The Walls Between Conflict and Peace [1 ed.] 9789004272859, 9789004272842

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The Walls between Conflict and Peace

International Comparative Social Studies Editor-in-Chief Mehdi P. Amineh (Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research, University of Amsterdam, International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden University) Editorial Board W.A. Arts (University College Utrecht, The Netherlands) Sjoerd Beugelsdijk (Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands) Harald Fuhr (University of Potsdam, Germany) Joyeeta Gupta (University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands) Nilgün Önder (University of Regina, Canada) Gerhard Preyer (Goethe University Frankfurt am Main, Germany) Islam Qasem (Webster University, Leiden, The Netherlands) Kurt W. Radtke (International Institute for Asian Studies, The Netherlands) Ngo Tak-Wing (Leiden University, The Netherlands) L.A. Visano (York University, Canada)

Volume 34

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/icss

The Walls between Conflict and Peace Edited by

Alberto Gasparini

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Cover illustration: Variant of the border cities in the chess game: from war machine to cooperation tool. Created and with kind permission by Alberto Gasparini and Giuseppe Assirelli. The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016044163

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1568-4474 isbn 978-90-04-27284-2 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-27285-9 (e-book) Copyright 2017 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Preface vii List of Figures, Tables, and Graphs  ix Notes on Contributors  xi Introduction. Walls: Ways of Being, Ways of Functioning, Ways of Being Transformed 1 Alberto Gasparini

Part 1 Walls Dividing, Walls Uniting 1 Walls Dividing, Walls Uniting: Peace in Fusion, Peace in Separation 35 Alberto Gasparini

Part 2 Macro Walls and Macro Networks 2 Why Empires Build Walls: The New Iron Curtain Around the European Union 97 Max Haller 3 The Enlargement Process and the “Dividing Lines of Europe” 126 Melania-Gabriela Ciot 4 Are Walls a National Security Issue? A View from the United States-Mexico Border 146 Dennis Soden and Alejandro Palma

Part 3 State, Security and Ethnic-Political Walls 5 The Berlin Wall 161 Anneli Ute Gabanyi

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Vatican City-Italy Wall: Consolidating Social and Political Peace 183 Domenico Mogavero

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The “Crossings” along the Divide: The Cypriot Experience 197 Maria Hadjipavlou

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Israel-Palestine: Concrete Fences and Fluid Borders 217 Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Sigal Ben-Rafael Galanti

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Ordinary Everyday Walls: Normalising Exception in Segregated Belfast 238 Hastings Donnan and Neil Jarman

Part 4 What Happens after the Wall? 10

European Twin Cities: Models, Examples and Problems of Formal and Informal Co-operation 263 Thomas Lundén

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Scenario for the New Town of Gorizia/Gorica 294 Alberto Gasparini

Bibliography 331 Index 367

Preface Walls are as old as the world of human groups and communities. And their purpose has always been to provide the group, the homeland and the nation with security and internal freedom by means of a walled social and political order, walled social and cultural homogeneity and in modern times walled sovereignty and a walled democracy. A wall has also been a perverse dream which may have been a short-term tactical success but has not met the medium- and long-term needs of the society which built it. Such walls have crumbled, and in some cases disappeared, because they have not lived up to the promises made for them, and because the closure they bring has always entailed economic, social and cultural impoverishment. Walls have changed by means of their transformation into borders, and subsequently by processes of reciprocal awareness, diplomacy, reconciliation and cooperation. It was thought that in the globalising modern world there would no longer be any need to erect walls, or at most there would be room for walls between neo-empires and for military fences. But the world has belied such predictions; walls are reappearing, even between countries which have laboriously come together in federations, confederations and special unions, not least the European Union itself. Who would have thought this could happen after decades of work by people living in border areas and the institutions (Euroregions, EGTCs, etc.) to build cross-border cooperation and remove the obstacles to it? Under these conditions it becomes essential to understand the logic of walls and the part they play in a dynamic process of change which turns them into something new, and how to use such processes to discourage the construction of walls, since they are not a real solution to the problems they are supposed to solve. It is to be hoped that this book may contribute to mutual awareness between peoples and deter them from building walls. Like all others, our epoch must come to understand that walls go against history and are ineffective and a waste of resources. Every story has a beginning, though the starting point gradually fades. The same goes for this book. The original idea came up around a table in a restaurant in Gorizia, during a discussion with Professor Eliezer Ben-Rafael. It took shape as the articulation of the volume was influenced by the novelty of its approach to public walls. Behind the restaurant was the fact that Gorizia was the venue for an international conference on “The Berlin wall and the other walls”, and it was there

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that scholars from Europe and the rest of the world met to discuss the subject. The conference was organised by ISIG (International Sociology Institute of Gorizia) and the IUIES (International University Institute for European Studies) in September 2009. From there the idea began to take off as it was proposed to a number of European teaching and research institutions. The enthusiastic support it received enabled us better to articulate the various facets of the idea as they are illustrated in the introduction to the book. Of additional significance is the fact that behind the scholars who contributed to the book are research institutes which for years, if not decades, have devoted their attention to walls, borders and cross-border cooperation. Among these I have particular pleasure in citing Belfast, El Paso, Nicosia and Cyprus, Cluj-Napoca, Berlin and the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies in Stockholm, besides ISIG and IUIES in Gorizia. Our heartfelt thanks therefore go to all the authors for the enthusiasm and commitment they have put into their contributions. And I would like to give special thanks to Eliezer Ben-Rafael for his unstinting collaboration and invaluable advice in the organisation and evaluation of the contributions which go to make up this volume. I would also like to thank Luigi Pellizzoni and Adrian Belton for their invaluable scientific and linguistic advice, Mark Brady for his translations and his revision of texts in English, Giulio Zanoli and Bernardo Gasparini for their IT expertise, Matteo Delli Zotti for his production of graphs and images adaptation. My undying gratitude goes to Mehdi Parvizi Amineh, Editor-in-Chief of Brill’s International Comparative Social Studies series, and the reviewers for reviewing the manuscript. My best wishes go to Rosanna Woensdregt at Brill for her guidance and management at all the stages of our work. Last and by no means least, I reiterate my thanks to Brill Publishers for believing from the outset in this book on world walls and local walls and their limitations.

List of Figures, Tables, and Graphs Figures 2.1 The duration of the existence of state borders in Europe 104 2.2 The New Iron Curtain around the Schengen area and the European Union, 2010 110 2.3 Where the new Iron Curtain between Africa and Europe comes to light: Ceuta (Spain/Morocco) 119 6.1 Map of the Vatican City, surrounded by the wall 191 7.1 Borderline between Turkish and Greek Cyprus 201 7.2 Street cut by the Green Line in Nicosia 201 7.3 Hundreds of people wait to cross to the other side after the check points opening at Ledra Palace Hotel in Nicosia 212 7.4 Central street in the capital of Cyprus, Nicosia, Ledra street which was closed in the interethnic fighting in 1963 and reopened in 2008 212 8.1 Central Israel between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 2007 223 8.2 The barrier in the Northern West Bank 226 8.3 The Gaza Strip 231 9.1 Map of Belfast ‘peace walls’ 243 9.2 Falls-Shankill barrier at Cupar Way 244 9.3 Crumlin Road ‘peace wall’ 244 9.4 ‘Wall’ of CCTV cameras on the Limestone Road interface 245 9.5 ‘Peace wall’ dividing public park (Alexandra Park) 246 10.1 Map of Haparanda-Tornio twin towns 269 10.2 Map of Narva-Ivangorod twin towns 277 10.3 Map of Narva 278 10.4 Map of Valga and Valka twin towns 286 11.1 Map of Gorizia and Nova Gorica divided by the border 304 11.2 American soldiers mark off the new border between Italy and Yugoslavia at Gorizia, 1947 305 11.3 Red star surmounting Nova Gorica railway station on the far side of the border fence. On this side, Italy 305 11.4 Demolition of the boundary stone of the fence between Gorizia and Nova Gorica 306 11.5 The mayors and the people of Gorizia and Nova Gorica toast in the occasion of the fence fall 306

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11.6 April 30th 2004. Celebration for the fall of the ‘wall’ of Gorizia outside the railway station in the area formerly divided by a fence; it is now a common square 307 11.7 The new square in front of the railway station, now bereft of its red star 308 11.8 The new square playing a role in daily life; the railway station is in the background 310 11.9 Gorizia. The future in the past 312 Tables 3.1 Per Capita expenditures on social protection 134 3.2 GDP per capita in PPS (Purchasing Power Standards) in the EU Member State from 2007 137 8.1 Terror attacks and casualties in Israel, 1994–2014 by year 224 9.1 Reasons given for not wanting the wall removed 256 11.1 Scenarios possible in 2030 according to times 327 Graphs 1.1 1.2 1.3 3.1 4.1 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4

Many superimposed borders form a hard wall 72 Organisations and their borders in modern society 79 Organisations and their borders experienced by the individual 79 Unemployment situation 139 Migration of Mexicans Into and Out of Mexico: Mexican National Survey of Occupation and Employment, 2006–2009 (thousands) 151 Networks within each sector and between sectors 322 The towns of Gorizia and Nova Gorica remain divided (hypothesis a) 324 The towns of Gorizia and Nova Gorica construct a differentiated integration (hypothesis b) 325 The towns of Gorizia and Nova Gorica achieve an (almost) perfect integration (hypothesis c) 326

Notes on Contributors Eliezer Ben-Rafael is a Professor of sociology, Tel Aviv University. His areas of research are ethnocultural cleavages in Israel, collective identities, sociology of languages and linguistic landscape and the sociology of the kibbutz. He received the Landau Prize for his life achievements in Sociology and was president of the International Association of sociology. He published recently Sociologie et Sociolingustique des Francophonies Israéliennes (with Miriam Ben-Rafael) (2013); The risk of enduring (with M. Topel, Sh. Getz and A. Avrahami) (2011); Jews and Jewish Education in Germany Today (with O. Guckner and Y. Sterberg) (2011); Ethnicity, Religion and Class in Israel (with S. Sharot) (reprint 2007); Jewish Identities in a Era of Multiple Modernities (with L. Ben-Chaim) (2006); and Is Israel One? Religion, Nationalism and Ethnicity Confounded (with Y. Peres) (paperback 2010); Jewish Identities: Fifty Intellectuals Answer Ben Gurion (in Hebrew, French, English and Italian: 2002–2013). He has also edited several books about The Communal Idea in the 21th Century (2013); World Religions and Multiculturalism (2010); Linguistic Landscape in the City (2010); The Jewish People Today (2009); and Transnationalism: Diasporas and the Advent of a New (Dis)order (2009). Sigal Ben-Rafael Galanti is a senior Lecturer in Political Science and Chair of the Beit Berl Research Center for Educational and Social Studies at Beit Berl College. During the years 2006–2012 she headed the Social Sciences and Civic Studies department of the college. She also teaches at the East Asian department of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Sigal Ben-Rafael Galanti was a Research Fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences (SHAKEN), Tokyo University (2001) and the Graduate School of Political Science at Waseda University, Tokyo (2005). She carried out her PhD research in Japan, focusing on this country’s democratization under American Occupation. She also investigates Israel’s political parties and civic education. She recently wrote Judicial Review in Japan—a Limited Mechanism or an Agent of Democratization (2010); The Memory of the Second World War and the Essence of ‘New Japan’ (2009); The Emperor in New Japan: The Parliamentary Debate (2008). In the field of Israeli politics she wrote From the Margins to a Continues Governing Position: The Miracle of the Israeli Rightist Likud Elite (2008); The ‘Miraculous Likud’ and the Polish formula (2011); Political Elites at the Right—the Likud (2007); Kibbutz Sector and Israel’s Political Elite of Today (2011).

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Melania-Gabriela Ciot is associate professor at Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca (Romania), where she is currently teaching courses on International and European Negotiations, Idiosyncrasies and Foreign Policy Decisions Making. She holds a PhD in International Relations and European Studies from BabeșBolyai University and one in Educational Sciences from Ghent University, Belgium. Gabriela Ciot has an intense scientific and research activity, which includes books, articles and studies in international and national journals, including “The Negotiator Magazine”, “Disability and Society Journal”, “Studia Universitas Babes-Bolyai—Psychologia-Paedagogia”, “The Journal of E-working”, “International Journal of Psychology”. Her research interests are the psychology of decision-making process, especially in foreign policy, European and international negotiations, mediation and management of conflict and cooperation. Recent publications include Modelul Negociatorului (idiosincrazii în procesul decizional al politicii externe) (2012); Managementul educației (clasa de elevi) (2012); Educație și societate (2012); Fundamente ale pedagogiei—partea I, (2012); Media portrayals of people with disability—an intercultural approach, (2009); Managementul clasei de elevi (2007); Elemente de pedagogie şi teoria şi metodologia curriculumului (2003); O abordare sintetică a educaţiei—suporturi pentru formarea iniţială şi continuă a cadrelor didactice (2002). Hastings Donnan is Director of the Institute for the Study of Conflict Transformation and Social Justice, co-Director of the Centre for International Borders Research and Professor of Anthropology at Queen’s University Belfast. His research focuses on the comparative study of borders that have experienced conflict, violence and war and on related issues of trauma, memory and displacement. He has conducted long-term residential field research at Pakistan’s borders with Afghanistan and Kashmir as well as at the Irish land border, and he is particularly interested in boundary crossing and boundary transgressions. His publications include A Companion to Border Studies; Borderlands: Ethnographic Approaches to Security, Power and Identity; Culture and Power at the Edges of the State; Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State; Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity; and Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and a Member of the Royal Irish Academy. Anneli Ute Gabanyi born in Bucharest to a Transylvanian Saxon family of partly Hungarian heritage, completed secondary studies in her parents’ native town of Sibiu.

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As a former trader, her father was subjected to restrictions by Communist authorities, and the Gabanyi family residence in the Sub Arini area was confiscated by the state. Gabanyi studied Philology and Political Science at the University of Cluj, and later at the Université d’Auvergne and the University of South California. She received a PhD in Philology from the Helmut Schmidt University in Hamburg. In 1963, Gabanyi and her family were allowed, as ethnic Germans, to reunite with their relatives living in West Germany. They settled in Munich, where she became an analyst for Radio Free Europe (1969); she was head of the station’ Romanian Research Section until 1987. She has frequently visited her native country after the Revolution, and is a regular contributor to Sfera Politicii. Anneli Gabanyi is presently as associate researcher for the German Institute for International and Security Issues (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) in Berlin. Her recent works include Systemwechsel in Rumänien: von der Revolution zur Transformation (1998), The Ceauşescu cult: propaganda and power policy in communist Romania (2000), Vom Baltikum bis zum Schwarzen Meer. Transformationsstaaten im östlichen Europa (with Klaus Schoeder) (2002). Alberto Gasparini is professor of sociology at the University of Trieste, Faculty of Political Science, where he holds courses in Rural and Urban Sociology, Sociology of International Relations and Forecasting techniques. Alberto Gasparini is founder and president of the International University Institute for European Studies since 2000 and director of the International Sociology Institute of Gorizia from 1989 to 2011. He seats in the directing board of several Italian and international scientific institutions. Since 1994, Alberto Gasparini is director of the Italian journal “Futuribili”. His main fields of research and study are: trans-border relations, urban and rural sociology, regional planning, international relations, ethnic relations, futures studies. Alberto Gasparini is a member of the expert group on the EGTC organized by the Committee of the Regions (EU) and of Working group organized by the Council of Europe. He is ISIG’s first delegate at the United Nation EcoSoc in New York, Wien and Geneva. Alberto Gasparini has received international honors and awards for his work, including “Doctor and professor honoris causa in social sciences” in 2012 by the Eotvos Lorand University of Budapest, and in 2013 by Babes Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca. Recent publications include La sociologia degli spazi (2000); Cross-border Co-operation in the Balkan-Danube Area (2003); Swot 1. Analysis and Planning for Cross-border Co-operation in Central European Countries (with D. Del Bianco) (2010); Swot 2. Analysis and Planning for Cross-border Co-operation in Northern Europe (with D. Del Bianco) (2010); Società civile e relazioni internazionali (2011); Strategies and Euroregions for Cross-border Co-operation in Balkan and Danube Countries

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(with D. Del Bianco) (2011); Swot 3. Cross-border Co-operation in Europe: A Comprehensive Overview (2012). Maria Hadjipavlou was Associate Professor at the Department of Social and Political Sciences, University of Cyprus (1995–2013). Previously she taught at Boston University and Bentley College in the USA. She has, for decades, facilitated and designed numerous conflict resolution workshops among different social groups from across the divide. She is a founding member of non-governmental organizations: the Peace Center, Hands Across the Divide, The Cyprus Academic Dialogue, the Cypriots’ Voice and the Gender Advisory Team. She has been a consultant to the Council of Europe on issues of inter-cultural dialogue and gender equality. As a trainer for the UNFPA, she worked with women in Bratislava. Kabul, Tunisia and has been a member and trainer for WINPEACEGreece, Turkey and Cyprus. She has published in international journals on conflict resolution and the Cyprus conflict, citizens’ unofficial diplomacy, women and the peace negotiations, etc. Her book “Women and Change in Cyprus: Feminisms, Gender and Conflict”, I. B. Taurus, 2010, has become a reference book on Women and Cyprus. Her research interests include international conflict resolution, gender and conflict, peace education, feminist theories, memory and reconciliation, gender and migration, women, peace and security, and women and the economic crises. She is a member of the ‘Gender Equality Technical Committee’ working on the integration of gender equality provisions in the peace negotiations in Cyprus. For the last four years she has been teaching at Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey, in the Summer Term. Max Haller born 1947 in Sterzing (Italy), is professor of sociology at the University of Graz (Austria). 1986–89 president of the Austrian Sociological Association; 1988–92 vice-president of the European Sociological Association; 1984–85 co-founder of ISSP; member of the Austrian Academy of Science. Visiting professor at the Universities of Klagenfurt and Innsbruck (Austria), Mannheim and Heidelberg (Germany), Trento (Italy), Sta. Barbara (California, USA) and St. Augustine University of Tanzania. He published 16 monographs, edited 16 books and about 240 scientific articles in leading international sociological journals and books in German and English, several translated into Italian, French and Hungarian. Research areas: social stratification, ethnic relations, sociology of European integration, comparative social research, and sociological theory. Recent books: The Making of the European Union. Contributions of the Social Sciences (editor, Springer 2001); European Integration as an Elite Process.

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The failure of a Dream? (Routledge 2008); The International Social Survey Programme. Charting the Globe (editor with R. Jowell and T. Smith, Routledge 2009); Ethnic Stratification and Economic Inequality around the World. The End of Exploitation and Exclusion? (Ashgate, forthcoming). Neil Jarman is a research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Conflict Transformation and Social Justice at Queen’s University Belfast and the director of the Institute for Conflict Research, a not-for-profit, policy orientated research centre, based in Belfast. He has a PhD in anthropology from University College London and has worked extensively on issues associated with the political context in Northern Ireland over the past 20 years. His work on parading and visual displays was published as Material Conflicts in 1997. His more recent work has focused on the processes of conflict transformation, including work on the role of the civil society in peacebuilding; vigilantism and the control of violence; public order policing; hate crimes and issues related to migration and cultural diversity. Over the past six years he has worked with the Northern Irish government and other agencies in reviewing the physical legacy of the conflict and the continued presence of walls, fences and barriers in residential areas of Belfast. Neil also chairs the International Expert Panel on Freedom of Assembly at the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, part of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Panel has produced two editions of the Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and works with governments and NGOs across Eurasia on issues related to protests and demonstrations. Thomas Lundén PhD (1977) in human geography, University of Stokholm, is Professor Emeritus of human geography, Stockholm University. Lundén was dozent at the University of Stockholm, then Associate Professor at the same university, and finally Professor at the Södertörn University. He was project leader: “The influence of political territorial hierarchies on local development and relations in cross-border areas. The role of Szczecin as central place in relation to the divided Pomeranian hinterland”, and member of TRATEBBB-project: “Reaching religion and thinking education in the Baltic-Barents Brim”. Lundén was director of the Swedish Institute (under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) of “International academy exchange cultural relations”; acting director of Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES), Södertörn University; board member, vice-chairman and chairman of Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography (SSAG). Now he is chair of the editorial advisory board of the “Journal Baltic Worlds”, Södertörn University. Recent publications include

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Boundary Towns. Studies of Communication and Bound­aries in Estonia and its Neighbours (with D. Zalamans) (2000); On the Boundary: About humans at the end of territory (2004), Crossing the Border. Boundary relations in a changing Europe (editor) (2006); Kaliningrad Identity: Crucial to Democracy and Development in the Baltic Sea Region (2009); Religion Symbols as Boundary Markers in Physical Landscapes: An Aspect of Human Geography (2011); Stettin (Szczecin): A Node in a Geographical Network (2013). Domenico Mogavero trained as a lawyer a priest and is now Catholic Bishop of Mazara del Vallo (Italy). He was awarded a PhD in Canon Law at the Potifical Lateran University in Rome. He has been an Expert in Canon Law in the Faculty of Law at the University of Palermo. He has been Special Professor of Canon Law and ViceDean at the Pontifical Faculty of Theology in Sicily. He has been co-director and then director of the National Office for legal questions of the Italian Episcopal Conference—Conferenza Episcopale Italiana (CEI). He was then appointed president of the CEI’s Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts. As president of the Council for Legal Affairs he has on several occasions made public appeals to Italy’s political leaders to draw attention to their immoral behaviour and involvement in legal questions. During the debate on the company kept by Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, he suggested that he resigns “for the good of the country”. Domenico Mogavero has written a number of books and articles on canon law, the role of judges in Courts of first instance, Catholic associations, Councils of Participation, canonical marriage, training for the clergy, lawsuits against bishops in the canon of the special councils from the 4th to the 6th century, and relations between church and state. Alejandro Palma received his BA in Political Science, as well as his MS in Intelligence and National Security Studies from the University of Texas at El Paso. As a graduate student, Alejandro was selected as an Intelligence Community Center for Academic Excellence (IC CAE) Scholar. He currently works for the City of El Paso, Texas as an Urban Planner, where he advises public and private sector clients on municipal policy best practices and compliance. Prior to his work with the City of El Paso, Texas, Alejandro worked for the Institute for Policy and Economic Development (IPED) on cross-border (U.S./Mexico) research projects regarding various political, economic and security issues with an emphasis on transnational criminal organizations. He can be contacted at [email protected].

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Dennis L. Soden is a professor of Leadership Studies at the University of Texas at El Paso, where he previously served as executive director of the Institute for Policy and Economic Development. He also previously was on the faculties in Political ­Science and Public Administration. His current research examines the geopolitics and geo-economics of international straits. He is the author of over one hundred articles and technical reports and has authored or co-authored 9 books, including Global Environmental Policy and The Environmental Presidency. He holds a Bachelors degree in Economics from the University of California at Riverside, a M.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California, and a PhD in Political Science from Washington State University.

Introduction. Walls: Ways of Being, Ways of Functioning, Ways of Being Transformed Alberto Gasparini The reality contained within a wall, and a border, is very complex, as is the context in which it is embedded. This introduction analyses that complexity and examines practical examples of walls which are still highly visible in the towns or cities crossed by, or located close to, a border but which are also present in rural or other non-urban settings.

Walls Hard and Soft: Images and Historical Experiences

The idea of a wall evokes classic models such as the Great Wall of China, the Roman limes, the modern fence, the ghetto, the metropolitan banlieue, the favela, the gated community. Walls thus conceived generally function for empires and (less frequently) states and within cities; they are built by wealthy social groups and nations to protect themselves from or marginalise the poor and the different. There are also ethnic and ideological groups which erect walls or see them erected around them. Walls have been present in every age and every society; although they may be metaphorical and invisible, they are no less effective than physical walls. Such walls abound in descriptions in the literature and in personal experience. I am put in mind of the invisible wall between Jews and Christians in a village street near Manchester described by Harry Bernstein (2006). I recall the state of affairs in a country village (population 2,000) in Emilia (Italy) in the 1950s. It was divided into two impenetrable parts; what might today be called ‘no-go areas’:1 Communists on one side and Christian Democrats and Catholics on the other. On one side people gathered in the social centre (casa del popolo), children enrolled in the Pioneers and the cinema showed socialist films. That part of town had its own bakery and its own bar, and everyone shopped at the cooperative. Weddings were held in the Town Hall and funerals were non-religious. On the other side people went to church, belonged to Azione cattolica and other Catholic associations, and watched films at the parish cinema. That side of town had its own bakery, its own bar and its own 1  From personal experience.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004272859_002

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general store; weddings and funerals were held in church. Crossing the wall between the two sides was not an option. If a Communist wanted to attend Mass s/he had to go to another town, and the further away the better. One feature distinguishing the various types of wall is the form of protection it is supposed to provide. Protection against the loss of freedom is the type characterising empires which have achieved an external-internal balance and seek to assure their global position and at the same time prevent the immigration of the world’s poor, who would jeopardise their internal social equilibrium. The Chinese and Roman empires built walls as a protection against barbarian invasions, to defend their territorial and political integrity. Modern “empires”2 such as the United States and the European Union protect themselves against immigrants from impoverished countries seeking a decent life and an escape from war, terrorism and persecution. They either prevent such immigration or adopt quota-based regulations. The justification given for quota systems (in use at Ellis Island from 1892 to 1954) and closure to the outside is the need to prevent the poverty imported by immigrants from disrupting the balance between the indigenous classes living in the empire. Put otherwise, walls are erected to preserve (defend) the social, economic, cultural and political equilibrium within the empire, the state, the metropolitan city and every town. Not only are there highly visible and extremely long walls between empires, between states lying on imperial borders (North and South Korea, Greece and Turkey, the Berlin Wall) and between large states with unresolved border problems (India and Pakistan); there are also walls around poor or rich minorities, between different cultures and different ethnic groups within states or more often within towns and cities. They produce ghettos, refugee camps, slums, favelas, gated communities, lazar houses and metropolitan banlieues. The ghetto (from the Venetian “geto”—meaning an iron foundry— which the local German-born Ashkenazi Jews pronounced “ghèto”) was the name given to that part of Venice from the 14th century (Calimani 1995; 2  The term “empire” is used here in a sense more metaphorical than with regard to earlier empires (Chinese, Roman, Persian, Holy Roman, Spanish, Habsburg, German, and so on), which were marked by territorial continuity and one overarching state power. These modern empires are an expression of the current process of globalisation of states. They are empires in which a dominant state lies at the centre of an international system which exercises its imperial function through political and economic power but also cultural and ideological power, and through circles of states which coalesce around the dominant state. In truth something of the kind developed under the Roman empire with the formation around it of client states such as Judaea, Commagene, Pergamon, Armenia and others in Anatolia.

Introduction

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Quétel 2013:65–66). It was only a century later that it became identified as a poor district. It was surrounded by a wall, and within it the Jews lived, worked and ran their shops; in the evening the wall was sealed by the gates built into it. In 1555 Pope Paul IV decreed the establishment of the Rome ghetto; the Papal Bull “Cum nimis absurdum” compelled the Jews to live in a circumscribed area and laid down a series of restrictions that remained in force for centuries (Calimani 2000:94–95; Quétel 2013:67). The ghettos were later dismantled, and the walls around them were abolished in the 19th century. The last one to disappear in western Europe was in Rome, when the temporal powers of the Papal States were virtually abolished in 1871. Forms of ghetto also existed in Muslim cities; they went by the name of Mellah in Morocco and Hara or Mahale in Persia (Quétel 2013:70). Other types of walled districts (physical, social or cultural) take various forms: Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan (Sacca 2007; Fashtanghi 2014); refugee camps in Darfur (Quach 2004; Darren 2008; Duta 2009) and Jordan (holding Syrians);3 favelas, squatter areas (United Nations 1971; VV. AA. 2012) and communities of migrants from rural to urban areas; slums and new ghettos formed by immigrants from abroad;4 the Parisian banlieues (Chombart de Lauwe 1960; Boumaza 1988; Caldiron 2005; Pironet 2006; Marconi 2007; Melotti 2007), largely inhabited by families from former colonies; what were known as the “Coree” in northern Italian cities (especially Milan) formed by immigrants from the south;5 the “Borgate” on the periphery of Rome inhabited by former residents of the city centre and southern immigrants in the 1960s;6 3  A consequence of the Syrian civil war and the recent rise of ISIS. 4  In particular the slums formed and being formed as a result of immigration from former Communist countries, as well as African and Asian countries in an attempt to escape political violence and poverty. 5  The “Coree” were common in and around Milan in the 1960s and early 1970s. In the Milanese dialect “Corea” means “a place of poverty, hunger, degradation and death. It is set in contrast with Milan, the metropolis of luxury, opulence, work and the future” (Alasia and Montaldi 1975:10). Formed by immigrants from southern Italy and poor areas in the north (such as Polesine in Veneto), they were created by the occupation and conversion of farmhouses and rural buildings in the area around Milan and by the illegal construction of houses by the immigrants, who found work as building labourers and street traders. In a period of economic boom and rapid industrial modernisation the immigrants arrived illegally and did their best to get by and avoid being sent back to their home towns. Promoted by Danilo Dolci, Franco Alasia and Danilo Montaldi, research published in 1960 sheds light on the subject. A 1975 edition is entitled Milano, Corea. Inchiesta sugli immigrati (Feltrinelli, Milan). 6  Since it became capital of the kingdom of Italy, the development of Rome has never been planned along the lines of an industrial city. Fascist policy was to make it the heir of the

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unauthorised camps set up by Roma originating from eastern Europe;7 Indian, Pakistani and Filipino quarters in cities in the Arab Emirates; other districts marked by a radical social and ecological difference from the rest of a city. The sharp differentiation of these marginalised quarters—which are further discussed in various parts of the book—from the rest of the city and the nation assumes the characteristics of a wall. That is because their populations are both homogeneous with and different from the populations outside the wall, and the latter have no effect on the equilibrium achieved and consolidated inside it. The focus of the research carried out by the scholars of the Chicago School was the community and its borders. In some cases borders are characterised as walled; in others the community is divided from the outside by its strong internal cohesion in the form of “natural areas”. The School concentrated above all on how borders change over time as a result of “invasion” from the outside and the “succession” (Zorbaugh 1983:230–235) of new ethnic groups. Typically, a quarter was initially inhabited by Anglo-Saxons, who were replaced by Irish, who were in turn replaced by Scandinavians, and the process continued with the arrival of Germans, Poles, Russians, Italians, Afro-Americans, Puerto Roman Empire, which resulted in the demolition of the old (medieval) working-class areas in the city centre to make way for Via dei Fori Imperiali and refurbish Piazza Venezia, and the area between Borgo Santo Spirito and Borgo Sant’Angelo to make way for Via della Conciliazione between Castel Sant’Angelo and St. Peter’s Square. The people living and working in these (and other) areas were moved to new social housing built on the outskirts of the city. These new residential areas were augmented or expanded as a result of immigration from 1946 onwards, but above all in the 1960s. This expansion was conducted without any official authorisation and took no account of any urban planning. In one case “the Borghetto Alessandrino was started following the unauthorised parcelling out of some ‘war allotments’ immediately after the war. The numerous immigrants . . . built their houses first in wood and then with bricks and mortar. Once the war allotments had been used up, the immigrants began building on adjacent land which was almost exclusively state property” (Antiochia 1968–1969:105). This phenomenon and its social consequences were studied in social research and in other disciplines, which produced a large body of literature and films for the purpose of informing public opinion and exposing the scandal. The prime mover in the sociological studies was Franco Ferrarotti, who worked through the journal “La critica sociologica”, founded by him in 1967; further research was carried out by Corrado Antiochia (1968–1969), Franco Martinelli (1986), Giovanni Berlinguer (1976), Giovanni Berlinguer and Piero Della Seta (1976). In cinematic studies the leading light was Pier Paolo Pasolini and the best films on the subject were “Accattone” (1961) and “Mamma Roma” (1962). 7  A relatively recent development in Italy and Spain, this is a result of Roma immigration following the entry of Romania and Bulgaria into the EU and the opening of EU internal borders.

Introduction

5

Ricans, Asians, and so on. The School centred most of its studies on particular areas in the city of Chicago. Such areas were often slums of what was known as the “zone in transition” (Burgess in “The City”, 1925), where the groups replaced by new arrivals moved to more stable neighbourhoods. As part of this pattern, improvised settlements of vagabonds sprang up alongside urban railway lines (“The Hobo” by Nels Anderson, 1923); inner city waste areas became the ganglands used by young delinquents organised in groups of varying sizes (“The Gang” by Frederic M. Trasher, first published in 1927); other quarters took on the form of a ghetto (“The Ghetto” by Louis Wirth, 1928), with the social, religious, cultural, cohesive and commercial features, and the dividing lines, typical of a Jewish community; of the Lower North Side of Chicago Harvey W. Zorbaugh (1929) analysed the many “natural areas” in “The Gold Coast and the Slum”,8 observing and comparing their processes of change—one such area was Little Sicily; low-rent areas saw a spread of “Taxi-Dance Halls”9 (Paul G. Cressey, 1925/1932), which were indicative of ethnic succession trends because they attracted the interest of members of ethnic groups with high-up political connections (see Hannerz 137).

Walls: Security and Freedom

It is clear that in all these areas in transition in a city (specifically Chicago) and in these “natural areas” there are walls, of varying degrees of hardness, 8  The Gold Coast and the Slum were the socially opposite poles of the “natural areas” located in the zone in transition on Chicago’s Near North Side. The Gold Coast was inhabited by the city’s upper classes and the Slum was composed of at least two parts. The former was inhabited by society’s outcasts—hoboes and gangs of youths—and had a certain cosmopolitan dimension. The latter was inhabited by Italian immigrants, mostly from Sicily, who conserved their traditions and family solidarity; Zorbaugh called it Little Sicily and Little Hell. Between the two extremes were the World of furnished rooms, rented by spatially mobile single people; Towertown, the artists’ quarter; the Rialto of the Half World, centred on North Clark Street, which “at night . . . is a street of bright lights, of dancing, cabareting, drinking, gambling, and vice” (Zorbaugh 1983:115), “and its people, it ways of thinking and doing . . . are incomprehensible to the people of the conventional world” (Zorbaugh 1983:126). 9  The taxi-dance halls were places where three groups met: the dance-hall owners, the girls who danced for money and the customers. Such places were widespread in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s. In Chicago they were located mostly on North Clark Street (Rialto) and were frequented by the singles renting furnished rooms and young taxi-dancers originating mostly from the Slum, Little Sicily and other nearby natural areas (Hannerz 1992:136–141).

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made up of arterial roads, canals and railway lines but also of radical differences between what is inside and what is outside the perimeter (see also research carried out in Udine to identify the walls between the town’s quarters: Gasparini 1979). The hardness of an area’s borders is also affected by the changes of population resulting from the successive invasions of ethnic groups referred to above; same may occur in the handover from the first to the second generation of a single ethnic group before it is replaced by new immigrants. The process of succession in urban area, but also within national borders, brings to the fore another feature of walls: that of the security and at the same time the freedom that a wall is expected to ensure. To this our attention now briefly turns. It may be pointed out firstly that in general terms walls represent a principle of order in spaces which would otherwise be in the sway of chaos and disorder. One example of perceived chaos is described by Dino Buzzati in his novel Il deserto dei Tartari (The Tartar Steppe) (Buzzati 2012/1940), where it represents the hic sunt leones from which the enemy may appear at any time: an enemy such as Warsaw Pact troops advancing on Italy and western Europe. The wall, represented in the book by the Bastiani outpost, divides order (on this side) from the disorder and chaos beyond it. Walls are erected with the purpose of achieving individual, family, community and social security, but also in order to act out individual and collective will within the space they define, to secure within them a complete privacy, particularly in the functions described by Westin (1970). They are also a way to asserte and consolidate identity. A wall may thus be interpreted as a factor determining security and privacy in that it is an autonomous sphere and transforms disorder into order. One example is provided by the American pioneers: in the early days, in the absence of state law or its enforcement, they were at the mercy of predatory gangs, Indian tribes and the overweening interests of local elites (landowners, bankers, corrupt lawmen). Under these conditions they were compelled to defend themselves by erecting the best walls they could, such as the not particularly daunting walls of their own homes. In sum, walls serve to ensure security from outside and freedom of action and planning inside (privacy). But it is clear that although such freedom and security produce order, such order is not necessarily shared and “just”. It is one order among many, seen from an internal and an external standpoint alike. In other words, a wall is a hard and rigid border, and the security it defends may be objective (experienced) or subjective (perceived and interpreted); furthermore the security it provides may be almost absolute, but hardly ever absolute. This also applies to the system of walls, real and tangible, represented by

Introduction

7

the home for individuals and families—the wall may easily be breached. But such almost absolute security provided by a wall must, by analogy, apply to a group, a community and a nation. Yet the adoption of hard technology, as used in wall-fences, shows that even these can be breached or circumvented, demonstrating that absolute security is extremely difficult to achieve. Examples are legion: the Roman limes, the Maginot Line, in the present day the fences around Ceuta and Melilla, between Israel and Palestine and the United States and Mexico, in Kashmir—and many others—have been built, are being built or are being planned. But hardly any of them have withstood or will withstand pressures coming from outside, or even from within.

Walls and Borders in the Academic Literature

The literature on borders has often been a residual (or perhaps “creeping”) category, part of the prevalent analysis of the centre of a social system and relations among the elements within it. Interest in borders, more implicit than explicit, varies according to the type of system in question—states, organisations, metropolitan areas, or social systems in general. Or it varies according to the approaches developed in a range of academic fields—politics, sociology, cultural anthropology, geography, psychology, architecture, law and so on. One of the first works to present a systematic analysis of borders (and frontiers) was “Théorie des Frontières et des Classes”, published in 1908 by the Belgian sociologist and economist Guillaume De Greef. Other writers who explored the subject in the first half of the last century include Frederick Jackson Turner (1894), George Nathaniel Curzon (1908), Lionel William Lyde (1915), Thomas Hungerford Holdich (1916), Vittorio Adami (1927), Karl Haushofer (1927), Paul de Lapradelle (1928), W. J. Rose (1935), Derwent Stainthorpe Whittlesey (1935) and Roderick Peattie (1944). A considerable amount of study has been devoted to tangible borders, above all state borders, while much less work has been done on borders of organisations, which in fact are replaced by relations between a social system and its task environment: that is to say, all aspects of the environment that are “potentially relevant to goal setting and goal attainment” (Dill 1958:410; Scott 1982:188), and in the case of state borders on international relations. In the field of political borders there are theoretical studies on and scholars of borders, but they are mostly niche studies and scholars. More frequently found are studies and scholars dealing with borders as the result of a need to solve problems concerning the particular borders in question. In both cases the scholars have often been trained and have developed

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their studies in research institutes and universities located in border areas. These include the “International Sociology Institute of Gorizia” (Istituto di Sociologia Internazionale di Gorizia—(ISIG)), the “Institute of Sociology” of the University of Graz, the “Centre for International Borders Research” (CIBR) of the Queen’s University of Belfast, the “Israeli/Palestine Center for Research and Information” (IPCRI) in Jerusalem, the “Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies” in Jerusalem, the “International Peace and Cooperation Center” in Jerusalem, the “Institute for Policy and Economic Development” (IPED) of the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP), the “Centre for Baltic and East European Studies” of the Södertörn University of Huddinge, the “Center of International and European Negotiations and Mediation” at the Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca, the “Conflict Resolution Trainers Group” in Nicosia, but there are many others. Such cultural and research institutes generally study peace, cooperation and cooperation strategies, all in a cross-border dimension. There is also a range of journals which have been set up in such border areas: “Journal of Borderlands Studies” (founded in 1986), “ISIG Journal” (founded in 1991), “Eurolimes” (founded in 2006), “IUIES Journal” (founded in 2007). The literature on walls has diverse features. Research conducted in border areas characterised by walls tends to analyse how walls can be transformed over time by actions which make them softer, more akin to borders and more likely to disappear. Such actions take the form of meetings and discussions between stakeholders, involving local populations and immigrant groups, on the one hand, and the relevant state authorities on the other. The aims of these actions are to effect a change in the rules, starting with attenuation or modification of their enforcement. In this book the chapters by Hadjipavlou, Lundén, Donnan & Jarman, and Gasparini analyse walls from the perspective of overcoming walls and borders. Recent years have seen an increased interest in walls. This is reflected in the publication of books by Chaichian (2014), Weber and Pickering (2014), Quétel (2013) and Brown (2010), in which walls are considered from varying standpoints: as the walls of empires, as death-producing walls, as fantasies of a walled democracy, among others. In much of the literature in which they are featured, walls are considered in specific cases and in the present, which leads to conclusions prevalently expressed in terms of denunciation, with conflict analyses and ideological analyses designed for immediate political action. Such writing can become an end in itself, producing statements that add little to understanding of the wall. The academic process stops without proceeding further with the scientific method, which is not confined to a description and explanation of the

Introduction

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­ henomenon in question but is also an attempt to predict how it can be overp come, to identify and explore actions and decisions which could change the wall in the immediate and more distant future—in a possible, probable and desirable future. It is hoped that some of the original contributions in this book will lead in that direction.

About this Book. Aims and Conceptual Grounds

This book deals with the security and privacy of the group living in the community and the nation in relation to the outside, and relations between the majority group and the minority group within the nation, a group which differs from the majority in terms of social, ethnic or cultural conditions or other criteria. Put briefly, a wall can take on a variety of meanings. Of these, discussion centres here on the fact that a wall is a hard border which may: 1) represent a profound injustice, if emphasis is placed on the consequences of the expansion and openness of a society/nation, but in this case the wall may be hard for certain functions (political, sovereign, administrative, fiscal, etc.) but not for those of exchange (of power, economic, and so on); and/or 2) represent a rejection of diversity, real or imagined, and a desire for ethnic and/or social cleansing and homogeneity; and/or 3) separate spaces and territories according to the principle of territoriality (Somner 1969) and privacy (Altman 1976); and/or 4) represent the conditions for lasting peace, in that it neutralises the factors that may produce conflicts (tangible or ideological, cultural, ethnic, etc.); and/or 5) emphasise a form of rationality, in that it introduces and reinforces a division between the inside and the outside that passes along the (or a) border. This book is addressed to academic specialists and intellectuals in general. It presents a number of original ideas designed to improve the understanding of walls and borders. It introduces concepts which go beyond the consideration of walls which remain hard; consideration which is often solely negative and expressed as a denunciation implying a duty to eliminate them. Here treatment is given to the variable of a wall’s time and dynamics. In this dimension, from the “moment after” its construction, the wall begins to change into something softer, more of a gateway, as a result of the relations which arise in the locality (the cross-border area) and gain the upper hand over relations between states and between cities in states. The logic of the closed system, implicit in the construction of a wall around a system, is based on a rejection

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of the resources (or some of them) coming from outside, which leads to an increase in the entropy and dissipation of energy10 in the system itself and a depletion of its creative capacity. This may be gradually replaced by the opposite logic of openness and external relations. The contents of this book are also designed to contribute to a definition of the concepts of the border and the wall. Borders and walls are formed by the ­association, or the overlap, between a line and an area which become a borderline and a border area respectively. A balance between the two produces a border, and above all autochthony in the area of cooperation between the populations which straddle the border. By contrast, a border composed of a line without an area produces a wall, since the state (as the national centre) extends its homogeneous reach right up to the line which separates it from another state. Understanding of what happens at a border and a wall is assisted by the introduction of the cultural, social and economic component of cooperation between the populations living in the area which gravitates around the border as a line. This cooperation is able to activate a state of peace which is based on and experienced in everyday life, mediation and intermediate values which mitigate and demobilise the harshness of the clash between two opposed homogeneous entities bent on the pursuit of ultimate values. Cooperation, or even revolt, are the keys to a change in which a wall in particular, but also a border, is transformed into something else or even disappears—because cooperation comes about through macro-political decisions, or through a popular revolt. A case in point is the events in East Germany between September and November 1989 (exodus to the West through Hungary and Austria), followed by the fall of the Berlin Wall. This stands as evidence that a wall, which may be taken as an instance of static reality, is part of a time, and progressively transforms itself into a border and may even cause it to disappear. In other words, the time variable (short and medium term) is essential for understanding how a wall can be changed. That is because a wall is always something that gives wrong solutions to problems which are sometimes real and sometimes invented out of the distorted dreams (see Brown 2010:110–142) of a culture that rejects what is different, thinks that radical solutions are the most effective (“once and for all!”) and is convinced that drug trafficking and terrorism can be kept at bay with barriers. But such barriers can be circumvented by criminal organisations; they are very expensive to build; and some elements of the public do not approve of them, starting 10  According to the definitions in the General Systems Theory (GST) and its geographical application.

Introduction

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with businesses in cross-border areas which profit from being able to pay low wages to foreign workers. Such internal opposition to the construction of walls is shared by other elements of the society which immigrants wish to enter, in particular intellectuals and people of a liberal mindset. It is thus observed in this book that attitudes in society to the wall are contrasting. On the one side is political society, or the structural society of rules and public institutions, which favours the building of a wall. Support for this political society comes from non-organised public opinion which is formed by the mass media and generally tends not to question tradition (with its consolidated view of right and wrong and the mantra “this is how we’ve always done things”) or the authority of those who use it. On the other side is the civil society, which tends to reject the wall because it is involved in international relations and shares a cosmopolitan culture open to the outside, directly and indirectly. Another question discussed here is that of interpreting peace (as already mentioned) as the result of cooperation in a border area or across a wall, and therefore the configuration of such a peace as an active peace formed in the personal, social, cultural and economic relations of everyday life. This peace is a process of consolidation over time of the intermediate values established in everyday activities. It is also highlighted that walls come in many types, act in different ways, and are activated by equally various functions, objectives and cultures. De Greef (1908) observes that these walls (or frontiers, as he calls them) are economic, genetic, aesthetic, psycho-collective, moral, legal and political. An important dimension of the book is methodological in nature, taking account not only of the walls separating state and society but also of those which may separate any social system or organisation. The joint application of these focuses adds a great deal to the understanding of walls. The application of the paradigm introduced by General Systems Theory (GST) (see Bertalanffy 1968; Gubert 1972, Strassoldo 1973) highlighted the dimensions of the closed system and the open system. It showed that walls, by tending to emphasise the state or an organisation as a closed sytem, waste a great deal of resources, both in their construction and in that they give rise to a logic of autarky towards the outside and the use of resources which could otherwise be employed to improve the lives of the population (Ceausescu’s wall in Romania is a case in point) and the proper functioning of the system itself. Walls have the effect of increasing the entropy in a society. This book thus highlights the advantage of using scientific approaches whose specific characteristics are different in that they allow a reading of empirical reality with the use of diverse heuristic devices to interpret that reality in analogical terms.

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Walls in Four Parts and Eleven Chapters

These are the conceptual dimensions on which the explanations of walls are based, and they are narrated in eleven dimensions: one general and the others specific to urban contexts, above all European but also referring to continental divides between Europe and Africa/Asia and between North and CentralSouth America. As regards the meaning and contents of each of these interpretations and narratives, they are organised into four parts, ranging from the general and the past to the specifics of cases of cooperation and the future. The first part of the book illustrates and provides a theoretical explanation of “public walls dividing the ‘in’ from the ‘out’ from a number of standpoints” Alberto Gasparini describes these walls in terms of “Walls dividing, walls uniting: peace in fusion, peace in separation”. The chapter is organised into six sections. The first defines borders, using the single term “border” to subsume the range of other words which differ according to national contexts and the choices of the authors who use them; according to Franco Demarchi’s sociolinguistic analysis, they arise from the evolutions of the linguistic phases in which each of them has been used. The condition for the existence of a border is identified as the fact that it should comprise a line (borderline) between two entities—states, organisations, social systems—and an area (borderland). A border may also assume different forms: barrier border, gateway border, symbolic mental virtual border, administrative border. These forms basically depend on the equilibrium (or lack of it) between the line and the area. The second section looks at the duality of borders—introverted and extroverted. For the state and its system, a prevalently outward-orientated border has little importance because strategies for outside connection make it more provisional and mobile. A prevalently inward-orientated border is much more important and is strenuously defended, since the use of buffer strategies to defend the internal structure and its way of working (technical nucleus) reinforces the identity of the state and social system. The third section examines the definitions of a wall, identifying it as a closed border (barrier) but also as something self-contained and different from a border. Its originality lies in the fact that it is formed as the maximum expression of the line and eliminates the area, or operates as though the “intermediate area” (De Greef 1908) (that is, the cross-border area) did not exist. Many types of wall are discussed: the Roman limes, the medieval city wall, the wall of the modern state, the modern state wall reinforced by nationalist ideology, the walls of confederations and unions of states in the age of globalisation. It is pointed out that there

Introduction

13

is a strong link between walls and “fantasies of a walled democracy” (Brown 2013:119ss.). The following section examines the violent face of the wall: a wall built where there is no border, a wall unlikely to be accepted on both sides, a wall imposed in response to aims which entail violence, a wall which may be built inside a single community. The next section looks at nine historical cases in which walls and borders stand in a relationship more problematic than the canonical type. These are: 1) the borders and walls of feudal states and city-states; 2) the process of development from a group of small states (or quasi-states) to a single state in which the border is a quasi-wall; 3) the border of an empire as the end of the world; 4) borders and walls in traditional communities; 5) a border which tends to become a wall when a state is treated as an extended local community; 6) a border and a wall being formed in the incongruity between the proto-modern state (still based on sovereignty) and post-modern globalisation; 7) borders and walls within states; 8) modern organisations as producers of soft borders which, from an individual’s point of view, are unlikely to become walls; 9) borders and walls which change from being lines to central points (airports resembling old city walls). The last section analyses the positive face of borders and walls and peace in fusion and separation. This comprises concepts such as cooperation and the operational assessment of how peace is produced by the reconstitution of a borderland (or intermediate zone) which goes beyond the borderline marked by a wall. Such cooperation strengthens identity and belonging; it responds to needs such as participation, transparency and borderland strategies; it brings forth new institutions with their own functions, such as Euroregions. All this is developed so as to bring about an active peace not only between border areas but between areas once divided by walls—towns along the old Iron Curtain are an example. Such a peace also asserts itself where there are new and hard walls, because they prove to be increasingly volatile and pointless. The configuration of this approach to active peace around walls is extremely useful for an assessment of whether they can be overcome, especially compared to a solely negative interpretation of walls that goes no further than a denunciation, leading to a fatalistic and passive wait for their fall. All this is developed by means of an integrated scientific method which is not confined to describing the walls and explaining their effects but predicts their future consequences and explores and assesses strategies for controlling them. This complex definition of borders and walls is exemplified in emblematic cases which are analysed in subsequent chapters. They are also highlighted below because they each represent a different dimension of a wall. The second part of the book tackles the general theme of “Macro walls and macro networks”, examining present-day imperial walls at the borders between

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North and South (specifically the north and south of Europe and America), but also networks within empires between towns and the walls, often invisible, which may form over time and through processes of differentiation and hardening within the empire of Europe. In actual fact, in their initial stages empires attach little importance to borders, and to walls even less (the Roman empire until Trajan, the early years of US power, the European Union until the 1980s), because they are in expansion and are certain of being able to face threats with adequate (if not brutal) counter-measures or by the creation of buffer (or client) states (see the Roman empire), or because they have no properly organised enemies (“hic sunt leones”). It is in their phase of maturity, or of political and military (as well as social) organisation, that they come to be dominated by insecurity at their borders which induces them to put those borders under the highest possible level of control and render them “absolutely” secure. In the chapter “Why empires build walls: The new Iron Curtain around the European Union” Max Haller describes the origin of the idea of building a security barrier along the border of the Mediterranean Sea, and walls, in the form of fences, at the most sensitive locations in Ceuta and Melilla. Haller draws on historical and comparative sociology to reach an understanding of the relation between empires and great walls. He describes how for centuries the Great Wall protected the internal security and peace of the Chinese Empire, and how the various limes of the Roman Empire ensured security and gave the impression of preventing, or at least controlling, invasions by enemy armies and barbarian tribes. Subsequently, there arose states in which the role of walls was fulfilled by natural barriers, such as the Pyrenees in the case of Spain. Some smaller states had no need of walls because they did not require the finances needed for the armies necessary to sustain the weight of empires. The borders of states such as Switzerland, the Low Countries and Portugal thus remained untouched by the big powers of the time. Recent times have seen the construction of the Iron Curtain, a wall between Western Europe and the communist East built by the regimes in the latter to prevent their citizens fleeing westward. A number of lessons on contemporary borders derive from Haller’s use of comparative sociology. Trying to identify how the European Union exhibits features of a new empire, he observes that it is tempted to build a new Iron Curtain around itself. The EU certainly has no army of its own (though the Lisbon Treaty provides for the nucleus of one), neither does it have a real political centre. Yet, he argues, the Union is configured as an empire considering that 1) it is a numerically large socio-political and economic community; 2) it may be seen as an ­influential political power at a global level. It is a “civil and soft power” based not on military strength but on normative principles

Introduction

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and international negotiation in which a central role is played by the principles of peace, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. In this sense the EU can be configured as a new form of empire; 3) the border question shows clearly that the EU considers itself as some sort of new empire because it has instituted a free internal market (including the job market), the Schengen area and freedom to travel without national border controls, but more stringent controls on its external borders; 4) the Treaty of Lisbon comprises a general paragraph which states that EU member states are obliged to provide mutual assistance in the event of a military attack from outside. If the EU can thus be considered a new type of empire, the question arises as to the reasons (if any) for building a new Iron Curtain, and what form it might take. There are many reasons for, and some against. The factors in favour include relations between Europe and Africa (enormous differences in income, birth rates, political stability, etc.) and internal political trends (the rise of extreme right political parties and support for them in the mass media). Among the factors militating against the idea of a new Iron Curtain, Haller cites the need of European industry for cheap labour from outside the EU and the influence of humanitarian organisations, often closely allied to the Catholic and Protestant churches and a number of progressive political parties. He then considers the forms of border control which, if implemented together and intensively, amount to a new Iron Curtain: 1) the selective use of visas; 2) border controls effected by specialised national and European paramilitary personnel (Frontex); 3) cooperation between European and African states with bilateral agreements to establish preventative measures against illegal immigration; 4) internal EU controls on personal identity and the possession of papers establishing immigrants’ rights to remain in a European country. These factors seem to confirm the development of an Iron Curtain. Haller is convinced, however, that three general factors show that such a curtain, should it exist, will be short-lived: 1) the contradiction between the Curtain and the basic right (UN Declaration of Human Rights, 1948) of every individual to move freely within the borders of each state and to leave his/her own state to go to another; 2) the identification of possible alternatives to the Iron Curtain between Europe and Africa; 3) the negative myths about immigration prevalent in Europe which identify migration from the south as a threat to Europe itself, but which take no account of the complexity of emigration, which may be permanent, temporary, circular or conclude with a return home in old age. Max Haller’s chapter has the merit of providing a macro approach to the state and border system of an EU which has very recently been forced to face the fact that a new Iron Curtain shows profound weaknesses. Its low level of political integration means that the EU is not able to deal with mass immigration,

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because national governments react to it by demanding a hardening of their borders—founder members and countries of recent accession alike. Walls have lives; they are born hard and then grow softer, after which they may become symbolic and then even tourist and cultural attractions. This is seen in cases such as the Berlin Wall; they may go from hard to psychological, or turn into something else or even disappear altogether. Walls and their functions change, and this may occur more frequently with walls formed within empires. Here walls are very often invisible, since they are not clear in geographical space, taking on the form of political, economic and social discrimination, even to the extent of denial of full citizenship, thus contributing to the formation of a variable-geometry (or multi-speed) European Union. Over time such invisible walls in the EU empire vary in substance. This leads to consideration of a second type of wall: one which is possible, and may disappear and then reappear. Such a wall may appear and disappear in that it may be visible or invisible, or may have a material and non-material character, because it may divide for reasons which are economic, political, social, psychological and cultural. It is more likely to appear within large states, where walls (old and new) are impalpable but real. In the chapter “The Enlargement process and the ‘dividing lines’ of Europe” Melania-Gabriela Ciot traces the development of the European Union from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1951) and the European Economic Community (EEC, 1957) to emphasise the economic integration of the member states and the removal of customs barriers and restrictions on trade in raw materials. In this process the EU enlarged to encompass other countries, first in Western Europe and then in 2004, 2007 and 2013 to include states in Eastern and Central Europe. Its organisation was enshrined in rules and institutions of increasing complexity, designed to create a spirit of integration “to find a solution for the management of diversity, in order to erase the existing dividing lines from its interior. Enlargement policy was meant to increase the competitiveness of the European Union, but has it succeded?”. In this enlarged Europe it seems that policies of differentiation rapidly create invisible internal walls between north and south and between large and small countries, giving rise to such phenomena as Euroscepticism. To ascertain whether dividing lines exist or are disappearing, Ciot starts from the European Social Model (ESM), defined by Butler, Schoof and Walwei as a model of ­integration policy and unity in diversity; based on a combination of economic efficiency, it comprises dividing lines at the political, societal, economic and psychological levels. At each of these four levels the author finds ­dividing

Introduction

17

lines, or walls, between the original EU member states and those which joined later. On a political level she identifies at least three overlapping dividing lines (walls). The first is two-speed Europe: the line between its northern and ­southern member states. The second separates a federation formed by the 15 states which were members before 2004 and a confederation of the 13 countries which joined the Union after that year. This line represents a two-class Europe in which closer cooperation between one group of member states leads to their irreversible separation from those outside it—and irreversible means permanent. A social dividing line (wall) is built above all on the difference in social spending between member states: on the welfare state, the job market and labour costs. In 2009 there was a marked percentage difference in these terms between the countries which joined before 2004 and those of later accession, and between the western countries (and some southern states) and those in Central and Eastern Europe. The same pattern emerges in economic dividing lines, which are clearly marked in terms of purchasing power, unemployment and the migration of workers and students. The author also highlights how these dividing lines characterise people’s psychology and culture, particularly in the form of a fear of invasion by migrants from Central and Eastern Europe. At the present moment, new walls are being built on national borders in the form of heavily policed fences: between Italy and France, France and Britain, Croatia and Slovenia, Austria and Hungary, Hungary and Croatia, Hungary and Serbia, and elsewhere. Is this to be ascribed to EU enlargement— too much, too soon? Rather, the author is convinced that the responsibility lies in hesitation in taking the decisions necessary to deepen European integration. The last chapter of the section on walls seen from a macro standpoint returns to the theme of the hard continuous wall represented by the fence between the US and Latin America. Dennis L Soden and Alejandro José Marìa Palma ask the question “Are walls a national security issue? A view from the United States-Mexican border”. They document the deep and sometimes arbitrary contradictions: 1) between the functions of a fence/wall between countries with different levels of power such as Mexico and the US, with few border controls on one side and highly stringent controls on the other, and a consequent difference in spending; and 2) between the many poor countries of one continent (Latin America) and one rich country which is almost a continent in its own right (or with Canada). The authors list the problems caused by the fence between the US and Mexico built in pursuit of contradictory interests (homeland security and national security). They conclude that it is a failure because politicians are afraid to

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redefine national security while the illegal flow of immigrants increases pandemics, pollution, poverty, drug trafficking and human trafficking, particularly on the American side of the fence, which is an extreme point of a continental border (between South and Central America and the North). In this b­ order/ wall area there is indeed a high level of violence in the form of murders, child kidnappings, disappearances, drug wars and so on. Both countries have developed specific policies. Mexico (starting with president Felipe Calderon) has invested heavily in a war on the drug cartels. The US did likewise in the construction of the fence, which subsequently required further spending on a network of surveillance cameras and sensors. In one episode, the Mexican police arrested six Mexicans who were tearing down the fence and selling the steel as scrap metal. However, the authors consider that the recent decrease in illegal immigration is due not to the Americans’ investment in the fence and the technology attached to it, but to the fact that the economic recession has discouraged immigration itself. As well as running through wide expanses of uninhabited frontier territory, the fence crosses areas containing towns which have developed at specific points. In such towns the wall has given rise, as said above, to some of the most violent communities in the world—Ciudad Juàrez, close to El Paso, is a case in point. To assure the function of border control and keeping criminal gangs out of the country, however, the concepts of homeland security and national security will have to be redefined. These two types of security entail different tools. The fence may succeed in halting illegal immigration and thus achieve its goals in terms of homeland security, but it does little to impede drug trafficking and terrorism and thus fails to ensure national security. To the latter end, the first requirement is to rethink US-Mexican relations. The fence-wall is not a national security solution because it was desired and built by one side only, while Mexico is simply unable to play an active role in preventing terrorist threats—different policies are required for that purpose. The third part of the book focuses on borders and walls of a more limited nature—for the most part within urban spaces, although the real reasons for them are political, religious and governmental, in which security plays a fundamental role. It has thus been named “State, security and ethnic-political walls”. Five emblematic situations are examined: the Berlin Wall as a means to prevent a state’s citizens from escaping (from East Berlin) to the West (Gabanyi); the wall between the Vatican City and Italy as a means to ensure the sovereignty of the universal state and peace in relations between the two (Mogavero); the wall dividing Nicosia and Cyprus and their sovereign political dimensions which resist fusion, and the people on either side of the wall who feel the need to take possession of the other side of the city and the state (Hadjipavlou);

Introduction

19

security and other factors underlying the establishment of the Israel-Palestine wall and its possible consequences for the borders (Ben-Rafael and Ben-Rafael Galanti); the walls for peace in Belfast—from the need for security to normalisation (Donnan and Jarman). The end of the Second World War gave rise to many cases of the division of single territories among the victorious powers: Vienna, Berlin and Germany, but also Venezia Giulia, particularly Trieste and Istria, are cases in point. In the Italian journal Futuribili Savino Onelli and Fausto Rotelli (1999:165–173) even presented a “retrospective forecast” (see also Besthuzev-Lada 1969:526– 534; Choucri & Robinson 1978:110; Gasparini 1999:17–21) on what might have happened in 1945 if Italy had been divided into four spheres of influence. The Berlin Wall was a particularly telling instance of the negative impact on everyday life caused by the continental wall that went by the name of the Iron Curtain, which was its extension. In “The Berlin Wall” Anneli Ute Gabanyi analyses the harbingers, construction and thirty-year consequences of the Wall, interpreting it as a complex fulcrum of international politics, even world politics. The Wall was built in a post-war era which began with a bipolar Europe (1945) and ended with the collapse of one of the poles, the Soviet Union, and the reunification of the two Germanies (1990). During that timespan the Wall went up in 1961 and came down in 1989. In 1945 Germany and Berlin had been divided and as such stood as the heart of the Iron Curtain separating western and eastern Europe. The Soviet Union envisaged Berlin as an integral part of Communist East Germany, but the city was itself divided into four sectors, three under western control and one under the Soviets. The result was the Soviet blockade on land access to the city from West Germany in 1948, to which the West responded with the Berlin Air Lift—227,264 flights carrying supplies of food and other materials to keep the city going. On May 12th 1949 the Soviet Union had to admit defeat, and the blockade ended. In 1952 Stalin proposed a peace treaty whereby he would acquiesce to the reunification of Germany in exchange for its demilitarisation and neutral status. West Germany’s rejection of his proposal brought it closer to the Western Allies and their institutions such as NATO and the treaties which paved the way for the subsequent formation of the European Union. The factors which kept Berlin divided and led to the construction of the Wall were the desire to stop East Germans fleeing to the West and to prevent German reunification. It has been calculated that between 1949 and 1960 2,686,942 refugees escaped to the West. For Khrushchev, putting a stop to this flight and the consequent construction of the Wall were essential for the vitality of East Germany, for Communist ideology and for his own political survival.

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The desire to ­prevent German reunification, however, was in fact shared by the West, though it expressed that desire differently. The Soviets made their intentions clear by authorising the construction of the Wall in August 1961 and rapidly bringing East Germany into the Warsaw Pact when West Germany joined NATO. Official and unofficial reactions to the Wall revealed Western attitudes: French minister of defence Pierre Messmer said that the French were not ready to “die for Berlin”; the British ambassador in West Germany stated “I personally have always wondered that the East Germans waited so long to seal this boundary”; US president Kennedy opined in private that the construction of the Berlin Wall “is not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war”; German chancellor Willy Brandt confessed that the building of the Wall had been at the root of his new Ostpolitik. The end of the Berlin crisis and the advent of the Wall thus marked an explicit change in Anglo-American policy on German reunification. It was not until the end of the 1980s and the fall of the Wall that reunification returned to the political agenda. In the four-power negotiations, Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to prevent a linkage between the prospect of the reunification of a demilitarised Berlin and a reunified Germany outside NATO, but he was frustrated by American support for the West German government. In the resulting Two plus Four Agreement (the two Germanies plus the four victorious World War II powers) signed in 1990 not all the participants showed the same attitude to reunification—reservations were voiced by the British and the French, and by countries outside the grouping such as Giulio Andreotti’s Italy. In the chapter “Vatican City—Italy wall: consolidating social and political peace” Domenico Mogavero considers another function of a wall—laying the foundations for political peace between new states which have radically new roles. Thus, since 1871 a wall in Rome has separated the Vatican City from Italy, originating from the need to make and consolidate peace between the two states. The passage from Papal State to Vatican City in 1871 was the result of a series of previous upheavals and required a series of subsequent rearrangements. In 1859 and 1860 there began a chain of events which culminated in the political unification of Italy, with the exception of Rome and Veneto. It started with a war between Austria and the King of Sardinia (and Piedmont) Victor Emanuel II of Savoy, allied with France under Napoleon III—the outcome was the annexation of Lombardy by the victorious House of Savoy. Against the wishes of the French emperor, Victor Emanuel then proceeded to annex the independent states of the Duchy of Modena, the Duchy of Parma, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and the Papal States (Romagna, Marche and Umbria), leaving only Rome and Latium to the Pope. In 1860 Giuseppe Garibaldi fought his

Introduction

21

way northwards from Sicily to Abruzzo, and met Victor Emanuel at Teano, where he presented him with his conquest of the southern half of Italy, the Kingdom of Two Sicilies. Following the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861, the capital was moved from Turin to Florence (in 1865) pending its definitive transfer to Rome. However, the King of Italy (of a secular disposition, like the rest of the elite which unified the country) did not dare to occupy Rome—the Pope enjoyed the explicit support of France and the tacit backing of other Catholic states, but above all the majority of the Italian population (unlike the elite) were Catholics. So he bided his time until Napoleon III was defeated by the Prussians (Franco-Prussian War, 1870) and then moved his capital to Rome. However, the Italian government felt bound to find a solution acceptable to Pope Pius IX, who would not agree to confinement within the walls of what was to be called the Vatican City. Domenico Mogavero argues that the solution eventually adopted led the Catholic Church to a full recovery of its spiritual and religious vocation, enhancing its position as a global point of reference for ecclesiastic and diplomatic relations. His analysis of relations between the new Vatican State and Italy shows how the walled city—more politically than physically—of the Papacy, of globalised religion, co-exists with a normal national state, which takes account of the importance of the Catholic community worldwide but particularly in Italy. The author starts by looking at the Leggi delle guarentigie (guarantee laws) enacted and implemented by the Italian state, though not accepted by Pius IX. They recognised, among other things, that the person of the Supreme Pontiff was sacred and inviolable (Art. 1), that the Italian government rendered sovereign honours to the Supreme Pontiff in Italy (Art. 3), that the Supreme Pontiff would continue to have at his disposal the Apostolic Palace within the Vatican walls, and also the Lateran Palace, the Archbasilica of St. John Lateran and the Papal residence at Castel Gandolfo (Art. 5), and that the Supreme Pontiff was free to perform all the functions of his spiritual ministry (Art. 9). From these articles alone it transpires that the Papal State was formally abolished, a fact to which the Pope had by this time resigned himself, but also that he was no longer sovereign of the state of the Holy See. That was the principal reason for the Pope’s determined opposition to those laws, which led to a long period of his isolation inside the Vatican walls, and with him (in a broader sense) all Italian Catholics. Mogavero goes on to recount 59 years (from 1870 to 1929) which saw a gradual shift in relations towards formal reconciliation by means of the integration of Italian Catholics into the everyday and political life of the state, and of the Papacy in its sole function of religious and spiritual ministry. With the signing of the Lateran Treaty in 1929 the wall between Italy and the Holy See no longer constituted a prison; it was the recognition of a formal border between two states.

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“Italy recognises the international sovereignty of the Holy See as an attribute inherent to its nature” (Art. 2) “thereby creating the Vatican City for the special purposes and in the manner laid down in this Treaty” (Art. 3). Combined with the Lateran Treaty was a Concordat, which “assured religious peace for the Italian faithful, no longer compelled to choose between loyalty to the Pope and loyalty to the unified Italian state with Rome as its capital” (Mogavero). Fifty-five years later the Holy See and the Italian state proceeded to a revision of the 1929 Concordat with an Accordo con protocollo addizionale (Additional Protocol), signed on February 11th 1984. Among the factors necessitating this agreement, Mogavero cites the Second World War, the fall of Fascism, the integration into the Italian constitution of the Treaty’s recognition of the sovereignty of the Holy See, the Second Vatican Council, and the changes which Italian society had undergone. In the chapter “The ‘crossing’ along the divide: the Cypriot experience”, Maria Hadjipavlou analyses a feature of walls familiar to her by virtue of her studies on peace and conflict resolution: when their physical, social and psychological substance starts to crumble and the process of reconciliation can begin, no matter how long it may be. In Cyprus this process began with people crossing from one side of the wall to the other, which enabled them to return to the homes they had left when the wall was built—in those homes they found “the others”, who were men and women just like them. Hadjipavlou observed this on both sides of the 112-mile wall which has separated Greek and Turkish Cypriots since 1974. On April 23rd 2003 five crossing points were opened to allow visits to the homes that Greek Cypriots had been forced to abandon on the Turkish side, and vice-versa. From this event the author observes how the reconciliation process develops and the stages through which it must pass to gain decisive momentum. The crossings brought to light the humanity of the Other—the individual perceived as a wrongdoer, but who proves to be no less a victim, living in the home of a family forced to abandon it and conserving the photographs of that family. The long reconciliation process (years if not decades) generates new systems of conviction, world views, attitudes, motivations, objectives and emotions which could form the bases of peaceful relations. But reconciliation must be supported by economic justice, power sharing, equality and the recognition of separate and multiple identities. Such a process clearly entails democratic governance and respect for human rights in the period following the conflict. The theoretical framework tested in various contexts around the world is here examined in Cyprus. Privileging the socio-psychological perspective and the idea of reconciliation, the chapter presents a number of individual stories of personal reconciliation after thirty

Introduction

23

years of “mutual quarantine” on both sides of the island. The data are collected from individual interviews, direct observation and media reports. In divided societies, maintaining contact across ethnic, religious or geographical barriers is paramount for two significant reasons: first, it helps soften stereotypes and misperceptions and gradually complicates the “enemy image”; second, without institutional support these contacts can reaffirm old stereotypes or misperceptions (Allport 1954). Reconciliation is needed not only between the two communities but also within each of them, and not only by Greek and Turkish Cypriots but also within the broader Greek and Turkish communities, above all in political and social relations. Reconciliation also requires a re-learning and re-teaching of history on the basis of the principles of conflict resolution. Among other things, this should lead to the replacement of provocative symbols and military statues with monuments celebrating a common peace. It is argued that whereas individual contacts form part of an unofficial reconciliation process and constitute an element of informal peace education, they are not sufficient unless decision-makers legitimise these processes and provide adequate institutional infrastructures. On the strength of her experience in international organisations, the author concludes that those same organisations and the state should allocate resources for the creation of reconciliation centres where people can go to discuss and recover from their sense of loss, injustice and sorrow. The state should therefore encourage dialogue and the exchange of stories yet to be told. It should also promote socio-cultural awareness of the importance of the crossings by means of the mass media, intellectuals and universities on both sides. In “Israel-Palestine: concrete fences and fluid borders” Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Sigal Ben-Rafael Galanti illustrate another possible relationship between a wall/fence and a border. In this case there is a clear contrast between the fixed character of the wall erected for the security of the Jews in Israel and the fluidity, or rather mobility, of the border—dozens of Jewish communities are allowed to establish settlements in Palestine, while individual Palestinians are left on the Israeli side of the border. To this should be added the continual changes among Israelis and Palestinians in zones A, B and C of the West Bank established by the Treaty of Oslo (Hilal and Petti 2011:180– 184). From these premises the authors draw a number of conclusions. The first is that the Israeli-Palestinian border is not fixed, which means that the stronger party—Israel—has no interest in defining a border because it can always shift it to its own advantage, though this can add further conflicts to the existing one produced by the wall/fence. The authors present a historical overview of Israeli-Palestinian relations, the Intifadas and the Gaza wall (barrier), and a

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prediction of the conflict’s future. Focusing on the fence, the interpretation of how it came into existence is the centre of a great deal of controversy. On the Israeli side it is seen as means of security from terrorist attacks, while the Palestinians say it is an aggressive tool in a strategy of annexation. The Israel’s High Court of Justice has made frequent pronouncements against the fence, and it has been condemned by many Israeli and Palestinian organisations, the United Nations and other international bodies, the European Union, the United States and the World Council of Churches. Some of the consequences of the fence are unexpected. Among these the authors indicate the non-­ separation of Israelis from Palestinians in some segments of the population, the repair of damaged roads and buildings and the return to a sort of normality; the fence has significantly improved the lives of many people by reducing terrorism and other illegals acts, and it continues to enjoy the overwhelming support of the Jewish population despite the campaigns against it. It is often featured in paintings, graffiti and political pamphlets. Under these conditions, awareness has grown that the fence provides security but does not ensure the prevention of terrorist attacks (which may pursue other avenues) and that it is there for the present but could in the future be taken down or forgotten. In these new conditions, therefore, borders become increasingly fluid and their fixing is postponed to a future time. Consequently, the only thing that we can certainly assume is that whenever Israelis and Palestinians finally decide to proceed from relative tranquillity towards peace itself, everything that was considered as acquired and definitive will be re-questioned and redrawn. The barrier will undoubtedly become outdated, be demolished, and most probably will soon fall into oblivion. In “Ordinary everyday walls: normalising exception in segregated Belfast” Hastings Donnan and Neil Jarmal contribute to discussion about the longevity and persistence of barriers in Belfast and offer an overview of the situation in the city. They provide a brief comparative review of the use of barriers as means to deal with conflict; outline the overall number and location of security barriers in Belfast; explore the wider framework of designing for security; and finally consider the attitudes of residents to the barriers as part of a wider debate about when and how they might begin to be removed some twenty years after the armed conflict was brought to an end. They thus look at another way of being for a wall. It has been seen that a wall tends to disappear over time, and here the focus is on how a wall (in this case a fence or barrier) changes function over time. When the original function of the wall has been lost, the time tends to be long. In general terms the change of function in time and space has been seen in cases of walls built in or around cities to defend

Introduction

25

rulers and citizens (the castle, the walled city, the Alcazar, the Kremlin). The wall’s defensive function declines, and it may be replaced by a park around the wall, a symbolic monument, a representation of community identity, a public place. These and other themes are explored by the authors in the context of Belfast, starting in 1969 with the outbreak of violence between Protestant unionists and Catholic nationalists. The state, first in the form of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and after 2009 the Ministry of Justice, responded to these disorders with the construction of barriers and fences under military surveillance (therefore walls) to keep the two communities apart. Set up as an immediate solution to security problems, in the short term they were merely palliatives for deep-seated social and political problems, whereas in the long term the question was tackled by other means: debate, dialogue, negotiation and other political initiatives. Though these were the approaches eventually adopted by the state and the two communities, once the barriers had been built they developed inertias of their own which were difficult to remove. They thus reinforced differences and divisions and heightened feelings of territorial belonging, even though they might take on other meanings. With these walls, and even before their construction, the authors identify cycles of segregation between the Protestant unionists and Catholic nationalists. There were models of segregation in Belfast before 1969, manifested in better economic, social, educational and cultural prospects for Protestants, as well as favourable voting rights, all at the expense of the Catholics, who settled in Belfast later and inhabited the poorer areas of the city. The flaring of violence at the end of the 1960s resulted in the erection of walls (by 2011 there were 99 separate barriers in Belfast) and their militarisation to minimise the risks of violence and reciprocal intimidation. The first barriers (1969–70) divided, among other areas, the Falls from the Shankhill Road in west Belfast and Ardoyne from Glenbryn in the north. The authors’ analysis of these and other walls of later construction is based on a survey of the attitudes expressed by people living in six neighbourhoods of Belfast, from which it appears that the maintenance of the walls is certainly linked to security, but value is also attached to their aesthetic dimension and their potential for tourism. Another significant factor is the realisation that the question was not simply the number of walls to be built to pacify the Protestant unionist community and the Catholic nationalist community by means of reciprocal security; it was also the streets and quarters where the walls were located and the decision-making processes lying behind the construction of what came to be called “peace walls”. The primary decision-­makers were central ministries and the local police, but subsequently municipal authorities and local parties and associations were involved in decision-­making. This means that the decisions to build the walls, and later

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to modify them, derived from an increasingly broad consensus among the actors in everyday urban life. These increasingly intensive social contacts produced “peace walls”, which are now perceived more positively as the meanings of security become more widely shared. Underlying this process is the new principle according to which good fences make good neighbours—this is true in Belfast insofar as good neighbours are also those who remain unseen and unheard. Here the state is variably present in interface areas; places where extraordinary historical events have left a trace that continues to generate novel political meanings and an exceptional response—the p ­ resence of barriers that help to sustain and reproduce perceptions of otherness and difference. To sumarise these analyses of walls (or fences) it should be said that they are tangible and they are generally found within cities—places of high relational density which require a substantial detaching factor (a wall) if artifical separation is to be achieved. But none of these walls (or fences) lasts forever. They fall because the factors which legitimised them disappear (the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain), or they take on new functions which tend to soften them and make them more compatible with everyday life (a tendency noted in the cases of Nicosia-Cyprus and Israel-Palestine), or they even become elements of peace and separation which do not separate, assuming the symbolic meanings of spaces (see Gasparini 2000:199–230), as is happening in Belfast. The only wall which remains a wall is the one dividing the Vatican City from Italy in Rome. That is because it does not mark a divide in everyday life (which is highly complementary across the two sides, if not integrated), but marks a political division between two states which are founded on, and legitimised by, radically different principles: the worldwide religious “empire” of Catholicism on the one hand, and the modern secular state, of which there are many, on the other. The book concludes with a question around which its fourth part is organised: “What happens after the wall? ”, which, as we have seen, is fated to change its nature and function or disappear. And that is all the more true when the wall is hard, when it is a fence. One instrument for changing that hardness is identified in cooperation between the areas or cities which have been separated for years. A significant example has been seen in Belfast. Cooperation strengthens the weaker forms of the informal relations between the two sides, followed by mutual (nonstereotyped) awarenesss which fosters a positive vision of the other, and subsequent cooperation leads to an accentuation of the fusion of the two civil societies and their respective institutions, or at least to differentiated integration (see Gasparini 1994a) between the two areas and/or towns. Cooperation is more marked in twin towns (Schultz 2009), which may even go so far as to

Introduction

27

plan a new town in an original form. This trajectory is the subject of the two chapters which constitute the fourth part of the book. Cooperation has a more positive future where it is a necessary condition for development, and twin towns are a case in point. These towns are generally engendered by, or at least have undergone, violent conflicts as a result of imperial interests or confrontations or highly conflictual political-strategic situations. The Rhine, for example, was for centuries a line of confrontation between France and German states. Between Germany and Poland there was confontation across the border drawn in 1945 (Frankfurt-am-Oder-Słubice, Görlitz-Zgorzelec, Guben-Gubin), as there was between Poland and what is now Belarus (Brest-Terespol), but also on national borders inside the Soviet Union, between Estonia and Russia (Narva-Ivangorod) and Estonia and Latvia (Valga-Valka). Such twin towns have experienced and overcome their walls (ethnic as well as political) out of both necessity and self-interest, first developing close cooperation because it was convenient to do so, and then realising that the objectives were the same on either side of the wall and they should be pursued with the same means. In “European twin cities: models, examples and problems of formal and informal co-operation” Thomas Lundén discusses the definition and current state of twin towns. The examples he provides are located on the borders of what was once the Tsarist Russian empire and is now the Russian Federation; in the intervening period most of them were borders between Soviet Socialist Republics. Situated at contiguous points on state borders, the twin towns in question are Tornio-Haparanda on the Finnish-Swedish border, Narva-Ivangorod on the Estonian-Russian border, and Valga-Valka on the Estonian-Latvian border with the appendage of a road—Savienība—located in Valka (Latvia) but with a majority of Estonian inhabitants. In each of the three cases, plus that of the road, the author analyses questions of internal integration, ethnicity, education, the mass media, communication and language, and in some of them citizenship, and interaction in shopping and daily life. Cross-border cooperation is flourishing between the Finnish Tornio (part of the Russian empire from 1809 to 1917) and the Swedish Haparanda, reflecting the intertwining histories of the two ethnic groups. Many people in the two towns know both languages, though the two bilingual schools are both in Haparanda and cross-border contacts are conducted increasingly in English. A particularly attractive feature of cooperation is a golf course built on the border wetlands separating Tornio and Haparanda. In spite of fairly successful cooperation, there is still much to be done in terms of language schools, health and ambulance services, fire and ­rescue services and the service sector in general. The construction of

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cross-border cooperation between twin towns throws up particular problems when one of them is in a former communist country, because the relations on which cooperation is based have to start from scratch—all the more so when both countries emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Such problems include state centralisation, lack of adequate structures for cross-border cooperation, differing degrees of competence on either side of the borders, lack of credibility of cooperation organisations, uneven development levels or rates between two states/twin towns, technology gaps, and customs regulations and taxation. In the cases of Narva-Ivangorod and Valga-Valka, the former dominant power (the Soviet Union) was not liked in what are now the new countries, which leads to discrimination against Russians in the attribution of citizenship to people not speaking Estonian or Latvian, and in the issue of visas to cross the border at the few crossing points. Although the majority of the population of Narva and Ivangorod is Russian, for the concession of citizenship the Estonian government insists on tests which are considered difficult, and many Russian-speaking adults refuse to learn the language of the smallest of the former Soviet republics. Moreover, there are contrasts involving Russians in both towns (Narva-Ivangorod) between the older and younger generations, leading to the development of a peculiar consciousness which separates Estonian Russians from Russian Russians. Similar problems are found in Valga and Valka, because both Estonia and Latvia have a fairly clear division of “nationalities” between the two majority populations, but with a large minority of ethnic Russians on both sides. There are only three crossing points, which makes for long waiting times to cross the border (half an hour, and much more on market days). Complicating matters still further is the presence of properly trained border guards on the Estonian side, while on the Latvian side border control is in the charge of military conscripts, who lack proper training and are more rigid than their counterparts. The fourth part of the book concludes with predictions of what may happen in twin towns within ten to fifteen years after the disappearance of the walls. In “Scenario for the new city Gorizia/Gorica, former twin cities” Alberto Gasparini considers two towns on either side of the line between the imperial blocs in post-war Europe (the democratic West and the socialist East), specifically on the Italo-Yugoslav border. They are Gorizia and Nova Gorica, located north of the Adriatic Sea. The author goes from the general to the particular, from twin towns as a common configuration worldwide (because borders exist everywhere) to the process whereby they are transformed into joint towns which are then considered ‘normal’ because they are united and no longer divided by a political border. Starting from an outline of the basic features of twin towns and those defining normal towns, the author then considers

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Gorizia and Nova Gorica in an exploration of the (possible) changes that they may undergo in the next fifteen years. The analysis focuses on levels of interpenetration between the two cross-border towns, depending on juridical reciprocity; the medium-large and small state to which they respectively belong; whether the towns are divided by a natural border, whether their border comprises services and whether they are large or small towns; the roles of their respective minorities, and the age of the towns; whether there is differentiated integration or a shared orientation to create a joint town. These general features are common to many twin towns around the world and may be enhanced to varying degrees by the cultural institutions, journals and cross-border policies which the towns manage to establish. The author reviews classical border literature, and in particular certain American writings on the towns straddling the US-Mexican border. His attention then turns to the macro border axes in Europe formed by the Rhine between France, Luxembourg and Belgium on one side and Switzerland and Germany on the other, and Holland on the Rhine. He also analyses the axis formed by the corridor of the old Iron Curtain, as cooperation between long-separated twin towns opens up new potential advantages for both sides. Moving to the particular, the author illustrates the birth and development of cross-border cooperation between Gorizia and Nova Gorica. The first trace of Gorizia is in an imperial document (issued by Otto IiI) dated 1001, while Nova Gorica was founded in 1947 as an administrative centre for the part of the province of Gorizia ceded to Yugoslavia after the Second World War and to provide a socialist symbol for this new Yugoslav territory. Crossborder cooperation began in the late 1960s with an intensification of relations between the two mayors and municipal authorities, the formation of commissions working jointly and planning joint initiatives, and the constitution of research institutes for cultural initiatives and the publication of books and journals. Another facet of the possible future scenario is the theoretical basis for the foundation of the new town of Gorizia/Gorica. The basic values are co-existence as partial integration between the two towns, reciprocal enrichment, the central importance of the urban fabric and community creativity on which that urban centrality can be built. This is followed by an identification the practical factors which may impede the development of Gorizia/Gorica new town, and those which favour the formation of a ‘normal’ new town. The last and most important section of the chapter concerns the construction of the new town in terms of the building of six scenarios centred on four time frames: the present, in five years’ time, in ten years and in fifteen years. The scenarios least burdened by negative factors are the first, the impossible new town; the fifth, the realist block, and the sixth, the optimum new town. These three are less marked than the others by the frustration engendered by defeats and the distortion of what has been predicted. The first scenario starts from

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the assumption that the joint town is not desirable, so that it is (ideologically) impossible to achieve. The fifth scenario perfects and spreads differentiated integration with a view to achieving the new town beyond the fifteen-year time frame. The sixth scenario sets out to establish Isonzopoli/Sočepolis (Gorizia/ Gorica) within the fifteen years, but according to a linear process starting from the separate towns of Gorizia and Nova Gorica and passing through a phase of highly intensive differentiated integration. Which is the best of these three? The choice will obviously depend on the political, cultural and social will of both sides, but there is no doubt that the sixth scenario is the optimum choice for the goal of constructing the joint town of Isonzopoli/Sočepolis (or GO-NGO or Gorizia/Gorica, according to preference).

Concluding Remarks

By way of a conclusion, at least three ways in which walls are formed may be identified, and within them ten dimensions and characteristics of walls in evolution and in projection into a future without walls. The first way of being a wall is represented by macro walls and the macro networks they entail; walls which are segmented in space and closely bound up with an empire—some of them are visible and others are invisible but no less real. The second way of being a wall is represented by walls forming a hard separation in cities and areas divided by states and ethnic-national groups. The cases of Berlin, Vatican City-Italy, Nicosia and Cyprus, Israel-Palestine and Belfast stand as diverse examples of such walls. However, also to be considered is what happens in the third way, which is that of no longer being a wall, no matter how formidable its past. The “postwall” phase has yet to unfold, and it will depend on social creativity involving the tools of cooperation in cross-border areas and twin towns. It will also involve the planning and pursuit of what is desired for the future, which may entail the continuation of two separate towns, the modification of both with a strong bias towards differentiated integration, or unification into a single entity—with some distinctions remaining because of the persistence of a largely de-activated border. Each chapter illuminates a different face of a wall and of how it is overcome with a view to achieving, in the short or long term, a form of peace which will have features varying according to the functions and ways of being a wall. Over time, these walls may assume the form of a border, or they may collapse, or they may remain but with different functions and meanings.

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The first chapter captures the complexity of the forms and functions of the wall, which over time change it into something different. After a period of conflict, sometimes very bitter conflict, the wall serves the final objective of pacifying ethnic, national, political and social groups. The subsequent chapters analyse and interpret the many concrete ways of being a wall. Each chapter analyses a different form of these transformations, which may be summarised as follows: 1)

the wall being formed between the “new empire” of the European Union and peripheries marked by long-standing poverty and pervasive violence: the Iron Curtain around the European Union (Max Haller); 2) walls within states and empires—they may easily appear and disappear, be visible or imvisible and tangible or intangible (Melania-Gabriela Ciot); 3) the wall which performs the function of homeland security, but not national security, as would be expected from the construction of a fence (Dennis Soden and Alejandro Palma); 4) the real and ideological wall in a bi-polar international system, which is destined to disappear when its ideology and politics disappear (Anneli Ute Gabanyi); 5) the real political wall resulting from mediation, which does not vitiate the life of a city such as Rome: Republic of Italy-Vatican City (Domenico Mogavero); 6) the wall that gradually takes on a role of reconciliation between the populations on either side of it, which eventually take it down (Maria Hadjipavlou); 7) a concrete fence/wall accentuates conflicts when it does not coincide with state borders and even more when those borders are mobile and fluid: that is to say, when the border is uncertain and fails to provide security for the population in a position of weakness (Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Sigal BenRafael Galanti); 8) the wall that changes function in that it becomes more symbolic and attached to new identities than to violence and the need for security (Hastings Donnan and Neil Jarmal); 9) the wall “breached” by cooperation, progressively changing into a border and twin towns, between democratic countries and between former Soviet republics (Thomas Lundén); 10) the wall which becomes a border, which in turn joins twin towns in a new town, according to possible and probable future scenarios (Alberto Gasparini).

PART 1 Walls Dividing, Walls Uniting

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Chapter 1

Walls Dividing, Walls Uniting: Peace in Fusion, Peace in Separation Alberto Gasparini Introduction The borders and walls discussed here are natural and general in nature, common to almost all human, community, animal, social and economic reality, including social, institutional and organisational systems. Borders amd walls conceptually defined are primarily those of communities and states, these are followed by the conceptualisation of the borders and walls of social systems and organisations, above all on the basis of the paradigm of general systems theory. One example of the functions performed by the borders (and walls) of an organisation for the individual is analysed below. An example of the functions performed by borders (and walls) for a system is provided by the border of a small organisation (weakly marked border with the task environment) and that of a wider organisation (border more connected to that environment).1 This chapter focuses on an analysis of the walls/borders of the state and society, viewed in the broader context of social systems. Referring to the natural and general characteristics mentioned above, we may observe that borders are a general feature of all bodies, social systems, communities, organisations and institutions and that they are intrinsic to their nature. The nature of a border, however, varies according to the functions it is required to perform, which are primarily to do with the identity of the social 1  Research carried out by the present writer—“Ambiente operativo e azienda agricola” (Task Environment and Agricultural Company) (Gasparini 1983)—has tested the hypothesis put forward by F. E. Emery and E. L. Trist (1965) that the causal role of the task environment varies according to the type of organisation. Small and large agricultural companies were chosen for the test. In the former case the task environment seemed to be a random factor, so the borders of small companies proved not to be penetrated by it. The task environment of large companies was found to be a strong causal factor, so their borders were open and dependent upon a number of organisations in the task environment (Gasparini 1983:19–50). On organisational borders see also Hannan and Freeman (1989:45–90).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004272859_003

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system as a whole (state, society, organisations) and its external security. Social systems are thus compelled to invent the type of border or wall which is most effective for itself (or which is forced on it by external factors) in adapting to the two basic functions just mentioned. It would be useful at this point to look at the invention of borders, and even more so the walls going back to the roots of present societies. In the beginning there was a nomadic world of small tribal communities constantly on the move, driven by the movements of other tribes; and, until a few decades ago in equatorial forests, forced to move by a burn-beat economy,2 and there were the nomadic peoples or families of European gypsies. Other examples are to be found in the Indo-European and Mediterranean migrations (Etruscans and Sardinians) and the movements of tribal groups from North to South America. There are still a great many signs of populations which came to areas not particularly well endowed with resources and stayed there, founded settlements and had the time to set up borders, which in time became symbols.3 Italy, especially in the south, abounds in place-names orginating from the Sicels, Sicani, Iapyges, Lucani, Volsci, Osci, Samnites and Picentes, as well as Etruscans, Veneti and Sardinians. Elsewhere in Europe are placenames relating to tribes which came into contact with the Roman empire, and American indians have left their mark in place-names such as Chicago, Seattle, Minneapolis, Massachusetts, Alabama, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota and Texas. No longer nomad tribes, these populations were able to create borders to defend themselves and assert their identity. They put down permanent roots, formed stable entities and developed their national and state identities. With “nomadic imagination” Zygmunt Bauman points out that from a rooted system of societies there is emerging a global civil society and a global elite which is “uncommitted and unconstrained, not entrenched in, rooted in, circumscribed by or confined to territory and locality. Fixedness, duration, 2  This is: 1) the movement of a community to a tropical forest area; 2) felling the trees and burning their roots; 3) almost invariably, the subsequent abandonment of the area and movement to a new one. One result of the deforestation of hills and mountains is land erosion, above all on mountainsides. For some decades this system of production has been banned by state authorities because of the harm it causes to the environmental balance. 3  In “City as Symbol” (It. Trans., 1981), Paul Wheatley points out that in many civilisations cities were the location of symbols such as the axis mundi, a centre whose function was to connect the earthly with the divine (almost always a temple); the border, with the attribution of a magical-cosmic significance to the moat around the city, sometimes even marking the city’s founding moment; the area between the centre and the border, in which holiness diminished as distance from the centre (axis mundi) increased, though it never disappeared altogether (Wheatley 1981: esp. 31–34).

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compactness, solidity and stability: these supreme values of the sedentary mentality have been discarded and have acquired a highly negative ­connotation.* (Bauman 2003:265–266). This chapter deals with the global spaces in these changing times which mutatis mutandi reproduce cycles (nomadic-sedentary-nomadic), in the extension of the planning of borders and walls to achieve goals of stabilty with different methods. The interpretation of borders, and above all of walls, is developed in the sections below. But there are some conceptual elements common to all of them. The first concerns borders and walls. A border is composed of two elements: the first is a line (borderline), and the second is an area (borderland); to constitute a border these two elements must be in a state of equilibrium. If a border is only a line and not an area, it becomes a wall—a line inert and hard, connected only to the centre of the state or other relevant entity. If it is an area with no line, it is no longer a border, and there is no distinction between one state and another or one social system and another (De Greef 1908:273 & foll.).4 The second is the fact that every wall and every border has its own history and its own time. They all start as one thing and over time become another. New borders often arise because political entities change size, and because new political entities come into being. Precisely because of this, many cities and regions which once constituted borders and walls no longer do so—they become mental only and then (sometimes) disappear altogether. This temporary existence applies particularly to walls, which are of relatively short duration. The third concept concerns border space. There is territorial space composed of the continuous and contiguous points of a state border. But there is also the space of discrete points typical of organisations, and it intersects with the spaces of other social systems.5 There is also a real space defined * The asterisk (*) here and elsewhere indicates that a quotation has been re-translated into English from the Italian or French or German version of the original. 4  Belgian sociologist and economist Guillaume De Greef (Brussels: 1842–1924) taught at the Université Nouvelle and was a member of the Institut des Hautes Études de Belgique, both in Brussels. In 1908 he published his three-volume work “La Structure Générale des Societés”, of which the third, “Théorie des Frontières et des Classes” (De Greef 1908), stands as a pioneering contribution to the sociological study of frontiers. The types of frontier he identified and analysed include economic, genetic, aesthetic, psycho-collective, moral, juridical and political (Ibid. 1908:136–233). In this regard he distinguished between borderlines (lignes séparatives) and borderlands (zone intermédiares) (Ibid. 1908:273–282). 5  There is a long tradition of research on city and neighbourhood borders. Two American authors have been particularly prominent in inter-organisational studies. Characterising

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a­ccording to academic disciplines—whereby reference is made to social spaces and borders, economic spaces and borders, cultural spaces and borders, the space and borders of a civilisation (in this regard see Huntington 2000:363; Toynbee 1954:282–3 II*)—which takes the form of an analogic border between the divisions among states and specific approaches to society. To these should be added a symbolic space, which runs along a border once invested with the political value of demarcating sovereignty but which now occupies a limbo of the cultural imagination and international relations and in the perception of the other (“us” and “them”), and which may be reinstated as a political border if someone or some new political force succeeds in making it so. Even now there are new political forces with aspirations to separate their regions from the central state, justifying them with traditions of past independence or autonomy. Another recurrent concept of basic significance for the interpretation of borders (and walls) is civil society as defined by Salvador Giner6 (as well as the complementary idea of political society). While political society is more sensitive to state order and thus to the state-national border as revolutionised cities (“macrosocial units”) as groups of organisations, Herman Turk (1977) focuses on the organisations which establish and maintain links with the world oustide the city with the task of expanding its borders and influence, though at times this objective is not achieved because the city loses certain organisations (as when a large industrial company closes or moves elsewhere). The organisations whose job is to expand the city’s borders are those which deal with outside interests such as industrial and commercial companies, hotels, etc. (Turk 1977:35–96, esp. Fig. 1). Joseph Galaskiewicz (1979) defines urban community borders in terms of the organisations (churches, banks, social services, companies, city council, etc.) working within them and in the city as a whole. He uses the SSA-I method (Smallest Space Analysis) to identify three networks and their respective borders: Money Networks (Fig. 1), Information Networks (Fig. 2) and Support Networks (Fig. 3) (Galaskiewicz 1979:1346–1364). On this type of research applied to the town of Bolzano/Bozen, see Licia Manzardo (1988). 6  Among the many definitions of civil society, the one given by Salvador Giner seems best to take account of the organisational world produced by the “power” of individuals (coming from grassroots level) which is “guaranteed by a public institution, known as the state, which refrains from intervening politically in the inner life of that organisational world of human activity. Any civil society so configured has at least five distinctive features; individualism, privacy, the market, pluralism and a class structure” (Giner 1981:105). The first three are structural features, the last two are consequences of them. The structure is thus represented by a point (ideological and physical): the individual; by each individual’s area of autonomy: privacy; by contact and competition between these areas: the market. The consequences are represented by the originality of every organisation produced by individuals and their areas (pluralism) and by the reformulation of social groups (classes). See Giner 1981:104–112; also Giner 1995:301–325. Along these definitional lines see also Shils (1997:99–114); Magatti (1997:7–40); Donati (2010:10750–10753).

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by modernity, civil society is more sensitive to globalisation, especially in the post-modern age. In qualitatively differing forms, civil society was recurrent in the Europe united by medieval nobility, the only social class to have seen a European globalisation, and subsequently in the Europe united by the modern bourgeoisie, which developed relations going beyond single modern states (on these united Europes see Gasparini 2004a:29–42; Gasparini 2014a:357–373). The chapter also makes use of the concept of peace to explain the dynamics surrounding borders (and walls). Peace is considered here as an active and dynamic process, animated and measured by cooperation between cross-­ border areas, in continual movement, in search of stability in an ever-changing context (De Greef 1908:275–277) and attempting to achieve a common objective. It is a practical peace, tied less to ideology than to inter-personal and interinstitutional relations, engaged in initiating “la fusion pacifique intersociale” (Ibid.: 277). In what are called “zones intermediares” (Ibid.: 276) peace consists of operational actions aimed at conflict resolution and the pursuit of negotiated settlements. This is because the values prevailing in actions and relations are more “intermediate” than “ultimate”.7 With the interpretation of peace in the operational terms of everyday life, it has come to be analysed according to basic values (intermediate rather than ultimate) which characterise it as a weltanshaung, as a conception of community life.8 In the context of the above concepts, the chapter is organised in a number of sections. The first defines borders, using the single term “border” to subsume the range of other words which differ according to national contexts and the choices of the authors who use them; according to Franco Demarchi’s sociolinguistic analysis, they arise from the evolutions of the linguistic phases in which each of them has been used. The condition for the existence of a border is identified as the fact that it should comprise a line (borderline) between 7  Ultimate values and intermediate values are bound up with ways of resolving conflicts in a community or in society, including at an individual level. Ultimate and radical values, if involved in the opposition of interests, activate the powerful energy typical of those who face a life-or-death struggle, that is to say in the conviction that default may lead to death. This is the case when it is felt that values such as honour, family, homeland, freedom and free initiative may be radically compromised if concessions are made to behaviour in contradiction with them. According to intermediate values there are differing and opposing interests whose resolution does not involve the total and radical assertion of one set of interests over others but negotiation and the search for a point of balance at which the interests of both competing players are sufficiently met. There is thus no optimum, but the sufficient achievement of objectives (Gasparini 2008a:38). 8  Such conceptions of peace are polysemic, and are defined below (note 49) in terms of the peace of tradition, the peace of modernity, the peace of good and the peace of goods.

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two entities—states, organisations, social systems—and an area (borderland). A border may also take on different forms: barrier border, gateway border, symbolic mental virtual border, administrative border. These forms basically depend on the equilibrium (or lack of it) between the line and the area. The second section looks at the duality of borders—introverted and extroverted. For the state and its system, a prevalently outward-orientated border has little importance because strategies for outside connection make it more provisional and mobile. A prevalently inward-orientated border is much more important and is strenuously defended, since the use of buffer strategies to defend the internal structure and its way of working (technical nucleus) reinforces the identity of the state and social system. The third section examines the definitions of a wall, identifying it as a closed border (barrier) but also as something self-contained and different from a border. Its originality lies in the fact that it is formed as the maximum expression of the line and eliminates the area, or operates as though the “intermediate area” (Ibid.) (that is to say the cross-border area) did not exist. Many types of wall are discussed: the Roman limes, the medieval city wall, the wall of the modern state, the modern state wall reinforced by nationalist ideology, the walls of confederations and unions of states in the age of globalisation. It is pointed out that there is a strong link between walls and “fantasies of a walled democracy”. The following section examines the violent face of the wall: a wall built where there is no border, a wall unlikely to be accepted on both sides, a wall imposed in response to aims which entail violence, a wall which may be built inside a single community. The next section looks at nine historical cases in which walls and borders stand in a relationship more problematic than the canonical type. These are: 1) the borders and walls of feudal states and city-states; 2) the process of development from a group of small states (or quasi-states) to a single state in which the border is a quasi-wall; 3) the border of an empire as the end of the world; 4) borders and walls in traditional communities; 5) a border which tends to become a wall when a state is treated as an extended local community; 6) a border and a wall being formed in the incongruity between the protomodern state (still based on (dynastic) sovereignty) and post-modern globalisation; 7) borders and walls within states; 8) modern organisations as producers of soft borders which, from an individual’s point of view, are unlikely to become walls; 9) borders and walls which change from being lines to central points (airports resembling old city walls). The last section analyses the positive face of borders and walls and peace in fusion and separation. This comprises concepts such as cooperation and the

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operational assessment of how peace is produced by the reconstitution of a borderland (or intermediate zone) which goes beyond the borderline marked by a wall. Such cooperation strengthens identity and belonging; it responds to needs such as participation, transparency and borderland strategies; it brings forth new institutions with their own functions, such as Euroregions. All this is developed so as to bring about an active peace not only between border areas but between areas once divided by walls—towns along the old Iron Curtain are an example. Such a peace also asserts itself where there are new and hard walls, because they prove to be increasingly volatile and pointless. The configuration of this approach to active peace around walls is extremely useful for an assessment of whether they can be overcome, especially compared to a solely negative interpretation of walls that goes no further than a denunciation, leading to a fatalistic and passive waiting for their fall. All this is developed by means of an integrated scientific method which is not confined to describing and walls and explaining their effects but predicts their future consequences and explores and assesses strategies for controlling them.

Borders, in General and in Their Complexity

The concept of a border is very simple and at the same time a complex one. It may be provisionally defined as a borderline and the borderland around it which together demarcate a state, a city, a community, a social system or an organisation (see Strassoldo 1987:500; Lundén 2006:8; Kaufman 1974:44–45). The border as a line (concrete, real, relational) “reduces the points of contact with the environment”, according to Niklas Luhmann (1982:236), but at the same time it is the case with such borders that “the relations between system and environment can increase their complexity, their differentiation and their controlled mutability” (Luhmann 1982:236).9 This is true of the line component of the border—borderline—that demarcates a system. But the area around the line configures the border as a borderland,10 an autonomous and local area which takes on its own features, a common and convergent place between two 9  As seen above (note 1), the relationship between a system and the environment may be simple or complex, stable or changeable and random or turbulent (See Emery and Trist 1974, and Gasparini 1983). 10  The borderland is the subject or a journal: Journal of Borderlands Studies. It was established in 1986 and is published three times a year by Routledge on behalf of the Association for Borderlands Studies. On the borderland-borderline relationship see also Kurczewska 2006:23.

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areas gravitating around the border11 which produce a common autochthony and a specific subsystem lodged between the two principal systems (primarily state systems) which established the border in question. The definition of a border preferred here is the above. It is a fairly simple definition and at the same time gives an idea of its complexity (or at least places it within a single term) because it comprises two dimensions: the (local) cross-border regions which emphasise the border area, and the two states which emphasise the clear separation between them with a line. In actual fact there are terms, varying according to national literatures, authors and their schools, which ascribe controversial meanings to the idea of a border; in addition to border itself these are frontier and boundary. Malcolm Anderson writes (1996:25) “ ‘Frontier’ is the word with the widest meaning . . . In contemporary usage, it can mean the precise line at which jurisdictions meet, usually demarcated and controlled by customs, police and military personnel. ‘Frontier’ can also refer to the region . . . Even more broadly, ‘frontier’ is used in specific cases to refer to the moving zone of settlement in the interior of a continent . . . The term ‘border’ can be applied to a zone, usually a narrow one, or it can be the line of demarcation . . . The word ‘boundary’ is always used to refer to the line of delimitation or demarcation and is thus the narrowest of the three terms”. In his “Théorie des Frontières et des Classes”, Belgian sociologist Guillaume De Greef defines a frontier (which in French includes other meanings of a border) by reference to “lignes séparatives” and “zones intermèdiaires (1908 vol. 3:273–282). According to Thomas Lundén (2006:7–8) “In English, ‘boundary’ and ‘border’ are often used indiscriminately, or rather, with different but undefined meanings. In American English, the word border usually denotes a dividing line, while the area around this line would be called the borderland. British English has a fine but clear distinction between ‘border’ 11  Research carried out on towns and their cross-border areas has highlighted a number of meanings attached to cross-border towns and areas, as well as the percentage of border towns whose inhabitants take part in the life, or use the services, of towns across the border. The meanings of an individual’s town are as follows (corresponding to the same number of factors): 1) Feelings of security and community experienced in border towns, 2) Contents of the originality experienced in border towns, 3) The negative soul of ethnic cosmopolitanism, 4) Aesthetics of time in border towns, 5) Border towns evoking marginalisation (Gasparini 2014b:174–178). In 56.2% of European border towns the inhabitants visit the nearest cross-border town to participate in cultural activities; 52.4% to take part in sports and clubs; 47.6% to frequent leisure associations; 37.5% to attend secondary schools; 37.1% to frequent ethnic associations; 36.1% to attend university courses; 35.4% to conduct trade union business; 35% to use hospitals; 33.3% to take part in voluntary associations (Gasparini 1999–2000:9).

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and ‘boundary’. A border is an area running parallel to and on both sides of the boundary, which is a line without area. ‘Boundary’ seems to be the most appropriate term with which to denote the line itself: A line or strip that marks or shows a limit or end (Webster’s dictionary). In cricket, to ‘make a boundary’ is to hit a ball that passes a border line, thus giving points. A bound is a limit or an enclosure. To ‘beat the bounds’ is to demarcate a limit between two villages, etc., and in English school jargon ‘out of bounds’ means to be outside the school area, on forbidden ground, off-limits. Border is defined as ‘an outer part or edge’ but is also synonymous with frontier and boundary. Webster adds, ‘A border is that part of a surface lying along its boundary line’. The Border is the area along the English-Scottish boundary. Border thus seems to have more of an area meaning than boundary, which means the line only”. From an anthropological standpoint, Hastings Donnan analyses the differences between a border and a boundary (Donnan and Wilson 1999:19–41). The use of this range of terms reflects the evolution of their meanings in the various traditions, to which linguistic analysis has provided a valuable contribution. A socio-linguistic study by Franco Demarchi highlights the superimposition of historical phases in the concept of the border (confine),12 which explain the continuation and spread of a range of border terms whose distinctions are not always clear. The most basic notion of a border derives from a group of root words which refer to the idea of spatial borders because it is founded on the primordial practice of human settlement as expressed by the most basic economic activity—that of gathering food in reach within known limits (Demarchi 1972:XI–XII). Another interesting group of concepts is made up of ‘margini’ (peaceful, because they are of no interest to anybody) and ‘termini’ (peaceful, because they are safe), which the author considers appropriate for an agricultural-nomadic economy and embryonic seasonal migration which gives rise to pathways and trade. A third group of concepts is bound up with the pairing ‘limites’ and ‘fines’. Demarchi writes: “From the Latin ‘fines’, in the sense of lands distant but of interest to those in the centre, there developed the medieval ‘confine’ by means of a wholly new conceptualisation, which started from the division of responsibilities for property and grew into the agreed establishment of areas reserved for the centres of territorial power (Ibid.: XV).” “Meanwhile, other terms had come into use: ‘frontiera’, a late Latin development of ‘frons’, through the military expression ‘a fronte’ . . . Nowadays the idea of frontier has more of a military than a juridical ring to it, c­ alling 12  Another terminological analysis has been developed by Stefan Böckler and Reinhard Schmidt (1998–1999:32–46). The border as reality and as a metaphor for distinction is analysed by Giamprimo Cella (2006).

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attack and defence to mind rather than the stability of an international ­agreement . . . The use of this word (“frontiera”) is thus to be attributed to a further stage of awareness of the border situation” (XVI), that in which a professional army is trained in the construction and defence of walls (limes). Perceptible in this is a pairing of frontier with “barrier”, usually used to emphasise the need to prevent transit. The idea of the border as a barrier has its surest origins in the Great Wall of China (Lattimore 1970:49–73), but it spread rapidly in Persia, the Crimea (from the Mongol “kerem”) and in Europe (walls on the northern periphery of the Roman empire), and later came fortified monasteries (Demarchi: XVII; Harrison 2006) which served the purpose of territorial expansion in central and eastern Europe. These links between the terms used for border and the various stages of socio-economic development are further proof that the terms available to refer to a border change significantly over time, therefore enabling us to use a single term, border, which is then declined in institutions and in the processes operating within the border itself. The origins of these terms go back thousands of years, to when man, communities and societies wished to distinguish between the space which was “ours” and “yours”, “mine” and “yours”, with a juridical value for legitimacy and a political value for defence. Studies of the operational aspects of borders have been somewhat lacking in the social sciences, however, as shown by the work of Hettlage (1998–1999:103–211), Fideli (1998–1999:275–309) in Annali di Sociologia/Sociologisches Jarbuch (1998– 1999, No. 14) and Strassoldo (1987:499–511). Most studies have focused on the centre of systems rather than the periphery and its extreme extent represented by the border. One exception is General Systems Theory (see Bertallanfy 1968; Buckley 1976, et al.), in which the border is the basic element of containment of a system and the point of connection and control between the system and the environment. Studies of the international political system and relations between states and international organisations have also made use of the systemic paradigm13 and much research has been conducted on systems applied to organisations. In the case of organisational systems borders obviously take on different characteristics, whereby the line-area (the border) runs where r­ elations thin out. 13  A well-known application of systems theory to relations between states has been developed by Morton Kaplan (1957). He looks for patterns of behaviour in states, which may be explained by the characteristics of varying models of the international system. The six models he analyses (Kaplan 1957:23–50) are: balance of power system, loose bipolar system, tight bipolar system, universal international system, hierarchical international system and Unit Veto system.

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The objects of such studies include: universities and large and small agricultural companies,14 spaces equidistant from two central locations,15 neighbourdoods,16 service systems.17 But borders change where the social system presents clusters of relations, because dense connections concern some actors and not others: banks, people orientated towards one system or another, suppliers, customers, etc.18 Work has also been carried out on the new 14  The research mentioned in note 1 has shown that there is a close link between the organisation or agricultural company’s relationship with its task environment and the role—expressed as its “core decision making”—of the company itself. The greater the organisational dimension of the company becomes (as it grows from small to big), the more intense the relationship. It thus seems that the coefficients of the canonical correlation (R̅ c) between the entities in the relationship increases from 0.18 to 0.34, which means that between the two entities (the organisation’s task environment and its “core decision making”) the border becomes less rigid as the company expands (Gasparini 1983:148–154). 15  In Walter Christaller’s view the borders between two central places on the same hierarchical level run through the area where for an individual it matters nothing whether he has to go to one central place or another in order to have access to a service. That is to say, through the area in which there is no difference in terms of opportunity or convenience between one place and another. This applied to the time when the research was carried out: in the 1930s, in a flat area (region of Munich), with little in the way of vehicles and telephones, in a predominantly agricultural economy (Christaller 1980:91). 16  The border of an urban neighbourhood may be identified by a number of criteria, regarding the border as a line (borderline) and as the social life carried on within it, in which case it is a borderland. In a research project carried out on behalf of Udine City Council for the implementation of Italian Law No. 278 of April 8th 1978, the author defined neighbourhood borders: 1) using the mental maps described by inhabitants on the basis of their perceptions of the borders (barriers) and centres of their neighbourhoods, which allowed an initial postulation of the neighbourhood; 2) within the neighbourhood thus postulated it was observed whether there were the conditions necessary to define it as a community (social heterogeneity, variety of architecture and urban layout, multi-­functionality, social participation, practical forms of social life, the demographic dimension); 3) using a survey of the organisation (and location) of services seen as the organisation of collective spaces. If these conditions are found to obtain within the borders initially postulated by the inhabitants of a neighbourhood, the borders perceived by them may be considered verified (Gasparini 1979:15–37 and 151–234). 17  The system of services and their location has different patterns according to urban area: old town centre, modern central area or suburban area. These results emerged from a study carried out on Gorizia in 1975 (Gasparini 2001a:275–283). 18  All of these elements are parts and functions of organisations (banks, companies, agencies, etc.). From the research cited in note 1, for instance, it seems that the role played by the task environment of (agricultural) organisations varies according to their size. In large ones 61.5% of these external elements appear to breach the company’s border, ­penetrating

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conformation of metropolitan areas, large companies and orientation systems for the localisation of services. Connected to power relationships which are much more often asymmetrical than symmetrical, borders frequently mutate, tending to incorporate external organisational elements or cede their own elements to other organisations (see note 5 on Turk 1977:35–96; Galaskiewicz 1979:1346–1364; Gasparini 1983:203–226; Gasparini 2004b:52–107).19 Such inter-system relations also occupy spaces, of varying degrees of explicitness and visibility, which may be continuous (like a line) or composed of points separated by distance, as happens when an organisation absorbs elements of other organisations or lets go some of its own. It is temping to say that the rationality of organisations is reconstituted in spaces separated by distance, rather like the leopard-spot structure of feudal power. Associated with these relations and spaces, as border markers for organisations and state or administrative units there are also perceptual, cultural and symbolic elements which contribute to the demarcation of a border—emphasising, maintaining or reducing it: one example is twin towns, which may also become single towns (see Reusch 1956; Campbell 1958). To sum up, it may be observed that all systems have borders which act according to similar mechanisms, be they territorial spaces (state borders, regional borders, urban borders, urban district borders), organisations, or academic disciplines (sociology, anthropology, psychology, etc.), in which purposeful relations, values, symbols, perceptions and spaces are inextricably mixed. Regarding the forms that a border may take, it has been maintained that they are determined by the encounter between the two criteria of static/mobile and open/closed (Strassoldo 1987:501). The static/mobile criterion is not really convincing because since nation-states came into being, or more simply since the configuration of the modern state, borders have been static, or at most they it and affecting its functions. In small companies the breaching of their borders involves a lower proportion of the elements in question: 40% (Gasparini 1983:203–226). 19  Another way of identifying borders is by defining metropolitan areas in terms of the influence organisations located in the city exert on the regional territory outside it. In this case the entity which determines the border of the metropolitan area is the organisation, or rather the organisation which is able to expand the influence of the city where it is located to other cities, near or far. From research carried out by the present writer it appears that in five Italian regions (Lombardy, Emilia Romagna, Veneto, Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia) the following cities act as centres of metropolitan areas based on economic organisations: Milan, Modena, Verona and Treviso (Gasparini 2004b:52–109). Large agricultural businesses and the location of services have been discussed in previous notes.

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change in the case of strategically important areas which change hands following a military victory. One example of such an area was the contention of Briga and Tenda between France and Italy after the Second World War. In addition, while there are some towns which have recently become border towns, others are borders towns no longer; should they also be considered part of the process entailed by the static/mobile criterion? A more useful criterion for distinguishing between types of border is open/ closed, a pairing present in all social systems, above all in organisations. To that we may add the time for which a border exists or behaves as a border. While a conflict usually, though not always, has its victors and its vanquished, borders are not necessarily overturned as a result; negotiations may produce an outcome which does not affect the border, or often only slight modifications are effected. One of the new developments marked by the First World War was the practice of fighting for total victory, to the ultimate point of the destruction of the losing side (Feito 2001:317).20 That fate befell the Austro-Hungarian empire in central Europe and the Balkans. Research carried out by the present writer on a sample of European border towns found that 79.6% of them were founded before 1500, and no less than 46.7% of the total have become border towns since the end of the First World War (Gasparini 1999–2000:5). Most of Europe’s border towns have aquired that status in recent times (since 1918). It is significant to observe the ways of being a border, which obviously depend on the times and exceptional events which bring them into being, change them and make them disappear. As said above, the most suitable criterion for considering a border is comprised between the extremes of closed and open. Along the segment comprised between them we may identify the ways of being a border formed by the equilibrium between line and area. In sequence, the ways of being a border are the following: – Barrier border, – Junction border, – Virtual border, – Symbolic border, mental border (psychological, cultural), – Administrative border. The barrier border is based on the pre-eminence of the line over the area; the junction border is characterised by equilibrium between line and area; in the virtual, symbolic and mental borders the prevailing force is 20  Wars, especially world wars, bring out “ultimate values” as a solution to the conflict, in the meaning discussed in note 7.

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the interests of the cross-border community, though there are political, symbolic and psychological lines that can be activated when major new events arise; the administrative border has only an area—the line is not political and at the most it has an echo in a division of the community. All these border types regard not only the state but the social systems and units within the state. An administrative border may become a barrier or a junction because it is subject to external political, state, or social developments. Examples may originate from the break-up of one state or the expansion of another state or organisation. A barrier entails the prevention of communication with what is beyond the border, which prevents the formation or continued vitality of the local areas and everyday life between the two areas contiguous (on either side) with the border. In history such barriers have taken varying forms. Before the advent of the modern state, and with rudimentary technology, barriers were constituted by no-man’s lands, scorched earth and natural barriers (Pounds 1980, vol. I: 85–94). These were borders with areas which were virtually uninhabited and unlikely to host the formation of local communities. Things changed when states felt the need for a secure border for the purposes of defence and the maximum assertion of their sovereignty. In this case the border became a line running between local populations, which were thus separated by a barrier, a border wall, a fence. Such walls are more often to be seen on the periphery of the state, but they may also be found within it, representing factors which are more social, cultural and economic than military and political. This theme will be further developed below with regard to walls. A junction is the most typical form of a state border and borders of organisations in general. Its main function is to direct relations, between local communities on either side of a border as well as between states, towards specific gates (border crossings). In this situation the population living along the border may continue to conduct their relations and feel that they are bearers of their own original culture, often in contrast to that of the state, and devise an equally original from of cross-border cooperation. For the state the border thus takes on a significance of controlled separation form the neighbouring state, while for local communications it acts as a source of complementary enrichment in the cross-border area. Along a junction border an important role is played by an area which lies, and in some cases has lain for many centuries, along a border line established relatively recently.21 21  Taken from the above-mentioned research on European cities (Gasparini 1999–2000:5), the table below (aggregated for periods) shows that 1) the foundation of European cities (including those which are now border towns) occurred mostly between 1000 and 1500,

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A virtual border is one de-activated by inter-state agreements whereby the contries involved have joined a higher entity (the European Union, a confederation, etc.) without juridically relinquishing their borders and may re-activate them when necessary. Examples of such re-activation are the G8 held in Genoa in 2001, the 2006 World Cup in Germany and in France immigration from Italy as a result of the recent fighting in Libya. In other words, on either side of the state border people behave as if the border did not exist (or were only administrative) unless or until the border is restored by the states (or state) which deems it necessary. A symbolic and/or mental border is the residue of a border which no longer exists—the line and area that made it a border have disappeared, swallowed by a bigger or entirely new state entity. Historical examples are legion: the border between eastern Germany (west of the Oder- Neisse line) and Poland before the Second World War; the borders running between the duchies of Modena and Parma, the grand duchy of Tuscany, the kingdoms of Lombardy-Veneto and Naples, the Papal states and other neighbouring states prior to the unification of Italy; the borders between the German kingdoms and seigniories and the German empire (Holy Roman empire and from 1870 the German empire). Such borders stay in the minds of the populations living in the old border a period accounting for 55% of them; 2) their consolidation as border towns occurred above all in the 20th century. This means that major border changes started in the 11th century and again in the 19th with the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna (accounting for 13.3% of border towns); but it was in the 20th century that 53.3% of border towns acquired that status.

Periods

Period of foundation of the present border towns

Period in which the towns (notes) become border towns

< 500 501–1000 1001–1500

9.3% 14.8% 55.5%

0.0 % 1.0% 18.1%

1501–1800

9.3%

14.3%

1801–1900 1901–2000

6.8% 4.3%

13.3% 53.3%

——— 100.0%

——— 100.0%

Total

(average 3.6% per century) (average 4.8% per century)

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areas for a long time, and may be re-evoked by their restoration as regional or ­administrative borders. In the future they may also become state borders again as a result of the formation of new states from what are currently internal regions; this has recently occurred through secessions in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and may yet occur in Great Britain (with a new Scottish state), Spain (with Basque, Catalan and Galician states) and Italy (with Padania and Sardinia). An administrative border is an old regional border which lies within a state and has a non-political character with regard to other states but political, institutional, cultural and financial distinctiveness with respect to other regions in the state, if the state in question has a federal constitution (such as Germany, Austria and Belgium) or confers a special autonomous status on some regions (as is the case in Italy). As states may break up and be reconstituted, borders may thus be subjected to dynamics which entail their disappearance and reappearance, and the forms they take are also subject to dynamic forces. It may even happen that the reconstitution of an old border gives it the characteristics of a barrier, or in its modern form, a wall. But it will last only a few decades and then revert to a junction, not only between two states but more so between two crossborder communities, then to become a virtual border once again, and finally disappear. With this definition of a border the conclusion is that it is subject to variations which may cause its recomposition in the acute forms of a wall but reconstitute an autochthony in the cross-border areas22 gravitating around it, in a process entailing the recomposition of a dualism between the nation-state and cross-border regions. All the above is clearly observable in state borders, which in the modern era are obviously spatial, but also visible are borders within states, which take on the form of administrative, social, ethnic, cultural and economic borders. That is not all. It has also been seen that borders are highly dynamic, developing a spatial conformation different from that described above, as is the case with the many organisations that arise in society (civil and political alike).23

22  In an article published in the Journal of Borderlands Studies (2010:31–49) Lena Laube and Christof Roos define these areas as “Borders for the People”. 23  Thus far the notes have referred to a large body of research on organisations to emphasise the importance of their borders and possible changes to them. In point of fact the influential organisations that define metropolitan areas, cities and neighbourhoods are bodies, associations and welfare state agencies typical of civil societies.

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Extroverted Borders and Walls and Introverted Borders and Walls

Given that borders exist—in fact in the modern era they are as widespread as are the organisations which acquire identity and legitimacy within them— they are experienced and perceived according to a variety of conditions, of which four have been listed above. It will be seen below how borders operate and are perceived in these conditions. Given what has been said on the general function of a border, it may be asked whose interest a border serves, particularly whose interest a controlled border serves, and what a border is for. In the first place a distinction must be drawn between a state, an organisation or a social system, in expansion and a state, organisation or social system in introversion. For an entity in expansion a border is a hindrance because is puts limits on that expansion. Examples are legion, mostly concerning territorial expansion, but expansion may also occur in terms of political or especially economic influence. In these cases the borders are not fixed or there is a reluctance to fix them. Recent cases include Israeli expansion into the Palestinian territories, and Germany into Czechoslovakia and Poland before the Second World War, but there were also expanding powers in the ancient world. In such cases the borders of others are considered easily penetrable, while one’s own remains impermeable to those from states whose borders have been penetrated. The same applies to tourism, which requires borders which are little more than formal for tourists travelling abroad, above all for tourism from the North to the South; borders for any tourists travelling in the opposite direction are much more rigid. Briefly put, states in expansion tend to under-value foreign borders, near or far (expecting them to be “very” open), but strictly control passage through their own borders for those from outside. One example is the borders of Northern countries compared with those of the rest of the world. There is a theoretical symmetry between all states, but reality is different. Weak, poor and economically underdeveloped countries have a greater need of others— for emigration and as a result of their limited capacity to export globalisation. This expansion of states takes the form of a system of bridging strategies (Scott 1981:193 & foll.)24 that pass through the border of the outward-­orientated 24  The theoretical framework of the sociology of organisations and macro-social systems provides concepts regarding the relationship between a social system (an organisation or state) and its borders; these include bridging and buffering. Among others, Homans (1950), Thompson (1967), Lenski (1970), Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), Scott (1981) and

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state. Scott identifies these strategies as (194–197) bargaining, contracts, co-opting, hierarchical contracts, joint ventures and mergers. His analysis was conducted with organisations in mind, but several of his strategies also apply to (and are followed by) states. The opposite is true of states in introversion. For them the border is ­crucial. It marks the extent of the territory and population on which their order is imposed, but it also represents the line to be defended at all costs in order to protect the integrity of their system, which is both state and homeland. The introversion of a state thus means the reinforcement of the elements within the border that enable it to be defended “at all costs”. For this purpose Scott (1981:190–192) identifies buffer strategies: codification (of citizenship, for instance, and papers for crossing the border), stock-building (or self-­sufficiency in assets and skills), levelling (or the capacity to balance the internal and the external at the border), prediction (or the ability to control the future) and growth (endo-growth). In other words buffer strategies are designed to make sure that what is inside the border leads to self-sufficiency or at least to the ability to maintain the “core technology”25 of the nation-state system. Gasparini (1983) have focused on the social system and its environment. Several criteria are used in the literature to define the relationship between these two entities. These include the behavioural and normative social structure (Scott 1981); a rarified network of relations that form “certain thin places” on the border (Homans 1950:85); the nature and contents of the activities carried out on the border (Scott 1981:180); the border which may be measured “as a gradient of influence” (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978:32). In the case of states the border may run where relational networks become rarified, the social structure changes, border activities are concentrated and the gradient of influence tends to differ either side of the border. 25   “Core technology” is a concept defined and used primarily in organisations and also by scholars studying macro-social systems. Scott (1981:189) defines it as follows: “Organizations may be viewed as technological systems—as mechanisms for transforming inputs into outputs. It is almost always possible to identify one or more central sets of tasks around which the organization is built. Teaching in schools, surgery and patient care in hospitals, laboratory work in research organizations, line work in assembly plants, legislating in Congress—these are examples of central tasks in varying types of organizations. Following Thompson (1967), we will refer to the arrangements developed to perform these central tasks—including the skills of personnel employed to carry them out—as the core technology of the organization. A key proposition formulated by Thompson is that ‘under norms of rationality, organizations seek to seal off their core technologies from environmental influences’ (1967:19)”. This relates to organisations, but it may be extended to the social system represented by the state. The core technology of the state is formed of all the ways of doing things (which may be called techniques)—mechanical technologies and resources such as identity and belonging—without which there would

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Generally speaking, the processes here identified as expansion and introversion have to be balanced, in the sense that cross-border bridging should not be detrimental to the capacity for introversion, where a border stands as the buffer between one state system and another. In actual fact a country capable of bridging and expansion may also be able to defend its core technology (power) with inputs and outputs coming from over the border—this is the case when the country is very strong (the North of the world). By contrast, a weak, smallmedium sized, or particularly micro, country has a low capacity for expansion,26 so emphasis is placed on the defence, as observed above, of its internal “technical nucleus”. A strong country may also develop a range of strong bridging strategies while at the same time preventing other countries (as happens with immigration from the South) from bridging with it, thereby building defensive buffers on its border. It may therefore be said that between the North and South of the world the border takes on an asymmetrical character. Indeed such asymmetry applies to small or micro countries in all continents. In the second place, if a comparison is made between civil society and political society, border expansion and introversion may be observed in all states. not be that specific state or even any state at all. From this point of view core technology makes the life of a state predictable, since it (core technology) has the characteristics of a closed system and thus acts according to criteria of rationality. This reference to core technology is most typical of small states or micro-states whose greatest need—upon which their existence even depends—is to defend their core technology, and it is from this that buffering strategies are derived. By contrast, for large or medium-sized states the defence of core technology is virtually taken for granted, so they tend to expand their borders by permitting themselves to use outward bridging strategies, as described in the text. Micklin and Postor add to this that core technology “is perhaps the most critical for the adaptation of human populations” (1988:36). Lenski (1970:102–103) has suggested that technology is the “prime mover” in the process of social change and adaptation for at least three reasons: 1) it sets the boundaries for feasible social and economic options; 2) technological change appears to be more easily accepted by the population than change in organisation or ideology; 3) it is “easier to compare the effects of alternative tools or techniques that it is to compare the effects of alternative systems of social organ­ ization or alternative ideologies”. 26  Research carried out by the present writer on secondary UNESCO data concerning international organisations working for peace has produced the following breakdown of countries which are the seat of at least ten peace organisations: 28.5% of organisations are based in the United States, up to ten organisations per country are based in (in descending order) Germany, Britain, Canada, Japan, France, India, Russia, Spain, Israel, Sweden, Italy and Australia. These countries together account for 69.6% of the world’s peace organisations. The remaining 30.4% are based in 70 countries with at least one organisation (Gasparini 2002a:254–262).

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Indeed it may be asked who benefits from the border between civil society and political society. It may be said that civil society has no need of a political border, particularly if certain rules (codified by international and business law) are shared. Civil society (according to Giner’s definition),27 at least as it is being configured in the globalisation process and especially in the countries exporting globalisation, is becoming increasingly international, and because of this expansion borders stand as an obstacle to civil society’s performance of its functions. One example is the international relations conducted by companies, voluntary associations, international organisations, churches and so forth. A border is perceived all the more as a hindrance in twin towns divided by it, since these two branches of civil society represent the driving force of cross-border cooperation. By contrast, political society is dominated by state institutions and local authorities and their powers, so a border is an essential territorial point of reference defining the extent of the powers of those institutions. Political society therefore needs borders because they indicate the basis of definite rules—the border confers certainty, the line between yes and no, between can and cannot. In other words, by this logic the border divides two sacred elements, two ubi consistant, of the order that is given inasmuch as it is circumscribed (Marramao 2008:130–1). In the light of the above, it may be concluded that civil society seems more closely linked, and gives greater emphasis, to border expansion strategies; while political society seems more closely linked, and gives greater empahsis to, buffer strategies aimed at border introversion.

Walls, in General and in Their Complexity

Walls have been characterised above as a form of border, in an extreme position whose exclusive function is the political and military function of security. They have been contrasted to a border in that the latter is much more complex, political in the broader sense of the term, and because it is surrounded, as a line and an area, by life and activity which pertain to the centre of the 27  This concept is defined in note 6 above. It may be added that in modern and post-modern societies civil society is the organisational sphere organised by individuals and is part of a cultural context dominated by individual values, separation from community membership and the global dissemination of the culture expressed by the organisations in question. This lends relative legitimacy to civil society and drives it to develop relations wherever they are profitable—initially in the state to which they belong, but above all where they are possible and useful at an international level (Gasparini 2008a).

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system and the borderland alike. The functions of this activity have been noted as economic, cultural, ethnic, social, communitary, transport-related and so on. By contrast, a wall stands as a closed border, allowing little trade and few functions—enemies, migrants and smugglers are not permitted to pass and others are discouraged from doing so. And it is clear that it is precisely on its borders that a system is opened. If a border becomes a wall, it is equally clear that a system closes, which produces entropy,28 chaos and dissipated energy within the system, even in the case of the extreme closure to some functions. A wall as a closed border (or barrier) may surround states, communities, ethnic groups, social classes, cultures, organisations, and social systems in general. For this reason and others which will be explored below, a wall may be considered something radically different from what is defined as a border. In conceptual terms a wall tends not to allow the continuation of a crossborder area (borderland), so it strongly discourages the formation of areas of autochthonous belonging; it rather emphasises belonging to the statenational centre of civilisation, religion and so forth. This functional condition also radically differentiates a wall from a border—and analytically it is one of the two extremes of a border, to be considered closed and a barrier against the formation of a border. As observed above, the other extreme condition of a border also has a solely analytical value, in that such a degree of openness is the equivalent of disappearance. In definitional terms, however, the idea of a closed border/barrier and a border so open as to disappear is a useful one because the forms of a border (especially the junction and the virtual border) may modify over time, either towards disappearance or evolution into a wall (for recent contributions on the subject of walls, see Chaichian 2014; Quétel 2013; Brown 2013). Historically, then, walls have taken on different connotations. The great empires resorted to walls to defend the large expanses of their states. The primary example is the Great Wall of China, but it is worth dwelling for a moment on the limes of the Roman empire. Among the many they had (in Britain, in Germany and in the Asian and African deserts),29 the Germanic wall is of 28  On the connection between entropy and information, see Buckley 1976:103–108. 29  Desert limes were very different from those in Europe. In the early days of the Empire, in the Middle East Rome had no need of border walls because it used buffer states such as Nabatene, Palestine, Palmyra, Armenia, Pergamon and Commagene. When Rome changed strategy and incorporated such client states in its provinces, the desert limes were formed by militarily fortified roads (such as the Via Traiana Nova and the Strata Diocletiana) with legionary forts, auxiliary forts, watchtowers and city walls (Lewin 1999; 55). On this subject see also Luttwak (1993).

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­ articular interest. According to Portner (1961:506), it went back to Domitian’s p campaign against the Chatti, after which he built a series of walls to defend the Germanic border—these were then extended and consolidated by subsequent emperors. Around 121–122 AD, however, Hadrian realised that the limes could not be “solely a gigantic show of strength”(*) (Portner 1961:191). This was because over time the wall could not maintain its defensive efficiency due to the progressive depletion of the defenders’ capacity to contain the attacks launched by the tribes beyond the wall in addition to the pressure exerted by other tribes behind them. And around the wall there developed areas inhabited by Roman soldiers and “a local population formed mostly of Gallo-Celtic elements”(*). These areas saw the growth of “agglomerations of workshops and taverns which, under the influence of Roman veterans and merchants, developed into small urban comunities”(*) (Portner 1961:191). This phenomenon was legitimised by Alexander Severus (222–235), according to whom “the soldiery became militarily organised farmers”(*) (Portner 1961:508).30 And under Valerian in 258–259 AD the limes saw their last—the Alemanni penetrated northern Italy and the Franks made inroads into Gaul. Under the land ownership system of feudalism (from 800 to 1200) and subsequently the mercantile system of the seigneuries and corporations of central-northern Italy and Flanders (Pirenne, 1967:508; Huizinga 1966:73 & foll.; Baschet 2005:133–141), walls were no-man’s lands, scorched earth, often configured as “natural borders” (Pounds 1980:80 & foll.) which were areas rather than lines. They were isolated, mountainous or boggy, difficult to cross and therefore required little surveillance—they were guarded by nature. Under these conditions controls could be effected in the few openings found in these natural walls. In Italy such natural openings of access were the Moncenisio pass in the west (from France), the Great St Bernard pass in the centre-west (from Switzerland), the Brenner pass in the centre-east (from Austria and Germany) and the “threshold” of Gorizia in the east (from Slovenia and Hungary). It was through this threshold that the barbarian invasions of the Po valley came: Visigoths, Heruli, Ostrogoths, Huns, Lombards and others. The threshold is a small flat area between the Julian Alps and the Carso plateau, dominated by the hill where Gorizia was subsequently built (the Slovene name means small 30  This border configuration has obtained in various places and at various times. This form of the Roman limes is similar to the situation on the military border between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, which gave rise to what were known as Krajine. Serbs fleeing from the Ottoman Empire became “border soldiers” and were given the task of defending the Habsburg borders, with the licence to conduct raids in Turkish territory. This arrangement lasted for three and a half centuries, until the mid-1800s (see Mandić 1973:443–458).

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mountain—it was first mentioned in a document in 1001), and the Isonzo and Vipacco rivers run through it. In contrast to these natural walls were the limes built by great empires, running through area easily penetrated (plains, low hills, navigable rivers, etc.) by nomad tribes and armies and inhabited by settled populations. In other cases walls were respresented by well-defended points, which were actual walls. The whole of Europe was scattered with castles, walled cities and “Castles of God” (Harrison 2006; Lattimore 1962), in which walls acted as a defence against enemies who had overcome the first walls of natural defence. At various times such walls enclosed 1) a feudal seigneury: the castle and the communities gravitating around it (see Weber 1968:234–235); 2) a nascent religious (bishops) and mercantile power: the city and community in which, according to Weber (1968:249), “servitude rises to freedom”; 3) a base for the life of an extended family to be protected and for a religious community and its work, as in the case of fortified houses (prevalent above all in Alpine areas, see Carlo Sgorlon, 1973) and fortified monasteries. Harrison (2006:13 & foll.) observes that the latter were widespread in many countries in Europe and elsewhere, especially in Egypt, Syria and Palestine. He points out that for individual monks they acted as places to obtain spiritual guidance and as local centres for community services and if need be for the protection of “Christian anchorites returning from community meetings (on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays) to their cells and remote caves”(*). According to Franco Demarchi (p. XVII) “fortified monasteries” were widespread in central-­eastern Europe, where the frontier/wall took on the significance of a progressive advance into and organisation of new territories”. Later in this chapter mention will be made of states in expansion, exemplified as a “frontier on the move” by the pioneers of north American colonisation, and discussed by Lattimore (1962:198–199) in the case of southern China in contrast to the rigid linear frontier of the north and of European countries in the modern age. With the advent of the modern state, models of walls changed their forms, functions and purposes. Borders became exact and essential, running along the margins dividing larger state entities from single duchies, marquisates, counties and signeuries, becoming a sort of aggregation (ordered by the new power) of old and small signeuries aspiring to statehood, with the dominion of one of the old states over the others: in France, for instance, the kingdom of France over the feudal states of Anjou, Bourbon, Guyenne, Armagnac, Toulouse, Dauphiny, Brittany, Normandy and Burgundy (Castelli 2004:232). Consequently the old network of borders fell into decline and the new state border was strengthened towards the outside. New borders were instituted in much the same way as has come about with the present-day European Union: internal borders between states lost importance, while those towards

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the ouside became relatively hard. The modern state border was rather like a line passing through inhabited areas which were often ethnically heteroge­ nous. This situation came into conflict with the new state’s need for integration, which imposed on all those within the borderline the same language, the same interpretation of history, the same bureaucracy, the same compulsion to finance the state through taxation, tithes and military service. In these conditions a border was a barrier between two states, with some characteristics of a wall but with plenty of scope for external relations—in everyday life there was a relatively open attitude towards the cross-border area on either side of the line. The border was thus configured as a junction with regard to habits and usages, local trade and the old autochthonous languages—now downgraded to local parlances or dialects.31 Such cross-border areas took on the features of a wall (barrier) and of a border proper (junction), with a prevalence of the former over the latter. This process came about in the first generation of nationstates (France, England, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Poland-Lithuania, Sweden, etc.) but it was also the case in the small German states, for which the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) recognised the sovereignty within their border-walls. The balance between wall and border tips towards the former when the idea of the nation prevails over that of the state, or rather when the ideology of the nation (nationalism) (Goio 1994; Geertz 1998:33–56) is used to legitimise the state and guides or determines its social policies. This ideology tends to eliminate local specificities and force uniformity on border areas, thereby reinforcing the division between one state and the other. The elimination of border areas is exemplified by the policies of the fascist regime in Italy between the wars: the prohibition of the teaching (even in small groups) of languages other than Italian (Slovene and German), the Italianisation of surnames, the disappearance of books written in foreign languages, the teaching of Italian history and culture to the detriment of other histories and cultures. In such cases there are no cultural differences between centre and the extreme periphery of the national state system. The result is a very hard border, an extremely thick wall, which tends to soffocate the local area. The rise of nationalism as an ideology, in the 19th and 20th centuries but above all after the First World War, produced a sort of “total victory” strategy (see Fejto) against multi-culturalism in

31  An emblematic case of the increasing dominance of the nation over regional cultures is France; French was imposed at the expense of other languages, history was reconstructed and reread so as to glorify the nation, etc. But the same applied to all nations in Europe and beyond.

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cross-border areas. It may be postulated that such a strategy derived from the idea of a wall as the last line of defence for the national culture in the state’s most multi-ethnic areas, which were almost always border areas. Since the Second World War, and even more so with the enlargement of the European Union in the last 20 years, the states and societies of the entire planet have become progressively globalised.32 The novel consequences of this development, according to Wendy Brown, 1) “weaken state sovereignty, or more precisely, disjoin the sovereignty of the nation-state”(*) (Brown 2013:11); 2) produce state borders that are more areas than lines, since communications between states are very easy, particularly within international confederations; 3) produce in states and nations, nonetheless, a need for protection and security, as a result of which they exchange part of their sovereignty for membership of confederations, federations and unions of states (such as the European Union); 4) transfer many functions of their borders (their functions as lines) to the new inter-state unions and their borders, which become harder than state borders and take on the features of a wall. The controls provided by such a macro-wall should ensure the achievement of four objectives, which Brown calls “fantasies of walled democracies”(*). The first fantasy is that of “extraneous danger”(*) in an increasingly borderless world (Brown 2013:120). In the first world today the construction of the dangerous outsider is produced not only by the effects of globalisation on politics, security and the economy. The presence of large numbers of immigrants poses “serious problems for cultural, linguistic and racial hegemony”(*) (Ibid. 2013:121). The second fantasy is containment: “protection from the idea of danger from outside brings on and fuels a fantasy of containment in which walls are the ultimate, fundamental icon”(*) (Ibid. 2013:123). The third fantasy is impermeability, perhaps also impenetrability, which was once provided by and expected of castle and city

32  Of the abundant literature on globalisation, what is most of interest here is work on the connection between globalisation and other socio-political dimensions. Particularly useful in this regard are three dictionary entries and their bibliographical references. The first links globalisation to modernisation (Marsh 2014:331–341); the second links it to global systems analysis (Riain and Evans 2000:1084–1098; Hughes 1999; 153–184); the third links it to tradition (Friedman 2001). To these may be added an article in which globalisation is linked to its transformation from globalisation by analogy (mechanical) to globalisation by interpenetration (organic), to reconciliation and peace, to conflict resolution and to “leopard-spot” world government (Gasparini 2008a; Gasparini 2011a:79–95).

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walls.33 This impermeability is now expected of the wall of the borders of the political unions of nation-states, and is designed for defence against an “enemy ­imagined as an attacker, an invader”(*) (Ibid. 2013:127). The fourth fantasy is that of purity, innocence and virtue, that is non-contamination by the brutal and barbaric behaviour of those beyond the wall—which entails ethnic cleansing. Wendy Brown takes her ideas about fantasy from Benedict Anderson’s book “Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism” (1996:6–7); the philosophy depicted therein is neither credible nor serious, but its harmful consequences are both real and serious. In this respect it makes sense to speak, as Brown does, of the psychoanalysis of defence (2013:130–139). A clear example of walls, though small states were involved, is to be found in the Balkan wars of the 1990s, between Yugoslavia and Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, Serb, Croat and Bosniak areas within Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia and Kosovo. Yet the hardness of those walls, which then became borders, was produced by at least eleven variables, as pointed out by the present writer in “What can happen when small gods have big dreams? The risk of producing a future small, clean and unstable” (Gasparini 1994b:7–30). These variables include: border culture;34 the relationship between city and countryside;35

33  In Italian cities and many European cities the old walls were demolished at the turn of the 19th century for reasons of urban development, to adapt the cities to their physical expansion. 34  In brief. The area of the Balkan Southern Slavs (Yugoslavia) was an intersection of borders which developed a strong border culture. Since Roman times it had seen the borders between Pannonia and Moesia, the Western and Eastern Roman Empires, the Kingdom of Hungary and the Byzantine Empire, Serbia and Bulgaria and the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. The borders between a range of ethnic groups (Muslims, Serbs, Croats, Albanians, Gypsies) ran within, outside and around communities (see Andric 1991, 1993, 1995). These border areas were left largely to their own devices, since the great powers at any given time had little interest in imposing order—their only concern was that they should not be controlled by competing powers. 35  In brief. The relationship between town and countryside has always been problematic. With its many small communities (mostly Serb and Croat, mostly agricultural) the countryside underwent a certain simplification in its social structure, as a result of which selection criteria were rooted in group membership, ascription and particularism, with an emphasis on strong bonds steeped in nationality. Rural communities thus considered themselves as paragons of purity in terms of lifestyles and social life, and towns were held to be corrupt and contemptible. The towns were inhabited by Muslims (in the interior) and Italians (Veneti) on the coast, and were more heterogeneous (Serbs, Croats, Muslims and Jews), with varying degrees of peaceful co-existence.

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marginalisation and violence;36 ethnic confrontation;37 rationality, tolerance and Utopia (new socialist man) against the radicalism of the ethnic cultural clash;38 the role of nationalism in large and small states;39 the myth of the great nation experienced in a small state;40 the aggressiveness of large groups 36  In brief. Marginalisation and violence were a consequence of being border communities and isolated rural communities. They were culturally and politically isolated because they were areas of no interest to any of the dominant political entities in Europe and Asia. The presence there of any order was an irrelevance. As marginal areas they were left to fend for themselves, prey to the tyranny of local warlords. Physical violence, for that matter, was normal common practice in the management of marginalisation. 37  In brief. The lack of any central order, resulting from indifference, marginalisation, marked cultural specificity, the rural setting of small communities and the great differences between their cultures, turned everything into an ethnic confrontation punctuated by outbreaks of ethnic violence. Ethnic membership thus promoted ethnic identification and coalescence and induced self-reflection which was then projected outwards, often directly against other ethnic groups. 38  In brief. Rationality, tolerance and Utopia were at the root of a project, initially espoused by King Alexander I of Yugoslavia (1929) (one single Yugoslav nation with three tribes) and subsequently by Tito (Yugoslav Socialist Man, see note 45) designed to create a new identity and sense of belonging which would overcome the problems arising from the religious, ethnic, historical and linguistic differences between the many cultures in the land of the southern Slavs. The overly Utopian character of the project and its incapacity to keep the promises made for what became an increasingly remote future resulted in a reassertion of the “certainties” of the ethnic tradition and the manifest universal success of the model of nationhood that was based on it. 39  In brief. As the ideology of the nation, nationalism had the aim of reinforcing the integration and cohesion of a state with the characteristics indicated in note 20. In large states it contributed to the process of modernisation, and in general terms to the production of universalism in relations between groups and individuals within it. In small states nationalism distorted that aim and process, producing an excess of internal cohesion, an unnatural closure and an excessive reliance on resources for the maintenance of nationalism itself (for new languages, publications promoting nationalism, the structure of an independent state, etc.). 40  In brief. The progressive break-up of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires spawned a large number of small republics and kingdoms: Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Most of these small political entities were independent, others joined the Kingdom (subsequently Socialist Republic) of Yugoslavia. By the time of the First World War all of them had developed aspirations to nationhood, which with the dissolution of their respective empires led to the constitution of new states. But because each of them was leaving an empire, their borders were wider than those of their new national territories, since the nation came into existence before the state (unlike what had happened with France,

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and small groups;41 ethnic cleansing;42 the strengthening by superimposition of the border of civilisation (the cosmopolitan culture) and the local border (and local culture);43 elites: from the pursuit of future order to the recovery of an order legitimised by the past, without passing through the present.44 England and other older states). Under this asymmetry between wider borders (those of the nation) and narrower ones (those of the state) a great deal of friction arose between these states and peoples (Smith 1988:113; Lucchitta 1996:2; Lucchitta 1997; Gasparini 2003a). It gave rise to the myths devised by intellectuals and politicians in the form of Greater Serbia (Garašanin 1993:57–80; Čubrilović 1993:150–185; Čubrilović 1993:225–228; Mihailovic 1993:212–224; Serbian Academician 1993:231–269), Greater Croatia, Greater Bulgaria and Greater Albania, which were supposed to make the borders of the state coincide with those of the nation. This proved to be one of the causes of the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. 41  In brief. Small communities, antagonistic ethnic groups within a community (see Andric 1991), small states aspiring to rejoin the greater nation, marginalisation and violent conflicts are all factors fostering small-group aggression which has not yet been sublimated into non-violent symbolic expressions (such as provincialism and sports competitions). The emotional charge of asserting ultimate values thus prevails. Considering also largegroup aggression in the recourse to violence that is seen as a fruitful and rational way of achieving an objective, it becomes clear that it is really, and was in the case of Bosnia Herzegovina, small-group violence, or actions presented by large-group media as smallgroup violence. 42  In brief. Ethnic cleansing is almost a direct consequence of the variables considered thus far, but above all of the distance between the borders of the nation and the state and the desire to make them one and the same. There is a desire to deny the citizenship, and the very presence, of those belonging to an ethnic group different to that of the state which wishes to rejoin the nation. In the second place, ethnic cleansing is conducted in accordance with the aggressive methods of the second group. 43  In brief. A factor of some weight in these Balkans conflicts was that other opposing forces tended to be superimposed on the struggle between two cultures: cosmopolitanism and localism. Cosmopolitan culture brought out the contrast between three great cultures: Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim. Local culture was the product of isolated communities, above all rural, of ethnic contrasts experienced as violent clashes in small states aspiring to be great nations, of a border culture and marginalisation. This superimposition of diametrically opposed cultures (cosmopolitan and local), at least in the terms considered, led to a perverse exacerbation of the management of confrontation and violence. 44  In brief. The control of public policy by elites in the way indicated in the name of the variable, that is moving from the socialist project for the future to the national recovery of the past, led to failure to pass through the present. As a result the old elite became the new one, with the advantage of not having to take responsibility for the failures, inefficiency (Obradović 1996:1–4) and corruption (see Begović and Mijatović 2005) it produced when it was the socialist elite.

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External walls, legitimised by a range of different and complex factors, including the fantasies of a walled democracy identified by Wendy Brown, do not actually seal off the North from the rest of the world. A good number of the migrants who have entered the European Union and the United States have done so illegally, and more will do the same, attracted to areas inside the EU and the US which offer economic opportunities, even though migrants are paid much less than the indigenous population. This leads to a radicalisation of the cultural, social and economic differences in the EU population, and to calls for the construction of internal walls (Beck, Grande 2006:220–223) as a result of the spread of the walled democracy fantasies mentioned above. One consequence of globalisation is the hardening of the external borders of the new unions or confederations of nation-states, making them hard walls or at least leading to fantasies about such walls defending the countries in question. But it appears that the failure (present or imminent) of these internal/ external walls throws up new walls, in this case within the European Union, which are economic, cultural and social. This state of affairs is very similar to that observed with regard to medieval walls (but also earlier and later walls), which were external but natural in character (no-man’s lands, marshes, mountain ranges) but also internal (around cities, fortresses of God, monasteries, etc.). Between the external and internal walls the situation is generally similar but not equal, because the social, cultural, economic and psychological conditions are very different. In general terms, then, a historical analysis of walls reveals a range of different types: imperial limes, “natural” walls, walls around castles and “fortresses of God”; borderlines which hardened with the advent of the modern state; a line which cancelled out the border area with the assertion of a national ideology (nationalism); the walls around great political areas (EU and US); new internal walls of a social, cultural and economic character. A sort of cyclical return of general types of wall may be observed. To this typological sequence it may be added that over time all walls change their appearance and functions, in some cases ending up by performing an exclusively political role (the wall between the Vatican State and Italy) and in others failing and disappearing altogether (the Berlin Wall). They may also be transformed (in substance and function) into something else: they may become walls of peace (through cross-border cooperation), they may contribute to the formation of a new urban and social identity (Belfast), or they may acquire an economic role through tourism. Such transformations will be ­analysed in the final part of this chapter.

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A Word on the “violent face” of Walls

A wall (fortified wall, limes or the more generic barrier) refers to a border, but also implies further dimensions specific to it, and above all it emphasises the coercive aspect of the border. When is a wall built? The first thing to be said is that the “when” depends on the function that the wall is intended to perform. One primordial function was a defence against external threats. The wall started out as a means of protecting the community’s central nucleus, and then other functions followed— territorial control and the expansion of the political, social and cultural order emanating from the centre. The latter function is relatively recent, coinciding approximately with the advent of the modern state, and it is expected to be performed above all by the border, since before its conceptual identification with a wall a border was indeterminate and of little interest, taking the form of a no-man’s land or a simply natural barrier (Strassoldo 1979:152–155; Strassoldo 200: 1931–1939; Luhmann 1982; Anderson 1996:178; Guichonnet and Raffestin 1974:9). On the basis of the above, emphasis may now be given to some specific characteristics of the wall that divides. Of which there are at least four. 1) The wall is erected where there is no border, or where the border is a highly informal one. In the absence of a border there is a desire to create one, for an immediate and rigid separation of one’s own side and population from that which is on the other side. This category includes the Berlin Wall, the Iron Curtain, the wall in Via Anelli in Padova, the wall in Mitrovica, the wall in Jerusalem, the wall in Nicosia and the wall separating Gorizia from Nova Gorica. Such walls are built suddenly, from a desire to fix borders ex-novo to establish a rigid division. They are designed as an imposition to create the precedent of a clear border with a strong social, cultural, economic and political impact. This aim is achieved from the very beginning of the wall’s life (which may last for decades). They are built to divide densely inhabited areas, and reach their maximum expression when they perform this function inside a single town or city. 2) The wall is unlikely to be welcomed by both sides, because it is almost invariably chosen by a community on one side of it, or more often by the elite of that community. As such it is a solution which arouses deep hostility on the part of those who are on the other side or do not belong to the elite. The Berlin Wall was a choice made by the communist part of Berlin, and within that by the elite that governed directly (the East German rulers) and indirectly (the Soviet

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Politburo). It was an imposition on the populations on either side of it. The same may be said of the two sides facing each other across the Iron Curtain and of the wall (or fencing) separating Gorizia from Nova Gorica (and Italy from Yugoslavia), at least until the 1960s. 3) The wall is imposed as a response to a number of factors. Of these, four may be cited. (1) The wall provides an initial response to the insecurity and fear felt by those who are momentarily stronger with regard to those who are currently weaker but may become stronger. The insecurity and fear are projected into the future (predicted with near-certainty) and derive from a negative interpretation of the consequences that may arise from the direction in which society is currently moving. The insecurity is felt towards what is new and the fear is of what may happen as a result of an attack on the part of those who are different in terms of race, culture, economic condition, lifestyle, religion or values, with the destruction of well-being that those who are different are likely to produce. (2) The wall is a response to the idea of cleanliness and homogeneity, and is imposed to strengthen security. As such it entails a process of the ethnic and social cleansing by one society of another, by one state of another. Towns, and particularly cities, often contain tangible or social or symbolic walls which take the form of homeogeneous ethnic or social quarters, Jewish ghettos, natural areas (see Park, Burgess, MacKenzie, 1979), or zones of ethnic or cultural influence such as in Sarajevo, Mostar and Jerusalem. But the idea of cleansing may arise when the co-existence of cultural groups fails—war breaks out and comes to an end when the idea of cleansing produces (or even when it is unable to produce) a new idea of the state. This is what happened in the Yugoslavia left by Tito: the officially sponsored model of “Yugoslav Man”45 was 45  “Yugoslav Man” was the product of an idea (to form a common Yugoslav identity), a consequent ideology (Yugoslavism) and a policy launched under King Alexander I between the wars and vigorously pursued by Tito in the 1950s. It was supposed to go beyond the fact of belonging to the nationalities and republics of which Yugoslavia was composed (see Djokic 2002:369). Founded on the principles of brotherhood and unity in the name of internationalism and socialist unity (Cviic 1993:16; Kovacevic 2008:330; Fabretti 1994:9; Jancar 1991; Janjic 1997:12–14), this ideology was designed to unite all the southern Slavs (Yugoslavia), with the prospect of including the Bulgarians. Questions on the Yugoslav

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repudiated in favour of identification with the nations and the statehood of the republics which had formed Yugoslavia (Gasparini 2001a:307–330). But this recovery of nationhood, transformed into a new state, involved not only local communities, forced to choose a nationality which in some cases was not that of their origins, but even families of mixed nationality. In such cases one parent and the children have to cross their own wall and go over to the side to which the other parent belongs, that of the majority which composes the new state. (3) The creation and imposition of the wall stems from a desire to build an artificial state and society in the conviction that they will develop to form a new and original society in a new self-legitimising state. The wall produces an artificial rupture which after decades, if not centuries, grows into something perceived as natural and obvious. A few generations are enough to pass easily from a border-as-wall to a “natural” and legitimate border. Over time many walls have produced such a natural and “legitimate” state of affairs, but it has been the case (and still is) that the imposition of walls has continued to be perceived as a violent rupture, and sooner or later the borders they embody are no longer acceptable. This category includes the Iron Curtain, the ideological antagonism that produced the division between West Germany and communist East Germany, and the Berlin Wall. These three walls lasted, though they never developed beyond their condition as an ideological artifice. Other imposed walls stemmed from the idea of cleansing and then over time disappeared or were transformed, or are still too recent to have disappeared or been transformed: the wall of apartheid in South Africa, the wall of the Indian reservations in the United States (see Jacquin 1997:152 & foll.), the recent wall between Mexico and the Unites States and the even more recent one between Israel and Jerusalem and the West Bank (Hilal 2011:134–152; Hilal and Petti 2001:180–194; Klein 2011:195–203). One wall which evolved from an imposition to a legitimate border is that between the Italian state and the Vatican City. These cases are obviously a few among many. They are considered as qualitatively different but have identity of the population of Yugoslavia were included in a national census for the first time in 1971, on the basis of a range of criteria: Serbs living outside Serbia, Muslims who rejected religious classification, people born from mixed marriages, militants in the Yugoslav cause (Garde 1992:114). In 1971 self-declared Yugoslavs were 1.3% of the population (273,077), and by 1981 they had increased to 5.4% (1,216,463). The biggest percentages of Yugoslavs were in Croatia at 8.2%, Voivodina at 8.2%, Bosnia Herzegovina at 7.9%, Montenegro at 5.3% and Serbia at 4.8%.

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in common a forcible separation imposed by a wall, which subsequently becomes functionally modified or tends to disappear. (4) The wall is a brutal imposition, in that it is built by the stronger of two competing groups or by one side which takes the initiative ­unopposed by the other side (as happened with the ideologically-based walls erected by communism). Such walls are generally built to prevent flight from a country or to control immigration from outside it, or from areas within it (native reservations, among other configurations). Here the wall represents an extreme solution to a danger, be it real or merely perceived. 4) The wall may also be built within a community as a defence against the outside but above all to preserve the integrity of the utopia experienced in the community. Such a wall is symbolic rather than tangible, but is no less strong for that. It surrounds a utopian community so that its mission and original rules may remain as untouched as possible, with the result that anyone wishing to establish an individual dialogue with the outside, and/or lead the community towards the external society, crosses the wall and is thereby excluded from the community. A current Italian case in point is Nomadelfia, a significant community in terms of its mission (see Gasparini 2002b:346–375) and the rules of living deriving therefrom. Anyone who does not accept its mission and its rules is considered to have crossed the wall and is automatically excluded from the community—there is no going back.

Problematic Cases of Borders and Walls in Different Historical Situations

Relations between borders and walls have varied a great deal over time and in space. At various times such a relationship: 1) indicates a disjunction between a very long border and a wall limited to single settlement; 2) indicates an overlap between a border and a wall; 3) indicates the wall as the edge of the known world, followed over time by the discovery that there are other societies beyond the border against which the wall/limes is required as a defence; 4) takes the form of a number of superimposed borders which become social, cultural and economic walls; 5) takes the form of a modern state border defined through the metaphor of a highly extensive community which sets wall against wall; 6) replicates in the border-wall dynamic the incongruity between modernity and globalisation; 7) trasforms a wall into a border, progressively less political amd more administrative in nature, which then disappears completely as a

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result of inter-state relations (the Schengen area) or the political integration of a number of previous states into a single one, or the merger of provinces and towns; 8) stands at the root of modern society in that it is centred around organisations, each of which has borders that do not coincide and are thus generally weak and only rarely consolidate to become walls, such as those dominated by ideologised organisations; 9) is the result of a redefinition of a border, which changes from a line into a point (such as an airport) that may be a virtual or actual wall. Each of these points is now analysed below. Borders and Walls in Feudal States and City-states The feudal state46 was way of organising power, the economy and land which was closely tied to the ownership of property. At the centre of this organisation was the ownership of things which were important and wealth-giving, while the identity of the periphery was progressively accentuated as it became more distant from the centre. The centre was located within property-rich areas, and was thus the location of the power wielded over the property, a place where the security of the feudal lord and his serfs and other inhabitants was generally assured. For this reason the border of the fief tended to be fairly weak, or rather its defence was left to hostile natural features such as marshes, mountains and stretches of no-man’s-land. Real defence was reserved for the centre, around which the castle or city walls were built. In the event of a war the fief’s border did little to impede an invader, while the castle or city walls (see Harrison 2006) acted as a barrier to siege and thus performed the proper function of defence (see Meschini 2006:8–9; Baschet 2005:115 & foll.). It should be added that in terms of borders and walls the “para-state” feudal entity was made more complex by at least two factors. First, it was dominated by the criterion of ownership of the land and its population, but was also subject to the character of the ownership of the fief by the local lord, who may also have owned other non-contiguous lands. In such circumstances a 46  The feudal state was the result of a fairly long process which by the 10th century had produced institutions typical of a state, though still feudal: the assumption of legal, fiscal and administrative powers and the regulation of property rights. The turning point came in the 12th century with the assertion of the power developed by Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I (Barbarossa), but the first strong feudal state was founded by the Normans. Starting from the Duchy of Normandy, they took their model of the state to England, and to the Kingdom of Sicily with the Hauteville family (Robert Guiscard and his brother Roger). It is above all to this feudal state that reference is made (Cammarosano 2001; Tabacco 1979; Pacaut 1982; see also Barbero and Frugoni 2002:231–232). Following the Hundred Years’ War a feudal state was also established in France. In spatial terms, the feudal state became the predominant form in most of Europe.

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border might remain indeterminate because it was provisional and subject to change—­feudal lands might be lost and others acquired, and the latter might be contiguous or (more often) separate. The history of a feudal family would often reveal the flexibility of such an entity, how it was related to ties of loyalty to the king or emperor, and how these might accumulate, change and ­disappear, and how the family’s genealogical tree might disappear and/or reappear somewhere very distant from its origin. In terms of castle walls there was a proliferation of points, each one corresponding to the various castles that the family and its branches decided to build. In short, in the feudal system there was a clear functional distinction between the wall and the border in feudal territory.47 Borders which Act as Walls with the Rise of the Modern State What has been outlined above with regard to the feudal system also goes for medieval urban development, in which towns and cities were formed or reformed on the initiative of bishops, the mercantile bourgeoisie, the new governing nobility and the landed aristocracy. Society had become much more complex, structured around new and old classes, new types of relations, new economies and new productive and military technology. Walls continued to exist around towns, but their defensive function was diminished by the development of artillery. Conversely, the borders of seigneurial lands gained in importance as they were accorded a defensive function—the risk attached to the contraband trade that developed along it increased in proportion to the extent that the border was subject to controls. Such border controls developed between the Duchy of Ferrara and Modena and the Duchy of Mantua. Between the 16th and 18th centuries there was a reduction in the number of such seigneuries as the more powerful states absorbed their smaller neighbours. A significant instance was the expansion of the Duchy of Modena, which started in the 16th century with the absorption of the County of Carpi and then took over the County of Novellara, the Principality of Correggio, the 47  The subject of feudal borders appears widely in historical literature, though rarely as a central theme. Borders between states and between peoples are discussed by François Louis Ganshof (1961:178–180) in his study of medieval international relations. Also relevant are Peter Brown (2004:93–116 and 307–332) on European borders and Florin Curta (2005) on Bulgarian, Persian, Byzantine-Arab, Roman-Germanic, Carolingian and Ottonian borders. For castle and village borders see Henri Pirenne (1967:68ss.) on city walls, on castles and battlements see Paolo Cammarosano (2001:20–389), on frontiers and castle sieges see Aldo A. Settia (2002:10–27 and 77–182), on specific sieges see Marco Meschini (2006), on village defences see Monique Bourin and Robert Durand (1984:179–181).

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Duchy of Mirandola, the Duchy of Massa Carrara and the Duchy of Guastalla. This ­process ­produced a large mature state with an articulated set of institutions. As its borders expanded they took on the characteristics of increasingly rigid walls which were difficult to cross without agreements between states. Within its borders there formed a hierarchy of towns, comprising the state’s ­institutional centre (Modena) and subordinate centres with a degree of local autonomy. There were walls around each one of them, but their function became more formal and economic than military.48 The case described above was matched by larger-scale developments in Italy—such as that of the Kingdom of Sardinia, which progressively aborbed all the marquisates of the house of Aleramici as well as many other seigneuries— and elsewhere when European kingdoms began to grow into nation-states. The first of these was the Kingdom of France—at the end of the Hundred Years’ War under Charles VII it was formed as a collection of fiefs, some of which were very extensive. Here too the border grew in rigidity to such a degree that it resembled a wall, an assertion of the power of the new and greatly extended monarchy. The Border of an Empire as the Edge of the World The relationship between the border and the wall has a different conceptualisation and conformation in the case of empires. First of all it should be said that the border of an empire is ambivalent. This means that the “con-fine” (the Italian for border, deconstructed as reciprocal limit) is not recognised as such by an expanding empire. Indeed, an empire in expansion recognises no borders, it feels free to go beyond the limits hitherto reached, it even considers itself as the Only World—the name given by the Aztecs to the huge Cem-Anàhunac region which made up their empire. The Romans too considered their empire to comprise all that was civilised or to be civilised, calling what was outside it a place where “hic sunt leones” or a barbarian land (Wells 2007:145–172), or a desert land (Lewin 1999). Anybody in the largely unknown regions beyond 48  The aggregation of small states and seigneuries in Italy began in the 16th century and came to an end in the 19th. By the eve of Italian unification (1859) the number of states had been reduced to seven: the Kingdom of Sardinia, the Kingdom of Lombardy and Veneto (actually under the Habsburg Empire), the Duchies of Parma and Modena, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the Papal States and the Kingdom of Two Sicilies. On the Duchy of Modena see Alberto Gasparini (1960), on the states of the House of Este see L. Federzoni, G. Biondi, A. Fontana, G. Badini, G. Ricci, P. L. Ricci, G. Zacché, T. Sorrentino, A. Ghidini, B. Andreolli, G. Fabbrici and O. Raffo (VV.AA. 2001:451–667).

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the border/limit was clearly not allowed to cross the border into the empire. Luttwak (1993) points out that the imperial border, at least until Trajan’s rule, passed through the client states which divided the Roman sphere of influence from that of the Parthian empire. This in effect was a border constituting a large politically organised area. A more recent version of the Roman invention of the buffer state as a border is provided by the Soviet empire. Yet it was under Trajan that the Roman empire passed from expansion to defence. At that point its border took the tangible form we know today, taking on the features of a militarised border. This entailed a functional change in the border: the specific status of enemy was attributed to those living beyond it. It was these conditions that gave rise to the limes, the walls, and in general to hard and closely-controlled borders. Not only were limes designed and built on the Parthian and Germanic borders, but fortified barriers—Hadrian’s Wall and the Antonine Wall—were erected in Britain to defend Roman territory from the Picts. What happened in the Roman empire has also been observed elsewhere— the Great Wall in China is one example. Indeed, most of the empires down the centuries have developed similar characteristics (on the ideology of empire, see Pagden 2005:91 & foll.), though every empire has had its own characteristics and border configuration. What is different about modern states is that empire borders are not always contiguous—they can take the form of influence in a coalition or central points (airports) rather than borderlines and/or borderlands. Borders can clearly take on the features of the political, economic and cultural influence of empires on large parts of the world. The imperial diarchy of the United States and the Soviet Union in the second half of the 20th century was demarcated by borders, many of which were hard (with tangible or metaphorical walls) and others weaker, passing through non-aligned countries. Now rapid advances are being made by the empire of globalisation, in which the importance of national borders is acknowledged but in terms of some crucial functions connected to the mobility of people and groups borders are becoming harder, developing into walls between the North and the South of the world. Public health (see Isig, Onu/Ecosoc 2009) and immigration are two questions giving rise to the construction of thick walls between North and South (Schiavone 2008:36–37; Gasparini 2008a:43–45). Lastly, mention should be made of the disappearance of walls and the softening of borders within an empire. This coincides with the development of a specific global culture for the whole empire, at the same time respecting local cultures. A clear example of this was the culture of Mitteleuropa in the Habsburg empire in the 19th century, which had the purpose of ridding

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the empire of its internal cultural walls so as to encourage dialogue, at least between the various elites. Borders and Walls Superimposed in Traditional Communities No less marked than the political borders of fiefs, kingdoms and empires are those enclosing traditional communities. Such communities may be towns, neighbourhoods and villages in a world composed of many such self-sufficient units. The basic principle of this self-sufficiency is represented by the border which denotes it. And self-sufficiency derives from the ability of the community to solve its problems internally, so for each of these problems a border is formed, corresponding approximately to the perimeter of the community. These problems become themes which are characterised by a number of partial borders concerning social relations, dialect, kinship, the workplace, the parish/mosque/pagoda, religious values and daily life, festivities, education and upbringing, customs, and so on (Graph 1.1). For each of these “problems” the border runs along the same perimeter. In other words, in these traditional communities the borders are basically superimposed and occupy the same line, so crossing them may be very difficult, not to say painful. The superimposition of so many borders makes them hard—so much so that they become walls. Going beyond these walls, constituted by the mutual reinforcement of many borders, is so painful because leaving a community means facing social death, feeling bereft of an essential part of oneself, and inside the community anyone who leaves is seen as a sort of apostate. The superimposition of a number of borders thus produces a wall—either it cannot be crossed or if it is crossed there is virtually no way back.

GRAPH 1.1 Many superimposed borders form a hard wall. Source: Graph by Matteo Delli Zotti.

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The Modern State Border as a Wall Containing an Extended Local Community In territorial terms the European modern state came into being through the absorption of a number of fiefs, a process in which their borders became less important as the new border of the enlarged state became stronger. But with the advent of the modern state the border was also a new concept—not only did it enclose a territory, its border contained the population inhabiting it and the order (sovereignty) that the state exercised over the population and the territory. This was part of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, first mercantile and then industrial. The reconceptualisation of the state and thus of the border established the latter as a demarcation (see Fichte analysed in Irti 2008:122) in terms of currency, language, trade, industrialisation, market expansion, citizenship, law, defence and security. There were two additional factors attached to this demarcation. The first is that the general development of states meant that a border indicated a sequence of points that separated two states: on one side was one of them, on the other side was the other. The border signified a clear and tightly-controlled separation of one side from the other. The second factor, also a novelty as applied to the state, is the denotation of what formed in the territory, the population and the order of the state as a result of the consolidation of the concept and idea of the nation, which was almost always a single one dominating any other nationalities (Goio 1994; Gasparini 2011a:189 & foll.). The introduction of the national conception of the modern state made its border a certainty, more rigid than its predecessors and quite possibly a wall. Theorising about the concept of the nation is relatively recent, emphasising the indigenous and nativist bond of the population living in the state, its roots in the territory, blood, and cultural and ethnic belonging to the state (Roseano 2005). Such theorising about the nation gave rise to its ideologisation as nationalism, which obviously set one individual’s nation against that of others, especially that of his neighbour. Similar cases of ideologisation—such as socialism, communism (involving the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain) and fascism—made borders more like walls. It is natural for such a development to occur at the border of the nation-state, but the nation is an instrument to enhance cohesion, integration and the attachment of a population to the state and its institutions. It is under these conditions that cultures of regions forming the (new) state are reduced to local cultures, subservient to the national culture which the state has adopted; and it is in the light of this adoption that their values, history, traditions and even language are rewritten (Gasparini 2003a).

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This fusion of state and nation actually entails a recovery on a large scale of the characteristics observed (on a small scale) in the previous section on the walls surrounding the traditional community, in that the nation-state produces a superimposition of almost all the networks of relations and the commonality of lexicon and meaning that the broad new national community shares. In these conditions the modern state reproduces the traditional character of small communities, but which is now extended to comprise an entire society and its ideologisation—national, communist or capitalist. Its border is consequently hardened, taking on irrational elements of the traditional community, even to the extent of becoming a wall. It may also be added that the hardness of the border (or even the walls proper) of the modern nation-state is emphasised by the fact that it does not depend on whether each state is small, medium-sized or large (see Schiavone 2008:36–37), precisely because they all enjoy the maximum degree of independence, so each state is to be defended irrespective of its size (ibidem 2008:35).

The Border-Wall Relationship as a Reproduction of the Incongruity between the Early Modern State and the Post-Modern State The advent of early modernity (known as the modern state) brought about a reconceptualisation and re-evaluation of borders as the reciprocal limit of two states, and thus as the closure of the state with respect to the outside world. Yet modernity, understood to mean a process over time and projection towards the outside world, developed a rejection of closure in the local dimension and tended to search for what was common between the self and the outside, shaped around a rationalisation of such common internal and external features. The process of modernisation was therefore a result of the break-up of society and partly of the state into a range of organisations, civil and political alike, and their dialogue with the outside through international relations, above all among civil societies, which took on global and a-national form (Gasparini 2011a:19 & foll.). Under this long process of modernisation everything tended to become global. In analytical terms it may be said that early modernisation, which may also be referred to as a process of mechanical globalisation, was “achieved by states which were independent but which understood each other because they were constructed on similar criteria, that made these states believe in, vigorously assert and defend their own localism” (Gasparini 2008a:32; see also Puscas 2010:38; Held 1999; Nye 2003; Parker 2005). The process of modernisation then produced a subsequent modernity, or post-modernity, which may be called organic globalisation, “arising not from spatial proximity and the organisational similarity of states but from their functional interpenetration. They

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need each other, so requirements of political independence are sacrificed for the sake of economic consumption and lifestyles” (Gasparini 2008a:34; Puscas 2010:40; Harvey 1993:13–148). The early modern state (territory, population and sovereignty) has not disappeared, because of the inertia of its institutions (at least for the foreseeable future) and because it offers considerable advantages for the preservation of the identity of its people and the redistribution of wealth among them. This is despite the fact that in practical terms post-modern globalisation erodes the state’s internal power and its external sovereignty. There is, however, a kind of dual emphasis: on the local through the modern state, and on the global through modernisation. The local emphasises everything that is national and rooted in the state, with a tendency towards territorialisation and an enhancement of borders. The global emphasises everything that is communication and trade (exchange), everything with a propensity to connection, with a tendency towards de-territorialisation and the depletion of borders and the idea of the border. The modernisation process thus produces an incongruity with between the modern state (of early modernity) and the post-modernity of organic globalisation in the meaning outlined above. This makes the idea of the border ambivalent; some borders may be hard while others are nothing more than virtual (see Marramao 2008:136). Borders and Walls within the State Borders may exist within a state, but they contain less sovereignty and are less political than they are administrative, social and economic or to do with citizenship and discrimination (as in apartheid). The old political borders between fiefs, seigneuries, duchies, marquisates and counties have not entirely disappeared but have often become (local) cultural or administrative borders. They demarcate towns, districts or villages (in Italy comuni, the basic administrative units), provinces and regions. In actual fact such borders were functioning as recently as the 1950s for the levy of duties payable on entry to the centre of a comune. All these administrative borders are virtual in nature, operating at a cultural level and for the management of services provided and used at a local level. There are other internal borders which are much more rigid, even acting as walls, concerning social status, immigration, ethnicity and other dimensions. Some states are divided vertically by walls: between citizens and non-citizens, indigenous people and immigrants, rich and poor. They are walls that split villages, cities and societies (the indigenous from the immigrant, for example) into two or more uncommunicating parts. A feature of everyday life, this

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­ henomenon may take the form of two cities within one, communicating with p each other only through a few institutional locations such as schools, hospitals and other local public services (see Isig 2002). Determined by walls, invisible but real, this type of dichotomy has always existed. There are a number of classic examples of it: a ghetto and the rest of the city; Chicago-school city centres and the rest of the city and the changes imposed on it as a consequence of invasion and succession; the caste system in Asian cities studied by Weber and Fasana (1998); American Indian reservations and the rest of the country; apartheid in South Africa. There are also more recent examples: the wall dividing indegenous citizens from non-citizen foreign workers in Dubai (similar walls, though less hard, also exist in other countries); the wall surrounding Israelis and Palestinians around Jerusalem; the walls (sometimes physical) in Western cities separating indegenous people from immigrants and the marginalised (via Anelli in Padova). It should be added that another reason for building a wall is the desire for class security, as manifest in the formation of gated communities. They are strikingly defended by a physical wall or steel fence for perimeter security and use private police personnel to emphasise their internal security. Recourse to gated communities began in colonial or former colonial countries and in countries under military occupation for the defence of military personnel and their families. They are also found in countries which have recently started up tourist industries, organising Club Med structures or similar compounds designated exclusively for tourists. One example is the tourist village of Sharm el-Sheikh. Gated communities have now spread in western countries as a defence against crime and terrorist attacks. They are particularly common in the United States but are not unknown in Italy—one example is the Milano 2 residential complex in the Milan suburb of Segrate. Another form of internal border is the ethnic-national borders that have emerged from recent civil wars and the transformation of areas within a state into quasi-political divisions, entailing a new configuration of ethnic-spatial relations and a redefinition of state sovereignty. A clear example may be found in the internal division of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina between the Republika Srpska and the Croat-Muslim Federation. Between the two entities runs a hard border (a wall) strictly demarcating one from the other, even though no formal border exists. Here trade takes place because the availability of everyday goods differs between the two sides, but the border is such that currency from, and relations with, the other side are unacceptable. Borders and walls evidently exist within the modern state, though they are more administrative, social and cultural than political. At times there is a relation between walls internal and external to the state. When internal walls are

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soft, hard ones can be built against what is outside the state, and vice versa. Perhaps the most significant case in point is the European Union and the United States. Immigrants in the EU, especially illegal immigrants, come up against many internal walls. In order to be accepted and enjoy a basic level of protection, immigrants must prove that they have regular employment, a residence permit in the host country, entitlement to its services, etc. These are “invisible” walls which are difficult to overcome without legal status. Since these checks have to be passed for an immigrant to stay in Europe, there is no need to erect barriers (hard walls) on Europe’s external borders. By contrast, in the US the internal walls described above are soft, and as a consequence the US-Mexican border from California to Texas is a high-technology fenced barrier. Once it has been crossed, illegal immigrants can find their way into American society with relative ease. It should also be added that to the east the European Union has external borders with countries (Russia in the form of Kaliningrad, Belarus, the Ukraine, Moldova, and some Balkan states) with a culture and religion in common with the Union and a tradition of coexistence, countries which above all wish to join the Union. The only borders with the characteristics of a high-tech barrier are overseas, surrounding the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, designed as a deterrent to African emigrants who attempt to enter the European Union from Morocco through Spain. Here the border has been transformed into a wall on the European frontier with the South of the world. This leads to the conclusion that, starting with Europe, the border understood as a long and soft territorial separation qualitatively mutates into a wall operating at a series of points considered sensitive and thus equipped with advanced technology. It has to be asked whether such solutions, deriving from the conviction that undesirable immigration flows can be stopped, can actually keep the “promise” of security implicit in such convictions. In actual fact the political dimension may resurface and replace the administrative one. This happens when cross-border cooperation spreads to include areas on either side of a border, to the extent that it attenuates the divisive function of the state border and at the same time hardens the administrative borders of cross-border regions with the neighbouring regions in the states to which they belong. Another internal border may take on the characteristics of a wall, even though in formal terms it remains invisible and changeable. This happens when a state creates divisions between parts of itself; they may be, or may become, differences, then borders, and then walls; or there may arise the opposite process, albeit slower and more difficult. This may be observed in a

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­ umber of states, but is more common in large ones. One such case is Italy, n where there is a border, at times an invisible wall, between the North and South of the country. There may also be an inversion of cardinal points: west and east in Germany, south and north, also in Germany, north and south in Belgium, France and Spain, and centre and periphery in Portugal. In the US it is possible to speak of a divide between the two coasts and the American heartland. A border which may develop into a wall can also arise or be imagined for the future. There may arise, or be consolidated, a multi-tiered European Union, with invisible borders, or even walls, between countries which joined the Union at different times or between the north-western member states and those with less developed economic and cultural backgrounds. Such differences are explained in terms of divisions between Carolingian Europe, Mediterranean Europe, the former Communist Europe, Balkan-Danubian Europe, etc. Such interpretations rest on an extensive body of political, economic and futuristic literature, even though the centre of the EU bends its efforts to redistribute wealth in favour of its poorer members. Organisations as the Load-bearing Structures of Modern Society— More Borders than Walls Modern society is formed of organisations, each of which is independent, exists to perform a specific function (in training, education, work, health, leisure and so on) and has borders which separate it from the others (Graph 1.2). Which means that modern society is a world full of borders, but unlike the situation pertaining to the traditional community most of these borders are not superimposed, but divergent (see Mayhew 1971:18; Gasparini 2011a:27 & foll.). In other words daily needs and cultural, political and economic ­requirements are fulfilled by a variety of organisations, and this variety represents the heart of modernity and modern civil society. Membership of an organisation requires the acceptance of a code of access to cross the border and enter it, as in the case of educational qualifications to enrol in a university, having a ­certain disease to be admitted to a certain hospital ward, or expressing support for the principles of an association to be allowed to join it. But at any time it is possible to withdraw from such organisations. This means that the borders are not superimposed, that they can be crossed in an inward or outward direction, that an individual can be inside any number of borders, and thus belong to any number of organisations, at the same time (Graph 1.3). The consequence of this complex situation is that the borders of many organisations are in fact, and perceived to be, very weak. Borders are thus weak and may easily be crossed as perceptions of convenience and opportunity arise, without the formation of feelings of betrayal and

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GRAPH 1.2 Organisations and their borders in modern society. Source: Graph by Matteo Delli Zotti.

GRAPH 1.3 Organisations and their borders experienced by the individual. Source: Graph by Matteo Delli Zotti.

apostasy. The walls within society and the state or between states may obviously be formed on the basis of social, economic and cultural variables which are very hard in terms of their capacity to discriminate against social groups and individuals and their capacity to create needs based on feelings of security or pseudo-security. Such cases result in the construction of the walls analysed in section “Borders and walls within the state” above.

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But here, speaking of the weakness of organisational borders, reference is made to a result of the plurality of organisations in civil society and their role in meeting its specific needs.

Redefinition of the Border, Transformed from an Unbroken Territorial Line into a Point which is a Virtual or Real Wall In conclusion of this analysis of the relationship between borders and walls it may be observed that in the modern state and society borders are being reconceptualised as points rather than lines. A fundamental component of the modern state has been the border dividing one state from another, to express sovereignty in a space and over the population living in it, to contain the state’s order within that space and to defend it from outside. In modern and postmodern societies the function of national limits now tends to curtail their importance and borders are tending to become more virtual. In such situations the borders which become harder, even to the extent of acting as walls against the entry of people from the Third World, are points within the state. The most representative example is the airport, which ­operates a distinction between outsiders who are admitted without checks and controls, outsiders admitted subject to checks on their identity papers, and outsiders admitted only if they possess visas issued by the state which they wish to enter. Under these circumstances the airport has a virtual border, a controlled border and a wall-border. To this it should be added that the military defence function performed by territorial borders is now little more than symbolic, at least in the very numerous cases of non-wall borders. With modern aeronautical technology borders are violated by points, when cities or military targets are attacked from the air. The same may be said for the potential targets of terrorist attacks. Here too, around these important points the state erects walls of strategic defence which are designed to go into action when threats are perceived. It is thus clear that the reconceptualisation of the border in the post-modern state has relocated the border from the periphery of the state system to its centre, re-evoking the age of castles and walled cities.

The “positive face” of Borders and Walls. Peace in Fusion, Peace in Separation

The writings of Zigmunt Bauman often contain statements such as, “Future identities are to be found in borders . . . Borders are battlefields. But also creative workshops sprouting the seeds of future forms of humanity . . . Barriers

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and walls are laboratories where new societies are shaped, but walls are by definition climbable . . . In contemporary societies demarcations proliferate: the future depends on the dialogue that will be created along these borders”(*) (Bauman 2003:259; Bauman 2009; http://www.lavocedifiore.org/SPIP/article .php3?id_article=4154). Bauman’s conviction that future identities will grow from borders are an echo of Arnold Toynbee’s view (“The Geneses of Civilizations”,1955: tome 1, 75 & foll.) that civilisations arise in a context that presents challenges to human groups, in a context in which adversity, and the act of overcoming it, becomes a virtue for the beginning of a civilisation (Toynbee 1955:94 & foll.). Obervations such as these lead to the conclusion that the complexity of borders (and walls) make the area around a borderline the basis of relations between ethnic and social groups, of a unique culture and a body of identities which are perceived as distinct from those around them and those distant from the border. Such cross-border societies experience continual challenges deriving from the need for co-existence and for a basis of cooperation, despite their complexity. It is a need, however, which leads these societies to augment their other community identities with the identity of a border community (See Gasparini 2014b:184–191. See also Gubert 1972; Cohen 1985:39–70; Badie 1996:186; Zago 2000; Gasparini 2000b; Prokkola 2009:21–38). Before discussing the positive face of borders and walls, it has to be said in the light of the above that ignoring the positive dimension means subscribing to the opposite viewpoint on borders and walls, their lifespans and processes—that which considers them only as lines; this is the viewpoint of large systems such as a state, an organisation or a social system, a viewpoint which ignores the everyday life of the cross-border area. In current ­conditions, where borders are increasingly limited in the function of defending the nation and the state, this viewpoint is somewhat reductive. In this regard the idea of peace on the border 49 means the desire to find a way of living, to pursue the 49  This note is to explain the meanings of peace as the term is used here. The word peace is usually attributed with a negative dimension and a positive one. The negative concept of peace is the absence of war. The positive one entails the attempt to overcome the violence, conflict and competition of war and transform it (with empathy, non-violence and creativity) into cooperation (Cesa 1981, Galtung 1969 and 2000, Ragionieri 2008). In the case of borders and walls, a borderland is conducive to a positive peace of competition conducted under a set of rules. It is a line of peace able to prevent (or limit) war, violence (personal and structural alike, to use Galtung’s terms: 1969:253 and foll.) and conflicts of political origin. Even in the presence of walls, over time wars, violence and conflict tend to become less acute, coming under the regulation of treaties and shared norms working in favour of the peace of civil society. The positive peace prevalent in borderlands

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values that unite in everyday life, to cooperate. And this may spring from people in everyday life and from the encounters in it, rather than from a national ideology sustained by the sovereignty of the state and social system. Local considered here is an active peace for everyday life that: 1) is born of cooperation and faces problems positively, 2) resolves conflicts and competition, 3) is founded on what are referred to in note 7 as “intermediate values”, characterised by a shared willingness to negotiate (Raiffa 2002) in order to exploit anything good that may come from cooperation between national groups in cross-border areas rather than going it alone (see De Greef 1908:276). Such peace processes for the solution of border problems are easier to establish when there is a common “cultural vision of the world”, of the order in it and therefore of a concept of peace between the peoples of a divided border area, even though there are ethnic differences in the border area. If the area is marked by the presence (or the clash) of two or more cultural visions of the world and concepts of peace, cross-border cooperation takes longer and requires the adoption and/or invention of new and effective tools rooted in methods of overcoming violence and seeking a “new cultural vision of peace”. The literature, experience and research on these tools—tenaciously pursued and ­developed—make up a long-standing tradition: conflict resolution (Galtung (1969 and 2002), non-violence (Gandhi 2006; Dolci 1962; Bosc 1965; Capitini 1968; VV.AA 1969; Galtung 1969; Muller 1975; L’Abate 1990; Delli Zotti and Pocecco 1998), pacifist experiences (Cereghini 2000; other authors in Gasparini 2002c) and a wide range of experimental work (L’Abate 2001). Speaking of cultural visions of the world and related conceptions of peace, reference may be made to at least four forms of peace (Galtung 2000:9; Gasparini 2002c; Gasparini 2008a:39–42; Ragionieri 2008:188): the peace of tradition, the peace of modernity, the peace of good, the peace of goods. The peace of traditional society represents the ideal of stable equilibrium, where everything is predictable and “perfectly accepted”. The result is an inability to think of a world different from the one experienced and of social and interpersonal relations capable of producing results different from those predicted. The world is thus a “positive inevitability”—it is accepted, pursued and considered just (and legitimate). The peace of modernity in our line of reasoning based on extreme cases, is the product of a permanently unstable equilibrium. It is generated by a system of values and rules whereby each individual has a number of basic rights as well as some freedoms which have to be combined with the freedoms of others. The peace of modernity is g­ enerally much more common in liberal societies. The peace of goods is a way of understanding and experiencing peace in a context of high average incomes which allow the general daily use of consumer goods by the vast majority of the population. The peace of goods is thus a feeling experienced in modern countries. By contrast, the peace of good is the product of the dissemination and assertion in a country of a strong ideological conception of good, morals, Utopia and religion. Developing countries frequently provide examples of the widespread presence of the peace of good (Gasparini 2008a:39–41). In the light of this it is not difficult to see that the presence on either side of the border of a single conception of peace, of peace activated by daily life, is more easily based on cooperation than is the case in a situation with diverse conceptions of peace. It may thus be concluded that positive peace is not so much a fixed state as an active process for the achievement and/or maintenance of peace.

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cross-border areas develop forms of peace in fusion and/or peace in separation or differentiated integration, which means the desire on the part of both sides of the border area to cooperate for the complete fusion of everyday life and their institutional structures, or at least for the partial integration (differen­ tiated integration) of some sectors (transport, planning, services, etc.) of everyday life between the two cross-border areas (Gasparini 1994a). Cooperation, according to Richard Sennet, is “an art, or a skill, that requires an ability to understand and respond emotionally to others for the purpose of acting together”(*) (Sennet 2012:10), or to put it another way, it is “everyday diplomacy”(*) (Ibid. 2012:243 & foll.). Cooperation requires the will and cooperative mentality to solve new and complex everyday problems, as happens in border areas. Such cooperation should not be confused with solidarity, however, since, according to Sennet “the very desire for solidarity encourages domination and manipulation from above . . . The perverse power of solidarity in the form that sets ‘us’ against ‘them’ still pervades civil society and liberal democracies, as may be seen in the attitudes of Europeans towards immigrants from other ethnic groups, which are seen as a threat to social solidarity . . .”(*) (Ibid. 2012:305). It should also be borne in mind that when a border/wall is dominated by the line rather than a balance between line and area, inter-­ ethnic cooperation is replaced by “voluntary servitude” towards the state or by an ethnic group which is silent, or in the case of some of its members, in opposition to or even rebellion against the state centre. In border areas it is often the case that members of an ethnic minority adopt more strongly loyalist attitudes towards the state than do those belonging to the majority (see De la Boétie 1979; De Montaigne 2006; 343–360). The idea of peace based on the cooperation experienced on national borders, which has even been indicated as a model for co-existence in Europe, may be verified by research carried out on European borders. A case in point is the research conducted by the present writer, which dealt with a range of themes related to border towns and cross-border areas: the complexity of border towns; the values of border towns and how the former relate to belonging and cooperation; cooperation policies and the strategies and institutions that lend them greater weight; social classes and cooperation; walls and borders in relation to cooperation; etc. The complexity of European border towns, which is the root of their difference from non-border towns, is specifically indicated in the conditions set out in note 50.50 What is even more important, though, is to specify the 50  A large body of information has been collected and in part published by “ISIG Magazine” (Gasparini 1999–2000). Some of it is cited in notes 11 and 21. It may be added that the average distances between the cross-border towns from the own towns studied are:

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v­ alues underpinning identity and the sense of belonging to a border town, values which give rise to a feeling of cultural autochthony in a cross-border area. The same research (Gasparini 2014b:172–184) indicates51 that the originality attributed to the border town and cross-border area stems from the fact that they constitute a meeting point for diverse economies and cultures, among whose benefits is that inhabitants belonging to different ethnic groups are “compelled” to co-exist and create a culture of tolerance. These values are closely connected (standing as the second factor of importance in the relevent factor analysis), although it is also remembered (fourth value) that the architecture of many European border towns recalls the foreign dominations to which they have been subject through history (rxy = 0.49) (Ibid. 2014b:175). In other words, it has been found that the present culture of co-existence (which may be defined as active peace) comes partly from an awareness that the border’s history is marked by the unpleasant memory of foreign dominations of the local community. This autochthonous culture, which makes the border town and area original, is so deeply rooted that in the presence of the conditions for even a slight degree of openness it becomes cooperation (rxy = 0.69) (Ibid. 2014b:193, Table 9.1). This may be seen in the practical management of local spaces, the meeting of needs and the practical measures taken in order to achieve cooperation. Spaces of cooperation on the ground in present-day Europe first arose in border towns in the Rhineland, since collaboration was solidified there (though it also has a war-torn past) (see von Malchus 1973:179–198; Ferrara 1998; Caramelo 2007); after 1989 there was then an explosion of cooperation in towns along the old Iron Curtain; and after 2004 it started among the former communist countries in the EU and other neighbouring states (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the western Balkan countries). Behind these three areas of collaboration there have been as many walls: the ancient wall of the Rhine, the recent one of the Iron Curtain and the current wall between the EU and non-EU countries, around which, despite everything, forms of cooperation arise.

the n ­ earest (town A) 35 km; the middle (town B) 52 km; the farthest (town C) 61 km. Public offices in 76.9% of border towns admit the use of two or more languages, while in the remaining 23.1% of towns only the national language is recognised. 51  Of the thirteen values considered, three indicate the originality of the border town and the borderland of which it is a part. All of them are in the second factor of the relevant Factor Analysis, which is labelled “The contents of the originality experienced in border towns”.

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Part of this sequence of collaboration in space and time is the meeting of needs involved in cooperation. These needs are: people’s participation in the cooperation between cross-border civil societies; transparency in the actions of cross-border organisations which may be subject to different rules in their respective states; a strategy to place in central European spaces cross-border areas which are generally peripheral in their respective states (Leontidou 2001b; Gasparini 2008b:53–56; Gasparini 2012). Over time, the practical ways of achieving cross-border cooperation and the meeting of needs have taken the form of relations between components (people and private organisations) of the two civil societies, between the institutions of the societies and finally the creation of new institutions common to the two cross-border parties, which in Europe have coalesced into Euroregions and in operational terms EGTCs (European Groups of Territorial Cooperation). In the Rhineland and in the Franco-Spanish and Spanish-Portuguese border areas there has clearly been cooperation between the respective sets of civil societies and public institutions, which led naturally to the creation of Euroregions and EGTCs (Levrat 2007; Schaffer, Ringler and Mühleck 2008) to support grass-roots cooperation. In two other cross-border areas, the product of hard borders such as the old Iron Curtain and the new “curtain” between the EU and countries outside it, the desire for informal collaboration between civil societies has been met by the creation of Euroregions. The first Euroregion, dubbed “Euregio”, was set up by Germany and Holland in 1958. Others followed in the cross-border areas of Benelux, France, Germany and Switzerland, and after 1989 they began to proliferate in central and eastern Europe. There is a wide body of literature on the creation of Euroregions: Von Malchus 1973; Ferrara 1998; Ferrara and Pasi 2000; Gasparini 2003b; Strassoldo 2005; Zhurzhenko 2004; many other papers have been produced in EU research institutes and institutions.52

52  These institutions include the Council of Europe, founded in 1949 and based in Strasbourg, for which an essential pillar in terms of cross-border cooperation was the drafting, adoption and ratification of the Madrid Convention (1980); ISIG (Istituto di Sociologia Internazionale di Gorizia), founded in Gorizia in 1968, which carries out research into cross-border cooperation; the AEBR (Association of European Border Regions), founded in 1971 and based in the German town of Gronau, which promotes cross-border cooperation and the formation of Euroregions; the COR (Committee of Regions), founded in 1994 and based in Brussels, which acts as the EU body for cross-border policy and the formation of EGTCs; the MOT (Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière), an association founded in 1997 by the French government, which in 2006 published a handbook entitled “Guide pratique de la cooperation transfrontalière”.

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A Euroregion is an institution set up by two or more states to support cross-border cooperation, and as such is a framework for meeting the needs for participation, transparency and strategies mentioned above. The present writer53 has adumbrated a model of Euroregions based on three types, which are autonomous but interconnected, to meet each of the three needs. Of these models, the cross-border Euroregion is the narrowest, comprising only the municipalities directly adjacent to the border, meeting the need for participation in cooperation. Broader in scope is the functional network Euroregion, which comprises institutions (universities, large companies and regional, provincial and urban institutions) in the two border areas and meets the need for transparency in norms, their interpretation and consequent behaviour. The broadest of the three is the macro-infrastructure Euroregion, which comprises several cross-border regions and functions to strengthen their centrality; it is thus able to meet the need for strategic policy-making in the cross-border area regarding matters such as motorways, ports and airports. Each of these types of Euroregion requires a specific organisation—they are considered separately to avoid the creation of bloated institutions which would be difficult to assemble and make work, for the reasons indicated in the note. It may be concluded from the above considerations that cooperation is the result of a series of values, actions, needs, strategies, organisational plans and starting conditions (varying according to such factors as economic and social development, ethnic integration and historical background), but also of local policies and support from the state centre; the pace of cooperation also varies greatly. It is therefore a form of active peace in constant movement, showing among other things that even within cooperation processes borders considered to be junctions can in practice turn out to be barriers if they fail to produce collaboration. The calculation of a cooperation index (comparative and quantitative, from 0 to 100) from a SWOT analysis,54 applied to European cross53  On the theoretical dimension see Gasparini 2012:17–32; on a Euroregional application see Gasparini 2000b:179–260. On cooperation between cross-boder entrepreneurs see Langer 2000:11–18. On relations between social elites and Euroregions see Gasparini 2008b:167–214. 54  The algorithm of the Cooperation Index is as follows (Gasparini 2011b:32): Cooperation percentage index = [(S + W + O + T): 53] × [(S + O): (S + W + O + T)] × 100 Where S = Strengths W = Weaknesses O = Opportunities T = Threats (which are the components of the SWOT variables) 53 = total number of indicators used to detect the SWOT variables

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border areas between the Russian-Norwegian and Bulgarian-Turkish borders, has found that three border areas are still walls—the states in question are centralised and on either side of the borders the conditions necessary for cooperation are absent. The areas in question are on the borders between Estonia and Russia (score: 3.75), Belarus and Lithuania (score: 3.76), Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (score: 3.78) (Gasparini 2011b:37). At the opposite end of the scale the highest cooperation indices were found in the border areas between Estonia and Finland (score: 51.01), Hungary and Romania (score: 50.90) and Hungary and Slovenia (score: 47.20). As observed above, cross-border cooperation indicates a prevalence of a borderland over a borderline, and this may be said to create a “border for the people”, as found by Lena Laube and Christof Roos (2010:31–49). An attempt may be made to answer the following question: can this type of peace be achieved when states are separated by a wall, when the borderline between two states or regional macro-areas (such as the EU and non-EU countries) is favoured at the expense of the borderland? In such cases the borderland, in terms of cross-border cultural continuity, is destroyed by expulsions or population transfers,55 or cooperation in the area is strongly discouraged or prevented by the construction of artificial barriers: emphasis on the state centre, the creation of future myths (various types of New Man), the rewriting of history, the rewriting of laws and rules, the introduction of economic and political differences between the two states, an obsessive insistence on defence against the enemy beyond the border—the list may go on. Hence the wall. How can some sort of peace be created under these conditions? Such a peace has to be understood (see the meanings of peace in note 49) as a refusal to forget the values of regional co-existence experienced in the past, or as a willingness, after a period of time, 1) not to consider the other (beyond the border) as the source of all ills, the absolute enemy; 2) not to continue waiting for the promised New Man, who will never appear; 3) not to consider the other as a non-person, or as sub-human. If these conditions can be achieved, the wall In other words the Cooperation index is equal to: [(all SWOT variables): 53 indicators] × [(positive SWOT variables (S and O): (all SWOT variables)] × 100. 55  This is a well-used technique in border areas: Turks living in Greece to Turkey and Greeks living in Turkey to Greece; Italians in Yugoslavia forced out of Istria and Dalmatia; Germans forced to leave areas of Poland and Czechoslovakia after the Second World War. It has also been employed in other areas: Stalin used it on entire populations considered unreliable, transporting them to Siberia; Hitler “gave” the Italian region of Friuli as a homeland to the Cossacks who had followed him to Italy; Italians were expelled from Libya when Gheddafi came to power.

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is considered as an evil coming from the centre of the state;56 there is a revaluation of the local experience and the values directly experienced in everyday life with people who have the same needs, requirements, will to live and desire to plan their own lives. It is then that people realise that the wall is a “fantasy of walled democracy” (Brown) and that some sort of peace has to be reinvented in spite of it (see also Quétel 2013:245–252). And the starting point is again cooperation, but adapted to the wall in the expectation that it will collapse, or become a symbol or a tourist attraction. The question therefore becomes one of how long the wall will last—a short time rather than a long one. An example given above is the Roman limes, which gradually became a settlement and then a common village with its everyday life—soldiers, craftsmen, traders and their houses, shops, taverns and temples. The same pattern may be observed along walls that divide a town into two (twin towns), or where a town is founded on one side of a wall on whose other side a town already exists. One such case is Gorizia, an old Italian town on the Iron Curtain between Italy and Yugoslavia. Beside it on the other side of the wall, in 1947 a town was founded named Nova Gorica, an alternative in (socialist) mythology to the “capitalist” Gorizia. The towns symbolised Slovenian and Italian identity respectively, together with a sort of desire on the part of the former to avenge past dicrimination at the hands of the latter. Only three years had elapsed (August 1950) before the people of Nova Gorica decided they had had enough of the wall, burst their way through it and cleared out the shops in Gorizia (especially buying all the brooms they could find—the episode became known as Broom Sunday). Another example, different from others but equal in terms of the softening of a wall, is to be found in Narva and Ivangorod (Lundén 2000; Lundén 2001a; Roll and Susi 2002; Brednikova and Voronkov 1999). Narva in Estonia and Ivangorod in Russia are separated by the Narva river and by the border between the two countries that runs along it, but they remain complementary in the functions inherited from the Soviet Union. Narva was (and is) home to the local industrial complex and Ivangorod was (and is) the place of residence for the people working in the factories in Narva. The majority of the population in both towns is Russian, or at least Russian-speaking, so there is a marked tendency to strengthen their common identity through joint cultural and sporting initiatives. After an initial phase (1991) in which a wall was erected on the river 56  In many states the capital is popularly perceived as the centre of corruption—in Italy the saying is “Roma ladrona” (crooked Rome). This is borne out by research on 14 majority and minority ethnic groups in Europe.

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between the two towns, in practical terms it has been a junction border and in some functions has acted almost as a virtual border (at least for the towns’ residents). If anything, the wall function has shifted beyond the towns towards the rest of Estonia and Russia. Now Nicosia, divided between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot Republics since 1974, is showing signs of overcoming the barrier of the wall. Greeks have not forgotten the homes they were forced to abandon on what is now the Turkish side, and vice-versa, and there is an increasing sense of a common culture and a common city (Hadjipavlou 2002b:1–11; Hadjipavlou in this volume). Another example of a wall (and walls) which has lost its original function is to be found in Belfast, where the many walls served to defend the ethnicreligious-political groups (Catholics and Protestants) from reciprocal attacks. Now shared, the same walls have become symbols to be conserved in the name of a shared identity—they are known as Peace Walls (Wilson and Gallagher 2002:1–10; Donnan and Jarman in this volume). Such a conversion of the function of walls recalls what happened in European (particularly Italian) cities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries with the demolition of city walls and their replacement with broad thoroughfares (ring roads) which now encircle and touch on the city centres. Other cases of towns being joined on the occasion of the symbolic demolition of walls were brought about by the intense cooperation (and orientation towards fusion) between cross-border towns which followed the collapse of the communist regime in Poland in 1991. Collaboration between GermanPolish border towns united until the end of the Second World War has resulted in the twinning of Görlitz (Germany) and Zgorzelec (Poland), Bad Muskau (Germany) and Ceknica (Poland), Guben (Germany) and Gubin (Poland), Frankfurt am Oder (Germany) and Slubice (Poland), Kustriner Vorland (Germany) and Kostrzyn nad Odra (Poland) (Schultz 2009:157–166). The walls between these towns were a product of recent history. Before the Second World War they were single towns with peripheral districts which were then separated by a new border reinforced by marked hostility (and the militarisation of the Oder and Neisse rivers) between the side still in (East) Germany and the German side which had become Polish and had new Polish ­inhabitants—the Germans there had been forced to leave, or emigrate to, Germany. Yet after 1990 these walls were overcome by the desire of the local authorities on both sides to cooperate, partly for the sake of local tradition and partly to obtain European Union funding for building infrastructure, economic development and a better quality of life. The result was enthusiastic direct cooperation and participation in cross-border Euroregions and EGTCs.

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Such were the conditions for the demolition of 50-year old walls and fusion between several twin towns.57 A similar experience has been registered in the towns of Komarno (Slovakia) and Komaron (Hungary), a single unit until the end of the First World War (see Krajczar and Pasztor 1995:4–5). In contrast to these examples of the recovery of original unity through the active peace of cooperation are new cases of walls dividing towns which were originally united. In 1999 Mitrovica, a mining town in northern Kosovo, was caught up in the consignment of Kosovo to the Albanians by the United States and its allies. The losers of the contest, the Serbs, responded by building a wall between themselves and the Albanians in the town. The dividing wall is the Iber river, and no time was lost in reinforcing its role. Equally prompt, however, were initiatives designed to do away with the wall, by means of joint media campaigns and cultural events involving the two communities sponsored by national and international NGOs (Hysa 2002:1–12; Janjic 2002:1–20). These actions were designed to erode the wall between the two communities so as to restore the unity of the town.58 Some years before that, in nearby Herzegovina there was the fusion of Mostar, which the war in Bosnia had split between the local Croat and Bosnian muslim (Bosniak) communities in the 1990s (see Pocecco and Tarlao 2007; Colafato 1999). Since then the two communities have decided to dismantle the wall and re-unite the town, with the provision that the offices of mayor and deputy mayor must be held by a representative of each community one year, with a reversal of the roles the following year. One of the many peace plans put forward for Jerusalem involves a similar scheme of alternating the tenure of municipal posts between the biggest ethnic and religious groups (Fellah 2011:212–220). It therefore seems that the peace of fusion is able to erode the hardness of walls, turning them into a positive shared value or simply a historical residue. If the implications have no great political import and do not intrude on international relations, it may happen in just a few years. This is exemplified by the walls in Berlin and Vienna. The former had a marked political and international standing, bound up in the existence of a state, East Germany, and the 57  See the project known as Slubfurt—Slub(ice)-(Frank)furt. It is the name given to a virtual borderless town, unique for its fusion, where municipal elections were held in June 2014 (in “Voxeurop”: August 26th 2014, Italian edition). 58  In 1998 Mitrovica was estimated to have a population of 132,000: 103,884 Albanians, 15,397 Serbs and Montenegrins, 12,719 Muslims, Turks, Gypsies and other smaller groups. Figures from the 1971 census put the population of Mitrovica at 81,452: 52,285 Albanians, 23,121 Serbs and Montegrins and 6,108 other groups (see Hysa 2002:4).

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position of a superpower, the Soviet Union. The latter was an idea of the victors of the Second World War but was quickly forgotten because it was of no interest to anyone, not even the Soviet Union. An alternative to the end of a wall is the situation in which it performs a political role involving state sovereignty and is therefore considered an indispensable line of defence, while the everyday life of, and relations between, the civil societies on either side of it are carried out in a situation of a junction or virtual wall, as if local and state controls did not exist. There are examples which explain the extreme case of compatibility between a wall and a border tending to become virtual. The first is the achievement of peace between the Vatican State and the Kingdom, and subsequently the Republic, of Italy. The formation of a wall (physical, but also of state sovereignty) enabled hostilities to end between the new Vatican State and the recently-formed Kingdom of Italy. In the presentday Rome of two states, while there is a wall of political sovereignty which divides the states there is at the same time a single and global Rome for the functions of civil societies and international agreements (security, police, currency and so on). Another case of what may be called peace of separation is in the new Balkan states, where there is great emphasis on the role of border-walls in ensuring national homogeneity, but associated with it is the function of peace in everyday life and civil societies, which is encouraged by governments in domestic policy and international relations. This state of affairs is particularly marked in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where there is still the syndrome of a wall separating Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks but fairly intense relations between the three ethnic areas, whose capitals are Banja Luka, Mostar and Sarajevo. It is a peace in an unstable equilibrium between the borders of everyday relations, where they sometimes become virtual, and the ethnic-national walls, which are held to have hardened to the extent of turning from internal walls (within Bosnia-Herzegovina) to external walls between entities which may themselves become new Balkan states (see Brown 2013; Gasparini 1994b). A more ethnic-political case is constituted by the many walls between the Catholic and Protestant communities in Belfast. These walls, described in a number of studies and in the chapter in this volume by Hastings Donnan and Neil Jarman, were built to defend the two communities from each other. Now their defensive function is beginning to diminish but the consensus in the two communities is that they should be kept as a symbol of their identity, and even as part of the city’s architectural heritage. It may also be postulated that walls contribute to peace. In many cases they are so rigid and unacceptable that they produce a rejection, which gives rise

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to social processes which render them volatile and ultimately pointless. The use of walls to defend rich populations is ineffective because organised crime can get round them no matter how rigid they are, as do immigrants who are sufficiently determined to do so in order to find a better life (or one they consider better) or one free from the violence experienced in their home countries. But immigrants are not the only people who want to breach the wall. Public opinion in countries inside it are divided by two cultures, which are in fact two faces of the same culture. Rich countries have created and absorbed a deep-seated culture of human rights and the conviction that all people are endowed with them, regardless of colour, ethnic group, culture, religion or origin. It is true that some people in these countries demand the creation of a wall to defend them from what they see as competitors for jobs, religious fundamentalists, thieves, rapists, the great unwashed, and so on. Nevertheless, these same people are aware that the result is a backward slide into the irrationality of closure, which runs counter to the culture and values of openness towards others and towards European culture. On Europe’s southern border the wall is breached by the desperation of immigrants who will run any risk, including death,59 to get a better life for themselves and their children. In the last thirty years this wall has proved to be Europe’s most rigid in time and space. The first wall was in the east, to keep out people coming not only from communist central Europe but from Afghanistan and Pakistan60 into Europe through Italy and Austria—from the 1980s to 2001. Then it moved south to the coast of Puglia to deal with immigrants from Albania, Greece and Turkey (in transit). The next move (1990s to 2000) was to the Spanish-Moroccan border with the construction of fences round the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. And since 2000 the wall has been the Mediterranean Sea, which is difficult to defend because the public consensus is that boats full of men, women and children cannot be sunk. Indeed the predominant Italian policy has been to assist and accept all the people who have crossed the Mediterranean to escape their countries—currently Syria, Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea as well as Libya, which is bearing an increasing resemblance to a failed state. 59  This is the very high price to pay that Weber and Pickering (2014) have quantified in tens of thousands of deaths occurred along these global borders. 60  They left for Sarajevo, without visas because they were not required for Muslims. From there they went by bus to Nova Gorica, where after destroying their identity papers they crossed the border illegally into Italy, for the most part entering Gorizia. Thence most of them tried to make their way to France, Britain or Germany. Before crossing the French border they would gather at Sanremo (see De Bortoli 2001:5).

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It may be observed from the above that the wall between Europe and some of the countries outside it also becomes volatile and pointless. It is volatile because it is so extreme that the people inside it end up rejecting it and want it taken down (metaphorically, in the case of the Mediterranean), and over time it also becomes politically unacceptable. And it is pointless because sooner or later immigrants get through it. The Iron Curtain was a hard wall in the 1940s and ’50s, after which in some ways it began to resemble a junction border, at least for the migrants who passed through it. The new walls are not founded on a clear division between rich and poor countries, since new migrants very often have relatives already living and working in Europe. So the wall is still there, but it is increasingly failing in its objective of ­preventing the entry of new migrants. Entry regulations are enforced with progressively less rigour by the police and other state agencies, and new forms of integration are found between immigrants and indigenous populations. The form of peace, based on collaboration in border areas and the whole of Europe, already discussed above in terms of cooperation, thus takes hold and spreads. In this case cooperation is not based on a peace aimed at re-uniting indigenous people residing in the areas on either side of a border. It is a form of cooperation requiring more time because it juxtaposes conceptions of peace and world views, defined according to the polysemy of peace (see note 49), which differ greatly, entailing long-term contact and dialogue in the sometimes arduous task of building a new peace. The breach of the new walls (in Central and South America and between Mexico and the US as well as in Europe) throws up new processes, new equilibriums and new forms of cooperation to build on the “smoking ruins” of progressively vanishing walls.

PART 2 Macro Walls and Macro Networks

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Chapter 2

Why Empires Build Walls: The New Iron Curtain Around the European Union1 Max Haller

Introduction

The European Union praises itself for being a prosperous, well-integrated, democratic and peaceful political community, providing free mobility to its half a billion citizens within its large territory and respecting human rights. Yet, at the outern frontiers of the EU, a new Iron Curtain has been erected which shows up openly in the Spanish enclaves in Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco and which works efficiently also in the Mediterranean. Basic human rights are often violated at these frontiers. About 10.000 emigrants from Africa and other poor regions of the global South have left their lives in the Mediterranean while trying to debark on the coast of a South European country and enter into the EU, the “land of promise”—not the least because assistance was refused to them while in distress at sea. The question is: How can we explain this split between the proclaimed self-ideal and the actual behavior of the EU and its member states? The thesis proposed in this paper is that we can answer this question better if we look at these phenomena from a comparative perspective, the view point of historical sociology. We will consider the EU as a kind of new empire which—like its historical predecessors—wants to provide for its security by establishing an outside wall. In the paper, I will first discuss the question why historical empires have built their walls and what the functions of these walls were. Then, I will discuss two recent or present-day walls, the Iron Curtain between East and West Europe, and the walls built by the state Israel. A short excursus follows about the surprising fact that the most stable borders in Europe were those around small states. In the fourth section, I will show the forms and functions of the new, invisible wall, the “Iron Curtain” 1  Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the ISIG Summer School 2009: Il muro di Berlino e gli altri muri, Gorizia, September 8, 2009, at the Conference of the Austrian Sociological Association, Graz, September 25, 2009, and at the Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), São Paolo, Brazil, April 27, 2011. Thanks for very useful suggestions are given to Monika Eigmüller (Leipzig).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004272859_004

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which was erected around the EU and around the whole globe between the rich North and the poor South. The paper concludes with some considerations about possibilities to make the borders between the South and the North commensurate with standards of universal human rights; I will also argue that the factual of the patterns of migration and their change as well as interests of the EU itself could make the wall obsolete. This paper is written in the framework of historical sociology and wants to make a contribution to the sociology of borders. The basic assumption of historical sociology is that there exists no sharp line of demarcation between the disciplines of history and sociology. Rather, both can profit from borrowing concepts and theories, and methods and empirical findings from each other, even if sociology may be stronger in the two first, history in the two latter aspects. Charles Tilly (2001) has distinguished four approaches within historical sociology; two of them, historical social criticism and pattern identification, inform this paper. Historical social criticism assumes “that history contains a record of human successes and failures in dealing with problems persising into the present; that if long-term causes exist, their causes are likely to continue; and that recent history limits what will happen next.” (Tilly 2001:6753) Efforts to build seemingly impermeable boundaries around political communities constitute a pattern which existed in ancient kingdoms and empires as well as in presentday nation states and empires. Their aims, functions and consequences were often surprisingly similar, as will be shown in this paper. The other area of social research with which this paper ties in, is the new sociology of territory and of borders which investigates how different kinds of border come into being and what their functions are (see Strassoldo 1987, 2000; Donnan & Wilson 2001; Eigmüller & Vobruba 2006; Boeckler 2007; Eigmüller 2007:13–45). The basic premise of the sociology of borders is that territoriality will “not evaporate as an organizing principle for social life. Territory means bounded and marked social space. It works as a resource control stratetgy, proscribing and prescribing specific activities within spatial boundaries. Space, boundaries, boundary control and boundary transgression are the key words of the territorial approach.” (Immerfall 1998:7) As far as the empirical basis of this paper is concerned, I do not pretend to present anything new, unknown to historians. The basic informations presented are available in standard encyclopedia and lexicons.2 What is new is the comparative approach with the intent to deduce some explanations from it for the understanding of present-day walls.

2  See, for instance, Encyclopedia Britannica, Meyer’s Enzyklopädisches Lexikon, Wikipedia etc. As long as data from these sources are concerned, I do not quote the concrete volumes and pages.

Why Empires Build Walls



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Historical Empires and Their Walls

Let us begin with a short discussion of two very famous, important and wellknown historical walls: the Great Wall of China and the Roman Limes. First, we look at their forms and functions and then we draw some lessons out of them. The Great Wall of China The Great Wall of China is one of the oldest and largest human buildings on earth, comparable, for instance, to the Egyptian pyramids. The wall was not a single large edifice, but a series of fortifications erected with different materials (tamped earch, wood, brick, stone etc.) and in different forms; it was built and re-built, and enlarged and relocated in its course over two millenia (from the the 8th century BC till the 17th century AD). It ranged from the northeastern to the northwestern frontiers of China over a distance of maybe 9000 kilometers; its concrete position and course, however, changed significantly over the centuries, following the expansion of the Chinese empire. The last period of its building was during the Ming Dynasty in the 14th century when China was threatened by Manchurian and Mongolian tribes from inner Asia. The main course of the wall was an arc following the southern edge of Mongolia. In many sections, the wall was interrrupted by signal and watch towers; using fires and other signals, soldiers on the towers informed those on other towers and in the centre about incoming enemies. Today, many parts of the wall have disappeared totally; others are in a bad situation and dilapidated. The surviving parts have been restored continuously and constitute one of the world’s main tourist attractions (Luo, Dai and Wilson 1990). The precondition for the building of the wall was the political integration and centralization, and the military strengthening and expansion of the Chinese Empire. Its principal task was the protection of the fertile, densely populated and rich areas of China from invasions of warlike and aggressive northern nomadic groups and tribes. In addition, subsidiary measures were taken by Chinese emperors to protect the northern frontier: The creation of dependent states, the seeding of discord and conflict among the peoples outside the wall, and the undertaking of military campaigns into foreign territory. The wall itself did not constitute a sharp demarcation of Chinese from non-Chinese territories. In spite of the existence of the wall, a variety of exchanges—economic, social and cultural—were going on between China and its neighbour lands and peoples in the North. The Roman Limes The wall which was built by the Romans to protect their northern, eastern and southern frontiers is well comparable to the Chinese wall in its scope and

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extension. It was stretching around the whole empire, from the north-western to the south-eastern edges of Europe, that is, from present-day Britain through Germany till the Black Sea, from there to the Red Sea, and back to the West in North Africa till the Atlantic sea (Klee 2006; Graichen 2009). Even more than the Chinese wall, the Roman wall was no single structure but consisted of many different parts, built in varying forms and in different periods. In Britain, it consisted of two walls (the Antonine wall in Scotland and the Hadrian wall in northern England). The Limes Germanicus is the most well-known part of the whole wall; it ranged about 550 kilometers from the river Rhine in northwest Germany to the river Danube in the south-east. In North Africa where the wall protected Lybia from the southern parts of the Sahara desert it was much less fortified. Also the Roman Limes was interrupted by regular watching towers and castles. It was built in regions where no natural barriers did exist; in Germany and Central East Europe, the rivers Rhine and Danube constituted such barriers and the Limes Germanicus was erected to protect the open frontier of the Roman Empire lying between the two rivers. Also along the Rhine and the Danube, fortifications and streets were built which served—together with the rivers—as channels of traffic, transport and communication. Also the Limes did not constitute an absolute frontier, particularly from the side of the Romans. For these, unlimited passage and travel into the foreign territories was possible, but entry into the Roman Empire for members of the Germanic tribes was allowed only in a limited way, for instance, at market days, within a restricted geographical area and without weapons. For the peoples living outside the Limes, it had also the symbolic function of demonstrating the power of the empire. At the Limes, Roman law, administration and culture ended, but not its influence and power. Also peoples outside the Limes were considered as being sub-ordinated to Rome; the castles and military camps along the Limes also served as bases for military campaigns into the foreign territories. Some Lessons from the Ancient Walls These two historical walls exhibit some conspicuous characteristics which are quite relevant for the analysis and understanding of the forms and functions of present-day walls. Four particular facts may be mentioned: 1) The walls were built along border regions where no natural barriers (high mountains, deserts, seas, rivers) did exist. The main reason why they were built was obvious: Given the immense extension of these empires, it was impossible to garrison strong military forces all along the frontiers. So, the

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walls served as a kind of an early warning system against invading foreign tribes and armed forces. 2) The walls were not impenetrable, but the penetrability was one-sided: For peoples from within the empire, they constituted no barrier to enter the foreign territories; for the peoples from outside, they were open only in a limited way and under a series of restrictions. 3) There were two preconditions and reasons for the building of the walls. One was the establishment, centralization and consolidation of the empire. As long as the empire was expanding, the frontiers were not fixed. However, at the time when the empire had become too large and the internal resources for carrying out continuous and expansive warfare had been exhausted, the outer frontiers of the empire had to be fixed. 4) The other reason was a clear gap in living standards, wealth and civilization between the territory of the empire and the external territories and countries. This gap come into being because the empire from the beginning was more highly developed in economic, technological and organizational terms so that it was able to subdue all neighbor peoples. Later on, the gap increased because within the empire wealthy town centers and regions did develop. This prosperity induced peoples of foreign regions, both as individuals and as more or less organized groups, to intrude into the territory of the empire. Such ­conflicts and fights between highly developed, wealthy kingdoms with prosperous town centres and less civilized but aggressive tribes from neighbouring territories have been a characteristic occurence throughout human history. They could be observed again and again particularly in North Africa where they were analysed as early as in the fourteenth century by the Arabic historian and sociologist Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406; see Simon 2002). The PolishAustrian sociologist Ludwig Gumplowicz (1838–1909) tied in with Khaldun’s theory in his work on the eternal fights between ethnic groups (Gumplowicz 2007 [1883]; see also Mozetic 1985).

Contemporary Societies With and Without Walls

In the twentieth century, one wall—the Iron Courtain between East and West Europe—has become most famous and one country—Israel—has been most prolific in building walls. In some regards, these walls had quite different intentions than those of ancient times; in others, however, they are well comparable to them. Their consideration provides us with some additional insights into the motivations and forces leading to the establishment of walls.

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The Iron Curtain between East and West Europe Between 1945 and 1991, a nearly impenetrable border fortification, the Iron Curtain, separated West Europe from communist Central and East Europe. This was a border stretching nearly 7000 kilometres from the Barents sea north of Scandinavia (separating Finland from Russia), through Germany and along the western borders of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, down to the border between Bulgaria and Greece in South-East Europe. The concept of the Iron Curtain was first used by the writers W. Rossanow and E. Snoxden to characterize the isolation of the young Soviet Union. In the 1940s, it was used in political speeches of the Nazi minister J. Goebbels and of the British Prime Minister W. Churchill. The most conspicuous course of the Iron Curtain was running through Germany, and in particular through the capital city of Berlin, dividing both the country as a whole and this city into two parts. The wall was a very strong and in the end nearly insurmountable border fortification. Over the plain land, it consisted of double fences and walls made of steel mesh with sharp edges, supplemented by numerous watch towers along the border; streets were connecting them and minefields existed before the fences. In the city of Berlin, it consisted of a high wall made with solid bricks and stones; houses and shops along its course were closed and windows locked with masonry. However, in spite of its daunting structure, thousands of refugees from East Germany tried to get over the wall and several hundreds lost their lives in these attempts because the soldiers of the German Democratic Republic got the command to fire a gun on the refugees if they did not stop after having been warned. The reason for the establishment of this wall was very different from that of the ancient walls. Its function was not to protect the territory of the empire from foreign intruders, but, conversely, to prevent mass emigration and flights from this territory to the outside world. The general political background for its building was the new world-politicial situation after Second World War when a deep division emerged between capitalist, democratic Western Europe, allied with the United States in the NATO, and state-socialist communist Eastern Europe integrated by an economic and political-military alliance (COMECON and Warsaw pact) under the leadership of the Soviet Union. In fact, from 1950 on a strong wave of emigration took place from East to West Germany involving particularly young and well educated people. The city of Berlin was a loop hole through which thousands of citizens of the German Democratic Republic escaped to the West which was attractive both because of its political freedom and its more dynamic economic growth which led to an increasing gulf in standards of living between East and West.

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The political challenge to the existence of this Iron Curtain began in Poland when workers established the independent Union Solidarnosc whose actions during the 1980s more and more undermined the legitimacy of the system. In the late 1980s, regime critical people movements emerged also in other East Central European countries, including the German Democratic Republic. They were encouraged by the change of the political climate in the Soviet Union where the new General Secretary of the Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbacev, since the mid 1980s had initiated far-reaching political reforms (Glasnost and Perestroika) which finally led to the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The opening of the Iron Curtain was celebrated in a ceremony of the foreign ministers Mock and Horn on June 27, 1989 at the border of Austria and Hungary. The most spectacular moving event, followed up world-wide through television, was the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. However, such a kind of wall between communist and non-communist countries of the world does still exist today. It is a 248 km long wall between North and South Korea along the 38th degree of latitude. The control of this border is supported by heavily armed military units and high-tech control systems. The reason for the existence of this wall is the same as that in the case of the Iron Curtain between East and West Europe: It is the power holding of an authoritarian regime which deprives its citizens of economic and political freedom and thus inhibits socio-economic development. The wall has the function to prevent a mass emigration from this country, particularly because South Korea has been developing in an impressive way in the last decades. The situation between the two Koreas, thus, is very similar to that between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic between 1953 and 1989. In addition, the tensions between South and North Korea play a role here. These two countries which fought a bloody war against each other in 1950 (with a toll of death and injured people of 1.5 million soldiers and 2 million civilians), and today there still exists only a cease-fire but no peace accord. In North Korea one of the last totalitarian regimes is in power.

A Contrary Case: Century-Old Stable Borders Around Small States in Europe Geographers have drawn maps about the course and persistence of political borders in Europe which are highly interesting also from the viewpoint of historical sociology. These maps point to some cases which are just the opposite of the empires discussed so far which saw it necessary to protect their territory by walls. There are a few small European states which were able to preserve

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their political independence and autonomy and also their borderlines without being a part of or protected by a mighty larger empire (Heller 2001). Figure 2.1 shows the map of the historical borders in Europe; the temporal duration of a border is indicated by the thickness of the lines. Four borderlines stand out as the oldest—persisting in the same form at least four centuries or longer: The border around the three countries Portugal, Switzerland and the Netherlands and the border separating Spain from France. While the last is a “natural border” running along the Pyrenees, the other three are artificial ones and are encircling small states. All these states have been political neutral in the Second World War, and the last two of them have tried to remain outside of international conflicts and wars long time before as well. Uber 400 Jahre 300‒400 Jahre 200‒300 Jahre 0

100‒200 Jahre 50‒100 Jahre unter 50 Jahre

400 km

FIGURE 2.1 The duration of the existence of state borders in Europe. (Note: The duration of the existence of the same state borders is indicated by the size of the lines, going from more than 400 years to less than 50 years). Source: Heller 2001.

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The most famous case is Switzerland which refrained from participating in international military conflicts since 1515, while in some earlier periods it was a rather bellicose nation. It is a general characteristic of small states that they do no initiate wars; therefore, they constitute no threat to neighbouring nations (Kohr 1983). In political terms, Switzerland and the Netherlands were also among the first countries in Europe which gave themselves a democratic constitution. Democracies, however, are more secure in political and in military terms because they are less militant and martial and, therefore, in less danger to be attacked by other countries (Kant 1795; Rauch 2005). Switzerland and the Netherlands are also distinct from most other European countries in economic terms. They were always very open to exchanges with neighouring countries. Switzerland, for instance, is no member of the European Union but in fact has more close and intensive economic relations with the EU than some other member states of the EU itself (Haller 2008:117). The Netherlands was one of the strongest proponents of the establishment of the European Economic Community in the 1950s; already before that it had established a common market with Belgium and Luxembourg. Economic openness toward the outside world is a necessity for small countries which cannot produce most goods by themselves (Katzenstein 1985). In addition, economic openness is also a condition very favourable for economic growth and wealth accumulation. Finally, small states also have not the need to finance huge armies which is an increasing burden for empires and contributes to their final decline and collapse (Kennedy 1987). Today, Switzerland and the Netherlands are among the richest nations in Europe. It is also no accident that Portugal is less developed in economic terms. Portugal was a colonial power till the 1970s and this status formally ended only in 1999, when the province of Macao was handed over to China. While extracting huge wealth from its large oversea colonies, particularly from Brazil, till the early 19th century, later on the colonial empire become more a burden than a benefit for Portugal’s economy since large numbers of soldiers had to be supported in colonies such as Angola. In political terms, the late abolishment of slavery in the colonies in 1869, as well as the long period of authoritarian rule under Salazar in the 20th century (1932–1968), may have contributed to social and economic stagnation of this country which today is one of the poorest within the European Union. Sociological Lessons from Contemporary Boundaries We can draw four lessons from this short characterization of different forms of boundary control around the world today.

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1) The character of a political system reflects itself in the kind of borders it draws around its territory. Only authoritarian regimes or political communities co-existing with a high level of distrust with its neighbour states need walls with the aim to control or inhibit movement over the border in one or the other direction. Such a wall is a clear indication that the freedom of the citizens is restricted. The authoritarian character of the Soviet-type Communist systems was out of question even if many features of its politics were supportive for economic growth and equality (see Lane 1996; Applebaum 2012). 2) No wall is impenetrable. People who want to leave an authoritarian country usually have a bundle of reasons for doing so—social, economic, cultural and political—and they will invent manifold means and take over incredible risks and sufferings to attain their goal. From the sociological point of view, it seems erroneous to make a normative-evaluative distinction between “economic”, e.g., egoistic, and “political”, e.g., idealistic refugees. Most of the irregular migrants are young men looking for better opportunities which they expect to find not only in rich and prosperous countries, but also in free, democratic countries free of clientelism and corruption. 3) The age of walls is limited. Absolute borders, as walls intend to be, cannot be sustained for a very long time because they contribute to the undermining of the legitimacy of the system. Many such regimes are dependent on support from outside for their economic and political persistence and survival. Most of the non-Soviet Communist Central East European regimes (with the exception of a few countries such as Yugoslavia and Romania) were dependent for their persistence on the Soviet Union which in fact two times (1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia) intervened by military force for this aim. 4) The biggest harm of walls is for the regimes and countries themselves which have erected and try to control their border in this way. In the short and mid-term view, the closure reduces economic growth by restricting ongoing economic and social exchange with other countries and cultures (Kennedy 1987). In the long term view, it reduces scientific and technological development with the consequence of a relative fall-back also in economic standards of living, and in political and military power. Such a process has clearly contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its COMECON economic area (Haller 2011).

The New Iron Curtain between Africa and Europe

In this final section, I will now discuss the character of the new Iron Curtain between Africa and Europe. First, the forms are described which the new wall between Europe and Africa takes on in different regions, followed by a

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d­ iscussion of the reasons for its building. Finally, the forms of border control in different sections along this new Iron Curtain are discussed. Can the European Union be Considered as a New Empire? One reason speaks clearly against the argument that the European Union constitutes a new empire. This is the fact that it does not dispose of a big army and that it did not come into existence through military conquest of neighbouring countries as most historical empires—including the United States—did (Münckler 2005). In fact, the European Economic Community came to life in a fully free decision of the six founding member states in 1957, and the same was true for all the subsequent accessions of the additional members to the EC and the EU—leaving aside here the issue that in many cases this was only a decision of the political elites but the citizens at large were not asked about their consent. Till today, the EU has not developed its own army although many would like that it does and the Treaty of Lisbon foresees a nucleus of an army. Three other considerations, however, clearly suggest that the EU exhibits the characteristics of an empire. First, it is a matter of fact that the European Union itself is a huge sociopolitical and economic community. The EU is not extremely large in terms of geographic extension; with its 4.3 million square miles it has only half the size of present-day nation states such as Brazil, Canada, China or the USA (not to speak of the Russian Federation). With about half a billion inhabitants, however, it is third in population size worldwide, after China and India, and clearly before the United States. Most impressive, however, is the size and weight of the EU in economic terms. Its GDP is as large as that of the USA (about 14 trillion $ in 2009, about 25% of total world GDP), and both are ahead of all other states around the world in this regard (for a summary see Donici et al. 2010). Despite the fact that most exports and imports are internal, the EU is the largest global exporter in goods and services. This huge economic size certainly gives the EU also strong economic influence and power at the global level. This may be felt by other states and international actors in four ways: by the patterns of investment and production, trade and consumption of the EU, its member states and economic actors; by the direct influence of the EU itself and its member states in negotiations about rules for international stability and order, as well as by the contribution to the formulation of rules concerning international investments, trade and other economic transactions; at the operational level by every actual economic transaction of buyers and sellers, creditors and debtors (Strange 1975). Second, the EU can also be considered as an influential political power on the global level. Here, it is a “civil power” (Kohnstamm 1973) which in the last instance does not rely on military power but on negotiations and other

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non-violent forms of international communication and interaction. One can also speak of a “soft” or of a “normative power”. Over the decades, the EU has developed a code of normative principles which are the base for their international negotiations (at least in principle) as well as for the admission of new members (the acquis communautaire). These principles are peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and the respect of human rights (Manners 2002; Telò 2009). There is a discussion going on to which degree the application of this “soft power” itself is acceptable from a human rights point of view; it was argued that one can speak here of a problematic “military humanism” (Beck 2005; Haaland Matlary 2006). The effective political and normative influence of the EU is certainly varying in different domains and world regions; it is most effective in neighbouring countries which aim toward becoming members. But also in countries far away, the EU has power if it is able to bind economic advantages for a trade partner with incentives or political conditions (Haas 2009). The limited influence of an empire in territories far away from its homeland is no peculiarity of the European Union. Such experiences were made by empires throughout history, beginning with the seafaring expeditions into the Indian and Pacific sea of the Chinese general Zheng He between 1405 and 1433; the early loss of the most developed colonies in the Americas by Britain and Portugal (declaration of independence of the USA in 1776, or Brazil in 1822); and the failure of the European, American and Russian military interventions in Afghanistan, Korea, Vietnam etc. Thus, there are many reasons to consider the European Union as a new empire, although one could use also other, similar terms, such as “superpower” (McCormick 2007), “global power” (Haas 2009) or “unprecedented power” (Telò 2009), although it is the question if this label helps at all. It is certainly true that the EU with its complex and cumbersome governance and decision structures and the lack of a strong army resembles more the medieval Holy Roman Empire than the highly centralized, militarily powerful empires such as ancient Rome or present-day United States (Zielonka 2006). Third, the issue of the borders clearly shows that the EU considers itself in some way as a new “empire.” The creation of the internal free market, including the labour market, has been one of the main achievements of European integration. In this regard, particularly the abolishment of internal border control in the Schengen area was a decisive step. First signed between five EC members states (Germany, France and the Benelux countries) in 1985, it became part of the basic EU laws in 1997 (in the Amsterdam Treaty). Today, the Schengen agreement includes 26 states, all but two EU members (except Britain and Ireland) and, in addition, four non members of the EU, and de facto all European mini states; all in all, it includes a population of about 400 million

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people. The agreement establishes that the member states have to abolish all internal border controls (only airlines are permitted to continue with identity controls).3 In fact, today, one can travel through most of Europe without being controlled. This fact is seen by many as an epoch-making achievement of integration and praised by EU representatives as the establishment of the “freedom of travel” in Europe. This designation certainly is a burlesque for two reasons. First, there was no restriction on such travel but only a border control,4 at least in Western Europe, also before Schengen.5 Second, the free movement does not include the former states of the Soviet Union, including Russia, whose affiliation to Europe is beyond doubt. Also the right to settle down and to look for work in any other EU member states by an EU citizen has been praised as a big step forward and internal labour mobility is seen by the EU Commission as one of the main instruments to improve the employment situation in the EU. The other side of the Schengen agreement, however, was that the members of the agreement with frontiers to non-member countries have the obligation to strengthen these external borders. All passengers entering the EU over external borders (except those from the EEA) are subjected to a thorough personal check, including a control of identity, the validity of the visa, a consultation of the Schengen information system in order to make sure that the entrant poses no threat to internal security, and a verification of the entrants purpose of stay and his or her disposal of adequate financial means for the stay (see Figure 2.2). Thus, the downgrading of the internal frontier of the EC/EU was closely linked to the strengthening of external border controls with the reasoning that “if we diminish internal border controls then we must harmonize and strengthen the control at the external borders of the European Community to guarantee a sufficient level of control of who and what can legitimately enter the space of free movement” (Huysmans 2000:759; Huysmans 2006). This reasoning makes certainly sense: If a person now is able to enter, say, into Greece, Italy or Spain, it has the possibility of fully free internal movement in the large Schengen area; thus, Greek, Italian and Spanish border control operates also on behalf of Germany, France, Belgium etc. S. Eylemer and S. Semsit (2007:68) have drawn an illuminative map of concentric circles for the EU immigration policy; at the 3  For an overview, see Wikipedia, Schengen area, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area (9.2.2013). 4  In many cases and at border crossing points with high traffic (such as, for instance, at the Walserberg border between Austria and Germany or the Brennerpass between Austria and Italy), there was often no personal control at all. 5  Max Haller, “Kampf um ‘Reisefreiheit’: Falsche Fronten, hohles Pathos”, Der Standard (Vienna) 7./8.7.2012, p. 12.

FIGURE 2.2 The New Iron Curtain around the Schengen area and the European Union, 2010. Source: Le Monde Diplomatique http://www.monde-diplomatique.de/pm/.home.

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core of it are the EU member states, in the first surrounding circle the candidate countries, in the third the Mediterranean and Eastern EU neighbour states, and in the outmost circle all other states and regions of the world. The fact that North Africa does belong only to the outermost area—like Latin America, Asia etc.—is of very recent origin. G. Therborn (1995:35) noted rightly in this regard: “It is a geographical irony that the most clear-cut important European border today is the Mediterranean, now dividing the relatively prosperous regions of naturally declining populations and one set of politics on the north side from the pauperizing, rapidly growing populations under quite different political and religious systems to the south, while the same sea once held a common civilization together.” (See also Immerfall 2006:13–15.) Thus, the new Iron Curtain clearly shows that also the EU aspires to claim jurisdiction over a large territory—a characteristic of any empire (Gamble 2009:16). In general, one could even say in this regard that “Schengen agreement is not primarily intended to ensure freedom of travel, but to control immigration.”6 Finally, the Lisbon Treaty includes a general paragraph which states that the EU member states are obliged to assist one another in the case of a military attack from outside: “If a Member State is a victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power . . .” (Art.28A, Par.7). Thus, in principle all armies of the member states—together larger in numbers of soldiers than that of the USA, and including the two atomic powers France and Great Britain—could and should become active to defend the Union. Thus, the Union clearly conceives itself also as a military power. This is implied also in Par.3 of the same Article which states: “Members shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities.” Such a statement is clearly contrary to the expectation that the securing of peace within Europe and good neighbourhood relations with other countries is the only main aim of integration; if it were so, it would make it possible to reduce the military capababilities of the member states. Reasons for the Building of the New Iron Curtain between Africa and Europe We can mention at least six factors which support the erection and the new wall around the EU and two factors which may be working against it. It is evident, however, that the first ones are much more influential than the latter; they can be subdivided into factors concerning the relation between Africa

6  Martin Kreichenbaum, “EU steps up internal border controls”, World Socialist Website, June 19, 2012, see http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2012/06/bord-j19.html?view=print.

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and Europe, and factors working mainly within Europe. The first three factors are the deep economic gap between Africa and Europe, the divergent demographic development and the difference in the political situation. The gap in terms of economic productivity, wealth and standards of living between Africa and Europe is more than evident; it is enormous. In the North African countries, GDP per head is between about 6.000 (Egypt) and 9.000 Dollars (Tunisia); in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is between a few hundred and at most 2.000 to 3.000 Dollars.7 By contrast, most central and north European countries have a GNP per head of 40.000 Dollars and more; in South Europe, Spain and Italy, it is somewhat over 30.000. Thus, the mean standard of living is three to five times higher in Europe compared with North Africa, and ten times higher than in Sub Saharan Africa. The extremely low standards of living in Africa are also connected with huge problems of under-employment and unemployment which on their side are closely related to demographic growth, the second factor. There exist also huge differences in patterns of demographic development between the two continents (Höpflinger 2012). In Europe, and in particular in South Europe, birth rates have been declining since decades and now are clearly below the level of self-reproduction. In fact, the South European countries, Italy, Spain and Portugal, have been changing fundamentally in regard to patterns of migration. During most of the 20th century, up to the 1970s, they have been countries of emigration. In the last decades, they became countries of immigration, attracting cheap labour power from East Europe, Africa and other poor countries. The number of foreigners living in Italy increased by the tenfold between 2000 and 2010; in this year, there were about 4.5 million foreigners, 7.5% of the population, living in Italy.8 The same happened in Spain where the number of foreigners increased from 350.000 in 1991 to 5.6 millions in 2009, 12% of the population.9 This was the fifth highest proportion in the EU. Africa, in contrast, today is the continent with the highest birth rates and demographic growth worldwide. These high birth rates were the main reason why, despite of some economic growth in recent years, GNP per head has been declining in Africa.10 While European states, such as Germany or Italy, had an annual rate of population growth of 0.2% between 1990 and 2005, in the of North African states it was 1.7 to 2%, that of Sub-Saharan African states like 7  Data of the World Bank for the period 2005–2011. 8  See Sozialpolitische Informationen Italien, ed. By Deutsche Botschaft Rom, Jan. 2012. 9  Eurostat, Population by citizenship-foreigners, 2001–2012. 10  See World Development Indicators 2012 of the World Bank; available at http://data .worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.

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Ethiopia 2.8%. Population size increased in Egypt from 21 million in 1950 to 80 million today, and in Sudan from 9 to 36 million; that is, by the fourfold in half a decade.11 Today, between 30% and 35% of the populations in the North African countries are below 15 years old, and only 5% 65 years and more; in Sub Saharan Africa, these figures are between 40% and 45% and 3% to 5% respectively. Population projections say that in 2050, Europe (including Russia) will have 786 million people (increasing only lightly from the present 769 million), but Africa not less than 2200 million (Höpflinger 2012:22). It seems not beside the point to argue that here a massive problem is emerging which is highly relevant both for Africa and for Europe (Heinsohn 2006). Third, also the differences in the political situation between Africa and Europe are highly relevant. Since 1945, Sub-Saharan Africa has been the continent shaped by violent internal conflicts and wars, and by massive refugee movements more than any other. This was due to the high internal ethnic differentiation of most new states, the weak or inexistent national identity and integration and the high levels of political corruption and authoritarianism. This situation has improved significantly in the last decade, but many conflicts are still not solved on a permanent basis, and in many countries there are no true democracies in spite of regular elections. In the Arab-Muslim North African countries, the situation was more stable for decades, but the regimes were rather authoritarian. The Arab spring, beginning in Tunisia in 2010, and spilling over to Egypt in 2011, which swept away the old regimes, is of highest importance for the issue of this paper, the control of the borders between Africa and Europe (see, for instance, Perthes 2011; Peters 2012). From the beginning of this revolution, thousands of refugees come to Europe and the capacity of these countries to control immigration from the farther South may also have been diminished. So far, the political situation has not been stabilized in this area and the need to exert a tight control of emigration—from the EU view— has not been reduced. A second group of factors which exerts pressure toward the establishment and maintenance of the new Iron Curtain between Africa and Europe are activities of right-wing political parties and mass media in Europe. In many EU member states, right wing parties exist which have as one of their main political aims the restriction of immigration. They contribute to the fuelling of antiimmigrant attitudes and prejudices, particularly those from Sub-Saharan Africa which are easily recognizable by their appearance and often are living in precarious conditions. In these efforts, they are strongly supported by influential 11  Source of these data: Fischer Weltalmanach, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag (annual editions).

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tabloid newspapers, such as the Bild-Zeitung in Germany, the Kronen-Zeitung in Austria, the Daily Star and Daily Mail in the United Kingdom. The latter, for instance, wrote that the immigration of the Labour Party “destroys for ever what it means to be culturally British” and proclaimed that “asylum seekers infected with Aids are putting public health at risk.”12 These tabloids increase their editions and commercial success by confirming stereotypes of criminal foreigners, for instance, about Nigerian drug dealers. Another buzzword of these groups and media is the immigrant and asylum seeker who enters mainly to capitalize on welfare state support and thus lives like a parasite in Europe. All these efforts are successful also because in Europe widespread ignorance exists about the real living conditions in Africa, the number of people who want to emigrate, the reasons for emigration and flight, and the experiences of emigrants and refugees through their journeys toward the North (Milborn 2006; Haller & Müller 2010; Haller 2012). The issue of uncontrolled migration particularly from the South and the threat of internal security as its consequence ranks very high in the list of the main concerns of European citizens as shown by Eurobarometer surveys (see also Eylemer & Semsit 2007:54). It is connected with national identity, and “the big political questions of cultural and racial identity, challenges to the welfare state, and the legitimacy of the post-war political order” (Huysmans 2000:761; Engbersen 2004). These issues played a significant role also in the rejection of the European Constitution by the French in 2005 (Haller 2008:18–29). We can also mention two factors or forces which work against the maintenance of the Iron Curtain. The first is the need of European enterprises and firms, as well as private households, for manpower. Especially in low-paid industrial and service sectors, it is more and more difficult to get workers in Europe. Therefore, South European enterprises in sectors with low wages (e.g., agriculture, building industry) and private households employ immigrants from Africa because they are ready to work at such wages. This is so not the least because many of these immigrants have no legal permission to live and work in these countries, so it is easy to exploit them, often under extremely bad working conditions (Milborn 2006). In fact, many of these workers, both in enterprises and private households experience a kind of new slavery (Bales 1999). From this point of view, it is even doubtful if these employers are really interested in the elimination of the Iron Curtain since they profit from its existence. This is not so in the case of the second force working against the new Iron Curtain around the EU. Here, we can mention humanitarian o­ rganisations, 12  See http://www.politisc.co.uk/comment-analysis/2011/07/25/comment-anti-immigranttabloids-have-question.

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often closely allied to the catholic and protestant churches, and also several democratic political parties. The position of the trade unions might be ambivalent. On the one side, immigration might weaken their bargaining power; for this reason, Austrian and German unions have asked for a delay of the immediate opening of the labour market after the aaccess of the new East European members. On the other side, many European unions opted for a controlled immigration policy (Eigmüller 2007). The Forms, Intensity and Consequences of EU Border Controls The new Iron Curtain between Africa and Europe is a complex system of surveillance (Foucault 1995) composed of many different elements and mechanisms which are applied so that they supplement the natural borders wherever necessary. Most of them were used by all historical empires. Five main mechan­ isms may be distinguished: The selective granting of Visas; the supplementing of natural borders by para-military forces, equipped with high-tech control instruments; the building of an open Iron Curtain in regions with no natural borders and high immigration pressure; the extension of immigration control into the countries and regions outside the area of the European Union proper; and the increase of continuous control inside the EU. The main instrument of the new Iron Curtain between Africa and Europe, and between the countries of the global South (Africa, South Asia) and North (Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand, Japan) in general, is the selective granting of Visas.13 A visa is a written permit (or a stamp in a passport) to enter a country. It was introduced during 1st World War because of the fear that foreign spies might enter and young men fit for military service might escape from the country. As many other “war inventions”, it proved to be a very useful instrument for governments and is used since then by all states around the world. Now, in most developed countries of the North, people do not need a Visa to enter another country or, if they need it, it is just a formality which can be fulfilled shortly before or during entering a country, maybe connected with the obligation to pay a modest fee. All rich countries of the North require visas from people of the Southern hemisphere of the globe, including Africa. The granting of these visas is connected with a series of conditions which are very difficult if not impossible to be fulfilled by a normal citizen from those countries. In most EU member states, they include the following elements:

13  The use of the concepts of developed and underdeveloped world has been replaced by those of global North and South because the latter are less value-ladden.

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• Application for visas is possible only at foreign consulates by personal

request; given the high number of applicants and the short office hours, this often means that one has to appear before the consulate during the night and wait for hours before getting access. The whole process of granting a visa takes quite a long time, maybe four months and more (two to three months announcement of the wish, several weeks for obtaining a date, one month for executing the application). Evidence must be established that the applicant is enrooted well in his homeland, in order to be willing to return to it after the visit. A sign of this may be to be married and have children; for young, single bachelors it will be extremely difficult to get a visa.14 A series of formal certifications are necessary to demonstrate a good ­economic situation in the homeland and during the journey, including (a) proof of stable employment, (b) of a valid social insurance, (c) bank statements of the last three months documenting receipts and expenses; (d) proof of a travel insurance, covering at least costs of 30.000 Euros.

• • •

Similar requirements are valid in all rich countries of the North (including Europe, North America, Japan, and Australia) making it extremely difficult for citizens of the majority of all other 150 states of the world, three fourths of the 192 member states of the United Nations to enter the rich countries of the North. In this way, a “global hierarchy of mobility” (Bauman 1998) is created, connected closely with a global hierarchy of citizenship (Castels 2005). A second form of border control takes place along frontiers which are to some degree marked by natural barriers (seas) and where immigration pressure is potentially high. These conditions are given in the Mediterranean and at the Eastern border of the EU. Here, the “securitization” of migration (Huysmans 2000; Eylemer & Semsit 2007) is very visible. The control of these borders is carried out by national para-military personnel with the most modern technical equipment for controlling people‘s movement at their disposal. In the Mediterranean, it is carried out, for instance, by the Italian Guardia di Finanza and by the Spanish Guardia Civil. Their obligation originally was mainly to control smuggling of goods but they have always been considered as military forces. In order to be able to fulfil their new function, these institutions have been strengthened considerably recently; the Guardia di Finanza, for instance, had a personnel of 52.280 in 1989 which increased to 66.000 till 14  This fact was confirmed by a collaborator of the Austrian embassy in Addis Abeba (Ethiopia) who discussed with the author and a group of students from Graz this issue in September 2009 (see Haller & Müller 2010).

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2000; their budget increased by the threefold (Lutterbeck 2006).15 They dispose of boats and aircraft (helicopters and airplanes) equipped with military-style technology such as thermal cameras and FLIR (Forward-Looking Infrared) systems for patrols at night and anti-terror radar systems. Since 1990, the southern European countries have deployed also their navy warships to prevent illegal immigration and trafficking over the sea; in 2002, about one quarter of the Italian navy’s total hours of navigation were devoted to immigration control. In this endeavour, the navies of most other South and West European countries, and even those of NATO, participated.16 The aim of the navy ships was to “stop and divert” refugee vessels; in doing so, they often used force with direct or indirect deadly consequences for the occupants of the poorly equipped refugee vessels (Milborn 2006). The recovery of alluvial dead bodies has become a routine task of Moroccan and Spanish police (Vermeeren 2008). Also in East Europe, were the Baltic States, Poland and Slovakia border on non-EU states in the East, such as Belarus and the Ukraine, strong controls and restrictions have been implemented at borders which were quite open in former times. People from the East, often from the same ethnic-national group, have to apply for visa. Strict border controls are applied also between the EU-member states (the Baltic States, Finland and Poland) and Russia. This border control inhibits economic transactions of EU-entrepreneurs with one of the most attractive foreign partners and day-to-day cross-border activities; it serves—as any historical empire wall has done—to erect a psychological barrier between the EU and Russia and to strengthen prejudices in Western and Central Europe about a potentially vast and dangerous influx of criminals (the “Russian Mafia”) into the EU.17 All these border control operations are supported by a new EU agency, called FRONTEX.18 It was established in 2004, has its seat in Warsaw, a staff of 200 people and a budget of 86 million Euros (2011).19 This is not large; but as most other EU agencies and the EU bureaucracy as a whole (see Haller 2008:160– 174), it is growing continuously since its foundation. Since border control is the 15  At the homepage of the Guardia di Finanza a personnel number of 68.000 is given; see: http://www.gdf.gov.it/GdF/it/Area_riservata/Personale_in_servizio/index.html. 16  See the NATO communication “Migration in the Mediterranean region: Causes, consequences and challenges” (2009), at: http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1858. 17  Sergei Golunov, “EU-Russian border security. Stereotypes and realities”, PONARS Eurasia Memo 16/2008. 18  Full name: European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union; see the Frontex homepage: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/about/mission-and-tasks. 19  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23.6.2011.

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prerogative of the member states, FRONTEX has the tasks to plan and coordinate joint operations, develop common training standards, collect and analyse information and the like. Since 2011, it has also the right to acquire its own vehicles, ships and aircraft. The establishment of this agency can also be seen as a response of the EU toward the threats from the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York 2001 and the Madrid bombings of March 2004. It confirms the dominant EU view that insecurity and threats comes from outside and immigrants are a major source of insecurity (Neal 2009). The operations of FRONTEX have been critized by many humanitarian organizations, also because its operations often take place outside of EU territory.20 A systematic analysis of the operations of FRONTEX concludes that the basic EU values, freedom and democracy, are not central for them but are subsumed under a perceived need for security; fundamental contradictions and discrepancies are evident, a lack of accountability and transparency; in emergency situations, security concerns triumph over human rights (Perkowski 2012). This author also stresses, however, that FRONTEX needs to be evaluated in context, since it is still relatively weak and controlled by the member states. In fact, in a new recommendation of the European Council of Ministers in 2012 allows to the member states to implement unilaterally strict internal border controls in “extraordinary circumstances”.21 The most unambiguous confirmation that the new border around the European Union can be considered as an Iron Curtain exists in the places where no natural border, but a high immigration pressure exists. This is the case in the two Spanish enclave cities Ceuta and Melilla at or near the Mediterranean coast in Morocco. These cities were used by many refugees from Sub-Saharan Africa as entry ports for continuing their flight to Spain and thus into the EU. As a consequence, Spain has established a true new Iron Curtain around these cities. As the author could verify himself,22 the Curtain exists of two three to six meters high fences, topped by barbwire (see Figure 2.3).23 Between the walls proceeds a road and besides of the wall, an additional broad asphaltic street was built going up and down the hills around the town along the wall; on 20  For instance, in a legal expertise of the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights; see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frontex. 21  See Kreichenbaum, FN. 11 above. 22  During a personal visit of Ceuta together with my friend Stefan Immerfall on June 28, 2009. 23  See also K. Peters, “Ceuta and Melilla: Europe’s High-Tech African Fortress”, Spiegel Online, August 10, 2011.

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FIGURE 2.3 Where the new Iron Curtain between Africa and Europe comes to light: Ceuta (Spain/Morocco). Source: Photo by Max Haller, September 2009.

this road, police and military forces can reach any point along the wall within minutes. A floodlight construction, infra-red cameras, motion detectors and similar equipment today make it practically impossible for anybody to overcome the wall. Spain spent more than 30 million Euros for these fortifications. This new Iron Curtain resembles very much the “hyperborder” (Romero 2008) between Mexico and the USA. As a consequence, there are hardly persons today who try to get over this wall.24 This was not so in earlier times, however. In 2005 and 2008 refugees attacked the wall and, through the violent military clearance, many of them met their death. A very interesting fact which 24  Personal communication of a friendly guard with whom we had a conversation when visiting the wall.

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shows the similarity between ancient and present-day walls: Moroccons living in the region around the two towns are allowed to enter into them for shopping sprees. Hundreds of taxi drivers are waiting outside Ceuta for the Moroccans after their shopping tour. A third form of the new Iron Curtain consists of a cooperation of the EU with the North African states concerning the preventive control of illegal immigration already on their own territories (see also Nuscheler & Schmuck 1992). A series of bilateral agreements have been made to this effect, particularly between Spain and Morocco, Italy and Albania and Libya, Greece and Turkey. The first of them have been concluded with the former authoritarian leaders of the North African countries; the treaties included also substantial financial support for these regimes in order to combat illegal migrations. The treatment of the migrants from Sub-Saharan countries by the North African countries often beggared humanitarian standards; many of the migrants were detained in barbarous camps, or even abandoned in the Sahara where many met their death. The fourth form of the working of the new Iron Curtain exists inside the European Union itself. As a consequence of the abolition of border controls, internal controls of identity and the possession of the documents confirming the right to stay in the country have become much more frequent and accurate. EU-member state laws require every person to be able to prove his or her identity at any time. In spring 2013, the new Schengen Informations System (SIS II) was enacted to provide opportunities for the searching of wanted persons by the police and can also be used as a dragnet.25 In February 2013, a new automatic electronic control of every immigrant is proposed during which his/her passport is scanned, his/her face is shooted and his/her finger prints are scanned; this would make border crossing easier for people entering frequently but would also imply a complete recording of those who enter the Schengen area.26 What were the consequences of all these measures? First, it is questionable if the stream of illegal migrations from South to the North has really been stopped. Still in 2005, it was estimated that 100.000 to 120.000 irregular migrants cross the Mediterranean every year (Baldwin-Edwards et al. 2005). On the other side, problematic and negative side-effects are also obvious. A first problematic aspect is the violation of human right principles. Partly as a consequence of the harsh and often violent border controls many refugees have to pay with their life for the attempt to cross the sea; it is estimated that 25  See Kreichenbaum, FN. 11. 26  See “Sicherheit: Finger-Scans an der EU-Außengrenze”, Die Presse (Vienna), 27.2.2013.

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at least 10.000 people have lost their lives in the Mediterranean in this way (see also Eylemer & Semsit 2007). The second negative side effect is also evident, an increase of human smuggling and trafficking (Lutterbeck 2006:74−77). The number of persons arrested in Spain and Italy for this reason was increasing substantially in recent times. Human smuggling has become a vast and profitable business; the irregular migrants often have to pay considerable sums (Vermeeren 2008). A third side effect is the diversion of irregular migration flows and migrant routes; in Italy, Sicily became a new immigration destination, replacing the Strait of Otranto; in Spain, Gibraltar was replaced by the Atlantic route. These new routes are longer and more dangerous than the older ones. In general, one can speak of a self-reinforcing dynamic, in exactly the same way as it happens at the Mexican-US border (Andreas 2000) whereby “stricter enforcement effects by state border control forces provoke responses on the part of the irregular border crossers, which in turn make it seem necessary to further strengthen the borders” (Lutterbeck 2006: 77). Fourth, the control of “illegal” migration in the North African transit countries inhibits also labour mobility within Africa; West African heads of state spoke of a plundering of qualified workers from their countries by the EU (Marfaing/Hein 2008). It is estimated that more Ethiopian physicians are working in the United States than in Ethiopia.27 It is estimated that between 33% and 55% of all university educated Africans today are living in OECD-countries, particularly in France and England (Kohnert 2006). Within Africa, there are about 17 million migrants (people living outside their home countries) but by far not all of them want to immigrate to Europe.

Summary and Conclusions

Let us first summarize our main findings resulting from the comparison between historical and present-day walls with the new Iron Curtain around the European Union. Six aspects can be mentioned here. (1) The EU is certainly a new global power, a new kind of “empire.” This becomes particularly clear if we see and analyze the new borders—mostly an invisible, but in some places a clearly visible Iron Curtain—and the methods of border control which the EU has established around its territory. (2) As in all historical cases, also the EU border is asymmetric: It is hardly penetrable from the outside, particularly for people from the poor global South, but can easily be transcended from inside to the outside. (3) As all other walls in history, also the new Iron Wall between 27  Edward Kifle, Ethiopian Review, March 6, 2008.

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Africa and Europe reveals a lot about the character of the EU. It is not mainly, as its political leaders are not tired of stating, a community of values, but first of all a community of interests. The obvious interest behind the building of the wall was security and internal order, whereby illegal immigration more and more is depicted as being a big threat. This finding is not very surprising from a critical perspective on the EU. An analysis of its core values, as they can be deduced from the European Constitution (de facto from the Lisbon Treaty), shows that security scores on top of all values, before freedom and justice, and is far more important than democracy (Haller 2008: 295). In fact, security before a (real or perceived) external threat has always been a central motive for the establishment of regional associations between nation states (Haller 2011). (4) As any wall in history, also the new wall around the EU is not insurmountable and has many negative side-effects. Illegal immigration to the EU member countries did not stop, but the extreme border controls induces people make ever more desperate efforts to irregular immigration, often leading to death; human trafficking is developing into a profitable business; and the migration flows are diverted to new destinations which are more difficult to reach. The next two aspects relate to the future of the new Iron Curtain, but the following two projections are also based on many historical examples. (5) In middle- and long-range terms, the new Iron Curtain will have negative consequences for the member countries of the European Union themselves, in the short-term, as well as in the middle- and long-term. Already now, the bureaucratic impediments to obtain visas are a serious handicap for entrepreneurs to establish and preserve economic transactions with partners in such important countries like Russia or Turkey. Negative effects are also already now in existence in regard to irregular migrants from Africa: Among them, many are not from the best educated and capable people from Africa, but people who were most effective in transcending the brutal border controls, or able to pay high sums to human traffickers or briberies to government and border officials. Their presence contributes to an increase of ethnic prejudices and negative attitudes to immigration among the populations in Europe. Further on, it leads to ever more harsh political measures against irregular immigration, thus producing a vicious negative circle. On the other side, Europe with its strongly aging population will experience an extreme shortage of young and middleaged, educated people in many social and professional services in the foreseeable future. (6) The durability of the new Iron Curtain will be limited. The last decades have shown that emigration countries and regions—like Spain, Italy and Turkey—can soon become immigration countries if their economic and demographic situations change accordingly. Africa with its young population, avid for education and knowledge, may be the most promising continent of

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the 22nd century, outdistancing countries like Japan and China with their overaged populations. In concluding, let us take up shortly three general points: The issue of human rights in regard to migration and border control; the question what the ­alternatives to the Iron Curtain between Europe and the Africa could be; and the issue of myths and reality about migration from the South as a threat to Europe. First, two authoritative sources can be mentioned supporting the thesis that international migration can be considered as a basic human right. The first is the enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant; in his famous essay On Eternal Peace (1795) he wrote that a stranger entering a country has the right not be treated in a hostile way by people living there, as long as he behaves peacefully. This is not a right to hospitality but a right to visit which belongs to everybody because earth is owned by all humans together and they must live side by side on it. The other is Article 13 of the 1948 UN-Declaration of Human Rights which states: (1) everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state; (2) everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. In both statements, the right to enter another country is not mentioned explicitly, but it certainly is implicit: How can I leave a country when I cannot enter any other? I have shown in this paper that the present situation concerning the possibility to enter the European Union and its allied countries hardly corresponds to these basic requirements. Maybe for three-fourths of the population on earth it is practically impossible to visit the EU, given the extensive requirements to obtain a visa. Those who try to enter in an irregular or illegal way face obstacles and deterrence measurements which again do not correspond to human right principles (see also Gibney 1988; Frühwirth & Kettemann 2009; Wilcox 2009). That similar problematic preconditions exist on other South-North divides, particularly in America, does not justify the regulations, measures and behaviour of the EU and its member states. They clearly create a “global hierarchy of mobility” (Bauman 1998) which supplements global inequality. Joseph Carens (1995) has argued from the viewpoint of political theory and human rights that an extensive closing of borders cannot be justified. Although his arguments have also met some criticisms (Haderer 2005), I think they are sound. From the viewpoint of liberal property rights theory (R. Nozick) one would argue that a state has no right to interfere with the right of individuals to enter a state, as long as they do not violate someone else’s rights; from the viewpoint of utilitarian theory, also the gains of people leaving outside a state would have to be considered; and even from the viewpoint of John Rawls’ activist state theory which foresees his responsibility for social welfare, an absolute closure

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of ­borders would be untenable; in a veil of ignorance (Rawls’ starting point) people would always prefer a situation with no closed borders because only in such a case those from poor countries or those with specific abilities etc. would have the opportunity to move to a place where they have the better opportunities. (See also Bauböck 1994; Soysal 1994.) Certainly, an unconditional opening of all borders and also of that between Africa and Europe would be hardly acceptable in the present-day world, given the aforementioned extreme differences in living standards, demographic development and political situation. However, the present situation of the existence of a factual Iron Curtain could certainly be changed and improved significantly in many regards. There are many concrete measures of which one could think here, including: (1) A search for alternative ways to satisfy European needs of security against international crime and terrorism, such as strengthening of international cooperation, and the enforcement of the role of the United Nations; (2) the establishment of fairer rules for the granting of Visa and the extension of the groups of people who realistically would be able to obtain them; (3) strengthening controlled immigration and exchange of people between Africa and Europe; this is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon as the slogan suggests “If we admit all immigrants we all will perish” (see Harding 2008); (4) supporting variable forms of limited immigration (for instance, for a certain period of time) in cases which would be useful both for Africa and Europe. A foremost possibility in this regard would be a much denser exchange of youth people and students who could come for a limited period of time to Europe to acquire occupational skills, experiences and knowledge. (See also Haller & Müller 2012.) In this regard, Europe could learn a lot from the United States which attract talented young people from all around the globe. It could establish an academic exchange program comparable to ERASMUS; a proper name would be Augustinus Program after the great philosopher and Doctor of the Catholic Church from Africa. A model could be the Swedish LennaeusPalme Programme which offers teachers and students from developing countries to come to Sweden.28 More transparent and less restrictive borders could also be established in the eastern borders of the EU, maybe with the vision to create a new, large “European Economic Area” (EEA), including Russia, Turkey, The Middle East and North Africa (Haller 2012b). Proposals of this sort are far from being unrealistic. In fact, they appear so only because a host of myths about migration patterns and threats exist (Wiedemann 2009). The dominant European myth in this regard may be that 28  See also: Hilde Selbervik with Knut Nygaard, Nordic Exceptionalims in Development Assistance? Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Report R 2006:8).

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most black African immigrants are potential criminals and that hundreds of millions of poor Africans would over-flood Europe if the borders were fully open. Similar myths exist about potential dangers from Russia.29 The real facts about migration are very different, and Africa might be no exception in these regards: Emigration is always an option for only small groups of a population; in the accepting countries, immigrants are only a minority (in most EU-member countries less than 10% of the native population); back-migration into the countries of origin was always considerable.30 The most important fact may be that migration in general has become a highly differentiated process, connected closely with globalization. Migrants see themselves increasingly as part of a border-transgressing or even global labour market, the traditional form of emigration once and for all from Europe to America, as it was typical up to the 2nd World War has disappeared or given way to many new forms. These include temporary emigration, circular migration, return migration in old age and so forth (Sassen 1988, 1996, 2007; Castles & Miller 2003; Castles 2004; World Development Report 2010; for Africa see Schmid & Wagner 2004; Konseiga 2005; Haller & Müller 2010). It would be a very important research task to investigate systematically the potential of migration from Africa to Europe, but also the factors which would reduce irregular migration but also those factors which would foster socio-economic development of Africa itself. Also research and statistics on immigration and migrants in Europe is hardly adequate today (Fassmann 2010); little is known about the exact numbers of irregular immigrants. The position of countries and continents in the streams of international migration may change fundamentally in the decades to come, as did that of most South European countries which for a century were emigration countries, and now are immigration countries. Such a change might also occur in the relationship between Africa and Europe, if Africa will be able to enter into a phase of political stability, reduced demographic growth and a decisive economic take-off; signs for such tendencies are already visible today (see, e.g., Samatar 1999).

29  See Golunov, EU-Russian border security. FN 21. 30  An example is the fact that a considerable proportion of Italians who emigrated to the USA around 1900, returned to Italy later.

chapter 3

The Enlargement Process and the “Dividing Lines of Europe” Melania-Gabriela Ciot

EU Integration and Enlargement

The European Union is a supranational institutional and procedural ensemble (inter-state and inter-governmental), which proposes to achieve certain common objectives, stated and argued through common acceptable standards and values. Certain stages of stagnation or even rebound in the evolution of European construction have been due to the incapacity of the negotiating parties (Member States) to stand on the platform of common European values (Pușcaș 2012:193–194). The same author believes that the present crisis of the European Union is more severe than the economic and financial crisis in other areas of the world because it has its origin in the abandonment of common European values: “Sometimes the values of the North and the South of the European Union were widened and even exalted, announcing the existence of distances and incompatibilities in values, renouncing efforts to manage diversity and search for common European ways and values, which are the essence and the strength of European construction.” (Ibid.: 194). Europeans have to admit the necessity of deepening European integration as the solution for the present crisis and for post-crisis evolution. But this leads them to the thesis of differentiation within the European Union as the reason for increasing convergence, without a clear definition of the European identity nor the expression of an identity option. In this context, the European spirit does not lead to diversity as a support for unity, but to differentiation as dissociation and distinctness as a support for integration in gradual, concentric phases: “In the interior of the European Union, instead of the pronoun us, often you can hear the pronouns us and you, as there are several categories of European citizens” (Ibid.: 136). In the context of globalisation, the European Union had to find a solution for the management of diversity, in order to erase the existing dividing lines from its interior. Enlargement policy was meant to increase the competitiveness of the European Union, but has it succeeded? The common perception is that the great divisions of Europe appeared after continental wars: the cordon sanitaire (after the First World War) and the © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004272859_005

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Berlin Wall (after the division of Europe into two blocs). In reality, these conflicts started because of the perceptual, attitudinal and behavioural dividing lines which still existed at the level of European states, nations and leaders. The enlargement of the European Union (the fifth wave) and the unification of Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall did not mean the disappearance of attitudinal and psychological barriers. The dividing lines have not disappeared when major decisions are taken; they still persist in behaviour. For this reason it is time to make a shift from the “old paradigm” to a “new paradigm” of cooperation and diversity management. On his visit to Mexico, from May 2013, President Barack Obama spoke about the new dividing lines of perception between the two countries: “Some Americans only see the Mexico depicted in sensational headlines of violence and border crossings. Some Mexicans may think America disrespects Mexico, that we seek to impose ourselves on Mexican sovereignty [. . .]. I have come to Mexico because it is time to put old mindsets aside. It’s time to recognise new realities, including the impressive progress in today’s Mexico” (Goldfarb & Miroff 2013:1). Even though it was only a political statement of the American President, it could be taken into consideration as a tendency to change the policies in the region. But when will the “old lines of division” in the European Union change? The construction of Europe started at the middle of the last century with the Schuman Declaration of 9th of May 1950, in which the French Minister of Foreign Affairs proposed joint management of the coal and steel resources of France and Germany by creating an organisation open to the participation of other European countries. In Paris, on 18th of April 1951, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which became functional from 1953, by removing the customs barriers and quantitative restrictions regarding the raw materials mentioned in the Treaty. In Rome, on 25th of March 1957 the ECSC Member States signed the Treaty establishing the European Community of Atomic Energy (Euratom) and the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC). The three Com­ munities (the ECSC, Euratom and the EEC) had a single Parliament and a single court of justice, called the Court of Justice of the European Communities. In January 1973, three more states joined the European construction: Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark, followed by Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986), Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995), Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary (2004), Romania and Bulgaria (2007) and Croatia (2013). Important steps in the European construction were the treaties: the Treaty of Maastricht (1992, which describes the activities of European Union based on three pillars: the European Communities, Common Foreign and Security

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Policy and Justice and Internal Affairs); the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997, which amended the Treaty of Maastricht) and the Treaty of Nice (2001, which refers to a reform of European institutions for future enlargements); the Treaty of Lisbon (2007, which amends the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Rome) and Europe 2020 (2010) (InfoEuropa 2007, Pușcaș 2011:51).

The Dividing Lines of the European Union?

In an interesting article about the European dividing lines in party politics, Julie Smith says: “Europe would nonetheless remain a deeply divisive issue in British politics” (Smith 2012: 1282), [. . .] and “Shifts in attitudes towards Europe occurred in all the main parties over time, as a result of either changes within the Community/Union or changes in perceptions of the EU and its purpose, strengths and weaknesses” (Ibid.: 1283). The author established very precisely the moment when the integration process “did not take all member states forward in convoy, leaving the UK outside certain key policies” (Ibid.: 1293), namely in 1991, when John Major negotiated the opt-outs included in the Treaty of Maastricht (1991). It was a symbolic and “crucial” (Ibid.: 1283) moment of establishing the first dividing line between the European Union and a Member State, which created a precedent for other Member States (Denmark, Ireland, Poland and Sweden). In the European Union, the appearance of differentiation policies created invisible internal walls between Member States, and at the domestic level of a Member State “European issues” created divisions in social and political society. And this was enough for the construction of the framework for rise of Euroscepticism. The results of the latest Eurobarometers (Standard Eurobarometer 2012:78) show that the economic situation at the national and European levels is still perceived negatively by large majorities of Europeans; wide differences still exist between EU countries despite some convergent trends. The economic and financial crisis continues to influence Europeans’ answers throughout the survey; especially regarding their main concerns at personal, national and EU level. A third of Europeans say they trust the European Union, and this proportion has slightly increased since spring 2012. The European Union continues to be seen as the actor best able to take effective action to tackle the effects of the crisis. Despite a slight fall, a large majority of Europeans continue to consider that the EU has sufficient power and tools to defend the economic interests of Europe in the global economy. Majorities of Europeans think that the

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e­ conomic crisis will have positive consequences for the EU: more than eight in ten say that the various EU Member States will have to work more closely together, and more than half consider that the EU will eventually emerge stronger from the economic crisis. Finally, support for the Europe 2020 strategy remains strong, and a relative majority of Europeans think that the EU is going in the right direction to emerge from the crisis and face new challenges. Were these answers the effects of the differentiation policies, of the concept of a “two-speed Europe”, or of the unsuccessful implementation of the cohesion policy, which deepened differences instead of reducing them? The dividing lines in the European Union could be understood from a territorial point of view and in terms of enlargement policy. A very interesting approach to be taken in to consideration belonged to Enlargement commissioner Gunter Verheugen, who said at London School of Economics in 2003: “Enlargement finally heals the rift caused by the Second World War, which left the continent split into two opposing blocs. Enlargement brings with it a new political order based, for the first time in modern European history, on common values and a shared desire for harmony and cooperation. The age-old dream of a united Europe is now beginning to take shape. We are leaving behind us the age of wars, hostile neighbors and unequal opportunities that did Europe so much harm. Instead, we will achieve a degree of European unity without precedent in the history of the continent” (Verheugen 2003:128). This process of “elimination of the walls/dividing lines” could be equated with the accession process through which the candidate country engages in a process of harmonisation, of applying the aquis. The complex process of accession negotiations is meant to “eliminate” the 31 or 35 “walls/dividing lines” (chapters of accession negotiations). Ratification of the Accession Treaty could be interpreted as the final “elimination” of the walls/dividing lines that stood between the European Union and the new Member State. At the same time, it is known that enlargement implies the incorporation of economies with different levels of development and significantly different economic structures. It is also known that as a result of enlargement income disparities in the EU will increase and the Union will face growing diversity. The complex integration process will underline persistence of the “internal European walls/dividing lines” and the domains in which they are “detectable”. Also, the management of EU enlargement must take into consideration the EU’s immediate neighbours: how to avoid a new division in Europe. A division, as commissioner Verheugen said, “this time not between blocs but between those countries able to cope with the future and those for whom there is no hope” (Verheugen 2000:12).

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The European Social Model and Enlargement Policy

The European Social Model (ESM) is a model of integration policy, a dynamic model whose development is influenced by global, European and national processes, including EU enlargement. It is specified that the ESM is “based on a combination of economic efficiency, in the sense of high productivity, ­competition and economic growth, and a high level of employment on the one hand together with social cohesion on the other hand” (Buttler, Schoof & Walwei 2006:97). Juhasz (2006:83) considers the ESM a “vague concept” which differentiates the “humanised Europe” from “the rest of the world’s forms of capitalism”. His approach to ESM emphasises the social protection system that it develops and the promotion of certain core values (freedom, equality, fraternity) by means of policies aiming at the redistribution of income and opportunities. Vos, de Beer and de Gier (2004:336) wonder whether the need for social cohesion was the element that provided the input for the creation of the ESM. The authors believe that this model is the result of a need to modernise Europe and that it could reinforce the development of a multi-speed Europe. The ESM is the model of unity in diversity, which refers to three factors: (1) the response of the ESM to changes in socio-economic conditions such as changing international production systems, the ageing of the population and high levels of unemployment and changing family structures (Esping-Andersen 2002; Buttler, Schoof & Walwei, 2006:98); (2) the implications of the European Monetary Union and the associated Stability and Growth Pact for leeway in shaping national social policy; (3) the impact of Eastern Enlargement on the European Social Model. The three characteristic elements or levels of the ESM are: 1)

2)

3)

A common normative basis: the declaration of belief in the core values of solidarity, social justice, social responsibility and social cohesion, which is shared by all continental European welfare states. Social cohesion, and thus the principle of social balance and social inclusion, are especially distinct in this connection and can sometimes be attributed to the Europeans’ particular ideas regarding justice and freedom. The conviction that the social dimension described by the core values has a positive effect on economic development and long-term political stability. Social policy is therefore regarded as a productive factor which can promote economic growth, competitiveness and social welfare equally. The political-institutional developments at national and European level.

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Public responsibility for social cohesion inside all Member States is a common challenge and a fundamental value of the ESM. Vos, de Beer, and de Gier (2004:342) consider that social cohesion in an enlarged European Union is a challenge for each separate Member State, and even more the community as a whole. If there is greater consensus regarding social policy objectives and joint policy learning results in policy convergence and the adoption of similar policy instruments, then the framework for reconciling diversity will be created by agreeing with the contents of the ESM. The above-mentioned ESM approaches show that the dividing lines could be considered as follows: – political; – social; – economic and – psychological. But the main important question that we have to answer remains: is there unity in European diversity? Political Dividing Lines Sedelmeier has said that enlargement affects the EU’s institutional structure and that it often triggers changes in the rules of government policies and policymaking. These changes could compensate for the impact of larger numbers and increased diversity “on the effectiveness of collective decision-making, the fairness of integration and the scope for further integration” (Sedelmeier 2010:402). Enlargement has the element of a redistributive policy, especially in policy areas, and from these characteristics appear the “potential” of a dividing line. For Eastern enlargement, the Commission set the agenda by forging incremental agreements, managing pre-accession relations with candidates, and monitoring their adjustments efforts. These efforts could be interpreted as tendencies towards eliminating the barriers which existed between EU 15 and the candidate countries. An important political dividing line that persists in the EU could be considered competitiveness, which can be seen as a factor that divides European countries. Klaus Swab (2012:62) discusses the competitiveness which divides northern European countries from southern European countries. His explanation for this situation is that most northern European countries are already positioned at the top of the competitiveness ranking while most southern countries can be expected to engage in the convergence process from a low

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starting point, assuming that they move ahead in earnest with their complex reform programmes. The author affirms that in the Index of Global Competitiveness 2012–2013, the countries from northern Europe are among the most competitive in the world. Three Eurozone countries (Finland, the Netherlands and Germany) are in the top 10, being more competitive than US. By contrast, the countries of southern Europe, which are suffering the most from the consequences of the competitiveness divide, are poorly ranked: Greece is in 96th position, Portugal in 49th, Italy in 42nd and Spain in 36th. But the paradox is that in these southern European countries, this poor ranking is a cause for optimism. Why is that? Because these countries have the chance of improving their competitiveness with the structural reforms which are currently being implemented, focused on the areas where they are weakest. An important point mentioned by Swab (Ibid.: 65) is that there is no necessary trade-off between being competitive and ensuring the provision of key social goals. The Nordic countries have proved that it is possible to be competitive (“entrepreneurial, flexible, agile”), while providing a strong social safety net. The most important element to erase this dividing line is linked with the resources spent on competitiveness by a Member State. Another political dividing line is the concept of a “two-speed Europe”, which provoked a lot of debate. The concept was launched by Nicolas Sarkozy, who called for a two-speed Europe: a “federal” core of the 17 members of the Eurozone, with a looser “confederal” outer band of the ten non-euro members (Charlemagne 2011). Piris (2012:3) sees three options for the future of Europe: a revision of the treaties, a continuation on the current path and the possibility of a group of a Member States (perhaps the ones in the Eurozone), acting temporarily in closer cooperation in order to be able to progress, without changing the EU treaties. These states could play an avant-garde role for developing common policies, and the others would join them when able to do so. This process would lead to an improvement in the functioning of the entire EU. The above-mentioned author draws a distinction between “two-speed Europe” and “two-class Europe” (Ibid.: 6). “Two-speed Europe” means the development of closer cooperation among some Member States, pursuing objectives that are common to all EU Member States. The idea is that the members of a smaller group could be both able and willing to go ahead, while this won’t be possible for all. The other Member States will follow later, so differentiation is only temporary. As an example, the author speaks of the transition periods and temporary derogations provided by the accession treaties for the new EU Member States. “Two-class” Europe also means closer cooperation within a group that may not include all EU Member States, but the

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cooperation would produce a permanent and irreversible separation between this group and the other EU Member States. The differentiation in this case is permanent. Social Dividing Lines Differences between social systems in the European Union may be found in per capita expenditure on social protection. The latest figures from Eurostat (2009) put EU-27 welfare spending at the equivalent of 29.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009 (see Table 3.1). Among the EU Member States, the level of social protection expenditure in relation to GDP was highest in Denmark (33.4%), France (33.1%), Sweden (32.1%), the Netherlands (31.6%) and Germany (31.4%), while Austria, Belgium and Finland also reported ratios in excess of 30%. By contrast, social protection expenditure represented less than 20% of GDP in Poland, Estonia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Latvia (where the lowest share was registered, at 16.8%). The differences in percentages show the diverse models of ESM existing within the MS (Member States), with the Scandinavian countries, southern European countries and continental central European countries representing different variants of the ESM, with Anglo-Saxon countries and the Mediterranean variant (Buttler, Schoof & Walwei 2006:100; Juhasz 2006:88). In order to reduce these barriers, the European Union has elaborated socialpolitical instruments such as: – legislation, – social dialogue, – financial instruments (structural funds), – the open method of co-ordination and – “mainstreaming” (Buttler, Schoof & Walwei 2006:103; Juhasz 2006:85–86). Other elements to reduce and eliminate the social dividing lines within Europe are: – – – – – – – –

employees’ rights, worker participation, employment and its quality, equal opportunities, social dialogue and collective negotiations, services of general interest the non-discrimination principle, regional cohesion,

134 Table 3.1

ciot Per Capita expenditures on social protection 1999

EU-27 Euro area Belgium Bulgaria Czech Republic Denmark Germany Estonia Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Cyprus Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Hungary Malta Netherlands Austria Poland Portugal Romania Slovenia Slovakia Finland Sweden United Kingdom Iceland Norway Switzerland

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

26.6 27.2 27.1 14.2 18.0

25.7 26.8 26.8 14.1 18.0

26.7 27.5 28.1 15.5 18.0

29.5 30.2 30.4 17.2 20.4

26.4

26.7 25.4

26.8 26.3

27.3 26.7

27.7 27.4

27.6 27.3

18.6

18.8

18.7

19.4

19.4

18.6

27.1 27.6 27.3 15.1 18.4

29.8 29.5 15.4 14.5 22.7 19.8 29.9 24.8

23.9 20.2 26.3 30.7 25.7

28.9 29.6 13.9 13.8 23.5 20.0 29.5 24.7 14.8 15.7 15.7 19.6 19.9 16.6 26.4 28.3 19.7 20.9 13.0 24.1 19.4 25.1 29.9 26.4

29.2 29.7 13.0 14.7 24.3 19.7 29.6 24.9 14.9 14.7 14.7 20.9 19.5 17.5 26.5 28.6 21.0 21.9 12.8 24.4 18.9 25.0 30.4 26.8

29.7 30.3 12.7 17.0 24.0 20.0 30.5 25.3 16.3 14.3 14.0 21.6 20.4 17.6 27.6 29.0 21.1 22.9 13.6 24.3 19.1 25.7 31.3 25.7

30.9 30.7 12.5 17.7 23.5 20.3 31.0 25.8 18.4 14.0 13.5 22.1 21.3 17.9 28.3 29.4 21.0 23.3 13.1 23.6 18.4 26.6 32.2 25.7

30.7 30.1 13.0 17.9 23.6 20.3 31.4 26.0 18.1 13.2 13.4 22.3 20.8 18.6 28.3 29.1 20.1 23.9 12.8 23.3 17.2 26.7 31.6 25.9

30.2 30.0 12.6 17.9 24.9 20.6 31.5 26.4 18.4 12.8 13.2 21.7 21.9 18.4 27.9 28.7 19.7 24.6 13.4 23.0 16.5 26.7 31.1 26.3

29.2 28.9 12.1 18.2 24.7 20.5 30.9 26.6 18.5 12.7 13.4 20.4 22.5 18.3 28.8 28.2 19.4 24.6 12.8 22.7 16.3 26.4 30.4 26.0

28.8 27.8 12.1 18.8 24.8 20.7 30.6 26.7 18.2 11.3 14.4 19.3 22.7 18.0 28.3 27.8 18.1 23.9 13.6 21.3 16.0 25.4 29.2 23.3

29.6 28.0 14.9 22.0 26.3 22.1 31.0 27.8 18.5 12.7 16.1 20.2 22.9 18.5 28.5 28.4 18.6 24.3 14.3 21.4 16.0 26.2 29.5 26.3

33.4 31.4 19.2 27.9 28.0 25.0 33.1 29.8 20.9 16.8 21.3 23.1 23.4 20.0 31.6 30.8 19.7 26.9 17.1 24.3 18.8 30.3 32.1 29.2

18.8 26.9 27.4

19.2 24.4 27.0

19.4 25.4 27.7

21.2 26.0 28.5

23.0 27.2 29.2

22.6 25.9 29.3

21.7 23.8 29.3

21.2 22.6 28.0

21.4 22.9 27.3

22.0 22.5 26.4

25.4 26.4

17.2  0.0 20.5 20.6 17.8 27.1 28.8 20.6

Source: Eurostat (online data code: spr_exp_sum).

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– social inclusion, – fair wages, – participation of social partners and civil society, – fundamental social rights, – cross-border social protection and – trans-national social policy (Vaughan-Whitehead 2003:6; Buttler, Schoof & Walwei 2006:104). Social policy is gaining a new dynamic within the European Union, due to the period of crisis and the particularities of Eastern enlargement, which has generated increasing economic and social disparities between and within the Member States. The social-political framework in the new Member States indicate that they will contribute to the development of European integration. Considerable economic disparities will continue to exist for some time in the enlarged Union. This will presumably be associated with a constant social gap in EU-27. One question that arises in particular in this respect is whether and to what extent the present social policy framework in the new EU countries will prove to be a help or a hindrance for the catching-up process that is needed there (Buttler, Schoof & Walwei 2006:109). Another dividing line that exists between the “old” and “new” Member States is the welfare system. For the newcomers, this system has to be reformed and harmonised with the economic catching-up efforts and cope with labour market problems (Ibid.: 109). The authors underline the main important elements that have to be taken into consideration in the process of reforming the welfare system: falling birth rates, the change to a service economy, increasing demand for qualifications in new employment opportunities and a greater demand for internal and external flexibility of labour input. Juhasz (2006:88) considers that almost a decade after the Eastern Enlargement we do not have a clear view of the type of welfare regimes of the newcomers and that it is still difficult to assess the performance of EastCentral European countries in the context of their adjustment to the ESM. He believes that because of the lack of political preconditions in these countries one can interpret each step of the new democracies as getting their welfare system closer to the ESM. Taking into consideration factors such as inequalities, social spending and respect for social rights we will have different approaches. Inequalities grew rapidly immediately after the transformation of the welfare system began and they seem to persist. Their dynamic is following the Western pattern. There are insufficient data to make a comparison and to assess social spending, but from available data, Juhasz (Ibid.: 90) states that the new post-

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communist Member States are among the lowest spenders on social protection, with the exception of Slovenia. There are a few data regarding social rights. It may be said that the reform of the pension system has been initiated in the new Member States, but deficits in social dialogue have prevented the social partners from having a major influence on social legislation. The labour market is another element which creates dividing lines, especially in the field of labour legislation. For example, countries such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have less strict regulations than many continental European countries. Buttler, Schoof and Walwei (2006:109–110) consider that the labour markets of the new Member States have become more flexible during their transformation, followed by different patterns of response to the economic situation from that seen in Western European countries. While the course of labour turnover has been counter-cyclical, the development of the duration of employment is more pro-cyclical (see Cazes/Nesporova 2003, quoted by Buttler, Schoof & Walwei, 2006:110). The authors consider that this can probably be put down to the transformation crisis, since unlike in Western Europe, the still-high level of employment insecurity in the new Member States induces fewer workers to change their jobs even during especially good times. Labour costs create inequalities between the European Member States. By and large this reflects differences in levels of economic development and productivity, so that the level of unit labour costs of the new Member States and those of the old members of the EU15 differ far less than absolute labour costs. The existing considerable differentials will keep wage pressure high for a long time in the enlarged European Union, will encourage the relocation of labourintensive production from the west to the east and will intensify competition in otherwise non-tradable or hardly tradable services immediately along the new borders in the EU (Buttler, Schoof, Walwei 2006:111, Juhasz 2006:100). Economic Dividing Lines Buttler, Schoof and Walwei (2006) consider that the success of the advancing European integration can initially be measured by how the necessary catching-up process gets off the ground and then gathers momentum. An appropriate social policy framework is inextricably linked with the new Member States’ catching-up process and it has to be determined which welfarestate structures are developing within the new EU Member States, in order to reduce economic discrepancies. Of course the new Member States are characterised by development levels that are significantly behind the other EU Member States. The disparities between the new Member States and in particular the gap between them and

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the enlargement process and the “ dividing lines of europe ”

the “old” States are outlined on the basis of key economic and labour market indicators. Table 3.2 indicates the GDP per capita in PPS in the EU Member States from 2007 (the accession of Bulgaria and Romania), the last wave of enlargement. If the index of a country is higher than 100, this country’s level of GDP per head is higher than the EU average and vice versa. The index calculated from PPS figures and expressed with respect to EU27 = 100 is intended for cross-country comparisons rather than temporal comparisons. The table below contains data regarding candidate countries, potential candidate countries, as well as Switzerland, the USA and Japan. In terms of the European Union it is clear that the “old” Member States have indices greater than 100, indicating higher levels of wealth in comparison with the “new” Member States from the fifth wave of enlargement (Central and East European). Interesting to observe is the fact that one of the most “powerful” Member States, Germany, increased its index from from 115 to 127 between 2007 and 2011, while that of one Member State (Slovenia) decreased from 88 (2007) to 84 (2011). There are some positive instances among the newcomers— Romania’s index rose from 41 (2007) to 49 (2011)—but the general conclusion is that the economic dividing lines persist in European Union, meaning that the management of diversity from an economic point of view has not succeeded. Table 3.2 GDP per capita in PPS (Purchasing Power Standards) in the EU Member State from 2007 Geo\time

EU (27 countries) EU (15 countries) Euro area (17 countries) Belgium Bulgaria Czech Republic Denmark Germany Estonia Ireland Greece Spain France Italy

2007

100 111 109 116 40 83 122 115 70 147 90 105 108 104

2008

2009

2010

2011

100 111 109 116 43 81 125 116 69 132 93 104 107 104

100 110 109 118 44 83 123 115 63 130 94 103 109 104

100 110 108 119 44 80 128 119 63 129 87 99 108 101

100 110 108 119 46 80 125 121 67 129 79 98 108 100

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Table 3.2 GDP per capita in PPS (cont.) Geo\time

Cyprus Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Hungary Malta Netherlands Austria Poland Portugal Romania Slovenia Slovakia Finland Sweden United Kingdom Iceland Norway Switzerland Montenegro Croatia Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Serbia Turkey Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina United States Japan

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

94 57 59 274 61 76 132 124 54 79 41 88 68 117 125 117 121 181 144 40 61 31

99 58 61 263 64 79 134 124 56 78 47 91 73 119 124 113 123 192 149 43 63 34

100 54 55 255 65 83 132 125 61 80 47 87 73 114 120 111 120 177 150 41 62 36

97 54 57 267 65 85 131 127 63 80 47 84 73 113 124 111 112 181 154 42 59 36

94 58 66 271 66 85 131 129 64 77 49 84 73 114 127 109 111 186 157 42 61 35

33 45 23 28 151 108

36 47 26 30 147 105

36 46 28 31 147 103

35 50 27 30 147 107

35 52 30 30 148 105

Source: Eurostat (25.04.22013), available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/ table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00114.

Also, we have to mention the positive fact of a slight catching-up process from the new Central and Eastern European enlargement: Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.

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Six years ago, without knowing about the crisis which would strike the EU, Buttler, Schoof and Walwei (2006) said that it would be hard to deal with these discrepancies but that the countermeasures would not result in lasting friction. It will be a very long time before it is possible to speak of an equality of living conditions in the enlarged European Union. Significant welfare differentials continue to exist among the EU Member States. It will be very difficult for the new Member states to achieve the Western European welfare corridor in the near future, even if their economies grow steadily and strongly: “Realistically, in the foreseeable future it will therefore be less a matter of alignment and more of convergence of living conditions in the enlarged European Union” (Ibid.: 106). Another economic dividing line that exists in the European Union is the unemployment situation. Among Member States, the lowest unemployment rates were recorded in Austria (4.7%), Germany (5.4%) and Luxembourg (5.7%), and the highest rates in Greece (27.2% in January), Spain (26.7%) and Portugal (17.5%). In March 2013 the youth unemployment rate was 23.5% in EU-27 and 24.0% in the Euro area. In March 2012 it was 22.6% and 22.5% respectively. In March 2013 the lowest rates were observed in Germany and Austria (both 7.6%) and the Netherlands (10.5%), and the highest in Greece (59.1% in January 2013), Spain (55.9%), Italy (38.4%) and Portugal (38.3%). In March 2013, the unemployment rate in the USA was 7.6%. In Japan it was 4.3% in February 2013. Graph 3.1 illustrates these data: 30

26.2 26.7

25 20

17.5

% 15 10

0

4.7

9.4

12.1 12.6

13.1

at de lu nl mt ro dk cz uk* be fi se ee** si pl eu27 fr hu** it ea17 bg lt ie cy lv** sk pt es el*

5

8.4 7.3 7.8 8.2 8.2 6.5 6.7 7.2 5.4 5.7 6.4

10.911.0 11.2 11.5 9.9 10.7

14.1 14.2 14.3 14.5

* January 2013 ** February 2013 *** O4 2012

GRAPH 3.1 Unemployment situation. Source: http//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistic_explained/images/1/1d/ Unemployment_rates%2C_seasonally_adjusted%2C_March_2013.png.

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The adjustment of employment policies to the European Employment Strategy could be a way of reducing the divide between old and new Member States, with each state trying to shift resources from a passive to more active policy (Juhasz 2006:99). Migration could be interpreted as an economic dividing line from the perspective of its origin, taking into account that it has a territorial dynamic. Migration has become an increasingly important phenomenon for European societies. Patterns of migration flows can change greatly over time, with the size and composition of migrant populations reflecting both current and historical patterns of migration flows. Combined with the complexity and longterm nature of the migrant integration process, this can present challenges to policy-makers, who need good quality information on which to base decisions. Adrian Favell (2009:167) considers that migration between Member States had an impact on the construction of European identity, by “building a bridge between the historical analyses of the phenomenon and emerging patterns that are shaping Europe”. We agree with Favell when he says that European migration made and remade Europe. Very interesting is his analysis when he speaks about the contribution of European migration to the increase in antiEuropean feeling, in a territorial and economic sense. The author distinguishes three migration forms in Europe: 1)

2)

3)

Traditional non-European “ethnic” immigrants—this form is similar to the classic post-colonial and guest worker scenario. European economies generate a demand for migrant workers and this lies at the root of decisions of migrants to move from Africa or Asia; West European “Eurostars” represent “the heart of the EU Commission’s efforts to build Europe through dynamic mobility policies” (Ibid.: 178). This movement is likely to be a predominantly urban hub phenomenon; it is about the circulation of “talent”, with its beneficial side effect of the building of European identity. New East-West post-Enlargement movers. Between the two above forms of migration (“ethnic” immigrants and “elite” professional movers) appears “what has become a cliché [. . .] of the polarised mobility opportunities” (Ibid.: 182). Among intra-European migrants there is evidence that a new generation has mobilised, a generation which is ambitious, mobile, provincial, working and lower-middle class, often women, often from the South, using international migration in Europe as an escape from career and lifestyle frustrations at home (Ibid.: 182).

The irony of this free movement within the European Union is that with the breaking down of frontiers and creation of incentive structures, there are

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statistically insignificant levels of movement. Typically, one of the assumptions is that Europeans do not like to move, they are rooted where they are born by culture and language. A separate category within the last form mentioned above is postEnlargement migration. This migration is dated since 2004 and 2007, even though it has roots before these years and involves countries which are not among the EU-27. The EU movers, new accession country citizens, migrants from all candidate countries, possible candidates, associated and neighbouring countries are included in this category, because of the territorial and concentric effects on integrating markets on a regional scale through the European neighbourhood policies. These free movers are seen as the “avatars of the alltriumphant theory of European integration”. Favell (Ibid.: 183) speaks of a win-win situation for post-Enlargement migrants: the migrants win through satisfying their ambition; the receiving society wins by creaming off their talents; and the sending society will benefit from the positive development initiated by the movement of skilled individuals who circulate money and networks within the new Europe and who will bring back their talents into the newly integrated European economy. The author also speaks of the “negative” effects of post-Enlargement migration: the “threats” that the immigrants represent for the receiving population (examples are Romanians in Milan and Bilbao, Poles in Berlin and London, Russians and Balkans in Paris and Amsterdam or the measures taken by France against the Roma people and by Britain against Bulgarians and Romanians). However, the reactions have been slow and measured. When Favell (Ibid.: 184) evaluates the new European migration system he says that it is not a system based on “a dual labour market in which East Europeans will take the secondary, temporary, flexible roles based on their exploitation in terms of cost and human capital premium” (Ibid.: 184). He predicts that Eastern Europeans will start to move, and they will learn the hard way that the West only wants them to do jobs that Westerners no longer want, so the danger is that they will become the “new Victorian service class for a West European aristocracy of university educated working mums and creative class professionals, who need someone to help them lead their dream lives” (Ibid.: 185). The author offers a solution to attenuate the negative effects which migration has caused to Western societies: regional economic integration, through bilateral external accords and neighbourhood policies. The Eurostat data showed that in 2011 there were 33.3 million foreign citizens resident in EU-27, 6.6% of the total population. The majority, 20.5 million, were citizens of non-EU countries, while the remaining 12.8 million were citizens of other EU Member States. Through better data availability, information on citizenship has often been used to study populations with a foreign

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b­ ackground. However, since citizenship can change over time, it is also useful to present information by country of birth. There were 48.9 million foreignborn residents in the EU in 2011, 9.7% of the total population. Of these, 32.4 million were born outside the EU and 16.5 million were born in another EU Member State. Only in Luxembourg, Ireland, Hungary, Cyprus and Malta did foreign-born people from other EU countries outnumber those born outside the EU. Several major types of migration can be identified based on the intended reason for migration. Albertinelli, Knauth, Kraszewska and Thorogood, (2011:14) identified labour immigration in the European space as a form of migration which is permitted or encouraged by destination countries as a way to fill gaps in the national labour market. This labour migration may take a variety of forms, possibly being aimed at recruiting migrant workers from particular countries of origin or workers with particular skills. They said that in the last years, certain migrant worker policies have focused on attracting highly skilled or educated migrants. Another form of migration identified by the above-mentioned authors is student migration, which has become important in certain parts of Europe, with generally young adults migrating to take part in university courses and other educational opportunities. Although student migration may be seen as essentially temporary in nature, significant numbers remain within the destination country after the end of their studies either as labour migrants or following family formation with a person resident in the destination country. Many European countries have, or have had at different times, specific programmes allowing student migrants who have successfully completed their education to remain in the country to work. The available data (from 2008) indicate that in terms of immigrant citizenship, first place is occupied by Romania, followed by Poland, Bulgaria, Germany, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Hungary, the Netherlands and Portugal. The EU-27 Member States received 384,000 Romanian citizens, 266,000 Polish citizens and 91,000 Bulgarian citizens. Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom were the EU countries with the highest immigration. They received more than half (53%) of all immigrants in 2008, but at the same time they also experienced high emigration. Psychological Dividing Line The changes in the social system became clear in the newcomers as a consequence of “cognitive Europeanisation”, rather than as an effect of an EU strategy (Juhasz 2006:94). The new components which were built in the social systems

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of the new Member States were similar to those in Western Member States, showing the psychological mechanism of coping. Juhasz (Ibid.) wonders why the EU did not give a clear reason for its weakness in influencing the social policy of the newcomers. He cites the example of the Copenhagen criteria and the accession negotiations process as the instruments which could have influenced the creation of a framework for the social system in these states, but he does not provide an answer. We could affirm that the answer lies in the psychological dividing line that might exist because of the idiosyncrasies that affect the decisional process at the EU level. Why are cohesion funds the only available solution for the reduction of disparities between European regions? Can we solve a socio-political and economic issue with an economic instrument? Another important barrier that still persists is the lack or the insufficiency of statistical data. It is clear from the Eurostat data that there is not enough information provided by the newcomers to make comparisons. There is a psychological barrier regarding the comparison that some of the newcomers could not accept, but this cannot be the solution. The first step in order to fix a problem is to accept that this problem exists, it is a form of awareness responsibility that these newcomers have to face. Regarding the statistical comparisons made between EU-15 and EU-27, we have to admit that some indicators are not appropriate for the newcomers. If the EU is proud to affirm that the ESM is its emblem and individual element, then it has to admit that major changes must come about in this indicator, because harmonisation is the key European element. Some of these indicators have psychological effects on the power which a Member State will exert at various levels of negotiations which take place in the EU (for example the dividing line of poverty). The fear of Western citizens regarding the newcomers from the East is a psychological element that might create a dividing line of acceptance. The resistance mechanism followed by the reaction of public opinion will have as effects the political measures which will favour the Member State’s citizens. In the case of Britain regarding Bulgarian and Romanian workers the reaction of the public in that Member State triggered political measures: restriction on the labour market (with its idiosyncratic elements of accession, integration and benefits). We are living in a globalisation era where competition is taking place at an individual level, and the need for protection is expressed in many quarters. The easiest social mechanism that might be deployed is the ethnic element, in order to form a group with a strong cultural background. But this is not a solution, and the political measures taken by Britain had a certain

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deadline, in order for the population to accommodate one effect of Enlargement, free movement of its citizens. Juhasz (Ibid.: 103) believes that the EU’s negligence is evident in the reaction of Member States to the entry of East-Central European countries, even from the moment of finishing the accession process. The East-West welfare gap increased fear in the EU-15 regarding welfare migration and induced governments to introduce preventive measures. As a consequence, a majority of Member States introduced restrictions to the free movement of workers. This short analysis demonstrates that before Enlargement took place, a social and media campaign regarding it should have been organised. The population of EU-15 should have prepared itself from a psychological, social and political point of view for the newcomers from Eastern and Central Europe, formerly “their enemies” if we are thinking in terms of Berlin Wall and its two major blocs: East and West. It was the “fear of invasion” that first had to be eliminated or reduced, followed by the building of the economic and social strategies of Enlargement. But recent policy developments in old members and the opening of the labour market for the post-communist Member States underpin these fears. Juhasz (Ibid.: 104) considers that these fears have started to appear in the new Member States regarding candidate countries in the Balkans. Conclusions The end of the Cold War and the bipolar antagonism of the international system brought the hope of the removal the “walls” which separated families, communities, nations, states, regions and continents. It was believed that the “dividing lines” would be replaced by unity, convergence and integration, and that the accelerated globalisation of international society would become manifest through interconnectivity and rational managed interdependencies. The European Union was seen as a successful historical experience of managing interdependencies and integration, generating expectation of the appearance of a new type of entity/actor in the future post-war international system. A quarter of a century after the elimination of some physical dividing walls, it seems that attitudinal dividing lines still persist at the level of leaders, political parties, governments, regional organisations, etc. Because of the maintenance of these kinds of perceptions and behaviours, the profound reform of European Union promised at the beginning of the 1990s has been repeatedly postponed, to the point of bringing the process of European integration into question. It took a terrible financial-economic global crisis to realise the

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significance of European integration. Yet sometimes these dividing lines have been underlined within the European Union, opening the way to manifestations of nationalist, xenophobic, populist and anti-integrationist feeling. The author of this study demonstrates that it is not enlargement which has thrown up a lot of dividing lines in the European Union, but hesitation in the decision-making necessary for the deepening of European integration. One important author (Wade Jacoby 2010) shows that removing the barriers maintained by the old members of European Union in the way of more rapid and complete integration of the Central-Eastern European states is the right method for the acceleration of the competitiveness of the European Union and for managing globalisation, and for reducing the dividing lines from Europe. Another author (K. Milzow 2008) thinks that these barriers were at the expense of new Member States first of all, damaged the other Member States and especially hampered the strengthening of the European Union. This is the reason why interaction between national and European interests must lead to the elimination of many dividing lines from the interior of the European integration process, taking into consideration the fact that the two types of interests can create a new balance at the level of European construction and thus decrease the inequalities between Member States.

chapter 4

Are Walls a National Security Issue? A View from the United States-Mexico Border Dennis Soden and Alejandro Palma Introduction In 2009 as the growth in transnational gang activity (Palma & Rico 2009) and cartel drug wars have accelerated, it may be argued that some of the policy context of the border has indeed changed, so much so that a redefinition of national security may be understood within the context of the border “fence” being built between the United States and Mexico.1 At one level, the violence that has swept across much of the United StatesMexico border has left few who do not know someone who has been murdered, kidnapped, or who has simply disappeared. Violence has been so rampant and sometimes random that gunfire has hit border checkpoints and victims have literally crawled in an attempt to cross from Mexico into the United States (Llana 2009). Violence has escalated to a point where the once heated debates about illegal immigration and lost jobs for Americans have been overshadowed by calls by the governors of the four border states (Arizona, California, New Mexico and Texas) for National Guard presence and increases in federal border agents. At the same time, Ciudad Juárez, adjacent to El Paso, TX, has become the most violent city in the world, surpassing other notorious crime capitals, including Cape Town, Moscow, Baghdad, and Caracas, among others (Emmott 2009). It should be understood that the problem is not new and has been developing for some time. The election of Mexican President Felipe Calderón in 2006 was followed by a commitment of thousands of Mexican soldiers to face off against the drug cartels. The war on drugs became a real war resulting in 6,200 documented/reported deaths in 2008 for the entire country. Last year 1  It is also a bit of wordsmithing that a barrier over 10 feet tall and several hundred miles long has been denoted as a “fence” by policymakers rather than a wall which has a stigma, at least in contemporary terms, as a failed exercise in the case of the Berlin “Wall” and the walls of the West Bank, among others.

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in Ciudad Juárez alone, a city of 1,6 million people, there were “130 murders for every 100,000 residents on average” (Ibid.). In addition, drug lords such as Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán (kingpin of the Sinaloa Cartel), instructed his forces that U.S. officials were appropriate targets of violence. As a result, 1,325 acts of violence were reported against U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agents in 2008, a 25 percent increase from the year before (Reuters 2009). Albeit a brief over view, clearly conditions have changed. The Obama Administration has also responded, by doubling the number of border patrol agents, tripling the number of intelligence personnel, increasing inspections southward to reduce gun smuggling from the United States, and increasing funding to the Department of Justice to prosecute more dealers and cartel members. In this environment there are of course those who declare that not enough is being done (Bowers 2005), and others, who feel the problem is Mexico’s and will not cross the border. Part of this change in the environment is also evidenced in the recent discussion about the risk in Mexico, economic and political, as well as physical, and personal (Kurtzman 2009). In 2008, Mexico was 31st out of 60 nations in opacity (Kurtzman & Yago 2007)2 and 98th on the Foreign Policy “Failed States Index” (Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace 2009). In the case of the latter, however, Mexico falls into a category that includes countries that presently are doing relatively well in light of the global recession including the BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Mexico’s highly integrated economy, especially in Northern Mexico, is based on a manufacturing sector that is almost entirely tied to U.S. demand; thus, concerns have been raised that lawlessness will spread North and even across the border and cause economic disruption (Lange 2009; Hawley 2009; Llana 2009, Llana & Roeder 2009; see also for a historical pre 9–11 perspective, Hanson 2001). In brief, the recession has dramatically impacted Mexico at the same time that transnational drug cartels began open warfare with the Calderón government. Immigration, both legal and illegal, have d­ ramatically 2  Opacity, as defined in the book Global Edge: Using the Opacity Index to Manage the Risks of Cross-Border Business, is the “lack of clear, accurate, formal, clear-cut practices in the broad arena where business, finance, and government meet”. It is a broad measure of the effectiveness of a country’s economic and financial institutions, as well as its overall risk. Unlike other analyses that examine country risks by summarizing the expert opinion of academics, analysts, former governmental officials, and the media, the Opacity Index is based entirely on empirical observations (J. Kurtzman and G. Yago, Global Edge; Using the Opacity Index to Manage the Risks of Cross-Border Business. Harvard Business School Press, Boston 2007).

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dropped as jobs in the United States have all but disappeared (Soden & Mendoza 2008), while Mexico’s oil supplies are also beginning to dwindle, furthering a cash flow crisis in a nation which funds 40 percent of its government with oil revenue. This is exacerbated by the fact that 60 percent of Mexico’s oil sales also go north to the United States which has tightened its gas guzzling habits in the last year as the recession has worsened (Associated Press 2009). The reality is that those who indeed called for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to further integrate the country were in fact correct, but that like Siamese twins, when one moves the other must come along (Hufbauer & Schott 2005; Gruben & Welch 1994, among others). Mexico is the follower, whether willingly or not, in an era of integration and dependency among global serving markets. Moreover, this setting occurs in a nation that ranks poorly, even when compared to its Western Hemisphere neighbors, on the Global Integrity Index which categorizes Mexico as being weak in terms of anti-corruption policies (Global Integrity 2006). As all this has occurred the United States has earnestly and perhaps a bit haphazardly, been building a “fence” between the two nations. Failed State: An Overview The best summary of this topic is perhaps, Noam Chomsky’s 2006 book, Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy. The term failed state is often used to describe a nation state perceived as having failed at some of the basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government. The following characteristics are proposed by the Fund for Peace, to characterize a failed state:

• loss of physical control of its territory, or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force therein, • erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, • an inability to provide reasonable public services, and • an inability to interact with other states. Common characteristics of a failing state include a central government so weak or ineffective that it has little practical control over much of its territory; non-provision of public services; widespread corruption and criminality; refugees and involuntary movement of populations; and, sharp economic decline (Chomsky 2006).

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The Southwest Border Fence

The construction of this “fence” at a cost of $3 million (U.S.) per mile (Meyers 2006), currently closes off 640 to 670 miles of the border3 attempting to force a funneling into urban areas where more border personnel and support infrastructure reside. In April of 2009, the new Obama administration eliminated funding to complete the fence, with little or no fan fare in light of the previous debate about the fence and its value to immigration, the environment (Oregon State University 2009), homeland security, and national defense. But even though the Obama administration has shunned further construction of the fence, there have been attempts to restart operations by members of Congress. In a recent funding package for the Department of Homeland Security, there was an amendment to construct an additional 600 miles of pedestrian fencing. The amendment was ultimately dropped from the appropriations bill, but adding this new layer of fencing would have cost taxpayers $7 million (U.S.) per mile or an estimated $4 billion (U.S.) according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (Janes 2009). The fence has also gone “virtual” by integrating a “network of cameras and sensors” which took three years to roll out and which at present is plagued with glitches and is over-budget (Avila 2009). In another ironic twist, while holes cut in the fence for smuggling and illegal entry have been common, a recent arrest by the Mexican government of 6 Mexican citizens was undertaken. The arrest was for dismantling the fence and selling the steel as scrap metal (Associated Press 2009: August 27). Government reports estimate that “$6,5 billion (U.S.) will be needed to maintain the new fencing over the next 20 years” and so far the fence “has been breached 3.363 times, requiring $1,300 for the average repair” (Wood 2009).

Border Security Personnel

As previously mentioned, the Obama administration has increased the number of Border Patrol agents to safeguard the nation’s borders, but this increase pertains to the Northern border solely. For fiscal year 2010 there is “a net decrease of 384 agents on the U.S.-Mexico border” and most of these agents move to the Northern border to meet the staffing requirements for that fiscal year, “with only a small increase in new agents for the Southwest border in the same year” (Jeffrey 2009). This reduction will bring the total number of Border Patrol agents on the Southern border to 17,015 and it will increase the number 3  This variation is a result of estimates of completion to date as of 1 September, 2009.

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of agents on the U.S.-Canada border to a total of 2,212 for the 2010 fiscal year (Ibid.). This comes at a time when even the Border Patrol claims that it cannot secure the Southern border in its entirety. But it seems that this reduction in personnel could be directly attributed to a drop in the number of people trying to cross the Southern border illegally. Some sources claim that the fence in combination with new technology and better border enforcement has aided in stemming the flow of illegal immigrants (Lawrence 2009) but the global recession proves otherwise.

Immigration and the Global Recession

The global recession has not only affected the American economy but immigration as well. U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions dropped down to 724,000 last year, the third consecutive year of decline and the lowest level since 1973 (Lozano 2009). The San Diego sector alone saw a 14 percent decrease4 in apprehensions while the Tucson sector saw a 28 percent decrease; there are nine sectors along the U.S.-Mexico border (Brezosky 2009). Since the state of the economy has worsened and fewer jobs are available, immigration has naturally dwindled. This highlights a traditional “push and pull” effect but in this case, the pull factor is not as great as in years past. Many immigrants, especially Mexican immigrants, go back to their countries of origin since they are unable to find jobs. Graph 4.1 showcases this decline in migration to the United States from Mexico right about the same time the country went into a recession. Countries such as Mexico are revamping their healthcare system, the Seguro Popular, to absorb returning migrants and is hoping to create jobs for them with a raft of new infrastructure projects such as highways, airports and new border crossings (Hawley 2008). This migrant return is actually detrimental to the Mexican economy since remittances are the country’s second largest source of revenue. According to Mexico’s central bank, remittances fell 3.6 percent in 2008 to $25bn (BBC 2009). But in the eyes of the Department of Homeland Security, this period of economic weakness could prove beneficial in terms of securing the border. The Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, hopes to beef up border security before the economy recuperates and another wave of illegal immigration follows (Levine 2009).

4  Time frame used is from Oct. 1, 2007 to Jan. 31, 2008 with a total of 39.614 apprehensions and from Oct. 1, 2008 to Jan. 1, 2009 with a total of 34.791 apprehensions. See Lawrence (2009).

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Out of Mexico 1026 479

2006‒2007

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Into Mexico 814 440

636 433

2007‒2008

2008‒2009

GRAPH 4.1 Migration of Mexicans Into and Out of Mexico: Mexican National Survey of Occupation and Employment, 2006–2009 (thousands). Source: Pew Hispanic Center 2009.



Context of Current Discussion: Homeland Security versus National Security

Three points must be considered if fences become walls and are a national security question. First, what was the intent of policies related to the current fence? Second, is the threat from Mexico or does it extend from beyond? Third, are we redefining threats in a post-Cold War world? Confusing real global problems as domestic issues as a result of a long term stand-off between the United States and Mexico about what are the national security questions facing the United States and the world in the 21st century? Policies Regarding the Border Fence Two important initiatives implemented by the George Bush administration relate to this basic question about the border “fence” and its intention. Both the Secure Border Initiative of 2003 and the Secure Fence Act of 2006 have been perceived as key components to the success in halting illegal immigration by the Bush administration, but in broad terms have never been placed into the context of the U.S. foreign policy stance or national security. A review of the Secure Border Initiative, passed in the year 2005, strongly indicates that it is intended to be a comprehensive multi-year plan to secure and reduce illegal immigration. The initiative has five major goals, namely: 1) to increase the staffing capabilities of the agencies in charge of stopping and apprehending illegal immigrants; 2) expand detention and removal

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capabilities; 3) increase investment on border security infrastructure; 4) increase the use and implementation of new technological advances to monitor the border; and, 5) increase interior enforcement of immigration laws (Department of Homeland Security 2009). Regardless of intent, this initiative did not have what we would deem as a “traditional” national security intention, in fact, U.S. Department of State involvement at the foreign policy strategy level was minimal as was that of the Department of Defense. And we would note, traditional is emphasized, a point to which we shall return. The Secure Fence Act was signed into law by President Bush on October 26, 2006. This act allowed for the construction of a fence covering 700 miles along the U.S.-Mexico border. Additionally, it authorized an increase in lighting, vehicle barriers, border checkpoints and placement of sensors, cameras, satellites, and unmanned aerial vehicles. All measures are implemented in an attempt to control illegal immigration, with again no discussion of “traditional” national security (The White House 2006). In the aftermath of the Bush policies, under the Obama Administration, the fence project has had most of its funding eliminated. The Obama Administration has reduced its request related border security from the $1,9 billion (U.S.) of the Bush Administration to nearly half or $926 million (U.S.) for FY 2010 (Newsmax 2009). The reality of decline in illegal immigration is more closely linked to the economy, as discussed in other studies, and the “threat” to the United States has neither increased or decreased in “traditional” national security terms as a result of these policies or changes as the Obama Administration has back-tracked on some of the Bush post-9–11 position. Where is the Threat Coming From? An additional terror threat that moves the discussion beyond the “traditional” national security questions and helps define the new paradigm, for lack of a better word, is the growing reality that the United States-Mexico border is, and probably has, become or could become an entry point for terrorists into the United States (Bowers 2005). No solid evidence to date suggests the number of terrorists who may have crossed into the United States, either legally on valid passports and visas, or illegally using the networks of organized crime, transnational gangs and drug trafficking organizations; although, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) acknowledges known terrorists have entered through the southern border. Most recently, Michael Braun who was assistant administrator and chief of operations for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) stated that Hezbollah supporters have been smuggled through the U.S.-Mexico border (Carter 2009). Even less clear is if these terrorists are linked strongly through organized cells, or weakly as individuals with a jihadist mission, to groups as openly opposed to the United States as al-Qaeda, or are part of more

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rapidly expanding organized crime and gang activity, which reaches from Canada deep into South America, creating a force that most Latin American governments are ill prepared to defend against or have been co-opted through corruption. As an example of the latter, Mexico’s anti-drug czar, supposedly the first line in the war against the drug cartels, was charged with accepting a $450,000 (U.S.) bribe from drug lords (Kurtzman 2009). The relative openness of the United States, compared to other countries, even in a post-9/11 world, is still remarkable and entry and exit is relatively easy despite best efforts to eliminate undesirable enemies of the state. However, the shift in national security reasoning suggests that the goal of international terror groups must be considered as an attack on the United States’ sovereign soils (Bowers 2005). However, the degree to which a fence or a wall can deter this threat must be considered minimal. The veracity and dedication of terrorists to attack the United States and the political system it represents will not be stopped by a fence. The fence as a surrogate for protection against these forces is failed policy at best. .

Redefining Threats to National Security Third, the reality of the fence between these two nations must, in time, raise the question of the hegemonic role of the United States in the post-Cold War period. Much of the United States’ foreign policy and national security as it pertains to Latin America has its roots in policies that go back at least two decades (Manero 2007:50). Redefining America’s Latin America policies has promoted the understanding of the transnational characteristics of threats such as narco-terrorism, organized crime, and human trafficking. In the United States this has had a major impact on redefining the role of the military which previously has had multiple locations and operations in Latin America (i.e., military bases in Honduras, operations in Grenada and Panama, fighting drugs in Colombia). These threats to national security, however, take advantage of the global system and its realities. It does little to separate Latin America, and Mexico in particular, from the rest of American foreign policy. The evidence for this is especially well represented by the presence of United States security facilities in Latin America in the post-Cold War period including an absence in the border region of the southern United States, an area no less populated than Europe or the Middle East or the Pacific Rim might show. Put into other words, the condition of the fence is that it is not a strategic consideration represented by a power relation in the larger international system and the society and its institutions. Nor does it suggest we are engaged in a collaborative and deliberative process about priorities based on national and sub-national agendas. In this interpretation, the fence or wall represents

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symbolic politics and stigmas associated with two nations that have had a cold war of their own since the mid-1800s, instead of deliberative policies about individual or joint national security concerns.

U.S.-Mexico Relations

When one examines the extant literature related to United States-Mexico relations, there is a startling gap about the national security issues between the two nations. Even the most recent activities associated with the Mérida Initiative are not traditional national security issues but linked to the “War on Drugs,” narco-terrorism, and immigration. Instead, the issues that underscore the discussion of the “fence” have been economic and social integration and the disruption immigration plays on the social fabric and labor markets in both nations. Even best efforts of the Mérida Initiative have not reached the realm of national security. The Mérida Initiative is a $1,4 billion + (U.S.) assistance program to Latin America to assist in combating organized crime and drug trafficking (Cook, et al. 2008). As an example of bi-national and multi-national cooperation, it includes several categories of expenditures, none of which would be characterized as traditional expenditures for national security and is weakly linked to foreign policy and diplomacy. While the Mérida Initiative is the most recent example of activity, a historical review suggests Mexico has never been a topic of U.S. “traditional” national Security policy, even during World War II when Mexico City played a role as home to agents from many nations, the Lisbon of Latin America in many ways for that era (Andrew 1995). This returns us to the question of the barrier between nations being a national security question. In other terms, is Mexico a national security threat and the wall any form of deterrent? Based on expenditures, a rather simple measure, Mexico spends more than $6 billion (U.S.) on defense (2006), a relative minimal amount compared to Canada at $19 billion (U.S.) and the United States at $515 billion (Global Fire Power 2009). At the same time the Obama Administration has committed Stimulus Funding in excess of $8,5 million (U.S.) to combat narco-terrorism, adding to over a trillion dollars spent in the past decade to fight “Laredo-style” or open warfare with drug cartels (Drug Sense Focus Alert 2007). By comparison, the defense expenditures related to traditional national security clearly exceed, by a great magnitude, the amounts spent on border security. In this environment, Mexico’s national security posture is reserved at best. The 3,200 km U.S.-Mexico land border is undefended by the Mexican gov-

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ernment, the 970 km border with Guatemala is unarmed, and the nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone and its coast are lightly monitored to the dismay of others (For overview see Encyclopedia of Nations 1996). Since WWI, Mexico has never been in an external defense role even in the midst of World War II. As a result, are we vulnerable in a traditional national security sense? Would loss of the United States’ second largest trading partner and access to Mexico’s oil be a larger concern than immigration issues that fostered the development of a fence policy? Mexican national security, internally and externally, is clearly threatened by inequality, lack of strong democratic institutions or rule of law, corruption in government, especially law enforcement, and the lack of resources to eliminate dependency on the United States. Yet, the wall/fence lacks strategic clarity is it supposed to stop immigrants, drugs, or al-Qaeda? Is the United States threatened or paranoid? There is no clear answer to these questions. However, added to this there is little in terms of a formal alliance between the two nations and the national security threat seems greater for the United States, which sees the border as a corridor for terrorists rather than Mexico or its citizens as being a threat. In some sense the position could be taken that the American appetite for illegal drugs is the larger cause, although not popular to discuss as Secretary of State Clinton recently discovered; although, she is entirely correct in her statements (Landler 2009). Even the shared paradigm of concern for narcoterrorism and transnational gangs does not equate to a fence/wall which does little to limit the effects of either (Curzio 2008).

Further Analysis

Within the United States, national security agencies and those associated with Homeland Security cannot coordinate a response internally and less so externally. Can this be seen as a lack of salience in national security terms or are they simply behemoth organizational structures that cannot work together? The Obama Administration’s investment in Department of Justice and Homeland Security does not equate with expenditures for Defense and the State Department (Labott 2009). Likewise in the opposite direction, defense expenditures do little to support Law Enforcement related to either immigration or drug trade. By contrast, maybe the threat is real, that national security has shifted to transnational issues and drugs and organized crime are as equally salient as protecting national interests in the Middle East or fighting intolerable regimes. Yet in other places where terrorism has been nurtured, walls and fences are

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not recorded responses. If the wall was gone, would Mexico stand-by as the United States used military force to combat drug cartels or condone United States use of force on Mexican soil? Would the United States grant Mexico open co-responsibility to protect the border region, the hemisphere? On face, the answer is a resounding NO, the United States is unlikely to relinquish its role to Mexico or invite it in as an equal. Why? Because the war on narco-terrorism and organized crime are domestic law enforcement issues in most people’s thinking. If, however, the wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan were to cease and the United States Armed Forces were to suddenly have far less value as a result of a miracle that led to a decline in the mission in the Middle East, would they find a new role in combating organized crime and narco-terrorism? Undoubtedly, the answer may be yes, recalling that in the aftermath of the Cold War United States’ forces played a role in fighting drugs in Colombia. The wall is an entity of large physical proportions, but we are not entirely sure what it is in the geopolitics of North America, and one of the authors has suggested before that it is a racist statement (Soden and Mendoza, 2008). Regardless, it is not a traditional national security apparatus nor is a routine response under the current state of affairs in global politics. Those who view it as such miss the point that despite decades of suspicion on both sides, Mexico and the United States are highly integrated allies; friends by default. At best, the wall may be a symbol of a new national security paradigm that is unfolding. The word strategic threat will no longer be limited to sovereignty, but to instability and weak government, in which Mexico has been described. The U.S. will increasingly rely upon weak and unstable governments to combat enemies who no longer fall into national categories: groups operating within the outer fringes of the law and sometimes out of the reach of governments. Do policymakers fear redefining national security? The answer to that is a definite YES! However, if nations destabilize, the effects are likely to flow across borders creating additional human and environmental catastrophes, so are we at risk? Yes, and the transnational nature of those concerns ranging from H1N1 to water pollution are examples. In this context, bombs and bullets of traditional national security are not the measure, but the misery of others will envelope us in health risks, poverty, drug addiction, and human trafficking, etc., that will in time redefine national security (Atwood 1995). Conclusion National security discussion may see United States policymakers examining more closely the problems of European societal security (Hamilton, et al. 2005:

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153–155). The new paradigm will push borders out to unprecedented levels transforming the domestic and internationally focused components of governments. Such need and associated effort may, however, be self-defeating if the wall/fence mentality sustains and current approaches cannot be pushed aside as a result of decades of innovation and bureaucratic inertia. The current fence/wall strategy continues to sustain the historic mistrust between the two nations and designating border and drug czars in either country is symbolic, proving or accomplishing little in the past. The fence/wall feeds what Craig Deare (2009:1–2) deems an “incompatible interface” between the two nations, defined as quite distinct and unaligned national security enterprises. The larger national security question requires more than alignment and cooperation, but reorganization of efforts ranging from a unified military in Mexico versus its two defense structure of the Army and Navy at present, adequate budgeting and training, including joint training, properly trained civilian executives, and reducing mistrust between the two nation’s military establishments. Beyond this, the national security of the region is at risk as the United States interacts on a domestic front and pursues global interests far away from the southern border, while Mexico simply has no ability to play an active role. That becomes the larger long term issue, namely that national security interests are not represented by the fence. It is only a fence, and good fences despite suggestions by the American poet Robert Frost, do not make good neighbors. The fence has done nothing to protect either nation nor will it succeed in staving off the problems associated with drug trafficking, human trafficking, and organized crime ranging from extortion to arms smuggling and money laundering. Moreover, the fence will never accomplish protecting the United States from terrorist threats.

PART 3 State, Security and Ethnic-Political Walls

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chapter 5

The Berlin Wall Anneli Ute Gabanyi Introduction On August 13, 1961, the government of the German Democratic Republic started the construction of a fortified wall which was to divide the city of Berlin for 28 years. The “the Anti-Fascist Protection bulwark” (der “antifaschistische Schutzwall”)”, as it was called by leading Socialist Unity Party activist Horst Sindermann (Jung 2007:100), separated the Sector of the city controlled by the Soviet Union from its three Western sectors which had been assigned to the United States, Great Britain and France at the end of World War II. Moreover, because of its location inside the territory of the Soviet-dominated part of the former German Reich which in 1949 had become the German Democratic Republic, the new wall was also to cut the Western sectors of Berlin off from their GDR “hinterland”, turning West Berlin into an exclave linked by few and fragile communication routes to the Western zones of Germany. The Berlin wall is unique because it was built not to fend off external enemies but in order to lock in a country’s population (Aly 2001:11). Because of its unique strategic location making it “the most dangerous place on earth” (Kempe 2011c), the Berlin wall stands out amidst the world’s other walls. As a matter of fact, the division of Berlin into three sectors had been recommended as early as in September 1944 by the European Advisory Commission made up by the representatives of the US, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. At the Yalta Conference held in February 1945, France was granted a fourth occupation zone in Germany and a fourth sector in Berlin. Finally, at the Potsdam Conference held between 28 July and 1 August 1945, the division of Germany into four occupation zones and of Berlin into four sectors was agreed upon between the partners of the anti-Hitler coalition. As long as the wall stood, the problem of a divided Berlin remained closely linked to the question of a divided Germany left unresolved after World War II, figuring high on the world political agenda and generating tension and conflicts. The crisis that erupted when the Berlin wall was built brought the world closer than ever to the brink of a hot, possibly nuclear war. When it finally came down, it was to symbolize the end of communism, of the division of Germany and of the division of Europe. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004272859_007

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In the context of the other walls in the world, the Berlin wall is noted for its high symbolic value. Between 1961 and its fall, it had come to be regarded as a symbol of the inhumanity of the communist system, the division of Germany and the post-war division of the European continent between two super-powers that stood for two antagonistic ideologies, political systems and economic strategies. As long as it stood, the Berlin wall “captured the essence of the Cold War” (Freedman 2002:1), serving as an indicator of the state of superpower relations, of the relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and, last but not least, of relations between the two German states.

Berlin at the Outset of the Cold War

At a very early stage, the Soviet Union realized that the provisional character of the Potsdam agreements, the lack of a peace treaty on Germany and the uncertain status of Berlin provided it with a valuable instrument to put pressure on its Western allies and extend its influence in Europe. During World War II already, the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had left no doubt about the determination of the Soviet Union to impose the communist system in the part of Germany occupied by the Red Army. Following the conclusion of the Potsdam Treaty, Stalin expressed confidence that within a year or two, he would be able to undermine the British position in its occupation zone and that the United States would soon withdraw from Germany. This Soviet strategy was not lost on its Western wartime allies. As soon as the war was over, contradictions between the former wartime allies were quick to develop. In February 1946 already, the Moscow-based American diplomat George Kennan warned that Soviet expansion could only be stopped by force through a long-term policy of containment. In his famous speech delivered on March 5, 1946, at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill prophetically pointed to what he called “an iron curtain” which had descended on the continent “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic.” The populations behind that line, he said, “lie in what I must call the Soviet Sphere, and all of them are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in some cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow” (Churchill 1946). A couple of days later, in a speech to Congress the American president Harry S. Truman set out what was to become the Truman Doctrine. In it, he outlined the need for the U.S. to support free peoples against totalitarian regimes and to stop Soviet expansionism through a policy of containment (Harbutt 2002:19–20). Faced with overt Soviet expansionism, the Western allies

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abandoned their original goal of a permanent demilitarization of Western Germany, drawing it into the Western security structures instead. Moreover, they adopted a policy of establishing the rule of law, democratic institutions and free market economy in the German occupation zones under their control. From the very beginning of the cold war, the Soviet Union had sought to change the status of Berlin and to terminate the presence of the Western allies in Berlin. Its ultimate goal was to preserve Moscow’s post-war territorial gains in Europe (Miller 2000:13). Soviet leaders Joseph Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev both tried to use Berlin as a lever to negotiate or force a settlement of the German question that would suit their overall political goals. In his typically blunt language, Khrushchev said that “Berlin is the West’s balls. Every time I want to make the West scream, I squeeze on Berlin” (Reynolds 2009:172). At the same time, Berlin had also become the Soviet’s Achilles’ heel. The Western allies exploited the “nuisance value” West Berlin offered them as their most Eastern outpost for extensive intelligence activities1 and a loophole for the growing numbers of East Germans who wanted to the leave the Sovietdominated part of Germany via West Berlin. However, their major problem was that, due to its strategic location inside East German territory, West Berlin was not defensible unless the Western allies took the risk of nuclear escalation which was in nobody’s interest.

The First Berlin Crisis: The 1948 Blockade

Immediately after 1945, Moscow’s main objective was to prevent West Germany from establishing itself as an independent state and turning west. However, Stalin’s first attempt to terminate the Western presence by force in Berlin failed. The first Berlin crisis erupted on 24 June 1948 a few days after a monetary reform had been implemented in the West German zones by the United States and extended to West Berlin. The Soviets withdrew from the Allied Control Council in West Berlin and decided to block almost all land and water routes between the city and the Western German zones. As a result of the Soviet blockade, West Berliners were cut off from all deliveries of food and energy by air, land and water. In a historic speech held before 300,000 Berliners, the city mayor Ernst Reuter launched an emotional appeal to the “peoples of the world, the peoples in America, England, France, and Italy! Look at this city and realize that you are not allowed to and cannot relinquish this city and this people!” (Schöne 2011:23). Being aware of the fact that the use of force would 1  The city had “the highest density of spies per square meter” (Freedman 2002:5).

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most certainly lead to war with the Soviets, the United States, alongside Britain, France, Canada, Australia and several other nations, staged an unprecedented airlift to Berlin in order to keep up a steady flow of supplies for the inhabitants of the city. During the Berlin blockade, the Western countries effected some 277,264 transport flights to the encircled city with their “raisin bombers” (“Rosinenbomber”, as they were called by the population) carrying almost two million tons of goods to Berlin (Führ 2008:20). Confronted with the Western resolve to stay in Berlin, the Soviet Union finally gave in by lifting the blockade on May 12, 1949, permitting Western shipments to Berlin again. The failure of the Soviet blockade ushered in a new phase in the development of the two German states. The Western powers signalled their acceptance of the constitution for the Federal Republic of Germany which was proclaimed on May 24, 1949 with the capital in Bonn. In his inaugural speech held on September 15, 1949, the newly elected FRG chancellor Konrad Adenauer expressed the intention of his government to integrate his country into the Western world. On the 7th of October of that same year, the German Democratic Republic was founded in the Soviet occupation zone; its capital was to become (East) Berlin. From now on, Germany was divided into two states. Under the new circumstances, Moscow resorted to diplomatic efforts in order to prevent the Federal Republic of Germany from joining the Western security structures. To achieve this end, the Soviet leader sent the draft of a Peace Treaty, the so-called “Stalin Note”, to the four allies with Germany on March 10, 1952, in which he offered to acquiesce to the unification of Germany in exchange for its demilitarization and neutralization. In his note, he outlined three stipulations of such a treaty:

· The withdrawal of all occupation troops from the territory of Germany within a year after the signing of the treaty, · The liquidation of all military bases stationed there and · The obligation of Germany not to enter into any coalition or alliance directed against any of the participants in the war against Germany.

It was the West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer who refused to sign such a Peace Treaty, opting for Germany’s Euro-Atlantic integration instead. On May 26, 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany and the three Western powers signed what has become known as the “Germany” or “General Treaty”, a treaty of international law which formally ended Germany’s status as an occupied country and granted it the rights of a sovereign country, with a few restrictions remaining in place until 1991. With the occupation regime of Western Germany

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having formally terminated, the Soviet Union reciprocated by handing over the task of guarding East Germany’s frontiers to the GDR border troops. Moreover, Moscow gave the GDR authorities green light to adopt a new law on border regulations in 1952. Border Before 1952, demarcation lines between the Western and the Soviet occupation zones had been fixed as early as July 1945. However, these lines, totalling 1,393 km (including 155 km separating West Berlin from the GDR and 43 km dividing East and West Berlin), were not hermetically closed until 1952. In the early post-war years, the (still) open frontier between East and West Berlin offered an escape route for East Germans increasingly dissatisfied with the Sovietization of the society and economy and the worsening supply situation in what became the GDR in 1949. Between 1949 and 1960, the number of East German refugees totalled 2,686,942 (Schöne 2011:40). Before the Berlin wall was erected in August 1961, the GDR thus lost almost 20% of its population, not to mention the damage inflicted by the ever growing exodus on the country’s economic stability and the regime’s legitimacy. On the basis of this law which came into force on May 26, 1952, the GDR authorities closed and fortified the inner-German frontiers, thus practically sealing off their territory and stepping up repression against those who tried to flee the communist “state of workers and peasants” (Führ 2008:33–49). However, given the four-power-status of Berlin, would-be refugees could still take the subway, streetcar or bus from the Eastern to the Western sectors of the city, from where they could reach West Germany via the communication routes controlled by the Western powers. From now on, West Berlin became the main and only “loophole” in the strictly guarded GDR border system for a growing number of East Germans dissatisfied by the communist regime in Eastern Germany. The rigid program of “building socialism” proclaimed by the communist “Socialist Unity Party” (Sozialistische Einheitspartei”, SED) exacerbated political repression of the population there. The economic crisis resulting from the nationalization of industry and the collectivization of agriculture in the GDR led to the breakout of the first popular uprising in a Soviet bloc country on June 17, 1953. It was crushed with the aid of Soviet tanks. At the same time, the Western integration of the Federal Republic of Germany continued. On July 23, 1952, the so-called Paris Treaty (the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community) signed in 1951 by the FRG, Italy, France and the three Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) which was to become the European Union, came into force. As the actual implementation of the provisions of the 1952 “General Treaty”

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had been blocked by France due to its opposition to the related treaty on the European Defence Community, a revised treaty (also referred to in Germany as “Die Pariser Verträge”—“the Paris conventions”) was signed in Paris on October 23, 1954 and came into force on May 5, 1955. On 9 May 1955, the sovereign West German state joined the West European Union and NATO. Once more, the Soviet Union responded immediately to this move. On May 14, 1955, the Warsaw Pact as the military alliance of the Soviet Union and the East European communist countries was established. The GDR joined the Warsaw Pact in January 1956, after the Soviet Union had granted it formal sovereignty in the bilateral treaty concluded in September 1955. With the establishment of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the border between Western and Eastern Germany became the frontline between two highly militarized opposing blocs. Once the outer GDR frontiers had been closed in 1952, Berlin became the main exit gate for East German refugees. Incidents along this frontline acquired an even greater potential for sparking a major, even thermo-nuclear armed conflict between the USA and the Soviet Union than before.

The Second Berlin Crisis—1958–1962

On November 27, 1958, a second major Berlin crisis erupted; it can be divided into two stages: 1958 to 1960 and 1961 to 1963 (Wilke 2011a:1). On November 27, 1958, Khrushchev confronted the Western powers with an ultimatum. He threatened to transfer control of the communication lines between West Germany and West Berlin to the GDR government. In the event of Western refusal to withdraw from Berlin within six months, he stated his intention to conclude a separate peace treaty between the Soviet Union and the GDR. On January 10, 1959, Moscow came up with another proposal, calling on all the World War II participants to meet for a peace conference to conclude a peace treaty with Germany. His draft of a peace treaty was based on the existence of two German states and a demilitarized “free West Berlin”. Analysts are divided about the main factors which prompted the hardening of the Soviet stance following several years of negotiations about the “German question” and the status of Berlin at that stage of the crisis. At the centre of scholarly debates is the question to what degree Khrushchev’s policy in the second Berlin crisis was influenced by the GDR leader Walter Ulbricht. Some authors, such as U.S. historian Hope M. Harrison, emphasize the role played by the East German “tail” wagging the Soviet “dog” (Harrison 2004). As a matter of fact, as Manfred Wilke pointed out, it was Ulbricht who publicly set the tone for Khrushchev’s November 1958 ultimatum. As early as July 1958, at the East

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German communist (SED) party congress, the GDR leader asked for the conclusion of a peace treaty on Germany and for change of the status of Berlin. His preconditions for a German peace treaty were a confederation between the two German states, nonalignment, and the strengthening of the international position of the GDR. According to Ulbricht, West Berlin, “occupied” by the Western powers, had to be “normalized” and transformed into a “city of peace and progress”. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev present at the GDR party congress echoed Ulbricht’s accusations against the Federal Republic of Germany by saying: “Nobody can deny that West Germany’s joining NATO, the introduction of compulsory military service and the decision to equip the West German army with atomic and rocket weapons have further exacerbated international relations and in particular the relations between the two German states. It is the Bonn government itself which is placing stone on stone to erect a wall between the two parts of Germany.” (Wilke 2011a:4). In this speech, Khrushchev not only used the term “wall” months before it was actually erected. He clearly outlined which main concerns had prompted the Soviet Union to present its ultimatum to the Western powers: the introduction of general compulsory conscription in the FRG, the positive vote of the German Bundestag on the stationing of U.S. atomic weapons on German soil, the NATO decision on acquiring atomic weapons, and last, but not least, the West German policy of preventing official recognition of the GDR under the so-called “Hallstein Doctrine”. According to Martin J. Hillenbrandt, a U.S. diplomat who spent the crucial years between 1958 and 1962 at the U.S. embassy in Bonn, Khrushchev was also under pressure “from hard-liners in the Politburo such as Frol Kozlov and Mikhail Suslov” (Hillenbrandt 1999:2). As a matter of fact, the question of whether or not to launch the ultimatum had been debated between “hawks” and “doves” in Moscow. Opposition to Khrushchev’s ultimatum had come not only from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but even from the Politburo itself where Anastas Mikoyan warned Khrushchev that his “sabre rattling” could trigger a war with NATO (Reynolds 2009:195). Indeed, Western reaction to the Soviet ultimatum was quick in coming and was strong. On December 14, 1958, the foreign ministers of the three Western allies and the Federal Republic voiced their resolve to secure their rights in Berlin. Two days later, the foreign ministers of the NATO member states declared that West Berlin belonged to the area protected by the North Atlantic treaty. In a note to the Soviet government, the foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Germany refused officially to recognize the GDR and accept a change in the status of Berlin. Western military planners initiated contingency plans for any future Soviet interference with their right to use the transit ways to West Berlin. The risk of a war—even of thermo-nuclear war—over Berlin

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during the 1959 crisis was high. Given the impossibility of the Western allies to win a conventional war over Berlin in the face of the overwhelming tank superiority of the Soviet army stationed in the GDR and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the only viable military option of the West would have been to use nuclear weapons. A diplomatic intermezzo followed, temporarily easing the tension. The resolve shown by the Western powers to defend their rights over Berlin went along with efforts to convince the Soviet leadership that it was too risky to take unilateral action, pleading for negotiations instead. As president Dwight D. Eisenhower made the Soviet recognition of Western rights in Berlin the precondition for U.S. participation in a conference on Germany, Khrushchev gave in on March 15, 1959. Although the ensuing Conference on Germany taking place in Geneva between May and August 1959 at ministerial level did not bring about palpable results, it contributed to a lessening of tension between the two superpowers, paving the way for Khrushchev’s visit to the United States in September that year. There was even hope that a summit meeting between American and Soviet leaders held in Paris in May 1960 would result in substantive and constructive talks on the Berlin and German question. However, public recognition by Eisenhower of U.S. responsibility for the American U-2 spy plane shot down by the Soviet military provided the opportunity for Khrushchev to peremptorily break up the meeting. The abortive Paris summit marked the end of the first stage of the second Berlin crisis. The second stage of the crisis was ushered in by the Soviet-American summit meeting held on June 3–4, 1961 in Vienna, marking a turning point in the unfolding of the events. There, the inexperienced newly elected American president John F. Kennedy, weakened by the disastrous failure of the CIA-led coup against the Cuban president Fidel Castro in the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, met with a self-confident and aggressive Nikita Khrushchev, whose spirits were high after the Soviets had sent the first man ever into space. Unlike Kennedy, who sought to reach an agreement with the Soviets on a nuclear test ban, for Khrushchev, the German question and the problem of Berlin figured high on his summit agenda. In private talks with Ulbricht, Khrushchev left no doubt that the treaty he had in mind was one that would favour Soviet interests: “In the talks with Kennedy”, Khrushchev told Ulbricht on the eve of the Vienna meeting, “the peace treaty will be a central question. If we can wrest the peace treaty from him, this will tear NATO to pieces, because the German question is cementing NATO” (Wettig 2011; Wilke 2011b:9). Just like Stalin before him, Khrushchev used the Berlin problem and in particular the presence of the Western allies in the city “as a leverage to force the West into serious negotiations” (Reynolds 2009:198) about a German peace treaty. However, with the

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growing number of refugees from Eastern Germany, the Berlin issue in itself turned into an essential problem for the Soviet leader himself: “existential: to the viability of East Germany, to Communist ideology, and to his own hold on power.” (Kempe 2011a:1). Although no agreements were expected from the Vienna summit, termed as “informal”, the outcome was catastrophic for the American side. At the beginning of the last round of talks (Wettig 2011; Wilke 2011b:10), that was to deal with the German question, Khrushchev handed Kennedy an ultimatum giving the Western powers six months to solve the Berlin question. As in 1958, he threatened that in the event of Western refusal to conclude a peace treaty, Moscow could not be prevented from concluding a separate peace treaty with East Germany. This would end Western access to Berlin unless it was negotiated with the GDR government. The American president made it clear that the issue of West Berlin deeply affected Western interests and had the potential to damage the credibility of the United States in standing by its commitments in Europe as a whole. If the United States was to give up its rights in Berlin, “no one would have any confidence in U.S. commitments and pledges . . . If we were to leave Berlin, Europe would have to be abandoned as well” (Reynolds 2009:208). He pointed out that “a peace treaty denying us our contractual rights is a belligerent act”, whereas Khrushchev made it clear that that the Soviet decision to sign a peace treaty in December was irrevocable and that it was “up to the U.S. to decide whether there will be war or peace” (Ibid.: 209).

Preparations for the Building of the Wall

In despair over the demographic haemorrhage, Ulbricht put increased pressure on the Soviet leader to block the escape routes to the West via Berlin. Moreover, he availed himself of the Sino-Soviet rift in order to put additional heat on Khrushchev urging the Soviet Union to act in order to prevent a GDR breakdown. In November 1960, Khrushchev had proposed to Ulbricht that the two countries jointly elaborate tactics to push the Western powers out of West Berlin, but without provoking a war. The Soviet leader asked the GDR leader to postpone the implementation of his plans until after his scheduled meeting with American President Kennedy in order not to complicate “the real Soviet goal of a German settlement”.2 Ulbricht agreed but wanted to be sure that the Berlin problem would be solved in 1961. 2  The Soviet ambassador Pervuhin in a message to the Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko on May 19, 1961 (Reynolds 2009:198).

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Kennedy’s show of strength at the Vienna summit did not, however, impress Khrushchev, who left the Austrian capital convinced that the United States was ready to defend the rights of the allies in West Berlin only, giving him a free hand to act in the Eastern part of the city and in East Berlin. Back from Vienna, he gave green light to Ulbricht on July 6, permitting him to take the necessary steps to close the border to West Berlin. West Berlin, Kennedy insisted, was under the shield of NATO and an attack against it would be considered an attack against all its member states. He announced an increase in U.S. military spending and in the number of draftees and reservists to be called to arms (Wilke 2011a:14). When Kennedy reiterated his position in a televised speech on July 25, 1961, formulating the “three essentials” of America’s Berlin policy— the right of the Western powers to be in West Berlin, their right of access and the securing of the freedom of its inhabitants—preparations for the building of the wall had already started.3 By marking the red line for Western reaction— the presence of the U.S., Great Britain and France in Berlin and the roads to West Berlin only—Kennedy in fact “wrote the script that Khrushchev followed—as long as Khrushchev restricted his actions to East Berlin and East Germany, Kennedy would accept his actions” (Kempe 2011a:1). After the Soviets had given their go-ahead to the East Germans on the wall on July 6, they were surprised to find out that Ulbricht’s preparations for the building of the Berlin wall were already well advanced. As early as January 1961, a task force had been set up in East Berlin to work out concrete plans for a closing of the Berlin escape hatch. Erich Honecker, the head of the CC secretariat in charge of security problems, was entrusting with the practical implementation of the project. Yet, at an international press conference held on June 15, 1961, the GDR leader Walter Ulbricht declared that “nobody has the intention to raise a wall in Berlin.” He got away with it. From August 6 on, the task of the overall planning of military operations was given over to the Soviet military stationed in the GDR. By then, the number of troops belonging to the so-called Group of Soviet armed Forces in Germany had been increased by 37,500 to 380,000. At the same time, additional Soviet troops were stationed in Poland and Hungary. On the eve of the building of the Berlin Wall, the total strength of the Soviet military in central Europe had been increased by 25% to a total of 545,000 troops, representing about one third of the total ground troops of the Soviet Union. The Soviet air force in the GDR was also reinforced, being also armed with “special” i.e. nuclear ammunition (Wilke 2011a:19). On August 10, retired Marshal Ivan Konev, who together with Marshal Konstantin Zhukov had commanded the Soviet troops which had conquered 3  http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1961berlin-usa-ussr.html.

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Berlin in 1945, was nominated as supreme commander of the Soviet troops in Germany. A symbolic measure, no doubt. At a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact States held on 3–5 August in Moscow, Walter Ulbricht presented the other heads of state of the member organisations with his intention to close the sector border in Berlin.4 Drawing an analogy with the 1953 GDR uprising, he claimed that the “revanchist policy” conducted by the Federal Republic of Germany, using West Berlin as an instrument, made it necessary to declare that the closing of the sector border was an issue for activating the Pact’s mutual defence clause. Considering a threat against the German Democratic Republic as a threat against the Warsaw Pact as a whole, its leaders agreed, launching an appeal to the GDR Parliament (“Volkskammer”) and its Council of Ministers to introduce a border regime capable of “stopping the subversive activities against the countries of the socialist bloc” (Ibid.: 17). The GDR Parliament unanimously “adopted” the Warsaw Pact declaration and so did the Council of Ministers in the course of a nocturnal meeting held at Ulbricht’s country resort on August 12, just an hour before the operation started (Ibid.: 18).

Western Reactions to the Building of the Wall

The preparations for the closing of the border between East and West Berlin, codenamed “Action Rose” proceeded in conditions of the utmost secrecy. A frequently asked question is whether Western intelligence was aware of the events to come. As a matter of fact, Western human intelligence sources in the GDR had correctly reported the imminence of the construction of barriers in Berlin, even predicting the exact date of the operation (Wyden 1989:91). On August 9, for instance, Colonel Ernest Von Pawel, Chief of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission to the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, predicted the construction of a wall at the weekly meeting of the Berlin Watch Committee coordinating the activities of the U.S. intelligence agencies active in the city, but he lacked hard evidence to support his prediction. However, the 4  The East German leader had already tried to rally support for this policy from the other Warsaw Pact states at a Warsaw Pact meeting in March 1961. According to Jan Sejna, counsellor to the Czechoslovak Minister of Defence who had defected to the West, he had presented his counterparts with the need to take “countermeasures” to close the Berlin sector borders with “military guards of our frontier troops, barriers, even with barbed wire entanglements.” According to Sejna’s report, his proposals had then been rejected as being “provocative” (Harrison 2004:169).

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existing information was not correctly interpreted in the Western intelligence centrals or had not been passed on to the political leaders. Even if Western leaders had been correctly informed, they seemed to be neither willing nor prepared to act. If at all, the Western allies expected the Soviets to take action in Berlin later in the year. In a conversation with his advisor Walt Rostow just a week before the building of the Berlin wall started, President Kennedy is quoted as saying: “Khrushchev is losing East Germany. He cannot let that happen. If East Germany goes, so will Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe. He will have to do something to stop the flow of refugees. Perhaps a wall. And we won’t be able to prevent it” (Kempe 2011a:1). In a cable to the State department released on August 12, 2011, U.S. ambassador Thompson even argued that “the cessation of refugee flow” from Eastern Germany could turn out as a long-range advantage” for the West “by demonstrating the weaknesses of the Soviet and East German position”. He even advised against Washington giving the impression that “strong countermeasures” could be taken by Washington in the event.5 On July 30, Senator William Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said in a televised speech that the Russians could close the borders between East and West Berlin “without violating any treaty”. According to him, the East Germans “have the right to close their borders” (Fulbright 1961). In a similar vein, French Minister of Defence Pierre Messmer told his British counterpart that the French were not ready to “die for Berlin” (Taylor 2006:256). America’s Western allies were briefed on the U.S. position at a meeting held by Secretary of State Dean Rusk with his French, British and West German counterparts. In his memorandum on the conversation, Rusk recalls that he emphasized the importance of drawing a line between the allies’ vital interests—i.e. “the Western presence in West Berlin” and “our physical access to the city”—and important interests which were “not worth risking the precipitation of armed conflict.”6 To make matters worse, highly placed Soviet spies in the West had let the Soviets know in time that if they were to build a “barrier” to close off East Berlin, the Western allies were not prepared to use force to stop them (Catudal 1980:244–245).

Erecting a Provisional Fence on August 13, 1961

The actual building of the Berlin Wall started on August 13, 1961, a Sunday morning, when East German police and factory guards started building a provisional 5  Moscow Embassy Cable 1961. 6  Memorandum of conversation 1961.

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fence made of barbed wire across the city of Berlin. In doing so, the Soviets and East Germans were “careful to erect their barbed wires entirely within East Berlin territory, leaving checkpoints through which allied personnel were allowed to pass” (Kempe 2011b). The task of sealing off the sector border had been entrusted to the forces of the GDR Ministry of the Interior headed by Erich Mielke, the frontier guard and the so-called “battle-groups of the working class” (the party troops) alongside the East Berlin police (“Volkspolizei”). The Soviet military formed a second line behind a line-up of soldiers belonging to the East German “National People’s Army” (“Die Nationale Volksarmee”) ready to step in. Dramatic scenes occurred on that Sunday morning, when East Berliners tried to slip through the last loopholes to West Berlin as West Berliners watched desperately and protested on the other side of the newly erected fence. On Bernauer Strasse in Northern Berlin, where several housing blocks were placed exactly on the dividing line, two inhabitants trying to jump out of the windows of their flats fell to their deaths on that first day. Others were to follow until the blocks were evacuated by East German police and torn down.7 Public transport between the two sectors of Berlin was stopped. The official reaction of the GDR government and the official press was triumphant. The so-called “measures to protect peace and the German Democratic Republic” by building the Berlin wall were celebrated as “a great day” for the East German authorities and a “black day” for Western “warmongers” (Taylor 2006:235). As soon as the wire fence was in place, East Germany started to improve the 140 km border around West Berlin by setting up a second fence some 100 metres farther into East Berlin territory. Between 1962 and 1965, the houses located between the two fences were razed and their inhabitants relocated so as to create the so-called “Death Strip” covered with sand. It was meant to make the detection of refugees easier and offer clear fields of fire for the wall guards. Between 1965 and 1975 the wall was reinforced by elements of concrete, while in 1980 the construction of the Berlin wall had reached its final stage. It now consisted of 45,000 blocks of concrete reinforced by mesh fencing, signal fencing, anti-vehicle trenches, barbed wire, watchtowers and bunkers. Technically speaking, except for the absence of landmines and spring-guns, the wall between East and West Berlin had by now become identical to the border separating the GDR from the Federal Republic of Germany. Nine border crossings had been established between East and West Berlin. These crossings were restricted to the Western allies, West Germans and West Berliners entering East Berlin as well as to citizens of the GDR and other communist countries 7  Today, the area has become the site of the official German Wall Memorial.

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provided they got a passport. Several additional crossings were set up between West Berlin and the surrounding East German territory which could be used for transit purposes between the GDR and the FRG. For the population of East Berlin and East Germany, the building of the wall represented the setting up of a fortified communist ghetto similar to the rest of the Soviet bloc satellite countries. Visiting West Berlin or travelling to the FRG by GDR citizens had become practically impossible. With the policy of détente setting in during the second half of the 1960s, exemptions from the travel ban included elderly GDR pensioners. Following the Four Power Agreement on Berlin reached in 1971, the list of exemptions that could be granted by the East German regime included GDR citizens visiting relatives on important family matters as well as artists, musicians and writers travelling for professional reasons. For the rest of the GDR population, leaving the GDR remained practically impossible. It is estimated that around 5,000 people did, however, successfully cross the wall during the 28 years of its existence. They escaped through the sewer system linking the two parts of Berlin, through tunnels dug under the fortifications, by swimming across the Berlin canal system or driving through the wall and even by air. The number of East Germans who lost their lives while trying to defect has been officially set at 136 (Chronik der Mauer 1989). The last victim of the Berlin wall was registered on February 6, 1989. The number of those who were imprisoned in the GDR for having planned or attempted to escape from communist Germany remains unknown to this day.

Initial Western Reactions

Once the barbed wire barrier had been put up on August 13, the official Western reaction was entirely muted for two days. The Western city commanders immediately formulated a letter of protest but due to orders from the State Department, it was to be delivered only after the publication of a communiqué from the foreign ministries of the Western allies. On August 15 the State Department released a brief press statement in which it termed the closing of the frontier between East and West Germany as a dramatic admission of communist failure. However, as long as Western access to the divided city was respected, protests and propaganda were to remain the main forms of retaliation.8 On the same day, the Western commanders handed over their letter of protest to the Soviet city commander. 8  Reds Held Losing 16 August 1961.

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Another two days passed before the Government of the United States addressed a note to the Government of the Soviet Union; identical notes were dispatched by the French and British governments. In their note, the three governments protested against the measures taken by the East German government, for which, however, they held the Soviet Union responsible. They called on the Soviet government “to put an end to these illegal measures” as “this unilateral infringement of the quadripartite status of Berlin can only increase existing tension and dangers.” It was not lost on anybody that the Western powers had not demanded the removal of the fence. In its answering note, the Soviet Union rejected the Western protest as unfounded, calling the measures taken by the GDR “temporary”. It reiterated the Soviet proposal for a normalization of the situation in West Berlin in the context of a peace treaty (United States Government 1961:397–400). In private, Western leaders even expressed relief. President Kennedy told his aide Kenny O’Donnell that the building of the Berlin wall “is not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war” (Kempe 2011c:379) and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk concluded that “in realistic terms, the sector border made a Berlin settlement easier” (Taylor 2006:272). Great Britain’s ambassador to the FRG Christopher Steel pointed out “that I personally have always wondered that the East Germans waited so long to seal this boundary” (Taylor 2006:268–269). France’s President Charles de Gaulle, who was resting at his country home in Colombey-les Deux-Èglises, returned to Paris only on August 17. Meanwhile, West Berliners were shocked and awed, many of them gathering on August 13 at the sector border protesting against the barbed wire fortification that had been put in place in the city during the early hours of the morning. An appalled world was watching the unfolding of events, which was covered extensively by international radio and television stations. The attitude adopted by the Western powers led to a major rift between the United States and Great Britain and the West German government. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who had immediately dispatched the Chairman of the FRG parliament Eugen Gerstenmaier to the city, visited West Berlin on August 22, where he got a rather unfriendly reception from the population. The major political figure in the crisis was Berlin’s mayor Willy Brandt, who called on the West Berlin population to stay calm in order to prevent the situation from escalating. In his first speech, he condemned what he called “the fortification of a concentration camp” that was being built in the city, asking the East German regime to remove it. He asked the Western powers to signal that they were taking events seriously (Taylor 2006:266–267). In a “private and informal letter” to the American President, Brandt warned that the “inaction and purely

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defensive stance” of the West could trigger a crisis of confidence in West Berlin and further embolden the East Berlin government. He asked the United States to strengthen their military presence in Berlin and to launch an appeal to the United Nations. In a second speech, delivered at a mass rally held on August 15 in front of the seat of the West Berlin mayor in Schoeneberg, Brandt informed his audience about the letter he had sent Kennedy, in which he had told the American President: “Berlin expects more than words. Berlin expects political action to be taken”. President Kennedy was reportedly taken by surprise by the strong reaction of the West German government and the West Berlin population, feeling annoyed by the strong words used by Brandt, whom he suspected of trying to use the Berlin crisis as an electoral manoeuvre in the ongoing elections for the FRG Bundestag (Taylor 2006:274–275). In his letter of response, handed to Brandt by U.S. Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson and the former military governor of the American occupation zone in Germany, the popular General Lucius D. Clay, Kennedy expressed his understanding for Brandt’s concern. At the same time, he expressed his conviction that the closing of the frontier between the two halves of the city represented a fundamental Soviet decision which could only be reversed by war, which was not in the Western interest. Except for the strengthening of the American garrison in West Berlin, Kennedy rejected all the other concrete proposals made by Brandt (Ibid.: 281–283). On 19 August, the promised reinforcement of allied troops in West Berlin started. Three allied brigades in full battle gear—one each from the US, Britain and France, a convoy 160 km long—marched towards Berlin from West Germany through East Germany. Their vanguard was met at the outskirts of Berlin by Johnson, who left West Berlin on August 21. General Clay was to stay as President Kennedy’s personal representative in Berlin. Once the sealing off of the sector border between the two parts of Berlin had been successfully completed, the East German leader Walter Ulbricht was to provoke a highly dangerous escalation of the wall crisis two months later. As Khrushchev had signalled to the participants of the Congress of the Soviet Communist Party that opened in Moscow on October 17 that he was going to lift the ultimatum he had put to the West, Ulbricht tried to twist Khrushchev’s arm to get his remaining demands fulfilled—the conclusion of a separate friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, the full international recognition of the GDR and its right to control the communication roads of the Western allies between the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin. On October 22, 1961, he ordered his border troops to ask allied troops and civilians who were somewhat provocatively crossing into East Berlin at Friedrichstrasse, at “Checkpoint Charlie”, to present their identification papers to the GDR

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frontier guards. This move was not only an act of violation of allied rights under the quadripartite agreement; it also meant a humiliation to the Western occupation troops. This time, the United States did not give in. In the event of a repetition of such an incident, General Clay had obtained permission from the White House on October 24 to break through the GDR barrier with tanks and to protest against the GDR action to the Soviet military command. At this juncture, Khrushchev once more played a double game. On the one hand, he felt compelled to demonstrate strength in order to rebut Chinese criticism of his allegedly compromising stance with the capitalist West by resuming nuclear tests on October 23. On the other hand, however, he did not want to let the East Germans win the upper hand in dealing with the West Berlin crisis. Although the Soviet military in Berlin took measures to de-escalate the rising tension, the GDR authorities did not desist from further provocations. This led to a confrontation with the risk of triggering a war between the superpowers by intent or by miscalculation at an unprecedented high: during the night from October 27 to 28, ten fully armed American and Soviet tanks confronted each other over the demarcation line at Checkpoint Charlie, ready to shoot at the first movement from the other side. The dramatic “high noon” (Ibid.: 323) standoff lasted for 16 hours, in the course of which Kennedy and Khrushchev exchanged (still unpublished) messages through an informal channel, finally allowing the tanks on both sides to withdraw.9 Following this dramatic confrontation, relayed by television crews present at Checkpoint Charlie to a worldwide public, neither side risked further provocative steps, both the United States and the Soviet Union being obviously satisfied with the preservation of the status quo. On October 28, the Berlin crisis was over and the wall begun in August 1961 was there to stay. In 1962, East Germany started to replace the wire fence with the elaborate concrete fortification around West Berlin which became known as “the Berlin wall”. It remains a matter of conjecture and a topic of public and scholarly debate whether the building of the wall could have been prevented by a more assertive stance adopted by the Western allies both on the eve and during the unfolding of the crisis. Hagen Koch, former member of the East German state security STASI, remembered that “most of DDR personnel believed that the Americans would call our bluff. They didn’t” (Beschloss 1991:282). Historian Frederick Kempe also speculated that, if confronted with a steadfast position 9  The informal communication between Soviets and Americans involved John F. Kennedy’s brother Robert on the one hand and Georgi Bolshakow, press attaché at the Soviet Washington embassy, on the other. Allegedly, this contact was also used one year later to resolve the Cuban missile crisis (Taylor 2006:342).

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of the Americans, the Soviets would have desisted from building the wall: “I think that if Kennedy had said more clearly that the Four-Power-Agreement was sacrosanct and unchangeable the way US Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower had pointed out before him, Khrushchev would not have dared to build the wall in August” (Kempe 2011b). On the other hand, the fact that the overall planning of the operation had been in the hands of the Soviets, and the activation of the Warsaw Pact’s mutual defence clause on the eve of the operation, lends credence to those who believe that the Soviet Union would not have retreated in the face of a strong Western stance. The formal document legitimizing Warsaw Pact support for East Germany in the eventuality of Western opposition to the construction of the Wall in Berlin points in the same direction. The passive stance adopted by the Americans on Berlin was not, however, interpreted by the Soviets as a beacon of peace, but as a major sign of weakness. Encouraged by his success over Berlin, Khrushchev felt emboldened to continue the policy of brinkmanship which led the world into its most dangerous showdown—the Cuban crisis. The lesson of Berlin, however, was not lost on President Kennedy, who emerged victorious from the even more dangerous Cuban crisis. In July 1963, the American President visited West Germany and West Berlin in an attempt to mend fences with the West German government and to restore the positive American image in the eyes of the West German population. His speech from the balcony of the West Berlin Schoeneberg townhouse culminating in the famous phrase pronounced in German “Ich bin ein Berliner” (“I am a Berliner”) was an overwhelming publicity success. Yet, the end of the Berlin Crisis also put an end to Anglo-American policies on German reunification. In effect, and without ever saying so to each other, much less to the public, the Western Allies and the Russians agreed to a stalemate in Germany. Kennedy had long been sceptical about German reunification. According to Rolf Steininger, “from early 1962 onwards, it was Kennedy’s policy to put pressure on Adenauer so that—in Kennedy’s words— the Chancellor would ‘put his hand upon the coffin [of the reunification policy] and help to carry it’. And he told British Ambassador Ormbsy-Gore that the West Germans ‘if they want to get their snouts into the Berlin trough I would be in favor of it” (Steininger 2005:1). A severe crisis in U.S.-German relations ensued, with Adenauer edging closer to de Gaulle. Recently released U.S. documents have shown that in 1963, Chancellor Adenauer’s successor Ludwig Erhard had privately developed a plan to propose that the Soviet Union sell the GDR to the Federal Republic of Germany, by which both the German and the Berlin questions would be solved. The U.S. did not take this initiative seriously and it was shelved shortly

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afterwards. Paradoxically enough, the Berlin crisis may have even paved the way for a period of détente between the two blocs in general and on Berlin in particular. Willy Brandt, who was become the FRG foreign minister in 1966 and Chancellor in 1969, confessed that the building of the Berlin Wall stood at the origins of his new “Eastern Policy”: “In August 1961 a curtain was drawn aside to reveal an empty stage. To put it more bluntly, we lost certain illusions that had outlived the hopes underlying them. (. . .) My political deliberations in the years that followed were substantially influenced by this day’s experience, and it was against this background that my so-called Ostpolitik—the beginning of détente—took shape (Brandt 1978:20). Despite the continuing existence of the wall, or perhaps because of it, Berlin ceased to be the major crisis spot in East-West relations until its fall in 1989. In 1967, the FRG quietly buried the Hallstein Doctrine by taking up diplomatic relations with communist Romania. On September 3, 1971, a new Four Power Agreement was concluded, reiterating the responsibility of the four powers for the divided city. The agreement was a compromise. On the one hand, the Soviet Union recognized the presence of the three Western military commanders in West Berlin, while reiterating the Soviet position that the Western sectors of the city of Berlin did not represent a “constituent part” of the Federal Republic of Germany and were not governed by it. Moreover, the four powers agreed on a set of measures to facilitate communication and travel between West and East Berlin as well as between West Berlin and the GDR. Last but not least, the Four Power Agreement paved the way for the conclusion of the Basic Treaty (der “Grundlagenvertrag”) between the FRG and the GDR on December 21, 1972. During the years to come, with the GDR economy heading towards another collapse, West Germany succeeded in obtaining from the GDR leadership a number of measures facilitating travel for East Germans. By January 1989, East German leader Erich Honecker had expressed confidence that “the Berlin wall will be going to exist for another 50 or 100 years unless the conditions for it are removed” (Chronik der Mauer 1989). It took less than a year for the wall to actually come down, which it did on November 9, 1989. Following the accession to power in the Soviet Union of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985, a major change in superpower relations occurred, creating the preconditions for the fall of the Soviet communist system imposed on Eastern Europe, and along with it, the fall of the Berlin wall. On June 12, 1987, attending the 850th anniversary of the founding of Berlin, American President Ronald Reagan (who had paid a private visit to West Berlin in 1978) availed himself of the ideological and economic crisis that gripped the Soviet Union and its allies in the 1980s to put the Berlin issue on the agenda of superpower talks. In a highly symbolic speech held in front of the Brandenburg Gate in

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Berlin, Reagan stated: “Behind me stands a wall that encircles the free sectors of this city, part of a vast system of barriers that divides the entire continent of Europe. . . . Standing before the Brandenburg Gate, every man is a German, separated from his fellow men. Every man is a Berliner, forced to look upon a scar. . . . As long as this gate is closed, as long as this scar of a wall is permitted to stand, it is not the German question alone that remains open, but the question of freedom for all mankind. . . . General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization, come here to this gate. Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!!” (Archives 2007). After the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in December 1987, the road was open to secret negotiations between the superpowers on how to jointly manage a peaceful transition towards an end of the cold war and an end to the division of Europe. Hard pressed by a severe economic and financial crisis at home, the Soviet Union was ready to relinquish control over its increasingly unruly satellites in the Eastern bloc. Left without Soviet support, the East European regimes collapsed one after another. Over the summer of 1989, tensions had been growing fast in the GDR after Hungary had opened its frontier with Austria, allowing East German citizens to flee to the West. The process reached a climax in the GDR when hundreds of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets of Leipzig and Berlin shouting “we are the people” and “we are ONE people”. On October 18, 1989, Erich Honecker was forced by the members of the East German Politburo to relinquish power. By that time, the GDR was on the brink of immediate economic bankruptcy. In order to create a valve for popular dissatisfaction, the new East German leader Egon Krenz and his supporters in the Politburo decided to pass a new set of emigration rules for GDR citizens on November 9, 1989. When GDR party politburo spokesman Günter Schabowski presented the content of the new regulations to the press later in the day, he was asked by Western correspondents when the new travel regime was to become effective. For reasons which have not yet been fully elucidated, Schabowski announced that the new law was to come into effect immediately. After West German television, which could be watched in East Berlin and most of the GDR territory, had announced the opening of its frontiers, a growing number of East Berlin citizens rushed to the crossing points into West Berlin, where the situation threatened to get out of control. Confronted with this situation, Egon Krenz did not order the use of force and despite a lack of orders the East Berlin border guards desisted from stopping the tide. Hundreds of East Berliners climbed up the wall at the Brandenburg Gate cheering, dancing and singing, while others passed

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through the Autobahn crossing to take an impromptu trip to West Germany. On 3 December 1989, Egon Krenz stepped down as Secretary General of the “Socialist Unity Party”. Faced with the massive demonstrations of protest in the GDR and hard pressed by the financial and economic crisis in the Soviet Union, Soviet leaders Gorbacev and Shevardnadze consented to the dismantling of the Berlin wall, not without, however, pointing to the danger of chaos in the GDR, a resurrection of Fascism in the FRG and a destabilisation of Europe as a whole (Mitter 2011:29). The recent opening of the files of the West German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (disclosed and analyzed for the first time by Armin Mitter) reveals the major role played by the Berlin question in the debates between the representatives of the four powers and the FRG during the period between the fall of the Berlin wall and the reunification of Germany, which was to take place on October 3, 1990. New light is being thrown on the policies conducted by various FRG actors in order to achieve German unity, on the—often rather divergent— positions adopted by the three Western powers and, last but not least, by the stance taken by the Soviet Union. At various stages of negotiations for the Two plus Four Agreement between the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France on the one hand and the two German states on the other, the Germans had to overcome the resistance put up by some allies using their prerogatives under the Four Power Agreement on Berlin to block or to slow down the process. The efforts of Soviet leader Gorbacev, who pressed for a decoupling of the reunification of a (demilitarized) Berlin from the reunification of East and West Germany (outside NATO), failed mainly due to U.S. support for the Bonn government. Under the terms of the Two plus Four Agreement, signed in September 1990, the troops of all the four powers were to leave the united Germany, Berlin included, by the end of 1994. Germany became a fully sovereign state. In exchange, Germany renounced any future claims on its pre-1937 territory, recognizing the territorial changes that had taken place in Europe after World War II. More than two decades after the collapse of the Berlin wall, the enthusiasm of the early days about the unification of Germany has given way to a more realistic assessment of the costs and consequences of reunification. Although the wall separating East and West Berlin as well as the GDR and the FRG has gone, it seems that the former Berlin wall has been replaced by a “mental wall” separating former East and West Germans (“Ossis” and “Wessis”, as they are called). Whereas citizens from the former Federal Republic of Germany are becoming increasingly aware of the burden represented by the huge financial transfers from West to East, the former GDR citizens feel disappointed

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because their high economic expectations—i.e. a rapid spillover of the West German level of income and quality of life—have not materialized to the degree and at the speed they expected. This “wall in peoples’ minds” (“die Mauer in den Köpfen”) resulting from the differences in mentality and socialization in the two German states is, however, gradually vanishing with the ongoing change of generations. It is perhaps one of the curiosities of history that whereas the worldwide interest in the Berlin wall is still high, there are only a few remnants of the wall that can be detected in Berlin itself, as it was not only politically undone, but also physically destroyed, its fragments being dispersed across the five continents. Whereas the government of united Germany and the Berlin administration tried to get rid of the remnants of the wall as quickly as possible, with only a few stretches having been preserved as official monuments, there was an immense interest abroad in acquiring fragments of it. Politicians, art collectors, military personnel and even the Pope bought or were presented with parts of the construction, not to speak of the fragments that were simply stolen from the site. Many fragments of the former wall are exhibited in public, testifying to the end of an era. Thanks to NASA, a small block of the Berlin wall has even been deposited on the planet Mars (Bundesstiftung 2009).

chapter 6

Vatican City-Italy Wall: Consolidating Social and Political Peace Domenico Mogavero Introduction The story of the Vatican Walls is a highly complex one, bound up with the thousand and more years over which the history of the city of Rome has unfolded. Piecing together their various metamorphoses is an enterprise that has engaged experts in urban history and art historians, but it goes beyond the scope of this paper. The focus of this contribution is dictated by the history of Italian unification, starting with the events that led to the conquest of Rome by the troops of Savoy and the unification of Italian territory under the Kingdom of Italy with Rome as its capital. The date symbolising this process is September 20th 1870, when the Piedmontese light infantry flooded into Rome through the breach at the Porta Pia, forcing the Pope-King to relinquish temporal power over the city and thereby putting an end to the Papal States and the temporal power of the Popes. From here begins the analysis of the Vatican Walls and the political and religious consequences of the succession of situations that concerned them in the subsequent decades.

Law of Guarantees (1871)

The first situation is one of what may be termed irreconcilable hostility, characterising the period between September 20th 1870 and February 11th 1929. The act of war with which the Piedmontese army invaded and occupied Rome was met by Pope Pius IX with a rejection of any dialogue with the Savoy monarchy. (Lanza 1938; Mori 1967; Sardo 1969; Manfroni 1971; Fiorentino 1996; Kertzer 2005; Bianchi 2011). He retired within the Vatican Walls in what amounted to a deliberate and contemptuous exile in an attempt to stigmatise the invasion and make the violence he had suffered known to the world at large. The breach of Porta Pia was indeed an epoch-making event, not only because it marked the unification—immediately geographical and subsequently © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004272859_008

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political—of Italy, but because it represented the coup de grace for the Papal States and thereby for the Popes’ temporal power, founded on the Donatio Constantini, a document proved by thorough historical and documentary research to have been bogus (Henderson 1912:319–329; Valla 2001:20–183). Though at the time the loss of the Papal States was seen by Pius IX and the doctrine of the Curia as a serious wound to the Church, the events and above all the reflections that followed showed that in actual fact it was an act of providence which served to restore the Church’s proper image and bring it back to the genuine presence and mission assigned to it by history. For a full and clear understanding of the Pope’s position reference should be made to the protest encyclical Respicientes ea omnia (Pius IX 1870), published on November 1st 1870, a few weeks after the breach of Porta Pia. This document formally opened the “Roman question” (Jemolo 1938; Pirri 1951; Spadolini 1970, 1973) which would torment a great many Catholics, and some lay people, for almost 60 years. Through a detailed and documented account of the events, in his encyclical Pius IX roundly condemned the action of the Italian army, protested against the capture of Rome (a “sacreligious invasion”), declared the Holy See to be a de facto prisoner and proclaimed the excommunication, the severest punishment laid down by canon law, of all those who had taken part and assisted in the invasion of the Catholic State. A number of expressions used in the document are of particular interest because they give a clear and direct exposition of the facts as seen from the ecclesiastical standpoint and provide an insight into the factors adduced in support of the Pope’s position. The Pope was at pains to list the facts and circumstances which preceded, accompanied and followed the events of September 20th, drawing the bitter conclusion that “every day We realise more painfully the imprisonment to which We are subjected and the lack of the proper freedom which the world is mendaciously told We have been given to exercise Our Apostolic Ministry and which the invading government claims it has decided to confirm with what it calls the necessary guarantees” (Pius IX 1870). He justified his uncompromising position, reiterating previous pronouncements “so as not to be reproached before God and the Church for remaining silent and thus tacitly consenting to such a disastrous upheaval” (Ibid.). He declared that “any act of usurpation, carried out now or hitherto, is unjust, violent, vain and null and that all the acts of rebels and invaders, those already committed and those which may be committed in the future to consolidate such usurpation, are by Us now condemned, annulled, rejected and abrogated” (Ibid.). He also solemnly stated, “with the authority of Almighty God and the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul and Our authority” (Ibid.) that “all those distinguished by any dignity, even worthy of special mention, who have perpetrated the invasion, usurpation or

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occupation of any province of Our dominion and this noble City, as well as their commanders, supporters, collaborators, advisors, followers and anybody else who causes, on any pretext in any way, or acts for himself in the execution of, said iniquities, shall incur the maximum excommunication and the other pains and punishments inflicted by the Holy Canons, the Apostolic Constitu­ tions and the decrees of the General Councils, above all the Council of Trent, in the form and to the extent expressed in Our Apostolic Letter of March 26th 1860, mentioned below.” (Ibid.) It is clear that this situation amounted to a direct confrontation between the Kingdom of Italy and the Holy See, with an accentuation of the political dimension of a relationship in which the two sides were openly hostile to one another and prepared to do whatever was necessary to further their own positions. The most obvious consequence of this progressive deterioration in relations was an inner turmoil for Italian Catholics, who found themselves unable to enjoy a full and responsible sense of belonging to and participation in both institutions at the same time. Rather than entering into a detailed analysis of the tortuous development of relations over that 60-year period, the focus here will centre on two initiatives which exemplify the climate of relations between the two sides and their respective positions. The first of these was the approval in the Italian Parliament of “Law No. 214 of May 13th 1871, on Guarantees of the prerogatives of the Supreme Pontiff and the Holy See and on relations of the Church with the State”, known as the Law of Guarantees (Italian Parliament 1871). What was clearly a piece of unilateral legislation by the Kingdom of Italy formed part of the Josephinist line of ecclesiastical policies to which considerable recourse was made in the second half of the 19th century. With this measure the Kingdom of Italy assumed the right to allow the Holy See a series of operational spheres, acknowledging certain Papal prerogatives in the exercise of his holy office and granting the Holy See an allowance of 3,225,000 Lire. An idea of the demands represented by this law is given by the wording of the two titles of which it is composed (I. Prerogatives of the Supreme Pontiff and the Holy See; II. Relations of the State with the Church) and the meticulousness with which it set out to regulate the various aspects of the life and activity of the Pope and the Holy See Predictable in its terms and tone of expression, the Pope’s response appeared just two days later. In his encyclical Ubi nos (Pius IX 1871, May 15) an indignant Pius IX flatly rejected the Law of Guarantees, stating that it mortified the Pope and deprived him of the freedom required to exercise his Holy ministry: “in its hurry to tell the world preposterous stories about Rome, and to put smoke in the eyes of

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Catholics and allay their anxieties, the Piedmontese government has devised and developed a few insubstantial immunities and some privileges commonly known as Guarantees, which it intends to grant Us to replace the temporal power of which it has stripped Us with a long series of deceptions and parricidal weapons” (Ibid.). There follows a declaration that the law is devoid of any juridical foundation: “We feel it behoves Our Apostolic Office to declare solemnly to the whole world, through Yourselves, that not only the so-called guarantees wretchedly fabricated by the Piedmontese government, but also the titles, honours, immunities, privileges and any other offer made under the name of Guarantees have no validity when they declare the use of the power entrusted to Us by God to be secure and free and that they are designed to protect the necessary freedom of the Church” (Ibid). In that light the Pope stated his absolute refusal to agree “to any forcible conciliation that might in any way annul or curtail Our rights, which are the rights of God and of the Apostolic See; therefore now, by the duty of Our office, We declare that We shall never in any way be able to admit or accept those Guarantees contrived by the Piedmontese government, whatever their terms of enactment, nor other agreements, whatever their content and mode of ratification, since they were proposed to Us under the pretext of strengthening Our free and holy office in place and instead of the civil Principality with which divine Providence saw fit to strengthen the Holy Apostolic See” (Ibid.). The Pope’s clear and intransigent position set the seal on a break with the Italian government as unequivocal as it was predictable. It should be added that formally the law remained in force until the signing of the Lateran Pacts (February 11th 1929), though only regarding the provisions which could be imposed upon individuals and organisations. A further papal intervention enjoined Italian Catholics to refrain from participating in the political life of the Kingdom which had so brutally attacked the Pope’s sovereignty. In the run-up to the general election of December 5th 1874, on September 10th the Apostolic Penitentiary issued a decree which used the well-known formula of non expedit (Tamburini 1987:128–151) to impose a blanket veto on the participation of the Italian faithful in the election, reiterating the Holy See’s condemnation of the occupation of Rome and the Law of Guarantees. The veto did not apply to local elections, in which Catholics were encouraged to vote so as to ensure the best possible protection of their religious interests, at least at that level. The early 1870s thus saw a deep fracture in relations between the Church and the Kingdom of Italy, starting a long period of mutual hostility with serious repercussions at an institutional level and in the consciences of practising Catholics. They were torn between their obligation of faith to the Supreme Pontiff and their civic duty to participate in the life and problems of the new

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national state, finally unified after centuries of division into territorial units of varying sizes. In terms of the metaphor of walls, this period may be considered one of the construction of extremely high walls, closed and impenetrable, harmful to the country’s religious peace and disturbing to the consciences of Catholic citizens who were aware of their spiritual mission and temporal duties.

Lateran Pacts, the Concordat (1929)

The second period is centred on the signing of the Lateran Pacts (February 11th 1929) (Holy See & Kingdom of Italy 1929), which marked the reconciliation between the Church and the Kingdom of Italy. It was a time of mutual recognition and collaboration, at least in the years close to the event. The Pacts were the result of a long and complex effort to dilute the antagonists’ intransigence, starting from a search for some common ground conducted by leading figures on both sides. They were asked to enter into respectful and mutually legitimising relations with their counterparts so as to put misunderstandings and rancour behind them in the recognition that Italy’s geographical unification could not be called into question and that new cultural and political approaches were needed to discourage Catholics from electoral abstention. It was no easy task, since on both sides it was a question of overcoming a series of deep-seated prejudices and diehard fundamentalism. An interesting point on this long road to reconciliation was marked by the encyclical Il fermo proposito, (Pius X 1905) published by Pius X on June 11th 1905, addressed to Italian bishops to promote Azione cattolica, a new non-political lay Catholic organisation. Speaking of citizens’ participation in political life, the Pope observed that “the present organisation of states provides everybody without distinction the opportunity to influence public affairs, and Catholics, without prejudice to the obligations imposed by God’s laws and the prescriptions of the Church, can with a clear conscience make use of it to show that they are as fit as, or rather fitter than, others to cooperate in the civil material welfare of the people and so acquire the authority and respect which likewise enable them to defend and promote the highest good, which is that of the soul” (Ibid.). Though Italian Catholics were precluded from participation for the “most serious reasons” which had induced Pius IX to pronounce the non expedit, “other equally serious considerations, deriving from the supreme good of society, which is to be saved at all costs, may require that in particular cases the law be set aside” (Ibid.), which in effect the Pope sanctioned by allowing the bishops

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to identify such cases on the merits of each single context. Taking his cue from this relaxation of previous canon law, the Pope requested that active participation in politics and the presence of Catholics in the country’s institutions be accompanied by “the duty for all Catholics to prepare prudently and seriously for political life, should they be called to it. It is thus essential that the laudable efforts already made by Catholics to prepare with proper electoral organisation for the administrative life of town and provincial councils, be extended to the proper preparation and organisation for politics at a national level” (Ibid.). It is also interesting to note that the Pope recommended observance of the “principles governing the conscience of every true Catholic”, adding that all of them must remember “above all else to be in all circumstances and to appear truly Catholic, acceding to and exercising public office with the unswerving purpose of doing all in their power to promote the social and economic good of the country and particularly the people, in accordance with the quintessentially Christian maxims of civility and at the same time to defend the interests of the Church, which are those of Religion and justice” (Ibid.). This great step forward found effective practical application in what was known as the Patto Gentiloni (Tornielli 2011:88–89) (named after Vincenzo Gentiloni, president of the Giolitti Electoral Union), signed in 1913 between moderate Catholic groups and liberal candidates with links to prime minister Giovanni Giolitti. Called for by Liberal candidates who were aware that they could not win the elections without the Catholic vote, the agreement was based on the candidates’ acceptance of seven points: defence of the Albertine Statute and the laws safeguarding freedom of conscience and association and the existence of religious congregations; defence of private education; support for the teaching of religion in state schools; opposition to divorce; recognition of the parity of Catholic organisations in state bodies; fiscal and legal reform; support for a policy to broaden Italian influence in the world. The agreement was a success in two respects. Firstly, it resulted in the revocation of the non expedit in about half the electoral constituencies. Secondly, it resulted in the election of 226 candidates on the strength of the Catholic vote, including some who were themselves Catholics. This emblematic development prepared the ground for the de facto removal of the non expedit, made explicit on March 3rd 1919 in a speech to the Diocesan Councils (Giunte Diocesane) of Italy (Benedict XV 1919, March 3), and in the same year the foundation of the Partito Popolare by Don Luigi Sturzo. The time was ripe for such an initiative, as confirmed by the general election of November 16th 1919, in which one hundred Partito Popolare candidates were elected to parliament.

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On the distant horizon by this time was the prospect of an official reconciliation between Church and state. The ground was laid by long and painstaking personal initiatives and discreet diplomatic negotiations lasting two and a half years. The result was the signing of the Lateran Pacts on February 11th 1929. The negotiations between the Holy See and the Italian government were far from easy, coming close to complete breakdown on several occasions. It was only through the diplomatic ability of the two officials delegated to draft the texts (lawyer Francesco Pacelli on behalf of the Holy See and Councillor of State Professor Domenico Barone) (Pacelli 1959) that the various political, legal and practical obstacles were eventually overcome. The document signed by the two parties was ratified almost unanimously by the Chamber of Deputies on May 10th 1929 and by the Senate two weeks later, following an extremely lively debate in the Chamber concluded with a long and meticulous speech by Mussolini, punctuated by bouts of polemical haranguing. In addition to revealing the various positions held on the question, the parliamentary proceedings are interesting in their record of the expectations raised by the reconciliation in terms of politics and international prestige. It seems appropriate here, however, to focus on the ecclesiastical point of view, quoting from a speech made by Pius XI to the the parish priests and Lent preachers of the city of Rome on the morning of February 11th (Pius XI 1929, February 11). Concerning the two principal documents of which the Pacts were composed, the Pope observed: “The Treaty is designed to recognise and, inasmuch as hominibus licet, assure the Holy See a full and proper territorial sovereignty (since there is not known to man, at least thus far, any form of true sovereignty other than the territorial) that is evidently necessary and due to He who, given the divine mandate and divine representation invested in Him, cannot be subject to any terrestrial sovereignty. From the outset We wanted a Concordat, indissolubly joined to the Treaty, properly to regulate the condition of religion in Italy, for too long manipulated, subverted and devastated by a succession of sectarian governments or obedient servants to the enemies of the Church, even when they were not themselves enemies” (Ibid.). The Pope had criticisms and reservations, however, and made no secret of them. He assumed personal responsibility for the conduct and conclusion of the negotiations. “We have no hesitation in saying that there is no line, no expression in the aforementioned accords that was not, for at least thirty months, the object of Our personal study, Our meditation, and even more of Our prayers, prayers also required of a great many good souls more beloved of God” (Ibid.). With regard to the possible strictures of those who thought that too much or too

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little had been demanded in territorial terms, he pointed out that “what We demanded in this field is little, very little, the least possible—and deliberately so, after much reflection, meditation and prayer” (Ibid.) and that behind his demand for territorial sovereignty was no territorial greed, only the consideration that “some degree of territorial sovereignty is the condition universally recognised as indispensable for any true jurisdictional sovereignty: hence at least the territory sufficient as a basis for sovereignty itself; the minimum extent without which that sovereignty could not exist because it would have nothing upon which to rest” (Ibid.). As to the allowance granted by the Italian government, Pius XI observed that its value was more symbolic than real, compared with “everything of which the Church in Italy was stripped, including the patrimony of St Peter”, and that its purpose was not to enrich the Apostolic See but to enable it to exercise “its right to provide for its financial independence, without which neither its dignity nor its effective freedom would be provided for” (Ibid.), not to mention its evangelical and charitable works. An interesting development of these ideas is to be found in a speech given by the Pope two days later to the staff and students of the Catholic University in Milan, in which Mussolini was described as “the man who Providence led Us to meet” (Pius XI 1929, February 11). A significant clue to his thinking is also to be found in the chirograph (Pius XI 1929, May 30: 297–306) he wrote to Cardinal Pietro Gasparri, Secretary of State and signatory to the Pacts, regarding controversial points in the Treaty and the Concordat about which he provided his own observations and explanations. An analysis of the two principal documents making up the Pacts has to take account of the complexity of the subject, a result of the singular nature of the relationship in question. It ranges from the agreement covered by international law, formalised in the Treaty, concerning the solution of the “Roman question” to the bilateral agreement between Italy and the Vatican, regulated by the Concordat, on matters of common interest to the Church and the state, an agreement designed to safeguard the religious interests of Catholic citizens. Specifically, the Treaty finally settled the dispute over the Pope’s territoral sovereignty (Figure 6.1) and his recognition of the new geographical configuration of the Kingdom of Italy and Rome, previously capital of the Papal States, as its new capital. The Treaty also instituted the neutral and inviolable State of the Vatican City, with a clearly defined territory of 44 hectares, over which the Pope would exercise not only his spiritual power but also his political jurisdiction (Article 3). It laid down specific provisions regarding citizenship (Articles 9 and 10), the right of legation (Articles 11 and 12), the properties owned by the Holy See (Articles 13 and 14), fiscal and customs exemptions (Articles 15 to 19) and the neutrality of the Vatican (Article 23). It should be reiterated that the

FIGURE 6.1 Map of the Vatican City, surrounded by the wall. Source: Holy_See_(Vatican_City)-CIA_WFB_Map.png (330x355 pixels, file size: 8KB, MIME type: image/png) 2005.

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result of this confrontation between Italy and the Holy See was not achieved through unilateral initiatives, as had been the case with the Law of Guarantees, but through bilateral decrees which resolved the hostile confrontation between the two sides engendered by the breach of Porta Pia and the capture of Rome by the army of Savoy. The provision most warmly received was the cessation of the Pope’s self-imposed exile within the Vatican Walls. It represented the restoration of peace between the Church and the Italian state, at the same time resolving its diplomatic stand-off with the states that had taken the Pope’s side against the Kingdom of Italy. Complementary to the Treaty was the Financial Agreement, which quantified the compensation owed by Italy to the Holy See as a result of the suppression of religious institutes and ecclesiastical bodies and the expropriation of their property enshrined in Law No. 878 of May 29th 1855 and Law No. 3036 of July 7th 1866 (Romanato 2006–2007:9). The Concordat assured religious peace for Italian Catholics, no longer compelled to choose between loyalty to the Pope and loyalty to the unified state with Rome as its capital. The many points covered by the understanding were all significant for the private and social life of the faithful. To cite only some of the most important, these included recognition of the free exercise of the Church’s spiritual power (Article 1), the condition of the clergy (Article 3), the recognition of religious holidays (Article 11), pastoral care to servicemen under the jurisdiction of Military Ordinariate (Articles 13–15) the appointment of bishops (Articles 19 and 20), the legal status of ecclesiastical bodies (Articles 29 and 30), the institution of marriage (Article 34) and the teaching of the Catholic religion in state schools (Article 36). In the light of what happened in subsequent years, this new configuration of relations between Church and state in Italy may be judged on balance to be positive. In the first place, it put an end to a deep and painful rift in a country where the majority of citizens considered themselves Christians. Secondly, it marked the beginning of a period of mutual legitimisation and collaboration between ecclesiastical and political institutions. Thirdly, it brought a climate of civil and religious peace to the country after decades of rancour and recrimination. As was to be expected, there were dissenting voices on both sides. In the Catholic camp particularly harsh criticism was voiced by Don Luigi Sturzo and Alcide De Gasperi, who considered the reconciliation to be a factor lending legitimacy to the Fascist regime. On February 12th 1929 De Gasperi wrote to his friend Don Simone Weber: “The old Catholic Popolari reacted against the Conciliation. They were aware that this solution of the Roman question consolidated the Fascist regime, by this time completely dictatorial, and compromised the Catholic world (and the Church itself) with an undemocratic government” (De Gasperi 1970). In lay quarters, distinguished by philosophers

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Giovanni Gentile and Benedetto Croce (1929:10), it was objected that the demands of the clergy had been accepted too easily, which compromised the secular nature of the state. In any event, the broad acceptance of the Pacts made it clear that the two sides had made their peace and some sort of dialogue had been resumed, something which had seemed impossible only a few years before. Inevitably, however, there were subsequent episodes of severe tension between the Papacy and the Fascist regime—one such case followed the government’s suppression of the Azione Cattolica organisations in 1931. The Pope responded with the encyclical Non abbiamo bisogno (June 29th 1931) (Pius XI 1931), addressed to the Italian bishops, in which he roundly condemned the regime’s hostile act and in so doing entered into another serious dispute. He wrote: “We have chosen to speak with calm serenity and in all clarity; yet We cannot but worry about being understood, not by you, Venerable Brothers, always and now more than ever united with Us in thought and sentiment, but by all. It is for this reason that We add that with everything We have said thus far We have not seen fit to condemn the party and the regime as such. We have indicated and condemned such elements of their programme and actions as We have considered contrary to Catholic doctrine and practice and thus irreconcilable with the name and profession of Catholics. And in so doing We have carried out a specific duty of the Apostolic Ministry towards all Our children who belong to the party, that they might provide for their own consciences as Catholics.” (IV) (Ibid.). Towards the end of his office, the Pope’s differences with the regime were further exacerbated. It appears that he intended to come out with a unilateral repudiation of the Pacts on February 11th 1939, the day of their tenth anniversary; having died the day before, he was unable to do so. Another milestone in the history of the Pacts was the drafting of the Constitution of the Italian republic, approved by the Constituent Assembly on December 22nd 1947, promulgated five days later by Enrico de Nicola, elected provisional head of state after the institutional referendum, and brought into force on January 1st 1948. Article 7 of the Constitution adopted the Lateran Pacts as part of the republican state structure, endowing them with constitutional status. “The state and the Catholic church are, each within their own order, independent and sovereign. Their relations are regulated by the Lateran Pacts. Any modifications of the Pacts accepted by the two parties do not require a procedure of constitutional revision” (Onida 2004:142). This was a provision of great political and juridical import, since it enshrined the democratic legitimisation of a negotiated solution devised by the Fascist regime. It marked a fresh impetus towards reconciliation, particularly considering that its formulation was the result of almost unanimous agreement on the part of the

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founding fathers of the republic, including left-wing leaders such as Palmiro Togliatti, general secretary of the Italian Communist Party (Italian Parliament, 1946–1947).

Revision of the Lateran Concordat (1985)

The third phase is the revision of the Concordat, in which the first step was the inclusion of the Pacts in the republican Constitution. That amounted to a change in political form, making no innovation in terms of its political philosophy and content. This was confirmed by a ruling of February 24th and March 1st 1971 (Corte Costituzionale Italiana 1971, no 31), as a result of which the Lateran Pacts were classified as an atypical source in the Italian legal structure in that their provisions are not of the same nature as constitutional laws but are more durable than ordinary sources of law. The process of revision was given greater imputus by the second Vatican Ecumenical Council (October 11th 1962–December 7th 1965), which launched a reform of the Church recasting its relationship with the state. No longer was it based on the principles of ecclesiastical public law, in particular that of potestas indirecta Ecclesiae in temporalibus, but on the principal of religious freedom in the context of the Church’s relations with the world (see the pastoral constitution Gaudium et spes (Paul VI 1965a) December 7th 1965, first part of chapter IV, 40–45; second part of chapter IV, 73–76, and the declaration Dignitatis humanae (Paul VI 1965b) December 7th 1965). Mention should also be made of the new Codex iuris canonici, (John Paul II 1983) promulgated on January 25th 1983. Although the bilateral basis of the negotiation between the Church and the state was unchanged, it should be pointed out that the various above-mentioned documents contributed to a refinement of the logic at the basis of the work of revision. The foundation and the motivation of the new Concordat lay not so much in the definition and concession of privileges to the Chruch by the state, it was rather in the recognition of the Catholic Church’s “full freedom to carry out its pastoral, eductional, charitable, evangelical and sanctifying mission” with special reference to the “freedom of organisation, public worship, teaching and spiritual ministry as well as jursiduction in ecclesiastical matters” (Article 2 of the Revision Agreement). In addition, the intention was to give substance to and regulate the exercise of the right to the religious freedom of the faithful in public life, considering that such a right cannot be relegated to the private sphere alone since it is of public interest, as is any other fundamental right bestowed upon citizens.

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The long and complex process of revision was launched in 1975, after the referendum regarding the recognition of divorce under Italian law, and was concluded with the signing of the Agreement for the Revision of the Lateran Concordat at Villa Madama on February 18th 1984. It was signed by Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Agostino Casaroli and Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, and ratified by the Italian parliament with Law No. 121 of March 25th 1985 (Holy See & Italian Republic 1984–1985). The work of revision was confined to the Concordat. Any attempt to revisit the Treaty would have entailed a return to the pre-1929 state of affairs. A number of articles in the Agreement were augmented by an additional Protocol attached to it. Among the most significant points in the new arrangement was the abrogation of the principle which recognised Catholicism as Italy’s official state religion (enshrined in Article 1 of the Treaty, to be compared with point 1 of the Protocol) and the establishment of the independence and sovereignty of Church and state, “each with its own order”, on the basis of mutual respect and cooperation “for the promotion of mankind and the good of the country” (Article 1 of the Revision Agreement). Other important measures included new regulations covering marriage (Agreement Article 8 and Protocol point 4), the teaching of the Catholic religion (Article 9 and point 4) and ecclesiastical bodies and assets (Article 7 and point 3). Here too the negotiation process was long and hard, here too marked by phases of deadlock which threatened complete breakdown, but the desire to modernise and modify the legal framework of the Concordat prevailed over all the difficulties, much of the merit being due to the determination of the two chief negotiators. Had that enterprise ended in failure, any other opportunity to conclude an honourable agreement would have been unlikely to arise. Indeed, from time to time voices are raised in opposition to the church-state relationship as regulated by the Concordat, seeking the abrogation of the Concordat and the regulation of religious institutions under the normal system of government legislation. Such opinions, regarding the question from the doctrinal standpoint and the political dimension alike, have supporters in both civil life and the ecclesiastical sphere. However, neither the Holy See nor the Italian Episcopal Conference consider the system of the bilateral agreement to be in need of replacement. In terms of the impact of the Agreements’ provisions on Italian public opinion, mention should be made of the recognition of the legal status of the Episcopal Conference under Article 13 of Law No. 222/1985 on ecclesiastical bodies and assets (“The Italian Episcopal Conference acquires civil legal personality as an ecclesiastical body with the entry into force of these provisions”) and the granting of eight-thousandths of each individual taxpayers’ declared

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income to the Episcopal Conference for the purposes of religious worship, pastoral care and charitable works (see Article 47 of Law No. 222/1985). Conclusion This is the current arrangement, and it may be said to represent the accomplishment of an understanding, in that it is not identified with a measure handed down by legislators but rather it has introduced a form of citizens’ participation which in the context of the exercise of religious freedom lays certain provisions of the Agreement open to continuous public assessment. This may be illustrated by two examples. One is the decision to make the teaching of the Catholic religion, treated as a curricular subject rather than a course of catechism, open to believers and non-believers alike. The other is the annual concession of eight-thousandths of taxpayers’ incomes to the Catholic Church. With reference to the metaphor of the wall, the current state of affairs may be said to have enhanced the communicative dimension of the Vatican Walls, increasing the involvement of the Church and its organisations in Italy and at the same time modernising its instruments of communication. In other words, in present-day Italy the Church and the political community manage to talk to each other relatively easily and with mutual respect for their diversity, even though in recent times there have been instances of friction marked by some bitter exchanges. It is to be hoped that despite the differences in their views and assumptions, both sides can manage to keep the common good and the people’s welfare at the forefront of their minds, safeguarding the values of truth and justice. In the final analysis, neither the Church nor the state intend to use the Agreement to prevail over the other; neither do they intend to change their respective identities or purposes, nor to resurrect the old regime based on privileges. At the centre of the Concordat’s philosophy are individuals, their fundamental rights and their prerogatives, alongside the common good which comprises the spiritual well-being of individuals and society and which is the raison d’être of the political community and its structures.

chapter 7

The “Crossings” along the Divide: The Cypriot Experience Maria Hadjipavlou Introduction A day after our Easter in 2003 I crossed to the other side and visited my house in Lapythos. The Turkish Cypriot woman who has been living in my house invited us in and offered us coffee and not only that, she asked us to stay for lunch. I was emotionally drained. I almost collapsed. Looking at the house I felt so sad: they had not even put a brush of paint on it. It looked so aged. Our orchard was dry, not a drop of water on the trees. They had sold it to some foreign couple to build a villa. How could I bear it? I left feeling sick and weak . . . could not stand on my own legs . . . Eleni, Greek Cypriot refugee, 2006

I heard the above experience in a doctor’s waiting room where the woman speaking, Eleni, had met another refugee from the nearby village Karavas who recalled: “I crossed too, but only once and went to my village. The people in my house were nice and clean but my pain was so big, my heart started beating fast and my daughter had to carry me to the car and decided not to go again. The village looked different . . . I called my neighbours’ names but they were not there . . .”. What struck me as I listened to these women was that the Greek Cypriot refugees’ stories have changed since the partial openings of the Green Line on April 23 2003. They now include the presence of the Other who has been inhabiting the homes of their memories and their “personal sovereign space”. These “visits” have a striking physical impact on their bodies and evoke an unparalleled intensity of feelings as they see their homes not cared for (not a brush of paint on it) and confront now in a real way the break-up of their community, their neighbourhood (I called out the names of my neighbours but they were not there). They realized that even if they did return to their villages, the community would not be the same as the one they had known and remembered from thirty years ago when they were violently displaced.

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Despite the pain, however, both women saw the humanity and kindness in the Turkish Cypriots who presently live in their houses, allowing for a transcendence of rigid, historical ethno-religious identities. All Cypriots who have crossed, and who I have met, talked about the coffee offering (coffee in Cyprus is a symbol of welcome but also of consolation after a sad event, such as a loss or death) and the ritual that this entails. This element of mutual humanisation despite the pain is indeed part of the reconciliation processes that thousands of Cypriots—Greek, Turkish, Armenian, Maronite, Latin and others—have experienced in the last five years. Statistics inform us that the first six months of the Green Line (April to October 2003) about one and a half million Greek Cypriots crossed to the North and 700,000 Turkish Cypriots to the South. The United Nations office in Cyprus estimates that a total of nine million people crossed in the first three years from 2003 to 2006. If we were to base our analysis on these mere statistics we might conclude that “reconciliation” has to some extent been achieved at the grassroots level since no violence has occurred. However, a high percentage of Greek and Turkish Cypriots have not yet crossed to the other side for various reasons, such as the requirement to show a passport or identity card and fill in a visa application; other reasons are the military occupation and the presence of the Turkish army and fear of the Turks in general. Many who crossed and saw their old homes and properties returned with new reconstructed memories, experiences, stories and feelings. The past was recalled and re-lived by those who owned the houses and properties and those who listened to the memories of the real/original owners in their current experience. Both felt embodied in a past and both desired a future different from the present which sits on the past. But neither yet dared clearly to articulate this future and how it is to be imagined. Some felt that after a few trips it was time to “say goodbye” to what used to be theirs but no longer felt so since they have constructed “new attachments”, and some have grown old with grandchildren on the other side of the island (Papadakis 2005) Some analysts, international journalists and academics spoke about a new history being made in the early days of the crossings in 2003 which connected people who were former “enemies” or invisible nameless “Others”. The young generation which had learned only through second-hand information about the “other side, the fearful other”, has been given an opportunity to experience the other and the “occupied lands” about which they learned at school “not to forget”. Often the young have become the witnesses of their parents’ recollection of their past which they kept alive through family stories. The article is structured as follows: I will first give a brief background to the Cyprus conflict and the partial opening of the Line on April 23 2003 (according

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to ideological positioning the event was variously referred to as the opening of borders, of the gates, of the doors). I then provide a general discussion on reconciliation followed by an analysis of the stories and experiences of Cypriots— Greek, Turkish, Armenian, Maronite and Latin—when crossing the Line from both sides. The data come from interviews I have conducted since 2003, and from Greek and Turkish Cypriot press articles and television programmes. What are the implications of these findings regarding the reconciliation process in general? I contend that these crossing contacts by themselves are not sufficiently dynamic unless they are supported institutionally and legitimised at the macro level. I conclude with some policy recommendations regarding the inclusion of these narratives in the dominant national narrative in each community.

Cyprus: History of the Conflict

The geo-strategic location of Cyprus in the easternmost part of the Mediter­ ranean has always made it vulnerable to outside conquest and interference. Whichever power dominated the region also controlled Cyprus. The Achaean Greeks settled on the island in the 2nd millennium BC, formed city-kingdoms on the Minoan model and introduced the Greek language and culture. To this day the Greek Cypriots refer to this period to stress the Hellenic heritage and its continuity with the present. The Turkish Cypriots stress the three centuries of the Ottoman presence (1571–1878) which determined the inter-ethnic character of the island. When Cyprus obtained its independence in 1960 the Turkish Cypriots comprised 18% of the population and Greeks 80%. The demographics were cited as 82% Greek Cypriots, however, the 1960 constitution forced the Armenian, Maronite and Latin 2% of the population to choose one of the two major communities to belong to, and all of them chose to belong to the Greek Cypriot majority, being Christians themselves. In 1878 the British took control of the island and Cyprus became a British colony in 1925. During the anti-colonial struggle in 1955–9 the Greeks of Cyprus fought the British for “enosis” (union) with the Greek homeland, whereas the Turks of Cyprus demanded “taxim”—partition, or a union of part of the island with the Turkish homeland. The 1950s was a period of intense inter-ethnic mistrust, fear and violence. According to Turkish Cypriot writers (Salih 1968, Nedjatigil 1997), the Turkish Cypriot leadership expected that the Greek fighters would eventually terrorise the Turkish Cypriot community. As a result, by 1957 the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT) had been formed in an effort to counteract the E.O.K.A (National Organisation of Greek Cypriot

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Fighters). Thus two competing nationalisms were created (Hadjipavlou— Trigeorgis 1987) The British politicised communal differences as a tool to serve their colonial interests in the Middle East (Pollis 1998) and reinforced the rise of the two antagonistic nationalisms and competing visions based on each group’s “primordial attachments” to their respective motherlands. A compromise settlement was worked out by outside stakeholders—Greece, Turkey and Britain—which led in 1960 to the creation of the Republic of Cyprus (Xydis 1973). Cyprus is a case of an imposed settlement which ignored prevailing local realities (culture of intolerance, inter-ethnic violence) and micro-level concerns (Kitromilides 1977). The imposed accommodation and constitutional arrangements remained fragile, and inter-ethnic violence broke out in December 1963 and later in 1967 (Kyriakides 1968). This resulted in the creation of a “Green line,” that is to say a dividing line in the capital Nicosia to keep the two warring factions apart. This line was drawn by the British commander and was later patrolled by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in 1964. Turkish Cypriot enclaves were set up in the major cities of the island to which Turkish Cypriots moved for security reasons. After that the Republic of Cyprus was administered exclusively by the Greek Cypriots. The period between 1963 and 1974 was a time of unequal social and economic development, another factor that pulled the two communities further apart. Greek Cypriots experienced economic prosperity and modernisation, whereas Turkish Cypriots entered a period of economic and cultural dependence on Turkey, which they regarded as their “protector” from Greek Cypriot domination. In the early 1970s extremist groups in both communities developed with the help of outside parties. In July 1974 the Greek junta launched a coup d´etat, which was followed a few days later by Turkish military intervention. This led to de facto partition of the island followed by massive displacement of both communities; hundreds were killed, thousands became missing persons and an economic catastrophe ensued. In 1983 Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, with the full support of Ankara, proclaimed the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) but failed to gain recognition by any country except Turkey, which meant the international isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and increased dependence on Turkey. Over the years the demographic composition in the north has changed with the influx of people from poor Turkish regions. This created what became known as “the settler problem”. There are estimated to be 200,000 Turkish settlers living in Northern Cyprus and often the Turkish Cypriots say they feel a minority on their own side (Figures 7.1 and 7.2).

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FIGURE 7.1 Borderline separating the Republic of Cyprus (South) and the ʻTurkish Republic of Northern Cyprusʼ, which is not recognized by any country by Turkey. Source: Map by Golbez [GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/ fdl.html)].

FIGURE 7.2 Street cut by the Green Line in Nicosia. Source: Photo by Gérard Janot [GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/ copyleft/fdl.html).

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A long series of high-level inter-communal negotiations have been conducted on and off since 1975 under the auspices of the United Nations, but to this day no mutually acceptable agreement has been reached. There is some renewed hope in 2008 with the new leadership in both communities; both are in favour of a solution and have a long-standing relationship as both are on the left of the political spectrum.

The Opening of the Green Line

The Line that splits the island into two is about 112 miles long, separating North and South. This Line carries different names according to one’s position in politics, ideology and history. It is referred to as the green line—as it was initially called in 1963 after the first communal violence—the ceasefire line, the deadzone, the demarcation line, the partitioning line, the Attila line, no-man’s land or the border, designated after the 1974 events (Hadjipavlou 2006, 2010; Cockburn 2004). It was partially opened on April 23, 2003, at five points—three in the Nicosia district, one in the Famagusta area, and one in Larnaca. Prior to the opening the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had submitted a Plan for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem to the leaders of the two communities. This initiative, which became known as the ‘Annan Plan’, was defeated in joint referenda in which 76% of Greek Cypriots voted “No” to the Plan and 67% of Turkish Cypriots voted “Yes”, supporting reunification with entry to the European Union of the whole of the island. A week later, on May 1 2004, the Republic of Cyprus (the south) became a member of the European Union. This marked a new turning point in the recent history of Cyprus. Some Greek Cypriot politicians referred to the “Europeanisation” of the conflict. The EU has always supported UN efforts for a lasting settlement which would guarantee the basic needs and civil, political and cultural rights of all Cypriot citizens (Bryant 2004a, 2004b; Tocci 2004). Prior to the referenda many changes had occurred in the Turkish Cypriot community, namely massive mobilisation and public demonstrations led by the left and the centre-left, youth organisations, women’s groups and NGOs, all supporting a change of leadership and of the status quo. This “revolution from below” forced the military and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to open some “gates” across the Green Line, which led to the subsequent “crossings”. There followed a change in leadership, in which Mehmet Ali Talat, who comes from the left, the Turkish Republican Party, succeeded Rauf Denktash as the leader of the community. Pro-solution forces thus came to power in the North.

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On the Greek Cypriot side centre-right Tassos Papadopoulos became President, backed by the Communist AKEL party and the socialist party, EDEK. He promoted the view that the Annan Plan was pro-Turkish and did not respond to the Greek Cypriots’ need for security and full human rights. In his view accepting the plan would have meant the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus without any guarantee that the agreement would be implemented, given Turkey’s untrustworthiness. These different and competing interpretations of the Plan deepened the divisions. Despite the “crossings”, which helped, as I will argue below, challenge many old inter-ethnic stereotypes and misperceptions while at the same time creating new and different ones, the post-referendum climate was one of renewed mistrust and feelings of betrayal, especially among the Turkish Cypriot left (Republican Turkish Party PRT), which expected the Greek Cypriot left (AKEL) to vote for the Plan; rather, they characterised it as “Anglo-American” and claimed that it did not serve the interests of the Cypriot people. The adversarial discourse at official levels created frustration among the pro-solution people in both communities as well as weakening engagement in work for rapprochement. The international community and the European Union were surprised by the Greek Cypriot negative vote. International attention then focused on how to help the Turkish Cypriots get out of their political and economic isolation. They had failed to recognise that a change of leadership in the Greek Cypriot community meant a different ideology, ethnic politics and understanding of the solution from the previous Clerides administration, which was promoting a pro-solution position. There followed a period of frustration, lack of empathy and reinforcement of misperceptions (a “the Greeks do not wants us” attitude). The conflict culture re-emerged in that period, and the rapprochement movement tried to reactivate itself. In the 2008 presidential election in the Republic of Cyprus Demetris Christofias, secretary general of the left party AKEL, was elected president. He and Mr. Talat have known each other for many years and have both committed themselves to a “Cypriot solution for the Cypriots and by the Cypriots.” They soon agreed to the opening of Ledra Street/Locmaci, which had been closed by barbed wire since 1963 and patrolled by Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot soldiers. After the first meeting between the leaders of the two communities in March 2008, both leaders agreed to set up working parties and technical committees to discuss day-to-day problems and questions of substance. The two leaders started official negotiations in September 2008, and there was then renewed hope in both communities and a new challenge for civil society, which has mobilised and started exerting pressure for a solution.

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Reconciliation—the Concept, the Goal and the Process There is no handy roadmap to reconciliation. There is no short cut or simple prescription for healing the wounds and divisions of a society in the aftermath of sustained violence. Creating trust and understanding between former enemies is an extremely difficult challenge. It is, however, an essential one to address in the process of building a lasting peace. Examining the painful past, acknowledging it and understanding it, and above all transcending it together is the best way to guarantee that it does not, and cannot, happen again. Tutu 2003

In the above quotation Desmond Tutu of South Africa highlights the importance of coming to terms with the painful past as a goal to guarantee that it will not happen again. This is of particular importance in the case of deeprooted and protracted conflicts like the Cyprus one (Bar-Tal 2000; Burton 1990; Azar 1985). The key concepts here are “acknowledgement, understanding and transcending” the past together. All three processes are complex and involve acts of will, courage and risk. Both the leadership and civil organisations can play a crucial role in such processes, as they have done in South Africa, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, East Timor and elsewhere. The issue of reconciliation in conflict societies needs to be understood both in the pre- and post-solution period. As seen above, in Cyprus the efforts for a solution at the macro level have created further polarisation, expressed during and after the referenda without any mention of reconciliation or of coming to terms with a painful past. If we accept that much of the hatred, fear, negative stereotyping, misperceptions, competing interpretations of historical events, contested identities and ambiguities, victimhood, silencing of the other and enemy images are part of the conflict culture in Cyprus and are constructed and thus learned and often reproduced and transferred inter-generationally in formal and informal education, then we can, with the appropriate interventions, de-construct them and transform this conflict system (Lederah 1997). One spontaneous intervention has been the people’s “crossings” during the last three years, when I have spoken to many people from both sides who have been across. The new personal stories and feelings that emerge are complex and point to the need for reconciliation and empathy building across the Line. A new human community is being created whose stories are based on direct personal experiences that often challenge the official pronouncements and past collective narratives.

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It is well understood that when one group has victimised another or when there has been mutual victimisation by two groups, if the groups continue to live near each other, reconciliation is essential to stop potential violence and to facilitate healing (Staub 1989, 2002). There is a positive cyclical relationship between healing and reconciliation; as reconciliation begins it increases security and makes healing possible which, as it progresses, makes reconciliation become more possible. This is a cycle in which progress in one realm fosters progress in the other. As Staub informs us, being the victim is often a psychologically comforting position. Victims are absolved from the need to accept responsibility for their role in the conflict. They are, furthermore, preoccupied with the distant and recent past of the conflict and cannot attend to the possibility of future possibilities for co-existence. Victims are conscious exclusively of their own pain and cannot empathise with the suffering of the Other party. This is what Montville coined as “egoism of victimhood” (Montville 1987). Conflicts become even more intractable when each side views itself as the only legitimate victim. Reconciliation is a process that redesigns our relationships so that a society can move from a divided past to a shared future (Bloomfield 2003). To engage in this process, especially in protracted conflicts, we need to understand that it takes years, if not decades (Azar 1990; Kriesberg 1999). Reconciliation is more than co-existence or formerly hostile groups living near each other. It is even more than formerly hostile groups interacting and working together, although working together for shared goals is one important avenue to overcome hostility and negative views of the other (Allport 1954; Staub 1989, 2002; Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis 1998, 2002; Hadjipavlou 2003, 2004) and move toward reconciliation. I view reconciliation as the capacity to reach out to the Other, feel empathy for their suffering and engage in shared social activities. This means mutual acceptance and trust-building preceded by the task of forgiveness whereby victims and perpetrators come to acknowledge past hurts. They come to see the humanity of one another, and see the possibility of a new constructive relationship. Apart from entailing the healing of relationships, the underpinnings of reconciliation include economic justice, power-sharing, equality and recognition of separate and multiple identities, and the fulfilment of basic human needs (Sisk 1997; Kelman 1990). According to Kriesberg (1999) processes of reconciliation are complex and unending and whatever kind of reconciliation is attained is not permanent. He supports the view that reconciliation achieved between peoples takes years, decades or even centuries after an intercommunal accommodation is achieved. He cites the example of the relationship between Native Americans and the dominant ethnic groups in the United

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States, which has undergone many transformations. Other examples of this multi-generational process of reconciliation include the Spanish acknowledgement that the expulsion of Jews in 1492 was wrong and the Canadian and Australian governments’ apologies for denying basic rights to indigenous people. More recently, the establishment of various Truth and Reconciliation Commissions—in South Africa, Rwanda, Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and elsewhere—have constituted tools in the healing processes. Thus reconciliation is multi-faceted and the domestic context as well as the readiness factor must be considered before any intervention is considered. One of the reconciliation interventions aims at the formation of new belief systems, worldviews, attitudes, motivations, goals and emotions that would form the backbone of peaceful relations. Reconciliation is not a natural process but one that requires active efforts to overcome its obstacles. Reconciliation does not occur spontaneously, but requires guidance, policies and initiated acts in establishing new institutions. The process requires the participation of leadership, elites, institutions, non-governmental organisations, the media and peace education programmes, and society as a whole. The “crossings” in Cyprus, as I will argue, constitute only a small part of the public reconciliation and informal peace education processes in which all interested sectors have yet to participate. Solomon (2003) proposed four kinds of inter-related dispositional outcomes which he believes will help institute a systematic reconciliation process, which is a capacity that can be developed and learned. It is assumed that the collective historical memories and narrative each side holds about the conflict affect the views and attitudes of individuals and communities. Another important connection of reconciliation relates to the prevalence of democratic governance and the implementation of human rights in the postconflict period. This is so because a well-balanced democracy is a form of governance that has the capacity not only to manage conflicts and contradictions, containing recourse to violence, but also to bring out differences and allow them to exist without threatening the whole system. Thus the development of a democratic culture goes side by side with reconciliation processes based on new relationship building at both governing elite and polity levels.

The Cyprus Context

Person-to-person encounters constitute part of the much-needed reconciliation processes in Cyprus as well as part of the public peace education which aims to de-escalate misperceptions, address past fears and build new spaces for connection. It must be noted that although there was mention of

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a Reconciliation Commission in the Annan Plan (See www.un.org/cyprus/ annan) no political leader or Party or NGO addressed this issue in either community during the public information campaign prior to the referendum. This shows that the issue of reconciliation is politically sensitive. The use of the past still constitutes political capital for each side to promote selectively its own “chosen traumas and chosen glories” and continue living in “half-truths” (Volkan 1978). As thousands of people from all Cypriot communities have been crossing the Green Line since 2003, new relationships have been formed based on direct face-to-face experiences with the Other. Many of these stories initially revealed the presence of the past as experienced by each community. The Turkish Cypriots recall Bloody Christmas in 1963 and 1967 which meant death, expulsion, missing persons, fear and the deprivation of human rights. The Greek Cypriots recall the consequences of the 1974 Turkish invasion which again meant the death of loved ones, fear, missing persons, displacement, violation of human rights, and loss of economic well-being. They do not, however, stay there because through the direct meeting with the Other, i.e. the Turkish or Greek Cypriot who has been living in the landscape and home of the Others’ memories for over thirty years, they discover the human being who has also suffered and has been imagining a different life. In some cases the transformation is deep and mutual caring develops a new possibility for a human community to emerge, a necessary condition for reconciliation to sustain any political solution. The experience of displacement and forced separation has influenced many creative minds and artist in Cyprus, as in the following poem by Turkish Cypriot Mehmet Yashin, who wrote it prior to the crossings: If I could only meet you one day, I’d be so happy, ever so happy I’m keeping all your photographs, little girl: -Here is your birthday -Under the mandarin tree, the cake with three candles -you, in the sea with Donald Duck -you, waving from the car, your parents smiling at you and now you are smiling at me I’ll give these pictures back to you, little girl, But from time to time All this weighs heavily on me. I’m anguished What if they killed you during that war? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M. Yashin, Don’t Go Back to Kyrenia, 2000

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What the Turkish Cypriot poet prophetically desired in his poem, written in the 1990s, actually happened on April 23, 2003, and many photographs left behind by the original owners had been kept and saved by the “new owners” and were given to their real owners when they knocked at the door of their homes. By means of these objects left behind the poet enters the life of the family and also the fearful thought that the war might have killed them, something that creates regret and anguish. During those early days of the crossings local newspapers and television stations carried stories of Greek Cypriot people returning with photo albums, wedding dresses, valuable silver and gold artifacts and old traditional embroideries which the Turkish Cypriots had kept as if they knew the owner would come to claim them one day. The old memories were reconstructed in the acquisition of these material objects. These objects became the renewed connections of the real owners to their homes and a new realisation that someone they did not know lives there in the present. The Turkish Cypriots who were given the Greek Cypriot homes knew well enough the emotional and historical value of these objects and made sure to keep them safe. Through the crossings not only did the ‘enemy’ acquired a face, a name, and a new possibility, but also, to the surprise of both sides, they discovered that the Other honoured the same elements of shared Cypriot culture, i.e., hospitality and local traditions. Many Greek Cypriots admitted that they had never expected “that after so many years the Turks would keep our family valuables.” These gestures have had a humanising and connecting impact on both.

Deconstructing Stereotypes and a Cry for Help

In protracted conflicts the issue of stereotypes and misperceptions forms part of an intractable culture and needs to be addressed (Allport 1954; Hadjipavlou 2004). In the following narrative a Greek Cypriot family “visited” their house in the north after twenty-nine years; though pleasantly surprised at the way they were received, still they could not hide their pain and sadness. (A distinction is made between the Cypriot Turks and the Turks from Turkey, who are called ‘the settlers’, or “xeni” (foreigners) and are given Greek Cypriot homes, an issue that would further complicate the property settlement): The people who now live in our house are very nice. They kept these photographs of my family and some valuables, like embroideries, and have now given them to us (she shows these to me). I wonder if they knew that one day

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we would return. The family who live in my parents’ house come from Ayios Nikolaos of Paphos (meaning they are Cypriots and refugees too); they are very clean and have kept the house and the garden in good condition. But I still felt a lot of pain and cried witnessing my parents’ grief . . . seeing the house I now understood what my parents had been talking to me about for so many years . . . Despina 2003

Told by a young university student, the above story reveals, among other things, a number of assumptions about the Other which had been transmitted to her by her parents and her informal and formal education. It is interesting to note that she refers to “our house” even though she never lived there herself and has no memories of it. The fact that those “others” were “nice, clean and considerate” breaks down the ethnic stereotypes which the Greek Cypriots hold of the Turks and by extension of Turkish Cypriots (Hadjipavlou 2003). This positive realisation was not enough, however, to alleviate the injustice they felt or their pain and grief in seeing someone else living in their family’s home. The Turkish Cypriots who came from the villages in the Paphos district (south west Cyprus) spoke the Cypriot dialect, which was another surprise for many young Greek Cypriots. Thus the language barrier was not a problem in such cases, which made interaction easier and brought the people closer to each other. As mentioned earlier, reconciliation is a long-term process and grieving and coming to terms with loss require a well-designed support system, which is not yet in place in Cyprus. In fact, the state has undermined the importance of reconciliation by insisting that there can be no reconciliation prior to a solution. From my research I find that reconciliation processes need to start in parallel to official negotiations. People have to become accustomed to a culture of safety, trust and confidence in the future so that they can invest in the implementation of the political solution when it comes. Societal needs and fears have to be addressed and incorporated into the future guidelines for a lasting solution. The citizens’ crossings provide ample evidence of this need. According to Solomon (2002), one of the “dispositional outcomes” in peace learning refers to the Legitimisation of the Other’s Collective Narrative, which means focusing on the conflict as defined between collectives and not between individuals, i.e. the enemy is neither Ahmet nor Eleni but governments and institutions of which the individual is a product. To accept the Other’s narrative means that events past and present can be seen through both lenses. The crossings gave the opportunity to many Cypriots to share their stories and their

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pain. Here is one example. Nahite, a Turkish Cypriot woman in her late forties living on the north side of divided Nicosia—she originally came from the south side—told me the story of when her father was killed in 1974 by Greek Cypriot nationalists and how this pain and loss has defined her life in the last thirty years. Through her personal story she held an entire community responsible and at fault. She regretted that to this day no reconciliation process has been instituted to offer psychological or other support and allow their grievances and story be heard. No forum for victim/survivor groups has been developed by any NGO, unlike the case of Northern Ireland (White 2003).This lack of any support and psychological services has been lamented by many Cypriots I have spoken to. Another prevailing theme and emotion amongst the Turkish Cypriots was “fear”, “anger” and the desire for justice which emerged through these interethnic contacts. Thirty years later Nahite cannot “forgive the Greeks” since no Greek has either acknowledged or apologised for her father’s unjust death and her own suffering as a survivor. She kept reconstructing her father’s murder, which brought memories of fear and an unwillingness to live with the Greeks. She also experienced an ambivalence, expressed in her yearning to see her birthplace and old neighborhood in Limassol, in the south. A few days after our interview, she went and found that Greek Cypriot refugees from the north were living in her house in the south. This visit somehow softened her anger as she realised that the war had taken its toll on both sides. Thus, momentarily, she overcame the fixation of hatred, fear and discomfort and was able to see the Other through a different lens. Reconciliation is not only a need between the communities but within each community as well. A Turkish Cypriot man spoke about criminals who live in his own community and the kind of reconciliation he wants so that justice can be done. He feels that no institution has addressed his need for justice. The political and social implications of the lack of “justice” allows the perpetuation of a social order which is unsafe since the “criminals” are out free. He criticises the political system which ignores or covers up such serious matters. This person has the evidence but there is no legal infrastructure in place to hear such cases. He feels that the administration in the north silences such voices in order to keep social cohesion and sustain the “enemy image”. I know who killed my relative’s brother. It was not the Greeks but the Turks in our community. They did it because they just felt like it. These criminals are free and live among us. Who is going to arrest them and bring them to justice? There is no service to report these cases. We have been told to keep silent . . .

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Another prevalent theme revolved around the past and specifically about history learning and teaching. For instance, a male academic in the north spoke about the power of symbols and the need for reconciliation with history and national narratives. Each official side wrote a different version of the same historical events which is selective, exclusive and promotes the nationalist agenda. The burden of history and the competing commemorations perpetuate the conflict system in Cyprus whereby the heroes of one community become the villains of the other and the nationalist symbols of the one constitute a threat to the Other’s identity. I believe we need reconciliation. The problem in Cyprus is that the symbols are all wrong. The Republic of Cyprus does not resonate with Turkish Cypriots . . . for some it does but it resonates as the old republic of Cyprus . . . there are national symbols, the EU symbols which until recently were associated with the Greek Cyprus . . . then there are these Greek and Turkish nationalist symbols everywhere as well as statues that honor EOKA and TMT. . . . In the case of Cyprus symbols are maintained to sustain particular way of thought and give it legitimacy. . . . I think over time symbols can change but it requires reconciliation with history . . . Interview 2005

Moreover, by legitimising the Other’s narrative as much as one’s own, a space is opened for dialogue and trust building, a necessary ingredient for what Solomon proposes as a critical examination of our side’s contribution to the conflict. This means that the suffering which each side has inflicted on the other is acknowledged, together with the guilt and denial that usually accompany lack of acknowledgement. In conflict resolution workshops between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots this skill was learned and often we noted that after a mutual apology, a shared narrative emerges based on a new experience which liberates both sides from their “egoism of victimhood” as well as from fear of how they would be perceived when they revealed their own “badness” (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis 1998) (Figures 7.3 and 7.4). Genuine voices of apology were heard in those inter-communal encounters and the dignity of the survivors felt restored. Thus symbolic forms of healing can include the elimination of those symbols and provocative militaristic statues whose sole aim has been to point in a generalised way to the aggression and badness of the Other. The past history of hostility can be transcended through joint peace monuments as forms of symbolic remembrance of the suffering of all sides in the conflict.

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FIGURE 7.3 Hundreds of people wait to cross to the other side after the check points opening at Ledra Palace Hotel in Nicosia. Source: Photo by Panicos Chrysanthou.

FIGURE 7.4 Central street in the capital of Cyprus, Nicosia, Ledra Street which was closed in the interethnic fighting in 1963 and reopened in 2008. Source: Photo by Olga Demetriou.

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Whose House is it?

I was present when a Greek Cypriot owner visited her home, inhabited by a young Turkish Cypriot family for the last thirty-two years. Its location is a southern village called Peristerona, which prior to 1963 was a mixed village (before the conflict there had been 300 mixed villages around the island, which were gradually reduced to 63 during the communal clashes in the 1960s and since the Turkish intervention in 1974 there exist only two mixed villages: Pyla and Potamia). This was part of the exchange between two men: GC; This is my home (eine to spitimou). I was born here and lived here until 1974 when I was twenty three. I want to return and have my property back. TC: This is my house too. I was born here thirty-three years ago and I want to live here on this side. I feel it is my home too. The property issue is the most complex and significant one in the Cyprus conflict because of its connection to identity, justice and family history. This complexity emerged during the crossings. This is an example where the same space, a family house, provides for and symbolises past and present memories and realities. Each legitimately claims it to be his own. These individuals shared personal stories related to the same territory in which violence and war deprived the real owner of his birth-home and passed it to a stranger who made it his birthplace. They both experienced dislocation and fear. How can they each come to terms with this mutual claim? Could sharing the same “territory” be possible? Can a judicial process reach a satisfactory settlement and if so of what kind? Can the one return without the other’s expulsion? Can we negotiate legal with ontological and existential issues? The issue of memory in person-to-person reconciliation processes plays a crucial role. It can both enhance and hinder reconciliation processes. As Andrew Rigby (2003) states, “too great a concern with remembering the past can mean that the divisions and conflict of old never die, the wounds are never healed. In such circumstances the past continues to dominate the present, and hence to some degree determine the future.” On the other hand, “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Memory is selective and can be easily manipulated. Part of the official historiography in the Greek Cypriot community promotes the view of a shared past with the Turkish Cypriots going back to the Ottoman period in order to show that socially at the grassroots level there were no real differences between the two communities and it is the “foreign Other” who caused all the violence and separation

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between the two sides. In Turkish Cypriot historiography the view that the Greeks always dominated the Turks and wanted to harm them predominated and thus the “let us live separately” position prevailed. (Joint efforts to address these issues have recently been undertaken by academics and educators in both communities). There is a need for a new social and political history to be part of a new inclusive narrative which will bring all the different and competing narratives into the conversation and develop a critical understanding of the events and the various stakeholders’ responsibility in them. The new history as it unfolds with the crossings needs to be legitimised as part of the bigger peace and reconciliation efforts, otherwise they will fade both in political importance and frequency of occurrence.

Some Concluding Remarks

The search for reconciliation is a recognition that conflict resolution—that is to say the mutually accepted negotiated agreement at macro level—is not by itself adequate to create a culture of peace, that is to say a comprehensive society-wide system of values, beliefs and attitudes to help people in their daily lives put a premium on peace, desire peace, seek peace and stand for peace after the solution. It has also been observed that sometimes formal agreements fall apart or fall short in establishing peaceful and trusting relations between former rivals. This is where the process of reconciliation has to penetrate deep into the societal fabric and include all segments of the population in order for trust and cooperation to begin evolving as well as a consideration of each party’s concerns, fears, grievances, needs and interests. The discussion and analysis of narratives of Cypriots’ crossings have revealed the need for a reconciliation process. A complexity of themes and problems have to be studied systematically and addressed prior to, during and after a solution. Geographical and psychological separation as well as lack of institutional structures to get to know each other’s culture, achievements and concerns has kept the citizens of both communities ignorant of each other. The consequences of failing to cultivate a pro-solution culture or institute a peace-socialising process was manifest in the failure of the 2004 referendum, which caused further polarisation both intra- and inter-communally. Reconciliation requires the formation of new beliefs, attitudes, motivations, goals and emotions that support peaceful relations, and this is where an integrated curriculum can play a significant role. Reconciliation is not a natural process, but one that requires active efforts to overcome past obstacles.

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Although in Cyprus since 2003 public reconciliation has occurred spontaneously and on an individual, voluntary basis with differing motivations, the predominant one being the desire to see one’s home and meet the “invisible Other”, analysis has shown that there is a need for a well-designed process that would require guidance, expertise, new policies and political initiatives. The figure of nine million crossings has not in itself changed macro-level policies, so the bottom-up dynamic needs to be reinforced and legitimised as part of the broader peace building and official processes. This process would require the participation of leaderships, elites, institutions, non-governmental organisations, the media, the church, the family and of course, education both formal and informal. As they unfold these new and complex realities come to challenge formal history teaching and learning as well as mainstream media and politicians’ rhetoric, which is based on an adversarial model. The alternative is the cooperative model. Through these contacts there arises the need for trust building, acknowledgment of past grievances as well as empathy and psychological healing. The impact of the conflict and de facto partition on the physical and psychological health of primarily female informants indicates the need for the establishment of trauma centres to address the long-term consequences of war and loss as well as the gendered conflict impact (Broome 1993; Hynes 2004). A form of empathy includes learning the Other’s language and way of life. Many individuals have already started to learn Greek and Turkish despite the lack of any state support. It would help enormously if the ministries of education officially introduce Greek and Turkish language learning at all levels of formal education. I believe this would contribute to the reconciliation process and would symbolise mutual respect and the appreciation of differences as well as the recognition of similarities. The state has done very little to foster reconciliation and to transform the citizens’ crossings into new political initiatives through which people would feel empowered to deal with both the past and the future and to stop wondering whether it is “politically correct” to cross! The state and international organisations should allocate resources for the establishment of reconciliation centres where citizens can have access for their own personal need for healing and legitimisation of their loss, grievances, hurt and pain. Legal action should also be taken against perpetrators of crimes in both communities who, as my informants mentioned, are out free and known for what they are. One sometimes wonders if the crossings have become, as has often been the case in Cyprus, part of the status quo. Or is the dynamic still there and is the people-to-people reconciliation taking place in a quiet way? I believe that this is not by itself an adequate process. The crossings have also revealed

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intra-communal differences and stories untold. Since the “us and them” dichotomy has become more complex it is possible to establish many inter-ethnic coalitions which can help prepare the environment for co-existence and future collaboration. After all, reconciliation is a complex process and a learned skill and capacity of which Cypriots are in need. The state should join in engaging in dialogue with the grassroots and local communities and start integrating much of this new social history into the official narrative and in the preparation of new teaching materials whereby the citizens’ crossings can become part of peace culture efforts. Television programmes, the media, intellectuals and the universities on both sides can promote the socio-cultural importance of “crossings” and publicise the complexity of these experiences so as to create the culture of mutual acceptance which is a prerequisite to any political solution and long-term peace-building. These “crossings” have also revealed that a “humanistic infrastructure” and attitude toward the Other is still deeply ingrained in Cypriot culture and awaits political utilisation in all its manifestations, and that more research is needed to discuss this further.

chapter 8

Israel-Palestine: Concrete Fences and Fluid Borders Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Sigal Ben-Rafael Galanti

The Historical and Political Context

The barrier that Israel has erected in recent decades on the West Bank, as well as smaller similar projects constructed on other sites, constituted important moves in the historical-political context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The barriers were not deemed to be solutions to the conflict itself, but only tactical and strategic means for Israel’s pragmatic response to situations that the conflict generated. Although the barriers were meant to represent a kind of consolidation of given military facts, everyone—on both sides—knew that the political reality is fluid and versatile and the barriers were only new elements in a far larger configuration of aspects. None the less, they constituted circumstances that would imprint themselves on further developments. This paper principally focuses therefore on Israel’s main security barrier—the West Bank barrier—and begins by charting a general (concise) picture of the PalestinianIsraeli conflict. Drawing such a picture sets the analyst in a difficult position since this conflict is deeply embedded in uncompromising political and ideological controversies. Its description is unavoidably challenged as “biased” once it diverges from the narrative of one of the sides. Yet it is impossible to elaborate on the roles and impacts of Israel’s barrier without confronting that risk. The best an analyst can do is to try to the best of his or her ability to remain unbiased visà-vis each of the contending parties. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is arguably the most tenacious and enduring in contemporary history (Tessler, 1994). It started before World War I, when the land of Palestine still belonged to the Ottoman Empire, and its roots can be traced to the rise of Zionism and Arab nationalism. Already then—in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth, incidents reflected the tensions between Arabs and Jews. Confrontations broke out immediately in 1917, when the British government issued its Balfour Declaration and soon obtained a Mandate over Palestine from the League of Nations. This declaration endorsed the project to establish a “national home” in Palestine for the Jews, in tandem with the British government’s commitment to respect the local Arab population’s rights and aspirations. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004272859_010

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For a short time, relations between the Zionists and the Arab national movement seemed to have reached understanding, with the Faisal–Weizmann Agreement (January 1919)—i.e. respectively the Saudi Prince and the head of the Zionist movement—which seemed to create an option for coexistence. However, the emerging leadership of Haj Amin al-Husseini marked the intensifying of the Palestinian Arab nationalist struggle against Jewish immigration to Palestine (Sela, [ed.] 2002). Large-scale riots broke out against the Jews as early as 1920 in Jerusalem and later on in 1921 and 1929, in Hebron and other areas. The riots caused many Jewish casualties and led to the evacuation of Jews from Hebron and Gaza. After a few years of relative calm, the Arab Revolt of 1936–39 broke out, motivated directly by the mass Jewish immigration to Palestine in the 1930’s following the rise of the Nazis in Germany and the spreading of the world economic crisis. Arab leaders now feared that the Zionist project would reduce to nothing their own project of building a Palestinian nation-state. A general strike was followed by a bloody revolt against the British and the Jews, the peak of which occurred with the establishment of the British Peel Commission that recommended partitioning Palestine. The Palestinian Arabs rejected this plan right away (Morris 2009). Military repression, the revocation of Peel’s recommendations, and the publication of Britain’s White Paper that reduced Jewish immigration to small yearly quotas jointly led to the restoration of relative calm. During World War II, the more moderate Nashashibi clan—that rose to Palestinian leadership when Al-Husseini fled the British and joined the Nazis in exile—strengthened the sense of truce in the country. By the end of the war, however, the crisis reignited around the fate of Holocaust survivors from Europe who tried to reach Palestine. This time though the animosity was leveled against the Jews and Britain. The British re-established immigration quotas and banned refugees from landing in the country (thousands were interned in Cyprus camps), causing the Zionists to start an insurgency of their own against them. On 29 November 1947 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution 181(II) recommending Palestine’s partition into an Arab state, a Jewish state, and the City of Jerusalem (Baum 2005). The Jews accepted the decision and on 14 May 1948, in Tel Aviv, the Jews proclaimed the founding of a Jewish State. The following day violence was already sweeping through Palestine. For four months, Jews sustained attacks by a coalition of Arab armies that intervened in support of Palestinian militias. On the Jewish side, the different groups united into a new national army, the IDF (Israel Defense Forces). By 1948, the Arab forces were losing ground and tens of thousands of Arab civilians had fled the region, creating in the process a brand new large-scale

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refugee population. It is in this context that what the Jews named Milhemet Ha-atzmaut (the War of Independence), the Palestinians would later call the Naqba (the Catastrophe). That exodus from the territories that had now become the State of Israel numbered about 6–700,000 Arabs. They fled war-torn areas and, in some cases, were expelled from their homes. The causes of the exodus is a topic of harsh dispute between Israeli and Arab spokespeople. Here and there, however, Israelis acknowledge that some massacres were committed by military units which forced inhabitants to flee—described by some commentators as “ethnic cleansing.” On the other hand, it is also undeniable that with the advance of Israeli troops many Arab leaders called on the populace to leave, and the most notable families were the first to set an example. The Palestinian leadership was itself subject to discord, and failed to articulate clear directives (Schechtman 1952). At the end of the war, the Israeli Authorities officially barred the refugees from re-settling or claiming their property. Their most “generous” offer was made in 1949 when they proposed allowing the return of 100,000 refugees— including 10,000 cases of family-reunion—in view of peace negotiations (Morris 2004). The proposal was conditional on a peace treaty and on the Arab states’ absorbing the remaining refugees. However, the Arab states rejected the proposal and requested that refugees receive the right to re-settle in their original homes. Ever since, this issue has been one of the greatest obstacles to concluding any definitive peace agreement between the Palestinians and Israel. The latter, it should also be noted, emphasizes that overwhelming Muslim support for the Palestinians throughout the Arab world created at that time a climate of expulsion for the Jewish communities of the Middle East and North Africa, giving rise to streams of migrants in the other direction, that also numbered hundreds of thousands. The armistice agreements of 1949 recognized Israel’s possession of much of the former British Mandate territory, Jordan’s occupying the West Bank, and Egypt’s taking over the Gaza Strip (Dershowitz 2005), although those agreements did not create genuine calm in the region. In the early 1950s, Palestinian fedayeen (militants) were already launching guerrilla attacks from Jordanian territory into Israel—which responded with reprisal operations across the borders. In 1964, Yasser Arafat established a new organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (Morris 2009) which was supported by most Arab governments. That move would transform the rules of the game, especially in the new reality created by the Six-Day War in June 1967. The war started with an offensive move of Israel against a newly concluded aggressive pact against the Jewish state, binding Syria, Jordan and Egypt (and was immediately followed by the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli

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ships). During the six days of the Israeli response, the Golan Heights were captured from Syria, the West Bank from Jordan, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt. Once this new situation came about, the PLO entered the category of “normal” movements of national liberation since it could now advocate on behalf of an occupied population and territory. Its original struggle against Israel’s very existence, as stipulated in its Covenant, was now overshadowed by the reality of the Israeli presence in a territory that was not part of its internationally recognized borders. At this stage, the PLO established its headquarters in Jordan, home to hundreds of thousands of Palestinians but the ensuing confrontation with the Jordanian regime in 1970 forced it to relocate to South Lebanon, among 1948 Palestinian refugees populating settlements of their own (“refugee camps”). It is a genuine “Fatahland” (after the name, Fatah, the leading nationalist organization) from which it was soon able to launch operations in northern Israel and beyond—including international terrorism campaigns. For the Israelis, this recrudescence of hostility was taking place just a few years after the Yom Kippur War (1973) in which a Syrian-Egyptian alliance managed to destabilize Israel’s defensive structures—on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai—causing it to pay a heavy human price during the war’s initial setbacks, until regaining its advantage on both fronts. The reinstating of the previous situation did not prevent Israel from making territorial concessions during the negotiations that concluded this phase. Small-scale hostilities continued with Palestinian groups, however, and a massacre in 1978 on the coastal road in central Israel, led Israel to launch an invasion of Southern Lebanon—though with little results on the ground since the Palestinian militants withdrew as the Israeli troops advanced, only returning when they evacuated the area. In 1982, following a Palestinian assassination attempt in London on one of its diplomats, the Israeli government went as far as to intervene directly in the Lebanese Civil War that was taking place at the time. After several weeks of conquest of the Southern part of the country, Beirut was encircled and the PLO leaders were expelled to Tunisia. By 1985, Israel withdrew to a 10 km occupied strip of South Lebanon, while a new conflict, this time with Lebanese Shia militants, was now brewing. Later, those Iranian-supported groups consolidated into Hezbollah, which launched attacks on the Galilee in the late 1980s. Intifadas In 1982, the Israel-Egypt peace treaty marked, again, a sharp turn in the development of the area’s geopolitical configuration. A sense of isolation pervaded

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the Palestinian population, who were living under an Israeli occupation that endorsed the creation of Jewish settlements in given areas of their territory. Moreover, the Palestinian leadership was confined to Tunisia while Egypt and Jordan were less friendly to their cause. Hence, activists—with or without injunctions from Tunisia—took the initiative in 1987 of launching what would later be called the First Intifada (uprising). Israelis did not find it easy to calm the wave of civil protest and street violence, which persisted until 1993. The intifada managed to attract international attention and set off huge international pressure to start a peace process. For Israel, however, it was a fundamental credo that the Palestinians must first revoke their national covenant, explicitly stipulating that their overarching goal is Israel’s destruction. That position had an impact, and finally Arafat, the top leader of the PLO, openly declared the covenant as “caduc” (i.e. obsolete). Secret meetings between Israelis and Palestinians followed which led in 1993 to the Oslo Accords that would soon be fleshed out in Camp David, USA. The agreement allowed the PLO to take lands in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, at the head of a newly established Palestinian National Authority. Things seemed to be moving toward progress but then a most unexpected (and dramatic) event caused a switch in a new direction: on 4 November 1995, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli fanatic. This act had an immense impact: following several years of unsuccessful negotiations, the rightist Israeli parties won the elections and a short time after, in September 2000, the Second Intifada broke out, continuing until 2005 (Grinberg 2009). Following the uprising and the particularly violent incidents in the Gaza Strip, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided on a unilateral Gaza disengagement plan in 2005. A year later the Islamist fundamentalist Hamas party gained power in general Palestinian elections, while clashes between Israel and Hamas in 2006 led Israel to impose a naval blockade on the Gaza Strip—in cooperation with Egypt—that guaranteed a ground blockade of the Egyptian border. Fatah-Hamas confrontations followed in the Gaza Strip, and the Battle of Gaza ended in 2007 with a victory by Hamas, which then assumed full control of the Strip. The tensions between Israel and Hamas—that were fueled by Iran and Hezbollah support—escalated until 2008, when Israel launched its Cast Lead operation. By February 2009, a cease-fire was signed with international mediation, but sporadic hostilities continued as rockets sent from Hamascontrolled Gaza were met with Israeli airstrikes (Goldberg 2012). The Idea behind the Barrier In the circumstances of the conflict’s development, both the one-sided withdrawal from the Strip and the building of the West Bank barrier were moves

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that seemed to Israeli leaders to be inevitable steps toward separation. And indeed these moves contributed to drastic alterations—though not necessarily in the way that the parties involved had anticipated. As far as the barrier is concerned, in June 2001 an Israeli grass-roots organ­ ization called “Barrier for Life” had already started campaigning for the construction of a security barrier that would demarcate a division between Israelis and Palestinians (Hagader La-Hayim 2013). The movement brought together people from all social strata, who organized in the aftermath of a suicide bombing in a Tel Aviv discotheque. The movement aspired to pressure the government to construct a barrier, unconnected to any vision of a future territorial settlement with the Palestinians. The only object was to prevent more terrorist acts in Israel. The movement organized mass demonstrations and created a lobby in the Knesset (Israel’s parliament). It also encouraged several localities that had particularly suffered from the absence of a border barrier to start building barriers—at their own initiative, and with their own funding (Ratner 2002). The actual idea was not in fact a new one. It had already been envisaged in 1992 by the then Prime Minister Rabin, following a series of terrorist attacks. It was Rabin who said at the time that Israel must “take Gaza out of Tel Aviv.” In 1995, a commission was even established to discussed the practicalities of constructing a barrier, although it was only in 2000 that discussions about the idea were renewed (Makovsky 2004). Finally, the project was set in motion in 2003 and endorsed two years later by the High Court of Justice (see Figure 8.1). Most of the barrier is made of a multi-layered concrete barrier system. The army’s preferred design consists of three barriers, with pyramid-shaped stacks of barbed wire for the two outer barriers and a lighter-weight barrier with detection equipment in the middle. Patrol roads run on both sides of the middle barrier, while anti-vehicle ditches are excavated on the eastward side. Some sections (less than 5% of the total length) are constructed as a barrier consisting of concrete slabs up to eight meters high and three meters wide. Due to topographic conditions, in some sections the width reaches 100 meters. Barrier construction (5%) is more common in urban settings, such as near Qalqilya and Jerusalem, because it is narrower and requires less land. There are also numerous observation posts and automated sensing devices. Soldiers control the gates at various points of passage. According to Israeli statistics, from the beginning of the Second Intifada in September 2001 until May 2014, the results of the barrier speak for themselves: from the yearly data for 2001, with 118 attacks that caused 204 mortalities and 2,594 injured people, in 2014—

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Lake Tiberias

ISRAEL

1949 Armistice (Green Line) Palestinian Authority Israeli control Wall/fence Roads Israeli settlement

0

‘Afula

Jenin Tulkarm Nablus

Tel Aviv 10

Nazareth

WEST BANK Ramallah Jericho

20 ml

10 20 30 km

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0

Tiberias

Haifa

J o rd a n

WEST BANK & GAZA

Jerusalem Bethlehem

Gaza

GAZA EGYPT

Qiryat Gat

Hebron

Beersheba

FIGURE 8.1 Central Israel between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 2007. Source: Map uploaded by Christ0 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Image:Israel_and_occupied_territories_map.png.

Dead Sea

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until May, there were six attacks, that killed three and injured ten individuals1 (see details in Table 8.1). These data endow this project with its entire legitimization, because it addresses the major concern of Israeli citizens, namely their feeling of security; a concern that the High Court also endorsed in 2005 when it declared the barrier to be a legal means of defense against terrorism. Experts speaking on behalf of the government underline that the suicide bombing attacks, which had reached unbearable frequency during the Second Intifada, were drastically reduced. The regained self-confidence that the barrier granted Israeli leaders widely accounts for their readiness to sign an agreement (2007) with the PNA under which close to 200 Palestinian militants wanted by Israel laid down their arms and joined the PNA forces. That step, in turn, led to a slowing-down of the works relating to completing the barrier’s construction. Table 8.1

Terror attacks and casualties in Israel, 1994–2014 by year

Year

Attacks

Killed

Injured

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

118 135 67 45 28 48 10 30 14 7 11 9 10 6

204 451 210 128 73 95 14 48 6 11 28 16 7 3

2,594 2,348 1,123 917 660 1,010 0 449 24 3 93 15 10 10

Source: Johnston, 31 May 2014.

1  However, precisely in this last year, three young students at an academic religious college (“yeshiva”) on the West Bank were apparently kidnapped, on their way home on the evening of 11 June. The details of the affair are not yet known at the time of writing.

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It is, moreover, the opinion of quite a few Israelis, such as Yossi Klein Halevi, the correspondent for The New Republic, that construction beyond the Green Line reminds Palestinians that every time they have rejected a compromise— whether in 1937, 1947, or 2000—the potential map of Palestine shrinks. The barrier is a warning: if Palestinians do not stop terrorism and forfeit their dream of destroying Israel, Israel may impose its own map on them (Klein Halevi, 2003). And indeed, some commentators, on the Palestinian side and further away too, describe the barrier as the de facto future border of the State of Israel. James Zogby, president of the Arab American Institute, declared that the barrier has “unilaterally helped to demarcate the route for future Israeli control over huge West Bank settlement blocks and large swathes of West Bank land” (Lob 2003). Chris McGreal in The Guardian writes that the barrier is, “evidently intended to redraw Israel’s borders” (McGreal 2005). Palestinian and International Criticism and Claims Hence, while supporters of the barrier speak of purely security considerations that justify its construction, opponents argue that it constitutes an illegal attempt to annex portions of Palestinian land. As such, this project violates international law and preempts final-status negotiations, not to speak of the restrictions imposed on the Palestinians who live nearby, concerning their ability to travel freely throughout the West Bank and to ultimately reach their work-places in Israel. While Israelis commonly refer to the barrier as the “separation (hafrada) barrier,” “security barrier,” or “anti-terrorist barrier,” Palestinians name the barrier “jidar al-fasl al-’unsuri,” i.e. “racial segregation barrier,” and in English the “Apartheid Barrier” (Alatout 2006).These contrastive namings are clearly perceived by observers: the BBC’s Guide for Journalists states (News 2006) “The BBC uses the terms barrier, separation barrier or West Bank barrier as acceptable generic descriptions to avoid the political connotations of “security barrier” (preferred by the Israeli government) or “apartheid barrier” (preferred by the Palestinians).” More specifically, the building of the barrier has elicited numerous complaints by Palestinian citizens living in its direct vicinity, who did not hesitate to petition Israel’s High Court. Hence, in February 2004, responding also to US concerns, the Israeli government reviewed the route of the barrier and, in a complementary move, reduced the number of checkpoints for Palestinians seeking to cross the Green Line—especially in areas such as the town of Qalqilya that by then was completely surrounded by the barrier. The town and its approximately 45,000 inhabitants exist behind an eight meter-high concrete section that follows the Green Line, and the town is accessible only through a military checkpoint and an underground tunnel built in September 2004 on the southern side. The Israeli High Court, however, ordered the government

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to change the route of the barrier in this area to ease the movement of Palestin­ ians between Qalqilya and surrounding villages. In the same ruling, the court rejected the arguments that the barrier must be built only along the Green Line: the ruling cited the topography of the terrain and security considerations based on The Hague Regulations. The Israeli human rights associations Hamoked Centre for the Defense of the Individual and The Association for Civil Rights in Israel as well as other non-governmental organizations now started to petition the High Court of Justice about a large variety of related issues. The main part of the barrier was built in the West Bank on the pre-1967 Israeli-Jordanian border—the so-called “Green Line”—or close thereto. Yet according to the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem, 8.5% of the West Bank area has been included on the Israeli side, and 3.4% of the rest of the West Bank is partly or completely surrounded by the barrier (Lein 2003). At given spots, its divergences from the Green Line can vary from 200 meters to as much as twenty kilometers. On the Israeli side it encompasses several localities that were created after 1967, on territories that were not previously part of Israel, such as the town of Ariel, the Gush Etzion region, the town of Maale Adumim, and other places, not to speak of East Jerusalem that was the main city of the West Bank under Hashemite rule (for an illustration of the concrete part, see Figure 8.2).

FIGURE 8.2 The barrier in the Northern West Bank. Source: Photo by Zero 0000 [GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/ copyleft/fdl.html)].

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In addition, Israeli left-wing opponents of the barrier emphasize the fact that the barrier severely restricts the freedom of movement of Palestinians living nearby the barrier, affecting both the possibility of traveling freely within the West Bank, and of getting to work in Israel (B’Tselem 2013; CNN 2004). In a 2004 release of an advisory opinion following a Palestinian-initiated UN resolution, the International Court of Justice held that “the construction of the barrier, and its associated régime, are contrary to international law” (International Court of Justice 2004). It is noteworthy that construction has practically stopped in recent years due to financial problems, lack of enthusiasm, and strong external pressures. Moreover, Palestinian villagers have filed dozens of suits with Israel’s High Court, which in many instances obliged the military to move the barrier’s route westward. Numerous testimonies and positions emanating from the Palestinian side are virulent, and they are joined by supportive international bodies and actors. The barrier, they maintain, has many effects on Palestinians including reduced freedom, road closures, loss of land, increased difficulty in accessing medical and educational services in Israel, restricted access to water sources, and economic effects (Stratton 2007; Qato, Doocy, Tsuchida, Greenough, Burnham, 2007; Barahona 2013). In a 2005 report, the United Nations deplored the fact that the route inside the West Bank severs communities, and people’s access to services and livelihoods. Moreover, the land between the Barrier and the Green Line constitutes some of the most fertile areas of the West Bank, it is contended, and it is currently the home of 50,000 West Bank Palestinian residents who live in 38 villages and towns. All in all, the result was that dozens of shops and stalls were demolished—as well as a number of homes—during the construction of the wall in some villages. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) also estimates that in the northern West Bank, close to 80 per cent of Palestinians who own land on the other side of the barrier have not received permits from the Israeli authorities, and hence cannot cultivate their fields. On the other hand, Israeli settlement councils already have de facto control of 86 percent of the Jordan Valley as the settler population steadily grows there (ESCWA 2008). Médecins du Monde, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, and Physicians for Human Rights-Israel have stated that the barrier “harms West Bank health.” In towns near Jerusalem (Abu Dis and al-Eizariya), for example, the average time for an ambulance to reach the nearest hospital has increased from 10 minutes to over 110 minutes. A report from Physicians for Human RightsIsrael states that the barrier imposes “almost-total separation” on the hospitals from the population they are supposed to serve. The report also said that the

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number of patients from the West Bank attending Jerusalem’s Palestinian ­clinics declined by half from 2002 to 2003 (Cohen 2005). At the same time, some Palestinian spokesmen concede that members of al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad are now less able to conduct attacks within Israel. In his November 2006 interview with Al-Manar TV, Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader Ramadan Salah said that the barrier is an important obstacle, and that “if it weren’t there, the situation would be entirely different” (Ramadan Shalah, 11 November 2006). He also admitted in the Qatari newspaper Al-Sharq that the separation barrier “limits the ability of al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to reach deep within Israeli territory to carry out suicide bombing attacks.” In 2004, the United Nations passed a number of resolutions and the International Court of Justice (Court 2004) issued an advisory opinion calling for the barrier’s removal, for Arab residents to be compensated for any damage done, and for other states to take action to obtain Israel’s compliance with the Fourth Geneva Convention. The advisory opinion resulted from a Palestinian-initiated resolution adopted in a special emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly. The opinion was not binding, because Israel refused to accept the Court’s jurisdiction over the matter. The Court found that both the barrier and the associated regime that had been imposed on the Palestinian inhabitants were illegal, and said that an occupying power cannot claim that the lawful inhabitants of the occupied territory constitute a “foreign” threat for the purposes of Article 51 of the UN Charter. It also explained that necessity may constitute a circumstance precluding wrongfulness under certain, very limited, circumstances, but that Article 25 of the UN Declaration on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts bars a defense of necessity if the State has contributed to the situation of necessity. The Court cited illegal interference by the government of Israel with the Palestinian’s national right to self-determination; it mentioned land confiscations, house demolitions, the creation of enclaves, and restrictions on movement and access to water, food, education, healthcare, work, and an adequate standard of living in violation of Israel’s obligations under international law. The Court also said that established Israeli settlements have displaced Palestinians in violation of Article 49, paragraph 6, of the Fourth Geneva Convention. At the request of the ICJ, Palestine submitted an extensive statement. The Anti-Defamation League strongly criticized the ruling, asserting that the outcome was stacked against Israel in advance through the biased wording of the submission. It said that Israel was systematically excluded from any say in the Court’s composition, and asserted that an anti-Israel environment prevails at the General Assembly (ADL 2004). Complaints about the Israeli barrier from all sides speak of an “Israeli plan to confine Palestinians to

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s­ pecific areas and to prevent Palestinian institutions from providing services to residents—especially in East Jerusalem.” According to Palestinian sources (Chalabi 2013), the number of fixed checkpoints reached 99 by 2012 and there were 310 temporary checkpoints. These restrictions impacted on imports and exports in Palestine and weakened its industrial and agricultural sectors. According to The Guardian and a report for the World Bank, the Palestinian economy lost $3.4 bn (35 % of the annual GDP) due to these restrictions (Abu Sada 2011). For over five years, hundreds of Palestinians and Israeli activists have gathered weekly in the town of Bil’in to protest the barrier. The wall has been used as a canvas for many paintings and writings (Jones 2005; BBC 2007). In August 2005, UK graffiti artist Banksy painted nine images on the Palestinian side of the barrier. He describes the barrier as “the ultimate activity holiday destination for graffiti writers,” and returned in December 2007 with new images for “Santa’s ghetto” in Bethlehem. In 2007, with their project “Face2Face,” French artists JR and “Marco” organized what was then (until at least 2010), considered to be the largest illegal photography exhibition ever made. The project spanned over eight cities on both sides of the wall including Bethlehem, Jericho, Ramallah and Jerusalem. The Cost At this point, it should be emphasized that in some instances, the Israeli High Court itself did not endorse the route of the barrier and was ready to defend the principle that harm caused to an “occupied population must be in proportion to the security benefits.” On this basis, the Court pointed out in 2004 how the barrier route could acutely harm local inhabitants and violate their rights. Accordingly, the Court ordered that given portions of the planned barrier would be re-routed (Defense Ministry of Israel 2004). Human rights organizations acting as lobbyists thus often successfully obtained the Court’s recognition of the soundness of Palestinian claims. In 2005, once more, a petition filed by Palestinian villages trapped in an enclave created by the barrier’s route, led the High Court of Justice to oblige the government to seek an alternative for the barrier and thus lessen the predicaments imposed on Palestinians. This ruling impacted on close to 40 pending petitions that concerned different sections of the barrier (Defense Ministry 2005). Following the discussion about the route of the barrier, on 20 February 2005, the Cabinet approved a new route, 681 kilometers long, that would leave only seven percent of the West Bank and 10,000 Palestinians on the Israeli side. These changes, however, did not entirely satisfy the opponents of the barrier. The fact that sections of the barrier are partly built on land seized from Palestinians has also spurred complaints to Israel’s High Court. Under Israeli

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legislation, owners of private land retain title to their land when it is seized for public purposes, and Israel is thus obliged to pay them compensation for lost income. In one case, after uprooting 60,000 olive groves and other orchards due to the barrier’s route, the authorities had to replant them in locations designated by their owners. These difficulties explain the fact that the present-day route of the barrier adheres more than previous drafts to the Green Line itself. These measures, however, did not subdue international organizations which continued to blame the project as the source of numerous impediments. Protests are now regularly submitted to the International Court which, as mentioned, ruled long ago that both the barrier and the associated regime imposed on the inhabitants are illegal, and that an occupying power may not claim that the lawful inhabitants of an occupied territory constitute a “foreign” threat. Even Israel’s closest friends could not escape being influenced by the tempest of protest. On 25 May 2003, George W. Bush, then President of the United States, said: “I think the barrier is a problem. And I discussed this with Ariel Sharon [Israel’s PM at the time]. It is very difficult to develop confidence between the Palestinians and Israel with a barrier snaking through the West Bank” (Bush 2003). The following year, addressing the issue of the barrier as a future border, he stated in a letter to Sharon dated 14 April 2004 that “It [the barrier] should be a security rather than political barrier, should be temporary rather than permanent, and therefore represent no prejudice for any final status issue like final borders, and its route should take into account, consistent with security needs, its impact on Palestinians not engaged in terrorist activities” (Bush 2005). The European Union condemned the barrier more strenuously as illegal and the same position was taken by the Canadian Government. The Catholic Church, up to the highest instances, joined its voice to this rejection of the barrier. This was shown in vivo during Pope Francis’ visit to the region in May 2014: during his visit to the Palestinian Authority he did not hesitate to stop at the barrier and pray for its prompt removal. In brief, these gestures attest to the barrier’s cost for Israel in terms of international status and relations. For the time being, however, Israeli leaders do not see that cost as counterbalancing the profits, in terms of security, that this barrier represents for them. The Gaza Barrier The West Bank, however, is not Israel’s only hostile next-door neighbor. When construction began on the West Bank barrier, Israel had already completed the building of a barrier between it and the Gaza Strip. This 60-kilometer long barrier was erected in 1994–1996, in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords and in compliance with their terms. It was damaged during the Second Intifada

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but later rebuilt. The barrier’s effectiveness prompted Palestinian militants to stop suicide bombings and to turn to firing rockets and mortars over the barrier (Almog 2004). This was a major factor that led Israel to withdraw in 2005 from the Gaza Strip and dismantle the colonies that had been built in the area. In June 2007, however, as mentioned, Hamas took control of the Strip, splitting Gaza from the West Bank in administrative terms. For several years now, the Strip has been Israel’s hot frontline with the Palestinians, marked by episodic intense rocket attacks on Israel to which the latter responds with air and ground attacks against the Strip (see Figure 8.3).

0 0

3

6 km 3

34’20’

34’30’

6 mi

Gaza

31’30’

Mediterranean Sea

Dayr al Balaḩ

rm

A 50

ne

i eL

ic

ist

31’30’

19 Khān Yūnis

31’20’

ISRAEL

Rafaḩ

EGYPT Abu ‘Awdah ( Joz Abu ‛Awdah)

Gaza International Airport 34’20’

34’30’

FIGURE 8.3 The Gaza Strip. Source: Map by CIA World Factbook website on 28 August 2006, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Gaza-Strip Overview Map, Retrieved January 23, 2014.

31’20’

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The border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip is eleven kilometers long. In 1982, Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula, which borders the Gaza Strip, to Egyptian control. As part of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979, a 100-meter-wide strip of land known as the Philadelphi Route was established as a buffer zone between Gaza and Egypt. Israel built a barrier and a 200–300 meter buffer zone along the Philadelphi route, mostly composed of corrugated sheet metal, with stretches of concrete topped with barbed wire. It was completed in 2005, before Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip. A continuing problem for Israel in the control of the Egypt-Gaza Strip border is the large number of smuggling tunnels dug under the barrier, through which sophisticated rockets and pieces of weaponry are brought in from diverse origins— especially Iran. Furthermore, the Israeli government states that it is also justified under international law to impose a naval blockade on an enemy for security reasons. The power to impose a naval blockade is established under customary international law and the laws of armed conflict. However, because an import-export ban was imposed on Gaza in 2007, the result was that 95% of Gaza’s industrial operations were suspended. Out of 35,000 people employed by 3,900 factories in June 2005, only 1,750 people remained employed by 195 factories in June 2007. By 2010, Gaza’s unemployment rate had risen to 40%, with 80% of the population living on less than 2 dollars a day (Oxfam et al. 2008). The blockade of Gaza set off harsh reactions in the world, and among radical circles in the West some individuals were ready to cooperate with pro-Palestinian groups in sending successive flotillas to Gaza with the aim of breaking the naval blockade. The first flotilla (six ships) confronted the Israeli navy in May 2010. The main ship was attacked by Israeli commandoes and the fight caused nine dead—all of Turkish origin—and dozens of wounded people, from among the passengers (nine soldiers were also injured). Several—far less violent—attempts took place later, on several occasions, with no more success (Gabbatt et al. 2010). In view of these reactions, on 20 June 2010, Israel’s Security Cabinet approved a new system governing the blockade that would allow practically all nonmilitary or dual-use items to enter the Gaza Strip (Figure 8.3). According to a cabinet statement, Israel would increase the transfer of construction materials designated for projects approved by the Palestinian Authority, including schools, health institutions, water and sanitation (Hass 2012). Despite the easing of the land blockade, Israel continues to inspect all goods bound for Gaza by sea, at the port of Ashdod. The Israel–Egypt border is another case when a fence was erected in place of an old rusty barrier serving as a marker between the two countries and quite useless in deterring the passage of smugglers, terrorists, and illegal migrants

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from African countries. Most of the new barrier was completed in December 2012 and it features cameras, radar, and electronic detectors. Human rights organizations, within and outside Israel, sharply criticized it as well, but its use of sophisticated technologies is currently inspiring similar projects in other democratic states (Jerusalem Post 2012). It is recognized today as highly efficient: while in 2011, 16,000 illegal immigrants crossed the borders, in 2012 fewer than some dozens succeeded in doing so (Maariv 2013). One more project of the kind is the barrier recently built between the region of the Golan Heights under Israeli control and the Syrian territory. This border had been quiet for decades. Following the outbreak of the anti-Assad revolt (2011), the barrier was constructed with the greatest urgency, to avoid the infiltration of Syrian refugees and Al-Qaida fighters enrolled in the revolt. This barrier is also equipped with electro-optical devices and radar, designed to register every incident near the border (Kershner 2013). The Future of the Controversies Of all the different barriers erected by Israelis, the West Bank barrier is obviously the only one that represents a genuine problem in terms of widespread consequences. Indeed, it raises the question of its relation to the future borderline between Israel and the Palestinian entity, and the significance of its entrenchment on the West Bank side of the Green Line. It contrasts with the cases of Gaza, Egypt, and Syria, since those barriers’ relation to territorial integrity is not on the agenda of any international debate. Moreover, Palestinian inhabitants have been left on the Israeli side of the barrier while several dozens of Jewish settlements are positioned throughout the Palestinian side, evincing the paradoxical character of this barrier: a line of “gross” separation with no steadfast geopolitical commitment. This aspect is further underlined by the fact that the barrier does little to interrupt ongoing relations between Israelis and Palestinian West Bankers in areas like trade, employment, academic meetings, and even shared political events. The extent of these relations does of course vary according to fluctuations in the tension between Israel and the PNA, which only attests how far this barrier could coexist with the eventual fluidity of borders. Needless to say, this lack of clarification fuels endless controversies. What is clear is that this barrier is entirely related to the effects of the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Speakers for Israel are inclined to describe the country’s stake in the conflict in terms of a zero-sum conflict, involving not only the direct contenders on the scene but also external actors (Sharansky and Dermer 2006). It is from this perspective that the Israelis seek “outside the box” solutions to terrorism, and the barrier was primarily a pragmatic solution of that sort. As also mentioned above, the statistics of terrorism originating

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from the West Bank showed a drastic decline in hostile acts. This relative calm is the reason why, in 2013, work came more or less to a halt. Still, this analysis should be set in proportion. A report published in early 2006 by the Shin Bet, one of Israel’s secret services, contended that the decrease in attacks in 2005 was also due to other reasons: Hamas’s decision to increase its political activity and reduce violent acts; the establishment of a temporary truce between Palestinian militant groups; more numerous pursuits of Palestinian militants by the IDF and intelligence agencies (Arens 2008). According to Haaretz, the report also states that: “The security barrier is no longer cited as the major factor in preventing suicide bombings” (Harel 2006). Already a few years after the barrier was set up, B’Tselem (2003) challenged the assumption that people who carry out attacks enter Israel via open areas between the checkpoints rather than through the checkpoints themselves. This position, it is worth emphasizing, is borne out by Israel’s State Comptroller’s audit report published in July 2002 (Renfro 2010). Furthermore, according to the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, the barrier has also had major unintended effects. For instance, many Palestinians who previously lived in areas beyond the barrier began moving into Jewish neighborhoods in order to remain close to given facilities. In turn, that demographic inflow worsens the housing shortages prevailing in the city’s Jewish neighborhoods and impacts on real-estate prices. Paradoxically, the barrier that was intended to create separation between Palestinians and Israelis has, in some segments of the population, resulted in an opposite tendency. While the barrier does reduce freedom of movement for residents living close to it, and also deprives them of land, The Washington Times (2004) mentioned that the relative calm now prevailing in large parts of the West Bank has prompted efforts to rebuild damaged streets and buildings. The Jerusalem Post also reports that in the Israeli-Arab town of Umm el-Fahem (population 42,000) situated near the West Bank town of Jenin, the barrier has “significantly improved inhabitants’ lives” by preventing outlaws and terrorists from reaching the town. This new calm also increased the flow of consumers from other parts of Israel, attracted by the advantageous prices on Umm el-Fahem’s market. In the West Bank itself, it was acknowledged that while in 2005, the PNA’s Ministry of Finance blamed the barrier’s construction as a major reason for economic depression, GDP growth modestly increased in 2003–2005, after declining in 2000–2002. In these circumstances, a survey by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research found overwhelming support for the barrier (around 80%) (Haaretz 2004) among the Jewish population of Israel, despite the campaigns led against it by leftists (the Israeli Peace Now movement, the Anarchists Against

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the Barrier, and Gush Shalom) who are active against the barrier in Israel as well as in West Bank towns. Some figures, like Shaul Arieli, a senior member of the Council for Peace and Security, are even ready to justify the barrier as a protection device against Palestinian terrorism, but he criticizes the government’s lack of concern for inhabitants’ well-being in the tracing of the route (Matar 2013). The majority of the Israeli public supports this approach and believes that together with military efficient operations, Israel should be able to contain terrorism and greatly improve security. Most Israelis also hope that the barrier forecasts the border of an eventual Palestinian state separate from the Jewish state. The most virulent Jewish opponents to the barrier are in fact the farrightists who view it as heralding partition of the country and too far-reaching concessions to the Palestinians. Settlers whose settlements are relatively far from the Green Line are also concerned that they will be cut off from mainland Israel. At the same time, the Palestinian population and its leadership overwhelmingly oppose the barrier and express their opposition in public protests—without discerning whatever positive impact it may still represent, here and there, for their population (Haaretz 2012; The Guardian 2011). Hence, undeniably, the barrier continues to be a factor of tension. In a report published in February 2014 covering incidents for the three-year period of 2011– 2013, Amnesty International asserted that Israeli forces employed reckless violence in the West Bank, and in some instances appeared to engage in voluntary killings which would be tantamount to war crimes. In this period, it was noted, 45 Palestinians, including six children, had been killed. Amnesty’s review of 25 civilian deaths concluded that in no case was there evidence of the Palestin­ ians posing an imminent threat. At the same time, over 8,000 Palestinians suffered serious injuries from other means, including rubber-coated metal bullets. Only one IDF soldier was convicted for killing a Palestinian attempting to enter Israel illegally. The soldier was demoted and given a one-year sentence with a five-month suspension. The IDF answered the charges by stating that it held itself “to the highest of professional standards” (Ravid 2012). Additional complaints and reports by international bodies were equally severe with Israel. According to a variety of sources, Israel confiscated water reserves for the benefit of the Israeli settlements (BBC 2003) and Maxwell Gaylard, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for occupied Palestinian territory, has not hesitated to state that “Gaza will have half a million more people by 2020 while its economy will grow only slowly. In consequence, the people of Gaza will have an even harder time getting enough drinking water and electricity, or sending their children to school.” Together with Jean Gough, of the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and Robert Turner, of

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the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian in the Near East (UNRWA), Gaylard presented a report projecting that Gaza’s population will increase from 1.6 million to 2.1 million people in 2020, resulting in a density of more than 5,800 people. Ahmad Hajihosseini, an Observer for the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), who gathered these reports, said that building and maintaining the wall is a crime of apartheid, isolating Palestinian communities in the West Bank and consolidating the annexation of Palestinian land by Israeli settlements (Hajihosseini 2003). Israel is not blame-free in the area of resource exploitation and the way it distributes water between Jewish settlements and the Palestinian population. In this respect, what does not ease the task of Israeli spokespeople is the fact that since November 2012, Palestine’s representation at the UN was upgraded to that of a Non-member Observer State. On the other hand, accusations that refer to warfare are counter-attacked on both methodological and substantive grounds by Israeli researchers and observers. In a study published by Scholars for Peace in the Middle East, Elihu D. Richter and Dr. Yael Stein examined B’tselem’s methods in calculating casualties during Operation Cast Lead. They argue that B’tselem’s report contains “errors of omission, commission and classification bias which result in overestimates of the ratio of non-combatants to combatants.”[248] Stein and Richter claim the high male/female ratios among Palestinians, including those in their mid-to-late teens, “suggests that the IDF classifications for combatant and non-combatant status are probably far more accurate than those of B’Tselem” (Mor et al. 2009). At this stage, it is difficult to conclude the story of the Israeli barrier, since it is still unfolding. Numerous events may still transform the rules of the game and create new perspectives and constraints—and the more so since the outbreak of the turmoil that embraced the Middle East in recent years, peaking with the civil war in Syria. Moreover, it is hard to imagine that a conflict of 100 years will come to an end in the near future, and enable the demolishing of this barrier erected in the heart of the region; nor do the two sides’ positions allow the predicting of rapid and drastic progress. This assessment gets validation with the new wave of “knife Intifada” that is going on during 2016. An Intifada of mostly individual acts against Israeli soldiers and civilian passersby in areas where the barrier is of no significance because of the mixed presence of Jews and Arabs—the area of Hebron and in Jerusalem, especially. This new outbreak of violence demonstrates how far the barrier built in the West Bank is but of partial reward. What we see, for the moment, is a dialectical process of confrontation and adjustment of two protagonists throughout the different stages of their

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endless quarrel. As the Israelis respond to Palestinian terrorist tactics by building a barrier that is probably very helpful in this specific respect, they find themselves in a new kind of confrontation around the significance of their choice of this response to terror. We think, especially, of the international context of the Israel-Palestine conflict where many influential actors either strongly oppose Israeli interests or, at least, are very hesitant to endorse them. Israel is regularly accused of implementing an apartheid policy; it is condemned by countless decisions of the United Nations and other international bodies; it is attacked by movements of public opinion led by people of goodwill. But while Israelis also know that peace is not guaranteed by barriers and separation, many of them, against the backdrop of their historical experience and like others in similar circumstances, are convinced that their barrier grants them a degree of security and tranquility in the context of the ongoing conflict. Those are the benefits, and those are the costs. The only thing that we can certainly assume is that whenever Israelis and Palestinians finally decide to proceed from relative tranquility towards peace itself, everything that was considered as acquired and definitive will be ­re-questioned and redrawn. The barrier will undoubtedly become outdated, be demolished, and most probably will soon fall into oblivion.

chapter 9

Ordinary Everyday Walls: Normalising Exception in Segregated Belfast Hastings Donnan and Neil Jarman Introduction Belfast is a divided and fragmented city. Like all contemporary urban centres its residential areas are primarily divided on the basis of wealth and class, but more prominent is the secondary level of segregation based on ethno-national identity, which dominates working class communities. The map of Belfast is a colour-coded patchwork of orange and green, which serves to delineate, respectively, those areas in which either members of the Protestant unionist community or the Catholic nationalist community are in a dominant, and often overwhelming, majority. On the ground this fragmentation and territorialism is underpinned through displays of flags, murals and painted kerb stones and street furniture, which provide visual indications of the community claiming possession of the streets. These symbolic displays are refreshed each year as part of the ‘marching season’, when political allegiance is performed on the streets through parades, marching bands and ethno-political banners and other regalia, and as an aspect of the annual commemorative cycle of battles, rebellions and lost lives that has come to pervade popular culture and ritual across Northern Ireland. One particularly striking feature of these segregated neighbourhoods is their separation by a variety of walls, fences and other barriers widely referred to as ‘peace walls’, the irony of which is often pointed out given the association of these barriers with the violence related to the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’, a term that is itself something of a euphemism for a thirty-year conflict that left many thousands dead or severely injured. First constructed some forty years ago in response to a deteriorating security situation, Belfast’s barriers share many of the characteristics of barriers built more recently elsewhere as a way of controlling movement in many parts of the world. These include barriers that have been built between countries as well as within cities, with the aim of controlling immigration, reducing crime or violence, increasing a sense of security and also to restrict movement and exclude the unwanted (Marcuse 1994). They can vary according to their permeability, visibility, materials used © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004272859_011

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and the extent to which they are seen as permanent or temporary. However, it is questionable what level of impact barriers have on the activities they supposedly regulate, beyond making a symbolic statement, and in many cases (including in Belfast) the barriers have become a target of violence, as they often serve to indicate the presence of a hostile, unwanted or unseen ‘other’ on the other side. This chapter is a contribution to the discussion about the longevity and persistence of barriers in Belfast and offers an overview of the situation in the city. It provides a brief comparative review of the use of barriers as a means of dealing with conflict; outlines the overall number and location of security barriers in Belfast; explores the wider framework of designing for security; and finally considers the attitudes of residents to the barriers as part of a wider debate about when and how they might begin to be removed some twenty years after the armed conflict was brought to an end. Perhaps because walls are such adamantine structures, they have often been subjected to very rigid and monolithic understandings and interpretations. Yet while barriers share many functions, the form, meaning and significance of these functions and how they are experienced may vary between different parts of the city across both space and time. Accordingly, the chapter emphasises the local contexts and world views of those whose lives these barriers frame. How walls come to be understood, seen (or not seen), and ‘mean’ or represent cannot be fully grasped without attention to these local contexts. People often hold contradictory views and express widely different opinions about the barriers in Belfast. The chapter thus explores how political subjectivities are differently formed and shaped by residential containment, the extent to which ‘security’ is experienced and felt by the inhabitants of walled neighbourhoods, and what the walls ‘mean’ to those who live in their proximity. It concludes by suggesting that the persistence of these walls reflects a dynamic and longstanding tension between neighbourhood and state.

Barriers and Conflict

Multiple forms of physical barriers are increasingly being constructed in diverse locations around the world as responses to conflict, inter-ethnic fears and violence, contest over territory and as attempts to control immigration. While some barriers have been built to address international conflict, others have been erected in response to intra-city tensions. In some cases, of course, intra-city conflict and international conflict are integrally related, so that a barrier operates on both of these levels. The Berlin Wall, for instance, is probably

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the most famous barrier of modern times that has been used to divide sections of a city as well as to separate opposing ideological and political regimes. Widespread criticism of the use of walls since the Berlin Wall was built in 1961 has not diminished their primordial appeal as defensive structures and numerous administrations have turned to barrier construction in an attempt to solve a variety of social problems internationally as well as internal to the state. In 1974 the ‘Green Line’ separation barrier was constructed to divide the island of Cyprus following the Turkish invasion and occupation of the northern half of the island and this still divides the capital city Nicosia into Greek and Turkish sections. The most high profile and controversial barriers currently under construction are probably those being built by the US government along sections of the border with Mexico, and the structure being erected by the Israeli government around the West Bank to restrict and control the movements of Palestinians. Other barriers exist in many other locations, for example between India and Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Morocco and Algeria and between the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and Morocco. And since this chapter was first drafted, barriers built to regulate the movement of migrants and refugees across Europe have been a focus for widespread challenge and debate. In many cities barriers have become widely used as a means of protecting middle class areas. Although gated communities have been critically evaluated (Caldeira 2001; Davis 1990), they are no longer regarded as particularly controversial and have become a common feature of urban regeneration, in Belfast as elsewhere. However, attempts to build barriers that segregate along racial or ethnic lines in urban settings have regularly proved to be extremely sensitive, as events around attempts to segregate African immigrants in the northern Italian city of Padua suggest.1 An example with a clearer parallel with Belfast was the decision by the American administration to construct a threemile long wall to divide a Sunni enclave from a wider Shi’ite neighbourhood in Baghdad in early 2007 (Brown 2010:19–20). Although the wall generated protests among Iraqi residents of the area who claimed that it would ‘separate family from family’ and would be a first step in the partitioning of Iraq, the decision received support from the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) whose Assistant Chief Constable was quoted as saying that walls would enable the provision of ‘security first and then we can normalise and build’ (The Guardian 14 September 2007). Such statements present barriers as temporary solutions to immediate problems of security. But while physical structures may provide some shortterm palliative to a social or political problem, they also provide a challenge 1  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5385752.stm.

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to human ingenuity and persistence. In the long term the problems have to be addressed by other means, through debate, dialogue, negotiation and some form of political process. Unfortunately, once erected barriers tend to be enveloped by a sense of inertia and caution and have often proved difficult to remove, a point we shall return to later. Barriers institutionalise distinctions and divisions, create or reinforce a sense of territorialism, and often exacerbate the very tensions they were intended to alleviate or prevent. The growing literature on walls and barriers has emphasised just such proc­ esses and suggests that separation is as likely to intensify instability as to ameliorate its negative effect. As Weizman (2007:172–173) points out in the case of Israel, the building of barriers may be legally tolerated as a contingent response to a ‘temporary emergency’ but because their presence provokes resistance, their definition as a response to threat merely ‘perpetuates the condition that justifies their further deployment’. Resistance and heightened vigilance thus become mutually entangled in a potentially escalating cycle. Rather than preventing conflict, barriers provide a stage on which competing identities can be enacted and enforced and where the Other beyond the barrier is silenced and stereotyped by closing off contact (Jones 2012:170–181). In this sense barriers condense division, creating hyper-spaces of intensification and amplifying vulnerability and difference. Barriers themselves thus become constitutive of what sometimes they seem merely to reflect. Moreover, such a situation can arise by stealth, developed incrementally through nominally apolitical urban planning interventions in which walls, roads and open spaces are constructed that consolidate, marginalise and separate, acting as bridges between some neighbourhoods but as barriers to others. So too the cityscape may develop through the cumulative accretion of barriers constructed initially as ‘temporary’ re-active solutions to security challenges where policy is ill-formulated, partial or even non-existent. Weizman (2007) has offered a persuasive account of the systematic way in which the Israeli state has deployed barriers in Jerusalem and the West Bank, but elsewhere policy has been more opaque and fragmented. For a long time, Belfast’s peace walls, for example, existed in a policy vacuum (Byrne et al. 2012:3; Community Relations Council 2008), reflecting the political instabilities and vacillations of a period of unpredictable chronic conflict. As we suggest below, the building of barriers in Belfast historically—and to some extent their persistence and extension today—can be interpreted as testimony to the state’s inability to police and provide security to neighbourhoods in ‘normal’ ways. Belfast’s peace walls arose during a period of ‘exception’, a moment of emergency when the rule of law was suspended, a status that has left traces even in the present, despite the multi-party peace agreement of 1998 (Agamben 2005). Belfast’s walls are intra-jurisdictional and thus do not mark the territorial and

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sovereign borders of the state. In this respect they are unlike many of the walls being built today that we alluded to above. Nonetheless, they mark the state’s conceptual or practical limits, by introducing an exceptional form of rule—the building of barriers—as a principal means of maintaining law and order within and between some of the city’s neighbourhoods. Where walls are deployed as a technology of governmentality, we might say, they thereby index ungovernability. Across Belfast, the apparatus and technologies of governance take different forms, ranging from conventional policing to residential walled containment, and are experienced differently by residents in different parts of the city. There are temporal and spatial dimensions to this as we elaborate below.

Cycles of Segregation

Research carried out in 2011 identified 99 separate barriers across Belfast, which can be grouped into thirteen distinct clusters or residential areas with two or more barriers in close proximity (Jarman 2012). These serve to reinforce the spatial division of the city into the spheres of influence of two mutually exclusive, mistrustful and at times hostile ethno-political constituencies (see Figure 9.1). While Belfast has more walls and longer walls than anywhere else in Northern Ireland, the city is not alone in building barriers as a means of controlling and restricting the movement of people and attempting to improve levels of security and safety. A small number of barriers have also been constructed in other parts of Northern Ireland: with at least four state-built barriers in Derry/ Londonderry, one in Lurgan and five in Portadown, plus a range of less formal barriers in other areas of Northern Ireland (Bell et al. 2010). And while all of these barriers share certain basic features—such as the presence of walls, fences and gates and their location at the boundaries, or interfaces, of many working class residential areas—they differ in other respects, including by structure, height, length, shape, configuration, materials, landscaping and permeability. Some sense of the variability of these barriers is evident from the following examples. The extended interface between the overwhelmingly Catholic nationalist Falls Road area of west Belfast and the neighbouring Protestant unionist Shankill Road area is marked by a series of interconnected walls, fences, gates, industrial sites and empty buffer zones that extends for over three miles from the edge of the city centre to the foothills of the Black Mountain (Figure 9.2). The Crumlin Road arterial route that marks the northern boundary of the Shankill area with the nationalist Ardoyne is a barren thoroughfare in which the houses on either side of the main road face inwards and present only blank protective walls and fencing to their neighbouring other (Figure 9.3).

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FIGURE 9.1 Map of Belfast ‘peace walls’. Source: Map by Libby Mulqueeny.

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FIGURE 9.2 Falls-Shankill barrier at Cupar Way. Source: Photo by Neil Jarman.

FIGURE 9.3 Crumlin Road ‘peace wall’. Source: Photo by Neil Jarman.

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In east Belfast the small Catholic enclave of Short Strand is virtually surrounded by a series of walls, fences and buffers of trees, vegetation and dead space; while the small Protestant enclave of Suffolk in the south west of the city is similarly enclosed and separated from the surrounding nationalist estates. In north Belfast the four-way interface on the Limestone Road between the nationalist Newington and Parkside areas and the unionist Tigers Bay and Mountcollyer communities are monitored by a phalanx of CCTV cameras on five towering pillars (Figure 9.4), while a network of walls, gates and fences physically separate houses in unionist and nationalist areas and the structures continue through the adjacent Alexandra Park leaving the Milewater River, which flows off Cave Hill towards Belfast Lough, as the only thing that can freely cross the steel ‘peaceline’ that divides the park into its Protestant and Catholic parts (Figure 9.5). These barriers have been constructed in response to recurrent and persistent paramilitary, sectarian and inter-communal violence over the past forty years. Initially the barriers were constructed by the British Army, but the process was subsequently continued by the British Government’s Northern Ireland Office on the advice of the police. The original impetus for constructing the barriers was to stop outbreaks of rioting and intimidation, to reduce the opportunities for attack and acts of violence directed towards the other community and to improve the sense of security and safety for people living at or near

FIGURE 9.4 ‘Wall’ of CCTV cameras on the Limestone Road interface. Source: Photo by Neil Jarman.

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FIGURE 9.5 ‘Peace wall’ dividing public park (Alexandra Park). Source: Photo by Neil Jarman.

an interface. However, in creating a network of defensible spaces the barriers have served to create and reinforce a sense of territoriality and a belief that each residential area belongs to one of the two ethno-national communities. The barriers in turn reduce opportunities for movement and access to employment, services and resources, thus limiting opportunities for casual contacts and interaction and therefore increasing experiential distance between members of the two main communities. The physicality and the permanence of the barriers also help to ensure that residential boundaries are fixed in place and belonging in ways that national boundaries aim to achieve, thus limiting scope for any informal or tentative re-integration. This has had the effect of heightening the importance of the interface as an indicator of difference, and thus of reinforcing its position as a site to defend and, paradoxically, as a target to attack. Rather than neutralising the physical spaces between the two communities, the barrier becomes a point of contention, reproducing the tensions and insecurities it is intended to counter. The barriers have reinforced and hardened the patterns of segregation in Belfast but they did not create them. The seeds were arguably sown for a segregated Belfast as far back as British colonial occupation of Ireland with the seventeenth century plantations of the province of Ulster by English and Scottish settlers who were allocated land taken from the local population in the northern counties of what was then an undivided island. Sectarian patterns of

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conflict and affiliation largely stem from this period and have shown a remarkable resilience and adaptability as wider economic and political contexts shifted. Belfast itself reflected these patterns and accentuated their visibility and significance as it developed as a city with close cultural and commercial ties to Britain whose parliament underpinned Protestant commercial interests by, for example, legislating in favour of Protestant control over certain industries such as linen production. Throughout the eighteenth century Belfast had been a predominantly Protestant town but became increasingly mixed as Catholics moved from rural areas to work in the expanding textile industries. Catholic residential neighbourhoods grew up adjacent to many of the linen mills but remained distinct and separate from the already established Protestant communities. The rapid industrialisation of the nineteenth century with its shift to shipbuilding and local engineering as a Protestant monopoly exacerbated this trajectory and led to residential segregation becoming a prominent and enduring feature of urban life in Belfast and other centres across Northern Ireland that persists to the present. Recurrent outbreaks of political and sectarian violence, associated with Catholic campaigns for equality and nationalist movements for political independence from Britain, punctuated the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Bardon 1992; Farrell 1980; Jarman 1997). These outbursts of violence impacted most strongly in working class communities as members of the minority community were targeted, marginalised and excluded, thus reinforcing the practice of working class segregation. The fight for independence culminated in the division of Ireland in 1921 and the creation of the Irish Free State, but the six northern counties with the largest population of Protestants were retained as part of the United Kingdom. In more peaceful periods after partition in 1921, some working class areas became more integrated and the physically unmarked boundaries became blurred through demographic movement and some degree of intermarriage. However, residential integration was effectively always a temporary and tentative process as any rise in political tension was likely to provoke some degree of sectarian intimidation or violence which resulted in the exclusion of minorities who chose or were forced to seek safety in a retreat to their own (Boal 1982, 1995). Such tensions intensified across the twentieth century, with discrimination in economic, educational and electoral opportunity between Catholic and Protestant a persistent grievance that by the 1960s had produced a civil rights movement which seemed to threaten Protestant power and its union with Britain. Increasingly violent demonstrations and counter-demonstrations precipitated the arrival of British troops, brought initially to support the police and restore order (Purdie 1990). However, these troops had quickly ‘militarized the Catholic ghettos . . . and the consequent military theatre invited a nationalist

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military response’ (Mulholland 2002:74) that resulted in an armed republican campaign of resistance to British presence in Northern Ireland. The rapidly escalating scale and ferocity of inter-communal conflict and the chronic and sustained nature of the violence associated with the onset of the Troubles in the late 1960s led to what was described (at that time) as the most extensive movement of people in Europe since the Second World War (Darby 1986). It is estimated that some 60,000 people moved home to escape violence and intimidation in the early years of the conflict and one consequence of this was that many working class residential areas became more firmly and extensively segregated than at any time in the past. Furthermore, the ongoing nature of the violence meant that previous patterns of oscillating cycles of segregation and integration came to an end and the demographic process became a one-way trajectory towards ever-increasing levels of residential segregation. The Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE), the agency responsible for public housing, categorises an estate as ‘segregated’ if over ninety per cent of the population are from one of the two majority communities, and a survey of public housing published in 1999 indicated that ninety-eight per cent of NIHE properties in Belfast were in segregated communities, while across Northern Ireland seventy-one per cent of tenants live in segregated areas (Northern Ireland Housing Executive 1999:22). This scale of residential segregation was a direct result of the Troubles. In part it was a consequence of people seeking some degree of safety and security and a respite from fear of attack and in part it was a result of naked sectarian intimidation of the Other. It also led to greater levels of community isolation and differentiation and to greater community fragmentation. As residential communities drew in upon themselves, people limited their personal movements, became wary of outsiders and unknown visitors and generally avoided contact with members of the other community. Such routine practices only served to reinforce the patterns of segregation and isolation. Although in some areas residential segregation has occurred through homogenisation and agglomeration, resulting in large single identity zones such as the Greater Shankill and the Falls Road areas, in other parts of Belfast the segregation has led to an increase in smaller, single identity estates. In north Belfast, the most fragmented part of the city, greater levels of segregation have led to an increase in the number of boundaries between single identity areas and an increase in the number of potentially contentious interfaces. The first barriers between segregated neighbourhoods were constructed in response to inter-communal rioting and intimidation in the streets that ran between the Falls and the Shankill Roads, between Ardoyne and Glenbryn in north Belfast, and around Short Strand in the east of the city in 1969–1970.

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These early barriers involved the British Army using rolls of barbed wire to limit movement and thus to provide greater security for residents and to reduce the opportunity for disorder. These barriers were viewed as temporary structures, but as the violence continued and increased in severity more barriers were built, particularly across north Belfast, although it was not until the early 1980s that barrier building became a more commonly used response to violence and security concerns. During the Troubles a number of barriers were erected as means of reducing opportunities for paramilitary violence or to aid the work of the security forces, rather than as a response to rioting and intimidation. Roads were closed off to restrict access to vehicles for night time drive-through attacks, derelict houses were bricked up as a buffer between residential areas or demolished and replaced by a steel fence or brick wall, sightlines for snipers were closed by solid barriers and the physical landscape became marked by road closures and communities turned in on themselves to create a patchwork of defended and defensive enclosures. Through the 1980s barriers were built in the Suffolk area of south-west Belfast, on the Springfield Road in west Belfast, in various parts of north Belfast and inter-connecting roads were closed off between the Falls and the Shankill, further reducing direct access between the two areas. In short, where conventional methods of maintaining order were ineffective, walls proliferated. As well as the residential interface barriers, a number of other forms of security structures were constructed during the Troubles. The Westlink dual carriageway, which was built in the early 1980s to link the M1 motorway south and west of the city with the M2 motorway to the north and east, also acts as a barrier between parts of nationalist west Belfast and unionist south Belfast and serves to limit points of access from the west of the city to the city centre. One result of its construction was that the security forces could control access into and out of west Belfast by positioning checkpoints at just five locations (Divis Street, Grosvenor Road, Broadway, Donegall Road and Kennedy Way). These thoroughfares remained the only vehicular routes between west Belfast and the central and southern areas of the city as the Westlink created an effective moat-like structure, closing off smaller roads and other connections to west Belfast. Belfast city centre was similarly protected by a ‘ring of steel’ during the worst of the Troubles, a network of steel gates and fencing which closed off most access roads, and channelled all vehicles and people through a small number of points of access, where they were subject to extensive searches of person and possessions. However, the ring of steel was always considered a more temporary phenomenon than the Westlink or the interface barriers and it had been partly dismantled before the ceasefires of 1994, and the remaining security barriers around the city centre were removed in the years following

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the signing of the Agreement as part of the wider process of transition, demilitarisation and normalisation. In contrast, the vast majority of residential interface barriers built during the conflict remain in place and many new barriers have been built throughout the period of political transition, particularly in the highly fragmented communities in the north of the city where barriers have continued to be built largely in response to recurrent acts of rioting and disorder associated with the disputes over Orange parades and ongoing inter-communal tensions associated with fear, suspicion and mistrust of the Other. Since 1994, not only have the total number of barriers increased but many of the older barriers have been raised in height, extended in length or strengthened in some way. Furthermore, many of the new barriers have been constructed in a more solid and permanent form, rather than as temporary structures. Although steel sheeting or fencing was still used in some cases, in a number of areas, for example along parts of the Falls-Shankill divide, the older structures were replaced by higher quality brick walls, and sometimes with additional design features in stone or steel, or had their appearance softened by planting trees and other vegetation beside them to act as a buffer and further aestheticise the structures. This practice also served to emphasise the expected permanence of the barriers, which could no longer be considered as temporary structures that were hurriedly thrown up in response to a short-term emergency. Rather, their solidity and scale indicated that the authorities viewed the construction of barriers, and by extension the claiming of defensible residential territories, as a permanent feature of the Belfast social landscape and thus a permanent mechanism for maintaining order in areas that seemed less amenable than other parts of the city to standard forms of policing. The history of such constructions over the past forty years suggests that while the initial barriers were built in response to persistent localised violence, increasingly barriers have not been constructed in response to specific incidents. Rather, protective and defensive factors have come to be regarded by the state as an integral and necessary precautionary part of a wider programme of urban regeneration and development. In other words, the exceptional has been increasingly incorporated as an everyday feature of the rule of law in some parts of the city during the peace process.

From Imposition to Consultation

The gradual shift towards greater involvement of neighbourhoods in the decision-making process since the mid-1990s arguably contributed to the nor­ malisation of walls as an acceptable form of maintaining public order but

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simultaneously created barrier construction as a new field of communal conflict. The decision to erect a new security barrier or to extend or heighten an existing one was, until 2009, the responsibility of the Secretary of State acting on advice from civil servants in the Northern Ireland Office. In 2009, responsibility for the barriers passed to the newly devolved Minister of Justice. The government usually receive requests for the construction of a barrier from the police, although requests may also come from representatives of a local community or from two neighbouring communities. Such requests will be justified by security concerns, which are based on the number or level of incidents in an area over a significant period of time. The government will generally consult with the relevant parties (the police, local residents of the two neighbouring communities and local political representatives), although there is no formal requirement for them to do so. The imperative for consultation is to gauge local preferences and to gain support from all sides for their ultimate decision. The interest in consultation and gaining support from local communities for security barriers is a relatively new development and only dates from the period following the 1994 paramilitary ceasefires. Prior to 1994, the decision was made by the government in consultation with the police, and the local community was then informed that a barrier would be constructed after the relevant decisions had been taken. Often there is agreement among all parties on the desirability of a barrier but sometimes one party is keener on having a structure put in place than the others. In such situations, the government bases its decision on the balance of support: if the police and one community favour a barrier it goes ahead, and if the police and one community oppose the barrier it does not go ahead. In theory, if the two communities favour a barrier and the police oppose construction, permission would not be given. However, in practice if the two communities both want a barrier to be built and the police oppose the request, localised violence may well be sustained and even intensified until they change their minds. Therefore, while in theory the Police Service of Northern Ireland always has a veto on peace-line construction, in reality the decision making process has often been more complex. Unionists have tended to support barriers and further segregation more often than nationalists. They have generally argued that walls are needed to provide greater safety and security to local residents who have been under persistent attacks from the other side. Nationalists, and in particular Sinn Féin, have generally publicly opposed walls. They view unionist demands as part of a wider agenda of asserting control over their territory and as a means of demarcating local boundaries once and for all. In turn, nationalists have often claimed that a decision by the government to construct a wall is either giving in to unionist threats and pressure, an example of the police failing to defend

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nationalist communities adequately, or part of a state agenda to consolidate segregation. However, the sustained violence in and around the interfaces of Short Strand in east Belfast during 2001 and 2002 led Sinn Féin politicians to argue that more barriers were needed in the area to protect nationalist residents. A number of the barriers surrounding the Short Strand area were subsequently raised in height. For a long time the lack of legitimacy that the police had in nationalist communities made consultation over barriers difficult as residents were reluctant to participate if the police were involved in any way, while the police were reluctant to accept any opposition to proposed barriers that they could not guarantee was free from potential political manipulation. After the paramilitary ceasefires of 1994 the police often opposed recommending new barriers and they hoped to encourage people in the local communities to help bring the violence under control. But they also acknowledged the inevitable need for a barrier if the violence persisted. Most barriers were thus only constructed after a period of recurrent violence and after extensive debate and consultation among and with local residents and political representatives. An example will illustrate some of the issues and dynamics of advocacy and opposition. Through the winter of 1998 and spring of 1999 there were recurrent instances of interface violence in the White City-Whitewell area of north Belfast. While residents in the unionist community were in favour of a barrier, the local nationalist residents were opposed to it and claimed that the violence was being orchestrated by unionists who wanted the road linking the two areas closed off so that a planned community centre would be solely accessible to the unionist community. Consultations were carried out by both the police and local community groups and these indicated that there was no agreement between the two communities on the matter. The police decided that as houses on both sides were suffering attacks the barrier was the best option to reduce violence. The road was subsequently closed off (albeit with pedestrian access during daylight hours) and a 200 metre long six metre high fence was built between the neighbouring areas. The violence largely ceased once the barriers were erected and the community centre was built in the unionist White City the next year. This example raises issues about the ‘real’ reasons for wanting peace walls to be constructed. There are often suspicions among some communities that the recurrent violent attacks conceal ulterior motives, which are more about entrenching division, asserting control over territory and local resources and reinforcing segregation than they are about security. The lack of dialogue between such opposed neighbouring estates undermines any mutual empathy or understanding and prevents any possibility of working to a shared agenda.

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In almost all cases where interface violence occurs, there is an unwillingness to acknowledge responsibility and a tendency to blame the other for the attacks as well as to explain the actions of one’s own community as regretful but understandable retaliation. The failure of the other side to acknowledge their involvement in violence in turn feeds suspicion of what the ‘real’ reasons for the violence might be. On the one hand, unionists inevitably accuse nationalists of trying to force them out of an area in order to be able to claim houses for their community. Nationalists on the other hand claim unionists want the barriers to reinforce their claims to territorial ownership and thus to formalise tribal boundaries. In Whitewell there was strong suspicion that the violence was initiated to generate a crisis that could only be solved by building a barrier, behind which the new community centre would provide resources for one segregated community without fear that residents from the neighbouring area would make claims upon it. The trouble is that it can be difficult to turn the violence off once it has started, and although the peaceline is now well established between White City and Whitewell, violent incidents in the area have persisted and the entire length of the fence was subsequently raised in height by three metres as a result. Although the government has been responsible for building the majority of the peace walls, other agencies including the Housing Executive and the City Council have been involved in proposals for security barriers. After recurrent violence in and around the Waterworks Park in north Belfast during the summer of 2001, Belfast City Council proposed a variety of fences and gates on the park perimeter and across certain pathways, which would effectively have divided the park in two. Planning approval was sought and residents had an opportunity to register their views. Sufficient opposition was voiced to the council for the proposals for fences and gates to be quietly abandoned. Furthermore, the threat to the local amenity that had been raised by the proposals encouraged local people to work to reduce further tensions and also to assert greater levels of ownership over the park. Most notably this involved claiming a large lake as a local resource, stocking it with fish and organising cross-community angling competitions. These competitions proved to be particularly attractive to many local young males and the violence in and around the park has remained at low levels in subsequent years. These brief examples illustrate that there is often considerable opposition from some sectors of local communities to the construction of barriers, although they will often accede to the proposals if the violence cannot be brought under control. However, if time and space are made for an effective form of consultation, and if local actors on all sides are genuine in trying to control the violence, then barriers are not inevitably the answer.

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Normalising Exception

The elaborate and aestheticised construction of many barriers is an implicit acknowledgement that ethnic residential segregation and division is a permanent feature of Belfast’s working class communities for at least the medium future. The growth in size and numbers of barriers that we mentioned earlier, together with the increasingly imaginative attempts to integrate them into the urban landscape, bears testament to this. So too does the fact that, once erected, few barriers have been removed. The barriers offer a sense of security and reassurance, not simply from attacks or violence, but also of ethnic identity. The barriers help to define the boundaries and confirm the identity of the area and thus the identity of the people within (and implicitly those without) and they offer a sense of security against any change. A barrier is seen as a line in the sand against demographic change and thus against political change and eventual attempts at reconciliation. A barrier offers the comfort of the sanctuary, of being amongst one’s own in a protected and defended environment. While the barriers remain as a reminder of the threat without, some are also utilised in ways that normalise their existence as an ordinary feature of the local environment. For instance, some school children reported that they did not know what a peace wall was and when it was pointed out to them, one remarked: ‘Oh, I thought that was just a wall, sure it’s always been there. I thought it was just for playing against’, while another explained that ‘you just look at it without really seeing it cos like it’s just always been there’ (Leonard & McKnight 2011:577–78). In Short Strand, the gates at Madrid Street, erected in 2002 four years after the peace agreement was signed, were soon painted on both sides by young people from each local community. Each side contained an image of what the children remembered of the view before the gates were in place, or imagined what the view could be if the gates were removed. (More recently the gates were removed and a permanent wall constructed in their place, thus formalising the division as permanent.) Parts of the Shankill-Falls peaceline at Cupar Way have also been decorated with a variety of small murals depicting local history, popular culture and local heroes and although the images have not been well maintained, they remain a focal point for tourists. The walls and gates are thus no longer considered as exceptional; instead, they become viewed as a normal part of the environment. Their acceptance as a routine feature of a locale is also an indication of the need that sustains their presence: the need for safety and security, the freedom from threat, the certainty of identity, the need to be with one’s own. One reason for the failure to remove barriers is that local residents want them to remain, since they do

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provide some sense of security and safety and provide some level of protection from missiles. The assertion that ‘good fences make good neighbours’ is true in Belfast insofar as good neighbours are also those who remain unseen and unheard. The continued existence of the barriers is evidence that at present there is no widespread desire to engage across the ethnic divide and that people are happy to live as neighbours with members of the other community as long as they do not have to meet or talk and as long as each side keeps itself to itself. In May 2007 the Northern Ireland Office announced that an eight-metrehigh fence was to be built in the playground of Hazelwood Integrated Primary School on Whitewell Road in north Belfast to protect the houses and residents of Old Throne Park from attack (Belfast Telegraph 23 May 2007). The announcement was notable and disturbing from a number of perspectives. First, the fence was to be built in the grounds of an integrated school in which Catholic and Protestant children are educated together, which for many symbolises the future direction of education and the attempt to build a shared and integrated society in Northern Ireland. Second, the announcement was made just weeks after the formation of the new devolved government, the first since the signing of the Agreement in 1998 that had the willing and active participation of each of the main political parties. And third, the incident that had precipitated the decision, a petrol bomb attack on a house, had occurred some nine months previously in the summer of 2006 and no evidence was given of a sustained or ongoing series of such attacks. The decision suggested that while some changes had undoubtedly occurred in Northern Ireland, some things remained the same: building a barrier was still regarded as an appropriate response to a sectarian incident resulting in criminal damage. Voices thus began to be raised about the desirability of yet another barrier, particularly at a time of positive developments in the political sphere and conversations began about the need to develop a long-term strategy that would focus on preventing the construction of further barriers and would begin to develop a framework and a timeframe for removing the existing barriers.

Beyond Barriers?

The attitudes of those who live alongside Belfast’s walls were explored in a survey commissioned by the US-Ireland Alliance (2008). The survey polled 1,037 residents of six Belfast neighbourhoods (the Falls and Shankill in west Belfast; Antrim Road and Tigers Bay in north Belfast; and Short Strand and

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Templemore Avenue in east Belfast).2 One series of questions explored people’s understanding of why the walls had been erected and the purpose they served: fifty-one per cent of people thought it was ‘to stop the troubles, fighting etc.’, while a further fifteen per cent said it was ‘to stop rioting’. However, a large minority of those surveyed believed they were built ‘to keep the two sides apart / segregation’ (39%), or for ‘protection / keep people safe / feel more secure’ (10%). Only two per cent believed that the walls were not needed or should never have been built. The survey also explored people’s attitudes towards the possible removal of the walls in each area. Overall, twenty-one per cent of respondents were in favour of the wall coming down right away, while sixty per cent said that the wall ‘should come down whenever it is safe to do so’, and just sixteen per cent said they did not care if the wall never came down. In each case, there was slightly more support in the nationalist community than in the unionist community for the removal of a wall at some time. Reasons given for not wanting the wall to be removed are summarised on Table 9.1 (with some respondents giving more than one reason). Table 9.1

Reasons given for not wanting the wall removed

Reason

Percentage

Don’t feel safe enough / wouldn’t feel safe without it Too soon / people not yet ready / still tension across divide Trouble would start again / would cause more trouble taking wall down Segregation / wall still needed / still problems Things are OK the way they are / the wall works / it stops trouble Children / young ones would cause trouble Not enough policing in area Don’t trust police or other side

33 31 23 15 6 4 2 2

Source: http://www.us-irelandalliance.org/content/155/en/About%20the%20 Alliance/Press%20Releases/2008%20Press%20Releases/Peace%20Poll%20 Results:%20Belfast%20Residents%20Asked%20if%20Peace%20Lines%20 Should%20Come%20Down.html.

2  For the full survey details and results, see US-Ireland Alliance 2008; Vargo 2008.

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People were also asked what they thought might happen if the wall was removed. Only eleven per cent thought that it would have no real impact and things would remain as they were, while most people believed it would lead to an increase in some level of violence: thirty-two per cent thought it would involve minor violence that could be handled by the police and community leaders; twenty-three per cent thought it would lead to significant incidents requiring a heavy police presence, but only on particular dates, anniversaries or when marches took place; seventeen per cent thought it would lead to some significant incidents requiring a heavy police presence; and fifteen per cent thought it would lead to constant problems of a serious nature. People were then asked how confident they were in the ability of the police to preserve peace and maintain order if the wall was removed. Overall just twenty-five per cent said they were very confident or fairly confident in the ability of the police, while fifty-eight per cent said they would be fairly worried or very worried about their capacity to maintain peace and order. Perhaps rather surprisingly, in each paired area people in the nationalist community expressed higher levels of confidence in the police than did people in the unionist community. Finally, people were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with a series of more general statements related to the continued presence of the wall. In total, sixty-two per cent felt that the wall was still necessary because of violent factions within the communities, while, by contrast, forty-three per cent believed that the wall served to maintain tensions and antagonism between the communities. Forty-five per cent believed that removing the wall would encourage better community relations while fifty-two per cent believed that the two communities were already growing in confidence with each other. Furthermore, while sixty-one per cent of respondents felt that local politicians should be doing more to create the conditions for the walls to come down, forty-nine per cent believed that some local politicians used the walls to play on the fears of the community and forty-one per cent stated that the politicians were not interested in whether the walls were dismantled or remained. Overall, the general response to the survey was that local residents would be willing to have the walls removed but not necessarily immediately. There was a belief that the walls did serve some purpose in reducing acts of violence, and although most people believed that removing the walls would not result in anything more than minor or occasional acts of violence, there was limited confidence in the ability of the police to preserve the peace without the existence of physical barriers. Many people felt that the walls did provide some degree of security for people living near them and it was still too soon to remove the barriers.

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The survey was thus a useful contribution to an emerging dialogue about the future of the interface barriers. This process was subsequently taken forward by Northern Ireland’s Community Relations Council, which took the lead in setting up the Interface Working Group and involved key government departments, statutory agencies and community-based organisations in a discussion about how to develop the policy agenda and practically begin to deal with the legacy of nearly 100 barriers across the city. The Interface Working Group approved a framework approach to removing the interface barriers that was based on a process of regeneration through sustainable security (Community Relations Council 2008). The working group also identified those barriers that might be removed most easily and this in turn led to the initial transformation of six of the barriers. It also established models of practice for consulting with local residents over barrier removal and identified and addressed a number of bureaucratic hurdles that impeded the removal of the barriers. As part of the wider process the Minister of Justice, who has responsibility for the interface barriers, imposed a moratorium on the construction of any new barriers, while in 2013 Northern Ireland’s First Minister and Deputy First Minister published their draft ‘good relations’ strategy which included a target date of 2023 for the removal of all the government’s security barriers across Northern Ireland (Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister 2013). The decision to erect another new barrier—the one at Hazelwood Integrated School mentioned above—nearly ten years after the peace agreement was signed thus set in chain a process that has resulted in the first clear commitment to move on from the state of exception that has dominated Northern Irish politics for too long. Conclusion Many of the interface barriers considered here emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s in response to the ungovernability of specific adjoining working class neighbourhoods. Initially the response was from local people, protecting their lives and homes, but subsequently building barriers became the default response of the state to violence and civil disorder. In the beginning, walls and barriers were the extraordinary reaction to an extraordinary situation, intended only as a short-term solution to what it was believed would be a short-lived problem, a view epitomised in the much-quoted words of the British military commander who supervised the building of the first barriers: ‘This is a temporary measure, we do not want another Berlin Wall situation in western Europe . . . It will be gone by Christmas’. Similar phrases have often

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been repeated, with the exceptionality of walls legitimated by their putative ephemerality. Some forty years later the walls remain: higher, longer and separating many more neighbourhoods than when first introduced. Estimates suggest that one third of all barriers in Belfast have been built since the paramilitary ceasefires in the mid-1990s. Of course, across this period there have been many changes. As we touched on above, temporal shifts in symbolic and functional meanings of peace walls in Belfast are evident in the oscillations between moments of violence and relative calm. Barriers were more necessary at some times and in some places than in others. Some years were more or less violent, while tensions fluctuated within any particular year according to the political season in rhythms that intersect with spatial location to create barriers with shifting prominence or invisibility: at different times in the same place; at the same time in different places; and at different times in different places. Such rhythmic patternings are reflected in local models of conflict, which speak of ‘cycles of violence’ across generations and through history. Nor should the walls be understood only as the interventions of the state. As we have seen above, new barriers are rarely erected without neighbourhood consultation. In post-Agreement Belfast walls have been normalised and have taken on new political meanings. They have provided a focus and arena for new rhetorics of communal discord and dispute, a heterotopic space within which meanings and functions are shifting and politically ambiguous (Tate 2013:87). Yes, they remain defensive and continue to express a proprietorial, territorial and symbolic belonging as many observers have noted. But they have also increasingly become the material foundation around which political subjectivities are constituted and new political arguments are constructed in what some refer to as ‘war by other means’. They consequently produce an ‘affective and visceral togetherness . . . that articulate[s] the collective political subject of the people’, a ‘barricade sociality’ generated by populist political practice that cannot be fully captured by ‘sociological criteria such as ethnicity or class’ (Dzenovska and Arenas 2012:646). Nevertheless, the point we wish to end on here relates to the state, about which relatively little has been said in the literature on Belfast’s walls, other than to note its role in reproducing residential segregation and providing security. In Belfast, walls have become an increasingly acceptable way of enforcing order, but one which is unevenly deployed across the city, as a substitute for standard and conventional forms of policing and a response to their limitations. Weizman (2007:210) has noted the almost palindromic structure of ‘law/ wall’, and while there is clearly a risk of reading too much into this, there is nonetheless a sense in which at moments in Northern Irish history, walls have

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come to stand in for law in an exceptional inversion of the ordinary. Certainly the persistence of walls implies that people have greater faith in the power of objects to protect them than they do in the abstractions of the law. Walls spectacularise the presence of the state by dominating some neighbourhoods but not others. However, at the same time as walls punctuate the cityscape as material mnemonics of the state, they stand as witness to its limits. These may not be the limits of its sovereign borders, but they are limits nonetheless in their resort to the exceptional. If barriers were an extraordinary and shocking reaction in 1969 in response to civil disorder, the burning of hundreds of homes and gunfire on the streets, how much more extraordinary they might seem now nearly twenty years after the multi-party agreement that brought widespread violence to an end were their visibility not masked by their longevity as the state’s tactical response, a kind of banal, everyday exceptionalism that goes largely unnoticed. In short, the state is differently present in interface areas; somewhere that extraordinary historical events have left a trace that continues to generate novel political meanings and an exceptional response—the presence of barriers that help to sustain and reproduce perceptions of otherness and difference.

PART 4 What Happens after the Wall?

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chapter 10

European Twin Cities: Models, Examples and Problems of Formal and Informal Co-operation Thomas Lundén Boundary Towns and Twin Cities in Europe Boundary towns are anomalies. The role of the town has been to regulate and supervise commerce with an umland, a surrounding area in a strong relationship with the town as a market place for goods and services. In traditional urban geography a distinction was drawn between the basic function, trade with its umland, and those functions that served the trading population with their own necessities. In central place theory the umlands inside a boundary are either abnormally large, or the boundary town is smaller than it had been without a boundary (Christaller 1966, Loesch 1954). But in reality the umland can be at a distance. The Greek city states, the Republic of Venice, the network of the Hanseatic League and the wealth of Singapore were founded on maritime contacts, where distance is less important than transport technology, and where the city could be surrounded by an alien territorial power on all sides but the sea. Towns, however, were often founded for military reasons (towns as castles), and for such purposes strategic locations were chosen not too far from the enemy boundary. When a wide or rapid river or other stretch of water separates two border towns it is often a question of technology (ferries, bridges) which decides whether the towns shall be regarded as one agglomeration or two functionally separate units. Some rather big European towns are located close to a state boundary, but none of them have a substantially ‘equal’ half on the other side, and its inhabitants can live their lives without even seeing the boundary if they do not wish to. This type of boundary town is often the result of a fairly recent boundary change, in many cases involving the expulsion and resettlement of the urban population (Lundén 2003b). Real border towns, towns that are separated by a state boundary somewhere within an earlier centre, or at least somewhere between a city centre and a suburb, have almost all sprung up within one existing country and been

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partitioned afterwards, often as a result of ethno-political delimitations. Boundary towns within the formerly communist part of Europe have to start from zero as regards relations, while towns within the ‘West European community’ can continue co-operation where the populations on each side of the boundary have known each other for a long time. In the third type of boundary pairs, along the old ‘Iron Curtain’, special efforts are made to ameliorate contacts (Gasparini 1999). Factors Influencing Spatial Behavior The spatial behaviour of the boundary twin town dweller is thus influenced by a number of localised supplies and services, and by their relative attractiveness and cost (in time and money). Freedom of movement and contacts is further influenced by status of residence and citizenship, as well as by the linguistic and social competence of the inhabitants. Their culture of seeking and evaluating possibilities and choosing their life paths is furthermore an important determinant of how people meet and how contacts are formed. In more detail, the factors influencing spatial behaviour in general can be summarised as follows: Biological reach, the individual ability to move freely, changing over the life span and according to health and social roles. Technical reach, the individual ability to move with the help of technical devices such as vehicles, transport infrastructure etc. Technology is characterised by, among other things, definition and delimitation. Regulation, the array of laws and other societal forces restricting mobility and contacts. Regulation, like technology, is characterised by definition and delimitation, in the most visible way through border controls, but also in more general ways (age limits, censorship, etc.) Economy, or the evaluation of supplies and services in society. Economy, or housekeeping, is the system of survival and accumulation of resources. Unlike technology and regulation, economy is, in principle, boundless. Culture, the evaluation of norms and traditions in Society. This includes norms on family formation, upbringing of children, group relations and ethics (religion). While cultural norms have no clear boundaries, much of group formation (networks) is characterised by boundary-drawing (in-group—out-group) (Barth 1969, Migdal 2002). Communication, the spread of information in society, especially its reception and its effects. This obviously includes a strong linguistic factor. These factors work in time and space as competing and co-operating pressures on individuals, forming their life paths. On the state level, the boundary town presents a very special case where the ‘national’ idea of unquestioned

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allegiance to the state and its territory can be questioned. While some of the factors mentioned above will work in favour of a homogeneous state territory with no supplies or attractions outside its boundaries, others will emphasise proximities to supplies and attractions beyond that territory. Obviously the regulation factor, including state laws, the election system and boundary controls will mostly work in favour of the state of domicile. Technical infrastructure is moreover often attuned to the state territory. The economic and the communications factors have no boundaries, in principle, but in reality they are often restricted by regulation. Furthermore, through the ‘national’ systems of education and mass communication, there is an influence on culture that may work in favour of the state of residence. Boundary Theory With the re-emergence of Political Geography a few decades ago, new emphasis was put on trans-boundary communication and the role of the individual in relation to the territorial state, especially at ‘open’ boundaries (Reynolds & McNulty 1968 for Canada-USA; Lundén 1973 for Norway-Sweden). In many contemporary social science boundary studies the focus is on the conflict between the natural tendency of the state to integrate its territory, while, for the individual, groups and organisations, contacts and interaction with the neighbouring state territory will be rewarding and natural. The theoretical approach to the geography of boundary towns could start with the individual and his spatial field of contact and movements and, on the other hand, with the state as an organisation and a territory. The individual is creature with biological, social and economic needs and desires. As many of these needs and desires have a localised supply, the individual has to relate to the surrounding world by moving, forming daily, annual and life-time trajectories in time-space (Hägerstrand 1975). The individual contact and movement field is composed of voluntary acts, such as meeting friends and going shopping and mandatory acts, such as going to school, doing military service and paying taxes to the state and/or to the local municipality. In the everyday life of most people and under ordinary conditions, acts, contacts and movements are a mixture of individual decisions, biological necessities and involuntary acts, imposed either by the State and its organisations, or by “social compulsion”, e.g. family matters and cultural norms. Different people have different needs and desires but also different constraints in fulfilling their chores and wishes. Buttimer speaks about the reach, the individual range of contacts and movements, usually centred on the home (Buttimer 1978). As pointed out by Schack for example, different groups may form different networks, creating separate ‘regions’, but within each group there will also be different networks depending on the type of action or communication, e.g. economic, regulation, social

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or cultural (Schack 2000:204 ff.). But as indicated in Hägerstrand’s Time Geography, different types of individual and joint projects have to fit into the time and space restrictions of individual life lines, and different types of networks therefore influence each other (Lundén 2000). Every characterisation of group behaviour and region-building activities will, of course, be highly speculative. Obviously, people with a life history of migration or belonging to an ethnic, social or religious minority may have a reach that is very skewed, perhaps not even centred around the present place of residence. Such groups have developed “virtual checkpoints, boundary markers and monitoring devices that their members employ in order to project the essentiality and primacy of the group’s own boundaries” (Migdal 2002). In the studies of border area inhabitants made by Meinhof et al., there are very clear differences between e.g. ethnic Italy Italians, Italy Slovenes and Slovenia Slovenes in their perception of history and environment, especially based on the language oppression of the Fascist period (Carli et al. 2002). In Görlitz and Zgorzelec the different histories of settlement have an impact on how inhabitants regard and react. Old people on the German side look positively on the (former German) neighbour town, while young people want to leave the area; on the Polish side the young are more positive than the old (Waack 2000). On the other hand, people of Görlitz feel a certain pride of their town, while Zgorzelec residents look on Görlitz as their proper city centre (Galasińska et al. 2002). While all these findings rest on very narrow statistical base, they indicate, however, that personal histories, which often show the same pattern on the same side of the boundary (or in the Gorizia/Gorica case also the same language), must be taken into consideration when estimating formal and informal contacts across the state limit. Waack (2000:107) cites Kemper in a differentiation between a homogenising and a nearness principle, the first uniting kin or similarity irrespective of distance, the other obviously based on proximity. In Hägerstrand’s words “every large group of human beings is subjected to a tension between two principles of integration, the territorial and the functional modes. In the first mode, nearness is the supreme category. Thinking, loyalty and acting are highly place-bound. In the functional mode of integration, similarity is the supreme category. Thinking, loyalty and action become of a ‘non-place’ kind and unite what is similar in function over wide geographical areas” (Hägerstrand 1986). Even if all societies are a mixture of both modes, it is clear that the process has over a long time-span favoured the functional mode at the expense of the territorial mode. And in this process, technological development and the increasing intervention of formal regulation have been strong forces. And the latter force has been related to the integrating force of the state. The state is a territorial, mostly hierarchical, organisation, claiming monopoly on the use of force within its domain. It supplies services to its members

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(citizens and/or residents), such as the provision of infrastructure, protection and education. In response it demands loyalty, membership fees (taxation) and certain services (e.g. military and civil defence efforts). In certain respects, the independent state strives at certain types of homogeneity over its territory. This particularly refers to the validity of its laws and the rights and responsibilities of the domain dwellers, in most cases equal to the citizens of the state, but with important exceptions. In most states, however, there is some measure of local self-determination under the general umbrella of state legislation. Municipalities, provinces or autonomous regions thus form smaller domains where decisions are in some respects valid over the local area. The power and action space of these domains differs from state to state. This often means that a certain function is treated on the local government level in one state but on the provincial or even central state level in the other, making cross-boundary contacts difficult. The official organisation is like building blocks of territories put on top of each other, forming the states and ultimately the world. This hierarchical structure means, however, that environmental and other problems related to the boundary situation often cannot be politically treated locally through cross-boundary contacts but will have to be referred from the area itself up the hierarchy and to the capitals of each state. This mismatch of jurisdictions creates a hierarchical asymmetry which greatly impedes local cross-border cooperation (Lundén 2009). The individual living in a certain state and in a certain location is partially influenced by the state and its territory of authority. In some ways this is taken for granted, in other situations, the state authority is questioned. As pointed out by Deutsch (1953), a successful ‘nation state’,1 that is a state where its inhabitants see themselves as loyal to the idea of that state, makes the citizens faithful participants in the social communication of the state (Lundén 2001). Language obviously plays an important role in this communication. A ‘nationalising state’ (Brubaker 1996) will use the language of the ‘nation’ (in the sense of the stateforming people) both for direct communication with its inhabitants, but also as a symbol of something uniting the population, often at the expense of autochthonous language minorities and allochtonous immigrant groups. Twin cities are characterized by a conflict between the political split between two territorial state systems and the individuals’ tendency to act in a neigbourhood irrespective of state limits. This means a contradiction between similarity principle, tied to the state system and the territorial system, where nearness matters. 1  The word ‘nation’ is used in the more original meaning of a group of people claiming commonness and destiny, in difference to the interpretation of nation as being synonymous to ‘state’.

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In the case of several of our study areas, the present situation as regards ‘national’ allegiance and spatial behaviour cannot be understood without an analysis of the factors that influence communication and culture in the old cultural region of the area in question, i.e. the spread of information and the unwritten rules of behaviour that distinguish different groups of people in the boundary area. In the individual’s choice of life line, the state territory and its organisational and behavioural implications play a particularly important role in an area cut by a state boundary. This double dichotomy—state-to-state and individual-to-neigbourhood is the theoretical basis for the following examples. Haparanda-Tornio (Lundén, Zalamans 2001; Lundén 2003b) The neighbouring towns of Haparanda and Tornio, separated only by a narrow strip of grass and wetland, are divided by the only inhabited land boundary between Finland and Sweden in the southern part of the Torne River. In the daily lives of the inhabitants, the state boundary is probably of less significance than linguistic, social and ‘ethnic’ differences. On the local government level there is a strong will to unite forces to make the total area a viable one in spite of its peripheral location, but state legislation makes co-ordination difficult. This map (Figure 10.1) depicts the situation around 2000, before the two municipalities were built together with a large shopping centre on the Swedish side and a new bridge plus a bus terminal opened in 2014. Until 1809, Finland was an integral part of Sweden. According to the peace treaty ceding Finland to Russia, the town of Torneå/Tornio (situated west of the Torne river) would be part of the new Grand Duchy of Finland with the Russian Czar as Grand Duke. This sudden change caused a rupture in a hitherto fairly homogeneous river valley, populated mainly by Finnish-speaking peasants, except for the trading town of Tornio, which had a bilingual (Finnish/Swedish) population. Losing the central place of the river valley, Sweden decided to build a new town at some distance from the boundary. But by ‘voting with their feet’ rather than by political decision, the new town dwellers appeared in a small suburban village of Tornio, Haparanda (a Finnish name, Haaparanta, meaning Aspen Beach), immediately south of the urban and state boundary. With the establishment of the Town of Haparanda there followed an influx of merchants and administrators from other parts of Sweden, while most of the Swedish-speaking bourgeoisie of Tornio left or was eventually immersed in the Finnish-speaking hinterland. In terms of culture as defined above, the population of the southern part of the Torne valley, comprising the two town

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Map of Haparanda-Tornio twin towns. Source: Map by Dept. of human Geography, Stockholm University.

municipalities, can be said to be composed of four groups: Finland Finns, living in Tornio and on the eastern side of the river, speaking modern Finnish with some regional dialect, ‘tornion murre’. They mostly have little or no knowledge of Swedish, with the exception of higher officials and people with particular boundary-related jobs or interests. The Finland Finns have little experience of Sweden and might only use the neighbouring country if some types of supply, e.g. groceries or berry lands are cheaper or better available on the

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Swedish side. Thanks to the existence of Finnish speakers on the Swedish side, they can often be served in their own language. Sweden Swedes (ethnic Swedes), living mainly in the urban area of Haparanda municipality. Some are descendants of the urban population of merchants and traders that was mainly Swedish speaking, others are officials, teachers etc. occupying professions open to people competing and moving across the whole state territory. They mostly have little or no knowledge of Finnish. Due to this, the Finland side is more or less incomprehensible to them. Torne Valley inhabitants on the Swedish side, speaking Swedish and, with varying degrees of fluency, Finnish, the original language of the region. Their language skills may differ between the elderly, whose Finnish may be better than their Swedish, and the young, whose Finnish may be rudimentary. Some live in the urban area of Haparanda, but they are more dominant in the rural areas and in the municipalities further north. Torne Valley inhabitants (in Sweden) usually have kinship and friendship contacts on both sides of the boundary. In their relations, they may be hampered by an inferiority complex imposed on them by the fight for language allegiance and by the relative deprivation of the area. Sweden Finns (ethnic Finns in Sweden), living in the urban area of Hapa­ randa, mostly immigrants from Northern Finland (including its part of the Torne Valley) who have settled in Haparanda after having lived in Southern Sweden as labourers. Many of them have little or no skill in speaking Swedish, and their capability of reading Swedish may also be low. They usually have learnt some Swedish at school in Finland or at work in southern Sweden, but their reason for moving to Haparanda seems to be to keep some advantages of being Swedish residents (but not necessarily Swedish citizens). Having their homes just a few hundred metres from the boundary, their main scope of interest is in preserving Finnishness and contacts with Finland. It should be noted that Swedish administration does not register ethnic or language affiliation, while in Finland, the chosen language, Finnish or Swedish, is registered and used for determining the language/s of the local administration. The Setting The municipalities have a population of about 10 000 (Haparanda) and 23 000 (Tornio). They each cover an area of approximately 30 kilometres northwards along the Torne River, 20–30 kilometres inland plus the northernmost part of the Gulf of Bothnia including a number of islands. The western boundary of Haparanda coincides with the old linguistic boundary towards Swedish. The urbanised areas comprise a nucleus of fairly dense settlement with 2–3 storey blocks, surrounded by areas of detached one-family houses. Most buildings are modern, post World War II, with some wooden merchant’s

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houses dating back to the 19th Century. One kilometre north of ‘downtown’ Haparanda and rather close to Tornio there is a suburb, Marielund, consisting of detached and semi-detached houses built in the 1980s and mostly inhabited by Sweden Finns (Lundén 2003a). For a long time official cross-boundary co-operation was more or less nonexistent, with the exception of the necessary duties of customs controls and boundary inspection. During the times of the two World Wars Finland was deeply involved while the Swedish side remained neutral. Atrocities and hardships on the Finland side forced some irregular or even clandestine rescue cooperation between the populations in the area, which to some degree eased the slightly strained relations between officials on the two sides. During the last decades several organisations have been established in the Torne Valley with the aim to encourage cross boundary activities across the state boundaries. The most successful example of transboundary regionalisation in the Torne Valley is the co-operation between the towns (municipalities) of Haparanda and Tornio through the Provincia Bothniensis. This body was created in 1987 by the two towns after more than twenty five years of informal collaboration. The framework of the PB co-operation can be divided into three major groups: political, commercial and societal action. The achievements in recent years include language schools, open to pupils from both sides, fire, rescue and ambulance co-operation, an agreement on the connection of district heating networks and deliveries of heating across the state boundary and the merging of tourist offices and a common tourism policy. The two cities co-operate in running a common circle bus line. In order to avoid the hierarchy of postal delivery which would send a letter mailed in Haparanda bound for Tornio first to Stockholm, then to Helsinki, the towns have installed letterboxes of the neighbouring postal administration so that people can use them—with proper stamps—as domestic mail. For legal reasons, the bilingual schools are both located in Haparanda, the Swedish school system being more liberal. English is increasingly being used in cross-boundary contacts. Studies of the future plans of teenagers in both towns indicate a low degree of willingness to stay in the area, an almost total lack of interest in moving over to the other town, but rather vague dreams of a future in the capital of the respective country, or—the only thing that unites the two groups—in some international metropolis (Jukarainen 2001). Political and technical development is rather diverse concerning crossboundary co-operation within the tertiary sector. The development of wired telephony has resulted in decreased costs and simplified use, especially for cross-boundary calls. But user costs have been made less and less dependent on the actual distance between speakers within the state territory. With the

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success of the mobile phone many of the hierarchy and domestic-international problems of wired telephony have gone. The user is dependent on operator and coverage. But the operator is almost always dependent on an agreement covering a state and its territory. Some parts of Haparanda are dominated by the nearest Finnish sender/receiver, which is a nuisance but also an opportunity, especially for the Sweden Finns who have most of their contacts on the Finland side (Lundén 2003b). Because of its association with ‘national symbolism’, sport is usually carried out within each country’s hierarchical system. But for practical purposes, the two towns share much of the sports and recreation infrastructures. When the World Championships of Bandy, a sport resembling ‘land hockey on ice’ was arranged by Finland in the early spring of 2001, Tornio’s matches were held in Haparanda where there is an artificially frozen rink for bandy. One of the most fascinating aspects of boundary co-operation in the area is a golf course, built on the border wetlands separating Tornio and Haparanda. Another aspect of recreation is walking path of 5 kilometres, the Path of Health, set up in Haparanda under an Irish initiative and leading through the two towns. In spite of fairly successful co-operation there is still much to be done. One problem characteristic of boundary area co-operation is the discrepancy in hierarchy levels. While certain aspects of medical and health care in Sweden are the responsibility of the County Councils (Landsting), this is taken care of by municipalities in Finland. There is, however, a fruitful co-operation between the local county council agency in Haparanda and the Town of Tornio in utilising expensive equipment and specialists, e.g. gastroscopy and x-ray services, and an ambulance from the other side can be used if the local ambulance is already occupied. In some of these cases, both specialists and patients are required to meet in the health care centre in the other country. When a common travel centre to be placed on the Swedish side was proposed, it was found that Finnish legislation hindered the handling of domestic goods abroad, and that soldiers and recruits in uniform were not allowed to cross over into Sweden to use the terminal (Information from Birgitta Tamminen, Haparanda municipality, April 2013). There is of course some inter-municipal and inter-provincial co-operation which may ease these restrictions, but at the State boundary this local cooperation often meets a number of problems in the form of state-wide legislation that does not foresee the need for local co-ordination across the boundary. Attitudes, Identities and Cultures Within the research project ‘Boundaries to communication’ a large questionnaire survey ‘Attitudes, identities and cultures; social communication and ­contact and movement patterns in Haparanda and Tornio’ was conducted

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during the summer of 1999 (Zalamans). Three hundred questionnaires were distributed to inhabitants in Haparanda and Tornio, one hundred and fifty in each town. In Haparanda 69% of the respondent’s replied, whilst in Tornio the figure was 76%. The respondents were aged between 18 and 69 years and were chosen through a random sample of the population register of each municipality. They answered the questions anonymously. Due to its method, the random sample choice, its size and the frequency of the answers, the survey is considered to be statistically representative for the inhabitants between 18 and 69 years of age in Haparanda and Tornio. Mass Media Communication The content of the mass media communication part in our survey deals with how the inhabitants of Haparanda and Tornio use different media. The newspapers chosen for the survey are the most widely read in Haparanda and Tornio. Each town is dominated by newspapers issued for the province in either Finland or Sweden, in Finnish or Swedish only. The only exception is the bilingual local newspaper, the local three-days-a week paper Haparandabladet/Haaparannanlehti. It is issued in Swedish and Finnish (with some articles also in the local Finnish dialect of the Swedish side) and primarily covers the Swedish Torne Valley, but also to some extent the Finland side. It has most of its subscribers in the rural areas on the Swedish side, and very few in Finland. Among the Swedish newspapers the local Haparandabladet is without doubt the most popular one on the Swedish side, with about 95% of the population as readers. The regional Swedish newspapers NSD and Norrbottenskuriren, issued at Luleå (and with different political leadership) together account for a slightly higher readership. The Finnish Pohjolan Sanomat is read quite frequently by the Sweden Finns. On the Finland side it is the most popular, with about 93% of the population as readers. The radio channels chosen for the survey are national, regional and local. The main languages used are those of the majority of each state but there are programs are in the minority languages as well. Among the Swedish channels the regional Radio Norrbotten and the local Radio Haparanda have most listeners in Haparanda. However, while the listeners of the regional channel Radio Norrbotten mainly listen to news on that channel, the other two are used equally for news, debates and, in particular, music (P3 is the light music channel of the Swedish Broadcasting Corporation). Among the Finnish channels the local commercial channel Radio Ankkuri and the regional Radio Perämeri in particular have most listeners in Tornio. In Haparanda a good many Sweden Finns listen to Radio Ankkuri, mainly for music but also for news.

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The television channels used for the survey all cover the territory of “their” respective country (but they can be received on the other side of the boundary) and both countries have programmes in the minority languages. In Sweden SVT2 and TV4 (private and commercial) have regional programmes that can be viewed on both sides of the boundary for a limited time every day, while regional programs were not introduced in Finland until 2000. Among the Swedish channels there is no special pattern shown for Haparanda—all three are frequently used, even though the commercial TV4 is the most popular. The main reason for watching TV is equally news and entertainment, with debates in third place. In Tornio the Swedish channels are sporadically used, exclusively for entertainment. Among the Finnish channels in Tornio the commercial Mtv3 has a clear first position with regard to number of regular viewers, with the non-­commercial channels Yle1 and Yle2 close behind. In Haparanda a good many watch Finnish channels, especially Mtv3. In both towns 89% said they are interested in local news, while around 55% are interested in the local news of the other side. The best media for local news on both sides is the newspapers, followed by radio, with TV at some distance in third place Judging from the results above the interest in Finnish media in Haparanda is much higher than Swedish media in Tornio in general, the main reason being the large group of Finnish speaking inhabitants in Haparanda. (Zalamans 2001). Activities and Attitudes About 90% of the respondents answer that they cross the boundary at least once a month. The main reason for the inhabitants in both towns is shopping. Contacts with relatives and/or friends are also fairly frequent. In Haparanda 48% have relatives in Tornio, and 66% of those meet them at least once a month. The equivalent figures for friends were 67% and 65%. In Tornio 50% said they have relatives in Haparanda, and 39% of those meet them once a month or more. The equivalent figures for friends were 74% and 51%. While 25% of the respondents in Haparanda and 23% in Tornio are active in an organisation or Ngo, they mostly do it in the domestic town. Only 12–15% of those who are active stated that their activity is taking place on the other side. The attitudes and perceptions of the inhabitants are very important but difficult to measure. In the survey we asked a number of open questions with connection to their relations with their neighbours, the boundary itself and co-operation between the two towns. The answers show that there are some dissimilarities between the inhabitants as regards perceptions of the different groups. In Haparanda 36% mentioned there are differences between the inhabitants in Haparanda and Tornio and that there is an ‘us and them’ mentality, while

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the equivalent figure for Tornio is 23%. Generally the inhabitants of Tornio are more positive in their opinions of their neighbours than the opposite. Those who are most negative towards their neighbours in Haparanda are Swedes with little or no knowledge of Finnish. Conclusions From a functionalist perspective, the division into two states has created substantial differences between the two towns. Of the four major population groups, two seem to be able to use the opportunities of both sides. Both reside in Sweden: The Finland Finns, who benefit from some advantages from living in Sweden while using social, cultural and commercial networks on the Finland side, and the autochthonous Torne Valley population in Sweden, who can use their (relative) bilingualism for contacts on both sides. To the two remaining groups the boundary to some extent deprives them of half of their action space This, however, is not the result of the boundary itself but of the language and education policy of the two neighbouring states. On the official side, the two municipalities show a great willingness to co-operate in order to strengthen the position of the area. Resistance to this comes from above and below. From some groups on each side there are signs of hesitance or passivity. This may come from a traditional way of thinking ‘what is good for them is bad for us’, in other words a win-lose model, or from a lack of interest in politics generally. There can also be some remnants of thinking in national stereotypes as a result of earlier nationalist indoctrination. From above the resistance is more structural. Much of new legislation is taken without consideration of its boundary effects, and in the traditional administrative structure what was beyond the boundary was at best a matter of foreign relations.

Narva-Ivangorod—An Unequal Twin (Lundén, Zalamans 2000, 2002)

A Transitional Place in History Narva is a town of approximately 74 000 inhabitants on the western bank of the Narva River in north-eastern Estonia. The town is situated 210 kilometres east of Tallinn, 150 kilometres south-west of St Petersburg and 14 kilometres inland from the shores of the Gulf of Finland. On the eastern bank of the Narva river is Ivangorod (Estonian: Jaanilinn) with its 10 000 inhabitants. From 1558 to 1944 Ivangorod was a suburb of Narva, but during the last 5 decades it has belonged to the Leningrad oblast’ in Russia.

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These maps (Figures 10.2 and 10.3) depict the area around the Narva River with the international boundary following the river. The 1920–1944 border is shown in the east. In the year 1900, Narva with its suburb Ivangorod was an industrial town of about 30 000 inhabitants in the Estlandskaya Guberniya, a town with a wellpreserved 17th-century citadel surrounded by fortress walls and moats, two fortresses on each side of the river and a number of industries. The Krenholm Textile Company dominated the local economy, forming a town in the town, south of the old City. The town was an important station on the St Petersburg– Tallinn–Paldiski Railway. After the First World War and the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920, Narva, Ivangorod and a 20-km slice of the eastern river bank of the Narva was made part of the Republic of Estonia. The inter-war depression and the loss of the Russian/Soviet market led to a stagnation in the local economy. The population decreased to under 25 000, the percentage of Estonians increasing to about 64%. Narva had a certain international character with many ethnic and religious groups. In September 1939, Narva was invaded by Soviet troops, in June 1940 Estonia was annexed to the Soviet Union and little more than a year later the town was invaded by German troops. In 1944, Soviet troops approached and during the early spring the town was more or less devastated by Soviet bombardment until the town was finally taken on July 26th. On the re-establishment of the Estonian Soviet Republic, the land east of the river was ceded to the Russian SFSR. The Krenholm plant was rapidly rebuilt according to old maps and drawings. Part of its production was moved over to Ivangorod, which served as a transit centre for people moving westwards towards Narva and other parts of the Baltic republics. Narva was designated as an important union centre for textile production, eventually it was also provided with a furniture and a metalworking industry, and ethnic Russians and other ethnic groups from the Soviet Union now replaced the population, which had practically disappeared from the area during the evacuation. The bomb-stricken old town was almost totally demolished, save for a few buildings. In the 1950s the compact City was replaced by grey multi-family blocks and by greenery. In the surrounding area both on the Estonian and Russian side the large deposits of oil shales were exploited for a number of large power plants supplying large areas of Estonia and particularly the Leningrad district with electricity and central heating. Deliberately or not, this industrial expansion led to a massive influx of workers from the RSFSR, resulting in an almost total russification of language use in Narva and the rest of Ida-Virumaa.

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Map of Narva-Ivangorod twin towns. Source: Map by A. P. Gogolina, Komitet po geodezii i kartografii Rossiyskoy FEDERATSI, St. Petersburg, Russia (1992).

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Map of Narva. Source: Dept. of Human Geography, Stockholm.

In 1991 the Soviet Union fell apart, and Estonia reappeared as an independent state with the factual territory the Soviet Republic had been given in 1944. De facto, the Narva River was the north-eastern boundary with the Russian Federation, in spite of Estonia’s insisting on the territory of the Tartu Peace

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Treaty. After many failed attempts, a border treaty was to be signed on February 17, 2014, but state-to-state relations remained strained, and Russia in 2016 refused to sign. As a result of the economic decline of Russia, and the complication of contacts with Narva, Ivangorod has lost almost all its industry, its main economic role now being as a cheap supply of Narva inhabitants’ household goods. In his study of Ida-Virumaa, the Estonian hinterland of Narva, Berg has pointed out the political passivity and general lack of mobility that characterises the area. Narva was also severely affected by the collapse of the command economy that characterised the whole former Soviet Union (see below). During the last few years a number of small companies have set up in Narva with its rather good infrastructure, well-educated manpower and low wage structure. In Pikner and Jauhiainen’s studies of the Estonian press there is also a minor study of the picture of boundary conditions with Russia. Most of the articles were written when boundary relations were still strained, and the number of articles has since decreased. There is often an association made between Narva and boundary problems, and the general picture in the Estonian (language) press is negative, focusing on the Russian speakers as different, on crime, corruption and unemployment. The authors conclude: “people from outside build their understanding of the social situation in Narva on news and articles in the mass media. This can create an imposed picture of Narva and of the boundary that is not truly consistent with factual processes in the daily reality”. Narva as a Community To the casual visitor, the townscape is an important signal—albeit often a wrong one—of the conditions of its population. If we believe the analysis of Pikner and Jauhiainen, which also corresponds to the image of local politicians of Narva, the ordinary Estonian visitor will come to (or rather, will not come to) Narva with a prejudiced view of the town and its society. Students from a number of countries have studied different aspects of life in Narva and will shortly be presented below (Lundén, Zalamans 2000). Their result must be interpreted with caution. It is difficult to analyse social conditions even in familiar situations in one’s own native language, and even more difficult in an unknown environment. Narva is different, not only culturally and linguistically; it also has a traumatic history that makes every narrative valueloaded. A study of contemporary conditions may be misleading also because most Narvaites carry experiences from wars, forced migrations, advancements and degradations that will influence their views on the contemporary situation. Political structure: Narva is a town (municipality) within the province of Ida-Virumaa. During the first years of independence, the political leadership of Narva advocated autonomy for Narva (and Ida-Virumaa). With the 1992

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law on state language, Estonian became the only language used in public ­administration at all levels, from 1993 only citizens could run for public office while residents could vote in local elections. A 1996 law requires knowledge of Estonian from all public servants, but this has not been implemented. There have been several changes in the political leadership (one mayor, of EstonianAzerbaijani origin, becoming Estonian minister of minorities and integration). While Narva’s integration into Estonia has been wholly accepted, there are still strong public and political opinions for making Russian the second official language (Smith). The main political complaint from Narva towards the central state administration regards lack of interest in the Russian-speaking industrial problem area of Estonia’s Northeast. Children and youth: With one exception, all schools use Russian as the native language. Soviet textbooks have eventually been changed for Estonian books in Russian or Estonian. Some schools have begun teaching in Estonian and there are plans for “immersion” classes with an intense use of the State language. There is a great lack of teachers of Estonian in spite of vigorous recruitment attempts by the state and the municipality. Very few local teachers speak Estonian, and there is a great anxiety for the future, as Estonian will be the only route to higher education and the use of Russian in the schools will decrease. Among certain teachers, including headmasters, there is bitterness about the Estonian laws on language and citizenship, they have the (erroneous) opinion that Estonia is breaking the conventions of the Council of Europe when the state language is forced upon the schools. The teacher training college of Narva, which used to train Russian language teachers, has now been attached to Tartu University as an annexe, and is now training for conversion into Estonian as the dominant school language. There is no co-operation with schools in Ivangorod. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, the communist Pioneer organisation was disestablished. Narva now has a youth centre premises and equipment for voluntary youth organisations. But most young people remain passive, only some 500 being members of any club or organisation. Most young people speak Russian to each other; the very few Estonian speakers live in an environment where they still have to speak Russian most of the time. The attitude towards Estonia is, however, mainly positive—“we were born here”. Few young people want to stay in Narva, they want to “go west”. Very few see Russia as an alternative, but Estonia is not very attractive either. To many, English seems to be more important than the language of the home state. Sport in Narva is primarily an activity of the young. With its Russian working-class character, Narva’s edge is primarily in action and team sports. There was earlier an intense co-operation with Ivangorod in sports, but this has completely ceased. In sports there is more co-operation with Finland than with the former suburb of Narva on the Russia side.

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Work: Before Estonia’s independence in 1991, the employment “market” was dictated in central plans. Production units were established or enlarged, and workers were recruited, almost always from outside Estonia (i.e. from the RSFSR). As elsewhere in the Soviet Union (Kosonen 1996), a production unit could have rather divergent assignments, and there were few or no local linkages between different units. On the other hand the production units “owned” housing, recreation establishments and other things that in a market economy would belong to the private or public sphere. As workers “belonged” more to production units than to the municipalities, it did not matter in which area they lived. The Krenholm plant had some responsibilities on the Ivangorod side, a pedestrian bridge connected the areas and evidently some workers lived on the Russian side. With the establishment of the state boundary, successive layoffs at Krenholm and its successors and other measures, the number of employees living on the other side has dwindled to almost nil. The largest employers of today are the power stations in the Narva region plus Balti-ES, a company that used to deliver advanced equipment to the Soviet military complex. Today, after some changes of ownership, it is run by the Danish Maersk company, producing containers for shipping. During the 1990s, uncertainty dominated the attitudes of Balti’s management staff and employees. One consequence of the change in production was that specialists were not in demand any more, while the new “strength” was in the presence of unskilled, low-wage manpower (Ljung 1999). Beyond the large companies there are a number of smaller enterprises, often run or owned by West European companies. Around the Krenholm production some smaller enterprises have grown up that utilise the local know-how and the wage structure in combination with Narva’s rather good transport location. As a tourist market, Narva is hampered by its (unfairly) bad reputation in Estonia, by the lack of linguistic competence among the population as well as of the almost total lack of good hotels in the town itself. The nearby bathing resort of Jõesuu has more hotels of good standard than it will probably ever need, but their location is unsuited to the needs of a possible type of cultural tourism along the Tallinn–St. Petersburg route with one-night stops that might have some chances of success. Boundary passage may take time, and a visa is expensive for foreign tourists. Family life: In Narva today, family life is almost totally absent from public affairs. The pressure to organise and participate in public life during Soviet times has resulted in passivity. Apart from the cases of divorce and male alcoholism so typical of Eastern Europe, there is in Narva a special problem of divided families. In Soviet times, industrial workers were moved to NarvaIvangorod from different parts of the union. Male workers were first housed on

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the RFSR side, where they were registered. Women and children were housed on the Estonian side. In reality, most men moved over the river without changing their official domicile, something that had no consequence as long as there was no difference between the two Soviet Republics. With Estonia’s independence, local inhabitants were forced to show their official registration in order to get a residence permit. In the spring of 1999, there were still some 500 cases of residence permits waiting for a solution. Some families have given up and moved to Russia, in some cases the father has died, some families have “immigrated” illegally, and some have moved over to Ivangorod while keeping their contacts with Narva According to reports from Ivangorod, some 250 inhabitants have family members registered in Narva, this being the other side of the same coin. The same report says that several municipal civil servants of Ivangorod have their domicile in Narva. Citizenship: Narva inhabitants are divided into three fairly equal categories according to citizenship, about 34% having acquired Estonian citizenship, 27% have applied for and received citizenship of Russia while 38% are regarded aliens who require a special permit which was until recently also valid for crossing the boundary. According to interviews, many Narvaites do not see the advantage of acquiring Estonian citizenship. After five years, residents can vote in local elections irrespective of citizenship, and there is very little interest in “national” Estonian politics anyway. Citizens of Russia have a right to free basic medical care in Ivangorod, and boundary passage has until recently been facilitated by being a Russian citizen. Narvaites had a special document enabling them to visit the Ivangorod without a visa. With the Estonian compliance to the European Union standards and the Schengen agreement, visas are now required, and a number of multi-purpose visas were distributed free of charge to a (limited) number of residents, but this probably presupposes a valid passport. The tests for citizenship are regarded as difficult, especially the language test, since people live in a totally Russian language environment and most adults never accepted that they would have to learn the smallest of the Union Republics’ languages. It is, however, not easy to be an “alien”—it requires applications for working and residence permits, and the application procedure is slow and tedious. An alien’s action radius is circumscribed; it is difficult to travel abroad, to invite relatives to Estonia, to do business and to acquire land in border areas (including, of course, the Narva area) (Lundén & Zalamans, 2000). Crime: In the Estonian mass media, Narva and Ida-Virumaa province have been reported to have high levels of crime. Available statistics show that violent crime, particularly between residents of the area, smuggling and drug trafficking is over-represented in the north-eastern parts of the area. This is not

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unexpected for an area with border traffic, high unemployment and a class structure characterised by certain types of “visible” crime. During Soviet times, criminals were often deported to areas outside the home oblast’ after release. Narva was just beyond the Leningrad oblast’ and therefore attractive. Narcotics of low quality are smuggled into Estonia from the east through Narva, while products of higher quality are being produced in Estonia for export westwards. Recent reports have indicated high frequencies of Hiv/Aids in Narva. This seems to be the result of massive testing among drug addicts in the area rather than any proven higher incidence compared to other areas. Mass media consumption: The population of Narva in principle has access to media from Estonia and from Russia, and in Estonian and Russian. Most people (“almost everybody”) watch TV from Russia, particularly the ORT, RTR (both state-owned) and NTV (independent). News is watched on ORT and NTV, the latter being seen as more trustworthy. Thanks to the fact that all rented housing is linked to cable television there is no problem with the fact that Estonia changed over to the West European technology of colour transmission, which would mean that viewers with direct reception would have to choose between the two systems or get two TV sets. Local Narva radio stations (FM) mostly broadcast in Russian and try to cover news from Ivangorod also. Evidently there is no local station on the Russian side, only medium-wave transmitters broadcasting from St. Petersburg. Recent events in Ukraine have made Estonian authorities aware of the need for an extended Russian language service of Estonian Television. Narva has some local newspapers, all in Russian. There is also a regional paper for Ida-Virumaa with some articles also in Estonian. The papers to some extent cover Ivangorod, but they are not available there as the price would be far too high. There is a small local weekly in Ivangorod, but the nearest daily is issued at Kingisepp some 20 kilometres eastward, and in St. Petersburg. Young people usually do not read newspapers, but an Estonian (language) youth magazine has become quite popular. The public library has a good supply of (Soviet) Russian literature, but it is difficult to order new books from Russia and there is a lack of good Russian language literature relating to Estonia. Technical services: Urban planning has started in Narva according to new Estonian legislation. There is no co-operation with Ivangorod in this respect, one reason being that the sister town lacks any planning organisation. A negative attitude to planning still lingers, even on the Estonian side. Narva is supplied with water and sewerage from a local plant that used to supply Ivangorod also. This continued after the state boundary was created, but from then on Ivangorod was a foreign customer that had to pay its share of the cost. Narva Vesi, the local water supplier, cut off supplies to Ivangorod in November 1998

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after repeated reminders of overdue payments. Payment was promised from Moscow, but nothing happened. Eventually even sewerage and purification were cut off, dispersing effluents into the river. The situation is somewhat eased by the sad fact that most industries on the Russian side are idle. Now a new plant has been built with financial help from Danish development assistance. Customs and border protection: Of the three East Baltic states, Estonia is said to have the best border protection. The Russian side is less well equipped, but the staff is more numerous. There are plans to connect the Ivangorod station to the Estonian on-line system to improve surveillance. The railway border handling system is still manual, and the line is said to be one of the most frequent smuggling routes. Infrared cameras that even react to animals that cross the boundary in the night are now monitoring the boundary. On the Ivangorod side there is a market place where many types of goods are offered at considerably lower prices than in Estonia—clothing, books, groceries. In a nearby shop food and liquor is offered. Small vans from Belarus are a fairly common sight, probably a sign of suppliers benefiting from the relatively higher purchasing power from Narva. Social institutions: The municipalities of Narva and Ivangorod signed an agreement on co-operation in 1999, but so far nothing substantial has come out of this. The Narva hospital has no contact with its corresponding hospital in Russia. On the Russian side, hospitals receive many Russian citizens from Estonia for treatment, as they have a right to free care, whereas the Estonian system requires that they as aliens pay a substantial sum for health care insurance. This, together with other real and imagined benefits, explains why so many Russians have chosen Russian citizenship. To Ivangorod this is a financial problem, another reason for cross-boundary tensions. Attitudes: Narva politicians, who may not be totally representative of local opinion on these matters, wholly accept Estonia, but they often complain that the Central Government ignores Narva and that the Estonia Russians are seen as an “alien mass”. Narva Russians in intellectual positions (teachers, headmasters) often express bitterness over language legislation, which they see as an oppression of minority rights. Narva Russians have a positive attitude to Russia, they almost exclusively watch Russian television, and most of them would have voted for Putin in the presidential election. They are strongly against Nato membership for Estonia. Young people are much more positive to Estonia than their parent generation is. Estonian Russians have a reputation in Russia as being more “western”, in the sense of being more law-abiding, disciplined and less emotional than Russia Russians. An interpretation of this could be that there is a special

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c­ onsciousness developing, separating Estonian Russians from Russia Russians. The boundary makes a difference.

Valga-Valka—A Town on the Boundary (Lundén & Zalamans, 2000, 2002)

The Situation Valga (Estonia) and Valka (Latvia) are legally two towns but morphologically and, partly functionally, they constitute one unit separated by the state boundary. The town’s expansion started with the building of a railway during the Imperial Russian regime. With the independence of Estonia and Latvia in 1920, the town was divided between the two states, mainly on ethnic grounds. With the Soviet annexation in 1940, the town for practical reasons became united again, although divided between two Soviet republics. With the independence of Estonia and Latvia in 1991, Valga/Valka again became a divided town. The border cuts right through the urban centre, Latvia on the western side. Savienība street is seen in the northern part of the map. The boundary towns of Valga and Valka were subject to investigation by the social geographer Edgar Kant (1932) already in the inter-war period. Kant discusses the physical appearance and the economic geography of the town(s), but the social-spatial relations of the inhabitants are at best vaguely mentioned. In the present-day situation, certain factors have to be considered: The ethnic and linguistic distribution of population, with a fairly clear delimitation along the boundary between ethnic Estonian and Latvians, but with Russian-speaking population groups on both sides. The regulation of cross-boundary traffic, with a restricted number of crossings and different conditions for citizens, non-citizen residents and aliens respectively. The ‘opportunity landscape’ of existing workplaces, educational institutions, markets and shops and other facilities, both in the twin town and in the surroundings. Education The structure of the education systems in Estonia and Latvia is similar. Estonian schools have changed their school literature to a larger extent than is the case in Latvia. A few pupils, 10–20 from each school, pass the boundary every day to go to school on the other side, but all of them are Estonian or Latvian

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FIGURE 10.4

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Map of Valga and Valka twin towns. Source: Map by Jüri Vanaveski, A. S. EOMAP, Tallinn.

c­ itizens, which gives them no trouble at the boundary. The reason why some Russian-speaking pupils cross the boundary from Valga to Valka may be a matter of distances to school, the Valka school being near some parts of Valga municipality.

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There are both Estonian- and Russian-speaking schools in Valga and Latvian- and Russian-speaking schools in Valka, and contacts between the schools on the same side of the boundary seem to be frequent and positive. Contacts between schools over the state boundary are rare between Estonianand Latvian-speaking schools but, evidently, non-existent between Russian speaking schools across the boundary. It is notable that the Russian-speaking schools seem not to have any contacts with schools in Russia. Public Administration During the Soviet time healthcare was common for Valga/Valka. Patients could get their treatment in the closest hospital or nursing home irrespective of residence. In cases of emergency the patient would get treatment where they were at the moment. Today healthcare is strictly connected to the country where the patient lives. In an emergency the first treatment could be given on the other side if needed, but sometimes these patients are taken to the boundary with ambulance for further transport to their own hospital— this happens a couple of times every month. The other side has to pay for the treatment given. The hospital in Valka has special X-ray equipment for strata treatment, and it is used by Estonian patients as well, which happens 10–15 times per month. Valga has to pay for this treatment as well, of course. Valga fairly recently opened its own hospital. When the town was united, the intentions were to handle patients from both Valga and Valka. Today the Valka hospital is over-sized, which leads to severe problems for an already strained economy. During the Soviet time Valga/Valka was one city in areas such as planning and development of infrastructure. During the first years of independence the situation was reversed, resulting in no co-operation at all. The general situation of self-governance in Valga and Valka differs considerably. Estonia is much more decentralised than Latvia, and the municipality is the only administrative level with the state just as a controller/distributor. The situation in Latvia is a little unclear, but the real power is within the counties, not the municipalities. People in the post-Soviet Union are often negative to the expression cooperation. Valga/Valka is not an exception, and on top of these doubts the state boundary serves as another barrier. On the local government level most of the difficulties seem to be due to the difference in political systems. Both towns have had problems with quality of drinking water and both recently constructed their own sewage-treatment plant. The size of each plant is big enough to serve both towns, and both sides express a wish to supply clean water to the other side as well, which of course is impossible now.

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Communication Even though Valga/Valka is a twin-town situated on the border news is separated to Estonian and Latvian news respectively. In Valga there is one local newspaper, Valgamaaline, and two local radio stations, Radio Valga and Radio Ruut, all in the Estonian language. Once a month there is a short summary of Valgamaaline published in Russian, and the radio stations also broadcast in Russian sometimes as well. In Valka there are two local newspapers, Ziemellatvija and Tava Balss, and a local television-station broadcasting twice a week, all in the Latvian language. The conclusion from the interviews of the media situation in Estonia and Latvia in general and in Valga/Valka in particular is that there is little or no interest in the neighbouring country. This is not only shown in the lack of information about its neighbour but also in the attitudes of the people interviewed. Culture Sport in general is normally connected to a state system with ‘national’ teams and leagues. In Estonia as a whole, sports are normally ethnically divided. In Valga as well as in Valka there are no such limits and the sports clubs are ethnically mixed. There seem to be almost no formal connections or collaborations between Valga and Valka in regard to sports. Before independence in 1991 exchanges in sports were much more frequent than afterwards. Earlier was it quite common that sports schools and sports clubs had members from both sides of the two Soviet republics. Apart from difficulties with visa problems (see below) and differences in languages, waiting time at the boundary is a problem, especially for non-citizens. There have been several meetings between Valga and Valka to increase sports exchanges and to discuss common use of different sport facilities in the two towns. Today Latvian pupils are to some extent using the sports arena and the swimming pool in Valga. Individual Factors Crossing the boundary in Valga and Valka: The reasons for passing a boundary are sometimes described as ‘push and pull factors’. In Valga/Valka the most common reason to cross the boundary seems to be visiting relatives and friends. The inhabitants of Valga/Valka can be defined in three groups; ethnic Estonians, ethnic Latvians and others. In the first two groups the needs are low. The third group, non-citizens and people with other citizenship, has a larger motivation for boundary crossing, and this group is also the one that

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has restrictions on boundary crossing. Another factor worth mentioning is that Valga has a wider choice of shopping and dining, often in addition to lower prices. Study and work are two other factors for boundary crossing that are brought up, but at least the latter does not seem to be very frequent. Common cultural events happen rather seldom nowadays. In Valka there is no Russian Orthodox Church or Catholic Cathedral, which Valga can offer. On the other hand several cemeteries from the Soviet time are located in Valka, with graves of ethnic Estonians, Russians and others. For those who are non-citizens with alien passports the number of boundary crossings is set to a maximum of ninety crossings per year. For those who have specific needs, for example some school children, special permits have been authorised. About three hundred special permits are given every year, but there are far more applications. This is a strong limitation for non-citizens, the group with the greatest need to pass the boundary. While people with Estonian and Latvian passports can pass the boundary just showing their passports, non-citizens need a stamp in their alien passports. These passports have about twenty-five pages for stamps, which means that they have to renew them at least every year if they use the ninety occasions. Russian citizens need a visa to pass the boundary, and they do also need to stamp their passports. There are three official boundary points in Valga/Valka. Between the three points and just outside the towns a special ‘green line’ is running along the boundary. Border guards patrol the green line twenty-four hours a day, Estonia being more active than Latvia. While Estonian guards have professional training, the majority of the Latvian guards are compulsory military service personnel. The average waiting time for a car passing the boundary is about half an hour, but during market days or special occasions the waiting will be much longer. On a few occasions criminals have used the advantage of poor co-operation, and slipped over the boundary at an unguarded spot. Three types of illegal boundary crossing have been noticed: people who do not have the legal right to cross the boundary, people who have the legal right to cross the boundary but will cross the boundary illegally out of convenience and people who are smuggling. There is a paradox in the situation that a majority of the population in Estonia and Latvia was in a minority in the Soviet Union for more than fifty years, and that the Russian former majority now find themselves as a minority, partly in the same territory, in Estonia and Latvia. International powers strive to ease the pressure on non-Estonians and non-Latvians to become Estonian and Latvian citizens, but the immigration authorities in Estonia and Latvia underline the importance of knowing local history and language to become an Estonian or Latvian citizen.

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In Valga/Valka is the situation quite different from many other towns or cities in Estonia and Latvia in regard to the social situation. People of all kinds of nationalities are living side by side, and the towns are not segregated in that respect. One might talk about segregation when it comes to boundary crossing though, because movement for non-citizens is restricted. It is not only that the boundary can be seen as a barrier, but also that non-citizens are registered when they pass the boundary. Citizenship, Nationality and Language The situation between different ethnic groups in Valga and Valka is calm and without great problems. However, the language barrier in Valga/Valka is a major problem. Estonia and Latvia now have only one official language each. It seems as if Estonians are more unwilling to speak Russian than Latvians, partly because of greater linguistic difficulties with the language. Even though all Estonians and Latvians at the age of thirty and older speak Russian more or less fluently it is seldom used in conversations. During the Soviet time the Estonian and Latvian languages were taught in the schools for Russian children of each republic, but the teaching was seen as a ‘joke’. Today is it essential to have a good knowledge of the language as well as the state history and constitution to become an Estonian or Latvian citizen. For these and other reasons a large part of the population in Valga (~40%) and Valka (~25%) has no citizenship in their state of residence. These people are often referred to as non-citizens with another citizenship, mainly Russian or alien ‘citizenship’. In Valga/Valka the common centre has become a periphery as both sides are turning towards their capitals. It is remarkable that the ‘Russian’ community on each side has little or no contact with each other on official level, while it seems that they are the ones that pass the boundary most frequently. Shopping Interaction between Valga and Valka According to the central-place theory (Christaller 1966), Valga/Valka can either be seen as two separate shopping areas in a hierarchy within their respective state, or as one big central place serving people from both sides of the boundary. Waiting time on the boundary and the real time it takes to move to the other side seems to be the major hindrance. Insurance fees (for people heading to Valga) and import regulations are other, but minor, obstacles. Lower prices are the major push factor. In general prices are lower in Valga, except for tobacco and alcohol, and on top of that there is a greater supply of shops and goods in Valga as well. The population of Valka crosses the boundary more often that the population of Valga for shopping purposes.

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Savienība—A Case Study

Savienība is the northern part of a street located in Valka in Latvia. The street and its houses were established during the Soviet time, during 1950–80, as an extension of the Estonian street Põhja. The street is unique because it is inhabited mainly by Estonians, and their situation has been discussed on a government level between Estonia and Latvia several times, so far without a solution. It is said that Estonians who settled here were mainly repatriated from detention in Siberia or elsewhere in the USSR, allowed to resettle but not in their original home municipalities. By settling in Valka, Latvia, they would formally be outside their Valga hometown. The people in Savienība Street have to choose one of the three official stations to pass the boundary, which means a clear inconvenience. The authorities in Valga/Valka have agreed on a special permit to pass the boundary on the street for the people who have their permanent addresses at Savienība. The problem, however, is that several inhabitants have their permanent addresses somewhere else on the Estonian side even if they are living in Savienība in reality. These Estonian citizens prefer an Estonian address for several reasons, mainly to ease insurance and labour issues, and they have their post boxes on the Estonian side as well. At the moment of investigation there were thirty-five people living at Savienība in nine houses. Of the thirty-five, twenty-six were Estonian citizens, seven Latvian citizens and two so-called non-citizens. From the group of seven Latvians two have Estonian origin and they have taken Latvian citizenship to make life easier, even if they still consider themselves as Estonians by nationality. The two non-citizens, with ethnic Russian origin, also consider themselves as Estonians as they have lived in Valga all their lives. The average age of the Savienība population is relatively high, and no school children belong to the group. The main reason for the inhabitants of Savienība to cross the boundary is for working purposes. Most of the Estonians have their place of work on the Estonian side Other problems for the Savienība Estonians are electricity, telephone, road maintenance and emergency healthcare. Electricity comes from the Estonian side as before, but the Latvian authorities want to change the distribution to the Latvian side. As the price of electricity is much lower in Estonia the Savienība population does not want such a change. The telephone system is Latvian, and this has made all Estonians choose not to have telephones at all, as they would have to make international calls every time they wanted to call somebody on the Estonian side. Road maintenance is conspicuous

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by its absence. Neither the Estonian or Latvian authorities are maintaining the road. If any of the Estonians at Savienība need emergency treatment from their hospital, which is situated in Valga, it might be very difficult to pass the boundary quickly enough. The same problem might occur if a doctor from Valga has to go to Valka for a house-call. The ownership of land is also an uncertain issue. It is unclear who owns the land and the houses in Savienība. Legal title to the land belongs to a Latvian citizen who left Valka a long time ago. If the owner of the land would like to sell it another problem would arise. According to Latvian law a foreigner is not allowed to own land closer than two kilometres from the Latvian boundary. This means that the Estonians in Savienība will never be able to own the land where they are living, only the house. Some of the Estonians at Savienība have reluctantly thought of selling their houses and moving over to Valga but this area is a periphery in Valka and it seems that no Latvians want to move to this ‘problem-area’. The territory of Savienība, just 2,6 acres, seems to represent an insoluble problem. The deputy mayor of Valga is being bold enough to suggest two possible solutions. The first one suggests that Latvia will offer the territory of Savienība to Estonia. It could be seen as a payment of the debt of the about 20 acres that Latvia owes Estonia after the new boundary was delineated in 1995. The deputy mayor admits, however, that this solution is not feasible at all. The second one suggests that a border-station will be erected at Savienība. This solution is more probable and would ease the situation for the inhabitants at Savienība a little, but would it be a true improvement? There are at least two committees with Estonian and Latvian participants working on boundary issues between the countries, one dealing with general issues, the other with the Valga/Valka situation. Both committees are set up at government level, not municipal, as boundary issues come under state responsibilities. Compared to other twin towns in Europe, Valga/Valka is even more unique because of a fairly clear division of ‘nationalities’ between the two majority populations, but with a large minority of ethnic Russians on both sides. With advice from the Haparanda/Tornio administrations, Valga and Valka have entered a programme of contacts and communication, aiming at easing the living conditions at and across the boundary. The reports indicate several difficulties, however. In most cases, local intentions clash with state legislation and with policies for the ‘estonification’ or ‘latvification’ of each country: The Savienība case illustrates how extremely difficult a seemingly simple case can become. To most inhabitants of the towns, the boundary seems to be of little hindrance as they see very few opportunities on the other side. The ethnic

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Russians and other Russian-speakers seem to be the only group that really has a contact network across the boundary. Conclusions Even if two neighbouring municipalities separated by a state boundary want to and can legally co-operate, they often find that their legal competences differ so much that other hierarchy levels must be involved. This is the case in relations between Estonia and Latvia but also between Finland and Sweden, culturally similar and both members of the European Union. In the case of Narva and Ivangorod, the obstacles are so great that co-operation is practically impossible, in spite of a common local language and a common history—or perhaps just because of that. In the double dichotomy, the state-to-state relation differs from, in Haparanda-Tornio, friendly and mostly unproblematic relations (with minor obstacles caused by hierarchical asymmetries) to the Narva-Ivangorod case of restrained state-to-state relations in spite of an ethnically homogeneous population. The Valga-Valka case represents a case of friendly but rather cool relations between two nationalizing states, while the autochtonous populations is divided into their respective “nation states” while the Russian-speaking minority population once forming one local “ethnic community” is increasingly divided into each territorial homeland.

chapter 11

Scenario for the New Town of Gorizia/Gorica Alberto Gasparini

Introduction

This chapter deals with border twin towns, that is to say towns which would be one if it were not for the presence of a state border between them. They belong to a special type of town in that they have characteristics in addition to those of “normal” towns, characteristics which emphasise their specificity. They appear to be more heterogeneous than other towns: in terms of the social groups living in them—especially those composed of state agencies (border police and their families); ethnic complexity; linguistic complexity; economic complexity; and in many cases the radicalisation of these features (both when a consensual synthesis is found and when differences remain and lead to conflict). The case examined is that of Gorizia and Nova Gorica, whose configuration is a product of the border as it stands. When it was established by the victorious powers after the Second World War, Yugoslavia was assigned some eastern quarters of the Italian Gorizia (Salcano, San Pietro, Vrtojba), and within them plans were drawn up and implemented for the construction (in 1947) of a new Gorizia, which became Nova Gorica. As its name implies, this town was supposed to be a message and a dream of how things should be: socialist with the garden-city face of 19 and 20-century utopias (on the Ebenezer Howard model). After about 20 years these socialist and garden-city dreams began to pall, and on the other side there was resentment at the loss of the Italian part of the town and a sense of the superiority of old Gorizia. The feeling arose of a need to build active cooperation between the two towns and to achieve a form of union between them (differentiated integration, rather than a normal town like any other) even across a state border, though Italy and Slovenia both belong to the European Union, the Eurozone and the Schengen area. The chapter explores the possible future of this union of two towns through the method of scenario building. The preliminary phase considers the basic values of the “new town”, feelings of belonging to the two towns and the newlyexplored one, and an assessment of elements working in favour of and against the achievement of the goal of a new town. Consideration is given to the various forms of possible interpenetration between the towns, followed by a review of the prospects for what are now Gorizia and Nova Gorica becoming © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004272859_013

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a new town, to be called Gorizia/Gorica or Isonzopoli/Sočepolis. To this end predictive scenarios are constructed (present, after 5 years, 10 years and 15 years) based on three hypotheses of relations between the two current towns: that they remain separate, that they develop some degree of differentiated integration, that they join to become a new and “normal” town, that is the same as both their previous forms except for the constraints that may derive from the continued existence of a border between two sovereign states, despite its disactivation. Lastly, consideration is given to six possible final scenarios (at 2030), comprising an impossible new town, an over-ambitious scenario, an absolute negative scenario, a relative new town, a realistic block scenario, and an optimum new town. The probability of each scenario is assessed, as is their applicability to other twin towns.

Twin Towns Which Tend to Become Joint Towns

A twin town is a border town in which the border is a division but is also a factor which strengthens its identity. Twin towns on borders experience the border in their daily lives with its advantages and disadvantages great and small, with kinship relations and friendships which cross the border, with relationship networks involving the structure and organisation of economic life (cross-border joint ventures, amalgamations and business co-optations) and the individual and informal sphere of cross-border shopping, holidays and commuting to work. These factors amount to an interpenetration, something which is stronger in some relational areas and weaker in others. The more one of the towns, or both of them, develops to exploit the opportunities offered by the other, the more marked that interpenetration is. In such a case interpenetration (deriving from structural complementarity) clearly produces the enfeoffment of one town by the other. By contrast, it represents symmetrical development1 if interpenetration is the result of a desire to create unity between the two towns to be used towards the outside (interpenetration from atomistic complementarity). In other words there arises a differentiated integration2 for each sector—financial, commercial, associative, recreational, cultural and political.

1  “Symmetrical development” is not meant to mean egalitarian reciprocity, but a common interest in pursuing shared developmental objectives. 2  On differentiated integration see the first chapter of this volume, in the section “The ‘positive face’ of borders and walls. Peace in fusion, peace in separation”.

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In these relations the intermediaries, at various times well accepted or rejected, are the ethnic minorities always found in border areas. Below is a brief consideration of these characteristics, which in certain sectors tend to keep the two towns apart and in others configure them as a joint town, producing variable interpenetrations in terms of intensity and symmetry/asymmetry between the two. 1) The existence of juridical reciprocity produces intense and symmetrical interpenetration because it provides the same opportunities of expansion to each set of citizens. Common access to property and all other opportunities produces symmetrical conditions of interconnection to the two towns. In the opposite case, that is when such legal freedoms are present in only one of the towns, the result may be the Italianisation, Slavification, Germanification or Americanisation of that town, the maintenance of homogeneity in the other and the expansion of the latter into the former. 2) The degree of socio-economic development of the two towns produces different types of interpenetration. In the case of homogeneous development the relationship between the two rests on the atomisation of individual interpenetrations, so the advantages are greatly enhanced by the spatial proximity in which the companies, shops, or people in question find themselves. In the absence of such socio-economic equilibrium, that is when one town is rich and the other poor, interpenetration is also favoured by opportunities on the basis of the complementarity of development, but that reproduces the enfeoffment of one town by the other and the formation of a majority elite in one town and a minority elite, smaller numerically but not in terms of power, in the other. 3) The case of the national culture of a medium-large state dominant in one town alongside the local or even national culture of a small state in the other may also result in an unbalanced interpenetration in favour of the former town, which expands disproportionately to its demographic weight into the other in terms of the language spoken to non-compatriots and in the influence of the mass media, especially television. 4) Twin towns may be formed in at least three situations: (a) the border follows a natural separation, such as a river or a lake. The two towns pre-date the border, having developed in the first place to exploit the favourable conditions for trade provided by the river. In this case interpenetration accumulates, or partly replaces, common functions such as being the gateway to two states. Their dimensions are not greatly altered, but an intelligent system of exploiting synergies with respect to the outside may enhance the importance of the two towns; (b) the border runs outside an existing town and around the customs services and crossing-point generates a settlement which, though

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it may remain small, takes on the features of a town near its original bigger neighbour. In this case the imbalance between the towns follows the direction of interpenetration, because the small town will be attracted by, and be the object of, the services and opportunities of the larger one; the smaller town, however, may take on specific characteristics which make it indispensable3 to its bigger neighbour; (c) a border may be drawn inside a town to emphasise a division and non-communicability which may be political (the Berlin Wall) or ethnic (Gorizia) in character, though a state may continue to use some services offered by the pre-existing, now foreign, town. In such cases the border, which should be experienced as a traumatic imposition, in fact generates interpenetration due to the needs of everyday life and the small-scale exchanges of the retail trade. In these three conditions, even though the borders have arisen in different ways, interpenetrations are produced which indicate the overcoming of differences and the existence of crucibles of collaboration, even under extreme circumstances. 5) In the interpenetration between the twin border towns the role of the minority, and its relationship with the majority, is a very active one in that it strengthens the factor of contact with the Other on which the town is founded. If the interpenetration is to be real and strengthened by the minority it is essential that: (a) ethnic differences be prevalently cultural and not correspond to economic and social differences; (b) there be reciprocal minorities in each of the two towns (the majority in one town has its own minority in the other, and vice versa); (c) the security and prosperity of each of the minorities be based more on openness to the outside than on closure within itself. 6) The age of the town may also favour interpenetration between the twin towns. The older town is a container of symbols, buildings and community history which may attract and generate feelings of belonging even in those living beyond the border. In this case there is an attraction that reinforces integration between the towns. This does not mean that the newer town loses its identity, because a set of stereotyped perceptions of the inhabitants of the older one 3  The labels large and small are of course referred to the time when the two towns unite, but subsequent relations may lead to a modification of their relative sizes. At the moment most twin towns are composed of a small town and a big one: this is true of Mexican-American towns as well as European twin towns, as shown in Schultz’s research (2009:164–165). In 73.3% of cases a town with a large population is twinned with a small one: these include Strasbourg (273,000 inhabitants) and Kehl (34,700), Ruse (169,800) and Giurgiu (74,200), Brest (285,000) and Terespol (6,000). In the remaining 26.7% of cases the populations of the twinned towns are relatively well balanced.

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contrasts the liveliness of the new-towners with the “phlegmatic somnolence” of the old-towners.4 What is generated in twin towns is a process of disintegration and reconstruction of integration—starting from two substantially and separately integrated towns, a new type of integration develops and affects the two towns together, and this common integration forms a joint town. The passage from the integration of the twin towns (the first stage of interpenetration) to the integration of the joint town (the final stage of interpenetration, which becomes a fusion sui generis) takes place through a long process in which the integration inside each town is gradually loosened to make way for an integration by sectors of the various spheres of everyday life: cultural, recreational, educational, economic, political and so forth. In this second stage, integration is differentiated by sectors functioning on both sides of the border, becoming stronger than that existing within each town, which is steadily reduced to a symbolic level. This differentiated integration process continues until it produces, sooner or later, what is identified above as integration into a joint town.5

Twin Towns—A Widespread Phenomenon

Thus far twin towns have been described in terms of the close cooperation between them, since this is essential for their very existence. The daily life of the local social classes, their practical interests and culture, is closely combined with international politics and state sovereignty, in that the sovereignty of the two states in these cross-border areas is combined with a sort of supranational sovereignty. It was no accident that the participants in an international 4  “Phlegmatic somnolence” is a metaphor visible in most towns which are the older of the twins, Gorizia included. Typical of an older town, the metaphor is built around a sense of superiority developed around it, long-standing habits, a tendency to absorb suburban novelties, its ability to reinforce urban identity, its role as a container of old architecture and the seat of institutions (educational, cultural, religious, etc.), its role as a centre of competition between the two towns (in this case between capitalism and socialism, long-standing membership of the European Union and newcomer status, and so on). Phlegmatic somnolence often comes to the older town as a result of resting on past laurels and expecting others to step forward rather than reaching out to them. 5  Differentiated integration leads (or rather, may lead) to a “joint town”, bearing in mind that their commonality is conditioned by constraints of sovereignty and competition. In actual fact it is always a process that can yield the expected theoretical result. Cooperation is always intense, always takes on different forms and is widespread.

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conference held in Gorizia in 1994 drafted and approved the “Gorizia Charter”, which accorded European border towns a special status (1999/2000).6 This is why the word diplomacy is used with increasing frequency when relations are established between twin towns. In the first part of this volume, the section devoted to cross-border cooperation refers to the “positive face” of borders and walls. Here further emphasis is placed on cross-border twin towns as a worldwide phenomenon, since the world is made up of states and their borders. In places where there are border towns state sovereignty takes on connotations which are different from the obvious one of the state’s internal sovereignty. These towns are the sites of the negotiation and signing of exceptions to the rules of sovereignty and their application to promote cooperation and achieve an effective copenetration of the twin towns. Twin towns are found on all land borders on all continents, and are of a great many demographic sizes. They range from metropolitan areas such as Tijuana-San Diego, Nuevo Laredo-Laredo and Cuidad Juárez-El Paso to 6  The text of the “Gorizia Charter” (1999–2000:9) is as follows: “The representatives of the European border towns and scholars who study the problems and opportunities offered by these territorial situations, having met in Gorizia for the International Conference “Borders in towns—Towns without borders”, sponsored jointly by the University of Trieste, the Italian Association for the Council of Communes and Regions of Europe (AICCRE) and the Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia (ISIG), BEING CONVINCED that borders must increasingly become, not barriers, but real and veritable centres of cooperation, not only in actuality, but also in an appropriate legal and institutional form (regarding social, cultural and school life, as well as the economic and business sector, communications and transport systems, and the safeguarding of environmental resources), and not only in their already existing horizontal dimension, but also in their tendency to support the effort to build a new Europe. AFFIRM THAT: 1) the role of border towns is basic to the present geopolitical situation in Europe, because they are a laboratory for trying out and experimenting with forms of cooperation between very different cultural, ethnic, state, economic and administrative situations; 2) the political, economic, social and cultural integration of Europe presupposes a balance between the awareness of belonging to a common civilization with a common destiny and participating in the same large political design, and the enhancement of the specific identities of the autochthonous cultures of different peoples; 3) the vaster sensitivity to the need for co-existence imposed by changed conditions in the society and economy of Europe and the entire world must be kept in mind; such new conditions cause large movements of people and, consequently, the acceptance and knowledge of cultures that are even foreign to the traditions of each country. For these reasons IT IS REQUESTED that the border towns be given a recognized, special “status”, in order to encourage maximum cooperation and the finding of adequate solutions to the needs of border communities. Gorizia, 10 September 1994”.

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the medium-sized pairs still prevalent on the Mexican-US border (such as Matamoros-Brownsville and Reinosa-McAllen (D’Antonio and Form 1965; Sloan and West 1976:451–474, and 1977:270–282; Tocups 1980:619–644; Hall 1985:223–229; Russell 1987; Cutler 1991:44–57; Romo 2005)). An emblematic South American case is Ciudad del Este-Foz do Iguaçu (Paraguay-Brazil) (see another example in Parkin 1986:55–61), which have over half a million inhabitants between them. Most of Europe’s cross-border twin towns are small to medium-sized. Helga Schultz of the Viadrina University in Frankfurt am Oder has carried out a survey on European twin towns (2009:157–166) for the Council of Europe. Of the 60 cross-border twin towns she identified, 40% are in central Europe (of which a third are on German borders), 26.7% are in north-eastern Europe (of which 31.3% are on Poland’s borders) and 18.3% are in south-eastern Europe (of which 27.7% are on Romania’s borders). The average population of the larger twin town is 55,780 and the average population of the smaller one is 20,640. Eighty per cent of Europe’s twin towns are separated by a river. Ten per cent (6 in number) have been twin towns since the Middle Ages: Buchs-Schaan/ Vaduz (Switzerland-Liechtenstein), Irun/Hondarribia-Hendaye (Spain-France) and Tui-Valença (Portugal-Spain); 53% (32) have been twin towns since the end of the First World War. Institutional agreements have been signed to make cooperation between twin towns more effective and long-lasting. Schultz writes, “We can observe three steps or levels of institutionalization. The first is project-cooperation, for instance a common water plant, common using of indoor swimming pools or concert halls, or cooperation in a special branch of health care. This early step claimed, “Simply to save money” for the best of the citizens. This rather spontaneous mutuality dominated at the internal borders of the European Community during the seventies and eighties. The second level is an agreement for permanent cooperation with meetings of mayors and councils, and committees for all relevant fields. Meanwhile all twin towns on the internal EU-borders, old and new, reached this level. Then the twin towns feel a new barrier, grown by the institutionalization itself. To get finances by the European Union needs high efforts, and became harder. Elaboration of projects takes a lot of money and work force. All twin cities except Haparanda and Tornio complain about this. The third level is the joined twin city. There the twins establish not only permanent commissions and continuous meetings, they arrange also a common body of public right beyond the both municipalities. The joint body has to be equipped with the competences, and legitimated in a democratic way. Nicole Ehlers, who investigated the “binational city Eurode” (Kerkrade-Herzogenrath) as a prototype, gives the definition: “A binational city is a pair of neighbouring border towns whose local authorities aim

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at achieving the economic, political-administrative and cultural integration of both towns” (2007:52). She describes the establishment of Eurode, rooted in the everyday problems of cooperation caused by different law and governance. “Like a millstone” clasped the national legislations around the neck of the twin cities. The joint body seemed the solution, acting in the framework of both states (Ibid.:16). For the same reason, the Basque cities Irún, Hondarribia, and Hendaye established their consortium, against resistance from Paris and based on Spain public law (Grünert 2005:182–195). The binational city seems not only the way, to overcome the difficulties of national legislation; she is also a vision of integration, as the definition says. The Provincia Bothniensis came on this way to the planning of a new common city centre “På gränsen-Rajalla” (Höhn 2005:52–55). So the unified town became reality” (162–163). Such details from Schultz’s survey serve as a useful background for a description of such towns (see also Pantaleo 2006). The literature on the dimensions of cooperation is very broad because each pair of towns develops its own trajectory of combination where local everyday life (the population) and the everyday life of the state (public institutions and their staff) meet, confront each other and are fused in something which is unique and original. In addition to institutional agreements, each pair thus develops its own research institutes, universities, journals, newspapers, and cultural institutions which produce culture, professional expertise, planning and problem-solving techniques designed to bring the two towns closer together. Among the complex bibliography on the subject, mention should be made of the following. Training institutions for cross-border cooperation have been surveyed by Paolo Pasi (2004), and a guide for cooperation has been produced by Françoise Schneider (2007) and Nicolas Levrat (2007), ISIG (Gasparini and Del Bianco, 2010). On the many instances of cross-border cooperation, see John Sloan and Jonathan West (1976, 1977), Nora Maija Tocups (1980), J. W. House (1980:456–477), Linda Hall (1985), Thomas Parkin (1986), James Russell (1987), Blayne Cutler (1991), Nadio Delai and Mauro Marcantoni (1992), Bruno Luverà (1996), György Ėger and Josef Langer (1996), Gianfranco Battisti (2002), István Süli-Zakar (2008). Of major significance as a vehicle for the international dissemination of such contributions are the journals dealing with cross-border themes. The principal publications include: “Documents d’Analisi Geografica”, founded in in 1982 by the Autonomous Universities of Barcelona and Gerona; “Journal of Borderlands Studies”, founded in 1986 by the Association for Borderlands Studies; “ISIG Journal”, founded in 1991 by the International Sociology Institute of Gorizia; “Eurolimes”, founded in 2006 by the Universities of Oradea and Debrecen; “IUIES Journal”, founded in 2007 by the International University Institute for European Studies.

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Gorizia, Nova Gorica: Birth, Life, Cross-Border Cooperation

The history of the two towns is very different, and in what little relational life they initially had the Iron Curtain determined the wall between them, and it was a very hard one until the 1950s. Then as the years went by the ideological force of the wall lost its grip because people could see that the radiant future promised by socialism was not materialising. In the 1960s the two towns thus began to cooperate, not only on urgent questions (such as the water of the Isonzo river and the pollution of streams running through both towns), but on “optional” matters such as the economy, culture, language, sport and mutual respect. With the fall of the Communist regimes in the Soviet bloc, the role of the Italian and western Gorizia in the first line of defence against a postulated Soviet invasion (which had led Italy to station most of its conscript army on this eastern land border) disappeared, leaving the way clear for crossborder cooperation and turning Gorizia and Nova Gorica from “state” towns to “regional” towns. It was thus that the border became less of a line and more of an area. This new role also compelled the two towns to devise new functions for themselves (no longer military), which required an increasing level of cooperation. Such policies obtained the support of the European Union, which financed Euroregion and EGTC (European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation) projects. Thus far the focus has been on relations, which has led to an emphasis on how future cooperation between the two towns may need future scenarios to promote new forms of acting together—to the extent of postulating the formation of a new town, albeit with specific features. At this point it would be useful to provide further information on their historical development. The first known mention of the old town of Gorizia is in a document, dated 1001, concerning the donation of lands, villas and vineyards by Holy Roman Emperor Otto III (Tavano 1994:25–38). By this time Gorizia was already a town, extending from its hilltop castle down towards the nearby plain. It then became a county, given by the Emperor to Werner count of Friuli and then to the Eppenstein dynasty, along with the county of Tyrol. The town of Gorizia grew into a community composed of Slovenes (mostly peasants), Friuliani (artisans), Italians (merchant class and administrative elite) and Germans (military elite representing the central power). The county was in perennial contrast with the theocratic state of the Patriarchate of Aquileia. In 1500 the last dynasty of counts died out with demise of Leonardo, and Emperor Maximilian I became the new Count of Gorizia (De Vitis Piemonti and Spanghero 1997). Until its incorporation into the Kingdom of Italy, in the subsequent centuries

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Gorizia was known as a peaceful, pleasant location for imperial dignitaries to spend their twilight years (they called it the Nice of Austria), a place of rest for wandering celebrities (such as Giacomo Casanova and Lorenzo da Ponte), a supplier of sculptors, architects and faithful high-ranking servants of the Habsburg state, and a refuge for deposed French monarchs and their Bourbon families (Charles X and the pretender Henri, Count of Chambord) (Bader 1993). This period ended with the First World War, after which the town and its surrounding territory were annexed to Italy. In the inter-war years Italy did nothing to understand an area which had been the scene of twelve battles. It arrogantly imposed self-serving Italian nationalism on the Slovenes, who lived in most of the territory administered by Gorizia Town Council. At the end of the Second World War, with a defeated Italy and a victorious Yugoslavia, the question of Gorizia’s future was posed in the following terms: Yugoslavia wanted the town of Gorizia (as well as Trieste) and its province. Italy and the western Allies were obviously against the idea. A negotiated settlement left most of the town (and Trieste) to Italy, while its Slovene-majority eastern districts (Salcano, San Pietro and Vrtojba) and the entire eastern part of the province (Figure 11.1) (making up most of it) went to Yugoslavia. It was through Gorizia that the border was drawn and the Communist Iron Curtain rose (Figure 11.2). In its eastern districts the Yugoslavs drew up plans for Nova Gorica, built in 1947. The centre for its services was hard by the border, on the other side of which were the cemeteries of Italian Gorizia. Nova Gorica stood as a symbol of socialist planning, a future society planted there as if to remind Italy of what it had stolen from Yugoslavia, to show what a Nova Gorica could teach the Stara (old) Gorica on the Italian side (Figure 11.3). Those dreams of the future faded as time passed, leaving a growing perception of the need for collaboration between the two towns, which developed the idea of becoming (or returning as) one. Then in 1991 the break-up of Yugoslavia produced an independent Slovenia, which joined the European Union in 2004 (Figures 11.4, 11.5 and 11.6), the Eurozone January 2007 and the Schengen area in December of the same year. These external developments strengthened the cooperation between Gorizia and Nova Gorica which had begun in the 1960s, though they also diminished their respective roles: neither was now of any significance for the defence of the state. It can thus be stated that cooperation between the towns has a long history, with many advocates and consolidated achievements. It has given rise to a particular sensitivity among a number of intellectuals (historians, geographers, sociologists, politicians, economists and elite figures) locally and further

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FIGURE 11.1

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Map of Gorizia and Nova Gorica divided by the border. Source: Planning Office, Gorizia Town Council (geometra Giorgio Rossi). Adapted by architect Luisa Codellia, Gorizia.

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FIGURE 11.2

American soldiers mark off the new border between Italy and Yogoslavia at Gorizia, 1947. Source: Foto Edvigio and Arduino Altran, Gorizia.

FIGURE 11.3

Red star surmounting Nova Gorica railway station on the far side of the border fence. On this side, Italy. Source: Ed Foto G. Lazzaro, Gorizia. Roberto Ballaben Collection, Gorizia. Photograph from a 1960s postcard.

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FIGURE 11.4

Demolition of the boundary stone of the fence between Gorizia and Nova Gorica. Source: Photo by Pierluigi Bumbaca Fotografo (SIAE 2016), Gorizia, www.bumbacafoto.it, www.foto360bumbaca.it.

FIGURE 11.5

The mayors and the people of Gorizia and Nova Gorica toast in the occasion of the fence fall. Source: Photo by Pierluigi Bumbaca Fotografo (SIAE 2016), Gorizia, , www.foto360bumbaca.it.

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FIGURE 11.6

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April 30, 2004. Celebration for the fall of the ‘wall’ of Gorizia outside the railway station in the area formerly divided by a fence; it is now a common square. (Note: Local newspaper “Il Piccolo”, under the headline. The event fills the front page of “The wall of Gorizia falls, the new Europe is born”). Source: “Il Piccolo”, Trieste, May 1st 2004.

afield.7 These intellectuals and other authors have found a voice in journals— popular local publications and international academic journals alike—which have developed and maintained discussions and planning for cross-border cooperation. These include “Studi Goriziani” (founded in 1923), “Iniziativa Isontina” (founded in 1959), “Voce Isontina” (founded in 1964), “Isonzo/ Soča” (in Italian and Slovene, founded in 1989), “ISIG Journal” (in Italian and English, founded in 1991) and “IUIES Journal” (Italian and English, founded in 2007). The newspapers are “Il Piccolo” (Trieste-based Italian paper with a

7  See Gubert 1972; Strassoldo 1973; Valussi 1972/2000; Bergnach and Stranj 1989; Calligaris 1992; Angelillo Al., Angelillo An. and Menato 1994; Scarano 1994; Prestamburgo 1995; Martina and Strukelj 1997; Gasparini and Zago 1998; Zago 2000; Leontidou 2001; Cressati 2006; Gasparini 2010.

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FIGURE 11.7

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The new square in front of the railway station, now bereft of its red star. Source: “Isonzo/Soča”, no. 104, 2014:7.

Gorizia edition, founded in 1881), “Primorski Dnevnik” (Trieste-based Slovene paper with a Gorizia edition, founded in 1945) and “Il Messaggero Veneto. Giornale del Friuli” (Udine-based Italian paper with a Gorizia edition, founded in 1946). Cooperation between the two towns has resulted in intense urban planning, but above all social activities involving institutions, services and cultural initiatives, often financed by European and regional funds; these have made an important short-term contribution and the local populations hope that they will be consolidated as basic strategic resources. The most significant planning schemes include: EGTC (2011), Euradria Euroregion (Gasparini 2000b) later Eurego (Gasparini and Del Bianco 2005), urban planning (Angelillo 2002:11–205; Angelillo An., Angelillo Al. and Menato 1998:287–299), twin towns future simulation (Rizzi and Zago 1998b:57–76), an international development model for economic future (Gasparini 1998a:85–108), a line linking the two towns (VV. AA. 2001b), Gorizia-Nova Gorica as a possible virtual telematic community (Bregantini and Zago 1998:77–83), a cross-border international university (Gasparini 2001b), an international university consortium for European studies (IUIES 2014: web-site), inter-town bilingualism (Roseano and Novak Lukanović 2010:272–286), European economic projects (London School of Economics 2000) (Figure 11.7). The intensity of the cross-border cooperation between Gorizia and Nova Gorica has led their inhabitants to call the towns a “laboratory”; in a similar vein, a congress organised in 1997 by ISIG in Gorizia and the University of

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Trieste, held in Gorizia, was entitled “This side and that side of the border. Same sun, same plans for the future” (Figure 11.8). It is in this cooperative context that we place the scenarios for a future Gorizia and Nova Gorica—separate, partially united and completely united. The good and not-so-good practices of cooperating European twin towns have been discussed in the first chapter of this volume.8 This chapter deals with the possible futures that Gorizia and Nova Gorica can build for themselves. Whether it will be for ever, we cannot tell, but a great deal will certainly depend on them. A lot of creativity will be needed to build such a future, and more again to manage and conserve it.

Postulating the Scenario for Gorizia-Nova Gorica

In the interests of applying the twin-town dynamics discussed above to Gorizia and Nova Gorica, there follows a hypothetical plan for a town and a quality of life congruent with a number of basic values. What is meant by basic values for planning, quality of life, and even planning itself? The basic values comprise a number of conceptual pairings that serve to define a town, such as homogeneity/heterogeneity, isolation/contact, peripheral/central, confrontation/co-existence and closure/openness.9 The quality of urban life is a judgement (negative or positive) on the spatial and social organisation of the above-mentioned urban values and the current organisation of society—the greater the distance between expectations and experience, the lower the quality of urban life (Gasparini, De Marco & Costa 1988). The planning of quality of life indicates action designed to improve the quality of life, that is to say to reduce the distance between the reality expected and the reality experienced. What follows is an exploration of whether and to what extent a common border town can produce integrative values between its two parts through planning that brings the real closer to the ideal, thus planning, as said above, an enhancement of the quality of life.

8  In the section “The ‘positive face’ of borders and walls. Peace in fusion, peace in separation” in the opening chapter of this volume. 9  This series of contrasting characteristics obviously represents the extremes of a number of continuums within which each of the two towns stands, especially the new towns.

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FIGURE 11.8

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The new square playing a role in daily life; the railway station is in the background. Source: Photo by Pierluigi Bumbaca Fotografo (SIAE 2016), Gorizia, www.bumbacafoto.it, www.foto360bumbaca.it.

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The Basic Values of the New Town10 The first step is to specify the basic values underpinning an exploration of the possibility of forming a single system made up of Gorizia and Nova Gorica. The values that justify greater integration between the two towns are: 1) co-existence as partial integration (active and passive): meant as the ability to value the specificity of cultural differences. This co-existence (and partial integration) is easier to achieve in everyday life. Active co-existence is also possible in leisure time, although differences in the respective institutional structures necessitate the greatest possible reduction of organisational asymmetries. The biggest difficulties are to be found in political participation, given the differences between the institutional, party and socio-political systems to which Gorizia and Nova Gorica belong; 2) mutual enrichment: a dimension naturally connected to co-existence, but which shifts the focus to the results of co-existence with those who are different. These results are interpreted as positive, in that they represent a tendency towards contact, to knowing something new, which means viewing the question of security in terms of contact and exchange with what is outside one’s culture rather than in terms of withdrawal and closure within it. This is an enrichment, provided that priority is given to other values such as mutual awareness, the centrality of one’s town and, ultimately, creativity; 3) urban centrality: this places the town as a whole at the centre of the community, where the town (or city) is the highest expression of human creativity, the creation of “one’s own thing”—an artificial construct—which embraces and combines the heterogeneous, if not contrasting, elements of its social and individual life. In this sense the town is the most unnatural but also the most creative human element, since it entrusts security to contact with what is different rather than to the warmth of the homogeneous. In a border context, or at the global level of a city-state such as Singapore or the Principality of Monaco, the city is more of a city to the extent that it is able to capture and fix cultural diversity, and above all political and structural diversity, in its fundamental elements. There are other examples of a similar capacity to create urban centrality based on a marked social heterogeneity—in different ways, 19th-century Gorizia and Trieste may be cited as two of them. It is much more difficult to recompose this heterogeneity in a cosmopolitan dimension, with the additional component of the division between states and the attendant differences in political organisation. In this case a role may be played by some 10  A new urban entity formed by the unification of two existing towns, not a newly-built urban centre.

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FIGURE 11.9

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Gorizia. The future in the past. Source: Imagination of the future of Gorizia by A. Gabršček, Gorica, 1908, “Il porto dell’avenire presso Gorizia / Bodoča luka pro Gorici / Der Zukunftshafen bei Görz”.

favourable elements, which in Gorizia include the tradition of tolerance and of the co-existence of different social worlds and at a spatial level the symbolic significance of the old town centre, with its tradition of ethnic heterogeneity and (sometimes critical) co-existence; 4) community creativity: this is the value on which urban centrality may be built. Centrality implies creativity in that it creates an original culture which is different from each of those from which it derives: Italian and Slovene, in addition to Friulian in the case of Gorizia. Centrality may thus be constructed only by creatively overcoming the peripheral status (Figure 11.9) in which each part of the border town finds itself with respect to the central elements of its national system.11 11  When radical changes occur in a town’s functions, creativity always takes on an important role, be they new towns in the form of garden cities (Howard: Giordani 1972), American

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Characteristics of the New Town What sort of town establishes the four values discussed above? It is an urban system straddling a border with openness and closure in different combinations. Openness may be at the maximum when it concerns everyday life and a number of basic cultural values, some of which are mentioned above. It will be limited in the more specific functions of each town’s hinterland and in the general political functions related to the organisation of the state. In between is economic activity and activities generally connected to infrastructure and services. The result may be a town with differentiated integration. This real integration starts at grassroots level, which may be considered an indicator of the extent to which the above urban scenario values are shared and thus of the social and political consensus enjoyed by such an imagination. To become established, however, such differentiated integration must turn the basis of common initiatives from personalised and emotional relations into facts represented by the channels through which “by definition” flow the interests pursued by cultural, economic, leisure-time and administrative organisations. Under such circumstances it may be possible to establish the complex network of relations between organisations, given vigour by the people who believe in them and thus by the cultural values enjoying the consensus of the collectivity. This differentiated integration scenario is of course dynamic, firstly in that it entails continuing consensus and commitment to achieve it (it is only too clear that without such commitment the organisations’ traditional aims may continue to be achieved “on the quiet”), and secondly in that, even with popular consensus, the time needed for the translation of plans into reality varies according to the fields of interest: leisure time, culture, education, work, services, administration and so on.

(Logan 1994:111–130) or Russian (Mansurov and Barbakova 1994:131–141) new towns, or new towns in the third world (Oluwatudimu 1994:157–169) or cross-border twin towns which turn themselves into new towns or areas transformed into new cross-border areas. Creativity is also crucial in bestowing a new role on existing towns (Gasparini 1990:63– 91) through the adoption of new technologies (see, among others, Charles Landry (2000), Manuel Castells (2002), Richard Florida (2003), Saskia Sassen (2004:279–296), John Kasarda (2004:129–152), Giuseppe Dematteis (2006:107–120). The present writer (Gasparini 2000a) has highlighted that a city is stronger if it has two souls: a soul of specificity (produced by the sedimentation of residues of the past) and a soul of utopias and technological creativity. With the latter soul technological creativity (in a very broad sense) often provides the town with a new centrality.

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The Urban Scenario and Feelings of Belonging If such a new town is produced by a body of values, in turn it produces an essential result—a feeling of belonging (identity) to the town. What does belonging to the town mean? And to what town may the feeling apply? There are many dimensions to this belonging, and it is strengthened by the fact that they overlap. They stem from and are reinforced by the town’s history, personal histories, the density and intensity of social relations (Gasparini 2000a:224–229), the culture of tolerance between social and national groups, the town’s symbolic myths and, in our case, living with the idea and the circumstances of the border. The question of the meaning of belonging, or identity, requires further analysis and exploration. Considering that the construction of new identities is a long process, on the basis of the present situation or starting point, a hypothetical target has to be identified. It must also be taken into account that an individual may have a range, broad or narrow, of identities. Identities and feelings of belonging are also linked to various levels of territorial extension and/ or social groups—from a small scale (belonging to a village or quarter) to the largest (belonging to Europe or the European Union). Regarding Gorizia and Nova Gorica, it seems that there are individuals with a highly developed ethnic-national identity (Friulian, Slovene, Italian) and an identity bound to their town (either Gorizia or Nova Gorica); identities at other levels, if present, are irrelevant to this analysis, provided that they are not particularly strong or exclusive. Three hypotheses, or future possibilities, may be formulated in this regard. If the situation undergoes no substantial changes, there may be said to be a low level of integration. Weak and slow improvement in cooperation between the towns would constitute one of the conditions for maintaining the status quo in terms of identity. There would continue to be two separate urban identities, and underpinning their separateness would be the border and the two different ethnic-national identities. In the event of perfect integration—total or complete, that is to say the transformation of the new town into a no-man’s-land or a town open to the two state systems—it may be postulated that feelings of belonging to the new town take on fundamental and founding importance as ethnic belonging becomes secondary. There would be a single urban identity and the ethnic-national identities would probably fade or disappear. Probably more practicable and stimulating, though by no means free of obstacles, is the path to differentiated integration, which would be characterised by the broad co-existence of three feelings of belonging or levels of

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identity: 1) one relating to the new town (Gorizia and Nova Gorica together); 2) one relating to the ethnic-national group, which is the bond with the wider national community; 3) one relating to one of the two towns, provided that it does not conflict with the new identity. Each of these identities may become pre-eminent at one time or another, but always in the context of the overarching value of the centrality of an urbanism in which the high value of coexistence should provide a positive resolution to the sort of situation which ethnic-national belonging left to itself might push towards separation and fracture. Elements Which Obstruct and Elements Favourable to the Creation of the New Town Is it possible to achieve the scenario of an urban system straddling a border, in this case Gorizia-Nova Gorica? If it is, how much time is required? If it is not, is that due to the length of time required and/or that the time is not yet ripe? These questions cannot be answered in such a short paper, which has the purpose of exploring a possible scenario. The discussion here is thus confined to certain factors which obstruct the creation of a new town and others which are favourable to it. The obstructing factors include the logic behind the establishment of the border in the first place—nationality, the historical memory accumulated in the last fifty years, the responses to crises internal and external (to Gorizia and Nova Gorica), and above all language. The favourable factors may be said to include the crisis of the nationalist nation-state, the recovery of the idea of regionalism going beyond national borders (Mitteleuropa, Alpe-Adria, Euroregions), the experience of co-existence deposited in a centuries-old historical memory, projection towards the international and global dimensions of regionalism, the existence of an old town centre symbolising a co-existence going back over a thousand years (Gorizia), the existence of a new town that reflects some ideas of modern man with a new relationship with nature (Nova Gorica); and last, but by no means least, the specific factors “uniting” the two towns, such as the political border, which is still there. There now follows a brief analysis of each of these elements.

Factors Which Obstruct the New Town 1) The reason for the establishment of the border following the end of the Second World War was the division of the Italian ethnic element from its Slovene counterpart. Apart from its functional significance (resolving ethnic friction with the separation of two potential adversaries in separate zones), this logic

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separated those who were different, thereby strengthening the experience of cultural homogeneity and weakening interest in the comprehension of other cultures. Both factors stand as obstacles to the construction of the new town, despite the two towns’ increasing dependence on national and international events that are not controllable at a localistic level. 2) Followers of the nationalist tradition, which reached its peak in the 19 and early 20 century, with its over-simplification of culture and local culture in particular, devoted their energy to the construction of self-sufficient border settlements rather than complementary ones. But faced with a burgeoning cosmopolitanism, often cultivated under an English-speaking cultural umbrella, nationalist forces are losing vigour and operational effectiveness. 3) Since the Second World War historical memory, characterised by separation, indifference and even an underlying ethnic hatred, has stood as a serious obstacle to the construction of a new town. It is a historical memory that draws life and energy from a series of tragic episodes, including attempts at denationalisation, military and political occupation and coercive policies used to change social and political systems. Only since the 1990s have they begun to be forgotten and has the idea developed that present-day Italians and Slovenes (and their political ideas) are different from those of the terrible times in which those events occurred. 4) Responses to crises between different state and urban systems have been extremely complex, in general producing a deleterious effect on relations between the two urban entities. Crises can obviously be external or internal to the towns: external when they stem from relations between national or international systems and are visited upon the two local communities; internal when they penetrate and involve the fabric of the two towns. It goes without saying that the origins of crises here defined as internal may actually lie outside the two communities. The external crisis during the Yugoslav period could be traced first of all to relations between Rome and Belgrade. Its local impact had irrational, even severely disruptive, consequences for relations between the two towns: thoroughgoing checks at border crossings, bans or strict limits on the passage of certain goods, etc. Such effects did not generally last very long, and were often less harmful to personal relations than trade relations, certain sectors of which were put under severe pressure. It should also be pointed out that such external “contingent” crises were relatively easy to deal with, since they were susceptible to the intervention of local forces of national standing (a regional government, the government of a federal republic, national parliamentarians from the region), to cushion or dilute the effects of economic, political or military closure.

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With the foundation of the Republic of Slovenia, its accession to the European Union and entry into the Schengen Area and the Eurozone, the terms of such external crises have changed. They now take the more underground form of resistance to the centralist interpretation of national sovereignty conserved and manifested by states in their reluctance to make concessions to local autonomy and cross-border cooperation. One example is the long time taken by Rome to recognise the towns’ status as a European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC). But another external source of crisis is brought by the culture of globalisation, particularly among the young people in both towns; they do not see cooperation as a value to be pursued across the local border but rather with international centres such as New York, Brussels, London, Paris, Rome, Milan and Moscow, or even Ljubljana and countries in the Third and Fourth World. Such external crises are less tangible but no less of a hindrance to the formation of a new town originating in Gorizia and Nova Gorica. Internal crises are more insidious, since they tend to be structural in character and thus make creativity less effective, less complementary and less able to contribute to the a sense of unity for the new town. Nova Gorica is suffering from economic problems stemming from changes in the political system, which have led to a fall in living standards and a widening gap in comparison with those in Gorizia. The Italian side is affected by demographic decline and an ageing population, which reflect an inability to attract wealth and vitality from outside. On both sides there is evidence of a structural crisis in the loosening of kinship ties between the two, and above all in the early obsolescence of services not being used to the full or which are poor in quality because of the need to provide a separate service for each town. 5) There can be no doubt that one of the obstacles to the creation of a new town, one immediately perceptible in everyday life, is language (Council of Europe 1992). Apart from those involved in direct contact between Italians and Slovenes (in shops, petrol stations, etc.) the two towns find it difficult to communicate. This may stand as a formidable obstacle to the differentiated integration outlined above. It can only be overcome by embracing the abovementioned values (co-existence, enrichment, centrality, creativity) to break down nationalistic barriers and converting those values into political will. The best way to bring the two sides together will be through education, and the young generations will be those best able to absorb the value of learning both languages. In overcoming this particular obstacle a crucial role is obviously played by the time factor (in this case spanning generations); indeed the entire integration process of the new town is dominated by the time factor, sometimes in complex sequences.

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Factors in Favour of the New Town 1) The crisis of the nation-state and nationalism has been developing since the Second World War in the wake of the decline of the countries which most emphatically propounded and supported the idea, especially by force of arms. Italy’s history and culture have been characterised by feelings of loyalty and belonging which were markedly localistic and subsequently regional in nature. The crisis of nationalism has radiated from the centre of the state system and from the regions at its periphery, including the areas and regions of more recent acquisition (such as Venezia Giulia). 2) The crisis of the centralised and defensive national culture is clearly also the result of an underlying emergence (or re-emergence) of the idea of the region and feelings of belonging to it. It has already been mentioned that the truest Italian loyalty is to the region since it stands as the oldest political entity (county, duchy or dogate, viceroyalty, kingdom, etc.). With regard to Venezia Giulia it should be added that there is a burgeoning supra-national attitude redolent of Mitteleuropa, which has its political-administrative reflection in Alpe-Adria and the Euroregion. This attitude is less interesting in this context as nostalgia for the Austro-Hungarian empire (nor is it relevant to assess whether it actually provided good government) than as an indicator of the possibility of creating new and heterogeneous identification, that is as a basis for asserting the value of co-existence. 3) The historical memory of multi-ethnic co-existence, built up over centuries in Gorizia by the presence of Italians, Friulians, Slovenes and others, has the positive value of what is known and experienced, rather than unknown and dangerous. This experience of co-existence was a feature of local life until the end of the First World War. 4) Spatial organisation and the construction of the architectural fabric represent the projection in tangible space of the life and relations of a town’s social groups. Their visibility in tangible space strengthens feelings of belonging, including the feeling of belonging to a society composed of differentiated ethnic groups. The old part (the historical centre) of the Gorizia-Nova Gorica system, in its details and its historical wrinkles, reflects this common experience of cultural homogeneity, and is located in Gorizia, on the Italian side. In a single urban system the town therefore gains—it recovers its proper historical dimension. 5) It may also be said that the very configuration of a new town on which the specificity of Nova Gorica is founded gives a spatial symbolism to the entire new urban system, providing examples of new urban values based on a different relationship between built-up areas and green spaces (nature) developed by modern man. In other words, it is a new town in which the symbolic values

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of the present (the new town of Nova Gorica) are wedded to the symbolic spatial values rooted in the past (the historical centre of Gorizia).

Closely Grouped Bases for Scenarios of Integration Between the Twin Towns of Gorizia and Nova Gorica

What has been outlined thus far can now be looked at in the practical light of possible actions to be taken in creating the new town, here referred to for the sake of convenience as GO-NGO. It should actually be called Gorizia/Gorica because it has always had that name, though since 1947 a state border has run between the towns, and above all because in 1947 Nova Gorica was founded. It was given the latter name partly to emphasise its newness and the superiority of, and pride in, the socialist town, and partly because it was supposed to be a provisional name pending reunification with the “true” Gorizia—on the Italian side of the border—that was the repository of the history (stara) and identity of the town that had existed since at least 1001. Still now the name Gorizia/Gorica would take quite a long time to be accepted, so the town could be given the provisional name of GO-NGO, but in Italian it sounds “funny”. An alternative name could also be adopted: Isonzopoli/Sočepolis (12) is entirely new, and perhaps goes against the thousand-year history of Gorizia/Gorica, a name whose geographical root denotes a small hill rather than a river. The choice here falls on Gorizia/Gorica, though Isonzopoli/Sočepolis is not ruled out a priori. In terms of actions, when they are innovative they are obviously a novelty, but there are also what might be called conservative actions, those which continue processes activated in an earlier period. This distinction is analytically useful in scenario-building and predicting the future, because both types of action are necessary. That is because innovations are much more successful when implemented in a favourable context than in one of tabula rasa or against strong opposition. This form of passivity represents an “active” situation over the sedimentation time required for forming the new town. In addition to being active and passive, actions must be positive, that is to say they must be conducive to the formation of the new town or weaken opposition and negative attitudes, since the joining of forces between Gorizia and

12  My thanks go to Professor Matej Šekli (Fran Ramovš Slovene Language Institute—Inštitut za slovenski jezik “Frana Ramovša”, Ljubljana) for this translation of the name Isonzopoli (deriving from nearby river Isonzo).

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Nova Gorica (GO-NGO) is perceived as a necessity. In these positive and necessary actions the following functions may be highlighted: 1) emphasis on the role of public institutions in taking these initiatives and then a movement towards cultural actions. A start can be made at the level of universities, schools, municipal councils, university consortiums, European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) and cross-border agreements, then proceeding with cultural, voluntary and professional associations, though this cannot involve imposition. This means that the institutions must put mechan­ isms in place so that civil society can use them. Before being implemented actions must obviously be planned; for GO-NGO, the International Sociology Institute of Gorizia (ISIG) (Gasparini 1998a) and the cross-border town councils (Gasparini & Del Bianco 2005) have drawn up a number of them; 2) the adoption of a language policy centred on the teaching and highlighting of three languages: the mother tongue of each ethnic group and two others—that of the ethnic and/or cross-border neighbour and an international lingua franca such as English. This approach has already been recommended by the Council of Europe. The policy can be promoted through schools, cultural associations and specific initiatives, entailing a combination of compulsory language learning at school and encouragement and guidance from families; 3) promotion of an interpretation of Gorizia and Nova Gorica as containers of several ethnic and linguistic groups, counteracting cultural and ideological incompatibilities; cultural incompatibilities still have to be smoothed out, while in everyday life ideological incompatibilities have now been overcome. In Italian Gorizia the ethnic and linguistic groups are already present and will require protection (in particular the Slovene minority), while in Nova Gorica integration with Gorizia will lead to the creation of an Italian minority, which at present does not exist. The residence there of an increasing number of Italians will bring about the formation of this group; 4) enhancement of the symbols of cooperation, but without giving them an ideological value, which would favour only the people who in past have made a battle-flag of them and alienate people who do not wholly approve of such symbols. The aim is to emphasise that if cooperation as a symbol is useful for the creation of a cultural consciousness for a new urban identity and sense of belonging, this ideology may progressively fade if it fails to produce tangible and practical benefits. To put it another way, the construction of the new town derives from the convergence of several ideologies, including one based on symbols and one based on opportunities and practical benefits. Among the symbols mention may be made of those linked to a widespread culture which, according to a survey conducted by ISIG (see Gasparini 1999–2000), is based in

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both towns on the emphasis given to attitudes such as the following: “a border town is a meeting place for different economic systems and cultures” (strong agreement in both towns), “a border town is a practical example of what future European co-existence must be” (strong agreement), “the old part of the town represents links with the past” (moderate agreement), “my town compels different ethnic groups to create a culture of tolerance” (moderate agreement). “My town gives me a sense of security and protection” was more prevalent in Gorizia (strong agreement) than in Nova Gorica (little agreement) and “my town evokes memories of childhood and family but also foreign domination” was also more prevalent in Gorizia (moderate agreement) than in Nova Gorica [no agreement, obviously because of the recent foundation of Nova Gorica (1947)]. Feelings that “the border offers benefits” and “the central (national) government pays little attention to local communities” were more prevalent in Nova Gorica (strong agreement) than Gorizia (moderate agreement). The opportunities and practical benefits of cooperation between the two towns regard savings on services, dovetailed planning of urban spaces and citizenship and the creation of strategic and unique central roles for Gorizia-Nova Gorica to make it an example for European macro-regions and for Europe and Asia in general. Unless proper account is taken of the dynamics between symbols and practical benefits, the immediate novelty value and enthusiasm for openness and the idea of cooperation will wear off in the medium and long term because of the realisation that no practical operational effect has been obtained; 5) activation of processes whose effectiveness and interrelated nature is evident in space (synchronic situation) and over time (diachronic dimension). The synchronic situation highlights the complexity of the circumstances in which a city-system or more than one city-system finds itself at a particular time, laying bare the relations between the elements of which it is composed. It is evident that within such systems (GO-NGO in this case) there are multiple networks of relations between points in all sectors. These sectors are schools, associations, institutions, businesses, etc., which form internal networks of relations (intra) and in turn these elements link up with others (inter) in a more general network (Graph 11.1). But these intra-element networks generally produce a different form of integration of relations and actions in each of the sectors. Such integration will be more intense between associations, cultural agencies, institutions and services, and less intense in the sectors involved with political-national sovereignty and the economy. Integration between elements will also vary according to whether it concerns the convergence of objectives rather than their functioning. A convergence of objectives is thus more likely

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GRAPH 11.1

Gasparini

Networks within each sector and between sectors. Source: Graph by Matteo Delli Zotti

for most of the localistic sectors, while in terms of functions convergence is more likely to occur between the agencies of civil society than among political and administrative institutions. This overall process of integration intra the networks of each sector at the level of the joint town of GO-NGO and at the level of networks inter the various sectors constitutes the differentiated integration referred to above. This may be studied, and thus may be modified, through actions and policies which take time to be implemented and above all to bear fruit. This is why it is necessary to move from a highly analytical present scenario (synchronic situation) to predictive scenarios (diachronic situation) that are more synthetic and concern contexts in which changes are considered desirable. The diachronic dimension originates from internal impulses (decisions and allocations of resources) coming from actors within GO-NGO, but also from the automatic (passive) development produced by previously-activated relations and processes which may be influenced by variables external to the new town. This means that the diachronic dimension is modified over time along a range of autonomous axes which call into question the integration of the points in an element, and even more so the global integration of GO-NGO. In these conditions differentiated integration is changeable over time, and, in addition to requiring resources to support the development of the points in one or more elements, needs further resources to promote the integration of the development of these points with other points not directly affected by intervention with fresh resources (policies, planning and funds).

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The diachronic dimension addresses the construction of a desired future, including normative prediction (Besthuzev Lada 1997: 44–45). It can be used to consider the following consequences (some of which are alternatives, others not) in a projected future at five, ten, fifteen and twenty years hence: (1) as a result of the promotion of common actions, GO-NGO is a deeply integrated town; (2) over the period in question nothing is done in terms of future planning, but common access to job applications (as EU citizens), property purchases, the establishment of universities and university departments and calculations of personal convenience induce inhabitants of Nova Gorica to move to Gorizia and vice versa; (3) the two towns become one normal town, where differences are mostly the result of social factors rather than the present ethnic and political factors; (4) there is a repositioning of relations between Italians and Slovenes in economic activity, in which the ethnic and political dimensions are not a significant factor. At this point a number of future scenarios can be postulated and their consequences observed.

Analytical Scenarios and a Succession of Possible Scenarios for Go-Ngo in Overlapping Time-Frames—5, 10 and 15 Years from Now

The first step is the definition of time starting from time zero (0), the present situation, and projecting it for periods of years, at the end of each of which a scenario may be identified. The times at the end of which a scenario of GO-NGO is completed are the following: time zero (now) = 5 years from now = 10 years from now = 15 years from now =

present scenario first predictive scenario, the end of which sees the materialization of the processes activated in the fiveyear period second predictive scenario third predictive scenario.

The situations expressed in the four scenarios, present and predicted, may assume the configurations corresponding to the following three hypotheses:

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H (a) = the towns of Gorizia and Nova Gorica remain divided, despite all the actions undertaken, in their political, cultural and administrative character. That situation obviously corresponds to the starting point (present scenario), but it may also remain the case in the predicted scenarios. Hypothesis (a) may be graphically represented as follows (Graph 11.2):

GRAPH 11.2

The towns of Gorizia and Nova Gorica remain divided (hypothesis a). Source: Graph by Matteo Delli Zotti.

H (b) = the two towns construct a differentiated integration, meaning that each urban macro-sector produces its own network of relations (Galaskievicz 1979) whose integration is different from that of other macro-sectors. These sectors may be listed in descending order of intensity of integration: (1) integration of macro-services (hospitals, planning, inter-urban networks, etc.); (2) integration of administrative institutions in the launching of joint initiatives between town councils, chambers of commerce, European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation, Euroregions, schools, etc.; (3) economic integration: this is more problematic because companies are tied to markets, so integration may be helped by actions to support companies and their continued presence in the new town; (4) integration of services for everyday life and of cultural associations. This comes down substantially to individual initiatives. There is a tradition in Gorizia and Nova Gorica for doing things together, but it has been suspended for fifty years by political, economic and ideological confrontation between two different regimes;

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(5) integration of leisure time activities and sport. Here too integration can be encouraged by institutions (schools and associations) rather than personal initiatives alone. Hypothesis (b) may be graphically represented as follows (Graph 11.3):

GRAPH 11.3

The towns of Gorizia and Nova Gorica construct a ­differentiated integration (hypothesis b). Source: Graph by Matteo Delli Zotti.

H (c) = Gorizia and Nova Gorica achieve an (almost) perfect integration, in that they become one normal town in the traditional sense except for the variable of national sovereignty, which is only likely to change as the result of a dissolution of states. In other words, normality entails the persistence of divisions according to social class, ethnicity, zoning (different quarters and sides), but a loss of significance for variables connected to the border, political ethnicity and the administration specific to each of the towns. Hypothesis (c) may be graphically represented as follows (Graph 11.4):

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GRAPH 11.4

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The towns of Gorizia and Nova Gorica achieve an (almost) perfect integration (hypothesis c). Source: Graph by Matteo Delli Zotti.

Having defined the four times in the formation of the new town GO-NGO (Gorizia/ Gorica or possibly Isonzopoli/Sočepolis), and having developed three hypotheses (a, b, c) for the four scenarios (present and predicted), the four scenarios may now be superimposed so as to find out what may happen in the new town of GO-NGO over fifteen years—whether they remain divided or undergo a process of transformation into a normal town in the meaning outlined above. In other words it may be asked whether (and how) there will be a temporal integration of possible scenarios. It may be now be observed how the four scenarios undergo sedimentation and which possible scenario may arise after fifteen years of cooperation strategies and actions between the present twin border towns. After fifteen years of collaboration the possible scenario may take six forms, illustrated below, ranging from the continuation of the state of separation to the transformation of the two towns into one normal one. Considered below are the six scenarios possible in 2030, as well as the proc­ esses by which these scenarios can be summed up, through the present and intermediate five-year scenarios, in the following table (Table 11.1). Of the six possible scenarios the most interesting is obviously the one postulated to come about after fifteen years, that is to say in 2030 (or 2032, to be

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Scenario for the New Town of Gorizia / Gorica Table 11.1 Scenarios possible in 2030 according to times and three hypotheses (a, b, c)

Times: present 5 years 10 years 15 years

Possible Scenarios: III IV

I

II

Impossible new town a a a a

overambitious a c a a

absolute negative a c b a

relative new town a b c b

V

VI

Realistic block a b± b± b+

optimum new town a b± b+ c

Source: Alberto Gasparini.

precise). Here, in the first three scenarios (I, II and III) it appears that the two towns remain separate (hypothesis a), while in the next two (IV and V) there is differentiated integration (hypothesis b), and only in the last scenario (VI), defined as optimum, is there a new normal town. The table also illustrates how developments over the years lead to the results obtained. That is important because the weight of the possible final scenario (in 2030, after fifteen years) will depend on whether it derives from a linear process or from highly advanced strategies which lead to no tangible results, eventually proving self-defeating and necessitating the adoption of lower-profile strategies and actions. Below is a review of each possible scenario for 2030. The first scenario has been identified as the one in which the new town remains an ideological impossibility. There is no desire to create it, so the towns of Gorizia and Nova Gorica remain separate over the fifteen-year time­ span, rather marginal with respect to their national systems and closed in the identities experienced over the last fifty years. They remain as twin towns. Cooperation is exclusively a matter of convenience—the only actions taken by a town are those perceived conducive to its own development. The second scenario has been defined as over-ambitious. The ambition is to transform the two towns into one new town in the first five years, but the strategy fails because the time is too short to provide the immediate results desired. The consequence is disappointment and frustration on the part of the towns’ elites and public, leading to abandonment of the unification plan and reversion to the previous condition of separate and autonomous towns. The final result in 2030 is that of the first possible scenario.

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The third scenario has been defined as absolute negative. The final conclusion is the same as in the first two: that of hypothesis (a), in which the towns remain separate. The third scenario differs from the second in that in the first five years everything (energy and resources) is directed towards the immediate construction of a single and normal town (hypothesis c) only for it to become clear that the time is too short and so there is a retreat to hypothesis (b), differentiated integration, in the following five years, that is to say ten years from the present. The frustration accumulated over the ten-year period at the abandonment of the initial objective undermines the commitment and enthusiasm for differentiated integration, which leaves the only possible option of a return to the starting point—the two separate towns of hypothesis (a). The fourth scenario has been defined as relative new town. The construction of GO-NGO as a “normal town” is undertaken step by step: from the present condition of separate towns (hypothesis a) the aim is to establish differentiated integration (hypothesis b) in five years and then the “normal town” GO-NGO (hypothesis c) in ten. This “normal town” is unable to match the pressures of reality over the following five years, however, so it regresses (at fifteen years) into a GO-NGO with differentiated integration (hypothesis b). The failure of the “normal town” is followed by an attempt to conserve at least the integration built and experienced in the scenario predicted for the five years after the present scenario. The fifth scenario has been defined as a realistic block. In fifteen years differentiated integration (hypothesis b) is fully achieved (+), but the construction of the “normal town” (hypothesis c) is postponed to some time after 2030. In this scenario the formation of a single town (“normal town”) is thus blocked at completed differentiated integration, since this is target of the progressive intensification of that integration. The block is considered to be realistic because the process leading towards a “normal town” takes a relatively long time, so full differentiated integration after fifteen years is a result in keeping with the difficulties to be faced in achieving complete integration (“normal town”). The sixth scenario has been defined as optimum new town. The planning, resources, and the real and durable popular support invested in the construction of the new town of GO-NGO (hypothesis c)—or rather Gorizia/Gorica, or Isonzopoli/Sočepolis if this name is preferred—have been constant and linear over the three phases of the fifteen-year period. Starting from the present scenario (hypothesis a) of two separate towns, some forms of differentiated integration (hypothesis b±) are achieved in the first five years, a more intense, extensive and natural differentiated integration (hypothesis b+) is achieved

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after ten, followed by the pursuit of the main objective of the new (normal) town (hypothesis c) for the end of the fifteen-year period. The objective is achieved by following a path of progressive steps towards intermediate goals, which leads to the ultimate goal of the normal town.

Conclusions

By way of a conclusion it may be asked which 2030 scenario is most possible, most probable and most desirable. In the first place it should be pointed out that in general the fact that scenarios are predicted does not necessarily indicate that they will come about in reality, they are rather an indication of alternative reasonings, or rational conjectures (see De Jouvenel 1967), which are of assistance in decision-making, which take account of consensus, resources, plans made by elites, ideas of the common good and so on. It should therefore come as no surprise if at the end of all this scenario-building the prevailing scenario is one not elaborated—an alternative (the “seventh”) to those built or a synthesis of elements from them. Even this is a positive result for scenariobuilders and especially for policy-makers. Returning to the six possible scenarios, it becomes clear that their materialisation depends greatly on psychological factors and the political majorities governing the town or towns, and thus depends on the prevalent cultures, consolidated ideologies and the ability to make progressive choices that are not over-ambitious, because over-ambitious decisions can produce frustration, lack of confidence in the future and demoralisation which can turn into a negative attitude in decisions and priorities regarding strategies and actions to be adopted. The scenarios least burdened by these negative factors are the first, the impossible new town, the fifth, the realistic block, and the sixth, the optimum new town; they are less marked than the others by the frustration engendered by defeats and the distortion of what has been predicted. The first scenario starts from the assumption that the joint town is not desirable, so it is (ideologically) impossible to achieve. The fifth scenario perfects and spreads differentiated integration with a view to achieving the new town beyond the fifteen-year time-frame. The sixth scenario sets out to establish Isonzopoli/Sočepolis (Gorizia/Gorica) within the fifteen years, but according to a linear process starting from the separate towns of Gorizia and Nova Gorica and passing through a phase of highly intensive differentiated integration.

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Which is the best of these three? The choice will obviously depend on the political, cultural and social will of both sides, but there is no doubt that the sixth scenario is the optimum choice for the goal of constructing the joint town of Isonzopoli/Sočepolis (or GO-NGO or Gorizia/Gorica, according to preference). The scenarios and underlying reasonings formulated here to assist in choosing the best paths to various forms of cooperation for Gorizia and Nova Gorica are valid for all twin towns.

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Index Additional Protocol (1984) 22, 195 Africa, African 3, 12, 14–15, 31, 55, 66, 76–77, 97, 100–101, 107, 111–115, 118–125, 140, 204, 206, 219, 233, 240, 345–346, 351, 360 Agreements 15, 49, 70 91, 120, 131, 162, 169, 186, 195, 214, 219, 300–301, 320 Airport 13, 40, 68, 71, 80, 86, 150, 231 America, American 4, 6, 12, 14, 17–18, 20, 29, 36–37, 42, 57, 76–78, 93, 108, 111, 115–116, 123, 125, 127, 146, 148, 150, 153–157, 162–163, 168–170, 172, 175–179, 181, 203, 205, 225, 240, 296–297, 300, 305, 312, 337, 344–345, 349, 353–354, 357, 360–361, 364–365 Annexation 20, 236, 285 Strategy of 24 Anti-Defamation League 228, 332 Apartheid 66, 75–76, 225, 236–237 Armistice 219, 223, 231 Artificial state 66 Asia, Asian 3, 5, 12, 55, 61, 76, 99, 111, 115, 117, 140, 227, 321, 339 Barrier 10, 12, 14, 16, 23–26, 40, 44–45, 47–48, 50, 55, 58, 64, 68, 71, 77, 80, 86–87, 89, 100–101, 116–117, 127, 131, 133, 143, 145–146, 152, 154, 171–172, 174, 177, 180, 209, 217, 221–222, 224–242, 244–246, 248–255, 258–260, 287, 290, 299, 300, 317, 332, 336–337, 347, 349, 352, 359, 363 Belfast 8, 19, 24–26, 30, 63, 89, 91, 238–243, 245–250, 252–256, 259, 332–335, 337, 349, 352, 356, 359, 363–364, 366 Belonging 13, 25, 41, 52, 55, 61–62, 65, 73, 83–84, 170, 173, 185, 246, 259, 266, 294, 297, 299, 314–315, 318, 320, 343 Benedict XV 188, 333 Berlin wall 2, 10, 16, 18–20, 26, 63–64, 66, 73, 103, 127, 144, 161–162, 165, 170, 172–175, 177, 179, 181–182, 239–240, 258, 297, 336, 341, 362 Border 1–2, 4, 6–19, 21, 23–24, 27–31, 35–64, 66–89, 91–93, 97–98, 102–104, 106–109, 111, 113, 115–118, 120–125, 127, 135–136, 146–147, 149–152, 154–155, 157, 165–166,

170–173, 175–176, 180, 199, 202, 219–222, 225, 230, 232–233, 235, 240–241, 260, 263–264, 266, 272, 276, 279, 282–285, 288–289, 292, 294–300, 304–305, 308–309, 311–317, 319–321, 325–326, 331–343, 345–346, 348–354, 356–357, 359–366 Border and/of: Administrative 12, 40, 47–48, 75, 77 Analogic 38 Areas 8, 11, 13, 30, 39, 41–42, 50, 58–60, 82–83, 85–87, 93, 282, 296, 298, 313, 353, 354 Barrier 55 Borderland 8, 12–13, 37, 40–41, 50, 55, 71, 81, 84, 87, 337, 343, 349, 351–352, 359, 366 Borderless 59, 90 Borderline 10, 12–13, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 48, 58, 63, 71, 81, 87, 104, 201, 233, 334 Century-old stable 103 Civil society 85 Community 38, 48, 50, 61, 81, 299 Cooperation 48, 54, 63, 77, 82, 85–87, 267, 299, 301–302, 307–308, 317, 342–343, 357, 366 Cultural 75, 87 Economic 50 External 15, 77, 109, 117 Feudal 69 Fluid 23–24, 31, 217, 233 Future 225, 230, 233 Gateway 12, 40, 47–48 Global 92 Hard 6, 9, 76, 85 Historical 104 Hyperborder 119, 360 Imperial 2, 13, 40, 71 Internal 75–77, 108–109, 118, 300 Invisible 78, 121 Junctio 48, 55, 58, 89 Mental 47, 49–50 National, ethnic. national 6, 8, 15, 17, 27, 38, 71, 75–76, 83, 315, 363 Natural 29, 56, 104, 115, 118

368 Border and/of: (cont.) Old 49–50 Organisations 35, 80, 85 Political 7, 28, 38, 48, 54, 72, 75, 103, 315 Region 42, 50, 77, 85–86, 100, 153, 156, 339, 342, 357, 360 Security, insecurity 14, 48, 117, 125, 149–152, 154, 349, 357, 364 Soft 13, 40 State 7, 14, 27, 31, 38, 46, 48, 50, 58–59, 77, 79 Symbolic 47 Twin towns 294, 299–300, 313, 361 Virtual 50, 55, 75, 80, 89 Wall (and border) 8–10, 13, 18, 35, 37–40, 58, 67–68, 73–75, 78, 80–81, 83, 91, 299, 301, 309, 349, 355–356 Bosnia-Herzegovina 60, 76, 87, 91 Boundary 20, 42–43, 98, 105, 175, 242, 263–272, 274–276, 278–279, 281–293, 306, 333, 347, 351, 353–354, 359 Theory 265 Bridging strategies 51, 53 Buffer 14, 51–53, 55, 71, 232, 242, 245, 249, 250 Strategies 12, 40, 52–54 Burgess model 5, 65, 357 Caste system 76 Catholic Church 21, 124, 193–194, 196, 230 Catholic Nationalist 25, 238, 242 Centrality, urban 29, 311–312 Centre 1–5, 7–10, 14, 23–24, 29, 36–37, 43–46, 54–58, 64, 68, 70, 75–76, 78, 80, 83, 86–89, 99, 101, 166, 185, 187, 196, 202–203, 215, 226, 238, 242, 247, 249, 252–253, 263, 265–266, 268, 272, 276, 280, 285, 290, 298–299, 301, 303, 311–312, 315, 317–320, 337, 339, 345, 357, 363 Ceuta and Melilla 7, 14, 77, 92, 97, 118–120, 240 Chaos 6, 55, 181 Chicago School 4, 76 Chinese empire 14, 99 City-states 13, 40, 68, 263, 311 Citizenship 16, 27–28, 52, 62, 73, 75, 112, 116, 141–142, 190, 264, 280, 282, 284, 288, 290–291, 321, 333, 335–336, 362

index City 2–5, 12–13, 18–22, 24–28, 30–31, 36–38, 40–41, 45–46, 51–53, 55, 57, 59–60, 64, 66, 68–69, 76, 89, 91, 102, 146–147, 154, 161, 163–165, 167–168, 170–176, 179–180, 183, 185, 189–191, 199, 218, 226, 234, 238–242, 245, 247–250, 252–253, 258–260, 263, 266, 276, 287, 294, 300, 301, 311, 313, 321, 334–335, 338–339, 346, 351–352, 355, 360, 364 Ciudad Juarez, El Paso 8, 18, 146–147, 299, 339, 360 Civil societies 26, 50, 74, 85, 91 Cleanliness, cleansing 9, 60, 62, 65–66, 219 Client states 2, 14, 55, 71 Closed border, system, wall, road 9, 11–12, 40, 46–47, 53, 55, 57, 102, 124, 165–166, 180, 187, 203, 212, 245, 249, 252, 327, 343 Co-existence 77, 218, 315, 350 Comecon 102, 106 Community 1, 4–7, 9, 13–14, 16, 21, 25, 29, 35–36, 38–42, 45, 48, 54, 57, 62, 64, 67, 72, 74, 81, 90, 97, 105, 107, 109, 122, 127–128, 131, 165–166, 196–197, 199–200, 202–204, 207, 210–211, 213, 238, 241, 245, 247–248, 251–253, 255–258, 264, 279, 290, 293, 297, 300, 302, 308, 311–312, 315, 333, 337, 341, 345, 350, 356, 358, 361, 363 Local 13, 40, 73, 84, 251–252, 254 Traditional 74, 78 Concordat 22, 187, 189–190, 192, 194–196, 338, 347, 358 Conflict 8–9, 22–24, 27, 31, 39, 47, 58–59, 62, 81–82, 99, 101, 104–105, 113, 127, 161, 166, 172, 198–199, 202–206, 208–209, 211, 213–215, 217, 220–221, 232–233, 236–239, 241, 246, 248, 250–251, 259, 265, 267, 294, 315, 332–335, 338, 343, 345, 349–353, 355–356, 358, 361–365 Consensus 26, 91–92, 131, 313, 329, 341, 363 Cooperation 8, 10–13, 15, 17, 26–31, 39–41, 48, 54, 63, 77, 81–90, 93, 117, 120, 124, 127, 132–133, 154, 157, 195, 214, 221, 267, 271–272, 287, 294, 298–303, 307–308, 314, 317, 320–321, 324, 326–327, 330, 333, 349, 352–353, 361, 364–366 Index of 86, 87 Core technology 52, 53 Creativity 30, 81, 309, 311–313, 317

index Crime 76, 92, 124, 146, 152–157, 215, 235–236, 238, 279, 282–283, 335, 337 Culture 2, 10–11, 17, 48, 54–55, 58–62, 65, 71, 73, 77, 81, 84, 89, 92, 100, 106, 141, 199–200, 203–204, 206, 208–209, 214, 216, 238, 254, 264–265, 268, 272, 288, 296, 298–299, 301–302, 311–314, 316–318, 320–321, 329, 333, 335, 342, 344–346, 348–349, 352, 360, 366 Cyprus 18, 22, 26, 30, 127, 134, 138, 142, 198–204, 206–207, 209, 211–213, 215, 218, 240, 335, 337, 345, 349–351, 356–358, 360, 364–366 Decision makers 23, 25 Declaration 15, 108, 123, 127, 130, 171, 186, 194, 217, 228 Deconstructing stereotypes 208 Demography, demographic 112, 122, 124–125, 169, 199, 200, 234, 247–248, 254, 296, 299, 317, 337 Development, growth 3, 4, 8, 13, 15–16, 27–29, 40, 43, 45, 47, 59–60, 69–71, 73, 106, 112, 124–125, 129–130, 132, 135–136, 141, 144, 155, 164, 185, 188, 190, 206, 217, 220–221, 250–251, 255, 266, 271, 284, 287, 295–296, 302–303, 308, 322, 327, 345, 351–352, 356, 360, 362, 365 Socio-economic 44, 48, 86, 89, 103, 125, 130, 136, 200, 296 Dialogue 23, 25, 67, 72, 74, 81, 93, 133, 136, 183, 193, 211, 216, 240, 252, 258, 333, 344–345, 352 Differentiated integration 26, 29–30, 83, 294–295, 298, 313–314, 317, 322, 324–325, 327–329 Disorder 6, 25, 249–250, 258, 260, 354 Dividing lines 5, 16–17, 126–129, 131, 133, 136–137, 144–145, 362 Drug 10, 18, 114, 146–147, 152–157, 282–283, 336–337, 339, 351 Dynamics 9, 39, 50, 252, 309, 321, 350–351, 359, 364 Egypt 57, 99, 112–113, 219–221, 223, 231–233 Empire 1–2, 4, 8, 13–16, 26–27, 30–31, 36, 40, 44, 47, 49, 55–57, 60–61, 70–72, 97–105, 107–108, 111, 115, 117, 121, 217–218, 336, 340, 360–361, 366

369 Initial stages 14 From expansion to defence 70 Softening of borders within an 71 Enemy image 23, 204, 210 Enlargement process 16, 126 Policy 16, 126, 129–130 Enrichment mutual of twin towns 29, 48, 311, 317 Equilibrium 2, 4, 12, 37, 40, 47, 82, 91, 93, 296 Estonia 27, 87, 89, 127, 133–134, 137, 275–276, 278–285, 287–293, 333, 352–353, 358, 362 Europe 3–4, 6, 8, 12, 14–17, 19, 27–28, 36, 39, 42, 44, 47–48, 55, 57–58, 60–61, 68–70, 77–78, 83–86, 88–89, 92–93, 97, 100–109, 111–119, 121–133, 135–145, 153, 156, 161–163, 165–166, 168–170, 172, 179–181, 202–203, 218, 240, 248, 258, 263–264, 280–281, 283, 292, 294, 297, 299–302, 307–309, 314, 317, 320–321, 324, 331–332, 335–350, 352–355, 357–366 European Union (EU) 2, 14, 16, 19, 24, 31, 49, 57, 59, 63, 77–78, 89, 97, 105, 107–108, 110, 115, 117–118, 120–123, 126–129, 131, 133, 135–137, 139–140, 144–145, 165–166, 202–203, 230, 282, 293–294, 298, 300, 302–303, 314, 317, 339, 341, 344–345, 349, 355, 357, 361–366 European Social Model (ESM) 16, 130, 335, 349, 364–365 Euroregion 13, 41, 85–86, 89, 302, 308, 315, 318, 324, 340, 342–343, 362–363, 366 Exclusion 247, 340, 352 Exodus 10, 165, 219 Expansion, extroverted 4, 9, 12, 14, 40, 44, 48, 51, 53–54, 57, 60, 64, 69–71, 73, 99, 162, 276, 285, 296, 332 Failed states 147–148 Fence 1, 7, 14, 17–18, 23–26, 31, 48, 76–77, 92, 102, 118, 146, 148–155, 157, 172–173, 175, 177–178, 217, 232, 238, 242, 245, 249, 252–253, 255, 305–307, 331–332, 338–339, 344, 347–348, 350, 354–356, 359, 363–364, 366 “Good fences make . . .” 26, 157, 255, 347

370 Feudal states, feudal system 13, 40, 46, 56–57, 68–69, 73, 333, 363 Fiefs 68, 70, 72–73, 75 Freedom 2, 5–6, 15, 39, 57, 82, 102–103, 106, 109, 111, 118, 122–123, 130, 170, 180, 184–186, 188, 190, 194, 196, 227, 234, 254, 264, 296, 361, 365 Frontex Agency 15, 117–118, 356–357 Frontier 7, 11, 18, 37, 42–44, 57, 69, 77, 97, 99–101, 109, 116, 140, 165–166, 171, 173–174, 176–177, 180, 331, 334, 337–339, 344, 347, 350, 352, 354, 357, 360, 364–365 Future 3, 9, 12–13, 24, 27, 29–31, 41, 50, 52, 60–62, 65, 75, 78, 80–81, 87, 122, 128–129, 132, 139, 144, 167, 181, 184, 198, 205, 209, 213, 215–216, 222, 225, 230, 233, 236, 254–255, 258, 271, 280, 294, 302–303, 308–309, 312, 314, 319, 321, 323, 329, 334, 336, 338, 343–345, 347, 358, 360, 364, 366 “Futuribili” 19, 334, 338, 340, 342–343, 346–347, 350–351, 356, 360 Gated community 1, 2, 76, 240, 248 Gaza 23, 218–223, 230–233, 235–236, 331, 346, 356 Generations 28, 66, 182, 259, 317 Ghetto 1–3, 5, 65, 76, 174, 229, 247, 355 Globalisation 2, 12–13, 39–40, 51, 54, 59, 63, 67, 71, 74–75, 126, 143–145, 317 Golan Heights 220, 233 Gorizia 28–30, 45, 56, 64–65, 85, 88, 92, 97, 266, 294–295, 297–299, 302–312, 314–315, 317, 318–321, 323–335, 337–340, 342–344, 348, 353, 355, 357, 359–360, 362–366 Gorizia/Gorica, new town 28–30, 266, 294–295, 319, 326, 328–330 Great Wall of China 1, 44, 55, 99 Greek Cypriots 22, 198–200, 202–203, 207–209 Green line 197–198, 200–202, 207, 223, 225–227, 230, 233, 235, 240, 289 Group 1–2, 4–9, 13, 17, 20, 27, 30–31, 36, 38, 40, 43, 55, 58, 60, 62, 65, 67, 71, 79, 81–85, 88–90, 92, 99, 101, 113–114, 116–117, 124–125, 132–133, 143, 152–153, 156, 170–171, 173, 188, 200, 202, 205, 210,

index 218, 220, 232, 234, 242, 252, 258, 264–268, 271, 274–276, 285, 288–291, 293–294, 302, 314–315, 317–321, 324, 333, 337, 345, 347, 350, 352, 361–362, 365 Hamas 221, 228, 231, 234, 344 Haparanda 27, 268–275 Hebron 218, 223 Hezbollah 152, 220–221, 336 Historical sociology 97–98, 103, 364 Holy Roman Empire 49, 108 Housing 4, 173, 234, 248, 253, 281, 283, 356 Human rights 15, 22, 92, 97–98, 108, 118, 123, 203, 206–207, 226–227, 229, 233, 332, 352 Human rights organisations 229, 233 Identity 6, 12–13, 15, 25, 35–36, 40–41, 51–52, 61, 63, 65–66, 68, 75, 80–81, 84, 88–89, 91–92, 109, 113–114, 120, 126, 140, 198, 211, 213, 238, 248, 254, 295, 297–298, 314–315, 319–320, 336, 339–341, 343, 345, 359, 352 Ideology, ideologisation of the state 12, 19, 31, 39–40, 53, 58, 61, 63, 65, 71, 73–74, 82, 169, 202–203, 320 Immigration, migrant, control of, illegal  2–4, 15, 18, 36, 49, 53, 67, 71, 75, 77, 109, 111–118, 120–122, 124–125, 142, 146–147, 149–152, 154–155, 218, 238–239, 279, 289, 340, 352, 362, 366 Individual 6–7, 13, 15, 22–23, 35, 38–40, 42, 45, 54, 57, 61, 67, 73, 78–79, 82, 101, 123, 141, 143, 152, 154, 186, 195–196, 206, 209, 213, 215, 224, 226, 232, 264–268, 288, 295–296, 311, 314, 324 International Court of Justice 227–228, 230, 348 International Organisations 23, 44, 53 Integration, disintegration 15–17, 21–22, 27, 29, 58, 61, 68, 73, 83, 86, 93, 99, 103, 108–109, 111, 113, 126, 128–131, 135–136, 140–141, 143–145, 148, 154, 164–165, 246–248, 266, 280, 297–299, 301, 311, 313–314, 317, 319–322, 324–326, 328, 334, 343–346, 361 Interpenetration 29, 59, 74, 294–298 Intifada 23, 220–222, 224, 230 Introversion, introverted 12, 40, 51–54

index Iron Curtain 13–15, 19, 26, 29, 31, 41, 64–66, 73, 84–85, 88, 93, 97, 102–103, 107, 110–111, 113–115, 118–124, 162, 264, 302–303, 332, 336 Israel, Israeli 7–8, 19, 23–24, 26, 30, 51, 53, 66, 76, 97, 101, 217–237, 240–241, 331–333, 338–339, 341, 343–344, 346–347, 349–352, 355, 359, 362–363, 365 Israel-Egypt peace treaty 220, 232 Government 220, 225, 232, 240 Israeli’s High Court 227, 229 Italy 1, 3–4, 6, 17–22, 26, 30, 36, 47, 49–50, 53, 56, 58, 63, 65, 70, 75–76, 78, 87–88, 91–92, 109, 112, 120–122, 125, 127, 132, 134, 137, 139, 142, 163, 165, 183–190, 192, 195–196, 266, 294, 302–303, 305, 318, 347–348, 362 Ivangorod 27–28, 88, 275–277, 279–284, 293, 334, 353 Jerusalem 8, 64–66, 76, 90, 218, 222–223, 226–229, 233–234, 241, 331–332, 347, 349, 352, 363 John Paul II 194, 349 Jordan 3, 219–221, 223, 226–227 Languages 27, 58, 61, 84, 273–274, 282, 288, 290, 317, 320 Lateran Treaty (1929) 21–22 Latin America 17, 111, 153–154, 345, 354 Latvia 27–28, 127, 133–134, 138, 285, 287–293, 339 Law of Guarantees (1871) 183, 185–186, 192 Lebanon 3, 220 Legitimacy 44, 51, 54, 103, 106, 114, 165, 192, 211, 252, 339 Limes 1, 7–8, 12, 14, 40, 44, 55–57, 63–64, 67, 71, 88, 99–100, 245, 301, 340, 344, 350, 352, 361 Lisbon Treaty 14, 111 Majority 9, 21, 27–28, 66, 82–83, 88, 116, 128–129, 141, 144, 192, 199, 235, 238, 248, 250, 253, 273, 289, 292, 296–297, 303 Mediterranean sea 14, 36, 78, 92–93, 97, 111, 116–118, 120–121, 133, 199, 231, 332, 340, 345, 349, 352, 354 Memory, historical 315–316, 318

371 Middle East 55, 124, 153, 155–156, 200, 219, 236, 332, 335, 361 Military 14–15, 23, 25, 28, 42–43, 47–48, 54, 56, 58, 69–70, 76, 80, 99–100, 102–103, 105–108, 111, 115–119, 153, 156–157, 164, 166–168, 170–171, 173, 176–177, 179, 182, 192, 198, 200, 202, 217–219, 225, 227, 232, 235, 245, 247, 249, 251–252, 258–259, 263, 265, 267, 281, 289, 302, 316, 344 Minority 9, 28, 83, 88, 125, 200, 247, 256, 266, 273–274, 284, 289, 292–293, 296–297, 320, 340, 342 Mitteleuropa 71, 315, 318, 363 Mobility 23, 71, 97, 109, 116, 121, 123, 140, 264, 279, 340, 360, 362 Modernisation 3, 5–9, 61, 74–75, 200 Modernity 39, 67, 74–75, 78, 82, 346, 363 Municipality, “Comune” 75, 86, 265, 267–268, 270–273, 275, 279–280, 284, 286–287, 291, 293, 300 Narva 27, 88, 275–284, 293, 334, 353, 360, 362 Nation 1, 4, 7, 9, 46, 50, 52, 58–63, 66, 70, 73–74, 81, 98, 105, 107, 122, 127, 144, 147–149, 153–157, 164, 217–218, 267, 293, 300, 318, 336, 339–340, 342, 345–346, 351, 356–358, 362 Nationality 28, 60, 65–66, 73, 290–292, 315, 360, 366 Natural area 4, 5, 65 Negotiation 8, 15, 20, 25, 39, 47, 107–108, 129, 133, 143, 166, 168, 180–181, 189, 194–195, 202–203, 209, 219–221, 225, 233, 240, 299, 359 Networks, macro 13, 30, 95 Nicosia 8, 18, 26, 30, 64, 89, 200–202, 210, 212, 240, 345 No-man’s-land 68, 314 Nomadelfia 67, 342 “Non expedit” 186–188, 363 Normalising exception 24, 238, 254 Normative power 108, 354 North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) 148, 344, 347 North of the world 53, 260 Northern Ireland Housing Executive (Nihe)  248, 356

372

index

Nova Gorica 28–30, 64–65, 88, 92, 294, 302–306, 308–309, 311, 314–315, 317–321, 323–327, 329–331, 333–335, 342–343, 353, 355, 360

Pius XI 189–190, 193, 358 Political society 11, 38, 53–54, 128 Privacy 6, 9, 38, 331, 365 Protestant Unionist 25, 238, 242

Opacity 147, 351 Openness, open, opening 4, 9–11, 22, 29, 35, 46–47, 51, 55–56, 58, 84, 92, 97, 100–101, 103, 105, 113, 117, 124–125, 127, 133, 144–145, 147, 152–155, 165, 176, 180–181, 184–185, 196–198, 202–203, 211–212, 221, 234, 241, 265, 270–271, 274, 287, 297, 309, 313–314, 321, 335, 343, 348, 366 Organisations 7, 10–16, 23–24, 28, 35–38, 40–41, 44–48, 50–55, 57, 68, 74, 78–81, 85–86, 114, 127, 144, 171, 186–188, 193–194, 196, 199, 202, 204, 206, 215, 258, 265–268, 271, 274, 280, 283, 295, 309, 311, 313, 318, 352

Rationality 9, 46, 52–53, 61, 92 Recession, global 147, 150 Reciprocity, juridical 29, 296 Reconciliation 21–23, 31, 59, 187, 189, 192–193, 198–199, 204–207, 209–211, 213–216, 254, 333–334, 343, 351, 353, 360, 364–365 Reduction 69, 143, 149–150, 311, 352 Refugees 19, 102, 106, 113–114, 118–120, 148, 165–166, 169, 172–173, 197, 209–210, 218–220, 233 Region 13, 37–38, 42, 45–46, 50, 58, 70, 73, 75, 77, 85–87, 97, 100–101, 106, 108, 111, 115, 117, 120, 122, 127, 133, 141, 143–144, 153, 156–157, 199–200, 218–219, 226, 230, 233, 236, 265–271, 273–274, 281, 283, 299, 302, 308, 315–316, 318, 321, 335, 337, 339–340, 342–343, 345–346, 351–352, 354, 357, 360, 362, 365–366 Regulations 2, 28, 93, 123, 136, 165, 180, 195, 226, 290 Roman empire 2, 4, 14, 36, 44, 49, 55, 60, 71, 100, 108 Rome 3, 20–22, 26, 31, 55, 88, 91, 100, 108, 127–128, 183–186, 189–190, 192, 316–317, 362 Russian Federation 27, 107, 278

Palestine 7–8, 19, 23, 26, 30, 55, 57, 217–218, 225, 228–229, 236, 331–333, 336, 343–344, 351, 355, 357, 361 Palestine Liberation Organisation (Plo) 210, 220–221, 361 Palestinian Authority 223, 230, 232 Peace 8–11, 13–15, 18–20, 22–26, 30, 39–41, 43, 53, 59–60, 63, 81–84, 86–91, 93, 97, 103, 108, 111, 123, 147–148, 162, 164, 166–169, 173, 175, 178, 180, 183, 187, 192–193, 200, 204, 206, 209, 211, 214–216, 219–221, 232, 234–237, 241, 245, 247, 250–251, 253–254, 256–258, 268, 276, 278, 303, 336, 338, 340–341, 343, 345, 352–353, 357, 360–362, 364 In fusion 12–13, 30, 83, 90, 295, 309 In separation 12–13, 30, 80, 83, 91, 295, 309 Of good 39, 82 Of goods 39, 82 Of modernity 39, 82 Of tradition 39, 82 Peace walls 238, 241, 243–244, 246, 252–254, 259, 335, 352 Periphery 3, 44, 48, 58, 68, 78, 80, 290, 292, 318, 333, 345 Pius IX 21, 183–185, 187, 358 Pius X 187, 358

Savienība 27, 285, 291–292 Scenario 28–31, 140, 294–295, 302, 309, 313–315, 319, 322–323, 326–330, 337, 343, 366 Possible 315, 323, 326–327, 329, 356 Predictive 322–324, 326, 328 Present 322–324, 326, 328 Schengen Area 15, 68, 108–110, 120, 294, 303, 317 Security, insecurity 5–6, 9, 14, 18–19, 23–26, 31, 36, 42, 54, 59, 65, 68, 73, 76–77, 79, 91, 97, 109, 114, 118, 122, 124, 127, 136, 153, 156, 159, 163–164, 170, 177, 200, 203, 205, 217, 222, 224–226, 229–230, 232, 234–235, 237–242, 245, 248–249,

index 251–255, 257–259, 297, 311, 321, 331–333, 337–338, 340, 344–349, 355, 357, 363 Homeland 17–18, 31, 149–152, 155, 338 National 17–18, 31, 146, 149, 151–157, 332, 337, 340 Segregation 225, 238, 242, 246–248, 252, 254, 256, 259, 290, 335, 337 Seigneuries 56, 69–70, 75 Separation 12–13, 17, 24, 26, 30, 35, 40, 42, 48, 54, 64, 67, 73, 77, 80, 83, 91, 133, 207, 213–214, 222, 225, 227–228, 233–234, 237–238, 240–241, 295–296, 309, 315–316, 326, 332, 344–345, 352, 359, 363 Settlements (in Palestine) 23, 220–221, 228, 233, 235–236 Sinai Peninsula 220, 232 South of the world 53, 71, 77 Sovereignty 13, 18, 22, 38, 40, 48, 58–59, 73, 75–76, 80, 82, 91, 127, 156, 166, 186, 189–190, 195, 298–299, 317, 321, 325, 335 Soviet Union 19, 27–28, 71, 88, 91, 102–103, 106, 109, 161–167, 169–170, 175–181, 276, 278–281, 287, 289 Spatial organization 3, 8 State 1–18, 20–28, 30–31, 35–38, 40–42, 44, 46, 48–55, 57–63, 65–66, 68–71, 73–79, 81–86, 88, 90–91, 93–94, 98, 102, 104, 106–109, 111, 113–118, 120–123, 126–133, 135–137, 139–145, 147–153, 155–156, 159, 162–167, 170–172, 181–190, 192–196, 209, 215–216, 218–219, 225, 227–228, 233, 235–236, 239–242, 247, 250–252, 258–260, 263–268, 271–273, 275, 278–281, 283–285, 287–288, 290, 292–299, 301–303, 311, 313–319, 325, 331, 334–335, 337, 339–340, 347, 351, 354–356, 359, 362–364 Medium 53, 74, 296 Modern 12–13, 39–40, 46, 48, 57–58, 63–64, 67, 69, 71, 73–76, 80 Small 13–14, 29, 40, 53, 60–62, 70, 74, 97, 103–105, 108, 296, 350 Large 16, 57, 61, 74, 296 Survey 25, 45, 114, 128, 151, 234, 248, 255–258, 272–274, 300–301, 320 Synchronic situation 321–322 Syria 3, 57, 92, 219–220, 233, 236, 350

373 Task environment 7, 35, 45 Tel Aviv 218, 222–223 Terrorism 2, 10, 18, 24, 124, 153–156, 220, 224–225, 233, 235, 349 Tornio 27, 268–275, 292–293, 300, 347, 351, 354 Tourism 25, 51, 63, 271, 281 Trieste 19, 162, 299, 303, 307–309, 311, 332–333, 337–338, 342, 344, 348, 354, 362, 365 Turkish Cypriots 22–23, 198–200, 202–203, 207–211, 213 Twin towns, twin cities 26–31, 46, 54, 88–90, 263–264, 267, 269, 275, 277, 285–286, 288, 292, 294, 296–301, 308–309, 313, 319, 326–327, 330, 351, 354, 361 2030 (futures up to) 295, 326–329 “Ubi nos” 185, 358 United Nations Organisation (Uno/Onu) 3, 24, 116, 124, 176, 198, 200, 202, 218, 227–228, 237, 332, 345, 349 United States of America (Usa) 2, 5–7, 12, 14, 17–18, 20, 24, 29, 36–37, 42, 53, 57, 63, 66, 71, 76–78, 90, 102, 107–108, 115–116, 121, 123–125, 127, 138, 146–148, 150–157, 161–164, 168–170, 175–181, 203, 205, 230, 240, 341, 345–347, 349, 352–353, 357, 360–361, 364 United States—Mexico 146, 151–152, 154 Utopia 61, 67, 82, 294, 313 Valga 27–28, 285–293, 350, 353 Valka 27–28, 285–293, 353 Vatican City 18, 20–22, 26, 30–31, 66, 183, 190–191 Vatican City and Italy 18, 20, 26, 30–31, 66, 183 Wall 1–14, 16–27, 30–31, 35, 37, 40–41, 48, 50, 54–60, 63–81, 84, 87–93, 97–103, 106, 117, 119, 121–122, 144, 146, 151, 154, 156, 161–162, 167, 169–183, 187, 191–192, 196, 227, 229, 236, 238–242, 245, 249–251, 254–261, 276, 302, 307, 335, 340, 344, 346, 350–352, 357, 363–364, 366

374 Wall and/of: Age, years, time 9, 20, 25, 30, 56, 60, 66, 84, 88, 90, 92, 97–98, 100, 101–102, 106, 111, 120–121 Apartheid 66 Artificial separation, rupture 26 Berlin wall 2, 10, 16, 18–20, 26, 63–64, 66, 73, 103, 127, 144, 146, 161–162, 165, 170, 172–175, 177, 179, 181–182, 239–240, 258, 297, 336, 341, 362, 366 Border 1, 7–10, 13–14, 18, 31, 35–41, 48, 51, 55, 58, 64, 66–70, 72–81, 83, 87, 91–92, 295, 299, 309, 349, 355–356 Brutal imposition 67 City wall, walled city 12–13, 21, 25, 40, 55, 57, 59–60, 68–69, 80, 89 Cultural 67, 72, Democracy walled 8, 13, 40, 59, 63, 88 Disappearance 28, 55, 66, 71, 99 Dividing 12, 17–18, 33, 35, 76, 90, 129, 144, 246 Empire 8, 13–14, 31, 97, 99, 117, 336 Ethnical-political 18, 27, 91, 159 External 63, 76, 91 Fence 7, 17–18, 23, 26, 31, 64, 102, 153, 155, 157, 223, 242, 245 Functions 9, 17, 26, 30–31, 35–36, 44, 55, 57, 64, 89, 97–100, 239, 259, 296 Hard 13, 41, 63, 72, 76–77, 90, 93 Implicit 254 Indian reservation in US 66 Indigenous people and immigrants 75, 93, 206

index Internal 16, 63, 72, 76–77, 91, 128 Invisible 1, 16, 76–78, 97 Israel-Palestine wall 19 Macro 13, 30, 59, 95 Mental 181, 182 Metaphorical 71, 187, 354 Modern state wall 40, 57 National security 17, 146 Natural 56–57, 63 Ordinary everyday 24, 238 Peace wall 19, 25–26, 63, 89, 238, 241, 243–244, 246, 252–254, 259, 335, 352 Phisical 1, 76, 91 Positive face 80–81 Post-wall phase 30 Rich and poor 75, 93 Security, wall barrier 5–6, 14, 17, 24, 151 Social, economic 67 Soft 1, 88 Symbolic 25, 65, 67, 89 Tangible 71 Uniting 12, 33, 35 Vatican City-Italy (wall) 20, 183 Violent face 13, 64 Virtual 68, 91 Within states 13, 31, 40 Walled democracy 8, 13, 40, 63, 88 West Bank 23, 66, 146, 217, 219–231, 233–236, 240–241, 331–332, 336–337, 339, 344, 359, 353 West Bank barrier 217, 221, 225, 230, 233, 336, 359, 363 Yugoslav man 65–66