The state and rural class formation in Ghana: A comparative analysis 9780710301178, 9781315829050

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The state and rural class formation in Ghana

Monographs from the African Studies Centre, Leiden

The state and rural class formation in Ghana: A comparative analysis Piet Konings

First published in 1986 by K P I Lim ited

This edition published 2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park Abingdon, Oxon 0X14 4RN 711 Third Avenue New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint o f the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Set in 10 on 12 point Times by Fontwise

© African Studies Centre, Leiden 1986 No part o f this book may be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except for the quotation o f brief passages in criticism Library o f Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Konings, Piet. The state and rural class formation in Ghana. Bibliography: p. Includes index. I. Social classes-Ghana. 2. Ghana-Rural conditions. 3. Agriculture and state-Ghana. 4. Cocoa trade-Ghana. 5. Rice trade-Ghana. I. RavelI, James J. II. Title. HN832.Z9S65 1986 305S09667 85-28109 British Library CIP Data also available ISBN 13: 978-0-7103-0117-8 (hbk)

Contents

List of Abbreviations

ix

List of Tables and Maps

xi

Acknowledgments

xv

Introduction

1

Chapter 1 The Colonial and Post-Colonial State in Ghana

25

Chapter 2 The State and Cocoa Production in Ahafo 2.1. The development of cocoa production in Ahafo 2.1.1. The history of Ahafo 2.1.2. Ahafo’s economy prior to the introduction of cocoa cultivation 2.1.3. The introduction and expansion of cocoa production in Ahafo 2.2. Social stratification and class formation in cocoa production in Ahafo 2.2.1. Peasantry and capitalist farmers 2.2.2. Labour 2.2.2.1. Abusa labour 2.2.2.2. Annual labour 2.2.2.3. Casual labour 2.3. The post-colonial state and cocoa producers 2.3.1. The state and increasing surplus extraction from cocoa producers 2.3.2. Cocoa producers versus the state over low cocoa price 2.3.2.1. Cocoa producers’ declining production

43 52 52 56 61 75 75 83 86 96 101 104 105 109 114 v

Contents 2 3 .2 2 . 2.3.23. 2.3.3. 2.3.3.1. 2 3 3 .2 . 2 3 3 .2 .1 . 2 3 3 .2 .2 . 2.4

Cocoa producers’ switch to production of crops other than cocoa Smuggling of their produce by cocoa producers Increasing state intervention in cocoa production The Ashanti and the Eastern Region Cocoa Projects State cocoa plantations Kenyase no. 2 cocoa plantation The Mim cocoa plantation Conclusion

Chapter 3 The State and Capitalist Rice Farming in the Builsa District o f Northern Ghana 3.1. The domestic community and its function as supplier and reproducer of cheap labour for the export economy of Southern Ghana 3.1.1. The Builsa land tenure system 3.1.2. Builsa economic organization 3.1.3. Changes brought about in the Builsa land tenure system and socio-economic organization during the colonial period 3.1.3.1. Changes effected in the customary land tenure system 3.1.3.2. Superimposition of a ‘modern’ land law onto the ‘neo-traditional’ land tenure system 3.1.3.3. Builsa society as a labour reserve for the Southern export economy 3.2. The emergence of capitalist rice farming within the domestic community Capitalist rice farming and class formation in 3.3. the Fumbisi Valley 3.3.1. The class of capitalist rice farmers in the Fumbisi Valley 3.3.2. Labour in the Fumbisi Valley 3.3.2.1. Permanent workers 3.3.2.2. Casual workers 3.4. The domestic community’s conflict with the capitalist rice farmers: the Gbedembilisi Valley Dispute vi

117 122 123 124 128 130 133 137 140 144 144 148 153 153 154 158 163 177 178 201 202 211 221

Contents 3.5.

Conclusion

232

Chapter 4 The State and Irrigation Projects in the Upper Region o f Ghana 4.1. The domestic community’s colonial function: supplier of labour to the Southern capitalist sector 4.1.1. The system of land tenure among the Frafra and Kasena The economic organization of the Frafra and 4.1.2. the Kasena The domestic community’s function as labour 4.1.3. reserve for the Southern export economy The domestic community’s post-colonial 4.2. function: production of cash crops for the Southern economy The Vea and Tono Irrigation Projects 4.2.1. The domestic community’s forced entry into 4.2.2. cash-crop production: expropriation of its food farms (and houses) in the Vea and Tono Project areas The domestic community’s function as a source 4.3. of labour for cash-crop production in the Vea Irrigation Project: 1968-1978/79 Proletarians 4.3.1. 4.3.2. Outgrowers 4.4. The domestic community as a controlled and supervised producer of cash crops at the Vea and Tono Irrigation Projects since 1977/78 4.5. The domestic community: control or action? 4.6. Conclusion

237

General Conclusions

331

Notes

341

References

356

Index

379

240 241 245 249 254 256 270

282 283 293 299 314 326

List of Abbreviations

ADB AFRC BTC BYA £

CMB CPP FPC GAWU GGADP GIHOC GNFU GNRC GTUC IBRD IDA IMF NIB NLC NT’s OFI

Agricultural Development Bank Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (4 June-23 September 1979) Builsa Traditional Council Builsa Youth Association Cedi (used to be on a par with the American dollar; its - official - value between 1972 and 1978 was equal to about US $ 0.78. In 1978 the cedi was once again devalued by 58.2% in terms of the dollar) Cocoa Marketing Board Convention People’s Party (1949-1966) Food Production Corporation General Agricultural Workers Union Ghanaian-German Agricultural Development Project Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation Ghana National Farmers Union Ghana National Reconstruction Corps Ghana Trades Union Congress International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Irrigation Development Authority International Monetary Fund National Investment Bank National Liberation Council (1966-1969) Northern Territories (colonial name of Northern Ghana) Operation Feed Your Industries ix

Abbreviations OFY OGL PBA PBD PNDC PNP PP SMC UAC UGFC UGFCC UP URADEP URDECO

x

Operation Feed Yourself Open General Licence Produce Buying Agency Produce Buying Division Provisional National Defence Council People’s National Party (1979-1981) Progress Party (1969-1972) Supreme Military Council (1975-1979) United African Company United Ghana Farmers Council United Ghana Farmers Co-operative Council United Party Upper Regional Agricultural Development Project Upper Regional Development Corporation

Tables

1 The population of Ahafo 2 Down payments to be made for the acquisition of an acre of cocoa land in the Brong-Ahafo Region, 19001970 3 Distribution of output among cocoa farmers in Ghana, 1963/64 4 Cocoa farmers’ production in Hwidiem, 1954/55 5 Production of cocoa farmers interviewed in the MimKenyase area 6 Production and employment of annual labourers by cocoa farmers interviewed - during the 1979/80 cocoa season 7 Production and employment of sharecroppers (Abusa labourers) by cocoa farmers interviewed - during the 1979/80 cocoa season 8 Production and farms of cocoa farmers interviewed 9 Types of cocoa labour in Ghana in 1960 10 Assistance said to be received during the 1979/80 cocoa season from kinsmen by cocoa farmers interviewed 11 Production of cocoa farmers interviewed during the 1979/80 cocoa season - according to gender 12 Labour services said to have been received by Abusa labourers interviewed 13 Statement made by cocoa farmers interviewed concerning the production of their Abusa labourers 14 Demographic variables of Ahafo cocoa farmers and Abusa labourers in 1979/80 15 Abusa labourers and the number of employers they have had in their present place of residence

64 67 76 78 78 79 80 82 84 84 87 87 88

90 92

xi

Tables 16 Wages received by annual labourers in Ghana, 19141970 17 Wages received by annual labourers in Ahafo during the 1979/80 cocoa season 18 Number of annual labourers employed by cocoa farmers interviewed - past and present 19 Ethnic composition of annual labourers employed by Ahafo cocoa farmers in 1979/80 20 Types of labour employed by Ahafo cocoa farmers during the 1979/80 cocoa season 21 Wages paid to casual (cocoa) labour in Ahafo, 1956— 1975 22 Wages paid to casual (cocoa) labour in Ahafo during the 1979/80 cocoa season 23 Export and producer prices, 1950-1976 24 Cocoa producer price: Ghana, Ivory Coast and Nigeria, 1957-1976 25 Nominal and real producer prices of cocoa in Ghana, 1961/62-1976/77 26 Government and the agricultural sector: some indices 27 Input supplies: selected indices 28 Most beneficial government to the cocoa industry according to the Ahafo cocoa farmers interviewed 29 Number of Abusa labourers employed by cocoa farmers interviewed - past and present 30 Production of Ahafo cocoa farmers interviewed - past and present 31 Brong-Ahafo’s share in the Ghanaian cocoa output 32 Ghanaian cocoa production and world cocoa production 33 Forecast of production in the major cocoa-producing countries and in the world as a whole, 1978/79—1984/85 34 Trends in producer prices of cocoa and competitive crops 35 Cocoa farmers interviewed and their monthly income from food farming during the 1979/80 season 36 The Eastern Region Cocoa Project’s financial sources 37 The Ashanti Cocoa Project’s financial sources 38 The Kenyase no. 2 and Mim cocoa plantations in 1979/80 xii

97 97

100 100 102

103 104 106 107 108 109

110

114

116 117 118 119 120 120

121 125 125 132

Tables 39 Cultivation on Kenyase no. 2 cocoa plantation land prior to expropriation in 1977 40 Population density in some northeastern districts of the Upper Region in 1970 41 Occupations of Builsa males in 1960 - aged 15 and above 42 Estimated acreage of paddy in Ghana 43 Quantities of local and imported rice, 1957-75 44 Import of agricultural machinery into Ghana, 1961-74 45 Rice farmers’ acreage at Wiasi and Gbedembilisi in 1979 46 Number of tractors owned by rice farmers at Wiasi and Gbedembilisi in 1979 47 Tractor services supplied by rice farmers in 1979 48 Total quantities of paddy purchased by state marketing agencies in the Upper Region 49 Output of rice in the Fumbisi Valley 50 Number of rice farmers at Wiasi and Gbedembilisi, 1974-1979 51 Residence of Wiasi and Gbedembilisi rice farmers in 1977 52 Social composition of Wiasi and Gbedembilisi rice farmers in 1977 53 Cost of rice production per acre, 1978-79 54 Main types of seed used in the Fumbisi Valley and their planting and maturing periods 55 Socio-demographic characteristics of permanent workers 56 Income of two selected tractor operators in the Fumbisi Valley 57 Age composition of population of Wiasi and of Gbedembilisi, 1960-1970 58 Socio-demographic characteristics of casual workers 59 Casual workers’ wage rates in the Fumbisi Valley rice fields, 1975-80 60 A breakdown of occupations for migrants and nonmigrants (home area) in 1960: Frafra males aged 15 and above 61 Irrigation projects under the Five-Year Development Plan, 1975/76-1979/80

132 149 161 166 166 169 180 180 180 182 183 184 184 187 200 201

204 206 213 216 218 251 260 xiii

Tables 62 Land development under the irrigation projects identified during the Five-Year Development Plan, 1975/76— 1979/80 63 Summary of cost of irrigation projects identified under the Five-Year Development Plan, 1975/76-1979/80 64 Investment in the Tono Project 65 Yields of cash crops under rainfed and under irrigated conditions 66 Number of households affected by the Vea Irrigation Project and the compensation monies paid out 67 Compensation sums received by peasants affected by the Vea and Tono Irrigation Projects for the loss of their houses 68 Population of villages in the Vea Irrigation Project area, 1948-1970 69 A breakdown of land allocation at the Vea Irrigation Project during the 1978/79 irrigation season 70 Income from rice farming generated at the Vea Irrigation Project, 1973 71 Commercial farmers’ average gross revenue per acre 72 A commercial farmer’s net revenue per acre 73 The FPC’s net revenue per acre 74 GIHOC’s acreage at the Vea Irrigation Project, 1975/ 76-1979/80

261 262 263 269 272 275 279 284 286 287 288 288 295

MAPS 1 2 3 4

xiv

Cocoa-Producing Areas of Southern Ghana Ahafo Predominant Ethnic Groups in Northern Ghana Builsa Area

45 46 146 147

Acknowledgments

This book could not have been completed without the generous contribution of a number of persons who not only provided basic information but also assisted me in various ways in preparing and carrying out my research and in improving the text. It is not possible for me to mention by name all the people in Ghana who helped to make this study possible, but the evidence of the trust and co-operation of a substantial section of the rural population can be found throughout the book. I would, however, like to single out a few individuals to whom I owe an especial debt of gratitude: my research assistants, Alphonsus Abavari, Ninfaah Sapato, Martin Akannuemenema, and Thomas Owusuansah; Freek Schiphorst, at the time a post-graduate student at the University of Amsterdam, who made an in-depth study of Zaare, one of the villages affected by the Vea Irrigation Project, and who worked closely with me; and my friends and former colleagues at the University of Ghana, Legon: in particular Emmanuel Hansen, Eboe Hutchful, Andra Thakur, Hetty and Albert Smit, and Paul Benell, who were all a continuous source of inspiration to me and who made my stay on the university campus as pleasant as possible. In the course of my research I benefited from the hospitality, advice and assistance of various institutions in Ghana: the University of Ghana awarded me a research fellowship in the Department of Sociology and provided me with accommodation and research facilities; the Ghana National Archives readily gave me access to relevant archival sources in Accra, Sunyani, and Tamale; the Ghana Trades Union Congress, the Labour Department, the Irrigation Development Authority, the Cocoa Marketing Board, the Lands Department, the Regional Administration of the Upper Region and Brong-Ahafo Region, and the District and xv

Acknowledgments Traditional Councils in the areas of my fieldwork supplied vital information and rendered valuable assistance; and, lastly, the Catholic Mission, especially the Society of African Missions in South Ghana and the White Fathers in North Ghana, was unstinting in its support. I would like, further, to express my deep gratitude to the African Studies Centre at Leiden in the Netherlands not only for financing the entire project but also for providing the excellent conditions under which I was able to write up the fieldwork data. I am particularly indebted to Gerrit Grootenhuis, Managing Director, for his wise counsel and constant encouragement; to Joop Nijssen, Administrator, for his smooth handling of the financial and administrative aspects of my research; and to my colleagues in the Department of Political Science and History for a stimulating intellectual ambience - notably Wim van Binsbergen and Rob Buijtenhuijs who have always spurred me on with sound advice and challenging criticism both as regards the content and the organization of the manuscript. Over the past few years, I have also profited from valuable comments on parts, or the whole, of the manuscript made by friends and specialists in the field covered by my study. While exonerating them from sharing any responsibility for the undoubted shortcomings of this book, I would very much like to thank here in particular Henry Bernstein, Wim van Binsbergen, Rob Buijtenhuijs, John Griffiths, Gerrit Grootenhuis, Richard Jeffries, Paul Lumsden, Freek Schiphorst, Hans Schoenmakers, Rüdiger Schott, and Peter Skalmk. Finally, I am most grateful to James J. Ravell for his painstaking work of improving upon the original English text, editing the book as a whole, and of successfully resolving the problems of my overly convoluted style.

xvi

Introduction

Africanists are nowadays devoting increasing attention to the role of the state - both colonial and post-colonial - in the process of class formation in African societies. The present study of the role of the state in the process of rural class formation in Ghana can be viewed as both an expression of the current interest in, and an addition to the growing body of literature on, this subject. From about the beginning of the 1970s onwards, scholars of both the neo-classical and marxist schools of thought have published a number of studies which may serve as fruitful points of departure for an understanding of the role of the state in the process of rural class formation in Ghana. One of the most influential recent books - a fine example of the neo-classical approach to the role of the state in African agriculture - is undoubtedly Robert Bates’s Markets and States in Tropical Africa.1 In this monograph Bates offers a provocative perspective on the question of what is currently going wrong in African agriculture. He seems generally to be in agreement with the view of the neo-classical agricultural economists (cf. Schultz 1976; and 1978) that government intervention in agricultural markets has been detrimental to the interests of the majority of the producers and to overall agricultural output. The originality of his contribution lies, however, in his attempt to show that this ostensibly harmful government intervention is entirely logical when viewed in terms of political pay-offs. According to the author, agricultural policies are designed ‘to secure advantages for particular interests, to appease powerful political forces, and to enhance the capacity of political regimes to remain in power’.2 To substantiate his thesis, Bates deals in the first part of his book with government intervention in three markets. First, government intervention in the market for agricultural commodi1

Introduction ties has the effect of depressing producer prices. The ‘logic’ behind the drain of resources from the producers is that ‘governing elites’ seek to increase public revenues, to industrialize, to finance the large bureaucracy, and to supply cheap food to urban workers and inexpensive inputs to local industries. Through this policy various urban ‘alliances’ are created. Second, government intervention in the market for factors o f production has the effect of depressing the prices of inputs. While keeping the prices of agricultural commodities low, governments subsidize the costs of farm inputs so as to increase the profitability of farming and to stimulate production. In almost the whole of Africa, according to Bates, these benefits by-pass the overwhelming majority of the small producers and are primarily conferred on a small number of ‘elite-level farmers’. Such a policy ‘leads to the entrance into the countryside of politically influential elites elites who seek to augment their fortunes by engaging in food production, and who adopt farming technologies that fundamentally alter the social and economic patterns of the African countryside’.3 Politically, this policy is highly advantageous: it has created ‘followers’ and ‘alliances’ among the rural population. Third, government intervention in the market for consumer goods has the effect of inflating prices paid by consumers - including farmers - for consumer goods. A major strategy adopted for the promotion of industrial development has been the sheltering of new - and often inefficient - firms from any meaningful competition, whether domestic or foreign. Inevitably, therefore, consumers pay part of the cost of industrialization in the form of higher prices. This pattern of government intervention has been characterized as a suicidal policy that inhibits rural development and jeopardizes the long-term political and economic future of those African countries lacking any substantial non-agricultural resources. In the second part of his book Bates offers an explanation as to why African governments are able to pursue policies that are detrimental to the interests of the vast majority of their ‘constituents’, without however encountering any kind of organized opposition. He advances three main reasons for this anomalous situation. In the first place, rural producers are generally not interested in taking collective action against the state. Bates argues, following 2

Introduction Olson (1968) and Popkin (1979), that most rural dwellers consider the individual costs involved in collective action too high and the immediate, personal benefits too remote to wish to participate in such joint action. Consequently, they are more inclined to favour less costly, more individualistic ‘solutions’ to their collective problems: as a rule they ‘use the market’ against the state through a calculated withdrawal from government-controlled markets - and are thus able to compensate themselves for the low producer prices offered by the state. Bates employs the same logic of collective action, on the other hand, to show how smaller groups of elite farmers will organize themselves in defence of their own interests against the state. Such elite farmers incur relatively low organizational costs because they are a small group that is often geographically concentrated. Marketing a large volume of output, they are moreover able to reap substantial personal benefits from (collective) action in support of higher prices. Secondly, Bates stresses that the ‘entrenchment of enormously powerful private interests’4 has become a major cause of the durability of agricultural policies. These policies create opportunities for private gain and for securing a political following. In this respect, Bates often refers to a ‘development coalition’: owners and workers in industrial firms, economic and political elites, privileged farmers, and the managers of public bureaucracies - these constitute the development coalition in contemporary Africa. It is they who reap the benefits of the policy choices made in formulating development programs.5 And, finally, Bates notes that a wide variety of tactics is employed by African governments to demobilize rural dwellers: repression, co-optation, organization, and the fuelling of factional conflicts. Moreover, through the conferment of ‘divisible benefits’, these governments are able to satisfy private rural interests and to forestall any challenges to the existing order. For example, rural development projects (rather than changes in agricultural policies) are instrumental in creating a system of spoils, thereby maintaining a measure of rural political support. In the countryside, Bates suggests, ‘the politics of the pork barrel supplants the politics of class action’.6 Bates’s analysis of the role of African states in agricultural markets is supported by evidence from six English-speaking 3

Introduction African countries in particular, including Ghana. The period covered is largely restricted to the post-colonial era. The present case study of Ghana will enable me to provide a more detailed, historical, analysis of the Ghanaian government intervention in the agricultural markets and its impact on the process of rural class formation. It will show that - for historical reasons - the impact of government intervention has been much greater on the producers of agricultural commodities for the export market (cocoa) than on producers of food crops (the exchange of which largely falls outside government control). The real incomes of the Ghanaian cocoa producers have indeed been seriously affected - as Bates rightly argues - by the low producer price offered by the state, the inequitable distribution of the necessary inputs, and the maintenance of over-valued exchange rates. However, in contrast to Bates’s view, the largest proportion of the cocoa surplus has not been used by the Ghanaian state to industrialize the country but rather to finance a parasitic and generally corrupt bureaucracy. In this connection, Jeffries (1982:308-9) notes as follows: The structure of relations by which Ghana’s productive population, in large part her peasantry, is heavily taxed - directly, if surreptitiously, through the operations of monopolistic state marketing boards and indirectly through import-export duties and a grossly over-valued currency - in order to finance the wage bill for large numbers of highly-paid but essentially parasitic bureaucratic and party or military personnel, is more appropriately termed a ‘kleptocracy’.7 This term is more appropriate, of course, to the extent that such functionaries derive additional revenue, in many cases probably the bulk of it, from various forms of corruption and embezzlement. The fact that Bates’s study lacks any historical dimension makes his analysis prone to partial explanation or even misinterpretation. An historical approach would for instance have revealed a wide variety of reasons for government intervention in the cocoa market in Ghana during the colonial period and for the changes in the action taken in the course of time by the cocoa producers in defence of their interests. This study will demonstrate that one of the main reasons for government intervention in the cocoa market was the challenge of a class of big cocoa producer-traders to the 4

Introduction colonial pattern of surplus accumulation and ultimately to the colonial state itself. At times, this same class proved to be capable of organizing actions of all producers against the low producer price. It is only now in the post-colonial era - as Bates correctly observes - that we witness a remarkable absence of collective action on the part of the cocoa producers and the widespread emergence of individualistic accommodations to the low producer price offered by the state: withdrawal from cocoa production and evasion from the government-controlled market (smuggling). Bates mentions a number of reasons for this change in forms of producer protest: growing repression, co-optation of peasant leaders, political organization, and the fomenting of factional conflicts by the post-colonial state. While Bates lays great emphasis on the individualistic economic responses of peasants to the harmful government intervention in the agricultural markets - a fall in the producer price of specific agricultural commodities is usually followed by a switch in production to other, more highly priced, commodities or a reversal to food production - , he never informs us just why peasants are able to make these shifts in production. Bates’s lack of interest in the process of production and his almost exclusive focus on the process of exchange do not come as a surprise, however; for this predilection for the latter process to the virtual exclusion of the former is a distinct feature of the neo-classical tradition in the social sciences from which Bates draws his inspiration (cf. Dupré and Rey 1973). It will be shown in this study that the introduction of the capitalist system during the colonial period has - for various reasons - not led to the complete destruction of the pre-capitalist mode of production. That is why most Ghanaian peasants continue to exercise a large measure of control over the means of production, the process of production, and hence - as Bates himself has so convincingly shown - the process of exchange. Their ‘relative autonomy’ enables them to make shifts in the production of agricultural commodities or even to withdraw from the market altogether, albeit often at considerable cost. It was not only for ‘political reasons’ - e.g. to build up a rural ‘following’ that the post-colonial state has established large-scale state and private farms but also because it lacks control over peasant production (and exchange). The refusal by the peasants to produce low-priced agricultural commodities has become a cause 5

Introduction for concern to the post-colonial state, resulting in official efforts to gain greater control over the process of production. This study will demonstrate how such attempts at integrating the peasantry more fully into the capitalist system often require ‘alliances’ not only with elite farmers but also with those who control the pre-capitalist organization of production. The contributory role international capital has played in these agricultural policies is completely absent in Bates’s monograph. And, finally, Bates’s ‘market’ approach and lack of interest in the process of production preclude him from offering us a more detailed and refined analysis of the class and power structures in African states. In general, Bates treats ‘farmers’ as a homogeneous class, though he sometimes describes elite farmers as being ‘captured’ and ‘bought off’ by the government. At times he argues that government intervention in agricultural markets serves private interests (creating opportunities for maximizing their incomes), and then again certain group interests (creating particular rural-urban ‘development coalitions’). Neither is it at all clear how individual interests are turned into group interests nor how the various components of these ‘development coalitions’ are linked to each other and to the structures of state power. The state is presented as seemingly satisfying particular class interests but very little is said explicitly about the ‘class composition’ of those who man the post-colonial state apparatus. The absence of any theoretical discussion of the class and power structures in the African states is particularly evident in Bates’s vision of the political future of agricultural producers in Africa. Bates assumes that, as the number of big farmers increases in Africa, the farming community will tend to grow more assertive politically.8 However, this vision may turn out to be far too optimistic so long as African governments - as Bates himself asserts - deny small-holders the opportunity of joining the ranks of big farmers and so long as the group of big farmers is mostly composed of class forces with close ties with the state apparatus. Considering the stake these class forces have in the ‘harmful’ government agricultural policies and their alliance with the state bureaucracy (with its own vested interests in such policies), Bates’s conclusion that a mere raising of the awareness of the disincentives of the policies concerned may be sufficient ‘to provide a foundation for attempts to reform the agricultural policies of the nations of Africa’,9 appears to be rather naive. 6

Introduction The various shortcomings of a market approach (as employed by Bates for example) for an analysis of the role of the state in the process of rural class formation in Ghana - particularly the lack of historical depth and of any theoretical analysis of the organization of production and the class and power structures in African states - , have received greater attention in recent studies by neomarxist scholars. Two such neo-marxist theories, namely, the ‘theory of the articulation of modes of production’ and the ‘theory of the post-colonial state’, seem to be of particular relevance to my study. The ‘theory of the articulation of modes of production’ arose as a reaction to the view propounded by Frank (1969) and others that capitalism destroyed or totally transformed all pre-capitalist societies upon contact.10 Laclau’s well-known critique of Frank (1971), namely, that there was no immediate dissolution of precapitalist modes of production upon initial contact between the capitalist mode of production and pre-capitalist modes of production in Latin America but rather a period of linkage, of combination or ‘articulation’ (though Laclau himself never used this concept), has been largely backed up by scholars working within the African context. These Africanists include Amin (1973) Wolpe (1972, 1980) and French marxist anthropologists like Rey (1971, 1973, 1976, 1979) Meillassoux (1972, 1975) and Terray (1969, 1974, 1975). According to these scholars, presentday African societies can be characterized as social formations in which the capitalist mode of production has become dominant since colonial rule but with the (at least partial) preservation of the pre-capitalist mode(s) of production - albeit in subordination to the capitalist mode of production. Particularly Meillassoux (1975) has stressed that the (partial) preservation of the pre-capitalist mode of production may be functional to the capitalist mode of production: it guarantees a cheap production of commodities and supply of labour by the pre-capitalist mode of production to the capitalist mode of production. Both Rey and Meillassoux argue, however, that the establishment of capitalist domination and the subordination of precapitalist modes of production are by no means an easy and automatic process in the African social formations. Rey, in particular, maintains that the ‘lineage mode of production’ (or what Meillassoux prefers to call the ‘domestic community’) may 7

Introduction offer (initial) resistance to capitalist domination in defence of its own autonomy. Indeed, as long as the domestic community controls the means of production and the process of production (and exchange) and produces primarily for its own subsistence, it will be difficult to integrate such communities into the capitalist system. The problem that now arises is: how can capitalism ‘take root’ in the pre-capitalist mode(s) of production? Various authors (Bradby 1975; Foster-Carter 1978) criticize Rey for over-emphasizing the necessity of violence and extra-economic means in the process of subordinating the pre-capitalist mode(s) of production to the capitalist mode of production. Geschiere (1978, 1981, 1982a), however, correctly notes that a closer reading of Rey’s publications reveals ample reference to a greater variety of mechanisms for integrating the domestic community into the capitalist system, mechanisms which may occur in different forms and combinations and which are of great importance to processes of rural class formation. The following are some of these mechanisms: - Rey continuously stresses the importance of class contradictions within the pre-capitalist mode of production and the role of ‘class alliances’ between the dominant classes in the pre-capitalist mode of production, on the one hand, and in the capitalist mode of production, on the other - as stepping-stones to the implantation of capitalism in the pre-capitalist mode of production. - However, when opportunities for ‘class alliance’ are absent, recourse to violence often becomes necessary (initially). Rey assigns to the colonial state the significant function of forcing reluctant domestic communities on to the labour and commodity market when economic forces - the market mechanism - cannot achieve the same end. Rey’s scheme seems to serve as a powerful conceptual tool with which to explain the different ways in which capitalism ‘has taken root’ in the various African pre-capitalist social formations. It provides us with a clear insight into the varied role played by the colonial state in the process of the ‘articulation’ of the capitalist mode of production with the various pre-capitalist modes of production in Ghana, described in this study. Already from the sixteenth century onwards, the domestic communities of Southern Ghana - transformed into cocoa producers by the colonial ad8

Introduction ministration - had known a linkage, in the domain of exchange, with capitalism. And, in the course of time, an alliance came to be formed between the dominant classes within the pre-capitalist mode of production - the ruling aristocracy and a new class of African middlemen, traders and merchants - and European commercial interests. Following the abolition of the slave trade in 1807, the dominant classes in the pre-capitalist mode of production switched to the production of, and trade in, cash crops like palmoil and rubber for the world market. This development in turn led, from the very beginning, to important changes within the precapitalist mode of production (e.g. land sales). No coercion was required to make these dominant classes accept cocoa production after the establishment of colonial rule in 1874. On the contrary, they were quick to recognize this new potential source of capital accumulation and as a matter of fact the rapid expansion of cocoa production can largely be attributed to their entrepreneurial zeal (Hill 1963). The North Ghanaian domestic communities described in this study, transformed into suppliers of labour by the colonial administration, corresponded more closely with the ‘lineage mode of production’, so well documented by Rey. These domestic communities lacked both a class of political rulers and a class of merchants and traders. However, a marked characteristic of such societies was the dominant position held by the elders over the young men. (In contrast to Meillassoux, Rey is inclined to characterize the domestic contradiction between the young and the old as a class contradiction.) Initially, the colonial state was compelled to use force in order to integrate the Northern Ghanaian autonomous communities largely producing subsistence crops - into the capitalist system and to obtain the necessary labour for the capitalist mode of production in Southern Ghana. It was only later that the domestic contradiction between the young and the old became one of the factors making for a more ‘automatic’ process of labour supply to the capitalist mode of production in the South: the control of elders over women, and the conversion of the bride-price into money, forced the young men on to the labour market. Both Rey and Meillassoux seem to assume that, once the domestic communities have become integrated into the capitalist system, capitalism will ultimately transform all pre-capitalist modes of production completely. Rey views the direct intervention 9

Introduction by the colonial state as a transitional phase to destroy the autonomy of the domestic community: as soon as capitalism has taken root and the circulation of money has become dominant, state intervention will no longer be necessary. On the other hand, Meillassoux allows for further state intervention before the process of radical transformation will have come to an end. He argues that the domestic community’s function as a source of labour will inevitably lead to its disintegration and to the stagnation, or even deterioration, of its food production - thus threatening the domestic community’s reproductive function. For that reason the colonial state had to intervene and try to consolidate the domestic community by curbing the development of capitalist relations such as the growth of a land market, and stimulating the cultivation of cash crops within the domestic community. The growing dependence on the market will in the long run, however, culminate in the dominance of capitalism, the corrosion and eventual collapse of the domestic community, and in a radical transformation of the old patterns of organization. Meillassoux’s and, more especially, Rey’s bold argument that, once the domestic communities have become integrated into the capitalist system, capitalism will eventually transform all precapitalist modes of production, seems to me to come dangerously close to the central thesis of the modernization theories current in the fifties and sixties, theories subscribed to tenaciously at the time by late colonial and post-colonial administrators: the cause of the failure of transition lies within the pre-capitalist (or, alternately, the backward and traditional non-western) society itself. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this is that only greater exposure to capitalism (or, alternately, to western ideas, values, techniques, and so on) will bring about a transformation. This thesis rules out the possibility recognized by various authors - e.g. Wolpe (1972), Amin (1974a), Wallerstein (1974), Bradby (1975) as well as Meillassoux himself (1975) - that it may precisely be capitalism rather than the pre-capitalist mode of production that is obstructing a radical transformation of the pre-capitalist mode of production. The argument of the above authors to the effect that, under certain circumstances and/or during a specific period, it may very well be in the interest of capitalism to preserve rather than destroy the pre-capitalist mode of production, is in any event substantiated by the Ghanaian experience. In order to guarantee 10

Introduction the metropolitan bourgeoisie a cheap supply of commodities (cocoa) and labour, the colonial state regularly intervened in, and attempted to preserve, the pre-capitalist mode of production. The specific form of the colonial state’s intervention was closely connected with the role various geographical areas were destined to play in the colonial economy, and with the presence, or emergence, within the pre-capitalist mode(s) of class forces that could threaten the colonial pattern of surplus extraction, as Cliffe (1977) has shown for East Africa. Lacking any natural resources of immediate importance to the metropolitan economy, Northern Ghana was assigned the role of labour reserve for the capitalist mode of production in Southern Ghana by the colonial administration. After an initial policy of coercion, carried out in co-operation with the chiefs, mostly appointed by the colonial government, various administrative measures were taken. Their aim was twofold: first, to secure the ‘freeing of labour’, a process considered by Rey as the essential condition for every form of capitalist expansion; second, to prevent the emergence of social forces that could challenge Northern Ghana’s ‘peripheral’ function as supplier of labour to the export economy in the South. These measures included the following: a) depriving the North of development funds which could have improved or transformed peasant agriculture, b) vesting Northern lands in the state in order to curb the growth of a land market and the establishment of capitalist relations of production in the North, and c) obstructing missionary efforts in the field of education so as to forestall the emergence in the North of an educational elite capable of mobilizing the chiefs and the people and thus threatening colonial interests, as was the case with the ‘intelligentsia’ in Southern Ghana. Even when it became increasingly clear after the Second World War that food production within the domestic community was deteriorating as a direct result of its labour supply function, the colonial state did not promote - contrary to Meillassoux’s assumption - cash-crop production within the domestic community. Instead, it allocated more and more development funds to large-scale, mechanized farming schemes. The result was that changes within the domestic communities were very limited. For example, the domestic community’s labour supply function seemed to have weakened the elders’ authority over the young men considerably, mainly because 11

Introduction these youths were able to earn their own living and hence pay for the bride-wealth themselves. Furthermore, the absence of the young men for long periods has increased the work load of the elders and women. In many instances chiefs have been appointed to control the domestic community and to guarantee its regular supply of labour. For the rest, the domestic community has remained in control of the means of production, the processes of production and exchange, and largely continues to produce for its own subsistence. Contrary to Rey’s view, state intervention and/or ‘class’ alliances (with chiefs and elders) still appear to be necessary to force the domestic community into commodity production. Southern Ghana, rich in minerals and suitable for cocoa production - natural resources of immediate importance to the metropolitan economy - was provided by the state with the necessary infra-structural facilities such as a network of communications for the expansion and smooth running of the market economy. Moreover, cocoa production was encouraged by the availability of a ready and guaranteed market (the colonial trading firms). It appears that the colonial state initially considered the possible introduction of plantation agriculture, a possibility which, if it had been realized, would certainly have resulted in the creation of a rural proletariat and a concomitant corrosion of the domestic community. However, the colonial state soon began to promote cash-crop production within the domestic community for a variety of reasons (Howard 1978, 1981): a) the resistance of local chiefs, intelligentsia and farmer-traders to the colonial government’s attempts at vesting Southern lands in the state; b) failure of the few existing foreign-owned plantations; c) the enthusiastic response of local peasants to the introduction of the new crop (cocoa) (these peasants had already experienced cashcrop production for the world market in pre-colonial times); and d) the early recognition by the authorities that cash-crop production within the domestic community was cheaper and also politically less dangerous than the promotion of plantation agriculture and the ‘freeing of labour’ (viz. the emergence of a landless rural proletariat). There were various features of the pre-capitalist socio-economic organization that subsidized production costs and provided the colonial trading firms with a cheaper supply of commodities than the more highly capitalized plantation systems in Latin America 12

Introduction (Tudhope 1918, 1919). These special features have been summarized by Grier (1981:33) as follows: The low costs of production in Ghana were due to the cultivation of most of the crops on family or stool land for which there was no original capital outlay; to the use of family labour, to the simultaneous cultivation of the bulk of the family’s subsistence food crops; and, to the practice of allocating a plot of land to laborers and sharecroppers for the cultivation of subsistence food crops. These pre-capitalist features came increasingly under threat of erosion: Southern Ghana witnessed a progressive neglect of food production in favour of cocoa production (in part due to the colonial state’s initial promotion of the new crop); further commercialization and alienation (sale) of communal lands; growing individualization of land holdings; and increasing social differentiation and concentration of lands into the hands of a few individuals. These factors in turn resulted in land and labour shortages, higher production costs and constant pressure to raise the producer price. Principally responsible for these developments were chiefs selling communal lands to strangers and a new class of capitalist cocoa farmer-traders serving as ‘middlemen’ between producers and colonial trading firms (controlling both the internal and external cocoa trade). Time and again this new class (including a number of chiefs) invested capital accumulated in the cocoa trade in expanded production and vice versa. The new class soon came to be considered a threat to the continuation of cheap peasant production, to the pattern of surplus extraction and capital accumulation by the colonial trading concerns as well as to the hegemony of the colonial state safeguarding metropolitan interests. The special position of this particular class - as ‘middlemen’ - in the internal cocoa trade provided it with ample opportunities for capital accumulation, both at the expense of the foreign trading companies and the producers (resulting, for example, in widespread peasant indebtedness and mortgage of land) (Southall 1978). As (big) producers interested in a rising producer price and capable of leadership, the class concerned organized various actions of cocoa producers in favour of an increase in the producer price. And, finally, it tried again and 13

Introduction again to circumvent the monopoly held by foreign trading companies in the external cocoa trade and even to oust such firms from the cocoa trade altogether. In its efforts to preserve cheap peasant production, the colonial state employed several mechanisms to halt the corrosion of the domestic community and to block the growth and consolidation of the new class of capitalist farmertraders (Grier 1979, 1981). Various attempts were made to stop the outright sale of land by chiefs to capitalist stranger farmer-traders. The colonial state prohibited Ashanti chiefs from selling Ashanti land to nonAshantis (instead chiefs were encouraged to lease land for a share of the crop or for an annual fee or rent). A state-controlled cocoa marketing co-operative system was introduced to undermine the capitalist farmer-traders’ intermediary position in the internal cocoa trade and to protect the interests of the small producers. And, lastly, the state intervened directly in the external cocoa trade in 1947/48 through the establishment of the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB), thereby creating a state monopoly over the external cocoa trade. In time, the CMB was to become an instrument of state appropriation of the cocoa surplus rather than of price stabilization. It denied the class of capitalist farmertraders the opportunity for (rapid) capital accumulation and barred all private access to the world cocoa market. In these various ways it slowed down considerably the process of class formation in the cocoa-producing areas of Southern Ghana, and ensured the domestic community’s continuing subsidization of production costs (the state’s increasing surplus extraction forcing the domestic community to go on relying partially on food production for its reproduction). After the achievement of independence we witness an intensification rather than a slackening of the post-colonial state’s intervention in the domestic communities in the cocoa-producing areas of Southern Ghana and the labour-supplying areas of Northern Ghana. The ‘theory of the articulation of modes of production’ does not account for this increasing intervention by the post-colonial state in the domestic community. Rather, it is the ‘theory of the post-colonial state’ that provides us with some useful insights on this score (Alavi 1972; Saul 1974a, 1976, 1980; Leys 1976, 1982; Mamdani 1975, 1976; von Freyhold 1977, 1979; Shivji 1976; Ziemann and Lanzendörfer 1977; Goulbourne 1979, 1981). 14

Introduction The latter theory rejects the modernization theory (cf. Apter 1965) - according to which the growing intervention by the postcolonial state must be seen as an expression of the ‘selfless’ involvement of the ‘political elite’ in the modernization of the ‘traditional’ society - and focusses attention on the ‘class character’ of those who man the state apparatus in ‘dependent’, ‘neocolonial’, or ‘peripheral-capitalist’ societies. The ‘theory of the post-colonial state’ holds that, in the absence of a strong indigenous bourgeoisie - a direct result of colonial intervention - , the post-colonial state has been taken over by a class with no economic power base in society. This group has variously been designated as a ‘political class’ (Murray 1967), a ‘petty bourgeoisie’ or, more specifically, the dominant fractions within the petty bourgeoisie (Saul 1974a; Mamdani 1976; Hutchful 1979), and a ‘bureaucratic class’ or ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’ (Meillassoux 1970; Shivji 1976; Ziemann and Lanzendörfer 1977). On the basis of their direct control over the state machinery, the dominant fractions within the petty bourgeoisie, the leading political cadres, the senior military officers and upper strata of the bureaucracy have been able to distance themselves more and more from other fractions of the petty bourgeoisie (including businessmen, petty traders, small manufacturers and entrepreneurs, and intellectuals and professionals). At the same time, these dominant fractions have acquired a large measure of ‘relative autonomy’ from (Alavi 1972; Saul 1974a), or ‘freedom of action’ (Ziemann and Lanzendörfer 1977) vis-à-vis these other groups - not least through their ‘privileged access to surplus’ (Saul 1974a). It is not only its ‘development’ or ‘modernization’ efforts that account for the postcolonial state’s ‘central’ role in the economy but also its ‘class character’. Lacking an economic base in society, the ruling class reproduces itself and seeks to accumulate capital in the following two ways: 1) Through the promotion of state or private property (depending on the fraction of the petty bourgeoisie in power) or, at times, through a combination of these two forms as in Zambia (Baylies 1980), Kenya (Leys 1975, 1982; Swainson 1977, 1980) and Ghana (Kennedy 1977; Hutchful 1979), and in various alliances with international capital. One is reminded here of Mamdani’s argument (1975) that, in its attempts to accumulate property, the African petty bourgeoisie has two options open to it: it can use the 15

Introduction state either a) to create public property which the petty bourgeoisie is then able to control indirectly through its hold over the state - the so-called progressive option, or b) to expand private property which the petty bourgeoisie is able to control directly through ownership. In practice, of course, the distinction is by no means always so clear-cut. For, the ruling fractions of the petty bourgeoisie may utilize state property to generate property controlled directly by them, thereby increasingly diversifying from their immediate base in the state, and, in addition, assuming the role of ‘businessmen’, ‘entrepreneurs’ and ‘farmers’ (Hutchful 1979). 2) Through the exploitation of labour and the extraction of surplus from the pre-capitalist mode of production. This is one of the main reasons why the post-colonial state has generally not been interested in the (total) transformation of the pre-capitalist mode of production but is, on the contrary, profiting from its continuing existence. Up to now, the ‘theory of the post-colonial state’ has chiefly concentrated on the former source of accumulation. In particular, it has stressed the ruling petty bourgeoisie’s continued dependence on - rather than ‘relative autonomy’ from - international capital (Leys 1975, 1976; von Freyhold 1977, 1979; Shivji 1976; Hutchful 1979). It has furthermore emphasized the petty bourgeoisie’s ‘mediating’ role in ‘balancing’ the competing interests between domestic private capital and state capital, on the one hand, and foreign capital, on the other. Various authors (Swainson 1977, 1980; Kennedy 1977; Leys 1982) have recently criticized the dependency theory which denies the possibility of an ‘autonomous’ capitalist development in the ‘periphery’ (Frank 1969; Amin 1974a; Langdon 1980; Kaplinski 1980) and have tried to prove the active involvement of the post-colonial state in the process of ‘emancipating’ a ‘national bourgeoisie’ in commerce and industry, a bourgeoisie which is not merely an ‘auxiliary’ of foreign capital but which can compete with it and even seeks to replace it.11 In the past, very little attention has been devoted to the post-colonial state’s efforts in promoting a class of rural capitalist farmers in various African countries (Amin 1975; Shepherd 1979, 1981a and b; Baylies 1979; and Sender 1975). The ‘theory of the post-colonial state’ has so far largely neglected the second source of accumulation mentioned above, 16

Introduction namely, the petty bourgeoisie’s dependence on - rather than ‘relative autonomy’ from - the domestic community for the supply of cheap labour and commodities (Hyden 1980). This is all the more surprising in view of the fact that, for the expansion and reproduction of the ‘bureaucratic class’, the second source of accumulation has - for historical reasons - been of much greater importance than the first. Beckman (1976) has convincingly shown that the ‘overdeveloped’ character of the post-colonial state in Ghana is less a colonial legacy {pace Alavi (1972) and Saul (1974a)) than a consequence of the post-colonial state’s massive surplus extraction from the domestic community. While the ‘theory of the articulation of modes of production’ does not account for the post-colonial state’s continuing intervention in the domestic community, the ‘theory of the post-colonial state’ is potentially able to offer precisely such an explanation: the ruling petty bourgeoisie, lacking any power base in society, is largely dependent upon an increased supply of cheap labour and commodities from the pre-capitalist mode of production. That is why the post-colonial state continues to be interested in the domestic community’s (further) subordination to, and integration into, the capitalist mode of production. Up to now, however, the ‘theory of the post-colonial state’ has never taken into account the following factors: the continuance of the articulation of modes of production within African social formations; the regional variations in rural class formation resulting from the historical process of the articulation of modes of production; the post-colonial state’s interest in the further subordination of the pre-capitalist mode of production to the capitalist mode of production, without destroying it fully; and, lastly, the relationship between the ruling petty bourgeoisie and the various classes emerging out of the process of the articulation of modes of production. It is the main thesis of this study that a combination of these two theories, namely, the ‘theory of the articulation of modes of production’ and the ‘theory of the post-colonial state’, goes a long way in explaining a) the post-colonial state’s increasing intervention in the domestic community, and b) the regional variations observed in rural class formation between the cocoa-producing areas of Southern Ghana, on the one hand, and the laboursupplying area of Northern Ghana, on the other. The post-colonial state has largely become dependent upon the 17

Introduction cocoa surplus because of the need for capital accumulation not only for the reproduction and expansion of a bureaucratic class without an economic stronghold in society but also for the ‘modernization’ of the country. The dependence on the world market for cocoa also accounts for the regular outbreaks of crises in the Ghanaian political economy: any fall in the price of cocoa directly erodes the economic base of the class in power. The postcolonial state has not abolished the CMB; rather, it is using it as an instrument of extracting more and more surplus from the domestic community. Massive surplus extraction from the cocoa producers has given rise to a growing class conflict between the post-colonial state and the producers, and to an intensification of the state’s efforts to subordinate and control the producers, in particular the most articulate section of them, i.e. the class of capitalist farmertraders. The post-colonial state has suppressed independent farmers’ organizations and co-operatives and has in the main succeeded in ousting the class of capitalist farmer-traders from the internal cocoa trade - thus blocking one of their most important sources of capital accumulation. Subsequently, it has also sought to enter into ‘class alliances’ with the class of capitalist farmertraders mentioned and to co-opt it - in return for minor benefits into the structure of control over the producers (Beckman 1976; Grier 1979). Enormous surplus extraction from the producers and the attempts to arrest the growth of a capitalist class have contributed substantially to the ‘underdevelopment’ of capitalism in the cocoa areas of Southern Ghana and to the (partial) preservation of the pre-capitalist mode of production. Though this (partial) preservation of the pre-capitalist mode of production has guaranteed a continuing supply of cheap commodities (cocoa), it has at the same time made it possible for the producers to withdraw from the capitalist market and to revert to food production. It will be shown in this study that, in the absence of a strong, independent organization capable of fighting for an increase in the producer price and protesting against the lowering of the standard of living, the producers have expressed their opposition to the post-colonial state’s large-scale surplus extraction by either circumventing the state monoply over the cocoa trade (smuggling) or withdrawing - in part or completely - from cocoa production into food production. Needless to say, through such forms of protest 18

Introduction the producers are effectively threatening the post-colonial state’s principal source of capital accumulation and, ultimately, its very survival. The state has therefore tried to counter this threat in two ways: i) by setting up ‘modern’, capital-intensive state plantations, a process often leading to the expropriation and proletarianization of the producers; and ii) by seeking to extend control from the process of exchange to the process of production and the means of production so as to destroy the domestic community’s autonomy and to incorporate it more fully into the capitalist system. It was hoped that these two expensive ways of ‘modernizing’ cocoa production, largely financed with the aid of international capital, would set in motion a self-generating process of transformation of the pre-capitalist mode of production, resulting in a greater degree of integration into the capitalist system of non-participants in the schemes in question. That all this would, however, remain wishful thinking could have been predicted: the need for the establishment of such schemes proves that continuing state intervention is required to ‘capture’ the peasantry and to integrate it more fully into the capitalist system (Hyden 1980). The need to accumulate capital and to increase food production for the reproduction of the expanding bureaucratic class, has led to the post-colonial state’s intervention in Northern Ghana in order to transform the area from a supplier of labour into a producer of food (and agricultural raw materials) for the economy of Southern Ghana. For purposes of bringing about the necessary increase in agricultural production, the post-colonial state - like its colonial predecessor - regards the largely untransformed pre-capitalist mode of production as incapable (using ‘archaic’ production methods) and even unwilling (being still in control of the means of production and of the processes of production and exchange and producing chiefly for its own subsistence). Consequently, the state has initially relied mostly on large-scale mechanized farming projects controlled by either state capital or private capital (or a combination of both), depending on the fraction of the petty bourgeoisie in power at the time. This study gives a description of the post-colonial state’s promotion of capitalist rice farming in the Fumbisi Valley situated in the southeastern part of the Builsa district of Northern Ghana. Capitalist rice farming has enabled the petty bourgeoisie in power to attach an economic base onto its political power base and to 19

Introduction grant well-disposed fractions within the petty bourgeoisie an additional, potentially highly lucrative, source of capital accumulation. The introduction of the capitalist mode of production into the domestic community was facilitated by a ‘class alliance’ between the class of capitalist stranger farmers and local chiefs (co-opted into the class of capitalist farmers). Capitalist rice farming has not resulted in the destruction of the pre-capitalist mode of production; on the contrary, it is benefiting from the latter’s continued existence. The pre-capitalist mode of production became articulated with the capitalist mode of production as a supplier of cheap (uncultivated) communal land and cheap casual labour, reproduced by the pre-capitalist mode of production. Whenever the domestic community has protested and taken action against the exploitation of its lands and labour by stranger farmers, this latter class has been able to count on the protection of the post-colonial state and the local chiefs. The post-colonial state’s lack of control over capitalist farmers’ production and exchange has given rise to antagonistic relations between capitalist farmers and the state. This lack of control accounts for the increasing intervention in the domestic communities in Northern Ghana by the post-colonial state - the aim of such interference being to destroy the autonomy of the domestic communities and to integrate them more fully into the capitalist system. The domestic community’s transformation from a supplier of labour into a producer of cash crops for the economy of Southern Ghana was considered not only to be socially more acceptable and economically more beneficial but also politically less dangerous than a capitalist transformation of Northern Ghana. An additional advantage of this development was that it would stabilize labour in the North. The post-colonial state and the capitalist mode of production in Southern Ghana have long ceased to be interested in the ‘freeing’ of Northern labour, for, the slowly expanding industrial sector in the South can no longer absorb the unskilled labour supplies from the North. Furthermore, there has been the fear that the emergence of a ‘lumpenproletariat’ in the Southern urban centres might constitute a political threat to the post-colonial state. Accordingly, the state has preferred to stimulate the local production of cash crops so as to supply the Southern urban markets with cheap food and the newly established agro-industry with agricultural raw materials. 20

Introduction Large-scale, capital-intensive development projects - e.g. resettlement and irrigation schemes - have been particularly attractive to the post-colonial state, notwithstanding the heavy costs involved and the resultant dependence on foreign capital, technology and management. The reason is that these projects seem to offer exceptional opportunities for ‘capturing’ the domestic community and forcing it more fully into the capitalist system. Such schemes tend not only to expose ‘conservative’ peasants to ‘modern’ values and production methods but also to tighten state control over the means of production (land, inputs, technology, etc.) and over the processes of production and exchange. In this study two irrigation schemes in Northern Ghana are described, namely, the Vea and Tono Irrigation Projects, whose establishment has entailed the expropriation by the state of the domestic community’s lands. As a direct result of this expropriation the domestic community has become transformed from a producer of use-values and supplier of labour into a producer of cash crops for the economy of Southern Ghana - on land leased in the project areas. It will be shown that the peasants’ loss of control over the means of production and over the processes of production and exchange, has produced a special form of proletarianization (Banaji 1977; Bernstein 1977, 1979; Boesen 1979), a form providing the project management with labour that is cheaper and easier to control than full proletarianization (as the form of peasant production appears to have remained largely intact). However, it is clear that the conflict between the state, represented by the project management, and local peasants over the domestic community’s loss of control of the means of production and of the processes of production and exchange, has not yet been resolved and that the peasants are trying to regain - at least part of - their autonomy. It will be shown that the project management is seeking to ‘contain’ the domestic community’s opposition by establishing ‘class alliances’ with local chiefs and elders - the ‘traditional’ controllers of labour within the domestic community and ‘co-opting’ such dignitaries into the control structure of the projects. Having provided the reader with an insight into the theoretical framework and the most important themes that will be explored in this book, we can now proceed to explain how it is organized and how we have arrived at the research findings on which it is based. 21

Introduction The book comprises 4 chapters: In Chapter 1 a brief overview is given of the various governments in Ghana since the introduction of colonial rule. The chapter has two broad aims: i) to test the ‘theory of the postcolonial state’ in the Ghanaian context; and ii) to serve as background to the subsequent discussion about the role of the Ghanaian state in the process of rural class formation in Ghana. In Chapter 2 there is first of all a description of how the colonial administration promoted cocoa production in Ahafo - one of the newer cocoa-growing areas in Ghana - , the impact of this promotion on the domestic community, and the resultant process of class formation. Next, the chapter discusses the increasing surplus extraction by the state - as sole controller of the relations of exchange - , an extraction that has not only blocked the (further) growth of a class of capitalist farmers but has also given rise to various forms of protest on the part of the producers. A steady decline in production - an unmistakable expression of the producer’s dissatisfaction with the low producer price - has prompted the state to intervene directly in cocoa production. Chapter 3 deals with the state promotion of capitalist rice farming in the Fumbisi Valley in Northern Ghana. It shows how the pre-capitalist mode of production has become articulated with the capitalist mode of production and what effects this process has had on the domestic community. It, furthermore, assesses the emerging class structure and the attendant conflict and struggle arising from the introduction of capitalist rice farming in the valley. Chapter 4 traces the establishment by the state of two largescale capital-intensive irrigation schemes in Northern Ghana, namely, the Vea and Tono Irrigation Projects. The setting up of these projects has entailed the expropriation by the state of local peasant lands in the project areas, a development which has forced the peasants concerned to switch to cash-crop production on irrigated land leased to them. It will be argued in this chapter that the peasants’ loss of control over the means of production and over the processes of production and exchange has rendered them subordinate to management control and placed them in a structural position closely resembling that of a proletariat (though the form of peasant production has largely been retained). The present study is based on fieldwork undertaken in Ghana 22

Introduction from February 1979 to June 1980. Ghana was by no means an unknown entity to the author when he started his fieldwork there in 1979. For, he had studied at the University of Ghana at Legon for three years (1969-72) and had subsequently carried out research - including a year’s fieldwork (1975) - into industrial labour and trade unionism in Ghana (see Konings 1977, 1978, and 1980). As a matter of fact, it was through his research into urban labour in Ghana and its links with the countryside that the author became aware of the importance of studying the ‘labour situation’ in the rural areas. Though the author felt more or less at home in Ghana when he arrived there in 1979, fieldwork proved to be far more difficult than in the past due to circumstances beyond his control. The country’s rapidly deteriorating economic situation (see Chapter 1) had adverse effects on any research planning and moreover imposed considerable hardship on the fieldworker and - to an even greater extent - on many of his informants. Universities, libraries and offices were regularly faced with electricity cuts and water shortages, resulting in total or partial closure. Transport was difficult because of the shortage of petrol, lack of spare parts and the poor and dangerous condition of the roads. More particularly, the daily struggle for survival in a situation marked by constant shortages of (highly-priced) food and the most essential commodities, was very enervating and time-consuming; this was moreover the main cause of all the difficulties experienced in contacting and interviewing suitable informants. Many Ghanaians were very often absent from home or work so as to be able to search for food and other essential commodities or to look after their own ‘business’ or farm - all practices that enabled them to keep their heads above water. I have employed various research techniques to gather data and to increase their reliability. The main methods followed were the following: the study of written material in various libraries, archives and offices in Ghana; interviews (unstructured or partially structured) with informants at the local, district, regional and national level; and, more especially, participant observation at the local level. In addition, a number of surveys were conducted at the local level in order to check or acquire (additional) material: - two surveys were carried out at Mim and Kenyase No. 2, the 23

Introduction towns in Ahafo where I stayed while doing my research into ‘the state and cocoa production in Ahafo’. One survey was held among local cocoa farmers and was based on a 25% sample of the members of the two leading local buying centres at Mim and Kenyase No. 2. The second survey was conducted among sharecroppers - the main group of labourers in the area - and was based on a random sample of sharecroppers visiting the local buying centres mentioned. - three surveys were held at Wiasi and Gbedembilisi, two ‘rice villages’ in the Fumbisi Valley where I carried out my research into ‘the state and capitalist rice farming in Northern Ghana’. I tried to interview all sixty farmers still engaged in rice production in the two rice villages during the 1979/80 farming season, but, unfortunately, was able to contact only 48 of them as the remaining 12 (absentee) farmers could not be reached (largely because of the transport difficulties noted above). A fairly large number of labourers were also interviewed: 148 casual labourers (semiproletarianized peasants from the rice villages) were selected, based on a 25% sample of all houses in Wiasi and Gbedembilisi; and 58 permanent workers (skilled and unskilled, mostly hailing from the farmers’ home areas), constituting the total population of permanent labourers at Wiasi during the 1979/80 farming season. - two surveys were conducted at the Vea and Tono Irrigation Projects where I carried out my research into ‘the state and irrigation farming in Northern Ghana’. A 20% sample was taken of the estimated total number of households affected by the Vea Irrigation Project, covering 124 households, and a 25% sample of the estimated total number of households affected by the Tono Irrigation Project, covering 140 households. In the various regions where I conducted my research, I was fortunate enough to be able to select as research assistant someone who had either been to high school or agricultural college or who had served (or was still serving) as an agricultural officer in the area concerned. Such an individual was usually fluent in English as well as in several local languages. These local research assistants proved to be extremely helpful in contacting the various informants and in gaining their confidence. It is to the profound knowledge of local conditions of such assistants that I largely owe my understanding of the processes of rural class formation in Ghana. 24

Chapter 1

The colonial and post-colonial state in Ghana For various reasons, Ghana is obviously important in any discussion of the post-colonial state in Africa. Firstly, it served as a ‘pioneering experiment’ in decolonization in Africa. Secondly, the Ghanaian state has passed through apparently different phases of development. And, thirdly, there is the rapidity with which successive variants of petty bourgeois regimes have followed one another since the gaining of independence in 1957. This first chapter gives a brief overview of the various governments in Ghana, an overview which may serve as useful background to our subsequent exposition of the role of the Ghanaian state in the process of rural class formation in the cocoa regions of Southern Ghana and in the labour-supplying and foodproducing areas of Northern Ghana. In order to understand the process of ‘decolonization’ and the ‘class character of the post-colonial state’, it is necessary, at the outset, to examine the nature of the colonial state and, more particularly, the class interests served by it. Alavi (1972) and Saul (1974a) argue that by and large the colonial state sought to promote the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie and to dominate the pre-capitalist social formations and indigenous classes. With regard to Ghana specifically, Howard (1978) has demonstrated that it was primarily in response to pressure from the metropolitan bourgeoisie that the British government a) took effective control over the coastal states and established the Gold Coast Colony in 1874, b) pacified Ashanti and annexed it to the Gold Coast Colony in 1901, and c) granted ‘protection’ to the ‘Northern Territories’ in that same year - even though, according to Ladouceur (1979), ‘protection’ differed very little in practice from annexation. While conflicts between the colonial state and the metropolitan bourgeoisie were never entirely absent (Howard 25

The colonial and post-colonial state in Ghana 1978:146-80), it is none the less true to say that the colonial state generally aimed at furthering both the interests of, and capital accumulation by, the metropolitan bourgeoisie. During the colonial period, the state provided the necessary infrastructure for the expansion of the cocoa production and the profitable exploitation of the Gold Coast’s rich mineral resources (Kimble 1963; Kay 1972). Preferential allocation of import and export licences and credit facilities to the metropolitan (and Levantine) bourgeoisie discouraged, and largely eliminated, African competition: by 1931 a small group of foreign trading firms, the most important of which was the United African Company (UAC), dominated the Gold Coast import and export trade (Hopkins 1973; Howard 1978). The establishment of the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) in 1947/48 further thwarted African chances of capital accumulation and blocked the emergence of an African bourgeoisie. The colonial state, moreover, strove to safeguard colonial interests and to gain ascendancy over all the indigenous classes by co-opting the traditional rulers and upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie - the professionals and businessmen - into the colonial administrative structure. The constitutional changes brought about since the First World War were aimed at an eventual takeover of state power by the ‘indirect rule’ chiefs and ‘intelligentsia’, looked upon as the safe warranties of ‘responsible’ self-government (Austin 1964; Mohan 1967; Goldschmidt 1981). This neat scheme of decolonization met with increasing opposition after the Second World War from those Africans whose aspirations and opportunities were frustrated by colonial rule and whose only means of selfadvancement and ‘progress’ appeared to be the seizure of political power. This latter group of Africans included the following: small businessmen and a section of the big businessmen and contractors who found it difficult to compete with the European trading concerns and Levantine entrepreneurs (Rathbone 1973); teachers and clerks in the expanding bureaucracy who considered themselves entitled to a higher status and income on the basis of educational achievement; workers whose low wages were eroded by post-war inflation and high-priced goods; and, finally, unemployed school-leavers, the so-called ‘verandah boys’, who were not able to secure any ‘suitable’ employment. All these social groups, predominantly - but by no means exclusively - recruited from the lowest strata of the urban petty bourgeoisie, were united 26

The colonial and post-colonial state in Ghana by Kwame Nkrumah in 1949 in the Convention People’s Party (CPP) under the banner: ‘self-government now’ (Austin 1964; Mohan 1967). The colonial administration was quick to recognize the ‘radical’ challenge to the whole colonial politico-economic system of domination posed by this new nationalist party with wide mass support. It therefore sought to ‘tame’ the party by inducing it to operate within the existing constitutional framework and by entrusting it with government ‘responsibility’ (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966; Mohan 1967; Goldschmidt 1981). Following the spectacular CPP election victory in February 1951, Nkrumah accepted the colonial administration’s offer to become ‘Leader of Government Business’, under a new constitution during a transitional period before the granting of full independence (1951— 1957). This dual system of government Wallerstein (1964) has described as ‘dyarchy’. Under the dyarchy the CPP was obliged ‘to maintain sufficient pressure on [the] colonial authorities for the final transfer of power, so as to keep possible critics and militants within the party at bay and not to forfeit electoral support, while giving colonial officials, at the same time, unimpeachable evidence of their moderation and “statesmanship” , politically and economically (Mohan 1967:195-96). Particularly evident during this period of ‘dual rule’ - designated as ‘tactical action’ by Nkrumah - was the CPP’s accommodating strategy. The dominant hold of foreign capital over the Ghanaian economy was never challenged despite pressures from both the right and the left wings of the CPP (Esseks 1967). The CMB was kept intact as a source of state revenue. Increasing surplus extraction from the cocoa producers through the CMB served two ends. First, it augmented the country’s foreign exchange reserves in British banks (constituting, at very low interest rates, an invaluable support for sterling vis-à-vis the dollar as well as an important source of Britain’s own capital needs). Second, it contributed to the financing of an impressive infrastructure and public service sector (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966; Beckman 1976). Though the CPP continuously stressed the need to diversify the economy and to industrialize the country during this period, it in fact left the whole question of industrialization to private enterprise - on the advice of the Government’s chief economic adviser, the West Indian, Arthur Lewis (1953). How27

The colonial and post-colonial state in Ghana ever, foreign capital showed very little initiative, while domestic capital was too weak and also lacked the necessary incentives to invest in industrialization projects (Esseks 1971; Dorm-Adzobu 1971; Kennedy 1977). The foundation for the establishment of a substantial bureaucratic bourgeoisie was laid by the expansion of the public sector and by the increasing bureaucratization of the party, which had acquired a virtual monopoly of political power following the eradication of all forms of opposition (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966; Mohan 1967; Marshall 1972, 1976). It was not long after the gaining of political independence in 1957 that the inner contradictions of an essentially colonial economy became visible and that intervention by the state in the economy was more and more resorted to (Fitch and Oppenheimer 1966; Genoud 1969; Marshall 1972; Murray 1967; Beckman 1976; Killick 1978). Falling cocoa prices in the early 1960s and the subsequent shortage of foreign exchange strikingly exposed the vulnerability of the state’s dependence on cocoa income threatening both the expanding bureaucracy’s reproduction and the ambitious plans for an ‘industrialized welfare state’. The first state visits to the Soviet Union and China - inaugurating the establishment of close ties with the socialist countries - highlighted the alternative of a state planned economy over against a free enterprise economy. The CPP now vigorously strove to develop Ghana on the basis of an economy characterized by government controls and rapid industrialization (through stateowned enterprises) and sought to lessen the hold of foreign capital over the economy (the so-called ‘socialist’ or ‘non-capitalist’ road). The bureaucracy’s already fairly dominant role in the economy was further reinforced by the centrally planned economy and by the efforts of the state to curb the growth of an indigenous bourgeoisie, which might constitute a political threat (Kennedy 1977). State control allowed the bureaucracy to ‘profit’ from contracts made with, and from import licences issued to, foreign capital interests and to enmesh the petty bourgeoisie in a network of controls through which it was obliged to bribe its way (Marshall 1972, 1976; Hutchful 1979). Increasingly, the CPP turned to largescale, mechanized state farms in order to feed the rapidly growing non-agricultural population and to supply the newly established agro-industry with agricultural raw materials. In respect of cocoa marketing, foreign firms and indigenous buyers were expelled 28

The colonial and post-colonial state in Ghana from the internal cocoa trade and the United Ghana Farmers’ Cooperative Council (UGFCC) became the sole officially licenced buying agency for the CMB. Beckman (1976) has shown that the UGFCC’s monopoly over the internal cocoa trade provided not only lucrative opportunities of capital accumulation for the ‘new middlemen’ - the bureaucrats - but also effective control over the cocoa producers in a situation in which falling prices were threatening state appropriation. Various writers (Dadson 1970; Killick 1978) have provided ample evidence that most state enterprises were characterized by low production, poor planning, poor management and massive corruption and that they caused huge domestic and external debts (mainly to western creditors), a balance of payment crisis, and a high rate of inflation. When western creditors demanded the acceptance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposals - which inter alia comprised, as a precondition for debt repayment relief, a drastic cut in state expenditure and the dismantling of the state enterprises - , Nkrumah publicly defied the IMF. A few months later, his regime was overthrown by the military and police, representing a fraction of the petty bourgeoisie whose privileged position within the Ghanaian political economy had been threatened by the Nkrumah regime and that enjoyed the backing of western countries, in particular, the United States of America (Afrifa 1967; Ocran 1968, 1977; First 1972; Hutchful 1973). The National Liberation Council (NLC), the army-police regime established after the February 1966 coup, went out of its way to convince western countries and investors that it was determined to purge Ghana of Nkrumah’s ‘socialist’ policies and sever his links with the East, while at the same time projecting itself as the ‘saviour’ of Ghana from economic collapse and dictatorship (Pinkney 1972; Hutchful 1973; Ahmad 1973; Marshall 1976; Austin and Luckham 1975; and Killick 1978). On the advice of the IMF, the new regime pursued a policy of ‘economic stabilization and consolidation’. Government spending was cut back, the cedi devalued by 30%, and an attempt was made to dismantle state controls over, and state participation in, the economy. Thus a number of state enterprises were either sold to private enterprise, especially foreign capitalists, or simply abandoned (leading to mass dismissal of workers). The NLC undertook to repay all foreign loans, including obviously dubious ones; in 29

The colonial and post-colonial state in Ghana return, the western creditors agreed to reschedule the debt payments. Highly favourable fiscal concessions were announced in an effort to attract foreign investment. At the same time serious attempts were made ‘to emancipate’ a ‘national bourgeoisie’. The Ghanaian Enterprises Decree of 1968 reserved for Ghanaian businessmen certain sectors of the distributive trade, taxi services, manufacturing, processing and basic extractive industries, and agencies representing foreign manufacturers - all of which were up to that time largely in the hands of alien African and Levantine entrepreneurs (Esseks 1971; Grayson 1974; Kennedy 1977). The primary aim of the Two-Year Development Plan, 1968-1970 was to provide incentives to ‘key farmers’ and to stimulate the growth of a class of capitalist farmers engaged in food production. Though the bureaucracy’s leading role in the economy was certainly not unaffected by the dismantling of a number of state enterprises and the concomitant liberalization of various control measures, its overall position was not in any way put in jeopardy by the 1966 coup (Markowitz 1967; Beckman 1981b). So, for instance, the bureaucracy - unlike wage labourers - remained virtually unscathed by the mass dismissals and wage freezes. Fresh recruitments and upward revision of salaries continued. These two developments ensured that state expenditure was not substantially reduced and that the margin for raising the producer price of cocoa remained small, despite the post-coup recovery of market prices. The continuation of the bureaucracy’s leading role in the economy was most definitely in part due to the weakness of domestic capital. The efforts made to transfer state enterprises to private Ghanaian hands were largely thwarted by the petty bourgeoisie’s lack of capital resources and managerial expertise. Even the attempts to ‘privatize’ the internal cocoa trade after the dissolution of the UGFCC failed for similar reasons, so that a growing portion of the cocoa trade had to be handled by the CMB’s own subsidiary (Grier 1979; Beckman 1981b). The bureaucracy’s control over the state apparatus was further reinforced by the new regime’s reliance on the bureaucracy for administering the country: highranking bureaucrats manned the various advisory commissions and committees established by the NLC. The bureaucracy’s direct control over large sectors of the economy, and its own relatively autonomous base in the state apparatus, allowed it to enter into

30

The colonial and post-colonial state in Ghana profitable alliances with international capital and to continue its stifling hold over domestic capital. In August 1969, the much-heralded return to civilian rule took place, with Busia’s Progress Party (PP) taking over the reins of government (Owusu 1972; Goldworthy 1973; Ahmad 1973; Hutchful 1973; Austin and Luckham 1975; Marshall 1976; Hansen 1982). The leadership of the party consisted mainly of representatives of the intelligentsia and business community who had been supporters of the United Party (UP), the opposition party during the Nkrumah period (Austin 1964), supplemented by a younger generation of intellectuals. No wonder that the PP projected itself as a party of experts, as a body comprising ‘the best brains of the country’, a party that would be able to resolve once and for all the recurring crises in the Ghanaian economy. In ethnic terms, the Progress Party had gained most support among the Akan. The PP leaders were fiery opponents of socialism and the CPP. They vociferously championed liberal-democratic ideas (Busia 1967), and, like their predecessors, were overly pro-western in ideology even to the extent of advocating ‘dialogue’ with South Africa. The most prominent PP leaders had held important posts under the NLC administration and had gained considerable advantage from the backing by influential NLC members (especially Akan) of their succession and from the legal injunction barring most ex-CPP politicians from standing for political office. Their leadership during the second republic guaranteed a certain continuity with the previous government’s economic programme, as evidenced particularly by the PP’s promotion of the private enterprise and liberalization policies initiated by the NLC. Immediately after its assumption of power, the PP, owing deep gratitude to Ghanaian businessmen for their support during the election campaign, reciprocated by accelerating the NLC’s policy of ‘indigenization’ of small and medium-sized enterprises. In November 1969, the Busia Government issued the controversial Aliens Compliance Order, in terms of which thousands of alien Africans (and Lebanese) not in possession of valid residence permits, were expelled from the country. The aim of the expulsion order was to enable Ghanaians to take over alien commercial and trading concerns as well as wage-labour jobs (Addo 1970). The Aliens Compliance Order was followed by the Ghanaian Business 31

The colonial and post-colonial state in Ghana (Promotion) Act of 1970, which reserved small and medium-sized enterprises for Ghanaians. The government provided a special loan scheme - which benefited many parliamentarians and senior bureaucrats - for the taking over, or establishment, of small and medium-sized concerns. It also launched a plan to guarantee commercial bank credit facilities to ‘suitable’ Ghanaians, and expanded training facilities for future entrepreneurs. The government furthermore provided various incentives to bureaucrats and businessmen who were willing to switch to capitalist agriculture. While promoting private Ghanaian enterprise, the government continued to woo foreign capitalists by various attractive investment facilities, including state loans (Häberli 1979). Though, as we have seen, expressly advocating private enterprise, the PP was nevertheless prepared - for pragmatic reasons - to expand state enterprises into those sectors of the economy in which foreign and domestic capitalists were unable or unwilling to invest, such as seafishery, large-scale agriculture and certain forms of import trade (Esseks 1975). In addition, the state intervened more and more in the field of food marketing, for shortages and rising food prices were blamed on the inefficiency of the private marketing system. A highly ambitious scheme to improve food distribution - the Task Force - was planned in 1971 but it had, however, not matured yet by the time of the 1972 military coup. Beckman (1981b: 152-53) also draws attention to the PP Government’s partial retreat to the public service ideology of the ‘dyarchy’ and the first few years of independence: the emphasis on the diffusion of social amenities (provision of clean water and electricity) in the rural areas as the principal means of achieving an increase in agricultural production and of arresting the flow of unemployed youth to the towns. ‘Rural development’ became one of the most important ideological slogans of the Busia regime. Public investment in the rural sector was, however, to be cut back because the main source of public funds - the cocoa income - was adversely affected by declining production and falling cocoa prices. The decline in cocoa production was in part a direct consequence of government policies: the constantly low producer price offered to cocoa producers, acute shortages of labour in the cocoa-producing areas following the promulgation of the Aliens Compliance Order (1969), a lack of regular inputs, and the spread of the highly 32

The colonial and post-colonial state in Ghana resented ‘chit system’ (viz. the payment of cocoa producers by promissory notes). The Busia government attempted to resolve the problem of economic stagnation and to promote economic growth by following a far more vigorous liberalization policy on imports than the previous NLC Government: around 1970 about 60% of Ghana’s total imports had been placed on ‘open general licence’ (OGL). The resulting rise in import levels, coinciding with a sharp fall in world cocoa prices, led to a record current account deficit of some US $200m in 1971. A package of austerity measures was announced in the July 1971 budget. These measures included the following: import surcharges; restriction on the import of luxury goods (like cars and TV sets); reduction in the defence expenditure and in the fringe benefits of public servants and military officers; and, finally, the imposition of a national development levy on wages and salaries. The net result of all these measures was to arouse serious discontent among the different fractions of the petty bourgeoisie and workers and to spark off a clash between the trade union movement and the PP government (Jeffries 1978). The final blow to the Busia government was administered by the external debt crisis. At the end of 1971, Ghana’s total external debt amounted to $882m, with $286m due immediately, or soon afterwards. The IMF insisted upon yet another devaluation as a condition for the granting of further loans and for assistance in reopening talks with overseas creditors. While Nkrumah was prepared to reject out of hand the proposed IMF ‘solutions’ for the Ghanaian economic crisis, Busia in fact succumbed to them. Accordingly, in December 1971, the cedi was devalued once again; this time by 44% against the dollar. A few weeks later, on January 13, 1972, the Busia government was itself overthrown by the military, deeply disgruntled by the defence cuts and by the loss of all sorts of fringe benefits as well as by other ‘hardships’ imposed from above (Hutchful 1973). The 1972 coup leaders instituted a National Redemption Council (NRC), headed by Lt.-Col. I. K. Acheampong, which ruled the country until October 9, 1975. On that day, Col. (later General) Acheampong installed a Supreme Military Council (SMC), comprising the highest ranking army officers, which took over direct control of the state (Hutchful 1973, 1979; Owusu 1975; 33

The colonial and post-colonial state in Ghana Marshall 1976; Hansen and Collins 1980; Oquaye 1980; Okeke 1982; Hansen 1982). From the very beginning, the NRC/SMC regime tried to win the support of the various fractions of the petty bourgeoisie and other classes in society and to resolve the deteriorating economic crisis. Immediately after assuming office, the NRC restored to the bureaucracy the privileges of which it was divested by the Busia administration. It abolished the national development levy, reestablished the Ghana Trades Union Congress (GTUC), raised wages and cocoa prices, and was also later to create new investment outlets for domestic capital. The regime moreover strove to unite in a programme of ‘national reconciliation’ under its leadership both its right wing opponents and the CPP left. ‘Unity’ and ‘patriotic nationalism’ became major themes in the NRC’s ‘Charter of Redemption’, a programme in which class and ethnic unity and ‘brotherhood’ were stressed. An alliance was sought with the chiefs, on the one hand, so as to gain control over the peasantry, and with labour leaders, on the other, so as to ensure the necessary industrial peace for the successful waging of the ‘economic war’. Initially, the NRC regime displayed striking similarities with the Nkrumah administration: a populist style of leadership, an ideology of ‘national revolution’, a more militant foreign policy (including support for the liberation movements in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa), combined with a resurgence of state intervention in the economy. However, it soon became clear that excessive state intervention in production and distribution went hand in hand with the promotion of private enterprise, both foreign and domestic. Beckman (1981b: 154) has correctly observed in this connection that the latter phenomenon contrasted sharply with the marked ‘anti-capitalist’ pattern of state intervention during the later Nkrumah period. The NRC/SMC aimed at achieving economic recovery and growth through the pursuance of a policy of economic nationalism and self-reliance. It repudiated some foreign debts that had been tinted by corruption and fraud and unilaterally rescheduled others. In open defiance of the IMF, it revalued the cedi by 42% (from £ 1 = $0.55 to