The Two-State Solution: The UN Partition Resolution of Mandatory Palestine 9781623567811, 9781623566074, 9781501301261, 9781623568269

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The Two-State Solution

Other Publications of The Metzilah Center Civil Framework for Marriage and Divorce in Israel Avishalom Westreich and Pinchas Shiffman (2013) Return of Palestinian Refugees to the State of Israel Yaffa Zilbershats and Nimra Goren-Amitai (2011) Managing Global Migration: A Strategy for Immigration Policy in Israel Shlomo Avineri, Liav Orgad, Amnon Rubinstein (2010) The Arabs in Israel: Contemplations on State Commissions of Inquiry and the Status of the Arab Minority in Israel Ruth Gavison (2010) The Law of Return at Sixty Years: History, Ideology, Justification Ruth Gavison (2010) Demographic Trends in Israel Uzi Rebhun, Gilad Malach (2009) Conditions for the Prosperity of the State of Israel Ruth Gavison (2007)

The Two-State Solution The UN Partition ­Resolution of Mandatory Palestine ­Analysis and Sources Edited by Ruth Gavison Translation from Hebrew: Gadi Weber Translation Editor: Allan Arkush

Metzilah

(R.A)

Center of Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanist Thought

N E W YOR K • LON DON • N E W DE L H I • SY DN EY

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www.bloomsbury.com First published 2013 © Metzilah Center, 2013 The contents of this book do not necessarily represent the views of the Metzilah Center and are presented at the sole responsibility of the authors. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury Academic or the author.



ISBN: HB: 978-1-6235-6781-1 PB: 978-1-6235-6607-4 ePDF: 978-1-6235-6826-9 ePub: 978-1-6235-6079-9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

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The Metzilah Center was founded in 2005, in order to address the growing tendency in Israel and throughout the world to question the legitimacy of Jewish nationalism and its compatibility with universal values. We believe: that Zionism and the liberal-democratic worldview can, and even must, admit to coexistence; that public discourse, research, and education possess the key to combining Zionism, Jewish values, and human rights in Israel; that the integration of these values is essential to the prosperity of the State of Israel and of the Jewish people. The primary purpose of the Metzilah Center is to promote knowledge and understanding, and to provoke a public dialogue in those fields which we view as the central topics relevant to life in the State of Israel and to the prosperity of the Jewish people in Israel and throughout the world. These central topics include: the right of the Jewish people to national selfdetermination in (part of) Eretz Yisrael; contemporary Jewish identities; the nature and characteristics of Israeli society; the ways of securing the human rights of all the citizens and residents of Israel. We believe that recently, as opposed to the earlier stages of the Zionist enterprise, there is a lack of in-depth and well-founded discussion on the central issues and their premises. In many cases, exchanges and debates are limited to the dissemination of slogans and the perpetuation of stereotypes. Accordingly, the Metzilah Center focuses both on ideological, academic, and historical investigations connected to these topics, and on practical discussions that pertain to policy making. In an attempt to address this urgent need, the Metzilah Center is at work on the publication of a variety of texts which shed new light on the fundamental problems and lay factual, historical, and ideological foundations for thought and action. The Center aspires to produce meticulous and professional publications, which can lay a common basis for the promotion of a serious public discussion of the key issues, which is so requisite in Israeli society and the Jewish world, and to re-clarify essential insights pertaining to them. The Metzilah Center believes that the State of Israel is essential to the well-being and prosperity of the Jewish people, and that it is important to establish Israel’s goals in all of their complexity: to realize the right of Jews and the Jewish people to self-determination through a Jewish state in their historical homeland; to respect the human rights of all the citizens and residents of Israel; to be a stable, peace-loving, and prosperous democracy which works for the well-being of all its residents.

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Contents

About the Authors  xi From the Editor  xiii

Part One  Studies on the Partition Resolution  1 1 The Zionist debates on partition (1919–47)  3 Itzhak Galnoor

2 The positions in support of the partition plan  17 Alexander Yakobson

3 Palestinians and the partition plan  29 Mustafa Kabha

4 The position of the Arab leadership vis-à-vis the partition plan: The crime and its punishment  38 Nazier Magally

5 The November 29th resolution: Then and now  45 Ruth Gavison

Part Two  Sources  63 6 First Crossroads: Peel Commission, 1937  65 A memorandum submitted by the Arab Higher Committee to the Royal Commission  65 Peel Commission Report, July 1937  71

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C ontents

Address by Mr V. Jabotinsky to members of the British Parliament, 13 July 1937  86 Address by Dr Chaim Weizmann at the 20th Zionist Congress, 4 August 1937  87

7 Second Crossroads: The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, March–April 1946  93 Address by Prof. Martin Buber (Ha-Ichud) at the first session of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry  93 Address by Mr Emil Ghoury (member of the Arab Higher Committee) to the final session of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 25 March 1946  96 Address by Mr Albert Hourani (representing the Arab Office) to the final session of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 25 March 1946  102 Address by Mr Moshe Shertok to the final session of the AngloAmerican Committee of Inquiry, 25 March 1946  122 Recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (Excerpts), April 1946  144 Dr Goldmann’s mission to Washington, 5 August 1946  145

8 Third Crossroads: UNSCOP—Establishment, Work, and Recommendations May–September 1947  147 Address of Mr Andrei Gromyko to the General Assembly of the UN regarding the establishing of UNSCOP, 14 May 1947  147 Addresses and memoranda presented to UNSCOP  151 Memorandum from Lohamei Herut Yisrael (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) to UNSCOP, Tammuz 5707, 26 June 1947  151 Memorandum from “The Communist Union in EretzYisrael” to UNSCOP, June 1947  157 Address of Mr David Ben-Gurion to UNSCOP, 4 July 1947  161 Address of Rabbi Yehuda Hacohen Leib Fischmann (Hamizrachi) to UNSCOP, 4 July 1947  179 Address of Mr Eliezer Kaplan before UNSCOP  184 Address of Rabbi Yitzhak Meir Levin (Agudath Yisrael) to UNSCOP, 10 July 1947  188

Contents

Address of Dr Judah Leon Magnes (Ha-Ichud) to UNSCOP, 14 July 1947  190 The UNSCOP Report: Report to the General Assembly of the UN Special Committee on Palestine, 3 September 1947  196 Reactions to the UNSCOP Report  235 Letter from Mr David Ben-Gurion to Paula Ben-Gurion, 2 September 1947  235 Letter from Mr Moshe Shertok to Golda Meyerson, 7 September 1947  238 Memorandum by the British secretary of state for foreign affairs, Ernest Bevin, 18 September 1947  242 Speeches at the United Nations  246 Address of Faris Bey El Khouri (Syria) to the General Assembly  246 Address of the Right Honourable Arthur Creech-Jones, to the UN General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, 16 September 1947  251 The Arab case stated by Mr Jamal Husseini to the UN Ad Hoc Committee, 29 September 1947  256 Address of Dr Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman of the American Section of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, to the UN Ad Hoc Committee, 2 October 1947  262 The minority recommendation stated by Mr Vladimir Simic (Yugoslavia) to the UN Ad Hoc Committee, 14 October 1947  275 Address of Mr Camille Chamoun (Lebanon) to the UN General Assembly, 26 November 1947  276

  9 Fourth Crossroads: United Nations Resolution, 29 November 1947  281 Resolution 181 (II). Future government of Palestine, 29 November 1947  281 Voting assessments and actual votes in the UN General Assembly  295

10 Fifth Crossroads: Following the resolution  299 Azriel Carlebach, “Shehecheyanu”: A description of the Zionist reaction to the UN resolution, 30 November 1947  299

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Zalman Lipschitz, memorandum: Account of the erosion in support for the partition plan in the US and the UN, circa 15 February 1948  301 Report from Golda Meyerson on her discussions with King Abdullah of Jordan, 12 May 1948  307 Letter from Dr Chaim Weizmann to President Truman, 13 May 1948  310 The declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel, 14 May 1948  311 Appendix  315 Index  321

About the Authors

Professor Ruth Gavison is Haim H. Cohn Professor emerita of Human Rights at the Faculty of Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Founding President of Metzilah—a center for Zionist, Jewish, Humanist and Liberal Thought. She has written extensively on human rights, Israeli society and Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Professor Gavison served as a member in the Winograd Commission which investigated the 2nd Lebanon War (September 2006 to January 2008). She is the recipient of a number of prizes, including the Emet Prize for Law (2003), the Cheshin Prize (2009) and the Israel Prize for Legal Research (2011). Professor Itzhak Galnoor is the Herbert Samuel Professor of Political Science (emeritus) at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Chairman of the Israeli Political Science Association. He has been a visiting professor at many international universities, and served on the executive committee of the International Political Science Association. He edited the book series, Advances in Political Science (Cambridge University Press and IPSA). From 1994–1996, he was Chairman of the Civil Service Commission in Itzhak Rabin’s administration. Since 2007 he has been a senior fellow at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and the academic director of its “State Responsibility and the Limits of Privatization” project. He is the author of The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement (SUNY Press, 1995). Professor Alexander Yakobson is Associate Professor of Ancient History, at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His main fields of research are: democracy, popular politics, public opinion and elections in the ancient world. He is the author of: Elections and Electioneering in Rome: a Study in the Political System of the Late Republic (Stuttgart 1999). His research other than ancient history involves: democracy, national identity, nation-state and the rights of national minorities, religion and state—in Israel and in Western democracies. Professor Yakobson co-authored (with Amnon Rubinstein) the book Israel and the Family of Nations—Jewish Nation-State and Human Rights (Hebrew version—2003; English version—2008). The book was also

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translated into French, Israël et les nations. L’État-nation juif et les droits de l-homme (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 2006). He also writes op-eds often in Haaretz newspaper. Professor Mustafa Kabha is the Chairman of the Department of History, Philosophy and Judaic Studies at the Open University of Israel, where he is a researcher and associate professor in History and Communications. His fields of research are Middle Eastern History in the Modern Era, the History of the Palestinian National Movement and the History of Arab Mass Communications. His publications include The Palestinian Press as Shaper of Public Opinion 1929–1939 (Vallentine Mitchell, 2007) and (with Dan Caspi) The Palestinian Arab In/Outsiders: Media and Conflict in Israel (Vallentine Mitchell, 2011). Nazier Magally is a writer and journalist who lives and works in Nazareth. He has served as Editor-in-Chief of Al-Ittihad, Israel’s only Arabic-language daily. He presently is a columnist on Israeli topics for the London-based newspaper Asharq Alawsat, and the host of several news magazines on Channel 2 (Israel). Mr Magally teaches at Birzeit University in the West Bank, and has taught at Ben-Gurion University. He is a long-time activist in matters concerning the relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel and in the region. In 2003, he led, with Father Emile Shoufani, a delegation of Arab and Jewish public figures to Auschwitz.

From the Editor1

On 25 November 2007, the Metzilah Center held its founding conference on the subject “The November 29th Partition Resolution—Sixty Years Later.” The book which is presented here is to a large extent the product of that conference.2 We chose to devote the inaugural conference to this subject and to document it in a book because we believe that one of the less positive consequences resulting from the Zionist success story is the fact that the existence of Israel and its Jewish character are perceived as accomplished facts and taken for granted. Large portions of the public living in Israel— to say nothing of people who do not live here—lack knowledge about the historical foundations of the Jewish existence, the Zionist movement, and the history of the Jewish-Arab conflict, and they even distance themselves from involvement in these subjects. This fact is very troubling. In our opinion it is impossible to deal appropriately with the complicated realities of the State of Israel today without knowing its roots and the history of its foundation. This is perhaps true regarding any state. But it is particularly true about Israel because this is a case of the reestablishment of a Jewish state by Jews, most of whom returned to their historical homeland in order to rebuild their national home in Eretz Yisrael3 after 2,000 years. This was a dramatic event and an unusual one in the history of the human race. It is impossible to understand this without a thorough knowledge of the historical background of the people and without understanding both the positions and motivations of the leaders of the I am grateful to Eyal Benvenisti, Aviva Halamish, and Yehoshua Freundlich, who read earlier versions of this introduction and made important comments on it. 2 A film of the conference can be viewed on the Metzilah Center website (www.metzilah.org.il). 3 The complexity of the subject of this book is also manifested on the terminological level affecting the labels and names used by speakers. Most of what we are dealing with here has to do with documents that are over 60 years old. The State of Israel was founded on 14 May 1948. Even today there are those among its detractors who refuse to refer to it by its official name and do not even include it on their maps. In the period preceding the partition resolution the state did not yet formally exist (though most of its main pre-state institutions existed de facto) and the primary question had been: what is the name of the territory under discussion? 1

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Zionist movement on the one hand, and the positions of their supporters and critics, at home and abroad, on the other. Evaluating the struggle for the continuation of Israel’s existence and success as a state in which the Jewish people fulfills its right to self-determination, especially in light of the objections and reservations regarding the legitimacy of this enterprise, must be based on confronting questions such as what is the identity of the people demanding self-determination in Israel, and where is it heading? Only such an informed knowledge can bestow the feelings of justice and necessity which are needed in order to carry on. Only sentiments such as these can ensure the perpetuation of the state’s accomplishments, and can permit a contemporary reevaluation of its purposes, of its goals, and of its prospects in the future. Only these will make it possible to deal with the many criticisms directed at it by both Jews and non-Jews. At the conference, as we have done in the book, we combined a historical analysis of the partition resolution with an examination of its relevance today. When one examines the Partition Proposal and all of its ramifications, it is also important to look at the historical-political context out of which it emerged and in which it was designed. We also have to study the political reality that resulted from it. For this purpose we have chosen to focus our study on the crossroads at the center of the events which led to the realization that partition was the correct solution to the conflict in Eretz Yisrael. We have collated the sources included in this book focusing on each crossroads separately.4 The Jewish struggle for the establishment of the State of Israel began with the foundation of the Zionist movement. The struggle of the Arab residents of Palestine against Zionism began at a fairly early stage. The most important turning point in this struggle, as far as the Zionist movement is concerned, was the movement’s rejection of the alternative Uganda Program at the beginning of the twentieth century; it was then determined that the revolutionary ambitions of the movement could come to fruition only in Zion. The First World War also set in motion highly significant processes in this struggle. The most important of these was the success of the movement in receiving the Balfour Declaration in 1917  For the Zionists this was of course “Eretz Yisrael” (the Land of Israel). The mandate document referred to “Palestine (Eretz Yisrael),” and the Arabs for the most part referred to “Palestine.” The difficulty of names is connected to the fact that the term in English was simply “Palestine.” It goes without saying that the selection of the name was a loaded and significant issue. We have chosen to leave the terms in the original texts as they were, even in cases where today the particular use of terms looks strange or inexact. In the essays we have preferred a multiplicity of terms, which reflects the multiplicity of narratives and attitudes, to the imposition of an artificial consistency. Similarly, we have left untouched most variations on transliteration of names. (e.g. Jamal al-Husseini is at times Jamil or Jamel; or Husayni). 4 For a general up-to-date survey of this background, see B. Morris, 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2008), chapters 1–2.

FROM THE EDITOR

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and basing on it the logic of the mandate, which placed the mandate for Palestine in the hands of Britain.5 The beginning of the British mandate period was not characterized by a consistent approach regarding the “National Home” project, and there were harsh differences of opinion among central parties in both London and Jerusalem. For the Jewish settlement in Eretz Yisrael, namely the Yishuv, the early mandate period was one of growth and of taking root (although the commitment regarding a “National Home” was limited by the mandate authorities to the territory west of the Jordan River). This period also saw increased resistance to Zionism on the part of the local Arab leadership. The historical period which we cover—the limits of which are admittedly a little arbitrary—begins in July 1937 with the efforts and recommendations of the Peel Commission, which for the first time suggested an explicit proposal for partition, and continues up to the establishment of the state in 1948 and Israel’s acceptance as a member in the UN a year later, in May 1949. The first crossroads, with which we have chosen to open the sources section of the book, was the Peel Commission, which was sent to Eretz Yisrael at the beginning of the Arab Revolt (1936). The Peel Commission report, which was officially published in July 1937, even though its main points had already been anticipated, reflected the intensity of the dilemma which the British mandate government had to deal with. The commission conceded that Britain had made incompatible promises to the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine-Eretz Yisrael and concluded that the deep conflict between the sides made it impossible to keep these promises within a single political entity. The commission stated that Britain would not and should not seek to exempt itself from its basic commitments to either of the groups, and therefore recommended—for the first time in an explicit and fully-arguedfor way—a partition of the country into a Jewish state, an Arab area which would be annexed to Transjordan, and an area which would remain under permanent Mandatory control. The Peel Commission even recommended that for the sake of stability it would be appropriate to consider population and property exchanges (“population transfer”), which would reduce the number of people of one group staying in the areas of the other. The Zionist Congress, at the end of a lengthy session, accepted the principle of partition, but rejected the recommended borders. By contrast, the Arab leadership’s rejection of the plan was unequivocal. In any event, the commission’s recommendations did not receive the approval of the British government itself. An additional commission We shall not deal with other important processes which were under way at that point, such as the British commitments to Arab rulers, the Great Powers’ struggle between England and France for control over the Middle East, the Sykes-Picot agreements, and the dialogue between Faisal and Weizmann. For a detailed description of these processes and events, see Morris (above, footnote 3).

5

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FROM THE EDITOR

appointed to make recommendations on the implementation of the Peel report—the Woodhead Commission—concluded, in a report published in November 1938, that the principle of partition could not be implemented, and in May 1939 Britain issued the White Paper, the substance of which was a push toward the establishment of one state west of the Jordan river, in which the status of Jews as a minority would be preserved. As part of this policy, stringent quotas were placed on the immigration and settlement of Jews in Eretz Yisrael. The struggle of the Jewish Yishuv to fulfill its national aspirations was focused on resistance to the White Paper policy which Britain was imposing in Palestine. It viewed this policy as an illegal retraction of the mandate document. Nonetheless, with the outbreak of the Second World War this policy became a topic of secondary importance for most of the leadership in the Yishuv: while the Haganah and the Irgun believed that first of all it was necessary to help Britain defeat Nazi Germany, and only afterwards to return to questions regarding Eretz Yisrael, the members of Lehi continued to wage a struggle against the British despite the war. The Arabs in the country, as a group, did not take a clear stand in the war itself, but a central leader, Haj Amin  al-Husseini, who fled from Eretz Yisrael in  1937 and eventually settled in Germany in 1941, openly operated in the ranks of the Nazi establishment. With the end of the Second World War the extent of the Holocaust was revealed as well as the extent of the problem of displaced Jews in Europe who did not wish or were not able to return to their homes. It was at that point that the different Jewish factions in the Yishuv united in the struggle against the White Paper and its quotas. Jewish demands were well expressed by the slogan, “Down with the White Paper! Free Aliyah! Hebrew State!” On the other side, the Arabs also continued to adhere to their determined resistance to the continuation of Jewish immigration and to the establishment of a Jewish state. The struggle of Jewish underground movements against the British was mutually violent and cruel. The continuation of the mandate was becoming increasingly expensive for the British. Britain promoted attempts at a dialogue between the Jews and the Arabs which was intended to bring about a consensus on the future of the country, but these were unsuccessful. In the international community there was substantial pressure to find an immediate solution to the problem of Jewish displaced persons in Europe. In this framework, the committee which would stand at the second crossroads was established: the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. This committee was founded as a cooperative effort by Britain and the US in order to review the problem of Palestine (Eretz Yisrael), while explicitly emphasizing the problem of the displaced Jews in Europe. The committee concluded that neither Jewish control over the Arab population nor Arab control over the Jewish population was an acceptable solution, and recommended the establishment of a trust territory until the alleviation of the enmity between the groups. It also recommended the immediate issue

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of Aliyah certificates for 100,000 displaced Jews. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry’s recommendations, however, were rejected by Britain itself, and lacked practical significance.6 Following this failure Britain took what was a fairly unusual step in the context of that period, and turned to the UN, the latter having taken the place of the League of Nations which initially had made the original mandate decision, and requested that the UN review the problem and recommend a solution. Britain was no longer capable of filling the role which the mandate system of the League of Nations had assigned it. The third crossroads pertains to the immediate political, humanitarian, international, and diplomatic background of the Partition Resolution itself, which represented the focus of the Metzilah Center’s conference. This resolution had been based on the thorough and systematic work of the committee of experts founded by the UN for this purpose, known by the acronym UNSCOP (United Nations Special Committee on Palestine). As we have said, UNSCOP was founded by the UN following Britain’s request to receive directions from the organization for the continued administration of the mandate of Palestine (Eretz Yisrael).7 The committee’s work and the recommendations of its majority served as the basis of the Partition Resolution which was adopted on 29 November 1947. These were recommendations to establish two states in Palestine (Eretz Yisrael)—a Jewish one and an Arab one—between which there would be economic unity, and to establish an international regime in Jerusalem and the holy places. After UNSCOP finished its deliberations, it presented its recommendations to the UN and these served as the basis for the discussion which took place in the third session of the UN Assembly in the fall of 1947. Over the course of the deliberations in the General Assembly and in an ad hoc committee which was founded for this purpose, it became clear that both the US and the Soviet Union saw in the majority recommendation for partition of UNSCOP the most feasible solution to the Palestine-Eretz Yisrael question.8 These deliberations concluded with a vote on 29 November. For a detailed discussion, see Y. Freundlich, From Destruction to Revival: The Zionist Policy from the Second World War to the Foundation of the State of Israel (Tel Aviv: University Publication Industries, 1994) [in Hebrew]. 7 For a detailed discussion on the work of UNSCOP, see Y. Freundlich, “An Account of the Research and Conclusions of the UNSCOP Committee in Eretz Yisrael, 1947,” Zionism Anthology 13 (1988), 27–51 [in Hebrew]. 8 In order to learn the reasons for the positions of the great powers, it is impossible of course to rely solely on speeches and official stances. Along with the moral support for the claims of the Jews there were also typical interests of world power. At this stage the Soviet Union was a resolute supporter of the Jewish state. There are those who claim that its motivations were primarily to weaken Britain and to make a mark on international policy. It was actually the US whose support was ambiguous, and was given only after misgivings and disagreements among the American policy makers (see also Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–2001. 1st Vintage Books edn. New York: Vintage Books, 2001). 6

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The fourth crossroads was, then, the 29 November Resolution, known also by its official name, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181. This exciting and dramatic vote, which led to the adoption of the Partition Resolution, was determined by the necessary majority of more than two thirds. The main points of the resolution were, as with the majority recommendation of UNSCOP, the establishment of two states—a Jewish one and an Arab one—between which there would be economic unity, and the internationalization of Jerusalem and the holy places. After the adoption of the resolution, crowds of Jews went out to dance in the streets. Following the termination of the British mandate in May 1948, armed attacks by several regular Arab state armies joined the deadly civil war with the Arab residents of the country which immediately followed the same resolution. This signaled the full initiation of what the Israelis later termed as their War of Independence. The last crossroads in our collection of sources is the span of months that passed between the adoption of the Partition Resolution (29 November 1947) and the Declaration of the Establishment of the State. This was a fascinating and seminal period, full of military, political, and economic activity. The situation in Palestine—violent clashes between Jews and Arabs, alongside an ambiguous stance on the part of the British authorities— weakened the support of part of the international community for the idea of partition. This rethinking stemmed from the prediction that the Arabs would not permit a Jewish state to come into existence, and that the chances for such a state to come into being and to survive over time were not great. Against this background there were those who believed that adopting the Arab position or an additional attempt to delay things were preferable to implementing the principle of partition.9 The Zionist leadership, and especially the leadership of the Yishuv, were under pressure not to declare the establishment of the state with the end of the mandate. Among the countries which applied this kind of pressure was the US, whose support at the time for the Partition Resolution had not been unambiguous. The US was extensively involved in the feverish attempts to establish a new international trusteeship to replace the British mandate. The interests of the great powers in this matter, collectively and individually, are one of the most complicated questions in the history of the period. It is not at all certain that they had clear and consistent interests. With at least some of them, it is clear that there were fairly scathing internal debates about what was required in terms of their own interests, in terms of their responsibility for world peace, and in terms of the dictates of the Partition Resolution itself. One version of the accepted wisdom states that “all of the great powers sought stability,” but one needs to be very careful about statements such as these. There are those who claim that at least some of the great powers were actually interested in instability in order to justify their continued involvement in the region. Thus, for example, the CIA recommended in 1947 not to support the Partition Resolution in principle on the basis of its assessment that Israel would not be able to survive more than two years. See the CIA’s recommendation in the Metzilah Center website (www.metzilah.org.il).

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The leadership of the Yishuv decided nonetheless to declare the establishment of the state. With this declaration we have chosen to conclude the sources section. The decision not to delay the declaration and to move toward political independence was an important one strategically, and was made with grave doubts on the part of the Yishuv’s leadership. It was a fateful decision that was not at all self-evident. Despite the pressures and fears, the Soviet Union (whose support for the establishment of a Jewish state at this stage was consistent and determined) and the US recognized the new state immediately after the declaration of its establishment. The State of Israel had begun its journey. A final UN General Assembly resolution on accepting Israel as a member was passed on 11 May 1949. Nonetheless, the struggle between the newly born Israel and the Arab countries quickly turned into war: the violent clashes gave way to warfare with the armies of the neighboring Arab countries.10 Even before the declaration of the state’s independence the leadership of the Yishuv was making contacts to prevent the invasion of forces from the other side of the Jordan into territories intended for the Jewish state. After the declaration and with the outbreak of war, Jordanian forces did in fact invade the western part of Eretz Yisrael, but they concentrated on protecting territories intended for the Arab state. Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi forces invaded Israel as well. In May 1948 the commissioner Count Folke Bernadotte was sent to the region. He was murdered by members of the Lehi on 17 September 1948, only one day after he had managed to submit a detailed report to the UN in which he recommended a solution similar in its structure to that proposed by the Peel Commission (a Jewish state alongside an Arab area which would be annexed to Transjordan) and the recognition of the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes. As far as the international community was concerned, the process was completed only with Israel’s acceptance as a member of the UN organization, despite the staunch and unequivocal resistance on the part of the representatives of the Arab countries.11 At this stage, these representatives repeated both their basic claims against the legitimacy of the Jewish state, which they had voiced during the struggle over the Partition Resolution, as well as their claims that Israel had not fulfilled its obligations in the relevant UN resolutions. Thus, for instance, they made mention of General Assembly

The position of the Arab states regarding military action against Israel was complex, and the fighting did not always proceed wholeheartedly or with the proper preparation. For our purposes here it is important to emphasize that the Arab League presented this war as the inevitable result of the Arab states’ need to prevent the realization of what they perceived as the unjust and illegitimate consequence of the Partition Resolution—the violation of Arab sovereignty over all of Palestine. 11 The resolution was passed, as we have said, on 11 May 1949. Thirty-seven states supported Israel’s membership, 12 were against, and nine abstained. The Soviet Union led the move of accepting Israel to the UN. 10

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Resolution 194, which called for the establishment of a peace-making mechanism between Israel and its neighbors and discussed the regulation of the refugee problem, or the principles of Resolution 181 itself, such as those which stated Jerusalem and the holy places were supposed to be under international control.12 Resolution 181 was therefore a necessary condition for the struggle of the Jews, and afterwards of the State of Israel, to be seen in the eyes of most of the members of the UN—including those of Count Folke Bernadotte— as a just cause, while the military struggle of the Arab residents of Palestine (Eretz Yisrael) and of the Arab countries (after 15 May 1948) against the Jewish state was considered to be illegal. It was a necessary condition, but definitely not a sufficient one. It stands to reason that if the Arabs had been victorious in their war, a Jewish state would not have been founded or continued to exist. The Partition Resolution would have joined a long series of ineffective resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. It is doubtful whether any military force would have stood by the Jews to prevent the attempt to undermine the implementation of the Partition Resolution, and the possible results of that attempt. The establishment of the state depended on the victory of the Jews in the war, and on the facts that were created on the ground following it, no less than on the Partition Resolution. As we have mentioned, even the Partition Resolution itself was based on the realities that the Jewish settlers managed to create in Eretz Yisrael. The significance of Resolution 181, as well as that of other General Assembly resolutions such as Resolution 194, or of later resolutions pertaining to the conflict, has often been questioned. This is because, according to the principles of international law, General Assembly resolutions have a status which is different from that of Security Council resolutions, and there are those who believe that only the latter are legally binding. The distinction is indeed significant, but in the context of Resolution 181 its importance is mitigated for two reasons. First, while the Security Council has the authority to create binding law and while General Assembly resolutions are only recommendations, legitimacy and symbolic status are sometimes no less important than the legal status of resolutions.13 Resolution 181 demonstrates the enormous symbolic importance which an informed discussion and a decision which follows from it can have, especially if it is conducted in the framework of the General Assembly of the UN, the body in which all

Indeed, in Abba Eban’s important speech on the same occasion, he agreed, in the name of Israel, to fulfill these requirements if they should be found to be amenable to political conditions. 13 This is not intended to detract from the importance of the distinction between a binding resolution (which has control mechanisms such as a veto right, and which at times may be implemented by imposing sanctions against its infraction) and a declaratory or advisory resolution, such as that of the UN General Assembly. This is all the more relevant in the situation that prevails today in the UN, where on many subjects there is an almost automatic majority against Israel. This general issue deserves a serious discussion. In this book we will not address this important and complex subject. 12

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nations are members. This significance became all the greater in light of the facts that this subject remained on the agenda for several months, that all of the participants were well aware of the many and long-lasting ramifications, and that the permanent members of the Security Council supported the resolution, or at least did not actively resist it. The second reason that Resolution 181 is especially important, despite the fact that this is not a resolution which had been adopted by the Security Council, concerns the circumstances in light of which it was adopted. The General Assembly drew its authority from the fact that at issue was territory subject to the rule of a mandate, regarding which the UN had the status of trustee.14 As we have said, Britain—the country which initially had been appointed as the mandatory power by the League of Nations—requested the involvement of the United Nations (which had replaced the League of Nations). The British request, to all intents and purposes, amounted to the return of the mandate to a sovereign or responsible party representing the international community. Accordingly, the General Assembly resolution to regulate sovereignty in the mandate territory did not involve a change in international law, but rather was an authoritative decision regarding the fate of territory under its control. General Assembly Resolution 181 possessed, therefore, a special status, and was not merely a recommendation. This thinking was the basis of the decision of those who participated in the vote. This is how the matter was understood, both within the organization itself as well as among the countries which had recognized Israel. It was an important first test for the new organization: if it had not adopted the resolution, it stands to reason that Britain would have abandoned the territory and its fate would have been determined by war. The UN organization came into being with the explicit purpose of avoiding “solutions” of this kind.15 This analysis has dictated the structure of the book. The first section of the book is based on the lectures given at the conference, to which has been added the article by Prof Mustafa Kabha. Our intention has been to combine a discussion of the Partition Plan which was adopted on 29 November 1947 from today’s perspective, 60 years later, with a renewed historical study of the resolution itself, of its circumstances and of the positions of its supporters and detractors. We have sought in particular to retrace the views which were current on both sides regarding the Partition Resolution: the intra-Jewish See articles 75 and 77 of the UN Charter. The topic of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has a long tradition of discussions and resolutions, particularly in the General Assembly. This subject requires an independent study. I will note only two examples: first, the Partition Resolution and the continued involvement of the UN in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by way of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions took on a special status when the ruling of the International Court regarding the security fence relied on their authority as one of the justifications for agreeing to the General Assembly’s request that it discuss the subject, despite the objections of numerous countries including that of Israel (paragraph 49 of the decision). Second, the court explicitly noted—in the context of a historical survey of the conflict—that Israel’s declaration of independence was based on the Partition Resolution (paragraph 71 of the decision).

14 15

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debate, which resulted in the decision to accept the principle of partition, on the one hand; and the official position of the Arabs which was decisively opposed to partition, or even to a bi-national state or federation, on the other. The Partition Resolution was without a doubt an important element in the international legitimacy for the idea of partition and for the process which concluded with the establishment of a Jewish state in part of Eretz Yisrael. Nonetheless, the establishment of the State of Israel was made possible principally as a result of the war which broke out immediately after the resolution, and not necessarily as a result of the Partition Resolution. This war was perceived as a catastrophe (Nakba) by the Palestinians, and the consequences of this war led to the destruction of the Palestinian society, to the problem of the Palestinian refugees, and to the fact that even today the section of the Partition Resolution pertaining to the foundation of an Arab state in part of Eretz Yisrael has yet to be implemented. Indeed, the current political situation in the region demonstrates that that war and the ones which followed it, as well as demographic and economic processes, were no less important than the UN resolutions. Nonetheless, the renewed examination of 29 November resolution and of the positions of the sides regarding it continues to be important today because most of the views voiced then—from both sides—continue to be voiced today. Moreover, there are those who claim even today that the outline drawn by that resolution is valid even in our time. There are even those who claim that the proper legal basis for dealing with the conflict is not only the general framework of “two states for two peoples” but rather the Partition Resolution itself, including its original borders and formal arrangements.16 The positions of those who opposed partition and those who opposed the Jewish state have to a large extent remained as they were: the arguments which were cited then against the Partition Resolution are made now against the continued existence of the State of Israel as a state in which the Jewish people realizes its right to self determination.17 But it is especially in the views heard from the side supporting the Jewish state and its continued justification that one can see some erosion. Because of this, even today we are wrestling with the questions which were raised then, and our generation is required to respond to them with an awareness—at present not adequate 16 For this topic see for example the court ruling on the security fence (above, note 14) and compare to E. Hertz, This Land is My Land (Forest Hills, N.Y.: Myths and Facts, 2008); Hertz claims that since the Partition Resolution was not implemented (because of the war that broke out on account of Arab resistance to its implementation), the basis for recognition of the State of Israel cannot include it. This basis can be the mandate document itself, or the international situation which developed following the war and after Israel’s acceptance as a member of the UN. 17 Today, in addition to the claims against Israel, we also have claims against the continued occupation of the “territories” after the 1967 war and against the fact that in the territories between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea a policy of apartheid has come about. Precisely because of this it is important to mention that many of Israel’s detractors see in the very establishment of the state the “occupation” of Palestine, and that the accusations of apartheid are not intended exclusively for the situation in territories which were occupied after 1967.

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in either depth or in breadth—of what was and of what developed from then up until today. The relevance of the events of the Partition Resolution to our current situation has enabled us to connect the conference and its content to the goals and unique character of the Metzilah Center. Itzhak Galnoor, who was the first of the speakers, describes the origins of the dispute within the Jewish settlement regarding the principle of partition from the beginning of the twentieth century. He describes how a painful wrestling with the controversy surrounding the recommendations of the Peel Commission, and the decision in favor of partition in principle at that stage, made it possible for the Jewish settlement to reach the decision to recommend partition in  1947 with well-founded and extensive support, despite the continued presence of those who objected. Alexander Yakobson describes the principal arguments of the states and bodies which supported the Partition Resolution—these being the same states which supported the foundation of a Jewish state—Jews and non-Jews alike. Yakobson explains the fundamental debates among the powers and emphasizes the fact that even then the justification for the foundation of a Jewish state was based, for some of the speakers, on the right of the Jewish people for self-determination in its homeland. Mustafa Kabha describes the attitude of the leaders of the Palestinian public toward the partition initiatives, from the Peel Commission up to Resolution 181, and details the complexity behind the official, consistent, unified position of those who opposed partition. Nazier Magally lays out other aspects of the complicated views of the Arab leadership, and also elaborates on the relevance of these positions to the realities of today. Ruth Gavison describes the importance of the Partition Resolution and addresses the fact that it expressed international support for the idea of self-determination for both Jews and Palestinians in part of Eretz Yisrael. Gavison raises the pressing need to deal with the challenges facing the present-day Zionist enterprise, which stem from the fact that before the Partition Resolution there was a pre-state national Zionist movement at work fighting to establish a state, but once the state was founded, its obligations toward the territory and all its inhabitants are very different. She discusses the ways in which the Metzilah Center proposes to address this need. We deliberated somewhat regarding the style in which we wished to present the materials. Even though most of the pieces are products of the conference, some of the articles are based on edited transcripts and some of them are based on written texts which were submitted to us. Despite the obvious disadvantages in such a situation, we have chosen to leave the choice of style in the hands of the authors. Thus in some of the cases we have a redacted Torah she-be-al peh (i.e. the oral tradition) and in other cases we have a Torah she-bi-ktav (i.e. the written tradition).18

18 Galnoor’s essay in this volume is in fact not a translation of the Hebrew version, but is a reprint of his English article published in Israel Studies (vol. 14, no. 2, Summer 2009), printed here by permission.

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The second section of this book is a collection of sources, to which we ascribe an enormous amount of significance. In our work here we have relied on a very long series of historical studies dealing with the period.19 We have also sought out—with the guidance of experts—sources which have not been easily available since the period in question. For us, the introduction to the texts, and reading them anew, constituted a real and exciting experience. One of the purposes of this book is to invite the greater public to participate in this experience. We believe there is no substitute for knowing the views and the nuanced manner in which they were understood and presented in different and sometimes conflicting narratives in authentic primary sources from that period. These texts are illuminating and in some cases seminal. They expose not only the positions of the sides as they were expressed, in the given context, in real time, but reveal them in all their complexity and richness. The reader will witness the extent to which the fundamental and important claims cited in these texts are relevant up to the present. This is true for the speeches given in the UN General Assembly and the statements in the UNSCOP report, and it is equally true for the statements of the Jewish and Arab representatives which were given at various stages of the deliberations.20 The process of selecting the sources was made difficult because of the great wealth of important and moving texts we have found. The choice was also determined by our hope that this book will serve as a starting point for exposing members of all the groups in Israel to a fascinating chapter in the history of the State of Israel and in the relations between Jews and Arabs in the region. We publish this English version because we think this exposure is urgently needed outside Israel as well. We have made an effort to avoid writing a book which is academic or tedious, and we wanted to keep the book on the short side. We know that anyone whose curiosity will be piqued will have no trouble finding references to additional sources.21 19 See for instance M. Avizohar and I. Friedman (eds), Studies in the Palestinian Partition Plan, 1937–1947 (Sde Boker: Ben-Gurion University, 1984) (in Hebrew); Joseph Heller, In the Struggle for the Jewish State: Zionist Policy, 1936–1948 (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1984) (in Hebrew); Political and Diplomatic Documents, December 1947—May 1948 (Jerusalem: Ganzakh Ha-medinah, 1979) (in Hebrew); Y. Freundlich and Z. Ganin (eds), Political Documents of the Jewish Agency (Jerusalem: Hasifriya Haziyonit, 1998), vol. 2, pp. 618–19. 20 We have wavered at times between the desire to point out diversity and the desire to primarily reflect the central and influential positions. In the attempt to do both, greater weight has naturally been given to the central trends. Nonetheless, we have at times given expression through original texts to stances which were of particular theoretical interest even though they represented minor opinions in the population, such as those of the Lehi, “Ha-Ichud,” and the Communists. 21 The Hebrew version of the book appears in its entirety on the Metzilah Center website (www. metzilah.org.il). Additional texts which were not included in the book, or were included only in part, are uploaded on the site. A sizeable portion of the texts are not given in their entirety. In places where we have omitted portions of the texts, we have indicated the omission with an ellipsis […] as is customary.

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The sources have been presented as they are, without the addition of explanatory notes or context. Our goal in this has been to provide a tool for the supplementation of knowledge and study. The articles which open the volume are accompanied by references to some of the sources. As stated, the sources are organized according to the pivotal crossroads which we have mentioned above.22 From the crossroads of the Peel Commission we have chosen only to bring the memorandum submitted by the Arab Higher Committee to the Royal Commission, which presents the reasons for its total resistance to partition and its demand for recognition of the right of the local population (of which more than two thirds were Arabs at the time) for self-determination. We have not included official positions from the Jewish side, because there is an abundance of powerful pieces of this sort included in the subsequent crossroads. It was important for us to show that the consistent and adamant stances of the Arab side were already being given a resolute and clear expression at the first crossroads. We continue with a few principal sections from the commission’s report.23 Then we bring portions of the impressive, systematic, consistent and original response of Ze’ev Jabotinsky against the plan. We conclude with the words of Chaim Weizmann in support of the principle of partition at the 20th Zionist Congress, in which the “great debate” described in Galnoor’s lecture took place. The debate concluded with a decision that established the principle for accepting the notion of partition by the leadership of the Jewish public, while rejecting the specific proposal and declaring willingness to negotiate its details. Even though the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry did not have much practical importance, we have chosen to include a few of the speeches made before it in light of the concentration of statements which are moving, fascinating, and sometimes less formal, which some of the speakers made over the course of its deliberations. Furthermore, following its recommendations there was a crucially important discussion at a meeting of the board of the Jewish Agency in Paris, which in no small way influenced the manner in which the Jewish leadership dealt with the subject of partition from that point onward. We open our second crossroads with a speech by Martin Buber (as a member of “Ha-Ichud”) which he gave at the opening session of the committee. It is known that his special personality and the manner in which he presented things greatly influenced the members of the committee, despite the fact that he expressed a view

A few paragraphs explaining issues of translation of sources into Hebrew were naturally dropped in this introduction and can be found in the Hebrew version of this book. 23 This report is one of the most important and systematic documents for understanding the history of the conflict, especially from the perspective of the British mandate authorities: the manner in which they understood their responsibility by virtue of the mandate, the promises given to the different sides, British interests, and their self-image. 22

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which was not accepted by the leaders of the Yishuv.24 We also represent the Arab side in the words of Emil Ghoury, a member of the Arab Higher Committee, alongside the statements of Dr Albert Hourani from the Arab Office. The latter presented a view which, while demonstrating empathy and a certain understanding of the Jewish side, ultimately would also “fall in line” with the Arab position. This was also the case, notably, concerning the critical humanitarian question of Arab consent for granting immigration permits for a limited number of Jewish displaced persons. Hourani believed that, despite the moral difficulty, such immigration would not be possible given the political situation, but he emphasized that the responsibility for this did not lie with the Arabs.25 In this section we also bring the words of Moshe Shertok (Sharett) at the concluding meeting of the committee. We include a summary of the main points of the committee’s recommendations, submitted in April 1946. We conclude the presentation of the sources in this crossroads with the extremely important decision made by the board of the Jewish Agency in Paris on August 1946 to adopt the principle of partition and perhaps even to initiate some activity to promote it. Like the great debate which arose regarding the recommendations of the Peel Commission in 1937, this decision also paved the way for the leadership of the Yishuv’s attitude toward future decisions on partition. But unlike that debate, the discussions which took place and the decisions made at this meeting were not published at the time. The third crossroads which we have chosen pertains to the work and the report of UNSCOP. From the important and innovative process of appointing the committee in the UN, we have chosen to bring only the significant and powerful speech given by the representative of the Soviet Union in the UN, Andrei Gromyko, on 14 May 1947. In this speech he conveyed unequivocal and unwavering support for the right of the Jewish people to self-determination.26 Of the materials presented before UNSCOP we have included only testimonies and memoranda from the various groups in the Jewish population, since the Palestinians boycotted the committee and refused to cooperate with it. Here we have clearly given preference to variety and clarity over representation. In addition to “official” positions such as those of David Ben-Gurion and Eliezer Kaplan, the treasurer of the Jewish Agency,

See for example the memoir written by a member of the committee: B.C. Crum, Behind the Silken Curtain: A Personal Account of Anglo-American Diplomacy in Palestine in the Middle East (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1947). 25 See ibid., pp. 257–8. Eventually he was to say that he himself believed that the entrance of 100,000 displaced persons should be permitted, and that on account of Jamal al-Husayni’s objection to voicing this position before the committee Hourani left Palestinian politics. I am grateful to Prof. Emmanuel Sivan for directing my attention to this matter. 26 For a detailed reference to this speech and its importance, see Chapter 2 by Alexander Yakobson. 24

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we have included the testimonies of Rabbi Fischmann, the representative of the Mizrachi, of Rabbi Levin, the representative of Agudath Yisrael, and of Dr Judah Leon Magnes, the official representative of “Ha-Ichud.” Likewise we have included here the memoranda of the Lehi and the Communists. We have closed this chapter with passages from the UNSCOP report, which was submitted in September 1947. The entire report is a comprehensive, impressive, and fascinating document, which analyzes the situation in Palestine (Eretz Yisrael) from the point of view of an international, professional and independent body. In this it differs from the report of the Royal Peel Commission, which presented a comprehensive account of the subject by a British committee. The UNSCOP report yielded numerous responses and lively diplomatic activity. We have chosen to include here both the personal responses of different leaders to the report and to the manner in which it was understood: the responses of David Ben-Gurion, in a personal letter to his wife Paula; Moshe Shertok, and the British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin; speeches given in the UN bodies and in the General Assembly—the speeches of two representatives of the Arab states in the UN (the Syrian representative, Faris al-Khoury and the Lebanese representative, Camille Chamoun); the speech of Jamal al-Husayni, the proxy of the Arab Higher Committee; the speech of the Yugoslavian representative, Vladimir Simic, who was one of the proponents of the minority proposal in the UNSCOP report; the speech of the British Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech-Jones; and the speech of Abba Hillel Silver, the chairman of the board of the Jewish Agency in America. The following crossroads of sources was, as stated, the November 29th Resolution itself. In this framework we have selected passages from the resolution (in addition to a link to the complete document). We added a detailed description of the exciting and dramatic vote which concluded with the adoption of the resolution with the required majority of more than two thirds. The final group of sources deals with the months between the adoption of the Partition Resolution (29 November 1947) up until the Declaration of the Establishment of the State (14 May 1948). In the first passage Azriel Carlebach expresses very well the excitement that seized the Yishuv following the adoption of the resolution, and caused the masses to dance in the streets. But already on the same day Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary that his heart was not with the dancers, because he knew that the decision would lead to war, and that some of the people dancing in the streets would never see the establishment of the state. Zalman Lipschitz’s memorandum gives expression to the erosion of the support for the partition plan in the United States after the Partition Resolution. The report of Golda Meyerson (Meir) about her discussions with King Abdullah of Jordan relates the attempts of the Zionist leadership to prevent Transjordan from joining the expected war, immediately before the declaration of the establishment of the state. Chaim Weizmann’s letter to President Truman,

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the day before the declaration, reflects the successful efforts to convince the president to recognize the State of Israel, despite the recommendations of some of his advisers. The second part of the book concludes with the Declaration of the Establishment of the State, the strategic and important decision made by the leadership of the Yishuv not to delay further the much desired political independence despite international pressures, and despite the realization that such a decision was equivalent to a decision to begin a war, the results of which one could not foresee. On 29 November 2012 the UN General Assembly has closed a circle of sorts. 65 years after the original partition resolution, it re-affirmed its view that partition of Mandatory Palestine between two nation-states, one Jewish and one Palestinian-Arab, was the best solution for this persistent conflict. Israel was founded in 1948 and admitted as a UN member in 1949. In 1967 Israel gained military and de-facto control over the rest of Mandatory Palestine. A long process of international diplomacy and activities by the parties culminated in the General Assembly conferring upon Palestine the status of a non-member state. Some among the Jews and some among the Palestinians still claim that the land is ‘all theirs’. The arguments made in the documents presented in this book are still taken seriously by some on both sides. Again, Israel and the Palestinians cannot agree on a ‘final status’ arrangement concerning borders, settlements, Jerusalem and refugees. Again, the question is not only the identification of the best political arrangement, but also – and primarily – issues of workability and implementation, given the attitudes of the parties themselves. In 2013, as in 1948, a real question is whether and how the Arab-Jewish conflict, now the Israeli-Palestinian one, affects peace in the world and in the Middle-East. Seems that time has shown that the hopes of supporters of partition were not fully met, but that the predictions and warnings of those opposing it have not materialized. Again, many feel that partition is unworkable. However, the obvious obstacles to effective partition are never enough to point out a better arrangement for the land and the peoples inhabiting it. Some observers of this conflict say that there is a catch here. You cannot address the issues without knowing the history, but the only way to find an acceptable arrangement is by transcending the history. I believe both are indeed right. 29 November 1947 is a critical crossroads. It will be good if the lessons of the past can make 29 November 2012 an equally essential crossroads. Making progress here requires a combination of deep understanding and empathy, resolved leadership, and political will and courage in both the parties and in the international community. The 1947 resolution on partition was allowed to stand, among other things, because people feared the implications of non-implementation on the young UN would be too serious. The resolution did dictate the general contours of the reality that was created – Jews not being subject to Arab rule,

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and not ruling over a large number of Arabs. Palestinian Arabs, however, did not gain self-determination at that stage. This has changed since. Palestinian Arabs are in control in Gaza, and they enjoy a degree of self rule in the West bank as well. To reach the situation in which Jews and Palestinian Arabs can both live as free people in (parts of) their historic homeland still requires many concessions from both sides. The parties do not seem able to reach an agreement by themselves. They need the international community and the UN to create a set of incentives that may lead them towards the goal that had eluded them, in part, 65 years ago. This book would never have seen the light of day were it not for the continual professional guidance of the then chief archivist, Dr Yehoshua Freundlich, who drew our attention to numerous important sources which had escaped our notice. Freundlich and Dr Avraham Sela also had some enlightening conversations with us about the greater context of the subject matter. Prof. Yosef Heller and Prof. Yehoshua Porath helped us with many discussions and much valuable advice. We learned a great deal about the period in question and its background from our conversations with Prof. Arieh Naor and Prof. Immanuel Sivan. Many others helped us through the process of preparing the Hebrew volume and in the process of translating it into the English. Special thanks go to Dr Doron Shulziner, who has supervised the transformation of the Hebrew volume into an English manuscript, and to Roger Hertog who provided the financial support for this translation. We are very grateful to all of them. Some of the sources which we have used are still protected by copyright. We would like to thank the Zalman Shazar Center, the Ben-Gurion Institute for the Study of Israel and Zionism, the Magnes Press, the Israel State Archive, and Tekumah Carlebach-Mendel, the daughter of the late Azriel Carlebach, for the permission that they granted us for publication. We also thank Israel Studies journal for permission to use the English version of Galnoor’s lecture in this book. Ruth Gavison, Jerusalem 2013

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Pa r t O n e

Studies on the Partition Resolution

2

Chapter One

The Zionist debates on partition (1919–47) Itzhak Galnoor

Summary: This essay presents the public debates and the decisions within the Zionist movement between World War I and the founding of the state of Israel in 1948. In these decisions the Zionist movement was willing to consider trading territory for other values, mainly sovereignty. Itzhak Galnoor places the decision of the Zionist movement on the 29 November in the historical context in which it was made and presents it as the culmination of a process which had begun thirty years earlier: Beginning with the decision of the Zionist Organization in  1919 which presented a map of its territorial “ideal,” through “the great debate” which took place in the Zionist movement in  1937 following the Peel Commission report, and concluding with the more subdued internal debate within the Zionist movement between 1946–1947 and the agreement to the UN General Assembly Resolution on the 29 November. Jewish attitudes toward territory in these decisions reflect a duality. On one hand, territorial attitudes were emotional and inseparable from a sense of collective identity, fatherland, motherland, and homeland, leading to expressive positions. On the other, territory and boundaries were seen as a tangible resource,

4

Two-State Solution

a means for satisfying specific needs—security, economic viability, social development, and natural resources.

Introduction Between World War I and the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, three internal decisions were made by the Zionist movement that reflect its attitudes and position toward territory, boundaries, and partition. These decision crossroads—in  1919, 1937, and 1947—were not only critical during those formative years, but also carry lessons for the dilemma facing Israelis and Palestinians today. At the time they were subject to considerable internal debate, and once these decisions were made, they established precedents that were crucial in forming Zionist consensus around the relative value of—and the potential trade-offs between—state sovereignty, territory, and boundaries. The central question discussed here is whether the Zionist movement was willing to consider the partition of Palestine (E.I.),1 namely, a tradeoff between territory and boundaries and other values. The main value at that time was the establishment of a sovereign state. At the end we pose the question of whether the pre-1948 decisions—and especially the public discourse of 1937—contained the parameters of the choices that confront Israel today.

Decisions crossroads2 The 1919 memorandum Although Britain had pledged in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 to help establish a “Jewish national home” in Palestine—an area not then under its control—it did not delineate boundaries. Following World War I, representatives of the major powers met at the Versailles Peace Conference to carve up the territories of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, among them the “Near East”. This was the first time that the Zionist movement had to consider the practical implications of its territorial aspirations and define the area desired for the Jewish “national home”.

Palestine (E.I.) is the official name used by the British to designate the area west of the Jordan River. 2 Based on Itzhak Galnoor, The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement (New York University Press, 1995). 1

THE ZIONIST DEBATES ON PARTITION (1919–47)

5

The memorandum submitted in February 1919 by a delegation headed by Chaim Weizmann outlined the goals, principles, and arguments of the Zionist Organization. There were two types of claims in the memorandum3: first, the historic right of the Jewish people to Eretz-Israel, and the link to the fertile plains east of the Jordan River; second, the need for a territory large enough to sustain settlement and viable economic development. In addition, the memorandum emphasized the need for political, administrative, and economic conditions that would ensure the growth of the national home and eventually lead to the establishment of an “autonomous commonwealth”. The territory described in the memorandum covered an area of some 45,000 sq km including the “northern Galilee” (today southern Lebanon), the Golan Heights, the Gilad mountains, and approximately 18,000 sq km of land across the Jordan River. The Zionist Organization, however, had already built into the document several significant political compromises: first, it drew the northern border at Sidon, in an attempt to include most of the Litani River within the area of the Jewish national home, but also to help the British in their negotiations with the French. Second, it did not ask to include the entire area of Trans-Jordan in the Jewish national home, in an attempt to attain support from the Arab national movement, headed by Emir Faisal.4 The most they could hope for was a border running east of the Jordan River along the Hajas railway. Third, the initial proposal set a southern border along the El ArishAqaba line to include part of the Sinai Peninsula, but in the official 1919 memorandum, due to British pressure, the matter was left open for negotiation with the Egyptian government. The 1919 map presented the Zionist territorial aspirations, but it already included a “partition element”, a pragmatic willingness to weigh nonterritorial goals, and the political constraints of that time. The territory claimed was smaller than the definition of the “Land of Israel in its natural boundaries”, encompassing approximately 59,000 sq km5 or the “promised boundaries”. Zionist claims in  1919 concerning Trans-Jordan were also much more limited than the territory of 90,000 sq km that would become the British Mandate there.

PRO FO 371/4170 (February 1919). The reasoning appears in Weizmann’s letter to Lloyd George of December 29, 1919, See Chaim Weizmann, The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann (Series A, Letters), Ed. Leonard Stein (London, 1968–1985) 277–9. See also “The Zionist Movement’s Territorial Proposal” in p. 458 in this book. 4 Gideon Biger, Crown Colony or National Homeland (Jerusalem, 1983) 32 [in Hebrew]. 5 This territory includes 27,000 sq km of western Palestine; approximately 17,000 in TransJordan, 11,000 in Syria (the Golan Heights and Bashan), 1,000 in southern Lebanon (up to the Litany River), and 3,000 sq km in Sinai. See M. Brawer. “Boundaries [of Eretz-Israel],” in Encyclopaedia Hebraica (Jerusalem, 1957) 6:31–35 [in Hebrew]. 3

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Two-State Solution

Although the 1919 map was based on several internal drafts, its preparation was not accompanied by a heated debate within the Zionist movement about territory versus other considerations. Therefore it was not as divisive a decision as the next crossroad of 1937. In the 1920 San Remo Agreement, the League of Nations allotted the mandate for Syria and Lebanon to France, and the mandate for Iraq and Palestine to Britain, thus fixing the northern border south of the Zionist 1919 map. In September 1922, the League of Nations approved the separate status of Trans-Jordan and the establishment of an independent administration there. Emir Abdullah became its ruler in 1923 under the formal jurisdiction of the British High Commissioner for Palestine. The articles of the mandate concerning the Jewish national home did not apply to Trans-Jordan. The Zionist movement expressed its opposition to this “partition”, but was helpless in the face of British policy and the League of Nations mandate. Thus, despite the continuing opposition of the Revisionist movement, the subsequent debate within the Zionist movement was confined to the 27,000 sq km of “western Eretz-Israel”, even though claims to include Trans-Jordan or parts of it in the national home continued throughout the Mandate period. The 1919 memorandum was nevertheless precedent-setting. It sought to establish the legitimacy of Zionist claims in an international forum. Furthermore, the attempt by the Zionist movement to define the map and the boundaries of the national home was already understood internally to be a compromise between expressive aspiration and instrumental needs.6

The 1937 decision As a result of the “Arab Revolt” that broke out in April 1936, the British Cabinet appointed a Royal Commission headed by Lord Peel to look into “the underlying causes of the disturbances . . . [and whether] either the Arabs or the Jews have any legitimate grievances.”7 The Peel Commission published its report in July 1937, concluding that the situation in Palestine (E.I.) was deadlocked and that under the British Mandate there could be no permanent settlement between Jews and Arabs. Hence, the Commission proposed “partition”—dividing up the territory of Palestine (E.I.) as follows:

Instrumental arguments invoke “needs” such as defense, economic viability, and transportation, and are willing to compare cost to benefits. Expressive arguments invoke a higher principle of religion, ideology, history, language, nationality, or culture to prove that a certain territory “belongs” and should not be a subject of compromise or even debate. 7 Palestine Royal Commission Report (July 1937) London, Cmd. 5854:2. 6

THE ZIONIST DEBATES ON PARTITION (1919–47)

7

a An independent, sovereign Jewish state along the coast, the northern

valleys, and the Galilee that would comprise a territory of about 5,000 sq km. b An independent, sovereign Arab state in the rest of Palestine to be attached to Trans-Jordan [note: no independent Palestinian state].

c A new mandate would be given to Britain on an enclave in the shape

of a corridor extending from Jaffa to Jerusalem and a number of cities. d As far as possible, there would be a transfer of land and an exchange of population between the two proposed states. The British government endorsed the Commission “partition plan”, but soon had second thoughts with the gathering storm in Europe that increased the strategic value of Palestine (E.I.). Before Britain reneged, the Zionist movement and the Yishuv [Jewish settlement in Palestine] were caught up in a swirling debate (the “Great Pulmus”) over the offer to turn part of the national home into a Jewish state: should they accept sovereignty over a mere 5,000 sq km, far less than anyone believed was practical for a viable state, or no sovereignty at all, at least not at that stage? For the first time, the possibility of establishing a Jewish state was discussed not only among Jews or under the vague rubric of a “national home”, but as a proposal by the ruling power in the Middle East. For the first time, the Zionist movement faced a real decision concerning statehood and its territorial dimension. The need to formulate a response to the Royal Commission proposal presented a decision crossroads, forcing unprecedented ideological soul-searching and practical deliberations among both supporters and opponents of partition. The debate began before the publication of the Peel Commission report (July 7, 1937) and it caused a schism between and within the political parties, youth movements, voluntary organizations, academics, teachers, writers, and rabbis. The “pulmus” engulfed not only the Yishuv in Palestine, but also the Zionist movement abroad. The initial reaction was negative because the British proposal seemed so unattractive and risky. However, the official Jewish reply announced one month later at the 20th Zionist Congress on August 11 and the Jewish Agency Council on August 20 was different. The final position was rooted in two contradictory factors: the weakness of the Zionist movement at the time, which dictated absolute dependence on Britain, and its strong and rather united dedication to its main goal— establishment of a state—even at the expense of other goals. Accordingly, the decision was a fusion of the political hallmarks of Weizmann and Ben-Gurion. Weizmann’s realism stemmed from being essentially “non-ideological”, in the European sense of those words, and from representing the “General Zionists”, as he and his associates called

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8

themselves. Striving to establish a Jewish state stood at the center of Weizmann’s spiritual and practical world. In contrast, Ben-Gurion was a Zionist and a socialist—in that order. When these two beliefs conflicted, such as over the question of partition, he rejected the socialist solutions of the left-wing parties, including his own, and adhered to Weizmann’s brand of pragmatic political Zionism. Berl Katznelson, a central Mapai leader, was a crucial figure in the 1937 decision. In his initial strong opposition to partition, he had avoided both the ideological arguments of the socialist left and the religious fundamentalist arguments of the right. Since his reservations stemmed mainly from his distrust of British intentions, he was able to help formulate a compromise resolution in qualified support of the principle of partition. Thus, a very intensive debate between the “ja sagers” (supporters of partitions) and the “nein sagers” (opponents) ensued up to the Zionist Congress. The main arguments are summarized in Table 1.1 below. The strong opponents endorsed the idea of a Jewish state (unlike some who rejected it completely), but only on the “whole Land of Eretz-Israel”. Their main arguments were social (Hashomer Hatza’ir and Hakibbutz Hameuhad), religious (Hamizrahi), and national (the Revisionist Movement, part of the General Zionists and Hakibbutz Hameuhad). The moderate

Table 1.1  Partition in exchange for sovereignty: positions and arguments Position

Main argument

Main counter-argument

Strong Opposition

Prevent a precedent for partition of the Land of Israel.

Rejection of partition would result in an Arab state in the entire land of Israel.

Moderate Opposition

Chance to continue the Mandate and international sponsorship of the National home.

The Mandate would continue under worsened conditions.

Undecided

Prevent an internal rift and clarify the conditions for implementation of the Royal Commission’s proposal.

Lack of influence on events increases the chance of worse options.

Moderate Support

Create a commitment for establishment of a state and improve the territorial proposal.

Agreement to territorial concessions will become the minimum demand of the other side.

Strong Support

Create a sovereign territorial hold, especially to rescue European Jews.

A state of 5,000 km2 has no right to exist; boundaries cannot be changed.

THE ZIONIST DEBATES ON PARTITION (1919–47)

9

opponents, including parts of Mapai and the American Zionists, argued mainly in terms of economic viability and absorption capacity. Security was not a major consideration in  1937 because the assumption was that the British army would remain and maintain law and order. The proponents, on the other hand, argued that sovereignty was the main vehicle to achieve the Zionists’ goals. They were pragmatists presenting tactical considerations, arguing, among other things, that the Peel Commission’s proposal could be improved and the borders could be expanded in the future. The strong proponents were willing to support the suggested partition proposal, arguing that either it would increase the prospects of Jewish-Arab co-existence or that self-rule (even a spiritual center) is more important than the size of the territory. The undecided presented four preconditions before they would consider partition:







1 The size of the proposed Jewish State should be “sufficient” for

sustaining a viable state. Ben-Gurion was the only central leader to say openly that 12,000 sq km would suffice, at least for the time being8: 2 The boundaries should be defensible. Defense considerations were not central because it was assumed Britain would remain responsible. The main concern, however, was for the safety of the Jewish settlements. 3 The Jewish majority should be significant and the number of Arabs in the Jewish state should be minimal. This was a major concern because of the importance of free immigration. According to the Report’s estimates, an annual immigration of 60,000 would produce a Jewish majority no earlier than the 1950s. The Report proposed that since 225,000 Arabs would remain in the Jewish state (and 1250 Jews in the Arab state), “there should be a transfer of land and, as far as possible, an exchange of population.” All Jewish leaders publicly opposed this proposal; privately, some supported the idea if Britain should enforce it. 4 There should be clear consent on the part of the Palestinians and the Arab states to the partition plan. The undecided, notably Berl Katznelson, feared that the Jewish state would remain without territories and without peace.

The pragmatists’ main argument in favor of qualified support was that agreement in principle to partition would pave the way for Jewish sovereignty. If partition were rejected, they feared a change in British policy that would strangle the Yishuv or establish an Arab state in all of Palestine. By accepting

8

Protocol of the Mapai Central Committee, April 10, 1937, p. 12.

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the principle of partition, they believed that it would grant the Zionist endeavor international legitimacy and provide a solution for distressed Jews in Europe. Many hoped that it would also pave the way to ending the ArabJewish conflict.

The debate The Peel Commission proposal would have given the Jews 10 per cent of their 1919 demands, and about 20 per cent of western Eretz-Israel. On the other hand, there was an opportunity to establish a sovereign state. This was the essence of the debate in 1937. If the first negative reaction to the proposal prevailed, the opponents and the undecided had a majority in the Zionist Congress. The debate encompassed all the institutions in the Yishuv and the Zionist movement abroad. The voluminous deliberations were passionate, impressive, and of a very high quality. There were also some surprising paradoxes.9 The opponents, who were generally anti-British, favored continuation of the British Mandate. The expressive opponents, whose arguments were moral, were willing to form political alliances with ideological opponents, while the pragmatic proponents displayed stronger organizational loyalty to their parties. Another interesting feature of the debate was the arguments on whether time was working in favor of or against the Zionist endeavor,10 underscoring the sense of urgency and the strong belief that having a state would enhance immigration of distressed Jews from Europe, both for rescue and as a realization of Zionist goals. In retrospect, the division into two camps—opponents and proponents— helped to create a wide and comprehensive public discourse about choices that had to be made. The Zionist leaders rejected the option of “deciding not to decide”. Unbeknownst to the Zionists, Britain had already changed its previous position in favor of partition, and thus the immediate impact of the Zionist decision was not important. This fact, however, does not diminish the great importance of the internal debate.

The decision The carefully worded compromise of the resolution adopted by the Zionist Congress in  1937 supported the principle of partition in return for a sovereign state:

Yosef Gorni, The Arab Question and the Jewish Problem (Tel-Aviv, 1985) 315–16 [in Hebrew]. 10 Yonathan Shapira, The Organization of Power (Tel-Aviv, 1975) 316 [in Hebrew]. 9

THE ZIONIST DEBATES ON PARTITION (1919–47)

11

 It

reaffirmed the historic connection of the Jewish people with EretzIsrael and its inalienable right to its homeland.

 It

rejected the assertion of the Royal Commission that the Mandate was unworkable and demanded its fulfillment.

 It

rejected the Commission’s conclusion that the national aspirations of Jews and Arabs in Palestine were irreconcilable, and declared the readiness of the Jewish people to reach a peaceful settlement with the Arabs of Palestine based on mutual recognition of respective rights.

 It

declared that the scheme of partition proposed by the Royal Commission was unacceptable.

 It

empowered the Zionist Executive to enter into negotiations to ascertain the precise terms of the British government for the proposed establishment of the Jewish state.

 Agreement

was reached that if a definite scheme for the establishment of a Jewish state emerged, this scheme would be brought for decision before a newly elected Congress.

Although the resolution was not unanimous (a nearly two-thirds majority), a compromise reached between the supporters and the undecideds had important repercussions for future democratic decisions in the Zionist movement. Some opponents claimed after the Zionist Congress that they had not voted for partition, as the final decision had been postponed. They argued that the Executive was empowered only to explore the British proposal to establish a state—i.e. the sovereignty aspect and not partition. Nonetheless, the political meaning of the Congress resolution was clear. A resolution to reject the idea of partition altogether failed to reach a majority in the Congress. The Zionist Executive was empowered to negotiate with the British government. Since the only relevant proposal for a Jewish state was based on partition, it was patently clear to Britain that the Zionist movement was willing to talk. The principle of partition (not the particular proposal of the Peel Commission) was therefore endorsed.

The Palestinian position All factions of the Palestinian national movement officially rejected the partition principle—not only the Arab Higher Committee, headed by Haj Amin el-Husseini, but also the more moderate Nashashibis, who were close to Emir Abdullah. In their view, the Arab revolt that had led to the establishment of the Commission had failed to achieve its goals if the

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result was a partitioned Palestine.11 Despite differences of opinion on other subjects, the Palestinian leadership clung to the demand to establish an Arab state in all of Palestine and opposed partition for reasons similar to those of the extreme opponents among the Jews.12 The position of the Palestinians and the Arab States was that the Jews had no legitimate claims to their territory, and the sheer idea that a Jewish state would be established on any part of Palestine was unjust and unacceptable. Agreement to partition, that is Jewish territorial control, would have implied recognition of their rights in Palestine and would have constituted a turning point in the Palestinian position. Indeed, such a development, caused by Jewish immigration, was precisely what the Arab revolt was intended to prevent. The adherence of the Palestinians to this position ignored the emerging political reality. They resolved to choose between an all-or-nothing approach, similar to the extreme Jewish opponents: rule over all of Palestine or continued subjugation to the British. As a result of this reduction of the choices, the first option was selected, leading to the demand to replace the Mandate with an Arab-Palestinian state in the entire territory. In the short term, the second option materialized—continuation of the Mandate, but in the long term, all of Palestine was lost. Moreover, the Palestinians were less ready to examine partition when it was offered by the 1947 UN resolution.

The importance of 1937 In October 1938, the new Palestine Partition Commission (the Woodhead Commission) put an end to the British offer of partition. Subsequently, Britain convened the London Conference of 1939, inviting representatives of the Zionist and Palestinian movements and the Arab states to seek an accommodation. The failure of the conference was followed by the “White Paper” of May 1939, which imposed severe limitations on Jewish immigration and land acquisition in Palestine. *** The immediate impact of the Zionist movement’s 1937 decision was relatively limited. Its internal significance, however, was crucial, affirming in principle the willingness to consider partition and compromise over territory when sovereignty was at stake. The 1937 decision paved the way for 30 years (1937–1967) of consensus among the majority of Jews on the territorial partition of Eretz-Israel.

W. F. Aboushi, The Angry Arabs (Philadelphia, 1974) 40. Yehoshua Porath, From Riots to Rebellion: the Palestinian-Arab National Movement 1929–1939 (Tel-Aviv, 1978) 272 [in Hebrew].

11 12

THE ZIONIST DEBATES ON PARTITION (1919–47)

13

Many of the terms used today were first coined in 1937: partition of EretzIsrael, historic rights, secure borders, natural boundaries, transfer, drawing (and not drawing) maps. Among the opponents: not an inch (of land), greater (undivided) Israel, the integrity of the land, two banks of the Jordan river (also a state on the two banks of the Yarkon river), the land of our forefathers, a cry for generations to come. Among the proponents: historical compromise, peace in exchange for sovereignty, a state now, the Masada complex, political boundaries, the Promised Land as mere aspiration.

The 1947 confirmation of partition The Jewish world was totally transformed between 1937 and 1947 as a result of World War II and the Holocaust. With the end of the war, there was a more urgent need to find a solution for the Jewish refugees in Europe. Several events regarding territory and boundaries led up to the U.N. partition proposal. The Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry (April 1946) proposed the establishment of a trusteeship in Palestine—not a division between Arabs and Jews—and 100,000 immigration visas to Jewish refugees from Europe.13 The Morrison-Grady Plan of July 1946 proposed a kind of canton plan for Palestine.14 Internally, the most important decision was taken by the expanded Jewish Agency Executive in Paris in August 1946, stating that: “The Executive is prepared to discuss the proposal to establish a viable Jewish state in an appropriate territory of Eretz Israel.” Compared to the 1937 decision, in which partition was not mentioned and only the principle was indirectly endorsed, the term “appropriate territory” implied partition. It was an attempt by the Jewish Agency to break up the British logjam of deliberations and, primarily, to convince the United States to endorse the establishment of a Jewish state. In December 1946, the 22nd Zionist Congress, drawn together by its anguish over the destruction of European Jewry and the plight of the Jewish refugees, declared outright support for the immediate establishment of a Jewish state. The critical need for sovereignty under these conditions compelled most Zionist leaders to agree to partition, which by then was a foregone conclusion for most except the ardent ideological opponents on the right (Revisionists) and the left (Hashomer Hatza’ir). The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) pub­lished its report in August 1947. The majority called for termination of the British Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry (1946); selections from the Report can be found in Part II of this book, p. 151. 14 Proposals for the Future of Palestine (July 1946–February 1947). 13

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14

Mandate, the establishment of two independent states in Palestine—one Jewish, one Arab—and turning Jerusalem into an international trusteeship under U.N. supervision. The proposed territory of the Jewish state was approximately 16,000 sq km, some 62 per cent of Palestine (E.I.). The UNSCOP plan also proposed, for the first time, a separate Palestinian Arab state, independent of Trans-Jordan. While the Palestinian leadership and the Arab states rejected the UNSCOP proposal, the Zionist movement regarded it as a victory, despite the awkward territorial structure and the very long boundaries of the proposed Jewish state and the exclusion of most of the Galilee, Jerusalem, and 39 Jewish settlements. The UNSCOP report was approved by a large majority of the enlarged Zionist General Council15 and welcomed by most Jews; the Jewish Agency lobbied for its adoption by the U.N. General Assembly. In November 1947, more than two-thirds of the U.N. General Assembly voted in favor of the partition plan. The plan was essentially the same as the majority proposal of UNSCOP, although the territory proposed for the Jewish state was reduced to 14,000 sq km, which constituted about 55 per cent of Palestine (E.I.) (see the territorial differences shown in Appendix C, p. 318). The U.N. decision was greeted with enthusiasm among most Jews in Palestine and the Zionist movement. The problems raised by the moderate opponents of partition and the doubts that had troubled the undecided in 1937 did not evaporate in 1947, as shown in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2  Conditions raised in the 1937 debate and the response in the United Nations plan of 1947. Yes Sufficient territory?

Partly X

Defensible boundaries? Jewish majority? Arab consent?

No

Remarks The Galilee omitted from the Jewish state; most of the added territory in the arid Negev.

X X

Approximately 1,500 km of winding boundaries. Approximately 40% Arabs in the Jewish state.

X

Absolute Arab opposition; slim chance for peace.

Meeting of the enlarged Zionist General Council, Zurich, September 1947, Central Zionist Archive, File S/5/320.

15

THE ZIONIST DEBATES ON PARTITION (1919–47)

15

The four conditions raised in the 1937 debate were fulfilled only partially or not at all. The size of the Jewish state as proposed in the 1947 partition plan did not add significantly to the arable land, which was then regarded as too little to absorb millions of Jews. The proposed borders did not provide a solution to the problem of security, when it became clear that the Jewish state would not win the agreement of the Arabs from within or without. Finally, although the partition lines were drawn to ensure a Jewish majority in the Jewish state, it was only a 60 per cent majority. Willingness to ignore all these shortcomings testifies that the Zionist decision to adopt the 1947 partition plan was based on giving priority to sovereignty over other goals, as well as over expressive values. Politics, not geography, tipped the scale toward Zionist agreement to the partition plans of 1937 and 1947. As a result of the war of 1948–1949, the expanded boundaries of the State of Israel included 20,600 sq km. The rest was annexed to Jordan and the Gaza Strip to Egyptian administration. A Palestinian state was not established and the partition was between Israel and two Arab states until 1967.

Conclusions In the key territorial decisions made by the Zionist movement in the prestate period, it was willing to consider trading territory for other values. The primary “other” value was political sovereignty. Jewish attitudes toward territory in the decisions of 1919, 1937, and 1947 reflect a duality.16 Territorial attitudes were emotional and inseparable from a sense of collective identity, fatherland, motherland, and homeland, leading to expressive positions. Territory was seen as a tangible resource, a means for satisfying specific needs—livelihood, security, economic viability, social development, natural resources, etc.—leading to instrumental positions. The Zionist agreement to partition in  1937 and 1947 indicated a willingness to define national interests as a choice between values that are contradictory in a particular political context. It is irrelevant whether the willingness to forego territory was merely tactical, as territorial concessions were viewed as a very big risk and irreversible. Accordingly, the pre-1948 decisions of the Zionist movement fell rather consistently on the side of instrumental pragmatism, and this approach dominated Israeli policy until 1967. Comparison of the pre-state decisions with those currently confronting Israelis and Palestinians does not ignore the very different circumstances Jan Gottman, The Significance of Territory (Charlottesville, VA, 1973), pp. 14–16.

16

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that exist today. For example, since 1948 the issue of sovereignty has become secondary as illustrated by the transformation of the slogan “territories for sovereignty” to “territories for peace”. Both, however, are still relevant for Palestinians. Therefore, the comparison is not between the content of the decisions, but the very willingness to define choices in terms of conflicting values. This kind of choice exists in territorial decisions only when the territory itself is viewed instrumentally and its value is weighed against the probability of attaining other values, e.g., sovereignty, peace. The choice completely disappears when the whole territory is an expressive value—not negotiable under any conditions. In retrospect, the words of Ben-Gurion before the 1937 decision still stand the test of time: “Before us is a decision, not a verdict.”17

Path of Our Policy: Protocol of the World Council of Poalei Zion (Jerusalem, 1938), p. 201 [in Hebrew].

17

C h a p t e r T wo

The positions in support of the partition plan Alexander Yakobson

Summary: In this essay we present the primary arguments for the UNSCOP majority decision in favor of the partition plan, as well as the rationales of those who supported partition at the time of the discussions about it in the UN General Assembly. Alexander Yakobson reviews the arguments regarding the ambitions and rights of the two peoples in the country for independence, regarding the historical connection between the Jewish people and the land, and regarding the international commitments given to the Jewish people. Yakobson points out that the importance of the report was principally that it recognized the Jews, even if not always explicitly, as a nation entitled to self-determination. The main justification in support of the partition proposal, on which the speaker dwells, is the set of realities which the partition proposal sought to address in 1947. This attempt can be divided into two fronts: one, Mandatory Palestine, which was inhabited by two peoples with conflicting political ambitions; the other, the countries of Europe in which the Jewish refugees after the Second World War sought their way.

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In my discussion I would like to focus on the arguments in favor of partition given by the UN committee after it investigated the subject. The UN committee known by the name UNSCOP (United Nations Special Committee on Palestine) was sent here in the spring of 1947 by the decision of the General Assembly and composed a detailed report, in which it recommended partition. The resolution was adopted by a majority vote with the support of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Holland, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay. On the other hand, a minority of the committee’s members— the representatives of Yugoslavia, Iran and India—recommended a JewishArabic federation—that is, a bi-national state: an autonomous Jewish state alongside an autonomous Arab state, with a united state over them. Since the Zionist movement accepted the majority proposal, while the Arab Higher Committee in the country and the states of the Arab League rejected the partition proposal and also—with no less fervor—the proposal for a bi-national federative state, what in effect came up for discussion in the General Assembly leading up to the famous resolution on the 29 November was the majority proposal—the partition proposal. The committee visited the country and quickly composed a detailed report, which presented the conflict and its origins and the demands of the two sides and which offered a reasoned recommendation in support of partition. The report took the form of a detailed presentation of the principle of partition into two states, with the discourse and the presentation of the rationales of the two sides at a very high level.1 A reading of the report, and afterwards a reading of the protocol of the long discussions in the UN General Assembly up to the point at which the resolution was adopted, reveals that very little—if anything at all—has changed in the principled arguments for and against partition and the Jewish state. All of the arguments which have been raised from then until now were already included in that document. It is therefore advisable to read carefully the report and then the discussions in the General Assembly. The committee opens with a short summary of ancient Jewish history and mentions briefly the historical connection of the Jews to the land. It dwells at greater length on modern history—that is, on the international guarantees given to the Jews. On the one hand the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate document, and on the other hand the promises made by the great powers to the Arabs and to the Arab nationalist movement. The question was whether or not Palestine was included in the promise made to the Arabs regarding the Arab state which would be established after the victory over the Ottoman Empire. The members of the committee ruled that this was a question which could not be resolved. Regarding the expression

[Editor’s note: The full UNSCOP report is indeed a fascinating document. Sections of it are included in the sources part of this book, in addition to a link for the complete document, see p. 196.]

1

THE POSITIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE PARTITION PLAN

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“a national home for the Jewish people,” they ruled that it did not have to be understood as referring to a Jewish state, but that this was a reasonable interpretation. I would like to examine a short passage from the historical survey which the report presents: Both the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate [which reinforced the Balfour Declaration] involved international commitments to the Jewish people as a whole. It was obvious that these commitments were not limited to the Jewish population of Palestine, since at the time there were only some 80,000 Jews there.2 We see, therefore, that the committee refers to the Jewish people all over the world as a people with national ambitions, who enjoys an international status; as a people for whom the existence and the legitimacy of their national ambitions are recognized by the international community. In the eyes of the committee members, the Jewish people is a subject of international focus—a people with national aspirations. This is a matter of fundamental significance. Then, and since then, it has been claimed that the Jews are only a religious community and not a people, nation or ethnicity. This was vehemently asserted by the Arab representatives. Consequently, the Jews have no right to develop national aspirations. This is a familiar argument. Of late we have heard a new twist to this subject: the Jews are indeed a people, but not a nation. The members of the committee did not think of this particular sophistry. They addressed the Jews as a people with national ambitions and an international status, and which was recognized as such. One should remember that in standard international discourse, one speaks of the right of peoples to self-determination, so it would seem that the term “people” would certainly be sufficient for this purpose. However, it is important to emphasize that the committee did not base the main part of its arguments for the partition solution on historical considerations, and not even on international guarantees, even if it mentioned them, and not even on the recognition of the world’s Jews as a people. It referred to these factors with a certain vagueness while concentrating on what it considered to be the main point: the existence of two peoples with different national identities and contradictory political and national aspirations in Mandatory Palestine in 1947. It was easier for them to analyze an existing situation than to deal with complex theoretical questions such as: what is the significance of historical rights? What weight do contradictory diplomatic promises have? In any “ordinary” territorial conflict taking place today it is clear that the international community would not accept a territorial claim based on a 2

See below the UNSCOP report (3 September 1947), p. 203.

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historical right from two thousand years ago. But is it possible to discount the historical argument in the case of a homeless people, who by definition has no homeland apart from its historic one? And if we accept this claim, does it not represent a dangerous precedent? What is the status, for the time being, of the people without a homeland? Dealing with these questions does not admit of relying on precedents or analogies, since this is a highly unique situation. But the members of the committee permitted themselves to delve into these subjects because they faced a situation in which there were already two peoples living in Mandatory Palestine in 1947. I quote from the report: The basic premise underlying the partition proposal is that the claims to Palestine of the Arabs and Jews, both possessing validity, are irreconcilable . . . Accordingly, the report states that: . . . among all of the solutions advanced, partition will provide the most realistic and practical settlement, and is most likely to afford a workable basis for meeting in part the claims and national aspirations of both parties. It is a fact that both of these people have their historic roots in Palestine, and that both make vital contributions to the economic and cultural life of the country. [. . .] The basic conflict in Palestine is a clash of two intense nationalisms. Regardless of the historic origins of the conflict, the rights and wrongs of the promises and counter promises and the international intervention incident to the Mandate, there are now in Palestine some 650,000 Jews and some 1,200,000 Arabs who are dissimilar in their ways of living and, for the time being, separated by political interests. [. . .] Only by means of partition can these conflicting national aspirations find substantial expression and qualify both peoples to take their places as independent nations in the international community and in the United Nations.3 The rationale of partition, therefore, was this: there are two peoples with contradictory national aspirations, and we wish to give both of them national independence. “Jewish immigration,” the report continued, “is the central issue in Palestine today and is the one factor, above all others, that rules out the necessary co-operation between the Arab and Jewish communities in a single State.” This is a very important point, of course, since the minority position of the committee, which advocated an Arab-Jewish federation, supported one state, which was to give expression to two national entities. The difficulty was

3

See below the UNSCOP report (3 September 1947), pp. 228–9.

THE POSITIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE PARTITION PLAN

21

that the Arab majority in this federation would of course block immigration. Even the supporters of the bi-national state acknowledged this. On the other hand, most of the members of the committee claimed that because of the problem of Jewish immigration there was no chance that Jews and Arabs would share one country. The report continues immediately: The creation of a Jewish State under a partition scheme is the only hope of removing this issue from the arena of conflict. It is recognized that partition has been strongly opposed by Arabs, but it is felt that that opposition would be lessened by a solution which definitively fixes the extent of territory to be allotted to the Jews with its implicit limitation on immigration.4 This means that the limit on Jewish immigration is a territorial boundary in the framework of which massive Jewish immigration will be possible—as the representatives of the Jewish side who appeared before the committee declared would happen, and the committee noted this in the report. The committee remarked that in the eyes of the Jews the question of the Jewish state and the question of Jewish immigration were two sides of the same coin and that, on the other hand, Palestinians would receive a different portion of the country in which they would be able to realize their national independence, and would be absolved of that very fear that Jewish immigration would make them a minority in their own country. The members of the committee recognized the legitimate resistance of the Palestinian Arabs to the flooding of the country with Jewish immigration which would render them a minority in their own land. In their way of thinking, the solution to the problem is the division of the country and the establishment of two states. Thus, the question of Jewish immigration would become an internal problem for the Jewish state [or, in their words, partition would remove “this issue from the arena of conflict”]. It is important to emphasize that the assumption of the committee was that massive Jewish immigration after the establishment of the state would continue and would become an internal matter for the Jewish state. As we have said, the problem of immigration was the principal controversy which ultimately led to the need to divide the country. The introduction to the report goes on at length in this spirit: . . . the Committee was fully aware that both Arabs and Jews advance strong claims to rights and interests in Palestine, the Arabs by virtue of being for centuries the indigenous and preponderant people there, and the Jews by virtue of historical association with the country and international pledges made to them respecting their rights in it. But the

4

Ibid., pp. 229–30.

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Committee also realized that the crux of the Palestine problem is to be found in the fact that two sizeable groups, an Arab population . . . and a Jewish population . . . with intense nationalist aspirations, are diffused throughout a country . . .5 Once again we have here the argument that two peoples with conflicting political and national ambitions cannot successfully coexist in the framework of a single state, and thus we have the partition solution. With regard to the question of immigration, it is explicitly stated that the territory allocated to the Jewish state will be large enough to absorb Jewish immigration. And indeed, the partition plan granted the Jews about half of the territory, despite the fact that at that point they were only about a third of the country’s population. The committee explicitly stated that the Jews needed to receive a land reserve which would enable them to absorb immigration. It was primarily for this reason that a situation was created in which a very large Arab minority would be destined to live within the borders of the Jewish state and the Arab state would also include a Jewish minority, albeit a small one. This was despite the basic, and understandable, desire that the two peoples would dwell on opposite sides of the border as much as possible. The committee required both of the states to guarantee full equality of civil rights for the two national minorities, and to guarantee their cultural rights as well. Ever since then, one hears over and over again the statement that the concept of a “Jewish state” contradicts the possibility that any nonJewish minority in the state would enjoy full equal rights. As a matter of principle I reject this statement, which is completely contradictory to the UN committee’s recommendation to divide the country in  1947, and the very logic of dividing the country between two peoples. The committee’s report recommends the establishment of a Jewish state and an Arab state, and requires both of them to be democratic states which respect the rights of minorities. In the discussion which developed in the United Nations General Assembly and in its committees after the submission of the report, one of the more pleasant and positive surprises for the Zionist movement was the position taken by the Soviet Union, the age-old enemy of Zionism, which supported the partition move for its own reasons and logic. Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet representative, gave two speeches on this subject: the first, in the discussion in the General Assembly in which it was decided to send the committee to the region, and the second, after the UNSCOP committee, in which he expressed his support for the partition plan. I would like to quote a few excerpts from Gromyko’s speeches, because in my opinion it was precisely the Soviet delegation which expressed their support

5

Ibid., p. 217.

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for partition most vehemently and on the basis of the enlightened principles of international law. Gromyko spoke about the question of Palestine in his first speech as follows: As we know, the aspirations of a considerable part of the Jewish people are linked with the problem of Palestine and of its future administration. This fact scarcely requires proof . . . During the last war, the Jewish people underwent exceptional sorrow and suffering. Without any exaggeration, this sorrow and suffering are indescribable . . . The total number of members of the Jewish population who perished at the hands of the Nazi executioners is estimated at approximately six million . . . Past experience, particularly during the Second World War, shows that no western European State was able to provide adequate assistance for the Jewish people in defending its rights and its very existence from the violence of the Hitlerites and their allies . . . The fact that no western European State has been able to ensure the defense of the elementary rights of the Jewish people, and to safeguard it against the violence of the fascist executioners, explains the aspirations of the Jews to establish their own State. It would be unjust not to take this into consideration and to deny the right of the Jewish people to realize this aspiration. It would be unjustifiable to deny this right to the Jewish people, particularly in view of all it has undergone during the Second World War . . . It is essential to bear in mind the indisputable fact that the population of Palestine consists of two peoples, the Arabs and the Jews. Both have historical roots in Palestine. Palestine has become the homeland of both these peoples . . .6 In his first speech he explained that the ideal solution would be a bi-national state—a state common to the two peoples. If the two parties would not agree on this, then the solution would have to be two states. In his second speech he supported, as we have said, the majority recommendation, and explicitly gave his support for the partition into two states. These are his words: The logical conclusion follows that, if these two peoples that inhabit Palestine, both of which have deeply rooted historical ties with the land, cannot live together within the boundaries of a single State, there is no alternative but to create, in place of one country, two States—an Arab and a Jewish one . . . The representatives of the Arab States claim that the partition of Palestine would be a historic injustice. But this view of the case is unacceptable, if only because, after all, the Jewish people has been closely linked with Palestine for a considerable period in history. Apart from 6

For selections from Andrei Gromyko’s speech, see below, pp. 147–51.

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that, we must not overlook . . . the position in which the Jewish people found themselves as a result of the recent world war . . . it may not be amiss to remind my listeners again that, as a result of the war which was unleashed by Hitlerite Germany, the Jews, as a people, suffered more than any other people . . . The delegation of the USSR maintains that the decision to partition Palestine is in keeping with the high principles and aims of the United Nations. It is in keeping with the principle of the national self-determination of peoples. He was one of the few, if not the only one, who explicitly referred to “the principle of the self-determination of peoples,” even though the reasoning of UNSCOP says the same thing, of course, without using the explicit expression “self-determination.” It uses word combinations such as “two peoples”, “aspiration for independence,” “the aspirations of both groups for independence,” which were usually identified with the right to selfdetermination. The expression, “self-determination,” is highly problematic, and even the proponents of partition were aware of this. As far as the international discourse was concerned, the most decisive argument which served the opponents of partition was the fear that ethno-national self-determination for two ethnonational groups in one territory opens the door to the secession of every ethnic group which sees itself as a people independent of the majority. The Arab representatives warned those present of this problem. The Syrian representative warned the representative of Canada in his reference to the national aspirations of French Canadians, and asked him if they were prepared to permit them to secede and if anyone who chooses should be permitted to secede. This difficulty regarding the right of secession, which preoccupies many countries, was useful to the Arabs and they claimed that the appropriate implementation of the right to self-determination was to grant independence to the country as a whole and to permit majority rule. This claim impressed many of the participants, including naturally the representatives of those countries concerned about the right of secession as well. The natural preference of the international community when dealing with ethno-national conflicts internal to a particular country is to support the preservation of the territorial integrity of the given country in order not to invite a debate about borders and to avoid creating a precedent for secession. The tendency of the international community in situations such as these is to pressure the competing national groups to arrive at a solution acceptable to the different parties, through power-sharing, frequently by means of federative arrangements. But the problem was, of course, that the Arab stance did not leave open any such possibility. The Arab position ruled out, with the same vehemence and with the same threats of violence, even the possibility of establishing a bi-national federation, and demanded a unitary Arab state in  all of Palestine. In the conditions of the time it would have been very difficult to accept such a

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proposal, the meaning of which would have been to turn the members of the Hebrew settlement in the country into the subjects of the Mufti. The members of UNSCOP were respectful of both sides in their report, but some of the participants in the General Assembly discussions mentioned the Mufti, his position and his behavior during the Second World War, and they believed that it was not a good idea to place the responsibility for the Jewish settlement in the country in his hands. Of course the single state solution—an Arab state in all of the country, as the Arabs demanded, or the establishment of a bi-national federation—could do nothing to solve the problem of Jewish immigration and the suffering of about a quarter of a million displaced Jews and Holocaust survivors who were interned in camps on European soil. The UN committee’s report, as we have seen, ascribes enormous significance to the problem of Jewish immigration (and thus, indirectly, to the suffering in the Displaced Persons Camps, although in their report they preferred to concentrate on what was taking place in the region). If the Arab elements had accepted the idea of federation, which to some extent satisfied the national aspirations of the Jews in the country—although not abroad—the two-thirds majority required to adopt the partition plan in the General Assembly might not have been attained. The Canadian representative stated in the General Assembly that in a situation in which there are two peoples in one country, the best solution is the establishment of combined state for both of them, as there is in Canada. But he emphasized that union between English speakers and French speakers in Canada was founded by choice, whereas in Palestine the two sides rejected a combined state, and only one side was agreeable to partition. In such a situation there is no choice but to support partition. He did not specify what would happen if only one side would support a combined state. Of course it is not simple, if even possible, in principle or practice, to establish a combined state for two peoples when one of them does not agree to it. The majority conclusion in UNSCOP was, as we have said, that the two peoples were not capable of cooperating in the framework of a combined state. It was clear both to the members of the committee and to the discussants in the General Assembly that it would be impossible to ensure the rights, national or otherwise, of the Jewish settlement in the country in a state with an Arab majority under the leadership of the Mufti. Nonetheless they did not always use explicit language and made do with the diplomatic phrasing, “are incapable of cooperating.” In such a situation, in which there is no possibility of ensuring the rights and safety of a national collective without an independent country, even those who have a minimalist interpretation of the right to self-determination understand that the best solution is national independence.7

For this position see, for example, Chaim Gans, A Just Zionism: On the Morality of the Jewish State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

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In Gromyko’s two speeches there was an additional point of interest, apart from his explicit statement regarding the right to national selfdetermination for the two peoples. I am referring to his willingness to use the phrase “the Jewish people” when referring to all the Jews of the world and not just the Hebrew settlement in Mandatory Palestine. This is of course the epitome of Zionism. He succeeded in expressing the essence of the Zionist idea without the explicit use of the word “Zionism.” These statements of Gromyko are especially interesting in light of the fact that initially the basic Communist position was the denial of Jewish nationalism, and afterwards—readiness to accept that the Jews can be a nationality in each country where they reside, but not one nation including the Jews of different countries. This led to the official recognition of the Jews of the Soviet Union as one of the nationalities in the multi-national Soviet state, while rejecting any national connection between them and the Jews outside the Soviet Union. Thus it is possible to state in principle, if one so chooses, that the Jews in Palestine became a nationality. In this way the Communists in Palestine justified their support for partition. When Gromyko walked up the steps on his way to the podium in the General Assembly they still did not support partition, but when he descended them they were already in full support of it.8 To justify this transition they claimed that the Jews in Palestine were a nation which developed in historical circumstances and that they had a right to self-determination. Nonetheless, up until that point the Communist position—in the Soviet Union and in other places throughout the world—was that there was no such thing as a “global Jewish nation.” That is to say, that there is no national connection between the different parts of what the Zionists define as “the Jewish people” and thus there is no national connection between Soviet Jews and Western Jews and the Zionists in Palestine. This statement was important, of course, to the Soviet regime. As we have seen, Gromyko spoke specifically about the Jewish people in Western Europe, where the extermination of the Jews by the Nazis took place, following which they aspired to establish a state in Palestine. In Western Europe there was a failure to protect the Jews but, as we know, in Eastern Europe they were defended. The Soviet Union successfully defended the Jewish people from the fascist executioners, in contradistinction to the countries of capitalist Western Europe. Accordingly, if one wishes to make use of the lessons of the Holocaust and the suffering of the displaced persons as a justification for the establishment of the Jewish state, one has no choice but to speak about the Jewish people in the world. As we have said, this is what Gromyko did: he adopted the Zionist phraseology and the logic of the Zionist position without mentioning, of course, the word “Zionism.” It is important and interesting to note that even though the committee itself was aware of the tragedy of the Holocaust, it made very little For the reversal of the positions of the Arab Communists, see also Mustafa Kabha’s article, Chapter 3.

8

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mention of it. Unlike the suffering of the displaced persons, the Holocaust is almost never referred to in the UNSCOP report. The reason for this is that international diplomacy tends to address burning problems and not the catastrophes of the past. In 1947 the Holocaust was already a matter of history, although its repercussions still represented a painful problem. There were a quarter of a million people in Displaced Persons Camps and no one was willing to take them in. They could not return to the world that had been destroyed in the countries of Eastern Europe, and if they tried to return they were likely to be murdered. At that time numerous refugees had already been murdered when they tried to return to Poland. Accordingly there were many more Jews sitting in the refugee camps in 1947 than there were immediately after the war, because those who had tried to return to their homeland were unable to remain there, and fled once again. When the representatives of the committee visited the camps it was explained to them that the refusal of countries to absorb displaced persons stemmed, among other things, from the fear that Jewish immigration would ignite anti-Semitism, and anti-Semitism is a phenomenon which any enlightened country vehemently opposes. Even before the Holocaust there were numerous statements to the effect that it would be impossible to take in Jewish refugees lest, God forbid, this results in the importation of antiSemitism. And even two years after the Holocaust one could still hear arguments against Jewish immigration, while these people continued to sit in Displaced Persons Camps on German soil, with all that this implies. This situation, despite the attempts of the committee to concentrate on what was happening in the region at that moment and not to address the past or what was happening outside the country, certainly had an impact on some of the committee members. In the UN General Assembly discussions, as in the speech from Gromyko which I quoted, and also in numerous other speeches, the harsh suffering of the Jews at the time was strongly felt. The statement that Jews were without a home did not sound at the time like a metaphor or rhetoric. It was a very exact description of reality. In conclusion I will say that the Zionist movement in  1947 made a sophisticated tactical move: Ben-Gurion appeared before the UN committee and demanded the entire country, which enabled the members of the committee to say that the partition proposal was a compromise between two demands: both parties want the country in its entirety. But whereas the Arabs rejected any possibility of compromise, Ben-Gurion responded directly to the members of the committee, when asked, and stated that he would agree to partition if it would be offered to him.9 Behind the scenes Zionist diplomacy did everything in its power to cause the members of the UN committee to adopt the principle of partition which For the positions of the Jewish leadership on the subject of partition immediately prior to the November 29th resolution, see below, pp. 235–41 in Part II of this book.

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the Zionist Executive Committee had already adopted a year earlier.10 Chaim Weizmann, who by this time did not hold an official position within the Zionist movement and therefore probably felt more at liberty to speak freely, stated explicitly when he appeared before the committee that partition was the most just and practical solution. He persisted with his famous dictum that the conflict between Arabs and Jews in the region was a matter of right versus right, justice versus justice, and therefore it would be not only pragmatic but also appropriate and just for there to be two states for two peoples. In this way of managing its affairs one could say that the Zionist movement exploited the logic of “shnaim ohazin be-talit” (a Talmudic expression which refers to an object with two claimants) to avoid finding oneself in a situation where “one says, it is all mine, and the other says, half of it is mine.” If you ask for only half already at the beginning, and the other party asks for everything, you will only receive half of the half which you requested, since only that half is contested, and with regard to the other half there is ostensibly a consensus. And so the Zionist movement demanded everything at the beginning and then agreed to receive half as a compromise. In this respect they also used the logic of “tafasta meruba lo tafasta” (another Talmudic proverb: “having tried to take everything, you are left with nothing”). They refrained from insisting on their demand for the entire country, at a time when the Jews were a minority. The international community would never have acquiesced to a demand for the entire country. By being stubborn they would have lost everything. The Arab side lost, no doubt, because of its extreme position. By virtue of this conduct, the Zionist movement earned a glorious political victory on the 29 November 1947.

For the intra-Jewish debate regarding partition, see Chapter 1.

10

Chapter three

Palestinians and the partition plan Mustafa Kabha

Summary: In his article Mustafa Kabha presents a general sketch of the positions of the Palestinian side at the major crossroads which led to the establishment of the Jewish national home: beginning with the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, through the Peel Commission and the “White Paper,” and ending with the UN partition resolution in November 1947. According to Kabha, the public discussion about the Palestinian side’s position regarding the partition plan suffers from broad generalizations. Therefore, in his article, Kabha seeks to present the Palestinian side in all of its complexity, with all the different groups which it included, and the variety of interests and positions which characterized these groups.

Background It is fitting to open the discussion about the Palestinians’ position vis-à vis the idea of dividing the country between the two peoples—a principle which had been agreed upon by numerous committees and international bodies—and

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their reaction to it with the fact that grave concern accompanied the reactions of the Palestinians to the proposals and declarations pertaining to the future of the country ever since the end of the First World War and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Their concern was that this idea would lead to their being disinherited from their homeland and to the expunction of their identity, which they viewed as part of the regional Arab identity. Their resistance to the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate stemmed first and foremost from the concept governing these two documents, which ignored the distinctive identity of the Palestinians and saw the Arabs residing in the country as a mass of different religious groups. It is amazing that several scholars have written things that imply a criticism of the fact that Palestinians objected to the Balfour Declaration.1 One wonders if these writers tried to answer the following question which is so pertinent here: why did the Palestinians need to accept a declaration which did not recognize them as a people; the document openly declares its deep sympathy for the aspirations of another people to found a national home in the country which the Palestinians saw as their home and in which they themselves hoped to found a national-political entity, at first as part of a greater Arab national entity, and later on a specifically Palestinian national entity? The disregard of the Palestinians as a people, Zionism’s treatment of them as a mass of religious communities, and the serious reservations about reaching a compromise with the Zionist movement were the primary causes which stood behind Palestinians’ resistance to the League of Nations Mandate. As is well-known, this document granted Great Britain a mandate which, according to the basic concept of the Mandatory principle, was supposed to lead the people residing in the country to independence. Throughout the Mandate, the British (at least until the White Paper declaration of 1939) gave no indication that they intended to depart from the conception of the Palestinians as a collection of religious communities, and were not even inclined to recognize the political institutions which the Palestinians established in order to represent their national agenda and to act for its implementation.2 Accordingly, one of the three primary Palestinian national demands during this period was to revoke the Mandate, which they saw as a founding document for the Jewish national home on the one hand, and an obstacle inhibiting the attainment of Palestinian independence on the other.3 And indeed, the principle of partition was not mentioned in the Balfour

See for instance this claim in Shaul Arieli and Michael Sfard, The Wall of Folly (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2008) 21 [in Hebrew]. 2 These institutions are: The Arab Executive Committee which was founded in  1920 and operated until 1934; the Arab Higher Committee which was founded in 1936 and operated until 1945; and the Arab Higher Institution which was founded in  1946 and continued to operate until the establishment of the PLO in 1964. 3 Their two other demands were a freeze on Jewish immigration and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. 1

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Declaration or in the Mandate document. It would seem that in these two important documents there was no reference to the right of the Palestinians to national sovereignty either in their homeland, or at least in parts of it. These were also the reasons that brought about the Palestinian rejection of the Peel Commission’s recommendations, which were published at the beginning of July 1937 and which spoke about the partition of the country. While this plan limited the territorial extent of the Jewish national home and recognized the existence of two national communities with rights in the country, it also ignored the Palestinian people and their entitlement to sovereignty, and recommended annexing the Arab parts of the country to Trans-Jordan. In addition to this primary fact, there are three substantive reasons which caused the Palestinians to be disappointed by these recommendations and led their leadership to reject them and to begin a bloody armed revolt which continued until 1939, in which the Palestinians fought without much success against both the British and against the Jewish settlement. The first reason was that the Mandate government appropriated places from the territories which the Peel Commission had allocated to the Arabs, which were considered centers of activity for the Palestinian national movement and some of its symbols, such as the cities Jerusalem, Lod, Ramla and Nazareth. The second reason was that the idea of population transfer which had been proposed in the plan discriminated against the Arabs. Thus, for example, it was suggested that 1,250 Jews residing in territories designated for the Arabs be transferred, compared to the transfer of 300,000 Arabs residing in territories designated for the Jews. This meant uprooting what was at that point almost one third of the Palestinian people from their place of residence. The third reason was that Arab citizens possessed three million dunams—a quarter of the private agricultural land in the territories designated for the Jews, in contrast with 100,000 dunams in Jewish possession in the territories designated for the Arabs. The shapers of Palestinian public opinion at the time for the most part supported the position of the Mufti Haj Amin al-Husayni and of the members of the Arab Higher Committee—a position which rejected the partition plan. Only a small number among the opponents of the Mufti (the faction members of the Al-Nashashibi family) came out openly against the decision to reject the proposal. They expressed their opinion in the written press and came out against armed revolt. They emphasized that the lack of flexibility on the part of the Palestinians, and in particular on the part of the Mufti, was what brought the Peel Commission to make its recommendations. The Palestinian revolt from 1936 to 1939 suffered a terrible defeat and its consequences were catastrophic both with respect to interrelations within Palestinian society and with respect to the balance of power with the Jewish settlement, which had benefited from the results of the British repression of the Arab revolt, and from the exhaustion of the Palestinians’ military power, which had been sparse from the beginning. Consequently the Palestinians

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arrived at the moment of decision in 1948 at the height of their weakness, as opposed to the military power of the Jewish settlement which had increased considerably during the Arab revolt period, and had only grown stronger leading up to 1947–1948. Despite the military failure of the revolt, it did have one important political success to its credit: Britain’s issue of the White Paper. The implementation of the White Paper would have frozen the plans for a Jewish national home and emptied the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate of all meaning. But al-Husayni also rejected this British policy, presented to him on a silver platter, on the grounds that one could not trust the policies of “treacherous Britain.” While this British proposal was not tested in the language of action, a little bit of flexibility, even if only tactical, on the part of Haj Amin would have certainly made things more difficult for both Britain and the leadership of the Jewish settlement, the latter also having bitterly rejected this policy. The context in which the UN partition resolution was adopted and the discourse which took place around it were somewhat different from previous occasions, but the results—in terms of Palestinian interests—were more disastrous. In terms of the international context, the power of the British decreased astonishingly, despite their victory in the Second World War. The reins of world leadership were passed on to new hands—those of the United States and the Soviet Union—which acted according to different considerations. The Jewish settlement in the country and the Jewish people throughout the world were the objects of unprecedented sympathy and identification following the Holocaust which befell the Jewish people during the Second World War. Facing them was the Palestinian leader, Haj Amin  al-Husayni, who in the Second World War bet on the wrong horse when he supported the Axis powers who opposed democracy. He was at his weakest position and had much difficulty shaping moves in the high places of international politics. He had also collected enemies and hostile forces within the Arab world (primarily the Hashemites in Iraq and Jordan), and even within his own people his authority and influence did not return to what they were in the 1920s and 1930s. But his weakness did not prevent him from causing a situation in which no alternative leadership could come into being in the circles of the Palestinian national movement: the Mufti and his camp made sure to place him in every unifying formula of Palestinian forces. The fateful error was that the Mufti, after being elected president of the Arab Higher Institution, continued to conduct himself according to mecha­ nisms which had operated during earlier periods, and failed to recognize the substantial change which had taken place in world and regional politics. Anyone who examines his attitude toward the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry will find that nothing had changed in his approach since the Peel Commission: at first he asked the Palestinians not to cooperate and not to appear before the committee—a fact which no doubt caused tension between him and the committee members—but when he acquiesced and decided nonetheless to cooperate, the tension had already left its mark. It is

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not impossible that these scars hurt the Palestinian image in the eyes of the committee members, and probably even influenced their recommendations. Nonetheless I would like to point out that al-Husayni’s position, rejecting the partition plan, was widely held then in the Palestinian and Pan-Arabic publics, but was not common to everyone. There were groups which publicly expressed support for the report (parts of the National Liberation League and the Palestinian Communist Party), and there were those which supported it, but preferred not to proclaim their views in public (the Al-Nashashibi family). As is natural, within the different groups (of both the opponents and the supporters) there were currents and subgroups. I shall briefly present a breakdown of them here.

The anti-partition camp This camp enjoyed wide support in Palestinian society and was composed of four sub-groups.

The Husayni camp, under Haj Amin This group adhered to the traditional positions developed at the beginning of the 1920s and rejected any compromise regarding Palestinian control of the country. Most of its power came from the rural population, which was likely to suffer the most from the consequences of partition, especially in those areas which were supposed to be included within the boundaries of the Jewish state. They rationalized their resistance with Pan-Arab arguments (“Palestine is a part of one Arab expanse which stretches from the Atlas Mountains in the west to the Persian Gulf in the east”) as well as in terms of local Palestinian patriotism (they made famous the slogan, “Palestine for the Palestinians”). These circles made frequent use of the story of the “Judgment of Solomon” which Haj Amin had used in his testimony before the Peel Commission for the purpose of rejecting the idea of partition. In this well-known story, King Solomon is forced to make a ruling regarding two women who quarrel over a baby. Each one had claimed: the child is mine. When Solomon had ruled that the child be divided in two, the true mother refused. On the other hand the other woman accepted the “solution” because she was more concerned about causing the other woman suffering than she was about the well-being of the child. Jamal al-Husayni, the Mufti’s right-hand man, voiced the camp’s position when he appeared before the UN committee: Arabs have physical ownership of Palestine, today as in the past, and therefore they are obligated both legally and religiously to defend Palestine from any attacker. The Zionist movement, which acts to conquer Palestine,

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and it makes no difference whether this is in religious, humanitarian or political garb, is nothing more than an invader trying to forcefully take control of a country over which it has no ancestral rights, and to impose a tyranny over it. Thus on the one hand we have self-defense and on the other—aggression. The very raison d’etre of the United Nations organization is to take the side of self-defense against aggression.4

The Nationalist Arab Al-Istiklal circles (Al-Qawmiyyun Al-Arab), and the Palestinian branch of the Baath Party It was mostly the forces associated with the intellectual elite in the cities which popularized the Pan-Arab ideology. They viewed Palestine as part of the entire Arab sphere and the cornerstone to its unity. Accordingly they saw in partition a difficult challenge which was likely to prevent the realization of the ideal of Pan-Arab unity. It should be noted that these groups objected to the idea of a particularistic Palestinian nationalism.

Parts of the National Liberation League (Utsbat atTaharrur al-Watani) and a few Communist intellectuals This group objected to the idea of partition because they continued to adhere to the traditional position of the Communist Party and other leftwing bodies, according to which a secular democratic state needed to be founded in the entire Mandate territory.

The Muslim Brothers This group began to establish branches in the country immediately after the end of the Second World War. In the years 1946–1947 the group began to make its voice heard through associations which it established in the cities (mostly in Jaffa and Haifa). These associations organized festivals in religious clubs, to some of which were invited speakers from the mothermovement in Egypt, who frequently attacked the partition plan and any compromise proposal. They based themselves on religious arguments and claimed that all of the holiness of the country was reserved for Muslims and that giving up any part of it would be considered a religious sin.

The pro-partition camp Contrary to what has been written in the texts dealing with the partition plan, this camp did not include a small minority. The feeling that it was a 4

For a summary of Jamal al-Husayni’s statement (29 September 1947) see pp. 251–7.

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minority resulted from the fact that the vast majority of this camp chose not express its positions publicly. This camp included two primary groups.

Most of the Al-Nashashibi Camp, which served as an alternative to the Al-Husayni camp As we have said, this group was inclined to accept the recommendations of the Peel Commission, and objected to the initiation of an armed rebellion. The members of the group even left the Arab Higher Committee because of this. In the final stage of the rebellion they took part in the establishment of groups opposed to the revolt, which helped Britain to repress it. A few of the leaders of this camp, such as Fakhri Nashashibi, paid with their lives for these activities.5 In the discourse surrounding the partition plan they persisted in adhering to their flexible and compromise-oriented positions, supported the partition proposal, and called for the annexation of the Arab areas of Palestine to the territory of the Kingdom of Jordan.

The Communists, and parts of the National Liberation League Much has been written about the conduct of the Communists and the members of the National Liberation League in the matter of the partition plan. After the 1948 war and the catastrophe which befell the Palestinian people following it, the members of the Communist Party made a practice of abusing their opponents—especially those associated with the nationalistoriented movements—for the lack of foresight which they demonstrated in resisting the partition plan. In criticizing the leadership of the central movement under the Mufti they used the well-known metaphor: “The stone which the builders refused became the cornerstone.” Nonetheless it is important to emphasize that this is not the way things were at the outset: at the beginning of the discussions about the proposals of the committee which the UN had appointed to investigate the situation in the country, most of the members of the National Liberation League (NLL) and the Arab Communists rejected the partition plan on the grounds that it contradicted the historical platform of these groups, according to which a secular democratic state would be founded in all the territory of the Mandate. The Al-Ittihad newspaper, the mouthpiece of the NLL in those days, waged a campaign against the partition proposal. The essayists even included people who would later support the resolution, such as Emile Habibi and Tawfik Toubi. Contrary to the accepted wisdom, Al-Ittihad objected to the partition proposal during this period, and still advocated the idea of a bi-national This fact can explain the preference of the people in this camp not to express support for the partition plan in public.

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state. Thus, for example, the following passage appeared in an editorial in the newspaper at the beginning of September 1947: When we find ourselves in this painful situation and the people which has been deceived sees disagreement in high places and remarkable unity in the lower ranks, while staring with amazement at the schism between those who need to lead and those who need to be led, suddenly there appears the international inquiry committee’s recommendation for the partition of Palestine! This people’s stance, among all its institutions and individuals, against the partition of its homeland and the quartering of its members is clear and unwavering. This position alone is the only guarantee that the partition initiative will not succeed, even if the sky should fall to the earth with the purpose of imposing the execution of this recommendation. Our absolute rejection of partition is something about which there is a consensus and no one has the power to go against it, whatever their ability to incite strife. Yet despite the necessity of this consensus regarding the opposition to partition, it is not sufficient to resolve problems or to dispel danger. The relevant question remains: In what ways can its implementation be obstructed?6 The substantial change in the paper occurred following the speech of Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister at the time, at the UN General Assembly where he expressed his country’s support for the proposed partition plan.7 This event divided the National Liberation League (to which Al-Ittihad was subject). From that point onward the voice of the proponents of partition, under the leadership of Habibi and Toubi, was given prominence on the pages of the paper, while those who persisted in their rejection of the proposition plan (Emile Toma and Bulus Farah) lost their primacy in the party. While Toma did return to its ranks after the foundation of the state (when the party was already being called the “Israeli Communist Party”), he refrained from taking important political roles, and made do with cultural matters and with editing the party’s journals.

Conclusion When examining the Palestinian position vis-à-vis the 1947 partition plan, one encounters sweeping generalizations and preconceived notions. These phenomena even progressed over time, from the point that the military struggle between the two peoples was determined in favor of the Jewish

6 7

Al-Ittihad, 6 September 1947. For Andrei Gromyko’s speech see pp. 147–50; also see Chapter 2.

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side in  1948. This outcome was manifested in the establishment of an independent Jewish state in borders more spacious than those allotted to the Jewish state by the UN partition resolution, alongside a grave tragedy for the Palestinian people and their hopes of establishing an independent state, which has not been founded to this day—neither in the partition borders nor in any lesser territory. These generalizations and preconceived notions are for the most part based on the claims that everything that happened to the Palestinians resulted from their resistance to the Zionist movement and to any compromise with it, and that the actions of the Israeli side (including the deviation from the borders of the partition plan during the course of the war and the occupation of more than half of the territory allocated for the Arab state) were for the most part responses to acts of Palestinian aggression. Jewish opinion makers on this subject take pains to divert attention from the significant subjects, while focusing on less important questions and issues. Thus for instance there is discussion on questions such as: who initiated the acts of aggression? Did the Arab civilian population flee or were they pushed out? Was there a written plan for the expulsion or forced evacuation of the Arab population dwelling in the Jewish state? The answers to these questions usually led to clear and unambiguous conclusions: the Arabs began the acts of aggression and therefore got what they deserved; the residents of rural areas fled, despite the fact that the leaders of the Jewish forces asked them, and the village leaders, and the representatives of urban neighborhoods to remain in place; the Israeli forces did not expel or forcefully evacuate Palestinians. These resolute answers are given without dealing with questions such as: even if the Palestinians resisted partition and began the acts of aggression, does this justify the deviation from the partition borders which the Jews had accepted with revelry and dancing in the streets? Supposing that the civilian population did indeed flee from its places of residence, what are the rationales and justifications explaining the refusal to permit their return with the cessation of the battles? Does such a policy not amount to a clear violation of international and moral conventions? The question of the Palestinian position regarding the UN partition plan which was adopted on the 29 November 1947 is not as clear and sharp as it is customary to portray it in most of the historical sources dealing with the issue. In the Palestinian camp there was a variety of views which were not expressed in the ultimate position, which crystallized and was perceived by the international community as an absolute rejection of the partition resolution. The Palestinian people was forced to pay an unbearable price for their acquiescence to the decision of a short-sighted leadership. The terrible tragedy which befell them demolished their hopes to realize their national ambitions and to live in a state where they would enjoy sovereignty and independence like all other nations. The Palestinian people rejected partition, and many blame them, completely and unequivocally, with responsibility for their own sad fate.

C h a p t e r Fo u r

The position of the Arab leadership vis-à-vis the partition plan: The crime and its punishment Nazier Magally

Summary: The following survey presents one of the ways in which one can understand the positions of the two sides—the Jewish and the Arab—regarding the UNSCOP report, from a current Palestinian point of view. At the basis of these statements lies the argument that the Arab Higher Committee’s rejection of the partition plan was a fateful error for the Palestinian people—an error the source of which was that the Arab Higher Committee did not confront the Zionist leadership with a responsible Arab leadership, committed to the interests of Palestinians as a people. The position of the Arabs regarding partition is familiar and well-known. In Israel it is quite common to say that the Arabs fought against the partition plan and refused to accept it. It is standard to claim that this is what the Arab leadership chose, and that that decision led to the war. These statements are correct. That decision was an error and a foolish one. It is true that not all Arabs are willing to admit this, especially not in front of Jews, but it is the truth.

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It might seem that we could end the discussion here, but I would like to try to understand how it came about that a decision of this kind was made. When I was invited to lecture on the positions of “the representatives of the Palestinian public and the Arab states,” I was reminded of a joke about three Arab students—an Egyptian, a Sudanese, and a Syrian—who came to take an examination. On the test paper there was only one question: “What is your opinion about eating meat?” The Egyptian raised his hand and asked: “What is meat?” The Sudanese asked: “What is eating?” Finally the Syrian raised his hand and asked: “What does ‘What is your opinion?’ mean?” It should be admitted that the Palestinian people did not have any representatives or any leadership. On the other hand, the Zionist movement had intelligent and well-educated people who sketched out their plans, discussed in depth each and every subject, and delved into the subjects of water, geography and geology. There was no Palestinian leadership. The Arab Higher Committee was composed of a group of Mukhtars, who were the representatives of a few large families. They were never elected to office in any way, shape or form, and were not representatives of the law. Total chaos prevailed within the Palestinian people. The leadership of the Palestinian Arabs was usually given over to the seven Arab countries with representation in the UN: Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen and Jordan. And the regimes in these countries were also anachronistic—royal or dictatorial. There was no way for the public to express its own opinions. The Arab Higher Committee, contrary to what is usually thought today, did not take upon itself the role of leadership with sufficient seriousness. It did not invest any effort in the study of the Palestinian economy or in its planning. It never examined the territorial question or similar issues. It did not function as the leadership of a country or even like a neighborhood committee. The members of the committee were a decorative leadership (zaamah) and not a representative one. Thus, for instance, when conflict broke out between them and the British they preferred to flee the country. In 1939, after the Arab Revolt, and up until 1946 a large number of people fled and resided outside the country.1 Thus for instance Haj Amin  al-Husayni, the head of the Arab Higher Committee, the personality which so frightened the Jews and whom they tended to present as the leader of the Palestinian people,2 was nothing more than a Mufti, a clergyman representing the al-Husayni family. He was not alone in the leadership role. In 1929 a different family—the al-Nashashi-bis—won the elections for the city of Jerusalem. The elected mayor, al-Nashashibi, was well-known throughout the city and he maintained good relations with all Abd al-Hadi Hashim (ed.), Encyclopaedia Palaestina (Acre: Al-Asuwar, 1986). Zvi Elpeleg, The Grand Mufti Haj Amin  al-Hussaini, Founder of the Palestinian National Movement (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1993); Ilan Pappé, The Nobility of the Land: The Husayni Family—A Political Biography (Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik, 2002) [in Hebrew].

1 2

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the inhabitants of the city, including the Jews. With his election to office he appointed a Jewish assistant mayor.3 Al-Husayni did not wish to recognize al-Nashashibi out of clan jealousy, but he used the appointment of a Jewish assistant mayor in order to undermine the legitimacy of the elected mayor. Following this the British threatened him and he fled. He began to resist the British, and in this way joined with the Germans and arrived at Nazism. He began to organize Bosnian Muslims within the framework of the Nazi army in order to wage war against the British. In effect, for most of the relevant period he was residing abroad. When he returned to the country in 1946—it is still a mystery why the British permitted him to return—he was forced into hiding for a short time, but eventually he took back the leadership within the limits allotted to him by the Arab state leaders and the British.4 This was apparently because the British realized that extreme resistance to partition served their own policy. After he returned to the country and took back the leadership role, he began to conduct an “armed” resistance against the Jewish fighting organizations, out of a sense of revenge. He resided from 1947 to 1948, on and off in Lebanon, Syria and Turkey, and finally settled in Jordan. When the PLO—the Palestinian Liberation Organization, under the leadership of Yasser Arafat—was founded, he objected to it. When fighting broke out between King Hussein and the PLO in what the Palestinians refer to as “Black September” in 1970, al-Husayni did not open his mouth and raised no objections. He dreamed of the possibility of the Palestinians receiving autonomy in the framework of the Kingdom of Jordan.5 To the outside, al-Husayni was a representative figure, but in my opinion the Palestinians could not have seen him this way. The Palestinian people was, then, without representation and without means of expression, and did not know what was happening around it. The vast majority of the people (80 per cent) did not know how to read or write. There was no television or radio. At most there was a radio only in the city coffee shop. In villages there was no such thing—not even newspapers. Only very few Palestinian intellectuals—those who got together in professional associations or in political parties (there were not many political parties; the Communist Party was the main one)—regarded the conflict from a completely different point of view. This group was not made up exclusively of opponents to the partition plan.6 For the complexity of the relations between the al-Husayni and al-Nashashibi families, see also Chapter 3. 4 For the Jewish leadership’s stance vis-à-vis the leadership of Haj Amin  al-Husayni, see Moshe Shertok’s speech (25 March 1946) before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry below, pp. 122–43. 5 Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf), Without a Homeland: Conversations with Arik Rulu (Haifa: Mifras, 1983) [in Hebrew]. 6 For a breakdown of the positions of groups in the Palestinian public, see also Mustafa Kabha’s chapter in this part of the book. 3

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The Communists for the most part followed the Soviet Union, and when the latter supported the partition plan, they did also. But this was not only a manifestation of dependence on the Soviet Union—rather they adopted the partition plan as an expression of self-determination for the two peoples. Advertisements in support of the partition plan which were published by the Communists referred in the most explicit way to Israel as a Jewish state giving expression to the self-determination of the Jewish people, and to the Arab Palestinian state as an expression of the national ambitions of the Arab Palestinian people.7 The Palestinian intellectuals were more knowledgeable and had connections with international movements and bodies. They understood the situation and analyzed it beyond the significance of the partition plan. They had a progressive agenda which included the struggle against fascism, and not just Nazism, although the struggle against Nazism was of course more urgent. They discussed these subjects and held a few meetings. The most well-known and famous was held in Ashkelon (Majdal), and its agenda included the struggle against Nazism. They spoke about Nazism and its crimes against the Jews and other peoples as well.8 This was during the Second World War, and as we have said they dealt not only with matters pertaining to Jews and with the Jewish question but with the problems of all the other nations as well.9 In light of this description, if it had been possible for Palestinian Arabs to establish a true leadership, it is difficult to know what they would have decided regarding partition. It is possible that even then they would have decided against it, but this would have been at least the result of level-headed thinking and based on an understanding of Arab-Palestinian interests. But in the situation which had been created at that point there was no one to think in these terms and there was no one who would read the map—neither the map of the past, nor the present, nor the future. Regarding leadership, the Arab world was not in a better situation than that of the Palestinian people. It should also be noted that the entire Arab world, apart from what was then Syria, was under complete British control. The Jordanian Arab Legion, the one that started the war (it attacked Jerusalem), was under the command of the British general Glubb Pasha, who continued to command the Jordanian army until 1956. This means that additional players were

7 See the memorandum of the “Communist Union in Eretz Yisrael” which was sent to UNSCOP, June 1947, below, p. 157. 8 Criticisms against Anti-Semitism in general and Nazism in particular on the part of Arab leaders can be found in the testimonies of Emil Ghoury (25 March 1946) and Albert Hourani (25 March 1946) before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. See below, pp. 96–101 and 102–21 respectively. 9 Meir Wilner (ed.), 60 Years of the Israeli Communist Party (Tel Aviv: Maki, 1980) [in Hebrew].

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involved as well. Everyone possessed the power to decide, apart from the Palestinian people. The Arab states acted according to their own interests. There was no one who would think about a Palestinian state, about Palestinian independence or about the Palestinian people. In Egypt, King Farouk the First was subject to the absolute control of the British and fought, for the sake of appearances, against the establishment of the Jewish state. The Iraqis (in the geographic terms of today), who were under British control, also acted in this way.10 In order to better understand the Arab resistance to the partition plan in practical terms, it is helpful to learn the history and to check what actually happened. Incidentally, most of the sources on which I rely are in Hebrew. The Arabs’ first shot against the partition plan was fired on November 30—that is, one day after the adoption of the partition resolution in the UN. The action targeted an Egged bus with the license number 2094, which was on its way to Jerusalem from the center of the country. Three to five Arabs captured the bus and threw a grenade inside, which then exploded. Afterwards they began to fire on the terrified passengers who fled for their lives.11 Who were the people who carried out this deed? The leader of the group was Seif al-Din Abu Kishk. Abu Kishk was an Egyptian Bedouin tribe (Ashi-ra), which had reached Palestine at the beginning of the century and settled in the center of the country, where Ramat HaSharon is located today. He was the leader of a Bedouin gang which wanted to control the entire area. In 1929 Abu Kishk attacked a few Jews, as was the manner of such gangs. He was caught and fined a large sum. In order to raise the money he sold 4,197 dunams, out of 20,000 dunams owned by the tribe, to the Palestine Land Development Corporation, whose representative was Yehoshua Hankin. Following the transaction there was a sulkhah (formal reconciliation), but Abu Kishk was left feeling as if he had been “set up”. A Bedouin who has been “screwed over” will seek revenge even after forty years. This is how he explained the action he committed on November 30.12 The day after the event, the people of Abu Kishk met with the Jews. The two sides made a sulkhah and the Bedouins promised not to act against the Jews and not to cooperate with the Arabs when they would invade Eretz Yisrael. Incidentally, it was the members of the Irgun who violated the For documents reflecting some of the positions of the Arab states regarding the question of Palestine, see the Syrian representative’s speech in the United Nations General Assembly (22 September 1947), below p. 247; the Lebanese representative’s speech in the General Assembly (26 November 1947), below p. 277; and Golda Meyerson’s report about her conversations with King Abdullah (12 May 1948), below pp. 307–9. 11 Uri Milstein, “The Brink of the Independence War,” in History of Israel’s War of Independence: The First Month (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1989), pp. 9–28 [in Hebrew]; Wikipedia, Abu Kishk, http://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%90%D7%91%D7%95_%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%A9 %D7%A7 [in Hebrew]. 12 Ibid. 10

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agreement when, in March 1948, they kidnapped five of the leaders of this tribe. Nonetheless they did not fight, and in April all the members of the tribe fled because the Irgun continued to threaten them. And so, in what I have said here I do not seek to justify the Palestinian leadership, and I have already stated that they acted foolishly. Their error was not their improper attitude toward the Jews, but rather the inability of the Palestinian leadership and the general Arab leadership to express a responsible position vis-à-vis the Palestinian people. Leaders are measured according to the test of results, and in this case the results were awful: the Palestinian people is still licking the wounds of the Nakba which has lasted sixty-five years. There is no doubt that this is a case of an error, but one must not ignore the mitigating circumstances in which it was made. I should mention once again the other forces which were at work on the ground: the British. All of the Arab peoples of the time thought that the British had betrayed them, because the Arab leadership treated them as allies, but this alliance led to the Nakba. Some of them also believed that the British were stirring up the relations between the Jews and the Arabs. For this reason, for instance, Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, after whom the military wing of Hamas is named today, began his war against the British. This was also the claim of the Arab Communists throughout. The Al-Ittihad newspaper wrote at the time on several occasions that the British had stirred up problems between the Jews and the Arabs. It is my impression that all the countries of the world did not believe that it was their responsibility to assist the Arabs in understanding the perspective of the Jews. The Jewish leadership also share some responsibility for this. Everyone spoke about “the Jewish question” as if it was self-evident. But the Arabs did not know anything about it. How could they have known? From what source? At that time there were no media, electronic or otherwise. The Bedouin could not even read newspapers. Moreover, in my opinion, even today the Jewish leadership does not do enough so that the Arabs will understand the true problem of the Jews. I am referring to two thousand years of suffering and persecution throughout the world, which reached their height during the Nazi period, when a plan for genocide was developed which led to the murder of six million Jews. People do not know this and do not understand it. The Jews do not do enough so that we would know about it. I speak from personal experience. I went to my Jewish friends and asked them: “Explain to me what happened to you? What is it with you? What is this Jewish question?” In this way I began to learn and to understand that there is a real problem here. Thus, for instance, Jamal al-Husayni, the representative of the Higher Committee, appeared before some of the United Nations committees (at times we did not appear at all because we had boycotted the committee), and claimed that the Ashkenazim should not remain in Palestine, but the Jewish-Arabs could. He was referring to

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the Jewish residents of Palestine who arrived in Eretz Yisrael until 1922, before the British Mandate. For all the Jews who had arrived subsequently he recommended deportation.13 Nonetheless, many Arabs would certainly have been willing to continue living with the Jews de facto. If one were to take a survey of the Arab residents of Tiberias and ask them if they were willing to live with Jews, I am convinced that they would answer in the affirmative. The relations between the Jews and the Arabs in Tiberias were excellent. This was also the case in Haifa and in additional cities. There were good neighborly relations in numerous places, outside the mixed cities as well. That was one of the reasons why many Arabs chose to remain here. There were connections of brotherhood and friendship. I should emphasize once again: I do not wish to justify the Arab position. The Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular know that they made a mistake. They regret their error and gave this the most appropriate and authentic expression in 1988, when the National Council of the PLO met in Algeria and declared not only their adoption of the partition plan, but also the adoption of the “two states for two peoples” solution, within the borders of 1967. The decision made in 1988 was not only recognition of an error, but also a courageous decision to take part of the responsibility for the outcome of the error. The Palestinians knew that the partition plan had been based on the 1947 borders, but on their own initiative they compromised with the 1967 borders—not only because they had read the map of the world, but because they realized that the Palestinian people needed to pay part of the price of defeat in the war. The Palestinian people paid a dear price: a Palestinian diaspora was created, there arose the problem of the refugees, and many fell in the different military confrontations. Accordingly, when they adopted the 1988 resolution, the Palestinian people entered a different path, in which they are learning at least some of the lessons of the past. The question which remains is: has everyone learned these lessons?

For a summary of the speech of Jamal al-Husayni (the representative of the Higher Arab Committee) before the ad hoc committee, 29 September 1949, see below pp. 251–8.

13

Chapter five

The November 29th resolution: Then and now Ruth Gavison

Summary: This essay presents the vision of the Metzilah Center by sketching the connection between the meanings and accomplishments of the November 29th resolution on the one hand and the rationale of founding the center at this present time on the other. The November 29th resolution was made possible, among other things, by the impression made on its supporters concerning the power of the Zionist idea to bring about a living and thriving reality in Eretz Yisrael, and the fervent belief of the Zionists in the justness of their moral cause. Against this background, Gavison describes the erosion in dealing with the ideological justification of Zionism and Jewish self-determination since the foundation of the state, and the growing schisms regarding the use of the state’s power, internally and externally, which have led to misgivings and undermined the faith in the justness of this path. The Metzilah Center believes that Zionism is still important, and that self-determination for the Jewish people in part of their historical homeland is still justified. The Center believes, however, that there is an urgent need for a revival of the discussion about Zionism, Jewish identity and those central issues which are the subject of controversy, and for

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providing a forum for a lively and productive discourse which will shed light on the ways in which Jewish and Zionist values meld, and should meld, with humanist and liberal ways of thinking. For this purpose it is important to distinguish between the institutions of the state, which are committed to all of its citizens, and the institutions of the Jewish people and Jewish civil society, whose continued belief in Jewish self-determination is essential to the prosperity of Israel and to the clarification of its relations with the Diaspora.

Preface We celebrate this evening the launching of the Metzilah Center, whose Hebrew acronym is an expression of its vision: it is devoted to thought, characterized by four different adjectives: Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanist. The meaning of each of these adjectives is deeply contested, and each has many interpretations. The relations between these adjectives are also very complex. Indeed, some claim that not one of these pairs admits of peaceful coexistence: Zionism cannot be liberal, and particularistic Judaism cannot be humanist or universal. Similarly, others argue that the state of Israel cannot be both Jewish and democratic. The Metzilah Center stands for the statement that these adjectives are compatible, and that the State of Israel and the Jewish people should aspire to their coexistence, and act in a way to bring it about. Moreover, the Center posits that the combination of these elements is part of the Jewish tradition itself. And most importantly—the Metzilah Center seeks to emphasize these principles and demonstrate them especially against the backdrop of the suspicion which continually increases today that an integration between particularistic and universal perspectives in Israel, Judaism, and Zionism is impossible. I shall analyze the relevance of the November 29th resolution for us, not as an examination of the history of the conflict between the Jewish national movement and the Arab one, but rather from a different angle. My discussion will be divided into three parts. In the first part I will speak about the characteristics of the November 29th resolution from the point of view of the Zionist movement and the Jewish people. I shall claim that the November 29th resolution was a fantastic achievement for the Jewish people, which marked the end of an extraordinary process. It shows the Zionist

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movement at its best, and underscores the latter’s profound connection to the problems of the Jewish people. In the second section, I shall address the implications of the founding of the state. As a result of the November 29th resolution, both the declaration of the establishment of the state and the actual establishment of the state became possible. It is important to remember that at the time of the resolution itself there still was no state. From the foundation of the state until today, over sixty years of repeated upheavals have passed. Today, when we look at this enterprise, we face numerous questions. We should remember that the partition resolution sent thousands of Jews, whose greatest hope was for the foundation of a state, out to dance in the streets. Which events have taken place since then, that cause us today to question the strength and justification of the state? In the third section I shall say a few words about Zionism today and describe the reasons that led us to found the Metzilah Center.

Existential problems and Zionism’s response to them up to 29 November and the establishment of the state The basic claim of the Zionist movement was that it was essential to find a solution to the unique problem of a people that had survived without a homeland for two thousand years, and that was forced over the course of so many years to deal with two sorts of challenges: first—persecution, expulsion, discrimination, exclusion and genocide, which had caused its deficient existence, and caused a degree of detachment and disconnection from any contact with the land they inhibited; second—continual pressures to assimilate, to integrate within the society in which they lived, and to conversion and loss of identity. These challenges always existed in different forms, and became very pronounced during the modern period of enlightenment and secularization. During this time some of the Jews believed that they could be accepted as full members of the societies in which they lived, if they would take on the culture of the place of their birth or residence. They were, however, confronted with the realization that anti-Semitism had perhaps changed its face, but had not vanished. While Emancipation had granted them a certain equality of rights, it had not enabled them to become part of the people among whom they lived, even if they were willing to give up a part of their unique Jewish identity. The threats to the Jews, which had generated the Zionist movement, were complex: they challenged Jewish identity, culture and physical existence. In

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the modern period a new challenge was added for those Jews who ceased to be religious, but wished to both remain Jews and to integrate into the society in which they lived. Very quickly they discovered that society rejected them, and thus “forced” them to be Jews, almost against their will. They discovered, like Jean Améry, that they were Jews both by choice and by necessity. This is the problem which it was customary to refer to as “the Jewish question.” Zionism was not the only solution to this problem, but it was an important one—original, bold and authentic. It fitted in with the nationalist awakening in Europe at the time. The Zionist enterprise, in the eyes of those who were a party to it, was therefore very exciting. It had some impressive accomplishments to its credit, which were a central component, essential to the adoption of the November 29th resolution, which led to the foundation of the state. Thus, in the reasons given for the majority recommendation in the report of the special committee, which had been established in order to examine the question of the end of the British Mandate, and whose basic recommendation had been embraced in the November 29th resolution, we see not only a recognition of the moral justification for the fact that the Jews needed a country, but we also see the impression made by, and the admiration for, what the Jews had succeeded in doing in Eretz Yisrael since the beginning of the Zionist enterprise. It is important to remember: Zionism was not only a political lobbying project. It was accompanied by slow and resolute settlement activity, extensive cultural creativity, and a penetrating ideological reflection on the interrelations between religion, nationalism and culture within the Jewish people. An important part of the Zionist enterprise, as it came into being, included an impressive confrontation with questions such as: what makes the Jewish people unique and what makes Jews one people, even though the Jewish people includes communities that possess different approaches to religion and tradition? How can an educated Jewish person reconcile his or her desire to be Jewish with the desire to be a member of the global community? How can one describe a tradition which simultaneously includes within it statements such as “beloved is the person, who was created in the divine image” but also those which emphasize that a Jew must preserve his separate identity, through separateness among other things? The great achievement of the Zionist enterprise, up to the establishment of the state, was its success over the course of about fifty years, with many ups and downs and with much persistence and determination, to achieve so many things even without relying on the power of a state. This ability stemmed from intense thought, from dialogue, from compromise, from devotion to the cause, from organization, from the formulation of ideas, from political initiative, from spiritual, ideological and educational activity, from the construction of an economic, scientific and industrial foundation, and from the establishment of institutions in Eretz Yisrael and abroad. The translation of the Zionist idea of a Jewish state into the establishment of a

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Jewish settlement, in Eretz Yisrael and abroad, which supports the Zionist enterprise from within and without, was the most impressive achievement of the Zionist movement.1 It is important to stress that the November 29th resolution was adopted because the international community was convinced that the Jews also deserved a state: a place in which they would not live under foreign rule or be subjected to its mercy or its decision to either defend them or to persecute them; a place where they would not be a minority and not have to be Jews in private but Frenchmen, Englishmen or Germans in the public sphere; a place in which they could be Jews both inside and outside their homes. This was a main vision of the Zionist dream. These claims were strong enough not only to convince many Jews, but many non-Jews as well. As we have said, the November 29th resolution was made possible on the one hand by virtue of the belief in the justness of this idea, and on the other hand by virtue of the intensive Zionist activity in the country, which included settlement, the revival of the Hebrew language and of cultural activity, the establishment of systems of education and medicine, the construction of Tel Aviv, and the development of a flourishing industry. As we have mentioned, the partition resolution spoke about two states operating within an economic union.2 Economic unity was necessary, because the Jewish state was supposed to have subsidized the Arab state, since at the end of the Mandate period the Jewish third of the population controlled more than two thirds of the Gross National Product (GNP). It was clear that the Jewish state would have to share resources with the Arab state in order to preserve for it the level of social services achieved in Palestine/Eretz Yisrael during the Mandate period. It is important to emphasize that part of the amazing power of the Zionist enterprise, including the cultural renewal, was based not only on the hope that Eretz Yisrael would become a “national home” for the Jews, but also on the depth of the historical, cultural and, for some of the people, religious connection to the land and to the Bible. Because of this there was no doubt—among either Jews or non-Jews—that this collective, that was conducting a project of national rebirth in Eretz Yisrael, that also included a vision of a just society and of human renewal, of different new forms of settlement, of communalism and of Jewish creativity, was the Jewish people as a whole, and not just those Jews who happened to be living in Zion. We should also mention that the national and cultural awakening On the accomplishments of the Zionist movement, spiritual and material, see Martin Buber’s speech before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on the one hand (p. 93), and that of Eliezer Kaplan before UNSCOP on the other (p. 184), in the sources part of this book. 2 See additional details about the economic unity proposal in the UNSCOP report. See also the Zionist leadership’s treatment of the economic unity proposal in Kaplan’s speech (see footnote 1) and in that of A. H. Silver (p. 262), in the sources part of this book. 1

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included important demonstrations of religious awakening, and alongside it an awakening of various forms of non-halachic (or orthodox) Jewish culture. This was manifested, for instance, in the creation of new Haggadas for Passover (i.e. stories of Exodus), and in the development of aspects of Jewish civilization not monopolized by religion. Thus, the Zionist enterprise included attention, revival and analysis of Judaism in all its cultural forms, and not only of the political aspirations of Jewish nationalism. Zionism reflected a movement of the Jewish people, characterized by affinity to the ancient Hebrew culture and by a connection to the land, which were part of the heritage and the identity of all Jews, regardless of whether or not they were religious. They came to their ancient homeland because they wished to preserve their Judaism, even if their form of Judaism was different from that Jewish-religious identity that defined the Jewish people throughout most of its history and exile.3 All of these impressive achievements were already evident on the 29th of November, even before the establishment of the Jewish state, and it was this activity that prepared the ground for the adoption of the resolution. However, up until November 29th, the Jews and their institutions in Eretz Yisrael enjoyed the advantages of autonomy without the obligations of a state. They fulfilled a large portion of the usual functions of a state, but for the most part only with respect to the Jewish Yishuv. And so, when the UN committee proposed transition arrangements between the end of the Mandate and the establishment of the two states, the responsibility for matters of immigration, for instance, was assigned to the Jewish Agency, and not to the Mandatory authorities or to the institutions of the international committee. The Jewish institutions were very efficient in addressing the interests of the Yishuv, and established an extraordinary infrastructure of education, higher education, health and labor. They also significantly improved the quality of life for the non-Jewish inhabitants. The Jewish institutions were required, of course, to act in accordance with the law of the British Mandate, and also dealt with lobbying the Mandate authorities to address their needs and to facilitate their efforts of building of institutions. Jews also took part in the judiciary, police and civil service. Nonetheless, direct responsibility for the welfare of Arab residents was not placed on the Jews, nor was the obligation for maintaining public order. These roles were given to the Arab leaders and to the Mandate authorities respectively.

Ben-Gurion’s testimony before UNSCOP on 4 July 1947 (p. 161) is instructive regarding the national, cultural and religious connection between the Jewish people and its land. Likewise one can learn about this connection from a religious-Zionist perspective from the testimonies of Rabbi Yehudah ha-Cohen Leib Fischmann of Ha-Mizrachi (p. 179) and Rabbi Yizhak Meir Levin of Agudath Yisrael (p. 188).

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The characteristics of Zionism after the establishment of the state This reality was the backdrop for the partition resolution. In actuality, of course, Resolution 181, the partition resolution, was implemented only in part. The Jewish institutions of the state-to-be, and afterwards the institutions of the state, satisfied the requirements set by the United Nations as the initial conditions for receiving independence which were: a declaration of the establishment of the state, a commitment to democracy, an intention to enact a constitution, and a commitment to protect basic rights for minorities. A bitter argument erupted when Israel asked to be accepted as a member of the UN. Claims regarding borders and refugees were hurled at Israel, but despite the objections of the Arabs, Israel was accepted as a member of the United Nations on 11 May 1949. The Zionist dream—the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz Yisrael—had come true. The Palestinians, on the other hand, did not receive a state. The territory which had been intended for an Arab state in Mandatory Palestine was in part occupied by Israel, in part annexed by Jordan (“the West Bank”), or occupied and administrated by Egypt (the Gaza Strip). Does there remain any reason or justification for Zionism after the establishment of the state? There are those, Jews and non-Jews alike, who claim that with the realization of the goal of the foundation of the Jewish state, which gives control to the Jews and enables them to preserve their separate identity, Zionism has, or in any event should have, finished its role as an active national force. Some of them go so far as to claim that the state can—or even must—cease to be a state which is the realization of Zionism, and become a state “of all its citizens.” Given the background of the discussions and general situation before the November 29th resolution and the foundation of the state, these claims are astounding: should the state, which was defined as a Jewish state by the UN resolution, and which was supposed to come into being alongside an Arab state in order to enable each of the two peoples continuous control with respect to immigration, security and culture in their respective states, lay down its unique character and purpose with the accomplishment of the very goal for which it was founded?! The move may be less surprising if we recall that these attitudes did not immediately awaken among the Jews who supported Zionism and the establishment of the state. The transition from support for Zionism and willingness to take part in the Zionist struggle—militarily, economically, in terms of settlement and culturally—for the state and its Jewishness, to a willingness on the part of some of the public to give up the state’s specific national character, was not immediate. These feelings only began to develop and spread a few years after the foundation of the state. This is because in the first years after its establishment it was clear that the struggle for the

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existence of the state had not come to an end. The belief in the justness of the case also did not wither. One of the reasons for the preservation of near consensus, despite serious and fundamental differences of opinion, was that the Jewish leadership of that initial period—unlike today—made a strategy of avoiding public and clear resolution of ideological issues, which were likely to be divisive. I will use two central and highly controversial questions to illustrate this point. The first is connected to the intra-Jewish debates regarding the meaning of the state’s Jewish identity, and the second—to the intra-Jewish as well as to the Jewish-Arab aspects of that same essential question. The first example: as we have said, the Zionist movement was based on the historical connection between the Jewish people and Eretz Yisrael. But a large part of the leaders of the movement were not religious and some of them were even anti-clerical. The declaration of independence makes mention of this historical connection, and the religious political bloc very much wanted the word Elohim (God) to appear in the document. The anti-clerical faction objected. The well-known compromise was the phrase “placing our trust in the ‘Rock of Israel’.” This wording made it possible to avoid explicit mention of faith in God as a foundation for the establishment of the state, and at the same time to emphasize the profound historical connection of the state which had been founded to the long history of the Jewish people.4 The second example of the judicious avoidance of making unnecessary decisions was the fact that the State of Israel refrained from enacting a constitution. This avoidance stemmed, among other things, from the understanding that it would not be possible to reach a wide consensus on at least two questions: issues of religion and state, and the status of the state’s non-Jewish citizens and residents. The clear wish to avoid these issues is powerfully reflected by Eri Jabotinsky’s attempt, during a debate about the constitution, to raise the question of the status of Arabs in a state defined as Jewish. In reaction to this, it was not only Mapai which silenced him. Even his own faction, Herut, declared that it was not party to the question which he had raised. That is to say, the policy of the Jewish-Zionist leadership of the time was to make practical decisions and implement them without laying out presuppositions or making high-visibility binding constitutional pronouncements. There was then a clear reluctance to make binding declarations regarding the meaning of the state’s Jewishness. This reluctance, and the vagueness which it made possible, were acceptable because there was a clear consensus within the Jewish public and among the decision makers that the Jewishness of the state was connected to the Jewish nationality and not to the Jewish religion (the contraposition in the UN discussions was to an Arab state and not to a Muslim state). Jewish history, the context of the

4

See the text of The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel on p. 311.

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November 29th resolution, and the opening proclamation of the declaration of the establishment of the state communicated unequivocally that Jewish self-determination was a very important aspect of the state’s identity and purpose. Hence, despite the absence of a constitutional clarification of the issues, it was clear that the state which was established was neither a Jewish theocracy nor a neutral democracy, nor a “state of all its citizens.” It was a state which was intended to permit the Jews a national and cultural rebirth and control over their own destiny in a part of their historical homeland. Today, debates about these subjects contribute to the declining faith in the justness of Zionism and the right of Israel to continue to be a state in which the Jewish people realizes its right to self-determination. The state did in fact supply the Zionist movement with the means to realize an important part of its goals. Not surprisingly, a large portion of the Jewish national energies were immediately channeled toward the state, its reinforcement and its defense. This is not merely because there were many pressing challenges, but rather it was done as a matter of principle. Ben-Gurion set the ideal of “mamlachtiyut” (statism—i.e. state interests above party interests), and he took important steps—some of which were controversial among his political supporters—in order to minimize the factional or sectorial tensions of Jewish society. This statism and the desire not to be divisive were based on the understanding that the Zionist enterprise was not strong, its existence was not guaranteed, and the partners in this endeavor—within the country and abroad—would have to join hands against the existential challenges facing the young country. Such was the case regarding military defense against the Arab nations, who refused to accept the partition resolution and the founding of the Jewish state. Such was the case with the coordination of Aliyah and the absorption of immigrants. Such was the case, subsequently, with “the conquest of the desert” and the settlement of olim (immigrants), some of whom arrived in Israel in complete destitution. Indeed, Ben-Gurion’s focus on joining forces by doing rather than by entertaining divisive ideological debates facilitated a unified activity on all these fronts. In the first years of the country, the Zionist enterprise was still naive in many ways. The harsh descriptions that one hears at times that this was a colonial enterprise which deliberately dispossessed the local population are simply not adequate. It did make use of military force in order to sustain itself, and hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were indeed uprooted and made into refugees, who were not permitted to return to their homes even after the battles had subsided, and some of their lands were taken by means of controversial legal instruments such as the Law of Absentee Properties. But despite all this, this use of force seemed on the whole justified at the time. It was perceived as a use of force essential for the realization of a right recognized not only by the Jewish Zionists themselves, but also by the international community. The war was perceived as a matter of life and death and as a just war, and the measures which were taken—even if they

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were harsh—were perceived as necessary. The general attitude was that the Palestinians, who had sought by means of force to settle the matter to their own advantage and prevent the establishment of the State of Israel, could not complain if—in light of the fact that they had lost—they had sustained grave injuries. Jews would have suffered no less had the Arabs won. These consequences, so it was claimed, were not a necessary or planned part of the Zionist strategy, and perhaps would never have happened without the war. This perception also did not change immediately after 1967. The occupation of large territories was perceived as a victory in a war of existential defense. As time elapsed, however, the sustained occupation and especially the extensive settlement enterprise in the territories which had been occupied raised a profound debate—political and moral—even within the Israeli public, regarding the justification of the Jewish national movement and the justification of using military force to defend “Greater Israel” and the settlement enterprise. This important internal debate among Jews should not lead us to forget, however, that the Arab rejection of the Jewish state started with the Zionist enterprise itself. It did not begin with the Six Day War or with the occupation that followed it. The resistance to the existence and goals of the Zionist enterprise, and the use of force against the Jews in order to expel them from the country or to prevent the establishment of their state, were perceived as a legitimate way for the Arabs to defend their soil and their homeland. The use of force by the Jews to defend themselves and their towns was perceived by many Arabs as a use of violence to make the theft permanent. In other words, when we (i.e. Jewish Israelis) were given a state, we at times harnessed it—and its essential claim to a monopoly on the justified use of force within it—to processes which later became controversial within the Israeli public or even within the Jewish public in Israel. These processes raised questions both with respect to the justification for the specific use of force by the state and with respect to the justification for the Zionist enterprise in general (one should remember that even before the establishment of the state there were attempts to solve internal disputes within the Yishuv by means of force, only this force was not that of a state, but rather communal, organizational or sectorial). Thus tacit consensus turned into an open debate regarding the justification for Jewish settlement in the territories which were occupied in the 1967 war. This is also what occurred in the internal Jewish debate concerning the nature of Judaism—Judaism as a religion, Judaism as a nationality, or a combination—and the legitimacy of different streams within Judaism. What should be an ongoing, natural and fruitful debate between Jews turned at times into an imprudent use of the power of the state, in an attempt to dictate through law a particular position in that debate. Such a victory could not be obtained, of course. But the use of state power to promote the view of this or that side hurt the unity and the feeling of a shared destiny among Jews in and outside Israel.

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Thus debates over both these issues started to generate a general doubt about the state and its roles in advancing legitimate goals. The Orthodox monopoly on marriage and divorce is increasingly perceived as religious coercion and as a misinterpretation of the Jewishness of the state. Similarly, the view of the state as permitting sustained occupation and Jewish settlement in the territories which had been occupied after the 1967 war became divisive as well. In the eyes of part of the public this was seen as if the Jewish state was ignoring the fact that there are two peoples here, both of whom have rights. These numerous and profound disagreements, together with the consistent and increasing objection of the Palestinians and of parts of the international community, undermined somewhat the confidence of people in Israel and abroad in both the strength and legitimacy of the Jewish state. In addition to these divisive disagreements, the Zionist movement became, in a certain sense, a victim of its own success and of the Jewish state itself. In many respects the Jewish state has fulfilled all that was expected of it: it has a Jewish majority; a Hebrew army defends the state and its population; there is a Hebrew public culture; Hebrew is an official language; the calendar is Hebrew and Jewish; the reigning historical narrative is Jewish; cultural activity takes place for the most part in Hebrew. All of this takes place in a state which is economically developed, is thriving, and is technologically and scientifically advanced. These accomplishments on the part of Israel are a great victory for Zionism and the state. Jewish youngsters who were born here or who immigrated take them for granted. Consequently, the cultural, ideological and moral activity which accompanied the Zionist enterprise from the outset up to the establishment of the state appears today to be less critical and necessary. As we have seen, a portion of the Jewish cultural effort was diverted to the state itself. However, the feeling that such cultural and ideological work was urgent and necessary has also weakened. Many think that after the state was founded Israeli Jews no longer need to be concerned about our Jewish identity, because we live in the only state in the world where the public culture is Jewish and Hebrew. According to this way of thinking, the state will, through public culture and public education, make it possible for us to preserve our cultural Jewish identity and pass it on to our children, without having to make any personal effort. We are not concerned about assimilation to a foreign and dominant public culture, since Israel is our home, and the dominant culture is our own. And indeed, Israel is undergoing an impressive rebirth of Jewish cultural creativity of every kind, religious and non-religious alike. We have been blessed with a Hebrew literature that is of a level far higher than I had ever hoped for. Yet despite this, and perhaps precisely because of this, the Jewish identity—in particular that of secular Jews in Israel—has been weakened because there is no feeling of a need to nurture or develop it. Jews in Israel no longer feel the need to have a dialogue with the forms of Judaism different from their own within the country or abroad. They

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feel that they are conducting a full existence which is totally self-sufficient. The State of Israel created Israeli-ness not only as citizenship, but also as a kind of cultural identity. And indeed, cultural Israeli-ness is an important feat and it is one of the achievements of establishing the State of Israel. Israeli cultural identity is different from Israeli citizenship. The latter is an important and highly significant matter, which is common to all the citizens of the State of Israel, regardless of their cultural identity. Equal citizenship is infinitely important, because in a democracy all the citizens, and only the citizens, elect the national institutions. These institutions, in their turn, are responsible for making the most fundamental decisions of the state. Recognition of equal citizenship for all, irrespective of religion or ethnic origin, is a basic obligation of the state. Nonetheless it must also respect the fact that some of its citizens and residents have a separate cultural identity, and permit the minority—especially if it is a native group—to preserve its separate identity and to pass it on. Israeli-ness as a culture is an important part of the construction of a person’s membership in the Israeli community. However, it is a thin and weak culture compared to affiliation with Jewish culture and the Jewish people. Israeli citizenship is exactly sixty-five years old, because it is based on a legal connection which originated with the establishment of the state. Israeli-ness as a cultural form may date back to the beginning of the Jewish Yishuv in Eretz Yisrael at the end of the nineteenth century. But a sixty-five-year-old culture, and even a hundred-and-twenty-year-old culture, is of necessity an elementary and sparse one. More importantly: the Jews who came as members of the ancient Jewish people, who came to Eretz Yisrael in order to preserve their connection to their own past, in order to strengthen their present and in order to make possible a long future in their historical homeland, cannot afford to let their culture be only “Israeli.” To summarize this section I should say that for the Jews the establishment of the state created a new responsibility, and with it the potential for achievements but also for challenges. The Jewish state is no longer responsible only for the welfare of the Jews. It must make use of its power for the sake of all of its citizens. This is a responsibility. Moreover, as for all states, while the state needs effective power to fulfill many important state functions, all such power may also be abused, and thus requires to be checked. The State of Israel has indeed made very positive uses of its power, but it has not always successfully avoided abusing it. At times we fail to take into account the people, both Jews and non-Jews alike, who pay the price for our endeavors. The state has also led some of us to abandon the humility which we need as we confront the complexity—the depth, length and breadth— of the mosaic of Jewish identities. The state has also allowed some of the abilities and qualities which are necessary to ensure the long-term existence of the Jewish people in Israel and in  all of its diaspora communities to atrophy.

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The Jewish state is a great achievement for the Jewish people. The existence of Israel as a nation-state for Jews is not guaranteed. The Zionist movement made its foundation possible. Today, anyone who desires the well-being of the Jewish people and its continued existence needs to consider how the state assists in realizing these goals, and thus to re-examine one’s relations with the Jewish people, with Zionism and with the state of Israel.

Why the Metzilah Center? Seemingly, the establishment of the state left the continuation of Jewish and Zionist action and thinking in the most secure framework which these had ever enjoyed: the Jewish-Zionist community, living in political independence in part of its historical homeland. But as we have seen, while the establishment of the state has granted Judaism and the Jews enormous and unique advantages, it has also brought with it cultural weaknesses, as well as imposing on the state the task of promoting the welfare of the entirety of its residents and citizens. Let us consider, for example, the status of the national institutions of the Jewish people. At the time of the struggle for the establishment of the state it was only natural that a variety of Jewish bodies would commit their energies to the success of the Zionist enterprise. As we have seen, important functions for the Jewish Yishuv in Eretz Yisrael were filled, even from the point of view of the Mandatory government and the United Nations, by institutions such as the Jewish Agency. The role of these institutions was to assist in the national struggle. But since the foundation of the state this situation has changed. The State of Israel, even if it is the nation-state of the Jewish people, is not permitted to promote only the interests of the Jewish people. It has obligations to all of its citizens and residents. However, the Jewish national movement and its institutions were never, and are still not, under an obligation to promote the welfare of non-Jews, and they do not have obligations to all Israeli citizens as such. Since the Palestinians still do not have a state, the Palestinian national institutions (in Israel and in the region) have obligations only to the Palestinian people and to their struggle. Those who wish well for both identities—the Israeli civic identity which is common to all the citizens of Israel, but also the Jewish identity which is common to both the Jewish citizens of Israel and to Jews outside Israel—must do at least two things. First, they must clarify and explain the complicated relations between Israel on the one hand and Jews and Judaism on the other. Second, they must address the institutional aspects of these basic questions. Among other things, it is necessary to keep—or to re-establish—Jewish institutional structures and Israeli political structures which are independent of each other. Since after the establishment of the state, the Jewish national

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institutions received official status in it, we need to rethink the institutional question. We need Jewish institutional structures which are not connected by means of an umbilical cord to the State of Israel, in order to make possible a more dynamic, richer interplay between Israeli citizenship and the Israeli state, which is also the nation state of the Jewish people, on the one hand, and the Jewish people with its varied identities and localities, on the other. The Metzilah Center sees it as its function to emphasize the importance of these goals and to work for their realization. Such a separation is necessary not only because the Jewish state is obligated to ensure the welfare of all its citizens, both Jews and non-Jews alike. As stated, the UN General Assembly decided on the establishment of a Jewish state in order to enable it to take responsibility for the physical safety of the Jews, to work for the preservation of a Jewish majority in the state (in a way consistent with human rights), and to ensure the existence of a Jewish public culture. The Jewish state has an important contribution to make to these aspects of Jewish renaissance as well. But the Jewish state, all by itself, is not capable of ensuring the preservation and transmission of the Jewish culture, unless the Jews who live in Israel understand what it is about them that makes them Jews; will wish to remain Jews; will wish their children to remain Jews; and will wish and will be prepared to do what is necessary for their children to be Jews (so long as they want to, of course). All of this requires cultural and spiritual activity in Jewish frameworks. And these, as we have said, must be different from the institutions of the state, and be relevant to both Jews in Israel and in the Diaspora. In addition, the Metzilah Center was founded because we believe that it is not true that Zionism completed its role with the establishment of the state. The reasons for founding the Jewish state that were in effect at the time of the partition resolution, which are narrated so acutely in the UNSCOP report, continue to be relevant today, with even greater force. Zionism, as the idea that a Jewish state is needed and justified, is alive, pertinent and relevant to this day. One should remember that the need for a Jewish state (rather than self-determination in the form of national and cultural autonomy) is connected—perhaps paradoxically—to the continued Arab Israeli conflict, which means that there can be no physical security or security of identity for Jews without the protection of a state. This needs to be stressed in response to the loud voices which claim that today there is no longer any need for Zionism, and that the continued insistence on the Jewish identity of the state excludes Arab Israeli citizens and prevents their complete integration in the state. The Metzilah Center is an organization explicitly dedicated to Zionism and to its justification not only as a matter of history, but also as a valid and relevant commitment today. Like many of the founders of the Zionist movement—in both the political and cultural varieties—the Metzilah Center aspires to preserve and even to give new life to the Zionist idea within a state which is committed not only to the maintenance and flourishing of the Jewish state, but also to

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the promotion of the welfare of all the population, including a continued and intensive investigation of the interrelations between the different parts of this society, Jewish and non-Jewish. In this state, and in the society that lives within it, a continual deliberation needs to be made, within a commitment to human rights, concerning the ways in which the state relates to all of its citizens, and about the ways in which the Jews relate to themselves, to their heritage, and to the other people that lives here. This is not a question of Judaism verses democracy. The investigation is not with respect to the question: to what extent is it permissible to infringe on democracy in order to preserve the Jewish character of the state? The Metzilah Center comes to make heard the voice of the broad backbone of the Jewish society which does not wish to rule over another people and does not wish to live here as dispossessors, exploiters or occupiers. At the same time, we do not want to be dominated by another people, and wish to found our life on the Jewish heritage. The ideal state which we seek is not a neutral state, which takes no position vis-à-vis culture or tradition and makes do with the external protection of its residents (we should note that this ideal of a state is also not acceptable to the Arab citizens of the State of Israel). The Metzilah Center supports the existence of a state with a designated interest in a particular culture and identity—specifically, a Jewish one. This is a nation state par excellence, in the ethnic (and not the civic) sense of the term. True, more and more people today contend that such states are anachronistic and unjustified. Nonetheless, many such states are still in existence. Moreover, at this very time new states of this kind are coming into being with the purpose of granting the majority of their populations the feeling of affinity between the political framework and an ethno-national cultural identity. This was the image of the Jewish state in the partition resolution. This is still its image today. We wish to live in this state so that it will allow us to rule over ourselves and to control our own destiny. We wish to be “a free people in its own country”—in the very same country in which this people had lived independently in the past. It is exciting to find that the place-names in this country, even those which have been recycled through Arabic, are the same as the names of the places mentioned in ancient Jewish texts. We are a part of this country, of all of this country. But we understand that there is another people in this land, and we are prepared to think of a political solution, such as partition, which will enable both these two peoples to live independently in their homeland. This claim is part of the greatness of the November 29th resolution. It does not only deal with two just claims, but rather focuses on two native peoples, who both belong here. Precisely because the state is part of our dream and precisely because it is so important to our survival as a people—we should not place too heavy a burden on its shoulders. We must, as individuals, as groups and as a civil society, continue to take part of the responsibility for the fate of the Jewish existence, in ways other than the means of the state.

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We must remember that the state is only an instrument, even if it is an extremely important one, and that it cannot survive unless we have a deep knowledge of our own roots in the Jewish people, in Jewish culture, and in Jewish history; unless we understand why we are in this particular place, where we have come from and where we are going; why it is justified to demand from our neighbors that they pay the price for our independence in part of our homeland; why it is worth fighting for this enterprise even if there is obstinate and determined resistance against it; why it is worthwhile to wish to join it, to be a part of it, to live in it and even, if necessary, to die for it—even if at times we may criticize the way it is being administered. In other words, for us this state, and independence in our country, are not luxuries but rather are actual existential necessities. The Metzilah Center has come into being in order to study and promote the desires and beliefs of those who think that the Zionist enterprise is exciting, necessary and justified even today. At the same time it presents the point of view of many—in the country and abroad—who feel uncomfortable and dissatisfied with some of the things that happen to us: for instance, the use of Judaism to justify the exercise of power to injure others more than the minimum required to survive; the cultural shallowness, which fails to supply us with the vitality, the community of fate and the depth of meaning which had accompanied the beginnings of the Zionist endeavor (even its in-house opponents5). The Zionist enterprise today appears less focused than it was in the past, and it is not difficult to discern the weakening in the feeling of the justice of the cause, and a sense of a loss of direction. The Zionist vision has changed, the quality of its leaders has diminished, the willingness to devote oneself to the public causes has waned, and the commitment to solidarity and social justice has been weakened. The Zionist enterprise which argued for the right of the Jews to be a free people in (part of) their land is threatened today not only from without but from within as well. The Metzilah Center wishes to represent those who say that we—the Jews in Israel and abroad—can and must rise up and act, as we did at the beginning of the Zionist endeavor. Like the Zionist founding fathers, we are prepared to “assist” history. We are willing to take responsibility for our own existence. We are willing to answer the questions: why are we here? What is the meaning and what is the purpose of our existence? We aspire to achieve the correct balance between private and public. While we do not wish to be only a Spartan “enlisted” society, we do aspire to be a society in which people work not only for their own individual benefit. We are in no way giving up the dream to continue to be a free people in its own country. But we also are not giving up the very basic elements of In this context we can add that some of the opponents of the foundation of the Jewish state came from within the Zionist movement, such as Martin Buber and Judah Leon Magnes of “Ha-Ichud” who supported the foundation of a bi-national state (see their testimonies in the resource part of this book, pp. 93, 190).

5

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this dream: to build a just and progressive society here, a developed society and one which is fair and decent to all its members. This picture of Israel—which was cast on the 29 November, and because of which people wept in the streets—is still valid. Israel today is stronger than in the past, and in many ways its achievements are very impressive. The spirit which created Israel still exists. We have in Israel extraordinary potential. For these unique creative forces we must open up paths of activity, of searching, of investigation, of thought and of action—within the institutions of the state and outside them, in Israel and in the Diaspora. If we do that, we can once again retain the sense of understanding, justness, the necessity and the pride in being Jews who are simultaneously Zionists, liberals and humanists.

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Sources

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Chapter six

First Crossroads: Peel Commission, 1937

A memorandum submitted by the Arab Higher Committee to the Royal Commission1 Honourable Sirs, The Arab Higher Committee acting on behalf of the Arabs of Palestine, hereby begs to submit to the Royal Commission an analysis of the Arab Case in Palestine, embracing the fundamental causes of last Summer’s disturbances and those that have recurred in Palestine since the year 1919. The fundamental causes of the disturbances may be summarized in the following two points:

a The Deprivation of the Palestinian Arabs of their natural and

political rights. b The fixed intention of the British Government of maintaining a policy in Palestine which, in so far as it operates in favour of establishing a Jewish National Home, cannot but lead to the destruction of the Arabs as a national and cultural entity in the country . . . as shall be explained hereafter: FIRST: We beg to stress the fact that the Arab movement in Palestine is one which from the first has aspired to national independence, a movement

From A Memorandum Submitted by The Arab Higher Committee to The Royal Commission on 11 January 1937, Jerusalem, 1937, pp. 5–13.

1

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which does not in its essence differ from parallel movements amongst the Arabs of other Arab territories, nor can this be dismissed as a new movement (consequent upon the mandatory policy) for it dates back to pre-War days. The Arabs formed an important part of the Ottoman Empire, and it is quite erroneous to suggest that they were exposed to particular sufferings under the oppressive Turkish regime, and that their uprising with the co-operation proceeding from the Allies was merely intended to free them from the Turkish yoke merely for its own sake. The truth is that under the Ottoman Constitution they were enjoying all the rights and privileges, political and otherwise, which were accorded [by] their Turkish brethren, without the least discrimination being exercised between the different racial elements within the body of the Ottoman Empire. In actual fact the Arabs shared fully with their Turkish brethren in the administration of the Government in all its varying aspects, occupying both civil and military positions in Major and Minor affairs alike. They filled with distinction the positions of Prime-Minister, ministers of the Chamber, military commanders, and provincial and district governors. They were also represented in the Ottoman Parliament, in both the Senate and the House of Representatives in proportion to their numbers as specified (in principle) in the Ottoman Constitution and in the Ottoman electoral laws. Furthermore the Administration of the Arab territories was entrusted to certain executive bodies elected in the provinces, their districts and sub-districts, as well as to representative bodies elected for the provinces and independent districts such as Jerusalem; which said bodies were free to exercise the widest discretion in the Administration, the Treasury and matters of Education and Development. In spite of all this, however, the Arabs were continuously aspiring for complete national independence in their own country, motivated by the desire to reachieve the distinguished position which they had held in the past centuries, when they rendered to the civilized world the greatest contribution, affecting every phase of human activity. For many generations in the past the Arab leaders and the Arab Youth (including many natives of Palestine) have clung to the principle of independence and succeeded in spreading this conviction among all the ranks of Arab society. This movement was given a new impetus in the year 1908, with the result that after the Paris Conference of 1911, which was one of the most fervent and complete expressions of this aspiration, the Arabs embarked on an era full of persecutions and valuable sacrifices. It was as a consummation of this movement that the Shereef of Mecca (King Hussein) declared in the name of all the Arabs the widespread rebellion which followed the treaty of alliance made with Great Britain in 1915, a rebellion which was entered upon for the declared purpose of realizing the aim of freedom and independence for the Arab territories. SECOND: The British Government entered into a covenant with King Hussein as representative of the Arabs, which promised Great Britain’s recognition of

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the establishment of an Independent Arab State. The promises therein made covered all the Arab territories then falling within the Turkish Empire. Mr Winston Churchill, as Secretary of State in  1922, attempted unsuccessfully to establish that Palestine was not intended to fall within the frontiers referred to in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence. The territories to be specifically excluded from the Independent Arab State as set out in that correspondence, and which remained unapproved of by Shereef Hussein (King Hussein) were intended to cover only the area that is now known as the Lebanon. This is provable by the following facts:

1 These exclusions were only made to avoid a collision with the

French interests in the western parts of Syria. France had no interests at that time save in the Lebanon (as this territory is called today). 2 The excluded area comprised only those parts falling west of the Districts of Damascus, Hamah, Homs and Alleppo. Palestine, it is clear, does not fall to the west of any of the above Districts. 3 The allegation of Mr Winston Churchill that “Damascus” meant the Vilayat of Damascus is fundamentally erroneous, for there was no Vilayat known as “Vilayat of Damascus,” for “Damascus” itself was the Capital of the Vilayat of Syria. It is one of many Districts (kadaa) included within the Vilayat of Syria. Had the “Vilayat of Syria” (including as it then did the different Districts of Transjordan, West of which Palestine falls), been intended for complete exclusion from the Arab Independent State, there would have been no necessity to mention the Districts of Homs and Hamah, which all fall within the Vilayat of Syria, as also does the District (kadaa) of Damascus. And had Palestine been intended for exclusion from the Independent Arab State, the Districts of Salt and Karak would not have been disregarded in a document which set out to lay down frontiers with diplomatic precision. 4 Basing himself on the above mentioned pledges, King Hussein played his important role in declaring war against the Turks. He called all the Arab territories to participate, and the Palestine volunteers were amongst the first to join the “Arab Revolutionary Armies.” Aeroplanes continually rained upon Palestine various proclamations calling upon the Arab officers and men in the Turkish ranks to join the Arab Revolution. This the Arabs of Palestine accordingly did on a large scale, officers and privates alike, with the sole aspiration of attaining a single end, viz. the independence of the Arab lands including Palestine. THIRD: After the War came to an end, schemes of territorial reconstitution were put forward on the basis of President Wilson’s principles of the right of self-determination, the fulfillment of which has since become a sacred trust of civilization.

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When victory was finally achieved by the Allies, Lord Allenby, the commander of the Allied forces in the East, issued in the year 1918, and in the name of the two Governments of Great Britain and France, a written Declaration that was distributed in all the cities and villages of what is now Palestine, in Syria and in the Lebanon, affirming that it was the solemn purpose of the Allies to further the cause of Arab self-determination and to establish Arab National Governments; it furthermore declared that neither France nor Great Britain had any imperialistic ambitions whatsoever on this country. This to the Arabs of Palestine meant a renewed assertion of the promises made to King Hussein, to which reference has been made above. FOURTH: The most important outcome of the Peace Conference of Versailles was the creation of the League of Nations which was established on the above-mentioned principle of national self-determination. This involved the recognition in principle of the independence of the Arab states that were separated from the Turkish Empire, and that were declaredly considered to have attained such a degree of political consciousness as entitled them to national independence, subject only to the temporary advice and supervision of a Mandatory Government, in the choice of which the public opinion of the state concerned was to be the most important consideration. In pursuance of that principle an international commission known as the King-Crane Commission was sent to the Arab-population lands to investigate and scrutinize the wishes of the inhabitants thereof on the subject of mandates; and the result of its investigation was a definite and conclusive proof that the Arabs rejected not only the mandatory principle in its entirety but the Balfour Declaration specifically, reasserting at the same time their original demands of Arab unity and independence. FIFTH: In spite of all this, however, and in utter disregard of the right of the Palestine Arabs to take their place in the promised Independent Arab State, their land was severed from Syria and forcibly placed under a British Mandate, in which the Balfour Declaration was iniquitously enshrined. Furthermore, even though the Mandate purports to base itself on Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which sets forth the doctrine of national self determination, it is clear that in its formation Jewish interests were given precedence, and to the Mandatory Government was delegated absolute power over both the Legislative as well as the Administrative side of the country’s government, at the same time as it undertook to place the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as would secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home. The British Government has for the last nineteen years followed a policy clearly aimed at the building of the Jewish National Home, entirely disregarding in the meantime such guarantees as were asserted in the terms of the Mandate as being intended to safeguard the rights and national position of the Arabs.

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That these have been prejudiced is clearly exhibited in the fact that their racial proportion in the population of Palestine has been decreased from being 93 per cent at the time of the occupation to 70 per cent today. Their aspiration to self-rule has been disappointed; they have been deprived of the administration of their own country, and their national entity is now threatened with annihilation (through the influx of an alien race). Meanwhile the Jews have been allowed to occupy the best and most productive land, from which the Arab farmers and the Arab villages were ruthlessly swept off. All this took place when other Arab territories that were separated from the Ottoman Empire along with Palestine, viz. Syria, the Lebanon and Iraq, have since the establishment of the Mandatory regime enjoyed a form of national rule which has finally developed into complete independence and the termination of the Mandates, on the basis of treaties of friendship between the original Mandatory powers and the mandated territories. It is only natural therefore that the Palestine Arabs who during all the past years have trustfully awaited justice at the hands of the British Government should now be firm in their conviction that any power militating against their sacred right to independence and national existence is rank despotism, and that it is their sacred duty to uphold the struggle by all means at their command until that despotism is removed, and their rights regained. SIXTH: Mr Winston Churchill declared in 1922 that the obstacle in the way of establishing a National Government in Palestine, similar to those in the other Arab territories was not because the inhabitants of Palestine were less mature of culture and civilization than those of other countries, but was the commitments of the Balfour Declaration. The injustice and the prejudice revealed in this declaration does not require either comment or explanation. It suffices however to say that no honest person could justify the deprivation of the Palestine Arabs of their natural and sacred rights to freedom and independence, denied them for no act or negligence on their part, but purely because His Britannic Majesty’s Government promised to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine. Whatever may be said of the Balfour Declaration, one thing remains in it prominent and clear: that it is void ab initio, illogical, and unfounded in any principle of justice. The Jews left Palestine and have ceased to have connections therewith for the last two thousand years. They lost their national existence with that communal severance, none the less complete for the later presence of a few thousand Jews who lived here intact and secure (both their souls and their property) by virtue and justice of Arab tradition. The Arabs on the other hand have occupied Palestine for more than 1,300 years, during which period their civilization and culture have unfailingly stamped the country with the Arabic character. The Arabs are still the legitimate owners of the Country and form the greater part of its population. The total number of Jews entering and living in the country during and before the Turkish rule, up to the time of the British Occupation, did not exceed 50,000—which

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represented some 7 per cent of the sum total of the population as it then was, and even that number contained a great many foreign Jews. SEVENTH: The Balfour Declaration leads to an unknown end, and contains two propositions which have been proved by actual experience and application to be in utter contradiction to each other. That the end of the Balfour Declaration is ambiguous has been clearly exhibited in the fact that the several official attempts at its interpretation have only served to increase its ambiguity. The two contradictions are these: (a) establishing a National Home in Palestine, and (b) safeguarding the rights and status of the Arabs. The former is inevitably detrimental to the rights of the Arabs in this country, and herein lies the practical and complete contradiction which the Arabs have never ceased to assert. The British Government, through its commitments involved in the Balfour Declaration, has openly deviated from the path of sacred justice . . . and shed the laudable quality of honouring its solemn undertakings and pledged word; and having neglected its Sworn Promises to the Arabs, it has obdurately persisted in its pursuance of this unjust policy. By attempting to build a Jewish National Home in this Arab country, which is but a fragment of the extensive Arab territories which surround it on all sides, the British Government has endeavoured to make the impossible appear as a reality. Over and above this, this country is particularly dear and sacred to both the Arab and the wider Moslem world, and the British Government, by its failure to appreciate the sanctity of this small territory, has committed a breach of faith and respect; and by so doing has converted this sacred land into a place of bloody turmoil such as can never be assuaged while the avoidance of justice and natural right is the basis of its administration. History has never recorded an attempt of this character, and the pursuance of such a policy can never be of benefit to any of the parties concerned. EIGHTH: The Arab Higher Committee does not see much value in entering into details or relying on mere statistical figures to prove the injustice done to the Arabs by the British Administration; or to prove the partiality and bias shown by Government towards the Jews in Palestine, as evinced in the  backing consistently afforded them by Government, and the grant of the natural resources of the country for their exclusive development; or to prove further what is involved in the imperialist and Zionist policy operative in Palestine—viz. the firm hold maintained by these considerations over the administrative and legislative departments of the Government alike; or what acts of partiality are being perpetrated which can find no justification in principles of right and justice. The Arabs, further, see no benefit nor hope of reform to be gained from minor changes within the existing structure, because the evil has its roots deep within the system itself. Therefore unless the grievances fundamental to this system are themselves remedied, wholly and courageously, the evil cannot but continue, and the grievances intensify.

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And this fundamental and frank treatment, we would suggest, is as follows:

1 The immediate abandonment of the abortive attempt to establish

still further the Jewish National Home which originated in the Balfour Declaration, and the reconsideration of all the consequences thereon resultant, which, fraught with harm to the Arabs, have gone far to undermine their rights and even their existence.

2 The immediate and complete stoppage of Jewish immigration.



3 The immediate and complete prohibition of the sale of Arab land to



the Jews. 4 The solution of the Palestine problem on a basis parallel to that on which were solved the problems of Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon— viz. by means of the termination of the period of mandatory rule, and by the formation of a treaty between Great Britain and Palestine which shall be the basis for the establishment of an independent national government, constitutionally elected, in which shall be represented all sections of the population, and which shall guarantee justice, progress and well-being for all. We beg to remain, Honourable Sirs, Respectfully yours

Fuad Saleh Saba Muhammed Amin Husseini SECRETARY PRESIDENT ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE

Peel Commission Report, July 19372 Chapter XX. The Force of Circumstances

1 Before submitting the proposals we have to offer for its drastic

treatment we will briefly restate the problem of Palestine.

Palestine Royal Commision Report, Presented by the Secretary of State For the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, July, 1937, London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office 1937.

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Two-State Solution 2 Under the stress of the World War the British Government made

promises to Arabs and Jews in order to obtain their support. On the strength of those promises both parties formed certain expectations. 3 The application to Palestine of the Mandate System in general and of the specific Mandate in particular implied the belief that the obligations thus undertaken towards the Arabs and the Jews respectively would prove in course of time to be mutually compatible owing to the conciliatory effect on the Palestinian Arabs of the material prosperity which Jewish immigration would bring to Palestine as a whole. That belief has not been justified, and we see no hope of its being justified in the future. 4 On that account it might conceivably be argued that Britain is now

entitled to renounce its obligations. But we have no doubt that the British people would repudiate any such suggestion. The spirit of good faith forbids it. And quite apart from past commitments we have a present duty to discharge. If there had been no promises or expectations, if there were no Mandate, the existing circumstances in Palestine would still demand the most strenuous efforts we could make to deal with them. We are responsible for the welfare of the country. Its government is in our hands. We are bound to strive to the utmost to do justice and make peace. 5 What are the existing circumstances? An irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within the narrow bounds of one small country. About 1,000,000 Arabs are in strife, open or latent, with some 400,000 Jews. There is no common ground between them. The Arab community is predominantly Asiatic in character, the Jewish settlement predominantly European. They differ in religion and in language. Their cultural and social life, their ways of thought and conduct, are as incompatible as their national aspirations. These last are the greatest bar to peace. Arabs and Jews might possibly learn to live and work together in Palestine if they would make a genuine effort to reconcile and combine their national ideals and so built up in time a joint or dual nationality. But this they cannot do. The War and its sequel have inspired all Arabs with the hope of reviving in a free and united Arab world the traditions of the Arab golden age. The Jews similarly are inspired by their historic past. They mean to show what the Jewish nation can achieve when restored to the

Can also be found on the Internet: http://www.hartzman.com/Israel/Mandate%20Era/ Peel%20Commision%20Report%20%Part%203%20&%20Appendices.pdf 

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land of its birth. National assimilation between Arabs and Jews is thus ruled out. In the Arab picture the Jews could only occupy the place they occupied in Arab Egypt or Arab Spain. The Arabs would be as much outside the Jewish picture as the Canaanites in the old land of Israel. The National Home, as we have said before, cannot be half-national. In these circumstances to maintain that Palestinian citizenship has any moral meaning is a mischievous pretence. Neither Arab nor Jew has any sense of service to a single State.

6 This conflict was inherent in the situation from the outset. The terms

of the Mandate tended to confirm it. If the Government had adopted a more rigorous and consistent policy it might have repressed the conflict for a time, but it could not have resolved it. [. . .] 9 The conflict is primarily political, though the fear of economic subjection to the Jews is also in Arab minds. The Mandate, it is supposed, will terminate sooner or later. The Arabs would hasten the day, the Jews retard it, for obvious reasons in each case. Meanwhile the whole situation is darkened by uncertainty as to the future. The conflict, indeed, is as much about the future as about the present. Every intelligent Arab and Jew is forced to ask the question, “Who in the end will govern Palestine?” This uncertainty is doubtless aggravated by the fact that Palestine is a mandated territory; but, in the light of nationalist movements elsewhere, we do not think the situation would be very different if Palestine had been a British Colony. 10 Meantime the “external factors” will continue to play the part they have played with steadily increasing force from the beginning. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia, the Yemen, Iraq and Egypt are already recognized as sovereign states, and Trans-Jordan as an “independent government.” In less than three years’ time Syria and the Lebanon will attain their national sovereignty. The claim of the Palestinian Arabs to share in the freedom of all Asiatic Arabia will thus be reinforced. Before the War they were linked for centuries past with Syria and the Lebanon. They already exceed the Lebanese in numbers. That they are as well qualified for self-government as the Arabs of neighbouring countries has been admitted. 11 On the other hand, the hardships and anxieties of the Jews in Europe are not likely to grow less in the near future. The pressure on Palestine will continue and might at any time be accentuated. The appeal to the good faith and humanity of the British people will lose none of its force. The Mandatory will be urged unceasingly to admit as many Jews into Palestine as the National Home can provide with a livelihood and to protect them when admitted from Arab attacks.

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12 Thus, for internal and external reasons, it seems probable that the

situation, bad as it now is, will grow worse. The conflict will go on, the gulf between Arabs and Jews will widen. [. . .] 14 In these circumstances, we are convinced that peace, order and good government can only be maintained in Palestine for any length of time by a rigorous system of repression. Throughout this Report we have been careful not to overstate the facts as we see them: but understatement is no less reprehensible; and we should be failing in our duty if we said anything to encourage a hopeful outlook for the future peace of Palestine under the existing system or anything akin to it. The optimism which naturally prevailed at the outset of the enterprise was chilled by the series of Arab outbreaks, but never extinguished. In each case it soon revived, and in each case it proved false. The lesson is plain, and nobody, we think, will now venture to assert that the existing system offers any real prospect of reconciliation between the Arabs and the Jews. Hence the Government are faced with the unpleasant necessity of maintaining security-services at a very high cost, with the result that they are unable to improve and expand, and may even have to curtail, the services directed to “the well-being and development” of the population which, in the words of the Covenant, constitute their “sacred trust.” If “disturbances,” moreover, should recur on a similar scale to that of last year’s rebellion, the cost of military operations must soon exhaust the revenues of Palestine and ultimately involve the British Treasury to an incalculable extent. The moral objections to maintaining a system of government by constant repression are self-evident. Nor is there any need to emphasize the undesirable reactions of such a course of policy on opinion outside Palestine. 15 And the worst of it is that such a policy leads nowhere. However

vigorously and consistently maintained, it will not solve the problem. It will not allay, it will exacerbate the quarrel between the Arabs and the Jews. The establishment of a single self-governing Palestine will remain just as impracticable as it is now. It is not easy to pursue the dark path of repression without seeing daylight at the end of it. 16 Those, in our judgment, are the circumstances which Your Majesty’s Government have to face in Palestine. We do not, of course, mean to suggest by anything we have said that the British people would flinch from bearing the burden of governing Palestine under the existing system if they were in honour bound to bear it. They lack neither the power nor the will. But they would be justified in asking if there is no other way in which their duty can be done. [. . .]

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Chapter XXI. Cantonization

1 The political division of Palestine could be effected in a less final



and thorough-going manner than by Partition. It could be divided as federal States are divided into provinces or cantons; and this method has been so often mentioned and so ably advocated under the name of “Cantonisation” as a means of solving the Palestine problem that it is incumbent on us to discuss it before setting out the plan for Partition which we ourselves have to propose. 2 The essence of the Cantonization scheme is, in the words of one of its principal advocates, “that areas should be officially defined within which Jewish acquisition of land and close settlement would be permitted and encouraged in discharge of the positive obligation under the Mandate regarding the National Home, and without which the land would be reserved for the needs of the indigenous population.”3



3 The scheme may be formulated in a variety of ways; but in



general it envisages the division of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab canton (the former corresponding to the areas of densest Jewish settlement—more particularly the plain of Esdraelon, the coastal plain north of Tel Aviv and the old-established settlements centred on Rishon le Tsiyon and Rehovot), while the Holy Places of Jerusalem and Bethlehem with the port of Haifa would be retained in enclaves under direct Mandatory administration. It has been proposed that the area round Tiberias, Safad and Huleh might constitute a third “mixed” canton. The Arab canton, it is suggested, might embrace not only the predominantly Arab areas of Palestine proper, but also the whole of the present territory of Trans-Jordan. 4 It is contemplated that each canton would have its own Government, completely autonomous in such matters as public works, health, education and general administration (including control of land sales and immigration), while the central (Mandatory) Government, with the assistance presumably of advice from representatives of the cantons, would retain control over such matters as foreign relations, defence, customs, railways, posts and telegraphs and the like, and would continue to collect customs and postal and any other federal revenues. Choice of official languages would be left to the cantons.

“Cantonisation: A Plan for Palestine,” by Mr Archer Cust, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XXIII, page 206.

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Two-State Solution 5 On behalf of such an arrangement it is claimed that it would solve

the three major problems of land, immigration and self-government. There would, of course, be many difficult points to settle under each of these heads, but it can be argued that the scheme would give the Jews in their canton the right to buy as much land as they wished (subject no doubt to certain safeguards in the interests of existing non-Jewish owners) and to admit as many immigrants as they themselves determined; while the Arab canton within its own boundaries would be free to impose any restrictions it pleased on the further extension of Zionist settlement. Each canton would attain self-government in all but the “federal” sphere. 6 As against those apparent advantages there are certain obvious difficulties in the scheme. In the first place, the drafting of federal constitutions is never easy. Complicated questions are involved in the structure of the central government and the division of function between it and the component units. There are constant dangers of overlapping and of rival claims on the same field of authority. [. . .] 7 Difficulties would arise, in particular, in the financial relations between the central Government and the cantons. Whether in the distribution between the cantons of an excess of federal revenue or in the collection of contributions towards a federal deficit every assessment would give rise to fierce argument and bitter recrimination. The financial consequences, moreover, of unfettered Jewish control of immigration into the Jewish canton might be extremely embarrassing to the federal Government, called upon to provide federal services for a population increasing at a far more rapid rate than what it might itself consider reasonable. Thus Cantonization, though it would mitigate the difficulties caused by Jewish immigration, would by no means eliminate them. They would still have to be considered to some extent by the Mandatory Government at the centre, and would keep alive the feud between Arabs and Jews. Only, in fact, by Partition can the problem of immigration be solved. [. . .] 9 In any scheme of dividing Palestine the primary difficulty lies in the

fact that no line can be drawn which would separate all the Arabs from all the Jews. Both under Cantonization and under Partition a minority of each race remains in an area controlled by a majority of the other. [. . .] 10 For Cantonization does not settle the question of national selfgovernment. Cantonal autonomy would not satisfy for a moment the demands of Arab nationalism; it would not raise the status of Palestinian Arabs to the level of that enjoyed or soon to be enjoyed

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by Arabs in the neighbouring countries. Nor would it give the Jews the full freedom they desire to build up their National Home in their own way at their own pace, nor offer them the prospect of realizing on a small territorial scale all that Zionism means. And in the background, still clouding and disturbing the situation from year to year, still intensifying the antagonism between the races, would remain the old uncertainty as to the future destiny of Palestine. 11 Cantonization, in sum, presents most, if not all, of the difficulties

presented by Partition without Partition’s one supreme advantage— the possibility it offers of eventual peace.

Chapter XXII. A Plan of Partition

1 We return, then, to Partition as the only method we are able to



3 While we do not think Your Majesty’s Government would expect

propose for dealing with the root of the trouble. [. . .] us to embark on the further protracted inquiry which would be needed for working out a scheme of Partition in full detail, it would be idle to put forward the principle of Partition and not to give it any concrete shape. Clearly we must show that an actual plan can be devised which meets the main requirements of the case. There seem to us to be three essential features of such a plan. It must be practicable. It must conform to our obligations. It must do justice to the Arabs and the Jews.

1. A Treaty System



4 [. . .] The Mandate for Palestine should terminate and be replaced

by a Treaty System in accordance with the precedent set in Iraq and Syria. 5 A new Mandate for the Holy Places should be instituted to fulfil the purposes defined in Section 2 below. 6 Treaties of Alliance should be negotiated by the Mandatory with the Government of Trans-Jordan and representatives of the Arabs of Palestine on the one hand and with the Zionist Organization on the other. These Treaties would declare that, within as short a period as may be convenient, two sovereign independent States would be established—the one an Arab State, consisting of Trans-Jordan united with that part of Palestine which lies to the east and south of a frontier such as we suggest in Section 3 below the other a Jewish State consisting of that part of Palestine which lies to the north and west of that frontier.

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7 The Mandatory would undertake to support any requests for

admission to the League of Nations which the Governments of the Arab and the Jewish States might make in accordance with Article I of the Covenant. 8 The Treaties would include strict guarantees for the protection of minorities in each State, and the financial and other provisions to which reference will be made in subsequent Sections. 9 Military Conventions would be attached to the Treaties, dealing

with the maintenance of naval, military and air forces, the upkeep and use of ports, roads and railways, the security of the oil pipe line and so forth.

2. The Holy Places 10 The partition of Palestine is subject to the overriding necessity of

keeping the sanctity of Jerusalem and Bethlehem inviolate and of ensuring free and safe access to them for all the world. That, in the fullest sense of the mandatory phrase, is “a sacred trust of civilization”—a trust on behalf not merely of the peoples of Palestine but of multitudes in other lands to whom those places, one or both, are Holy Places. 11 A new Mandate, therefore, should be framed with the execution of this trust as its primary purpose. An enclave should be demarcated extending from a point north of Jerusalem to a point south of Bethlehem, and access to the sea should be provided by a corridor extending to the north of the main road and to the south of the railway, including the towns of Lydda and Ramle, and terminating at Jaffa. 12 We regard the protection of the Holy Places as a permanent trust, unique in its character and purpose, and not contemplated by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. We submit for consideration that, in order to avoid misunderstanding, it might frankly be stated that this trust will only terminate if and when the League of Nations and the United States desire it to do so, and that, while it would be the trustee’s duty to promote the well-being and development of the local population concerned, it is not intended that in course of time they should stand by themselves as a wholly self-governing community. 13 Guarantees as to the rights of the Holy Places and free access thereto (as provided in Article 13 of the existing Mandate), as to transit across the mandated area, and as to non-discrimination in fiscal, economic and other matters should be maintained in accordance

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with the principles of the Mandate System. But the policy of the Balfour Declaration would not apply; and no question would arise of balancing Arab against Jewish claims or vice versa. All the inhabitants of the territory would stand on an equal footing. The only “official language” would be that of the Mandatory Administration. Good and just government without regard for sectional interests would be its basic principle. 14 We think it would accord with Christian sentiment in the world

at large if Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias) were also covered by this Mandate. We recommend that the Mandatory should be entrusted with the administration of Nazareth and with full powers to safeguard the sanctity of the waters and shores of Lake Tiberias. 15 The Mandatory should similarly be charged with the protection of religious endowments and of such buildings, monuments and places in the Arab and Jewish States as are sacred to the Jews and the Arabs respectively. 16 For the upkeep of the Mandatory Government, a certain revenue should be obtainable, especially from the large and growing urban population in its charge, both by way of customs-duties and by direct taxation; but it might prove insufficient for the normal cost of the administration. In that event, we believe that, in all the circumstances, Parliament would be willing to vote the money needed to make good the deficit.

3. The Frontier 17 The natural principle for the Partition of Palestine is to separate

the areas in which the Jews have acquired land and settled from those which are wholly or mainly occupied by Arabs. As shown in Map 4 at the end of this Report, the Jewish lands and colonies are mostly to be found in the Maritime Plain between Al Majdal and Mount Carmel, in the neighbourhood of Haifa, in the Plain of Esdraelon and the Valley of Jezreel, and in the east of Galilee, i.e. south of Tiberias, on the shores of the Lake, near Safad, and in the Huleh Basin. The rest of Galilee4 and the northern part of the plain of Acre are almost wholly in Arab occupation. So also is the central hill-country of old Samaria and Judaea—except for Jerusalem and its vicinity. The towns of Nablus, Jenin and

4

We use the term “Galilee” to include the Sub-Districts of Acre, Safad, Tiberias and Nazareth.

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Tulkarm, the last an outpost on the edge of the Maritime Plain, are centres of Arab nationalism. Except in and near Jerusalem and at Hebron, there are practically no Jews between Jenin and Beersheba. This Arab block extends eastwards to the River Jordan between the Dead Sea and Beisan. In the area stretching south and south-east of Beersheba to the Egyptian frontier, the Jews have bought some isolated blocks of land but the population is entirely Arab. 18 This existing separation of the area of Jewish land and settlement

from that of wholly or mainly Arab occupation seems to us to offer a fair and practicable basis for Partition, provided that, in accordance with the spirit of our obligations, (i) a reasonable allowance is made within the boundaries of the Jewish State for the growth of population and colonization, and (ii) reasonable compensation is given to the Arab State for the loss of land and revenue. This last is one of the reasons we give in paragraph 23 below for suggesting the payment of a subvention by the Jewish State to the Arab State in the event of Partition coming into force. 19 Any proposal for Partition would be futile if it gave no indication, however rough, as to how the most vital question in the whole matter might be determined. With the information at our command, we are not in a position to assert that the proposal we have to make in this matter is the only solution of an obviously difficult problem. But as one solution of it, which in our judgment would be both practicable and just, we submit the following frontier, based on the principle stated above. It is not possible for us to draw a precise line: for that purpose we would recommend the appointment of a Frontier Commission. [. . .]

4. Inter-State Subvention 23 As we have explained in an earlier chapter, the Jews contribute

more per capita to the revenues of Palestine than the Arabs, and the Government has thereby been enabled to maintain public services for the Arabs at a higher level than would otherwise have been possible. Partition would mean, on the one hand, that the Arab Area would no longer profit from the taxable capacity of the Jewish Area. On the other hand, (i) the Jews would acquire a new right of sovereignty in the Jewish Area; (ii) that Area, as we have defined it, would be larger than the existing area of Jewish land and settlement; (iii) the Jews would be freed from their present liability for helping to promote the welfare of Arabs outside that Area. It seems to us, therefore,

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not unreasonable to suggest that the Jewish State should pay a subvention to the Arab State when Partition comes into effect. [. . .]

10. Exchange of Land and Population 35 We have left to the last the two-fold question which, after that of the

Frontier, is the most important and most difficult of all the questions which Partition in any shape involves. 36 If Partition is to be effective in promoting a final settlement it must

mean more than drawing a frontier and establishing two States. Sooner or later there should be a transfer of land and, as far as possible, an exchange of population. 37 As regards land, the Jews on the one hand may wish to dispose of some or all of the lands now owned by them which lie within the boundaries of the Arab State, and their Jewish occupants may wish to move into the Jewish State and resume their life on the land therein. The Arabs on the other hand may likewise be willing to sell the land they own within the boundaries of the Jewish State. But what is to become, in that case, of its occupants, whether owners or tenants or labourers? Whether they remain in the Jewish State or move into the Arab State, where there is under present conditions no cultivable land to spare, there is a manifest risk of their becoming a “landless proletariat.” 38 The Treaties should provide that, if Arab owners of land in the Jewish State or Jewish owners of land in the Arab State should wish to sell their land and any plantations or crops thereon, the Government of the State concerned should be responsible for the purchase of such land, plantations and crops at a price to be fixed, if required, by the Mandatory Administration. We suggest that for this purpose a loan should, if required, be guaranteed for a reasonable amount. 39 [. . .] The “Minority Problem” has become only too familiar in recent years, whether in Europe or in Asia. It is one of the most troublesome and intractable products of post-war nationalism; and nationalism in Palestine, as we have seen, is at least as intense a force as it is anywhere else in the world. We believe that Partition, once effected, might ultimately moderate and appease it as nothing else could. But it is, of course, too much to hope that after Partition there would be no friction at all between Arabs and Jews, no “incidents,” no recriminations, keeping open the wound which Partition must inflict. If then the settlement is to be clean and final, this question of the minorities must be boldly faced and firmly

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dealt with. It calls for the highest statesmanship on the part of all concerned. 40 An instructive precedent is afforded, as it happens, by the exchange effected between the Greek and Turkish populations on the morrow of the Greco-Turkish War of 1922. On the initiative of Dr Nansen a convention was signed by the Greek and Turkish Governments at the beginning of 1923, providing that Greek nationals of the Orthodox religion living in Turkey should be compulsorily removed to Greece, and Turkish nationals of the Moslem religion living in Greece to Turkey. To control the operation a Mixed Commission and a group of sub-commissions were established, consisting of representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments and of the League of Nations. The numbers involved were high—no less than some 1,300,000 Greeks and some 400,000 Turks. But so vigorously and effectively was the task accomplished that within about eighteen months from the spring of 1923 the whole exchange was completed. Dr Nansen was sharply criticized at the time for the inhumanity of his proposal, and the operation manifestly imposed the gravest hardships on multitudes of people. But the courage of the Greek and Turkish statesmen concerned has been justified by the result. Before the operation the Greek and Turkish minorities had been a constant irritant. Now the ulcer has been clean cut out, and Greco-Turkish relations, we understand, are friendlier than they have ever been before. 41 Unfortunately for our purposes the analogy breaks down at one essential point. In Northern Greece a surplus of cultivable land was available or could rapidly be made available for the settlement of the Greeks evacuated from Turkey. In Palestine there is at present no such surplus. Room exists or could soon be provided with the proposed boundaries of the Jewish State for the Jews now living in the Arab Area. It is the far greater number of Arabs who constitute the major problem; and while some of them could be re-settled on the land vacated by the Jews, far more land would be required for the re-settlement of all of them. On earlier pages of this Report we drew attention to the lack of adequate evidence on this question, but such information as was available seemed to us, as we said, to justify the hope that the execution of large-scale plans for irrigation, water-storage, and development in Trans-Jordan—and the same applies to Beersheba and the Jordan Valley—would make provision for a much larger population than exists there at the present time. 42 The immediate need, therefore, is for those areas to be surveyed and an authoritative estimate made of the practical possibilities of irrigation and development. This, we suggest, should be undertaken at once, and the requisite staff and funds provided for

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its completion in the shortest possible time. If, as a result, it is clear that a substantial amount of land could be made available for the re-settlement of Arabs living in the Jewish area, the most strenuous efforts should be made to obtain an agreement for the exchange of land and population. [. . .] 43 We think that in the event of Partition friction would be less likely to occur in the hill-country of North Galilee with its wholly Arab population than in the plain-lands where the population is mixed. In the former area, therefore, it might not be necessary to effect a greater exchange of land and population than could be effected on a voluntary basis. But as regards the Plains, including Beisan, and as regards all such Jewish colonies as remained in the Arab State when the Treaties came into force, it should be part of the agreement that in the last resort the exchange would be compulsory. [. . .]

Chapter XXIII. Conclusion



1 “Half a loaf is better than no bread” is a peculiarly English proverb;

and, considering the attitude which both the Arab and the Jewish representatives adopted in giving evidence before us, we think it improbable that either party will be satisfied at first sight with the proposals we have submitted for the adjustment of their rival claims. For Partition means that neither will get all it wants. It means that the Arabs might acquiesce in the exclusion from their sovereignty of a piece of territory, long occupied and once ruled by them. It means that the Jews must be content with less than the Land of Israel they once ruled and have hoped to rule again. But it seems to us possible that on reflection both parties will come to realize that the drawbacks of Partition are outweighed by its advantages. For, if it offers neither party all it wants, it offers each what it wants most, namely freedom and security. 2 The advantages to the Arabs of Partition on the lines we have proposed may be summarized as follows: a They obtain their national independence and can cooperate on an equal footing with the Arabs of the neighbouring countries in the cause of Arab unity and progress. b They are finally delivered from the fear of being “swamped” by the Jews and from the possibility of ultimate subjection to Jewish rule. c In particular, the final limitation of the Jewish National Home within a fixed frontier and the enactment of a new Mandate

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for the protection of the Holy Places, solemnly guaranteed by the League of Nations, removes all anxiety lest the Holy Places should ever come under Jewish control. d As a set-off to the loss of territory the Arabs regard as theirs, the Arab State will receive a subvention from the Jewish State. It will also, in view of the backwardness of Trans-Jordan, obtain a grant of £2,000,000 from the British Treasury; and, if an arrangement can be made for the exchange of land and population, a further grant will be made for the conversion, as far as may prove possible, of uncultivable land in the Arab State into productive land from which the cultivators and the State alike will profit.



3 The advantages of Partition to the Jews may be summarized as

follows:— a Partition secures the establishment of the Jewish National Home and relieves it from the possibility of its being subjected in the future to Arab rule. b Partition enables the Jews in the fullest sense to call their National Home their own: for it converts it into a Jewish State. Its citizens will be able to admit as many Jews into it as they themselves believe can be absorbed. They will attain the primary objective of Zionism—a Jewish nation, planted in Palestine, giving its nationals the same status in the world as other nations give theirs. They will cease at last to live a “minority life.” 4 To both Arabs and Jews Partition offers a prospect—and we see no such prospect in any other policy—of obtaining the inestimable boon of peace. It is surely worth some sacrifice on both sides if the quarrel which the Mandate started could be ended with its termination. It is not a natural or old-standing feud. An able Arab exponent of the Arab case told us that the Arabs throughout their history have not only been free from anti-Jewish sentiment but have also shown that the spirit of compromise is deeply rooted in their life. And he went on to express his sympathy with the fate of the Jews in Europe. “There is no decent-minded person,” he said, “who would not want to do everything humanly possible to relieve the distress of those persons,” provided that it was “not at the cost of inflicting a corresponding distress on another people.” Considering what the possibility of finding a refuge in Palestine means to many thousands of suffering Jews, we cannot believe that the “distress” occasioned by Partition, great as it would be, is more than Arab generosity can bear. And in this, as in so much else connected with Palestine, it is not only the peoples of that country that have to

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be considered. The Jewish Problem is not the least of the many problems which are disturbing international relations at this critical time and obstructing the path to peace and prosperity. If the Arabs at some sacrifice could help to solve that problem, they would earn the gratitude not of the Jews alone but of all the Western World. 5 There was a time when Arab statesmen were willing to concede little Palestine to the Jews, provided that the rest of Arab Asia were free. That condition was not fulfilled then, but it is on the eve of fulfillment now. In less than three years’ time all the wide Arab area outside Palestine between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean will be independent, and, if Partition is adopted, the greater part of Palestine will be independent too.



6 There is no need to stress the advantage to the British people of



a settlement in Palestine. We are bound to honour to the utmost of our power the obligations we undertook in the exigencies of war towards the Arabs and the Jews. When those obligations were incorporated in the Mandate, we did not fully realize the difficulties of the task it laid on us. We have tried to overcome them, not always with success. They have steadily become greater till now they seem almost insuperable. Partition offers a possibility of finding a way through them, a possibility of obtaining a final solution of the problem which does justice to the rights and aspirations of both the Arabs and the Jews and discharges the obligations we undertook towards them twenty years ago to the fullest extent that is practicable in the circumstances of the present time. 7 Nor is it only the British people, nor only the nations which conferred the Mandate or approved it, who are troubled by what has happened and is happening in Palestine. Numberless men and women all over the world would feel a sense of deep relief if somehow an end could be put to strife and bloodshed in a thrice hallowed land.

ALL OF WHICH WE HUMBLY SUBMIT FOR YOUR MAJESTY’S GRACIOUS CONSIDERATION.

PEEL.HORACE RUMBOLD LAURIE HAMMOND WM. MORRIS CARTER HAROLD MORRIS R. COUPLAND

J. M. MARTIN, Secretary 22 June 1937.

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Address by Mr V. Jabotinsky to members of the British Parliament, 13 July 19375 To begin with Jewish interests: I will first ask you to look at this very rough map: it gives you an idea of the areas with which we shall have to deal. As the Report admits, when the Balfour Declaration was given, the word “Palestine” meant, in the minds of the authors of that Declaration, the whole of Palestine including Transjordan—what we call “Palestine on both sides of the River.” [. . .] Subsequently, in  1922, Transjordan was cut off and closed to Jewish immigration: an area of 90,000 square kilometers, containing even today a population of only 320,000. What was left for us since 1922 to try to colonize, is the Western slice of the country, [. . .] But the area recommended by the Royal Commission for the “Jewish State” is just about under one quarter of that Western quarter of Palestine [. . .]. I hope to be forgiven if, in my further references to this area, I will use not the term “Jewish State” but the term “Pale”—the Pale outside which the Balfour writ is no longer to run, so that all Jewish immigration in future will have to be confined to this area. The question therefore arises: what can be done upon that area from the viewpoint of colonizing immigrants? The conception of Zionism which I have the honour to represent is predominantly humanitarian: we want to save as many Jews as possible from the conditions in which they have to live in Eastern and Central Europe. What could be the maximum of population such an area can reasonably be expected to absorb and support? [. . .] Absorptive capacity after all must have its limits, and it seems that in the “Pale” those limits have already been reached and that the hope of settling there large numbers of additional immigrants, on anything like a healthy economic basis, is rather fantastic. But I must further disappoint those friends of the Partition idea who think that matters could be mended by increasing the area of the “Pale”, especially by adding to it a slice of the South, the so-called “Negeb,” which coincides more or less with what is known as the Beersheba area. I highly doubt if such an addition will prove possible from the point of view adopted by the Royal Commission—not to “irritate” the Arab opponents of Zionism; but let us be optimistic and assume, for argument’s sake, that the Negeb will be encroached upon and the slice given to the Jews so big as to double the area of the “Pale”. Even in that case the prospects for Jewish immigration would

The Threatened Partition of Palestine: Address to Members of the British Parliament on Monday, 13 July 1937 (Johannesburg: New Zionist Organization. 1937), p. 8 (Supplement to the Eleventh Hour, 6 August 1937).

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remain very meagre and very slow. The Negeb is a kind of terra incognita where no water to speak of has so far been discovered; it is, for the present, at best a “dry farming” area where the maximum density of population one may dream of reaching (and that only in the future) may be 25 inhabitants per square kilometre [. . .] This must be made absolutely clear. From the point of view of humanitarian Zionism, which needs above all room for millions of immigrants, any “Pale” would be perfectly valueless, with the Negeb as without it. With or without the Southern slice, Partition means the death of humanitarian Zionism. [. . .] For real Zionism, not the kind of Zionism-de-luxe concerned with creating in Palestine a toy-garden of Hebrew literature, but real Zionism bent on saving millions of men and women from their distress—for this kind of Zionism Partition, if final, would mean the doom of death. [. . .] Strategically, how can this “Pale” be defended against any serious aggression? Most of it is lowland, whereas the Arab reserve is all hills. Guns can be placed on the Arab hills within 15 miles from Tel Aviv and 20 miles from Haifa; in a few hours these towns can be destroyed, the harbours made useless, and most of the planes overrun whatever the valour of their defenders. [. . .]

Address by Dr Chaim Weizmann at the 20th Zionist Congress, 4 August 19376 The 1936 “Incidents” (Me’oraot) [. . .] at a certain stage in the incidents they decided in London to send sizeable forces to the country. It is true that the English Army is not at all large, but a significant percentage of this army was sent to Eretz-Yisrael. According to my simple understanding, there must have been some known purpose for this army. But it arrived, observed, and did not do a thing [laughter], it was not permitted to act. The Eretz-Yisrael administration has almost completely humiliated England. That same England, which is so dear to us, and especially to me. An entire division came to Eretz-Yisrael and then

In Meir Avizohar and Isaiah Friedman, The Palestine Partition Plans, 1937–1947. (Beersheba: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 1984), pp. 234–9. Source: The 20th Zionist Congress and the Fifth Session of the Jewish Agency Council, Stenographic Report, (Jerusalem: Directorate of the Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency, 1937), pp. 28–33. The source is a collection of selected passages from the original address delivered in Zurich at the 20th Zionist Congress. We thank the Ben-Gurion Research Institute for the Study of Israel and Zionism for giving us permission to publish this text.

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returned from there, and just as I have no idea why it set out in the first place, I have no idea why it hastened to return. But the strangest thing of all in this matter is that they are presenting us with a bill, to pay for the travel expenses of this excursion! A large portion of the change from six million pounds, about which we were so proud, from which we hoped that some crumbs might fall on our table as well, for the needs of the Jews, has melted away for the sake of this outing. Soldiers came, soldiers went—and they order us to pay the bill.

The Royal Commission and its propositions It is in this atmosphere that the Royal Commission has come to EretzYisrael. This commission included some serious individuals. They had a sincere and honest desire to investigate the matter in all its depth, without any bias, and a readiness to examine and to check everything. But within this atmosphere which I have described they had to remind themselves that a large movement with deep roots must certainly be behind these attacks. Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, Iraq, India—the whole world raging and erupting because of Eretz-Yisrael—this is more or less the sequence of thoughts which must have dominated the commission. I do not know what was said to them; I have not heard the testimonies of the administration. But it goes without saying that, in order to justify its inaction and to prove that it had not been possible to act otherwise, the administration had to say that there are here forces which exceed the proportions visible on the surface. It is a gross error to underestimate one’s opponent, but at the same time it is also an error to exaggerate one’s estimation of their power. And I have a feeling that the administration did everything in its power to exaggerate their estimation of the Arabs’ strength and therefore it was the main point of our testimonies, especially the testimony which I delivered to the Royal Commission, to emphasize with all vigor that under no circumstances should these incidents have taken place in Eretz-Yisrael. Under no circumstances! I cannot imagine in which corner of the British Empire they would have permitted such a situation to come about; and when I said this, not once but repeatedly, with all the energy and bitterness which I carried in my heart, I received the following reply: “Perhaps you are correct in what you say; but today we are already in this situation!” And what solution do they offer? One can see it in every line of the report. This is a report prepared by people for whom I have nothing but respect. Nonetheless I cannot refrain from pointing out the dissonance in it. Here they say: the Mandate document is complicated. But it is not we, after all, who have created it. It is not the Jewish Agency, but rather English politicians who wrote the Mandate document. After years of trying, it became clear indeed that this is no simple matter—is there anything Jewish which is simple?—but, nonetheless, there were things accomplished with the

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aid of this document, as a basis for action, which are worthy of praise. And the Royal Commission report confirms this. It even goes overboard with this praise. And so, it is not the Mandate document, of which they have made a scapegoat, which is to blame; to blame are the ambivalence, the weakness, the insecurity, the doubts and the hesitation of those who were appointed to implement the Mandate and who should have done so with dignity and force. The Royal Commission itself states: “If they had initially gone so far as to declare a Jewish state, there is no doubt that it would have been easier than this state of ambivalence in which we have been for 20 years.” Then, they would have found some way and some plan to implement this, and they would have been certain that the world at large would have understood this. Even among the Arabs there was at first an understanding of our situation; for after all Faisal was also a representative of the Arabs, and not just the Mufti, and Faisal knew all too well in what direction we were headed. And nonetheless we could have reached a compromise with him; in  1919 and in  1920 there were Arabs with whom we could have negotiated. But in their view, when they saw the constant vacillating, taking two steps forward and one step back, and that we were being delayed and obstructed at every single step, and that the authorities were like one enchanted by the singular principle of preserving equilibrium, and all that we were permitted is the possibility of work and nothing more, and that the entire extent of assistance is for the minimal maintenance of order in the country—a minimum which decreased from time to time, until it reached zero in 1936—it is no wonder that this only added power and capacity to the extremists among the Arabs to rally. And thus their realization was intensified that one need only apply more and more “pressure”—and in the end the English will give in.

The Aliyah in psychological terms And now, here is the great concession: they did not speak at all, or at least not to a great extent, in the Royal Commission about accusations of economic fault—since, from an economic point of view the Jewish people have not harmed and will not harm the Arabs; on the contrary, as the country develops, so increased prosperity has come to all parts of the community. Nonetheless at this stage they are emphasizing the political side: the Jewish Aliyah, from this point onward, is not to be considered in terms of economic absorption but rather in psychological terms. Perhaps you have heard in some corner of the world that the Aliyah official needs to be a psychologist? I wonder if soon they will not invite Professor Freud to sit in the Aliyah offices in the ports of entrance… To which psychology are they referring? If it is to the Mufti’s psychology, then it is fairly clear: that no single Jew should enter the country; on the contrary, that as many of them as possible should be removed. If it is in accordance with the wishes of the Mufti, then there is only one path before the Jews: the one that leads out of the country,

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but no way into the country. Where then is the psychological boundary which will satisfy the wishes of those who oppose the national home? This proposal and others, with which you are familiar from the “Blue Book,” they are all nothing but destructive for the national home, and we shall fight with all the means at our disposal, openly and honorably, against these proposals [tumultuous applause for several moments]. This is a violation of that guarantee granted to us on ceremonious occasion and at occasion of crisis for the English Empire; it injures us several times over since it falls upon us at a critical time in our history. I say this—I, who have made it my life’s work for twenty some years to bring the Jewish people and the English people closer, that they might understand one another and come closer in historical consciousness. I say this to you, who know my opinion so well, and who have misrepresented me on this point. It is true that we have arrived at the point from which it is impossible to proceed. About proposals such as these we cannot even argue. There is no psychological standard for Aliyah; there can only be this, that the ports be open more or less according to some principle—or that they will be closed altogether. One cannot so err with a people such as the Jewish people; it is not possible to approach the Jewish people carelessly. If it will be said to us openly: “In our opinion, the construction of the national home is at an end”—then we will know. But we will not accept this game, with a people swimming in its own blood. And especially England, whose empire is founded on the principles of morality—is it not the case that Canada and Africa are not connected to England only because of her war-fleet—this important empire in particular cannot permit itself to wrong an ancient and cultivated people so profoundly! Let them tell us the truth! We are entitled to it! [tumultuous applause] […]

The proposal for the Jewish state And now, I have come to the most important thing in what I have to say. In the Royal Commission’s report there is a revolutionary proposition, which has greatly shocked the Zionist Organization and the Jewish settlement: the proposal to establish a Jewish state on a limited portion of Eretz-Yisrael. There are, respected Congress, two criteria according to which we need to discuss this proposal. However, I would like to start at this time by saying that I am not speaking about the proposal included in the “Blue Book.” This proposal is unacceptable! [long applause] I am speaking about the very idea, the principle, the perspective, which this proposal contains. And I believe that the expression used by Secretary Ormsby-Gore yesterday in his letter is the right one: a proposal such as this needs to be examined in light of the possibility of the distant future. As I am not speaking about the concrete proposal in the “Blue Book,” I can exempt myself from a discussion on its particulars. More will be said

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on this topic, and I am prepared to clarify the issue in the committees. Moreover: even the British government does not quote this proposal, but rather has made a declaration of the principle and nothing more. I believe therefore that there are two questions, two criteria, according to which one can evaluate the value of this proposal from the perspective of principle: 1) Can the given principle serve as the basis for the construction of a Jewish existence?—and by this I am referring to construction, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, in the sense of that culture for which we have already laid the groundwork, and about which the “Blue Book” speaks with such appreciation. Can we, on the basis of such a principle, build a Jewish existence, as we would understand it: to raise upright Jewish men and women, to cultivate agriculture, industry, language, literature and art— in short, to raise and to construct all those same values which constitute the sacred and sanctified content of Zionism? Can we do this? That is one question. Our great teacher, Ehad Ha-Am, who is no longer with us, might have made do with this question alone. But times have changed and the history of our people, the direction of which to our regret is not for the most part determined by us, has burdened us with a sorrowful problem. And so we are compelled to consider the question also in terms of the second criterion: 2) Is this proposal a sufficient solution to the problem of the Jews, which today—it has already become banal to say this—has become thoroughly dangerous not only for us, but rather for the entire world? Does the proposed solution address these two questions? It is incumbent upon this congress to supply a clear answer. They are waiting for this answer in Warsaw, in Bucharest, in New York and in Argentina. And as for those Jews who have the good fortune to live under a liberal government, they also need to think very carefully about what answer they should give. This is not a question for a mathematician—what is the size of the part of EretzYisrael which they are offering us. We know arithmetic all too well. We have learned this over the course of two thousand years. It is our task now to provide an answer in light of those two criteria: can we answer, yes or no? I believe that we can, most certainly. Moreover, I would go so far as to say that we must answer in the affirmative. The choice before us is this: a Jewish minority in the whole of EretzYisrael—it is even possible to say in an Arab Eretz-Yisrael—or a block with a Jewish majority in part of the land. At this moment I would like to turn to those with whom I have not always been in agreement on matters political, and even they have not always been in agreement with me. I do not speak as would a member of Ha-Mizrachi, but as a man of deep religious feeling, even if I do not observe the official customs of the religion. I make an absolute distinction between reality and messianic destiny, in which all of us believe and which is a part of our being, which has been preserved and cultivated by the national tradition, and which has been sanctified by the suffering of martyrs over the course of thousands of years. There will come a time when there will be no enemies or borders, a time when there will not

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be heard the sound of cannon-fire and the sons of man will become humane people. Then Eretz-Yisrael will be ours. I have said this to the members of the commission: “God has promised Eretz-Yisrael to the Jews, and this promise is our most important document.” And though we are but flesh and blood, possessing but a limited field of vision, an unparalleled responsibility hangs upon us with all its weight and magnitude. I have said to the members of the Royal Commission that there are six million Jews waiting for Aliyah, and one of the members of the commission asked us: do you intend to bring them all to Eretz-Yisrael? To this I responded: no. I am well versed in the laws of physics and chemistry, and I know what material causes are. For our generation, I divide the number six by three, and this will be the sign for a Jewish tragedy, deeper than the sea. Two million young people, standing on the edge of survival, who have already today lost the most elementary right—the right to work—these two million we wish to save! The aged will go their way, will adapt or will not adapt. They have already become dust, economic and moral dust in this cruel world. And once again I reflected on our tradition. And what is tradition, esteemed friends? Tradition is nothing more than memories which have been given a poetic form. And we have memories. Already from thousands of years ago. We heard this from Jeremiah and Isaiah, and what I can say today is nothing more than a faint echo of what our sages, poets and prophets already said. Two million, and perhaps less than that, the remnant of the exile! But we must do this, and the future we must leave for this our young generation. If they will suffer and tremble as we suffer and tremble today—they will find the way in the end of days. And to my religious friends I say: know before whom and before what you are standing, for this is not a matter of political parties. Respected Congress! For the past two thousand years there has not been placed upon us a responsibility as heavy as that which is placed upon us today. We have neither sufficient wisdom nor sufficient strength to bear this responsibility; but history has placed it upon us and no one can penetrate and see what she has stored in her cards. We can only do what is possible. And if there are possibilities such as these, then I, who have given fifty years to the movement, all that a man has to give, and I have sacrificed the best part of my flesh and blood—then I say: yes! And I hope that you will also do the same. We will ask of you, at a certain part of our deliberation, to adopt a resolution which will empower the Directorate to negotiate a plan, which will guarantee these two principles. Afterwards the Directorate will approach you again and will present the matter before you, and you will be able to decide. And thus I wish you, and all of us, and the president of the Congress, that we enlist all our spiritual and psychological energies in order to find a way out of our predicament. But first and foremost, we must labor for and preserve our organization—this, our only asset—that it will remain intact [tumultuous applause; most of the delegates sing Ha-Tikva].

Chapter seven

Second Crossroads: The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, March–April 1946

Address by Prof. Martin Buber (Ha-Ichud) at the first session of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry1 Mr Chairman, it is impossible to survey the problem you are trying to meet without an understanding of the very roots of Zionism. For only through this understanding will the observer realize that he faces something quite different from the well-known national antagonisms, and therefore that methods other than those of political routine are called for. Modern political Zionism, in the form it has taken during my nearly fifty years of membership in this movement, was only developed and intensified but not caused by modern anti-Semitism. Indeed, Zionism is a late form assumed by a primal fact in the history of mankind, a fact of reasonable interest at least for Christian civilization. This fact is the unique connection of a people and a country. This people, the people of Israel, was once created by the power of a tradition that was common to some semi-nomadic tribes. Together these tribes migrated, under very difficult conditions, from Egypt to Canaan because they felt united by the promise to them of Canaan as their “heritage” since the days of the “Fathers.” This tradition was spectacular Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945–1948, Public Hearings (Zug: Inter Documentation Co., 1977), 14 March 1946, pp. 2–5.

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and decisive for the history of mankind in that it confronted the new people with a task they could carry out only as a people, namely, to establish in Canaan a model and “just” community. Later on, the “prophets”—a calling without any historical precedent—interpreted this task as obliging the community to send streams of social and political justice throughout the world. Thereby the most productive and most paradoxical of all human ideas, Messianism, was offered to humanity. It placed the people of Israel in the centre of an activity leading towards the advent of the Kingdom of God on earth, an activity in which all the peoples were to co-operate. It ordered every generation to contribute to the upbuilding of the sacred future with the forces and resources at their command. Had it not been for this idea, neither Cromwell nor Lincoln could have conceived their mission. This idea is the origin of the great impulse that, in periods of disappointment and weariness, ever and ever again encouraged the Christian peoples to dare to embark upon a new shaping of their public life, the origin of the hope of a genuine and just co-operation among individuals as well as nations, on a voluntary basis. But within the people that had created it, this idea grew to a force of quite peculiar vitality. Driven out of their promised land, this people survived nearly two millennia by their trust in their return, in the fulfillment of the promise, in the realization of the idea. The inner connection with this land and the belief in the promised reunion with it were a permanent force of rejuvenation for this people living in conditions which probably would have caused the complete disintegration of any other group. This serves as an explanation of the fact that, in the age of national movements, Judaism did not simply create another national movement of the European type but a unique one, a “Zionism,” the modern expression of the tendency towards “Zion.” In this age the hostile forces which, consciously or not, see in Judaism the Messianic monitor, quite logically attacked it more and more violently. Yet simultaneously in Judaism itself a great regeneration had started. Out of an inner necessity this movement of regeneration chose for its aim the reunion with the soil and, again out of an inner necessity, there was no choice other than the soil of Palestine and its cultivation. And with an inner necessity the new Jewish settlement on this soil centres in the village communities which, in spite of their differing forms of organization, all aim at the creation of a genuine and just community on a voluntary basis. The importance of these attempts surpasses the frontiers of Palestine as well as of Judaism. Given the chance of unhampered development, these vital social attempts will show the world the possibility of basing social justice upon voluntary action. Sir Arthur Wauchope, who, as High Commissioner in the years 1931–8, had the opportunity of acquainting himself with this country and this work, was right in pointing out that these “astonishingly successful” communal settlements are an example of co-operation for the whole world, and can be of great importance for the foundation of a new social order.

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At one time the productive strength of the people of Israel in this country was a collective strength in the most sublime sense. Today the same might be said of the productive strength which the returning Jews have started to display in this country. It is the productive strength of a community directed towards the realization of real community, and as such, it is important for the future of mankind. Mankind is fundamentally interested in the preservation of a vital and productive Jewish people, one that can grow only if fostered by the unique connection of this people and this country. The history of this principle is Zionism. Its meaning: concentration in Palestine of the national forces fit for renewing their productive strength. This principle again results in the three irreducible demands of Zionism. They are: First: Freedom to acquire soil in sufficient measure to bring about a renewed connection with the primal form of production from which the Jewish people had been separated for many centuries, and without which no original spiritual and social productivity can arise. Second: A permanent powerful influx of settlers, especially of youth desiring to settle here, in order incessantly to strengthen, to amplify and to revive the work of reconstruction and to protect it from the dangers of stagnancy, isolation and the forms of social degeneration particularly threatening colonization in the Levant. Third: Self-determination of the Jewish settlement about their way of life and the form of their institutions, as well as an assurance for their unimpeded development as a community. These demands, formulated simply in the concept of a “National Home,” have been recognized, but not yet adequately understood by large parts of the world. The tradition of justice, which I have mentioned, and which must be realized within every community and between the communities, makes it clear that these demands must of necessity be carried out without encroaching upon the vital rights of any other community. Independence of one’s own must not be gained at the expense of another’s independence. Jewish settlement must oust no Arab peasant, Jewish immigration must not cause the political status of the present inhabitants to deteriorate and must continue to ameliorate their economic conditions. The tradition of justice is directed towards the future of this country as a whole, as well as towards the future of the Jewish people. From it and from the historical circumstance that there are Arabs in Palestine springs a great, difficult and imperative task,  the new form of the age-old task. A regenerated Jewish people in Palestine has not only to aim at living peacefully together with the Arab people, but also at a comprehensive co-operation with it in opening and developing the country. Such co-operation is an indispensable condition for the lasting success of the great work, of the redemption of this land. The basis of such co-operation offers ample space for including the fundamental rights of the Jewish people to acquire soil and to immigrate, without any violation of the fundamental rights of the Arab people. As to the

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demand of autonomy, it does not, as the greater part of the Jewish people thinks today, necessarily lead to the demand for a “Jewish State” or for a “Jewish majority.” We need to absorb, but not in order to establish a majority against a minority. We need them because great—very great—forces are required to accomplish the unprecedented enterprise. We need for this land a solid, vigorous, autonomous community, but not in order that it should give its name to a State; we need it because we want to raise Israel and Eretz Israel to the highest possible level of productivity. The new situation and the problems involved ask for new solutions. An internationally guaranteed agreement between the two communities is asked for, an agreement which defines the spheres of interest and activity common to the partners and those not common to them, and a guarantee for mutual non-interference in these specific spheres. The responsibility of those working on the preparation of a solution of the Palestine problem goes beyond the frontiers of the Near East, as well as the boundaries of Judaism. If a successful solution is found, it will be a first step, perhaps a pioneer’s step, towards a juster form of life between two peoples.

Address by Mr Emil Ghoury (member of the Arab Higher Committee) to the final session of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 25 March 19462 Emile Ghoury: I am a member of the Arab Higher Committee, and Secretary-General of the Palestinian-Arab Party. Mr Chairman, Gentlemen, during your sojourn in this Holy Land you have been most patient in hearing testimonies from public bodies and from individuals. Allow me now to address you on behalf of the Arab Higher Committee. This statement will be our concluding testimony, the concluding testimony of the Arab Higher Committee. Your Committee was supplied with abundant material by the Arab Office and before you appeared representatives of Palestine, Arabs of all shades of opinion. We feel confident that the following outstanding points and facts have now been made clear to all concerned:

1 That the Arabs have no quarrel with the British Government or with

the British people, but they have a fight with the British policy as adopted in Palestine and imposed upon them against their will by legislation, administration and by force of arms. Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945–1948, Public Hearings (Zug: Inter Documentation Co., 1977), 25 March 1946, pp. 10–16.

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2 That the Arabs have nothing against the Jews as Jews. Anti-Semitism



3



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7

is alien to us; it is a European invention. We oppose the policy of political Zionism aiming at the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, and the transformation of the Holy Land into a Jewish State. That there are no schisms or differences between the Palestine Arabs, neither on religious nor on class grounds. They are all one people with the same background, cherishing the same hopes and aiming at the same goal. That the question of minorities does not exist among the Arab people and it shall never exist. The Christian Arabs numbering over 135,000 have definitely identified themselves with their Moslem Arab brethren. The Christian Arabs consider as a great insult to their honour and pride any suggestion to regard them as “minorities” or as needing a “special status.” The Arab national movement in Palestine is a genuine movement, emanating from the patriotic feeling and national consciousness of the whole nation. It is not the creation of any special class or any specific group. This movement has nothing to do with local family rivalries and does not derive its existence from any family or a group of families. It is above all groups and above all families. The Arabs do not deny the role played by the British forces in the Near East during the First World War in occupying this and other Arab countries. It should be remembered, however, that then the British were the allies of the Arabs and that both groups fought together against the common enemy. The contribution of the Arabs and of the Arab forces towards British and Allied victory were greatly appreciated by the late Viscount Allenby. The British were welcomed to Palestine by the Arabs as friends and allies, not as conquerors or invaders. The occupation of Palestine in 1917/1918 does not necessarily give Great Britain a “right by conquest.” The Palestine Arabs are not alone in their struggle against the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. The entire Arab and Moslem worlds support them in any stand they may take vis-à-vis the Zionist policy.

A quarter of a century has elapsed since the Mandatory Government has taken upon itself to establish the Jewish national home. During that period a series of calamities and injustices have befallen the Arabs: 1 They have lost their “absolute” majority in their own homeland. In 1918 they constituted 93 per cent of the entire population. In 1946 they constitute about 68 per cent only. 2 They have lost the most fertile parts of their lands.

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enjoyed in the Ottoman days, but they have also been deprived of all forms and institutions of self-government, of a constitutional administration, as well as of liberty and independence. The neighbouring Arab countries which like Palestine had been parts of the Ottoman Empire and were placed under class “A” Mandate are all independent and free. Palestine has fared otherwise.







4 The Arabs have lost much of their civil rights and privileges. The

Mayor of the Holy City of Jerusalem is no more an Arab; neither is that of Haifa or Tiberias. The ratio of Arab Councillors to Jewish Councillors is daily dwindling in those municipalities. In Jerusalem itself there is now no Municipal Council. 5 The most important economic resources of the country have been granted to Jews who have also come to control the country’s economy and industry. 6 Not only are the Arabs labouring under an almost dictatorial form of government, but they are also the victims of a policy of bias and discrimination adopted for the welfare and benefit of the intruders. The Jewish Agency which is nothing but a government within a government adds, because of the privileges it enjoys and the influence it possesses, to the fortification of this policy. 7 And in general the Arabs now find themselves aliens in their own home land with a sole obligation of paying taxes and fees to meet the yearly increasing governmental budget.

Meanwhile the statements submitted by the Jews and the testimonies of their leaders who have divided themselves to play the roles of intransigence, moderation, humanitarianism, have all proved that the Jews demand the transformation of Palestine into a Jewish state. Thus have grown the Jewish demands from a refuge in Palestine to that of a national home, and now to the Jewish state. But that is not all. The Jews look at Arab lands beyond the frontiers. They cherish the idea of having a “Land of Israel” extending from the Tigris to the Nile. There is a heap of evidence to support what we saw. The Charter of the Keren Kayemeth mentions Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Transjordan and Egypt, as the countries in which that institution is entitled to purchase lands. Apropos the various statements and testimonies offered, the Honourable Chairman and members of your Committee asked questions as to the soundness of certain proposals for the solution of the Palestine problem. We believe that we could envisage what intentions underlie some of those questions. We therefore find it incumbent upon ourselves to declare once more before your Honourable Committee that the Arabs can in no circumstances

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whatever acquiesce in any solution prejudicial to their interests and detrimental to their country. The Arabs are decidedly opposed to any further Jewish immigration to Palestine irrespective of number, class or period. Reference was made to the proposal of the theory of parity between the two peoples. This again will never be acceptable to the Arabs. It is a theory that entails serious dangers to their entity in their own homeland. Furthermore, the Arabs will never accept any solution aiming at the dismemberment of the country. The Arabs refuse partition from the outset and will never acquiesce in slicing away any portion of their country, not even the city of Tel Aviv itself. The unsound proposal of “partition” introduced by the Lord Peel Commission in  1937 threw the country into a state of chaos, turmoil and bloodshed for several months. Any lover of peace and stability should think twice before ever embarking on a similar proposal. The Woodhead Enquiry Commission, an official British Commission, reported that the partition scheme was impossible. Jamal Husseini, who has opened the Arab case before your Committee, has presented to you the Arab demands. The Arabs are unanimous in their support of these demands and they pray that they may be implemented. The Arabs demand as well the repatriation to Palestine of their first leader, the Grand Mufti, and of all Palestine Arab absentee, exiled and interned leaders. We hold that the implementing of the demands of the Arabs constitutes the only just, legal and practicable solution for the Palestine case. Gentlemen, whether this country has or has not benefited from Jewish immigration, Jewish capital, Jewish enterprise, Jewish industry and from all the other efforts and developments of which our opponents seem to boast so much is a matter beyond the point. For the Palestine case is not one of figures, statistics or preferment. It is not a case of bread and butter, but one of principles and morals. It is a struggle between right and might. Should might prevail? For the last 28 years this country, because of the Zionist movement, lost every sense of peace, moral or material. Your governments have brought about this dilemma through the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate and their imposition by force on the Arabs. It is for you now to recommend whether this state of turmoil and trouble should continue, or it should end by the termination of the Mandate and the abrogation of the Balfour Declaration. It fares you well, Gentlemen, to recommend the termination of the unbearable state of affairs in Palestine. Peace will then prevail and so will justice. [. . .] MR Crossman: I should like to ask just one question. In London I think it was the last Arab witness when asked what attitude would be adopted by the Arabs to Jewish immigration in the event of a final giving up of the

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notion of the Jewish state and the Jewish majority, said he thought a new situation would arise. Now I would like to ask you a similar question and ask you what your thought on the subject was. Supposing that the Jewish state were abandoned and the Jewish majority, what would be the Arab attitude to further immigration? GHO: The Arabs are not prepared to accept any more immigration. CRO: You do not take the same view as the Arab spokesman in London who said that a new situation would arise. GHO: The Arabs in Palestine are the people mostly concerned with their own affairs in their own country and their word should be taken as their word in this matter. We are not prepared to accept Jewish immigration. CRO: That is why I asked the question to make sure. Can I take it a stage further, supposing the White Paper policy were enforced and that independence was granted immediately, you are certain that an independent Arab Council would put an absolute stop to all immigration? GHO: It has to. CRO: Will you tell me why? GHO: Because the Arabs do not want any more immigration into their homeland, to their country. CRO: You say “it has to,” but what is the overwhelming necessity there? GHO: In every country in the world you have laws governing immigration. You have the quota system in the United States and the immigration laws in Great Britain, and that is what I meant, you have to make laws to prevent illegal immigration. CRO: You have laws to control immigration. What I wanted to know was what the content of those laws would be. You are certain that any Arab Council, if it were formed, by overwhelming public pressure it would have to stop any immigration whatever? GHO: Yes. CRO: So under Arab independence there is no place for the Jew in the Middle East? GHO: There is a place for the Jew in the Middle East if he gives up Zionism and gives up the idea of further immigration to Palestine and is prepared to live in harmony with the Arabs. CRO: In other countries of the Middle East. GHO: As well as Palestine. CRO: That is what I am trying to get at, supposing there was an independent Arab state, that would be the end of political Zionism. GHO: Yes. CRO: In that situation, would the ban on immigration be complete?

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GHO: Yes, there would be a ban on immigration. CRO: If the Jews had given up Zionism. GHO: Yes, giving up Zionism would terminate Jewish immigration; Jewish immigration was born of Zionism. CRO: So that no Jew after that would immigrate. GHO: Into Palestine, I assure you there would be many Jews who would leave Palestine. CRO: That is not the question. I am asking you whether the Jews would be allowed to immigrate. Long before the Balfour Declaration Jews came to this country and lived here. There was no ban on their coming here. They immigrated and settled here. GHO: We were then sovereign in our own country in common with the Turks and when we have our new independent Council, I am not a spokesman for that future Council, the matter will have to rest in its own hands. CRO: The record is getting confused. That was precisely the question I asked you, whether you would be able as a member of the Arab High Committee to give us a view of what that independent Council would be to Jewish immigration. GHO: We will terminate all Jewish immigration to Palestine. MR Manningham-Buller: You regard, I understand, every Jewish immigrant as a danger and a threat to the Arabs in Palestine? GHO: Yes, Sir. MBU: Is that right? GHO: Yes, Sir. MBU: Do you seriously take that view in fact, to an elderly, sick and infirm Jew who is now seeking a home and shelter for himself for the last few years of his life? GHO: Palestine is not an asylum. MBU: Would you prevent Jewish people in Palestine now providing a home for that sick and infirm and old Jew? GHO: All those Jews that have come to Palestine after the Balfour Declaration came in spite of our will, not with our acquiescence. We could not sanction any facility to take them as a result of their coming in against our will. MBU: That hardly answers my question. Let us deal with the present situation. There are as you know some remnants of the Jews who were in Europe in 1939 still in Europe. GHO: Yes, Sir. MBU: Some of them old; they have been persecuted, some of them are ill. GHO: Yes, Sir.

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MBU: A re the Arabs prepared to stop any old, infirm, sick Jew from coming to Palestine to spend his or her last few years in a Jewish home in Palestine? GHO: Yes, Sir. We are against any Jewish immigration irrespective of class, number or type of immigrant. MBU: Would you regard such a Jew coming to Palestine as a danger to the Arabs? GHO: Yes, Sir. MR Buxton: If somehow the Arabs of Palestine should consent to a fairly liberal immigration, would the Arabs of other countries protest against it? GHO: Will you repeat the question? BUX: If the Arabs of Palestine somehow should consent to a fairly liberal immigration, would Arabs of countries outside Palestine protest? GHO: I am afraid the question does not arise because there is no readiness on the part of Palestine Arabs to admit any immigrant. BUX: It is a hypothetical question. GHO: And the Arabs in other countries—you have heard more than we have during your last trips. Our experience of the Arabs living in the neighbouring Arab countries as well as the Moslem in India support the Arabs in Palestine, whatever stand they take. BUX: My question is, would the Arabs in other countries accept the decision of the Arabs of Palestine as final on immigration into their own country, into Palestine? GHO: As I said, the Palestine Arabs are not prepared to consider this.

Address by Mr Albert Hourani (representing the Arab Office) to the final session of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 25 March 19463 Albert Hourani: Mr Chairman, I think it is best to speak as shortly as is consistent with the adequate expression of my most important ideas, and I shall therefore not go over in detail the grounds which have already been covered in our written evidence. I shall use my time in order to reply to certain questions which have been raised in the course of your inquiry and to deal with certain considerations which may be present in your minds. But

Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945–1948, Public Hearings (Zug: Inter Documentation Co., 1977), 25 March 1946, pp. 102–128.

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before this, speaking as a Member of the Arab Office, and I believe as the last witness who will appear on the Arab side, I think it is right to emphasize, without elaborating what needs no further elaboration, the unalterable opposition of the Arab nation to the attempt to impose a Jewish state upon it. This opposition is based upon the unwavering conviction of unshakeable rights and a conviction of the injustice of forcing a long-settled population to accept immigrants without its consent being asked and against its known and expressed will—the injustice of turning a majority into a minority in its own country—the injustice of withholding self-government until the Zionists are in the majority and able to profit by it. The Arab opposition is based also upon the situation of the dangers of Zionism which threaten to distort the whole natural development of Arab peace—social, economic, political, and intellectual—and threatens also if not to dominate the Arab world, at least to disturb its life for generations to come. The Arab people, speaking through its responsible leaders, has again and again emphasized that the only just and practicable solution for the problem of Palestine lies in the constitution of Palestine, with the least possible delay, into a self-governing state, with its Arab majority, but with full rights for the Jewish citizens of Palestine—a state which should enter the United Nations Organization and the Arab League on a level of equality with other Arab states—a state in which questions of general concern, like immigration, should be decided by the ordinary democratic procedure in accordance with the will of the majority. I don’t intend, as I said, to go into detail about the Arab objections to Zionism or the Arab proposals for the solution of the problem, since they have been expressed in intolerable length in the written evidence we have placed before you. But I wish to make one remark. Even those who reject the Arab proposals cannot deny them one merit: They are at least proposals for a final and definitive solution of the problem. The Zionist proposals also have an appearance of finality, although we believe they are impossible of application; and if the attempt were made to carry them into practice, it would involve a terrible injustice and could only be carried out at the expense of dreadful repressions and disorders, with the risk of bringing down in ruins the whole political structure of the Middle East. It has been made clear to the Committee that what the Zionists want is a state and nothing else. I make reference to Mr Ben-Gurion’s answer when he was asked whether he would save the lives of 100,000 German Jews at the cost of giving up his ideal of a Jewish State, and he said no. The alternatives, it seems to me, are perfectly clear—either one must attempt to establish a Jewish State with all the risk involved, or else one must attempt to put into practice the Arab proposals. Nevertheless, it may still be thought possible to escape between the horns of the dilemma and to find some intermediate solution for the problem. All these intermediate

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solutions, I believe are illusory, but they should be examined, and I propose to examine, as briefly as I can, three of them: the first, partition; the second, Dr Magnes’ proposal for the establishment of a bi-national state; third, the proposal which has not been crystallized, but which I feel is in the air, that a certain number of immigrants, let us say 100,000, shall be brought in with the least possible delay and a certain amount of self-government should be established, also without much delay, but that the final solution of the problem should be postponed until the future. First, the idea of partition. It isn’t necessary for me to emphasize that the fundamental Arab objection to this is one of principle. If they object to a Jewish State on the grounds of principle in the whole of Palestine, they cannot object to it and they cannot accept it in part. If they accept it in principle in part, they cannot oppose it in principle in the whole. The size and the extent of the Jewish State are irrelevant to the question of principle. Apart from that, there are grave practical difficulties in the way of partition—difficulties which were dealt with finally in the report of the Woodhead Commission—difficulties in regard to administration, to finance, to trade—difficulties of having an Arab State which would be confined mainly to the hill country which is poor and where there is already a problem of rural over-population—and above all, the difficulty of whatever frontiers you attempt to draw for a Jewish State, there would still be a very considerable Arab minority in there, and this Arab minority could not be transferred forcibly because you can’t transfer peasants forcibly. And equally, it could not be exchanged, because there would not be a similar Jewish minority in the Arab State for which it could be exchanged. The Peel Commission, as you will recollect, admitted the practical difficulties of partition and said that the more they were examined, the greater they appeared, but nevertheless, it felt that partition held out the only hope of lasting peace. This hope, I believe, is vain. I believe that even more than any other solution, partition would be opposed to the very object of peace, and that for two sets of reasons: The first, because it is clear that the establishment of a Jewish State in part of Palestine would not satisfy the great majority of Zionists that want political domination over the whole of Palestine, at least. If they obtain a state in part of Palestine, they would be tempted to use it as the first step to pressing further claims. The establishment of a Jewish State in part of Palestine would not satisfy them, but would strengthen their position and encourage them to ask for more. That, on the one hand. On the other hand, even if they accepted partition in the first place, there are factors at work which would draw them, sooner or later, and probably sooner, into inevitable conflict with the surrounding Arab world. There is a dynamic force in Zionism which, unless it is checked now, will lead them on to destruction. They will be forced into conflict with the Arab world by various factors—by the need to deal with their own Arab minority, which would not

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consent willingly to become the subjects of a Jewish State and which would rise and protest and whose protest would be aided actively by surrounding Arab countries. So that for reasons of internal security and in order to deal with their minority, the Jewish State would be brought into conflict with the surrounding countries. Then again, in certain circumstances, I can imagine the pressures of population in the Jewish State would be so great it would turn the thoughts of the governing body to expansion, either in order to settle Jewish immigrants outside the Jewish State, or else in order to evacuate their Arab minority. Also in certain circumstances, they might be led to expansion by the need to secure stable markets for their industrial products. I turn secondly to Dr Magnes’ proposal for the establishment of a bi-national state. Before I examine it in detail, there is a statement which I have been asked to make. In his evidence before you, Dr Magnes made certain statements in regard to an agreement which had been made between leading Arabs and leading Jews in 1936. This agreement, he stated, had been signed—or he implied it had been signed—by certain leading Arabs in this country at the request of the Arab Higher Committee and its Members and at the request also of the Director General of the Arab Offices. Speaking, I am certain, on behalf of all responsible Arabs in this country, I wish to deny categorically and emphatically that any such agreement was ever signed between Dr Magnes and anybody who might be called a leading Arab in Palestine. I may mention that I saw Dr Magnes just before this session, and he has authorized me to say the statement he made was not intended to have that implication; that, in fact, the proposals were never signed by any leading Arabs. [. . .] As with partition, the basic Arab objection to Dr Magnes’ proposal is one of principle, which again I needn’t elaborate, an objection to the principle of further immigration which would be involved, to conceding Zionists more than they can legitimately claim, to weakening the Arab character of Palestine and to admitting the principle of the National Home. In addition to those objections of principle, there are certain others. Dr Magnes, in cross-examination, admitted that force might be necessary in order to bring in the hundred thousand immigrants whom he asked to be brought in immediately. This, it seems to me, destroys the moral basis of his proposals. The great advantage, as he has always urged in his proposals, is that they would make the dream possible and force unnecessary, but now he is willing to show, or, as it appears, to contemplate the use of force in the very beginning of the process, and two consequences immediately follow: The first: It will be impossible to establish an agreement if force is used at the beginning of a proposal.

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Secondly, if force is to be used at all, perhaps it should better be used in support of the policy which has more intrinsically to recommend it. Again, a bi-national state of the kind that Dr Magnes suggests can only work if a certain spirit of cooperation and trust exists and if there is an underlying sense of unity to neutralize communal differences. But that spirit does not exist in Palestine. If it existed, the whole problem would not have arisen in this form and Dr Magnes’ solution would be unnecessary. Since it doesn’t exist, Dr Magnes’ solution is, under present circumstances, impossible. And if it were possible—if a bi-national state could be established—it would lead to one of two things: either to a complete deadlock involving perhaps the intervention of foreign powers, or else to the domination of the whole life of the state by communal considerations. Moreover, the parity which Dr Magnes suggests is not so complete as it appears. As we understand his proposals, the Arabs ought to make an immediate concession of a number of immigrants, in return for the granting of self-government some time in the future. Again, self-government is not to be granted absolutely, but conditionally upon the Jews and Arabs having already found a way of peace. And again, when and if this self-government is established, it will be incomplete. The veto, as we understand Dr Magnes’ plan, is to lie in the hands of the head of state, and the Constitution is not to be drafted by representatives of the people, but by the United Nations Organization, and certain departments, among which I believe he mentioned the Department of Education, are not to be given either an Arab or Jewish head. There is one final objection to Dr Magnes’ plan, which is perhaps the most serious of all. Dr Magnes is a person whose integrity and sincerity none of us doubt, but it is clear to me he only represents a very small section of the Jewish settlement in Palestine. If his scheme were carried out, it would satisfy Dr Magnes and his supporters, perhaps, but it would not satisfy the vast majority of Zionists. Perhaps, if a bi-national state were established, Dr Magnes and his group would be swept aside and the majority of Zionists would use what Dr Magnes had obtained for them in order to press their next demands. Dr Magnes, in other words, might be the first victim of political Zionism. I turn now to the third set of proposals which I mentioned, a proposal which runs something like this: that the problem is very acute; there are difficulties on both sides; there is a balance of right and justice, and therefore we cannot hope for a definitive solution at the moment, but at the moment we can bring in a certain number, 100,000 immigrants; we can take the first steps to the gradual extension of administrative responsibility among the inhabitants of the country, and we can postpone the final settlement until sometime in the future, when perhaps things will be better than they are now. Here, again, the Arabs object to such a solution on grounds of principle. The number of immigrants to be brought in is irrelevant. The Arabs can never

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acquiesce in any immigration imposed upon them, and they cannot even begin to consider the question of immigration profitably so long as they are denied all responsibility for their own fate. The first condition about their even thinking of immigration as a possibility is that they should be given responsibility for their own national affairs. Then, again, the Arabs do not understand by what right Great Britain and the United States demand of them that they should bear the main burden of solving the problem of refugees. The guilt for creating that problem does not rest upon the shoulders of the Arabs, but on those of Europe. The Arabs have already been compelled to bear more than their fair share of solving the Jewish problem. I know so well the usual answers to this objection: the answer that it would be difficult to pass the requisite legislation through the United States Congress or the British Parliament, and the answer that the Jews would prefer to come to Palestine. But nevertheless I am not satisfied, and I do not believe that any Arab is satisfied, that Great Britain and the United States have done all that they can possibly do to solve the refugee problem at their own expense. In the past few months I have seen references in the newspapers to various motions and resolutions introduced in the United States Congress asking that the gates of Palestine should be opened to the Jews, or that the gates of America should be shut to immigrants, but I cannot recollect seeing a serious attempt made to open the gates of America to refugees. Until the Arabs are satisfied that Great Britain and the United States have done all that they can to solve the refugee problem at their own expense they are of the opinion that the British and American Governments should refrain from urging, still more coercing, the Arabs to solve the problem, or at least if they do so they should do so with the deepest possible sense of guilt and shame. Then again it is impossible, it is unhappily impossible, to consider the question of immigration simply on humanitarian grounds or on any other grounds. The question of immigration into Palestine must be seen in its general political framework. It must always be remembered that what the Zionists are aiming at is not to solve the refugee problem for its own sake, but to secure political domination in Palestine, and that their demand for immigration is only a step towards dominating Palestine. The first essential is therefore to convince them that they can never hope to achieve their aim by pressure or in any way. The grant of immigration now, however it were justified, would encourage them to ask for more, without in any sense satisfying them. Further, one may point out that this suggested solution is not a definitive solution; it leaves the way open for protests and pressure, for more committees and more reports, and an endless series of changes of policy. I may recall to you what happened in 1939 when the White Paper was issued, which laid down that self-government should be established after a delay of five years, but that in the interval 75,000 immigrants should be brought

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in. The five years have passed, and more than passed, and 75,000 and more than 75,000 immigrants have been brought in, and the country is no nearer to self-government than it was then, and now perhaps the Arabs are going to be asked to accept more immigrants, and more undertakings of eventual self-government will be given, and who knows whether after another five years they will be asked to accept more, and where will it have an end? Again, this suggested solution would not even preserve the status quo. In Palestine it is not enough to do nothing in order to preserve the status quo. Every day the situation grows worse; every day the tension mounts higher; every day the gap between rulers and ruled grows greater. The moral basis of the government is undermined, and this has a demoralizing effect both on rulers and on ruled. Perhaps two arguments may be put forward in favour of this type of proposal with which I am now dealing, and the first might be that even if these proposals did not solve the problem in the long run, at least they would solve it in the short run; they would help to clear the camps in Europe, they would appease Jewish terrorism; they would not, so it may be claimed, arouse immediate and violent reactions among the Arabs, and that would enable the British and American Governments to think about something else for the next few months. Even if these premises were true this would be a shortsighted argument. It would create a permanent problem for the sake of a temporary respite. But these premises are untrue. People who have a much closer contact with Arab public opinion than I have, have no doubt warned you of the danger of believing that the present quiescence and tranquility of the Arab people in Palestine and outside Palestine will continue. Every day some sort of outbreak grows nearer. I do not know what form it will take. It may or it may not take the obvious form of a rising in Palestine, but there is no doubt at all that some sort of violent reaction in some part of the Arab world will be expected, must be expected, to the attempt to continue the Zionist policy in Palestine. The second argument which might be used in favour of such proposals is one which is based upon the evidence given to you by Dr Notestein in America. Dr Notestein, I believe, gave evidence to the effect that the natural increase of the Arab population was so much greater than that of the Jewish population that there was no possibility of the Jews ever obtaining a majority in Palestine, or, if by chance they obtained it, of preserving it. Thus, what is necessary is to tide over the next few years and then the problem will solve itself, because it will become clear that the Jews can never be in the majority The Arab fears are therefore unjustified and will ultimately disappear, and the Jewish hopes are therefore unbased and will ultimately be given up. To this argument there are various objections: I do not speak about the factual basis of it, because I am not competent to judge, but one may point out that there are more ways than one of obtaining a majority. The Arabs are bound to remember that in the past few years responsible Zionists have talked seriously about the evacuation of the Arab population, or part of it, to other

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parts of the Arab world. It may be that their statements have been disowned by the Jewish Agency or by other responsible bodies, but nevertheless the possibility does exist, and the Arabs are bound to accept it very seriously. Again it must be emphasized that what the Zionists want is a State, political domination, and they are therefore prepared to do anything to get it. Everything else is political strategy. Thus in the past they used the method of economic absorptive capacity in order to obtain immigration, and thus they will use the democratic argument if possible. If they can obtain a State by way of having a majority that might seem simpler and it would enable them to justify their action in the eyes of the British and American public, but if they cannot obtain a State and political domination by way of having a majority they will try to obtain it in some other way, either by violence or by securing an artificial domination supported from outside. It may be that these objections to the various alternative solutions would be accepted, but that it would be pointed out that similar objections might be made also to the Arab proposals. I propose therefore to turn to certain obvious objections which might be made to the Arab proposals. The first is that if Great Britain and the United States accepted the Arab proposals this would be, in fact, to concede one of the two extreme positions, and this, it might be urged, would be unfair to the Jews and unacceptable to the British and American publics. In reality the Arab proposals are not extreme but are a compromise. For 25  years the Arabs have been protesting violently against the attempt to impose Zionist immigration upon them. Immigration has been forced upon them against their will and without their consent. Now, speaking through their responsible leaders, they declare again and again their willingness to accept those Jews who have entered Palestine legally and acquired Palestinian citizenship legally as full members of the political unity which they wish to form. They declare their willingness to enter into full community with their Jewish fellow-citizens of Palestine to try the dangerous experiment of people of different races and ideals living together. The generosity of this offer should not be underestimated. If it is not a compromise, what is? Secondly it might be asked what could the Jews expect under Arab rule in a self-governing Palestinian State with an Arab character? To this it should be enough to refer to the minutes of the proceedings of the 1939 Conference—which I believe are already in your hands—when Jamil Effendi Husseini, speaking as spokesman of the Arab delegation, made clear that what the Jews could expect would be full civil and political rights, control of their own communal affairs, municipal autonomy in districts in which they are mainly concentrated, the use of Hebrew as an additional official language in those districts, and an adequate share in the Administration. It should be clear from this that there is no question of the Jews being under Arab rule in the bad sense of being thrust into a ghetto, or being cut off from the main stream of life of the community, always shunned and sometimes

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oppressed. The Arabs are offering not this ghetto status in the bad sense but membership of the Palestinian community. If that community has an Arab character, if the Palestinian State is to be an Arab State, that is not because of racial prejudice or fanaticism but because of two inescapable facts: the first that Palestine has an Arab indigenous population, and the second that Palestine by geography and history is an essential part of the Arab world. It might be replied to this that no terms the Arabs could offer would be adequate compensation for giving up the idea of a Jewish State. The whole point of Zionism, it might be said, is that the Jews should be in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance, and that this is impossible so long as they are in a minority and have not a State. This antithesis of right and sufferance is meaningless. The true antithesis is between goodwill and force; whether the Jews wish to live in Palestine with the goodwill of the Arabs, or whether they wish to rely on force, their own or others’. What the Arabs are asking is not that the Jews should be here on sufferance in the bad sense, but that they should recognize their need for Arab goodwill. This is not humiliating to the Jews, to recognize that they are dependent on normal, good relations with Arabs. Moreover it is true that the Jews here in Palestine do need the Arab goodwill, and even if they were here by right that would not make any difference at all to this fundamental fact. The third and most searching objection to the Arab proposals takes the form of a question. The Arab proposals, it might be said, are all very well in principle but could they, in fact, be carried out except by force? Would the Zionists accept them? Would they not revolt against the attempt to deprive them of their possibility of establishing a Jewish State, and if they revolted would it not be difficult to repress their revolt, either because of the military risks involved or else because of the immediate outcry from British and American public opinion which no doubt would be misled by Zionist propaganda, whereby they would be led to believe that methods of repression were being used by the Arab Administration. The answer is clear, that there is a serious risk involved, just as there is a risk involved in any solution of the Palestine problem. The precise nature and extent of it are matters on which I believe you have already heard the evidence of the competent authorities, but this much can be said with certainty, that whatever risk there is will be greater in future than it is now, just as it is greater now than it was five or ten years ago. Nothing will be gained by waiting, but much will be lost. If there is a risk of violence now there will be a certainty of it if you wait much longer. There are either of two alternatives: either the extremist organizations on the Jewish side are bluffing, and then it will be best to call their bluff before it turns into reality, or else they are not bluffing and then it is better that the reckoning should come now rather than in a few years time. Every day which passes the Agency and its affiliated organizations become stronger and it becomes more difficult to dislodge them from their position. Under the Mandatory rule and with

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the acquiescence of the Mandatory Authorities the Agency is preparing to seize power. There can be no lasting peace in Palestine until the teeth of this monstrous organization are drawn. To this another point may be added. I believe that whatever immediate troubles may break out, sooner or later the Jews in Palestine will have to recognize that they need Arab goodwill and will try to win it but they will never do this until they are convinced that they have no alternative but good relations with the Arabs. So long as the state of Palestine is not definitely settled, so long as no national government exists, so long as the Zionists still hope for a state, they will refuse to take the steps necessary to win Arab friendship. The definitive settlement of the problem in the only way in which it can be settled, by the establishment of a national government, may or may not arouse immediate violence but it will certainly bring into existence the first and essential condition for an ultimate understanding between Arabs and Jews. It is worthwhile emphasizing this point because it makes clear one important aspect of the problem. There is a certain inclination in Great Britain and America to state the problem in terms of the conflict of two races and two nationalisms, and to picture the British and American Governments as impartial peacemakers and judges in no way involved in the conflict, but holding the two antagonists apart and doing justice between them. This is not the correct view. You will never understand the problem aright unless you realize that Great Britain and America are essentially involved in it. They are not only judges, they are also actors in the tragedy. There can be no settlement, no final settlement, until the Zionists realize that they can never hope to obtain in London or Washington what is denied them in Jerusalem. So much for the various solutions of the problem and the various objections to them. In closing I should like to emphasize what must be present in  all our minds, that ultimately this is not a political or an economic problem to be decided only by political or economic criteria; ultimately and inescapably it is a moral question. There is a question of right and justice involved, and, more than that, what is done or not done in Palestine will deeply affect the system of moral relationships between the Arabs, the Jews, and the Western world. Firstly the relationship between the Arabs and the Jews. No honest Zionist can deny that the Jews have been well-treated throughout history in the Arab world. It was here that they found refuge when they were turned out of Spain; not a refuge given to strangers; they became part of the Arab universal community and Arabic became their language. No Arab would wish to destroy the good relations which have always existed between Arabs and Jews if the Jews still care to accept them. If there is tension in various parts of the Arab world, if relations are not so good as they were or as we all should like them to be, that is entirely due to political Zionism.

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Secondly, the relation between the Jews and the Gentile world, and here, if you will allow me, I would like to speak for a moment not as a member of the Arab Office but as one who was nurtured in the European Christian tradition and who feels deeply and personally the guilt and sufferings of the Jews, and who would do nothing in the world to irritate the wounds of a hurt people. Quite apart from the Arab objections, I am not convinced that Zionism is the solution of the Jewish problem, or that the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine would improve relations between the Jews and the Gentile world. My views on this point have been put before you in a memorandum called, “Is Zionism the solution of the Jewish problem?”, which I believe you have before you, and I do not intend to go into detail about it, but I wish to mention two queries which were in my mind. The first is whether, in fact, Zionism does not involve a despair of Europe and European democracy; whether it is not the turning away from Europe and all that it means; whether it is not a confession that Europe has failed, that European democracy is no more than a sham, and that the Jews can never, never live in tolerance and good relations in Europe. The second query is a query whether even if a Jewish State were established in Palestine the Jews would become a normal nation like all nations. I do not believe that the unlikeness of the Jews is due simply to a combination of political, economic and social causes. I believe it lies much deeper than that and can ultimately only be explained in theological or metaphysical terms, and it seems to me that if the Zionists came back to Palestine and had their dream of a Jewish State, their unlikeness and all that gives rise to troubles to themselves and others would change its form, perhaps not for the better. Finally, the relations between the Arabs and the West. Here, again, my views on this subject have been fully expounded in the various written evidence, and I do not need to go into detail about them, but it seems clear to me that the main task of the Arabs today is to come to terms with Western civilization and with the new Westernized world community which is coming into existence, and the Arabs are faced today with a choice between paths: either they can go out towards the West and towards the world in openness and receptiveness, trying to take from the West what is of most value and greatest depth in its tradition and blend it with what they have of their own, trying to establish a relationship of tolerance and trust between them and the Western nations with whom they are brought into contact, and trying to enter into the new world community on a level of equality and in a spirit of cooperation; or else they can turn away from the West and from the world, in spiritual isolation and in hatred, taking nothing from the outside world except the material means with which to combat it. I believe the first path is the path that the Arabs must follow, and that the responsible leaders among them want to follow. Nevertheless the attitude which the Arabs will take up towards the West is not entirely a matter for the Arabs themselves; it depends very largely upon the attitude which the West takes up towards them, and

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it is at this point that Zionism comes in. Zionism for the Arabs has become a test of Western intentions, and so long as the grievance, the intolerable grievance, of Zionism exists it will be impossible for the Arabs to establish that relationship of tolerance and respect, of trust and cooperation, with the world and to live at peace with themselves and their neighbours, and it will be impossible for that Arab nation—progressive, tranquil, contented and stable—to come into existence for which we all hope, and to which we are all trying to work. MR JUSTICE SINGLETON: [. . .] You said that the bi-national state was the most serious proposal of the three alternatives you mentioned. [. . .] You added that Dr Magnes was a man of integrity of whom no-one could think anything but good. There are some, too, upon the Arab side, I hope, are there not? HOU: I hope so. SIN: Have you seen any real effort made for them to get together? HOU: It seems to me it is difficult to make an effort to reach agreement so long as the very basis of agreement is lacking; so long as the question of immigration and the Jewish State is not in abeyance I do not see on what grounds there could be an agreement. SIN: Well, it may be in certain events—of which I know nothing—that the chance is greater now rather than later on, do you mean? HOU: If I may put it in this way, I would say that if the question of immigration and of a Jewish State were finally settled, and if the Jews in Palestine were willing to accept their status as full citizens of a Palestinian democratic state, then I foresee no ultimate difficulties of relationship arising from fanaticism or prejudice between Jew and Arab. SIN: Believe me, I appreciate the difficulty of an answer to a question like that, and the necessity for the “ifs” which you put into your answer, but I do not regard it as an ultimate answer, and there I was not speaking to you but to others. You see, time runs on; it is nearly thirty years that this trouble has been in existence now, and I cannot help thinking that reasonable men ought to try to get together if possible, and the earlier the better. However, I was told by one distinguished man who gave evidence before us in Washington months ago that if you could get rid of the extremists on both sides the thing would be easy, and I asked him how you got rid of the extremists on both sides. You cannot reckon on that, I suppose? HOU: No. SIN: As to the third alternative, that is the proposal to let a certain number of Jews into Palestine at the moment, and then to have a temporary set-up with some postponement for a while, you think that is objectionable too? HOU: Yes.

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SIN: You think the matter must be solved now? HOU: I believe the situation will tend to get worse rather than better if it is left. SIN: Believe me, every member of this Committee is anxious to find a solution if he can, and to find it quickly, but the solution which you put forward on behalf of the Arab Office is that the Arab Office, or the Arab people, should really be given all that they ask, that is the only justice in the matter. That is your case. That is a fair way to put it, is it not? HOU: That is, I think, a fair way to put it, but I am afraid it might give the impression that what the Arabs are asking is something intrinsically unreasonable or violent. I can imagine Arab proposals which would be much more extreme than that, which nevertheless the Arabs are not putting forward. SIN: And you put it forward as the final and definitive solution of the problem? HOU: Yes. SIN: Did you hear the evidence of Mr Ben-Gurion? HOU: Yes, Sir. SIN: Did you hear him say that 100,000 or 200,000 Jews were ready to die for the Jewish State? HOU: Yes. SIN: If that is right it may be that the solution which the Arabs propose would not be final and definitive, at least for a long time, might it? HOU: If I may, I should like to repeat what I said in my statement, that I fully realize the risks and dangers involved, but I believe those risks and dangers exist whatever solution is attempted, or even if no solution is attempted. I believe also that those risks and dangers will grow greater in course of time rather than less. SIN: It may be that you are right. HOU: It may be. SIN: But there is a grave risk. Suppose the Committee thought, at the end of all their deliberations, that that was fair and just in all the circumstances, it is not an end of the problem in all human probability, as far as one can judge at the moment? HOU: It is an end to the problem in the present form. SIN: Yes. Now, on the other side, you appreciate it is said by the Zionists or the Jewish Agency, “Give us Palestine as a Jewish State; let us put in as many people as we want so that we have a majority, and there is a final and definitive solution.” Would you regard that as a final and definitive solution?

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HOU: I think it has the appearance of finality, but I do not believe it could in practice be carried out, and even if it could I think it would only be carried out at the expense of great injustice, great repression, great hardship and with risks to the whole of the Middle East. SIN: And with risk of bloodshed again? HOU: I am afraid so. SIN: I would like you to tell me one thing upon this matter, and I ask you because I know you have thought of the whole problem, from your address to us. One witness at least on behalf of the Zionist side of the case told us some weeks ago, I think, that the Jews would be much safer if they had their own state, and that if they had had their own state at the time of the European war they would not have suffered as those in Europe suffered under Hitler, who could be reached by him. What do you say to that? HOU: I should not like to say anything dogmatic about it, but it seems to me there is at least an equal probability of exactly the opposite being true. The existence of a Jewish State in Palestine might very well endanger the position of the Jews with the Arabs in the outside world by providing an additional argument for anti-Semitism, and also it would increase the tragic self-division of the Jews of the dispersion. SIN: I have thought a good deal about that argument put up by someone, and I do not mind saying now that I want at some time, perhaps tomorrow morning, to have an opportunity of asking Mr Ben-Gurion how he would deal with that. Suppose you have a Jewish State in Palestine, surrounded by Arabs who are hostile, if there was another world war or anything of that kind what chances of survival do you think it would have? I suppose your answer would depend on which side it was. [Laughter]. But it is not easy, is it? HOU: With all respect, there are so many “ifs” involved in that question that I find it difficult to answer. SIN: There are not quite as many as there were in your previous answer, but it is a problem for consideration. HOU: Yes, I agree. SIN: Suppose there were a large number of Jews congregated together forming a Jewish State, if there were a million or so, do you think they would be any safer here than they would be in the middle of another country, be it the United States or England, or now Germany or Austria? HOU: I think there are many answers which could be made to that, but the point which comes to my mind is that the Jews in Palestine, however many they are, and however well organized they are, cannot be safe if they come into this country against the will of the inhabitants. [. . .]

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MR CROSSMAN: [. . .] You stated, as is often stated, it was unfair for Palestine to bear the main burden of the European refugee. Has it occurred to you that in fact the Jewish displaced person is a very small part of the total problem and that the rest of them will certainly have to be borne mostly by America and Great Britain. HOU: Even then, even if all the displaced persons are given consideration, I do believe that if you take the record of Palestine for the last 25 years, it has taken its fair share. CRO: I only want to suggest that there was a much larger problem, that the countries of the West were willing to deal with the huge displaced persons problem which nobody pretends that the Yugoslav should come to Palestine. Then one second point. You mentioned particularly about forcible immigration, I remember, that you couldn’t be forced to have immigration. I would like to ask you a similar question to the question I asked the last speaker of the Arab Higher committee, not to catch you, but to find out what you feel. Imagine your Arab State with complete sovereignty. Imagine the situation of your Jewish minority in the State with some of its children and its old people in displaced persons camps in Europe. Do you believe that the Arab with his sense of courtesy and truth would ban any one of those from coming into Palestine? HOU: I think that the answer to that is clear. The very question of immigration on any grounds cannot be responsibly or profitably discussed so long as there are no channels of consent and consultation. If there really is a case of mandatory or any grounds for the admission of immigrants, then that is an additional reason for hastening the establishment of self-government as soon as possible. But if any section of self-governing Palestine wanted further immigration it would be able to urge the matter by ordinary democratic procedure and in accordance with ordinary democratic principles would have to abide by the will of the majority. CRO: You wouldn’t, therefore, exclude as a matter of principle all Jewish immigration into an Arab Palestinian State? HOU: I refuse to mortgage the future of the Arabs in any way. I refuse to say what would or would not happen if there were an independent Arab State. That would have to be left to the future. CRO: I feel to some extent you are a little unfair on that because unless one is to some extent prepared to say what one is going to do—you are not going to kill all the Jews. You have to give a certain mortgage to try to decide about the future. I don’t feel you are quite right in saying that. HOU: I think one can mortgage the future by saying one isn’t going to kill the Jews, because the essential condition of establishing a democratic community—the question you are asking is not essential to the constitution of an Arab State.

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CRO: It might be essential really to the life in any real sense of one-third of your community, as it would be now. HOU: Then I return to what I said before, if there is a case on any grounds to be made for further immigration it would have to be made in democratic ways and decided in democratic ways. CRO: The third point, I think your chief objection to Magnes, or one objection, was that underlying unity does not exist upon a bi-national state? HOU: Yes. CRO: Did it occur to you in saying that, that is an equal objection to the immediate establishment of Arab independence because if the relations are really bad of the two communities, mustn’t we fear that independence will enable the majority to maltreat the minority? HOU: No, I think if I may answer that at some length, the difference between the Arab proposal and Dr Magnes’ proposal is that if an independent state, or an Arab State were set up at least from the beginning it would command the loyalty of a large section of the population who will believe in it and take all the steps necessary to make it a success. If Dr Magnes’ state were set up nobody, with the exception of a few individuals, would believe in it. It wouldn’t have any sort of loyalty. CRO: I see your point there, but I still want to press you on this point: if you admit there is no real underlying unity of Arab and Jew, isn’t that really an argument for the prolongation of a mandate in the sense if neither really likes the other, hates the other, somebody ought to be there to make sure they don’t kill each other? HOU: I think the reply to that is that the establishment of a self-governing state is the first condition for the creation of an independence. The Zionists will never make any concessions and they say there is no alternative. CRO: The last point—don’t misunderstand me. The first question is who are you—that is to say, those who speak for the Arabs, what right have they to speak for them? I want to get this question. When we have the Jewish side we know there are elections, the people have been elected. There is a movement that has gone through the form of electing its leaders. On the other side I hear you say it is perfectly rational, but I wonder what justification there is for believing what you say would happen. Could you tell us something about the structure and the representation and perhaps your present and future plans for it? HOU: As for me personally, I can’t say. An Arab Higher Committee functioned until 1937 which commanded the loyalty and obedience of the vast majority of the Arab population. That Higher Committee was dissolved during the disturbances, and in 1937 until 1945 there was no representative

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body for the Palestinian Arab. At the end of 1945, in November, I believe, the new Higher Committee was established. Elections were held under circumstances not allowed up until now, but I think there is no doubt at all that they do represent the overwhelming body of responsible Arab opinion. Whether they will be able to impose their will upon the people, whether they will form the government of independent Palestine it is not for me to say. But insofar as there is such a thing as Arab opinion today, and insofar as the Arabs of Palestine are united—you have heard their voice in this hall. CRO: The Arab Higher Committee has never, in fact, been elected? HOU: It was formed, not elected. CRO: Would you feel that it would be absolutely vital to the health of the Arab, the Palestinian Arabs, to hold elections in the future for the creation of your leadership? HOU: I feel it is vital to establish democratic institutions for the Arab people in Palestine in the full sense. The precise nature of the constitution I don’t know. It isn’t my business. I am not a member of the Arab Higher Committee. I think everyone is agreed on the fact that the Arab Higher Committee must in the fullest sense represent the people in Palestine, and this involves some sort of democratic power. Again I am talking as a private individual. I have no right to commit anybody. MR CRUM: Is it part of your case that in the establishment of an Arab State force might have to be used? HOU: Yes, if you do not broaden that with the conclusion that I welcome it. CRU: No, but you feel that the establishment or setting up of an Arab State or any other conclusion might result in the use of force? HOU: I feel there is no solution of the Palestinian problem, not even refusal to solve it, which doesn’t involve the risk of using force. CRU: Do you think that the Arab community in Palestine could establish itself as a State without outside aid? HOU: Since Palestine at present is still under mandate, and since the whole administration is in the hands of a foreign government, it would be impossible for a Palestinian State to come into existence without help. CRU: Assume the withdrawal of forces, would it be your view that the Arabs could establish a State here themselves? HOU: Yes. CRU: And could prevent any activities, successful activities, say, by the Jewish Agency? HOU: Yes, with the help of the Arab League.

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MR MANNINGHAM-BULLER: [. . .] There are people in Europe now, old people, and I put this point before but I want to put it once more to see what your answer is. There are old people who can scarcely spend a year waiting until Arab self-government was set up, if it was going to be set up, and then going on waiting to see what the Arab government then decided to do about them. I would like to put this to you: with regard to those old, sick people does the Arab office—in your capacity would you object to those individual Jews who have relatives here who are prepared to look after them, would you object to their coming to this country? HOU: If I may say so, I feel the question is not quite adequately posed. It implies there is no other possible assignment for those people. MBU: With great respect, I don’t think so. You said in your address to us that you wouldn’t agree to immigration until you were satisfied that Great Britain and the United States had done all that was possible. Well, we have lost thousands of homes and houses during this war, but we have at the same time opened our doors to Jews who have relatives in Great Britain. I was only asking whether the Arabs would be prepared to open their doors to elderly Jews who had relatives now in Palestine as a humanitarian measure. HOU: May I make two replies to that? The first is that it would not be true to assume that the only choice before those refugees in Europe is either to come to Palestine or to die. There are other possible assignments. In the second place, with regret, as one says, it is impossible to divorce the question of immigration on whatever grounds you justify it from a peaceful settlement. MBU: Let me assume at the moment that the only relatives these elderly Jews have in the world are in Palestine. Would you be in favor of keeping them in their last few years away from the one relative who perhaps possibly can give them help? HOU: In view of all that has happened and in view of the political aid of the Jewish Agency I am afraid there is no alternative, but I insist that the Arabs are not responsible. These people, like Dr Magnes says, are the victims of political Zionism. MR PHILLIPS: Now the people of Palestine are at present roughly two Arabs to one Jew. If there was an Arab State do you consider that some type of cooperation between the majority and minority at this point would be set up? In other words, there is already a considerable minority and I wondered whether you could conceive of any piece of machinery by which the people, to use your own language, of Palestine could cooperate on this broadened matter.

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HOU: In any circumstances I think the constitution would have to be a very complicated machine, and sitting here like this I wouldn’t like to improvise one to answer that question. That and other questions would be a matter for considerable thought. MR MCDONALD: If you had to choose between waiting a long time to get your complete solution, or taking something less, which would you prefer? Or, to put it otherwise, would you prefer to have the continuance of the mandatory or some other form of outside power rather than accept something less than your complete desire? HOU: No, I would prefer to have the whole. MCD: And in the meantime have the foreign power? HOU: In the meantime go on struggling for independence. SIR FREDERICK LEGGETT: Is your great fear due to the fact that the emphasis is put on young men as immigrants, and are you afraid that they will simply add to the army which is going to fight you? HOU: Well, that is one fear. Another fear is that any immigrants who come into the country, whether or not they are young and able to fight, do add to the Jewish element and bring nearer the day when the Jews will be able to say that they are a majority. LEG: Would your view be changed if there was some complete understanding about the number? HOU: Well, I think if I may repeat what I said in my statement, I should like to recall what happened in  1939 when such an understanding was attempted. It was proposed by the British Government, that precise figure, 75,000 immigrants, would be brought in in  5  years and that would be the end. LEG: Hasn’t the whole problem been completely changed for the world generally by the awful slaughter that has happened to the Jews? HOU: I think the problem has been multiplied in many regards. I don’t believe the danger of Zionist domination has completely disappeared. LEG: The problem has changed, you agree? HOU: There has been considerable change in the problem. MR CRICK: I understood you to say in the course of your address that if Palestine were now granted its independence that there would be no difficulty about allowing them to remain in the country, those Jews who are already in Palestine legally and have obtained Palestine citizenship legally. Now I gather that we may take a rough figure—let us suppose there are

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600,000 Jews. I was rather struck with the care by which you used your words, “those who are in Palestine legally,” because I imagine out of that 600,000 you would consider that a considerable number are here illegally. Is that true? HOU: I have no precise idea of the numbers involved, but all I was concerned to do was state the principle. No government of any sort, whether it is mandatory government or independent government, can function without reserving its right to take action. CRI: Would you agree with me that there are a number of Jews in the country now who have been here a good many years but have not taken up Palestine citizenship? HOU: Yes. CRI: What would you do with the Jews who are here illegally in the sense of having come in as illegal immigrants and with the Jews who are already here, but have not taken out citizenship papers? HOU: I don’t think I should like to answer in detail because that is obviously a very complicated technical question for the Department of Immigration. CRI: Would you let them stay or would you want them removed? HOU: Those who obtained their citizenship legally would stay and have complete political rights. I don’t think there is any question of the illegal immigrants being forcibly deported. They would remain, but insofar as they have not taken out the rights of citizenship they would not have the political rights of citizenship. In fact, they would be treated exactly as illegal immigrants are in America. CRI: So I take it that no Jew now here need have the fear under your proposals that he would be deported, assuming he is a decent citizen? HOU: I must make clear I am speaking of the individuals who have no right to citizenship. It is extremely unlikely that Arab Palestine would want to add to the refugee problem of the world. CRI: There are one or two questions I would like to ask in respect to your policy with regard to them. First of all, if you have your independent government now established in Palestine with an Arab majority, how would you imagine land in Jewish ownership now would be treated? Would you want to make any modification of the terms upon which their land is held? HOU: Again that is a technical question on which I shouldn’t like to go into detail. I have the gravest doubt whether the clauses could be allowed to remain. CRI: Would you feel in regard to the present restrictions upon land transfers, would you feel inclined to retain them?

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HOU: I should feel inclined to retain them so long as two conditions exist: firstly, so long as there continues to be in existence a desire for a Jewish State; so long as the danger of political Zionism is not destroyed. Secondly, so long as there continues to be a serious rural over-population. I believe the present land transfer regulations need not be justified simply on political grounds; they could also be justified on economic grounds! Every Government reserves to itself the right to take steps to safeguard the position of its cultivators, and there is no doubt there is a serious problem of landlessness and rural overpopulation.

Address by Mr Moshe Shertok to the final session of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 25 March 19464 I am deeply conscious of the responsibility which has devolved on me to wind up the case for the Jewish Agency for Palestine and to be the last of the long string of Jewish witnesses to appear before this distinguished Committee. The issue before this Committee does not lie merely between the Jews of Palestine and the Arabs of Palestine. It is not comparable to the problem that faced Canada in the middle of the last century, or Switzerland at the time when its present constitution was adopted. The question is not how to compose the differences between two sections of an existing population. The question is whether the growth of one section of the population should be prevented or accelerated. It is not a matter of mere internal rearrangement within an existing political system. The issue at stake is whether a new political set-up will be established for the righting of an old wrong. It is an age-old and world-wide issue. It lies between the Jewish people and the whole world. The Jews and the Arabs are the parties primarily concerned. Now the crux of the matter is the right of entry—the right of the Jews to enter Palestine. That right was never, and is not today, considered by the Jews to depend on Arab consent. To say this does not mean that the Jews are not vitally interested in securing Arab agreement to their return. But experience has shown that consent is only likely if those concerned realize that it is not an indispensable condition. If in  1917 Dr Weizmann had been referred to King Hussein or Emir Feisal for their prior blessing to the Balfour Declaration as a condition of its issuance, the blessing would never have been given and the Declaration

Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945–1948, Public Hearings (Zug: Inter Documentation Co., 1977), 26 March 1946, pp. 77–105.

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would have remained unissued. But, basing himself upon the Balfour Declaration as an accomplished fact, and realizing how vital agreement with the Arabs is, Dr Weizmann was able to obtain Amir Feisal’s blessing on it and to reach a complete agreement with him. I hope the Committee did not take seriously the contention advanced here the other day that the late T. E. Lawrence was a dishonest broker, and that the late King Feisal was a man who knew not or cared not what he was signing. I have the Photostat copy of the agreement here before me and it can be made available to the Committee. The rider in Arabic in Feisal’s own handwriting is beautifully clear and it shows great care in the choice of words and in formulation on the part of the late King. Its literal translation is as follows: “If the Arabs attain their independence as requested by us in our memorandum to the British Foreign Office of 4 January 1919, then I agree to what is contained in the provisions of this document, but if there is the slightest change, then I will not be bound or tied by any word and this treaty will be considered as null and void and I will not be held responsible.” “The Arabs” does not, of course, mean “Palestine Arabs,” otherwise the whole agreement would be meaningless. Feisal’s signature to the agreement with Weizmann was not an isolated act. He wrote a letter and gave an interview to “The Times” in the same tenor. An official record of his appearance before the Council of Five in Paris in 1919, together with Nuri Said Pasha and Auni Bey Abdul Hadi, runs as follows: “Palestine, for its universal character, he left on one side for the mutual consideration of all parties interested. With this exception, he asked for the independence of the Arabic areas enumerated in his memorandum.” A few days later, a Syrian delegation, which included Jamil Mardam Bey, the present Foreign Minister of Syria, appeared before the Supreme Council. It is interesting to read what they had to say, and they said this: “Palestine is incontestably the southern portion of our country. The Zionists claim it. We have suffered too much from sufferings resembling theirs not to throw open wide to them the doors of Palestine. All those among them who are oppressed in certain retrograde countries are welcome. Let them settle in Palestine, connected with Syria by the sole bond of federation. . . If they form the majority there, they will be the rulers.” The Feisal-Weizmann Agreement remained on paper. Arab independence took time to materialize. In Palestine, weakness of purpose and slow execution on the part of the Mandatory proved fatal to the success of its declared policy. The political fact was not translated with speed and determination into a physical reality. The failure of that period, the unique chance that was then missed, is a grave lesson for the present time. Meanwhile, through all the years of slow and difficult progress the Jews continuously strove for an agreement. I am not going to weary the Committee with a detailed account of the efforts made by the late Brigadier

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Kisch, who was the political officer of the Zionist movement throughout the 20s. Interesting material on that subject about his efforts on behalf of peace, political peace, will be found in his Diaries. I myself am more closely familiar with developments since the autumn of 1931, when the late Dr Arlosoroff was elected to succeed him. In the period from 1933 to 1935 particularly active efforts were made, in which Mr Ben-Gurion played a major part. Meetings with Arab leaders, all on Jewish initiative, took place in Palestine, in the Middle East and in Europe. Every conceivable avenue of approach and contact was explored. The conversations were long and interesting, and, as a rule, very frank. At times it seemed as if some elements of agreement were in sight. There was no question, of course, of sacrificing, for the sake of an agreement, what is the very essence of Zionism—the unhindered growth of Jewish Palestine through continued immigration, and the right of the Jews to form a majority if economic conditions warranted it. Some Arab leaders seemed inclined to accept very substantial immigration, but they attached conditions which could not be fulfilled. It was not for the Jews to bring about the immediate liquidation of the British Mandatory regime, nor did they at the time particularly cherish the prospect. The removal of the French from Syria was certainly beyond Jewish control. These were not the only reasons why the negotiations remained inconclusive. While on the Jewish side a policy of agreement was openly canvassed in the press and formed the subject of numerous public conferences, nothing of the sort was in evidence on the Arab side. The leaders who were ready to discuss a compromise in private would not state their views publicly. Their usual line was to insist on the necessity of a careful preparation of the ground before they could come out into the open, but their very refusal to declare themselves made the preparation of the ground impossible. A vicious circle was created which no one dared to break. Another contributory cause was the attitude of the Mandatory Government. The impression prevailed that the Government was extremely sensitive to Arab criticism, and apologetic for anything they did for the Jews; that many officials were out of sympathy with official policy, and that increased pressure might bring about its complete reversal. The Arabs were treated as the real sons of the country and the Jews as mere stepchildren. Jewish needs were largely ignored by the Administration. Former British officials and members of the English community in Palestine actively assisted the anti-Zionist movement. The Arabs could not help wondering whether it was really worthwhile to come to a compromise with us. But perhaps the most pernicious part in obstructing agreement was played by the unsettled state of world affairs which set in in the middle ‘‘30s and gained in gravity from year to year. Among the Arabs two different reactions to Jewish progress were always noticeable. One was to accept Jewish increase as inevitable and make

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the best of it. The other was to try and stop it, before it was too late, by political pressure and, if need be, by violence. The two reactions struggled for supremacy within the Arab body politic and often within each individual Arab. Sometimes the one, sometimes the other seemed to gain the upper hand. The ups and downs depended very largely on outside circumstances. As the attitude of Germany and Italy became more and more challenging, the chances of an agreement in Palestine ebbed away. The looming world conflict spelt to many Arabs the emergence of a new revolutionary phase, in which they hoped to gain that part of the ground that remained ungained as a result of the first world war. This was a time, they thought, to wait and gather forces, to wait for a fighting chance and make the most of it. It is necessary to point out that in their efforts to explore agreement the Jews deliberately sought contact with their most extreme adversaries in Palestine. Some of the conversations to which I have referred were conducted with gentlemen from that wing. At that time a municipal election was fought in a mixed city in Palestine, the outcome of which, within the Arab fold, depended to some extent on the Jewish vote. A gentleman very close to the paramount Arab leader who stood at the extreme wing came to my house and explained that Jewish behaviour in the election would be to them a test of our sincerity in the negotiations. In the past, he said, the Jews had always been under a suspicion of not earnestly striving for an agreement, but only trying to achieve a tactical advantage out of the mere fact that negotiations were in progress. This time the Jewish Agency had an opportunity of showing in a practical way whether it was working for a rapprochement with the people that mattered in Arab politics, or not. The prospect of agreement would depend on the way the Jewish vote would be case. It was a very serious risk, but we took it and kept our word, though in the teeth of very serious criticism and opposition within the Jewish settlement. An Arab mayor was put into office, who was much nearer the political group I am referring to than his adversary. The result was only to strengthen the enemy’s front and solidify the power wielded by the extreme faction in the disturbances that broke out in 1936. Efforts on behalf of political peace went on throughout the years of bloodshed. They broke down in  1936 over Arab insistence on the suspension of Jewish immigration. This we were determined to resist. As I had an opportunity of explaining in an otherwise friendly talk with Nuri Said Pasha on his visit to Jerusalem in August 1936, for us to agree that Jewish immigration should be suspended in order to put an end to Arab violence meant to concede Arab mastery over Palestine and then go to the Arabs and appeal to their mercy for the re-opening of the gates. This, I explained, we could not possibly do. We were most vitally interested in reaching a modus vivendi, but not at the expense of our right of entry. By that we stood and fell.

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I am sorry to have to join issue at this juncture with so well-meaning a person as Dr Magnes. He told the Committee that in 1936, after the outbreak of the Arab revolt—I am quoting from the record of evidence—it was agreed between some Jews and Arabs that after ten years the Jews should constitute 40 per cent of the population, that is, 800,000. He added that it was most regrettable that this agreement was not ratified. But in his letter to the Hebrew press, written after his appearance before the Committee, he refers not to an agreement actually reached, which had only to be ratified in order to be implemented, but to an impression that was gained that an arrangement along certain lines might possibly serve as a basis for discussion with a fair prospect of success. This is something quite different. It is difficult for me at this stage to go into all the intricacies of the political situation which existed at the time. It may be appreciated that we were watching developments very, very carefully. We had serious reasons to question the readiness of the other side to conclude any such agreement. Efforts previously made on our part in that direction via Egypt and other channels had remained fruitless. Moreover, on the basis of concrete evidence we felt justified in assuming that the other party was merely trying to score a tactical success for the continuation of what they hoped would be a completely victorious struggle. We felt certain that they had no intention of giving in on the question of the suspension of immigration—a matter on which there could be no compromise. At that time Jewish lives were being lost daily, but the overwhelming majority of the Jews of Palestine and of Zionists abroad were determined to uphold that stand even at the cost of lives. Nevertheless, in order not to leave the mystery unprobed, I went and called on a certain Arab gentleman very close to the supreme political leader of the Arab revolt. I said to him: “Here are people, private Jewish people, but holding important positions in the community, coming and telling us that there is a chance of an agreement with your side on a certain basis. If this is the case, why should we not meet direct? No agreement is possible anyhow unless your leaders and the Jewish Agency agree. Will you please find out whether there is any readiness at all to negotiate?” He promised to take soundings and let me know. A fortnight passed and every day Jews were killed and Arabs, too, but there was no reply. So I wrote a letter to that gentleman, which now lies before me, reading as follows: “Today is a fortnight since we met last, when you promised to take certain soundings and let me know their results. I said on that occasion that I did not want to rush things, but that, on the other hand, I was anxious to avoid an unnecessary loss of time. If I write today it is again not to press you but just to remind you that I am still waiting for your reply.” The letter remained unanswered. On one notable occasion the initiative came from the other side. This was when the Peel scheme of setting up a Jewish State in a part of

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Palestine had been officially adopted. A certain group, including Colonel Newcombe, was then commissioned by the Husseini group to sound us as to the possibility of negotiations on a certain basis. But this opening was short-lived. As soon as the Woodhead Commission was appointed and it became clear that the British Government was beating a retreat from the Peel scheme, Colonel Newcombe was repudiated by his Arab friends and nothing came of it. MR CRUM: Are we to imply from that, that you were in favour of partition at that time? SHE: No, not quite. Our attitude was that we were prepared to explore the possibilities of partition. We said neither yes nor no to the Peel scheme, but after a great deal of internal discussion and a great deal of heart-searching— the Movement was sharply divided on the issue and it was a very precarious balance within the Movement—nevertheless, the Movement as a whole, in the Congress which assembled in 1937, decided that it was something which would repay exploration, and it empowered the Executive to explore, on the condition that the Executive should come back and report on the best possible terms that could be secured from H.M.G., whereupon the Movement would take a decision. But it never came to that because of the Woodhead Commission and the liquidation of the whole scheme. In the London Conference of 1939 the representatives of Palestine Arabs, led by Mr Jamal Husseini and instructed by the Mufti from afar, refused to sit with the Jews. We were brought together by His Majesty’s Government with the heads and envoys of the Governments of Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, but in view of the attitude of the Palestine Arabs the meeting led nowhere. The bringing of Arab States into the orbit of Palestinian affairs was a move for which the British Government bears sole responsibility. There was no provision whatever in the Mandate for such an intervention. All the Arab States could constitutionally claim with regard to Palestine was their status as member States of the League of Nations. This applied to Egypt and Iraq; but as members of the League of Nations they were bound by the Mandate. The bringing in of the Arab States resulted in no moderating influence. It merely served to strengthen the negative stand of the Palestine Arabs. We told the Colonial Secretary beforehand that by inviting the Arab States to that conference His Majesty’s Government was actually inviting and organizing pressure against itself. The result of the Conference was the White Paper. It was a very farreaching concession to Arab feeling, wholly at the expense of the Jews, not at the expense of British interests in Palestine. I don’t mean to imply that British interests should necessarily be sacrificed. I am only pointing out that it was a very far-reaching concession, a complete sell-out of the Jewish position to the Arabs, but it was brought into harmony with the

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maintenance of British interests in Palestine, as they were then conceived. Events proved that the concession to Arab feeling made in the White Paper at the expense of the Jews, which was no doubt largely motivated by the fear of the oncoming war, proved of no avail in the war itself. In the main it was the victory of the British and Allied arms that decided the issue as far as the eventual attitude of the Arab States was concerned, and nothing else. Mr Churchill described the White Paper of 1939 as “a mortal blow to the Jewish people.” The White Paper was certainly a mortal blow to the chances of an early Jewish-Arab understanding. Why should the Arabs seek a compromise with the Jews, when the British Government offered them a settlement which went far beyond any concession which they could dream of wringing from the Jews in direct negotiations? And yet our efforts continued: we met Arabs in Palestine; we visited Syria and the Lebanon; we went to Iraq whenever we were admitted. We had numerous talks in Egypt. The blighting effect of the White Paper was felt throughout. Not that we found everywhere confidence in the future of this policy, but it seemed unreasonable to give up the gains contained in it before all efforts to maintain it in force had been exhausted. Arab leaders also seemed to realize that the Jewish tragedy in Europe and Britain’s wartime experience in the Middle East had reopened the issue, and that sooner or later the Great Powers would have to take a new decision on Palestine. Before that stage was reached they quite naturally refused to prejudice their case. One typical conversation may illustrate the position. In the autumn of 1942 I met a non-Palestinian leader, very prominent in pan-Arab councils. I suggested to him that the lull in the Palestinian conflict created by the war might be a good opportunity for getting together and exploring the chances of a post-war agreement. His reply was that the problem of Palestine was international in scope and its solution depended primarily on the Great Powers. It was useless for Jews and Arabs to negotiate, so long as those in control had not spoken their weighty word. There was nothing for it but to wait until they addressed themselves to the subject, which could only be after the war, in the hope that we both would find it possible to accommodate ourselves to the verdict. One redeeming feature of that otherwise barren conversation was that the White Paper was never mentioned throughout its course. Another, that we both agreed that it was important for us to keep in touch and preserve intact the bridge of personal relations in the hope that one day it might be used for traffic. The war has revealed to the whole world the true character of the Palestine Arab leadership with which we had to contend through all those years. We have all heard in this room a kind of oath of allegiance to “the first leader for whom there can be no substitute.” Mr Jamal Husseini maintained that all that leader did in Berlin was to uphold Arab interests for the eventuality of Nazi victory. He denied that his leader had done anything actively to

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further that victory. Facts tell a contrary tale. No sooner had the Mufti reached Berlin than he began to broadcast on the Berlin radio, calling upon the Arabs to engage in a campaign of sabotage behind the British lines and await a signal from him for a general rising. Numbers of Palestinian Arabs, who had joined the British forces and were taken prisoner by the Germans, joined Arab units in the German army at the Mufti’s behest. Quite a number—and they were met by some of our people when they had again been taken prisoner by the British forces; but no fuss was made about it, they were repatriated as if they had been found in their former state as British prisoners-of-war held by the Germans and not as German prisonersof-war taken by the British; they were brought back to Palestine, and we have talked to some of them and they have told us the story. In  1943 the Mufti went on a propaganda tour through Bosnia, appealing to the local Moslems to rally to the Nazi colours and greeting Moslem Waffen-SS Units already formed. An original copy of the “Wiener Illustrierte,” in which one appearance is depicted, lies before me. According to the deposition of a prominent Nazi official at Nuremberg, the Mufti was one of the primary instigators of the wholesale campaign of extermination of the Jews. What all this means to Great Britain and her Allies is for them to say. What it means to the Jews, primarily in Palestine, is clear. Surveying as we do before you today—very briefly in relation to the length of the period and the efforts made—the course of attempted negotiations, which took us to practically every city in Palestine, to every capital in the Middle East, and to every major political centre in Europe and America— Jerusalem, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, London, Paris, Geneva, Washington and San Francisco—innumerable journeys, innumerable meetings with Palestinian Arabs, Transjordanians, Syrians, Lebanese, Iraqis, Saudi Arabians, Egyptians, American Arabs—it would seem that we should stand despondent and admit defeat. We do not. Nor do we regret the efforts made. We do not believe they have been wasted. We have learned a great deal in their course and we believe we have also taught something. Just as we are not prepared to give up our Zionist ideal, so we are not giving up our hope of an Arab-Jewish understanding. This is no mere pious aspiration or wishful-thinking. It is something based on experience, something that has facts to support it. The first question that arises is whether the Palestinian Arab and the Palestinian Jew can live together and respect each other as neighbours of equal standing. Experience in the Arab countries generally is irrelevant, as there the Jews are on sufferance and they perforce accept a state of submission. But in Palestine the Jew is there as of right and feels himself no less a son of the country than his Arab neighbour. So the question is, can a Jew, feeling this way, and an Arab who knows that the Jew feels this way live together? The answer is yes. They can and they do. It is not a case of

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oil and water, which will not mix. They do mix. They mix in day-to-day life and get along well as neighbours. Nothing inherent in the nature of either prevents fellowship and good neighbourliness. The second question is—does the fact of the Jewish increase in numbers and expansion in area militate against peaceful relations in dayto-day life? The answer is no, they do not. Go to any settlement newly established by the Jewish Agency in the wilds, where no Jew was seen before but only heard of, and see how relations shape. They seldom sit apart and glower at each other. Generally there is much spontaneous, natural friendliness. Sometimes there are disputes as to land boundaries. So there are between the Arabs themselves. As a rule, peaceful counsels prevail. It is noteworthy that in the last disturbances very few of our settlements were attacked by their close neighbours. Mostly the evildoers were brought from afar, while neighbours often warned the Jews against impending danger. Of course, the fear of armed reaction on the part of the Jews worked as a salutary deterrent. Defence, readiness for it, a capacity for it, breeds respect, and respect is the only sure basis for true friendship. The third question is—is the Jewish influx, on balance, detrimental or beneficial to Arabs as individuals and to the Arab community as a social, as distinct from a political, unit? On this point objective evidence is overwhelmingly to the credit of Jewish development. The last question is—are the political interests of the Jew in Palestine and of the Arabs throughout the Middle East, broadly conceived, contradictory, or capable of being harmonized? Our answer is, there is no inherent contradiction between their respective interests. On the contrary, they are basically in line with one another. But this point will require some elaboration. The crux of the problem is the political conflict between the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine. Jewish-Arab relations in this country proceed on two different planes: the first is the plane of day-to-day life, of economic and social affairs; the second is the political plane, that of the country’s ultimate future. On the first plane there is a great deal of peaceful collaboration. Jewish and Arab orange-growers are pulling together in forms more or less organized, more or less publicly expressed, according to political circumstances, but always on the basis of complete solidarity and with active interest in the same results. Jewish and Arab organizations of trade and commerce likewise, often act in common. There is satisfactory collaboration on a number of Government boards and committees. The Committee has already heard here of the expressions of solidarity between Jewish and Arab wage-earners and of joint trade union activities. Jewish settlers give various forms of assistance to the fellahin, agricultural and medical. In the mixed cities, when no political conflicts supervene, cooperation is smooth and effective. In Jerusalem the issue is vitiated by the question

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of the mayoralty. The Jewish majority in the city for a long time put up with an Arab Mayor, but when it came to appointing a Jewish Mayor the Arabs refused cooperation. The Government proposed a rotation system. The Jews accepted; the Arabs did not. The Government dropped the scheme and blamed the failure on both parties. It was a matter of deep regret and resentment that the Government, in an official communiqué, represented both parties as being equally obstructive, equally uncooperative, equally immature. The Jewish Councillors who were ready to accept the compromise and operate it, and whose presence on the Council was by no means such a dismal failure as one might infer from the communiqué, were dismissed from office and sent home, and Government officials were put in to administer the affairs of the city in their stead. Now that is something that rankles and will go on rankling. In Jaffa again there is a complication. There are Jewish quarters in Jaffa, not just Jewish residents of Jaffa town, but Jewish quarters which are actually an outgrowth of Tel Aviv. They just happen to be within the municipal area of Jaffa, but they are part and parcel of Tel Aviv in every ethnic, cultural and economic respect. They get most of their services from Tel Aviv, and they do not want to remain part of Jaffa; they want to be joined up with the city of Tel Aviv of which they are a natural outgrowth, and they are kept in Jaffa against their will by the Government, and this again complicates matters. But in Haifa, where no such complications have arisen, cooperation in the municipal sphere has been eminently successful, both under the Arab and under the Jewish Mayors. Cooperation in all these fields of everyday life is restricted and hampered by the overshadowing political conflict. Yet, if it is so much in evidence while the conflict is raging—and, admittedly, it is hampered by the fact that the conflict is raging—how much fuller and more effective will it become once the conflict has been resolved. This is true not only within Palestine. It holds good for the relations between Jewish Palestine and the neighbouring Arab countries. On the surface the position in this regard is characterized today by the Arab boycott, but beneath the political surface there is a broad undercurrent of economic and scientific give-and-take, often with the initiative exercised on the other side. Professors of the Hebrew University have been repeatedly invited by the Governments of the neighbouring countries to undertake research and formulate schemes of improvement. Schemes of reafforestation and entomological services are notable cases in point. Officials and students from neighbouring capitals have been sent to work and study in our research institutions and laboratories. Special emissaries and whole missions have come over to study our agricultural improvements, our industrial development, our housing schemes, our system of rural education, our cooperative movement, our medical organizations. Innumerable inquiries have been addressed to us, either direct or through the consular representatives, on all these and many other points. We have assisted in the

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purchase of samplings, pedigree cattle, precision instruments. The services of our Agricultural Research Institute have been particularly in demand. The report of the Agricultural Committee of the Arab League itself drew largely on its publications. Patients from all neighbouring countries have resorted to the Hadassah University Hospital. The list can be prolonged indefinitely and chapter and verse given for each form of assistance, but it would be preferable not to go into detail. On the Jewish side a great deal of effort is being invested in the study of the Arab world and in the acquisition of the necessary equipment for the broadening of the plane of contact. Arabic is taught in  all secondary schools and in a large growing number of elementary schools. In recent years special care was taken to raise the level of tuition. An inspector for the teaching of Arabic in Jewish schools was appointed on the initiative of the Jewish Agency. The Institute of Oriental Studies at the Hebrew University is providing an increasing cadre of teachers of Arabic, far better adapted than the old-fashioned type to this difficult pedagogic task and bringing a great deal of pioneering enthusiasm to bear upon their work. Teachers recruited from among Jews coming over from Arab countries are also a very valuable acquisition. Refresher courses are held regularly for Arabic teachers in Jewish schools, and the lecturers include a number of distinguished Arab scholars. Schools ready to devote more space in their curriculum to the study of Arabic than that prescribed have received special grants from the Jewish Agency. There is a considerable amount of study of Arabic among adults. The Jewish Agency has made it a point to ensure that not a single Jewish settlement should find itself unable to establish relations with its Arab neighbours for lack of people with a knowledge of Arabic. In many settlements special teachers of Arabic are maintained. Courses are held for the training of Mukhtars and hospitality officers, and the programme consists mainly of Arabic, Arab lore and the study of Arab customs. One such course of six months’ duration is now in progress at Chadera, the students being drawn from all parts of Palestine, and when that batch graduates another will take its place. The Jewish Agency publishes a magazine reviewing developments in the Arab world for the information of Hebrew readers. It also runs a regular service of circulars to all settlements with informative material on Arab customs, Moslem holidays, events and trends in Arab life. A news bulletin in Arabic, to acquaint the Arabs with events in Jewish life, is published regularly for distribution in Palestine and the neighbouring countries. The Histadrut runs a fortnightly Arab paper, which is widely read. I believe it has already been brought to the notice of the Committee that there is not a single Arab school in Palestine (nor for that matter a single Government school) in which Hebrew is taught, though the number of Hebrew-speaking Arabs is on the increase. To us the teaching of Arabic is not a matter of quid pro quo. We do not do it to please anyone but because

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it is in our own interest. Our vision is not one of perpetual strife but of eventual peace and harmony. We want to be ready for it. We believe that peace and harmony will come on a higher level of development and within a wider framework. Today the slogans in the Arab world are independence and unity. I hope I am right in saying that mere political independence is an empty phrase, unless the framework of national activity which it creates is filled with economic and social content. The Arab countries are today flushed with their political independence, so easily gained, but they are only on the threshold of the transition from militant nationalism to constructive statesmanship. Their Governments have a very hard struggle ahead of them if they are to feed their populations, to educate them, to combat poverty and disease, to develop latent resources. Syria and Iraq are half empty. In Syria only one quarter of the cultivable land is cultivated, and even that very sparsely. The cultivable area by no means exhausts the agricultural potentialities. There are swampdrainage propositions in Syria in comparison with which our Hula drainage scheme pales into insignificance, yet the Hula will no doubt have good lessons for those who will one day tackle Syria. The fabulous development possibilities of Iraq in terms of land and water need no emphasis. There are only faint glimmers at present of the awakening of social consciousness in  all these countries and of a progressive economic understanding. It is a welcome fact that these glimmers are already discernible. Some of their people realize that so long as a country is poor, its population small, its industry primitive, it cannot feel secure in its independence in the world today. They realize that real independence means development, that is, building from below and creating new values. Many understand that in this respect we have learned something in our own hard school and something can be learned from us. We always had to make something out of nothing, doing it with our own efforts, almost entirely unaided, often obstructed. We began by creating physical facts, and we hope one day—and we hope that the day is not very far off—to evolve them into a State structure. The Arab countries have started with a State machinery and they are only gradually taking up development. The two converse processes can be mutually complementary—there is no contradiction between them. Whatever there is of value in our limited experience is at the disposal of all our neighbours, near and far. A Prime Minister of one of the neighbouring countries said to me: “If we once do get together, we can do great things in the Middle East.” And I said, “Of course we shall,” and he said, “No, I am sure you yourself cannot imagine how great those things will be.” But we seem to strike a discordant note in the general chorus around us clamouring for unity. Are we really such an anomaly in the general Middle Eastern pattern? Far from it. There is a wide diversity of ethnic elements in the Middle East and a sharp divergence of religious and political alignments. The unity slogan is genuine and legitimate among those who are

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really at one. But it is also a means in the hands of the majority to achieve domination over the heterogeneous elements. The minorities fall into two sorts: those who are too weak to withstand pressure—they throw in their lot with the masters and try to outdo them in the pan-Arab game. But there is another category—those who are morally and materially strong enough to resist. Sometimes the dividing line cuts across the same minority group. The policy of bolstering up the Arab League and lending it unqualified support means the delivery of all minority and non-conformist groups into the hands of the ruling element. The uniformity which it strives to create is artificial and cannot last. It does not make for justice. It certainly does not make for peace in the long run. Another Balkans will be created, in which more than one Macedonia will make itself felt. Divergent elements—if they are really divergent, and we believe they are; if they had all appeared here they would have told you so—divergent elements should be harmonized, and not pressed into an artificial uniformity. Wide autonomy, territorial and communal, should be the guiding principle, harmonizing, synthesizing, not sacrificing one to another. Within a political pattern which is true to the ethnic realities of the Middle East, we also claim our place. In helping ourselves we shall also be helping others. We have come here to stay. Jewish Palestine will forever remain part of the Middle East. It is our life interest, but not ours alone, to resist obliteration and assert our individuality. In doing so, we stretch out a hand to all who are ready to promote real peace and harmony. The desire for complete homogeneity may be perfectly natural, yet where it flies in the face of realities it is not merely futile, it is harmful. But facts are accepted, sooner or later, and we firmly believe that the fact of our establishment in Palestine will be accepted just as the existing Yishuv of 600,000 people has for better or for worse been accepted. Our establishment in Palestine cannot be firm and secure without the framework of Statehood, resting on a Jewish majority. It is an idle and morbid fancy—it may be a genuine conviction but nevertheless irrational and morbid—to imagine that Palestine as a Jewish State will be a threat to Arab independence. All the Jewish State will be able to achieve will be to give adequate protection to the Jewish work of reconstruction and Jewish right of refuge in this country. It is similarly idle to visualize the Arabs of Palestine as a helpless minority. With an all-round development, there will be innumerable ties between Palestine and its neighbours, and the Arabs here will always remain members of the large majority. Encompassed by Arab States in  all three sides, the Jewish State will know better than to oppress its Arab citizens. We think we understand Arab nationalism. But do the Arabs understand ours? Listening to representatives of the Arab Higher Committee, one could not help wondering whether they are at all capable of looking facts in the

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face and of realizing what was going on before their eyes. There is, of course, no common basis so long as they maintain that Palestine must remain Arab and that the Jews must be content to remain a minority relying on the benevolence of their Arab masters. If that is the attitude, then political understanding must wait. It will come when the attitude has fundamentally changed, as a result either of a change of heart or of an inevitable adjustment to the new facts that will have been created. It is all very well for Mr Jamal Husseini to long for the days when he could sit peacefully at the feet of his old Jewish wet-nurse. I myself was fortunate enough to spend part of my childhood among Arabs. Next week it will be forty years since I came to Palestine. The first two years were spent in an Arab village, in a completely Arab part of the country. We were tenants of Jamal’s family. I owe a great deal to those two years and I keep up and cherish to this day my friendship with the villagers. But I cannot suggest my experience as a model for all Jewish immigrants to follow. We should never be able to settle Jews in this country in any appreciable number if we tried to scatter them in twos or threes over the existing Arab villages. By the way, it is not true that in those days peace reigned supreme without any political friction between Jews and Arabs. Peace there was between neighbours just as there is today, but political strife was already in evidence. There were Arab newspapers which carried on violent agitation against Zionism; an Arab Deputy from Jerusalem in the Ottoman Chamber in Constantinople warned the Sublime Porte against our dangerous political aspirations. Dr Hitti in his evidence in Washington referred to us, the Jewish old-timers in Palestine, as Jewish Arabs. There were 50,000 of us, he said, at the end of the first world war. I will simply introduce myself as a specimen of that breed of Dr Hitti’s imagination, and say no more. Even if we wanted to, there was no way at all for us to fit ourselves into the fabric of Arab economic and social life. It could not absorb us. There was no physical room for us in it. But we had no intention of assimilating. We came here to be independent. As a result both of desire and necessity we had to erect our own economic structure and develop our own cultural life. We had to build up everything from scratch, from the very foundations. Hence the principle of Jewish labour. Who else ought to have done all our work? What is perfectly natural in the life of any normal people—that its members should range from street scavengers to University professors— becomes somehow unreasonably exclusive where Jews are concerned. Naturally, in our efforts to normalize our life, we are driven to try and create by a conscious effort a state of things which is the natural product of evolution in the life of other nations. But what would have happened if such had not been the case—if the Jews had become gentlemen planters and factory-owners, while the Arabs did all the dirty work? In  1925, the Executive Committee of the Palestine Arab Congress, the forerunner of the Arab Higher Committee, in a petition to the League of Nations, alleged that

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most, if not all, of the work on Jewish farms was done by Arab workmen, and tried to make political capital out of this allegation. Peace in Palestine will not be achieved by Jews and Arabs’ forming, so to speak, horizontal layers, the former superimposed upon the latter, but by their national structures’ developing vertically side by side and aiming at an increasing equality of wage levels and at an eventual complete merger. When we are invited to compare the wage levels of the Arabs in Jewish employ with that of the Jews, we reciprocate by an invitation to compare the wages of Arabs employed by Jews with those of Arabs employed by Arabs or by the Government—in most cases they are higher. For years the Federation of Jewish Labour has pressed for minimum wage legislation. As early as the mid-20s the demand was voiced jointly by Jewish employers and workers before a Government Committee. It was not granted. For years the Jewish Agency has pressed for an all-round increase of rate of pay to Jewish and Arab policemen, to Jewish and Arab civil servants in lower grades. A certain cost of living allowance was authorized, but the basic wage remained practically unaltered. The Jewish idea was to raise the Arab wage up to the Jewish. The Government’s idea was to lower the Jewish wage down to the Arab. The criterion which should be applied is whether Jewish effort tends to raise wages or lower them, and by that criterion we stand vindicated. The decisive question is not how many Arabs are employed by Jews at any given time, but whether the general volume of employment for Arab labour has increased or diminished as a result of Jewish development. By this test, too, we stand vindicated. The same principles govern our approach to the question of land. The rules of the Jewish National Fund have come in for reference at many an inquiry and again we have to explain what appears to be their peculiarity. As in many other cases, the national interest is here identical with the social. We believe this identity to be the test of a progressive institution. The national interest is that there should be land belonging to the Jewish people. In England or in France, or in Syria and Iraq, for that matter, there is no need for any special measures to ensure that the soil should be forever English or French, Syrian or Iraqi. Irrespective of whether it is privately or nationally owned, it is from the wider aspect a national possession. But the Jews did not start building their State from the top. They started from the bottom— the earth. They knew that only what they acquired and cultivated would be theirs. They also knew that in the long run the land belongs to those who work on it and not necessarily to those who hold formal title to it. That was the national aspect. On the social side there was a paramount need of withholding at least a part of Jewish land from the speculative market and ensuring that it serve the needs of national colonization, that is to say the settlement of impecunious people who had no money to buy land of their own but only their hands to work it and determination to make good as peasants. They remembered the Word of God: “The land shall not be sold forever for the land is mine” (Leviticus XXV, 23). They also remembered

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the saying of Genesis, “In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread.” They tried to live up to these words. With regard to the impact of Jewish land acquisition and agricultural settlement on the Arabs, the decisive consideration is not whether and how many Arabs had to be shifted to make room for Jewish settlement; the decisive consideration is whether as a result of Jewish settlement the total number of Arabs on the land has decreased or increased and whether their lot has worsened or improved. By these two tests—the size and condition of Arab peasantry—we again stand vindicated. The main features of Arab agricultural development in the last few decades has been the continuous transition from tents to houses, from mud huts to tile-roofed buildings, from grazing to agriculture, from sowing to planting, from unirrigated to irrigated farming, and in recent years from primitive ploughs to tractors, from sickles to mechanical reapers. All this has been happening not despite Jewish settlement but concurrently with it and thanks to it. The curious fact is that as a result of, or should we say despite, the fact that over one and a half million dunams have passed from Arab to Jewish ownership, not only have Arab fellahin grown in numbers but they have become more deeply rooted in the soil than they were before, and their stake in the land of Palestine has increased: more houses, more trees, more wells, more livestock, more implements. But the question of shifting in itself is not unimportant. We claim that we have always tried to shift as little as possible, and when shifting was unavoidable we saw to it that those concerned should at least not be the worse for the shifting. Jamal Eff. Husseini mentioned five villages—Jinjar, Khneifes, Shatta, Fula and Affula—which, he said, had disappeared from the face of the earth, their names obliterated from the map, their mosques and cemeteries destroyed. Now all these villages were in the malaria-ridden Vale of Esdraelon. The land was bought from absentee landlords, who were large estate-owners not quite typical of the rest of Palestine. Their tenants had to be moved and the villages, mostly very small, naturally ceased to exist. But this kind of thing happens as a result not only of Jewish land purchase. Palestine is full—the map of Palestine is full of what is called khirbeh units, a place which was inhabited only a few decades ago but which was abandoned for some reason. Land was bought and sold and people moved from place to place. There is a shifting. It is not an exception. It is untrue that cemeteries were obliterated. They have all been preserved. I have here photographs of some of them. As a rule the cemeteries and such shrines as were left— an occasional tomb of a Moslem Saint or Wulli—I have here a picture of that—were, upon the transfer of the land, registered in the name of either the Supreme Moslem Council or His Excellency the High Commissioner, and not in that of the Jewish National Fund. But what happened to the tenants? As a result of the disturbances of 1929, the question of landless Arabs began to figure very prominently in

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the proceedings. Sir John Hope-Simpson was sent out to investigate the position. On the basis of the report a special commissioner, Mr Lewis French, was appointed to conduct an inquiry. A leading English Judge in Palestine, Mr Justice Webb, was commissioned to scrutinize the claims. Arab District Officers scoured the villages encouraging whoever had a vestige of a chance to put forward a claim. Altogether, after ten years of Jewish land purchase from the end of the first world war, 3,188 claims were filed, of which Judge Webb allowed 570. Four tracts of land were bought by the Government for the resettlement of these people. Only about 100 took advantage of the offer. Of them only about 60 have remained on the new land, the rest drifting back to their villages. Two tracts have remained unused—I don’t know what Government is doing with the land. I hope it is not wasted. The Jewish Agency cooperated in the inquiry and was able to trace practically every former tenant of land which the Jewish National Fund acquired to his then place of residence and show exactly how he was making his living, mostly on the land. But what happened in the Emek is by no means typical with regard to the whole of Palestine. The main zone of Jewish settlement is the coastal plain. There, over 130 Jewish villages have been established since the first world war. A large proportion of the land was bought from peasant proprietors, yet not a single Arab village has disappeared from the map, not one. Dr  Weizmann quite rightly said with regard to our development process that you cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs. But in the coastal plain something like a miracle was achieved: a huge omelette was made and not a single egg was broken. Moreover, using largely the same frying pan, the Arabs managed to make quite a decent omelette for themselves: practically all villages in this zone, and particularly those which sold a part of their land to the Jews, are more populous today than 25 years ago, and considerably better off than they were, and than other Arabs are elsewhere. If you analyse the position more closely you will find that prosperity and increase of population are in direct ratio to the sale of land to the Jews. The sale of the surplus created the necessary capital to finance the transition from primitive to more advanced farming. That is what has been happening. I don’t say it will necessarily happen every time, but it has the advantage of having happened, of being a fact, and not a mere prediction. We do not think that there have been many colonization efforts which were conducted with greater consideration, and indeed, with greater benefit for the local population than the Jewish resettlement of Palestine. Our reward has been the Land Regulations of 1940, giving effect to the policy of the White Paper of 1939. By way of a political premium on a campaign of violence, the Regulations, at one stroke, closed 65 per cent of Palestine in our face and very seriously limited our land acquisition in another 30 per cent. The official justification was again land shortage among the Arabs. No facts or figures were given in support of the allegation. The scheme itself belied it. The restrictions were in inverse ratio to Jewish land holdings.

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Where the Jews held only 3 per cent, they were completely prohibited from buying more. Where they had 7 per cent, they were restricted. Where they had 49 per cent, in law they were left free to buy up the remainder. It is not a measure of social protection; it is not a scheme to promote economic development; it is a crude piece of racial crystallization—an expedient to preserve intact the predominantly or overwhelmingly Arab character of most of Palestine. The territory of the Balfour Declaration was reduced by  the delimitation of the  northern frontier, to the benefit of Syria and the Lebanon. Its whole eastern part was cut off, and the Jordan, which was the country’s artery, became its border. By virtue of the Land Regulations the area of the Jewish National Home, as far as land settlement is concerned, shrank to a very small fraction of what was left. The law struck at the very foundations of Zionism. The main Zionist aims are to emancipate the Jews from two age-long disabilities: divorce from the soil and a status of inferiority. What the law does is in effect to recreate for the Jews in Palestine these two evils: it throws them back on the cities and it relegates them to the position of second-class citizens. Arabs are free to buy land everywhere. We are free to buy land only in 5 per cent of Palestine. I would invite you to put yourselves in the position of a Palestinian Jewish soldier who comes home after five years of service. He went through the hell of the Libyan Desert, was besieged in Tobruk, went forwards and backwards with Wavell’s and Alexander’s armies, fought with the Jewish Brigade in Italy, where he buried some of his comrades. He is back, and anxious to settle on the land. The Jewish Agency applies on his behalf to the Government for a grant of land and points to a certain area which it believes is available. The Government says no, that land cannot be granted because it is in the prohibited zone. Another soldier is not a farmer, but an artisan. He wants a plot of land upon which to build a house. He wants it in Jerusalem. The Jewish Agency goes to the Government with a proposal that a certain area on the outskirts of the city, which is lying useless, should be provided for a housing scheme for ex-servicemen. The Government says no, we cannot do it; it is just outside the boundaries of the city in the prohibited zone and it cannot be made available for Jews. So here is a man who left his country to strike a blow against the enemy of the Jewish people and of Great Britain. He helped to defeat him; he comes home to his own country and that is what he has to face, and that is what the Government expects him to put up with: that as a Jew, after the defeat of Hitler, in the country of the Jewish National Home, he may not be given a plot of land to put a house on, to marry a girl and to have children in it and to grow a few trees around it—because he is a Jew, not because that land is wanted by anyone, for he sees it, it is not used. The Arab owning it may be wanting to sell; he mustn’t. He is precluded from doing so; there is a law. That law was passed in the good old Munich days and it stands today. Do you think it hits only the soldier? It hits the whole community. It is a humiliation, an intolerable humiliation, for the whole people.

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Mr Kaplan mentioned the case of the village of Beer Tuvia, where on the same area of land eight times as many people now live and in greater comfort than the original settlers. May I add that that colony was rebuilt and put on a higher level of development after it was razed to the ground in the 1929 riots? The area now comprises two villages, one of which consists mostly of refugees from Germany. If the same political conclusions had been drawn from the 1929 riots as were drawn from the disturbances of 1936–1939, this transformation would not have been possible. They built the village, but they also build themselves and their children. If the White Paper had existed then, these refugees would have been denied the chance of rehabilitation which they have used with such marvellous effect. Another instance I should like to mention is the settlement of Maale Hachamisha in the hills near Jerusalem, which five of the members of your Committee have visited. That village was built in the middle of the disturbances of 1936–1939. Five of its members fell while breaking new ground in the wilderness. The forest there was planted literally under fire, planted by the settlers for the Jewish National Fund—one of the forests that are actually changing the landscape of the barren hills of Palestine. Do you realize that the border of that forest has, since its planting, become a political boundary? No trees may be planted by Jews beyond that line, because all around is the prohibited zone. No trees, no clearing of stones, no terracing, no development by Jews, and there is no-one else to do it. This is the result of the Land Regulations. At the Palestine Conference in London, the Arab delegation, headed by Mr Jamal Husseini, stated that 19 million dunams of the land of Palestine were uncultivable, that is to say, as far as the Arabs are concerned, of no use to God or man. What the land law does is to deny us that derelict land and to rob the land of its development. Its effect is to perpetuate the wilderness. The Jewish people claims access to all derelict and under-developed areas throughout Palestine. We are prepared to come to terms on the question of future Arab increase. In the memorandum which we submitted to you on possibilities of agriculture we have claimed in the hills not more than onethird of the dead areas. We leave two-thirds. But unless we do something, we are practically sure no-one else will. There is a great deal of development in the Arab villages, and may they prosper. But there are areas of land which cannot be reclaimed without a proper scientific approach and an enormous amount of investment of effort, of labour, of love. Unless that happens it will stay derelict until doomsday. We claim such areas all over Palestine, north and south and east and west. If we get them, it will be not only for our benefit; it will revolutionize the economics of the country as a whole. Jewish land purchase, people say, leads to trouble. It has never led to trouble between neighbours—between those who sell the land and those

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who buy. It is a political question, perfectly true. So is immigration, so is Jewish industry. Here there is a boycott of Jewish industry. People talk of picketing. Picketing is not peaceful. It may lead to clashes, recriminations, bloodshed among the Arabs themselves. Immigration, land purchase, boycott, so long as there is political struggle every weapon is used and peace may be disturbed. The question is whether that should decide the issue. We have proved that what we are doing is not at the expense of Arabs as individuals or as a social unit. As to the Arabs as a people, the unit is not the Arabs of Palestine but all Arabs, and the relative justice of the claim and the injustice involved in its rejection should be weighed on bigger scales. To the Arab race Palestine is a mere corner. To the Jews it is the only place. What we claim is freedom for the Jews to settle in this country. A question has been raised whether the position of Jews in other continents would not be adversely affected if the Jews of Europe were made to leave the countries where they now live. We have never suggested a compulsory exodus. All we claim is self-determination for the Jews. Those who want to leave for Palestine should not be prevented from doing so. Those who choose to stay should be free to do so. Those who prefer to leave Palestine and go back to Europe should likewise be free to go, as in fact they are. A whispering campaign has spread around this Committee: an absurd insinuation that pressure was being brought to bear on Jews anxious to leave Palestine to prevent them from doing so. It is a lie. I challenge anyone to produce one name, one fact, one date, of pressure being used to prevent anyone leaving this country. Nothing of the sort has been happening. We are not interested in keeping in Palestine Jews who do not consider this country their home. Immigration into Palestine has always had its backwash. That backwash decreased very considerably in the ‘30s, but even in the war years and also since the war some Jews left Palestine. To me they are very precious because they show that whoever wants to go is free to go. Who thought of stopping them? Who could stop them? Every one is free to leave. No, it is not true, everybody is not free. Coercion is applied in many places. There are people who are not free to move, Jews in Iraq and Syria who want to go to Palestine cannot leave. They are kept there by force. Jews in the camps of Europe who are desperately anxious to come to Palestine cannot do so. Some people have to run the gauntlet of warships and aeroplanes. Everybody is not free to leave Europe. Jews in camps are kept by force. That is what it comes to; for the time being they are kept by force, unless they want to go back to their countries of origin, which they do not want to do; they cannot start on a trek from the camps of Europe to Palestine; they will be kept back. MR CRUM: I do not think that last statement is accurate. They are not kept by force in camps in Germany. SHE: I say as far as coming to Palestine is concerned.

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CRU: That applies to anybody else, does it not? SHE: All I am anxious to point out—I speak subject to correction—is that force is being used to prevent people coming to Palestine. JUDGE HUTCHESON: That does not apply in the camps; in the camps I know in Germany it does not apply. SHE: I did not say that they are kept in the camps by force, but that they are prevented by force from leaving Europe in order to go to Palestine, not that they are kept at the gates of the camps. MR CROSSMAN: Supposing I wanted to travel and refused to get a visa or any papers, I should be kept by force. Everybody is kept by force. SHE: Perfectly true. May I explain. Maybe I have been a little rhetorical about this, but I think logically rhetorical. Here was an accusation thrown at us, that we bring pressure to bear on people, that we use threats of force against people wanting to leave Palestine and go back. I say it is not the case. If force is used, the shoe is on the other foot. CRO: I do not see that two blacks make a white; it is certainly untrue about force being used in the camps. SHE: Again I do not say that they are kept in the camps by force, but they are prevented from coming to Palestine by force and they know they are, therefore they do not leave the camps and they have the feeling that they are kept by force. For if a Jew wants to go to Palestine there is no permit for him; if he tries to do it on his own, he will be stopped somewhere, therefore he does not start. CRO: Is it any more force than stops an Englishman from going to Switzerland? SHE: No, Sir, but an Englishman does not feel that Switzerland is his country, and the Jews in the camps feel that Palestine is their country. Some members of the Committee are sincerely concerned lest the evacuation of Jews from Europe to Palestine signify the victory of Hitler as far as the Jews are concerned. But surely this is a matter for the Jews to decide. They say emphatically that if they are left in their present state in Europe, or in the Orient for that matter, then indeed Hitler goes undefeated. They insist that victory over Hitler cannot be complete unless it leads to the re-establishment of Jewish political independence. The Jewish State is an urgent necessity. It is a burning world issue. There can be no other effective protection for the Jewish National Home. Consider the lesson of the Arab boycott. We are not being protected against it. There are weapons, perfectly legitimate weapons, which could be employed, but as they are not in the hands of the party directly interested they remain unused. Palestine and the neighbouring countries are interdependent. The Arab States need the Palestine market, the transit facilities which Palestine

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provides, and its industrial and technical services. They even need Jewish dollars. But apparently they knew that they could indulge in the boycott with impunity. Nothing has been done to our knowledge, or the knowledge of the Arab world. If they knew that they faced a State which was in a position to retaliate, their ardour would have cooled considerably. Political defence works like physical defence. It is first of all a very powerful deterrent to aggression and it thereby paves the way for peace. The new world order is again based on a community of States. The Arab world is inside with five members. Even Transjordan with its 350,000 inhabitants is to be admitted. The U.N., in eluding its Arab members, is to discuss the fate of Palestine and decree the Jewish future. Are the Jews themselves to be left outside? Will that be democratic? Let me again assure the Committee: Palestine as a Jewish State implies no superior status for the Jews save in one respect: the right of entry. Inside the State there will be complete equality of rights for all inhabitants regardless of race or creed, complete eligibility of all for all offices, up to the highest. A Jewish majority is inevitable and indispensable. Inevitable because it is impossible to settle Jews in large numbers in this country without their becoming a majority. Were it not for the restrictive immigration policy before and during the White Paper regime, we might have been a majority today. It is indispensable because no other arrangement will serve as an effective guarantee of the freedom of entry of Jews who might in the future be in need of a home. Otherwise, I repeat, no privileges, no superiority of status, no special rights for the Jews of Palestine or for the Jewish religion or for any Jewish institution. The Holy Places will be inviolate. Their inviolability can be internationally safeguarded. The hundreds of millions of Moslems—and, for that matter, of Christians—need have no fear. And it need not take ten years. This figure was tentatively mentioned as a period which might be necessary to ensure the complete economic absorption in current production of one million settlers. Even then it was pointed out that within the first two or three years far greater numbers than a hundred thousand per year might be brought in. At the end of the first world war 1,300,000 Greeks were transferred from Turkey to Greece within a matter of nine months. The transfer of many fewer than one million—say five to six hundred thousand—will be enough to decide the issue in Palestine, and it can be done in under two years; in other words, less than half the Greek figure in about twice the time. I know, Gentlemen, how difficult the problem is; if it is difficult for us, how doubly difficult it must seem to you. I understand this Committee was selected on the principle that its members should have had no previous connection or any intimate knowledge of the problem and it is perhaps quite right it should have been so. I appreciate the tremendous difficulty of the effort, of the intellectual effort—apart from the pressure on your time and the physical exertion, the difficulty of the intellectual effort which I am sure you are making in these weeks, in these weeks crucial to us and many others,

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in order to probe the depths of this most intricate problem; but it is no use artificially simplifying it, it is no use patching it up. It is a world issue. It is age-old and it is world-wide, and the solution must be a lasting one. We in our hearts, wishing you as we do not, winding up the case, Godspeed on your journey back to Europe and in your efforts, we in our hearts feel that if there is a will, there is a way.

Recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (Excerpts), April 19465 [. . .]

Recommendation No. 2.

We recommend (A) that 100,000 certificates be authorized immediately for the admission into Palestine of Jews who have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution; (B) that these certificates be awarded as far as possible in 1946 and that actual immigration be pushed forward as rapidly as conditions will permit. [. . .]

Recommendation No. 3.

In order to dispose, once and for all, of the exclusive claims of Jews and Arabs to Palestine, we regard it as essential that a clear statement of the following principles should be made: (I) That Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine. (II) That Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state. (III) That the form of government ultimately to be established shall, under international guarantees, fully protect and preserve the interests in the Holy Land of Christendom and of the Moslem and Jewish faiths. Thus Palestine must ultimately become a state which guards the rights and interests of Moslems, Jews and Christians alike; and accords to the inhabitants, as a whole, the fullest measure of self-government, consistent with the three paramount principles set forth above. [. . .]

Recommendation No. 4.

We have reached the conclusion that the hostility between Jews and Arabs and, in particular, the determination of each to achieve domination, if necessary by violence, make it almost certain that, now and for some time

Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Report to the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, Lausanne, Switzerland 20 April 1946, Washington, D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 1946.  Also available on the Internet: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/angtoc.asp

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to come, any attempt to establish either an independent Jewish State or an independent Palestinian State would result in civil strife such as might threaten the peace of the world. We therefore recommend that, until this hostility disappears, the Government of Palestine be continued as at present under mandate pending the execution of a trusteeship agreement under the United Nations. [. . .]

Recommendation No. 7.

(A) We recommend that the Land Transfers Regulations of 1940 be rescinded and replaced by regulations based on a policy of freedom in the sale, lease or use of land, irrespective of race, community or creed, and providing adequate protection for the interests of small owners and tenant cultivators. [. . .]

Dr Goldmann’s mission to Washington, 5 August 19466 It was decided by 9 votes of members of the Executive, 3 abstaining, that Dr  Goldmann should proceed to Washington. 3 non-members were in favour, the rest abstaining. The following resolution, to serve as basis for Dr Goldmann’s mission in America, was adopted:





1 The Executive of the Jewish Agency regards the British proposals

based on the Report of the Committee of Six and as announced by Mr Morrison in the House of Commons as unacceptable as a basis of discussion. 2 The Executive is prepared to discuss a proposal for the establishment of a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine. 3 As immediate steps for the implementation of Paragraph 2 the Executive puts forward the following demands: a the immediate grant of 100,000 certificates and the immediate beginning of the transportation of the 100,000 to Palestine; b the grant of immediate full autonomy (in appointing its administration and in the economic field) to that area of Palestine to be designated to become a Jewish State; c the grant of the right of control of immigration to the administration of that area in Palestine designated to be a Jewish State.

Joseph Heller, The Struggle for the Jewish State: Zionist Politics, 1936–1948 (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1984), p. 436 [Hebrew]. Source: Central Zionist Archives Z4/15, 170.

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Voting: On Paragraph 1): Executive members: unanimously in favour; Non-members: 9 in favour; On Paragraph 2): Executive members: 10 in favour; 1 against; 1 abstention; non-members: 5 for it; 4 abstaining. On Paragraph 3): a) Executive members: 10 in favour; 2 abstaining: b)     “     “   9 in favour; c)    “     “    9 in favour.

Chapter Eight

Third Crossroads: UNSCOP—Establishment, Work, and Recommendations May–September 1947

Address of Mr Andrei Gromyko to the General Assembly of the UN regarding the establishing of UNSCOP, 14 May 19471 [. . .] In discussing the question of the task of the committee for the preparation of proposals on Palestine, we must take into account another important aspect of this question. As we know, the aspirations of a considerable part of the Jewish people are linked with the problem of Palestine and of its future administration. This fact scarcely requires proof. It is not surprising, therefore, that great attention was given to this aspect of the question, both in the General Assembly and at the meetings of the First Committee. Interest in this aspect is understandable and fully justified.

United Nations, “Official Records of the first Special Session of the General Assembly” Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, vol. 1, Verbatim Record, 28 April 1947–15 May 1947, 77th Plenary Meeting, 14 May 1947, Discussion of the First Committee on the establishment of a special committee on Palestine, pp. 128–35.

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During the last war, the Jewish people underwent exceptional sorrow and suffering. Without any exaggeration, this sorrow and suffering are indescribable. It is difficult to express them in dry statistics on the Jewish victims of the fascist aggressors. The Jews in territories where the Hitlerites held sway were subjected to almost complete physical annihilation. The total number of members of the Jewish population who perished at the hands of the Nazi executioners is estimated at approximately six million. Only about a million and a half Jews in Western Europe survived the war. But these figures, although they give an idea of the number of victims of the fascist aggressors among the Jewish people, give no idea of the difficulties in which large numbers of Jewish people found themselves after the war. Large numbers of the surviving Jews of Europe were deprived of their countries, their homes and their means of existence. Hundreds of thousands of Jews are wandering about in various countries of Europe in search of means of existence and in search of shelter. A large number of them are in camps for displaced persons and are still continuing to undergo great privations. To these privations our attention was drawn in particular by the representative of the Jewish Agency, whom we heard in the First Committee. It may well be asked if the United Nations, in view of the difficult situation of hundreds of thousands of the surviving Jewish population, can fail to show an interest in the situation of these people, torn away from their countries and their homes. The United Nations cannot and must not regard this situation with indifference, since this would be incompatible with the high principles proclaimed in its Charter, which provide for the defence of human rights, irrespective of race, religion or sex. The time has come to help these people, not by word, but by deeds. It is essential to show concern for the urgent needs of a people which has undergone such great suffering as a result of the war brought about by Hitlerite Germany. This is a duty of the United Nations. In view of the necessity of manifesting concern for the needs of the Jewish people who find themselves without homes and without means of existence, the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics thinks it essential, in this connection, to draw the attention of the General Assembly to the following important circumstance. Past experience, particularly during the Second World War, shows that no western European State was able to provide adequate assistance for the Jewish people in defending its rights and its very existence from the violence of the Hitlerites and their allies. This is an unpleasant fact, but unfortunately, like all other facts, it must be admitted. The fact that no western European State has been able to ensure the defence of the elementary rights of the Jewish people, and to safeguard it against the violence of the fascist executioners, explains the aspirations of the Jews to establish their own State. It would be unjust not to take this into consideration and to deny the right of the Jewish people to realize this aspiration. It would be unjustifiable to deny this right to the Jewish people,

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particularly in view of all it has undergone during the Second World War. Consequently, the study of this aspect of the problem and the preparation of relevant proposals must constitute an important task of the special committee. I shall now deal with a fundamental question in connection with the discussion of the tasks and powers of the committee we are about to set up, that is, the question of Palestine’s future. It is well known that there are many different plans regarding the future of Palestine and regarding the decisions of the Jewish people in connection with the Palestine question. In particular, several proposals were drawn up in connection with this question by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, to which I have referred. Among the better-known plans on the question of the future administration of Palestine, I should like to mention the following:

1 The establishment of a single Arab-Jewish State, with equal rights

for Arabs and Jews; 2 The partition of Palestine into two independent States, one Arab and one Jewish; 3 The establishment of an Arab State in Palestine, without due regard for the rights of the Jewish population; 4 The establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, without due regard for the rights of the Arab population.

Each of these four basic plans has, in turn, different variants for regulating relations between the Arabs and the Jews and for settling certain other problems. I shall not analyse all these plans in detail at the present time. The Soviet Union will explain its position on the various plans in greater detail when definite proposals are prepared and considered and, more particularly, when decisions are taken on the future of Palestine. For the time being, I shall confine myself to a few remarks on the substance of the proposed plans, from the point of view of defining the committee’s tasks in that field. In analysing the various plans for the future of Palestine, it is essential, first of all, to bear in mind the specific aspects of this question. It is essential to bear in mind the indisputable fact that the population of Palestine consists of two peoples, the Arabs and the Jews. Both have historical roots in Palestine. Palestine has become the homeland of both these peoples, each of which plays an important part in the economy and the cultural life of the country. Neither the historic past nor the conditions prevailing in Palestine at present can justify any unilateral solution of the Palestine problem, either in favour of establishing an independent Arab State, without consideration for the legitimate rights of the Jewish people, or in favour of the establishment of an independent Jewish State, while ignoring the legitimate rights of the Arab population. Neither of these extreme decisions would achieve an equitable solution of this complicated problem, especially since neither

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would ensure the settlement of relations between the Arabs and the Jews, which constitutes the most important task. An equitable solution can be reached only if sufficient consideration is given to the legitimate interests of both these peoples. All this leads the Soviet delegation to the conclusion that the legitimate interests of both the Jewish and Arab populations of Palestine can be duly safeguarded only through the establishment of an independent, dual, democratic, homogeneous ArabJewish State. Such a State must be based on equality of rights for the Jewish and the Arab populations, which might lay foundations of cooperation between these two peoples to their mutual interest and advantage. It is well known that this plan for the solution of Palestine’s future has its supporters in that country itself. Contemporary history provides examples not only of the racial and religious discrimination which, unfortunately, still exists in certain countries. It also gives us examples of the peaceful collaboration of different nationalities within the framework of a single State, in the course of which collaboration each nationality has unlimited possibilities for contributing its labour and showing its talents within the framework of a single State and in the common interests of all the people. Is it not obvious that it would be extremely useful, in reaching a decision on the Palestine problem, to take into consideration existing examples of such friendly co-existence and brotherly cooperation among various nationalities within a single State? Thus, the solution of the Palestine problem by the establishment of a single ArabJewish State with equal rights for the Jews and the Arabs may be considered as one of the possibilities and one of the more noteworthy methods for the solution of this complicated problem. Such a solution of the problem of Palestine’s future might be a sound foundation for the peaceful co-existence and cooperation of the Arab and Jewish populations of Palestine, in the interests of both these peoples and to the advantage of the entire Palestine population and of the peace and security of the Near East. If this plan proved impossible to implement, in view of the deterioration in the relations between the Jews and the Arabs—and it will be very important to know the special committee’s opinion on this question—then it would be necessary to consider the second plan which, like the first, has its supporters in Palestine, and which provides for the partition of Palestine into two independent autonomous States, one Jewish and one Arab. I repeat that such a solution of the Palestine problem would be justifiable only if relations between the Jewish and Arab populations of Palestine indeed proved to be so bad that it would be impossible to reconcile them and to ensure the peaceful co-existence of the Arabs and the Jews. Of course, both these possible plans for the solution of the problem of Palestine’s future must be studied by the committee. Its task must be a multilateral and careful discussion of the plans for the administration of Palestine, with a view to submitting, to the next regular session of the General Assembly, some well-considered and reasoned proposals, which

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would help the United Nations to reach a just solution of this problem in conformity with the interests of the peoples of Palestine, the interests of the United Nations and our common interest in the maintenance of peace and international security. Such are the considerations which the Soviet delegation thought necessary to express at this initial stage of the consideration of the Palestine problem.

Addresses and memoranda presented to UNSCOP Memorandum from Lohamei Herut Yisrael (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) to UNSCOP, Tammuz 5707, 26 June 19472 G. Independence is the Optimal Solution [. . .]

d. Alliance with the Peoples of the Independent and Democratic Middle East.

[. . .] To counter the policy of British imperialism, which seeks to crumble the peoples of the Middle East and plant seeds of division between them in order to dominate them more easily, we propose a peace plan: The Middle East region will be recognized as a neutral region with an international guarantee. British army bases and “military advisers” will be removed from all these countries. A regional federation of Middle Eastern peoples will be established that is not under British auspices, as is the Arab League. Every people will reign in its own country, and all will be united for the sake of mutual assistance and national development, for the advancement of material and human culture. The federation of Middle Eastern peoples will be a cornerstone of world peace and not a tool of provocateurs and instigators of war. If the influence of British imperialism will be eliminated, the anti-democratic regimes of these countries will also collapse. Government will be transferred directly to the peoples, who have no interest in war and thirst for peace, for freedom from slavery and exploitation, for progress, for culture. In the independent and neutral Middle East the independent state in Eretz-Yisrael

Lohamei Herut Yisra’el: Writings, vol. 2 (Tel-Aviv: The Committee for the Publication of Lehi Writings, 1960), pp. 582–7.

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will be a member enjoying equal rights and equal responsibilities. The Hebrew nation will assist in developing the neighboring countries as much as needed, based on mutual assistance. It will also be a full partner in the defense of this region from external attacks.

e. Absorption Potential of the Country

We are speaking about the absorption of millions of Jews. The question which arises, when the problem is investigated, is clear: will the country be able to absorb such huge numbers without reducing the quality of life and harming the status of its residents in practice? A partial answer to this question can be found by any objective scholar in the studies and plans of the American scientists, Robert Nathan and Hayes. They suggest programs for the development of the country which would enable the absorption of hundreds of thousands, apart from the possibilities existing at this moment. It is no wonder that the foreign administration has rejected these plans. We have proved that it is not interested in the development of the country. Quite the contrary, it is making plans to prevent development. All the British officials have acted in this way until now. The possibilities of development therefore depend first of all on the removal of the political obstacle—the foreign administration. Only then will it be possible to carry out large-scale plans to transform our country into one of the most populous countries. We take this opportunity to note that according to conservative studies, during the Byzantine period Eretz-Yisrael in its historical borders contained 4 million inhabitants, most of whom earned their livelihoods through agriculture. At that time the field labourer did not yet have at his disposal either agricultural machinery, scientific research or intensive farming methods. Now that these accomplishments are available to every farmer, the land can provide for a population of at least this size, even if we take into account the rise in the quality of life and the demands of the field worker. But Eretz-Yisrael was not intended to be just an agricultural country. Industrial development in recent years demonstrates that our country is destined to be an important industrial center. Industrial plants have been established here despite the disturbances of the foreign administration, despite the opening of doors to competition with foreign products without import tax, despite the import tax on raw materials. There is no question that if, in the place of this restrictive and obstructive foreign administration, a government interested in developing the country should come to power, then industry would also advance rapidly. An exact geological survey has yet to be carried out in order to determine what resources are buried beneath our land. But even the results of those surveys which have been carried out are being kept secret by the administration. The enormous resources contained in the Dead Sea, however, are known. In Eastern Transjordan there are known resources of oil and metals. The exploited resources currently serve as a source of profit

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for British companies. But if they were to be transferred to the people, they would provide a livelihood for hundreds of thousands. One should also remember the geographic situation of Eretz-Yisrael, positioned at the point of contact of three continents. The most important paths of transportation pass through it. Lydda is a layover point for planes on their way from the U.S.A. to Central Asia. Haifa is destined to become a major mercantile seaport. The country’s geographic position has thus far stimulated the urges of greedy powers and brought it nothing but trouble; but when these powers are removed, it will become a blessing and a source of income for sailors, transport workers and merchants. Even if space were lacking, no entity would be entitled to deny us the right to rescue and give housing in our country to our brethren, to share with them our scanty crust of bread. But every objective study shows that there is much more space and many more possibilities for hundreds of thousands and millions of Jews, who will come to the country to develop it and make its desert fertile. The past has shown that new opportunities have arisen relative to the increase in immigration. The quality of life has not decreased, but rather risen. And so it will be in the future.

f. The Problem of the Arab Population

It is common knowledge who has an interest in conflict between the Jewish people and the Arabs. Anyone who requires proof of the fact that the conflict has been inflated by the British administration for selfish reasons, should look at the example of the Jerusalem Municipality. For years municipal matters in the country’s capital were handled by a council elected by the population—Jews and Arabs. But the administration could not tolerate this cooperation, which might spread to other locations and serve as proof that the diverse parts of the population could work together for the benefit of the whole. Special efforts were made by the administration to arrest this cooperation. And so, in the spring of 1945, the Arab representatives left the city council. The administration dismissed the Jewish members as well, dissolved the council, and set up at the head of the Jerusalem municipality an appointed committee of British officials. At the time of the appointment the administration claimed that the directive was temporary, and established an investigative committee to check the situation and to look for a solution. Since then two years have passed and the council of British officials has become a permanent institution. These officials displayed alacrity in setting high salaries for themselves and raising municipal taxes, but have not been at all concerned with the city’s citizens, and have not paid attention to their needs. Jerusalem under British rule suffers from a shortage of water in the summertime and a shortage of electricity in the winter months. Nothing has been done for education; no concern has been shown for the problem of abandoned children. All the citizens of Jerusalem suffer from the caprice of foreign officials, who are concerned primarily with preventing the development of the city and with slowing down its growth.

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The administration finds support for this policy among reactionary Arab groups, who also fear the infiltration of culture and civilization, which constitute a threat to their influence over the frustrated masses. The “familial” structure of Arab society is the factor which supports the influence of “family heads.” The administration and its reactionary accessories have succeeded in instilling feelings of fear and terror toward Jews in the hearts of the Arabs. The Jewish “leaders,” for their part, who have ignored the obstructive role of imperialism, have also found convenient propaganda in “the Arab threat.” They have closed their eyes and failed to see that the “Arab boycott” of Hebrew industrial products was organized by British agents. Instead of revealing the source of evil in order to fight against it exclusively, the banner of boycotting Arab production has been raised. The past few years, which were notable for the war waged by the Hebrew underground against the foreign administration, have brought about a certain change in the views of the Arab masses. This fact has not found widespread public expression because the process is still in its initial stage and because the “familial” bond is still strong. But it has already yielded substantive results in the form of Arab assistance to the Hebrew underground. Not only have Arabs—and even some important ones—opened their homes to the underground fighters in the hour of need, to provide them rest and protection. There have even been cases of active assistance on the part of Arabs. In any event, this help is not given in exchange for money, but rather out of sincere sympathy and out of a desire to cooperate in the struggle against the common enemy. We believe that as the struggle against British imperialism gains momentum, the cooperation will expand to include not only the Arabs of Eretz-Yisrael, but the Arabs of the neighboring countries as well, for the cause of achieving independence for Eretz-Yisrael and its neighbors. We believe that once the independent state of Eretz-Yisrael is founded— which will serve as a place of concentration for the Jews after the removal of the foreign administration, which agitates and instils fear—friendly relations will prevail between all parts of the population. In the state of Eretz-Yisrael, Arabs will have equal rights as citizens and will enjoy cultural autonomy, which will permit them to develop their own original genius and to take part in the cultural life of the greater Arab people. The state will provide education for Arab youth in their national language, just as it will provide education for Hebrew youth. The Arabs will participate in the political life of the state in proportion with their population in the country and in accordance with their abilities. The economic development of the country will lead to the removal of divisions. Arab workers will be members of the professional unions, which will include all the workers in the country. The quality of life of all parts of the population will equalize. The many millions, which currently go to the police and prisons and to finance British officials—will be devoted in the future to education, health, public buildings and the development of the country. The strike by postal workers and telegraph workers in April 1946, and the military workers

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strike this summer, are additional proof that the two parts of the population are abused and exploited by the foreign administration and that they can cooperate when necessary. We believe that the Arab population in Eretz-Yisrael will serve as a bridge for cooperation between the Jews and the neighboring countries. There is no chance of a take-over or a policy of Jewish oppression against the Arabs. The Jews are a democratic people by nature. In every place in the world Jews have stood in the front line of those fighting for equality among all citizens, against tyranny and oppression. The Jews will not establish in their own country a regime that they hate everywhere else. The victims of persecutions will not become persecutors in their own country. They would not want to do this, since then part of the population would be dissatisfied and this would serve as a pretext for foreign intervention. It is possible that one may find certain groups among the Arabs which would not want to live as neighbors with the Jews for one reason or another. This might happen in the first few years, considering the incitement disseminated so far by the British imperialists and their accomplices. If these Arabs should prefer voluntarily to live in the neighboring countries which are suffering from population shortages, the borders of the country will be open before them. The borders of the country will be open at the same time for the entry of hundreds of thousands of Jews from the countries of the Middle East who currently live in conditions of atrophy and persecution, subject to the oppression of the reactionary regimes which exist in these countries today. After the last war we witnessed examples of population exchanges between friendly countries, such as between Poland and the Belarusian and Ukrainian republics and between Poland and the Czechoslovakian republic. This remedy might be effective in our country as well, if part of the population should voluntarily prefer to give up the quality of life in the developing state of Eretz-Yisrael, and should prefer instead to live in a purely Arab country [. . .]

H. The Elimination of Other Solutions In the past few years numerous solutions to the problem of Eretz-Yisrael have been put forth. We will not dwell on the proposals of the British government—cantonization, federalization, etc.—the intention of which is clear to everyone: to leave the administration of Eretz-Yisrael in the hands of Britain. But there are proposals which mislead public opinion with their external glow and appear reasonable. Two such proposals have earned the attention of those concerned about the future of the country: (a) a bi-national state; (b) the partition of the country into two separate states belonging to Jews and Arabs. We reject these two plans and ask those parties interested in the welfare of the country to reject them as well.

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If it was the intention of this plan to emphasize that in the independent state of Eretz-Yisrael there would live both Jews and citizens belonging to another people who would enjoy complete equality of rights—this would represent the statement of a correct fact, about which there would be no disagreement. But the proponents of the plan see in this a solution for the relations between Jews and Arabs currently and in the future, which would not be on the basis of a war against the foreign administration; indeed it would serve as the basis for the division of power between the two parts of the population in the state to be established. For the most part those who support the plan propose parity in government: that is to say, a division of roles in the legislative and executive branches—in equal parts, without taking into account the numerical ratio of the populations. It is no wonder that the plan has found no supporters among the Arabs. At this point, when according to the official statistics they constitute a majority of the country, their agreement to parity in government seems like a concession on their part. The proposal is conditioned on their agreement to large-scale Jewish immigration, which would doubtless change the numerical ratio of the parts of the population. And what are the guarantees that after the Jews become a majority they would not demand a critical review of this agreement? The Arabs fear that the proponents of the plan intend only to ensnare them in a trap and that in time they will rely on the principle of the democratic majority and will demand a majority in the government for the majority of the population. If the proposal is conditioned on the agreement of the Arabs—and this is indeed its intention—there is no chance of its coming to fruition. For the standard of a bi-national state will be shattered on the rock of reality the moment that the problem of immigration is brought to the negotiating table. The proponent of the plan understands that the Jews intend to open the gates of the country to large-scale immigration. And the Arabs, should they discuss this plan, will wish to achieve through it a status quo with respect to the numerical ratio of the parts of the population—that is, a cessation of immigration. There is no doubt that they will treat with a complete lack of faith the rhetoric of people who seek to achieve a certain goal by concealing it. An explicit statement of the minimum and maximum of the Jews’ national expectations will certainly be received with greater credibility. The slogan of parity in government is also anti-democratic, because it states that government roles will be distributed not on the basis of the will of the population and not on the basis of the abilities of the candidates, but rather according to identifying signs of race. There is no sensible reason, for instance, why there should not be a Minister of Economic Planning who belongs to the Arab people in the independent state of Eretz-Yisrael, if he should be found to be qualified for this position—in the event that the “bi-national” arrangement requires that this position should be reserved specifically for Jews. It is not

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impossible that in the independent state of Eretz-Yisrael there will be unified parties—that is, parties belonging to both Jews and Arabs: the Socialist Party, the Conservative Party, etc. It is possible that the Socialist Party, for example, will win an election and be charged with putting together a government. The principle of “parity in government” will require a distribution of ministries according to racial alignment, while it is possible that there may be more Jews who are qualified for the positions, or the opposite situation. Sometimes examples are brought in support of this proposal. But not all the examples are applicable to the situation in Eretz-Yisrael: neither the Czechoslovakian example nor the Yugoslavian example. Czechoslovakia includes two complete peoples, each inhabiting its own country. The Czechs have no countries outside their own and neither do the Slovaks. Each of them rules over its own country and they are united in one state by a central government. The situation in Eretz-Yisrael is different. The Arabs of EretzYisrael are not a specific people. They are part of the greater Arab people, whose countries are divided by borders only because of the interference of foreigners and because of competition between dynasties of “rulers.” The Jewish people has no country besides this one. It is still not concentrated in its own country. Millions wait for their opportunity to settle there. They will settle in every part of the country, in every desolate corner which can be made fertile. The Arabs in Eretz-Yisrael would not therefore have territorial borders such as the Slovaks have in Czechoslovakia. In Yugoslavia too, the ratio between the parts of the population is static. The Serbs, Croats and Slovenians do not have territories or brethren outside the boundaries of the Yugoslavian federation. In Czechoslovakia before the last war the Sudeten Germans did not constitute a separate political administrative unit like the Slovaks, although they were a significant minority in the state. The proposal for a bi-national state in Eretz-Yisrael is an abstract slogan which does not solve either the country’s problem or that of the Hebrew people [. . .]

Memorandum from “The Communist Union in Eretz-Yisrael” to UNSCOP, June 19473 D. Guidelines for a Solution (Conclusions)

1 One obvious conclusion, at which any objective observer of what

happens in Eretz-Yisrael must arrive, is that the previous situation

Memorandum on the Problem of Palestine: To the United Nations Special Committee from Ha-Iggud Ha-Komunisti Be-Eretz Yisrael (Jerusalem: Ha-Iggud Ha-Komunisti Be-Eretz Yisrael, Ha-Mazkirut Ha-Artzit, 1947), pp. 22–4 [Hebrew].

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cannot be sustained. The Mandatory system has utterly failed. The British have not fulfilled in the past and do not currently fulfill the role which they took upon themselves. They have failed to meet their obligations to both the Jews and the Arabs. They have not assisted in the economic and political development of the country or of the peoples in it—on the contrary, they have for the most part been an obstruction in attaining this goal. Their policy, as the facts demonstrate, far from increasing the understanding and cooperation between the two peoples, has done quite the opposite and actually impeded such progress. They have used their constitutional and economic power in order to foster nationalist conflict, and given perpetual assistance to precisely the most reactionary circles within the two peoples, these being the sworn enemies of brotherhood and cooperation between nations. In this manner has this tiny country been transformed into one large military camp, into a police state. And the Mandatory power, which is maintaining this army ostensibly in order to preserve the peace, exacerbates the populace’s animosity toward it and the mistrust between the peoples in the country. Moreover, both of the peoples in this country have stated explicitly that they have no need for a legal guardianship, that they demand autonomous national existences which do not depend on any foreign entity, and that they do not aspire to be the subjects of any person, but rather to be the independent masters of their independent country. Accordingly, in order to attain a constructive solution to the country’s problem in the spirit of the UN Charter, which guarantees the national liberty of peoples, it is necessary to sever all ties of Eretz-Yisrael to Britain (the leading representatives of which have also for their part stated more than once that their policy in Eretz-Yisrael has failed) and to declare complete independence. The meaning of this independence is: a declaration of the annulment of the Mandate with which Britain was entrusted by the League of Nations, an end to the activities of the British administration, and the evacuation of all British military forces from Eretz-Yisrael. 2 No positive solution to the problem of Eretz-Yisrael is possible without a solution to the country’s painful nationalist predicament. In order to achieve a just and sustainable solution to this problem, it is necessary to recognize the fact that two separate national entities exist in Eretz-Yisrael—Jewish and Arab. And both of them have just national claims in this country, each has the right to build a free national-political existence here—and the rights of the one group do not and need not infringe upon the rights of the other. Nonetheless, it should be noted that as a result of the ways in which the British

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Mandate manifested itself which we mentioned above, and because of the fact that the political leadership of both national entities was in the hands of reactionary, chauvinistic, anti-democratic groups for so long, there exists a tradition of non-cooperation, mistrust, fear of seizure and even ethnic hatred, and these factors no doubt inhibit a democratic and just solution to the country’s problems. Therefore in order to reach such a solution it is necessary to establish political principles which will facilitate a surmounting of the current national disintegration. Accordingly, in addition to recognizing the right of Eretz-Yisrael to complete independence, it is necessary to recognize the right of self-determination (to the point of separation) of both national entities, and guarantees of complete national independence should be given to each of them by the United Nations Organization. International guarantees of this kind are likely to alleviate the relations of mistrust and the fear of seizure prevailing between the two peoples.

3 It seems to us that the best way to make use of political sovereignty

with respect to both peoples, in order to ensure economic prosperity and the absorption of those Jews who are interested in making Aliyah to Eretz-Yisrael, is the creation of a single independent and democratic state, common to both Jews and Arabs, founded on complete national-political equality for each of its ethnic groups and on full democratic rights for all of its residents. The form of government which ensures political equality needs to be based on parity. We will not embark here on an exact constitutional description of the future state in Eretz-Yisrael, for in our opinion it is too early to discuss a constitution so long as those fundamental principles, on the basis of which cooperation between the peoples can be established, have not been secured. On the other hand, in the event that these principles will become a matter of agreement, the representatives of the two peoples will be able to work out the details of their constitution in accordance with both of their interests. We wish to emphasize again that, as the experience of the Soviet Union and other multi-national states (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, etc.) has demonstrated, only the right of self-determination to the point of separation can serve as a sufficient safe-guard to each nation from the attempts at seizure by another nation. Nonetheless, we also emphasize that it is not in the best interests of the two peoples to use this right in order to achieve separation, because only a joint bi-national government can promise free economic development, inter-ethnic peace, the realization of the Jewish national right of Aliyah absorption and settlement, and an elevated quality of life for both peoples.

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4 Joint rule can come about when both peoples realize that their well-

being requires a unified state and a joint rule agreement. No external power is entitled to impose on them this governmental arrangement; therefore, so that they will be able to reach a settlement, it will be necessary to eliminate the fear of seizure. We have already stated that such a safeguard is implied in the principle of self-determination to the point of separation, in the right of each national community to create its own separate state. This right can only exist with a territorial basis. We therefore believe that a joint state for Jews and Arabs should be made up of regions possessing their own local institutions, while at the same time guaranteeing equal representation in the high institutions. 5 As a condition for the establishment of a parity-based bi-national state, it is necessary to nullify colonial limitations, both political and economic. The Ottoman constitution, which continues to serve today as the basic constitution of Eretz-Yisrael, needs to be revoked, as well as all the special and emergency regulations which were passed by the Mandatory government. It is necessary to annul the census system currently used in municipal elections, and the undemocratic system of taxation which falls as a heavy burden on the wide strata of the populace on the one hand, and on the other hand denies them the right to vote. Local democratic institutions should be founded, under the supervision of UN representatives, in all regions. In districts with only one ethnic group these institutions need to be elected by direct democratic elections. In the bi-national districts these institutions need to be based on parity, but elected democratically by both Jews and Arabs. A parity-based founding council, which will be elected democratically by both national groups in Eretz-Yisrael and which will need to establish, under the supervision of the UN, the territorial boundaries of districts and to work out the future constitution of Eretz-Yisrael, should be summoned.

6 The right of Aliyah absorption and settlement is one of the basic

national rights of the Hebrew Yishuv. Any attempt to deny these rights is equivalent to an infringement on the national independence of the Jews, since each national group is entitled to determine its own independent path in all questions, especially with respect to so vital a question as the absorption of Jewish brethren who have suffered so greatly during the period of Hiterlist rule—the surviving remains of the horrifying eradication of the Jewish people at the hands of fascism. On the other hand, however, this Aliyah needs to be conducted in such a way as not to infringe on the rights of the residents of Eretz-Yisrael already located therein. Accordingly, in the framework of a bi-national state,

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Aliyah can only be executed on the basis of a development plan for sparsely populated regions, a plan based on the exploitation of the natural resources of Eretz-Yisrael (oil, potash, water access, etc.). The development plan can be modified with the assistance and supervision of the UN, in such a way that will ensure both the possibilities of Aliyah for the Jews and the elevation of the quality of life for Arabs.



7 These guidelines, should they be set at the foundation of the

solution for the problem of Eretz-Yisrael, will be uniquely capable of creating in this country conditions most favorable for both peoples and of preventing all of those deficiencies inherent in the other plans, and to lay the groundwork for the free political national development of the peoples of Eretz-Yisrael. A solution founded on these guidelines is in accordance with the spirit of the UN charter and is likely to transform Eretz-Yisrael from a country which is a danger to world peace to a tranquil state which contributes to the improvement of world peace, as an equal among equals in the framework of the UN. 8 It should be taken into account that, in order to achieve a solution to the problem of Eretz-Yisrael in accordance with the guidelines which have been laid out above, there may be a need for a transitional period during which this settlement, which will ensure the national independence of both peoples in the framework of a free EretzYisrael, will be achieved with the assistance of the institutions of the United Nations Organization.

Address of Mr David Ben-Gurion to UNSCOP, 4 July 19474 Mr Chairman, Members of the Committee! First of all I wish to congratulate your Committee on the procedure you have adopted in conducting your inquiry, of seeing things for yourselves before hearing oral evidence. [. . .] We have had a rather long and disappointing experience of numerous commissions of enquiry which were sent to Palestine by the Mandatory Government to enquire into things perfectly well-known to everybody and to make recommendations which remained on paper. [. . .] We welcome this inquiry committee because it has been sent by the United Nations. It is fitting that this highest international forum in the world

United Nations, “Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly,” Supplement no. 11, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, vol. 3, pp. 8–23.

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should deal with these twin problems of the Jews and Palestine, as they both are international in their character. There is hardly a country in the world, perhaps with the exception of the countries in the Far East from India to Japan, which has no direct concern with the Jewish problem, and Palestine is certainly not a matter for England alone, which is here only as temporary trustee to carry out an international mandate under specific conditions and with a specific purpose. The settlement of those twin problems is perhaps the supreme test of the United Nations, a test both of their freedom and ability to deal with an issue involving as it does a conflict between a small, weak people and a powerful world empire; to deal with it not as a matter of power politics and political expediency, but as a question of justice and equity, as far as these are attainable in human affairs, and in accordance with the merits of the case. The United Nations in our view embody the most ardent hope and the most vital needs of the peoples of the world—a hope and a need for peace, stable and lasting peace, which is possible only if based on justice, equality and cooperation between nations great and small; a hope and a need for a comprehensive international system establishing relations between peoples on the rule of right instead of might, on mutual help instead of competition, on freedom, equality and good will instead of oppression, discrimination and exploitation. The Jewish people, no less than any other people in the world, is deeply anxious for these ideals to prevail, and that for two reasons—because of our spiritual heritage and tradition, and because of our unique position in the world. The gospel of lasting peace, brotherhood and justice as between nations was proclaimed thousands of years ago by the Jewish prophets in this country, perhaps in this very city, the eternal city in which you are now holding your inquiry. More than 3,300 years ago, when our ancestors were on their way from the house of bondage in Egypt to the Promised Land, they were taught by our lawgiver and the greatest of our prophets, the supreme command for men on earth—“thou shalt love thy fellow-men as thyself”, and that if “a stranger sojourn with you in your land . . . that stranger shall be unto you as one home-born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself, for we were strangers in the land of Egypt”. The prophets who followed Moses—Isaiah, Hosea, Micah and others— proclaimed the gospel of social justice and international brotherhood and peace. They left us the vision of a future when the people “shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning-hooks, nation shall not lift sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more”. The teachings and ideals of our prophets together with the peculiar nature of our country, the uniqueness of its structure and its geographical position, all shaped the character of our people and its civilization, and made us perhaps the most exclusive and the most universal of nations, since ancient times up to the present. When we were still living independently in our country we clashed with the civilizations of great

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and powerful neighbours, first Egypt and Babylon, then Greece and Rome, who tried to crush our individuality and assimilate us among them. With an indomitable obstinacy we always preserved our identity. Our entire history is a history of continuous resistance to superior physical forces which tried to wipe out our Jewish image and to uproot our connections with our country and with the teachings of our prophets. We did not surrender, we never surrender to sheer physical force deprived of moral validity. We paid a dear price for our resistance. We lost our independence. We were dispossessed of our homeland. We were exiled to strange lands. The pressure against us in the Diaspora was even stronger and still we persevered.

2 In  almost every country of our dispersion and in every generation our forefathers gave their lives for “Kiddush Hashem”, which literally translated means “The Sanctification of the Name”. They gave their lives out of fidelity to their religious, national and human ideals. In this resistance the soul of our people was forged, and this gave us strength to survive until now. There were two main things which enabled us to survive all these persecutions— our faith in Zion, faith in our national revival, our faith in the vision of our prophets for the future, and our faith in a new world of justice and peace. That is why we are so anxious for the success of the United Nations. But it is not only our spiritual heritage, but also our peculiar position in the world which makes us attach so much value to the United Nations and its aims and aspirations. We are a small, weak, defenceless people, and we know that there can be no security for us, either as individuals nor as a people, neither in the Diaspora nor in our Homeland, even after we become an independent nation in our own state, as long as the whole human family is not united in peace and good will. The case before you is rather a complicated one. It involves, first, relations between Jews and Gentiles; second, relations between the Jewish national home and the Mandatory power; third, relations between Jews and Arabs. On the first point I shall confine myself to a few remarks. You are faced with a tragic problem, perhaps the tragic problem of our time and of many generations, of a people which was twice forcibly driven out of its country and which never acquiesced in its dispossession, and although it was its bitter destiny to wander in exile for many centuries it always remained attached with all its heart and soul to its historic homeland. It is a unique fact in world history, but it is a real, living, incontestable fact. During your short visit in this country you have seen, I believe, some manifestations of this deep attachment. You have seen Jews from all parts of the world—the call of the homeland brought them here—who with passionate devotion

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to the soil of their ancestors are endeavouring to regenerate a people and a land. An unbroken tie between our people and our land has persisted through all these centuries in full force because of two fundamental historical facts: first, this country has remained largely desolate and waste while possessing great potentialities of development, given the need, skill, means and devotion for their realization. Second, Jewish homelessness and insecurity in the Diaspora, which is the underlying cause of all Jewish suffering and persecution. Jewish misery may vary from time to time, it may become more or less acute, but it never ceases. Jewish insecurity originates in three fundamental disabilities of Jews throughout the world; they are deprived of statehood, they are homeless and they are in a minority position everywhere. Unless and until these three disabilities are completely and lastingly remedied, there is no hope for the Jewish people, nor can there be justice in the world. The homelessness and minority position make the Jews always dependent on the mercy of others. The “others” may be good and may be bad, and the Jews may some time be treated more or less decently, but they are never masters of their own destiny, they are entirely defenceless when the majority people turn against them. What happened to our people in this war is merely a climax to uninterrupted persecution to which we had been subjected for centuries by almost all the Christian and Moslem peoples in the old world. There were and there are many Jews who could not stand it, and they deserted us. They could not stand the massacres and expulsions, the humiliation and discrimination, and they gave it up in despair. But the Jewish people as a whole did not give way, did not despair or renounce its hope and faith in a better future, national as well as universal. And here we are, not only we the Jews of Palestine, but the Jews throughout the world—the small remnant of European Jewry and Jews in other countries. We claim our rightful place under the sun as human beings and as a people, the same right as other human beings and peoples possess, the right to security, freedom, equality, statehood and membership in the United Nations. No individual Jew can be really free, secure and equal anywhere in the world as long as the Jewish people as a people is not again rooted in its own country as an equal and independent nation. An international undertaking was given to the Jewish people some thirty years ago in the Balfour Declaration and in the Mandate for Palestine, to reconstitute our national home in our ancient homeland. This undertaking originated with the British people and the British Government. It was supported and confirmed by 52 nations and embodied in an international instrument known as the Mandate for Palestine. The Charter of the United Nations seeks to maintain “justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law.” Is it too presumptuous on our part to expect that the United Nations will see that obligations to the Jewish people too are respected and faithfully carried out in the spirit and the letter?

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3 This brings me to the second phase of the problem, the conflict between the Mandatory power and the Jewish people. It is a very sad and very painful conflict for us. It is a conflict of two unequal parties. On the one hand a great world power, possessing tremendous military, economic, territorial and political resources, linked in a community of interest and alliance with a great number of large and small peoples, enjoying, deservedly, great moral prestige for the heroic part it played in the last war, wielding unlimited power in this country, backed as it is by large military forces on land, at sea and in the air. On the other hand, a stateless, homeless, defenceless, small people with nothing but the graves of six million dead, hundreds of thousands of homeless and displaced persons, having to rely only on its own constructive will and creative effort, on the justice of its case and the intrinsic value of its work, on its natural and historic right to its ancient homeland, where the first foundations have already been laid for a regenerated Jewish Commonwealth. What is the nature of the conflict? Palestine is not part of the British Empire. Great Britain is here as a mandatory to give effect to the internationally guaranteed pledges given to the Jewish people in the Balfour Declaration. It will be to the everlasting credit of the British people that it was the first in modern times to undertake the restoration of Palestine to the Jewish people. Jews in England were and are treated as equals. A British Jew can be and has been a member of the Cabinet, a Chief Justice, a Viceroy, and can occupy any other place in the political and economic life of the country. Only those who in such a way could respect the rights of the Jews as individuals could also recognize the rights of Jews as a people. The Balfour Declaration was in the first place a public recognition of the Jews as a people, and in the second place a recognition of the Jewish people’s right to a national home; in the third place, of a national home not merely for Jews, but for the Jewish people in its entirety. The Balfour Declaration did not come out of the blue. [. . .] In 1902, the British Government set up a Royal Commission to enquire into the question of aliens in England. Dr Herzl, whose book on “The Jewish State as the only solution of the Jewish problem” was epoch-making in our history and who became the founder of modern Zionism, was invited by His Majesty’s Government to give evidence before that Commission. His statement at the hearings that “the solution of the Jewish difficulty is the recognition of the Jews as a people and the finding by them of a legally-recognized home, to which Jews in those parts of the world where they are oppressed would naturally migrate” fell on fertile soil, and met with deep sympathy in the British Government. Palestine was then still part of the Ottoman Empire, so Mr Joseph Chamberlain, then Secretary of State for the colonies, offered Uganda to the Jews. While our people was deeply grateful for such an

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unprecedented offer, it was rejected by us, for the simple reason that it was not our historic homeland, it was not the Land of Israel. It was Russian and East European Jews who were mainly responsible for the rejection, in spite of the fact that the plight of our people in many countries and especially in Czarist Russia was at that time desperate. The British Government then offered the Zionists an alternative, a large area on the border of Palestine known as El Arish, which had been detached from Ottoman rule. This plan, too, came to nothing because of lack of water, and it was only the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War which gave the British an opportunity to restore Palestine to the Jews. The Balfour Declaration was not the first of its kind, just as this is not our first return. After the destruction of our first commonwealth by the Assyrians and Babylonians, the Persian King Cyrus the Great in the year 538 B.C. made the first “Balfour Declaration”, as we are told in the Book of Ezra. [. . .] 2,455 years after the Cyrus Declaration, another one was issued by Mr Balfour on behalf of H.M. Government on 2 November 1917. I can safely assume that all of you are acquainted with the text of that document, but I must draw your attention to the first and last sentences, which are sometimes omitted when that document is quoted. The opening is this: “Dear Lord Rothschild, I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His Majesty’s Government the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations, which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet”. And the last sentence reads: “I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation” The text of this declaration had been submitted to President Wilson and had been approved by him before its publication. The first people after Britain and America to associate itself with this declaration was Yugoslavia, or as it was then called, Serbia (27 December 1917). Then came the confirmation of France (9 February 1918), Italy (9 May 1918), China (14 December 1918), and many others. Emir Feisal representing the Arabs at the Peace Conference on behalf of his father, the Sherif of Mecca, gave it his blessing. “The field in which the Jewish National Home was to be established was understood at the time of the Balfour Declaration to be the whole of historic Palestine”, stated the Royal Commission for Palestine of 1937. That is to say it included Transjordan. The meaning of the national home was at that time made abundantly clear by the authors of the Declaration. Mr Lloyd George, who was Prime Minister at the time, testified: “The idea was, that a Jewish State was not to be set up immediately by the Peace Treaty . . . it was contemplated that . . . if the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity and had become a definite majority of the inhabitants, then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Commonwealth”. The Royal Commission for Palestine, which examined the records bearing upon the question, stated in its report that “His Majesty’s Government evidently realized that a Jewish State might in course of time be established, but it was

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not in a position to say that this would happen, still less to bring it about of its own motion”. The Commission goes on to cite the authors of the Declaration, “‘I am persuaded’, said President Wilson on the 3 March 1919, ‘that the Allies are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundation of a Jewish Commonwealth’. Lord Robert Cecil in 1917, General Smuts and Sir Herbert Samuel in 1919 and others spoke or wrote in terms that could only mean that they contemplated the eventual establishment of a Jewish state. Leading British newspapers were equally explicit in their comments on the Declaration”. [. . .] Mr Winston Churchill, in a statement published on the 8 February 1920, said: “If, as may well happen, there should be created in our own lifetime by the banks of the Jordan a Jewish State under the protection of the British Crown which might comprise three or four millions of Jews, an event will have occurred in the history of the world which would from every point of view be beneficial, and would be especially in harmony with the truest interests of the British Empire”. And what is perhaps especially significant in this respect is the agreement concluded between the Emir Feisal and Dr Weizmann on 3 January 1919. Article 4 of the agreement lays down that “All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly as possible to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil”. [. . .] On 24 July 1925, the Mandate for Palestine was confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations. The Mandate embodied the Balfour Declaration and it added a meaningful amplification. After citing in a preamble the text of the declaration it added, “recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting (not constituting) their national home in that country”. In commenting on the Mandate, the Royal Commission makes the following observation: “. . . Unquestionably, the primary purpose of the Mandate, as expressed in its preamble and its articles, is to promote the establishment of the Jewish National Home”.

4 In  1936 large-scale Arab riots broke out which later received the help of the Axis partners. A Royal Commission was then sent out to “ascertain the underlying cause of the disturbances, to enquire into the manner in which the Mandate is being implemented, and to ascertain whether Arabs and Jews have any legitimate grievances” against “the way the Mandate is being Implemented”.

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The Commission found “that though the Arabs have benefited by the development of the country owing to Jewish immigration, this has had no conciliatory effect. On the contrary, improvement in the economic situation in Palestine has meant deterioration of the political situation” (Report of Palestine Royal Commission, chapter 19, Paragraph 2). The Commission thought that “the obligations Britain undertook towards the Arabs and the Jews some twenty years ago have not lost in moral or legal weight through what has happened since, but the trouble is that these obligations proved to be irreconcilable. The Mandate is unworkable”, and they reached therefore the conclusion that the only solution lay in the partition of the country into two states, a Jewish and an Arab State. [. . .] The Zionist Congress which assembled after the publication of the Royal Commission’s report considered its proposals, which had been approved by His Majesty’s Government. A considerable minority was for rejecting the plan in principle, as inconsistent with the obligations to the Jewish people, its historic rights, and its vital interests. The majority was opposed to the concrete proposals of the Commission mainly for two reasons: that the Negev, the unsettled and uncultivated part of Southern Palestine was excluded, as well as Jerusalem. Everybody admitted that the Holy Places ought to be internationally safeguarded and that the Old City of Jerusalem required a special regime. But there were very grave objections to the exclusion of Jewish Jerusalem from the Jewish State. At the same time the majority decided to empower the Executive to negotiate with the Government, and if a satisfactory plan for a Jewish state emerged it would be submitted to a Congress to be elected for decision. Meanwhile Mr Chamberlain’s Government changed its mind and sent out another Commission which reported against partition. A year later, in May 1939, an entirely new policy was inaugurated, which actually scrapped the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, the policy of the White Paper of 1939 which can be briefly summarized in the following three principles:

1 Jews to remain a permanent minority not to exceed a third of the

population. After the admission of another 75,000 immigrants over the next 5 years, “no further Jewish immigration will be permitted, unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it”. 2 Jews not to be allowed to acquire land and to settle except in a very limited area of Palestine. 3 Within ten years an independent Palestine state to be established in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will “provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future”.

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In February, 1940, in pursuance of the new Policy a new Land Ordinance was promulgated which established three zones in Palestine: Zone A comprising 6,415 square miles, 63.1 per cent of the total area of Western Palestine, where a Jew is prohibited from acquiring land, water, buildings, trees, or any interest or right over land, water, building or trees by purchase, lease, mortgage, charge or any other disposition; Zone B, comprising some 3,225 square miles, 31.8 per cent of the total, is restricted zone; there special permission in writing from the High Commissioner, which he may at his unfettered discretion grant or refuse, is necessary if a Jew wants to acquire lands, buildings, trees etc., from an Arab. The third Zone, where the Jews are free to buy land, is only 5 per cent of the area of Palestine. When the White Paper quota of 75,000 immigrants was exhausted at the end of the war, the present Government fixed a political maximum of 1,500 a month, in keeping with the terms of the White Paper of 1939, that the Jewish population should not exceed approximately a third of the total. In the memorandum presented to you by the Government on the “Administration of Palestine under the Mandate” you are told that the two measures under the White Paper, the prohibition of Jewish settlement on land and the arbitrary limitation of immigration, have been bitterly resented by the Jews who have represented that they are contrary to His Majesty’s Government’s obligations under the Mandate. This is one of the half-truths in which that document abounds. It is quite true that the Jewish people, as stated by the Jewish Agency on May 17, 1939, the day that the White Paper was issued, “regard this breach of faith as a surrender to Arab terrorism. It delivers Great Britain’s friends into the hands of those who are fighting her. It must widen the breach between Jews and Arabs, and undermine the hope of peace in Palestine. It is a policy in which the Jewish people will not acquiesce. The new regime announced in the White Paper will be devoid of any moral basis and contrary to international law. Such a regime can only be set up and maintained by force”. But it is not quite accurate, as the memorandum seems to indicate, that it is merely a Jewish assertion that the White Paper violates the Mandate. The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, the only international institution which was asked by the Mandatory to consider the proposals of the White Paper, declared unanimously that “the policy set out in the White Paper was not in accordance with the interpretation which in agreement with the Mandatory Power and the Council, the Commission had always placed upon the Palestine Mandate”. The majority of the Commission, the chairman M. Orts, from Belgium, the vice-chairman Professor Rappard from Switzerland, Baron van Asbeck from Holland and Mademoiselle Dannevig from Norway, declared that the very terms of the Mandate and the fundamental intentions of its authors ruled out any conclusion that the policy of the White Paper was in conformity with the Mandate.

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But it was not only the Permanent Mandates Commission which condemned the White Paper. In a debate in the House of Commons in May, 1939, Mr Herbert Morrison, now Lord President of the Council in the Labour Government, declared bluntly on behalf of the Labour Party, “We regard the White Paper and the policy in it as a cynical breach of pledges given to the Jews and the world, including America”. Mr Clement Attlee, the present Prime Minister, said, “The action of the Government (of Mr Chamberlain) in making themselves the judge of their own case, in taking action contrary to the Permanent Mandates Commission’s decision and in disregarding the Council of the League of Nations, will cause very wide feeling that instead of acting to their obligations under the mandate they are flouting the policy of the League and international law”. [. . .] Mr Winston Churchill was not less outspoken in his criticism of the White Paper—“I regret very much that the pledge of the Balfour Declaration, endorsed as it has been by successive governments, and the conditions under which we obtained the Mandate have both been violated by the Government’s proposals (of the White Paper) . . . To whom was the pledge of the Balfour Declaration made? It was not made to the Jews of Palestine, it was not made to those who were actually living in Palestine. It was made to world Jewry and in particular to the Zionist associations”. The Archbishop of Canterbury in the House of Lords pointed out that the White Paper imposed a minority status on the Jews in Palestine. “They [the Jews],” he said, “shall return in their National Home to that minority status which has been their lot through long centuries in every part of the world . . . Whatever a National Home may have meant . . . it surely cannot have meant that”. [. . .]

5 Seven years have passed since then, Hitler has been destroyed and the Nuremberg Laws are abolished in the whole of Europe. Palestine is now the only place in the civilized world where racial discrimination still exists in law. Even if there were no National Home we should not acquiesce in such discrimination. We should not acquiesce in being deprived of the elementary right of citizens, the right of free movement and settlement in the country in which we live, of being deprived of equality before the law. But this is our National Home. Eighty generations lived and died with the hope of Zion. A great people and the entire civilized world recognized our right to reconstitute our National Home here. And now the same Government that was charged with that sacred trust of promoting the Jewish National Home has put us into a territorial ghetto, condemned us to live as in Czarist Russia in a pale of settlement. In our long history we have suffered many cruel persecutions, but to be locked up in a ghetto in our own country, to be debarred from our own ancestral soil, lying derelict and waste, such cruel torment even we have not hitherto experienced. Is it conceivable that the United Nations should

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allow these racial laws to exist in the Holy Land for a single day after the matter was referred to them? The Anglo-American Committee headed by two judges, one English and one American, unanimously requested “that the Land Transfers Regulations of 1940 be rescinded”. That decision was published on 20 April 1946. The racial land law still exists. [. . .] I shall now turn to the second restriction, that on immigration. When the White Paper was introduced in 1939, Mr Churchill said that this was a mortal blow to the Jewish people. I am sorry to say, he did not exaggerate. The White Paper, in closing the gates of Palestine to Jews in the hour of the greatest peril, is responsible for the death of tens of thousands, perhaps of hundreds of thousands of Jews who could have been saved from the gaschambers had Palestine been open to them. Just before the war we applied to the Colonial Secretary for permission to bring over 20,000 Jewish children from Poland and 10,000 youth from the Balkan countries. Permission was refused and these 20,000 Jewish children and the 10,000 youth were put to death. There were times when Jews could still escape from Nazi-occupied territories, but the gates of their National Home were closed by the Mandatory Power and they were sent to their death in Dachau and Treblinka. I do not know whether you remember the case of the “Struma”. It was a small ship which left Roumania at the end of December 1941, with 769 refugees. Roumania was then under Nazi occupation. The position of Jews there, as in other Nazi-occupied countries, was desperate. Jews, old and young, women and children, were herded into goods-trains and dispatched to unknown destinations, which meant death in gas-chambers somewhere in Poland. On many occasions they were collected in the streets and machinegunned on the spot. In the city of Jassy alone 8,000 Jews were assembled in the market-place and machine-gunned in cold blood. Whoever could do so tried to escape to the sea. The “Struma” was a cattle-boat which had originally been built for navigation on the Danube. The 769 refugees who managed to reach it did not care very much about the amenities of sea-travel; to get to Palestine or not meant life or death. The trip from the port of embarkation in Roumania to Istanbul took four days. The passengers were not allowed to land in Turkey, as they had no visas either for Turkey or for their final destination. All the efforts of the Jewish Agency to get permission from the Government for them to enter Palestine were of no avail. The Agency was not even allowed to allot certificates in their possession to these unfortunate people, the reason given being that they were enemy subjects. The agony dragged on for more than two months. On February 18 the Government agreed to allow children below the age of 11 to land, but it was already too late. The boat had to leave Istanbul. On February 24 the “Struma” went down with 764 passengers. The refugees of the “Struma” were not the only direct victims of the White Paper, nor did all the refugee victims who came in ships die by drowning. Some of them were killed by His Majesty’s Forces. A few were killed on the eve of the war, on 1 September 1939, when the boat “Tiger Hill” reached the shores of Tel-Aviv and was fired on. More recently,

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in May 1947, three refugees were killed on the ship the “Theodore Herzl” which was intercepted by His Majesty’s Navy. [. . .] Not all Jews in Europe were exterminated: out of 9,270,000 who lived in continental Europe in 1939—some 3,000,000 have remained alive (including Jews in U.S.S.R.). Out of 3,250,000 Jews in Poland—150,000; out of 850,000 in Roumania—300,000; out of 360,000 in Czechoslovakia—33,000, and so on. Hundreds of thousands of those survivors are still in camps, in that same Germany, surrounded by the murderers of their people, surrounded by the same hatred as under Hitler. In a Gallup Poll recently taken by the American Military authorities in the American Zone of Germany, 60 per cent of the Germans approached approved of the massacre of the Jews by Hitler, 14 per cent condemned the murders, 21 per cent were “neutral”. The Jews do not want to stay where they are. They want to regain their human dignity, their homeland, they want a reunion with their kin in Palestine after having lost their dearest relatives. To them, the countries of their birth are a graveyard of their people. They do not wish to return there and they cannot. They want to go back to their national home, and they use Dunkirk boats. And here, as the noble Lord said in the House of Lords, “their hope is doomed to end in the most terrible disillusionment”, as on the seas leading to their land they are hunted by the powerful navy of the Mandatory, and forcibly sent back to live in concentration camps again, this time in Cyprus. And we were told by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr MacNeil, in the House of Commons on May 5, that “vigorous, extensive and varied measures are being taken” against immigration of Jews into Palestine unauthorized by his Government, meaning that pressure, economic, military and diplomatic, is being exerted by the British Government on the governments of other countries in Europe and America, to blockade the Jewish victims of the Nazis in Europe, to close all frontiers against them for transit and exit, to keep them forcibly where they are in order to preserve the sanctity of the White Paper. Even the machinery of the United Nations is used for that inhuman purpose. [. . .] Even the unanimous recommendation of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry to admit 100,000 refugees was turned down. Similarly, the finding of the Anglo-American experts that the country could absorb 100,000 refugees within a year had no effect. The White Paper policy proved to be superior to all humanitarian considerations, to all the economic needs of the country, to all obligations and requirements of the Mandate. Such a policy could only be carried out by force and the Government embarked on a system of oppression which turned Palestine into a police state. All civil liberties known to English law were not merely limited but for all practical purposes abolished. Orders can be made for the detention of any person for any period or “during the High Commissioner’s pleasure” without any process of trial. Thousands were in fact so detained and many have been kept in detention for years.

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Even persons convicted by the Courts were detained after having served their sentences. [. . .] I should be the last person to make wholesale accusations; on the contrary, I must record numerous occasions when British soldiers and sailors carried out the painful duties of searches, arrests and expulsion of refugees with disgust and tears in their eyes, and tried as far as was consistent with their position to help the victims of the oppressive regime. There were cases of soldiers and sailors risking their lives to save refugees from drowning, and considering the spirit of the regime and the virtual lawlessness which it has established in this country, it is a matter of surprise that the unofficial assaults were so few. It is not the soldier or the policeman who is to blame—it is the regime, the White Paper policy, the breaching of pledges, the violation of the Mandate, in short, what Mr Churchill called the “squalid war against the Jews”. [. . .]

10 The White Paper in destroying the Mandate has removed the moral and legal basis of the present regime in Palestine. It is an arbitrary rule based on force alone. It is contrary to the wishes of the entire population of the country, it causes untold sufferings to our people, it threatens our national existence. It is incompatible with international obligations and good faith. Now the question, the main and fundamental question arises: what should be the future regime of this country? It does not matter so much what name is given to the regime, whether you call it Mandate, National Trusteeship, Palestine State, National State, Arab State or Jewish State. Neither does it matter very much what the formal constitution would be. You have countries with good constitutions on paper and with bad governments in practice, and you have the reverse. Life does not follow paper constitutions. I will give you an example of a name which can cover different purposes: the term or name “Bi-National State”. I know at least two projects for a Bi-National State in Palestine which are diametrically opposed to each other. One is based on the very denial of Zionism and the National Home whereas the other is a full blooded Zionist scheme. The anti-Zionist Bi-National State is the White Paper of Mr Malcolm Macdonald, who claims that his policy envisages neither a Jewish nor an Arab State, but a Bi-National one. Although the Jews will form one-third of the population, the state will not be Arab, but will be shared by both peoples, and shared in such a way that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded. It even promises to protect the special position of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. This is a Bi-National State which prohibits Jewish immigration, condemns Jews to remain a permanent minority and perpetuates the homelessness of the Jewish people.

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And there is another proposal for a Bi-National State advanced by an important labour left-wing group in Zionism, the Labour party “Hashomer Hatza’ir”. It is a project to settle two to three million Jews in Palestine in the next 25 years. For that period Palestine would be placed under the administration of a special Development Authority, the specific objective of which would be:

i to promote the settlement in Palestine of at least 2 to 3 million

Jews during the next 20 or 25 years by developing the economic possibilities of the country. ii To raise the standard of living and education of the Palestinian Arabs to approximately the present Jewish level during the same period. iii To promote and actively encourage Jewish-Arab cooperation as well as to encourage the gradual development of self-governing institutions, local and national, on bi-national lines, until the stage of full independence within the framework of a bi-national constitution is reached. To achieve this, Palestine should be placed under a Permanent Supervisory Commission of the three Great Powers and this Commission should be responsible for selecting an administration fitted to fulfill the afore-mentioned tasks; a Development Board is to be instituted by that government in which Jews and Arabs will participate in equal numbers. When the independence of Palestine would have been achieved after some twenty to twenty-five years, the Permanent Supervisory Commission would continue to execute some powers of general supervision until the United Nations decided that the new constitution was working well and that Palestine was ready for membership of the UN. Jews and Arabs would be organized in two national, autonomous communities; when Palestine becomes independent, it would be constituted as a federation of these two communities. The Central Government would consist of four members, two Arabs and two Jews, elected by a State Assembly, composed of the two National Councils of the Jewish and Arab communities and of the State Council with half Jews and half Arabs. You can easily see that, although these plans are both called Bi-National State, they mean in reality two contradictory things.

11 The question of the future regime in Palestine is really not so much a question of legal, constitutional arrangements, but a more fundamental question of the desired future structure of the country, the make-up, size and composition of the population and the nature of the development of its resources. The most crucial question is immigration. Here you are faced with two possible

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lines of action: the anti-Zionist line, which is that the constitution of the country should preserve the status quo, freeze the size and the growth of the present population, arrest the development of agriculture and industry, stop immigration and turn Jews into a statutory minority. And there is another line—the Zionist line: that the regime of the country should be designed to realize the maximum development of all the potentialities of Palestine; to cultivate as many millions of dunams as possible out of the 18 million which are at present uncultivated; to irrigate instead of 400,000 dunams as at present, at least 4,000,000; to increase the size of the population to three or four millions and afford full opportunities for the Jewish people to rehabilitate themselves, while raising the standard of the Arabs to the same level, and in this way to create a living example for the whole Middle East, where Jews and Arabs will cooperate and work together as free and equal partners. I venture to submit that the second line was envisaged and adopted by the statesmen at the end of the first world war, when a general desire for a new social order and new international relations stirred humanity. It was felt that the time had come to redress the ancient wrong committed against the Jewish nation and to give it a chance to restore its ancient commonwealth. It was part of a larger arrangement which gave the Arabs their national freedom after many centuries of Turkish oppression. It is wrong to regard the problem of Jewish-Arab relations only in the framework of this little country. The statesmen who were responsible for the Balfour Declaration did not envisage merely the restoration of the Jewish nation alone. At the same time they provided for the liberation of the Arab people and they achieved this on a much larger scale and in a more effective way. The Arabs gained their freedom in an area of 1,250,000 square miles, 125 times as large as the area of Western Palestine with a population of some 15 to 16 million Arabs—about the number of Jews then living in the world. This was the real two-fold arrangement made with the Arabs and the Jews. The freedom of the Arab people in their countries—the restoration of Palestine to the Jewish people. The representatives of the Arabs saw and acknowledged this two-fold arrangement, as can be seen from the following preamble to the Feisal-Weizmann agreement: “His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal, representing and acting on behalf of the Arab Kingdom of Hejaz, and Dr Chaim Weizmann, representing and acting on behalf of the Zionist Organization, mindful of the racial kinship and ancient bonds existing between the Arabs and the Jewish people, and realizing that the surest means of working out the consummation of their national aspirations is through the closest possible collaboration in the development of the Arab State and Palestine, and being desirous further of confirming the good understanding which exists between them, have agreed upon the following Articles;- . . .”

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The Mecca newspaper, “Al Qibla”, carried an article, in its 183rd issue of 23 March 1918, written by King Hussein himself, “calling upon the Arab population in Palestine to bear in mind their sacred books and their traditions, and exhorting them to welcome the Jews as brethren and cooperate with them for the common welfare”. While realizing that the aspirations of the Jews and Arabs would be fully met—those of the Jews in Palestine, those of the Arabs in the Arab countries—the statesmen then were not unaware of the existence of Arabs in Palestine, nor were they unmindful of their interests. But these interests were limited to civil and religious rights, and did not comprise political aspirations which were fully met in the Arab countries. This was the underlying idea in the agreement between the Emir Feisal and Dr Weizmann. It contemplated an Arab State on one side—and a Jewish Palestine on the other. While it was stipulated that measures should be taken to protect and assist the Arab peasant in Palestine, it was understood that Palestine should be a Jewish State. All the promises made to the Arabs were fulfilled, most of them at once, others after some delay. The Arab political problem has been solved completely, and the Jewish people, no less than anybody else, congratulate the Arabs on achieving their full independence. The promise given to the Jews has not yet been fulfilled. There is no doubt what the promise meant: not a Hebrew University, not a cultural centre, not a community of 600,000, not a minority. British and Arab statesmen at that time knew perfectly well what the promise given to the Jews meant. The original intention of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate could have been achieved and the Jewish Commonwealth would have been an accomplished fact before the Second World War—if the Mandatory had implemented its mandatory obligations resolutely and consistently. I ask you Gentlemen to imagine for one second that there were two or three million Jews in the Jewish State of Palestine before the outbreak of the last war. Do you believe that the disaster which overtook our people in Europe would have happened? Hitler oppressed and enslaved all the people whom he conquered: Dutch, Czech, Yugoslav and others—but there was only one people which he singled out for complete extermination, the Jewish people, because this was the only people without a land of its own, a government of its own, a state of its own, which was able to protect, to intervene, to save and to fight. And now I put the question to you: who is prepared and able to guarantee that what happened to us in Europe will not happen again? Can human conscience, and we believe that there is a human conscience, free itself of all responsibility for that catastrophe? There is only one safeguard: a Homeland and Statehood! A Homeland, where a Jew can return freely as of right. Statehood, where he can be master of his own destiny. These two things are possible here, and here only. The Jewish people cannot give up, cannot renounce these two fundamental rights, whatever may happen.

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12 The problem of Jewish-Arab relations is not merely the problem of Jews and Arabs in Palestine. It is the problem of the relations of the Jewish and Arab peoples as a whole. Their national aspirations in that broader sense are not only compatible but complementary. Nobody can seriously claim that a Jewish Palestine could in any way endanger or harm the independence and unity of the Arab race. The area of Western Palestine is less than 1 per cent of the vast territory occupied by the Arab States in the Near East, excluding Egypt. The number of Arabs in this country is less than 3 per cent of the number of Arabs who have gained their political independence. The Arabs in Palestine, even if they were a minority, would still be part of that large Arab majority in the Middle East. The existence of Arab States to the north, east and south of Palestine is an automatic guarantee, not only of the civil, religious and political rights of the Arabs in Palestine, but also of their national aspirations. But a Jewish Palestine, a populous, highly-developed Jewish State has something of greater value and importance to offer, not only to the Arabs in Palestine, but to those in the neighbouring countries as well. Even the small beginnings of the National Home, where Jews have occupied and developed only a small fraction of the country, have already had a marked effect on the advancement of the population in Palestine. Even now the position of the Arab peasant and farmer in Palestine is superior to that of the Arab peasant and farmer in Arab States. Our national aim cannot be achieved without great constructive work, agricultural, industrial, material and cultural, and this must, by its nature, raise the economic and social standard of all the inhabitants of the country. We cannot fully utilise the water resources of Palestine, which are now being wasted, without providing larger irrigation possibilities for the Arab fellah as well. We cannot introduce modern methods of cultivation without the Arabs learning from that example. We cannot organize Jewish labour and improve conditions of work without similarly organizing the Arab worker and improving his conditions. As long as the government is in foreign hands, the impact of our development on Arab advancement is small. The theory of holding the balance between Jews and Arabs, which in practice meant curbing and obstructing our work, was not only injurious to us but to the Arabs as well. One may rightly ask: why is it that a million Arabs can be safely left in a Jewish State and why should not a million Jews be left in an Arab State? If the Jews and the Arabs who are in Palestine were all the Jews and all the Arabs that exist in the world, this would be a very logical and conclusive argument. There would then be no reason whatsoever why one should prefer an Arab to a Jew or a Jew to an Arab, and only numbers would count.

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But one cannot ignore the fact that both communities living in Palestine are merely fragments of larger communities living outside, and both of them belong to these larger units. By depriving the Jews in Palestine of a national home, by preventing them from becoming a majority and attaining statehood, you are depriving not only the 600,000 Jews who are here, but also the millions of Jews who are still left in the world, of independence and statehood. In no other place can they have the desire or the prospect of attaining nationhood. In depriving the million Arabs of the same prospect, you do not affect the status of the Arab race at all. An Arab minority in a Jewish State would mean that only a certain number of individual Arabs would not enjoy the privilege of Arab statehood, but it would in no way diminish the independence and position of the Arab race. The Arab minority in Palestine, being surrounded by Arab States, would remain safe in national association with their race. But a Jewish minority in an Arab State, even with the most ideal paper guarantee, would mean the final extinction of Jewish hope, not in Palestine alone, but for the entire Jewish people, for national equality and independence, with all the disastrous consequences so familiar in Jewish history. The conscience of humanity ought to weigh this: where is the balance of justice, where is the greater need, where is the greater peril, where is the lesser evil and where is the lesser injustice? The fate of the Jewish minority in Palestine will not differ from the fate of the Jewish minority in any other country, except that here it might be much worse.

13 [. . .] Only by establishing Palestine as a Jewish State can the true objectives be accomplished. Immigration and statehood for the Jews, economic development and social progress for the Arabs. With the liberation of the Middle Eastern countries from the decadent Ottoman Empire, the Arab race achieved its political aspirations. It is still very far from economic, cultural and social liberation. Formal political independence is not enough, and the more far-sighted people among the Arab leaders realize this very well. Unless the Arab peoples advance socially, economically and culturally, their independence is an empty shell. When the Arab race was liberated, the Jewish people too was promised national restoration. The Jewish political aspirations have not yet been attained, but a great deal has been achieved in the economic, social and cultural fields. The historic interests and aspirations of the Jews and Arabs are not mutually exclusive—they are complementary and interconnected. Each one of them has in abundance what the other needs. Cooperation between Jews and Arabs will prove the truest blessing for both peoples. Such a cooperation can rest only upon—equality. Nothing will further the Jewish-Arab alliance more than the establishment of the Jewish State. The present tension and unrest, once the main problem is

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finally settled, will give place to a new orientation among these two Semitic peoples. The United Nations possess the necessary authority to undertake that great act of statesmanship, which would change the face of the entire Middle East and free the energies of the Arab and Jewish peoples for a great constructive effort. You will achieve your mission successfully when you restore freedom to Palestine, give justice to the Jewish people and stability, progress and prosperity to the Middle East. These three objectives can be accomplished by the immediate abolition of the White Paper, the establishment of a Jewish State and the promotion of Jewish-Arab alliance.

Address of Rabbi Yehuda Hacohen Leib Fischmann (Hamizrachi) to UNSCOP, 4 July 19475 1 As the representative of the religious wing of the Zionist movement on the Executive of the Jewish Agency, I would begin by recalling the eternal bond between the Jewish People and this country—the Land of Israel. There is an indissoluble bond between the People of Israel and its Torah (religion), and there is similarly a strong and enduring tie between our People and this land, the like of which is not to be found elsewhere. About eighteen hundred years ago—a century or so after pagan Rome had robbed us of our country—a Jewish sage said that Palestine had been given to the Jewish People because it was preeminently suited to its nature and character. The peculiar features and characteristics of this country and its geographical position, surrounded as it is by sea, desert and mountains, made it indeed a fit home for a people of distinctive outlook and spiritual traditions. Rabbi Yehuda Halevi, who lived over eight hundred years ago, and was one of the greatest Jewish figures of the Middle Ages, a physician, philosopher, and poet, perhaps the most Hebrew spirit since the days of the Prophets, was wont to stress the unique character of this attachment. The period in which he lived was one of prosperity for the Jews of Spain, where he was born. They enjoyed full civic and political rights. Nevertheless he insisted that the Jewish People in the Diaspora was a body without a heart and a soul. He wrote: “Neither in the East nor in the West is there a place of assured hope for us.” There was only one cure he could prescribe for his dispersed people: to return and settle in the Land of Israel.

United Nations, “Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly,” Supplement no. 11, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, vol. 3, pp. 23–26.

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The bond between the People of Israel and the Holy Land was maintained throughout the ages and lands of our exile. It was upheld by the leaders of the Nation in successive generations: the Sages of the Talmud and Midrash, the rabbis of Halakhic and Midrashic literature, the Jewish pilgrims and travellers who recorded their experiences and impressions of the Holy Land. Sermons were preached in the synagogues and houses of study concerning the sanctity of the ancestral homeland. Legends and traditions were handed down embodying ancient memories and historical associations. In every age the leaders of the Jewish People in every land were busily engaged in activities for the benefit of the Jewish population of the Holy Land. There were many movements of re-immigration to Palestine, among the most notable being those of the Jews expelled from Spain and, about 150 years ago, of the Jews of Lithuania, Poland and the Ukraine. All these helped to strengthen the spiritual tie between the Jewish People and its historic homeland, a tie that will never be sundered. Permit me to dwell on some aspects of this unbreakable attachment.

2 It was in the Prophetical Books that mention was first made of “Eretz Israel” (the “Land of Israel”). This, and not Palestine, is the historic name of the country. It has been known as such to the Jews from the times of the Prophets to the present day. The Books of the Prophets convey a picture of our country in all its aspects. They describe its boundaries, districts and cities; they recount its history from the days of Joshua’s conquest to the return from Babylon in the time of Ezra and Nehemiah. It is from these sources that archaeologists and historians derive their basic knowledge. Often Jews, reading in distant lands the story of the country and its historic places, have reconstructed in their imagination forgotten episodes from bygone happy days. As in a vision the ancient places would become real to them, and they would be seized with an ardent yearning to make the ascent to the Land of Israel and kiss its soil. From the time of Joshua to the present day, for a period of 3,318 years—I am only stating here what is known to every historian—Jews have lived in the Land of Israel in unbroken sequence. After the destruction of the first Temple by Babylon, and again after the destruction of the second Temple by the Romans, Jews continued to dwell on this sacred soil. Those who were exiled to foreign lands strove at all times to strengthen the Jewish population of Palestine materially and spiritually, and to extend it and ensure its continuance. I would also point out that since the ancient Jewish Commonwealth was destroyed, Palestine has never been an independent State. After the advent of pagan Rome, which persecuted Christianity as well as Judaism, and which destroyed the Jewish kingdom, our nation was

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rendered homeless and was scattered all over the globe. To the world at large the Jewish people after its terrible fall appeared like a scattered flock of wandering sheep. Such would, indeed, have been their fate had it not been for their great past in this country and their unquenchable hope of a coming restoration. This unique past lived on in the heart of the people and encompassed it on all sides. Every Jew whoever and wherever he was, heard in the pages of the Holy Writ the mighty voices of the past, the voice of the Almighty issuing from the lips of the Prophets, and beheld the ancient sites of his Holy country. From these he derived his hope and unshakable faith in the future. In another three weeks our people throughout the world will again mournfully recollect the destruction of our Commonwealth and our Sanctuary. On that day, the ninth of Av, we observe year after year an annual fast of twenty-four hours, assemble in our Synagogues and mourn the destruction of our land and people. On that day we give ourselves up to weeping and yearning for our homeland. Our people sit with bowed heads on the floor of the Synagogue reciting the Book of Lamentations. They are a timeless reminder of a tragedy the impact of which is felt to this day. But this age-long mourning is not merely an agonized cry of dejection uttered by a people bereft of hope and a prey to despair. There is in it also a strong note of protest against the civilized world which has failed to extend a helping hand to our martyred people. The memories of the Zion of the past have implanted in our hearts the hope of the Zion of the future. Zion, the home of the Prophets and the center of Jewish creativeness—has been our guiding star throughout our wanderings in the lands of our exile. From the days of Daniel during the Babylonian Exile to the present day—that is to say, a period of 2,300 years—every Jew saying his prayer has turned his face towards Jerusalem. Three times a day, in the course of his religious devotions, he stressed the connection between himself and his ancient home, praying for the return of his exiled people. The hope of a revival of Jewish independence in this historic land was the corner-stone of his faith. It was an essential of his spiritual life.

3 There are numerous religious precepts which can be properly fulfilled only in this Holy Land, and even those precepts which we are enjoined to observe in exile cannot be carried out there as they should be. The alien environment inevitably exercises a profound effect upon ourselves and our children. The life of the Jews in the Dispersion cannot be one of action, as in the life of any free nation moulding its affairs according to its own spirit. Living amid strange environments the Jew has been compelled to adapt himself to the standards and the spirit of others. In spite of himself

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he had to accept their values and suppress his own national and spiritual characteristics. In a renewed Jewish national life in Palestine such adaptation to others will not be necessary. There the Jews will live an independent, natural and Hebrew life, free from the coercion of foreign rulers and the pressure of alien cultures. Throughout their exile, Jews have steeped themselves in memories of their homeland. For hundreds of years religious Jews have observed the practice when building a house, of leaving one square patch un-whitewashed, in memory of the destruction of their country. Throughout the exile every Jew has a handful of earth from Palestine placed in his grave so that even in death he may be united with his ancient land. To go and settle in the Land of Israel has always been considered by the Jews as a most meritorious deed. Throughout the ages we find Jews making efforts to reach the land of Israel. The spiritual leaders of the people were among the first to translate that ageless yearning into positive action. On reaching the land of their desire they would write to their people in the lands of their origin, telling them of the beauties of Palestine and urging them to follow in their footsteps. Up to a few generations ago the journey to the Holy Land was fraught with hardships and danger. Travellers would spend many months travelling in rickety carts, on ill-paved roads and in unseaworthy sailing craft. Many  would leave their homes and property, their families and friends, to wander from country to country in an attempt to reach the Holy Land. They were exposed to persecution and mockery, an easy prey to robbers and cut-throats. Yet they willingly risked all these privations to accomplish their hearts’ desire, and for the many who perished on the way the Holy Land was their dying thought. Those who were fortunate enough to reach their destination arrived for the most part utterly destitute. They lived in great poverty and frequently in fear of their very lives, for conditions were most insecure. It was only because of their great love for the country, because of their conviction that by settling in the Land of Israel they were obeying a major precept of the Torah and hastening the redemption of the land and the people, that they were able to hold out. They accepted with love the tribulations bound up with life in Palestine in those days; it was they who paved the way for the pioneers of the national revival in modern times. In our view it is the duty of every Jew to come and live in Palestine; and any regulation restricting the fulfilment of this commandment is not only devoid of legal authority, but positively sinful. This land was once ours and by the grace of Heaven it will be ours again and a new Jewish Commonwealth will arise in it. No power in the world can stop us from returning to this our land. To make war on Jewish immigration is to make

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war not only against the Jewish people but also against what we believe to be a precept of our creed. Since the dawn of political Zionism, which was created by Herzl, many leading rabbis, including the great Rabbi Samuel Mohilever, have lent their support to the new movement. A distinctive religious grouping, known as the Mizrachi, was formed within the Zionist Organization, and it was my privilege to be among its founders forty-five years ago. The Mizrachi Organization, which is wholly religious in character, has been enabled, largely by virtue of its labour section—the “Hapoel Hamizrachi”—to take part in the reconstruction of the country. Dozens of villages, including collective settlements, have been established upon the sacred soil by “Hapoel Hamizrachi,” to the glory of our nation and the Torah. We have founded scores of elementary and secondary schools, where our children are brought up according to our religious traditions, and where they also receive a broad secular education. These schools are scattered throughout the country, and they are exercising a most profound influence.

4 The religious grouping within the Zionist movement—it numbers tens of thousands of members—calls for the establishment of the Land of Israel as a Jewish State for religious as well as for political reasons. In its view, the revival of our Religion and the observance of its commandments in their entirety are possible only in an independent Jewish Palestine free from foreign control. Religious Jewry wants to see the new Jewish life in this country built up on the eternal foundations of the law of Israel. We do not however refuse to cooperate with non-religious Jews in the building up of the country. The precept to reclaim and rebuild this land is so holy, that whoever engages in the task, even if he is not religious, becomes sanctified thereby. We firmly believe that the holy character of this effort will also influence the non­religious builders, and that eventually they or their children will proceed along the path of the revealed Law and Jewish tradition. Such is our hope. Here I wish to make it clear that this hope of ours does not entail the establishment of a theocratic State in Palestine in the sense in which the term is generally used. The Law of Israel is a law of life. It was vouchsafed equally to prophet and priest, to the leaders and the masses of the people. It was granted both to the individual and the community that all might study it and live according to it. We must make provision in our State for all its inhabitants whether they are of our faith or not. We must see to it that all have a livelihood, and that all are able to live in their own way. At no time have we wished—nor do we wish now—to compel other peoples, even if they live in our midst as a minority, to accept our creed. We want our fellowJews to live according to our Law and tradition. But we cannot cast off those of our people who do not observe the precepts of their religion: the basic

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principle was long ago formulated by our sages, who said: “An Israelite who sins is still an Israelite.” Our attitude is clear: the entire people, including all movements and parties, whether they obey the commandments of the Almighty or not, are members not only of one religion, but of one nation. They constitute a single, united nation. We exist not only by virtue of our religion, but also by virtue of our natural inheritance passed down from father to son, by virtue of our homeland, lineage and race. As a nation we have been persecuted; and as a nation we demand the restoration of our homeland, the Land of Israel.

5 In conclusion, let me state a simple truth. We cannot and do not want to adapt ourselves to an alien life. We cannot and do not want to trade our soul and spirit for civic rights or for all the rights in the world, quite apart from the fact that we do not believe we shall ever achieve complete equality in foreign countries. We do not wish to forgo our right to exist as a nation in our own land in accordance with our own traditions. It is utterly absurd to query the existence of a Jewish nation, even if we do speak a variety of languages and are scattered throughout many countries. We have only one homeland in the world—the Land of Israel. We shall never have any other. This is our country, and ours it shall be, with the help of Him who chose Zion.

Address of Mr Eliezer Kaplan before UNSCOP6 Mr Chairman, Members of the Committee! My task is to sum up the economic evidence of the Jewish Agency and to answer questions, if any, with regard to the economic and financial activities of the Jewish Agency, with regard to our general plan of economic development, and with regard to our programme for the financing of this development. In summary, our contentions are that Jewish immigration has created new economic absorptive capacities in Palestine and has given great impetus to the economic progress of the country as a whole, to the benefit of all its inhabitants; that we have established a Jewish economic entity, which is sound and self supporting; that we are in Palestine still at the beginning of the development process; that Palestine can absorb additional millions of people; that our plan for the absorption of a million Jews during the next decade, as submitted to the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee, is a practical United Nations, “Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly,” Supplement no. 11, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, vol. 3, pp. 39–47.

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one; and that, given a reasonable amount of international cooperation, the means can be found to finance this absorption. I had the privilege of testifying before the Anglo-American Committee mainly on matters pertaining to agriculture. I tried then to indicate, in some detail, that the supplies in Palestine of the basic natural resources of land and water are not the limiting factors in the absorption of large numbers, and that the agricultural population of this country can easily be doubled and maybe trebled. The things that are needed to make this great agricultural expansion possible are large-scale immigration and a broad development policy designed and executed with vision, courage, and a pressing sense of need on the part of the responsible authorities. The progress of modern agriculture depends upon the expansion of urban markets, and we consequently envisage further agricultural development in this country as a part of its general all-round progress. My previous testimony on these questions appears as a part of the statements and memoranda submitted to you under the title THE JEWISH CASE, pp. 141–165. In the hope that you had an opportunity at least to glance through the printed material, I shall, with your permission, confine myself to a brief review of the basic data. I shall try to supplement our printed submissions principally by summarizing for you the research and development work accomplished during the past fifteen months.

The Legend of Land Scarcity Let me begin with the legends that Palestine is a country where land is scarce and water is still scarcer. The latest memorandum of the Government of Palestine on “The Administration of Palestine under the Mandate” states that “under British rule in Palestine the main impediment to large-scale planning was however and remains uncertainty as to the availability of land not only for close settlement of an additional agricultural population, but adequately to support the existing population. The position as regards water resources was equally characterized by imprecision”. Please note that this uncertainty and . . . imprecision still holds good in the minds of the Government after 27 years of its rule in the country. It might perhaps not be unreasonable to have been anticipated that, if the Government of Palestine was so uncertain of the land and water resources of the country, it might have used more of its resources during the past 27 years to go thoroughly into these questions instead of leaving them predominantly to Jewish public and private bodies. The Government has, on the other hand, not refrained from translating its uncertainties into policies that stand as barriers across the main line of economic progress. Despite the uncertainty in its own judgments, the Government justifies the White Paper by the argument that “there was no room in certain areas for further transfer of Arab land, while in some other areas such transfers of land must be restricted if Arab cultivators were to maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless Arab

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population was not soon to be created”. “In fact, a review of the condition of congestion in Arab and Jewish rural areas carried out in 1938 had indicated serious congestion in  almost the whole of the Arab area, whereas Jewish land supported fewer families in proportion to the acreage”. In my evidence before the Anglo-American Committee, p. 156, I repudiated this assertion with regard to the use of land at Jewish disposal. If we take only the rural population, we have a ratio as between Jewish and Arab population of 1 to 5 in Palestine as compared with a ratio of cultivated land of 1 to 10. Further, in accordance with Government statistics relating to 1944–5, the ratio of Jewish to Arab use of cultivated land under main groups of crops (excluding citrus) was 1 to 13, while the ratio of value of crops was 1 to 4 1/2. Jewish rural population is, therefore, twice as dense as Arab rural population per unit of cultivated land, and Jewish output is therefore three times as great as Arab output per unit of cultivated land. Nevertheless the Government again now cites conclusions of a “review” made in 1938—a review never put at our disposal so that we might be able to analyse it and show how it had fallen into error. At the same time the Government ignores its own published figures, which flatly contradict the conclusion of this 1938 “review”. Gentlemen, with a clear conscience I say: the truth is that this little country contains sufficient land and water to feed not only its present population but twice and thrice this number. I say it upon the strength of our colonizing experience during three generations and on the basis of the scientific research which we have conducted during the past 35 years. Of course Palestine, like many other countries, cannot and should not produce everything. But then Palestine produces some commodities in abundance which other countries will gladly take from her in exchange for products of which she is short. [. . .] Last year was quite a promising year as regards Zionist funds. Upon the request of the Anglo-American Committee, I placed before them some figures about the financial activities of the Jewish Agency and the other principal Jewish institutions (see p. 152 of THE JEWISH CASE). The total expenditure of the main Jewish bodies for the period 1917 to October 1945 was £45 million. From October 1945 to September 1946 the same bodies spent in Palestine an additional £12 million. The total expenditure of these bodies therefore came to about £57 million. Of this total about £21 million was spent for the purchase of land and agricultural settlement; more than £10 million for education and cultural activities; about £5 1/2 million for immigration; about £5 million for national organization and religious and cultural institutions; about £5 million for urban settlement, trade and industry and urban investments; about £4.6 million for health and social services; about £3 1/4 million for public works, labour and housing; and about £2.6 million for administration and miscellaneous. The income of these institutions reached a figure of £53 million. Of this the Jewish Agency and its financial instrument, the Palestine Foundation Fund, had an income

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of £26.5 million and spent £29 million. The Jewish Agency spent about £9 million for agriculture alone. In addition to this capital brought into the country by the principal Jewish institutions (though about 10 per cent of the above sum comes from Palestine itself), about £125 million of capital has been brought in by private Jewish individuals and companies. Of this total, about four-fifths was brought in during the period between the Great Wars. I would, however, be doing this Committee a disservice if I were to give you the impression that the sizeable capital sums which Jews have brought into Palestine during the past quarter century have served Jewish purposes alone. On the contrary, we have been contributing capital on a very large scale to the Arab community of Palestine. During the past fiscal year, 1946–7, we Jews contributed about £8 million to the Arab community of Palestine through the Government fiscal mechanism alone. Though Arab wealth has increased markedly during recent years, the Jewish settlement’s share of total taxes continues to rise. In 1946–7 the Jewish contribution to Government revenue was more than three times that of the Arabs. Even the wealthiest Arabs pay very little in taxes. It is this financial contribution which has made possible a standard of social services (education, health, etc.) for Palestine Arabs far above those of any Arab country. We anticipate that, as our development plan proceeds, we shall continue to bring financial and economic benefits to our Arab neighbours. We regard it, however, as an elementary right that, in the future, such benefits be realized in a framework which takes due account of our own needs. The Government, in its statement, advocates “the willingness of each to contribute according to his means and the need of the other”. We accept this, as a general principle. But a fair evaluation of means and needs is imperative to a just application of this principle. We question the evaluation implied by the Government’s statement. We Jews have always to consider not only the needs of the existing population in Palestine (and we have also in our community many under-privileged) but also the needs of our people abroad. In accordance with official statistics, of 7,851 Jewish immigrants during the year 1946 only ten persons with two dependents brought £1,000 or more per capita; 99 per cent of the immigrants now arrive in Palestine penniless. They are the victims of the war and of Nazi persecution. We have to care for their human rehabilitation and economic integration. The reason for the large collections of funds in Jewish communities in all countries is to settle new immigrants, to expand the country’s economy so that more newcomers can be absorbed, and not to support the established population in Palestine. These are the needs which have first claim on our attention. I do not underestimate the magnitude of the financial problem of the year before us, but the upbuilding of Palestine should not be discussed merely as an economic and financial problem. It is a great human problem for all peoples of the world; for us it is a question of the revival and survival of

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the Jewish people, and who is able to appraise the cost of the survival of a people? [. . .]

Address of Rabbi Yitzhak Meir Levin (Agudath Yisrael) to UNSCOP, 10 July 19477 In the name of the national and the world movement of Agudath Yisrael, I would like to express my good wishes to you for success in the task you have undertaken. I think this is a first and unique event in history: representatives of fiftyfive nations organized in the United Nations have come to the Holy Land, to Jerusalem, in order to hold an enquiry into the question of Palestine and of the Jewish People. We appear before you as the representatives of independent orthodox Jewry organized in Agudath Israel in Palestine and all over the world. It is our view that Divine Torah alone forms the eternal constitution of the Jewish people, and that it, and it alone serves as the foundation and essence of the existence of the Jewish people as the nation of the Lord; that Torah alone is the soul and backbone of that nation, and that whatever is formative in Palestine and within the Jewish people can be of lasting value and can have a right of existence only inasmuch as it is connected with—and flowing from—the Almighty’s Torah. This, in our view, presents an unbroken tradition of about 3,000 years, one that has always been absolutely based on the Bible and its teachings, both written and oral, and that is independent and uninfluenced from any other spiritual foundation. In making this short address to you, I should like to assist you in solving the difficult problem in connection with which you have come here, from our point of view. First of all: we declare the following to be our main aspiration, in which we feel united with the entire Jewish people. The land of Israel and the People of Israel form one complete entity forever inseparable. In practice we demand, therefore, that the gates of the Holy Land be opened to all Jews wishing to come here; that the absorptive capacity of the Land be developed to the utter possible limit; and that a political regime be established capable of guaranteeing free immigration, the development of the country and exploitation to the full of its absorptive capacity. May I, as a son of an ancient people, speak to you in a language as peculiarly singular as the People of Israel. For 2,000 years this people has

United Nations, “Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly,” Supplement no. 11, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, vol. 3, pp. 130–5.

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been wandering the face of the earth and has failed to find a resting place; it has undergone the most hellish and inhuman sufferings and has been tossed on the wheels of nations, rulers, governments, regimes and parties. The forms of war against the Jews have been varied, and evil plans, campaigns and persecutions have incessantly changed; but the People of Israel has preserved its life and existence, outliving its torturers and persecutors who have vanished from the arena of History. You can destroy or assimilate large parts of it, but no power in the world can liquidate it or bring into oblivion the living memory of its past. [. . .] There have at all times been Jews who left the comfort, or comparative comfort, of the countries of their dispersion. Often in immediate danger to their life, they flocked to the Land of Israel, a land that was waste and utterly destitute. The degree of Israel’s loyalty to its land was reflected in the land’s loyalty to its people. Not a single one of the country’s conquerors throughout past centuries succeeded in making the desert bloom. The Torah’s words: “And your enemies shall be waste on it,” was literally fulfilled. The land refused its yield to the stranger. The people of the Diaspora was barren from afar, longing and yearning for the land; and the land remained barren, longing for its sons. On your recent tour you have seen the great wonder with your own eyes: the barrenness of parts of this land uninhabited by Jews, and blossoming freshness wherever the Jew has grown attached in love, sacrifice and devotion to the soil of the land. May this miraculous sight that you have witnessed become living evidence and manifest proof of the metaphysical connection linking Israel with the Land of Israel, a connection imprinted by the Divine Creator from the days of Abraham to the end of Messianic days. In the course of 2,000 years of dispersion we have been persecuted to unending lengths, but these two treasures—the Lord’s Torah and the Lord’s Land—we have never forgotten. The Jew’s love of his land knows no limits; it suffers no comparison with what is called love of one’s country. In his land the Jew sees not merely the land of his birth but land hallowed by the Divine Creator, the cradle of prophecy chosen by Him and upon which rest the eyes of the Lord your God from the beginning of the year to the end of the year. From the moment of his birth to his departure from the world, in all his thoughts and contemplations, during his meals, in his hour of mourning and of joy, the Jew raises the land of Israel to his lips in prayer for his return to the Land. “If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget” is the oath we have taken, and the very course of our history speaks out to the fact that not for a single moment have we forgotten the Land of Israel. [. . .]

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You have come here in the name of the United Nations. The Holocaust took place in your era. Today we need an Isaiah, a Jeremiah, to pronounce the condemnation of the nations. We are sustained by knowledge of a Lord, the Leader of Creation. We are convinced that no amount of suffering and cruelty is ever in vain; that the sufferings of our people through thousands of years are summed up in one total account. There is justice and there is a judge in this World. But what happened during the years 1940–5 is unprecedented in the annals of world history. It may appear boring to reopen the chapter of the destruction of six million Jews, but we cannot help repeating and again repeating the subject; six million Jews have perished. Europe’s Jewry has been put to destruction. I am one of those who as if by miracle was saved from the wide-open jaws of the monster. I do not know why I should have been privileged to escape the fire that enveloped us all in the crematories of Treblinka and Auschwitz— maybe that I should be their messenger and bring their cries before you? [. . .] While the White Paper undoubtedly bears a great share of the responsibility for inactivity in the rescue of Jews, the world at large, and particularly the Great Powers, cannot be freed from answering this charge. [. . .]

Address of Dr Judah Leon Magnes (Ha-Ichud) to UNSCOP, 14 July 19478 [. . .] Our contention is that Arab-Jewish co-operation is not only necessary for the peace of this part of the world, but that it is also possible. We contend, upon the basis of the experience of the past twenty-five years, that Arab-Jewish cooperation has never been made the chief objective of major policy, either by the Mandatory Government, by the Jewish Agency, or by those representing the Arabs. We regard this as a great sin of omission which has been committed throughout all these years. Arab-Jewish relationship is the main political problem which must be faced. There may be attempts to evade facing this by placing emphasis on other very important aspects of the problem, but that is the kernel of the problem, and it must be faced courageously and with intelligence, based upon the experience of these past twenty-five years. Palestine is a land sui generis, and no one can have in Palestine everything that he wants. In all of the history of Palestine, no one has had everything that he wants. Palestine is not just a Jewish land; it is not just an Arab land. Among other things, Palestine is a Holy Land for the three great monotheistic United Nations, “Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly,” Supplement no. 11, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, vol. 3, pp. 164–87.

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religions. The Arabs have great natural rights in Palestine. They have been here for centuries. The graves of their fathers are here. There are remains of Arab culture at every turn. The Mosque of Aksa is the third holiest mosque in Islam. The Mosque of Omar is one of the great architectural monuments in the world of Islam. The Arabs have tilled the soil throughout all these centuries; they have, as we say, great natural rights in Palestine. The Jews, on the other hand, have great historical rights in Palestine. We have never forgotten this country. “If I forget Thee, O Jerusalem, may my right hand wither.” That has been upon the lips of our children from generation to generation. The Book of Books was produced here in this city by our ancestors. From that time until the present day, there have been hymns, prayers, voyages, great stirrings among the Jewish people, indicating that this Holy Land has been engraved in their hearts all these centuries. Moreover, since the return to Zion, during the past generation and more, the Jews have, by their sacrifice, by their scientific ability, by their love of the soil, by their hopes for its future, built up a national home of which in many respects they may well be proud. This labour has also given them a kind of right which is not to be scorned. Thus we have the Arab natural rights on the one hand, and the Jewish historical rights on the other. The question, therefore, is how can an honourable and reasonable compromise be found. There are those, we know, who reject the very idea of compromise. No answer can be found for this complicated situation, except through a compromise that may be reasonable and feasible. We are in full accord with Recommendation No. 3 of the Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. You will permit me to read out part of that: “that Palestine shall be neither a Jewish State nor an Arab State,” but “a country in which the legitimate national aspirations of both Jews and Arabs can be reconciled, without either side fearing the ascendancy of the other. In our view, this cannot be done under any form of constitution in which mere numerical majority is decisive.” I should like to emphasize that they say that the answer cannot be found under any form of constitution in which a mere numerical majority is decisive “since it is precisely the struggle for a numerical majority which bedevils Arab-Jewish relations. To ensure genuine self­government for both the Arab and the Jewish communities, this struggle”—that is, for majority—“must be made purposeless by the constitution itself.” The Anglo-American Committee did not, unhappily, propose the outlines of such a constitution. We regard this as the main weakness of their Report, along with all of the recommendations with which we are in full accord. We are attempting to give the outlines of a constitution for Palestine in which the question of a mere numerical majority is not to be decisive. We propose that Palestine become a bi-national country composed of two equal nationalities, the Jews and the Arabs, a country where each nationality is to have equal political powers, regardless of who is the majority or the minority. We call this “Political Parity.”

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Majority rule is, to be sure, the accepted working rule in countries which are uni-national—as, for example, in the United States; but majority rule is not the universal working rule in multinational countries such as Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Russia, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, where the equality of basic national rights of the different nationalities making up the state is protected against majority rule. It will not do, therefore, to try to apply the working rule of the majority to a country like Palestine in some such way as is done in countries of the West. Bi-nationalism based on parity is a comparatively new way. It gives full protection to the various religions of the country, to the national languages, cultures, institutions, and yet, with all of that, there is full allegiance to the political State. Switzerland proves this possible. There, to be sure, it is not so new; it is over one hundred years old. In Switzerland, there are three or four basic nationalities. There is no concurrence of religion, language, nationality in the twenty-two cantons. Some of them are divided up. Nevertheless, we find in Switzerland this great experiment that has been succeeding for more than one hundred years, of three distinct nationalities, each one guarding its own culture jealously, and at the same time proving faithful citizens of the political state. We contend that multi-nationalism is a high ideal. It is not just something that is made to order to cover a given situation. We regard as reactionary the old way of having a major people and a minor people in a state of various nationalities. To have a dominant people and a dominated people will not lead to success. It will lead to constant friction, revolutions, wars. Parity, we contend, is the one just relationship between the different nationalities of a multinational State. It is not always easy to achieve a bi-national or multinational state. In Palestine great concessions have to be made by all concerned. What are the concessions that the Arabs would have to make? They would have to yield their ambition to set up in Palestine a uni-national independent sovereign state. There are other Arab states which are uni-national, independent, sovereign. Yet in yielding that great ambition of theirs, which is only natural and to be understood, they would enjoy the maximum of national freedom in a bi-national Palestine equally with their Jewish fellow-citizens. What are the concessions that the Jews would have to make? They would have to give up their dream of a uni-national independent sovereign Jewish state. That is a great concession. This is the only country where such a thing is conceivable. Yet a bi-national Palestine based upon parity between the two nationalities would give the Jews what they have not in any other place. It would make them a constituent nation in this country. They would not be classified as a minority, because in the bi-national state, based upon parity, there is no such thing politically as majority and minority. We have seen how the minority guarantees of the Treaty of Versailles broke down at every point. Minorities can be protected only through parity, and the Jewish case, the Jewish cause in Palestine, can be protected here on the basis of bi-nationalism with two equal nationalities, so that in Palestine

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they are not a minority—to be sure, not a majority, and they, too, can have full national rights equally with their Arab fellow citizens. There is another concession that the Jews would have to make which is rather serious and which requires grave consideration. If there were a Jewish state, presumably that Jewish state would have its representation in the United Nations. This is a problem which requires very careful consideration. We are of the opinion that the Jews should have representation in the United Nations; exactly in what form remains to be seen, although we have certain views as to how that might be achieved. Now what are the concessions that the Administering Authority or the Mandatory, or whoever it is that is here, would have to make: this is a concession of very far-reaching importance. We say that Palestine is the Holy Land of the three great monotheistic religions. Are there any practical consequences to be drawn from this? Does it merely mean that there will be a few so-called sacred places which will be held intact, to which access will be granted? That is not our conception of it. Our conception of Palestine as the Holy Land covers the whole country. Our historical and religious associations are with the whole of Palestine and not with a few isolated places. The practical consequence to be drawn from this thesis is that Palestine should be made neutral, that perpetual neutrality should be accorded to Palestine. Switzerland has neutrality. The Vatican has neutrality. And what we mean by that is that Palestine should not be—should not become—a military base, or a naval base, or an air base for any of the Powers, whether that Power be the Mandatory or the Administering Authority or anyone else. We have tried to set out in the documents presented to you how selfgovernment based on parity might be introduced and carried through in Palestine. [. . .] It has been asked: How could the bi-national state legislate on immigration? We propose that there be a standing Committee on Immigration on which should be represented the Jews, the Arabs and the United Nations. I shall deal with immigration later on, but the decisive voice would be that of the United Nations. We do not believe, in general, that it is possible, within the near future, for Palestine to be without some third party—the United Nations. It may be that in the course of Palestine’s development that may be achieved. There certainly is required, not necessarily for a long period, but a considerable period of transition under the auspices of the trusteeship system of the United Nations. [. . .] We think that a bi-national Palestine based on parity has a great mission to help revive this Semitic world materially and spiritually. The Jews and the Arabs are the only two peoples remaining from Semitic antiquity. We are related. We have lived and worked together. We have fashioned cultural values together throughout our history. We regard it as the mission of the

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bi-national Palestine to bring about once again, within the Semitic world, this revival of the spirit which has characterized Semitic history since antiquity. [. . .] We propose three principles upon which Jewish immigration is to be encouraged. You will note that I say “encouraged.” First, that Jewish immigration be permitted up to parity with the Arabs. We call this numerical parity. What I described before is what we call political parity. This would enable the Jews to bring in another 500,000 to 600,000 immigrants. The second principle would be that Jewish immigration be regulated in accordance with the economic absorptive capacity of the country. Third, that this economic absorptive capacity of the country be enlarged through a Development Plan, which is to be of benefit to all the inhabitants of the country. I would like to describe these three principles or stages one by one as briefly as I can: number one. Why should not the 100,000 Jewish displaced persons be admitted into Palestine rapidly? President Truman began to speak of it, I think almost two years ago. Admitting them into Palestine would, of course, mean an enormous enterprise. It will require great sums of money, great capacity for absorption, and great sacrifice on the part of the Jews of Palestine and perhaps of the rest of the world. We wish to express to you our opinion that if it be decided to admit these 100,000 Jews into Palestine as rapidly as possible, you will find that the Jews of all the world will put their shoulders to the wheel—that they will find the manpower, the organizational ability, the money, together with the money which the United States and Great Britain have already said they were ready to put into this enterprise. It will be a great challenge to the Jewish people. No one can say to you at the present time that these 100,000 can be absorbed in Palestine in a year, as was thought. But the Jewish people can rise to that challenge. We have wanted these 100,000 brothers and sisters of ours so intensely that it seems to us that it ought to be granted, if for no other reason than because the Jewish people have suffered this unspeakable tragedy. Forty per cent of the Jewish people have been annihilated. No other people has suffered anywhere near such losses. This challenge to the Jewish people, putting upon their backs this burden, this task, would in large measure calm them down and keep them from thinking constantly about what happened to their father, mother, brother and sister in those gas chambers. The Jewish people need to be saddled with this enterprise. One should not be particular and say that 1,500 or 4,000 or 5,000 a month, or however many a month, should be admitted. Give these certificates, 100,000 certificates, and tell the Jewish people that they are primarily responsible for the use of them. Those who have rooms to spare in their spacious homes will yield some of them. Those of us who have clothes to spare will turn some of them over. Those of us who have a little extra money, or no extra money, will

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turn the money over or go into debt. It is a matter of historic mercy. It is a psychological problem, and not so much a political or an economic problem. The Jewish people must be given something—not as a gift—not as charity— but given a task, a burden, an enterprise. One hundred thousand souls! What greater function can all of us see before ourselves than to do what we can to bring these brands snatched from the fire, into this new National Home. The Arabs need not be afraid of these 100,000. In one of our documents you will find that we have made a computation based upon authentic figures which will show that during the war there was very little Jewish immigration. The Arab natural increase is much greater than that of the Jews—almost twice as much. During the war, all these years, the Arab natural increase brought the Arab population up to figures out of all proportion to what they were before. Last year when we prepared these figures we found that if 100,000 Jews were brought into the country at once, the increase in the Jewish population in relation to the Arab population would be only about 30,000, taking into account the lack of immigration during the war and the greater Arab natural increase. These 30,000 would not bring the Jewish State of which the Arabs are so afraid. We are convinced that if these 100,000 had been admitted, without all of this discussion going on for almost two years, the Arabs would have acquiesced. They would have protested, but we know that they are at heart our brothers, and that it would not have been on account of these 100,000 that any revolt would have taken place. We feel the same thing now despite the fact that the situation has been aggravated by these two years of bitter and acrimonious discussion. The next stage that we envisage is, as I have said, reaching parity with the Arabs. Where would these additional immigrants come from? There are, in accordance with figures that I have seen lately, about 200,000 displaced Jews in the camps of Europe. That would not make up the 500,000 to 600,000 to bring the Jewish numbers up to parity with the Arabs. These immigrants would probably come, in the first place, from North Africa. There are 300,000 to 400,000 Jews in North Africa, who are very unhappy. Then there are hundreds of thousands of Jews in Hungary and Rumania. And in Jewish history, one can never tell, unfortunately, where the shoe will begin to pinch next. Moreover, there are many Jewish young men and women who want to give their strength to the upbuilding of the National Home, although they are not in need of migrating at all. All of these would make up, so we think, the additional numbers. The third stage is: If parity were ever reached with the Arabs, what then? I mentioned to you, in the first place, the greater Arab natural increase. There would always be that much to catch up with. But the chief answer that we give is that if in the course of those years Jews and Arabs find the way of peace and understanding together, they would come to some agreed conclusion as to how much additional Jewish immigration the Jews might be able to have. [. . .]

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Many Jews as well as many Arabs of all classes and sections—some openly and many more privately—anxiously look for a courageous lead from you which will deliver this unhappy country from the evils of political tension and nationalist passion, of mental and physical terror. We call upon you to take up this noble attempt, and not to accept counsels of despair, but to give a fair chance to constructive proposals which in the long run bear hope for real freedom, prosperity and peace for the two peoples of this land.

The UNSCOP Report: Report to the General Assembly of the UN Special Committee on Palestine, 3 September 19479 Chapter II: The elements of the conflict [. . .]

C. Palestine under the Mandate [. . . .]

The present situation 117. The atmosphere in Palestine today is one of profound tension. In many respects the country is living under a semi-military regime. In the streets of Jerusalem and other key areas barbed wire defences, road blocks, machine-gun posts and constant armoured car patrols are routine measures. In areas of doubtful security, Administration officials and the military forces live within strictly policed security zones and work within fortified and closely-guarded buildings. Freedom of personal movement is liable to severe restriction and the curfew and martial law have become a not uncommon experience. The primary purpose of the Palestine Government, in the circumstances of recurring terrorist attacks, is to maintain what it regards as the essential conditions of public security. Increasing resort has been had to special security measures provided for in the defence emergency regulations. Under these regulations, a person may be detained for an unlimited period, or placed under police supervision for one year, by order of an area military commander; and he may be deported or excluded from Palestine by order of

The entire document can be found on the internet: http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/071 75DE9FA2DE563852568D3006E10F3

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the High Commissioner. Where there are “reasons to believe that there are grounds which would justify . . . detention . . . or deportation”, any person may be arrested without warrant by any member of His Majesty’s Forces or any police officer and detained for not more than seven days, pending further decision by the military commander. The regulations concerning military courts prohibit a form of judicial appeal from or questioning of a sentence or decision of a military court. Under the regulations, widespread arrests have been made; and as of 12 July 1947, 820 persons were being held in detention on security grounds, including 291 in Kenya under Kenya’s 1947 ordinance dealing with the control of detained persons. The detainees were all Jews with the exception of four Arabs. In addition to these, 17,873 illegal immigrants were under detention. 118. The attitude of the Administration to the maintenance of public security in present circumstances was stated to the Committee in the following terms: “The right of any community to use force as a means of gaining its political ends is not admitted in the British Commonwealth. Since the beginning of 1945 the Jews have implicitly claimed this right and have supported by an organized campaign of lawlessness, murder and sabotage their contention that, whatever other interests might be concerned, nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of a Jewish State and free Jewish immigration into Palestine. It is true that large numbers of Jews do not today attempt to defend the crimes that have been committed in the name of these political aspirations. They recognize the damage caused to their good name by these methods in the court of world opinion. Nevertheless, the Jewish community of Palestine still publicly refuses its help to the Administration in suppressing terrorism, on the ground that the Administration’s policy is opposed to Jewish interests. The converse of this attitude is clear, and its result, however much the Jewish leaders themselves may not wish it, has been to give active encouragement to the dissidents and freer scope to their activities.” 119. There can be no doubt that the enforcement of the White Paper of 1939, subject to the permitted entry since December 1945 of 1,500 Jewish immigrants monthly, has created throughout the Jewish settlement a deepseated distrust and resentment against the mandatory Power. This feeling is most sharply expressed in regard to the Administration’s attempts to prevent the landing of illegal immigrants. During its stay in Palestine, the Committee heard from certain of its members an eyewitness account of the incidents relative to the bringing into the port of Haifa, under British naval escort, of the illegal immigrant ship Exodus 1947. In this, as in similar incidents, the Committee has noted the persistence of the attempts to bring Jewish immigrants to Palestine irrespective of determined preventive measures on the part of the Administration, and also the far-reaching support which such attempts receive from the Jewish settlement in Palestine and abroad.

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The unremitting struggle to admit further Jews into Palestine, irrespective of the quota permitted by the Administration, is a measure of the rift which has developed between the Jewish Agency and the Jewish settlement, on the one hand, and the Administration on the other. In the present state of tension, little practicable basis exists for the discharge by the Jewish Agency of its function under the Mandate of “advising and cooperating” with the Administration in matters affecting the interests of the Jewish settlement. 120. As far as the Arab community is concerned, the Committee has had less opportunity of ascertaining its attitude in detail in view of the boycott on association with the Committee pronounced by the Arab Higher Committee. During the hearings of representatives of the Arab States at Beirut, however, the Arab assessment of the present situation of unrest in Palestine was thus: “Zionism, however, does not content itself with mere propaganda in favour of the fulfilment of its expansionist projects at the expense of the Arab countries. Its plan involves recourse to terrorism, both in Palestine and in other countries. It is known that a secret army has been formed with a view to creating an atmosphere of tension and unrest by making attempts on the lives of representatives of the governing authority and by destroying public buildings. . . This aggressive attitude, resulting from the mandatory Power’s weakness in dealing with them, will not fail to give rise in turn to the creation of similar organizations by the Arabs. The responsibility for the disturbances which might result therefrom throughout the Middle East will rest solely with the Zionist Organizations, as having been the first to use these violent tactics.” It was declared at the same meeting that “against a State established by violence, the Arab States will be obliged to use violence; that is a legitimate right of self-defence”. 121. Arab resistance to Jewish political demands in Palestine has in part taken the form of an economic boycott of Jewish goods, decided on by a resolution of the Council of the Arab League in December 1945. Representatives of the Arab States stressed in evidence to the Committee that the boycott would prove effective due to the dependence of Jewish industry on the market of Arab countries.Within Palestine, though it would be difficult to estimate its present effectiveness, the boycott is regarded by the Arab leaders as an important means of furthering their political aims. During the Arab Conference in Haifa in July 1947, Jamal Eff. el Husseini spoke of the necessity of “strengthening the boycott in order to pull down Zionist existence”, and warned Arab merchants who did not observe the boycott that they would be regarded as “traitors”, since “the nation cannot keep patient over humiliation.” 122. The view of the mandatory Power on Arab-Jewish relations was given by the British Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons on 13 November 1945, as follows:

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“The whole story of Palestine since the mandate was created has been one of continued friction between the two races culminating at intervals in serious disturbances. The fact has to be faced that since the introduction of the mandate it has been impossible to find common grounds between the Arabs and the Jews.” Yet, while recognizing that in practice the Mandate has become unworkable, one cannot ignore the belief of those responsible for the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate that the obligations undertaken towards Arabs and Jews respectively would not seriously conflict. To many observers at the time, conclusion of the Feisal-Weizmann Agreement promised well for the future cooperation of Arab and Jew in Palestine. If Arab protests and uprisings in the 1920s seemed to give warning of serious conflict, it was assumed, and repeatedly proclaimed by the mandatory Power, that the necessary measures of Arab-Jewish cooperation would be found to bridge the gap between the two communities within the framework of the Mandate. 123. In the circumstances of the mandatory regime, that necessary measure of understanding between the two peoples of Palestine has not yet been evident. The immediate and compelling reality is the constant pressure exerted by Arab and Jewish political leaders to maintain and advance their respective national interests. Yet there are those, both Jew and Arab, who believe in the possibility of mutually advantageous understanding and, as circumstances permit, seek its promotion. Instances of cooperation and good neighbourly relations in the affairs of everyday life may be observed. In the field of labour, joint Jewish-Arab strike actions have occurred. On official bodies, such as the General Agricultural Council the Citrus Control Board and the Citrus Marketing Board, Arabs and Jews have cooperated in furtherance of a common interest. 124. Against the background of major and conflicting political objectives, however, these forms of cooperation are necessarily limited in scope and effectiveness. Their prospects of success have been and are determined by the complex of political and economic factors, internal and external to Palestine, which the application of a mandatory regime has brought about. Should these conditions be adjusted so as to permit the joint utilization of the resources of Palestine between the two peoples on a basis of national autonomy, the forces working for amicable relations between Arabs and Jews may yet become a significant factor in the future of Palestine.

D. The conflicting claims 125. The basic contentions of the Arab and Jewish claims are summarized separately in this section with a brief appraisal of each claim.

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The Jewish case 126. The Jewish case, as herein considered, is mainly the case advanced by the Jewish Agency which, by the terms of the Mandate, has a special status with regard to Jewish interests in Palestine. 127. The Jewish case seeks the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, and Jewish immigration into Palestine both before and after the creation of the Jewish State subject only to the limitations imposed by the economic absorptive capacity of that State. In the Jewish case, the issues of the Jewish State and unrestricted immigration are inextricably interwoven. On the one hand, the Jewish State is needed in order to assure a refuge for the Jewish immigrants who are clamoring to come to Palestine from the displaced persons camps and from other places in Europe, North Africa and the Near East, where their present plight is difficult. On the other hand, a Jewish State would have urgent need of Jewish immigrants in order to affect the present great numerical preponderance of Arabs over Jews in Palestine. The Jewish case frankly recognizes the difficulty involved in creating at the present time a Jewish State in all of Palestine in which Jews would, in fact, be only a minority, or in part of Palestine in which, at best, they could immediately have only a slight preponderance. Thus, the Jewish case lays great stress on the right of Jewish immigration, for political as well as humanitarian reasons. Special emphasis is therefore placed on the right of Jews to “return” to Palestine. 128. Aside from contentions based on biblical and historical sources as to this right, the Jewish case rests on the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and on the Mandate for Palestine, which incorporated the Declaration in its preamble and recognized the historic connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and the grounds for reconstituting the Jewish National Home there. 129. It is the Jewish contention that the mandatory Power in Palestine became a trustee for the specific and primary purpose of securing the establishment of the Jewish National Home by means of Jewish immigration, which must be facilitated, and by close settlement of the Jews upon the land, which must be encouraged subject to certain safeguards. 130. In their view, the Mandate intended that the natural evolution of Jewish immigration, unrestricted save by economic considerations, might ultimately lead to a commonwealth in which the Jews would be a majority. 131. They regard the pledges to the Jews in the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate as international commitments not to the Jews of Palestine alone, who were at the time only a small community, but to the Jewish people as a whole, who are now often described as the “Jewish nation”. 132. They contend that there has been no change in conditions since these intentions were expressed, for the existence of an Arab majority was a fact well understood at the time when the legal and political commitments of the Mandate were originally made.

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133. The Jews, it is urged, have built in Palestine on the basis of faith in the international pledges made to the Jewish people and they cannot be halted in midstream.

a The Jewish immigrants to Palestine, who are said to be merely

returning to their homeland, are portrayed as having been primarily responsible for developing the economy of the country, for establishing an infant industry, for cultivating theretofore waste lands, for instituting irrigation schemes and for improving the standard of living of Palestine Arabs as well as Jews.

b The immigrant Jews displace no Arabs, but rather develop areas

which otherwise would remain undeveloped. 134. They contend that no time limit was suggested for immigration or settlement. The Mandate, it is claimed, was to be terminated only when its primary purpose, the establishment of the Jewish National Home, had been fulfilled. That Home will be regarded as having been established only when it can stand alone, for there can be no security for it unless it is free from Arab domination. Any proposed solution, therefore, should ensure the existence and continued development of the Jewish National Home in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the international pledges made.

a The establishment of the Jewish Home and State will, it is claimed,

do no political injustice to the Arabs, since the Arabs have never established a government in Palestine. b In the Jewish Home and State the Arab population, which, as a result of accelerated Jewish immigration will have become a minority population, will be fully protected in all its rights on an equal basis with the Jewish citizenry.

Appraisal of the Jewish case 135. Under the preamble of the Mandate, the Principal Allied Powers agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a mandatory Power the administration of the territory of Palestine. They also agreed that this mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the Balfour Declaration. Article 2 of the Mandate made the mandatory responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as would assure:

a The establishment of a Jewish National Home, as laid down in the

preamble, and b The development of self-governing institutions.

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The obligation to assure the establishment of a Jewish National Home was qualified by article 6, which made the mandatory Power responsible for the facilitation of immigration and the encouragement of close settlement on the land. 136. There has been great controversy as to whether the obligations relating to the National Home and self-governing institutions were equal in weight, and also as to whether they were consistent with each other. Opinions have been expressed that between these two obligations the Mandate recognizes no primacy in order of importance and no priority in order of execution, and that they were in no sense irreconcilable. According to other opinions, however, the primary purpose of the Mandate, as expressed in its preamble and in its articles, was to promote the establishment of a Jewish National Home, to which the obligation of developing self-governing institutions was subordinated. 137. The practical significance of the controversy was that, if the country were to be placed under such political conditions as would secure the development of self-governing institutions, these same conditions would in fact destroy the Jewish National Home. It would appear that, although difficulties were anticipated, when the Mandate was confirmed it was not clearly contemplated that these two obligations would prove mutually incompatible. In practice, however, they proved to be so. The conflict between Arab and Jewish political aspirations, intensified by the growth of Arab nationalism throughout the Arabic-speaking countries and by the growth of anti-Semitism in some European countries, excluded any possibility of adjustment which would allow the establishment of selfgoverning institutions. Had self-governing institutions been created, the majority in the country, who never willingly accepted Jewish immigration, would in  all probability have made its continuance impossible, causing thereby the negation of the Jewish National Home. 138. It is part of the Jewish case that any restriction on immigration, other than economic considerations, is illegal and in violation of the provisions of the Mandate. Article 6 of the Mandate made the mandatory Power responsible for facilitating Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, while insuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population were not prejudiced. No other restriction was provided thereon. 139. By 1922, the mandatory construed article 6 to mean that Jewish immigration could not be so great in volume as to exceed whatever might be the economic capacity of the country to absorb new arrivals. This interpretation was accepted by the Executive of the Zionist Organization and, thus, by construction, a restriction of the general terms of the article was established. 140. The Jewish contention, that the Mandate intended that the natural evolution of Jewish immigration might ultimately lead to a commonwealth in which Jews would be a majority, raises the question as to the meaning of “National Home.”

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141. The notion of the National Home, which derived from the formulation of Zionist aspirations in the 1897 Basle program has provoked many discussions concerning its meaning, scope and legal character, especially since it has no known legal connotation and there are no precedents in international law for its interpretation. It was used in the Balfour Declaration and in the Mandate, both of which promised the establishment of a “Jewish National Home” without, however, defining its meaning. The conclusion seems to be inescapable that the vagueness in the wording of both instruments was intentional. The fact that the term “National Home” was employed, instead of the word “State” or “Commonwealth” would indicate that the intention was to place a restrictive construction on the National Home scheme from its very inception. This argument, however, may not be conclusive since “National Home,” although not precluding the possibility of establishing a Jewish State in the future, had the advantage of not shocking public opinion outside the Jewish world, and even in many Jewish quarters, as the term “Jewish State” would have done. 142. What exactly was in the minds of those who made the Balfour Declaration is speculative. The fact remains that, in the light of experience acquired as a consequence of serious disturbances in Palestine, the mandatory Power, in a statement on “British Policy in Palestine,” issued on 3 June 1922 by the Colonial Office, placed a restrictive construction upon the Balfour Declaration. 143. The statement recognized for the first time “the ancient historic connection” of the Jews with Palestine, and declared that they were in Palestine “as of right and not on sufferance.” It, however, excluded in its own terms “the disappearance or subordination of the Arabic population, language or customs in Palestine” or “the imposition of Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole,” and made it clear that in the eyes of the mandatory Power, the Jewish National Home was to be founded in Palestine and not that Palestine as a whole was to be converted into a Jewish National Home. 144. It should be noted here that this construction, which restricted considerably the scope of the National Home, was made prior to the confirmation of the Mandate by the Council of the League of Nations and was formally accepted at the time by the Executive of the Zionist Organization, in its capacity as the “appropriate Jewish agency” provided for in article 4 of the Mandate. 145. Nevertheless, neither the Balfour Declaration nor the Mandate precluded the eventual creation of a Jewish State. The Mandate in its Preamble recognized, with regard to the Jewish people, the “grounds for reconstituting their National Home.” By providing, as one of the main obligations of the mandatory Power, the facilitation of Jewish immigration, it conferred upon the Jews an opportunity, through large-scale immigration, to create eventually a Jewish State with a Jewish majority.

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146. Both the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate involved international commitments to the Jewish people as a whole. It was obvious that these commitments were not limited only to the Jewish population of Palestine, since at the time there were only some 80,000 Jews there. 147. This would imply that all Jews in the world who wish to go to Palestine would have the right to do so. This view, however, would seem to be unrealistic in the sense that a country as small and poor as Palestine could never accommodate all the Jews in the world. 148. When the Mandate was approved, all concerned were aware of the existence of an overwhelming Arab majority in Palestine. Moreover, the King-Crane Report, among others, had warned that the Zionist program could not be carried out except by force of arms. It would seem clear, therefore, that the provisions of the Mandate relating to the Jewish National Home could be based only on the assumption that sooner or later the Arab fears would gradually be overcome and that Arab hostility to the terms of the Mandate would in time weaken and disappear. 149. This seems to have been the basic assumption, but it proved to be a false one, since the history of the last twenty-five years has established the fact that not only the creation of a Jewish State but even the continuation of the building of the Jewish National Home by restricted immigration could be implemented only by the use of some considerable force. It can not be properly contended that the use of force as a means of establishing the National Home was either intended by the Mandate or implied by its provisions. On the contrary, the provisions of the Mandate should preclude any systematic use of force for the purpose of its application. In its preamble, the Mandate states that the Principal Allied Powers agreed to entrust Palestine to a mandatory Power for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The guiding principle of that Article was the well-being of peoples not yet able to stand by themselves. 150. It has been suggested that the well-being of the indigenous population of Palestine might be ensured by the unfettered development of the Jewish National Home. “Well-being” in a practical sense, however, must be something more than a mere objective conception; and the Arabs, thinking subjectively, have demonstrated by their acts their belief that the conversion of Palestine into a Jewish State against their will would be very much opposed to their conception of what is essential to their well-being. To contend, therefore, that there is an international obligation to the effect that Jewish immigration should continue with a view to establishing a Jewish majority in the whole of Palestine, would mean ignoring the wishes of the Arab population and their views as to their own well-being. This would involve an apparent violation of what was the governing principle of Article 22 of the Covenant.

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151. That the Jews have performed remarkable feats of development in Palestine cannot be denied. The fact remains, however, that there may be serious question as to the economic soundness of much of this achievement, owing to the reliance on gift capital and the political motivation behind many of the development schemes with little regard to economic considerations. 152. That Jews would displace Arabs from the land if restrictions were not imposed would seem inevitable, since, as land pressures develop, the attraction of Jewish capital would be an inducement to many Arabs to dispose of their lands. Some displacement of this nature has already occurred. 153. It would appear that the clear implication of the Jewish contention that the National Home can be safeguarded from Arab domination only when it can stand by itself is that an independent Jewish State in all or part of Palestine is the only means of securing the promise of the Mandate for a Jewish National Home. Even a binational State, on a parity basis, unless there were extensive international guarantees, would not seem to meet the Jewish contention. 154. The Jewish assurance that no political injustice would be done to the Arabs by the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine, since the Arabs have never established a government there, gains some support from the fact that not since 63 B.C., when Pompey stormed Jerusalem, has Palestine been an independent State. On the other hand, the fact remains that today in Palestine there are over 1,200,000 Arabs, two-thirds of the population, who oppose a Jewish State and who are intent on establishing an independent Arab State. 155. Any solution assuring the continued development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine would necessarily involve continued Jewish immigration, the postponement of independence, and also administration by a third party, at least until the Jewish people become a majority there. Such absolution would have to be enforced, in view of the opposition of the Arab population. Many Jews contend that, if given the opportunity, the Jews alone could defend a Jewish State. Even this, however, envisages the possibility of a violent struggle with the Arabs.

The Arab case 156. The Arab case as here set forth is based mainly on the contentions made by the representatives of the Arab Higher Committee before the first special session of the General Assembly and by the representatives of the Arab States at that session, at Beirut and Geneva. The Arab case seeks the immediate creation of an independent Palestine west of the Jordan as an Arab State. It rests on a number of claims and contentions which are summarized below.

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The Arabs emphasize the fact of an actual Arab numerical majority, in the ratio of two to one in the present population of Palestine. 157. They postulate the “natural” right of the Arab majority to remain in undisputed possession of the country, since they are and have been for many centuries in possession of the land. This claim of a “natural” right is based on the contention that the Arab connection with Palestine has continued uninterruptedly from early historical times, since the term “Arab” is to be interpreted as connoting not only the invaders from the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century, but also the indigenous population which intermarried with the invaders and acquired their speech, customs and modes of thought in becoming permanently Arabized. 158. The Arabs further stress the natural desire of the Arab community to safeguard its national existence from foreign intruders, in order that it may pursue without interference its own political, economic arid cultural development. 159. The Arabs also claim “acquired” rights, based on the general promises and pledges officially made to the Arab people in the course of the First World War, including, in particular, the McMahon-Hussein correspondence of 1915–16 and the Anglo-French Declaration of 1918. The “HogarthMessage,” the Basset letter, and the “Declaration to the Seven” are regarded as further support for the Arab claim to an independent Palestine.

a In the Arab view, these undertakings, taken collectively, provide a

firm recognition of Arab political rights in Palestine which, they contend. Great Britain is under a contractual obligation to accept and uphold—an obligation thus far unfulfilled. b It is also their contention that these promises and pledges of Arab freedom and independence were among the main factors inspiring the Arabs to revolt against the Ottoman Empire and to ally themselves with Great Britain and the other allies during the First World War. 160. The Arabs have persistently adhered to the position that the Mandate for Palestine, which incorporated the Balfour Declaration, is illegal. The Arab States have refused to recognize it as having any validity.

a They allege that the terms of the Palestine Mandate are inconsistent

with the letter and spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations for the following reasons: i Although paragraph 4 of Article 22 stipulated that certain communities had reached a stage of development where their existence as “independent nations” could be provisionally recognized, subject only to a limited period of tutelage under

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a mandatory Power in the form of administrative advice and assistance until such time as these communities would be able to stand alone, the Palestine Mandate violated this stipulation by deliberately omitting immediate provisional recognition of the independence of the territory and by granting to the mandatory Power in article 1 of the Mandate “full powers of legislation and administration.” ii The wishes of the Palestine community had not been “a

principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory,” as provided for in Article 22, paragraph 4 of the Covenant. b The principle and right of national self-determination were violated. c The Arab States were not Members of the League of Nations when the Palestine Mandate was approved, and are not, therefore, bound by it. 161. Although the terms of the Palestine Mandate are, in the Arab view, illegal and invalid and, therefore, Jewish immigrants have had no legal right to enter the country during the period of the Mandate, the Arab position regarding such Jews is that their presence has to be recognized as a de facto situation.

Appraisal of the Arab case 162. That the Arab population is and will continue to be the numerically preponderant population in Palestine, unless offset by free and substantial Jewish immigration, is undisputed. The Arab birth rate is considerably higher than the Jewish birth rate. Only large-scale Jewish immigration, strongly assisted by capital and efforts from outside Palestine, can provide the basis for the attainment of numerical parity between Arabs and Jews in the population. 163. The Arabs of Palestine consider themselves as having a “natural” right to that country, although they have not been in possession of it as a sovereign nation. 164. The Arab population, despite the strenuous efforts of Jews to acquire land in Palestine, at present remains in possession of approximately 85 per cent of the land. The provisions of the land transfer regulations of 1940, which gave effect to the 1939 White Paper policy, have severely restricted the Jewish efforts to acquire new land. 165. The Arabs consider that all of the territory of Palestine is by right Arab patrimony. Although in an Arab State they would recognize the right of Jews to continue in possession of land legally acquired by them during the Mandate, they would regard as a violation of their “natural” right any effort, such as partition, to reduce the territory of Palestine.

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166. The desire of the Arab people of Palestine to safeguard their national existence is a very natural desire. However, Palestinian nationalism, as distinct from Arab nationalism, is itself a relatively new phenomenon, which appeared only after the division of the “Arab rectangle” by the settlement of the First World War. The National Home policy and the vigorous policy of immigration pursued by the Jewish leadership has sharpened the Arab fear of danger from the intruding Jewish population. 167. With regard to the promises and pledges made to the Arabs as inducement for their support of the Allies in the First World War, it is to be noted that apparently there is no unequivocal agreement as to whether Palestine was included within the territory pledged to independence by the McMahon-Hussein correspondence. In this connection, since the question of interpretation was raised Great Britain has consistently denied that Palestine was among the territories to which independence was pledged. 168. These promises were examined in 1939 by a committee consisting of British and Arab representatives which was set up for that purpose during the Arab-British Conference on Palestine. That committee considered the McMahon correspondence and certain subsequent events and documents which one party or the other regarded as likely to shed light on the meaning or intention of the correspondence. It examined, inter alia, the so-called Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Balfour Declaration, the “Hogarth Message,” the “Declaration to the Seven,” General Allenby’s assurance to the Amir Feisal, and the Anglo-French Declaration of 7 December 1918. 169. In its report the committee stated that the Arab and the United Kingdom  representatives had been “unable to reach agreement upon an interpretation of the correspondence.” The United Kingdom representatives, however, informed the Arab representatives that the Arab contentions, as explained to the committee, regarding the interpretation of the correspondence, and especially their contentions relating to the meaning of the phrase “portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo have greater force than has appeared hitherto.” Moreover, the United Kingdom representatives informed the Arab representatives that “they agree that Palestine was included in the area claimed by the Sherif of Mecca in his letter of 14 July 1915, and that unless Palestine was excluded from that area later in the correspondence, it must be regarded as having been included in the area in which Great Britain was to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs. They maintain that on a proper construction of the correspondence, Palestine was in fact excluded. But they agree that the language in which its exclusion was expressed was not so specific and unmistakable as it was thought to be at the time.” 170. With regard to the various statements mentioned in paragraph 168, the above committee considered that it was beyond its scope to express an opinion upon their proper interpretation, and that such opinion could not

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in any case be properly formed unless consideration had also been given to a number of other statements made during the war. In the opinion of the committee, however, it was evident from these statements that “His Majesty’s Government were not free to dispose of Palestine without regard for the wishes and interests of the inhabitants of Palestine, and that these statements must all be taken into account in any attempt to estimate the responsibilities which—upon any interpretation of the correspondence— His Majesty’s Government have incurred towards those inhabitants as a result of the correspondence.” 171. With regard to the “Hogarth Message,” the Arab representatives explained that they relied strongly on a passage in the message delivered to King Hussein of the Hejaz in 1918, to the effect that Jewish settlement in Palestine would be allowed only in so far as would be consistent with the political and economic freedom of the Arab population. 172. It is noteworthy that the “Hogarth Message” was delivered to King Hussein in January 1918, that is, two months after the Balfour Declaration was made. There is a clear difference between the Balfour Declaration itself, which safeguarded only the civil and religious rights of the existing nonJewish communities, and the “Hogarth Message,” which promised political freedom to the Arab population of Palestine. 173. A Memorandum presented by Emir Feisal to the Paris Peace Conference, however, would indicate that the special position of Palestine was recognized in Arab circles. He said: “The Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood and there is no conflict of character between the two races. In principle we are absolutely at one. Nevertheless, the Arabs cannot risk assuming the responsibility of holding level the scales in the clash of races and religions that have, in this one province, so often involved the world in difficulties. They would wish for the effective superposition of a great trustee, so long as a representative local administration commended itself by actively promoting the material prosperity of the country.” 174. It was also Amir Feisal who, representing and acting on behalf of the Arab Kingdom of the Hejaz, signed an agreement with Dr Weizmann, representing and acting on behalf of the Zionist Organization. In this agreement, Feisal, subject to the condition that the Arabs obtained independence as demanded in his Memorandum to the British Foreign Office of 4 January 1919, accepted the Balfour Declaration and the encouragement of Jewish immigration into Palestine. The Feisal-Weizmann agreement did not acquire validity, since the condition attached was not fulfilled at the time. 175. The Peel Commission, in referring to the matter, had noted in its report that “there was a time when Arab statesmen were willing to consider giving

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Palestine to the Jews, provided that the rest of Arab Asia was free. That condition was not fulfilled then, but it is on the eve of fulfilment now.” 176. With regard to the principle of self-determination, although international recognition was extended to this principle at the end of the First World War and it was adhered to with regard to the other Arab territories, at the time of the creation of the “A” Mandates, it was not applied to Palestine, obviously because of the intention to make possible the creation of the Jewish National Home there. Actually, it may well be said that the Jewish National Home and the sui generis Mandate for Palestine run counter to that principle. 177. As to the claim that the Palestine Mandate violates Article 22 of the Covenant because the community of Palestine has not been recognized as an independent nation and because the mandatory was given full powers of legislation and administration, it has been rightly pointed out by the Peel Commission: “a That the provisional recognition of certain communities formerly

belonging to the Turkish Empire as independent nations is permissible; the words are can be provisionally recognized, not ‘will’ or ‘shall’; b That the penultimate paragraph of Article 22 prescribes that the degree of authority to be exercised by the mandatory shall be defined, at need, by the Council of the League; c That the acceptance by the Allied Powers and the United States of the policy of the Balfour Declaration made it clear from the beginning that Palestine would have been treated differently from Syria and Iraq, and that this difference of treatment was confirmed by the Supreme Council in the Treaty of Sevres and by the Council of the League in sanctioning the Mandate.” 178. With regard to the allegation that the wishes of the Palestine community had not been the principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory Power, it should be noted that the resolutions of the General Syrian Congress of 2 July 1919, in considering under certain conditions the possibility of the establishment of a mandate over the Arab countries, gave Great Britain as a second choice, the United States of America being the first. This choice was also noted by the King-Crane Commission. 179. There would seem to be no grounds for questioning the validity of the Mandate for the reason advanced by the Arab States. The terms of the Mandate for Palestine, formulated by the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied Powers as a part of the settlement of the First World War, were subsequently approved and confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations.

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180. The spirit which prevailed at the creation of the Mandate for Palestine was explained by Lord Balfour at the opening of the eighteenth session of the Council of the League of Nations as follows: “The mandates are not our creation. The mandates are neither made by the League, nor can they, in substance, be altered by the League . . . Remember that a mandate is a self-imposed limitation by the conquerors on the sovereignty which they obtained over conquered territories. It is imposed by the Allied and Associated Powers themselves in the interests of what they conceived to be the general welfare of mankind and they have asked the League of Nations to assist them in seeing that this policy should be carried into effect. But the League of Nations is not the author of the policy, but its instrument. It is not they who have invented the system of mandates; it is not they who have laid down the general lines on which the three classes of mandates are framed. Their duty, let me repeat, is to see, in the first place, that the terms of the mandates conform to the principles of the Covenant, and in the second place, that these terms shall, in fact, regulate the policy of the mandatory Powers in the mandated territories. Now, it is clear from this statement, that both those who hope and those who fear that what, I believe, has been called the Balfour Declaration is going to suffer substantial modifications, are in error. The fears are not justified; the hopes are not justified . . . The general lines of policy stand and must stand.” [. . .]

Chapter IV The main proposals propounded for the solution of the Palestine question General 1.  Proposals for the solution of the Palestine question propounded at various times by official and unofficial sources during the past decade may be broadly classified as of three main categories:

i The partition of Palestine into two independent States, one Arab

and one Jewish, which might either be completely separate or linked to the extent necessary for preserving, as far as possible, economic unity;

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ii The establishment of a unitary State (with an Arab majority, unless a

Jewish majority is created by large-scale Jewish immigration); iii The establishment of a single State with a federal, cantonal or

binational structure, in which the minority would, by such political structure, be protected from the fear of domination. 2.  The following is a brief summary of the main proposals which have been put forward, including those advanced prior to the creation of this Committee as well as those submitted to it.

Main proposals of commissions and British Government plans prior to the creation of the Committee 3.  The Royal (Peel) Commission, 1937: Partition was recommended for the first time by the Royal Commission, and was regarded by it as the only solution which offered any possibility for ultimate peace. While not intending that the principle of partition should stand or fall with its specific proposals, the Commission submitted a map on which the whole of Galilee, the Plain of Esdraelon and Jezreel and the Maritime Plain as far south as Isdud were allocated to the Jewish State. The greater part of Palestine to the south and east of this line would constitute the Arab area, to be united with Transjordan. Jerusalem and Bethlehem, with a corridor reaching the sea at Jaffa, and also Nazareth, would remain under British Mandate. 4.  The Partition (Woodhead) Commission, 1938, rejected the partition plan of the Royal Commission upon finding that the Jewish State contemplated by that plan, after certain modifications of the proposed frontier which its security would necessitate, would contain an Arab minority amounting to 49 per cent of the total population. The four commissioners could not, however, agree on any other partition scheme. One concluded that no form of partition was practicable. The chairman and another member recommended a plan according to which the Jewish State would have consisted of a strip of territory in the northern part of the Maritime Plain, approximately 75 kilometres in length, but restricted by an Arab enclave at Jaffa and a corridor connecting with the Mediterranean a Jerusalem enclave under Mandate. The Arab State would consist of the remainder of Palestine except Galilee and the sub-district of Beersheba, which would be administered by the mandatory until the Arab and Jewish populations could agree on their final destination. An essential feature of the plan was a customs union of the Arab State, the Jewish State and the territories under Mandate. The fourth member of the commission recommended

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the addition to the Jewish State proposed by the chairman and another member of the valleys of Esdraelon and Jezreel with lakes Huleh and Tiberias. 5.  The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1946, expressed the view that “now and for some time to come any attempt to establish either an independent Palestinian State or independent Palestinian States would result in civil strife such as might threaten the peace of the world.” This committee accordingly recommended that Palestine should continue to be administered under the Mandate pending the execution of a Trusteeship Agreement, and also recommended that the constitutional future of Palestine should be based on three principles: “i That Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew

in Palestine;

ii That Palestine shall be neither a Jewish State nor an Arab State;

iii That the form of government ultimately to be established shall,

under international guarantees, fully protect and preserve the interests in the Holy Land of Christendom and of the Moslem and Jewish faiths.” The concrete recommendations of the AngloAmerican Committee of Inquiry concerned the immediate future (revocation of the land transfer regulations of 1940 and authorization of 100,000 immigration certificates to be awarded in so far as possible in 1946). 6.  Plan for Provincial Autonomy, 1946: This plan (generally known as the Morrison plan) aimed at putting into effect the recommendation of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry “that Palestine shall be neither a Jewish State nor an Arab State.” The greater part of Palestine would be divided into an Arab province and a Jewish province, the latter including almost the entire area on which Jews had already settled, together with a considerable area between and around the settlements. Each province would have an elected legislature and an executive. Jerusalem and Bethlehem, together with the Negev, would remain under the direct control of the representative of the British Government acting as trustee for Palestine in virtue of a United Nations Trusteeship Agreement. The way was left open for future development, either towards an independent federal State or towards partition with the Arab and Jewish provinces becoming independent States whose boundaries could not be modified except by mutual consent. It was contemplated that the adoption of this plan would make it possible to admit immediately 100,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine, as the AngloAmerican Committee had recommended, and to continue immigration into the Jewish province, subject to the final control of the Central Government (the High Commissioner, assisted by his nominated Executive Council).

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7.  Cantonization Plan, 1947: This plan (generally known as the Bevin plan) provided for a five-year period of British trusteeship, with the object of preparing the country for independence. Areas of local administration would be so delimited as to include a substantial majority either of Jews or Arabs. Each area would enjoy a considerable measure of local autonomy. The High Commissioner would be responsible for protecting minorities. At the centre, he would endeavour to form a representative Advisory Council. At the end of four years, a Constitutional Assembly would be elected. If agreement was reached between a majority of the Arab representatives and a majority of the Jewish representatives in this Assembly, an independent State would be established. In the event of disagreement, the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations would be asked to advise upon future procedure. As regards immigration, the plan provided for the admission of 96,000 Jews during the first two years. Thereafter, the rate of entry would be determined by the High Commissioner in consultation with his Advisory Council. In the event of disagreement, the final decision would rest with an arbitration tribunal appointed by the United Nations.

Proposals submitted to the Committee 8.  Jewish Organizations. Most Jewish organizations in Palestine and abroad which submitted written or oral statements to the Special Committee agreed with the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Vaad Leumi in demanding the creation of a Jewish State. Divergencies exist between the organizations which demand that the whole of Palestine should become a Jewish State and those which would accept partition, provided the territory allotted to the Jewish State permitted the settlement of a large number of new immigrants. The opposition to the creation of a Jewish State is represented by a minority. In Palestine, the Ihud (Union) Association and the Hashomer Hatza’ir Workers’ Party are in favour of a “binational” State in which the two communities would have equal status and political parity. The Communist Party proposes a democratic Arab-Jewish State which might be binational or federative. In the United States, opposition to Zionism is voiced by the American Council for Judaism, which opposes proposals to establish a Jewish State. In its view, such proposals are a threat to the peace and security of Palestine and its surrounding area, are harmful to the Jews in Palestine and throughout the world, and are also undemocratic. 9.  The position of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, which represents the opinion of the majority of organized Jewry in the country, supports the programme defined by the last Congress of the Zionist Organization (Basle, 1947) as follows:

a That Palestine be established as a Jewish commonwealth integrated

in the structure of the democratic world;

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b That the gates of Palestine be opened to Jewish immigration;



c That the Jewish Agency be vested with the control of immigration

into Palestine and the necessary authority for the upbuilding of the country. 10.  As regards partition, the Political Survey 1946–7, submitted to the Committee by the Jewish Agency states on page 71: “. . . A solution on partition lines, if it is to be at all acceptable, can hardly be regarded as other than a pis aller. . . Any solution of the Palestine problem which may be proposed will be judged by the Jewish people by reference to whether it ensures largescale immigration and settlement and leads without delay to the establishment of the Jewish State.”

11.  The Arab States. The representatives of the Arab States at Beirut put forward much the same constitutional proposals for the future government of Palestine as those advanced by the Arab States’ delegations to the Palestine Conference at London in September 1946. In summary, those recommendations were:

a That Palestine should be a unitary State, with a democratic

constitution and an elected legislative assembly, b That the constitution should provide, inter alia, guarantees for (i) the sanctity of the Holy Places and, subject to suitable safeguards, freedom of religious practice in accordance with the status quo; (ii) full civil rights for all Palestine citizens, the naturalization requirement being ten years’ continuous residence in the country; (iii) protection of religious and cultural rights of the Jewish settlement, such safeguards to be altered only with the consent of the majority of the Jewish members in the legislative assembly, c That the constitution should provide also for (i) adequate representation in the legislative assembly of all important communities, provided that the Jews would in no case exceed one-third of the total number of members; (ii) the strict prohibition of Jewish immigration and the continuation of the existing restrictions on land transfer, any change in these matters requiring the consent of a majority of the Arab members of the legislative assembly; (iii) the establishment of a Supreme Court which would be empowered to determine whether any legislation was inconsistent with the constitution. 12.  The Arab plan envisaged that a constitution along these lines should be brought into being after a short period of transition under British Mandate.

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During the transition period, the High Commissioner would first establish, by nomination, a provisional government consisting of seven Arab and three Jewish ministers. The High Commissioner would retain a power of veto throughout the transition period. The provisional government would arrange for the election of a constituent assembly of sixty members, to which it would submit a draft constitution. If within six months the constituent assembly failed to agree on the constitution, the provisional government would enact it itself. When the constitution had been adopted, the first head of the independent Palestine State would be appointed, the Mandate would be terminated, and a treaty of alliance concluded between the United Kingdom and the State of Palestine. The plan should be completed with the least possible delay, notwithstanding the non-cooperation of any section of Palestine citizenry.

Recapitulation 13.  All the proposed solutions have aimed at resolving, in one manner or another, the Palestinian dilemma: the reconciliation of two diametrically opposed claims, each of which is supported by strong arguments, in a small country of limited resources, and in an atmosphere of great and increasing political and racial tension and conflicting nationalisms. 14.  Some of the solutions advanced have been more in the nature of palliatives than solutions. Confronted with the virtual certainty that no solution could ever be devised that would fully satisfy both conflicting parties, and probably not even one party except at the expense of determined opposition by the other, arrangements have at times been suggested such as the continuation of the Mandate or the establishment of a Trusteeship, which, in the nature of the case, could only be temporary. 15.  It is not without significance that only since the rise of Nazism to power in Germany, with the resultant mass movement of Jews to Palestine, has the Palestine question become sufficiently acute to require the devising of solutions outside the framework of the normal evolution of an “A” Mandate. Thus, all of the significant solutions devised for Palestine are of comparatively recent origin. 16.  Every practicable solution today, even the most extreme, is confronted with the actual fact that there are now in Palestine more than 1,200,000 Arabs and 600,000 Jews, who, by and large, are from different cultural milieux, and whose outlook, languages, religion and aspirations are separate. 17.  The most simple solutions, naturally enough, are the extreme solutions, by which is meant those which completely reject or ignore, or virtually so, the claims and demands of one or another party, while recognizing in full the claims of the other. The Special Committee has rejected such solutions.

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Chapter V Recommendations (I) Introductory Statement 1.  The Committee held a series of informal discussions during its deliberations in Geneva as a means of appraising comprehensively the numerous aspects of the Palestine problem. In these discussions the members of the Committee debated at length and in great detail the various proposals advanced for its solution. 2.  In the early stages of the discussions, it became apparent that there was little support for either of the solutions which would take an extreme position, namely, a single independent State of Palestine, under either Arab or Jewish domination. It was clear, therefore, that there was no disposition in the Committee to support in full the official proposals of either the Arab States or the Jewish Agency as described in Chapter IV of this report. It was recognized by all members that an effort must be made to find a solution which would avoid meeting fully the claims of one group at the expense of committing grave injustice against the other. 3.  At its forty-seventh meeting on 27 August 1947, the Committee formally rejected both of the extreme solutions. In taking this action the Committee was fully aware that both Arabs and Jews advance strong claims to rights and interests in Palestine, the Arabs by virtue of being for centuries the indigenous and preponderant people there, and the Jews by virtue of historical association with the country and international pledges made to them respecting their rights in it. But the Committee also realized that the crux of the Palestine problem is to be found in the fact that two sizeable groups, an Arab population of over 1,200,000 and a Jewish population of over 600,000, with intense nationalist aspirations, are diffused throughout a country that is arid, limited in area, and poor in all essential resources. It was relatively easy to conclude, therefore, that since both groups steadfastly maintain their claims, it is manifestly impossible, in the circumstances, to satisfy fully the claims of both groups, while it is indefensible to accept the full claims of one at the expense of the other. 4.  Following the rejection of the extreme solutions in its informal discussions, the Committee devoted its attention to the binational State and cantonal proposals. It considered both, but the members who may have been prepared to consider these proposals in principle were not impressed by the workability of either. It was apparent that the binational solution, though attractive in some of its aspects, would have little meaning unless provision were made for numerical or political parity between the two population

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groups, as provided for in the proposal of Dr J. L. Magnes. This, however, would require the inauguration of complicated mechanical devices which are patently artificial and of dubious practicality. 5.  The cantonal solution, under the existing conditions of Arab and Jewish diffusion in Palestine, might easily entail an excessive fragmentation of the governmental processes, and in its ultimate result, would be quite unworkable. 6.  Having thus disposed of the extreme solutions and the binational and cantonal schemes, the members of the Committee, by and large, manifested a tendency to move toward either partition qualified by economic unity, or a federal-State plan. In due course, the Committee established two informal working groups, one on partition under a confederation arrangement and one on the federal State, for the purpose of working out the details of the two plans, which in their final form are presented in Chapters VI and VII of this report, with the names of the members who supported them. 7.  As a result of the work done in these working groups, a substantial measure of unanimity with regard to a number of important issues emerged, as evidenced in the forty-seventh meeting of the Committee. On the basis of this measure of agreement, a drafting sub-committee was appointed to formulate specific texts. 8.  In the course of its forty-ninth meeting on 29 August 1947, the Committee considered the report of the drafting sub-committee, and unanimously approved eleven recommendations to the General Assembly, the texts of which are set forth in section A of this chapter. A twelfth recommendation, with which the representatives of Guatemala and Uruguay were not in agreement, appears in section B.

Section A. Recommendations approved unanimously Recommendation I. Termination of the Mandate It is recommended that The Mandate for Palestine shall be terminated at the earliest practicable date. Comment Among the reasons for this unanimous conclusion are the following:

a All directly interested parties—the mandatory Power, Arabs and

Jews—are in full accord that there is urgent need for a change

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in the status of Palestine. The mandatory Power has officially informed the Committee “that the Mandate has proved to be unworkable in practice, and that the obligations undertaken to the two communities in Palestine have been shown to be irreconcilable.” Both Arabs and Jews urge the termination of the mandate and the grant of independence to Palestine, although they are in vigorous disagreement as to the form that independence should take.

b The outstanding feature of the Palestine situation today, is found



c



d



e



f

in the clash between Jews and the mandatory Power on the one hand, and on the other the tension prevailing between Arabs and Jews. This conflict situation, which finds expression partly in an open breach between the organized Jewish settlement and the Administration and partly in organized terrorism and acts of violence, has steadily grown more intense and takes as its toll an ever-increasing loss of life and destruction of property. In the nature of the case, the Mandate implied only a temporary tutelage for Palestine. The terms of the Mandate include provisions which have proved contradictory in their practical application. It may be seriously questioned whether, in any event, the Mandate would now be possible of execution. The essential feature of the mandates system was that it gave an international status to the mandated territories. This involved a positive element of international responsibility for the mandated territories and an international accountability to the Council of the League of Nations on the part of each mandatory for the well being and development of the peoples of those territories. The Permanent Mandates Commission was created for the specific purpose of assisting the Council of the League in this function. But the League of Nations and the Mandates Commission have been dissolved, and there is now no means of discharging fully the international obligation with regard to a mandated territory other than by placing the territory under the International Trusteeship System of the United Nations. The International Trusteeship System, however, has not automatically taken over the functions of the mandates system with regard to mandated territories. Territories can be placed under Trusteeship only by means of individual Trusteeship Agreements approved by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. The most the mandatory could now do, therefore, in the event of the continuation of the Mandate, would be to carry out its

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administration, in the spirit of the Mandate, without being able to discharge its international obligations in accordance with the intent of the mandates system. At the time of the termination of the Permanent Mandates Commission in April 1946, the mandatory Power did, in fact, declare its intention to carry on the administration of Palestine, pending a new arrangement, in accordance with the general principles of the Mandate. The mandatory Power has itself now referred the matter to the United Nations.

Recommendation II. Independence It is recommended that Independence shall be granted in Palestine at the earliest practicable date. Comment

a Although sharply divided by political issues, the peoples of Palestine

are sufficiently advanced to govern themselves independently. b The Arab and Jewish peoples, after more than a quarter of a century of tutelage under the Mandate, both seek a means of effective expression for their national aspirations. c It is highly unlikely that any arrangement which would fail to envisage independence at a reasonably early date would find the slightest welcome among either Arabs or Jews.

Recommendation III. Transitional period It is recommended that There shall be a transitional period preceding the grant of independence in Palestine which shall be as short as possible, consistent with the achievement of the preparations and conditions essential to independence. Comment

a A transitional period preceding independence is clearly imperative.

It is scarcely conceivable, in view of the complicated nature of the Palestine problem, that independence could be responsibly granted without a prior period of preparation. b The importance of the transitional period is that it would be the period in which the governmental organization would have to be established, and in which the guarantees for such vital matters as

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the protection of minorities, and the safeguarding of the Holy Places and religious interests could be ensured. c A transitional period, however, would in all likelihood only serve to aggravate the present difficult situation in Palestine unless it were related to a specific and definitive solution which would go into effect immediately upon the termination of that period, and were to be of a positively stated duration, which, in any case, should not exceed a very few years.

Recommendation IV. United Nations responsibility during the transitional period It is recommended that During the transitional period the authority entrusted with the task of administering Palestine and preparing it for independence shall be responsible to the United Nations. Comment

a The responsibility for administering Palestine during the transitional

period and preparing it for independence will be a heavy one. Whatever the solution, enforcement measures on an extensive scale may be necessary for some time. The Committee is keenly aware of the central importance of this aspect of any solution, but has not felt competent to come to any conclusive opinion or to formulate any precise recommendations on this matter. b It is obvious that a solution which might be considered intrinsically as the best possible and most satisfactory from every technical point of view would be of no avail if it should appear that there would be no means of putting it into effect. Taking into account the fact that devising a solution which will be fully acceptable to both Jews and Arabs seems to be utterly impossible, the prospect of imposing a solution upon them would be a basic condition of any recommended proposal. c Certain obstacles which may well confront the authority entrusted with the administration during the transitional period make it desirable that a close link be established with the United Nations. d The relative success of the authority entrusted with the administration of Palestine during the transitional period in creating the proper atmosphere and in carrying out the necessary preparations for the assumption of independence will influence

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greatly the effectiveness of the final solution to be applied. It will be of the utmost importance to the discharge of its heavy responsibilities that, while being accountable to the United Nations for its actions in this regard, the authority concerned should be able to count upon the support of the United Nations in carrying out the directives of that body.

Recommendation V. Holy places and religious interests It is recommended that In whatever solution may be adopted for Palestine,

a The sacred character of the Holy Places shall be preserved and

access to the Holy Places for purposes of worship and pilgrimage shall be ensured in accordance with existing rights, in recognition of the proper interest of millions of Christians, Jews and Moslems abroad as well as the residents of Palestine in the care of sites and buildings associated with the origin and history of their faiths. b Existing rights in Palestine of the several religious communities shall be neither impaired nor denied, in view of the fact that their maintenance is essential for religious peace in Palestine under conditions of independence. c An adequate system shall be devised to settle impartially disputes involving religious rights as an essential factor in maintaining religious peace, taking into account the fact that during the Mandate such disputes have been settled by the Government itself, which acted as an arbiter and enjoyed the necessary authority and power to enforce its decisions. d Specific stipulations concerning Holy Places, religious buildings or sites and the rights of religious communities shall be inserted in the constitution or constitutions of any independent Palestinian State or States which may be created. Comment

a Palestine, as the Holy Land, occupies a unique position in the

world. It is sacred to Christian, Jew and Moslem alike. The spiritual interests of hundreds of millions of adherents of the three great monotheistic religions are intimately associated with its scenes and historical events. Any solution of the Palestine question should take into consideration these religious interests. b The safeguarding of the Holy Places, buildings and sites located in Palestine should be a condition to the grant of independence.

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Recommendation VI. Jewish displaced persons It is recommended that The General Assembly undertake immediately the initiation and execution of an international arrangement whereby the problem of the distressed European Jews, of whom approximately 250,000 are in assembly centers, will be dealt with as a matter of extreme urgency for the alleviation of their plight and of the Palestine problem. Comment

a The distressed Jews of Europe, together with the displaced

persons generally, are a legacy of the Second World War. They are a recognized international responsibility. Owing however to the insistent demands that the distressed Jews be admitted freely and immediately into Palestine, and to the intense urge which exists among these people themselves to the same end, they constitute a vital and difficult factor in the solution. b It cannot be doubted that any action which would ease the plight of the distressed Jews in Europe would thereby lessen the pressure of the Palestinian immigration problem, and would consequently create a better climate in which to carry out a final solution of the question of Palestine. This would be an important factor in allaying the fears of Arabs in the Near East that Palestine and ultimately the existing Arab countries are to be marked as the place of settlement for the Jews of the world. c The Committee recognizes that its terms of reference would not entitle it to devote its attention to the problem of the displaced persons as a whole. It realizes also that international action of a general nature is already under way with regard to displaced persons. In view of the special circumstances of the Palestine question, however, it has felt justified in proposing a measure which is designed to ameliorate promptly the condition of the Jewish segments of the displaced persons as a vital prerequisite to the settlement of the difficult conditions in Palestine.

Recommendation VII. Democratic principles and protection of minorities It is recommended that: In view of the fact that independence is to be granted in Palestine on the recommendation and under the auspices of the United Nations, it is a proper and an important concern of the United Nations that the constitution or

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other fundamental law as well as the political structure of the new State or States shall be basically democratic, i.e. representative, in character, and that this shall be a prior condition to the grant of independence. In this regard, the constitution or other fundamental law of the new State or States shall include specific guarantees respecting

a Human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of

worship and conscience, speech, press and assemblage, the rights of organized labor, freedom of movement, freedom from arbitrary searches and seizures, and rights of personal property; and b Full protection for the rights and interests of minorities, including the protection of the linguistic, religious and ethnic rights of the peoples and respect for their cultures, and full equality of all citizens with regard to political, civil and religious matters. Comment

a The wide diffusion of both Arabs and Jews throughout Palestine

makes it almost inevitable that, in any solution, there will be an ethnic minority element in the population. In view of the fact that these two peoples live physically and spiritually apart, nurture separate aspirations and ideals, and have widely divergent cultural traditions, it is important, in the interest of orderly society, and for the well-being of all Palestinians, that full safeguards be ensured for the rights of all. b Bearing in mind the unique position of Palestine as the Holy Land, it is especially important to protect the rights and interests of religious minorities.

Recommendation VIII. Peaceful relations It is recommended that It shall be required, as a prior condition to independence, to incorporate in the future constitutional provisions applying to Palestine those basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations whereby a State shall;

a Undertake to settle all international disputes in which it may be

involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered; and b Accept the obligation to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

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Comment

a A fundamental objective in the solution of the Palestine problem

is to achieve a reasonable prospect for the preservation of peaceful relations in the Middle East. b Taking into account the charged atmosphere in which the Palestine solution must be effected, it is considered advisable to emphasize the international obligations with regard to peaceful relations which an independent Palestine would necessarily assume.

Recommendation IX Economic unity It is recommended that In appraising the various proposals for the solution of the Palestine question, it shall be accepted as a cardinal principle that the preservation of the economic unity of Palestine as a whole is indispensable to the life and development of the country and its peoples. Comment

a It merits emphasis that the preservation of a suitable measure of

economic unity in Palestine, under any type of solution, is of the utmost importance to the future standards of public services, the standards of life of its peoples, and the development of the country. Were the country less limited in area and richer in resources, it would be unnecessary to lay such stress on the principle of economic unity. But there are sound grounds for the assumption that any action which would reverse the present policy of treating Palestine as an economic unit particularly with regard to such matters as customs, currency, transportation and communications and development projects, including irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation—would not only handicap the material development of the territory as a whole but would also bring in its wake a considerable hardship for important segments of the population. b Arab and Jewish communities alike would suffer from a complete severance of the economic unity of the country. Each of the two communities, despite the inevitable economic disruptions incident to the present state of affairs in Palestine, makes vital contributions to the economic life of the country, and there is a substantial degree of economic interdependence between them. c Despite the degree of separateness in the economic life of the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine, the fact that unity exists in

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essential economic matters contributes to the material well-being of both groups. If that economic unity were not maintained in essentials, people in all parts of the country would be adversely affected.

Recommendation X. Capitulations It is recommended that States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, be invited by the United Nations to renounce any right pertaining to them to the reestablishment of such privileges and immunities in an independent Palestine. Comment

a Article 9(1) of the Mandate for Palestine makes provision for

a judicial system which “shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete guarantee of their rights.” It is especially significant, in this regard, that article 8 of the Mandate did not abrogate consular jurisdiction and protection formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, but merely left them in abeyance during the Mandate. b On the termination of the Mandate, therefore, States having enjoyed such rights prior to the Mandate will be in a position to claim the re-establishment of capitulations in Palestine, and may demand, in particular, as a condition for waiving such right, the maintenance of a satisfactory judicial system. c The Committee takes the view that, since independence will be achieved in Palestine under the auspices of the United Nations, and subject to guarantees stipulated by the United Nations as a condition prior to independence, there should be no need for any State to re-assert its claim with respect to capitulations.

Recommendation XI. Appeal against acts of violence It is recommended that The General Assembly shall call on the peoples of Palestine to extend their fullest cooperation to the United Nations in its effort to devise and put into effect an equitable and workable means of settling the difficult situation prevailing there, and to this end, in the interest of peace, good order and lawfulness, to exert every effort to bring to an early end the acts of violence which have for too long beset that country.

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Comment

a The United Nations, being seized with the problem of Palestine,

should exert every proper effort to secure there a climate as congenial as possible to the application of a solution of the problem, both as regards the transitional and post-transitional periods. b The recurrent acts of violence, until very recently confined almost exclusively to underground Jewish organizations, are not only detrimental to the well-being of the country, but will also so augment the tension in Palestine as to render increasingly difficult the execution of the solution to be agreed upon by the United Nations.

Section B. Recommendation approved by substantial majority Recommendation XII. The Jewish problem in general (Two members of the Committee dissented from this recommendation and one recorded no opinion.) It is recommended that In the appraisal of the Palestine question, it be accepted as incontrovertible that any solution for Palestine cannot be considered as a solution of the Jewish problem in general. Comment

a Palestine is a country of limited area and resources. It already has a

considerable settled population which has an unusually high rate of natural increase. It is, therefore, most improbable that there could be settled in Palestine all the Jews who may wish to leave their present domiciles, for reasons of immediate displacement or distress, or actual or anticipated anti-Jewish attitudes in the countries in which they now reside. b In any case, owing to the factors of time, limited transportation, and local ability to absorb, it could not be anticipated that Palestine alone could relieve the urgent plight of all of the displaced and distressed Jews. c Further, serious account must be taken of the certain resentment and vigorous opposition of the Arabs throughout the Middle East to any

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attempt to solve, at what they regard as their expense, the Jewish problem, which they consider to be an international responsibility. d With regard to Jewish immigration into the Jewish areas of Palestine during the proposed transitional period, it is to be noted that provision for limited and controlled immigration during such period is made in both the partition and federal State proposals set forth in Chapters VI and VII respectively.

Chapter VI Recommendations (II) 1.  The Committee, sitting informally as a means of facilitating its deliberations on specific proposals, informally set up two small working groups to explore specific proposals with regard to a plan of partition involving economic union. One of these groups was known as the Working Group on Constitutional Matters; the other was the Working Group on Boundaries. 2.  The Working Group on Constitutional Matters (Mr Sandstorm, Mr Blom, Mr Granados, and Mr Rand), in a series of informal meetings formulated a plan of partition with provisions for economic unity and constitutional guarantees. This plan was subsequently discussed and completed in joint discussions of these two working groups. 3.  In the course of the forty-seventh meeting of the Committee on 27 August 1947, seven members of the Committee (Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay), expressed themselves, by recorded vote, in favour of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union, presented by the Working Group on Constitutional Matters. 4.  The Plan of Partition with Economic Union is herewith reproduced. It consists of the following three parts: Part I. Partition with economic union Part II. Boundaries Part III. City of Jerusalem

PART I. Plan of partition with economic union justification 1.  The basic premise underlying the partition proposal is that the claims to Palestine of the Arabs and Jews, both possessing validity, are irreconcilable,

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and that among all of the solutions advanced, partition will provide the most realistic and practicable settlement, and is the most likely to afford a workable basis for meeting in part the claims and national aspirations of both parties. 2.  It is a fact that both of these peoples have their historic roots in Palestine, and that both make vital contributions to the economic and cultural life of the country. The partition solution takes these considerations fully into account. 3.  The basic conflict in Palestine is a clash of two intense nationalisms. Regardless of the historic origins of the conflict, the rights and wrongs of the promises and counter promises and the international intervention incident to the Mandate, there are now in Palestine some 650,000 Jews and some 1,200,000 Arabs who are dissimilar in their ways of living and, for the time being, separated by political interests which render difficult full and effective political cooperation among them, whether voluntary or induced by constitutional arrangements. 4.  Only by means of partition can these conflicting national aspirations find substantial expression and qualify both peoples to take their places as independent nations in the international community and in the United Nations. 5.  The partition solution provides that finality which is a most urgent need in the solution. Every other proposed solution would tend to induce the two parties to seek modification in their favour by means of persistent pressure. The grant of independence to both States, however, would remove the basis for such efforts. 6.  Partition is based on a realistic appraisal of the actual Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine. Full political cooperation would be indispensable to the effective functioning of any single-State scheme, such as the federal State proposal, except in those cases which frankly envisage either an Arab or a Jewish-dominated State. 7.  Partition is the only means available by which political and economic responsibility can be placed squarely on both Arabs and Jews, with the prospective result that, confronted with responsibility for bearing fully the consequences of their own actions, a new and important element of political amelioration would be introduced. In the proposed federal-State solution, this factor would be lacking. 8.  Jewish immigration is the central issue in Palestine today and is the one factor, above all others, that rules out the necessary cooperation between the Arab and Jewish communities in a single State. The creation of a Jewish

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State under a partition scheme is the only hope of removing this issue from the arena of conflict. 9.  It is recognized that partition has been strongly opposed by Arabs, but it is felt that that opposition would be lessened by a solution which definitively fixes the extent of territory to be allotted to the Jews with its implicit limitation on immigration. The fact that the solution carries the sanction of the United Nations involves a finality which should allay Arab fears of further expansion of the Jewish State. 10.  In view of the limited area and resources of Palestine, it is essential that, to the extent feasible, and consistent with the creation of two independent States, the economic unity of the country should be preserved. The partition proposal, therefore, is a qualified partition, subject to such measures and limitations as are considered essential to the future economic and social wellbeing of both States. Since the economic self-interest of each State would be vitally involved, it is believed that the minimum measure of economic unity is possible, where that of political unity is not. 11.  Such economic unity requires the creation of an economic association by means of a treaty between the two States. The essential objectives of this association would be a common customs system, a common currency and the maintenance of a country-wide system of transport and communications. 12.  The maintenance of existing standards of social services in all parts of Palestine depends partly upon the preservation of economic unity, and this is a main consideration underlying the provisions for an economic union as part of the partition scheme. Partition, however, necessarily changes to some extent the fiscal situation in such a manner that, at any rate during the early years of its existence, a partitioned Arab State in Palestine would have some difficulty in raising sufficient revenue to keep up its present standards of public services. One of the aims of the economic union, therefore, is to distribute surplus revenue to support such standards. It is recommended that the division of the surplus revenue, after certain charges and percentage of surplus to be paid to the City of Jerusalem are met, should be in equal proportions to the two States. This is an arbitrary proportion but it is considered that it would be acceptable, that it has the merit of simplicity and that, being fixed in this manner, it would be less likely to become a matter of immediate controversy. Provisions are suggested whereby this formula is to be reviewed. 13.  This division of customs revenue is justified on three grounds: (1) The Jews will have the more economically developed part of the country embracing practically the whole of the citrus-producing area which includes a large number of Arab producers; (2) the Jewish State would, through the customs union, be guaranteed a larger free trade area for the sale of the

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products of its industry; (3) it would be to the disadvantage of the Jewish State if the Arab State should be in a financially precarious and poor economic condition. 14.  As the Arab State will not be in a position to undertake considerable development expenditure, sympathetic consideration should be given to its claims for assistance from international institutions in the way of loans for expansion of education, public health and other vital social services of a non-self-supporting nature. 15.  International financial assistance would also be required for any comprehensive irrigation schemes in the interest of both States, and it is to be hoped that constructive work by the Joint Economic Board will be made possible by means of international loans on favourable terms. [. . .]

Part II. Boundaries Definition The plan envisages the division of Palestine into three parts: an Arab State, a Jewish State and the City of Jerusalem. The proposed Arab State will include Western Galilee, the hill country of Samaria and Judea with the exclusion of the City of Jerusalem, and the coastal plain from Isdud to the Egyptian frontier. The proposed Jewish State will include Eastern Galilee, the Esdraelon plain, most of the coastal plain, and the whole of the Beersheba subdistrict, which includes the Negev. The three sections of the Arab State and the three sections of the Jewish State are linked together by two points of intersection, of which one is situated south-east of Afula in the sub-district of Nazareth and the other north-east of El Majdal in the sub-district of Gaza. [. . .]

Part III. City of Jerusalem Justification 1.  The proposal to place the City of Jerusalem under international trusteeship is based on the following considerations. 2.  Jerusalem is a Holy City for three faiths. Their shrines are side by side; some are sacred to two faiths. Hundreds of millions of Christians, Moslems and Jews throughout the world want peace, and especially religious peace,

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to reign in Jerusalem; they want the sacred character of its Holy Places to be preserved and access to them guaranteed to pilgrims from abroad. 3.  The history of Jerusalem, during the Ottoman regime as under the Mandate, shows that religious peace has been maintained in the City because the Government was anxious and had the power to prevent controversies involving some religious interest from developing into bitter strife and disorder. The Government was not intimately involved in local politics, and could, when necessary, arbitrate conflicts. 4.  Religious peace in Jerusalem is necessary for the maintenance of peace in the Arab and in the Jewish States. Disturbances in the Holy City would have far-reaching consequences, extending perhaps beyond the frontiers of Palestine. 5.  The application of the provisions relating to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in the whole of Palestine would also be greatly facilitated by the setting up of an international authority in Jerusalem. The Governor of the City would be empowered to supervise the application of such provisions and to arbitrate conflicts in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites. 6.  The International Trusteeship System is proposed as the most suitable instrument for meeting the special problems presented by Jerusalem, for the reason that the Trusteeship Council, as a principal organ of the United Nations, affords a convenient and effective means of ensuring both the desired international supervision and the political, economic and social well-being of the population of Jerusalem. [. . .]

Chapter VII Recommendations (III) 1.  In the course of the informal meetings of the Committee to explore solutions, a working group was set up to deal with the federal-State proposal. 2.  The Working Group in the Federal State Solution (Sir Abdul Rahman, Mr Entezam, Mr Simic, and Mr Atyeo) formulated a comprehensive proposal along these lines and it was voted upon and supported by three members (India, Iran and Yugoslavia) at the forty-seventh meeting of the Committee on 27 August 1947. 3.  The federal-State plan is herewith reproduced.

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Plan for a Federal-State Justification for the federal-State solution 1.  It is incontrovertible that any solution for Palestine cannot be considered as a solution of the Jewish problem in general. 2.  It is recognized that Palestine is the common country of both indigenous Arabs and Jews, that both these peoples have had a historic association with it, and that both play vital roles in the economic and cultural life of the country. 3.  This being so, the objective is a dynamic solution which will ensure equal rights for both Arabs and Jews in their common State, and which will maintain that economic unity which is indispensable to the life and development of the country. 4.  The basic assumption underlying the views herein expressed is that the proposal of other members of the Committee for a union under artificial arrangements designed to achieve essential economic and social unity after first creating political and geographical disunity by partition, is impracticable, unworkable, and could not possibly provide for two reasonably viable States. 5.  Two basic questions have been taken into account in appraising the feasibility of the federal-State solution, viz., (a) whether Jewish nationalism and the demand for a separate and sovereign Jewish State must be recognized at all costs, and (b) whether a will to cooperate in a federal State could be fostered among Arabs and Jews. To the first, the answer is in the negative, since the well-being of the country and its peoples as a whole is accepted as outweighing the aspirations of the Jews in this regard. To the second, the answer is in the affirmative, as there is a reasonable chance, given proper conditions, to achieve such cooperation. 6.  It would be a tragic mistake on the part of the international community not to bend every effort in this direction. Support for the preservation of the unity of Palestine by the United Nations would in itself be an important factor in encouraging cooperation and collaboration between the two peoples, and would contribute significantly to the creation of that atmosphere in which the will to cooperate can be cultivated. In this regard, it is realized that the moral and political prestige of the United Nations is deeply involved. 7.  The objective of a federal-State solution would be to give the most feasible recognition to the nationalistic aspirations of both Arabs and Jews, and to merge them into a single loyalty and patriotism which would find expression in an independent Palestine.

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8.  The federal State is also in every respect the most democratic solution, both as regards the measures required for its implementation and in its operation, since it requires no undemocratic economic controls, avoids the creation of national minority groups, and affords an opportunity for full and effective participation in representative government to every citizen of the State. This solution would be most in harmony with the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 9.  The federal-State solution would permit the development of patterns of government and social organization in Palestine which would be more harmonious with the governmental and social patterns in the neighbouring States. 10.  Such a solution would be the one most likely to bring to an end the present economic boycotts, to the benefit of the economic life of the country. 11.  Future peace and order in Palestine and the Near East generally will be vitally affected by the nature of the solution decided upon for the Palestine question. In this regard, it is important to avoid an acceleration of the separatism which now characterizes the relations of Arabs and Jews in the Near East, and to avoid laying the foundations of a dangerous irredentism there, which would be the inevitable consequences of partition in whatever form. A Federal State solution, therefore, which in the very nature of the case must emphasize unity and cooperation, will best serve the interests of peace. 12.  It is a fact of great significance that very few, if any, Arabs, are in favour of partition as a solution. On the other hand, a substantial number of Jews, backed by influential Jewish leaders and organizations, are strongly opposed to partition. Partition both in principle and in substance can only be regarded as an anti-Arab solution. The Federal State, however, cannot be described as an anti-Jewish solution. To the contrary, it will best serve the interests of both Arabs and Jews. 13.  A federal State would provide the greatest opportunity for ameliorating the present dangerous racial and religious divisions in the population, while permitting the development of a more normal social structure. 14.  The federal State is the most constructive and dynamic solution in that it eschews an attitude of resignation towards the question of the ability of Arabs and Jews to cooperate in their common interest, in favour of a realistic and dynamic attitude, namely, that under changed conditions the will to co-operate can be cultivated. 15.  A basis for the assumption that cooperation between the Arab and Jewish communities is not impossible is found in the fact that, even under

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the ­existing highly unfavourable conditions, the Committee did observe in Palestine instances of effective and fruitful cooperation between the two communities. 16.  While it may be doubted whether the will to cooperate is to be found in the two groups under present conditions, it is entirely possible that if a federal solution were firmly and definitively imposed, the two groups, in their own self-interest, would gradually develop a spirit of cooperation in their common State. There is no basis for an assumption that these two peoples cannot live and work together for common purposes once they realize that there is no alternative. Since, under any solution, large groups of them would have to do so, it must either be taken for granted that cooperation between them is ­possible or it must be accepted that there is no workable solution at all. 17.  Taking into account the limited area available and the vital importance of maintaining Palestine as an economic and social unity, the federal-State solution seems to provide the only practical and workable approach. [. . .]

Reactions to the UNSCOP Report Letter from Mr David Ben-Gurion to Paula Ben-Gurion, 2 September 194710 Dear Paula, Yesterday we received the [UN] committee’s full report. I will not write about its content, since a summary must have been published in the newspapers. The meeting of the executive committee, which should have ended yesterday, is still going on. I demanded that the executive committee react immediately to the [UN] committee’s proposal, to tell the Jewish people, and the world, what our current stance is. I formulated a series of proposals, and after they were examined, amended and abbreviated in the sub-committee they were adopted by the directorate and no doubt will be adopted by the executive committee. I wanted us to receive a clear mandate to do everything to make the majority proposal become fact. We should say this without cries of victory and without giving the impression

10 Original Hebrew text published in Yehoshua Freundlich (ed.), Political Documents of the Jewish Agency, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Hasifriya Haziyonit, 1996–1998), pp. 618–19. We are grateful to the National Archives in general and to Dr Freundlich in particular for referring us to this item and for permission to publish it.

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that the majority proposal is a Jewish proposal. Especially important and pressing is the need to condemn the hypocrisy of the minority proposals with their anti-Zionist and reactionary character. Even the minority offers, on the face of it, “a Jewish state”—probably in order to satisfy the requirements of Gromyko’s speech, which recognized the right of the Jewish people to a state. But this “state” does not represent the fulfillment of the [White?] Paper—in effect an Arab State throughout all the country, a guarantee of an Arab majority, the prevention of Jewish Aliyah, and a prohibition against Jews settling in most of the territory of the federate state. The minority makes much use of the phraseology of Hashomer Hatza’ir and Magnes, but only to disguise the anti-Zionism inherent in their proposals for action. More than once have I warned the people from Hashomer Hatza’ir that the gentiles would adopt only the negative aspects of their statements—the arguments against a Jewish state, and not the Zionist content which they try to insert into their formula for a bi-national state, and this is exactly what has happened; and in my opinion it is very important to expose public opinion to the nationalist content of the minority proposals. We do not know if the Yugoslavian delegate did what he did by order of Moscow or on his own initiative. If Moscow is behind these propositions then it is a very grave matter. Perhaps we will find out in the UN General Assembly. But the principal question is this: what is and what will be America’s position—here a great degree of concern is warranted. Silver’s statement before he left for the executive committee meeting, that America still supports the Jewish state, was made frivolously, and in my speech in the executive committee I expressed my anxiety with respect to the attitude of the American government. On this matter America means one person— Marshall, the Secretary of State. To the extent that I know something about him, he is an extraordinary individual—both intellectually and morally. An independent person, serious; not a “politician.” He weighs and considers every issue separately after extensive review, knowledgeably and with comprehensive information, like a highly responsible military leader. Without America’s active and reliable assistance the majority proposals do not have, in my opinion, any chance of receiving a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, or of getting adopted at all. The British Foreign Ministry will no doubt be hostile to the majority proposal, even though they are not demanding the immediate liquidation of British rule and the immediate evacuation of the British Army. Bevin is insane with hatred for the Jews and the Zionists. Foreign Ministry officials will no doubt do everything possible to thwart the majority plan. Their strength and abilities are not insignificant, despite the crisis that England is undergoing. And it is only with America’s energetic intervention that there is a chance that the majority plan will be adopted and come to

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fruition, since a General Assembly resolution by itself will not be enough. Clearly England will [not]11 want to execute this plan, and will not do so without America’s assistance and guarantee, even if someone besides Bevin should head the Foreign Ministry. Will America help? That is the question. I have serious misgivings about this issue, and nonetheless—we must now make every effort in order to receive this assistance. The realization of the majority plan—with all of its shortcomings—this will truly be a “beginning of the redemption” (atchaltah de’geulah), and even more than a beginning. But whatever the fate of the plan in the General Assembly and afterwards— there is enormous importance in the very fact of the plan’s adoption by an international committee, and this importance is two-fold: (1) the declaration of a Jewish state; (2) the offer of all of the Negev for the Jewish state. Even the proposal about Aliyah contains an affirmation which is not insignificant. There is also a difficult flaw in the majority proposals—not only the removal of Jerusalem and the Western Galilee—but also the proposal that the Land Transfer Regulation should be revoked only in the territory allocated to the Jews. The perpetuation of the Land Transfer Regulation in any part of the country represents an international legitimization of this racist discrimination against us. The plan as a whole, however, is a moral victory (for we still are far from a practical victory, and perhaps very far!) for Zionism. I can imagine the celebrations and I have been assured that there was celebration in all the kibbutzim of Hashomer Hatza’ir and among the members of Faction B, but I fear that there may be too much celebration—because to date, this is only a UN proposal. What will the General Assembly decide? And if they make a resolution, what will be the fate of that resolution? The distance to practical victory is great. In any event, our circumstances have not been hurt by this committee. But now there is a need to be vigilant, more so than up until now. . . I will only leave for Paris tomorrow. The executive committee session will apparently be finished today, and the directorate will convene throughout the night. I will only be in Paris for four days, and next Monday (8 September) I will fly from Geneva to Lod. I hope to find you safe and in good health. Hannah Sneh is still looking for a gown for you—as of yet she still has not found one. Be well, kisses.

The original does not contain this negation, but we were convinced that it was necessary to make the sentence comprehensible.

11

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Letter from Mr Moshe Shertok to Golda Meyerson, 7 September 194712 [. . .] 1. As I wired you at the time, a bitter quarrel has been raging among the members of the majority in the committee, in the last few days before they finish, regarding borders. From the beginning five of them had established an affirmative position with respect to including the Galilee (Uruguay, Guatemala, Canada, Holland and the Chairman). We had some grounds for hoping that the Czech13 would join them, but he proved indecisive, failed to take a stand, retracted positions taken earlier, and in general was unsympathetic and unpleasant, and it was only on the very last day that his affirmative stance took form—perhaps under the influence of explicit directions from Masaryk,14 whom Goldmann had called in Prague. Of these five, the first three also demanded the inclusion of most of the Northern Negev. At first it had been their inclination not to grant us all of the “desert triangle,” so as not to inflate the territory of the Jewish state unnecessarily, and this led them to the idea of removing the shore of the Dead Sea altogether from the Jewish state, and annexing the shore strip either to the international region or to the Arab state for the sake of continuity. Opposing them, the other two (the chairman and Blom) never even leaned towards giving us the Negev—according to one version they did not intend at that stage to give us anything at all from the Negev, but it is possible that this was a bargaining position and nothing more. At the same stage the Peruvian,15 after whom it seemed as if the Australian16 was dragged, requested that we be given in the Galilee only the Hula region, and at a certain point these two sought to take from us the Galilee in its entirety—we were to transfer even the Hula to the Arab state (such was one of the British plans submitted to the committee, and there it was said that Syria—Syria and not Lebanon!—would be pleased to receive into its control the whole of the Galilee!), but once again it is possible that this was nothing more than a bargaining position. The Peruvian at that point was prepared to grant us more of the Negev than Sandstrom-Blom.17 In sum, it seemed possible then that three territorial plans for the Jewish state would be submitted to the UN: the maximum from the first trio, and two different minimum plans from the other two pairs. This was a Original text published in Y. Heller, The Struggle for the Jewish State (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1984), pp. 525–9 [Hebrew]. Source: The Central Zionist Archive S25/5991. 13 Karel Lisický, member of UNSCOP representing Czechoslovakia. 14 Jan Masaryk, Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia. 15 Enrico Salazar, member of UNSCOP representing Peru. 16 John L. Hood, member of UNSCOP representing Australia. 17 Emil Sandstrom, Chairman of UNSCOP and representative of Sweden. Nikolaas Blom, representative of Holland. 12

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very discouraging prospect, since a breakdown with respect to the practical side of the partition plan would have undermined the beginning stages of the theoretical side and placed live ammunition in the hands of every enemy of the plan, internal or external. Nonetheless we had a very difficult choice to make—whether to push for a compromise in order to receive a consensus plan for the majority, or to support the trio and to insist on the maximum, so that in the subsequent battle in the General Assembly we could rely on the fact that the largest group had decided to give us both the Galilee and the Negev. We considered and dithered much, and made endless consultations by telephone with Zurich (this was after I had returned from Zurich to Geneva, mostly because they informed me where things stood and insisted that I leave the executive committee with its political committee and that I come). In the end I decided—to an extent against some of the opinions voiced in Zurich—that it was worth trying for a compromise on the condition that it not be too costly; that is—it would be advisable to pay some price for a consensus proposal, but not any price; if it becomes clear that the price is too high, then we should become adamant, even if this causes a disintegration of the majority on the subject of territory. In the meantime there have been changes and we are starting from scratch. On the one hand the path is open for our two Latin friends18 to influence their Peruvian comrade to come closer to their position. On the other hand the stance of the chairman, the Dutchman and the Czech vis-à-vis the affirmation of the Galilee has been upset: they have begun to withdraw from this position all along the front line. At the same time the Guatemalan came along with the proposal to give up some of the Galilee in order to preserve most of it, along with some bonus in the Negev: the plan had been to give up the hilly part of the Galilee south of the Acre-Safed Road so that it would include Nazareth and Acre and would connect with the Arab state south of the valley by means of a narrow corridor somewhere east of Haifa; the hilly region north of the Acre-Safed Road, up to the northern border, including the Nahariyah District—for us; in the Negev we would receive the western portion of the northern territory, until but not including Beersheba. I reluctantly approved this compromise plan with a heavy heart. I will not tire you with additional details about the upheavals which have taken place in the past two days. I have returned in the meantime to Zurich in order to deliver a more detailed report in the directorate on the state of things, and to peek in on the political committee. Indeed, upon my return the next day to Geneva I found a dramatic turn of events: the seven parties had reached a compromise which left the vast majority of the mountainous Galilee with the western shore line to the Arab state and granted all of the Negev, north and south, including the town of Beersheba, to us. There remained two objections: that of the Uruguayan with regard to the Nahariyah-Hanitah

The representatives of Guatemala and Uruguay.

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District on the one hand and with regard to Beersheba on the other (in order to avoid being accused of partiality he sought to defend the city of Beersheba from the Jewish state); and that of the Czech, who demanded that the question of the fate of the Western Galilee be delegated to the General Assembly (right from the beginning he had avoided joining the haphazard coalition of five in favor of including the whole Galilee in our state; afterwards he explicitly joined with those who opposed the idea; and now, at the final stage, he has objected to the compromise precisely on these grounds—God knows the secrets of his reversals—perhaps Jan’s rebuke from afar did some good). In shaping the final form of the partition map, the intransigence of Mohn (the Swedish alternate) played a significant role. It seems to me that effective devices against enclaves and corridors were implemented mostly on account of his influence. He solved the question of corridors by the introduction of the “crossing point”: . . . there are two such crossings: one near Ashdod and one near Afula. As for “enclaves”—he prevented them by means of annexation (or by not annexing, depending on the point of view). Through the application of this principle, Jaffa was included in the Jewish state and Nahariyah District in the Arab state. I am sending you a map which was prepared for us by the Uruguayan secretary, whose name is Sisto, and who is an engineer by profession. This map is still not exact. A more explicit map is currently being prepared and will be sent to us in New York. But it seems to me that from this sketch which I am sending to you now, you will get a clearer picture of what is intended than that which you have had up until now. I have checked the map with Herzfeld and we have collected a list of points that remain outside the border—their number is about thirty. Elias19 has speculated that the inclusion of Jaffa and the contiguity of the Jewish state to Egypt were traps intentionally planted in order to provoke more vigorous Arab resistance and to torpedo the plan. I must state that, to the extent that the considerations which came into play on the inside and the sequence of events which took place in the discussions are clear to us, there is no basis for this theory. 2. Another important point which demands explanation is the recommendations clause which requires a referral to the UN General Assembly in the event that one state is willing to sign the treaty but the other refuses—or to be more exact: one territory is prepared to take on independence and the other territory is not. Right at the outset there was a proposal to establish that in such a case the Mandate rule continues in the region which is not ready for independence and it is the Mandate government which is signatory to the treaty with the region which is ready, in order not to delay its independence. But here with regard to this proposal there took place a strange turn of events. It was specifically our Latin American

Eliyahu Sasson.

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friends, out of their resistance to England, who suggested denying England a pretext for continuing its hold on the country indefinitely. There is no guarantee, of course, that other parties who assisted in this alteration did not understand the loophole being made here. In effect it is clear that this clause, as it is currently phrased, enables the sabotage of the entire plan by refusal to cooperate, procrastination and appeals. 3. I feel myself exempt from the need to repeat here all of the self-evident premises regarding the extraordinary achievement of the majority report, with all of its shortcomings; or on the other hand to reiterate the slim chances for its successful implementation given the position of England and the United States. I do not however feel myself exempt from celebrating the extraordinary efforts of our people, and of two of them in particular: Dolik and Moshe Tof.20 There is no doubt that criticisms of Dolik21 will make their way to Jerusalem: he is reckless, quick to admit defeat, speaks his mind too much, usurps authority, etc. In all of these there is a kernel of truth and much exaggeration. There is no question that he needs to be reigned in and guided, because he is capable of “taking off” in whatever direction seems right to him. But his deficiencies are negligible alongside his exceptional good qualities: his formidable dynamism, his attentiveness and flexibility in excess of all human ability—a vigilance which does not let up even for a moment for days and nights on end, his rapid adjustment to any complication, his penetration to and pursuit of the essential, his ability to adapt to people and to exploit every opportunity to impress upon them what is required. The great conquest which is to his credit is Rand,22 who trusted him completely and was greatly subject to his influence. In three ways we won this man over: by what he saw of the country with his own eyes, by his own conscience, and through the influence of Dolik H. over him. The conversion of this old man was important beyond all estimation, because he immeasurably strengthened the extreme Zionist branch, by adding to these two exceptional Latin Americans the authority and gravitas of a man of the British Empire, and in the end it was he who served as the liaison between this branch and the Chairman Blom-Lisický-Salazar group. As for Moshe Tof, it is simply difficult for us to imagine what our situation would be like without him. His quiet pioneer passion is admirable. He served us as an electrified telegraph line and worked without rest; it was only through him that we knew, day and night, about every movement which took place and could, morning, evening and noon, take account of the state of affairs and direct our briefings and reactions accordingly. In general, there has never been a committee to which we had such access to its members and secretaries, to such an extent that we got so much inside

Moshe Tov, of the political department of the Jewish Agency—expert on Latin America. David Horowitz. 22 The Canadian representative. 20 21

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information regarding what was going on behind the scenes. Indeed, in the last two weeks direct communication with the members of the committee has become very difficult; nevertheless, there is no comparison between the connection this time and the network of relations with the AngloAmerican Committee or, even more so, with the Peel Commission. With respect to attaining materials—real materials—miracles took place, thanks to Gideon,23 as well as to Kahani,24 and especially to some anonymous individuals . . .

Memorandum by the British secretary of state for foreign affairs, Ernest Bevin, 18 September 194725 Palestine, C.P.(47)259 Top Secret [. . .] 8.  The majority proposal is so manifestly unjust to the Arabs that it is difficult to see how, in Sir Alexander Cadogan’s words, “we could reconcile it with our conscience”. There are also strong reasons of expediency for declining the responsibility for giving effect to this proposal. The attempt to do so would precipitate an Arab rising in Palestine which would have the moral approval of the entire Moslem world and would be more or less actively supported by the neighbouring Arab States. The Chiefs of Staff state that, in this situation, reinforcements amounting to not less than one division would have to be sent to the Middle East. 9.  The long-term political and strategic consequences would be more serious than the immediate military problem. We should be engaged in suppressing Arab resistance in Palestine, and thus antagonizing the independent Arab States, at a time when our whole political and strategic system in the Middle East must be founded on co-operation with those States. The treaty rights which would probably be accorded to us by the Jewish State would be poor compensation for the loss of Arab goodwill and with it of our prospect of establishing that firm strategic hold on the Middle East which is an indispensable part of Commonwealth defence policy. 10.  In answer to these considerations it might at first sight be argued that, once the operation of partition was completed, we could rely on time to heal

Rufer (Rafael). Moshe Kahani, from the political department of the Jewish Agency. 25 Joseph Heller, The Struggle for the Jewish State: Zionist Politics, 1936–1948 (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1984), pp. 529–33 [Hebrew]. Source: British Foreign Office Files, The Royal British Archives, Public Record Office FO/371/41879/E8773. 23 24

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the wound, so that after an interval Anglo-Arab relations would no longer be affected. This, however, would be an unduly optimistic forecast. It would probably not be long before the Jewish Government, faced as it would be in the course of time with a problem of over-population and driven by the ultra-nationalist political parties which will not accept partition as a final settlement, would try to expand its frontiers. If Jewish irredentism is likely to develop after an interval, Arab irredentism is certain from the outset. Partition would establish a miniature State, under a Jewish Government but with a relatively very large Arab minority, entirely surrounded by Arab territory. It seems reasonable to suppose that the Arab population of this State would play a part in history not unlike that of the Sudeten German minority in pre-war Czechoslovakia. Thus the existence of a Jewish State might prove to be a constant factor of unrest in the ­Middle East, and this could hardly fail to have a damaging effect on Anglo-Arab relations. 11.  It is suggested, in the plan under consideration, that other Governments might be associated with His Majesty’s Government in carrying out partition. Even if this were possible, which seems doubtful, it would not greatly affect the issue. On a short view, Arab sympathies would be no less alienated from Great Britain. And on a long view, British interests more than any others would suffer from the new element of discord introduced into Middle Eastern politics.

Enforcement of an alternative plan of partition 12.  The principle of partition is distinct from any particular application of it, and adjustments could be made in the map proposed by the majority of the Committee which would, principally by reducing the size of the Arab minority in the Jewish State, eliminate much of the injustice of the present plan. But these adjustments would have to be very substantial indeed before they had any appreciable effect on the Arab reaction to partition. And long before that point was reached they would provoke a Jewish refusal to accept it. Now that the appetite of their followers has been whetted by the majority plan, the Zionist leaders cannot accept much less. 13.  Thus, if the Assembly were to adopt partition in a form intrinsically more just than that now proposed, the probable result would be that any Power attempting to give effect to it would be faced simultaneously with an Arab rising and large-scale Jewish terrorism. This would create the most difficult of all possible situations in the short run. Nor would the revision of the boundaries of the Jewish State greatly affect the long-term consequences of its establishment. A Jewish Government would not be able to regulate immigration in accordance with a realistic assessment of their territory’s economic absorptive capacity. The desire for expansion might develop earlier if the Jewish State occupied a smaller area and would be felt more strongly if the Jews were dissatisfied with the frontiers.

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Enforcement of the minority plan 14.  Despite their objections to the minority proposal for a federal State, primarily on the ground that it does not altogether close the door to eventual partition, the Arabs might be persuaded to acquiesce in this solution. To the Jews on the other hand it is totally unacceptable. An attempt to give effect to it would therefore be followed by an intensification of Jewish terrorism. On these assumptions the Chiefs of Staff consider that no reinforcements would be needed; in view, however, of the planned run-down of our forces in the Middle East, a point would shortly be reached at which the necessary strength could be maintained only at the expense of some other commitment. 15.  The main difficulty, however, in the way of the minority plan is that, since it involves the willing co-operation of the two peoples, it is not capable of being enforced. Many details in this plan are borrowed from the two sets of proposals which His Majesty’s Government successfully laid before the Palestine Conference in London last winter. But it was assumed at that time that the proposals would not be practicable unless they received some measure of consent from both Arabs and Jews. 16.  It therefore seems probable that, if the Assembly were to adopt the minority plan, any Power accepting the responsibility for giving effect to it would not obtain a sufficient measure of co-operation and would thus be unable to extricate itself from Palestine after the three year period of transition.

Withdrawal from Palestine 17.  It appears from the preceding paragraphs that grave disadvantages would follow from a decision by His Majesty’s Government to undertake the task of carrying out any of the three solutions which the Assembly may be expected to consider. If these disadvantages are held to preclude acceptance of responsibility for any of the three solutions, His Majesty’s Government must be prepared for an alternative course of action. This would be equally necessary in the somewhat similar situation which would be created by a failure of the Assembly to carry any resolution whatever by the necessary two-thirds majority. 18.  The present situation in Palestine is intolerable and cannot be allowed to continue. His Majesty’s Government have themselves failed to devise any settlement which would enable them to transfer their authority to a Government representing the inhabitants of the country. If the Assembly should fail, or if it were to propose a settlement for which His Majesty’s Government could not accept responsibility, the only remaining course would be to withdraw from Palestine, in the last resort unconditionally.

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19.  The threat of British withdrawal within a specified time, coupled with an offer to assist in giving effect to any agreement reached between the Arabs and the Jews before our departure, might conceivably have the result of inducing them to co-operate in order to avoid the otherwise inevitable civil war. But a withdrawal, if decided upon, should not be made conditional on such an agreement. 20.  Withdrawal in the absence of Arab-Jewish agreement has disadvantages which should not be underestimated. There would be an interval between the announcement of our intention to withdraw and the actual withdrawal, an interval in which the task of the Administration might be more difficult than in any previous period. In the absence of a Government to which power could be transferred, the consequences of our evacuation would be unpredictable. Some or all of the Arab States would probably become involved in the resulting disorders; they might even quarrel among themselves over the country’s future. In any event it is likely that the situation would before long be brought to the attention of the Security Council. 21.  On the other hand our withdrawal from Palestine, even if it had to be effected at the cost of a period of bloodshed and chaos in the country, would have two major advantages. British lives would not be lost, nor British resources expended, in suppressing one Palestinian community for the advantage of the other. And (at least as compared with enforcing the majority plan or a variant of it) we should not be pursuing a policy destructive of our own interests in the Middle East. 22.  If we were to leave Palestine in this way we should no doubt be accused by both Jews and Arabs of having failed to fulfil our obligations to them, deriving from the Mandate or from general principles of political justice. The force of the accusation, however, would be greatly weakened by:

i the record of our repeated efforts to arrive at a settlement;



ii our offer to stand aside and allow the United Nations to implement

a policy; iii our offer to abide by and facilitate any agreement arrived at by the

Arabs and Jews themselves. We cannot permit ourselves to be kept in Palestine indefinitely by the fear of this accusation. We have already stated, in the document which we presented to the London Conference last February, that “His Majesty’s Government are not prepared to continue indefinitely to govern Palestine themselves merely because Arabs and Jews cannot agree upon the means of sharing its government between them”. It should also be remembered that each of the other suggested policies would expose us to the same charge from either Jews or Arabs.

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Recommendations 23.  Once it has been decided that, failing a satisfactory settlement, we are determined to withdraw British Forces and British administration from Palestine in the near future, we should clearly announce this intention in such a way as to derive the maximum possible advantage from it. Nothing short of an announcement of our determination to withdraw rather than to carry out an unacceptable policy will induce a sense of realism and offer a prospect of a settlement. With this end in view, it should be made clear at an early stage in the Assembly that our minds are made up. [. . .] 24.  There is a chance that the effect of this announcement may be sufficient to produce a solution (either by a recommendation of the Assembly or by direct agreement between the Arabs and the Jews) for which His Majesty’s Government would feel justified in accepting responsibility. 25.  We must however be prepared, should there be no prospect of this when the present Assembly ends, to make a further statement announcing the date on which British Forces and the Civil Administration would be withdrawn from Palestine. In making this statement, we should also renew our offer of British assistance to the Arabs and Jews for the purpose of facilitating any settlement on which they were able to reach agreement before we left the country. Ernest.Bevin Foreign Office, S.W.1.

Speeches at the United Nations Address of Faris Bey El Khouri (Syria) to the General Assembly26 The General Assembly in this session is seized with the problem of Palestine, by virtue of the report of the Special Committee constituted during the recent special session. For this purpose, my delegation, being primarily concerned with this subject because of the fact that Palestine is an integral part of Syria, may be allowed to dwell on this point. I feel obliged to explain to the General Assembly in this general debate the attitude of the Syrian Government and

United Nations, “Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly,” Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, 16.9.1947, vol. 2, 110th–128th Meetings, Lake Success, New York, pp. 195–203.

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people regarding the report of the Special Committee, reserving the right of expanding on the details in the proper Committee. As a first step, I venture to make a brief analysis of the recommendations presented by seven of the members of the Special Committee, to which the senior representative of the United States of America referred in his speech as worthy of being given “great weight” by the Government of the United States. I do not think he meant that his delegation must necessarily give full support to these recommendations, but in view of such a statement, I feel it appropriate that the General Assembly should be acquainted with the view of my delegation in this regard. We consider these recommendations are not in conformity with the terms of reference of the Special Committee nor with the Covenant of the League of Nations, nor with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, nor with the principles of justice, nor with the facts of history and the principles of public rights. The proposal recommended the partition of Palestine into two separate States, granting the lion’s share to the Jews and depriving the rightful owners of the country of their homeland. The majority go so far, in their proposal, as to prepare a draft basis for a constitution, treaties and legislative bills to be forcibly imposed on the people of Palestine. We cannot give weight to such recommendations, they violate one of the fundamental principles of the Charter—namely, the right of selfdetermination of peoples. This right of determining their fate and regime of government should belong to them alone, as well as the right to determine their relations with others. In its terms of reference, the Special Committee was instructed by the General Assembly to study the question of Palestine in all its phases. One of these phases is the legal aspect, which should have been considered the most important, along with the political, social and economic aspects. The Arab States, as well as several other delegations, raised this legal issue before the First Committee and before the General Assembly. They contested the legality of the Balfour Declaration and the exceptional terms of the Palestine Mandate. They emphasized the contradictory nature of these terms and their violation of and contradiction to the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as to international law and the sacred rights of peoples. They presented substantial arguments to prove their points. But the First Committee did not consider this legal aspect at all. It gave it no attention. It overlooked the question of the illegality of the document which gave birth to this problem. The Committee restricted its efforts to dealing only with the symptoms of the disease rather than with its causes. Had it not been for that Mandate and its exceptional terms and stipulations, and the extravagant imperialist ambitions of the First World War victors, Palestine would have remained as it used to be for centuries, a province of Syria.

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Moreover, the Special Committee did not confine its liberality towards the Jews within the terms of the Mandate, but went much further, bestowing upon them a sovereign State instead of a national home, which was all that was provided for in the Mandate. Its members took the liberty of giving the term “national home” much wider scope than was intended and interpreted by the authors of the Declaration and the authors of the Mandate themselves. The term “national home” was never construed to mean a sovereign State. The Arabs revolted against the idea of the national home, which was made possible only by the invasion of their fatherland and the settlement upon their soil of foreign immigrants under the protection of the bayonets and armed forces of a great Power. The Arabs never thought that this national home would undergo a metamorphosis which would turn it into a sovereign State. The British Government, on many occasions and by decision of its Parliament, declared that it never intended to give the national home the significance of a State, and the Committee’s majority surpassed in liberality even the gratuities of the Mandate. The Special Committee gave no weight to the explicit promises of His Britannic Majesty’s Government to King Hussein and other Arab officials and organizations in regard to recognizing the independence of Syrian districts, including Palestine. During the second part of its first session, the General Assembly adopted a constitution covering all proceedings for the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and an agency was created for that purpose.27 The Special Committee was not asked to interfere in the functions of that organization. In spite of the fact that the aforesaid constitution adopted by the General Assembly prohibited the re-settlement of refugees in non-selfgoverning territories without the consent of the indigenous inhabitants or when such contemplated settlement might disturb friendly relations among Member States, the Committee deliberately visited the refugee camps and proposed the admission of a large number of the refugees in these camps into Palestine against the express will and the determined refusal of the great majority of the people of Palestine and against the refusal of the neighbouring States. The Special Committee, in its report, denied to the Arabs the right of independence, alleging that the Arabs had never been an independent separate State in the past. For more than thirteen centuries Palestine has been an integral part of the Arab and Ottoman empires, enjoying all the rights and privileges and bearing all the duties and responsibilities of the other

Reference is to the International Refugee Organization. See Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the second part of its first session, resolution 62 (I).

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provinces of the empire, including the prerogatives of independence and sovereignty. When any province is detached from an independent State of which it was an integral part, it is unfair to deny it the right of independence on such a flimsy allegation. The committee assumed that the Jews are a race and a nation entitled to cherish national aspirations. The Jews are not a nation. Every Jew belongs to a certain nationality. None of them in the world is now stateless or without nationality. In their entirety they embrace all the nationalities of the world. Nor are the Jews a race. The Children of Israel today are a very small fraction of the Jewry of the world, for the Jews are composed of all races of mankind from the Negroes to the blond, fair-skinned Scandinavians. Judaism is merely a religion and nothing else. The followers of a certain religious creed cannot be entitled to national aspirations. Suppose the Quakers, who have their majority in the United States, were to rally their congregations and demand that the United States Government should satisfy their national aspirations for a national home and give them some state like Texas, for instance, to be established for them as a sovereign State. I do not know what would be the attitude and the reaction of the leaders of United States policy in such a case. There are many religions in the world. The Charter did not recognize the establishment of any State on the basis of religion. States are established on the basis of their existence as nations, irrespective of religion, creed, faith, colour, race, and so on. The Committee assumed the validity of the Jewish claim to Palestine on the basis of historical rights in that country. What are these historical rights? In the report of the committee, it is stated that the Jews had a dynasty in Palestine two thousand years ago. Everybody knows that all civilized rules of prescription hold that when rights are neglected for such a long time, they are lost. Even the right to property would be proscribed after the lapse of a few years—a maximum of thirty years. But after 2,000 or 2,500 years, what kind of right would be based on historical rights? Everybody knows how the Jews first came to Palestine. They were not the original inhabitants of Palestine. They came from outside as invaders, massacring everybody before them, and killing every living creature in order to take a small part of Palestine on the eastern side in the mountains. Even Jerusalem was not occupied by them until the days of David in the tenth century before Christ. According to the proposal of the majority of the Special Committee, the Jewish State is to be on the seacoast. The seacoast was always held and fought for by the Philistines. The name of Palestine is taken from the Philistines of history, of antiquity, who fought against the Jews and strove with them for a very long period, and did not allow them to reach the seacoast. The country now given to the Jews was never occupied by the Jews and the Jews never settled there. It is not a historical principle which

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has been adopted. It is simply some fantastic dream of the Zionists who wish to have that country for themselves. When the Jews had that dynasty in Palestine, 2,500 years ago, there were many other tribes and nations which flourished at that time. They all disappeared, and do not exist now. There were the Babylonians, the Sumerians, the Akkadians, the Assyrians, the Phoenicians and the Hittites. There were so many nations that contributed greatly to the civilization of the world and which were stronger and more powerful than the Jewish dynasty. Yet we find none of them in existence now. They were not exterminated; they were assimilated by their invaders and became adapted to the environments in which they found themselves. Of the peoples of antiquity only the Jews maintain their isolation and seclusion, to the dissatisfaction and anger of their compatriots and their neighbours, who never failed to molest and persecute them, on each occasion giving to the world a problem of refugees; a problem of displaced persons. Not a single century in history has been free from such a problem as we now face. The world has always been faced with the problem of Jewish refugees and displaced persons and Jewish persecution at some time or other. Why is that? The only reason is the special manner of life which the Jews adopt for themselves and to which they adhere in spite of all the developments and the metamorphoses which have taken place all over the world for all nations. The Jews are all alone, and the United Nations now is faced with the last, but not the least, of these problems. It is as important as any of the previous problems. In order to solve this problem, I understand that the Jews wish to have a sovereign State. It would be extraordinary to find judges who would admit that claim and admit also the historical claim for Palestine. It would be very strange to reach that point of view. The USSR prepared a way to satisfy this Jewish aspiration, as it was asserted that they have aspirations which ought to be satisfied. The USSR gave them a certain area which was vaster than Palestine, and called it the Jewish Socialist Republic of Birobidzhan. Birobidzhan has an area, as I have said, which is more than double the area of Palestine, and already there are about 200,000 Jews who have immigrated there and who are very happy. The country there is sufficient to contain perhaps all the displaced Jews, and more than that number. They say it can contain about four million people. The soil there is very fertile, and there are rich mineral deposits and virgin forests. They have established textile and other industries there. They are exporting to other countries. I do not see why the International Refugee Organization has not thought of taking the displaced Jews of Europe to that country to live happily with their co-religionists and save the world from this problem which has given so much annoyance and difficulty to all the Members of the United Nations and the world in general.

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Finally, in that respect, I should like to state that the Arabs are convinced that the United States of America, whose money finances the widespread Zionist propaganda and their terroristic underground activities, is able, if it wishes, to put an end to all these evils, and render, by such an act of justice and fairness, an honest service in support of the principles of the United Nations. United States arms and money are freely sent to other countries to aid a majority against the opposition of a minority within the same nation. But in the case of Palestine, United States arms and money are willingly sent to aid a minority of intruders against the lawful indigenous majority, and against the mandatory authority itself. It requires a great amount of tolerance and hypocritical courtesy to refrain from denouncing such an equivocal attitude. In conclusion, I must solemnly state that the peace-loving Syrian and Arab peoples squarely oppose the recommendations of the Special Committee, and will never allow a wedge or a foreign hostile bridgehead to be driven into the heart of their fatherland. They expect that this great Organization, which was created to maintain peace, may be reminded that justice is the only safeguard of peace. They also earnestly hope and wish that they shall not be compelled by acts of injustice to have no other course but to resort to the sacred right of self-defence.

Address of the Right Honourable Arthur Creech-Jones, to the UN General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, 16 September 194728 Gentlemen, the National Home has been established, a Jewish settlement of over 600,000 has been built up, the Arab population has doubled, social standards have improved and economic activities have increased to the advantage of everyone. The services of the modern state have been created. [. . .] Britain which has played some part in saving liberty against tyranny in two world wars, which contributed something to the making of the new Arab nations, which has given shelter in the United Kingdom since the end of the war to over 300,000 individuals who would otherwise have been in the displaced persons camps on the Continent and has found homes since 1933 for some 70,000 Jewish refugees, and which by its struggle in war and its administration helped to make the National Home possible, will be

United Nations, United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on The Palestinian Question, 15th Meeting, Press Release GA/PAL/17 16, September 1947.

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judged before the bar of history in due course. I want only to say that in spite of the revolts and terrorism, Palestine has built up its services and still enjoys economic prosperity; the machinery of administration has worked—a great tribute to the Palestine authorities and the Government servants who under great strain and risk have been employed there. Our efforts to find accommodation between the communities in Palestine have failed. This cannot be attributed to the various terms of the White Paper of 1939 which in a number of major respects have not been implemented; indeed immigration has continued well beyond the 75,000 contemplated; and constitutional changes, for reasons outside the Mandatory’s control, have not been made. In the absence of full cooperation or of any positive contribution from other Powers and in view of the sheer hopelessness of the Mandatory obtaining a settlement and reconciliation of conflicts within the Mandate, the United Kingdom Government asked the United Nations to consider the future government of Palestine. The United Nations Special Committee have submitted suggestions and we have made known our agreement with its twelve general recommendations. We have repeated our views that the Mandate should be laid down because it is unworkable and that obligations to the two communities are irreconcilable and that Palestine should now move to independence. We made these decisions known without delay in order to facilitate the work of the Assembly. In our discussions with the two communities in recent years we have evolved a number of proposals within the terms of the Mandate but experience finally convinced the United Kingdom Government that an impartial consideration by an international and independent authority was needed. It felt that such consideration should not be prejudiced by the advocacy by the United Kingdom of any particular scheme after our submission to the United Nations, though our knowledge and experience were at the disposal of the Assembly. This decision seemed the more necessary because there exist prejudices and suspicions about Britain’s role in Palestine and these have been expressed over a period in bitter and unfriendly terms. Whatever the British views on possible working arrangements may be, we realized that our efforts in Palestine have failed to secure any accommodation between the two communities and that it was better we should urge no proposals if they were to be suspected of containing some hidden motive calculated to serve some purpose of our own, worthy or unworthy. The Special Committee with some assistance from the factual information we provided have produced their recommendations and many Member States have now freely expressed their views on the principles underlying the recommendations. The position of His Majesty’s Government remains today as I have just stated. I would repeat, however, what I made clear in my first statement to this Committee—that I cannot easily imagine circumstances in which the United Kingdom would wish to prevent the application of a settlement recommended by the Assembly regarding the future structure of Palestine.

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I also made clear I hope where the United Kingdom stood in the matter of implementation of any settlement and of any decision reached by the Assembly. Our single-minded purpose is to end the tragic situation in Palestine. Whether we have any interests in that unhappy land is irrelevant; our anxiety is to facilitate a settlement. The announcement of our decision that we shall make an early withdrawal not only of our forces but also of our administration is designed to remove all lingering doubt, to induce both parties to face up to the consequences of failure to come to an agreement, to emphasize the urgency of the whole matter and to leave the United Nations unhampered in its recommendations as to the best solution for the future government. It should help to bring home the realities of the situation and bring both sides together. It recognizes the place of international authority in liquidating a grave and menacing conflict of interest which is likely to develop in that part of the world. In our judgment a Mandatory Government may voluntarily relinquish the administration of a mandate. His Majesty’s Government are entitled in view of the general opinion expressed in this Committee and also the unworkability of the Mandate to lay it down and ask the United Nations because of the conflict and its menacing possibilities to consider how orderly government can be achieved and Palestine move rapidly to self-governing and independence—the goal unanimously desired by all the parties and the nations represented here. We have struggled hard for a solution of these difficulties and at the cost of hundreds of lives and considerable wealth. Perhaps in the light of all the advice and criticism offered to us in the past by the nationals of other states, more effective ways of securing the elusive solution we were always seeking may be found. We cannot go on indefinitely faced with the hostility of the parties in Palestine, with fierce misrepresentations outside and with the drain in our own resources. But no scheme for modifying the clash of rights as they are understood by the parties in Palestine can be divorced from the question of its implementation. It seems to us essential that in determining the nature of a settlement the Assembly should also determine the measures to implement it. It would be unreasonable to ask His Majesty’s Government to carry the sole and full responsibility for the administration of Palestine and for enforcing changes which the United Nations regard as necessary. It has been suggested, as I understand it, that the United Kingdom should carry such responsibility throughout an indefinite transition period until independence is attained, acting under the supervision of the United Nations to enforce United Nations policy and being assisted by a programme of aid as mentioned by the distinguished delegate of the United States, including the possible assistance of a voluntary recruited international police force. My Government desire that it should be clear beyond all doubt and ambiguity that not only is it our decision to wind up the Mandate but that within a limited period we shall withdraw. They made only two qualifications.

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First, that in the event of a settlement between Jews and Arabs they would if so desired continue the administration of Palestine through the limited period of the transfer to independence. Second, that they would consider an invitation to participate in giving effect to a settlement in partnership with other members of the United Nations. In short, His Majesty’s Government will not accept the responsibility for enforcement either alone or in the major role. They still hope that in view of their firm intention to withdraw both the Jewish and Arab communities will be seized with the realities of the situation and appreciate to the full the unhappy consequences that can flow to themselves and their country by failing to agree on the future of Palestine. The United Kingdom Government most earnestly hopes that the discussions of the past weeks have revealed the trend of world opinion and the dangers of a continuing struggle between the two peoples and that their representatives and the United Nations will quickly move to some accommodation which will bring harmony and stability in this part of the Middle East. It is a new situation confronting the parties concerned. The weeks of discussion here should make this hope not more unrealistic (as it has been described) but less. Moreover we trust that anxieties now felt in the Middle East about the present deliberations of the United Nations and their possible outcome will not lead to military preparation or deployment of force amongst the peoples concerned. We hope that no steps will be taken that will be provocative and result in violence. Certainly His Majesty’s Government has given and will give no encouragement or assistance to actions which will inflame the situation in the Middle East. Rumours and assertions that any such encouragement has been given are entirely without foundation. Another dangerous factor in the present situation is the traffic in illegal immigration into Palestine and the connivance of some Governments in the provision by their nationals of ships, arms and money to defeat the Mandatory in the very difficult task of upholding the rule of law in Palestine, which greatly influences the feeling of the Arab world and sets irresponsible influences at work which cannot readily be controlled. In this last period, and in discharge of its duties, the British authorities will have no easy task in controlling the problem of immigration into Palestine particularly in the face of the bitter resentment of one of the parties that immigration continues at all and the indignation of the other that it is far too limited. In any event it must be recognized that the immigration question is one which arouses bitter feelings in Palestine and that proposals for a change in the status quo should not be lightly put forward by those who have no responsibility for the consequences. The complications of this problem are known and the difficulties of the Mandatory in carrying its difficult and onerous responsibility should not be increased. My delegation expresses the hope that the Committee will regard as an urgent contribution to the solution of the Palestine problem the resolution we

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have submitted concerning displaced persons in Europe and particularly that aspect of the matter concerning the absorption of Jews and other displaced persons in countries besides Palestine. No action is more calculated to help the Arab people to a fair appreciation of our sincerity in this problem of refugees and Jewish displaced persons and our sincerity about the Palestine problem than action on this resolution. My government will continue to make available what experience and knowledge it possesses for the use of the United Nations in its search for the solution to this problem. Our resources can be used to assist in arriving at an equitable and just plan. But I should be unfair to the Committee if I did not repeat that the sand has started to run and that conclusions should not be unduly delayed and the problem of implementation should be conceived as a parallel study and integral part of the Committee’s work. On this last point my Government has stated (and it needs to be repeated in view of doubts expressed) that if the Assembly should recommend a policy which is not acceptable to the Jews and Arabs, some authority alternative to the United Kingdom must be provided in order to implement the United Nations policy. If it is desired that His Majesty’s Government should participate with others in the enforcement of a settlement—and everything that can be done to bring about a permanent and acceptable solution to all concerned is essential—my Government adheres to the view that it must take into account the inherent justice of the settlement and the extent to which force would be required to give effect to it. But I hope it will be agreed by all delegates that the view of the Special Committee’s Report should be upheld that there is urgent need for change of status in Palestine. The withdrawal of the British administration there should if possible proceed by an orderly transfer of power to a suitable authority recognized by the United Nations to usher in independence. Britain in any case is unable to sustain a burden too heavy for any mandatory to discharge, especially when its responsibilities are made the more difficult by the freedom enjoyed by the nationals of other states to employ every means to defeat her efforts. This problem should be studied at once for it is of the utmost importance that in the possible absence of agreement between the Jews and Arabs the complicated task of withdrawal should not be the prelude to disorder and disintegration of the public services essential for the normal life of Palestine. Without suitable authorities to negotiate and transfer responsibility to the preservation of institutions, communications and public works, the observance of law and fundamental services become problems of major difficulty. Some procedure should be worked out by the substitute authority which will ensure proper safeguards for the preservation of good order and the requirements necessary to give effective security forces for the police and other measures which the situation may require. We hope that when a policy is worked out as representing the consensus of international opinion both parties will respect it and not resort to methods

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which will destroy security and create chaos and violence in Palestine. In that unhappy eventuality the United Nations must control a situation dangerous to peace. We hope that all concerned will realize that their ultimate best interests lie in a settlement that can be worked in goodwill and good neighbourliness. My delegation will have the opportunity of expressing its views on certain of the proposals embodied in the resolutions before the Committee. We desire both now and in the future to live in friendly cooperation with Arabs and Jews alike. I have tried to restate the position of my Government and to suggest that we view our membership of this organization as a responsibility not lightly carried. Our earnest wish is to be helpful in the great tasks the United Nations was brought into being to discharge. We ask the Committee to act quickly and we hope that the opportunity and the duty confronting the Member States will be conceived comprehensively and realistically as well as in a generous spirit. All of us want harmony restored to this Holy and tragic land.

The Arab case stated by Mr Jamal Husseini to the UN Ad Hoc Committee, 29 September 194729 Summary Press Release 29 September 1947 At today’s third meeting the Committee, under the chairmanship of Dr H. V. Evatt (Australia), heard a statement from Mr Jamal Husseini, Vice-President of the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine. Mr Husseini declared that the Arabs have always been in Palestine and that the Zionists are conducting an invasion of that country. The Zionist case, he said, is based on the association of the Jews with Palestine two thousand years ago. World Jewry, he said, would not claim to be one race composed of the descendants of Israel. As for religious rights, they could give no secular claim to any nation in any country. The Balfour Declaration contradicts the Covenant of the League of Nations, said Mr Husseini, who recalled the British promises during the First World War to assist the Arabs in regaining their independence. The Palestine Mandate, Mr Husseini went on, does not implement the objects of the Mandatory system as defined by the Covenant of the League of Nations. United Nations, United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on The Palestinian Question, 3rd Meeting, Press Release GA/PAL/3 29, September 1947.

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Mr Husseini called the Jewish Agency a “state within a state” and described what he termed the discriminatory treatment of Arabs in Palestine in matters of illegal immigration and acts of violence. Even if there existed any room in Palestine for an increase in the population, said Mr Husseini, that must be left for the natural increase of the present population. Mr Husseini complained of the neglect of Arab public education under the Mandatory Power and of economic discrimination against the Arabs, both on the part of the Mandatory and the Jews. Concluding, Mr Husseini advocated freedom and independence for an Arab State in the whole of Palestine which would respect human rights, fundamental freedoms and equality of all persons before the law, and would protect the legitimate rights and interests of all minorities whilst guaranteeing freedom of worship and access to the Holy Places. Rejecting the report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Mr Husseini declared that the Arabs of Palestine were determined to oppose with all the means at their disposal, any scheme that provided for segregation or partition, or that would give to a minority special and preferential status. The Committee will reconvene next Wednesday at 3:00 p.m. [A chronological account of the meeting is given in Takes #1 through 6 which follow this summary.]

1 The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Dr H. V. Evatt, called the meeting to order at 3:15 p.m. and gave the floor to Mr Jemal Husseini, of the Arab Higher Committee, who read a prepared statement. Mr Husseini said that the Palestine Arab case is simple and self-evident. The Arabs of Palestine are there where Providence and history have placed them. As all other nations, they are entitled to live in freedom and peace and to develop their country in accordance with their traditions and in harmony with universal conceptions of justice and equity. The Arabs, he declared, are and have always been in actual possession of Palestine and thus have one binding, lawful and sacred duty: to defend it against all aggression. No matter, said Mr Husseini, with what apparel it is clothed, religious, humanitarian or political, the Zionist movement for the possession of Palestine is nothing but an invasion that aims, by force, at securing and dominating a country that is not theirs by birth-right. On one side, therefore, there is self-defence, on the other side an aggression, as said. The raison d’etre of the United Nations is to assist selfdefence against aggression.

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Investigation and fact-finding, said Mr Husseini, should have, by all means, been set afoot a long time ago. When enquiries are conducted for the removal of injustices, they are understandable and commendable. But when they take the course of finding ways and means to cover and justify aggressive acts and to recommend unjust and absurd projects, they become hazardous and futile. Referring to the previous 18 investigations in the past 25  years, when “such recommendations as were made in favor of the Arabs were ignored by the Mandatory and those in favor of the Zionists were carefully enforced,” Mr Husseini said: “It is for this and other reasons that were duly communicated to the United Nations that we refused to appear before the Special Fact Finding Committee on Palestine. Otherwise, I desire to assure you in the name of the committee that represents the Arabs of Palestine of our great veneration for your august body, and to impress upon you the fact that we look to the United Nations for justice and equity, and we pin our faith and find our salvation in its Charter.” In their life or death struggle against Zionism, said Mr Husseini, the Arabs have nothing in common with anti-Semitism. In Palestine, the Arabs had no record of a single clash with the small Jewish settlement, before the British occupation, because there existed no political designs over that country. Mr Husseini then went on to say that the Zionist claims over Palestine, to which, he said, the Jewish position in the diaspora and their political influence in the capitals of the world gave undue support, have no legal or moral basis. The Zionist case, he said, is based on the association of the Jews with Palestine 2,000 years ago. If that claim had any legal or moral value, the Arabs could have better and stronger claims over Spain, parts of France, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and even parts of India, Russia and China, he said. The Zionists, Mr Husseini added, say that they have a special religious connection with Palestine, but so do the Moslems and Christians. Religious rights can give no secular claim to any nation in any country.

2 Finally, said Mr Husseini, the Zionists claim the establishment of a Jewish National Home by virtue of the Balfour Declaration. Great Britain, he said, had never owned Palestine to dispose of it. The Balfour Declaration, declared Mr Husseini, contradicted the Covenant of the League of Nations, and was “an immoral, unjust and illegal promise.” Referring to the British contention that the said promise contained two obligations, one to establish a Jewish National Home, and the other to safeguard the rights of the indigenous population, Mr Husseini declared

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that no one could seriously suppose that the establishment of a national home for a people on top of the national home of another people could be achieved without undermining the rights and interests of the latter. Great Britain, Mr Husseini continued, as one of the greatest powers, and the Zionist Organization, the most influential association in the capitals of the world, joined hands 30 years ago, to execute a policy in Palestine that aims at the destruction of the national existence of its Arab owners. The two powerful allies, he said, had one point of difference in the execution of their destructive policy, and that was one of method and duration. This difference, he said, continued to grow after 1920, until it has waxed in the present campaign of Jewish terrorists. But there was no difference in substance, Mr Husseini said. The Zionists would destroy the Arab structure in Palestine precipitately by successive quick blows, charged Mr Husseini, and the British would only dissolve and liquidate the Arab national existence in Palestine by leisurely and smoother means. Mr Husseini then recalled the Arab national awakening since the middle of the last century, and the promises given by Great Britain to assist the Arabs in regaining their independence, Mr Husseini stressed, from which Palestine was not excluded.

3 When the Balfour Declaration was proclaimed, said Mr Husseini, vehement protests surged out from the Arabs of Palestine and representative Arabs of other territories. The Sherif Hussein who was responsible, on the Arab side, for the British pledges, sent an unequivocal and sharp objection. A special envoy was sent out from the British Government to reassure him that the Balfour Declaration meant only a spiritual Jewish Home, and not a political one, and that it would have no effect on Arab rights or freedom. These reassuring statements, said Mr Husseini, were made by the same Cabinet that issued the Balfour Declaration, and they should be taken as its real and true interpretation. Mr Husseini then declared that Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which defined the objects of the Mandatory system, states that the rights and interests of the indigenous population under the Mandate become a sacred trust of civilization in the hands of the Mandatory. But, he added, the Palestine Mandate does not implement this promise, for its object is to create a home for a people who were not in Palestine, and who have no direct relation with the indigenous population. Furthermore, he said, the inhabitants of Palestine, and the government which they were supposed to constitute and for whose assistance the British Government got the Mandate, have no place or existence in this British combination.

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“Deprived of their rights, the Arabs were rendered helpless spectators to behold the funeral of their national existence passing slowly before their eyes,” Mr Husseini continued. “This policy and that atmosphere in general continue to the present day.”

4 Mr Husseini then said that the Jewish Agency had over-stepped its original limits and, through Jewish influence abroad, wielded such powers that made it a state within the state. “The Agency was able, under the eyes of the Administration, to form semi-secret military forces by means of which it bullied the Government,” declared Mr Husseini. “Whenever the Government showed any signs of shaking the Agency’s power of intimidation, the whole Jewish world rose up, and through its influence in the press, put up a huge chorus of baseless complaints that aroused human sympathies and enlisted the support of the uninformed masses.” In this manner, charged Mr Husseini, the Jewish Agency pushed the British Government to limits beyond those contemplated for the execution of its policy and caused the U.S. Government to forsake its principles of democracy in Zionist support. The U.S. Government, said the Arab spokesman, has permitted activities and fund-raising designed to flout the laws of Palestine and to subvert peace and order, “contrary to the attitude which the same government is adopting with regard to the allegations of subversion of peace and order in another country.” Mr Husseini declared that there are two scales of justice in Palestine, one— less favorable—for the Arabs, and one—more favorable—for the Jews. Mr Husseini declared that Article 6 of the Mandate obviously imposed two clear and separate conditions for the regulation of Jewish immigration: (1) The preservation of the rights and position of the indigenous population, and (2) the existence of suitable conditions. But, he added, both of these protective conditions were ignored by the Mandatory. We submit, said Mr Husseini, that even if there exists any room in Palestine for an increase in the population, which is not the case, that must be left for the natural increase that has attained the figure of 80,000 per year. With this average, the population of Palestine without immigration will be doubled in less than 20 years, and will make of Palestine one of the most densely populated countries of the world. Mr Husseini then passed on to the matter of public education in Palestine. Under the Turkish regime, he said, when the budget of the Palestine districts was less than 5 per cent of the present budget, 70 per cent of the Arabs were illiterate in Palestine. This situation has hardly changed during the last 30 years. In the economic field, Mr Husseini continued, discrimination against the Arabs is still more apparent. The Arab economic structure in Palestine is mainly agricultural, that of the Jews is predominantly commercial and

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industrial. It has been the calculated policy of the Mandatory and the Jewish Agency, he said, to frustrate and raise obstacles in the face of Arab agricultural development, and assist Jewish industry.

5 To increase Arab economic difficulties, Mr Husseini went on, the Jewish Agency and its satellite organizations adopted an economic policy of complete Jewish exclusiveness. Mr Husseini then referred to what he called the Government’s discriminatory policy in the financial field, charging the following points: The Jewish minority one-third of the public, gets nearly one-half of the benefits of the budget, and the Arab two-thirds of the population get the other half. During the last 7 years, Jewish local authorities representing one-third of the population got 77 per cent of the loans given by the Government. Jewish local authorities benefited by 89 per cent of the special loan funds of $10 million granted for housing and other purposes. Over the period of the last 10 years, Jewish local authorities have received 62 per cent of the grants-in-aids from public funds. Mr Husseini then recalled the efforts made in the past to solve the Jewish problem and said: “Great Britain had, over forty years ago, generously offered them Uganda for a national home. The father of practical Zionism, Dr Herzl, who strove to relieve distressed Jews in any territory, accepted the offer, but it was turned down by the Zionist Organization. Now, Soviet Russia has an open offer in Birobidzhan, in which thousands of Jews are leading a happy and safe and independent life—but the Zionists will not hear of it. Both these territories are large and fertile enough to relieve millions of Jews from their distressful conditions, in a manner which Palestine could not do. Palestine is a tiny country of only 10,000 square miles, more than half of which is uncultivable. The Zionist Organization does not want Palestine for the permanent solution of the Jewish problem or the relief of the Jews in distress. They are after power, they are after the central and strategic position of Palestine that neither Uganda nor Birobidzhan possesses.” Mr Husseini said that the peoples of the southern and parts of the eastern board of the Mediterranean Sea from the north of Africa throughout Egypt to the Persian Gulf and from the Turkish borders to the Indian Ocean, speak one language and have the same history, traditions and aspirations. One of the greatest political achievements in the world that served as a bulwark of peace and stability was the fusion of several nations into one homogeneous entity. The USA, the UK and the USSR were all created homogeneities that proved of great service in the maintenance of regional and world peace. It was illogical, therefore, he said, that the United Nations, the peacemaking machinery of the world, should lend a helping hand to break up an existing

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natural old homogeneity as that of the Arab world by the introduction in its midst of an alien body as contemplated by sponsors of a Jewish State in Palestine.

6 The solution of the problem that was created by the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, said Mr Husseini, was that the Arabs of Palestine, who constitute the great majority, set up a free and independent state. After welcoming last Friday’s declaration of the British Government, Mr Husseini outlined the following principles for the future constitutional organization of Palestine:

1 That an Arab State in the whole of Palestine be established on



2 That the said Arab State of Palestine will respect human rights,

democratic lines.



fundamental freedoms and equality of all persons before the law. 3 That the said Arab State of Palestine will protect the legitimate rights and interests of all minorities. 4 That freedom of worship and access to the Holy places will be guaranteed to all.

That report, he said, contains two schemes both of which are based on considerations that are, in the opinion of the Arabs of Palestine, inconsistent with and repugnant to their rights, the United Nations Charter, and the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Arabs of Palestine are, therefore, he said, solidly determined to oppose, with all the means at their disposal, any scheme that provides for the dissection, segregation or partition of their country or that gives to a minority on the ground of creed, special and preferential rights or status.

Address of Dr Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman of the American Section of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, to the UN Ad Hoc Committee, 2 October 194730 Mr Chairman and Members of the Committee: 1.  The Jewish Agency for Palestine, which I have the honor to represent, is appreciative of the privilege which this Committee of the United Nations

United Nations, United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on The Palestinian Question, 4th Meeting, Press Release GA/PAL/4 2, October 1947.

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General Assembly has extended to it to be represented at its deliberations and to express its views on the Report which the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine has submitted. We have read the Report with the deepest interest and the closest attention, and we are prepared to make our observations on it. We are greatly impressed with the earnest and conscientious labors which the eleven members of the Special Committee devoted to their task and which are reflected in the comprehensive and impressive document before us. It was good to have a committee of neutrals examine the Palestine problem afresh in an effort to arrive at a solution which would be morally justifiable and politically sound. We share entirely the view expressed in the Report that the “opinions of members of an international committee who represent various civilizations and schools of thought, and have approached the question from different angles, may be of some value.” 2.  The Jewish Agency availed itself of the invitation extended to it by the Special Committee to present its case. We were happy to make available to the Committee whatever information it desired of us, to answer any question, and frankly to share our thinking with it. We regarded it as an inescapable obligation to cooperate to the fullest extent with the United Nations which had this grave international problem presented to it and which assumed the responsibility for formulating a decision on the future government of Palestine. 3. In this connection we find it necessary to point to a circumstance to which the Report itself draws special attention, namely, the failure of the Arab Higher Committee to cooperate with the Committee. The Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee, during the hearings in Jerusalem made an appeal by radio for the full cooperation of all parties. The Special Committee also addressed a letter directly to the Arab Higher Committee regretting the decision of the latter not to cooperate and repeating the Special Committee’s invitation for full cooperation. In reply Mr Jamal Husseini, vice-chairman of the Arab Higher Committee wrote that the Committee found no reason to reverse the previous decision to abstain from collaboration. One is at a loss to understand why the Arab Higher Committee was unwilling to present its case to the Special Committee of the United Nations. The Jewish Agency likewise had been subjected to the strains and disappointments of the numerous Palestine inquiries which preceded it. Having repeatedly refused the invitation to present its case, why does the Arab Higher Committee come now to ask “justice and equity” at the hands of the United Nations whose authority it had flouted and whose competence to define the form of the future government of Palestine the Arab spokesman on Monday categorically denied? 4.  The same spokesman treated us to an historic improvisation on the origin of the Jewish people and on the history of Palestine. History may not

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be an exact science but it certainly is not a story out of the Arabian nights. There are certain facts which do not yield to wishful thinking. Thus the canard that the Jews of western Europe are descendant not from Israel of old, but from a tribe of Khazars in Russia, is a relatively recent invention and was popularized in the racial mythologies of our day whose political motivations are clearly transparent. One would assume that the Arabs of Palestine would be among the last people on earth to wish to engage in genealogical research. When the Allies liberated Palestine in  1917 along with other parts of the former Ottoman Empire, Palestine was a segment of a Turkish province. There was no politically or culturally distinct or distinguishable Arab nation in that province. There never had been. The Arabs who conquered Palestine in the seventh century of the common era held sway over that country which contained a very mixed and heterogeneous population for 437 years between 634 and 1071 A.D.—437 years out of more than 3,000 years of recorded history in Palestine. After 1071 the country was conquered by various non-Arab peoples such as the Seljuks, the Kurds, the Crusaders, the Egyptian Mamelukes and finally, by the Ottoman Turks. By the time the Arabs conquered Palestine in 634 A.D. the Jewish people had already completed nearly 2,000 years of national history in that country, during which time they created a civilization which decidedly influenced the course of mankind, gave rise both to Judaism and Christianity, produced the Bible and brought forth prophets, saints and spiritual leaders who are venerated not only by Judaism, but by Christianity and Islam as well. “In the 12 centuries or more that have passed since the Arab conquest,” reads the Report of the Royal Commission of 1937, “Palestine has virtually dropped out of history . . . In economics and in politics Palestine lay outside the main stream of the world’s life. In the realm of thought, in science or in letters it made no contribution to modern civilization.” The very identity of Palestine as a unit of human society is an achievement of Jewish history. The country lost its separate character with the Jewish dispersion and only resumed a specific role in history when the Palestine Mandate was ratified. The Mandate acknowledged this history by setting Palestine in a distinct and separate context in relation to the Arab world. “I am persuaded,” declared President Wilson on 3 March 1919, “that the Allied Nations with the fullest concurrence of our own Government and people are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundation of a Jewish Commonwealth.” Speaking in the House of Lords on 27 June 1923 Lord Milner, who called himself “a strong supporter of the pro-Arab policy,” stated: “Palestine can never be regarded as a country on the same footing as the other Arab countries. You cannot ignore all history and tradition in the matter . . . and the future of Palestine cannot possibly be left to be determined by the

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temporary impressions and feelings of the Arab majority in the country in the present day.” When the Palestine Mandate therefore recognized “the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine” it was only stating a fact that was universally acknowledged through the ages. And when it gave international recognition to the grounds for reconstituting the Jewish national home in that country—an act which Field Marshal Smuts, member of the War Cabinet which issued the Balfour Declaration, called “one of the greatest acts of history”—it was only reaffirming the fact that the Jewish people had never surrendered the hope of national restoration in its ancestral homeland. For to the Jews Palestine was not merely a place of sacred shrines as to Christians and Moslems, but the home of their exiled people, the land of their national destiny, and throughout the dark centuries of persecution and wandering there were continuous efforts to return to it. Concerning the Arab economic grievances which were aired here the other day, we wish only to refer to the Report of the United Nations Special Committee which examined all of them, as well as to the relevant chapters in the Royal Commission Report of 1937, to show how utterly groundless they are. These Reports, as well as the memorandum of the Palestine Government which was submitted to the Special Committee of the United Nations—a document which can hardly be charged with pro-Jewish bias—conclusively prove that the Palestine Arabs benefited considerably and directly from Jewish development in the economic, financial and social spheres. We must take note, too, of the interesting contrast which the Arab spokesman attempted to draw between the terroristic acts of the Arabs of Palestine in 1936–9—acts which were never condemned or repudiated by any responsible Arab spokesman—and the regrettable acts of some dissident Jewish groups in Palestine today which the official bodies of Palestine Jewry have most severely condemned. “It has been officially admitted that in their several uprisings against the British in Palestine,” stated the Arab spokesman, “the Arabs ordinarily fought face to face as noble men.” As illustrative of this nobility, permit me to quote the statement of Sir John Chancellor, the High Commissioner of Palestine, on the Arab riots there in  1929: “I have learned with horror of the atrocious acts committed by bodies of ruthless and blood-thirsty evildoers, of savage murder perpetrated upon defenseless members of the Jewish population regardless of age or sex, accompanied as at Hebron by acts of unspeakable savagery, of the burning of farms and houses in town and country, and of the looting and destruction of property. These crimes have brought upon their authors the execration of all civilized peoples throughout the world.” In commenting upon the riots of 1936, the Report of the Palestine Royal Commission has this to say: “There were similar assaults upon the persons and property of the Jews, conducted with the same reckless ferocity (as in 1929). Women and children were not spared.”

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5.  Before making our observations on the Report itself, may we be permitted to comment on the statement which was made at the beginning of your deliberations by Mr Arthur Creech-Jones on behalf of His Majesty’s Government? It was the United Kingdom Government which requested that the question of Palestine be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly; it was His Majesty’s Government which asked the Assembly to make recommendations under Article 10 of the Charter for the future government of Palestine. In making these far-reaching requests, with which the United Nations complied, the United Kingdom surely must have had in mind not the thought of ultimately imposing its own solution on the United Nations, but the hope that this great international body, approaching the problem anew and without bias, might find a solution which, while not fully acceptable to everyone, would nevertheless represent the collective wisdom and judgment of the nations of the world and would have behind it such weight of authority that His Majesty’s Government would be prepared to accept it and to cooperate in its implementation. Surely such loyal cooperation on the part of member nations is presupposed when any international problem is considered by the United Nations. Otherwise His Majesty’s Government might just as well have announced six months ago what it declared the other day. Why were six critical months lost, during which time the situation in Palestine was permitted to deteriorate most gravely? And why was all the apparatus of the United Nations invoked to investigate and to recommend a settlement of the problem if there was no intention to accept and to participate in the implementation of such a settlement? Sir Alexander Cadogan, at the 52nd meeting of the first committee of the General Assembly, stated: “All we say—and I made this reservation the other day—is that we shall not have the sole responsibility for enforcing a solution which is not accepted by both parties and which we cannot reconcile without conscience.” But we observe that His Majesty’s Government is not being asked to accept a sole responsibility. The Report of the Special Committee clearly recommends that if so desired, one or more members of the United Nations shall be invited to assist in the administering of the country along with the present Mandatory Power. The statement of Mr Creech-Jones seems to go beyond that of Sir Alexander Cadogan’s and implies that His Majesty’s Government not only does not wish to assume sole responsibility for implementing the Report but reserves to itself the right of refusing any cooperation in implementing the final decision of the United Nations if, in its judgment, it does not comply with its own criteria of justice and with its own preferred technique of implementation. One questions whether in taking such a position—if we have understood the position correctly—the United Kingdom is helping to solve this difficult problem and whether its course will enhance the authority and prestige of the United Nations which has assumed responsibility over the Palestine question. It is clear to everyone that the solution of this problem

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represents a vital challenge to the United Nations and a crucial test of its future effectiveness. In view of His Majesty’s Government’s reluctance to impose a policy by force of arms—a policy which would have behind it the sanction of the community of nations—one may be pardoned for inquiring why His Majesty’s Government has not hesitated to employ in recent years a military force of 100,000 men, along with its navy and its air force, to impose by force a policy on Palestine which no international body has approved, which is contrary to the purposes and provisions of the Mandate, and which has been thrice disapproved by international bodies. It would have been more helpful if the statement of His Majesty’s Government had been more revealing. Surely it must be clear to everyone that no settlement of the Palestine problem is possible without some enforcement. The Palestine problem is not at all unique in this regard. The Report of the Special Committee correctly states: “Taking into account the fact that devising a solution which will be fully acceptable to both Jews and Arabs seems to be utterly impossible, the prospect of imposing a solution on them would be the “basic condition of any recommended proposal. It was the realization that such an Arab-Jewish agreement was impossible that prompted Mr Bevin to turn the problem over to the United Nations. Mr Creech-Jones’ declaration, therefore,” that “the United Kingdom Government are ready to assume the responsibility for giving effect to any plan on which agreement is reached between the Arabs and the Jews” is very singular indeed and does not advance the solution at all. It may be pertinent to recall that the principle of partition on which the Majority Report of the committee is based, was first projected by the allBritish Royal Commission in  1937. At that time the British Government accepted that recommendation in principle and declared, “In supporting a solution of the Palestine problem by means of partition, His Majesty’s Government are much impressed by the advantages which it offers to the Arabs and the Jews. The Arabs would obtain their national independence, and thus be enabled to cooperate on an equal footing with the Arabs of neighboring countries in the cause of Arab unity and progress. They would be finally delivered from all fear of Jewish domination. . . On the other hand, partition would secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home and relieve it from any possibility of its being subjected in the future to Arab rule. It would convert the Jewish National Home into a Jewish State with full control over immigration. . . Above all, fear and suspicion would be replaced by a sense of confidence and security, and both peoples would enjoy, in the words of the Commission, the inestimable boon of peace.” Confronted as we now are by the latest expression of His Majesty’s Government, we cannot help but reflect upon the course which has been followed by successive British Governments during the past decade. In 1937 the British Government appointed a Royal Commission to study the

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Palestine problem, which, after an exhaustive study, recommended partition as a solution. After an initial approval of the plan, the British Government wound up by rejecting it and promulgated in its stead the White Paper policy of 1939 which was in complete contradiction to the basic recommendation of the Royal Commission. In  1945 the British Government invited the American Government to join in a two-nation inquiry into the Palestine problem with a view to its solution. This Committee submitted unanimous recommendations proposing not partition, but a unitary state. It called for the abrogation of the White Paper policy, including its racial land law, the early admission of 100,000 Jews, continued Jewish immigration thereafter, and the faithful implementation of the provisions of the Mandate. The British Government rejected the recommendations of this Committee also and wound up by putting forward the Morrison and Bevin proposals which were diametrically opposed in substance and in spirit to the Report of the Anglo-American Committee. Finally, in  1947 the British Government proposed another examination of the Palestine problem, this time by the United Nations. As a result, a commission was appointed consisting of the representatives of 11 nations. This Committee has now submitted a Report which recommends a plan of partition coupled with economic union. But this Report seems no more acceptable to His Majesty’s Government than the two earlier Reports. It has indicated no support of this latest Report and offers in its stead—nothing. The failure, however, of the United Kingdom Government to give the United Nations a measure of guidance and support, and its announced intention of an early withdrawal from Palestine which we welcome, makes it more imperative than ever that the General Assembly should proceed with the work before it with utmost dispatch. As early as last April it was realized in the special session of the Assembly that there was great urgency to the matter. Certainly that urgency for action and decision has been intensified by all that has transpired since. 6.  The Jewish Agency, in making this preliminary comment on the Report itself, wishes to indicate at the outset its full approval of all but one of the eleven unanimous recommendations made by the Committee. On the sixth recommendation, of which it does not disapprove, I would like to make this observation. The sixth recommendation calls upon the General Assembly “to undertake immediately the initiation and execution of an international arrangement whereby the problem of the distressed European Jews, of whom approximately 250,000 are in assembly centers, will be dealt with as a matter of extreme urgency for the alleviation of their plight and of the Palestine problem.” It will be recalled that the AngloAmerican Committee of Inquiry likewise recommended that efforts be made immediately to find new homes for these displaced persons. In making this recommendation the Anglo-American Committee stated: “We have to report that such information as we received about countries other

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than Palestine gave no hope of substantial assistance in finding homes for Jews wishing or impelled to leave Europe.” The position in this respect has remained completely unchanged. The recommendation has remained a dead letter. Our unfortunate refugees are still languishing in the displaced persons camps facing a third winter after the termination of the war. The Report of your Special Committee refers to the “intense urge” of these distressed persons to be allowed to go to Palestine. The “intense urge” of the Jewish displaced persons to proceed to Palestine and the refusal of most of them to go anywhere else springs not only from their realization that the prospects of their admission to other countries are slight in the extreme, and even then only of a very limited scope. It springs preeminently from the fact that Palestine offers to them that which they need most and cannot find anywhere else: the chance of a real home, the prospect of a life in congenial surroundings, the insurance of permanency. All the longing of these uprooted people for a life of peace and dignity, for a normal and secure existence finds expression in this intense urge to go to Palestine. What more overwhelming and tragic evidence of this urge is required than the persistent and desperate attempts of these men, women and children to reach the shores of the Jewish National Home from where they are forcibly turned back—in the case of the “Exodus 1947” back to Germany! And if it be countered that mere desire does not create a right, a complete answer is that that desire was the basis for the creation of the right by the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations Mandate. That desire was recognized as morally so compelling that it led the victorious Allies in the First World War to establish solemn international commitments guaranteeing the legal right of Jews to go to Palestine. The Jewish Agency strongly hopes that the nations of the world will welcome those among the displaced persons who wish to emigrate to other lands. The Jewish Agency never contemplated that any displaced person should be forced to go to Palestine. But surely, to compel those Jewish refugees, many of whom have close family ties with Palestine, to go against their will to other lands and to deny them the right to go to the Jewish National Home would be most unjust and unkind and would be bitterly resented. The twelfth recommendation of the Committee reads: “It is recommended that in the appraisal of the Palestine question, it be accepted as incontrovertible that any solution for Palestine cannot be considered as a solution of the Jewish problem in general.” We are at a loss to understand the meaning of this recommendation—actually not a recommendation but a mere postulate. The “Jewish problem in general” is not a problem of Jewish immigration or of refugees. It is the age-old problem of Jewish national homelessness. There is but one solution to this problem, a national home. This was the basic Jewish problem which was faced by the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, and to which the proper solution was given—the reconstitution of the national home of the Jewish people in Palestine.

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7.  Without attempting at this stage a detailed analysis of the solution recommended by the minority of three members of the Special Committee, we must state at once that we find it wholly unacceptable, even as a basis for discussion. It proposes the establishment of an independent Federal State of Palestine, consisting of what are described as an Arab and a Jewish “State” though they are, in fact, little more than semi-autonomous cantons or provinces. It is obvious that under the constitutional provisions envisaged in this recommendation, Palestine would become in effect an Arab State with two Jewish enclaves, in which the Jews would be frozen in the position of a permanent minority of the population of the Federal State. Under the proposed constitution the Jewish province would not have control over immigration even within the narrow confines of its own borders. Nor would it have control over its own fiscal policies. Not only with regard to the crucial question of immigration, but also with regard to many other matters of fundamental importance, the ultimate power of decision will rest with the Arab majority of the proposed Federal State. The proposal is a variant of the Federal scheme put forward last year by His Majesty’s Government, generally known as the Morrison Plan, which was rejected at the time both by Jews and Arabs, as well as by the Government of the United States. The plan entails for the Jews all the disadvantages of partition—and a very bad partition geographically—without the compensating advantages of a real partition: statehood, independence and free immigration. 8.  As regards the Majority proposals, we wish to make the following observations: these proposals are those of the Committee. Needless to say, they are not the proposals of the Jewish Agency which, in fact, were ruled out by the Committee. They do not represent satisfaction of the rights of the Jewish people. They are a serious attenuation of these rights. At the hearings of your Committee we fully defined these rights and their justification; I will not here impose upon you by restating them. Partition clearly was never contemplated by the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate. It was intended that Palestine, the whole of Palestine, shall ultimately become a Jewish State. This is the clear testimony of Mr Lloyd George, who was the British Prime Minister at the time of the issuance of the Declaration. The land referred to as Palestine in the Declaration included what is now Trans-Jordan. The Royal Commission of 1937 declared that “the field in which the Jewish National Home was to be established was understood at the time of the Balfour Declaration to be the whole of historic Palestine.” That area has already been partitioned. The first partitioning of Palestine took place in 1922 when Trans-Jordan, representing 3/4 of the original area of Palestine, was cut off and has since been set up by the British as an Arab kingdom. Thus, one Arab state has already been carved out of the area assigned to the Jewish National Home. It is now proposed to carve a second Arab state out of the remainder of the country. In other words, the Jewish National Home is now to be confined to less than 1/8 of the territory originally set aside for

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it. This is a sacrifice which the Jewish people should not be asked to make. The legitimate national aspirations of the Arab peoples have been fully satisfied. President Truman, in his letter of 28 October 1946, to the king of Saudi-Arabia, calls attention to this fact. “I am happy to note,” he writes, “that most of the liberated peoples (of the Near East) are now citizens of independent countries. The Jewish National Home, however, has not yet been fully developed.” The Arabs possess today independent monarchies in Saudi-Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Iraq and Trans-Jordan, and independent republics in Syria and Lebanon. A population of 17 millions in Arab Asia occupies an area of 1,290,000 square miles, enormously rich in resources and potentialities. This area, which formerly belonged to the Ottoman Empire, and which, together with Egypt, was liberated by the Allied Nations, includes all the centers which are primarily associated in history with Arab and Moslem traditions. Palestine, the historic home of the Jewish people, which the nations of the world after the last war declared to be the Jewish National Home, is, after the loss of Trans-Jordan, only 10,000 square miles in extent, and it is now proposed, in the Majority Report, further to reduce the area of the Jewish National Home by almost one half. It is not our intention at this time to enter into a detailed discussion of the many territorial provisions in the proposals of the Majority Report. But we feel constrained to point out at least two features which are open to most serious objections. The Majority Report eliminates western Galilee—that is most of Galilee—from the Jewish State. The Peel Commission included western Galilee in the Jewish State. For reasons which we shall endeavor to explain more fully at a later stage, we regard the proposed exclusion of western Galilee as an unjustified and a particularly grievous handicap to the development of the Jewish State. Under the terms of the Majority proposal, the city of Jerusalem is set up as a separate government unit. We would not question the propriety of placing the old city of Jerusalem, which contains the holy places, as well as the holy shrines which may be outside the walls of the old city, in the custody of an international trustee. But outside the old city a modern new city has grown up which contains a compact Jewish section of approximately 90,000 inhabitants. This new city includes the central national, religious and educational Institutions of the Jewish people of Palestine. Excluding all of Jerusalem from the Jewish State would be a particularly severe blow. Jerusalem holds a unique place in Jewish life and religious traditions. It is the ancient capital of the Jewish nation and the symbol throughout the ages of Jewish nationhood. The undefeated resolve of our people to be reconstituted as a nation in the land of Israel was epitomized in the solemn vow of the Psalmist and of the exiled people throughout the ages: “If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning.” We strongly urge that the Jewish section of modern Jerusalem, outside the walls, be included in the Jewish State.

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There are other modifications which we will take up at a later stage of these discussions. 9.  To return to the basic solution of partition proposed by the Special Committee, it entails, as we have said, a very heavy sacrifice on the part of the Jewish people. But if such a sacrifice is made the inexorable condition of an immediate and final solution, we would be prepared to assume the responsibility for recommending acquiescence to the supreme organs of our movement—subject, of course, to further discussion of the constitution and territorial provisions which we assume will take place in the course of these sessions. We would be prepared to do so because the proposal makes possible the immediate re-establishment of the Jewish State, an ideal for which our people ceaselessly strove through the centuries, and because it ensures immediate and continuing Jewish immigration which as events have demonstrated is possible only under a Jewish State. We would do so also as our contribution to the solution of a grave international problem and as evidence of our willingness to join with the community of nations in an effort to bring peace at last to the troubled land which is precious to the heart of mankind. 10.  We are impressed with the recommendation in the Report of an economic union between the two states. We approve of the conclusion reached by the Committee that “in view of the limited area and resources of Palestine, it is essential that, to the extent feasible and consistent with the creation of two independent states, the economic unity of the country should be preserved.” This appears to us to be a progressive and statesmanlike conception of great promise. The Jewish Agency is prepared to accept this proposal of an economic union. It should, however, be understood that this economic union—while it would bestow some benefits on the Jewish State—would also impose grave sacrifices. The acceptable limit of these sacrifices is, in principle, clear: the Jewish State must have in its own hands those instruments of financing and economic control that are necessary to carry out large-scale Jewish immigration and the related economic development. The Jewish State must have independent access to those world sources of capital and supplies that are indispensable for the accomplishment of these purposes. The Majority Report provides, in effect, for a large subsidy from the Jewish to the Arab State, through equal sharing by the two States of the net revenues from customs and joint services. This subsidy would be a very heavy one in relation to the national income. The Jewish Agency would, however, be prepared to assume this burden as one of its sacrifices designed to find a way out of the present intolerable impasse. 11.  We mean to be good neighbors, not only to the Arab state of Palestine, but to the Arab states throughout the Middle East. And certainly we mean scrupulously to respect the equal rights of the Arab population in the free and democratic Jewish State. With the removal of political friction and

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bitterness which we hope will eventually result from the setting up of these two independent states, each people master in its own home, it should be possible to usher in an era of progress and regeneration which would be a boon to all the peoples in that important part of the world. What the Jewish people has already achieved in Palestine in a short time and in the face of enormous obstacles is indicative of what it hopes to do in the future along with, and in fullest cooperation with, all of its neighbors. Neighborliness, however, is a two-sided affair. Sincerely and without reservations we bring the offer of peace and friendship. If it is met with the same spirit, rich and abundant blessings will redound to all. If not, we shall be compelled to do what any people must do under such circumstances— defend our rights to the utmost. We have built a nation in Palestine. That nation now demands its independence. It will not be dislodged. Its national status will not be denied. We are asked to make an enormous sacrifice to attain that which, if uninterfered with, we would have attained long ago. In sadness, and most reluctantly, we are prepared to make this sacrifice. Beyond it we cannot, we will not go. 12.  The Report recommends that “during the transitional period the authority entrusted with the task of administering Palestine and preparing it for independence shall be responsible to the United Nations.” In view of the statement of His Majesty’s Government, it is not clear now which will be this authority. We favor an international authority under the United Nations to supervise and insure the implementation of all its decisions. Above all, we urge that the transitional period be as brief as possible. A period of two years is, in our judgment, considerably longer than is necessary or desirable. It is to be assumed that the transfer of the powers and functions of administration to the two peoples in their respective states would not take place at the end of the transitional period, but would be inaugurated immediately and consummated as rapidly as possible. The Jewish people in Palestine stand ready to assume immediately all responsibilities which the establishment of the Jewish State will involve. We agree with the Report that “whatever the solution, enforcement measures on an extensive scale may be necessary for some time.” The Jewish Agency hopes that the transition from the present status of the country to the new status of two independent states will be attended by a minimum of friction and conflict. Once the boundaries are defined and the states established by the United Nations they will be entitled to have their territorial integrity and sovereign rights respected and protected as fully as all other nations which are covenanted to peaceful relations under the Charter. All members of the United Nations, whether in the neighborhood of Palestine or elsewhere, who are bound by the principles of the Charter, will be expected to respect the rights of these new states, under pain of being condemned as aggressors and subjected to international sanctions. Moreover, we assume that in the constitution of whatever military or

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police force may be required during the transitional period, full use will be made of the trained manpower available in Palestine which will be prepared to offer its services to the United Nations to maintain law and order. The Jewish State, when it is established, will respect the sovereignty of its neighbor states as fully as it will defend its own. The Jewish people in Palestine is prepared to defend itself. It is not impressed by idle threats. A people that has survived the accumulated fury of the centuries, faced powerful empires in a bitter battle for survival, and during the last war saw hundreds of thousands of its sons fighting for freedom in  all the liberating armies of the Allied nations—while the head of the Palestine Arab Higher committee was broadcasting Nazi propaganda from Berlin and congratulating Hitler on his African victories over the Allies—such a people will not be intimidated. Nor, we are confident, will this great international body which is earnestly wrestling with this tremendously difficult problem and which is seeking a just and equitable solution, be terrorized into surrendering its high mandate. We recall with satisfaction that similar threats uttered by the same parties during the first Special Session did not influence the resolution of the Assembly. Just as the Special Committee was not impressed by these threats during its hearings, we hope that these same threats will not influence this great deliberative body which must be guided by principles of truth and justice—the underlying principles of its Charter. The Jewish people in Palestine, I repeat, will be prepared to defend itself. It will welcome, of course, whatever support can properly be given to it by the United Nations or its members, pursuant to the decisions of the United Nations. In this connection we must take note of the announcement made by the representative of the United Kingdom that its forces may not be available to the United Nations during the transitional period, and may be subject to early withdrawal from Palestine. In that event, in order to avoid the creation of a dangerous vacuum which might affect public security, the Jewish people of Palestine will provide without delay the necessary effectives to maintain public security within their country. Mr Chairman and members of this Committee: with this United Nations Report we have reached one of the important crossroads of history. The course which will be followed will be fraught with destiny for all, the Jews, the Arabs and the United Nations. We hope that it will be a course of wisdom, justice and courage. The Jewish people hopefully await the decision of this body. Twenty-five years ago a similar international organization recognized the historic claims of the Jewish people, sanctioned our program and set us firmly on the road of realization. We were not then regarded as intruders or invaders—not even by the foremost leaders and spokesmen of the Arab world—but as a people returning home after a long sad exile. The world approved and acclaimed the return of Israel to its ancient homeland. The statesmen of the world faced the tragic problem of Jewish

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national homelessness and they set about to solve it. The Jewish people was confirmed in its right to rebuild its national life in its historic home. It eagerly seized the long-hoped-for opportunity and proceeded to rebuild that ancient land of Israel in a manner which evoked the admiration of the whole world. It has made the wilderness bloom as the rose. Surely this great international body, surveying this faithful and fruitful work, will wish to see that work continued, that undertaking advanced, that hope of the centuries consummated. It will be a noble achievement which will redound to the everlasting glory of this world organization; it will be a supreme act of international justice.

The minority recommendation stated by Mr Vladimir Simic (Yugoslavia) to the UN Ad Hoc Committee, 14 October 194731 Summary Press Release 14 October 1947 Mr Vladimir Simic (Yugoslavia) recalled that his country had been represented in the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, and that Yugoslavia’s views were set forth in the minority proposal (federation). Mr Simic stated that the best solution would have been one reached by common consent of the Arabs and Jews. This, however, did not seem possible in view of the existing state of tension. Mr Simic declared that an analysis of historical and legal facts led to the conclusion that both Arabs and Jews had a historical association with Palestine, and that the right of both peoples to independence was a result of the national awareness of both. He added that the maintenance of economic unity in Palestine would serve the interests of both Arabs and Jews. Mr Simic declared that equal civil, political and religious rights for all the inhabitants of Palestine was the basic prerequisite if a democratic state were to be set up. He made it clear that, in his opinion, a solution of the Palestine problem did not at the same time constitute a solution of the Jewish problem in general. Mr Simic then asked that the British Mandate over Palestine be terminated, the foreign administration withdrawn and the country proclaimed independent.

31 United Nations, Ad Hoc Committee on The Palestinian Question, Summary Records of Meetings, 25 September 1947–25 November 1947, Lake Success, New York, 14 October 1947, pp. 82–4.

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Mr Simic argued that the Mandatory Power had failed in its task in Palestine, and had thereby tended to make the solution of the Palestine problem more difficult. The country, he explained, had not been prepared for independence by the Mandatory Power, which had not fostered the development of appropriate institutions. He also criticized the increase in military expenditure in comparison with the limited credits for education and health. Mr Simic said that if the Mandatory Power had developed self-governing institutions in Palestine, Arabs and Jews would have been better prepared to cooperate. He then outlined the proposals of the minority (federal) plan and explained its advantages. He argued that the proposed transition period of three years was too long. With regard to Jewish immigration, Mr Simic declared that there was a certain interdependence between the survival of the European Jewish refugees and the solution of the question of Palestine. Both, he said, were international questions. He went on to explain the proposals on this matter put forward by the minority report. He also submitted a resolution calling upon the Mandatory Power immediately to admit into Palestine the Jewish deportees now living in the Cyprus camps.

Address of Mr Camille Chamoun (Lebanon) to the UN General Assembly, 26 November 194732 [translated from French] Mr President, fellow representatives, or rather my friends—for at the moment when we are about to separate I think that this latter word is the most appropriate and I should therefore like to begin with it—to judge by the press reports which reach us regularly every two or three days, I can well imagine to what pressure, to what maneuvers your sense of justice, equity and democracy has been exposed during the last thirty-six hours. I can also imagine how you have resisted all these attempts in order to preserve what we hold dearest and most sacred in the United Nations, to keep intact the principles of the Charter, and to safeguard democracy and the democratic methods of our organization. My friends, think of these democratic methods, of the freedom in voting which is sacred to each of our delegations. If we were to abandon this for the tyrannical system of tackling each delegation in hotel rooms, in bed, in corridors and anterooms,

United Nations, “Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly,” Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, 16.9.1947–29.11.1947, vol. 2, 110th–128th Meetings, Lake Success, New York, pp. 1341–5.

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to threaten them with economic sanctions or to bribe them with promises in order to compel them to vote one way or another, think of what our organization would become in the future. Should we be a democratic organization? Should we be an organization worthy of respect in the eyes of the world? At this supreme juncture, I beg you to think for a moment of the far-reaching consequences which might result from such maneuvers, especially if we yielded to them. I belong to one of the smallest members of this organization; neither on this occasion nor on any other have I or my government given a favorable reception to any sort of pressure. Millions of human beings, millions of young men did not die on the fields of battle in order that the Charter’s fundamental, sacred and immortal principles should be flouted and trampled underfoot, or that democratic methods should be replaced by a veiled and dark tyranny. They died in order that the principles of liberty and self-determination, which are the basis and essence of our Charter, might triumph in such an organization as this. And if, to turn from the general to the particular, I may refer to that great nation, the United States, which throughout its history has represented for all peoples the ideals of liberty, justice and equity, I am forced to note that unfortunately that giant, the United States, is putting on the fatal shirt of Nessus. The rule of self-determination—there is no need for me to dwell on it at length—is the basis of our organization; it is set out in Article 1 of the Charter. The representative of El Salvador has explained it in terms which no one can deny: it is self-determination for peoples, in particular for those that are not self-governing, for self-governing peoples have no need for this fundamental principle to be applied to them. Had we been aware of the obligation imposed on us by the categorical terms of the Charter, to safeguard the right of peoples to govern themselves and to decide their own destiny, we should, before arriving at today’s conclusion—at the resolution—at least have adopted a procedure of popular consultation in order to ascertain the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of Palestine, expressed for once and for all, in such a way as to leave no doubt in anyone’s mind. What sort of popular consultation have we attempted? Is it for us to define and decide here the future of these populations? There is no need for me to add anything to the brilliant and eloquent exposition given by the representative of El Salvador. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has told you that if you create an Arab state, and if you continue to talk of selfdetermination, this principle should apply to both the Arabs and the Jews. In those circumstances, both would vote for an independent state. That is a rather curious way of getting round the difficulty. In a land shaped by geography and history, there can be no separate consultation first

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of one group alone, and then of the other. All the citizens of that land should be consulted, and the majority of the citizens should determine the future of the country. The USSR representative’s argument, if it were pushed to its logical conclusion, would lead to the following sequence of events: self-determination for the Jewish people, therefore a separate Jewish state. Now there is an Arab minority almost equal to the majority in this separate Jewish state, as you have envisaged it. Will the principle of self-determination, as the USSR representative understands it, apply to this Arab minority? If it applies to the Arab minority, there will be a fresh sub-division in the Jewish state for the sake of the Arab part and the Jewish population. Pushing this argument still further, if there is a Jewish minority in the sub-territory formed by the Arab minority, a new sub-division must be made into a Jewish sub-state and an Arab sub-state. That is where we are led by arguments which do not conform either to the principles of the Charter or to the actual state of world affairs. At a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, the representative of Canada asked by virtue of what legal principle were we upholdingd the plan for a unitary state. The representative of Pakistan replied immediately that it was in conformity with the principle of self-determination on which the Charter was based. I might add in reply to the Canadian representative’s question that the plan for a unitary State of Palestine is based on the same principles on which rests the existence of a Canadian state today. We know Canadian history. We know about the struggle of the FrenchCanadian population with the population of English origin. We know that, during and after this struggle, Canada remained a united state because the wishes of the minority have never succeeded in partitioning Canada and in interfering with the majority’s wishes. The representatives of Canada and the United States have told us, in a somewhat irregular manner, that if we do not adopt this plan, there is no other which can be adopted at present. At the very start, an attempt is being made to force you to vote by saying that there is no other plan which can possibly be adopted. You are being placed before a sort of vacuum and, to avoid that vacuum, you will be driven to vote for this plan despite your convictions, and despite your knowledge that it is unjust and inequitable. In history, there was a tyrant who conquered Switzerland. His name was Gessler. He put his hat on top of a pole. Everyone who passed had to bow before Gessler’s hat. The William Tell legend was born from this historical incident. The vacuum which we are shown today is just like Gessler’s hat. So far, despite my forty-seven years, I have never known tyranny of thought; and I imagine that we could never recognize the dictatorship of thought, particularly in a democratic and liberal organization like ours.

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There is no other plan before you. Is that a reason for adopting a plan which does not convince you? Is that a reason for adopting this plan, when the representative of the United States himself tells you that it contains imperfections and is not all that it should be? When, for instance, the representative of Sweden has just told you that this plan is not convincing, but that we are faced with a vacuum and that there is no other plan, is that a reason forcing you to adopt it? What is happening to our consciences here? Have we or have we not a conscience? Are we or are we not free to make a decision? If we are free, we should reject the plan. What will happen if we reject it? It is very simple. The Ad Hoc Committee, a special committee, or some other organ will be obliged to revise the plan submitted to us, taking into account our unfavorable vote. We have already had similar examples, and they are likely to be repeated many times in the future. Our Assembly is logical because, when a resolution is rejected, it is either abandoned or submitted for study to committees which may be appointed at any time to study a question and to find a solution based on the revision of the unjust plan on which you are asked to vote. In a statement which I had the honor to make to the Ad Hoc Committee, I ventured to warn the Assembly against creating a precedent fraught with very serious consequences. I said that if this precedent were admitted, we ought to write in letters of fire and blood above the doorway of our organization that here we have created a procedure for encouraging political, racial and religious minorities to break away, that we have encouraged minorities to form independent states, and that we have worked to destroy, in this way, the political and social structure of many states which are already members of our organization, or which have not yet joined it. It would appear that the prophecy which I ventured to make to you ought not to be realized for a long time. It is, however, about to be realized if we take into account the news which has reached us this morning. In an article published this morning by the New York Times—and we know that the New York Times is not a paper which favors the Arab cause and that it does not publish its articles to help the Arab cause—we read this news which comes to us from Moscow dated 25 November of this year: “The newspaper Pravda asserted today that the time was coming when the people of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan bordering the Soviet Union would regain their freedom.” That is the movement which is growing up alongside the resolution which is before you, and which you are in danger of adopting. I am not raising the question because of the news which we have heard today, but in order to oppose all the possibilities which may arise tomorrow; and I want to quote only cases known to me of existing minorities. I will quote the case of Kurdistan where there are minorities, of Yugoslavia where there are minorities, of the Dominican Republic where there are minorities, and I could continue this list ad infinitum.

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You see that the example which you are giving today, and the precedent which you are creating, will give rise to a number of cases throughout the world; and I am certain that the United States delegation, which for reasons of which I am ignorant is so ardently supporting the division and partition of Palestine, would be the first to regret that that partition had taken place. I have finished my explanations, but I should like to close my statement by thanking, with all my heart, the delegations which, by their abstentions or by their negative votes, have so far prevented, or will prevent, the adoption of a resolution which I can see already smirched with the blood of all the innocent victims who will be the first to suffer if it is adopted.

Chapter Nine

Fourth Crossroads: United Nations Resolution, 29 November 1947

Resolution 181 (II). Future government of Palestine, 29 November 19471 The General Assembly, Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future government of Palestine at the second regular session; Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document A/364) including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee,

Can be found on the internet: http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/5ba47a5c6cef541b802563e0 00493b8c/7f0af2bd897689b785256c330061d253

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Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations; Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948; Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below; Requests that





a The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in

the plan for its implementation; b The Security Council consider, if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution; c The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution; d The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities

envisaged for it in this plan; Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect; Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations, and Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of the members of the Commission referred to in Part I, Section B, paragraph 1 below, on such basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the Commission with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Commission by the General Assembly.

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PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION PART I Future constitution and government of Palestine A. Termination of Mandate, Partition and Independence

1 The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in

any case not later than 1 August 1948. 2 The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.   The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far in advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the Mandate and to evacuate each area.   The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948. 3 Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in part III of this plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in parts II and III below. 4 The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its recommendation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of the independence of the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period.

B. Steps Preparatory to Independence

1 A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative

of each of five Member States. The Members represented on the Commission shall be elected by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise, as possible.

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2 The administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory Power with-

draws its armed forces, be progressively turned over to the Commission; which shall act in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance of the Security Council. The mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent co-ordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over and administer areas which have been evacuated.   In the discharge of this administrative responsibility the Commission shall have authority to issue necessary regulations and take other measures as required.   The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of the measures recommended by the General Assembly. 3 On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine. Nevertheless, the boundaries as described in part II of this plan are to be modified in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary. 4 The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other public organizations of the Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of the Commission.   If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission shall communicate that fact to the Security Council for such action with respect to that State as the Security Council may deem proper, and to the Secretary-General for communication to the Members of the United Nations. 5 Subject to the provisions of these recommendations, during the transitional period the Provisional Councils of Government, acting under the Commission, shall have full authority in the areas under their control, including authority over matters of immigration and land regulation. 6 The Provisional Council of Government of each State acting under the Commission, shall progressively receive from the Commission full responsibility for the administration of that State in the period between the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the State’s independence.

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7 The Commission shall instruct the Provisional Councils of



Government of both the Arab and Jewish States, after their formation, to proceed to the establishment of administrative organs of government, central and local. 8 The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, within the shortest time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents of that State, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes.   This armed militia in each State shall, for operational purposes, be under the command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, but general political and military control, including the choice of the militia’s High Command, shall be exercised by the Commission. 9 The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, not later than two months after the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold elections to the Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on democratic lines.   The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up by the Provisional Council of Government and approved by the Commission. Qualified voters for each State for this election shall be persons over eighteen years of age who are: (a) Palestinian citizens residing in that State and (b) Arabs and Jews residing in the State, although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a notice of intention to become citizens of such State.   Arabs and Jews residing in the City of Jerusalem who have signed a notice of intention to become citizens, the Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the Jewish State, shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish States respectively.   Women may vote and be elected to the Constituent Assemblies.   During the transitional period no Jew shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Arab State, and no Arab shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Jewish State, except by special leave of the Commission. 10 The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission. The constitutions of the States shall embody Chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in section C below and include inter alia provisions for:

a Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal

suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation, and an executive body responsible to the legislature;

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involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered; c Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations; d Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory

rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication, education, assembly and association; e Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of national security, provided that each State shall control residence within its borders.

11 The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commission

of three members to make whatever arrangements are possible for economic co-operation, with a view to establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the Joint Economic Board, as provided in section D below. 12 During the period between the adoption of the recommendations on the question of Palestine by the General Assembly and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for administration in areas from which it has not withdrawn its armed forces. The Commission shall assist the mandatory Power in the carrying out of these functions. Similarly the mandatory Power shall co-operate with the Commission in the execution of its functions. 13 With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in the functioning of administrative services and that, on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, the whole administration shall be in the charge of the Provisional Councils and the Joint Economic Board, respectively, acting under the Commission, there shall be a progressive transfer, from the mandatory Power to the Commission, of responsibility for all the functions of government, including that of maintaining law and order in the areas from which the forces of the mandatory Power have been withdrawn. 14 The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations of the General Assembly and by such instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue.

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  The measures taken by the Commission, within the

recommendations of the General Assembly, shall become immediately effective unless the Commission has previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council.   The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports, or more frequently if desirable, to the Security Council. 15 The Commission shall make its final report to the next regular

session of the General Assembly and to the Security Council simultaneously.

C. Declaration A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the provisional government of each proposed State before independence. It shall contain inter alia the following clauses:

General Provision

The stipulations contained in the declaration are recognized as fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

Chapter 1 Holy Places, religious buildings and sites

1 Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or

sites shall not be denied or impaired. 2 In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizens of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum.   Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing rights, subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum. 3 Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Government that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Government may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Government may carry it out itself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

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4 No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious

building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the State.   No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly’s recommendations.

5 The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the right to

determine whether the provisions of the Constitution of the State in relation to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within the borders of the State and the religious rights appertaining thereto, are being properly applied and respected, and to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community with respect to such places, buildings and sites. He shall receive full co-operation and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in the State.

Chapter 2 Religious and minority rights

1 Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship,

subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all. 2 No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or sex. 3 All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws. 4 The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected. 5 Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality. 6 The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish minority, respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions.   The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while

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conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights. 7 No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any citizen of the State of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.



8 No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State (by



a Jew in the Arab State) shall be allowed except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be paid previous to dispossession.

Chapter 3 Citizenship, international conventions and financial obligations 1 Citizenship. Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City



of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights. Persons over the age of eighteen years may opt, within one year from the date of recognition of independence of the State in which they reside, for citizenship of the other State, providing that no Arab residing in the area of the proposed Arab State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Jewish State and no Jew residing in the proposed Jewish State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Arab State. The exercise of this right of option will be taken to include the wives and children under eighteen years of age of persons so opting.   Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish State and Jews residing in the area of the proposed Arab State who have signed a notice of intention to opt for citizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of that State, but not in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the State in which they reside. 2 International conventions.



a The State shall be bound by all the international agreements

and conventions, both general and special, to which Palestine has become a party. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by the State throughout the period for which they were concluded.

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b Any dispute about the applicability and continued validity of

international conventions or treaties signed or adhered to by the mandatory Power on behalf of Palestine shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court. 3 Financial obligations.









a The State shall respect and fulfill all financial obligations

of whatever nature assumed on behalf of Palestine by the mandatory Power during the exercise of the Mandate and recognized by the State. This provision includes the right of public servants to pensions, compensation or gratuities. b These obligations shall be fulfilled through participation in the Joint economic Board in respect of those obligations applicable to Palestine as a whole, and individually in respect of those applicable to, and fairly apportionable between, the States. c A Court of Claims, affiliated with the Joint Economic Board, and composed of one member appointed by the United Nations, one representative of the United Kingdom and one representative of the State concerned, should be established. Any dispute between the United Kingdom and the State respecting claims not recognized by the latter should be referred to that Court. d Commercial concessions granted in respect of any part of Palestine prior to the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly shall continue to be valid according to their terms, unless modified by agreement between the concession-holder and the State.

Chapter 4 Miscellaneous provisions



1 The provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of the declaration shall be under

the guarantee of the United Nations, and no modifications shall be made in them without the assent of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Any Member of the United Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the General Assembly any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and the General Assembly may thereupon make such recommendations as it may deem proper in the circumstances. 2 Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of this declaration shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.

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D. ECONOMIC UNION AND TRANSIT 1 The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall enter into



an undertaking with respect to economic union and transit. This undertaking shall be drafted by the commission provided for in section B, paragraph 1, utilizing to the greatest possible extent the advice and cooperation of representative organizations and bodies from each of the proposed States. It shall contain provisions to establish the Economic Union of Palestine and provide for other matters of common interest. If by 1 April 1948 the Provisional Councils of Government have not entered into the undertaking, the undertaking shall be put into force by the Commission.

The Economic Union of Palestine 2 The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine shall be:



a A customs union;



b A joint currency system providing for a single foreign exchange

rate; c Operation in the common interest on a non-discriminatory basis of railways; inter-State highways; postal, telephone and telegraphic services, and port and airports involved in international trade and commerce; d Joint economic development, especially in respect of irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation; e Access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem on a nondiscriminatory basis to water and power facilities. 3 There shall be established a Joint Economic Board, which shall consist of three representatives of each of the two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The foreign members shall be appointed in the first instance for a term of three years; they shall serve as individuals and not as representatives of States.





4 The functions of the Joint Economic Board shall be to implement

either directly or by delegation the measures necessary to realize the objectives of the Economic Union. It shall have all powers of organization and administration necessary to fulfill its functions. 5 The States shall bind themselves to put into effect the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The Board’s decisions shall be taken by a majority vote. 6 In the event of failure of a State to take the necessary action the Board may, by a vote of six members, decide to withhold an appropriate portion of that part of the customs revenue to which the State

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in question is entitled under the Economic Union. Should the State persist in its failure to co-operate, the Board may decide by a simple majority vote upon such further sanctions, including disposition of funds which it has withheld, as it may deem appropriate. In relation to economic development, the functions of the Board shall be the planning, investigation and encouragement of joint development projects, but it shall not undertake such projects except with the assent of both States and the City of Jerusalem, in the event that Jerusalem is directly involved in the development project. In regard to the joint currency system the currencies circulating in the two States and the City of Jerusalem shall be issued under the authority of the Joint Economic Board, which shall be the sole issuing authority and which shall determine the reserves to be held against such currencies. So far as is consistent with paragraph 2 (b) above, each State may operate its own central bank, control its own fiscal and credit policy, its foreign exchange receipts and expenditures, the grant of import licenses, and may conduct international financial operations on its own faith and credit. During the first two years after the termination of the Mandate, the Joint Economic Board shall have the authority to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that—to the extent that the total foreign exchange revenues of the two States from the export of goods and services permit, and provided that each State takes appropriate measures to conserve its own foreign exchange resources—each State shall have available, in any twelve months’ period, foreign exchange sufficient to assure the supply of quantities of imported goods and services for consumption in its territory equivalent to the quantities of such goods and services consumed in that territory in the twelve months’ period ending 31 December 1947. All economic authority not specifically vested in the Joint Economic Board is reserved to each State. There shall be a common customs tariff with complete freedom of trade between the States, and between the States and the City of Jerusalem. The tariff schedules shall be drawn up by a Tariff Commission, consisting of representatives of each of the States in equal numbers, and shall be submitted to the Joint Economic Board for approval by a majority vote. In case of disagreement in the Tariff Commission, the Joint Economic Board shall arbitrate the points of difference. In the event that the Tariff Commission fails to draw up any schedule by a date to be fixed, the Joint Economic Board shall determine the tariff schedule.

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13 The following items shall be a first charge on the customs and other



common revenue of the Joint Economic Board: a The expenses of the customs service and of the operation of the joint services; b The administrative expenses of the Joint Economic Board;



c The financial obligations of the Administration of Palestine



consisting of: i The service of the outstanding public debt; ii The cost of superannuation benefits, now being paid or falling due in the future, in accordance with the rules and to the extent established by paragraph 3 of chapter 3 above. 14 After these obligations have been met in full, the surplus revenue from the customs and other common services shall be divided in the following manner: not less than 5 per cent and not more than 10 per cent to the City of Jerusalem; the residue shall be allocated to each State by the Joint Economic Board equitably, with the objective of maintaining a sufficient and suitable level of government and social services in each State, except that the share of either State shall not exceed the amount of that State’s contribution to the revenues of the Economic Union by more than approximately four million pounds in any year. The amount granted may be adjusted by the Board according to the price level in relation to the prices prevailing at the time of the establishment of the Union. After five years, the principles of the distribution of the joint revenues may be revised by the Joint Economic Board on a basis of equity. 15 All international conventions and treaties affecting customs tariff rates, and those communications services under the jurisdiction of the Joint Economic Board, shall be entered into by both States. In these matters, the two States shall be bound to act in accordance with the majority vote of the Joint Economic Board. 16 The Joint Economic Board shall endeavour to secure for Palestine’s export fair and equal access to world markets. 17 All enterprises operated by the Joint Economic Board shall pay fair wages on a uniform basis.







Freedom of transit and visit 18 The undertaking shall contain provisions preserving freedom of

transit and visit for all residents or citizens of both States and of the City of Jerusalem, subject to security considerations; provided that each State and the City shall control residence within its borders.

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Termination, modification and interpretation of the undertaking 19 The undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall remain in

force for a period of ten years. It shall continue in force until notice of termination, to take effect two years thereafter, is given by either of the parties. 20 During the initial ten-year period, the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom may not be modified except by consent of both parties and with the approval of the General Assembly. 21 Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the international Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.

E. Assets

1 The movable assets of the Administration of Palestine shall be



allocated to the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem on an equitable basis. Allocations should be made by the United Nations Commission referred to in section B, paragraph 1, above. Immovable assets shall become the property of the government of the territory in which they are situated. 2 During the period between the appointment of the United Nations Commission and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power shall, except in respect of ordinary operations, consult with the Commission on any measure which it may contemplate involving the liquidation, disposal or encumbering of the assets of the Palestine Government, such as the accumulated treasury surplus, the proceeds of Government bond issues, State lands or any other asset.

F. Admission to Membership in The United Nations When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State as envisaged in this plan has become effective and the declaration and undertaking, as envisaged in this plan, have been signed by either of them, sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the United Nations in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.



0





















United Kingdom

Egypt

Iraq

Lebanon

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Yemen

Afghanistan

India

Iran

Pakistan





















0























0























0























0























0



Vote in the plenary session of the General Assembly, November 29

Roll call vote in the special committee

Prediction in meeting of the American branch of the Jewish Agency Directorate

Journalists’ assessment, October 27

Assessment of Harold Beeley, October 17

Assessment at the opening of the General Assembly

United States

F

E

D

C

B

A

 supports partition;  opposes; 0 abstains; ? unknown

Voting assessments and actual votes in the UN General Assembly2

Fourth Crossroads 295



0

?



?



?

?

?













0

Turkey

China

Thailand

Liberia

Ethiopia

Philippines

Soviet Union

Ukraine

Byelorussia

Czechoslovakia

Poland

Yugoslavia

Canada

New Zealand

South Africa

Australia

0







_?













_?

_?



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





 ?







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

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0

0

0

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

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0

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0

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0

0 







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?

0

0



0

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



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



0

?

_?















0













0



?

0



F Vote in the plenary session of the General Assembly, November 29

E Roll call vote in the special committee

D Prediction in meeting of the American branch of the Jewish Agency Directorate

C Journalists’ assessment, October 27

B

Assessment of Harold Beeley, October 17

A

Assessment at the opening of the General Assembly

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0

0



0









0















Belgium

Holland

Luxembourg

Denmark

Norway

Sweden

Iceland

Greece

Argentina

Cuba

Brazil

Chile

Guatemala

Peru

Uruguay























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

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



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 ?













0













0

 ?









0



0

0













0









0

0

0

0

0

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

0





0



















Vote in the plenary session of the General Assembly, November 29

Roll call vote in the special committee

Prediction in meeting of the American branch of the Jewish Agency Directorate

Journalists’ assessment, October 27

Assessment of Harold Beeley, October 17

Assessment at the opening of the General Assembly

France

F

E

D

C

B

A

Fourth Crossroads 297







0









?







Bolivia

Colombia

Ecuador

Mexico

Paraguay

Nicaragua

Panama

Honduras

Haiti

Costa Rica

El Salvador

Dominican Republic





















_?





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0

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

 ?

 ?

 ?

 ?

 ?

 ?





0









0

 ?

0



0

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

0



0

0



 

0





0







? 

0



0





0



0





2

From Yehoshua Freundlich, From Destruction to Restoration: Zionist Policy from the End of the Second World War to the Establishment of the State of Israel (Tel Aviv: University Publication Industries, 1994), pp. 202–201 [Hebrew]. We thank Dr Yehoshua Freundlich for permitting us to publish this section.



Venezuela

F Vote in the plenary session of the General Assembly, November 29

E Roll call vote in the special committee

D Prediction in meeting of the American branch of the Jewish Agency Directorate

C Journalists’ assessment, October 27

B

Assessment of Harold Beeley, October 17

A

Assessment at the opening of the General Assembly

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C h a p t e r TEN

Fifth Crossroads: Following the resolution

Azriel Carlebach, “Shehecheyanu”: A description of the Zionist reaction to the UN resolution, 30 November 19471 7,000 Jews crowded into Nicholas Hall one hour after the historic declaration, 10,000 blocked the subway tunnels, thousands upon thousands filled the streets around the Assembly building. The morning papers reported that Weizmann and Shertok would be the speakers. The Jews brought ladders and climbed up to the windows of the hall. They danced the horah on Broadway. They would grasp the hem of the garment of any Eretz-Yisraeli, surround him, and dance around him. The police arrived to enforce order, but in the end handed over their loudspeaker cars to the demonstrators. The Eretz-Yisraelim got up on the cars and gave speeches to the crowd. In the hall, the aged labor leader, Schlossberg, covered his head, tears in his eyes, when he said at the opening of the meeting: “Let us all join in the Shehecheyanu2 prayer.”

In Azriel Carlebach, Sefer ha-Tekumah (Tel-Aviv: Sifriat Ma’ariv, 1967), pp. 9–11. We thank Tekumah Carlebach-Mandel, daughter of Dr Azriel Carlebach, z’l, for giving us permission to publish this text. 2 [Translator’s note: This is a benediction recited by Jews at different times, including unusual, cyclical, new, or long-awaited occasions. The entire prayer translates: “Blessed are You, Lord our God, who has given us life, kept us, and brought us to this occasion.” The name, Shehecheyanu, corresponds to “who has given us life.”] 1

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7,000 Jews in the hall and tens of thousands outside prayed in unison: Shehecheyanu . . . that we have been so privileged. We. We, and not the six million—said Shertok. Our thoughts turned to Warsaw. What would be happening there tonight? In all of the thousands of Jewish communities. In the hearts of all the millions of dreamers for whom the state was intended, all the old and young people who went to the gas chambers, with this hope throbbing in their hearts. All the fighters from the Bilu pioneer days. Everyone who was infected with malaria. Everyone murdered on the roads of Eretz-Yisrael. All the prisoners at Acre. All those who gave their lives that we might live. Shehecheyanu… Thousands of workshops all over New York stopped work today. Next to the machines stood speakers, broadcasting the meeting of the UN General Assembly. All ears and hearts were in the hall of the General Assembly, not at work. And when the vote count was over the machines stopped. Everyone hugged one another. They drank, celebrated, ran home. My taxi was moving in the center of town—so Abba Hushi tells me. The radio was broadcasting advertisements for coffee and soap. Suddenly the broadcast was interrupted and there was a special announcement: the UN had voted in favor of a Jewish state. The driver stopped in the middle of the noisy traffic. He jumped out of his car, pulled me out and kissed me in the middle of the street. “I’m a Jew!” he shouted; “I have a state.” Shehecheyanu . . . We got it. We remembered all of our leaders, from Herzl and onward, who led the generations in the desert and they themselves did not get to see the promised state. I remembered at that moment the snow-covered displaced persons camps, in the far-flung villages of Germany. I heard the beats of their shaking heart. I heard their voice calling for the freedom of all the Jewish captives, echoing in the four corners of the world. I remembered the tens of thousands of underground immigrants who set out on their way but never arrived. They remained there, somewhere in mid-journey. Shehecheyanu. . . 10,000 Jews carry Weizmann in their arms up to the stage. They declare him the first president of the Jewish state. And Weizmann is at a loss for words. The hour is too enormous for words. In the Yiddish of his upbringing he says: this is not the time for words, it is the time for deeds. He relates that immediately after the Balfour Declaration the British Foreign Secretary said to him: now you’re in the saddle, but the

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future of the Jewish state is like the Baltic Sea. It looks small and quiet, and good for sailing. But then you run into huge icebergs blocking your way. And you smash your head on these obstacles. We have smashed our heads on the icebergs. We have been cast backwards. But in the end we overcame the obstacles and made it to a safe port. Weizmann, moved to the depth of his soul, finishes with a prayer: Shehecheyanu . . ... We got it. We got to see the greatest change of our lives. We grew up dependent on others. Our fathers sighed for two thousand years under a world of foreign peoples, Schutzjuden (protected Jews). And today we have been set on our own feet. We are going to live a different life. No more the lives of beggars, holding out their hands for the charity of the nations. No more helpless or subject to will of others. Masters of own destiny. We still cannot comprehend the transition. The exile is too deeply rooted in our blood. When the Lord brought back those that returned to Zion, we were like unto them that dream. The gentiles have already understood. In every place they congratulate every Jew. For them this is obvious. This is their way of life. But are we like all the other nations? It is unbelievable. We know only this, that it will be very difficult. We know that we are about to face many problems that we have not known for 2,000 years. We know that all the past is gone and that questions which we have not dreamed of all our lives lie ahead of us. We expect that we are going to have to sacrifice many more lives. Years of suffering that defy description. But we stand on this moonlit night outside the UN building. Next to all the flagpoles of the free nations of the earth. And we know that one more flagpole is going to be planted next to them. Our own. And we pray: Shehecheyanu . . .

Zalman Lipschitz, memorandum: Account of the erosion in support for the partition plan in the US and the UN, circa 15 February 19483 I left New York on 2 November 1948 in the afternoon. Mr Moshe Shertok requested that I submit a report on the political situation. I am here putting In Joseph Heller, The Struggle for the Jewish State: Zionist Politics, 1936–1948 (Jerusalem: ­ alman Shazar Center, 1984), pp. 541–5. Source: Political and Diplomatic Documents, December Z 1947—May 1948 (Jerusalem: State Archive and Central Zionist Archive no. 204, 1980), pp. 339– 45. We thank the Zalman Shazar Center for giving us permission to publish this text. 3

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into writing a summary of those things about which I have already spoken with Mr David Ben-Gurion and Mr Eliezer Kaplan. On the day before I left New York we reviewed our situation in the United Nations and our relations with the United States. In general terms the situation then looked like this: Immediately after the decision was passed in Lake Success there was the feeling that the State Department was uncomfortable with the resolution passed. In particular it upset the members of the American delegation that the southern Negev was attached to the Jewish state. As everyone knows, the State Department persisted to the last in the opinion that the southern Negev, below the 31° latitude, would be part of the Arab state. With the development of events in Eretz-Yisrael, different State Department officials expressed the opinion that the United States government had made a serious mistake by supporting partition, and that the State Department could not take part in any responsibility for decisions made under Jewish American pressure out of consideration for party politics, and not out of consideration for the national and political interests of the United States. There was some bad news about Marshall,4 to the effect that he had said in London, at a gathering with his assistants, that he was very concerned that a fatal mistake had been made. There was also some bad news about Lovett, Marshall’s undersecretary, who said that he was fed up with the whole business, because the decision had been made under unrestrained Jewish pressure and that he was not able or required to take responsibility for the decision. Particular resistance to the Zionist cause, and especially partition, was voiced by Forrestal, the Secretary of Defense, who unites the three military services in this position. From conversations which he had both with Jews and non-Jews, it appears that he has arrived at far-reaching conclusions regarding Zionism and United States policy vis-à-vis the implementation of United Nations resolutions regarding the partition of Eretz-Yisrael, and that his opinion is set in stone and unsusceptible to influence or change. He explained that his primary role is the defense of the national interests of the United States, the establishment of a global strategy which would prevent the spread of the Soviet Union, and securing the supply of oil in the event of world war, which requires calm in the Middle East and correct relations with the Arab peoples. The Zionist issue is an obstruction in the way of a desirable solution to all of these problems. Thus he has come to the conclusion that it was an error for the United States to support the Zionist cause, and he sees no future in the widespread settlement of Jews in Eretz-Yisrael. If there really is a problem of Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe, then it would be necessary to find some territory appropriate for this; he believes that Kenya is a possibility. If this is not possible—for reasons that we cannot go into now—and the problem of the Jewish refugees and

4

Secretary of State of the United States.

Fifth Crossroads

303

deportees becomes urgent, then an effort needs to be made to find places of refuge for them, even if this requires the entrance of most or all of them into the United States itself. With respect to the Jewish settlement in Eretz-Yisrael, he believes that the existing Jewish settlement can constitute a small religious state, similar to the Vatican. And if the question of Aliyah will be removed, it will become possible to arrive at an agreement with the Arabs and to secure the safety of the Jews already in the country, so that no harm will come to them. When pressed regarding the question of the UN’s prestige, which is likely to suffer if the resolution is not implemented but rather there is acquiescence to Arab pressure—he said that he views the UN resolution not as a resolution but rather as a recommendation and nothing more, and that it will not be a tragedy if an unworkable resolution is not put into effect. In any event there is no cause to fear that this will bring about a crisis in the UN. He claims that by means of the illegal Aliyah from the communist Balkan countries, the Russians are infiltrating their own Communists into Eretz-Yisrael, and that on this matter he relies not only on information received from English sources, but that he has reliable sources of his own which confirm these facts. We should mention one of the stories making the rounds in the officialdom of the United States, according to which Soviet Russia is transporting masses of Jews from interior regions to the frontiers where they are organizing them, indoctrinating them, so that after the Jewish state is founded they will transfer them in significant quantities to Eretz-Yisrael in order to make the Hebrew Eretz-Yisrael into a Communist one. These reports about the mood in the upper echelons of the United States, especially in two departments— the State Department and Defense—have raised some serious concerns, that it is clear that an initiative is taking form to reverse everything and to bring about a complete revision of the United States’ approach to Zionism and the problem of Eretz-Yisrael. Steps have therefore been taken to arouse public opinion and to set the party movers in motion, and pressure has been applied both to the president and to Marshall. Bernard Baruch5 met with Marshall and also with Forrestal. He was unable to influence Forrestal, because he found that his opinion was set and absolute. He also could not extract anything clear from Marshall. The impression was that his attitude was not exceedingly positive. Marshall also told him that he is no longer even dealing with the Eretz-Yisrael issue; but unlike Forrestal, who does not especially appreciate the UN, Marshall was concerned about the impact this matter would have on the fate of the United Nations organization, and he was worried about this. Despite Forrestal’s activity and his efforts to bring about a radical change in the United States government regarding the problem of Eretz-Yisrael, the

5

United States representative to the Atomic Energy Commission.

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Two-State Solution

concerns about such a change did not prove to be founded. Two things are working against Forrestal: Truman’s personal interests and Marshall’s concern for the fate of United Nations. In a private conversation with one Jew, Marshall said that there would be no American policy change with respect to Eretz-Yisrael, but that America would not take upon itself any initiative and would not bring to bear the whole of its weight in order to influence other countries in this direction, but rather would itself remain faithful to the resolutions adopted in the framework of the UN. In the above conversation it was difficult to get him to say anything clearer about the stance of the United States in the Security Council when the question would arise regarding the establishment of an international military force; despite the arguments that even the UN resolution itself was dependent on America’s position, he did not wish to define exactly what that position would be, emphasizing instead how important it was to preserve the existence of the UN. In the same conversation he expressed disappointment regarding the Jewish military force in the country, and said that he had had the impression that, if the Arabs were to begin to agitate and to resist the UN resolution, they would immediately receive a knockout blow from the Jews, so that they would not have anymore will to go on. (Mr Shertok asked that I emphasize that this in no way implies that his position is that overt aggression against the Arabs should be exercised.) In a conversation with Lowett about the embargo, when it was claimed that through the embargo the administration places the attackers and the attacked in Eretz-Yisrael on an equal footing, and that with respect to the law the situation of the Arabs, who are aggressors seeking to forcefully undermine the UN resolution, is much preferable to that of the Jews defending themselves, who seek to implement the resolution—Mr Lowett said that he still does not know who is the attacker and who is the attacked in Eretz-Yisrael. When pressed to explain his statement, he said that the Arabs should be viewed as defending themselves as well, since the intention is to take their country from them, and they are defending themselves. However unlike Forrestal who ascribes great importance to the supposed infiltration of Communists into Eretz-Yisrael, Marshall announced that he was not especially impressed by the British propaganda about Communist infiltration in Eretz-Yisrael. He assumes that the source of all these reports is British, and that as for Russia, he was much more worried about the situation in Persia than in Eretz-Yisrael. It was difficult to correctly determine the president’s position. But after Mr Dave Niles,6 who had been ill for some time, returned to the White House and saw the President, he announced that there was no cause for Jews to fear that a change would take place in United States policy regarding Eretz-Yisrael, because the president had stated that he would not release his

6

Adviser to the president for minority affairs.

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own hold on the matter and would continue to follow developments in what was happening. In order to calm public opinion, which had been stirred up by rumors that had leaked about the position of different administration members on the above question, he is willing to release a statement which will disperse these concerns. On the other hand it came out that Forrestal was also trying to get out a statement in the name of the President in favor of his own view regarding Eretz-Yisrael. Forrestal also takes pride in the fact that he was the one who came up with the idea of bringing the two parties, the Democratic and the Republican, to a consensus of policy with respect to Eretz-Yisrael in order to deny the Zionists the possibility of influence by means of playing the votes on the position of the parties about the Zionist cause. He saw Vandenberg and Taft.7 According to Forrestal he succeeded in convincing Vandenberg in this direction, but met with a certain amount of resistance from Taft. He added that he hopes to convince Taft and to bend him in the direction that he prefers. Truman’s position was that under no circumstances should the American Army get involved in the implementation of the UN resolutions, but that if a way could be found to raise an international army which would be composed of the smaller countries, then the United States would be ready to assist it with both equipment and funding. Forrestal and Marshall’s position is usually negative with everything that pertains to an international army, and this is because they are concerned about the infiltration of Russians into the Middle East. For if an international army were to be composed of larger countries, then the Soviet Union itself would participate; and if it would be composed of representatives of the smaller countries—then it would be possible that smaller countries which were satellites of Russia, such as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, etc., would take part in it. Through Loy Henderson, in a conversation with Eliyahu Epstein,8 it was stated clearly, that the United States would oppose the establishment of an international army. But it was hinted that if the UN or the Executive Committee would decide to raise a militia in the two states—Jewish and Arab—or in one of them, and if they would turn to the United States with a request for assistance equipping the militia, then the United States would be willing to contribute its part. [. . .] And now pertaining to our situation and our relations with the Executive Committee and the Secretariat of the UN in general. Trygve Lie returned recently from Europe full of anger and fury at the English, and immediately upon his return invited—on his own initiative—Shertok and Silver for a discussion. He opened the discussion with these words: “The English are the worst street thieves that I have seen in all my life.” He went off on Bevin and called him a Jew-hater and a Communist-hater. To be sure he is also no

Vandenberg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Pro-Zionist Republican. Taft, Pro-Zionist Republican Senator. 8 Epstein (Elath), Representative of the Jewish Agency in Washington. 7

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fan of the Communists, but he feels that one cannot build a global policy on simple hatred. He did not actually see Bevin when he was in London, but he had some conversations with McNeil, and in those discussions he pressed him to clarify England’s policy vis-à-vis Eretz-Yisrael. He did not receive any clear answers and therefore could not say what were the true intentions of the English. Although McNeil is not—according to Trygve Lie’s standards— one of the worst of the English statesmen, nonetheless he also lied to him more than once and changed his mind ten times over. Trygve Lie is therefore ready for war. For him the fate of the UN is inseparably connected to the implementation of the resolutions adopted regarding Eretz-Yisrael. That is to say, the implementation of partition. If the resolution will not be put into effect, and they try to distort it and to reach a revision, giving in to pressure from the Arabs—then he is prepared to resign, and together with him another 200 people from the upper echelon of the UN will leave, and the entire structure is likely to crumble. He is prepared to fight together with us, he sees in us allies for victory or defeat. He defined his own position on this whole problem approximately as follows: he had been objective and tried to maintain neutrality during the discussions, but from the moment that the decision was made there was no room for neutrality, and he wished to implement the resolutions faithfully and to the letter. It is essential to the UN, and he will fight to the best of his ability for the execution of the resolutions. He hinted that it seemed to him that both the English and the Americans were following him and spying on him, and therefore he asked not to be contacted through the office or during the standard working hours. As for the problem itself, he expressed his opinion, that he does not believe in an international army which will be composed exclusively from the small nations. While he was in Europe he tried to feel the pulse and to find out what the stance of the Scandinavian countries and the Low Countries would be on this question. These countries do not have extraneous ready-made military forces, which these governments can quickly dispatch to serve in Eretz-Yisrael. Even if such an army could be found, it would have to be a large military force, since the Arabs would not be chivalrous towards it and it would need to defeat them by force and to actually fight. This would not be the case if the United States or the Soviet Union will involve themselves in an international army [which] will take upon itself the implementation of partition. In that case its prestige will be much greater and it is possible that the military actions will be limited. In order to raise an international army composed of the smaller countries, it would be necessary to enlist volunteers, to train them, to equip them, and this will take a long time and will not be immediately effective. He knows from his experience in Norway that this is not the case. The Russians do not evacuate a place that they have not committed to evacuate, but when they commit, they carry out their commitment completely. In Norway, in any event, the Russians were the first ones to remove the six divisions that they had, within 24 hours. The Americans stayed much longer and the English stayed more than anyone.

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He is therefore prepared to demand the participation of the United States and the Soviet Union in an international army. He is prepared to go to Truman and to Marshall and to explain to them his point of view and to threaten his resignation if they reject it.

Report from Golda Meyerson on her discussions with King Abdullah of Jordan, 12 May 19489 I do not know if all those present are aware that a few months ago, about ten days before the UN resolution, there was a meeting with Abdullah which included, on our side, Sasson, Danin,10 and myself. At that point the meeting was in the territory of Transjordan, but nonetheless in Jewish territory.11 That is to say, he came from Amman to meet with us. The discussion then was conducted on the basis that we share an arrangement and an understanding about what he wants and what we want, and that the interests of us both do not conflict. For our part we said to him then that we could not promise to help him enter the country, on account of the fact that we are obligated to maintain the UN resolution, which—as we supposed already then—would include the establishment of two states in Eretz-Yisrael. We cannot, therefore—we said—actively assist in the violation of this resolution. If he is willing and wishes to present the world and us with a fact—the tradition of friendship between us will continue and we certainly will find a common language regarding an arrangement for the issues which concern both sides. He promised us at that point that his friendship for us was still in effect and that there was no chance for a conflict between us. He spoke of his friends and about the other states and in particular about the Mufti; he disregarded the strength of the other neighboring countries; and he granted us, that if Arabs will attack us—then it is understood that we need to respond. The conversation was conducted with much friendliness and without any arguments. In that same conversation he said, as if by the way, two things which caused some suspicion, some concern. But the discussion was concluded then with the understanding that we would meet again after the resolution. The two things which aroused suspicion were: (1) he wanted to

In Joseph Heller, The Struggle for the Jewish State: Zionist Politics, 1936–1948 (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1984), pp. 499–502. Source: The People’s Administration, Protocols: 18 April 1948—13 May 1948 (Jerusalem: State Archive, 1978), pp. 40–3. We thank the Zalman Shazar Center for giving us permission to publish this text. 10 Employee of the Arab Section of the Political Department in the Jewish Agency. 11 Naharayim. 9

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know what we would think if the Jewish state (the way that he said it then was “the Jewish republic”) were to be included in the Kingdom of Transjordan; (2) he hopes that there will be a partition that will not humiliate him. Both of those things, as we have said, caused us concern and we thought that when the time came we would speak about it. Since then we have not had a direct meeting with him, although there was one man who—after the adoption of the resolution by the UN—was in contact with us and with him and traveled there twice and back to us. This man came from abroad with a proposal, and then I related in the Administration that he had come to an agreement with the King that we would relinquish territory, so that he would be able then to appear with greater credibility in the eyes of the Arab world, having gotten some profit. We informed the King then, through the messenger: under no circumstances would we forfeit territory. And again, in general, he should know that the border is the border, and we will respect the border in conditions of peace. And if there is war—then he who is stronger will take what he can. Since then, on account of what was happening, we have had no contact with him. A week ago contact was reestablished and a meeting with him was set. This time he was not willing to come to Jewish territory and we had to go to him. At the time I was proud of the fact that no item or any hint at all had appeared in the newspapers about our previous meeting. I don’t know what happened in connection with this meeting, why the whole country was full of rumors and news about it. I even saw reports about it in the paper. Now it is perhaps not so important. But there were reports about it even before the meeting. The journey to the place of the meeting was in rather uncomfortable conditions, which was not good. Bad weather prevented Sasson from taking an airplane from Jerusalem to join us, and therefore there were only two of us present in the meeting: Danin and myself. On the King’s side—the King himself and his assistant. The King met us cordially, but he was altogether a different man, very depressed, preoccupied and agitated. He had informed us of what his proposal was via the man who had set up the meeting: that the country be unified; that there would be autonomy for Jews in those areas most heavily populated by them. For instance—Tel-Aviv. This arrangement would be for one year. After that year, the country would be annexed to Transjordan. In the conversation with this man he had said something about a parliament of fifty-fifty, maybe even a government of fifty-fifty. Afterwards he said about the government: perhaps, we will see. He wanted to know if his proposal had been conveyed to us. We said: yes. And although there was no chance that we would accept it, we thought that it was necessary to meet with him. He once again said that he wanted peace and not destruction. It would be too bad—he said—for the agriculture and industry. All the while he was for peace—he claimed—but the only way to prevent war was to accept his proposal. And in general, what was our rush?

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In response we told him: there had been an understanding between us. We had trusted that understanding. We had trusted this friendship, since for years there has been mutual understanding and cordial relations with him. We also told him that we viewed our friendship as based on an additional factor: that we have mutual enemies. Over the course of the previous five months we had done something which was also to his benefit: we had struck successfully at these enemies. The Mufti and the Mufti’s strength had diminished considerably in the country, thanks to our military successes; we had successfully expelled those foreign powers which had invaded the country; and his way had never been so perfectly paved as it was now. And this was the outcome of our efforts. We added that, as opposed to his program, we were proposing to him to return to the same plan which had always been in place and about which there was mutual understanding and an agreement. He did not deny that this was his wish. But in the meantime, things had happened in the country. There was the Deir Yassin affair, “Then I was one, but now I am one out of five and I am unable. I have no choice and I cannot do otherwise . . .” We told him: we knew that there were five, but we always saw you as one who stood opposite to all the others. We also hinted that we think that it is not just five and that England had already now done everything in order to ensure its status even in the event that he will be defeated. Now it must be taken into consideration that partition is a fact and that England would be very satisfied if it succeeds. But even if it does not—nothing will happen to England. We also said to him that our strength now is nothing like it was 3–5 months ago or even one month ago. And if there will be a war—then we will fight with all our strength. He said: it goes without saying that you must repel an attack. After this we said that we were prepared to respect borders, as long as there was peace. But in the event of war, we would fight in every place, with whatever strength we have. Over and over he repeated the warning, but not in the form of a threat. The entire conversation was conducted in friendship, and for his part—in exhaustion and depression. He is very sorry—he said— but he has no choice. He asks that we think it over. And if the answer will be affirmative—then it needs to be given before the 15th of May. He will invite  his Eretz-Yisraelim and the moderate Arabs, and he also requested that we send moderates—and then the matter can be settled. He also said: there is no cause to worry that there will be Arab extremists, Jew-haters, in the government, but rather only moderate Arabs. We told him that we did not wish to mislead him, and that there was not even a possibility that his proposal would be brought to discussion. Not only would the responsible institutions not accept it, but one would not even be able to find ten Jews who would be willing to support such a plan, and our response is immediate: no way. If he reneges on the agreement that we had, and if he wants war—then we will meet after the war. We parted in friendship. He complained, by the way, turning to Danin, and asked why this time he had not come to his assistance.

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I will add two more sentences about his assistant and those close by. This man, who is extremely loyal and devoted to him—is very much opposed to this war; he also told us that even the King does not want it. As proof of how much the King does not want war he said to us that, if he had to choose between, on the one hand, a room full of gems and the obligation to go to war, and on the other, peace with no such treasure—he would give up the gems and choose peace. [. . .] But he is entangled and the English are entangling him and sending the Iraqis to war, out of English interests, because they are angry at Iraq for not signing a treaty with them. Therefore they are sending the Iraqis to the front so that they will take a beating there, and then afterwards they will be able to bring them to their knees. [. . .] Also the oldest son,12 who is more extreme than his father, on this occasion sees Abdullah’s movement in the direction of war as a defeat from the outset, and he opposes it. This man also promised to try to convince Abdullah. But my feeling is that he is at this point so thoroughly entangled that I doubt that he would be prepared to retract. My feeling was reinforced that he is not getting involved in this business because he wants to, but rather because of the mess in which he has become embroiled. In the previous conversation he had said to us that he had told the Arabs that he would not have anything to do with this business if the administration of the Eretz-Yisrael matter in its entirety would not be entrusted to him. Now, apparently, he has gotten to it. I have the feeling that he is afraid of his partners, and apparently of England. He said to me in the discussion: we do not need America and Europe. We—the people of the East—need to show this wonder, that we will sit at one table and guarantee peace between us. It seems to me that he fully understands his situation, both among the Arab countries and also in his relations with England. He is not becoming involved in this matter happily or with confidence, but rather like someone in a vice-grip who is unable to extract himself.

Letter from Dr Chaim Weizmann to President Truman, 13 May 194813 Dear Mr President, I fully hope that the gloomy events which have occurred in the past months will not obscure your enormous contribution, Mr President, to a final and

Prince Talal. In Gedalia Yogev (editor), Political and Diplomatic Documents, December 1947—May 1948 (Jerusalem: State Archive and Central Zionist Archive no. 204, 1980).

12 13

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just resolution for the persistent and troublesome question of Palestine. Following your example, the United States government has taken a leading role in the establishment of a Jewish state, which I am completely confident will contribute substantially to solving the problems of the world’s Jews, and I am equally certain that it is a necessary condition for the development of a sustainable peace between the peoples of the Middle East. The Jewish people residing in Palestine have obeyed the spirit of the UN resolution from 29 November 1947, as much as the conditions of reality have made possible. Tomorrow at midnight, 15 May 1948, the British Mandate will come to an end, and the temporary government of the Jewish state, embodying the best efforts of the Jewish people and which has been founded by virtue of the UN resolution, will take full responsibility for enforcing law and order within the borders of the Jewish state; for the defense of the territory before external attack and for the fulfillment of the Jewish state’s obligations to the rest of the nations of the world in accordance with international law. Taking into consideration all the expected difficulties, the chances for a just resolution of the relations between Arabs and Jews are not discouraging. At this time we should end the search for new solutions, a search which has usually caused delay and has not facilitated a final arrangement. For these reasons I express the profound hope that the United States, which has done so much through its leadership to find a just solution, will recognize the temporary government of the new Jewish state as soon as possible. I believe that it will be well regarded by the world, if the largest democracy of the world’s states will be the first to congratulate the newest democracy on the day it joins the family of nations.

The declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel, 14 May 194814 The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books. After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it throughout their Dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their return to it and for the restoration in it of their political freedom. Impelled by this historic and traditional attachment, Jews strove in every successive generation to re-establish themselves in their ancient homeland. In recent decades they returned in their masses. Pioneers, defiant returnees,

Can be found on the internet: http://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm

14

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and defenders, they made deserts bloom, revived the Hebrew language, built villages and towns, and created a thriving community controlling its own economy and culture, loving peace but knowing how to defend itself, bringing the blessings of progress to all the country’s inhabitants, and aspiring towards independent nationhood. In the year 5657 (1897), at the summons of the spiritual father of the Jewish State, Theodore Herzl, the First Zionist Congress convened and proclaimed the right of the Jewish people to national rebirth in its own country. This right was recognized in the Balfour Declaration of the 2 November 1917, and re-affirmed in the Mandate of the League of Nations which, in particular, gave international sanction to the historic connection between the Jewish people and Eretz-Israel and to the right of the Jewish people to rebuild its National Home. The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people—the massacre of millions of Jews in Europe—was another clear demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish State, which would open the gates of the homeland wide to every Jew and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a fully privileged member of the community of nations. Survivors of the Nazi holocaust in Europe, as well as Jews from other parts of the world, continued to migrate to Eretz-Israel, undaunted by difficulties, restrictions and dangers, and never ceased to assert their right to a life of dignity, freedom and honest toil in their national homeland. In the Second World War, the Jewish settlement of this country contributed its full share to the struggle of the freedom- and peace-loving nations against the forces of Nazi wickedness and, by the blood of its soldiers and its war effort, gained the right to be reckoned among the peoples who founded the United Nations. On the 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel; the General Assembly required the inhabitants of Eretz-Israel to take such steps as were necessary on their part for the implementation of that resolution. This recognition by the United Nations of the right of the Jewish people to establish their State is irrevocable. This right is the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State. Accordingly we, members of the People’s Council, representatives of the Jewish settlement of Eretz-Israel and of the Zionist movement, are here assembled on the day of the termination of the British Mandate over Eretz-Israel and, by virtue of our natural and historic right and on the strength of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel. We declare that, with effect from the moment of the termination of the Mandate being tonight, the eve of Sabbath, the 6th Iyar, 5708 (15 May

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1948), until the establishment of the elected, regular authorities of the State in accordance with the Constitution which shall be adopted by the Elected Constituent Assembly not later than the 1st October 1948, the People’s Council shall act as a Provisional Council of State, and its executive organ, the People’s Administration, shall be the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, to be called “Israel.” The State of Israel will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The State of Israel is prepared to cooperate with the agencies and representatives of the United Nations in implementing the resolution of the General Assembly of the 29 November 1947, and will take steps to bring about the economic union of the whole of Eretz-Israel. We appeal to the United Nations to assist the Jewish people in the building-up of its State and to receive the State of Israel into the community of nations. We appeal—in the very midst of the onslaught launched against us now for months—to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in  all its provisional and permanent institutions. We extend our hand to all neighbouring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighbourliness, and appeal to them to establish bonds of cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish people settled in its own land. The State of Israel is prepared to do its share in a common effort for the advancement of the entire Middle East. We appeal to the Jewish people throughout the Diaspora to rally round the Jews of Eretz-Israel in the tasks of immigration and upbuilding and to stand by them in the great struggle for the realization of the age-old dream—the redemption of Israel. Placing our trust in Tzur Yisrael [Rock of Israel], we affix our signatures to this proclamation at this session of the provisional Council of State, on the soil of the Homeland, in the city of Tel-Aviv, on this Sabbath eve, the 5th day of Iyar, 5708 (14 May 1948). David Ben-Gurion

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Daniel Auster, Mordekhai Bentov, Yitzchak Ben Zvi, Eliyahu Berligne, Fritz Bernstein, Rabbi Wolf Gold, Meir Grabovsky, Yitzchak Gruenbaum, Dr Abraham Granovsky, Eliyahu Dobkin, Meir Wilner-Kovner, Zerach Wahrhaftig, Herzl Vardi, Rachel Cohen, Rabbi Kalman Kahana, Saadia Kobashi, Rabbi Yitzchak Meir Levin, Meir David Loewenstein, Zvi Luria, Golda Myerson, Nachum Nir, Zvi Segal, Rabbi Yehuda Leib Hacohen Fischmann, David Zvi Pinkas, Aharon Zisling, Moshe Kolodny, Eliezer Kaplan, Abraham Katznelson, Felix Rosenblueth, David Remez, Berl Repetur, Mordekhai Shattner, Ben Zion Sternberg, Bekhor Shitreet, Moshe Shapira, Moshe Shertok

Appendix Partition Plans for Palestine

APPENDIX

316

A. The Zionist movement’s territorial proposal, 19191 Sidon

Damascus

Tyre

n Sea

Haifa Med iterr anea

Nazareth

Tulkarm Nablus Jaffa Jericho

Amman

Jerusalem Gaza

Be’er Sheba

Ma’an EGYPT

Aqaba

0

50 km

Itzhak Galnoor, The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 38.

1

317

APPENDIX

B. Map attached to the Report of the Royal Commission, 19372 n Sea

LEBANON

nea

Sidon

SYRIA

Metulla

M

ed

ite

rra

Tyre

Damascus

Haifa

PROPOSED JEWISH STATE

Nazareth

Tulkarm Nablus

Tel Aviv Jaffa

Jencho

BRITISH ENCLAVE

Amman

Jerusalem Gaza

Rafah

Beer Sheba TRANS-JORDAN (JORDAN)

PROPOSED ARAB STATE

Ma’an

EGYPT

Aqaba

0

50 km

Itzhak Galnoor, The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 83.

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APPENDIX

318

C. The majority plan and the minority plan in the UNSCOP report3 Mediterranean Sea

Rehovot

Jerusalem

Ashdod

Bethlehem

Jercho Palestine Potash Ltd.

Hebron Gaza Be’er Sheba Palestine Potash Ltd., Sodom

Asluj’

Egypt

Beit She’an Jenin (Ein Canim) Tulkarm Tel-Aviv Jaffa

Lod Ramla Latrun

Nazareth Mount Tabor Afula

Lod Jericho Ramla Latrun Palestine Jerusalem Potash Ltd. Bethlehem

Rehovot Ashdod

Hebron Gaza Be’er Sheba Palestine Potash Ltd., Sodom

Transjordan (Jordan)

Tel-Aviv Jaffa

Haifa

Nazareth Mount Tabor Afula Beit She’an Jenin (Ein Canim) Tulkarm

Transjordan (Jordan)

Haifa

Rosh ha-Nikra Safed Acre

Syria

Rosh ha-Nikra Safed Acre

Lebanon Syria

Lebanon

Mediterranean Sea

Asluj’

Egypt Aqaba

Majority Plan

Aqaba

Minority Plan

United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly (Tel-Aviv: Haaretz, 1947), p. 36 [Hebrew].

3

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APPENDIX

D. The UNSCOP majority plan compared to the UN partition plan, 29 November 1947

N Tiberias

ARAB STATE Sidon JERUSALEM INTERNATIONAL ZONE Tyre Metulla

Syria

Safed

Kinneret

n Sea

Nazareth

SYRIA Haifa

nea

Jenin

rra

Tulkarm Nablus

M

ed

Tel-Aviv Jaffa

JaffaTel Aviv

ea

Jerusalem

Jerusalem

Be’er Sheba

Negev

International Region Arab State Jewish State

Aqaba

0

Amman

Jericho

Transjordan (Jordan)

Bethlehem Hebron

Dead S

Gaza

Nazareth

ite

Nablus

Damascus

20 km

UNSCOP Majority Plan for Partition of Eretz-Yisrael, August 1947 4

Gaza Rafah

TRANS-JORDAN (JORDAN)

Acre Haifa

LEBANON

JEWISH STATE

Lebanon

Be’er Sheba

Ma’an

EGYPT

Aqaba

0

50 km

UN Plan for Partition of Eretz-Yisrael, November 1947 5

Yossi Katz, A State in the Making: Zionist Plans for the Partition of Palestine and the Establishment of a Jewish State (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2000), p. 144 [Hebrew]. 5 Itzhak Galnoor, The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 284. 4

320

Index

Abdul Hadi, Auni Bey  123 Abdullah, Emir  6, 11, 42n. 10, 307–10 absentee landlords  137 absorptive capacity (economic absorption)  86, 109, 184, 194, 243 Abu Kishk, Seif al-Din  42 Ad hoc committee (on the Palestine Question)  xvii, 44n. 13, 251–7, 251n. 28, 256n. 29, 262–80, 262n. 30, 275n. 31 Agudath Yisrael  50n. 3, 188–90 Al Husayni (also Husseini)  40n. 3 Haj Amin (the Mufti)  xvi, 11, 31–3, 39, 39n. 2, 40n. 4, 71, 89, 129, 270 Jamil (Jamal, Jamel)  xxvin. 25, xxvii, 33, 34n. 4, 43, 44n. 13, 99, 127, 256–63 Aliyah  xvi–xvii, 53, 89–90, 92, 159–61, 236–7, 303 Al-Ittihad  35, 36n. 6, 43 Allenby, Edmund  68 Al Nashashibi (also Nashashibis)  11, 31, 33, 39–40, 40n. 3 Fakhri  35 Al-Qassam, Izz al-din  43 America see United states American Council for Judaism, opposes Jewish state  214 Améry, Jean  48 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry  xvi–xvii, xxv, 13, 13n. 13, 32, 40n. 4, 41n. 18, 49n. 1, 93–146, 149, 171–2, 184–6, 191, 213, 242, 268–9 Anglo-French declaration 1918  206, 208

anti-semitism  27, 41n. 8, 47, 93, 97, 258 Arab criticism of  41n. 28, 202, 258 metaphysical and theological bases  112 apartheid  xxiin. 17 Arab aspirations for independence  4–5, 11, 19–20, 22–5, 30, 50, 66, 72, 85, 135, 147–8, 163, 166, 175–8, 191, 197, 202–3, 216–17, 220, 224, 229, 233, 249–50, 261, 271 Arab Boycott  131, 142, 154 Arab executive committee 1920– 34  30n. 2 Arab generosity  84 Arab goodwill  110–11, 242 Arab Higher committee 1936– 1945  xxv, 30n. 2, 31, 39, 65–71, 96, 105, 116–18, 134–5, 198, 205, 256–7, 263 Arab Higher Institution, 1946–64   30n. 2 Arab hospitality to the Jews  111 Arab (independent, Palestinian) state  xix, xxii, 7, 9, 12, 14, 18, 22, 24–5, 37, 40, 42, 49, 51–2, 67–8, 77, 80–1, 83–4, 100, 104, 110, 116–19, 127, 134, 142, 144, 149, 168, 173, 175–8, 191, 205, 207, 212–13, 230–1, 236, 238–40, 242, 257, 262, 270–1, 272, 277, 283, 285, 289, 302 Arab indigenous population  110 Arab-Jewish conflict  xiii, xxviii, 10, 325

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Arab-Jewish cooperation critical  190 possible  190 Arab League  xixn. 10, 18, 103, 132, 134, 151, 198 Arab Legion  41 Arab national movement  5, 97 Arab Office  xxvi, 96, 103, 105, 112, 114, 119 Arab position on Palestine  xviii, xxvi, 24, 44, 65–71, 207 as compromise  109 Arab representativeness  117–18 Arab Revolt  xv, 6, 11–12, 31–2, 39, 126 Arabs relations with West  112–13 and relation to Palestinian Arabs  141 Arabic  xii, 111, 132, 203, 261 became language of Jews  111 Histadrut, publishes news bulletin in Arabic  132 Arafat, Yasser  40 Arlosoroff, Chaim  124 assimilation  55, 73, 135 Attlee, Clement  170 autonomy  40, 50, 58, 76, 95–6, 109, 134, 145, 154, 199, 308 communal  134 territorial  134, 213–14 Azerbaijan  279 Balfour declaration 1917  xiv, 4, 18–19, 29–30, 32, 68–71, 79, 86, 97, 99, 101, 122–3, 139, 164–8, 170, 175–6, 199–201, 203–4, 206, 208–11, 247–8, 258–9, 262, 265, 269–71, 300, 312 critique of declaration  69, 256 Balkans  134 Baruch, Bernard  303 Basle program 1887  203, 214 Beersheba  80, 82, 86–7, 212, 231, 239–40 Beisan  80, 83 benefit to Arabs from Jewish development  177–8, 187

Ben-Gurion, David  xxvi–xxvii, 7–9, 16, 27, 50n. 3, 53, 103, 114–15, 124, 161–79, 302 assessment of UNSCOP  235–7 talks with Arab leaders  124 Ben-Gurion, Paula  235–7 Benvenisti, Eyal  xiiin. 1 Bernadotte, Folke  xix–xx Bethlehem  75, 78, 212–13 Bevin, Ernest  236, 242–6, 267–8, 305 binational state  155 endorsement by the communists  157–61 hashomer hatzair  174 no majority rule  192 not workable  218 political parity  156, 192, 205 rejection by Lehi  155–7 two different conceptions  173 and UN representation for Jews  193 Birobidzhan  250–1, 261 Blom, Nikolaas, member UNSCOP, Holland  238n. 17, 241 boundaries  4–6, 13–15, 23, 33, 76, 80–2, 139, 157, 231–2 Brawer, Moshe  5n. 5 Britain (also England, United Kingdom, UK)  xv–xviii, xxi, 4, 6–7, 9–12, 30, 32, 35, 66, 68, 71–2, 87, 90, 97, 100, 107, 109, 111, 115–16, 119, 128–9, 136, 139, 155, 158, 162, 165–6, 168–9, 194, 206, 208, 210, 216, 236–7, 241, 243, 251–5, 258–9, 261, 266–8, 274, 282, 290, 306, 309–10 policy implications of UNSCOP  242–6 British imperialism  151, 154 British mandate (mandate for Paleastine)  xv, xviii, xxvn. 23, 5–6, 10, 14, 44, 48, 50, 68, 74, 77, 124, 164, 167, 169, 199–200, 206–7, 210–12, 215, 226, 247, 256, 259, 264–5, 275, 283, 311–12 burdens of the mandate  74 Buber, Martin  xxv, 49n. 1, 60n. 5, 93 Buxton, Frank  102

INDEX Cadogan, Alexander  242, 266 Canada  18, 24–5, 90, 122, 192, 228, 238, 278 cantonization Bevin plan  75, 155, 214 unworkable  218 capitulations, abolition of  226 Carter, William Morris, member, Peel Com.  85 Cecil, Robert  167 Chamberlain, Joseph  165, 168, 170 Chamoun, Camille  xxvii, 276–80 Chancellor, John  265 China  166, 258, 296 Christian civilization  93 Churchill, Winston  67, 69, 128, 167, 170–1, 173 CIA  xviiin. 9 civic nation state  150 Commission (in resolution 181)  174, 282–7, 291–3 Conversion  47, 84, 204, 241 Coupland, R., member, Peel Com.  85 Creech-Jones, Arthur  xxvii, 251–6, 266–7 Crick, Wilfrid  120 Cromwell, Oliver  94 Crossman, Richard  99–101, 116, 142 Crum, Bartley  xxvin. 24, 118, 127, 141 Cust, Archer  75n. 3 Cyprus, camps  172, 276 Czechoslovakia 18, 155, 159, 172, 192, 228, 238nn. 13–14, 243, 296, 305 not applicable to Palestine  157 Damascus (vilayat)  67 Danin, Ezra  307–9 Dead sea  80, 152, 238 declaration of state obligations  51, 285, 287, 290, 294 Declaration of the foundation of Israel  xix, xxvii–xxviii, 47, 53, 311 the rock of Israel  52 Defence emergency regulations  196 Deir Yassin  309 democracy  32, 51, 53, 56, 59, 112, 224, 260, 276, 311

323

diaspora (dispersion)  58, 115, 163, 189 difference between Jews and Arabs  72, 135 displaced persons  xvi, 148, 223 disturbances (meoraot) (also Arab revolt) 1936  117, 125 Dominican republic  279 Eban, Abba  xxn. 12 economic union (also economic unity)  xvii–xviii, 49, 211, 218, 225–6, 228–31, 233, 268–73, 275, 281–94, 313 and equal division of surplus  230 Egypt  34, 39, 42, 51, 73, 93, 98, 126–8, 162–3, 177, 240, 261, 271 Ehad Ha-Am  91 El Khouri, Faris Bey  246–51 El Salvador  277 Emancipation  47 Epstein (Elat) Eliyahu  305 Eretz Yisrael (the land of Israel)  xiii–xvii, xix–xx, xxii–xxiii, xxvii, 5, 8, 10–13, 42, 44, 48–52, 56–7, 87–8, 90–2, 96, 151–61, 180, 299–300, 302–7, 309–10, 312–13 attachment of Jews to the land  179–184, 188–9, 191 ethnic nation state  59 Etzel (Irgun)  42 Europe  xvi, 7, 10, 13, 26–7, 48, 73, 81, 84, 86, 101, 107–8, 112, 115–16, 119, 124, 128–9, 141–2, 144, 148, 170, 172, 176, 190, 195, 200, 223, 250, 255, 264, 269, 302, 305–6, 310, 312 exile  270, 301 Exodus 1947  141, 197, 269 expansion (of Jewish state)  105, 230, 243 Tigris to the Nile  98 Farah, Bulus  36 Farouk, King  42 fascism, fascists  23, 26, 41, 144, 148, 160

324

Index

federal state as a civic nation state  233 critical for peace  234 and cultivation of cooperation  233 Jewish-Arab federation  18, 229, 232–5 federation, with Syria  123 Federation of Middle Eastern Peoples  151 Feisal, Emir  5, 89, 122, 175, 209 Feisal-Weizmann agreement  123, 167, 175 Fishman, (Maimon) Yehuda hacohen  50n. 3, 179–84 Forrestal, James  302–5 France  xvn. 5, 6, 67–8, 136, 166, 258 French, Lewis  138 Freundlich, Yehoshua  xiiin. 1, xviinn. 6–7, xxivn. 19, xxix, 235n. 10 friendly relations  154, 248, 282 Galilee  5, 7, 14, 79n. 4, 83, 212, 231, 237–40, 271 Galnoor, Itzhak  xxiii, 3–16 Gavison, Ruth  xxiii, 45–61 Genocide  43, 47 Germany  xvi, 24, 115, 125, 140–2, 148, 172, 216, 269, 300 Ghoury, Emil  xxvi, 41n. 8, 96–102 Goldmann, Nahum  145, 238 Gorni, Yosef  10n. 9 Gottman, Jan  15n. 16 great debate (Pulmus)  7 Greater Israel  54 Great powers  128, 190 Greece  82, 143, 163, 297 Greek-Turkish population exchange 1923–24  82, 143 Gromyko, Andrei  xxvi, 22–3, 23n. 6, 26–7, 36, 36n. 7, 147–51, 236 Habibi, Emil  35 Hadassah University hospital  132 Haganah  xvi Ha-Ichud  xxv, 93, 190 Haifa  44, 75, 79, 87, 98, 131, 153, 197–8, 239 Halamish, Aviva  xiiin. 1

Halevi, Yehuda  179 Hamizrahi (religious Zionism)  8, 91 cooperation with non- religious Jews  183 Hapoel Hamizrahi  183 Hammond, Laurie, member, Peel Com.  85 Hankin, Yehoshua  42 Hashim, Abd al-Hadi  39n. 1 hashomer hatzair  8, 13, 174, 214, 236–7 Ha-Tikva (Zionist and Israel hymn)  92 Hebrew language  49, 55, 91, 109, 312 nation (people)  152, 157 state  55 underground  154 Hebrew University  131–2, 176 Hebron  80, 265 Heller, Yosef  xxivn. 19, xxix, 145n. 6, 238n. 12, 242n. 25, 301n. 3, 307n. 9 Herut (Israeli party)  52 Hertz, E  xxiin. 16 Herzl, Theodor  165, 172, 183, 261, 300, 312 High Commissioner  6, 94, 137, 169, 172, 197, 213–14, 216, 265 historical rights of Arabs  191, 229, 233 historical rights of Jews affirmation  165, 167, 182, 191, 229, 233 denial of  69, 249–50, 252–3 Hitler, Adolf  139, 142, 170, 172, 176, 274 Hitti, Philip Khuri  135 Hogarth message  206, 208–9 holocaust  xvi, 13, 25–7, 32, 190, 194, 312 Holy Land  96–7, 144, 171, 180–2, 188, 190–1, 193, 222, 224 Holy Places  xvii–xviii, xx, 75, 77–9, 84, 143, 168, 215, 221–2, 232, 257, 262, 313 and sites  287–8 Hood, John, member of UNSCOP, Australia  238n. 16

INDEX Hope-Simpson, John  138 Horowitz, David (Dolik)  241n. 21 Hourani, Albert  xxvi, 41n. 8, 102–22 human rights  58–9, 148, 224, 257, 262, 286, 313 cultural rights  224 Hushi, Abba  300 Hussein, King of Jordan  40 Hussein-McMahon correspondence  67 Hutcheson, Joseph Chappel  142 illegal immigrants  121, 197 immigration  76 Jewish (also Aliya)  xvi, 10, 30n. 3, 89–90, 124, 160 numerical parity  194 imperialism  70, 151, 154 implementation  266–8, 273, 282, 284, 302, 305–6, 312 impossibility of meeting both claims in full  70, 72, 217 independence and development  133 political  133 India  18, 88, 102, 162, 258 inevitability of the conflict  73 international community  xvi, xviii–xix, xxi, xxviii–xxix, 19–20, 24, 28, 37, 49, 53, 55, 229, 233 international law  xx–xxi, 23, 164, 169–70, 203, 247, 311 international legitimacy  xxii, 10 Iraq  6, 32, 39, 69, 71, 73, 77, 88, 98, 127–8, 133, 136, 141, 210, 271, 310 irgun  xvi, 42–3 see also Etzel irrigation and development  82, 231 Israeli communist party  36 Italy  125, 139, 166 Jabotinsky Eri  52 Ze’ev (vladimir)  xxv, 86–7 Jaffa  7, 78, 131, 212, 240 Jenin  79–80 Jerusalem  xv, xvii–xviii, xx, xxviii, 7, 14, 31, 39, 42, 65n. 1,

325

65–6, 75, 78–80, 98, 111, 125, 129–30, 135, 139–40, 153, 168, 181, 188–9, 191, 196, 205, 212–13, 230–2, 237, 241, 249, 263, 271, 283–9, 291–4, 301, 307n. 9, 308, 310n. 13 elections of Mayor  125, 131, 153 international trusteeship  231–2 Jewish Agency  xxv–xxvii, 7, 13–14, 50, 57, 88, 98, 109, 122, 130, 132, 136, 148, 169, 198, 256 Jewish Arabs  135 Jewish Brigade  139 Jewish distress  10, 84, 223, 227, 261, 269 Jewish labour  135–6, 177 Jewish national fund  see Keren Kayemet Jewish national home  4–6, 30–2, 65, 68–71, 83–4, 97, 139, 142, 163, 166–7, 170, 173, 200–5, 210, 258, 265, 267–71 Jewish people  xiv, 122, 147 a democratic people  155 denial of  249, 252 not a nation or a race  249, 252 and Torah (religious law)  188 Jewish pluralism  56 Jewish settlement in the occupied territories  54–5 Jewish state  142 and national home  203 is no theocracy  183 as source of unrest  243, 257 Jewish terrorism  108, 243–4, 259 Jewish vs Israeli identity  xiv, 55–8 Joint economic board  231, 286, 290–3 Jordan river  xv–xvi, xxiin. 17, 4n. 1, 5, 13 Jordan (Trans-Jordan)  31–2 Judaism, only a religion  50, 54, 249, 264 justice  xiv, 28, 60, 69–72, 77, 85, 94–5, 99, 106, 111, 141, 162–5, 178–9, 190, 224, 245, 247, 251, 255, 257–8, 260, 263, 266, 274, 276–8, 286, 290, 294, 313

326

Index

Kabha, Mustafa  xxiii, 29–37 Kahani, Moshe  242, 242n. 24 Kaplan, Eliezer  xxvi, 49n. 1, 140, 184–8, 302 Katznelson, Berl  8–9 Kenya  197, 302 Keren Kayemeth (Jewish national fund)  98, 136–8, 140 Khalaf, Salah (Abu Iyad)  40n. 5 King-Crane commission  68, 210 King Hussein, Shereef of Mecca  66–8, 122, 176, 209, 248 Kisch Brigadier  123 land (soil)  95 derelict  140 national land  136 sale of land  71, 138 land and water resources  185–6, 205 landless Arabs  137–8 Land Regulations, 1940  138–40, 169 language  6,72, 75, 79, 216 and binationalism  192 in declaration of independence  313 equal rights to  286, 288–9 in the holy places  79 Law of Absentee Properties 1950  53 Lawrence, T. E.  123 League of Nations  xvii, 30 Article 22 of the covenant  68, 78, 201, 204, 206–7, 256, 259 Permanent Mandates Commission  169–70, 219–20 Lebanon  6, 39–40, 67–9, 71, 73, 98, 128, 139, 270, 277 Leggett, Frederick  120 Lehi (Stern Gang) (also Lohamei Herut Yisrael)  xvi, 151–7 Levin, Yitzhak Meir  xxvii, 188–90 Lie, Trygve  305–6 Lincoln, Abraham  94 Lisický, Karel, czeck member of UNSCOP  238n. 13, 240–1 Lloyd George, David  5n. 3, 166, 271 Lovett, Robert A.  302

loyalty  10, 117, 189, 233 Lydda  78, 153 MacDonald, Malcolm  173 Macedonia  134 Magally, Nazier  xxiii, 38–44 Magnes, Judah  104–5, 126, 190–6, 218 majority Arab  21, 25, 103, 121, 177, 200, 204, 206, 212, 236, 265, 270 Jewish  123–4, 134 should be made purposeless  191 malaria  137, 300 mamlachtiyut (statism)  53 Mandate for Palestine  222, 226 Article 4  203 Article 6  202, 255–6 Article 9  226 Article  13 and Balfour declaration  211 implications of dissolution  219 temporary in nature  219 and trusteeship  219 unworkable  219 Mandatory Administration  75, 79, 81, 197–9 Manningham-Buller, Reginald  101–2, 119 Mapai (party)  8–9, 52 Mardam Bey, Jamil  123 Marshall, George  302–5 Masaryk, Jan  238, 238n. 14 McDonald, James  120 McMahon-Hussein correspondence 1915–1916  67, 206, 208 McNeil, Hector  306 messianism  91, 94 Metzilah center  xiii, xvii, 46–7, 57–61 Meyerson (Meir) Golda  xxvii, 42n. 10, 238–42, 307–10 Middle East  xvn. 5, xxviii, 7, 100, 103, 115, 124, 128–30, 133–4, 151, 155, 175, 177, 179, 198, 225, 227, 242–5, 254, 272, 302, 305, 311, 313 Milner, Lord  264 Milstein, Uri  42n. 11

INDEX minority rights  288–9 cultural  288 individual  289 Mohilever, Samuel  183 Morris, Benny  xivn. 4, xviin. 8 Morris, Harold, member, Peel Com.  85 Morrison, Herbert  170 Morrison Plan (also MorrisonGrady)  13, 213, 270 muslim brothers  34 Nablus  79 Nakba (catastrophe)  xxii, 43 Nathan, Robert  152 National assimilation, ruled out  73 National Home  xiii, xv, 4–7, 30–2, 49, 65, 68–71, 75, 77, 83–4, 90, 95, 97–8, 139, 142, 163–7, 170, 172–3, 178, 191, 200–5, 210, 248, 258–9, 261, 265, 267–71 was already established  251 national independence  20–1, 65–6, 68, 83, 159–61, 267 National Liberation League  33–6 nation like all nations  112 Nazareth  31, 79, 212, 231, 239 Nazi Germany  xvi Nazism  40–1, 41n. 8, 216 Negev (Negeb)  86–7, 87n. 6, 168, 213, 231, 237–9, 302 Newcombe, colonel S. F.  127 Niles, Dave  304 Notestein, Frank  108 29 November 1947 resolution  xxviii, 281–98 see also resolution 181 Nuri Said Pasha  123, 125 objection to partition among Arabs  51, 103–10, 112 among Jews  55, 108, 244 in the international community  19, 233 obligation to keep the peace  224 occupation  xxiin. 17, 37, 54–5, 69, 79–80, 97, 171, 258 Ormsby-Gore, David  90

327

Ottoman Chamber, Constantinople  135 Ottoman Empire  4, 18, 30, 66, 69, 98, 165–6, 178, 206, 226, 248, 264, 271 Pakistan  278 pale of settlement  170 Palestine  227 as integral part of Syria  247–8 and the Jewish problem  227 sanctity of Palestine to Arabs and Moslems  70 Palestine Arab Congress  135 Palestine Conference, London 1946  215 Palestine (EI)  xvii, 4, 6–7, 130 Palestinian Communist Party  34 Palestinian nationalism, and Arab nationalism  208 Palestinian people  31, 35, 37, 39–44, 57 Pan-Arabism  33–4, 128, 134 Pappe, Ilan  39n. 2 Paris conference 1911  66 partition  228–31 as anti-Arab  234 advantages for Jews  84 advantages for the Arabs  83, 230 and British interests  242–4 and future violoence  107, 243 impractical and unworkable  232–5 the most realistic and practicable  229 and peace  77, 84, 229 recommended by Peel Commission  xv rejection by Lehi  155–7 supported by Ben-Gurion  236 unstable for demographic reasons  244 voluntary exchange of population  155 Pasha, Glubb  41 Peel, Horace, Chair, Peel Com.  85

328

Index

Permanent Supervisory Commission  174 perpetual neutrality  193 Phillips, William  119 PLO National Council 1988  44 Pravda  279 problem of Judaism  94 problem of the Jews  43, 91 promised land  13, 94, 162 Prophets  92, 94, 162–3, 179–81, 264, 313 proportional representation  285 protection of minorities  78, 221, 223–4 Provisional Council of Government  284–5, 291 Rafael, Gideon (Rufer)  242n. 23 Ramle  78 Rand, Ivan, member UNSCOP, Canada  241 refugees Jewish  13, 27, 171–3, 250–1, 269, 276, 302 Palestinian Arabs  xxii, xxviii, 44, 51, 53, 248 religious monopoly over marriage and divorce  55 religious peace  222 and a dispute resolution mechanism  222 resolution 181, 1947 (partition)  xxviii–xxi, 51, 281–98 resolution 194 (1948)  xx return, right of  176 revisionist movement, revisionists  6, 8, 13 rights of minorities (also minority rights)  224 right to self-defence (also selfdefence)  198, 257 1929 riots  140 Royal Commission (Peel Commission) 1937  xv, xxv, 3, 6, 30, 65–92 exchange of land and population  6, 83 and partition  6

sacred trust  67, 74, 78, 170, 259 Safad  75, 79, 79n. 4 Said, Nuri  125 Salazar, Enrico, Peru member of UNSCOP  238n. 15, 241 Samaria and Judea  79, 231 Samuel, Herbert  167 Sandstrom, Emil, chairman UNSCOP, Sweden  238, 238n. 17 San Remo agreement 1920  6 Sasson, Eliyahu (Elias)  240n. 19, 307 Saudi Arabia  39, 73, 127, 271 Schlossberg, Joseph  299 Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias)  79 secession  24 self defence  270 to resist the Jewish state  251, 270 self-determination  xxvi, 24, 53, 67 right of  67, 207, 247 Sfard, Michael  30n. 1 Shapira, Yonathan  10n. 10 Shertok (Sharett), Moshe  xxvi–xxvii, 40n. 4, 122–44, 238–42, 299–301, 304–5 Silver, Abba Hillel  xxvii, 49n. 2, 236, 262–75, 305 Simic, Vladimir, member UNSCOP, Yugoslavia  xxvii, 232, 275–6 single Arab-Jewish state  149–50 Singleton, Justice  113 Six Day War  54 Smuts, Ian  167, 265 sovereignty  9, 65 Struma  171 subvention  80–1, 84 support of partition among Arabs  18, 21, 27, 135 among Jews  54 in the international community  xviii, 55, 233 Supreme Moslem Council  137 Sweden  18, 228, 238n. 17, 279 Switzerland  122, 142, 144n. 5, 169, 192–3, 278 Sykes-Picot Agreement  xv, 208 Syria  5–6, 39–41, 67–9, 71, 73, 77, 88, 98, 123–4, 128, 133, 136, 139, 141, 208, 210, 238, 246–51, 271

INDEX Taft, Robert  305, 305n. 7 Tariff Commission  292 Tel-Aviv  10nn. 9–10, 12n. 12, 151n. 2, 171, 299n. 1, 308, 313 territorial integrity  24, 224, 273, 286 terrorism  108, 169, 197–8, 219, 243–4, 252 The moral task of Jews in Canaan  94 The Peel Report (the blue book)  xvi, 90–1 threat to peace  282 Toma, Emile  36 Toubi, Tawfik  35–6 Tov, Moshe (Tof)  241n. 20 transitional period between Mandate and independence  221–2, 269 Treaty of Sevres  210 Treaty of Versailles  192 Truman, Harry  xxvii, 194, 271, 304–5, 307, 310–11 trusteeship  xviii, 13–14, 145, 193, 214, 231 Tulkarm  80 Turkey  40, 82, 143, 171, 258, 296 Uganda  165, 261 United Nations Article 39, 41  282 Charter  xxi Economic and social council  291 General Assembly  xvii, xx–xxii, 147, 205, 281, 294–5 Security Council  xx–xxi, xxin. 15, 245, 282, 284, 286–7, 304 United states (America)  xvii–xviii, 13, 32, 78, 100, 107–9, 111, 115–16, 119, 121, 129, 144n. 5, 145, 166, 170, 172, 192, 194, 210, 214, 241, 247, 249, 251, 253, 261, 270, 277–80, 302–7, 310–11 doubt concerning support for Jewish state  236–7 UNSCOP (also Special Committee)  xvii recommendations on displaced persons  249

329

UNSCOP report  196–235 The Arab case  205–11 England, response to  242–6 inconsistency of mandate tasks  202 the Jewish case  200–5 USSR (Moscow, Soviet Union)  xvii, 22, 24, 26, 32, 41, 149, 159, 236, 250, 261, 278, 279, 302, 305–7 vaad Leumi  214 Vale of Esdraelon, vale of Jezreel  137 Vandenberg, Arthur  305, 305n. 7 Vatican  193, 303 Versailles Peace Conference  4, 68 voluntary exchange of population  155 1948 war (also War of independence)  35 1967 war (six days war)  xxiin. 17, 54–5 Wauchope, Arthur  94 Webb, Lord Justice  138 Weizmann, Chaim  xxv, 5, 7, 87–92, 122, 175, 299, 301 White Paper 1939  xvi, 12, 30, 127, 169, 179, 185, 190, 197, 207 impact on negotiations  128, 169 inconsistent with mandate  169–70 Wilner, Meir  41n. 9 Wilson, Woodrow  67, 166–7, 264 Woodhead commission  xvi, 12, 104, 127, 212 world war 1  3, 97, 165 world war 2  xvi, 13, 17, 23, 25, 32, 34, 41, 148–9, 176, 223, 312 Yakobson, Alexander  xxiii, xxvi n. 26, 17–28 Yishuv (Jewish settlement) (also Jewish community of eretz Yisrael)  xv–xvi, xviii–xix, xxvi–xxviii, 7, 9–10, 50, 54, 56–7, 134, 160 Yogev, Gdalia  310n. 13 Yugoslavia  xxvii, 18, 159, 166, 192, 232, 236, 275, 279, 296, 305 case not applicable  157

330

Index

Zionism  xiv–xv, xxix, 8, 22, 26, 32, 45–58, 77, 84, 86–7, 91, 93–5, 97, 100–1, 103–4, 106, 110–13, 119, 122, 124, 135, 139, 165, 173–4, 183, 198, 214, 236–7, 258, 261, 302–3 as invasion and aggression  253 and relations with non-Jews  112

20th Zionist congress 1937  xxv, 7, 10, 87–92 Zionist movement  xiii–xiv, xxiii, 3–4, 6–7, 10–12, 14–15, 18, 22, 27–8, 30, 33, 37, 39, 46–7, 49n. 1, 52–3, 55, 57–8, 60n. 5, 99, 124, 179, 183, 257, 312