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“These studies of institutional changes in China’s treaty port economies introduce the challenges and potential payoffs of understanding how institutions affect economic performance. With rich and diverse empirical material, they provide perspective on more recent Chinese economic reforms and the ways in which economic growth need neither intend nor result in prosperity for all.” —R. Bin Wong, University of California, Los Angeles
The Treaty Port Economy in Modern China
“Where previous generations of researchers sought to account for China’s failures, we now face the novel problem of explaining massive success. This volume offers a timely reappraisal of circumstances in China’s treaty ports, one of many legacies underpinning today’s economic boom. The emphasis on institutions, a topic that recent studies tend to sidestep, adds to the value of the lively empirical studies in this new book.” —Thomas G. Rawski, University of Pittsburgh
The Treaty Port Economy in Modern China Empirical Studies of Institutional Change and Economic Performance
So and Myers
SoMyersCoversFinal.indd 3 63851cov-IEAS_TreatyPort.indd 1
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CRM 65
CENTER FOR CHINESE STUDIES
INSTITUTE OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES
INSTITUTE OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA ● BERKELEY
Billy K. L. So Ramon H. Myers
CHINA RESEARCH MONOGRAPH 65
Edited by
8/10/11 4:24 PM
Notes to this edition This is an electronic edition of the printed book. Minor corrections may have been made within the text; new information and any errata appear on the current page only. China Research Monograph 65 The Treaty Port Economy in Modern China: Empirical Studies of Institutional Change and Economic Performance Billy K. L. So and Ramon H. Myers, editors ISBN-13: 978-155729-154-7 (electronic) ISBN-13: 978-1-55729-099-1 (print) ISBN-10: 1-55729-099-7 (print) December 2016: “Map 1. The fifty-four treaty ports of China” and its corresponding table were added as pages xvi–xviii. Please visit the IEAS Publications website at http://ieas.berkeley.edu/publications/ for more information and to see our catalogue. Send correspondence and manuscripts to Katherine Lawn Chouta, Managing Editor Institute of East Asian Studies 1995 University Avenue, Suite 510H Berkeley, CA 94704-2318 USA [email protected]
December 2016
The Treaty Port Economy in Modern China
ȱ ȱ ȱȱŜś
The Treaty Port Economy in Modern China Empirical Studies of Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Edited by ¢ȱ ǯȱǯȱȱȱȱ ǯȱ¢
A publication of the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley. Although the institute is responsible for the selection and acceptance of manuscripts in this series, responsibility for the opinions expressed and for the accuracy of statements rests with their authors. The China Research Monograph series is one of several publication series sponsored by the Institute of East Asian Studies in conjunction with its constituent units. The others include the Japan Research Monograph series, the Korea Research Monograph series, and the Research Papers and Policy Studies series. Send correspondence and manuscripts to Katherine Lawn Chouta, Managing Editor Institute of East Asian Studies ŘŘŘřȱȱǰȱŜȱ Berkeley, CA 94720-2318 [email protected] Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The treaty port economy in modern China : empirical studies of institutional ȱȱȱȱȦȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ ǯȱǯȱȱȱȱ ǯȱ Myers. ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱǯȱȬȬȱȱǻȱȱȱDzȱŜśǼ Includes bibliographical references and index. Summary: “Through eight empirical studies, this volume explores the interplay between institutional change and economic performance in a constructed model of the treaty port economy in late-Qing and Republican China”--Provided by publisher. ȱȱȬŗřDZȱşŝŞȬŗȬśśŝŘşȬŖşşȬŗ ȱȱȬŗŖDZȱŗȬśśŝŘşȬŖşşȬŝ ȱŗǯȱȱȱȱȱ£ȬȬȬȬ ¢ǯȱŘǯȱȱȬȬȬȬ
¢ǯȱřǯȱȱȬȬȱȬȬŗŜŚŚȬŗşŗŘǯȱŚǯȱȱȬȬȱ ȬȬŗşŗŘȬŗşŚşǯȱȱǯȱǰȱ¢ȱ ǯȱǯȱǻ¢ȱ ȱǼǰȱŗşśŘȬȱǯȱ¢ǰȱȱ
¢ǰȱŗşŘşȬȱ ȱȱ ŗŚŗŞǯřǯŜŝŚȱŘŖŗŗ ȱȱřřŖǯşśŗȂŖřȬȬŘŘ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŘŖŗŗŖŖşşśŞ
Copyright © 2011 by the Regents of the University of California. Printed in the United States of America. All rights reserved. Front cover: The banks of Guangzhou’s Pearl River. 1920s. (Courtesy of the ȱ1¸ȱȱǯǼ
Contents
Acknowledgments Contributors 1. Modern China’s Treaty Port Economy in Institutional Perspective: An Introductory Essay Billy K. L. So PART ONE: Institutional Change and Economic Growth ŘǯȱȱȱȱȱǰȱŗşŖŖȮŗşřŜDZȱ An Institutional Perspective Debin Ma 3. The Shanghai Real Estate Market and Capital Investment, ȱ ŗŞŜŖȮŗşřŜȱ Tomoko Shiroyama 4. The Rice and Wheat Flour Market Economies ȱ ȱȱ ȱ£ǰȱŗşŖŖȮŗşřŜȱ Kai-yiu Chan śǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢Ȃȱȱ¡ ȱ ȱ¢ǰȱŗşŘŖȮŗşřŝȱ Hon-ming Yip Ŝǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ of the Lower Yangzi in the 1930s James Kai-sing Kung, Daniel Yiu-fai Lee, and Nansheng Bai PART TWO: Dynamics in Institutional Change ŝǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱȱ Kentaro Matsubara ŞǯȱȱȱȱDZȱȱ ȱ ȱ Business Experience in the Early Twentieth Century Stephanie Po-yin Chung 9. Legalization of Chinese Corporation, 1904–1929: ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ Billy K. L. So and Albert S. Lee Bibliography Index
xii ix 1
33 Śŝ ŝś şŜ 118 ŗŚŝ 172 ŗŞŜ 211 249
Acknowledgments
This volume grew out of two symposia organized by the Chinese ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ŘŖŖŚȱ ȱ ȱŘŖŖŜǯȱȱȱ¢ȱ£ȱȱȱ ȱȱ and assistance have been instrumental to the outcome of this volume. First and foremost, we are grateful to the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for providing a generous conference grant, making the symposia as well as the publication of this book possible. ȱ ȱȱ ȱĴȱȱ¢ȱȱȱtant insights on the chapters and the overarching thesis. They include ȱǰȱȱǰȱ ȱǰȱȬȱǰȱȱ Zhiping, Chi-kong Lai, Edmund S. T. Kwok, and Kent Deng. We thank them for their contributions to this volume. We are indebted to Sherman Cochran for reading an earlier version of the manuscript and to Paul Coȱȱȱȱ¢ȱĞȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ greatly improved our arguments. Wen-hsin Yeh provided important advice on how we might proceed on the winding path of revision. To her, we owe much for the completion of the project. The anonymous reviewers of the China Research Monograph series gave very critical and constructive ȱȱǯȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ǯȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱęȱĞȱ of the introduction and Katherine Lawn Chouta for her very professional handling and copyediting of our entire manuscript. ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ £ing the treaty port economy as discussed in the chapters herein, which date to the beginning of the twentieth century. Thanks must be given ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ ··ȱ ȱ Ȭ ¸ȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱȱǰȱǯǰȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȬ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱ¢ȱDzȱȱȱęǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǯ ǯȱ ǯȱǯȱǯǰȱǯȱ ǯȱǯȱȱ 20 February 2010
Contributors
ȱȱǻȱǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱricultural and Rural Development at Renmin University, China, since 2004. Prior to this post, he was a research fellow at China’s Research Center for Rural Development, of the State Council, and the Research ȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱ ȱȱ research interests are surplus rural labor, social inequality, and poverty ȱȱǯȱ ȱȱȱȱReturn Home or Go to Town: Research on the Return of Rural-Urban Migrants ǻŘŖŖŘǼȱȱOut of the Village: Research on Rural Labour Migration in China ǻŗşşŝǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱǯȱ West and Yaohui Zhao titled Rural Labor Flows in China (Institute of East ȱǰȱ¢ȱȱǰȱ¢Ǽǯ
Ȭ¢ȱ ȱǻȱ ȱǼȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¡ȱ ǻǯǯǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ institutions, organizational structures, accounting systems, and crossȱȱǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȱBusiness Expansion and Structural Change in Pre-War China: Liu Hongsheng and His Enterprises, 1920–1937ȱǻ ȱ Ǽǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱęǰȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱing, trade associations, and grain trade networks, and on the migration, social and economic history, and costume business of the Taiwan ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ grain-trade networks and transformations in business organization. ȱȬ¢ȱ ȱǻȱȬ¢ȱȱȱ¡Ǽȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ǯȱ She holds a D.Phil. from the University of Oxford and focuses her research on social and economic history, business history, and the history of business laws and customs, as well as migration and enterprises in south China and Southeast Asia. She is the author of Chinese Business Groups in Hong Kong and Political Changes in South ChinaȱǻǼǰȱȱ published articles in major journals such as Modern Asian Studies and
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Asia Europe Journal, and of chapters in books such as Corporate Globalization: Business Cultures in Europe and in Asia and Chinese Transnational DZȱȱĜ¢ȱȱȱ. ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ǻ ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ Cambridge. With a broad research interest spanning China’s political economy and economic development and history, Kung has published in Economic History Review, The China Quarterly, China Journal, Modern China, Economic Development and Cultural Change, and the Journal of Comparative Economics, among others. ȱȱȱȱȱeral volumes, including Property Rights and Economic Reform in China. ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Technology in Electrical Engineering and Economics and a J.D. from
ȱ ȱǯȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǯǯȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱ¢ǯȱ ȱȱ interests are in the area of interdisciplinary study that includes economic and systems theory, socioeconomic and political institutions, business organizations, law reforms, comparative law, and legal his¢ǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱĜǯ ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ China focuses on income distribution, female labor supply, and familyȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Economic Development and Cultural Change and China Economic Review. ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱ the London School of Economics and Political Science since the sumȱ ȱ ŘŖŖŜǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ extensively on economic history, comparative economic systems, and ȱǯȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱJournal of Economic History, Economic History Review, Explorations in Economic History, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Review of Income and Wealth, and others, and he has contributed to various edited volumes and encyclopedia entries. Kentaro MATSUBARA is an associate professor of legal history at the Uni¢ȱȱ¢ǯȱ ȱȱȱǯǯǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱǯǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¡ǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ traditional Chinese property rights and lineage social structuring, especially on the interaction of these with the colonial legal system in
ȱ ǯȱ ȱȱȱȃ£ȱȱȱ ȱȱ
Contributors
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ȱȱDZȱ ȱȱȱȬȱȱ¢ȱȱ kozo bunseki” (Lineage property holding and social structures in tradiȱDZȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱǼǰȱ serialized in the Hogaku kyokai zassi. ȱ ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱȱȱǯǯȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱ ȱȱȱ¡ȱclude international relations, the economic history of East Asia, and the political and economic development of East Asia. The author of more than one hundred journal articles and book reviews, he was associate editor of the Journal of Asian Studies and also edited Ch’ing-shih wen-t’i. Myers’s major works on Chinese economic history are The Chinese Peasant Economy, The Chinese Economy: Past and Present, and two essays in The Cambridge History of China (in volume 9, part 1, and volume 13, part ŘǼǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱStorm Clouds over China: The Memoir of Ch’en Li-fu, 1900–1993, Last Chance in Manchuria: The Diary of Chang Kia-ngau, and Prescription for Saving China: Selected Writing of Sun Yat-Sen. On post-1949 China, he has coedited ȱ ȱȱDZȱȱȱȱĞȱȱ Sixteenth Party Congress, Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations, and Understanding Communist China: Communist China Studies in the United States and the Republic of China, 1949–78. ȱ ȱȱȱǯǯȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ¢ǰȱ¢ǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ¢ȱ ȱęȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with a special interest in China ȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȃpanies in Debt: Financial Arrangements in the Textile Industry in the ȱ£ȱǰȱŗŞşśȮŗşřŝǰȄȱȱContract and Property in Early Modern China, edited by Madeleine Zelin, Jonathan K. Ocko, and Robert Gardella. She authored China during the Great Depression: Market, State, and the World Economy, 1929–1937ȱǻ ȱ¢ȱȱǼǯȱ ¢ȱ ǯȱǯȱȱǻȱ Ȭȱȱȱ Ǽȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ph.D. at Australian National University and has published extensively in the areas of Chinese social and economic history, historical geogra¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ T’oung Pao, Journal of Song-Yuan Studies, Journal of the American Oriental Society, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Lishi yanjiu, Journal of Chinese Studies, Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales, and Hong Kong Law Journal.ȱ ȱȱ Prosperity, Region, and Institutions in Maritime China: The South Fukien
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ĴǰȱşŚŜ–ŗřŜŞȱǻ ȱ¢ȱȱǼǰȱȱPower and ¢ȱȱȱȱȱDZȱĞȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ Gungwuȱ ǻ ȱ Ǽǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History.
Ȭȱȱǻȱ ȱȱȱȱ Ǽȱȱȱǯǯȱȱ the University of California, Los Angeles, and is a professor in the Deȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱsearch interests are in the areas of modern and contemporary Chinese social and economic history, the local history of north and south China, ȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ Ȯȱȱȱ and overseas networks, and women’s and gender history. She is cocompiler of two editions of Women in China: Bibliography of Available English Language Materials, chief compiler of Indexes of the Dianshizhai Pictorial ǻȱǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĞȱȱ ȱDZȱ An Ethnographic and Historical Study of a Community in Hong Kong and Gender and Women’s Studies in Chinese SocietiesȱǻȱǼǯ ȱcations include Social History and the Study of Chinese Women, In Search of Subjectivities: Historical Studies of Chinese Women, and The Tung Wah Ĝȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ DZȱȱȱȱȱ Archival Materials ǻȱȱȱǼǰȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱJournal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Journal of Chinese Studies, New History, Lishi yanjiu, and Jindaishi yanjiu, among others. ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ǰȱȱ ȱǻǼǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǻ ȱ Ǽǯ
The banks of the Pearl River in Guangzhou. The tallest building on the facing page is the ȱ¢ǯȱŗşřŖǯȱǻ¢ȱȱȱȱ1¸ȱȱǯǼ
Map 1. The fifty-four treaty ports of China as reported by the British War Office in 1910 (modern place-names on a 2016 geopolitical map). Source: “Map of China: Shewing Railways, Telegraphs & Treaty Ports,” first p roduced b y t he War O ffice, Gre at Bri tain, Aug ust 190 8, corrected July 1910, and printed at the Ordnance Survey Office, Southampton, 1911. Toyobunko collection, Tokyo.
Year designated treaty port
Modern place-name and (province)
Chinese place-name (modern)
Place-name on source map
Chinese place-name (historical)
1842
Shanghai (Shanghai Municipality)
上海
Shanghai
1842
Ningbo (Zhejiang)
寧波
Ning-po
1842
Fuzhou (Fujian)
福州
Fu-chou
1842
Xiamen (Fujian)
廈門
Amoy
1842
Guangzhou (Guangdong)
廣州
Canton
1858
Nanjing (Jiangsu)
南京
Nanking
1858
Zhenjiang (Jiangsu)
鎮江
Chinchiang
1858
Hankou (Hubei)
漢口
Hankow
1858
Jiujiang (Jiangxi)
九江
Kiukiang
1858
Shantou (Guangdong)
汕頭
Swatow
1858
Yantai (Shandong)
烟台
Chih-fu
芝罘
1858
Near Yingkou (Liaoning)
營口附近
Niu-chuang
牛莊
1858
Yingkou (Liaoning)
營口
Ying-k’ou
1858
Qiongzhou (Hainan)
琼州
Ch’iung-chou
1860
Kowloon (Hong Kong SAR)
九龍
Chiu-lung
1860
Tianjin (Tianjin Municipality)
天津
Tientsin
1876
Wuhu (Anhui)
蕪湖
Wu-hu
1876
Wenzhou (Zhejiang)
温州
Wen-chou
1876
Yichang (Hubei)
宜昌
Ichang
1876
Beihai (Guangxi)
北海
Pakhoi
1887
Mengzi (Yunnan)
蒙自
Meng-tzu
1887
Longzhou (Guangxi)
龍州
Lung-chou
1890
Chongqing (Chong qing Municipality)
重慶
Chungking
1895
Hangzhou (Zhejiang)
杭州
Hang-chou
1895
Simao (Yunnan)
思茅
Ssu-mao
1895
Hekou (Yunnan)
河口
Ho-kou
1897
Tengchong (Yunnan)
騰沖
Teng-yueh
1897
Wuzhou (Guangxi)
梧州
Wu-chou
京江
騰越
Year designated treaty port
Modern place-name and (province)
Chinese place-name (modern)
Place-name on source map
Chinese place-name (historical)
1898
Wusong (Shanghai Municipality)
吳淞
Wu-sung (by Qing)
1898
Jiaozhou (Shandong)
膠州
Chiao
1898
Qingdao (Shandong)
青島
Tsingtau
1898
Weihai (Shandong)
威海
Wei-hai-wei
1898
Qinhuangdao (Hebei)
秦皇島
Ch’in-wang-tao (by Qing)
1899
Sanduao (Fujian)
三都澳
San-tu-ao (by Qing)
1899
Dalian (Liaoning)
大連
Dairen
1899
Zhanjiang (Guangdong)
湛江
Kwang-chou-wan
1899
Yuezhou (Hunan)
岳州
Yo-chou (by Qing)
1902
Changsha (Hunan)
長沙
Ch’ang-sha
1902
Jiangmen (Guangdong)
江門
Chiang-men
1903
Suzhou (Jiangsu)
蘇州
Su-chou
1903
Shashi (Hubei)
沙市
Sha-shih
1903
Shenyang (Liaoning)
瀋陽
Mukden
1903
Dandong (Liaoning)
丹東
An-tung
安東
1903
Dandong Harbor (Liaoning)
丹東港
Ta-tung-k’ou
大東溝
1904
Jinan (Shandong)
濟南
Chi-nan (by Qing)
1904
Zhoucun (Shandong)
周村
Ch’ou-ts’un (by Qing)
1904
Weifang (Shandong)
濰坊
Wei (by Qing)
濰
1905
Changchun (Jilin)
長春
Kuan-ch’eng-tzu
寛城子
1905
Jilin (Jilin)
吉林
Kirin
1905
Tongjiangkou (Liaoning)
通江口
T’ung-chiang-kou
1905
Faku (Liaoning)
法庫
Fa-k’u-men
1905
Tieling (Liaoning)
鐵嶺
Tieh-ling
1905
Liaoyang (Liaoning)
遼陽
Liao-yang
1905
Fengcheng (Liaoning)
鳳城
Feng-huang
膠 威海衛
廣州灣
法庫門
鳳凰
ONE
Modern China’s Treaty Port Economy in Institutional Perspective: An Introductory Essay BILLY K. L. SO
The eight empirical studies presented in this volume illustrate the complex ȱȱȱȱȱȱĜ¢ȱȱmance within the historical context of modern China. Together they suggest ȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȂȱȬȱnomic development.1 These studies also suggest how the discourse on instiȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱęȱȱȱȱǯ ȱȱ¢ȱ¢ǰȱȱěȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱ the empirical studies are organized so as to address the previously menȱǯȱȱ ȱęȱȱ ȱ ȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ treaty port system and an extended conceptualization of this historical phenomenon, which leads to the notion of a form of regional economy in modern China that we refer to as the “treaty port economy.” Following that, I outline the rise of the treaty port economy based on the well-documented context of China’s economic development from the middle of the nineteenth century to the early decades of the twentieth century. The third section contextualizes the institutional framework of Douglass C. North in light of the ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ of each empirical case and organize them under the two themes of performance under institutional change and of dynamics in institutional change. ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ arise from the themes and empirical studies presented in this book.
Naturally, this does not mean that every contributor to this volume shares the same institutional concerns. Rather, the diverse approaches of their individual research agendas on the modern Chinese economy converge in a mutually reinforced institutional conceptualization that is the main task of this introductory essay. ŗȲȱ
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The Advent of the Treaty Port System The Genesis and Evolution of the Treaty Port System The treaty port system in China began with the Opium War and the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842. The series of treaties signed between China and various foreign powers during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were unprecedented in Chinese history. Fairbank and other scholars have meticulously detailed the evolutionary process of this political structure over the past four decades. This system did not start to decline until the 1930s and was not formally abolished until 1943, primarily as a result of the new China policy formed by Great Britain and the United ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻ ¢ȱŘŖŖŖǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱęȱ ȱŗŞŚŘȱȱ¢Ȭ ȱ¢ȱŗşŗŝȱǻ ȱŗşŞřǰȱŗŘşǼǯȱǰȱȱȱ ęȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǻŗşşŘǰȱŘŖŗȮŘŖśǼǰȱȱȱȱȱlowing sections. ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢¢ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱĴǰȱ ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ever-growing population of Chinese nationals. The concessions were ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ Ğȱ ȱ close proximity to a waterway for ease of transport. The treaty port was regulated and governed by a consul or by individuals with similar diplomatic standing. Foreign establishments such as clubs, churches, and racecourses were prominent features of the concessions. In certain major treaty ports such as Guangzhou, Xiamen, and Fuzhou, landed foreign garrisons protected the concessions, and in other cases foreign gunboats regularly patrolled the neighboring waters. Extraterritoriality granted by treaties enabled foreign nationals to avoid being subject to Chinese civil or criminal law. Instead, they were answerable to the laws of their respective countries. In certain larger concessions such as those of Shanghai, the treaty port legal system was so pervasive that even Chinese nationals ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǻûȱŘŖŖŝǰȱŗşŗȮŗşřǼǯȱȱ ȱȱȱ concentration of foreign business interests in these enclaves, originally ȱȱǰȱȱĞȱȱŗŞşŖȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱęǯȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ compradors. Again following the 1890s, there were increasingly more Chinese business interests either independently run or managed in collaboration with foreign businesses. On the one hand, these concessions contained immense pockets of wealth and prosperity; on the other, they ȱ£ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǻǼȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱȱę¡ǰȱ ȱěȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ
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through the Chinese Maritime Customs Service. This organization was ȱ¢ȱ¡ȱ ȱȱĜȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȱȱ this way, the Customs Service maintained control over foreign trade. It is important to note that the aforementioned treaty port institution was not engineered by a single architect with a rational design. Rather, it was the product of successive generations of foreign diplomats who, with the best interest of their individual countries in mind, gradually shaped a structure by either force or negotiation. The most-favored-nation clause in these treaties allowed each foreign power to share whatever privileges other powers might receive, which resulted in a considerable amount ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱǻȱŗşŜŞǰȱ ŘśŝȮŘŝśDzȱŗşŝŞǰȱǯȱśDzȱŗşŞřǰȱŘŖȮŘŝDzȱ ȱŗşŞřǰȱŗŘŞȮŘŖŝǼǯȱȱǰȱ the system provided internationalization, urbanization, and industrialization to an urban population on Chinese soil under a politically and legally stable environment, which proved conducive to the development of a large-scale industrialized market economy characterized by heavy investment. China entered into these disastrous international treaties primarily as the result of military defeats or due to its inferior international position. Although the treaties were signed as international treaties, the agreements were perceived by the Chinese as being highly inequitable. And as Chinese nationalism emerged at the turn of the twentieth century and quickly evolved into a major political and social force in Chinese society, the treaty ports increasingly became a symbol of national humiliation and Western imperialism.2 Despite the specter of imperialism, the treaty port system was, as Fairbank demonstrated, the single most important means by which China came into contact with the outside world from the nineteenth century. It therefore also accounted for many new developments in modern China.3 Whether intended or not, these consequences demand more scrutiny, and it is the economic aspect of these consequences that is the focus of the eight studies in this book. The Treaty Port System and Treaty Port Economy ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ęȱ immensely from the excellent scholarship of Fairbank and others, there ŘȲȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡¢ȱȱȱǻŗşŘşǼǯȱȱ more recent work on the inequitable treaties, in particular on the backdrop of nationalism, ȱȱ ȱǻŘŖŖŖǼǰȱȱȱǻŘŖŖśǼǰȱȱȱǻŘŖŖśǼǯ řȲȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱĚȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱȱȱǻŗşşŝǰȱŘŖŖřǼȱȱ his landmark criticism of Eurocentrism in both modernization theory and modern/tradition approaches in American scholarship on modern China.
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have been relatively few examinations of the treaty port economy per se. The term “treaty port” has been used historically as a synonym for the modern economic sector, the treaty port urban economic sector, or ȱ£ȱȱǻ¸ȱŗşŞşǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ it was only under the treaty port system within the Chinese treaty port ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ £ǰȱ as measured by the growth of internationalization, urbanization, and industrialization—the three key indicators of modern Western economic ǯȱ ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱcal implications of the term “treaty port economy,” and it is in this new context of potential implications that the current volume organizes its empirical cases, thereby illustrating a broader theme that transcends local details. First, what is meant by “treaty port economy”? On the surface, it apȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǯȱ ǰȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱ ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱ ȱĞȱȱȱ disparity between the economic fortunes of the various treaty ports and their respective economies. Certain of these economies performed well based on the standards of Western economic performance, whereas others remained in a stagnant and preindustrial state. What are of most interest to us in this study are those treaty port economies that supported modern businesses, industries, and urbanization. In this sense, we are primarily discussing treaty port economies that were highly internationalized, industrialized, and urbanized. In the 1910s, there were perhaps no more than twenty out of the ninety-two treaty port economies that would have met these guidelines. Barely four decades earlier, in the midst of the Self-Strenghtening Movement, even Shanghai did not satisfy these standards, not to mention other treaty ports, some of which had already existed for more than a few decades. This means that a historical treaty port by itself did not necessarily develop a “treaty port economy,” as the ȱȱęȱǯ Our second meaning refers to the spatial scope of the economy. When ȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱĞȱ¢ȱȱȱtion in order to qualify its scope for measurement. Without exception, ȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǻ¢ȱǼȱȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŗşŝŝǼȱ described China’s economy as the aggregate of many interrelated and multilayered regional and local economies. The treaty port economy can also be viewed as an economy with a spatial context that is centered at ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ Ǽǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ nomically into the neighboring territories. To the extent that there was a
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considerable degree of economic integration between the outlying areas ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻ¢ȱ Ǽǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ spatial unit, radiating from its core to the periphery. ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱę¡ǯȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱǯȱȱ¢ȱȱȱpear to have been expansive and pervasive in many cases. This geographically expansive nature of the treaty port economy leads to our third and ȱ ¡ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱȱ ȱ gration took place in an increasingly expanded hinterland of a treaty port economy, this does not imply that the institutional structure of the treaty port system followed this expansion. In the more powerful treaty port economies, the enforcement characteristics of their institutions should have been proportionally stronger at the core than in the peripheries. Reȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢Ȭęȱtion of extraterritoriality should have contained a diminishing order of enforcement in regards to the institutional matrix. Finally, from an economic viewpoint, we may venture conceptually to extract key components from the previous description of the treaty port economy, that is, the treaty port itself and its inherent imperialist elements. What then remains are forms of internationalization, urbanization, and industrialization under a politically and legally stable environǯȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱǻ¢ȱȱǼȱȱȃ¢ȱ port economy” without a treaty port. Few examples of this existed in the ¡ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱħȱ¢ȱȱȱŗşŗŖȱȱ 1920s comes close to this notion. ȱȱęȱȱħȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ stability and established rule of law. Despite the successive civil wars ȱȱ¢ȱ ǰȱ¢ȱĴȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱħȱǻȱȱ ȱȱǼǯȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱĞȱȱ¡ȱȱ for the purpose of guarding the diplomatic community. The city was effectively regulated by its gendarmeries and new police force (Dray-Novey ŘŖŖŝǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ sector as in Shanghai. Although its scale and output could not match that ȱȱĴȱ¢ǰȱħȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱŗşŘŖǯȱȱȱȱħȱȱ ȱȱ the extent that an increasingly assertive Chinese Chamber of Commerce gradually took shape and began to perform functions not dissimilar to ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ŗşŞşǼǯȱ ȱ ¢ȱĜȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
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ȱȱȱħǯ4 The central judiciary of the Republican govȱȱħȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ civil litigation and the enforcement of the judicial decisions on commerȱ ȱ ǻȱ ŘŖŖŞǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ħȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ǯȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ
ȱ ǰȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱ¢ǯȱĞȱȱȱ of abstraction allows the removal of the components of the treaty port and ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱǰȱ ǰȱȱȱ New Territories—along with adjacent Guangdong counties—constituted an increasingly integrated regional economy in the early decades of the twentieth century. Of the empirical studies presented here, chapters 7 and Şȱȱę¢ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ǯȱ ȱęȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱ “treaty port economy” in this volume. When it is used to refer to a particular treaty port economy, such as the Shanghai treaty port economy, or with the connotation of referring to a treaty port economy centered in ȱęȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱ ǰȱȱǰȱȱ term may be used more generically to refer to the treaty port economy as a whole, which represents the aggregate of all the treaty port economies. ȱěȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱ in the context of further discussion. The Emergence of the Treaty Port Economy Performance Converging with Industrialized Economies Although the treaty port economy never constituted more than 10 percent of the GNP of the entire country, it is well documented that it developed slightly faster than the economies of other regions of the country and began to gain real momentum beginning in the 1890s, achieving its most ȱ ȱȱȱŗşŘŖȱȱŗşřŖǯȱȱ ȱǻŗşŞşǰȱŝŖǼȱ found that the annual growth of the manufacturing sector of this econo¢ȱȱŗşŗŘȱȱŗşřŜȱ ȱȱȱȱŞǯŗƖǰȱ ȱȱfortably with other advanced and industrializing countries such as Japan ǻŞǯŞƖǼȱȱȱȱȱǻŘǯŞƖǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ¡ǰȱĚȱ ǰȱĴǰȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱ and although there were important foreign interests, an increasingly large segment of Chinese investments and enterprises started to play
ȱǻŗşŞşǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ Service in the treaty ports. ŚȲȱ
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a vital role in this sector. Output from this “enclave industrialization” established markets both overseas and across China (Naughton 2007, ŚřȮŚśǼǯȱ ȱ ¢Ȃȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǻŗşŝŚǼȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱȱĚȱȱȂȱ£ȱȱȱȱ of these cities to international trade. According to him, the treaty ports “increased stimulus of commercial production for export” by developing “concentrated commercial structure” and witnessed the outstanding ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ¡ȱ ǻǯȱ śŗȮśŝǼǯȱ ǰȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǻǯȱřşǼǯȱȱŘȱȱȱ ȱ trend as a result of internationalization. ȱ ȱȱȱȱŗşŘŖȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱ as a whole and the treaty port economy in particular because of its high degree of internationalization. The hardest hit areas were in the exports ȱȱǯȱ¸ȱǻŗşŞşǼȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱpression from 1921 to 1923, Chinese foreign trade declined, yet its modern industries, concentrated in the treaty port economies, continued to exȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ¢ȱǻŗşŞşǼȱȱ ȱ ȱȱŗşřŗȱȱŗşřŜȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ expansion in domestic trade. Although the agricultural annual growth ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ŖǯŖŘƖǰȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱ¡ȱȱȱȱŘǯŗŗƖȱȱŗǯśśƖȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱŗǯśśƖȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱĚ ȱȱǰȱȱ a decline in wholesale and factor pricing. These points demonstrate the resilience and adaptability of the treaty port economy in withstanding ȱĚȱȱȱǯ Treaty port economies driven by light industries also expanded into a larger section of the outlying rural areas.ś As growth typically came ȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱĚȱǰȱȱ ȱȱ£ing amount of potential for Chinese entrepreneurs to tap into their local social networks and to develop commercial links with agricultural production households. This assisted them in diversifying not only the production line but also the supply of raw and semiprocessed materials that were used in mechanized assembly-line production in the urban factories. In this regard, Chinese entrepreneurs had an edge over their ȱ ǯȱ ȱ Řȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ£ȱȱǰȱȱȱŚȱȱśȱȱ¡ȱ ȱȱĴȱ¡ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱĚȱǯȱȱŜȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ For a succinct reassessment of the scholarship on and complex estimates of Republican ȱ ǰȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŖǼǯ śȲȱ
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household behavior within the context of a set of factor markets in an ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ treaty port economy. Negotiated Convergence of Models and Practices
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ port economy? It is likely that the many interlocking factors in the enȱ ȱȱȱę¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ we discuss here in mind. First and foremost among these factors was technology transfer, which constituted a necessary condition for modern industrialization as embodied in machinery-driven factory production. Technology transfer enabled lower transformation cost, standardized ǰȱȱȱȱĜ¢ǯȱȱȱ ȱȱ a combination of experience learned from foreign factories in the treaty ports and from direct observation, participation, and education abroad ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŗŞşŖǯȱ ever, technology transfer even took place during the Self-Strengthening Movement in the 1870s and 1880s, but during this movement, the transfer did not generate the type of economic performance witnessed in the early twentieth century in the treaty port economy. Second, beginning in the 1900s, managerial experience and corporate governance became key components of this knowledge transfer. A wide range of new business models and practices developed in the West, beginning with the Industrial Revolution and the advent of the capitalist market, were injected into the millennium-old traditional Chinese business model. Of most importance, these models were actively promoted ȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱĜǰȱȱĚȱ intellectuals. This leads to the third factor: the implantation of the corporate model into the Chinese business world in the early twentieth century (see chapȱ Şȱ ȱ şǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ corporate model, as outlined in the next section and in more detail in ȱşǰȱ ȱ ȱȱę¢ȱȱȱȱȱȬ scale industrial organizations so that they could compete with foreign enterprises. Many Chinese at the time apparently believed that a corporate model was necessary to promote impersonal investment and a broader capital market in order for Chinese businesses to tap into the required ęȱǯȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ǻŗşŞŖǰȱ ŘŖŖŖǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ¢ȯ marked by a combination of rivalry, collaboration, and knowledge transfer—between Chinese and foreign business interests in the modern economic sector, or, in our context, the treaty port economy, as well as
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ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻ Ǽȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻǼǯȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻ ȱ ȱ Ǽȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱ¢ȱ interpretation is the topic of the next section. The Institutional Matrix of the Treaty Port Economy The Northian Framework in Chinese History ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱnomic performance in historical as well as modern societies, North (1991, ŗşşśǰȱŘŖŖśǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȃȱ ȱȱȄȱǻ ȱŘŖŖřǼǯȱȱ there are a number of successful applications of the Northian framework ȱȱȱ¡ȱǻǰȱǰȱȱȱŗşşŜDzȱ ȱ ŘŖŖŜǼǰȱȱĚȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱę¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǯŜȱȱȱĴȱȱtextualize this framework in the case of the treaty port economy. But to begin with, it is imperative to outline the key structure of the Northian framework, in particular that which is most relevant to our study. In North’s conceptual construct, “institution” is a category of abstract ȱ¢ȱęȱȱȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢Ȅȱȱ ȱěȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȃ£ǰȄȱ referring to such social entities formed within the given institutional ma¡ȱȱȱȱȱǻŗşşŗǰȱřȮŚǰȱŝřȮŝŚǼǯ7 In a nutshell, the Northian framework postulates an institutional matrix for any market economy. ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¡DZȱǻŗǼȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱDzȱǻŘǼȱȱȱȱ There are only a few examples of the use of this approach and none published prior to 2000. I have explicitly incorporated the Northian framework with the spatial approach of Skinner to create an analytical framework for the interpretation of a premodern Chinese maritime economy in the southern part of Fujian from the tenth to the fourteenth century ǻȱŘŖŖŖǼǯȱȱȱ¢ȱǻŘŖŖŖǼǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ legal categories such as civil law, property rights, and contracts in scholarship on China by ȱǻŗşşŚǼǰȱȱǻŘŖŖŚǼǰȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŚǼǯ ŝȲȱ For further explanation of these categories and terminologies of “new institutional ǰȄȱȱ ȱȱȱǻŗşşŗǼȱȱ·ȱȱ¢ȱǻŘŖŖŞǼǯȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ǻŗşşŘǼDzȱ Ĵǰȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱǻŗşşŚǼDzȱȱȱȱȱǻŗşşŞǼǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǻŗşşŞǰȱŗȮŗŜǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŘŖŖśǼȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ meanings of institution in the social sciences, in particular that which is applied in the economic sociology of capitalism. ŜȲȱ
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ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ DzȱȱǻřǼȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱ¢Ȃȱȱǯȱ ȱęȱȃȱȄȱȱȱ¡ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȱǻǼȱforcement cost, and the cost of maintaining property rights, among others.8ȱȱȱ¢Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ for entrepreneurs to seize upon such opportunities. This process generates dynamics of growth, which in turn improves economic performance. ȱȱĜȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȯȬȱtional change. Institutional change can occur in all three aspects—formal institutions, informal institutions, and enforcement characteristics. The ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱěȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱȱpact the institutional change will have on transaction cost and economic performance. To account for the West’s modern economic success since ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱtional change underscores the enormous dynamism behind the growth, in particular the development of the rule of law for third-party impartiality within the formal institutional dimension, which enables widespread impersonal investment in large-scale business ventures. This, in turn, is a necessary condition for large-scale investment in the manufacturing industrialization sector to take full advantage of modern science and technology. The remaining issue is how and why institutions change, ul¢ȱȱȱȱĜ¢ǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ on an assumption of the culturally bounded rationality of entrepreneurs ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡£ȱ ęȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ¡ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ¡ȱĞȱȱȱ ěȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ builds, resulting in the overall upward performance of the economy.
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ economy? We have already outlined the remarkable economic growth ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ DZȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ pen? Numerous supply and demand factors were at work, given the economy’s internationalized background. For instance, the relative prices of the factor and demand markets linked the modern production sector of the treaty port economy with the overseas markets of advanced countries such as the Western powers and Japan. But to account for this ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŗşşŘǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱĚȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻŗşŞśǰȱŗśȮŚŘDzȱŗşşřDzȱŗşşŞDzȱŘŖŖŖǼǯ ŞȲȱ
Modern China’s Treaty Port Economy
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ǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱęcial turmoil of the postwar years and the Great Depression, relative prices in supply and demand alone may not be adequate explanation. It is useful also to look at the institutional dimension of the story. In the following subsections, we will relate salient developments of the treaty port economy in light of the three key factors of the Northian framework so as to illustrate the institutional change that took place concurrently with the economy’s expansion. Formal Institutions and Their Enforcement Characteristics In a treaty port economy, the major formal institution is a legal frame ǰȱ ȱȱȱȬĴȱǰȱ¢ȱȱęȱ ǰȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱęȱ£ǰȱ and contract law to regulate transactions between owners of exchanged items. One of the basic features of the treaty port system was its Western legal framework. This was used as a powerful argument for any Western power to justify the imposition of unequal treaties on China. Treaty ports were created based on the belief that Chinese law was too outdated ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ foreigners on Chinese soil, which ultimately led to the aforementioned extraterritoriality. Extraterritoriality was embodied in and implemented through exactly such a treaty port system. In the Shanghai concessions, there were locally formed municipal courts, but in other treaty ports, those that lacked a structured court system autonomous from the Chinese local judiciary, adjudicating mechanisms were managed by the local foreign consuls. Treaty port economies generally contained a formal judicial infrastructure where commercial disputes could be adjudicated, usually applying Western commercial laws. This legal system was widely ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱĚȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĜ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ǻȱŗşşŘǼǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ found not only well-established court systems but also a legal professional community including both foreign and Chinese practitioners. The professional standard of legal practice in these major cities was reason¢ȱȱǻȱŘŖŖŗǼǯȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ followed that of the Western powers, it converged with the broader legal institutions in the Western business world. Under this broad Western leȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱęȱ ȱ ȱȱthian theoretical underpinnings of lower transaction cost, clearer property rights, and improved contract enforcement, all under a theoretically more impartial third-party legal system of adjudication. Because the only
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way to achieve economic growth at the turn of the twentieth century was ȱ ȱȱĴȱȱȱ£ȱȱȬȱȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ħȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ that the treaty port economy possessed exactly this kind of institutional ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ¡£ǯȱ This precise structure and its underlying maximization code of conduct ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱĞȱȱǯ
ǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ treaty port economy and that of the rule of law in Western societies. It is common sense that the liberal ideal of the rule of law cannot be realized without the separation of powers among the executive, legislature, and judiciary.9 But under the treaty port system, the judicial apparatus was always a component of colonial or semicolonial rule, which by nature ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱŗşşŝǼǯȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ demonstrated no institutional autonomy of judicial decision. Nor could the more professional Shanghai Mixed Court claim to be independent from the interference of the foreign diplomatic community in China or ȱ ȱ Ȭ¢ȱ ȱ ěȱ Ĝǯȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ Ĝȱ legal system was hardly a representation of the Western liberal ideal of the rule of law, even though it did serve certain Chinese and foreign business interests and does account for the economic performance from an institutional perspective. Under the legal framework of the treaty port economy, apart from the legal enforcement of contracts and the legal protection of private prop¢ȱ ȱ Ȭęȱ¢ȱǰȱȱęȱ ȱȱ ȱ the Western-style corporation, or joint-stock company with limited liability. Chapters 8 and 9 further elucidate the impact of this institutional ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱŗŞŜśȱȱȱȱ ȱŗşŖŚǯȱĜȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱtemporaries as a crucial force that would shape the competitiveness of Chinese businesses to the extent that it would determine the outcome of competition between Chinese and foreign enterprises. It represented the model of modern business that cherished expansionism and scale of ¢ȱȱęȱ¡£ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱȱȱǼǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ China at the turn of the twentieth century.
A voluminous amount of literature is available on this topic. For its implication for the ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŘǼȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŞǼǯ şȲȱ
Modern China’s Treaty Port Economy
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ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ would work depended largely on the support of a service industry of law and accountancy that needed to be highly professional and selfregulated. In the treaty port economy, these professional services were ęȱȱ¢ȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ companies, but from the turn of the century there were an increasing number of Chinese practitioners. Again, supply and demand was conȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǻȱŘŖŖŗǼǯ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ governance of surrounding areas, these treaty port economies not only had their own established court systems and law enforcement, but also ¢ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ forcement of a formal infrastructure that facilitated Western-style economic growth, especially in terms of scale and industrialization. Informal Institutions and Their Enforcement Characteristics It is simple enough to understand why Western business communities operating in a Chinese treaty port economy thought it necessary to bring abroad informal institutions and mind-sets from their home countries. Their innate sense of superiority under the veil of imperialism as well as their missionary zeal to save the unenlightened world were incorporated ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱ ǰȱȱȱ this was new to China, and the Chinese response is a more complicated story. Is it possible to identify new mind-sets and informal institutions in the Chinese communities within the treaty ports, especially in the segments engaged in modern businesses and industries? ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱĚȱ veins of criticism of traditional Chinese culture and its institutions by ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ ȱȱĞȱȱ 1911 Revolution, which expanded into the antitraditionalism and antiȱȱȱŗşŗŖȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǻ ȱŗşŜŝDzȱ ȱŗşŝşDzȱȱŘŖŖŜǼǯȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱě¢ȱ disseminated in the treaty port urban areas. Familial and business ethics that had intermingled for centuries in the market economy of late imperial China suddenly encountered internal challenges. These traditional modes of behavior were controversial in the society at large, and they ȱȱȱȱȱĚȱȱȱ ȱȱǯ New values also emerged in urban areas and soon became dominant ideologies; these include nationalism and social Darwinism, which were ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ŘŖŖŞǼǯȱ Chinese merchants were immersed in these new values and ideals in their daily urban lives through the mass media and educational system.
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The notion that China might be facing the extinction of not only its sovereign state but also its nation, or race, was particularly widespread. This fear of extinction soon translated into a movement to strengthen and save China by bolstering its industry and economy, which was enthusiasti¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ Ĝǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱǻȱȱşǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ business ethics and an increasingly more positive view of merchants in Chinese society. Although an improved image of the merchants can be ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ĞȱȱȱȱǻȱŘŖŖŖǼȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¡ȱ¢ȱǻȱȱŘŖŖŚǼǰȱ imbuing business enterprises with a high moral order of importance in Chinese society was a decidedly new invention. The business community ȱěȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱtions were in the best interest of the public good while at the same time removing the traditional embarrassment of maximizing self-interest. ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱęǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ¡£ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ of modern and Western-style market economies, was not entirely absent ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǻȱ ŗşşŞǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ at an unprecedented level of social endorsement. Championed by the current Western, hence modern, knowledge of business and economics, ȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ǰȱęȱ¡£ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱȱȬȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱęĴȱǻ ȱŗşŜśDzȱ¢ȱŗşŞřDzȱȱ ȱŘŖŖŞǼǯȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ the market seemed to make sound sense. Furthermore, Western urbanism and its associated rich cultural milieu in the late nineteenth and early ȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ port cities, particularly in Shanghai (Yeh 1997, 2000, 2007; Esherick 2000; ǰȱǰȱȱȱŘŖŖŝǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱderstanding of the consumerism in these cities (Bergère 1989a; Cochran ŘŖŖŜDzȱ ȱŘŖŖřDzȱãĴȱŘŖŖŝǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ęȬ¡£ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ stitutional constraints on market behavior in Chinese society. These new ȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱęǰȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ that the new mind-set was most evident in Shanghai, where, as observed ¢ȱȱȬȱȱǻŗşşşǼǰȱȱ¢ȱǯȱ Following the emergence of this new treaty port economy mind-set, business mechanisms began to witness more widespread qualitative change. The traditional network and familial bonds, which used to hold a ȱȱęȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ
Modern China’s Treaty Port Economy
ŗś
ȱȱęȱȱȱ¡¢ǰȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱ legalistic organizational order and transactions. Although traditional ties remained important, Chinese entrepreneurs now had more options at their disposal. The new social fabric evolved into new networks, such as membership in social or jockey clubs, Christian churches, alumni net ȱȱȱȱǻȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǼǰȱfessional associations, and so on. Of these various groups, the single most ęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ perhaps the Chamber of Commerce, which sprang up in major treaty ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱęȱȱ activity. There is already a substantial amount of literature on this institution, and what needs to be highlighted here is the fact that this institution enjoyed unprecedented autonomy from governmental authority in cities with treaty port economies, whether or not the chambers were actually located in treaty ports. The clearest example of this phenomenon can be ȱ ȱ ȱ ħȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŘŖǯȱ ȱ ȱ şǰȱ the institution’s role in shaping the second legislation of company law in China is noted. These informal institutions soon became viable options for the Chinese business community. They provided new opportunities and at the same time also created behavioral constraints through implanted codes of conduct and virtue. To this we must add the notion of individualǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ŗşşŗǰȱ ǯȱ şǼǰȱ ȱ went hand in hand with the principle of an individual’s legal rights and the range of commercial laws that evolved to render protection to these entitlements. At the time, the missionary schools provided the best form of modern education and thus the best chance for upward mobility to increasingly ȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱ schools eventually penetrated into the adjacent cities and outlying rural areas, as well as into the interior provinces. This system produced a major supply of new forms of native human resources with the skills and technological knowledge necessary to support the demands of a modern ¢ǯȱȱ£ȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱĴȱȱȱ income may well account for the prosperity of this educational sector, ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ğȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱǻȱ ¡ȱŗşşŝǼǯȱ The treaty port economy witnessed a wide range of new, interlocking, informal institutions and mind-sets with a greater deal of dynamism than in other parts of China. The enforcement characteristics of these institutions made the treaty port economy the center of gravity for economic modernity.
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Billy K. L. So
Institutional Change in the Treaty Port Economy The institutional matrix of the treaty port economy witnessed enormous changes both in the formal regulatory domain as well as in the underlying informal social fabric and mind-set. Both the formal and the informal institutions were also enmeshed and mutually reinforced in the unique ȱĴȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱ ¡ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱĜ¢ȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęĴȱȱ ȱ ȱ Ě ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱĜ¢ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ£ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ treaty ports. There is a logical link between the remarkable performance of the Chinese treaty port economy and its new institutional matrix.10 ȱ ȱ ȱ¡£ȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱDZȱȱĴȱȱȱǯȱȱ¢ȱȱomy and its institutional matrix provide a good case study for the theory. ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱęȱ and foremost came from the foreign diplomats, who developed the sysȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱěȱȱȱing blueprint. The system came into being largely as an evolutionary proǯȱ ǰȱȱȱĞȱȱȱȱȱȱ and demands from entrepreneurs from their respective home countries. ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵǯȱ ȱ Şȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȯȱ Chinese enterprises. This scenario of institutional change by agents of ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱtion of the Northian framework. The Chinese entrepreneurs are a more complicated case. Were they also agents of change? Before the 1890s, most Chinese involved in the treaty port economy were compradors hired by foreign employers. Some ȱȱȱȱĚȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ hardly be seen as agents of any real change or importance within the institutional matrix, either in the formal or informal domain. Beginning ȱȱŗŞşŖǰȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ in the treaty port economy, and they eventually played a crucial role in ȱŗşŘŖȱȱŗşřŖǯȱȱęȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ the segment of compradors—either compradors-turned-entrepreneurs or second- or third-generation compradors. They were familiar with the system and had a solid international background and network. Their I have discussed at length this logical link between institutional change and economic ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǻȱŘŖŖŖǼǯȱ ŗŖȲȱ
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ȱȱȱĚȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ the formal and informal institutions. The second type of Chinese entrepreneur evolved from the migrant-returnees. This group consisted of individuals who had migrated to foreign countries, most notably the ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱtury. While abroad they learned new business methods, accumulated ęȱ ȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ China because of unfavorable legislation introduced in the 1880s in those foreign countries. Chapter 8 gives examples of the migrant-returnees in
ȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ies, as compared to the compradors. Their local networks were also well maintained, which gave them a considerable advantage in tapping reȱȱǯȱȱęȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱ their interests and rights. They soon became an important force of change in a number of institutions. The third group of entrepreneurs were the Chinese merchants who had no comprador or international background but who were invested with the business vision to see the myriad opportunities of the treaty port economy. Engaging with the treaty port economy was simply an investment strategy for them. The institutions of the treaty port economy were not entirely within their control, but they were subject to their negotiations. From the 1910s, they constituted a majority of the newly emerging informal business institutions, for example, the Chambers of Commerce. By this time, they also had formed the majority in the Chinese business communities in every treaty port economy. Their role as agents of change varied but became increasingly crucial. Within the Northian framework, these various Chinese entrepreneurs were the postulated agents of change who could alter the matrix out of personal economic interest. The last source of change was individuals not engaged directly in business. These included Chinese who had converted to a Western lifestyle and value system—through either education, travel, immigration, or reǯȱȱȱȱĚȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱĚȱȱȱȱȬ¡ȱȱǯȱȱ good deal of this was initiated by people—both Chinese and foreign— ȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱęȱ maximization. To these we must add those who embraced nationalism and held the view that it was imperative for the sake of national salvation to compete successfully with foreign enterprises in the business world, ȱ ȱĚȱȱȱȱȱ£ǰȱ£ǰȱȱ
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internationalization. They also abandoned the traditional legal and business cultures and fully embraced the Western legal and business system as a model of modernity and a worthwhile national goal. The unintended consequence of their zealous social missions turned out to be favorable ȱ ęȱ ¡£ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ did help enhance the informal institutions that promoted Western-style modern economic growth in the treaty port economy. There were, of course, exceptions to this maximization mentality, such ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱĞȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ port economy, which was seen as nothing but an exploitative product of Western capitalism and imperialism. One intriguing example is the ȱȱ ¢ǯȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŝǼȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱĞȬ ȱȱȱȱŗşŘŖȱȱŗşřŖǯȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱ¡£ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱ hinder the trend up through the 1930s,11 and lawyers certainly held even more power within the treaty ports. The issue of disparity and the disadvantageous position of rural farmers engaged in contractual borrowing ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱśǯ ȱ ȱ ȱĚ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ volume in light of the current framework. The cases will be grouped ȱ ȱDZȱęȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱstitutional change, and the other three with institutional change and its dynamics. Performance of the Treaty Port Economy under Institutional Change: Five Cases Chapter 2 begins by presenting a new quantitative account of the economic growth in the Lower Yangzi Delta region with Shanghai’s industrialization of the 1880s to the 1930s as a backdrop; Debin Ma next narrates the urban-based municipal institutional change that transpired in the city ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱ of the infrastructure and foreign elements—ranging from business networks to various forms of expertise in every aspect of urban life—on the economic performance of the city under the treaty port system. In the Far East, the city was transformed into a modern metropolis. But, it was the autonomous status of these enclaves that unleashed the immense Chinese dynamism of the market economy in a modern sense. A conducive environment for modernity created in the treaty port concessions was For information on Marxism and the labor movements in modern China, see Dirlik ǻŗşşşǼȱȱ¢ȱǻŗşşřǼǯ ŗŗȲȱ
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unmatched by anywhere else in China. In this way, Shanghai generated not only new and unprecedented commercial wealth but also a rich milieu of cultural transplantation and innovation, in which was embedded ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ¡£ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ paradoxical phenomenon that although the treaty port system opened up abundant new economic opportunities to Chinese entrepreneurs who took advantage of this new institutional matrix, and subsequently did extremely well in the business world, the safe havens largely denied them ȱȱȱȱȱȱȬǯȱ ȱȱ concludes with the fact that whereas Western institutional implants resulted in rapid economic growth in terms of industrialization and GDP indexes, economic development in modern China must still be observed in terms of the political economy rather than as pure market force. Tomoko Shiroyama provides in chapter 3 a detailed narrative of the Shanghai real estate boom in the early twentieth century against the related institutional change. This chapter discusses how and why Shanghai’s wealth grew in a well-constructed real estate market. Urban markets made it possible for private and public individuals to expand their perȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵǰȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ land was leased, based on a complex contractual basis between Chinese landowners and foreign tenants. This institutional framework for land property evolved over time within the treaty port urban governance structure. Major instruments are discussed at length to illustrate how the new institutions helped secure property rights. This development induced a dynamism in the Shanghai real estate market that engaged Chinese and foreigners in a complex form of landownership and tenancy. ȱȱ ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱerty rights in Shanghai also generated a prosperous real estate dealership business. The Shanghai real estate boom no doubt supported the remarkȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱdustry, equity loans on landed property, and business lending on landed collateral by modern banks. It also promoted large-scale investment vital to modern businesses. ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ŚǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ŗşŖŖȱȱŗşřŜǰȱȱȱĚȱȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱ a proliferation of market agents without vertical integration as a result of the constraints of local customs, that is, informal institutions. In conǰȱȱ ȱĚȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱ¡ȱ ȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ institutional change, signifying the vertical integration of production, purchasing, and distribution. The vertical model of organization, which
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was conducive to large-scale investment, mechanization, the application of new technology, and widespread marketing and retailing networks ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱĴȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱtutional frameworks, for example, corporate law and the capital market, that emerged in treaty ports such as Shanghai. Through Kai-yiu Chan’s contrastive study of two trades that linked agrarian production to the urban markets of mass consumption, the correlation between institutional change and productivity and performance becomes discernible. The ȱȱȱȱĚȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ was able to achieve economic integration with rural regions beyond the boundaries of the treaty ports. ȱȱśǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱnomic integration that took place between the treaty port economy and ȱȱǰȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱĴȱ¡ȱ production was conducted in institutional terms. Wei County experienced major economic transformations in the 1920s and early 1930s up until the outbreak of war. Treaty port economic forces from Tianjin and ȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱǻȱȱȱ Ǽȱǰȱ penetrated the highly stagnant structure of native cloth weaving, which ȱ¡¢ȱȱȱȱȱĜȱ£ȱ¢ȱȱ handloom weaving; this factor assisted in relegating it to a household Ĵȱ ¢ǯȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ path of change following the advent of new institutions such as the ĴȬȱ¢ǯȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱĴǰȱ ȱȱity and lowered their transaction and transformation costs per unit of ȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱĚȱȱ the treaty port economy in terms of institutional change, the construction ȱȱȱǰȱȱęȱȱȱȱral county. Regardless of who gained the upper hand in the Wei County ǰȱȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱ ȱȱĚȱȱton textile industry that was able to compete with both the modern cotton textile factories in the treaty ports and with manufactured textiles imported from overseas. By the 1920s, the larger treaty ports had integrated with the economies of their neighboring counties. Making use of a set of village-level ȱ¢ȱȱȱŗşŘşǰȱŗşřŜǰȱȱŗşŚŞǰȱȱŜȱȱȱ integration process between Shanghai and the land and labor markets ȱȱȱ¢ȱ¡ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱǯȱ ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱśŖȱȱȱȱŗşřŖǰȱ¢ȱ a substantial increase in crop output, manufactured silk, and associated services. Market integration with Shanghai accounted for this remarkable
Modern China’s Treaty Port Economy
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ęȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ǰȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱęȱ employment opportunities in Shanghai. The expanding treaty port economy created an urban labor market, skilled and unskilled, of service inȱȱǯȱěȬȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ and townships, which grew as a spillover of Shanghai’s prosperity, also Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃmative growth” breakthrough in the Wuxi agrarian economy. As James Kung, Daniel Lee, and Nansheng Bai observe, there were signs of an early “Green Revolution,” as the Wuxi local economy slowly adapted to become a high-yield, surplus-marketed agrarian system based on sustained commercialization and industrialization with the help of experimental public sericulture institutes that transferred technologies to rural areas. The authors argue against the notion that the county experienced ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱęȱȱ economic rationality of the village households in Wuxi in response to the opportunities created by the treaty port economy. Dynamics in Institutional Change: Three Cases In chapter 7, Kentaro Matsubara provides a succinct account of the complex traditional landed property rights and land transactions in Qing ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ Island, which had been leased to Britain for ninety-nine years by the Qing ȱȱŗŞşŞǯȱ ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ traditional mode of landownership transactions, in particular those that ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ contextualizes this issue in detailed court cases from the New Territories. Matsubara highlights the strong association of the legal aspect of property rights transactions with the social, religious, and political relationships among the parties concerned. This association prevented absolute ownership from developing in the modern sense. Although the state might have preferred for absolute ownership to exist so as to reduce the amount of litigation, the state itself simply was not conducive to marketȱȱǯȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ detrimental and compatible elements in traditional land-property rights, for both private parties and the Qing government, the market had never been a primary consideration. This was the local situation prior to the end ȱȱȱ¢ǯȱĞȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱerty were bound to change. As Matsubara discusses in this chapter, the British colonial government established a Land Court to handle disputes in the New Territories and introduced the institution of “crown land” in
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which land ownership had to be clearly registered with the colonial govȱȱǯȱȱě¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱěǯȱ In an expanding market economy such as that of Guangdong Provȱȱ ȱ ǰȱȱ£ȱ ȱǯȱȱȱŞǰȱ Stephanie Chung explores the interplay between the traditional institution of the tongȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱ corporation legalized under British company ordinances beginning in ȱŗŞŜŖǯȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ business cases and lawsuits, was far from being the straightforward and linear transplantation of Western legality resulting in Chinese adaptation ȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱęȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱ new mode of corporate governance, which required registration with the ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȂȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ status in cross-border economic activities. The situation changed when ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ istration in 1923 that ignored ambiguous land claims. The subsequent Ĝȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ǰȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ law rules at the turn of the century that repealed the legal status of the ambiguous corporate institutions in traditional Chinese business models. ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ homogeneous fashion. Some merchants had considerable overseas experience, primarily the migrant-returnees, who actively exploited the corporate institutions to their own best interest. There were also merchants with far less overseas experience, who perceived the new institution strictly in terms of a strong traditional vision. Clashes of understanding ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱĞȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱĴȱȱȱ law because of the complex social and political networks at work. In any event, the treaty port legal framework regarding business organizations did open up new business opportunities and modes of conduct for the ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ǯȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱĚȱ economic institutions implanted from the West to modern China is, as mentioned previously, the corporation, or joint-stock company with limited liability. This was a decidedly exogenous implant with no Chinese
Modern China’s Treaty Port Economy
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ȱȱȱȱȱȱȬȱęȯȬȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱȱǯȱȱduced and made possible capital formation that was vital for technologydriven modern industries in China. The importance of the corporation was ȱȱȱ ȱȱĚȱȱȬȬĜȱȱ the turn of the last century, including Wu Tingfang, Liang Qichao, and Zhang Jian, among others. In this chapter, Albert Lee and I trace the legislative evolution of three succeeding Chinese company law regimes from 1904 to 1929, examining the regulatory framework of each with a focus ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ shareholders. The chapter seeks to show that there were clear intentions on each occasion to improve the law so as to promote the corporation ǯȱȱȱ ȱ¡ǰȱȱȱęȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǻȱǼȯȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ this model instead of more conventional forms such as private companies or partnerships—and the protection of shareholders (large and small inȱǼȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ ǯȱĞȱȱ discussions of the agents of change, the models they adopted, and the complex legislative process for each time that the law was enacted and reenacted, we conclude that whereas there was no large-scale adoption of the corporate model in the Chinese business world, successive regimes clearly had taken this legislation seriously, placing it among their top legȱǰȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ ȱȱěǰȱȱ ¢ȱ observed. Also, there was indeed enthusiasm among some Chinese entrepreneurs who wanted to adopt the model, and, more importantly, some of them had done well. We urge future studies to explore structural problems such as weak government enforcement characteristics and the lack of complementary informal institutions in early twentieth-century China. Both factors may account for the absence of wholesale transplanting of the model in that country. From this conclusion, we may infer that a majority of Chinese companies incorporated in the 1920s and 1930s would have been situated in or near the treaty port economies where enforcement was strongest and the cultural atmosphere most conducive to this model. ȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱŞǰȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ¡ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ ȱ ǯ Concluding Remarks ¢ȱęȱĚȱǰȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ between the remarkable performance of the Chinese treaty port economy ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ę¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȬȬěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ
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based on direct evidence? In order to establish a consequential and causal relationship, or any correlation between the two, we must sketch the details of at least certain select enterprises. These details must include all major decisions of structural change in the context of the trajectory of institutional change for the individual institutions, both formal and informal, in each and every treaty port economy. Does that level of knowledge exist? Or, is there an adequate amount of information for the creation of such knowledge? Despite great advancements in our understanding of ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęǰȱȱȱ gap remains in our present ability to substantiate whatever conclusions we might reach at this preliminary stage. The empirical studies in this volume provide a few qualitative and quantitative cases with discernable links. These links are then meant to generate more constructive and Ěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱě¢ȱ substantiate certain claims or conclusions, but that is beyond the scope of the present volume. ǰȱ ȱȱęȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ǰȱing along a line of internationalization, urbanization, and industrialization by, in part, imitating the West, it was inevitable that the nation’s economy would become increasingly sensitive to the impact of international ȱĚǯȱȂȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ global economy, and it shared in the international market’s prosperity ȱǯȱ ǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ represented only a small portion of China’s economy as a whole, both in terms of space and total output, China was able to absorb the impact of ȱȱĚȱ¢ȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱȬŘŖŖŞȱȱȱ¢ȱę¢ȱȱȂȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ of China’s involvement in the world economy since the early twentieth century. On the contrary, the recent globalization of China also implies problems of equality and disparity in the distribution of opportunities ȱ¢ȱȱěȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ urban and rural areas, and between coastal and inland China. These curȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱǻȱȱŗşşŚǰȱŗşşŝǼȱȱ also valid for the treaty port economy. But, the treaty port system was not developed with equality, social justice, or human rights in mind. Rather, it was constructed for the privileges of foreigners on Chinese soil. The treaty port economy was never intended to be a response to inequality, disparity, or injustice; it was created primarily for the market, competition, and growth.
Modern China’s Treaty Port Economy
Řś
ȱȱĚȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ economy and the special economic zones created in the 1980s and 1990s. ȱȱ£ȱ ȱęȱȱȱŗşŝşȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǻǼȱ ĴDzȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ ǰȱ Ĵȱ foreign investment and experimenting with Western-style economic organizations, while China embarked on a course of economic modernizaȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǻȱŗşşŗDzȱȱŗşşŝǼǯȱ£ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ £ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱǯȱ Since then, it has become a vibrant industrial and commercial city with ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǻȱŗşşşǼǯȱ Are these special economic zone economies a shadow of the treaty port economy? There is no issue of sovereignty in this case. Special economic zones have always operated under Chinese sovereignty. Their inȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ other areas of China in terms of being more conducive to foreign investȱȱ£ȱǻȱŘŖŖŝǰȱǯȱŗŝǼǯȱȱȱǰȱ there is a similarity between the special economic zone economy and the treaty port economy. Regarding formal institutional enforcement in the ȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱties, but in terms of lacking the separation of powers and a democratic constitutional order as the basis for the rule of law, the two do not diverge from each other very much. In any event, the treaty port economy led China on the path of economic modernization, but it also generated enormous change within institutions and the overall business culture, in ȱȱȱȱęȱ¡£ǯȱȱȱȱŗşşŖǰȱȱ economic zones had not created a comparable impact, but a belief in maximization had already swept across China. The privileges of special economic zones have since been made available to more Chinese territories, making the institutional matrix in these zones not quite as special anymore. They have also lost their historical importance within the formidable rise of major international metropolises such as Shanghai, £ǰȱȱħǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ borrowed from the West, reinvented, and tested earlier in these special economic zones has since been transplanted into other regions of China, including the three aforementioned metropolitan areas.12 In this sense, the special economic zone as an institutional matrix played a role similar to that of the treaty port economy in early twentieth-century China. Both provided the impetus for market-related institutional change that was For a succinct account of China’s economic reform since 1978 as a backdrop for the role ȱȱȱȱ£ǰȱȱȱǻŗşşśǰȱŘŖŖŝǼǯ ŗŘȲȱ
ŘŜ
Billy K. L. So
conducive to China’s remarkable economic growth, and both were also based largely on privilege and disparity. In any event, both became platforms where China reconnected with the global economy and its various institutions. ǰȱȱȱȱȱĚȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱ of China’s market economy and perhaps more tangentially to political ¢ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱǻŗşŞŚǼȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱvelopment, which was awaiting a modern state to engage in necessary infrastructure building. This is in line with the established literature on ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃ ȱ ȱ Ȅȱ ǻȱ ŘŖŖśǼDzȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǻŗşŝŝǰȱŗşşŖǼǰȱ ȱȱȱplex vertical organizational structure of capitalist corporations, backed ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȯ ȱ ęȱ ȱ the United States and Western Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—as a necessary condition of modern economic deǰȱȱȱȱǻŘŖŖśǼǰȱ ȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱ the state in providing a necessary regulatory and legal framework for the functioning of modern economic development, to cite just a couple of exǯȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŚǰȱŘŖŖŚǰȱŘŖŖśǰȱŘŖŖşDzȱǰȱ ǰȱȱ ȱŘŖŖŚǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ the Chinese state in late imperial China, which together with the private sector created a market institutional infrastructure that might have been more conducive to modern economic development than previously believed. This also accounts for the continuity of many features of Chinese business practices into the twentieth-century, when the wholesale introduction of Western-style business institutions took place in China. Kenȱ £Ȃȱ ȱ ǻŘŖŖŖǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ of China’s traditional economic performance up to 1800, just before its encounter with the British in the Opium War.13 This is echoed by recent ȱȱȱȱȱȱŘŖŖŖȱǻȱŘŖŖśDzȱȱȱȱ ŘŖŖŞǰȱŗŘśȮŗŚŞǼǰȱ ȱęȱȱȬ¢ȱ ȱȱĴȱȱ ěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱ £ȱǻŘŖŖŝǼȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱern contract law may be irrelevant to economic life amid the advent of a modernized Chinese economy, whereas Barry Naughton has adopted a more positive narrative of the Chinese traditional economy as a backdrop for his recent account of China’s outstanding current economic growth ǻŘŖŖŝǰȱřŚȮŚŘǼǯ ŗřȲȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱ£ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǻŗşşŝǼDzȱȱȱ ȱǻŗşşşǼDzȱǰȱȱǰȱ£ȂȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŞǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ state and land markets from imperial to Republican China.
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If this emerging scholarship on the traditional Chinese economy withstands future countercriticism from adherents to the former mainstream ǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱĚȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ economy played in the transformation of the Chinese economy from the second half of the nineteenth century. This volume seeks to show the complexity of this issue and suggests that it is oversimplistic to ask whether the treaty port economy, built upon the treaty port system, came into being in China as an invading villain or a descending angel. The ChiȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱĚȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱously perceived. If so, then the broader discourse of state and economic development will need to take into account more seriously the nonrational human factors embedded in the cultural and linguistic environments, ȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱǯȱ Such factors may partially account for the eventual outcomes resulting from behaviors of both the individual and the market. Finally, the construct of the “treaty port economy” postulated in this essay may accidentally open a new way to compare the economic modernization trajectories of China and Japan.14 There were treaty ports in ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ treaty ports played a role in Japan’s modern economic development from ȱħȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ type of treaty ports in China that generated a treaty port economy as discussed. Indeed, probably none of the Japanese treaty ports can be ȱȱȱȱęȱ ȱ¢ȱǰȱ¢ǰȱalization, industrialization, and urbanization on a massive scale. In other words, Japanese economic modernization was never driven by any treaty port economy, whereas China was quite the opposite. In our institutional perspective, this divergence may help account for the more comfortable blend of old and new in Japan, in contrast with the radical antitraditionalism in China’s new business culture that has radiated from the major treaty port economies such as Shanghai. This issue is not within the scope ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱĴǯ
I am indebted to Kaoru Sugihara for his comment on the transnational phenomenon of treaty ports. ŗŚȲȱ
Ling Nam shop, Canton. 1919–1920. (Copyright John Swire & Sons, Ltd. ȱ ǯȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ¢ȱȱDZȱĴDZȦȦǯȬ¢ǯǯȦǯǼ
Canton from the Sun Building. 1919–1920. (Copyright John Swire & Sons, Ltd. ȱ ǯȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱȱDZȱĴDZȦȦǯȬ¢ǯǯȦǯǼ
Steamships Linan and Pekin and the French Bund, Shanghai. 1911–1912. ǻ¢ȱ ȱ ȱǭȱǰȱǯȱȱǯȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱDZȱĴDZȦȦǯȬ¢ǯǯȦǯǼ
PART ONE Institutional Change and Economic Growth
TWO
The Rise of Modern Shanghai, ŗşŖŖȮŗşřŜDZ An Institutional Perspective
DEBIN MA
Max Weber remarked that cities in China or Asia in general, unlike those ȱȱǰȱȱȱęȱȱǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱ ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱĞȱȱȱȱ¢ȱpendent military power, no privileges or freedoms granted by a charter ǻȱŗşŞřǰȱśşǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ of both the modern state and capitalism; but according to Weber, cities in ȱȱ ȱĞȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ£ȱȱǻǯȱŜŗǼǯȱ Around the time Weber was musing about the contrasting features of cities in the East and West, the Chinese empire was crumbling. During ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱern imperialist challenge was timid and conservative. Reforms such as the Tongji Restoration and the Self-Strengthening Movement all aimed at preȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱęȱǻȱ ŗşŜŘDzȱȱŗşŝŞǰȱǯȱŗŖȮŗŗǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱĴȱȱȱŗŞşŚȮŗŞşŜȱȱ¢ȱȂȱȱ¢ȱ defeat by Japan—long regarded as China’s humble student. The Treaty ȱǰȱȱȱȱĞȱȱȬ ȱǰȱȱŗŞşŜȱ granted foreigners the right to establish industrial enterprises in the treaty ȱȱĞȱȱĚȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱvertently legitimized modern Chinese enterprise. ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŗşŖŚȮŗşŗŗǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱħȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱthrough and the beginning of fundamental institutional change. Yet, this ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱħȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ
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ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱę¢ȱǰȱȱȱęnally collapsed in 1911. The political fortune of China’s new military ruler, ȱǰȱ ȱȱǯȱ ȱȱȱŗşŗŜȱȱȱȱȱ the warlord era, which was to bring enormous damage if not complete disaster to the national economy. According to James Sheridan, the warlords Ğȱȱȱȱ¡DZȱȃǽǾȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱsatiable and the militarists wrung an astonishing array of taxes from the population. They printed worthless currency on a large scale.… In many areas, the actions of organized crimes were less serious than hordes of uncontrolled soldiers who roamed the countryside preying on the peas¢ȄȱǻŗşŞřǰȱřŗŞǼǯ
ȱǰȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ spread practices of warlords for revenue extortion (Du Xuncheng 2000, ŘŘŝśȮŘŘŝŜǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ǯȱ ȱ ŗşŘŜǰȱ ȱ Shandong warlord placed the manager of the Jinan branch of the Bank of China under house arrest. When the bank agreed to lend the Shandong ȱśŖŖǰŖŖŖȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǯȱ Later, the manager of the bank’s Tianjin branch noted, “Actually, if we ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȄȱǻȱ ŘŖŖřǰȱŗŖŗǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȂȱ ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǻŗşşřǰȱśŜŞǼǯ Surprisingly, it was this period of political instability and civil strife ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ industrialization. Calculations from the data compiled by Du Xuncheng show that the nominal annual industrial investment by Chinese nationals ȱȱȱȱŗşŗŚȱȱŗşŘśȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱŗŞŚŖȮŗşŗŗȱriod. The capital of a modern Chinese banking sector, largely nonexistent ȱȱȬŗŞşŖǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŗŖǯŘƖȱ ȱŗŞşŝȱ ȱŗşřŜǯȱǯȱǯȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱŞǯřƖǰȱśƖǰȱȱŚǯřƖȱȱǰȱǰȱȱȱ rest of China, respectively, between 1902 and 1931. The amount of railroad ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ řŜŚȱ ȱ ȱ ŗŞşŚȱ ȱ ȱ ŘŗǰŖŖŖȱ by 1937. The national industrial output index constructed by John Chang ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱŗŖƖȱȱȱȱȱŗşŗŘȱȱŗşřŜǰȱ a phenomenal growth rate by the standard of the time. A somewhat provocative study by Thomas Rawski even contends that China’s per capita ȱ ȱȱŗşŗŗȱȱŗşřŜȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ of Japan in the same period.1
ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǵȱ This chapter argues that the missing piece to this puzzle is the external ŗȲȱ
ȱȱȱȱęǰȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŞǼǯȱ
The Rise of Modern Shanghai
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or Western imperialist factor. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Western imperialism did not subjugate China to full colonization but manifested itself through trading rights, leased territories, and treaty ports with extraterritoriality or spheres of interest. In the early twentieth century, when central control was weakened, Western treaty ports expanded rapidly at the expense of Chinese sovereignty. Most notable is the growth of the treaty port cities of Shanghai, Tianjin, and Wuhan, all strategically located in China’s major economic regions. These treaty ports became the ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ century. Large-scale investment, modern banking, and industry were disproportionately concentrated in those “pockets” of relative stability. Clearly, these privileges and extraterritorialities were politically unjust and socially discriminating, but their expansion in an era of political chaos and national disintegration turned out to be a blessing in disguise for two reasons. First, some of these “privileges” happened to coincide with necessary conditions needed for growth, namely, the maintenance of peace and public order, the security of property rights and contract ǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¡ȱȱĜȱ¡ǰȱȱ the right to transparent rules and predictable jurisprudence. Second, as ȱǰȱȃȄȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱĞǰȱ¢ȱȱmally, used by Chinese business and residents. ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴment of Shanghai, China’s largest and most important treaty port territory ruled by Western business interests. I show that the phenomenal growth ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱ¢ȱęȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȃȄȱȱ¢ȱȱěȱ¢ȱȱdictability to the growth of not only Western but, increasingly, Chinese business and industry. The so-called golden era of growth in the 1910s and 1920s fell in the period when Western-controlled Shanghai wrested almost complete political and legal autonomy from China. Shanghai in the 1920s looked increasingly like an autonomous Western-style city in the ȱǯȱ ȱȱȱȱǻŗşŞşǼǰȱȱǻŗşşřǼǰȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŗşşřǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ from this political process is crucial to understanding long-term economic change in China. The chapter is divided into two main sections followed by a concluǯȱȱęȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ my recent quantitative reconstruction of a region-based GDP estimate ȱȱ ȱ ȱ£ȱȱȱȱŗşřŖȱǻ ȱȱǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ŘŖŖŞǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ rates the evolution of political and institutional changes, especially the rise of Shanghai as a “city-state” in the early twentieth century.
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Shanghai-Based Industrialization: A Quantitative Analysis in the Regional Context ȱȱŗşřŖǰȱȱȱȱŚŗƖȱȱȂȱȱȱȱǻŚŞƖȱȱ¡ȱǼDzȱȱśŖȱȱŜŖƖȱȱĴȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŗŖȱ ȱ ŗşřŖDzȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ śŖƖȱ ȱ national electricity in the 1920s, almost twice that of the major British industrial cities of Manchester and Glasgow. In the 1930s, Shanghai alone ȱŚŜǯŚƖȱȱȱȱȱȱǻǼȱȱȱȱŜŝƖȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱŚŝǯŞƖȱȱȂȱęȱǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱęĞȱȱȱȱ shipping tonnage sailing through the harbor, Shanghai was the commerǰȱęǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ǯȱ The city’s population doubled from only half a million in the 1890s, to over a million in the 1910s, and to about three and a half million in the 1930s, ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǻȱ ŘŖŖŞǰȱ řśŞǼǯȱ ȱ staggering statistics lead some scholars to refer to China’s early twentiethcentury growth as Shanghai-based industrialization. ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ analysis of the modern industrial sector. The growth rate in the widely used Chang industrial output index for China, which covers the output of the modern “factory” employing seven or more workers, is known to be ȱȱȱȱȱĜȱǯ2 Recently, Toru Kubo reȱȂȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĚǯȱȱ ȱ ¡ȱȱȱȱȱŘǯŗȱȱȱȱȱȱŝŘƖȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱŞǯŚƖȱȱȱŗşŗŘȱȮŗşřŜȱǯȱ Table 2.1. Annualized Real Growth Rates of Modern Industry Output ȱȱȱ ȱǻȱŗşřŖȱȱǼ China ȱǻƖǼ ȱǻƖǼ ȱ¡ȱǻƖǼ ȱ¡ȱǻƖǼ ŗŞŞŖȮŗŞşś 10 ŗŞşśȮŗşŗŘ 9.4 śǯŝ ŗşŗŘȮŗşŘś ŗŘǯŜ 10 12 ŞǯŜ ŗşŘśȮŗşřŜ 7.4 śǯŚ Ŝǯś şǯś ŗşŗŘȮŗşřŜ 10.2 8.4 şǯŜ 8.3 Source:ȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŞǰȱȱŗǼǯȱ
I shall now compare these national indices with the new modern indusȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ
ǰȱȱȱȱȱŗŞşśǰȱŗşŗŗǰȱŗşŘśǰȱȱŗşřŜȱȱȱŗşřřȱ ŘȲȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŚŖȱ ȱ śŖȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ Dzȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŗşŜşǰȱřŜǼǯ
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ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Řǯŗǰȱ ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱşǯŜƖǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱŞǯŚƖȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ¡ǯȱȱ the national average includes the fast-growing Shanghai and Manchuria, ȱěȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱside of these regions should be larger than is shown in table 2.1. Modern industrial growth in Shanghai compares favorably with Japanese industrial performance as measured by those items produced by ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱęȱ ǯȱȱŘǯŗȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱŗŞşśȮŗşŗŗȱȱŗşŗŘȮ ŗşřŜȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱŗşŗŘȱȱŗşřŜǯ3 Shanghai-based industrialization spilled over to the rest of China but most directly to the immediate hinterland, the Lower Yangzi region. For the Lower Yangzi, Shanghai became a massive draw for labor and a major source of capital and entrepreneurship. Shanghai capital supported the renowned scholar-bureaucrat-entrepreneur Zhang Jian to turn Nantong in Jiangsu Province into an industrial city. Capital infusion from Wuxi-born industrial tycoons in Shanghai transformed the ȱ ȱȱ¡ȱȱȂȱęĞȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱŗşřŖǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȃĴȱǯȄȱǻȱŜȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ¢ǯǼȱȬȱ£ȱȱ had an impact on the agriculture sector. Industrial demand brought direct ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱ practices; the demand also accelerated the adoption of commercial fertilizers and the introduction of power-driven agricultural machines such as ȱȱȱȱȱĚȱȱǻȱŘŖŖŞǰȱřŜŗȮřŜŘǼǯȱ Using a region-based production account, I reexamined the quantitaȱ ěȱ ȱ Ȭȱ £ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱǰȱȱ ȱ£ǰȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱǻĞȱȱȱȱ ȬǼǯȱȱ method uses provincial and regional data to tease out the share of the two ȱ ǻȱ Ǽȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǻŗşŜśǼȱȱȱȱŗşřřȱȱ GDP.4 The estimated result shows that in 1933, Jiang-Zhe, with a popuȱȱŗŘȱǰȱȱȱȱȱŗśȱȱȱǰȱŘŖȱ ȱȱĞǰȱśŝȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱŜśȱȱȱ ęǰȱȱŚśȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱǰȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗŞşśǰȱ Japanese industrial expansion in the twentieth century started from a larger base than Shanghai’s. For industrial growth in Taiwan and Korea during this period, see Mizoguchi ȱȱǻŗşŞŞǰȱŘŝřȱȱŘŝŜǰȱ¢Ǽǯȱȱ ŚȲȱ ȱȱǻŘŖŖŞǰȱřśŝǼȱȱȱȱȱȱǯ řȲȱ
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provinces had a 19 percent share in China’s NDP, making the area’s per ȱȱŗǯśśȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱ Ȭǰȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱŜȱǰȱȱȱŘȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ whole. The ratio of modern factory output to total manufacturing output ǻ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĞȱǼȱ ȱ ŖǯřŜȱȱ ȬǰȱȱȱŖǯŘŚȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱȱ the Lower Yangzi on about the same level as Japan in the 1900s or even the ŗşŗŖȱǻȱŘŖŖŞǰȱřŜŚȮřŜśǼǯ Based on very preliminary backward projections using sectoral real ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱŘŖŖŞȱȱȱęȱȱȱ economic structures of Jiang-Zhe NDP in the periods 1914–1918 and 1931– ŗşřŜȱ ȱ¢ȱę¢ȱěȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ as a whole, making the region more comparable to industrialized Japan and its colonies of Korea and Taiwan. In particular, industrial growth had ȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ£ȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱǻŗƖǼȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǻŖǯśřƖǼǰȱ¢ȱble to that of Japan and Japanese colonies during this period. Preliminary comparisons based on the 1930s exchange rates also show that per capita income in Jiang-Zhe was higher than that of Korea and Manchuria and ȱȱȱĞȱȱȱ ȱȱ ǯȱȱȱ ȱ£ǰȱ with its population almost the size of Japan’s and more than ten times that of Taiwan in the 1930s, had clearly emerged as the second largest indusȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱȱȱȱȱ Ǽǯ The Growth of Shanghai: An Institutional Narrative In the traditional Lower Yangzi, Shanghai was a market town at the pe¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ£ǯȱĞȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ in the middle of the nineteenth century, Shanghai grew and developed ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȯȱȱȱȱĴǰȱ ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱĴment, produced by a merger of the British and American Concessions, started as a segregated community for Western expatriates. But followȱȱȱĚ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ Ĵȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱĞȱŗŞśŚǯ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ from those of a typical colonial enclave toward a Western-style autonoȱ¢ȱ ȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ members chosen by an electorate made up of foreigners (largely British Ǽȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱśŖŖȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ
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around two thousand electoral members, which was less than 10 percent of the foreign population. The municipal employees of the International Ĵȱȱȱȱȱȱȯ ǰȱȱǰȱ Finances, and Disposal, as well as the Fire Brigade, Shanghai Municipal Police, and others. The Municipal Council had its own mini constitution, the Land Legislation. As part of the extraterritorial rights, judicial powers over foreigners were vested in the consular courts of the foreigners or, for unrepresented foreigners or Chinese, in the Mixed Court. Chinese residents could be arȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱĴȱǯȱȱȱȱȱĴǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱĞȱȱȱȱǻȱ¢ȱ¢ȱǼȱ ¢ȱȱȱǻȱŗşŞřǰȱŗřŘǼǯȱȱĴȱȱȱ ȱunteer army and police, as well as a prison system, but could make no arrests, as a general rule, except on a warrant of the proper court. The Municipal Council had a right to sue in these courts and in turn to be sued in a court elected from the consuls of the Treaty Powers, known as the Court of ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ of limited power and rule of law.śȱ ȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱeval European political tradition where incorporated urban communities ȱȬȱȱȱȱȱȱĞȱ ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱĴȂȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ¢ǰȱ its Western merchant elites had desired and fought for self-rule. This is ȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ treaty ports in China or even the neighboring French Concession, which ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ pointed from Paris.Ŝ ȱȱȱȱĴȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Shanghai. Taking advantage of the self-government movement under the late-Qing constitutional reform, Chinese gentry and merchants set up the Shanghai City Council in 1904 and practiced what Mark Elvin has called “gentry democracy” in the Chinese Quarter in direct imitation of the MuȱȱȱȱȱĴǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ experimented with the separation of powers between legislative and executive branches, having open debates and majority votes, standardizing śȲȱ ȱĴȱǻŗşŘŞǰȱŗŗŚǼǯȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ Ğȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŘŖŖřǰȱ ŘŗśȮŘŘŞǼǯȱ ŜȲȱ ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱ¢ȬȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŖǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱǰȱȱ¸ȱǻŘŖŖśǰȱǯȱśǼǯȱ
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¡ȱȱǻȱȱȱ¡ȱǼǰȱȱȱȱȱ facilities, developing its own merchant militia and courts of justice with elected judges, and promulgating various regulative laws and moral codes that seem like a distant echo of Lee Kuan Yew’s modern Singapore. ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱǻȱŗşşŜǰȱǯȱśȮŜǼǯ In 1913, Yuan Shikai’s policy of recentralization forcibly ended this short-lived Chinese experiment in local self-government. By then, only £ȱȱǻȱȱĴȱȱȱȱǼȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȂȱǰȱȱ by international treaties, and, more importantly, by Western gunboats. By ŗşŗŗǰȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ to extend their territories in Shanghai to 33 square kilometers (approx. ŞǰŗŖŖȱǼǰȱȱȱŗǯśȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱĴȱ in the other twenty-three treaty ports in China combined (Fei Chengkang ŗşşŘǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȯ¢ȱ ȱ ȱȯȱȱȱȱŗşŗŗǰȱȱȱĴȱ seized control of the Qing’s Shanghai Mixed Court and began to appoint its own Chinese personnel. By then, Westernized Shanghai had become somewhat of a de facto “city-state” with full territorial jurisdiction over its residents, Western and Chinese, a feature that set it apart from the other foreign concessions in China. Shanghai’s Golden Age: 1911–1925 Ğȱŗşŗŗǰȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ and procedural transformation and became an indispensable legal arm ȱȱĴȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ from 1911 to 1927. Despite the stigma of being a foreign-run court on Chinese soil, the Mixed Court reached an annual average of thirty-two thouȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŗřȱ ȱ ŗşŘŜǰȱ Ğȱ stripping the court’s capacity. The Mixed Court handled the largest civil caseload of all Shanghai courts, with a secular rise in the share of Chinese lawsuits in the total. In 1908, the court for purely Chinese suits was in sesȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱŗşŘśȱ ȱȱȱȱǻȱŗşşřǰȱŗřŚŞȮŗřŚşǼǯȱ The Mixed Court successfully outcompeted other courts established in early twentieth-century Shanghai due to several advantages. The ruling or adjudication of the Mixed Court was credible and enforceable with the backing of a highly armed and well trained municipal police force. Distinct from the Chinese tradition of discouraging formal legal litigation, the ȱȱȱȱěȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ variety of suits civil, commercial, or otherwise from a wide spectrum of ȱǻȱŗşşřǰȱŗřśŖǼǯȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱ¢ȱĴȱ
The Rise of Modern Shanghai
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ȱȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱĴȱȱȱ on private property rights.7 Shanghai, as Thomas Stephens aptly put it, was “an oasis of peace, order and good government, in a China torn into ȱ¢ȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȄȱǻŗşşŘǰȱŗŖŚȮŗŖŜǼǯ ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱŗşŗŜȱȱȱȱȬȱȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŗŖǰȱ ħȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ because of the presence of large state-backed banks such as the Bank of ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱ ǰȱȱŗşŗŜȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ħȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ revenue and ordered the suspension of paper note conversion to silver, a ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱǯȱ With the backing of the Mixed Court, the Shanghai branch of the Bank ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǯȱȱ¢ȱŗşŗŜȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱęȱǯȱȱ bankers later played a leadership role in privatizing the government’s state banks and inducing the rise of a modern Chinese banking sector, with almost all the important banks being located in the foreign concesȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȱ¢ȱŗşŘśǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱnese banks was 41 percent, higher than the 37 percent held by the once dominant foreign banks.8 The impact of the Mixed Court reached far beyond the courtroom, with ȱ ȱ Ğȱ ¢ȱ £ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯ9 In this era of legal reform, Shanghai nurtured China’s largest professional legal association and highest number of lawyers and law schools (Lee 1993, ŗŚŖşȮŗŚŗŖDzȱ ¢ȱŗşşśǰȱŚŞȮśŖǼǯȱǰȱȱȱŗşşŘȱ¢ȱȱȱ¡ȱ Court during 1911–1927 period, emphasizes the transformation of legal ǯȱ ȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢tem as “disciplinary,” meaning that it places priority on the maintenance For a comparison with the taxation system in Shanghai and the Mixed Court’s repeated ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱĴǰȱȱȱǻŗşřŗǰȱŗŖřȮŗŖŝǼǯ ŞȲȱ For details on the note-suspension incident and on the role of the Shanghai Bankers’ Association in privatizing modern state banks in China and the shares of capital power, ȱ ȱ ǻŘŖŖřǰȱ śŚȮŜŘǰȱ ŗŜŘȮŗŜŞǰȱ ŘŚŗǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ £ǰȱȱ ȱǻŗşŞşǰȱŗśśȮŗŝşǼǯ şȲȱ ȱěȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱĴȱ¢ȱȱ ȱǰȱȱǰȱ observation made in 1917: ȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱŞŖŖǰŖŖŖǯȱȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǽǾȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǽȱ ȱ Ǿȱ ȱ dzǯȱǽȱȱǰǾȱĜȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱȱǯȱǻȱȱȱŘŖŖŗǰȱŚŗǼ ŝȲȱ
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of social order and group solidarity over abstract and transcendent legal rules. The Mixed Court, he argued, resorted to this “disciplinary” legal tradition but, more importantly, strived for the ideal of dispute resolution according to predetermined and known standards. Moreover, the ȱȂȱĴȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ model of Western jurisprudence brought legal certainty and calculability previously lacking in the Chinese legal tradition.10 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵǯȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ adopted there—particularly, transparency and security—laid the foundation for the rise of modern real estate that further fueled the growth of modern banking.11 Zhao Jin’s work shows that land values per mou in the ȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱ ȱŗŞŜśȱ ȱ ŗşřŖǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŗŗȱ ȱ ŗşřŖȱ ǻŗşşŚǰȱ ŗŚśǼǯȱ More important, by 1930, the average per mou land value in the InterȱĴȱ ȱȱ ¢Ȭ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Quarter and three times that of the highest-valued area in the Chinese ǰȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱĴǯ12 ȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱness establishments. Data culled by Marie-Claire Bergère illustrate that over 70 percent of highly contract-intensive sectors such as banks and insurance, trading, and other service companies were located in the InternaȱĴǰȱ ȱȱȱŘŖȱȯ¢ȱȱȱ banks and pawnshops—were in the Chinese Quarter. In the case of the capital-intensive sector of the mechanical engineering industry, 84 percent ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱĴǯȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ¢ȱ ȱŜŖȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȬȱȱȱȱ ¡ȱȱȬȱȱ ȱȱȱȱĴǰȱ ȱ the Chinese Quarter took in more than 30 percent (Bergère 1989a, 108–109, ȱřǯřǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ institutional demarcation: the number of industrial and commercial entiȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱŘŖŖŘǰȱŘŘŗȮŘŘŘǼǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ¡ȱȱȱęȱȱĜȱȱ ŗŖȲȱ ȱȱǻŗşşŘǰȱŗŖŝȮŗŖŞȱȱǯȱŗȮřǼȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŜǼǯȱ ŗŗȲȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ£ǰȱȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŘǰȱǯȱřǼǯȱȱȱȱȱęȱ (daoqiǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱ ȱŗşşŚǰȱǯȱŗǼǯȱȱȱ¢Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ řǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ period. ŗŘȲȱ Overall, per mouȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ ȱȱŘŞȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǻȱ ȱŗşşŚǰȱŗśřǰȱŗśŜǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱęǰ ȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŘǰȱǯȱřǼǰȱȱ ȱǻŗşşŚǰȱǯȱŗǼǰȱȱȱȱǻŗşřŗǰȱřŗŝȮřŚŞǼǯ
The Rise of Modern Shanghai
43
ȱȱ ȬȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱ¢ȱȱna in the 1920s.13 It was in Westernized Shanghai that a new generation of Chinese entrepreneurs was born. They came from modest backgrounds and gained fortunes without the bureaucratic patronage and rent-seeking tendencies that ȱĞȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱȬȱ of earlier periods. Whereas Shanghai’s business class was dominated by entrepreneurs of the Lower Yangzi, the city had become a magnet for Chinese merchants nationwide. The virtuous merchants of old China were no longer the executive role models sought by the young merchants who had already become successful compradors. Wen-hsin Yeh has given this phenomenon a succinct account: “What set the compradors apart from the late imperial predecessors was not what they might have lost, but what had become necessary for them to learn. This included both younger language skills and knowledge of the world that lay beyond China.” Further, this new breed of Chinese sought the “pragmatic value of the learning of Ȅȱ ǻȱ ŘŖŖŝǰȱ ŗśǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ techniques, including foreign languages, new comparative business practices, a variety of business concepts, new contracts, and so on (Yeh 2007, ǯȱŗȮŘǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ownership in nine major modern industries in Shanghai were consistently higher than those of foreign ownership from the 1910s through the 1930s. In this sense, Westernized Shanghai, from a colonial perspective, had induced far more vigorous indigenous entrepreneurship than Japanese colonialism did in Taiwan, Korea, or Manchuria. In fact, Japanese entrepreneurs themselves thrived in the highly competitive and mulȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşşŞǰȱ řŚŗǼǯ14 This led to the rise of a legendary Shanghai style of freewheeling capitalism £ȱ¢ȱȱĚ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ small government but a large civil society, a model that stood apart from the acclaimed East Asian model of state-led industrialization in postwar Japan and Korea. ȱŗşŘŜǰȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱǰȱȱǰȱDZȱ whenever I come to a treaty port I feel thoroughly humiliated, not only because a treaty port is a standing reminder of our loss of sovereignty, but also because whenever we pass from the concessions into Chinese territory we feel that we are crossing into a ěȱ ȯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȬ ǰȱȱȱ in the Chinese territory—roads, buildings, or public health—can be compared with the concessions. This is the greatest of our national humiliations, much greater in my ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱǻȱȱȱŗşřŗǰȱŘŚŘǼȱ ŗŚȲȱ For the share of Japanese capital in industries in Taiwan and Korea, especially in largeȱǰȱȱ£ȱȱȱǻŗşŞŞǰȱŝŝǼǯȱ ŗřȲȱ
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The City and the Empire Beneath the prosperity of Westernized Shanghai lay a set of fundamental ǯȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ no democracy. Controlled by what was dubbed a “taipan oligarchy,” the Municipal Council was elected by a tiny and powerful Western business class who met the property requirements for voting rights. The council defended the rule of law as much as Western privileges. It denied repreȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱşŜȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱŗşŘśǯŗś This is unfortunate as, accordȱȱȱȱ ǯȱǻŘŖŖřǼǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱtween Chinese entrepreneurs and the treaty port irrespective of the social discrimination these entrepreneurs had felt—perhaps more keenly than average Chinese residents because of their wealth and education. ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵment and French Concession sheltered China’s outspoken intellectuals and creative artists as well as radical dissidents and revolutionary advocates of violence.ŗŜ With three independent jurisdictions in a tight, dense space with open borders (except in brief periods of external military threat ȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱǼǰȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱĜȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȃ ȱ ǰȄȱȂȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱęȱȱęȱ the French Concession, the Chinese warlord government, and, later, the Nationalist government. In the midst of surging nationalism, advancing Japanese imperialism, and growing communist agitation, Shanghai was increasingly politicized by forces both within and without and saw a fair share of massive labor strikes and sometimes violent protests.17
ǰȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ for China: the insertion of an independent political entity into the heart of an empire whose stability had long rested on the elimination of alternative power structures. Western Shanghai thrived during the near absence of empire, a period that seemed to be drawing to a close by the late 1920s. In ŗşŘŞǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱĞȬ ȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ and destruction of property, brought a poignant reminder of the limited reach of Western military power in the face of rising nationalism. Western ŗśȲȱ ȱ ǻŗşřŗǰȱ ŗřŞǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ śśȱ ǯȱ
ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŗşşŘǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱǯȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱ¡ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱŜŖȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱǻǯȱŗŘŝǼǯȱ ŗŜȲȱ For Shanghai’s emergence as China’s new intellectual capital by the late 1920s, see ¸ȱǻŗşŞŗǰȱŗŘȮŗřǼǯ ŗŝȲȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŗşşŘǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱǻŗşşŜǼȱȱȱ ȱ ǯ
The Rise of Modern Shanghai
Śś
ȱȱ ȱ ȱǻȱ ȬǼȂȱ¢ȱȬ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǻ ȱǼȱȱŗşŘŝǯȱ Some Western privileges were forsaken: the Mixed Court was reverted to the new Chinese regime; the long-sought Chinese representation was accepted into the Municipal Council; and even the “public” parks were opened to Chinese residents by 1928.18 The Nationalist regime in Nanjing was a mixed blessing for Shanghai capitalists. Not unlike other Chinese governments, Jiang’s extended its grabbing hand to tax revenue and then state control (Coble 1980; Bergère ŗşŞşǰȱǼǯȱȱȱȱǰȱ ǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
¢ǰȱ ȱĞȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻŗşşśǰȱśŗǼǯȱ ever, the Jiang regime did bring back general peace and stability to the Lower Yangzi, which enabled a heightened spillover of Shanghai industrialization to the region. Only ten years later, the Nationalist rule came to an end in the Lower Yangzi following Japan’s full-scale invasion in 1937. It was an irony of ȱȱ ȱȱĜ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ£ȱ ȱȱŗşŚŗȱǻȱȱŗşşŘǰȱŚŗśǼǯȱȱǰȱtheless, survived till the day when Communist troops marched into the heart of the city’s commercial district in 1949. It was then that Shanghai’s once bright evening city lights—a symbol of its freewheeling spirit of ȯ ȱȱěǰȱȱ ȱȂȱȱȱȱǯȱĞȱ 1949, Shanghai, like other cities in China, returned to being an administrative district—albeit an important one—of a highly centralized state. Meanwhile, Chinese capitalism went on the run. Shanghai capitalists ȱȱȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱȱǰȱȱǰȱ ȱȱǰȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȬȬęĞȬ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱǻȱŗşŞŞǰȱŘǼǯȱȱȬȱ ǰȱ the educated elite from the Lower Yangzi region made up most of its ecoȱȱȱȱǻȱŗşŞŝǰȱŚşǼǯȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱnese peripheries that capitalism, spared from annihilation, blossomed into two East Asian miracles. Conclusion Against the long history of the Chinese empire, the life cycle of Shangȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱĚȱǯȱǰȱȱ full extent of its historical implications is yet to be grasped. Cities in the West, from antiquity to the medieval period, were regarded by Weber as forming a crucial transitional phase in the rise of the modern state and of ŗŞȲȱ For the issue of public parks and other municipal services in Shanghai, see Feetham ǻŗşřŗǰȱŗřŞȮŗŚŜǼǯ
ŚŜ
Debin Ma
capitalism. Undoubtedly, the intrusion of Western institutions into China in the form of colonial privileges had been intended for the safeguarding ȱȱȱǰȱĞȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȂȱ¢ǯȱ Yet, many of these privileges happen to coincide with those conditions conducive to growth, namely, the maintenance of public order, the security of property rights and contract enforcement, freedom from arbitrary taxation or extortion, and the right to transparent rules. Thus, their extension to Shanghai, whose overwhelming majority of residents was Chinese, ¢ȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ rule of law to anchor China’s early twentieth-century industrialization ȱȱȱ ȱǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ interest of the business oligarchy embedded in the anachronistic political structure of a “city-state” constrained its potential for a more broad-based growth across China. In this regard, the city-state model of Shanghai was neither sustainable, nor would it be replicable. Nonetheless, the place of Shanghai along China’s tortuous path to in£ȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱěȱȱȱȱ experiment of competing modes of political governance that sheds light on long-term institutional dynamics in China. As demonstrated in this chapter, Chinese entrepreneurs have risen to occasions with commercial acumen, industrial entrepreneurship, and organizational capability, as well as a political consciousness even under the constraints of the political ǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱ political structure—as articulated in the city-state model of the Internaȱ Ĵȯ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ especially in a time of national disintegration. The contrasts in the mercantile access to formal political power between Europe and China as revealed here should be part of a larger research agenda including comparative studies of historical institutional evolution to shed light on the ěȱĴȱȱȬȱȱǯȱ This chapter, amid the current swirl of excitement about the imminent rise of the world’s largest economy, “Great China,” serves as a reminder ȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȬȱȱĞȱȱȃȄȱǯ
The Shanghai Real Estate Market ȱȱǰȱŗŞŜŖȮŗşřŜ
ȱ
From the 1870s to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, treaty port cities in China—including Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, and
ȯ ȱȱȱȱ¢ǯ1 All of these cities underwent rapid appreciation of their real estate values, which induced investments in construction and industries. Shanghai was the largest of these cities, and its foreign area was arguably the city center.2ȱȱȱĴȱ ȱȱȱŗŖȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŗşřśǰȱȱŚśȱcent of the city’s population, 70 to 80 percent of its factories, and many of its major shops and banks were located there (Zou Yiren 1980, 90; Zhang ȱŗşşŖǰȱŘřǼǯ3 What institutions in the new treaty port cities promoted this concentraȱ ȱ ǵȱ Ȭȱ ¸ȱ ǻŗşŞşǰȱ ŜȮŗŖǰȱ ŘŝşȮŘŞŖǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ to expand their businesses because of the lack of interference by the Chiȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱ Republican era, particularly the period of World War I and its immediȱĞǯȱ¡ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ¸Ȃȱǰȱ Zhonghua minguo tongji tiyao, compiled by the statistics bureau of the Nationalist ǰȱ ȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱ ȱ£ȱ£ȱħȱǻŗşřśǰȱŜŖŗǼǯ ŘȲȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱĴǯȱ ǰȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱĴȱ important features such as land regulations and many Chinese residents. řȲȱ Similarly, in the city of Tianjin, Zhong Ёȱ ǻǼȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ French, and British Concessions, hosted most of the modern foreign and Chinese banks in ȱ¢ȱȱȱŗşŘŖȱǻȱŘŖŖřǰȱŚŞǼǯ ŗȲȱ
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this chapter looks into the realm of real estate transactions.4 The presentation has two parts: First, the chapter discusses how real estate in the ȱĴȱ ȱ¢ȱ£ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ these areas in monetary terms. From the middle of the nineteenth century, ȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱĴȱĴȱ Chinese people there. As the population grew in this limited area, land values inevitably rose. Many foreigners as well as Chinese perceived vast investment opportunities there, so new institutions and organizations evolved to facilitate trading real estate. Second, this chapter explains how wealth generated from real estate transactions sparked urban development and economic expansion (at least before a housing bubble formed ȱȱŗşŘşȱȱȱȱȱȱĚȱȱȱ ȱȱ Ǽǰȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ęȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Ĵǯś I will begin by looking at how institutional changes starting in the middle of the nineteenth century promoted economic change in early twentieth-century China.
ŚȲȱ ȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ ȱęȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱ¡¢ȱ ¢ȱ¢ȱȱǻȱŗşŚŗǼǯȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ systems, which conferred extraterritoriality only on foreigners. In treaty port cities, both ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ and sold it. By the 1990s, the institutions and organization of the real estate market in Shanghai, including rules for land registration and for the operation of foreign real estate ǰȱȱĴȱȱǻȱ ȱŗşşŖǰȱŗşşŚǼǯȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱę¢ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ ¢ǯȱ ǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȱȱ ȱǻŗşşŚǼȱȱȱȱȱȱ in coastal cities such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Tianjin, and inland cities such as Nanjing and Chongqing; she discovered an upward trend in Chinese land values in the early twentieth century. Zhao detected several factors contributing to this rise—population growth, government spending, and road repairs—but failed to make a convincing case. śȲȱ ȱȱŗşŘşȱȱȱŗşřŗǰȱȱ ȱȱĚ¡ȱȱȱȱȱ and from the Chinese interior. Because of the impact of the Great Depression, the international ȱȱȱȱę¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱĚ ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱ Ȭȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱǰȱȱĞȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ especially Shanghai. As a large portion of the accumulated money was invested in real estate, the Shanghai real estate market saw a speculative boom. From September 1931 on, ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱĚȱȱǯȱȱȱ international price of silver rose, a large amount of silver started to drain out of China. When ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱĚǰȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱŗşřŖǰȱȱ¢ȱǻŘŖŖŞǰȱǯȱŜǼǯ
The Shanghai Real Estate Market
49
Early Institutional Change: Chinese Residents in the Foreign Ĵ Rising Urban Land Values in Port Cities Urban land values generally rose in China in the early twentieth century because of the increasing urban population. Social disturbances in rural areas also forced many people to migrate to large cities. Table 3.1 shows the upward trend in land values in the cities of Tianjin and Guangzhou. Table 3.1. Land Values in the Chinese Areas of Tianjin and Guangzhou Year 1912
Tianjin (yuan/muǼ řŜŜǯŜŝ
Index ǻŗşŗŘƽŗŖŖǼ
Guangzhou (yuan/muǼ
Index ǻŗşŗŘƽŗŖŖǼ
100.0
7,434.00
100.0
1913 śŖŗǯşŜ ŗřŜǯşȱ 1914 ŚŘśǯŖŖ ŗŗśǯşȱ ŗşŗś śŖŖǯŖŖ ŗřŜǯŚȱ ŗşŗŜ ŚŝśǯŖŖ ŗŘşǯśȱ 1917 1,331.27 řŜřǯŗȱ 1918 ŚŝśǯŖŖ ŗŘşǯśȱ 1919 ŜŖŖǯŖŖ ŗŜřǯŜȱ 1920 ŚśŖǯŖŖ 122.7 1921 800.00 218.2 1922 1,309.09 řśŝǯŖȱ 1923 ŗǰŜřřǯřř ŚŚśǯŚȱ 1924 ŗǰŞŜŜǯŜŝ śŖşǯŗȱ ŗşŘś 1,790.00 488.2 ŗşŘŜ ŘǰśŗśǯŖŖ ŜŞśǯşȱ 1927 2,940.00 801.8 1928 3,811.11 1,039.4 1929 řǰŘŚśǯŗŘ ŞŞśǯŖȱ 1930 řǰŖřŘǯśş 827.1 1931 řǰŗşśǯśŝ Şŝŗǯśȱ 1932 3,297.89 899.4 1933 řǰśśřǯřŗ şŜşǯŗȱ Source:ȱȱ ȱǻŗşşŚǰȱŗŜśǰȱŗŞśǼǯȱ
ŝǰŞŘŜǯŖŖ 10,833.00 8,478.00 8,084.00 şǰŞŜŗǯŖŖ 8,921.00 8,991.00 9,279.00 10,728.00 ŗŗǰŞŜŖǯŖŖ ŗŗǰŘŜśǯŖŖ 10,397.00 12,074 10,929 ŗŖǰŘŜř ŗŖǰŜŝŗ n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
ŗŖśǯřȱ ŗŚśǯŝȱ 114.0 108.7 ŗřŘǯŜȱ 120.0 120.9 124.8 144.3 ŗśşǯśȱ ŗśŗǯśȱ 139.9 ŗŜŘǯŚȱ 147.0 138.1 ŗŚřǯśȱ n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Table 3.2 compares the land values in eleven Chinese cities, using the ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ǰȱȱ¢ȱ high land values in the treaty port cities are obvious.
śŖ
Tomoko Shiroyama
Table 3.2. Comparison of Land Values of Various Areas in China in the 1920s and 1930s Value per muȱǻ¢Ǽ
Comparison with Shanghai
Shanghai
ŘŘǰŖŜŘ
100
1930
Xiamen
12,900
śŞ
early 1930s
Guangzhou
ŗŖǰŜŝŗ
48
1928
10,271
ŚŜ
1933
Tianjin
8,110
řŜ
early 1930s
Chongqing
7,320
33
ŗşřŜ
Fuzhou
śǰŘŞŖ
24
ŗşřŜ
Nanjing
řǰŜŜŖ
ŗŜ
1931
£
3,000
13
1929
Kunming
3,000
13
ŗşřŜ
3
1929
City
Beiping 790 Source:ȱȱ ȱǻŗşşŚǰȱŘŖŜǼǯ
Year/s
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ¢ȱ sible for raising the average land values in Shanghai. As table 3.3 shows, ȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Chinese districts in these cities. ȱřǯřǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǰȱǰȱȱ ȱ City and
ȱĴ
Chinese Districts
(yuan/muǼ
(yuan/muǼ
Year/s Shanghai
ȱĴ
French Concession
1930
37,743
ŘŝǰŖŗś
Tianjin Early 1930s
British
French
Italian
Japanese
Ĵ
Ĵ
Ĵ
Ĵ
8,000
12,000
7,000
10,000
Special District 1
Special District 2
Special District 3
(former German
(former Russian
(former British
Early 1930s
ĴǼ
ĴǼ
ĴǼ
8,880
13,980
ŗśǰřŜŖ
1,428
řǰśśř
ŘǰŞŜś
Source:ȱȱ ȱǻŗşşŚǰȱŘŖŞǼǯ
ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ ȱ ŘŜǯŚȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱǰȱŗŞǯşȱǯȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ ȱ
The Shanghai Real Estate Market
śŗ
ŘǯŘśȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱDzȱȱȱȱsion, 3.37 times; in the Italian Concession, 1.97 times; and in the Japanese ǰȱ ŘǯŞŗȱ ǯȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ řǯŖşǰȱ ŚǯŞŞǰȱ ȱ śǯřŜȱ ȱ ǰȱ respectively, than those in the Chinese areas. ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱȱȱȱĴȱ ȱȱřǯŗȱȱśǯřȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱĴȱȱǰȱȱȱŘǯŚȱȱŚǯŘȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ǯ ȱȱȱȱȱȱĴ Chinese migration was one of the main factors raising the land value ȱȱȱȱȱĴǯȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱĚȱȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ŗŞśřȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ŗŞśśǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱŗŞŚśȱȱȱȱȱȱĴǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ŗŞśŚǰȱ ȱ ȱ twenty thousand refugees from the county seat had entered the foreign ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǻȱŗşşşǰȱŗřśǼǯȱ The second tide of war refugees was driven by the Taiping Rebellion ǻŗŞśŖȮŗŞŜŚǼǯȱȱȱȱŗŞŜŖȮŗŞŜŘǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ Shanghai several times, the number of refugees from the Lower Yangzi ȱ ȱ ę¢ǯȱ ¢ȱ ŗŞŜśǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱşŘǰŞŞŚǰȱȱȱśŖǰŖŖŖȱȱȱ moved into the French Concession. By the end of the Taiping Rebellion, ȱ ȱ ŗŗŖǰŖŖŖȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ĴȱǻȱȱŗşŞŖǰȱřȮŚǰȱşŖȮşŗǼǯ The British consul of the time, Rutherford Alcock, intended to proȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱĴȱȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ŗŞśŚǰȱ ȱ the clause prohibiting Chinese residence (Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Shanghaishi weiyuanhui and Wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui ŗşŞşǰȱ ŗřŗǼǯȱ ¢ȱ ŗŞŜŖǰȱ ȱ ȱ ŞǰŝŚŖȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵǰȱ mostly owned by Britons and Americans but inhabited by Chinese renters. The end of the Taiping Rebellion caused a temporary decrease in the ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴǯȱ ȱȱ¡¢ȱ¢ȱĞȱŗŞŝŖǰȱȱȱȱęȱřǯŗǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱĚȱȱȱȱȱĴǰȱȱȱ the demand for residence increased, rents and land values rose. Foreign
śŘ
Tomoko Shiroyama
ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱ buying land, building houses, and renting them to the Chinese. ȱřǯŗǯȱȱȱȂȱȱĴ ŗǰŘŖŖǰŖŖŖ
ŗǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ
ŞŖŖǰŖŖŖ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ŜŖŖǰŖŖŖ
ȱ
ŚŖŖǰŖŖŖ
ȱ
ŘŖŖǰŖŖŖ
ȱ
Ŗ
ȱ
ŗŞŝŖ
ȱ
ŗŞŝś
ȱ
ŗŞŞŖ
ȱ
ŗŞŞś
ȱ
ŗŞşŖ
ȱ
ŗŞşś
ŗşŖŖ
ŗşŖś
ŗşŗŖ
ŗşŗś
ŗşŘŖ
ŗşŘś
ŗşřŖ
ȱ
Source:ȱȱǻŗşřŗǰȱǯȱŗǰȱ¡ȱŘǰȱȱŚȱȱŜǼǯ
From the turn of the century, population grew consistently and land ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵǯȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ cades of the twentieth century saw the most rapid population increase in Shanghai’s history. Most immigrants came from other parts of China, ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǻȱȱŗşŞŖǰȱŗŖȮŗřǼǯȱ ¢ȱȱ businesses—such as commerce in the central district, manufacturing in ȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȯěȱȱȱȱǻ ǯȱ ȱŗşşŖǰȱŚŘŘȮŚŘŜǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ¡ed the outgoing population, thereby increasing the urban population. At the turn of the century, Shanghai’s population still had not reached a million, but by 1930 more than three million people lived in the city (Zou ȱŗşŞŖǰȱŗřǰȱşŖǰȱŗŖŝǼǯ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ problem. The annual report of the Shanghai Municipal Council in 1928 ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱĜǯȱǰȱ rapid transport did not reach the sparsely populated areas, and builders had no incentive to invest in the outer limits (Shanghai Municipal
The Shanghai Real Estate Market
śř
ȱ ŗşŘŞǰȱ ŞśȮŞŜǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱĴȱ¢ȱȱ ǰȱ ȱȱ lodging. The typical Chinese-style residence for Chinese workers in prewar Shanghai was an alleyway dwelling called a lilong 䞠ᓘ. By the end of ŗşŚŖǰȱŝśȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱlilong, in which 70 to 80 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻǯȱ ȱ ŗşşŗǰȱ ŗřşǼǯȱ Lilong housing was built by foreigners for refugees from the Small Sword and Taiping Rebellions. Although the general layout of Shanghai’s lilong in rows resembled that of urban workers’ housing in Britain, the interior layout was derived from the traditional Chinese house, known as the siheyuan ಯড়䰶 (MuraȱȱŗşşŗǰȱşřǼǯȱȱęȱřǯŘȱ ǰȱȱȱȱŗşŖśȮŗşřŖǰȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȬ¢ȱȱę¢ȱȱȱȱȱ Ĵǯȱ ȱřǯŘǯȱ ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱĴ şŖŖŖ
ȱ
ŞŖŖŖ
ȱ
ŝŖŖŖ
ȱ
ŜŖŖŖ
ȱ
ȱ ȱ
ȱ¢ ȱ¢
ȱ ȱ ȱ
śŖŖŖ
ŚŖŖŖ řŖŖŖ
ȱ
ŘŖŖŖ
ȱ
ŗŖŖŖ
ȱ
Ŗ
ȱ
ŗşŖś
ȱ
ŗşŖŝ
ȱ
ŗşŖş
ȱ
ŗşŗŗ
ȱ
ŗşŗř
ȱ
ŗşŗś
ȱ
ŗşŗŝ
ŗşŗş
ŗşŘŗ
ŗşŘř
ŗşŘś
ŗşŘŝ
ŗşŘş
Source:ȱȱȱǻŗşřŘǰȱȱŘŘȱȱŘřǼǯ
Yet, the supply of housing could not meet the increasing demand. In ŗşŘŜǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ factories are abundant, but housing for them is needed.” Thus, from ŗşŗśȱȱŗşŘŖǰȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱřŖȱȱŗŖŖȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱŗşŘŖȱǻȱȱȱŗşŘŗǼǯ
śŚ
Tomoko Shiroyama
Rising Land Values and Other Trends in Shanghai Land values inevitably followed the upward trend in rent. From the middle of the nineteenth century to the 1930s, land values in the Shanghai ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ¢ǯŜ Table 3.4 shows that land values ȱŗşřřȱ ȱȱȱ ¢ȬęȱȱȱȱŗŞŜśǯȱȱ¡ȱĚȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ǯȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŜŞǯŝƖȱ ȱ ŗşŗŘȱ ȱ ŗşřŗǯȱȱ ȱ Ěȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ the steep rise in land values during this period. Whereas the general trend of wholesale prices was upward, and the rate of change varied year by year—rising in some years and declining in others—the trend for land ȱ ȱ¢ȱ ǰȱ¢ȱĞȱŗşŖŖȱȱ¡ȱȱŗşŗŗǰȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǻȱ¡ȱřǯŗǼǯ ȱřǯŚǯȱȱȱȱȂȱȱĴ Year Area (muǼ Total Value Yuan/mu ŗŞŜś 4,310 śǰŝŜşǰŞŖŜȱ 1,318 ŗŞŝś ŚǰŝśŘȱ śǰşřŜǰśŞŖȱ 1,249 1903 ŗřǰŗŘŜȱ ŜǰŖŚŘřǰŝŝřȱ ŚǰŜŖřȱ 1907 ŗśǰŜŚŘȱ ŗśŗǰŖŚŝǰŘśŝȱ şǰŜśŜȱ 1911 17,093 ŗŚŗǰśśŖǰşŚŜȱ 8,281 ŗşŗŜ ŗŞǰŚśŖȱ ŗŜŘǰŝŗŞǰŘśŜȱ 8,819 1920 ŗşǰŚŜŖȱ ŘŖřǰŞŜśǰŜřŚȱ ŗŖǰŚŝŜȱ 1922 20,338 ŘŚŜǰŗŘřǰŝşŗȱ 12,102 1924 ŘŖǰŝŝśȱ řřŜǰŝŗŘǰŚşŚȱ ŗŜǰŘŖŝȱ 1927 21,441 řşşǰşŘŗǰşśśȱ ŗŞǰŜśŘȱ 1930 22,131 śşŝǰŘŚřǰŗŜŗȱ ŘŜǰşŞŜȱ 1933 22,330 ŝśŜǰŚşřǰşŘŖȱ 33,877 Source:ȱȱ£ȱǻŗşŚŝǰȱŘŘŞǼǯ
Index 100.00 şŚǯŝŜȱ 349.24 ŝřŘǯŜŘȱ ŜŘŞǯřŖȱ ŜŜşǯŗŘȱ 794.84 918.21 ŗŘŘşǯŜŜȱ ŗŚŗśǯŗŝȱ ŘŖŚŝǯśŖȱ ŘśŝŖǯřřȱ
ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ central, north, east, and west. Land values varied among them, as shown ȱęȱřǯřǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĚȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱěȱǯ ȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ value every few years from 1890 to 1933. Since the land tax and the tax on rents—referred to ȱȱȱ¡ȯ ȱȱȱęȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱȱȱȱŗŞŜşȮŗşřřǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱǯȱȱȂȱȱĚȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ Ğȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǻȱȱȱŗşŞśǰȱřŚȮřśǼǯ ŜȲȱ
The Shanghai Real Estate Market
śś
ȱřǯřǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴ ŗŘŖŖŖŖȱ
ŗŖŖŖŖŖȱ
ȱ ȱ
ŞŖŖŖŖȱ ȱ ŜŖŖŖŖȱ
ŚŖŖŖŖȱ
ŘŖŖŖŖȱ
Ŗȱ ŗşŖřȱ
ŗşŖŝȱ
ŗşŗŗȱ
ŗşŗŜȱ
ŗşŘŖ
ŗşŘŘ
ŗşŘŚ
ŗşŘŝ
ŗşřŖȱ
Source:ȱȱȱǻŗşřŘǰȱȱŘŖǼǯ
ȱȱȱǰȱȱęȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ Ğȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Shanghai in the middle of the nineteenth century, this district became a shopping center. At night, the modern skyline along the Bund and NanȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱĴǰȱȱ the central district’s business center for banking and commerce (Shanghaiȱ ȱȱ£ȱŗşŞşǰȱŗŗȮŗŘǼǯȱȱřǯŚȱ ȱȱȱ values of land on Nanjing Road for eight buildings. At this location for Ĝǰȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ anywhere else in the city. The prosperity of the central district gradually spread to the north and east districts, where the price of land was lower than in the central disǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ŗŞŜřǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ by Yangshupu ⌺ Road, the east district became an industrial center. ȱŗŞŝŞȱȱŗşŗřǰȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱĴȱǰȱȱing, brewing, and chemical manufacturing were built. With World War I, China’s industrialization surged, especially in the east district, and Chiȱȱ ȱĴȬȱȱȱȱǻȱȱȱ£ȱŗşŞşǰȱŘŝŜȮŘŝŞǼǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ŗŞşşȱ ȱ of real estate regulations. Manufacturing and shipping were the major
śŜ
Tomoko Shiroyama
ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǯȱĞȱȱŗŞşśȱȬ ȱǰȱȱ ȱȱ steadily grew, reaching twenty-eight thousand in 1928. Most of the Japanese in the north district lived along Wusong ਇ⎲ Road, which came to be ȱȱ ȱĴȱǻȱ ȱȱ£ȱ ŗşŞşǰȱŚȮśǼǯ Figure 3.4. Land Values on Nanjing Road ŚŖŖŖŖŖ
ȱ
řśŖŖŖŖ
ȱ
řŖŖŖŖŖ
ȱ
ŘśŖŖŖŖ Ȧ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ ȱ
ȱ
ŘŖŖŖŖŖ
ȱ
ŗśŖŖŖŖ
ȱ
ŗŖŖŖŖŖ
ȱ
śŖŖŖŖ Ŗ
ȱ
¡ ¡
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ŗŞŚŚ ŗŞŚŝ ŗŞśś ŗŞŜŗ ŗŞŜş ŗŞŝŜ ŗŞŞŘ ŗŞşŖ ŗŞşŜ ŗŞşş ŗşŖř ŗşŖŝ ŗşŗŗ ŗşŗŜ ŗşŘŖ ŗşŘŘ ŗşŘŚ ŗşŘŝ ŗşřŖ ŗşřř
ȱ
Source:ȱȱȱ£ȱȱ ¢ȱǻŗşşşǰȱřŚŗǼǯ
The west district was divided into two parts. Its northern part was an industrial district like that of the east and north. The southern part, adjacent to the French Concession, was a residential area for the wealthy ǻȱȱȱ£ȱŗşŞşǰȱŚȮśǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ this area’s land prices during the 1920s occurred because of the development of the west district’s southern part. ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȂȱĴtion, and land values continued to grow in all four districts. Except for 1911, the year of the revolution, land values consistently increased until ȱŗşřŖȯȱȱŗşŖřȱȱŗşŖŝȱ¢ȱŜŜȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ than 100 percent in the central, north, and west districts. Land values accelerated in the 1910s, rising from 7 percent in the west to 17 percent in the east in the early 1910s, and from 14 percent in the west to 27 percent in the central district in the late 1910s, and from 17 percent in the east to 88 percent in the west in the 1920s.
The Shanghai Real Estate Market
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Population density rose, and housing and transportation lagged behind. Many complained about these shortages, but as few measures were ȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęǯ7 ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱĴȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱĞǰȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ The later rise in rental and land values made real estate investment in the ȱĴȱ¢ȱęǯȱ ǰȱȱȱed that only foreigners could own land registered at foreign consulates. Despite this rule, many Chinese managed to own land in the concession ȱ¢ȱȱȱĴȱȱ ǯȱ Institutions and Organizations for Marketing Real Estate Two types of title deed are important in analyzing the dynamics of the Shanghai real estate market: the daoqi 䘧༥ and the quanbingdan ⃞ᶘஂ. Daoqi ȱȱȱȱȱĴǰȱzujie ⾳⬠, literally means “eternal lease”—that is, the land has been leased, but not sold, to foreigners— ȱ¢ȱȱŗŞŚśȱǰȱȱǰȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱ the emperor’s property. In certain designated areas, the Chinese were allowed to lend their land permanently to foreigners. For a land transaction, an “eternal” lease was drawn up and served as the equivalent of a contract ȱȱȃȄȱǻȱ £ȱȱȱ ȱŗşŞŖǰȱŚŚȮśŖǼǯȱȱȱȱ ȱȱĴȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱǰȱȱȃĴȄȱ¢ȱ ȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȃǯȄȱȱȱȱ system, such as that in Tianjin, foreign governments could lease any land conceded to it by the Chinese government to foreign nationals. The daoqiǰȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ Chinese landlords and foreign tenants. Once a Chinese landlord and a foreign tenant agreed to the terms of a lease, the land was measured and ŝȲȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱĚ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ǰȱĞȱȱȱȱȱŗŞŜŗǰȱȱȱȱȱ the devastation wrought by the Taiping Rebellion. Urban commerce was concentrated in the ¢ȱȱȱĴDzȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ ǻȱȱŗşŞŝǰȱŗŝşǼǯȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ŜŞǰŖśřȱȱŗşŖŜȱȱŗŗşǰŗśŖȱȱŗşŗŝǰȱȱȱŘŘşǰŖŗŚȱȱŗşŘśǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ŗşşřǰȱ ŚśśǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȬŗşŘŖȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ŗşřŖǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ the 1922 civil war and the 1931 Manchurian Incident, the demand for concession premises increased, and merchants even moved their businesses and residences from the Chinese part ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǻȱ ȱŗşşřǰȱśŝŜǰȱśŞŝǼǯ
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registered at the appropriate foreign consulate. Simultaneously, the local magistrate of Shanghai—the daotai 䘧ৄȯȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ęȱ called a daoqi ǻȱ¡ȱŗşřŖǰȱŗŗřǼǯ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ŗşřřǰȱ ȱ ȱ leased to foreigners reached more than 80 percent of the designated area.8 Foreign tenants were obliged to pay an annual land tax to the council of ȱ Ĵǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ tered under the names of foreigners enjoyed extraterritoriality (Shanghai ¡ȱŗşřŖǰȱŗŗřȮŗŘŜǼǯȱ Quanbingdan The rules of the treaty system designated that only foreigners could own land registered as daoqi. But actually, many Chinese did own land in the ȱĴǯȱȱquanbingdan document was a declaration of trust that enabled Chinese to own land while foreigners registered the land and ȱȱȱ¡ȱǻçȱ¢ĀȱŗşŚŗǰȱŗǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ asked a foreigner to register his or her land, they exchanged a quanbingdan, certifying that the Chinese “entrusted” his land to the foreigner (see appendix 3.2 for the quanbingdanȱǼǯȱȱǰȱȱquanbingdan was customarily regarded as a title deed. If a Chinese person possessed a daoqi ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱsulate, and a quanbingdanȱęȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȃȱ Ȅȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱęȱǻȱ ĀȱçȱȱȱȱȱçȱŗşŚŘȮŗşŚřǰȱ ŝŚǼǯ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȬŗŞśŖǰȱ ȱ¢ȱȱŗŞŜŖȮŗŞŜŘȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴǯȱ ǰȱȱ ȱȱhai became uncertain. In a time of such unrest, Chinese registering land under foreigners’ names while retaining actual ownership hired foreigners to register their land by using a daoqi; at the same time, the Chinese exchanged a quanbingdan declaring that they nominally trusted the land ȱǯȱȱȱǻǼȱęȱȱȱȱ to foreign employers. Foreign employers required compradors to pledge assets as security when they let their Chinese employees handle large ȱȱ¢ǯȱȱĞȱȱȬŗŞŞŖǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȯȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱĴȱ ǯȱ
çȱ ¢Āȱ ŗşŚŗǰȱ śŜȮśŝǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ŗşřřǼȱ ȱ Role de la propriete fonciere ǻȱŗşřŚǼǯ ŞȲȱ
The Shanghai Real Estate Market
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Organizations for Real Estate Transactions ȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱěȱȱȱȱ ǰȱȱ land ownership secured by a combination of daoqi and quanbingdan was potentially insecure. Nonetheless, this method of registering land under foreigners’ names, called yangshang guahao ⋟ଚ㰳, was preferred in the ȱĴǯȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱĴǰȱȱȱŗşŘŜȱȱȱȱ was any trouble between foreigners and Chinese landowners, it was never reported. The security of yangshang guahao was provided by professionals such as foreign lawyers, construction companies, and real estate dealers, ȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱĀȱçȱȱȱȱȱçȱ ŗşŚŘȮŗşŚřǰȱŚŜǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȂȱȱĴǯȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱŗŞŝŖǰȱ ȱȱęȱȱ¢ǯȱ Ğȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ increased. In 1914, 30 companies were operating, whereas 140 companies were registered as members of the Shanghai Real Estate Owners AssoȱȱŗşřŖǯȱĞǰȱȱȱěȱȱȱǯȱȱ example, China Realty Company was an American real estate agency that ȱȱȱȱȱśŖŝȱȱȱŗşŘŜDzȱşŗşȱȱŗşřŖDzȱȱŗǰŖŘşȱ ȱŗşřŚȱǻȱȱ£ȱȱ ¢ȱŗşşşǰȱŗśŗǼǯ By registering land under foreigners’ names, Chinese could enjoy extraterritorial rights and hide their assets from Chinese authorities. Since Chinese landowners registered their property under foreigners’ names ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱĜȱȱȱ Chinese ownership. According to data prepared by the Shanghai Muȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŘŜǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŘŞřǰŖŖşǰŚŖŖȱ ȱ ǻ¡¢ȱ şŚǰŖŚŗǰřŖŝȱ ǯǯȱ Ǽȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ŗŖřǰřŖŖǰŚŝřȱȱǻřŜǯśƖǼȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȬȱǯȱȱŗşŘŝǰȱȱȱ ȱȱŗŖǰŖŜśȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴǰȱȱȱ ȱřǰŝŖŖȱȱȱǻřŜǯŝƖǼǯȱȱȱȱĴǰȱȱ property was concentrated in the central district, the center of the comȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ ȱśŘŘȱȱȱŝŖŖȱ ǻŝŚǯśƖǼȱȱȱȱǰȱśřŞȱȱȱŗǰŗŞŘȱǻŚśǯśƖǼȱȱȱǰȱŗǰŖŜŜȱ ȱȱŗǰŞśřȱǻŜŝǯřƖǼȱȱȱǰȱȱŗǰśŝŞȱȱȱŜǰřřŖȱǻřŜǯŝƖǼȱȱȱ ȱ ǻȱŗşřŗǰȱřŘŘǼǯ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ daoqi and quanbingdan. For example, of a hundred daoqi listed in the publication Shanghai daoqi, there is only one case without a recorded change of ownerǯȱȱŗŞŚŝȱȱŗşŚśǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱśǯřȱ ȱǻȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱȱŗşşŝǼǯ
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ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ changing the names on a quanbingdan. The procedure was simple: on the back side of a quanbingdan, a printed text said: “I hereby assign all my ǰȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǽȱȂȱǾȱȱ authorize and request you to grant him a new declaration of trust. Upon your so doing, I hereby undertake to indemnify you from any further ȱȱȱĴǯȱǰȱȱǽǾȱ¢ȱȱȱǽǾȱȱȱŗşǽ¢ǾǯȄȱ Once seller and buyer had agreed on the terms, the seller would sign the document and send it to the foreigner to ask for a new contract (Minami ĀȱçȱȱȱȱȱçȱŗşŚŘȮŗşŚřǰȱ śŚȮŜŗǼǯ9 The daoqi, the institution formally set up under the agreements between China and foreign governments, and the quanbingdan, the local custom developed by both foreign and Chinese participants in the real estate market, legitimated the ownership and exchange of real estate in ȱȱĴǯȱȱ£ȱȱ ȱȱ a piece of real estate was a safe asset and readily mortgaged properties through this system. The Merchandising of Real Estate: Investment and Mortgage Investment Strategies of the Real Estate Agencies As discussed in the previous section, many foreign real estate agencies made a business out of registering land at foreign consulates for their Chinese customers. Although some small-scale dealers specialized in services with commission, such as registering land with foreigners’ names and collecting rents, many large-scale dealers, such as the Sassoon family’s agent, ȱȱ ǰȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ the stock, in addition to providing the various services that enabled their foreign and Chinese customers to acquire, manage, and trade real estate in ȱȱĴǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ illustrate the dynamics of the real estate market. The Sassoons as Early Shanghai Real Estate Investors. The Sassoon family was one of the major real estate investors in Shanghai. Elias David Sassoon, a Baghdadi Jew of British nationality, expanded the family’s business from the opium trade to real estate management in 1877. When Auȱ ǰȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱǰȱȱȱ A title deed similar to the daoqiȱ ȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ quanbingdanȱ ȱȱȱȱǻȱ ȱŗşşŚǰȱŗřǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ¢ȱĚȱȱȱȱȱȱ Ĵȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯ şȲȱ
The Shanghai Real Estate Market
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the company’s property at the corner of the Bund and Nanjing Road and ȱȱȱȱęǯȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱ cob Elias Sassoon, in 1880, and then by his grandson, Elice Victor Sassoon, in 1917. By 1921, the company ED Sassoon owned twenty-nine sites, valued at a total of 13,300,000 taels. Deducting their initial investment of ŘǰŖşŖǰŖŖŖȱǰȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱŘŘǰŗşŖǰŖŖŖȱǰȱŗŖǯŜȱȱ their capital investment, with an equivalent annual compound interest ȱȱŘŚȱȱǻȱȱȱȱȱŗşŞśǰȱŚŘǼǯ When buying and managing properties, the Sassoons carefully evaluated the locations, potential rental returns, and future prospects for Shanghai’s economy. Their purchase of land in the central district in 1911 illustrates how their strategies in the keenly competitive environment of ȱȱȱȱȱȱěǯȱȱȱŗşŗŗǰȱȱȱĜȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ Consular Lot 233—Cadastral Lot 239 in the central district—on the north side of Nanjing Road. A group of nine Chinese individuals had bought the property for 340,000 yuan about four years before and had taken a ȱȱȱȱŘŜŖǰŖŖŖȱ¢ǯȱ¢ȱȱȱȱęȱĜculties, owing several thousand taels in back interest on the mortgage for the property. Under pressure from the mortgagee, they agreed to sell the ¢ȱȱŘŝŖǰŖŖŖȱ¢ǯȱȂȱȱĜȱȱȱerty as “one of the very best localities with bright future prospects”—a ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱŜȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǻȱǼǯȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱĜȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ŘŜŖǰŖŖŖȱ¢ȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱĜȱȱȱȱDzȱ ȱȱěȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱŘŜŜǰŖŖŖȱ¢ǯȱǰȱȱȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱęȱ ȱȱěǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ the value of the property might decline because of the Revolution of 1911. ȱȱĜȱȱȱ ǰȱDZ we have made enquiries from several old residents, property owners and agents, architects and others who are well informed and have great experience in property business, and they all agree that property here will not ěǰȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĚ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ protected by all the treaty Powers; properties outside the limits of the Ĵȱ ȱȱȱěǯȱ
¢ǰȱȱŗŘȱ ¢ȱŗşŗŘǰȱȱȱĜȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ŘŜŚǰśŖŖȱ ¢ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ¢ȱ ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ and in the best part of the most favorable road in Shanghai,” the Shanghai
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Ĝȱ ȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȃȱ¢ȱȱȱtrinsic value and highly improves your property in Tianjin Road, which is just at the back of this lot.” As discussed earlier, the rising rental returns and land values in the setȱĞȱŗşŗŗȱȱȱȱĜȱǯȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱǯȱȱȱ dealers could sell their assets whenever they found this advantageous, and some of them took that option. For example, in 1904 the Shanghai ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ şśǰŖŖŖȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŗŞşśǯȱ When the American company Asia Realty sold 3 muȱǻ¡ǯȱŖǯŗŜŚŝȱǼȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŗşŗşȱȱśŘǰŖŖŖȱȱȱmu, which it had ¢ȱȱȱŚŚǰŗŜŜȱȱȱmu in the same year, the net profȱ ȱ ȱ ŘśǰřŖŖȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗŝǯŝƖȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱȱ£ȱȱ ¢ȱŗşşşǰȱŗśřǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ dealers intended to sell their own land, in the interim they were happy to build on it and lease the stock, from which they could receive handsome ęǯ The Sassoons, on the land that they purchased, built not only magęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ¢ȱ Ȃȱǰȱȱ lilongȱǻȱ ȱŗşşŗǰȱŗřşDzȱȱȱŗşşŗǰȱşřǼǯ Lilong were built ȱȱȱĴǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱtral district, and for factory workers in the north and east districts (Muraȱ ŗşşŗǰȱ ŞşȮşŘDzȱ ȱ ȱ ħȱ ŗşşřǰȱ śȮŘŖDzȱ ȱȱȱ£ȱŗşŞşǰȱŘŝşǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȬ¢ȱȱ ȱ¡¢ȱęǰȱȱ though the buildings looked “suicidal” to Western people’s eyes. The stock of lilong houses, for which the rent ranged from 8 to 40 yuan per ǰȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱĚȱ ȱȱȱ ¢ȱǻȱȱȱŗşřşǰȱŞŘȮŞřǼǯȱ As for the Sassoons, their rental income of 144,412 yuan from eight lilongȱȱŗşŗśȱȱȱŗŜŜǰŚşŝȱ¢ȱȱŗşŗşDzȱřŖŞǰŞŞşȱ¢ȱȱŗşŘŜDzȱȱ ŚśŗǰŚřŞȱ¢ȱȱŗşřŗǰȱřǯŗřȱȱȱȱȱŗşŗśȱǻȱȱ £ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ŗşşşǰȱ ŗŞŘǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ lilong was not restricted to the Sassoons: the British-owned Shanghai Land Investment ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱŗşŘŖǯ10 ȱ ęȱ řǯśȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗŖȲȱ Not only in Shanghai but also in Tianjin, foreign real estate agencies constructed buildings to lease as residences. Charles Daniel Tenny, an American missionary, and a group of foreigners founded the Xiannong ܜ䖆 Company in 1902. Taking advantage of his close tie ȱȱ £ǰȱȱȬȱĜȱȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱęȱ from investment in Tianjin foreign concessions that were recovering from the devastation ȱ¢ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱŗşŖŖȱǻȱȱ¢ĀȱȱŗşşşǰȱŗŚŗǼǯ
The Shanghai Real Estate Market
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ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱŗşŘŖȱĚȱ rate, around 10 percent. ȱřǯśǯȱȱȱȱ¢ȂȱęȱȱǰȱŗşŘŗȮŗşřŖ řśŖǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖȱ
řŖŖǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖȱ
ȱȱ ȱȱ
ŘśŖǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖȱ
ŘŖŖǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖȱ ȱ ŗśŖǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖȱ
ŗŖŖǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖȱ
śŖǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖȱ
Ŗȱ
ŗşŘŗȱ
ŗşŘŘ
ŗşŘřȱ
ŗşŘŚ
ŗşŘś
ŗşŘŜ
ŗşŘŝ
ŗşŘŞ
ŗşŘş
ŗşřŖȱ
Note:ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱęǯȱ Source:ȱȱȱ£ȱȱ ¢ȱǻŗşşşǰȱŗŚśȮŗŚŜǼǯȱ
Hardoon: Mortgage and Urban Investment. The Sassoons established a model for operating in the real estate market, and their employees, both foreigners ȱǰȱ ȱȱǯȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ
ȱȱŗŞŝŚȱǻĴȱŗşşŝǰȱŗŗǼǯȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱ ǰȱȱ ȱȱ promoted to a position of responsibility, in which he bought land in unȱȱȱȱȱĴǯȱȱŗŞşśǰȱȱęȱȱ a large property in the central district. Continuing to increase his acquisition of land, he founded his own company in 1901 and achieved complete ȱȱȱȱȱŗşŗŗȱǻĴȱŗşşŝǰȱŗŖŖȮŗŖřǼǯȱȱ that point on, he successfully established himself as Shanghai’s major indiȱ ǯȱ ȱȱȱȱŚśŖȱmu of land, with 1,200 buildǰȱȱȱŗśŖǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱŗşřŗȱǻĴȱŗşşŝǰȱŗŖşǼǯ
ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ in the central district to raise funds for his continuing program of land ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱ
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Tomoko Shiroyama
on Nanjing Road around 1901—the former site of the racecourse—in a segment of the central and western districts. In 1912, he bought a more valuable site in the central district part of Nanjing Road and mortgaged ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻĴȱŗşşŝǰȱŗŗŖȮŗŗŗǼǯȱ ȱ repeated this process on many occasions over the following decades while ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱǻȱȱ£ȱȱ ¢ȱŗşşşǰȱŗŚŞǼǯ11 Thus, he bought properties in the central district along Nanjing Road and in other ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǯȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻĴȱ ŗşşŝǰȱ ŗŗŚȮŗŗśǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱĴǰȱ starting in the central district and proceeding westward. In other words, he reinvested in up-and-coming districts the wealth he had generated from his investments in the central district. ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱlilong for lease. In some cases, he leased his land to other developers. Dividing the roles of buying and developing property was another popular way to manage real estate, as illustrated in the following case, of Cheng Jinxuan 䄍䒦. Cheng Jinxuan: Renting Land for Development. Cheng Jinxuan, who later was called the “king of real estate,” started his career as a comprador for the Sassoons. Noticing that one of the buildings he managed was in bad conǰȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢Ȭęȱ¢ǯȱ The rent per room of the old building was only 2 to 3 yuan, but he was able ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱ for another twenty-three years (Shanghai fangdichan zhi bianji weiyuanȱŗşşşǰȱŗŞşǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ Ȃǰȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ for example, near Xizang Road (Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang ¢ȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱ£ȱ ¢ȱŗşŞşǰȱŜşǼǯ Cheng’s success was not unique. Sun Chunsheng ᄿ⫳, who entered a ȱęǰȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱęĞǰȱȱ his own real estate company, Jinxing yingye gongsi 䣺㟜➳ὁ݀ৌǰȱȱŗşŘśǰȱ ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ¢Ȭ¡ǯȱȱŗşŘşǰȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȬęȬ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ central district, in the middle of the most prosperous commercial area. Even before the building was constructed, demand was such that he was able to let Other foreign real estate agents also depended on loans from foreign banks. For example, from 1921 onward, the Shanghai Land Investment Company borrowed from 1,000,000 to şǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱǯ ŗŗȲȱ
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the rooms. In less than three years, his constructions costs were paid, and Sun ¢ȱȱęȱȱȱ ¢Ȭȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǻȱȱ£ȱȱ ¢ȱŗşşşǰȱŚŚśǼǯ Separating the ownership of land and the construction of a building on the site—zudizaowu ⾳ഄ䗴ሟ—was a popular way to develop properties. ȱȱȱȱĴǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱants. As was the custom in Shanghai, the building was given to the land ȱ ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ for landowners. Though the owner of the building lost it at the end of the lease, the practice was also advantageous for him or her. First, the building owner could accumulate from room rents the large amount of money ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ Ğȱ ¢ȱ ȱ costs of construction and the lease. Not only famous Chinese dealers such as Cheng Jinxuan and Sun Chunsheng, but also businesspeople and shopkeepers participated in the real estate industry by constructing and letting buildings on leased land (Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi ȱ ¢ȱȱȱ£ȱ ¢ȱŗşŞşǰȱśŘȮŜŜǼǯ Because of the foreign backdrop of the property venture, compradors ȱȱȱęȱȱǯȱȱȱǰȱȱȱᕤ┸, ȱęȱȱȱȱŗŖŖǰŖŖŖȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱŗǰŖŖŖȱǯȱ ȱȱȱȬȱĜȱȱȱȱȱȱDZȱ ȱ £Ȃȱᴢ匏ゴ family had the British company Alger manage his property on Nanjing West Road, and Sheng Xuanhuai’s ⲯᅷ់ children contracted with another company, Luis and Company, to handle the property in the middle of the city that they had inherited from their father ǻȱȱ£ȱȱ ¢ȱŗşşşǰȱŗŞŞǼǯ A businessman who engaged in the real estate business in Shanghai recalls that by the end of the 1940s, more than three thousand Chinese ȱ ȱȱȱŗǰŖŖŖȱȱȱǻ¡ǯȱŗŖǰŝŖŖȱȱǼȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱ ŗŜŖȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ more than 10,000 square meters, and thirty each owned more than 30,000 square meters (Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Shanghaishi ¢ȱȱȱ£ȱ ¢ȱŗşŞşǰȱŗŚȮŗśǼǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴments, they did not monopolize the industry. On the contrary, for Chinese entrepreneurs, real estate transactions and the management of industrial and commercial enterprises were closely integrated. Real Estate as a Source of Credit for Enterprises Chinese entrepreneurs were particularly interested in real estate in the ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȂȱ
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ęȱ£ǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱĚȱȱęȱ ǯȱȱȱ ȱȱęȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱĴȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǻȱ ĀȱçȱȱȱçȱŗşŚřǰȱŗŗǰȱŚŜǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȂȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱ ęȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ DZȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱĜȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ from the deck of an ocean liner steaming up the river, are at once recognized by the newcomer as evidence of the wealth and enterprise of Shanghai, and of the belief which its merchants and citizens have in its ǯȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱDzdzȱǰȱ the fact that land is held on titles of unquestioned validity and is immune from the risk of illegal exaction—has not only given faith and courage ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ sphere. It has been one of the factors in enabling Shanghai to function ȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱȱĴȱ large sums of money for investment from outside, also mobilizes credit by providing, in the shape of assets safely held within its borders, a basis of trading operations not only in Shanghai itself, and in adjacent areas, ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱĞȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱĞȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱǻŗşřŗǰȱřŗŝǼ
Feetham’s insights were echoed by Yang Yinpu 㬁⑹, a professor at Guanghua ܝ㧃 University who specialized in banking and monetary sysǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱĴȱȱ ȱę¢ȱȱDZȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ accurate measurement of the property and the legal protection provided by this system were highly regarded by both foreigners and Chinese. At the same time, the perpetual rise in land values made investment in land ĴǯȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱ¢ȱęȱ£ȱȱǰȱȱ£ȱ¢ȱ ¡ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱĴȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱǻȱĀȱçȱȱȱçȱŗşŚřǰȱ ŗŖȮŗŗǼǯ ȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱ collateral. Businesspeople considered title deeds equivalent to securities in other countries, since they could easily be rediscounted at foreign banks. Although foreign banks hesitated to lend money directly to individual Chinese customers, foreign real estate agents would handle mortgage business with foreign banks for Chinese clients. Real estate agents apȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱěȱ by their Chinese customers, and the agents re-lent with commission the
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money that they had borrowed from the banks. In 1930, fourteen foreign ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱŗŘŗǰŘŞřǰŜřŗȱǰȱ ȱ formed half of their collateral holdings. Real estate credits were important for Chinese banks, which depended on foreign banks for working capital. Chinese banks also accepted real estate mortgages, which constituted half ȱȱȬȱȱǻȱŗşřŗǰȱŗŖŞȮŗŖşǼǯȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱęȱǰȱȱŞŖȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱěȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱŝȱȱşȱȱǻȱĀȱçȱȱȱȱȱçȱŗşŚŘȮŗşŚřǼǯ The mortgaging of real estate was an important way for Shanghai entrepreneurs to raise funds for their businesses. Since the market for stock or company bonds had not been developed in China, credit secured with real estate was crucial. When factory managers needed to borrow large amounts of money, ¢ȱěȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱę¡ȱȱ¢ȱ had already bought as security for the loan. The loan contract between the Shenxin ⬇ᮄȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȯȱȱȱǰȱ the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, and Yongfeng qianzhuang ∌䈤䣶㥞—illustrates how credit was secured through the mortgaging of ¢ȱǻ¡ȱ£ȱ£ȱǼǯȱ The contract started with the exchange of information on sale and profit by the parties. This entailed listing as the creditor not only the creditor’s manager but his legal deputy, the shareholders and their heirs, and the shareholders’ deputies. A similar list followed for the debtor—in this case, ȱĴȱȯ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȂȱǰȱ and the shareholders’ deputies. The contract initiated collecting the money that the creditor was lending to the debtor; each of the three banks lent śŖŖǰŖŖŖȱǯȱȱ¢ȱǰȱǰȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱĴǰȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱ issues: property rights, the repayment of principal and interest, and penalties for any violation of the terms. Once the contract was drawn up, the creditor could claim property rights over the collateral under the agreed terms. Before signing the contract, the debtor was required to transfer the title deeds to the creditor, to deliver the documents to the creditor, and to agree that the creditor would have ownership rights to machinery and unsold products (term ŗǼǯ12 When the creditor found it necessary to register the transfer of rights ŗŘȲȱ By custom in Shanghai businesses, banks required debtors to transfer title deeds before ȱ ȱȱǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ǰȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ğȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ŗşřřǰȱ ŚşȮśŖǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȄȱ ȱ ȱ
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over the real estate, machinery, and inventory in the Shanghai courthouse, ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǻȱŗŘǼǯȱȱ debtor also had to declare that all the collateral was already paid for in full ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǻȱŜǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ was set at one year—in this case, from the date of signing until 11 November 1933. The debtor could not mortgage or rent out any of the collateral ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ ȱȱȂȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ǻȱ ŗŚǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱǯȱśȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǻȱŘǼǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ creditor, the debtors would have to rent the equipment from the creditor ȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱśǼǯȱȱȱȱ (zujie qiyue ⾳׳༥㋘Ǽȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Dzȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǻ¡Ǽȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱing any interest.13 There were also regulations concerning the payment of principal and interest. The entire sum of the loan was given to the debtor at the signing ȱȱȱǻȱřǼǯȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱęȱȱǻȱŗŗǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱŞǯŝśȱȱȱŗǰŖŖŖȱ per month. The interest would be paid once every three months. If the debtor did not pay the interest on time, the unpaid amount would be added to the principal. The creditor would allow the debtor two weeks to pay the original interest plus the added interest for the extended period. If the debtor could not pay this amount back within two weeks, the creditor would execute his right as provided ȱȱȱǻȱŚǼǯ ȱȱȱĴȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱ ȱtitled to ask the court to let, sell, or auction the collateral without notifying ȱȱǻȱŗŜǼDZȱǻŗǼȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱDzȱǻŘǼȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱDzȱǻřǼȱȱȱDzȱȱǻŚǼȱȱ any other term of the contract. Upon the debtor’s default, if the collateral items were let, the debtor ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱŗŝǼǯȱȱȱceeds of the sale or auction of the collateral, the creditor could deduct any expenses he may have incurred before taking the receipts of the sale or auction as payment of the principal owned by the debtor. Any excess Shanghai mortgage. ŗřȲȱ The rental of factory equipment by debtors was a common practice in Shanghai (Yan ȱŗşřřǰȱśŗǼǯ
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ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱ from the sale or auction was less than a full repayment, the debtor would ȱȱȱȱȱěȱǻȱŗŞǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ sell the collateral, the debtor would have to repay the principal immediately. The debtor could not urge the creditor to sell or auction the collateral ǻȱŗşǼǯ14 When the debtor repaid the principal and interest in full, the creditor would return the collateral, but if the debtor failed to repay any part of the principal and interest, the creditor could refuse to return the ȱǻȱŘŖǼǯ ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱtract was to be registered at the courthouse, three were to be kept by the creditor, and one by the debtor. As declared in the contract, the title deed covering the mortgaged property as well as the copies of the contract were ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǻȱȱǰȱ¡Ǽȱȱȱȱ ǻȱȱǼȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ up in the name of the mortgagee was issued by the real estate company, ȱȱȱȃȱ ǯȄȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȃęcial owner” of the property. At this point, the loan contract was completed ǻȱĀȱçȱȱȱçȱŗşŚřǰȱŗŖŗǼ As the Shenxin case shows, it was important that trading property with a daoqi and quanbingdan was supported by powerful legal organizations. The loan contract usually included the terms of a penalty for failing to pay interest on a due day. Usually, a mortgagee was given the right to declare the whole debt immediately due in case of default (Puyi dichan gongsi ŗşřŘǼǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ could bring the case to a court, which could sell the land by auction. If the ȱȱȱȱĞȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ownership to the lender. Since the right to ask for debt redemption was legally protected, a loan secured with land was regarded as safe by both ȱȱȱǻȱĀȱçȱȱȱȱȱçȱŗşŚŘȮŗşŚřǼǯ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȯȱĞȱȯȱ ȱȱȱĜǯȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ the declaration of trust was considered to bestow full security and was regarded locally as a normal procedure that would always be recognized by the courts, including Chinese ones.ŗś ŗŚȲȱ In contrast to contemporary Western mortgages, in which mortgagees have obligations to liquidate the property, the mortgagee could keep the property without liquidating it and ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ caused by mortgages. ŗśȲȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱǯȱĴǰȱȱȱȱȱĜȱȱȱ
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The mortgaging of factory sites and equipment, called changqi yakuan ᒴᢐℒ or ħȱ ᢉ⃞׳ড়ৠ, was common (Liu Dajun 1937, ŝŗǼǯȱ¢ȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱȱcumulate assets but also to get working capital for their businesses.ŗŜ They ȱ¢ǰȱěȱȱȱȱȱDzȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ operation of their own business.17 The mortgage of land was not new to the Chinese. According to traditional business customs, the ownership of ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱDzȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱ right, the second the subsoil right. Both subsoil and topsoil rights changed hands frequently through lease or sale contracts.18 It appears that, against ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵments saw mortgaging as a desirable method of raising capital. The prosperity of the real estate market and the trend toward industrialization and commercialization in the early twentieth century were closely related. The concentration of commerce and industries in the ȱĴȱȱęȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱ workforce, which in turn raised the demand for housing. The consequent ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ěȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱset; this, in turn, encouraged further investment in real estate. At the same ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ funds for businesses through mortgaging. Financial institutions and ordinary investors gave credit for real estate ȱȱȱȱĴȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱlateral. Entrepreneurs and real estate developers expanded their businesses with the borrowed money, which in turn led to further development of ȱĴǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ perpetual rise or, at the very least, stability of rents, because all aspects of ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱǯȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱ ǰȱ ȱ¢ȱȱĀȱçȱȱȱçȱǻŗşŚřǰȱ ŞŘǰȱŗŖŘǼǯ ŗŜȲȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ǰȱ the Yipin ۔ક Company, a real estate agency founded in 1907 by the Belgian Copagnie ȱȂǰȱěȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ loan policy was supported by French banking capital closely related to the Belgian company ǻȱȱ¢ĀȱȱŗşşşǰȱŗŚŗǼǯ ŗŝȲȱ For example, Bei Runsheng 䉱┸⫳, who ran a cosmetics company, entered the real estate trade in 1918. By the 1930s, he owned more than a thousand properties. A famous entrepreneur, Yu Qiaqing 㰲⌑॓ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱĀȱ çȱȱȱçȱŗşŚřǰȱŚřǼǯ ŗŞȲȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱǻŗşŞřǼǯȱȱ ǻŘŖŖŚǼȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ prewar China.
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bear an interest rate as high as 7 to 8 percent a year, as long as they could secure 9 to 12 percent of the land’s value as annual rental income. In this way, a large part of Shanghai’s economy revolved around generating, collecting, and investing in rental income. The market economy for real estate was a driving force for the urban market economy from the late nineteenth century until the 1930s. The prosperous run of the real estate market only ended because of a worldwide economic depression in the early 1930s. There was an oversupply ȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱŗşŘşȱȱŗşřŗǰȱȱ ȱȱ large amounts of speculative investment in real estate. Land values rose and credit expanded, but funds were not reinvested in productive industries. This unusual speculative boom in real estate became a threat to the Shanghai economy. When the U.S. Silver Purchase Act of 1934 induced a ȱĚȱȱȱȱȱȱŗşřŚǰȱȱĚȱȱǯȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęcial institutions and debtor enterprises. A large drop in land value led to ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱǯȱȱ real estate–inspired mechanisms led to a downward spiral. ȱȱȱȱȱȬ ȱȱȱ ¢ȱŗşřŝǰȱȂȱęnancial institutions and industrial enterprises searched for ways to revive ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱĞȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵǰȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȃ ȱ ᄸዊ period” in Shanghai’s history is beyond the scope of this chapter. Conclusion What were the institutions, new incentives, and economic changes that enabled real estate exchange to drive urban development? ȱęǰȱȱȱ ȱ¡ǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱĴments were established. Property rights and human safety were more ę¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴǰȱ the favorable environment and the economic landscape of the port cities ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱǰȱȱ ȱ entrepreneurs and organizations, such as real estate agencies, emerged. ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ vice for Chinese investors by lending their names for registering land with foreign consulates. The combination of a formal process (the registration ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱěȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱ
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might have been destabilizing, but professional real estate dealers were Ĵǰȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȬȬȱ¢ȱȱ enough for investors to have trust in it. ǰȱ ęǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ pushed up its value. Most important, a belief in the value of real estate ȱ ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȂȱęȱ£ǯȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴǯȱ ing acquired land, real estate agents and entrepreneurs could secure extra funds through bank credit to expand their businesses. Since the long-term capital market was underdeveloped, mortgaging real estate was the best ¢ȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ Ĵǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱȱęȱǰȱȱȱȱęȱĚ¡ibility by owning real estate in the area. For the development of port cities ȱȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱǯȱĴ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ due to some complex problems, both internal and external (Shiroyama ŘŖŖŞǰȱǯȱŜǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ the institutions and the market boom up to the late 1920s. The trade and mortgage of real estate always required the transfer of title deeds to buyer or mortgagee. This way of property transaction was simple and required minimal transaction costs but was secure enough to protect participants from the manipulation of property rights. In cases of default, the mortgagee had the right to liquidate the property through auction. This legal protection and the upward trend of the real estate market added to the prevalence of mortgages in the port cities. The initial institutional change sparked by the opening of the ports revealed new opportunities for both foreigners and Chinese. As more busiȱȱȱȱȱĴǰȱȱ ȱǰȱȱ rent and land values rose. And as people sought economic prosperity and security, intricate layers of vendor-purchaser and owner-renter relationships among Chinese and foreigners formed around the real estate market.
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Appendix 3.1 Index of Wholesale Prices in Shanghai, 1912–1931 (1926=100) ȱȱȱ ŗşŗŘȱ ŗşŗřȱ ŗşŗŚȱ ŗşŗśȱ ŗşŗŜȱ ŗşŗŝȱ 1918 1919 1920 ŗşŘŗȱ ŗşŘŘȱ 1923 1924 ŗşŘśȱ ŗşŘŜȱ 1927 ŗşŘŞȱ ŗşŘşȱ 1930 ŗşřŗȱ
ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱ ŝśǯŗȱ ŝşǯŜȱ Şśǯřȱ ŝŝǯřȱ ŞřǯŞȱ ŝşǯŘȱ 87.3 87.2 94.8 ŗŖŚǯŜȱ şŞǯŜȱ 102.0 97.9 şşǯřȱ ŗŖŖǯŖȱ 104.4 ŗŖŗǯŝȱ ŗŖŚǯśȱ 114.8 ŗŘŜǯŝȱ
ȱȱȱǻƖǼ Ȯ ŜǯŖ ŝǯŘ ȮşǯŚ ŞǯŚ ȮśǯŜ 10.2 –0.1 8.7 ŗŖǯř Ȯśǯŝ 3.4 –4.0 ŗǯŚ Ŗǯŝ 4.4 ȮŘǯŜ ŘǯŞ 9.9 ŗŖǯř
Source: Zhongguo kexueyuan Shanghai jingji yanjiusuo and Shanghai sheȱ¡¢ȱȱ¢ȱǻŗşśŞǰȱŚǰȱŗŘŜǼǯ
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Appendix 3.2 Format of a Quanbingdan ȱ ȱ £ǰȱ ȃĀȱ ȱ ȱ ¢Āȱ ħçȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȄ in ȱ Āȱ çȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱçȱǻŗşŚŘȮŗşŚřǰȱŗŘŗȮŗŘŘǼǯ No. _____ Declaration of Trust Know all men to whom these present shall come that we (foreigner’s nameǼȱȱǻaddressǼǰȱǰȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ of Land Registered in our name in the books kept for that purpose at the (foreign country’s nameǼȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ (numberǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻXǼȱmou (XǼȱfen (XǼȱli (XǼȱhao is the property of (Chinese nameǼȱȱȱ ȱȱ the same interest for him/them to dispose of as he/they, his/their heirs, ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱĞȱ¢ȱęȱȱ on payment of all charges due us in respect thereof. Witness our hands this (XǼȱ¢ȱȱǻXǼȱȱȱȱȱ and (XǼ Signed by the said In the presence of
FOUR
The Rice and Wheat Flour Market Economies in the Lower Yangzi, ŗşŖŖȮŗşřŜ
Ȭȱ
ȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱna has institutional implications, as seen in the rice trade and the wheat Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŖŖȱ ȱ ŗşřŜǯ1 That region, ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ Ȭȱ private grain trade. As the most industrialized area in pre-1937 China, this region provided a large consumer market and was the most important Ȭȱǯȱȱěȱȱȱ¡ȱȱěȱȱ participants in the grain trade was most felt in this region.2
I would like to thank the following people for their encouragement, help, and suggestions ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ DZȱ Ȭȱ ǰȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ
Ȭ ǰȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱ ȱȬ¢ǰȱ ȱȬ ȱǻ£Ǽǰȱȱ Ȭǰȱȱȱ Chi-chung in copying, at various stages, the whole set of the Maritime Customs annual ȱȱęȱȱ¢ȱ ǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱ of all data is my responsibility alone. I would like to thank the National Science Council ȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȬȱ ǰȱȃȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȄȱǽ⏙ҷ㊻亳䊓ᯧ ⱘ㌘㐨㟛䞥㵡Ǿȱ ǻŞşȬŘŚŗŗȬ ȬŖŖŗȬŖŜŘǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱǰȱŗŞŝŖȮŗşřŜǰȱȱȱ Ȅȱǽ䖥ҷЁ㊻亳䊓ᯧ㎆㌵ⱐሩ㟛ଚὁ㌘㐨䅞䙋ǰȱŗŞŝŖȮŗşřŜǰȱȱȱǾȱǻşŗȬŘŚŗŗȬ ȬŖŘşȬŖŗŗȱ ȱşřȬŘŚŗŗȬ ȬŖŘşȬŖŖŝǼǯ ŗȲ ȱȱęȱȱȱȃ ȱ£ȱȄȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱ ȱȱǻŗşŝŝǰȱřȮřŗǰȱŘŗŗȮŘŚşǰȱŘśřȮŘŝřǰȱŘŝśȮřśŗǰȱśŘŗȮśśřDzȱŗşŞŖǼǯ ŘȲȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱ£ǰȱǰȱȱȱęȱǰȱ wherever possible, under the English names by which they are regularly known. Where the English names are not known, the Chinese names have been transliterated into pinyin.
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ȱȱȱȱ ǰȱȱĚȱȱęȱȱstitutional change in becoming more integrated through lowering transaction costs.3 In the rice trade, the highly competitive market accommodated ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱtion. Much of the persistence of the market mechanism in the rice trade had to do with the interrelationship of local customs, specialization, and the problem of standardization. Such an interrelationship, in turn, shaped the Ĵȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ěȱȱȱȱĚǰȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ǯ Market Development and Trade Expansion ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ greatly expanded in the early twentieth century because of China’s growing foreign trade and the introduction of new technologies in production, transportation, and communications. Chinese Maritime Customs annual reports reveal that the trade volume increased in these two grain markets ȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ in 1912. Junk trade in the nineteenth century is not included in these anȱȱǻȱŗşŜşǰȱřŚśȮřŜśDzȱȱȱŗşřŚDzȱȱȱŗşŜŚǼǯ In the case of rice, as shown in table 4.1, the total trade volume of rice ǻȱ¢ǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱśǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖȱ piculs in 1872 to more than 8,000,000 in 1912.4 Most of this expansion was due to domestic rather than foreign factors. The seven ports’ domestic imȱȱȱȱȱŘśǰŞŚŗȱȱȱŗŞŝŘȱȱŗǰŜşŖǰřśŖȱȱȱŗşŗŘDzȱȱ ȱśǰŖŖŖȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŗŞŝŘǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ 1912. Exports came mainly from Shanghai, Zhenjiang (Chinkiang 䦂∳Ǽǰȱǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗŞŝŘǼǯȱ ¢ȱ speaking, the region’s rice exports constituted the lion’s share of China’s total rice trade. The Maritime Customs statistics do not clearly state the destination of the produce, but one can still observe from the trade reȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ¢Ǽȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ instead of overseas. Most of this output must have gone to the domestic ȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ǰȱ ǰȱ Ğȱ ŗşŖŖǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱĜȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ exports in several rice-surplus areas, such as Wuhu 㬾 in this region ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ǯȱ ȱǻŗşŞŞǼǰȱȱǯȱȱǻŗşŞŗǰȱǯȱǯȱŗśǼǰȱȱȱǯȱȱ ǯȱǻŗşŜŘǰȱŗşŝŝǰȱ ŗşşŖǼǯ ŚȲȱ “Paddy” refers to rice grains still in their husk. In Chinese Maritime Customs statistics, rice and paddy are put into one entry and so are treated thus in this chapter. řȲȱ
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and Changsha䭋≭ȱȱȱ£ȱȱǻȱ ȱȱ ȱ Minyi 1988, 1–11; Wong Wing-ho 2001; Zhou Shishan 2001; Wang Yong ŗşşŖǼǯȱȱĞȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ǻŗşŞşǼǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ out the two regions. Rice exports from Wuhu in 1912 doubled those of Zhenjiang in 1872. In short, growth occurred in both import and export of ȱǻȱ¢Ǽȱȱȱǯ ȱŚǯŗǯȱȱǻȱ¢ǼȱȱǻȱǼȱȱȱ ȱ£ȱǰȱŗŞŝŘȱȱŗşŗŘȱ 1872 1912 Foreign Domestic Exports Foreign Domestic Exports Imports Imports ǻǼ Imports Imports ǻǼ Chinkiang ǻǼ 0 0 1,771,971 0 ŗǰřśŞȱ ŗǰşşŜȱ
ȱ ǻ £Ǽ n.o.y.* n.o.y. n.o.y. 0 ŝŝǰŜŖŗȱ 0 Nanking ǻǼ n.o.y. n.o.y. n.o.y. 0 0 ŘǰŗŝŜȱ Ningpo ǻǼ 4,978 0 śŖǰŗŝŜ 0 şřřǰşŚŜȱ Shanghai 0 ŘśǰŞŚŗ ŘǰŜŜřǰŖŝş 0 śřŜǰŗşŜȱ ŚŖŝǰŞŜřȱ Soochow ǻ£Ǽ n.o.y. n.o.y. n.o.y. 0 0 0 Wuhu n.o.y. n.o.y. n.o.y. 0 2,188 ŚǰśŜŘǰŗşśȱ Subtotal for Central China and Yangzi Valley 4,978 ŘśǰŞŚŗ ŚǰŚŞśǰŘŘŜ 0 ŗǰŜşŖǰřśŖ ŜǰŜřŗǰŜŖŚ China Total ŜŝŜǰŘŜŞ śǰŜşŞǰŗŜş ŚǰśŗŜǰŚŖŗ 2,700,274 ŜǰŘŘŗǰŖŚř ŜǰŜŚŝǰśřŞ Source:ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻŗŞŝřǰȱŗşŗśȮŗşřśǼǯ * “N.o.y.” = not open yet.
ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱ ŚǯŘȱ ȱȱȱȱȱĚǰȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ nearly nonexistent in 1872. Flour imports of domestic and foreign origins were less than 10,000 piculs each. But in the next forty years, a growth ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŘǰśŞşȱ ȱȱŗŞŝŘȱȱŘŞśǰŖŚŝȱȱȱŗşŗŘǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¡ȱȱĚȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ŗşŗŘǰȱ Shanghai alone accounted for nearly three-quarters of the region’s total ¡ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŜŖȱȱȱȂȱȱ Ěȱ¡ǯȱȱ ȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱȱĚȱ¡port center in China, with a wide distribution network across the country ǻȱȱȱŘŖŖřǰȱŗŞřȮŗŞśǼǯ
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ȱŚǯŘǯȱȱȱǻȱǼȱȱȱ ȱ£ȱǰȱŗŞŝŘȱȱŗşŗŘȱ 1872 1912 Foreign Domestic Exports Foreign Domestic Exports Imports Imports ǻǼ Imports Imports ǻǼ Chinkiang ǻǼ 0 0 0 4,431 ŚǰşŜŗȱ şŖǰŘŜŝȱ
ȱ ǻ £Ǽ n.o.y.* n.o.y. n.o.y. śǰśŖŝȱ 4,922 0 Nanking ǻǼ n.o.y. n.o.y. n.o.y. 1,411 2,907 0 ȱǻǼ 0 0 0 39,718 ŝŖǰŜśŞȱ 0 Shanghai ŘǰśŞş śǰŘŜŗ 0 ŘŗŜǰśŞŝȱ 97,712 şşŖǰŜśŗȱ Soochow ǻ£Ǽ n.o.y. n.o.y. n.o.y. 0 0 śǰŖŜřȱ Wuhu n.o.y. n.o.y. n.o.y. 1,898 şǰŝŜŞȱ śǰŖŗŞȱ Subtotal for Central China and Yangzi Valley ŘǰśŞş śǰŘŜŗ 0 ŘŞśǰŖŚŝ ŘśŘǰŜśŞ ŗǰřŖśǰŖśş China Total ŞǰŜŞŗ śǰŘŜŗ 0 3,207,921 ŗǰŘşřǰŜŖŚ ŗǰşşŖǰŖŚŜ Source:ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻŗŞŝřǰȱŗşŗśȮŗşřśǼǯ * “N.o.y.” = not open yet.
ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱĚȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱęȱŚǯŗȱȱęȬ¢ȱȱȱŗşŗŘȱȱŗşřŚǯȱǰȱ these numbers exclude reexports, as do the Maritime Customs records. ȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱ volume. The total transactions for rice rose from nearly 21,000,000 piculs ȱȱȱŗşŗŘȮŗşŗŜȱȱȱȱřŜǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖȱȱȱȱŗşŘŝȮŗşřŗǯȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗŘǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖȱ ȱȱȱȱŗşŗŘȮŗşŗŜȱȱřŞǰŝŖŖǰŖŖŖȱȱȱȱŗşŘŝȮŗşřŗǯ The growth of these trades in the Lower Yangzi region was rapid even in the decades before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War ǻŗşřŝȮŗşŚśǼǯȱȱŚǯŗȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¡ǰȱȱ Ěȱȱȱȱȱǻȱ¢Ǽǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ the rice trade came in the period 1927–1931, at a rate of 1.72 times more ȱȱȱȱȱŗşŗŘȮŗşŗŜǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱĚȱǰȱřǯŗŖȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ ęȱ¢ǯȱěȱ¢ȱȱȱȱŗşřŘȱȱŗşřŚǰȱȱȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱęȱęȱ¢ȱĞȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ trade volume of the two grains estimated by the Maritime Customs was ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŗŝȱ ȱ ŗşřŗǰȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ spectacular.
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ȱŚǯŗǯȱ ȱȱȱǻȱ¢Ǽȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ£ȱ ǰȱŗşŗŘȮŗşřŚȱǻȱȱȱǼ 45,000,000 40,000,000
A
35,000,000 30,000,000 25,000,000 20,000,000 15,000,000 10,000,000 1912–16
1917–21
1922–26
1927–31
Riceȱ(andȱPaddy)ȱQty.ȱ(piculs)
1932–34
FlourȱQty.ȱ(piculs)
ȱ
ȱ ȱ 350
B
300
250
200
150
100 1912–16
1917–21
1922–26
1927–31
1932–34
FlourȱGrowthȱIndexȱ(1912–16ȱasȱ100) Riceȱ(andȱPaddy)ȱGrowthȱIndexȱ(1912–16ȱasȱ100)
ȱ
Source:ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻŗşŗśȮŗşřśǰȱȃȱȱȱǰȱŗşŗŚȮřŚȄǼǯ
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Kai-yiu Chan
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ǰȱȱĚȱȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ Ěȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǵȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ market unable to achieve similar results? Were the technologies, organizaǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱěǵȱȱȱ¡ȱ ȱȱĞȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱǯ The Mechanization of Rice and Flour Milling ȱȱȃ£Ȅȱȱȃ£ȄȱȱȱĜȱȱscribe how grain-processing industries evolved during the period under re ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĚȱȱęȱ ȱȱ ȱ mechanical devices in an environment where human or animal power was widely applied. Mechanization, or industrialization, used the steam engine to replace other sources of power in two distinct ways. First, the steam engine ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǻȱħǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¡£ȱ ħǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡Ȭ ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱŗşŞŝǰȱřȮŞDzȱ ȱŗşřŝǰȱŚŗȮŗśşǼǯ ȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱĚǯȱȱĚȱǰȱȱ ęȱȱȱȱȱ Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ dust from the crop. The second was grinding the inner part of the grain into ĚȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȃȄȱǻmo ⺼ǼǯȱȱȱĚȱȱ (mofang ⺼᠓ǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǻçȱçȱŗşŖŞǰȱřřŗȮřřŝǼǯȱ For rice, however, before crushing or polishing (nian ⺒Ǽǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ were removed in a hulling workshop (longfang ⼅᠓Ǽǯȱȱȱȱ ȱ called “unpolished rice” and had some husks sticking to the surface. To remove the husks, the product had to be taken to a rice miller or rice polisher (nianfang ⺒ഞ or nianmichang ⺒㉇ᒴǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ ȱǰȱ ȱȱȃȱȄȱǻȱȱǼȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǻçȱçȱŗşŖŞǰȱŘŜŝȮŘŝŞǼǯ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ŗŞŜŖǯȱ Steam-powered mills were initially established in the Shanghai area because of the existing technical know-how, personnel, and capital in the foreign ¢ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ǯȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱȱęȱ£ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱŗŞŜřȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻ¢ȱȱ¢ħȱŗşřřǰȱŞȱǽŘǾǰȱȃěȱǰȄȱřŜŗǼǯȱȱęȱĚȱǰȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱpeared that same year, but it was established and managed by foreigners in Shanghai who did not have the treaty rights to do business (Sun Yutang ŗşśŝǰȱȱŗǰȱŗŖŞȮŗŖşDzȱȱħǰȱȱȱ¡£ȱ ħǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱŗşŞŝǰȱŞǼǯ
The Rice and Wheat Flour Market Economies
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ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ǯȱȱȱ¢ȱĴȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȯȱ ŗŞşśǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱĚȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱŗşśŝǰȱȱŘǰȱşŞŜȮ şŞŝDzȱ ȱ ħǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¡£ȱ ħǰȱ and Shanghai shehui kexueyuan jingji yanjiusuo jingjishi yanjiushi 1987, ŚŝŖǼǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ £ȱǻ ȱᵁᎲǼȱ ǻ¢ȱȱȱȱ£ȱ ¢ȱŗşřŚǰȱ śŞȮśşǼǯȱȱ ȱĚȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱ ŗşśŝǰȱȱŘǰȱǯȱşŞŝǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯ ĞȱŗŞşśǰȱȱȱĴȱȱĴȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ ȱȱŗŞşśȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǻȱȱȱȱȱǼȱȱȱȱȱȃȱ open factories and engage in industries and manufacturing in China” (Fairȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŞŖǰȱ ŗŖŞǼǯȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ £ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱǯȱȱĴȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱǻǼȱȱǯȱȱŗŞşŜǰȱ British capital established the China Flour Mill in Shanghai.ś Four years later, the Chinese-owned Fu Feng Flour Mill (Fufeng mianfenchang 䯰䈤咉㉝ᒴǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǻȱ ¢ȱ ŗşśŝǰȱ şŘŝȮşŘŞDzȱ ȱ ħǰȱȱȱ¡£ȱħǰȱȱȱhui kexueyuan jingji yanjiusuo jingjishi yanjiushi 1987, 190–191; Chen Zhen ȱȱȱŗşśŝȮŗşŜŗǰȱŗǯŚŝŚǼǯȱȱȱǰȱȱȬ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǻŗşŖŖǼǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱ Ğ ǰȱ ȱ ŗşŖŗȱ ǻ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ħȱ ŗşřřǰȱ Şȱ ǽŘǾȱ ȃěȱ ǰȄȱřŜŗȮřŜŘǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ of mechanized mills having steam engines and steel millers. In the three decades before the Second Sino-Japanese War, the rice- and ĚȬȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¡ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Śǯřǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ region rose from twenty-nine to thirty-eight from 1913 to 1921. Although ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȬęȱȱŗşřŜǰȱȱȱity continued to grow, from 49,000 bags a day in 1913 to 134,700 bags a day ȱŗşŘŗǰȱȱȱŗŞřǰŘŖŖȱȱȱ¢ȱȱŗşřŜǯȱȱȬ ȱȱȱȱ region were so competitive with both domestic and foreign rivals that they accounted for more than 40 percent of the total daily production capacity for all Chinese-owned mills in the country throughout those years. Moreover, foreign-owned competitors were selling out and leaving the market by the eve of the Second Sino-Japanese War. ȱȱȱǻŗşŗşǰȱŘǯŚǼDzȱ ȱȱǻŗşŘśǰȱśŚǼDzȱȱȱħȱǻŗşŞşǰȱśŖŜǼǯȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȃ Ȭ ȄȱĚȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęǯȱȱȱ Ȭ ȱǰȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ħȱ ǻŗşřřǰȱ Şȱ ǽŘǾǰȱ ȃěȱ ǰȄȱ řřŘǼDzȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ǻŗşřşǰȱ śŚśǼDzȱ ȱ ȱǻŗşřřǰȱŚśǼDzȱȱȱȱǻŗşřŝǰȱŘşǼǯ śȲȱ
Foreign-owned
Chinese-owned
ŗşřŜ Foreign-owned
řśǰśŖŖ
11,900 1,000 ŜŖŖ
49,000
ŝśǰŞŗś
ŗś
12 1 1
29
śŝ
43
1
0 0 0
1
98,739
800
0 0 0
800
137
38
12 1 0
Řś
řŗŘǰŜŚř
134,700
19,200 1,000 0
ŗŗŚǰśŖŖ
14
1
0 0 0
1
ŚşǰśŚŜ
ŘǰśŖŖ
0 0 0
ŘǰśŖŖ
ŗśŘ
řś
13 3 1
18
ŚśŘǰŘŗŞ
183,200
33,800 ŗŖǰŜŖŖ ŗǰŜŖŖ
137,200
17
0
0 0 0
0
śŞǰśŖŖ
0
0 0 0
0
Number Daily Number Daily Number Daily Number Daily Number Daily Number Daily of mills production of mills production of mills production of mills production of mills production of mills production capacity capacity capacity capacity capacity capacity
Chinese-owned
Chinese-owned
Foreign-owned
1921
1913
Note:ȱȱȱȱȱȃȄȱǻȱŗşŘŚǰȱśŖȱȱȱDzȱĞǰȱŚşȱȱȱǼǯ Source:ȱȱħǰȱȱȱ¡£ȱħǰȱȱȱȱ¡¢ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱǻŗşŞŝǰȱřřȮřśǰȱŚŞȮśŗǰȱŜŜȮŜşǼǯ
Shanghai and Wuxi Other Parts of Jiangsu Anhui Zhejiang Regional Total China Total
Location
ȱŚǯřǯȱ ȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ£ȱǰȱŗşŗřȮŗşřŜ
82 Kai-yiu Chan
The Rice and Wheat Flour Market Economies
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Incomplete data for the rice trade shows the same trend. In Shanghai, from 1900 to 1931, the number of mechanized rice mills rose from 1 to 49 ǻȱ ¢ȱ ¡ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ŗşřŗǰȱ ŝşȮŞřǼǯȱ ¡ȱ ⛵䣿 ȱȱęȱ£ȱȱȱȱŗşŗŖǰȱȱ¢ȱŗşřŜȱȱ ȱŗřȱȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşřŜǰȱ ŜŘȮŜřǼǯȱȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǰȱ ȱśşȱȱȱ ǰȱşȱȱǰȱȱŗŖřȱȱǰȱȱŗŝŗȱ mills all together (Shiyebu Zhongguo jingji nianjian bianzuan weiyuanhui ŗşřśǰȱşȮŗŞǼǯȱȱ ȱȱǯ The mechanization in both industries required successive technological breakthroughs in the 1910s and 1920s, such as using electricity for steam ȱ ǻ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ħȱ ŗşřřǰȱ Şȱ ǽŝǾDZȱ ŗŗŗřDzȱ ȱ ħȱ ŗşŞşǰȱ ŚşŗDzȱ ȱ ȱ ¡£ȱ ħǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ£ȱŗşŝşǰȱŗǯŚŗŜDzȱȱȱŗşřŞǰȱŗǯşŗŜȮ şśŜǼǯȱȱȱŗşŗŖǰȱȱȱĚȱȱȱȱȱ machines to replace the steam engine (Shanghaishi gongshang xingzheng ħǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ£ȱŗşŝşǰȱ ŗǯŚŗŜǼǯȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȬŗşřŖǰȱȱȱĴȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ of electrical motors and diesel engines (Shiyebu Zhongguo jingji nianjian £ȱ ¢ȱŗşřŚǰȱ ŚŝǼǯȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱǰȱęȱ¢ȱ using steam, and then sustaining growth by using electricity. Records of production capacity enable us to distinguish mills by their technology: late vintage mills used steam engines, whereas earlier factories used stone mills. Although we do not have evidence for pre-1890 animal ȱȱȱȱ ȱ£ǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱ production capacity of any single set of milling machines, we do know that ȱȱȱȱŗşŚŖǰȱĚȬȱȃ Ȅȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱęȱȱǻŚşȱȱȱǼȱȱ¢ȱ ǻȱħǰȱȱȱ¡£ȱħǰȱȱ ȱȱ¡¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱŗşŞŝǰȱŗŞǼǯȱ ǰȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱjing area of the early 1890s could already produce 200 piculs, or roughly 440 ȱǻśŖȱȱȱǼǰȱȱ¢ǯŜȱȱŗŞşŜǰȱȱęȱȱȱȬ owned “modern mills” in Shanghai could produce two times more (800 Ǽȱȱ¢ȱǻǯȱśŗŞǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǻŘǰśŖŖȱȱ ȱȱȱǻŗşśŝǰȱȱŘǰȱǯȱşŞŝȮşŞŞǼǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱŘŖŖȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱŗşŘŚǰȱśŖȱȱ ȱȱȱŗȱǰȱ ȱŗȱȱ ȱȱ ȱŗŖŖȱĴǰȱȱŗŗŖȱǯȱǰȱŘŖŖȱȱ ȱȱȱŘŘǰŖŖŖȱǰȱȱŚŚŖȱǯȱ ĞȱŗşŘŚǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĚȱ ȱȱȱŚşȱǯȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱĴ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱǻŗşŜşǰȱȃȱȱȄǼDzȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱĚȱȱŗşŘŚǰȱȱȱ¡¢ȱȱ¢ǰȱ¢ȱ ȱ¡£ȱħǰȱȱ£¢ȱȱ£ȱ¢ȱǻŗşŜŜǰȱśřǼǯ ŜȲȱ
84
Kai-yiu Chan
ȱ¢ǼȱȱȱȱȱȱǻǯȱŗşŚǼǯȱȱȃ Ȅȱȱȃȱ ǰȄȱ ȱȱěȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱǰȱȱĴȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǯ In rice milling, a non-steam-powered polisher (nianfangǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱşȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ǻçȱçȱŗşŖŞǰȱŘŝŚǼǯȱȱǰȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱȱ city in the early 1930s could produce 4 piculs per hour (Yao Qingsan and ȱ ȱ ŗşřśǰȱ ŚǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȬŗşřŖǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŝŚŜȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ŘǰŚŞşǰŝşŖȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ capacity. In other words, each workshop could produce about 3,337 piculs ȱ¢ǯȱ ǰȱȱȱęĞ¢Ȭȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱȱ same province, forty-eight listed their production capacity as 3,243,000 piculs of aggregate production capacity a year. On average, each mill could ȱȱŜŝǰśŜŘȱȱȱ¢ȱǻ¢ȱȱȱȱ£ȱ ¢ȱŗşřśǰȱşȮŗŘǰȱŘśȮŘŜǼǯȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱęȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱǯ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱĚǯȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱŗŞŞŘȱȱ ŗşřŗǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱĚǯȱ ȱęȱȱȱŚǯşȱȱȱęĞ¢ȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱŗǯŜşȱȱ ǻȱȱȱŘŖŖřDZŗşŗǼǯȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱ have shows that in Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, the price of rice rose ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱĚȱȱȱȱŗşŗŘȮŗşřŜȱǻȱŘŖŖŘǼǯȱ Flour was probably processed more economically than rice. ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱǯȱ ever, production capacity only represents a potential. Organizational facǰȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱȱĴȱȱǯ Business Organization: Proliferation versus Integration ȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱĚȱȱȱȱ ȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱě¢ǯȱȱȱȱȱ chains of market agents and participants (brokers, grain shops, warehouses, ȱǼǰȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱěȱȱǯ The rice trade in Shanghai underwent proliferation in the marketplace without substantial institutional change for vertical integration. According to several invaluable Japanese surveys of the early twentieth century, the rice trade was conducted by multiple layers of market agents, including grain dealers from source markets (maimi keren 䊷㉇ᅶҎǼǰȱȱȱȱ boat owners (chuanhu 㠍᠊ , independent grain merchants (shuike ∈ᅶǼǰȱ Shanghai wholesale rice dealers (mihao ㉇㰳 or mihang ㉇㸠Ǽǰȱ ȱ
The Rice and Wheat Flour Market Economies
Şś
wholesale grain dealers (zalianghang 䲰㊻㸠 or lianghang ㊻㸠Ǽǰȱȱȱ rice shops (midian ㉇ᑫ or famihang ⱐ㉇㸠Ǽǰȱȱ ȱȱ¡ȱers (baozihang ࣙᄤ㸠ǼDzȱȱęȱŚǯŘǯȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱĜȱ ęȱȱȱǻyatie ⠭ᏪǼȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ ǰȱ they were licensed merchants in a particular city, bringing buyers, sellers, ȱȱȱǻȱȱŗşŖŞǰȱŗǯŗřŖȮŗŜřǰȱśǯŗśȮŘŜǰȱřŚȮřşDzȱçȱ çȱŗşŖŞǰȱŘřşȮŘśŗǼǯȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ǰȱřřȱȱȱ sale dealers conducted trade within Shanghai’s walled city, with another 32 in Nanshi फᏖǰȱŝŘȱȱȱȱĴǰȱŗŖřȱȱȱȱĴǰȱ 28 in the French Concession, and 30 others in the suburbs, bringing the total ȱȱŘşŞȱǻȱȱŗşŖŞǰȱśǯřŝȮřşǼǯ Figure 4.2. The Shanghai Rice Market, ca. the 1900s ȱȱ ȱȱ Ȭȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱDZȱ ȱ
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
ȱ ȱ ȱ DZȱ ȱ
ȱ ȱǻǰȱ ǰȱ £ǰȱ Ǽȱ
ȱȱ ǻǰȱ Ǽȱ
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
¡ȱ ȱ ǻ£Ǽȱ
ȱȱ ǻǰȱ Ǽȱ
Sources: ȱȱǻŗşŖŞǰȱśǯŗśȮŘŜǰȱřŚȮřşǰȱŗDZŗřŖȮŗŜřǼDzȱçȱçȱǻŗşŖŞǰȱ ŘřşȮŘśŗǼǯ
ŞŜ
Kai-yiu Chan
Within these chains of marketing agents, mechanized rice mills (nianfang or nianmichangǼȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ a dealer, or a rice or grain shop. In so doing, the mill charged its client a fee. To clients overdue in collecting the grain, the mill would also charge a ȱȱǻçȱçȱŗşŖŞǰȱŘŜŝȮřŖŘǼǯ The mill seldom acquired paddy for its own milling, probably because ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ǯȱ ȱ to the observations of some Japanese scholars, rice in Shanghai could be ȱȱȱ ¢DZȱǻŗǼȱȱȂȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱǰȱǻŘǼȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǻǼȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱǻřǼȱȱ ȱȱ of the source markets entrusting a Shanghai grain merchant to look for a ¢ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ǻŚǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ pendent grain merchants when they struck a good bargain. Among these ǰȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Ȭ¢ȱȱǻȱȱŗşŖŞǰȱŗǯŗřśȮřŜǰȱśǯřśȮřŜDzȱçȱçȱ ŗşŖŞǰȱŘŜŝȮřŖŘǼǯȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¡ȱȱȱęȱǯȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ rice certainly posed a problem for any participant of this market chain. Despite milling at a fast rate, a mechanized rice mill would have to assume tremendous risks to break out of such an unfavorable market condition. In the next twenty years or so, the Shanghai rice market continued to grow. Its transacted volume for domestic rice imports and exports expanded ȱŗǰşŝŞǰŜŖŚȱȱȱȱȱŗşŗŘȮŗşŗŜȱȱřǰŖŚŞǰśŚśȱȱȱȱȱŗşŘŝȮŗşřŗǰȱȱȱȱȱŞǰŝŖŞǰśşŗȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ from 1932 to 1934.7 The number of wholesale rice dealers decreased to only ŗŗŝȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱŗşřŖȱǻȱ¢ȱ¡ȱ¢ȱȱ ŗşřŗǰȱŝŜȮŝŞǼǰȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǯ
ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱture of the rice trade, although new participants appeared in the market all the time. According to some 1930s surveys, the Shanghai rice market consisted of not only all the agents mentioned previously but also a new market agent group called “distributors” (jingxiaoshang ㍧䢋ଚ or jingshou ㍧ଂ; ȱȱȱȱ ȱŗşřśǰȱŘDzȱ ȱ¢ȱŗşřŖǰȱŗŗȮŗŘDzȱ ȱ¢ȱ¡ȱ¢ȱȱŗşřŗǰȱŘśȮŘŜǰȱŞŚȮŞśǼǯȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȬ ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱĞȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ŗşŖŖǰȱ ȱ ing more unpolished rice from the source markets to that mill (Gongshang ŝȲȱ ȱęȱȱęȬ¢ȱȱȱȱ DZȱŗǰşŝŞǰŜŖŚȱȱȱŗşŗŘȱȱŗşŗŜDzȱŘǰřŝŖǰřŖŜȱ ȱȱŗşŗŝȱȱŗşŘŗDzȱŘǰśŚŞǰŚŚŜȱȱȱŗşŘŘȱȱŗşŘŜDzȱȱřǰŖŚŞǰśŚśȱȱȱŗşŘŝȱȱ ŗşřŗǯȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱȱȱŗşřŘȱȱŗşřŚǰȱȱęȱȱŞǰŝŖŞǰśşŗȱǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻŗşŗśȮŗşřśǼǯ
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¢ȱ ŗşřŖǰȱ ŗŖȮŗŗǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŗŖǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱǻȱȱȱȱ ȱŗşřśǰȱŘǼǯ These distributors dealt with junk owners, cooperated with wholesale merchants in the source markets, and had relationships with Shanghai wholesale rice dealers and rice mills. They also transacted with the rice mills of other provinces and sold rice on their behalf. More important¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ęǯȱ ŚǯřǼǯȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ŗşřŖǰȱ ȱ were twenty-seven in all who handled polished rice from other counties brought in by junks, while eight handled unpolished rice from other provȱǻȱȱȱȱ ȱŗşřśǰȱŘDzȱȱ¢ȱ¡ȱ¢ȱȱŗşřŗǰȱŘśȮŘŜǰȱŞŚȮŞśDzȱ ȱ¢ȱŗşřŖǰȱŗŗȮŗŘǼǯȱ These new distributors represented the further proliferation of trade net ȱȱěȱ£ȱ¢ȱȱǯ Figure 4.3. The Shanghai Rice Market, ca. the 1930s ȱȱ ȱȱ Ȭȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱDZȱ
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Sources: ȱ¢ȱ¡ȱ¢ȱȱǻŗşřŗǰȱŝŜȮŝŞǼDzȱ ȱ ¢ȱǻŗşřŖǰȱŗŖȮŗŗǼDzȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǻŗşřśǰȱŗȮśřǼǯ
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In this new chain of rice procurement, Shanghai rice mills encountered new problems. Although the number of mills, as mentioned previously, inȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ǰȱ¢ȱȱ 1930s most did not procure their own unpolished rice but were still milling rice on behalf of others. Moreover, other market agents, such as wholeȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱĜȱ as an independent enterprise. Most rice was processed in markets up-country, particularly in Wuxi and Changzhou ᐌᎲ. The rice mills in Shanghai could only handle rice from other provinces, most of which was unpolished ǻȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ŗşřśǰȱ řDzȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¡ȱ ¢ȱ ȱŗşřŗǰȱŘśǰȱřŗȮřŚǰȱŞřȮŞŚǼǯȱȱȱ ǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ these mechanized rice mills, though higher in number, still did not integrate the distribution of rice under their command. Figure 4.4. The Shanghai Wheat and Flour Market, ca. the 1900s ȱȱ ȱȱ Ȭȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱDZȱ ȱ ȱ
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ȱǰȱȱ ȱĚȱȱ¡ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱĚȱǰȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻzalianghangǼǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻçȱçȱŗşŖŞǰȱŘŞşDzȱ ȱęǯȱŚǯŚǼǯ ȱ ȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ǯȱȱ¡ǰȱȱŗşŖřǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǻ¡ȱȱ 㣖ᮄ咉㉝ᒴǼȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭȱ Ĝȱ ǻbanmaizhuang 䕺呹㥞 or maizhuang 呹㥞Ǽȱȱ ¢ȱྰคȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱǯȱ¢ȱǰȱȱĚȱȱȱ ȱęȱǻpifachu ᡍⱐ㰩Ǽǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȬȱĜǯȱ ȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱĜȱȱ£ȱȱŗşŗŗȱǻ¡ȱ ¡ȱ¡ȱ£ȱŗşŘşǰȱȃȱȱȱȱȱĜȄDzȱȱęǯȱŚǯśǼǯ ȱ Ȭȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȬŗşŗŖǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ŗşŗŖȱ ȱ ŗşŗŗȱ ǻȱ ŗşŗşǰȱ ŞŖŞȮŞŗŖǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ǻ¡ȱ ȱ ⽣ᮄ咉㉝ᒴǼȱ ȱ ǰȱ ǰȱȱ ǰȱ ȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱǻȱȱȱȱᾂᅫᭀȱȱȱȱ ᾂᖋ⫳Ǽȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱĜǯ ¢ȱȱȱŗşŘŖȱȱ¢ȱŗşřŖǰȱȱȱȱȱ Ȭ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ¢Ȭ¡ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ Ȭȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ĚȬ ȱ Ĝȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱĜȱȱȱȱ ȂȱĴȬȱǰȱȱȱȱĴȱȱǻ¡ȱ£ȱ ⬇ᮄ㋵㐨ᒴǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱŗşşŘǰȱŘśȮŘŜǼǯ ȱȱȱȱ ȬȱȱĚȬȱĜȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ęȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ Ěȱ ǯ8ȱ ¢ȱ ŗşŘŖǰȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱǰȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱĚȱȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱ ȱȱǻȱŗşşŘǰȱŘŖǼǯȱȱȂȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱşŖǰŖŖŖȱȱȱ¢ȱȱŗşŖřȱȱŗşǰşśŖǰŖŖŖȱȱȱ¢ȱȱŗşŘŖȱ ŞȲȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂǰȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱǻŗşŞśǰȱŗśȮŘŖǼǯ
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ǻȱŗşşŘǰȱŘŗǼȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȬȱȱĚȬ ȱĜǯ ȱŚǯśǯȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱǯȱȱŗşřŖ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ
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ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¡ǯȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȱȱ the late 1900s and early 1910s, as Rong Desheng said in his memoir, their ęȱĚȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱĚȱȱȱȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ Ȭ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱŗşŚřǰȱřŖȮřŚǼǯȱȱ ȱ¢ǰȱȬ ȱȱȱȱ country continued to increase, as did their production capacity (see table ŚǯřǼǯȱȱǯȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
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competitive by continuing investment in production equipment, manageǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ preneurial reaction to market adversities as suggested by North (2005, 59). ȱȱ ȱĜȱȱ¢ȱ ǰȱȱ¢ȱ Ȭ ¢ȱĚȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ existing market agents: dealers, local brokers, and even the commodity ¡ǯȱȱĚȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ market agents when handling wheat transactions in various areas. At othȱǰȱȱȂȱěȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǯȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ ȱĚȱȱȱȱȱȱȱDZȱȱȱȱ or the managerial hierarchy (Shanghai shangye chuxu yinhang diaochabu 1932, 47–56, 62–70, 77–78; Jincheng yinhang zongjinglichu Hankou diaocha fenbu 1938, 26–37, 90–99; Shehui jingji diaochasuo 1935b, 1–2, 7–8). ȱȱĚȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱing raw materials to maintain production: foreign supplies. China was importing wheat in negligible quantities before the 1910s. By 1912, the country imported less than 2,500 piculs, and Shanghai obtained only 31 ȱȱȱǻȱęǯȱŚǯŜǼǯȱȱŗşŘŗǰȱȱȱȱȱȱing amount of wheat from the international market, mainly from the United States and Canada through urban foreign mercantile houses, including Japanese ones (Shanghai shehui kexueyuan jingji yanjiusuo 1980, 1.230, 235–237). By 1922, Shanghai already outnumbered other cities in foreign wheat imports. The price competitiveness of American or Canadian wheat was one factor considered by the Chinese mill owners (Gongshang banyuekan 1931, 108). The continually available supply of North American wheat probably also stabilized production and prices at mills, particularly when the domestic supply was not ensured by domestic markets or by the mills’ managerial hierarchy. The Shanghai rice market in the 1920s and 1930s also absorbed a conȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱĚǰȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ rice was signed, usually half a year in advance, a foreign mercantile house contacted market agents in source markets such as Saigon, Bangkok, and Rangoon. These agents ordered the product and prepared the shipment Ğȱǯȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱerated in these rice-exporting areas.9ȱȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȂȱ local mills to process foreign paddy. şȲȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ mentions the milling of foreign rice. One source indicates that there were about eight rice mills in Saigon, mostly owned by overseas Chinese merchants; see Gongshang banyuekan (1930a, 9). Some other information on the rice mills in Southeast Asia’s rice-exporting areas ȱȱȱȱȱǻŗşşŜǰȱŚŜȮśŗǰȱŞřȮŞŝǰȱŗŗŖȮŗŘŘǼDzȱȱǻŗşŜŞǰȱŚŞȮŗŗŗǼDzȱȱǻŗşŝŗǰȱ 36–92); Skinner (1957, 103–109); and Robequain (1944, 275–278).
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Rice mills in the source markets across the Lower Yangzi region equally failed to initiate vertical integration. By the early 1930s, surveys of major upstream rice markets, including Wuxi, Zhenjiang, and Wuhu, found ȱěȱȱȱȱȱǯȱĞǰȱȱ agents had no clear specialties. A rice dealer might need to mill rice or to have its own warehouse. Sometimes, a warehouse possessed its own mill to cater to the needs of customers (Shehui jingji diaochasuo 1936, 1935a, 1935c; Sun and Yang 1936, 21–45; K. Zhu 1937, 6–45; Sun Xiaocun and ȱȱŗşřśǰȱśŚŝȮśŜŜǼǯȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱĚȱǰȱ where the mills were the motor force, the rice-milling industry became an auxiliary sector in the rice trade. ǰȱȱ ȱĚȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱĚȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱ having rice mill owners buy more raw materials to feed their machines. ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ between the two products. Local Custom, Specialization, and Standardization The grain market itself was related to the ways that food was consumed. ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱĚǰȱ ȱęȱěȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱ used those products. People of the Lower Yangzi region, as in other areas, consumed rice in the form of grain, whereas wheat had to be ground into Ěǯȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱĞȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱȱ criteria made particular regions famous for their rice in the minds of local inhabitants and formed the basis for classifying rice in the Shanghai market and elsewhere in China (Shanghai shangye chuxu yinhang diaochabu 1931, 1–4). According to one survey in the late 1920s, the Shanghai market ȱȱ¢Ȭęȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱeign rice, from Saigon (Gongshang banyuekan 1929, 2–3). ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ been adopted to classify rice by standards based on the content of protein or fat in the grain. These standards had to be compatible with the preexisting names of rice grains. Japanese surveys of the 1900s cite experimental results comparing the chemical content of the rice from Japan with that ȱȱȱȱȱǻçȱçȱŗşŖŞǰȱŘřŗȮŘřşǼǯȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ Shanghai rice market in the 1930s, Chinese researchers also introduced a ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱable in the city (Shanghai shangye chuxu yinhang diaochabu 1931, 4–7). ǰȱȱȱ ȱȱěȱ¢ȱȱęǯȱȱ ȱȱ quoted by the local categories of rice (Gongshang banyuekan 1929, 14–17; ŗşřŖǰȱśȮŞǼǯ
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Notes: ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱŗşřŚǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȃȄDzȱŗȱȱƽȱŗǯŜŚŝŖśŞŞȱǯȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǯȱǰȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱěȱȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱȱ¢ǯ Source: ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻŗşŗśȮŗşřśǰȱȃȄȱȱȃȄǼǯ
ŘŚǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŘřǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŘŘǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŘŗǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŘŖǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŗşǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŗŞǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŗŝǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŗŜǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŗśǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŗŚǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŗřǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŗŘǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŗŗǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŗŖǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ şǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŞǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŝǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŜǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ śǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŚǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ řǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŘǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ ŗǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖ Ŗ
Figure 4.6. Shanghai in China’s Foreign Wheat Market, 1912–1934
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Rice market agents could divide their labor not only by sorting specialty rice by its market function, a method examined by researchers in the pre-1936 years, but also by its kind of specialty. Although the Chinese researchers of the 1930s failed to give more details, they still managed ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱěȱȃȄȱǻbang ᐿ) handling market ǯȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ¢ǯȱ Therefore, rice bought for the Shanghai market came from Songjiang ᵒ∳, Zhangyan ᔉคǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ फᐿǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ǰȱ ȱ ℺䘆, ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱ࣫ᐿ).10ȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱ¢ȱ chuxu yinhang diaochabu 1931, 10). ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǯȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱǯȱȱǰȱ ǰȱȱ ¢ȱȱ¡ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǻȱǼȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱǰȱ¡ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱǰȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱ ȱȱȱȱǻǯǯǰȱȱȃ¡ȄȱȱȱǼǯȱingly, the market remained dispersed rather than integrated, even though ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ£ǯ ȱǰȱȱ ȱĚȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱĚȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱę¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱĚǯȱ ȱĚȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ technicians, the most important standard being the content of sand, dust, ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ŗşŗşǰȱ ŜŖŖȮŜŖŘǼǯȱ Ğȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ęǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǻȱ¢ȱ¡ȱ¢ȱȱŗşřŘǰȱŗřǼǯ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱĚȱȱȱȂȱ ȱ¡ǰȱȱȱ£ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ£ȱȱǻȱȱ㯛ᐿ), ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ǻȱ 䣿ᐿ); see Shanghai ¢ȱ¡ȱ¢ȱȱǻŗşřŗǰȱŞŚȮŞśǼǯ ŗŖȲȱ
The Rice and Wheat Flour Market Economies
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quality. Shanghai mill owners had to think of other ways of distinguishing their product quality, such as advertisements and brand names to elicit goodwill,11ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ǻȱ shangye chuxu yinhang diaochabu 1932, 5–13). Conclusion ȱȱĚȱȱ¡ȱĞȱȱȱȱ ȱtation methods, the adoption of new technology, and the enlargement of production capacity. Standardization still depended on local customs and market specialization, however. The rice trade experienced a proliferation of market agents without much vertical integration. In contrast, the ȱĚȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱal changes, signifying the vertical integration of production, purchasing, and distribution. ȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ that integrated production and distribution, the answer is as follows. To integrate meant coping with the market’s customary traditions, including taste, custom, or, in some cases, religion. By not ignoring but extending the existing customs or traditions, these customs and traditions became a new “knowledge,” one that required specialization and promoted the ȱȱȱȱęȱȱǯȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ transaction costs for those participating in the rice market. But, customs were not unchangeable. Product price and quality, popular migration, government policy, and so on also played a role in changing ȱȱȱȱȱȱęǯ12 Similarly, once a new packaging technology emerged, and new marketing agencies such as supermarkets and convenient stores appeared in the late twentiȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱĜȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱę¢ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ęǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ ǰȱ ěȱ ¢ȱ ȱ the rice milling one and became one of the fastest growing industries in ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǻȱŘŖŖŘǼǯȱȱ See the brand names of the Mow Sing and Foh Sing Flour Mills in Maoxin Fuxin Shenxin £ȱǻŗşŘşǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǯ ŗŘȲȱ On this issue, consider the Taiwan rice industry. Before 1895, the island had more than ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱŗŞşśȱȱȱ¢ȱŗşŘŖǰȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱęǰȱǰȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǻ ȱȱŗşŜşǰȱŝȮŞǼǯ ŗŗȲȱ
FIVE
The Regional Development ȱȱ¢ȂȱĴȱ¡ Market Economy, 1920–1937
Ȭ ȱ
Late nineteenth-century China was transformed by railway and coastal transportation, as has been well documented. This new communication system rapidly replaced much of the preexisting river and canal transport and ended the traditional courier station communication network. The new system enabled market forces, in which foreign capital played a dominant role, to penetrate rural China on an unprecedented scale. Such a ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ The case of Wei ◄ County illustrates the point. ȱ¢ȱȱȱĴȱ¡ In 1898, Qingdao became a treaty port, and later, in 1904, Germans built the Qingdao-Jinan Railway (Jiaoji tielu 㝴△䨉䏃Ǽǯȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ of its location in close proximity to the treaty port, became a pivotal station on the trunk line. The county rose to become a large trading center in Shandong Province and eventually grew into one of the more important commercial and transportation centers in northern China (Buck 1978, ŘŘDzȱȱŗşŝŝǰȱřŚŘǼǯ1 Owing to its increasingly important position in the regional commercial network, Wei was opened to foreign trade by the ȱȱȱŗşŖŜǰȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱ line, Jinan △फ and Zhoucun ਼ᴥȱǻȱȱŗşŜŞǰȱŗřŚDzȱ ȱ£ȱ ŗşŚŗǰȱŘŜDzȱ ȱŗşŖŚǰȱśŜȮśŝǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ ŗȲȱ G. William Skinner considers the city of Wei a county-level capital that served as a ȱȱǻŗşŝŝǰȱřŚŘǼǯȱȱȱȱ ȱǻŘŖŖśǼǯ
ȱ¢ȂȱĴȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱ
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import of both foreign and domestic factory goods into the rural interior as well as the export of raw materials from the countryside. Through modȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ¡ȱ Ğȱ¢ǯȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱǰȱȱŗŗŚȱǰȱȱȱ to four hours by rail, from Qingdao and 131 miles from the provincial ǰȱ ǯȱȱ ęǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ port and later was the center for machine-spun yarn manufactured in Qingdao, Tianjin, and Shanghai (Gongshang banyuekan 1934, 92; Long ȱŗşřŜǰȱśŚŗǼǯȱȱ ȱȱĚ¡ȱȱ¢Ȭȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱĴȱ ȱĞȱȱĚȱȱȱern part of Wei. The manufacturing of yarn in Chinese treaty ports and urban centers ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱĞȱ¢ȱȱǯȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱĞȱȱȱȱȱ that specialized in producing the “new handloom cloth” (xinshouzhibu ᮄ㐨ᏗǼǰȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ¢ǯȱ The superiority of the factory-made product was obvious, as noted by Kang Chao: ȱ¢ȱěȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Chinese countryside and modern spinning equipment was indeed astonishing. The simple spinning wheel would produce about half a pound of ¢ȱȱ¢ȱǻȱ ȱǼǯȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱ used in the 1930’s the same amount of labor could on average produce 22 ȱȱŗŜȱȱ¢ǯȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱ two types of production was at least 44 to 1, not counting the time saved in modern mills in various stages prior to the spinning process. (Chao ŗşŝŝǰȱŗŞŖǼȱ
ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĴȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱĴȱĞȱǯȱȱǰȱ it took three to four hours of hand spinning to supply enough yarn for one hour’s hand weaving. Obviously time-consuming, spinning labor was ŝśȱȱŞŖȱȱȱȱȱĞȱ¡ȱȱǻȱŗşŝŝǰȱŗŝşǼǯȱȱ ȱ¢ȱěȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱ of competition from the second.
ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ ȱȱ hand weaving was not as important as that between modern and tradiȱǯȱȱȱ ȱȱĞȱ ȱ¢ȱcreased at the turn of the century though the adoption of an improved handloom called the “iron-gear loom” (tiefangzhi 䨉㋵ᴎǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ weaving instrument was said to possess all the advantages of early factory equipment, except that it was still operated by human power (Chao
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ŗşŝŝǰȱŗŞŚDzȱȱȱŗşřŝǰȱŗŖŚŗȮŗŖśřǼǯȱȱǰȱȱȱ stretching of warps and the rolling of cloth, were controlled by simply using foot pedals. In consequence, the iron-gear loom functioned four times ȱĜ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱǯȱȱ ȱęȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ Ğȱ ǯȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ from Tianjin in the late 1900s, and, by the early 1930s, seven thousand ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱǻȱȱȱǯȱŗşśśǰȱŘśřǼǯ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ hand spinning was forty-four to one, the ratio between factory weaving ¢ȱ£ȱĴȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȬȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱǻȱŗşŝŝǰȱŗŞśǼǯȱȱ ěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱal instrument was stronger in spinning than in weaving. These ratios also ¡ȱ ¢ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ğȱ ȱ spinning had been replaced by factory production. To quote Kang Chao, ȱ¢ȱěȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȃȱȱȱȱ¢ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ weavers over hand weavers, if we take into consideration capital costs, administrative costs, and many other indirect costs in the modern mill” ǻŗşŝŝǰȱŗŞśǼǯ As a result, the progress in spinning technology and the invention of the iron-gear loom promoted the expansion of handloom weaving. Be ȱȱȱŗşŖśȮŗşŖşȱȱŗşŘŚȮŗşŘŝǰȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ¢ȱ śŘȱ ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşřŘȱȱŗşřŜȱȱ ȱȱŘŖȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŗşŖśȱȱŗşŖşǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȬ ȱǰȱ ȱ ȱĜ¢ȱȱȱŗşřŝǰȱ Ğȱȱȱ ȱŜŜȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ ȱȱȱǻ ȱȱȱȱ £ȱŗşŚŘǰȱśŗǼǯȱȱȱ ȱŗşřŚȱȱŗşřśǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŝřȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǻȱŗşŝŝǰȱŘřřǰȱŘřŜǼǯȱ Actually, handloom cloth remained popular among ordinary Chinese. In the mid-1930s, handloomed products accounted for 71 percent of the toȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱȱǯȱŗşśśǰȱ ŘşŝDzȱȱ ȱŘŖŖŘǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱsearchers as showing the high adaptability of the Chinese hand-weaving industry and the mutually complementary relationship and coexistence of Ĵȱ¡ȱĞȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǻȱ ¡ȱ ŗşşŖDzȱȱȱŗşşşǰȱŘŖŖŗǼǯ The new handloom cloth promoted socioeconomic changes. In areas where peasants were previously engaged in the combined activities of cotton growing, hand spinning, and hand weaving, they abandoned spinning ¢ȱĞȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱ ǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ
ȱ¢ȂȱĴȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱ
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farming with weaving since they could now use factory yarn instead of spinning their own yarn. In other words, although China’s traditional integration of farming with both spinning and weaving was restructured ȱȱĚ¡ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱĞȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ mills. The Wei County Weaving Zone ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱcame centers of handloom cloth production with the arrival of new technology. Wei is representative of these new centers. Before the introduction ȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ǰȱǰȱȱȱ ȱĴȱȱȱ ȱ ĴǰȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ Women then wove the hand-spun yarn during the slack season with traditional wooden handlooms. With this method, only “narrow cloth” (zhaibu じᏗDzȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ȱǯȱȱȱ ȱ made in rural households and were woven predominantly for home conȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ŗşśśǰȱ řŖŖǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ Ğȱ ȱ ing of Qingdao as a treaty port and the construction of the Qingdao-Jinan Railway that Wei began to use large amounts of machine-spun yarn from Qingdao. ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ last to fail, declining rapidly on the eve of the Japanese invasion of China. ȱęǰȱȱȱȱȱᅮȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱᖋᑇ County in Shandong lost their positions of supremacy to a new center, Baodi ᇊⷹ ¢ȱȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȬȱ¢ȱȱproved handlooms at the turn of the century. When the quality of Baodi cloth deteriorated in the mid-1920s, Gaoyang 催䱑ȱǻȱȱȱǼȱ rose to take Baodi’s position, by producing high-grade cloth products.2 After several boom periods in the 1930s, products from Wei surpassed those ȱ ¢ȱ ǻȱ ŗşŝŝǰȱ ŗşŗȮŗşŞDzȱ ŗşŝśǰȱ ŗŞŞȮŗŞşǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ these “new handloom cloth” centers indicate that one area prospered only at the expense of another. One explanation for this is the keen competition among them. Another is that cloth merchants responded to competitive market conditions. Ğȱȱȱȱ ¢ǰȱ¢ȱŗşřŖȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱĴȱȱǯȱȱŗşřŗǰȱȱȱ ŘȲȱȱ Linda Grove has been studying Gaoyang’s handloom cloth production for years. Based ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ę ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŘŖŖŜǼȱ studies in detail the long-term development of the weaving district and provides an in-depth exploration of Chinese rural industry.
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ȱȱȱȱ ȱ£ȱ ȱŘŜǯŜƖȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗŗǯşƖǰȱ ȱ ŜǯśƖǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ŗǯŘƖȱǻȱŗşŝŝǰȱŘŗǼǯȱȱ¢ȱŗşřŚǰȱȱȱ ȱ£ȱȱŝŗǯŜŚƖȱȱ ȱȱȱȱŞśǯŚśƖȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡¢Ȭ ȱȬ ȱȱȱȱǻȱĀȱçȱȱǰȱ Āȱȱ£ȱçȱŗşŚŘǰȱŗşǼǯ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱĴȱ transportation than either Baodi or Gaoyang, the two other major handweaving areas in north China in the early twentieth century. Though Baodi and Gaoyang were not far from Tianjin, neither of them was located on a railroad line. To obtain machine-spun yarn from factories in Tianjin, Gaoyang’s merchants had to allow three or four days for either junk passage along the Daqing ⏙ River or transportation by cart overland (Wu ȱŗşřŞǰȱŜŝŞDzȱȱȱŗşřŜǰȱŚřřǼǯȱ¢ȱǰȱȱtation connected Wei not only with Qingdao to the east but also with Jinan to the west, meeting the Tianjin-Pukou Railway (Jin-Pu tielu ⋹⌺䨉䏃Ǽȱ there. This transportation network was a chief reason for the expanding market for Wei’s handloom fabrics. Modern transport also made easier the import of foreign cloth into Wei. The sheer size of initial cloth imports easily eliminated Wei’s traditional cloth industry, based on the production of yarn at home by female labor. Later, higher-quality imported cloth provided the inspiration for improving handloom production techniques. As early as the beginning of the Republican period, certain natives of the prosperous eastern part of Wei were intent on improving the quality of textile production. These local entrepreneurs purchased the new iron-gear looms from Tianjin and disȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱęȱ ȱǰȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱ the Wei ◄ River such as Mucun 〚ᴥ, Dengcun 䛻ᴥ, Shibuzi ᇎපᄤ, Fumaying 侭侀➳, Sangyuan ḥ೦, and Meicun ⳝᴥ (Gongshang banyuekan ŗşřŚǰȱşŗǼǯ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŗśȮŗşŗŜǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęĞ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ 1923–1924 when hand weaving spread from eastern Wei to the southern, northern, and western parts of the county. Local machine factories were built to manufacture the improved loom, by which a person could weave 100 chi of “wide cloth” in a 10-hour workday.3 Demand for the iron-gear looms became so great that seventy to eighty thousand sets, each costing 70 to 80 yuan, were sold during a ten-year span (Gongshang banyuekan ŗşřŚǰȱşśǼǯȱ řȲȱȱ
One chi equals 0.333 meter equals 1.094 feet.
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ȂȱĴȱ ȱĞȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ late 1920s and the early 1930s. The “Wei weaving zone” came to denote a wider weaving region with the city of Wei as its collecting center. Thus ęǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱᆦҁ, as well as parts of three neighboring counties: Changyi ᯠ䙥 (including the county seat, Liuhe ⌕⊇, Shibu ᇎප, and Yinma 仆侀Ǽǰȱ ȱ ໑( ܝDongjiadaozhuang ᵅᆊ䘧㥞, Dingjiadianzi ϕᆊᑫᄤ, Baisunxuezi ⱑᄿ䲾ᄤ, and Zhangjiaying ᔉᆊ➳Ǽǰȱȱȱ ᯠῖȱǻ ȱȱŗşřśǰȱŝşǼǯȱȱśǯŗȱ ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱ County weaving zone and the numbers of handlooms in the large weavȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŗşŘŖȱȱ¢ȱŗşřŖȱǻ çȱ ȱŗşŚřǰȱŗŘşǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ in the Wei weaving zone as around a hundred thousand in the early 1930s, ȱȱȱȱęĞ¢ȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ and twenty thousand for Shouguang and Changle combined (Amano MoȱŗşřŜǰȱŘŗŝǼǯ ȱśǯŗǯȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ£ȱȱȱ¢ȱŗşŗŖȱ ȱ£ȱȱŗşŘŗȱ ȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱȱŗşŘşȱ
ȱ ¢ȱ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱȱ ȱ
102
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As the industry proliferated throughout the area, modern spinning mills in Qingdao, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Wuxi sent machine-spun yarn ȱȱȱȱǻ¢ȱŚŖȱȱŚŘȱǼȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱŗşŘŖȱȱ¢ȱŗşřŖǰȱȱȱȂȱ yarn imports were from Japanese mills in Qingdao. The amount of factory yarn consumed by the county in the four years from 1931 to 1934 was ŗŜǰŘŞŖǰȱ ŗŜǰŗŜřǰȱ ŗŝǰŞŜśǰȱ ȱ ŗşǰŖşŖȱ ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ǻȱ ȱȱǯȱŗşśśǰȱŘŚśǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ ȱton spinning businesses inside China, the quantity of imported yarn from abroad gradually decreased. From the early 1920s, over 80 percent of Wei’s yarn imports were produced in Qingdao’s textile mills, and the Japanese ȱȱȱȱǻ ȱ¢ȱŗşřŚǰȱşŘǼǯȱȱȱȱ conditions created by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which granted foreigners the right to build factories in China, Japanese textile consortia founded ȱĴȱȱĞȱȱȱǰȱȱȱŗşŗŜǯȱ¢ȱŗşřŝǰȱȱ of the ten textile factories in the port had Japanese owners, leaving only ȱ ȱȱ ȱǻ£ȱĀçȱŗşŚŝǰȱŝŘŞǼǯȱȱȱŚśŖǰŖŖŖȱ piculs of yarn delivered during the 1930s to Wei from Qingdao, 400,000 ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ¢Āȱ ŗşřŝǰȱ śŗǼǯ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ Wei. By the mid-1920s, these amounted to about 10,000, involving roughly 90,000 male and female weavers (“Shandong Weixian zhi jingji jinkuang” ŗşŘŜǰȱŞȮşǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ£ȱȱȱȱsideration, the total number of weavers should have numbered around ŗśŖǰŖŖŖȱ ǻ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ŗşŚŘǰȱ śřǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ 1930s, the amount of cloth produced from the county of Wei reached 10,000,000 bolts a year, about one-half the total output for Shandong Provȱǻȱȱ¢ĀȱŗşřŝǰȱŚŗȮŚŘǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱŝśǰŜŖŖǰŖŖŖȱ¢ȱǻ ȱ¢ȱŗşřŚǰȱŗŖŖǼǯ Population growth was crucial for the development of the handloom weaving industry in Wei. Many scholars studying Chinese rural handiĞȱȱȱŗşřŖǰȱȱȱȱȱᮍ乃ᓋ, Wu Zhi ਇⶹ, and Yan Zhongping ಈЁᑇǰȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Wei’s success. Japanese South Manchurian Railway investigators in the ¢ȱ ŗşŚŖȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱȱǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ ȱ industry was in stark contrast to the need for supplementary employment ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǻȱŗşřŜǰȱŜşŚDzȱȱȱ ŗşřŜǰȱŘŚŞDzȱȱȱŗşřŝǰȱřŞŚDzȱ çȱȱŗşŚřǰȱŞŞǼǯȱȱȱ ȱŗşŚŗȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ唞 of Dahexi ⊇㽓ȱǰȱ Ȭ ting ᆦҁȱ ȱǻȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱŜȱȱşȱmu on the average, yet one could hardly make a living
ȱ¢ȂȱĴȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱ
103
without cultivating more than 12 muȱǻŞŖȱǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ interviewer about the poor irrigation in the area due to a groundwater ǯȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱǻ ȱȱ ȱȱ £ȱŗşŚŘǰȱśŘǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ shortage made it impossible for family farms to survive only by farming. Wei, like many areas in north China, was characterized by fragmented landholding and a high ratio of population to cultivated land. The county ȱ ȱŗŜǯŞȱmu of cultivated land per household in the 1930s (Shi¢ȱ ȱ ¢ħȱ ŗşřŚǰȱ ŗŜǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ tivate at least 18 mu to support themselves.4 A 1934 survey had an even lower estimate of the county average of cultivated land per household, ȱǰȱŗřǯŜȱmuȱȱŗşřřȱǻ ȱȱħȱ ȱŗşřŚǰȱȱȱȱ
¡ȱŗşşśǰȱŚśŗǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱ poor. For example, in Gaojialou 催ᆊῧ, a village in Wei surveyed in deȱ¢ȱȱ ȱǰȱŝśȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱŖȱȱŗśȱmuȱȱȱǻȱĀȱçȱȱ ȱçȱŗşŚŘǰȱŜŝŜǼǯś Overpopulation and cultivated land scarcity made Wei an area of emigrant labor. Of necessity, these desperate people ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǻ çȱ ȱŗşŚřǰȱŞŞǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱȱǰȱ¢ȱ ¢ȱȱĞȱȱǯȱ The early surveys of Wei’s weaving areas also showed that few cash crops grew in the region before the late nineteenth century. Only food crops such as wheat, sorghum, soybean, and millet were planted. Local peasants lacked cash income except when they occasionally managed ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǻ ȱȱŗşřśǰȱŞŞǼǯȱ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ǯȱ fore weaving became the most popular subsidiary industry of Wei, surȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ Ğȱ ȱ ȱ straw braiding, hair-net weaving, embroidery, pig-bristle preparation, ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻ çȱ ȱ ŗşŚřǰȱ ŞşǼǯȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ iron-gear looms became more available and other conditions matured in ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ ȱĞǯ Fabrics produced in the region were sold both locally and nationwide.
ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȂȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ¡ǰȱ ¡ǰȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ¡ǰȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ £ǰȱ ŚȲȱ
ŝŞǼǯ śȲȱ
These numbers are based on estimates from the tobacco region in Wei (see Chen 1939, Unfortunately, data of land distribution at the county level are not available.
104
Ȭȱ
¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ǻ çȱ ȱ ŗşŚřǰȱ ŗŖŖȮŗŖŗǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ➅⊇ ȱȱȱȱȱȱħȱ¢ȱǻȱȬ ȱŗşŚŘǰȱřŘǼǯȱȱȱȬ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱǻ ȱ¢ȱŗşřŚǰȱŗŖřǼǯ Yarn and cloth merchants played an important role in the supply and distribution of yarn and the marketing of cloth. Merchant capital was another crucial factor for developing Wei’s hand-weaving industry. Other factors included a large population and the special advantages of ecoȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǻ çȱȱŗşŚřǰȱ ŞŞȮŞşǼǯŜ Wei had long been a hub of commerce for east Shandong even before hand weaving made a name for the county. Before the opening of Qingdao as a treaty port, Wei was the strategic transportation link between the northern and southern parts of the Shandong Peninsula. With Wei as the nucleus, an overland transport network radiated, reaching as far as
ȱ 咗 County and Chefoo 㡱㔬 (presently Yantai ✭ৄǼȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ Jinan to the west, Zhucheng 䃌ජ to the south, and Yangjiaogou ᆊ⑱ to the north. By using overland links to ports such as Chefoo, Wei was also ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǻ ȱȱ ȱȱ £ȱŗşŚŘǰȱśŖȮśŗDzȱȱ ȱŗşşŘǼǯ Wei County, owing to its location on vital trade routes, developed into a distinctive market area that drew crowds on the monthly market days from neighboring counties such as Changyi, Shouguang, Changle, and Anqiu ᅝϬȱǻ ȱȱȱȱ £ȱŗşŚŘǰȱśŖȮśŗǼǯȱȱ ȱȱǰȱȂȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ than seventy, the second largest number among all the counties in Shanȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǻ£ȱ ŗşŞŘǰȱ ŗřŞǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ Many of them accumulated capital by engaging in other businesses such as money exchange and the sale of food grains, as well as sideline products ǻ çȱȱŗşŚřǰȱŞşǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ development of the handloom weaving industry in the twentieth century.
ȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱ¢Ȃȱȱ¢ȱȱ Ĵȱ¡ȱĞǵ Market and Contractual Relations between Merchants and Peasant Producers ȱȱ¢ȱȱĴȱ¡ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ raw material was also an important function performed by the market ŜȲȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĀȱçȱȱǰȱ Āȱ ȱ£ȱçȱŗşŚŘǰȱśśȮśŝǯ
ŗŖś
ȱ¢ȂȱĴȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱ
¢ȱȱȂȱ ȱĞȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡port statistics helps one grasp the magnitude of these transactions. During ȱ ¢ȱ ŗşřŖǰȱ ȱ ¡ǰȱ şǰśŗŝȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ǰȱ ȱ śǰŜŚŘȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǻ¢ȱȱ¢ħȱ ŗşřŚǰȱ ŗŖŝǰȱ ŗŗŖǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢Ȭȱ ȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱǻȱȱŗşŜŞǰȱŗǼǯȱȱȱ and Nanliu फ⌕, two important stations in the Wei weaving zone, annual yarn imports exceeded 10,000 tons, having a total value of 10,000,000 yuan ǻ ȱȱħȱ ȱŗşřŚǰȱŗŝǼ. ȱȱ ȱ¡ȱȱ ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱęǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ¢ȱȱ ǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȬ¢ȱǰȱ ȱȱǰȱǰȱ Ğǰȱǰȱ ¢Ȭǰȱȱ ¢Ȭ seventh of every month of the lunar calendar. Sellers erected street stalls and transported goods to town the day before the fair (Shiyebu guoji ¢ħȱŗşřŚǰȱŗŘŗǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱŗŖŖȱli ǻřŗȱǼȱȱȱĚȱǻ ȱȱŗşřśǰȱŞŜDzȱȱȱ ŗşŚŖǰȱŜşŖǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱ at intervals at the market towns of the weaving area. For instance, a marȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱęǰȱ¡ǰȱǰȱ¡ǰȱ ¢Ȭęǰȱ ȱ ¢Ȭ¡ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱęĞǰȱǰȱęĞǰȱȱǯȱȂȱȱĴȱȱ ȱȱȱȱśŖȱliǰȱ ȱ Ȃȱȱ ȱȱȱȱdius of 30 liȱǻ ȱȱŗşřśǰȱŞśDzȱȱȱŗşŚŖǰȱŜşŖǼǯȱȱ districts in the Wei weaving zone, such as Yinma, Shibu, and Liuhe ⌕⊇ ȱȱ¢ȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱęȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱśǯŗǯȱ ȱśǯŗǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ Market Towns Market Days of the Month ȱȱĚȱ ǻȱǼ (Radius in liǼ Vicinity of the Wei County Seat
2 and 7 (i.e., 2nd, 7th, ŗŘǰȱŗŝǰȱŘŘǰȱŘŝǼ
100
Meicun
ŗȱȱŜ
śŖ
śȱȱŗŖ
30
Yinma
4 and 9
śŖ
Shibu
śȱȱŗŖ
śŖ
Liuhe
śȱȱŗŖ
śŖ
Vicinity of Changyi City
2 and 7
śŖ
Sources:ȱ ȱȱǻŗşřśǰȱŞśǼDzȱȱȱǻŗşŚŖǰȱŜşŖǼDzȱǯȱ ȱȱ ǻŗşřśǰȱŚŘŝśǼǯ
ŗŖŜ
Ȭȱ
ȱ¢ȱȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱ¡ǰȱȱ ȱ ¢ȱ¢ȱęȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱǰȱ ȱ¡ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱęȱȱ ¢ȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱĜȱȱǰȱȱȱ from Wei would dispatch representatives to handle business at that town on ȱ¢ȱǻ ȱȱŗşřśǰȱŞŜDzȱȱȱŗşŚŖǰȱŜşŖǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱǻ ȱȱŗşřśǰȱŞŜǼǯȱȱ business was carried out either directly between the seller and the buyer or else through a middleman. It was the custom for a broker to receive a commission from the seller, generally in promissory notes from a native bank that could be cashed the same day. Credit purchases were sometimes granted to regular customers, those who usually paid back the debt in a month ȱȱǻ¢ȱȱ¢ħȱŗşřŚǰȱŗŗřDzȱȱĀȱçȱȱ ǰȱ Āȱȱ£ȱçȱŗşŚŘǰȱŗŗŞȮŗřŗǼǯȱȱŗşřŗȱęȱ¢ȱed that transactions amounting to over 700,000 yuan could be concluded in a single market day during the peak season (“Diaocha Weixian, Changle, ǰȱ£ǰȱȱ£ħȱȱȱȱ£ȱȄȱŗşřŗǰȱŗǼǯȱ ȱśǯŘȱȱśǯřȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱĴȬ ȱ Ğȱ¢ȱȱȱĴȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǯ ȱśǯŘǯȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱŗşŘŜȮŗşřř ȱȱȱȱDZȱ
ȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ ȱ¢Ȃȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢DZȱ ȱ ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ
ȱ
ȱȱ ¢Ȧ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
ȱ ȱ ȱ
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ
107
ȱ¢ȂȱĴȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱ
ȱśǯřǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱŗşŘŜȮŗşřř ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱȱ
ȱ
ȱ ȱȱ
ȱ
ȱ ȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
Ȭȱ
ȱ
¢Ȧȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
ȱ
ȱ ȱ
¢Ȧ ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ
As shown in the yarn distribution diagram, yarn wholesalers represented the major yarn suppliers for the weaving industry. They procured most of the raw materials from Qingdao, mainly through the warehouses of the Wei bang ᐿȱǻȬȱǼǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ¢ȱȱęȱȱȱ¢Ȧ ȱ ȱǻȱȱęǯȱśǯŘǼȱ ȱǯȱȱȱ¢ȱęĞ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱęȱȱȱ city of Wei, the twenty-four yarn wholesalers were reputed to be the best £ǰȱȱȱŚŘŜǰŚŖŖȱ¢ as their total capital, or 17,800 yuan ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ǻ ȱ ȱ ŗşřśǰȱ ŞŜDzȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŚŖǰȱ ŜşŖDzȱȱĀȱçȱȱǰȱ Āȱȱ£ȱçȱ ŗşŚŘǰȱŗŗŞȮŗřŗǼǯȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱęǰȱ¢Ȭ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ workshops, dye houses, yarn peddlers, and retailers. Although transactions at the local market were carried out with cash, purchases in bulk ȱȱȱ ȱ¡ȱ ȱ¢ȱęȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱǻ ȱȱŗşřśǰȱŞŝȱȱǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Transactions were usually conducted at the commercial hubs of an urban area, especially Dongguan ᵅ䮰 to the east of the city and Nanguan फ䮰 to the south of the city. In Dongguan, a famous yarn-distributing center, the most important yarn trade was undertaken on Dongguan Street and Xiahe ϟ⊇ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ŗşřśǰȱ şśDzȱ ȃȱ ¡ȱ£ȱȱȄȱŗşŘŜǰȱŗŖDzȱ ȱ¢ȱŗşřśǰȱřřDzȱ ȱȱ
108
Ȭȱ
ħȱ ȱŗşřŚǰȱŗŝǼǯȱȱȱȱ¡ȱřǰŖŖŖȱ ȱȱȱǻȱ¡ȱŗşřŚǰȱřŖŜŗǼǯȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ were also held near the city. During the more prosperous seasons, Wei’s ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱęĞȱȱȱ¢ȱǻŗȱȱȱ ŝśȱǼȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǻ ȱȱŗşřśǰȱŞŝȱȱǯȱŗǼǯȱȱnual consumption amounted to about 180,000 piculs (Yamakami Kanao ŗşřśǰȱşśǼǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱ¢ȱĴȱ¢ǯȱ Urban yarn retailers also sent their salesmen to market towns such as Meicun, where there was no local yarn shop, in order to sell weaving material on rural market days. Wei’s yarn merchants provided for ȱ ȱȱȱ ǰȱ¢ǰȱǰȱȱǯȱȱȱ Yinma and Shibu, where there were local yarn shops, yarn was purchased wholesale by the shops so as to make retail sales on periodic market days ȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱǻ ȱȱŗşřśǰȱŞŜȱȱ Ǽǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ to door and served as intermediaries between the urban market and the ȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǯȱ Therefore, in the periodic rural yarn market, yarn retailers and peddlers could be regarded as sellers, whereas peasant weavers were buyers. By some estimates, the amount of yarn sold at Yinma on a market day ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱěȬȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ peak periods. The amount for Shibu and Liuhe was three carts sold in ȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻ ȱȱ ŗşřśǰȱŞŜǼǯȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ¢ǰȱȱbution network of handloom cloth was organized into two markets, the ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱęǯȱśǯřǼǯȱȱȱȱ market, independent weavers represented the chief sellers, and cloth merchants, including retailers and peddlers, the chief buyers. Some market ȱȱȱȱȱęǯȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ and Shibu numbered twelve and twenty, respectively. At Meicun, howǰȱȱȱȱęȱ ȱǯȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ Yinma and Shibu were transported to Wei by local merchants, but Meicun’s cloth had to be collected on market days by the buying agents disȱȱȂȱȱęǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱǻ ȱȱŗşřśǰȱŞŜȱȱǼǯȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ Wei’s cloth trade. The quantity disposed of at that market was one-quarter ȱȂȱȱȱǻȃȱȱȱȱȄȱŗşŘŜǰȱ śřŞǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭŗşřŝȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ Ğȱ dustry, transactions carried out at Meicun amounted to more than 200,000
ȱ¢ȂȱĴȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱ
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ȱǻȱ¢ȱŗşŚŝǰȱŘřǼȱȱȱŜŖǰŖŖŖȱȱŝŖǰŖŖŖȱ¢ȱȱȱ day (Gongshang banyuekanȱŗşřřǰȱŘśŗŖȮŘśŗŗǼǯ The cloth market in Wei’s urban area accommodated major buyers that ȱȱęȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱ ȱȱŘśŝȱȱęȱȱǰȱ ȱvidual capitalization ranging from 2,000 to 20,000 yuan and a total annual turnover of 3,012,700 yuan in 1934 (Gongshang banyuekan 1934, 99; Chang Zhiying and Liu Zugan 1941, juanȱŘŚǰȱǯȱŗȮŘDzȱȱĀȱçȱȱǰȱ Āȱȱ£ȱçȱŗşŚŘǰȱŗŗŞǰȱŗřřȮŗřŚǼǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ be found at Fangzi ഞᄤ, Baya ຽ⎃, and other towns. Cloth transactions were carried out either directly between buyers and sellers or through broǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ Ğȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ğȱ ȱ ȱ cashed the same day. Regular customers made purchases on credit and ¢ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻ ȱ ¢ȱ ŗşřŚǰȱ şşDzȱ Chang Zhiying and Liu Zugan 1941, juanȱŘŚǰȱǯȱřǼǯȱ ȱĴȬȱ¢ Some wholesale cloth buyers also procured fabrics for the outside market ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱęǰȱ¢Ȭ ȱ ǰȱȱ ȱ ǯȱȃĴȬȄȱȱȱ¢ȱęǰȱ¢Ȭ ȱ workshops, and some dye houses supplied yarn for their outworking weavers. The woven fabric was then collected for sale on the local market, sold to cloth merchants from other cities, or exported. There were cloth sellers in Wei’s urban market, joining cloth peddlers and retailers as well as workshops. Variously described as the “merchant employer system,” “advance payment system,” “weaving-on-order system,” and “weaving-on-contract ¢ǰȄȱȱĴȬȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱĞȱȬȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱŗşŘŖǯȱĞȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ğȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ came factory yarn suppliers and handloom cloth buyers and developed relationships with small peasant families. It has been suggested that ȱȱ ȱȱȱěȱȬȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ĴȬ ęȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǯȱ Of these, a few even set up their workrooms to produce cloth by using ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱȱĞǰȱȱȱ ȱ independent weavers at one moment and weavers for their merchant employers at another, depending on market conditions. Thus, when cloth ȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȃ ȱȱȄȱȱȱĴȱturn, or when yarn became cheaper, they bought the material themselves.
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Conversely, in a time of declining cloth markets, weavers naturally preferred “weaving on order” and earning solid payments. When yarn prices ȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ĴȬȱ ęȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȃ ȱ for sale” and “weaving on order” coexisted in Wei, and the family was the unit of coordination and production. ȱȱĴȬȱ¢ǰȱȂȱȱȱ¢ȱęȱȱ¢Ȭ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡change for woven fabrics that met stipulated standards. The merchant ¢ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱĴȬȱęǯȱȱȱ ¢ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱĴȬȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱŗǯŘƖȱ ȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ĴȬȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ signed quota of cloth and receive a certain cash amount upon turning in ȱęȱǯ ¢ȱ ǰȱ Ȃȱ ĴȬȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱǻȱȱħȱŗşřŜǰȱŗřŗDzȱ ȱȱŗşřřǰȱŝŞşǼǯ 1. Merchants provided factory yarn at the current market price, and ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŗǯŘƖȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ ¢ǯȱȱȱ ȱĞȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱ Řǯȱ ȱ ęǰȱ ȱ ęǰȱ ȱ ¢Ȭ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ product. The prices of raw material and the end product were usually ęȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱĚȱȱȱśȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱěǯȱ 3. Weavers received a piecework wage of cloth set by their merchant ¢ȱȱȱȱĴǰȱ£ǰȱ ǰȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱbers of warp, woof, and so on. If the product fell below the mark, the ĴȬȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ canceled the weaver’s contract, depending on the shortfall in quality. ȱęȱĴȬȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱŗǯŘƖȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻ çȱȱ ŗşŚřǰȱŗŘřǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱę¡ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǯȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱĞȱ ers earning a piece-rate wage and producing for their merchant employers ȱ ǯȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱŖǯŜȱȱŖǯşȱ¢ per bolt of cloth. These payments varied depending on the fabrics involved. For
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example, the lowest on the scale was 0.3 yuan per bolt (Amano MotonoȱŗşŚŖǰȱŜşŖǼǯ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ĴȬȱ ęȯȱ ȱ ¢ȱ shops, dyeing-weaving workshops, or yarn-dyeing houses—production was carried out predominantly in rural weavers’ households with fam¢ȱǯȱȱĴȬȱęȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱpended on rural weaving households. It was paradoxical that whereas the Ĵȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ǰȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱęȱ product markets, operated as merchant employers for their weavers. Wei’s contract weavers were also cloth providers for several wellcapitalized cloth merchants from other provinces. These merchants sometimes sent buying agents to collect cloth directly from Wei’s producers who wove on orders given by agents. The cloth turned out in this way was of standard quality and sold by the dealer under a trademark of his own ǻȃȱȱȱȱȄȱŗşŘŜǰȱśřŞȮśřşǼǯȱȱ from the outside could also procure their fabrics from Wei through two large cloth dealers at Dongguan whose main business was to collect the woven products from the weavers on behalf of their clients in other cities. Institutions and Incentives in the Market Economy of Wei County ȱ ĴȬȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ǰȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱęǯȱȱȱȱtions could be performed in the village economy. In diverse ways, the ĴȬȱęȱȱȱȱęȱĴȱȱ¢ȱ the local market. They also distributed yarn from mills in distant large citȱȱȱ ǯȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱĴȬȱ merchants served as quality control agents and helped to standardize products to meet the needs of the wholesale market. The formal rules used in this system helped make the market economy more productive. AnothȱȱȱȱȱĴȬȱ¢ȱ ȱęǯȱ¢ȱĴȱȱ on credit, merchant employers provided working capital for their outside ȱ ȱȱȱěȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ their woven products to anticipate an increase in prices. For impoverished weavers, who were likely risk averse, “weaving on Ȅȱȱȱę¡ȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȃ ȱȱǯȄȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ second, where they risked not being able to make a living during hard ǯȱȱ£ǰȱȱȱĴȬȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ¡ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱĞȱ ¢ȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱěǰȱęȱ ȱȱȱǯȱ
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Rural weavers, having entered into a contractual relationship with their merchant employers, lost their independence. As a result, they had to rely ȱȱĴȬȱęȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱmation. In other words, the weavers withdrew from the production of ȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ merchant entrepreneurs. There were many weavers, a situation that made ȱ ¡¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ĴȬȱ ęǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ bargaining power of weavers transacting with merchant employers was weak. Between them, however, their contractual trust meant that weavers depended on merchants who also counted on weavers for the woven ǯȱȱȱęȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŗşŞŝǼȱȱȱ the three meanings of bao (ࣙ, ֱ, ฅǼǰȱ ȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱ can be extended to denote contracts based on trust, clientage-patronage, and reciprocity. Chinese business institutions functioned in Wei’s handweaving industry to give strong incentives for households to transact in myriad contractual relationships that made for a highly competitive market for yarn and handloom cloth. ȱĴȬȱęȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ were not involved in the production process. In reality, they coordinated production from outside, and the small producers still possessed their own means of production. The contract-weaving system did not change family production, nor did it bring about any technological or qualitaȱǯȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱĜ¢ǰȱȱ work schedules, and the waste of materials in transit and product adulȱǻȱŗşŝŚǰȱŜřǼǯȱȱǰȱȱĴȬȱ¢ȱȱĴȱ hand weaving was integrated with workshop production. Many weaving ȱȱȱ ȱȱĴȬȱęǯ ¢ǰȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ from the market without transforming their business into a modern-style manufacturing enterprise. Because of the risks involved in the cloth trade, cloth and yarn merchants, especially the powerful among them, usually saved part of their capital for other investments. For instance, among the ȱȱ¢ȱęǰȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ such as groceries or native products. Most yarn wholesalers engaged in ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻ ȱȱŗşřŚǰȱřŝDzȱŗşřśǰȱ ŞŝǼǯȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ trade in leather and still held on to these businesses as sidelines while ȱȱ¢ȱǻ çȱȱŗşŚřǰȱşşǼǯȱ Besides supplying yarn, traditional banking performed another funcȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱęǯȱȱȱȱǻȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŚŘŜǰŖŖŖȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşřŚDzȱ ȱ ȱ Āȱ
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çȱȱǰȱ Āȱȱ£ȱçȱŗşŚŘǰȱŗřŗǼǰȱȱęȱ overtook other sources of traditional credit and became the main crediȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǯȱȬęȱȱȱ banking functions to the handloom cloth business, taking deposits from local cloth and yarn dealers and advancing them loans. They also cashed Ğȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ purchases from other districts, a service that was also extended to itinerant traders. These banking houses were agents in other areas as well and ȱȱȂȱ¡ȱ¢ȱȱǻȱ ȱŗşřŝǰȱŝŖȮŝŘDzȱ
ȱ ȱ ŗşřśǰȱ ŞŝDzȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşřśǰȱ ŚŘŝśDzȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ħȱ ŗşřŚǰȱ ŗŗŘȮŗŗřǰȱ ŗŗŜDzȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ŗşŚŘǰȱ śśDzȱ ȱĀȱçȱȱǰȱ Āȱȱ£ȱçȱŗşŚŘǰȱ ŗřŗȮŗřŚǰȱŘŞŗǰȱŘŞřǰȱŘŞŜDzȱ çȱȱŗşŚřǰȱŗŘŚǼǯȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱęǰȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ abundant funds and control of yarn, were able to exercise power over other cloth merchants and over the entire cloth production business in the weaving area. The powerful position of these yarn wholesalers went unchallenged in Wei’s commercial circles until the early 1930s. At that time, the Japanese yarn-selling agents became the main yarn suppliers of the area. Starting in 1931, the wholesale yarn sector was dominated by an agent of the Japanese textile enterprises called Ruixiang ⨲⼹. The Japanese took over the function of the Chinese merchants, linking the fac¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĞȱȱȱǯȱ¡ȱ received yarn directly from the Japanese mills in Qingdao for distribution ȱȂȱ ȱǯȱȱȱ ȱȱĜȱȱ to bypass all intermediaries and even evade Chinese taxes, it could afȱȱěȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱǻ¢ȱȱ¢ħȱŗşřŚǰȱŗŖŘǰȱ ŗŗśǰȱŗŗŞDzȱȱ ȱŗşřŝǰȱşŘǼǯȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ limit their wholesaling business and make banking their main enterprise ǻȱ ȱŗşřŝDzȱȱ¡ȱŗşřŚǼǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ market apparently represents political interference into the market to create a more favorable condition for Japanese business interests. A survey conducted by Japanese in the early 1940s indicated that these ¢ȱęȱ¡ęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱnese merchant capital. This survey indicated that, as a whole, the composition of personally owned and borrowed capital showed “the usurious ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȅȱ ǻȱ Āȱ çȱ ȱǰȱ ȱȱ£ȱçȱŗşŚŘǰȱřřŞȮřŚŖDzȱ çȱȱŗşŚřǰȱ ŚŘȮŚřǼǯȱȱǰȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ capital and the other of borrowed capital, the percentages of the two parts ȱȱŘşǯŗƖȱȱȱęȱȱŝŖǯşƖȱȱȱȱǻȱĀȱ çȱ ȱ ǰȱ Āȱ ȱ £ȱ çȱ ŗşŚŘǰȱ řřŚȮřřŜDzȱ çȱ
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ȱŗşŚřǰȱřşǼǯȱ ȱȱȱȱęȱȱǻǯǯǰȱȱ from modern banks, traditional banking houses, pawnshops, individual ¢ȱ ǰȱ ǯǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ȱęȱȱȱȱDzȱȱȱȱDzȱȱ¢ments from buyers; support from owners, branches, and joint enterprises; ȱDzȱǯǼǰȱȱȱȱǰȱǰȱȱȱ ęȱǻȱĀȱçȱȱǰȱ Āȱȱ£ȱçȱ ŗşŚŘǰȱřŚŖȮřŚřDzȱ çȱȱŗşŚřǰȱŚřȮŚŚǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ borrowed capital, deposits occupied the highest percentage, amounting ȱ śŚǯřƖȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ęȱ and yarn and cloth peddlers, and deposits from prominent wealthy peasǰȱǰȱĜǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǯȱ ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢Ȃȱȱ ȱęǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱęǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ relative or friend of the investor or else had to apply through a guarantor.
ǰȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱęȱ¢ȱǻȱ Āȱçȱȱǰȱ Āȱȱ£ȱçȱŗşŚŘǰȱřŚŘȮřŚřǼǯȱ The large percentage of borrowed capital in the total capital assets of ȱ¢ȱęȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǯȱȱȱęǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱers: 70 percent was distributed to the owner and 30 percent to the manǯȱ ȱ ȱ Ğȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱĀȱçȱȱǰȱ Āȱȱ£ȱçȱŗşŚŘǰȱ řŝŝȮřŝşDzȱ çȱȱŗşŚřǰȱŝŞȮŝşǼǯȱǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱĴȱȱment its own capital assets. On the composition of total assets, the Japanese survey showed that ȱȱ¢ȱęȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱę¡ȱȱȱculating assets. On average, circulating assets occupied 94 percent of the ǰȱȱ¢ȱŜȱȱȱę¡ȱȱǻȱĀȱçȱȱǰȱ Āȱȱ£ȱçȱŗşŚŘǰȱřŚśȮřŚŜDzȱ çȱȱŗşŚřǰȱ ŚŝȮŚŞǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱę¡ȱǰȱȱ¢ȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱǻȱ Āȱçȱȱǰȱ Āȱȱ£ȱçȱŗşŚŘǰȱřŜřDzȱ çȱ ȱŗşŚřǰȱŜśǼǯȱȱȱę¡ȱȱȱȱĚ¡¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱ ǰȱ ȱ Ě¡¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ could easily retreat to another business when the yarn market contracted. Under these conditions, few yarn shops had long-term plans or consistent policies. Yarn dealing had long been a risky enterprise and was highly sensitive to market conditions, especially when yarn merchants had to depend on Japanese mills for supplies. To avoid total bankruptcy in times of
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crisis, most yarn dealers also engaged in various sideline businesses such as trade in cloth, grain, and paper. The Japanese accounts of the Chinese yarn business suggest on the one hand the vulnerability and limitation of the sector and on the other hand the rationality of risk aversion among these Chinese merchants in response to the unstable market environment. ȱǰȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱęǰȱȱȱ and informal exchange relations continued to function. These established institutions coexisted with emerging organizations such as the contractual system that characterized the new handloom cloth business. Chinese yarn wholesalers, dependent on Japanese mills for factory yarn supplies, ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱǯȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱęǰȱ ȱ¢Ȭ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱ and yarn supplies. They entered into contractual relationships with rural weaving households and functioned to advance yarn to weavers, to control the products’ quality, and to extend the cloth market. Nevertheless, ¢ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ĴȬȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱĴȬȂȱȱ ȱȱ Ȭ£ȱ ȱȱȱ ȬĜȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ form of business that merchant capitalists could achieve. This was already ȱȱǯȱȱȱǰȱȱĴȬȱ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ¡ȱ ¢ǰ7 ǰȱȱȱǯȱȂȱ ȱǻŗşŞŗǰȱŗşşśǰȱŘŖŖśǼǰȱȱȱȱ that equipped Chinese society with an incentive structure for adapting to changing economic circumstances at the critical juncture of the early twentieth century. In Wei’s case, the system does seem to have enabled ȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱęȱĚ¡¢ȱȱȱ traditional mode of production. ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱěȱĴ¢ȱȂȱ¢ȱvailed. Weaving households produced the bulk of the cloth on the market. Most of these direct producers remained as part-time peasant weavers Ĵȱȱȱǯȱ¢ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱĴȱȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ To compound the problem, they were not able to sell their woven fabric beyond the local market unless through merchants in one way or another. Nor did they have enough capital to stockpile their products in times of ȱȱĴȱȱǯȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱing problems of the family production system, the merchants did play an important role not only in distributing the new material but also in buying ŝȲȱ I am indebted to James Kung and Tomoko Shiroyama for this connection. See, for example, Abe Takeshi 1989; Nishikawa Shunsaku and Abe Takeshi 1990, 193–198.
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ȱęȱȱǻȱŗşŝśǰȱŗşŖȮŗşŗǼǯȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ǰȱ¢ȱȱĴȬȱǰȱȱȱĞȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱtween merchant capital and the small peasant economy. The proliferation of handloom cloth production did increase wealth ȱ¡ȱ ǰȱ¢ǰȱęǰȱȱĴȬȱǯȱ
Ȭ ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ£ǰȱ¢ȱ¡ǰȱȱĴȬȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱǯȱ The new enterprises also provided small peasant-weavers with income, always in cash, thus helping them to survive. This was no small achievement.8 Actually, the symbiotic interrelationship between merchant capital, Chinese as well as foreign, and the small peasant economy in Wei County constituted a complex, productive market economy of considerable adaptability. Conclusion Wei County experienced a large economic transformation in the 1920s and ¢ȱŗşřŖǯȱȱĞȱŗşřŜǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ place. During the rise of the Wei County native cloth industry, local entrepreneurs did not have the technical and organizational capabilities to inteȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǻȱ ȱŘŖŖŘǼǯȱstead, they behaved as competing players in a highly competitive market that was only partly integrated. The most resourceful players invested in ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĞȱȱǰȱ but many integrated some processing stages, showing that transformation costs could be slightly reduced per unit of output through factor productivity and modest economies of scale. Wei’s commercialization in the twentieth century took place because commerce and manufacturing coexisted in a low-cost labor market. This arrangement enabled modest economies of scale and improved factor productivity. This production system, however, did not greatly change ȱ ǯȱ ȱ Ğȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ the county, there were still peasant-weavers living at home and working at this occupation. But where merchants integrated and coordinated more input exchanges for the production of native cloth and the repair and replacement of ȱ ȱ ĴȬȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ transaction and transformation costs per unit of marketed output. As a ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ¢ȱ Ğȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱěǯȱǰȱȱȱ ŞȲȱ
ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŘǰȱŘŗŞȮŘŚŞDzȱȱȱŘŖŖŝǰȱǯȱŜǼǯ
ȱ¢ȂȱĴȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱ
117
ȱ Ĵȱ ¡ȱ ¢ȱ Ěǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱĴȱȱȱȂȱȱ¡ȱ manufacturing sector.
SIX
Chinese Farmer Rationality and the Agrarian Economy of the Lower Yangzi in the 1930s
ȱ Ȭ ȱ ǰȱȱȬȱǰȱȱ ȱ
A prominent theme in the economic history of contemporary China revolves around the contentious issue of why China did not experience a qualitative breakthrough or “transformative growth” during at least the ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŚşȱ ǻ ȱ ŗşŞśǰȱ ŗşşŖDzȱ£ȱŘŖŖŖDzȱȱŗşşŝǼǯȱ One theory has it that China’s inability to experience rapid economic growth was because of irrational social constraints on women in the forȱȱȱǻ ȱŗşşŖǼǯȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ high wages for men and blocked the formation of capitalist “managerial farms,”1 the low opportunity costs for women and their struggle for subsistence combined to push them into household production for cash ǯȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȯȱĴȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ¢ǯȱ Whereas income-augmenting activities may have raised total household income, the greater labor intensity they entailed allegedly brought diminishing returns to the marginal product of women’s labor. Total output growth only kept pace with population growth, a process described ¢ȱȱȱȱȃ ȱ ȱȄȱȱȃȄȱǻ ȱ ŗşşŖǼǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǯ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŗşŞśǼǰȱ ȱ ȃȱ Ȅȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ production in that its owner hired wage laborers and paid them the marginal product. This enabled them to avoid the allegedly sharply diminishing marginal returns that many small peasant farms—which relied on their own family members for labor—typically encountered, to the extent that they applied “excessive” labor to their small plots. ŗȲȱ
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Another view, the “modernization policies” approach, does not agree that rural institutions and socioeconomic class relations were barriers to economic development. Citing the development experiences of Taiwan and the Liaodong Peninsula of mainland China in the early-to-mid twentieth century as evidence, this school of thought argues the importance of ěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻ¢ȱȱ ȱŗşŜŚDzȱ¢ȱȱȱŗşŝŘǼǯȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱ increase yields and specializing in production for the market could have raised land and labor productivity and increased income, if two policy conditions were met. First, the land survey, and, with its completion, the land tax reform, could clarify ownership and provide added security to property rights in land, thereby facilitating land market transactions. Secǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ development in agriculture—essentially a seed-fertilizer revolution—and established agricultural experimental stations to disseminate new farming ¢ǰȱǰȱȱȱħȱ ǰȱȱȃ ȱǯȄȱȱ public goods were essential for modernizing Chinese farming.2 China’s failure to transform its small family farms must be understood by the Republican government’s failure to adopt appropriate policies as in Taiwan and on the Liaodong Peninsula under the Japanese colonial regime. There is then a third—essentially “Smithian”—“commercialization” approach, one that sees “commercialization,” or specialization and exchange with increasing returns to scale and the development of markets, as central to agricultural modernization. According to this view, agricultural transformation depends not so much on raising farm yields as on, through the development of markets, using specialization and exchange ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱěȬȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ to scale as primary economic decision-making units become more specialized in response to commercialization. The highly competitive nature of both factor and product markets in China in the early twentieth century, ȱȱ¢ȱǻŗşŝŖǼǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ in farm household income before the Japanese invasion can be interpreted as a result of this increased specialization, though far from being a breakthrough in the economy. In short, there are three approaches to looking into the Chinese agricultural economy in the early twentieth century: involution and underdevelopment theory, institutions and policies theory, and commercialization ¢ǯȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ŘȲȱ The Green Revolution is a shorthand referral to the large increase in mainly grain (rice ȱ Ǽȱ¢ȱȱȱŗşŜŖȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȬ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ and of chemical fertilizers in a context of improved irrigation and mechanization (Farmer ŗşŞŜDzȱȱŗşŝŚǼǯ
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breakthrough, whereas the last one explores the improvement without a ȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ market or the people who made choices but rather a lack of institutions and policies. Although the involution theory has inspired a large body of literature on China’s economic development, and it is imperative to compute the marginal product of labor of each economically active household memȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ this undertaking due to the paucity of good-quality data. Moreover, the other two approaches previously mentioned also generate an interest in the economic behaviors of farm households. The institutions and policy theory requires data on whether farm households allocated their land and ȱ¢ȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ ǻĴȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ŗşŝŗǼǰ3 whereas the commercialization approach tries to document the active and competitive operations of factor and product markets before the late 1930s as indirect proof that, because farm households had alternative outlets for their surplus labor, the kind of ȃȄȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¡ȱ ǻȱŗşŞŝDzȱ¢ȱŗşŝŖǼǯ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢¢ȱǰȱȱȱęȱǰȱȱȱ farm survey conducted in the late 1920s in the Lower Yangzi. With this set of data, we can address several important related issues similar to those of the third approach outlined here, using a method broadly consistent ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǻŗşŝŗǼǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ economic context in which farm households operated so as to understand the employment and income opportunities actually available to those households. Second, we explore two questions: Did economic exchange— either transacted through the market or organized within the family (such ȱȱȱȱǼȯȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ǰȱȱȱǻȱȱǼȱȱȱȱǵȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ regarding the resources allocated to both income and basic consumption? Although our empirical results should not be taken as an outright rejection of the involution thesis (which we do not think we have formally Ǽǰȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǻŗşŝŗǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱ of China were increasing welfare in a way consistent with economic ra¢ǯȱ ę¢ǰȱ £ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǻŗşŝŗǼȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¡£ȱ ¢ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱęȱ¢ȱęȱěȱ between the two. This leads them to conclude that farm households had been allocating their ȱ ȱĜ¢ǯ řȲȱ
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regional economy, with factor and product markets behaving competitively, and family farms, as the primary economic organizations, adjusting to “changing relative prices” by reallocating household resources. One ¢ȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȯ¢ȱȱśŖȱȱȱŗşŘşȱȱŗşřŜȱǻȱȱȱ¢ȱ ŗŖȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱŗşŚŞǼȯȱȱȱ economic rationality and to the market development that we see in the ȱǻ ǰȱǰȱȱȱŘŖŖśǼǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱęȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǻȱȱȱȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ¢ǰȱȱȯȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǼǰȱȱtinctly higher economic development there implies that chances for farm households to “involute” there would be less—at least when compared with the north of China. It is from this vantage point that Wuxi provides a good case for testing the involution hypothesis. ȱȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱ capita income; they also have equity implications. Although the ownership distribution of land and probably other assets might have been very unequal in this highly commercialized region of China, operated holdings ȱ ę¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯ4 This implies that the intrinsically unequal distribution of land was moderated because of the active operations of the land rental market. Moreover, with alternative income sources, except those provided by land, total income inequality would be distinctly lower than land inequality. Though we paint a generally positive picture of the Jiangnan economy in early twentieth-century China, it is important to bear in mind that rational economic behavior at the microeconomic level is not enough to modernize traditional agriculture. Because technological and organizational innovations entail “public goods,” they can be supplied only by government actions—an insight inspiringly demonstrated by the modernization breakthrough approach. Why the Republican government of China failed to bring about this innovation is an important research topic, but it is beyond the scope of this chapter. ȱȱ¡ȱǰȱ ȱĚ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱ A descriptive analysis of the land rental and pawning market follows. The labor market, which includes not only the farm labor market, but more ¢ȱ ȱ ěȬȱ ȯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ily production of sericulture—is the subject of the next section. We then analyze the factors determining the choices of farm households in allocating family resources among the various economic activities listed in the “Operated holdings” refer to the total acreage a household cultivated, which could be larger than the amount of land it owned in the event this household rented more land for cultivation, or smaller if a household let others farm part of it in exchange for a rental payment. ŚȲȱ
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¢ǯȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱ and basic staple consumption or, in short, economic welfare and then close with a short summary and conclusion. The Data Our data are based on a two-part farm survey of nine representative vilȱǻȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǼȱȱ¡ȱ ¢ȱ ǻęǯȱ ŜǯŗǼǯȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ¢ȱȱ Ȃȱ ȱȱȱȱǻǼȱȱȱ¢ȱŗşŘşȱǻȱŗşřŖǼǯȱȱ second part was conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Science’s ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ Ǽȱ ȱ ŗşśŞǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşřŖȱȱŗşŚŖȱǻȱŗşśŞǼǯȱȱȱȱŗşśŞȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ to eleven originally surveyed villages with basically the same questionnaire and asked the respondents to provide them with answers for the ¢ȱ ŗşřŜȱ ȱ ŗşŚŞǯȱ ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ enumerated around eight hundred households. The two parts together ȱ ȱ ȱ ȯŗşŘşǰȱ ŗşřŜǰȱ ȱ ŗşŚŞǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ this survey is that all 1,207 households in these villages were studied. Although others have made use of this survey information, they did not ana¢£ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǻȱŗşşşDzȱȱȱŘŖŖŘǼǯś There are three distinct advantages in using this survey information. First, we can construct a panel data set by merging the information of various years and thus can track changes in a village’s economic structure and in peasant welfare over two decades. Second, the survey was conducted in a prosperous county in China’s most advanced region—the ȱ£ȯȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱmercialization on peasant economic behavior. Third, although the SSRI survey did not cover a geographical area as wide or diverse, or sample as many households, as the surveys conducted by John Lossing Buck and his Chinese associates at Nanking University,Ŝȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱ sampling7 or underenumeration of small farms.8 ȱǰȱȱȱǻŗşşşǼȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱŗşŘşȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱǻŘŖŖŘǼȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǯ ŜȲȱ ȱȱȱęȱ¢ȱȱŗşŘŘȱȱŗşŘŚȱȱŘǰŞşşȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǻŗşřŖǼǯȱ
ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱŗşŘşȱȱŗşřřǰȱȱŗŜǰŝŞŜȱȱȱȱ ¢Ȭ two provinces and was published in 1937. ŝȲȱ ȱ ¡ǰȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ęȱ ¢ȱ ȱ şȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ Řȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ surveyed, at one extreme, whereas 102 households in a village were interviewed, at the other extreme. In his second survey, only 1 household was interviewed in 21 of the 101 villages, whereas in each of the 2 other villages 100 households were surveyed. There is no sampling issue for the SSRI data, since the surveys covered the entire selected villages. ŞȲȱ This may explain why farm size per capita was as large as 7.4 mu in the 1930s in Buck’s ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ Ĵȱ ȱ řȱ muǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ śȲȱ
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ȱŜǯŗǯȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ
The SSRI survey was designed to categorize variables by the followDZȱȱȱǻǰȱǰȱȱ£ǼǰȱȱȱǻǰȱǰȱȱǼǰȱȱ ȱ ǻǰȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽǰȱ ȱ ǻ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ĴǼǰȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ¡ȱ the factor markets as they were described in the surveyed villages. Land Markets in Wuxi Size Distribution and Land Rental The land rental market must be examined in the context of how much arable land was available in the Jiangnan region and where arable land was ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ by the turn of the twentieth century was exceedingly small—about a mu ŗǯŞȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱŗşřŖȱǻȱ ȱ ŗşşŖǼǯȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ behavior occurred only on the small peasant farms.
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ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ŗşşŜDzȱ ȱ ŗşşŖǼǯ9 Moreover, the farms were ¢ȱǯȱȱȱȱȃ¢£ȱȄȱȱęȱ¢ȱȱ SSRI survey, which found that average per capita arable land in this highly commercialized area was 1.2 muȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŘşȱ ȱ ŗşřŝǯȱ ę¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱŜŖȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŗȱmu, whereas about 19 percent owned from 1 to 2 muȱȱȱŗşŘşȱȱŗşřŜǯȱȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ĜȱȱȱǯȱȱŖǯŜȱȱȱŗşŘşȱȱŗşřŜǰȱȱȱȱ enough to lend credence to the conventional view that landownership distribution was very unequal. ȱȱěȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱ meant that as much as half of the cultivated land—42 percent according ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱŜŜȱȱȱȱ ȱ researchers—was rentedȱǻȱȱŗşşŜDzȱ ȱŗşşŖǼǯȱȱȱęing lies somewhere in between but is closer to that of the former survey; ȱǰȱŜŘǯŜƖȱȱŗşŘşǰȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¡ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱǻȱŜǯŗǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ŝŞǯŜƖȱ ȱ ŗşŘşȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ rental market as buyers, compared with a mere 11 to 13 percent of ownersuppliers in this market. The vast discrepancy between the two sides of the market—whether measured by the quantity of land rented or by the number of households participating—is consistent with an earlier view that many landlords were absentees. Although land rental transactions had declined slightly, substantial proportions of households continued to adjust their operated holdings through the rental market in the ensuing ȯŝŝǯŝƖȱȱŗşřŜȱȱŝŖǯŗƖȱȱŗşŚŞǯ Although some may regard a highly active land rental market in Wuxi ȱȱȱȱȬęȱȱ ȱȱ¡ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ surplus land, it could also mean that households with surplus laborers could avoid overworking their land through land renting. The Gini coefęȱȱȱȱȱȱȃȄȱȯ ȱȱ rented land—is only 0.4, which is substantially smaller than that based ȱ ȱ ǻŖǯŜǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ£ȱěȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȯȱȱȱȱȯ ȱĴȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ǯ10 This opportunity ȱȬęȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱplus farm workers have few outside wage-earning opportunities, since One muȱȱŖǯŖŜŜŝȱǯ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŗşşŘǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ dzǽ Ǿȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȄȱǻŗŞşȮŗşŖǼǯ şȲȱ
ŗŖȲȱ
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that opportunity allows them to expand farm operations and more fully use family surplus labor, thereby preventing the marginal product of their ȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȯ an important “symptom” of involution. Table 6.1. Land Rental and Pawning Markets in Wuxi County 1929
1936
1948
Percentage of households participating in (a) the land rental market in*
78.6
77.7
70.1
out
13.2
11.8
13.9
1.2
0.8
2.3
out
17.1
13.2
3.5
in
62.6
61.2
38.9
out
15.2
15.1
15.5
(b) the pawning market in Percentage of (a) land rented
(b) land pawned in
0.20
0.24
0.60
11.22
7.75
1.42
5.53
4.51
5.63
in
3.46
2.76
2.19
out
0.84
0.68
0.87
in
0.01
0.01
0.03
out
0.62
0.35
0.08
out Amount of land owned (in mu) (a) rented
(b) pawned
Source: SSRI (1929, 1958). * “Rent in” refers to the demand for rental land, whereas “rent out” refers to the supply of rental land.
Land Pawning Compared with the land rental market, the market for pawning was smaller. For example, though nearly half the land cultivated in Wuxi in 1929 was rented, only 11% was pawned out in the same year (table 6.1). Similarly, compared with 78.6% of households having reported to have
ŗŘŜ
Kung, Lee, and Bai
ȱȱǰȱ¢ȱŗŝǯŗƖȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǯ11 Unlike the land rental market, where most participated on the demand side of the market, land pawning was more active on the supply side. Once again, the ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱĚȱȱȱȱȱ an “absentee landlord” class and the fact that pawning was an important means of informal credit to which capital-constrained farm households Ğȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ was pawned to a fellow villager, the party who pawned out the land could lose its cultivation right to the family advancing the loan to it, whereas an absentee landlord would allow a debtor household to continue to farm the ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱŘŖŖřǼǯȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ the possibility that pawning could eventually lead to an outright land sale ěȱȱȱȱǯȱ To the extent that pawning represented an important source of credit ȱȬȱǰȱȱ¢ȱ ȱĞȱȱȱȱȱ expansion of sericulture in those land pockets where soil characteristics were especially well suited for mulberry tree cultivation. The availability of credit was important, since it helped families who wanted to develop a sideline in sericulture but were unable to purchase mulberry leaves for ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ȱ haps also helped them purchase charcoal for maintaining warmer room temperature during the winter. This cash availability is crucial in a context ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱǻŗşşŜǼǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĞȱȱ in the Lower Yangzi as dependent mainly on loans that pledged land as collateral—a practice very popular during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Labor Markets in Wuxi Farm Labor Economic historians view the farm labor market in the Lower Yangzi as highly inactive, in sharp contrast to the land rental market in Wuxi. The agricultural year-labor market is considered exceedingly thin because most ŗŗȲȱ Both the incidence and magnitude of pawning out land had, however, waned over time. ȱ ȱ ŗşŘşǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ŗřȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱŗşřŜǰȱȱȱȱȱȱŘśȱǰȱȱ¢ȱŗşŚŞȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ řǯśƖǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşřŖȱ ȱ¢ȱȱĴȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱěȬȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ¢ȱĴǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱ ŗşşŜǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ Ğȱ ŗşřŝȱ ¢ȱ decade-long warfare was probably another factor that discouraged absentee landlords from further accumulating land.
Chinese Farmer Rationality
127
farms were small and fragmented, as managerial farms simply did not ¡ȱȱȱȱǻ ȱŗşşŖǼǯ12 The Mantetsu data that Cao Xingsui ǻŗşşŜǼȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱcluding those with land exceeding 20 mu, relied mainly on their own family labor power. Only exceptionally large farms—those with more than 10 mu per capita—were found to have hired any year laborers. The bulk of farm labor hiring thus took the form of casual or day labor during peak agricultural seasons. But, the number of days hired was just as limited; according to the Mantetsu survey of eleven villages, the average number of days hired out per worker was only seventeen for the entire year for this kind of labor, obviously too few to be relied on as a major income source. ȱȱ¢ȱȱęȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ ȱȱȱǻȱŜǯŘǼǯȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȱȱveyed year in which the demand for agricultural year-labor market was ȱȱȱǻŗşŘşǼǰȱ¢ȱŝǯŚƖȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ those that did, the number of laborers hired was small—less than 0.12 person per household in all surveyed years. This market was even thinner ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ DZȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ŗşŘşǰȱ ¢ȱ ŘǯşƖȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ on average.13 This imbalance between the two sides of the long-term farm ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ę¢ȱ ȱ the supplying households, has two important implications.14ȱ ȱ ęȱ is that the local labor market was providing employment opportunities for peasants from outside the villages—from villages that might be even ȱǻȱȱŗşřśǰȱřŗǼǯȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ participated in this labor market, indicating that alternative employment ȱ¡ȱ ȱ¢ȱĴȱȯȱȱ lay outside the farm sector. In sharp contrast, the day-labor market was far more active. In 1929, the ȱȱ¢ǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱŚŝǯŜƖǰȱȱ¢ȱ laborers. Depending on how we count the number of days for which this kind of labor was hired, the unconditional mean is about nineteen days, ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱęǯȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ those households that hired short-term farm laborers, the mean number of days hired soars to a substantial forty-one, which was more than double ŗŘȲȱ Managerial farms probably existed for two centuries from the late Ming to the late Qing in the Lower Yangzi but disappeared toward the early twentieth century for many reasons, among which prohibitive supervision cost, high wage cost, and higher relative returns to ȱȱȱęȱ ȱ¢ȱǻȱȱŗşşŜDzȱ ȱŗşşŖǼǯ ŗřȲȱ ȱȱŚŞśȱȱ¢ȱȱŗşŘşǰȱȱǻŘǯşƖǼȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱŖǯŖřȱȱȱȱǻŗŚȱȱ¢ȱŚŞśǼǯȱ ŗŚȲȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĚȱȱȱ fact that those who hired in had larger farms.
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the magnitude of that found by the Japanese researchers. Similar to what we found with the year labor market, proportionately more households ȱȱǻŚŞȱǼȱȱȱȱǻŘřȱǼǰȱȱȱȱveyed villages provided this kind of employment opportunity to villagers ȱȱǻȱŜǯŘǼǯȱ ȱŜǯŘǯȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ¢ 1929
ŗşřŜ
1948
Percentage of households participating in day labor market year labor market
hired in
ŚŝǯŜ
37.7
38.8
hired out
23.1
ŘśǯŘ
28.2
hired in
7.4
3.7
4.4
hired out
2.9
2.9
1.7
Average number of persons hired in the year labor market: hired in
0.12
ŖǯŖŜ
ŖǯŖŜ
hired out
0.03
0.04
0.02
Average number of persons hired in the day labor market: hired in
19.4
ŗŜǯř
ŗŚǯŜ
hired out
11.2
11.3
12.3
Source:ȱȱǻŗşŘşǰȱŗşśŞǼǯȱ
ěȬȱǰȱǰȱȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ing peak agricultural periods is consistent with the observation concerning the dearth of managerial farms in the Lower Yangzi. Moreover, the fact that more than 80 percent of surveyed households were engaged in seriȱȱŗşŘşȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȂȱȱȱǻȱŜǯřǼǯȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱǰȱ the overall lack of demand for year farm labor and the undersized farms in Wuxi together suggest that even male workers would have been severely underemployed if alternative income opportunities were seriously lacking. A typical trait of small peasant farms is their reliance on a combinaȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ maximization. Chinese farmers in the Republican period—in the Lower Yangzi at least—were no exception. To increase income subject to availȱ ȱ ȱ ǻǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ Ǽǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ of the surveyed villages allocated their members among a variety of
Chinese Farmer Rationality
129
income-generating activities, besides farming their undersized farms and engaging in the household sideline of sericulture. Whereas long-term farm labor work may not have been easy to come by, there were abundant ¢ȱȱȱȱěȬȱǯȱȱŜǯřȱ ǰȱȱ¡ample, that roughly half the households had a nonfarm job in the local ¢ǯȱȱě¢ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ engaged in this kind of work, suggesting just how widely available such ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŘŖǯȱ er, though there were plenty of employment opportunities, only a few households had their own family businesses or had members possessing the knowledge and skills needed to become school teachers or medical ȱǻȱȃȄǼǯȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ much as 28 percent of households had reported at least one family member working outside the village as a migrant worker, a substantial proportion of the farm households in Wuxi in the 1930s had a wide array of income opportunities besides rice or wheat cultivation and sericulture. This ¡ȱȱęȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȯ¢ȱ in response to a secular decline in the prices of silk and cocoon—and rise in emigration.ŗś Taken together, the evidence of farmers reallocating their family resources in accord with relative price changes suggests that they were behaving in a way consistent with economic rationality. The concomitant participation of Wuxi villagers in both local and nonȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ China’s largest metropolis and to the emergence of Wuxi as another growing city in the Lower Yangzi region, second only to Shanghai (Cao XingȱŗşşŜDzȱȱŗşŞşDzȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱȱ¡ȱŗşŞŝDzȱȱȱ ŘŖŖŘǼǯȱȂȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱŗşřŖȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ from within Jiangsu Province seeking work opportunities.ŗŜ Many from the southern part of the province (Sunan 㯛फǼǰȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȱȱ ŗśȲȱ The heyday of sericulture appears to have been around the 1910s. For example, in 1913, nearly all farm households in Wuxi engaged in sericulture, with some allocating 30 percent of their arable land to the cultivation of mulberry trees, whose leaves provided ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ŗşşśDzȱ ȱ ȱ ŘŖŖŘǰȱ ǯȱ ŘǼǯȱ ȱ ŗşŘşǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ŘşǯŞƖȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŞŞǰȱ řřǼǯȱĞȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ peaked and began to decline on a secular basis, and by the early 1930s net income from sericulture allegedly fell to levels similar to those of rice-wheat farming. Further, as cocoon ȱȱȱȱȱȱŗşřŖȱȱŗşŚŖȱǻȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢Ǽǰȱ¡ȱȱ began, in earnest, converting the mulberry land into rice paddy and reduced their labor and £ȱȱ¢ȱǻȱ ǰȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱŗşŞŞǰȱřśȮřŜDzȱȱ ȱŘŖŖŘǰȱǯȱŘǼǯ ŗŜȲȱ Because of in-migration, the population of Shanghai grew from less than half a million to over three million in the century between roughly the 1840s and 1940s.
130
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factories or worked as sales clerks in department stores or as servers at hotels, whereas their northern counterparts found employment in dockyards or worked as rickshaw pullers and housekeepers (Zhang Zhongmin 2002, ǯȱśǼǯ17ȱȱ ȱĚȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȬ¢ȱȱ tailors, cobblers, peddlers, and the like. ȱ Ŝǯřǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡Ȃȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǻȱ ȱ Ǽ 1929
ŗşřŜ
1948
Percentage of farm households with members engaged in ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱǻǼ
śŗǯř
48.2
32.0
teaching and medical professions
ŗǯŜ
ŗǯŜ
Ŗǯś
family business
0.2
ŖǯŜ
0.7
ȱȱȱȱĴ¢ȱ
11.1
11.3
8.9
sericulture
81.0
ŝŘǯŜ
ŜŖǯş
Average number of family members engaged in local wage employment
ŖǯśŞ
ŖǯśŚ
ŖǯřŜ
teaching and medical professions
0.02
0.02
0.01
family business
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.12
0.12
0.09
N/A
N/A
N/A
ȱȱȱȱĴ¢ȱ sericulture Source:ȱȱǻŗşŘşǰȱŗşśŞǼǯ
A similar process was at work in Wuxi. Although wages in Wuxi were not as high as those in Shanghai, its development in the 1920s from a market town into a medium-sized city with modern textile, food-processing, ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ěȬȱ ¢ȱ ǻȱȱŗşşśǼǯȱȱǰȱȱ£ȱȱȱ£ȱȱerated many self-employment opportunities for carpenters, cooks, tailors, ȱȱǻȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱŗşşŜǼǯȱ ȱ ǰȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱǻŗşŞŞǰȱřŘǼǰȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ of Wuxi people to compete with their counterparts from the north (Subei 㯛࣫Ǽȱȱ ȱ pulling. ŗŝȲȱ
Chinese Farmer Rationality
131
In summary, both the land and labor markets in the Wuxi economy appear to have operated actively in the 1920s and 1930s, before the Japanese military invasion and the resulting economic disruptions. Whereas land and other endowments were unequally distributed across farm households, the active operations of land and nonfarm labor in particular ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ their endowment characteristics, thereby reducing the incentive to behave as they would under involution. Why Did Households Participate in Land and Labor Markets? ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȬĜȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱǯȱȱ¡ǰȱȱĴȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱȱhold, it gains by hiring workers if it does not have enough family laborers ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ ¢ǰȱȱĴȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱęȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȂȱǯȱȱ ȱȯ£ȱ¢ȱěȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȯȱ¢ȱęȱȱȱȱȱket for labor exchange. In principle, a household, like any economic unit, ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȬęȱǰȱ for example, may rent in land to meet the consumption requirements of its “surplus” members or it may hire out in the labor market; either choice helps to increase income. This economic principle does not fundamentally change even in a complex economy including jobs other than farm work, ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŗǼȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǻŘǼȱ ȱȱȱȂȱǰȱ one can choose to work outside of farming. ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŘŖǰȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ menu of employment choices to Lower Yangzi villagers. As mentioned in the previous section, many nonfarm occupations were already available; in fact, they were even more readily available than long-term farm employment. The issue that we will take up here concerns the bases of farm households’ economic decision making, that is, what determined ȱ ȱ ǻȱ Ǽȱ ȱ ȱ ȯȱ ȱ variable of this analytical exercise. According to conventional economic reasoning, a farm household will premise its choices by both its land and ȱ ȯȱĴȱȱȱ¢ǯȱǰȱȱȱȱěȱȱěȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱ endowments by genderȱǻȱȱȱ¢ȱǼȱȱage (“young” for dependents below a certain working age and “old” for those who have ȱȱȱȱǼǯ18 ŗŞȲȱ We treat those family members not in the working population as “dependents” largely because chances are greater that they are consumers rather than breadwinners in a family.
132
Kung, Lee, and Bai
Economic returns are determined not only by the quantity of labor but also by the “quality,” which economists usually measure by educational Ĵǯȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱtainment of individual household members, there is enough information to compute an average household education index for measuring variaȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱeral, and it can be used to estimate economic returns to education (Kung, ǰȱȱȱŘŖŖśǼǯȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ¡¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ household economic decisions. The results of this multivariate regression ¡ȱȱ£ȱȱȱŜǯŚȱǻȱȱȱȱȱǼȱȱ ȱŜǯśȱǻȱȱȱȱȱȱǼǯ An important conclusion from this analytical exercise is that both household demographics and capital endowment (now referred to as ȃȱ Ȅȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ nomic decisions in Wuxi in the 1930s. Of the four demographic variables, the quantity of male labor played an important role in household deciǯȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱdicted positive direction, that is, the more male laborers in a household, the higher that household’s proclivity to rent in land, but it was also a predictor of pawning activity—an economic activity in which female laȱȱȱęȱȱěǯȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ this decision in order to engage the “surplus” male labor in agricultural ȯȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ of the two purposes of pawning lay in the expansion of farm operations ǻȱȱ ȱ ȱȱǼǯȱȱ¡ȱȱȱęȱȱȱ with greater male labor power were less likely to hire in day laborers to help with time-critical farm tasks during the busy peak agricultural seasons; instead, these households were more likely to hire out to work on other people’s farms.19 Finally, the quantity of male labor also determined nearly all nonfarm labor market participation in the same positive direction, except in the medical and education professions. This is a reasonable result considering that both medicine and teaching are occupations that require above-average human capital. ȱȱĞȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ǰȱȱȃȄȱȱ¢ȱȱ contribute to household income by way of choices households make on how best to use them. ŗşȲȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱ tend to hire in labor gives further support to the idea that labor hiring decisions are predicated mainly by households’ varying labor endowments, particularly those of healthy male laborers.
-1.141 ǻŖǯşŘǼ
ŗǯŜŗŚ
ǻŗǯŚŚǼ
1,287
1,287
ǻŘǯşŜǼ
ǻŚǯŘřǼ
ǻřǯřŚǼ
śǯŝŜŝȘȘȘ
-3.213***
ŘǯŖŞŜȘȘȘ
ǻŘǯŜřǼ
ǻŖǯŝŞǼ
ŚǯşŘŜȘȘȘ
-0.194
ǻŘǯśŗǼ
ǻŜǯşśǼ
ŖǯśřŝȘȘ
-2.383***
ǻŜǯřŗǼ
out
ŗǯŜŗŜȘȘȘ
in
Rental in
1,287
ǻŘǯŗŚǼ
7.184**
ǻŖǯşŖǼ
ŘǯřŜŚ
ǻŗǯşŝǼ
3.310**
ǻŖǯŖŜǼ
ŖǯŖŘś
ǻŘǯřřǼ
1,287
ǻŖǯŖŝǼ
0.230
ǻŗǯŗŜǼ
2.080
ǻŘǯŗřǼ
2.192**
ǻŗǯŖŖǼ
0.338
ǻŖǯşŚǼ
0.333
out
1,287
ǻŗǯŜŜǼ
ŘǯśŖŗȘ
ǻŖǯŗŖǼ
-0.094
ǻŘǯśŜǼ
ŗǯŘŜřȘȘ
ǻřǯŚřǼ
ŖǯśŜŞȘȘȘ
ǻśǯřŜǼ
1,287
ǻŗǯŖşǼ
-1.844
ǻŗǯŗŜǼ
-1.313
ǻŖǯśŗǼ
0.277
ǻŘǯřśǼ
-0.443**
ǻŚǯŜŝǼ
0.942***
out
1,287
ǻŗǯŗşǼ
3.839
ǻŖǯŝśǼ
ŗǯśśŚ
ǻŗǯŝŖǼ
ŘǯřŚśȘ
ǻŖǯśŘǼ
ŖǯŗŜş
ǻŖǯŝŖǼ
ŖǯŘŜŗ
in
1,287
ǻŗǯŗŚǼ
-4.374
ǻŗǯŘŜǼ
-3.289
ǻŘǯŖşǼ
-2.387**
ǻŖǯŘşǼ
ŖǯŖşś
ǻŖǯśŞǼ
0.177
out
Year labor
Farm labor market Day labor
0.974***
in
Participation Pawning ǻȱǼ
0.917**
Land market
Notes: Absolute value of zȱȱȱǯȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱ£ǰȱȱǰȱȱȱ¡ǰȱ distance to the nearest township, and percentage of rice transacted in the market. ȘȱęȱȱŗŖƖDzȱȘȘȱęȱȱśƖDzȱȘȘȘȱęȱȱŗƖǯ # Number of household members age fourteen or younger, divided by household size. ## Number of household members age fourteen or older who do not belong to the labor force, divided by household size.
Number of observations
average household education
Household endowments
##
old dependency ratio
young dependency ratio#
female laborer
male laborer
Household demographics
Dependent variable
ȱŜǯŚǯȱȱěȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
Chinese Farmer Rationality 133
1,287
1,287
ǻŗǯŞŜǼ
ǻŗǯřşǼ
ǻŗǯśřǼ 39.890*
ȬřŖǯřśŚ
1.373
ǻŖǯřřǼ
ǻŗǯŘŖǼ
ǻřǯŞřǼ
ȬŖǯśŗś
ŞǯŖşŜ
ǻŗǯŜŜǼ
ŗǯşśŝȘȘȘ
řǯśŞŚȘ
ǻŚǯřŘǼ
ǻŖǯşŞǼ
ǻŚǯŞŚǼ
0.730***
-0.972
Professional
0.842***
Local wage
1,287
ǻŖǯŗŞǼ
ŖǯŝŞś
ǻŖǯşŝǼ
2.904
ǻŗǯśŞǼ
4.208
ǻŗǯŖŝǼ
ŖǯśŚŗ
ǻŘǯřŜǼ
ŗǯŗŜŗȘȘ
Family business
Nonfarm labor market
1,287
ǻŖǯŘŗǼ
-0.848
ǻŗǯśŜǼ
řǯśŜŜ
ǻŗǯŘŜǼ
ŗǯśŖŗ
ǻŗǯşŖǼ
ŖǯśŝŜȘ
ǻŘǯřŞǼ
0.727**
Ĵ¢ȱ
Participation
1,287
ǻŚǯśśǼ
śǯŘŗŚȘȘȘ
ǻŗǯŚŜǼ
-0.808
ǻŗŘǯŗřǼ
ŝǯŜŚŜȘȘȘ
ǻŗǯşşǼ
ŖǯŘśřȘȘ
ǻŚǯŗŘǼ
ŖǯśŗŘȘȘȘ
Migration
1,287
ǻŖǯŜŜǼ
0.891
ǻŘǯşŝǼ
2.483***
ǻśǯŝŝǼ
2.878***
ǻŜǯşşǼ
ŗǯŘşśȘȘȘ
ǻŚǯŚřǼ
0.771***
Sericulture
ȱ
Notes:ȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱ£ǰȱȱǰȱȱȱ¡ǰȱ distance to the nearest township, and percentage of rice transacted in the market. ȘȱęȱȱŗŖƖDzȱȘȘȱęȱȱśƖDzȱȘȘȘȱęȱȱŗƖǯ # Number of household members age fourteen or younger, divided by household size. ## Number of household members age fourteen or older but who do not belong to the labor force, divided by household size.
Number of observations
average household education
Household endowments
##
old dependency ratio
young dependency ratio#
female laborer
male laborer
Household demographics
Dependent variable
ȱŜǯśǯȱȱěȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ
134 Kung, Lee, and Bai
Chinese Farmer Rationality
ŗřś
Female labor, though not to the same extent as its male counterpart, also explained a household’s economic decisions for sericulture and local wage employment, as well as, unexpectedly, migration. The positive correlation between female labor and household participation in both local wage employment and migrant nonfarm work provides strong evidence in support of women’s economic participation beyond that of familial production of sericulture. In particular, women’s involvement in migration ȱŗşřŖȱ¡ȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǻ ǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ŘŖŖśǼǯȱ ȱ ęȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ among the human capital–intensive professions. We should stress, however, that both these sectors were very small—only one household in the ȱȱȱȱȱĴDzȱǰȱȱȱȱěȱ should not be overblown. Although the economic behaviors regarding ȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱĴȱȱdered labor choices, this is due to the socially constructed economic opȱȱȱȱěȱ¡ǯȱȱ¡ǰȱǰȱ ȱȱ ȱȱǰȱȱěǰȱȱȱȱȱȱnality, together making it possible for measurable increases in household income, even though falling short of creating an economic breakthrough. What is rather unexpected is the role played by “young dependents.” An important reason that some households rented in land and hired in labor was that they had more young family members to feed than other households. Moreover, these families also seemed to be active in the pawnȱǰȱȱęȱĜȱȱ¡ǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ is clearly needed to enhance our understanding of this economic activity in rural China before the Communist Revolution suppressed markets and abolished private land ownership. Fourth, as with the amount of available labor, the amount of land that ȱȱ ȱȱěȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱ and many nonfarm economic decisions. As expected, land and labor are positively correlated—families with more land tended to hire in more farm labor but were less likely to rent in land. More interesting are the ęȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱning a business and are also more likely to engage in sericulture—the latȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱtory practices that women in the formal labor market faced. Instead, the lack of land appears to have pushed families into local wage employment ȱĴ¢ȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ
ŗřŜ
Kung, Lee, and Bai
migrant work especially but also with sericulture.20 A most interesting ęȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ ǯȱ Though families with surplus land to farm were more likely to rent out part of their land in return for rental income, they were most unlikely to ȱȱȱȯȱęȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ an important way of obtaining informal credit but that it may also have Ȭȱȱěǯȱ Ğǰȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ ȱtion and renting in land suggests that returns to farming were most likely lower than those associated with at least some nonfarm activities, particularly migration and professional occupations—the two activities that corȱ¢ȱǻȱę¢Ǽȱ ȱȱȱǯȱȱtioned earlier, per capita income of households with members engaged in migrant activities was much higher than for those engaged in most other ǰȱȱęȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱǻ ǰȱǰȱȱȱŘŖŖśǼǯ ¢ǰȱȱȱǰȱę¢ǰȱĞȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ positively both with participation in land rental markets and concomitantly with the hiring of long-term farm labor, but negatively with local ȱ¢ȱȱĴ¢ȱǯȱȱĴȱȱęȱȱȱ economic process of households’ “selecting” between farm and nonfarm work in the resource allocation process. Only households with the intention to specialize in farming would invest in farm capital by acquiring ȱĞȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱěȱȱȱȱȱ opposite. Our analysis lends strong empirical support to the hypothesis that farm households in Wuxi did allocate their resources—especially labor resources—in a way consistent with economic rationality. Whether that produced the best results is the question we will address next. ěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ It is one thing to suggest that farm households in Wuxi were allocatȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱĚȱȱȱȱȱȱ endowment characteristics, and quite another thing to ascertain the welȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱĞȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ fect of resource allocation on income and consumption that is of greater direct relevance for economies at the lower levels of economic developǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŘŖȲȱ The per capita income of families with members engaged in sericulture and migration ǰȱ ¢ǰȱ ŗǰŖŘŝȱ ȱ ŗǰśŝŖȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ Ĵ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ şŞŜȱ ȱ ŝśŜȱ Ĵǰȱ ¢ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱŗǰŖŖŖȱĴǯȱȱĴ¢ȱȱśŖŖȱǯ
Chinese Farmer Rationality
137
per capita can be explained by household economic choices. To ensure that income comparisons are consistent over time, we have converted all income denominated in money into husked rice (caomi ㊭㉇Ǽȱȱ ǻ¢ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ĴǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ survey years in question.21 Data on household consumption, although available, is more restricted, since the surveys list only the consumption ȱȱǻȱȱ Ǽȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱtion of meat and dairy products such as eggs—an omission that most likely will bias downward the consumption of the richer households. This limitation aside, the pertinent data still allow us to measure and compare the caloric intake of households as associated with their choice of economic participation. Caloric comparisons are made by convertȱȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ equivalence on a per capita basis.22 Besides correlating economic participation with income and consumpȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱǻǯǯǰȱ ȱǼǰȱȱsets used in household sideline production (e.g., silkworm feeding trays, ȱ Ǽǰȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱȱǻǯǯǰȱŗşřŜȱȱŗşŚŞǼȱȱ¡¢ȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱŜǯŜǯ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽǰȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ of income sources—rental, local wage employment, family business, miǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱǯȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱ¡¢ȱȱȱǼȱ is obvious and needs no further elaboration. The same analysis applies also to the few families with members working as professionals. What is ȱǰȱǰȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱ ȱ¢ment, migrant work, and sericulture on per capita income. Although we are unable to measure with precision the marginal product of labor in these economic activities, there is now solid empirical evidence to suggest that households with members engaged in these labor-intensive activities enjoyed higher per capita incomes than families that did not or could not take advantage of these employment opportunities. A detailed explanation of how we perform this exercise can be found in Kung, Lee, and ȱǻŘŖŖśǼǯ ŘŘȲȱ The conversion rates are based on those provided by the Nutrient Data Laboratory of ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱǰȱȱȱȱřŜŖȱȱȱŗŖŖȱǰȱȱ for wheat 340 kcal. ŘŗȲȱ
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ȱ ŜǯŜǯȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ Ǽȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Consumption Dependent variable
Log per capita income
Log per capita energy consumed
-0.102***
0.020
Land and credit markets renting
in out
pawning
in out
ǻŘǯşśǼ
ǻŗǯŗŜǼ
0.288***
0.009
ǻŜǯřŜǼ
ǻŖǯŚřǼ
ȬŖǯŖŖŜ
ŖǯŖŜś
ǻŖǯŖŜǼ
ǻŗǯřşǼ
-0.128***
-0.002
ǻŘǯŞśǼ
ǻŖǯŗŗǼ
0.017
-0.017
ǻŖǯśśǼ
ǻŗǯŗŘǼ
0.042
0.003
ǻŗǯŘŞǼ
ǻŖǯŗşǼ
0.024
0.049
ǻŖǯřŘǼ
ǻŗǯřśǼ
0.070
0.199***
ǻŖǯŞŞǼ
ǻŚǯşŚǼ
ŖǯŗŜśȘȘȘ
-0.000
ǻśǯśŜǼ
ǻŖǯŖŖǼ
ŖǯŗŜŘ
0.049
ǻŗǯŘŝǼ
ǻŖǯŝşǼ
ŖǯŚśśȘȘ
ŖǯŗśŝȘ
ǻŘǯřŝǼ
ǻŗǯŜŞǼ
ŖǯŖŜŞ
0.090***
ǻŗǯřŜǼ
ǻřǯŜřǼ
0.213***
ŖǯŖśŜȘȘȘ
Farm labor markets day labor
in out
year labor
in out
ěȬȱȱ wage employment professionals family business Ĵ¢ȱ Migrant work
ǻŝǯŝŖǼ
ǻŚǯŗŝǼ
Sericulture
ŖǯŗśŘȘȘȘ
ŖǯŖŜŗȘȘȘ
ǻŚǯŜşǼ
ǻřǯŞŜǼ
Number of observations
ŗśŜś
ŗśŜŘ
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. In the estimations, we have ȱȱȱěȱȱȱ£ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ ǻ¢ȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱǼǰȱȱ¢ȱ ǻ ȱǼǰȱȱ£ǰȱȱȱǯ ȘȱęȱȱŗŖƖDzȱȘȘȱęȱȱśƖDzȱȘȘȘȱęȱȱŗƖǯȱ
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ȱ ǻǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ęǯȱ Whereas the negative relationship between pawning and income may apȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ reasoning. To the extent that pawning out land represented a desperate Ĵȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȬȱǰȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱ ȱ¢ȱĚȱ the debtor’s options. Alternatively, pawning might have resulted in some households cultivating smaller farms in which land was pawned to their ȱȱǻ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǼǯȱȱȱ case, the negative relationship between income and pawning appears to ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱęȱȱ ȱȃȱ ȱȄȱǻ ȱŗşşŖǼǯ ȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱěȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ on consumption; only migration and sericulture—and, to a much lesser ¡ǰȱȱ¢ȱȯȱȱęȱěȱȱǯȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱŗşşşDzȱ ȱ ŗşşŖǼǯȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ economic activity for income and consumption, we conclude that migraȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ villagers than for households relying on either rental or local wage inǰȱȱȱĴȱ ȱȱȱȱęȱěȱȱȱ consumption. Finally, there are those activities that, although conferring no distinct economic advantage to their participants in income, nonetheless help raise the consumption standards of poorer households. For example, where the per capita income of households with members engaged ȱĴ¢ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȯŘśȱȱ ȱȱȱǻ ǰȱǰȱȱ ȱŘŖŖśǼȯȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǯȱ Conclusion The macro issue of why China’s economy, in particular its agricultural sector, did not achieve a breakthrough in the past few centuries continues ȱ Ĵȱ ¢ȱ Ĵǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ¡ȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ performance of a local economy can be seen as rather prosperous with observable rational behaviors in the labor market. We made use of panel data that cover an important period of almost twenty years in a local econ¢ȱ ȱȱěȱȱ£ȱ ȱȯȱ nan economy of the Lower Yangzi. We found that farm households were allocating their resources in a way consistent with economic rationality and, equally important, that factor markets were active and operated
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¢ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ farm household economic behavior and markets. First, this local economy had not just an active land rental market, but ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱěȬȱ¡ǰȱȱȱ ¢ǯȱȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱěȬȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱǰȱ to increase household income. Our survey evidence, reported elsewhere, ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŗşŘŖȱȱŗşřŜȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱśŖȱǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱŗŖȱȱȱȱ high point because of military and political disturbances. Although our ęȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ expansion of specialization and exchange and per capita income growth. ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ pering despite the unequal distribution of land ownership. The rapid exȱȱȱěȬȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ contributing to this income growth process. Second, a household’s choice of economic participation appears to be conditioned by the comparative advantage of such endowments as land, ǰȱȱǯȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱę¢ȱtermines a household’s decisions about land rental, pawning, and a range of nonfarm work opportunities (except for those that require distinctly ȱ ȱ Ǽǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ¡plains a family’s decision to participate in sericulture but also local wage ¢ȱȱȱěȬȱ ǯȱȂȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱęȱ¢ȱȱȱȱduction but engaged in highly paid work as did their male counterparts. Just like labor, land is a good predictor of household allocation decisions. The positive association it had with family business and sericulture suggests that a broad spectrum of society, including the rich, participated in sericulture. Conversely, the negative association between land, on the ȱǰȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱĴ¢ȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȬęȱȱȱȱ Ȭȱǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ activities, including local wage employment and sericulture, were found ȱ ȱ ę¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ Dzȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ households entering into the pawning relationship might have been forced to do so by adverse circumstances, a possibility consistent with the ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱ ȱȃȱ ȱǰȄȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱĴ¢ȱȯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¡ǯȱȱĴ¢ȱȱȱȱ ęȱěȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱǯȱȱ
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141
ȱȱȱȱȱĴȱěȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ Ȭȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ¢ǰȱȱ and migration. There is solid empirical evidence to refute the alleged irrationality of household participation in sericulture. Meanwhile, labor miȱěȱȱȱȱȱȃȄȱȱȱȱȱ in Jiangnan. This absorption of labor was even greater in the Lower Yangzi ȱ ȱȱĚǯȱ The issue of economic underdevelopment for most parts of the past ¢ȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ institutional and policy environment, China’s market and economic behavior could perform very well, just short of a fundamental transformation or breakthrough. More importantly, this performance can still be accounted for in terms of rationality.
ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱĴȱǯȱŗşŗŚǯȱǻ¢ȱȱȱȱ 1¸ȱȱǯǼ
ȱ ȱ ȱĴȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱǯȱȱŗşŗŚǰȱȱȱȱ St. Paul de Chartres bought the premises and converted it into St. Paul’s ǯȱŗşŗŚǯȱǻ¢ȱȱȱȱ1¸ȱȱǯǼ
ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ £ȱ ȱ ȱ of the Missions Etrangères was previously called Douglas Castle and ȱ¢ȱ ǯȱǯȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱŗşśřǯȱŗŞşŜǯ ǻ¢ȱȱȱȱ1¸ȱȱǯǼ
PART TWO Dynamics in Institutional Change
SEVEN
Traditional Land Rights in
ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ KENTARO MATSUBARA
One problematic aspect of assessing the development of a productive market economy in late nineteenth- to early twentieth-century China is ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ing practices and the economy in general and established that one could ȱȱȱĴȱȱȯęȱȱȱȱȃ Ȭ cultivators,” “part-owners,” or “tenants”—to the degree of commercial£ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǻ ȱ ŗşŝŘDzȱ ȱŗşŞşǼǯȱ Moreover, as various kinds of land-related rights have been analyzed through land deeds, it has become apparent that this variety hinged on the diverse arrangements among local social groups, and such groups were not limited to the signatories of a particular deed. Many rights established in a deed could be explained only by referring to the involvement of ȱȱǰȱĞȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ¡ǰȱȱ to zhaojia ᡒۍǰȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱĞȱȱǰȱȱȱȱvolved the role—within the local community encompassing both vendor and purchaser—of the previous owner, that is, the vendor, in somehow guaranteeing the land rights of the current owner, that is, the purchaser ǻ ȱȱŗşşŝǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱticular area were closely connected to the formation of local groups based ȱȱ¡ȱ¢ǰȱȱǰȱȱȱǻȱŗşŞŜǼǯȱȱ¡ȱ ȱ land rights were related to the workings of the market and the economy, it is useful to begin by outlining some basic features of how these social groupings of lineages worked, both in holding property and in forming local communities. It was in the context of these social processes that land transactions were agreed on, performed, and secured.
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The primary unit of private property holding in Qing China was the household. While much of this property was held under individual names, the individual name was that of the paterfamilias, and the property was held in the form of “collective residence, common property,” tongju gongcai ৠሙ݅䉵, by the household group. This group consisted of the paterǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱǻȱǼȱȱȱ ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱ£ȱŗşŜŝǰȱ śŖȮśŞǼǯȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱmon account, and all expenditure by the members came from the same common account. Property that could be independently held by individual members of the household appears to have been severely limited, ¢ȱȱȱǻȱ£ȱŗşŜŝǰȱśŖŝȮśśŖǼǯȱ This form of property holding, according to Shiga Shuzo, was one consequence of the ideal of zong ᅫ, which involves the notion that property ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱǼȱȱȱȱ continuity of the male line. Shiga, however, stops short of exploring a much more direct expression of this idea than household property: the institution of ancestral property. Ancestral property is held in the name either of a particular ancestor (zu ⼪, Cantonese tsoǼȱȱȱȱǻǼȱȱ (tang ූ, Cant. tongǼǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǻȱŗşŜŜǰȱśŗȮ śŘǼǯȱ ǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱǰȱȱȱȱ rule was that all direct male descendants of these focal ancestors could ęȱȱȱ¢ǯȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ lineage group, some encompassing an entire localized lineage (if the focal ȱ ȱȱȱǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱticular branch or extended household within such a group (if the holding ȱȱȱȱȱǼǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱ zu or tang. Unlike the household, which would dissolve upon division, these organizations were considered permanent, and whereas managers might change, the organizations would persist as the same entities throughout the generaȱǻȱŘŖŖŚǼǯȱ Ancestral property holding is known to have had particular implications for lineage integration and local social structuring. It could provide material backing to lineage groups and could work either as a unifying or ȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱǻȱŗşŜŜDzȱȱŗşŞŜDzȱ¢ȱ ȱȱŗşşŗǼǯȱȱȱȱǰȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ lineage were not the only principles according to which local communities could be formed, ancestral property was not the sole form of property holding that transcended the households. Territorial ties, arranged primarily through organizations focusing on popular religion, were also imȱȱĴȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ£ȱ could also hold property and be parties to land transactions (Duara 1988;
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ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşşśǼǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢Ȭȱ bodies could take place in various contexts, including market manageǰȱ ȱǰȱȱ¢ȱǻ ȱŘŖŖŖǼǯȱ An individual could simultaneously participate in a number of these overlapping groups, and economic exchange between these parties took place in the context of the multilayered relations established with each ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ sources, intermarriage, interlineage alliances, ritual cohesion, long-term loans, and so on. While most land deeds signed by the parties betrayed only a small part of such diverse relations, the economy, of which land ȱ ȱȱǰȱ ȱę¢ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ Ěȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱ easily have made economic decisions simply in accord with market forces. Under such conditions, assessing the extent to which a market might have operated in relation to land is a problem needing careful treatment, ȱȱȱȱĴȱȱǯȱȱȬȱǰȱȱ as those of primary purchase or those concerning the use of common land, ȱȱ¡¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱ descent and territory. Such rights, clearly limiting the social scope within which transactions involving a certain plot of land could take place, were pervasive: the most common format for a deed of sale included a clause ȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱĴment would be decisive in what could or could not be done with a particuȱȱȱǯȱȱȯȱȯęȱȱȱtions in this environment appears to be understandable only in the context of the dynamics involving the relevant social groupings.
ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ the opportunity to place land transactions in the context of these social dynamics. The exceptional richness of documentation allows land deeds to be checked against genealogies, account books, and fengshui 乼∈ documents, as well as detailed, plot-by-plot colonial land records.1 Moreover, the amount of anthropological research that has gone into this small area is extremely useful, as the resulting reconstructions of social landscapes provide new insights and background material in understanding the social processes surrounding land transactions. Later in this chapter, I will ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǻȱȱ ȱȱȱȱŗşşŖǼǰȱȱ ŗȲȱ Land deeds that have survived in great numbers throughout China constitute the primary source material in trying to understand traditional Chinese land transactions and their social ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ documents to prove land rights either in court or in other social contexts, they cannot be thought of as full and accurate records of the actual transactions and holding arrangements, any more than a political treatise can be depended on as a descriptive representation of the status quo.
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ȱĴȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱground involving lineages and religious organizations in the early twentieth century.2
ǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱing into the forms and categories of land transactions that were not only ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱ Some Basic Forms of Land Transaction Sale, Mortgage, and Tenancy One basic tenet about the relation between land rights and the functioning of a productive market economy for land is the following: institutions that allow for “weak” land rights, and a lack of clear delineation between different rights competing over one plot of land, are more likely to impede a productive land market. In traditional Chinese society, there was a strong ¢ȱȱěȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱ¡ȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱĞȱ ȱȬȱǯȱȱ ȱȱpect of customary land law in Taiwan that was thought to present serious impediments to economic development and was explicitly tackled in the course of integrating customary law with the colonial legal system under the Japanese.3ȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱing of a land market over a wide region in China. For example, it has been ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ that largely followed the prices of grain, and institutions allowing for a wide range of potential buyers to be sought for the sale of land can also be ȱǻ ȱȱŗşşŝǰȱǯȱŚDzȱȱŘŖŖŖǼǯ To the extent that there was an “ownership” of land in Qing China, it resided with the party referred to as yezhu ὁЏǻ Ǽȱȱȱ ship was transferred by either of two forms of sale (mai 䊷Ǽǯȱȱ ȱȱ “live” sale, huomai ⌏䊷, and the other was the “absolute” sale, juemai ㍊䊷. ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱĞȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ the vendor can buy the land back at the original price. Thus, the vendor receives a payment upon transferring the title of yezhu to the purchaser, ȱ Ğȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ original purchaser and resume as yezhu. From the purchaser’s viewpoint, ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ğȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ than as a straightforward commercial transaction. I will try to avoid simply juxtaposing an “embedded” economy and a market economy, characterizing traditional Chinese land ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǻȱ ¢ȱ ŗşśŝǼǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ the institutional framework of the land transactions that allowed aspects both hostile and auspicious to a market economy to exist at the same time. řȲȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĴȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱTaiwan shiho, ȱȱ ȱǻŘŖŖŚǼǯ ŘȲȱ
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ȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ of yezhu, then receiving, for the duration of the sale, the proceeds from the ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ę¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯ4 Another way to put it is that the transaction works in the same way as a loan from the purchaser to the vendor, with the land as security and the proceeds paid to the purchaser in lieu of an interest. By contrast, the absolute sale brings about the transfer of the title of yezhu without any provision for the vendor to buy it back and involves the payment of a larger amount of money by the purchaser than for a live sale. The deed of an absolute sale, for example, would include such words ȱȃȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱǯȱǰȱȱ shall be no troublemaking or regrets, no additional payment, no redemption, or any other misconduct.”ś The absolute sale is closer to the “sale” in modern legal parlance, transferring ownership, giving the purchaser a right of free disposal of the property, where the vendor, once he has sold the object in question, ceases to be an interested party. The term mai used on its own could imply a live rather than an absolute ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ǰȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ maiȱ ǻǼȱ ȱ dian , usually translated as “mortgage,” becomes far from clear-cut. In a transaction of dian, the original owner, the yezhu, becomes the mortgagor ȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱgagee, dianzhu Џ, who has in turn made a certain payment to the mortǯȱȱȱȱȱȱę¡ȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱĞȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ Ğȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱtion, which works in the same way as receiving interest on the original funds transferred to the mortgagor at the beginning of the transaction. In both the dian and the huomaiǰȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱě¢ȱing a loan that he must repay over a set number of years, and his property is the security. In both cases, failure to pay back the amount of money could lead to the deed being redrawn into one of absolute sale (Matsubara ŘŖŖŖǼǯȱȱęȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ cases, constitutes the gain for the purchaser-mortgagee, who advanced the funds at the beginning.Ŝ ŚȲȱ The gender referred to in this sentence and similar ones throughout the chapter is male but in much rarer occasions it could be female. Women could, in limited circumstances, be ȱȱȱȱǯȱ ǰȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱ ȱĞȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĞȱȱ property while a son was young or until an “appropriate” male in the family could take over. śȲȱ ȱ ȱȱŗŞŜŖǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ texts quoted here are my direct translations of the original wordings, remaining as faithful to the Chinese language structure as possible. ŜȲȱ ǰȱȱ ȱǻŗşŞşǼȱȱdian and huomai as two ways of referring to the same transaction, the use of the terms depending on the geographical area where the transaction
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ȱȱȱ¡ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱěȱ ȱhuomai and dian might have beȱęǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱ did not operate in such a way as to take each land transaction into account. As a result, the land tax owed by a particular person or household did not correspond to the actual property that this party held; thus, whether a ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱĚȱ ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱǻȱŘŖŖŚǰȱǯȱŗǼǯȱ The categories of mai, huomai, juemai, and dian can be found in land deeds throughout Qing China, and the deeds appear to be standardized ǻ ȱ ȱ ŗşşřǰȱ ŝşřǼǯȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱǯȱ There were also tenancy agreements between those parties holding certain land rights, either as yezhu or dianzhu, and parties wishing to pay a rent and use the land. Such categories as pidian ᡍԗ and zhaodian ԗ would be used for these tenancy transactions. Although tenants might struggle for certain rights, the basic categories implied that the tenant’s ȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱyezhu or the dianzhu. Limitations to Selling and Mortgaging Land Whereas the same categories were widely used for land transactions throughout Qing China, actual land deeds reveal that these transactions were not conducted in an open environment where property rights could ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱěȱȱȱǯȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ DZȱȃǻȱǼȱęȱȱ the elder brothers, uncles, cousins, and so forth (as prospective purchasǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱĞȱǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱěȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱǽȱȱȱȱǾǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ęȱ¢ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱDZȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ¢Ȅȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ŗŞŜŖǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ tives had priority over other parties to purchase property, and this right could be exercised in such a way as to impede the sale of land outside the family. Moreover, these rights could also be held by neighbors and previous owners, working as an encumbering factor when selling land (Niida ȱŗşşŗǰȱřśşǼǯȱ One might not accept the macro explanation that these rights of priority, traceable to the mid-eighth century, were premodern rights that gradually eroded over a period of more than a thousand years through the growth of individual freedom to dispose of one’s property (Niida Noboru 1991, řŚřȮřŚŚǼǯȱȱ ¢ǰȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱĜȱȱȱȱ took place.
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sense of the institution or to understand the rationale of each economic deȱȱ¢ȱ ȱǻȱǼȱȱǯȱȱȱȱǰȱ the social circumstances under which family members or neighbors might have tried to exercise these rights will need to be reconstructed. Another slightly less well-known limitation can be perceived in anȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŗŞřŜǯȱȱǰȱĞȱ Ĵȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȃȱȱȱȱȱ zhunzhe ⑪ᡬ,” that is, the land transaction is not being conducted in lieu of the payment of a bad debt owed by the vendor.7 This phrase is set in the context of listing the factors that might impede the sale and of guaranteeȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡DZȱȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱ relatives have not been kept in the dark and that the property is not common property belonging to a wider descent group. The notion that zhunzhe was a practice to be avoided appears to be at odds with many records of long-term land transactions, in which land is taken as security for a loan, taking the form of dian or redeemable sale. In these cases, the dianzhu or purchaser gradually assumes greater control ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱŘŖŖŖǼǯȱȱ tension is tightly connected to the problematic nature of another category widely observed in Qing land transactions, the zhaojia. Zhaojia is a practice in which the vendor can demand a supplemen¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĞȱȱȱǯȱ This practice would make sense where the sale was a live one. As long as the land was worth the total amount paid, and as long as this sum could ȱȱǻȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǼǰȱȱȱȱě¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ although the “interest rate” (that is, the rent yielded from the property set ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǼȱȱȱ Dzȱȱ¢ȱȱ zhaojiaȱ ǰȱȱȱ¢ǰȱĞȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ Kishimoto Mio observed that in many such cases the total amount paid at the point of the absolute sale showed a certain consistency in that it ȱȱ¢ȱĚȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱĞȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱĞȱȱȱȱ ȱǯȱ ȱ ǻŗşşŝǼȱĴȱȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ purchaser’s need to have his land rights continuously guaranteed by the former owner in the wider local community. Such an explanation, while at odds with the typical wording of a deed of absolute sale, implies there was a constraint whereby the vendor of land might retain certain claims ȱȱȱĞȱȱǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ŝȲȱ Deed held at the Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, cited in Kishimoto Mio 1993, 772.
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the purchaser’s options in trying to sell the property to yet another party, since his rights over the land depended on the original vendor. Underregistration, both of taxable land and of transactions, made it necessary ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱĜȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ Ǽȱ ȱ ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ǰȱȱȱěǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱ £ȱŗşŞŚǰȱŘśŘȮŘśśǼǯȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ if a party intended to secure its land rights, these rights had to be secured and guaranteed primarily in a nongovernmental context, involving the immediate parties to the transaction giving the land rights, as well as the local communities surrounding these parties. Land Transactions and Social Structuring in the New Territories of Hong Kong One Field, Two Owners The customary practice of yitian liangzhu ϔ⬄ϵЏǰȱȃȱęǰȱ ȱ ers,” is well known to Chinese historians. Usually, this practice meant dividing the land rights into “surface” (tianmian ⬄䴶ǼȱȱȃȄȱǻtiangen ⬄ḍǼǯȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ the land, while the surface owner, who could not be removed by the subsoil owner, managed the land. The surface owner was free to dispose of his right without the subsoil owner’s consent. This right, combined with the subsoil owner’s inability to remove him, made the surface right a kind of ownership rather than a mere tenant’s right. This form of landholding has interested scholars for several reasons. For historians interested in the ȃȱȱȄȱȱĚȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ for those concerned with whether “modern ownership rights” developed in traditional China, yitian liangzhu showed that one could not envisage either a simple landlord-tenant relationship or a modern ownership that implied unrestricted control over land by a landlord. One aspect of this ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ȱ ¢ȱ tended to understand yitian liangzhu as an arrangement between an individual surface owner and an individual subsoil owner, without bringing ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱŗşşŗǰȱŗŜŚȮŘŗśDzȱȱ
ȱŗşŞřǼǯȱ Another context in which scholars have been interested in yitian liangzhu is that of property rights and social formations in the New Territories ȱ ȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱĜȱȱȱȱȱȱȱported that the arrangement was at the core of local problems about landȱǻȱŗşŖŖǰȱŗȮŚŗDzȱȱȱŗşŖŗǼǯȱȱȱȱ established the Land Court to deal with these problems. Surface-subsoil
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ȱ ȱ ě¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ Dzȱ ǰȱ ȱ ated through the activities of the Land Court provide historical material of unique quality. Using both these records and data from intensive anȱę ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱyitian liangzhu in the New Territories. Their work takes into account not just individual signatories to land deeds but relationships between lineages and villages, as well as forms of tax payment and rent collection (Watson 1977; Faure ŗşŞŜDzȱȱŗşŞŝǼǯȱ ȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ ¢ȱyitian liangzuȱȱȱDZȱǻŗǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱDzȱǻŘǼȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǻ ȱȱȱǼDzȱǻřǼȱȱbers of powerful lineages discovering tax evasion on land (over which the ȱȱȱȱȱȱǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱDzȱǻŚǼȱȱ¡Ȭȱǰȱ ȱȱ baolan ࣙᬀDzȱȱǻśǼȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȯȱȱistered sales where the vendor continued to pay tax, the “perpetual lease” that functioned either as a hidden sale or a genuine lease, and sales where ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱŗşŞŝǰȱŗřȮřŘǼǯȱ The relationship between this form of divided ownership and the categories of land transaction used widely in Qing China—described earlier ȱȱȯȱȱ¡ǯȱȱęĞȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ clearly indicates a variety of transactions that could lead to this arrangeǯȱǰȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ǰȱȱȱȱ to assume that some category of land transaction—be it mortgage, sale, or ¢ȯ ȱȱȱǯȱ ǰȱ¢ȱĴȱȱȱȱ how these agreements between surface and subsoil owners were formuǯȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ȱ rights, it is possible to see two types, according to the categories used for the transaction. ȱęȱ¢ȱ¡¢ȱȱȱȃȄȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱ Ȭ known deed issued by the Sheung Shui Lius to the Chung lineage of Tai Om Shan in 1733.8 In this deed, a Chung Yuk-hing is described as tenant dianren ԗҎ, accepting the tenancy rights that enable the opening and culȱȱęǯȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱ ŗȱ ǰȱ Śȱ ǰȱ ȱ Śȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ śŖŖȱ ȱ ǻȱȱȱȱǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȬȱ ȱȱ allowed to reclaim, cultivate, and control this land forever and the Lius ŞȲȱ
¢ȱȱ¢ȱ ǯȱǯȱ ¢ǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȬǯ
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would not cause trouble or “regret” this transaction at a later date (Faure ŗşŞŜǰȱřŜȮŚŖǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱ limits to what the Chungs were allowed to do: toward the end of the deed, there is a clause providing that the Chungs could not “privately transfer ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȄȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŗşŞŜǰȱ řşȮŚŖǼȱ ȱ argued that this clause prevented the Chungs from transferring rights to such parties as other “great surnames” (the magnate lineages, including the Lius themselves, competing for hegemony in what became the New Ǽȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱtook to deal with such problems that might arise between the Chungs and ȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱĚȱȱ the area. In this example, it appears that local politics imposed legal limits ǻȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǼȱȱȱȱ rights of the “surface owners.” Such limits were much more evident in the second type of formulation for granting surface rights, as can be found in a deed from the village of Pui O on Lantau Island.9 The Lei lineage of Pik Sha Chan issued a tenancy deed to a Cheung Man-shing, also described as dianren, and the wording of the deed does not suggest an arrangement of surface ownership at all. ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱę¡ȱȱȱ¢ȱǻȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ to allow relatives or friends to live in the village. The reason this deed can be said to have granted surface rights is that in reality, the Cheung ȱĴȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ renewed for generations throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Moreover, the Lei lineage did not succeed in preventing the Cheungs from reclaiming new land and eventually challenging its authority by apȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ǻǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŞŜǰȱ ŚřǼǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ yitian liangzhu was created by local interlineage politics, overriding the ǻǼȱȱęȱȱȱǯ Both in name, and in the substantive arrangement of land rights, the practice of yitian liangzhu appears to have been basically the same in the ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ observe in the New Territories is the interaction between the formal arȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǯȱ ȱ ȱǻŗşŞřǼǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ transactions associated with yitian liangzhu, has argued that analogous to “live” and “absolute” sales, there were “live” and “absolute” tenancies, the surface-subsoil form of ownership resulting from this absolute tenancy. Whether this formulation is a valid reconstruction of the conceptual framework in the cases cited by Terada, the New Territories cases show şȲȱ
¢ȱȱȱȱ ǯȱǯȱ ¢ǯ
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that the relation between the social arrangement of yitian liangzhu and the ȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱǯȱěȱȱȱ be used in transactions underpinning the same arrangement, while difȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱȱ Ĵȱȱ ȱȱȱȱĚȱȱȱȱ arrangements nor a document dictating the exact conditions of a particular transaction. The Social Environment of Land Transactions in the New Territories That deeds did not cover all categories and conditions or social arrangeȱȱȱȱȱȱ Ĵȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱȱ was no internal coherence in the use of land-transaction categories in the New Territories. What it does mean is that the categories of land transacȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ social dynamics. These dynamics included such processes as competition among subsoil-holding great surnames, later immigrants trying to establish themselves and challenge the political supremacy of the great surnames, and the material base of each party being secured through land ȱǻȱŗşŞŜǼǯȱ A provision of “permanence” in a deed of tenancy would encourage ȱȮȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱĞȱȬ¢ȱȱȱ by the landlord–subsoil holder. The deed then would facilitate the process ȱĴȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱǻȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǼǰȱȱ the establishment of an independent group on the land involved political risk. Such a provision as that found in the Tai Om Shan deed, that land rights could not be transferred to “those who live far away,” could be used to alleviate the risk of outside parties eroding the subsoil holder’s material base. Conversely, such a deed as the Lantau one would present obstacles ȱȱȱȱȱȱĴǯȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱ with the hope of checking, or preventing, social changes, at the cost of reducing the incentive for their tenants to reclaim and enhance the land in ǯȱȱ ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱ Ĵȱȱ ȱȱsarily be kept, and the enforcement of contracts was not a strong point of the Qing judicial system. Such circumstances, where the categories used in land transactions appear to have been intricately connected to local politics, had implications for the market as well. In a previous analysis of village account books in the New Territories, I showed that land transactions in the village social context were part of long-term relationships involving loans, intermarǰȱȱ¢ȱǻȱŘŖŖŚǰȱǯȱŚǰȱǯȱŜǼǯȱȱȱ ǰȱȱ transactions tended to occur within a limited group where the long-term
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ȱ ȱǯȱǰȱȂȱȱȱĴȱȱ suggest that even if one purchased land in the New Territories, unless ȱȱȱȱȱȱĴǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ seriously limited. Although he could receive rent income, he would not be able to live on the land with the full rights of an inhabitant of the area. Such factors as these would quickly limit the parties to which land would actually be sold. Consider the following well-documented case from the New Terriǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ Ĵȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ğȱȱȱȱ ǯ The Ancestral Property of the Tuen Mun Tos The Lineage and the To Ka-yi tso The case of To Kan Chi and Others v. Pui Man Yau and Others revolved around the To 䱊ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ ownership of a Daoist temple and Buddhist monastery. One interest of this case lay in the traditional forms of land transaction that were used by the Tos and how these transactions might substantiate claims to ownership in the present (To Kan Chi and Others v. Pui Man Yau and OthersȱŗşşŘǼǯ ȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢¢ǯȱ A third-generation member of this lineage was To Ka-yi 䱊۔, who is ȱȱȱȱȱŗŚśŚǯȱȱ Ȭ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱcame the founders of the three branches into which the lineage is divided to this day.10 Thus, all male members of the lineage were considered direct descendants of Ka-yi and could claim rights to the property held by the ancestral estate (called tsoǰȱȱȱȱȃȄǼȱȱȱ Ȭ¢Ȃȱ name. This property included the Daoist temple that became a focus of the legal dispute in the 1990s.11 The Daoist temple had an abbot named Pui Man-yau, who had been appointed by his predecessor to succeed him when he died, which happened in 1989. The line of abbots could be traced back to one Chan Chunting, who had acquired certain property rights from the To lineage in 1914. One major issue in the dispute was the exact nature of the property rights that had been transferred in the transaction of 1914: whether the Tos had performed an outright sale allowing Chan Chun-ting to be the absolute owner or whether the To Ka-yi tso owned the temple. ŗŖȲȱ The fourth branch is recorded to have moved away from Tuen Mun, with a descendant living in Dapuxu Nankeng 㥚फഥȱ ȱ ȱ ŗŞŞŖȱ ǻȱ ȱ ŗŞŞŖǰȱ ŚǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ numbering here of the account book is the same as that used in court. ŗŗȲȱ The complex including the temple also had a Buddhist monastery, which had been ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ continued to function; here, for the sake of clarity, I will concentrate on this temple.
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The grant issued in 1914, signed by members of the To lineage, was not one of absolute sale, and the court duly acknowledged this point. One aspect of the case is that the abbot’s control over the property, although based on this transaction, took on a life of its own and eventually evolved to the point where he would claim absolute ownership. However, questions were raised about what property rights the To lineage held before the grant of 1914. An important document here was an account book dated 1880, in ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǻȱȃęȱ¢ǰȄȱ changchan ௫⫶) held by the To Ka-yi tso was recorded. This account book was titled An Account Book to Record the Fair Apportionment of the Shared ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Fongs of the To Ng Lau Tong.12ȱȃȱȱȱȄȱȱȱtong name for the Kayi tso (Account Book 1880, 4). Property of the tsoȱȱęȱȱ ȱȱǯȱȱȱ ęȱǰȱȃȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱ Ȭ¢ȱTsoȱȱȱ Ȅȱǻȱ Book 1880, 18), there is a list of place-names, with the due rent and the tenants. If there is more than one tenant for a piece of property, the distribution of rent among these tenants is also entered. Tenants include both To lineage members and outside parties, and in some cases particulars of ¢ȱȱęȱǻȱȱŗŞŞŖǰȱŗŞȮŘřǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ properties are referred to as dianren, and the property rights appear to be of a straightforward landlord-tenant relationship. The second heading, under which the Daoist temple in question falls, is more complex. It reads “The Annual Tax Grain and Silver To Be [Collected and] Paid for the Farmland and Orchards that the Ka-yi Tsoȱ Ğȱ and That Are Mortgaged or Perpetually Sold to Other People Is Recorded ȄȱǻȱȱŗŞŞŖǰȱŘŚǼǯŗř For the phrase “mortgaged or perpetu¢ȱǰȄȱdianduan ᮋ, the court referred to a translation “assigned by ȱȱ¢ȄȱǻTo Kan Chi and Others v. Pui Man Yau and Others ŗşşŘǰȱ ŜŝȮŜŞǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ dian and duan (duan being the equivalent of jue), especially given the di¢ȱȱȱȱęȱǰȱ ȱhuo and dian on the one hand and jue or duan on the other. However, since each item of property listed ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱdianshou ফ (taken by mortgage—by the mortgagee) or duan (perpetually sold—to the Tao Wuliutang junpai sanfang fen liangwu changchan dengji bu 䱊Ѩ᷇ූഛ⌒ϝ᠓ߚ㊂ ࢭ௫⫶ⱏ㿬㈓ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ ȱ ŗŞŞŖǯȄȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱǰȱĴȱ¢ȱ¡ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱǻȱ ȱȱȱȱ v. Pui Man Yau and Others 1992, 67). The preserved copy of this account book was made in 1884. ŗřȲȱ The original Chinese heading reads ⼪۔᠔䙎ϟᮁߎ㟛Ҏ⬄೦↢ᑈ䁆ঢ㋡㊂㉇䡔ⱏ 㿬ᮐᕠ. ŗŘȲȱ
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Ǽǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱěȱȱ makes more sense. An example of property referred to as mortgaged property is as follows: “Land of the place-name Wai Fan, mortgaged to Leung Gin-luk of ȱȱ ȱDZȱȱȱȱśȱshi 9 duǰȱȱȱ¢ȱśşŖȱȱȱ owed for rice and silver. Now Lau A-gau has paid 390 cash, and Tsa-sing’s ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǽŗŞŝŘǾǰȱȱŘŖŖȱǯȱȱȱȬȱȱ ȱȬȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǻ Ǽȱ ȱŚŞŖȱȄȱǻȱȱ ŗŞŞŖǰȱřŖǼǯȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ Ȭ¢ȱtso mortgaged the land to Leung Ȭǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱśȱshi 9 douǯȱȱȱȱęȱ ȱ much was due for the initial mortgage or how much was actually paid. ǰȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ śşŖȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ǰȱ parties of the Lau surname, from the same walled village as Leung Ginluk, are mentioned as those actually making the payment, and the yield, on the part of the tsoǰȱȱęǯȱ For an example of property described as “perpetually transferred land” (a translation of the term duantian ᮋ⬄Ǽǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ DZȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǽȱ Ǿȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ for perpetually transferred land rice silver of 7 qian 2 fen. To be divided equally by the three branches, each branch taking the silver of 2 qian 4 fenǯȱǽȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ǯǾȱȱȱȱ silver, 700 cash should be given to supplement the senior branch. The rest ȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱǯȱǻȱȱŗŞŞŖǰȱřŗǼ
This is a curious provision, since land perpetually transferred is yielding an annual income to the To Ka-yi tso. One possible inference is that the tax for the land was still owed by the To Ka-yi tso, and the purchasers ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱĜȱȱ ȱ ȱbers of the To Ka-yi tso actually were paying the taxes for this particular property perpetually transferred, though we do have the records of the tsoȂȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱŗŞŞŖǰȱřȮŗŝǼǯȱ An entry in these records gives the name under which the tax burden is registered, the jia ⬆ȱǻȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱ¢Ǽ under which that registration is made, and the amount owed: there is no information about which part of the tso’s property each item of land tax is paid for.14ȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ A similar arrangement can be seen in the land tax payment in neighboring Xiangshan ¢ȱȱȱȱȱǻ¢ȱ ¢ȱ¢ȱǼǯȱȱȱȱ ȱ¡ȱȱ were registered in the Xiangshan case bore no resemblance to the actual living taxpayers. For the Tos as well, it is not clear whether names such as 䱊ϔ㟝ȱǻǽǾȱȱǼǰȱ䱊টᄿ(To ǽǾȱȱǽǾǼǰȱȱ䱊᭛টǻȱ¢ȱǽǾǼȱȱȱȱǯȱ Tax was also registered under the name of the ancestor Ka-yi who had been dead for three ȱ¢ǯȱȱěȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱ ŗŚȲȱ
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ęǰȱȱȱ Ȭ¢ȱtsoȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȬ ¢ȱȱǯȱ The Interpretation of the Hong Kong High Court ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱdianduanȱȱduantianȱȱ ȱȱȱŗŞŞŖȱȱǯȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱdianduanȱȱȱȃȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢Ȅȱ ȱǰȱ ȱȱduantianȱȱȱȃ¢ȱȱȄȱ ȱǯȱȬ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǰȱ ȱȱĴ¢ȱȂȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ ǯȱ ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ DZ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ duanmaiȱ ȱ juemaiǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȬ Ȅȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȃȱȱȱȱȱȁdian mai 䊷ǰȂȱ ĞȱȱȱȁȂȹȄ (To Kan Chi and Others v. Pui Man Yau and Others ŗşşŘǰȱŝŗȮŝŘǼǯȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱdianȱȱȱȱǰȱhuomaiǰȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱǯȱ
ǰȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ ȱȱDZȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȬȱȬ ȱȱ ǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȬ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȃȱ ǽsicǾȱ ȱ ⬄ḍǰȄȱ ¢ȱȃȱȱȱǰȄȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ ȃȱȱ⬄䴶ǰȄȱȃȱȱȱǯȄȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȬ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȬ¡ȱȱę¢ǯȱȱ ǰȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȄȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĜȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¡ǯȱǻTo Kan Chi and Others v. Pui Man Yau and Others ŗşşŘǰȱŝŘǼ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȃȱ¢ȱȬ Ȅȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱyitian liangzhuȱǻȱ ȱȬȱȱȱȱ Ǽȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȬ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ ȱǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŚǰȱǯȱŗǼǯȱ
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formulation, was a position that enjoyed a perpetual right not to be removed from the land (Terada Hiroaki 1983). Moreover, the court’s formulation sees the subsoil owner as lianghu ㊻᠊, the “taxpayer,” and the surface owner as dianhu ԗ᠊, the “cultivator.” This on its own is a valid observation about the standard formulation of the surface-subsoil form of divided ownership. However, by linking the practice with the revocable sale and the dian transaction, the court gives rise to an unfortunate confusion of categories: the transaction that creates the position of dianhu, usually translated “tenant,” is not a revocable sale but what is usually called a tenancy contract, in which the categories used are pi ᡍ (decide on) or zhao (invite) and dian ԗ (tenancy) rather than dian ( mortgage) and mai (sale).15ȱȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱvant to the position of the “owner,” the yezhu, whereas the former are not. Moreover, the characterization of dian (mortgage) as a transaction where the “possession and enjoyment of the land was vested” in the mortgagee, the dianzhu, is clearly inaccurate.16 The court appears to have combined the previous fallacious formulation with the testimony of expert witness Anthony Dicks, who (quite reasonably) opined that a possible explanation for the phrase duantian was that it referred to the surface right (To Kan Chi and Others v. Pui Man Yau and Others 1992, 74–75). The result has been a formulation where: (1) the court endorses the dichotomy between the perpetual sale duan and the revocable sale similar to the dian; (2) the surface-subsoil form of divided ownership is described as usually arising from the dian transaction; but (3) the term duan in duantian somehow refers to the alienation of the surface right only or, in other words, is akin to the dian. This formulation would have been in line with the court’s accepting the interpretation of the term dianduan as meaning “assigned by mortgage for perpetuity.” Whereas the court’s interpretation of the relationship between the situation of landholding in the pre-British New Territories and the categories of land transaction is rather misleading, its conclusion—that the To lineage’s claim on the Tsing Wan Kun was akin to that of a subsoil holder— appears reasonable. This can be inferred from the fact that the To Ka-yi tso had given up certain property rights for perpetuity (as suggested by the term duan), and that they were collecting a certain annual payment, possibly related to taxation. Moreover, although this is circumstantial, the colonial government treated this property in the same way that it treated ȱȱȱęȱdian here is ԗ (tenancy) and the second dian is ( mortgage). In a collection of 279 land cases from the Xingke tiben (Memorial notes to the throne from the Bureau of Punishment) of the Qianlong period (1736–1795), there are 54 cases where a dian transaction took place. Of these, in 25 cases it was clearly stated that there was no change in the cultivator (Zhongguo diyi lishi danganguan and Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan lishi yanjiusuo 1988). ŗśȲȱ ŗŜȲȱ
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property whose rights were divided into surface and subsoil. The properȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ ȱȱ in 1905, and these properties were registered under the name of the Tsing ȱ ȱǻȱŗǰȱŘǰȱřǰȱŚŗŜȱȱȱŗřŗǼǯȱȱȱȂȱȱ¢ȱ toward the surface-subsoil form of divided ownership was to destroy it through registering the surface holders as crown lessees (Wesley-Smith ŗşşŞǰȱŗřŗȮŗřŞǼǯȱ However, when one accepts that the arrangement of land rights for this property was basically one of surface-subsoil division, a question arises ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗŞŞŖȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ ǰȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱ duanȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǵȱ Landholding Arrangements and Categories of Transaction ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ property of the Tsing Wan Kun is that the original deed has not been preȱǻȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǼǯȱȱ ȱȱǰȱ the arrangements for surface-subsoil division were not made by drawing ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭȱ sion might have more to do with power relations between landlord and ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȬȱǰȱěȱ categories appear to have been used for the Tsing Wan Kun. We cannot ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǻȱȱ ȱǼǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱŗŞŞŖȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ of duanȱǻȱǼȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱ¡¢ȱǯȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱǯȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ in the narrow sense but nevertheless relevant, appears to have been the ȱȱ¡ȱȱȃȱȱȄȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ lighting ceremony (To Kan Chi and Others v. Pui Man Yau and OthersȱŗşşŘǰȱ ŜŘȮŜŜǼǯȱǰȱȃȱȱȱ¢Ȅȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱĞȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǻǯȱŜśǼǯȱ ȱȱĜȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ between the Tos and the Tsing Wan Kun, since the rights established in ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǯȱǰȱ it is possible that this arrangement came about not as the direct result of a deed of duan, but as the result of later developments in the power relations involving the To lineage. Either way, the use of the term duan does appear to represent one aspect of the transaction, that the Tos were giving
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Kentaro Matsubara
ȱȱȱ¢ǯȱ ǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱter the property in their own account book, and issue a grant to an abbot in 1914. This situation, in which the Tos are clearly retaining certain rights that could be understood as ownership, poses a more general question about the term duan: what arrangements could it represent and what arrangements could it not? If the actual conditions of a land transaction were the result of balancing the various complex relationships between parties, and the land rights could evolve in accord with these relationships without being completely constrained by the deed, then the land rights established through these ȱ ȱȱȱęȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ rights formed through the social relations and land transactions between ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ Ĵȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱǻ ȱȱŗşşřǼǯȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ǯȱȱ ¢ǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱĜȱȱȱȱȱ conditions of a land transaction, although the categories might not accu¢ȱĚȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱated by the transaction. The land deeds with their limited contents would separate the considerations laid down in the deeds from the many other ȱ Ěȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱ¢ȱ of arrangements would necessarily be associated with each category of transaction, and in some cases certain arrangements might appear to run counter to the implications of the categories used. Regardless of the degree to which such a generalization explains the rather odd use of the term duan in the To case, not enough is understood about the relationship between land transactions and long-term social relations among parties. A study of the correlations between the land deeds ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¡ed periods of time, even if each land deed suggested a single transaction on the day of the deed. Moreover, the parties that could enter into these ęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱĞȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ of intermarriage and of entering into territorial arrangements about their grave rituals and dealings with their subsoil owners (Matsubara 2004, ǯȱŚǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ what land, and in a legal system where the enforcement of judgments relied on the compliance of the parties involved (Shiga Shuzo 1984, 149–197, ŘśŘȮŘśśǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ the communal contexts that were created, reinforced, and given nuance through these relationships.
Traditional Land Rights
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In these multilayered relationships between parties, a certain social equilibrium—helped by a common cultural repertoire of formal and informal institutions, norms, values, and so on—is maintained during mulȱ¡ȱǻȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱǼǯȱ
ǰȱȱ¢¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ǰȱȱǯȱȱȱȱĞȱȱ to in connection with the notion of préstation totale have been observed widely outside the New Territories or China,17 and a cursory investigation into the social relationships between parties dealing in land suggests that land transactions are indeed made in this context. One of the strengths of historical material from the New Territories is that, as we saw in the case of the Tuen Mun Tos, it can reveal the discrepancies between the categories used in transactions and the actual land rights in operation. This opens the way to investigations into the more complex interactions between law (to the extent that the contents of a deed can be ȱ Ǽȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ the social groupings that form the bases of local communities. I will now ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ be applied to land transactions in Qing China. Land Transactions in Qing China: The Limits of “Absolute” Sales Land Transactions in Qing China Land transactions, disputes arising from them, and the related legislation in the Qing period are subjects relatively well covered in the literature ǻȱ ȱ ŗşŞŝDzȱ ȱ ŗşşŚDzȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ŘŖŖŚǼǯȱ eleine Zelin took the view that the dian and the huomai, characterized together as the “conditional sale,” were, along with the priority given to relatives and neighbors in purchasing land, factors “with the potential to ȱȱȱ¢ȄȱǻŘŖŖŚǰȱŘŜǼǯȱȱǰȱȱȱ ǰȱȃȱ its origins to the same belief that it was the responsibility of descendants to protect the inherited patrimony from alienation” and became a source ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǰȱ Ğȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱŗŝřŖȱȱŗŝśřȱȱĴȱ to “clarify and contain” conditional sales and prevent disputes, through such means as dispelling ambiguities about whether a particular sale was “conditional” or irrevocable and prohibiting the vendor in an irrevocable sale to ask for supplementary payment, not to mention redemption (Zelin ŘŖŖŚǰȱŘŜȮŘŝDzȱ ȱŗşşŚǰȱŜŞȮŝŖǼǯ Zelin’s observations, while largely valid, have the following characteristics: ŗŝȲȱ A paradigm for such a social formation is found in the classic essay by Marcel Mauss ǻŗşŘřȮŗşŘŚǼǯȱ
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Kentaro Matsubara
First, land transaction begins with the premise of an “unconditional” ¢ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǻȱ £ȱ ȱ Ǽȱ juemai, endorsed in the substatutes of the Qing code. From here, it follows that this was the normative form of sale, and “conditional” sales had to be “contained.”
ǰȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ conducted as juemai—and it cannot be assumed that these parties read, let alone operated within the premises of, the code—would frequently inȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱĞȱȱȱȱ an irrevocable “absolute” sale of juemai. One could even cite a case where a party held that it was a village custom (xiangjian suli 䛋䭧֫՟Ǽȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱĞȱȱȱǰȱȱȱtual judgment included a clause ensuring this supplementary payment ǻ ȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱǼȱȱȱȱȱǯ18 Another custom that can be cited from the same class of cases is one where the vendor in an irrevocable sale could retain the right to a gratuity when the purchaser sold the same property to another party (Zhongguo diyi lishi danganguan ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ŗşŞŞǰȱ ȱ ŗŜŗǼǯȱ ȱ cases underscore the tension between customary practice and the legislaȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱĴǯȱȱȱȱȱ if one focuses on the parties’ perception of such categories as juemai rather than the perception of the code, the use of the term “absolute sale” in a ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ ǰȱ ě¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ question: what social factors made these nominally “absolute” sales “conditional” in reality? The second characteristic of Zelin’s formulation is closely connected to this question. Whereas Zelin does point to the origins of the conditional sale—namely, the responsibility to protect inherited patrimony from alienation—her formulation does not go into the contemporary interests that might have induced the parties to follow this ancient practice.19 AlȱȱȱĜȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ěȱ ¢ȬȬ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Qing period, one possible line of argument is to follow Zelin’s own assessment of the 1730 legislative reform. There, she argues that this reform was in response to excessive litigation resulting from conditional sale (Zelin ŘŖŖŚǰȱŘŜȮŘŝǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŗŝśŜȱȱ the punishment of descendants for selling ancestral property (that was set aside permanently, as opposed to property inherited from ancestors ȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ¢ȱ ǯȱ may well suggest that this ŗŞȲȱ Zhongguo diyi lishi danganguan and Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan lishi yanjiusuo ŗşŞŞǰȱȱŘŖŞȱǻ ȱ¢ǰȱȱǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱŗŝŞŘȱȱȱzhaojia ȱŗŝŞŜǰȱĞȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱ ŗşȲȱ ȱǰȱȱ¡ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǻŗşşŗǰȱŚŞŚǼǯ
Traditional Land Rights
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ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ¢ȱȱ the mere alienation of inherited property, was prevalent enough to necesȱȱǯȱȱȱ ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱęȱ¢ȱȱ responsibility to protect inherited patrimony in the mid-eighteenth century would have been overridden habitually, if not put in serious jeopardy. ȱ ¢ǰȱȱȱĜȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱǯȱ Whatever the origins of the conditional sale, it is clear that from the viewpoint of those buying and selling, both conditional and unconditional sales could be conducted in a way that retained certain claims to the property on the vendor’s part. Such claims included a payment supplementary to the original property price and the payment of a gratuity on a second sale by the purchaser to another party. That the vendor retained certain claims to property, even when the property was irrevocably sold, formed a salient feature of the transaction described as duan in the account book of the To Ka-yi tso. The Tos, despite having alienated the property by this duan transaction, retained a right to annual payment from the Tsing Wan Kun, along with other privileges. Moreover, this retention of certain claims to alienated property underwrote the long-term relationships among parties, and not just in the narrow context of the land transaction. Thus, in Qing China even absolute land transactions were conducted in a way that allowed the vendor to retain certain claims to the land. To ȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ absolute duan transaction was conducted with similar restrictions. Such commonality is only the starting point of the debate on whether analyzing cases from the New Territories would “explain” those characteristics ȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱǯȱ ǰȱȱ Ĵȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ land transactions in the New Territories would not be out of place. Social Structuring in the New Territories Previous scholarship has examined how long-term social relationships ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ Ěenced land transactions between the parties to such relationships. These ȱȱĴȱȱȱDzȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱĞȱȱȱȱDzȱȱ£Dzȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱŗşŞŜDzȱ ȱȱȱŗşşśǼǯȱ Whereas these processes brought various groups together, they fre¢ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ repeatedly leading to violent confrontation or lineage warfare. The
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Ĵȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǻȱŗşŞŜǰȱŗŘŜȮŗŘŝǼǯȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȯĞȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȯȱ ȱȱ ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱĞȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱǰȱ ȱ¡¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱǯȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǻȱȱǼȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱǯȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ Ȯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ£Ȭȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǻȱŘŖŖŚǰȱǯȱřȮŚǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȂȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ŗŞŚřDzȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ Dzȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ¡¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱDzȱȱȱȱȱshanzhu ቅЏȱǻȱ Ǽȱ ȱĜȱȱȱȱȱŗşŗŚ ǻTo Kan Chi and Others v. Pui Man Yau and Others ŗşşŘǰȱŚşȮŜŚǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĞȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȂȱǯȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ęǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ǯȱ
ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ
Traditional Land Rights
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in purchasing the property in question would have served this purpose well, particularly if many facets of local society were organized through ȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǯȱǰȱȱȱ ȱ ǰȱȱ ȱ ȱĞȱȱȱȱȬȱȱȱ¢ȱ ǰȱ prohibiting zhunzhe—the purchase of land taken as security—would have blocked such a purchase. Moreover, if these incumbents had to part with their property rights, the various practices—both the legally endorsed “conditional” sales and the customary practices rendering the “absolute” sale not quite absolute—allowing previous owners to retain claims over ȱ ǻǼȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ interests.
ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱǰȱȱ¢ȱęǰȱȱȱȱ Ȃȱȱȱ ĴǰȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱĴȱȱ ȱȱȱȱĚȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ would have been to limit the vendor’s retention of land rights to a minimum. A common clause found in deeds throughout China, stressing the “absolute” nature of an absolute sale as “forever, there shall be no troublemaking or regrets, no additional payment, no redemption, or any other misconduct,” would be entirely in line with this newcomer-purchaser’s interest. In other words, the interest to “contain” conditional sales could be held by the parties themselves and did not belong exclusively to the state. ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ social dynamics observed in the New Territories provides, at best, only a ȱ¡ȱȱȱǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ tension between “absolute” land rights and the various limitations posed ¢ȱȱȃȄȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱ of local politics. This would be a step forward from an explanation that had to rely on seeing “absolute” land rights as a state interest and condiȱȱȱȱȱęȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ inherited patrimony. Conclusion: Land Transactions, Social Structures, and Economic Growth This chapter started with a discussion of how traditional land rights may have related to the development of a market economy for land. In cases ȱȱ ȱǰȱ¢£ȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱ ȱęȱ that land transactions were conducted as part of multilayered social reȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱĚȱ¢ȱ¢ǰȱ¢ǰȱ ritual, and local politics. The social processes associated with such considǰȱȱȱȱǰȱ£ȱȱǰȱĴǰȱ
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and territorial competition, have been studied in these cases. Some institutions of land transaction, widely observed in Qing China, appear to provide for particular needs in the context of these social processes; this chapter has tried to clarify the formal and informal rules, or institutions, regulating land transactions. ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȯȱĞȱ inseparably from—various social relations was that the transactions were Ěȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱǰȱ interests in keeping parties outside a particular social sphere from becoming potential purchasers. Moreover, the institutions that allowed parties alienating land to retain certain rights to the property were much used, making for “weak” property rights. It is possible that the situation is representative of the notion that where the economy is “embedded” in the social structure, a market cannot fully develop.20ȱ ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱ enough to say that the economy was thus embedded. The state’s legislative measures were designed to contain the disputes arising from ambiguous property rights, and parties with an interest to establish “stronger” property rights, thus trying to ensure absolute sales, certainly existed. A process needing further study here is the interaction between the notion of absolute sales and land rights—eventually fully endorsed in the Ĵȱ ȯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ Ğȱ ȱ gional variations that limited, or sometimes undermined, these property rights. What can be said at this stage is the following. ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱǻǼȱ practice. Strong property rights were desired when private parties were dealing with each other, and the traditional categories of land transaction ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱĚȱȱǯȱ ǰȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱǰȱĞȱȱȱȱȱ in the process of local social structuring, also allowed for these provisions to be undermined. This could, for example, take place through the establishment of customary practices allowing the retention of certain rights despite an absolute sale. Moreover, whereas Qing legislative measures did endorse strong property rights through clarifying how ambiguous sales might be determined as absolute, and disallowing such practices as zhaojia Ğȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ custom for the payment of such a form of zhaojia (Zhongguo diyi lishi danganguan and Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan lishi yanjiusuo 1988, case ŘŖŞǼǯȱ Second, and more important, this tension did not represent a dichotomy between an “embedded” customary economy and a market-oriented economy. Whereas the tensions among private parties regarding strong ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǻŗşśŝǼǯ
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or weak property rights appear to have been part of the power relationships among the parties, the government’s concern had more to do with the keeping of the peace than with the establishment of these rights as ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱĴȱȱ ensure the absolute nature of a sale are unlikely to have been concerned ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ£Ȭȱȱ ȱ ǰȱȱ example, was more concerned with building a territorial base for himself and the Yungs, and he certainly did not proceed to sell his property to outsiders. There is no reason to assume that the government had the same motives as private parties did in endorsing strong property rights, but even if the containment of property disputes had economic implications, in a system where land-tax collection was based largely on Ming records ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ how the government might have wished to pursue this as an economic ȱǻȱŘŖŖŚǼǯȱ Thus, the institutions of land transactions in Qing China had elements that were both detrimental to and compatible with the development of a ȱ ¢ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ gests that these elements coexisted in a social environment where the market was not a primary concern, both among private parties and in their relations with the Qing government.
Chinese Enterprises across Cultures: ȱ ȱ ȱȱ¡ in the Early Twentieth Century
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ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȃȱ¢Ȅȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ and trading communities. By using both Chinese and British business inǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱěȱes of their business ventures. Western business laws and traditional Chinese business customs also converged in the “mixing vessel” of colonial
ȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱ in southern China accelerated this mixing process in the early twentieth century. Company Law and Its Migration to the Far East
ȱ Ȃȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱtives. One way to view that story is through the lens of economic history, especially the making of its hybrid business traditions. Born of an encounȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ Kong’s story is vividly told through the plot of how Western business laws migrated to the East. For instance, with the passing of the Joint Stock ComȱȱȱŗŞŚŚȱȱǰȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱǯȱȱŗŞśśǰȱ the Limited Liability Act was introduced. New and old company statȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŗŞŜŘǯȱȱȱ legislation, incorporating companies into new business enterprises with limited liability became a legal vehicle accessible to the general public. Companies could be incorporated not only by charter or a special act of Parliament but by registration under the company law. This institutional
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ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ǰȱ many scholars argue that these developments greatly induced the remarkable growth of commerce within the British empire from the middle of the ȱ ¢ȱ ǻ ȱ ŗşřŜDzȱ ȱ ŗşşśDzȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşşśDzȱ ȱȱ¢ȱŗşŝŝǼǯȱȱ¡ȱȱǻȱȱȂǼȱ ȱȱȱȱ bearing of this model on China in further detail. With the rise of Western imperialism and colonialism, corporation and company enterprises quickly spread to other parts of the world. By the nineteenth century, corporate laws had been transplanted to the British ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ǰȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱcessions of Canton and Shanghai, a commercial corridor slowly developed in maritime Asia. In particular, the three maritime metropolises of ǰȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ frontier par excellence for many Chinese and Western merchants. On this Singapore ȱ Ȭȱ ¡ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ the mixed mercantile circles. These cities became commercial hubs where ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱŗşşŜǼǯ In concessions such as Canton and Shanghai, foreign laws transformed the cities into “special economic zones.” Under extraterritoriality, the legal frameworks of these concessions became increasingly detached from that of the Chinese state. These new commercial institutions, protected by a Western legal framework, represented new business opportunities for Chinese merchants. As we will see, the foreign concessions of coastal Chiȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǯȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱěȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ cal patrons based around these coastal cities. Through their familial and regional networks, Chinese merchants mobilized capital to operate their business ventures, built market connections, and shielded themselves ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ǻȱ ŗşŜŞDzȱ ȱ ŗşŞŜDzȱ ȱ ŗşŝŖDzȱ ȱ ŗşşŞǰȱ řȮŜǰȱ ŗŘŝȮŗřŘǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ume discusses the case of commercial laws in the Shanghai concession in ȱDzȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱǯ Traditional Chinese Business Practice in Hong Kong As early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, the term “company” (translated kungsze ݀ৌ in Cantonese and gongsiȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ȱ troduced to Canton by Western missionaries active in southern China.1 ȱȱȱȱŗŞŜśǰȱȱȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱȱęȱ ŗȲȱ
For a detailed historical account of the term gongsiǰȱȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŘǼǯ
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company law for regulating businesses on the China coast. It was enacted ¢ȱȱ¢ȱĞȱȱȱȱȱŗŞŜŘǯȱȱȱ Ordinance was used by a small number of Western companies that operȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱDzȱȱȱĴȱěȱȱȱǯȱ¢ȱȱǰȱ ȱȱ ȱȱĜǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱęȱǯȱǰȱȱȱęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱĜȱȱĜȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ business disputes. This practice confused not only the foreign community ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǯȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ noted that one of the strangenesses of these Chinese practices rested in the mobilizing of capital in the name of a tong ූ (Cantonese pronunciation; tang ȱǼ.ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĜȱȱ ȱ ǰȱȱȱ was an entity like the corporate estate owned by Chinese traders. It was common for Chinese merchants to adopt one or several tong names to represent their corporate interests in a wide array of business ventures. As tong shares could be inherited by the descendants of the tong’s founder, ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǻ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŖŗǼǯȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱĚ¡ǯ Recent historical discoveries suggest that the origin of the idea of the tong can be traced back to the sixteenth century. The Chinese character denoting the word “tong” is identical to the character used for “hall” (e.g., an ancestral hall, ⼴ූǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱȱ economic application, no concrete building is implied. By the sixteenth century, it was common practice to register a tong name (for instance, the ȱȱȱȱǼȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱĜȱȱǯȱ ȱȱĞȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ǻȱ ȱ ŗşşŝDzȱȱŗşşśDzȱȱŘŖŖŚǼǯ2 ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ǯȱȱ as it may be, there is a rationale for the institution to prevail among Chinese merchants. The institutions of tong can be easily found in both rural ȱȱ ȱ ȱǻȱȱŗşşŖǼǯȱȱȂȱĚ¡¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱěȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱŗşŗŖǰȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ǯǰȱǰȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŗŖǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ court held that the Chinese tong was not a legal entity with a right to ȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ the tong was contested. The court decided that a tong was not a legal ŘȲȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ħȱ ǻȱ ŘŖŖŜǰȱ ǯȱŘǼǯ
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person (Tung Sang Wing Firm v. Chow Chun Kit 1910; Chow Cham v. Yuet Seem ŗşŗŖǼDzȱǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱ Kong. Nor was a tong entitled to accumulate wealth or transfer or inherit company shares. These cases highlight the imposition of British company law on Chinese business practice. The result was the surfacing of a grey legal area between Chinese customary commercial law and British law. ȱęȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱ increased transaction costs. But ironically, for many Chinese merchants ǻ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǼǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱĚ¡¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱity in China, where they were usually based. To illustrate how Chinese ȱȱȱȱȱȱĚ¡¢ǰȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱǯȱ East Meeting West ȱ ȱ ȱǻŗŞŚŗȮŗşşŝǼȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ several generations of transient populations. By using Eastern and Westȱǰȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ¢ȱ registration records,3 which can be seen as a barometer of China’s political and economic instability. ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗŞŜśǰȱ ȱ registered companies were foreign owned and managed. According to the ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱęȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ
ȱȱŗşŖŖǯȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱsurance business. These companies were Man On Insurance (Wanan yangmian baoxian 㨀ᅝ⋟䴶ֱ䱾Ǽǰȱȱȱȱǻȱ¡ ܼᅝ ☿䱾Ǽǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱ¢ȱȱ£ȱȬ xian ᅰᅝ⋟䴶ֱ⟁☿ݐ䱾ǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȂȱ¡ ৠᅝֱ䱾Ǽǯ4 According to the registration records, these companies had a small number of founders and shareholders who were mainly immigrants ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ फ⍋Ǽǰȱ ¢ȱ ⬾⾎, and Chiuchow (Chaozhou ╂⌆Ǽȱȱȱ ȱǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱǻȱȱफ࣫㸠Ǽȱȱȱ ȱ ǰȱȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ registration, were destroyed or damaged during the Second World War. The company registration records used in this chapter were reconstructed from the surviving records. ŚȲȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ǻŗŞşşǼȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱŗŘŘǰȱŗŘřȱǻ
ȱŗŘŘǰȱŗŘřǼDzȱ¢ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ DZȱ ŗşŘśȮŗşŜśǰȱ ȱ ŗŘŚȱ ǻ
ȱŗŘŚǼǯȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ǰȱȱ ǰȱ ȱǻ
ȱŗŚŚǼǯ řȲȱ
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Stephanie Po-yin Chung
ǰȱȱęȱȱ ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱ¢ǰȱȱȱǼǯȱȱȱȱ ȱȱrectors of the Nam Pak-hong Kung-so (Nanbei hang gongsuo फ࣫㸠݀ ᠔Dzȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱǼǯȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱŗŞŜŖȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱęȱȱ ȱȱȱǻȱȱȱȱȱȱǼȱȱȱ have been an extension of their core import-export business (which always ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǼǯȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱ Ǽȱ under the Companies Ordinance. The risk involved in the insurance business, especially the need to obtain protection from the clause of “limited liability,” may partly explain their tactic of registration. Given their shared ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱ could be regarded as a group of cooperative insurers. It might not be a coincidence that all these companies had the character on ᅝ (“safety” or ȃ¢ȄǼȱȱȱ¢ȱǯ From 1900 to 1920, the number of Chinese businesses registered under the Companies Ordinance visibly increased. About twenty-two Chinese ęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ǰȱ Western-style banks, and Western-style department stores. Most of them had a small number of founders but a large number of shareholders. According to the registration records, these company founders and shareholders mainly originated from Xiangshan 佭ቅ and Siyi ಯ䙥 (“Siyi” literally means “Four Counties,” referring to Toishan ৄቅ, Enping ᘽᑇ, Kaiping 䭟ᑇ, and Xinhui ᮄ᳗Ǽǯȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻ¢ȱĞȱȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱǼǯȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ founders were Chinese immigrants who had returned from the United States or Australia in the 1890s. They returned to China mainly because of American and Australian exclusion policies, which came into operation in the 1880s, targeting Chinese immigrants. Most of these immigrants returned to their native counties, but a number of them chose to reside in
ȱ ǰȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱǻǯǯǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ comers to the colony. They maintained close connections with their home ȱȱȱȱȱȱĚȱǰȱȱǰȱȱ the building of new schools. The most famous of these overseas-returned immigrants are Ma Yingbiao 侀ឝᔾ and Li Yutang ᴢ✰ූ. Ma was a Xiangshan man returned from Australia, and Li was a Toishan man (of
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ȱ¢ȱǼȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱĴȱȱ
ȱ ȱȱȱŗŞşŖǯȱ In south China, a new set of vocabulary developed to describe these returnees from overseas. They were addressed as “Gold Mountain guests” (Jinshanke 䞥ቅᅶ, with “Old Gold Mountain” referring to California ȱȃ ȱ ȱȄȱȱȱǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱously mentioned. These merchants constituted a community marginal to ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȃ ers” to the colony, they maintained close connections in their joint business ventures. Subscription lists indicate that the adoption of company ȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ Chinese businesses. Very clear familial and geographical networks can be ęȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ the Sincere Company (Xiansi gongsi ܜᮑ݀ৌǰȱȱęȱȬ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ Ǽȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ collected for the department store was raised through the founder’s ancesȱȱȱȱǻȱ¢Ȃȱȱ ȱȱǼǯȱȱȱ before the outbreak of the Second World War, a regular amount of Sincere Company’s dividends was distributed to male members of the Ma family in Xiangshan through their ancestral hall there, because several tongs were registered shareholders of the Sincere Company (author’s interview ȱ ǯȱ ǯȱ ǯȱ ǰȱ Řȱȱ ŗşşŘǼǯȱ ǯȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ¢ȱ the company subscription records. Some of the Sincere Company’s shares were subscribed in the names of tongs. ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ devices for doing business: the concept of limited liability and the practice of interlocking shares. In the absence of a stock market and with the ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱěent groups of merchants. Shareholding was also interlocked. In the case of ¢ȱȂȱǰȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǻ ȱ yinhang ᒋᑈ䡔㸠Ǽȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǻ nian rensou ᒋᑈҎ໑Ǽǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ of these two companies was Li Yutang, the previously mentioned Toishan ȱȱȱ ȱ ǯȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱpanies, the resulting joint-stock companies were able to create credit because subscribed shares were not required to be fully paid. By distributing ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱěǯȱȱȱ way, it may be said that interlocking investments created a group of cooperative businesses. With personal connections in the United States and Australia, many of ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ
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ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱęȱ ȱȱȃ ȱȱ Ȅȱǻ䞥ቅ㥞; Kam Shan Chong in CanDzȱ ȱ£ȱȱǼȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱous services that connected Chinese to their homeland and around the ǯȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱ Ĵȱȱȱ ǰȱ ȱ ǰȱȱȱnese communities. Li Yutang was the owner of several Kam Shan Chong ęȱȱȱȱĴȱǰȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ ǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱ ȱ ȱDzȱǰȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǯȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ business, but according to a survey conducted by C. F. Remer from 1930 ȱŗşřŗǰȱȱśŖȱȱǻȱ
ǞŗřŜǯŞȱȱȱ
ǞŘŝŘǯŝȱǼȱȱȱ Ĵȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱĴȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ in their business and political endeavors in south China.ś ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ who had returned from North America were active in the political circle ȱ ȱ ǯȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ¡¢ȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ĴȱȱȱǯȱȱŗşŖŚǰȱ¢ȱ were founders of the Society to Oppose the United States Exclusion Treaty against Chinese Laborers (Guangzhou juyuehui ᒷᎲᢦ㋘᳗Ǽǯȱ¢ȱȱȱȬȱ¢Ĵȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ as a protest of the renewal of the United States Exclusion Treaty in Chinese ǯȱȱȱ¢Ĵǰȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱ¢ȱ provided by the crisis and mobilized themselves into capital syndicates to invest in steamship transportation and railway construction in south China. Their decision to invest in steamships and railways was far from ǯȱȱŗşŖśȱ ǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȃȱ¢ǰȄȱȱ Qing government began to recover railway concessions given to foreign investors. The notion of rights recovery was soon taken up by merchant groups in various provinces, who embarked on schemes to amass capital ȱęȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱǯȱȱ¢ȱes, especially in such poor provinces as Yunnan and Guangxi, merchants could not collect adequate capital for investments, and funds from local governments were used to assure the purchases. Guangdong was one of the very few provinces in which merchants managed to raise adequate funds among themselves for building railways. śȲȱ
ȱȱǰȱȱȱǻŗşřřǼǯ
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ȱ¢ȱŗşŗŗǰȱħȂȱȱȱ ¢ȱ£ȱȱ ȱ violent resistance by various provincial groups. Railway protection societies were formed that protested against the policy of railway nationalization and declared it an infringement on provincial interests. In Guangǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱěȱ¢ȱȱ ¢ȱǯȱȱȱ 1911, the Railway Protection Society of Guangdong was established in
ȱ ȱȱȱDzȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǯȱȱȱ ȱ ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱtinue their political and economic activities in south China (Chung 1998, řśȮśśǰȱŗŝŚȮŗŝśǼǯ Chaos in South China and Safe Haven in Hong Kong ȱ ȱ ŗşŗŗǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ merchants active in south China became more apparent. As we will see, ȱȱȱĞȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ Ȃȱ¢ȱȱ records. In October 1911, the tartar-general of Guangdong Province was assassinated, and a massive defection of government troops in Guangȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ęĞ¢Ȭȱ ǰȱ Ȭ¢ȱ ¢ȱ troops, known as “people’s armies,” gathered in Canton and its surrounding areas. The collapse of the Qing court in 1911 led China into decades of political chaos and continuous warfare. As the confrontation between the Peking and Canton governments sharpened, both were desperate for economic resources to consolidate their military strength. The Canton government was actually a loose coalition of warlords, including those from such provinces as Yunnan and Guangxi (troops under their control were ȱȱȱȃȱȄȱǽkejun ᅶ䒡Ǿȱ¢ȱȱǼǯȱȱȱ ęȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ rampant. But to sustain this fragile regime, the Canton government also ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ęȱ system in Canton continued to deteriorate as a result (Chung 1998, 99– ŗŘŜǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȃȂȱȄȱȱtain its rule. Toishan merchants who had returned from the United States were among the important donors. In return, many of them were apȱȱĜȱǯȱȱ ¢ȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱ ȱǰȱ was particularly concerned that the treasury of the Canton government was under Li Yuktang’s control. Governor May observed in 1912 that the treasury “has been managed very badly. It was practically emptied.… The ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱǽ
ǾǞŘǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖȱȱ ǞřǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖȯȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ££Ǽȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ been kept. Following this, the pernicious device was resorted to of issuing ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȄȱǻȱȱȱŗşşŞǰȱŚśǼǯȱ Governor May also estimated that in October 1912, Canton’s depreciating
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¢ȱǻ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǼȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ
ǯȱ ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱĜȱȱȱȱ but also by means of intimidation practiced by so-called patriotic associaȱȱ ȱ ǯȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȃę¢ȱ Ȅȱ ȱ ȱ Ěǯȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱǻȱŗşşŞǰȱŚśǼǯ In 1923, the Canton government formally implemented a land registration ordinance in the city. All common properties controlled by lineages, ǰȱȱȱȱǻ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǼȱ ȱȱ public property (gongchan ݀⫶Ǽȱȱȱ¢ȱǻguanchan ᅬ⫶Ǽȱ unless “red deeds” (hongqi ㋙༥; sealed deeds, i.e., land deeds endorsed ¢ȱȱȱǼȱ ȱǯȱȱȱȱŗşŘŖǰȱȱ ȱcommon for property owners to seek endorsement of a property transfer ȱȱĜǯȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ private contracts (i.e., contracts signed by seller and buyer, without govȱǼȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǻȱŗşşŞǰȱşřȮşśǼǯȱ Using this policy, the Canton government sought to increase its revȱ ¢ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ hitherto concealed in private hands. Properties of this nature but held by known civilian organizations such as temples, guilds, ancestral halls, and regional associations became vulnerable targets of this policy. As a result, many property owners looked for alternative methods to hide their assets. Some tong property owners tried to liquidate their immoveable wealth ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱŗşşŞǰȱŗŖřȮŗŖŜǼǯŜ Parallel to the political changes in Canton, the number of Chinese ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŘŚȱ ȱ ŗşřŚǯȱȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¢Ȭȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ¢ȬȱȬȱȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ engaging in the loan, mortgage, and land investment businesses. Some of these registered companies even carried the character tong in their name—for example, Tsang Chung Shun Tong Co. Ltd. (Ceng zhongxin tang youxiangongsi ᳒ᖴֵූ᳝䰤݀ৌǼǰȱȱȱ ȱȱǭȱǯȱǯȱ (Shen Yuqing tang youxiangongsi ብ们ᝊූ᳝䰤݀ৌǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Tong Land Investment Loan and Agency Co. Ltd. (Yu Anli tang youxian ŜȲȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĚȱȱǯȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱǻŗşşřǼǯȱ
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gongsi ԭᅝ⾂ූ᳝䰤݀ৌǼǯȱȱȱ ¢Ȭȱȱȱȱȱ following three features in common. First, directors and shareholders of the same company shared the same surname and the same place of origin; some even shared the same registered address. Second, although the Ȃȱȱȱȱ ȱĴȱȱ ȱ ǰȱȱ China, Southeast Asia, and North America, all the directors registered ȱȱ ȱ ȱǯȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱęȱȱ in the development; according to the company registration records, many of these shareholders registered their place of origin as Toishan County. To understand how these companies operated, we can consider the following registration materials and what they reveal. The Toi Shan Investment Co. Ltd. (Taishan qiao gang Chenshi lianhe youxiangongsi ৄቅڥ ␃䱇⇣㙃ড়᳝䰤݀ৌǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşřŖǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ claimed that its major businesses were mortgages and real estate, stating that “the objects for which the Company is formed” included “to purchase for investment or resale, and to trade in land and house and other property of any tenure and any interest therein, and to recreate, sell, and deal in freehold and leasehold ground rents, and to make advances upon the security of land or house or other property, or any interest therein, and generally to deal in, trade by way of sale, lease, exchange, or otherwise with land and house property and any other property whether real or ǯȄȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ
ǞřŖǰŘŖŖǰȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱŜǰŖŚŖȱǰȱȱȱȱ
Ǟśǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ that the company had forty; all of them had the same place of origin: ǯȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ ¢Ȭȱȱ ȱ ǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǻǯǯǰȱ䱇; ȱȱDzȱȱȱǼǯ7 It is noteworthy that high on Toi Shan Investment’s shareholders’ list ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ¡ȱ £ȱ 䱇ᅌ⼪Ǽǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǻȱ ȱȱȱȱ ǰȱȱ¡ȱȱǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ that the tong was established or managed by his direct descendants, but ȱȱȱ ȱȱȯȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ history of Toishan men’s migration to North America. Toishan immigrants had good reason to remember his name. Chin was known to be one of ȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱǰȱȱȱŗŞŜŖǯȱ¢ȱŗŞŜŞǰȱȱ had founded a general merchandising store, the Wa Chong Company ǻ ȱ 㧃ᯠ݀ৌǼǰȱȱĴǯȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ ŝȲȱ
ȱǻŘŖŖŖǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ who migrated to the United States and their relatives remaining in Guangdong at the turn of ȱ¢ǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ and their native counterparts in the United States from the 1920s.
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ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ¡ȱ 䱇ᅰ⽻Ǽȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱŗşŖśȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱǰȱȱȱroad (Xinning tielu ᮄᆻ䨉䏃Ǽǯȱȱȱȱ Ȃȱȱȱȱholders’ list, the company might have enjoyed high popularity among the Toishan men’s circle in south China.8 Let us place the Chens’ story in a broader political context. Madeleine
ǰȱȱȱȱDreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration between the United States and South China, gives an elaborate narrative of the strong link between Toishan merchants who migrated to the United States and their relatives back in Guangdong. The company regȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱę¢ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȃȱȄȱȱȱȃ ȱǻ Ǽȱ Returns” in these stories. In the following paragraphs, let us visit a less “heroic” side to the Toishan men’s story in south China and see what it reveals. ȱ¢DZȱȱĚ
ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱěȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱěȱ a political safe haven for cross-border speculation activities. The company ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱŗşŘŚȱȱŗşřŚǰȱ a substantial portion of the Chinese-owed companies registered themselves as engaging in land investment and mortgages. This development was not accidental. To understand this story, we must go into further details of the 1911 chaos in Guangdong and the Canton government’s land policy in 1923 mentioned previously. Starting from 1911, with the collapse of the Qing government, competing cliques of army leaders began to auction their seized properties in Canton. Ironically, this move activated the real estate market of Canton. This trend grew stronger from 1919, when Sun Yat-sen’s son, Sun Ke ᄿ⾥, was appointed mayor of Canton city. Being an idealist keen on exerting ȱȱĚǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ started to demolish the old city wall of Canton. Many public and government buildings were also demolished. The trend got another boost in 1923, the year when the Canton government formally implemented a land registration ordinance. Accordingly, all common properties controlled by lineages, temples, and guild halls without red deeds were declared public property or government property. This resulted in the holding of a ȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǯȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱǯȱȱęȱȱĴȱȱĚ¡ȱȱȱǻȱȱ ȱ Ǽȱ into the real estate market and created a land boom in Canton. In 1923, ŞȲȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŘŖŖŖǰȱ ǯȱŜǼǯ
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ȱȱȱĜȱȱȱȃȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ considerable rise in the prices fetched by land sold by auction on the open market and an outburst of speculation in real estate.” A foreign reporter also recorded that “the boom in lands and shares was the most outstandȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŘřǯdzȱ ¢ȱ ǽǾȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǽǾȱ Ȅȱ (China Weekly Reviewǰȱŝȱ¢ȱŗşŘŚǼǯȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ĜȱȱǻǯǯǰȱȱȱǼȱ ȱȱȱȱ the supply, and they acquired the best properties at largely reduced prices ǻȱŗşşŞǰȱşřȮşśǼǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǯ In 1920, the year when the old city wall of Canton was demolished and the Canton government implemented its plan for urban redevelopǰȱ¢ȱȱȱęȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ their counterparts in Toishan to apply to the Canton government for the purchase of three parcels of land. The application was put under the name of the “Toishan Regional Association” (Taishan huiguan ৄቅ᳗仼Ǽǯȱ ȱ purchased properties had previously been a police station, a police training school, and a prison. To encourage fellow Toishan men to subscribe, ȱ ęȱ ǻǯǯǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱǼȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱtion on the “call for subscription” notice. In additions, all subscribers were entitled to install their ancestors’ spirit tablets in one of the rebuilt hall constructions (also called tong ූǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱtral tablets were in proportion to the amount of the contribution. Gener¢ǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱǞŜŖǰȱǞŗŖŖǰȱȱǞŗŗşǯȱ ȱȱȱȱǞŘŖǰŖŖŖȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱȱŜŘşȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ silver dollars were gathered as a result (Toishan gonghui yuekanȱŗşřřǼǯȱȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ Toishan men in the colony. Due to the political instability in Canton, the land deeds, the surplus after the purchases, as well as the management documents were all kept by ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ǯȱ¢ȱŗşřŗǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ property described previously had almost doubled. A dispute broke out among these Toishan men over the nature of the collaboration when the
ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱȱȱęǼǯȱ The native group in Toishan and Canton, however, insisted on retaining the properties for charity, because the native associations in Toishan and Canton regarded the collaboration as one of a tong, which traditionally was perpetual and normally not supposed to be divided by the descenǯȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ collaboration was that of a “joint-stock company,” and as the majority
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shareholders they were entitled to make the business decision to sell the ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ in their hands could have given this clique of Toishan men the upper hand over their counterparts on the Mainland. But, the native group in Toishan and Canton fought back by soliciting support from political and ¢ȱęȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱǯȱȱȱǰȱȱĴȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱǻToishan gonghui yuekanȱŗşřřǼǯ The interest of this case lies not so much in the issue of business disȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱęȱȱ it indicates the ambiguous relationship between “tong” and “company” ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ the Chinese tong might adopt a double identity—it could be a traditional Chinese tong and concurrently a Western-style corporation. It was not uncommon for some members of a tong to secure foreign legal protection by registering themselves as a company in the treaty ports. Neither was ȱȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ
ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ¢ȱ Ǽǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ driven Chinese merchants to look for alternative venues for protecting ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ heaven for Chinese merchants who endeavored to invest in a politically disintegrating China. By registering their investments under British com¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ventures from the political instability in or interference from the Chinese government. These Chinese merchants believed that the British presence ȱ ȱ ȱěȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǯȱ The dispute discussed here between two groups of Toishan men is but a single example that survived because of exceptional circumstances. Even so, it reveals much about the conditions facilitating cross-border land speculations among merchant cliques in south China. The British presence ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȬȱlations. But, this legal protection had limits. As revealed by the case of ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ǯȱ In south China, especially in the 1920s and 1930s, political reality always spoke louder than institutional protection. Conclusion On the surface, it looks as though the transplantation of British com¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱŗŞŜŖȱȱȱȱȱȱ
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the Chinese business institution, which could have eventually led to the breakdown of the traditional mode of economic organization in China. The discussion here demonstrates that both British business laws and Chinese business traditions played crucial roles in creating an environȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱȬȱtion activities in south China. By examining company registration records ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ of these forms was constrained and shaped by the particular historical ęȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ ǰȱ however, not a straightforward replacement of the Chinese model with a British institution. Rather, traditional business practices in China were actively reinvented during this mixing process.
NINE
Legalization of Chinese Corporation, 1904–1929: Innovation and Continuity in Rules and Legislation
BILLY K. L. SO AND ALBERT S. LEE
In the early twentieth century, China tried to adopt two Western institutions—company law and the corporate form of the joint stock company with limited liability (gufen yuxian gongsi 㙵ӑ᳝䰤݀ৌ, referred to here ȱȱȃȱȄȱǰȱ¢ǰȱȱȃȄǼǯȱȱtions have been widely perceived as among the most crucial in China’s quest for economic modernization. This chapter examines the evolution of company law in relation to the Corporation Model. The Corporation Model is generally considered the foundation for the separation of ownership and management in modern business history. ȱ¢ȱȱęȱĚȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ States and Great Britain from the nineteenth century. It embodies what we today commonly term “an open corporation,” or the Berle-Means type ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱȱŗşřŘǼǯȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱ viewed as a modern business practice that would have been impracticable had there not been the corresponding third-party regulating mechanism of an impartial state, manifested in a corporate governance framework under the rule of law. There is an intrinsic assumption of a close relationȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşşŗǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ Dzȱ this view is common across disciplines from legal studies to economics ȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱěȱǰȱȱȱǻȱȱ et al. 1998, 2000; Bebchuk 1999; Black 2001a, 2001b; Gugler, Mueller, and ȱŘŖŖŗǼǯȱ
ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŗşşŜǰȱ ŘŜśǰȱ ŘŝŝȮŘŝŞǼȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ tion, which was largely derived from rigorous theoretical inference and
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mainly Anglo-American experiences in law and business, may not necessarily apply to empirical cases in historical contexts of other cultural Ĵǯȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱŗşŖŚȱȱŗşŘşǰȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱęȱȱmulgated the third version of the Chinese company law. We are interested ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱĚȱ the historical perceptions of the Corporation Model. Since company law legislation encompasses a wide variety of issues, we focus our empirical examinations on areas pertaining to corporate governance and, more speę¢ǰȱȂȱǰȱĚȱȱǰȱȱȂȱǯ Our approach asks who did what in the process of legal development ȱ ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱǯȱȱ¢ȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ the ideal type of Corporation Model and the thinking and behavior of ȱȱȱȱĜȱ ȱĚȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱŗşşŗǰȱŘŖŖśDzȱȱŗşşŚǰȱŘŖŖŖǼǯȱȱȱ¢ses of the legislators and other important players describe the legislative ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ evolving legal environment. In terms of legal history, we do not take legal ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ sonal “state” imagined as a lone actor in legislation for either normative or pragmatic purposes.1 The next section introduces the law and the events that coincided with its establishment with the ideal type, or Corporation Model, in China during the period of our inquiry. We examine the process that produced institutional change and corresponding incentive structures for how company law actually evolved. Later sections look into the legal reform provisions in relation to our chosen area—corporate governance—of the Corporation Model, as well as the agents of change and the legislative measures that tried to reform the three company laws of 1904, 1914, and 1929. A conȱĚ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱ law and the Corporation Model. Chinese Company Laws from 1904 to 1929 ȱ ȱ ŗŞśŖǰȱ Ȭ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ £ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ funds these stock companies assembled overseas and in China enabled them to expand quickly in the new market. A new corporate form was the ŗȲȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱǻŘŖŖşǼȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¢£ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşśŜȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȬȱȱǻǰȱěǰȱȱǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱĚȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱǯ
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ǯȱȱĜȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ment and for markets in the 1870s and 1880s. Government policies followed, in 1898, to encourage and reward those who could successfully do ȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱ¢ȱĴȱȱȱǯȱ Ĝȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŗşŖŚȱ ¢ȱǰȱȱ ȱŗřśȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ŗǰşŖŖǰŖŖŖȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱȱĚȱȬ¢ȱȱȱȱȱĜȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱĜcials of the Self-Strengthening Movement such as Zhang Zhidong ᔉП⋲ and Liu Kunyi സϔ called for a company law to further the development of large Chinese companies in industries such as shipping and manufacturing. A contemporary had argued that legislation was needed to achieve these goals and to give Chinese merchants a competitive edge against forȱȱǻȱȱȱȱ ȱŗşşśǰȱşśȮşŞDzȱ ¢ȱŗşşśǰȱŚŚȮŚŝDzȱ ȱȱŘŖŖŖǰȱŞŖřȮŞŖŚǼǯȱǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ in China was a response to existing practices among Chinese merchants ȱȱȱǻȱŗşşŜǼǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ much to do with limited liability, which was new and outside Chinese business traditions. The very fact that Chinese investors felt comfortable investing in foreign enterprises but were reluctant to do so in Chinese establishments prompted advocates to believe that new laws could change ǯȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ was the real reason for initiating new company laws. The Assumption and Predicament of the Corporation in China One prevalent view was that the Corporation was needed for China’s economic modernization. This view was shared by eminent thinkers in lateQing and Republican China and was echoed by those who studied China in the second half of the twentieth century. For instance, Liang Qichao ṕ ଳ䍙ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ the turn of the twentieth century, wrote an article in 1910 on Chinese enterprises. Liang made it clear that poverty in China could be ended only ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱǻŗǼȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱǻŘǼȱ¢ȱ¡ȱȱǰȱȱ ǻřǼȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱing. Liang further argued that the so-called modern enterprise model he favored was the Corporation, a model that had become well known in China at the time. Wu Tingfang ӡᓋ㢇, a contemporary of Liang Qichao, had this to say about the Corporation:
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We Chinese have a reputation for being good business men. When in business on our own account, or in partnership with a few friends, we succeed marvelously well; but we have yet much to learn regarding large concerns such as corporations or joint stock companies. This is not to be wondered at, for joint stock companies and corporations as conducted in the West were unknown in China before the advent of foreign merchants in our midst. Since then a few joint stock companies have been started ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Dzȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ by Chinese exclusively, but the managers have not yet mastered the systematic Western methods of conducting such concerns. Even unpracticed and inexpert eyes can see great room for improvement in the management of these businesses.… Corporations and joint stock companies are ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱǻȱŗşŗŚǰȱŗŚşȮŗśŖǼ
¢ȱ¢ȱǰȱȱŗşşśǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ Kirby in what is now commonly called the “Kirby Puzzle” (Rose and BowȱŗşşŞDzȱȱȱŘŖŖŘǼDZȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ the past century failed in one of their major tasks, that is, to promote the Western-style corporation as a model for Chinese enterprises and thereby achieve economic development? The Western model Kirby referred to was the Corporation. The same issue has been described in the history of Chiȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŘǼǯȱ
ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ mote a company code in 1904, and over a thousand companies had incorporated, at the time Liang wrote his article in 1910, the situation was far from satisfactory for two reasons. First, enormous obstacles blocked the way for those who tried to incorporate. Second, most who did take the incorporation path failed miserably and went bankrupt. Liang sugȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ DZȱ ǻŗǼȱ introduce a constitutional government for establishing the rule of law; ǻŘǼȱȱ£ȱȱȱȬDzȱȱǻřǼȱȱȱture such as a stock exchange and banking system to support business enterprises. In discussing China’s slow economic modernization, Kirby questioned whether the Corporation Model could ever be the dominant form of Chinese enterprise. This reservation needed to take into account the economic performance of Chinese business enterprises in the later decades of the ȱ¢ǰȱȱ ¢ȱȱĴȱǻŗşşśǼǰȱ ȱȱȱȱsibility of an alternative model of modern corporation. Like Kirby, Zhang Zhongmin also suggested immense cultural and political obstacles blockȱȱȱȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŘǼǯ
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Issues Concerning Chinese Company Law and the Development of the Corporation First, how should the Corporation be legally regulated in the Chinese context? The Corporation Model has great potential for tapping funds. This form of company enables investors of all kinds to invest their savings. In the aggregate, the pool of capital becomes enormous and can support an ever-expanding, capitalistic, large-scale enterprise. But, why would people invest so much capital on an impersonal basis? The answer is that peoȱȱęȱȱ ȱDZȱęǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱ investments; second, that company managers will protect the interests of ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱęǯȱȱȱ tradition, trust in business investment relies heavily on personal networks ȱȱǻ ȱŗşşŗǼǯȱȱȱȱȱment needs a new form of trust in addition to, if not in replacement of, the personal trust upon which investment had been made possible before ǻȱŘŖŖŖDzȱȱŘŖŖřǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ on, entrepreneurs will turn to the state or administrative mechanisms to ȱȱȱȱęǯȱǰȱȱȱȱed to convince investors that there are adequate third-party controls over management or company directors—controls that will protect investors’ interests. The Chinese company law regime needed to address this investment dimension of the Corporation. But, how could shareholders be empowered to control the directors and monitor a company’s important decisions so that shareholders feel safe to invest? The second question about the Corporation ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ management of capital in company decision making. A company’s performance depends upon capital, assembled from the public, to be invested in ȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱĜ¢ȱȱ¡ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ expanding the business. Also, a company must be rationally managed by experts. Capital should be placed in the best hands to maximize return ȱȱȱĜȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱ With these two dimensions in mind, let us ask what was the legislative process for the three Chinese company laws and how did they address the issues related to the Corporation as outlined here? Our analytical frame ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ DZȱǻŗǼȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱDzȱǻŘǼȱȱȂȱȱǻ¢ȱȱȱǼDzȱǻřǼȱȱ ȱȱĚȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱDzȱȱǻŚǼȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ of the shareholders’ general meeting. These four legal elements serve as reference points for a normative theory of company law to confront managerial shareholder problems.
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The Company Code of 1904 The legislative process in late-Qing China has been mentioned in many writings about Chinese company law. There is a need to clarify this process, since only one piece of source material is extant, which many scholars have referred to exclusively. Until new information emerges, we will look carefully into this document, of which the full translation follows: ȃȱȱĴȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ğȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Chapter of the Company Law for Imperial Examination and Awaits Further Imperial Instruction” I, Minister of Commerce Zaizhen 䓝ᤃ, received an imperial order on 22 April 1903 stating that facilitating commerce and promoting industries were among key areas of state policies of national importance since ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ Zaizhen, Yuan Shikai 㹕Ϫ߅ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱĞȱȱ commercial code. This shows how high a priority the imperial court regards commerȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ǰȱȱ that time Wu Tingfang was participating in the diplomatic negotiation ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǻ ȱȱȱȱǼȱȱǯȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱ parts of commercial laws of other countries for our reference. ȱŝȱȱǻȱ¡ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǼǰȱȱ ȱȱ new imperial order to establish a Ministry of Commerce, and Wu was apȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱǽǾǯȱ ȱȱȱȱperial Capital the following month. We discussed face-to-face and came to the conclusion that due to the complexity of commercial law it would be unrealistic to compile a comprehensive one in a short period of time. For the time being, the most urgent task was to help organize various companies and rectify the former problem of overdispersed resources. In ȱǰȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱǰȱȱęȱ¢ȱȱȱ the compilation of a company ordinance for merchants to follow. When ȱȱȱǽȱȱȱȱȱȱǾǰȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ǯȱǰȱ ȱ¢ȱĞȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ and added at the beginning a set of general ordinances on merchants. Ğȱ ȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȬȱȱǰȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱĴȱ ȱȱȱĜȱȱ¢ȱȱȱěȱǻ ȱ䒡″㰩Ǽǯȱ A subsequent edict of 29 December (the eleventh day of the eleventh Ǽȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ himself from excessive tasks. Since a Ministry of Commerce had already ȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱsponsible for detailed examinations of the law.
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Billy K. L. So and Albert S. Lee With the consent of Governor-General Yuan and in accordance with the previous edict, we now submit a general ordinance for merchants of 9 articles and a company code of 131 articles for your imperial examination. If it receives your approval, please promulgate it as an imperial law that would be put in print and circulated by my ministry. Other parts of the commercial law will be our next tasks of lawmaking. Recently, Wu ȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱ minister. We know well that he has been overseas for a very long time ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱǽǾȱ ǯȱȱ ȱǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱĞȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ that the outcome will be more favorable. Our humble memorial to the Emperor. 21 January 1904. (DQGXXFL ŗşŖşǰȱŗŖǯŗȮDzȱȱ¢ȱȱǼ
The legislative process described here was standard for late imperial DZȱȱĞȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ǰȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱ ǰȱ the agent of change, as indicated in this text, seems to have been overlooked in previous scholarship. Many have assumed that it was a product of three persons assigned to the job. Based on the full translation here, ¢ǰȱȱȱĞȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱǯȱ£ȱ ȱȱ Ĵȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȱȱ Wu Tingfang was the sole agent of change in this process merits more attention than it has received so far. This legislation drew considerable criticism from contemporaries such ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŗşŗŖǼȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşşśǰȱ ŗŖŝǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ground of Wu when discussing this company law in China, except ShiȱȱǻŗşŞŖǰȱřŜǼȱȱȱȱǻŘŖŖŖǰȱŞŝǼǯȱȱ ȱȱȱ top Chinese authorities on Western law in the Self-Strengthening MoveȱȱȱȬȱǯȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ only when they discussed the role of Wu as a reformer (Pomeratz-Zhang ŗşşŘǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ŗŞŞŖǯȱ ȱ was practicing as a common law barrister in the United Kingdom when ęȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱěǰȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗŞŞŖȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱǯȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱ ȱ £ȱᴢ匏ゴ and his later appointments as envoy to the United ȱȱǯȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ practices, and his role in the negotiation of the Treaty of Commerce, in which he faced a strong counterpart in the British delegation, had providȱȱ ȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱȱ
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made on the Corporation as cited previously reveals his mind-set when he had to advise Zaizhen about the commercial code. Wu was very likely ȱȱ ȱĞȱȱŗřŗȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱĚȱȱȱǰȱ might not have understood the law well enough to translate it. ȱ ħȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ŗŞşşȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ Ȃȱ Ğȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱǻȱ¡ȱȱȱȱŘŖŖřǰȱŗśŖȮŗśŗǼǯȱless, this Qing legislation was not a translation of the Japanese code, even though Wu had the Japanese company code at hand. A comparison of the ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗŞşşȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǻ ȱ ŗşŝŚǼȱ ȱ ȱ yield much evidence of a strong genealogical tie, even in Chinese characters. For one thing, Wu did not use the important legal term of “stock” found in the Japanese law, that is, kabushiki ᷾ᓣ, but instead introduced the more conventional Chinese term gufen 㙵ӑ. At least one company law ¡ȱ ȱȱȱȱĜȱ ȱȱǰȱGongshang guanbao Ꮉଚᅬฅ, in 1907 still used the term kabushiki instead of gufen ǻȱ¡ȱŗşŖŝǼǯȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱĚǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱkaisha ᳗⼒ for “company” but kept the conventional Chinese term gongsi ݀ৌ. The most ȱěȱȱȱęȱȱȃ¢ǰȄȱ ȱȱȱȱ ęȱȱȱȃ£ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ business (maoyi 䊓ᯧǼȄȱǻȱŗǼǰȱȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱȱ “organization formed for the purpose of conducting commercial behavior (ççȱଚ㸠⚎ǼȄȱǻȱŚŘǼǯȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱęȱȱ “company” will be discussed later as regards the 1914 legislation, which ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱǰȱĞȱǰȱȱȱ much stronger background in Anglo-American common law. It is more likely that at least some of his main jurisprudence was transplanted from the British and U.S. common law systems, rather than coming from the continental European civil law system. This is especially salient for the parts pertaining to the Corporation Model, since the form was common not only in the United States but also in Great Britain. We now consider how the 1904 Company Code (DQGXXFL 1909, ŗŖǯŘȮŗŗǼȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȱ ǻŗǼȱThe director’s pay and its disclosureDZȱȱǻĞȱǯǼȱŜŜȱȱ that unless indicated in the incorporation contract, the director’s pay will ȱȱ¢ȱȱȂȱȱȱǻ Ǽǯȱȱȱȱȱ policy of openness about compensation and authorized shareholders to ȱȱȱ ȱȱę¡ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱǯ ǻŘǼȱ The director’s duties (dishonesty and negligence issues): Art. 17 stipulates that the founding members of a corporation will not hide unreasonable private interests from other shareholders in cases of fraudulence
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ǻĚȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ǯȱ ǰȱȱ were required not to engage in business similar to what the company was ȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱǻǯȱŝŚǼDzȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ company’s capital stock for any purpose other than what the company ȱȱȱȱǻǯȱŝśǼǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ǻǯȱŝŜǼȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ śŖȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȱȂȱ¢ȱ to prepare and disclose company information in an annual report that contained a balance sheet, a transaction report, a report of any loss, the suggested dividends for share and the amount for reserve, and an account of capital stocks, inventory, and assets, as well as of borrowing and lendȱ ȱ ǻǯȱ ŗŖşǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ (chazhangren ᶹ䋀ҎǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ who were responsible for auditing the company accounts for disclosure ǻǯȱŗŖŞǼǯȱȱȱȱȱǻǯȱŗŘŜǼȱȱȱȱȱȱ by directors that warranted a penalty. Directors were liable to a penalty ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ śŖŖȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻǯȱ ŗŘŜǯŘǼǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ nual reports, founding contract, minutes of every SGM, and so on (Art. ŗŘŜǯşǼDzȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱśŖȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǻǯȱŗŘŜǯŗŖǼDzȱȱȱȱǯȱŗŝǰȱ ȱȱȱĚȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǻǯȱŗŘŜǯŗŗǼǯȱ ȱęǰȱȱȱȱśǰŖŖŖȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱŝśǰȱ allocating company property for purposes other than those authorized by ȱ¢ȱǻǯȱŗŘŝǼǯȱȱȱȱ££ȱȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱȱŗŖǰŖŖŖȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢Ȭ ¡ȱȱǻǯȱŗŘşǼǯ ǻřǼȱȱȱȱĚȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱticular about company loans to directorsDZȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻǯȱ ŗŝǼȱ ȱȱĚȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱȂȱĚȱ of interest, even though there are some regulatory rules on the misuse of company resources. Those rules make clear one important aspect of the Corporation, which is distinct from other private Chinese business operations: the principle of prohibiting the use of a company’s resources without the formal approval of the shareholders. ǻŚǼȱShareholders’ rights and the authority of the shareholders’ general meeting: One major development in company law was the provision that introduced the rule of limited liability for a Corporation ǻǯȱŘşǼǯȱȱ liability exempted the liability of a shareholder beyond the share that he ȱȱȱĴǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱĜȱȱȱ
Legalization of Chinese Corporation
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ȱǻǯȱřśǼȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǻǯȱŚŚȱȱśŝǼǯȱȱȬȱ provisions were probably of concern at the time because the earlier disȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĞȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱĜȱȱȱ apparently deterred many from investing substantially in such enterprises. Another concern was that of possible disputes arising from foreigners’ investing in Chinese joint stock ventures. That issue posed complex legal issues under the extraterritoriality rules of treaty ports. These problems represented important issues holding back both Chinese private investment and foreign capital from Chinese joint stock ventures. Shareholders were given a certain authority to monitor their directors, mainly through the SGM. Art. 39 recognized the transferability of shares in the open market insofar as there was no violation of company regulations. In principle, each share represented one vote. The law empowered a company to decide, according to its regulations, whether those holding more than ten shares could exercise a diminishing voting right such as ten or twenty shares for one vote in addition to holding ten votes ȱȱęȱȱȱǻǯȱŗŖŖǼǯȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱ which company decisions required the SGM’s approval except for decisions about increasing the capital stock of the company or about a merger ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǻǯȱ ŗŖřǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ require compliance with SGM resolutions by the directors. Unless the diȱĴȱěȱȱȱǯȱŗŘŜȱȱŗřŖǰȱȱ ȱ no mention of any shareholders’ right to sue the directors if the directors had violated any SGM resolutions. The shareholders, by a majority vote, could decide important company business; for example, the selection and ȱȱȱǻǯȱŜŘǰȱŝŘǼDzȱȱȂȱ¢ȱǻǯȱŜŜǼDzȱȱȱȱ annual reports, including all accounts and balance sheets as well as diviȱǻǯȱŚŞǼDzȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǻǯȱŗŖřǼDzȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȂȱȱȱȱȱǻǯȱŗŗŚǼDzȱȱ ȱȱǻȱȱǯȱşŞȱȱŗŖŜǼǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ ǰȱȱ ȱȱĜȱȱȱśȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱśȱȱ¡ȱŘśȱȱȱȱ stock capital, the shareholders could decide at an SGM whether the extra ęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǻǯȱŗŗŘǼǯ ȱȱǰȱȱęȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱtract more Chinese investments in Chinese Corporations by boosting ChiȱȂȱęȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȱȱ promulgation did enjoy a certain success. In the following few years, there ȱŘŜśȱȱǰȱȱ ȱŗśŚȱǻśŞȱǼȱ ȱtions ǻȱȱȱȱ ȱŗşşśǰȱŗŖřȮŗŖŚǼǯȱȱȱȱȱ
ŗşŜ
Billy K. L. So and Albert S. Lee
ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ ¢ȱǻŗşşśǰȱŚŞǼǰȱ there were exemplary cases of large-scale Chinese corporations emerging. Most noticeable is the establishment of eighteen railway companies and forty mining companies with a total public investment of 74,000,000 yuan ȱ ŗşŖśȱ ȱ ŗşŖŞȱ ȱ ǻ ȱ ȱ ŘŖŖŖǰȱ řşǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ Ĵȱ to promote the Corporation to shareholders in Chinese capital markets Wu still needed to maintain the appeal of the Corporation to entrepreneurs and thus could not incorporate too many managerial constraints. Before 1904, China had no tradition of Corporation. Promoting the new corporate model for two parties of divergent interests was a formidable ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ viewed from the perspective of either management or investors. Even so, the legal framework established in a timely way and promoted the ability of any systematic company law regime in China to regulate and facilitate the Corporation. In this regard, Wu Tingfang, with his British common ȱǰȱȱę¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ corporate governance. The Company Ordinance of 1914 The Company Code of 1904 was supposed to promote the Western model ȱǯȱȱȱǰȱȱŗśŖȱȱȱȱȱporation entered the Chinese capital market in the next few years. Before long, however, the code and other commercial laws were found inadeȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱŘŖŖŘǰȱŝŖȮŝŗǼǯȱȱ instance, there were many reports on clashes between shareholders and directors at shareholders’ meetings, especially among the railways and mining companies.2 Such problems had much to do with implementation, but a legal reform might address some of the clarity issues involved, for example, the authorities of the SGM and the directors. The Chinese ȱȱȱĞȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱȱȱ ççȱᖫ⬄䠔䚢, to prepare new legislation ȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱĞȱ ȱȱȱȱĴȱ to the court, however, did not include the company law (Wang Zonghui ŗşŘŜǰȱŗȮřǼǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱĚȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ game. The company registration procedure as stipulated in the 1904 code Some examples can be drawn from Shenbao to illustrate the kinds of problems. For selection of chief executive and inspection of company expenditures, see the case of Guangdong Railway in Shen BaoȱǻşȱȱŗşŖşǰȱřDZŘDzȱŜȱ ¢ȱŗşŗŖǰȱŘDZŘǯȱȱȂȱ challenge to directors’ authorities, see 2 December 1908, 3:2. For property rights disputes, see 9 November 1909, 3:4. ŘȲȱ
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provided that a new company might register with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry through the local chambers of commerce if they existed. The chambers were directly involved in carrying out the law. On the contrary, in the treaty ports, particularly Shanghai, merchants and their ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĚȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ 1900. This new interest group felt strongly that the 1904 code had been proȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ Chinese business practices. The group lobbied hard for the government to reform the law in ways that would satisfy businesses’ needs. For instance, the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce rallied support from the Shanghai Federation of Businesses and the Shanghai Association for Business Studies and organized a public conference on commercial law in Shanghai in ȱŗşŖŝǯȱȱȱ ȱ ȱDZȱŗŚřȱȱȱŞśȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱĴǯȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱȱĞȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱ was held in Shanghai in 1909 (Shenbao 21 December, 2:2–3; 22 December, ŘDZŘDzȱ Řřȱ ǰȱ ŘDZŘǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ law proposal that was prepared by legal experts whom the group had commissioned earlier; the proposal was supplemented by a document ofȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ǻȱ £ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ŘŖŖřǰȱ ŘŗŗȮŚřśǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ¢£ȱ the legal concepts and principles from company laws enacted in both Europe and the United States at the time. This comparative study closely ȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱ¡ǰȱȱçȱ ᵒᴀ⚱⊏ȱ ǻŗşŖŚȮŗşŖśǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ Ğȱ ȱ later accepted and further improved for intended legislation by the Qing ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŗŗȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşşśǰȱ ŗŖŝDzȱ ȱ £ȱȱǯȱŘŖŖřǰȱŘǼǯȱ Contemporary intellectual reformists also saw the 1904 law as inadȱȱ£ȱȱȱǻǯǯǰȱȱŗşŗŖǼǯȱȱȱ was the famous intellectual and industrialist Zhang Jian ᔉ䃛ȱǻȱŗşŜśǼǯȱ Zhang was a self-made entrepreneur who managed various enterprises ȱȱ ȱ£ȱȱĞȱȱȬȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻ ȱ ŗşŜśǰȱ ǯȱ Śǰȱ ǯȱ ŗȮǼǯȱ Ȃȱ ęȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ accessing a capital market for Chinese entrepreneurs (Yu Xiaobo 2003, ŗŜŚǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱ in Republican China as the minister of agriculture and commerce, Zhang saw it as an opportunity to reform the company law regime and accepted Yuan’s appointment. In his inaugural speech to the parliament on 8 November 1913, Zhang proposed four priorities: legislating commercial
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ȱǻȱ¢ȱ ǼDzȱȱȱȱȱǻȱȱ ¢ȱ¢ȱǼDzȱȱ¡Dzȱȱȱȱ to promote important industries as risk management measures (Zhang ȱŗşřŖǰȱŗŞŗȮŗŞśDzȱȱ ȱŗşŞŝǰȱŗŘǼǯ Company law reform was probably the highest priority on Zhang’s ǯȱǰȱ ȱĚȱȂȱȱȱ¢ȱ ǵȱȱȱ not expect that Zhang’s knowledge of Western law would have surpassed Wu Tingfang’s, but Zhang’s proposed company law followed closely (with ȱ¡ǰȱȱȱȱęȱȱȃ¢ǰȄȱȱȱȱ ǼȱȱĞȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱǰȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱ¢ǯȱȱĞȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ Ğȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ness community in 1909. The spirit of this reform came from merchants ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȂȱęȱȱǯȱ On 13 January 1914, a new company ordinance was enacted by order of President Yuan. The new ordinance superseded the previous company ǯȱȱ£ȱȱȱŗşŗŚȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱ ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱŘśŗȱǯȱȱȱŘśŗȱ ǰȱŗřŘȱ ȱ£ȱȱȱȱǻȱŚǼȱȱȱ ȱśŖȱȱȱȱȱę¢ȱȱȱǯȱȱ remaining provisions dealt with three other types of companies: the unlimited company (wuxian gongsi ⛵䰤݀ৌǼǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǻlianghe gongsi ܽড়݀ৌǼǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱǻgufen lianghe gongsi 㙵ӑܽড়݀ৌǼǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ǻȱȱŘŖŖŘǰȱŝřȮŝŚDzȱȱȱŘŖŖŖǰȱŞŖŚȮŞŖŜǼǯȱ ¢ǰȱȱęȱǰȱ ȱęȱȱȱȃ¢ȄȱȱȱŗşŗŚȱ ordinance, was identical to a provision in the 1899 Japanese company ȱ ǻǯȱ ŚŘǼǯȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȃ¢Ȅȱ ȱ ȃȱ £ȱ ȱ ȱ the purpose of conducting commercial behavior (shangxingwei ଚ㸠⚎ǼǯȄȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ¢ȱȱęȱȱȱȃ£ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱęȬȱȱǻyi shangye huo biezhong yinglishi wei ye ҹଚὁ߹。➳߽џ⚎ὁǼȄȱǻȱ £ȱȱǯȱŘŖŖřǰȱşŖǼǯȱȱ ęȱȱȱȱȱȱȃȱȄȱȱȱȱ ŗŞşşȱ ȱȱǻǯȱŘŜřȮŘŜŚǼȱȱȱȱȱȱŗşŗŚȱȱ ȱ ȱ ǻǯȱ ŗǼȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¡¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȬȱȱȱȱęǰȱǰȱ¢ǰȱǰȱ¢ǰȱ¢ǰȱ and so on.3ȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ řȲȱ The economic activities include trading, renting, light manufacturing and processing, supplying energy and water, publishing and printing, banking, foreign exchange, money-
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organizations regulated by the same rules as the “Implementation Regulations of the Company Ordinance” (“Gongsi fa shixing xize ݀ৌ⊩ᮑ㸠 ㌄ࠛǰȄȱǯȱŗǯŘDzȱ ȱ¢ȱŗşŘŚǰȱŗŗŜśǼǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ ŗşŗŚǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ industries without giving them a full company legal implication did not create much enthusiasm within these sectors to register, which is underǯȱȱěȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱĞȂȱǯȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱŗşŗŚȱȱȱěȱȱȃ¢Ȅȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ community. Several Corporation provisions relating to corporate governance are ȱȱ ȱǻȱ ȱ¢ȱŗşŘŚǰȱŗŗśřȮŗŗŜśǼDZ ǻŗǼ Director’s pay and its disclosure: The rule governing directors’ pay remained unchanged in that it was decided by the SGM if not already stated in the company’s regulations; it was information open to shareholdȱǻǯȱŗśŚǼǯ ǻŘǼȱThe director’s duties (dishonesty and negligence issues): A director’s duties were decided by the majority of the shareholders at the SGM, unless ȱęȱȱȱ¢ȂȱȱǻǯȱŗśŝǼǯȱȱȱ ȱ therefore answerable to the regulated area of duties and authorities in repȱȱ¢ȱǻǯȱŗśŞǼǯȱȱ ȱȱĴȱęȱȱtor’s authority and duties. Each director could represent the company in ȱȱ ȱȱȱǻǯȱŗśŞǼǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ¡ed from the liabilities of any damages caused by that if there was mischief ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻǯȱřřǼǯȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ important in making directors’ negligence a legal defense so that companies could wash their hands of transactions by negligent directors. It also gave shareholders some comfort by protecting them from potential misȱ¢ȱǯȱ¢ǰȱǯȱŗŜřǯŗȱȱȱȱȱȱ directors to the interest of the company and its shareholders. It required directors to “follow the company’s regulations and conduct business in great care and caution.” Also, “A director failing this responsibility and thereby causing damages to the company would become liable for comȱȱȱ¢ȄȱǻǯȱŗŜřǯŗǼǯȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱpany law history, tough constraints were imposed on directors by these ȱȱȱȱȂȱęȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱĞȱȬęȱ¢ȱȱagement scandals followed the promulgation of the 1904 code, reported ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻŗşŗŖǰȱŘŜŞȮŘŜşǼǯȱ lending, trust, service providing, hotels, warehouses, insurance, transportation, consignment, agency and middleman, and so on.
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Since many sponsors of the 1914 ordinance were business leaders ȱ ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱǯȱŗŜřȱȱȱ backdoor liability exemption for the directors. It stipulated that a director could be relieved from liabilities arising from the violations of law or of the company’s regulations if the director’s course of action was approved ȱęȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ was that the director must have voiced his objection at the SGM or have informed the supervisor (jiancharen ⲷᆳҎǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ holders and selected by the SGM for this post, of his or her disagreement with such a decision. The other duties of the directors, for instance, to disclose the company’s ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱśŖȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱŗşŖŚȱ¢ȱȱǻǯȱŗŝŞȮŗŞŘǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ be approved by the SGM before the directors could be exempted from any ¢ȱȱȱȱǻǯȱŗŞŘǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ contained fraudulent information. ȱǻřǼȱȱȱȱĚȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱticular about company loans to directorsDZȱǯȱŗŜŘȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ required directors to obtain approval from the supervisor before they could transact with their own company on behalf of outside third parties. This self-dealing rule is one of the most common forms of regulation on Ȃȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ This principle was to enhance directors’ accountability and transparency. ǻŚǼȱ The shareholders’ rights and the authority of the shareholders’ general meeting: The authority of shareholders to contest management was enȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ǻǯȱ ŗŜŚȮŗŜśǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ between the company and shareholders, as one group, and directors, as ȱȱǰȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĞers’ concern about possible litigation between management and investors. Since many scandals had involved directors’ fraudulence or negligence, ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱȱtors’ mismanagement. ǰȱ ȱȱȱȂȱȱ ȱęȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ and the company’s regulations, of which the approval of the SGM was presumed. There were also new measures to empower shareholders and thus create a safer environment for investors to make investments. The SGM continued to be the approval forum for any amendment to the com¢Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻǯȱ ŗşşȮŘŖśǼǰȱ except that incumbent shareholders had preemptive rights, that is, the ȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻǯȱ ŘŖřǼǯȱ ȱ ŗşŗŚȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǻǯȱŗŚśǼȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ
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ȱ ǯȱǯȱ ŗŚśȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ holder who held more than ten shares of the company. This article also called for the regulation of major shareholders’ voting rights as set forth in ȱ¢Ȃȱǯȱ ǰȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱǯȱŗŚśǯ The 1914 ordinance introduced two new instruments, not available in ȱŗşŖŚȱǰȱȱĴȱDZȱ¢ȱȱǻgongsizhai ݀ৌ;ډ ǯȱŗşŖȮŗşŞǼǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱǻǯȱŗřŗǰȱ ŗřşǯŘǰȱŗŚŖǯŘǰȱȱŗŚśǯŚǼǯȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱ ǰȱ¢ȱȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱ managers and directors. Company bond issuance was a convenient practice of amassing additional funds from the capital market without issuing additional equity or borrowing from money-lending institutions. Most important, the Corporation was the only corporate form allowed to issue such bonds among the three types of companies prescribed by the 1914 ordinance. Nominee shareholding allowed a shareholder to hold an unlimȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱ did not have to disclose their identities unless they needed added votes at an SGM. To do so, they had only to convert the nominee stocks into named ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱęȱ¢ȱȱȱ ǯȱȱ nominee shareholding system gave major shareholders, usually directors or other controlling parties, the ability to conceal their company stocks until they were forced to convert them into voting powers under hostile circumstances at the SGM. As noted previously, business scandals and failures following the 1904 code were observed by prominent people at the time and weakened pubȱęȱȱȱǯȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ to promulgate the 1914 legislation. The substance of the new law came mostly from the business community, and particularly from Shanghai. The emerging legal profession, which understood Western laws well (Xu ȱŗşşŞǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱŗşŗŚȱǯȱ Moreover, the new legislation was introduced by Zhang Jian, whose comments provided credibility and were easily accepted by the general ȱ ǻ ãȱ ŘŖŖřǰȱ ŗŘŚȮŗřŗǼǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ister of justice in 1913 and 1914, had devotedly promoted reform of the legal system. Although we cannot be sure of Liang’s role in the company ordinance, the new law certainly was born in a favorable environment in the cabinet of Yuan Shikai with considerable political support (Xu 2008, ǯȱŘǼǯ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱęȱ by strengthening the regulations for management and by giving shareholders more statutory authority to safeguard their interests. In addition, most of the new articles were introduced to clarify corporate organization,
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including the boundaries of each party’s respective rights and duties. The new law was a legal response designed to give incentives to entrepreneurs to incorporate. Kirby is skeptical of how far this 1914 legislation promoted the Corpoȱǯȱ ȱȱȱĜȱȱȱ ȱDZȱęǰȱȱǯȱ ǯȱ ȱȱȱŗşŘśǰȱȱȱȱǻ¢ȱ⧚䰶Ǽȱȱ ȱ¢ȱęȱȱȱ between 1914 and 1923; second, the enforcement of registration was poor, allowing many unregistered companies to use the name “Corporation”; third, the fears of local government might have accounted for the lack of interest in registrations ¢ȱȱDzȱǰȱę¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Nanyang Brothers’ Tobacco Company continued to be family businesses, though registered as Corporations. Kirby concludes that even during the “most dynamic and unencumbered growth” of Chinese capitalism’s “golden age,” the Chinese business community continued to reject the ȱȱĚȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻŗşşśǰȱŚşȮśŗǼǯȱ
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱȱȱȱȱĞȱȱȱȱȱŗşŗŚȱ Company Ordinance an understanding that the new law did induce more ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŘŖŖŘǰȱ ŝśȮŝŜǰȱ ŘśŚȮŘśŜǼǯ Jiang ȱȱȱȱŝśŝȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ones within nine years with a total investment of over 433,000,000 yuan, roughly 7.7 times more than the total number of registered limited comȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱ ȱȱȱ large companies that raised large sums of capital from the public such as the Wing On ∌ᅝ Group of the Kuo 䛁 family, which operated in diverse ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱśǰŖŖŖǰŖŖŖȱ¢ȱĞȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ŗşŗŞȱ ǻ ȱ ȱ ŘŖŖŖǰȱ ŚŖDzȱ ȱ ŗşşśǼǯȱ ǰȱ Ȃȱęȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ A company law textbook published in 1934 cited at least eight Supreme Court cases concluded from 1914 to 1919, all of them involving the Corȱǻȱ ȱŗşřŚǰȱŜŜǰȱŝŗǰȱŝşǰȱŞśǰȱŗŖŜǰȱŗŘŚǼǯȱȱȱ¡ȱ ȱęȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱŗşřŖȱȱȱȱ were organized as Corporations ǻȱ ȱ ŗşřŚǰȱ ŜřǼǯȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ points out that those who chose to incorporate never practically transformed from network-based family businesses into the Berle-Means corǯȱǰȱ ȱȱȱěȱDZȱȱȱŗşŗŚȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ impersonal investment from the Chinese capital market? Or, to put it another way, did Chinese investors respond to the new corporate model by Ĵȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ
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ownerships would not necessarily give them control over management as the new law might have intended? The answers for both questions are positive. The legislative intent was ǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱęing channel positively with the increased adoption of the Corporation Model. The 1914 legislation may have served its objectives to put the development of Corporation in China on a solid path while making every ěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯ The Company Law of 1929 Kirby gives a succinct account of a common view on the Company Law of ŗşŘşǰȱ ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǻ DzȱĞȱ Ǽȱǯȱȱȱ ȱ£ȱȱŗşŘşȱȱȱness because it imposed harsher regulations with punitive penalties on private enterprises, especially Corporations, and their managers. The GMD initiated the review process under one of its founding father’s (Sun ȬȂǼȱȱȱȃȱȱȄȱȱȱȱ through substantial amendments to the Company Ordinance of 1914. For instance, Art. 129 of the 1929 law diminished the powers of major shareholders by limiting their voting rights to a maximum of 20 percent of the total votes regardless of actual shareholding. More importantly, the new ȱęȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱǻŗşŗŚǼȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱȃ¢ȱȱ ȱȄȱǽȱȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȄȱȱȱ¢ǾǰȱȱŗşŘşȱȱęȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȃȱȄȱ ȱȃȱ ȱȱęǯȄȱ ¢ȱ concludes his review of the 1929 legislation by claiming that it deterred merchants from engaging in business activities, rather than encouraged ȱǻŗşşśǰȱśŗȮśŘǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻŘŖŖŖǰȱ ŞŖřȮŞŗŚǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱĞȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ a more detailed account of the complicated procedure to promulgate this ŗşŘşȱǯȱȱ ¢ȱŗşŘŞǰȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱ laws was formed by the Bureau of Industry and Commerce to provide a legal framework for the regulation of those undertakings. The review Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ DZȱ ęǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ law conform with the guiding principles of the GMD; second, dealing with the mushrooming of companies in China; and third, taking into account experience accumulated since 1904. The new legislation proposal ȱ¢ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ¡ȱȱǻ¡ȱ Ǽǯȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ěȱǻ¢ȱ££ȱ ¢ȱЁ༂ᬓ⊏ྨવ᳗DzȱĞǰȱȱ
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ȱǼǰȱȱ facto supreme decision-making body of the GMD. ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ Ǽȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱęȱȱȱȱȱĞȱĴȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ŗşŘşǰȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ Ğȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱĴȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ Ğȱ Ĵȱ signed Wei Tingsheng 㸲ᤎ⫳ȱȱĞȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ǰȱȱȱnized meetings from March 7 to July 17 of the same year to compile the Ğȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱǻȱ¢Ȭ ȱǼǯȱȱ Ğȱȱ ȱĴȱȱȱŗşŖȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ㚵⓶⇥, in August. The same meeting asked Kong Xiangxi ᄨ⼹❭ and Li Wenfan ᴢ᭛㆘ȱȱ¡ȱȱĞǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱturned it to the 191st meeting, where a resolution of the Central Commisȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱĞǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱǰȱȱĞȱȱȱ¢Ȭ ¡ȱǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢Ȭęȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱęȬȱĞȱĴȱȱȱǯ ȱ ȱȱ¡ȱ ȱȱĞȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ Ğȱǯȱ¢ȱĞȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĞȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱęȱĞȱȱȱ¢ȱ ǯȱĞȱȱȱȱ intensive meetings, with the help of external experts, from late NovemȱȱŚȱǰȱȱĴȱȱȱĞȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱŜȱ ȱȱŘřŚȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱĞǰȱȱ ȱĞǰȱȱȱȱ industry and commerce Kong Xiangxi, and his deputy minister to reexamȱȱĞȱǯȱĞȱȱ¡ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱǰȱȱĞȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱĞǰȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱtion, through the legislative process of three readings. The newly enacted ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŘŜȱ ȱŗşŘşǰȱȱȱȱěȱȱŗȱ ¢ȱŗşřŖǯȱȱęȱȱȱȱ ŗşŘşȱ¢ȱȱȱŜȱȱȱŘřřȱȱǻȱȱŘŖŖŖǰȱŞŖŜȮŞŗŗǼǯ The promulgation process of the 1929 legislation has important aspects ȱȱĴDZȱęǰȱȱȱ ȱ¢ǰȱǰȱȱulous; second, it used many experts, including one of the top economists of the time, Ma Yinchu 侀ᆙ߱Dzȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱĚȱ people, such as Minister Kong Xiangxi, who were politically powerful in the GMD yet at the same time represented the interests of the business
Legalization of Chinese Corporation
ŘŖś
¢ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱtive process, there was reason to expect that the new law would represent ȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ¡ȱ ǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱtion is concerned, this new company law showed surprising continuity with the earlier ones. This can be demonstrated by a careful comparison, article by article, of the 1914 and 1929 legislation. There were changes of wording but these were mostly for clarity; much of the wording remained the same. There were 132 articles on Corporation in the 1914 Company Ordinance but only 127 articles on the same concerns in the 1929 one. Several new articles were introduced to clarify previous provisions. Some subsecȱ ȱȱȱȱěȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱmoved. With a few exceptions, there were no major changes in legislative principles. Those that are most relevant to our discussion are noted here ǻȱȱȱȱŘŖŖŘǰȱŝşȮŞŖǼǯ 1. Unnamed shares could not exceed 33 percent of the total stock (Art. ŗŗŞǼǯȱ(This was new.) 2. An individual shareholder’s voting rights could not exceed 20 percent ȱȱȱȱǻǯȱŗŘşǼǯȱ(This was new.) řǯȱȱȱśȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¡¢ȱȂȱȱǻǯȱŗřřǼǯȱ(The threshold was lowered from 10 percent in 1914.) ŚǯȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱǻǯȱŗřŞǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱŜŜȱǰȱȱ¡¢ȱȂȱ ȱȱȱȱǻǯȱŗŚřǼǯȱ(This was new.) śǯȱȱȱ¢ȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱřřȱȱȱȱȱ capital, an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting should be called (Art. ŗŚŝǼǯȱ(The threshold was lowered from 50 percent in 1914.) Ŝǯȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱŗşŘşȱȱȱŗşŗŚȱȱǻǯȱŗŜŘǼȱȱ directors could do business with the company only with the supervisor’s approval. 7. Another 1914 requirement that was removed was that directors should “manage with care and caution.” Instead, the 1929 legislation required directors to follow not only the company’s regulations but also the “resoȱȱ¢ȱȂȱȄȱǻǯȱŗŚŞǼǯ ŞǯȱǯȱŗŝŖȱȱȱŗŖȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢Ȃȱȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ śȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŗŚǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱśŖȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱŘśȱǯ şǯȱ ǯȱ ŗŝśȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ śȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ stocks to request the court to send an inspector to investigate the business of their company. This amount was down from 10 percent in 1914. 10. In the penalty section, there was a new article listing four counts of offense with punishment of up to one year of imprisonment or up to 2,000
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¢ȱ ȱ ęǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ company’s property for speculation activities outside of the company’s ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ¢Ȃȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ present in the 1904 Company Code but absent in the 1914 Company Orǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱgested a tightening of control over management’s violations of investors’ interests. The outcome of this legislative process in 1929 did not fundamentally depart from the 1914 Company Ordinance. Most important changes reĚȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ of requirements for investors to monitor management. From this perspective, the 1929 Company Law was a piece of pro-investor legislation, a continuation along the same path as that of the Chinese company law regime of 1914, a path that was probably reinforced by GMD ideology. Moreover, as the 1929 framework on Corporation remained largely the same as that in the 1914 law, the 1914 reform was a greater qualitative departure from the 1904 reform than the 1929 reform was from the 1914 one. The 1929 legislation had three new clauses that are noteworthy. First, the maximum limit of unnamed nominee stocks was at 33 percent of toȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ lems associated with some companies issuing too many unnamed shares. When there were too many unnamed shares outstanding, shareholders ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ ǰȱ the cap of 20 percent voting rights for any individual shareholder seems ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱĴȱěȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱerty had prevailed throughout its history. A major shareholder could eas¢ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ ¢ǰȱ the major shareholder could circumvent the rule and maintain control of ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ǯȱǰȱȱȬȱȱěȱ ȱȱ rhetorical than realistic. The legislative intent behind the 20 percent voting ȱ Ěȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ Dzȱ however, there were no provisions elsewhere that would suggest such an intention to limit the rights of major shareholders. More important, one ȱȱ¢Ȭ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱĞȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱĚ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱmate rights because they had more genuine concerns about the company’s Ȭȱęȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ ȱȱ to focus on immediate dividend and interest gains at the expense of the ¢Ȃȱǯȱǰȱȱ ȱȱěȱȱȱ the company’s resources for illegitimate purposes, in particular for specuȱ ǰȱȱĚȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ¢ȱagement misconduct responsible for company scandals. This provision
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helped ease investors’ fears and reduced their investment risks pertaining to the Corporation. ȱ ȱęȱȱȃ¢ȄȱȱȱŗşŘşȱȱȱȱ ¢ǯȱȱǯȱŗǰȱȱ ȱęȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ£ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ǻyingli ➳߽Ǽǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱȱȱŗşŗŚȱ¢ȱǰȱ ȱęȱȱȃ¢Ȅȱȱȱ £ȱȱȱȱȃȱȄȱǻǯȱŗǼǰȱȱ ęȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ in the late 1900s. The broadening of the connotation of company purpose made Corporation more appealing for enterprises such as mining and heavy industry, encouraging them to register formally as Corporations. Raising investment for these enterprises became easier. A contemporary company law expert viewed the law as a technical adjustment to address ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ŗşřŚǰȱ řDzȱ ǯȱ ¢ȱ ŗşşśǰȱ śŘǼǯȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȃ¢Ȅȱ ȱ ȱ 1914 ordinance began before the establishment of the GMD. The event can ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŗşŗŜȱĞȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱǻûȱŗşŗŜǰȱŗǼǰȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱĞȱȱȱȱ the ordinance. ȱ Ğȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŘşȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŗŚȱ lation. It is impossible to provide a comprehensive investigation of the ĞȂȱ ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ğȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱȱȱŗşŘśǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱĴȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱtionship to the companies. The main problem was that those shareholders were interested only in seizing the largest possible amount of dividends each year, and they did not care about the long-term prospects of their companies. This kind of shareholder motivation encouraged management ȱȱȱȂȱȱęǰȱ ȱȱȱȱmate managerial activities such as insider trading. In the end, many companies were reluctant to disclose their real balance sheets, and investors began to distrust their company owners and managers. In general, Ma appears to have been pro-business and skeptical about ȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ dominated by the majority will of shareholders would make enterprises honest and successful. Instead, Ma preferred Corporations that were ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǻŗşŘśǰȱŘŜřȮŘŜşDzȱȱ ŞŘȮŞŜǼǯȱȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ Ğȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ included a principle for recognizing the legitimate rights and interests of the major shareholders. This principle was in line with Ma’s writings in the 1920s, which suggested protecting the managing directors while at the same time avoiding short-term, speculative, and irresponsible voting
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by a minor group of impersonal shareholders. In Ma’s mind, the minority shareholders could collude together to take control of the SGM and ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱǰȱȱĚȱ ȱ Ěȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱǯȱȱȱęȱǰȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ newly formed Chinese Corporations in the 1920s encountered problems of huge impersonal investments and resulting corporate mismanagement due to speculative, incompetent directives by short-term-minded shareholders. This development suggests a phenomenon that we can call “democratic dictatorship.” ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşŘşȱ pany Law on Chinese Corporations because of the Japanese invasion of ȱȱȱȱŗşřŖǯȱȱĞȱȱŗşŘşȱ ȱ ȱȱǰȱ there were a series of Japanese military adventures in China. The GMD also began state enterprise projects. The legal environment for carrying out company law directives was further disrupted following the formal declaration of war between China and Japan in 1937. The general environment for Chinese business in those turbulent years was uncertain, and ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ǯȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ would have happened to the Chinese economy during the 1930s had the ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ fects the Sino-Japanese War had on the development of the Corporation form in China, especially when we contrast this development with that of the same corporate form in the West during the pre–World War II era of ȱŗşŘŖȱȱŗşřŖȱǻȱŗşşŘǰȱŗŗŗȮŗŗŘDzȱ ȱŗşŞŖǰȱŗşŞřDzȱȱŘŖŖŘǼǯ4 Conclusion As shown in the trajectory of company law legislations from 1904 to 1929, ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ of directors and shareholders, there was genuine intention of succeeding regimes to improve the law so as to promote the Corporation Model. The legislative task was how to balance the interests of the directors (or Ǽȯȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ conventional forms such as private companies or partnerships—with the ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ȱ ȱ supposed to invest on an impersonal basis and whose interest could be protected only by corporate law. This is a task so complicated, and inherently contradictory, that no perfect solution could be found each time the ȱ ȱǯȱ ǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱstantially to problems and crises arising from the previous circumstance, ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ŚȲȱ
See also The EconomistǰȱŗŗȱȱŗşřŝȱǻŝŞDZŚşŖŝǼǰȱǯȱśŖŞǯ
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remains true that the much anticipated, enthusiastic, large-scale adoption of the Corporation Model, which accounts for many successful practices in Europe and the United States during the early twentieth century, did not happen in China during those decades, it is not due to lack of bona ęȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱ not only were there genuine legislative intents, they were in fact rather ȱȱĚȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ of response from the business sector to pick up the Corporation Model. Regarding the relationship between the law and the model, our study shows that the law did facilitate and promote the model in the Chinese context, though not leading to widespread incorporation. This means that statutory law itself was neither a precondition for, nor adequate inducement to, widespread adoption of the model in China. ȱȱȱǰȱǰȱȱĴȱȱDZȱ¢ȱȱȱǵȱȱ this our answer is that it is likely to be accounted for by structural problems other than the law, which are beyond the scope of this chapter. What we can do is to outline some of them here for further exploration. First of all, the lack of massive incorporation may have had much to do with the lack of complementary and informal institutional constraints to support the formal institutional ones, that is, laws. For instance, the same period saw the pervasive disintegration of Chinese society in the realms of political ideologies, social values, and business ethics. Whereas the absence of a dominant set of these values in Chinese society might ȱȱȱęȬ¡£ȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱŗȱǻ¢ȱǼǰȱ it did not lead to a new code of contractual conduct regulating impersonal ǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĞȱĚȱ up and became a corporate or social crisis. This no doubt hindered the spread of the model. Second, the implementation of Chinese laws during these turbulent ǰȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱěȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱęȱȱěǯȱȱȱȱȂȱ and its relevant company laws may, therefore, not be so much why the laws had failed that model or how the laws might have been improved to induce more use of the model. Instead, the question is how political order could have been stabilized to the extent that the government would be able to enforce the laws and protect participants in corporations. The response of Chinese entrepreneurs to the new alternative organizational model of Corporation can be considered as quite rational within their cultural mind-set. There were clearly interests, and incentives, to adopt the corporate form from the start during the late nineteenth century, ȱȱȱȱęȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱǯȱȱȱȱ limited use may have been due to inadequate enforcement characteristics
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of formal institutional constraints and the absence of a complementary informal culture, as noted previously, rather than from a lack of rational¢ȱȱȱȱȬȱȱǯȱȱȱȱěȱ protection of private property against the state’s unlawful appropriation may have played a role in such organizational business decisions (Rose ȱ ȱŗşşŞǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȃ¢ȱȄȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱěȱȱ£ȱȱȱęȱȱȱ Corporation in a politically unstable China. This Chinese business rationality of adopting the new model but only in a conducive environment ¢ȱȱȱĴȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ vacuum were much less a problem than elsewhere in China. To this, we can relate the treaty port economy issue discussed in chapter 1.
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The Treaty Port Economy in Modern China
Liu Donghou ᵅփȱȱǯǰȱǯȱŗşŜŞǯȱWeixian zhi ◄㏷ᖫȱǽ £Ĵȱȱ ¡ǾǯȱǯȱŗǯȱȱȱȱŗşřŝȱǯȱDZȱ ȱ¡ȱ shuju. ȱ ȱ់⑹, Zhang Ziyi ᔉП↙, and Chu Xuejing ܆䲾⩒. 1988. “Jiangsu sheng Wuxi xian jin sanshi nian lai Wuxi nongcun jingji diaocha baogao ∳㯛ⳕ⛵䣿㏷䖥ϝकᑈ՚⛵䣿䖆ᴥ㍧△䂓ᶹฅਞ, ŗşŘşȮŗşśŝȄȱǽȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱ¡ȱ ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ǾǯȱȱJiefang qianhou Wuxi, Baoding nongcun jingji, 1929–1957ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ ǰȱ Xue Muqiao, and Qin Liufang. Liu, Jung-Chao. 1970. China’s Fertilizer Economy. Chicago: Aldine Publishing. ǰȱ ȬǯȱŗşŜŘǯȱAnglo-American Steamship Rivalry in China, ŗŞŜŘȮŗŞŝŚǯȱǰȱǯDZȱ ȱ¢ȱǯȱ ǰȱȬǰȱȱ ȬȱǯȱŗşŜśǯȱThe Economy of the Chinese Mainland: National Income and Economic Development, 1933–1959. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. ǰȱȱ Ȭǯȱŗşŝśǯȱȃȱ¢ȱȱȱȱDZȱfucian Theories in Action.” In Confucianism and Chinese Civilization, ȱ¢ȱȱǯȱǰȱŗŜȮŚşǯȱǰȱǯDZȱȱsity Press. Liu Zhiwei ᖫ؝. 1997. Zai guojia yu shehui zhi jian: Ming-Qing Guangȱħȱ¢ȱ£ȱ¢ȱᆊ㟛⼒᳗П䭧ᯢ⏌ᒷᵅ㺣⬆䊺ᕍࠊᑺ ⸣おȱǽ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢DZȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǾǯȱ Guangzhou: Zhongshan daixue chubanshe. Long An 啡ॖǯȱŗşřŜǯȱȃȱ¡ȱ£ȱȱ¢ȱቅᵅ◄㏷ П䖆ᴥࡃὁȄȱǽȱ¡¢ȱȱȱ¡ǰȱǾǯȱ In Zhongguo nongcun jingji lunwenjiЁ䖆ᴥ㍧△䂪᭛䲚ȱǽȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢Ǿǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱगᆊ侦, śřŝȮśŚŚǯȱDZȱȱǯ ǰȱ ǯȱŗşşşǯȱȃȱ¢Ȭ ȱDZȱȱȱmerce in Shanghai’s Shikumen ǰȱŗŞŝŘȮŗşśŗǯȄȱȱInventing Nanjing Road: Commercial Culture in Shanghai, 1900–1945, edited by Sherman Cochran, 133–184. Ithaca, N.Y.: East Asia Program, Cornell University. Luo Shuwei 㕙╡؝. 1993. Jindai Tianjin chengshi shi 䖥ҷ⋹ජᏖ ǽȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱǾǯȱDZȱȱȱ¡ȱ chubanshe. Luo Suwen 㕙㯛᭛. 1991. Shikumen: Xunchang zhi renjia ᑿ䭔ᇟᐌПҎ ᆊȱǽShikumenȱȱ¢ȱȂȱǾǯȱDZȱȱȱ chubanshe.
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Yan Esheng ಈ䂸㙆. 1933. Shanghai shangshi guanli Ϟ⍋ଚџ՟ȱǽȱȱȱǾǯȱDZȱǯǯ ȱ ȱಈᯢ. 1937. “Shandong Weixian de xiangcun mianzhiye ቅᵅ◄㏷ⱘ䛝ᴥẝ㐨ὁȄȱǽȱȱĴȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ ¡ǰȱǾǯȱTianjin yishi bao ⋹ⲞϪฅ, 27 February. Yan Zhongping ಈЁᑇ. 1937a. “Dingxian shougong mianfangzhiye zhi shengchan zhidu ᅮ㏷Ꮉẝ㋵㐨ὁП⫳⫶ࠊᑺȄȱǽȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĴȱ¡ȱĞȱ¢ȱȱ¡ǾǯȱShehui kexue zazhi ⼒᳗⾥ᅌ䲰䁠 8.3. ______. 1937b. “Shougong mianfangzhiye wenti Ꮉẝ㋵㐨ὁଣ丠” ǽȱȱȱĴȱ¡ȱĞȱ¢ǾǯȱZhongshan wenhua jiaoyuguan jikan Ёቅ᭛࣪ᬭ㚆仼ᄷߞ4.3. ȏȏȏȏȏȏǯȱŗşśśǯȱZhongguo mianfangzhi shigao, 1289–1937 Ёẝ㋵㐨 〓ˈŗŘŞşȮŗşřŝȱǽȱĞȱ¢ȱȱȱĴȱ¡ǰȱŗŘŞşȮ ŗşřŝǾǯȱħDZȱ ¡ȱǯ ȏȏȏȏȏȏȱȱǯȱŗşśśǯȱZhongguo jindai jingjishi tongji ziliao xuanji Ё䖥ҷ ㍧△㍅㿜䊛᭭䙌䔃ȱǽȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ǾǯȱħDZȱ ¡ȱǯ Yang Dajin 䞥. 1938. Xiandai Zhongguo shiyezhi ⧒ҷЁᆺὁ䁠 ǽȱ£ĴȱȱȱǾǯȱŘȱǯȱDZȱ ȱ yinshuguan. Yang Liansheng 㙃䰲. 1987. Zhongguo wenhua zhong “bao, “bao,” “bao” zhi yiyi Ё᭛࣪ЁࣙǃֱǃฅПᛣ㕽ȱǽȱȱȱbao in Chinese Ǿǯȱ ȱ DZȱȱ¢ȱǯ Yang Zhixun ᖫ⌉. 1907. “Gongsi leibie suo ݀ৌ串߹䁾.” Shanwu guanbao ଚࢭᅬฅȱǽȱȱ£ĴȱȱȱěǾȱŗřDZŗȮŚǯȱ Yao Qingsan ྮᝊϝ and Ang Juemin ᯖ㾎⇥ǯȱŗşřśǯȱȃȱȱ diaocha Ϟ⍋㉇Ꮦ䂓ᶹȄȱǽ¢ȱȱȂȱȱǾǯȱShehui jingji yuebao ⼒᳗㍧△᳜ฅȱŘǯŗDZŗȮśřǯ Yasuhara Misao ᅝॳ㕢Ԥ䲘. 1919. ȱȱç¢çȱȱ¢çȱᬃ䙷ȃᎹὁ ǽॳ᭭ȱǽȂȱ¢ȱȱ ȱǾǯȱǯȱŗǰȱȱŘǯȱDZȱ ȱȱ£¢çȱ¢çǯ ȱ ȱǻ ȬȱǼȱ㨝⓶ᯢǯȱŗşşŘǯȱȃħȱħȱȱ¡ȱȱ shehui jingji bianqian: Shandong jingji zhongxin dongyi dui difang shehui de yingxiang कбϪ㋔◄㏷ⱘ⼒᳗㍧△䅞䙋˖ቅᵅ㍧△䞡ᖗ ᵅ⿏ᇡഄᮍ⼒᳗ⱘᕅ䷓Ȅȱǽȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢DZȱȱĞȱȱȂȱȱȱ of gravity to the eastern part of the province and its impact on local ¢ǾǯȱȱQingdai quyu shehui jingji yanjiu ⏙ҷऔඳ⼒᳗㍧△ⷨお ǽȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢¢Ǿǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ Xianen 㨝乃ᘽǰȱŗDZȱŗřŗȮŗśřǯȱħDZȱȱǯ ______. 2002. “Chengzhang yu zhihua: Kangzhan qian Shandong Weixian shabu shang de lizi ៤䭋㟛Ⓝ࣪ᡫ᠄ࠡቅᵅ◄㏷㋫Ꮧଚ
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ZJZJL (Zhang Jizi jiulu ᔉᄷᄤб䣘ȱǽȱ ȱȱȱ ǾǼǯȱŗşŜśǯȱ Edited by Zhang Yizu ᔉᗵ⼪. Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe. Zou Yiren 䛦ձҕ. 1980. Jiu Shanghai renkou bianqian de yanjiu㟞Ϟ⍋Ҏষ 䅞䙋ⱘⷨお ǽȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǾǯȱhai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe.
Index
agricultural production: and ȱȱěǰȱŝǰȱřŝDzȱ and technological change, 37, 119 alleyway dwellings (lilongǼǰȱ ǰȱśř ancestral property holding: and competing land rights claims, ŗŚŞȮŗśŗDzȱȱȱȱȱzong ǻǼǰȱŗŚŞDzȱȱȱȬ¢ȱtso ǰȱŗśŞȮŗŜŗǰȱŗŜřȮŗŜŚǰȱŗŜŝǰȱŗŜŞDzȱ and tongju gongcai (household ǼǰȱŗŚŞǯȱSee also household property; yitian liangzhu (divided Ǽ annual reports of corporations requirements, 194, 200 auditors (chazhangrenǼǰȱŗşŚ bangȱǻǼȱȱȱǰȱşŚ DZȱȱħȱȱȱȱȱ ŗşŘŖǰȱśǰȱŚŗDzȱȱȱȱ ȱȱĴȱǰȱŜŜȮŜŝǰȱ 72; growth of Shanghai as a ęȱǰȱŗşǰȱŚŗǰȱŚŘǰȱŚŝǰȱŜŜDzȱ ȱȱǰȱŗŗŗȮŗŗśDzȱ £ȱǰȱřśǰȱŚŘDzȱȱ and interest payment regulations, ŜŞȮŜşǰȱŗśŗDzȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǰȱŜśȮŝŘDzȱȱ Shenxin fangzhichang (Sung Sing ĴȱǼȱǰȱŜŝȮŜŞǰȱŜşDzȱȱ ȱǰȱŗŝŜǰȱŗŞřDzȱȱ warlordism, 34. See also collateral
ħDZȱȱȱęȱǰȱśǰȱŚŗDzȱ ȱȱǰȱśȮŜǰȱ ŗśDzȱȱǰȱśŖDzȱ¢ȱȱ ¢ȱȱǰȱśȮŜ Bergère, Marie-Claire: business establishment distribution analyzed by, 42; on foreign trade from 1921 to 1923, 7; on the success of entrepreneurs in Shanghai ȱĴǰȱŚŝ ¡ȱǰȱś ȱĴǰȱȱǰȱśŖ business ethics: and ǰȱŗřȮŗŚǰȱŗŜDzȱ management misconduct, 194, 199, ŘŖŜDzȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱŗśǰȱŘŘ business models: hybrid convergence ǰȱşǰȱŗŞřȮŗŞśDzȱȱ of agents, 84–88, 91–92, 94, şśDzȱȱȱȱ networks, 8–9; vertical integration, ŘŜǰȱŞśǰȱŞŞȮşŘǰȱşś business networks: handloom cloth ȱ ȱǻȱ¢Ǽǰȱ ŗŖŜȮŗŖşDzȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ŞŚȮŞŞǰȱşŗȮşŘǰȱşŚǰȱşśDzȱȱ ǰȱŗŝŜȮŗŝŞǰȱŗŞŗǰȱŗŞŚǯȱ See also social networks; Toishan merchants ȱ£DZȱęȱ strategies by merchant capitalists, ŗŗŗȮŗŗŘǰȱŗŗŚȮŗŗśDzȱ¢ȱ
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businesses and incorporation, 202–203; “organization” and “institution” distinguished, 9; the ĴȬȱ¢ǰȱŘŖǰȱŗŖşȮŗŗŘǰȱ ŗŗśȮŗŗŜDzȱȱȱǰȱ 84–88, 91–92; tong organization, ŗŝŚȮŗŝśǰȱŗŞřȮŗŞśDzȱ ȱĚȱ trade structure, 89–92. See also family businesses Canton. Seeȱ £ȱǻǼ capital markets: and Chinese yarn ęǰȱŗŗŘȮŗŗśDzȱȱ¢ȱ bonds (gongsizhaiǼǰȱŘŖŗDzȱȱ ȱ ǰȱŘŖǰȱŘŘȮŘřǰȱŗşŜǰȱŘŖŗDzȱ and economic modernization, 188, 208; and impersonal investment, 8, 12, 201, 208; and the Shanghai real estate market, 19, 72; and the Corporation model, 188, 201–203. See also farm capital capital stock: directors’ use of, 194; issuance of, 200; and tong property rights practices, 174 Chambers of Commerce: as agents of ǰȱŗŝDzȱȱħȱȱȱ ǰȱŗśDzȱȱǰȱŗś changqi yakuan (or ħȱǼȱ mortgaging of factory sites and ǰȱŜŝȮŝŖ chazhangrenȱǻǼǰȱŗşŚ ȱ ¡ǰȱŜŚȮŜś Cheung Man-shing tenancy deed ǰȱŗśŜǰȱŗśŝ ȱ Ȭȱǻǯȱ ȱ Ǽǰȱ Śś Chinese business interests, collaborations with foreign business interests, 2, 72 Chinese Commercial Law of 1914: corporate governance provisions ǰȱŗşşȮŘŖŗDzȱęȱȱ “company” in, 198 Chinese Maritime Customs Service: and foreign trade, 3; grain market ǰȱşǰȱŝŜǰȱŝŝǰȱŝŞǰȱŝşǰȱŞŚǰȱşř Chinese Quarter: economy compared
ȱȱȱĴǰȱ ŚŘDzȱȱǰȱŚŘǰȱśŖǰȱśŗDzȱȱ one of three original Shanghai governments, 38; Shanghai City Council in, 39–40 ǰȱȱǰȱŚŝǰȱśŖ Chung lineage of Tai Om Shan land ȱǰȱŗśśȮŗśŜǰȱŗśŝ cities in China, Max Weber’s observations of, 33 cliques (bangǼȱȱȱǰȱşŚ Coble, Parks M., Jr., 44 collateral: used by factory managers, ŜŝDzȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱǰȱŗŘŜDzȱȱȱ ǰȱŜŞȮŜşDzȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱŜŜȮŜŝǯȱSee also banking commercial behavior (Mand. shangxingwei; J. ççǼǰȱŗşřǰȱŗşŞ commercialization: integration of, with the real estate market and £ǰȱŜśǰȱŝŖȮŝŗDzȱȱȱ Jiangnan economy, 139; and the ĴȬȱ¢ǰȱŘŖǰȱŗŖşȮŗŗŘǰȱ ŗŗśȮŗŗŜ company bonds (gongsizhaiǼǰȱŗşŗŚȱ Company Law Ordinance and, 201 Company Code of 1904: and the 1914 Company Ordinance, 201; business failures following, 189, 199, 201; and Chinese investment ȱȱǰȱŗŞŞǰȱŗşśDzȱ and corporate governance, 193– ŗşśDzȱȱȱǰȱŗşŗȮŗşŘDzȱ and institutional change, 23, 187; Liang Qichao’s criticism of, 189, ŗşŘDzȱȱǰȱŗşŜȮŗşŞDzȱȱ ǰȱŗşśȮŗşŜDzȱȱȂȱȱǰȱ 192. See also legal reform Company Law of 1929: challenges ȱȱěȱǰȱŘŖŞDzȱ Company Code of 1904 compared ǰȱŘŖŜDzȱ¢ȱęȱȱ a “legal person,” 203, 207; and ¢ȱǰȱŘŖśǰȱŘŖŜǰȱ
Index 207; Company Ordinance of 1914 ȱ ǰȱŘŖśǰȱŘŖŜǰȱŘŖŝDzȱ Guomindang Legislative Yuan ȱǰȱŘŖřȮŘŖśDzȱȱ ȱǰȱŘŖŜȮŘŖŞDzȱ and institutional change, 23, ŗŞŝǰȱŘŖŜȮŘŖŝDzȱȱȬȱ ǰȱŘŖŜDzȱȱȱ business commmunity, interests, ŘŖŚȮŘŖśDzȱȱȂȱǰȱ 208. See also legal reform Company Ordinance of 1914: Chinese business community involvement ȱĞȱǰȱŗşŜȮŗşŝDzȱ¢ȱ bond issuance and, 201; Company Law of 1929 compared with, ŘŖśDzȱȱȱǰȱ 199–201; encouragement of incorporation, 202, 203; and institutional change, 23, 187, 201– 202; and nominee shareholding, 201; and the Company Code of 1904, 201; and Zhang Jian, 197– 198, 201. See also legal reform compensation of company directors, 193, 199 DZȱȱǰȱŗŜȮŗŝDzȱ and imperial entrepreneurs compared, 43; and land leasing ǰȱśŞǯȱSee also “taipan oligarchy” concessions: business opportunities ȱȱȱ ǰȱŗŜȮ 18, 19, 173; and daoqi (land-lease ęǼǰȱśŝȮŜŖǰȱŜşDzȱĴȱ ȱ ǰȱśŝDzȱ ȱǰȱŘǰȱ 43. See also treaty port cities corporate governance: director’s authority and duties, 23, 190, 193–194, 199–200; disclosure of ĚȱȱǰȱŗşŖǰȱŗşŚǰȱ 200; self-dealing rules, 200; shareholder-appointed auditors, 194; shareholders rights and the authority of the SGM, 190, 193– ŗşśǰȱŗşşȮŘŖŗ corporate law in China: and capital
Řśŗ ǰȱŘŖǰȱŘŘȮŘřǰȱŗşŜǰȱŘŖŗDzȱ Chinese company law regimes, 23; and Chinese investment in Chinese establishments, 188; ¢ȱęȱȱȱȃȱ person,” 203; development of, 22– ŘřDzȱȱ¢ȱȱǻŗŞśśǼǰȱ 12, 172–173; Supreme Court litigations concerning Corporation ǻŗşŗŚȱȱŗşŘřǼǰȱŘŖŘDzȱȱȱ Corporation Model, 22–23, 187, ŗşŜǰȱŗşŞǰȱŘŖŘȮŘŖřǰȱŘŖŜȮŘŖŝǰȱŘŖşDzȱ Western legal framework of treaty ports, 11–12 ȱ ȱȱ ȱ DZȱȱ business registration tactics, 17, ŗŝśȮŗŝŜǰȱŗŝŞǰȱŗŞŖȮŗŞŗDzȱȱȱ ¢ǰȱŗŝŜǰȱŗŝŝDzȱȱȬ ȱǰȱŗŝǰȱŗŝśȮŗŝŝ Corporation Model: and capital management, 190; and Company Ordinance of 1914, 199–201, 201–203; and corporate law development, 22–23, 209; and disclosure, 22, 190, 193, 194, 199, 200; dynamic interaction with social networks, 8–9; and the economic modernization in ǰȱŗŞŜȮŗŞşDzȱȱ ȱ Province land policy changes, 22, ŗŞŖȮŗŞśDzȱȱȱ promoted by, 8, 12, 190, 201, 208; and institutional change, 187; joint-stock corporations, 22–23, 177; and the “Kirby Puzzle,” 189; professional services supporting, 13; and the Sino-Japanese War, 208; and the Chinese capital market, 188, 201–203. See also vertical integration ĴȱDZȱȱȱĴȱȱ ǻ¡ȱ£ǼǰȱŜŝȮŜŞǰȱŜşǰȱ 89. See also factories court system: Land Court established in the New Territories, 21–22; Shanghai Mixed Court, 12, 39; ȱȱǻ¢Ǽȱ
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litigations concerning Corporation ǻŗşŗŚȱȱŗşŘřǼǰȱŘŖŘ credit: and company bonds (gongsizhaiǼǰȱŜŝǰȱŘŖŗDzȱȱ ǰȱŗŘŜǰȱŗřřǰȱŗřŜǰȱŗřŞǰȱŗřşDzȱ and joint-stock corporations, 177; promissory note practices ȱȱ¡ȱ¢ǰȱŗŖŜǰȱŗŖşDzȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱŜśȮŝŘDzȱ rice dealers (mihao or mihangǼȱ ȱǰȱŞŝDzȱȱ¢ȱęȱ merchant capitalists, 110, 111, ŗŗřȮŗŗś ȱǰȱŘŗȮŘŘǰȱŗŜř ¢ȱǻȱǼǰȱȱ concerning Corporation (1914 and ŗşŘřǼǰȱŘŖŘ daoqiȱǻȬȱęǼǰȱśŝȮŜŖǰȱŜş dianȱǻDzȱȱǼǰȱȱ huomaiȱǻȱǼǰ ŗśŗȮŗśŘǰȱ ŗśř dianduanȱǻȱȱ¢Ǽǰȱ ŗŜŖǰȱŗŜŗ directors of companies: authority and duties of, 23, 199–200; compensation of, 193, 199; and fraudulence, 193–194, 200 disclosure requirements: Chinese ęȱȱǰȱŘŘDzȱȱȱ Corporation Model, 190, 193, 199, 200; overseen by SGM-assigned auditors, 194 economic growth: and commercialization theory, 119; and industrialization, 12–13; and institutions and policies theory, 119; and involution and underdevelopment theory, 118, 119–120; and land transactions in ȱǰȱŗŜşȮŗŝŗDzȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ǰȱŗŖȮŗŗǰȱŗřǰȱŗŞǰȱřŚȮřśǰȱ 72. See also economic performance; treaty port economy economic modernization: and ǰȱřśǰȱŚŘDzȱȱȱ
imperial entrepreneurs compared, 43; and the Corporation Model, 189; and the political economy, 19, řŚȮřśǰȱŗŝŘǰȱŗŞŖȮŗŞŗ economic modernization in Japan: and Chinese treaty ports compared, 27; modern industrial growth in Shanghai compared with, 37, 43 economic performance: and the Corporation Model, 189; and institutional change introduced, ŗǰȱŗŖǰȱŗŜǰȱŗŞȮŗşǰȱŘřȮŘŚDzȱȱȱ ȱȱĚȱȱǰȱ 19; and the Shanghai real estate market introduced, 19; traditional Chinese economic ǰȱŘŜDzȱȱȱ costs, 10; and the treaty port economy, 4, 8–9. See also economic growth; industrialization; internationalization; Northian framework; urbanization economic rationality: Chinese entrepreneurs’ response to the Corporation model, 209–210; and equity implications, 121; and farm household resource allocation, ŗŘŞȮŗŘşǰȱŗřŜȮŗŚŗDzȱȱȱ theory, 118, 119–120; and ȱȱęǰȱ ŗŗŗȮŗŗŘǰȱŗŗŚȮŗŗśDzȱȱȱ human factors, 27, 121; and pawning out land, 139 embezzlement addressed in the Company Code of 1904, 194 entrepreneurs: Chinese merchants with business vision, 17, 22, ŗŗŘȮŗŗśǰȱŗŗŝDzȱȱȱȱ ǰȱŗŜȮŗŝǰȱŚřDzȱȱȱ ĴȱǰȱŗŜȮŗŞǰȱŗşǰȱ ŚřǰȱŜŜǰȱŝŗȮŝŘǰȱŗŝřDzȱȱȬ ǰȱŗŝǰȱŘŘDzȱȱęȱ ¡£ǰȱŗŚǰȱŗŜǰȱŗşǰȱŗşDzȱȱ the Corporation model, 209–210. See also Toishan merchants equity: and company bonds issuance,
Index 201; and economic rationality, 121 extraterritoriality: business opportunities for Chinese ȱǰȱŗşǰȱřśǰȱŗŝřDzȱȱ Chinese joint stock ventures, 188, ŗşśDzȱȱ ȱǰȱŘǰȱśǰȱŗŗǰȱ řśǰȱřşDzȱȱȱǰȱ řśǰȱŚŞŚDzȱȱyangshang guahao (foreign merchant land ǼȱǰȱśŞǰȱśşǯȱSee also treaty port system factories: and agricultural production household links, 7; Chinese company law encouragement of, 188; distribution of, in Shanghai, ŚŘǰȱŚŝDzȱĚȱȱȱǰȱ 80–82; and housing of laborers, śřDzȱȱȱ Ȭȱ ȱĚȱȱĜǰȱŞşDzȱ in Jiang-Zhe, 38; mortgaging of factory sites and equipment (changqi yakuan or ħȱ hetongǼǰȱŜŝȮŝŖDzȱȱ¢ȱ transfer, 8; and the Treaty of Shimonoseki, 33, 81, 102. See alsoȱĴȱDzȱĚȱDzȱ manufacturing sector growth; textile industry factory output: coexistence with Ĵȱ¡ȱĞȱ production, 98; weaving zone production statistics for 1931, 100 failure and resilience: business failure disclosure to SGM, 194; business failures following the 1904 Company code, 189, 199, 201; and China’s lack of “transformative growth” before 1949, 118–120; ęȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ ǰȱŗŗŗȮŗŗŘǰȱŗŗŚȮŗŗśDzȱ ȱȱȱĚȱȱȱ 1932 to 1934, 78–79, 84, 90; rice mills’ failure to initiate vertical ǰȱŝŜǰȱŞśǰȱŞŞǰȱşŘǰȱşŚǰȱşśDzȱ the Shanghai real estate bubble, 48, 71, 72; and the Kirby Puzzle,
Řśř 189; treaty port economy and ȱȱĚǰȱ 7, 24; Wei County textile industry, 99–101, 104 Fairbank, John King, treaty port system, 1, 2, 3 ¢ȱDZȱȱǰȱŗřśDzȱ and incorporation, 202–203; and Wuxi rural households, 129, 130, 134, 137, 138, 139, 140. See also business organization; Sassoon family Fang Xianting, 102 farm capital: and land rental markets, ŗřŜDzȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱŗŖřȮ 104. See also capital markets farmer rationality: and economic exchange, 119, 120–121; and ěȬȱ¢ǰȱŗŖŘȮŗŖřǰȱ 128–129 Faure, David, on Chung family land ǰȱŗśŜǰȱŗśŞ ǰȱǰȱśşǰȱŜŜ ęȱDZȱ£ȱȱ ȂȱȱęǰȱŗŖŝDzȱȱ merchant capital in Wei, 104; and ȱȱȱǰȱŚŞǰȱŜśȮŝŘǰȱ ŜśȮŜŝǰȱŝŖȮŝŘDzȱȱȂȱȱ estate boom, 19 ęȱǰȱȬ appointed auditors, 194 ĚȱDZȱȱȱ competition, 81–82, 90–91; growth of, 77–80, 81–82, 89–91; and institutional change, 19–20; mechanization of, 80–84; rice ȱȱ ǰȱŝŜǰȱŞŖǰȱŞŚǰȱ şŗȮşŘǰȱşŚȮşśDzȱ£ȱǰȱ ŝŜǰȱŞřŜǰȱşŚȮşśǯȱSee alsoȱĚȱ ĚȱDZȱȱȱĚȱȱ ǻ¡ȱǼǰȱŞşDzȱ Mow Sing Flour Mills (Maoxin ǼǰȱŞşDzȱȱȂȱ organization of, 89–91. See also factories ĚȱDZȱĴȱȱ enterprises associated with, 89;
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ȱȱȱ ǰȱŝŜǰȱ 91–92; in Shanghai, 77–78; vertical ȱǰȱŞşȮşŘǰȱşśǯȱSee also Ěȱ foreign community assets, and technological change, 80, 83 ȱȱȱǻǼDZȱȱ nineteenth-century rural China, şŜDzȱȱǰȱřŚǰȱřŜDzȱĞȱȱ Treaty of Shimonoseki, 2, 33, 34, 81, 102; during the warlord era, 34. See also investment ȱĴDZȱȱȱ ǰȱśşDzȱȱǰȱŚŞDzȱȱ ȱȱǰȱśŝȮśŞǰȱŜŜDzȱȱ Shanghai introduced, 47–48 foreign trade: and American and ȱ¡ȱǰȱŗŝŜǰȱ 178; and the Chinese Maritime ȱǰȱřDzȱȱĚȱȱ rice trade, 84, 94; during the Great ȱǻŗşŘŖǼǰȱŝDzȱȱ ȱ £ȱȱȱĚȱǰȱŝŜȮŞŖǰȱ 91; opening of Wei County by the ȱǻŗşŖŜǼǰȱşŜDzȱȱȂȱ ĚȱǰȱşŗDzȱȱȂȱȱ ǰȱşŗDzȱȱęȱȱ ȱ
ǰȱŗŝśȮŗŝŞDzȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ economy, 7; and Wei’s weaving Ğȱ¢ǰȱŗŖśǰȱŗŖş fraudulence of directors: Company Code of 1904 addressing of, 193– 194; and investor trust, 200 freedom of the press and speech, 44 French Concession: governance ǰȱřşDzȱȱǰȱśŖǰȱśŗDzȱȱ one of three original Shanghai governments, 38, 38 £ǰȱŘǰȱśŖ ȱęȱȱǻŘŖŖŞǼǰȱŘŚ globalization, and problems of equality, 24 ȃ ȱȱȄȱǻ Ǽǰȱ 177–178 ȃ ȱȱ Ȅȱǻǯȱ Kam Shan Chong; Mand. Jinshan
£ǼǰȱŗŝŞ gongsizhaiȱǻ¢ȱǼDZȱŗşŗŚȱ Company Law Ordinance and, 201; and credit secured with real estate, 201 ȱȱǻŗşŘŖǼǰȱŝǰȱŗŗǰȱŚŞśǰȱ ŝŗǰȱŝŞǰȱŞŜ “Green Gang,” 44 Guangdong Province, land registration introduced, 22, 180, 182 £ȱǻǼDZȱ industrialization of, 47; land ǰȱŚŝǰȱŚşǰȱśŖȮśŗDzȱȱ of concessions within, 2; warlord ȱȱǻŗşŗŗǼǰȱŗŝşǯȱSee also
ȱ Dzȱ¢ȱȱ guest armies (kejunǼǰȱŗŝş gufenȱǻǼǰȱǯȱ ȱȱȱ kabushiki, 193 gufen yuxian gongsi. See limited liability ȱǻ DzȱǼDZȱ Legislative Yuan (Legislative ǼǰȱŘŖŚDzȱȱȱ projects, 208; taxation practices, ŚśDzȱȱ¢ȱȱ£ǰȱ 3. See also Company Law of 1929; nationalism Ğȱ¢DZȱȱȱǰȱ ŗŖŖǰȱŗŖŘDzȱȱȱǰȱŗŘŜDzȱ and Jiang-Zhe manufacturing ǰȱřŝȮřŞDzȱȱȱĴȬ ȱ¢ǰȱŘŖǰȱŗŗŗȮŗŗŘǰȱŗŗśȮŗŗŜDzȱ ¡ȱĞȱȱ¢ȱ production coexistence, 20, 98–99. See also textile industry
£ǰȱȱǰȱśŖ
DZȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱŜŖşDzȱȱǰȱŚŝǰȱ śŝŝǰȱśŖǰȱśŗDzȱĞȬ ȱȱ takeover of, 44. See also treaty port cities; Wuhan
ǰȱȱǰȱŜŖǰȱŜřȮŜŚ
ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱŗŖř
ȱ DZȱȱ ȱȱ
Index ¢ȱȱȱǰȱŗŝŜDzȱȱ ȱ ǰȱŘŘDzȱȱęȱ property, 22, 179, 180, 182–183; ȱ¢ȱǰȱŗŝśDzȱȱ overseas-returned immigrants, ŗŝŜȮŗŝŝDzȱȱȱȱ ¡ǰȱŚśDzȱȱęȱ¢ǰȱ 180. See alsoȱ £ȱǻǼ
ȱ ȱȱ DZȱȱ business registration tactics, ŗŝśȮŗŝŜǰȱŗŝŞDzȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ŗŝŜǰȱŗŝŝDzȱȬȱ ǰȱŗŝǰȱŗŝśȮŗŝŝ household property: and taxation ȱȱǰȱŗśŘDzȱȱȱ ties, 148; and tongju gongcai ǻȱǼǰȱŗŚŞDzȱȱyitian liangzhuȱǻȱ ǼǰȱŗśŚDzȱ and zhunzheȱǻȱȱ¢Ǽȱ ǰȱŗśřǰȱŗŜŞȮŗŜşǯȱSee also ancestral property holding; rural economic system housing: alleyway dwellings (lilongǼȱ ȱȬ ȱǰȱśřǰȱŜŘDzȱȱ zudizaowu building and leasing ǰȱŜś
ȱ ǰȱŘŖŚ
ȱ ǰȱřŜȮřŝǰȱŚř human capital, and farm household decision making, 120, 132 huomaiȱǻȱǼǰȱȱjuemai ǻȱǼȱŗśŖǰȱŗśŗǰȱŗŜŗǰȱ ŗŜŜȮŗŜŝ income: rental income as a major ȱȱęȱȱȱŗşŘŖǰȱŜŘȮ Ŝřǰȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱŗřŜŘŖǰȱŗřŞǰȱŗřş incorporation, of property-holding bodies, 149 industrial performance in Japan, and modern industrial growth in Shanghai compared, 37 industrialization: and corporate law, 22–23; during World ȱǰȱśśDzȱȱȱȱ contextualization of, 37–38; and
Řśś economic growth, 11; and foreign ȱȱǻǼǰȱŘǰȱřřǰȱřŜDzȱ ȱȱȱǰȱřŚǰȱřŜȮřŝDzȱ integration of, with the real estate ȱȱ£ǰȱŜśǰȱ 70–71; and international market ĚǰȱŘŚDzȱȬȱ investment, 12; Shanghai’s role in, řŜȮřŝǰȱśśȮśŜDzȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ system, 3, 7. See also economic performance; technology transfer informal credit: and land pawning, ŗŘŜǰȱŗřřǰȱŗřŜǰȱŗřŞǰȱŗřşDzȱȱ ǰȱŗŘŜ informal institutions: Chambers of ǰȱŗśǰȱŗŝDzȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱŗśDzȱȬȱ of Chinese communities within ¢ȱǰȱŗřȮŗśǰȱŗŝȮŗŞDzȱȱȱ mind-sets of Western business communities, 13 “institution” and “organization” distinguished, 9 institutional change: and Chinese entrepreneurs, 17; Chinese migration into Shanghai foreign ĴǰȱŗŝǰȱřŞǰȱŚŞǰȱśŗȮśŚǰȱśŝDzȱ and the Corporation Model, 187; and the development of corporate law in China, 11–13, 22–23, 172– 173; economic change spurred by, 48; and economic performance ǰȱŗǰȱŗŖǰȱŘřȮŘŚDzȱȱĚȱ ȱ£ǰȱşŚȮşśDzȱ and land property concepts, ŘŗȮŘŘDzȱȱǰȱŗŞŜȮŗŞŝǰȱ 201–202, 208; and new mind-sets of Chinese communities within ¢ȱǰȱŗřȮŗśǰȱŗŝȮŗŞDzȱȱ ęȱ¡£ǰȱŗŚǰȱŗŝȮŗŞǰȱ ŗşǰȱŘśDzȱȱĴȬȱ¢ǰȱ ŘŖǰȱŗŖşȮŗŗŘǰȱŗŗśȮŗŗŜDzȱ¡ęȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱĚȱǰȱ 19–20; and social constraints, 10; and special economic zones ǻǼǰȱŘśȮŘŜDzȱȱtong ownership traditions, 22; and the treaty
ŘśŜ
The Treaty Port Economy in Modern China
ȱ¢ǰȱŗŜȮŗşDzȱȱ ȱȱȱĚȱǰȱ ŗşȮŘŖǰȱŝŜǰȱŞşȮşŘǰȱşśDzȱěȱȱ Western lifestyle and value system adaptees, 17–18 ȱDZȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ǰȱŗŝśȮŗŝŜDzȱ and limited liability protection, ŗŝŜ ȱĴDZȱ¢ȱ ǰȱŚŘDzȱǰȱśřǰȱŜŘȮŜřǰȱŜŚDzȱ and Medieval European citystate structure, 38–39; and the merging of British and American Concessions, 38; as one of three original Shanghai governments, 38 internationalization: and the treaty port system, 3. See also economic performance investment: and the 1914 Ordinance, 188, 200–203; by Chinese entrepreneurs in treaty ports economy, 17, 188; and contractual conduct, 209; and ¡¢ǰȱřśǰȱŗşśDzȱȱlilong ǰȱŜŘȮŜřǰȱŜŚDzȱȬȱ principles of the 1929 Company ǰȱŘŖŜDzȱȱȱ impersonal investment, 8, 10, 12, ŗşȮŘŖǰȱŗşŖǰȱŘŖŜȮŘŖŞDzȱȱȱ ȱǰȱŜŖȮŜśDzȱȱȱ Corporation Model, 190; by yarn ȱǰȱŗŗŘȮŗŗśǯȱ See also foreign direct investment ǻǼ involution and underdevelopment theory: introduced, 118, 119–120; and sericulture, 118, 128; and Wuxi village household economic rationality, 21, 120–121 iron-gear looms (tiefangzhiǼDZȱȱ adoption of, 97–99; Wei County cloth industry transformed by, 100–101 Japan: and the Company Ordinance
ȱŗşŗŚǰȱŗşŜǰȱŗşŞDzȱȱ¢ȱ law in Taiwan, 11; iron-gear looms imported from, 98; Japanese entrepreneurs in Shanghai, 43; ȱĴȱǰȱśŖǰȱ śŗǰȱśŜDzȱ ȱ¡ȱǰȱ 102, 113 ȱ¢ȱȱǻħȱǼDZȱ “company” (kaishaǼȱęȱǰȱ 193, 198; legal term of “stock” (kabushikiǼǰȱŗşřDzȱȱ¢ȱ code compared with, 193 Japanese economic modernization: and Chinese treaty ports compared, 27; modern industrial growth in Shanghai compared with, 37, 43 jiancharenȱǻǼǰȱ ȱ appointment of, 200 ȱ ȱǻȱ ȬǼǰȱŚś Ȭȱǻ ȱȱǼǰȱ manufacturing sector growth, 37–38 ȱȱǻȬ ȱ ¢Ǽǰȱ Wei County textile industry and, şŜȮşŝ ȬȱȱǻȬȱ ¢Ǽǰȱ 100 Jinshan zhuang (Cant. Kam Shan Dzȱ ȱȱ Ǽǰȱ 178 ȱǻ ȱȱǼǰȱ 177 joint-stock corporations: and credit, ŗŝŝDzȱ ȱ ȱȱǰȱŗŝŝDzȱ introduced to China, 12, 22–23; and the modernization of Chinese business, 12; tong interpreted as type of, 183–184; and treaty port ȱ¡ǰȱŗŞŝȮŗŞŞǰȱŗşś juemaiȱǻȱǼDZȱȱhuomai ǻȱǼǰȱŗśŖȮŗśŗǰȱŗŜŗǰȱ ŗŜŜȮŗŜŝǯȱSee also zhunzhe (land as ¢Ǽȱ kabushikiȱǻǼǰȱgufenȱǻǼȱ compared to, 193
Index kaishaȱǻ¢ǼDZȱȱȱ behavior (J. çç; Mand. ¡ ǼǰȱŗşřǰȱŗşŞDzȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱęȱǰȱŗşřǰȱ 198 Kam Shan Chong (Mand. Jinshan £Dzȱ ȱȱ Ǽǰȱ 178 Kang Chao, 97, 98 kejunȱǻȱǼǰȱŗŝş Kirby, William: on business deterred by Company Law of 1929, 203; and corporate law development, ŘřǰȱŚśǰȱŘŖŘǰȱŘŖřDzȱȱȃ ¢ȱ Puzzle,” 189; on network-based family business, 202 Kong Xiangxi, 204 Kotenev, A. M., on litigations concerning Corporation (1914 and ŗşŘřǼǰȱŘŖŘ
ȱȱǰȱśŖ labor force: gender of workers, ŗŗŞǰȱŗŘŞǰȱŗřŗȮŗřśǰȱŗŚŖDzȱȱ capital intensive professions, 132, ŗřŚǰȱŗřśDzȱȱȱǰȱŗřŗǰȱŗřřǰȱ 134; rural household economic activities, 133, 134; Wei County household weavers, 102; and young dependents, 131, 133, 134, ŗřś labor market, migrant labor, 129, 134, ŗřśǰȱŗřś labor migration: outmigration from Wei County, 103; to Shanghai, 37, 129–130 laborers: availability of in treaty ports, 2; availability of in Wei ¢ǰȱŗŖŘDzȱȱǰȱśřǰȱŜŘ Land Court, and surface-subsoil ǰȱŘŗȮŘŘǰȱŗśŚȮŗśśǰȱŗŜř landholding practices: and categories ȱǰȱŗŜřȮŗŜśDzȱȱ commercialization, 147; court rulings in the To lineage case, ŗŜŘDzȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ ȬęȱǰȱŗŖřǰȱ
Řśŝ ŗŘŚȮŗŘśDzȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱŗŘřȮŗŘśDzȱȱȱȱ categories of yezhu; dianzhu, ŗśŘDzȱ and yitian liangzhu,ȱŗśŚ ȬȱęȱǻdaoqiǼǰȱśŝȮŜŖǰȱ Ŝş ȱDZȱȱȱǰȱśşǰȱŜŖDzȱ and daoqiȱǻȬȱęǼǰȱ ŗşǰȱśŝȮŜŖǰȱŜşDzȱȱ ȱ Province land policy changes, 22, 180, 182–184; and quanbingdan ȱǰȱśŞǰȱśşDzȱ and yangshang guahao (foreign ȱǼǰȱśş land rights: Chinese landownership ȱȱĴǰȱśŝǰȱśşDzȱ discrepancies in categories in ȱǰȱŗŜŚȮŗŜśDzȱȱȱ used to analyze, 147, 149; and local community involvement, ŗŚŝǰȱŗśŘȮŗśŝǰȱŗŜŚȮŗŜśǰȱŗŜŞȮŗŜşDzȱ ȱȱǰȱŘŗȮŘŘǰȱŗŜŘȮŗŜřǰȱ ŗŜŞȮŗŜşǰȱŗŝŖȮŗŝŗDzȱȬȱ form of ownership, 21–22, ŗśŚǰȱŗśśǰȱŗŜŗȮŗŜřDzȱȱ¢ȱ ǰȱŗśŘǰȱŗśŚǰȱŗśśǰȱŗŜŗǯȱSee also property rights land title deeds: and absolute land ǰȱŗŜşDzȱȱȱȱmai ǻǼǰȱhuomaiȱǻȱǼǰȱ juemaiȱǻȱǼȱȱdian ǻǼǰȱŗśŗȮŗśŘDzȱȱȱ Ȭȱ¢ȱȱǰȱŗśŜǰȱ ŗśŝDzȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱŗśśȮŗśŜǰȱŗśŝDzȱ deeds of duan, ŗŜřȮŗŜŚDzȱȱȱ ǰȱŗŚŝǰȱŗŚşǰȱŗśśȮŗśŝDzȱȱȱ ǰȱŗśŘDzȱquanbingdan ȱǰȱśŝǰȱśŞǰȱ śşȮŜŖǰȱŜşǰȱŝŚDzȱȱȱ ǰȱ 147; and yezhuȱǻ ǼǰȱŗśŖȮŗśŗDzȱ and zhunzheȱǻȱȱ¢Ǽȱ ǰȱŗśřǰȱŗŜŞȮŗŜş land transactions: basic forms ǰȱŗśŖȮŗśŘDzȱ discrepancies in categories in ȱǰȱŗŜŚȮŗŜśDzȱȱȱ
ŘśŞ
The Treaty Port Economy in Modern China
ǰȱŗśśȮŗśŝǰȱŗŜŗȮŗŜřDzȱ documented in land deeds, 149; juemaiȱǻȱǼȱǯȱhuomai ǻȱǼǰȱŗśŖȮŗśŗǰȱŗŜŗǰȱ ŗŜŜȮŗŜŝDzȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱĴȱǻzujieǼǰȱśŝDzȱȱ ¢ǰȱŜŜǰȱŜşŗŚǰȱŝŘDzȱȱ ȱȱȱĴǰȱŚŞǰȱŜŝȮ ŝŖǰȱŜşŗŚDzȱȱȱ ȱǰȱ ŗśŝȮŗśŞǰȱŗśŞȮŗŜŗDzȱȱȱǰȱ ŗśŖȮŗśŚǰȱŗŜśȮŗŜŝǰȱŗŝŖȮŗŝŗDzȱȱ religious organizations, 148; and surface-subsoil property rights, ŗŜŗȮŗŜřDzȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ ŗśŘDzȱȱȱǰȱŗŚŞDzȱ and yitian liangzu, ŗśśȮŗśŜDzȱȱ zhaojia supplementary payments, ŗŚŝǰȱŗśřǰȱŗŝŖDzȱȱzhunzhe (land ȱ¢Ǽȱǰȱŗśřǰȱ ŗŜŞȮŗŜş land values: and Chinese migration ȱȱĴǰȱśŗȮśŘDzȱ ȱȱĴǰȱŚŘȮŚřǰȱ ŚŞǰȱśŘǰȱśŚȮśŝDzȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ǰȱŚşȮśŖ legal profession: high quality of, in treaty ports, 11, 13, 42; negative portrayal of, 18; Shanghai as stronghold of, 41 legal reform: commercial law conference organized in 1907, 197; and the Corporation Model, ŘŘȮŘřǰȱŗŞŝǰȱŗşŜǰȱŗşŞǰȱŘŖŘȮŘŖřǰȱ ŘŖŜȮŘŖŝǰȱŘŖşDzȱȱȱȱ ȱ ǰȱŜDzȱȱȱ ȱȱǰȱŗŜśȮ ŗŜŜDzȱȱ¢ȱǰȱśǰȱŚŗǯȱSee also Company Code of 1904; Company Law of 1929; Company Ordinance of 1914; reform movements; Shanghai Mixed Court legal system in China: agents of change at the legislative level, ŘřǰȱŗŞŜȮŗŞŝDzȱȱ ȱȱ treaty ports, 11; legislative process in late imperial China, 191–192; and limited liability, 12, 172–173;
Shanghai Mixed Court system compared with, 41–42. See also limited liability (gufen yuxian gongsiǼDzȱȱ¡ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ DZȱȱ limited liability, 12; and the tong, ŗŝŚȮŗŝś ȱǰȱŗŝŜȮŗŝŝǰȱŗŝŞǰȱŗŝş Liang Qichao: and corporate law reform, 199, 201; Company Code of 1904 criticized by, 189, 192; and the corporation, 23, 188, 189; and poverty elimination, 188 lilongȱǻ¢ ¢ȱ ǼDZȱ ǰȱśřDzȱȱǰȱ ŜŘȮŜř limited liability (gufen yuxian gongsiǼDZȱ 1914 Ordinance inducement of new companies incorporated as, ŘŖŘDzȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱ
ǰȱŗŝŜǰȱŗŝŝDzȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ
ǰȱŗŝŜDzȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ China from 1904, 12; and the legal ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱŗŞŜśǰȱ ŗŘDzȱȱ¢ȱȱǻŗŞśśǼǰȱ 172–173; and negligence, 200; and the practice of interlocking shares, 177 lineage, and property holdings, 147 ¢DZȱȱȱĴȱǰȱ ŜŜDzȱȱȱǰȱŜşŗŚǰȱ 72 Lower Yangzi: industrial growth, 37–38; industrial growth of Wuxi, 129–131; and nonfarm employment introduced, 128–129; population size, 38 Ma Yinchu, 204, 207–208 ȱǰȱŗŝŜȮŗŝŝ manufacturing sector growth: compared to treaty port economy ǰȱŜȮŝDzȱȱ Ȭȱǻ ȱ ȱǼǰȱřŝȮřŞDzȱȱȱ ŗŞŝŞȮŗşŗřǰȱśśȮśŜǯȱSee also factories market development, and equity
Index implications, 121 market economy: and antitraditionalism, 13–14; of the Ĵȱ¡ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱǰȱşŜȮŗŗŞDzȱȱ imperial China’s contribution to, ŘŜDzȱȬȱȱ relations, 104–109, 112; and the Northian framework, 9–11; and ȱȱ¢ǰȱŘŜDzȱȱȱ Shanghai real estate market, 71; and transportation infrastructure, şŜǰȱşşǰȱŗŖŖǰȱŗŖŚDzȱȱȱ¢ȱ port system, 3, 18–19. See also real estate market merchant capital: and the textile ¢ȱĴȬȱ¢ǰȱ ŗŖşȮŗŗŘǰȱŗŗśȮŗŗŜDzȱȱȱ¢ȱ commercialization, 104, 109–117 migration: of Chinese into ĴǰȱřŞǰȱŚŞǰȱśŗȮśŚǰȱśŝDzȱ and income and consumption ǰȱŗřŜŘŖǰȱŗřŞǰȱŗřşDzȱȱ ȱȱǰȱŗřśȮ ŗřŜDzȱȱȱȱȱȱ Jiangnan, 128–129, 141 mihao or mihangȱǻȱȱǼǰȱŞśȮŞŝ modernization. See economic modernization; economic modernization in Japan; institutional change; technological change; technology transfer DZȱȱǰȱŜşDzȱȱ credit securing by Shanghai ǰȱŜŝǰȱŝŘDzȱdian ǻDzȱȱǼǰȱȱ huomaiȱǻȱǼǰȱŗśŗȮŗśŘǰȱ ŗśřDzȱdian (mortgage; redeemable ǼȱȱmaiȱǻǼǰȱŗśŗǰȱŗśŘDzȱ and duanmaiȱǻȱǼǰȱ ŗŜŗDzȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ (changqi yakuan or ħȱ hetongǼǰȱŜŝȮŝŖDzȱȱ¢ǰȱŜŜǰȱ ŜşŗŚǰȱŝŘDzȱȬȱȱ to selling and mortgaging land, ŗśŘȮŗśŚǰȱŗŜśȮŗŜŝǰȱŗŝŖȮŗŝŗDzȱ and quanbingdan entrustment
Řśş ǰȱŜŖǰȱŜş most-favored-nation clause, and the treaty port system, 3 Municipal Council (Shanghai ȱĴǼDZȱȱ ȱǰȱŚŚǰȱŚśDzȱ introduced, 38–39; investigations into land registration in foreign ĴǰȱśşDzȱȱȱ¡ǰȱ śŚŜǰȱśŞDzȱȱǰȱśŘǰȱśřǰȱśŚŜǰȱ śŞŞǰȱśşDzȱȱ¢ȱȱ imitation of, 39–40 Murphey, Rhoads, on treaty ports and China’s modernization, 7 ȱȱ ȱȱǻȱ Pak-hong Kung-so, Nanbei hang ǼǰȱŗŝśȮŗŝŜ Nam Pak-hong Kung-so (Nanbei ȱǰȱȱȱ ȱ ǼǰȱŗŝśȮŗŝŜ ǰȱȱǰȱŚŝǰȱśŖ Nanyang Brothers’ Tobacco Company, 202 “narrow cloth” (zhaibuǼǰȱşş ȱǻ Dzȱ ǼDZȱ Legislative Yuan (Legislative ǼǰȱŘŖŚDzȱȱȱ projects, 208; taxation practices, ŚśDzȱȱ¢ȱȱ£ǰȱ 3. See also Company Law of 1929; nationalism nationalism: institutional change promoted by, 17–18; treaty ports as symbol of national humiliation, 3, 18, 43n13. See also Nationalist ǻ Dzȱ Ǽ Naughton, Barry, on the Chinese ȱ¢ǰȱŘŜ “new handloom cloth” (xinshouzhibuǼǰȱ and the emergence of new Ğȱǰȱşŝ nominee shareholding: 1914 Ordinance introduction of, 201; 1929 Company Law limits on ȱȱǰȱŘŖśǰȱŘŖŜ North, Douglass C., institutional
ŘŜŖ
The Treaty Port Economy in Modern China
framework, 1, 9–11 Northian framework: formal institutions, 11–13; informal ǰȱŗřȮŗśDzȱȱ ǰȱŗŜȮŗŞDzȱǰȱŗǰȱşȮŗŗǯȱ See also economic performance Opium War, and Western business ȱȱ ȱ ǰȱŘǰȱŘŜǰȱŗŜŞ “organization” and “institution” distinguished, 9 Palmer, Michael, on yitian liangzhu ǻȱ Ǽǰȱŗśś pawning out land: and distress land sales, 139, 140; and economic rationality, 139, 140; and household demographics, ŗřŘǰȱŗřřȮŗřśDzȱȱȱȱ consumption measures, 138, 139; and land rental compared, ŗŘśȮŗŘŜǰȱŗřřǰȱŗřśȮŗřŜDzȱȱȱ labor availability, 132; “young ȄȱȱǰȱŗřřǰȱŗřśǯȱSee also rural livelihoods Ĵ¢ȱDZȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱŗřŜŘŖǰȱ 138, 139, 140–141; and rural households, 130 political economy: and economic ǰȱŗşǰȱŘŜǰȱřŚȮřśǰȱŗŝŘǰȱ ŗŝŜȮŗŝŞǰȱŗŞŖȮŗŞŗDzȱȱȱǰȱ ŗśŜȮŗśŝǰȱŗŞŖDzȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱǰȱřŚȮřśǰȱ ŚŚȮŚśǰȱŗŝŘǰȱŗŝşȮŗŞŖǰȱŗŞřȮŗŞŚǰȱŗŞśDzȱ and the structuring of the New ǰȱŗŜŝȮŗŜş £ǰȱ ǰȱŘŜ population growth: and China’s economic growth, 118; and the handloom weaving industry in Wei, 102, 104; in Shanghai, ŘşŗŜǰȱřŜǰȱśŗȮśŘǰȱśŝǰȱŗŘşDzȱȱȱ ȱ ȱĴǰȱśŜDzȱ ȱ¢ȱȱǰȱśŝŝ professionals: and income and consumption measures, 138, 139;
and rural households, 129, 130 ęȱ¡£DZȱȱǰȱ 17–18, 209; and capital management by corporations, 190; as a new business ethos, 19, ŘśDzȱȱȱȱ ǰȱ ŗŖDzȱȱȱĴȬȱ¢ǰȱ ŗŗśȮŗŗŜDzȱȱȱ ǰȱ ŗřȮŗŚǰȱŗŜ ¢ȱDZȱęȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱŘŘǰȱŗŝşǰȱŗŞŖǰȱ 182–183; confusion regarding piȱǻȱǼǰȱzhaoȱǻǼǰȱȱ dianȱǻ¢ǼǰȱŗŜŘȮŗŜřDzȱȱdaoqi ǻȬȱęǼǰȱŚŘŗŗǰȱ śŝȮŜŖǰȱŜşDzȱdianduan (mortgage ȱ¢ǼǰȱŗŜŖǰȱŗŜŗDzȱdiantian ǻ¢ȱǼȱǰȱ ŗŜŖȮŗŜŗDzȱȱ¡¢ǰȱśŞǰȱ śşDzȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ sites and equipment (changqi yakuan or ħȱǼǰȱŜŝȮŜŞDzȱ and Guangdong Province land policy changes, 22, 180, 182–184; ȱȱ¡ȱǰȱŗŗşǰȱŗśŚDzȱ and land values in Shanghai, 42; market driven land transactions, ŘŗDzȱȱȱǰȱŘŗȮŘŘǰȱŗśŖȮŗśŚǰȱ ŗŜśȮŗŜŝǰȱŗŝŖȮŗŝŗDzȱȱ¢ǰȱ řśǰȱŚŘǰȱŚŜǰȱŜŖDzȱȱȬ¢ȱ legal system, 11; and the tongju gongcaiȱǻȱǼǰȱŗŚŞDzȱ associated with traditional tongs, 174; and yitian liangzhu (divided ǼǰȱŗśŚDzȱȱzhunzhe ǻȱȱ¢Ǽȱǰȱ ŗśřǰȱŗŜŞȮŗŜşǯȱSee also land rights; yitian liangzhu (divided Ǽ ȱǰȱřśǰȱŚŜǰȱŚŞ ĴȬȱ¢ǰȱŘŖǰȱŗŖşȮŗŗŘǰȱ ŗŗśȮŗŗŜ Qing company code, Japanese company code compared with, 193 Qingdao: Japanese textile consortia
Index in, 102; size and geographical location of, 47n1, 97; as source of foreign yarn for inland centers, 97; ¢ȬȱȱǻŗŞşŞǼǰȱ şŜǰȱşş Ȭ ȱ ¢ȱǻ ȱǼǰȱ Wei County textile industry and, şŜȮşŝǰȱşş quanbingdan entrustment practices: Chinese purposes for adopting, śŞǰȱŜŖDzȱȱǰȱŝŚDzȱǰȱ śŝǰȱśŞǰȱśşDzȱȱȱǰȱ ŜşDzȱȱǰȱŜŖǰȱŜşDzȱȱȱ Ȭ¢ȱǰȱŜŖşǯȱSee also real estate transactions railways: disputes over nationalization, 179; Jiaoji tielu ǻȬ ȱ ¢ǼǰȱşŜDzȱ Ȭ ȱȱǻȬȱ ¢Ǽǰȱ 100; mileage built during the warlord period, 34; and the ¢ȱȱȱŗşŖŚǰȱŗşŜDzȱ Toishan merchant investment in, 178 Rawski, Thomas: on GDP growth ȱȱȱŗşŗŗȮŗşřŜǰȱřŚDzȱȱ manufacturing growth of treaty ȱ¢ǰȱŜ real estate market: Cheng Jinxuan, ŜŚȮŜśDzȱȱęȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱŘŖǰȱŗŞŖǰȱŗŞŘȮŗŞřDzȱ ȱȱęȱǰȱ ŚŞǰȱŜśȮŜŝǰȱŝŖȮŝŘDzȱȱ with industrialization and £ǰȱŜřȮŜŚǰȱŜśǰȱŝŖȮ ŝŗDzȱę¢ȱȱȱlilong ǰȱŜŘDzȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱĴǰȱŚŘDzȱ rental income as a major source of ęȱȱȱŗşŘŖǰȱŜŘȮŜřǰȱŜŘȮŜřDzȱ ȱȱǰȱŜŗȮŜřǰȱŜŚǯȱSee also market economy ȱȱDZȱŝŘǰȱŜŜǰȱŜşŗŚDzȱ and daoqi (foreign concession ȱęǼǰȱŚŘŗŗǰȱśŝȮŜŖǰȱ ŜşDzȱȱȱ¡ǰȱŚŞDzȱ
ŘŜŗ ȱȱȱĴǰȱśŝȮśŞǰȱ ŜŜǰȱŜşDzȱ£ȱǰȱśşȮŜŖDzȱ zudizaowu building and leasing ǰȱŜśǯȱSee also quanbingdan entrustment practices reform movements: late-Qing constitutional reform, 33, 39; SelfStrengthening Movement, 8, 33, 188, 192. See also legal reform Remer, C. F., 34, 178 resilience and failure. See failure and resilience ȱ¢DZȱĚȱ¢ȱ ȱ ǰȱŗşȮŘŖǰȱŝŜǰȱŞŖǰȱŞŚǰȱ şŗȮşŘǰȱşŚǰȱşśDzȱȱȱȱ ǰȱşŗDzȱ ȱǰȱŝŜȮŞŖǰȱŞřǰȱ ŞŜȮŞŞDzȱȱȱ¡¢ȱȱ ǰȱŞŜǰȱŞŝȮŞŞǰȱşŘDzȱȱȱ ȱǰȱŞŚȮŞŞǰȱşŗȮşŘǰȱşŚǰȱşśDzȱȱ ęȱ¢ȱǰȱşŘǰȱşŚǰȱşś rice milling: as an auxiliary sector ȱȱȱǰȱŞŜǰȱŞŝȮŞŞǰȱşŘDzȱ and foreign competition, 81–82; ȱǰȱ ȱĚȱȱ in Shanghai, 80–81; mechanization ǰȱŞŖȮŞŚǰȱŞŜ ȱDZȱĚȱȱ£ȱ by, 89–91; incorporation by, 202 Rong Desheng, 89–91 rule of law: and the Court of Consuls ȱȱȱĴǰȱřşDzȱ ȱ¢ȱ Ȭ¢ȱħǰȱ śDzȱȱȱǰȱ 10; and transaction costs, 10, 11; and the treaty port economy legal system compared, 12 rural economic system: and cash payment, 107, 109; and family business, 129, 130, 134, 137, 138, 139, 140; and farm capital ǰȱŗřŜǰȱŗřŝDzȱȱ household demographics, 122– 123, 132, 133–134; fragmented landholdings, 103; impact of modern transportation upon, şŜȮşŝǰȱşşǰȱŗŖŖǰȱŗŖŚDzȱȱ and consumption measures,
ŘŜŘ
The Treaty Port Economy in Modern China
ŗřŜŘŖǰȱŗřŝǰȱŗřŞǰȱŗřşDzȱȱ to develop rice-surplus areas, ŝŜȮŝŝDzȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ ¢ǰȱśǰȱŘŖǰȱşŜȮşŝǰȱşşDzȱȱ ȱǰȱŗŖśȮŗŖŞDzȱȱĴȬ ȱ¢ǰȱŘŖǰȱŗŗŗȮŗŗŘǰȱŗŗśȮŗŗŜǯȱ See also household property; ȱě rural livelihoods: farm labor hiring ǰȱŗŘŜȮŗŘŞǰȱŗřŜDzȱȱ of machine spinning on, 98–99; and income and consumption measures, 138, 139; and overpopulation, 103; structure of Wuxi’s nonfarm economy, 130; ¢ȱěȬȱǰȱ 102–103, 128–131. See also pawning out land Sassoon family: and Cheng Jinxuan, ŜŚDzȱǰȱŜŖȮŜŗDzȱȱ ȱȱǰȱŜŗȮŜŘDzȱ lucrative leasing of lilong workers’ ȱ¢ǰȱŜŘȮŜřǯȱSee also family businesses ęȱȱȱǰȱřŝ Second World War, and the decline of the Treaty Port System, 2 security: comprador assets used as, śŞDzȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ ĴǰȱŚŞDzȱȱ¢ȱ ǰȱřśǰȱŚŜǰȱŜŜǰȱŚŘŗŗDzȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱŜśȮŜŝDzȱ for yangshang guahao real estate ǰȱśş self-dealing rules, 200 Self-Strengthening Movement, 4, 8, 33, 188, 192 sericulture: decline of, 129, 130; female labor in, 118, 120, 128, 134, ŗřśDzȱȱȱȱȱ ǰȱŗřŜŘŖǰȱŗřŝǰȱŗřŞǰȱŗřşǰȱ ŗŚŖǰȱŗŚŗDzȱȱ ǰȱŗřśǰȱ ŗŚŖDzȱȱȱ ǰȱŗŘŜDzȱȱ migrant work income compared, ŗřśȮŗřŜDzȱȱȱ growth of the Wuxi agrarian
economy, 21 SEZs. See special economic zones ǰȱśŘǰȱśŚȮśŝDzȱȱ establishment distribution within, 42–43; challenges posed to governance of, 44; Chinese ȱȱȱĴǰȱ ŚŚǰȱśŗȮśŘǰȱśŝǰȱśşDzȱȃ¢ȬȄȱ ȱȱǰȱŚŜDzȱȃ¢ȬȄȱ ȱȱȱǰȱřśǰȱ 38–40; distribution of business establishments in, 42; distribution of factories in, 47; exodus of ȱȱǰȱŚśDzȱ and foreign direct investment, řŚǰȱřŜDzȱȱĴȱ population, 47–48; indigenous entrepreneurship in, 43; and ȱǰȱŚŚǰȱŚśDzȱȱ system, 2, 11, 41–42; migration of ȱȱȱĴȱ ǰȱřŞǰȱŚŞǰȱśŗȮśŘǰȱśŝDzȱȱ of rural laborers to, 37, 129–130; modern industrial growth in, řŜȮřŞDzȱȱǰȱřŞȮřşǰȱ ŚŚǰȱśŚŜǰȱśŞDzȱ£ȱǰȱŚŚDzȱ ȱ ȱǰȱŘşŗŜǰȱřŜǰȱ śŘǰȱśŝDzȱȱǰȱŞŜȮŞŞDzȱȱ City Council, 39–40; strategic ȱǰȱřśDzȱȱ ȱǰȱśŘȮśř Shanghai land values: in the foreign ĴǰȱŚŘȮŚřǰȱŚŞǰȱśŖȮśŝDzȱȱ modern property rights, 42; and ȱȱȱęȱȱ linkage, 72 ȱ¡ȱDZȱŗşŗŗȮŗşŘśȱ transformation of, 40–43; courts in early twentieth-century Shanghai compared with, 40–41; and foreign diplomatic community interference, 12, 39, 40; traditional Chinese legal system compared with, 41–42. See also legal system in China Shanghai Steam Flour Mill, established by foreigners, 80
Index Ȃȱȱȱǻ ǼDZȱ auditors (chazhangrenǼȱȱ ¢ǰȱŗşŚDzȱ¢ȱǰȱŗşŖǰȱŗşřȮŗşśǰȱ 199; and the issuing of new capital stock, 200; and speculative investing, 207–208 ȱǰȱŗşŖǰȱŗşřȮŗşśǰȱ ŗşşȮŘŖŗǰȱŘŖŜ shareholding: company bond issuance, 201; interlocking of, 177; ȱǰȱŘŖŗǰȱŘŖśǰȱŘŖŜ Shenxin fangzhichang (Sung Sing ĴȱǼǰȱŜŝȮŜŞǰȱŜşǰȱŞş £ȱǰȱȱǰȱŘś Sheridan, James, on the warlord era in China, 34 Shiga Shuzo, 148 Shimonoseki, Treaty of, 33, 81, 102 çç (Mand. shangxingwei; ȱǼǰȱŗşřǰȱŗşŞ siheyuanȱǻȱȱǼȱ and lilongȱǻ¢ ¢ȱ Ǽǰȱśř DZȱȱȱǰȱŗśşǰȱŗŜŖDzȱ Ě ȱȱ¢ȱȱǯǯȱȱ ȱȱǰȱŗşřŚDzȱĚ ȱȱ during the Great Depression, 7, ŚŞśDzȱȱȱȱȱ conversion to, 41 ȱ ȱǰȱśřǰȱśŞ social change: and acceptance of the Corporation Model, 209; and Chinese nationalism, 3, 17–18; and newcomers to the New Territories, ŗŜŝȮŗŜşǰȱŗŝŝDzȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ¢ȱȬǰȱŗśȮŗŜ ȱ ǰȱŗřȮŗŚǰȱŗŜ social networks: and ancestral ¢ȱǰȱŗŚŞȮŗśŖDzȱȱ bao (trust, clientage-patronage, ¢ǼǰȱŗŗŘDzȱȱǻbangǼȱ of rice merchants, 94; importance for Chinese businesses, 8–9, 22; local community involvement ȱ ǰȱŗŚŝǰȱŗśŘȮŗśŝǰȱ ŗŜŚȮŗŜśǰȱŗŜŞȮŗŜşDzȱȱȬ returnees, 17, 22; and property ȱǰȱŘŗȮŘŘǰȱŜŖǰȱŗŚŝDzȱ
ŘŜř and surface-subsoil ownership, ŘŗȮŘŘǰȱŗśŚȮŗśśǰȱŗŜřDzȱȱȱ ǰȱŗŚŞDzȱȱǰȱŗŝŜǰȱ 178. See also business networks Social Science Research Institute ǻǼǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ introduced, 122–123 ¢ȱǻǼDZȱȱ ȱ
ǰȱŜDzȱȱǰȱŘśDzȱ ȱ ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ¡ǰȱřśǰȱ ŚřŗřǰȱŚŜ ȱȱ£ȱǻǼǰȱȱ ȱǰȱŘśȮŘŜ ȱěDZȱȱȬȱ £ǰȱŘŗǰȱřśǰȱřŝȮřŞǯȱSee also rural economic system £DZȱȱĚȱȱ £ǰȱşŚȮşśDzȱȱȱ ĴȬȱ¢ǰȱŗŗŖȮŗŗŗ Stephens, Thomas: on Shanghai governance, 41; Shanghai Mixed Court and traditional Chinese legal system compared by, 11, 41–42 stock (gufenǼǰȱǯȱ ȱȱȱ kabushiki, 193 stock markets in China, development of, 12 stockholders. See shareholding; shareholders’ rights ȱǰȱŜŚȮŜś Sun Ke, 182 Sun Yat-sen, 203 supervisor (jiancharenǼǰȱ ȱ appointment of, 200 ȱȱǻ¢Ǽǰȱȱ concerning Corporation (1914 and ŗşŘřǼǰȱŘŖŘ surface-subsoil form of ownership: ȱ ȱ ǰȱŗśŚȮŗśśǰȱŗŜŗȮŗŜřDzȱ ȱȱǰȱŘŗȮŘŘǰȱŗśŚǰȱŗśśDzȱ and the mortgaging of factory sites and equipment, 70; and yitian liangzhuȱǻȱ Ǽǰȱ ŗśŚȮŗśŝǰȱŗŜŗȮŗŜŘ £ȱǻ ǼDZȱĚȱǰȱŝŞǰȱ 89; rice trade, 77, 94n30
ŘŜŚ
The Treaty Port Economy in Modern China
“taipan oligarchy”: introduced, 44; and the treaty port system, 2. See also compradors Taiping Rebellion: and Chinese ȱȱȱĴǰȱ řŞǰȱśŗǰȱśřǰȱśŞDzȱȱȱ ȱȱ
ȱ ȱǰȱŗŝŜDzȱȱȱ ¡ǰȱŝŜ Taishan huiguan (Toishan Regional ǼǰȱȱǰȱŗŞř DZȱ¢ȱȱ ȱǰȱŗśŖDzȱ indigenous entrepreneurship in Shanghai compared with, 43; industrialization in the Lower Yangzi compare with, 38; and Shanghai capitalist professionals, ŚśDzȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱǰȱşśǰȱ 119 tax reform, Zhang Jian’s encouragement of, 198 taxation: and quanbingdan ȱǰȱśŞDzȱȱ Chinese entrepreneurs in the ȱĴǰȱŚŚDzȱ incentives to develop rice-surplus ǰȱŝŜȮŝŝDzȱȱȱ ǰȱ ŗśŘDzȱȱ¡ȱ¢ǰȱŗŝŖDzȱȱ ¡ǰȱśŚŜǰȱŗŗşǰȱŗśŘǰȱŗŜŖǰȱŗŜŘDzȱ ȱǻ Dzȱ Ǽȱ ǰȱŚśDzȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ ŗŗşǰȱŗśŘDzȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱřśǰȱŚŖȮŚŗǰȱŚŜDzȱȱ rising land values in Shanghai, ŚŘȮŚřǰȱśŚDzȱȱ¢ȱȱ standardizing of, 39–40; tax evasion and yitian liangzu, ŗśśDzȱ¡ȱ farming (baolanǼǰȱŚŖǰȱŗśśDzȱȱȱ tong system, 174 ȱDZȱȱĚȱ milling, 80, 83–84; and foreign community assets, 80, 83; handloom weaving innovations, 20, 97–99, 100–101; and rice ǰȱŞŖǰȱŞřȮŞŚǰȱŞŜǰȱŞŞDzȱȱ Shanghai-based industrialization, 37; spinning technology, 97–99;
£ȱȱĚȱǰȱşŚ technology transfer: and modern economic performance, 8; and sericulture, 21; and standardized output, 8. See also industrialization tenancy agreements: daoqi (land-lease ęǼȱ ȱȱ landowners and foreign tenants, ŗşǰȱśŝȮśŞDzȱȃȄȱ¢ȱ ǯȱȱǰȱŗśśȮŗśŜDzȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱǰȱŗŜřȮŗŜŚDzȱ and yezhuȱǻ Ǽȱȱ dianzhuȱǻǼȱǰȱŗśŘǰȱ ŗŜŘDzȱȱyitian liangzhu, ŗśŚȮŗśśǰȱ ŗśŜȮŗśŝ textile industry: competition among ȱǰȱşşȮŗŖŖDzȱĴȱ¡ȱ Ğȱȱ¢ȱȱ coexistence, 98–99; female labor in, 100, 102; and iron-gear looms (tiefangzhiǼǰȱşŝȮşşDzȱȱȱ wooden looms, 99; and merchant ǰȱŗŗŗȮŗŗśDzȱȱȱ spinning equipment, 97–99; and modern transport, 100; “narrow cloth” (zhaibuǼȱǰȱşşDzȱȱ ĴȬȱ¢ǰȱŘŖǰȱŗŖşȮŗŗŘǰȱ ŗŗśȮŗŗŜDzȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱśśDzȱȱ¢ȱ Weaving Zone, 99–104. See also DzȱĞȱ¢Dzȱȱ County Tianjin: land leasing to foreign ǰȱśŝǰȱŜŖşDzȱȱǰȱ ŚŝǰȱŚşǰȱśŖǰȱśŝŝDzȱȬȱ yarn factories in, 97, 100; strategic ȱǰȱřśǯȱSee also treaty port cities; Wei County Ȭȱ ¢ȱǻ ȬȱǼǰȱ 100 tianminȱǻǼȱȱtiangenȱǻǼǯȱ See surface-subsoil form of ownership tiefangzhi ǻȬȱǼDZȱȱ adoption of, 97–99; Wei County cloth industry transformed by, 100–101
Index title deeds. See land title deeds To Ka-yi tso, and Tsing Wan Kun ǻȱǼǰȱŗśŞȮŗŜŚǰȱŗŜŝǰȱŗŜŞ Toishan merchants: homeland ȱǰȱŗŝŜȮŗŝŞǰȱŗŞŗǰȱ 184; investment in steamship transportation and railways, 178; “Toishan Regional Association” ǻȱǼȱȱ¢ǰȱ 183; tong considered joint-stock corporations by, 183–184. See also entrepreneurs “Toishan Regional Association” ǻȱǼǰȱȱǰȱ 183 tong: as concurrently traditional and Western-style corporations, 183– ŗŞŚDzȱęȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱ government, 180; legal ambiguity, ŗŝŚȮŗŝśDzȱȱȱȱȱǰȱŗŝŚDzȱ property rights practices of, 174 Tongji Restoration, 33 tongju gongcaiȱǻȱǼǰȱ 148. See also households transaction costs: and economic ǰȱŗŖDzȱȱęȱ of, 10; and rule of law, 11; and the ¢ȱȱ¢ǰȱŗŜ transportation: access to foreign and domestic factory goods facilitated ¢ǰȱşŜȮşŝDzȱȬ ȱǰȱ ŗŖřDzȱěȱȱ¡ȱ¢ǰȱŗŖŖǰȱ 104 transportation centers, rise of Wei ¢ǰȱşŜȮşŝǰȱŗŖŚ ȱǻǼDZȱ extraterritoriality granted by, 2; and foreign trade, 2–3; Treaty ȱȱǻŗŞŚŘǼǰȱŘDzȱ¢ȱȱ ȱǻŗŞşśǼǰȱřřǰȱŞŗǰȱŗŖŘ ¢ȱȱȱǻŗŞŚŘǼǰȱŘ ¢ȱȱȱǻŗŞşśǼǰȱřřǰȱŞŗǰȱ 102 treaty port cities: foreign concessions in, 2; foreign garrisons associated with, 2; as industrial centers, 47; institutional features of, 2,
ŘŜś 4; and the intrusion of Western ǰȱřřǰȱŚŜDzȱȱȱ ǰȱŚşȮśŗDzȱȱȱ of legal practice in, 11, 13, 42; ǰȱşŜDzȱ£ȱǰȱ 3, 18, 43n13. See also concessions; £ȱǻǼDzȱ Dzȱ Shanghai; Tianjin; Wuhan; Xiamen treaty port economy: and the 1929 Company Law on Chinese ǰȱŘŗŖDzȱħȱǰȱ śȮŜDzȱȱȂȱ contribution to, 17, 22, 44; economic integration with ȱǰȱśǰȱŘŖDzȱȱǰȱ 4; and foreign privileges, 24; institutional framework of, 1, ŗŜȮŗŞDzȱȱȱȱ ĚǰȱŝǰȱŘŚDzȱǰȱ ŗDzȱȱ ȱęȱȱ ȱȱǰȱŚŞǰȱŜśȮŝŘDzȱȱ modern economic performance, 8–9, 12; and modernization in China and Japan compared, 27; and nonrational human factors, 27; and Northian framework introduced, 10–11; rise of, 1; ȱȱǰȱŚȮśǰȱŘŖDzȱȱ ȱ£ȱǻǼȱȱ ǰȱŘśȮŘŜDzȱȱěǰȱŝȮŞǰȱ ŘŗǰȱřśǰȱřŝȮřŞDzȱ¢ȱȱȱ factors, 10–11, 13; and transaction ǰȱŗŜDzȱȱȱȱ of businesses, 19–20; and village household economic rationality, 21; Western legal framework of, 11–13, 20, 23, 210. See also economic growth treaty port system: advent of, 2; and the most-favored-nation clause, 3. See also extraterritoriality treaty rights, and business established by foreigners without, 80 ȱȱ ȱǻȱǼǰȱȱ the To Ka-yi tso, ŗśŞȮŗŜŗǰȱŗŜřȮŗŜŚǰȱ ŗŜŝǰȱŗŜŞ
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The Treaty Port Economy in Modern China
tso (Mand. zu; Ǽǰȱ¢ȱ held by, 148 United States Exclusion Treaty, 178 urbanization: cities in the West and traditional China compared by Weber, 33; six largest cities ęǰȱŚŝŗDzȱȱȱ¢ȱ port system, 3. See also economic performance vertical integration: and capitalists ǰȱŘŜDzȱȱ ȱ institutional frameworks in treaty ǰȱŗşȮŘŖDzȱȱȱĚȱǰȱŗşȮ ŘŖǰȱŝŜǰȱŞşȮşŘǰȱşśDzȱȱȂȱȱ ȱǰȱŝŜǰȱŞśǰȱŞŞǰȱşŘǰȱşŚǰȱşśǯȱSee also Corporation Model ȱȱǻŗşŗŜȮŗşŘŞǼDZȱħȱ ǰȱśȮŜDzȱȱȱǻ ȱ
ǼǰȱŗŝşȮŗŞŖDzȱȱȱȃ ȱ Gang,” 44; industrialization of ȱǰȱŚŜDzȱ ȱ of, 34 ǰȱ¡ǰȱřřǰȱŚś Wei County: favorable location of, 100, 104; population, 102, 103, 104; transportation networks connecting, 99, 100; Wei County Weaving Zone expansion, 101. See also textile industry; Tianjin Wei Tingsheng, 204 Western imperialism: Qing response to, 33; and the spread of corporation and company enterprises, 173; and economic ǰȱřŚȮřśDzȱȱȱȬȱ of Western business communities, 13 ȱĚǯȱSeeȱĚȱDzȱĚȱ DzȱĚȱ Wing On Group of the Kuo Family, 202 DZȱȱȱǰȱŗśŗŚDzȱ and local wage employment, ŗřśDzȱȱȱȱ
ǰȱŗřśǰȱŗŚŖDzȱȱȱ ¢ǰȱŗřŚǰȱŗřśDzȱȱ ǰȱŗŗŞǰȱŗŘŖǰȱŗŘŞǰȱŗřŚǰȱŗřśǰȱ 140; social constraints on, in the formal labor market, 118 workers. See laborers Wu Tingfang: and commercial law ȱǰȱŗşŗȮŗşřǰȱŗşŜDzȱ legal background of, 192; and the corporation, 23, 188–189 Wu Zhi, 102 DZȱȬ ȱĚȬ milling workshops in, 83; strategic ȱǰȱřśǯȱSee alsoȱ Dzȱ treaty port cities Wuxi, industrialization of, 37, 130– 131 Xiamen: land leasing to foreign ǰȱŜŖşDzȱȱǰȱŚŝǰȱ śŖDzȱȱȱȱ within, 2. See also treaty port cities Xie Chunmin, 203, 204 xinshouzhibuȱǻ ȱȱǼǰȱ and the emergence of new Ğȱǰȱşŝ ȱ ǰȱřŜȮřŝǰȱŚř Yan Zhongping, 102 Yang Liansheng, 112 ȱǰȱŜŜ yangshang gua hao (foreign merchant Ǽǰȱśş Yeh, Wen-hsin, compradors and imperial entrepreneurs compared by, 43 yezhuȱǻ ǼDZȱȱhuomaiȱǻȱǼǰȱ ŗśŖȮŗśŗDzȱȱjuemai (absolute ǼǰȱŗśŖǰȱŗśŗ yitian liangzhuȱǻȱ ǼDZȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱŗśŚȮŗśŝDzȱȱȱ cultivation by surface holders, ŗśśȮŗśŜDzȱȱȱ¢ȱ ǰȱŗśŚȮŗśŝDzȱȱ ȱ ȱǰȱŗśŚDzȱ and surface rights granted to ȱĴǰȱŗśśǰȱŗśŜDzȱ
Index and surface-subsoil form of ǰȱŗśŚȮŗśŝǰȱŗŜŗȮŗŜŘǯȱSee also ancestral property holding; property rights Yuan Shikai, 34, 40, 191, 192, 197, 198, 201 ǰȱǰȱŘŜǰȱŗŜśȮŗŜŜ zhaibuȱǻ ȱǼǰȱşş Zhang Jian: and company law reform, 197–198, 201; and the corporation, 23; and Shanghai capital, 37 Zhang Zhongmin, 189, 202 Zhao Jin, Shanghai land values analyzed by, 42 zhaojiaȱǻ¢ȱ¢ǼDZȱ disallowing of, 170; introduced, ŗŚŝǰȱŗśř Zhejiang manufacturing sector growth, 37–38 zhunzheȱǻȱȱ¢Ǽȱ ǰȱŗśřǰȱŗŜŞȮŗŜşǯȱSee also juemaiȱǻȱǼ
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY INSTITUTE OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES The Institute of East Asian Studies was established at the University of California, Berkeley, in the fall of 1978 to promote research and teaching on the cultures and societies of China, Japan, and Korea. The institute unites several research centers and programs, including the Center for Buddhist Studies, the Center for Chinese Studies, the Center for Japanese Studies, the Center for Korean Studies, the Group in Asian Studies, the East Asia National Resource Center, and the InterUniversity Program for Chinese Language Studies. Director: Associate Director: Executive Committee:
Wen-hsin Yeh Martin Backstrom Martin Backstrom, Patricia Berger, John Efron, Thomas B. Gold, Jeffrey Hadler, Andrew Jones, John Lie, Kevin O’Brien, Kaiping Peng, Robert Sharf, Yuri Slezkine, Alan Tansman, Steven Vogel, Bonnie Wade, Wen-hsin Yeh
CENTER FOR BUDDHIST STUDIES Chair: Robert Sharf CENTER FOR CHINESE STUDIES Chair: Andrew Jones CENTER FOR JAPANESE STUDIES Chair: Steven Vogel CENTER FOR KOREAN STUDIES Chair: John Lie GROUP IN ASIAN STUDIES Chair: Bonnie Wade EAST ASIA NATIONAL RESOURCE CENTER Director: Wen-hsin Yeh INTER-UNIVERSITY PROGRAM FOR CHINESE LANGUAGE STUDIES Executive Director: Thomas B. Gold
KOREA RESEARCH MONOGRAPHS (KRM)
24. Lancaster, Lewis R., and Richard K. Payne, eds. Religion and Society in Contemporary Korea. 1997. 25. Shin, Jeong-Hyun. The Trap of History: Understanding Korean Short Stories. 1998. 26. Pai, Hyung Il, and Timothy R. Tangherlini, eds. Nationalism and the Construction of Korean Identity. 1998. 27. Hesselink, Nathan, ed. Contemporary Directions: Korean Folk Music Engaging the Twentieth Century and Beyond. 2001. 28. Choi, Byonghyon, trans. The Book of Corrections: Reections on the National Crisis during the Japanese Invasion of Korea, 1592–1598. 2002. 29. Dilling, Margaret Walker. Stories inside Stories: Music in the Making of Korean Olympic Ceremonies. 2007. 30. Kim, Hyuk-Rae, and Bok Song, eds. Modern Korean Society: Its Development and Prospect. 2007. 31. Park, Hun Joo. Diseased Dirigisme: The Political Sources of Financial Policy toward Small Business in Korea. 2007. 32. Finch, Michael, trans. Min Yŏnghwan: The Selected Writings of a Late Chosŏn Diplomat. 2008. 33. Pettid, Michael. Unyŏng-jŏn: A Love Affair at the Royal Palace of Chŏson Korea. 2009. 34. Park, Pori. Trial and Error in Modernist Reforms: Korean Buddhism under Colonial Rule. 2009. RESEARCH PAPERS AND POLICY STUDIES (RPPS)
40. Hao, Yufan. Dilemma and Decision: An Organizational Perspective on American China Policy Making. 1997. 41. Wakeman, Jr., Frederic, and Wang Xi, eds. China’s Quest for Modernization: A Historical Perspective. 1997. 42. West, Loraine A., and Yaohui Zhao, eds. Rural Labor Flows in China. 2000. 43. Sharma, Shalendra D., ed. The Asia-Pacic in the New Millennium: Geopolitics, Security, and Foreign Policy. 2000. 44. Arase, David, ed. The Challenge of Change: East Asia in the New Millennium. 2003. 45. Kang, Sungho, and Ramón Grosfoguel, eds. Geopolitics and Trajectories of Development: The Cases of Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Puerto Rico. 2010. SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS
Han, Theodore, and John Li. Tiananmen Square Spring 1989: A Chronology of the Chinese Democracy Movement. 1992. Scalapino, Robert. From Leavenworth to Lhasa: Living in a Revolutionary Era. 2008. Thompson, Phyllis L., ed. Dear Alice: Letters Home from American Teachers Learning to Live in China. 1998. Zhan, Kaidi. The Strategies of Politeness in the Chinese Language. 1992. PUBLICATIONS WITH THE SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF EARLY CHINA
Loewe, Michael, ed. Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographical Guide. 1993. Qiu, Xigui. Chinese Writing. Trans. Gilbert L. Mattos and Jerry Norman. 2000. von Falkenhausen, Lothar, ed. Japanese Scholarship on Early China, 1987–1991: Summaries from Shigaku zasshi. 2002. For a complete catalogue and current prices, see http://ieas.berkeley.edu/publications/catalogue.html
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“These studies of institutional changes in China’s treaty port economies introduce the challenges and potential payoffs of understanding how institutions affect economic performance. With rich and diverse empirical material, they provide perspective on more recent Chinese economic reforms and the ways in which economic growth need neither intend nor result in prosperity for all.” —R. Bin Wong, University of California, Los Angeles
The Treaty Port Economy in Modern China
“Where previous generations of researchers sought to account for China’s failures, we now face the novel problem of explaining massive success. This volume offers a timely reappraisal of circumstances in China’s treaty ports, one of many legacies underpinning today’s economic boom. The emphasis on institutions, a topic that recent studies tend to sidestep, adds to the value of the lively empirical studies in this new book.” —Thomas G. Rawski, University of Pittsburgh
The Treaty Port Economy in Modern China Empirical Studies of Institutional Change and Economic Performance
So and Myers
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CRM 65
CENTER FOR CHINESE STUDIES
INSTITUTE OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES
INSTITUTE OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA ● BERKELEY
Billy K. L. So Ramon H. Myers
CHINA RESEARCH MONOGRAPH 65
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