The Unintended Consequences of Interregionalism: Effects on Regional Actors, Societies and Structures 2020035772, 2020035773, 9780367554774, 9780367554842, 9781003093749

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THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INTERREGIONALISM

This edited book brings a new analytical angle to the study of comparative region­ alism by focussing on the unintended consequences of interregional relations. The book satisfies the need to go beyond the consideration of the success or failure of international policies. It sheds light on complex interactions involving multiple actors, individual and institutional, driven by various representations, interests and strategies, and which often result in unintended consequences that powerfully affect the socio-political context in which they unfold. By provid­ ing a new conceptual framework to understand how interregionalism brings about social change, the book examines the effects on the individual and insti­ tutional actors of interregional relations, and the effects on the social structures that constitute interregionalism. It also examines interregionalism’s transforma­ tional character for structures of regional and international governance, as well as societies. This book will be of key interest to scholars and students in the fields of com­ parative regionalism, interregionalism, EU studies, international and regional organisations, global governance and more broadly to international relations, international politics and (comparative) area studies. Elisa Lopez-Lucia is an assistant professor at the Research and Studies in International Politics (REPI) centre of the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Belgium. Frank Mattheis is a researcher at the Institute for European Studies of the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Belgium.

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Globalisation, Europe, Multilateralism Series With the institutional support of the Institut d’études européennes-Université libre de Bruxelles The series offers an interdisciplinary platform for original peer-reviewed publications on the institutions, norms and practices associated with Globalisation, Multilateralism and the European Union. Each published volume delves into a given dynamic shap­ ing either the global-regional nexus or the role of the EU therein. It offers original insights into: globalisation and its associated governance challenges; the changing forms of multilateral cooperation and the role of transnational networks; the impact of new global powers and the corollary multipolar order; the lessons born from com­ parative regionalism and interregional partnerships; as well as the distinctive instru­ ments the EU mobilises in its foreign policies and external relations. Series Editor: Mario TELÒ, Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgium, and LUISSGuido Carli, Rome, Italy.

International Editorial Board Amitav ACHARYA, American University, Washington Shaun BRESLIN, University of Warwick Ramona COMAN, Université libre de Bruxelles Marise CREMONA, EUI, Florence Louise FAWCETT, University of Oxford Andrew GAMBLE, University of Cambridge Robert O. KEOHANE, Princeton University Nicolas LEVRAT, Université de Genève

Christian LEQUESNE, IEP-Paris Leonardo MORLINO, LUISS-Guido Carli, Rome Tamio NAKAMURA, Waseda University, Tokyo Yaqing QIN, CFAU, Beijing Ummu SALMA BAVA, JNU, New Dehli Vivien SCHMIDT, Boston University Leonard SEABROOKE, Copenhagen Business School Karen E. SMITH, LSE, London Anne WEYEMBERGH, Université libre de Bruxelles Michael ZÜRN, WZB, Berlin

Series Manager: Frederik PONJAERT, Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgium. Theorising the Crises of the European Union Edited by Nathalie Brack and Seda Gürkan The Unintended Consequences of Interregionalism Effects on Regional Actors, Societies and Structures Edited by Elisa Lopez-Lucia and Frank Mattheis For more information about this series please visit: https://www.routledge.com/ Globalisation-Europe-Multilateralism-series/book-series/ASHSER1392

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THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INTERREGIONALISM Effects on Regional Actors, Societies and Structures Edited by Elisa Lopez-Lucia and Frank Mattheis

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First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 selection and editorial matter, Elisa Lopez-Lucia and Frank Mattheis; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Elisa Lopez-Lucia and Frank Mattheis to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Lopez-Lucia, Elisa, editor. | Mattheis, Frank, editor. Title: The unintended consequences of interregionalism: effects on regional actors, societies and structures / edited by Elisa Lopez-Lucia and Frank Mattheis. Description: Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2021. | Series: Globalisation, Europe, multilateralism | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020035772 (print) | LCCN 2020035773 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367554774 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367554842 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003093749 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Regionalism—Case studies. | International cooperation—Case studies. | International agencies—Case studies. Classification: LCC JF197.U65 2021 (print) | LCC JF197 (ebook) | DDC 341.24—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020035772 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020035773 ISBN: 978-0-367-55477-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-55484-2 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-09374-9 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd.

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CONTENTS

List of figures and tables List of contributors Preface Acknowledgements 1 The unintended consequences of interregionalism: New concepts for understanding the entanglements of regionalisms Elisa Lopez-Lucia and Frank Mattheis

vii viii x xiii

1

PART 1

Unintended effects on the actors of interregionalism 2 Overlapping regionalism and the unintended consequences of democracy clauses in the Americas Haroldo Ramanzini Junior 3 The unintended consequences of interregionalism on actorness of the European Union: The case of EU-ASEAN cooperation in disaster management Giulia Tercovich 4 The EU-CELAC cooperation programme on drugs policies and the unintended consequences of interregional interactions Carolina Salgado

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Contents

PART 2

Unintended effects on the interregional structure 5 The asean way versus EU maritime multilateralism: The unintended consequences of EU-ASEAN maritime security cooperation Dominik Giese 6 Between bilateralism and interregionalism: EU-Brazil strategic partnership and the unintended consequences for EU-MERCOSUR relations Bruno Theodoro Luciano 7 The unintended consequences of regional security cooperation in West Africa-EU relations beyond the African peace and security architecture Friedrich Plank

83

85

106

125

PART 3

Unintended effects in terms of broader social change

145

8 The sahel as an unintended region: Competing regionalisms and insecurity dynamics Edoardo Baldaro

147

9 Agential constructivism, shadow regionalisms and interregional dynamics in the horn of Africa J. Andrew Grant, Abdiasis Issa and Badriyya Yusuf

165

10 When external drivers of regional integration turn into actors of regional disintegration: Regionalism and interregionalism in the South Caucasus Giulia Prelz Oltramonti 11 The unintended consequences of neighbourhood policies by the European Union and Russia: Region-building in Moldova in an interregional context Johann Wolfschwenger Index

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FIGURES AND TABLES

Figures 5.1

9.1

The Southeast Asian Maritime Space (UN Geospatial Information Section, 2012; Map No. 4365 Rev.1, 2012; permission granted for reproduction by the United Nations) Annual intra- and extra-trade (Merchandise), IGAD Countries, 1995–2018

174

Topics of EU-MERCOSUR and EU-Brazil relations (New Topics in Bold) Intentions of interregional and regional actors in West Africa

117 127

89

Tables 6.1 7.1

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CONTRIBUTORS

Edoardo Baldaro is a postdoctoral fellow in Politics and International Relations

at the University of Naples “L’Orientale”. Louise Fawcett is a professor of International Relations and Head of the

Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. She is also the Wilfrid Knapp Fellow and Tutor in Politics at St Catherine’s College, Oxford. J. Andrew Grant is an associate professor at the Department of Political Studies

of Queen’s University at Kingston. Dominik Giese is a research fellow at the Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences of the Universität Hamburg. He is also a PhD candidate at the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick. Abdiasis Issa is a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) Canada doctoral fellow at the Balsillie School of International Affairs of Wilfrid Laurier University. Elisa Lopez-Lucia is an assistant professor at the Research and Studies in

International Politics (REPI) centre of the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB). She is also a research associate at the Centre for European and International Studies of the University of Portsmouth and at the Chaire Raoul-Dandurand of the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM). Frank Mattheis is a researcher at the Institute for European Studies of the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB). He is also an associate research fellow at

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Contributors ix

the United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS) and the Department of Political Sciences of the University of Pretoria. Friedrich Plank is a researcher at the Department of Political Science of the

Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz. Giulia Prelz Oltramonti is an assistant professor at the European School of Political and Social Sciences (ESPOL) of the Université Catholique de Lille. She is a member of ESPOL-LAB and a research associate at the Research and Studies in International Politics (REPI) centre of the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB). Haroldo Ramanzini Junior is an associate professor at the Federal University of Uberlândia. He is also a National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) Productivity Research Fellow. Carolina Salgado is an assistant professor at the Institute of International Relations of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) and a research fellow at the think tank BRICS Policy Center in Rio de Janeiro. Giulia Tercovich is an assistant professor at the Vesalius College of the Vrije

Universiteit Brussel (VUB). Bruno Theodoro Luciano is a teaching fellow at the Department of Politics and

International Studies of the University of Warwick. He is also a member of the Research Network on Foreign Policy and Regionalism (REPRI) in Brazil. Johann Wolfschwenger is a Marie Sklodowska-Curie doctoral fellow at the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB) and the Université de Genève. Badriyya Yusuf is a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC)

Canada doctoral fellow in the Department of Political Studies at Queen’s University at Kingston.

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PREFACE

The 21st century confirms the enduring relevance of regionalism in world politics. Despite the scepticism that accompanied its formal appearance after the Second World War it is today well-established fact, as demonstrated by the sheer number and variety of regional bodies in existence. Both regionalism – institutionalised interactions between state and non-state actors in a given international region – and interregionalism – interactions between actors from different regions – have become an integral part of the architecture of global governance such that it is impossible to conceive of any world order without them. Whether in areas related to trade, aid, security or welfare, the actions of regional bodies and actors are consequential in myriad ways. To say that regionalism – and by extension its younger by-product, interregionalism – is important, reveals little about its pathways and purposes and whether and how those purposes have been achieved. Certainly, its trajectory has been neither straightforward nor uncontested, as the different chapters of this volume show. Those who have studied the processes of regionalism over the years will be aware how original concepts and plans, together with the accompa­ nying theories designed to explain them, have frequently changed track, become derailed or been proved less useful or relevant than their advocates first believed. Think back to the seminal piece by Ernst Haas (1975) who, despite initially having been one of its most fervent advocates, proclaimed the “obsolescence” of integration theory. Or think of the recent crises of regionalism, notably in Europe and the Americas but also in other parts of the world, which have raised serious questions about its nature and purpose (Zielonka, 2014). Or, the fact that some regionalisms, originally designed to serve economic purposes have switched focus to political or security concerns. The Economic Community of West African States is an example of a regional organisation that shifted from mainly economic objectives, as suggested by its name, towards security

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Preface

xi

functions, reflected in its role in peace operations. Or, to move to the immediate concerns of this volume, how the stated intentions of interregionalism to fos­ ter greater collaboration and good institutional practices between regions have been frequently frustrated by accident, or even by design. The European Union’s many and often thwarted plans and projects for securing peace and prosperity in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are a case in point. Like regionalism, interregionalism evidently has not behaved according to any single or prescribed set of criteria but is highly sensitive to time, place and the inputs of different actors. Whether in buttressing the global security architecture, in promoting trade or in supporting political and institutional change, regionalism and interregionalism have frequently defied the expectations of their protago­ nists and theorists. Such evident unpredictability leads directly to the issue of unintended conse­ quences, the focus of this volume. Unintended consequences are acknowledged to be an “inescapable reality of international politics and policies” (page 12 in this volume). Indeed, they are perhaps an inevitable outcome of interregionalism, involving a complex range of different actors with often diverging points of view. In the words of the editors, they are a “theoretical device to decentre the way in which interregionalism and regionalism more generally are studied in international relations” (page 7 in this volume). Exploring such unintended consequences across a range of cases – including Latin America, the Sahel, the Caucasus and Southeast Asia – helps therefore to shine new light on the processes of regionalism and interregionalism themselves. The scholarship on regionalism and interregionalism has been characterised by recurrent critical reflection and debate. Over the past two decades, authors have noted the need to move beyond “old” and “new” paradigms (Hettne, 2005), to embrace a “post-revisionist” approach (Telò, Fawcett, & Ponjaert, 2015), to decentre regionalism or to move beyond Eurocentrism (Acharya, 2016; Fawcett, 2020). And, by asking questions about unintended consequences, this book fur­ thers that debate in a number of important ways. Here, three interrelated points stand out. First, such consequences challenge the received notion of regional­ ism as necessarily enhancing public goods: interregionalism is supposed to have benign and positive consequences for the different parties involved, but evidence shows it can also have detrimental effects, contributing to competition and resist­ ance. This recalls Richard Falk’s (2002: 69) warning of regionalism’s potentially “negative” sides. Second, and precisely through its involvement of a wide range of state and non-state actors, inter-regionalism may also have the effect of weak­ ening rather than strengthening formal institutions, by privileging some actors or policies over others. Regionalism and interregionalism can, like globalisa­ tion, lead to fragmentation. Third, exploring the unexpected consequences of interregionalism supports an approach that decentres regionalism and interre­ gionalism by shifting it from its European and North Atlantic moorings. This has as a levelling effect where different regions, actors and outcomes need to be examined on their own terms, not from the singular perspective of a particular

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Preface

organisation, which in academic practice, is often the European Union. This decentring challenges scholars to adopt a more critical, holistic and indeed global view of the processes of regionalism and interregionalism. All the chapters in this thought-provoking volume tackle this central issue, albeit in different settings and in different ways. In doing so, they alert us to the multifaceted and contested nature of regionalism and interregionalism as well as the need for theory to keep pace with constantly evolving practice. Louise Fawcett, University of Oxford, United Kingdom

References Acharya, Amitav. (2016). Regionalism beyond EU-Centrism. In: Börzel, Tanja and Thomas Risse (Eds.). Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 109–130. Falk, Richard. (1999). Predatory Globalization. Cambridge: Polity. Fawcett, Louise. 2020. Regionalism. In: Berg-Schlosser, Dirk, Bertrand Badie and LeonardoMorlino (Eds.). The Sage Handbook of Political Science. London: Sage, 1349–1365. Haas, Ernst B. (1975). The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory. Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies. Hettne, Björn. (2005). Beyond the New Regionalism. New Political Economy, 10(4): 543–571. Telò, Mario, Louise Fawcett and Frederik Ponjaert (Eds.). (2015). Interregionalism and the European Union. A Post-Revisionist Approach to Europe’s Place in a Changing World. New York: Ashgate. Zielonka, J. (2014). Is the EU Doomed? London: Polity.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This publication received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Grant Agreement No 722826. The starting point for this book was a scientific work­ shop held in February 2018 in Hamburg, Germany. The workshop was part of the GEM-STONES project (Globalisation, Europe and Multilateralism  – Sophistication of the Transnational Order, Networks and European Strategies), in particular the Rubies work package dealing with how regionalisms interact. We also thank two anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful input. During the preparation of the manuscript we received valuable support from Joanna Britton for proofreading.

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1 THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INTERREGIONALISM New concepts for understanding the entanglements of regionalisms Elisa Lopez-Lucia and Frank Mattheis Introduction In February 2020, the College of European Commissioners jointly travelled to Addis Ababa to meet with their counterparts from the African Union. It was the tenth time that this Commission-to-Commission (C2C) encounter took place already and is just one of the manifold visible manifestations of the growing importance that interregionalism plays in international rela­ tions (IR). Interregionalism is generally examined according to the intended objectives of the driving actors. Given the asymmetric character of most interregionalisms, this examination is focused on the European side of the relationship. By contrast, the other end of the interregional relationship as well as the unintended consequences and the broader impact of interregionalism on its socio-political environment are given less attention. To address these biases we seek to go beyond this predominant focus on the EU and self-given standards of success and failures, and propose a more fine-grained and con­ textual analysis. To this end this chapter proposes a novel framework to look at interregional interactions from the lens of unintended consequences. The framework serves as a decentring device to examine the overlooked interplays between the actors, interactions, circumstances and social structures that con­ stitute interregionalism. The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, we discuss the phe­ nomenon of interregionalism as well as the relevant scholarship and the short­ comings related to EU-centrism and terminology, which we seek to address in this text. In the second part, we lay out the reasons why we have chosen to apply the concept of unintended consequences to study interregionalism. We consider how various literatures have identified unintended consequences in IR before unpacking this concept and its application to the field of interregionalism. In

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the third and last part, we introduce the individual chapters of the volume and explain how the book is structured according to three effects that interregional relations have: effects on the actors, effect on the interregional structure and broader social change.

Interregionalism: relevance and shortcomings of the scholarship The phenomenon of interregionalism Interregionalism regularly appears in the news. High-level summits such as the C2C are convened, trade agreements are negotiated between regional groups (Mercosur-SACU), foreign ambassadors are accredited to regional organisations (e.g. there are a dozen permanent delegations of non-members to the Association of South-East Asian Nations, ASEAN) and regional development aid represents a substantial share of the portfolio of donor agencies (i.e. 5 billion USD in 2016, cf. Stapel and Söderbaum, 2020). Although some earlier attempts at interregionalism have been abandoned, others have emerged and evolved, putting into question previous assessments that formal interregionalism might have been a passing fad (cf. Hardacre, 2010; Camroux, 2010). In addition to the interactions between regionalism and mem­ ber states as well as those between regionalism and globalisation, the interre­ gional level is thus gaining importance. Yet in terms of theoretical and conceptual work, the scholarship on interregionalism is still developing. The study of exter­ nal relations, interactions and transfers with and between region-building pro­ jects constitutes a recent but significant subfield within research on IR and global governance. Even though there is no authoritative definition yet, in its narrowest sense interregionalism refers to the interdependence and institutionalised interactions between two distinct regionalisms, usually embodied in formal regional organ­ isations (cf. also Mattheis and Litsegård, 2018; Baert et al., 2014; Doidge, 2007). Several authors have expanded or nuanced this definition so as to include infor­ mal processes or actors that are not regional organisations, but which have acquired regional agency (Söderbaum, 2016; Hänggi, Roloff, and Rüland, 2006; Gardini and Malamud, 2018).

Interregionalism in regionalism studies The scholarship on interregionalism can be considered an offshoot or niche of regional integration studies. The precursor of interregionalism studies was the study of external relations related to particular regional projects (Kaiser, 1968). Most of the related empirical research predominantly understood interregionalism – albeit without using the term – as a unidirectional matter. European Studies dominated the field since the 1970s, when the European Communities were

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Unintended consequences of interregionalism 3

deemed to have developed the capacity to play a role on their own in inter­ national affairs (Cosgrove-Sacks and Twitchett, 1970; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). Much of this research related to specific external entanglements, such as Europe’s relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states or with groups of states seeking accession to the European Communities. Little research was devoted to any overarching framework of interregionalism. In general, regionalism theory and concepts focused on intraregional dynam­ ics and engaged less with interregionalism, with some exceptions such as the influence of external hegemons. Therefore, the scholarship of regionalism made few theoretical claims in relation to interregionalism. However, some of their concepts of regionalism can be extrapolated to apply to interregionalism (cf. Mattheis, 2014). For instance, the rapprochement of political elites (engrenage), spill-over effects or the impact of domestic politics have been suggested as factors driving regionalism and can be similarly applied to the emergence and evolution of interregionalism. However, interregionalism will invariably be of a looser nature than the underpinning regionalisms, meaning that on average, those mechanisms can be expected to be more ephemeral and less committal than regional integration dynamics. The conceptual study of interregionalism as a global phenomenon emerged alongside the advancement of comparative regionalism, which occurred from the late 1990s onwards (Hänggi et al., 2006; Doidge, 2007; Baert et al., 2014; Fawcett et al., 2015). Two considerations propelled the scholarship. The first one was of an empirical nature, as the 1990s had witnessed a proliferation of regional projects across the world, leading to many of them acquiring institutional capac­ ities and aspiring towards some form of actorness outside of their own region. The second consideration was how to reconcile the divisions between EU studies and regionalism studies (Mattheis, 2017). Interregionalism – if understood as a global phenomenon – would go beyond the study of the EU’s external relations and take the other end of interregionalism as seriously as the EU itself, and even expand its remit to encompass interregionalism that does not include the EU at all (Lammich, 2020). As a consequence, the bulk of scholarship focused on providing a more sophisticated understanding of interregionalism by engaging with two related research questions: how to explain the emergence and purpose of interregion­ alism, and how to go beyond the European case and cover the entire gamut of interregionalism.

Interregionalism as a distinct research object Regarding the first question, scholars proposed numerous reasons to explain interregionalism, ranging from rational and realist arguments highlighting interests and power to institutionalist and constructivist arguments highlight­ ing identities and norms (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2005; Doidge, 2011). Much of the reasoning derived its arguments from the European case and was used in

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connection with the growing mandate and impact of the EU’s emerging foreign policy regarding other regions. The neofunctionalist concern with how national political elites converge towards a common way of thinking indicates that assimilation between regional elites could facilitate interregionalism. The intergovernmental argument of inter­ est convergence among national leaders within a region goes in a similar direc­ tion and would suggest that interregionalism is largely determined by domestic (i.e. regional and national) policies. For instance, interregional trade negotiations would be a consequence of domestic industrialisation policies. Interregionalism could also serve as a means to consolidate regional power and gain legitimacy. But interregionalism cannot be reduced to a simple extension of national inter­ ests. The proliferation of the ideal of region-building across the world suggests the existence of direct connections between these projects, a hypothesis that the literature on norm diffusion has investigated (Solís et al., 2009; Simmons and Elkins, 2004), and it has been suggested that successful or widespread types of regionalisms would be emulated in other regions (Börzel and Risse, 2009). The research strand of diffusion has been concerned with the questions of whether and how regional models diffuse across regions (Solingen, 2012). Regionalisms would thus constitute an independent variable for other regionalisms with respect to their design ( Jetschke and Lenz, 2013). The EU has constituted the central reference point in the scholarship of diffusion, as scholars have been concerned with the transfer of its institutional models and policies abroad (Risse, 2016). A different but related strand of research has been concerned with the impact of interregionalism on regionalism, for instance on regional actorness, consisting of the visibility, recognition and institutionalisation of regionalisms (Mattheis and Wunderlich, 2017; Doctor, 2007). Regarding the second question of going global, a considerable proportion of the scholarship has revolved around the creation of a terminology with several neologisms that would allow a differentiation of the empirical manifestations under one umbrella of interregionalism. Initially, this approach was mainly used to distinguish the numerous foreign policy instruments that the EU set up – from its neighbourhood policy to the strategic partnerships with regional pow­ ers. However, it has resulted in the production of sub-categories that would also be applicable beyond the European case. A significant number of categories have been proposed, including: • • • •

Pure or bilateral interregionalism (Hardacre and Smith, 2009), i.e. between two formal regional organisations. Crossregionalism (Garzón and Nolte, 2017), i.e. between a regionalism and several states in another region. Transregionalism (Ribeiro-Hoffmann, 2016), i.e. among a heterogenous group of actors, including individual states, that belong to different regions. Overlapping regionalism (Panke and Stapel, 2018), i.e. between regional organisations with an overlapping territory.

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Unintended consequences of interregionalism 5

• • •

Bifurcated regionalism (Mattheis, 2017), i.e. between regional projects that belong to the same regional order. Stealth interregionalism (Gardini and Malamud, 2018), i.e. occurring in informal ways between two regionalisms. Hybrid or quasi interregionalism (Farrell, 2010; Teló et al., 2015), i.e. between a regional organisation and an actor representing another region, such as a regional hegemon or an ad hoc group of states.

The main concern of these efforts concerned with terminology was to distin­ guish interregionalism according to the main actors involved. In other words, scholars assumed that substantial differences would be uncovered from who was engaging in relations with other regionalisms or acting on behalf of a region abroad. Although in practice, the categories often overlap and interregionalism is usually an amalgamation of several of these layers, these distinctions have enabled a debate about the complementing or competing relationship between different interregional layers as well as about the distinct links between interre­ gionalism and regionalism.

Advancing interregionalism beyond EU-centrism and terminology The focus of the scholarship on terminology and on diffusion of norms produced useful insights but also faced limitations. The most evident limitation has been EU-centrism, and this volume seeks to address some of the challenges stemming from this shortcoming. Since most interregional concepts have been devised around the EU, they implicitly or explicitly assume asymmetry between two regions: an institution­ alised driving force and a weak receiving end. Indeed, interregionalism is linked to financial support, as many regional organisations depend on the EU as an external donor for their activities. And even if the literature does not rely on the EU as a primary factor for region building across the world, recognising that the evolution of regionalisms cannot chiefly be explained by a process of imitating other regions, it still takes the EU as a prima facie point of reference. For many reasons the EU constitutes the “‘most likely’ case for the study of regional actors in interregionalism”, as Baert et al. (2014: 3) argue. The role of the EU as a regionalist model might be misleading here, as most regional organisations lack supranational elements (Fioramonti and Mattheis, 2016). Regional organisations outside of the EU might not necessarily have a strong mandate or institutional capacity to conduct interregional relations with third parties and few of them consider the active promotion of their values outside their region to be a central task. Yet, this does not prevent them from going beyond their region. They do not operate in isolation but are entangled in complex interregional webs. For instance, the subsidiarity of the United Nations (UN) to delegate security responsibilities to regional organisations as per Chapter VIII of the UN Charter

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(United Nations,  1945) has triggered interactions between the organisations themselves. In the field of economic integration, learning processes have reg­ ularly been promoted, for instance between South America and Southeast Asia (Hira, 2007). Therefore, the focus on supranationalism obscures mechanisms of interregionalism, which are subtler than formal diplomatic and financial ties, for instance two regionalisms competing for recognition or over the form, mean­ ing and function of a region. Some of these mechanisms of interregionalism are potentially easier to discern when we examine interactions that go beyond the EU as predominant actor of interregionalism, both within Europe and globally. A particular omission from the EU-centric asymmetric notions in the litera­ ture on interregionalism has been the relatively lack of attention to the influence of interregionalism on the EU itself. If effects have been examined at all, the scholarship has generally analysed them in a unilateral fashion, thus privileging direct impact in one single direction while omitting the reciprocity of interre­ gionalism (Lammich, 2020). However, the nature of interregionalism implies that each regionalism is able to exercise an impact on its counterpart (Mattheis and Wunderlich, 2017; Kotsopoulos and Mattheis, 2018). More generally, the impact of interregionalism has typically been understood as a function of the interests and objectives of one regionalism, whether political, economic or ide­ ological (Mattheis and Litsegård, 2018). In this context, little attention has been paid to effects that can be considered unintended consequences of interregionalism. However, interregionalism constitutes a transformative transnational social phenomenon and such unintended consequences are crucial elements. There is thus a particular need to go beyond official declarations and rational-choice or functional approaches. Moreover, despite important scholarly advances in this area over the last years, entanglements among the rest of the world remain underestimated (cf. Hettne and Söderbaum, 2005; Doidge, 2007). As a consequence, global comparison remained limited, as the typologies discussed above have mainly been applied to analyse different types of interregionalism as variations of EU-driven rela­ tionships. In order to remedy this lack of comparative interregionalism, and thereby develop a broader research framework (Rüland, 2014: 41), scholarship would need to move beyond proto-typologies through terminology. Thus, the next step is to better understand interregional relations through the dif­ ferent forms they take, including the sets of actors and strategies, and their many effects. This would constitute a step towards an interpretive comparative approach to interregionalism, which identifies the particularities of different patterns of processes and interactions that constitute interregionalism. Indeed, regional organisations remain unique institutions and their interregionalisms combine contextual elements with external influence. With this book we seek to respond to some of the major shortcomings in the scholarship by bringing in cases that are not centred one-sidedly on the EU but equally include other regional actors, while also considering the multitude of effects of interregionalism, including on the EU itself.

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The unintended consequences of interregionalism The following section first lays out the purpose of this edited volume and the rea­ sons for which we have chosen to apply the concept of unintended consequences to study interregionalism. It then explains how various literatures have identified unintended consequences as an important aspect of IR, before unpacking the concept and its application to the field of interregionalism.

Decentring the study of (inter)regionalism in international relations For the purpose of this edited volume, the concept of unintended consequences constitutes a theoretical device to decentre the way, in which interregionalism and regionalism are more generally1 studied in IR. Although regionalism stud­ ies constitute a rich and an eclectic body of literature, it is also characterised by several ‘ways of thinking’ about the phenomena of regionalism and interregion­ alism. Even though they cannot be said to characterise the entire literature, the following ‘ways of thinking’ remain particularly prominent and have left their imprint on this academic field. The first way of thinking that shapes the field of regionalism studies is Thinking deductively. Although most work in this field cannot be said to be purely deductive, as deductive and inductive moves are often intertwined in empirical research, it tends to have deductive ambitions or to be framed by a deductive logic. Indeed, case studies in the comparative regionalism and the interregion­ alism literatures are often analysed through the lens of theoretical or analytical frameworks that include pre-identified scientific categories, factors and variables, which are connected to causally explain the phenomenon of (inter)regional­ ism. When possible, hypotheses and concepts derived from these frameworks are tested against an objective reality in one or more case studies with the ambition of generalising explanations across cases. A volume edited by Börzel et al. (2012) is particularly illustrative of this deductive thinking as the book’s aim is to pro­ vide and apply a comprehensive framework to explain the emergence and role of regional organisations.2 More specifically, on interregionalism, the literature on diffusion has come up with a typology of direct and indirect influence mecha­ nisms ranging from coercion to emulation (Risse, 2016). Another path is the construction of a ‘pre-theory’ or conceptual apparatus to come up with a matrix to investigate regionalism, which is able to articulate and order empirical facts. Even if it stops short of developing hypotheses to be tested, this path is still framed by a deductive way of thinking as facts become signif­ icant only through their lodging in this matrix (Hollis and Smith, 1991).3 For instance, comprehensive theoretical frameworks such as regional security com­ plex theory (Buzan and Wæver, 2003) and the security community framework (Adler and Barnett, 1998) aim to explain the creation and evolution of regional entities through the identification of stages and sets of material and ideational

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factors, which are then applied to empirical case studies. Other approaches pro­ pose looser analytical frameworks such as regional security governance4 and the new regionalism approach (NRA)5 but also endeavour to identify and apply sets of factors that can explain the emergence and/or evolution of regionalism and compare their influence across geographical case studies. In the NRA, the concept of ‘regionness’ elaborated by Hettne and Söderbaum (2000) provides a typology to analyse the different evolutionary stages of regional entities.6 Finally, typologies have also been conceived to classify different types of interregionalism (cf. Section 1; Gardini and Malamud, 2018). Thinking normatively is the second ‘way of thinking’ that has contributed to define these literatures. The tendency to assume that regionalism is a pos­ itive development with the potential to bring security and prosperity across the world, has been strong since the expansion of this field of research in the 1990s (see e.g., Hettne et al., 2000). Regionalism is too often taken to be a functional and/or rational answer to complex regional and international issues, mirroring a policy debate ‘plagued by idealism about the benefits of regional organizations and more or less naïve assumptions about what they can achieve’ (Söderbaum, 2013: 11). This presupposition has opened the way for the production of a large amount of work analysing the efficiency, effi­ cacy and legitimacy of regional projects, driven by the broader and some­ times implicit objective of improving the intended impacts of regionalism. With some important exceptions, in particular work investigating the polit­ ical economy of regionalism,7 and scholars who have endeavoured to analyse regionalism in authoritarian contexts (see Russo and Stoddard, 2018) or as a way of regime-boosting (Söderbaum, 2004), the unintended consequences, and the broader impact of regionalism on its socio-political environment and on people’s lives is usually not on the agenda. Given the uncertainty regard­ ing the direct and indirect consequences of interregionalism, more attention should be invested in understanding the social conditions, working and effects of interregionalism, instead of presupposing that interregional relations will be or are set up to be providers of public goods. These ‘ways of thinking’ are not misguiding in themselves. They have pro­ duced rich empirical analyses and fruitful attempts to theorise and empirically study regionalism. However, we argue that some space should be further opened for alternative ‘ways of thinking’ about interregionalism, in particular for Thinking inductively and Revisiting the normative dimension to analyse more comprehensively interregional interactions and their effects. In recent years, some innovative work has been pushing the boundaries of comparative regionalism by engaging with other field of studies such as political geography, political economy and political sociology (Hameiri, 2013; Bach, 2016; Lopez-Lucia, 2019; Mattheis et al., 2019; Parthenay, 2019). They have offered more sociological, historical, contextual and less normative understandings of regionalism. This edited volume’s ambition is to contribute to this trend by investigating interregionalism through the lens of its unintended consequences.

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Engaging with interregionalism through this lens provides an alternative to the deductive tendencies of this field of research dominated by positivism like much of IR – a domination that has led to a general difficulty in acknowledging complexity and contingency (Daase and Friesendorf, 2012). Too much focus on theorisation, which has been a central ambition of comparative regionalism,8 risks overshadowing ‘meanings as they exist for social agents’ (Pouliot, 2007), and thus limiting our ability to understand the working and the politics of interregionalism understood as the negotiations and struggles over the defini­ tion, function and resources of these interregional relations. Thus, the meaningmaking and social practices of actors and region-builders that feature at the core of their politics are often neglected by regionalism studies (Lopez-Lucia, 2019; Parthenay, 2019). The risk is thus that one turns a blind eye to the complex social processes that constitute this international social phenomenon. Focusing on the unintended consequences of interregionalism enables us to engage with these alternative ways of thinking about regionalism. Instead of being a conceptual apparatus meant to order or make sense of the world, the concept of unintended consequences is used here as a decentring device meant to bring our attention to the interactions that constitute interregionalism. It acknowledges the multifaceted outcomes of complex interactions taking place between groups of individual and institutional actors both within each side of the interregional relations and between them, and requires approaches that are less driven by pre-identified scientific categories which are thus more inductive. This inductive way of thinking is more sensitive to the meanings created through the discourses and the practices of the actors of interregionalism, and to their con­ stitutive effects. In particular, through interpretation, the analytical step which often follows the first inductive moment, these meanings are contextualised and historicised to shed light on social phenomena such as interregionalism (Pouliot, 2007). However, we do not mean that induction and interpretation do not entail preconceptions. Interpretation is also the ‘key heuristic moment (which) consists of making sense of raw empirical data. This process of sense making always consists of entering into a dialogue between the preconceptions we bring to the study and the empirical data we have collected’ (Wagenaar, 2011: 244; see also Bevir and Rhodes, 2012). The concept of unintended consequences is indeed a guiding lens for analysis that is based on certain assumptions as specified above but does not provide a matrix connecting specific factors and variables to inves­ tigate interregionalism. Concretely, Thinking inductively has led the authors of this volume to focus on the actors of interregionalism; on how their actions, and the collective meanings and material constraints that shape their action, constitute interregional interac­ tions. For the authors in this edited volume, using unintended consequences as a decentring device has been a way to raise new empirical puzzles in case studies which they were, sometimes, already very familiar with, and thus enabled them to reflect on, or bring out new and surprising elements about the social condi­ tions, practices and effects of interregionalism. To cite Geertz (1973: 26), the

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task of the inductive and more interpretive work undertaken by the authors of this volume was not ‘to codify abstract regularities but to make thick description possible, not to generalize across cases but to generalize within them’ with a view to better understand the working of interregionalism. This inductive approach also allows for a less normative perspective on interregionalism: one which is less concerned with improving the role of regional projects and their relations as providers of public goods, and more concerned with understanding their working and broader effects. This means, on the one hand, going beyond analyses of the efficiency, coherency and legitimacy of (inter)regionalism and engaging with the social processes at play that characterise interregional interactions such as processes of domination, contestation, compe­ titions, negotiation, adaptation or instrumentalisation that can lead to a variety of effects on all sides of the interactions. On the other hand, it means not limiting our focus to the outcomes of interregional relations in terms of unilateral insti­ tutional and normative transfers as is often the case, but also studying the impact of these relations on the affected individuals and societies. Indeed, in a world where regionalism has become a major form of political rule (Acharya, 2007), the potential to transform its environment is inherent in interregionalism. While interregional relations are often legitimised by official statements asserting their positive impact on the security, prosperity and trade or political stability of all parties, the complexity added by the important number of actors and institutions involved, and the power asymmetries that often exist between them can also trigger a set of unintended consequences impacting these actors and their envi­ ronment that deserve to be studied. Bringing attention to both the direct and broader effects of interregionalism can contribute to help uncover unexpected issues, sometimes, on the darker sides of interregionalism that might mitigate the usual representation of a clear provider of public good.

What does thinking about unintended consequences bring to international relations? Dissatisfaction with the focus of empirical analyses on the efficiency and suc­ cess of international policies is not unique to comparative regionalism and the literature on interregionalism. Researchers have identified this limitation and argued that it is necessary to look at the broader impact of international policies, including their unintended consequences which, in some cases, may turn out to be the policies’ main effects. Close to regionalism studies, Daase and Friesendorf (2012) have made this case in an edited volume on the unintended consequences of security governance. Similarly, in EU studies, Burlyuk (2017: 1009–1010) argues that: “The mainstream scholarship on the assessment of EU external performance – ‘external governance’, ‘transformative power’, ‘value promotion’ or ‘impact abroad’ – frames the subject in terms of a success or a failure to achieve the intended effects, the latter usually defined against the EU’s own declared objectives and tacitly surrounded with an air of positive connotations”.

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Furthermore, studying the unintended consequences of social and political phenomena has already been central to other subfields in IR such as development studies, gender studies and peacebuilding among others. A seminal example from development studies is James Ferguson’s (1994) book, The Anti-Politics Machine. In this study, Ferguson analyses the effects of agricultural development and decen­ tralisation projects that were funded by Canada and the World Bank in Lesotho. These projects failed for various reasons, including the planners’ handling of the projects as mere technocratic reforms to be implemented, and their disconnec­ tion from local realities. At the same time, these projects were instrumentalised by various actors in Lesotho to pursue their own goals. Indeed, what Ferguson powerfully shows is that an unintended consequence of these projects was to enable the government of Lesotho to expand its bureaucratic power through­ out the territory and in people’s day-to-day lives. More recently, in her book Governing Failure, Jacqueline Best (2014) examines the transformations of the governance practices of international financial institutions and of major donors. She shows that the erosion of their expert authority in the 1990s, due to a grow­ ing perception of the failure of development aid, has led more experimental strategies to minimise failure. These new strategies have brought about new actors and forms of knowledge, in particular local ones, as a way to learn from past failures and better respond to a world seen as increasingly uncertain. Often, however, Best argues, this more experimental and inclusive form of expertise is trumped by a risk-averse one relying on measurable results to deal with the messiness; a traditional strategy that, on the contrary, reduces genuine debate and deliberation. This lack of consensus over strategies, in addition to persistent fail­ ures of performance, produced a further erosion of the authority of international financial institutions instead of fostering it. Peacebuilding provides another compelling example of a policy field where surprising unintended consequences arise. Andreas’ (2009) study of peace oper­ ations in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995 is particularly revealing as he shows that, while these operations unintentionally contributed to illicit business activities (e.g. smuggling weapons and other supplies, theft and diversion of humanitarian aid); these activities also unexpectedly contributed to some of the goals of the peace operations such as helping to sustain the civilian population and bringing an end to the conflict. In another article, Autesserre (2012) explores the nega­ tive impact of international efforts aiming at building peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo. She argues that three dominant narratives were produced on the conflict leading to different solutions whose effects clashed with their intended objective, namely the reduction of violence. These narratives identify the primary cause of violence as the illegal exploitation of mineral resources; the main consequence as the sexual abuse of women and girls; and the key solution to be the extension of state authority. Autesserre shows that these narratives provided simplistic readings of the situation which had the effect of eclipsing alternative understandings of the problems and solutions. Instead, they led to a deterioration of the situation: the armed groups strengthened their control over

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the mines; sexual abuse became an effective bargaining tool for combatants; and the capacity of an authoritarian regime to oppress its population was boosted. These two examples belong to a large literature in peacebuilding, which pro­ vides fine-grained analyses showing the complexity of international interven­ tions and the unintended consequences that result from their interactions with local actors (see also Chandler, 2013; Visoka, 2016). In gender studies, many researchers have highlighted how (gender) policies can also have unintended and sometimes undesirable, consequences for wom­ en’s opportunities and status (e.g. Jennings, 2010). Berry (2017) contradicts the idea that international support for gender policies that promote women’s rights and their political representation in post-war contexts provide opportunities for women. She shows that in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, instead of help­ ing women build on the fluidity of the gender order brought by the war, the post-war political settlement negotiated by elites and international actors had counter-productive effects. Policies such as the introduction of rights-based pro­ tections and increased inclusion in formal political processes actually created hierarchies of victimhood among women that deepened divisions within and between women’s groups, and lessened their ability to organise collective action around shared gender interests. Also studying a women’s movement in a post­ war context, Liberia, Debusscher and Martin de Almagro (2016) argue that the unexpected consequences of the internationally proclaimed success of this move­ ment are, paradoxically, its fragmentation and incapacity to take action, as the success triggered competition within the movement, attempts at appropriation by the government and unmet expectations. This brief review shows how unintended consequences are an inescapable reality of international politics and policies. The effects of these policies on the actors involved, on the policies themselves and on their broader environment cannot be analysed by merely evaluating their self-given standards of success and failures. They require more fine-grained and contextual analyses bringing our attention to complex interactions involving multiple individual and institutional actors, driven by various representations, interests and strategies, which often result in unintended consequences that substantially affect the socio-political context in which they unfold. These examples thus provided us with a produc­ tive inspiration for this volume. Daase and Friesendorf ’s (2012) edited volume and Burlyuk and Noutcheva’s (2019) co-edited special issue of on the unintended consequences of the EU external action already made the case for a theorisation and systematisation of the study of unintended consequences in academic fields, which are close to comparative regionalism and interregionalism. One of the aims of Daase and Friesendorf ’s (2012) contribution is to improve the effectiveness of security gov­ ernance by limiting the damages caused by unintended consequences (see also Aoi et al., 2007 for a similar ambition). Although the containment of negative effects is a legitimate objective that may appear in some contributions of this vol­ ume, our main objective is not to contribute to improve interregional relations.

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Rather, we seek to open a space to inductively study interregional relations, understand their working through a focus on the complex and contextual inter­ actions between the actors involved, and to study how they contribute to social change through their unintended consequences. We take on Boudon’s (1977: 1) claim that unintended consequences or ‘perverse effects’ as he labelled them ‘are present everywhere in social life and they represent one of the fundamen­ tal causes of social imbalances and of social change’. As such, they are worth studying as a research object in their own right to advance our reflection on interregionalism.

What does the concept unintended consequences entail? The concept of unintended consequences was initially theorised in sociology. Merton (1936: 903) was the first sociologist who explicitly tried to character­ ise unintended consequences, which he defines as follows: ‘with the complex interaction which constitutes society, action ramifies, its consequences are not restricted to the specific area in which they were initially intended to centre, they occur in interrelated fields explicitly ignored at the time of action’. Later on, another sociologist, Baert (1991), drew on Merton’s article to provide a typology of unintended consequences. He defines unintended consequences as ‘a particu­ lar effect of purposive action which is different from what was wanted at the moment of carrying out the act, and the want of which was a reason for carrying it out’(Baert, 1991: 201). It should be noted that unintended consequences do not have to be undesirable from the point of view of the actor(s) carrying out the action. They can be desirable for some actors and undesirable for others; and they can leave the actors directly involved indifferent while positively or negatively affecting broader society. The chapters by Johann Wolfschwenger and Giulia Prelz Oltramonti in this volume show, for instance, that different interregional actors – in their cases the EU and Russia – can have diverging assessments of the same unintended consequence. Strong asymmetries can also exist inasmuch as some actors might be affected much more than others by unintended conse­ quences. Unintended consequences can also reinforce, adversely affect or re­ orient the actor(s)’ intended objectives (Merton, 1936; Baert, 1991). Hence, these consequences do not have to be about policy failures even though many have highlighted their link to policy failure (Daase and Friesendorf, 2012). Boudon (1977: 5), for instance, stresses that ‘The perverse mechanisms that are most sig­ nificant socially are those that end up producing undesirable effects, those that are in everyday parlance called perverse. By creating unwanted and often unex­ pected social imbalances, they play a vital role in social change’. Yet our aim is not to reduce the term to mere policy failure and negative effects but to study more comprehensively the working and the effects of interregionalism. Further complexity stems from unintended consequences not having to be unanticipated nor unexpected. They can be unanticipated if the actors have not thought of them before carrying out the action which is how we commonly

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think about unintended consequences. They can be anticipated but unexpected when the actors were at least aware of their possibility even though they thought it would not happen. And they can be expected in the case that the actor(s) were expecting the unintended consequences but still decided to carry out their action (Baert, 1991). Finally, they can be either synchronic (when they occur simultane­ ously with the action) or diachronic (when they occur sometime after or before) (Baert, 1991) – the diachronic type being more difficult to trace but potentially more interesting in terms of broader social change. Without attempting to make a typology or classification of unintended consequences as, for instance, Baert (1991) and Burlyuk (2017) have sought to do, our aim is to build on their work and on the interpretive and sociological literature developed in IR to provide a framework for this volume. Given the diverse manifestations of unintended consequences, an important question raised by various authors concerns the definition of what an intended action is in the first place. This ‘fuzzy notion’(Daase and Friesendorf, 2012: 10) might be better understood as ‘a complex of intentions which guide one’s action’(Baert, 1991: 202). The fuzziness of the intended objectives of the actors is particularly challenging when we immerse ourselves in a case study. Depending on the research question, the explicit and official – as apparent in publicly released documents – objective(s) of a policy can be used as a benchmark for what is intended. In such cases, the purpose is rather to investigate the broader social effect of interregional relations than to open the policy-making box; to focus on actions and practices throughout the implementation of interregional initiatives or programmes rather than during the elaboration of policies. For instance, the chapters by Edoardo Baldaro and Friedrich Plank show that beneath the surface of formally and informally defined interregional projects in West Africa lie numer­ ous practices that contribute to regional and interregional instability. In many cases, however, it is thus central, through various qualitative methods (analyses of speeches and documents, interviews or participant observation), to delve into the preferences, representations, positions or strategies of the actors involved in policy-making to understand how the objectives driving the interregional rela­ tions came to be, and how they are put into practice (Daase and Friesendorf, 2012; Burlyuk, 2017). This path might make it possible to establish whether the unintended consequences were anticipated, unanticipated or expected. Some have warned, however, that this is a difficult endeavour, complicated by processes of rationalisation through which the actor(s) might reassess their intentions after the action has been carried out (Merton, 1936; Baert, 1991). For example, unintended consequences might be rationalised as intended, in particular if they are seen as desirable, and, vice versa, some consequences can be declared to be unanticipated even though they were indeed anticipated and even expected. Nevertheless, such an analysis depends on our understanding of intentions. Problems mainly arise when intentions are seen as a mental process depending exclusively on the internal experience of the actors, and when the aim is to reconstruct this mental process. This position can be called intentionalism

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Unintended consequences of interregionalism 15

(Wagenaar, 2011). Interpretivists, instead, would argue that the beliefs, prefer­ ences, representations and strategies that people hold derive their meaning from, and are only understandable within, a larger social system made of social rules (Hollis and Smith, 1991). By relating actors’ behaviours to the collective mean­ ing on which they draw to make sense of their reality, we can gain access to the social meaning of their actions which is where our interest lies. This also means that intentions, understood in this way, can be derived from context, circum­ stances and an understanding of the social structures in which they are embedded (Coulter, 1979). Understood as a set of effects, unintended consequences are also categorised according to the nature of the effect. Merton (1936) and Baert (1991) broadly identify three types of effects, which we have adapted to provide the structure of this volume. First, effects on the actor(s) carrying out the action. For us, this cat­ egory includes the effects of interregional interactions on groups of individuals and institutional actors situated on either or all sides of the relations. Interactions can produce a broad range of effects linked to institutional, political, normative, identity or economic change. In an edited volume on interregionalism, Jürgen Rüland, for instance, highlights the normative impact of EU-ASEAN relations on the ASEAN side. He argues that the EU’s normative capacity-building efforts towards a more participatory regionalism not only failed but also reinforced and re-legitimised ASEAN’s ‘selectively inclusive state-controlled corporatist type of interests representation’ (Rüland, 2015: 283). Stevens (2006) suggests that the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and Sub-Saharan African regions have the potential to weaken regionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa. Issues of (des)integration, challenged regional agency and fragmentation can thus arise as unintended consequences of interregional interactions. The second type of effect comprises those on the level of the social system or structure. As we identify interregionalism as the social and/or institutional structure within which individual and institutional actors interact, this third type of effect is par­ ticularly relevant to understand the working and dynamics of transformation of interregionalism. We will see in particular how competition and asymmet­ rical relations between regionalisms can affect and sometimes undermine the interregional structure. Finally, the third type of effect concerns broader social changes. This category can include effects on the regional environment (stabil­ ity, economic development, political dynamics, etc.) and on actors who are not directly involved in interregional interactions. Indeed, interregionalism can have effects on the everyday life of individuals, communities and on societies who do not participate in the shaping of interregional relations. In the case of RussiaNATO relations, for instance, Pouliot (2012) shows that even though both sides appeared to be seeking to transform regional security practices away from Cold War realpolitik, their interactions ended up producing continued insecurity in the Russian-Atlantic region, thereby affecting societies in this region. The classification of unintended consequences also engages with the factors explaining the reason for unintended consequences. Merton (1936) lists five such

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factors: ignorance and lack of knowledge, error, the imperious immediacy of interest, basic values, self-defeating predictions and self-fulfilling prophecies. Burlyuk (2017) adds three more categories: willingness to risk, indifference and contextual change. Since we are mostly interested in unintended consequences as a device to decentre the study of interregionalism, our primary aim is not to identify and categorise the origin of unintended consequences. We have thus not asked the authors of this volume to explicitly single out these explanatory factors in their contributions. In some cases, however, it is necessary to analyse how these various explanatory categories are themselves intertwined in the negoti­ ation of policy objectives: how categories such as the imperious immediacy of interest or basic values are used by the actors to justify particular policy choices leading to unintended consequences that are considered necessary to achieve a higher goal. Bruno Theodoro Luciano’s contribution in this edited volume shows well how the EU evokes this imperious immediacy of interest to justify the marginalisation of one of its ‘basic value’ – the EU’s support for regional integration – when establishing a privileged political partnership with Brazil outside of the EU-Mercosur framework. In this context, the undermining of the EU-Mercosur relations becomes an unintended but maybe not an unexpected consequence. A similar dynamic can be observed in Carolina Salgado’s chapter in this volume with respect to the EU’s approach to Latin America as it under­ mines regional cohesion in the field of drug policies. Such categories are part of the meaning created and mobilised by actors to make sense of interregionalism and frame their actions. We have given the authors of this volume the freedom to engage with these different aspects depending on their research question and case study.

Structure of the edited volume The structure of this edited volume follows the distinction we have outlined above between the three types of effects of interregional relations: (1) effects on the actors directly engaged in these relations; (2) effects on the interregional structure and (3) broader social change, including for actors who are not directly involved in interregionalism and on the regional environment. This distinction shows the complex and transformational character of interregionalism. Indeed, it underlines the broad set of effects that can arise from interregional interac­ tions and significantly transform actors who can be both directly and indirectly engaged in these interactions, as well as their environment. It should be noted, however, that, in most chapters, two and sometimes the three types of effects overlap and interact. We have asked the contributors to engage with the dif­ ferent types of effects they encountered while at the same time identifying the most relevant one to their case study to enable us to structure the volume along these lines. The first part of this edited volume is dedicated to contributions that have identified effects on the actors of the interregional relations as the main type

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Unintended consequences of interregionalism 17

of unintended consequences. In his chapter, Haroldo Ramanzini Junior stud­ ies overlapping regionalisms in South America as a case of interregionalism. He analyses in particular the simultaneous use of democracy clauses by three regional organisations to address the same crises: Mercosur, the Organisation of American States and Unasur. He argues that instead of consolidating regional­ ism and regional autonomy, the simultaneous activation of overlapping democ­ racy clauses triggered conflict and competition that led to reduced expectations and investment in regionalism in South America. The next chapter, by Giulia Tercovich, looks at pure interregionalism involving the EU and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the field of disaster management. She shows that the EU’s support has fulfilled the intended objective of increasing the actorness of ASEAN. This has, in at least initially, also increased the EU’s actorness in terms of opportunity, presence and capability. However, as an unin­ tended consequence of strengthening ASEAN, the latter developed more ambi­ tions both inside and outside its region, which challenge the EU’s own actorness. The third and last chapter in this section, by Carolina Salgado, engages with hybrid interregionalism between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in the field of drug policies. Salgado argues that by selecting certain countries to act as role models within their region the EU creates a stratification between South America and the Caribbean. As an unin­ tended consequence this stratification results in the marginalisation of less devel­ oped countries and undermines regional cohesion. The second part of this edited volume includes contributions that engage with effects on interregional structures. Dominik Giese studies the EU-ASEAN interregional cooperation on maritime security. He analyses how the normative mismatch between the European Maritime Security Strategy and the Southeast Asian security ordering principles and practices rooted in the ‘ASEAN Way’ has helped to build mistrust among ASEAN policy elites towards the EU. The author underlines the fact that instead of furthering EU-ASEAN interregional cooper­ ation on maritime security, which is the intended objective, the EU Strategy might end up impeding further development of this cooperation. In his contri­ bution, Bruno Theodoro Luciano also investigates how and in which ways the nature and extent of interregionalism has been transformed, this time in South America. By focusing on the impact of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership on the EU-Mercosur relations, he shows how the latter has been emptied from its political dimension to the benefit of the former and is thus turning into purely trade oriented relations. The next chapter by Friedrich Plank looks at interregionalism between the EU and several overlapping regional security organ­ isations in West Africa. He argues that the EU’s increased focus on hybrid interregionalism with more ad hoc regional arrangements in West Africa has an unintended consequence for pre-existing bilateral interregionalisms with more institutionalised organisations. These unintended consequences negatively affect the interregional structure by fostering rivalry between overlapping regional­ isms, and undermining efficiency in security cooperation.

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Lastly, the third part focuses on how interregional relations can bring about broader social change beyond their impact on the actors involved in the relations or on interregionalism as such. The contribution of Edoardo Baldaro on interregionalism in the Sahel brings this out particularly well. He studies regional security dynamics in the Sahel as a case of bifurcated regionalism, which brings together various regionalising agents (regional organisations, states, jihadist groups) with opposing representations of the Sahel and competing regional pro­ jects. Interactions between these agents have fuelled a vicious circle of instabil­ ity, which has kept any solution to the many security issues plaguing the region out of reach. The second chapter by Andrew Grant, Issa Abdiasis and Yusuf Badriyya examines a case of bifurcated interregionalism in the Horn of Africa between a formal regionalism embodied by Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and an informal regionalism. The interactions between these two regionalisms have brought a variety of unintended consequences that are transforming the social and political environment of the region through, for instance, the growth of an informal common market, and the intensification of public sector elites’ accumulation of private gains rather than cultivating the provision of regional public goods. The following chapter highlights the effects of interregional relations on the regional environment, in particular effects of regional fragmentation and disintegration. Here, Giulia Prelz Oltramonti exam­ ines a case of hybrid interregionalism involving the EU, Russia with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the South Caucasus. She argues that the struggle for influence between the EU and Russia has transformed the South Caucasus into a sparring ground where regional cohesion is lacking and harder local bor­ ders have been created within the region, thereby affecting cross border com­ munities. The third and last chapter in this section, by Johann Wolfschwenger, engages with competitive interregionalism in Eastern Europe between the EU and Russia’s Eurasian ambitions. He argues that domestic actors in Moldova react to this interregionalism by articulating contradictory notions of ‘Europeanness’ and ‘Eastness’ in the construction of Moldova’s regional identity. As an unin­ tended consequence, this reproduces, if not widens, Moldova’s national identity dilemma and contributes to regional instability. Taken as a whole, this edited volume is thus also an endeavour to address the EU-centric bias in the study of interregionalism by taking other regionalisms as seriously as the EU. The geographical diversity of the contributions, as well as the diversity of interregionalisms and actors analysed, enable us to shed light on interregional processes and their transformational character for international pol­ itics, the structures of regional governance and societies at different scales. This volume is – to paraphrase Merton (1936: 900) – a call to look at interregionalism as the interplay of actors, interactions, circumstances and social structures, which is so complex and diverse that prediction is beyond reach. Unintended conse­ quences will always be part of the outcomes and should be taken as a conceptual device to understand how interregionalism brings about social change that can be intended and expected, but also unintended, unexpected and often surprising.

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Notes 1 Although our claims firstly concern interregionalism, we believe they have implica­ tions for regionalism studies at large since we consider the study of interregionalism to be a subfield of regionalism studies. 2 Four dimensions of regionalism are studied through this framework: the emergence of regional organisations, the design of their institutions, the influence of domestic factors on member states’ behaviour, and the impact of regional organisations on their member states. These four dimensions are applied comparatively across 12 case studies to explain variations in the role of regional organisations. 3 Hollis and Smith (1991: 58) refer to Rosenau’s ‘pre-theory’ to illustrate this point: ‘it consists of a set of definitions of the sources of foreign policy, three measures of the type of state (size, economic, development, and political system) and two analytical dimensions (issue areas and permeability)’. 4 Kirchner and Dominguez (2011) elaborate a framework to evaluate the performance of these organisations across four security dimensions (assurance, prevention, pro­ tection, and compellence). Each chapter of their edited volume undertakes the same endeavour: it identifies the nature of the threat in the region, analyses the historical development and institutionalisation of the organisation, and assesses the level of governance and the compliance with the norms of the system. 5 NRA scholars have sought to analyse the impact of three levels of factors: the domes­ tic, the regional, and the global – with an emphasis on the global level and the effects of globalisation (Hettne, 1999; Hettne et al., 1999, 2000). 6 The five stages are: regional space, regional complex, regional society, regional com­ munity, and region-state. 7 See, e.g. scholars who have drawn on Cox and Gramsci and the World Order Approach (WOA) to analyse regionalism in relation to the global system, in par­ ticular economic globalisation and its hegemonic manifestations (Gamble & Payne, 1996). The WOA raises important questions concerning the negative effects of regionalism in terms of unequal development within and among regions. In the same way, International Political Economy scholarship on African regionalism has shown the negative impact of open regionalism projects on African states and citi­ zens (Söderbaum, 2004). 8 However, these attempts to theorise have not been particularly successful as they have been hindered by disagreements over conceptual, ontological, and epistemological premises (Hameiri, 2013; Russo, 2016; Söderbaum, 2013).

Bibliography Journal articles Acharya, Amitav. 2007. The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics. World Politics 59(4): 629–652. Andreas, Peter. 2009. Symbiosis Between Peace Operations and Illicit Business in Bosnia. International Peacekeeping 16(1): 33–46. Autesserre, Séverine. 2012. Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and Their Unintended Consequences. African Affairs 111(443): 202–222. Baert, Patrick. 1991. Unintended Consequences: A Typology and Examples. International Sociology 6(2): 201–210. Berry, Marie. 2017. Barriers to Women’s Progress After Atrocity: Evidence from Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Gender & Society 31(6): 830–853. Bevir, Mark and R. A. W. Rhodes. 2012. Interpretivism and the Analysis of Traditions and Practices. Critical Policy Studies 6(2): 201–208.

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Burlyuk, Olga. 2017. The ‘Oops!’ Of EU Engagement Abroad: Analyzing Unintended Consequences of EU External Action. Journal of Common Market Studies 55(5): 1009–1025. Burlyuk, Olga and Gergana Noutcheva. 2019. Special Issue: Unintended Consequences of EU External Action. The International Spectator 54(1): 1–129. Camroux, David. 2010. Interregionalism or Merely a Fourth-Level Game? An Examination of the EU-ASEAN Relationship. East Asia 27(1): 57–77. Chandler, David. 2013. Peacebuilding and the Politics of Non-Linearity: Rethinking ‘Hidden’ Agency and ‘Resistance’. Peacebuilding 1(1): 17–32. Debusscher, Petra and Maria Martin de Almagro. 2016. Post-Conflict Women’s Movements in Turmoil: The Challenges of Success in Liberia in the 2005-Aftermath. The Journal of Modern African Studies 54(2): 293–316. Doctor, Mahruhk. 2007. Why Bother with Inter‐Regionalism? Negotiations for a European Union‐Mercosur Agreement. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 45(2): 281–314. Doidge, Matthew. 2007. Joined at the Hip: Regionalism and Interregionalism. European Integration 29(2): 229–248. Fioramonti, Lorenzo and Frank Mattheis. 2016. Is Africa Really Following Europe? An Integrated Framework for Comparative Regionalism. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 54(3): 674–690. Hameiri, Shahar. 2013. Theorising Regions Through Changes in Statehood: Rethinking the Theory and Method of Comparative Regionalism. Review of International Studies 39(2): 31–335. Hardacre, Alan and Michael Smith. 2009. The EU and the Diplomacy of Complex Interregionalism. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 4(2): 167–188. Hettne, Björn and Fredrik Söderbaum. 2000. Theorising the Rise of Regionness. New Political Economy 5(3): 457–472. Hettne, Björn and Fredrik Söderbaum. 2005. Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as a Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism. European Foreign Affairs Review 10(4): 535–552. Jennings, Kathleen. 2010. Unintended Consequences of Intimacy: Political Economies of Peacekeeping and Sex Tourism. International Peacekeeping 17(2): 229–243. Jetschke, Anja and Tobias Lenz. 2013. Does Regionalism Diffuse? A New Research Agenda for the Study of Regional Organizations. Journal of European Public Policy 20(4): 626–637. Kaiser, Karl. 1968. The Interaction of Regional Subsystems: Some Preliminary Notes on Recurrent Patterns and the Role of Superpowers. World Politics 21(1): 84–107. Kotsopoulos, John and Frank Mattheis. 2018. A Contextualisation of EU–Africa Relations: Trends and Drivers from a Reciprocal Perspective. South African Journal of International Affairs 25(4): 445–460. Lammich, Georg. 2020. Funktionen von Interregionalismus – Eine Globale Perspektive. Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaften 30: 123–140. Lopez-Lucia, Elisa. 2019. Unpacking the Politics of Regionalism: What to Expect from a Socio-Political Economy of Regionalism? International Relations 33(4): 610–615. Mattheis, Frank. 2017. Repositioning Europe in the Study of Regions: Comparative Regionalism, Interregionalism and Decentred Regionalism. Journal of European Integration 39(4): 477–482. Mattheis, Frank and Uwe Wunderlich. 2017. Regional Actorness and Interregional Relations: ASEAN, the EU and Mercosur. Journal of European Integration 39(6): 723–738.

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Merton, Robert K. 1936. The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action. American Sociological Review 1(6): 894–904. Panke, Dianaand and Sören Stapel. 2018. Exploring Overlapping Regionalism. Journal of International Relations and Development 21(3): 635–662. Pouliot, Vincent. 2007. “Sobjectivism”: Toward a Constructivist Methodology. International Studies Quarterly 51(2): 359–384. Russo, Alessandra. 2016. Comparative Regionalism: Still Emerging, Already to Be Reformed? International Politics Reviews 4(1): 7–16. Russo, Alessandra and Edward Stoddard. 2018. Why Do Authoritarian Leaders Do Regionalism? Ontological Security and Eurasian Regional Cooperation. The International Spectator 53(3): 20–37. Simmons, Beth A. and Zachary Elkins. 2004. The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy. American Political Science Review 98(1): 171–189. Solingen, Ethel. 2012. Of Dominoes and Firewalls: The Domestic, Regional, and Global Politics of International Diffusion. International Studies Quarterly 56(4): 631–644. Söderbaum, Fredrik. 2013. Rethinking Regions and Regionalism. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 14(2): 9–18. Stevens, Christopher. 2006. The EU, Africa and Economic Partnership Agreements: Unintended Consequences of Policy Leverage. The Journal of Modern African Studies 44(3): 441–458.

Book chapters Doidge, Matthew. 2011. Regional Actors and the Rise of Interregionalism. In: Doidge, Matthew (Ed.). The European Union and Interregionalism: Patterns of Engagement. Farnham: Ashgate, 3–50. Farrell, Mary. 2010. A Move Toward Hybrid Interregionalism in Asia. In: Söderbaum, Fredrik and Patrick Stålgren (Eds.). The European Union and the Global South. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 115–140. Fawcett, Louise, Frederik Ponjaert and Mario Teló. 2015. Introduction. In: Teló, Mario, Louise Fawcett and Fredrik Ponjaert (Eds.). Interregionalism and the European Union: A Post-Revisionist Approach to Europe’s Place in a Changing World. Farnham: Ashgate, 1–15. Gardini, Gian Luca and Andrés Malamud. 2018. Debunking Interregionalism: Concepts, Types and Critique – With a Pan-Atlantic Focus. In: Mattheis, Frank and Andréas Litsegård (Eds.). Interregionalism Across the Atlantic Space. Cham: Springer, 15–31. Garzón, Jorge and Detlef Nolte. 2017. The New Minilateralism in Regional Economic Governance: Cross-Regionalism and the Pacific Alliance. In: Riggirozzi, Pia and Christopher Wylde (Eds.). Handbook of South American Governance. London: Routledge, 173–190. Hettne, Björn. 1999. Globalization and the New Regionalism: The Second Great Transformation. In: Hettne, Björn, Andras Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel (Eds.). Globalism and the New Regionalism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1–24. Mattheis, Frank. 2017. Towards Bifurcated Regionalism – The Production of Regional Overlaps in Central Africa. In: Dietze, Antje, Ulf Engel, Frank Mattheis, Thomas Plötze and Heidrun Zinecker (Eds.). The New Politics of Regionalism – Perspectives from Africa, Latin America and Asia-Pacific. London: Routledge, 37–51. Pouliot, Vincent. 2012. Regional Security Practices and Russian–Atlantic Relations. In: Paul, T.V. (Ed.). International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 210–230.

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Rüland, Jürgen. 2015. The Unintended Consequences of Interregional Democracy Promotion: Normative and Conceptual Misunderstandings in EU-ASEAN Relations. In: Teló, Mario, Louise Fawcett and Fredrik Ponjaert (Eds.). Interregionalism and the European Union: A Post-Revisionist Approach to Europe’s Place in a Changing World. Farnham: Ashgate, 267–283. Ribeiro-Hoffmann, Andrea. 2016. Inter-and Transregionalism. In: Börzel, Tanja. A. and Thomas Risse (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 600–619. Risse, Thomas. 2016. The Diffusion of Regionalism. In: Börzel, Tanja. A. and Thomas Risse (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 87–108. Rüland, Jürgen. 2014. Interregionalism and International Relations: Reanimating an Obsolescent Research Agenda? In: Baert, Francis, Tiziana Scaramagli and Fredrik Söderbaum (Eds.). Intersecting Interregionalism. Global Governance and the EU. Dordrecht: Springer, 15–35. Stapel, Sören and Fredrik Söderbaum. 2020. Mapping and Problematising External Funding to the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities. In: Engel, Ulf and Frank Mattheis (Eds.). The Finances of Regional Organisations in the Global South: Follow the Money. Abingdon: Routledge, 112–125.

Edited books Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett (Eds.). 1998. Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Aoi, Chiyuki, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur (Eds.). 2007. Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations. Tokyo: UNU Press. Baert, Francis, Tiziana Scaramagli and Fredrik Söderbaum (Eds.). 2014. Intersecting Interregionalism. Global Governance and the EU. Dordrecht: Springer. Börzel, Tanja, Lukas Goltermann, Mathis Lohaus and Kai Striebinger (Eds.). 2012. Roads to Regionalism: Genesis, Design, and Effects of Regional Organizations. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Cosgrove-Sacks, C. and K J. Twitchett (Eds.). 1970. The New International Actors: the United Nations and the European Economic Community. London: Macmillan. Daase, Christopher and Cornelius Friesendorf (Eds.). 2012. Rethinking Security Governance: The Problem of Unintended Consequences. London: Routledge. Hänggi, Heiner, Ralf Roloff and Rüland, Jürgen (Eds.). 2006. Interregionalism and International Relations. Abingdon: Routledge. Hettne, Bjorn, Andras Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel. (Eds.). 1999. Globalism and the New Regionalism. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Hettne, Björn, Andras Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel (Eds.). 2000. The New Regionalism and the Future of Security and Development. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Kirchner, Emil and Roberto Dominguez (Eds.). 2011. The Security Governance of Regional Organizations. London: Routledge. Mattheis, Frank and Andreas Litsegård (Eds.). 2018. Interregionalism Across the Atlantic Space. Cham: Springer. Solís, Mireya, Barbara Stallings and Saori Katada (Eds.). 2009. Competitive Regionalism: FTA Diffusion in the Pacific Rim. Cham: Springer. Teló, Mario, Louise Fawcett and Fredrik Ponjaert (Eds.). 2015. Interregionalism and the European Union: A Post-Revisionist Approach to Europe’s Place in a Changing World. Farnham: Ashgate.

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Monographs Bach, Daniel. 2016. Regionalism in Africa. Genealogies, Institutions and Trans-State Networks. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. Best, Jacqueline. 2014. Governing Failure. Provisional Expertise and the Transformation of Global Development Finance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Boudon, Raymond. 1977. The Unintended Consequences of Social Action. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Bretherton, Charlotte and John Vogler. 2006. The European Union as a Global Actor. 2nd Edition. London: Routledge. Buzan, Barry and OleWæver. 2003. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Coulter, Jeff. 1979. The Social Construction of Mind. Studies in Ethnomethodology and Linguistic Philosophy. Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield. Ferguson, James. 1994. The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Gamble, Andrew and Anthony Payne. 1996. Regionalism and World Order. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation Of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. Hardacre, Alan. 2010. The Rise and Fall of Interregionalism in EU External Relations. Dordrecht: Republic of Letters. Hira, Anil. 2007. An East Asian Model for Latin American Success: The New Path. Farnham: Ashgate. Hollis, Martin and Steve Smith. 1991. Explaining and Understanding International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mattheis, Frank. 2014. New Regionalisms in the South – Mercosur and SADC in a Comparative and Interregional Perspective. Leipzig: Universitätsverlag Leipzig. Mattheis, Frank, Luca Raineri and Alessandra Russo. 2019. Fringe Regionalism. When Peripheries Become Regions. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Parthenay, Kevin. 2019. A Political Sociology of Regionalisms. Perspectives for a Comparison. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Söderbaum, Fredrik. 2004. The Political Economy of Regionalism: The Case of Southern Africa. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Söderbaum, Fredrik. 2016. Rethinking regionalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Visoka, Gëzim. 2016. Peace Figuration after International Intervention: Intentions, Events and Consequences of Liberal Peacebuilding. London: Routledge. Wagenaar, Hendrik. 2011. Meaning in Action: Interpretation and Dialogue in Policy Analysis. Armonk, NY: Routledge.

Online resources Börzel, Tanja. A. and Thomas Risse. 2009. Diffusing (Inter-) Regionalism: The EU as a Model of Regional Integration. KFG Working Paper Series 7. Available at: https:// nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-368027 Accessed on 12 May 2020. United Nations. 1945. Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements. Charter of the United Nations. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-viii/index. html Accessed on 24 June 2020.

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PART 1

Unintended effects on the

actors of interregionalism

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2 OVERLAPPING REGIONALISM AND THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOCRACY CLAUSES IN THE AMERICAS Haroldo Ramanzini Junior

Introduction1 The Common Market of the South (Mercosur), Ushuaia Protocol of 1998, the Organisation of American States’ (OAS), Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) of 2001 and the 2010 Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) on Commitment to Democracy are all agreements that demonstrate the enhancement of regional mechanisms for protecting democracy in the Americas. They are also evidence of the enlarge­ ment and reconfiguration of regionalism in the 2000s. The question of which motivations drive this process and what possible unintended consequences it may have are little studied themes. Hence, this chapter seeks to analyse the reasons for the reconfiguration of regionalism and the unintended consequences of overlap­ ping regionalism, with reference to democracy clauses in South America. In order to analyse overlapping regionalism with reference to democratic clauses at OAS, Mercosur and Unasur levels, we shall study two cases of interac­ tion between the three overlapping institutions and different member countries. The first case is the 2012 political crisis in Paraguay, which resulted from the impeachment of President Fernando Lugo. The second case is the situation of Venezuela from 2012 to 2017, beginning with Venezuela’s entry to the Mercosur and ending with its suspension in August 2017. These cases involve an overlap of mandates and actions by the three regional organisations. Building on the case studies, the paper seeks to contribute to the debate on overlapping regionalism, interregionalism and unintended consequences. We start off from the idea that regionalism, interregionalism and overlapping regionalism are results of a complex combination of domestic politics, identities, interests and aspirations to power in the international sphere. These processes are the result of interactions rather than of a deterministic strategy and are thus

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open to dynamics of unintended consequences resulting from increased interac­ tions, institutional building and contextual changes. As stated by Lopez-Lucia and Mattheis in Chapter 1, more attention should be invested in understanding the social conditions and effects of regionalism, rather than presupposing that regionalism projects will be providers of public goods. The overlap of democracy clauses and of members of the Mercosur, Unasur and OAS characterises the phe­ nomena of the unintended consequences of the overlapping regionalism at hand. The three institutions represent different kinds of regionalism and have their spe­ cific institutional features. The way they relate to each other in the implemen­ tation of democracy clauses may be characterised as a type of interregionalism, since it involves the relation between different regionalisms or regional organisa­ tions. To put it another way, we consider the overlapping democracy clauses as a specific instance of overlapping regionalism, which in turn is a subtype of interregionalism. As stated by Mattheis (2017: 38), “interregionalism within a region is therefore often tied to a second type of interregionalism, namely between distinct regions”. When studying multiple regionalisms in Central Africa, this author pointed out that “regionalism paradoxically reflects division, not unity” (Mattheis, 2017: 50). In the Americas a similar process occurs, that is, there are relations of competition among different regional sub-groups, although there are also relevant situations of cooperation and institutional deference2 between different regionalisms. Thus, a topic of analytical relevance is to understand how regionalism projects directly or indirectly shape its trajectories in reference and in relation to other regionalisms. This chapter will examine this through the study of the application of democracy clauses and the unintended consequences resulting from these processes. Studies with a greater empirical focus on the consequences of overlapping regionalism in the Americas have focused on analysing the dimensions of secu­ rity, trade and economic relations (Weiffen, Wehner, and Nolte, 2013; GomezMera and Molinari, 2014). However, few works analyse the consequences of the overlap as it relates to the democracy clause issue or to the response of regional organisations to political crises in member countries. In this regard, the works by Hoffmann (2016) and Weiffen (2017) are two relevant references. Research into specific dimensions of overlapping regionalism indicates that the consequences are dynamic and that they vary (Nolte, 2018). Dynamics of cooperation, conflict, or non-interaction can coexist among overlapping regionalisms. Overlapping regionalism can be complementary in one area and competing in another; its consequences may be positive or negative; they may be positive for a certain actor or set of actors and negative for others. For instance, Hofmann (2011) points out that institutional overlap creates operational, political and institutional problems that actors do not necessarily want to alleviate but instead have an interest in creating, maintaining and exploiting. Building on these insights, we intend to analyse the unintended consequences of overlapping regionalisms. However, we acknowledge at the same time the difficulty of assessing whether a determined consequence was intended or not with regard to the challenge that surrounds

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the identification of member state preferences and the objectives of institutional building. Lopez-Lucia and Mattheis point out in the first chapter of this volume that unintended consequences are an inescapable reality of international policies. It is plausible to consider that unintended consequences are likely outcomes of the growth and development of regional institutions with democracy clauses. There are three inter-related reasons for this. First, as drawn from the three organisations that will be analysed here, democracy clauses concern situa­ tions of political crisis and instability, where the appraisal of how and if there was a violation of democracy depends on the evaluation of contextual factors subject to a series of arrangements that are difficult to anticipate and thus unintended consequences are a likely outcome. Second, regionalisms in the Americas are institutionally weak and strongly dependent on states’ actions, so that contextual changes in specific states resulting, for example, from elec­ tions, significantly condition regional governance. Third, there is an insti­ tutional complexity resulting from having three organisations involved, all featuring democracy clauses. Thus, in this chapter we will analyse the following questions: what are the intended objectives of the establishment of democratic clauses in the three regional organisations and how did they emerge? Through the analysis of the implementation of the democracy clauses, what are the unintended consequences of the initial actions? What kind of specific effects and social change arise as unintended consequences? Through the case studies, we argue that the dynam­ ics involved in the implementation of democracy clauses led to the unintended consequences of weakening South American regionalism, regional autonomy and democracy protection in South America. The sections below engage with these different aspects. In the next section, we analyse the context of the emergence of a new regionalism in Latin America in the 2000s, its main characteristics, its key policy initiators (Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela) and the objective of the democratic clauses in each of the three organisations. Next, we look at the democratic clauses in action in the cases of Paraguay in 2012 and Venezuela between 2012 and 2017. Lastly, we analyse whether the consequences of the operationalisation of democratic clauses help fulfil or frustrate policy intentions and what kind of effects and social change arise from the unintended consequences.

Regionalism and democracy clauses in the Americas in the 2000s Regionalism in Latin America underwent significant transformations in the first decade of this century. These changes involved an expansion of the number of regional institutions and a modification of the agendas of existing organisations, particularly Mercosur. The commercial orientation of regionalism and its relation to the economic liberalisation agenda that had prevailed in the 1990s gave way to a more politicised view, focused on the issue of national and regional autonomy.

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Social issues, infrastructure integration, security and defence cooperation, as well as social participation in regionalism were considered priority issues. In that period, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA), Unasur and Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) became key players in Latin American regionalism. Quiliconi and Salgado Espinoza (2017) argue that the process of institutional proliferation in Latin America in the 2000s has its motivations in the displacement of the agenda of Latin American eco­ nomic regionalism towards a set of diverse political, security and strategic issues in the region. Some authors have used the concept of post-liberal or post-hegemonic regionalism to characterise the changes in Latin American regionalism in the first decade of the 21st century (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012). Despite the fact that considerable changes in the focus of regionalism did occur, institutional developments have followed the pattern of other Latin American experiences, characterised by intergovernmentalism and decision making at summit meet­ ings. Although this institutional architecture enables collective dialogue, it inev­ itably limits action when members disagree, in addition to leaving regionalism vulnerable to changes in the domestic politics of member states. Brazil during the governments of Lula da Silva (2003–2010) and Rousseff (2011–2016), Argentina during the Nestor (2003–2007) and Cristina Kirchner (2007–2015) governments and Venezuela during the Chávez (1998–2013) and Maduro governments (2013–current) may have started from different objectives and priorities in their respective external policies, but they shared the objective of regional autonomy and relation to the United States (Briceno, Vigevani, and Mariano, 2017). This objective was part of a more general strategy aimed at the creation of a more international multipolar order characterised by less unilater­ alism. In this context, Unasur was created in 2008 as a South American institu­ tion focused on defence and the promotion of democracy. The founding of new regional organisations without US participation was testament to a decreased convergence with the United States compared to the 1990s, and an attempt to advance new forms of economic projects and democratic experiences, emphasis­ ing experiments of participatory democracy in member states and in regionalism that have, in some cases, challenged the paradigms of free trade and representa­ tive democracy. In this context, the aim was also to reduce the central role of the OAS in hem­ ispheric governance, since it was understood that this organisation was exces­ sively influenced by the interests of the United States. From the point of view of security issues and conflict resolution, the creation of the South American Defence Council within Unasur is linked to the idea of avoiding US interven­ tions in the region and resolving potential conflicts through a South American institution. Between 2008 and 2013, Unasur intervened in crisis situations on several occasions (Ramanzini Júnior and Luciano, 2018; Nolte, 2018). In the defence of democracy, the idea was to use South American instead of hemi­ spheric institutions in situations of political crisis or democracy rupture in the

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region. For this reason, a democracy clause was included in UNASUR’s statutes in 2010. From an institutional point of view, Heine and Weiffen (2015: 142) con­ sider that the frameworks of Unasur and Mercosur for democracy protection go beyond the IADC because they set up a more comprehensive toolkit of measures to sanction constitutional interruptions. On the other hand, compared to the OAS, sub-regional organisations have a more limited institutional structure and capacity to observe, monitor, follow up and give recommendations during or after a democratic crisis (Heine and Weiffen, 2015: 142). The early 2000s thus saw a renewed interest in South American regional­ ism, based on intraregional norms, confidence measures and collective action, in order to reduce external intervention and increase the region’s autonomy. The changes in Mercosur, which involved a broadening of its social agenda as defined in the 2003 Buenos Aires Consensus, and the creation of Unasur in 2008 as successor to the South American Community of Nations (SACN), sought to go beyond US-led or hemispheric patterns of integration and cooperation, thus reflecting changes in the domestic politics of certain countries, in particular Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela (Vigevani and Ramanzini Júnior, 2011). This also means that four policy areas central to the United States (and to some extent of the OAS as well), that is, democracy, free trade, security and human rights, became the object of a greater political and normative dispute. There is consid­ erable disagreement about the interrelation between these themes and how they should be addressed in regionalism. Therefore, the overlap between the OAS, Unasur and Mercosur, among other factors, represents an institutional manifes­ tation of the variety of visions on these issues. The OAS, Mercosur and Unasur have acquired a democratic identity over time. The democracy clauses are institutional mechanisms designed to react to crises and coups d’état in member states. Moreover, they can serve as a foot­ hold for national, transnational and international actors trying to establish or re-establish democracy and are able to raise moral objections that can affect the image and reputation of a state. The motivation behind the creation of the democracy clauses is both political and normative. However, the fact that regional organisations uphold democracy clauses and have the possibility to sus­ pend members or apply sanctions in cases of institutional rupture or authoritarian retrogression does not mean that these mechanisms are automatically put into action (van der Vleuten and Hoffmann, 2010). Member states frequently disagree on how to define a situation in which democracy is in peril, as well as over the timing and ways to apply the democracy clause. Article 2 of the 1948 OAS constitutive treaty establishes that one of the main objectives of the organisation is to “Promote and consolidate represent­ ative democracy in relation to the principle of non-intervention”’. That is, the theme is not new in the history of the OAS. There has been a long lasting for­ mal support for democracy. In addition, since 1962 the organisation has had a mechanism in place for monitoring elections in member countries. During the Cold War period, events such as the support for intervention in the Dominican

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Republic through the Inter-American Peace Force in 1965 and the OAS’ silence during surges of authoritarianism in several countries in the region show that the OAS was extremely hesitant to act in the first place, and sometimes even acted in contradiction with its own proclaimed goals. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the OAS has taken on a more active role in maintaining and strengthening democracy in the region, but these past events in the record of the organisation did not disappear at all and many political forces in the member states, mainly left-wing ones, continue to present doubts in relation to the organ­ isation’s independence and neutrality. In 1991, the OAS proclaimed the Declaration of Santiago de Chile, by which all member states committed themselves to the defence and enhancement of representative democracy in the Western Hemisphere. In 1992, following the path of institutional strengthening for the protection of democracy, an amend­ ment to the OAS Charter, the so-called Washington Protocol, was enacted. This made it possible to suspend the membership of countries where democratically elected governments were overthrown. In 2001, the OAS members promulgated a new normative instrument called the IADC, which reaffirmed the organi­ sation’s commitment to the defence and promotion of democracy and created procedures to act in cases of democratic disruption or other threats to demo­ cratic continuity. The three categories of events that should grant the activation of the democracy clause and, eventually, lead to the suspension of a member state from its participation in the various organs of the OAS are: (1) the forcible overthrow of a democratically constituted government; (2) the unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order; or (3) the unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state (El Hage, 2010). The Ushuaia Protocol of 1998 and the Montevideo Protocol of 2011 are Mercosur’s main instruments for protecting democracy. Article 5 of the Ushuaia Protocol states that in the event of a breakdown of the democratic order in a member state, that state’s right to participate in the different organs of Mercosur can be suspended. The Montevideo protocol of 2011, which still needs to be ratified by Paraguay in order to come into effect, went one step further by intro­ ducing the possibility of additional sanctions. Article 6 states that Mercosur can, among other things: (a) suspend the state’s right to participate in the different organs of the institutional structure of Mercosur; (b) close land borders com­ pletely or partially and (c) suspend or limit trade, air and sea traffic, communica­ tions, energy provision, services and supplies. In the case of Unasur, a democracy clause emerged in 2010. It is important to note that Unasur is the consolidation of a cooperation effort among countries of the region that began with the Treaty of the South American Community of Nations (SACN) in 2004. The treaty, signed in Cusco in 2004, mentioned the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which is a relevant OAS document. However, in neither the Constitutive Treaty of Unasur nor the 2010 Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of Unasur on Commitment to Democracy,

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was there any mention of the OAS Charter. Unasur has actively engaged in all political crises that have taken place since its creation in 2008, particularly in the cases of Bolivia in 2009 and Ecuador in 2010. Nonetheless, it is important to observe that the organisation adopted the Democratic Protocol only in 2010 and national parliaments ratified it in 2014. As noted by Closa and Palestini (2015), Unasur implemented actions in the cases of Bolivia in 2009, Ecuador in 2010 and Paraguay in 2012 outside the formal framework of its democracy clause. The 2010 Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of Unasur on Commitment to Democracy, encompassing all the countries of South America, represented the formalisation of a South American mechanism for democracy protection. The protocol may be activated in cases of a “rupture or threat to the democratic order, a violation of the constitutional order or of any situation that endangers the legitimate exercise of power and the validity of democratic values and principles” (UNASUR, 2011). Another relevant pro-democracy tool in Unasur’s structure is the Electoral Council, created in 2012 and designed as a South American mechanism for the organisation of electoral observation missions and monitoring of elections in member states. To date, the Electoral Council of Unasur has sent missions to monitor elections in Colombia (2014), Venezuela (2015), Peru (2016) and Ecuador (2017). Another important issue to note is that the 2011 Montevideo Protocol shares several written elements with the 2010 Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty on the Commitment to Democracy of Unasur, particularly when it comes to sanctions in cases of democratic rupture. The signing of the Unasur Protocol in 2010 paved the way for the implementation of the Montevideo Protocol in 2011. This suggests that regionalism projects shape their trajectories in refer­ ence and in relation to each other. Amongst the shared elements, it is worthy to note, according to Hoffmann (2016), that both documents are characterised by their concern with counterbalancing the commitment to democracy and human rights with the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Even more, Closa and Palestini’s (2015) assessment is that the UNASUR mechanism to protect democracy has a strong bias towards the incumbent government.

Political crises and the positions of Mercosur, Unasur and the OAS: the cases of Paraguay (2012) and Venezuela (2012–2017) Now that we have analysed the main content and characteristics of the demo­ cratic clauses of the three organisations, their objectives and the context of their creation, in this section we turn to the democratic clauses in action. In other words, we shall analyse how the episodes of President Fernando Lugo’s impeach­ ment in 2012 and the situation of Venezuela in the 2012 to 2017 period were dealt with by Mercosur, Unasur and the OAS. Countries’ domestic political pro­ cesses will not be analysed, but we shall look at how the regional organisations reacted to the events in question.

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President Fernando Lugo’s impeachment was approved by the Paraguayan Senate on 22 June, 2012. Since the start of his term in 2008, after defeating the Colorado Party candidate Blanca Avelar, Lugo found it difficult to govern, as he lacked a parliamentary majority. His election victory closed a 61-year period during which the Colorado Party held power. His political coalition counted on the support of left-wing forces and social movements, and of the centre-right Authentic Liberal Radical Party (PLRA) of Vice-president Federico Franco. In the unstable political context that marked Lugo’s term from the beginning, a police operation to enforce the ownership repossession of a rural property in Curuguaty on 14 June, 20123, served as the trigger for the president to be accused of negligence, irresponsibility and poor performance of his duties by the Chamber of Deputies. In less than 48 hours he was unseated by the Senate. With Lugo’s impeachment, Vice-president Federico Franco, who had withdrawn his already tenuous support for Lugo only a few days before, became interim presi­ dent of Paraguay until the April 2013 elections. The immediate reaction of South American countries was to question the legitimacy of the process that unseated Lugo. President Cristina Kirchner of Argentina stated that “Argentina will not validate the coup d’état in Paraguay” (La Nación, 2012). In the context of the Curuguaty episode and before the deci­ sion of the Paraguayan Congress, the presidents of Unasur countries were gath­ ered in Rio de Janeiro for the Rio+20 Conference. During the event, it was decided to immediately send a mission of foreign ministers of Unasur countries headed by Secretary General Alí Rodríguez, a Venezuelan diplomat, to nego­ tiate with Lugo and Paraguayan parliamentarians in an effort to overcome the country’s political crisis. Rodríguez’s assessment was that “If one does not respect due process in the political trial of President Fernando Lugo that would consti­ tute a threat of rupture to the democratic order” (La Nación, 2012). He went on to say that “it is essential that the Paraguayan authorities abide fully by the democratic clauses of Unasur, Mercosur and Celac” (La Nación, 2012). Note the absence of a reference to the Inter-American Democratic Charter in Rodríguez’s statement. The evaluation of the Mission headed by Rodríguez was that “The mission of foreign ministers restates its total solidarity with the Paraguayan peo­ ple and support for the constitutional president, Fernando Lugo” (La Nación, 2012). According to Brazil’s foreign minister, “We very much regret this sit­ uation (Paraguay’s suspension). We had 11 foreign ministers (from Unasur) in Paraguay, and we stress that there were doubts as to the process (of removal from office), such as President Lugo’s lack of defence. This led to one to ascertain that democracy is not fully in force (in Paraguay)” (Carmo, 2012). On 28 June, 2012, during the Mercosur summit in Mendoza (Argentina), Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina announced the suspension of Paraguay from Mercosur until the elections that were to occur in that country in April 2013. At the same meeting, Venezuela’s entry into Mercosur was announced. This had not yet become concrete, as it depended on ratification by the Paraguayan Senate, which was in opposition to then President Lugo and refused to approve

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Venezuela’s entry on the grounds that it was not a fully fledged democracy. It is possible to suggest that one of the reasons for which Paraguay was suspended is also linked to the removing of the impediment to the admission of Venezuela in the bloc ( Jatobá and Luciano, 2018). In her speech at the Mendoza meet­ ing, President Cristina Kirchner of Argentina invoked the democratic clauses of Unasur, Mercosur and CELAC, but did not mention the OAS. In her words, “it is indispensable that the Paraguayan authorities obey with full respect the demo­ cratic clauses of Unasur, of Mercosur and of CELAC” (quoted in Merke, 2013). In another context, commenting on the democratic clauses of Mercosur and the OAS, the president of Argentina considered that “Mercosur will never accept a country without democracy, because it has a democratic clause”. However, “the OAS also has a democratic clause, but it is a little more elastic” (La Nación, 2009, quoted in Merke, 2013). In conjunction with the Mercosur summit, a special meeting of Unasur took place. The document of the Mendoza special meeting, which justified the deci­ sion to suspend Paraguay, restated “its commitment to the democratic spirit and principles espoused in Unasur, Mercosur and CELAC” (UNASUR, 2012). According to this document, which at no time mentions the OAS Democratic Clause, democracy had been interrupted in Paraguay because during the impeach­ ment process, the president’s defence had not been given a reasonable amount of time, thus disrespecting the due legal process. In the same document, and in the context of Paraguay’s suspension, it was decided to interrupt the pro-tempore pres­ idency, which was in that country’s hands, and to transfer it to Peru. Despite the suspension, the countries of Mercosur and Unasur decided not to impose economic or trade sanctions on Paraguay, with the justification that such measures would harm the Paraguayan people and result in a worsening of polit­ ical and social tensions in the country. The leaders of Ecuador and Venezuela, who were closely allied to President Fernando Lugo, advocated economic sanc­ tions, but their demand was not incorporated by either Unasur or Mercosur. The then president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, stated: “I have ordered that our ambassador in Asunción be withdrawn. (…) And we are also going to stop shipping oil. We are very sorry, but we are not going to support this coup d’état at all’” (G1, 2012a). Alongside Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Mexico also with­ drew or recalled their ambassadors in Asunción in response to Lugo’s removal (G1, 2012b). Paraguay questioned the decisions of Mercosur and Unasur, arguing that the Unasur special meeting had been called without respecting the rules of the constitutive treaty that says that the call for the meeting should be issued by the country holding the temporary presidency – in this case, by Paraguay itself (G1, 2012b). José Féliz Fernández Estigarribia, foreign minister of interim President Federico Franco, stated that the governments of Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay were violating article 4 of the Ushuaia Protocol, according to which “in case of democratic rupture in one of the countries of the bloc, it is mandatory

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to hold pertinent consultations before adopting any kind of measure”. According to Estigarribia, “they are suspending us without holding prior consultations, as set out in the protocol. They are doing the same thing they accuse us of doing to Lugo, acting quickly while not allowing the accused party to have the possibility of defending itself ” (Krakovics, Fariello, and Figueiredo, 2012). Riggirozzi and Grugel (2015) make the point that Unasur’s positions in rela­ tion to the Paraguayan crisis stood in marked contrast to those of the OAS, which considered the removal of Lugo to be legal. According to these authors, Unasur benefited from the Paraguayan crisis in that it became clear that it was willing not only to act but also to pursue an independent line from the United States in terms of democracy protection (Riggirozzi and Grugel, 2015). Roberta Jacobson, then Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, reflecting the US position, took the view that Paraguay should not be suspended from the OAS (Presse, 2012). In a context where some Latin American countries withdrew or recalled their ambassadors from Asunción in response to Lugo’s removal, the Obama administration recognised the government of Federico Franco. The then OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza, in spite of express­ ing surprise at the speed of Lugo’s removal, took the view that the events did not warrant suspending Paraguay. In Insulza’s assessment, “suspension from the OAS would have economic implications for the country” (Uol, 2012). As for the fact that Mercosur and Unasur had suspended Paraguay, Insulza commented: “I consider that the adoption by the OAS of a similar measure will not contribute to the attainment of our objectives” (Uol, 2012). Insulza led an OAS mission to Paraguay in early July 2012 to accompany in locu the situation in the country. Among the participants of this mission not a single South American country was represented. It was made up of representatives of the USA, Canada, Mexico, Honduras and Haiti, countries that until then had not shown themselves willing to condemn Lugo’s removal from office (Uchoa, 2012a). After the visit, Insulza stated that “there exists in Paraguay a situation of political, social and economic normality that is worth preserving” (Pisani, 2012). Breno Dias da Costa at the time was interim representative of Brazil at the OAS meeting that decided to send the mission headed by Insulza even without the support of all the members of the Permanent Council. Costa took the view that the OAS Council should wait for the outcome of the Unasur and Mercosur meetings in Mendoza before expressing an opinion. In his assessment, the OAS “can only benefit from leaving sub-regional groups, which are more involved with the issue, free to act” (Uchoa, 2012b). The then Undersecretary for South American and Caribbean Affairs of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, Antônio José Simões, indicated that in situations of democratic rupture “sub-regional clauses will prevail” (Terra, 2011), such as, for example, the Unasur clause, which “is more profound and cannot be diluted” (Terra, 2011). The Brazilian evaluation was that the OAS should take its cue from the regional blocs. For his part, the Paraguayan representative at the meeting held the view that “The OAS does not depend on Unasur or Mercosur. The OAS has the capacity to solve its questions”

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(Uchoa, 2012b). Ultimately, the Secretary General of the OAS decided not to suspend Paraguay and to send a mission to observe the process leading up to the April 2013 election. Another situation of democratic crisis involving the democracy clause of Mercosur, Unasur and the OAS being applied was the situation of Venezuela. At the end of 2012, Hugo Chávez was re-elected president of Venezuela for the fourth time, prevailing over Henrique Capriles with 54% of the vote. In March 2013, Chávez died and Nicolas Maduro became interim president until the next elections were held in April 2013. Maduro then beat Capriles with 50.6% of the vote, in a hard fought race that the opposition contested, and became the elected president of Venezuela. Since then, the country’s political, economic and social situation has been deteriorating, worsened by the significant fall in the price of oil since 2014. Owing to the situation of the country, the Mercosur Summit Meeting of the second half of 2013 could not happen in Venezuela, which held the bloc’s pro-tempore presidency at the time. The process of Venezuela’s entry into Mercosur had begun in July 2006 and was consolidated in 2012. After an intense debate about the democratic credentials of the Venezuelan government, the request was approved by the Brazilian National Congress in December 2009. Since the process of acces­ sion had already been approved by the Legislative branches of Argentina in February 2007 and of Uruguay in August 2007, only the approval by the Paraguayan Senate remained pending. Paraguay’s suspension from Mercosur from June 2012 to August 2013 made it possible for Venezuela to enter the bloc as a full member from July 2012. The actions of Mercosur, Unasur and the OAS in the case of the crisis in Venezuela between 2012 and 2017 evince differences between the organisations in applying their respective democratic clauses. They also reveal differences in terms of the Venezuelan government’s relations with each of the organisations. In the case of the OAS, during the whole period there was a critical evaluation about the situation of democracy in Venezuelan, however between 2012 and 2015, the OAS was not central to this process. The countries of the region, with the decisive action of Brazil and Argentina, and in sync with the preference of the Venezuelan government, prioritised the centralisation of the discussion within the sphere of Unasur. Nolte (2018: 146) considers that the major ‘involvement of Unasur (relative to the OAS) in the Venezuelan crisis has led both to a watering down of democratic standards and to norm subversion with regard to the protec­ tion of democracy’. Regarding the situation of democracy in Venezuela, Brazil’s foreign minister during the Dilma Rousseff government, Antonio Patriota, stated in 2012: “No democracy is perfect. We are all here fighting to perfect our democracy and there may be aspects in one democracy or another that seem improvable to us” (Mendes, 2012). In March 2014, at a special meeting of the OAS Permanent Council, Brazil and Argentina voted against sending observers from the organisation to evaluate the situation in Venezuela and gather infor­ mation on complaints of abuses against opponents of the government. On that

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occasion only Canada, the USA and Panama voted in favour of the initiative (G1, 2014). Unasur expressed its disagreement with the sanctions imposed by the US government on Venezuelan government officials in December 2014 (UNASUR, 2016). Between 2012 and 2015, Unasur’s position was to seek to contribute to dialogue between the parties. However, starting in 2016, owing to the grow­ ing divergences between member states such as Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Bolivia, the organisation started losing relevance and stopped working on the Venezuelan crisis. The election of Mauricio Macri in Argentina in 2015 and the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in Brazil in 2016 contributed to this, since both events led to policy changes vis-à-vis Unasur, Mercosur and the Venezuelan crisis. One common feature of the right-wing political forces that emerged in Brazil and Argentina was a critical position in relation to Unasur, considered as a left-wing ideological project, partially because of the institution positions in relation to the Venezuelan crisis. From 2016 onward, the nucleus of regional activity to deal with the Venezuelan crisis shifted to the OAS and a new ad hoc group called the Lima Group. Between 2012 and 2015, Mercosur did not have direct activity in the case of the Venezuelan crisis because the activity of Mercosur countries occurred via Unasur. However, in 2016, partly due to changes in the foreign policies of Brazil and Argentina under the Temer and Macri right-wing administrations in both countries, the bloc started adopting a more critical position in rela­ tion to Venezuela, culminated in the country’s suspension in December 2016 for not abiding by the norms and agreements of the bloc, and in application of the Ushuaia Protocol for the rupture of the democratic order in August 2017. When Venezuela was suspended from Mercosur, the OAS released a communiqué stat­ ing that “The General Secretariat of the OAS expresses it support for the decision adopted today to suspend the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela from Mercosur, in accordance with the democratic clause of the Ushuaia Protocol” (OAS, 2017). As seen above, during the Paraguayan crisis in 2012, there was interregional cooperation between Mercosur and Unasur in the decision to suspend Paraguay until the holding of new elections in April 2013. The OAS had a different posi­ tion, taking the view that there was a situation of political normality in Paraguay and not suspending the country. In the case of Venezuela between 2012 and 2015, there was also an interregional convergence between Mercosur and Unasur. Between 2012 and 2017, the OAS always held a critical position vis-à-vis the sit­ uation of democracy in Venezuela. Between 2016 and 2017, a process of interre­ gional convergence started between Mercosur and the OAS in terms of a critical diagnosis of the Venezuelan situation and the side-lining of Unasur from the pro­ cess. This dynamic illustrates the role of interactions, domestic politics, critical junctures and institutional trajectories in the application of democracy clauses. In this chapter, we were able to ascertain that in the two cases analysed, the phenomenon of overlapping regionalism resulted in dynamics of competition and complementarity between the regional organisations and of strategic use of

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these dynamics on the part of the states targeted by the organisations in question. As Weiffen (2017: 193) summarises well: Paraguay in 2012 and Venezuela since 2013 are cases where different organisations’ assessments of the situation and the instruments chosen to deal with them clearly diverge, hampering a solution of the crises and creating norm “ambiguity and norm subversion. In those two episodes, overlapping actions to defend democracy are characterised by a struggle for competence and for the power to define the nature of the crisis. Venezuela is so far the most extreme case where the competitive dynamics between OAS and Unasur have drastically surfaced”. The policy initiators behind the enhancement of Latin American regionalism in the first decade of the 2000s were the governments of Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela. Their main purposes in establishing democracy clauses at Mercosur and Unasur and pushing for the reconfiguration of Latin American regionalism were: to contribute to stability in the region; to increase regional autonomy to address political crises; the conception that sub-regional norms should prevail; elaborating deeper and more appropriate norms than the OAS; and to strengthen regional institutions and increase the legitimacy of regionalism. However, two negative unintended consequences arose instead from the application of the democracy clauses over the course of the second decade of the 2000s: the weak­ ening of South American regionalism and of regional autonomy to deal with crises, which significantly changed the regional political context. Indeed, the processes analysed in this section had the following outcomes: the reactivation of the OAS as a relevant forum to tackle political crises in South American countries in place of Mercosur and Unasur; the suspension of Venezuela from Mercosur; Paraguay’s non-ratification of the 2011 Montevideo Protocol on Commitment to Democracy in Mercosur; and the institutional crisis and paralysis in Unasur, due to controversies on how to manage the crisis in Venezuela, in addition to the organisation institutional and budgetary problems. Despite the differences between the cases, by using the categories set out by Lopez-Lucia and Mattheis in Chapter 1 of this volume on the effects of unin­ tended consequences on the actors of interregionalism, interregional structure and broader environment, one can observe a weakening of two actors of interregionalism, particularly Mercosur and Unasur, as well as of the interregional structure of cooperation between these two organisations, that was built around convergences among the main member states, in tandem with a general decrease in the authority of the democratic clauses and the regional autonomy to manage crisis in South America. The broader environment of the region became char­ acterised by fragmentation with limited instruments of cooperation, in a new context of increasing domestic instability in different states. These consequences clearly frustrated the policy intentions of the actors that, during the first decade of the 2000s, built inclusive South American governance structures and fur­ thered the autonomy of the region. Indeed, one of the reasons Venezuela felt the application of Mercosur’s democ­ racy clause that triggered the unintended consequences mentioned above was

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related to domestic changes in Argentina and Brazil in 2015 and 2016, respec­ tively, i.e. the election of Mauricio Macri and the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff. These changes, in conjunction with President Maduro’s decision to dissolve the National Assembly in April 2017, consolidated a new consensus that Venezuela should be suspended from Mercosur for the rupture of democratic order. The Chavez and Maduro governments invested heavily in the construction of demo­ cratic clauses and in the agenda of democracy in Mercosur and especially Unasur, partially in reaction to the trajectory of escalation of OAS critics in relation to the Venezuela’s regime. A few years later, their country ended up being a target of the institutions they had created. In the Paraguayan case, the fact that President Fernando Lugo had signed the Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of Unasur on Commitment to Democracy of 2010 and the Montevideo Protocol on Commitment to Democracy in Mercosur of 2011 “was one of the motives evoked by the Paraguayan congress to justify the accusation of ‘poor performance of his duties’ and ensure its demise” (Dabéne, 2016: 131–132), probably because some of the Paraguayan political elites did not want to be submitted to this deeper international insurance against democracy breakdown. From the point of view of democratic governance in the region, the fact that the Paraguayan Legislative Branch did not ratify the Montevideo Protocol of Mercosur, owing to the coun­ try’s suspension from the bloc in 2012, prevents a new and institutionally stronger regional mechanism of protection of democracy from coming into force. One could add that an additional unintended consequence of the eroding of South American regionalism is that the competition between democratic clauses and organisations may have even contributed to undermining democracy through the weakening of the authority of the democratic clauses in Mercosur, Unasur and the OAS. Genna and Hiroi (2015) consider democracy clauses as potentially effective in preventing coups and backsliding within countries that are mem­ bers of regional organisations with such clauses. The cases analysed in this chap­ ter demonstrate, however, that the operationalisation of democracy clauses can bring about significant conflicts between states and a series of unintended conse­ quences, including undermining democracy. Finally, the fact that South American regionalism has been incapable of con­ tributing concretely to a solution for the Venezuelan crisis enhances a situation of disintegration and conflict that has impacted Mercosur since 2016 and Unasur since 2015. Unlike during its initial years, Unasur currently seems less able to solve regional crises, such as the Venezuelan one. This leads some to question its very reason for existing, whether in countries that have always been sceptical of Unasur, like Colombia, or in countries that strongly supported its creation and activities, like Argentina and Brazil. In the Brazilian case, positions assumed by then Secretary General Ernesto Samper during the Brazilian political crisis of 2015 (Peron, 2015) against President Rousseff’s impeachment generated negative responses from the government of Michel Temer, who practically removed the organisation from his speeches and press statements. The organisation has lacked a Secretary General since 31 January, 2017.

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Conclusion Two relevant motivations driving the forces for the reconfiguration of Latin American regionalism in the first decade of the 2000s were to increase regional autonomy and democracy protection. From the above we could observe that the dynamics involved in the implementation of democracy clauses in the Americas and the effects of unintended consequences on the actors of interregionalism, on the interregional structure and on the broader environment ended up weakening both objectives. These consequences were not restricted to the issue area of democracy protection. They also led to spillover effects for the actors and the interregional structure, contributing to the decrease in regional autonomy, the increase in conflicts and the accentuation of differences among the states and the fragmentation of regional governance. The interre­ gional structure of cooperation between Mercosur and Unasur was collapsed and today there is no South American institution that contributes to managing political crises in the region. The complexity added by the increase in the number of actors and institu­ tions involved in Latin America regionalism and the controversies related to the implementation of the democracy clauses triggered a set of effects that, in conjunction with domestic changes, reduced the expectations and the invest­ ment Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Venezuela direct towards regionalism. The analysis of the 2012 political crisis in Paraguay resulting from the impeach­ ment of President Fernando Lugo and the situation of Venezuela from 2012 to 2017 demonstrated that instead of reinforcing the democratic norm, the overlap­ ping actually made it more difficult to put in practice, resulting in competition between the regional organisations and of strategic use on the part of the states targeted by the organisations in question. The competition between democracy clauses and organisations may have even contributed to undermining democ­ racy or the authority of the democratic clauses in the Americas. In this context, one additional hypothesis for future works about the controversies related to the Venezuelan case would be to check the extent to which democracy clauses in dif­ ferent regional organisations can contribute to enduring defective democracies through regional legitimacy and defence from external pressure (Davies, 2017).

Notes 1 I would like to thank Elisa Lopez-Lucia and Frank Mattheis for the helpful and insightful comments on earlier versions of this chapter, as well as Bruno Theodoro Luciano, Carolina Salgado, Gustavo Muller, and the participants of the Rubies Scien­ tific workshop “Unraveling ties? The unintended consequences of interregionalism” held at the University of Hamburg 21–22 February, 2018. 2 According to Pratt (2018) the practice of institutional deference relates to one inter­ national organisation’s acceptance of another organisation’s exercise of authority. It might be a tool used by member states to manage jurisdictional overlap among inter­ national organisations. 3 The operation resulted in the deaths of eleven landless workers and six police officers.

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Bibliography Journal articles Davies, Mathew. 2017. Regional organisations and enduring defective democratic mem­ bers. Review of International Studies 44(1): 174–191. Gomez-Mera, Laura and Andrea Molinari. 2014. Overlapping Institutions, Learning, and Dispute Initiation in Regional Trade Agreements: Evidence from South America. International Studies Quarterly 58(2): 269–281. Hoffmann, Andrea R. 2016. As organizações regionais e a promoção e proteção da democracia: reflexões a partir das práticas de intervenção democrática na América do Sul. Caderno CRH 29: 47–57. Hofmann, Stephanie. 2011. Why institutional overlap matters: CSDP in European Security Architecture. Journal of Common Market Studies 49(1): 101–120. Jatobá, Daniel and Bruno Theodoro Luciano. 2018. The deposition of Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo and its repercussions in South American regional organiza­ tions. Brazilian Political Science Review 12(1): 1–26. Merke, Federico. 2013. Política exterior da Argentina e escolha institucional: a OEA no espelho da Unasul e do Mercosul. Lua Nova (90): 65–95. Nolte, Detlef. 2018. Costs and Benefits of Overlapping Regional Organizations in Latin America: the case of OAS and Unasur. Latin American Politics and Society 60(1): 128–153. Pratt, Tyler. 2018. Deference and Hierarchy in International Regime Complexes. International Organization 72(3): 561–590. Quiliconi, Cintia and Raul Salgado Espinoza. 2017. Latin American Integration: region­ alism à la carte in a multipolar world? Colombia Internacional, 92: 15–41. Ramanzini Junior, Haroldo and Bruno Theodoro Luciano. 2018. A comparative anal­ ysis of regionalism in the global South: the security and defence dimension of Unasur and the African Union. South African Journal of International Affairs 25: 239–261. Riggirozzi, Pia and Jean Grugel. 2015. Regional governance and legitimacy in South America: the meaning of Unasaur. International Affairs 91(4): 781–797. Van Der Vleuten, Anna and Andrea R Hoffmann. 2010. Explaining the enforcement of democracy by regional organizations: comparing EU, Mercosur and SADC. Journal of Common Market Studies 48(3): 737–758. Vigevani, Tullo and Haroldo Ramanzini Junior. 2011. The impact of domestic politics and international changes on the Brazilian perception of regional integration. Latin American Politics and Society 53: 125–155. Weiffen, Brigitte, Leslie Wehner and Detlef Nolte. 2013. Overlapping regional security institutions in South America: The case of OAS and UNASUR. International Area Studies Review 16(4): 370–389.

Book chapters Briceno, Jose Ruiz, Tullo Vigevani and Karina Mariano. 2017. Post-hegemonic region­ alism in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. In: Briceño-Ruiz, José and Isidro Morales (Eds.). Post-Hegemonic Regionalism in the Americas. Toward a Pacific-Atlantic Divide? New York: Routledge. Dabéne, Olivier. 2016. Crisis induced agenda setting in the Unasur. In: Sauruger, Sabine and Fabien Terpan (Eds.). Crisis and institutional change in regional integration. New York: Routledge.

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Mattheis, Frank. 2017. Towards bifurcated regionalism: the production of regional over­ laps in Central Africa. In: Engel, Ulf, Heidrun Zinecker, Frank Mattheis, Antje Dietze and Thomas Plötze (Eds.). The new politics of regionalism: perspectives from Africa, Latin America and Asia Pacific. London/New York: Routledge.

Edited books Riggirozzi, Pia and Diana Tussie (Eds.). 2012. The rise of post hegemonic regionalism: the case of Latin America. New York: Springer.

Monographs Heine, J. and Brigitte Weiffen. 2015. 21st Century Democracy Promotion in the Americas: Standing up for the Polity. London/New York: Routledge. Weiffen, Brigitte. 2017. Institutional overlap and responses to political crisis in South America. In: Suarez, Marcial, Rafael Duarte Villa and Brigitte Weiffen (org.). Power Dynamics and Regional Security in Latin America. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Official documents OAS. 2017. The General Secretariat of the OAS Supports the decision by MERCOSUR on Venezuela. Available at: https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release. asp?sCodigo=E-062/17.pdf Accessed on 10 December 2018. UNASUR. 2011. Protocolo Adicional ao Tratado Constitutivo da Unasul Sobre Compromisso Com a Democracia. Available at: http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/ images/ed_integracao/docs_UNASUL/PROT_COMP_DEM_PORT.pdf Accessed on 10 December 2018. UNASUR. 2012. Reunión extraordinaria del Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de UNASUR. Available at: http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/images/ed_ integracao/docs_UNASUL/DEC26.2012.pdf Accessed on 10 December 2018. UNASUR. 2016. Comunicado de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas Sobre el Proyecto de Ley Aprobado por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de America. Available at: http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/images/ed_integracao/docs_UNASUL/ COM_SANES_VEN_2014.pdf Accessed on 10 December 2018.

Online resources Carmo, Márcia. 2012. Países do Mercosul decidem suspender Paraguai do bloco. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2012/06/120628_paraguai_ suspenso_mc. Accessed on 10 December 2018. Closa, Carlos and Stefano Palestini. 2015. Between democratic protection and selfdefense: the case of Unasur and Venezuela. EUI Working paper, RSCAS. Available at: https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/38064. Accessed on 10 December 2018. El Hage, Javier. 2010. Under what circumstances may the OAS apply the democracy clause against a member state? Working paper on International Democracy Law. March. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2480086. Accessed on 10 December 2018. Genna, Gaspare and Taeko Hiroi. 2015. Do democracy clauses matter? The effects of regional integration Associations on political stability and democratic consolida­ tion. EUI Working paper. Available at: https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/36318. Accessed on 10 December 2018.

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G1. 2012a. Hugo Chávez interrompe envio de petróleo da Venezuela ao Paraguai. Available at: http://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2012/06/hugo-chavez-interrompe­ envio-de-petroleo-da-venezuela-para-o-paraguai.html Accessed on 10 December 2018. G1. 2012b. Paraguai ‘não aceita’ sua exclusão da cúpula da Unasul na Argentina. Available at: http://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2012/06/paraguai-nao-aceita-sua-exclusao­ da-cupula-da-unasul-na-argentina.html Accessed on 10 December 2018. G1. 2014. Brasil vota contra envio de missão da OEA para apurar crise na Venezuela. Available at: http://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2014/03/brasil-vota-contra-envio­ de-missao-da-oea-para-apurar-crise-na-venezuela.html. Accessed on 10 December 2018. Krakovics, Fernanda, Danilo Fariello and Janaína Figueiredo. 2012. Paraguai será afastado do Mercosul e da Unasul até eleições presidenciais em 2013. Available at: https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/paraguai-sera-afastado-do-mercosul-da-unasul­ ate-eleicoes-presidenciais-em-2013-5301933 Accessed on 10 December 2018. La Nación. 2012. Argentina “no convalidará el golpe en Paraguay” mientras que Brasil sugirió que quedaría fuera de la Unasur y el Mercosur. Available at: https://www. lanacion.com.ar/1484357-unasur-y-mercosur-tomaria-medidas-severas-ante-la­ remocion-de-lugo Accessed on 10 December 2018. Mendes, Priscilla. 2012. OEA não tem consenso sobre retaliação ao Paraguai, diz Patriota. Available at: http://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2012/07/oea-nao-tem-consenso­ sobre-retaliacao-ao-paraguai-diz-patriota.html Accessed on 10 December 2018. Peron, Isadora. 2015. Unasul se posiciona contra o impeachment de Dilma. Available at: https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,unasul-se-posiciona-contra-impeachment­ de-dilma,1778992 Accessed on 10 December 2018. Pisani, Silvia. 2012. Descarta la OEA suspender a Paraguay y critica al Mercosur. Available at: https://www.lanacion.com.ar/el-mundo/descarta-la-oea-suspender-a­ paraguay-y-critica-al-mercosur-nid1489389 Accessed on 10 December 2018. Presse, France. 2012. Paraguai não deveria ser suspenso da OEA, diz chancelaria dos EUA. Available at: http://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2012/07/eua-paraguai-nao­ deveria-ser-suspenso-da-oea-1.html Accessed on 10 December 2018. Terra. 2011. Chanceleres aprovam cláusula democrática da Celac. Available at: https:// www.terra.com.br/noticias/mundo/america-latina/chanceleres-aprovam-clausula­ democratica-da-celac,d71db048a67ea310VgnCLD200000bbcceb0aRCRD.html Accessed on 10 December 2018. Uchoa, Pablo. 2012a. Sem consenso e descolada do Mercosul, OEA volta a discutir Paraguai. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2012/07/120709_ oea_paraguai_pu.shtml Accessed on 10 December 2018. Uchoa, Pablo. 2012b. Sem consenso, OEA decide enviar missão ao Paraguai. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2012/06/120626_oea_paraguai_missao_ pu Accessed on 10 December 2018. Uol. 2012. Secretário-geral rejeita que OEA suspenda o Paraguai por destituição de Lugo. Available at: https://noticias.uol.com.br/internacional/ultimas-noticias/2012/07/10/ secretario-geral-rejeita-que-oea-suspenda-o-paraguai-por-destituicao-de-lugo.htm? cmpid=copiaecola. Accessed on 10 December 2018.

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3 THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INTERREGIONALISM ON ACTORNESS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION The case of EU-ASEAN cooperation in disaster management Giulia Tercovich Introduction “I think we will need to work together with other regional organisations […]. We have common work, just as we have a common agenda” said Federica Mogherini, former High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission during her first hearing at the European Parliament in October 2014 (Mogherini, 2014). During the last decade, there has undeniably been a growing emphasis both within and outside the EU on the strategic importance of regional integration and interregionalism, not only with respect to region-to-region relations but also in the form of institutionalised multidimensional cooperation between at least one regional grouping and either a regional grouping or a vast country belonging to a different region (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert, 2015). Scholars have developed multiple analyses of regionalism in two main ways: looking at the region-specific factors (Mattli, 1998; Rosamond, 2000; Söderbaum and Shaw, 2003; Wiener and Diez, 2009; Laursen, 2003) or as reac­ tion to global challenges (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995; Gamble and Payne, 1996; Hettne, 2002, 2007). Scholars looked to the EU as a model for other regions or as a sui generis actor that cannot be replicated elsewhere or as an essential point of reference for different regions, while also considering the reality of the multipolar world (Telò et al., 2015). Interregional relations are thus often under­ stood as a process of regional emulation, in which existing regionalism processes influence others, with potentially positive or negative consequences (Hettne, 2002; Rüland, 2001).

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In 2016, the EU Global Strategy stated that the so-called regional order remains one of the core elements of the EU. “[The EU] will promote and sup­ port cooperative regional orders worldwide, including in the most divided areas. Regional orders do not take a single form. Where possible, and when in line with our interests, the EU will support regional organisations. We will not strive to export our model, but rather seek mutual inspiration from different regional experiences” (European Commission, 2016a: 32). Although scholars disagree on the modalities and results of the EU’s approach to regionalism, they largely agree that the EU’s promotion of regional cooperation worldwide remains one of the EU’s main priorities (Börzel and Risse, 2015). The EU justifies its commitment towards interregional cooperation by ref­ erencing the UN Charter’s desire for stronger regional organisations. Thus, the EU’s commitment to stronger regionalism is based on the EU’s genuine desire to support other regionalisms and consequently the UN idea of a de facto division of labour where regional actors take on increasingly important roles (Fawcett, 2004). The assumption implies that the more other regional organi­ sations develop and expand, the less the EU needs to intervene in other crises. However, this type of support for other processes of regionalism is counter­ balanced by the EU’s ambition for actorness at a global level. If, on the one hand, EU discourse is in line with some academic positions, which support the idea of the strategic importance of other regionalisms as forums for building trust (Haver and Foley, 2011), on the other hand, the eternal fight of the EU to be perceived as a legitimate, effective and relevant global actor continues (Niemann and Bretherton, 2013). This chapter looks at the issue from a novel point of view by arguing that the intended promotion of interregional links also produces unintended effects for the EU global actorness in countries and regions far away. If on the one hand the EU is supporting – in its discourses and practices – the process of regionalism as a way to achieve global governance, for example, by supporting the efforts in other regions to develop mechanisms to coordinate the response to disasters, on the other hand, the EU’s presence abroad is still used to justify the relevance of EU institutions for dealing with disasters. The chapter studies a case of pure interregionalism (cf. Lopez-Lucia and Mattheis in this volume) between the EU and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). In particular, it looks at the EU’s interregional involvement in ASEAN’s disaster management, arguing that these initiatives undermine the EU’s objective of establishing its institutions (namely the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, DG ECHO) as credible and effective instruments in the management of disasters taking place outside Europe. Disaster management is a crucial dimension of the EU-ASEAN interre­ gionalism, as it constitutes one of the formally recognised areas of cooperation. It was after the 2004 tsunami, and with the 2007 Nuremberg Declaration on ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership, that disaster management officially become

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one of the areas of EU-ASEAN cooperation. In the past 20 years, the ASEAN disaster management policy has evolved considerably. In July 2005, with the signature of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), the ten members of ASEAN created their regional dis­ aster management mechanism. In November 2011, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) was officially launched and between 2011 and 2016 it developed a full regional disaster response capacity. This chapter contributes to the edited volume by arguing that the EU’s sup­ port of ASEAN in developing regional instruments to respond to disasters ends up reducing the EU disaster management actorness in South East Asia. This is not as a policy failure as such, but rather an unintended consequence of the EU’s interregional actions. By unpacking the unintended consequence of the interre­ gional relations between EU and ASEAN in disaster management (Lopez-Lucia and Mattheis in this volume) the chapter highlights the fact that interregional relations between the two regional organisations might have unintended conse­ quences in terms of the opportunities for the EU to enhance its actorness in the region. The chapter is structured around four sections. The first section provides an overview of the discourses of the EU as a global actor in disaster management. The second section introduces ASEAN as a rising actor in crisis management. The third section presents EU-ASEAN interregionalism in disaster management and the first three phases of evolution of that collaboration. The fourth section is devoted to the unintended consequences of the EU-ASEAN cooperation in disaster management that have been unfolding in the current fourth phase since 2016, and applies an analysis of the different actorness elements discussed by Bretherton and Vogler (2006). Finally, the conclusion summarises the main find­ ings and highlights the contribution of this chapter to the theme of this edited volume.

The discourse of the EU as a global actor in disaster management The EU sees itself as a global actor that still has to express all its potentials. As stated by Federica Mogherini in the forward of the 2016 EU Global Strategy: “[…] as a Union of almost half a billion citizens, our potential is unparalleled. […] It is also clear, though, that we are not making full use of this potential yet” (European Commission, 2016a: 3). Bretherton and Vogler (2006) proposed a framework to look at the oper­ ationalisation of EU actorness based on three interrelated concepts: oppor­ tunity, presence and capability. Opportunity is described as the “external environment of ideas and events which frames and shapes EU action or inac­ tion” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 24). Presence is defined as “the ability to exert influence externally” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 27). Presence, in Bretherton and Vogler’s understanding, is not only the proactive action

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to shape perception, expectation and behaviours as proposed by Allen and Smith (1991, 1998), but is also a consequence of the mere existence of the EU. Finally, they noted how the “fact of just being’ is not enough, and they added capability as the third concept. Capability refers to the ‘internal context of the EU action or inaction” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 29), which mitigates the notion of presence. By adding the capability element, Bretherton and Vogler remind us that expectations of what the EU can or cannot do in reality often depend on its capacity to formulate and implement policy. The three concepts proposed by Bretherton and Vogler (2006) are useful keywords that the chap­ ter uses to discuss the different phases of EU disaster management actorness and why interregional relations with ASEAN in the same area might cause unintended consequences. These are not pre-made typologies which the case should fit into, but are useful concepts for unpacking EU actorness and the potential impact on it. The EU translates its will to be recognised as an inter­ national actor in the needs to be present and effective in its external policies (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Niemann and Bretherton, 2013). However, this chapter argues that while the EU keeps investing in its capability to respond to crises happening outside Europe, the interregional cooperation with ASEAN impacts both the actorness’ elements of opportunity and presence (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 2006). Beyond the policies in which the EU traditionally sees itself as an important actor at the global level, including trade and development, humanitarian assis­ tance has become an increasingly prominent part of the EU’s external activities (Tercovich, 2018). As a humanitarian aid donor, the EU does not directly pro­ vide humanitarian aid, but it supports partner organisations in implementing humanitarian assistance programmes. This burgeoning policy field also boasts increasing support from EU citizens, who strongly favour the EU’s financial engagement in humanitarian aid and related activities (European Commission, 2015). The 1992-established Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management (ECHO) stands at the core of humanitarian assistance. Since 1992, ECHO has fought to progressively gain legitimacy. Internal and external interlocutors played an essential role in the evolution of the institution. Since its establishment, the support granted to ECHO has contributed to its legitimacy. Now that it is recognised as a legitimate actor, ECHO’s new challenge is to prove its global effectiveness (Tercovich, 2018). The 2016 EU Global Strategy expects the EU to play a global role as a “security provider”, not only in traditional terms but also in dealing with the “resilience of States and societies” (European Commission, 2016a: 4). ECHO’s commissioners made this very clear every time there was a catastrophic event where the EU provided its support. The commissioners recalled the global actor­ ness of the EU in terms of opportunity, presence and capabilities (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006) and by doing so they clearly stated the intended consequences of the EU actorness: respond to an opportunity, be present and have the capa­ bilities to respond.

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In EU discourses, the opportunity is provided by a world that is ever more affected by disasters, where the EU has to show solidarity (presence), using the means that it can mobilise in terms of financial assistance and response tools (capabilities). Kristalina Georgieva, first post-Lisbon Commissioner in charge of International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response (2010–2014), stated in a speech delivered during a conference dedicated to Haiti “I can assure you the European people will, as always, show generosity for those in need. We are less than a third of worldwide GDP, but we provide 60% of development assistance worldwide. Even now, during the worst [economic] crisis of the last 50 years, we stick to our contributions to make the world a better place for all” (Georgieva, 2010). Christos Stylianides, EU Ebola Coordinator and Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response between 2014 and 2019, stated that the EU is the kind of actor that “leads by example” (Stylianides, 2019a), and that the ability of the EU to respond to disasters also outside Europe is “an instru­ ment, a tool, which we can show in real terms… tangible European solidarity” (Stylianides, 2019b). A similar discourse on the need for the EU to respond to crises happening outside the EU as a way to show solidarity, and by using its financial and technical means, is also part of the new Commission approach. In a mission letter to Janez Lenarčič, new Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, Commission President von der Leyen stated “Europe has a responsibility to show solidarity and to support those in need. This is one of our core values and has overwhelming public support. Together with its Member States, the European Union is the most generous humanitarian aid donor in the world and is seen by many as the world’s first responder” (von der Leyen, 2019). It is interesting to notice that the EU justifies its support for populations affected by disaster (presence) as based on the needs of the affected people and not on the political, economic, or security agenda of the EU, as stated by the independence principle of DG ECHO. Yet this role of the EU as “world first responder” is often used in EU rhetoric to leverage the role of the EU in the world. For example, in preparation for the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, the EU perceived itself not only as a major humanitarian donor but also as a “key policy-setter with global operational experience” (EU Commission, 2016). Yet in the multipolar world, the EU is not the only regional actor who is seeking a role at a global level in the field of disaster management. In July 2005, with the signature of the ASEAN AADMER Agreement, the ten members of the ASEAN created their regional disaster management mechanism. In November 2011, the AHA was officially launched and between 2011 and 2016 developed a full regional disaster response mechanism.

ASEAN as a rising actor in crisis management The ten ASEAN countries are located in one of the most disaster prone parts of the world. The ASEAN region regularly experiences tsunamis, floods, volcano eruptions, typhoons, cyclones and earthquakes. Since the establishment of the

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ASEAN in 1967, the region has been hit by more than 1550 natural disasters with severe consequences in terms of people affected and economic damages. Therefore, although not among the core elements driving the foundation of the Association in 1967, the need to collaborate on disaster response at ASEAN level has emerged since the first years, becoming an ever more pressing issue. The need for the five ASEAN founding members to cooperate in the area of disaster management was officially set for the first time in article 4 of the Concord I Declaration in 1976. “Natural disasters and other major calamities can retard the pace of develop­ ment of member states. They [ASEAN member states] shall extend, within their capabilities, assistance for the relief of member states in distress” (ASEAN, 1976)’. The ASEAN Declaration for Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters was signed in Manila on 26 June, 1976, and the ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM) was officially tasked to explore different options to increase the ASEAN coordination of the response to disasters. The first ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) was finally adopted in May 2004. Following the adoption of the ARPDM Programme, the ten ASEAN member states, together with the ASEAN Secretariat, started a discussion on the adoption of an ASEAN framework on disaster management. The tsunami in December 2004 accelerated this process quite consistently. The AADMER was signed by the ten ASEAN member states in July 2005, only seven months after the cata­ strophic disaster, but entered into force four years later in December 2009. The AHA on disaster management (AHA Centre) is the operational mani­ festation of the AADMER. Although functional since October 2007, the AHA Centre was officially established on 17 November, 2011. The AHA Centre is the hub coordinating the ASEAN regional response in case of disaster. Similarly to the EU ERCC instrument for monitoring and responding to disasters, the AHA Centre operates 24/7, it ensures better preparedness and coherent response based on needs, and it coordinates ASEAN member states response to crises. Still, while the EU also responds to events outside EU borders, the ASEAN AHA Centre focuses only on internal disasters. Even if the AHA Centre’s response focuses on ASEAN member states only, it is the main regional actor responding to the numerous crises affecting South East Asia. Using Bretherton and Vogler’s concepts (2006), considering that South East Asia is one of the most disaster-prone regions in the world, a regional actor like the AHA Centre has numerous opportunities to act. In terms of presence, between 2012 and 2016, the AHA Centre has responded to 15 disasters and provided preparedness and assessment missions on the other four occasions. The capabilities of the AHA Centre are continually evolving, and since 2011 it has developed a set of instruments to better respond to disasters within the ASEAN region, including a Disaster Emergency Logistic System (DELSA), a growing number of Emergency Response and Assessment Teams (ERAT), an execu­ tive training programme dedicated to ASEAN national experts, as well as the

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organisation of an increasing number of exercises. The development of these ASEAN disaster management capabilities was also made possible thanks to the support of some of the ASEAN dialogue partners, including Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the US, as well as the EU. Initially conceived as a donor–client relation, with the reinforcement of ASEAN capabilities this relationship became more and more balanced (Pushpanathan, 2003). This led the ASEAN leaders to sign the ASEAN Declaration on One ASEAN One Response in September 2016. They not only reaffirmed the centrality of the AHA Centre in the regional response to disasters but were also “recognis­ ing the role of the AHA Centre, at a later stage, to enable ASEAN to respond to disasters outside the region, where appropriate, in partnership with regional and international agencies and centres” (ASEAN, 2016: 10). Even if this “will take a lot of time to materialise” (European Commission Official, 2018), it still creates a tension with the EU’s aim to act as a global actor. If this tension is at the moment limited to South East Asia, it might potentially expand to other areas in the world where the EU is responding, creating a de facto competition among regional actors.

EU-ASEAN interregional cooperation in disaster management Although South East Asia has one of the highest levels of vulnerability to dis­ asters in the world, it was only in 2007 and following the tragedy of the 2004 tsunami, that disaster management officially became one of the areas of coop­ eration between the EU and ASEAN. Previous agreements had not included disaster management in the interregional cooperation (European Commission, 2001; European Commission, 2003b). By using Bretherton and Vogler’s (2006) operationalisation of the EU actorness concept, the chapter argues that EU actor­ ness in South East Asia in the field of disaster management could be divided into four phases. During these different phases, the EU presents itself as an actor in the region by advancing its presence and capabilities (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006) albeit to varying degrees. During the initial phase before 2004, the EU’s development projects were the main elements of the EU’s presence in the region. Although not initially listed among the strategic areas of EU-ASEAN cooperation, the EU initiatives in the South East Asia region under the development and humanitarian aid umbrella included the management of disasters. The ECHO’s Disaster Preparedness Programme (DIPECHO) was part of Commissioner Bonino’s strategy to increase ECHO visibility outside the EU to enhance its legitimacy (Tercovich, 2018). Overall, the DIPECHO program could be seen as the first instrument used by the EU to show its presence in the region (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). For around ten years, EU-ASEAN cooperation on disaster-related issues was limited to the DIPECHO programme. It was only in December 2004, with the 9.15 magnitude earthquake, which triggered the Indian Ocean tsunami, that

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the EU started paying more attention to the management of disasters in South East Asia. During this second phase (2004–2007), the 2004 tsunami represented a critical juncture for both the EU and ASEAN ways of dealing with crises and disasters. Yet the initial European and ASEAN reaction to the 2004 tsu­ nami focused more on the importance of strengthening the respective regional instruments (capabilities). In contrast, not much attention was paid to advanc­ ing the EU-ASEAN cooperation in this field. At the EU level, the tsunami pushed the further institutionalisation of the community instruments and in particular the Community Civil Protection Mechanism (CCPM). At the ASEAN level, the Indian Ocean Tsunami acted as an accelerator for the adop­ tion of the AADMER agreement (ASEAN, 2004). Overall, during this phase, the EU prioritised the need to develop its capabilities further to be perceived as a credible actor in the field of disaster management. Even if the EU expressed its support, this was mainly in terms of financial aid to the ASEAN popula­ tion rather than in reinforcing ASEAN’s tools to better respond to disasters. In his intervention at the January Special ASEAN Summit, the EC President Barroso reinforced the message that the EU was ready to support the popu­ lation in need by doing “everything in our power to help you in your efforts to put this tragedy behind us” (European Commission, 2005c), but nothing was mentioned in terms of the possibility for the EU to support the devel­ opment of ASEAN instruments to better respond to disasters. On the con­ trary, the 2004 tsunami was used to justify the need to further reinforce the existing EU instruments, including the ECHO emergency response centre and the CCPM with the same EC President Barroso stating “I am proud of the response of the EU to the tsunami disaster. Our institutions, governments and peoples responded quickly and generously. Nevertheless, we should learn from what we did in responding to this terrible disaster to make more effective our response to the next catastrophe. In particular, we should consider how to strengthen our response by working together further through the Union” (European Commission, 2005d). In fact, at that time the EU mechanism of Civil Protection was still taking its first steps and was not (yet) considered the successful instrument that it is now. ECHO was focused on the negotiations around the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid and to gain EU member states’ support for its activities after an external evaluation on ECHO that had been very critical about the lack of strategy it was pursuing (Tercovich, 2018). During the third phase (2007–2016) and with the signature of the Nuremberg Declaration on ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership (15 March, 2007), disaster management is mentioned for the first time as an area of cooperation between ASEAN and EU. The two regional organisations agreed to “cooperate at regional and global levels on disaster management including supporting the ARPDM and foster closer cooperation at the regional and global levels on dis­ aster management, preparedness, mitigation and emergency response as well

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as rehabilitation and reconstruction” (European Council, 2007). During this phase, the EU’s presence materialises in the form of several projects launched to support ASEAN in developing its instruments to respond to disasters in its region. The €70 million Plan of Action (European Commission, 2007) for the period 2007–2012 that followed the Nuremberg Declaration identified disaster man­ agement and emergency response as crucial priorities within the Socio-Cultural pillar of the cooperation (European Commission, 2007). With the 2007 Plan of Action, the European Commission committed to supporting the creation of the ASEAN disaster management and emergency response mechanism. As for why the EU decided to support the development of a disaster management com­ ponent in ASEAN, the 2007 Nuremberg Declaration states that this was a way to respond to the UN chart’s call for “building solid regional organisations” (European Council, 2007). Yet using Bretherton and Vogler’s (2006) framework, one could argue that the EU supported the development of ASEAN’s capabilities while justifying the EU presence in the region. If on the one hand, the EU was supporting ASEAN in becoming an actor in the field of disaster management, on the other hand it was also imposing itself as a relevant actor in a region that is not a direct strategic area for the EU. Since 2007, disaster response has always been mentioned as one of the pri­ ority areas of cooperation between the two regions by ministers during the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meetings (Council of the EU, 2009; 2010a; 2012). With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the creation of the European External Action Service and the organisational structural changes that followed, EU-ASEAN cooperation on disaster management also became part of the com­ petencies of the newly established EEAS, and it was no longer exclusively in the remit of the ECHO competencies. Yet this institutional change did not result in a shift in the approach towards the development of ASEAN’s instruments to respond to crises. Under the new framework offered by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU and ASEAN adopted the Bandar Seri Begawan Plan for Action (2013–2017) with the aim of “continu[ing] to strengthen ASEAN’s centrality in the evolving regional architecture” (Council of the EU, 2010b). The EU-ASEAN Plan of action still emphasised the focus on sharing of experiences and best practices, raising aware­ ness, as well as support in the implementation of the Work Programme for the ASEAN AADMER and strengthening of the AHA on disaster management (AHA Centre, 2012). By supporting ASEAN, the EU launched two, almost par­ allel, initiatives. Firstly, the Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument READI aimed to support the policy dialogue of the EU with ASEAN “drawing on European experience and know-how” to develop ASEAN processes in non-trade related areas (READI, 2017). The four year initiative ran between 2011 and 2015 with a budget of €4 million. READI focused on ten components, one of which was disaster management.

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Secondly, the ASEAN-EU Emergency Management Programme (AEEMP) started in 2013. The three-year project has been funded by the EU Instrument for Stability with around €2.2 million (European Commission, 2016b). The declared aim was to reinforce the cooperation between ASEAN emergency response actors, including the AHA Centre, ASEAN Secretariat and the ASEAN mem­ ber states as well as connecting them with similar EU bodies, namely the EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) and the EEAS Situation Room. The AEEMP ended in October 2016 and was not renewed (ASEAN, 2015; EEAS Official, 2015). Overall, the AEEMP project is not considered to be among the most successful project of the EEAS Instrument for Stability (European Commission Official, 2017). Set up in Brussels by the EEAS Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department, the AHA Centre initially had a hard time in placing this project in its multi-annual planning. Overall, the most successful project was the inauguration of the Myanmar Crisis Centre. Yet that was driven more by a bilateral interest than by the genuine will to support the AHA Centre. Nevertheless, the AEEMP project, as well as the disaster management component of the READI instrument was part of the EU establishment of its actorness, and in particular, it was a way for the EU to establish its presence in the region. The EU’s willingness to reinforce its actorness by enhancing its presence in the region characterised the different three phases. To do so, it started by sup­ porting ASEAN disaster management actions in the region, and it continued by enhancing ASEAN capabilities in responding to disasters. These first three phases do not present unintended consequences in terms of EU actorness. In fact, the intended objectives of the EU in terms of actorness in the region were gradually achieved over time. However, this chapter argues that since the signa­ ture of the 2016 ASEAN Declaration ‘One ASEAN One Response’, in which ASEAN established itself as a disaster management actor able to respond to dis­ asters inside its region as well as intending to respond outside ASEAN member states territories, a fourth phase started. In this fourth phase, ASEAN presents itself as a more autonomous actor in crisis management. Following the support received by external actors (including the EU), ASEAN acquires competencies and capabilities to coordinate the regional response to disaster within ASEAN territories and beyond. Although the overarching objective of creating a division of labour among regional organisations seems within reach, on the other hand, this might represent an issue for EU actorness in the region. If ASEAN now has all the necessary capabilities to respond to disasters, why should the EU still be involved in the region? What is more, if the aim of ASEAN is now to build its capabilities to also respond outside South East Asia, what does this mean for the EU and its quest for global actorness? In line with the main objective of this volume, this chapter aims to reflect on the assumption that interregionalism is a desired development for the EU as well as on the potential unintended consequences of this assumption for EU actorness. In the next section, this unintended consequence is discussed and its potential effects unpacked.

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Unpacking the unintended consequences of the EU-ASEAN cooperation in disaster management This section argues that in the most recent phase since 2016 the EU’s interre­ gional support to ASEAN has started to produce unintended consequences for EU actorness in the disaster management-related actions in the South East Asia region. This is not a policy failure of the EU but rather a “particular effect of purposive action which is different from what was wanted at the moment of carrying out the act” (Baert, 1991: 201). In line with the introduction of this volume, this is an unintended consequence that the EU is not expecting when carrying out its actions (Burlyuk, 2017). It is difficult to assess if it is desirable for the EU to support another regional organisation if it consequently de facto undermines its own role as a global actor in the area. This mainly depends on what the EU sees as a priority: the presence of the EU as a disaster manager in South East Asia as Bretherton and Vogler (2006) would argue, or the creation of a division of labour among different regional organisations (Fawcett, 2004), where a more independent ASEAN would entail the progressive disengagement of the EU. Both elements are part of the recently published EU Global Strategy, and it seems that the potential tension between these two objectives has not yet been taken into consideration by EU policymakers, as the case of disaster management cooperation shows. Quite the opposite, the interregional support from the EU to other regions is often presented as a strategic component of the EU without a reflection on the potential unintended consequences of this support in terms of EU actorness. The declared aim of the EU support towards ASEAN in developing an effi­ cient instrument to respond to crises is to reinforce ASEAN as a regional organi­ sation and in particular its instrument to respond to disasters. The EU is involved because it is perceived as a legitimate and competent actor in this specific filed. As underlined by the executive director of the AHA Centre “the EU’s excellence in responding to disasters outside its region is what the AHA Centre aspires to” (Kamal, 2020). This statement might be read in positive terms, as it entails ASEAN recog­ nising the EU as a model in the regional response to disasters. Yet this chapter argues that this declaration should also be read as reflecting the desire of ASEAN to establish itself as a global responder, potentially proposing an alternative model to the EU. The 2016 ASEAN Declaration ‘One ASEAN One Response’ states the objective of achieving a faster response, mobilise resources and reinforce coordination among ASEAN member states to ensure the collective response to disasters “in the region and outside the region” (ASEAN, 2016). Until then, ASEAN was mainly inward looking and focused on strengthening its own regional coordination to disasters, but since 2016 it has set a new ambition. This new ambition to also respond to events outside the region represents the mate­ rialisation of an unintended consequence for the EU. In fact, a stronger ASEAN in the field of disaster management which has the capacity to respond outside its

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own region has different implications for the EU actorness’ three components of opportunity, presence and capabilities. First, the component of opportunity as the external environment of events which frames EU action or inaction (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006) has not changed much since 2016. Looking at the regional trends (EM-DAT, 2016) the region is not less affected by disasters, and these disasters still require interna­ tional cooperation to help the local populations affected. In addition, South East Asian states still welcome EU support both in terms of humanitarian funding in response to disasters, as well as in terms of projects and initiatives to enhance the region preparedness and risk reduction. Overall, there remains substantive opportunity to show actorness for the EU, although a stronger ASEAN in the field of disaster management would incite its members to reduce opportunities by expressing less demand towards the EU to intervene. Second, new unintended effects of the interregional cooperation in the disaster management field are emerging for the EU’s presence in the region. At this stage, even if the AHA Centre’s actorness in the region is growing, the EU remains involved in the responses to natural disasters in the region, from the floods in Myanmar (ECHO, 2015a) to the Typhoon Koppu (ECHO, 2015b). In 2018 alone, the EU intervened at least three times in South East Asia. In August 2018, the EU allocated €650,000 to support communities hit by a series of strong earth­ quakes in the Indonesian island of Lombok. In September 2018, the EU provided €1.5 million in response to the Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami in Indonesia. Finally, following the eruption of the Anak Krakatau volcano and the consequent tsunami that affected the coastal area of Indonesia in December 2018, the EU pro­ vided €400,000 of assistance as well as the deployment of expertise to participate in the assessments and coordination of the relief efforts in the region (ECHO, 2019). Therefore, even if the AHA Centre is increasingly capable of coordinating the response, the EU remains involved not only in channelling the support from the EU and its member states but also in running the needs assessment and the local coordination of relief support. Although this is perfectly in line with the EU’s wish to be perceived as a present global actor, it also creates competition over visibility and potential friction with the AHA Centre that is also aspiring to gain legitimacy through its activities and therefore also needs visibility (ASEAN Official, 2017). Third, in terms of capabilities, the EU could argue that ASEAN has now developed instruments to respond to disasters in their region that equal the ones developed by the EU. Thus, there would be no need to further invest in enhanc­ ing ASEAN capabilities. As a consequence, interregional projects with ASEAN in the field of disaster response would fade out as an area of the cooperation, in which the EU wants to invest further. Considering that in June 2019 the EU launched the new €11 million project on ‘Enhancing the Capacity of AHA Centre and ASEAN Emergency Response Mechanisms’ (EU SAHA project), this is not the case yet. Becoming a global actor in response to crises might be a long-term plan for ASEAN but it remains unfulfilled for now, as the organisa­ tion is still developing its own capabilities.

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The current phase of EU-ASEAN interregionalism thus entails an increase of the EU’s actorness, as evidenced by the launch of the recent SAHA project and a continued presence of the EU in the region despite the AHA Centre’s advancements. Nevertheless, a stronger ASEAN in the field of disaster manage­ ment with capacities to respond outside its own region would ultimately have unintended consequences on the EU actorness in terms of opportunity, presence and capabilities. Commenting on the launch of the new EU SAHA project, the executive director of the AHA Centre said “the EU’s excellence in responding to disasters outside its region is what the AHA Centre aspires to. We want in the future to be able to facilitate ASEAN response outside the region. And the best teacher to do that would be the EU because it has been doing it collectively as a region for years” (Kamal, 2020). Even if the effects of the unintended conse­ quence have not yet fully materialised, ASEAN’s trajectory to develop its means to respond to disasters in its own region would challenge the EU’s justification of its presence – as currently conceived – in the region. First, affected states in Asia might prefer to accept emergency support from an institution that is already based in the region and that is directly controlled by them. In addition, ASEAN is not only geographically and culturally closer but would also have more exper­ tise in responding to recurrent types of disasters. Second, if ASEAN responds to disasters in third regions this will create overlaps with the EU that either require the EU to submit to joint coordination or lead to direct competition. Third, European parties, auditors and constituencies, in particular those already scepti­ cal of the efficiency of development aid, would have more grounds to question interventions by the EU in regions where other actors might be more suited. Despite the potentially far reaching unintended consequences that the EU-ASEAN cooperation in the field of disaster management could have on EU actorness abroad, practitioners working in the field seem to be unaware of them. They do not mention the potential impact of strengthening another regional organisation on the EU itself (European Commission Official, 2019). This is due to disconnect of many EU’s officials with the local developments and the persisting perception of the EU as the most advanced regional organisation in any policy area or world region (Burlyuk, 2017). The EU, although it supports the ASEAN mechanism to respond to disasters via various projects, is often not aware of the level of development of this regional mechanism in South East Asia (European Commission Official, 2019), and this perception is even reinforced by the same ASEAN officials (Kamal, 2020). Moreover, the EU’s eternal competi­ tion between interests and values also contributes to these disconnects. The EU’s discourses and practices are trying to get out of the long, highly criticised Eurocentrist approach. The support given to other regional organisa­ tions to implement their own instruments is part of this new vision (European Commission Official, 2018). Meanwhile, the EU also aspires to global actorness and these two objectives remain difficult to reconcile. EU officials are not pur­ suing policies to anticipate the potential consequences of the two competing views. The prevalent perception is that “maybe one day they [AHA Centre]

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will be completely independent, but there is a long way to go, and there is still a lot we can share of our experiences” (European Commission Official, 2019). However, this view obfuscates the already ongoing changes that the EU faces in its relationship with ASEAN in the field of disaster management. The posi­ tive and intended impact of interregionalism that will allow the EU to still be perceived as a relevant actor in the region, even under a more limited presence, also entail unintended consequences induced by a more equal division of labour with other regional organisations that are able to coordinate their own response to disasters or better target their support. As part of the broader debates around the fading out of development aid, the EU will need to adapt to a new reality. Even if the effects of the unintended consequences have not fully unfolded yet, they are in-built in current developments and it would be essential for the EU to recognise them and to start addressing them.

Conclusion This chapter discussed the unintended consequences of interregionalism on regional actorness. Based on an analysis of the EU-ASEAN relations and the consequent development of ASEAN instruments to respond to disasters, the chapter argues that an unintended consequence is unfolding regarding the EU actorness in disaster management abroad. The EU’s support for the institutional capacity of other regions on the one hand and the challenge of being perceived as a global actor on the other hand, which have hitherto been mutually reinforcing, have started to pose an important dilemma. In line with the aim of the edited volume, this chapter has provided an alter­ native point of view to the ‘normative way of thinking’ that regionalism entails only positive effects for the actors involved (cf. Lopez-Lucia and Mattheis in this volume). By applying Bretherton and Vogler’s (2006) definition of actorness, the consequences on the EU’s opportunity, presence and capability have been highlighted. If on the one hand, the EU is reinforcing its capabilities to further respond to crises outside the European borders, on the other hand, by supporting ASEAN regional instruments it risks reducing the elements of opportunity and presence. These unintended consequences are thus not a policy failure but rather the result of a disconnect between two dichotomous ambitions. In the first three phases of the evolution of the EU-ASEAN interregionalism in disaster management, the intended objectives of the EU in terms of actor­ ness in the region were gradually achieved over time. The unintended con­ sequences have materialised in the ongoing fourth phase of the cooperation, starting with the 2016 ASEAN Declaration “One ASEAN One Response”. This chapter argues that if the ASEAN disaster management instruments develop as stated in the 2016 ASEAN Declaration on “One ASEAN One Response”, this would have multiple consequences for EU actorness in the field of disaster man­ agement in the region and might require the EU to re-evaluate its interregional engagement. As a consequence, EU regional actorness will need to go beyond

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the conceptualisation done by Bretherton and Vogler (2006) as opportunity, presence and capabilities. Even if the effects of the unintended consequence in terms of opportunity, presence and capabilities of EU actorness have not fully materialised yet, the rec­ ognition of the unfolding dynamic provides an opportunity to re-think in a more reciprocal way how the EU’s actorness is established in relationship with other regions. ASEAN’s aspiration needs to be taken seriously, both within its own region and globally. Coordination should be the main mantra for guiding the evo­ lution of interregionalism if ASEAN’s striving for actorness is supposed to enhance rather than rival the EU’s global actorness in the field of disaster management.

Bibliography Journal articles Burlyuk, Olga. 2017. The ‘Oops!’ of EU Engagement Abroad: Analyzing Unintended Consequences of EU External Action. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 55(5): 1009–1025. Baert, Patrick. 1991. Unintended Consequences: A Typology and Examples. International Sociology 6(2): 201–210. Fawcett, Louise. 2004. Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism. International Affairs 80(3): 429–446. Niemann, Arne and Charlotte Bretherton. 2013. EU External Policy at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Actorness and Effectiveness. International Relations, 27(3): 261–275.

Book chapters Allen, David and Michael Smith. 1991. Western Europe’s Presence in the International System. In: M. Holland (Ed.). The Future of European Political Cooperation. London: Macmillan, 95–120. Allen, David and Michael Smith. 1998. The European Union’s Security Presence: Barrier, Facilitator or Manager? In: Carolyn Rhodes (Ed.). The European Union in the World Community. London: Lynne Rienner, 45–63. Börzel, Tanja A. and Thomas Risse. 2015. The EU and the Diffusion of Regionalism. In: Mario Telò, Louise Fawcett and Frederik Ponjaert (Eds.). Interregionalism and the European Union: A Post-Revisionist Approach to Europe’s Place in a Changing World. London; New York: Palgrave, 51–66. Hettne, Björn. 2007. Interregionalism and World Order: The Diverging EU and US Models. In: Mario Telò (Ed.). European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-hegemonic Era. Aldershot: Ashgate, 101–119. Tercovich, Giulia. 2018. A Quest for Legitimacy: The Evolution of the EU in the Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management Field. In: Daniela Irrera and Claudia Morsut (Eds.). Security Beyond the State: The EU in an Age of Transformation. Toronto: Verlag Barbara Budrich.

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Fawcett, Louise and Andrew Hurrell (Eds.). 1995. Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gamble, Andrew and Anthony Payne (Eds.). 1996. Regionalism and World Order. London: Macmillan. Hettne, Björn. (Ed.). 2002. In Search of World Order. Global Governance in the 21st Century: Alternative Perspectives on World Order. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. Laursen, Finn (Ed.). 2003. Comparative Regional Integration: Theoretical Perspectives. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Company. Söderbaum, Fredrik and Timothy M. Shaw (Eds.). 2003. Theories of New Regionalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Telò, Mario., Louise Fawcett and Frederik Ponjaert (Eds.). 2015. Interregionalism and the European Union: A Post-Revisionist Approach to Europe’s Place in a Changing World. Farnham: Ashgate. Wiener, Antje and Thomas Diez (Eds.). 2009. European Integration Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Monographs Mattli, Walter. 1998. The Logic of Regional Integration. New York: Columbia University. Rosamond, Ben. 2000. Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Official documents AHA Centre. 2012. AHA Centre Annual Report 2012. Available at: https://ahacentre. org/publication/aha-centre-annual-report-2012/ Accessed on 23 June 2020. ASEAN. 1976. Declaration of ASEAN Concord. 24 February 1976. Available at: https:// asean.org/?static_post=declaration-of-asean-concord-indonesia-24-february-1976 Accessed on 23 June 2020. ———. 2004. Declaration on Action to Strengthen Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Prevention on the Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster. 26 December 2004. Available at: http://asean.org/special-asean-leaders­ meeting-on-aftermath-of-earthquake-and-tsunami-jakarta/ Accessed on 8 October 2019. ———. 2016. ASEAN Declaration on ‘One ASEAN One Response: ASEAN respond­ ing to disasters as one in the region and outside the region’. ———. 2015. ASEAN Officials Visit Paris and Brussels to Strengthen Emergency Management. ASEAN Secretariat News. 8 May. Available at: http://asean.org/ asean-off icials-visit-paris-and-brussels-to-strengthen-emergency-management/. Accessed on 8 October 2019. Council of the EU. 2009. 17th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting (AEMM): Joint Co-chairmen’s statement. 28 May. ———. 2010a. 18th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting Co-Chair’s Statement. 26 May. ———. 2010b. Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to strengthen the ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership (2013–2017). Available on: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/129884.pdf Accessed on 23 June 2020. ———. 2012. 19th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting: Co-chairs’ statement. 26–27 April. ECHO. 2015a. EU supports people affected by floods in Myanmar/Burma and Bangladesh. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-supports-people-affected-floods­ myanmarburma-and-bangladesh_en Accessed on 8 October 2019.

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———. 2015b. EU brings relief to the victims of Typhoon Koppu. Available at: https:// ec.europa.eu/echo/news/eu-brings-relief-victims-typhoon-koppu_en Accessed on 8 October 2019. ———. 2019. Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Factsheet. Available at: https://ec. europa.eu/echo/where/asia-and-pacific/thailand_en Accessed on 8 October 2019. ———. 2001. Communication from the Commission: Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships. 4 September. ———. 2003b. Communication from the Commission: A New Partnership with South East Asia. COM (2003) 399/4. ———. 2005c. EU Commission President Barroso on Tsunami Disaster: European Aid Will Be around 1.5 Billion Euros. Press release. 6 January. ———. 2005d. Speaking Points by President Barroso on the Tsunami and Reinforcing EU Disaster and Crisis Response. ———. 2007. Plan of Action to Implement the Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership. ———. 2015. Eurobarometer Report on Humanitarian Aid, 434. May 2015. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/eurobarometer/2015/reports/HA_en.pdf Accessed on 8 October 2019. ——— 2016a. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/ en/file/441/download?token=KVSh5tD Accessed on 23 June 2020. ———. 2016b. Blue-Book 2016: EU-ASEAN Development Cooperation in 2015. European Council. 2007. Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership. 15 March 2007. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ cmsUpload/070315-EU-Asean.pdf Accessed on 8 October 2019. ———. 2010. Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to Strengthen the ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership (2013–2017). Available at: http://www.consilium.europa. eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/129884.pdf Accessed on 8 October 2019. Georgieva, Kristalina. 2010. Building Back Better Haiti. 25 March. Available at: https:// reliefweb.int/report/haiti/building-back-better-haiti-speech-eu-commissioner­ georgieva Accessed on 2 June 2020. Mogherini, Federica. 2014. Opening statement at the hearing in the European Parliament. 7 October. Available at: https://europa.ba/?p=11581 Accessed on 2 June 2020. Pushpanathan, Sundram. 2003. ‘ASEAN’s Strategy Towards Its Dialogue Partners and ASEAN Plus Three Process’. November 4. Available at: http://asean.org/?static_ post=asean-s-strategy-towards-its-dialogue-partners-and-asean-plus-three-process­ by-s-pushpanathan Accessed on 2 June 2020. READI. 2017. Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument READI Overview. Available at: http://readi.asean.org/readi-2011-2015/2012-10-21-15-57-52/overview Accessed on 23 June 2020. Stylianides, Christos. 2019a. I say Europe, you say…? Interview with Christos Stylianides. Martens Centre. Available at: https://www.martenscentre.eu/news/i-say-europe­ you-say-interview-christos-stylianides Accessed on 2 June 2020. Stylianides, Christos. 2019b. Europe to the rescue! Emergency response team’s global mission. Politico. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-emergency-response­ team-global-mission-ercc-relief-portugal-fire/ Accessed on 2 June 2020. von der Leyen, Ursula. 2019. Mission Letter to Janez Lenar čič. Available at: https:// multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/hearing-of-janez-lenarcic-commissioner­ designate-crisis-management_13208_pk Accessed on 2 June 2020.

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Online resources EM-DAT. 2016. EM-DAT: The Emergency Events Database - Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL). Available at: – www.emdat.be Kamal, Adelina. 2020. ‘EU to Spend Rp 108b on Strengthening Asean’s Disaster Management Center’ Interviewed by Diana Mariska for the Jakarta Globe. 27 January. Available at: https://jakartaglobe.id/news/eu-to-spend-rp-108b-on-strengthening­ aseans-disaster-management-center Accessed on 2 June 2020.

Interviews ASEAN Official. 2017. Interview conducted in February 2017 in Jakarta.

EEAS Official. 2015. Interview conducted in December 2015 in Brussels.

European Commission Official. 2017. Interview conducted in February 2017 in Brussels.

European Commission Official. 2018. Interview conducted in October 2018 in Brussels.

European Commission Official. 2019. Interview conducted in September 2019 in

Brussels.

Other Haver, Katherine and Foley, Conor. 2011. Regional and International Initiatives. Background Paper for the International Dialogue on Strengthening Partnership in Disaster Response: Bridging National and International Support. London: Humanitarian Outcomes. Rüland, Jürgen. 2001. ASEAN and the European Union: A Bumpy InterRegional Relationship. Conference presentation. 22 June.

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4 THE EU-CELAC COOPERATION PROGRAMME ON DRUGS POLICIES AND THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INTERREGIONAL INTERACTIONS Carolina Salgado

Introduction The Cooperation Programme on Drugs Policies (COPOLAD) between the European Union (EU) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) was launched in 2011 for a period of four years and was further extended for a second term in 2015. The programme provides a good depic­ tion of the EU’s interregional engagement with Latin America for two reasons. First, COPOLAD tackles the drug problem, one of the key areas defined as a bi-regional priority at the II EU-CELAC Summit in 2015. Second, it comprises a tangible initiative within the framework of the broader EU-CELAC Strategic Partnership which, since 2015, has been regularly criticised as ‘a strategic rela­ tion that has not moved from political declarations and rhetoric’ (Rodriguez, 2019). It can be said that one reason for the so-called inertia that characterises the EU-CELAC interregional partnership is the great differences between the types of regionalism at stake. CELAC is an intergovernmental community assembling 33 states and was formally created in 2011 through the Caracas Declaration, which has replaced the Rio Group (I CELAC Summit, 2011). It is driven by regional demands under the main principles of consensus, flexibility and voluntary participation of mem­ bers. In this way, CELAC has neither supranational institutions nor the ambition to become more institutionalised. Ultimately, CELAC is the main forum for the region to have political dialogue without the USA and Canada. The organisation is based on the premise of assuring autonomy after the centuries of Northern domination, and therefore represents a growing sense of identity articulation around regional autonomy and development. The EU, by contrast, is the most institutionalised regional organisation on the global stage, in which supranational institutions exercise actorness far beyond

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regional borders through a wide range of mechanisms and instruments of foreign policy. Whether such actorness is translated into leadership remains to be seen case by case (Ortega, 2004; Elgström and Smith, 2006; Lucarelli and Manners, 2006; Elgström, 2007; Torney, 2013; Elgström, 2015). For instance, by analysing the impact of EU norm diffusion in Latin America, Domínguez (2010) claims that the transformative power of the EU is limited. According to Ribeiro-Hoffmann, EU foreign policy and norms diffusion are two approaches employed to explore interregionalism and transregionalism, phenomena that ‘are created as mechanisms for the EU to diffuse norms, includ­ ing the spurring of regionalism’ (Ribeiro-Hoffmann, 2016: 606). EU-CELAC interregionalism is primarily a case of ‘EU-centric interregionalism’ that, none­ theless, has little chance of emulating EU regionalism due to historical, political, economic and normative differences between the two regions. Although the literature has already recognised the need to advance interregionalism beyond EU-centrism, there is a lack of work that applies non-Western theories of (inter) regionalism in empirical research that embraces the post-colonial world, where regionalisms are ‘sites of resistance to great power intervention’ and have auton­ omy as the end goal, i.e. the preservation of state sovereignty (Acharya, 2016: 109–111; Lopez-Lucia and Mattheis in this volume). From a functionalist perspective, which was thought to theorise European integration (Haas, 1964; Mitrany, 1965, 1975; Groom and Taylor, 1975, 1990), COPOLAD can be portrayed as an instrument designed to consolidate Latin America and the Caribbean as a region to boost cohesion and manage complex relations among its members. It also represents much of what the EU understands an effective foreign policy to be: it comprises the instrument of a strategic part­ nership; it is fully funded by the Commission; it is demand driven and consensus based (even though the programme is not jointly designed); and it is oriented by values and principles that the EU seeks to uphold in its relations with CELAC countries. Overall, not only does COPOLAD communicate the EU norma­ tive message but it is also efficient in advancing the EU goals of external action and in promoting EU leadership in development and in support for regional integration.1 Yet if COPOLAD is studied inductively, while focusing on the perceptions and experiences of CELAC officers over these interactions, it is possible to observe how Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries have a limited say in terms of agenda setting and programme design. In contrast, the EU – represented by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)2 and by national agencies of the six participating member states, namely Czechia, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Spain – determines organisational and institutional actions. The EU attempts to diffuse its prac­ tices – by instructing without incorporating feedback, through top–down inter­ action, with an impetus to coordinate without acknowledging the other side, acting as a role model to be followed, and misunderstanding the aims, condi­ tions and experience on the ground of CELAC – and this results in unintended

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consequences both for the EU and for the interregional structure itself. Material factors such as the weak institutionalisation of CELAC and the deep economic asymmetries that characterise the interregional relationship do not fully explain the existing unintended consequences associated to the design of COPOLAD. In addition, social factors play a central role in the interregional interactions and are crucial if the purpose is to grasp perceptions over each side and the state of their partnership. This chapter builds on one of the main critiques of the interregionalism literature that underlines the Eurocentric bias, i.e. the uncontested centrality of the EU in influencing other regions either through vast amounts of fund­ ing or by means of its institutional strength that might serve as a model to be emulated elsewhere (Malamud, 2010; Camroux, 2011; Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert, 2015; Acharya, 2016; Pirozzi and Litsegard, 2017). The centrality of the EU and the scarcity of studies on comparative interregionalism consti­ tute two factors that veil unintended consequences of interregional relations. Moreover, far from promoting some critical thinking on EU foreign pol­ icy, most analyses about EU interregional relations are restricted to tackling impacts on the EU partners. Hence, the contribution of this chapter is to the­ oretically and empirically explore the link between unintended consequences and interregionalism. The present case study explores one specific aspect of the Eurocentric bias in the interregionalism literature: the idea that the EU possesses and is able to disburse normative power of its own. After having been qualified as a civilian power, mainly because of its economic weight in the world, the EU was coined in 2002 as a normative power by Ian Manners, in reference to the EU’s capacity ‘to shape conceptions of the normal’ (Manners, 2002) through the diffusion of its norms, ideas, principles and beliefs. Notwithstanding the fact that the empirical sustainability of such a term has been much discussed in EU foreign policy stud­ ies, this chapter chooses to decentre the EU by leaving aside the issue of whether it is a normative power or not in its interregional relations. This analysis instead focuses on the effects that the underlying Eurocentric bias of claims to ‘norma­ tive power’ has in its interactions with CELAC. By zooming in on these specific interactions, I reflect upon the relational dimension of the EU’s normative power – here understood as ‘a relationship with an audience, rather than being a possession of the organisation’ (Gulmez and Gulmez 2013: 113) – and argue that there are discrepancies between the EU’s self-perceptions and the perceptions that CELAC members have of the EU in the COPOLAD cooperation. To investigate the impact of these discrepancies I look at two types of unintended consequences: first, on the actor level with the mar­ ginalisation of less developed countries in CELAC, and second, on the regional structure with the reinforcement of the regional stratification within CELAC between South America and the Caribbean and Central America. CELAC countries question the EU’s normative discourse, which is impaired by EU’s excessive sense of coordination and lack of knowledge of CELAC itself.

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It causes COPOLAD to deviate, to some extent, from the intentions of EU policymakers, which are the strengthening of the interregional relation, and the EU normative power. This investigation aims to shed light on processes whose impacts are central to interregional politics, although they often remain more than hidden due to power asymmetries surrounding the narratives of interna­ tional and regional relations. Empirically, this chapter is grounded in primary sources and substantial par­ ticipant observation. The relevant policy actors from CELAC have been taking part in COPOLAD since its first phase and have a solid understanding of its interactions with the EU. Those standpoints and perceptions are then juxtaposed with the EU’s own views, thus substantiating the argument over the existence of mutual discrepancies that leads to concrete unintended consequences affecting both the interregional structures and the EU. The findings of this analysis help to better understand how successful narratives and practices of interregional rela­ tions might be jointly constructed instead of being merely idealised and commu­ nicated, as well as how the EU might improve its relations with external partners. The chapter is organised as follows: the first section reveals that the EU has a ‘selective interaction’ and trickle-down approach to LAC countries. This behav­ iour results in two types of unintended consequence: on the actor level and on the regional/interregional structure. The second section focuses on the EU’s ‘hierarchical diffusion’ and top–down means of cooperation, leading to a neglect of local contestation and, as a result, to a self-defeating foreign policy. Here, we locate the same two types of unintended consequences: first, the inefficiency of EU foreign policy leads to the decline of its normative power, and second, the ramping up of grievances in the EU-CELAC relationship results in a thwarting of CELAC’s expectations of being treated as a real strategic partner. The con­ clusion discusses the various types of unintended consequences in light of the intended ones.

Unintended consequences with regard to regional cohesion in CELAC COPOLAD is a cooperation programme between the EU and CELAC with the intended objective of strengthening national institutions in CELAC and of pro­ moting political and technical dialogue on drug-related problems at the bi-regional level. The four components are: consolidation of National Drugs Observatories (NDO); capacity building in Drug Demand Reduction; capacity building in Drug Supply Reduction and consolidation of the EU-CELAC Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism on Drugs. Some of the concrete outputs of COPOLAD are products such as tutorials and guidelines delivered to CELAC,3 four on-line courses,4 a database for evaluating assistance programs, directory of services in Demand Reduction as well as institutional strengthening of NDOs. The aim of COPOLAD is to jointly improve drugs policies in all CELAC countries, strengthening institutions and promoting more cohesion on the drug

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problem in the region. Indeed, there are starkly distinct existing levels of devel­ opment on drugs policies among CELAC countries, which explain the goal of regional cohesion. However, CELAC countries do not perceive their diversity as a burden. They see it as a reason to join COPOLAD precisely because the pro­ gramme represents an opportunity of mutual learning and exchanging of prac­ tices and ideas. The EU also encourages the participation of the most developed countries in CELAC as a more efficient means to transfer their knowledge to other participants. It is thus an explicit policy behaviour of the EU to interact pri­ marily with the more developed countries in this policy field. Given this policy behaviour that favours interaction with some countries over others – which I call ‘selective interaction’ – a perception of regional stratification in CELAC prevails. This perception eventually brings about new challenges to the EU interre­ gional intentions of generating common inputs and promoting more cohesion on the drug problem in the region. In particular, two unintended consequences unfold. First, the EU’s selective interaction ends up marginalising less devel­ oped countries in CELAC. Second, such marginalisation results in a stratification within CELAC, as the asymmetric EU-CELAC interregionalism reinforces a second asymmetric interregionalism between South America on the one side and the Caribbean and Central America on the other side. These unintended consequences thwart the COPOLAD goal of regional cohesion. The EU seeks to be closer to the most developed countries as a means of being effective in terms of diffusion. This is the reasoning behind ‘selective interaction’, i.e. those more evolved in terms of drugs policies may be more pre­ pared to operationalise the EU’s knowledge and methods, and to transmit them to others. These others, in turn, understand that the outcome of such selective interaction is a regional stratification in CELAC, as the EU privileges dialogue with some South American countries. The perception of regional stratification, thus, directly interferes on the goal of COPOLAD interregionalism: instead of fostering regional cohesion, it produces hierarchies within the region. In addition, the countries considered less developed in terms of drug policies, pri­ marily the Central American and Caribbean countries, do not endorse the ‘double role models’ represented by European countries, and also some South American countries such as Argentina, Chile and Colombia. Since COPOLAD only embraced the countries of Central America and the Caribbean in its second phase, starting in 2015, technically all countries in South America and Mexico could be part of what I call ‘double role models’. However, being a role model in COPOLAD also depends on a country’s political will, a factor that cannot be observed in all South American countries. In an interview, the representative of Costa Rica expressed what is likely the common view of less developed countries on this matter: COPOLAD is designed for the Southern Cone and leaders come from there. It is still the same in COPOLAD II. The Caribbean was included but this has changed nothing in the overall design of the Programme. They have far less space to speak about decisions and proposals and,

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surely, they have to stand altogether. Your voice in COPOLAD depends on what you have been doing in your country, the same for the interac­ tion with the EU. Costa Rica is incipient in the Early Warning System, for example. Honduras cannot say anything because they are just jump­ ing into the topic; they do not have established institutions neither pol­ icies for drugs combating. Overall, in the case of Central America, it is exactly because we have not done much so far that we have joined COPOLAD. However, although the Programme has potential to foster south–south cooperation, it has been developing in a top–down way that is not so productive for us. (Costa Rica Representative, 2017) Costa Rica is the current LAC leader of the component of Drug Demand Reduction of COPOLAD. In this regard, the representative commented: In the case of demand reduction, we need better courses. We do have joint proposals for courses but the COPOLAD decides tutors, didac­ tic and evaluative methods. To be honest, I do not know what it means, the leadership of Costa Rica. We give a kind of consultancy in standards of demand reduction but the leader of the Task Force in this component is Chile, who has more power upon decisions. Everything comes to us ‘pre-manufactured’ by the Task Forces. Overall, we do have a say but an effective change towards equal participation might be slow”. (Costa Rica Representative, 2017) The most developed countries in terms of drugs policies also acknowledge that the EU’s selective interaction creates internal tensions in CELAC. From their point of view, the perception of regional stratification turns them into mediators and regional leaders. They see COPOLAD as an opportunity to play a key role in improving drugs policies of Central American and Caribbean countries. The main goal of the leading South American countries is to strengthen the region by making feasible recommendations to each country, in line with local particulari­ ties and different domestic structures. In this regard, the Colombian delegate says: Colombia tries to stimulate small and poor countries to start with a small initiative within their NDOs on behalf of their societies. They may avoid comparisons, and must concentrate on doing what is available, being sure that small initiatives are better than nothing. In fact, in COPOLAD II, having room to forward demands depends on which country it is. When you have consolidated national instruments, methods or laws, the relation with the EU becomes easier. There is a hierarchy posed by the EU among CELAC countries, but Colombia tries to speak on behalf of others. And the EU accepts because it seeks coordination. (Colombian Representative, 2017)

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Several South American countries have acquired the technical and political capacities to deal with their main issues such as drugs production, transport and consumption, and organised crime. Those countries benefit the most from the EU’s capacity building and subsequently engage in South–South coopera­ tion. Central American and Caribbean countries recognise the effort of South American countries to establish productive dialogues. However, they also per­ ceive the EU’s selective interaction and the consequent stratification of CELAC as counterproductive to advance cohesion and a horizontal dialogue in the region. The Caribbean countries have no stimulus to engage directly with the EU. For them, the disparity between the levels of drug policy development within CELAC sounds like a problem for the EU, ‘because it loses the precondition to act as an example and is called to act as an interlocutor’, as said by a Caribbean policy official in an interview, who continued, stating that ‘COPOLAD’s great­ est value is to promote face-to-face encounters and an opportunity to estab­ lish dialogue with South American countries. Interaction should be on the basis of exchanging practices and coordination, rather than checking lessons learned’ (Caribbean Representative, 2017). After seven years the design of the Programme remains the same and the Caribbean countries do not expect real changes. CELAC countries act pragmatically and meet with each other to take advan­ tage of EU practices and South–South cooperation. Although South American countries recognise that the EU’s mode of selective interaction deepens the asymmetry in the region, they invest in exchanging practices, studies, prod­ ucts, trainings, evaluation and indicators. The shared perception of all CELAC countries is that regional stratification undermines COPOLAD’s goal of regional cohesion, although they differ with regard to consequences: although less developed countries criticise the ‘double role models’ of European and South American countries, the more developed countries embrace the role of mediators and regional leaders induced by the EU selective interaction. This section has uncovered two aspects related to the unintended conse­ quences of interregionalism. First, critical views in CELAC emerge from the interaction with the EU, through the latter’s mode of exercising power, com­ municating its knowledge and performing its practices in COPOLAD. Second, the silenced voices of less developed countries participating in COPOLAD reveal that the EU practice of ‘selective interaction’ with CELAC countries – differentiating its degree and form of dialogue depending on the level of development of its interlocutor – compromises COPOLAD’s goal of regional cohesion. Specifically, it results in tensions between certain CELAC coun­ tries and the EU, as well as between the more and less developed countries of CELAC, thus working against the intended construction of regional cohesion in CELAC. In the next section, I turn to analyse one specific policy of COPOLAD, named Alternative Development, in order to unpack a second set of unintended

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consequences. Although in this section, we observed unintended consequences affecting the regional actors and structure of CELAC, the next section deals with unintended consequences that concern EU-CELAC interregionalism as a whole as well as the EU side.

Unintended consequences with regard to EU diffusion It has been ten years since the publication of Antje Wiener’s book (2008) on con­ tested norms in the international system, which argued that contestation is not an anomaly but an essential feature to explain how norms matter and how commu­ nity’s practices are constituted. Contestation does not necessarily represent failed interaction, but is an opportunity for actors to engage in deliberation towards the creation of meaning in a given context (see also Deitelhoff and Zimmermann, 2013; Schillinger and Niemann, 2017). This section draws on Wiener’s work on contestation in International Relations in order to address unintended consequences of an explicit policy behaviour by the EU that I call ‘hierarchical diffusion’ – the EU top–down, authoritative mode of diffusing its approach to Alternative Development (AD) within COPOLAD. On the one hand, the EU AD approach is based on eradi­ cation and substitution of illicit crop cultivation by other sources of income for farmers, seeking rural development. On the other hand, the perspectives of CELAC countries regarding the EU AD approach are of insufficiency and limitation. The main divergence concerns the scope of such an approach. Within COPOLAD and other forums such as the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (UNCND), as well as in bilateral talks with the EU, CELAC countries call for the inclusion of urban development and other related issues in the AD approach. In their view, such enlargement would enable the participation of non-producing countries and the design of new products like peer-to-peer activities, trainings and COPOLAD guidelines that would be more suitable for what CELAC calls Integrated Development. However, as we shall see, the EU mode of diffusion hinders potential opportunities for more horizontal dialogue in COPOLAD, resulting in unintended consequences for EU foreign policy and for the EU-CELAC strategic partnership. The EU has the goal of diffusing its AD approach through COPOLAD so that it is implemented in CELAC’s local contexts. This goal is reflected, for instance, in the explanation by the director of COPOLAD: COPOLAD is based on EU approaches to drugs policies. It is a regional programme for Latin America and the Caribbean that follows the EU guidelines, which are gathered in the EU Drugs Strategy 2013–2020 and Plan of Action on Drugs 2013–2020. The activities are set by means of working plans within the four components established by the EU for the Programme. In this sense, COPOLAD is a platform for learning and

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training of methods and approaches to be further implemented in CELAC’s local contexts.’ (Salvador-Livina, 2017) For CELAC, in turn, the EU’s understanding and implementation of the AD approach is considered to be deliberately top–down and authoritative and results in self-defeat. Such implementation does not happen in the local context, and thus entails a first unintended consequence on the EU foreign policy. The EU’s ‘hierarchical diffusion’ also affects the EU-CELAC strategic partnership. The EU and CELAC seek to strengthen interregionalism through COPOLAD, but for CELAC the EU uses the programme as another platform to promote its policies to CELAC. The second unintended consequence thus concerns the EU-CELAC strategic partnership. CELAC denies the instrument of strategic partnership as a means of horizontal dialogue with the EU, as it perceived that it was not being treated as an actual partner. The perspectives of CELAC countries over the EU AD approach are expressed through applicatory discourses of contestation. Contestation can be observed in four different ways: behavioural (Kreuder-Sonnen, 2019); discur­ sive and within the discursive type, applicatory and justificatory contestation. Applicatory discourses of contestation take place where and when norms are contested in the face of particular contexts, with the aim of being improved and implemented afterwards. This is an expression of the appropriateness of a norm, knowledge or approach for each context, underpinning further imple­ mentation. An applicatory discourse of contestation therefore ‘measures the degree of coherence between the norm and all relevant characteristics of the respective situation at hand’ (Deitelhoff and Zimmermann, 2013: 5; Wiener, 2017: 1–4). The AD approach is part of the COPOLAD component ‘Capacity Building in Drug Supply Reduction’ under the leadership of Peru, Colombia and Germany – represented by the German Agency for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development (GIZ). The GIZ representative expressed a positive perception of AD activities based on: the increase in the number of participating countries over time; the positive evaluation of such activities and priorities as referred by CELAC’s participants; progress in terms of working with the instru­ ments, methodology (ValueLinks) and tutorials provided; the achievement of greater regional coherence and respect of different national contexts during the activities. Indeed, CELAC does not engage in behavioural contestation by directly confronting the EU policy behaviour of ‘hierarchical diffusion’ because of the high cost of losing the programme in terms of access to EU funding and facil­ ities. Applicatory discourses of contestation by CELAC members are mobilised towards the AD approach itself, seeking to adjust the coherence between the EU AD approach in COPOLAD and their respective national contexts. The

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EU mode of hierarchical diffusion makes it difficult to distinguish between contestation as a sign of deviation or an anomaly, or as an essential and pro­ ductive feature of the process of learning, adaptation and implementation of the norm. Both unintended consequences can be derived from expressions of Ecuadorian, Peruvian and Bolivian representatives with regard to the AD approach in COPOLAD. These countries are deeply entangled with the relevant component of drug supply reduction. The Ecuadorian media reported that: Diego Tipán, Undersecretary of Drug Prevention Policy, said that the Technical Secretariat for the Coordination of Comprehensive Drug Prevention Policies (SETED) sees the need to work not only in rural areas, to change the dynamics of what happens in these areas and the produc­ tion of drugs, but also in the cities, and thus strengthening the economic development of these people, in order to prevent them from involvement in illicit activities, such as the sale of narcotics. (EL TIEMPO, 2017) Carmen Masías Claux, the Executive President of the National Commission for Development and Life Without Drugs (DEVIDA) in Peru, gave an interview in which she stated: The EU is already demonstrating in Peru a concern that leads to specific support towards a greater ‘balance’ between supply reduction and demand reduction. However, this ‘harmony’ could be greater. […] Comprehensive Prevention in Sustainable Alternative Development is understood as a set of policies, programs and actions that promote change and the improvement in the quality of life of the most vulnerable populations in relation to drug trafficking. This development should not develop alone or necessarily as ‘crop substitution’ although this is a very important component. It is essen­ tial to promote the presence of the state and all its sectors as well as to work on security […]. Alternative Development must be understood as a tool that focuses on personal change (from illegality to legality) and is produc­ ing an ethical, communitarian transformation. (COPOLAD, 2017a). Bolivia is a targeted country in AD activities, as part of the Andean region of coca producers. The country has been strengthening its bilateral relations with the EU in drug policy since 2008 when President Morales expelled the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) from Bolivian territory. In an interview with a high official from the Bolivian NDO, Morales said that: The EU has the interest to be in Bolivia and to work together with the UNODC towards alternative development and eradication in

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non-authorised areas, because the Andean coca is responsible for 60% of Europe’s cocaine. The EU gave us 60 million Euros in investment so far. Yet in Alternative Development we adopt an approach different from what is proposed by GIZ. GIZ proposes zero coca and, then, the substi­ tution of coca for other products in order to diversify farmers’ options. Our approach is to have control of the coca crop area. Because, in Bolivia, we have a millenary tradition to use hoja de coca for endless purposes – we are talking about an ancestral culture. Therefore, we do not want to prohibit, criminalise, militarise or to use violence. We want a controlled growing, so we call it ‘Desarollo Integral’ for what we have 40 million Euros to implement. Years before, the EU managed the money and estab­ lished norms. Currently we have more autonomy, but need to fulfil indi­ cators. COPOLAD is, in this sense, with a great methodological benefit for Bolivia. ( Bolivian Official, 2017) The German representative, when asked in an interview about the possibility of enlarging the AD approach in COPOLAD towards urban areas in order to suit CELAC’s demands, replied: ‘There is a trend that more countries are turning towards health and development-oriented drug policies (especially in the CELAC, but also in other regions). One can notice an increasing demand of countries that do not have significant drug crop cultivation or rather prioritise issues around drug-trafficking or urban drugs issues, who search for developmentoriented solutions to drug policy issues. The UNGASS outcome docu­ ment of 2016 can be seen as an indicator of this development. Although this is a very positive trend, at the same time it requires that the inter­ national community provides more evidence and best practices on how to tackle these specific issues in the framework of comprehensive and balanced drug policy’ (German Representative, 2017)5 With regard to evidence and best practices, during the 2017 Annual Meeting of COPOLAD an Ecuadorian participant said that serious talks had already been conducted in Quito on ideas and suggestions to improve and adjust the AD approach in COPOLAD towards an integrated approach. However, these ideas have not been given much space in COPOLAD. In the previous quotes, CELAC members request that AD activities should reach out to cities and incorporate dynamics of economic development. Cities are usually a concern in the separate component ‘Capacity Building in Drug Demand Reduction’ that is not con­ cerned with AD. Even though CELAC countries seem to be satisfied with activ­ ities in rural areas, they still argue for the necessity to enlarge the AD approach in COPOLAD towards ‘greater harmony’ between the two components of supply

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reduction and demand reduction, in recognition of the inherent complementa­ rity between them. As observed by the German representative in the quote mentioned above, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia have expressed great interest in AD activities of COPOLAD and, undoubtedly, have provided positive evaluations of the activi­ ties. Nonetheless, the EU pitfall expressed by the German representative indicates that there can be no legitimate knowledge coming from below through contes­ tation, but only from above, i.e. the international community. As a consequence, the EU understands such engagement from CELAC countries as pure compli­ ance and adoption to local contexts, disregarding their contested discourses to improve the approach in COPOLAD. That is to say, CELAC is satisfied with AD activities in rural areas as they are offered by GIZ who represents the EU approach. However, in practice, CELAC does not entirely adopt the EU AD approach to local contexts because it misses the urban side. Rather, it adapts it and turns it into what CELAC countries call an ‘Integrated Approach’. Different from adoption, adaptation is an effect of applicatory contestation. By contrast, the EU just sees the adoption of the rural side, disregarding their contestation to enlarge the AD approach in COPOLAD. The neglect of the local contestation thus arises from the policy behaviour I call ‘hierarchical diffusion’. This results in the first unintended consequence on the EU foreign policy, namely self-defeat, as the policy lacks efficiency because its AD approach is not adopted in CELAC’s national policies. CELAC countries include the aspects of drugs trafficking, economic development, urban security and moves from illegality to legality in their domestic policies. Even though those elements could be embodied in the AD approach of COPOLAD to meet the needs of CELAC countries, they have not found much space so far. The EU top–down mode of cooperation in COPOLAD also negatively affects the EU-CELAC relationship as a whole. COPOLAD stresses the compliance of CELAC with the programme but silences applicatory discourses of contestation that CELAC explicitly promotes. This dynamic is fuelled by the EU’s expecta­ tions of consent and adoption in its approach. It characterises the overarching model of development cooperation of the EU, which is based on the reasoning of sender and receivers. In this way, CELAC’s expectation of being treated as a true strategic partner is dashed by the EU’s impetus to engage with norm-takers.

Conclusion The cooperation programme between the EU and CELAC on drugs policies (COPOLAD) represents a rich space for an inductive analysis that addresses the often-overlooked topic of unintended consequences. At a moment in which the interregional relationship requires a renewed narrative and solid policies, it is crucial to highlight unintended consequences and effects. On the one hand, we have claims from the EU and CELAC about the urge to leverage the interre­ gional relationship that was raised to the level of strategic partnership on the basis

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of large and historical convergences with regard to norms, values, principles and beliefs. On the other hand, we also see the extensive academic criticism about the underdevelopment of concrete initiatives to achieve the intended conse­ quences (Grabendorff, 2012; Sautenet, 2012; Sanahuja, 2015; Serbin and Serbin, 2018; Sanahuja andSandoval, 2019). Thus, although the content of such potential is largely exposed in EU-CELAC political declarations and plans of action, few initiatives address the practical implementation. COPOLAD is one of those ini­ tiatives. Therefore, drawing on COPOLAD, how can we better understand the lack of fulfilment of the intended consequences of the EU-CELAC interregional relationship? An examination of unintended consequences has much to contribute to the reflection over such questions. In the first section, we analysed the intended objective expressed by CELAC countries for COPOLAD to integrate countries that are currently at different levels of drugs policies. As an unintended effect of the EU selective interaction, however, some members are marginalised. This marginalisation creates tensions within CELAC as a second unintended conse­ quence, affecting the intended COPOLAD’s objective of strengthening regional cohesion. The EU is aware of the claims from some Central American and Caribbean countries concerning their feeling of subdued participation in COPOLAD, which arises from the relation with the EU. However, the EU’s hierarchical identity that manifests both through the selective interaction and top–down dif­ fusion hampers any possibility of seeing marginalisation and regional stratifica­ tion in CELAC. To recognise these unintended consequences would mean to reflect on Eurocentrism in order to understand CELAC on its own terms. In this regard, in an interview the senior representative of the NDO at the Junta Nacional de Drogas of Uruguay claimed: ‘Uruguay has taken part in COPOLAD since 2011. In CELAC, we are all partners. But in the relation with the EU, hierarchy is imposed: the EU acts as the leader, while CELAC must be the follower. The state of the art is that the EMCDDA has developed a lot, and its methods inevitably resonate in COPOLAD. Then the problems begin, as it is difficult to set interests apart in COPOLAD. The EU always seeks for common interests, indica­ tors, standardised products because it needs to find a common ground on which to practice its role as the model. The consequence is that EU inputs in COPOLAD are good but still lack practicality, and more awareness of context-driven differences. It is very hard for them to put us ‘into our per­ spective’, to contextualise CELAC in our own terms.’ (Uruguayan Representative, 2017) This chapter also engaged with the realm of EU foreign policy, which seeks to improve the EU external governance beyond its borders. In the second section, we considered the intended objective of the EU that COPOLAD would serve

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as a platform for learning and training of methods with approaches to be further implemented in CELAC’s local contexts. However, the EU’s hierarchical dif­ fusion instead triggered contestation and selective adaptation by CELAC rather than the adoption of the EU’s approach to Alternative Development. The EU’s way of conducting interregionalism, namely hierarchical diffusion, undermines its intentions and its interregional relations even in a favourable situation such as the relationship with CELAC at COPOLAD. In line with the assumption held by scholars (Bengtsson and Elgström, 2011; Torney, 2013; Nicolaïdis, 2015) that the EU’s normative power needs mutuality to truly empower the EU in the international system, revisiting this hierarchical diffusion would then be an important way of trying to address the unintended and undesired consequences that damage EU interregionalism and global actorness in general. Furthermore, CELAC’s contestation leads to a second unintended conse­ quence. CELAC has become frustrated with regard to the joint interregional objective of giving a new boost to the strategic partnership through initiatives like COPOLAD. CELAC expected to be treated as an equal partner by the EU, based on increasing mutual learning and jointly building best practices. Instead, they see that the EU only acts unidirectionally by envisaging them as normtakers and thus reinforcing interregional asymmetries. The argument of the chapter identifies discrepancies between the EU’s selfprojection and the perceptions that CELAC members have of the EU. The mode of cooperation within COPOLAD leads to a set of unintended consequences. Both sections highlight a hierarchical identity of the EU that works against the policy objectives of the EU in the interregional cooperation programme and strategic partnership. We see selective and divergent local adaptations rather than adoption of the EU-promoted approach to Alternative Development. The hier­ archical set-up results in selective interaction and the failure to understand con­ testation as an essential step in implemented policies in local conditions. This chapter argues that CELAC countries address applicatory rather than behavioural contestation. They fully engage with rural activities promoted by the EU in the scope of AD approach and do not want to abandon them. Therefore, contestation is absent from evaluations that are carried out by COPOLAD’s staff for the corresponding component of the programme. Applicatory contestation can only be observed by understanding diffusion as a process instead of an out­ come and by unpacking it through interactions. Evaluations and reports do not seek to describe interactions but focus on measurable outcomes.6 They are the main documents based on which the European Commission decides on whether continuing the cooperation, and CELAC countries do not wish to run the risk of losing the funding nor many of the activities enabled by the EU. In addition to creating obstacles for policy implementation, the EU’s hier­ archical identity also leads to unintended consequences on a structural level. It reinforces regional stratification rather than cohesion. More broadly, these unintended consequences also concern the EU-CELAC interregional relation­ ship by undermining the EU and CELAC’s common goal of enhancing regional

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integration and the strategic partnership through COPOLAD. However, it is worth saying that, for the EU, these consequences are unintended but in the end not undesired enough to make it change the COPOLAD’s design. In inter­ views with CELAC representatives, it becomes clear that in their view the EU interprets their criticisms about its hierarchical identity as miscommunication, or raises justification for such criticisms on its partners’ underdevelopment. That is, according to longstanding CELAC participants in COPOLAD, the EU inter­ prets critique either as if the partners have not understood the communication, or react as if critique is a matter of evolution, or development, over time, i.e. that the day will come when the partners will have the conditions to properly engage with the EU (EU-LAC Programme Manager, 2017; Chilean Representative, 2017; Uruguayan Representative, 2017). Therefore, the EU does not take any responsibility for the unintended con­ sequences, mainly because of its difficulties to recognise their existence as such. COPOLAD was renewed in 2015 for another four years, and there was no attempt to mitigate these effects within the scope of the programme (II EU-CELAC Summit, 2015: 15). This does not necessarily indicate that the EU is satisfied with these consequences but may also reflect an inability to see these effects in the same way as CELAC. CELAC countries, by their side, act in accordance with the EU mode of cooperation translated in COPOLAD’s design because they perceive the programme as a source of major inputs and resources in terms of building common drugs policies in the region. One of the most important assets is the renewed space for South–South cooperation enabled by COPOLAD. Such a space previously existed through the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) of the Organisation of American States (OAS) but has faced increasing financial and operational challenges over the years. In addi­ tion, for several CELAC countries the cooperation over drugs policies with the EU is qualitatively superior to that of the US due to their respective conceptual approaches. Although the USA resorts to the ‘war on drugs’ approach, the EU directs its policies in the opposite direction, resorting to a human rights approach. Finally, recalling the research question, this analysis also contributes to the agenda on external perceptions of the EU. The chapter provides evidence of how discrepancies in perceptions can lead to concrete effects on interregionalism and how the EU reacts to it. The analytical framework offers inroads into understand these reactions. By putting together the critique of normative power in identity representations of the EU with modes of contestation that are present in EU external governance, this chapter aggregates new venues for policy making in EU interregional relations with actors that are beyond its range of direct influence.

Notes 1 These components were drawn mainly from the European Consensus on Development and the EU Global Strategy. For more on the EU development cooperation, see Euro­ pean External Action Service (n.d.).

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2 The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) is one of the EU decentralised agencies. It aims to “provide the EU and its Member States with a factual overview of European drug problems and a solid evidence base to support the drugs debate”, according to the description in its website (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, n.d.). 3 An example of guideline is COPOLAD (2017b).

4 For more information about the online courses, see COPOLAD (n.d.).

5 We can see the same standpoint of GIZ representative in the EU statement on the

occasion of the Intersessional Meeting 2018 of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (European Union, 2018: 2). 6 For COPOLAD annual reports and results, see COPOLAD (n.d.).

Bibliography Journal articles Bengtsson, Rikard and Ole Elgström. 2011. Conflicting role conceptions? The European Union in Global Politics. Foreign Policy Analysis 8(1): 93–108. Deitelhoff, Nicole and Lisbeth Zimmermann. 2013. Things we lost in the fire: how dif­ ferent types of contestation affect the validity of international norms. PRIF Working Papers 18: 1–17. Domínguez, Roberto. 2010. Diffusion of EU norms in Latin America: the cases of Mexico, Venezuela and Honduras. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Series 10(1): 3–18. Elgström, Ole. 2007. Outsiders´ perceptions of the European Union in international trade negotiations. Journal of Common Market Studies 45(4): 949–967. Elgström, Ole. 2015. Legitimacy, Credibility and Coherence – Perceptions of EU roles in global climate change negotiations. European University Institute Working Papers Rscas 06: 1–13. Grabendorff, Wolf. 2012. ¿Qué importancia puede tener la UE para una América Latina emergente? Nueva Sociedad 239: 24–34. Kreuder-Sonnen, Christian. 2019. China vs. the WHO: a behavioral norm conflict in the SARS crisis, International Affairs 95(3): 535–552. Malamud, Andrés. 2010. Latin American regionalism and EU studies. Journal of European Integration 32(6): 637–657. Manners, Ian. 2002. Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms? Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2): 235–258. Mitrany, David. 1965. The prospect of European integration: federal or functional. Journal of Common Market Studies 4(2): 119–149. Ortega, Martin. (Ed.). 2004. Global views on the European Union. Chaillot Paper 72. Sanahuja, José Antonio. 2015. The EU and CELAC: reinvigorating a strategic partner­ ship. EU-LAC Foundation, 23–79. Sanahuja, José Antonio and Érika Ruiz Sandoval. 2019. La UE y la Agenda 2030 en América Latina: politicas de cooperación en una región de ‘desarollo en transición’. Documentos de Trabajo Fundación Carolina, 3–42. Schillinger, Henrik and Holger Niemann. 2017. Contestation ‘all the way down’? The grammar of contestation in norm research. Review of International Studies 43(1): 29–49. Serbin, Andrés and Andrei Pont Serbin (Orgs.). 2018. Why should the EU have any rele­ vance for Latin America and the Caribbean? EU-LAC Foundation, 1–91.

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Torney, Diarmuid. 2013. Outsiders’ perceptions and EU influence in the world: the case of climate change. NFG Working Paper Series 04: 3–24. Wiener, Antje. 2017. A Theory of Contestation – a concise summary of its argument and concepts. Polity 49(1): 109–125.

Book chapters Acharya, Amitav. 2016. Regionalism beyond EU-centrism. In Börzel, Tanja and Thomas Risse. (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 109–131. Camroux, David. 2011. Interregionalism, a Critique. In: Rosamond, Ben, Nick Robinson and Alex Warleigh-Lack. (Eds.). New Regionalism and the European Union. London: Routledge, 201–217. Gulmez, Didem Buhari and Seckin Baris Gulmez. 2013. Theorizing the European Union’s Global Authority: An Alternative Trichotomy. In: Boening, Astrid, JanFrederik Kremer and Aukje van Loon. (Eds.). Global Power Europe – Vol.1: theoret­ ical and institutional approaches to the EU’s external relations. Heidelberg: Springer, 111–126. Nicolaïdis, Kalypso. 2015. Southern Barbarians? A Postcolonial Critique of EUniversalism. In: Nicolaïdis, Kalypso, Berny Sèbe and Gabrielle Maas. (Eds.). Echoes of Empire. Identity, Memory and Colonial Legacies. London: I.B. Tauris, 281–302. Pirozzi, Nicoletta and Andréas Litsegard. 2017. The EU and Africa: Regionalism and Interregionalism Beyond Institutions. In: Mattheis, Frank and Andréas Litsegard. (Eds.). Interregionalism across the Atlantic space. Cham: Springer, 75–93. Ribeiro-Hoffmann, Andrea. 2016. Inter- and Transregionalism. In: Börzel, Tanja and Thomas Risse. (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 600–618. Sautenet, Antoine. 2012. The EU’s strategic partnerships with emerging powers: insti­ tutional, legal, economic and political perspectives. In: Renard, Thomas and Sven Biscop. (Eds.). The EU and emerging powers in the 21st century: how Europe can shape a new global order. Farnham: Ashgate, 123–146.

Edited books Elgström, Ole and Michael Smith. (Eds.). 2006. The European Union´s roles in International Politics. Concepts and Analysis. London: Routledge. Groom, A.J.R. and Paul Taylor. 1975. Functionalism: theory and practice in International Relations. New York: Crane Russak. Groom, A.J.R. and Paul Taylor. (Eds.). 1990. Frameworks for International Cooperation. London: Pinter Publishers. Lucarelli, Sonia and Ian Manners. (Eds.). 2006. Values and principles in European Union foreign policy. London: Routledge. Telò, Mario, Louise Fawcett and Frederik Ponjaert. (Eds.). 2015. Interregionalism and the European Union. A post-revisionist approach to Europe´s place in a changing world. London: Routledge.

Monographs Haas, Ernst. 1964. Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

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Mitrany, David. 1975. The Functional Theory of Politics. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Wiener, Antje. 2008. The invisible constitution of politics. Contested norms and inter­ national encounters. UK: Cambridge University Press.

Official documents I CELAC Summit. 2011. In the Bicentenary of the Struggle for Independence Towards the Path of Our Liberators. Caracas Declaration. 2–3 December. Available at: http:// www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/notas-a-imprensa/2890-i-cupula-da-comunidade­ dos-estados-latinoamericanos-e-caribenhos-celac-caracas-2-e-3-de-dezembro-de­ 2011-documentos-aprovados#doc1 Accessed on: 27 June 2020. II EU-CELAC Summit. 2015. Shaping our common future: working together for prosperous, cohesive and sustainable societies for our citizens. Brussels Declaration. 10-11 June. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30031/qc0415217enn. pdf Accessed on: 27 June 2020. COPOLAD. 2017b. Analysis of living conditions and Alternative Development: manual for the analysis of subsistence bases and the evaluation of results. Madrid: COPOLAD. European Union. 2018. Statement on the occasion of the Intersessional Meeting 22–25 October. Commission on Narcotic Drugs 61st session. Vienna, 24 October. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/2019/Contributions/ October/MS_Statements/24_October/EU_Statement-_Alternative_Development. pdf Accessed on: 27 June 2020.

Online resources COPOLAD. n.d. Available at: http://copolad.eu/ Accessed on: 10 June 2020. COPOLAD. 2017a. Interview with Carmen Masías Claux, the Executive President of the National Commission for Development and Life without Drugs (DEVIDA) in Peru. 18 September. Available at: http://copolad.eu/en/entrevista/carmen-masias­ claux-presidenta-ejecutiva-de-la-comision-nacional-para-el-desarrollo-y-vida­ sin-drogas-devida-peru. Accessed on: 9 June 2020. EL TIEMPO. 2017. Ecuador fortalece estrategias a escala internacional para enfrentar el problema de las drogas. 9 May. Available at: http://www.eltiempo.com.ec/noticias/ ecuador/4/412675/ecuador-fortalece-estrategias-a-escala-internacional-para­ enfrentar-el-problema-de-las-drogas Accessed on: 9 June 2020. European External Action Service. n.d. Section on Development Cooperation. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/development-and-cooperation_en Acessed on: 27  June 2020. European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction. n.d. Online description. Available at: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/ Accessed on: 10 June 2020. Rodriguez, Joel Diaz. 2019. 20 years of bi-regional summits of EU-Latin America: is it time for a turning point? Centre D´ Études Juridiques Européennes. 29 April. Available at: https://www.ceje.ch/fr/actualites/action-exterieure/2019/04/20-years-bi-regional­ summits-eu-latin-america-it-time-turning-point/ Accessed on: 20 April 2020.

Interviews Bolivian official at CONALTID. 2017. Interview conducted on 15 November in Lisbon. Caribbean representative. 2017. Interview conducted on 14 November in Lisbon. Chilean representative at SENDA. 2017. Interview conducted on 13 November in Lisbon.

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Colombian representative at the Ministry of Law and Justice. 2017. Interview conducted on 15 November in Lisbon. Costa Rica representative at ICD. 2017. Interview conducted on 15 October by phone. EU-LAC Programme Manager. 2017. Interview conducted on 6 October in Hamburg. German representative at GIZ. 2017. Interview conducted on 6 November via e-mail. Salvador-Livina, Teresa, Director of COPOLAD. 2017. Interview conducted on 20 October via e-mail. Uruguayan representative at the Junta Nacional de Drogas, Uruguay. 2017. Interview conducted on 26 October by phone.

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PART 2

Unintended effects on the interregional structure

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5 THE ASEAN WAY VERSUS EU MARITIME MULTILATERALISM The unintended consequences of EU-ASEAN maritime security cooperation Dominik Giese

Introduction1 The 21st century is the century of the sea (Benbow, 2016). Over the last two decades, oceans and seas have retained their unprecedented historical signifi­ cance by providing international trade routes. As a result, the governance of the oceans and seas also retains major political implications and falls under the label of ‘maritime security’ (see e.g. Bueger, 2015). In turn, regional organisations are playing an increasingly significant role in taking up the challenge to include maritime security in their governance spectrum (Goh, 2014). Two such organi­ sations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU), are central for this chapter that sets out to explore the interregional dimension of maritime security governance between ASEAN and the EU in the waters of Southeast Asia. This interregional relationship is significant. Although the EU is ASEAN’s second-largest trading partner after the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China) (ASEAN Secretariat, 2018), ASEAN is the EU’s thirdlargest trading partner after the US and China (European Commission, 2018). For ASEAN and the EU to pursue growth and development, both regional organisations rely on the oceans and seas. Previous research on EU-ASEAN interregional relations considered the positive implications of Asia–Europe relations both for Southeast Asian coun­ tries (Fitriani, 2014) and for interregional cooperative culture (Fitriani, 2015). Others have found the EU to be ‘too ambitious’ and thus neglect the het­ erogeneous context among ASEANs member states, e.g. in the context of trade cooperation (Meissner, 2016). Although interregional relations between ASEAN and the EU exist across various policy sectors (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert, 2015), the organisations’ means and purpose notably differ in terms of the type of regionalism pursued, the size and role of institutions, as well as

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the size of their respective budgets (Kennes, 2015). This, in turn, has implica­ tions for their ‘competence to act, ability to decide and capacity to implement’ (Onestini, 2015: 253). Rüland’s (2015) study applying the concept of unin­ tended consequences in EU external action found that when the EU exports ideas of ‘democratisation’, Southeast Asian elites apply European norms to enforce rather than replace local orthodoxies and use these to re-legitimise ideas on Southeast Asian regionalism, instead of adopting a European style of integration. In contrast, as yet there has been little work on how ASEAN and the EU coordinate or cooperate in matters of maritime security. Studying EU-ASEAN maritime security relations from the perspective of unintended consequences is thus likely to reveal further insights about the complexity of this interregional relationship. The contribution this chapter makes to the literature on interregionalism, in general, and on unintended consequences in particular, is two-fold. The first contribution is to map out how far the EU and ASEAN have undergone cooperation in maritime security. It thus conceives of interregional relations as chiefly referring to connections between two regional organisations (Hänggi, 2006). The second contribution is to explore whether unintended consequences feature in EU-ASEAN maritime security interregionalism, while focusing on how EU maritime policy has been received in Southeast Asia.2 The chapter thereby engages with the following question: How is the EU Maritime Security Strategy received in Southeast Asia and what unintended consequences follow from this interregional policy? The focus of the analysis here is limited to a unidirectional account of EU-ASEAN interregional relations, which are normally mutually constitutive in practice. However, it is important to study how EU interests, views and strategies shape regionalism(s) external to Europe, as well as how local actors within these contexts perceive and interact with them. This is vital if we wish to account for the meaning-making and social practices of actors and region builders that feature at the core of the politics of regionalism, an aspect, which is often neglected by regionalism studies (Lopez-Lucia, 2019). To inves­ tigate this encounter, the chapter’s empirical analysis draws on several forms of primary data, including official documents published by ASEAN and the EU, seven semi-structured interviews with ASEAN member state (senior) offi­ cials and regional experts on Southeast Asian security, as well as one participant observation by the author at a Track 1.5 EU-ASEAN foreign policy exchange forum.3 The chapter supplements primary data analysis with secondary material from think-tank reports and academic publications. In following this approach, the chapter mirrors the volume’s general goal to pay attention to context, his­ torical factors and representations and practices of region builders. By doing so, the aim is to direct attention to the broader effects of interregional cooperation between the EU and ASEAN, and highlight unexpected issues that may weaken this relationship. This chapter argues that unintended consequences follow from the way the EU exports its Maritime Security Strategy to Southeast Asia. The chapter

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demonstrates how the EU principle of ‘maritime multilateralism’ presents a mis­ match with Southeast Asian security ordering principles, such as the ‘ASEAN Way’, and as an unintended consequence, builds up distrust among ASEAN policy elites towards EU External Action, which in turn unintendedly affects the structure of the EU-ASEAN interregional relationship. The chapter further argues that without addressing this mismatch, the European Maritime Security Strategy, which initially seeks to upgrade EU-ASEAN interregional cooperation on maritime security, may end up unintendedly impeding further developments in EU-ASEAN interregional relations, or may even weaken these relations alto­ gether. To demonstrate this argument, the remainder of this chapter unfolds in three parts. The first section outlines the EU maritime security policy and its relation to the waters of Southeast Asia. The second section contrasts this with the Southeast Asian regional maritime security environment and unpacks several ASEAN member states’ maritime security representations and priorities. The third section connects these two perspectives and analyses how ASEAN states have received the EU’s maritime security strategy, while exploring the unintended consequences of the EU-ASEAN interregional relations on mari­ time security.

EU Maritime Strategy: A provider of ‘maritime multilateralism’ and ‘global security’ in the waters of Southeast Asia? The outreach of the EU’s foreign and security policy is growing. As Ponjaert (2013) explains, ever since the Lisbon Treaty revisions, interregionalism has increasingly become an integral part of EU external action and a vital compo­ nent of EU global actorness. The expanding outreach of EU external action thereby also applies to the maritime domain. 2014 marked the year when the Council first adopted the European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS, Council 11205/14, 2014) together with the EUMSS Action Plan (Council 10494/18, 2018; Council 17002/14, 2014). The EUMSS describes the EU as a ‘global security provider’ that aims to contribute to a ‘stable and secure global maritime domain’ (Council 11205/14, 2014: 2). The EUMSS reflects the Union’s stated core values – human rights, freedom and democracy – and operates under the principle of ‘maritime multilateralism’. In support of a multi­ lateral approach to maritime security, the EU’s strategy respects existing mar­ itime domain regulation, such as United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and calls for a ‘rules-based good governance at sea’, and a peaceful settlement of any disputes. As maritime issues by their very nature cross borders, dealing with them requires cooperation among states, as well as the intervention of regional and international organisations. For example, regarding Southeast Asia, the EU accentuates the need for regional maritime confidence building measures that preserve ‘uninhibited access to the high seas areas’ (Council 10494/18, 2018: 29).

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This access is important for the uninterrupted network of seaborne logistic supply chains that connect Europe to other continents. Here, strategic value for maritime security arises from commercial interest. EU-based ship owners manage 30% of the vessels operating worldwide and 42% of seaborne trade value (European Commission, 2016). An escalation in the disputed territories of the South China Sea alone would adversely affect approximately 4.67 trillion Euros worth of global maritime trade (CSIS, 2018; European Commission, 2016). In addition, the EU backs an ‘ASEAN-led process and regional mechanisms such as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia and ‘the swift conclusion of the talks on a code of conduct [for the South China Sea], which will further support the rulesbased regional and international order’ (Council 10494/18, 2018: 29). Here, the EU foresees capacity-building activities and exchange of best practices with ASEAN. As exemplified in the 2018–2022 ASEAN-EU Plan of Action, these activities and practices encompass training in the rule of law for maritime gov­ ernance, criminal justice and maritime law enforcement, port transport secu­ rity, border management and the combatting of illegal fishing. Furthermore, respect for UNCLOS, open sea lines and peaceful dispute resolution are core to ASEAN’s and the EU’s common engagement in maritime security (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017a). Notwithstanding this, there are important caveats to mention in relation to the EU’s principle of ‘maritime multilateralism’ and aspiration to become a ‘global security provider’. The EU external action itself is dependent on the convergence of 28 member states’ political interests, but these interests do not always align. For example, the EU found it difficult to issue a common response to the July 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in favour of the Philippines’s sovereignty claims against China concerning their territorial dispute in the South China Sea. Moreover, while EU member states ardently defend international law in the EU maritime strategy nonetheless, Croatia, Greece and Hungary repeatedly blocked a common EU statement in favour of this award (Norman, 2016).4 The EU even­ tually issued a tepid statement (EEAS, 2016), which signified neutrality on the dispute and failed to mention sovereignty. A disconcerting reaction for a bloc that otherwise expresses vocal support for international law. Another case that appears to contradict EU maritime multilateralism is France’s position presented at the Shangri-La Dialogue forum on regional security held in Singapore in May 2019. Here, French Defence Minister Florence Parly emphasised a hard power stance, which stands at odds with the EUMSS. For example, she emphasised, today I upped my game and I came with a full carrier strike group, com­ plete with aircraft carrier, destroyers, tankers, 20 Rafale, Hawkei and helicopters…this mighty instrument of power projection, berthed only a few miles from here, means a lot to me…France is not going anywhere, because we are part of the region. We have territories here. (Parly, 2019)

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What these examples illustrate is that the EUMSS to some extent presents a ‘smoke screen’ of unitary EU action. The EUMSS conveys a multilateral strat­ egy, but its subtext does not demonstrate the actual internal split-up within the different EU member states positions. The third section below will show how such internal struggles contribute to ASEAN member states’ distrust towards the EU’s interregional ambitions. Before that, however, the second section will explore the various ASEAN member states’ representations and priorities for maritime security, which will be contrasted to the core elements of the EUMMS.

The Southeast Asian maritime domain This section details the ASEAN approach to maritime security cooperation and provides the context to understand the intricacies of the Southeast Asian mari­ time security environment. To illustrate this environment, Figure 5.1 presents an overview of the region and the key bodies of water that feature in the discussion of this section. The section explores the significance of these bodies of water for the ASEAN states and specifically targets two questions. First, what regional governance mechanisms address maritime security in the waters of Southeast Asia? Second, what does maritime security entail for ASEAN states?

FIGURE 5.1

The Southeast Asian Maritime Space (UN Geospatial Information Section, 2012; Map No. 4365 Rev.1, 2012; permission granted for repro­ duction by the United Nations)

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The architecture of Southeast Asian maritime security governance There are several regional security mechanisms, which deal with maritime secu­ rity in Southeast Asia. At the top of regional security diplomacy is the East-Asia Summit. Presidents and prime ministers from ASEAN and eight of its ten dia­ logue partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the US and Russia) meet in an annual summit to engage in strategic dia­ logue (the other two partners that do not attend are the EU and Canada). In the summits’ ‘Manila Plan of Action (2018–2022)’, maritime cooperation constitutes a significant portion of the document (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017c: 10–12). Next in line is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which annually convenes ASEAN states’ and partner countries’ foreign ministers and senior officials. These are the ten ASEAN dialogue partners, as well as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, Timor-Leste, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Papua New Guinea (as an observer). In its most recent Work Plan for the years 2018–2020, the ARF Intersessional Meetingon Maritime Security describes maritime security as ‘the most pressing but potentially most useful areas for cooperation for the ARF’ (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017b: 2). Furthermore, the Shangri-La Dialogue is the ARF’s counterpart at the defence ministerial and senior military officer level. Next to government representatives from over 27 countries, as a Track 1.5 diplo­ macy meeting, it also includes representatives from academia, business, thinktanks and NGO representatives (Morrison, 2004). Maritime air and sea patrol are often on its evolving agenda (Capie and Taylor, 2010). Another important defence-related regional mechanism is the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+), attended by the same constellation of states as the East Asia Summit. However, in addition to serving as a forum for dialogue on defence security, in contrast to the East Asia Summit or Shangri-La Dialogue, the ADMM+ organ­ ises joint military and naval exercises to train humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as preparing mari­ time security and counterterrorism operations (ASEAN Secretariat, 2011). Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand further engage in ‘minilateral’ cooperation under the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) framework. This encompasses coordinated sea and air patrols, as well as intelligence information exchanges. The MSP is reported to be instrumental in reducing piracy in the region (Loewen, 2014). A further mechanism curbing piracy is the ReCAAP and its Information Sharing Centre. The latter aims to ‘improve incident response by member states by facilitating communication, information exchange and operational cooperation among designated national focal points (usually coast guards or navies)’ (Storey, 2016: 3). Arguably, this is a successful cooperation, as for the period of January to June 2019, ReCAAP reported a 13-year record low in piracy and armed robbery against ships (ReCAAP, 2019). It is membered by ASEAN states (minus Malaysia and Indonesia), Australia, China, Denmark, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Sri Lanka, the UK and the US.

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Among the listed regional security mechanisms related to maritime secu­ rity, the ADMM+ and ARF Intersessional Meeting on Maritime Security are among the most successful at giving ‘bang for the buck’ (Senior Regional Expert B, 2018; see also Gamage, 2017). Cordner notes that although often based on non-legally binding declarations and statements, ASEAN’s numerous regional maritime security mechanisms ‘helped build habits of regional dialogue and cooperation, and have promoted a growing sense of a regional collective security community in the western Pacific and East Asia’ (2018: 169; but see also Hao and Qinghong, 2016). Three further observations can be added. First, there is no single strategy, agency, nor regional institution responsible for the governance of maritime security in Southeast Asia. Initiatives range from ‘mini-lateral’ coastguard-to-coast-guard cooperation to strategic dialogue exchanges at the elite leadership level. Second, non-ASEAN states geostrategically linked to ASEAN (notably Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russia, as well as the US, EU and individual European states) are members of one or more of Southeast Asia’s maritime security governance mechanisms delineated above. Third, importantly, ASEAN always remains the institutional centre of these mechanisms giving it the power to convene these forums and engage external powers according to the principle of the ‘ASEAN Way’ and ‘ASEAN Centrality’ (Caballero-Anthony, 2014). The ‘ASEAN Way’ is a COC for regional political action in Southeast Asia and prescribes respect for state sovereignty and inde­ pendence, the right to freedom from external interference, non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the renunciation of the threat or use of force and effective cooperation (ASEAN Secretariat, 1976, 2007). ‘ASEAN Centrality’ means that ASEAN and therefore also the ASEAN member states are at the heart of the regions’ security gov­ ernance mechanisms. This gives ASEAN the convening power to inaugurate regional security summits, such as the ARF and the EAS. More importantly, it gives ASEAN states the power to tie external powers to the ‘ASEAN Way’ as a regional COC in order to govern diplomatic inter-state relations not only in Southeast Asia but also in the whole of the wider Indo-Pacific region (ASEAN Secretariat, 2007).

ASEAN member states’ national priorities for regional maritime security governance Subsequent to the overview of important Southeast Asian maritime security gov­ ernance mechanisms, it is now essential to illustrate how ASEAN states’ national maritime security representations and priorities shape the ‘ASEAN Way’ in the regional maritime domain. This not only helps to account for maritime secu­ rity governance priorities in Southeast Asia but also gives a better idea of how their representations and practices frame ASEAN maritime politics and its inter­ actions with the EU. It is possible to group ASEAN states into two groups: those that, during the time of this analysis, follow a multilateral approach to

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maritime security governance and those that prioritise a bilateral agenda. The former group includes Vietnam, Singapore and Myanmar, whereas the latter encompasses the Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia and Malaysia.5 Some of these positions are evaluated next.

Examples of maritime multilateralism in ASEAN Vietnam is the most consistent and vocal ASEAN member state towards its ter­ ritorial claims and foreign policy discourse in the South China Sea disputed territory. In May 2018, a foreign affairs spokesperson condemned China’s livefire drills in the Hoàng Sa islands (also known as the Paracel Islands) as ‘severely infringing Viet Nam’s sovereignty over the archipelago, and running counter to the agreement on basic principles guiding the settlement of sea-related issues between Viet Nam and China… and affecting negotiation on the COC in the East Sea between ASEAN and China as well as the maintenance of peace, stabil­ ity and cooperation in the East Sea’ (VMFA, 2018). This leaves Vietnam as the most prominent example of resistance to China’s territorial acquisitions in the waters of Southeast Asia (Senior Regional Expert B, 2018; Shah, 2017). Vietnam has several maritime security priorities focusing on the settlement of the South China Sea dispute, the prevention and management of maritime incidents at sea, the application of the COC for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, and the devel­ opment of an agenda for the respect of freedom of navigation and overflight. Non-traditional maritime security concerns of Vietnam are illegal fishing and the protection of the marine environment (Gamage, 2017: 12–13). In order to pursue its maritime security priorities, Vietnam today supports a multilateral engagement among ASEAN states (Hai, 2018; Ngo, 2019), as well as drawing on support from external powers such Russia, Israel, Poland, France and India (Truong-Minh and Phuong, 2018). Singapore holds the world’s fifth largest merchant fleet and hosts the world’s second biggest port in trade volume (World Shipping Council, 2019). As a mar­ itime trade hub linking Southeast Asia with the rest of the world, maritime security is high on Singapore’s agenda. Singapore does not have a strong posi­ tion regarding any of the disputed territories in the South China Sea nor does it hold a claim to any of them; however, it strongly supports UNCLOS, open sea lines and freedom of navigation. In regional forums Singapore defends multilat­ eral regional governance (Koh, 2018), the centrality of ASEAN unity and the importance of a rules-based order, because ‘Singapore would be worst off in a world where might is right’ (Participant Observation, 2018). For example, in the 2019 Shangri-La Dialogue forum, Singapore’s PM Lee Hsien Loong unequiv­ ocally spoke out in favour of reforming, strengthening and building ‘a broader regional and international architecture of cooperation’, because ‘when groups of countries deepen their economic cooperation, they will enhance not just their shared prosperity but also their collective security’ (Loong, 2019). Although an economic powerhouse, Singapore remains a small country whose foreign policy

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relies on multilateral institutions and governance in order to achieve both eco­ nomic growth and national security.

Examples of maritime bilateralism in ASEAN With the signing of UNCLOS that entered into force in 1994, the Philippines developed a ‘maritime nation identity’ as an ‘archipelagic nation’. UNCLOS’ implementation brought a critical juncture to the Philippines’ maritime border management. As a country that consists of around 7200 islands, from that time on, for the Philippines maritime security meant that the country started think­ ing of itself as an archipelago, whereas it had previously had a disjointed way of dealing with its water territory, facilitating illegal entrance, porous borders and illegal fishing (Senior Official A, 2018). For the Philippines, national priorities in relation to the maritime domain involve the alleviation of piracy, maritime terrorism (e.g. through the Abu Sayyaf Group), smuggling and trafficking of goods and persons, environmental disaster management, as well as territorial disputes in the South China Sea. There the Philippines claims an area off its coast termed the Reed Bank. The ten-week standoff between the Philippine and Chinese Navies over the Scarborough Shoal in 2012 was a watershed moment in Philippine regional maritime diplomacy (Baviera, 2016). The Philippines sub­ sequently launched a formal case at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. China neither participated in the proceedings nor acknowledged the July 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling in favour of the Philippines (Ndi, 2016). However, since President Rodrigo Duterte took office in the same year, the Philippines has pursued a rapprochement with China and remains less vocal about its territorial claims in the South China Sea. For example, while President Duterte favours a bilateral settlement with China, this has the potential to undermine the value of the aforementioned arbitration ruling for other ASEAN claimant states, such as Vietnam or Malaysia (Petty, 2019). Indonesia, like the Philippines, is an archipelagic nation with over 18,000 islands ( Supriyanto, 2018). In 2014, Indonesia’s maritime identity was rein­ vented with President Joko Widodo’s ‘Global Maritime Axis’ concept (e.g. Sambhi, 2015; Muhibat, 2017). It has since become keener on territorial sovereignty and bilateral diplomacy (Connelly, 2015; Parameswaran, 2014). Retno Marsudi’s 2017 Foreign Minister Statement firmly supports this: ‘For Indonesian diplomats, there is no backing down when it comes to sovereignty. I repeat, we will not back down even for an inch when it comes to the sover­ eignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia’ (Marsudi, 2017: 5). Rüland (2018: 188–215) remarked a shift in Indonesian foreign policy away from its former focus on regionalism and community-construction during the ASEAN Charter drafting process of the 2000s towards a greater emphasis on sovereignty, national interest and material benefits. An Indonesian official confirmed this: despite highlighting ASEAN as a ‘good honest broker’ and a cornerstone of Indonesia’s regional security policy (see also Marsudi, 2017: 4),

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the official considers ‘ASEAN unity’ a farce and regrets the often-prevailing ‘dogma of consensus’ (Official A, 2018; see also Sukma, 2009; Febrica, 2017: 130–147). Although not a core claimant to the South China Sea dispute, China contests Indonesian fishing grounds near the Natuna Islands (Fitriani, 2018). Illegal fishing today remains one of Indonesia’s core maritime security con­ cerns. Other non-traditional maritime security issues involve disaster manage­ ment and irregular migration. Cambodia generally has a rather mute position towards ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms to regional security. It has hardly any expertise on maritime issues or maritime law. Cambodia’s priorities in the maritime domain relate to non-traditional security issues such as illegal fishing, human traffick­ ing, maritime terrorism and sea piracy. Since 2009, its interest in maritime affairs has somewhat heightened thanks to the US and Australia helping found the National Maritime Commission in the Cambodian Ministry of Defence. However, no action plan has since followed, making Cambodia more of a fol­ lower than an initiator of ASEAN maritime forums (Gamage, 2017: 7–9). Still, a commentator notes that Cambodia in recent years has often been ‘vocal in reverse’ about mentioning the South China Sea dispute in ASEAN’s official doc­ uments and opposes the South China Sea dispute being raised by other ASEAN states (Regional Expert A, 2018). In 2012, for the first time in 45 years, this led ASEAN to not reach consensus and to not issue a joint communiqué after an ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in Phnom Penh (Hoang, 2016). Thayer’s comparison of a leaked draft of the ‘Chairman Statement on the 32nd ASEAN summit’ with its final version presented at the summit held in Singapore in April 2018 provides further support for this claim. During the drafting stages of this Chairman statement, Cambodia’s interventions demanded the dele­ tion of entire sections. These sections referred to the legal precedence of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in 2016 (on the Philippines vs. China case) and the implicit reference to Chinese territorial acquisitions in the South China Sea. Cambodia also wanted to remove sections mentioning the need for regional initiatives that urgently advance progress on a ‘Code of Conduct in the South China Sea’, as well as a concrete outline and timeline for this Code (Thayer, 2018a). In fact, the final version of the Chairman statement later pub­ licly presented at the summit reflected a ‘consensus by deletion’, scrapping all passages initially criticised by Cambodia in the leaked draft (Thayer, 2018). Moreover, in July 2019, the Wall Street Journal released a report on a secret deal between China and Cambodia that would allow the Chinese navy access to Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base (Page, Lubold, and Taylor, 2019). Although both Cambodia and Chinese authorities have denied such deal, Cambodia’s increasingly Sinophile stance and preference for bilateral dispute settlement leave another commentator to argue that it is ‘bought by the Chinese’ (Senior Regional Expert C, 2018). The example of Cambodia further illustrates how easily multilateral processes in ASEAN can be muted by the unilateral interven­ tion of one of its member states.

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ASEAN unity through accommodation and consensus To conclude this section, while maritime security is important for many ASEAN states and regional mechanisms exist to address it, in contrast to the EUMSS outlined above, ASEAN’s maritime security governance mechanisms are not heavily formalised, but rely on informal decision-making, consensus and backdoor diplomacy. This form of regional governance, commonly referred to as the ‘ASEAN Way’, makes ASEAN states gear towards regional agreements that strengthen sovereignty and national independence over solutions that may take decision-making powers away from individual ASEAN states (Bhattacharyya, 2010; Febrica, 2017: 130–147; Sukma, 2010). In other words, unless there is an overarching consensus at the regional level that accommodates all ASEAN states interests and national representations of maritime security, individual ASEAN states would gear towards bilateral diplomacy. Furthermore, one of the primary aims of the ‘ASEAN Way’ principles that also underlie ASEAN maritime secu­ rity governance mechanisms is to build intramural trust between ASEAN states (ASEAN Secretariat, 2006), as well as to engage external powers into a system of regional governance centred on ASEAN (‘ASEAN Centrality’). However, as the excerpt of ASEAN states’ national maritime security priorities has demonstrated, trust is sometimes a rare commodity, both intramural, as well as extramural to ASEAN. Although intramural struggles between ASEAN states complicate their local process of finding regional solutions to regional problems, there is an ingrained scepticism towards external interference into ASEAN affairs that may potentially undermine ASEAN principles, which complicates any multilateral engagement from ‘abroad’. The implications of these findings in the next sections will be transferred to an evaluation of unintended consequences in EU-ASEAN interregional relations on maritime security.

ASEAN Way vs. EU Maritime Multilateralism: Unpacking the unintended consequences So far, this chapter engaged with two perspectives. One perspective consists of the EU strategy to expand its regional engagement into the waters of Southeast Asia, based on the principle of ‘maritime multilateralism’ and the aspiration to become a ‘global security’ provider. The political purpose behind this strategy is to reinforce EU trade interests and to strengthen the EU’s international actor­ ness. The other perspective relates to Southeast Asia’s regional maritime security environment, ‘centred’ on ASEAN. The primary political purpose of ASEAN maritime security governance mechanisms is to build trust among ASEAN states, as well as to engage external powers into a system of regional governance that centres on the principles of the ‘ASEAN Way’ and ‘ASEAN Centrality’. It follows that these two perspectives differ in how regional maritime security gov­ ernance ought to be pursued. This last section therefore considers how adapted the EUMSS is to this local maritime security environment in Southeast Asia.

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EU maritime multilateralism: A mismatch to the ASEAN way Cooperation in the area of maritime security is one that emerged out of steadily growing ties between the EU and ASEAN, ever since official dialogue relations began in 1977 (Senior Regional Expert D, 2018). These ties are characterised by mutual commercial interests that rely on the uninterrupted passage through var­ ious territorial and high seas, which connect the two regions. In principle, senior ASEAN member state officials and regional security experts consider interre­ gional maritime security between ASEAN and the EU a ‘low hanging fruit’. This means that while EU-ASEAN interregional cooperation is sometimes dif­ ficult to achieve in other areas (such as trade, see e.g. Meissner, 2016), maritime security cooperation is one policy area where EU-ASEAN relations can further grow (Council, 2019). Interregional cooperation between the EU and ASEAN on maritime security currently takes place at the Asia–Europe Meeting, the High Level Dialogue on Maritime Security, the ARF (where until 2020 the EU chairs the Working Group on Maritime Security together with Australia and Vietnam) and within the ReCAAP (by participation of Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK). However, the ARF is the only forum where the EU is currently represented by the External Action Service. Importantly, the EU does not have a seat at the important ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus. How, then, does the EUMSS, and, in particular, its vision of making the EU a ‘global security provider’ under the principles of ‘maritime multilateralism’, match those regional security governance principles of ASEAN? To illustrate this, the chapter now briefly draws on participant observations from a Track 1.5 EU-ASEAN foreign and security exchange forum, where four ASEAN high-level officials from Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Singapore, entered discus­ sions with EU External Action Service (EEAS) officials, academics and think-tank representatives. There, ASEAN member state officials generally welcomed more interregional cooperation with the EU on maritime security. However, as evolv­ ing discussions demonstrated, the ASEAN-defined boundary to cooperation was set to sharing best practices, a limited exchange of information and the transfer of technology. Notably topics of political concern were considered to be off the table. This stood in contrast to the EU’s approach. For example, the EEAS official present stated, ‘there is a huge spectrum of issues that we cooperate on with our ASEAN friends’, but ‘we still see in some sectors that ASEAN sees the EU merely as an eco­ nomic block. We also need to include security and political issues into our relations’ (Participant Observation, 2018). In response, the Malaysian official highlighted that the EU wants more than what is on the plate, e.g. a strategic partner­ ship. We have given a lot of thought on how to move forward. The most important aspect of our joint endeavour is the need to continue building trust because there are ideas where we might differ. We have to take into account each other’s side. (Participant Observation, 2018)

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Distrust and loss of regional actorness as unintended consequences potentially leading to weaker EU-ASEAN relations It appears here as though ASEAN and EU officials diverge in terms of the means and purpose of their interregional security relations. At first sight, the ASEAN reception of the EU’s strategy for becoming a ‘global security provider’ on the basis of ‘maritime multilateralism’ seems downgraded to the EU becoming a partner that provides individual ASEAN member states with sufficient technol­ ogy to deal with maritime security issues on their own terms. Mirroring Gardini and Malamud’s (2018) typology of interregional relations, while the EU is trying to take a ‘leadership’ role and pursue politico-institutional relations, ASEAN pursues interregional relations based on ‘exchange’ and socio-economic relations built on trade. Chen (2018) equally highlighted that ASEAN states consider the EU a trade partner, but not a strategic partner. However, these observations combined with the aforementioned evidence on the individual ASEAN member states’ positions towards maritime security governance seem to point towards a deeper dynamic. ASEAN officials distrust the EU approach to interregional maritime security cooperation. This follows from ASEAN officials’ different takes on the means and political purpose of regionalism. For example, as demonstrated in the previous section, many ASEAN states prefer bilateral solutions to address maritime security gov­ ernance issues. This stands in contrast to a multilateral EU maritime strategy. However, and more importantly, ASEAN states adhere to the ‘ASEAN Way’ as the final rule of arbitration that prescribes consensus. Even if this means ‘con­ sensus by deletion’, the ‘ASEAN Way’ also enshrines other principles, such as ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member States’ (ASEAN Secretariat, 2007: 4), or to foster respect for the conduct of regional relations based on freedom from external interference (ASEAN Secretariat, 1976).6 ‘Maritime multilateralism’, as a security ordering principle, to a considerable extent, pre­ sents a mismatch to these ASEAN security governance principles. Particularly, when the EU represents ‘maritime multilateralism’ to ASEAN states as a way to ‘promote there its own maritime security vision, interests and objectives’ (European Commission, 2017: 39; emphasis added), EU external action disregards local regionalism practices in Southeast Asia. These practices build on informal deci­ sion-making, consensus and backdoor diplomacy, have ASEAN at the centre of security governance mechanisms and consist of a diverse set of representations and interests that are governed under the auspices of the ‘ASEAN Way’. The aforementioned evidence leads this chapter to conclude that one impor­ tant unintended consequence that follows from the EU’s approach to upgrade maritime security cooperation with ASEAN is the build-up of distrust towards EU external action. Distrust manifests, amongst others, through the expectation gap that opens between EU ‘maritime multilateralism’, on the one hand, and the ‘ASEAN Way’, on the other. It here appears unclear how much and what

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type of interregional relations on maritime security the two regional blocs are willing to create (Gardini and Malamud, 2018). The ASEAN regional experts interviewed further recognised this divergence in means and purpose to regional security governance between the EU and ASEAN (Senior Regional Expert A, 2018; Senior Regional Expert D, 2018). In addition, a Philippine official noted, ‘the ASEAN Way means that ASEAN’s development is not going to be similar to the EU model’, because: the Southeast Asian continent is very different to Europe. National psy­ chology is determined by how you are to your neighbours. For Thailand, Cambodia and Laos, they are very close. For Indonesia and the Philippines, integration makes no sense. They are too different, they have a different identity. Vietnam has a strong Politburo. The Philippines are a rambling democracy, as well as Indonesia. Singapore is a one-man rule. (Senior Official A, 2018) The EUMSS’ focus on exporting EU governance principles to interregional relations with ASEAN may present one of the main causes of this distrust (see also Rüland, 2015). Furthermore, the Southeast Asian maritime environment involves a multitude of actors whose strategic interests and representations do not converge and who already share little trust within their regional bloc in this policy area (Gamage, 2017). Another reason for ASEAN states’ distrust in EU ‘maritime multilateralism’ could be the EU’s own incoherent application. One illustrative aspect here was the aforementioned difficulty for European states to adopt a joint statement following the arbitration ruling on the Philippines vs. China case in 2016, which would have been particularly important to the South China Sea ASEAN claimant states. It follows that the EU’s own inability to transfer the EUMSS ‘maritime multilateralism’ discourse into policy practice does not make it a reliable interregional partner, and perhaps even less so a ‘global security pro­ vider’. Finally, without further addressing the complexity of the Southeast Asian maritime security environment, as a strategy that seeks to upgrade EU-ASEAN interregional cooperation on maritime security, the EUMSS may end up unin­ tendedly impeding further developments in EU-ASEAN interregional relations. Although narrowing the scope of interregionalism, this could also decrease the EU’s ‘regional actorness’ in the region (Mattheis and Wunderlich, 2017).

Conclusion Against the background of the EU’s strategy to realise the maritime security strategy’s principle of ‘maritime multilateralism’ and its aspiration to become a ‘global security provider’ far into the waters of Southeast Asia, this chapter ana­ lysed the extent to which this interregional cooperation with ASEAN is under way. It further analysed the EU-ASEAN interregional relations by asking how the EU Maritime Security Strategy is received in Southeast Asia and how well

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it is adapted to the local regional maritime security context. The chapter finds that the EU-ASEAN interregional cooperation in maritime security is still in its nascent stages but presents a ‘low-hanging fruit’ for further cooperation. So far it is only in the ARF that the EU is institutionally represented by the EEAS. In contrast to the EU Maritime Security Strategy, ASEAN maritime policy gears towards a regional governance that is not heavily formalised, but that relies on informal decision-making, consensus and backdoor diplomacy, which is codi­ fied under the principles of the ‘ASEAN Way’ and ‘ASEAN Centrality’. These make ASEAN member states gear towards bilateral agreements to prioritise sov­ ereignty and national independence. The chapter also uncovered a diversity of interests among ASEAN states regarding how to govern maritime security, with some states following a multilateral agenda to maritime security governance, and others a bilateral one. Based on these two different perspectives to regional security governance within EU and ASEAN states, the chapter further demon­ strated how the EU principle of ‘maritime multilateralism’, which represents the normative bedrock of the European Maritime Security Strategy, presents a mis­ match with Southeast Asian security ordering principles rooted in the ‘ASEAN Way’. As an unintended consequence, this mismatch builds up distrust among ASEAN policy elites towards EU External Action, which in turn unintendedly affects the structure of the EU-ASEAN interregional relationship. The chapter further argues that without addressing this mismatch, and thus acknowledging local regionalism and practices among ASEAN states, the European Maritime Security Strategy may end up unintendedly impeding further developments in the EU-ASEAN interregional relationship, or weaken these relations altogether.

Notes 1 As part of the GEM-STONES program, this research received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Grant Agreement No 722826. 2 The Southeast Asian ‘region’ is here conceptualised to encompass those states that are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, namely Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 3 Interviews took place between May and October 2018 in London, Brussels, Hamburg and Singapore. Interviewees have asked the author to anonymise any identifiable personal information. The Track 1.5 EU-ASEAN foreign policy exchange was an event hosted by the Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations Institute in Brussels, on 5 June, 2018. 4 At the time, Croatia itself faced a maritime dispute with Slovenia, which was han­ dled by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which may explain its cautious posi­ tion (Dumitru, 2017). Hungary and Greece, on the other hand, had reportedly been lobbied by China to block the statement in return for lucrative investment contracts (Emmott, 2016; The Economist, 2018). 5 Thailand, Laos and Brunei do not have a clearly discernible approach in this policy area. 6 Which the European Union agreed to by acceding to the Treaty of Amity and Coop­ eration (TAC) in 2012; see (Council 1202/0028, 2012).

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Book chapters Baviera, Aileen S.P. 2016. The Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute: Security Interests and Perspectives. In: Ian Storey and Cheng-Yi Lin (Eds.). The South China Sea Dispute: Navigating Diplomatic and Strategic Tensions. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 161–85. Benbow, Tim. 2016. The Future of Naval Conflict and Lessons from History. In: Krause, Joachim and Sebastian Bruns (Eds.). Routledge Handbook of Naval Strategy and Security. Abingdon Oxon: Routledge, 27–43. Fitriani, Evi. 2015. ASEAN and EU Cooperative Culture in the Asia-Europe Meeting. In: Telò, Mario, Louise Fawcett and Frederik Ponjaert (Eds.). Interregionalism and

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the European Union: A Post-Revisionist Approach to Europe’s Place in a Changing World. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 249–65. Gardini, Gian Luca and Andrés Malamud. 2018. Debunking Interregionalism: Concepts, Types and Critique – With a Pan-Atlantic Focus. In: Mattheis, Frank and Andréas Litsegård (Eds.). Interregionalism across the Atlantic Space. Cham: Springer International Publishing AG, 15–31. Goh, Evelyn. 2014. Southeast Asia’s Evolving Security Relations and Strategies. In: Saadia Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 462–80. Hänggi, Heiner. 2006. Interregionalism as a Multifaceted Phenomenon: In Search of a Typology. In Hänggi, Heiner and Jürgen Rüland (Eds.). Interregionalism and International Relations. Abingdon Oxon: Routledge, 31–62. Hao, Chu and Chen Qinghong. 2016. Maritime Security Cooperation in the South China Sea. In: Bekkevold, Jo Inge and Geoffrey Till (Eds.). International Order at Sea: How It Is Challenged. How It Is Maintained. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 221–39. Hoang, Anh Tuan. 2016. A Vietnamese Perspective on the South China Sea Dispute. In: Storey, Ian and Cheng-Yi Lin (Eds.). The South China Sea Dispute: Navigating Diplomatic and Strategic Tensions. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 186–204. Kennes, Walter. 2015. ASEAN and the EU: An Evolving and Solid Development Partnership. In: Brennan, Louise and Philomena Murray (Eds.). Drivers of Integration and Regionalism in Europe and Asia. Abingdon Oxon: Routledge, 366–84. Koh, Collin. 2018. Naval Development in Singapore. In: Till, Geoffrey and Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto (Eds.). Naval Modernisation in Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects for Small and Medium Navies. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 47–60. Loewen, Howard. 2014. Security Regimes in Southeast Asia – Confidence Building and the Global Nexus. In: Hofmeister, Wilhelm and Patrick Rueppel (Eds.). EU-Asia Dialogue: Maritime Security and Piracy and Piracy. Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 11–21. Onestini, Cesare. 2015. How Do We Assess Cooperation between Regional Organisations? EU and ASEAN as an Example of Region-to-Region Cooperation. In: Brennan, Louise and Philomena Murray (Eds.). Drivers of Integration and Regionalism in Europe and Asia. Abingdon Oxon: Routledge, 252–69. Ponjaert, Frederik. 2013. Inter-Regionalism as a Coherent and Intelligible Instrument in the EU Foreign Policy Toolbox: A Comparative Assessment. In: Telò, Mario and Frederik Ponjaert (Eds.). The EU’s Foreign Policy: What Kind of Power and Diplomatic Action? Abingdon Oxon: Routledge, 135–58. Rüland, J. 2015. The Unintended Consequences of Interregional Democracy Promotion: Normative and Conceptual Misunderstandings in EU-ASEAN Relations. In: Telò, Mario, Louise Fawcett, and Frederik Ponjaert (Eds.). Interregionalism and the European Union. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 267–83. Sukma, Rizal. 2010. ASEAN And Regional Security In East Asia. In: Wilhelm Hofmeister and Megha Sarmah (Eds.). Security Politics in Asia and Europe. Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 109–20. Supriyanto, Ristian Atriandi. 2018. Naval Development in Indonesia. In: Till, Geoffrey and Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto (Eds.). Naval Modernisation in Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects for Small and Medium Navies. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 61–76. Telò, Mario, Louise L’Estrange Fawcett and Frederik Ponjaert (eds.). 2015. Interregionalism and the European Union: A Post-Revisionist Approach to Europe’s Place in a Changing World. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

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Truong-Minh, Vu and Nguyen The Phuong. 2018. Naval Development in Vietnam. In: Till, Geoffrey and Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto (Eds.). Naval Modernisation in Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects for Small and Medium Navies. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 93–106.

Monographs Cordner, Lee. 2018. Maritime Security Risks, Vulnerabilities and Cooperation: Uncertainty in the Indian Ocean. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Febrica, Senia. 2017. Maritime Security and Indonesia: Cooperation, Interests and Strategies. Abingdon Oxon: Routledge. Fitriani, Evi. 2014. Southeast Asians and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): State’s Interests and Institution’s Longevity. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. Rüland, Jürgen. 2018. The Indonesian Way: ASEAN, Europeanization, and Foreign Policy Debates in a New Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

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Council 10494/18. 2018. Council Conclusions on the Revision of the European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) Action Plan. 26 June. Available at: https:// ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/sites/maritimeaffairs/files/2018-06-26-eumss-revised­ action-plan_en.pdf Accessed on 24 Sep 2019. Council 11205/14. 2014. European Union Maritime Security Strategy. Available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST 11205 2014 INIT Accessed on 24 Sep 2019. Council 1202/0028. 2012. Council Decision On the Accession of the European Union to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Available at: Council of the European Union. Council 17002/14. 2014. European Union Maritime Security Strategy - Action Plan. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/sites/maritimeaffairs/files/docs/ body/20141216-action-plan_en.pdf Accessed on 24 Jun 2020. European Commission. 2016. EUMSS Guide for Stakeholders. Available at: https:// ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/sites/maritimeaffairs/f iles/leaf let-european-union­ maritime-security-strategy_en.pdf Accessed on 27 Oct 2018. European Commission. 2017. Second Report on the Implementation of the EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/ sites/maritimeaffairs/files/swd-2017-238_en.pdf Accessed on 24 Sep 2019. European Commission. 2018. Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/asean/ Accessed on 31 Oct 2018. Marsudi, Retno L.P. 2017. Annual Press Statement Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia Retno L.P. Marsudi. Available at: https://www.kemlu.go.id/ id/pidato/menlu/Documents/PPTM-2017-EN.pdf Accessed on 13 Oct 2018. Ngo, Xuan Lich. 2019. 18th Asia Security Summit - Fifth Plenary Session. Speech by Minister of National Defence of Vietnam General Ngo Xuan Lich. The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue. 2 June. Available at: https://www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la­ dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2019 Accessed on 11 Sep 2019. Parly, Florence. 2019. 18th Asia Security Summit - Third Plenary Session. Speech by Minister of the Armed Forces of France, Florence Parly. The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue. 1 June. Available at: https://www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-dialogue/ shangri-la-dialogue-2019 Accessed on 19 Sep 2019. VMFA. 2018. Remarks by MOFA, Spokesperson at the Regular Press Conference. 31 May. Available at: http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns180604162749/ view Accessed on 14 Oct 2018.

Online resources CSIS. 2018. How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea? Centre for Strategic & International Studies - China Power Project. Available at: https://chinapower.csis.org/ much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/ Accessed on 27 Oct 2018. EEAS. 2016. Declaration on the Award Rendered in the Arbitration between the Philippines and China. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/tunisia/6873/ declaration-award-rendered-arbitration-between-philippines-and-china _en Accessed on 18 Sep 2019. Emmott, Robin. 2016. EU’s Silence on South China Sea Ruling Highlights Inner Discord. Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/southchinasea-rulingeu-idUSL8N1A01TV Accessed on 18 Sep 2019.

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Gamage, Rajni. 2017. ASEAN Mechanisms on Maritime Security Cooperation. S. Rajartnam School of International Studies. Available at: https://www.rsis.edu. sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ER171212_ASEAN-Mechanisms-on-Maritime­ Security-Cooperation_WEB.pdf Accessed on 1 Apr 2020. Loong, Lee Hsien. 2019. 18th Asia Security Summit - Keynote Address Friday 31st May 2019 by PM of Singapore Lee Hsien Loong. The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue. Available at: https://www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2019 Accessed on 11 Sep 2019. Norman, Laurence. 2016. EU Issues South China Sea Statement Ending Discord Within Bloc. The Wall Street Journal. 17 July. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/ articles/eu-issues-south-china-sea-statement-after-failing-to-agree-common­ stance-1468583961 Accessed on 18 Sep 2019. Page, Jeremy, Gordon Lubold and Rob Taylor. 2019. Deal for Naval Outpost in Cambodia Furthers China’s Quest for Military Network. The Wall Street Journal. 22 July. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/secret-deal-for-chinese-naval­ outpost-in-cambodia-raises-u-s-fears-of-beijings-ambitions-11563732482 Accessed on 11 Sep 2019. Parameswaran, Prashanth. 2014. Is Indonesia Turning Away From ASEAN Under Jokowi? The Diplomat. 18 December. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/is­ indonesia-turning-away-from-asean-under-jokowi/ Accessed on 12 Sep 2019. Petty, Martin. 2019. Philippines’ Duterte Says Xi Offering Gas Deal If Arbitration Case Ignored. Reuters. 11 September. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-philippines-china-southchinasea/philippines-duterte-says-xi-offering-gas­ deal-if-arbitration-case-ignored-idUSKCN1VW07O Accessed on 12 Sep 2019. ReCAAP. 2019. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia - Half Yearly Report January - June 2019. Singapore: Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia. Available at: http://www.recaap. org/resources/ck/files/reports/half-year/ReCAAP ISC Half Yearly 2019 Report.pdf Accessed on 6 Sep 2019. Sukma, Rizal. 2009. Indonesia Needs a Post-ASEAN Foreign Policy. The Diplomat. 30 June. Available at: https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/06/30/indonesia­ needs-a-postasean-foreign-policy.html Accessed on 29 Oct 2019. Storey, Ian. 2016. Addressing the Persistent Problem of Piracy and Sea Robbery in Southeast Asia. ISEAS Perspective (30), 1–11. Available at: https://www.iseas.edu.sg/ images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2016_30.pdft Accessed on 24 Jun 2020. Thayer, Carl. 2018. Consensus by Deletion: Reviewing the 32nd ASEAN Leaders’ Summit and the South China Sea. The Diplomat. 30 April. Available at: https:// thediplomat.com/2018/05/consensus-by-deletion-reviewing-the-32nd-asean-leaders­ summit-and-the-south-china-sea/ Accessed on 13 Oct 2018. The Economist. 2018. Chinese Investment, and Influence, in Europe Is Growing. The Economist. 4 October. Available at: https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/10/04/ chinese-investment-and-influence-in-europe-is-growing Accessed on 23 Sep 2019. UN Geospatial Information Section. 2012. Southeast Asia, Map No. 4365 Rev. 1, March 2012. Available at: https://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/seasia.pdf Accessed on 17 Sep 2019. World Shipping Council. 2019. Global Trade Statistics - Top 50 World Container Ports. Available at: http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/global-trade/top­ 50-world-container-ports Accessed on 10 Sep 2019.

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Interview Official A. 2018. Interview conducted in June 2018 in Brussels. Regional expert A. 2018. Interview conducted in August 2018 at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore. Senior official A. 2018. Interview conducted in May 2018 at the Philippine Embassy in London. Senior regional expert A. 2018. Interview conducted in August 2017 at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore. Senior regional expert B. 2018. Interview conducted in May 2018 in Coventry. Senior regional expert C. 2018. Interview conducted in May 2018 via skype. Senior regional expert D. 2018. Interview conducted in August 2018 at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore.

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6 BETWEEN BILATERALISM

AND INTERREGIONALISM

EU-Brazil strategic partnership and the unintended consequences for EU-MERCOSUR relations Bruno Theodoro Luciano Introduction The European Union and Brazil signed a Strategic Partnership in 2007. This document highlighted the fact that the European side acknowledged Brazil as an important actor at the multilateral level and that a privileged dialogue should be established with this emerging country. On the other side, Brazil saw this agreement as an instrument to increase its international reputation and its engagement in the discussions of multilateral issues with global actors. In paral­ lel, since the 1990s the EU has nurtured a formalised dialogue with the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), a regional economic organisation that brings Brazil together with some of its neighbouring countries – Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela (currently a suspended member). These interregional relations have been institutionalised through the Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement signed in 1995. More recently, the relationship has been marked by the negotiation of an association agreement between the two blocs, concluded in 2019. In light of this context, this chapter aims to discuss the unintended conse­ quences of the establishment of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership for polit­ ical relations between the EU and MERCOSUR. Although the Strategic Partnership offers an opportunity to deepen political dialogue between the EU and Brazil, it has also fostered some issues of fragmentation, rivalry and selec­ tivity within MERCOSUR countries. These states see the individualisation of EU relations with Brazil as a drawback of the progress of the political dimen­ sion of EU-MERCOSUR relations, recently restrained to free trade negotia­ tions. Therefore, this chapter argues that privileging relations with key regional actors, such as Brazil, may lead to unintended negative impacts on the support of regional integration initiatives, a key foreign policy goal for the EU. Drawing

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from the notion of unintended consequences, this study reflects on how some bilateral initiatives might hinder the development of inter-regional projects pre­ viously set by the very same actors, creating inconsistencies in the interregional performance of the EU. The idea behind this book was to think inductively. As such, this chapter revisits the normative dimension of interregionalism. Based on semi-structured interviews conducted in Brussels and Montevideo and induc­ tive document analysis, the chapter addresses these conflicting dynamics within EU-Brazil and EU-MERCOSUR relations, in order to problematise EU-Latin America interregionalism. Through this case study, this research is meant to be read in dialogue with previous literature that has discussed the unintended effects of EU’s foreign pol­ icy action (introduction of this book). Although Brussels has defended its work, arguing that its performance is utterly embedded in normative principles such as supporting regional integration projects globally, this objective is not always achieved throughout its policies. For instance, Stevens (2006: 441), when inves­ tigating the EU economic talks with African nations stressed that “even though deeper integration is a stated goal of all the parties, the EU’s initiative risks weak­ ening rather than reinforcing the efforts under way”. Rather than supporting regional integration and intra-bloc cohesion, some EU initiatives might actually do the opposite, leading to regional fragmentation (cf. Lopez-Lucia and Mattheis in this volume), inasmuch as some countries might be privileged by strengthen­ ing their relations with the EU while others might feel marginalised. In this sense, the notion of unintended consequences, usually related to soci­ ology and historical institutionalism (Merton, 1936; Pierson, 1996; Lopez-Lucia and Mattheis in this volume), may offer important insights for understanding these unpredicted outcomes of EU relations with third countries and blocs. According to Burlyuk (2017: 1022), “the concept of unintended consequences is in fact much broader than its standard understanding and casual use as unwel­ come unanticipated policy outcomes, and it has relevance beyond historical insti­ tutionalism, with which it is typically associated”. Thus, applying these ideas to the study and the assessment of EU interregional relations is a relevant con­ tribution, which helps to analyse the various effects of the EU’s external action in a more comprehensive way. Due to the limits of the scope of this research, this chapter aims to focus on the effects of EU relations with specific countries (i.e. Brazil), on overall EU-relations with MERCOSUR (effects on the inter­ regional structure) and on MERCOSUR’s regional integration (effects on the actors). In this sense, although one of EU’s intended objectives (i.e. the devel­ opment of individual relations with Brazil) is guided by EU strategic, political and economic interests, these objectives have not necessarily contributed to the promotion of one of the fundamental EU principled goals: support of regional integration in the world. This may have resulted in unintended inconsistencies to EU’s relations with the Southern Cone. The first section of this chapter describes the initial European strategy to strengthen ties with Latin America and MERCOSUR since the latter’s

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foundation in the 1990s as part of a normative attempt to support regional inte­ gration worldwide. The second section addresses how the EU’s focus has changed in the 2000s and examines how the priority has emerged to deepen relations with key emerging countries such as Brazil, exemplified by the signature of a Strategic Partnership with this nation. Lastly, this chapter discusses whether this change of strategy from the EU side has led to inconsistencies regarding the main normative values of its external action. Therefore, while a multifaceted political dialogue was institutionalised with Brazil, the political relations with MERCOSUR as a bloc were sidelined, with the exemption of trade negotia­ tions. Moreover, individualising relations with Brazil has led to fostered issues of fragmentation within MERCOSUR, undermining the internal cohesion of this bloc necessary for it to act as an interregional and international political platform. By examining the case of EU-MERCOSUR and EU-Brazil relations, this chapter aims not only to contribute to the literature on EU-Latin America rela­ tions but also to the wider discussion on EU foreign policy and interregionalism, which are central areas explored in this edited volume. The unintended conse­ quences introduced in this case study may offer some important insights into the performance of the EU at the international level, particularly with regards to other regional organisations, highlighting whether in some particular cases the EU’s strategic interests may unintentionally jeopardise the EU’s global promo­ tion of normative standards.

When interests meet principles: The development of EU and MERCOSUR relations and the promotion of regional integration overseas Since the 1990s, and following the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has substantially strengthened its international engagement in order to become an acknowledged global actor, or as scholars in the field have called it, a civilian power (Telò, 2006), and ultimately a normative power (Manners, 2002). The EU’s international involvement has not only been constituted by material (economical and geopolitical) interests on the international stage but also by the EU’s own norms and values, such as the promotion of democracy, human rights and regional integration. These normative and interest components are intrinsi­ cally interlinked throughout the EU’s external action. As pointed out by Diez, “norms and interests cannot so easily be separated, and both are infused by each other” (Diez, 2013: 201). Therefore, the EU’s relationship with Latin America as a whole and with Latin American sub-regions in particular has been marked by this combination of mate­ rial and ideational concerns. The EU’s first policies towards the region have been driven by a will to reinforce its own principles, for example, by supporting regional integration initiatives, which have been developing in the region. In this sense, “The European interregional strategy distinguishes itself by its sustainable support to the various regional Latin American groupings, and developing relations of an

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institutionalised interregional type” (van Loon, 2010: 3). Interregionalism was seen by the EU as its global instrument to both increase its international presence and promote its regional integration model as a reference to other parts of the world (Doctor, 2015). Besides, in terms of the EU’s material interests, exporting its own model of regional integration was also a way to deepen trade and political relations with Latin American sub-regional blocs, competing with the US influ­ ence with the region, which has historically privileged bilateralism. This trend is also noticeable in the specific case of MERCOSUR. “In the early 1990s, when integration experiments in South America had already advanced, the European Union’s priorities envisaged the establishment of an agenda of cooperation with Mercosur” (Lessa, 2010: 127). This focus was seen in 1995 when the EU formalised an interregional dialogue with MERCOSUR via an Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement. This arrangement was marked by the diversity of topics that constituted the interregional dialogue of the two blocs. At the same take, this agreement reinforced the principles of interregionalism and restrained any bilateral moves between the two blocs, privileging the strengthening of the bi-regional relationship (Meissner, 2015). For instance, after the interregional framework agreement was agreed between the two blocs, the EU’s framework previous agreements with Argentina (1990), Uruguay and Paraguay (1992) have not resulted in new formalised instruments between the EU and individual MERCOSUR countries. Moreover, this intensive dialogue with the EU stimulated the invigoration of MERCOSUR integration. As argued by Doctor, “the interregional negotiating process itself contributed to Mercosur members’ interest in keeping the regional project alive, even under very difficult conditions and possibly nudged them towards taking more practical steps to inte­ gration” (Doctor, 2015: 968). In the following years, at the same time as the negotiations of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the EU has been pursuing stronger ties, propos­ ing to sign an Association Agreement (AA) with MERCOSUR. This was the first EU external initiative aiming beyond a mere Free Trade Agreement (FTA). It was a much more comprehensive proposal than a Free Trade Agreement and would include wider topics in the bi-regional agenda. “In 2000, the EU and MERCOSUR were ready to start negotiating an AA, which covered political issues, cooperation and an FTA. The FTA followed a comprehensive format that included investments, services and non-tariff trade barriers next to trade in goods and agriculture” (Meissner, 2018: 56). In this sense, EU-MERCOSUR relations have been very dynamic in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. Not only due to the prospective of an ambitious association agreement but also to the intensive technical coopera­ tion towards the institutionalisation of the MERCOSUR bodies, such as the Technical Secretariat, Review Tribunal and the MERCOSUR Parliament in the beginnings of the 2000s (Dri, 2010; Lenz, 2013). Overall, the EU intro­ duced three goals, which would support the MERCOSUR integration project:

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(a) completion of the Internal Market of MERCOSUR; (b) stronger institution­ alisation of MERCOSUR and (c) support for civil society in MERCOSUR. However, after the failure of the FTAA and due to pressures from both the agriculture sector of EU Member States as well as the industrial sectors in the MERCOSUR countries – which feared the impact of a significant trade liber­ alisation to national producers and industries – both sides lost interest in clos­ ing a trade deal, and the negotiations stalled in 2004 (Mariano and Luciano, 2019). As reported by the European Commission, “Trade negotiations reached a high point in September 2004 when the two sides exchanged revised offers in all areas of the future agreement. However, offers on both sides did not meet the high level of ambition desired for the EU-Mercosur association” (European Commission, 2007: 22). The discussions over the Association Agreement only resumed in 2010, in the context of the post-financial crises and when the intention from both sides was to open their markets as a way to increase economic growth and commercial transactions. Although the EU-MERCOSUR trade negotiations were formally reinitiated, protectionism from specific EU countries (mostly France, Ireland and Poland) and MERCOSUR ones (Argentina) created strong resistance to moving on with the agreement. The trade offers were finally exchanged in 2016 after the transition of government in Argentina and Brazil – which returned to an open liberalist approach1 – and the stalemate of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the US (Agência Brasil, 2016), facts that once again brought the both blocs closer. This new context in South America and Europe has given a new impetus to trade liberalisation between the two sides, which was seen by political actors of both regions as a response to the rise of global protectionism. In this sense, after 20 years of negotiations, on 28 June, 2019 the EU and MERCOSUR reached an agreement in principle on the terms of the negotiations (European Commission, 2019). Interestingly, at the same time that the EU-MERCOSUR trade negotia­ tions stalled in the early 2000s and the interregional technical cooperation was terminated, the EU showed strong interest in establishing a deeper political dia­ logue with Brazil, formalised by a Strategic Partnership in 2007. Therefore, this research aims to understand whether the strengthening of EU-Brazil bilateral relations has contributed to the low pace of EU-MERCOSUR relations over time and to the stagnation of interregional political relations.

Individualising interregional relations: the establishment of EU-Brazil strategic partnership Over the 2000s, the EU strategy of dialoguing with the region has changed sig­ nificantly. Instead of insisting on a interregional dialogue with MERCOSUR, not only by concluding the Association Agreement but also through the strengthening of political relations between the two blocs over bi-regional and multilateral issues, the EU has preferred to underscore its relations with Brazil

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based on a different interpretation of world politics, which does not necessar­ ily prioritise the principle of supporting regional integration initiatives at the global scale. Therefore, this section points out that this policy change is not only due to the difficulties in deepening the dialogue with MERCOSUR but also to the overall renovation of EU external strategies in the 2000s, which, for instance, led to the development of the concept of “Strategic Partnerships” with both traditional and emerging countries (Renard, 2016). Meanwhile, the rise of Brazil as a global actor in the 2000s led the country to establish more in-depth relations with key international players, such as the other members of the BRICS2 forum (Russia, India, China and South Africa), as well as tra­ ditional partners such as the EU. As this section highlights, the transforma­ tion identified in both sides led to the development of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership in 2007.

EU foreign policy change in the 2000s and the instrumentalisation of strategic partnerships The emergence of new key countries in the multilateral agenda has presented new challenges to the external action of the EU. From this point, EU global interests would not only be dependent on its dialogue with traditional powers and regional blocs but also its relations with emerging actors. Therefore, the EU’s external action started to pay more attention to emerging countries, which were expected to be at the central stage of the multilateral agenda and the global econ­ omy in the near future. Grounded in this new identification of global actors, the EU redefined its strategy to engage internationally, creating a novel framework which aimed to deepen its relationship with traditional and emerging countries (European Commission, 2006). Two key documents produced by the EU in this context must be highlighted: The European Security Strategy (2003) and the more recent Global Strategy (2016). As Tocci (2017) observes when reflect­ ing upon the changes brought by the two documents, that over the 2000s, the EU’s external action has moved from the notion of Transformative Europe  – which privileged the transformation of global politics according to the norms defended by the EU – to the concept of Principled Pragmatism, which has put more emphasis on pursuing the EU’s own interests at the international level. In fact, the Global Strategy ‘chose only to talk about interests, interpreting these in a manner which clarified that values are part and parcel of the definition of EU interests’ (Tocci, 2017: 498). When it comes to engaging with other regional organisations, the new global approach of the EU meant that it was not a priority to develop relations with like-minded regional organisations, such as MERCOSUR. In fact, this change in the EU’s perception regarding MERCOSUR is evident when comparing two key documents of EU’s contemporary foreign policy. The European Security Strategy conceived of MERCOSUR as a relevant actor to develop more institu­ tionalised regional orders, while “Other regional organisations such as ASEAN,

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MERCOSUR and the African Union make an important contribution to a more orderly world” (Council of the European Union, 2003: 11). Yet the Global Strategy has only referred to MERCOSUR as a trade bloc when EU indicated its intention to conclude a comprehensive free trade agreement with the bloc (High Representative of the EU, 2016). Therefore, as an instrument to privilege its political ties with leading nations in bilateral and multilateral affairs, over the 2000s the EU established Strategic Partnerships with key countries all over the globe. Alongside the EU’s external action move towards principled pragmatism, the notion of Strategic Partnership “introduced a ‘pragmatic move’ to EU’s foreign policy discourse, which adopted a new framework concept to neutralise differences concerning norms and values” (Blanco and Luciano, 2018: 2). When it comes to the EU’s relation with Latin America, this contextual change in EU external strategy favoured the establish­ ment of stronger cooperation with key countries in the region such as Brazil and Mexico (van Loon, 2010). In this sense, the development of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership was seen as an instrument to achieve the EU’s global interests. In particular, the EU’s motivations for establishing a formalised dialogue with Brazil have been seen by some as an attempt to counterbalance US and Chinese competing interests in this country (Meissner, 2018). Others have emphasised that the stagnation of EU-MERCOSUR relations, a dialogue that was firstly seen with great ambi­ tion, has deeply disappointed Brussels. “One of Brussels’ reasons for recognis­ ing Brazil as a strategic partner is the failure to conclude an EU-MERCOSUR free trade agreement, which both parties began to negotiate in 1999” (Gratius, 2010: 1). As no progress was envisioned for the future, and taking into account the broader EU foreign policy change of the 2000s, EU agents have preferred to be more realpolitik oriented and put less emphasis on interregionalism and the support for regional integration initiatives, marginalising the relationship with MERCOSUR and putting most of their efforts in developing a deepen bilateral cooperation with Brazil. As pointed out by one of the officials from MERCOSUR in interview, “EU-MERCOSUR cooperation has ended due to strategic changes of the Europeans, related to international politics” (Mercosur Official, 2018).3 Thus, as interregionalism via relations with MERCOSUR was not producing favourable results, the EU has pragmatically invested in bilateral relations with Brazil (Meissner, 2018).

Going global: Brazil’s motivations for establishing individual relations with the EU During the 2000s, Brazil’s international profile has risen exponentially, as the international community has recognised the country’s steady economic growth and its contribution to many key issues of the multilateral agenda. Acknowledging the auspicious momentum, Brazil opted to going solo in many areas such as

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climate change and financial governance, and in arenas such as the WTO and the G20, without necessarily gaining the approval of its Mercosur’s neighbours before going global (Malamud, 2011). In fact, Brazilian diplomatic actors envi­ sioned regionalism – in particular towards South America –as a means to an end, i.e. an instrument to both ensure the democratic stability of South America and to increase its international reputation as a regional and emerging power, without the requirement of bearing substantive leadership costs (Lazarou and Luciano, 2015). In this context, the decision to establish strategic partnerships worldwide with traditional and emerging international players and the interest in devel­ oping a dialogue on political and multilateral issues with the EU have pushed Brazilian authorities towards ‘going solo’, and setting up deeper relations with the EU outside the framework of the EU-MERCOSUR bi-regional relations. Furthermore, from the Brazilian perspective, the development of a Strategic Partnership with the EU was seen as recognition of its important contribu­ tion to the multilateral system, moving it into the ranks of global and regional powers (Christensen, 2010). Nonetheless, political actors in Brazil have put a different emphasis on MERCOSUR as a foreign policy priority for the coun­ try. Although some Brazilian actors believed that a strategic partnership with third partners such as the EU would in fact support MERCOSUR integra­ tion and the future negotiation of the EU-MERCOSUR association agree­ ment (European Commission, 2007; EU-Brazil Joint Action Plan, 2008; Ceia, 2008), others from political and business groups have advocated for turning MERCOSUR into a more ‘flexible’ bloc: (…) there is a widespread sentiment amongst Brazilian business elites that Brazil ought not to let itself be hindered in pursuing its interests bilaterally (Vigevani and Ramanzini, 2009). This posi­ tion is defended by the opposition candidate, José Serra of the PSDB, who leads the opinion polls for the presidential elections in Brazil in 2010. He favours that Mercosur goes from being a customs union to a mere free trade agreement (Christensen, 2010: 8). Although these two perceptions have different visions of the role of MERCOSUR within Brazil’s foreign policy, both supported developing stronger individual relations with key global actors such as the EU, creating no obstacles to the deepening of bilateral relations.

The development of the EU-Brazil strategic partnership In a Communication from 2005, the European Commission pointed out the increasing economic development and international engagement in recent years of two Latin American nations, Brazil and Mexico, recognising them as important actors to dialogue within a more regular and formalised fashion. In the words of the Commission, “There are some major players, i.e. Brazil and Mexico, which deserve special treatment because of their important role in

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regional affairs” (European Commission, 2005: 7). In the case of Brazil, accord­ ing to the European Commission: The strategy for a stronger partnership between the EU and Latin America must also take account of the importance and special role of the region’s big countries. This is particularly the case for Brazil, with which the EU has only the bare bones of bilateral dialogue with no political dimension. This situation is no longer in keeping with Brazil’s rapid development as a global economic and political player. (European Commission, 2005: 17–18) Therefore, an individualised dialogue with Brazil was foreseen, and it was the last of the BRIC countries that constructed this kind of relationship with the EU. Brazil’s historic ties with Portugal helped the establishment of this particular partnership, within a juncture in which Portugal was represented by José Manuel Burão Barroso who occupied the presidency of the European Commission, and it also held the Presidency of the European Council (Ferreira-Pereira, 2016; European Parliament Official, 2017). It was in this context that the Strategic Partnership was signed in Lisbon, 2017. Since then, the EU and Brazil have regularly organised high level summits in order to boost bilateral dialogue. A multitude of sectorial dialogues were also established (31), covering not only topics related to the bilateral agenda but also themes mostly related to multilat­ eral affairs. Since the first meeting in 2007, seven high level summits have been held so far where the parties have summarised the key outcomes produced by the sectorial dialogues. Amongst the topics most discussed are the effects of the economic and financial crises as well as climate change and the sustainable development agenda. In the meantime, two action plans were agreed by the partners refer­ ring to the period 2008–2011 and 2012–2014.4 However, the dynamism of the meetings identified in the first years of the Strategic Partnership has been lost in most recent years. Although the first summits have produced substantial pro­ gress in key multilateral and bilateral issues, the very same achievements were simply restated in the documents agreed in the following summits. Moreover, EU-Brazil relations have suffered from discontinuity issues, exemplified by the fact that no summit was convened in 2012. Subsequently, the political crisis in Brazil5 has also jeopardised this strategic relationship (Blanco and Luciano, 2018). “The political and institutional crisis in 2015 took up much of the gov­ ernment’s time and energy, so whatever was not a priority in foreign policy terms was put on hold. There was no 2015 summit and the 3rd Joint Action Plan has not yet been confirmed” (Saraiva, 2017: 11). As pointed out, political transformations in both the EU and Brazil added to the lack of significant outcomes from EU-MERCOSUR interregionalism, leading to the development of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership. However, the next section will question the assumed complementarity of EU-Brazil

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and EU-MERCOSUR relations, arguing that instead of supporting the development of stronger EU-MERCOSUR relations and the conclusion of EU-MERCOSUR agreement, the Strategic Partnership has negatively impacted the EU-MERCOSUR dialogue and the cohesion of MERCOSUR as a regional bloc, resulting in negative unintended consequences for EU-MERCOSUR interregionalism and MERCOSUR regional integration.

EU-Brazil relations and the unintended consequences to MERCOSUR political integration Although the previous sections traced the transformations of EU’s and Brazil’s foreign policies, which led to the Strategic Partnership, this section addresses what unintended consequences arose from singularising the EU relations with Brazil for the overall EU-MERCOSUR interregional relations. It is argued that the EU-Brazil partnership led to two main unintended consequences to MERCOSUR integration, affecting the broadening of its regional agenda and the cohesion of the bloc over the past years. While the first unintended conse­ quence is the reduction of MERCOSUR’s inter-regional agenda, due to the fact that some topics inserted on EU-Brazil partnership were actually transported from EU-MERCOSUR relations; the second consequence is the increase of fragmentation, rivalry and selectivity issues from other MERCOSUR coun­ tries (Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay), leading to negative perceptions of the individualisation of EU relations with Brazil. Although EU and Brazilian dip­ lomats have never disregarded MERCOSUR, by individualising EU relations with MERCOSUR’s biggest country, they produced negative incentives for the development of the bloc, going in the opposite direction to one of the key nor­ mative goals of EU’s external action since the 1990s, i.e. supporting regional inte­ gration worldwide, and also contradicted Brazil’s definition of MERCOSUR as a foreign policy priority. Thereby, both the EU’s focus on key regional/emerging countries and Brazil’s individual projection at the global level, aspects high­ lighted before, have prevented the development of EU-MERCOSUR relations beyond the commercial agenda in the recent years. These consequences will be demonstrated by a two-fold qualitative assessment: first by comparing the most recent agenda of EU-Brazil and EU-MERCOSUR relations, and then by looking at the reactions of other MERCOSUR members to the impact of EU relations with Brazil for the internal cohesion of MERCOSUR as a bloc. As shown previously, a variety of topics were included in the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership, not only those restricted to the bilateral dimension but also broader themes that refer to the multilateral system such as disarmament and non-proliferation issues as well as UN affairs. In the meantime, EU-MERCOSUR relations have mostly been restrained to the negotiation of a trade agreement, resumed in 2010 and only recently under conclusion. Although a rather ambitious association agreement was proposed at the time when these bi-regional negotia­ tions were launched, aiming to go beyond the trade dimension (Meissner, 2018),

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what we have recently seen in the negotiating agenda is a much more specific agreement, which contains trade elements as its core. This demonstrates that over the past years the EU-MERCOSUR inter-regional agenda has not been ampli­ fied, while the EU-Brazil bilateral agenda has flourished, despite its most recent stalemate. As discussed before, this is a reflection of Brazil’s realisation of its own capabilities to project itself globally, which led the country to invest in develop­ ing individual political relations with global actors such as the EU, leaving trade affairs to be discussed within MERCOSUR. Considering this scenario, what are the implications of the development of the EU-Brazil bilateral agenda since 2007 for the stagnation of the EU-MERCOSUR dialogue? Is there any topic that started to be discussed bi-regionally and was ultimately transported to the EU-Brazil agenda, excluding other MERCOSUR actors from the talks? By posing these questions, this chapter aims to understand whether the development of EU-Brazil agenda unintentionally led to the paral­ ysis of EU-MERCOSUR agenda over recent years, producing inconsistencies between the EU’s strategic interests and interregional principles. It is argued that most of the topics from the multilateral agenda and some of the bilateral themes that the EU started to discuss directly with Brazil could be deliber­ ated with the whole bloc, supporting the transformation of MERCOSUR into a stronger political actor. Additionally, this move would actually reinforce the EU’s own ambitions of itself becoming a more relevant international actor. However, what one currently observes is that due to shifts in their foreign policy strategies, the EU and Brazil preferred to engage in individual relations, set­ ting aside their own goal of supporting regional integration projects. Although ‘supporting MERCOSUR integration’ is expressed as one of the pillars of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership, it has not prevented the marginalisation of EU-MERCOSUR political relations since the establishment of the EU-Brazil partnership. By analysing Table 6.1, which refers to the topics listed in the EU-MERCOSUR interregional framework and to the dialogues developed within the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership, one may observe the overlap of several topics, i.e. areas that were planned to be discussed via the EU-MERCOSUR cooperation, which were progressively transported to the bilateral dialogue with Brazil, excluding other MERCOSUR countries from these deliberations. Thus, from the 30 sectorial dialogues established between the EU and Brazil, half of them were listed before as topics for the EU-MERCOSUR interregional framework. These dialogues – such as the ones on energy, drug trafficking and environmental protection – were first projected to be discussed bi-regionally but were only materialised at the bilateral level with Brazil. The only exception is science and technology, given that the EU signed a bilateral agreement in this area with Argentina in 1999, as well as with Brazil in 2004. On the other hand, multilateral dialogues – such as International Peace and Security, UN General Matters, Disarmament and NonProliferation and Human Rights – were discussed between the EU and Brazil but never envisioned to be discussed within the framework of EU-MERCOSUR

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TABLE 6.1 Topics of EU-MERCOSUR and EU-Brazil relations (New Topics in Bold)

EU-MERCOSUR Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement (Articles 5 to 22) Trade and economic matters Agri-food and industrial standards Customs matters Statistical Matters Intellectual Property Business Investments Energy Transport Science and Technology Telecommunications and Information Technology Environmental protection Training and education Information, communication and culture Combating drug-trafficking

EU-Brazil sectorial dialogues International Peace and Security UN General Matters Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Drug Matters Human Rights Macroeconomic and Financial Financial Services Social Policies and Social Cohesion Clusters, Innovation, Competitiveness and SME Policies Industrial and Regulatory issues Sanitary and Phytosanitary Intellectual Property Rights Competition Issues Regional Policy Dialogue The Environmental Dimension of Sustainable Development Climate Change Energy Agriculture Air Transport Maritime Transport Policy Tourism Science and Technology Disaster Risk Preparedness Space Policy Nuclear Issues Information Society Culture Education Public Sector Governance Statistics

Source: Author’s elaboration, based on Blanco and Luciano, 2018.

interregional relations. Once again, there is only one exception in the area of nuclear energy as the EU signed a cooperation agreement with Argentina (1997). Nonetheless, if instead these themes were discussed via the interregional rela­ tions, they would result in the transformation of MERCOSUR into a more political bloc and a more consistent international actor. Interestingly, only trade and investment issues are topics highlighted in the Interregional Framework that were not explicitly discussed in the EU-Brazil dialogues. This means that both the EU and Brazil assumed that these issues should be exclusively addressed within EU-MERCOSUR relations, reinforcing the notion of MERCOSUR as a solely trade bloc.

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Indeed, this trend shows that Brazil was not interested in turning MERCOSUR into a regional political actor such as the EU has become over the past decades. This implies a tendency that at moments when progress is not likely for MERCOSUR as a unified bloc, Brazil proceeds alone and engages with international partners in multilateral arenas according to its own global ambitions. Even in multilateral trade negotiations, an arena in which a bloc with a commercial vocation such as MERCOSUR should assume a common position, Brazil and Argentina have adopted distinct stances on trade liberalisation (The Economic Times, 2008). Nonetheless, MERCOSUR remains instrumental to Brazilian foreign policy in order to support the stabilisation of South America and to enhance Brazil’s global reputation as a regional leader (Lazarou and Luciano, 2015). When it comes to the EU side, the debate organised by the European Parliament on 25 September 2007 entitled “Negotiations on an Interregional Association Agreement with Mercosur and the new bilateral strategic partnership with Brazil”6 showed evidence that there was a reflection within EU institutions on whether the strategic partnership would undermine EU-MERCOSUR politi­ cal relations. In this context, representatives of both the Council and Commission had to assure parliamentarians that the development of relations with Brazil would not undermine the EU’s promotion of regional integration abroad. In this sense, a representative of the Council emphasised that they “[…] always made it absolutely clear that this strategic partnership which we believe the EU should establish with Brazil in no way excluded or limited other relations which we also wished to extend on the economic and political levels with Mercosur”. Meanwhile, the rep­ resentative of the Commission concurred on offering support to MERCOSUR integration via especial relations with Brazil, stating that: It is even more important to add that the strategic partnership is com­ plementary to overall broader priorities, including cooperation with Latin America and with Mercosur: in the partnership itself, one of the strategic common issues is the promotion of regional integration and an EU-Mercosur Association Agreement. (Figel, 2007: 2) Another unintended consequence is the proliferation of fragmentation, selectiv­ ity and rivalry dynamics within MERCOSUR countries, as they saw the estab­ lishment of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership as having a negative impact on the internal cohesion of MERCOSUR and on their own relationship with the EU. They suggested that “(T)he launch of the EU-Brazil strategic partnership has caused discomfort among Mercosur members, who fear the establishment of political and commercial agreements on a bilateral basis, without their involve­ ment” (Ceia, 2008: 2). Given the diverse political and economic capabilities of each MERCOSUR country, it is interesting to separate the regional repercus­ sions of the EU-Brazil partnership into two parts: on the one hand the reac­ tions from Argentina (second biggest country of MERCOSUR and historical

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geopolitical rival of Brazil), and those of Uruguay and Paraguay (the two smaller countries of the bloc) on the other. As expected, the strongest regional reactions to the EU-Brazil partnership came from Argentina. Christensen (2010) summarised Argentinean reactions to the strategic partnership: How has Argentina reacted to the EU-Brazil strategic partnership? Argentina has been critical towards the differentiated and special treatment given to Brazil by the EU and seems worried of the possibility that the EU and Brazil may celebrate their own trade agreement. This cannot be done as long as Mercosur remains a customs union, however. (Christensen, 2010: 8) In addition, the fact that the other MERCOSUR countries were not consulted or informed about the establishment of the EU-Brazil partnership fostered increas­ ing mistrust within the bloc. “Mercosur’s other members have been forced to accept Brazil’s strategic partnership with the EU, which understandably serves to increase resentment and distrust (especially in Argentina)” (Doctor, 2015: 980). Besides, Argentina also expected that the EU would acknowledge the coun­ try’s own status as a key actor in Latin America. Therefore, Argentineans have also appealed for their own Strategic Partnership with the EU, alongside those set up with Brazil and Mexico7 (van Loon, 2010). However, the EU does not seem interested in establishing additional strategic partnerships in the near future (EEAS Official, 2017), frustrating Argentinean ambitions. Meanwhile, Paraguay and Uruguay have also presented important con­ cerns with the strengthening of EU-Brazil relations. Although both coun­ tries acknowledge the importance of Brazil in the multilateral system and its role in the discussions of several global issues, they were mostly preoccupied with the commercial impacts that the Strategic Partnership would cause to MERCOSUR’s customs union and whether these relations would actually undermine the EU-MERCOSUR trade negotiations by forging an EU-Brazil bilateral trade agreement (Meissner, 2018). On the view of the small countries of MERCOSUR, “The dialogue between the EU and Brazil is not bad, but Brazil has to keep in mind its responsibilities with the bloc” (Mercosur Official, 2018). In contrast to Argentina, which is now requesting the same status of Brazil, these two smaller economies have often questioned MERCOSUR’s preference for negotiating trade agreements as a single bloc, instead supporting Member States’ individual pursuit of trade agreements, not only with the EU but also with other countries such as the United States and China (Santander, 2010). These political dynamics observed since the signing of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership have shown that the strengthening of EU bilateral relations with Brazil has resulted in unintended negative consequences for MERCOSUR integration, in fact reinforcing a tendency towards bilateralising relations with MERCOSUR countries instead of supporting the constitution of this bloc as a

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stronger international/regional actor, especially when it comes to its relations with third actors/regions. By departing from the discussions on unintended con­ sequences of EU’s foreign policy and interregionalism (Burlyuk, 2017; LopezLucia and Mattheis in this volume), this chapter stressed the impact of EU-Brazil relations on EU-MERCOSUR political relations. As EU and Brazilian actors have not expressly aimed to undermine MERCOSUR’s internal cohesion but instead considered that they were supporting MERCOSUR regional integration by reinforcing ties with Brazil (EEAS Official, 2017; ABC Color, 2007), one may see the discussed consequences of EU-Brazil relations to MERCOSUR as unin­ tended and anticipated, given that they have at least reflected upon this alterna­ tive. Considering the two consequences mentioned in this section (restriction of the thematic agenda and fragmentation issues), one may argue that the Strategic Partnership has indeed produced negative effects for EU-MERCOSUR rela­ tions and MERCOSUR integration. Nonetheless, the fact that trade negotia­ tions are still moving on, albeit with some difficulties, means that the EU-Brazil bilateral relations have not completely undermined EU-MERCOSUR relations, but may have restrained these dialogues to the commercial level. Last but not least, there are important reasons for these unintended conse­ quences from both the EU and the Brazilian sides. As highlighted in the previous section, the foreign policy changes conducted by the EU and Brazilian actors over the 2000s may explain why the EU and Brazil agreed to move on from EU-MERCOSUR interregionalism to EU-Brazil bilateral relations, undermin­ ing the development of MERCOSUR as a political bloc. In this case, blocto-bloc/pure interregionalism and bilateralism/hybrid forms of interregionalism (Baert, Scaramagli, and Söderbaum, 2014; Mattheis and LITSEGARD, 2018; Lopez-Lucia and Mattheis in this volume) have been developing as competing paths with regard to the EU’s external action towards the Southern Cone, some­ thing which has not been acknowledged by EU bureaucrats when they refer to EU’s relationship with the region. Instead, they rather blame Brazil or other neighbouring countries such as Argentina and more recently Venezuela for the setbacks to MERCOSUR integration. Henceforth, as argued by this case study and as observed elsewhere (Stevens, 2006), privileging bilateralism – i.e. deeply relating to key countries from specific regions – may in fact affect the promotion of the EU’s own principles, such as deepening regional integration initiatives, at the interregional level. As observed by Santander (2010: 8), ‘this shift may deprive the EU of a foreign policy instrument (interregionalism) that she has called on over the last 20 years to build its international identity and increase its visibility, legitimacy and ability to project itself as an international actor’.

Conclusion This chapter aimed to unveil the unintended consequences of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership for the development of EU-MERCOSUR cooperation beyond its commercial agenda. By first tracing EU’s and Brazil’s foreign policy

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changes over the 2000s, and secondly examining the content of the inter-regional agenda and the reactions of other MERCOSUR countries to the EU’s strate­ gic relations with Brazil, this chapter has stressed that the EU’s external perfor­ mance in this particular case has been inconsistent in terms of supporting its own normative standards. In fact, the strengthening of bilateral relations with Brazil has negatively impacted the EU-MERCOSUR dialogue and MERCOSUR regional integration. It has transported bilateral and multilateral issues that could be discussed via interregional dialogue to the EU-Brazil bilateral agenda, as well as fostering rivalry and fragmentation within MERCOSUR countries, which are not certain if the ongoing EU-Brazil relations are beneficial to MERCOSUR as a regional bloc. In this sense, the preference of the EU external action to strengthen bilateral relations with a key regional actor – grounded on the notion of Principled Pragmatism – has not necessarily contributed to the development of MERCOSUR as a regional integration project. Besides, one may question whether MERCOSUR is still considered as a priority in Brazil’s foreign policy. This chapter aimed to contribute to a better assessment of the EU’s foreign policy towards other regions of the globe. This tension between pure and hybrid versions of interregionalism in EU external relations may not be exclusive to Latin America and the Southern Cone, and could even go beyond the research on EU’s external affairs (introduction of this book). For instance, the EU has devel­ oped similar inconsistencies in Africa, when strategic relations established with key regional powers as South Africa may also produce unintended consequences to the deepening of regional initiatives such as the South African Development Community (SADC). Therefore, as stated by Burlyuk (2017), understanding in a more comprehensive way how EU external policies might produce more com­ plex, multidimensional and even inconsistent outcomes is essential if we wish to manage and mitigate negative unintended effects and maximise the positive ones, aiming to safeguard instruments such as bloc-to-bloc interregionalism. Interestingly, at the same time as the political and institutional crises of Brazil paralysed its dialogue with the EU, the EU-MERCOSUR trade negotiations are once again moving on, mostly because of other MERCOSUR countries, in particular Argentina. The “agreement in principle”, reached regarding the Association Agreement between the two blocs in 2019, could possibly renovate EU-MERCOSUR relations. On the other hand, if the inter-regional dialogue remains restrained to the trade level, it would in fact contribute to the stigmati­ sation of MERCOSUR’s vocation as a mere trade bloc.

Notes 1 This regionalist approach, hegemonic in the 1990s, assumed that ‘regional agree­ ments will in practice be building blocks for further global liberalization rather than stumbling blocks that deter such progress’ (Bergsten, F. 1997. Open Regionalism. The World Economy, 20(5): 1. 2 Acronym created by economist Jim O’Neill in 2001 to refer to Brazil, Russia, India and China, at that point seen as key emerging economies. In the following years,

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these countries have formalised ‘BRIC’ as a grouping through the establishment of regular summits. Later on, South Africa was added to the group, which was thus renamed as ‘BRICS’. All the translations of interviews in this chapter are the author’s own. More details on the content of the EU-Brazil Summits and key documents related to the Strategic Partnership are available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ brazil/7348/o-brasil-e-ue_pt Date accessed: 11 February, 2018. On December 2015, an impeachment process was started against President Dilma Rousseff, which resulted in her removal from Presidency on 31 August, 2016. Since its beginning, the conduct of the impeachment procedure has led to political insta­ bility and polarisation of the country, affecting Brazil’s international activism and reputation. A full transcrition of the debate organised by the EP is available at: http://www.europarl. europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20070925+ITEM­ 011+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=ENDate accessed: 9 October 2018. More recently, there have been talks on whether Argentina should also become an EU Strategic Partner. See: http://www.telam.com.ar/notas/201703/182877-union­ europea-argentina-socio-estrategico.html Date accessed: 11 February, 2018.

Bibliography Journal articles Blanco, Luis Fernando and Bruno T. Luciano. 2018. Understanding EU’s Strategic Partnerships in Latin America: A Comparative Assessment of EU-Brazil and EU-Mexico Relations. Journal of Contemporary European Studies 26(4): 459–472. Burlyuk, Olga. 2017. The ‘Oops!’ of EU Engagement Abroad: Analyzing Unintended Consequences of EU External Action. Journal of Common Market Studies 55(5): 1009–1025. Ceia, Eleonora. 2008. The New Approach of the European Union Towards Mercosur: What is Behind the Launch of the Strategic Partnership with Brazil and What are Its Chances of Being Effective? Studia Diplomatica 61(4): 81–96. Diez, Thomas. 2013. Normative Power as Hegemony. Cooperation and Conflict. 48(2): 194–210. Doctor, Mahrukh. 2015. Interregionalism’s Impact on Regional Integration in Developing Countries: the Case of Mercosur. Journal of European Public Policy 22(7): 967–984. Dri, Clarissa. 2010. Limits of Institutional Mimesis of the European Union: The Case of the Mercosur Parliament. Latin American Policy 1(1): 52–74. Ferreira-Pereira, Laura. 2016. The European Union’s Partnership Policy Towards Brazil: More Than Meets the Eye. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 29(1): 3–17. Lazarou, Elena and Bruno T. Luciano. 2015. Regionalism as an Instrument: Assessing Brazil’s Relations With Its Neighbourhood. Global Society 29(3): 390–408. Lenz, Tobias. 2013. EU normative Power and Regionalism: Ideational Diffusion and Its Limits. Cooperation and Conflict 48(2): 211–228. Lessa, Antonio Carlos. 2010. Brazil’s Strategic Partnerships: An Assessment of the Lula Era (2003–2010). Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 53(1): 115–131. Malamud, Andrés. 2011. A Leader without Followers? The Growing Divergence between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy. Latin American Politics and Society 53(3): 1–24.

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Manners, Ian. 2002. Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms? Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2): 235–258. Mariano, Karina and Bruno T. Luciano. 2019. The Parliamentarization of EU Trade Policy: Unveiling the European Parliament’s Involvement in EU-MERCOSUR Trade Negotiations. European Politics and Society 20(5): 591–608. Meissner, Katharina. 2018. Resorting to Bilateralism: the EU, MERCOSUR, and the Strategic Partnership with Brazil. Journal of European Integration 40(1): 51–66. Merton, Robert. 1936. The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action. American Sociological Review 1(6): 894–904. Pierson, Paul. 1996. The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis. Comparative Political Studies 29(2): 123–63. Renard, Thomas. 2016. Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism? Assessing the Compatibility Between EU Bilateralism (inter-regionalism and multilateralism). Cambridge Review of International Affairs 29(1): 18–35. Saraiva, Miriam. 2017. The Brazil-European Union Strategic Partnership, from Lula to Dilma Rousseff: A Shift of focus. Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 60(1): 1–17. Stevens, Cristopher. 2006. The EU, Africa and Economic Partnership Agreements: Unintended Consequences of Policy Leverage. The Journal of Modern African Studies 44(3): 441–458. Tocci, Nathalie. 2017. From the European Security Strategy to the EU Global Strategy: Explaining the Journey. International Politics 54(1): 487–502. Vigevani, Tullo and Haroldo Ramanzini Jr. 2009. Brasil en el centro de la integración: Los cambios internacionales y su influencia en la percepción brasileña de la inte­ gración. Nueva Sociedad 219: 76–96.

Monographs Baert, Francis; Tiziana Scaramagli and Fredrik Söderbaum. 2014. Intersecting Interregionalism: Regions, Global Governance and the EU. Dordrecht: Springer. Mattheis, Frank and Andréas Litsegard. 2018. Interregionalism Across the Atlantic Space. Springer. Telò, Mario. 2006. Europe: A Civilian Power? London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Official documents Council of the European Union. 2003. A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy. Brussels. December. EU-Brazil Joint Action Plan. 2008. 2nd Brazil-European Union Summit. Rio de Janeiro. 22 Dec. European Commission. 2005. A Stronger Partnership between the European Union and Latin America. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council. COM (2005) 636. Brussels. 8 December. European Commission. 2006. Global Europe: Competing in the World. A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy. European Commission. 2007. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Towards an EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership. COM(2007) 281 final. Brussels. 30 July. European Commission. 2019. EU and Mercosur Reach Agreement on Trade. Press Release. Brussels. 28 June.

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High Representative of the EU. 2016. European Union Global Strategy. Brussels. June.

Online resources ABC Color. 2007. Satisface al Brasil una alianza estratégica con Unión Europea. 2 June. Available at: http://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/internacionales/satisface-al­ brasil-una-alianza-estrategica-con-union-europea-985767.html Accessed on: 5 February 2018. Agência Brasil. 2016. Mercosul e União Europeia trocam ofertas para acordo em Bruxelas. 11 May. Available at: http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/economia/noticia/2016-05/ mercosul-e-uniao-europeia-trocam-ofertas-para-acordo-em-bruxelas Accessed on: 5 October 2018. Figel, Ján. 2007. Intervention at the parliamentary debate on the ‘Negotiations on an Interregional Association Agreement with Mercosur and the New Bilateral Strategic Partnership with Brazil’. European Parliament, 25 September, Strasbourg. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP// TEXT+CR E+20 070925+ITEM- 011+DOC+X M L+V0//EN&lang uage =EN Accessed on: 9 October 2018. The Economic Times. 2008. Brazil’s WTO Stance Creating Tension in Mercosur: Argentina. Jul 26. Available at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/ brazils-wto-stance-creating-tension-in-mercosur-argentina/articleshow/3283199. cms Accessed on: 1 October 2018.

Interviews Mercosur official. 2018. Interview Conducted in February 2018 in Montevideo. European Parliament Official. 2017. Interview Conducted in February 2018 in Brussels. EEAS official. 2017. Interview Conducted in February 2017 in Brussels.

Other Christensen, Steen. 2010. Argentina and Brazil’s Relations to the EU. Paper presented at CCIS workshop: Competing or Complementary? Multiple and Overlapping Integration and Cooperation Schemes Within Regions. Aalborg University. Working paper. Gratius, Susanne. 2010. The EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership: Everything But Trade? World Commerce Review. September. Working paper. Meissner, Katharina. 2015. Living in a Material World: Comparing the EU’s Foreign Trade Policy Towards South America and Southeast Asia. Comparative Regional Integration Seminar Series, EUI, Florence. Working paper. June. Santander, Sebastian. 2010. EU-LA Relations: From Interregionalism to Bilateralism? Working Paper 29, Programa de América Latina, CAEI. Working paper. Van Loon, Aukje 2010. The EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership: From Interregional Favouritism to Bilateral Bias and Back? Paper Prepared for the 2nd ‘Bamberger Sommerworkshop zur Vergleichenden Regionalismusforschung’. Working paper.

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7 THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION IN WEST AFRICA-EU RELATIONS BEYOND THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE Friedrich Plank Introduction Studies on regional powers, regionalism and regional institutions are increasingly gaining relevance (Acharya, 2014; Börzel and Risse, 2016; Söderbaum, 2016). This reflects the fact that the prolific research agenda on regionalism has also been driven by the empirical phenomenon of interactions between Regional Organisations (ROs) and the complex web of interregional relations that strongly shape international rela­ tions, which has emerged in the last decades. Moreover, the number and scope of policy fields addressed by interregional relations has equally increased to cover a more diverse set (Telò, 2015: 74). Security challenges perceived as spreading over the bor­ ders of states and regions such as terrorism, regional conflicts and migration require interregional cooperation. Although the web of region-to-region cooperation has grown considerably in scope and intensity with the mushrooming of regionalism in the 1990s, interregional security cooperation is particularly relevant in the context of Africa-European Union (EU) relations. Since 2003, the EU has given substantial support to African capacity building in the security sector, and the partners have con­ ducted operations jointly, for example, in Somalia or the Central African Republic. Consequently, security has been ‘inter-regionalised’ within the partner­ ship between Africa and the EU (Haastrup, 2013a: 59). The Africa-EU part­ nership on peace and security is specifically implemented between the EU and the African Union (AU) in cooperation with the various Regional Economic Communities (RECs) on the African continent. In this regard, the partnership specifically focuses on capacity building, knowledge transfer and coordinated activities within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which focuses on the AU as main continental body in the field of peace and security in Africa. However, regional arrangements that were not created within this framework, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

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or the G5 Sahel, have also emerged as security actors. The EU has increasingly fostered new interregional relations with these entities. Although research has examined the scope (Haastrup, 2013a; 2013b), types of actorness (Carbone, 2013b), external influence (Brosig, 2011; Muntschick, 2017) and norm diffusion (Lenz, 2012) in the context of Africa-EU relations, our knowledge with regards to three rather important aspects of interregional relations remains limited: (1) Despite recent efforts to assess the objectives of cooperation between African ROs and the EU (Plank, 2017; Rodt and Okeke, 2013) and analyses of the new interregionalisms between the EU and the G5 Sahel and MNJTF (Bagoyoko, 2019; Dieng, 2019; Gnanguênon, 2019), the unin­ tended consequences of these partnerships have been barely investigated (LopezLucia and Mattheisin this volume). Although the partners seek to achieve specific objectives, we can identify unintended consequences of the enhanced cooper­ ation. In general, external interventions imply normative expectations or spe­ cific objectives the partners might have. However, these intended exchanges and interventions can often produce completely unplanned effects or generate pro­ cesses that actors did not intend. Although there have been explicit and implicit attempts to put in focus unintentional effects in EU external affairs (Börzel and Pamuk, 2012; Burlyuk, 2017; Dimitrakopoulos, 2001; Plank and Niemann, 2017; Stevens, 2006), research on interregional security cooperation has not systemati­ cally analysed the specific effects of unintended consequences. Moreover, (2) most of the scholarship in EU external affairs frames the subject in terms of success, which often implies that specific goals of the EU have been achieved. Whereas the goals of the partners of the EU’s external engagement are relevant objectives to study (Plank, 2017: 494), analyses that frame EU external performance tend to neglect the broader implications of EU policies (Burlyuk, 2017: 1009). In this regard, how these unintended consequences affect the Africa-EU partnership has been barely interrogated. Finally, (3) new interregional relations of the EU beyond the AU and the RECs, such as those with the G5 Sahel or the MNJTF, have barely been brought into focus by scholars. Consequently, the effects of the unintended consequences of these interregionalisms on the Africa-EU partner­ ship more generally have not been analysed so far, although these developments constitute a growing dimension in the relations between the two continents. Acknowledging these research gaps and the emergence of new interregional layers within Africa-EU relations, this study embarks on analysing the unin­ tended consequences of the EU’s new interregional ties with the G5 Sahel and the MNJTF and in particular their effects on the more traditional interregional relations within the framework of the APSA that the EU maintains in West Africa. As such, it engages with bilateral interregionalism (ECOWAS-EU), which is being increasingly confronted with hybrid interregionalism (G5-EU, LCBC-EU) in the same region (see Lopez-Lucia and Mattheis in this volume). Instead of drawing on preconceived theoretical assumptions, this chapter exam­ ines unintended consequences of these relations inductively and seeks to ana­ lyse potential implications that arise from these effects as part of an unintended

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Unintended consequences 127 TABLE 7.1 Intentions of interregional and regional actors in West Africa

Actor

West Africa-EU partnership

European Union (EU)

G5 Sahel

• Fight terrorism • Fight human trafficking and drug trafficking • Restoration of G5 Sahel-EU state authority • Fight • Facilitate Reference to G5 insecurity in humanitarian • Fight against Sahel action terrorism • Fight terrorism • Generate • Address illegal • Restoration of international state authority migration support to G5 • Reform efforts Reference to LCBC Security • Fight Boko Sector of Sahel Haram countries • Coordination

Intentions • Promote peace and stability • Support of regional initiatives

• Strengthen international visibility • African ownership • Reduction of migration

LCBC • Create secure environment • Facilitate stabilisation programs and humanitarian aid • Fight against Boko Haram • Generate international support for MNJTF

LCBC-EU • Fight Boko Haram • Coordination

complex leading to direct and indirect effects on the partnerships. I propose that such an inductive approach leaves enough room for tracing unintended con­ sequences, while a rather deductive approach might not provide for sufficient space. I specifically place an emphasis on the EU’s engagement in West Africa. This is put into practice by using a wide range of data including case-specific media reports, official documents, interregional partnership agreements and joint decision documents of the regulatory bodies of the West Africa-EU relationship. In addition, I refer to 27 semi-structured expert interviews with decision makers and independent experts conducted in Africa and Europe (see Table 7.1). The chapter is divided into five sections. I will outline the partnership between the EU and West Africa in the field of peace and security, assess the objectives of the West Africa-EU partnership, analyse new regional arrangements in the West Africa-EU relations, examine unintended consequences and conclude with a discussion of the findings.

The Africa-EU partnership on peace and security and the EU’s new interregionalisms in West Africa The EU’s relations with other regions have grown considerably in quantity and quality. The increased relevance of these partnerships has also attracted the attention of academics, and there have been substantial efforts made to analyse interregional

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cooperation (Baert, Scaramagli, Söderbaum, 2014; Hänggi, Roloff, and Rüland, 2006; Rüland et al., 2008; Söderbaum, Stalgren, and Van Langenhove, 2005; Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert, 2015) and Africa-EU relations in particular as a highly institutionalised and comprehensive instance (Carbone, 2013a; Haastrup, 2013b; Mangala, 2013; Muntschick, 2017). Quite a number of ROs and regional groups have been established in Africa in the last decades. Concurrently, with the mushrooming of African regionalism and the increasing development of EU external affairs in particular since the treaties of Maastricht and Lisbon, the EU’s engagement in Africa has grown. Despite originally focusing on development, Africa-EU relations increasingly centre on security issues with the signature of subsequent agreements, in particu­ lar the Cotonou Agreement (2000) and its revisions in 2005 and 2010. Another novelty in Africa-EU relations has been the attempt of the EU to pursue a common approach to Africa for instance outlined in the EU’s Africa Strategy (European Union, 2005). In this strategy, the EU committed itself to addressing Africa as ‘one entity’ and agreed to ‘further reinforce the basic principles that govern this relationship, most prominently equality, partnership and ownership’ (European Union, 2005). During the second EU-Africa Summit in December 2007, the partners finally yielded the Joint Africa EU Strategy ( JAES) (European Union and African Union, 2007b), which has laid the foundation for a long-term strategic partnership setting out specific targets (EU_MS 2.EU Member State Representative, 2015). Africa-EU security cooperation is embedded in the APSA as the main struc­ ture implementing policies dealing with peace and security on the continent. Based on the AU as continental body and the RECs as sub-regional bodies, the APSA lays out the main instruments of these regional groups in the field of peace and security. It is meant as a structure that provides for peace and security on the continent and lays the foundation for ‘African solutions to African prob­ lems’. It incorporates a political decision-making body, the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which legitimises and coordinates the other elements such as the Panel of the Wise, an African Standby Force or the African Peace Fund. Main components of the APSA such as the standby forces are still under construction. Hence, the dependency of the African partners on external funding is still high, which is why the EU plays a major role in Africa (Williams, 2014: 150). Within the framework of the APSA, the AU is tasked with the coordination of highlevel organisation. However, the structure heavily relies on the support by the RECs of the five regions (North, South, East, West and Central). These regions should each provide a standby force, contribute one member to the Panel of the Wise, establish early warning systems and implement the APSA in the regions. In this regard, the EU has also developed strong interregional ties to some of the RECs, in particular those who have developed a rather high and ambitious mandate in peace and security. As such, ECOWAS, for instance, as the main body of the EU’s efforts in West Africa has been traditionally at the centre of the EU’s attention towards

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interregional cooperation. The RO which has a proven track record in peace and security already conducted peace operations, influenced the development of the APSA considerably and has emerged as an important security actor in West Africa (Piccolino and Minou, 2014: 116). ECOWAS which was founded by the Lagos agreement in 1975 includes 15 states in West Africa as mem­ bers. Originally, the main focus of ECOWAS was to become a customs union and a common market. With reference to regional conflicts in West Africa, ECOWAS increasingly strengthened its competences and capacities in the security realm and has intervened in crises such as those in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali or recently in the Gambia. With the multiple conflicts and crises in West Africa and the Sahel region, the EU has increasingly acknowledged the security-driven regionalism of ECOWAS (Piccolino and Minou, 2014: 117). Dialogue between the EU and ECOWAS started in 2000 with the first ministerial meeting in Abuja, and since then the partners have cooperated on a multitude of conflict-related areas. The EU’s support for ECOWAS has been channelled through the Regional Indicative Programs (RIPs) and within the framework of the African Peace Facility (APF), which was established in 2003 and has since then developed to become the key mechanism for implementing Africa-EU cooperation on peace and security. African regionalism and the APSA specifically are shaped by a multitude of organisations. The five regions designated by the AU for the implementation of the APSA do not correspond directly with the eight RECs. Moreover, in recent years, new regional groups have been established without being recog­ nised as RECs within the APSA framework. In this regard, these ad hoc projects act beyond the existing peace and security frameworks in Africa. There are in particular two striking examples of this phenomenon in West Africa: (1) the MNJTF in the Lake Chad region and (2) the G5 Sahel. When confronted with the Boko Haram uprising which poses a threat to the Lake Chad region due to its transnational character (Maiangwa, 2014: 19), there were generally three options available for the affected states including Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger. Given its strong security profile, ECOWAS would have been one option for tackling the threat posed by Boko Haram in a con­ certed effort. The AU, which has managed security challenges such as in the Central African Republic in the past, would have been another option for how to engage with the transnational threat of Boko Haram in a multilateral manner. However, the MNJTF under the umbrella of the rather unknown Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) has been tasked by the affected states with fighting against Boko Haram. This is rather puzzling since the use of ECOWAS would have been most likely for this purpose due to its relative capacity. Conversely, the choice of the LCBC is quite surprising, given the (alternative) presence of the AU and ECOWAS, which both have an extensive track record in the security realm and, conversely, the low profile and degree of integration the LCBC previously had in this area (Henneberg and Plank, 2019).

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In the Sahel-region, the G5 Sahel has emerged as another ad hoc regional entity that is not explicitly embedded in the APSA. The regional group is a joint project undertaken by the five countries of the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad), which was created in 2014. Whereas the group described itself as a multidimensional grouping with a strong development com­ ponent, this aspect has gradually moved into the background and the G5 has turned its attention to security. As a consequence, in February 2017, the G5 initiated the G5 joint force which is tasked with tackling security challenges in the region. In particular, France and the EU have backed the force and played a significant role in its establishment (International Crisis Group, 2017: 4). Indeed, France has been a major driver behind the creation of the force, also through military cooperation between the French Operation Barkhane and Sahelian mil­ itaries (Griffin, 2016; Diallo, 2018; Desgrais, 2018). This support is linked to substantial funding of the group by the EU through various channels such as the APF, the Trust Fund for Africa and through other instruments of its development policy tools. Moreover, it might be linked to growing European interest in con­ trolling and decreasing migration from and through the Sahel region to the EU. Both groups constitute recent ad hoc projects that have increasingly emerged in Africa, and in particular in West Africa (AU 1. AU Official, 2017). However, the initiation of these groups as new developments has also affected West Africa-EU relations in peace and security more generally. The next section points to the intentions of these new interregionalisms in this field and assesses their unintended consequences.

Intentional and unintentional processes in West Africa-EU security cooperation In order to assess unintentional consequences of the pursuit of new interre­ gionalisms with the G5 Sahel and the MNJTF in the peace and security realm, this chapter proposes to firstly examine intended objectives towards the part­ nership of the respective partners. As research has already emphasised (Baert, 1991: 202; Burlyuk, 2017: 1013), unpacking the intentions and objectives of the actors involved constitutes an essential step for the study of unintended effects. Therefore, before tracing the unintended consequences of the EU-G5 Sahel and the EU-MNJTF relations, I assess the objectives of the cooperation. Moreover, I also seek to assess the individual goals of the EU, the G5 Sahel and the MNJTF. As such, this study argues that region-to-region cooperation constitutes a twosided affair with specific objectives on both sides of the partnership. The objec­ tives of the partnership might then differ from those expressed by the partners, for instance since they are formulated in broader manner. Although analyses of effectiveness in international relations tend to miss unin­ tended effects, they can help us with regard to the objectives. In general, the examination and aggregation of goals has been a major attempt in various studies since goal achievement constitutes a relevant variable in terms of measuring the

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performance of an actor’s action (Niemann and Bretherton, 2013; Van Schaik, 2013; Young, 1994). This part will thus examine the goals as a complex of inten­ tions expressed by the actors (Baert, 1991: 202). This assessment will be based on official documents and interview data. Afterwards, I seek to assess the unintended consequences of the new interre­ gional relations, which the EU and African regional arrangements have devel­ oped. As Baert has rightly noted (Baert, 1991: 202), it might be difficult to assess unintended consequences given the problem of linking events to specific conse­ quences. In addition, it might be challenging to identify relevant consequences and distinguish them from less relevant ones. In this analysis, I try to tackle these challenges by providing a detailed examination of the intentions expressed by the actors and by reflecting particularly on whether unintended consequences have been identified as relevant by policy-makers and research. Finally, I assume that unintended consequences are not necessarily undesirable or negative and reflect on analytical challenges associated with this assumption in the conclusion. In contrast, they might bring along desired or neutral benefits for some of the actors involved (Baert, 1991: 204; Burlyuk, 2017: 1013; Kohstall, 2010: 31).

The intentions of new interregionalisms within Africa-EU relations On a general level, the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security identifies priority actions for enhancing peace and security in Africa (European Union and African Union, 2007a: 2) as the broad objectives of the partnership. The RIPs have laid out more specific objectives for the partnership. The latest 2014–2020 RIP sets out two specific objectives within the priority area peace and security: (1) strengthening mechanisms to promote peace and stability as well as postcrisis operations; through four components, the EU seeks to build capacity and develop the expertise of ECOWAS. (2) The second main objective focuses on the support of regional initiatives, primarily developed by ECOWAS, to address security threats and challenges (European Commission, 2014: 7). Overall, the budget stands at €1.15 billion while €250 million are specifically dedicated to peace and security. Although the EU’s focus on ECOWAS as main security actor in the region is repeatedly emphasised within the 2014–2020 RIP (European Commission, 2014: 16–21), Brussels has increasingly advanced its engagement in the region in collaboration within new interregional ties: G5 Sahel-EU coop­ eration and LCBC-EU cooperation focusing specifically on the MNJTF in the Lake Chad region. However, both the EU and the ad hoc groups G5 Sahel and MNJTF have developed specific objectives that are not explicitly expressed in documents such as the RIP. With regard to EU-West Africa relations, the EU and particu­ larly the European External Action Service (EEAS) as a political body engaged in the Africa-EU partnership intent to focus on strengthening its international agency and visibility (Rodt and Okeke, 2013: 221; EU 5. EU Official 2015). The

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interregional engagement of the EU in general can also be related to establish ‘security by proxy’ (Nivet 2006; EU_MS 1.EU Member State Representative, 2015) and African ownership in peace and security issues as an aim of the EU (EU 1. EU Official, 2015; EU 2. EU Official, 2015). It thus focuses on African partners that engage in crisis management instead of European efforts, the latter mostly being limited to training missions in the region. A more recent goal of the EU in West Africa is the reduction of migration to the EU. The recently enhanced efforts of the EU in the Sahel region which seek to limit migration to Europe have been intensified through the Sahel strategy and the EU Emergency Trust Fund. Limiting migration to Europe has become a major objective of EU member states and the European Commission in Africa (AU 1. AU Official, 2017; ECOWAS 1. ECOWAS Official, 2017; EU 12. EU Official, 2017; EU 20. EU Official, 2018). Moreover and with reference to the G5 Sahel, the EU seeks to fight terrorism and to contribute to an effective restoration of state authority in the region (European Commission, 2019). In the context of its relations with the LCBC, the EU has the goals of fighting the terrorist movement Boko Haram and to enable the states in the region to provide for a secure environment (EU 12. EU Official, 2017). The G5 Sahel has formulated specific intentions as outlined in the concept of operations of its joint force: to fight terrorism, drug trafficking and human traf­ ficking, to contribute to a restoration of state authority, to facilitate humanitarian aid and to contribute to development policy in the region (African Union, 2017). In addition, the force aims to generate international support for its efforts. The paucity of resources has been a major challenge throughout engagements in West Africa (EU_MS 6.EU Member State Representative, 2017; UN 2. UN Official, 2017; ECOWAS 1.ECOWAS Official, 2017; ECOWAS 2.ECOWAS Official, 2017), specifically with reference to military operations (AU_MS 1.AU Member State Representative, 2017; AU_MS 2.AU Member State Representative, 2017; EU 11. EU Official, 2017), and the G5 Sahel has repeatedly called for financial support for its actions (G5 Sahel, 2019), which have officially been estimated at €423 million (Desgrais 2018, 217). As outlined in the EU-G5 Sahel roadmap and the five ministerial meetings that have taken place so far, the partnership intends to engage in action against insecurity in the region and to fight terror­ ism, address illegal migration, reform the security sector in the G5 states, provide for dialogue formats also involving single communities and coordinate closely on the ground (G5 Sahel and European Union, 2016; 2019; 2018). The MNJTF, under the umbrella of the LCBC, intends to create a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by Boko Haram, to reduce violence against civilians, to facilitate stabilisation programs in the areas occupied from Boko Haram and to facilitate humanitarian aid (African Union, 2015). The force is mandated to conduct offensive military operations in the Lake Chad region against the terrorist group. Moreover, with the MNJTF dependent on external funding, one objective refers to predicable support for the operation (Assanvo, Abatan, and Sawadogo, 2016: 8–9). The partnership established between the LCBC and the EU in the context of the fight against Boko Haram seeks specifically to fight Boko

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Haram and to coordinate accordingly in order to achieve the objectives of the partners (Delegation of the European Union to the African Union, 2017). In sum, we can identify the intentions of the partners involved in these new interregionalisms, which target both conflict-related objectives and the general goals of the Africa-EU partnership. From a general perspective, in the past, the partnership between West Africa and the EU has been quite successful in achiev­ ing some of the objectives. In fact, an enhanced dialogue has been established between actors, a high number and frequency of meetings have evolved, several CSDP missions of the EU and African-led operations have been deployed, and the partners have engaged in coherent positions for instance on the political crisis in Mali 2012 (Plank, 2020). However, this intensity and output has been par­ ticularly achieved with ECOWAS as the main regional body, as emphasised in the Regional Indicative Plan and embedded in the APSA. For instance, specific focal points (ECOWAS 1.ECOWAS Official, 2017), daily contact also with the inclusion of ECOWAS member state representatives (AU_MS 3.AU Member State Representative, 2017) and a professional working level established between staff from both organisations (EU_MS 6.EU Member State Representative, 2017), have been mentioned. Although challenges such as the development of the Standby Force still remain (EU 9. EU Official, 2017; EU 12. EU Official, 2017; CS 5.Independent Expert, 2017), ECOWAS used to be perceived as major hub for West Africa-EU cooperation. In contrast to the prominent role of ECOWAS, ad hoc mechanisms such as the G5 Sahel and the MNJTF have increasingly gained the attention of the EU: ‘The priority given to ECOWAS by the EU in the field of peace and security in the last two decades seems to have vanished’ (Lopez-Lucia, 2019: 48). The following section particularly focuses on the unin­ tended consequences of these new interregionalisms and argues that unintended effects impact specifically the more traditional Africa-EU partnership on peace and security embedded in the APSA.

Unintended consequences emanating from interregionalism beyond the APSA Some implications that arise from interregionalism beyond the APSA as outlined in the previous sections might reflect unintended consequences. The initiation of regional ad hoc groups such as the MNJTF and the G5 Sahel has (1) led to competi­ tion and undermined traditional channels of cooperation, (2) limited the efficiency of the efforts and (3) gives rise to an extraversion-approach by West African elites: First, regional security cooperation beyond the APSA as pushed by regional ad hoc groups has led to competition as an unintended consequence. Notwithstanding the fact that there has also been competition between the AU as the continental body and ECOWAS as the sub-regional REC, for instance in the case of Mali (CS 4.ECOWAS Partner Representative, 2017; ECOWAS 1.ECOWAS Official, 2017; ECOWAS 2.ECOWAS Official, 2017), these conflicts arose within the framework of the APSA, e.g. between the continental body (AU) and the regional

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mechanism (ECOWAS). However, both the MNJTF and the G5 show growing scepticism within the EU towards traditional interregionalisms embedded in the APSA. This has been specifically referred to in the context of the G5 force which has, however, also caused contestation with ECOWAS over the non-inclusivity and less effective structure for addressing problems in the region in contrast to the Nouakchott process, which involves West African and Maghreb states and is legitimatised by the AU (International Crisis Group, 2017: 10). Both with regard to the EU-G5 Sahel relations and within the EU, coordination has been identi­ fied as a major challenge. This specifically applies to the Regional Coordination Cell, which should coordinate activities of the G5 Sahel and cross-border coop­ eration, as well as strengthen capacity building of the states involved. Within the EU bureaucracies and between member states and the EU a number of diverg­ ing interests and views evolved, for instance over control of the CSDP mission deployed in the region (Lopez-Lucia, 2019: 44–45 also EU 16. EU Official, 2018; EU 19. EU Official, 2018; EU 20. EU Official, 2018). Moreover, although the G5 Sahel has been referred to as a smaller organisation in terms of member­ ship (EU 20. EU Official, 2018), the geographical scope of its membership might be too exclusive for tackling the threats of jihadist groups operating in a larger area also involving Libya, Algeria or spreading to the West African coast. In addition, the mandate focuses on the border regions of the G5 Sahel states, not encompassing the security situation, for instance in central Mali (Lopez-Lucia, 2019: 48). Likewise, the engagement of the MNJTF reflects national and sub­ regional preferences, for instance those of Nigeria which favoured engagement in a regional ad hoc group against ECOWAS and the AU. When Ghana put Boko Haram on the agenda at the January 2015 AU summit and the AU decided to commit an 8700-person force, Nigeria quickly restructured the AU force to become a regional one (EU 19. EU Official, 2018). This echoes recent research: [T]he ECOWAS would then have been the rational choice. However, in the light of its external and internal hegemonic aspirations, Nigeria pushed for the use of the LCBC. This approach facilitated keeping the actions against Boko Haram in the Nigerian sphere, since the LCBC executive director, the mission commander, the UN officer in charge and other stakeholders were of Nigerian origin. (Henneberg and Plank, 2019: 16) This meant that Nigeria had more opportunities to keep the issue in Nigerian hands. Both developments might potentially undermine the peace and security frameworks that were created. In the context of these new interregionalisms, the EU risks side-lining established and legitimate ROs in (West) Africa: for instance, “[t]he EU has invested a lot into the development of the ECOWAS Standby Forces and appears to be starting all over again now with the G5JF [ Joint Force]” (Lopez-Lucia, 2019: 49)

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Second, the initiation of ad hoc groups has led to inefficiency of interregional actions as an unintended consequence. Whereas interregional security cooper­ ation has proven to have the potential for effective action (Plank, 2017), and the partners might develop sustainable structures and mechanisms for com­ prehensive action, groups such the MNJTF or the G5 Sahel operate outside the APSA, creating serious obstacles to efficient resource provision (Albert, 2017: 131; Assanvo et al., 2016: 9). For instance, the EU’s €50 million funding of the MNJTF efforts against Boko Haram is channelled through the AU since the group acts beyond the APSA. Within the framework of the APF, a chan­ nelling of the APF funds to the MNJTF via the AU was necessary since the LCBC was institutionally not capable to manage the funds and is not embedded in the APSA as a pre-condition for APF funding (EU 10. EU Official, 2017). This detour has created serious problems for the acquisition of the funds and the coordination between the AU and the MNJTF, which left the force illequipped (EU_MS 10.EU Member State Representative, 2017). More precisely, in case there is a need for specific equipment, the MNJTF makes a formal request to the AU which then delivers this request to the EU Military Service and DG DEVCO. This has created serious challenges like delays in funding or inefficient resource acquisition (EU 10. EU Official, 2017). With regard to the G5 Sahel, the partnership with the EU is less institutionalised, which is typical for ad hoc cooperation. In contrast to various channels of interaction between ECOWAS and the EU such as high level meetings and day-to-day exchanges, the G5 Sahel meetings are open to EU decision-makers but no regular meetings have been established, which undermines the efficiency of cooperation (EU 16. EU Official, 2018). As one interviewee put it: ‘[…] we do create structures that need a lot of time instead of using existing ones’ (EU 23. EU Official, 2019). In fact, these problems seriously hamper the efficiency of the joint efforts since to a large extent, equipment, infrastructure and support have not reached the forces yet (EU 12. EU Official, 2017). The lack of coordination and the fact that the EU’s funding was stocked in Addis Ababa even gave rise to mutual recriminations between the EU and the AU over who to blame for the lack of funding (Delegation of the European Union to the African Union, 2017). Through the fact that the MNJTF operates outside the APSA, the creation of an ad hoc group even decreased the likelihood of managing the fight against Boko Haram efficiently. In addition, creating new structures and building headquarters take time and both forces have not developed sufficient opera­ tional experience (EU_MS 10. EU Member State Representative, 2017; EU 16. EU Official, 2018; EU 25. EU Official, 2019). For instance, the capacity of the G5 Sahel in terms of staff is rather low (EU 19. EU Official, 2018). ‘So far, the G5 Sahel does not have own staff and is clearly member state driven’ (EU 16. EU Official, 2018). As an effect of the rather poorly developed organisational capacities of both regional groups, in contrast to the AU or ECOWAS as part­ ners that have adjusted to procurement processes of the EU through previous cooperation such as in Somalia or Mali (Plank, 2017; 2020), it becomes obvious

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that resource acquisition constitutes a major problem for the efficiency of the efforts. Consequently, both ad hoc groups have been referred to as short-term solutions that are not sustainable (EU 25. EU Official, 2019). Finally, the presence and development of ad hoc groups such as the MNJTF and the G5 Sahel gives rise to an extraversion-approach of states and political elites in West Africa as an unintended consequence. For instance with reference to the enhancement of the MNJTF in the fight against Boko Haram, Nigeria, which has been referred to as an African hegemon (Buzan and Wæver, 2003:  249) or West Africa’s big brother (Adebajo and Mustapha, 2008: 13), might have specific interest both on behalf of its elites as well as towards external actors. These interests, such as resistance against external influence by being depend­ ent on it at the same time or the attempt to exert more control by creating a rather small organisation such as the MNJTF, might seriously undermine regional integration projects and instead strengthen intergovernmental ad hoc engagement. Both the cases of the G5 Sahel and the MNJTF might also reflect a strategy used by (autocratic) political elites to strengthen their position at home through the acquisition of funds (Gnanguênon, 2017: 62). These resources espe­ cially affect the military forces of the countries as important stakeholders. As long as there is funding local governments might be encouraged to ignore the consequences of their actions and non-actions (Dieng, 2019; Tull, 2017: 3). In addition, through the deployment of soldiers to operations supported by the EU, troop contributors might generate equipment, training and the funding of specific stipends, a mechanism that has been frequently observed in the context of international interventions (Brosig, 2017; Murthy, 2007). These funds have also been referred to as additional resources for equipment and military devel­ opment of the military forces (AU_MS 2.AU Member State Representative, 2017; EU 10. EU Official, 2017). Whereas even illicit business has been found as an unintended consequence of peace operations (Andreas, 2009; Aning, 2007), EU funding might particularly facilitate resource acquisition of mili­ tary forces. For instance, a soldier deployed within the G5 Sahel Joint Force or within the MNJTF receives considerably more salary than his comrades paid by the local government (EU 16. EU Official, 2018). In the case of the G5 Sahel, the growing efforts reflect bilateral approaches of Germany, Spain, Italy and France, which opt for a rather nation-interest-based approach for tackling migration challenges or security threats in West Africa instead of cooperating with ECOWAS as a less controllable organisation (AU 1. AU Official, 2017; ECOWAS 1.ECOWAS Official, 2017; EU 23. EU Official, 2019). France is a privileged partner of the G5 Sahel and heavily involved in the funding mecha­ nisms (Diallo, 2018), for instance through French officers within the G5 head­ quarter or by the use of Expertise France, and it has particularly put an emphasis on the group in efforts to rely on well-established bilateral contacts in the Sahel region (AU  5. AU  Official, 2019), instead of including Nigeria as a power­ house within ECOWAS. Moreover, parts of the EEAS, in particular within the

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EU Military Service and DG DEVCO, are also driving this approach, although the initial ‘excitement’ over the G5 Sahel has been replaced by a more realistic approach (EU  20. EU Official, 2018). An interest in regional ad hoc groups emphasised by actors within the interregional partner might then give rise to extraversion-approaches by West African elites. Described as an answer to (previous) perceived failures of the AU and ECOWAS, the new interregionalisms constitute a novel approach of EU efforts in West Africa (EU 24. EU Official, 2019). Interlinked to the unintended conse­ quences identified above, this might seriously undermine the EU’s interregional efforts more generally: So it means, instead of having one main partner, we have 25 fragmented, all of them being at the starting line, waiting for departure and running to catch resources on the other side. (EU 19. EU Official, 2018) The enhancement of hybrid interregionalisms beyond the APSA might then lead to extraversion-approaches by West African elites. Countries disengage from bilateral interregionalism to hybrid forms of interregionalism with the EU since more resources are available through the G5 Sahel or the LCBC. In sum, the three unintended consequences – competition and undermined traditional channels of cooperation, inefficiency and extraversion – constitute an entangled complex of direct and indirect effects of the new interregionalisms. Whereas competition and inefficiency constitute direct effects, extraversion is an indirect effect that emerges subsequently, once interregional settings generate opportunities.

Conclusion Addressing the question of which unintended consequences evolve from the new hybrid interregionalisms pursued in West Africa-EU relations, this study has examined processes that were not intended by the actors. The main findings of this study are that the EU’s relations with the MNJTF in the fight against Boko Haram and the G5 Sahel have also involved unintended consequences that are also undesired from the point of view of the regionalisms involved. This chapter has found: (1) competition between regional groups, (2) less efficient aid and security cooperation and (3) the opportunity to use extraversion-approaches as unintended consequences emanating from interregionalism beyond the APSA. These findings thus coincide with those of other cases in this volume such as fragmentation of regional governance (Ramanzini in this volume) or the under­ mining of interregional structures (Giese in this volume). Some of the unintended consequences highlighted in this chapter could be anticipated by the partners. First, (1) (EU) decision makers might well anticipate

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that African states provide troops in interregional conflict management efforts, whereas European states and the EU provide the funding. Increasingly, EU deci­ sion makers within the EEAS have recognised the resource-driven approach of some troop contributing countries and made use of it in this regard. However, because of the experience with the engagement in Somalia for which the bulk of the EU’s funding for African-led conflict management activities has been spent, the EEAS as well as the Commission increasingly put their emphasis on providing equipment rather than stipends and allowances (EU 9. EU Official, 2017; EU_MS 10.EU Member State Representative, 2017). Second, (2) unin­ tended consequences might reflect a rather bilateral focus in Africa-EU relations more generally. This approach has been enhanced by EU member states such as Germany and France as well as growing European interests in the migration issue. Beyond development and security interests, the initiation of the G5 Sahel is also linked to the migration file and an AU that is less interested in the endeavours to curb migration from Africa to Europe. However, extraversion strategies might also reflect intended enhancement of regional arrangements by African states in order to keep a regional approach to a security challenge under tight control such as in the case of the MNJTF, or in order to catch resources for their own secu­ rity forces such as in the case of the G5 Joint Force. In this respect, unintended consequences might also shift to intended ones once they facilitate achieving altered objectives. Moreover, the effects of unintended consequences could then be well anticipated among European or African decision-makers. Finally, this study argues that there is substantial ground for studies to further embark on this topic. Further analysis could be deepened with regard to whether consequences that are generally unintended might actually reflect intentions of specific actors such as extraversion-strategies applied by certain African elites. Another ave­ nue for research would be to examine the effectiveness associated with ad hoc interregional mechanisms through in-depth case studies that uncover the causal mechanisms at play to explain specific degrees of effectiveness. Lastly, scholars might also investigate the unintended outcomes of security efforts in other inter­ regional contexts, such as in Somalia or the Central African Republic.

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European Union (EU), and African Union (AU). 2007a. Joint Africa EU Strategy. First Joint Action Plan (2008–2010). http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/ files/documents/jaes_action_plan_2008-2010.pdf. European Union (EU), and African Union (AU). 2007b. The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. Available at: http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/ documents/eas2007_ joint_strategy_en.pdf Accessed on 3 July 2020. G5 Sahel. 2019. 5ème Session Ordinaire de La Conférence Des Chefs d’Etat, Ouagadougou. 5 February. Available at: https://admin.g5sahel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ images_Docs_Communiqu%C3%A9_final_sommet_G5S_2019.pdf Accessed on 3 July 2020. G5 Sahel and European Union. 2016. Feuillet de Route. Available at: https://www.g5sahel. org/images/Docs/feuillet_de_route.pdf Accessed on 3 July 2020. G5 Sahel and European Union. 2018. Joint Communiqué: Meeting between the European Union and the Ministers Responsible for Foreign Affairs in the G5 Sahel Countries. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/47860/ joint-communiqu%C3%A9-meeting-between-european-union-and-ministers­ responsible-foreign-affairs-g5_en Accessed on 3 July 2020. G5 Sahel and European Union. 2019. Fifth Ministerial Meeting between the High Representative of the European Union and the Sahel G5 Ministers for Foreign Affairs. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/65464/ fifth-ministerial-meeting-between-high-representative-european-union-and-sahel­ g5-ministers_en Accessed on 3 July 2020.

Online resources Assanvo, William, Jeannine Ella A. Abatan and Wendyam Aristide Sawadogo. 2016. Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram. West Africa Report 19. Dakar: Institute for Security Studies. Available at: https://css.ethz.ch/ content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/ docs/ISS%20Africa%20Assessing%20the%20Multinational%20Joint%20Task% 20Force%20against%20Boko%20Haram.pdf Accessed on 3 July 2020. Bagoyoko, Niagalé. 2019. Le multilatéralisme sécuritaire africain à l’épreuve de la crise sahélienne. Montreal: Université du Québec à Montréal. Available at: https://dandurand.uqam.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Rapport_Bagayoko_ Multilateralisme_Securitaire_Africain.pdf Accessed on 3 July 2020. Gnanguênon, Amandine. 2019. A cooperation of variable geometry. The African Union and Regional Economic Communities. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/15632.pdf Accessed on 3 July 2020. International Crisis Group. 2017. Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Africa Report 258. Brussels: International Crisis Group. Available at: https:// d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/258-finding-the-right-role-for-the-g5-sahel-joint­ force.pdf Accessed on 3 July 2020. Lopez-Lucia, Elisa. 2019. The European Union Integrated and Regionalised Approach towards the Sahel. Montreal: Centre FrancoPaix en résolution des conflits et mis­ sions de paix. Available at: https://dandurand.uqam.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/ 02/2019_02_Report-Lopez-Lucia.pdf Accessed on 3 July 2020. Piccolino, Giulia, and Stephanie Minou. 2014. The EU and Regional Integration in West Africa: What Effects on Conflict Resolution and Transformation? Regionconf

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Working Paper Series 5. Available at: http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/index.php?eID= tx_nawsecuredl&u=0&g=0&t=1421492121&hash=­d 37e60959a972b1569ba15bbc 5803851e0973fe1&file=fileadmin/Uni_Tuebingen/Fakultaeten/SozialVerhalten/ Institut_fuer_Politikwissenschaft/Dokumente/diez/Projekte_Diez_RegioConf/ Pretoria_Feb14_final.pdf Accessed on 3 July 2020. Tull, Denis M. 2017. Mali, the G5 and Security Sector Assistance: Political Obstacles to Effective Cooperation. 52. SWP Comments. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Available at: https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/55731/ssoar­ 2017-tull-Mali_the_G5_and_security.pdf?sequence=1 Accessed on 3 July 2020.

Interviews EU_MS 1. EU Member State Representative 2015. Interview conducted in October 2015 in Brussels. EU_MS 2. EU Member State Representative 2015. Interview conducted in October 2015 in Brussels. EU 1. EU Official. 2015. Interview conducted in October 2015 in Brussels. EU 2. EU Official. 2015. Interview conducted in October 2015 in Brussels. EU 5. EU Official. 2015. Interview conducted in November 2015 by telephone. EU_MS 6. EU Member State Representative 2017. Interview conducted in January 2017 in Cologne. AU_MS 1. AU Member State Representative 2017. Interview conducted in February 2017 in Nairobi. AU_MS 2. AU Member State Representative 2017. Interview conducted in February 2017 in Addis Ababa. EU 9. EU Official. 2017. Interview conducted in March 2017 in Addis Ababa. EU 10. EU Official. 2017. Interview conducted in March 2017 in Addis Ababa. EU 11. EU Official. 2017. Interview conducted in March 2017 in Addis Ababa. UN 2. UN Official. 2017. Interview conducted in March 2017 in Addis Ababa. AU 1. AU Official. 2017. Interview conducted in March 2017 in Addis Ababa. EU_MS 10. EU Member State Representative. 2017. Interview conducted in March 2017 in Addis Ababa. AU_MS 3. AU Member State Representative. 2017. Interview conducted in May 2017 in Abuja. CS 4. ECOWAS Partner Representative. 2017. Interview conducted in May 2017 in Abuja. CS 5. Independent Expert. 2017. Interview conducted in May 2017 in Abuja. ECOWAS 1. ECOWAS Official. 2017. Interview conducted in June 2017 in Abuja. ECOWAS 2. ECOWAS Official. 2017. Interview conducted in June 2017 in Abuja. EU 12. EU Official. 2017. Interview conducted in May 2017 in Abuja. EU 16. EU Official. 2018. Interview conducted in November 2018 in Brussels. EU 19. EU Official. 2018. Interview conducted in November 2018 in Brussels. EU 20. EU Official. 2018. Interview conducted in November 2018 in Brussels. EU 23. EU Official. 2019. Interview conducted in May 2019 in Addis Ababa. EU 24. EU Official. 2019. Interview conducted in May 2019 in Addis Ababa. EU 25. EU Official. 2019. Interview conducted in May 2019 in Addis Ababa. AU 5. AU Official. 2019. Interview conducted in May 2019 in Addis Ababa.

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PART 3

Unintended effects in terms of broader social change

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8 THE SAHEL AS AN UNINTENDED REGION Competing regionalisms and insecurity dynamics Edoardo Baldaro

Introduction The African Sahel1 has gained momentum in the international debate during recent years, where expressions such as “Sahelistan” (Laurent, 2013) or “the cor­ ridor of all dangers” (Zoubir, 2017) have made their appearance to describe a space that is mainly perceived as an (international) security threat. In this region state fragility, terrorist activities, criminal organisations and humanitarian crises presumably coalesce, furthering the idea that the Sahel represents a new and threatening area at the southern borders of Europe. This security narrative tries to intercept – and to reify – a region whose geographical definition and conceptualisation remain fluid. In a sense, the Sahel seems to offer a clear confirmation of Söderbaum’s claim (2015: 18) that regions are not “natural” entities, but they are created, transformed or unmade by collective human initiatives. More specifically, the Sahel represents a region in-the-making, where various actors of different natures are struggling to delineate the boundaries of that space, and to impose a self-serving vision of (geo-)political, economic and social regional order. This overlap of different regional projects and narratives is not new in the area (Mattheis, Luca, and Russo, 2019), nor limited to the case of the Sahel. Over the last decade, “overlapping regionalism” has been at the centre of a discussion involving various scholars, and exploring different areas and regional organisations around the globe (Malamud, 2019; Yeo, 2018). As underlined in the introduction to this volume, this debate has been characterised by the tendency to privilege the analysis of formal agents – primarily states and established regional organisations – in order to question the effects produced by regional overlap on the integration process and the efficiency of regional organisations (Panke and Stapel, 2018). Nevertheless, as observed by Bøås, Marchand and Shaw (2003) – and as underlined by Lopez-Lucia and

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Mattheis (in this volume) – “regional activators” can be formal, informal or both, and their regionalising projects can co-exist, overlap or compete over the same geographical space. Accordingly, disentangling the “politics of defining and redefining the region” (Neumann, 2003: 166) becomes the main analytical aim. Investigating the strategies and the actions of the agents, in fact, represents the best way to grasp the competition around geopolitical meaning and order creation – what Mattheis (2016: 35) would term the “dialectic relationship” between different regionalisms. Starting from these premises, and with the aim of building on the framework of this edited book, this chapter claims that the Sahel represents a privileged point of observation, for exploring the unexpected effects of competing region­ alisms. The different regionalisms at work in the Sahel are influenced by a spe­ cific global security setting – the Global War on Terror – and are shaped by their mutual interaction. The dynamics of violence, conflict and insecurity currently affecting the region can consequently be explained – at least in part – through the lenses of the unexpected and uncontrolled consequences that are produced by the clashes and the exchanges between these competing regional projects. At the same time, reasoning in terms of conflicting regionalisms also allows us to engage with the concept of interregionalism. The definition of interregionalism employed in this chapter relies on a partial re-elaboration of the concept of “bifurcated regionalism” (Mattheis, 2016: 38), which suggests that regions “comprise more than one regionalism”, also that “the existence of multiple regionalisms […] leads to competition”, and that these regionalisms are based on the “nexus between internal and external interre­ gionalism”. Accordingly, when analysing the politics of regionalism, the focus must be on the interactions between the different regionalising projects at work in the same place. Expanding from this point of departure, I suggest here that interregionalism should be seen as an arena of action, where the distinction between external and internal – as much as between formal and informal – become blurred, and every regionalising agent simultaneously opposes and legit­ imises, confronts and (indirectly) supports other actors’ presence and regional projects. Even if the different agents own different positions of power and mate­ rial resources, none of them is able to control the result of their interactions, a fact which suggests one should interpret the current dynamics of insecurity and “disorder” in the Sahel as the unintended consequences (Baert, 1991; Burlyuk, 2017) of the interplay between these projects, narratives and practices. In the case of the Sahel, three main regionalisms can be distinguished and ascribed to three groups of actors. These are (1) the external security interveners, and in particular the United States, France and the European Union;2 (2) the insurgent jihadist groups and (3) the regional governmental elites. These three projects compete with, but also depend on, the regionalisms advanced by other actors. These attempts at regional construction are overlapping, but they are also inextricably interconnected, and all of them, to different degrees, present informal features, and are based on the nexus between external and internal

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regionalisms. In a similar vein, even their geographical imaginaries change and evolve, following the development of their interactions. The chapter is organised as follows: after the theoretical part, in the follow­ ing sections the three regional projects are presented, focusing attention on the external interveners, the terrorist actors and the governmental elites. In the last part, the social changes arising from these competing projects are illustrated, shedding light on the current dynamics of insecurity and instability in the area.

Competing regionalisms, contrasting orders and unintended consequences in the Sahel The Sahel tends to defy the classical defining categories of a regional space, which are based on physical-material, socio-cultural and governance compo­ nents (Agnew, 1999; Paasi, 2009). As remarked by Mattheis (2016: 38): “the existence of multiple regionalisms in or across a region often leads to a com­ petition that reinforces the hybridity and expansion of regionalisms […] [and] ultimately produces overlaps and contributes to the dissolution of established margins”. In accordance with this latter consideration, the multiple and conflict­ ing dynamics of regionalisms at work in the Sahel determine the emergence of a contested region, whose “ordering principles” (Agnew, 1994) change and remain unfixed. This is even more evident in a space whose ‘margins’ have never been clearly established. The Sahel has always represented both a connecting space and a border line between two “worlds” – northern and sub-Saharan Africa, respectively (Mattheis et al., 2019). Nonetheless, through their interaction the three processes of regionalism identified in this chapter are (almost paradoxically) defining an autonomous regional space. Consequently, in order to identify the (mostly unexpected) effects produced by competing regionalisms on governance setting, social arrangements and geographical frontiers, the three regional pro­ jects must be analysed separately. When analysing the processes of regional formation, the region-building approach (RBA) (Neumann, 2003) suggests that the creation of a region must be seen as a political act purposely implemented by an Agent. In a sense, the geopolitical dimension of a region can be determined only by considering the process of construction of meaning and the relations of power that lie behind it (Agnew, 1999). Therefore, attention must be devoted to the “regionalising actors” (Bøås et al., 2003) who activate the process of regionalisation, asking who these actors are, what kind of region are they trying to pursue and what this region is for. In the contemporary international system, regional activators can be formal polities such as states or international organisations, but they can also be identified in the informal political entrepreneurs owning strategic material, symbolic or normative resources (Söderbaum, 2005). In this sense, partly revis­ iting the RBA, we should remark here that not all regions start with a deliberate process: as attested in different cases on the African continent or in the Caucasus, economic networks built by transnational businesspeople and traders, as much

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as communitarian, ethnic or other forms of customary linkages, can result in the formation of regions, even if their practices and exchanges were not meant to produce this output (Söderbaum and Taylor, 2008; Mattheis et al., 2019). Even more importantly, different regional processes can be activated during the same period, and they can overlap and compete over the definition of the geo­ graphical and social frontiers, and the kind of order that will rule the regional space. Recalling Mattheis (2016), the Sahel can be seen as a sort of ‘trifurcated regionalism’. More specifically, I maintain that three groups are pursuing a more or less coherent regional project in the area. These are the external security interveners – primarily the United States, France and the European Union – the insurgent jihadist groups, and the regional governing elites. Engaging with the analytical approach of this volume, I maintain here that unintended consequences represent a powerful analytical tool for exploring the social and security changes deriving from the interactions of the three regionalising moves. The spiral of violence currently affecting the Sahel directly questions the actions of the actors involved in the redefinition of the region. Even if the three regional projects are based on very different, and even contrasting spatial and political “ordering principles” (Agnew, 1994), all of them advance a specific set of norms and institutions, with the aim of ruling social interactions and modifying power relations. For the external deliverers of security, the Sahel appears as a space of insecurity and threatening instability. Consequently, region-building becomes a strategy for stabilisation, to be pursued through the construction of local capacities in order to delegate the fight against the threats identified by the external actors. On the other hand, regional governmental ruling elites express their preferences for the construction of a “predatory” regionalism that would improve their legitimacy and maximise their material and symbolic utilities. In opposition to these forms of order based on state sovereignty and “territoriality” (Paasi, 2009), jihadist actors seem to advance a regional project built on the idea of the control of space and its “nodal points” (Walther and Retaillé, 2010). The clash between these pro­ jects, which is a clash between basic values and interests, is furthering violence and insecurity in the area. At the same time, none of the actors involved are in full control of the dynamics currently developing in the Sahel, and the “region” Sahel as it emerges today, should be seen as “unexpected” for all of them.

The Sahel and the external interveners: Region-building as a strategy for stability The first regionalising project shaping the borders and the power dynamics of the Sahel can be identified in the actions and practices implemented by the United States at the beginning of the 2000s. The American approach to the Sahel is fully inserted within the “War on Terror” framework, which since the publication of The National Security Strategy of the United States in 2002, has seen “fragile states” and “ungoverned spaces” as some of the main triggers of global insecurity

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(Rabasa et al., 2007). In particular, the weakness of state authorities was sup­ posed to leave room for manoeuvre for violent – mostly jihadist – non-state actors, who could exploit the “ungoverned spaces” arising within one or more fragile states to develop their activities (Patrick, 2011). Regarding the Sahel, in the eyes of US decision-makers poor economic per­ formance, weak institutional and infrastructural conditions, and vast stretches of semi-desert and empty territories, depicted an almost ideal-typical environ­ ment for the development of terrorist and criminal “sanctuaries” (Ryan, 2011). Consequently, for the United States elaborating a regional project for the Sahel should work as a strategy of counterterrorism and containment of ungoverned space, able to fulfil the double purpose of (1) remedy the inherent weaknesses of local states and security forces by favouring their integration and (2) adapting to a mobile and deterritorialised threat, which was exploiting – and still exploits – the fading frontiers of that space. By 2002, the USA had launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative, a military cooper­ ation programme deployed in Chad, Niger, Mauritania and Mali, with the aim of protecting borders, combat terrorism and enhance regional cooperation and stability (Archer and Popovic, 2007). Following the same logic behind the PSI, in 2005 the United States created the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative (then Partnership, TSCTP), in order to both further regional security govern­ ance and enlarge the geographical scope of the programme. The United States started to reframe the region following the perceived “enlargement” of the ter­ rorist and criminal threats, and the TSCTP was thus opened to the participation of Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Cameron, and the area was renamed “Sahara-Sahel” (Warner, 2014). The USA invested around $850 million in the program between 2005 and 2013, and its strategy has been renewed in 2013 (Warner, 2014) and then confirmed by the new US Presidency in 2017 (U.S. Department of State, 2019). In this sense, by pursuing a strategy of containment, the United States changed its geographical imaginary, moving towards a “Northwestern Africa complex” (Whitehouse and Strazzari, 2015). If the first international regionalising moves have been realised by the United States, France and the European Union soon emerged as the most important external security and development partners of the Sahel, in both material and symbolic terms (Helly et al., 2015). France in particular, which had adopted a similar interpretation of the “fragile states” threat in previous years (Gaulme, 2011), followed the USA by pursuing a similar geographical and strategic approach to the region. According to different interviewees, an inter-ministerial task force was already elaborating a “Stratégie Sahel” in 2008 (French Foreign Affairs Official, 2015; United States Diplomat, 2015). This strategy was supposed to prevent the worsening of local crises and to fight terrorist groups, and mobilise European institutions and allies, with the objective of “Europeanising” French initiatives (French Government Official, 2015). Following the military inter­ vention in Mali in 2013, France deepened its security engagement in the region in 2014 through the military operation Barkhane: as a mission deploying around

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3500 soldiers on an operative theatre comprising the territories of five different countries, Barkhane itself can be interpreted as a regionalising move implemented by France in the security domain, which revives the historical tradition of French military interventions in Africa (Goffi, 2017). On the other hand, the “Stratégie Sahel” was effectively translated – with no significant changes – in the European Strategy for the Sahel in 2011. The Sahel currently represents a “laboratory”, where the EU is testing its new strategies and capacities in the security and threat-containment domains (LopezLucia, 2017). These dynamics have directly affected the regionalising move of the EU, which shares the same premises of France and the USA – seeing the area mainly as a security threat – and it is similarly trying to implement a regional project able to bring stability to the area, through the double initiative of build­ ing local capacities and externalising security management. In 2014, with the aim of furthering coordination among the different inter­ national interveners, the EU has expanded its Sahel strategy to include Chad and Burkina Faso in the same framework with Mauritania, Mali and Niger (Helly et al., 2015). This choice decisively reinforced the international convergence towards the identification of a regional “core” formed by these five countries. At the same time, the convergence of the different international regional­ isms appears even more evident, when considering the changing discourse in Brussels, vis-à-vis the “expansion” of the regional security complex. Observing that terrorist and criminal activities have started to attain coastal countries in Western Africa – such as Ivory Coast or Benin – European practitioners are already changing their geographical threat perception, converging towards the American vision of a Northwestern Africa complex (EEAS Member, 2019). The security-prone approach of the EU has been mainly interpreted in terms of capacity-building activities to be developed on a regional basis (Raineri and Baldaro, 2019). This trend can be identified in the evolution – and the extension  – of the mandates of all the three Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions currently deployed in the Sahel, namely European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali and European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Mali. In particular, furthering regional cooperation of the local security forces has been made explicit following the launching of the G5 Sahel in 2014 – both a regional institutional framework and a spatial format (see below) – and its Joint Force in 2017. France and the EU have been particularly committed to supporting the creation of this new regional framework, and the three CSDP missions are currently training the officials of this newly born multinational military force (Lopez-Lucia, 2019). On the whole, the priority accorded to the fight against radical extremists (for both the US and the European actors) and the mobilisation against irregular migration (for the EU) implies a preference for security practices – such as the reinforcement of border management – which tend to confirm the existence of a common regionbuilding project among the external interveners. At the same time, regional cooperation is only a part of a wider strategy, aiming to give to local authorities

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and security forces – through training, equipping, advising and financing – the capacities for tackling the threats identified in Brussels and Washington DC.

Insurgent jihadist groups: The Sahel as an Islamic Caliphate According to various observers and security practitioners, a few years before the implementation of the first external security initiatives, various members of the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), a terrorist group established during the Algerian Civil War, had moved its area of operations to Northern Mali, Eastern Mauritania and Western Niger (Harmon, 2014). During a first phase, the group consolidated its settlement in the region and furthered its linkages with local communities, alternating violence with more peaceful strategies of co-optation directed at the inhabiting populations (International Crisis Group, 2012). In the same period, the GSPC also started to establish contacts and contingent forms of collaboration with those criminal groups involved in various sorts of illegal trafficking in the area. One of these was cocaine, since the early 2000s, West Africa and the Sahel had become an essential point of transit for around 15–30% of the product directed from South America to Europe (Briscoe, 2014). In 2007, the GSPC declared its allegiance to Al-Qa’ida and officially rebranded as Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (International Crisis Group, 2012). Following this change, the group transformed its objectives and its line of action. With regard to the former, AQIM’s emir Abdelmalek Droukdal declared to The New York Times (2008) that AQIM had been created with the main aim of fighting against the local corrupted states and their Western patrons. The goal was to create an African Islamic Caliphate, in place of an externally imposed and unfair system, based on rules and principles that did not belong to the traditions of local populations. In accordance with this renewed ambition, it should be remarked here that AQIM played a central role in supporting – at a logistical, material and doctrinal level – the consolidation and the development of the Nigerian insurgent and jihadist organisations who in 2009 founded Boko Haram (Brigaglia and Iocchi, 2017). This initiative was in line with the doctrine of the “global jihad” pursued by al-Qa’ida. At the same time, it also confirms the regional nature of AQIM’s strategy, which was acting in an area where the memories of the ancient Islamic kingdoms of the Sahara and the Sahel were – and still are – present among the populations.3 In tactical and operative terms, the affiliation with al-Qa’ida drove AQIM to launch a campaign of open confrontation against its “enemies” and significantly increase attacks against local armies and Western targets (International Crisis Group, 2012). At the same time, the jihadist group continued to reinforce its “kidnapping industry”, once again mainly directed against Western tourists and officials. The results of various academic studies and investigative reports show that AQIM obtained somewhere in the region of US$90–150 million in ran­ som money between 2003 and 2012 (Nünlist, 2013). The organisation used its

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capacity to move between different countries, redistributing some of the ransom money among local populations as a way of strengthening its presence in the area. The strategies implemented by jihadist actors contributed to redefining rules and norms governing social and economic interactions among local communi­ ties, successfully contesting the very legitimacy of local states and their ruling elites. On the one hand, the radical and anti-status quo Islam proposed by AQIM resounded as a tempting message for all those groups and communities who felt marginalised by central powers for economic, geographical, ethnic or religious reasons (Baldaro, 2018). This ability to exploit local grievances can be observed even today, as it is one of the factors fostering the violent escalation taking place in the trans-border area between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger (International Crisis Group, 2016). On the other hand, these same actors actively participated in the control of the territory, creating alliances with big men and political elites, and guaranteeing a certain order so far as trans-Saharan trade and exchanges were concerned (Bøås, 2015). As previously noted, in a semi-desert environment with little infrastruc­ ture, territorial control and security delivery are not built around the full com­ mand of the space, but rather on the exercise of ruling power over nodal points and exchange places, which shape mobility, and where most of the economic and political activities are concentrated; AQIM demonstrated its ability to participate in this informal and cooperative system of space control. The regionalising project promoted by insurgent actors appears “revolutionary” vis-à-vis an interpretation of order based on the Westphalian and Weberian fea­ tures of statehood. AQIM refuses the colonial borders and the Western-centred idea of sovereignty, which has allegedly been imposed on the area, and rejects laws and conventions fixed by local states. It is thus interesting to remark how, starting from the Malian crisis, these actors have elaborated and imple­ mented their own system of rule and governance. When AQIM, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) – a group formed by former members of AQIM and drug traffickers – and Ansar Dine – a “tuareg-jihadist” formation – occupied Gao and Timbuktu in 2012, they eliminated taxes, cus­ toms and land registers, as well as substituting French-inspired civil laws with Sharia law (Lecocq et al., 2013). If these choices appeared as a means of gaining support among local merchants, preachers and farmers, they also seemed to be an attempt to affirm an alternative form of order in the conquered lands. In a similar vein, in the territories currently under their control – corresponding to vast areas of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso – violent Islamist actors are reinforc­ ing and improving their efforts to enact a sort of “ jihadist governance” based on the delivering of basic public services such as spatial control and justice, in accordance with their “literalist” interpretation of Islam (United Nations Employee, 2019). Based on a “state de-construction” approach, aiming to create a space free from “external” norms and rules, regionalism promoted by jihadist actors has mirrored – and at the same time subverted – external strategies for stabilisation,

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contributing to a reinforcement of the same regional complex, where competi­ tion mainly concerns the forms of authority and the norms that should rule the regional space. In recent years, this regionalising dynamic has been strengthened by two factors. On the one hand, jihadist groups are experiencing a process of “Sahelisation” – both in terms of their membership and their grievances – which is reinforcing the regional scope of their initiatives (Pellerin, 2019). On the other hand, the emergence of an Islamic State branch in the area in 2015 has generated and furthered competition among jihadist groups, with the result that this strug­ gle is delimiting the spatial limits of this conflict – more or less corresponding to the North-western Africa complex (International Crisis Group, 2019).

Regional governing elites: The Sahel as a predatory strategy At the end of a summit held in Nouakchott (Mauritania) in February 2014, the five presidents of Chad, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania delivered a joint press release announcing the creation of an institutional framework in charge of the coordination and the monitoring of regional cooperation, named G5 Sahel (Le Monde, 2014). The following Convention, signed in December 2014, clarified the main objectives of this new regional organisation. The G5 Sahel aims to improve peace and prosperity in the region, tackling the interconnected challenges to security and development affecting the area. In this sense, cooperation and sol­ idarity in the security, governance and widespread development domains are considered as necessary conditions for pursuing the ambitious purposes fixed in the Convention (Desgrais, 2019). At first glance, the G5 Sahel seems a typical example of a top–down process of regional formation driven by central governments. At the same time, different elements seem to suggest that this interpretation of the G5 risks to hide other more complex dynamics lying behind the organisation. On the one hand, the fact that the G5 Sahel pursues both development and security and aims to fight against terrorism, criminality and the contextual fac­ tors causing violence and radicalisation, perfectly fits with international commu­ nity’s expectations and interests in the area. In a sense, a process of “emulation” (Risse, 2016) of the external priorities and the forms of intervention seems to have taken place. On the other hand, the G5 Sahel is also a regional framing, which was born in implicit competition with other already established regional organisations such as ECOWAS or the African Union. Different international actors and donors are now adopting strategies for the Sahel, which implicitly recognise the G5 Sahel as the “more legitimate” organisation representing the region (Bagayoko, 2019). Consequently, regional elites are trying to advance a discourse about the Sahel, linking a specific regional identity to the territory of the five member states. One of the first declarations of Najim El-hadj Mohamed, first Permanent Secretary of the G5, is particularly revealing, showing the dou­ ble purpose of (1) adopting and reinforcing the international spatial and strategic

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imaginary about the region and (2) distinguishing this regional framing from alternative geographical interpretations of that space: Countries of the G5 Sahel, […], form a space where the biggest concentra­ tion of threats to peace, security and development are gathered together. These countries are homogeneous considering their physical and natu­ ral characteristics, and on the basis of their socio-economic development indexes and they are homogeneous because of their history, geography, culture and even on geopolitical basis. The G5 is perceived as the good format and the good level to deal with specifically Sahelian issues. It inte­ grates different countries hit by similar structural fragilities and forming a coherent system (G5 Sahel, 2016a: 3). These elements tend to confirm the hypothesis that the G5 Sahel represents the local answer to different external pressures, which became even more pressing after the Malian crisis and the French military intervention. Accordingly, local governments would appear as “second movers” of a region-building process firstly implemented by other subjects. The G5 Sahel reproduces the geographical extension of the French Opération Barkhane and the European strategy, and it has also been endorsed by the United States. Moreover, at the moment of its founda­ tion it adopted the same priorities and lines of action of external interveners. In this sense, the essential strategic guidelines of the G5 were – and still are – fully consistent with the European approach to conflict and crisis (Helly and Galeazzi, 2015). At the same time, other interests and motivations can be identified behind its creation. Some observers have suggested that the G5 Sahel could be seen as another predatory strategy implemented by regional ruling elites who aim to strengthen their power and increase their personal wealth and legitimacy (French Government Official, 2015; EEAS Member, 2018). In this sense, concepts such as “shadow regionalism” (Söderbaum, 2011) and “African extraversion” (Bayart and Ellis, 2000) can help in grasping the dynamics and the reasons behind the creation of the G5 Sahel, giving agency back to governmental actors, and show­ ing their ability to adopt, shape and originally transform international agendas and strategies. The different Sahelian regimes have already shown their ability to attract international aid and military support by modifying their behaviours and their rhetoric in order to comply with requests coming from external donors (Fisher and Anderson, 2015). They used these new symbolic and material resources to reinforce their power positions and nourish their networks, strengthening their regimes and their personal rule (Bach and Gazibo, 2013). Consequently, the G5 Sahel could be understood as another way of “giving satisfaction” to external allies – France and the EU in particular – and capture international resources (French Defence Official, 2015; EEAS Member, 2018), promoting a regional project that is apparently coherent with the expectations of

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the international community. Conversely, this initiative is exploited as a power­ ful tool for guaranteeing and reinforcing regimes’ security, thanks to the legit­ imacy and the funding obtained through their relations with external partners. The evolution of the initiatives and the discourse surrounding the G5 seem to confirm this impression. At the time of its establishment the organisation presented an (over-)ambitious Priority Investment Program, which would have needed financial support of approximately US$14.8 billion (Chavez, 2014). At the same time, the G5 Sahel has already undergone an important shift concern­ ing its goals and, to a certain extent, its reasons for existing, since the securityfocused interpretation of its mandate has now taken the lead. In February 2017, the five countries comprising the regional organisation started to establish a G5 Sahel Joint Force. This initiative should offer “African solutions to African prob­ lems” in the security, counterterrorism and migratory domains, in line with the requests advanced by international partners. This move towards a security-first agenda of the G5 had already been made explicit in the 2016 EU-G5 Sahel Feuille de Route (G5 Sahel, 2016b), where the main priorities for the coming years were indicated as the fight against terrorist and criminal organisations, border management, fight against violent extremism, migration management and fight against human trafficking. Overall, it is probably too early to determine whether the G5 Sahel will actu­ ally be an effective tool for furthering regional cooperation in the security and development domains. Nevertheless, its creation has already had an impact on the conflicting dynamics of the different regionalisms in the Sahel.

The unintended effects of competing interregionalism in the Sahel The imposition of specific norms and rules, and the connected definition of the regional space, are at the centre of the struggle involving the different regional­ isms presented in this chapter. On the whole, overlapping regional and security practices do not always generate dysfunctional systems of governance or even insecurity, as different orders and regional security logics can coexist within the same space (Ciut ă, 2008). In the case of the Sahel, the competing inter­ ests, visions and interpretations of order are producing a deep impact on the regional social system, generating vast and unintended changes and destabilising dynamics. The “trifurcated regionalism” of the Sahel presents some fundamental features: (1) all the actors involved in this process seem unable (or unwilling) to change their course of action, and none of them is able to control the result of their mutual interactions; (2) the three region-building projects tend to be based on strong normative assumptions – coupled, in particular in the case of the external interveners, with a certain lack of understanding of the regional context and (3) a preference for immediate and short-term interests characterises the ini­ tiatives of the region-builders.

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Starting from these premises, the unintended consequences of conflicting regionalisms in the Sahel are explored on two levels, namely the interactions between the three projects and their social effects. According to Branch (2011), the very presence of external actors inexorably modifies local arrangements and actors’ priorities, changing perceptions, inter­ ests and behaviours of the players on the ground. Thus, international initiatives must be considered as the point of departure for the discussion. Considering the reinforcement of local states and central governments as the main solutions for containing and, in a longer term, eliminating the Sahelian “ungoverned space”, external actors have created new room for manoeuvre for the predatory regional ruling elites. Thanks to the international support, local governments have been able to sustain those clientelist and self-serving networks ruling both central institutions and cross-borders regions, which have furthered grievances among those parts of the population excluded from the system of power built by governmental rulers. Moreover, given this renewed material and symbolic power, regional governmental elites have tried to play the role of the self-interested gate-keeper also vis-à-vis the transnational groups. Since the middle of the 2000s, both drug traffickers, but also AQIM, thanks to its “kidnapping industry”, have taken increasing control over economic activities in the region, earning local legitimisation and penetrating the political and social systems. Sahelian governments have tried to co-opt drug traffickers and jihadist groups in their system of power once they were installed in the region, causing spectacular growth in the level of corruption among civil servants and politicians, while allowing them to reinforce and expand their presence in the area (Harmon, 2014). These two elements combined have dramatically impacted the political legitimacy of the governmental elites and their local clients and representa­ tives ( Jourde, Brossier, and Cissé, 2019). As a result, the presence of jihadist fighters could be seen as a self-fulfilling prophecy vis-à-vis the international region-building project: the strong security international engagement in the area, and the indirect support the international actors are providing to dysfunc­ tional governmental practices, have turned the Sahel into an ‘ideal’ theatre for developing a Sahelian branch of the global jihad (Pérouse de Montclos, 2015). In a similar vein, the reinforcement of these same violent insurgents legitimises and “ justifies” the transformation of the Sahel into one of the most important battlefields of the Global War on Terror. For its part, the jihadist regional project has also gone through an unexpected evolution. In the growing competition opposing the different expressions of Sahelian jihad, we can identify a conflict about the scope and the geographical objectives of the insurgency. Although for those groups who have experienced an increasing process of “Sahelisation”, a Sahelian caliphate is apparently becoming the main goal, others – principally those allied to the Islamic State – continue to pursue the unbounded ideol­ ogy of the global jihad, where the Sahel represents only an intermediate step. These contrasting imaginaries can be retraced in the different approaches to

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governance and rule that the various groups are implementing in the areas under their control. With regards to the unexpected social effects produced by these contrasting regionalisms, one should consider how authority and exchanges have been histor­ ically distributed and ruled in the Sahel. The Sahel is neither empty nor ungov­ erned. Customary and religious leaders, local entrepreneurs and chiefs of local militias, all contributed to exerting ruling power over the “marginal” territories of the Sahel, occupying official positions in the administration or exerting an informal power over their communities. As local governments did not have the means to impose their direct control, they usually preferred to co-opt, make alli­ ances or obstruct local actors (Raleigh and Dowd, 2013). This particular style of governance is linked to the traditions of a territory where economic and social activities have always crossed borders, exploiting the economic and political dif­ ferentials created by the frontiers: in this sense, commercial, smuggling and migra­ tion routes cross frontiers and connect far villages and communities, determining a form of order that depends more on human activities than on border controls (Mattheis et al., 2019). The renewed external attention to security and control, the insertion of the Sahel within particularly rich (and illegal) transnational exchanges and new opportunities for predatory elites are producing direct effects on local societies and their strategies of adaptation. With regard to mobility, placing security and territorial and border control at the top of the priorities caused unexpected con­ sequences that contributed to worsen the situation. The increasing control on the frontiers made more difficult for local populations to carry on their informal and theoretically illegal commerce across borders. The costs linked to these activities augmented, threatening to exclude small business people from this market. At the same time, this gave more power to transnational entrepreneurs who had the means and the resources to carry on their activities, corrupting or co-opting security forces, employing local people and redistributing a (small) part of the profits (Cantens and Rabailland, 2016). A case in point is represented by those entrepreneurs, mainly from the transport sector, who are currently exploiting their connections with local decision-makers and their transborder networks, to gain a central role in organising the migratory routes and to cumulate remarka­ ble economic and political resources (Molenaar and El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017). On the other hand, when dealing with issues such as border management, migra­ tion and radicalisation, local needs and perceptions do not necessarily coincide with the priorities of the external interveners or their local allies. As already stated, migrations and the related business have historically represented one of the most important strategies of economic survival for Sahelian populations (Molenaar and El Kamouni-Janssen, 2017). In a similar vein, different pieces of research have underlined the role of socio-political grievances and marginalisa­ tion amongst the main drivers of radicalisation and violence: these are provoked more by the corrupted and/or repressive behaviour of the local states than by the activities of external/transnational jihadist actors (Metelits, 2016). In this

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sense, the interaction between the G5 Sahel, EU initiatives and even transna­ tional dynamics are (in)directly fostering those same elements, which condemn the region to a persistent condition of insecurity.

Conclusion The current situation in the Sahel suggests that the region remains a “contrasted idea”, a spatially bounded order in-the-making, where it appears almost impos­ sible to find a synthesis among competing interests and visions advanced by the different actors acting on that territory. The struggle involving the three differ­ ent regionalising moves contributes to explaining both the social changes and the insecurity dynamics, which characterise the area. Interregionalism intended as the interaction of various regionalisms should be able to build a shared and enduring structure of governance and power redistribution, which should guar­ antee a sustainable equilibrium between the different interests and strategies pur­ sued and adopted by the actors. In the case of the Sahel, region-builders seem to be “entrapped” in a vicious circle: on the one hand, none of them appears able to impose the dominant definition of the region; on the other hand, the more the unintended consequences of their interactions destabilise socio-political equilib­ ria, the more they reiterate their engagement and course of action. As shown in the previous section, these unintended consequences can be categorised, distin­ guishing between (1) the impact every regionalism has on the competing regional projects and (2) the consequences they create at the social level. Although exter­ nal interveners are involuntarily furthering the predatory behaviours of regional elites, consequently reinforcing the “revolutionary” discourse advanced by jihad­ ist insurgent groups, regional governments are creating the conditions for their strong delegitimisation, while acting to strengthen their regimes. For their parts, the jihadist groups are exploiting these conditions to deepen their presence and their engagement in the area, but at the same time they are incurring a process of fragmentation and internal conflict. Moreover, the encounter between these competing dynamics is forcing local societies to adapt to a changing context, which is furthering economic inequalities and threatening fragile socio-political equilibria and allegiances. Given this situation, the Sahel currently appears as a region “condemned” to instability.

Notes 1 In geographical terms, the Sahel designates a vast semi-arid band bordering the Sahara desert stretching from the Atlantic coast of Senegal to the Red Sea. 2 For a matter of clarity and given the purpose of this chapter, these three states will be treated as unitary actors. By this, I am not suggesting that their action is not shaped by internal and intra-organisational struggles, but that the analysis of these would risk deviating the attention from the main argument advanced here. 3 Among them, the most famous are probably the Macina Empire (1818–1862) and the Sokoto Caliphate (1804–1903).

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Raleigh, Clionadh and Catriona Dowd. 2013. Governance and Conflict in the Sahel’s “Ungoverned Space”. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2(2): 1–17. Ryan, Maria. 2011. “War in Countries We Are Not at War With”: The “War on Terror” on the Periphery From Bush to Obama. International Politics 48(2/3): 364–389. Yeo, Andrew I. 2018. Overlapping Regionalism in East Asia: Determinants and Potential Effects. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 18(2): 161–191. Whitehouse, Bruce and Francesco Strazzari, F. 2015. Introduction: Rethinking Challenges to State Sovereignty in Mali and Northwest Africa. African Security 8(4): 213–226.

Book chapters Bøås, Morten, Marianne H. Marchand and Timothy M. Shaw. 2003. The Weave-World: The Regional Interweaving of Economies, Ideas And Identities. In: Söderbaum, Fredrik, and Timothy M. Shaw (Eds). Theories of New Regionalism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 197–210. Mattheis, Frank. 2016. Towards Bifurcated Regionalism: The Production of Regional Overlaps in Central Africa. In: Engel, Ulf, Heidrun Zinecker, Frank Mattheis, Antje Dietze and Thomas Plötze (Eds). The New Politics of Regionalism: Perspectives from Africa, Latin America and Asia-Pacific. London: Routledge, 57–71. Neumann, Ivan B. 2003. A Region-Building Approach. In: Söderbaum, Fredrik, and Timothy M. Shaw (Eds). Theories of New Regionalism. London: PalgraveMacmillan, 160–178. Raineri, Luca and Edoardo Baldaro. 2019. Resilience to What? EU Capacity-Building Missions in the Sahel. In: Cusumano, Eugenio and Stefan Hofmaier (Eds). Projecting Resilience Across the Mediterranean. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 169–188. Risse, Thomas. 2016. The Diffusion of Regionalism. In: Börzel, Tanja A. and Thomas Risse (Eds). The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 87–108. Söderbaum, Fredrik. 2005. Exploring the Links Between Micro-Regionalism and Macro-Regionalism. In: Farrell, Mary, Bjorne Hettne and Luk Van Langenhove (Eds). Global politics of regionalism: theory and practice. London: Pluto Press, 87–103. Söderbaum, Fredrik. 2011. Formal and Informal Regionalism. In: Grant, J. Andrew, Timothy M. Shaw and Scarlett Cornelissen (Eds). The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalisms. London: Ashgate Publishing, 51–67.

Monographs Bach, Daniel and Mamadou Gazibo. 2013. Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond. London: Routledge. Branch, Adam. 2011. Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention In Northern Uganda. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Harmon, Stephen A. 2014. Terror and Insurgency in the Sahara-Sahel Region: Corruption, Contraband, Jihad and the Mali War of 2012–2013. Farnham: Ashgate. Laurent, Samuel. 2013. Sahelistan - De la Libye au Mali. Au cœur du nouveau Jihad. Paris: Seuil. Mattheis, Frank, Raineri Luca and Alessandra Russo. 2019. Fringe Regionalism: When Peripheries Become Regions. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Patrick, Stewart. 2011. Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rabasa, Angel, Boraz Steven, Chalk Peter, Cragin Kim, Karasik Theodore W, Moroney Jennifer D P, O’Brien Kevin A and John E Peters. 2007. Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Söderbaum, Fredrik and Ian Taylor. 2008. Afro-regions: The Dynamics of Cross-Border Micro-Regionalism in Africa. Upsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Official documents Archer, Toby and Tihomir Popovic. 2007. The Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative: The US War on Terrorism in North Africa. FIIA Report 16. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Bagayoko, Niagalé. 2019. Le multilatéralisme sécuritaire africain à l’épreuve de la crise sahélienne. A Stabilizing Mali Project Report, June. Montreal: Centre FrancoPaix en résolution des conflits et missions de paix. Briscoe, Ivan. 2014. Crime after Jihad: Armed Groups, The State And Illicit Business in Post-Conflict Mali. Conflict Research Unit Report. The Hague: the Clingendael Institute. Cantens, Thomas and Gael Raballand. 2016. Fragile Borders: Rethinking Borders and Insecurity in Northern Mali. Report, November. Geneva: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime. Desgrais, Nicolas. 2019. Cinq ans après, une radioscopie du G5 Sahel. Des réformes nécessaires de l’architecture et du processus décisionnel. Paris: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique. G5 Sahel. 2016a. Revue Semestrielle d’Informations sur le G5 Sahel. N. 1, June. Nouakchott: G5 Sahel. Goffi, Emmanuel. 2017. Opération Barkhane: entre victoires tactiques et échec stratégique. Eléments de réflexion sur l’intervention militaire Française dans la bande Sahélo-Saharienne. A Stabilizing Mali Project Report, June. Montreal: Centre FrancoPaix en Résolution des conflits et Missions de paix. Helly, Daniel and Greta Galeazzi. 2015. Avant la lettre? The EU’s Comprehensive Approach (to crises) in the Sahel, ECDPM Briefing Note 75. Maastricht: ECDPM. Helly, Daniel, Théroux-Bénoni Lori-Anne, Galeazzi Greta, Maïga Ibrahim and Fatimata Ouédraogo. 2015. Stratégies Sahel : L’impératif de la coordination. ECDPM Briefing Note 76. Maastricht: ECDPM. International Crisis Group. 2012. Mali: Avoiding Escalation. Africa Report 189. Brussels/ Dakar: International Crisis Group. International Crisis Group. 2016. Central Mali: An uprising in the making?. Africa report 238. Brussels/Dakar: International Crisis Group. International Crisis Group. 2019. The Risk of Jihadist Contagion in West Africa. Africa Briefing 149. Brussels/Dakar: International Crisis Group. Lopez-Lucia, Elisa. 2019. The European Union Integrated and Regionalised Approach Towards the Sahel. A Stabilizing Mali Project Report, February. Montreal: Centre FrancoPaix en Résolution des conflits et Missions de paix. Molenaar, Fransje and Floor El Kamouni-Janssen. 2017. Turning the tide. The Politics of Irregular Migration in the Sahel and Libya. CRU Report, February. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. Nünlist, Christian. 2013. Kidnapping for Ransom as a Source of Terrorism Funding. CSS Analysis in Security Policy 141. Zurich: Center for Security Studies.

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Pellerin, Matthieu. 2019. Les violences armées au Sahara. Du djihadisme aux insurrec­ tions? Etudes de l’Ifri, December. Paris: Ifri. Söderbaum, Fredrik. 2015. Early, Old, New and Comparative Regionalism: The Scholarly Development of the Field. KFG - The transfromative power of Europe 64. Berlin: KFG. Walther, Olivier J., and Daniel Retaillé. 2010. Sahara or Sahel? The fuzzy geography of terrorism in West Africa. Working Papers 35. Brussels: Ceps/Instead. Warner, Lesley A. 2014. The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership: Building Partner Capacity to Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism. CNA Report. Arlington, VA: CNA Corporation. Zoubir, Yahia H. 2017. Security Challenges, Migration, Instability and Violent Extremism in the Sahel. In: IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2017. Girona: IEMed.

Online resources Chavez Dominic. 2014. G5 Sahel : les partenaires techniques et financiers se mobilis­ ent pour accélérer le développement régional. World Bank News, Washington DC, 14 July. Available at: https://www.banquemondiale.org/fr/news/feature/2014/07/14/ sahel-g5-meeting-brings-together-governments-and-donors-to-accelerate-regional­ development Accessed on 12/04/2019). G5 Sahel. 2016b. Feuille de Route pour le renforcement du dialogue et de la coopération entre le G5 Sahel et l’Union Européenne. Available at: https://www.g5sahel.org/ images/Docs/feuillet_de_route.pdf Accessed on 30/08/2018. Le Monde. 2014. Un « G5 du Sahel » pour le développement et la sécurité. Le Monde, Paris, 16 February. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2014/02/16/un­ g5-du-sahel-pour-le-developpement-et-la-securite_4367635_3212.html Accessed on 20/02/2018. The New York Times. 2008. An interview with Abdelmalek Droukdal. The New York Times, New York, 1 July. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/ africa/01transcript-droukdal.html Accessed on 16/09/2018. U.S. Department of State. 2019. Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. Available at: https://www.state.gov/trans-sahara-counterterrorism-partnership/ Accessed on 26/06/2019.

Interviews EEAS member. 2018. Interview conducted in Brussels in March 2018.

EEAS member. 2019. Interview conducted in Brussels in February 2019.

French defence official. 2015. Interview conducted in Paris in June 2015.

French foreign affairs official. 2015. Interview conducted in Paris in November 2015

French government official. 2015. Interview conducted in Paris in June 2015.

United Nations employee. 2019. Interview conducted in Bamako December 2019.

United States diplomat. 2015. Interview conducted in Paris in June 2015.

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9 AGENTIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM, SHADOW REGIONALISMS AND INTERREGIONAL DYNAMICS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA J. Andrew Grant, Abdiasis Issa and Badriyya Yusuf

Introduction1 Scholars of Regionalism studies have devoted increasing attention to links between natural resources and illicit business activities (Shaw et al., 2003; MacLean, 2003; Grant and Taylor, 2004; Grant, Mitchell, and Nyame, 2011; Grant et al., 2013; Alorse, Compaoré, and Grant, 2015). Although some of this scholarly work has occurred in the form of formal regionalism and policy responses under the auspices of institutions such as the European Union (EU) or African Union (AU), the most fruitful analyses have examined the dynamics of informal regionalism wherein state and non-state actors seek to circumvent the state (Mattheis, Raineri, and Russo, 2019). In regional terms, Africa has been the predominant focus of the latter type of studies. For example, the ‘Parrot’s Beak’ region that comprises parts of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia carries more importance as an informal common market for traders of illegal goods, ranging from unlicensed weapons to undocumented rough diamonds to illicit narcotics, than the national capitals of those countries (Grant, 2005, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2017). In other parts of West Africa such as the Gulf of Guinea, similar dynamics are at play in relation to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Mutatis mutandis, the intersection of infor­ mal actors’ discourses and practices, produces greater salience for the Horn of Africa than governance efforts from Mogadishu, Asmara, Addis Ababa, Djibouti City or the region’s predominant intergovernmental organisation, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The underlying human security needs (e.g. livelihoods and household security) that construct the Horn of Africa – or other regions of the continent such as in Central Africa (Mattheis, 2017) – are aggregated and understood by residents and observers alike on a regional basis. Invoking the phrase ‘in the Horn’ evokes images of

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insecurity that are socially constructed insofar as they are shared and under­ stood within and outside the region. Parts of Africa, Asia, the Americas and Europe often generate ‘shadow regionalisms’ consisting of socially constructed ‘corridors’ and polygons that are home to illicit transfers of goods, services and persons. Although the profits and related proceeds of these informal intra­ regional hubs are hard to measure with exactitude, households and government officials alike are cognisant of such economic flows. In turn, individuals may very well seek to participate in the intra- and inter-regional networks that sus­ tain these hubs. If participation meets a greater proportion of human security needs, then it is a rational and understandable decision. Furthermore, partic­ ipation in these socially constructed corridors and polygons also changes per­ ceptions of authority and legitimacy that are normally associated with de  jure territorial demarcations. Although the above literature on regionalism has provided valuable insights into the political economy and social construction of regions and regionalisation, comparatively few studies have delved into the dynamics of interregionalism understood as the interactions between formal and informal regionalisms. This is somewhat surprising, as formal and informal regionalism are not discrete enti­ ties. Beyond merely noting that formal and informal regionalisms overlap and interact with one another, we respond to this oversight and elucidate the unin­ tended consequences of these interactions in an inductive manner. Our chapter is therefore animated by the following intertwined research questions: what type of interregionalism exists between IGAD and the Horn of Africa and what are the unintended consequences of the interactions between this formal regional­ ism and informal regionalism? Our responses to these questions shed light on the socio-political environment of East Africa in general, and on human security provisions as public goods in particular. Within the socio-political environment of East Africa, the interregional actors holding the greatest degree of agency are IGAD member-state representatives such as bureaucrats, and Horn of Africa non-state actors such as small-scale entrepreneurs, pastoralists and armed groups, among others. The interregional interactions of these agents of formal region­ alism and informal regionalism, respectively, are an example of bifurcated interre­ gionalism as conceptualised by Mattheis (2017). The IGAD-Horn of Africa case also has one foot in each of the following neologist camps: stealth interregionalism as advanced by Gardini and Malamud (2018); and quasi-interregionalism as concep­ tualised by Farrell (2010). This would accommodate the informal interactions between two regionalisms (i.e. a regional organisation and shadow regionalism) as well as the type of actors and their actorness (i.e. a formal regional organisa­ tion and individual agents of the state and non-state actors) under examination. Studying a case of bifurcated interregionalism between a formal regionalism and an informal regionalism is an important contribution to the literature. Such an analysis uncovers the contestations that underpin regionalism, wherein compet­ ing and diverging interests and processes interact to produce evolving meanings and understandings.

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This chapter is based on analyses of primary sources – including IGAD docu­ ments as well as field work and participant observations conducted in East Africa and other parts of the continent. It seeks to contribute in the scholarly litera­ ture on interregionalism in the following ways. First, the chapter describes how the conceptual aspects of interregionalism have evolved as useful social scien­ tific tools. Second, it examines how IGAD’s intended objectives infused with nor­ mative regionalism’s liberal ideals diverge from those of informal regionalism (i.e.  shadow regionalisms). Third, this study illustrates how East Africa’s pre­ dominant formal region-building project (i.e. IGAD) competes with the shadow regionalism of the Horn of Africa, which generates unintended consequences. Patrick Baert’s (1991: 201) conceptualisation of unintended consequences is help­ ful here because it draws attention to the “particular effect of purposive action which is different from what was wanted at the moment of carrying out the act, and the want of which was a reason for carrying it out”. As such, the unintended consequences of IGAD’s regional governance emerge from the overlap of formal and informal regionalisms in the Horn of Africa. Consequences that have not been intended by IGAD include public sector elites accumulating private gains rather than cultivating the provision of regional public goods, the growth of an informal common market across the Horn of Africa, and a perceived need for IGAD to oversee more forceful military and regional peacekeeping missions. These effects are elaborated upon in the empirical section of the chapter. The chapter concludes by delving into the implications of how the specific inter­ regional dynamics of a case of shadow regionalisms and formal regionalism (i.e. Horn of Africa and IGAD) can contribute to our broader understanding of the unintended consequences of interregionalism. This discussion identifies the governance challenges that IGAD will face in terms of dealing with the unin­ tended consequences produced by how the regional organisation interacts with the Horn of Africa’s actors. This will provide the context for our provisional assessment that the actorness of formal regionalism (region-building project) cannot assume it will be viewed as legitimate by all constituents residing in a particular region, since competing actors that drive informal regionalism can be better at providing public goods such as livelihoods and safety.

Theoretical and conceptual approaches to bifurcated interregionalism: Agential constructivism, regions, networks and shadow regionalisms Agential constructivism is an appropriate theoretical approach to interregionalism because it acknowledges the importance of identities and norms in the opera­ tionalisation and performativity of regions, regional projects and networks and regionalisms (Söderbaum, 2004; Doidge, 2011; Grant et al., 2020). Notably, how­ ever, agential constructivism places greater emphasis on the agency of actors  – including the regional actorness of formal regional institutions and informal illicit networks alike – and less emphasis on structure. Agential constructivism is

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therefore consistent with the new regionalist conception of ‘actorness’, whereby interregionalism evolves in a socially constructed manner (see Hettne and Ponjaert, 2014: 12). Yet this is not to say that agential constructivism discounts the influence of structure on regional dynamics. As expanded upon below, a region is demarcated in relation to various structured features. Agential constructivism recognises that structure is important, but it has its limits, as allocating too much explanatory weight to structure risks portraying actors as static entities that can­ not evolve beyond – or break free of – extant structural conditions (Grant, 2018a). A fundamental component of interregionalism is the ‘region’ – which may be socially constructed (in accordance with agential constructivism) or rather arbitrarily drawn based on geographical features – or some combination thereof.2 The study of regions is attracting attention from many corners, from commen­ tators to policy-makers to scholars. Henry Kissinger – a polarising figure to be sure, but one who is nonetheless still influential – provides a recent assessment of the importance of regions in the contemporary world order: This is the first time in human history that all the regions of the world could interact with all other regions and not only interact but their actions had consequences of a global nature…. Now we are facing extraordinary com­ plex situations within regions and between regions. (quoted in Salinas, 2014: np; emphasis added) Kissinger not only avers that regions are important but also highlights the com­ plexity of the dynamics of interregionalisms, which are sustained by networks. Like regions, networks are not natural entities. Rather, networks are deliber­ ately created and sustained by actors with sometimes differing backgrounds but common interests. If these networks are established on a regional basis and con­ stituted with glocal – global and local – orientations with illegal objectives and outcomes in mind, then they are shadow regionalisms. A useful way to conceptu­ alise constituent networks of shadow regionalisms is through agential construc­ tivism. This agential variant of constructivism sheds light on “how seemingly ‘weak’ actors actually possess significant influence as part of the ‘glocal networks’ that” permit actors to engage in “emancipating themselves from historical power imbalances” (Grant, 2020: 201). This is consistent with Söderbaum and Taylor’s (2003: 45, emphasis added) observation on what helps networks thrive: “What is significant is that for all such networks to prosper, transboundary formations must be constructed”. These insights help us develop a definition of bifurcated interregionalism below. Although interregionalism is not a new phenomenon, the wider recogni­ tion of its importance in scholarly and policy-related circles is still relatively novel. Moreover, the recognition of inter-regional dynamics as compelling areas of academic inquiry represents an affirmation of the region as important unit of analysis. Our definition of bifurcated interregionalism owes a debt to other scholars of interregionalism, such as Gaens (2011), Hänggi, Roloff, and

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Rüland (2006), and especially Roloff (2006: 18), who conceptualised it as a “pro­ cess of widening and deepening political, economic, and societal interactions between international regions.” Similarly, we agree with Hettne and Ponjaert (2014: 116), that interregionalism can be thought of as the “formal relation­ ship between organised regions.” Our definition of bifurcated interregionalism is inspired by the aforementioned work of Mattheis and combines the formal relations identified by Gaens, Roloff, Hettne and Ponjaert with the informal rela­ tions identified by Gardini and Malamud (stealth interregionalism) and Farrell (quasi-interregionalism). Specifically, we define bifurcated interregionalism as the informal interactions between two regionalisms – one that is formal and one that is informal – that belong to the same socially constructed region. Although the interactions in our case of bifurcated interregionalism are best described as competitive, this does not rule out occasional cooperative behaviour between the two types of actors. Our study of IGAD-Horn of Africa bifurcated interre­ gionalism primarily consists of informal interactions between agents of IGAD (e.g., state representatives) and non-state actors (e.g. small-scale entrepreneurs, pastoralists, criminal networks and armed groups) residing in the Horn of Africa. In the next sections of the chapter, we anchor our analyses of this East African constellation of formal–informal regionalisms by drawing upon Söderbaum’s (2011: 55) conception of formal regionalism as that includes “official policies and codified interactions, which are often backed by written texts, legal treaties or constitutions”. We are mindful that the discourse on regionalism has largely emphasised the formal elements of regional integration, vis-à-vis a state cen­ trism that has largely focused on the European regional experiment. We also incorporate informal regionalist analyses, which reject the classical theories of functionalism and neo-functionalism. Informal regionalism in this context has sought to empower analyses that are more pluralistic in nature, taking into consideration several different actors, processes and contexts. Moreover, insti­ tutionalisation is a key moniker of where formal ends and informal regionalism begins. Institutionalisation in this context examines the way in which regional institutions are designed and constructed, accounting for the norms, values and ideologies that underpin their structure. Informal regionalism is not merely the absence of regional integration. Rather, as Söderbaum (2011: 55) notes informal regionalism “non-codified series of events based upon mutual understandings, accommodations and tacit agreements”, which falls squarely within our agential constructivist understanding of bifurcated interregionalism, and emphasises the importance of shared norms and conventions.

Intended objectives of formal and informal regionalism in East Africa In East Africa, the two regionalism projects are competing and interacting: IGAD (formal regionalism) and the Horn of Africa (informal regionalism). IGAD as a formal region-building project has been the principal regional organisation in

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the Horn of Africa since its inception in 1986 as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development. IGAD’s focus has expanded since the late 1980s to promote a cohesive regional bloc wherein economic, political and social interdependence. IGAD consists of eight East African states: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. The Horn of Africa is home to informal patterns of regional trade and commerce that is exhibited in other parts of Africa, such as within the Gulf of Guinea (Grant, 2008, 2010; Iheduru, 2003, 2011; Haastrup and Lopez-Lucia, 2014; Lopez-Lucia, 2015, 2018), particularly the way in which non-state actors actualise personal eco­ nomic and political interests. Shadow regionalism, which is a form of trans-state regionalism, posits that agents utilise the informality of cross-border networks to sustain personal wealth and power. In the IGAD-Horn of Africa case, the lack of firm border controls in the region has been advantageous for illicit criminal and terror networks that have proliferated in recent years. Additionally, the intended objectives of shadow regionalism underscore the importance of longstanding traditional and cultural agreements, such as the rights associated with pastoralist and nomadic cultures that are built upon cross-border networks and occupy the borderlands of the Horn of Africa. IGAD’s intended objectives are best understood against the backdrop of nor­ mative regionalism, which means that they are infused with liberal ideals of region-building that aim to produce an increase in economic prosperity meas­ ured by industrial production, formal trade and investment, and peace and secu­ rity at the regional level. IGAD’s agents – heads of state, ministers, bureaucrats and diplomats – work on behalf of state governments. The IGAD Council is responsible, amongst other things, for making policy recommendations to the assembly, approving the organisational budget, and reviewing and approving the various IGAD-level initiatives and projects. IGAD’s Secretariat serves at the core of IGAD’s bureaucratic mission, conducting policy identification and develop­ ment, as well as the initiation and coordination of development programmes and projects. IGAD’s intended objective of economic regionalisation reflects the AU’s pro­ motion of the African Economic Community system. IGAD’s regional integra­ tion plans have been in line with AU initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development and policy frameworks such as the Minimum Integration Plan (MIP), an initiative that works towards accelerating the strategic goals of continental economic integration. IGAD notes that the implementation of the MIP serves as “a guiding and dynamic strategic framework for economic and social integration … [wherein] IGAD will continue pushing ahead with its regional integration agenda by developing an IGAD Free Trade Area (FTA), taking into account” (IGAD, n.d.). The MIP strategy has principally taken the form of normative regionalism that seeks to: liberalise inter-regional trade in goods; promote efficiency in production within the region; enhance domestic, cross-border, and foreign investment in the IGAD region; and promote eco­ nomic development and diversification in industrialisation (IGAD, 2016: 22).

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In accordance with the MIP, during the 12th Assembly of Heads of State in 2008, the IGAD Secretariat was tasked with developing and implementing regional integration policies and programmes that would result in the creation of an IGAD specific FTA (IGAD, 2016: 22). IGAD’s decision to pursue an FTA was thought of as a practical effort towards the organisation’s goal of support­ ing the movement of goods, services and people. Additionally, other regional multilateralism framework efforts have sought to accelerate the actualisation of an integrated region that is prosperous and peaceful for the enjoyment of its population. For instance, IGAD identifies Regional Economic Cooperation and Integration as a priority policy area through which it is interested in creating an open, unified regional economic space for the business community – including a single market open to competitive entry and well-integrated into the continental and global economies” (IGAD, 2016: 22) – which aligns with the liberal ideals of normative regionalism. Another important intended objective is IGAD’s promotion of peace in the Horn of Africa, particularly given that the region had witnessed numerous cases of protracted political instability as well as inter- and intra-state conflict. Human security challenges in the region stem from territorial and border disputes, polit­ ical fragility, resource scarcity and environmental degradation (Khadiagala, 2008: 1), which in turn have led to conflict at several levels. For example, con­ flict over the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia has been the source of three wars between the two countries dating back from 1961 to 1978 and con­ tributed to the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. State collapse and humanitar­ ian crisis in Somalia prompted the deployment of UN peace operations, which culminated in the infamous “Black Hawk Down” battle in 1993 and subsequent situations where “governance without government” (Menkhaus, 2006:  75) existed through the involvement of a variety of non-state actors including Al-Shabaab. War broke out again between Ethiopia and Somalia from 2006 to 2009 when Ethiopia intervened with the backing of United States efforts to dis­ lodge Somalia’s Islamic Courts Union government, which is viewed as a threat to its stability and territorial integrity (Barnes and Harun, 2007: 151). IGAD has gained the support of the AU and the United Nations, demonstrated via their support of IGAD-led peace-focused diplomacy and state-building initiatives in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia (see Apuulli, 2015; Mays, 2009; Tavares, 2010). The agents of informal regionalism primarily consist of small-scale entrepre­ neurs, pastoralists, organised criminal networks, and non-state armed groups (NSAGs). This list is not exhaustive, as formal representatives of the state, such as soldiers (e.g., selling weapons to NSAGs) and border officials (e.g., facilitating graft), also drive informal regionalism. Their intended objectives can be best understood though the emergence of complex political structures built on neo­ patrimonialism, whereby gifts and favours are exchanged for power and influ­ ence (van de Walle, 2007; Vicente and Wantchekon, 2009). As de Waal (2014) notes, clientelism has been an important element in the protracted instability of conflicts in the Horn of Africa. In the IGAD-Horn of Africa relationship,

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these historical structures are further compounded by violence and conflict. For instance, de Waal (2014) describes South Sudan’s “political marketplace” as one that is shaped by the country’s complex military-political patronage system to such an extent that little remains for providing public goods to the citizenry. Additionally, this system was mobilised to exploit “the greed and grievance of southern elites to turn the civil war into an internecine conflict between south­ ern Sudanese armed groups, with militia commanders selling their services to the highest bidder” (de Waal, 2014: 352). Ultimately, clientelism, patronage and neopatrimonialism create a system of which corruption and influence peddling are defining features. As de Waal (2014: 349) puts it, “in a rentier political mar­ ketplace, corruption and patronage are the system. There may be bubbles of integrity, due to the efforts of committed and influential individuals to carve out a sphere of public spiritedness, but they are fragile and subordinate to the kleptocratic operation of the broader system.” These micro-regional, state-level dynamics have an influence on the broader regional dynamics of IGAD-Horn of Africa relations. Illicit trade is another important intended objective and driver of the informal region-building part of bifurcated interregionalism. The trade of arms in the Horn of Africa is predominantly dominated by small-scale, informal and illicit networks. For instance, Mack and Slijper (2016: 54) note that small-arms trade in South Sudanese border areas is between pastoralist, tribalist groups and militias. And, in the case of the South Sudanese White Army, weapons and ammunition are locally obtained from traders across Ethiopia’s Gambella border region. Other scholars such as Wezeman (2010: 4) explore the risks associated with provid­ ing arms to regional security groups such as African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali forces. In 2008, for example, it was alleged that Ethiopian units serving with AMISOM had sold arms and ammunition provided to them or confiscated from rebels and sold directly traders in the Somali arms market. The above case of agents who represent formal regionalism engaging in illicit trade with agents of informal regionalism remind us that although the overarch­ ing relationship is one of competition, there are instances of cooperation within bifurcated interregionalism. This recognition of the blurred dynamics between formal and informal regionalism and their agents is to be welcomed, as there is “messiness” in practice when analysing bifurcated interregionalism. Cognisant of the wide spectrum of intended objectives, we now proceed to an analysis of how the competition within bifurcated interregionalism produces unintended consequences.

Unintended consequences of bifurcated interregionalism in IGAD-Horn of Africa We now investigate how the bifurcated interregionalism of IGAD-Horn pro­ duces unintended consequences that diverge from the above intended objectives of the respective regionalisms.

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The main unintended consequence that our study finds is that some public sector elites accrue private gain in a manner that undermines the production of public goods measured by economic prosperity and security. IGAD’s heads of state, ministers, bureaucrats and diplomats do not intend for their efforts outlined in the above section to result in the following outcomes. Although they are also state actors and indeed considered public sector agents, it is largely a separate set of public sector elites – including well-placed political appointees, public servants and partisan affiliates – that take advantage of their positions in the apparatuses of government in relation to formal regionalism to accrue personal benefits. Söderbaum (2011: 60) notes that regionalism can provide conditions whereby ‘regime actors use their power positions within the state apparatus in order to erect a complex mode of regionalisation, characterised by informality and driven by rent-seeking and personal self-interest’. Some public sector elites of IGAD member-states take advantage of regionalisation processes under the cover of bifurcated interregionalism with non-state actors in various economic sectors. In East Africa, the centrality of the cattle sector in economic and symbolic terms casts it as an evocative example of how bifurcated interregionalism has the effect of opening up spaces for certain public sector elites to establish patronage net­ works with pastoralists that ultimately provide personal gains. Among the most important informal regionalism actors in the Horn of Africa are the pastoralists, whose hinterlands reach across boundaries of states and are found in the lowlands of Ethiopia, Somalia, Northern and Eastern Kenya, and the borders between Tanzania and Uganda (Pavanello, 2009). Under cover of IGAD’s push for greater intra-regional trade and loosening of intra-regional borders as part of economic integration, well-placed public sector elites are able to participate in the cattle trade for personal enrichment by circumventing customs documentation as well as avoiding various fees and levies. An increase in illegal cross-border cattle flows is also less likely to arouse attention among residents of the borderlands dur­ ing a period of loosening border controls. In a similar vein, delivery of “new” customs forms is often delayed, and the confusion over the use of “old” versus “new” forms is an additional layer of “cover” that well-placed political appoin­ tees, public servants (including police) and political party officials can exploit (Marchand et al., 2016). The annual value of the informal livestock trade out of Ethiopia alone is an estimated $200 million (Byiers, 2016: 44). IGAD memberstates do not receive tax revenues from the illicit cattle trade, and they must wrestle with the unchecked transmission of pests and disease in the sector. A companion unintended consequence is the loss of the public good of tax inflows, which is compounded by the burden placed on the government (and hence the public) stemming from the episodic outbreak of pathogens in the animal live­ stock sector. IGAD officials have long sought to increase formal intra-regional trade. In its 2016 State of the Region report (IGAD, 2016: 7) states that the “over-arching objective of regional integration is to create an open, unified, regional eco­ nomic space for private operators – a single market open to competitive entry

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and well-integrated into the global economy”. Despite the focus on liberalising trade, merchants must nonetheless obtain licences to operate, collect taxes and submit them to government coffers, pass a variety of inspections and regulatory checks in order to conduct business. In practice, the regulatory oversight is not only very slow but also opens up opportunities for demands for bribes by public servants whose modest government incomes are steadily being reduced owing to inflation. Graft of this nature increases costs for merchants and generates delays, frustrations and grievances. However, the overlapping regionalism in the Horn of Africa presents traders and consumers with an attractive alternative: an infor­ mal common market in the border areas of Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia that is bereft of (though not untouched by) corruption and delays. Like the regional illicit cattle trade, this informal common market is a concrete example of another unintended consequence – one that is anathema to the intended objective of regional economic integration under the aegis of IGAD officials. The impact of the unintended consequence of an informal common market is apparent in the statistical tracking of formal trade within IGAD. As depicted in Figure 9.1, IGAD’s efforts to boost trade via liberalisation generating some initial increases in formal flows from 1995 to 2010. However, the rise of the aforementioned informal common market in the Horn of Africa has meant that formal trade in the region has remained flat over the past decade. Hence, despite IGAD’s ambitions, small-scale entrepreneurs do not always choose to conduct business via formal channels. Like some pastoralists, some small-scale entrepreneurs find the illicit channels and networks of informal regionalism to be more efficient and therefore profitable. In comparative terms, this unintended conse­ quence of bifurcated interregionalism on formal trade flows is more pronounced in the Horn of Africa than other regions. The World Bank (2014) notes that IGAD lags behind other regional organisations in facilitating and expanding

FIGURE 9.1

Annual intra- and extra-trade (Merchandise), IGAD Countries, 1995–20183

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trade agreements in the Horn of Africa. Informal trade among IGAD memberstates is estimated to represent as much as 40% of the region’s Gross Domestic Product (Byiers, 2016: 45). Although this informal trade has vital development spin-offs, it does not occur in a way that would allow state actors to capture taxation revenues that could be redistributed, at least in theory, as spending on public goods. This finding is underscored by Healy (2011: 10), who notes that whilst the Horn of Africa is involved in various stages of economic integration, with slow progress being made by states, informal cross-border trade continues unimpeded, leading to the aforementioned development of an informal common market in the heart of the Horn of Africa. Against the backdrop of economic repercussions stemming from the above unintended consequences, residents of the Horn of Africa live in what is widely regarded as the most conflict-affected sub-region in Africa (Mengisteab, 2011: 10). It has experienced more inter-state wars than any other region on the continent, and every country in it has faced at least one civil war, exacerbated by intra­ regionals flows of small arms and light weapons. Human security is concerned with economic development as well as personal security, which can be applied to a particular region. One of IGAD’s primary objectives is the promotion of peace and security in the Horn of Africa. However, IGAD faces a competitor on this front. That is, NSAGs in the region, financially enabled by illicit networks of shadow regionalism, compete with IGAD to be seen as the preferred guarantors of personal security for residents in the Horn of Africa. Further complicating this competitive relationship between formal and informal regionalism is the fact that conflicts in the Horn of Africa differ from one another in scope and intensity in that com­ munal conflicts often lead to inter-state conflict as a result of the prevalence of the norm of “mutual interference” (Cliffe, 1999: 89; Kroslak, 2008; Grant, 2011; Dumo, 2020), whereby ethnic-based insurgency groups are supported as proxies in the form of NSAGs in the conflicts between IGAD member-states Ethiopia and Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Sudan and South Sudan. Norms that guide relations in other regional organisations, such as that of intra-organisation non­ interference, generally do not apply in the case of IGAD (Healy, 2009: 4). Ethiopian interference in Somalia is a contemporary, instructive example of norm divergence in formal regionalism. This interference in a fellow IGAD member-state occurred via proxy NSAGs, but “for the sake of appearances” Ethiopia lobbied for the deployment of an IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM). This ultimately failed to gain support from the UN Security Council despite initial approval from the AU Peace and Security Council (Williams, 2018: 27). Deployment of IGASOM would have meant lift­ ing the UN arms embargo on Somalia at a time of heightened arms prolifera­ tion through proxy NSAGs. The fact that most IGAD member-states had vested interests in Somalia’s conflict suggested the potential for further destabilisation. AMISOM was therefore authorised instead of IGASOM. AMISOM, in Somalia for more than a decade and with a mixed-track record in dealing with NSAGs, has a provisional withdrawal date of December 2020.

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Despite IGAD member-states destabilising one another for several years, NSAGs have not been able to take advantage of such activity or successfully offer a viable alternative as security guarantors. The most notorious NSAG in the region, Al-Shabaab, has been unable to translate its sustaining networks of shadow regionalism into implementing its theocratic vision of peace and security within its sphere of influence. If anything, Al-Shabaab has fomented greater regional instability and imperilled human security. In other words, the competition at the core of this case of bifurcated interregionalism is not pro­ ducing IGAD’s intended outcome of peace and security. This situation might lead to more robust interventions by government armed forces and regional peacekeeping missions, which in turn would be undesired from the perspec­ tive of NSAGs like Al-Shabaab and potentially strengthen IGAD’s position a regional security coordinator. Meanwhile, the residents of the Horn of Africa continue to be exposed to festering intra-regional conflicts and oft-broken peace agreements.

Conclusion Through an agential constructivist lens, this chapter has examined the unin­ tended consequences of bifurcated interregionalism involving IGAD and the Horn of Africa. By taking an inductive approach, we have provided a contex­ tual understanding of interregional interactions and their impacts within East Africa. The study analyses how the liberal region-building objectives of for­ mal regionalism compete with informal regionalism in the Horn of Africa, and vice versa. The attendant unintended consequences primarily constitute spaces for some public sector elites to capture private gains as well as an expanding informal common market in the middle of the Horn of Africa. In addition, the overlapping regionalism is set out for future military and regional peacekeeping missions. As UN and World Bank statistics corroborate, the knock-on effects of these unintended consequences include weak levels of relative economic pros­ perity, and stagnant flows of formal intra-regional trade and investment continue throughout the Horn of Africa. This has been exacerbated by other knock-on effects in the form of continuing regional violence and insecurity as well as per­ sistent informal and illicit trade within the Horn of Africa. There is an impor­ tant distinction to be made between illicit networks and informal networks; the latter largely are thought of in relation to individuals who are self-employed and are not employed in the formal economy (Lee, 2014: 16). The idea of illicit economies, on the other hand, refers to a degree of criminal enterprise and trade in goods or services that are not legal. Informal economies are not necessarily illicit, whilst illicit economies are certainly informal. In the Horn of Africa, as in much of Africa, illicit and informal networks dominate the economic structures and have had noticeable impacts. Healy (2011: 23) notes that “informal trade is difficult for governments to manage but is often the most effective, sometimes the only, means to supply basic goods to outlying places … maintaining food

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security and is a key source of income and employment in remote areas where other economic opportunities are very limited.” As we elucidated in the chapter, however, this underscores the perceptions that many residents of the region have of state actors – corrupt and lacking in effectiveness – hence the attractiveness of informal actors in East Africa. To that end, we have advanced the concept of bifurcated interregionalism to shed light on these governance challenges and draw attention to attendant unintended consequences. Actors involved in the illicit market thrive with the lack of good governance, which is bolstered by the inability of IGAD to con­ trol borders and enact inclusive trade policies. Despite efforts of one set of state actors to disseminate normative regionalism’s liberal ideals, the unintended con­ sequences of bifurcated interregionalism persist at the hands of other well-placed public sectors actors. Smuggling, bribery and threats to human security continue throughout the IGAD region (Marchand et al., 2016: 9). Additionally, longstanding informal trade patterns, such as pastoralists and nomadic communities operating within borderlands, also aid these actors. This is not only due to the difficulty associated with governing large spaces but also the nuances of limited statehood associated with such systems. Certainly, there is no easy way to have informal regional economies without having shadow regionalisms. We have also responded to calls from scholars such as Le Gouriellec (2018) and Enns, Andrews, and Grant (2020) for studies that emphasise how regions of the Global South, like East Africa, are home to regional security dynamics akin to those found in the Global North. Our study therefore informs such a broadening of IR scholarship so that the latter may become truly global in scope. Specifically, the bifurcated interregionalism of IGAD-Horn of Africa under­ scores the important notion that relationships between state and non-state actors are not simply based on material power calculations but that the symbolism, agential action of socially-constructed identities, and personal financial interests are vital for understanding why normative regionalism often falls short of its intended liberal objectives. Should we expect the unintended consequences of bifurcated interregion­ alism to persist or is some modicum of responsiveness and change possible? The issue of informal trade sheds some light on this question. In the case of IGAD, it seems that some degree of responsiveness and change is indeed possible. Although IGAD has not yet completed an FTA – despite the development of the aforementioned initiatives and frameworks on formal regional trade – recent policy is finally recognising the importance of informal cross-border trade in the region. Since 2008, IGAD has implemented a number of trade integration initiatives such as the Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP), an initiative that targets small agro-producers and traders, as well as regional capacity building in the areas of mineral resources development, industrialisation and value addi­ tion (IGAD, 2016: 22). Initiatives like TFAP offer IGAD a mechanism to fos­ ter and manage informal cross-border trade in the region, a policy issue that

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remains high amongst IGAD’s trade priorities. In the Horn of Africa, informal cross-border trade represents a significant portion of regional trade, and consists of micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises. The creation of an IGADspecific FTA had included a “Free Mobility Regime” through the implemen­ tation of a Protocol for the Free Movement of Persons, which “aims to reduce travel restrictions persisting in the region and to facilitate movement, the right of establishment of business and employment, residence, the acquisition of work permits, and pastoral mobility” (IGAD, 2018).4 Additionally, at the June 2018 Meeting of Ministers Responsible for Trade, IGAD adopted a series of new pol­ icy positions including supporting informal cross-border trade through trade facilitation at border crossing points, promoting the participation of borderland communities in regional trade, and supporting member states with border secu­ rity and customs (IGAD, 2018). In the case of the agents of informal regionalism in the Horn of Africa, it is difficult to predict how they will change in response to these policy developments. Even if TFAP achieves its objectives, new unin­ tended consequences are likely to arise, which are of course very difficult to anticipate at present. This difficulty should not be lamented; rather, the challenge of forecasting unanticipated consequences should be embraced. The above analyses are consistent with an agential constructivist approach to regionalism and also suggest that scholars of interregionalism are encouraged to place more emphasis on the agency of state and non-state actors, and the ability of these actors to effect broader social change. Agential constructivism recog­ nises that African actors are not merely “norm-takers” (Grant, 2018a; 2018b). In East Africa and other parts of the continent, African non-state and state actors are remaking the liberal norms of economic and political integration of formal regionalism and recasting them in order to account for local realities (e.g. for­ mal regional institutions lack legitimacy and/or the capacity to provide public goods). This form of agency must be kept in mind when assessing the actorness of formal regionalism – and informal regionalism – of bifurcated interregionalism in Africa and elsewhere across the globe.

Notes 1 The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada (Doc­ toral Fellowships; Insight Development Grant; Partnership Development Grant) and Queen’s University (grants from the Senate Advisory Research Committee; Office of the Vice-Principal (Research)-International Research Fund; Department of Political Studies-Sir Edward Peacock Faculty Research Fund) provided partial research fund­ ing for this chapter. The authors thank Carolyn Thompson for her research assistance as well as Paul Bacon (discussant), the other members of the authors’ workshop at the University of Hamburg, and the book editors for their supportive comments. The views presented in the chapter belong to the authors and do not reflect those of the abovementioned institutions or individuals. 2 See for example: Hettne and Inotai (1994), Hettne and Söderbaum (1998, 2000), Bach (1999; 2003), Söderbaum and Shaw (2003), Grant and Söderbaum (2003), Hentz and

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Bøås (2003), Bøås (2003), Bøås et al. (2003), Väyrynen (2003), Acharya and Johnston (2007), Hurrell (2007), Söderbaum and Taylor (2007), Shaw et al. (2011), LorenzCarl and Rempe (2013), Lopez-Lucia (2018), and Mattheis et al. (2019). 3 Based on data from UNCTAD. Available at: https://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/. Accessed on 28 May, 2020. 4 Available at: https://igad.int/index.php/about-us/the-igad-region. Accessed on 28 May, 2020.

Bibliography Journal articles Alorse, Raynold Wonder, W.R. Nadège Compaoré and J. Andrew Grant. 2015. Assessing the European Union’s Engagement with Transnational Policy Networks on ConflictProne Natural Resources. Contemporary Politics 21(3): 245–257. Apuulli, K.P. 2015. IGAD’s Mediation in the Current South Sudan Conflict: Prospects and Challenges. African Security 8(2): 120–145. Baert, Patrick. 1991. Unintended Consequences: A Typology and Examples. International Sociology 6(2): 201–210. Barnes, C. and H. Harun. 2007. The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts. Journal of Eastern African Studies 1(2): 151–160. Cliffe, Lionel. 1999. Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa. Third World Quarterly 20(1): 89–111. De Waal, Alex. 2014. When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in South Sudan. African Affairs 113(452): 347–369. Enns, Charis, Nathan Andrews and J. Andrew Grant. 2020. Security for Whom? Analysing Hybrid Security Governance in Africa’s Extractive Sectors. International Affairs 96(4): 995–1013. Grant, J. Andrew. 2005. Diamonds, Foreign Aid, and the Uncertain Prospects for PostConflict Reconstruction in Sierra Leone. The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 94(381): 443–457. Grant, J. Andrew. 2010. Natural Resources, International Regimes and State-Building: Diamonds in West Africa. Comparative Social Research 27(1): 223–248. Grant, J. Andrew. 2018a. Agential Constructivism and Change in World Politics. International Studies Review 20(2): 255–263. Grant, J. Andrew and Ian Taylor. 2004. Global Governance and Conflict Diamonds: The Kimberley Process and the Quest for Clean Gems. The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 93(375): 385–401. Hettne, Björn and Fredrik Söderbaum. 1998. The New Regionalism Approach. Politeia 17(3): 6–21. Hettne, Björn and Fredrik Söderbaum. 2000. Theorising the Rise of Regionness. New Political Economy 5(3): 457–473. Hurrell, Andrew. 2007. One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society. International Affairs 83(1): 127–146. Le Gouriellec, Sonia. 2018. Regional Power and Contested Hierarchy: Ethiopia, an ‘Imperfect Hegemon’ in the Horn of Africa. International Affairs 94(5): 1059–1075. Lopez-Lucia, Elisa. 2015. Regional Powers and Regional Security Governance: An Interpretive Perspective on the Policies of Nigeria and Brazil. International Relations 29(3): 348–362.

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New Politics of Regionalism: Perspectives from Africa, Latin America and AsiaPacific. London: Routledge, 146–158. Grant, J. Andrew. 2018b. Eliminating Conflict Diamonds and Other Conflict-Prone Minerals. In: Coleman, Katharina P. and Thomas K. Tieku (Eds.). African Actors in International Security: Shaping Contemporary Norms. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 51–71. Grant, J. Andrew. 2020. Conflict-Prone Minerals, Forced Migration and Norm Dynamics in the Kimberley Process and ICGLR. In: Krieger, Tim, Diana Panke, and Michael Pregernig (Eds.). Environmental Conflicts, Migration and Governance. Bristol: Bristol University Press, 197–217. Grant, J. Andrew, Abdiasis Issa, Fredrik Söderbaum and Badriyya Yusuf. 2020. Regionalism (formal and informal). In: Falola, Toyin and Emmanual Mbah (Eds.). Routledge Encyclopedia of African Studies. New York: Routledge. Grant, J. Andrew, Matthew I. Mitchell and Frank K. Nyame. 2011. New Regionalisms, Micro-Regionalisms, and the Migration-Conflict Nexus: Evidence from Natural Resource Sectors in West Africa. In: Shaw, Timothy M., J. Andrew Grant and Scarlett Cornelissen (Eds.). The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalisms. Aldershot: Ashgate, 375–396. Grant, J. Andrew, Matthew I. Mitchell, Frank K. Nyame and Natalia Yakovleva. 2013. Micro-Regionalisms, Information and Communication Technologies, and Migration in West Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Ghana’s Diamond, Cocoa, and Gold Sectors. In: Lorenz-Carl Ulrike and Martin Rempe (Eds). Mapping Agency: Comparing Regionalisms in Africa. Aldershot: Ashgate, 149–174. Grant, J. Andrew and Thomas Kwasi Tieku. 2012. New Regionalisms and the African Union: Reflections on the Rise of Africrats, Regional Economic Integration, and Inter-Regional Relations. In: McKercher, B.J.C. (Ed). Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft. London: Routledge, 264–273. Hänggi, Heiner, Ralf Roloff and Jürgen Rüland. 2006. Interregionalism: A New Phenomenon in International Relations. In: Hänggi, Heiner, Ralf Roloff, and Jürgen Rüland (Eds). Interregionalism and International Relations. London: Routledge, 3–14. Hettne, Björn and Frederik Ponjaert. 2014. Interregionalism and World Order: The Diverging EU and US Models. In: Telò, Mario (Ed.). European Union and New Regionalism: Competing Regionalism and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era 2nd Edition. London: Routledge, 115–138. Iheduru, Okechukwu C. 2003. New Regionalism, States and Non-State Actors in West Africa. In: Grant, J. Andrew and Fredrik Söderbaum (Eds.). The New Regionalism in Africa. Aldershot: Ashgate, 47–66. Iheduru, Okechukwu. C. 2011. The ‘New’ ECOWAS: Implications for the Study of Regional Integration. In: Shaw, Timothy M., J. Andrew Grant and Scarlett Cornelissen (Eds.). The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalisms. Aldershot: Ashgate, 213–239. MacLean, Sandra J. 2003. New Regionalism and Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Networks of Plunder and Networks for Peace. In: Grant, J. Andrew and Fredrik Söderbaum (Eds.). The New Regionalism in Africa. Aldershot: Ashgate, 110–124. Mattheis, Frank. 2017. Towards Bifurcated Regionalism: The Production of Regional Overlaps in Central Africa. In: Engel, Ulf, Heidrun Zinecker, Frank Mattheis, Antje Dietze, and Thomas Plötze (Eds.). The New Politics of Regionalism: Perspectives from Africa, Latin America and Asia-Pacific. London: Routledge, 57–71.

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Roloff, Ralf. 2006. Interregionalism in Theoretical Perspective: State of the Art. In: Hänggi, Heiner, Ralf Roloff, and Jürgen Rüland (Eds.). Interregionalism and International Relations. London: Routledge, 17–30. Shaw, Timothy M., Fredrik Söderbaum, Julius E. Nyang’oro, and J. Andrew Grant. 2003. The Future of New Regionalism in Africa: Regional Governance, Human Security/Development and Beyond. In: Grant, J. Andrew and Fredrik Söderbaum (Eds.). The New Regionalism in Africa. Aldershot: Ashgate, 192–206. Söderbaum, Fredrik. 2011. Formal and Informal Regionalism. In: Shaw, Timothy M., J. Andrew Grant and Scarlett Cornelissen (Eds.). The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalisms, Aldershot: Ashgate, 51–67. Söderbaum, Fredrik and Ian Taylor. 2003. The Role of the State in the Maputo Development Corridor. In: Söderbaum, Fredrik and Ian Taylor (Eds.). Regionalism and Uneven Development: The Case of the Maputo Development Corridor, Aldershot: Ashgate, 41–52.

Monographs Acharya, Amitav and Alastair Iain Johnston, (Eds.). 2007. Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Doidge, Mathew. 2011. The European Union and Interregionalism: Patterns of Engagement. London: Routledge. Grant, J. Andrew and Fredrik Söderbaum, (Eds.). 2003. The New Regionalism in Africa. Aldershot: Ashgate. Hentz, James J. and Morten Bøås (Eds.). 2003. New and Critical Security and Regionalism: Beyond the Nation-State. Aldershot: Ashgate. Lee, M.C. 2014. Africa’s World Trade: Informal Economies and Globalization from Below. London: Zed Books. Lorenz-Carl, Ulrike and Martin Rempe, (Eds.). 2013. Mapping Agency: Comparing Regionalisms in Africa, Aldershot: Ashgate. Mattheis, Frank, Luca Raineri, and Alessandra Russo. 2019. Fringe Regionalism: When Peripheries Become Regions. London: Palgrave. Shaw, Timothy M., J. Andrew Grant and Scarlett Cornelissen, (Eds.). 2011. The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalisms. Aldershot: Ashgate. Söderbaum, Fredrik. 2004. The Political Economy of Regionalism: The Case of Southern Africa, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Söderbaum, Fredrik and Timothy M. Shaw, (Eds). 2003. Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Tavares, Rodrigo. 2010. Regional Security: The Capacity of International Organizations. London: Routledge.

Official documents IGAD. n.d. IGAD Regional Strategy. Available at: https://igad.int/about-us/strategy IGAD. 2016. IGAD State of the Region Report: A Popular Version – Formulation of IGAD Strategy and Medium-Term Implementation Plan 2016-2020, Baseline Studies at the National Level on IGAD Priority Sector. Available at: https://igad.int/ documents/7-igad-state-of-the-region-v9/file IGAD. 2018. About Us – The IGAD Region. Available at: https://igad.int/index.php/ about-us/the-igad-region.

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Online resources Dumo, Denis. 2020. “South Sudan’s Kiir, Machar Differ Over States, Jeopardising Unity Government.” Reuters. May 8. Available at: www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan­ politics/south-sudans-kiir-machar-differ-over-states-jeopardising-unity-government­ idUSKBN22K244 Accessed on: 28 May 2020. Kroslak, Daniela. 2008. Unfinished Peace in the Horn of Africa. International Crisis Group. Available at: www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/unfinished-peace-horn­ africa Accessed on: 28 May 2020. Mack, Daniel and Frank Slijper. 2016. Armed and Insecure: An overview of arms transfers and armed violence in the Horn of Africa (2010–2015). PAX for Peace. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/pax-report-horn-of-africa­ armed-and-insecure.pdf Accessed on: 28 May 2020. Williams, P.D. 2018. Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007–2017. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: www-oxfordscholarship-com.proxy.queensu.ca/view/10.1093/oso/ 9780198724544.001.0001/oso-9780198724544-chapter-2#oso-9780198724544­ chapter-2-note-133 Date accessed: 28 May 2020.

Other Byiers, Bruce. 2016. The Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa: Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Report. Brussels: European Centre for Development Policy Management. Report. Haastrup, Toni and Elisa Lopez-Lucia. 2014. Nigeria and Regional Security. Research Paper No. 49. Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Research Paper. Healy, Sally. 2009. An Assessment of IGAD’s Contribution to Regional Security in the Horn of Africa. London: LSE Crisis States Working Paper No. 59. Research Paper. Healy, Sally. 2011. Hostage to Conflict: Prospects for Building Regional Economic Cooperation in the Horn of Africa. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. Available at: www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/179951 Date accessed: 28 May 2020. Report. Hettne, Björn and András Inotai. 1994. The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and International Security, Helsinki: UNU/WIDER. Research Paper. Khadiagala, Gilbert. 2008. Eastern Africa: Security and the Legacy of Fragility. International Peace Institute. Africa Program Working Paper Series. Available at: www. ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/eastern_africa.pdf Date accessed: 28 May 2020. Research Paper. Marchand, Katrin, Inez Roosen, Julia Reinold and Melissa Siegel. 2016. Irregular Migration from and In the East and Horn of Africa. Maastricht: Maastricht University. Research Paper. Mays, Terry. 2009. The African Union’s African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Why Did it Successfully Deploy Following the Failure of the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM). New York: United Nations Peace Support Operations. Report. Mengisteab, Kidane. 2011. Critical Factors in the Horn of Africa’s Raging Conflicts. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Discussion Paper 67. Available at: www.operationspaix. net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6670∼v∼Critical_Factors_in_the_Horn_of_Africa_s_ Raging_Conflicts.pdf Date accessed: 28 May 2020. Research Paper.

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Pavanello, Sara. 2009. Pastoralists’ Vulnerability in the Horn of Africa: Exploring Political Marginalisation, Donors’ Policies and Cross-Border Issues – Literature Review. London: Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) Overseas Development Institute. Research Paper. Salinas, Eva. 2014. Henry Kissinger — The Peacemaker?. Toronto: Canadian International Council. 30 October. Interview Transcript. Söderbaum, Fredrik and Ian Taylor, (Eds). 2007. Micro-Regionalism in West Africa Evidence from Two Case Studies. Discussion Paper 34. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Research Paper. Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2007. The Path from Neopatrimonialism: Democracy and Clientelism in Africa Today. Research Paper. Wezeman, P.D. 2010. Arms Flows and the Conflict in Somalia. SIPRI. Report.

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WHEN EXTERNAL DRIVERS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION TURN INTO ACTORS OF REGIONAL DISINTEGRATION Regionalism and interregionalism in the South Caucasus Giulia Prelz Oltramonti Introduction This chapter looks at the interaction between interregionalism, regionalism and externally driven region-building taking place in a specific Eurasian area. It focuses on the South Caucasus, a region that was highly integrated until 1991 and has been subjected to a process of political and economic fragmentation since then. Although the few timid Caucasus-based attempts at fostering regionalism have been severely curtailed by unresolved conflicts, two external actors – Russia and the European Union (EU) – have pursued larger regional and interregional frameworks that directly impact on region-building processes. This chapter demonstrates that these regional and interregional projects added to the very weak foundations of regionalism in the Caucasus, which was easily undermined by a scramble for power in the last decade. Until 1991, the geopolitical map of the Caucasus looked fairly straightforward on paper. One long border divided the Soviet Union from its southern neigh­ bours, and internally, administrative boundaries parcelled the territory into Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR), Autonomous SSR and Autonomous Oblasts. The whole territory belonged to a large integrated economic space – the Soviet Union – that had no borders or customs fracturing it. Soviet boundaries were unquestionably disturbed by the fall of the USSR, and by events even earlier than that. Since then, dividing lines on maps of the Caucasus have multiplied at a considerable speed. National borders were established de jure by the three newly independent states, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and, almost at once, de facto borders were superimposed as a result of the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh (1991–1994), South Ossetia (1991–1992), and Abkhazia (1992–1993). Although national and geopolitical transformations are the most easily identifiable changes,

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shifting cleavages across the region have occurred in a multiplicity of areas, espe­ cially as local and regional economic, commercial and security structures have overlapped with those of external actors. Against the process of regional disaggregation that took place after the fall of the Soviet Union, external actors encouraged various processes of what they referred to as regional integration. Russia encouraged – forcefully in Georgia’s case – regional integration within the umbrella of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in line with its intended objective of maintaining the South Caucasus in its own sphere of regional influence. The EU, instead, aimed at interacting with the South Caucasus on an interregional footing, as hence promoted through the creation of a regional partner in the region, deal­ ing with the three countries of the Caucasus in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and, since 2009, with its Eastern Partnership (EaP). However, Georgia quit the CIS in 2009 in the aftermath of the RussoGeorgian War; and the EU’s attempt to increase ties with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan at the same pace floundered. The various attempts by external actors to drive regional integration were interpreted as expansion in the light of the geopolitical scramble for the Caucasus that took place in the 2000s and resisted by the opposing power. As a result, a new phase of integration took place in the Caucasus – not regional integration among Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, but two differ­ ent projects of regionalism driven by external actors. The first, led by Russia, aspired to integrate the South Caucasus within its regional project, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU); the second, fostered by the EU, was aimed at develop­ ing regionalism in the South Caucasus, with a further goal of establishing strong interregional links with the EU. As a consequence of these competing projects, the South Caucasus ended up being split in three ways: Armenia became a member of the EEU, Georgia is linked to the EU by an Association Agreement (AA) and Azerbaijan pursues its own course outside larger integration projects. In other words, there has been a phase of regional disintegration and of interregional balancing, leaving the region more divided and less open to regional cooperation than before – whether in terms of security, economics or on a political level. Regional fragmentation and disintegration, which impact significantly on cross-border communities, thus constitute the main unintended consequences identified in this chapter. Their appraisal, however, differs: whereas the EU regards fragmentation and dis­ integrationas negative consequences, Russia has folded them into its well-tested strategy of divide et impera. After tracing these processes, the goal of this chapter is to identify and ana­ lyse the gap between the all-pervasive discourse of regionalism and a reality of regional disintegration; to identify the loci of friction in the processes of interre­ gionalism and regional competition; and to sketch out the unintended effect of regionalism and interregionalism in the form of regional disintegration on key segments of the ground.

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What is meant here by interregionalism? In this chapter, interregionalism indi­ cates one specific relationship: that between the EU and an imaginary region, namely the South Caucasus, which the EU itself has been in the process of promot­ ing. It is thus a case of hybrid interregionalism that contains a unilateral objective of pure interregionalism (cf. Lopez-Lucia and Mattheis in this volume). In this exercise of identification of the unintended consequences of interregionalism, the three main regional actors are taken into account: the EU, Russia with the EEU and the South Caucasus as a previously integrated region. Due to being a largely disintegrated area and object of dispute, the latter currently has a low level of actor­ ness that is diffused in the three capitals and expressed through various strategies of adaptation. The choice of focus on the three capitals is not to deny the existence of other actors (whether state actors, business and residents) in this delicate balance, and, in fact, they appear in the following pages. However, most attention here is paid to institutional actors and drivers of regional integration and disintegration. As this chapter demonstrates, local actors are largely forced to accommodate and adapt to the consequences of the sparring interregionalism that unfolds in the region, although they are also able to take advantage of power rivalry. This chapter proceeds as follows: first, it delves into the topic of postSoviet transition, questioning the appropriateness of the concept of transition and sketching the context that led to a process of disaggregation in the South Caucasus. Second, it outlines the creation and escalation of numerous conflicts in the region, and their partial transformation (at least in Georgia) from localised violent disputes to interstate war in the 2000s. Third, it addresses the fact that, since the end of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus, as a region, has been largely generated from the outside, through competing regional and interre­ gional projects. Finally, it shows that these competing projects have accentuated the disaggregation of the region. This disaggregation constitutes an unintended consequence for some, but not all interregional actors, and strategies of accom­ modation have been developed locally as a response.

Complex post-Soviet transitions and regional disintegration In order to understand the interregional links related to the South Caucasus, it is necessary to first unpack what regionalism means in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and the South Caucasus. To do so, we contextualise regionalism in the process of disaggregation of the Soviet Union that coincided with different tra­ jectories in the post-Soviet newly independent states. A significant Soviet leg­ acy can be found in both public and private spheres, which were dramatically reshaped with perestroika, starting in the mid-1980s, and the subsequent pro­ cess of privatisation. Consequently, while this chapter largely discusses formal­ ised, institutional regionalism, it is worth underlining that, in the FSU, there is another crucial aspect of regionalism, namely the mix of formal and infor­ mal interactions among private actors, including businesses, on the other hand (Libman and Vinokurov, 2007).

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As shown by Libman and Vinokurov, the process of regional integration in the FSU differs considerably from most other processes of regional integration across the globe. It is, as opposed to most scenarios of “coming together” regional integration, a process of “holding-together regionalism: the integration of coun­ tries, which until recently were part of a single political entity” (Libman and Vinokurov, 2007: 2). Hence, the starting point is the disaggregation of a uni­ tary state. This is why the process of regional integration in the FSU cannot be understood without taking into account the process of disintegration of the Soviet Union that took place in the early 1990s, including its extent, its limits and its drivers. The fall of the Soviet Union gave way to what is generally labelled a period of economic, social and political transition that proceeded at different speeds in the different regions of the FSU. It is worth underlining that the Soviet politi­ cal and economic systems and institutions were extremely centralised and even while attempts to decentralise the economy had been promoted as part of the Perestroika, the deterioration of economic performance and of living standards led to a sharp turnaround in 1990.1 So, while decentralisation of the Soviet Union was resisted until the end, the all-encompassing centralisation that characterised the Soviet system and therefore connected territories, peoples and modes of pro­ duction in the four corners of the Soviet Union came to an end in 1991, and in the following years the various processes of national transitions led to regional disaggregation. The above-mentioned concept of transition has had many critics, especially when used to describe the post-Soviet context. It has been widely condemned for suggesting a linear transition from a command economy to a market economy, and for failing to reflect the disparities of experiences among different countries and different segments of the population. Because of the multi-dimensionality of post-Soviet transitions, the existing models of transition, which traditionally focused on the modes of transition (whether elite- or mass-driven, by nego­ tiation or by force) and had been developed in other regional settings (Karl and Schmitter, 1991), were difficult to apply. In the FSU, transitions not only included regime changes but also partial or overall conversions of systems of pro­ duction and exchange of goods and services, as well as the creation from scratch of independent national institutions. These three elements (political, economic and institutional) hardly proceeded synchronously. Also, the political, economic and institutional elements evolved accord­ ing to separate trajectories in each of the newly independent countries of the FSU. Regime changes did not take place in most Central Asian republics and in Georgia and Azerbaijan regime change only occurred partially, lacking an alternation in the political leadership after a brief interruption in the early 1990s. For Thomas Carothers, the examples of the post-Soviet states, stuck in what he calls a grey zone, undermine the transitional paradigm, based on the assumption that the logical conclusion of transitions is functioning democracies (Carothers, 2002). At the same time, institution-building and economic reform proceeded

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at different speeds within the various countries. This leads to cases of the FSU being singled out and treated separately, not only from the wider literature on transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America but also within the pool of post-Soviet cases. Although significant differences were observable among post-Soviet countries and regions, certain policies and phenomena were recurrent across the board. These included social repercussions such as growing inequality in the instances where shock therapy strategies were adopted at a macro-economic level. But while the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe are often portrayed as revolutions with large mass demonstrations months or years in the making, in 1991 popular participation was relatively subdued in what became the FSU and independence largely came as a surprise for both authorities and people. Consequently, both governments and people were largely responding to processes of political and economic disintegration instead of actively participating in them (Bridger and Pine, 1998; Daucé and Rousselet, 2011). This does not mean that they were unable to respond to changes at a macro-level but the response mostly took place in terms of adaptation and coping, with little influence stemming from the bottom and directed upwards. The responsive strategies employed were largely determined by local characteristics, histories and previous levels of economic development and interconnectedness with the outside world, leading to marked differences by the first decade of independence. In other words, the disaggre­ gation of the post-Soviet area was tackled nationally and locally according to local characteristics and endowments, which in turn deepened the disaggrega­ tion process.

Disaggregation in the South Caucasus The South Caucasus, which had been forcefully integrated during the Russian empire and the Soviet Union, has been the theatre of a double process of what Karl Deutsch called a “disintegration of amalgamated political communities” (Deutsch et al., 1957). On the one hand, the three countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were bequeathed with independence in 1991, and there­ fore became separated units of a previously united Soviet Union. On the other hand, centrifugal forces affected the unity of those three countries that inherited the mantle of de jure independence from the Soviet Union. Tensions between national capitals and their peripheries had become apparent in the South Caucasus before the key date of 1991, which marked the end of the Soviet Union and the independence of 15 successor states. A series of phe­ nomena, seen as concomitant, lead to a re-evaluation of history and its impact on collective behaviours, namely: perestroika’s openness and the rise of national movements, as well rapid and disorienting changes (Urjewicz, 1995). History and historiography were the widely deployed tool of nationalisms across the region, a trend that continues to this day and was largely discernible in inter­ views (Interviews, 2012, 2015): key actors in Georgia and the separatist regions

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brand themselves as historians first, and as officials/elected representatives after.2 The disciplines of archaeology and anthropology were mobilised to the same ends.3 The national question, interlaced with an account rof the past, became the key node around which contemporary questions should be debated (the econ­ omy, education, the role of religion and the church) ( Jones, 2012). This use of the past, however, meant that, similar to Soviet historiography, the newly developed national historiographies could not support a plurality of opinions.4 Statehood and ethnicity were to go hand in hand. In the final years of the Soviet Union, the communist party was unable to play a moderating role, being “morally and ide­ ologically destroyed from within by corruption” (Urjewicz, 1995). The Soviet ideology of Druzhba Narodov (Friendship of the Peoples)5 was discarded in paral­ lel with the process of de-legitimisation of the communist party. The affirmative action policies that existed during the Soviet Union were outright rejected as unjustly favouring minorities (Slider, 1991).6 The resulting nationalisms led to a violent fragmentation of the newly inde­ pendent states of Azerbaijan and Georgia and to the drastic deterioration of relationships among the various entities, which were previously part of the Soviet Union. This deterioration was far from short-lived and, in fact, conflict has been a defining feature of the South Caucasus over the past 30 years. The collapse of the Soviet Union and independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the early 1990s was accompanied by the emergence of three major secessionist armed conflicts: Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan (with intense fighting in the period 1988–1994), as well as South Ossetia (1991–1992) and Abkhazia (1992–1993) in Georgia. Although ceasefire agreements and interna­ tional conflict management mechanisms were eventually established in all three cases, they did not translate into peace agreements. During the 1990s and much of the 2000s, conflicts in the South Caucasus continued under the conditions of no peace, no war. Although “hot” large-scale violence was largely absent after the signature of ceasefire agreements in the early 1990s (with the notable exception of the Nagorno-Karabakh clashes in 2016), the conflicts were not, as they have often been described, “frozen”. Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh were, to different extents, consolidated as de facto states. What had originally been local disputes gradually solidified as state-to-state conflicts. Armenia and Azerbaijan became all-out adversaries in relation to Nagorno-Karabakh, and Russia became more involved in the conflicts in Georgia. From the early 2000s, the Euro-Atlantic community strengthened its presence in the South Caucasus (Delcour and Duhot, 2011; Zarifian, 2015). In this shifting context, the pro­ tracted conflicts took on a regional security significance. The transformation of the conflicts of the South Caucasus from localised violent disputes into interstate war was laid bare by the 2008 Georgia–Russia war, which concluded with Russia de facto occupying both Abkhazia and South Ossetia and recognising them as independent states. Multilateral efforts to manage the conflicts in Georgia collapsed with the United Nations and the Organisation

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for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) withdrawing their missions. The EU deployed its own monitoring mission and became a co-chair of the Geneva International Discussions on the Georgia conflicts. As a consequence, no discussion of regional integration in the South Caucasus initiated by any of the three internationally recognised countries has ever come to fruition, engendering a consensus around the concept of “broken region” (De Waal, 2012). The conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh makes any discourse of cooperation between Azerbaijan and Armenia toxic, while Georgia’s difficult relationship with Russia is at odds with Armenia’s interests, for which Russia is a key element of its security and economy. These considerations overshadow the potential benefits that would be derived from a closer collaboration of all parties on a number of issues, which span from infrastructure to energy markets and borderland populations. Ceccorulli, Frappi, and Lucarelli (2017: 65) argue that the securitisation of a new issue such as energy has been a fundamental element in the definition of the Southern Caucasus as a region (). However, it is worth noting that, in terms of energy and infrastructure, agreements are established in a way that usually cuts off one of the three countries. Tbilisi is often the central node. This is the case with all major infrastructure initiatives, which have occurred since inde­ pendence, including the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline and Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway. Even if energy security is a key issue in all three countries, it has not led to greater regional integration. On the contrary, the exclusion of Armenia from both abovementioned projects testifies to strategies of exclusion to the detriment of a comprehensive region-building strategy.

An externally generated South Caucasus? The picture described above begs the question: is it even relevant to talk about the South Caucasus in terms of a region? This issue is a bone of contention that was thoroughly unpacked by German (2012a). The debate verges on its appellation (Transcaucasus, Central Caucasus and South Caucasus), on its his­ tory and identity, and on its coherence, reflecting the wider literature on region. Here, region is taken to signify the “larger territorial […] units or sub-systems, between the state level and the global system level (Söderbaum, 2007: 477), given the intent of this chapter, namely to look at the trajectory of cooperation, or lack of it, of certain states with their neighbours and neighbouring powers. There is no scope here for retracing centuries of history of the South Caucasus, but it suffices to underline that its history was characterised by division and pressures – and at times dominion – of the neighbouring empires. Only the creation of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (1918–1918) and the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, within the USSR (1922–1936) allowed for political unity. Both attempts were short-lived and unsuccessful, resulting in the establishment of separate republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). Together with the resurgence of nationalisms, this led

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observers such as Alexander Iskandaryan and Alexander Rondeli to state that there is no common identity in the South Caucasus (German, 2012a: 138–139). It would be disingenuous, however, to negate the numerous ties that con­ nect the various corners of the South Caucasus, especially in terms of infor­ mal regionalism. Family networks in the FSU crisscross borders, a legacy of the Soviet population distribution. In the South Caucasus in particular, there are extensive contacts among people due to inter-marriages, family connections and business relations. Migration flows and management are, to a great extent, still shaped by (post-) Soviet legacies and interdependences (Ademmer and Delcour, 2016). Although the formal economies of the three South Caucasus states are poorly integrated, with higher trade with third countries than among them­ selves, the informal economies of the South Caucasus are intertwined, and trad­ ers have found ways to move across and around closed borders. The markets of Ergneti and Sadakhlo have linked the economies of warring parties and kept goods flowing between areas officially unconnected (Chkhartishvili, Gotsiridze, and Kitsmarishvili, 2004). As for instances of collaboration among sworn ene­ mies on civil matters, these range from civil aviation to firefighting (Sammut, 2018). All these links are far from immutable, and they vary according to the political, geopolitical and economic climates. The key point made by German is to show that, to a large extent, the South Caucasus is “externally generated” (German, 2012a: 137). She underlines the fact that the one-speed regional involvement of the EU, which in the 1990s and 2000s insisted that its approach with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia had to take place on a regional footing, contributed to the solidification of an artifi­ cial regional unit. It is undoubtedly true that until the early 2010s, the EU has attempted to deal with the three South Caucasus states in conjunction. It has justified this position by underlining the need to enhance interregional coopera­ tion, and it has presented itself as its potential catalyst. Still, to this day, observers point to its hypothetical role as “the only international player able […] to nudge the process [of trilateral co-operation] forward” (Sammut, 2018). As for Russia, it is a crucial actor in the creation and maintenance of the South Caucasus as a region. Leaving aside the role of its Soviet predecessor, Russia’s projection of its power over the South Caucasus, coupled with the fact that it strives to depict the area as its own southern neighbourhood, means that the South Caucasus exists as a geopolitical region. However, Russia does not aim to establish interregional relations with the South Caucasus, that its posture consid­ ers the South Caucasus as part of its own backyard has become clear in the 2000s and was openly stated in several instances, including in President Medvedev’s speech in 2008, in which he spoke about the country’s spheres of “privileged interests” (Trenin, 2009). The following section shows that the EU’s and Russia’s involvements in the South Caucasus contribute to a deepening of the ongoing process of disaggre­ gation in the South Caucasus. At the same time, the EU and Russia are substan­ tially shaping the regional political geographies of their neighbourhood. Regions

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are territorial entities “created and recreated in the process of global transfor­ mation” (Hettne et al., 2000). External pressures create regions just as much as internal dynamics (the two are not mutually exclusive) and external actors might aim at extending or securing their influence over the regions that they create. In the South Caucasus, the EU’s and Russia’s regional projects interact – and often clash. These resulting interregional dynamics shape the sparring ground where the two regional projects meet.

Externally driven regionalism In the absence of local initiatives for greater integration among the three coun­ tries of the South Caucasus, external actors have promoted various forms of regionalism and interregionalism with the South Caucasus as a region. Following the 2008 war, the EU’s involvement in the South Caucasus was channelled into the EaP, which was designed to promote engagement with the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe and, implicitly, to counter Russia’s influence. In bilateral terms, this evolved into a roadmap for AAs with Armenia and Georgia, which included a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). The EU and Georgia signed an AA/DCFTA in 2014 (Association Agreement, 2014). The decision of Georgia to move forward with EU association has, however, become a source of instability. Russia has responded to the AA/DCFTA by reinforcing its position in the region. Russia concluded a “Treatyon Alliance and Strategic Partnership” with Abkhazia in January 2015 and agreed a comprehen­ sive “Alliance and Integration Treaty” with South Ossetia in March 2015, further integrating the two regions’ security and economies with Russia. At the same time, Russia has demonstrated its ability to control developments on the ground through a process of borderisation, whereby a de facto international frontier has been built inside Georgia (Prelz Oltramonti, 2016; Markedonov, 2015). Although the EU was developing its interregional agenda, a group of Eurasian states led by Russia were formulating their own initiative. In 2010, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia established the Eurasian Customs Union and agreed in 2011 to establish the EEU, which entered into force on 1 January, 2015. The EEU aims to greatly expand the scope of the Eurasian Customs Union by cre­ ating a single market for goods, services, capital and labour. In September 2013, following a meeting between the presidents of Armenia and Russia, in which President Putin sought to leverage Russia’s key security and economic support for Armenia (Giragosian, 2014), Armenia opted to join the EEU rather than conclude an EU AA. Armenia’s decision to join the EEU rather than the EU AA did, however, serve to feed growing tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan over NagornoKarabakh. Given the lack of customs controls between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, Armenia’s accession to the EEU was viewed in Azerbaijan as effectively marking the integration of Nagorno-Karabakh, via Armenia, into the EEU. This step was seen as further consolidating the conflict status quo,

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which Azerbaijan views as against its interests. It sought to challenge Nagorno­ Karabakh’s de facto incorporation into the EEU, thereby raising tensions with Armenia. In this way, the wider regional instability generated by the struggle over the geo-economics of integration projects fed into the intensification of armed clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan from July 2014 to October 2015 (Melvin, 2014; Fuller, 2015). After six years of engagement with the EU’s EAP, Azerbaijan declined both to conclude an EU AA and to join the Eurasian Union (Alieva, 2015). Thus, by 2015, the three South Caucasian de facto states were ostensibly operating in different economic and political spaces, and yet they appear to be gradually inte­ grating – albeit to differing degrees – into the Eurasian Union market. Interregional relations between the EU and the EEU, however, had also been envisaged as less conflictual and potentially beneficial to both parties. The EU, in particular, has been advocating for cooperation with the EEU, claiming that WTO rules would allow for cooperation and that common interests, in this case stability and development in the South Caucasus, would be sufficient to overcome political and technical differences (Della Sala, 2014). This normative position clashed with the economic and regulatory implications of adapting to EU standards, which the EAP and AA frameworks carried with them.

(Un)intended consequences and local strategies of accommodation As described above, during 2014–2015, the South Caucasus entered a new phase of its post-Soviet development. Georgia’s conclusion of an AA with the EU in June 2014 and Armenia’s accession to the Russian-led EEU in January 2015 crowned a decade of efforts to engage the South Caucasus with the parallel integration projects. In both the case of the EU and the EEU, the aim was that of integrating the South Caucasus as a whole into the external interregional structures. However, given the geopolitical competition in the area, this was and remains unlikely to happen. The result of this struggle for influence is the transformation of the South Caucasus into a sparring ground – a space where regional and interregional cooperation would jointly link the three small states of the Southern Caucasus to the larger economic, trade and infrastructure networks, but where regional cohesion is largely lacking. The direct consequence of this, as detailed above, is the continuous disintegration of a previously integrated region and a largely externally driven fragmentation. At this stage, then, it is necessary to establish whether this is an intended or unintended consequence. Some may point out that a strategy of divide and control is not new to Moscow. It is true that the Soviet approach to territorial control of the Caucasus – especially the North Caucasus – was largely based on creating fragmentation to better control the elites, although other factors may have contributed to a quirky territorial decoupage in various entities of different levels of autonomy

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(Saparov,  2014). The current lack of regional cohesion in the South Caucasus allows Russia to establish and cultivate bilateral ties with Baku, Yerevan and Tbilisi, as well as with the capitals of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia can thus employ different levers to ensure influence: if in Armenia it co-opts elites through a complex web of patronage and security guarantees (Vasilyan, 2017), in Georgia it maintains a military presence that threatens the capital and its main transport axis (German, 2012b). Russia feels that it would gain little from South Caucasus integration, unless such integration took place under its own aegis. In fact, an attempt at integrating the South Caucasus as a whole in a Russia-led regional structure, namely the CIS, had previously been carried out to the point of shoe-horning membership on Georgia in 1993 (who eventually left in 2008). Initially, Georgia had refused to become a member of the CIS and accepted only as a bargaining chip for Russian support in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. As a counterbalance, Georgia became a founding member of GUAM Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development in the late 1990s. Given the existence of the Russian-led CIS, GUAM was and is sometimes seen in Russia as a way of countering the Russian influence in the area and as part of a strategy backed by the United States. At the same time, Georgia voiced its wishes to join both the EU and NATO in the mid-2000s, signalling to Russia that it would reject an alignment with Armenia and Azerbaijan under the CIS umbrella. In the EU’s case, however, the contribution to regional disintegration is most likely unintended. To start with, Hettne and Söderbaum underline that the EU is highly supportive of all endeavours aimed at creating and sustaining forms of regional integrations (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2005). One of the stated objec­ tives of the ENP is to facilitate cooperation at the regional level. The EU has an advantage in dealing with a region such as the South Caucasus as a whole for a variety of reasons, including the small area, population and market of the region. It is in line with EU practice to establish – or attempt to establish – relations in its neighbourhood on a regional basis, through a ‘one-fits-all’ approach (Börzel and Risse, 2009), so much so that the EU was willing to tone down Georgia’s enthusiasm for further integration in 2000s to accommodate Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s slower pace. What is more, in terms of unintended consequences, the scramble for influ­ ence in the South Caucasus has led to the creation of negative perceptions of the EU in certain areas of the region. This is the case is Abkhazia, where the EU is perceived as an institution in conflict with Russia, using the South Caucasus as a sparring ground, and at the same time ineffective and out-of-tune with local realities (Interviews, 2015). The EU’s involvement in the region has also led it to get involved in conflict management, which distorts the image of the EU among residents. For example, the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) is seen by many in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and even Georgia, as a military EU mission aimed at strengthening Georgia’s security along the ceasefire lines – as a weaker mirror image to the Russian military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

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(Interviews, 2015). In other words, the EU is perceived as an active security actor, albeit a weak one, notwithstanding the fact that it does not have the capac­ ity nor the mandate in the South Caucasus to act like one. The introduction of two competitive integration projects has initially deep­ ened intra-regional political fault lines through the creation of ‘harder’ local borders within the region, and this has had a particularly negative impact on cross border communities. There are numerous other examples in addition to the one described above and concerning the Georgian-Abkhaz ceasefire line. The Samstkhe Javakheti region in Georgia (bordering Armenia and largely inhabited by an Armenian minority) is an area where ethnic, economic and political boundaries overlap. Residents in Samstkhe Javakheti have been craft­ ing livelihoods through cross-border trade since the 1990s, while many work in Russia and have Russian citizenship. With Armenia/Russia and Georgia in dif­ ferent economic and trading systems, the populations in the region have become concerned about their future and their ability to sustain livelihoods operating between the EEU and AA/DCFTA. As the post-Soviet history of the South Caucasus has shown, it is precisely in areas such as Samstkhe Javakheti that resentments, expressed in communal or ethnic terms, can emerge and rouse the spectre of territorial and even secessionist movements (Boonstra and Melvin, 2011: 17). Interestingly, while Russia has largely no interest in the impact that regional fragmentation has on residents of marginal areas, the EU denies its responsibility. Claiming to be an actor of positive interregionalism in the area, it eschews its role in contributing to negative consequences that interregional interactions may bring about.7 It is worth noting that accommodation strategies were sought by the var­ ious South Caucasus parties to deal with the consequences of the fragmenta­ tion brought about by the competition between different integration projects. The Free Trade Regime in place between Georgia and Armenia since 1998 was preserved notwithstanding their membership into different trade-blocks – and opening a potential side door into the EEU (Delcour, 2018). At the same time, Armenia has also signed a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU in 2017. These strategies however were reactive and ad hoc. As a consequence, not only have governments in the region become adept at devising accommodation strategies but they have also learnt to play one regional integration project against the other, with national elites leveraging their position on the geopolitical minefield. In both Armenia and Azerbaijan, the EU and Russia are cultivated as equivalent interlocutors and then either chosen out of their ability to offer more resources or used as guarantee, should the other interlocutor exert unwelcome pressure on decision makers (Ismayilov, 2014; Vasilyan, 2017). This is notably what happened with Armenia in 2013 and its choice to join the EEU, but was also the case for Azerbaijan and its strat­ egy of avoiding significant repercussions notwithstanding the extensive repres­ sive measures employed by its government, the rampant corruption and the well-documented cases of human rights abuses (Knaus, 2015). However, the

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hedging of their foreign policy bets as described above might more straightfor­ wardly been considered an attempt at balancing. States opt for this strategy in order to eschew the alternative, namely bandwagoning. This is notable in the twist and turns of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, for example, dictated by geopo­ litical imperatives but also identity issues and economic constraints (Mehdiyeva, 2003; Alieva, 2014).

Conclusion In light of the main theme of this volume – the unintended consequences of interregionalism – it is worth recapping some key points. First, the stated and thus intended objectives of regional (EEU) and interregional (EU) actors in the South Caucasus were those of better integrating the countries of the region into larger regional constructs, a process which would ensure greater inclusion into wider markets and mobility areas. The rationale of these objectives, however, differed between the EU and Russia: while the former aimed at increasing its normative power and supporting development in order to ensure stability in its neighbourhood on the basis of the establishment of an interregional setup, the latter aimed at maintaining control over its southern neighbourhood, and economic integration would be one of the many tools it could use to do so. Fragmentation of the region constitutes another element of the Russian toolbox, which leads to the next point. Second, the fragmentation of the South Caucasus is fostered by the concomi­ tant presence in the region of two exclusive integration projects. However, while this is an undesirable consequence for the EU, it might just be a desirable tech­ nique to control the region for Russia. As seen above, Russia is more concerned with control over the South Caucasus than with the cohesion of the region. As for the EU, not only is fragmentation of the region an unintended consequence, it is also an unacknowledged one (at least overtly). Although the EU has eventu­ ally accepted to proceed at a different pace in its relations with the three coun­ tries of the South Caucasus, it continues to brand itself as a neutral presence in the region and therefore refutes any role in the regional scramble for influence and power. Finally, there is also an unintended consequence that reinforces a crucial aspect of regionalism. As outlined above, the externally driven processes of regionalism and interregionalism and the interactions among regional actors that take place in the South Caucasus have led to the region turning into a deeply fragmented one. Yet, they have also ensured that the South Caucasus exists as a region, unmistakeably united by its geopolitical salience and its role as a sparring ground of EU and Russian interests. External actors have produced and are in the process of maintaining an externally produced region in the South Caucasus, which might not exist otherwise, and parts of which would be absorbed by its neighbours. As a paradoxical consequence, the struggle over the South Caucasus has led to both its fragmentation and its existence as a region.

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Notes 1 In an attempt to make the economy more competitive, a package of reforms were passed in the late 1980s under the label of perestroika. They were meant to effectuate a transition from a highly centralised command economy to a more hybrid system that integrated some market components. Although already uncompetitive, the Soviet economy was dented by the attempted reforms (Goldman, 1992). Top-down reforms lacked the sort of incentives that would increase productivity and efficiency in distribu­ tion, as well as any sort of popular ownership to create some popular allegiance to the process. On the contrary, inflation and shortages spiralled and the value of the rouble declined, widely alienating the population. Furthermore, even among the Soviet rul­ ing elites there was no consensus on the direction to be taken, with strong resistance from institutions and ministries that were bound to lose power from a liberalisation of the economy. Directives were therefore contradictory, as central authorities resisted the process of de-centralisation at the core of perestroika (Dallin and Lapidus, 1995). 2 On the role of history in the nationalist discourse, see Gordadzé, 1999. 3 On the role of intellectuals and academics in shaping the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict, see Coppieters, 2002. 4 Also, it has been claimed that, given the suffering endured in the past, especially during the Stalinist period, grief endured a process of de-valorisation, with regard to both one’s own past, and that of others. This allowed for the negation of other peo­ ple’s sufferings and the refutation of their national histories and memories of depor­ tations and repression (Urjewicz, 1995). 5 Druzhba Narodov, usually translated as the Friendship of the Peoples or Fraternity of Peoples, was one of the main ideological pillars of the Soviet Union and entailed cooperation between nations that strived for socialist ideals and adopted them as a basis for their development. 6 Martin shows how nationalities’ policies were developed in the early Soviet period, leading to the development of non-Russian nationalisms, through the territorialisa­ tion and institutionalisation of national languages, elites, and cultures (Martin, 2001). 7 This was clear from numerous private conversations by the author with officials from the EU Commission, the EU Delegation in Tbilisi, and the EUMM during the 2012–2018 period.

Bibliography Journal articles Ademmer, Esther, and Laure Delcour. 2016. With a Little Help from Russia? The European Union and Visa liberalization With Post-Soviet states. Eurasian Geography and Economics 57(1): 89–112. Alieva, Leila. 2014. Azerbaijan and the Impact of the Lack of Democratisation on Relations with the EU. European View 13(1): 39–48. Carothers, T. 2002. The End of the Transition Paradigm. Journal of democracy. 13(1): 5–21. Ceccorulli, Michela, Carlo Frappi and Sonia Lucarelli. 2017. On Regional Security Governance Once Again: How Analysis of the Southern Caucasus Can Advance The Concept. European Security. 26(1): 59–78. Daucé, Françoise and Kathy Jeanne Rousselet (Eds.). 2011. 20 ans après la disparition de l’URSS. Trajectoires individuelles et destins sociaux dans le changement. Revue d’Etudes comparatives Est-Ouest. 3. Delcour, Laure. 2018. Regionalism as You Like It? Armenia and the Eurasian Integration Process. The International Spectator. 53(3): 55–69.

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De Waal, T. 2012. A broken Region: The Persistent Failure of Integration Projects in the South Caucasus. Europe-Asia Studies. 64(9): 1709–1723. German, Tracy. 2012a. ‘Good Neighbours or Distant Relatives?’ Regional Identity and Cooperation in the South Caucasus. Central Asian Survey. 31(2): 137–151. German, Tracy. 2012b. Securing the South Caucasus: Military Aspects of Russian Policy Towards the Region Since 2008. Europe-Asia Studies. 64(9): 1650–1666. Gordadzé, T. 1999. La réforme du passé: l’effort historiographique de construction de la nation georgienne, Revue d’Etudes comparatives Est-Ouest 30(1): 53–80. Hettne, Björn. and Fredrik Söderbaum. 2005. Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as a Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism. European Foreign Affair Review. 10: 535–52. Ismayilov, Murad. 2014. Power, Knowledge, and Pipelines: Understanding the Politics of Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy. Caucasus Survey. 2(1-2): 79–129. Karl, Terry Lynn and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1991. Modes of transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe. International Social Science Journal. 128: 269–284. Knaus, Gerald. 2015. Europe and Azerbaijan: The End of Shame. Journal of Democracy. 26(3): 5–18. Mehdiyeva, Nazrin. 2003. Azerbaijan and Its Foreign Policy Dilemma. Asian Affairs. 34(3): 271–285. Prelz Oltramonti, G. 2016. “Southbound Russia: Processes of Bordering And De-Bordering Between 1993 and 2013”. Connexe. 1: 103–24. Slider, Darrell. 1991. The Politics of Georgia’s Independence. Problems of Communism. 40(6): 63–79. Trenin, Dmitri. 2009. Russia’s Spheres of Interest, not Influence. The Washington Quarterly. 32(4): 3–22. Vasilyan, Syuzanna. 2017. Swinging on a Pendulum. Problems of Post-Communism. 64(1): 32–46. Zarifian, Julien. 2015. U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1990s and 2000s, and the Case of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia). European Journal of American Studies. 10(2): 1–17.

Book chapters Chkhartishvili, David Roman Gotsiridze and Bessarion Kitsmarishvili. 2004. Georgia: Conflict Regions and Economies. In: Champain, P., Diana Klein and Natalia Mirimanova (Eds.). From War Economies to Peace Economies in the South Caucasus. London: International Alert, 120–57. Coppieters, Bruno 2002. In Defense of the Homeland: Intellectuals and the GeorgianAbkhaz Conflict. In: Coppieters, Bruno and Michel Huysseune (Eds.). Seccession, History, and the Social Sciences. Brussels: VUB Brussels University Press, 89–116. Della Sala, Vincent. 2014. The EU and the Eurasian Economic Union. In: Piotr Dutkiewicz and Richard Sakwa (Eds.). Eurasian integration – the view from within. Oxon and New York: Routledge, 161–72. Deutsch Karl et al. 1957. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. In: Nelsen, Brent and Alexander Stubb (Eds.). The European Union. Reading on the Theory and Practiceof European Integration. Boulder/New York: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 121–134. Söderbaum, Fredrik 2007. Comparative Regional Integration and Regionalism. In: Landman, Todd and Neil Robinson (Eds.). The SAGE Handbook of Comparative Politics. London: Sage, 477–496.

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Urjewicz, Charles, 1995. La Transcaucasie face aux fantômes de son passé: le cas géorgien. In: Djalili, Mohammed-Reza. (Ed.). Le Caucase postsoviétique : la transition dans le conflit. Brussels: Bruylant, 30–42.

Monograph Bridger, Sue and Frances Pine. 1998. Surviving Post-Socialism: Local Strategies and Regional Responses in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. New York: Routledge. Dallin, Alexander and Gail W. Lapidus. 1995. The Soviet system: from crisis to collapse. Boulder: Westview Press. Goldman, MarshallI. 1992. What went wrong with Perestroika, New York: Norton. Hettne, Björn., Andras Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel, O. 2000. (Eds.). The new regionalism and the future of security and development. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Jones, Stephen. 2012. Georgia: A Political History since Independence: Nation, State and Democracy, 1991–2003. London: I.B.Tauris. Alexander Libman and Evgeny Vinokurov. 2007. Holding-together regionalism: Twenty years of post-Soviet integration. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Martin, Terry D. 2001. The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Saparov, Arsène. 2014. From Conflict to Autonomy in the Caucasus: The Soviet Union and the Making of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh. London and New York: Routledge.

Official documents Association Agreement. 2014. Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part. 30 July. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22014A0830(02)&from=EN Accessed on 1 January 2020

Online resources Alieva, Leila. 2015. The Eastern Partnership: the view from Azerbaijan. Food for Thought Paper. European Council on Foreign Relations. 19 May. Available at: http:// www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_azerbaijan3023 Accessed on 1 January 2020. Boonstra, Jos and Neil Melvin. 2011. Challenging the South Caucasus Security Deficit. FRIDE Working Paper no. 108. Madrid. April. Available at: http://fride.org/ download/WP108_South_Caucasus_Eng.pdf Accessed on 1 January 2020. Börzel, Tanja. A., and Thomas Risse. 2009). Diffusing (inter-) regionalism: the EU as a Model of regional integration. KFG Working Paper Series, 7. Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, FB Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften, Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft Kolleg-Forschergruppe “The Transformative Power of Europe”. Available at: https://nbn-resolving.org/ urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-368027 Accessed on 1 January 2020. Delcour Laure, and Hubert Duhot. 2011. Bringing South Caucasus Closer to Europe: Achievements and Challenges in ENP Implementation” College of Europe (Bruges). Natolin Research Papers. March. Accessed on 1 January 2020. Fuller, Liz 2015. ‘OSCE Minsk Group Condemns “Unacceptable Escalation” of Hostilities Between Armenian, Azerbaijani forces. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

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30 September. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/osce-minsk-group-escalation­ of-hostilities-armenia-azerbaijan/27279387.html Accessed on 1 January 2020. Giragosian, Richard 2014. Armenia’s Strategic u-turn. European Council on Foreign Relations. Policy Memo 22 April. Available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR99_ ARMENIA_MEMO_AW.pdf Accessed on 1 January 2020. Markedonov, Sergei. 2015. Why Russia’s ‘borderization’ strategy makes Georgia so nerv­ ous. Russia Direct. 29 July. Available at: http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/ why-russias-borderization-strategy-makes-georgia-so-nervous Accessed on 1  January 2020. Melvin, Neil. 2014. Nagorno-Karabakh: the Not-So-Frozen Conflict. Open Democ­ racy 9 October. 2014. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/ neil-melvin/nagornokarabakh-notsofrozen-conflict Accessed on 1 January 2020. Sammut, Dennis. 2018. Time to Give Regional Co-Operation in the South Caucasus another try. Common Space. 12 February. Available at: http://commonspace.eu/ index.php?m=23&n=123&news_id=4557&lng=eng Accessed on 1 January 2020

Interviews Interviews 2012. Interviews conducted by the author for a doctoral project on “Political Economies of Conflict Protraction” in September-December 2012 in Tbilisi, Sukhumi, Gagra, and in the districts of Shida Kartli, Samegrelo, and Gali. Interviews 2015. Interviews on “Perceptions of the EU in Abkhazia” conducted by the author as part of a wider FP7 research project on Perceptions of the EU in the Southern Caucasus in September 2015 in Sukhumi, Abkhazia.

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THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICIES BY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND RUSSIA Region-building in Moldova in an interregional context Johann Wolfschwenger Introduction1,2 The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered a proliferation of regional organisa­ tions in Eastern Europe, including the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the EU-led Eastern Partnership (EaP) and Northern Dimension, as well as several regional organisations around the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea or the GUAM. The interregional setting in the post-Soviet space is therefore best understood as a multi-layered interaction of various regional organisations, their predecessors, competitors and external supporters (see Mattheis, 2016). Concepts such as “overlapping regionalism” (PANKE and STAPEL, 2018) and “bifurcated regionalism” (Mattheis, 2016) may be the best suited to describe such a complex web of interregionalism (see Lopez-Lucia and Mattheis in this volume for a further discussion). The estab­ lishment of many of these regional organisations can be ascribed to two major region-builders, the EU and Russia, each of which sought to establish influence over Eastern Europe. Although the relations between each of the above men­ tioned organisations may be considered instances of interregionalism, this chap­ ter focuses on the two major region-builders and the countries “in-between”. It is interested in the potentially unintended effects of the “competitive interregionalism” (Delcour, 2017; Ademmer, Delcour, and Wolczuk, 2016; Casier, 2007, 2016a) in the Republic of Moldova, a small country “squeezed” between the EU and Eurasia. In order to bring to the fore the unintended consequences of EU and Eurasian regionalisms in Moldova, this chapter adopts a poststructuralist RegionBuilding Approach (RBA), which emphasises the role of external and internal

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region-builders in the social construction of regions. This theoretical approach complements the vast body of external governance literature (Lavenex, 2004, 2011; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009) and Europeanisation literature (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Langbein and Börzel, 2013; Börzel, 2010), which has been prominent in studies of regionalism in Eastern Europe. These approaches are concerned with the question of whether or not regionalism – mostly the EU’s regionalism – was effective in delivering its objectives, namely transfer­ ring the “appropriate” normative order to an external setting (Burlyuk, 2017; Korosteleva, 2016; Lavenex, 2017). In such a framework, Eurasian integration is often conceptualised as a contestation of this normative order (Delcour, 2017, Delcour and Wolczuk, 2017) and a constraint on the EU’s normative power (Dimitrova and Dragneva, 2009; Tolstrup, 2009; Obydenkova, 2011). Therefore, at least in EU external governance literature and Europeanisation literature, thinking deductively and normatively (see Lopez-Lucia and Mattheis in this vol­ ume) has been the modus operandi for studying the effects of (inter)regionalism in the Eastern Europe. The chapter analyses how domestic actors in Moldova respond to the com­ petitive interregional setting and how regionalism is performed as a result of the interaction of discourses and practices from the outside-in (the EU and Russia) and the inside-out (Moldova’s domestic actors). It shows how domestic political actors in Moldova, when articulating their position towards regional integra­ tion, simultaneously re-articulate exclusive national identity conceptions. This challenges social cohesion within Moldova and fosters regional instability, which is identified as the undesired consequence of interregionalism, at least from the perspective of the EU. The next section elaborates the analytical framework for this chapter, drawing on poststructuralist discourse analysis and the concept of unintended consequences. The third section describes the emergence of the competitive interregional setting in the so-called eastern neighbourhood. The fourth section analyses how Moldova’s domestic actors reproduce controversial national identity conceptions when articulating their positions towards EU and Eurasian integration.

Analytical framework: Linking unintended consequences to outside-in and inside-out region building According to Burlyuk, the concept of unintended consequences “refers to outcomes of purposive action(s), which are not directly intended by an actor” (Burlyuk, 2017: 1012). Using a poststructuralist lens has implications for studying unintended consequences, as it changes the way we think about the relationship between the cause (“purposive action”) and the (unintended) effects. Identifying “purposive actions” in a positivist framework suggests viewing agents’ actions as a result of their pre-given identities. Poststructuralism avoids the trap of a reduc­ tionist conceptualisation of identities.3 Instead, it emphasises how regional or national identities are relational and enacted through discursive and performative

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practices (Braun et al., 2019: 793–795; Lopez-Lucia, 2018). This shifts the focus from relations between agents, which take place across ahistorical, frozen and pregiven boundaries, to the establishment of the boundaries that constitute the self in relation to the other. “Conceptualised this way, foreign policy [for this paper also regionalisation policies] comes to be seen as a political practice that makes ‘foreign’ certain events and actors … In other words, foreign policy [and regional integration policy] is ‘a specific form of boundary-producing political performance’” (Campbell, 1992: 69, italics in original). Unlike in a positivist framework where the change of actor’s behaviour is of interest, effects of regionalism are concep­ tualised as the constitution of the agent’s identity as a result of interaction. A “purposive action” is, then, not necessarily an act taking place in the material world, but can simply be a discursive disposition, such as a verbal statement or the declaration of intent. In line with these thoughts Casier (2016b: 93; italics in orig­ inal) contends that “unintended external impact refers to the external effects, which are not linked to certain objectives, but result from the activities and existence of an actor on the international scene and the way these activities interact with the objectives, activities and perceptions of another actor”. The RBA understands regions as socially constructed and politically con­ tested, not only from the inside but also from the outside (Neumann, 2003; Hettne, 2003; Paasi, 2009). Instead of conceptualising regions as products of seemingly objective factors, RBA emphasises the constitution of regional identi­ ties in relation to difference. Region-building therefore requires the existence of region-builders who compete and interact to define the essential features of the region. Based on the conception of a regional identity and regional delineation, region-builders see it as in their interest to produce symbols, institutions and even political and economic systems on a regional scale as part of some politi­ cal project (Neumann, 2003: 161). Region-builders may be situated outside or inside a region. From an outside-in perspective, external region-builders such as the EU and Russia inscribe a particular identity to the post-Soviet countries through their regional integration discourses and practices (Diez, 2004, 2005; Rumelili, 2004). For example, the idea of a “neighbourhood country” defines Moldova in terms of a particular normative and institutional difference from the EU. The EU’s policy instruments towards Moldova are set up on the basis of a specific identity tied to the desire to close the “normative gap” between the eastern neighbourhood and the EU (see Joenniemi, 2008; Vieira, 2016). From an inside-out perspective the domestic actors in neighbourhood countries articulate their understanding of their countries’ regional identity. Here, it is politicians, political parties, foreign policy experts and other commentators in Moldova who put forward their vision of Moldova’s regional identity and thus also suggest how to engage with the EU’s or Russia’s policy instruments through their foreign and domestic policies. Because difference is omnipresent inside-out and outside-in constructions, the externalisation of difference through regionalisation practices reproduces the distinction between “internal” and “external” also in domestic discourses on Moldova’s regional identity (Rumelili, 2004: 35).

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This constitutive dimension of relational identities (see Hansen, 2006: 67) can be analysed according to three dimensions: the inclusive/exclusive character of the self/other relationship; whether the identity constructions complement or contradict each other and the discursive and performative practices by which the self socially converges or diverges with the other (Rumelili, 2004: 36–38; see also Flockhart, 2011: 265). First, the crucial dimension relates to ‘the inclusive/ exclusive nature of identity that the self claims in relation to the other’ (Rumelili, 2004: 37). Inclusive, liberal or democratic identities embody a conception of acquired difference. The construction of difference in terms of a normative gap is an instance of such an inclusive identity, as the two identities can be converged over time or through changes of practices. Exclusive identities construct dif­ ference in terms of inherent difference, such as clear geographical indications, securitisation practices or constructions of national identity based on culture or ethnicity.4 The main hermeneutic tool to grasp the nature of difference is the concept of basic discourses, which assumes that foreign policy representations and identity are co-constituted simultaneously through discourses and practices (see Hansen, 2006: 37–51). When engaging in the process of regional integra­ tion, actors mobilise a set of well-established meanings embedded in collective, historical scripts and analogies to justify foreign and regional integration policies (Guzzini, 2012: 52). These meanings can be revealed through analysing different degrees of inclusivity, usually articulated through spatial, temporal and ethical difference between the self and the other (Hansen, 2006: 52). In this chapter, the discourse analysis of the EU’s and Russia’s integration discourse towards Moldova focuses on ‘official discourses’, which are articulated primarily by government officials in official speech acts, strategic documents and policy documents. In the analysis of Moldova’s inside-out discourses, however, I will also incorporate oppositional discourses and the “wider political debate” in order to grasp how potentially competing domestic constructions of identity respond differently to the outside-in region-building. The analysis includes media reports, interviews by officials and politicians, party programs and other statements articulated in a political debate on foreign policy.5 The second and third dimensions are interested in the social practices (iden­ tity convergence or identity divergence) that are adopted as a result of the inter­ action of external and internal identity constructions. Identity convergence is a practice by which actors reduce social distance between two other actors (i.e. Moldova and the EU) in order match their identities. This can be a discursive practice, such as the strategic emphasis of one’s own Europeanness and the dis­ regard of contradictory identities (i.e. Eastness), or a performative practice such as the adoption of cooperation agreements that enables the transfer of norms and values from the external to the domestic setting (see Subotic, 2011: 313–314; see also Neumann, 1998). When performing identity convergence Moldovan domestic actors recognise the identity difference inscribed by the outside actors and actively re-articulate Moldova’s Europeanness in existing (national) iden­ tity discourses. As identities are inevitably constructed in relation to various

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degrees of difference actors, intentionally or not, perform identity convergence and identity divergence simultaneously. When performing identity convergence they simultaneously omit or disregard alternative narratives, or even securi­ tise certain issues in order to strengthen their own positive identity conception (Flockhart, 2011: 265). This may lead to a reduction of regionalisation prac­ tices between the Moldova and another external region-builder. This does not mean that regional cooperation cannot continue under these circumstances, but “association” in the sense of norm transfer and identity convergence is less likely to take place (Rumelili, 2004: 38). Through identity convergence and divergence, the discursive construction of national identity interacts with con­ struction of regional identity that are initially external to the self. Under such circumstances, the interregional setting (i.e. various degrees of ‘Eastness’ versus ‘Europeanness’) is reproduced in the domestic discursive context. In doing so, external region-building empowers certain national identity construction and disempower competing ones.

The emergence of competing regionalisms in the post-Soviet space For the EU, the newly independent states of the post-Soviet space were not of immediate importance in the 1990s (Bosse, 2010; Vieira, 2016; Delcour, 2018, 2017). This changed in the early 2000s in the wake of the prospective round of EU enlargement in 2004. Concerns about stability and security in countries that would soon border the EU sparked a discourse on how relations with those countries should be governed. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched to “avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stabil­ ity and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union” (European Commission, 2003: 4). It thus embodies the intended consequence of the EU’s region-building in Eastern Europe. In order to strengthen stability, democracy and prosperity – and thereby strengthen the EU’s own security – the ENP sought to externalise the EU’s norms, values and system of governance. It installed vast parts of the enlargement portfolio, such as acquis transfer through bilateral Action Plans, support programs linked to conditionality and expertise transfer (Tulmets, 2011). The EaP was launched in 2009 under the umbrella of the ENP and differentiated more between the southern neighbourhood, Russia and six EaP countries with stronger “European aspirations”(Council of the European Union, 2009).6 Furthermore, in 2014 three out of the six eastern neighbour­ hood states signed Association Agreements with the EU, establishing a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Mirroring the instruments of the enlargement process, these policy frameworks put the eastern neighbourhood countries in a category of “potential-we”, even if the EU did not officially grant the perspective of membership (Vieira, 2016: 134–136). This identity category reconciles the inclusive aspect of a potential membership with the production of difference in terms of the economic, political and normative order and thus

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differentiates between the EU and the neighbourhood countries in terms of a “normative gap”, which instigates an otherness that is not inherent but is tem­ porarily acquired (see Vieira, 2016; Joenniemi, 2008). The idea of such a nor­ mative foreign policy identity presupposes the construction of an EU identity against an ethically inferior other, embodied in various representation of the undemocratic and barbaric East (Morozov and Rumelili, 2012; Neumann, 1999; Hansen, 2006). Paradoxically, the promotion of multilateralism and interregionalism, which is a substantial part of the EU’s foreign policy identity (Telo, 2007; Söderbaum and van Langenhove, 2006), was largely absent from the EU’s approach towards existing regional organisations in Eastern Europe (Smith, 2005; Delcour, 2008a, 2008b). The Wider Europe Communication that initiated the ENP argued that “regional and subregional cooperation and integration [that] are precon­ ditions for political stability, economic development and the reduction of pov­ erty and social divisions” (European Commission, 2003: 3). But while this Communication acknowledged that regional cooperation among the neighbour­ hood states is strongly “oriented around traditional flows of trade and investment to and from Russia” (European Commission, 2003: 8), Russian-led regionalism was not seen as being in line with the EU’s own values but rather as a hin­ drance to possible future EU Free Trade Agreements (European Commission, 2004: 3). The policy documents that gave shape to the ENP in the early 2000s avoided engaging with, or even mentioning the CIS or the Single Economic Space agreement that was signed in September 2003 by Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.7 Instead the ENP promoted its own sub-regionalism on the EU’s Eastern border, for example, through regional cooperation in the Baltic and the Black Sea areas and the so-called Northern Dimension.8 As some scholars have suggested, EU involvement even contributed to fragmentation in Eastern Europe, as the ENP rests on the idea on differentiation and an incentive-based “more-for-more” approach (European Commission, 2015: 5), which privileged bilateral norm-transfer between the EU and partner countries over multilateralism among the East European partners (Smith, 2005; Delcour, 2008a, 2011; see also Prelz Oltramonti in this volume). For Russia, on the other hand, relations to the countries of the “near abroad” were high on the agenda in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. But Russia found itself in a politically and economically difficult situation and lacked capabilities to act as a region-builder in Eastern Europe. Russia’s influ­ ence was de facto reinforced by the weak involvement of other external actors (Delcour, 2018: 495). Russia’s economic recovery in the early 2000s, the consol­ idation of state power by Boris Yeltsin’s successor Vladimir Putin as well as the expansion of the EU and NATO changed this situation (Delcour, 2017: 62–66). Russia’s discourses on Eurasian integration are closely linked to the country’s selfperceived relation to Europe. Discourses on Russia’s identity in relation to Europe have, over many centuries, oscillated between two poles.9 A first discourse con­ structs Russia’s political and economic model as inferior to the European one

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and argues that Russia should Europeanise. Historically, this discourse reflects “Westernisers” such as Tsar Peter the Great, who sought to copy European politi­ cal, economic and normative models in Russia. A second ideology negates a moral inferiority and instigates a counter-hegemonic discourse resting on a distinct SlavOrthodox normative order (Neumann, 1996: 63). Confronted with an economi­ cally and politically more successful Western Europe in various periods in history, “Slavophiles insisted that Europe had paid for it by its spiritual death, while Russians had retained a richer spiritual life and were therefore morally superior to Europe” (Neumann, 1996: 199). The sources of this morality were linked to presenting Orthodox Christianity as the “true” Christendom (see Duncan, 2002). Perestroika and Glasnost mark the starting point of the growing dominance of the “Westernisers” who advocated for as much integration with Europe as speedily as possible (Neumann, 1996: 158). However, in the late 1990s the dominant dis­ course shifted towards the “Slavophile” position, which saw the growing Western influence increasingly as something corrupting Russia’s equally legitimate norma­ tive order. “This discourse foots on the refusal to accept the universal applicability of EU norms, and simultaneously an attempt to engage in normative competition with the EU and re-legitimise the ideas of balance of power and great power management.” (Makarychev, 2018: 7; see also Kobayashi, 2019). Mobilising this discourse allowed the Kremlin to justify two things: first, Russia could legiti­ mately refuse to participate in the ENP, which would have meant an asymmetric adoption of EU norms. Rather, Russia considered itself as an equal “strategic partner” of the EU. Second, Russia avoided being put into the same category as the neighbourhood states but could assert its own regional power status. The idea that Russia was a second pole of power in a multipolar Europe, or even a multipo­ lar world, justified the claim of legitimate influence over Eastern Europe and the portrayal of the ongoing EU and NATO enlargement as an attack on its own security and economic interests. Europe in this conception is merely a geographi­ cal indication, and Russia is therefore inevitably part of Europe. As a result of this shift, Russia started to actively perform its own Eurasian regionalism according to two discourses. First, in a realist geopolitical dimension Europe was not to be governed by a hegemony of the EU’s economic or normative models but through a balance of power between Russia and the EU (Kobayashi, 2019; Delcour and Wolczuk, 2017; Delcour, 2017). Moscow sought to strengthen its own geopolitical position through the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community and later the EAEU, which were presented as economically beneficial for the neigh­ bourhood countries and had a significant interregional component: …the Eurasian Union will also help countries [in the common neighbour­ hood] integrate into Europe sooner and from a stronger position. In addi­ tion, a partnership between the Eurasian Union and EU that is economically consistent and balanced will prompt changes in the geo-political and geo­ economic setup of the continent as a whole with a guaranteed global effect. (Putin, 2011, quoted in Kobayashi, 2019: 148).

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Another discourse framed Eurasian regionalism in terms of civilisational geopol­ itics. According to this discourse the former post-Soviet states inevitably consti­ tute a community based on culture, language and religion and a shared history (Makarychev, 2018; Makarychev and Yatsyk, 2017). This “Eurasianist” discourse stands in the tradition of Slavophiles and instigates a counter-hegemonic strug­ gle, asserting equality or even superiority of the Russian normative order. It proposes its own ’“civilisational approach rooted in a Slav-Orthodox ideology aimed at distinguishing Russia from the liberal emancipatory Europe (epito­ mised by the concept of ‘Gayrope’)” (Makarychev 2018, 7). Accordingly, foreign policy practices were aimed at promoting the cultural and historical contingency of Eurasia. The spectrum of instruments comprises forms of soft power – mainly through the omnipresence of the Russian Orthodox Church – Russian media and the selective support of NGOs (in the Moldovan case in specifically selected pro-Russian regions such as Gagauzia). It also includes economic sanctions and military intervention in the states of the near abroad (Delcour, 2017; 62–82). From a comparative view, two aspects of Russia’s and the EU’s RBAs can be emphasised: first, Russia’s and the EU’s regionalisms towards Eastern Europe lack an interregional approach (Delcour, 2008a, 2008b; Smith, 2005). Instead, the interregional setting in the post-Soviet space is characterised by competitive­ ness, as both regionalisms aim at “the production and maintenance of two differ­ ing [normative political and economic] orders” (Korosteleva, 2016: 71; see also Dias, 2013; Casier, 2016a). Second, both region-building approaches produce diverging boundaries between the self and the other (Makarychev, 2018). While the EU maintains boundaries mainly in terms of acquired otherness, which is rooted in the idea of the EU as post-national community of values, Russia’s conception of Eurasianism resorts to inherent otherness rooted in a civilisational approach that portrays the Slav-Orthodox Eurasia as inherently different to the European civilisation.

Moldova’s response to outside-in region-building In Moldova, two external identity constructions constitute central reference points of discourses on foreign policy and cultural identity that emerged on the verge of the collapsing Soviet Union (King, 2003). This section starts with the analysis of basic discourses on national identity in Moldova. The second part proceeds by analysing how Moldova’s domestic political actors mobilise identity in the four main discourses on regional integration: a pro-European discourse, a “balance of regionalisms” discourse, a Eurasian discourse and a pan-Romanian discourse.

The Janus-faced regional identity of Moldova The ambivalence of Moldovan foreign policy and national identity stems from rivalling pan-Romanian and Soviet interpretations in Moldovan history,

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culture and national identity (van Meurs, 2015; King, 2003). A first discourse promotes a Moldovan nation distinct from the Romanian nation in terms of ethnogenesis, language, culture and history. This “Moldovanism” is largely coherent with identity politics in the Soviet era (Ihrig, 2008: 169–171). In contrast, the pan-Romanian interpretation, often labelled “Romanianism”, re-emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s in opposition to Soviet rule. In this conception, Moldovans (sic Romanians) are Latin peoples, and Bessarabia had been separated by force from Romania. According to this view, Moldovan ethnogenesis, language and culture, and in radical versions also Moldova’s independent statehood, were merely a Soviet invention used to justify Russian and later Soviet rule over Bessarabia (van Meurs, 1998, 39–42). On the other hand, Moldovanists claim that Russian rule during the Tsarist Empire and later the Soviet Union substantially changed the ethnic, cultural and linguistic environment in the territory of Moldova. Even if a Moldovan ethnogenesis is scientifically unwarranted, at least the existence of Moldova as a multi-ethnic state that is independent (or at least autonomous) from Romania during the last centuries cannot be disputed. The fear of Romanianist domination over culture and language policies in the early 1990s and the claim to reunification with Romania contributed to the conflicts with Russian-speaking minorities10 and pro-Soviet elites (Kaufman, 2001: 129–163). These ethno-lingual groups established themselves in Moldova during more than two centuries of Russian rule and make up a significant part of Moldova’s population even today.11 They reject any cultural interpretation of Moldova’s national identity by the majority population and were particularly hostile towards the Romanianists and their strive for unification with Romania (Crowther, 1998). A political movement consisting of pro-Soviet elites and national minorities resisted Moldova’s dis­ sociation from the Soviet-Union and strongly advocated entry into the CIS (King, 2003: 67–68). After the political turmoil in the early years of independ­ ence, a group of political elites around Mircea Snegur, first President of the Republic of Moldova, re-invented the Soviet-inspired Moldovanist identity conception, which puts emphasis on Moldova’s multi-ethnic statehood and its Janus-faced identity torn between the East and the West (van Meurs, 1998). The Moldovan constitution and the first codified Foreign Policy Concept (Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, 1995) from 1995 reflect a Moldovanist viewpoint. These documents outline Moldova as a neutral state, with a for­ eign policy concept aimed at strengthening Moldova’s independent statehood through a balanced foreign policy vector. It was only due to the assertion of Moldovanism as the dominant viewpoint that one of the concrete manifes­ tations of ethno-lingual cleavages, the conflict with Gagauzia, was solved by an autonomy agreement (Wolfschwenger and Saxinger, forthcoming). More or less radical Moldovanists dominated the official discourse until 200912 and Moldova adhered to a balanced foreign policy doctrine until the Alliance for European Integration (AEI) came to power.

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The pro-European discourse: EU integration and domestic reforms Moldova’s European vocation started to be clearly articulated as a quest for EU integration in the late 1990s. It was “the work of a few, young, Western-leaning deputy ministers and heads of department within the foreign ministry”, rather than the result of visionary leadership or much popular demand (King, 2003: 78). Similar to the Westernisers in Russia, these “Europeanisers” sought to implement an economic and political model inspired by the EU. In this discourse, Moldova is constructed as a European state by implementing reforms aimed at closing the normative gap. Identity convergence is the result of a process of linking Moldova’s national identity to the EU’s post-national and value-based identity (see also Kakachia and Minesashvili, 2015 for the case of Georgia; and Subotic, 2011 for the case of Serbia and Croatia). The implied others within Moldova are political opponents and their alleged corruption, economic underdevelopment as well as undemocratic practices. In this type of normative pro-European dis­ course “Europe (without Russia) figures as the (only) model for democracy, while Russia is unambiguously presented as setting the standard for authoritarianism” (Morozov and Rumelili, 2012: 39). The pro-European parties see cooperation with CIS and the EAEU, and Moscow’s inference in Moldova’s domestic affairs as Moscow’s attempt to revive its hegemony over Eastern Europe. After a successful campaign in the 2009 parliamentary elections, the AEI, a pro-European reform coalition came to power consisting of the Liberal Party, the Democratic Party and the Liberal Democratic Party (PDLM). The Alliance reiterated Moldova’s “European aspirations” and, at least rhetorically, committed to the reform agenda promoted by the EU. Negotiations on Association Agreement and the DCFTA were launched shortly after the coalition took power. Since 2014, the proEuropean reform bloc ACUM has been the main proponent of this discourse. This pro-European discourse partly replaced the Romanianist discourses as it provided a new opportunity to legitimise Moldova’s “Europeanness” on the basis of the EU’s economic, political and normative order instead of cultural traits.

Different degrees of Russian-oriented regional identities: Between a “balance of regionalisms” and Eurasianism Political actors advocating a balanced foreign policy seize the middle ground in Moldova’s Eastness versus Europeanness debate. They mobilise a Moldovanist con­ ception of Moldova’s identity, acknowledging that Moldova’s identity combines Eastern and European features. In doing so, they sometimes re-articulate Moscow’s realist geopolitical discourse, and sometimes reflect Moscow’s civilisational approach. Our people have a bivalent collective identity: Eastern and Western. From the point of view of religious affiliation, we are Orthodox – therefore

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Eastern, while from the point of view of linguistic and cultural identity, we are Latin – therefore Western. And any attempt to artificially reshape us, to cut away one of the two components of our collective essence and impose foreign models is counterproductive, even harmful. In other words, given our identity and geographical location, Moldova cannot afford to ally itself with Russia against Europe or with Europe against Russia. (Dodon, 2017) In this statement, incumbent President Igor Dodon from the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova converges Moldova’s regional identity towards Moscow’s realist geopolitical discourse. He argues that Russia and the EU are constituted by two poles of power in Europe and recognises Russia’s influence over the post-Soviet space as being equally legitimate as the EU’s influence. Europe, in this conception, is merely understood as a geographical indication, and Moldova, the EU and Russia are inevitably part of it. Other statements by advo­ cates of the balanced foreign policy vector mirror Russia’s Eurasianist discourse – namely, the argument that Eurasia is not inferior to the EU. Instead of embracing the EU’s liberal values and its economic and political order, Eurasianists insti­ gated a counter-hegemonic discourse resting on traditional Slav-Orthodox vales. We have resisted the call of the unionists, we did not give the country into foreign hands, and we did not become annexed, we did not lose our neu­ trality and statehood, we did not give up Christian-Orthodox religion in exchange for anti-family and immoral pseudo-values. (Dodon, 2018) Dodon’s statements link Slavic-Orthodox values with Moldova’s national iden­ tity and thereby diverge from both the pro-European civic identity conception and the pan-Romanian identity conception. The radical other is the panRomanianism, which is portrayed as the major threat to Moldova’s statehood (Dodon, 2014). In contrast to European liberal values, Moscow’s representation of ‘Gayrope’ is mirrored in Dodon’s formulation of European pseudo-vales, which portrays traditional Orthodox family values as superior to the EU’s lib­ eral values. Through these speech acts President Dodon constructs Moldova as part of Eurasia in line with Moscow’s civilisational discourse, namely as part of a space bound together by history, religion and culture. Europe and Eurasia, in such a conception, are two separate civilisations based on two different political, normative and economic orders. Distinguishing between the two discourses is merely an analytical exer­ cise as left-wing actors such as Igor Dodon and other members of the Party of Socialists flirt with both discourses. In a ‘balance of regionalisms’ conception of regional identity they promote a balanced foreign policy vector, alongside coop­ eration with both regional integration projects and Moldova’s neutrality. In an Eurasianist conception they are sceptical towards an EU-dictated reform process

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and advocate Russian-inspired illiberal political, normative and economic order and integration with Eurasian regionalism.

Pan-Romanianism and Moldova’s identity dilemma The Eurasianist discourse and the pan-Romanian discourse address the Eastness versus Europeanness problem in civilisational terms. As a result, they feed into Moldova’s existing identity dilemma and mobilise national identity conceptions that are inherently exclusive towards each other. For pan-Romanianists, Moldova does not become European (sic Romanian) by closing the normative gap but it is European because of its cultural roots. Among the most outspoken advocates of this cultural conception of Moldova’s identity were pro-Romanian parties such as the Moldovan Popular Front, the Christian Democratic People’s Party and the Liberal Party. Included in the Liberal Party’s objective is the continuation of “the struggle to fully assert the scientific and historical truth of national identity. The identity of the people, the community formed by history, language, culture, spirituality and the future destiny between the Republic of Moldova and Romania is a fundamental component of the polit­ ical project of joining the European Union and is the guarantor of our European identity” (Partidul Liberal, 2014). It discursively links Moldova’s Romanian cul­ tural roots with Moldova’s Europeanness, summarised by the claim of wishing to ‘return to Romania in Europe’ (Sava, 2011: 447; see also Ciobanu, 1999). EU integration is a vehicle for reunification if the latter is not achieved first. In Romania’s official diplomacy reunification is not on the agenda. However, pan-Romanianism and the idea of ‘Greater Romania’ are relevant political movements also in Romania, prominently advocated by the former Romanian President and current member of the European Parliament Traian Bǎ sescu.13 In contrast to a pro-European discourse, EU values play a minor role. In 2018 Ghimpu (2018), chairman of the Liberal Party, declared: “As long as we are on a false history, on a false identity, a false language [he refers here to a Romanian language, identity and historiography], we cannot speak of European values.” Although the Romanianist discourse converges Moldova’s national identity and Europeanness in cultural terms, it simultaneously diverges Moldova’s iden­ tity from its Slav-Orthodox features. Thereby it reproduces a Huntingtonian ‘clash of civilisations’, embodied in the EU’s and Russia’s competing regional­ isms, in domestic identity politics (see Petsinis, 2020). The constitutive other not only relates to corrupt or undemocratic elites but is also constructed through the false historiography, language and the Slavic cultural elements that have been implanted in Moldovan national identity by centuries of Russian and Soviet occupation. Striving for the ‘historical truth’ has resulted in a set of controversial statements and practices concerning state language, culture of commemoration and historiography.14 It has also contributed to the stigmatisation of ‘proRussian’ actors, the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian media in Moldova, and it often portrays the separatist entity in Transnistria and the autonomous

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territory of Gagauzia as “back doors” for Russian influence in Moldova. PanRomanianists and also some pro-European actors tend to favour “a dominant position of the [Moldovan/Romanian] majority population rather than pro­ tecting or even promoting cultural and lingual diversity” (Wolfschwenger and Saxinger, forthcoming). The assertion of Europeanness by local domestic actors thereby “serves as a disciplining function inside the state, by defining and repre­ senting dissident elements as ‘foreign’ and ‘alien’, and linking them to external threats” (Rumelili, 2004: 35). The pan-Romanian discourse is highly problematic for Moldova’s Russianspeakers and ethno-lingual minorities. In their view, their status as a contingent part of the Moldovan nation is guaranteed by different factors, including the historical (Russian culture as an important factor in Moldova’s history), religious (Russian Orthodox Church) and linguistic (Russian language) elements in Moldova’s national identity formation (Dom, 2017; 196–204). In this discourse Moscow’s civilisational region-building approach – that idea of Eurasia bound together by history, religion and culture – is the guardian of their status in Moldova’s national identity conception and the state. At the same time, they tend to be sceptical towards EU integration (RFE Moldovan Service, 2014). While they do not oppose EU integration per se, if it comes along with civic nationalism, minority protection and concrete economic benefits, they strongly associate European integration with pan-Romanian chauvinism articulated by some pro-European actors. In contrast, in a pan-Romanianist conception it is exactly the “eastern“ elements that are a hindrance to asserting Moldova’s European (sic Romanian) identity. The shift from the Communist to the pro-European government in 2009 that also included the Liberal Party was perceived as a degradation of the status of the Russian language and culture in the public sphere (Dom, 2017: 105–159). Moderate centre-right parties and left-wing parties rarely make attempts to de-politicise the identity debate and distance themselves from radical positions (Groza et al., 2018: 5; see also Delcour, 2018;van Meurs, 2015: 201–204). On the contrary, the left-wing Socialist Party and President Dodon discursively nur­ ture the cleavage by discursively linking EU integration and unification with Romania15 in order to spark fears of Romanianist-nationalist chauvinism and garner support of the Russian-speaking population and national minorities. European integration is the path to the final territorial collapse of the country, the path to anti-people reforms […] and, finally, the path to the annexation of Moldova by Romania. (Dodon, 2014) On the other hand, the position of centre-right parties like the PDLM and the pro-European electoral bloc ACUM towards pan-Romanianism remains ambiguous as they seek to benefit from unionist voters. Common candidates for presidency and common electoral blocs between the pan-Romanianists and the pro-Europeans are frequently up for discussion.

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Conclusion Since the early 2000s Russia and the EU have rolled out competing European and Eurasian region-building projects over Eastern Europe. From the outset, the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy was framed in competition to Russian-led region-building and is a substantial building block of competitive interregion­ alism in Eastern Europe. Competition as a negative effect on the interregional structure was therefore at least anticipated, if not intended, but undesirable. However, proponents of the ENP probably underestimated the degree to which this competition would contribute to the ‘geopoliticisation’ of Russia’s foreign policy discourses and Moscow’s ‘counter actions’ (Delcour, 2017: 62) towards East European countries. For Moldova, a state “in-between”, this competitive interregional setting exacerbates an Eastness versus Europeanness debate in their own discourses on regional identity. This chapter showed how domestic actors in Moldova, through the practice of identity convergence and identity divergence, re-articulate inher­ ently contradictory notions of EU-led and Russia-led regionalisms in their national identity discourses. The construction of Europeanness in cultural terms portrays the Eastness of Moldova’s identity as foreign and thus challenges the sta­ tus of some minorities and Russian-speakers as part of the Moldovan nation. On the other hand, Moscow’s civilisational Eurasianism – the idea of Eurasia bound together by a Russian culture, language and civilisation – serves as guardian of Moldova’s eastern identity. This mutually exclusive articulation of identities maintains, if not widens, the existing rift in Moldova’s society. The widening identity cleavages in Moldova are thus direct and unintended consequences of interregionalism. They run counter to the EU’s intended conse­ quences of closing the normative gap with the region to enhance democratisation and political stability. Rather than avoiding dividing lines in its neighbourhood, the interregionalism exacerbates them. The risk that Europeanisation can rein­ force domestic socio-political cleavages is acknowledged by the scholarship (see Subotic, 2011; Freyburg and Richter, 2010; Diez, Albert, and Stetter, 2008) and the European Commission.16 However, the unintended consequences are not merely an effect of EU regionalism but materialise through the ability of domes­ tic actors to independently perform regional integration discourses in a local context. Unintended consequences thus unfold in the case of Moldova because the hardening boundaries triggered by the EU’s interregionalism are exacerbated by the locally driven ethno-lingual dimension of national identity formation. Completing the interregional picture, the rift in Moldova’s society and the resulting instability is also linked to the expansion of Russia-led regionalisms such as EAEU and CIS. Scholars have suggested that the intended objective of Moscow’s policies in the ‘near abroad’ is not primarily regional integration or stability but rather the obstruction of EU region-building through the ‘manage­ ment of instability’ (Tolstrup, 2009; Babayan, 2015). The intra-Moldovan antag­ onism would thus at least be a consequence that is not directly intended but still

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desirable by Russia’s regional policies, and it remains open whether this might even constitute a covert but intended consequence of interregionalism.

Notes 1 As part of the GEM-STONES program, the author received funding from the Euro­ pean Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Grant Agreement No. 722826. 2 Translations from Romanian or Russian into English are either by Irina Cojocaru or by the author. I would like to thank Irina Cojocaru, graduate student from the Université Libre de Bruxelles, for her help on this article. 3 A more comprehensive interpretivist critique of positivist causality can be found in Campbell and Bleiker (2016) and Kurowska (2018). 4 However, there is no evident yardstick for inclusive/exclusive constructions and each of these constructions is usually internally contested (Rumelili, 2004: 37). 5 For a more detailed description of ‘official discourses’ and ‘wider political discourses’ as two distinct intertextual models see Hansen (2006: 59–72). 6 These countries were Belarus, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. 7 Interviews by the author with former officials from DG enlargement suggest that concerns about Moscow’s perception of and reaction to the ENP were widespread and frequently discussed in internal meetings. 8 Relations between these regionalisms and the EU may also be considered instances of interregionalism. However, these regional initiatives were undertaken in the wider framework of EU integration and the European Commission remained the most important supporter. 9 For a detailed historical analysis of those discourses see, e.g. Neumann (1996) and Duncan (2002). 10 For most national minorities (i.e. Bulgarians, Russians, Ukrainians and Gagauz) Russian is the language of daily use. National and linguistic minorities are often subsumed under the label of Russian-speakers or Russian-speaking minorities. In 2014, 55.1% declared Moldovan their mother tongue and 53% the language of their daily use; 22.8% named Romanian as their mother tongue and 23.3% as language of their daily use. Russian, on the other hand, was the mother tongue for 9.4% and the language of daily use for 14.1% (National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic Of Moldova, 2014). 11 During that time Gagauz, Bulgarians, Russians and Ukrainians also settled on the territory of Moldova. According to the census from 2014, Moldovans consti­ tute 73.7% of the country’s population. The largest minority groups are Ukrainians (6.5%), Russians (4.0%), Gagauz (4.5%), Romanians (6.9%), Bulgarians (1.8%) and Roma (0.3%). (National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic Of Moldova, 2014). 12 Moldova’s Presidents who advocated Moldovanism were Mircea Snegur (1994–1996) and his successor Petru Lucinschi (1996–2001), both backed by the Democratic Agrarian Party, Vladimir Voronin (2001–2009) backed by the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) and the incumbent President Igor Dodon (since 2014) backed by the party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM). 13 On a European level not only Romania’s official diplomacy but also Romanian MEPs are strong supporters of Moldova’s EU integration. 14 For example, while Moldovanists prefer to call Moldova’s history textbooks ‘History of the Republic of Moldova’ Romanianists insists that the official historiography should be called ‘History of Romanians’. Furthermore, in 2013, members of the Liberal Party called upon the Constitutional Court with the claim that ‘Moldovan written in Latin alphabet’, which is the definition of Moldova’s state language in

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the constitution from 1994, is equal to Romanian and that the declaration of inde­ pendence from 1991, which uses the term ‘Romanian’ to describe the state language should be given preference over the constitution from 1994 (cf. Prina, 2015). Detailed analysis of identity politics in Moldova can be found in King (2000), van Meurs (1998, 2015) and Ihrig (2008). 15 In Moldova’s domesticpolitics, the Romanianist discourse is often labelled ‘unionism’ (see e.g. Dodon, 2018). 16 On the micro-level, the EU as well as the EU member states shows awareness of the problem of social cohesion in Moldova through their development projects (Groza et al., 2018).

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Monographs Campbell, David. 1992. Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Ciobanu, Vitalie. 1999. Frica de Diferenţǎ. Articole, esuri, cronici literare [Fear of Difference. Articles, essays and literary chronicles]. Bucharest: Editura Fundaţ iei Culturale Române. Delcour, Laure. 2011. Shaping the Post-Soviet Space? EU Policies and Approaches to Region-Building. Farnham: Ashgate. Delcour, Laure. 2017. The EU and Russia in Their ‘Contested Neighbouhood’. Multiple External Influences, Policy Transfer and Domestic Change. Abingdon: Routledge. Diez, Thomas, Mathias Albert and Stephan Stetter. 2008. The European Union and Border Conflicts. The Power of Integration and Association. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Dom, Rosanna. 2017. Fragile Loyalität zur Republik Moldau. Sowjetnostalgie und ‘Heimatlosigkeit’ unter den russische und ukrainischen Minderheiten. Edited by Ulf; Clewing Brunnbauer, Konrad. Vol. 156, Südosteuropäische Arbeiten. München: De Gruyter Oldenbourg. Duncan, Peter. 2002. Russian Messianism. Third Rome, Revolution, Communism and After. London, New York: Routledge. Guzzini, Stefano. 2012. The Return of Geopolitics in Europe? Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Hansen, Lene. 2006. Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War. London: Routledge. Ihrig, Stefan. 2008. Wer sind die Moldawier? Rumänismus versus Moldowanismus in Historiographie und Schulbüchern der Republik Moldova, 1991-2006. Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag. Kaufman, Stuart J. 2001. Modern Hatreds. The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. King, Charles. 2000. The Moldovans. Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture. Stanford CA: Hoover Instition Press. Neumann, Iver B. 1996. Russia and the Idea of Europe. A Study in Identity and International Relations. London, New York: Routledge. Neumann, Iver B. 1999. Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation. Mineapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

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Online resources Börzel, Tanja. 2010. The Transformative Power of Europe Reloaded. KFG Working Paper 11. Available at: https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/36800. Accessed on 15 May 2020. Dodon, Igor. 2014. 11 November. ИгOPь ДOдOH: “HAM HYжEH дPYгOй ПYTь”, HE EBPOиHTEгPAция, A BCTYплEHиE MOлдOBы B TAMOжEHHый COюз [Igor Dodon: “We need another Path”, not European integration, but the entry of Moldova into the Customs Union]." Available at: http://actualitati.md/igor-dodon­ nam-nuzhen-drugoj-put-ne-e. Accessed on 15 May 2020. Dodon, Igor. 2017. 15 December. Speech of His Excellency Mr. Igor Dodon, President of the Republic of Moldova, at the International Conference ‘Financial capitalism and its alternatives for the 21st century. Contributions to the 4th Economic Theory’. Website of the President of the Republic of Modlova. Available at: http://presedinte. md/eng/discursuri/discursul-excelentei-sale-domnului-igor-dodon-presedintele­ republicii-moldova-la-conferinta-internationala-capitalismul-financiar-si-alternativele­ acestuia-pentru-secolul-xxi-contributii-la-a-4-a-teorie-economica. Accessed on 15 May 2020. Dodon, Igor. 2018. 20 August. Interviu exclusive cu Presidentele RM, Igor Dodon cu ocazia celei de-a 27-a aniversă ria [Exclusive Interview with the President of the RM, Igor Dodon, on the occasion of the 27th anniversary of independence]. Available at: http://tribuna.md/2018/08/20/interviu-exclusiv-cu-presedintele-rm-igor-dodon­ cu-ocazia-celei-de-a-27-a-aniversari-a-independentei/. Accessed on 15 May 2020. Ghimpu, Mihai. 2018. Mihai Ghimpu: “Ast ă zi problema noastr ă este problema democraț iei. Ce facem mai departe?” [Mihai Ghimpu: “Today our problem is the problem of democracy. What do we do next?”]. Radio Free Europe. Available at: https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/mihai-ghimpu-ast%C4%83zi-problema-noastr% C4%83-este-problema-democra%C8%9Biei-ce-facem-mai-departe-/29260024. html. Accessed on 15 May 2020. Groza, Iulian, Mathias Jopp, Vladislav Kulminski, Vadim Pistrinciuc, Andrei Popov, Adrian Popescu, and Julian Rusu. 2018. Strenghening Social Cohesion and Common Identity in the Republic of Moldova. Report. Available at: http://iep-berlin.de/wp­ content/uploads/2018/02/Social-Cohesion-and-Common-Identit y-EN.pdf. Accessed on 15 May 2020.

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National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova. 2014. Results of the Population and Housing Cencus 2014. Available at: https://statistica.gov.md/pageview. php?l=ro&idc=479&. Accessed on 15 May 2020. Parlament of the Republic of Moldova. 1995. Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Moldova. Available at: http://lex.justice.md/md/306955/. Accessed on 15 May 2020. Partidul Liberal. 2014. Program of the Liberal Party. Available at: http://www.e­ democracy.md/files/parties/pl-program-2014-ro.pdf. Accessed on 15 May 2020. Putin, Vladimir. 2011. 4 October. Novyy integratsionnyy proyekt dlya Yevrazii budushcheye, kotoroye rozhdayetsya segodnya [A new integration project for Eurasia – The future in the making]. Izvestiya. Available at: https://www.europarl. europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-ru/dv/dru_2013_0320_06_/dru_ 2013_0320_06_en.pdf. Accessed on 15 May 2020. RFE Moldovan Service. 2014. 3 February. Gagauzia Voters Reject Closer EU Ties For Moldova. Radio Free Europe. Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova­ gagauz-referendum-counting/25251251.html. Accessed on 15 May 2020. Tulmets, Elsa. 2011. Institution-Building Instruments in the Eastern Partnership: Still Drawing on Enlargement? Eastern Partnership Review (6). Available at: https://eceap. eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/6_Review_No61.pdf. Accessed on 15 May 2020.

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INDEX

Note: Italicized and bold pages refer to figures and tables respectively. AADMER see ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response AEEMP see ASEAN-EU Emergency Management Programme AEGDM see ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management AEI see Alliance for European Integration Africa-EU partnership: Cotonou Agreement (2000) 128; CSDP missions 133, 134; ECOWAS 128–129, 131–137; new interregionalisms within, intentions of 131–133; overview 125–127; on peace and security 127–130; Regional Indicative Programs 129; security cooperation embedded in APSA 128; West Africa-EU security cooperation 130–137; see Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)

group 3

African Islamic Caliphate 153–155 African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 125; Africa-EU security cooperation embedded in 128; African regionalism and 129; G5 Sahel 130; Regional Indicative Plan 133; unintended consequences from interregionalism beyond 133–137

BK-TandF-LUCIA_9780367554774-200302-Index.indd 223

African Peace Facility (APF) 129

African Peace Fund 128

African Standby Force 128

African Union (AU) 125, 126, 134, 135,

137, 165

agential constructivism 167–169 AHA see ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance ALBA see Alliance for the Peoples of our America Alliance for European Integration (AEI)

210, 211

Alliance for the Peoples of our America

(ALBA) 30

Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb

(AQIM) 153, 154, 158

Al-Shabaab 176

AMISOM 172, 175

Ansar Dine 54

APSA see African Peace and Security Architecture ARF see ASEAN Regional Forum ARF Intersessional Meeting on Maritime

Security 91

ARPDM see ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management ASEAN see Association of South-East Asian Nations ASEAN Agreement on Disaster

Management and Emergency Response

(AADMER) 47, 49, 50, 53; Indian

Ocean Tsunami (2004) and 52

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224

Index

ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) 47; on disaster management 50 ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+) 90, 91, 96 ASEAN-EU Emergency Management Programme (AEEMP) 54 ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM) 50 ASEAN maritime strategy: code of conduct 88, 91, 92; maritime bilateralism, examples of 93–94; maritime multilateralism, examples of 92–93; maritime security governance, architecture of 90–91; regional maritime security governance, priorities for 91–92; Southeast Asian maritime domain 89; unity through accommodation and consensus 95; vs. EU maritime strategy 95–98 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 90, 91 ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) 50, 52–53 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 17, 48, 85; AHA Centres 50–51, 55–57; Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance 47; in crisis management 49–51; Declaration for Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters 50; Declaration on One ASEAN One Response 51, 54, 55; Disaster Emergency Logistic System 50; maritime strategy 89–95 Avelar, Blanca 34 Bandar Seri Begawan Plan for Action (2013–2017) 53 Barroso, José Manuel Burão 52, 114 bifurcated interregionalism 166; definition of 168–169; unintended consequences in IGAD-Horn of Africa relationship 172–176 bifurcated regionalism 5, 148; theoretical and conceptual approaches to 167–169 Boko Haram 129, 132–133, 134, 135, 137 Brazil: political crisis of 2015 40; relationship with EU; see also EU-Brazil relations Capriles, Henrique 37 CCPM see Community Civil Protection Mechanism CELAC see Community of Latin American and Caribbean States

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Chávez, Hugo 35, 37, 40 CIS see Commonwealth of Independent States Claux, Carmen Masías 72 Commission-to-Commission (C2C) 1, 2 Common Market of the South see Mercosur Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions 133, 134, 152 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 186, 202 Community Civil Protection Mechanism (CCPM) 52 Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) 17, 30, 35, 63–77; and Alternative Development approach 71–74; contestation 76; countries 67, 69–71, 73–74; critical views in, emergence of 69; vs. EU 63–64; EU’s normative discourse, raise question on 65–66; EU’s selective interaction 68, 69; regional cohesion in, unintended consequences to 66–70 competing regionalism: emergence in post-Soviet space 206–209; in Sahel region 149–150 Cooperation Programme on Drugs Policies (COPOLAD) 63–77; Alternative Development 70–74; deviation in 66; Drug Demand Reduction of 68; drugs policies for CELAC countries, role in 66–67, 68; experiences of CELAC 64–65; first phase of 66; four components of 66; goals of 66; regional cohesion, goal of 69; second phase of 67–68; see also Community of Latin American and Caribbean States COPOLAD see Cooperation Programme on Drugs Policies crossregionalism 4 CSDP missions see Common Security and Defence Policy missions DCFTA see Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) 193, 206, 211 DELSA see Disaster Emergency Logistic System Dias da Costa, Breno 36 DIPECHO programme see ECHO’s Disaster Preparedness Programme

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Index 225

Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management (ECHO) 48, 49; emergency response centre 52 Disaster Emergency Logistic System (DELSA) 50 disaster management: ASEAN as rising actor in 49–51; EU-ASEAN interregional cooperation 46–47, 51–58; EU as global actor in 47–49 Dodon, Igor 212 Druzhba Narodov (Friendship of the Peoples) 190, 198n5 Duterte, Rodrigo 93 EaP see Eastern Partnership Eastern Partnership (EaP) 186, 202 ECHO see Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management ECHO’s Disaster Preparedness Programme (DIPECHO) 51 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 128–129, 131–137, 165 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 15 ECOWAS see Economic Community of West African States EEU see Eurasian Economic Union Emergency Response and Assessment Teams (ERAT) 50 ENP see European Neighbourhood Policy ERAT see Emergency Response and Assessment Teams Estigarribia, José Féliz Fernández 35, 36 EU-ASEAN interregional cooperation 15, 17, 85; Bandar Seri Begawan Plan for Action (2013–2017) 53; DIPECHO program 51; disaster management policy 46–47, 51–58; first phase (2004) 51–52; Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004) 51–52; mechanism of Civil Protection 52; Nuremberg Declaration on ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership 52–53; Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument 53; second phase (2004–2007) 52; third phase (2007–2016) 52–54; unintended consequences in disaster management 55–58 EU-Brazil relations 17, 106; bilateral agenda 116; Brazil’s motivations to establish individual relation 112–113; development of 112, 113–115; establishment 110–115; MERCOSUR political integration, unintended consequences to 115–120; topics of 117

BK-TandF-LUCIA_9780367554774-200302-Index.indd 225

EUCAP see European Union Capacity Building Mission EU-CELAC cooperation programme 63; political declarations, exposed in 75; see also Cooperation Programme on Drugs Policies (COPOLAD) EU-CELAC interregionalism 75; asymmetric 67; ‘EU-centric interregionalism’ 64; unintended consequences 70–74, 75 EU-centric interregionalism 64 EU-centrism 5–6 EU-G5 Sahel relations 130, 132, 134 EU-MERCOSUR relations 16, 17, 106–107; development of 108–110; dynamic 109–110; EU foreign policy change in 2000s 111–112; goals introduced by EU 109–110; individualising interregional relations 110–115; interregional agenda 116; Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement 109; political relations 119–120; political relations, marginalisation of 116, 118; topics of 117; trade negotiations 110 EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) 196 Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) 18, 186, 193–194, 196, 202 Eurasianism 211–213 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) 64, 78n2 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 186, 195, 206 European Parliament Traian Basescu 213 European Union (EU) 4, 63–64, 85, 165; Alternative Development approach, goal of diffusing 70–74, 76; Association Agreement 186, 193–194; Economic Partnership Agreements with Sub-Saharan Africa 15; external performance, assessment of 10; foreign policy and norms diffusion 64; foreign policy change in 2000s 111–112; Free Trade Agreements 207; Georgia linked to 186; as global actor in disaster management 47–49; Global Strategy 46–49, 55; interregionalism and 3; maritime strategy 87–89; model for other regions 45; normative power 65; as “security provider” 48 European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) 152

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226

Index

European Union Maritime Security

Strategy (EUMSS): ‘global security’

in waters of Southeast Asia 87–89;

maritime multilateralism 96, 99;

vs. ASEAN maritime strategy

95–98, 99

European Union Training Mission

(EUTM) 152

EU SAHA project 56, 57

EUTM see European Union Training Mission formal regionalism 166–167, 169; intended objectives in East Africa 169–172 former Soviet Union (FSU) 187–189 Franco, Federico 36

Free Trade Area of the Americas

(FTAA) 109

FTAA see Free Trade Area of the Americas GEM-STONES program 99n1 gender 12

Georgieva, Kristalina 49

German Agency for International

Cooperation and Sustainable

Development (GIZ) 71, 73, 74

Ghimpu, Mihai 213

Governing Failure 11

Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication

et le Combat (GSPC) 153

G5 Sahel 130–137, 155–157 GSPC see Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat GUAM 195, 202

‘hierarchical diffusion’ 70, 71

Horn of Africa 165–178; formal and

informal regionalism in 169–172;

IGAD’s promotion of peace in 171;

informal regionalism, agents of 173,

178; informal trade in 170, 176–177;

overlapping regionalism in 174; trade

of arms in 172; see also IGAD-Horn of

Africa relationship

identity: democratic 31; external and internal 205; hierarchical 75–76; inclusive 205; maritime nation 93; regional 204, 209–213 identity convergence 205–206, 211

IGAD see Intergovernmental Authority for Development; Intergovernmental Authority on Development

BK-TandF-LUCIA_9780367554774-200302-Index.indd 226

IGAD-Horn of Africa relationship 171–172; bifurcated interregionalism in, unintended consequences of 172–176; intra-regional trade 173–175 IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia

(IGASOM) 175

informal regionalisms 166–167, 169; intended objectives in East Africa 169–172 Insulza, José Miguel 36

Inter-American Democratic Charter

(IADC) 27, 31, 32, 34

Inter-American Drug Abuse Control

Commission (CICAD) 77

Intergovernmental Authority on

Development (IGAD) 18, 165, 166,

169; intended objectives 167, 169–172;

Minimum Integration Plan 170–171;

and non-state armed groups 170–171,

175–176; Peace Support Mission in

Somalia 175; Regional Economic

Cooperation and Integration 171;

specific FTA 171

international relations (IRs): decentring study of regionalism 7–10; unintended consequences to 10–13 interregionalism 1; beyond EU-centrism and terminology 5–6; definition of 2; as distinct research object 3–5; fun­ damental component of 168; as global phenomenon 3; hybrid or quasi 5; inductive approach 10; pure or bilateral 4; in regionalism studies 2–3; stealth 5; unintended consequences of 7–16 Jacobson, Roberta 36

Joint Africa EU Strategy ( JAES) 128

Kirchner, Cristina 34, 35

Kissinger, Henry 168

Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) 129; partnership with EU 132–133 Latin American and Caribbean (LAC)

countries 64, 66

Latin America regionalism: complexity added in 41; and democracy clauses 29–33; enhancement of, policy initi­ ators in 39; key players of 30; political crises 33–40 LCBC see Lake Chad Basin Commission LCBC-EU cooperation 131, 132–133 Lenarčič, Janez 49

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Index 227

Lima Group 38 Loong, Lee Hsien 92 Lugo, Fernando 27, 35, 36, 40, 41; impeachment of 33–34 Macri, Mauricio 38, 40 Maduro, Nicolas 37, 40 Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) framework 90 maritime multilateralism 85–99; ASEAN maritime strategy 89–95; ASEAN vs. EU 95–98; EU maritime strategy 87–89; Southeast Asian Maritime Space 89 MERCOSUR 27–28, 106–108; democracy clauses in 29–32; Montevideo Protocol of 2011 32, 40; political integration, unintended consequences to 115–120; positions of, political crises and 33–40; summit in Mendoza (2012) 34–35; Ushuaia Protocol of 1998 32; Venezuela’s entry into 34–35, 37; see also EU-MERCOSUR relations MNJTF see Multinational Joint Task Force Mogherini, Federica 45, 47 Mohamed, Najim El-hadj 155 MOJWA see Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa Moldova 202–206; domestic political actors in 203; EU integration and domestic reforms 211; identity dilemma of, pan-Romanianism and 213–214; Janus-faced regional identity of 209–210; outside-in region-building, response to 209–214; pro-European discourse 211; region building, linking unintended consequences to 203–206; response to outside-in region-building 209–214; Russian-oriented regional identities 211–213 Montevideo Protocol of 2011 32, 33, 40 Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) 164 Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) 125, 126, 129, 131, 134–136; enhance­ ment for fight against Boko Haram 136; extraversion-approach, rise to 136; operate outside APSA 135–136; securing areas affected by Boko Haram 132–133 new regionalism approach (NRA) 8 non-state armed groups (NSAGs) 170–171, 175–176 NRA see new regionalism approach

BK-TandF-LUCIA_9780367554774-200302-Index.indd 227

Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 190–191 Organisation of American States (OAS) 27, 77; Article 2 of constitutive treaty (1948) 31; Brazilian evaluation 36; Charter 32, 33; Declaration of Santiago de Chile (1991) 32; democracy clause 30–33; events grant activation of democracy clause 32; interven­ tion in Dominican Republic 31–32; Permanent Council 36, 37; positions of, political crises and 33–40; vs. sub­ regional organisations 31; suspended Paraguay 36–37 OSCE see Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe overlapping democracy 28 overlapping regionalism 4, 202; in Horn of Africa 174; overlapping democracy and 28; unintended consequences of 28–29 Paraguay: political crises in (2012) 33–40; suspension of 35–36 Parly, Florence 88 peacebuilding 11–12; in Democratic Republic of Congo 11 Peter, Tsar 208 READI see Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) 88, 90 regional disintegration 186 Regional Economic Communities (RECs) 125, 126, 128 Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (READI) 53 regionalism: bifurcated 5; comparative 8; interregionalism in 2–3; overlapping 4; regions and networks 167–168; in Sub-Saharan Africa 15 regional security complex theory 7–8 region-building approach (RBA) 149, 202–206, 209–214 ‘regionness,’ in NRA 8 Republic of Moldova see Moldova Rodríguez, Alí 34 Rousseff, Dilma 38, 40 Russian-Atlantic region 15 Russia-NATO relations 15

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228

Index

SACN see South American Community of Nations SADC see South African Development Community Sahel (region) 129, 147–160, 160n1; competing interregionalism in, unintended effects of 157–160; competing regionalisms 149–150; external interveners 150–153; insurgent jihadist groups in 153–155; as Islamic Caliphate 153–155; migration to EU 130, 132; Pan-Sahel Initiative by the US 151; as predatory strategy 155–157; regional governing elites in 155–157; regionalisms in 148–149; regionbuilding as strategy for stability 150–153; “Stratégie Sahel” 151, 152; “trifurcated regionalism” of 157; see also G5 Sahel Samper, Ernesto 40

security community framework 7–8 shadow regionalism 167

Simões, Antônio José 36

Slav-Orthodox 208, 209, 212, 213

Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) 178n1 South African Development Community

(SADC) 121

South American Community of Nations

(SACN) 31, 32

South Caucasus 185–187; complex post-Soviet transitions 187–189; disaggregation in 189–191; in European Neighbourhood Policy 186; “externally generated” 191–193; integration, new phase of 186; local strategies of accommodation, consequences and 194–197; regional disintegration 187–189; regionalism, externally driven 193–194 Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR) 185

SSR see Soviet Socialist Republics stealth interregionalism 166

Stylianides, Christos 49

Sub-Saharan Africa: regionalism in,

weaken 15

Temer, Michel 40

Tipán, Diego 72

Transatlantic Trade and Investment

Partnership (TTIP) 110

BK-TandF-LUCIA_9780367554774-200302-Index.indd 228

Transcaucasian Democratic Federative

Republic 191

Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet

Republic 191

transregionalism 4

Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism

Initiative 151

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) 99n6 TTIP see Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership “tuareg-jihadist” 154

UNCLOS see United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UNCND see United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) 27–28; Constitutive Treaty on Commitment to Democracy 32–33; democracy clauses in 29–33; Electoral Council of 33; and Paraguayan crisis 36; political crises, engagement in 33; positions of, political crises and 33–40; on sanctions imposed by the US on Venezuela 38; South American Defence Council 30; Treaty of SACN (2004) 32 United Nations Commission on Narcotic

Drugs (UNCND) 70

United Nations Convention on

the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 87,

88, 92

Ushuaia Protocol of 1998 32, 35, 38

Venezuela: entry into Mercosur 34–35;

political crises in (2012-2017) 33–40;

sanctions imposed by the US 38

von der Leyen, Ursula 49

West Africa: EU’s new interregionalisms in 127–130; interregional and regional actors in, intentions of 127; see also Africa-EU partnership West Africa-EU security cooperation 130–137; new interregionalisms within Africa-EU relations, intentions of 131–133 Widodo, Joko 93

World Order Approach (WOA) 19n7

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