The Strategic Triangle and Regional Conflicts: Lessons from the Indochina Wars 9781685852337

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The Strategic Triangle and Regional Conflicts

The Strategic Triangle and Regional Conflicts Lessons from the Indochina Wars Min Chen

Lynne Rienner Publishers • Boulder & London

Published in the United States of America in 1992 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1992 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Chen, Min, 1957The strategic triangle and regional conflicts : lessons from the Indochina wars / Min Chen. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-287-5 1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975. 2. Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, 1979. 3. Great powers. 4. World politics—1945I. Title. DS557.7.C46 1991 959.704'3—dc20 91-20699 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United Slates of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

To a safer and kinder world

Contents

ix

Acknowledgments

1

1

Introduction Shape of the Strategic Triangle, 2 Restriction of the Strategic Triangle, 6 Compoundness of the Strategic Triangle, 8 Compound Triangular Model and Case Study, 11 Notes, 14

2

Historical Overview of Big-Power Involvement in Indochina

17

Notes, 23 3

25

T h e First Stage: 1 9 6 4 - 1 9 6 9 Basic Structure of the Strategic Triangle, 25 Escalation of the Vietnam War: Views from the Three Powers, 29 The Sino-Vietnamese-Soviet Triangle, 45 Emerging Factors Conducive to a Shift in the Triangular Pattern, 57 Analytical Summary, 62 Notes, 65

4

73

T h e Second Stage: 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 7 5 Basic Structure of the Strategic Triangle, 7 3 Building Up the Dream of a Triangular Solution, 77 US Withdrawal from Indochina: Illusion and Reality, 91 Strategie and Triangular Implications of the US Defeat in Indochina, 107 Analytical Summary, 112 Notes, 114

vii

viii

5

Contents

The Third Stage: 1 9 7 6 - 1 9 8 0

123

Basic Structure of the Strategic Triangle, 123 Sino-Soviet Rivalry and Triangular Tangos in Indochina, 128 The Sino-Vietnamese War: Triangulations of a Nonpivot Power, 140 Triangular Moves in the Wake of the Sino-Vietnamese War, 155 Analytical Summary, 161 Notes, 163 6

Conclusion

173

Contributions to Triangular Studies, 173 Contributions to the Study of Indochina Conflicts, 185 Strengths and Limitations of the Compound Triangular Model, 187 Notes, 189 Bibliography

191

For the Big-Power Triangle, 191 For the Indochina Conflicts, 204 Newspapers and Magazines, 221

Index About the Book and the Author

223 230

Acknowledgments

I am very grateful to Professor Peter Van Ness, Mr. G e o f f r e y Jukes, and Dr. John Girling, who advised and encouraged me during various stages of this book. I am also indebted to other members of the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University, but especially to Professor J a m e s Richardson, who not only found time to discuss my book with me, but also gave me timely administrative help. Thanks are also due to the Department of International Studies, American Graduate School of International Management. Among others who have made constructive comments on the book are Professors Donald Zagoria, Gerald S e g a l , L o w e l l Dittmer, and C a r l y l e Thayer. I would like to express my gratitude for their help. In addition, I would like to thank A N U ' s Research School of P a c i f i c Studies, which has offered me all the convenience necessary for this study, and to Barbara Jones-Owens and Lynne Payne for secretarial assistance. Special thanks should also be given to my parents for their constant encouragement and to my family for their understanding and support.

Min Chen

ix

Introduction

Empires wax and wane; states cleave asunder and coalesce. — L o Kuanchung in Romance of Three

Kingdoms1

The famous ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Zi made a well-known observation: "If you know both yourself and your enemy, you will never be defeated; if you know yourself and do not know your enemy, you will only win half of the battles; and if you know neither yourself nor your enemy, you will never win." 2 Here, he reveals the relationship between personal knowledge and the result of war. This is true not only with war but also with other human struggles. However, in studying the triangular relationship, we may find it necessary to elaborate on his commentary in the following way: You will never be defeated if in addition to knowing both yourself and your enemy, you also know the third party. Although running the risk of oversimplifying Sun Zi, this attempt at elaboration does in a way show the complexity of the triangular strategy. For a long time, the three m a j o r powers in our world—China, the United States, and the Soviet Union—have found themselves involved in such a relationship. Therefore, how to use the leverage of the strategic triangle has been a lively topic of research in the field of international relations. 3 Although rapid development in the international political arena may have rendered the Sino-Soviet-US triangular games much less important, triangular relationships among various countries will very likely continue to command attention in the study of international relations. Making the situation more complicated is the fact that the strategic triangle has its regional dimension: Rivalry of the great powers leads them to grab for regional spheres of influence, while the regional powers need the support of the great powers. This interdependent relationship is a mixed blessing for both sides. By involving themselves in regional conflicts that have little bearing on their own national security, the great powers may establish their own spheres of influence, thus improving their strategic positions. While b e n e f i t i n g from the support of the great powers to advance their regional interests, the regional powers may have to support global objectives of the great powers that arc not of

1

2

The Strategic

Triangle

and Regional

Conflicts

their immediate concern. This involves the concept of the great-power triangle and regional conflict. My own research is an effort to understand the dynamics of the great-power strategic triangle in the context of a regional conflict. T o do this, and in order to better understand the structural characteristics of the strategic triangle in a nonabstract context, I have built a compound triangular model.

Shape of the Strategic Triangle According to Martin Wight, the ideal characteristics of a triangle at the state level are three: (1) the existence of a state system; (2) three great powers of about equal strength within the system, each of which possesses enough power to dominate the rest of the world in the absence of the other two; and (3) a situation in which, because of mutual suspicion, tension, and hostility, no coalition, even a temporary one, can be formed between any two of the three great powers. 4

Figure 1.1

B=C, A