The Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio 047210294X, 9780472102945

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The Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio

MICHIGAN MONOGRAPHS IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY The Play of Fictions: Studies in Ovid's Metamorphoses Book 2 A. M. Keith Homeric Misdirection: False Predictions in the Iliad James V. Morrison The Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio Alain M. Gowing The Stranger's Welcome: Oral Theory and the Aesthetics of the Homeric Hospitality Scene Steve Reece

The Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio

Alain M. Gowing

Ann Arbor

THE UNIVERSITY

OF MICHIGAN

PRESS

Copyright © by the University of Michigan 1992 All rights reserved Published in the United States of America by The University of Michigan Press Manufactured in the United States of America 1995

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1993

1992 4

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A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gowing, Alain M., 1953The triumviral narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio / Alain M. Gowing. p. cm. - (Michigan monographs in classical antiquity) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-472-10294-X (alk. paper) 1. Rome-History-Civil War, 43-31 B.C.-Historiography. 2. Appianus, of Alexandria. Civil wars. 3. Cassius Dio Cocceianus. Roman history. I. Title. II. Series. DG268.G68 1992 937'.05'072-dc20 92-29116 CIP

... sapiens subtilisque lector debet non diversis conferre diversa, sed singula expendere, nee deterius alio putare quad est in suo genere perfectum. Pliny Ep. 4.14.7

Preface

Since the completion in 1988 of the Bryn Mawr dissertation herein revised, two major studies of Cassius Dio and Appian as well as several pertinent articles have appeared. D. Fechner's Untersuchungen zu Cassius Dios Sicht der Romischen Republik (Hildesheim, 1986), which became available to me too late to be of use in the original study, represents another in a series of specialized efforts since Millar's A Study of Cassius Dio (Oxford, 1964) showed that Dio's work warrants closer scrutiny. Of greater interest, perhaps, because it is the only book-length treatment of Appian since Emilio Gabba's seminal Appiano e la storia delle guerre civili (Florence, 1955) to deal with issues other than Quellenkritik, is B. Goldmann's Einheitlichkeit und Eigenstcindigkeit der Historia Romana des Appian (Hildesheim, 1988). Neither book has obviated the need for a study such as mine, though both corroborated some of my conclusions to a significant degree. More importantly, they confirmed my strong feeling that a comparison of Appian and Dio as historiographers was timely and in order. And while this might not seem a particularly compelling justification, detailed studies of these historians in English are still relatively few. It is hoped, therefore, that this book might bring the issues involved in the study of Appian and Dio before a wider readership. It is customary to record in this place debts of gratitude, and in my case those debts are especially numerous. They are owed to, among others, my mentors at Bryn Mawr College, in particular Mabel Lang, R.T. Scott, and Julia Gaisser, and my colleagues and students at the University of Washington. All have contributed, wittingly or not, to whatever may be useful and good in this study. I extend special thanks to my director David Potter of the University of Michigan for his constant support of and interest in the project, both at the dissertation stage and beyond. It has been a rare privilege indeed to have had the benefit of his remarkable and profound knowledge of all aspects of ancient history and historiography. In addition, I would like to express my deep

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Preface

appreciation to my editor Ellen Bauerle and the two anonymous referees. The Graduate School of the University of Washington generously provided a grant to defray the costs of photographs and map preparation; April Ryan of the University's Instructional Media Services designed and produced the maps. And finally, heartfelt gratitude goes to my wife Anne and son Benjamin, at whose patience and affection I never cease to marvel. The rhetoric of Prefaces also demands that I conclude with the admission that all remaining flaws and oversights are of course my own. I readily make such an admission as one further demonstration that all rhetoric need not be empty.

Contents

Texts and Abbreviations

Xl

Introduction

1

Part 1: Prolegomena

7

1. An Alexandrian in Rome

9

2. The Roman Senator from Bithynia

19

3. Overview of the Triumviral Period in Appian and Dio: Purposes, Perceptions, and Organization

33

4. The Source Question

39

5. The Historical Situation

51

Part 2: Persons

55

6. Octavian's Rise to Power

57

7. Octavian's Rival

95

8. The Odd Triumvir Out

123

9. Cicero's Final Year

143

10. The Tyrannicides

163

11. The Republicans' Last Hope

181

Part 3: Events

207

12. Battles

209

13. Speeches

225

14. The Proscriptions

247

x I

Contents

Part 4: A Final Context

271

15. Appian as an Antonine Historian

273

16. Dio as a Severan Historian

289

17. Conclusion

295

Appendices

299

1. Chronological Table of Events from the Ides of March 44 B.c. to the Death of Sextus Pompey in 35

301

2. Sextus Pompey and Neptune

309

3. Appian's and Dio's Accounts of Philippi

311

4. Did Appian Visit Philippi?

319

5. The i'.moµv~µaTa of Appian BC 5.45.191

321

Works Cited

323

Index Locorum

335

Index

365

Illustrations

following page 146

Texts and Abbreviations

References to Cassius Dio are to the edition of U.Ph. Boissevain, Cassii Dionis Cocceiani Historiarum Romanarum quae supersunt, 5 vols. (vols. 13: Text; vol. 4: Historical Index, edited by H. Smilda and U.Ph. Boissevain; vol. 5: Greek Index compiled by W. Nawijn) (Berlin, 1895-1931; photoreprint of 1-4, Berlin, 1955). Books 61-80 are cited throughout by Boissevain's divisions, with the traditional numbering provided in parentheses, e.g., 80(79).1.2. Readers using the Loeb edition should be aware that in those volumes Boissevain's book numbers are printed at the top of the page, the traditional numbers in the margins. Appian is cited from the Teubner editions of P. Viereck, A.G. Roos, and E. Gabba, Appiani Historia Romana I (Leipzig, 1962) and of L. Mendelssohn and P. Viereck, Appiani Historia Romana II (Leipzig, 1905, reprinted 1986). Unless otherwise noted, all references to Appian are to the Bella Civilia. Except where noted, translations of Cassius Dio are by E. Cary, Dio's Roman History, 9 vols. (Loeb Classical Library, 1914-27) and those of Appian by H. White, Appian 's Roman History, 4 vols. (Loeb Classical Library, 1912-13). For Plutarch I have used the translation by B. Perrin, Plutarch's Lives, 11 vols. (Loeb Classical Library, 1914-26). Since Plutarch is cited primarily in translation, references are to the chapter and section numbers of Perrin's edition. His section numbers differ from those of Ziegler's Teubner edition, so I give in parenthesis and designate by "Z" Ziegler's section numbers: e.g., Plu. Ant. 6.6 (Z 7). Fronto is cited from the 1988 Teubner edition of M.P.J. van den Hout; translations are by C.R. Haines, The Correspondence of Marcus Cornelius Fronto, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library, 1919-20). References will be given to both editions, e.g., Ad Pium 10.2 = H 1:262 (i.e., Haines, vol. 1, p. 262). Abbreviations of Latin authors and their works are as indicated on pp. ixxx of the Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford, 1982), and of Greek authors and their works, on pp. xvi-xxxviii of Liddell, Scott, and Jones' A Greek-English

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Texts and Abbreviations

Lexicon (Oxford, 1968). In references to his History Cassius Dio is therefore abbreviated to D.C. in accordance with Liddell, Scott, and Jones. Abbreviations of journals and periodicals are in accordance with those found in L'Annee Philologique. After the first citation of an article or book in the notes, subsequent references will be by author's name alone or together with a shortened title: these may be readily identified by referring to the Works Cited. The following special abbreviations are used throughout:

BM Brunt, IM

DG

FGrH Gabba BC I Gabba BC 5 Luce, AERRC

Magnino BC 3 Moles, PLOC

MRR MV

Pelling, PLOA

RE

P.A. Brunt and J.M. Moore, eds. and trans. Res Gestae Divi Augusti. Oxford, 1973. P.A. Brunt. Italian Manpower 225 B.C.-A.D. 14. Oxford, 1971. W. Drumann and P. Groebe. Geschichte Roms in seinem Ubergang von der republikanischen zur monarchischen Veifassung. 2d ed. 6 vols. Leipzig, 1899-1929. F. Jacoby. Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker. Berlin and Leiden, 1923-58. E. Gabba, ed. and trans. Appiani Bellorum Civilium Liber Primus. 2d ed. Florence, 1967. ---, ed. and trans. Appiani Bellorum Civilium Liher Quintus. Florence, 1970. T.J. Luce, Jr. Appian 's Exposition of the Roman Republican Constitution. Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1958. D. Magnino, ed. and trans. Appiani Bellorum Civilium Liber Tertius. Florence, 1984. J.L. Moles, ed. Plutarch The Life of Cicero. Warminster, England, 1988. T.R.S. Broughton. The Magistrates of the Roman Republic. 3 vols. Atlanta, Ga., 1986. Reference to the apparatus criticus of Mendelssohn and Viereck. For clarity page and line number will be cited as well as the location in the text. C.B.R. Pelling, ed. Plutarch Life of Antony. Cambridge, 1988. Pauly-Wissowa, Real Encyclopiidie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft.

Text and Abbreviations

Reinhold, FRTP

SB

Syme, RR Syme, AA Woodman, VP

/

xm

M. Reinhold. From Republic to Principate: An Historical Commentary on Cassius Dio's Roman History, Books 49-52 (36-29 B.c.). Atlanta, Ga., 1988. Designates D.R. Shackleton Bailey's editions of Cicero's correspondence (full bibliographic information in the Works Cited). I give the traditional numerations as well as Shackleton Bailey's: e.g., Att. 14.1 = SB 355. Ronald Syme. The Roman Revolution. Oxford, 1939. ---. The Augustan Aristocracy. Oxford, 1986. A.J. Woodman, ed. Velleius Paterculus: The Caesarian and Augustan Narrative (2.41-93). Cambridge, 1983.

Introduction

"The Triumviral Period is tangled, chaotic and hideous."

-R.

Syme

Following his victory over Sextus Pompey in September of 36 B.c., the future emperor Augustus commanded that all documents (ypaµµaTELa) dealing with the early years of the triumviral period be collected and burned (App. 5 .132.548). It was a symbolic gesture whose message was clear: the events following the Ides of March were to be forgotten. The memories were unpleasant, to be sure, but that was not all that concerned Octavian. There was a more sinister purpose, for those documents would contain much to embarrass or even discredit a man who professed to be restoring the Republic. Octavian was not so naive as to think he could erase the memory of those years. Rather, this was just the first of several steps taken to ensure that history would view events through Augustan eyes. In some measure, though largely by accident rather than design, the effort succeeded. Contemporary histories of the triumviral period have not survived, and outside of the meager account of the imperial historian Velleius Paterculus (who had his own agenda), we are reduced to the Histories of two Romanized Greeks writing two centuries or more after the fact for a continuous narrative of the period. 1 That circumstance alone has required close scrutiny of the reliability of Appian and Dio as historical sources. The present study, however, is concerned primarily with historiography rather than history; with few exceptions I have little to add to our knowledge of the historical facts of the triumviral 1. Dio, Appian, and Velleius aside, the major extant literary sources are as follows. For the period from the Ides to July of 43, Cicero's correspondence and Philippics are of primary importance. These may be supplemented by Plutarch's Brutus and Cicero; Nicolaus of Damascus' Vita Caesaris (for the Ides to October of 44); Nepos' Life of Atticus, the Laudatio Turiae, and some of the Elder Seneca's Suasoriae and Controversiae all provide additional material for the period of the proscriptions. For the period as a whole, Plutarch's Antonius, Suetonius' Divus Augustus, Florus, the Periochae of Livy, and Augustus' Res Gestae. Additional material in Orosius, Aulus Gellius, Valerius Maximus; Tacitus' occasional references back to the period also provide some valuable insights.

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The Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio

period, and I make no claim to having attempted to produce a coherent account of what happened between 44 and 35 B.c. I am proposing on the one hand a reading of Appian and Dio that will illustrate two vastly different approaches to and conceptions of both the period and historical writing, and on the other, an interpretation of those differences as a function of a variety of factors that transcend the question of source. In short, I intend to compare Appian and Dio as interpreters rather than mere transmitters of history, as authors whose works, however derivative, nevertheless provide valid evidence for the evolution of important historiographical trends and perspectives between the second and early third centuries A.D. This last assertion may elicit surprise and even suspicion from those who persist in regarding Appian and Dio as essentially compilers who added little of value or interest to what they found in their sources. In the case of Dio we have beyond question passed the point where an apology must be made for studying him as a historian in his own right. A series of analyses, beginning with Fergus Millar's groundbreaking A Study of Cassius Dio in 1964, has shown him to be innovative and thoughtful in a variety of ways. 2 An encouraging sign of this increased attention has been the formation of a Dio Project, under whose auspices a sorely needed commentary on the entire extant corpus of Dio has been undertaken; the first installment, by Meyer Reinhold, has already appeared. In addition, J.W. Rich has produced an excellent commentary on Books 53-55.9 (Cassius Dio. The Augustan Settlement [Warminster, England, 1990]). Efforts such as these will put in the hands of scholars the sort of apparatus long since available for and considered essential to the study of the other major ancient historians. We have been awakened, in other words, to the fact that the particulars of Dio's work need reassessment on all levels. Though B. Goldmann's recent Einheitlichkeit und Eigenstiindigkeit der Historia Romana des Appian, among other studies, suggests that the trend is reversing itself, Appian has still received less critical attention than Dio. On the whole, however, subsequent to the appearance of Schweighaiiser's 1785 text and commentary and his later "Exercitationes," Appian found more defenders than Dio. 3 But studies such as Dominicus' brief De indole Appiani Alexandrini Graeci Romanarum rerum scriptoris (Coblentz, 1844) and Wijnne's more thorough Defide et auctoritate Appiani in bellis Romanorum civilibus enarrandis (Groningen, 1855) credit Appian with more skill and 2. Fechner (1-10) surveys and discusses the scholarship on Dio. 3. "Exercitationes in Appiani Alexandrini Romanas Historias," in Opuscula Academica II: Commentationes Philologicae, 3-95 (StraBburg, 1806). For studies prior to Schweighatiser, largely unfavorable, see Goldmann, 2-3.

Introduction / 3 perspicacity than has generally been admitted in this century. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, Appian was increasingly subjected to Quellenforschung, and he has not often emerged from that pall. 4 Since 1955, studies of Appian have been dominated by Emilio Gabba, whose Appiano e la storia delle guerre civili remains the standard work on the subject. That book and Gabba's commentaries on Books 1 and 5 of the Bella Civilia, as well as his many articles, are indispensable to any student of Appian or late Republican history in general. But while Gabba did much to illuminate the tenor of Appian's work, his essential thesis, that the Bella Civilia derive directly and almost in their entirety from the lost History of Asinius Pollio, has never received wide acceptance. 5 Nevertheless, with some exceptions (most notably the work of Istvan Hahn), neither that thesis nor Gabba's notions about Appian's methods have often been challenged. Both authors therefore merit study in and of themselves, but when studied in conjunction it becomes quite apparent that each has something to teach us about the other. Most importantly, it will be clear that source criticism cannot satisfactorily account for the striking distinctions that come to light. I do not therefore intend to add in any substantial way to previous work done on the sources of Appian and Dio, except to reiterate a view expressed generally by Millar and others that such research, while inarguably valuable and vital, has unduly affected our reading of their work and of Appian's in particular. The principal aim of this study is instead to compare Appian and Dio at a variety of levels-as historians, as thinkers, as representatives of their age-through an examination of their accounts of the period following the assassination of Julius Caesar in March of 44 B.c. down to the death of Sextus Pompey in 35. The choice of this period for such an exercise has been influenced by a number of considerations, not the least of which are the survival of both authors' accounts of the period in intact condition and the termination of 4. Summary of the various theories on Appian's sources in N.I. Barbu, Les sources et l'originalite d'Appien dans le deuxieme livre des guerres civiles (Paris, 1934) 2-6; see also B. Haller, C. Asinius Pollio als Politiker und zeitkritischer Historiker (Ph.D. diss., Westfalischen Wilhelms-Universitat, Miinster, 1967) 106-12; W. Will, ed., Appian von Alexandria. Romische Geschichte, vol. 2, translated by 0. Yeh (Stuttgart, 1989) 2-4. 5. See M. Gelzer, review of Appiano e la storia delle guerre civili, edited by E. Gabba, Gnomon 30 (1958): 888-89; id., review of Appiani Be/forum Civilium Liber Primus, edited by E. Gabba, Gnomon 31 (1959): 179-81; E. Badian, "Appian and Asinius Pollio," CR 8 (1958): 15962; A.H. McDonald, review of Appiano e la storia delle guerre civili, by E. Gabba, JRS 52 (1962): 186-87. A.B. Bosworth's reassessment of Pollio's politics casts further doubt on Gabba's thesis ("Asinius Pollio and Augustus," Historia 21 [1972]: 441- 73). Gabba's approach was new, though the notion that Asinius Pollio lay behind Appian's Bella Civilia was not (see S. Mazzarino, I! pensiero storico classico, 3 vols. [Bari, 1966] 2:399, 533-35).

4

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The Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dia

Appian's extant Bella Civilia with Sextus' demise. 6 The circumstance is fortuitous, for the events, personalities, and sheer importance of the triumviral years could arouse even the dullest chronicler. There was ample material for any historian eager to exercise his critical, descriptive, and didactic faculties, and both Appian and Dio rose to the task with varying degrees of success. The heart of this book, Parts 2 and 3, consists of nine representative studies grouped under Persons and Events, rough but convenient rubrics denoting a historian's two principal concerns. These studies are largely self-contained and independent of one another; each entails rather close, parallel readings that serve to illustrate from different angles two disparate approaches to and views of the triumviral period proper and, to an extent, events leading up to the formation of the triumvirate. Part 2 focuses on Appian's and Dio's treatment of seven key figures: the triumvirs themselves, Octavian, Antony, Lepidus, and Cicero, the tyrannicides Brutus and Cassius (considered collectively), and Sextus Pompey. In order to avoid undue repetition, I have tried to be selective, to focus on the salient aspects of these portrayals that best illustrate the authors' differing viewpoints and historiographical method. It seemed best to discuss the characters individually: various traditions accreted around each figure, and treating them in isolation permits a clearer view of how Appian and Dio handled those traditions with sharply divergent results. In Part 3, on the other hand, I tum to their handling of and narratological approaches to important events-specifically, battles, speeches, and the proscriptions. A fundamental premise of this study is that each facet of Appian's and Dio's triumviral narrative should be interpreted in light of their respective purposes and experiences, insofar as we can know or reconstruct them. To that end Parts 1 and 4 furnish a context for the analyses contained in Parts 2 and 3. In Part 1 I briefly consider four areas, familiarity with which I believe to be germane to an informed reading of their triumviral narratives: some biographical considerations for both historians,7 their respective conceptions and purposes in writing of the triumviral period generally, and the source question. A fifth section will establish a cursory historical framework for the period under consideration. In all of these areas I wish to make some preliminary 6. In any event, Appian believed that for all intents and purposes the triumvirate ended in 36 after Lepidus had been edged out (5.1.3). 7. My criteria in these sections have been I) to identify factors of principal relevance to the triumviral period and 2) to use as evidence only such material as may be considered apart from the source question. The result has of necessity been a certain imbalance; the evidence for Dio's career and beliefs is broader and more certain than for Appian's. For fuller biographical treatments see Millar, Study, 5-27 for Dio and Luce, AERRC, I-29 for Appian.

Introduction

/

5

suggestions about the sort of influences at work on these historians as they researched and wrote about the triumviral period, particularly in the case of Appian. The social and literary milieu, an equally important influence, I leave to Part 4. I make no apology for the apparent tendency to dwell on Appian over Dio; our knowledge of Dio is in a far more advanced state than that of Appian. This study will, I hope, in part remedy that unjustified imbalance. Finally, I should add that I am not overly concerned with demonstrating either Appian's or Dio's capacity for original thought or with pinpointing precisely where and how they have departed from, improved upon, or otherwise altered their source material. My principal concern has been first to describe significant similarities and differences between the narratives, but I have not felt compelled to attempt an explanation of the differences at every step of the way. To be sure, I do not hesitate to point out and discuss such instances where revision or embellishment seem demonstrable or simply likely; by the same token, I do not deny that much of what we observe can be explained on one level as the consequence of variant sources. My reasons for these views will be laid out in depth in Chapter 4, but I wish to stress from the outset that in my opinion we cannot always come to the sort of firm conclusions about these authors and their texts that we might like. Appian wrote in the relative stability of the Antonine principate; Dio, in a period when revolution was virtually an everyday occurrence. The political climate, as well as their own very different temperaments and experiences, suggests that their views on the period of transition from Republic to Principate would differ dramatically. Even a cursory reading of the two historians' accounts of the triumviral period will confirm that this is indeed the case. But both shared the notion that the assassination of Caesar and the ensuing years of chaos resulted in the demise of the Republic and the beginnings of the Principate. This view, predictable and correct, prompted both to pay close attention to the genesis of the political system in which they lived and participated. The similarity essentially ends here. Together they represent a new breed of historian in which the Greek and Roman historiographical traditions were united; individually they express two contrasting and unique views of Rome's past.

Part 1

Prolegomena

Chapter 1

An Alexandrian in Rome

Despite occasional concessions, some quite recent, that Quellenforschung has produced inconclusive results as well as obscured the influence of Appian himself, scholarly opinion has overwhelmingly deemed Appian's chief value to lie in his preservation of sources now lost to us. 1 But one nineteenthcentury reader, who was little interested in source criticism, admired the Bella Civilia: Karl Marx. His assessment of the historian has attracted the attention of several scholars in the past few years and bears repeating: 2 "As a relaxation in the evenings I have been reading Appian on the Roman Civil Wars in the original Greek text. A very valuable book. The chap is an Egyptian by birth. Schlosser says he has 'no soul,' probably because he goes to the roots of the material basis for these civil wars" (Marx to Engels, 27 February 1861). Marx' observations are valuable on two counts. First, because he draws attention to Appian's origins-although more properly and more significantly he was Alexandrian. Second, because he remarks Appian's unusual interest in the financial motivations underlying the civil wars. Not surprisingly, Marx' admiration of Appian has caused him to be scrutinized by a number of Marxist scholars. 3 Whether one accepts or rejects 1. E.g., Luce, AERRC. v-vi; E.L. Bowie, "Appian," in The Cambridge History of Classical Literature, edited by P.E. Easterling and B.W. Knox, Vol. I: Greek Literature (Cambridge, 1985) 707-709, 888-89; P.J. Cuff, "Appian's Romaica: A Note," Athenaeum 61 (1983): 148-64, at 148 n. 1. 2. G.E.M. De Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World (London, 1983) 24, 208; Cuff, "Appian's Romaica," 148; H.-J. Kiihne, "Appians historiographische Leistung," W.Z. Rostock 18 (1969): 346 n. 16, citing the passage quoted above as well as Marx' other references to Appian. See also L. Perelli, II movimento popolare nell'ultimo secolo della Repubblica (Torino, 1982) 63 with n. 66; Will, 1; K. Brodersen, ed., Appian von Alexandria. Romische Geschichte, vol. 1, translated by 0. Yeh (Stuttgart, 1987) 5; id., "Die Buchtitelverzeichnisse, das Lexikon TTEPL CJVVTCI~EWS und der Aufbau von Appians Werk," WS 103 (1990): 49. 3. To Kiihne's study add, among others, L. Havas, "Asinius Pollio and the Fall of the Roman Republic," ACD 16 (1980): 25-36; Y.Y.Zaborovsky, "Appian and the Roman civitas in the Last Century of the Republic. Sources and Character of the Civil Wars," [in Russian with summary in

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The Trium viral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio

the validity of this approach to Appian, it cannot be denied that Appian evinces an unusual sensitivity to and preoccupation with social issues and the class struggle. 4 In this lies one fundamental distinction between Appian's and Dio's conception of the triumviral period. It is essential, therefore, to investigate the causes for Appian's interests. Appian concludes the Praefatio to his History with a few scraps of biographical information: Who I am, who have written these things, many indeed know, and I have already indicated. To speak more plainly I am Appian of Alexandria, a man who [attained] the highest place in my native country, and [have pleaded causes in Rome] before emperors, until they deemed me worthy of being made their procurator. And if any one has a great desire to learn more about my affairs there is a special treatise of mine on that subject. (Praef 15.62)5 Much has been made of this passage, primarily for the scant and inconclusive summation of Appian's career in Rome. Appian draws equal attention, however, to the fact that he is an Alexandrian who had gained some distinction in his native city. While he does not claim Rome as his naTpCs-,6 he is clearly proud of his service to the emperors. In view of Appian's emphasis, and of the little use that critical literature has made of his origins,7 it will be useful to digress briefly on the implications of the historian's background. English] VD! 158 (1981): 139-44. 4. I mean the definition provided by De Ste. Croix (44): "the fundamental relationship between classes (and their respective individual members), involving essentially exploitation, or resistance to it." Gabba once stringently denied that the emphasis on socioeconomic factors evident in Appian is attributable to the historian himself. Rather, he argued, such interest is limited to one section of his work (viz., BC 1) and hence probably derived from his source (Appiano, 81-82, n. 1). Significantly, Gabba has now modified this position ('The Historians and Augustus," in Caesar Augustus: Seven Aspects, edited by F. Millar and E. Segal [Oxford, 1984] 61-88, 69 with n. 23). See also Perelli, 63. 5. TLS'OE CDV Taurn auvE'ypmµa, TTOAAOL µi:v i'.aaaL Ka\. avTos- TTpocqrr7va,aa..LµoD,mfoavTos avTovs ES' foxaTov, W-.6ywsCJUxvousKaLEKOAa(Evci8[Kws-TTAELovas(cf. ibid., 55-56, esp. 56: si severus, cur non in omnis? si misericors, cur non in suos ?): KaKTOUTWV LCJXUPOTUTOSTE Et aCJ8EVECJTaTOUKQLTTAOUCJLWTUTOSEt ClTTOpulTClTOU YEVOµEVOSou8ETEpouUUTJ..aKal TO KpciTos-TOTwv 'PwµaLwv µ6vos- E'tnv EATTLCJasmhos- EUUTOV aTTEKTELVE. As the references in brackets indicate (and these are only the most obvious connections), Dio may have extrapolated this character sketch from his reading of Cicero's second Philippic. Dio's familiarity with and use of the Philippics are problematic, though as a rule Millar's conclusion seems correct, that he relied on the speeches to compose his own version at 45. I 8-47 (discussed in Chapter 13), but not necessarily for historical information (Study, 54-55). Nevertheless, their influence is perhaps more pervasive than has been supposed: see Manuwald, 271-72 with n. 635. 4. Sec Millar, Study, 43, 47; and p. 29 with n. 30. 5. See E.G. Huzar, Mark Antony: A Biography (Minneapolis, 1978) 12 ff. 6. Cf. the criticism of Antony's financial situation in Cic. Phil. 2.42, 44; Plu. Ant. 2.3 (Z 4-5). 7. The earlier notices are uniformly negative. At 41.17.3 he appears as a tool of Caesar's (cf. 41.18.3); Dio construes his actions thinly disguised LCJovoµ[a,which was in reality 8uvaCJTELa in Rome during Caesar's absence in 48 as those of a µovapx[a with only the "semblance of the

Octavian's Rival

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Dio's narrative. It is not Antony who takes the situation in hand, but Dolabella and Lepidus: the former enters the office of consul, delivers a brief speech, and joins the assassins on the Capito line (cf. App. 2.122), while the latter occupies the Forum with his soldiers and also delivers a speech (44.22.1-2). Antony "had fled immediately after Caesar's death, casting away his robe of office in order to escape notice and concealing himself through the night" (44.22.2). 8 The following day, upon learning that Lepidus had secured the Forum 9 and the assassins had retreated to the Capitoline, Antony convenes the Senate in the precinct of Tellus (44.22.3). The entire focus of Dio's account of this meeting is on Cicero, whose lengthy speech in favor of amnesty is quoted in full (44.23-33). There is no record of Antony's participation in the proceedings; in fact we would surmise that he had done nothing at all, a very different impression from that gleaned from Appian. 10 Appian likewise reports that Antony fled to his house, "apprehending that the conspiracy was against him as well as Caesar" (2.118.496). 11 But Appian indicates that Lepidus had relocated his forces to the Campus Martius and stood ready to obey Antony, yielding to him "as a closer friend of Caesar and also as consul" (ibid.). He therefore acts in concert with rather than independently of Antony. 12 Lepidus and Antony meet, and decide that although they wish to avenge the murder they had best wait and see how the situation develops (2.118.497). Though Dio excludes much activity between the Ides and this meeting, in Appian too Antony will convene the Senate in the precinct of Tellus on March 17. The assassins, perceiving the lack of popular support, choose from among their friends messengers to Antony and Lepidus. Appian records the gist of their message (2.123 .516-17) and thereupon inserts the first explicit statement of Antony's and Lepidus' motives. Typically, he gives variant versions: republic" (ELK6va TLVCT TT]S'8TjµoKpaTlas-, 42.27.2). Appian's remarks are colorless by comparison. 8. Cf. Plu. Brut. 18.3 (Z 6), Ant. 14.1 (Z 1), Caes. 67.2 (Z 2); Cic. Phil. 2.88. 9. Dio here refers to what Lepidus did two days after the assassination, on March 17 before the Senate meeting, apparently contrary to Antony's wishes (cf. App. 2.126.525-26). 10. Cicero's speech is discussed in Chapter 13. Plutarch states that at this meeting speeches in favor of amnesty were delivered by Cicero, Antony, and Plancus (Brut. 19.1 [Z 1]). Floros concurs with Dio (Epit. 2.17.4 ). 11. All our sources agree that Antony had originally been one of the tyrannicides' intended victims, but Brutus had dissuaded them: App. 2.114.478, 3.57.238; D.C. 44.19.1; Plu. Ant. 13, Brut. 18.3 (Z 4). Understandably, this was later regarded as one of Brutus' mistakes (Plu. Brut. 20.1 [Z 1]). 12. So too Nie. Dam. Vit. Caes. 49, 103. But whereas Appian attributes to both Antony and Lepidus the desire to avenge Caesar, Nicolaus isolates Lepidus (Vit. Caes. 106). See Gabba, Appiano, 149-50.

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"Antony and Lepidus wished to avenge Caesar, as I have already said [cf. 2.118.497], either on the score of friendship, or of the oaths they had sworn, or because they were aiming at the supreme power themselves" (2.124.518). Again, they decide to wait. Antony's conciliatory reply to the messengers is quoted-Appian characterizes it as a "safe answer" (6 µEv ciacpaAws-ouTwsaTTEKp(vaTo,2.125.521 )-and they agree to meet with the Senate on the following day. Thus encouraged, the messengers depart. Antony orders a night watch set and sends word that a meeting would be convened the next morning. He chose the precinct of Tellus, Appian discloses, because it "was very near his own house" and "he did not dare to go to the Senate-house situated just below the Capitoline, where the gladiators were aiding the conspirators, nor did he wish to disturb the city by bringing in the army" (2.126.525). Appian captures in some detail the mood and various arguments put forth in the course of the meeting, 13 and then Antony makes his move: When Antony, who had been looking on and waiting his tum, saw that a large volume of incontestable argument was being brought forward, he resolved to make chaos of their logic by exciting personal fear and anxiety for themselves. Knowing that a great number of these very senators had been designated by Caesar for city magistracies, priestly offices, and the command of provinces and armies . . . Antony proclaimed silence as consul and said .... (2.128.534-35) The text of his speech follows (2.128.535-37) and again the reaction 1s acutely described (2.129). While the Senate continues to debate Antony's words, he and Lepidus confront the crowd gathered outside: Antony responds both to those demanding peace and those demanding punishment, insisting to the latter that "'I myself would join you and would be the first to call for vengeance if I were not the consul, who must care for what is said to be for the common good rather than for what is just. So these people who are inside tell us'" (2.130.545). The scene is included, as Appian states, to show how Antony "worked upon both parties in tum" (Tou 'AvTwv(ov napa µEpos- TEXvci(ov13. Appian strikes a keynote in this passage with the use of ETEXVO(ov("eonnived") to deseribe what many senators were up to (2.127.531). The word will be applied regularly to Antony (2.131.547, 2.132.552, 2.143.599) as well as to Lepidus (2.132.552). By the notieeable repetition of the verb within a few chapters Appian dearly means to suggest that Antony was not alone in his maehinations.

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14

Antony thereupon returns to the meeting, where "[a]fter enjoying the spectacle sufficiently and perceiving that the people had not done anything rashly, he decided, under compulsion, to extend protection to the murderers (concealing the necessity, however, and pretending to act in this way as a matter of the greatest favour), and at the same time to have Caesar's acts ratified and his plans carried into effect by common agreement" (2.132.554). Antony's speech in favor of amnesty follows (2.133-34, on which see Chapter 13). There is, then, a clear difference in the way Dio and Appian depict Antony immediately following the Ides. In Appian, Antony takes charge, directing and manipulating both the Senate and the people, shrewdly awaiting the opportunity to exact punishment for the murder; when this fails to materialize, he navigates a middle course by attempting to appease both sides. A hint of personal ambition is left vague and unconfirmed, though his methods certainly seem to be self-serving. 15 But in Dio, Antony essentially fades from the picture; it is, rather, Cicero who leads the way in formulating a reconciliation, and Antony's role in the process, while acknowledged, is minimized (cf. 44.34.4). 16 Certainly we have no clear sense to this point of Antony's influence or of his own ambitions. Appian now inserts two scenes. Lucius Piso, the custodian of Caesar's will, delivers a harangue against the assassins (2.136.567-68). The assassins thereupon muster a crowd on the Capitoline before whom Brutus delivers one of the longest speeches in the Bella Civilia (2.137-41, discussed in Chapter 13), which has the effect of shifting popular sentiment in favor of the tyrannicides (2.142.592). The sons of Lepidus and Antony are demanded and delivered as TOS').

14. See previous note. As we know from 2.118.497 and 124.518, Antony was waiting for the right moment to exact his vengeance. This insistence on Antony's Machiavellian methods must be construed as a negative comment (pace Gabba, Appiano: 149; cf. Barbu, 79). Antony treads a very thin line between showing preference to the tyrannicides while at the same time placating the veterans and the people: Appian has brought this out with great clarity and consistency. There is no doubt that Appian 's treatment of Antony is far more benign than that of other sources, but we must not discount the fact that there are distinctly negative elements to his portrayal. See further H. Homeyer, Die Antike Berichte iiber den Tod Ciceros und lhre Quellen, Dt. Beitrage zur Alt. Wiss., no. 18 (Baden-Baden, 1964) 24 with n. 48; Pelling, PLOA, 27 n. 92 and on 14.4. 15. As, e.g., when he intimidates the Senate (Em8ELKVUS" TlJ~ou:>-..iJ TOV cp6~ov)into ratifying a decree that would confirm the land distributions for Caesar's veterans (2.135.565). Antony's obvious intent was to secure the support of the army, and this was uppermost in the assassins' minds as well (cf. D.C. 44.34.1-2); Brutus' speech at App. 2.137-41 is in large part directed toward the numerous veterans of Caesar in his audience. See Botermann, 7; Huzar, 88-89. 16. This is unhistorical. Cf. Nie. Dam. Vit. Caes. 106 and references in Bellemore ad Joe. (p. 120). Dio, however, knows the other version: see Calenus in his speech at 46.3.2.

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hostages (2.142.594). 17 But the growing popularity of their opponents disturbs the consuls: Antony and Dolabella were either fearful or envious (2.142.595). Dio believes, however, that Antony's immediate concern was Lepidus rather than the tyrannicides. At the conclusion of Cicero's amnesty speech, Dio briefly summarizes the assassins' meeting on the Capitoline (44.34.1-2), and then focuses on Antony. Lepidus, he asserts, possessed a powerful army and aspired to Caesar's former position (44.34.5). Antony, "perceiving his rival's favourable situation and having himself no force at his back, did not dare to begin any revolutionary movement [vrnxµwam] for the time being, and in order to prevent the other from becoming stronger, he furthermore persuaded him to bow to the will of the majority" (44.34.6; cf. 44.53.6). The clear implication is that a "revolutionary movement" was in the back of Antony's mind; he was merely waiting for an opportune moment, a notion suspiciously similar to that found at 45.3.1 where the subject is Octavian (see Chapter 6, n. 11). Although this is not inconsistent with (though stronger than) Appian's version, Dio certainly has not prepared us for what we read herethe first substantial appearance by Antony in Dio's narrative of the aftermath of the Ides-but the passage is purposefully constructed as a prelude to Antony's funeral oration. This, it seems, was the long-awaited moment. Antony uses the occasion to enflame the people's anger and resentment against the assassins (44.35.4), and now Appian's and Dio's accounts briefly fall into some sort of agreement. Appian has recorded in detail the events of the two days after the Ides, and in contrast to Dio has conveyed with some accuracy not only Antony's actions but the circumstances that prompted those actions as well. It is telling, therefore, that in describing the terms of the will at 2.143 .596-97 Appian fails to mention an important clause found in Dio's version, to the effect that Antony had been named as Octavian's guardian and Caesar's "second heir" (44.35.2). Appian names instead Decimus Brutus (ibid.). Dio's version is corroborated only by Floros (Epit. 2.15.4), 18 but in his scheme of things it 17. Cf. D.C. 44.34.6, Plu. An 1. 14.1 (Z 2), Brut. 19.2 (Z 2), Cic. Phil. 2.90. Dio appends an anecdote about Antony's dinner party with the assassins, during which he queried Cassius, "'Have you perchance a dagger under your arm even now?' To which he answered: 'Yes, and a big one, if you too should desire to make yourself tyrant'" (44.34.7). It is symptomatic of Dio's tendencies that other details about Antony are suppressed while this is included. Plutarch records the dinner, but not this story (Brut. 19.2 [Z 3 ]). 18. Veil. 2.59.1 and Suet. Jui. 83 are more in line with Appian. Cic. Phil. 2.71 implies that Antony wished people to believe he had been named one of Caesar's "sons" (there is clearly some purposeful irony behind Cicero's calling Antony the regni heres, Att. 14.21.3 = SB 375). Cf. Nie. Dam. Vit. Caes. 74 and Bellemore ad Joe.

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establishes a motive for Antony's subsequent dealings with Octavian (cf. 44.53.5 and seep. 60 with nn. 5 and 7). This circumstance draws attention to a fundamental distinction between the two historians' approach to Antony. Dio provides few details about Antony's actions; he is most concerned with conveying and developing what to him was the most essential fact to know about Antony: that he had cause to dislike Octavian. Thus Dio presents as true something that clearly seems to have been only a rumor put about to discredit Antony. Appian, on the other hand, raises the issue in a very different context. In his conversation with Octavian, Antony specifically states that he was not mentioned in the will (3.19.72, cf. 3.16.60). The fact that the issue is raised at all suggests that it was a sore point, but Appian chooses to deal with it in the course of this dramatic confrontation between the two principal players and in speech rather than narrative. He thereby evades the responsibility for explicitly adducing this as a motive, while not bypassing it altogether. And in any case, he rejects (if he even knew it) the slanderous version amplified by Dio. Both historians now offer versions of Antony's funeral oration on March 20. As I shall discuss further in Chapter 13, Antony's speech in Dio is largely a rhetorical showpiece; in Appian it forms a viable component of his characterization of Antony, designed to show once again how he continued to "work the crowd" (2.143.599). Both historians agree on its provocative effects (App. 3.2.2, D.C. 44.50), but whereas Dio simply mentions the point, Appian expands it with another revealing episode. As Appian explains, the Senate had censured Antony for the consequences of his speech (3.2.2). Loss of support from this quarter apparently troubled Antony, but, Appian writes, "he changed it from bad to good feeling toward himself by one capital stroke of policy" (ibid.). It happened that a certain Amatius, who claimed to be the grandson of Marius and hence related to Julius Caesar, was terrorizing the murderers and in the process becoming quite popular (3.2.3). Antony had heard that Amatius was laying a trap for Brutus and Cassius, and "making capital out of the plot ... [he] arrested him and boldly had him put to death" (3.3.6). The execution of this WEu8oµapCosroused the people against Antony and rioting ensued, which Antony put down with a firm hand (3.3.7-9). 19 Predictably, "the extreme fondness of the 19. Comparison of 3.3.9 and Cic. Phil. 1.5 suggests that Appian may have conflated two separate incidents: one with Amatius the Pseudo-Marius in early April, which, Cicero stresses, both Dolabella and Antony resolved; and other difficulties associated with the erection of a column to Julius Caesar in the Forum at the end of April (cf. Suet. Jul. 85), which Dolabella had to deal with alone, since Antony by this point had left Rome (cf. Cic. Phil. 2.107). See Magnino

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plebeians for Antony was turned to extreme hatred" (µ'iCJos-8E appT]TOVE~ app~TOUEUvo(as-TOU8~µou TTpos-TOV 'AVTWVLOV EY~YEPTO,3.4.10). 20 The Senate, on the other hand, was pleased that a potential threat to Brutus and Cassius had been removed (3.4.10), and Antony profited from their mood. He moved for the recall and restitution of Sextus Pompey, a maneuver that won the approval not only of the Senate but even of Cicero himself (3.4.1113).21 Antony thereupon formed a personal guard "either because he had done everything for this very purpose, or [seized] the happy chance as very useful to him" (3.5.14). Appian hints that Antony had some plans of his own: although the guard was not composed of common soldiers, "he thought that he should easily get [them] when he needed them otherwise," and made the guard "sharers of such of his plans as he made known" (ibid.). The Senate's suspicions were allayed with assurances that once the plebeians were quieted, he would reduce the guard's number from its initial 6,000 (3.5.15). 22 Dio does not directly allude to the Amatius affair, but reports an incident the details of which recall Appian's description of Amatius' disturbance. At some point after Caesar's burial, it appears, mourners had erected an altar near the pyre and were preparing to sacrifice to him (44.51.1); this looks very much like what we read in Appian at 3.3.7, where people clamor for the dedication of an altar on which they would sacrifice to Caesar. But in Dio's version, both BC 3 on 3.8. On Dolabella's activities (all but ignored by Appian) see Cic. Att. 14.15.1 = SB 369, 14.16.2 = SB 370, 14.17a = SB 371a, 14.19 = SB 372; Fam. 11.14 = SB 326, 12.1.1 = SB 327; Phil. 1.5, 30; see also MRR 2:317 and Holmes, 7-8. 20. Plutarch remarks that Antony "always sought to please the multitude" (Ant. 9.1 [Z 1)). The entire episode is a useful example of where Appian may be used to supplement Cicero's correspondence. A letter from Decimus Brutus to Brutus and Cassius (who had fled the city), dated March 21, records the author's suspicions of Antony (qua mente esset Antonius demonstravit, pessima scilicet et infidelissima, Cic. Fam. I 1.1.1 = SB 325). Decimus doubtless refers to Antony's funeral oration and the Senate's reaction (cf. App. 3.2.2). But Antony's handling of the Amatius affair (dated to the first two weeks of April) had instilled renewed confidence, as Appian suggests and Cicero confirms: de Mario probe, etsi doleo L Crassi nepotem. optime tamen etiam Bruto nostro probari Antonium (Cic. Att. 14.8.1 = SB 362, written April 16; cf. Att. 14.6.1 = SB 360, and App. 3.4.12). Appian's information does conflict with that provided by V. Max. 9.15.1, where we read that Amatius had been killed iussu patrum ... in carcere. See further Magnino BC 3 on 3.6; H. Frisch, Cicero'.~ Fight for the Republic (Copenhagen, 1946) 67- 71; Bellemare on Nie. Dam. Vit. Caes. 32. 21. Dio's account of this is correctly postponed until much later, at 45.10.6. Contrary to Appian, Dio stresses Antony's resistance to the recall of Sextus. Appian omits all mention of Lepidus in this process, though he was crucial to it: seep. 126 with n. 7. 22. Appian squeezes into 3.3-8 a variety of events involving Antony that are (as often) out of chronological sequence. The 6,000 probably were among those levied during his recruitment in Campania in late April/early May. Appian mentions it here because this was the point at which the Senate empowered Antony to create such a guard. See Magnino on 5.13 and 14; L. Keppie, Colonisation and Veteran Settlement in Italy 47-14 s.c. (Rome, 1983) 52-53.

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Antony and Dolabella remove the altar, punish objectors, and frame a law forbidding anyone ever to be dictator again (44.51.2): the presence of both consuls clearly dates the episode to early April, when the death of Amatius caused the commotion described by Appian (see n. 19). The act draws criticism from Dio: "This provision they made for the future, assuming that the shamefulness of men's deeds consists in the titles they bear, whereas these deeds really arise from their possession of armed forces and from the character of the individual incumbent of the office, and disgrace the titles of authority under which they chance to occur" (44.51.3). This is, of course, typical of the sort of thing that would interest Dio and elicit a personal aside. However, he still is not overly concerned with Antony; in fact Dio does not distinguish, as does Appian, between Antony and Dolabella, referring to this instead as an act by the "consuls" (cf. 44.53.1).23 Dio's procedure becomes clear in the final chapter of Book 44, where he finally focuses squarely on Antony and summarizes his activities from the Ides until the arrival of Octavian in early May. The difficulty with this method is that while he has already covered events down to mid-April, he must now digress to supply the relevant details on Octavian's rival. It is not at all apparent, however, that Dio regards this as a "digression"; he gives the appearance of reporting these events in chronological order, and in t!'ieprocess misrepresents some important events. For instance, he reports here that Antony took Dolabella as his colleague (44.53.1), though this had actually occurred shortly after the assassination: in the context of the larger narrative, though, we are in mid-April.2 4 More seriously, Dio distorts an event of some importance to an evaluation of Antony: "When . . . Antony himself was charged with the duty of investigating the acts of Caesar's administration and carrying out all his behests, he no longer acted with moderation, but as soon as he had got hold of the dead man's papers, made many erasures and substitutions, inserting laws as well as other matters" (44.53.2). Antony was indeed charged with this task in accordance with the senatus consultum passed during the meeting on March 17 (App. 2.135); 25 and Antony had transferred Caesar's 23. In reality, it was Antony who proposed the law (Cic. Phil. 1.3-4, 2.91). Appian knows this, but misplaces the event properly dated to early April (App. 3.25.94 and Magnino BC 3 ad Joe.; cf. Levi, 1:44 n. 3, 45 n. 2). Appian's error, however, is a significant one and symptomatic of the procedure of inferring (often, as here, erroneously) purposes from results. He holds that Antony promulgated the Jaw in order to mollify an anxious Senate, linking it with Antony's attempt to transfer the Macedonian army to his command, which in fact was effected in early June (though Appian mistakenly locates it in July!: see Ehrenwirth, 9-10). 24. Dolabella was in fact consul designate at Caesar's death, as Dio knows (44.22.1 ). 25. Dio appears to be referring to this rather than to the lex Antonia de actis Caesaris

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papers to his own house immediately after the assassination. 26 But Dio has failed to make clear, if he even realized it, that these events all occurred within a two-day period after the Ides. They certainly did not take place, in any case, in reaction to events of the weeks following the Ides, as we would infer from Dio's account. 27 Despite these difficulties, the purpose of 44.53 is obvious enough: to set the stage for the approaching conflict between Antony and Octavian. Here, too, Dio records a relevant detail, Antony's amassing, illegally or otherwise, large sums of money and making substantial gifts, all in an effort to fortify his position (44.53.3; cf. App. 3.5.16). Dio agrees with Appian that Antony tampered with Caesar's will, adding or removing clauses as it suited his purpose (D.C. 44.53.2, App. 3.5.16). 28 But in contrast to Appian, Dio suggests that behind all Antony's actions to this point lurked an ever-present awareness of Octavian. Antony, Dio states, considered himself to be Caesar's true heir, and hence "managed everything" as though he were in fact (44.53.5). As previously suggested, this is a gross misrepresentation of Octavian's current importance. If Cicero is any gauge, no one, much less Antony, seriously believed that the eighteen-year-old adoptive son of Caesar posed any substantial threat. 29 In the end Appian and Dio agree that Antony now exercised what Appian terms "monarchic power" (8uvaaTELas ... µovapxuc17s apxfiv,3.7.22; cf. D.C. 45.11.2). 30 But Appian has shown precisely how Antony arrived at that position. Dio's procedure, on the other hand, is a familiar one. He has sketched events as they unfolded after the Ides, but focused on no one individual, though by virtue of his lengthy speech Cicero acquires prominence. Information on Antony is supplied only at key points in his narrative: just before Dio's elaborately contrived funeral oration, and at the conclusion of Book 44, just before Octavian will be introduced in the opening chapters of Book 45. Antony per se was not important; Antony as Octavian's rival was. confirmandis in April (early May according to MRR 2:332), which confirmed it: see G. Rotondi, Leges Publicae Populi Romani (repr., Darmstadt, 1962) 429-30, and Magnino BC 3 on 5.16. 26. App. 2.125.524: "either because Calpumia thought they would be safer there or because Antony ordered it." See MRR 2:315. 27. Plutarch similarly mislocates this material (Ant. 15.1 [Z I]; see Pelling, PLOA ad loc.). 28. Cf. Cic. Att. 14.12.1 = SB 366, 14.13.6 = SB 367; Fam. 11.14 = SB 326, Phil. 2.97 ff.; Plu. Ant. 15.1-2 (Z 2-3); Yell. 2.60.4. See Pelling, PLOA Ioc. cit. n. 27; Woodman, VP on 2.60.4; Frisch, 74-75. Appian appears to contradict himself at 3.82.335: see Magnino BC 3 ad loc. 29. See Syme RR, I 15; and above p. 59. 30. Cf. Plu. Brut. 21.2 (Z 3), Cic. 43.1 (Z I) (with Moles, PLOC ad loc.); Cic. Ad Brut. 1.15.5 = SB 23; Aug. Anc. I.I; Livy Per. 117; Veil. 2.61.1.

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The contemporary evidence suggests that both historians to a degree may have exaggerated Antony's impact. 31 In retrospect, of course, Antony's maneuvers following March 15, like the arrival of Octavian in May, assumed greater significance. 32 Appian clearly followed an account that reflects this, but he perhaps amplified Antony even further, in part through the compression of material involving Antony into a few chapters (3.3-8, see n. 22). In the process, however, and in contrast to Dio, Appian underestimated the influence of Dolabella (see n. 19). But despite the prominence given Antony, Appian has maintained a rather stringent objectivity, offering neither overt condemnation nor praise: the number of occasions where he declines to choose between various versions of Antony's motives affirms this (cf. 2.124.518, 125.524, 3.5.14). In distinction to Dio, then, Appian has at least acknowledged different interpretations. Dio has imposed his own, explaining Antony's actions in terms of his apprehensions about Octavian, and so more explicitly refers to Antony's secret motives. Cicero's correspondence suggests that Dio was perhaps correct initially to minimize Antony's role, but as we have seen, such minimization perhaps arises not from any real effort to portray accurately the historical situation but from effort to postpone to a dramatic moment the salient facts about Antony.

Antony and his Army A distinguishing feature of Appian's and Dio's characterizations of Antony is the manner in which they depict his relationship to his forces and his own military ability. As is evident in his handling of the events in Italy following the fall of Perusia, Appian is in fact quite interested in the role played by the army in settling disputes during the triumviral period and before; and his admiration for Antony's military sense is apparent throughout. Dio, on the other hand, expresses quite a different perspective on both of these issues. 31. In the correspondence from the first few weeks after the Ides, Cicero rarely mentions Antony and even then only to dismiss him. Cf. Att. 14.3.1-2 = SB 357, Att. 14.13 = SB 367, Att. 14.13b = SB 367b, Fam. 16.23.2 = SB 330. Even Decimus Brutus, in a letter to Brutus and Cassius critical of Antony after the Ides, suggests that Antony was exaggerating conditions in Rome (Fam. 11.1.1 = SB 325). On Antony's generally cordial relationship with Cicero see Syme RR, 140-41. 32. This was as true for Cicero as it was for the later historians. In the second Philippic (September 44) Cicero boasts that he had seen through Antony the entire time (2.92; cf. Fam. 10.1.1 = SB 340). If Antony had done anything praiseworthy at the time, it was only because "fear made [him] honest" (bonum te timor faciebat, ibid., 90). His correspondence, of course, contradicts this stance: he himself later referred to this period as his caecum tempus servitutis (Fam. 12.25.3 = SB 373). See Syme RR, 98 n. 1, 108-109, 139. Appian, too, notes that fear of the tyrannicides had influenced Antony's decisions (2.124.518, 2.142.594).

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Two episodes will illustrate: Antony' s confrontation with his troops in Brundisium in October of 44 and his performance at Philippi.

In early June Antony had secured the exchange of the province of Macedonia for Cisalpine Gaul, retaining command of four Macedonian legions on the pretense that a campaign against the Getae would soon be necessary (Brunt IM, 480-81). On October 9 Antony left Rome for Brundisium to meet those legions. The reception was far from warm, and some noteworthy differences in Appian's and Dio's approach to Antony may be observed in their respective narratives of this episode. Once again sharp distinctions in each historian's perception of cause and effect are apparent. Dio indicates that Antony had traveled to Brundisium to meet the soldiers, and that Octavian, having sent men in advance of Antony to "win over" (0cpETEpC0w0L)those legions (45.12.2), likewise headed for Campania and then for Etruria to conduct his own levy. When Antony arrived, he was "at first kindly received ... because [the soldiers] expected to secure more from him than was offered by Caesar" (45.13.1). Perceiving that this would not be the case, the soldiers protested, but Antony "reduced them to submission by ordering the centurions as well as others to be slain before the eyes of himself and his wife" (45.13.2). 33 This temporarily quelled the opposition, but during the march to Rome two legions deserted (45.13.3). The suggestion therefore is that at the heart of the soldiers' dissatisfaction was money, and this seems to be Dio's own formulation. 34 Appian, on the other hand, consistent with his usual attempts to compare and contrast the pair, juxtaposes Antony's confrontation with the troops in Brundisium and Octavian's contio on November 10. He begins with the latter, compressing into two chapters Octavian's activities from early October to November 10, in order to suggest that Octavian acted in reaction to Antony. According to Appian, Octavian, in Rome, had been informed by his spies that "the army at Brundisium and the colonized soldiers were incensed against Antony for neglecting to avenge the murder of Caesar and that they would assist him (Octavian) to do so if they could" (3.40.164). From what follows it is clear that Antony had already left Rome for Brundisium, and fear of his return with an army induced Octavian to solicit military support in Campania. Appian thereupon recounts Octavian's trip to Campania, his return to Rome, 33. Cf. Cic. Phil. 3.4, 13.18. 34. In contrast to Dio, Livy Per. 117 makes Antony's saevitia (not money) the cause for the legions' desertion: see Manuwald, 186-87.

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and his contio of November 10 during which he managed to secure, but only with great difficulty, the soldiers' support (3.41-42). Now we shift to Antony in Brundisium. Appian writes not that he was "kindly received," as Dio maintained, but that the legions "blamed him because he had not proceeded against the murderers of Caesar" (3.43.175). There follows a lively, detailed account of their meeting, during which the soldiers scoff at Antony's paltry offer of 100 drachmas per man. Appian describes Antony's reaction and subsequent action: Antony rose and departed, saying, "You shall learn to obey orders."35 Then he required the military tribunes to bring before him the seditious characters (for it is customary in Roman armies to keep at all times a record of the character of each man). From these he chose by lot a certain number according to military law, and he put to death not every tenth man, but a smaller number, thinking that he would thus quickly strike terror into them. But the others were turned to rage and hatred instead of fear by this act (3.43.178). Octavian's spies seized upon the opportunity to foment further discontent, and Antony's efforts to ferret them out again failed (3.44.179). Recognizing that the situation called for moderation rather than severity, Antony promised an additional donative at a later date while at the same time insisting that "'it is necessary to obey the laws of our country, and of the army, in this affair as in others'" (3.44.181). The soldiers, "moved by penitence or by fear," submitted (3.44.182). Apart from the fact that Appian furnishes more detail about this encounter than Dio, he also views events from different perspectives. At first the soldiers' reaction stems not out of concern for who would pay more (Dio found this more plausible), but out of loyalty to the memory of Caesar. 36 Octavian's recruitment is initiated out of fear of Antony. In short, there is a more explicit statement of cause and effect. The explanation from Dio, which must be inferred, is that Octavian had aimed at supreme power all along and the recruitment in Campania and Etruria was merely one step in that process; the same holds true for Antony's actions. There is no suggestion that one acted in reaction to the other. 37 35. Cf. Cic. Att. 16.8.2 = SB 418. 36. This is a recurring motive in Appian: see Magnino BC 3 on 40.164. 37. A vexed question, however (see discussion by Botermann 34-35, countered by Ehrenwirth, 95-96). Nicolaus provides another version: After Antony had left for Brundisium, Octa-

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This particular episode was later seized upon by Cicero as one example of Antony's lawless behavior, and he returns to it again and again in the Philippics. 38 It is therefore worth noting that the episode as described by Appian emphasizes the legality of Antony's reprisal. The insertion of the information in 3.43.178 that "it is customary in Roman armies to keep at all times a record of the character of each man" is doubtless Appian's own, 39 and thus when Appian writes that Antony acted "according to military law" (TQ cnpaTLWTLKQ voµ4)) he presumably believed this to be the case. Significantly, the issue surfaces again a few chapters later in Piso's speech at 3.54-60. The entire point of that oration is that Antony had consistently acted within his rights; Piso counters the charge made by Cicero (3.53.218), that Antony had acted illegally at Brundisium, with the assertion that Antony had merely acted as a good officer faced with insubordination ought to have acted. The law, he argues, does not require a general to give an account of the punishment he crrpaTLWTLKousvoµous- (3.56.230, inflicts on those who have acted TTapaTOUS' 40 232). As noted in the fourth chapter, issues of legality consistently interest Appian, and his account of Antony at Brundisium reflects this interest. In view of Cicero's perspective-gladly taken over by Augustan apologistsAppian's stance is an important attempt at ameliorating the tradition. Its origins are doubtless to be found in his source, but Appian has clearly seen fit to stress this aspect. 41 Dio's short account does not aim at anything nearly so complicated; he merely relates the bare details, essentially unfavorable toward Antony, and moves on. Antony at Philippi Episodes such as that just described-a confrontation between a commander and his troops-often catch Appian's attention. He is, in addition, frequently vian surmised that an armed conflict was inevitable, and therefore decided to raise his own force among the veterans in Campania ( \lit. Caes. 131-34 ). This is closer to Appian, but Nicolaus does not suggest that Octavian was prompted by messages from his spies in Brundisium. Whatever the specific truth of the matter, it is at least certain that both parties had long considered a military solution not unlikely and had prepared accordingly (cf. App. 3.31.123). 38. E.g., Phil. 3.4, 4.4, 5.22, 12.12, 13.18. Cf. Cicero in Dio's version at 45.35.3. 39. Cf. similar comments at 2.96.402, 5.55.233, 5.46.192 (Luce, AERRC, 28). 40. Cassius makes a similar point at 4.92.385: "cl yap 8fJµos- uµELS EV µEv TOLSTTOAEµms unaKoUETE Ee;navTa C:is Kup[ms To'is (JTpaTT]yo'is."

41. Neither Appian nor his source seems to have been much interested in pointing out that Octavian 's recruitment was entirely illegal (see BM, 38). Piso's speech would have been a most appropriate place in which to make such a point.

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impressed by military competence, and Antony proves no exception. Dio does not actively set out to discredit Antony's military prowess; he is simply less interested in Antony, more interested in highlighting Octavian, as is apparent in the way he deals with the battles at Philippi. The order of Dio's narrative of Philippi and the surrounding events is of some importance here, for he locates after the campaigns at Philippi in October of 42 Octavian's defeat at the hands of Sextus Pompey in September. Their differing accounts of the battle aside (to be discussed in Chapter 12), the most notable feature with respect to Octavian is their view of its outcome. Dio asserts that this was Octavian's first defeat (48.18.4); Appian says it was a draw (4.85.361) and implies that Octavian had underestimated Sextus' strength (4.85.358). Dio does not wish to whitewash Octavian's experience in this battle, but it is clear that he does want to create the impression that at Philippi the Republicans faced in Octavian an invincible general and to that end postpones his account of Octavian's "first defeat"; in view of Dio's account of Philippi and of Octavian's role in it, this would appear to have been a deliberate arrangement (see Millar, Study, 56). Appian, however, maintains a fairly stringent, correct chronological sequence; the structure of his narrative is not motivated by any wish to create particular impressions one way or another about his characters. Dio's account of Philippi begins in the latter half of Book 47. After recording at 4 7 .20.1 that Antony and Octavian had set out on their campaigns, Dio digresses on Brutus and Cassius in the East and returns to the triumvirs at 47.36.3. 42 Here the reasons for their departure from Rome are expanded: ... these leaders, so long as they heard that Cassius and Brutus were busy with the Rhodians and Lycians, had supposed that their adversaries would have fighting on their hands there for a long time, and therefore had not made haste to come, but had merely sent Saxa and Norbanus ahead into Macedonia. But when they perceived that the Lycians and the Rhodians had been overpowered, they bestowed praise upon these peoples and promised to make them a present of money, and they themselves set out from the city. Both, however, encountered delays. 43 (47.36.3-4) 42. Dio here observes that Antony had sent assistance to his beleaguered brother Gaius in Macedonia (47.24.1, cf. 25.1), a detail missing in Appian. But this would have occurred in December of 44 or January of 43, and is another instance of where Dio has inserted items very much out of chronological order. It is pertinent here, however, because he has just finished telling us about Brutus' defeat of Gaius. 43. Dio's chronology is unclear. He begins this chapter by describing the initial confrontation

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Sextus Pompey held Octavian back (but this is what Dio details only after he has finished with Philippi), while Staius Murcus delayed Antony at Brundisium (47.36.4; cf. App. 4.82.346 44 ). Once met, they crossed the Adriatic. 45 When they landed at Dyrrachium, however, Octavian took ill while Antony pressed on toward Philippi (D.C. 47.37.2, App. 4.106.444, Suet. Aug. 13.1).46 From the outset it is clear that Dio will concentrate on Octavian. Of Antony's initial maneuvers he simply reports that upon arriving Antony had been "for a time a source of some strength to his soldiers, but after laying an ambush for some of the enemy when they were gathering grain and failing in the attempt, even he was no longer hopeful" (47.37.2). Matters change with the arrival of Octavian. Dio suggests that he feared victory by either party, Antony or the Republicans, and felt his presence crucial to his future (47.37.3). Thus he made for Philippi, an act that breathed new life into Antony's dispirited forces (47.37.4). Once bivouacked together, Antony and of Decidius Saxa and Norbanus Flaccus with the Republicans in Macedonia. This cannot have occurred before mid-September. Thereupon, Dio continues, Saxa and Norbanus urgently summoned Antony and Octavian (47.36.2). Then, Dio states that Antony and Octavian learned of the Republican victories at Lycia and Rhodes, which occurred during the spring of 42, and that this prompted their departure from Rome. The early dispatch of Saxa and Norbanus, however, must have been predicated on information that Brutus and Cassius intended to muster their forces at Sardis (which they did in mid-July) in preparation for crossing the Hellespont (early September), but the triumvirs surely acquired such information after they learned of Lycia and Rhodes. A campaign against Brutus and Cassius was of course one of the triumvirs' primary goals, but it had been agreed that Octavian's first priority was Sextus Pompey, and most of the summer had been devoted to this. Appian implies that Antony was at Brundisium by the end of August (4.86.362). Tentatively, we may conjecture that 1) news of the Republicans' plans reached the triumvirs in mid-summer, 2) they then dispatched Saxa and Norbanus, 3) in August Antony set out for Brundisium to make the crossing, and 4) from here he had summoned Octavian, who was now in Sicily battling Sextus (cf. App. 4.86.362, 82.347). Again in Dio there is a problem of cause and effect. The "urgent summons" from Saxa and Norbanus must have come after Antony and Octavian had crossed the Adriatic in mid-September, and news of the defeat of Lycia and Rhodes was not what prompted their departure from Rome. 44. Appian adds here that Staius was "lying in wait for Cleopatra," a surprising bit of information since to this point there has been no suggestion that she had offered her assistance to the triumvirs. Her fleet was shipwrecked en route. What we are told here corresponds to her version in the speech to Antony at 5.8.32. The only other significant distinction between Appian 's and Dio's account at this point, aside from the fact that Appian is as usual more detailed about the encounter, is that Appian says that Antony sought Octavian's assistance against Staius, and this was why he came to Brundisium (4.82.347). Dio makes no reference to this, although it might have been a good opportunity to diminish Antony' s generalship. 45. Appian furnishes details of this difficult crossing (4.86), whereas Dio does not and thereby minimizes the extent to which the Republican forces were organized and proved troublesome to Antony and Octavian. 46. Unlike Dio, Appian frequently mentions Octavian's persistent illness: aside from 4.106.444, cf. 4.108.453, 4.130.548, 5.3.11, 5.12.45, 5.14.57, 5.16.66, 5.57.242. Cf. Ill. 28.82.

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Octavian were eager for a confrontation, but the Republicans doggedly held out (47.37.5-6). Finally Brutus and Cassius yielded to their impatient troops and battle was engaged (47.38.5). At this point Dio interposes an excursus on the significance of Philippi (47.39) and on the omens that portended defeat for the Republicans (47.40). Dio maintains that the only omens of any significance for the Caesarians were two dreams, one that came to an unnamed Thessalian bidding him to advise Octavian to wear something that had once belonged to his adoptive father (47.41.2, Suet. Aug. 96.1) and another to Octavian's physician (47.41.3, Suet. Aug. 91.1, V. Max. 1.7.1). The physician admonished Octavian to stand in the battle line despite his illness, an act that Dio insists actually saved his life (47.41, cf. Yell. 2.70.1, Lact. Div. Inst. 2.8). ln describing the actual battle Dio pursues this theme, and in the process he presents what was beyond doubt a Republican victory as a victory for the Caesarians. Brutus defeated Octavian, because of the latter's sickness, and then proceeded to capture the enemy camp. Had Octavian remained in the camp, he would have been captured, and this presumably would have spelled certain defeat for the Caesarians (cf. 47.46.2). As it was, Octavian was spared and thus, according to this convoluted reasoning, victory was achieved. Perhaps most curious is Dio's curt treatment of the final battle at Philippi; it sufficed simply to say that Brutus lost (47.48.4). 1t is readily apparent therefore that in describing Philippi, Dio has put Octavian in the best possible light but has distorted historical fact to do so. As far as he is concerned the victory was due to a fortuitous dream and the Republicans' own folly; it had little to do with military ability. Appian's account bears little resemblance to this. Antony's daring strategy and keen perception of the enemy's advantages are noted (4.107.447-48), followed by an admiring description of the fortifications he proceeded to construct (4.107.450). Appian maintains that "Antony's audacity [T611.µ17µa], although he was driven to it by necessity, confounded the enemy ... " (ibid.). 4 7 There is no hint that in the occasional ensuing skirmishes Antony ever suffered defeat or that the soldiers were relieved at Octavian's arrival (4.108.452-53). Similarly, in the days ahead, it is Antony who proves the decisive factor, forcing an engagement with the reluctant Republicans and working feverishly to cut a passageway through the marsh (4.109); and it is Antony who secures victory in the first battle-where the Republicans again marvel at his temerity (4.111.464, cf. 4.112.468). Dio simply records in a 47. On Antony's ToAµT]in Appian see Goldmann, 16-17.

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single sentence that Antony defeated Cassius, diminishing the victory further by adding that his opponent was "by no means his equal in warfare" (47.45.2).48 As for Octavian, Appian, like Dio, asserts that he was not in his camp when it was captured, "having been warned in a dream to beware of that day, as he has himself written in his Memoirs" (4.110.463). 49 This concentration on Antony persists in Appian's narrative of the second battle on October 23. Even though Octavian apparently had a part in the final conflict, Antony again receives the credit. To him Appian assigns a prebattle exhortation (4.119-20) and to him goes the credit for the victory. Appian puts it thus: "Antony was everything and attacked everywhere [6 8E 'AvTWVLOS' (4.129.539). Perhaps even the Augustan ncivTa ~v KaL naow EVETTLTTTE]" propaganda could not whitewash this fact, and Dio consequently passes over the event in silence, as he did Antony's brilliant performance at Forum Gallorum in April of 43. 50 Appian, moreover, adds a final episode to illustrate Antony's humanity. Believing that a prisoner being brought before him was Brutus, Antony "went forward to meet him, with a pause to reflect on the fortune, the dignity, and the virtue of the man, and thinking how he should receive Brutus" (4.129.543). 51 It must be stressed, however, that Appian does not completely ignore Octavian. At 4.125 he reports a speech by both Antony and Octavian, and at 48. Schwartz ("Cassius," 1711) interprets this as praise for Antony, but in the context of the rest of the narrative it seems unlikely that this was Dio 's intent. Plutarch knows another version that held that Antony was not even present at the battle (Ant. 22.3 [Z 3]) and still another, that he ran away (Brut. 42.3 [Z 3]; cf. Flor. Epit. 2.17.10, Oros. 6.18.14). These indicate that Dio's account is not as unfavorable toward Antony as it might have been. See Pelling, PLOA on 22.3. 49. Plutarch again has two versions. At Ant. 22.2 (Z 2) he says Octavian was defeated by Brutus in the first battle, but cites the Memoirs for the alternate version that Octavian had withdrawn before battle was engaged; at Brut. 41.1 [Z 2] and 4 [Z 7] the two versions are blended. See Pelling, PLOA on 22.2, suggesting that the citation of the Memoirs is due to a shared source. According to the Elder Pliny, Octavian remained in a swamp for three days (Nat. 7.148). 50. Dio merely allots a single sentence (46.37.5) to the pivotal engagement at Forum Gallorum on April 15 of the previous year, where Antony scored a resounding victory over Pansa and Carsulcius. Appian, on the other hand, gives a complete and dramatic account (sec Chapter 12, n. 26), concluding that Antony had "fought splendidly" ('AVTluVt(;lKUAWS-ciywvwaµEv4>, 3.70.289). Cf. his description of Antony's attack on Servilius' men near Hyria (5.58.245). 51. See Gabba, Appiano, 186. This is, however, as much a comment from Appian on Brutus as on Antony. Plutarch twice tells this story, but with a different emphasis than Appian (Brut. 50.3 [Z 5], Ant. 69.1 [Z 2]). Another story with similar purpose is found at App. 4.135.568: "Antony found the body of Brutus, wrapped it in the best purple garment, burned it, and sent the ashes to his mother Scrvilia" (cf. Plu. Brut. 53.3 [Z 4], Ant. 22.4 [Z 7-8] with Pelling, PLOA on 22.7). Valerius Maximus includes the anecdote to prove that M. etiam Antoni animus ta/is hwnanitatis intellectu non caruit (5.1.11; cf. 3.8.8). For another illustration of Antony's humanity in Appian see the description of his reaction to the death of his wife Fulvia (5.59.249-50; cf. 62.266).

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4.138.579 admits that events had turned out as they had predicted. At 4.128.536 he remarks upon Octavian's marvelous EUTUXLa,and at 4.137.577 credit for the victory is apportioned equally to the two generals. Appian realized that from a strictly military point of view Antony had been the victor, but he did not accept without qualification the Antonian version of events. His participation at Philippi, or lack of it, obviously became a sore point for Octavian. To judge from Appian, Octavian's lackluster performance and Antony' s brilliance had a critical impact in subsequent years: at several points the recollection of Antony at Philippi dissuaded the soldiers from assisting Octavian. 52 Dio was certainly aware of this tradition, 53 but when it came to composing his narrative he rejected it in favor of the Augustan version, which made Octavian the victor of both engagements (cf. Aug. Anc. 2).54

Antony in the East (41 B.c.) In accordance with the new dispositions following Philippi, Antony, after wintering in Greece, left for the East in the spring of 41 to undo the damage done by Brutus and Cassius, 55 inflict punishment where needed, and raise money. In Cilicia he encountered Cleopatra and, as all our sources rightly or wrongly agree, this was the beginning of his estrangement from Rome. But most significantly, the relationship gave Antony a source of money and strength that eventually rendered his tenuous alliance with Octavian unnecessary. Dio's essential lack of interest in Antony per se has been adequately established, but it is nonetheless surprising that the political and financial settlements achieved by Antony in the East in the months following Philippi held little interest for the historian. 56 Dio briefly notes what Antony was supposed 52. Cf. App. 5.14.57, 53.220, 58.245, 59.246: see Gabba, Appiano, 186 n. 3. 53. He has Antony remind the troops before Actium that he was the victor at Philippi (50.18.3). In his speech Octavian does not answer the charge (50.23.4-30). 54. Note that in neither historian do we find evidence of Octavian's cruelty to the defeated as in, e.g., Suet. Aug. 13.1-2 (Gabba, Appiano, 186 n. l; cf. Scott, 22 ff., Levi, 2:1 n. 2). 55. Unlike Dio, Appian devotes a chapter to the activities of the tyrannicides' supporters in the East after Philippi, specifically those of C. Cassius Parmensis and a certain Clodius (5.2: see Gabba BC 5 ad loc.) 56. Dio does not know, or does not care, that Antony had originally gone to Bithynia (J. Al 14.301 ff., BJ 1.242, cf. Buchheim, 11-12). Of our sources, Josephus is the most thorough with regard to Antony's Eastern sojourns (esp. Al 14-15 passim and BJ 1). Neither Dio nor Appian mentions that following Philippi Antony had spent time in Athens (Plu. Ant. 23). Appian may have been aware that he did, but omitted the account as being irrelevant at the moment, yet later

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to do there (48.2.2), but then diverts to the Bellum Perusinum and the earlier conflict with Sextus Pompey (48.3-23). He returns to Antony at 48.24, covering his exactions and settlements in one sentence (48.24.1). Then Cleopatra comes on the scene: "Meanwhile he fell in love with Cleopatra, whom he had seen in Cilicia, and thereafter gave not a thought to honour but became the Egyptian woman's slave 57 and devoted his time to his passion for her. This caused him to do many outrageous things ... " (48.24.2). Dio conjectures that Antony's neglect, or poor execution, of his duty created chaos in the East and, most seriously, encouraged the Parthians to invade. After two chapters on the activities of the Parthians under Labienus and Pacorus (48.24.4-26), Antony surfaces again at 48.27 in the most negative of Dio's assessments yet: As for Antony, although he kept himself informed of all these operations, as no doubt he did in the case of what was going on in Italy also (for he was ignorant of none of them whatsoever), yet he failed in both instances to take defensive measures in time; instead, he was so under the sway of his passion and of his drunkenness that he gave not a thought either to his allies or to his enemies. It is indeed true that he had earnestly devoted himself to his duties so long as he had been in a subordinate station and had been aiming at the highest prizes, but now that he had got into power, he no longer paid strict attention to any of these things, but joined Cleopatra and until he the Egyptians in general in their life of luxurious ease [