallons of milk per day. If she was producing just enough to feed her calf, a dairy cow would only produce about one gallon of milk per day” (Compassion in World Dairy Farming, n.d.). We can look at this another way: despite the decrease in the number of cows on dairy farms in the US in 2017, compared with 1950 (an estimated 12 million fewer), milk production has increased from “116 billion pounds of milk per year in 1950 to 215 billion pounds in 2017” (see PETA and their article Cow’s Milk: A Cruel and Unhealthy Product ). To meet this increase in demand, cows are subject to genetic manipulation, as well as antibiotic and hormonal treatment. Their natural diets of grass are substituted with diets that are unnatural high in protein in order to fulfill the demand for dairy (PETA—Cow’s Milk: A Cruel and Unhealthy Product ).

Milk Production It is worth pausing here to look at these figures and the intensification of dairy farming in more detail. Intensification refers to the increase in dairy cows per hector of land alongside the decrease in dairy farms. For example, in 1970, there were an estimated 640,000 dairy farms in the US. This figure was 40,000 in 2017 (see Clay et al., 2020). A similar trend can be found in the UK, where dairy farms decreased from 35,000 in 1995 to 13,000 in 2017, while the number of dairy cows tripled. And while intensification has not been as pronounced in New Zealand, the country has still experienced a 19% decrease in farms alongside a 147% increase in herd size. A similar trend can be found in the EU (see Clay et al., 2020). In terms of milk production, between 1988 and 2018, there has been a 59% increase in milk production worldwide (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). According to projections reported by the Organization for Economic Co-operation Development (OECD) and the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations,

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in their Agricultural Outlook 2021–2030 report (2021),13 global milk production will grow by 1.7% per year between 2021 and 2030. It is the fastest growing commodity within agribusiness. Milk is comprised mainly of cow’s milk, which accounts for over 80% of the milk that is produced. There has been an increase in the volume of cow milk that is produced worldwide, from 497 million metric tons in 2015 to 544 million metric tons in 2021 (see Shahbandeh, 2022). It is estimated that there are 270 million dairy cows worldwide. India has the most dairy cows with 58 million, the EU has 20 million dairy cows (Shahbandeh, 2022), while the UK recorded 1.9 million dairy cows in 2020 (Uberoi, 2021). And while this number is lower than it was in 1996—amounting to a 28% reduction—there has been a 100% increase in the yield per cow, from 4,100 liters in 1975 to 8,200 liters in 2020. A similar trend can be found in the US. While the United States Department of Agriculture (2021) reports a decline in licensed dairy operations in the US, the production of milk has increased by 11.5% since 2011 (Market Intel, 2021). Summer Sewell’s report in The Guardian (2021)—Small Farms Vanish Every Day in America’s DairyLand: ‘There ain’t no Future in Dairy’ —offers a snapshot of the impact of the intensification of dairy farming for small family-run dairy farms. Her article focuses on ‘high-production outfits’ such as Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) in the state of Wisconsin. Out of all the US states, Wisconsin has the most dairy farms. However, its numbers have been declining, with 826 dairy farms closing in 2019. As Sewell (2021) notes, the state has lost 44% of its dairy farms during the last ten years. Despite the reduction in dairy farms, milk production has increased by 25% in Wisconsin. The use of CAFOs, which house thousands of cows, enables agricultural operations to meet the increase in demand. These large-scale enterprises—which have increased by 55% in Wisconsin during the last ten years—have replaced the small family-run business. As Mark Stephenson, director of dairy policy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, notes:

13 This report was compiled by the Organization for Economic Co-operation Development (OECD) and the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, with contributions from member governments and international commodity organizations.

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Those quaint red barns that you are used to seeing on green hillsides with black and white cows in the fields, that just doesn’t exist [anymore]…That image that people have of what dairy farming is has to evolve into what is much more the reality now and those are large barns that house thousands of cows. (as cited in Sewell, 2021)

This intensification of dairy farming is replicated across other states in the US and in other countries across the world. In terms of revenue, for the UK’s agricultural portfolio, milk comprises 16.4% of the output. This translates to a market value of £4.4bn (Uberoi, 2021). In 2020, the US exported over 55.75 billion dollars of dairy products—an increase from 39 billion dollars in 2015. The largest exporter of dairy products is the EU, which controls 38% of the global market (Shahbandeh, 2021). We will review the drivers and consequences of this intensification in Chapter 5 when we return to biopolitics and the war against nonhuman animals. For now, we will continue with our review of the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity committed during the war against nonhuman animals. Our next case study is the meat industry and the experiences of female pigs (sows).

Reproductive Violence and Reproductive Coercion Against Sows Within the Meat Industry The reproductive bodies of sows are exploited in a similar way to that of dairy cows within the animal-industrial complex. At around 6 months old, they are repeatedly impregnated through artificial insemination with an ‘insemination rod.’ They are separated from their babies after giving birth. The usual weaning process is around 3 months; however, piglets are typically removed after as little as three weeks. Once removed, the sow is forcibly impregnated again (Animal Aid, n.d.). As with cows, this separation of mother and baby causes great distress to both the sow and piglet. Sows are confined indoors in gestation crates during their pregnancy. The crates are so small they are unable to turn around. Before they give

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birth, the sows are then placed in a farrowing crate. As Animal Aid (n.d.) report: “[f ]arrowing crates are barren, metal and concrete cages, just a few inches longer and wider than the sow herself.” The sow “cannot step forwards or backwards or even turn around for the duration of her restraint.” And, as the Humane Society of the United States [HSUS] (2009) states, the result of selective breeding practices—which leads to bigger and faster-growing pigs used for meat—means that sows are now larger thereby exacerbating their confinement in these crates. The farrowing crate has two separate areas. In one part, the sow is confined and in the other, which is referred to as a ‘creep area,’ the piglets are kept (HSUS, 2009). This procedure is justified on the grounds that it stops the sows from crushing their babies (see Animal Aid , n.d.). However, this is not supported by research, which demonstrates that if sows give birth in bigger housing units, the death rate of piglets is no higher than when they give birth in farrowing crates. In their report, The Welfare of Sows used for Breeding in the Pig Industry, the HSUS (2009) notes that, as a result of the intensification of farming, “80% of gestating sows and 88% of lactating sows were kept in total confinement.” The isolation and deprivation that sows are subject to in these crates are at odds with their more social and interactive nature. In the report, the HSUS cites research on the importance of exercise for sows in terms of the survival rate of their piglets. Research found that piglets had a much greater chance of survival if their mothers had access to regular exercise. It is important to acknowledge that not all sows are individually housed. Some producers use group housing systems, where sows are housed in pens and can move around more freely (HSUS, 2009). However, as HSUS (2009) note, injuries and aggressive behavior can occur in these artificial and forced group settings. Finally, sows selected for breeding are subject to rapid growth which increases their appetites enormously when pregnant. However, to prolong their productivity, they are fed restricted diets—around 50–60% less than they would eat naturally—as they are able to consume this in less time than if they were to forage for food (HSUS, 2009). Once the sow is unable to reproduce, she is sent to slaughter (on this subject see also Brown, 2016; Gillespie, 2018; Joy, 2010; Kelty-Huber, 2015). I argue that sows are victims of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity

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in the war against nonhuman animals. Specifically, they are victims of rape, forced pregnancy, and sexual violations. All of which are the cumulative expressions and consequences of reproductive violence. In our final example of reproductive violence committed against nonhuman animals, we will address the experiences of hens within the egg industry.

Reproductive Violence Against Hens Within the Egg Industry Confined in overcrowded battery cages that restrict their movement so they cannot open their wings, egg-laying hens are also subject to reproductive violence. As PETA (n.d) reports, it takes hens around 34 hours to produce an egg. In order to meet the demand, the US uses over 300 million hens every year (see PETA 21 Things the Egg Industry Doesn’t want you to See). And in the UK, during 2021, 7.8 million cases of eggs were filled in packing stations across the UK (Gov, 2022). Battery cages are stacked on top of each other in sheds that can confine up to 100,000 birds (Kim, 2015). Urine and feces fall from higher cages on top of hens confined in cages below (PETA, n.d.). Their beaks are cut off (often with a hot blade, which is painful) to stop them from eating one another (Gillespie, 2018; Kim, 2015). Given the poor conditions, many hens die in their cages. Those who survive are exploited by the egg industry. Some hens undergo ‘forced molting.’ This involves withholding food for prolonged periods of time to increase the production of eggs (Kim, 2015). Genetic manipulation is also used as part of the forced/unnatural production of eggs among hens. In sum, farmers manipulate and exploit the reproductive bodies of hens. Despite their natural life span of around ten years, when hens are considered ‘spent’—when their productivity begins to wane—they are sent to slaughter14 (Gillespie, 2018; Kim, 2015). As PETA (n.d.) reports in their piece, Poultry and Eggs: Industries that Abuse Chickens, annually over 100 million ‘spent’ hens are sent to the slaughterhouse. As well as 14 Hens are usually considered spent after around 70 weeks. See Compassion in World Farming— The Life of Laying hens.

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the cruelty inflicted on the birds during their capture and transport to the slaughterhouse, upon arrival at the slaughterhouse they suffer further injuries which include handling them upside down, cutting their throats open with machines, and placing them in boiling water to remove their feathers (PETA, n.d.). It is also worth noting that male and female chicks are separated at birth. Echoing what takes place within the dairy industry, female chicks are treated as commodities and are separated from their mothers and used as part of the egg industry. Male chicks—who do not produce eggs—are seen as worthless and are therefore killed (Animal Equality & Davidson, 2021). It is estimated that 260 million male chicks are killed annually in the US. This translates to killing 30,000 newly hatched chicks every hour (Animal Equality & Davidson, 2021). Egg-producing hens are victims of reproductive violence. Like dairy cows, they are also victims of sexualized violence: “violence that is directed at the most intimate part of a person…” (Halbmayr, 2010, p. 30). The latter—sexual violence—is listed as War Crime and a Crime against Humanity. They are also subject to reproductive coercion: the forcible removal of their offspring. This falls under ‘control of pregnancy outcomes.’

Overlapping Sources of Oppression I want to close this chapter by highlighting the following themes that run across the examples discussed in this chapter, that arise from the same sources of oppression. These are: the assault on motherhood, the woman/mother-as-nation thesis, hetero- and anthropatriarchy, and finally, dehumanization. This translates to the following shared sources of oppression: reproduction and motherhood; ethno-nationalism, anthroand heteropatriarchy, and denial of personhood. Where relevant, we will proceed on the basis that nonhuman animals are recognized as legal persons.

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Assault on Reproduction and Motherhood As we have seen in all the examples reviewed, the potential to give birth and become mothers is a source of oppression for persons capable of becoming pregnant. The reproductive body becomes a site of racial, ethno-national, and/or agricultural politics. Motherhood is both regulated and destroyed. Various forms of reproductive coercion are employed to control pregnancy outcomes, for example forced abortion and forced adoption. The forced removal of newly born babies and offspring is a negation of motherhood, while forced sterilization is the destruction of potential biological motherhood. These, albeit in different ways, deny bodily integrity and subjectivity. In all instances, it is the (perceived) ability to reproduce that either informs the reproductive violence inflicted on these persons or informs the removal of their ability to reproduce. While the motivations may differ—fear often explains why women and girls are targeted during war and armed conflict, while productivity drives the reproductive violence committed against nonhuman animals, the target of these War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity remains the same: the reproductive bodies of persons capable of becoming pregnant.

Mother-Cow as Mother India15 The assault on reproduction and motherhood informs and is informed by the woman-as-nation thesis. As argued, this equation views women as both the symbolic and material mothers of the nation. Put simply, the fertile bodies of women are used to reproduce the nation. In the examples included—the Holocaust and the 1971 Liberation War—we reviewed both the regulation and destruction of motherhood as part of, and in response to, genocidal campaigns. In the case of Bangladesh, we reworked the woman-as-nation thesis to nation-as-mother. Here, I want to unpack this idea in relation to ritual and patriarchal narratives surrounding motherhood within Hinduism, specifically in relation to 15

This framing is taken from Narayanan (2019, p. 2).

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female cows. As Narayanan (2018, p. 136) explains: “Hindu patriarchal conceptions of…cows…as mothers are used to exploit bovines for their reproductive capacities.” Furthermore, “[t]he [instrumentalization] of motherhood follows a Hindu patriarchal line of reasoning whereby female Hindu bodies—women or bovine—are burdened as mothers to preserve an upper-caste Hindu cultural and religious purity.” Put simply, the consumption of cow milk is regarded as “central to the nationmaking narrative of Hindu India” (Narayanan, 2018, p. 140). It is worth pausing here to unpack this in more detail. As Ciecierska-Holmes (2021) highlights, bovine sacrality in India is historical. The image of the cow was used during British colonial rule to engender feelings of unification and nationalist pride. During this time, in 1882, the first Cow Protection Society was established. Ostensibly, as Ciecierska-Holmes (2021) argues, the rhetoric of the sacred cow narrative was used to unify Hindus of different racial and ethnic identities; however, the mother-cow narrative only served and serves the interest of the upper castes. Following independence in 1947, cow protectionism was reflected in laws that prohibited cow slaughter. Of India’s 29 states, 22 prohibit cow slaughter (Ciecierska-Holmes, 2021). We will return to this shortly. The mobilization of motherhood and the sacred cow narrative continued during the twenty-first century, with political parties such as the Rashtriya Swayamsebak Sang (RSS) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) employing “images of gods and goddesses, cow symbolism, and images of Mother India in an attempt to win voters” (CiecierskaHolmes, 2021, p. 15). Two interlinked narratives are at play here. The first centers on human and nonhuman notions of motherhood within Hinduism. These are comprised of literal motherhood (i.e., the production of children) and symbolic motherhood (i.e., mothers of the Hindu nation-state (Ciecierska-Holmes, 2021). The second is based on notions of Hindu motherhood as employed within cow protection narratives which, counterintuitively, involve the maternal and material exploitation of cows. The logic reads thus: cows are sacred and therefore must be protected so they can fulfill their patriotic duty. Within Hinduism, this means forsaking their infants (maternal) and their milk (material) for the greater good of the nation (Ciecierska-Holmes, 2021; Narayanan, 2019).

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As Narayanan (2018) explains, within Hinduism the consumption of milk (which forms the basis of all ritual practices in Hinduism) is justified through the invocation of two Hindu legends. The first relates to the boy-god Krishna and his love of butter from cow’s milk. And the second relates to Hindutva narratives that envisage a prosperous Hindu nation overflowing with milk. Within these legends, the separation of Krishna from his biological mother is obscured. Furthermore, any anxiety Krishna’s mother may experience following the removal of her new-born child go unremarked (Narayanan, 2018). As we know, this process is replicated within the dairy industry. Offering a feminist vegan critique of these narratives, Narayanan (2018, 2019) argues that, rather than acknowledging how milk is involuntarily taken when the calf is forcibly removed from the mother, analyses of milking within Hinduism are based on the belief that cows voluntarily offer up their milk. In her article Animal Ethics and Hinduism’s Milking, Mothering Legends, she demonstrates how the original sacred milk in Hinduism is in fact plantbased milk and is not derived from cows. According to Narayanan (2018, p. 144), the Hindu myth of creation—the Churning of the Ocean of Milk—challenges the “sacrality of cow milk in Hinduism” by offering an alternative version of how milk is produced. In this story, in order to attain the “nectar of immortality,” the gods and the ‘antigods’ had to churn and whip the oceans together in order to yield ambrosia—‘the essence of life.’ As Narayanan (2018, p. 145) explains: while the “ocean’s milky nature derives from different sources—in some versions, the milk is sourced from four cows while in others, it is from a single jet of the celestial cow Surabhi’s milk… in all cases, [however], the milk was originally sourced by the churning together of ocean waters and sacred herbs and plants.” The sexualized and reproductive violence that dairy cows are subject to as part of the dairy industry in India is unpacked in more detail in Narayanan’s next article “Cow is a Mother, Mothers Can Do Anything for their Children!”—Gaushalas as Landscapes of Anthropatriarchy and Hindu Patriarchy (2019). In this article, she argues that cow shelters— Gaushalas—are political, religious, and economic spaces of reproduction, where the commodification of cows is upheld by the narratives of anthropatriarchy and Hindu patriarchy. The former, which was defined

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in the Introduction/Chapter 1 , involves the gendered oppression and sexual exploitation of the reproductive bodies of nonhuman animals. The latter involves the equation of female bodies (both human and nonhuman) with motherhood and nation-building. Both patriarchies, Narayanan (2019, p. 1) explains, “commodify bovine motherhood and breastmilk.” Conditions in the gaushalas are stark. Cows often starve to death and suffer from various illnesses. They are separated from their calves when they are only days old. Comparisons can be drawn between these shelters and CAFOs where nonhuman animals are confined in overcrowded spaces (Narayanan, 2019). And yet, “[i]n the gaushala, the exploitation of bovine motherhood, and diversion of her breastmilk away from her biological infant, is framed as a religious duty of Hindus, to protect the Hindu nation from non-Hindu invasion” (Narayanan, 2019, p. 11). Cows are forcibly impregnated through artificial insemination to fulfill their roles as mothers of the nation. Paradoxically, this reproductive violence is overshadowed by concerns about cow slaughter and those who consume beef. As noted above, cow slaughter is banned in many Indian states. In a report titled Violent Cow Protection in India: Vigilante Groups Attack Minorities, Human Rights Watch (2015) documented cases of vigilante violence used by the BJP against individuals who consume beef as well as those involved in the cattle trade. It is estimated that at least 44 people were killed during these violent campaigns that took place between May 2015 and December 2018. This contradiction is identified by Ciecierska-Holmes (2021, p. 16), who notes: “[p]atriarchal Hindu hierarchies are…sustained by the reproductive labour of female bovines and their milk products, as well as distinguishing between those who eat cows, and those who do not.” In this example, we have considered the political mobilization of nonhuman animals to promote the interests and desires of the Hindu nation-state. I argue that this coding of mother-cow-as-nation stems from the same source of oppression as the woman-as-Jew, mother-asnation, and ‘woman-as-Muslim/terrorist’ coding discussed earlier. In all these examples, the reproductive body is targeted based on its perceived nation-building capabilities. I believe that such coding is informed

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by heteropatriarchy and anthropatriarchy which we will explore in more detail below.

Hetero- and Anthropatriarchy Patriarchy refers to a gendered hierarchical system in which men dominate and by and large women are excluded. Heteropatriarchy recognizes the heteronormative nature of this socio-political system, where cis gender heterosexual males have power over other gender identities and sexual orientations. As noted above, the term anthropatriarchy was coined by Narayanan (2019, p. 2) to capture “the human, gendered oppression, exploitation, and control of nonhuman animals via their sexual and reproductive systems.” In context-specific ways, India, Nazi Germany, Bangladesh, and China all rely on hetero-patriarchal beliefs that overemphasize biological and binary differences between genders. These afford men positions of power within the public sphere, while women are expected to fulfill childbearing and childrearing responsibilities in the private sphere. Within the Indian context, Hindu motherhood is viewed as patriotic. It is a woman’s duty to bear children of the Hindu nation and to pass Hindu values and culture onto them (Narayanan, 2018). As Narayanan (2019) explains: “Hindu patriarchy refers to the instrumentalization of female and feminized bodies (as “mothers” and cultural guardians of a ‘pure’ Hindu civilization.” Conversely, during the Holocaust, the 1971 Liberation War, and as part of the genocide against the Uighur population, a perverse manifestation of heteropatriarchy has/is been enacted. In these instances, women’s reproductive capabilities and the coding of them as symbolic and corporeal mothers of the nation are regarded as something to fear and control. Indeed, in these cases, heteropatriarchy is expressed through increased control over the reproductive autonomy of

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women and girls.16 As highlighted above, in relation to the womanas-nation thesis, it is the hetero-patriarchal equation of women with biological motherhood that informs the examples of state reproductive violence and reproductive coercion (e.g., forced sterilization, forced abortion and forced adoption) used during the Holocaust, in Bangladesh and in China. Reflecting on her “visits, conversations, and observations at different gaushalas in India,” Narayanan (2019) states how her experience “illuminated the ways in which bovine motherhood and breastmilk are mobilized to serve the compatible discourses and practices of anthropatriarchy and Hindu patriarchy” (p. 13). Although Narayanan’s (2019) words refer to Hindu patriarchy, I believe her argument extends beyond the Indian context. In the examples of intrahuman reproductive violence explored in this chapter—the Holocaust, the 1971 Liberation War, and the current genocide against the Uighur population in China—gender essentialism (specifically the equation of women with biological motherhood) and patriarchal traditions relating to the control of women’s reproductive autonomy worked/work in tandem with racist, political, and ethnonationalist discourses to inform the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity women and girls have and are subject to. Within agribusiness, the reproductive systems of nonhuman animals are exploited through human acts of rape, sexual violence, and forced pregnancy. Within the Indian context, to paraphrase Narayanan (2019), animal breastmilk and animal motherhood are placed on the production line. In this example, the commodification of bovine reproduction and motherhood is informed by political and ethno-nationalist discourses. Cow protectionism, paradoxically, normalizes the reproductive violence inherent in the production and consumption of dairy. To protect the bodies of human and nonhuman animals subject to reproductive violence via their reproductive systems, we must challenge the racism, sexism, and speciesism upon which these violence(s)

16

While we are referring specifically to birth control policies against Uighur women, China’s broader one-child policy, which ended in 2015, was implemented to control the population. This also involved state-led coercive reproduction in the form of forced contraception, forced sterilization, and forced abortion.

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are enacted. Narayanan (2019) is correct in stating that “anthropatriarchy and humanist forms of patriarchy mutually reinforce each other.” To dismantle both systems, gendered “strategic alliances between the women’s movement and the animal civil-protection movement” are needed. We now turn to our final shared source of oppression: denial of personhood.

Dehumanization In order to facilitate our discussion on dehumanization, I want to return to the re-education camps in China discussed above. Here, I will draw on the work of Razack (2007) and Deckha (2010). In the Introduction/Chapter 1 , we talked about the work of Giorgio Agamben, specifically his thesis on sovereign power and the state of exception. As a brief reminder, a state of exception is one characterized by lawlessness. Individuals placed within this site of forced exile—those attributed with bare life—are denied legal rights and protections. In her book, Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from Western Law & Politics (2007), Sherene Razack analyzes the war on terror within the context of lawlessness. As Deckha (2010) notes, camps such Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib are viewed by Razack as spaces that have been converted into states of exception. These sites—and the violence that is inflicted within them— are justified on the grounds that they are deemed necessary in the fight against terrorism. As both Razack (2007) and Deckha (2010) observe, these sites are racialized. They are reserved for those deemed racially inferior yet, at the same time, threatening. Reviewing Razack’s work, Deckha (2010) argues that the race thinking that drives the violence within the state of exception is informed by notions of the subhuman figure. For Razack (2007 as cited in Deckha, 2010, p. 38), race thinking is “the denial of a common bond of humanity between people of European descent and those who are not.” Therefore, these sites are not limited to security concerns as part of the war on terror, they also serve to delineate who counts as human. As Deckha (2010, p. 38) explains:

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Once placed outside the “human” zone by race thinking, the detainees may be handled lawlessly and thus with violence that is legitimated at all times. Racialization is not enough and does not complete their Othering experience. Rather, they must be dehumanized for the larger public to accept the violence against them and the increasing “culture of exception” which sustains these human bodily exclusions.

Deckha (2010) acknowledges that nonhumans are not the focus of Razack’s work. However, for Deckha, the figure of the subhuman— which is the result of dehumanization—is central to understanding the racialized and sexualized violence that takes place within these spaces. For her, racism works in tandem with speciesism (and dehumanization) to justify the violence that is enacted within the state of exception. While Deckha (2010) uses the term dehumanization, she appears to be describing the simultaneous process of animalization (see previous chapter). I want to further unpack this work in relation to the “re-education” camps in China. The 1990s was characterized by a ‘cycle of state versus local violence’ in the Xinjiang region of northwest China. During this time, the state would impose religious restrictions upon the Uighurs, the Uighurs would resist through force (such as attacking state agents), and then, the state would respond with disproportionate force, for example through detention, execution, and forced disappearances (Finely, 2021, p. 350). As a result of the continued resistance of the Uighurs to the restrictions imposed upon them, the Chinese government reframed their actions as acts of terrorism. This reinterpretation of events was used to justify their increased monitoring of the Uighurs which, the Chinese government claim, are necessary for the global war on terror (RodríguezMerino, 2019). Following the attack at the Kunming Railway Station by Xinjiang militants in 2014 (see Duncan & Pomfret, 2014), President Xi announced the ‘People’s War on Terror’ (Finley, 2021, p. 350. See also Finley, 2019). Then, in 2017, the Chinese government published the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Regulations on DeExtremification. As well as imposing further restrictions on the religious customs and practices of the Uighurs (see World Uyghur Congress,

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2018), these regulations authorized the creation of internment camps— initially called ‘transformation through education’ camps and then later rebranded as vocational training camps—to forcibly detain Uighurs and other Turkic Muslims (Amnesty International, 2018; Finely, 2021). There are numerous reports of torture, sexual abuse, forced labor, malnutrition, and the withholding of medical care in these camps (Amnesty International, 2018). For a more detailed review of conditions within these camps, see the 2018 report by Amnesty International, China: “Where are They?” and the BBC’s report, China’s hidden camps (Sudworth, n.d.). Echoing the arguments of Deckha (2010) presented above, many rely on the concept of dehumanization to explain the violence that is being committed against the Uighur population. Comparable to the camps Razack (2007) refers to in her book, I would argue that the internment camps in China (which form part of the war on terror) offer a more recent iteration of Agamben’s state of exception. For me, herein lies the paradox: one the one hand, those detained within the site of exception are regarded as subhuman. Their humanity has been removed. On the other, it is precisely their humanity—their membership to a specific group (albeit, within the category of ‘Other’)—that renders them dangerous and threatening. I agree that dehumanization and ‘subhumanization’—to use Deckha’s phrase (2010, p. 44)—are features of the war on terror. Yet, I am not convinced that these processes occur before the violence is enacted. Rather, these processes are implicated after the fact. The groups subject to this violence are targeted precisely because they have been identified as belong to a specific group. Dehumanization and subhumanization are what results from the violence inflicted upon their racialized bodies. In a similar vein to Jewish women during the Holocaust, it is precisely because of their reproductive capabilities that Uighur women are subject to forced sterilization. As argued above, the concept of ‘essentialization’ offers a better understanding of the use of rape, reproductive, and sexual violence against human populations. As Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) argue, by definition, genocidal killing involves killing by category and by membership in a group rather than by individual guilt or crime. Drawing on the distinguishing features of a group—its essence—is based on the logic

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of ‘us-them’ distinctions. This involves highlighting and exaggerating the differences between an in-group and an out-group. Closely related to this concept is moral disengagement. This involves a process of detachment, whereby certain “individuals and groups are placed outside of the moral boundary” (Waller, 2012, p. 88). In other words, they are treated as ‘Other.’ Furthermore, ‘Othering’ of the victim does not always involve dehumanizing the victim. Less dramatic processes to that of dehumanization are that of ‘difference’ and ‘distance.’ The concept of ‘difference,’ which is based on ‘us-them’ thinking or, ‘Othering,’ creates a “social context for cruelty” (Waller, 2012, p. 92). In this context, victims—as was/is the case with the examples discussed here—are placed in binary opposition to the perpetrators. They become the vessel onto which perpetrators project all of their anxieties, insecurities, and hostilities. The out-group is disparaged and treated as the undesirable and unwanted elements of a society (Lang, 2010). Here, it is worth returning to Chirot and McCauley’s (2006, pp. 84–85) definition of essentialization: Essentializing the out-group means that there is something bad about all of them, every one of them…Nazis knew perfectly well that Jews were not literally rats…But they did believe that everyone in that category, old and young, strong and weak, threatening and helpless-all must be exterminated, just as all vermin must be exterminated. Essentializing turns the enemy into a single dangerous and irredeemable character.

It is important to note that essentializing, as referred to above, refers to a sub-group of humans not the superior category human I will refer to below when discussing the work of Donna Haraway. In the case of the latter, what we are referring to here is the “denial of equal humanity” (Deckha, 2010, p. 41). Deckha (2008, p. 260) invites us to question what is really at stake when we talk about dehumanization. She asks: “is dehumanization really the problem?” Is it the act of dehumanizing a person what we object to or does our concern lie with what enfolds during the process: “exploitation, marginalization, oppression, and violence[?]” She suggests that rather than relying “…on an exclusively humanist discourse, it is possible to go underneath the problem of dehumanization to talk about that which

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we really care about when we complain about dehumanization: injustice and exploitation.” To put it differently, do we really need to rely on speciesist distinctions between human and nonhumans to draw attention to the violence and suffering of certain individuals or groups (see also Smith, 2013). In the case of nonhuman animals, as stated previously, they are treated as ‘legal things’ rather than ‘legal persons.’ This is reflected in their property status. In other words, nonhuman animals are not treated as subjects, rather they are viewed as objects. They are sub-, non-, or inhuman. While the phrase nonhuman animal need not carry negative connotations, in relation to the processes of dehumanization and animalization, in this context, to be placed outside and beyond the category human is a form of denigration. Indeed, when humans are referred to as animals, this animalization regards them as inferior beings. Like certain humans then, nonhuman animals (precisely because of their species difference) remain situated within the site of exception. Interestingly, feminists such as Donna Haraway (2008) have challenged the essentialism of the category human (see Twine, 2010). Elaborating on this, with reference to the work of eco-feminists, Twine (2010, p. 401) explains “…dehumanization is not unproblematically to be met with calls for ‘human citizenship’ but with a more systematic questioning of the historically, culturally, economically and politically situatedness of the ‘human’ …” He goes on: “if the partiality of the ‘human’, if this situatedness, is intersected by particular understandings of gender, sexuality, race and class, then an unreconstituted humanism will be of limited use to feminism.” This aligns with Kim’s (2015) reconstructive project previously discussed. Reformation in this case must involve forsaking the existing human/nonhuman divide. It will require engaging with a posthumanist understanding of the human and nonhuman animal as “relationally performed, re- and co-produced” (Twine, 2010, p. 401). In the words of Oliver (2009 as cited in Deckha, 2010, p. 46): …focusing on rights or equality and extending them to animals does not address more essential issues of conceptions of the animal, man, or human. It does not challenge the presumptions of humanism that makes man the measure of all things. Without interrogating the man/animal

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opposition on the symbolic and imaginary levels, we can only scratch the surface in understanding exploitation…of people and animals

In 2010, Deckha called for a: new discourse of cultural and legal protections…to address violence against vulnerable humans in a manner that does not privilege humanity or humans, nor permit a subhuman figure to circulate as the mark of inferior beings on whom the…violence is [legitimatized]. (p. 47)

This discourse would serve both humans and nonhuman animals who have been marginalized by their dehumanization.

Conclusion This chapter has provided a nuanced account of the following War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: rape, forced pregnancy, and sexual violence. I frame these acts as the expressions and consequences of reproductive violence. These, as well as acts of reproductive coercion, were reviewed in relation to human and nonhuman animals. The case studies of intrahuman violence—the Holocaust, the 1971 Liberation War, and the genocide against the Uighur population in China—established both the nature and target of these violence(s). Proceeding on the basis that nonhuman animals possess legal personhood, I then demonstrated how, within the context of the war against nonhuman animals, dairy cows meet the three cumulative prerequisites contained within the definition of forced pregnancy. Crudely put, the intensification of dairy farming (itself a feature of the war against nonhuman animals) involves the repeated rape and forced impregnation of cows for milk production. Following this, we reviewed the experiences of sows and hens within the animal-industrial complex, demonstrating how they too are victims of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. Across these historical and contemporary examples, the female reproductive body is exploited and mobilized for racial, ethno-national, and/or agricultural purposes. Hetero- and anthropatriarchy were the

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socio-political frameworks used to understand these acts of reproductive violence and reproductive coercion. While the motivations and contexts differ across human and nonhuman populations, it is the (perceived) reproductive capabilities that inform the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity that are carried out. In terms of the nature and target of these acts of violence, the following were identified as shared sources of oppression: motherhood, ethno-nationalism, heteroand anthropatriarchy, and the denial of personhood. With regard to the latter, reproductive violence and reproductive coercion resulted in the dehumanization of essentialized human groups. In the case of nonhuman animals, human essentialism and the denial of personhood result in the war against nonhuman animals. We will revisit these reflections on the shared sources of oppression between human and nonhuman animals in the proceeding chapter. This chapter reviews male-directed War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity against human and nonhuman animals.

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Ciecierska-Holmes, N. (2021). In the name of cows’ rights: Sacred cow “mothers” and ethnonationalism in India. Student Journal of Vegan Sociology, 1, 9–22. Clay, N., Garnett, T., & Lorimer, J. (2020). Dairy intensification: Drivers, impacts and alternatives. Ambio, 49, 35–48. Cohn, C. (2013). Women and wars: Toward a conceptual framework. In C. Cohn (Ed.), Women and wars (pp. 1–35). Polity Press. Compassion in World Dairy Farming. (n.d.). About dairy cows. https://www. ciwf.com/farmed-animals/cows/dairy-cows/ Compassion in World Farming. (n.d.). The life of laying hens. https://www.ciwf. org.uk/media/5235024/The-life-of-laying-hens.pdf Cusack, C. M. (2013). Feminism and husbandry: Drawing the fine line between mine and bovine. Journal for Critical Animal Studies, 11(1), 24–45. Dalton, J. (2021, June 3). Uighurs describe forced abortions and torture in China. Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/east-asia/china-uig hur-muslim-abortion-torture-b1859027.html Das, B. (2011). Bangladesh rape victims say war crimes overlooked . https://wom ensenews.org/2011/09/bangladesh-rape-victims-say-war-crimes-overlooked/ Deckha, M. (2008). Intersectionality and posthumanist visions of equality. Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender and Society, 23(2), 249–268. Deckha, M. (2010). The subhuman as a cultural agent of violence. Journal for Critical Animal Studies, 8(3), 28–51. Duncan, M., & Pomfret, J. (2014, March 2). Witnesses recall fear, chaos after China train station attack. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/ uk-china-attack/witnesses-recall-fear-chaos-after-china-train-station-attackidUKBREA200ON20140302 Dunayer, J. (2013). The rights of sentient beings: Moving beyond old and new speciesism. In R. Corbey & A. Lanjouw (Eds.), The politics of Species: Reshaping our relationships with other animals (pp. 27–39). Cambridge University Press. Farwell, N. (2004). War rape: New conceptualizations and responses. Affilia, 19 (4), 389–403. FBI: UCR. (2013). Crime in the United States 2013-rape. https://ucr.fbi.gov/ crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/violent-crime/rape Finley, J. S. (2019). The Wang Lixiong prophecy: ‘Palestinization’ in Xinjiang and the consequences of Chinese state securitization of religion. Central Asian Survey, 38(1), 81–101. Finley, J. S. (2021). Why scholars and activists increasingly fear a Uyghur genocide in Xinjiang. Journal of Genocide Research, 23(3), 348–370.

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4 Male-Directed Conflict-Related Sexual and Reproductive Violence Against Human and Nonhuman Animals

Introduction Prior to changes made on the first of January 2021, annually over 20 million piglets were castrated without the use of anesthetic (see Eurogroup for Animals, 2018). Castration is considered a necessary procedure to curtail the development of an unpleasant odor and taste in meat from uncastrated pigs. This odor, referred to as boar taint, is the result of the production of hormones when pigs reach sexual maturity, which is typically around 180 days (Professional Pig Community, 2022). The castration of piglets without anesthesia is a painful procedure: the skin around the scrotum is cut open, the testes are then pulled from the body, and, finally, the spermatic cord is then either severed or cut off. In 2013 Germany banned this procedure and farmers were given until 2018 to phase the practice out. However, this interim period was extended by two years in 2018 (Eurogroup for Animals, 2018). In response, Eurogroup for Animals and Deutscher Tierschutzbund (2018) have been advocating for the replacement of castration without anesthesia with less cruel alternatives (Eurogroup for Animals, 2018). Under their ‘Stop the pig suffering’ and ‘#EndPigPain’ campaigns, they argued © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Banwell, The War Against Nonhuman Animals, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30430-9_4

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that castration without anesthesia is a violation the ‘German Animal Welfare Act’ (Eurogroup for Animals, 2018). As noted by the President of the ‘German Animal Welfare Association:’ “… the entire pig farming system violates applicable law. The suffering of the pigs must finally come to an end—the policy may no longer place the economic interests of animal users higher than the protection of animals” (as cited in Eurogroup for Animals, 2018). Following this, in 2019, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) Germany and Dr Cornelia Ziehm filed a complaint with Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court on behalf of their legal plaintiffs: male piglets. The complaint put forward was that these nonhuman animals, through castration, are being “harmed without reasonable explanation” (PETA, 2019). Trying to find an update regarding this case proved difficult. An article from the Professional Pig community from 2020 states: “[a]s of January 1st, 2021, castration of piglets in Germany will only be allowed under anesthesia, meaning total elimination of pain.” The German Ministry of Food and Agriculture promised to allocate 20 million euros to facilitate the purchase of anesthetics among farmers (Professional Pig Community, 2020). A final search in June 2022 revealed that, within the EU, the castration of pigs is still common, comprising 31.5% of the 258 million pigs that were slaughtered during 2020 (Professional Pig Community, 2022). That said, as noted by the Professional Pig Community, the methods used to castrate pigs vary across European countries. For example, from January 2022, France banned the surgical castration of male piglets without the use of anesthesia. Some countries use general anesthetics (the Netherlands) while others only use local anesthetics (Denmark) (Professional Pig Community, 2022). In this chapter castration of male nonhuman animals will be framed as an example of reproductive violence.

Outline of the Chapter The first part of this chapter will review sexualized and reproductive violence, as well as genocidal violence committed against men and boys. Reproductive violence, specifically the sexual mutilation of the

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male genitals, has occurred throughout history (Sivakumaran, 2007; Solagon & Patel, 2012; Vojdik, 2014). The examples we will focus on include the 1971 Liberation War in Bangladesh (hereafter the 1971 Liberation War) and the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Darfur. The types of violence that will be reviewed include sexual torture and genital mutilation; enforced sterilization (through castration); and injury to the testicles, as well as the targeting of the penis. These acts of maledirected reproductive and genocidal violence are analyzed drawing on queer interpretations of this sexual and reproductive violence. Here we will challenge existing explanatory frameworks which rely on essentialist assumptions regarding the motivations of perpetrators and the experience of victims. I will close this section by reviewing the racialized nature of the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity that are discussed. The themes of animalization and dehumanization inform this analysis. The second part of the chapter analyses the experiences of male nonhuman animals. Drawing on the experiences of bulls and male calves, we will review conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence within the meat and dairy industries. The specific examples will include forced ejaculation and enforced castration. These are analyzed with reference to the vulnerability of the penis and displacement from gendered personhood. They are framed as acts of sexual violence and, as such, in the context of the war against nonhuman animals, are framed as War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. The final part of the chapter considers the shared sources of oppression between human and nonhuman animals who are subject to the expressions and consequences of reproductive violence. We will finish with a review of the human security framework within international security. Here I will demonstrate how a revised, more inclusive iteration of this paradigm—one that replaces the human-centered approach with personhood status—will benefit all those impacted by the violence(s) of war. As noted in the previous chapter, by including examples of intrahuman violence and violence against nonhuman animals in the same chapter, my intention is to not to engage in crude, hierarchical comparisons between these populations. Rather, my goal is to highlight how nonhuman animals are also subject to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity during war. In the first part of the chapter, based on

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the 1971 Liberation War and the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Darfur, I unpack examples of conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence, thereby establishing the nature of these violence(s). These cases of intrahuman violence also reveal the targets of this violence: bodies capable of procreation through semen production. Following this, the second part of the chapter demonstrates how nonhuman animals are also victims of sexual and reproductive violence during the war that is wage against them. In discussing both populations, the shared sources of oppression are highlighted.

Conflict-Related Sexual Violence Against Men and Boys As defined by the UN, conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) includes: “rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict” (United Nations, 2018, p. 3). Interestingly, the types of CRSV that men and boys may suffer (forced masturbation, genital violence and forced rape) are not explicitly listed in the definition above. They would fall under ‘any other form of sexual violence.’ Aside from rape and enforced sterilization, all other types of violence refer to violence against women and girls.1 In the case of women and girls—or, as referred to in the previous chapter—persons capable of becoming pregnant, rape, sexual violence, and forced pregnancy were understood, cumulatively, as the expressions and consequences of reproductive violence. While cis-gender men and boys are victims of wartime rape, they are not subject to forced impregnation through wartime rape. Therefore, in line with the focus of this book, the section below will address the following acts of sexual, reproductive, and genocidal violence: genital violence, castration, and enforced sterilization. While enforced sterilization falls within 1

This section is from my open access book—Banwell (2020), Gender and the Violence(s) of War and Armed Conflict.

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the definition of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, genital violence and castration will be understood, respectively, as examples of “sexual violence of comparable gravity” and “acts of sexual violence that violate the Geneva Conventions,” thereby falling within the definition of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (see War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity on the UN office on Genocide Prevention and Responsibility to Protect, n.d). I will use the term conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence to describe these violence(s). To set up the significance and implications of these acts, it will be helpful to discuss Clark’s (2017) thesis on the vulnerability of the penis.

The Vulnerability of the Penis Writers have argued that male-to-male conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence communicates a message of subordination to the victim. It involves the perpetrator depriving the victim of their manhood and their masculinity (Baaz & Stern, 2009; Christian et al., 2011; Clark, 2017; Ferrales et al., 2016; Lewis, 2009; Solangon & Patel, 2012; Vojdik, 2014). In their thesis on the vulnerability of the penis, Clark (2017, p. 3) urges us to think of the penis in a two-dimensional way: as a weapon that harms and as an object that is harmed. At once a symbol of phallocentric masculinity, as well as the target of its material and symbolic destruction.2 With reference to the vulnerability of the penis, Clark (2017, p. 3) observes: This ‘side’ of the penis is rarely seen. Within contemporary discourses on sexual violence… the penis is typically framed as a weapon. It is a hard, aggressive object that penetrates and tears, causing pain and suffering…the exposure of [the vulnerability of the penis] challenges phallocentric masculinity by stripping the phallus of its power and strength … hence its dominance.

2

This section is from my open access book—Banwell (2020), Gender and the Violence(s) of War and Armed Conflict.

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Clark (2017) draws on sexual violence inflicted on Bengali men during the 1971 Liberation War, as well as sexual violence against Tamil men during the Sri Lankan War, to illustrate her point. To determine the religious identity of Bengali Muslim men during the war, Pakistani soldiers would check the penises of Bengali men to see if they were circumcised. If there was an absence of foreskin, this was proof of their Muslim identity and, as such, they would be spared. A non-circumcised penis was evidence of a Hindu identity which would often result in death (Mookherjee, 2012). As Clark (2017, p. 7–8) notes: The penis became a corporeal delineator of the ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ and thus a core marker of an individual’s identity and loyalties. This nationalist context … rendered the circumcised penis critically vulnerable and heightened the utility of sexual violence in conflict.

In a similar vein, in her article titled, The Absent Piece of Skin, Mookherjee (2012, p. 1587) frames this violence as “religious, territorial, racialized and gendered” and argues that these inspections alluded “to the possibility of the violence of castration” (p. 19). I would add that this violence is also an expression of both reproductive and genocidal violence. Reproductive violence, as established, is violence directed against an individual due to their reproductive capabilities. And genocide includes “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,” for example, “killing members of the group” (The Convention on the Prevention & Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 2014). To reiterate: “membership to the ‘pure’ Muslim nation of Pakistan and the Muslim collective is determined by the absence of foreskin” (Mookherjee, 2012, p. 1588). Those who failed to prove this would often be killed. Thus, the literal and figurative mark of circumcision had the potential to either create or destroy the individual male and the group to which he was seen to represent. As Mehta (2000) notes, the sense of community is based on “the claim to membership in the community of Islam” (p. 94). Elaborating on this he states:

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The Muslin is separated from the Hindu through the inscription of the wound. In the estimation of Muslim speakers, it is only with circumcision that they become Muslim and masculine at the same time. Here such speech articulates a sense of community …. (Mehta, 2000. p. 81)

I would further argue that their perceived reproductive capabilities—that is, their ability to reproduce the Hindu, rather than the Muslim nation— informed this genocidal violence. Here we can draw on Zarkov (2001, p. 78 as cited in Mookherjee, 2012, p. 1592) who, with reference to the penis, states: “[t]he power to provide, to protect and to defend as well as to control and to define one’s belonging to the ethnic group is symbolically vested in men.” It is this symbolic and material understanding of the penis that rendered these men vulnerable to genocidal violence; violence that was informed by their reproductive capabilities. Reproductive and genocidal violence also involves genital mutilation, castration, and enforced sterilization. We will review these War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in more detail below.

Genital Violence, Castration, and Enforced Sterilization Genital violence, as described by Drumond (2019, p. 1272), involves “the use of physical force to injure, disfigure and/or damage the genital organs of an individual.” These acts, they argue, are the most prevalent among reported acts of conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence committed against men. As established, enforced sterilization is listed in the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a War Crime and a Crime against Humanity. In Elements of Crimes, the ICC (2011) notes the following in relation to enforced sterilization: “[t]he perpetrator deprived one or more persons of biological reproductive capacity” (International Criminal Court, 2011, p. 9, 29). As Sivakumaran (2007, p. 274) correctly observes, this definition is broad enough to “encompass male sexual violence such as castration or other genital mutilation that leads to the inability to procreate.” We will proceed based on this understanding of reproductive violence.

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With regards to the woman-as-nation thesis, as previously discussed, during war/armed conflict, women and their bodies become the receptacles through which national, racial, ethnic, and religious identities are reproduced.3 Comparable to this attack upon woman-as-nation, maledirected reproductive violence disempowers the national, racial, religious, or ethnic group to which he belongs. Here we might think of man-asprotector. The violated male has failed to protect the nation/community to which he belongs. In the words of Sivakumaran (2007, p. 274): “[t]he castration of a man is considered to emasculate him, to deprive him of his power. The castration of a man may also represent the symbolic emasculation of the entire community.” Yet, I would argue that, in cases of enforced sterilization (through castration) and other types of genital mutilation, this violence is more than symbolic. The definition of genocide (1948) includes the following element: “[i]mposing measures intended to prevent births within the group” (see The Convention on the Prevention & Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 2014). Violence that is intentionally aimed at injuring the male reproductive organs— with the aim of affecting their ability to procreate—is genocidal. This is clearly exemplified by enforced sterilization through castration. Likewise, the deliberate and systematic use of genital violence (that thwarts men’s reproductive capabilities) can also be considered genocidal. It is a physical and symbolic attack on men, masculinity, and the “national, ethnical, racial or religious group” to which they belong (The Convention on the Prevention & Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 2014). Let us explore this in more detail with reference to the genocides in the former Yugoslavia and Darfur.

The Former Yugoslavia Enforced sterilization, through castration, formed part of the landscape of sexualized and reproductive violence committing against Bosnian

3

This was also discussed in relation to bovine motherhood in India with reference to Hindu nation-building and cow protectionism as reflected in the mother-cow narrative.

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Muslim men during this war.4 These acts that deliberately targeted the male reproductive organs were carried out with the intention of preventing procreation, in this sense they are both examples of reproductive and genocidal violence. As explained by one perpetrator, while he was beating the testicles of his victim: “you’ll never make Muslim children” (as cited in Carlson, 2006, p. 19). Literal physical destruction, such as this, works in tandem with social and psychological (figurative) death to achieve the crime of genocide. As Sivakumaran (2007, p. 273) observes, “[e]ven if survivors come through the assault with their reproductive capabilities intact, they may experience psychological difficulties leading them to suffer from sexual and relationship difficulties.” This still destroys the group as survivors are unable to engage in future sexual relationships. This is supported by empirical research conducted by Yagi et al. (2022) with male survivors of conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The testimonies of male survivors reveal the deleterious effects genital violence had on their marital and sexual relationship. For some of the men they interviewed, ongoing pain, weakness, and the impact on their sense of masculine identity impeded their ability (and indeed, their willingness) to engage in heterosexual relationships. This, for some, resulted in the dissolution of their marriage. As the authors state: After the sexual trauma, most participants shared the experience of emasculation through decreased and/or lost masculinity. They shared the devastation linked to the feeling of being destroyed, damaged, broken, and reduced to a ‘de facto female’. The male body that once represented virility, strength, force, and self-sufficiency has been rendered weak and helpless. The participants’ experiences are consistent with past studies that describe the impact of sexual violence against men using common terminologies such as emasculation, feminization, and homosexuality. (Yagi et al., 2022, p. 8) 4 In addition to these acts of reproductive and genocidal violence, other acts of sexual violence were used against thousands of men and boys during the genocide in the former Yugoslavia. This included rape (both oral and anal); sexual assault; enforced rape; enforced masturbation; and incidents where men were forced to perform oral sex on one another. See Oosterhoff et al. (2004), Solangon and Patel (2012).

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Genital violence is another example of reproductive violence that can also be genocidal. This was the case during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The UN Commission of Experts reported on the crude methods that were used to remove the testicles of victims. This included, but was not limited to, men being forced to bite off the testicles of other men (as cited in Sivakumaran, 2007, p. 265). The following excerpts are testimonies presented during the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The first witness statement was presented in the case against Dusko Tadi´c, while the second was used in the case against Bjagoje Simi´c: The man with the beard came back over and told [witness G] to take Hari’s testicle out. G finally managed to get Hari’s testicles in his hands. ... The man with the beard was yelling ‘harder, harder, harder.’ G then was successful and bit one off ... and the man with the beard then cursed Hari’s mother and said to him ‘make a Turk son now!’ (Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission). (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadi´c (witness statement), IT-94-1, 9–11 Jan. 1995, p. 6 as cited in Drumond, 2019, p. 1279) He ordered us to spread our legs, and then he would hit us with his knee … and he said to all of us, ‘You won’t have any more children.’ … these words were harder for me than the actual beating … He hit me in the genital area … All of you present here, all of you who are males, can imagine this kind of pain …. (ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadi´c (witness statement), IT-94-1, 9–11 Jan. 1995, p. 6 as cited in Drumond, 2019, p. 1279)

The acts of reproductive violence outlined in these statements carry genocidal intent. In both cases, reference is made to the impact the violence will have on the reproductive capabilities of the victims. The intention is clear: to prevent births within the group and to destroy (both physically and symbolically) the ethnic group to which these men belong. The use of reproductive and genocidal violence was also prevalent during the conflict in Darfur.

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Darfur5 Based on the narratives of 1136 Darfuri refugees, Ferrales et al. (2016) analyzed gender-based violence against Darfuri men and boys. They used data collected by the US State Department through the Atrocities Documentation Survey. Their qualitative thematic coding of this data identified the following acts of violence: sex-selective killing, rape, sexual assault, and sexualized violence against the body. We will focus on examples of sexual, reproductive, and genocidal violence. Groups of soldiers and the Janjaweed raped Darfuri men either through penile penetration or through penetration using objects like sticks (Ferrales et al., 2016). They would also insert penises into the mouths of dead victims. In the words of a Fur woman: “I saw a young boy and his father dismembered while still alive. They cut off their penises and put them in their mouths” (Ferrales et al., 2016, p. 574). Genital violence, which included injury to the testicles as well as the targeting of the penis, was widespread and systematic during the conflict in Darfur (Ferrales et al., 2016). A female survivor witnessed five men bleed to death following castration, while other survivors spoke of men having organs dismembered and their “genitals cut off ” (p. 261). A male survivor recalls the following: For seven days, I was detained and tortured by government soldiers. I was made to lie on my back with my hands tied behind my back, ankles tied and they would stomp on my thighs and kick me in the genitals [and I have had] sexual problems ever since. (as cited in Ferrales et al., 2016, p. 576)

In a similar vein to the results presented by Yagi et al. (2022), Ferrales et al. (2016) used the narratives of emasculation, feminization, and homosexualization to understand this violence. We will address the limitations of this shortly. In my own analysis of the narratives of Darfuri survivors, I interpret these acts of male-directed genital violence—the 5

This section is based on my open access book—Banwell (2020), Gender and the Violence(s) of War and Armed Conflict —where I provide a more detailed analysis of gender-based violence against men and boys during the genocide in Darfur.

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targeting of the testicles and penises of victims—as examples of reproductive and genocidal violence. The targeted, widespread, and systematic use of reproductive violence, included in the narratives of survivors, frames this violence as genocidal. The violence was intended to impede the reproductive capabilities of African Darfuri men. To provide a more nuanced understanding of these violence(s), it is necessary to draw upon queer interpretations of these phenomena.

Queer Understandings of Sexual Violence Against Men and Boys While male-directed sexual and reproductive violence can result in emasculation, feminization, and homosexualization, scholars have recently begun to resist the heteronormative and homophobic underpinnings of existing narratives relating to this violence. Universal and essentialist narratives are being replaced with discourses that address the contextspecific ways in which men perpetrate and experience conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence. Schulz (2018), for example, based on his empirical research with male survivors in Uganda, replaces the terms ‘emasculation’ and ‘feminization’ with the concept of displacement from gendered personhood . For Schulz (2018. p. 1101) the terms ‘emasculation’ and ‘feminization’ “imply analytical and normative limitations.” Moreover, as Schulz argues, these terms, when used uncritically, may serve to reproduce gender essentialism as well as misogynist and homophobic thinking. For example, feminization reproduces normative and essentialist thinking that equates femaleness with weakness and females as subordinate to males. While homosexualization, and the process of rendering someone or something homosexual, to paraphrase Schulz (2018), only works if all victims of sexual and reproductive violence are heterosexual, which is not always the case. The term displacement from gendered personhood is preferable, according to Schulz (2018), for the following main reasons: (1) the term displacement suggests that the experience of survivors is temporal rather than fixed, thus implying

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the possibility of reintegration and healing and (2) it “can accommodate different gendered conflict-related experiences of male, female and non-binary, gender non-confirming survivors alike” (p. 1107). In a more recent article with Touquet, Schulz (2020), based on empirical research with Ugandan and Sri Lankan male survivors of sexual violence, advocates for the queering of existing paradigms that are used to understand conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence against men (Schulz & Touquet, 2020). Specifically, Schulz and Touquet (2020) challenge the taken-for-granted notion that these acts of violence are always and already deployed as weapons and are not rooted in sexual gratification. In other words, they explore other motivating factors for male-directed sexual violence outside of the emasculation-feminization nexus. Similarly, Drumond (2019), based on archival research of files from the ICTY and the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, unpacks the nuances of genital violence and asks us to discern the differences between acts of violence that are sexual and sexualize the victim; acts that are used as weapons to break the victim; and acts used to deter others and/or gather intelligence.6 In other words, when is reproductive violence the end goal (i.e., to deliberately impede reproduction) and when is it used as means to an end? To give some context, there are two main schools of thought within the literature on wartime rape and sexual violence. One views sexual violence as a by-product of war/armed conflict: an inevitable part of war/armed conflict. Within this framework wartime rape is considered an opportunistic crime (Davies & True, 2015). Enloe (2000) referred to this as ‘recreational rape.’ It can be related to the ‘pressure-cooker’ theory. This views wartime rape as either a result of men’s biological/innate sexual drive and/or the result of the chaos of war (Mullins, 2009). At the other end of the spectrum, is the rape as a weapon of war narrative. Within this framework the use of wartime rape and sexual violence is 6 For example, during the Sri Lankan war (which took place between 1983 and 2009) sexual and reproductive violence—forced masturbation, genital beatings, as well as oral and anal rape— were used by the government against Tamil men to obtain information about the militant separatist group—The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Here sexual violence was used as an intelligence-gathering tool to defeat the insurgency movement. As Clark (2017, p. 8) notes, during the war “… it was the instrumental utility of the penis (and more precisely the Tamil penis) that made it vulnerable”.

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widespread and systematic (Baaz & Stern, 2009; Meger, 2010). It is used as a political and social tool to achieve the goals of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Put simply, conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence is understood in “binary terms as either strategic or opportunistic” (Schulz & Touquet, 2020, p. 1172). Let us return to Schulz and Touquet’s (2020) article Queering Explanatory Frameworks for Wartime Sexual Violence against Men. Queer in this context, they explain, is about moving beyond gender binaries and heteronormative interpretations of sexual violence against men, toward a more complex and holistic understanding of the multiple ways in which gender and sexualities are performed and experienced during these encounters. Based on the testimonies of survivors from Uganda and Sri Lanka, they found that some male perpetrators would try to conceal their crimes and/or perpetrate the violence in private without an audience, thereby undermining the argument that their use of violence was strategic and used as a weapon of war. They explain: “[a]t the very least, these instances indicate that the perpetrators were not particularly interested in ‘performing’ gender subordination publicly—as is commonly suggested for most cases of sexual violence against men” (Schulz & Touquet, 2020, p. 1182). Rather, as with the case of wartime rape and sexual violence against Jewish women by German men during the Holocaust, these crimes were opportunistic. Indeed, for a number of the male survivors interviewed by Schulz and Touquet (2020), they made sense of their victimization by viewing the motivation of the perpetrators through the lens of sexual gratification. The narratives of these survivors disrupt existing explanatory scripts and reveal the implicit heteronormative and homophobic assumptions at the heart of these existing discourses, thereby offering a queer interpretation of male-directed sexual and reproductive violence. Following on from our discussion of pregnant persons in the previous chapter, with reference to reproductive violence, I believe we need to move beyond cis-gender bodies and focus on how this violence is targeted at persons capable of becoming pregnant: cis-gender women and trans men as well as persons capable of procreation through semen production: men and trans women.

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What Are the Implications for Nonhuman Animals? Taking on board this work, we can argue that these shifts away from essentialist and normative understandings of the motivations and consequences of conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence, have positive implications for addressing the war against nonhuman animals. First, by adopting gender-neutral language when discussing reproductive violence, as outlined above, we can open up a space for the inclusion of nonhuman animals capable of becoming pregnant and capable of procreation through semen production. Second, the term displacement from gendered personhood can be applied to nonhuman animals who are granted passive legal personhood. To be clear: my intention is not to equate the experiences of nonhuman animals with the experiences of the LGBTQ+ community rather, my goal is to highlight the benefits of adopting more inclusive terminology for both human and nonhuman animals alike. In the previous chapter, we examined how female farmed nonhuman animals are displaced from their gendered personhood when they are subject to forced separation from their offspring. In the second part of this chapter, we will review how this concept works in relation to the experiences of male farmed animals. Allied to the queering of intrahuman conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence, our analysis must address racial and religious politics as well as ethnonationalism, as these factors determine which groups of men are targeted. Here we return to the theme of animalization and racialized violence discussed in Chapter 2. Our analysis here is informed by male-directed reproductive violence carried out during the 1971 Liberation War.

Animalization and Racialized Violence in East Pakistan/Bangladesh and India During this war, Bengali Muslim men were subject to reproductive and genocidal violence. In order to determine their religious identity, Pakistani soldiers would inspect their penises to confirm if they were

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circumcised. Proof of circumcision was proof of one’s Muslim identity and thus the man would be spared. Here, drawing on Mookherjee (2012), I want to focus on the territorial and racialized underpinnings of this violence. The sexual violations that Pakistani soldiers inflicted on Bengali men were rooted in a desire to “improve the genes of the Bengali Muslim people and populate Bangladesh with ‘pure’ Muslims” (Mookherjee, 2012, p. 8). Indeed, “Bengali Muslims were also considered to be ‘Hinduized’, ‘half Muslims’ and ‘impure’” (Mookherjee, 2012, p. 8). In her aforementioned article, The Absent Piece of Skin, Mookherjee analyses photographs taken by Kishor Parekh during the war. These were published in the 1972 book Bangladesh: A Brutal Birth (see Mookherjee, 2012). Of relevance to our discussion here is an image of a Bengali man being inspected by a Pakistani solder. The translated caption reads: “[t]hat they are human is not important for these barbarians: what is important is whether they are Hindus or Muslims—so they are checking by making one naked” (as cited in Mookherjee, 2012, p. 16). Implicit in this statement is the association of humanity with Islam. In other words, the perceived barbarity of these men is removed (and their recognition as human confirmed) only if they could prove (through their circumcision) their status as ‘pure Muslims.’ In the words of Mehta (2000, p. 81), “… it is only with circumcision that they become Muslim and masculine at the same time.” Drawing on historical and contemporary examples of violent conflicts between Hindus and Muslims in East Pakistan/Bangladesh and India, respectively, Mookherjee (2012) utilizes the work of Mehta (2000) to examine the contradictory meanings ascribed to the circumcision of Muslim men. Interestingly, during the 1992–1993 Hindu-Muslim riots in Bombay, the absence of skin on the penises of Muslim men marked them as inferior. Muslim men, Mookherjee (2012) explains, were hunted, stigmatized, and regarded as animal-like and less-than human. The mark of circumcision in this instance was the delineator of savagery. She states: “[i]n the context of riots in India, the absent skin marks out the negative personhood of the Muslim man” (p. 19). Here the term katua is used to describe the circumcised penis. Mehta (2000, p. 96), based on his conversations with non-Muslim men, identified two

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themes that were applied to the term. The first posits that the Muslim is dirty and the second that the Muslim is animal-like. He states: “[t]he katua’s animal character is classified as either dangerous (mad dog), or productive (the harnessed bull). The contrived animality of the Muslim allows for him to be framed in behavioral terms as not to be trusted …” Conversely, in the context of the 1971 Liberation War, evidence of circumcision was considered a positive affirmation of a pure Muslim Pakistani identity. In this instance it is the non-circumcised men—those equated with being Hindu—who are ‘Othered.’ As noted earlier, this gendered, racialized, and territorial violence extended beyond the individual and had implications for the wider group to which these men were assigned. In his chapter, Circumcision, Body, Masculinity: The Ritual Wound and Collective Violence, Mehta (2000) asks: “in which way(s) does circumcision as a mark of identity shape and alter the destiny of individuals and groups?” (p. 80). In the remainder of the chapter, he demonstrates how “actors’ experiences of [reproductive violence] are translated into either a sense of community or the abrogation of what makes them human” (Mehta, 2000 p. 80–81).7 Drawing on conversations from his fieldwork with the Ansaris of Barabanki during 1985–86, Mehta (2000) conveys the significance of circumcision within Islam. For one particular family, circumcision is equated with male power and the ability of circumcised men to “impregnate all of womankind” (Mehta, 2000, p. 85). To put it another way, the circumcised male reproduces the Muslim nation. Conversely, the uncircumcised male represents its destruction. To elaborate: within Islam the ritual of circumcision carries connotations of purity, spirituality, legitimacy, and cleanliness. Through circumcision the human body rids itself of dirt. The ritual cleanses and elevates the Muslim body. It follows therefore that those who are uncircumcised are not only unclean, but are viewed as lessthan human. As we have established, during the 1971 Liberation War, Bengali men were required to prove they had been circumcised, not only

7

See also The Caricatured Bengali & the Pakistan Army by Hafsa Khawaja (2021). This essay unpacks the racist beliefs held by the Pakistani army toward Bengalis in the lead up to the war. Khawaha draws on the memoirs of members of the Pakistani Army who ‘Othered’, demonized, and pathologized Bengali men.

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to confirm their humanity, but specifically, their pure Muslim identity. Conversely, non-Muslims—Hindus, were regarded as impure. In the previous chapter, we discussed the concept of essentialization and how, during genocide, certain groups are associated with pollution and contamination. Specifically, we discussed the labeling of Jews as rats, and as vermin that needed to be exterminated. This notion of eliminating the less-than human out-group was also present during the time periods reviewed here: the 1971 Liberation War and the 1992 and 1993 Bombay riots. During these conflicts men were hunted, inspected, and degraded based on their perceived/assigned racial and ethnic identity. While the meaning ascribed to circumcision was inverted across these conflicts, the processes of dehumanization and animalization were used to disparage the out-group: Hindus during the 1971 Liberation War and Muslims during the Bombay riots. In the preface to Kishor Parekh’s book (mentioned earlier), S. Mulgaokar stated that “the dehumanization of Bangladesh defied imagination” (as cited in Mookherjee, 2012, p. 6). As with our discussion of the re-education camps in China and the genocidal violence carried out against the Uighur population, I believe that dehumanization and ‘subhumanization’ were features of the 1971 Liberation War. I maintain that such processes are implicated after the fact—they do not occur prior to the violence. The bodies of non-circumcised men were dehumanized and subhumanized as a result of the reproductive and genocidal violence inflicted upon them. Alongside these processes are references to the animal-like nature of the out-group (as discussed, animalization was also a feature of the Bombay riots in 1992 and 1993). To reiterate: the term ‘animal’ is associated with the labels ‘subhuman,’ nonhuman,’ or ‘inhuman.’ Not only does this justify violence against those referred to as ‘animal’, it also, as we will discuss in due course, legitimizes violence against nonhuman animals.

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Summary In this section we have reviewed examples of male-directed conflictrelated sexual and reproductive violence: genital violence, castration, and enforced sterilization. The War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity that were discussed were also framed as acts of genocidal violence. In the case studies that we examined (Darfur, Bangladesh and the former Yugoslavia) the racial, ethnic, and religious identity of victims determined how and why men were targeted for such violence. All revealed the vulnerability of bodies capable of reproduction. Indeed, despite existing approaches of understanding conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence—that reproduce gender essentialism and heteronormative understandings, through the narratives of emasculation, feminization, and homosexualization—I have demonstrated the value and importance of moving beyond such normative thinking. Drawing on the work of Schulz (2018), and the queer framework developed by Schulz and Touquet (2020), I considered the positive implications of adopting a more nuanced and holistic approach to understanding maledirected conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence. Specifically, replacing the terms emasculation, feminization, and homosexualization (when appropriate) with the notion of displacement from gendered personhood facilitates a queer understanding of this violence. This explanatory framework recognizes multiple gendered and sexual identities. And with reference to our discussion about the experiences of male nonhuman animals, to which we now turn our attention, the use of the term personhood will accommodate the experiences of nonhuman animals who have been granted legal personhood. I identify the following as themes that will also inform our discussion of the treatment of male nonhuman animals: the vulnerability of the penis; conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence carried out on bodies capable of procreation through semen production, specifically, enforced ejaculation and enforced sterilization; and displacement from gendered personhood and violence that is carried out on a group deemed less-than human. Unlike our examples of intrahuman violence, these violence(s) are not framed as acts of genocide. Importantly, in identifying these overlapping themes, the aim is not to equate these experiences;

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rather, the goal is to highlight the shared sources of oppression between human and nonhuman animals who are subject to conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence(s).

Reproductive Violence Against Bulls Within the Dairy Industry In the following section, we will consider War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity committed against bulls within the war against nonhuman animals. Our focus is the dairy industry, and the role of bulls within the animal husbandry practices described in the previous chapter. As noted, bull semen is used to artificially inseminate cows. Their semen is collected via forced ejaculation. This occurs around 2–3 times a week as well as 2–3 times on the day semen is collected (Gillespie, 2014, 2018). Two methods are used to forcibly ejaculate the bull: an artificial vagina or electroejaculation.

Artificial Vagina Three people are involved in collecting semen from a bull using an artificial vagina: one person to deal with the teaser (a steer is commonly used), another to restrain the bull, and a final person to collect the semen (Rouge, 2002). The procedure involves positioning the teaser animal in front of the bull for it to mount in order to sexually stimulate the bull. False mounts not only stimulate the bull, but they also help maximize sperm cell numbers. Once aroused the collector diverts the penis to the artificial vagina to collect the semen (Rouge, 2002).

Electroejaculation Rouge and Browen (2002) offer the following description of electroejaculation:

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Electroejaculation involves applying a series of short, low-voltage pulses of current to the pelvic nerves which are involved in the ejaculatory response. It sounds like an extremely unpleasant experience … but doesn’t seem to cause much distress in bulls (although they do need to be securely restrained).

In a slightly different interpretation of this procedure, Napolitano et al. (2020), in their chapter, Reproductive Technologies and Animal Welfare, place more emphasis on the fact that the bull needs to be restrained prior to the insertion of the probe into the rectum. They share details of the stimulation of the bull, through a transrectal massage, which is performed over the accessory sex glands. They explain that electric pulses used for ejaculation are increased during stimulation. Crucially, they observe that the procedure is stressful and painful, calling into question animal welfare standards. It is worth reiterating: an electric prod or a nose ring is used to physically control bulls while this nonconsensual procedure takes place (Gillespie, 2018). The forced ejaculation of bulls is a form of reproductive violence. Respectively, this is listed as a War Crime and Crime against Humanity under “any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions” and “any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity” (see the respective definitions by the UN office on Genocide Prevention and Responsibility to Protect, n.d.). In addition to the reproductive violence inflicted on bulls, their bodies are treated as disposable commodities within agribusiness. As Gillespie (2014, p. 1328) discusses in relation to the bull semen market: “[b]ull semen has become an internationally traded commodity and semen is shipped from suppliers for use in impregnating cows on dairy and beef operations around the world…” This commodity is advertised in semen catalogs where bulls are commodified for their reproductive prowess, appearance, genetic heritage, and the quality and virility of their semen. In her review of catalogs such as Select Series, Gillespie (2014, 2018) describes pornographic images of the bulls genitalia which serve to highlight their virility and reproductive viability. There are a number of available online semen catalogs (for example, The Sussex Cattle Society, Semen Catalogue and Bovine Elite). For our

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purposes here I will review the content of The Sexed Semen Catalogue, 2019, by Ai Services, Northern Ireland. The catalog includes images of bulls, written text, and numerical information regarding, for example, their fertility index, their lifespan, their reliability, and whether they have mastitis. Examples of the written text that accompanies the pictures of the bulls include: ● ‘Great red bull for improving milk production.’ ● ‘Daughters will have great fertility and longevity.’ ● ‘One of the best bulls for robotic milking, with wide rear teat placement and improved teat length.’ ● ‘Montoya (name of the bull) will suit farmers looking for big strong dairy cows with massive production.’ ● ‘Daughters should be ideally suited for large commercial herds.’ ● ‘Ideal sire for commercial milk production herds, combining massive production with strong robust cows.’ As well as the overt sexual objectification and commodification of these bulls, references to daughters are hard to read following our discussion of the cycle of reproductive violence to which they will be subject to. Like dairy cows, once the productivity of the bull diminishes, they are sent to slaughter.

Sexual Violations Within the Meat Industry Paradoxically, alongside this valorization of the virility and masculinity of bulls within the semen market, male calves are castrated. This is typically carried out when the male calf is around 6 months old (Gillespie, 2018). Castration is carried out primarily for economic reasons. As a result of castration—which lowers testosterone levels and reduces sexual activity—male calves become more attractive to buyers in the meat market. As Carter et al. (2011, p. 1) explain: “[b]ulls are still castrated to prevent reproduction and simplify management, but, most importantly, cattle are castrated to improve marbling and tenderness of the finished beef, which improves calf marketability.” Or to use the blunter

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words of Gillespie (2018, p. 173): “[c]onsumers in the United States are accustomed to the flavor and quality of flesh from castrated animals.” Different methods are used to castrate the male calf (these can be either physical, chemical, or hormonal). All cause the male calf chronic pain (Gillespie, 2018). Physical methods—such as the rubber ring, the Burdizzo, or surgical castration—are the most common. Elastic band castration involves cutting off the blood supply to the testicles. This kills them and they eventually drop off. In a similar fashion, the Burdizzo method crushes the blood vessels, thereby restricting the blood supply to the testicle. Surgical castration involves slicing the scrotum to reveal the testes. These are then twisted, cut, or torn until they are removed (see Anderson, 2015).

Conflict-Related Sexual and Reproductive Violence Castration is not limited to male calves. We began this chapter with a discussion of the castration of piglets and calls to ban the surgical castration of piglets without the use of anesthetic. In both cases, castration is driven by marketability within the meat industry. The pain and suffering nonhuman animals experience is considered both necessary and secondary to serving the interests of humans who consume meat. If we return to the question posed by Drumond (2019) with regard to understanding the purpose of reproductive violence, in the case of piglets (unlike with male calves) reproductive violence is used as a means to an end: to remove the unpleasant odor from the meat. In this instance, the explicit aim is not to impact the reproductive capabilities of pigs, rather this procedure is required to improve the marketability of the commodity. In the case of male calves, it is harder to disentangle the means from the end goal: castration is used to prevent reproduction which is deemed necessary to improve the quality of the meat. Here reproductive violence is both the means and the end goal in order to ensure the market value of the product. Aside from the motivations, the end result is the same: piglets and calves are routinely subject to conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence. As demonstrated, these violence(s) are also present within the dairy industry, where bulls are

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victims of forced ejaculation. These acts of reproductive violence—forced ejaculation and forced sterilization—fall under ‘any other form of sexual violence’ as listed in the definition of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.

The Vulnerability of the Penis Earlier we unpacked Clark’s (2017) thesis on the vulnerability of the penis with specific reference to the 1971 Liberation War. I drew upon the work of Zarkov (2001, p. 78 as cited in Mookherjee, 2012, p. 1592) and his examination of the power of the penis. Pertinent to our discussion here is his statement about men’s ability and their ‘power to provide.’ In the context of male bulls, it is their ‘power to provide’—their reproductive capabilities—that underpins the forced ejaculation that they are subject to. As Gillespie (2014, p. 1330) notes, male bovine bodies are fetishized as “sexy, productive, icons of virility, and masculinity.” With reference to semen catalogs, she states: [These] include regal portraits of bulls that draw attention to their height and stature and, in particular, to their highly visible (and large!) genitalia … the visibility of the bulls’ large testicles and penises recalls the important reproductive function of these parts to commodity production and they are reminiscent of pornographic images of the human male erection … the images of the bulls’ muscular physique and large and visible genitalia produce the bull as a gendered symbol of the virile and reproductive body, and as a symbol of masculinity as it is tied up with sex and reproduction. The bull is not only reproductively viable but also an exceptional specimen of proven reproductive potential. (Gillespie, 2014, p. 1330)

In all of the cases examined in this chapter, male-directed conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence reveals the vulnerability of the penis. This applies to human and nonhuman animals alike. In both cases the penis, through is literal and symbolic function, is a source of oppression.

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Displacement from Gendered Personhood At first glance these industries appear contradictory: the meat industry, through castration, performs sexual and reproductive violence against male calves. This improves their marketability. Castration of male calves involves displacement from gendered personhood and the negation of reproduction. Here the reproductive capabilities of nonhuman animals are thwarted in the interest of the meat market. Conversely, the dairy industry performs acts of sexual and reproductive violence through its retrieval of bull semen. This is based on hypermasculine and hypersexual notions of the reproductive capabilities of the bull’s body. In this instance male bovine reproduction is extolled. Yet, despite these differences, both acts—castration and semen collection—are carried out on the commoditized bodies of male nonhuman animals within industries driven by capitalism. They are carried out on the bodies of persons capable of procreation through semen production. In a similar way to castration, I argue that the artificial and nonconsensual methods used to retrieve the semen result in displacement from gendered personhood. Bulls are displaced from their natural reproductive activities and are forced to undergo these technological procedures. As Gillespie (2014, p. 1328) explains: Bulls were formerly kept on their home dairy farms for this process, but increasing division in the industry, resulting from the squeeze for greater economic efficiency, means that bulls are more regularly housed on breeding farms that specialize in semen production and store large tanks of each bull’s semen in cold storage for later sale and use.

There is a paradox at work here: animal husbandry practices within the meat and dairy industries, that impact cows, calves and bulls, are, to borrow from Gillespie, intimate and emotional. Yet, the individual lived experiences of nonhuman animals are lost within the broader animalindustrial complex where these processes take place. Here the emphasis is on productivity, global markets, international trade, and maximizing profit. As we will discuss in more detail in the following chapter, this commodification of nonhuman animals results in their alienation from

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both their products and their productive activity within the capitalist industrial model. This exploitation of nonhuman animals, as demonstrated here and in the previous chapter, is gendered. Therefore, in the war against nonhuman animals, bulls, as outlined above, are subject to displacement from gendered personhood. Indeed, this concept applies to all nonhuman animals whose reproductive bodies are exploited within the meat, egg, and dairy industries and who are subject to the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity reviewed in this book. It is the property status of nonhuman animals, and their treatment as legal ‘things’, rather than legal persons (i.e., the negative connotations associated with the term nonhuman) that, among other factors (to be explored in the proceeding chapter), perpetuate this violence. We close this chapter by revisiting the shared sources of oppression between human and nonhuman animals.

Shared Sources of Oppression In the Introduction/Chapter 1, I made the case for acknowledging the similarities that stem from the sources of oppression between human and nonhuman animals. I argued that both populations have been oppressed and exploited, and their personhood has been called into question. This is in contrast to the ‘dreaded comparisons’ that have and continue to be used, for example, by animal rights advocates. Now that we have reviewed reproductive violence(s), in the form of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, inflicted upon human and nonhuman animals, this feels like an appropriate point at which to address the interconnectedness between them. To do this we will need to utilize our “multi-optic” vision (see Introduction/Chapter 1). Using this vision, and drawing on our analysis from the previous chapter, we can trace the sources of these interconnected oppressions to the following: white supremacy, hegemonic masculinity, and the parallel institutions of heteropatriarchy and anthropatriarchy. To put it another way: what it means to be human (and afforded full protections from the law) is understood along racial, gendered, and speciesist lines. Mookherjee (2012, p. 1587) frames the violence during the 1971

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Liberation War as “…territorial, racialized and gendered.” Indeed, race, ethnopolitics, and gender informed the genocides that took place during the Holocaust, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur. And, to return to our Clausewitzean interpretation of war, the aim of war is complete domination of the ‘opponent’ (von Clausewitz, 1968). When we turn to the war against nonhuman animals, we see that race, gender, and speciesism also underpin the sexual and reproductive violence(s) that are enacted. Let us unpack each of these in more detail.

Race and Racism In Chapters 2 and 3, drawing on the work of the Ko sisters (2015/2020) and Jackson (2020), we examined how, within the racial hierarchy, black(ened) people, nonhuman animals (and indeed, all races deemed inferior to the white race) are positioned at the bottom. In the case of intrahuman violence, ethnopolitics works alongside the racial hierarchy to inform the violence(s) that take place. In both chapters race was discussed in relation to the processes of animalization, dehumanization, and subhumanization. Here the category human (and by extension, humanity) is understood as relational and hierarchical. That is, it is defined as superior to and different from animals/animality. In the various case studies reviewed, certain humans, both historically and contemporaneously, are placed outside of humanity and are deemed sub-, in-, and nonhuman. This is based on racialized and hierarchical thinking that views some humans as animal-like. In sum, racism—and the circular relationship between racism and animalization—informs the nature and the targets of intrahuman violence. In the war against nonhuman animals, this coupling of racism and animalization—which confirms the less-than-, sub-, and inhuman status of nonhuman animals—serves to justify the violence that is inflicted upon them.

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Gender Within the conventional gender hierarchy, masculinities are positioned above femininities. As we saw in Chapter 3, hegemonic heterosexual masculinity (militarized masculinity in the context of war) informs men’s use of wartime rape and sexual violence. The gendered woman-as-nation thesis highlights how bodies capable of reproducing the nation, through biological motherhood, are targeted during war. Gender informs the sexual commodification of nonhuman animals within the food industry. The term ‘feminized protein’ (eggs and dairy) replaces the term plant protein to highlight the reproductive violence committed against female nonhuman animals (Adams, 2015). And ecofeminists have demonstrated how and why rape and sexual violence within the industry is/should be a feminist issue: the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity carried out against female nonhuman animals are informed by their gender and their reproductive capabilities which, in turn, impacts their status as mothers (Cusack, 2013). As demonstrated in this chapter, human and nonhuman animals are also victims of male-directed, conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence and are targeted based on their gender and their perceived reproductive capabilities. In the case of men, we can attribute this to constructions of heterosexual masculinity and their power to provide. With regards to nonhuman animals, sexual and reproductive violence results in the simultaneous hypersexualization of their fertile bodies—through semen extraction—and the negation of their reproduction through castration. Both, however, involve displacement from gendered personhood.

Speciesism At first glance it may appear as though speciesism only concerns the status and experiences of nonhuman animals. However, as demonstrated in previous chapters, gender, race, and class are all implicated within the contours of speciesism. Human exceptionalism is based on a specific category of human, one that is rooted in white supremacy which has, historically, excluded (certain) human and (all) nonhuman populations.

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Here it will be useful to return to Trigg (2021) who reminds us that animalization works in consort with other forms of discrimination (based on race, gender, sexuality, and ableism, for example) that has deleterious effects on humans and nonhuman animals alike who are regarded as ‘Other-than’, sub, and nonhuman. As we have seen in all the examples throughout this book, the human and nonhuman victims of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity are those who have been excluded (based on their gender, race, ethnicity and species difference) from the category human. I have highlighted the importance of adopting gender-neutral terminology to capture the experiences of human and nonhuman animals. For example, in relation to the ICC definition of forced pregnancy, using the term pregnant persons rather than pregnant women, means not only addressing gender discrimination, but it also involves challenging the speciesism inherent within the ICC statute. Likewise, using terms such as displacement from gendered personhood and persons capable of procreation through semen production will have a similar effect. To facilitate this non-speciesist approach to understanding conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence, I believe we need to interrogate the category human as it relates to the human security framework within international security.

Sexual and Reproductive Violence and the Human Security Framework To reiterate: what it means to be human and to be protected by the law is understood along racial, gendered, and speciesist lines. Below I will explore this notion of protection in more detail with reference to the human security framework. The General Assembly defines human security in the following way: [Human security] is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people. It advocates for people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that

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strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people. (see the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2018)

Historically the experiences of men and boys have been obscured from the human security framework (Carpenter, 2005). With reference to CRSV, the United Nations Security Council (UNSCR) has passed ten resolutions on Women, Peace, and Security. The first was UNSCR 1325 passed in 2000. Among other issues these resolutions address the impact and consequences of sexual and reproductive on women and girls. It was not until UNSCR 2106, passed in 2013, that men and boys were included in the language of these resolutions. Elsewhere I have written about the gendered nature of the human security framework (see Banwell, 2018, 2020). I have demonstrated how exclusionary policies within international relations and international security are based, in part, on essentialist assumptions about men and women. Here hegemonic (also normative) understandings of gender associate men/masculinity with aggression, violence and agency, and women/femininity with victimization, vulnerability, and passivity (see Carpenter, 2005, 2006; Grey & Shepherd, 2012). I argue that the marginalization of men within the security paradigm is the result of biopolitical and ontological constructions of women as vulnerable and in need of protection (Banwell, 2020). I believe that all human and nonhuman animals, impacted by the violence(s) of war and armed conflict, should be recognized by the international security paradigm. However, if we are serious about the war against nonhuman animals, and are serious about protecting them from the violence(s) of this war, then we need to rethink the human security framework. I recommend that we replace the term human security with personhood security. This would protect human and nonhuman animals alike. I propose the following rephrasing of human security: Personhood security requires Member States to identify and address widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of all legal persons. It calls for comprehensive, context-specific

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and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all legal persons.8

Conclusion To paraphrase Clark (2017): the bodies and genitalia of men and boys are penetrable and vulnerable. The narrow gendering of vulnerability— i.e., the equation of vulnerability with women and girls—obscures the reality of the vulnerability of the penis (and the male reproductive body more broadly). Echoing the sentiment of Clark (2017), Gillespie (2014, p. 1325), in relation to nonhuman animals, notes: While female animals are more obviously subjects of gendered commodification and violence, male animals, too, experience a gendered appropriation of their lives and bodies. Male animals are routinely culled at birth (e.g., male chicks in the egg industry), raised in confinement for meat (e.g., veal), and are used for their reproductive capabilities (e.g., semen extraction).

In this chapter, we have reviewed male-direct, conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence. With regards to intrahuman violence, we considered genital violence, castration, and enforced sterilization during the 1971 Liberation War and the genocides in the former Yugoslavia and Darfur. Drawing on Schulz and Touquet’s (2020) queer explanatory framework, we moved away from essentialist, heteronormative, and homophobic understandings of this male-directed violence. Specifically, replacing, where appropriate, the terms emasculation, feminization, and homosexualization, with the term displacement from gendered personhood , adds to my proposal to use the term pregnant persons in relation to forced pregnancy. This allows us to (1) challenge gender discrimination and (2) capture the experiences of nonhuman animals who have been granted passive legal personhood status. Animalization, dehumanization,

8

This definition works in accordance with my revised definition of armed conflict vis-à-vis the war against nonhuman animals.

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and the racial hierarchy were also used to understand the motivations of male-directed, conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence. With regards to nonhuman animals, conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence was reviewed within the meat and dairy industries. In the case of the latter, methods used during semen collection (forced ejaculation) revealed the vulnerability of the penis. This was exemplified in the sexual commodification of the bull’s body in semen catalogs. Conversely, the castration of male calves within the meat industry was understood as the negation of reproduction. The differing motives for carrying out these acts of sexual and reproductive violence were examined. And despite the seemingly contradictory nature of these industries, in both cases, male-directed War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity resulted in displacement from gendered personhood. We completed our discussion of sexual and reproductive violence by identifying the shared sources of oppression between human and nonhuman animals: race, gender, and speciesism. As well as highlighting the impact of these discriminatory practices, I made the case for protecting the personhood status of human and nonhuman animals, by replacing the humancenteredness of the human security framework. The themes of alienation and displacement from gendered personhood touched upon earlier will be explored in more detail in the following chapter where we will unpack how these unfold within the animal-industrial complex.

References Adams, C. J. (2015). The sexual politics of meat. Bloomsbury Academic. Anderson, N. (2015). Castration of calves. Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs. Retrieved from http://www.omafra.gov.on.ca/english/liv estock/beef/facts/07-029.htm Baaz, M. K., & Stern, M. (2009). Why do soldiers rape? Masculinity, violence, and sexuality in the armed forces in the Congo (DCR). International Studies Quarterly, 53(2), 495–518. Banwell, S. (2018). Security, peace and development: Unpacking discursive constructions of wartime rape and sexual violence in Syria. International Journal of Peace and Development Studies, 9 (2), 15–30.

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Banwell, S. (2020). Gender and the violence(s) of war and armed conflict: More dangerous to be a woman? Emerald Publishing Limited. Bovine Elite. Retrieved from https://www.bovine-elite.com/about/ Carlson, E. S. (2006). The hidden prevalence of male sexual assault during war: Observations on blunt trauma to the male genitals. British Journal of Criminology, 46 (1), 16–25. Carpenter, C. (2006). Recognizing gender-based violence against civilian men and boys in conflict situations. Security Dialogue, 37 (1), 83–103. Carpenter, C. R. (2005). Women, children and other vulnerable groups: Gender, strategic frames and the protection of civilians as a transnational issue. International Studies Quarterly, 49 (2), 295–334. Carter, B., Mathis, C.P., Löest, C., & Wenzel, J. (2011). Castrating beef calves: Age and method. New Mexico State University. Retrieved from https://aces. nmsu.edu/pubs/_b/B227.pdf Christian, M., Safar, O., Ramazani, P., Burnham, G., & Glass, N. (2011). Sexual and gender-based violence against men in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Effects on survivors, their families and the community. Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 27 (4), 227–246. Clark, J. N. (2017). The vulnerability of the penis: Sexual violence against men in conflict and security frames. Men and Masculinities, 1–23,. https:// doi.org/10.1177/1097184X17724487 Cusack, C. M. (2013). Feminism and husbandry: Drawing the fine line between mine and bovine. Journal for Critical Animal Studies, 11(1), 24–45. Davies, S. E., & True, J. (2015). Reframing conflict-related sexual and genderbased violence: Bringing gender analysis back in. Security Dialogue, 46 (6), 495–512. Drumond, P. (2019). What about men? Towards a critical interrogation of sexual violence against men in global politics. International Affairs, 95 (6), 1271–1287. Enloe, C. (2000). Maneuvers: The international politics of militarizing women’s lives. University California Press. Eurogroup for Animals. (2018). Germany to delay implementation of mandatory anesthesia for piglets during castration. Retrieved from https://www.eurogr oupforanimals.org/news/germany-delay-implementation-mandatory-anaest hesia-piglets-during-castration Ferrales, G., Brehm, H. N., & Mcelrath, S. (2016). Gender-based violence against men and boys in Darfur: The gender-genocide nexus. Gender and Society, 30 (4), 565–589.

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Gillespie, K. (2014). Sexualized violence and the gendered commodification of the animal body in Pacific Northwest US dairy production. Gender, Place & Culture, 21(10), 1321–1337. Gillespie, K. (2018). Cow with ear tag #1389. University of Chicago Press. Grey, R., & Shepherd, L. J. (2012). ‘“Stop rape now?”’: Masculinity, responsibility, and conflict-related sexual violence. Men and Masculinities, 16 (1), 115–135. International Criminal Court. (2011). Elements of crimes. Retrieved from https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf Jackson, Z. I. (2020). Becoming human: Matter and meaning in an antiblack world . New York University Press. Khawaja, H. (2021). The caricatured Bengali & the Pakistan army. Retrieved from https://www.jamhoor.org/read/the-caricatured-bengali-ampthe-pakistan-army Ko, A., & Ko, S. (2015/2020). Aphro-ism: Essays on pop culture, feminism, and black veganism from two sisters. Lantern Publishing and Media. Lewis, D. A. (2009). Unrecognized victims: Sexual violence against men in conflict settings under international law. Wisconsin International Law Journal, 27 (1), 1–49. Meger, S. (2010). Rape of the Congo: Understanding sexual violence in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 28(2), 119–135. Mehta, D. (2000). Circumcision, body, masculinity: The ritual wound and collective violence. In V. Das, A. Kleinman, M. Ramphele, & P. Reynolds (Eds.), Violence and subjectivity (pp. 79–101). University of California Press. Mookherjee, N. (2012). The absent piece of skin: Gendered, racialized and territorial inscriptions of sexual violence during the Bangladesh war. Modern Asian Studies, 46 (6), 1572–1601. Mullins, C. W. (2009). ‘“He would kill me with his penis”’: Genocidal rape in Rwanda as a state crime. Critical Criminology, 17 (1), 15–33. Napolitano, F., Arney, D., Mota-Rojas, D., & De Rosa, G. (2020). Reproductive technologies and animal welfare. In G. Presicce (Ed.), Reproductive technologies in animals (pp. 275–286). Academic Press. Oosterhoff, P., Zwanikken, P., & Ketting, E. (2004). Sexual torture of men in Croatia and other conflict situations: An open secret. Reproductive Health Matters, 12(23), 68–77. PETA. (2019). Male piglets are first nonhuman animals to sue Germany’s highest court. Retrieved from https://www.peta.org/blog/german-piglets-con stitutional-rights/

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Professional Pig Community. (2020). Retrieved from https://www.pig333. com/latest_swine_news/germany-aid-for-the-castration-of-piglets-under-ana esthetic_15802/ Professional Pig Community. (2022). Retrieved from https://www.pig333.com/ articles/the-pig-castration-situation-in-the-european-union_18100/ Rouge, M. (2002). “Semen collection from bulls”: Pathophysiology of the reproductive system. Colorado State University. Retrieved from http://www. vivo.colostate.edu/hbooks/pathphys/reprod/semeneval/bull.html Rouge, M., & Bowen, R. (2002). “Semen collection”: Pathophysiology of the reproductive system. Colorado State University. Retrieved from http://www. vivo.colostate.edu/hbooks/pathphys/reprod/semeneval/collection.html Schulz, P. (2018). Displacement from gendered personhood: Sexual violence and masculinities in northern Uganda. International Affairs, 94 (5), 1101– 1119. Schulz, P., & Touqet, H. (2020). Queering explanatory frameworks for wartime sexual violence against men. International Affairs, 96 (5), 1169–1187. Sexed Semen Catalogue. (2019). Ai services. Retrieved from https://www.ai-ser vices.co.uk/workspace/pdfs/2019-sexed-semen-cat-210x210-web.pdf Sivakumaran, S. (2007). Sexual violence against men in armed conflict. European Journal of International Law, 18(2), 253–276. Solangon, S., & Patel, P. (2012). Sexual violence against men in countries affected by armed conflict. Conflict, Security & Development, 12(4), 417–442. Sussex Cattle Society Semen Catalogue. Retrieved from https://www.sussexcat tlesociety.org.uk/2021%20Semen%20Catalogue.pdf The convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. (2014). Retrieved from http://www.oas.org/dil/1948_Convention_on_the_ Prevention_and_Punishment_of_the_Crime_of_Genocide.pdf Trigg, R. (2021). Intersectionality—An alternative to redrawing the line in the pursuit of animal rights. Ethics and the Environment, 26 (2), 73–118. United Nations. (2018). Report of the secretary-general on conflict-related sexual violence. S/2018/250. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/sexualviolen ceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/report/s-2018-250/SG-REPORT-2017CRSV-SPREAD.pdf United Nations Trust for Human Security. (2018). What is human security? Retrieved from https://www.un.org/humansecurity/what-is-human-security/ UN office on Genocide Prevention and Responsibility to Protect. (n.d.). Crimes against humanity. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevent ion/crimes-against-humanity.shtml

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UN office on Genocide Prevention and Responsibility to Protect. (n.d.). War crimes. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/war-cri mes.shtml Vojdik, V. K. (2014). Sexual violence against men and women in war: A masculinities approach. Nevada Law Journal, 14 (3), 923–952. Von Clausewitz, C. (1968). On War. Penguin. Yagi, I., Malette, J., Mwindo, T., & Maisha, B. (2022). Characteristics and impacts of conflict-related sexual violence against men in the DRC: A phenomenological research design. Social Sciences, 11(34), 1–12.

5 The Nature, Motivations, and Consequences of the Animal-Industrial Complex

Introduction In March 2022 I visited the Francis Bacon exhibition Man and Beast at the Royal Academy of Arts. The exhibition includes paintings from his earliest works in the 1930s and 1940s, through to his final painting in 1991 (Artlyst, 2021). The exhibition starts with Head I, 1949. It depicts a scream from “a disembodied head with pallid, deathly flesh and the howling mouth of a chimp” (Frankel, 2022). Head I was part of Bacon’s 1949 solo exhibition which included a series of six Heads. In these “unsettling portraits… characters are placed in cuboid structures” demonstrating how “not only identity, but species, is called into question” (Artlyst, 2021). Departing from conventional portraiture, Bacon’s sitters are replaced “with the helplessness of a caged animal” (Artlyst, 2021). The exhibition features three of Bacon’s subversive portraits of Pope Innocent X, all depicting the Pope like a caged animal. In one of the images, for example, the Pope appears to be screaming like a wild animal (Frankel, 2022). These paintings are included in a section titled

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The Animal Within. The accompanying text reads: “Bacon’s portraits strip away the pretensions of even the highest stations in society, with the implication that status or success – the trappings of civilization – are merely a thin, fragile veneer distinguishing us from our nonhuman counterparts” (Royal Academy of Arts, 2022). Put simply, these ‘portraits’ challenge human exceptionalism. Despite Bacon’s fascination with animals and his observation of “the whole horror of life, of one thing living off another” (Royal Academy of Arts, 2022), Bacon was not an animals rights advocate. Nevertheless, from the paintings on display what seems evident is that Bacon was intent on blurring the distinction between Man and Beast. The themes of this exhibition aside, humans’ perceived superiority over nonhuman animals endure. Placing the animal-industrial complex at the center of our analysis, the implications of human exceptionalism, for both human and nonhuman animals, will be explored in this chapter.

Outline of the Chapter In the Introduction/Chapter 1 I defined my thesis on the war against nonhuman animals. In Chapter 2, I presented the case that nonhuman animals should be granted legal personhood. In Chapters 3 and 4, using existing explanatory frameworks relating to intrahuman violence to lay the foundations, I reviewed examples of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity committed during the war against nonhuman animals. Now that I have outlined the premise on which nonhuman animals should be granted legal personhood status, and the protections they should be afforded from the violence(s) of this war—rape, forced pregnancy, and other acts of sexual violence—this final chapter will unpack the system within/upon which this war is facilitated and maintained. We begin the chapter by returning to our discussion of biopolitics and the war against nonhuman animals. Here we will extend our analysis to include a discussion of thanatopolitics (the politics of death), Mbembe’s (2003) necropolitics, and Stanescu’s (2013) notion of ‘deading life.’ These concepts, which are inextricably linked to the notion of human exceptionalism, are used to explain the nature of the violence(s) inflicted

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against nonhuman animals. The second part of the chapter addresses the context and motivations behind these War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. I will draw on Marxism to unpack the relationship between carnism, alienation, and the commodification of nonhuman animals within the industrialized meat, egg, and dairy industries. Part three reviews the sites where the war against nonhuman animals takes place: factory farms, referred to as Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) in the US and mega farms in the UK, Europe, and the rest of the world. Here we will review the impact and implications of factory farming for public health, the environment, and industry workers. The concept of slow violence facilitates our discussion of the impacts of environmental pollution caused by CAFOs. Following on from this, I will outline the central paradox inherent within human exceptionalism. The final part of the chapter provides some suggestions on how we move forward beyond the quest for a ‘more than human utopia.’ It presents comparative data on the environmental impact of non-dairy and vegan alternatives. It is hoped that this information will incentivize readers to reconsider and reduce their consumption of nonhuman animals. The aim of this chapter is to answer the following questions: (1) What underpins and facilitates the war against nonhuman animals, and (2) what are the global consequences of the war on nonhuman animals for both human and nonhuman animals? Specifically, what are the implications for public health, physical, and mental well-being, as well as the environment?

‘Deading Life’: Biopolitical Violence and the Factory Farm At the start of the book—in response to Kochi’s (2009) three questions concerning the legitimacy of the war against nonhuman animals—I offered tentative answers to these questions. In the pages that follow I will elaborate on my responses to all three. We will start with: ‘what types of violence and coercion should be included in the definition of war?’ The dairy industry statistics presented in Chapter 3 form the backdrop to the analysis provided in this chapter. The short answer to Kochi’s (2009)

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first question (concerning the types of violence and coercion that should be included in the definition of war) is this: reproductive coercion, sexual and reproductive violence (rape, forced pregnancy, castration), and mass slaughter. I will go further and argue that these are examples of biopolitical and thanatopolitical violence. Acts of sexual and reproductive violence, as well as reproductive coercion, were all reviewed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4. Here we will dissect the biopolitical nature of these violence(s) in more detail. In the Introduction/Chapter 1, I provided an overview of the concepts of biopolitics (Foucault) and the state of exception (Agamben). They are, as Stanescu (2017) attests, complicated ideas. However, in simple terms, “they attempt to understand the way in which violence is promoted as an effort to protect others and the way in which death occurs in order to protect life” (p. 210). It is the premise on which protection is afforded (and to whom) and how death is administered (and to whom) that concerns us in this chapter. We will draw on the work of Foucault (1978/1995), Esposito, (2004/2008), Agamben (1995/1998), Mbembe (2003), and Stanescu (2013) to assist us in our analysis of biopolitics and the war against nonhuman animals. “Human exceptionalism,” according to Stanescu (2013, pp. 135– 136), “is based fundamentally in a desire to create protected lives, and lives that can be, or even need to be, exterminated.” In other words, human exceptionalism is inextricably linked to biopolitics. Taking this further Stanescu (2013) posits that thanatopolitics is also based upon human exceptionalism. Thanatopolitics concerns itself with the politics of death. It works, Murray (2018, p. 718) argues, in contradistinction to biopolitics and its affirmative “instantiations of ‘life itself.’” She explains: “[i]f biopolitics is a productive power that necessitates or silently calls for death as the consequence of ‘making live,’ then thanatopolitics,” Murray (2018, pp. 718–719) continues, “is not merely the lethal underside of biopolitics but is itself a productive power [that] ‘lets die.’” We might then say that thanatopolitical societies are ones characterized by a coalescing of absolute biopower (to “make live”) and sovereign power (“let die”). For Stanescu (2013) the shift from the biopolitical to

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thanatopolitical is what takes place (although not exclusively)1 on the factory farm. Biopolitical violence, Stanescu (2013) explains, has most commonly been used to explain human genocides, that is, intrahuman violence.2 While Stanescu (2013, p. 136) concedes that biopolitics is a useful concept for understanding the way humans treat nonhuman animals, he does not believe it is adequate for understanding the violence that takes place on the factory farm. In the remainder of his article, he sets out his thesis on the factory farm as an example of the inverse of biopolitics. Put simply, he argues that the horrors of the factory farm go beyond biopolitics. In a similar vein, Mbembe (2003), in his essay on necropolitics, questions whether Foucault’s notion of biopower is “sufficient to account for the contemporary ways in which the political, under the guise of war…makes the murder of the enemy its primary and absolute objective? War, after all, is as much a means of achieving sovereignty as a way of exercising the right to kill” (p. 12.). This is also taken up by Margulies (2019, p. 151) who, when writing about the politics of classifying the tiger as a ‘man-eater’ in South India, argues that the concept of necropolitics is better placed to address racialized violence in ‘colonial and postcolonial geographies.’ Unlike necropolitics—which is concerned with “death-in-life” (Mbembe, 2003, p. 21)—biopolitics, he explains, focuses on the bios; on ‘making live.’ He explains: This is not to say death does not figure in biopolitics, or that death has been ignored in critical studies of human-animal relations…Rather, the concept of necropolitics addresses the inadequacies of biopolitics’ engagement with the active political processes of death as necessary for the maintenance of other kinds of life under particular political regimes. (Margulies, 2019, pp. 151–152)

1 In his article New Weapons: Humane Farming, Biopolitics, and the Post-Commodity, Fetish Stanescu (2017) draws on Discipline and Punish to provide a critique of local, free-range, and humane farms in the US which, despite the more favorable conditions of these farms in comparison with factory farms, still involve the killing of nonhuman animals for consumption. To paraphrase Stanescu the reality is, the cage still exists. 2 The examples Stanescu (2013) refers to include Foucault’s Society Must Be Defended (2003), Agamben’s Homo Sacer Series (1995/1998), and Esposito’s Immunity Paradigm Trilogy (2004/2008).

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We will return to the concept of necropolitics in due course, for now let us continue with our review of biopolitical violence. I will present Stanescu’s (2013) thesis before reviewing his arguments and offering my own analysis. Sovereign, disciplinary, and biopower—what Stanescu (2013) refers to as Foucault’s triad of power—share one thing in common: fear of contamination. Biopolitics, then, is concerned with immunization, with protecting ourselves from contagion (Stanescu, 2013). Roberto Esposito developed the immunization paradigm (see Campbell, 2006 for a more detailed review). It works through negation, by delineating what something is not (Stanescu, 2013). In other words, deciding who is afforded immunity (protection from contamination) is built upon an understanding of who should and should not be offered protection. The affirmative only comes into being through negation and rejection. Ironically, this rejection emerges from recognition. As Agamben explained: “Homo sapiens…is an optical machine constructed of a series of mirrors in which man, looking at himself, sees his own features always already deformed in the features of an ape.” Furthermore, humans are “a constitutively ‘anthropomorphous’ animal … who must recognize [themselves] in a non-man in order to be human” (The Open 26–27 as cited by Stanescu, 2013, p. 140). We can unpack this as follows: humans are produced and come to recognize themselves based on what they perceive they are not. They are, as Stanescu (2013, p. 141) argues, produced from nothingness. Agamben uses the concept of the ‘anthropological machine’ to describe the biopolitical charge of creating the human (Stanescu, 2013). This machine works by constructing and reconstructing “what counts as legal and illegal, human and animal, bios and zoë.” Such machines Stanescu (2013) argues, “don’t just draw the line once, but rather constantly redraw the lines, so there is no way to ever know which side of the line one stands on” (Stanescu, “Species Trouble” 573 as cited in Stanescu, 2013, p. 140). If we follow the logic of this thinking, immunity is transformed into autoimmunity. In medical terms, an autoimmune disorder is when the immune system attacks its healthy cells in error. Given the precarious nature of the anthropological machine—the constant deciding of who is

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human and who is not, so that it is not clear who and where one is positioned at any given moment, and whether one is afforded protection (the drawing and re-drawing of the lines)—immunization leads inexorably to autoimmunity. To put it bluntly, the system will end up attacking itself. Thus, as Stanescu argues, biopolitics (deciding on who lives and who dies) is the social iteration of the auto immune (Stanescu, 2013). And in order to protect themselves from contamination, humans must find a way to distinguish themselves (permanently) from nonhuman animals. Indeed, human exceptionalism involves more than placing the human above the nonhuman animal. Its goal is a humanity that is irreducible to the nonhuman animal. A humanity “that is more than human” (Stanescu, 2013, p. 144). However, this biopolitical aspiration of producing the category of ‘more than human’ contains a central paradox: “…the production of the human entails the passive and active destruction of any beings…that are deemed to threaten this human.” This is why, in the context of the “political, auto-immunity is the truest expression of immunity. It is impossible for the social body to recognize itself; it must always kill healthy parts of itself in its dream of immortality” (Stanescu, 2013, p. 145). To reiterate, biopolitics is premised on human exceptionalism which, in turn is linked to eugenics, itself a study involving the separation of human and ‘animal.’ Based on this, it is not surprising, Stanescu (2013) argues, that the factory farm becomes part of the biopolitical system. As Cary Wolfe notes: “…the practices of maximizing control over life and death, of ‘making live’…through eugenics, artificial insemination and selective breeding, pharmaceutical enhancement, inoculation, and the like are on display in the modern factory farm as perhaps nowhere else in biopolitical history” (Wolfe, 2013, p. 46 as cited in Stanescu, 2013, p. 146). However, Stanescu (2013, pp. 146–147) questions whether the same biopolitical and autoimmunity argument i.e., the logic of ‘making live’ and ‘making die,’ can be applied to the factory farm. In short, the answer for Stanescu (2013) is no. For him the realities of factory farming go beyond these concepts. Taking Agamben’s (1995/1998) concept of bare life as his point of departure Stanescu (2013) introduces us to another iteration of life, that of deading life. Before we review this in more detail, let us refamiliarize ourselves with Agamben’s thesis.

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As we established in the Introduction/Chapter 1 (and revisited in Chapter 3), bare life, according to Agamben’s thesis, is one in which humans are stripped of their privileges and are excluded from the state (bios). They are reduced to zo¯e. As articulated by Margulies (2019, p. 152): “[b]eing reduced to bare life strips humans of value, rendering humans as animal bodies, killable without a crime being committed.” It is, he argues, ‘an act of violence occurring beyond the law.’ Stanescu’s ‘deading life’ is a life that is fundamentally about its death and consumption. Here we return to Mbembe (2003, p. 14) and his interest in the “material destruction of human bodies and populations.” What Mbembe (2003, p. 21) is referring to is “death-in-life”; of individuals being “kept alive but in a state of injury, in a phantom-like world of horrors and intense cruelty and profanity.” He further explains (2003, p. 40) that, in modern society, various types of “weapons are deployed in the interest of maximum destruction of persons and the creation of death-worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjugated to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living-dead.” I believe that “death worlds,” as described by Mbembe (2003, p. 40), compliment and sit alongside Stanescu’s notion of deading life to accurately describe the site and situation of nonhuman animals within the animal-industrial complex. Echoing our earlier discussion on dreaded comparisons Stanescu (2013) does not believe that murder and genocide are analogous to the violence of the factory farm. The former is concerned with the ontological production of the ‘living dead,’ while the latter is premised on deading life—entities that ought to be alive but are somehow already dead (Stanescu, 2013). Hannah Arendt famously described the nature of death in the Nazi camps as “the fabrication of corpses.”3 Similarly, Reviel Netz explains that, logistically, death camps had to accommodate for the disposal of future human corpses (Nets, 2004 as cited by Stanescu, 2013, p. 150). Conversely, factory farms do not simply involve the killing of nonhuman animals “but rather the production of corpses for consumption” (Stanescu, 2013, p. 153). The violence of the factory farm is not simply about killing and creating corpses. It 3

Here Stanescu cites Arendt’s Essays in Understanding (1994).

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is not even about the production of death as, according to Stanescu’s analysis, nonhuman animals are already dead. It is my contention that human exceptionalism is the basis upon which humans enact violence toward nonhuman animals. Unlike in the cases of intrahuman violence, such as genocide—which involves the production and ‘fabrication of death’—when nonhuman animals are killed, they were not treated as alive to begin with. They are viewed as commodities necessary to sustain human life. To paraphrase Stanescu (2013), concepts used to explain intrahuman violence cannot be uncritically applied to explain violence against nonhuman animals. In his own words, he states, “[t]he agricultural power and thanatonomy of the factory farm fabricates a new mode of being, a new production of death and life.” That of deading life, where nonhuman animals “should be alive, but are already somehow dead” (p. 155). While Stanescu’s analysis assists us in understanding which bodies this violence is inflicted upon—those considered already dead— Mbembe’s (2003) necropolitics reveals, to borrow from Davies (2018, p. 1538), the reality of “the violence of ‘letting die’”: perpetual pain and suffering. As sated, this chapter is interested in unpacking the relationship between protecting life and administrating death. But what does protecting life entail? Is sustaining life the corollary of protecting life? And is sustenance only achieved by consuming nonhuman animals? In other words, biopolitics and thanatopolitics, albeit in different ways, are premised on the following equation: the consumption of nonhuman animals leads to ‘life itself.’ Crudely put, in order for humans to live, nonhuman animals must die. For Stanescu what differentiates biopolitical intrahuman violence and violence against nonhuman animals, is that, in the case of the latter, these beings were not alive to begin with. To sum up: the notion of human exceptionalism, and by extension the protections and inoculation certain humans believe they are entitled to, is based upon exclusion and negation. It is built upon what it is not: nonhuman. This rhetoric informs the biopolitical and thanatopolitical violence enacted on those deemed subhuman, nonhuman, and inhuman. This is where the similarity ends. While the logic of autoimmunity can

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be applied to humans a different story emerges in the case of nonhuman animals—that of ‘deading life.’4

So Where Does This Leave Us and Our Analysis of the War Against Nonhuman Animals? Throughout this section, we have referred to death and the production of corpses. Given our focus in this book—the acts and consequences of conflict-related reproductive violence (rape, sexual violence, and forced pregnancy)—it is more appropriate to place death along a continuum of destruction. At one end, we have the literal death and destruction of the nonhuman animal, and at the other end, we have the social-symbolic death of nonhuman animals. In Chapter 3, I argued that reproductive violence committed against nonhuman animals is attack upon their personal integrity and autonomy. In relation to the forced separation of mothers and their offspring, I made the case that this is a genderbased violation that results in the destruction of motherhood. In relation to female nonhuman animals, we have seen how reproductive violence is used both within the meat, egg, and dairy industries. These violations result in both literal and social-symbolic death. Male calves and bulls also experience both literal and symbolic death via the reproductive violence(s) committed against them. Castration is used to increase marketability within the meat industry (death), and the methods used in semen collection—despite, paradoxically, involving the valorization of hypermasculinity—ultimately result in a symbolic attack upon the sexual autonomy of the bull. Both, as discussed in detail in the previous chapter, result in displacement from gendered personhood. In terms of their literal death, once their productivity wanes, these nonhuman animals are sent to slaughter. In the preceding paragraphs, we have reviewed differing perspectives on the explanatory power of biopolitics. While some writers have drawn attention to the limitations of biopolitics to explain, for example, war 4

See Campbell (2006) who, drawing on Derrida among others, reviews the implications of autoimmunity in relation to contemporary politics, for example, in relation to the war on terror.

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and the violence(s) of the factory farm, others, as Davies et al. (2017, p. 1268) point out, have noted “the intricate entanglements between biopolitical and necropolitical modes of governance, viewing them as separate concepts that are nevertheless intrinsically linked.” Drawing on various examples, Davies et el. (2017) illustrate how the biopolitical production of life is interconnected with Mbembe’s (2003) ‘death worlds.’ We can apply this thinking to the situation of nonhuman animals. As will be discussed, antibiotics are administered to nonhuman animals in order to promote growth and reduce disease and illness. In sum the aim is to increase productivity. This speaks to the biopolitical production of life (“make live”). However, the treatment of, and conditions under which nonhuman animals are kept (“let die”), places them within a “death world.” Referring to their empirical research of a refugee camp in Calais, Davies et al. (2017) link the “the squalor and permanent wounding of the Calais camp…to Mbembe’s ‘death-worlds.’” They argue that the conditions of the camp, alongside the inaction of the state, impose upon its “inhabitants the status of the ‘living dead.’” As they explain: they are “not actively killed—as would befit a ‘bare life’ reading—but destined to suffer the harm and indignity of long-term cruel conditions” (p. 1280). While similarities can be drawn between this example and the animal-industrial complex (and the treatment of nonhuman animals therein), there are subtle differences.5 Nonhuman animals are indeed kept alive and occupy the status of the ‘living dead.’ But they are also, as noted above, ultimately killed. To reiterate the words of Margulies (2019, p. 152): they are killed “without a crime being committed.” This bestows upon them a bare life. Drawing on all of the work reviewed so far, I would argue that the war against nonhuman animals is premised on the following triad of power: biopolitics, thanatopolitics, and necropolitics. Thus, nonhuman animals are subject to the violence(s) of “make live” as well as the violence(s) of “let die.” A process that entails ongoing pain and suffering.

5 Please note, here I am referring to similarities in the conditions rather than claiming there are similarities in the experiences.

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So far, we have answered Kochi’s (2009) first two questions. In the following section, we will return to Kochi’s (2009) third question: What are the motivations behind, and the contexts within which, the violence(s) of this war take place?

Carnism and the Animal-Industrial Complex I believe carnism, speciesism, and industrial capitalism are the driving forces of meat, egg, and dairy industries. These are what account for the triad of violence outlined above: biopolitics thanatopolitics, and necropolitics. The animal-industrial complex provides us with the context and factory farms are sites where the war against nonhuman animals takes place. All result in the commodification of nonhuman animals. We have addressed carnism and speciesism. Below I want to unpack the animalindustrial complex and industrial capitalism in more detail, as well as the use of factory farms across the world. For Noske (1997, p. ix) the animal-industrial complex is the result of “human domestication of animals” with the current industrial production demonstrating “poignantly the extent to which humans have come to dominate and exploit animals as mere resources.”6 Utilizing the work of Taylor and Marx, Noske (1997) draws parallels between the situation of industrial workers and nonhuman animals within the animal-industrial complex. It is worth quoting her at length: Under capitalism animals have come to be totally incorporated into production technology…animal industries have become increasingly mechanized, automated, and ‘rationalized’… Animals nowadays are increasingly made to produce in huge buildings, in systems ranging from moderate to total confinement…. Confinement systems serve a twofold purpose: to crowd as many animals as possible in one spot and to manipulate them toward ever greater productivity. (Noske, 1997, p. 14) 6

The traditional understanding of domestication refers to the capture, taming, and removal of nonhuman animals from their natural habitats for (re)productive purposes. For a more detailed review of the history of domestication and the shift from hunter-gatherer societies to agriculture see Noske (1997) and Patterson (2021/2002).

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Twine (2012, 2013) identifies and draws comparisons between four other complexes: the military-industrial complex, the prison-industrial complex, the entertainment-industrial complex, and the pharmaceuticalindustrial complex. He highlights how all four are driven by political and economic interests (for a more detailed analysis see Twine, 2012, 2013). In relation to the military-industrial complex nonhuman animals have been exploited and killed.7 They have been used as weapons, used to transport weapons, and used to test weapons during war and armed conflict. In sum, aligned with their treatment in the animalindustrial complex, they have been treated as disposal objects, whose purpose is to serve/protect the interests of humans. In terms the prisonindustrial complex, Twine (2013) believes that the term encapsulates the connections between the incarceration of nonhuman animals; of humans subject to animalization, and humans criminalized by their activism, for example, those that protest against animal cruelty. And in a similar vein he suggests that the entertainment-industrial complex could be aligned with the animal-industrial complex if we consider zoos and theme parks (I would add the circus to this list). However, the most obvious overlap, according to Twine (2013, p. 83–84), occurs between the animal-industrial complex and the pharmaceuticalindustrial complex. These are: 1. The use of nonhuman animals in experimental drug research. 2. The use of antibiotics in nonhuman animals within the meat, egg, and dairy industries (we will return to this shortly). 3. The use of anti-depressants in nonhuman animals. 4. Health related problems resulting from the consumption of meat and dairy which can then lead to need for pharmaceutical intervention. In all four complexes, capitalism, Twine (2012, p. 19) argues, “creatively commodifies its own excess [and] its own ailments.” In all instances, the mass production of numerous commodities does not align with the

7

The military-industrial complex involves interactions between the government (and its military policy), the armed forces, and the companies that provide financial support (Twine, 2012).

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well-being of human and nonhuman animals, and yet, as Twine (2012) highlights, they are “pursued and capitalized upon.”

Alienation Let us return to Noske (1997) and the animal-industrial complex. To elucidate these parallels Noske draws on Frederick Taylor’s The Principle of Scientific Management —which utilizes scientific measures to increase productivity among workers—and Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, specifically his four interconnected aspects of alienation: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Alienation from the product; Alienation from their productivity/their skills; Alienation from species life (nature); Alienation from humans.

Noske applies these four components to nonhuman animals. Others have also extended Marx’s analysis of alienation to nonhuman animals. Benton (1993, p. 59 cited by Gunderson, 2011, p. 266) notes that Marxist themes of enslavement, dehumanization, and estranged existence also apply to the situation of nonhuman animals within the animalindustrial complex. While lamenting this missed opportunity in Marx’s work, Painter (2016) acknowledges that nonhuman animals (particularly working nonhuman animals) are alienated insofar as they are: (1) treated as vehicles of production (2) viewed as private property (3) subject to forced unpaid labor, and (4) denied their sentience and are made to suffer while their interests are ignored. Gunderson (2011, p. 266) draws a similar conclusion noting that nonhuman animals have become alienated and estranged within ‘human-mediated conditions’ and much like humans, they experience the negation of their needs. It is worth noting, as Painter (2016, p. 332) does, that there may be some objection to applying the notion of alienation to nonhuman animals. This is mainly due to arguments that nonhuman animals do not have the capacity to reflect upon their experiences of exploitation vis-à-vis human institutions (Painter, 2016). As we have established,

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direct comparisons cannot be drawn between humans and nonhumans. However, it is still possible to observe the misery and pain experienced by nonhuman animals when they are exploited within a capitalist system. Painter urges us to read the work of Catharine MacKinnon, who posed the following questions: “[w]ho asked the animals?” And: “[d]o animals dissent from human hegemony [and dominance]?” MacKinnon responds: “I think they often do. They vote with their feet by running away. They bite back, scream in pain, withhold affection, approach warily, fly and swim away” (MacKinnon, 2004: 270 as cited by Painter, 2016, p. 332). Despite the misgivings of some, I agree with Noske (1997) and others (see above), that all four aspects of alienation can be applied to situation of nonhuman animals within the capitalist industrial model. However, the first two are relevant for our discussion of reproductive violence discussed in this book (see Stache, 2020 for a critique). Twine (2012, p. 15) warns us against the rhetorical use of Noske’s (1997) concept and urges us to move beyond philosophical musings toward practical application. He suggests a focus on case studies and specific examples when trying to understand the animal-industrial complex. Taking this into account in the following section I will outline the type of ‘animal alienation’ proposed by Noske (1997) before applying it to the specific War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity committed during the war against nonhuman animals. 1. Nonhuman animals are alienated from their products. In Chapter 3, we considered the separation of mother from her offspring as part of the meat and dairy industries. I described this as the destruction of motherhood. The grief the mothers experience—as evidenced from their cries when their babies are removed—speaks to their alienation from their ‘products.’ ‘Products’ that were never theirs to begin with (Painter, 2016).

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2. Nonhuman animals are alienated from productive activity. The bodily functions and capabilities of nonhuman animals are stripped from them. Their natural abilities are replaced by animal husbandry practices, which include artificial reproductive practices. I argue that these result in displacement from gendered personhood. As Torres explains, “[t]he bodies and functions of animals have been completely appropriated by capital, and, subsequently, put to use in a single way only, subordinating the total animal being to [a] single productive activity” (Torres, 2007, p. 40 as cited by Painter, 334–335). Noske argues that nonhuman animals have become commodities and as such, the same methods used by Taylor to increase the productivity of his workers can be applied to nonhuman animals. Various scientific and technological devises and methods are used to achieve this increased productivity. One of which is the ‘rape rack’ (see Chapter 4). Referring to Marx’s observations about male workers and the separation of home and work, Noske observes that in a similar way to female workers— where there is no distinction between home and work, as their work is done within the home—for ‘animal workers’ there is no separation; no ‘going home.’ They work—and are exploited—nonstop. She says: “[i]n the case of animals the ‘home; itself has been brought under factory control” (p. 17). And even if nonhuman animals do not fully understand their role as commodities within industrial capitalism this does not negate their ability to feel any kind of consciousness (Noske, 1997). They are still social beings who can suffer and feel pain. The terms industrial capitalism, exploitation, commodification, and alienation, among others, have featured heavily in our discussion so far. In the following section, drawing on Marxist perspectives, I want to unpack these in more detail.

Marxism and the Exploitation of Nonhuman Animals In an article titled Conceptualizing Animal Exploitation in Capitalism: Getting Terminology Straight Christian Stache (2020) highlights what he

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perceives are some of the problems with applying Marxist terminology to the exploitation and oppression of nonhuman animals in capitalism. Specifically, he asks whether we can conceive of nonhuman animals as wage laborers, slaves, or super-exploited commodities (Stache, 2020). I will consider Stache’s position on all of these before sharing my own analysis. Some writers view nonhuman animals as wage laborers and regard them as part of the working-class. Stache (2020, p. 409) cites Jason Hribal (2012, p. 2), a leading proponent of this viewpoint, who reminds us that nonhuman animals who worked on farms, in factories and cities “played an indispensable role in the development of capitalism through their role as laborers.” “They,” he argues, “as much as humans, built the modern world.” He believes that their roles as laborers place them within the working-class. Others posit that nonhuman animals have been exploited as slaves. And a third group view nonhuman animals as superexploited commodities. Stache (2020) mainly takes issue with the first two perspectives. First, he disagrees with the notion that nonhuman animals are wage laborer’s. While he accepts that nonhuman animals work and that they are worked on, they do not, he explains, receive a wage. They “do not sell their [labor] power on the market” (p. 410). And given that nonhuman animals are not part of the proletariat with regard to their political agency (they have no means to overthrow capitalism), they cannot, Stache (2020) agues, be part of the working-class. Second, while human slaves and nonhuman animals are not paid for their labor, nor are they regarded as politically ‘free,’ Stache believes there are significant differences between the slavery of humans in capitalism and the treatment of nonhuman animals. As previously discussed, we are not interested in drawing such analogies in this book, and therefore, we will not linger on this point. Finally, with regard to the third perspective—that nonhuman animals are super-exploited beings—Stache (2020, 411–412) regards this as an appropriate term to describe the subjugation of nonhuman animals within capitalism. One final point is worth addressing here and that is Stache’s (2020) claim that nonhuman animals do not produce commodities such as meat, eggs, and milk. Although Stache (2020) concedes that nonhuman animals are themselves commodities, they do not, according to his analysis,

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produce commodities. He explains that “…even though animals often work around the clock and under full use of their bodies, they do not produce value or exchange value… If nonhuman animals do not perform wage [labor] and do not create value, they cannot produce commodities” (Stache, 2020, p. 414). I believe these claims about wage labor and commodity production require further deliberation.

Nonhuman Animals as Laborers In agreement with Stache (2020), Chhabra (2019) acknowledges that, from a Marxist perspective, nonhuman animals do not make labor contracts rather, they are put to labor. She goes further and argues that even when they are no longer alive, nonhuman animals provide food. “Hence, in many different contexts, animals not only partake in work while they are alive, they are also ‘put to use’ after they cease to live. That scenario definitely does not come under [‘labor’] but has enormous economic significance” (Chhabra, 2019, p. 169). Here we return to our argument regarding shared sources of oppression. This is elucidated by Buzby (2015, p. 28) who—in her thorough analysis of Marxism and the situation of nonhuman animals—argues that, although we cannot engage in a flat comparison between the situation of humans and nonhuman animals, we must concede that both are impacted by “a system that voraciously consumes the life force of all living beings.” From my own perspective, I am less concerned with whether or not nonhuman animals are viewed as wage laborers, or as beings who are put to work. The point for me, from a Marxist analysis of “the systemic conditions of all labor under capitalism,” is that this labor is forced labor (Buzby, 2015, p. 40). Is this not the crucial point? Nonhuman animals have not chosen or consented to their status as laborers? In terms of Stache’s (2020) third point, I agree nonhuman animals are super-exploited beings. The triad of violent power exercised as part of their subjugation—biopolitics, thanatopolitics, and necropolitics—underscores the extent of their pain and suffering. Let us turn now to Stache’s final observation concerning commodity products and nonhuman animals.

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Do Nonhuman Animals Produce Commodities? It will be useful to start by defining and unpacking what is meant by the term commodity. Marx (1978) defines commodities as “mysterious, social things whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses” (pp. 302–321). The mysteriousness of the commodity can be attributed not to its use value, but rather, its exchange value. This is how Marx (1978) explains how products shift from their use value to acquiring an exchange value: It is only by being exchanged that the products of labor acquire, as values, one uniform social status, distinct from their varied forms of existence as objects of utility. This division of a product into a useful thing and a value becomes practically important, only when exchange has acquired such an extension that useful articles are produced for the purpose of being exchanged, and their character as values has therefore to be taken into account, beforehand, during production. (Marx, 1978, pp. 321–322)

Put simply, the goal of the commodity within capitalism is to make a profit, this is irrespective of whether the worker is a human or nonhuman animal (Painter). The latter—nonhuman animals—produce “animalderived commodities” (Gunderson, 2011, p. 259) in the form of food and clothing. However, within the capitalist system these commodities no longer have use value. Rather, the market-driven structure focuses on their exchange value (Gunderson, 2011). And it is the domination of the exchange value over its use value that accounts for the thanatopolitical violence that takes place within factory farming (Gunderson, 2011). As Buzby (2015, p. 36) explains: …the body of the pig or cow must be subjected fully to the will of capital and divorced from any value independent of the sum of its ‘useful’ parts. To continuously increase profit, therefore, the producer must devise more perfect means of extracting labor power and putting it to efficient use: modern factory farms are ideal laboratories where such techniques can be perfected.

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Based on Stache’s analysis, and my own reading of Marx’s work, from a purely Marxist perspective, nonhuman animals (as unpaid workers) do not (indeed, cannot) produce commodities. As Tucker (interpreting Marx) explains: “in wage [labor]…the worker sells to the capitalist employer the only commodity that he possesses, his [labor power], and receives in recompense a wage reflecting this commodity’s ‘value’” (Tucker, 1978, p. xxx). However, I believe we can think of labor and commodities outside a strictly Marxist analysis, replacing the notion of wage labor with unpaid labor, as is the case with nonhuman animals. Therefore, we can proceed on the following basis: “[unpaid labor] produces not only commodities; it produces itself and the worker as a commodity…” (Marx 1844/1978, p. 71). In other words, nonhuman animals produce animal-derived commodities (meat, eggs, and dairy) and their unpaid profit-driven working conditions reduce them to commoditized beings. While nonhuman animals do not negotiate their wage labor via the commodities they produce, the products manufactured—the meat, eggs, and dairy—do have exchange value within the market: these commodities are the basis upon which companies are able to compete within the capitalist market. As we saw in Chapter 3, the profit revenue from these industries is substantial. This categorization of nonhuman animals as exploited commoditized beings sits well with our understanding of them as passive legal persons (see Chapter 2). As argued, passive legal personhood is concerned with ensuring personal freedom, liberty, and bodily integrity. It is distinct from active legal personhood which comprises rights and duties. The latter carries with it both civil and criminal responsibilities. Stache’s argument concerning the non-agency of nonhuman animals within the market, i.e., their lack of market value, need not concern us. If our aim is to recognize the passive legal personhood status of nonhuman animals, then their violent exploitation as producers of animal-derived products, warrants they be afforded the same rights and protections as legal persons. Now that we have outlined the nature of, the reasons for, and the circumstances under which the war against nonhuman animals takes place, we will now move on to review the sites where War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (rape, forced pregnancy, and sexual violence) occur. We will start with Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations

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(CAFOs) in the US before moving on to consider mega farms in the UK, Europe, and the rest of the world.

Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations in the US Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) are large industrial farms that raise nonhuman animals at high-density, for the consumption of meat, eggs, and dairy. Under the Clean Water Act, prior to becoming a CAFO, a facility must qualify as an Animal Feeding Operation (AFO). These are defined as facilities where “animals... have been, are, or will be stabled or confined and fed or maintained for a total of 45 days or more in any 12-month period” (Elefritz, 2018, p. 897). As Hribar (2010) explains, CAFOs are classified by both the type and number of nonhuman animals they detain and the way waste is released into the water supply (see also Elefritz, 2018).8 In terms of the number of nonhuman land animals, to qualify as CAFOs, these facilities need to hold at least 125,000 broiler chickens, 82,000 laying hens, 2,500 pigs (in some instances this can be as much as 10,000 pigs), 700 dairy cows and 1,000 beef cattle (Four Paws, 2020; Moberg, 2021). Some have argued that CAFOS are efficient; that they result in increased employment and enhance the economy; that they provide animal specialization and produce low-cost meat, eggs, and milk (see Hribar, 2010). While some of these claims may be true, there are major shortcomings associated with these facilities. These will be reviewed in detail below. Mega farms are the British equivalent of CAFOs. In the UK there are 800. Indeed, as Wasley et al. (2017) report, every county in England has at least one of these intensive mega farms. To qualify, the farm must include facilities that can detain more than “40,000 birds, 2,000 pigs or 750 breeding sows” (Wasley et al., 2017). To put this in perspective: “Herefordshire has more than 16 million factory-farmed animals…which means the county has 88 times more factory-farmed 8

These industrial animal farms are referred to as Intensive Livestock Operations in Canada (McLeod-Kilmurray, 2012).

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animals than it does humans. Shropshire and Norfolk [have] more than 15 million and 12 million animals respectively” (Wasley et al., 2017). The same concerns raised about CAFOs in the US—relating to noise, smell, pollution, and disease—have been expressed in relation to mega farms in the UK (Four Paws, 2020; Wasley et al., 2017). While radical changes are being implemented across Europe—27 countries are planning to ban the use of cages for nonhuman farm animals by 2027—this is not the case with mega farms across Asia (Duteurtre et al., 2021). In the case of the latter, the increase in intensive farming—and the concomitant increased threat of viruses—has led to a doubling in the use of antibiotics over the past ten years. Indeed, based on current trends, Harvey (2017) estimates that Asia will experience a 120% increase in antibiotic use in these farms by 2030. This will have implications for antibiotic resistance globally (Harvey, 2017), not to mention the environmental and public health impacts this increase in factory farming will have across the region (Chandran, 2017).

What Are the Impacts of CAFOs? To answer the question posed at the start of this chapter—what are the global consequences of the war against nonhuman animals?—in the next section we will consider the various ways in which CAFOs impact society, both at the local and global levels. Our discussion will cover public health and antibiotic resistance, environmental impacts, and the working environment of factory and slaughterhouse workers.

Public Health Implications Manure is the main public health issue connected with CAFOs. This is because manure contains a number of contaminants. According to the Government Accountability Office (2008), the annual production of manure can range between 2,800 and 1.6 million tons (see Hribar, 2010, p. 2). The contaminants from manure impact surface and groundwater supplies. Certain contaminants can have adverse effects on both

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human and nonhuman animals (Burkholder et al., 2007). If the land application of manure is not done correctly, it leaks into the groundwater and can contaminate drinking water with nitrates. This can be harmful to humans (Hribar, 2010). As the Environmental Protection Agency argues, CAFOs—and the agriculture sector more broadly—are the “leading contributor of pollutants to lakes, rivers, and reservoirs. [Sates] with high concentrations of CAFOs experience on average 20 to 30 serious water quality problems per year as a result of manure management problems” (Environmental Protection Agency, 2001). This contaminated water can also kill aquatic life (Hribar, 2010). Air pollution is another area of concern as CAFOs produce a number of air emissions. This consists of gaseous and particulate substances (Hribar, 2010). The former is caused by the decomposition of animal manure, while the latter is caused by the movement of nonhuman animals (Hribar, 2010). The common air pollutants that surround CAFOs include “ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, methane, and particulate matter” (Hribar, 2010. See Son et al., 2021 for an empirical test of the impact of CAFOs on public health in North Carolina). The concentration of large numbers of nonhuman animals in poor and unventilated conditions (as is the case in CAFOs) often leads to the rapid transmission of viruses among nonhuman animals which are then passed on to humans, for example, the pandemic influenza viruses (Guo et al., 2022). Zoonotic diseases can be transmitted through air, water, the handling, or consumption of meat, or via direct transmission from nonhuman animals to humans (Gilchrist et al., 2007). To address the increased risk of illness and diseases antibiotics are often given to nonhuman animals (Guo et al., 2022).

Antibiotic Resistance The increase in antibiotic resistance—resulting from the overuse of antibiotics—has led to a concern that we are moving toward a ‘post antibiotic era’ (Jamrozik & Selgelid, 2020). This means we could be entering into a situation where we do not have access to lifesaving antibiotics (Gilchrist et al., 2007). The overuse of antibiotics is

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attributed, in part, to the increased use of antibiotics in animal feed to promote growth, increase meat production, and curtail disease and illness among nonhuman animals held in CAFOs or similar facilities (Gilchrist et al., 2007). As Hribar (2010) noted in 2010, “[t]here is strong evidence that the use of antibiotics in animal feed is contributing to an increase in antibiotic-resistant microbes and causing antibiotics to be less effective for humans” (see also Mehdi et al., 2018). Shapiro (2017) goes further and describes antibiotic resistance as “one of the greatest threats to human health globally.” She cites research that predicts an annual 10 million deaths across the globe by 2050 if policies are not put in place to address antibiotic resistance (see also Littmann et al., 2020). The overuse—or more accurately, the misuse use of antibiotics—in nonhuman animals leads to the development of drug-resistant bacteria. These bacteria—which develop into antibiotic resistant infections among humans—can be transmitted by handling or eating contaminated food, as well as coming into direct contact with nonhuman animals and/or nonhuman animal waste (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, n.d.). Currently, in the US, the Food and Drug Administration reports that 80% of antibiotics are used to feed nonhuman animals (Shapiro, 2017). While the use of antibiotics in agriculture is monitored closely in the UK (e.g., by the Swann Report, 1969 and farmantibiotics.org.),9 some report that the EU has banned the use of all growth hormone promoters which includes the use of antibiotics (Shapiro, 2017. See also Jamrozik & Selgelid, 2020). Conversely, Save Our Antibiotics argue that large quantities of antibiotics continue to be used in animal feed in the UK and across Europe. They do note that new regulations were being implemented across Europe in 2022 to end the routine use of antibiotics and that its use in the UK has fallen during the last 5 years (Save Our Antibiotics, n.d.). The situation is more concerning in developing countries, 9

The Swann report of 1969—Use of Antibiotics in Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Medicine— recognized the potential risks associated with the over administration of antibiotics in animal husbandry. In order to reduce the risk of antibiotic resistance, the committee responsible for the report outlined a number of recommendations to control the use of antibiotics. This mainly involved differentiating between therapeutic antibiotics and feed antibiotics. Only the latter would be available without prescription and was only permitted if they did not result in hazards to human health.

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for example, in sub-Saharan Africa, where there has been huge growth in the use of antibiotics among nonhuman animals (Anomaly, 2020, see also Hao Van et al., 2020).

Environmental The environmental impacts of CAFOs disproportionately impact vulnerable populations. Moberg (2021, p. 773) uses the term “environmental justice (EJ) communities” when referring to these populations which comprise mainly of low-income, Black, Indigenous, and people of color. She states: “[n]eighborhood pollution is a serious EJ issue as emissions from the large quantities of livestock manure stored at CAFOs can contain unsafe quantities of gasses” (Moberg, 2021, pp. 773–774. See also Buzby, 2015; Gilliland, 2020; Son et al., 2021). CAFOs emit greenhouse gases which has implications for climate change. Globally, greenhouse gas emissions from factory farming comprise 14.5% of all greenhouse gas emissions. Research conducted by Nature Food found that “[t]he use of cows, pigs and other animals for food, as well as livestock feed, is responsible for 57% of all food production emissions” (as cited by Milman, 2021 emphasis added). Milman goes on to state: “[t]he global production of food is responsible for a third of all planet-heating gases emitted by human activity, with the use of animals for meat causing twice the pollution of producing plant-based foods, a major new study has found.”10 Carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide are the main greenhouse gases produced by CAFOs. Both methane and nitrous oxide emissions 10

Conversely, George Dunn, chief executive of the Tenant Farmers Association, rejected the need for drastic cuts to UK meat and dairy production. He stated that only 10% of the UK’s CO2 emissions are from agriculture and highlighted that most of the UK’s emissions come from transport and energy, which accounts for almost half of all emissions. Given that UK agriculture comprises “over two-thirds of the UK landmass, its carbon emissions are already incredibly low by comparison to other land uses.” He further argued: “[i]f 70% of the landmass produces 10% of the emissions it must mean that the remaining 30% produces 90% of the emissions. Every acre of land in agriculture is already less polluting by a factor of 20 in comparison to every acre of land in another sector” (as cited in Harvey 2022). Notwithstanding these claims, as noted above, globally factory farming is responsible for 14.5% of all greenhouse gas emissions and 57% of all food production emissions.

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stem from manure management practices (when excess manure is stored in pits or lagoons). Carbon dioxide emissions are the result of a number of factors including, but not limited to (1) the use of fossil fuels to manage the temperature of the facilities and to run the machinery (2) the way nonhuman animals are processed and packaged, and (3) deforestation and desertification (Elefritz, 2018). Through their digestive processes, ruminant nonhuman animals (those with specialized digestive systems) produce methane gas. Cows, for example, use their rumen (one of the four components of their stomach) to digest undigestible food. They partially digest the food and then let it ferment before regurgitating it and completing the digestive process. It is during the fermentation that the grains or plants produce methane which is then released by the cow when it belches (Clear Center, 2019; Hribar, 2010). Therefore, the global agriculture industry contributes to climate change through greenhouse gas emissions (Elefritz, 2018).

Slow Violence and the Animal-Industrial Complex Following Davies’ article Toxic Space and Time: Slow Violence, Necropolitics, and Petrochemical Pollution—where he explores the impact of industrial pollution in a town in Louisiana—I believe it would be fruitful to draw on Mbembe’s (2003) necropolitics and Nixon’s (2011) concept of slow violence to unpack the environmental impacts of the animalindustrial complex. Slow violence is violence that is out of sight and that develops over time. It involves “delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all” (Nixon, 2011, p. 2). Typically, violence is viewed as something immediate and visible, whereas slow violence is gradual but not harmless (Davies, 2018). Environmental pollution is often used as a prime example of slow violence, where the harms of pollution accumulate over time, with serious consequences (Davies, 2018). As discussed above, the agricultural industry, through its greenhouse gas emissions, contributes to climate change. I argue, therefore, that the animal-industrial complex, and the pollution it causes, can be placed within this framework of slow violence.

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Returning to the subtle, yet important, distinction between biopolitical control and the necropolitical system—between ‘make die’ and ‘let die’—as Davies (2018) notes, slow violence does not involve actively killing individuals through environmental harm, rather, communities exposed to pollution, for example, are victims of state inaction, which results in the “subjugation of life to the power of death” (Mbembe, 2003, p. 39). “Slow violence, then, can be read as a form of latemodern necropolitics, where communities are exposed to the power of death-in-life. It is a nondeliberate consequence of polluting industries that they expose subaltern populations (especially) to the experience of ‘death-worlds’” (Davies, 2018, p. 1540). Indeed, as highlighted above, racialized and marginalized communities are often the most at risk of the violence of ‘let die’ (Davies et al., 2017). Ironically then, the necropolitical machine turns in on itself. Nonhuman animals, as a result of the violence and exploitation inflicted upon them within the animal-industrial complex, are subject to the following interrelated networks of violent control: biopolitics, thanatopolitics, and necropolitics. These processes take place on CAFOs which, as highlighted, result in various types of ground and air pollution. The latter, specifically greenhouse gas emissions, has implications for climate change. Slow violence captures the delayed destruction that follows from environmental pollution. Human populations exposed to this invisible, yet inevitable, destructive violence, occupy “spaces of contamination that are akin to ‘death-worlds’” (Davies, 2018, p. 1540). Put simply, they are the “living dead” (Mbembe, 2003, p. 40). In stark terms: the ‘death worlds’ and the ‘living dead’ status of nonhuman animals within the animal-industrial complex will, inevitably, become the reality for many human populations.

The Impact on Industry Workers In response to Kochi’s (2009, p. 354) second question—“who may legitimately use coercion, violence and killing”—I responded with the following: those who legitimately use this violence are individuals at the state and institutional levels and individual actors within the intensive

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animal farming industry. However, in this next section, we will focus on the emotional and physical harm experienced by factory and slaughterhouse workers who “earn poverty wages to perform dangerous and traumatic jobs” (Animal legal defense fund, 2020). Here it is important to distinguish between those who run these industries and those who work within them. Despite the routinized and systematic nature of the work, the exploitation and slaughtering of nonhuman animals is “up close and personal” (Baran et al., 2016, p. 355). It is stressful, unpleasant, and poorly paid work, often described as monotonous yet labor intensive. Efficiency and profit are the driving forces, requiring workers to perform their tasks at great speed which can have serious repercussions (see Sebastian, 2017).

Factory Farm Workers As outlined above, CAFOs and mega farms house thousands of nonhuman animals in close proximity in unventilated facilities where disease and illness are rife. In response nonhuman animals are given antibiotics to fight off illnesses which then causes them to develop drugresistance bacteria. Those who work in these facilities are exposed to a number of health risks including viruses, infections, and drug-resistant bacteria. Workers are also exposed to noxious gases as well as particulate matter which can lead to respiratory diseases. The work environment for factory farm employees is dangerous and stressful as they are required to handle large numbers of distressed nonhuman animals in unsuitable conditions. Physical injuries and illnesses are common, and the brutality visited upon nonhuman animals (whether inflicted or witnessed by workers) has an emotional and psychological impact on their mental well-being (Animal Legal Defense Fund, 2020). Indeed, there are high rates of depression and suicide among those who work in the farming industry (Gillespie, 2018).

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Slaughterhouse Workers11 The experience of slaughterhouse workers is similar. They too are exposed to large-scale cruelty and violence on a day-to-day basis, while receiving a lover than average wage for the dangerous and traumatic work they do (Dillard, 2007). As Dillard notes: The inside of a typical slaughterhouse is a place of blood, pain, and death…The animals killed in American slaughterhouses do not experience a painless death, and the slaughterhouse workers watch—and are implicated in—the gruesome deaths of thousands of animals every week.

Dillard cites the work of MacNair who uses the term PerpetrationInduced Traumatic Stress (a type of post-traumatic stress disorder PTSD) to describe situations which are traumatic because the individual was implicated in the creation of the traumatic event. In this case, workers experience the symptoms of PTSD, but as a result of PerpetrationInduced Traumatic Stress—i.e., the violence they are required to carry out as part of their jobs (Dillard, 2007, see also McLeod-Kilmurray, 2012). In 2005, Human Rights Watch produced a 175-page report—Blood, Sweat, and Fear: Workers’ Rights in US Meat and Poultry Plants—which documented the unsafe working conditions in US slaughterhouses. It highlighted the scale of injuries incurred, unlawful company practices, as well as aggressive and intimidating behavior toward workers from their employers. Then in 2019 Human Rights Watch published a second report—When We’re Dead and Buried, Our Bones Will Keep Hurting.12 Based on empirical research with current and former workers, the report notes that serious injuries and chronic illnesses continue to be a major problem for plant workers. It notes that between 2013 and 2017 an average of 8 workers a year died as a result of an incident that occurred in a slaughterhouse (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Among other things the 11 The term meat-packing industry is also used. It covers the slaughter, processing, packing, and distributing of ‘meat.’ 12 See the study by Cook et al. (2017) that reviews the working conditions and public health risks in slaughterhouses in western Kenya.

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report addresses “cumulative trauma injuries and musculoskeletal disorders”; the risks associated with ‘rapid work speed,’ for example, slaughter line speeds; “inadequate staffing and the mistreatment of workers” and the exposure to harmful chemicals (Human Rights Watch, 2019). With regard to latter Rebecca G., a poultry worker in Arkansas, explained: As soon as we would enter we would start to tear up.… It was really strong. We felt like we were getting sick—your throat, nose. For me, I would cry. I was always crying. I also had really strong pain in my throat. Some people would get bloody noses.… Almost every day it was one person or another [complaining to management]. One pregnant woman went to ask what chemicals they were using and what [they would] do to [her] child [but the company] said that it was within the permitted standards.… Their solution is to say: ‘If you don’t want to stay here, go. (as cited in Human Rights Watch, 2019)

Slaughterhouse work has been described as ‘dirty work.’ This is work that is considered “undesirable, morally objectionable, or otherwise carries a stigma…” (Baran et al., 2016, p. 353). Baran et al. (2016, p. 357) argue, however, that the work carried out in slaughterhouses goes beyond dirty work. “Instead,” they suggest, “the intentional killing of animals likely impacts workers’ well-being in deep, psychological ways through their repeated exposure to and involvement in tasks that make them additional victims of the pain they perpetrate.” Many slaughterhouse workers are undocumented migrant workers who are less likely to make official complaints about their working conditions (Nibert, 2013). As one poultry worker explained: “[t]hey have us under threat all the time. They know most of us are undocumented—probably two-thirds. All they care about is getting bodies into the plant. My supervisor said they say they’ll call the INS if we make trouble”13 (see Human Rights Watch, 2005). Working in the meat-packing industry in the US has always been dangerous. The Jungle, written by Upton Sinclair in 1906, offers a fictionalized account of the appalling working conditions within the meat-packing industry in the US. And as Younge (2006) writes, in his review of the novel, “the ethnicity of the protagonists and the location of 13

INS refers to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

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the story have changed, but the basic narrative of poor working conditions for immigrant [laborer’s] in the meat-packing industry and public concern over food quality remains constant.” Unfortunately, despite improvements following the publication of this book,14 the research by Human Rights Watch (2005, 2019) presented above reveals that the meat-packing industry remains a perilous occupation for its workers. Indeed, the safety of workers was further compromised during the coronavirus pandemic. Workers, with symptoms of COVID-19, were forced to work with inadequate PPE in situations that did not adhere to social distancing guidelines (Chang et al., 2021). During the first months of the pandemic, coronavirus outbreaks were common in meat-packing plants (Chang et al., 2021). Yet, as Chang et al. (2021) report, the chairman for Tyson (one of the largest US meat companies) argued that keeping the factories open to feed Americans—despite the risks to workers—was as “essential as healthcare.” Following this statement, 49 slaughterhouse workers died from COVID-19. “The message was clear: Americans needed meat, and workers needed to risk their lives to provide it” (Chang et al., 2021). The physical, emotional consequences of the global war against nonhuman animals are, for humans, to a greater or lesser degree, existential. Yet, ironically, they are premised on a misguided notion of ‘making live.’ I will explore this in more detail below.

The Central Paradox of the ‘More Than Human’ Biopolitical Dream For Joy the invisible, unrecognized victims of the animal-industrial complex are human animals. These, she states, are “the factory workers, the residents who live near polluting CAFOs, the meat consumers, the [taxpayers]. “They are,” she further explains, “you and I” (Joy, 2010, pp. 73–74). Joy believes that all of us “are the collateral damage of carnism; we pay for it with our health, our environment, and our taxes.”

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See Food Print (2021) for more details.

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Reading these words, I am reminded of the immunization and autoimmunity paradigm developed by Esposito. To reiterate: immunization involves developing methods that can protect humans from ‘contamination.’ However, the nature of biopolitics necessarily transforms immunity into autoimmunity, into a situation where the system attacks itself. As discussed above, human exceptionalism is rooted in a desire to protect certain lives while simultaneously dealing death and destruction to those deemed unworthy of such protection: the subhuman, nonhuman, and inhuman. I have suggested that human protection is inextricably linked with sustaining human life. This preserving of human life involves the consumption of nonhuman animals. And yet, the ways in which this consumption is made possible—through animal husbandry practices, CAFOs, and mega farms—is linked with serious environmental as well as physical and psychological health problems. The implications of this slow violence were outlined above. Paradoxically, the practices and processes required to uphold human exceptionalism are ones that carry serious risks to public health, thereby undermining the project altogether. The confinement of thousands of nonhuman animals within mega facilities which increase the risk of disease, viruses, infections—and perhaps, most concerning of all, antibiotic resistance—contradicts the central goal of the biopolitical dream: the elevation of the human above those reduced to the status of nonhuman ‘Other.’ To put it another way, the animal-industrial complex leads to the autoimmune response. Granted, not all humans consume animal products that have been produced on CAFOs or mega farms. And not all humans eat nonhuman animals. But not all humans engage in racism, sexism, or homophobia, but that does not negate the fact that human exceptionalism still exists. And that it is racist, sexist, speciesist and involves the exploitation and commodification of those rendered nonhuman. Human exceptionalism and the ‘deading life’ that it is premised upon is the underlying driving force behind the nature and context of the war against nonhuman animals. To return to Joy’s invisible victims (2010), it is a war that, ironically, humans wage against themselves as well as their nonhuman counterparts.

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Moving Forward: Non-Dairy and Vegan Alternatives Earlier we reviewed the various impacts of factory farming, not least in terms of the public health and environmental impacts. Below we will consider the environmental impact of plant-based alternatives, comparing them with the environmental impact of the meat and dairy industries. By doing so I want to consider the viability of adopting a plant-based diet and the possible benefits it can offer. As I write this chapter a new plant-based milk has entered the food market: potato milk. This is in addition to an already diverse range of non-dairy alternatives (from nuts, grains, and legumes) that include, respectively, almond, hazelnut, and coconut milk, rice and oat milk and soy and hemp milk. The alt-milk industry is worth £400 million a year in the UK (Wood, 2022). As Wood (2022) explains: “[f ]or many alt-milk fans the attraction is they offer a route to reducing the environmental impact of their diet due to the level of greenhouse gas emissions associated with traditional dairy farming.”15 However, the green and sustainability claims made by certain companies have been contested. For example, “the Advertising Standards Authority recently banned a marketing campaign by Oatly, ruling that the green claims made were misleading” (Wood, 2022). Below, drawing on empirical data, I review the green and sustainability credentials of various plant-based alternatives. Comparing a number of environmental metrics—land use, greenhouse gas emissions, water use, and eutrophication16 —Ritchie (2022) found that dairy milk, when compared with oat, soy, almond, and rice milk, scores higher across all metrics. Based on her research she states: “dairy milk causes around three times as much greenhouse gas emissions; 15

It is worth noting that, in 2022, according to Stuart Roberts, deputy president of the National Farmers’ Union, 90% of households in the UK were still consuming meat and dairy (as cited in Harvey 2022). 16 According to the European Commission, n.d—and its section on oceans, seas, and coasts— “Eutrophication is a process driven by the enrichment of water by nutrients, especially compounds of nitrogen and/or phosphorus, leading to: increased growth, primary production and biomass of algae; changes in the balance of organisms; and water quality degradation.”

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uses around ten times as much land; two to twenty times as much freshwater; and creates much higher levels of eutrophication” (Ritchie, 2022. See also Kanyama et al., 2021; Wexler, 2020). To put it another way: a glass of dairy milk, produced daily, for a year, uses 650 sq m (7,000 sq ft) of land (Guibourg & Briggs, 2019). This, Guibourg and Briggs (2019) note, is the equivalent of two tennis courts. This is ten times greater than what is required to produce the same quantity of oat milk. And while the production of plant-based milks requires relatively large amounts of water—for example, a glass of almond milk uses 130 pints of water—they still use less water than dairy milk (Guibourg & Briggs, 2019.17 See also Marinova & Bogueva, 2020). Kanyama et al. (2021) extend the analysis beyond milk and provide a detailed review of the literature that measures the differences in the environmental impact between a range of dairy products and plant-based alternatives. They draw on 21 studies that compare the environmental impacts of dairy products with plant-based alternatives—milk, butter, cream, cheese, and yogurt. The environmental metrics included greenhouse gas emissions (as well as other emissions), land, water, and energy use. From these studies, they conclude that overall, plant-based alternatives “have a lower environmental impact than the dairy products.” There were some outliers, for example, the study by Grant and Hicks (2018)—Comparative Life Cycle Assessment of Milk and Plant-Based Alternatives—found that some plant-based milks had higher greenhouse gas emissions than dairy milk (as cited in Kanyama et al., 2021). So, after reviewing and the comparing the environmental impact of non-dairy and vegan alternatives, can we say, decisively, which one we should be consuming.

Which Alt-Milk Is the Best? In terms of deciding which plant-based milk is the best alternative to dairy milk, there are a number of factors to consider. Are we mainly concerned with reducing greenhouse gas emissions? If so, according to 17

The article by Guibourg & Briggs draws on the study by Poore and Nemecek 2018— Reducing Food’s Environmental Impacts through Producers and Consumers.

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Ritchie (2022), almond milk releases less greenhouse gas emissions and requires less land-use than soy milk. However, almond milk uses more water (Ritchie, 2022). If we are concerned about the chemical impact, we should aim to buy the organic versions of these alt-milks “because they use, for example, fewer chemical fertilizers, they’re free from pesticides and herbicides, and they put less pressure on the soils” (Marinova & Bogueva, 2020). How the milk is packaged can also have environmental impacts. In California, the packaging of almond milk contributes to 45% of the global warming potential of this plant-based alternative (Marinova & Bogueva, 2020). However, Marinova and Bogueva (2020) conclude their article, Which ‘Milk’ is Best for the Environment, with the following: Any plant-based milk, be it made from beans, nuts or seeds, has a lighter impact than dairy when it comes to greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the use of water and land. All available studies, including systematic reviews, categorically point this out.

What About the Impact of Soy? Soy milk has received a lot of attention stemming from concerns about soy’s role in the deforestation of the Amazon. However, as the research demonstrates, while there has been an increase in the demand for soy over the past 50 years, changes in land-use in Brazil are attributed to the need for pasture for beef production (Ritchie, 2022). Interestingly, EU regulations have banned the human consumption of genetically modified soy. The majority of Brazil’s soy crop is genetically modified. Therefore, soy consumed in European countries has been produced in Europe (Ritchie, 2022). Added to this, it is important, as Ritchie (2022) argues, to highlight what soy is used for. In Brazil, for example, 95% of soy is used for animal feed. And globally three quarters of soy are used for animal feed (Ritchie, 2022). “This means that very little of Amazonian land-use pressures from soy have been driven by crops for direct human consumption; most is for animal feed” (Ritchie, 2022). So, while the production of soy has increased rapidly, drawing on data published by the University of Oxford’s Food Climate Research Network

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(FCRN), Ritchie and Roser (2021) note that this proliferation is based on the increase demand for soy-based animal feed, biofuels, and vegetable oil. Between 1990 and 2013 the use of soy-based food products, such as tofu and soy milk, increased from 7.4 to 10.7 million tons. However, for the same period, the use of soy-based animal feed, biofuels, and vegetable oil increased from 88 to 227 million tons (Ritchie & Roser, 2021). As they explain: When someone mentions soy we often think about foods such as tofu, soy milk, tempeh or edamame beans. This feeds into the argument that meat and dairy substitutes – such as switching from meat to high-protein tofu, or from dairy to soy milk – is in fact worse for the environment. But, only a small percentage of global soy is used for these products. More than three-quarters (77%) of soy is used as feed for livestock. (Ritchie & Roser, 2021)

The Link Between Soy Production and Deforestation To reiterate: there has been a 680% increase in soy production since 1980 (Ritchie & Roser, 2021). This means that more land is required to meet this demand. Research has been undertaken to assess the drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon (see, e.g., Tyukavina et al., 2017). The conclusion is that the driver of deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon is the growth of pasture for the production of beef (Barona et al., 2010; Ritchie & Roser, 2021). Indeed, as a result of ‘Brazil’s Soy Moratorium’—which bans farmers from selling soy grown in deforestation areas—the loss of land from soybean crops has declined (Ritchie & Roser, 2021). However, as the research suggest, while soy may not be the main direct contributor to deforestation, it still has indirect impacts when it comes to land-use. As noted above, the increased demand in soy results in an increase demand for land. And in certain regions of the Legal Amazon, such as Mato Grosso, soy crops are replacing pastureland. In other words, pastureland is being displaced by soy crops and is moving into forested areas, thereby implicated soy production in indirect deforestation (Barona et al., 2010; Ritchie & Roser, 2021). [S]ince most

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deforestation is driven by expanding pastures for beef, or soy to feed poultry and pigs, Ritchie and Roser (2021) believe that “reducing meat consumption is an effective way to end deforestation.” They also call for wider implementation of zero-deforestation policies (Ritchie & Roser, 2021). And the World Wildlife Fund argues that, given its association with deforestation and the overuse of fertilizer, imports of soy for animal feed in the UK need to be reduced by a fifth by 2030 (Harvey, 2022). I had two main reasons for including this data. First, I wanted to provide a balanced argument. I felt that it was important to address and review the environmental impact of non-dairy and vegan alternatives, compared with the meat and dairy industries. I believe comparative analyses such as this are key to fully understanding the deleterious effect the animal-industrial complex has on the environment and the implications this has for climate change. Second, I wanted to challenge some of the misconceptions surrounding the link between soy production and deforestation. Overall, my aim was to highlight the benefits of reducing our intake of meat and dairy products by shifting toward plant-based alternatives. Indeed, as I was completing this chapter, The Guardian newspaper included an article written by Fiona Harvey titled England Must Reduce Meat Intake to Avoid Climate Breakdown (2022). In it, drawing on the comments of Henry Dimbleby—co-founder of the Leon restaurant chain as well as the Sustainable Restaurant Chain—she argued that “the only way to have sustainable land use in this country, and avoid ecological breakdown, is to vastly reduce consumption of meat and dairy.” There is one other shift that is deemed necessary to combat the war against nonhuman animals: the dismantling of the capitalist model.

Alternatives to the Capitalist Model Painter (2016, p. 339) argues that in order to achieve animal liberation and to improve humans’ relationship with nonhuman animals, we need to dismantle capitalism. As Painter (2016) sees it, we have a moral obligation to develop non-capitalist modes of existence for all sentient beings. In agreement Gunderson (2011, p. 270) advocates for socialist

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reform stating that “[u]nlike capitalism, socialism would offer a considerable potential to fundamentally improve our relations with animals.” He notes that “…socialists were some of the first to call for the liberation of animals. Although socialism is not a guaranteed solution to animal suffering, it provides the prospect for a more free and rational society.” Of course, the capitalist model is not limited to the meat, egg, and dairy industries. Exploitation and forced labor are present within plantbased agriculture. A plant-based diet is not perfect and cannot eradicate all harm. It strives, as the Acti-Veg blog notes to “avoid exploitation as far as is possible and practicable.” Indeed, “[i]t is not possible to be a consumer in the modern world without causing some harm, but veganism is about reducing that harm as much as we are able to” (ActiVeg n.d.). While socialist reform and the dismantling of capitalism are utopian ideals, and exploitative practices within the industry cannot be ignored, there are clear benefits to adopting a plant-based diet. Not only will this free nonhuman animals from pain and suffering, and end the war against them, but it will also improve the physical and mental health of human populations, as well as the environment they inhabit.

Conclusion We finish where we started: Francis Bacon’s Man and Beast exhibition. For Frankel (2022), writing for Timeout, it was “a huge, daunting, breathtaking show, filled with violence and blood.” He correctly observes that the images on display leave you feeling “uncomfortable [and] physically affected by what you’ve seen.” “Bacon,” he argues, “makes you lose faith in humanity, in our morality and culture and superiority. You can dress it up any way you like, but in the end, we’re all just animals” (Frankel, 2022). In these final lines, Frankel (2022) both rejects and reinforces human exceptionalism. In his acceptance of the fallacy of human superiority, he, ironically, still manages to confer a lesser status on nonhuman animals. Humans, he argues, are nothing more than animals. Simply put, his words uphold the human/nonhuman divide. There are two points I would like to make here. First: not all humans benefit from human exceptionalism. As I have demonstrated in the chapters of this

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book, in the context of white supremacy (and by extension, animalization), certain humans are classified as ‘Other-than,’ subhuman, and nonhuman. Therefore, some humans have always been absented from humanity. And second, and here we return to the argument posed in Chapter 2, we must reconstruct what it means to be human. We must challenge hierarchical anthropocentric thinking that always and already places (some) humans above nonhumans. Throughout we have unpacked the shared sources of oppression between humans and nonhuman animals alike. In this chapter, our focus has been on the exploitation and commodification of nonhuman animals in a capitalist system. In line with a posthumanist perspective (see Chapters 2 and 3) and taking on board the suggestions of Painter (2016) and Gunderson (2011) outlined above, challenging the system of exploitation and commodification of nonhuman animals will have benefits for us all. In the words of Buzby (2015, p. 33): “[u]nless we raise the question of the nonhuman animal, in short, we will never apprehend the whole sphere of exploitation that capitalism opens for all living beings.” The aim of this chapter was to answer the following questions: (1) What underpins and facilitates the war against nonhuman animals and (2) what are the global consequences of the war on nonhuman animals for human and nonhuman animals alike? Specifically, what are the implications for public health, physical and mental well-being, as well as the environment? In response to the first question, this chapter has demonstrated that biopolitics, thanatopolitics, and Mbembe’s (2003) necropolitics facilitate the industrialized killing and industrialized reproduction of nonhuman animals within the animal-industrial complex. Capitalism underpins the exploitation and commodification of nonhuman animals within industrial animal agriculture. The facilities where this ‘deading life’ occurs (the CAFOs, the mega farms) have implications for public health, the physical and mental well-being of industry workers, and for the environment. As this chapter has demonstrated, the nature of factory farming poses serious public health concerns, particularly in relation to antibiotic resistance, which could lead to millions of deaths worldwide. The impact of climate change in the form of slow violence was also discussed, as well as the Perpetration-Induced Traumatic Stress experienced by many industry workers. By drawing comparisons with the

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impact of non-dairy and vegan alternatives, it is hoped that this chapter will inspire people to reduce their consumption of nonhuman animal products.

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The Plight of the Grey Squirrel At a birthday party in July 2022, the topic of the grey squirrel was raised. My partners’ mother mentioned a recent article she had read about squirrels being given oral contraceptives to render them infertile. This piqued my interest. Could this be relevant to my book, I asked myself? Specifically, I wondered whether this was the latest example of reproductive violence and reproductive coercion inflicted upon nonhuman animals? I decided to look into it. Over the past 4 years, the government’s Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) has been developing an oral contraceptive to control the grey squirrel population in the UK. Previous culling attempts have been unsuccessful (Rowlatt, 2022). This new drug works as a type of vaccine that triggers the immune system to restrict the production of sex hormones. This leaves both male and female grey squirrels infertile (see Rowlatt, 2022). The proposed treatment—anticipated to be deployed in the next few years if subsequent tests are successful—is believed to

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be a more humane method of controlling this population of nonhuman animals. The drug will be administered to squirrels via feeding boxes. The door to the feeding box will be weighted so that smaller red squirrels will be prevented from entering. They will contain pots of hazelnut spread dosed with the contraceptive (Gilchrist, 2021; Rowlatt, 2022. See also Horton, 2022). Introduced from North America in the nineteenth century, grey squirrels are classified as invasive non-native animals. The financial costs of the damage they cause to trees in England and Wales are estimated to cost £37 million a year (Royal Forestry Society, 2021). Grey squirrels strip the bark from trees to access the sap beneath. This scars the tree thus allowing entry for other invasive species and diseases to stunt its growth. It is argued that this damage to woodland impedes the UK government’s efforts to tackle climate change. It also, as Rowlatt (2022) reports, has implications for other species of nonhuman animal, as one “mature oak tree can support up to 2,000 other species” (Rowlatt, 2022). In addition, grey squirrels are larger and stronger than red squirrels and carry a squirrel pox virus, to which they are immune, unlike the red squirrel (Gilchrist, 2017). Indeed, it is believed that grey squirrels have driven red squirrels to the verge of extinction (Rowlatt, 2022). Estimates place the number of grey squirrels in the UK at 2.7 million. This is in contrast with the 160,000 remaining red squirrels. In his piece in the Conversation—Grey squirrels: Is Birth Control the Solution to Britain’s Invasive Species Problem? —Gilchrist (2021) interrogates “the idea that grey squirrels are bad for the environment because they damage trees,” suggesting that the damage they cause is exaggerated. He goes on to argue that if we are serious about reducing the impacts of climate change, then our priority should be the “phasing out of fossil fuels” rather than the killing of squirrels. He also points out that both grey and red squirrels play an important role in maintaining woodlands by burying nuts and seeding new trees. Gilchrist (2021) believes that eradicating the grey squirrel would in fact slow down the natural regeneration of woodlands in the UK. Despite concerns regarding the accuracy of the data pertaining to the environmental damage caused by grey squirrels, the UK government supports programs that call for the culling of this species. This includes

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the new oral contraceptive. Some concede that administering oral contraceptives is, at least, “a more humane alternative to live trapping and bludgeoning the animals to death” (Gilchrist, 2021). For example, in response to the government-backed program to control grey squirrels via oral contraceptives, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) also supported this non-lethal method of population control. However, they added: “[w]e mustn’t forget that grey squirrels and other species deemed ‘invasive’ are where they are through no fault of their own and entirely due to human carelessness, and they deserve to be left in peace” (as cited by Rowlatt, 2022). While I agree—this is a more humane way to manage this species of nonhuman animal—this program still raises ethical concerns. In the words of Gilchrist (2021): “[b]eing alive isn’t necessarily always better than being dead.” Below I will consider these ethical issues in more detail. The assumption that fertility control methods for managing nonhuman animals are ‘humane’ or ‘benign’ is not supported by everyone (Hampton et al., 2015). Furthermore, as Hampton et al. (2015) point out, a balance needs to be drawn between an emphasis on the efficacy of fertility control and the welfare of nonhuman animals. In their article, Is Wildlife Fertility Control Always Humane? they argue that animal welfare should not just be based on the short-term health implications for nonhuman animals. Referring to the Five Domains Model —which measures animal welfare along the categories of nutrition, environment, health, behavior, and mental state—they believe that the “assessment of animal welfare must be based on a wide range of measures in addition to health indices” (Hampton et al., 2015, p. 1057). At present, research only focuses on domain three of the model: health. Indeed, the ethics of controlling certain species of nonhuman animals is complex and is bound up with subjective viewpoints and personal values. An individual’s response to a method will depend on what alternative methods are available. For example, if your options are either between a non-lethal method, such as oral contraception, or a lethal method, such as shooting or kill traps, then it is reasonable to assume that most people will opt for the former. However, if your choice is simply between different types of lethal methods of population control, you may opt for the more ‘humane’ of these options. Lauber et al. (2007)

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conducted empirical research exploring the link between public policymaking and people’s ethical views on wildlife fertility control. While their research is based on white-tailed deer and feral cats, their overarching research question is one I share: Is it ethically acceptable to use fertility control, such as oral contraception, to control populations of ‘invasive’ nonhuman animals? Based on my belief that nonhuman animals should be granted legal personhood status, my response to this question is that it is not ethical to administer oral contraceptives to grey squirrels. While I appreciate that this procedure does not kill the squirrel, the potential harms have not yet been fully assessed and the procedure involves non-consensual administration of the drug. Ultimately, I believe that this method of population control is a form of reproductive violence and reproductive coercion. As a reminder: reproductive violence is violence that violates a person’s reproductive autonomy or violence that is directed against an individual due to their reproductive capabilities (Grey, 2017). This includes forced sterilization. And reproductive coercion involves interfering with contraception. Finally, one also wonders if, and how, this policy adheres to the aforementioned Animal Welfare (Sentience) Bill that was introduced in 2021. I recognize the importance of addressing the impact squirrels may have on the environment but, in agreement with Gilchrist (202), I believe phasing out the use of fossil fuels will have more of an impact. Furthermore, reducing our consumption of meat and dairy products, as outlined in the previous chapter, will also help to alleviate the impacts of climate change. In sum, current anthropocentric thinking—which focuses on controlling and manipulating the reproductive bodies of nonhuman animals—runs the risk of failing to address anthropogenic climate change. There is an alternative to these (non-lethal reproductive) methods of controlling the population of grey squirrels and that is: eating them. Framed as a form of ethical dining and a solution to controlling invasive species, Paul Wedgwood, a renowned Scottish chef, believes that eating squirrels can help the environment and save the red squirrel from extinction (Greenfield, 2022). This practice is referred to as invasivorism, a term coined by Joe Roman, a conservation biologist. Greenfield (2022)

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quotes Roman who describes invasivorism as a process where humans act as a type of “biological control.” He explains: “[h]umans are amazing predators: whether it’s eating the grey squirrel in Britain or the European green crab in the US, we know eating them can have an impact on populations” (as cited by Greenfield, 2022). At the end of this article, Greenfield includes a recipe by Paul Wedgwood for Squirrel rack, served with confit jersey royal potatoes, carrot puree, and wild garlic. Wedgwood is not alone in extolling the virtues of eating invasive species to reduce the impacts of climate change. Bun Lai—who received the White House Champions of Change award for the development of sustainable food in 2016—created a menu using invasive species. He claims that eating “invasive animals such as boar and nutria instead of cows…would have a significant impact on climate change because of their greenhouse gas emissions” (cited by Greenfield, 2022). Even with this acknowledgment of the relationship between meat consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, Wedgwood still offers an anthropogenic solution: to eat invasive nonhuman animals, thus maintaining the war against nonhuman animals. Here we should heed the words of Crowley et al., (2018, p. 138) who argue, albeit with reference to wildlife, that “a fundamental component of wildlife management planning” must address how and why certain wildlife is ‘killed and ‘made killable’” [emphasis added]. Throughout the chapters of this book, I have demonstrated how and why certain nonhuman animals are subject to the expressions and consequences of reproductive violence. In this final section, I will return to the main arguments of the book to provide an overall conclusion to this work.

The Main Arguments of the Book 1. We are currently engaged in a war against nonhuman animals. This war involves industrialized slaughter as well as industrialized reproduction (see Chapter 1/Introduction).

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I began the book by arguing that we are currently engaged in a war against nonhuman animals. War in this context is based on my reformulation of non-international armed conflict which I described thusly: the war against nonhuman animals involves violence committed by government and non-governmental groups against non-armed, non-combatants (nonhuman animals) within a state. This revision is based on a Clausewitzean understanding of war (i.e., the complete domination of the ‘opponent’) which focuses on the aims of war, rather than the means used to fight the war. Furthermore, departing from the existing status of nonhuman animals during armed conflict, I made the case that nonhuman animals should be treated as ‘protected persons’ rather than the property of ‘protected persons,’ and that, under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), they should be protected from the violence(s) of armed conflict. While the book focuses on War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity—rape, forced pregnancy, and other acts of sexual violence— these expressions and consequences of industrialized reproduction are inextricably linked to the industrialized slaughter of nonhuman animals. As discussed, when the productivity of the nonhuman animals wanes, they are sent to slaughter. This species war, then, is about life and death. The latter centers on “the power to make die,” while the former—industrialized reproduction—is based on the “the ability to bring to life”—the “power to make live” (Wadiwel, 2015, pp. 27–28). It is the latter that formed the main analysis in this book. Therefore, I want to pause here to consider the implications of industrialized reproduction in more detail. The industrialized reproduction of nonhuman animals involves the introduction of new biotechnologies to increase productivity. These involve the increased control of the reproductive function of nonhuman animals (Pieper et al., 2016). Methods include, but are not limited to, embryo transfer technology and in vitro fertilization. The aim of these refined technologies is to reproduce increasing numbers of offspring from “genetically superior animals” or, to “obtain offspring from infertile (or sub fertile) animals…” (Sejian et al., 2010, p. 687. See also Gillespie,

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2018).1 Drawing on the work of Chakravarthi and Sri Balaji (2010), Hafez (2015) outlines the steps involved in multiple ovulation and embryo transfer (MOET). Hormone treatment is administered to donor cows to increase the number of eggs released during ovulation (as cited in Hafez, 2015). The cows are then artificially inseminated with semen from a bull. After a week, using a catheter that is placed into the uterus, the embryos are flushed out. The embryos are then either implanted into the surrogate cow, who has also been subjected to hormone manipulation, or they can be frozen and used at a later date. This process is used to maximize pregnancy rates. In their article, The Use of Hormonal Drugs to Increase the Reproductive Function of Animals in the Agro-Industrial Complex, Malakhova et al. (2021, p. 2) argue that these new reproductive technologies are carried out under conditions that lead to ‘industrial stresses’ which, rather ironically, I would posture, impact the fertility of nonhuman animals. They explain: In the conditions of industrial complexes for the production of livestock products, there is a lack of heat in the breeding stock, which is associated with a violation of the technology of their raising, insufficient vitamin nutrition of animals, lack of insolation, exercise, and other reasons…In addition, it is known that chronic stress of animals under industrial technology (rearrangement of animals, lack of living space, lack of walking, occupational noises, geopathogenic zones, etc.) lowers the secretion of luteinizing hormone (LH), which leads to disruption of the ovulatory response of the ovaries… This is supported by Pieper et al. (2016, p. 3162) who also note that, while the use of these technologies leads to an increase in milk production, they also result in “…a decline in reproductive efficiency in high-producing cows worldwide….” Indeed, this decline in fertility has “perpetuated more research and development of new reproductive technologies that are widely applied in the dairy industry…” (Pieper et al., 2016, p. 3162).2 It is worth highlighting that all of this research 1 Assisted reproductive technologies is the term used to describe the various methods used to overcome infertility in male and female nonhuman animals (Hafez, 2015). 2 See, e.g., Malakhova et al. (2021) who conducted research to determine the reasons for the absence of a full-rate sexual cycle in cows and pigs and the reasons behind the reduced

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uses non-consensual methods of treatment to manipulate the reproductive bodies of nonhuman animals. Therefore, I argue that the treatment used in this research falls under reproductive coercion: power and control over the reproductive bodies of (in this case) female nonhuman animals (see also Crowe et al., 2018 who review the future of the reproductive management of cows). Interestingly, in their research on consumer attitudes to the dairy industry in Germany, Crowe et al. (2018) found that the majority of their 1,646 participants viewed assisted reproductive technologies negatively. This aligns with other research that has also documented concerns among consumers about the use of hormonal manipulation within the dairy industry (Crowe et al., 2018 for details). While Crowe et al. (2018) treat these results as a positive resource for change within the industry—suggesting that the refusal of consumers to buy dairy products will inform the future management of reproductive practices in the industry—I believe this alone is not enough. What is also needed is the following: (1) cognizance of the reproductive violence (s) that take place within the animal-industrial complex (2) recognition that nonhuman animals are sentient beings, and as such they should be granted legal personhood status and (3) the application of existing IHL to the situation of nonhuman animals. Ultimately, what is required is an acknowledgment that we are currently engaged in a species war against nonhuman animals. 2. Nonhuman animals should be granted passive legal personhood status, this will require a posthumanist reconstruction of what it means to be human (see Chapter 2). In Chapter 2, I provided a global review of the legal recognition of animal sentience. Notwithstanding the differing country-level positions on this, based on a review of the academic literature, as well as various fertility function of female cows and sows. They used various hormone treatments to measure their impact on the sexual function of cows as well as their effectiveness on the sexual and reproductive function of sows. For their research, they used black and white cows, aged three to five years, two months after they had given birth. And sows aged one to one and a half years, a month after they had giving birth. The results of the hormonal treatment led to the activation of sexual and reproductive function in cows and sows.

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policy-documents—in particular, the new UK Animal Welfare (sentience) Bill —I proceeded on the basis that all vertebrate and invertebrate nonhuman animals are sentient beings. As sentient beings, I argued that they should be granted legal personhood status. Following an analysis of the criteria that are used to determine whether nonhuman animals should be granted legal personhood status— equal consideration, consciousness, autonomy, and self-determination, and the sameness argument, as well as the work of Kurki 2021 and Fernandez (2019)—I arrived at this conclusion: nonhuman animals should be granted passive legal personhood. In contrast to active legal personhood—which is concerned with rights and duties—passive legal personhood is rooted in the belief that nonhuman animals have the right not to suffer. In the context of the war against nonhuman animals—based on my reformulation of non-international armed conflict—legal personhood means treating nonhuman animals as civilians. It means utilizing IHL to provide protections to nonhuman animals who are victims of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. In the book I focused on the experiences of cows, calves, bulls, sows, piglets, and hens who are subject to the expressions and consequences of reproductive violence. However, the principle of the argument that I have presented should be extended to include all sentient nonhuman animals who are victims of the wide range of violence(s) carried out during this species war. The clients and cases of the nonhuman rights project provided real-world examples of how debates concerning legal personhood work in practice. I concluded this chapter by advocating for the reimagining of the category human. Although I recognize the importance of differentiating between the legal classification of a ‘person,’ and the biological category ‘human,’ this should not preclude the task (to paraphrase Jackson, 2020) of rupturing the human. In other words, I believe that the dismantling of the category human (and its inherent racism, sexism, and speciesism) is a prerequisite for granting nonhuman animals legal personhood. Put simply, as argued in Chapter 2, this posthumanist project is a reconstructive one.

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3. War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity—in the form of rape, forced pregnancy, and sexual violence (i.e., the acts and consequences of reproductive violence and reproductive coercion)—are committed against human and nonhuman animals (see Chapters 3 and 4). The Third and Fourth chapters of this book provide a comprehensive review of intrahuman gender-based violence within and beyond the context of war and armed conflict. These chapters also examine the violence of the animal-industrial complex vis-à-vis the meat, egg, and dairy industries. Falling under the umbrella of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity the following acts of violence were considered across human and nonhuman populations: rape, forced impregnation, and forced pregnancy; forced sterilization, forced abortions, and the forced separation of mother and child; genital violence, forced ejaculation, and castration. I framed these as the expressions and consequences of reproductive violence and reproductive coercion. The aim was to demonstrate how persons capable of becoming pregnant and persons capable of procreation through semen production are targeted during war and armed conflict (persons in this context refer to human and nonhuman animals). The decision to include case studies of human and nonhuman animals in the same chapter was not taken lightly. Indeed, I have gone to great lengths to reassure readers that my intention in these chapters (and throughout the book as a whole) was not to draw crude, distasteful comparisons between these two groups, as is common within atrocity and slavery analogies. Rather, I included cases of intrahuman violence alongside cases of violence against nonhuman animals for the following reasons: firstly, I wanted to demonstrate how nonhuman animals, when granted passive legal personhood status, meet the criteria as outlined in the following War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: rape, forced pregnancy, and “any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions” (War Crimes) and/or “any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity” (Crimes against

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Humanity).3 In order to do this, it was necessary to establish the nature and the targets of this reproductive violence. The cases used in Chapter 3—the Holocaust, the 1971 Liberation War, and the genocide against the Uighur population in China—outlined the nature of the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity that were and are taking place: rape, forced pregnancy, and assault on motherhood. They also uncovered the targets of this violence: persons capable of becoming pregnant. Similarly, in Chapter 4, the 1971 Liberation War and the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Darfur were used to highlight the nature of maledirected conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence. These cases studies also elucidated the targets of this violence: persons capable of procreation through semen production. Secondly, I wanted to underscore the shared sources of oppression between human and nonhuman animals who are subject to the expressions and consequences of these acts of reproductive violence. In the case of the female reproductive body, I identified the following themes across all case studies examined: assault on motherhood, the woman/motheras-nation thesis, and dehumanization. These, I argued, translate to the following shared sources of oppression: reproduction and motherhood; ethno-nationalism, heteropatriarchy and anthropatriarchy, and denial of personhood. And with reference to male human and nonhuman animals, I identified phallocentric masculinity (specifically the vulnerability of the penis), gendered personhood, and animalization as shared sources of oppression. I will unpack these shared sources of oppression in more detail when we review argument five of the book below. 4. Human exceptionalism informs the thanatopolitical violence that takes place within the animal-industrial complex. Factory farms provide the locus for the war, while industrial capitalism is the driving force behind it. This carnist battlefield results in global negative public health and environmental outcomes (see Chapter 5).

3

Respectively: element b Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, p. 8 and element g Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, p. 4.

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Two questions framed the final chapter of this book: What underpins and facilitates the war against nonhuman animals? And what are the global consequences of the war on nonhuman animals for both human and nonhuman animals? I answered the first question in three parts. First, I addressed the politics that underpin the war against nonhuman animals. Second, I highlighted the driving forces of this war, and finally, I reviewed the sites where the violence(s) of this war takes place. Let us consider these in more detail. Elaborating on the preliminary discussion concerning the biopolitical nature of the war against nonhuman animals presented in the first chapter of the book, I posited that this species war (which is informed by human exceptionalism) is premised on the following triad of power: biopolitics, thanatopolitics, and necropolitics. In other words, I argued that the animal-industrial complex involves the violence(s) of “make live,” as well as the violence(s) of “let die.” While biopolitics is useful in so far as it reveals the interdependent relationship between industrialized slaughter and industrialized reproduction, to fully understand the violence of the factory farm, I proposed that we recognize the thanatopolitical nature of this violence and view it as a site where nonhuman animals “are subjugated to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living-dead” (Mbembe, 2003, p. 40). In this chapter, we returned to the theme of ‘dreaded comparisons.’ As previously argued, I do not believe that crude comparisons can be drawn between intrahuman violence and the violence of the factory farm. To this end I drew on the work of Stanescu who presents a convincing distinction between the two. For Stanescu (2013) intrahuman violence results in the ontological production of the ‘living dead’—what he refers to as the ‘fabrication of death’—whereas the violence of the factory farm is enacted upon bodies that are already dead. To put it another way, nonhuman animals are always and already regarded as commodities for human use and consumption. The war against nonhuman animals, to quote Stanescu, “fabricates a new mode of being,” that of deading life: where nonhuman animals “should be alive…but are already somehow dead” (p. 155). How do we account for this triad of biopolitical, thanatopolitical, and necropolitical violence? Carnism, speciesism, and industrial capitalism are

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the explanatory frameworks that drive the meat, egg, and dairy industries. I used Noske’s notion of the animal-industrial complex to provide the overarching context for this violence. I put forward the factory farm as the site where the war against nonhuman animals takes place: Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) in the US and mega farms in the UK, Europe, and the rest of the world. All of these, I argued, result in the commodification of nonhuman animals. Departing from a strictly Marxist analysis, I made the case that nonhuman animals, as unpaid laborers, produce animal-derived commodities (meat, eggs, and dairy) and that their unpaid profit-driven working conditions reduce them to commoditized beings. While I am willing to concede that nonhuman animals do not negotiate their wage labor via the commodities they produce, as noted, I do not accept that such commodities are devoid of exchange value. The products nonhuman animals manufacture—meat, eggs, and dairy—do indeed have exchange value within the market: these commodities enable companies to compete within the capitalist market. To answer the second question, I drew on the concept of slow violence to review the impact of the animal-industrial complex. The environmental and public health implications of confining thousands of nonhuman animals in unventilated facilities were addressed. In particular I highlighted how the global agricultural industry contributes to climate change through greenhouse gas emissions. The impact of the industry on the emotional and physical well-being of factory and slaughterhouse workers was also addressed. Indeed, I made the broader case that, for humans, the consequences of the global war against nonhuman animals are, to a greater or lesser degree, existential. With reference to Francis Bacon’s Man and Beast exhibition at the Royal Academy, I laid bare the fallacy of human exceptionalism. As revealed, the facilities where this violence is enacted carry an increased risk of disease, viruses, infections, and arguably most concerning of all, antibiotic resistance. This contradicts the central goal of human exceptionalism: a humanity that is irreducible to the nonhuman animal. The war against nonhuman animals is ironically then, as I argued, a war humans wage against themselves, as well as their nonhuman counterparts. While the plant-based industry is not immune to the capitalist model—indeed exploitation is somewhat inevitable within a consumerist

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society—I closed the chapter by providing a comparison between the environmental impact of the meat and dairy industries with plant-based alternatives. In doing so my aim was to incentivize people to reduce their consumption of meat, egg, and dairy products. 5. White supremacy, heteropatriarchy and anthropatriarchy and capitalism, and their relationship to racism, sexism, and speciesism inform the violence(s) experienced by human and nonhuman populations during war and armed conflict (All chapters). From the outset, this book has urged readers to adopt a ‘multi-optic’ vision to (1) embrace multiple forms of oppression across human and nonhuman populations and (2) realize the interconnectedness between these various forms of oppression. For example, in Chapter 3, drawing on examples of intrahuman violence and interspecies violence, as noted above, I identified the following sources of oppression: reproduction and motherhood, ethno-nationalism, and heteropatriarchy and anthropatriarchy. As succinctly put by Beirne (1999, p. 327): “[s]exism and speciesism operate not in opposition to each other but in tandem. Interspecies sexual assault is the product of a masculinity that sees women [and] animals, as objects that can be controlled, manipulated, and exploited.” Then in Chapter 4, I discerned that the category human is constructed along racial, gendered, and speciesist lines. This, as demonstrated, informs the nature of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, as well as the human and nonhuman targets of this violence. Following the Ko sisters (2015/2020), the redundancy of compartmentalized approaches to tackling the oppressions of racism, sexism, and speciesism was highlighted. Decolonization, i.e., the reappraisal of our treatment of those rendered sub-, non- and inhuman within white supremacy, alongside a posthumanist reimagining of the category human, is how I envision/ed we end the war against nonhuman animals. And finally, in Chapter 5, I put forward the argument that dismantling the capitalist system—which underpins the violence, exploitation, and commodification of nonhuman animals within the animal-industrial complex—not only benefits nonhuman animals, but also (from a public

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health and environmental perspective) has positive outcomes for human populations as well. To sum up the contents of this book, I will answer these final three questions: How do we tackle the violence(s) of this war? How do we protect nonhuman animals from this species war? And, who benefits from the dismantling of the carnist battlefield?

How Do We Tackle the Violence(s) of War? Non-speciesist Law First and foremost, we must recognize nonhuman animals as sentient beings, as a group who should be afforded legal personhood status. We, must, as Deckha (2010, p. 47) advised, create a ‘new discourse of cultural and legal protections’ for nonhuman animals. In Chapter 2, in agreement with Kurki (2021) and Fernandez (2019)—who believe, respectively, that nonhuman animals should be granted passive legal personhood and that nonhuman animals fit the category of quasi-property/quasipersons rather than full persons—I believe nonhuman animals should be granted passive legal personhood rather than active legal personhood. While active legal personhood is based on duties and rights, the former (passive legal personhood), only claims that nonhuman animals (as sentient beings) have a right not to be harmed but a right to be protected. This legal recognition aligns with, but also extends, Flynn and Hall’s (2017) proposal for a victimology of nonhuman animals to include the victimology of nonhumans during war. To repeat the words of Beirne from 1999: “a criminology that ignores animal abuse will be a speciesist discourse utterly irrelevant to the understanding of much harm and suffering inflicted by humans on nonhuman, but nevertheless valuable, forms of life” (p. 140). In sum, granting nonhuman animals legal personhood brings us closer toward a non-speciesist criminology.

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Non-speciesist Intersectionality On a conceptual level, in order to combat the war against nonhuman animals species difference needs to be incorporated into intersectional analyses of oppression. This will recognize how currently the nonhuman status of animals is a key factor of their oppression (as noted previously, the term ‘nonhuman’ need not carry negative connotations). Allied to this we must tackle the sources of oppression that intersect race, gender, and speciesism: white supremacy, heteropatriarchy and anthropatriarchy, and human exceptionalism. We can do this, as I have done in Chapters 3 and 4, by recognizing how those subject to the expressions and consequences of reproductive violence are objectified and exploited for the following reasons: they have been identified as either persons capable of becoming pregnant or, as persons capable of procreation through semen production; the violence inflicted upon them is informed by racist and ethno-nationalist politics (often expressed through discourses of animalization) and finally, the violence inflicted upon them removes their personhood, rendering, and/or confirming their ascribed status as sub-, non- and inhuman. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 2, animalization works alongside other forms of discrimination (based on race, gender, sexuality, and ableism, for example) to worsen the treatment of human and nonhuman animals who are regarded as ‘Other-than,’ sub-, non- and inhuman. I believe that developing an intersectional approach that recognizes how animality and other forms of oppression intersect with speciesism to discriminate against (certain) humans and (all) nonhuman animals will assist us in resisting anthropocentric social and legal structures that currently view nonhuman animals as property.

How Do We Protect Nonhuman Animals from the Violence(s) of This Species War? To protect nonhuman animals from the violence(s) of the war that is being waged against them we must regard them as noncombatants/civilians in this war. This requires applying citizenship to nonhuman animals (see Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011; Ferdowsian &

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Choe, 2013). The aim of IHL is to alleviate the impact of armed conflict by protecting civilians and by restricting the means and methods used during the conflict. As I argued in the first chapter, we must replace the current status of nonhuman animals as the property of ‘protected persons’ with the classification of nonhuman animals as ‘protected persons’ in their own right. Once we have done this, we can apply IHL to the war against nonhuman animals. As a final reminder, war in this context is based on my reimagining of non-international armed conflict as outlined in IHL. It is a war that involves violence committed by government and non-governmental groups against non-armed, non-combatants (nonhuman animals) within a state. Historically, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity have only applied to cases of intrahuman violence. I have demonstrated how nonhuman animals, when granted legal personhood, also meet the contextual and a mental element of War Crimes as well as the physical , contextual , and mental elements of Crimes against Humanity. Allied to my proposed revision of non-international armed conflict, I suggest replacing the human security framework with personhood security thereby offering protection to all legal persons.

Who Benefits from the Dismantling of the Carnist Battlefield? Smith (2013, p. 52) argues that “…if animals are excluded from the circle of moral consideration, it is not just because they are thought of as nonhuman, it is because they are believed to be sub-human (less than human).” As the contents of this book attest, it is not only nonhuman animals who are reduced to the status of subhuman. Certain human animals share this fate. If we follow the steps outlined above, dismantling the carnist battlefield will involve tackling systems of oppression that impact both human and nonhuman animals: racism, sexism, and speciesism. Therefore, on a conceptual level, a move away from white supremacy and speciesism—the lynchpins of human exceptionalism—will benefit human and nonhuman animals alike. On a practical level, granting nonhuman animals legal personhood, and ending the

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violence(s) inflicted upon them during this war, will have positive benefits for public health and the environment. In terms of the biopolitical dream, at present the goal is a humanity that is irreducible to the nonhuman animal. Or, to use Stanescu’s phrasing, a humanity “that is more than human” (Stanescu, 2013, p. 144). I believe if we peruse a non-speciesist agenda—by ending the war against nonhuman animals (and its related global impacts)—we will be in a stronger position to accomplish this more-than-human biopolitical dream. In this context, humanity is informed by a posthumanist sensibility. It is a humanity that extends legal personhood to nonhuman animals and one that is aimed at non-violence against nonhuman and human animals alike.

References Beirne, P. (1999). For nonspeciesist criminology: Animal abuse as an object of study. Criminology, 37 (1), 117–148. Crowe, M. A., Hostens, M., & Opsomer, G. (2018). Reproductive management in dairy cows - the future. Irish Veterinary Journal, 71(1), 1–13. Crowley, S. L., Hinchliffe, S., & McDonald, R. A. (2018). Killing squirrels: Exploring motivations and practices of lethal wildlife management. Environment and Planning e: Nature and Space, 1(1–2), 120–143. Deckha, M. (2010). The subhuman as a cultural agent of violence. Journal for Critical Animal Studies, 8(3), 28–51. Donaldson, S., & Kymlicka, W. (2011). Zoopolis: A political theory of animal rights. Oxford University Press. Ferdowsian, H., & Choe, C. (2013). Extending human research protections to nonhuman animals. In R. Corbey & A. Lanjouw (Eds.), The politics of species: Reshaping our relationships with other animals (pp. 232–240). Cambridge University Press. Fernandez, A. (2019). Not quite property, not quite persons: A quasi approach for nonhuman animals. Canadian Journal of Comparative and Contemporary Law, 5, 155–232. Flynn, M., & Hall, M. (2017). The case for a victimology of nonhuman animals. Contemporary Justice Review, 20 (3), 299–318.

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Gilchrist, J. (2017, March 8). In defence of the grey squirrel, Britain’s most unpopular invader. The Conversation. Retrieved from https://theconversat ion.com/in-defence-of-the-grey-squirrel-britains-most-unpopular-invader73983 Gilchrist, J. (2021, February 3). Grey squirrels: Is birth control the solution to Britain’s invasive species problem? The Conversation. Retrieved from https:// theconversation.com/grey-squirrels-is-birth-control-the-solution-to-britainsinvasive-species-problem-154400 Gillespie, K. (2018). Cow with Ear Tag #1389. University of Chicago Press. Greenfield, P. (2022, February 11). Rack of squirrel, anyone? The chefs putting invasive species on the menu. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/feb/11/rack-of-squ irrel-anyone-the-chefs-putting-invasive-species-on-the-menu-aoe Grey, R. (2017). The ICC’s first ‘forced pregnancy’ case in historical perspective. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 15 (5), 905–930. Hafez, Y. M. (2015). Assisted reproductive technologies in farm animals. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282943615_Ass isted_Reproductive_Technologies_in_Farm_Animals.pdf Hampton, J. O., Hyndman, T. H., Barnes, A., & Collins, T. (2015). Is wildlife fertility control always humane? Animals (basel), 5 (4), 1047–1071. Horton, H. (2022, July 11). Oral contraceptives could help reduce grey squirrel numbers, research finds. The Guardian. Retrieved from https:// www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/jul/11/oral-contraceptives-couldhelp-reduce-grey-squirrel-numbers-research-finds Jackson, Z. I. (2020). Becoming human: Matter and meaning in an antiblack world . New York University Press. Kelty-Huber, C. (2015). Towards a framework for reproductive violence (All Theses & Dissertations. 117). Ko, A., & Ko, S. (2015/2020). Aphro-ism: Essays on pop culture, feminism, and black veganism from two sisters. Lantern Publishing and Media. Kurki, V. (2021). Legal personhood and animal rights. Journal of Animal Ethics, 11(1), 47–62. Lauber, T. B., Knuth, B. S., Tantillo, J. A., & Curtis, P. D. (2007). The role of ethical judgments related to wildlife fertility control. Society & Natural Resources, 20 (2), 119–133. Malakhova, N., Olga Piskunova, O., & Lishchuk, A. (2021). The use of hormonal drugs to increase the reproductive function of animals in the

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agro-industrial complex. Retrieved from https://www.e3s-conferences.org/ articles/e3sconf/abs/2021/55/e3sconf_eeests2021_03019/e3sconf_eeests2 021_03019.html Mbembe, A. (2003). Necropolitics. Public Culture, 15, 11–40. Noske, B. (1997). Beyond boundaries: Humans and animals. Black Rose Books. Pieper, L., Doherr, M. G., & Heuwieser, W. (2016). Consumers’ attitudes about milk quality and fertilization methods in dairy cows in Germany. Journal of Dairy Science, 99, 3162–3170. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. (1998). Retrieved from: http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/7_4_1998.pdf Rowlatt, J. (2022, July 11). Scientists design contraceptives to limit grey squirrels. The BBC. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-enviro nment-62096272 Royal Forestry Society. (2021). The cost of grey squirrel damage to woodland in England and Wales. Retrieved from https://rfs.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/ 2021/03/grey-squirrel-impact-report-overview.pdf Sejian, V., Meenambigai, T. V., Chandirasegaran, M., & Naqvi, S. M. K. (2010). Reproductive technology in farm animals: New facets and findings: A review. Journal of Biological Sciences, 10, 686–700. Smith, D. L. (2013). Indexically yours: Why being human is more like being here than like being water. In R. Corbey & A. Lanjouw (Eds.), The politics of species: Reshaping our relationships with other animals (pp. 40–52). Cambridge University Press. Stanescu, J. (2013). Beyond biopolitics: Animal studies, factory farms, and the advent of deading life. PhaenEx, 8(2), 135–160. Wadiwel, D. J. (2015). The war against animals. Brill Rodopi.

Index

A

Adams, Carol 7, 13–15, 48, 94, 178 on feminized protein 94, 178 Agamben, Giorgio 23, 24, 136, 138, 190–194 and bare life 24, 136, 193, 194 and the state of exception 24, 136, 138, 190 animal 2–7, 11–13, 16–18, 20, 23, 33, 37, 49–54, 56, 58, 60, 61, 63, 67, 68, 70–72, 75–77, 79, 90, 91, 113–115, 119, 121, 126, 135, 136, 140, 141, 152, 166, 168, 170, 171, 175, 177, 187, 191–194, 196, 198, 202, 205, 207, 209, 210, 214, 221–223, 225, 234, 235, 240, 247, 250 and agriculture 60, 113, 210

and husbandry practices 27, 35, 38, 87, 90, 91, 113–115, 119, 170, 175, 202, 218 and sentience 36, 37, 48, 50–56, 59, 63, 78, 90, 200, 240 and sentience bill 51 Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) 233 and oral contraception 235, 236 animal-industrial complex 5, 6, 21, 23, 24, 27, 36, 58, 60, 94, 126, 141, 182, 188, 194, 197–201, 212, 213, 217, 218, 223, 225, 240, 242, 244–246 in relation to carnism 23, 198, 244 animalization 12, 38, 39, 76, 77, 137, 140, 153, 165, 168,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Banwell, The War Against Nonhuman Animals, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30430-9

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Index

177, 179, 181, 199, 225, 243, 248 and slavery 12 in relation to violence in East Pakistan/Bangladesh and India 165, 166 animal rights 10–12, 37, 56, 60, 66, 77, 176 and animal rights-based approaches 60, 62 animal sentience 36, 37, 50, 52, 54, 56, 78, 90, 240 antibiotic resistance 40, 208–210, 218, 225, 245 and Concentrated Feeding Operations 27, 40, 207, 245 and factory farming 5, 27, 35, 40, 208, 225 armed conflict 1, 2, 8, 26, 28–34, 62, 70, 99, 110, 130, 158, 163, 180, 199, 238, 241, 242, 249 and international 26–31, 95 and the International Committee of the Red Cross 26, 28 as recognized by International Humanitarian Law 2, 27, 93, 238 Arnold, Andrea 87 and the film Cow 87 artificial insemination 34, 87, 98, 116, 117, 119, 121, 122, 126, 133, 193 in relation to cows 116, 119 in relation to sows 34 assault on motherhood 38, 39, 92, 94, 112, 119, 243

autoimmunity 192, 193, 195, 196, 218 and paradox 24, 175

B

Beirne, Piers 5, 7, 8, 48, 51, 58, 63, 75, 93, 246, 247 and Nonspecieist Criminology 51 in relation to sexism and speciesism 246 Bengali 103–107, 156, 166, 167 and genocide 104, 105, 107 and Muslims 104, 166 and rape 104, 105 Bentham, Jeremey 51, 59, 90, 91 and Ptenotrophium 91 and the Panopticon 90, 91 biopolitics 5, 6, 20, 21, 23–25, 29, 36, 126, 188, 190–193, 195–198, 204, 213, 218, 225, 244 and factory farming 12, 23, 189, 191, 197 and necropolitics 23, 36, 40, 191, 192, 195, 197, 198, 204, 212, 213, 225, 244 and the war against nonhuman animals 3, 5, 10, 17, 19–22, 25, 28, 29, 34–36, 40, 41, 47, 49, 74, 92, 112, 115, 118, 126, 128, 141, 142, 153, 165, 170, 176, 177, 180, 188–190, 197, 198, 201, 206, 208, 217, 218, 223, 225, 237, 238, 240, 241, 244–246, 248–250 Bryant, Taimie 65, 66

Index

in relation to the sameness argument 63, 65 bull(s) 116, 153, 167, 170–176, 196, 239, 241 and castration 153, 172, 173, 175, 182, 196 and displacement from gendered personhood 39, 153, 162, 165, 169, 175, 176, 178, 179, 181, 182, 196, 202 and forced ejaculation 39, 153, 170, 171, 174, 182 and reproductive violence 34, 39, 162, 165, 169, 171, 173–175, 182, 196 and semen 171 and semen catalogs 171, 174, 182 and semen collection 175 and the vulnerability of the penis 39, 153, 169, 174, 182, 243

C

capitalism 14, 17, 18, 36, 175, 198, 199, 203–205, 223–225 carnist battlefield 33, 247, 249 castration 12, 22, 39, 151–158, 161, 169, 173, 178, 181, 190, 242. See also bull(s) and calves 89, 90, 114, 119–121, 123, 173, 175, 241 and genocide 36, 97 in relation to Darfur 34, 39, 153, 154, 158, 160, 161, 169, 177, 181, 243 in relation to piglets 34, 58, 114, 126, 127, 151, 152, 173, 241

255

in relation to the 1971 Liberation War 9, 39, 92, 93, 98, 99, 103, 104, 107, 111, 130, 134, 135, 141, 153, 154, 156, 167, 168, 174, 177, 181, 243 in relation to the former Yugoslavia 34, 153, 154, 169, 181, 243 in relation to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity 2, 8, 10, 16, 26, 27, 29, 34–36, 38, 39, 47, 58, 80, 91–93, 97, 113, 121, 126, 127, 130, 135, 141, 142, 153, 155, 157, 169, 170, 174, 176, 178, 179, 182, 188, 189, 201, 206, 238, 241–243, 246, 249 China 34, 38, 54, 94, 109–111, 134, 137, 138, 141, 243 and birth policies 110, 111 and woman-as-Muslim/terrorist 111, 133 in relation to the genocide of the Uighur population 34, 38, 92, 109–111, 135, 141, 243 in relation to re-education camps 136, 168 Chirot, Daniel & McCauley, Clark 103, 139 essentialization 103 Ciecierska-Holmes 131, 133 and bovine sacrality 131 circumcision 39, 156, 166–168 and Islam 39, 167 and Muslim men 166 Clark, Natalya 155, 156, 174, 181

256

Index

and the vulnerability of the penis 155, 174, 181 climate change 3, 41, 211–213, 223, 225, 234, 236, 237, 245 and greenhouse gas emissions 211–213, 237, 245 commodities 40, 56, 91, 120, 129, 171, 195, 199, 202–206, 244, 245 animal derived 205, 206, 245 nonhuman animals 36, 116, 178, 189, 198, 203–205, 225, 244, 245 in relation to bulls 58, 171 in relation to calves 58, 120 in relation to chicks 129 in relation to cows 58 in relation to meat, eggs and milk 203, 207 Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) 27, 40, 41, 125, 133, 189, 206–211, 213, 214, 217, 218, 225, 245 definition of 125 impact of 125, 209 conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence 39, 153–155, 157, 159, 162–165, 169, 170, 173, 178, 179, 181, 182, 243 contraception 98, 236 and reproductive coercion 236 Crimes Against Humanity 9, 26–28, 98, 110–112, 119, 243, 249 and International Humanitarian Law 2, 8

forced pregnancy 2, 5, 8, 9, 22, 26, 29, 34, 38, 47, 58, 91–93, 119, 128, 238 rape 2, 8, 22, 26, 29, 34, 38, 58, 91–93, 119, 128, 206, 238 in relation to the Uighur population 134, 138, 168 in relation to the war against nonhuman animals 10, 20, 21, 25, 29, 35, 41, 74, 115, 142, 165, 189, 197, 201, 208, 217, 218, 223, 225, 237, 238, 240, 244, 248 Critical Animal Studies 7, 10, 35, 48, 75, 77 and intersectionality 8, 48, 77 and posthumanism 8, 48 Cusack, Carmen 13, 14, 27, 113–116, 118–120, 178 and animal husbandry 113–115 and ecofeminists/ecofeminism 14

D

dairy cows 13, 34, 89, 91, 116, 117, 119–126, 129, 132, 141, 172, 207 in relation to India 125 in relation to milk production 90 in relation to rape, sexual violence and forced impregnation 38, 47, 58, 91, 112, 113, 119, 135, 141, 196, 206 in relation to sexual violations 128 dairy farming 122–126, 141, 219 in relation to Gillespie 116, 117, 122, 181

Index

in relation to milk production 90, 124, 125, 141, 239 in relation to this is dairy farming 123, 126, 141, 219 dairy products 27, 41, 94, 113, 126, 220, 223, 236, 240, 246 in relation to eggs 94 Darfur 39, 154, 161, 169, 181 and emasculation, feminization and homosexualization 39, 159, 161, 162, 169, 181 Davies, Thom 197, 212, 213 and necropolitics 195, 213 and slow violence 212, 213 Davies, Thom et al. in relation necropolitics and death worlds 40 Deckha, M. 4, 16, 48, 49, 65, 75–77, 79, 136–141, 247 and dehumanization 13, 38, 39, 76, 79, 112, 129, 136–140 and intersectionality 49 and Native and Indigenous 4 and new discourse 247 and non-speciesist law 7, 50, 247 and posthumanism 13, 75, 76 dehumanization thesis 141, 142, 153, 168, 177, 181, 200, 243. See also Deckha, M. and animalization 13, 76, 168 and the re-education camps in China 136, 137, 168 displacement from gendered personhood 39, 153, 162, 165, 169, 175, 176, 178, 179, 182, 196, 202. See also Schulz, Phillip and nonhuman animals 176, 200, 242, 243, 249

257

in relation to male-directed conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence 39, 169, 178, 182, 243 dreaded comparisons 10, 15, 49, 89, 113, 176, 194, 244 Dunayer, Joan 50, 51, 56, 96 and non-speciesist 50 and non-speciesist law 51, 96, 119 and the new speciesism 56

E

emasculation. See also Darfur enforced sterilization 26, 29, 39, 109, 153, 154, 157, 158, 169, 181 in relation to conflict-related sexual violence against men and boys 154 in relation to the former Yugoslavia 34, 39, 153, 158, 169, 181, 243 in relation to the Geneva Conventions 26, 93 in relation to the genocide of the Uighur population 34, 38, 109, 111, 141 environmental 40, 41, 189, 208, 211–213, 218–221, 223, 234, 245–247 in relation to Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations 125, 133 in relation to pollution 40, 189, 212, 213 in relation to slow violence 40, 189, 212

258

Index

essentialization 103, 112, 138, 139, 168. See also Chirot, Daniel & McCauley, Clark and China 92, 135 and the 1971 Liberation War 9, 34, 38, 39, 98, 103, 104, 107, 111, 130, 134, 135, 153, 156, 167, 168, 176 and the Holocaust 92, 93, 98–101, 103, 108, 141 in relation to woman-as-Jew 99, 102, 103, 111, 133 ethno-national 39, 129, 130, 141, 142, 243, 246 and assault on motherhood 38, 129 in relation to overlapping sources of oppression 129

F

factory farming 5, 12, 20, 23, 35, 193, 205, 208, 211, 219 the consequences of 40, 41, 126, 128, 153, 154, 238, 242, 243, 245, 248 and greenhouse gas emissions 211 Fernandez, Angela 69, 70, 73, 241, 247 and quasi-property/quasi-person 69, 70, 73, 247 fertility 113, 172, 235, 236, 239 and bulls 172 and control of grey squirrels 234–237 and the dairy industry 87, 91, 113, 116, 119, 120, 122, 129, 132, 170, 173, 175, 189, 239, 240

forced abortion 9, 38, 92, 93, 100–103, 108, 110, 111, 130, 135, 154, 242 in relation to Bangladesh 135 in relation to China 135 in relation to the Holocaust 135 forced ejaculation 39, 153, 170, 171, 174, 182, 242 forced impregnation 9, 93, 106, 116, 117, 122, 141, 154, 242 and forcible impregnation 95, 116, 119 in relation to Bangladesh 99, 106, 111 in relation to dairy cows 116, 119 in relation to forced pregnancy 95 in relation to forced miscarriage 96 in relation to Grey’s definition of reproductive violence 2, 9, 38, 87, 91, 93, 94, 98, 100, 102, 106, 178, 201, 243 forced sterilization 9, 38, 92, 93, 100, 102, 103, 108, 110, 111, 130, 135, 138, 174, 242 in relation to Grey’s definition of reproductive violence 2, 9, 38, 87, 91, 93, 94, 98, 100, 102, 106, 178, 201, 243 in relation to the Holocaust 99 in relation to Uighur women in China 92, 98 Francione, Gary 58, 59, 61–63, 74 and equal consideration and consciousness 37, 63 in relation to animal rights and the legal personhood status

Index

of nonhuman animals 61, 65 in relation to philosophical discourses on nonhuman animals 58

G

Geneva Conventions 26, 28, 29, 31, 93, 155, 171, 242 and International Humanitarian Law 8, 26 and the Additional Protocols 26, 28, 29, 31 and war crimes 28, 155 genital violence 39, 154, 155, 157–161, 163, 181, 242 in relation to Bangladesh 169 in relation to Darfur 161 in relation to the former Yugoslavia 39 in relation to Sri Lanka 164 genocide 11, 26, 93, 97, 100, 104–107, 109–112, 134, 135, 141, 156, 158, 159, 164, 168, 169, 177, 191, 194, 195 and Bangladesh 61, 99, 106, 108, 130, 169 and Darfur 153, 158, 160 and forced pregnancy 92, 95, 97, 107 and the former Yugoslavia 158, 160, 177 and the Holocaust 99, 103, 138, 177 and the Uighur population 94, 109, 141, 168, 243

259

in relation to the genocide convention 97, 109 Gillespie, Kathryn 34, 50, 116, 119, 120, 123, 127, 128, 170–175, 214, 238 and bull catalogs 182 and bull semen 116, 170, 175 and the dairy industry 89, 116 and nonhuman animals 34, 50, 89, 116, 117, 175, 181 and the rape rack 116, 117, 202 Global Animal Protection Index (API) 35, 52 greenhouse gas emissions 211–213, 219–221, 237, 245 in relation to climate change 211–213, 237, 245 in relation to dairy and non-dairy alternatives 219

H

heteropatriarchy 36, 134, 176 in relation to anthropatriarchy 36, 134, 176 Hindu and Hinduism 131–135, 156, 157, 167 in relation to the Bombay riots 168 in relation to circumcision 157 in relation to mother-cow as mother India 130 in relation to the 1971 Liberation War 165 human exceptionalism 17, 36, 38, 66, 76, 79, 178, 188–190, 193, 195, 218, 224, 244, 245, 248, 249

260

Index

in relation to animalization and dehumanization 38 in relation to biopolitics, thanatopolitics, and necropolitics 23, 36, 188, 190, 195, 197, 198, 204, 213, 225, 244 in relation to Francis Bacon, Man and Beast exhibition 187, 224, 245 in relation to speciesism 36, 40, 66, 76, 79, 178, 248, 249 the paradox of 114, 138 human security framework 153, 179, 180, 182, 249

I

industrial capitalism 23, 40, 198, 202, 244 industrialized reproduction 21, 24, 27, 36, 115, 225, 238 industry workers 40, 117, 189, 213, 225 and the implications of factory farming 40, 189 International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 2, 8, 27, 93, 238 and the Geneva conventions and the Additional Protocols 26 and nonhuman animals 5, 34, 38, 128, 238 in relation to armed conflict 1, 26, 28, 238 in relation to war crimes and crimes against humanity 2, 8, 10, 16, 29, 34, 36, 38, 39, 47, 58, 91, 92, 97, 119, 153, 170, 176, 238, 249

J

Jackson, Zakiyyah 17, 49, 75, 76, 78, 79, 177, 241 and animalization 76 Joy, Melanie 1–4, 6, 116, 119, 120, 127, 217, 218 and carnism 1, 217 and invisible victims 218

K

Kelty-Huber 13–15, 34, 94, 114, 127 and ecofeminists/ecofeminism 14, 15 and reproductive violence 5, 9, 10, 16, 20, 22, 27, 34, 36, 38, 91–94, 173, 177, 190, 233, 241–243, 248 Kim, Jean 11–13, 15, 16, 40, 49, 75, 79, 128, 140 and the multi-optic vision 15, 16, 19, 40, 49, 176, 246 and native and indigenous populations 211 and PETA the Holocaust on your place 11 Ko, Aph and Syl, Ko. See animalization Kurki, Visa 37, 66–70, 72, 73, 241, 247 and legal personhood 37, 38, 66–70, 241 in relation to the NhRP 37, 38, 57, 61, 65, 67, 73

Index

L

legal personhood 8, 25, 33, 37, 38, 47, 48, 56–58, 60–66, 69–72, 74, 77, 79, 92, 94, 96, 121, 141, 165, 169, 181, 188, 206, 236, 240, 241, 247, 249, 250. See also Kurki, Visa and the Nonhuman Rights Project 35, 37, 56, 57, 70, 72, 73, 241 and posthumanism 17, 38, 49 and rivers 61, 209 in relation to Happy the elephant 71 in relation to the cases of Tommy and Kiko the chimpanzees 72 1971 Liberation war in Bangladesh 9, 34, 38, 39, 92, 153 Light, Melanie 87 In relation to the film Herd 87

M

Marxism 40, 189, 204 and nonhuman animals as laborers 204 and the exploitation of nonhuman animals 13, 57, 176, 202 Mbembe, Achille 40, 190, 191, 194, 195, 197, 212, 213, 225, 244 and death in life 23, 36 and death worlds 40, 194, 197, 213 and necropolitics 36, 40, 188, 191, 212, 213

261

mega farms 27, 40, 41, 189, 207, 208, 214, 218, 225, 245 and factory farm workers 214 in relation to CAFOs 41, 189, 207, 214, 218, 225, 245 milk production 90, 122, 124, 125, 141, 172, 239 in relation to sexual violations within the dairy industry 121 Mookherjee, Nayanika 104–106, 108, 156, 157, 166, 168, 174, 176 and The Absent Piece of Skin 156, 166 and the removal of war-babies 106 in relation to Mehta 166 the regulation of post war reproductive bodies 20, 107, 108 motherhood 39, 88, 94, 99, 103, 108, 120, 129–131, 133–135, 142, 178, 196, 201, 243, 246 in relation to assault on reproduction 130 in relation to Bangladesh 99, 108 in relation to Hinduism 130, 131, 134 in relation to the Holocaust 111, 243

N

Narayanan, Yamini 13, 131–136 and anthropatriarchy 136 and gaushalas 132, 133, 135 and Hinduism 132

262

Index

nonhuman animals 1, 2, 4–16, 18–27, 29–34, 36–41, 47, 49–51, 53–71, 73–79, 88, 89, 91–94, 96, 98, 112–115, 117, 119, 121, 129, 130, 133–135, 140–142, 152, 153, 165, 168–170, 173–182, 188, 189, 191, 193–204, 206, 207, 209, 210, 212–214, 218, 223–225, 233–250 and property status 12, 13, 27, 48, 61, 62, 69, 140, 176 and reproductive coercion 2, 9, 22, 34, 38, 91–93, 96, 98, 99, 102, 106, 108, 109, 120, 126, 129, 130, 135, 141, 142, 190, 233, 236, 240, 242 and reproductive violence 10, 16, 20, 36, 38, 91, 93, 94, 241 and the killing of 100 and the slaughter of 1–3, 29, 214, 238 as civilians 10, 26, 30–33 as combatants 30, 31, 70, 92 as perpetrators 5, 159 as victims 6 Nonhuman Rights Project 35, 37, 57, 241 non-international armed conflict 26–31, 33, 34, 58, 62, 65, 92, 95, 238, 241, 249 and the Geneva conventions and the Additional Protocols 26, 29, 31 and Lawand, Kathryn of the IRC 28, 29

in relation to International Humanitarian Law 10 in relation to my reformulation 29, 65, 92, 238, 241 non-speciesism. See Dunayer, Joan non-speciesist. See Beirne, Piers; Dunayer, Joan Noske, Barbara 40, 60, 198, 200–202, 245 alienation 189, 200, 201 animal-industrial complex 40, 60, 198, 200

O

oppression 5, 7, 10, 14–17, 19, 23, 35–37, 39, 40, 49, 74, 77, 78, 93, 112, 113, 129, 130, 133, 134, 136, 139, 141, 142, 153, 174, 176, 182, 203, 204, 225, 243, 246, 248, 249 shared sources of 14, 15, 35, 36, 39, 40, 93, 113, 129, 141, 142, 153, 170, 176, 182, 204, 225, 243 oral contraceptives 233, 235, 236 and the grey squirrel 233, 235, 236

P

Pakistan 73, 104, 106, 156 and the 1971 Liberation War 98, 104 and rape and genocidal violence 2, 105 and the vulnerability of the penis 39, 155

Index

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) 11, 12, 117, 121–124, 128, 129, 152, 235 and the Animal Liberation Project 12 and cruelty in the dairy industry 121 and the egg industry 128, 129, 181 and the Holocaust on Your Plate 11, 13 and oral contraception 235, 236 and piglets 126, 127, 241 posthumanism 8, 13, 17, 38, 48, 49, 75, 76 and what it means to be human 8, 35, 49, 74–76, 79, 176, 179, 225 in relation to a multi-optic vision 49 pregnant persons 38, 94, 96, 97, 164, 179, 181 in relation to forced pregnancy 179, 181 in relation to speciesism 179

R

racism 13, 16–18, 36, 49, 75, 76, 79, 135, 137, 177, 218, 241, 246, 249. See also Aph, Ko & Syl, Ko. and race 77 in relation to a multi-optic vision 16, 40 in relation to animality and animalization 16, 76, 77 Regan, Tom 58–61

263

subjects-of-a-life 60 The Case for Animal Rights 59 reproductive violence 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, 22, 27, 34, 36, 38, 39, 87, 91–95, 99, 103, 107–113, 119, 121, 123, 126, 128–130, 132, 133, 135, 141, 142, 152–154, 156–158, 160, 162–165, 167, 170–175, 178, 179, 182, 190, 196, 201, 236, 237, 240, 242, 248 and the 1971 Liberation War 111 and bulls 34, 39, 115, 170, 171 and calves 34, 39, 153 and dairy cows 116, 123 and the dairy industry in India 132 and Darfur 160 and the former Yugoslavia 154 and gender 77, 135, 165, 248 and genocide 36, 109 and hens 34, 58, 128, 129 and queer perspectives 39, 153, 162 and reproductive technologies 239, 240 and sows 58, 126 and the vulnerability of the penis 153, 155, 174 definition of 22, 27, 95, 106 in relation to Bangladesh 104, 111 in relation to the genocide of the Uighur population 34, 94 in relation to the Holocaust 99, 138 Roscini, Marco 19, 29–32

264

Index

and nonhuman animals as combatants/civilians 30 and nonhuman animals as objects and military targets 32 and the status of nonhuman animals during armed conflict 238

S

Schultz, Phillip and displacement for gendered personhood 39, 165 Schultz, Phillip & Touquet, Helen 163, 164, 169, 181 and queering conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence against men 162 semen. See bull(s) sentience. See animal sentience sexual violence 2, 14, 26, 27, 29, 38, 58, 91, 93, 97, 113, 116, 135, 138, 153–157, 159, 163, 164, 171, 178, 188, 196, 238, 242 and forced pregnancy 2, 38, 58, 91–93, 95, 107, 112, 119, 135, 141, 154, 188, 190, 196, 206, 238, 242, 243 in relation to crimes against humanity 26, 29, 97 in relation to war crimes 8, 27, 93, 249 Singer, Peter 59–61 and Animal Liberation 59 and preference utilitarianism 59 and the welfarist approach 60 slaughterhouse workers 27, 208, 214–217, 245

sow 58, 114, 126, 127, 141, 207, 241 and reproductive coercion 9, 96, 98, 129 and reproductive violence 9, 240 soy 219, 221–223 in relation to deforestation 221–223 the impact of 221 speciesism 16–18, 23, 25, 35, 40, 48–50, 59, 75, 77–79, 96, 135, 137, 177, 178, 182, 198, 241, 244, 246, 249. See also Beirne, Piers; Dunayer, Joan and animal sentience 36, 37, 48, 50–54 and the legal context 52, 68 and the new speciesism 56 and species difference 35, 37, 48, 49, 77, 140, 179, 248 in relation to forced pregnancy 9, 34, 38, 181 in relation to shared sources of oppression 154, 176 Stache, Christian 201–204, 206 and nonhuman animals as laborers 204 in relation to Marxism and the exploitation of nonhuman animals 13, 57, 202 Stansecu, James 23, 36, 40, 188, 190–195, 244, 250 and autoimmunity 192, 193 and biopolitics 40, 190 and deading life 23, 36, 40, 188, 193–195, 244 and the factory farm 40, 193, 194 and thanatopolitics 40, 190, 191

Index

T

Takai, Alexandra 97, 104–107 and forced impregnation 106 Taylor, Sunaura 77 and Beasts of Burden: Animal and Disability Liberation Trigg, Robyn 76–78, 179 and intersectionality 77, 78 Twine, Richard 7, 13, 14, 35, 140, 199–201 and ecofeminists/ecofeminism 14 and the four complexes 199 and terminology 7

V

victimology of nonhuman animals 33, 247 von Clausewitz, Carl 20, 177. See also Clark, Natalya and war 20 vulnerability of the penis 39, 153, 155, 169, 174, 182, 243 in relation to bulls 174

W

Wadiwel and biopolitics 20–22 and epistemic violence 20–22, 25, 27 and institutional violence 20, 21 and the war against nonhuman animals 20, 25 Wadiwel, Dinesh 20–23, 25, 29, 115, 238 war 1–3, 5, 8, 10, 15, 17–21, 23, 25, 31–34, 40, 41, 58, 62, 65, 70, 93, 100, 104–106,

265

108, 111, 112, 130, 136–138, 153, 156, 158, 159, 163–167, 177, 178, 180, 181, 191, 196, 198, 199, 224, 238, 247, 248 and nonhuman animals 4–6, 8, 19–21, 249 in relation to the criminology of war 33 in relation to my reformulation of war 140 War Crimes 27, 93, 242 and International Humanitarian Law 27, 93, 238 definition of 118, 155, 174 forced pregnancy 2, 95, 107, 188 rape 117, 118 in relation to the war against nonhuman animals 3, 17, 19, 25 white supremacy 16, 18, 36, 49, 76, 176, 178, 225, 246, 248, 249. See also Aph, Ko & Syl, Ko. and animalization, dehumanization and (non)human animals 38, 76 in relation to shared sources of oppression 176 Wise, Steven 37, 57, 58, 61, 64, 65, 67, 77, 78 and autonomy and self-determinism 37, 63–65, 70 and Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals 57 and the NhRP 37, 56, 57, 61–63, 65, 66, 70–72, 77