The Search for an Alternative: Philosophical Perspectives of Subjectivism and Marxism [Reprint 2016 ed.] 9781512801842

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THE SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE

MARVIN FARBER

THE SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE Philosophical Perspectives of Subjectivism and Marxism

University of Pennsylvania Press Philadelphia

Design by Robert Nance Copyright © 1984 by the University of Pennsylvania Press All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Färber, Marvin, 1901The search for an alternative. Includes bibliographical references. 1. Phenomenology. 2. Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938. 3. Subjectivity. 4. Materialism. 5. Philosophy, Marxist. I. Title. B829.5.F37 1984 142'.7 83-23448 ISBN 0-8122-7921-2 Printed in the United States of America

CONTENTS

Foreword by Roderick M. Chisholm Subjectivism, Phenomenology, Marxism, and the Role of Alternatives

vii 1

The Perspective of Phenomenology

27

The Retirement to Inner Experience

47

The Goal of a Complete Philosophy of Experience

69

Values and the Scope of Scientific Inquiry

83

For a Materialistic Philosophy of Experience

100

The Philosophic Impact of the Facts Themselves

129

The Historical Outcome of Subjectivism

157

From the Perspective of Materialism

216

Notes

239

FOREWORD by Roderick M. Chisholm

I T h i s is the final work of one of the most influential American philosophers of the present century. It is his definitive answer to the question of the nature and function of philosophy, a question that had occupied him throughout his long and distinguished career. He had been working on the book since his retirement from active teaching. The manuscript was in its present form when Marvin Färber died, on November 24, 1980, shortly before his seventy-ninth birthday. In Naturalism and Subjectivism (1959),1 Färber had said that the only serious alternatives for philosophy were naturalism and subjectivism. And he had concluded that subjectivism is hardly an adequate view for anyone who is seriously concerned with philosophy and with the problems of the world. In the present book, Färber uses "phenomenology" instead of "subjectivism." This is because he thinks that phenomenology is the most important form of subjectivistic philosophy. And he uses "materialism," or "Marxism," in place of "naturalism." The reason is similar: he thinks of Marxist materialism as the most important form of naturalism. II To appreciate the significance of the present book, one must be aware of the role that Färber played in the history of the phenomeno-

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logical movement. In the 1920s he studied in Freiburg im Breisgau and formed a close relationship with Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology. His activity in the next two decades was conditioned by this relationship. Farber's first book, Phenomenology as a Method and as a Philosophical Discipline (1928)/ served to introduce phenomenology to the United States. After the publication of this book, he fulfilled two commitments he had made to Husserl. The first had to do with Husserl's journal, Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. With the advent of National Socialism in 1933, it had become impossible for Husserl to continue publication of the journal. Färber promised to revive the journal in the United States. He organized the International Phenomenological Society and became its first president in 1939. This made it possible for him to begin publishing the journal Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in the following year. He remained editor until his death. In 1940, he also published Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl,3 a collection of essays by a number of Husserl's more distinguished followers, many of whom had emigrated to the United States. Farber's second commitment to Husserl was a promise to make available to English-speaking readers the essential content of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen.4 Farber fulfilled this promise with the publication of his Foundation of Phenomenology,5 the first edition of which appeared in 1943. Although he was profoundly influenced by Husserl, Färber had never been an orthodox phenomenologist. He hinted in the preface to the Foundation that he differed from Husserl in fundamental respects. There was more to philosophy, he felt, than pure phenomenology. The goal of philosophy is, of course, truth—philosophical truth. But Färber is convinced that philosophy, like any other human activity, should be concerned with the maximal realization of human values. Its function is not that of offering solutions to idealized problems. Like any science, philosophy must "acknowledge the realm of natural and human existence as a prescientific, basic fact." And like any other scientist, the philosopher must learn "from the lessons of the past and the collective efforts of serious thinkers in all fields of human endeavor." This conception of philosophy precludes that suspension of belief by reference to which Husserl had characterized pure phenome-

Foreword

ix

nology. It also precludes taking philosophy as an autonomous discipline, as Husserl had done. Philosophy must make use of the conclusions of the particular sciences and of ordinary experience. Färber says that pure phenomenology, as a form of subjectivism, is essentially a withdrawal from the world and a philosophy of renunciation: The field of pure phenomenology is therefore limited in the nature of the questions it can raise. Its claims to absolute knowledge requires that it make an absolute beginning within the framework of a self-reflecting ego. But the thinking being who says "I think" and surveys his ideas is himself a part of the world of nature and human society. His ideas are conditioned by that world, and they have a history. Experience is a changing process, just as the world of experience is a changing world. Husserl had spoken of persons as "spiritual unities." Färber remarks that one may "hesitate to apply this designation to factory workers or coal m i n e r s . " In Foundation of Phenomenology and in the later Naturalism and Subjectivism, Färber had spoken of the "cooperation of m e t h o d s " and of "methodological pluralism." He was concerned to point out that the complexity of the world requires a great variety of methods of investigation. As he now says, "each type of method has its possible range of achievement, its own proper questions, and its own peculiar powers as well as limitations." Färber thus warns phenomenologists "against overextension of their transcendental m e t h o d . " And he warns Marxists against overextension of their dialectic. In each case there is the danger of treating philosophy as a closed system. To both phenomenologists and Marxists, he urges the importance of " t h e recognition of a plurality of procedures to solve diverse problems." T h e chapter of the present book entitled " T h e Historical Outcome of Subjectivism" is a detailed analysis of the later Husserl and the subsequent development of the phenomenological movement. It includes a critique of Husserl's Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (1936), 6 which was the final book that Husserl published. Farber views the book as an attempt to apply transcendental phenomenology to the actual events of the physical world. He concludes that the attempt is a failure. We are not likely to understand the actual world of concrete events if we suspend belief and deal only with idealities. This procedure, Färber says, is " n o

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The Search for an Alternative

better than supposing that one cannot investigate breathing without getting away from breathing."

III In 1949, together with Roy Wood Sellars and V. J. McGill, Färber had published a cooperative volume entitled Philosophy for the Future: The Quest of Modern Materialism.7 The book was intended to provide a clear statement of the nature of materialism and of its relevance to a science-oriented philosophy. Farber was to defend materialism, or "naturalism," for the rest of his life. In the present book, he provides a detailed statement of his own version of materialism. He sets forth several general principles, including: "All existence is within nature"; "There is no supernature as a mode of existence or reality"; "All inquiry is within nature, with multiple conditioning factors—social, economic, political, and psychological." Materialism, he says, signifies "due adherence to the findings of the sciences, as well as the self-sufficiency of nature." Färber is no orthodox Marxist, but he shares the Marxist concern with the problems of man and he attributes a large part of these problems to the evils of the profit system. Moreover, he is impressed by the realistic epistemology of Marxism and by the fact that, unlike traditional empiricism, it views man as a factor in transforming the world and not merely as a passive subject of sensations. Phenomenology, he believes, has a place in a more encompassing, science-oriented materialistic philosophy. One can be a phenomenologist without being a follower of Husserl. Färber compares the proper role of pure phenomenology with that of formal logic or pure mathematics. These disciplines may "contribute to a basic philosophy of real experience by making hitherto neglected or overlooked structures and features of experience accessible." Färber does not hesitate to speak of a "materialistic phenomenology."

IV This book is primarily concerned with the philosophy of philosophy (Färber does not like the term "meta-philosophy") and with the analysis of contemporary versions of phenomenology and Marxism.

Foreword

xi

But there are also discussions of many other fundamental philosophical topics. These include the nature of value, of essences, of structure, and of possibility and potentiality. His contributions are always penetrating and profound. Färber makes the following observation about Lenin: "It is difficult to imagine how any openminded student or scholar could read Lenin's forthright and sincere Materialism and Empirio-Criticism8 without experiencing a gain in mental health. Completely, uncompromising honesty characterizes it throughout. Such books are all too rare." The present book belongs to this category.

1 Subjectivism, Phenomenology, Marxism, and the Role of Alternatives

The Historical Nature of Philosophy

A

wareness of the significance of the theme of this chapter, the search for an alternative, as a widespread intellectual motive has grown in my mind for many years. This motive is grounded deeply in the conditions of human experience and is abundantly illustrated in social and intellectual history. It is important to bear in mind the historical nature of philosophy, which must be recognized first when dealing with philosophical issues. The historical nature of philosophy is one specialized part of the historical nature of thought in general, also comprising the ideas of science, morals, politics, religion, and all the other parts of the superstructure, which develops on the economic basis of the social world and as an integral, contributing factor of that world. The specialized philosophical portion is not to be fully understood or accounted for without reference to the other ideas and to the facts about the nature and development of society. In the course of the discussion, phenomenology (or subjectivism) and Marxism, with their revisionistic forms, are the central themes. Finally, the awareness of the search for an alternative which pervades

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the discussion is brought to the fore. A correction of the well-founded charge of the remoteness of much philosophical thought from central living issues must be made, without sacrificing the ideal of the uninhibited pursuit of truth. This requires the consideration of practice as well as theory before the philosopher's balance sheet can be regarded as complete. Philosophical thought is influenced by motives and causal factors in the historical tradition and in the existing social system. There have been alignments from "left" to "right," and differences in the nature of "left" and "right," as shown, for example, by medieval mysticism and nominalism at different times, ancient and modern materialism, idealism and subjectivism, and philosophies of human existence in different historical contexts. There have been various modes of social criticism and protest. Any talk of radicalism must answer the question "Radical with respect to what?" The same holds for the designation "conservative." Individual, novel, and even willful conceptions of philosophy are always possible, and there is nothing to prevent them from being advanced. But so far as the past is concerned, even the immediate past, the books may be considered closed and an effort made to establish the sociohistorical setting and motivation of thinkers designated as philosophical in the broadest and most tenuous sense of the term. The diversity of conflicting standpoints must be included, no matter how narrow or unsound the point of view may be judged to be, or no matter how one-sided the interests served—that is to say, so far as the mere designation "philosophy" is concerned. The exclusiveness of the existentialist Karl Jaspers, who distinguished between philosophical and unphilosophical writers in the field of philosophy, should not prevent him from being included in any classification of philosophical authors. There are degrees of good and bad philosophy when judged with logical standards, with no limit to the resourcefulness and ingenuity of the writers. On the other hand, many philosophers have served dominant historical interests. It is also true that others have on notable occasions challenged dominant interests, with the most thoroughgoing challenge being that of Marx, who also found past philosophers falling short of the ideal of changing the world. In all historically important cases, however, philosophers were credited with saying something and not brushed aside as saying nothing. The ideal of a rigorous science of philosophy has been defended as the ultimate objective and model of all science. But there are diffi-

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3

culties in the way of a program and platform presumed to be valid "once and for all time." The ideal—or pretense—of such a final science is itself historically conditioned; purportedly it is intended to surmount all future historical conditions and problems, but its spirit of neutrality tends to become a support for the established social world. It is an assumptive program which is envisaged, with assumptions concerning the static structure of thought and reality; and the selective nature of the contemplated program is overlooked. No foundation of a final philosophy in the traditional literature has had permanent prospects. Christian philosophy was developed through the centuries, and it is still affected by changing historical circumstances. The Valhalla of the great tradition in the Western world has provided a fixed and lasting place for great or not at all great thinkers, preserved side by side through their writings and ideas, and in part through their influence. The "neo" schools of thought could for a time resist change, but they always yielded to new conditions, despite the varying degree of their success, as illustrated by neo-Platonism, neo-Kantianism, neo-scholasticism, neo-Hegelianism, and other "neo" efforts on the part of realists, subjectivists, and existentialists. Does this apply to Marxism? There are complicating circumstances, requiring clarification of the scope of Marxist thought. In addition to the line of development through the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, the status of Dietzgen and more recent writers professing strict adherence to Marxism must be determined. It is also pertinent to consider the Frankfurt school, Lukacs, and numerous other points of influence of Marx's thought, along with the issues raised by the various types of revisionism. It may be argued that the talk of a philosophy "once and for all time" is hostile to the very meaning of philosophy. But that would not be borne out by the facts, for there have been efforts through the historical past to make ideas and doctrines official. In the medieval period that meant a formal decree as determined by authority. Like the enforcement of laws in everyday life, such decisions tend to be rigidly applied and enforced. The spirit of an open program of philosophical thought forbids closure by authoritative decisions at any points. The historical realities must be considered, however, and the actual motivations recognized. Outspoken defenders and apologists for a social order with a dominant class have the support of all who are interested in its continued existence. But even the devout claims

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to detachment of purely subjective or formal thinkers must also be questioned for their significance in the social system and for their failure to respond to needs connected with the welfare and dignity of mankind. To restrict one's domain for inquiry to an immanent or conceptual realm may be, and often is, to avoid thereby the transitory world of generation and decline, with all its social conflicts. The platform of the Personalists, as represented by E. S. Brightman and Mary W. Calkins in 1929, has now receded into history. The same may be said of the platform of the American neoRealists, which primarily owed its distinction to its opposition to idealism. 1 The "Platform of Personalistic Idealism" included Berkeleian, Lotzean, Hegelian, and Platonic elements; the universe was held to be completely mental in nature and to be a system of selves and persons, who are either members of an all-inclusive person or a society of many selves related by common purposes. It will also be recalled how Royce interpreted the nature of man and the world in relationship to a divine being. It was Royce's aim to absorb and reaffirm whatever is the case, and to incorporate it in the "Absolute," making use of ethical criteria derived ab extra. But in focusing on the "Absolute" in the absorptive effort, he neglected the differences and conflicts of real human beings, and especially the conflicts of economic classes. Because of his eternalistic perspective he operated with changeless units, including individuals. Even though he mentioned 2 the influence of sociohistorical conditions on the nature of individuals, his vision was directed toward "the union of God and man" rather than toward the nature and problems of human society. In practice, spokesmen for a formally adopted platform or for a system of thought defending traditional beliefs usually tend to become doctrinaire, dividing the relevant world into partisans and opponents. A sound philosophy cannot afford to neglect continued self-criticism along with the criticism of opposing views and the reappraisal of the needs of a changing world. As in the case of science, where there are important practical consequences of ideas, philosophy must always be sensitive to change. It is far from enough to achieve internal consistency in reasoning; and the hope that a place in the realm of eternal truth is assured therewith is only supported by what Feuerbach called the principle of sufficient wishing. All reasoning and all motivation for thought originate in the process of history, and they must be returned to history

Subjectivism, Phenomenology, Marxism, and the Role of Alternatives

5

for the examination of their significance and vitality. History is not a merely incidental item in an eternal, supertemporal matrix of forms of truth. On the contrary, every such presumed matrix, as a rational construct, is itself an event in the stream of historical becoming. It is unavoidable that a system of thought undertaking to do justice to change must itself be a changing system. History is the alpha and the omega of all rational thought—and that means real history, the actual development of human life in the natural and social world.

Radical Analysis and the Future of Philosophy The historical past was always a past future. All talk of the future of philosophy can be concerned ony with a "present future," insofar as it is talked about. For the future grows out of the present; it cannot emerge full-grown like Minerva, whereby it will be noted that Minerva was after all a cultural emergent from the Greek tradition of god-constructs. The concrete present is, as Hegel observed, the result of the past, and it is "big" with the future. But the present future of an hour ago is already a past future. Whatever emerges from the present is to be accounted for in terms of potentialities and transformations of already existing—and receding—conditions. The future is always the coming or relevant future, about which questions relating to present needs and frustrations are raised. There are also external, practical, or formalistic conceptions of the future, as measured by centuries, so that one readily thinks of "the next century." The most formalistic conception of the future of man refers to an ideal state of society when the lamb and the lion will lie down together and human beings undifferentiated historically, socially, or economically will coexist on the basis of a general love. Like Utopian or any other artificially contrived patterns for the future, however, such conceptions could have a useful function by providing a possibly helpful perspective on the present. Thus, in any talk of the future of Western philosophy, one should indicate the degree or extent of the future involved—the coming year, the next decade or century, or an indefinitely located future future. It is desirable to have practical considerations and real situations in mind. At the close of World War II, the future of Germany was in question, including among many other things the future of Germany's heavy industry and its capacity to produce materials for warfare.

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At that time the thought of Alfred Rosenberg had no future, and its past future, as viewed during the Nazi period of supremacy, appeared grotesque to most non-Nazis. A simple revival of the transcendental philosophy of Husserl, or of any other type of idealistic thought, had limited appeal. But any concern with human existence belonged to the order of the day and provided special motivation. It was possible, however, for those wishing to preserve the status quo to present alternatives in practical affairs. Vagueness and the use of idealized generalities can always function as means for the avoidance of actual problems of human existence, even though they may seem to be dealt with under the heading of abstract anxiety, care, and other types of disengaged experience. All talk of the future should accordingly be checked by reference to the present, with the requisite critical reflective detachment. That can be accomplished by means of a methodological suspension of beliefs in a realistic and materialistic setting, or an epoche which does not forget the primacy of the existing world, as distinguished from the subjectively directed epoche of pure phenomenology. A question of fundamental importance is raised therewith: Is it possible to engage in a type of radical reflection that is free from presuppositions and commitments of all kinds? Or does one unavoidably attempt to do so from a sociohistorical point of view, with recognizable commitments and beliefs, so that the present reflecting thinker, who is himself a sociohistorical product, is concerned in a historically conditioned way with selected materials and questions? Whether it is possible to transcend history in any sense will also be asked therewith. That is not the same as asking whether objective knowledge is possible, for that can be answered by means of the requisite evidence and by considering the practical aspects of the ideas in question. In short, the achievement of objectively true knowledge does not involve the transcendence of history by man. Man is both a product and a maker of history, who can no more evade history than he can leave his body. A complete radical analysis is an ideal. There are always further problems and unexplored dimensions for inquiry. The important thing to determine is whether any analysis is sufficient for the purpose in hand. Thus, Marx's analysis of capitalist production is to be viewed in relation to its practical objective, the elmination of the system of wage labor and the transformation of society in accordance with his conception of human needs and development. Similarly, Husserl's program for analysis was selective, and it was

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led by definite aims which, as it turned out, prevented him from successfully developing a universal philosophy. For he was a specialist in the study of philosophical aspects of formal logic and the structural features of pure experience, as he defined the nature of pure experience in the context of his transcendental phenomenology. He could speak of radicalism only in the special ideal sense of endeavoring to get back of and inspecting all assumptions and interpretations contributed by the human mind to the world of experience. His selective radicalism did not extend to the sources and conditions of human experience or to the questioning of social practices; it represented a mode of inquiry that failed to make contact with the actual experience of real historical persons. In general, the way in which such philosophers react to social problems is by bypassing them in favor of questions about timeless, abstractive types of structure. Because the inspection of selected structures of the work of experience on the part of subjectivists tends to disregard the existing order of society, the historically developed forms referring directly or indirectly to property relations are in effect accepted as finalities. The restriction of formal logic and pure mathematics to idealized concepts and structures does not mean denying the ontological basis of these disciplines in the existing world. This also applies to the purely reflective treatment of experience and its objects, whether real, imaginary, or purely conceptual. But a legitimate and defensible method of inquiry of that kind, meaning that it is free from dogmas, should not be overextended or regarded as the sole method of philosophy. The traditional as well as current functions of philosophical thought do not allow such overextension. Just as the starting point of all questions about the future is to be found in the present, the starting point of philosophy in general can be only the real world of history and nature. This primary fact should not be lost sight of in the pursuit of detached modes of analysis. A complete philosophy must include a response to existing and prospective needs, which requires awareness of the major problems of mankind. The tensions and conflicts of contemporary society, nationally and internationally, must be considered in all their aspects and in their bearing upon all modes of inquiry. Reflective thought appears to be empty in its treatment of experience if there is no evidence of awareness of industrial conflicts and their political representation; the effects of the competitive system on all classes of society; the relations

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of labor and capital; the uses and misuses of authority in its many forms; the clash of value judgments due to religious, socioeconomic, political, and other commitments; rivalries between or among nations; vested beliefs which are untouched by all general and formal talk about the provisional suspension and methodical examination of all beliefs; war as an extension and intensification of the economic system, and its effects on ideas and moral practice; and also the important theme of the sociohistorical role of philosophical thought, and the effects of ideas on the existing social system. The Marxist thesis must also be considered, that the types of conflict cited are related in various ways to the individual mode of ownership of the socialized means of production, motivated by the quest for profit. What follows as a matter of fact from the phenomenological suspension of beliefs about existence? Nothing in fact, for that suspension is the safest and most innocuous of all procedures so far as the entrenched interests of the existing social system are concerned. In short, it takes far more courage to challenge a matter of fact, such as an existing institution, than to retire to the immanence of conscious experience and the contemplation of nontemporal structures. A concrete understanding of human problems is required if the achievements of society are to be utilized in accordance with the needs and desires of the great majority of the people. This means actually existing people, more or less frustrated, rather than theoretical constructs or nameless, abstractive egos which are exempt from all the vicissitudes of birth, privation, and death. The heroism of the radical subjectivist is as sterile as it is devoid of real effects. This is not to deny that there has been merit in descriptive studies in the literature of idealism or subjectivism. In adding to our knowledge of the nature of the activities of thought processes, the most notable exponents of idealism have performed a lasting service to the development of philosophical thought. A sound and adequate philosophy, responding to the motive of the greatest possible human freedom and fulfillment, knows how to learn from the traditional literature. That literature must be viewed from a higher perspective of reflection, which sees the actual role played by each thinker and each type of thought. It is seen therewith that idealism is not to be judged simply as a generality and that there are vast differences between the historical mission of a Kant or a Hegel and that of relatively nonsignificant continuators of inherited doctrines. The subjectivistic suspension of beliefs amounts to a withdrawal

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from the concerns of the world, because of its retirement to the immanence of pure consciousness. But the suspension of beliefs which is integrated with general methodology will have learned how to combine reflective detachment with due regard for the established knowledge provided by the findings of the sciences and ordinary experience, and that includes knowledge derived by statistical methods and all types of description. It will deal explicitly with human problems of all kinds, and it will recognize the actual status of subjective analysis, now translated into the language of a specialized discipline, as one of the historical antecedents of a more adequate form of reflective analysis. Man and the historical route of his works, man and his needs, both current and ideally conceived, and man and the world of which he has increasing knowledge and possible control will define the beginning and the end of such inquiry. Some may continue to yearn for the most rigorous kind of deductive or "essential" knowledge in a final philosophical form. But man will continue to attempt to solve his problems by means of any available, practicable methods, with the subjectivistic ideal of certainty reserved for the quiet realm of pure, abstractive nothings. The crudest and most imperfect something is to be preferred ontologically to a perfect, idealized nothing; and a partial or imperfect solution is better than the vaunted apodictic knowledge, which if developed would supposedly be the key to solve the riddles of the universe, but which, for present and relevant future purposes, has no effect on the real world.

Subjectivism and the Prospects of Phenomenology The importance of Husserlian phenomenology as the most rigorous expression of subjectivism in this century raises the question of its present prospects for the coming generation. The critical reexamination of pure phenomenology which has been indicated requires renewed attention to its key concepts, such as evidence, truth, essence, the idea of a transcendental science, the transcendental ego, the world and contingent existence, and the natural attitude. In the present discussion, brief comments will be made about the concept of evidence and the role of the solitary ego. If evidence is taken to mean "having the meant object in view in its bodily givenness," the entire conception of evidence depends upon the cognitive setting provided by the method of analysis. With

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the performance of an epoche and the reduction to the sphere of experiences of a solitary ego to begin with, one operates with an ego that merely serves as a device of method and not as a real entity. Because of the suspension of all theses concerning transcendent natural existence, no use is made of the causal knowledge obtained by naturalistic methods. Sound descriptive findings of phenomenology could simply be added to the usual dimension of causal-genetic analysis, if not for the way in which the reduction to pure consciousness is carried through. The nonmaterialistic program (also antimaterialistic in actual practice) made it necessary to resort exclusively to essence-analysis in order to obviate questions requiring mundane methods for their answers. The requirement of "bodily givenness" for evidence may seem rigorous and admirable, but it is really an abstract condition within the confines of the purely subjective procedure, and it becomes properly meaningful only on the basis of normal, natural experience. That is to say, the experience of real, historically conditioned human beings who are complex organizations of matter, with the potentiality of carrying out perceptual, conceptual, and other activities, and even of speaking of "annulling" or "annihilating" the world phenomenologically. A purely subjective beginning for philosophy has its own specialized merits. Like any formal method, it is made possible by the imposition of artificial conditions and is narrowly selective in its questions, operations, and subject matter. In the interest of soundness and truth, that procedure must be aligned with other types of procedure and subordinated to a general methodology. There should be no suggestion of the pretense that is unmistakably present when transcendental phenomenology is portrayed as a protophilosophical discipline pointing the way for all the sciences. For it is only by non-purelysubjective existence and truth that one can have the artifice known as the reduced realm of pure consciousness, whether egological or intersubjective. In short, in the development of phenomenology the slogan "Back to the things themselves" was not really concerned with the things themselves, from which the subjective procedure had cut itself off. A genuine concern with the things themselves can be possible only on the basis of an antecedently existing world, which is not merely a "pregiven" world of lived experience. It must be the natural and sociohistorical world, in which active human beings seek to introduce changes in accordance with their needs and interests. The crucial aim should be to take account of the real nature of the things them-

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selves, and that means to take account of the collective knowledge provided increasingly by the sciences and general experience. No matter how much the sciences have required and may continue to require criticism, whether along logical, descriptive-philosophical, or historical-materialistic lines, they still continue to offer the most valuable body of knowledge about the nature and behavior of the things themselves. It should be noted, moreover, that the study of the sociohistorical conditions affecting science provides an addition to scientific knowledge, which is quite in accordance with the unlimited scope and self-critical nature of science. The evidence desired by pure phenomenology must be placed in a larger setting, without which its whole procedure would be an anomaly. The solitary ego is seen to be a fiction, when viewed from the larger perspective of a more general methodology. There can be no talk of an ego without a human body, and no talk of a human body without the physical and social world. The ego-body is derived from and is in relationship to other ego-bodies, physically, organically, and socially. So long as it is recognized that there cannot be a real solitary ego or ego-body, however, there need be no harm in operating abstractively with a selectively restricted sphere of experience of an individual ego, as one stage in a method of analysis of experience. But it is important to recognize that a subjective-ontological advantage has not been gained by this operation, which is completely nugatory so far as such consequences are concerned.

The Question of Independent Existence In the recent past the question of the independence or dependence of existence has been a recurrent issue, in keeping with what has been called the perennial problem of knowing and being. The different versions of the much discussed world-problem eventually lead back to the question of independent existence—that is, whether there is a domain of existence independent of and antecedent to the process of knowing. The so-called world-problem cannot be said to be a real problem, for the existing universe is the real basis of all thought and inquiry. There is compelling evidence that thought and inquiry are recent, limited events in a cosmic process that is unlimited temporally and spatially. It is thus unlike the question of the nature of the physical or social world. Falsification of the social world and

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concealment of real relations and causes are incomparably more important problems than the fictitious problem of the independent existence (or, indeed, the very existence) of the natural world, which has managed to remain unaffected by the skeptical or methodological doubts of philosophers. The cogito, which was in its original sense an important item in modern thought, has become a historical instrument for unsettling the thesis of the existence of the world. In the philosophy of the future, assuming that an equalitarian social system not disturbed by internal conflicts is developed on a world scale, there would be no excuse or motive for subverting the basic fact of the independent existence of the world. Neither would there be any serious deterrents in the way of establishing objectively sound knowledge about the social world. The frequently one-sided and misleading discussions of the nature of the economy, dealing with problems of money, profit, inflation, poverty, and so on, are examples of difficulties due to classinterest and self-interest that beset the understanding of the social world. Once the reduction to pure experience has been performed, which involves suspending the thesis of the independent existence of the natural world, one is faced with the problem of the relationship of the sphere of pure experience to what has been conceded to be the "rights" or truths of the natural view of the world. In short, there is a resulting world-problem, which I have called a methodogenic problem3 because it results from the adoption of a particular methodological approach, in the present case a radically subjective-reflective procedure. It does not help to argue that the natural world is contingent, so that its nonexistence is conceivable; for that is an assumptive argument, the premises of which can and must be challenged on grounds of the facts of established knowledge, which means with the requisite evidence. What is assumed by that argument? It is assumed that the entire world of existence can be treated as though it were an isolated particular event appearing in experience. Any experienced event may be doubted or held to be illusory, if not hallucinatory, from the point of view of an individual knowing being. But on the basis of the most direct facts of experience and established knowledge about the conditions of living and actual human existence, including dependence on the world for sustenance and on other persons for language, thought, and techniques, the physical and social world must be acknowledged

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to have antedated any particular knowing being and to be independent of all knowing beings, no matter how much they may do to change it. 4 For the world is always involved in a process of change, and it includes knowing beings as ingredient events, along with their activities and achievements. The traditional sharpness of philosophers in "questioning" the world is predominantly selective and abstractive; it results in methodogenic difficulties in various ways, conditioned historically and by individual peculiarities. It is assumed, in the literature of idealism and of pure phenomenology, that it is meaningless to talk of existence apart from an essential relationship to a knowing being (or to knowing beings). That is made clear by the delimitation of what is declared to be the closed sphere of pure experience. The entire procedure could be formulated without metaphysical implications for the specialized purposes of abstract reflective analysis, but that is unfortunately not the case. It is unwarranted to invoke the dogma that an object without a knowing subject is unthinkable, unless one were engaging in a merely verbal and trivial argument, with "object" an assumptive term involving a knowing subject. But even if one were to change the linguistic argument appropriately in order to obviate the error, that would not correct the underlying dogma. That can be done in principle by consulting the established facts about the place of man and his experience in the existing world. Failing to adhere strictly to a specialized descriptive program, the argument is extended by subjectivists to refer to all natural existence, the infinite realm within which even the pure philosopher carves out his allegedly selfcontained region for analysis. The argument assumptively consigns all existence to the region defined by the subject-object relationship, passing lightly over the difference between actual and possible experiences and their objects. Such premises are seen to be overextended when the nature of the facts about man's experience and the historical nature of existence, with its perspective of a beginningless past and an endless future, are considered. Finally, the assumption that existence is capable of closure by means of a knower-known (or noesisnoema) relationship is untenable. Either it merely implies that all existence can be stated to be in that relationship, from which it does not follow that it must actually be in that relationship, for it would require a kind of omnipresent knower, or an equivalent of some kind, all the way to an absolute mind, in order to avoid the charge of a non sequitur; or it is assumed that existence in general may be regarded as condi-

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The Search for an Alternative

tioned by or even constituted by subjective experience, in order to contribute toward a thoroughgoing understanding of experience and its world. But it would not follow that existence cannot be conceived to have antedated all knowing minds for an indefinitely long period of time, or that it cannot be conceived to go on without human life and experience in the future. It should be noted, in any case, that the actual correlation of knowing and being is the merest detail in the infinite realm of natural existence. Why then should one wish to deceive himself by means of tacit premises which are misleading at best, including the abstract and ontologically sterile conception of a possible relationship to knowing as such? That would hardly be sufficient for a feeling of cosmic comfort to be derived by going beyond the artifices of method in the analysis of experience. There is additional danger in such confusion, for if methods are devices for human inquiry and practice, they can also be means for obfuscation and the preservation of entrenched historical interests.

On Husserl's Later Philosophy When Husserl introduced his conception of a pregiven life-world, he seemed to be concerned with the problem of reconciling the claims of the natural attitude with those of his transcendental, constitutive phenomenology. Although he had considered this conception earlier, he discussed it at length in The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.5 The nature of the acknowledgment of a pregiven life-world can only be determined by answering some pertinent questions precisely. Is the entire spatiotemporal, natural world pregiven? Is the historical world, with its vast evolutionary background, also pregiven? Is a realm of independent existence acknowledged therewith; or is it the workaday world of everyday experience as such, without identification of any definite historical or cosmic location, and without reference to antecedent or contributing causes and conditions? Are the relationships discerned in the life-world adequate to account for the structural relationships of feudalism, or of modern capitalism, for example? Even if the answer were in the affirmative, which is not to be expected, are the events of the developing industrial world "first," not only for us but also "in themselves" (naturally including in the events "in themselves" the presence and participation of human beings, in their socioeconomic classes and activities)? When

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15

these questions have been considered, the answers should be reviewed in connection with Husserl's own pronouncements in his Crisis volume. It was of crucial importance to him to embrace the lifeworld in his program for a general constitutive phenomenology conducted according to the principles of his overriding subjectivism. It would be hasty indeed to regard his life-world conception as a naturalistic or materialistic departure, or to construe it in Marxist terms. Husserl was before all and above all a subjectivist, and he had only one way to go—in the direction of his distinctive type of idealism, featuring his penchant for eternalism. Husserl was never more unsatisfactory in this respect than in the Crisis volume, 6 but also never more fervently convinced that his way to philosophy was incomparably the right way. In effect, he appeared to be outflanking the various types of existential philosophy by means of his conception of a life-world; and also the objective sciences, which are subjected to an epoche in accordance with the procedure of transcendental phenomenology. The life-world itself was still in need of being adapted to his now seemingly enlarged constitutive program. As has been indicated, his use of the epoche, with its suspension of all naturalistic conceptions and determinations, leaves him with a philosophy which is greatly restricted in its content and effectiveness. It exposes him to a fundamentally incorrect view of man and of the very place of subjectivity and subjectivism in the cosmos and in real human history; for slaveholders, slaves, fascists, and workers are representative historical realities and not abstractive, nameless life-world denizens. His use of the epoche cuts him off from recognizing the impact of the facts themselves, meaning here the facts about man and his place in the existing universe temporally, spatially, and sociohistorically and the actual consequences for the theory of knowledge. The conception of phenomenology defended by Husserl indicates that non-Husserlian phenomenologists do not share a common denominator with him. It is emphasized in the Crisis volume that phenomenology is not intended to project a new science, in response to "a new, purely theoretical interest," and especially not a discipline serving the positive sciences; and there is a warning against the "misrepresentations of hurried readers . . . who . . . hear only what they want to hear." That he was boundlessly ambitious is clear enough, but that he failed to do justice to the knowledge gained about man and his place in the cosmos and in real history, and that he failed to apply it to man and his philosophical thought, is at least equally

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The Search for an Alternative

clear. In short, if a phenomenology of experience is to survive and make a place for itself as a scientific discipline serving the sciences, with no thought of dominating or admonishing them, it can succeed only on the basis of the existing world and real human beings, with their techniques, aims, and motives. The thought of comparing a cobbler and a phenomenologist (in the Crisis volume) is intriguing, even though the implication is denied that the life-world epoche "means no more for human existence, practically and 'existentially,' than the vocational epoche of the cobbler." Other vocations coming to mind will include the many types of skilled and unskilled labor, scientists, and educators. Despite the enormous importance of the function of such vocations in society, actually and potentially, there is no room for doubt as to the relative standing assigned to the phenomenologist. Asserting that there is "a complete personal transformation" which is effected by the epoche and the phenomenological attitude, a transformation "comparable in the beginning to a religious conversion," Husserl adds that it "bears within itself the significance of the greatest existential transformation which is assigned as a task to mankind as such." This may well remain as an unsurpassed faith, with nothing to support it. That none of the grave and really significant problems of mankind would be reached via the alleged existential transformation is predetermined by the nature of that transformation. It is far removed from the ideal of a rigorous science of philosophy, originally conceived abstractively and apart from the actual pursuit of science, and without the perspective of real history as applied so effectively by Marx and Engels, in its bearing upon ideas and human institutions.7 That perspective is needed if one is to understand the role of methods in relation to man and the existing world. To be sure, there are other and better things in the Crisis volume, but it is abundantly evident that it is not a new and important prospective type of phenomenology that is advanced there. Even the promising conception of meaning-sediments for the critique of science cannot stand by itself, in isolation from natural and real historical events and the work of practicing scientists. In the context of phenomenology it is undertaken within the confines of an abstract type of analysis concerned entirely with idealities, whereas what is needed to make contact with historical reality is a perspective for which temporal development is not only physically real, but encompasses human experience and all its conditions as well.

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On Phenomenology as an Alternative to Marxism Marxist thought and phenomenology or subjectivism in its general sense, including existentialism, have steadily come to the fore as representing major alternatives, both in theory and in practice. On both sides there are defenses of a strictly orthodox position, with deviations characterized as Marxist revisionism on the one hand, or as dogmatic (notably metaphysical or existential) aberrations as contrasted with pure phenomenology or transcendental subjectivism on the other hand. There has been a continuing search for alternatives within the indicated major alternatives, with occasional combinations of them testifying to the philosophical past of their authors, if not to their motives. To explain this interesting, profuse development one must look in more than one direction, for in addition to the nature of the reasoning employed, there are sociohistorical reasons, class or personal interests, and individual preference and temperament to be considered. Such a complex phenomenon is not to be fully accounted for in all its manifestations by means of a single causal-explanatory factor, although that is not to say that a unified theory is precluded thereby. In the Marxist literature, a humanist version and a revolutionary economic-materialistic version have been distinguished, with Marxist humanism now a prominent alternative. Although support for such an alternative might occur anywhere and at any time, it appears significant that it has developed in connection with tensions between Russia and countries in its sphere of influence, which readily provide a basis for social and political motivation of a trend of thought. The real historical Marx was a thinker who completed his development with respect to a dominant purpose. That purpose was the abolition of private ownership of the means of production and distribution, and therewith the abolition of the profit system. In Marx's view that meant the emancipation of the working class, which had "nothing to lose but its chains." How could the historical fulfillment of Marx's thought be circumvented? Many ways have been suggested, ranging all the way from external antagonism to intra-Marxist criticism, including the imputation of a narrow economic determinism, the emphasis upon the humanistic version of his thought, and the effort to undercut much of the science flourishing in the bourgeois world in the name of an ontology of man as characterized by free activity, with the concept of praxis bearing the main burden of the

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The Search for an Alternative

argument. This is the setting for Marxist revisionism in its socially motivated forms. If Marx had published a completed system of thought at a particular time, any deviation from it in the general area of his influence could properly be called revisionistic. It seems fair to infer from his own development, and his close attention to scientific progress, that he would have continued to change his thought in some respects if he had been alive and active for another twenty-five years. Reacting to his own intellectual background, which included Hegel and the tradition of philosophy, law, science, and literature, Marx broadened and deepened his understanding of social problems and human history. That meant emphasis upon neglected or misrepresented facts concerning man in his real social and economic relations. What led Marx to develop and change as he did is now well understood, in view of the availability of an extensive literature, including the complete edition of his writings and several volumes of Cornu's great biography.8 All the evidence indicates that he would undoubtedly have continued to react both critically and constructively to the sciences and to historical experience, rather than rigidly defend a previously accepted set of propositions. The danger of treating a philosophy as a closed system, or as an official set of principles and precepts, is always present. In general, there is a diversity of situations and motives that may lead to a revision of a given point of view, and that must be considered in judging its merits. In the case of Marx, the central issue is the preservation or abolition of capitalism, and all intellectual controversies pertaining to him are to be viewed in relationship to that issue. But there is still more to be considered. The historical change in philosophy, the sciences, and socioeconomic conditions must be considered in relation to the thought of Marx and Engels. A narrow reproduction or version of the now classical formulation of their philosophy would incur difficulties. There would be unanswered questions, and subsequent developments would require additional chapters and treatises to do full justice to them. Not the least of the problems is due to the tendency of some newly self-discovered interpreters toward identification with Marx himself. Whether Marxism is also a philosophy has itself become a moot question in some quarters. Everything depends upon the sense in which the term is used, for one can still advance a philosophy while rejecting much of the tradition, or even all of it. Thus Feuerbach, who

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published trenchant critiques of theology and speculative philosophy, could write, "No religion—is my religion; no philosophy—is my philosophy," meaning religion as theology and philosophy as speculation.9 There is philosophy and there is science in the seminal thought of Marx. The distinction between the structure of society and the superstructure of ideas and institutions, with recognition of the causal efficacy of elements of the superstructure, allows for the historical role played by ideas of all kinds. This constitutes the theme for a special science or for a group of special sciences. The Marxist rejection of the notion of man as a passive recipient of impressions of an independent and prior world of existence requires careful consideration. The idea of passivity with regard to an already completed world fits into a tradition going back to the upperclass conception of changeless being in ancient Greece, and it could be viewed as going along with the purposes of the status quo. But the prior and independent existence of the world—physical and social— may be maintained in its proper sense without neglecting the active character of human behavior or the degree to which the humanrelated world is affected by practical and theoretical activities. These activities should be understood to include conservative and reactionary trends as well as radical attempts to transform the humanrelated world. In short, a Marxist materialist must (and indeed does, in the best expressions of that philosophy, as shown by Marx, Engels, and Lenin) recognize the prior existence of an antehuman natural world. While recognizing the specific truth of a realistic epistemology, he is able to show to a striking degree how the contributive factors of human practice enter into the formation or transformation of the human-related world. This applies all the way from the development of an economic system to its decline and replacement, and from the occurrence of crises, waste, and pollution of the environment to social revolution. The radicalism of Marx differs on principle and in motivation from the radicalism of pure phenomenology, with its methodological suspension of all beliefs referring to an independently existing world, amounting to a radicalized philosophy of renunciation. Marx's central aim, as has been indicated, was a thoroughgoing transformation of the economic system and all that it entailed socially for a philosophy of human practice. Although his reasoning made use of a critical suspension of the acceptance of many beliefs in existing institutions and prevailing social practices, it operated on the ground of a world

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The Search for an Alternative

antedating human experience. The radicalism it expressed was opposed to the existing order of society, and many of those advancing it endangered or sacrificed their lives. The radicalism of transcendental phenomenology, on the other hand, does not challenge established interests or privileges as such, and it can be said truly that there is nothing political in the transcendental dimension. It is as remote from actually existing events and institutions as is the case with formal analysis—even though it is evident from a larger perspective that the very practice of such a radical method is indebted to the social and natural world at all times. This may be asserted despite the fact that the pure phenomenology that results from transcendental analysis lacks the necessary access to the real world, despite the possibility of changing to the natural attitude at any time. Its rudimentary structural findings are too greatly restricted to make significant contributions to actual living beings. There will not be enough to return to the existing world if too little was taken from it. The degree of this detachment is emphasized by Husserl's disavowal of all naturalistic motivation in his allegedly "unmotivated" discipline. Motives conditioned by the social and natural world are nevertheless responsible for the adoption of the phenomenological point of view and mode of inquiry in the first place, and every step in its procedure is located in that world. Once the need to extend the subjective domain is recognized, there is no way to prevent an unlimited number of existential approaches and developments from arising. The resulting literature is as enormous as it is varied. The revisionistic existential alternatives to pure phenomenology do not for the most part reach so far as the economic and social realities, just as they largely fail to take account of the natural world. Like pure phenomenology, they are at the same time alternatives to a direct program for changing the world by way of attempting to remove the causes of the problems of greatest concern to mankind. Placing primary emphasis upon changing structures or upon unusual, tragic, and subjective phenomena readily results in the ignoring of concrete socioeconomic problems. The very program and language of pure phenomenology, with its ideal of radical inquiry, led by the ideals of apodictic knowledge and freedom from presuppositions, is itself a mode of search for an alternative. How can social radicalism be circumvented, if not refuted? By resorting to another type of radicalism, transcendental in character, and sharpening the knife of analysis until it all but disappears, so that

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it is suited only for the handling of irreal idealities and generalities, while using a language professing true being and the highest concerns of mankind? Thus the real problems are missed effectively, leaving the realization of the ideal structures for the remote future. The program of social avoidance by way of a descriptive neutrality and vacuous ideals transcending actual conflicts represents a more exaggerated form of the saying, "Morgen, morgen, nur nicht heute," which may be continued in the present context as "sagen alle transzendentalen Leute"—but with "Morgen" understood to be an indefinite postponement for all mundane purposes. Here is indeed a basically distinct alternative to the theses of Marxist philosophy, which is the focal point for all thought toward a philosophy of participation and social change, led by the ideal of more complete human fulfillment.10 Some of the features of the emerging philosophy of the future are to be discerned in the juxtaposition and interplay of these opposing philosophies.

From the Sociohistorical Perspective The orientation of a philosophy to the evidence supporting logically established knowledge is a primary requirement for soundness and a continuing safeguard against errors and extravagances of thought. That includes the full recognition of the nature of the social system and of its motivational influences upon thinkers and writers. Conspicuous among the errors to be avoided are exclusive abstractive analysis and a narrow factualism, either neglecting relevant facts or not allowing for the importance of theory for the establishment of facts and for practice. There is the error of philosophical and Utopian reformers with ideal programs projected into an indefinite future. Such visionary writers fail to see that the present complex of social problems requires the transformation of the existing social system, rather than the inauguration of a sheerly created ideal society somehow located in the dim future, with no effective access to it. There is also the danger of immediate expediency, with the hope of preserving the present socioeconomic relations. In brief, the errors may be called "remote, detached, or idealized futurism," as contrasted with a "myopic, narrow immediacy" which takes the present system of society as a finality in its main structural and operational features. But it is unavoidable that all steps toward the future

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start from the present social system, and that requires a thorough understanding of the nature of capitalism, for which Marx's treatise on Capital11 has provided a revealing and indispensable analysis. Because the existing society affects and conditions all intellectual activities responding to its conflicts, it may be expected that new or continued forms of conflict will lead to opposing intellectual approaches and philosophical views of man and the world. The historical need to solve deep-seated human problems requires a repeated break with the prevailing views. The comparison of subjectivism and Marxism is thus pertinent. The "translation" of a critically reexamined subjectivist method and language is in order, to bring it into the family of the working methods of science in its broadest sense of logically organized knowledge and validated inquiry. Such restatements provide a basis for viewing and appraising all methods in the light of a general methodology, which in turn may be enriched by new formulations. The critique of the existing social order that has motivated dialectic, as opposed to static, nonhistorical, or evolutionary types of approach, will continue so long as the historical causes are present. In the future, with the eventual equalitarian solution of the major social problems of the modern period, the methodological extension and far-reaching insights represented by dialectic and sociohistorical inquiry may be continued indefinitely; and they have general philosophical implications. That would not be to assume a future idyllic form of society, devoid of conflicts and with no new problems. It is sufficient at this time to look ahead to the immediately relevant future, and only beyond that to make sure that no conditions are allowed to endure which might endanger human life in the more remote future. Cutting off the method of phenomenological analysis from the existing social and natural world and the intellectual forms developed historically greatly restricts its scope and renders it ineffective for many purposes. Pure phenomenology, with its recourse to immanent experience, was doomed by its commitments to remain out of touch with the so-called contingent world and the factual sciences. On the other hand, spokesmen for the dialectical approach may bring about a kind of undesirable detachment from the realm of scientific thought by making excessive claims for the independence of dialectic. It is both desirable and necessary to take account of all modes of sound inquiry, even though the total dialectical philosophy, with its dynamic impetus toward social change, and the scientific advance made

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possible by historical materialism, involves a radical transformation of prevailing philosophical views. The point is to understand differences, whether they be in the economic realm or in philosophy, by reference to the causes leading to those differences. The comprehensive unitary conception of method which is called for is not a monolithic, homogeneous kind of unity. It incorporates the truths of a methodology embracing various procedures and is fulfilled in special, selected situations, in accordance with the nature of the subject matter involved—for example, inorganic, organic, social, economic, formal, or philosophical. In short, it is a diversified unity—diversified with respect to its reference to selected subject matters requiring special methods for the solution of problems or answers to questions. This must be considered carefully in order to avoid any suggestion of a thoroughgoing relativism or a relativizing of truth in general. Where deduction is involved, the derived statements depend upon the nature of the premises and the system of thought involved. In a purely formal system freedom from contradiction is a prime requirement, and the question of the application to reality is most important practically. That kind of relatedness to the premises of a special system poses no threat of an embarrassing relativism. Where reality is involved, as for example social reality in the case of an economic theory, special assumptions may be introduced, and derived statements will be dependent upon those assumptions. In that case, they function like ordinary formal statements, and the problem becomes one of application to the realities of the social world. Thus truth is not relativized, but is seen to be realized in a diversity of situations and systems in different ways, without compromising the meaning of truth in relationship to natural and historical reality, but also without neglecting the reference to the future and the more comprehensive view of a dynamic world moving toward the future. All phases of human experience and knowledge are included in that larger view, for man and his activities are seen to be parts of the natural and social world and to be potential factors toward changing the world. The whole truth could not be achieved without the closure of time, which is out of the question. There would also be little point in positing some kind of escape from time as an ideal, unless one thought that it might serve as a means for overcoming the finitude of man. Such illusions are well left for those with the requisite emotional need for self-deception.

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On Philosophy and Social Change In considering the role of philosophy historically, one may emphasize the cumulative, progressive processes of growth which can be discerned, despite interruptions and complicating circumstances, as exemplified by the development of logic and dialectic. On the other hand, there is the ever-present motive of avoiding or modifying any program for social change that would interfere with special or dominant interests. This motive impels a perpetual and widespread search for an alternative, which can be recognized in concrete socioeconomic discussions and in the more remote, although by no means unrelated, realm of philosophical thought. Connections are often tenuous, however, and are in some cases difficult to establish. But, positively or negatively—meaning by that, by explicit commitments or by professed neutrality with respect to the human world—everyone unavoidably takes a stand on the status quo and its problems. Revisionism in numerous forms of manifestation is one of the modes of response chosen by representatives of special interests. This is conspicuously illustrated by the types of opposition to a definitive solution of problems resulting from social inequality and the domination of a social system by entrenched interests. The tendency toward revisionism can be seen to be present in all phases of experience, including philosophical thought. In the language employed by the present writer, this means the omnipresent search for an alternative, as a normal and natural tendency of the human mind whenever there is any possibility of choice, but it also means the reflection in the realm of ideas of conflicts in the social system. In the case of formal thought, say in the presentation of a deductive system, there are a number of alternative possibilities, differing in relative simplicity and with respect to the nature of the premises and basic ideas of the formal system. To seek an alternative in the context of formal reasoning could involve far-reaching principles, however, and even alternative philosophies of logic. In contrast to formal thought, conflicting social relations and economic interests present problems not to be solved by means of formally determined alternatives. Despite resemblances in the two spheres of discourse, the differences are weighty. Conflicting human interests are not only seen in one's own individual life, where subordination and even frustration occur for the purposes of a larger plan. They are seen in their most important forms in the antagonism of

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social and economic classes. The actual ways of dealing with the problems resulting from conflicting social interests include peaceful efforts, revolution, and brutal acts of suppression, depending upon the prevalent conditions, with examples ranging all the way from the handling of daily conflicts to wars and genocide. The numerous types of conflict which have been resolved practically and at least temporarily by means of programs of social and political action are not to be treated in the form of alternative approaches to a philosophy of human values. Interesting and important though alternative approaches may be for a rationally controlled practical life, for which it is possible to speak of a choice among a number of value-systems, the fact remains that such a pursuit is usually remote from the actual conflicts of our time. It is necessary to consider the social setting and linkage of the persons making the choice. Differences of objectives as well as premises have resulted in incompatible alternative philosophies. There are historical explanations for the development of conflicting philosophies responding to different motives. Thus there have been philosophers defending the church and philosophers undermining it. There were philosophers helping to prepare the way for the great French Revolution, and in more recent time, to defend or to oppose the existing social order. All of this is in accordance with the actual complexity of society, with its class alignments and antagonisms. Will this always be the case? Assuming idealized conditions of equality and fulfillment for the future, would thinkers simply follow the path of a nontemporal logical reason for the solution of problems? When stated in such abstract, general terms, it might seem possible to speak of a single unified philosophy of man and the world. But in determining the nature and province of philosophy, one must take account of the role of historical philosophies and not merely offer solutions to idealized problems. In contrast to attempts to defend the prevailing social system, a serious scientific philosophy, taking account of the achievements of the special sciences, may also make valuable additions to scientific knowledge. Like other sciences, such a philosophy is openended and forever incomplete, just as the temporal process is forever incomplete. Even assuming the absence of divisive interests, there are still alternatives to be considered apart from social alignments. Unity per se is not the aim. Truth and the maximum realization of human values are the real long-range objectives. There is no philosopher's

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stone to ensnare the truth or to solve all the problems of value-realization where conflicts abound, individually and socially. The way must be discovered progressively; it is not to be foisted upon man from the superior vantage point of a sovereign transcendentalism and is not to be guaranteed by any type of built-in ontology. It is to be earned honestly and painstakingly, learning from the lessons of the past and the collective efforts of serious thinkers in all fields of human endeavor.

2 The Perspective of Phenomenology

The Program for Descriptive Analysis

2

η its broadest sense the term "phenomenology" may apply to any type of descriptive philosophy of experience, with appropriate qualification. A purely descriptive discipline would undertake to assume nothing to begin with and would endeavor to avoid the introduction of theories and assumed constructions. That represents a highly restricted ideal, to be approached but never fully realized. The traditional treatments of experience involve assumptions and theories to varying degrees, with motives rooted in historical conditions. This is seen in the literature of empiricism, rationalism, and idealism. Husserl's elaborate and carefully defined method of procedure for the analysis of experience provides the closest approximation to a pure phenomenology. The clarification of the elements and structures of experience is a central theme of that philosophy, in keeping with its subjective character. Literally, the term "subjective" means "related to or involving a subject," and by "subject" a perceiving, thinking, and feeling being is meant. In the tradition of idealism, the subject and the object were

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regarded as mutually inseparable; and Schelling declared that an object without a subject is unthinkable. For Kant, judgments are "merely subjective when representations (Vorstellungen) are referred to a consciousness in one subject only and united in it, or objective when they are united in a consciousness generally, that is, necessarily."1 There have been numerous variants of subjectivism—individual, social, and absolute—as well as rationalistic and irrationalistic types. Husserl appears as a continuator of idealism in the development of his distinctive transcendental form of phenomenology. In a book representing a mature formulation of his views2 he states that by virtue of his method of epoche, everything objective is transformed into something subjective. By "inquiring into the subjective" he means inquiring into the psychic occurrences through which experience of the world is gained. For scientific psychology, the "presupposed" existing world is the "ground," and this "ground" is "taken from us by the epoche." The world or the objective thereby "becomes itself something subjective." From the point of view of natural existence, experiences have their causes and effects, and they play their part in the processes of life. For pure phenomenology, however, the essence-structures and meanings constituting the primary subject matter are viewed in the context of experiences of intention and fulfillment. The language of phenomenology has its history, in keeping with the various influences upon it, including Plato and Aristotle, medieval philosophy as transmitted by Brentano, British empiricism, rationalism, Kant, Bolzano, and James. In the early literature on the philosophy of experience, the popular term "idea" (Vorstellung, also translated by the term "presentation") is conspicuous but proves to be highly ambiguous and in need of clarification. Especially important historically is the confusion between the subjective and the objective. This error is incurred by Husserl himself in his early, prephenomenological period because of his initial acceptance of a misleading psychological theory and doubtful linguistic usage, with the term "content" naming both idea and object. This led to difficulties never overcome in the subsequent literature of pure phenomenology. The subjective stream of ideas refers to ("intends") a great variety of objects, which may be real or ideal. There is a difference between the meaningful act of reference and that which is meant as such. So far as pure phenomenology is concerned, there is no place in it for an

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independently real physical reality, for its subject matter does not go beyond the stream of experiences and their meant objects or objectivities. But it does aim to achieve a descriptive analysis of all modes and activities of experience, with the various types of objects involved. The justification for the view that there are acts of experience—of presentation, for example—is provided by reflecting upon the difference between a presentation and a presentation of the presentation. The existence of an act of presentation is shown by pointing out the difference between a mere sound and the same sound as an understood name. Thus there appear to be acts, contents of experience, and meant or intentional objects.

Kant and Husserl Experiences (cogitationes) are the stuff and substance of pure phenomenology, which is exclusively concerned with the activities of experience and their objects, just as they are meant. That is taken to be a closed domain for inquiry; it is said to be transcendental and is portrayed as a radically reflective point of view, with the experiences themselves as the material for reflection and with no stand taken on the independent existence of any of the objects of the experiences. For Kant, one's view is transcendental if it is concerned with one's experiencing an object, rather than with the object itself; and James has expressed it similarly in characterizing the object of reflection. The object is no longer the table, for example, but my perception of the table. The belief that there is a real, transcendent table is placed in abeyance by means of the phenomenological reduction to the realm of pure consciousness. Since the pure phenomenologist begins with his own experiences, the initial stage of his inquiry is called pure egology. But it is not a factual type of inquiry which is undertaken, for that would make it an empirical science. The restriction of the inquiry to essential structures and relations leads to the establishment of a purely reflective science of experience. Although it is true that much is to be found in that sphere, the nature of the idealized findings precludes making it the source of reality itself. In a strictly controlled descriptive discipline, due limits are imposed upon the permissible themes for inquiry, and it is then possible to determine to what extent it can contribute toward the solution of problems of actual existence or can aid in answering the more ultimate questions of philosophy.

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This situation is reminiscent of Kant, whose thought is a major influence on the development of transcendental phenomenology. Kant is firmly committed to the ideals of science and to the examination of the nature and reaches of experience. In addition to the ordinary usage for naming the contents of experience (including ideas or presentations), he uses the term "Idea" to name something transcending the limits of experience and going beyond our knowledge and possible evidence. Ideas of Reason such as the infinite, God, freedom, and immortality have a regulative use for the understanding, even though they are not knowable objects as such. This conception of an Idea lives on to some extent in pure phenomenology, even though Kant's thought is submitted to fundamental criticism. Thus Kant is criticized for failing to treat the knower in complete detachment from the conditions of his existence, which prevents him from establishing a pure philosophy of experience. Although the dualistic conception of an unknowable "thing in itself" provides a means for reconciling science and religion, it also stands in the way of a unified and unlimited program for descriptive inquiry. The quest for evidence in experience for all ideas, forms, and principles, including space, time, relation, the self or ego, and so on, requires that all previously accepted beliefs be reexamined. As a matter of method, an epoche (suspension of all beliefs) is a prerequisite, in order to avoid preconceived ideas and antecedent commitments. That is a basic requirement for the specialized purposes of a purely descriptive phenomenology. The further interest in a general phenomenological philosophy leads to the treatment of the traditional problems on that basis. Here the resemblance to the pattern of Kant's thought is again present, with the term "Idea" referring to something unattainable in experience but ideally conceivable as a limiting conception. The eighteenth-century presuppositions of Kant in science and philosophy are examined by means of a more radical method, led by the ideal of freedom from presuppositions. The slogan "Back to Kant" of the later nineteenth century is answered by the initial phenomenological program for an endless process of descriptive inquiry. But the elaboration of a pure phenomenology of experience encounters difficulties of a new kind. The quest for the suspension of all presuppositions is unavoidably conducted on the current intellectual level, with assumptions taken over from the sciences and philosophy. Even though such assumptions are regarded as suspended, the

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subjective inquiry is incapable of making a difference in the structure of scientific knowledge if it remains within its own framework. In short, the goal of freedom from presuppositions represents an ideal which cannot be realized by the mere formulation of a program, for there prove to be insuperable obstacles in connection with the existing world and the nature of experience. Thus the critique of presuppositions unavoidably becomes a never-ending process, which does not stop with the reduction to an ideally conceived realm of pure experience, with its own peculiar assumptions. That entire dimensions of reflection are lacking in such a procedure will become increasingly clear in the present volume. Furthermore, there are problems resulting from the treatment of the contents of experience as ideal finalities which are disengaged from their natural setting. The restriction of the inquiry to essence-structures and the analysis of meaning is undertaken in accordance with the program of a universal science of experience, whose function is conceived as analogous in a way to pure geometry in relationship to physical science. The ideal structures of experience are seen to be exemplified in real psychical processes, and in this sense phenomenology is said to be basic to scientific psychology. The indebtedness to the tradition of rationalism for this conception is apparent. The ideas are regarded as exemplifying ideal relations and forms which are seen (or directly "intuited") in experience and are so to speak lifted out of nature and social change. Thus Husserl speaks of the "supertemporal" in his Experience and Judgment,3 a book which could be well characterized as a phenomenological sequel to Kant's analysis of experience.

Ideas and Ideal Limits of Experience The various modes of experience—for example, perception, remembrance, fantasy—are grouped under the heading of noetic acts, along with the noematic objectivities which are meant. Perception has a preferred status in the analysis. The analysis of experience begins with the perception of resting, unmoved objects, in accordance with the methodological precept that one should begin the analysis with the more simple and then ascend to the more complex. The term "Ideas" is used to refer to ideal limits of experience. Exact concepts, which have their correlates in essences, are said to have the character of Ideas in the Kantian sense, 4 as distinguished from

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descriptive concepts which are based upon direct intuition and do not involve anything ideal. A process of ideation presents the ideal essences as ideal limits of experience, and they are not to be found in any sensory experience; they may be approximated but never reached by descriptive concepts. This ideation is fundamentally different from the grasping of essences by simple abstraction, in which a factor of an object is selected as something typical. The stream of experience is apprehended as a unity, not in a single act of experience but like an Idea in the sense of an ideal limit. This is said to be indubitably given in immanent perception. The Kantian Idea that points beyond experience is declared to be mentally seen, although it is recognized that the adequate determination of its content—the stream of consciousness in this case—is unattainable. Thus the attempt to include all ideas (including the ultimate Ideas that would require transcending all limits of experience) within the descriptive realm of phenomenology is confronted by unattainable goals. On the other hand, it may be that the conception of Ideas as ideal limits states everything that can be said meaningfully within the subjective frame, without acknowledging an inaccessible region beyond all possible experience. The strictly descriptive account of the process of experience includes a view of its incompleteness. Just as the series of perceptions of a physical object—a desk, for example— may be unending, without ever attaining the ideal goal of completeness; so in the case of the series of natural numbers the progression 1, 2, 3, . . . is unending, and one can observe the character of "and so forth"—descriptively, and without recourse to a formal rule determining "and how forth." A complete intuitive view is impossible in both cases, as shown by inspection of the actual content of experience. It is Husserl's thesis that no concrete experience can be regarded as entirely independent and that it needs completion by means of a connected context. In the case of an outer perception, say of this particular house, it can be seen that a larger environment or stream of experience (Erlebnisumgebung) necessarily belongs to it as a determination. Although that is peculiar and necessary, it is nevertheless "extra-essential" and is such that changing it does not change anything in the peculiar essential content of the experience. As the larger stream changes, the perception itself changes, but its inner peculiarity can be regarded as identical. Two essentially identical perceptions could not also be identical with respect to the larger stream, for they would then be one perception. Furthermore, two streams of experience or spheres of consciousness belonging to two

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pure egos could not be conceived to have an identical essential content, and neither could any definite individual experience of the one ever belong to the other. Only experiences identical in kind could be common to them. Husserl points out that things appearing to us can only be perceived inadequately. Although the transcendent objects of nature or the world cannot be completely given to any finite consciousness, the complete givenness is predelineated (vorgezeichnet) in the form of an Idea, as a continuum of appearances which are determined a priori. It is accordingly only as an Idea that the completed givenness lies before us and is open to our insight. The insight that the infinity of appearances can never be grasped intuitively goes along with the demand that the Idea of this infinity be insightfully given to consciousness. Thus the essence (or Eidos) of "truly-being" (Wahrhaft-sein) is correctively equivalent to the essence of "being adequately given" and "capable of being posited with evidence," in the sense of finite givenness or givenness in the form of an Idea. The case in which the being is "immanent," as a completed experience or noematic correlate of experience, is contrasted with the case of transcendent being, with the transcendence due to the infinitude of the appearances. The meaning is fulfilled in direct experience and coincides with the object in the case of adequate and immanent experience. But there can be no adequate givenness for a transcendent intuition, and only the Idea of such an objectivity can be given, along with an a priori rule for the infinities of inadequate experiences. The question of the status of the natural world and of access to it with the available means of pure phenomenology is raised therewith. The answer can only be given on the basis of the noetic and noematic structures to which it is restricted. How pure phenomenology may cooperate with empirical thought and the natural sciences in bridging the gap between the structural analysis of experience and the behavior of objects in the transcendent physical world is a basic problem left unsolved by Husserl. It is the first motivating question for a more general materialistic phenomenology, which would embrace the findings of pure phenomenology as a subordinate, revised, and reconstituted discipline.

The Materialistic and the Phenomenological Attitude The attitude or point of view (Einstellung) employed in pure phenomenology must be considered carefully, if misunderstandings

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and difficulties are to be avoided. Fortunately, the English language does not suggest the use of the spatial metaphor indicated by the German expression "in the purely reflective attitude of phenomenology." It should read, rather, "as viewed from the point of view of pure reflection" (or, in another example of its use, "from the materialistic point of view"), so that any suggestion of real ontological consequences because of a change of attitude or point of view may be avoided. From the materialistic point of view, the tree is something that exists in the real spatiotemporal world, which means making the all-inclusive ontological realm of material existence the point of departure and reversing the phenomenological order of priority. From the purely reflective point of view, the tree is regarded as a "bracketed" object because of the phenomenological reduction, and it is what is meant in perceptual experience. The tree as a thing in nature is to be distinguished from the perceived tree as such. No matter what happens to the natural tree, which may be destroyed, the meaning of the perception is not affected. The concept of an object as meant is useful for the purposes of a descriptive theory of knowledge. Avoiding all preliminary ontological distinctions, objects are considered only as meant correlates of experiences, whether they be perceptual, conceptual, or imaginative. The physical realities as objects meant in experience are included as one type, along with other types such as idealized fictions in formal thought and objects of illusion and hallucination. Granting the special utility of this procedure, the inevitable question remains whether the tree is really independent of experience, as an event in natural evolution. A prior question of actual fact is at issue; it is not only because of a point of view (the materialistic point of view) that it may be said to exist in nature and to transcend conscious experience. The noesis-noema correlationship of pure phenomenology is a device for analysis, and it cannot be defensibly used as a step toward a spiritualistic metaphysics.

The Role of Reflection The method of inquiry in pure phenomenology is reflective throughout. The descriptive analysis of the stream of consciousness is accomplished by means of acts of reflection that also belong to the stream of experience, and these acts in turn can become objects of

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analysis for another level of reflection. By means of reflection, the stream of experience can be analyzed with evidence; it is, as Husserl states it, the title of the method of consciousness for the knowledge of consciousness in general. But the term "reflection" is also the title for types of experience that belong together essentially and constitute an important chapter in phenomenology. Every kind of reflection has the character of a modification of consciousness which every consciousness can undergo on principle. The phrase "modification of consciousness" is used because the transition to reflection from nonreflective experience occurs by means of a change of the point of view. There is a basic difference between reflective consciousness and absolutely nonreflective experience, with its immanent or intentional data, whereby the original process of direct experience undergoes an essential modification. The experience itself is a stream of becoming, a continual stream of retentions from the past and protentions (anticipations) of the future; the living present of the experience is known, as distinguished from its "before" and "after." The continually streaming, living "now" is the absolutely original phase. It is only by means of reflection on the acts of experience that we can have knowledge of the stream of experience and its relationship to what is called the pure ego. The incompleteness of perception is now viewed in its incompleteness, in accordance with what is directly present to consciousness. Throughout the inquiry, Husserl insists upon abiding by what he calls "the principle of all principles," that complete clarity is the measure of all truth and that strict adherence to this principle renders descriptive statements immune to hostile criticism. This rationalistic principle, however, is itself in need of clarification.5

The Question of Ideal Unities The conception of intentional objects was vigorously challenged by contemporary writers. Thus Theodor Ziehen declared that they constituted a "third reality" in addition to the psychical and physical. In his view, the concepts of Husserl represented ideal unities with a kind of existence apart from our ideas. The appeal to intuition and evidence was held to be objectionable because of its variability among philosophers and philosophical schools.

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Husserl does in fact give some basis for the charge of critics that reality is being complicated unnecessarily by the transcendental, constitutive procedure of phenomenology. That is shown, for example, by his view that not only does every addition of new or modification of old noetic characters constitute new noematic characters, but that "new ontical objects" therewith constitute themselves for consciousness. It is necessary to make clear, however, how much is included in the meaning of "ontical objects," and also the actual role played by consciousness when something "constitutes itself for consciousness." The answer depends upon the meaning of constitution, and above all whether the nature of constitution is to be determined by a sheerly descriptive account of processes displayed in experience. In other words, the alternatives are an interpretation leading to metaphysical idealism, for which reality is made up of ideas, and a strictly descriptive and nonassumptive although specialized treatment of experience. For pure phenomenology operates within the "reduced" realm of pure experiences, as viewed reflectively and as subject to a group of conditions for its procedure. It is possible to find statements and arguments supporting both the idealistic and the strictly descriptive versions in Husserl's own texts. But there can also be no doubt about his ultimate preference for a thoroughgoing idealism, including its ontology, for which to be real means to be an item in a transcendentally determined realm.

Psychological Reflection and Pure Phenomenology It is Husserl's contention that one cannot probe to the most original evidence of experience by means of psychology.6 Psychological reflection upon the experiences does not show how the "garment of ideas" thrown over the world arises from the original experience of a pregiven life-world (Lebenswelt). Taking the experiences to be single distinct occurrences in our consciousness, psychological reflection treats them as experiences of the world as conceived and portrayed by modern science. For the pure phenomenologist, that means failing to go back to something more original in experience, because the psychologist has no way of proceeding from the experiences he finds present to the "origin" of this world itself. The "origin" is taken by Husserl to be due to subjective accomplishments, activities of knowledge, and the practice of scientific methods, through which the world

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is said to stand before us as determined in a certain way and as being capable of further determination in infinitum with regard to its true being. The performing subjectivity does not belong to an experiencing subject reflecting psychologically and looking at a completed world. It is rather a subjectivity through whose contributions of meaning a new idea of the world results. A set of meaning-sediments is deposited in diverse ways in the course of human history. But the pure phenomenologist is not interested in the way in which these meaningsediments arise in a particular historical subjectivity or in particular historical persons who formulate ideas for the first time (e.g., the ideas of mathematical form). Our world is regarded as an example in which we may study the structure and the "origin" or constitution of a possible world in general out of subjective sources. The process of idealization as something added to or superimposed upon the world can be more clearly discerned in this way. The transcendental subjectivity which is said to be involved in tracing out the meaning-deposits accruing in the course of experience is based upon the self-reflection of a knowing being, and this is in accordance with a motive for inquiry inaugurated by Descartes. In the process of the analysis, simple experiences are distinguished from founded experiences. The world is regarded as basically given in simple experience, as a domain of simple substrates that can be apprehended sensuously. In our world of experience, nature is the lowest stratum, founding all the others. Outer perception is called an "originally giving" experience. The external world is perceived as being in the space and time of nature. Where we encounter animals, men, and cultural objects, we do not merely have nature, but the expression of the spiritual sense of being, and there we are led beyond the domain of sensory experience. In contrast to sense perception, referring to bodily things, there is the perception concerned with the understanding of expression, such as the understanding of a tool in its referential "remembrance" of human beings who made it for a purpose. Another example is the expression of a material body as belonging to a human being. In such cases, a sense perception of the material thing founding the expression is presupposed; and there is also a process of reflection that directly or indirectly brings to consciousness a togetherness of a human or an animal subjectivity. In this way a type of existence is seen which is not only bodily existence but is also united with something subjective. This type of existence

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cannot be directly perceived, as in the case of corporeal things; it can be experienced only when founded through sense perception. The reflection is therefore not a process of perception directed upon what is perceived but involves turning away from the straight direction of perception. If one attends to a human being, the thematic ray of the activity is at first directed to the body in sense perception; but in understanding the expression it goes on to the ego-subject, and to his being, in various respects—for example, in being occupied with things or problems, in being affected by the world—insofar as that comes to expression. This normal process, leading from the body through the expression to the expressive ego-subject, permits a change of attitude or point of view. If one attends only to bodily existence, the expression is still understood, but the understanding does not function, and the ego-subject is there only as a background, so that it is extra-thematic. To attain to the final and original evidences, we must go back from the founded experiences to the most rudimentary forms, setting all expression aside. That would be to regard the world purely as the world of perception, abstracting from (or setting out of function) all other processes. Thus one may speak of a pure universal nature as perceived and as perceivable by an individual knowing being. In this abstractive restriction of experience to the domain of what is valid only for the person who reflects, all idealizations are excluded, along with the presupposition of the objectivity and validity of our judgments for all knowing beings as acknowledged in the tradition of logic. The methodological restriction to the realm of a single ego is held to be necessary in order to clarify the contributions of logical thought. The ideas of perception bringing us into direct contact with the natural world are selective and incomplete in their content. They have a kind of polar reference to a unified object meant as the same throughout the flux of experiences. The ideas of reflection include all the original or direct experiences in their subject matter. In pure phenomenology, reflection operates without the usual acknowledgment of an independently existing world. Although the existence of a pregiven life-world is admitted, that merely introduces another farreaching problem. 7 Pure phenomenology culminates in a program of constitutive analysis, seeking to account for all objects on the basis of direct experience. The structures of what is called the original lifeworld are to be accounted for by a process of origin-analysis, tracing

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out the complex structures to their simplest components. The acknowledgment of a pregiven life-world as having been "always there" is thus merely provisional, leaving open the "deeper" goal of accounting for it in the realm of pure experience, in which all meaningful ideas are said to have their place, along with their meant objectivities.

The Horizons of Experience Viewed reflectively within the phenomenological frame, every experience is seen to have its horizon, which means that there is a possibility of gaining further determinations. An experience of a single thing has its inner horizon, signifying a feature of induction in the experience itself. This is based upon the original character of anticipation. Not only are determinations in the experienced object anticipated; the expectation goes beyond them to the background of objects of which we are aware. Thus in addition to an inner horizon every experienced thing also has an infinite outer horizon of other objects, and hence a horizon of a second stage involving a horizon of the first stage, to which one can turn at all times. Every real object has its place in the one spatiotemporal horizon, directly or indirectly. We can regard what further perception could and would bring as belonging to reality itself. But every such "pre-envisagement (Vorveranschaulichung) of the a priori" which is to be ascribed to reality is essentially indeterminate. As in the case of a remembrance, we have a representative intuition but not a firm, individually binding determination. As we progress toward inner determinateness, we become aware, for instance, of the color of the thing, which is to be maintained. Every pre-envisagement occurs with a fluid variability, of which one is also aware, indicating the range of possible determinations within consciousness—for example, as a determinate color, but as a free variant which could be replaced by others. The arbitrariness is not unlimited, however. In the fluctuation of the pre-envisagement and in the transition from one variant to another, we remain in the unity of the anticipation, for example of the color of the reverse side, and the anticipation is indeterminately general. There is a range of possibilities for the actual existence of this color, and this indicates the scope of the anticipation. In the case of the outer horizon, the distinction between being

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known and not being known, with the relative distinction between indeterminate generality and determinate particularity, is a fundamental structure of world-consciousness. Being unknown is a mode of being known, in Husserl's language; an object can at least be apprehended within the most general form, "object in general." From the point of view of pure phenomenology, an existent object is treated as though it were the product of our cognitive activity. But this production of the object is not accomplished out of nothing, for there are always pregiven objects, just as there is a pregiven environment of objects for us; and these objects are possible substrates of experiences.

Primitive Ideas and Origin-Analysis Ideas taken as primitive on the level of formal logic are submitted to a process of clarification and analysis in phenomenology. The method or origin-analysis, tracing complex ideas back to elementary forms in experience, is employed in the examination of negation, relation, and possibility, for example. The origin of one concept of possibility lies in a conflict of inclinations to believe. There may be problematical possibilities that are in conflict with one another. The idea of problematical possibility, arising out of a situation of doubt, is contrasted with the idea of open possibility which is founded on the uninhibited and unbroken course of perception. Although there is always a predelineation of the farther side of a perceived object, the general indeterminateness has a range of free variability. In the clarification of the origin of the modalities, the simplest certainty of belief is the primal form (Urform). All other phenomena, such as negation, the consciousness of possibility, and the reinstatement of certainty through affirmation or denial, are regarded as first arising through the modalization of this primal form. The objectivities on the higher level of the understanding, as illustrated by logical and mathematical forms, are described as irreal, and yet they are said to be temporal. They are distinguished from objects on the level of sense perception by the difference of their temporality. That there is a sense in which objectivities of the understanding occur in the world, even though they are irreal, is shown when we say that an idea or an identical judgment-meaning is discovered. After being discovered, such objectivities can be thought again at will. It is also true that they were already valid before their discovery. Although it is said that "there are" irreal mathematical objects which have not yet

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been constructed, their existence is first shown by their construction or by their being experienced. So long as they are not discovered by anyone, they are not in space and time in any factual sense, and hence they have no mundane reality. The timelessness of the objectivities of the understanding, their "everywhere and nowhere," is viewed as a distinctive form of temporality, a form which distinguishes them from individual objects. 8 As irreal, they can occur in various realities and remain ideally identical. This is shown in the case of ideal judgment-meanings which are held to be the same in all statements, whether repeated in a similar manner or expressed in different symbols—for example, "that 17 is a prime number" can be expressed in various ways. Similarly, ideal sameness is present in the experience of cultural objectivities. Thus Goethe's Faust occurs in any number of real books called copies of Faust. The ideally identical Faust, as the same meaning-complex, is embodied in the real world, but is not individuated in the embodiment. The objectivities of the understanding are a special case of a comprehensive region of ideal objectivities, whose irreality can be explained by saying that they belong to the order of meanings. Having a real embodiment is essential to a meaning-objectivity. From the point of view of pure phenomenology, every object, whether irreal or real, is regarded as an identical pole of reference, as the object meant as the same in a variety of experiences. Thus the subject-object relationship is of central importance, for in this context it is held to be meaningless to speak of anything that is not an object of possible experience. But no ontological consequences follow from this methodological principle. The proper use of reflective analysis with the subject-object or noesis-noema correlation need not lead to a spiritualistic metaphysics; and it may be subordinated to a larger, scienceoriented philosophy, making use of all logically acceptable methods and taking care not to confuse the ascription of ideal sameness with actual existence. In that way the otherwise hopeless problem of returning from the transcendental realm of pure experience to the natural world is obviated, for one never really leaves that world.

Essences and the Existing World Phenomenology has been widely understood to be opposed to psychology, because of Husserl's critical opposition to naturalism and

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some of his remarks about scientific psychology. The rising science of experimental psychology had marked effects on the philosophical outlook and tended to disparage the reflective mode of inquiry of phenomenology. Thus the experimental psychologist Georg Elias Müller declared that he had never seen a "law of essence" (Wesensgesetz). The failure to discern the possible role of a descriptive phenomenology of experience by such special scientists was in part due to the use or misuse of insufficiently clarified concepts, as illustrated by essence and "seeing of essences" (Wesensschau), and the obstacles were added to by a false appraisal of the nature and potentialities of science and scientific method on the part of many phenomenologists. The question of the status and function of essences is crucial. Essences are regarded as determinate and lasting. Their relationship to the natural order of events must be pointed out, for experience does not begin with essences. They emerge from the natural order of events and are never completely dissociated from that order. It must be recognized that so-called essential structures and laws are instrumental and ancillary; they are not to be regarded as eternal ontological molds. They are bound to the real world of physical and historical existence, even though they may be treated as independent and autonomous, as a specialized stage in the more complete process of scientific inquiry. Essences come into being for phenomenology through a process of ideational abstraction. The underlying reality may change or disappear, as in the case of temporary historical forms and institutions. Thus the essence of a strikebreaker is a late emergent because strikebreakers appear in the course of industrial history. It ceases to have any application if strikes and the breaking of strikes become outmoded historical events; but the application is also affected if the behavioral patterns of strikebreakers change appreciably, or are superseded by other tactical procedures—undercover operations, for example—in economic class conflicts. Similarly, the strikes themselves change historically in their forms and causes, so that the formulation of the essential nature of a strike must be guided by the facts of industrial history. The peculiar advantages claimed for a phenomenological approach to psychology must be considered in comparison with a behavioral approach, and also a pluralistic approach embracing physical, biological, social, and reflective regions. Because psychology comprises a group of disciplines based upon the natural and social sciences, an ideally complete psychology would involve a broad

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region of ontology. In comparing the different approaches to psychology, one must consider the selection of facts and the nature of the questions for inquiry. Both descriptive procedures and explanatory devices must be employed. A phenomenological approach must have recourse to structural patterns in experience, of which ideal essences are an extreme, limiting case. There can, however, be more variable patterns, with essential structures reinterpreted with reference to the natural and social events involved. This is seen, for example, in the description of the self or ego and individuality, in relation to the different historical societies in which they emerge, as well as in relation to the socioeconomic conditions affecting them within the same social system. That natural events are prior to reflective processes is a factual truth. One can speak of a law of the dependence of reflection upon natural experience, but one can also speak of the power of reflection in dealing with possibilities and with ideal constructions. There are rules for the good behavior of idealities, including, first of all, orientation to the facts, and sensitivity to changes in natural experience— whereby a good working knowledge of the special sciences is of the greatest value, along with awareness of changes in scientific knowledge and also in social problems and tendencies. On the other hand, a merely factual treatment of behavior has its limitations, and there is a need for logical analysis and scientific clarification, involving questions requiring the cooperation of two or more sciences; and there is also a need for the type of sociohistorical analysis made possible by historical materialism, both because it focuses attention upon vitally important problems otherwise ignored or treated one-sidedly and because it provides an indispensable frame of unity for all human endeavors.

The Extension of Phenomenology If it is accomplished with strict observance of its own descriptive precepts, the elaboration of a specialized phenomenology of experience is as defensible as the elaboration of the formal logic which it seeks to clarify. But it must not introduce traditionally rooted ideas without a foundation in experience. The strength of pure phenomenology is dependent upon its very limitations, and in that respect it is like geometry and formal logic, for they also have their peculiar merits

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and special functions. Each of these disciplines has its own proper questions for which its method is instituted. In the case of pure phenomenology, the basic clarification of all contents of experience in terms of direct evidence is the final goal. The application of its findings to logic is most fruitful, and there is possible promise in their application to psychology. The phenomenological approach to history and social problems is most remote and is least successful thus far in the literature. The reason is readily seen. The essentially static conception of ideas is not softened by the so-called genetic procedure of originanalysis that traces them back to simpler forms in experience. Such an account has no reference to real time or history; it has nothing to do with what happens in actual fact. The field of pure phenomenology is therefore limited in the nature of the questions it can raise. Its claim to absolute knowledge requires that it make an absolute beginning within the framework of a self-reflecting ego. But the thinking being who says "I think" and surveys his ideas is himself a part of the world of nature and human society. His ideas are conditioned by that world, and they have a history. Experience is a changing process, just as the world of experience is a changing world. Ideas that occur in one historical setting are apt to be different from related ideas in another historical setting, even though the same terms may be used. This is strikingly seen in the case of moral and socioeconomic ideas, for they presuppose definite historical conditions. To suppose that there is a fixed, eternal essence of love, for example, or that there is an unchanging essence of friendship, property, and war, would be to disregard the facts. Even though an essence can be defined and thus rendered determinate, essences may come and go, and they must be adjusted to the changing realities if they are not to become obsolete or are not to be judged useless because of inapplicability. Hence it is necessary to enlarge the sphere of a restricted phenomenology of experience, in order to provide for change and novelty. The abstention of pure phenomenology from all beliefs about reality prevents it from considering the place of the mind or the knower in the existing world. Although Heidegger raises this question in a communication to Husserl,9 it proves to be no more than verbal, for he does not succeed in going beyond the framework of subjectivism. In general, the exponent of pure phenomenology thus faces the danger of using his philosophy as a mode of retreat from

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social and factual problems. Philosophical materialism provides the requisite point of view for the restoration of contact with the real world. A critically revised pure phenomenology is then incorporated into a larger materialistic phenomenology, functioning as a general philosopy of experience. As a specialized discipline, reflective analysis has its own peculiar questions and relative autonomy. If conceived without dogmas and applied rigorously in accordance with its restricted program, it would be a relatively independent discipline which is nevertheless to be subordinated to the collective totality of sciences dealing with the world of existence. Since ideas are viewed in abstraction from their natural and historical setting in pure phenomenology, questions pertaining to causal influences on the actual formation and change of ideas are not raised. All that can be learned from it about the structure of experience can be put to use in the more complete account made possible by a materialistic phenomenology, employing a unified methodological principle that allows for a diversity of approaches and devices of method, in accordance with the selected subject matter and the questions to be answered. 10 No single method can be expected to answer all types of questions. There are questions peculiar to a specialized discipline, and this is clearly seen in the case of pure phenomenology, with its self-imposed limitations. Questions involving real existence are ruled out, but they are appropriate from the larger point of view of a complete phenomenology of experience. The avowed exacting standards of pure phenomenology may be a helpful influence in all further inquiry. But it needs the factual content of experience viewed in its actual place in nature and human history if its specialized findings are to be integrated with other disciplines concerned with the world of experience. The attempt to begin without initial beliefs is merely a provisional device of method. There could be no lasting tabula rasa with respect to the knowledge established by the sciences and ordinary experience, and the attempt is never realized in fact. Apart from the fictional realm of subjectivism, one must recognize what is actually known about the place of man and his ideas in the process of natural and social evolution. If the point of view of pure phenomenology is adopted, existence cannot be affirmed by the reflecting phenomenologist, who operates to begin with as a self-chosen minority of one and is exclusively occupied with his own process of experience. The establishment of evidence for the existence of other selves then becomes a decisive problem which cannot be satisfactorily solved within the

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assumed limits of reflective experience. From the more comprehensive point of view a materialistic phenomenology, the self-reflecting phenomenologist is included in history and physical existence. The perspective of pure phenomenology is restricted to structural analysis in a subjective setting, whereas the perspective of a materialistic phenomenology is extended to include all logically acceptable types of method and all conditions of experience.

3 The Retirement to Inner Experience

Concerning Method in Philosophy

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t is a revealing commentary upon the state of philosophy to observe that any striking attempt to determine its subject matter anew is given wide attention, whether it be successful or not. The conspicuous attempts made in recent years have resulted in much controversy but unfortunately not always in fruitful discussion. Nothing less than the meaning of the philosophic enterprise as a whole has been called in question. An account of the meaning of philosophy should not exclude its historical status and function. What philosophy is must be determined by the historical facts;1 what it should be remains to be established. Traditionally, philosophy has functioned as an expression of the leading motives and interests of a historical period. Conditioned by the prevailing scientific level, from which its main theoretical content is derived, it also responded to socioeconomic, political, and religious influences. Clearly evident throughout the history of philosophy, however, were periodic attempts to construct a philosophy that would be binding on all thinkers who accept the logical standards of evidence

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and valid reasoning. A well-defined method is a prime requirement of such a philosophy. The general principle which holds for all our thinking, requiring that every statement be examined with respect to the method and evidence by which it was obtained or established, certainly holds good for philosophy. Care must be taken to avoid the narrowness or excesses that may result from the exclusive use of one method. Each type of method has been devised for a definite purpose, in every case to solve problems or to answer questions. Hence there is a place for all logically acceptable methods, whether to solve or to dissolve problems, as the case may be. It is not true that the procedures employed in philosophy cannot be subsumed under the concept of method in general. The very process of reflection which is required becomes a theme for a methodological analysis for which there are no exceptions. It has been argued that because the questions prompting the development of philosophical methods are most fundamental and universal in their significance, they are prior to all other methods. But philosophical methods presuppose the methods by which natural and social existence are known, so that there are no exceptions to the interrelationship of all methods of establishing knowledge and solving problems. It would be impossible to decide in advance and finally concerning the procedures that may be employed in philosophy. That could be done only if all present and future types of question were known. But it is another matter to ask whether philosophy makes use of any methods which are peculiar to it—for example, synoptic generalization or the interpretation of reality as a whole with reference to the special sciences. Although it is an essential element in all constructive philosophy, it may be undertaken naively, or critically. It is said to be naive if any subject matter is taken over without question as a basis for philosophy—for example, if the findings of the special sciences are simply taken over, in order to effect a cosmic generalization which seems to account for the facts known at a given time (e.g., generalizations by Comte, Spencer, and Haeckel in the ninteenth century). A critical philosophy that undertakes to reexamine the nature of experience and its relationship to the existing world must carefully consider the nature of the starting point and the entire constructive program. This has been done in different ways, with materialistic and idealistic points of view prominently represented. The phenomenological method is designed to attain this objective in its way, and it eventuates in a distinct form of transcendental

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idealism. It endeavors to found philosophy as an autonomous discipline and to formulate the procedure which would not only make it the fundamental "root-science" but also enable it to serve all knowledge constructively. This method should be considered in connection with two other leading types of procedure, the method of formal logic and the dialectic method. (1) The exact method of formal logic could hardly function as a self-sufficient Organum for philosophy, despite its undeniable merits. The enlarged program of logical and linguistic analysis aids in detail in realizing the Leibnizian-Husserlian ideal of a mathesis universalis. As in the case of phenomenology, its criticism of past and present philosophical trends may well be both damaging and beneficial. If objection is taken to it, that is for at least two reasons: (a) It cannot be the only method of philosophy, for it does not do justice to the whole field of systematic and historical inquiry. It is not enough to dismiss most traditional philosophy as being poetry.2 (b) It really operates on a high level of forms and devices produced by the historically conditioned understanding. Symbolic structure is central for it, and there is a group of presuppositions requiring clarification. It is not intended to give us that final understanding which is expected of philosophy as a whole. It could be expected to come to terms and to cooperate with a sound phenomenological approach, on the basis of an adequate analysis of experience, for which a systematic examination of assumptions would be helpful. But all forms of what may be called detached or abstractive philosophy, which deal with a subject matter disengaged from its real existential setting, are assumptive in their way, for they presuppose a world, and even though their programs purport to examine assumptions generally they are likely to fail because entire regions of questioning tend to be neglected or ignored. (2) The dialectic method, on the other hand, in its most fruitful form proceeds from the dynamic world of reality. A thoroughly dialectical philosophy spanning existence in its entirety must treat all things, including the formation of ideal meanings and structures, as phases of becoming. Its domain comprises nature and human society in its changing forms, including the contributive activities of human beings. Because it must answer questions concerning logic, truth, and values, it is compelled to extend its domain of inquiry to deal with traditional as well as current problems. Hence it must supply a completely reflective procedure that takes account of and appropriates

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the constructive findings of the sciences along with the logicallinguistic and descriptive-phenomenological types of method from the more general and fundamental point of view of a dialectical philosophy. That entails the continuing reflective criticism and appraisal of all methods of knowledge. The systematic examination of methods also applies to specialized philosophical procedures, which are to be subsumed under the heading of a general methodology. Every method has its own proper questions, and there are special problems due to the very choice of a given method. For a transcendental philosophy (qua phenomenology), the existence of other minds and the natural world are problems. The external world is a problem for a logistical philosophy. Universale present a problem for an empiricist, and induction presents a problem for a materialist or for a dialectician. If we do not speak of such questions in connection with naive philosophy, assuming that such a view involves no contradiction in terms and may be called a philosophy, it is because so much is taken for granted and nothing is questioned fundamentally. In any one of the special sciences, other sciences may be taken for granted, and that includes logic and the logically established knowledge of the various departments of philosophy. But all sciences acknowledge the realm of natural and social existence as a protoscientific, basic fact; and that also holds for philosophical thought, no matter how critically it views existence as such or how detached it may propose to be in its mode of inquiry. This basic fact must never be forgotten, for it is the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quern for all thought and inquiry. Many philosophers have begun with the subjective process of knowing and experience, in opposition to beginning with the world. As illustrated in traditional philosophy, a subjectively based philosophy may be antirationalistic and antiscientific, as in the case of Kierkegaard, but it may also be undertaken as a rigorous descriptive discipline, as shown by the best examples of twentiethcentury phenomenology. But apart from the greater degree of criticism incurred by an antirationalistic type of subjectivism, there are essential limitations in both cases, with real existence—natural and social—presenting insuperable difficulties. The question of a beginning is accordingly of deciding importance. The number of possible beginnings which are different on principle turn out to be very small. So far as actual existence is concerned, the subjective philosopher does not make a complete and self-sufficient beginning. There is a realm of existence that antedates, is stimultaneous with, and survives

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the subjective thinker and his world of experience. It has become customary for a subjectivist to speak of a pregiven realm for himself, as well as for all other experiencing persons, with pregivenness meaning that there is existence in advance of and independently of experience. Thus the pregiven may be spoken of with respect to one's own actual experience or to that of all simultaneously existing knowers, and again with respect to the experience of all human beings, past and present, or finally to that of all real and possible knowers. Although the existence of a pregiven realm must be granted from any point of view, including a philosophy with the ideal of complete understanding on a descriptive basis, it need not be explicitly treated as an assumption in the course of the investigation. It may be affirmed to be a basic premise, supported by factual and theoretical knowledge, beginning with man's place in the cosmos and the nature of human relations. To be sure, this may be placed in question without being denied. A completely understanding philosophy can be made possible only by a program for the unrestricted examination of all beliefs and assumptions. It must set up the ideal of the inspection of all elements of interpretation contributed by experiencing beings to the world of experience, and in general the inspection of the creative activities of our thought processes. It becomes clear therewith that a philosophy must be radically reflective if it is to deal with experience and the structure of knowledge. All that has been achieved under the heading of subjective analysis can be regarded as merely reflective analysis, without any implicit metaphysical assumptions or preferences. That represents a positive historical outcome of subjectivism, whose various forms continue to be responses to historical motivation and the interests served at different times. It is true that there is a real danger of individual arbitrariness in the use of a reflective method, but it is equally true that any objective or descriptive method may be vitiated similarly. The only point to be noted is that in such a case a rigorous philosophical method has not been employed.

The Nature of Phenomenology Modern phenomenology is associated with the name of its founder, Edmund Husserl.3 It derives from a large part of the history

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of philosophy and claims to be the culmination of both rationalism and empiricism. The influence of his master, Franz Brentano, linked Husserl with medieval philosophy and was directly responsible for his being a member of a group including Stumpf, Von Ehrenfels, Marty, and Meinong. The almost simultaneous publication of Von Ehrenfels' paper on Gestalt qualities and Husserl's study of the immediate apprehension of aggregate-characters in his Philosophy of Arithmetic is noteworthy. The reader of the original literature of phenomenology is impressed with the openness and diversity of its studies. There is no suggestion of a closed system. In his Logos4 essay on "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science," Husserl characterized the traditional systems of philosophy as so many Minervas which sprang fully grown from the god-head of Zeus (or from the minds of their makers), only to be stored away in the Pantheon of the history of philosophy. Phenomenology, on the other hand, is portrayed as representing a quest for truth and as endeavoring to contribute to its achievement by the cooperative work of generations of investigators. The first definition of phenomenology (as conceived by Husserl) was descriptive psychology, meaning really descriptive theory of knowledge; and its original problem was the clarification of the fundamental concepts of logic and mathematics and of their relationship to thought processes. In a narrow sense, phenomenology was a descriptive theory of knowledge and was regarded as being what was sought unsuccessfully under the title of empirical psychology in the British tradition. In its wider sense, as transcendental phenomenology, it was intended to provide a universal (and presumably the only) method for philosophy and a final foundation for science. In his last published writings, Husserl was interested not only in refining his method of procedure but also in extending its scope in the direction of a universal philosophy, for which the treatment of history, the sciences, and the existing world would be crucial. Descartes' Meditations represent, for phenomenology, a turning point in the history of philosophical method, even though Descartes himself had no clear idea of the significance of his procedure and failed to carry it out consistently. It was the style of philosophizing illustrated by Descartes which was singled out as most significant for phenomenologists, to whom it appeared evident that an autonomous philosophy must begin with the meditations of a self-reflecting ego. The choice of a subjective method was said to be due to the aim

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for more complete and radical understanding, which means that there were to be no unexamined ideas or assumptions. The appeal of such aims and claims is understandable, for they go along with longcherished ideals. In brief, Husserl's line of thought was as follows: Nothing may be naively assumed; there must be no prejudgments. In the natural view of the world, the common-sense view, and in all the special sciences a general thesis of existence is taken to be obvious. Its unconscious acceptance is regarded as justified for purposes of natural existence but not for theoretical understanding. A world existing continuously and independently of our experiencing is the natural basis for nonphilosophical thinking. But because philosophy is guided by the ideal of completeness of understanding, it cannot allow even so obvious a belief to remain unquestioned. The "natural" view of the world after all contains elements of theoretical interpretation to which we have become accustomed. In short, everything must be questioned, including the phenomenological procedure itself. Hence, it is concluded, only a subjectivistic method that begins with the experiencing knower and his evidence will answer. The careful reader will not fail to reflect that the brave talk of questioning everything before the bar of experience does not necessarily say very much. Nothing short of a general methodology and the results made possible by a great diversity of sciences, thinkers, and observers will be sufficient to make a persistent process of questioning concrete and fruitful, and rescue the discussion from the fate of a self-imposed, permanent emptiness. In order to bear in mind the necessary perspective, embracing methodology and the nature of existence, including human existence, it is wise to designate this mode of procedure as reflective. It becomes more clear therewith that the experiencing knower is himself a product of nature and society, so that the alleged subjective radicalism of questioning itself operates on a highly assumptive level. In the idealistic tradition it was only in recent years that it appeared to be necessary to work out the program and technique of a purely subjectivistic method. Although this fact has long been recognized, it was only in recent years that the program and technique of a pure subjectivistic method was worked out. In order to accomplish that, it appeared necessary to criticize and refute a partial type of subjective method, known as anthropologism or psychologism, according to which psychology, or the general study of man, was to provide the basis for philosophy. Husserl's critique of psychologism and of kindred forms of rela-

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tivism in philosophy appeared in his Logical Investigations in 1900, and the relationship of psychology, logic, and phenomenology is also discussed in some of his later writings.5 In arguing for the autonomy of reason, Husserl had in mind the independent validity of pure logic and of science in general. That did not mean independence in every sense, however. To be sure, the organism does the reasoning, and there is dependence on it, as a physical process. But the term "reason" refers here to the ideal content of the reasoning, or to the ideal objectivities involved. It thus comprises in its way the entire realm of thought that is subject to logical principles. The object of reason is never a particular matter of fact but is regarded as something general. Since idealities are not conceived as extended in time and space, it is said to be meaningless to speak of its dependence on particular things. On the other hand, the autonomy of reason is not referred to a Platonic heaven, although in the course of the development of phenomenology, reason appears at times as endowed with a superior being of its own, so that its validity is taken to be independent of matters of fact. Ideal relationships are in question for phenomenology, and laws of reasoning as well as of reason are held to be independent of the real world of existence "on principle." The question of the relationship of idealized fictions and abstractions to the real world must then be considered, and the materialistic answer compared with the phenomenological view. The method of transcendental phenomenology was declared by Husserl to be the specifically philosophical method. Not only does it differ fundamentally from other methods, but as the preparatory procedure that marks off the realm of philosophy and makes its subject matter completely accessible for the first time, it was held to be prior to and to underlie all other methods. In accordance with the ideal of a fully self-conscious and selfcritical methodological inquiry, there were to be no unclarified motives and concealed assumptions. How revolutionary and epochmaking Husserl conceived his philosophy to be is shown by some of its characterizations. In Logical Investigations,6 pure phenomenology is described as a domain of neutral investigations in which various sciences have their roots. In his Logos essay, philosophy is characterized as being essentially the science of true beginnings or origins, and it is pointed out that the science of the radical must also be radical in its procedure, in every respect. This note is again sounded in a later writing,7 in which the radi-

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calism of the foundation of philosophy is defined as "absolute freedom from all presuppositions." The "phenomenological reduction" is intended to make possible this "radical form of the autonomy of knowledge . . . in which every form of datum given in advance, and all being taken for granted" are suspended. Philosophy must "take possession of the absolute fund of preconceptual experience" and then "must create original concepts, adequately adjusted to this ground, and so generally utilize for its advance an absolutely transparent method." Husserl described his concept of philosophy as the most original idea of philosophy, which, since its formulation by Plato, has been basic to European philosophy and science. It is a science "with a final foundation," and it represents an ideal to be realized in an infinite historical process.

Reduction and Constitution The phenomenological reduction is the primary step for the constructive work of philosophy. It is really twofold and consists of (1) eidetic reduction, which means that only essences, or essencestructures, are of interest, and not particular facts;8 and (2) transcendental reduction, with its technique of "suspension" and "bracketing," leading one back to the "pure" consciousness of an individual knower as the starting point for philosophy. The transcendental reduction requires a thoroughgoing epoche or suspension of judgment and belief. Husserl liked to use the Cartesian method of doubt as a means of explaining the epoche, a device that also had the advantage of suggesting the certainty, or indubitability, of the experiences themselves. As Descartes reflected, the world may or may not really be as it appears to us, or, improbable though that be, it may not be at all. But his attempt to validate the experiences themselves theologically is merely of historical interest. In phenomenology this line of thought is followed out with thoroughness, the objective being to delimit the scope of philosophical inquiry in its initial stage. All judgments of existence (all "positings") in any form, including judgments involving material things, other human beings, and in general the existential judgments of all the sciences, are to be suspended or placed in abeyance, and the objects, real or ideal, to which they refer are bracketed or placed in quotation marks. What is left is the stream of pure experiences of a single experiencing being—

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my own perceivings, rememberings, imaginings, and so on. The world has become a bracketed "world"; it is merely a phenomenon for my transcendentally reduced consciousness. In its Kantian formulation, knowledge is "transcendental" if it is concerned with our manner of knowing objects, rather than with objects. If the thesis of existence is suspended, as has been indicated, its meaning for phenomenology is clear. With the epoche performed, it means pure reflection, which differs in principle from the reflection normally illustrated in natural experience (or with the "natural attitude"). The phenomenological method requires a well-defined attitude, for which all mundane beliefs are suspended not merely temporarily but for always as a matter of principle—as long as one wishes to work phenomenologically. This attitude is fundamentally different from the natural attitude, which is the attitude of all of us—including the phenomenologist when he is not engaged in his investigations—in our normal living and thinking. For it a world indefinitely extended in space and time is "there"; other people exist independently of one's processes of experience and have minds; and so on. When all the objects of this world are placed in brackets, in accordance with the requirements of the method, they may still be used as guidance for us in our pure reflective analysis. But they may not be used as the objectbasis of prejudgments for a method that proposes to test all knowledge before the bar of immediate, direct experience. The transcendentally reduced experiences constitute the theme of phenomenology, the stream of cogitationes in their typical forms, and the cogitata as the meant objectivities. This is the necessary first stage of a radical phenomenological inquiry. Husserl has spoken of a gigantic field for investigation which is opened up thereby. Although his meaning is precise enough, there is always danger in the use of such pictorial language, both for his followers and his opponents, for it might be subtly suggested that some kind of special spiritual province had been isolated. That is entirely ruled out, however. When criticizing the newest type of anthropologism which derives from Dilthey, Husserl pointed out9 the misunderstanding involved when one argues that the pure ego is an abstract stratum in the concrete man. That is simply to remain with the natural attitude and to reason on the basis of the general thesis of the existence of the world. Either one really performs the epoche, or one talks about something else in the field of the special sciences, which are viewed as being partially or wholly "naive."

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The term "naive" is opposed to "radical." It may readily become expressive of disdain when used with respect to the evolutionary point of view or the Marxist point of view, for example. That is by no means defensible, however, in view of the critical nature and farreaching implications of those great thought movements, and an exclusive preoccupation with pure reflective analysis can at least partially account for the occurrence of that error. Husserl himself stated that he never had any occasion to deal with particular "naivetes" pertaining to the philosophy of history, such as Marxism. In methodological contrast to them is his conception of genuine philosophy as a science on the "absolute" ground gained by means of the reduction, which is designed to yield a universal ground of intentional experience. Although that does not mean the neglect of history in every sense of the term, the specialized nature and standpoint limitations of the phenomenological approach prevent it from having access to real history. What he regarded as the "absolute historicity," in which everything that exists is "constituted," is to be revealed by the pure experiences themselves. Once the reduction is performed, human history, people, and societies are to be regarded as "constituted unities." It follows that all evolution in the usual sense belongs in the constituted world. Its validity is acknowledged, in the sense that everything which can be exhibited scientifically in the world of experience is accepted. But once one has gone back to the "transcendental dimension," to the "absolute, all-constitutive, intersubjective intentionality," an "absolute evolution" is discovered. Because previous philosophy operated on the basis of a "naive, self-evident world-ground," it is said to lack the concept for what would appear to be a contradiction in terms outside the framework of pure experience—namely, "absolute evolution." The reduction to the experience of an individual human being is held to be necessary for the desired ultimate clarification. Although it is known to be true, from the point of view of the natural attitude and on the basis of the special sciences, that the real ego is an evolutionary, social product, and that it could not be conceived as detached from a social group, that knowledge is regarded as not relevant initially for the phenomenological method. The inquiry begins abstractively with what is presumed to be the greatest possible freedom from assumptions, beliefs, and judgments. If it were to begin with intersubjectivity (or with a plurality of minds), the questioning would begin at that point and would not meet the requirements set for final questioning. An entire stratum of themes would be neglected, beginning with the rudimentary features of an individual's stream of expe-

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rience. If, however, one begins with his own ego, other minds must be established (the methodogenic problem of the "alter ego"). The sphere of transcendental consciousness which is opened up by the epoche can be described in familiar terms. The transformation to be carried through is conceived as universal, so that no special symbolism is desirable, other than, perhaps, quotation marks. Thus, "tree" would stand for the intended tree, which is not posited as existent but is merely the objectivity correlative to my awareness of it. It is the noema that corresponds to the cognitive activity, or the noesis.10 It will be asked whether one is able to deal with the ever-present problems of the natural world, once the epoche has been performed. In the first place, the reasons for that procedure should be recalled. Certain aims were to be achieved thereby; the critical, reflective point of view which is developed is supposed to enhance, for example, one's capacity to examine the basic concepts and principles of the various systems of knowledge, so that it could be an aid in all "worldbound" subject matters. It should be borne in mind that to bracket the world is not to deny it or to hold that it presents no philosophical problems. Although individual philosophers may find the subjective procedure congenial in that it facilitates (for them) a flight from reality, what it can properly mean is only that the world and its problems are viewed in a new way and that a contribution can be made therewith toward the more complete understanding of the nature of experience. The original "naivete" ascribed to those for whom the independent existence of the world is a basic premise is supposed to be abandoned therewith, so that there are to be no assumptions in the natural sense of the term. It is also supposed that no elements of natural experience are lost thereby, although they are preserved in a different way, subject to the special conditions of the phenomenological method. Can it be said in any sense that the turning to subjectivity in this way makes possible a really radical investigation of the world for the first time? The answer depends upon the meaning of the terms "radical" and "world," as already indicated in the present volume. But apart from this claim, it is maintained that the attitude of pure reflection helps to make possible a more thorough and discerning analysis of experience and of the part played by the mind in the process of experience—a contention for which there is a measure of justification. It is important to bear in mind the conditions under which phenomenological analysis may be employed. The essence-analysis of the phenomenological attitude is seemingly remote from the natural

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time-bound problems that concern us. It will be helpful to consider the conditions affecting the status and employment of pure mathematical analysis. For the purposes of practical or applied mathematics it is developed "purely," as an abstract or theoretical type of thought. The world of natural experience is the point of departure, and the idealities of mathematics are originally derived from it by a process of abstraction. They then seem to enjoy a life of their own—or so they are treated. But it would be a naive dogma to construe them metaphysically as independently real. Just as pure mathematical forms are applied to real situations, so the phenomenological studies of essencestructures are to be illustrated by real situations, whether psychical or physical or whether objects of naturalistic psychology, physical science, or social science. That is the hope, and it is to be judged by its degree of success. In commenting upon the distinction between psychological and phenomenological questions, Husserl pointed out11 that the phenomenologist in his doctrine of essences is no more concerned with the methods for determining the existence of the experiences which serve as a basis for the phenomenological findings than the geometer is in determining methodically how the existence of the figures on the board is to be rendered convincing. In short, geometry and phenomenology are "sciences of pure essence," and they "know nothing positive concerning real existence." Husserl goes so far as to state that clear fictions serve these sciences as a foundation even better than do data of actual experience. In his view "the science of pure possibilites must everywhere precede the science of real facts, and give it the guidance of its concrete logic." 12 This is taken to apply in a more exalted sense to the service rendered by transcendental philosophy. The term "precedes" is intended to be used in a logical rather than temporal sense, and the value of that point of view must be measured by its value for thought and by its results. If successful, the value for thought would in itself be abundant justification for the entire investigation. The achievement of results is illustrated conspicuously by the mathematical theories of nature, but admittedly only a beginning has been made in the case of transcendental phenomenology. Husserl believed that to know the world as a transcendental phenomenon is to know it "as it was in the first place." That contention cannot be taken in a temporal sense, because the natural worldtime has been bracketed. It can mean only that the real state of affairs and the essence-relationships underlying it are first seen adequately

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by means of the epoche. The knowledge thus obtained is said to be prior knowledge in the same sense in which pure mathematics is prior to applied mathematics. The technique of phenomenological analysis is not entirely new in principle. On the contrary, a kind of epoche is illustrated in each special science in which a characteristic set of concepts is placed in question or examined. The procedure is incomplete in two respects in such cases, however: (1) Only a limited set of concepts and principles, in a restricted area of knowledge, is involved in each case; (2) while placing one set of concepts and principles in question, all other sciences may be assumed. In phenomenology, on the other hand, all knowledge and experience, actual and possible, are referred to programmatically, and all scientific knowledge is affected by the suspension of judgments and beliefs. The epoche is intended to be as universal and thoroughgoing as possible. To be sure, no one can guarantee that it has been adequately carried out, and the ideal of completeness may never be realized, even on Husserlian grounds and within his framework of inquiry. If one is to characterize the natural attitude as such, reflection is required, and in that sense every consideration of a point of view as a whole requires at least partial detachment. This also applies to the characterization of the phenomenological attitude, which can be carried through on the basis of the natural world or by means of a more complete and far-reaching type of reflection, involving a broader methodology. One may speak of degrees as well as of types of epoche. Thus the methodological epoche is distinguished from an existential type of suspension. Differences of degree may be shown by the hierarchy of the sciences, with a generalized reflective philosophy as the ideally conceived basis. A science of method is made possible only by a certain reflective distance, a degree of detachment permitting the inspection of all methods. The circularity that is unavoidable, from a practical point of view, does not vitiate the procedure. While examining methods, we think and make use of various methods. But that does not affect the validity of the procedure, for it is merely provisional and is intended to await justification. Genuine reflection requires epoche in any field of discourse. In the study of ethics, it is a precondition of clear and critical thinking that the student suspend all beliefs and theories previously accepted, whether on authority, or naively, or for other reasons. Philosophical reflection requires a consistent effort to apply this procedure univer-

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sally. One type of "rock-bottom"—a subjectivistic type—is reached when one inspects all beliefs in the light of his own experiences and determines their evidence thereby. Having arrived at that point by means of the reduction (or reductions, as presented in Husserl's Cartesian Meditations), the procedure of the philosopher is seen to be descriptive and constructive, in attempting to account for all complex structures in terms of elementary experience, in accordance with the program of constitutive phenomenology. Corresponding to the "two-sidedness" of experience are two lines of inquiry, "the one bearing on pure subjectivity, the other on that which belongs to the 'constitution' of objectivity as referred to its subjective source." 13 This qualification, expressed by the words "objectivity as referred . . . ," indicates the scope of the constitutive phase of phenomenology. The possible ambiguity of the term "constitution" should be noted, for it has been understood in accordance with the descriptive procedure but also in the sense of creativeness, with subjectivity as the source of objectivity. In his posthumously published work Experience and Judgment, Husserl expounds and illustrates this method in detail.14 Its meaning is clearest on the level of the "objectivities of the understanding," where one may speak of the constitution (or of the "constitutional genesis") of propositions, and of "fact-objectivities." There one may observe the results of "creative spontaneity," in contradistinction to the level of receptive experience, for which the objects are acknowledged to be pregiven. 15 The nonhistorical sense in which "genetic" or "origin" analysis is meant should also be made clear. There is no interest in the first, historical genesis or in the origin of knowledge in every sense, but rather in that kind of production through which knowledge arises in its original form of self-givenness, a kind of production that always yields the same knowledge in its repetitions.

Some Results of Phenomenological Inquiry Levels of Analysis Once the reduction has been carried out and the nature of pure reflective analysis determined, the interest centers upon the nature and content of experience. Due to the influence of Brentano, the term "intentional" is retained to name the essential objective relatedness of experience. The understanding of intentional experience which is

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greatly facilitated and deepened by the phenomenological technique of analysis constitutes one of its greatest claims to importance and fruitfulness. In recent philosophy the question of the nature and validity of a priori knowledge has been prominent, as indicated by the work of C. I. Lewis. The Kantian principle that we participate in the formation of our experience has continued to provide the approach to this question, which is also of central importance in phenomenology. Mind is found to contribute to its world on different levels of experience. The difference between the levels of sense perception and the understanding must be recognized first of all. To speak of "contributions" of a knowing, experiencing being suggests that something is "given," unless one proposes to argue that an ego or mind is the self-sufficient source of all objectivity and existence. The admission of an original life-world as pregiven in Husserl's later writings shows his serious awareness of this problem. Beginning with the most rudimentary types of experience on the sensory level, the goal is to trace out the constitution of the forms and meanings which are met on higher levels, such as relation, the modalities of judgment, fact, essence, and so on. This indicates what is meant by "origin-analysis" or by the "genetic" method in the phenomenological sense of the term. It is not the actual temporal succession that is of interest here, but the essential process of the formation of complex structures out of simple ones. In tracing the concept of relation to its "origin in prepredicative experience," 16 for example, the inquiry is concerned with experiences as such, as a theme in the analysis of essence-structures. Husserl has indicated a "method of variation" for determining essences, 17 contending that no one can in truth profess not to know essences, for they are illustrated widely in our knowledge. Thus, it is essential to consciousness that it be of something, and it is an essential law that every experience of remembrance refers back to an original impression. The analysis of the contributions of the mind includes an account of universale, which are the results of a process of ideation. They are characterized as being non-real and timeless. But they may cease to apply to the actual world. Furthermore, our interpretations of them may change, and the experiencing of new ideal objectivities can continue. In this sense they can be said to have a historical aspect. It is possible to speak in universal terms about the analysis because the transcendental reduction determines a closed sphere for investi-

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gation, for which the constitution of all structures on the basis of pure consciousness is the goal. In this way a body of essential knowledge is delimited. It cannot be expected to account for the world of natural experience in terms of natural causation, because the world can be treated by it only insofar as the mind has functioned, and the given (or pregiven) as such cannot be accounted for by means of transcendental phenomenology. Neither can it be expected to account for the structures of events that have not yet occurred. For that matter, the purely subjective approach rules out the inspection of a great host of structures requiring objective methods and the atmosphere of the natural attitude. Concerning Phenomenology and Metaphysics The essence-analyses of phenomenology represent conditions of the actual world in the sense that the actual world is regarded as an exemplification of the essence-structures which have been determined. But there is nothing in the findings of phenomenology that prescribes the future course of the world. To speak of ideal structures and laws as being necessary is to maintain that they could not be what they are and yet be otherwise. That is not to legislate for matters of fact, even though the principles and rules of formal logic, such as the principle of noncontradiction, are taken to be negative conditions of possible truth,18 the point being that there are conditions or principles which must be fulfilled if truth and evidence are to be possible. That the concepts of contradiction and possibility may also be construed objectively on the basis of a materialistic ontology and with regard to the concept of historical and evolutionary change will merely be mentioned at this point. The question has been raised as to whether phenomenology can differentiate concretely between true reality and deceptive appearances. But that is not a proper question for phenomenological analysis, if one takes the descriptive program literally, with its self-imposed limitations and artifices. In that case, it does not have to provide such information and is concerned rather with the nature of such types of experience as illusion, fantasy, perception (in its various stages of completeness, culminating in adequacy or evidence), and so on; and its descriptive analyses may be valid whether we actually have experience or not. As far as the types of experience are concerned, the experience of true reality is therewith distinguished from that of deceptive appearance—that is to say, on the reflective level of anal-

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ysis. If no metaphysical elements were injected in the descriptive procedure, in accordance with its original strict formulation, it would be unwarranted to expect it to do something for which it was not intended. But metaphysical assumptions and pretensions were in fact manifested in the course of the development of phenomenology, culminating in the last work of Husserl. The term "real" may be applied to ideal meanings as well as to physical and psychical events. If the term is taken to mean merely that an event or meaning is independent of any actual knower for its validity, then ideal relations and entities may be said to be real. That is the broadest epistemological sense of the term. While it is true that human knowers have abstracted the ideal meanings, it is also true that there is something objective and compelling in the relationships and in the very status of "the same" ideal entity as such. Thus one can prove correctly, or fail to prove, a mathematical proposition. Others may do, or fail to do, "the same" thing. In all such cases, or wherever various knowers can intend the same thing, we have a difference between the subjective and the objective. The objective may then be said to be real in a broad sense, as a natural event, or as that which is meant in any one of the modes of experience. Because the phenomenological method deals with phenomena, all the questions it raises are related to the experience of a human knower. When being is spoken of, known being is meant. It is erroneous, then, to speak of the "origin of being" in the ordinary, literal sense of these terms, if by that expression something else, and quite acceptable, is meant. The term "origin" has been seen to be a technical term; and the expression is elliptical, for it refers to the origin of our "intention" of being. Similarly, the world is not constituted in or by experience if those terms are understood in their ordinary meanings. The danger is that philosophers may deceive themselves by confusing connotations of the terms just as Berkeley did in the case of the term "idea," which turned out to be something "in the mind." In short, the danger in question is one of confusing "reduced" with "unreduced" terms. This danger can operate in two directions: the nonphenomenologist may criticize phenomenology, expecting it to do what it cannot do on principle—to function as a naturalistic method; or the incautious phenomenologist may deceive himself by using assumptive language, when speaking of constituting the world and of providing a general philosophy as a basis for the sciences. As a matter of method, all considerations of ontology are separated

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out at the beginning. It will not be doubted that the descriptive work will be of significance for ontology. To begin with, it has immediate consequences for that type of ontology which operates with unclarified basic concepts and principles. Much is sure to be affected in this way. Positively, the characteristic concepts of ontology, such as reality, temporality, object, and so on, are clarified in a preliminary way in terms of a rudimentary level of experience. A constructive theory of reality may be served in this way, just as it is served by logic. The analyses of the structure of experience and thought may prove to be of value for other sciences, especially psychology and logic, and the critical adaptation of the method employed may have general philosophical value. Despite arguments which have been advanced in the literature, the subjectivistic approach does not necessarily eventuate in solipsism or even in spiritualism, if it is applied exclusively as a restricted descriptive procedure. But it is a fact that a phenomenological idealism is the final outcome historically in the thought movement stimulated by Husserl, with evidence of covert as well as explicit subjectivism widely disseminated and extending to existential forms. Mention has frequently been made of different types of phenomenology, notably the neutral, idealistic, and realistic varieties. The term "neutral" is an assumptive expression if it is taken to mean that anything under examination, whether a thought system or social institution, may be allowed to stand as valid per se. If it simply involves a descriptive method with an epoche performed with regard to all ontological theses, there is no special point in using the term. It is well understood that all existential judgments have been suspended. The discipline made possible therewith would avoid all questions of metaphysical preference and interpretation. Husserl disclaimed all other types of philosophy, both idealism and realism in their current forms being declared to be absurd in principle. His "beginning" was advanced as a device that makes philosophy possible for the first time. After his sweeping program of condemnation and construction, he was glad to acknowledge the modesty of his beginning, when compared with the magnitude of the work to be done as a result of it. Despite his repudiation of traditional idealism, he finally defended transcendental-phenomenological idealism as a philosophy. Although it is possible to make out a strong case for the ideal of a purely descriptive philosophy on the basis of much of his work, the fact remains that there is a strong and unmistakable

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preference for his distinctive form of idealism. Passages such as the following19 admit of a descriptive interpretation, while illustrating this preference: "Whereas the real world indeed exists, but in respect of essence is relative to transcendental subjectivity, and in such a way that it can have its meaning as existing reality only as the intentional meaning-product of transcendental subjectivity." And again: "The world has this meaning, whether we are aware of it or not. But how could we ever be aware of it prior to the phenomenological reduction which first brings the transcendental subjectivity as our absolute Being into the focus of experience?" When the transcendental Ego is spoken of20 as existing in transcendental description "absolutely in and for itself prior to all cosmic being," which first gains existential validity "in and through it," the terms "in transcendental description" could be interpreted nonmetaphysically. On the basis of description, no justification could be provided for the assertion that "I am the ego which invests the being of the world which I so constantly speak about with existential validity, as an existence which wins for me from my own life's pure essence meaning and substantiated validity." In another writing, belonging to his last period,21 in which he speaks of transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity, Husserl states that everything real derives "the sense of its existence" from this subjective source. Objective existence is declared to be essentially "relative" and to owe its nature to "a unity of intention" which is determined by transcendental laws. To be sure, the framework of phenomenological analysis requires a subject-object limitation or relatedness to a knower as a condition for meaningfulness. Before acquiescing in the methodological adoption of that framework, would it not be wise to see the consequences that could result? That precaution is made all the more important because of the use of a language with overtones of a long and familiar tradition, as indicated by the present quotations. Such passages are pertinent alike for the adherent of idealism and for the critic on the lookout for evidence of defection from an avowed nondogmatic program. Husserl's own belief that the answer to all legitimate metaphysical questions was to be provided by phenomenology could be supported only by an assumptive understanding of the term "legitimate." Not only would the target include outmoded, dogmatic metaphysical views, but all science-oriented, materialistic theses concerning actual existence would succumb to the epoche. An indication of what happens after that has been given.

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Historical Fact and the Genetic Method The ideal of a rigorous science of philosophy has been objected to by Spranger,22 in whose view this ideal may be considered for pure philosophy, but is not possible when cultural sciences with empirical contents are concerned. Some of the points he considers have long been familiar: The cultural sciences are bound to the particular historical period in which they arise; the capacity and maturity of the investigator are also to be noted; and all understanding derives consciously or unconsciously from a fundamental world-view attitude. These considerations have by no means been overlooked in the literature of phenomenology, although in most cases the real sociohistorical conditions affecting thought and attitudes have not been considered. The undeniable truth that all cultural meanings are historically conditioned does not forbid an objective study of them. On the contrary, such a study is necessary for purposes of social science. A description of the relativity of a set of facts is not therefore a relative description; the truth about historical change need not be historically changing. If it is found to be incorrect, it was not the truth. To point out that the content of the social sciences is changing historically is true, but it has no bearing on the question of the possibility of rigorous philosophical inquiry, which could assist in clarifying the basic concepts and problems of the historical and social sciences. A descriptive phenomenology of experience must be added to greatly in order to take account of the factual knowledge and problems of the social sciences, and if it is to function as a general philosophy of experience. Phenomenology is nonhistorical if history in the mundane sense is meant. Due to its very nature and aim, it is interested in clarifying the origins of meanings. Its attention to "intentional history" indicates its recognition of the historicity of experience in its peculiar nonnatural way. In considering the "origin of geometry" as an intentionalhistorical problem,23 Husserl was not interested in determining who were the first geometers, nor was he investigating the propositions they discovered. He was interested rather in "asking back" for "the most original sense in which geometry as a tradition of thousands of years was there, and is still there for us." It is pertinent to ask for the sense in which it must have appeared for the first time in history, even though we know nothing of its first creators. Furthermore, it is possible to suggest an order of abstraction of the ideal forms without regard to the order of the actual facts, which may exemplify the intentional

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order. The phenomenological genetic method has meaning within the artificial, abstractive framework of the phenomenological philosophy. Its difference from the ordinary genetic method is to be traced to the difference between the natural and the pure reflective attitudes, although qua descriptive methods they have features in common. Each type of method has its range of achievement. If one of them is able to bear forests on its back, it also turns out that it cannot crack a nut. The natural historical view and the nonnatural genetic method of analysis have their distinctive functions and powers, depending upon the question at issue, whether temporal-causal or ideal-essential. But this is not to suggest or condone an unbridgeable bifurcation of methods and approaches, for there is an overall unity to methodology in general, despite the unending diversity of specialized methods. The Phenomenological Tendency The recognition and pursuit of phenomenological analysis do not require blind adherence to any individual philosopher. It may and does in fact occur that the painstaking investigator, or the logical critic, will find himself unable to go along with the founder of phenomenology in numerous respects, both in the name of its guiding principles and because of a larger methodological perspective, and there have been fundamental differences with his later thought. The author of the precept "Back to the things themselves!" did not intend to found a sect, for the "things themselves," the objective states of affairs, were to decide us. In time the conception of this precept gave way to the growing eternalism of a program that would make transcendental phenomenology the ideal model and the ultimate source of clarification for all science. In the 1920s Husserl could say with justification that this philosophy was largely unknown, despite the international influence exerted by his writings. The growing expository and critical literature did much to meet a real need, with additional attention devoted to the work of the members of the original phenomenological tendency, including Scheler, Pfänder, Geiger, Reinach, Heidegger, and others. The larger literature of phenomenology includes writings in a diversity of fields—psychology, psychiatry, logic, philosophy of mathematics, law, social science, philosophy of art, ethics, and philosophy of religion. There is clearly no general agreement in this literature, in which the response to mixed motives and the element of irrationalism are conspicuous.

4 The Goal of a Complete Philosophy of Experience

On Science and Philosophy

2

t is convenient to characterize phenomenology in its generic sense as a descriptive philosophy of experience. The pure phenomenology developed by Husserl is one among various types of descriptive philosophy in the historical tradition, and it is distinguished above all by its radically subjective procedure. Despite its prominence, and the immense personal success of Husserl in reaching the world of philosophy, the nature and function of phenomenology have become problematical, and there have been numerous departures from Husserl's conception of philosophy. Husserl and his work have gone into history, and his influence has been considerable, even where fundamental critical reactions have occurred. To contribute substantially to the foundation of a purely reflective science of experience was an important achievement, even though much remained to be done critically—from within, in the reexamination of all concepts and structures, and from without, as viewed with the perspective of a more general methodology and with the knowledge achieved by the sciences and ordinary experience. It would be a serious error to suppose that the adoption of the attitude of pure

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subjectivism would preclude the consideration of that attitude from another (and more complete) methodological perspective. The ideal goal of pure phenomenology, to herald the development of a rigorous philosophical science which would at the same time be the model and foundation of all genuine science, was defended by means of a critique of historical conceptions of scientific thought. It is evident that the nature of science must be clarified on the basis of the leading productions and methods of scientific thinkers, and that the definition of science must not be arbitrary, or imported from another source. Past historical usage should not be disregarded; and new usage must be justified, if an idealized conception of science is intended. In view of the many types and examples of scientific thought, science may be defined most generally as logically organized knowledge, and scientific methods may be held to comprise any logically acceptable methods of inquiry or reasoning. Pure phenomenology then appears to be a candidate for inclusion in the growing group of sciences, to the extent that it can be justified in the face of logical criticism. Since knowledge grows endlessly in the course of human experience, and as the result of seeking solutions to problems or answers to questions under different historical conditions, one cannot expect the sciences to be fixed or final at any time. In other words, there are no set limits or ultimate forms of science, which must be conceived as open in all directions and as subject to change. Two things are then to be noted concerning phenomenology: (1) it adds to the procedures of science, when correctly employed, and (2) it cannot be regarded as the sovereign guide or criterion of all the sciences, for that could be defended only by assumptive reasoning, in violation of its own avowed precepts. Transcendental phenomenology, making use of a procedure of "reduction" of its subject matter to reflective experience, has a restricted sphere of questions for investigation. The fact that limited types of questions are raised is characteristic of all sciences, including the "meta"-analysis which presupposes ordered structures of knowledge. It is essentially the limitations of reflection that appear here; one reflects on what has been observed to happen or on what has been disclosed in experience. To criticize the sciences as Koestler does1 because they do not raise important questions about man and his problems ("the problem of man's predicament," in the words of Koestler) is to restrict the term

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"science" unduly. There are questions that are meaningful in terms of a given science, and there are questions that are not meaningful in such a body of knowledge, as organized at a particular time in intellectual history. In other words, there are "system-proper" and "system-strange" questions with respect to any well-defined system of thought or knowledge. But it would be wrong to suggest closure of the sciences at any stated time. The collective totality of the sciences must be regarded as forever open systems of knowledge and inquiry. New sciences may always be emerging, just as the existing sciences may always be subject to change. In short, there is no place for a "wastebasket" of questions rejected by the sciences. If the sciences are narrow and do not raise or attempt to answer questions pertaining to man, his experience, and his conflicting interests, more scientific knowledge, if not more sciences, are needed to fill the gap. Their inadequacy at a stated time is thus to be corrected by their further growth. On the other hand, care must be taken to examine the alleged neglected questions and aspects of human behavior, so that scientific dignity will not be too lightly assigned to what may be speculative or prescientific presumptions. That would be a highly dubious direction to be taken by the critics of science, including the subjectivistic critics.

Concerning the Crisis of the Sciences The ideal conception of a phenomenological philosophy as the most rigorous form of knowledge, and as the model of perfection for all the methods of inquiry, becomes more understandable if it is viewed in connection with the historical stage of development of scientific knowledge. It is also important to view it in relationship to the prevailing social system and its dominant interests, for scientific inquiry is motivated, influenced, and supported thereby. The turning to a subjective philosophy is to be explained not only in terms of its own professed objectives, but also as a response to changing social interests. Under historical conditions forbidding or greatly restricting independence of thought, it offers a mode of protest and a hope of emancipation; and under other conditions it offers a means of avoiding the real problems of mankind, because all contact with them has been weakened if not removed by the devices of a subjective method. The emphasis upon reason and subjective certainty in oppo-

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sition to authority early in the modern period was significant as a means to achieve autonomy for scientific thought. But a subjective setting for the theory of knowledge could also result in acquiescence to the established social order under any conditions. There is a place for rigor in the extreme, limiting sense of having the evidence in direct experience, which is the ideal goal of pure phenomenology in its study of subjectivity. It is an ideal which cannot be applied generally, however, for practical as well as theoretical reasons, for that would signify the imposition of a narrow pattern of unity on the nature of knowledge and the methods of inquiry. The unlimited diversity of problems arising in human experience requires a diversity of methods of procedure; and the differences in the types of knowledge add to the diversity. In its best formulation, which means with appropriate changes, pure phenomenology as a specialized discipline with its own rigorous standards may be added to the formal, physical, biological, and social sciences. It would be unwarranted to charge naturalistic psychology with not being a science in the light of the standards of phenomenology because it operates on the basis of other special sciences and the natural world. Pure eidetic psychology is not at all able to undertake the role of the naturalistic type of psychology. The usual naturalistic type of psychology which has been subjected to much criticism in the literature of phenomenology has become the name for a group of disciplines, and phenomenological psychology, admittedly in its beginning stage, may be added under the heading of the enlarged group of psychological disciplines. To chide psychology with regard to the small amount of progress made would be to expose phenomenological psychology to the same criticism and to the need to justify its method by means of results. There are to be sure results of a different kind, in keeping with its descriptive procedure. A diversified conception of methods including deductive, inductive, linguistanalytical, descriptive and explanatory types is the response to the diversity of problems and standpoints, ranging from everyday problems in experience to abstract regions of thought. In the introduction to his Crisis of the European Sciences,2 Husserl states that "merely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people." Whether this is a matter of actual fact and whether intellectual factors in human conduct are being overestimated should be considered carefully. The fact-minded type of science is held to exclude in principle "burning" questions of "the meaning or meaning-

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lessness of the whole of this human existence," questions which, as "universal and necessary for all men, demand universal reflections and answers based on rational insight." It is important, however, not to neglect the potentiality of the "fact-minded" sciences, for they may provide the basis for all "rational insight," when correctly employed, in cooperation with all relevant methods and sources of knowledge. For the rest, it will be recognized that Husserl has contributed to the illumination of what he calls "the enigma of subjectivity," making it possible to assimilate his findings for the purposes of the collective totality of scientific knowledge, where they can be rendered effective in conjunction with other types of procedure. But he has certainly not done justice to the nature of the sciences when he has history merely teach us "that all the shapes of the spiritual world, all the conditions of life, ideals, norms upon which man relies, form and dissolve themselves like fleeting waves, that it always was and ever will be so, that again and again reason must turn into nonsense." It would not be necessary to go to such lengths if the aim were the more modest one of arguing for a greater scope of science, sufficient to include the perspective of a logically defensible reflective analysis of experience. But what is to be understood by "the crisis of our culture," to which the sciences have allegedly contributed? Germany and much of the world in the years in which the Crisis of the European Sciences was written were affected by very grave and deep-seated problems. The normal problems of the capitalistic world, involving internal conflicts between economic classes, domestic and international competition, and war, were added to enormously in countries subject to a dictatorship. The real crisis, or more exactly the real crises, can be accounted for and explained adequately on the basis of the facts established by the sciences and ordinary experience. One should look to the role of the profit motive and to the actual working of the economic system, with its problems of overproduction, struggle for world markets, and overriding quest for profit, for the explanation of the internal and external conflicts producing the series of historical crises. This does not mean that the sciences as they now are will provide adequate explanation, although they are able to contribute toward the explanation. Statistical methods, abstract analysis, and the use of explanatory principles in relation to social processes are among the prominent means employed in attempting to understand the difficulties besetting our social system. The critique of the role of science should aim at the improvement and expansion of our scientific methods, and

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criticism should be especially concerned with all subterfuge standing in the way of the objective understanding of man and the world. Such deceptive devices, often resulting from the bias of vested interests, should be exposed as such, and that is again a proper matter for scientific analysis and an important part of the function of science. There is a sociohistorical explanation of the misuse of science and the falsification of scientific inquiry, which a truly "radical" mode of procedure can bring to light; and there is already a widespread awareness of the principal causes. Without denying that there is a place for Husserl's mode of descriptive inquiry as applied to the dominant conception of science in the early modern period, it is nevertheless necessary to refer the overriding problems of recent history to positive descriptive and causal analysis. That is properly undertaken "with the natural attitude" and with "radical" reflection on the basis of an independent, antecedent realm of existence in which we are now contributing participants. In short, the reflective attitude must be extended beyond the confines of phenomenological analysis, so that both the natural and the phenomenological attitudes are within the scope of the broader reflective inquiry. It is seen therewith that the primary causes of the decisive problems and tensions of history are not self-sufficient philosophical conceptions, but are due to the conflicts of interests of socioeconomic classes. The traditional meanings of freedom, justice, goodness, and happiness, when translated into actual practice, can be seen to accommodate themselves to the dominant interests and prevailing class structure. Skepticism may be examined in relationship to historical conditions; in one of its historical forms, it may be regarded as a response to motives connected with the period of decline of a social system. As for the potential power of ideas registering protest against existing conditions and representing a rising class in society, they too must presuppose real conditions sufficient to make them causally effective. This also applies to scientific ideas and inventions, which require favorable conditions in order to be realized as cooperating causal factors. Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in the transition from feudalism to modern capitalism, culminating in imperialism. It should be borne in mind that the intellectual activities are due to human beings belonging to the natural and social world, so that their abstract conceptual analyses are also bound to that world. It does not add to the clarity of historical explanation to assign causal roles to opposing philosophies or points of view, as though their abstract formulations were personified and given a material embodiment.

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The Marxist perspective sees the sciences as historically motivated and as conditioned by the existing social system. The sciences and technological advances help to bring about a new social system, and in select cases philosophers are also to be numbered among the factors leading to the transformation of society. This literally genetic, developmental view is to be distinguished from the conception-oforigin analysis of Husserl and from all talk of genetic phenomenology in the sense of subjectivism. Insofar as the latter contributes sound descriptive analyses it can and should be incorporated in the total account of historical reality and experience. The priority of real history (economic, political, scientific, etc., as dealing with events in the natural and social world) must be emphasized, however. One can say truly (with words reminiscent of Hegel) that the owl of pure phenomenology just appears on the basis of a real historical development and a society that can afford the luxury of such analysis.

The Inspection of Presuppositions The programmatic ideal of inspecting all presuppositions in relationship to the evidence found in experience has its historical significance. It is pertinent in connection with the questioning of all fixed commitments, associated directly or indirectly with entrenched interests; and it is a necessary step in the enlargement of the scope of science to include all forms of rigorous thought. But it does not properly mean dispensing with all presuppositions in order to make an "absolute" beginning in philosophy, with "absolute" meaning nondependence upon anything empirical or natural or upon any premises, so that the beginning would be self-sufficient and self-validating. That would be impossible as a matter of actual fact, however, as shown by all that is known about the conditions of human experience. It would thus be incorrect to speak of a denial of all presuppositions as the first step in philosophic thought. The aim is rather to realize as much as possible the ideal of suspending all presuppositions for the purposes of a descriptive and critical inquiry, and there are admittedly difficulties in the way of such a procedure. Husserl has spoken of presuppositions in the context of transcendental phenomenology as having "a different sense." What he was really trying to do was to clarify the nature of knowledge and experience, with no antecedent commitments allowed to stand unquestioned. That was the ideal. How it has worked out in practice in developing a descrip-

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tive philosophy of experience is another matter. For the program of a descriptive philosophy of experience is only an ideal, the realization of which is beset by many difficulties. It is not to be expected that the philosophers undertaking such a task are purely ethereal entities, or non-substantial cognitive egos with a locus in a realm distinct from the world of nature and culture. On the contrary, they can be classified as sociohistorical products and, like people in general, divided into a variety of classes and types. Every ego is to be accounted for in terms of the behavior of a material body and a social system, and can be regarded only as a fiction or as a pure nothing apart from such real conditions. Indeed, even the idea of an abstract, pure, or ideal ego is possible only as a cultural product presupposing a social system with a division of labor, so that specialists can create such ideal explanatory structures. What this means is that no one can begin a descriptive inquiry without a basis in an antecedent, independent domain of existence. Although it may be correct to refer to such a principle as a presupposition from the point of view of a particular philosopher of experience, it would be less misleading to speak of the antecedent and independent realm of existence as a matter of basic fact. It is a question of truth and the consequences of established knowledge that are at issue. Thus the independent existence of the world with respect to experiencing human beings is not a mere assumption. No difficulties of definition, and especially the question of the circularity of definition of fundamental ideas, will affect what is at issue here. The general question "What is existence?" depends upon endless questions about the nature of existence, and the question of the relationship of knowing beings to existence depends upon the endless questions about their actual relationship, including relations of space and time. If it is true that knowing beings are recent events on this planet, and if there is evidence of periods of evolution and existence antedating human life, the basis and significance of a binding subjectobject correlation comprising all existence can be challenged only by a line of thought which is sure to be continued in more than one direction. Furthermore, the scope of science cannot be restricted by the imposition of epistemological limitations, any more than it can be indefinitely restricted by religious or political influences. In addition to the endless further development of factual sciences, the scope of science also comprises formal theories, and explanatory devices. The relationship to the social order and to history presents a further seien-

The Goal of a Complete Philosophy of Experience

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tific dimension, and so does the most general philosophical perspective. The well-known ego cogito of the idealistic tradition is a fiction that can only have a subordinate function for a specialized type of descriptive inquiry, represented in its most exacting form by pure phenomenology. This is not to say that the method and concepts of transcendental phenomenology are to be adopted without detailed as well as fundamental criticism. But it must be recognized that the method has made possible valuable insights which can be assimilated to a larger descriptive phenomenology of experience, for which there is no methodogenic problem of existence (i.e., a problem resulting from the conditions and restriction of the method which has been adopted, in this case a subjective method, suspending all beliefs and theses of existence).

The Subject-Object Correlation and Its Consequences for Existence If the subjective restriction of the field for inquiry is adopted for the purposes of a descriptive analysis of experience, especially neglected phases of experience, can one then argue that it is not meaningful to speak of existence apart from a relationship to a knowing mind or to an experiencing being? To maintain that such a relationship of objects of knowledge to an experiencing being is essential as a condition of existence would be to exceed the range of application of the methodological frame. In fact, it may merely mean arguing from the "egocentric predicament," which in the present generation is surely a pathetic throwback to an untenable type of argument prominent at the close of the nineteenth century and early in the twentieth century. Such an argument would be no more cogent than reasoning that because every known object is known, therefore being known is essential to the being of all objects, whether known or not known. Such reasoning may be regarded as either a case of non sequitur or as violating the knowledge about the role and status of knowing beings in the existing universe. Husserl was on occasion in agreement with the idealists or covert subjectivists making use of this mode of argument, as shown by his contention that an object out of relationship to a knowing subject was "unthinkable." There is, however, a difference of principle between the deliberate adoption of a subject-object limitation of the subject matter, and the thesis that

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objects can exist only in that context. It becomes increasingly clear that one must consider the necessary safeguards carefully before entering the realm of subjective analysis. This indicates the sense in which one may speak of a strong as well as a weak version or interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology. The strict treatment of phenomenology as a specialized method of descriptive analysis, without metaphysical dogmas or speculative arguments, constitutes the strong interpretation, which has proved difficult to realize in actual practice and is in fact violated at various points by Husserl. The weak interpretation would give greater emphasis to elements of speculative idealism as a general philosophy, of which there is conspicuous evidence in Husserl's writings.

Concerning the Existential Basis of Experience and Knowledge The existential basis is the same for all methods, whether formal, empirical, or scientific in the broadest sense of the term. A formal method, or a transcendental device, will not bring a new type of existence or ontology into play. There is only one realm of being or existence; any suggestion of multiple realms of being can only be formal or linguistic in character. Merely postulated domains have no special ontological status and belong to the order of hypothetical thought. But hypothetical thought does not occur without real thinkers with bodies in causal relationship to the world (meaning by that the physical and social world). In view of the tremendous scope of formal thought, which may violate the facts of real existence and deal with pure, formally defined and possible meaning-structures in the sense of conceptual idealities, it is simply misleading to speak of the being of the fictions of thought involved. Philosophy does not and cannot begin without the acknowledgment of an independent realm of existence, with human beings as recent events in cosmic history, so that the knower-related subrealm of experience and its objects is merely a minute portion of all that exists, temporally and spatially. It always presupposes an existing world which extends indefinitely before and beyond all objects of human experience, and in particular a concrete sociohistorical system, with its economic relations and cultural tradition. The thoroughgoing radical criticism it may seek to carry out will not alter this fact, which

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must be acknowledged in the same sense in which a physiologist must acknowledge the independent organic structures which human beings are privileged to enjoy. The deft fingers of the philosopher must be controlled lest they extrude the basic realm of existence, which he would never be able to reinstate on his restricted premises. Most striking of all is the fact that the very method that loses the natural world also effectively replaces real social problems by artificial questions, all in the name of an allegedly objective, rigorous inquiry. There are serious problems still besetting the philosopher who begins with a sound ontology. He must depend upon the findings of the scientists, who are themselves influenced by the social system and sometimes by institutionalized beliefs. How can he overcome the obstacles in the way of an objective understanding of the nature of the world? This is not a new problem, for it has been at least recognized and taken account of by scholars in the literature of science and philosophy including V. I. Lenin's well-known counterthesis, denying the possibility of an impartial social science under the conditions of capitalism.3 A really "radical" reflective philosophy of experience must not only seek to uncover the "sediments of meaning" deposited in the process of history but also seriously take account of the concrete realities of history.

Are There Ontological Differences? It has been argued that one cannot become aware of the natural attitude (or the normal manner of viewing objects in natural experience) without recourse to another type of attitude—the phenomenological type of reflection. Is an ontological type of difference involved in the transition from one attitude to another? Can one speak of a different kind of being, in conformity to the different kind of epistemic frame? The argument that one must resort to another type of attitude or way of looking at things (an attitude or Einstellung of a fundamentally different kind) affords no support for an ontological thesis. The refutation of the argument is accomplished by showing how all varieties of reflection are possible on the basis of the natural view of the world or the natural attitude, and indeed that reflection is only possible on that basis as a matter of fact. One should not deceive himself by means of pictorial language and assumptive reasoning. The expres-

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sion "in the natural attitude" may suggest metaphorically that one is somehow contained in a manner of looking at things, so that it then appears necessary to become contained in another way of looking at things in order to become aware of the natural attitude. If it is assumed that there are ontological peculiarities in each attitude, then the whole argument is assumptive. On the basis of natural existence, one can discern all the structures of experience disclosed by phenomenological reflection. That is seen to be possible when one recognizes and dismisses the unwarranted assumption of a new kind of being—ideal being—to name all structures and correlates of pure thought (i.e., of all "reduced" experience, after the performance of an epoche or suspension of all beliefs). But fictions, or conceptual objects and idealized structures, do not have to be treated as ontological in that sense. It is sufficient to regard them as meant objects and productions of the thought of naturally real human knowers. This would dispose of an interesting case of philosophical self-deception, which is dissipated as soon as the error is pointed out. A prior matter remains to be clarified: What is the nature of an ontological question? Does that involve a view concerning the "stuff" of things, in a sense not to be provided by the present or future sciences? Or does it refer to facts about the relationship of human knowers to the existing world? The question of an indeterminate "stuff" would be pointless, and it could not be supported by even a narrow conception of the sciences. On the other hand, the question of the relationship of knowing to the existing world can be answered progressively. Mention may also be made of the critical function of philosophy as one of the sciences in the broadest sense of that term, for philosophy in a rigorous sense is also concerned with the exposure of bad ontologies.

Types of Illustration for Descriptive Analysis The types of illustration selected for descriptive analysis in the philosophy of experience may not be significant indications of the social alignment and the implicit commitments of a thinker, for they are often trivial. Thus chairs, tables, and trees, as meant objects of experience, have their "essential" structures, and the various modes of experience and their interrelationships have their characteristic

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patterns. So far as practical applications of the descriptive determinations are concerned, it is now largely possible to close the books on such descriptive analyses, which can hardly be expected to yield many novelties or fruitful results by further studies of the old materials. What proves to be more important is the critical examination and evaluation of the point of view adopted by specialized descriptive investigators. Quite different is the enlargement of the descriptive procedure to include all the conditions of thought bearing upon its motivation and its very existence as thought. It is then seen to be enmeshed in the social order, whose driving forces and conflicts are never absent. The illustrations for a reflective analysis are changed therewith, in keeping with the real structure of society, to include cases involving private property, the nature and conditions of profit, production and overproduction, money and capital, competition, class conflicts, and war. Associated therewith are further illustrative cases such as character, the family, and education, always as conditioned by an actual sociohistorical system. The technique of the so-called radical epoche of pure phenomenology is still of interest in this larger context. But it must be relieved of all misleading assumptions and claims. It is merely a limited model of an epoche suited above all to deal with an idealized situation employing abstractions and fictions. This applies to the ego of subjective analysis, which is remote from any real egos, and the same is true of the life-world of pure phenomenology. A new, generalized, and fundamentally changed conception of an epoche as well as of "radical" reflective analysis results from the methodological extension of the descriptive inquiry.

Concluding Remarks: On Phenomenology and Methodological Pluralism The goal of a complete philosophy of experience, which attempts to do justice to the realities underlying and affected by experience, requires the extension of the field for description far beyond the closed domain of pure phenomenology. At the same time, provision must be made for the assimilation and subordination of all that is sound in pure phenomenology to a more general methodology. In this sense, pure phenomenology, like formal logic or pure mathe-

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matics, may contribute to a basic philosophy of real experience and existence by making hitherto neglected or overlooked structures and features of experience accessible. It will be recognized that it is natural to overspecialize when calling attention to a new method or philosophic approach. The matter is not so simple in the case of phenomenology, however, in view of the ambitious efforts of its founder, leading to idealism, and, as it happens, to a distinctive phase of idealism. Until Husserl's last period of writing, the nature of that type of idealism was fairly evident. The final attention given to the problem of existence and the idea of a pregiven life-world left an unsolved problem. That is not surprising, because it is not possible to solve the methodogenic problem of existence in its full sense on the basis of the "reduced" realm of transcendental phenomenology, beginning with the experiences of a single knowing being, with the meant objects as such and a discipline known as "pure egology." The subjective approach and the abstractive devices involved in the restriction to essence-analysis must be regarded as specialized methods which are capable of being reinterpreted and translated into scientific terms within the framework of the natural and social world, to the extent to which they are strictly descriptive and do not involve special ontological premises purportedly transcending the real world. Science should be regarded as forever open to new types of method and to new conceptions, just as it is responsive to new problems. The overextension of one limited and specialized type of approach must be corrected, so that there need be no unnecessary warfare of standpoints. On the other hand, because of the actual historical motivation influencing philosophic thought, differences and conflicts are sure to be continued so long as their historical causes are in existence. An attempt to effect closure in philosophy by means of an idealized program would be as futile or pointless as an attempt to bring about closure in science. The goal of a complete philosophy of experience, then, must be approached by means of the full resources and methods of all the sciences as well as ordinary experience, with philosophical investigators among the contributing participants. The more general descriptive philosophy of experience which results may be called a materialistic phenomenology, because of its basic theory of pervasive materialism and because it recognizes and continues the important insights of historical materialism. All of this is conceived in accordance with the actual place of man and his experience in the real world, and with well-established facts about human history.

5 Values and the Scope of Scientific Inquiry

The Question of Philosophy as a Science

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hether philosophy may be regarded as a science is still a disputed question. The historical functions of philosophy have been diversified, with religious, political, socioeconomic, and individual motives playing a role, in addition to the influence of the sciences upon philosophic thought. The view that philosophy is the most* fundamental and rigorous science has coexisted with attempts to subordinate it to institutions representing vested interests. Early in the modern period, philosophy was conceived by the great rationalists as a universal deductive structure, in keeping with the growth of mathematics and physical science. This conception could only remain an unfulfilled ideal program which was to become more meaningful in later centuries. The speculative excesses of philosophy in the recent past, especially after Kant, at times brought philosophy into disrepute among scientists. Philosophers have often been on the side of scientists in the prolonged warfare between religion and science; but it is also true that philosophers have made adjustment to religious interests and have advanced elaborate theories to reconcile the conflicting views. This is conspicuous in the treatment

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of values, supposedly excluded from the domain of scientific inquiry. Conceptions of the nature of values and norms of conduct have been popularly derived from the religious traditions and supported by the dominant interests of the social system. It is not always easy to discover the nature of the adjustment made by philosophers, who may become in effect supporters or apologists for the existing order of society. Modes of adjustment are illustrated, historically and in the present, by dualistic philosophers (Descartes, Kant, Spencer), authoritarianism (the medieval tradition, and politically derived forms), and various types of fideism (as illustrated by James and the "will to believe"). Philosophical idealism and subjectivism in its various forms have frequently been prime modes of accommodation. This may even be said to be the case if a writer is not adequately aware of his motivation. Thus the feeling of hostility toward a science-oriented philosophy, which is so prevalent in many parts of the world of philosophy, usually has strands of connection with social and religious interests. Even the ideal of portraying philosophy as a science must be considered carefully, for it may combine rigor in a specialized region of questions with renunciation of the existing social world. Preoccupation with subjective processes and essential structures may readily go along with neglect of the pressing problems of human existence. A critical and well-balanced conception of the methods of inquiry can help to avoid such one-sidedness. Narrowness must be avoided in the conception of science, for scientific knowledge ranges all the way from descriptive findings in natural experience to formal and purely reflective results of inquiry. The domain of science is enlarged, not restricted, by additions to the methods of establishing knowledge. No one limited model should be allowed to be dominant, in view of the nature of experience and of man as a finite, fallible being. Although these considerations also apply to ontology and the theory of knowledge, it is in the philosophy of human values that they come into bold relief.

On Science and Values Let us now turn to the much discussed question of the relationship of science and values in order to bring to the fore the issue of the

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scope of scientific inquiry. Much has been written and said about the theme of science and values by philosophers seeking to determine limits to scientific inquiry and to assign values to another region. The interest in restricting the scope of scientific inquiry seemed to gain support from the excesses and abuses to which technological advances were subjected. Uppermost in the minds of many were the facts of the destructive powers unleashed by scientific inquiry. The use of scientific devices in the gas chambers of the Third Reich could only add notoriously to the case for linking science with human values, for it seemed evident that a "value-free" conception of science, allowing free play to inquiry, was bound to incur dangerous consequences. Everything depends, however, upon the conception of values that is introduced. It would hardly be helpful to state that it must be values of the right kind. For the late dictator of Italy, to live dangerously was to pursue the right course, and the ethical ideas of the late Fuehrer implied and condoned genocide. They were not scientifically instated or justified ideals, and they could not be, for the principle of objective science, with unlimited validity for all thinking beings, was repudiated in the interest of a national (or "political") conception of science. One need not go to such extremes for illustrations, although it is precisely such extremes that most clearly call attention to what is at issue. If value principles are brought in from the outside—whether that be from one of the various cultural traditions or from the dominant preferences of the existing social system—science will be guided, used, and judged in the light of those principles. Science in that case is the name for an organization of knowledge and techniques, which may be judged to be good and useful, or bad and useless—from the point of view that is imposed or accepted. But the question of the justification of the point of view must be answered, unless reason is renounced. If it can be said that science in its long history has carried on an offensive against a precarious cosmos and a difficult human world, it can also be said that there was a never-absent counteroffensive against science. This has taken the form of an attack, or criticism, of the philosophy inspired by the scientific advances of a given period. Efforts were made repeatedly and in different ways to "contain" the sciences, to delimit their scope, so that long-cherished ideals and values would not be affected by disillusioning progress. Frequently

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such efforts were made by philosophers. Sometimes the efforts were made covertly and were not recognized as such. That has recently been the case with existentialist or subjectivist writers. According to one of the favored lines of criticism, a limited model or conception of science cannot be extended to entire regions of experience. The historical background of this argument goes back to Descartes: the physical universe was amenable to mathematical treatment and causal determination, but the realm of the mind, or inner experience, was free. The assumptions concerning the physical and the mental realms predetermined the outcome. Kant circumscribed the area of scientific thought by means of a profound dualism, which allowed for an unknowable realm. But he was careful to allow science unlimited scope so far as space and time are concerned. Nevertheless, the region accessible to the human knower was compared to an island surrounded by an inaccessible sea—which could not even be identified as a sea. Although it had a similar outcome, Spencer's dualism, a century later in the evolutionary period, was more confused, especially when he sought to justify his conception of an unknowable realm. The restriction of science to the knowable was softened by the evolutionist Thomas Huxley, who was impressed by the need for caution in making claims for scientific knowledge as such. In his view the "act of faith" which leads us to take the experience of the past as a guide for the present and future was justified by results. The question of the validity and cogency of scientific prediction was involved. It was also urged repeatedly—and never more vociferously than in the American counteroffensive against evolutionism and naturalism—that whole regions of questions were not open to scientific inquiry, at least as represented by the science of the time. The question of the scope of science and scientific inquiry is raised therewith. Is science to be regarded as a limited, circumscribed area of human interest, or is it unlimited, and coextensive with all inquiry concerned with the answering of questions or the solving of problems? If science is regarded as limited in its scope, values can be introduced from another source, with conflicts of values the frequent outcome. But if the scope of scientific inquiry is held to be unlimited, all questions that are meaningful in terms of human experience are viewed as belonging to special systems of knowledge, subject to the requirements of the logic of science. There are to be sure incomplete systems. In fact, most systems of knowledge are unavoidably incomplete, but

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may nevertheless be as valuable as they may be said to be scientific. Their incompleteness and openness act as a spur to the activity of inquiry. At times a scientific investigator may prefer to work in a more restricted or definite area, as though to have respite from the endless complexity of an "open" system. The point is that every meaningful question must be assignable to a logically organized system of knowledge. Some systems are in an early stage of organization, and others are relatively advanced. New systems are always being developed. It is also true that apparently disparate systems are found to be related and may be united into one system. If the term "science" were used narrowly, the never-ending series of nascent and developing systems would not be said to be scientific throughout, and some systems would be regarded as nonscientific. But it is not necessary to construe science narrowly. In its broadest meaning, all logically organized and validly obtained knowledge may be said to be scientific, and the phrase "scientific inquiry" applies to all logically acceptable procedures, or ways of answering questions and solving problems. The burden is then placed upon the conception of what is logical—and fortunately there is sufficient lore and argument under that heading to bear the burden well. Logic must be broadly conceived as a universal methodology, or, as Dewey expressed it, as inquiry concerning inquiry. Never is a limit to be set to inquiry or to the modes of inquiry. If questions are not to be restricted or to be predicted and frozen into permanent molds, there will always be an endless set of questions and problems, making necessary, with the progress of knowledge, the organization of ever new systems and new procedures. That happens in the development of formal, mathematical sciences, as well as in the sciences dealing with the physical and cultural world. This pluralistic view is required by the nature of things, by the complexity of the world, and because of man's limited place in the world. In his status as a knowing being, man had to become a problemsolver in order to sustain and advance himself in the world. Science is the most carefully controlled knowledge developed early in response to practical motivation. Hence there is always a pragmatic aspect of science, which is judged by its results, by its successes, and by its satisfaction of human needs and interests. To say that science is intrinsically valuable as a pursuit would not add anything to the conception of the valuable as that which satisfied human needs or

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interests, the conception that is being favored here. One could indeed use other definitions. But this conception appears to be especially useful for many questions about human activities, and it has been proved to be fruitful. "Valuable" means, then, "valuable" with respect to human interests. What is called an intrinsic value is really an abbreviated mode of expression, meaning that a complex value situation has been compressed into a limiting case. Thus, it is said that it is intrinsically valuable to understand a mathematical proof or a logical demonstration of any kind. That understanding is intrinsically valuable as such may be taken to mean that there is an interest in understanding and that the satisfaction of that interest is good or valuable. It would follow that the answer to any question, regardless of practical utility, would signify the realization of a value—even the answer to an admittedly personal question with no apparent interest for others; thus a scholar may succeed in establishing results that interest no one except himself. But in spite of such extreme cases, freedom of inquiry may not be restricted to what is known to be practical—for practical as well as purely intellectual reasons. For it cannot be decided with finality whether a seemingly nonpractical study will never have an application to reality in the future. Apart from the possible practical value for human beings, one must consider the nature of needs and interests, which include an interest in understanding in abstract, imaginative, and theoretical fields. The overzealous confidence of the nineteenth-century prophet of a cult of science, Auguste Comte, remains a warning. Mill's indignant rejection of Comte's proposal to eliminate all species of animals and plants not useful to man did not go far enough, for usefulness to man is not the final justification for a right to exist. Once man has safeguarded himself against threats to his own welfare, he can afford to be magnanimous toward other forms of existence, plant and animal. But the human organism is no more central in his cosmic status than thought in any form can be really central for ontology. The dangers resulting from attempts to control scientific inquiry in some countries is well known. It can be said that the interests of society are best served by an open program for research of all kinds. That does not in the least preclude sufficient attention to immediate, concrete problems. It can be said in this case that it is more profoundly practical to set considerations of practice aside. What is involved is the contrast between a broad and a narrow conception of practice. In the larger sense of the term, all intellectual activities are

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also practical, for they are instances of the process of living experience. Theory is in short a select and often excellent mode of practice.

The Human Subject Some recent philosophical writers have sought to reestablish man "existentially" as the fulcrum if not the fountainhead of inquiry, both philosophical and scientific. The so-called human subject (a name for man as a knower and inquirer and also as a moral agent) has been given special ontological standing, as an omnipresent factor in experience and knowing. The term "ontological" may be used in an acceptable sense, meaningful in terms of actual experience. But it has also been misused for purposes other than those of science or a logical philosophy, to refer to something more fundamental than anything controlled inquiry could establish. In its good sense, it refers to basic truths about existence, always considered in connection with the facts established by the sciences. The human subject, meaning the human being as a knower and as an active being, is surely always involved in experience. It could not be otherwise. But the world and a culture system are also involved. In the great tradition of philosophy, the human subject was at times out of place, and the true place of man in the cosmos was forgotten, if it was ever known. To look to the nature and the structure of the mind for clues to the nature of existence may be to forget the simple fact that minds do not occur without human beings and that human beings are relatively recent emergents in an indefinitely long process of natural development. Some writers have regarded the finitude of man and his limited access to an infinite world as a predicament. It is an eternal predicament so far as man is concerned, for a finite knower cannot hope to encompass the whole of an infinite field of inquiry—whether it be infinite in temporal and spatial expansiveness or in complexity; and any finite situation is endlessly analyzable. But it is also an opportunity, for there are no limits that can be set beyond which human thought could not penetrate. There is no assignable limit to human ingenuity, as seen in experimental devices, and in the use of fictions and patterns of explanation. There are endless difficulties, but not fateful, insuperable obstacles of the kind some philosophers have supposed. On the other hand, the factor of infinite complexity can be overdrawn. That nature and anything in nature are always capable of

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further analysis does not mean that decisive answers to questions cannot be given. The process of the descriptive analysis of all circumstances bearing upon a steelworkers' strike, for example, might well go on endlessly. But it proves to be possible to determine the effective causes resulting in social conflict. The question of the cause or causes of such events can be answered with practical success, and that is the important point. If we had to wait for the conclusion of an endless process of inquiry to meet such problems, the strike in question, our culture system, and the earth itself might well yield their transient existence to other stages of the cosmic process. In short, the insight into the infinite complexity of reality should not interfere with one's grasp of questions and problems that can be handled from the human perspective. Despite the acknowledgment of the potential powers of reason, which has been indicated, it must be conceded that there are innumerable questions never to be answered. There are surely quantitative limits for human inquiry. Apart from the infinite horizons of time, space, and complexity, there are more questions than we are likely to be aware of within the immediate field of experience that are likely to remain unanswered—and many of them will leave us undisturbed. It seems that only when a cherished hope is involved, the failure to supply an answer to a question becomes intolerable (as seen in the argument about the alleged necessity of assuming a first cause). In practice, there are always open questions. Probably we shall never know much more about Arnold of Brescia, the follower of Abelard and one of the martyrs to the cause of reason. Many questions about recent events are sure to remain unanswered as well—say concerning the origins of the Russian revolution and many other events on the earth, within the earth, and beyond this planet. Only a being comprising all reality would have no unanswered questions. To be sure, such a being would have no questions at all. The entire scientific and philosophical enterprise is for limited beings. From the finitude of the human knower there follows the fallibility on principle of all his devices. No statement can be asserted to hold unconditionally, once and for all time. Every statement admitted to the body of scientific knowledge in any realm—real, formal, or purely subjective—has at most tentative standing. It is forever subject to possible future modification or cancellation. This is not to cast a shadow over the worth of scientific knowledge, including philosophical knowledge. It is merely to warn against the

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danger of dogmatism and to emphasize the dependence upon evidence for all claims to knowledge. The criticism exemplified in all logically controlled inquiry must be carried over to the appraisal of knowledge claims as such, to the examination of the conditions affecting our knowledge of the future, as well as the present or the past. That includes the question of the continued validity of a given statement. The question is not whether a given statement S (say a geometrical theorem, or a chemical equation, or a statement about the cause or causes of a given disease, or a given war) will stand the test of time. It is rather whether the statement will continue to be borne out by the relevant facts. Our confidence is understandably greatest in the area of formal thought, and it is most qualified in the area of human conflicts, where self-interest and partisanship introduce further obstacles to inquiry. The human subject so-called (or man the inquirer) is not a being set apart from and exempt from inquiry. Man too is a subject for investigation, and his problems fall within the scope of scientific inquiry. Even the much-talked-of subjective realm of "private" experience must be open to rigorous methods of inquiry. Whether such methods are called scientific is a minor question, so long as they are regarded as logical procedures, subject to the principles of methodology. It would, however, be desirable usage to call all such procedures scientific in the larger sense of that term. Does this point of view sacrifice anything of the dignity of man, or does it fail to do justice to the nature of man and his knowing? That would not be the case, for there is no implied restriction as to methods of inquiry, and there is no suggestion of a restricted type of scientific explanation, whether mechanistic or organic, for example. All methods and devices that can lead to the solution of problems are to be admitted so long as they are logically acceptable. Thus there will be no place for mysterious or obscure processes purporting to probe beyond the limits of possible experience. The criticism of narrow conceptions of scientific inquiry (e.g., whether mechanistic or behavioristic) may continue, but that will be done in the light of a more complete conception of method. Narrow, inadequate conceptions of scientific inquiry are corrected by means of broader and more adequate conceptions. But writers reluctant to accept so broad a conception of science ask, "What about the question of the ethical dignity of the human subject?" Man is regarded as being somehow incommensurable with

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the rest of existence, as belonging to another order of reality. Hence his values appear to be something sui generis, as some kind of intrusion into the course of natural existence from another source. Various philosophical expressions and arguments have been advanced to support this view. The resulting turgid atmosphere permits little light to enter. The unwary reader or listener is treated to a show of words involving a virtual nest of unclarified assumptions. Science is supposedly delimited in the course of the barrage, and insight into something inexpressibly deeper is the presumed reward. There is talk of subjective (inner) freedom, which would mean deliverance from the inexorable limits and conditions of nature; and there is talk of transcendence beyond nature, which might mean a locus for the fulfillment of ultimate human aspirations, the definition of which varies with different persons. As a rule, such aspirations require more than can be assured by scientific knowledge and ordinary experience, and hence the talk of transcendence.

Ethics and the Primacy of Facts It is a long time since the attempt was first made to divide man up among the various sciences. In the recent past, the soul, and mind, the will, and purpose were the objects of critical scrutiny. The denial of the existence of consciousness by William James was a kind of concluding phase of a long process of reduction and elimination of transnatural entities and structures. There was a danger of oversimplification, especially at the hands of writers who generalized hastily from the scientific literature. This danger was in part met by philosophers who knew how to learn from the findings of science. Thus a more balanced and complete view of man could result. It is important to do full justice to the complications introduced by experience and knowing, to the idealizations and constructive activities of thought processes. So far as human values were concerned, nothing was lost by the elaborate process of so-called naturalistic "reduction." Value, defined in terms of the fulfillment of human interests, is descriptively founded in the biological and cultural interests of individuals and groups of people. A large amount of scientific knowledge is implied by this view, with many special sciences providing relevant knowledge. The

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construction of a theory of values on that basis is an important function of philosophy. The task is synthetic to begin with, in that numerous facts must be organized with respect to questions concerning values and lines of conduct; and it is logical, in that basic definitions and premises must be clearly formulated and examined for their soundness and adequacy. Such a logical formulation of a system of ethical knowledge may be termed scientific, in accordance with the broad conception of science as logically organized knowledge. It shares features of formal science as well as empirical science. Its questions are distinctive and involve the formulation of norms, of standards and goals of conduct. Norms must be transformed into factual or theoretical propositions, if they are to be acceptable.1 They must be justified by their consequences for human life, ultimately in terms of real desires and interests. There is a final element of preference, and that depends upon the thinking and wishing of the majority of the people. It is possible to demonstrate to what extent values may be achieved, if a given program is carried through. That may be an objective demonstration, as valid as any other scientific demonstration. But in the field of values, the conscious decision of a sufficiently large number is necessary for the realization of a program. There are degrees of realization, and the maximum remains an ideal. The element of a conscious decision of preference or of commitment is a point at which ethics differs from other types of science. It is nevertheless still a science, and it will be borne in mind that the other sciences also differ from one another in type, structure, or principle. The question of the relationship of ethics to the factual sciences was obscured by much discussion of the possibility (or impossibility) of deriving normative from descriptive statements of fact (or deriving what ought to be from what is the case). It seemed evident that there was an unbridgeable gap between the order of facts ("the is") and the order of what should be, the normative order ("the ought"). How then could there be a science of values? If these two realms of discourse are defined in such a way that the one may never be derived from the other, the issue is predetermined—assumptively, it must be noted. Similarly, an "ought" could be defined as rooted in a transcendent realm or as ordained by some transcendent source. There is nothing to prevent such conceptions. In each case of that kind, it would clearly be impossible to derive statements of what should be (in the sense in question) from statements of fact. What occurs,

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however, is merely an artificially induced obstacle, which can be removed by the construction of a value philosophy within the descriptive field of human existence.

The Status of Essences and Idealities In addition to assumptively conceived norms, essences and idealities have been regarded as providing an impasse to scientific methods. The concept of essence, which is of central importance for phenomenology, is also widely used in appropriate versions by objective investigators; and the same holds for idealities, without which no logical procedure would be possible. It is necessary to clarify them reflectively, and with respect to all phases of knowledge and experience. Essences and essential structures are supposedly lifted out of time and change, even though they are associated with things that change. An essence is defined by those features of a thing or event without which the thing or event could not exist. One can speak of the essence of a diamond as soon as it is known to exist. In that case the essence is an object of thought that makes it possible to know and characterize the diamond as a concrete thing. The features determining the essence exist only in the thing. An essence should not be said to exist or to be real independently, for it is a cognitive instrumentality, a feature of experience as widespread as the "synthesis of identification" exhibited everywhere in experience. Essences presuppose ideal identification cognitively, along with an ontological principle of conservation for their stability. No preferred or privileged form of insight can guarantee the conservation of essences, which like the order of hypothetical knowledge are sterile without the empirical world. An individual event exhibits or embodies a structure and can be regarded as an ideal individual essence. The natural order of events can thus be treated in ideal terms for the purposes of reflective analysis and knowledge. This is not to suggest, however, that the exploration of alternative definitions and assumptions be abandoned. There is a place for alternative systems of thought that are concerned with human values. They are to be treated as hypothetical systems, with bearing upon the facts and problems of conduct. The choice of a value system will then depend upon its usefulness in enabling us to set up organized

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programs of conduct for the fulfillment of human interests and for the realization of well-defined ideals. The ultimate ideal is the greatest possible degree of fulfillment of interests of all the people, on a world scale.

Human Existence and the Scale of Values That a scale of human values can be determined in a number of ways is evident in the literature of the philosophy of values. If a scale of values is to attract most people or is to be at all convincing, it must be capable of making application to human needs. General requirements to be met include definitions of the lowest and the highest levels of value, with reference to goodness or positive fulfillment and evil or frustration. There must be a set of premises, whether explicit or implicit, in order to provide norms of conduct. But if norms are to make application to human conduct, they must be based upon the facts of human behavior. The formalistic and intuitionistic approaches to ethics, self-realization theories, and phenomenological theories must be judged according to their success in making effective contact with the facts of human life. In general, an abstract treatment of values that is not based directly upon the facts of human existence cannot be expected to deal effectively with its problems. One can speak of goodness, justice, and benevolence on an abstract level and fail to reach the problems of conduct requiring critical evaluation. There is, however, an important place for the abstract treatment of the philosophy of values, so long as it is undertaken on the basis of actual human existence. Any "suspension of beliefs" (epoche) introduced for the purposes of reflective analysis is merely a methodological device; there is a problem to be solved, or a goal to be attained, and the entire procedure is subject at all times to reconsideration. The realm of reflection, including radical reflection, is not exempt from error or immune to change. In addition to approaching a philosophy of values abstractly and externally, it is necessary to do so with reference to actual human situations and problems. The real basis of human values comprises the needs, interests, and desires, the conflicts and the aims, of living beings. That may never be lost sight of even when resorting to the

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purely abstract level for the purposes of a rational theory, for an abstract theory is a moral as well as a logical device, which presupposes the social and natural world and must always be guided by the facts. As a matter of fact, an examination of a philosophy of values will not fail to show connections with the existing social system and with a cultural tradition. This relationship must be explicitly recognized as the source and the goal of all value theory. With the social attachment adequately acknowledged, the greatest possible degree of critical detachment is required for analysis. In actual practice, there are degrees and styles of detachment, which are always partial and selective. Total detachment is not what is wanted, unless the aim is to turn away from the real world and to deal exclusively with an ideal realm. What is needed is the degree or kind of detachment that makes objective analysis possible. The problem of achieving objectivity in analysis should not be underestimated, for even a reflective philosophy aiming at the greatest possible freedom from presuppositions may leave factors conditioning individual and class interests unexamined. It is necessary to consider property relations and historical conditions in order to understand ethical concepts. The institution of private property was developed before the formulation of principles intended to prevent or resolve conflicts of property interests, to which ethical and social philosophies were modes of response. This also applies to all talk of a "just" settlement of an industrial conflict or of arrangements to satisfy the demands of any group or class for equality. One cannot disregard such concrete realities. If the subject matter of the philosophy of values is made up of human beings in their social relationships, any exaggeration of detachment is pointless. The problems that arise for concrete objective inquiry must allow for two dimensions of influence: (1) the influence of needs and interests as constituting the very substance of value realization and value conflicts; and (2) the influence of private, class, or traditional interests on a person making value judgments, as well as on the philosopher of values who is supposed to reflect objectively upon all human activities. The question of the influence of needs and interests is a theme for description for a number of sciences, whereas the question of the influences bearing upon value judgments and value philosophers presents the problem of the attainment of objective truth. It, too, is a theme for descriptive inquiry, requiring emancipation from standpoint narrowness in turn if it is to be successful.

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Philosophy and the Scientific Enterprise The scientific enterprise, which knows no distinctions of race, color, or class, is a powerful organization for the achievement of ethical values, for it is concerned with problems and questions in all contexts—in the understanding and control of nature, in the understanding and guidance of human beings, and in the progressive realization of a scientifically grounded conception of values. Whatever the various cultural traditions have contributed toward that end may be reformulated in the setting of a nonpersonal, objective system of ethical knowledge. Much of the content is sure to appear familiar in its abstract formulation, but the form of statement and of instatement are different. Neither is there any semblance of sectarianism or nationalism. On the other hand, when conceived concretely in terms of existing social relations, there are important omissions to be noted, and the inadequacy of merely abstract, general formulations is apparent. With the assimilation of the knowledge of values to science (which means also, with the extension of the scope of science to include the knowledge of values), no value, principle, or precept is exempt from the requirements of scientific knowledge generally. These requirements include the need to justify all moral rules and practical policies, for which reasons may be justly demanded. This challenging requirement may itself be formulated as an ethical precept, for it is to be justified finally in terms of its satisfactory consequences for human beings. If this precept is observed, it may add to human values, that is, to fulfillments of human needs. Not only is it pertinent to note the logical and ethical aspects of the scientific enterprise, but the social and political, or the cultural, aspects should be considered as well. One important requirement must be freedom from interference by any nonscientific persons or sources. The assurance of noninterference must be sufficiently implemented to be effective, but the means to realize that ideal are still inadequate. On the other hand, critical reactions on the part of all specialists, in the area that may be in question, constitute only one group of reactions to be welcomed. They constitute the primary group. But there are others who may react as well—as critics or evaluators—in the spirit of free inquiry. No one should be ruled out, except insofar as his arguments are untenable. So far as a possible decision by experts is concerned, on controversial or problematical issues particularly, there are warnings to be borne in mind. It is often

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necessary to go against the stream of accepted ideas, as shown by Georg Cantor, Frege, Russell, Vehlen, and many others. How thinkers like Feuerbach fared at the hands of official scholars may be illustrated at will. The nature of experts and the way in which they respond to prevailing influences is a pertinent theme, involving logical and sociohistorical clarification. On notable occasions, a minority of one has proved to be right. In philosophy proper, and especially in the philosophy of values, the going may be much rougher than in some other fields, for long strands of connection reach out from traditional or vested interests to members of that learned profession. Even those aspiring to make of philosophy a rigorous science must make sure that there are no hidden strands of connection of that kind remaining unexamined. The plea for a philosophy that could qualify as a rigorous science, if not as the most rigorous of all sciences, bespeaks the prestige of science for our era. But although its prestige is great, it is not unqualified. The evils attendant upon extreme specialization were pointed out long ago. Preoccupation with a narrow specialty was seen to be an obstacle in the way of understanding the major problems confronting society and the sciences. But specialization does not necessarily preclude broader cultural interests. That has been sufficiently shown in eminent cases. The philosophical perspective, representing as it does the function of synthesis and the broad conception of a general methodology, as well as the function of extablishing value principles, may provide an important part of the answer to this criticism—only it must be a sound perspective, answerable at all times to logical standards and to all the available evidence. Knowledge at its best is to be found in the sciences, and the technical requirements for its understanding, not to speak of adding to it, are very great. The genuine scientist enjoys a well-deserved prestige so long as he fulfills the exacting requirements of his science. But there is nothing "charismatic" about his prestige, except in the minds of the ignorant or naive, and such people are ever ready, in any case, to succumb to the allure of passing irrationalistic doctrines. The matter of appropriate recognition or valuation is finally an educational problem. The designation "being a scientist" should not be jealously guarded by partisans of any type of discipline. In more than one sense, all science can be conceived to be one; there is unity. But it is not an undifferentiated kind of unity. An equally strong case can be made out for the diversity of systems or types of science, comprising

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real and formal sciences, pure and applied sciences, factual and normative sciences. Despite the far-reaching differences, there is always a possible frame of unity. Thus, the sciences may be regarded as unitable in a collective system of knowledge, in which all the special sciences are subsystems and with physics occupying the fundamental position among the sciences of reality. They are also unitable with reference to human interests and their fulfillments. For all scientific pursuits, including the interest of a pure mathematician in proving a theorem, or of a biologist or social scientist in their types of inquiry, or of a value philosopher in systematizing questions of human ideals and their organization in concrete programs—all of these activities are related to human interests. There are thus at least two conspicuous frames of unity (only two will be mentioned here), both of which make allowance for the endless diversity of special systems of knowledge. The so-called unity of science turns out to be highly complex, and all unity is seen to be partial and selective. What holds for the sciences and their relationships also holds for their methods. No type of method is monopolized by any one discipline. Ideally every science may make use of deductive procedures. The same may be said of methods of experimentation, which are in greater use in some areas of inquiry than in others, especially in the natural sciences, and also of explanatory devices. No closure is possible with respect to questions and problems, and neither can there be any final list of methods of procedure. The method of pure phenomenology, which may be called pure or radically reflective analysis, should not be opposed to other methods because they presuppose the realm of natural existence. Exponents of the method of pure reflective analysis must also acknowledge the preexistence of that realm. That method is to be used in cooperation with the other types of method, and it is to be judged with respect to its success in solving the problems for which it was devised, as well as from the perspective of the special sciences and ordinary experience.2 In its best examples it adds to the scope of scientific inquiry. "Nature loves to hide," said the ancient philosopher Heraclitus. Bringing nature, physical and human, to evidence in all its aspects and forms is an ideal goal of scientific inquiry. The interest in the progressive understanding and control of nature and of the problems of man in all his conditions, relations, and aspirations is for the sciences the perpetual motivator of inquiry. That is at once the highest logical and ethical concern of mankind.

6 For a Materialistic Philosophy of Experience

The Philosophical Use of Experience

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hat all ideas begin with experience is true in a factual, temporal sense. It is also true that the validity of many ideas does not depend upon the observations of natural experience. The term "experience" is used therewith in two different senses, which cannot be fused by calling them different modes of experience. The difference between the inductive and the deductive, or the empirical and the formal, is involved, and this has been one of the supports for the doctrine of a priori knowledge. The difference between direct experience, in which one is "at the mercy of the object," and reflective experience, regarded by some philosophers as more adequate and independent, has also been prominent. It has led to the doctrine of transcendental knowledge, in response to the understandable wish to be emancipated from the natural conditions of experience. Curiously, it does not seem to be realized that an emancipation from nature could also involve independence from all conditions of human culture. That the direction of flight is away from the limitations of the natural world is evident. Not so evident is the goal, for the desired haven of refuge may well seem empty in a nonnatural world devoid of actual human beings and their social relations as we know them.

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All philosophers appeal to experience, but they do so in diverse ways. The one blanket term obliterates distinctions sufficiently to permit conflicting goals to be instated. Its cognitive function has been variously treated by empiricism, positivism, and other tendencies. In some cases, there is a severe restraint, with no talk of anything beyond the data of experience. In other cases, there is a vague or an inaccessible region beyond experience. But experience has also been converted into an ontology, with a resulting strain upon its interpretation, all the way from skepticism to absolutism or a convenient but sterile "neutralism." In past publications the present writer has used the terms "naturalism" and "materialism" interchangeably. This usage had the advantage of flexibility, leaving it to the context to show that naturalism did not signify a nonmaterialistic point of view. Because of the different uses and commitments of naturalism and materialism, not much is said by the adoption of either designation. The real significance has to be shown. Historically, "materialism" has been conspicuously used in an uncompromising way, both in its criticism of idealism and spiritualism and in its conception of the nature of existence. "Naturalism" has been associated with agnosticism and a spirit of compromise. On the other hand, a mechanistic version of materialism can go along with social and economic conservatism or even with a reactionary view, and "naturalism" can be used in the sense of an exacting methodology. The crucial question concerns man as conditioned historically, not only socially but intellectually as well, which requires thoroughgoing criticism. In short, the usage is merely a general, direction-giving indication, and the full import of the position in question must be provided. In the present work, the term "materialism" is preferred, to name a philosophy of man and natural existence which is science-oriented in the broadest possible way and includes in its scope the recognition of social conflicts and the motivation for change. In recent philosophical literature, the traditional opposition between materialism and spiritualism, or between materialism and subjectivism, has been obscured by the various types of existential philosophy, which include covert forms of subjectivism. The appraisal of the claims of subjectivism as a philosophy of experience has become a leading concern of contemporary philosophy. An ambitious philosopher of experience is not likely to restrict his inquiry to experience. He is more likely to press on to a universal philosophy. That

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distinguishes the thought of a speculative philosopher from the methodologically controlled inquiry of a scientific materialist. For the latter, speculative interpretations are recognized for what they are and are subject to the canons of logic. Thus, it is not the mere use of speculation that distinguishes materialistic from subjectivistic philosophers. Everything depends upon the way in which speculation is used. A subjectivist is not likely to place his conception of speculation on the same level with that of materialism, for it is a common practice of subjectivists to regard materialistic philosophies as dogmatic.

On Dogmatism and Radicalism Dogmatism, meaning philosophical dogmatism, is a relative term; its meaning is relative to a point of view in philosophy. To affirm the independent existence or preexistence (with respect to experiencing beings) of a world is dogmatic for a subjectivist. For a materialist it is simply a statement of a basic fact. For a radical subjectivist, the existence of the world is questioned, just as all statements are to be examined for their evidence in terms of the direct experience of an individual knower. The definition of dogmatism that develops depends upon this radicalism: any affirmation of existence, or of validity, that is not based upon such direct experience is said to be dogmatic. The radicalism involved here is a radicalism of questioning under artificial and abstract conditions. It is helpful to go along with that program tentatively in order to test its potentiality. The outcome could be described in terms of a series of passing experiences, and that would not be altered if essence-analysis (or "eidetic" analysis) were preferred. The thickness of the alleged dogmatic view has been eliminated in favor of the thinnest of possible contents of experience. Any advantages that may accrue are purchased at the cost of the independently real world. They can be safeguarded only by another type of dogmatism that endows the subjective realm with stability and validity. The alleged radicalism evaporates in view of the need to validate the subjective processes themselves, for it is necessary to connect the process of experience and its world. On the other hand, there is a spirit of radicalism expressed in the strictly applied methods of empirical or objective knowledge. Dogmatism is ruled out by the recognition of the fallibility and tentativeness

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of empirical knowledge. The assumptions in this case are acknowledged explicitly, and they are to be justified by their consequences. There appears to be no element of so-called radical knowledge that could not be attained by means of methodologically controlled inquiry, by way of a descriptive philosophy of experience on the ground of the world. The existence of the world may be affirmed as an antecedent fact while questioning its evidence under the abstract conditions of an individual experiencing being as well as for a society of human beings, in all possible and pertinent ways. For a radical subjectivist, the existence of another knowing being (an alter ego) presents a problem. For a radical objectivist, the affirmance of an isolated knowing being under any conditions is something to be justified. There is right on both sides. The contentions, the claims, and the questions raised may be methodogenic, that is, they may be due to the point of view, the method that has been adopted, and the assumptions that are accepted. Even if a radical program is adopted, there is always the need for special assumptions. That applies both to subjectivistic and objectivistic points of view. Explicitly formulated assumptions present no serious problem. It is the use of tacit assumptions, at times masquerading as truths or buttressed by confused arguments, that presents unrewarding difficulties. There is a danger besetting such radicalism in philosophy in the paralysis of activity that results from substituting reflective analysis for the realities of experience. This goes along with a general tendency to neglect important phases of social existence. For the rest, a "petty bourgeois" is petty whether he wears a philosopher's cloak or wends his way through life as a sausage merchant.

The Function of Pure Reflective Analysis Pure reflective analysis is a specialized procedure capable of dealing with selected aspects of experience. It cannot be self-sufficient; it would be worse than naive to suppose that it could deal with experience in general. This is not an objection to the use of reflection for descriptive analysis, for reflection is indispensable. But pure reflection is merely one of the modes of reflection. Remembering what is known about the actual place of man in the cosmos and the place of experience in the social world as well, one can attend to his own processes of reflection for special purposes.

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Those purposes include the clarification of basic ideas, such as meaning, truth, and evidence, within a carefully delimited framework of experience. Such ideas are considered without regard to confirmation in an empirical sense. "Seeing" is all that can be appealed to, with this procedure and the type of knowledge that is opened up therewith viewed as a standard of reference for the purposes of natural experience. But the findings of pure description must be undertaken in connection with the facts of experience. Not even the clarification of an essence stands completely alone. The relevant system of natural knowledge will help us to decide whether a given clarification is plausible. No absoluteness of knowledge may be claimed on the purely reflective level. Even if it were granted that there is less likelihood of error than in ordinary experience or in empirical knowledge, mistakes could be made and descriptions could be misleading. They could be faulty in their application to the natural world, if not devoid of application. The strictly neutral field of descriptive knowledge that is said to be opened up by the procedure of pure reflection may serve all scholars, regardless of their special interests or ulterior philosophical preferences. This descriptive discipline is intended to be free of all commitments, whether ontological, epistemological, or logical. That is an ideal, of course, which may well never be completely realized. As originally proposed, no denial of ontological theses is involved, and there is merely an abstention from all theses in the interest of the ideal of description. This ideal would be abandoned if an ontology were to be constructed on the basis of pure reflective analysis, which would result in a form of speculative idealism. A preliminary abstention from all ontological commitments may appear to be the only sure way to proceed if description is not to be interfered with. But such abstention can be carried too far or misused if it is forgotten that the initial procedure is an ancillary device for a larger methodology or if it is made to serve entrenched social interests. The clues to be followed out here are provided by our knowledge of facts, transmitted and current, but also by the problems which are brought to us in the primary process of experience. Thoroughgoing reflection requires a degree of detachment sufficient to examine all beliefs and assumptions and to appraise the evidence claimed for all assertions. This method of approach is at its best in attending to the contributions made by knowing beings in the process of experience. Contributions such as idealization and the use of fictions are to be

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regarded as tools for inquiry and as possible devices for ordering experience and knowledge. It is a later question to determine the way in which they may be of interest in connection with the problems of ontology. Any proposal or claim to extend the scope of ontology beyond the natural and social world, or to define regions of being on the basis of pure ("reduced") experience, must be examined with critical care.

Existence and the Transfiguration of Experience Experience is merely an abstraction and is artificially conceived if it is not located in the realm of existence. There is, however, an unlimited number of so-called philosophical views of existence, although they can be reduced to a few basic types. If the term "existence" names an infinite, all-comprehensive realm in which human life and experience occupy a very small place as a matter of fact, a hopeless problem is engendered by beginning and remaining with the ego cogito as a kind of Archimedean fixed point of philosophy. The philosopher who proposes to account for everything subjectively goes beyond the special sciences, which accept the independent existence or occurrence of the process of physical events. As in the case of the man of common sense and of everyday practical experience, all thinking is "on the ground of the world." An antecedently existing world is at the basis of all inquiry. Much of our established knowledge supports the thesis that there is an antecedently existing world. This basic fact underlies experience and the knowledge of reality. Doubts and reservations concerning the evidence for the existence of the world are either the consequences of faulty reasoning or due to the adoption of an artificial standpoint and procedure. The reasoning is initially misleading if it is supposed that one can really begin in philosophy as an isolated knower or that it is fruitful for such a knower to ask how or why there is a world, and how or why there are other experiencing persons. That is a case of being assumptive contrary to fact, for a single, isolated knower is a real impossibility. Although a knower is always and unavoidably an individual, a human individual is descended from and thus presupposes other human individuals. His life is bound up at all times with the society in which he lives, and he derives the material for his sustenance from the natural world. Hence the question of the existence of an external

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world is simply bizarre, and either it is based upon assumptive reasoning or it follows from the adoption of a nonnatural method of inquiry, which has its own conditions. In other words, it becomes a methodogenic problem. That is strangely forgotten, if it was ever understood, by many writers who wonder whether the human mind will ever be able to establish the existence of a world or whether it can attain to the knowledge of a real world. Such writers fail to see themselves in their selfimposed limitations. They fail to see that an artifice—the philosophical mind—has been substituted for the real human knower, whose knowing is a function of an organism and is conditioned by nature and human society. The question of the existence of an external world arises in philosophies that begin with experience or an ego. If there is a sufficiently well-defined procedure, as in the case of pure phenomenology, this question is seen to be methodogenic, for it arises once the acknowledgment of the world is suspended. The acknowledgment of a pregiven life-world in Husserl's later philosophy does not meet this objection, for it proves to have a double purpose. On the one hand, it is introduced to bridge the gap between subjectivity and real existence by a simple admission that purports to go a small part of the way, while being reminiscent of the transcendental eidetic realm in its abstract generality; and on the other hand it poses one of the final problems for a constitutive phenomenology, to account for the lifeworld on a transcendental basis, which means with subjective premises. If that were taken to mean establishing the life-world as a concrete form of existence, an impossible task would be undertaken, for that would involve confusing an effect with a cause. But apart from that objection, would a constitutive transcendentalist own up to the begetting of a human world with so much conflict and unhappiness? He might have been expected to do a better job than traditional theology and the apologists for the existing social order. Since only an abstract life-world as such was posited, the transcendentalist can defend himself on the ground that he is only accounting for essential structures, so that he has no responsibility for a pregiven life-world or for any actual, impermanent form it may have. Thus he is left with an unresolved dualism restricting the scope of his philosophical approach and method. In other words, the abstract generality of the life-world at best screens its ancillary status, for it is impotent without continual enrichment and reinforcement by actual sociohistorical

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worlds. The constitutive problem is bound to remain without any prospects of a solution because the real order of things has been reversed. If one begins with the real world, comprising all concrete, historical life-worlds, it is possible to account for abstractions as explanatory fictions, and such fictions, if applicable to real existence, may be useful in formulating general truths. The reverse, or beginning with subjectivity and abstractions, is untenable despite the positing of a life-world, for if the life-world were concrete and adequate that would simply beg the question. Moreover, the abandonment of subjectivism as a general philosophy would hardly be acceptable to the transcendentalist. The talk of a new kind of phenomenology, spearheaded by the conception of a pregiven life-world, is hasty and ill-advised because it does not accord with the facts. The truth is that Husserl did not depart from his cherished vision of subjectivism or abandon what he valued as his past contributions while trying to add to his method, with repeated attempts to refine and reinterpret some of his earlier efforts. The talk of the natural attitude or the natural view of the world, in his earlier years, could be recalled and refurbished in his later years without any thought of descending from the eternalistic order of the angels. To retire to "immanent" experience for the study of the structures of experience cannot be sufficient for most types of inquiry. It may appear to be disarming enough, to be asked to follow the course of experience descriptively with no thought of an independently and antecedently existing realm of events. The entire proposal would be assumptive, however, in that it could cut us off programmatically from our actual knowledge of the facts—in short, from the very lessons of our experience. A methodogenic question is not necessarily assumptive, for it may be formulated precisely, with all assumptions explicitly indicated, as seen in formal science. But such a question could be discussed with tacit and unclarified assumptions in the context of subjectivism, adding to the traditional fog shrouding the talk of the existence of an external world. The very expression "external world" suggests that there is an "internal world," and if that is meant either existentially in a unique sense or epistemologically, one faces the perennial problem of "external" existence. The outcome may either be an unspecified but alluring transcendence or an external world whose status is viewed as problematical. An unwarranted distortion of ontology, and a restriction to experience that carries with it a disregard of the most pertinent factual knowledge about experi-

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ence and the world—these are the usual props of the question of external existence.

On Questions and Answers in Philosophy For logically ordered knowledge, there are no detached or isolated questions. A question involves a system of knowledge, whether implicit or explicit, complete or incomplete; and it is not exempted from this requirement by labeling it a "metaquestion." There is always reference to a system of knowledge, whether it be based upon direct or reflective experience or upon factual or formal knowledge. Questions pertaining to experience and knowledge as a whole, the limits of knowledge, the temporality of experience and existence, and the nature of value are philosophical in the sense of radical reflection. The system of knowledge involved comprises all reflective statements about our knowledge of experience and existence. To every system of direct knowledge or experience there corresponds a reflective system consisting of statements about the system of direct knowledge and its constituent parts. Furthermore, there is a reflective system which relates to all such reflective systems, and its subject matter is constituted by what may be called the "first-order" reflective systems. Going beyond this to a "second-order" reflective system would depend upon interest in the questions that may be formulated. An iterated series of reflective systems, ad infinitum, would be pointless. When one considers the actual controversies of philosophy, including the proverbial warfare of the schools, it is apparent that there must be great latitude in the framing of questions. It would be naive to take all questions literally, at their apparent face value; it is necessary to inspect questions in relation to all the circumstances bearing upon them in order to seek out their real meaning. Questions may be indirect and symptomatic, as in the case of the problem of transcendence in the recent literature. Motives prompting questions may result in evasion and subterfuge, in apologetics and misplaced faith, or simply in accommodation to the dominant interests of the existing social system. It should be the function of philosophy to exercise the most fundamental type of criticism and analysis. In order to be aware of itself, it must resort to a type of reflection much more far-reaching than the

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pure reflection of transcendental philosophy. It cannot validate its own inquiry without the aid of the special sciences and ordinary experience. The science that investigates the historical conditions and the motivation for ideas will assist in understanding the efforts of a given philosopher or trend of philosophy. The historical conditions, the avowed purposes, the conscious or unconscious motivation, evasion, and accommodation may be pointed out in scientific inquiry, which requires economic and sociohistorical analysis, a type of inquiry initiated and illustrated by Marx and Engels. A spirit of hostility toward science occurs without interruption throughout the modern period and in our own time. There are always scholars who protest against the failures and shortcomings of science. That is done in various ways, from criticism of the unquestionable incompleteness of science (not only admitted but far more avowed by scientific spokesmen) to charges of falsification and pleas for special access to ultimate reality and values. Kant's effort to contain science was profoundly challenging, even if his special assumptions were not granted. He was willing to have science go as far as his assumptions would allow. In making room for faith, he was well aware of the importance of human desires in the choice of ultimate beliefs. There was no evasion or subterfuge. His effort was inhibited by conflicting motives and scientific limitations, involving special assumptions concerning the mind and its relation to the world of experience. His devotion to scientific rigor is lacking in writers who have standpoint and institutional commitments, such as Jaspers, Scheler, Maritain, and Marcel.

The Assimilation of Subjectivism The ideal of a descriptive philosophy of experience as expressed in the literature of subjectivism represents the preference for a single method or explanatory pattern, as opposed to a diversity of methods and devices for inquiry. Is it possible to inspect all elements of the interpretation of experience reflectively, and does that mean beginning with the greatest conceivable ignorance? A methodological suspension of beliefs is a suggestive as well as necessary stage of descriptive inquiry, which becomes fully effective when adapted and expanded in a materialistic setting. Many specialized questions are raised by the descriptive procedure of subjectivism in its undertaking

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to clarify basic ideas in terms of experience. As a purely reflective method, it is supposed to be free from the limitations of direct description, which encounters endless difficulties in dealing with events in a complex environment and an infinite universe. Is that possible? Are all the loose elements of the "lower order" of experience avoided by the adoption of a "higher order" level of reflective description? The limiting conditions of reflective description must be considered, in connection with the peculiar questions it alone is equipped to answer. With its domain for inquiry delimited by placing all ties to the natural events in abeyance, the pure reflection of phenomenology operates with eidetic forms and relations. It must be asked whether pure reflection could be said to be absolute and certain if the subject matter with which it operates must be supplied by realms not dependent on the mind. How would cases of deception, fraud, and perjury be handled? Knowing their essential nature would itself depend upon the changing events of the social world and would introduce a selective historical element into the inquiry. The vaunted certainty of reflection would be a hollow shell at best and would face the continual danger of being outmoded in any case. Although knowing beings have undeniably contributed to experience as one factor, there are other factors to be considered as primary, historically and ontologically. Reflection can occur only on the basis of socially conditioned experience, and those conditions cannot be emancipated from the independent realm of existence. There is always an aim to be realized when one engages in descriptive inquiry; there are always leading ideas, however tentative they may be. If the structure of the various types of experience is in question, there must be, or must have been, real experiences. If it is a person per se that is in question, there must have been, or must be, real persons. The facts of ordinary experience cannot be denied by a reflective procedure which merely questions them for certain features of structure or relatedness. For materialistic reflection there is a preexisting world, and an individual person or knower is conditioned by his group as well as by the natural world. Such a being has a history (a prehistory so far as all reflection is concerned); he has antecedents, causal relations, and normally a place in society. The importance of such reflection is shown by its function: it helps to make past experience and activity understandable, and it becomes a guide for future action. It stops when its purposes have been realized. In the epistemological sense of

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pure subjectivism it is not fully radical, for it operates with assumptions or with basic facts that transcend the scope of evidence of an individual knower. An exponent of radical reflection in this epistemological sense may be a conservative in matters of socioeconomic or political policy, and he may even be a reactionary. The elements or features of experience making up its subject matter are unaffected by the concrete problems of individual and social life. A more searching descriptive examination of our social system is not involved. What is ordinarily presupposed by experience and science becomes the theme for description and clarification: time, space, objects, statements, truth, existence, reality, meaning, evidence, value, the ego or person, and other basic ideas. However, a word of caution will be in place. Many of the concepts in question are bound up directly with scientific knowledge, and others have important relationships to ordinary experience and to the language of everyday usage. The pure philosopher can fail to make proper use of those indispensable sources of knowledge only at his peril. Access to the existing world is barred if the type of description employed neglects the realities of natural experience. A truly radical glance at a miner or steelworker may not allow anything to be subtracted from the realities involved. The wage system or wage scale would not be likely to be of interest to the subjectivist, and a process of transcendental constitution would not increase or diminish the package deal between capital and organized labor. To be sure, such interesting examples are not likely to be considered by transcendental questioners of experience. Such practitioners may be expected to allow all socioeconomic realities to stand unquestioned, both because they may happen to have no philosophical interest in them (although they are by no means devoid of philosophical significance) and because they prefer the safer region of descriptive analysis on a level that makes no real difference in our lives. It is always desirable to consider a concrete illustration; the steelworkers negotiating with the owners of the steel industry for a new contract will help to dispel illusions promoted by the conditions under which so many philosophers live. On the natural level, a definite historical event is described. It is unique as an event, while belonging to a class of events similar enough to be grouped together. On the pure level, the essential nature of such a wage negotiation is to be outlined. Nothing that is singled out will conflict with the real event in question. There are two parties—labor and capital—and there are

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past agreements and practices; there are the interests of various groups affected by the proposed contract; there are legal relationships as well as considerations of the realization of human values; and there are the actual principles of human values which are acknowledged. It is fair to ask what the philosophical type of pure reflection adds to the store of knowledge provided by the relevant sciences and ordinary experience. When philosophers, especially existentialists, refer to other types of experience, such as anxiety, the experiences in question may be so conceived that the sciences and ordinary experience do not touch them. A whole region of such "untouchables" has emerged through the filtering process of purported philosophers of human existence. There are natural events illustrating anxiety, with diverse causes; and no two such events are likely to be identical. There is a range of variation, with sufficient similarity to warrant the use of the same term, "anxiety." Thus, the reference may be to possible dangers, such as loss of employment, illness, or the possible failure of one's automobile. A state of anxiety with no concrete reference or cause may seem to have the advantage of eluding scientific study. Detached from the subject matter of science, it may seem to qualify for special philosophical treatment. In short, it would be an "untouchable" for all materialistic means of inquiry. The argument in defense of such a view would be completely assumptive. It would fall under the general heading of "pure subreption." This mode of thought has unlimited potentialities. Assumptively, man may have an "untouchable" essence that can be brought to an intuitive view. All the desired prerogatives can be packed away in this intuitively discerned essence, which is safe from the methods and concepts of the sciences. Guided by what Feuerbach has called the principle of sufficient wishing as the basis of belief, it would be possible to instate anything "doxically" in response to one's hopes and fears.

The Program of a Descriptive Philosophy of Experience As has been indicated, the procedure of pure reflection requires specially defined conditions. One may reflect, within strictly controlled conditions, on the perception of this table, on the percep-

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tion of that tree, or on this man as viewed perceptually. It can be said generally that perception is essentially incomplete and, reflectively, that the incompleteness is discerned completely. If one reflects upon one's experience of a man, for example, there will always be a particular situation in which he is involved. Thus he may be observed as engaged in an industrial conflict or in economic competition. There is little to be gained in viewing the experiences reflectively in terms of the essential relations that were present. It would not be tremendously helpful to ascertain that there must be at least two parties to a social conflict, for example. Such determinations could be safely neglected. Reflection on one's observations, with all beliefs suspended as a matter of procedure, could, however, help to make sure that nothing is taken for granted naively and that all questions about evidence will be raised and if possible answered. The matter is much more simple if tables and trees are considered. Husserl's procedure in such cases is seen to be a direct continuation of descriptive analyses such as James reported. In the case of an industrial conflict, freedom from bias is necessary if an objectively true report is to be rendered. The report of one observer must be examined in connection with all the known relevant facts, and it must be compared if possible with the reports of other observers. If such reporting has its empirical limitations and difficulties, what can be said of the reflections about them? If one extracts the essence or attends only to what is essential, he must be careful not to miss the full concreteness of living human beings in their actual social relations. The barrage of terms such as noetic, noematic, intential objectivity, eidetic, and the apparent depreciation of the factual level of experience, as merely consisting of the "this-here-now" which "could be otherwise," would seem to be most effective in evading the real problems of social experience. Whatever is "given" for a specialized type of analysis in my experience has been caused by an independently existing natural and social reality. There is no point in trying to "constitute" such a preexisting or independent world. The phenomenologist proposes to clarify the concept of being, or of existence in terms of the direct experience of an individual, as viewed in reflection. All concepts and meanings are to be clarified in that way, including being or existence. From the point of view of the phenomenologist, phenomenology is prior to metaphysics in a specially defined sense in that he asks about the meaning of being in terms of experience. But if one is not to incur

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the use of a dogma that may be called "determination by procedural clarification," declaring the clarified being to be only possible being, one must return to the actual facts. That means a return to our knowledge of being, of existence, of the world, and of man and his activities, as provided by our common experience, direct and historically inherited, and by the sciences. Taken all together, they provide an enormous amount of lore about existence, even though all of it may be declared to fall short of absolute certainty and to be subject to possible future change. Reflection about such knowledge with respect to its degree of evidence is illustrated in all the sciences. A materialistic philosophy, in its function of synthesis, has much more critical reflection to offer on the basis of an independent realm of nature and society—that is, independent of myself as a knowing being. If the phenomenological reduction to one's own conscious processes is performed, the way is prepared for the elaboration of a "first philosophy" or ontology as the fundamental study of being. Much more pertinent for pure phenomenology is the specialized treatment of such themes as formal and transcendental logic and the experience of time as distinguished from temporal properties of objective natural events. The general suspension of all beliefs and theses of existence and validity is required for the inspection of all assumptions. That is the ideal. But the general methodological procedure need not detain us in the case of an industrial conflict. In that context we are not really afraid that we may have an experience of illusion or of hallucination. What really occurs may be far worse than the limiting case of the possible falsity of experience, which is after all a merely empty possibility so far as our knowledge is concerned. The cases of falsification and fraud occurring in actual human conduct will not at all serve to indict normal, natural experience, for falsehood and unfounded pretense can be unmasked in the course of experience. Although some themes of inquiry are suitable for the "inner" view of phenomenology, most themes of inquiry are "outer" not "inner"; and ideally, all observation might be conceived as "outer" if the requisite techniques could be devised. For the indefinite future there is an appropriate but limited place for a science-oriented type of reflective analysis. On the other hand, the literature of subjectivism has shown how the thin, ethereal realm of pure reflection may make such a place for itself that it fails to stop when its proposed contribution toward clarification has been made. It may (and on occasion does) threaten not only to clarify being but also to provide the whole of ontology.

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If one begins with his own experiences, the existence of other egos, or other people, becomes a crucial problem. These problems do not occur in the same way for materialistic modes of inquiry. The world presents endless problems to an unlimited number of investigators. The discovery of truths about the world is a never-ending process. That is a real problem, a constant problem arising in natural experience. The independent existence of the real world is accounted for by real science and natural experience, which locate man objectively as a knowing being in the existing world. The problem is quite different for phenomenological analysis, once the reduction has been instituted. The world then becomes the theme for a methodogenic problem. That is only disturbing if one forgets the actual nature of his method, which is ancillary as well as artificial and is not suited to provide an ontology. The limitations of subjective inquiry are insuperable, whereas there are no essential obstacles in the way of an ideally complete type of objective method. The so-called "eidetic reduction" of phenomenology involves the concept of essence, of essential structures and relations. This concept was never clarified satisfactorily in the now classical literature of phenomenology. Husserl spoke of the "method of variation" to determine essences in his Experience and judgment (Erfahrung und Urteil). The contingency of the natural world was emphasized repeatedly, in contradistinction to the necessity attached to essences. That was understood to mean the possible nonexistence of the world, as discussed in his First Philosophy (Erste Philosophie).1 In his Ideas (Ideen), he gave some attention to the concept of essence. In his view, to say that a given thing could be essentially different would be to admit that it has an essence. Of course, if by essence is meant "that without which a thing would not be what it is," there is nothing to ensure the continued reality of an essence, for the essential features of a thing could cease to exist along with the concrete event illustrating them. Essences would then be affairs of knowledge, illustrated by events, but without ontological independence and without any preferred ontological status. A disengaged essence is a fiction. Husserl did not hesitate to recognize fictions as examples of idealizations. Is it not true that all the data for phenomenological inquiry belong to the order of fictions, in contrast to real existence? Essences frozen out of real events, essential relations of forms of experience, the essential structure of perception, remembrance, and other modes of experience—if such themes constitute the subject matter of phenomenological

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inquiry, it can only function as a preontological discipline, aiming to serve ontology in a way that will supplement the procedures of the special sciences. If there is any truth to the charge that the special sciences are in some respects naive or dogmatic (and that could be granted only in a carefully qualified sense, allowing for further critical development), it must also be pointed out that the phenomenological discipline is empty. The factory that provides the materials for subjective descriptions, for the idealizations of the thought processes, is located outside, and the credentials of its workers often bear union labels. The basic fact (or the basic facts) underlying all philosophizing (including what has been referred to by some enthusiasts as "phenomenologizing") comprises not only nature but also the innumerable forms of cultural activity, all of which represent historical processes. That thought is active, that experience is the resultant of "outer" and "inner" functions, and that there are constitutive activities of thought—these truths have been recognized by philosophers with divergent points of view, among others by writers deriving from Kant and from Marx. A sound phenomenology, as a procedure undertaking to work out in the greatest possible detail the technique involved in accounting for all the activities or contributions of thought processes, occupies a necessary place in philosophical inquiry, in opposition to a passive or a mechanical theory of knowledge. The conception of philosophy itself, of its problems and methods, underlies the entire question of a materialistic formulation of subjectivism. This involves the question of judging reflective analysis from the point of view of materialism, and materialism from the point of view of reflective analysis, either in toto or with respect to details—in a word, the question of instating intermethodological judgments. The "longitudinal" view of the materialistic sociohistorical approach to philosophy can handle many questions. The "cross-sectional" questions of formal logic or essence-analysis are meaningful in special systems of thought, with selected subject matters abstracted from the physical, social, and cultural events determining the real ontology. There is no rational or factual justification for a retreat to a subjective realm, for a real reduction to pure consciousness is ruled out in principle. Only one alternative remains—to add phenomenological analysis, critically revised and construed as a materialistic method, to the special procedures included under the heading of a dialectical methodology. An overall multisectional method combines features of unity

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as well as diversity in all domains of investigation. There is, however, no meaningful way to justify an ontological transcendence of nature. But is there a sense in which one can say of subjectivism the analogue of what has been said of historicism, that one never gets beyond history? Can it also be said that one never gets beyond experience, in the sense of lived experience? It is unavoidably true, but trivial, that experience indicates and presupposes the presence of experience. There are no ontological consequences of that statement. On the other hand, it can be said that as a matter of fact one never gets beyond nature. One can think beyond nature, in the sense that ideal entities and possibilities can be entertained or utilized. That does not mean transcending nature in an ontological sense. Even the capacity to entertain ideal entities in thought, such as transfinite sets, and the occasion for devising them, may be traced out to real sociohistorical conditions. Thus a problem of field measurement in classical antiquity could lead to the puzzling question of the nature of irrationals. Following the stimulus to scientific thought due to the needs and opportunities of the developing industrial system, an answer to that question was made possible in the nineteenth century by means of the mathematical theory of infinity. The "garment of ideas" that is alleged to attach to the objects of experience by subjectivism becomes a "pattern of interpretation" for materialism; but also, when truth is completely assured, it is regarded as the correct determination of the objects of experience. It is not suggested that ideas never shut us off from realities. The contrary is only too frequently the case. That is most strikingly seen in ideas concerning the actual social system. Thus ideas of military and political activities may be far removed from the facts. When the Nazi soldiers moved into Czechoslovakia with the belief that they were "liberating" its people, they were surprised at the cool reception by the inhabitants. Evidently at least one "garment of ideas" did not fit the facts. The moral protestations of numerous countries involved in the First World War may also be recalled. Both sides (if not all sides) were well supplied with a convenient coverage of ideas. The citation of economic causes was unpopular. That both sides in a war may be misled or that they may conceal their actual motives and operations by a smoke screen of avowed aims and empty generalities can be readily illustrated historically. What must be recognized is that ideas and judgments are to be tested for their truth. If true, they are simply a statement of the facts,

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and if they are false or misleading, that must be pointed out, and they should not be allowed to masquerade as the truth. One can undertake reflectively to examine all of them for their evidence, and with respect to the methods by which they were instated. Ideas, beliefs, and systems of judgments in the form of theories do not necessarily shut us off from the truth. True judgments name the actual state of affairs. What turns out to be a false hypothesis may nevertheless prove to be valuable in the discovery of truth. The questioning of all ideas and judgments is a programmatic aim which, while indispensable for the discovery of truth and the appraisal of the evidence, is not therewith an indictment of the work of the human mind. Deficient or inadequate ideas are corrected by more adequate ideas. There need be no search for dimension of a more ultimate, original truth regarded as prior to natural experience. Such a "preobjective" realm would merely be a result of analysis and would have the function of an explanatory abstraction, never real in itself. The search for a primitive realm of original experience turns out to be one more effort in the cause of antimaterialism or antinaturalism. The answer is provided by a philosophy of experience within nature, which undertakes to do full justice to all the aspects of experience by means of a growing diversity of methods and explanatory devices.

On the Promise of a Materialistic Philosophy To say that there is always an explanation for an event and a solution of a problem is either to express confidence in the rational nature of the world or to adjust the notion of explanation to whatever happens. Such an adjustment would then have the force of a tautology. An apt description may serve as an explanation. Whatever devices may be used, in the absence of the possibility of a definitive solution of a problem, the important condition to be observed is that the field of inquiry is in the objective world, so that there is no escape from nature. The tradition of materialism has maintained this principle. When Engels discussed the nature of materialism in his essay on Feuerbach, he drew the lines most generously: the restriction of reality to nature marked one as a materialist, whereas the admission of the primacy of spirit and a supernatural realm signified idealism. "For Engels as well as Marx there were historically outmoded types of

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materialism, there were crude and popular versions, and there was a narrow type of mechanism. Their interest in social philosophy led them to a historical materialism conceived in the setting of a general dialectical philosophy. There were no difficulties in principle in the way of an analysis of organic structures in terms of physical science, but that was not their problem. It was clear to them that one could be an analytical materialist while ignoring social problems. Materialism was regarded as a weapon, as an instrument for the transformation of society. For the evidence that reality can be known truly, Engels appealed to practice. Practical results were to determine the reaches of knowledge. It is easy to state the issue of idealism as opposed to materialism in a hopeless form. If the mind is taken to be irreducible and to be ontologically different from matter, with properties assigned to it which are not to be found in matter, it must follow that one cannot account for the mind in terms of matter. In one familiar type of argumentation it has been assumed that the mind cannot be located in space, which involves a hypostatized conception of the mind or thought processes. That such assumptions are unnecessary and unwarranted is shown by the possibility of conceiving the thought processes in terms of the behavior of organic and socially conditioned beings. On that basis there need be no sacrifice of any of the complexities of experience, for the thinkers who engender the intricacies of reflective analysis and scientific inquiry are material beings. The recent revival of interest in materialism as a philosophy goes far beyond the Marxist conception. In some cases it is practically nonsignificant, if not merely whimsical. Santayana provided an example earlier in the twentieth century. His materialism was so conceived that he could think of himself as the only materialist alive. In a period in which materialism was often far from welcome academically, such a conception was reasonably safe. In general, naturalism was a more convenient designation, meaning philosophy as a generalization of the sciences. That allowed considerable room for rigorous and mixed types of formulation. One could call himself a naturalist and still allow for religious interests, in the manner of Spencer or of emergent evolutionists and many humanists. The more recent philosophical interest in materialism has been associated with the growing tendency toward logical analysis. With the great increase of scientific knowledge and the controversies in psychology and philosophy in the twentieth century, it is no longer

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necessary to regard the argument for an alternative to materialism as difficult to meet. The understanding of the human mind depends upon physical, physiological, and psychological facts, but also upon social and cultural facts. It has also been added to by descriptive findings of reflective analysis. The term "materialism," as conceived here, is the name for a universal philosophy all-inclusive in its scope. The status of the mind, of the person, of social institutions, of cultural objects, of sonatas and symphonies, of mathematical truths, of aesthetic and moral values—all of these must have their place in the existential domain of materialism. It will be asked whether all philosophical questions can be answered by materialism. That depends upon the scope of philosophical questions. If they are taken to include all the questions asked by contributors to the literature of philosophy, it could well be that materialism has no possible answer to some questions, except to provide clarification from a sociohistorical perspective, and logical criticism of dogmas or unwarranted premises. What goes by the name of philosophy often involves special premises, which may not be meaningful in terms of empirical or physical reality. There are limited standpoint questions; there are questions resulting from the type of procedure in use. A materialistic philosophy that takes due account of the diverse types of questions, standpoints, and methods is not embarrassed by the charge that it seemingly cannot answer all questions raised by philosophical writers, because it does not accept the premises of various standpoints. Its criticism may itself be an effective answer. Quite different is the thesis that it is possible to translate all questions or statements about experience and reality from the language of subjectivism into the language of materialism. The question of the possibility of the reverse should also be considered. This is not only a problem of the use of language. It is a problem of the demonstration of facts. If an abstract language is used, it is always possible, with the aid of nominal definitions, to express any statement in other terms. Such nominal definitions, suited to a Procrustean conception of method, may be called key definitions. To some extent this type of definition may be used in concrete languages, insofar as no falsification in fact is incurred thereby. But this has to be carefully qualified and controlled in view of the inexhaustible nature of real events or things. On the other hand, formal objects of thought may be substi-

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tuted for other formal objects of thought at will, within the assumed limits and abstract properties of the system involved. Thus, the thesis of translation from language L, to language L2 (or from system Sj to system S2) may say very little. But it may say a great deal in crucial cases if more than formal operations are under discussion. The traditional questions at issue between materialism, naturalism, and temporalism on the one hand, and spiritualism, supernaturalism, and eternalism on the other hand, retain interest for the present generation. The line of cleavage between the opposing philosophies continues to be a firm one, even though the questions at issue have been clarified and settled in principle. The claim that spiritualism provides the only satisfactory interpretation of reality as a whole can be supported only by advantages arbitrarily introduced into its definitions and assumptions. The outcome of that claim depends upon the explanatory merit of entities (spirits and souls, or spiritualized selves and minds, etc.) with no standing in the world of science and experience, so far as the available evidence goes. The epistemological arguments supporting spiritualism have been demolished by philosophical criticism, based upon our scientific knowledge and general experience. The thesis of supernaturalism has long been regarded as simply unproved or as an unclear conception rooted in human desires. Eternalism has not been established as applicable to anything in existence, so that it could not be defended as a theory of reality. This leaves the field to materialism in accord with the present level of our knowledge. It does not involve the commonly understood narrow conception of mechanism, and it rules out vitalism as unnecessary at best, even if it were not defended fallaciously. It is both monistic, in the sense that there is one basic domain of existence, and diversified, in the sense that our knowledge is organized in a multiplicity of systems. The numerous systems result from the complex nature of our knowledge, including the unlimited number of formal systems, and also from the selective character of the sciences. The extension of the term "materialism" to apply to history and human society had its reasons. The autonomy so necessary for the development of physical science had been a hard-won achievement in the modern period. The automony of social science, the scientific and independent philosophical treatment of man and human history, required a much longer period because of the opposition to be overcome. It is understandable that supernaturalism was defended against the spread of scientific inquiry, with its various degrees and types of

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philosophical expression, for supernaturalism served firmly established interests. Spiritualism, supernaturalism, and eternalism offered ways of justifying dominant religious and social interests. It is not implied therewith that materialism is necesarily a revolutionary doctrine, despite the radical sweep making itself felt in the conception of man and human values. It could nevertheless be advanced as an upper-class philosophy, as was the case in ancient Greece. In the modern period it was associated with the interests of the commercial class and was a means of combating the ideology of the feudal-ecclesiastical tradition. Because it is dependent upon the scientific level of the time, it is always dated to some extent. The importance of scientific achievement for the development of the largescale industrial economy could be granted, however, while denying or modifying the philosophy based upon the sciences. Thus supernaturalism could readily fit into the world view of persons primarily interested in secular activities. Through their fundamental contributions to a scientific treatment of man and human society in the nineteenth century, Marx, Engels, and Morgan were founders and forerunners of a vast scientific growth. Materialism became a name for a universal, unrestricted scientific philosophy. In contrast to such thinkers as Comte and Spencer, who were conservative in their recognition of vested economic interests, Marx, Engels, and Morgan envisaged the complete transformation of economic relations with far-reaching social consequences. Historical materialism became a new chapter in the attempt to study man and society, including ideas and cultural activities, in an objective, scientific manner. A significant philosophy always has its primary motivation. In the case of historical materialism, the revolutionary motivation focused attention especially on economic factors—the economic structure—as conditioning the superstructure comprising social relations and cultural products. Religious, political, social, moral, and philosophical ideas were viewed as affected by economic changes in the last analysis. The fact that religious and moral ideas, for example, were regarded as having economic consequences in turn must be borne in mind in appraising the theory. This fact was recognized by Marx and Engels. The detailed elaboration of the theory, assigning appropriate weight to the various factors as an explanation of historical events, presents an objective scholarly program of interest to scientists and philosophers. It amounts to a never-ending inquiry, for questions

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relating to the past are endless and new questions are always emerging. Due weight is given to the various factors, once the scope and significance of the questions to be answered have been determined. The economic factor receives full recognition thereby, and for many questions it is of primary importance. Although omnipresent and essential, it is not overemphasized at the cost of other contributing factors, which may in turn play an effective part in the historical events under consideration. This view is materialistic, and it is temporalistic. It represents a continuing stage of scholarship, for which the now classical work on historical materialism has given an enduring impetus. It is unavoidable in a discussion of materialism that mention be made of writers who did not call themselves materialists or who would even reject that position. There are declared and undeclared varieties of materialism and naturalism. There are also near-materialists and partial materialists among those designated as naturalists as well as among those called materialists in a narrow sense. If all purported science-oriented philosophers are considered, the views of writers such as Comte, Spencer, Huxley, and Haeckel must be included regardless of the restrictions of their methods and theories of knowledge or special metaphysical interpretations which are introduced. A thoroughgoing materialism is a rare occurrence. It must satisfy scientific and logical requirements in all regions of experience. There must be methodological, ontological, epistemological, valuational, and social-philosophical theses to meet those requirements. In view of the diversity of historical and contemporary types, one cannot speak of uniformity or of a unified platform when characterizing materialism. The defects and omissions of a mechanistic version of materialism, and the abstractive, selective character illustrated by recent analytic versions, are cases in point. Justice must be done to all the facts of human existence and social relations, and to the complexities of experience and knowledge, if a philosophy is to conform to the requirements of inclusiveness in its scope and relevance to the social problems of the time. Thus the general designation of materialism as applied to historical types is understandably thin. The invariant features of past types of materialism amount to a group of general and abstract principles, which are readily added to and qualified in the light of later scientific progress. As conceived by the present writer, it is a "this-worldly" point of view, so that there

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must be a principle restricting all talk of ontology or existence to nature. That will be Ρ (1): All existence is within nature. A supernature is ruled out as a mode of existence; it has no ontological status. Accordingly, Ρ (2) is: There is no supernature as a mode of existence or reality. Moreover, existence occurs in the form of events differing in magnitude and temporal span, with relationships and patterns of behavior of varying degrees of generality. That is, Ρ (3): The domain of existence consists of relational events ranging from the most minute occurrences to the entire universe at a given time, and from events at a given time to event-members of an aggregate sufficiently large in scope to comprise entire evolutionary periods. Closure is ruled out because of the openness of temporal development and spatial extension. Individual events have characteristics conditioned by group organization, as illustrated by the effects upon individuals or membership in socioeconomic classes. The knowledge of the behavior of events is obviously dependent upon scientific inquiry and general experience. Thus, Ρ (4): Formulations of laws, generalizations, and explanations of events are subject to the standards of the scientific determination of evidence. The process of inquiry is a complex event, with a locus in the physical realm, and with conditioning factors derived from the social system and the cultural tradition, as well as from organic factors. That means, Ρ (5): All inquiry is within nature, with multiple conditioning factors—social, economic, political, and psychological—all of them within nature and a historically evolved society. Whether our experience reports the features of existence truly, just as they are (the contention of a "direct realism") or representatively, complicated by forms of interpretation, is a secondary problem for materialism. It is a primary problem for an idealistic philosophy which is instated by means of epistemological arguments and analyses. For materialism, the interpretations of the mind are modes of behavior of the socially conditioned organism. Idealization and ideal identification are features of experience with an important, widespread function. They name practical devices of experience, and they do not signify any additions to the content of ontology. To speak with Berkeley's language, although not at all in his spirit, they do not add to the furniture of the earth; and they would indeed find a place in the choir of heaven if heaven could find a place in ontology.

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On Dialectic and Experience Whitehead once declared that there is nothing behind the veil of experience pictured by science but that there is very much on that veil. While ruling out the inaccessible region of a thing-in-itself, this declaration should not be taken to support a restriction of existence to the process of human experience, and especially not any suggestion of getting out of nature, to which Whitehead expressed vigorous opposition. Along with the endorsement of the scientific enterprise and its successes, there is a further truth to be acknowledged. There is very much—an infinite amount—beyond actual experience. It is important first of all to determine what it is that is registered on the veil of experience; the physical universe is surely not to be equated or correlated with any amount of actual experience. Furthermore, it is important that experience be understood literally, in terms of the interrelationship of sentient beings with their environment. A metaphysics should not be locked up in the conception of experience. Neither should experience become in effect a straitjacket forced on the realm of existence; it should not be a means for imposing conditions on existence. Since experience is coextensive with the process of interaction between man and his environment, it has a definite place in nature. That there is no process of interaction apart from space, time, and physical reality is a primary truth that should predetermine the course of philosophical thought. The motive to escape from the confines of physical existence has led to strange operations with the concept of experience. Since the natural process of experience could not possibly transcend nature ontologically all such operations can only proceed assumptively with a specially conceived type of experience, along with restrictions imposed upon reality. It has been said, in the spirit of dialectic, that to know a limit is to know beyond the limit. Even though one could speak only of a vacuous otherness apart from possible experiencce and its objects, it can be said with evidence that there is always more in existence than could be experienced actually. The correlation between experience and reality need not be a restriction to an actual knower or to any group of actual knowers. It can be understood in an indifferent sense, with no consequences for the nature of reality or for the scope of experience and reality. If experience is regarded as having a special ontological character lifting it out of nature, it is likely to become a

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means for the ingestion of nature. Epistemological arguments combine with extraphilosophical motives of faith to assimilate nature to experience and to assign experience to an alleged higher type of being. The well-known absolute of the philosophical tradition has been succeeded in recent philosophy by a vague and mysterious transcendence. The scientific use of experience, with its emphasis upon clarity and evidence, yields therewith to obscurity and pretense. It is the negation of experience, which here means the misuse of experience. In the philosophical tradition the term "dialectic" has been on the governing side of experience, along with reason and the whole apparatus of transcendentalism. In its larger sense it has named the order and form inherent in a universal process, encompassing physical events and changing ethical standards. If the knowledge of the events of nature was not to be regarded as lacking in certainty, a suitable net was to be thrown over them or built-in principles of change and order provided. The commandment imposed upon the world of experience had the force of a general "Thou shalt," even if that was expressed by means of another vocabulary. The logos of Heraclitus adumbrated the eternalism of Hegel, and traces of it live on in the usage of some of the later dialectical philosophers. The conception of dialectic expresses transition, transitoriness, and negation; it is a response to the awareness of opposites. That life engenders death is testified to by all experience. In the words of Hegel (in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences), "life, as life, involves the germ of death, and the finite, being radically self-contradictory, involves its own self-suppression." On the other hand, it is not equally clear that death is followed by life. Considerable looseness of language would be required to fit both directions into one formula without doing violence to the facts. It was an ancient insight that the life of nature follows from the death of nature. But experience gives no basis for the necessity of such a transition. The talk of necessity should not proceed from a supposedly higher level of reason that determines reality. A science-oriented theory of dialectic is conceived as a system of ontological principles operating with manifold negations, and these are interpreted in various ways. Quantity plays an important part, but it cannot be left as a merely tenuous abstraction. What is needed is empirical inquiry in every case. The logically controlled use of dialectic as a methodological principle and as a generalization from the evidence of experience is an

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important advance with far-reaching consequences. The conception of logic as a universal methodology is immeasurably enriched and transformed through the insights afforded by its development in Marxist thought. Marx's analyses and descriptive studies illustrate the connection between devices of thought and the human world. His conception of man, history, and society combines extensive factual knowledge with abstract conceptual and structural analyses. The merit of his work is enhanced by its explanatory power, its application to social problems, and its predictions. Thus, on the basis of his analysis of the nature of capitalism, he predicted that the time would come when the world markets would be looking for world markets, a prediction accounting or much that has happened since his death in 1883 and especially for what has been a major unsettling element in recent years, causing tensions and wars. Following his analysis of the labor process and the process of producing surplus value, Marx turned to the tendency of capitalist accumulation. His terse comment that "one capitalist always kills many" ("Je ein Kapitalist schlägt viele todt") is noteworthy.2 It refers to the process of "centralization, or the expropriation of many capitalists by few." This is in line with his portrayal of the nature and tendency of capitalism, which so-called antimonopoly advocates have sought to convert into a tendency toward a form of oligopoly or a more tenuous polypoly and a legally mitigated, competitive jungle. Such observations tell far more about the motive forces and social relations in human experience than the usual detached attempts to clarify some of its constant structural features. They express insights leading to human beings in action, and since human beings are the vehicles of experience, it is a factually based view that is alone equipped to explain human experience and to point out the reasons for the search for alternatives to the whole truth. Alternatives may be devious ways of avoiding the whole truth for the sake of special or entrenched interests. Clarification of the ties between intellectual methods and various types of special interests is an important theme, illuminating philosophy as a historical enterprise in its many forms. The flexibility of the purview for Marx and Engels is shown by their conception of what is to be done to achieve the desired transformation of society. Their tactical program, adjusted to the prevailing conditions in a given country, ranged from "combat or death"3 to the belief that a peaceful solution of the social problem is possible. Thus Marx wrote at the close of his Poverty of Philosophy: "It is only in an

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order of things in which there will be no longer classes or class antagonism that social evolutions will cease to be political revolutions. Until then, on the eve of each general reconstruction of society, the last word of social science will ever be: 'Combat or death, bloody struggle or extinction.' " Marx's view concerning a possible peaceful solution is reported by Engels in his "Editor's Preface to Capital," where he refers to the swelling number of the English unemployed, who are bound "to take their own fate into their own hands." He writes, "Surely, at such a moment, the voice ought to be heard of a man whose theory is the result of a life-long study of the economic history and condition of England, and whom this study led to the conclusion that, at least in Europe, England is the only country where the inevitable social revolution might be effected entirely by peaceful legal means. He certainly never forgot to add that he hardly expected the English ruling classes to submit, without a 'pro-slavery rebellion,' to this peaceful and legal revolution." 4 There have been complicating circumstances, affecting the expectations of the earlier Marxists and becoming very important in subsequent history, as seen in the growth of imperialism, analyzed and discussed by Lenin. Also becoming increasingly problematical was the rise of labor unions under the leadership of men the American socialist Daniel DeLeon called the labor lieutenants of the capitalist class. Exhibiting features of a would-be "aristocracy of labor" with an interest in the preservation of the status quo and aspirations of climbing further in the economic scale, their influence grew with more widespread unionization and programs for stock ownership. Added to such circumstances has been the direct or indirect control of the intellectual life in accordance with dominant interests, a type of control the more difficult to unmask because it purports to be unbiased and objective. The resulting problems are accessible only to a materialistic critique. As for the conception of dialectic, what is admittedly a method based upon experience is not to be transformed into an essencetheory somehow independent of experience and yet conditioning it. The independent order of nature is investigated part by part in an endless process of inquiry. General determinations are subject to the findings of experience and must be justified by the evidence. The general requirement must be met that a philosophy of experience conform to the knowledge of existence, including experience as a type of existence.

7 The Philosophic Impact of the Facts Themselves

On Philosophy as the Basic Science

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f philosophy is to have the status of the most rigorous science, or if it is to be regarded simply as a science, it must earn the right to the designation. Every science has a special function and a selective domain for inquiry. Although a discipline that applies to all special sciences—logic—has been regarded as the science of sciences, it would be fatuous to portray logic as resting upon a throne and as governing all that exists or could possibly exist. The special sciences function as fields for work in a primary sense, and they grow out of the need to enable human beings to maintain themselves and to further their interests by understanding and changing the world. With conflicting social classes, this need has been satisfied onesidedly, in accordance with the dominant interests of the social system. The logic that is implicit in the nascent and developing sciences receives fresh impetus when it is treated as a special discipline, even though it has unrestricted application. It develops further with the growth of the sciences, and it is also an aid to that development. But there should be no talk or image of a logic "governing" the sciences.

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The transcendental philosopher who ascribes to transcendental logic and phenomenology such a universal regulative function is really seeking an absolute key to the riddles of the universe contained in a kind of philosophical Pandora's box of pure subjectivity. How can that be accomplished? By instituting a new form of subjective science, free from all the uncertainties and vicissitudes of natural existence? Can it then be shown that the detached pure science deals with structures that really condition the natural world? But if the realm for inquiry is concerned with experiences which are treated as disengaged from their natural setting, the transcendentalist never gets beyond idealities and fictions in his ontology. The methodological restriction of the objects of reality to a relationship with an experiencing subject—the subject-object limitation—serves as a wheelhorse for idealistic arguments at crucial points. The philosophical Pandora's box is one more fairy tale, as a matter of fact. It is, however, a fairy tale with sociohistorical linkage and consequences, for it is an ingenious philosophy of renunciation that leaves the status quo unexamined and unchallenged and that may even be accommodated to reactionary ideas. This has in fact occurred in the larger aura of influence of subjectivism, as illustrated by Scheler, who has added to the arsenal of philosophical apologetics serving the existing social system. 1 The methods of establishing knowledge and explanations in all the sciences, including the progressive growth of synthetic chemistry, the effort to achieve a unified physical theory, and the study of human behavior and social relationships, are primary sources of the positive knowledge underlying philosophic thought. These sources must be treated critically because of the historically conditioned motives leading to falsification and the defense of the established social order. They and the motivations derived from the social system determine the course of philosophy by presenting the decisive problems and the opportunity for direction-giving thought. The transcendental view that seeks to provide the principles and structures for historical change is itself a historical phenomenon, to be explained in relationship to the interests it serves, directly or indirectly, and not alone by a systematic analysis.

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The Ego and the World The so-called problem of the existence of the world and of the existence of the "external" world results from an assumed standpoint and method—in the present case, from the transcendental approach. The traditional problem, engaging the attention of idealists and realists, involved protracted discussion with no generally accepted solution. The lively idealism-realism controversy early in the twentieth century antedated the rise and spread of a new form of subjectivism, with the problem of existence the most crucial challenge to be met. In his early period, Husserl admonished philosophers to go "back to the things themselves," which meant attending to what is given in and to experience. That was much more promising in its time than the slogan "Back to Kant," as expressed by O. Liebmann in Kant und die Epigonen (1865).2 The later development of a philosophy of pansubjectivism was programmatic in character, with a world-problem resulting. It proved necessary to accept what was called a "pregiven" world of experience, and the assimilation of that world to the transcendental-subjective realm of pure experience remained an unsolved problem. 3 The provisional "egology," amounting to an individualistic subjectivism, was an initial stage of the operation, and it was to be overcome and absorbed in a larger subjective framework, universal in its scope. It may be noted that no mere subjectivity ever caused a war or committed robbery. The subjectivist of the latest vintage must acknowledge an order of events independent of all human processes of experience. On his premises and within the framework of his method, he can only resort to an absolute being to encompass the order of independent existence, and such a being has not been instated descriptively in experience. Has something been missed in the examination of this issue? Have the facts themselves been insufficiently considered? What may well be most obvious may for that very reason be neglected. The appeal to the facts themselves (which is to be distinguished from the Husserlian slogan "Back to the things themselves") involves a reexamination of the ontology unavoidably underlying all epistemology. It may break what has been embalmed as a perennial deadlock and consign it to its rightful place among the discarded curiosities of history. The implications of established knowledge, based upon adequate evidence, must be fully and frankly recognized. A broad definition of facts,

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allowing for the many types of fact, formal and ideal as well as real, is called for.4 Exponents of subjectivism must be forced to state their case precisely on all essential points: on the nature of man and society; on the mind and consciousness, the self, ego or egos, including the transcendental ego; on the nature of the world and man's actual place in the world. It is not to be supposed that questions about the relationship of an ego to the world or to passing circumstances of social standing and opportunity, or to genes, etc., would be disconcerting to a subjectivist. For the subjectivist is ever ready to admit the influences bearing upon the development of the mind, self, or ego, while being equally well prepared to transform the influences and the entire world in subjective terms. The operation is a simple one, even if less simple than the traditional theology, for which it was sufficient for a deity, blessed with aseity, to take a handful of nothing and produce something—the world and man. For the philosophical operation an intricate process of thought is required in order to provide a semblance of plausibility, but it can be done only by disregarding some of the most pertinent facts about knowing and being. The promise of pure subjectivism, that a universal suspension of beliefs and a retirement to immanent experience would bring to light all influences and all conditions bearing on experience, is not fulfilled. For a larger realm is needed, in which the mind and all experiences are contained—the infinite realm of existence, antedating the relatively recent development of human beings and continuing after the possible disappearance of life as we know it from the cosmos. The transmogrification of real existence to accommodate the central position accorded to minds, selves, or egos is a methodological achievement of philosophical subjectivism which is at times concealed linguistically by describing its determinations as "objective." One must look to sociohistorical factors for the explanation of the receptivity and persistent adherence to this position. Accommodation to the social order, the influence of factors of class interest, and religious motives are prominent in the explanation, along with personal factors such as fidelity to past teachers and faulty or confused reasoning. The underlying conditions of pure subjectivism, like pure or formal logic, are to be found in the natural and social world. Both types of discipline are derivative, presupposing the existing world, and they have only a restricted, relative autonomy as special systems

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of thought and mode$ of inquiry. The idea of a pure life-world as featured in phenomenology is similarly a derivative of the real world of existence. It is a nameless realm, unaffected by the troublesome world in which we live. But there is still more to attract many persons in our time: it offers a way to avoid taking a stand on the pressing practical issues affecting mankind, in accordance with the already indicated widespread desire for an alternative to social change. That desire is often unconsciously motivated on the part of all those not wishing to take a stand on the burning issues of our time, which are rooted in the basic issue of socialism versus capitalism in its various forms of manifestation. Since the real world of existence is presupposed as a matter of fact by any thought of a pure life-world, let us take another look at our actual life-world, and also at the procedure by which the ideal structures of phenomenology are obtained—above all, the epoche or suspension of beliefs and judgments. The epoche which is required in order to delimit the realm of pure experience can only be partial as a matter of fact. As a methodological device, it still presupposes the infinite realm of nature and the sociohistorical world. The professed aim can be viewed constructively: everything is to be examined for its evidence in direct experience, beginning with my own experience as a supposedly solitary knowing being. Since a solitary knowing being cannot exist in fact, the very beginning is artificial, and the whole procedure must be regarded as ancillary to natural beings. There has been no real flight from nature and no real breach in nature has been effected, nor has the existence of the world been disposed of by the process of suspension or questioning. On the contrary, it was a matter of ordinary observation that even pure phenomenologists defended their special privileges and property interests despite any suspension, so that they always maintained the independence of the natural world in practice. It is a curious fact that they did not acknowledge the priority of that world. This applies to the life-world as well, for it presupposes the physical universe, and also the sociocultural world in all its forms of development. The priority of the world becomes meaningful by means of a larger framework of method within which a specialized procedure could only have a provisional and relative autonomy. The nature of the solitary ego performing the epoche presents us with a group of questions. Is my epodie-performing ego the same as your epoc/ie-performing ego? And what is its nature? How is it related

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to my body, to other human beings, to my environment, social system, and historical tradition, with regard to physical, biological, and cultural factors? Is there one unchanging ego, or does a person have a plurality of egos differing from one another in at least one respect? Is this ego a part of nature, or does it have a special ontological status elevating it above nature? Real egos are always concrete, historically conditioned individuals. They are bodies in action, and they provide a unity of reference and ascription to experience. Biologically and socially they owe their existence to other egos. The pure ego, or the class of pure egos, cannot escape such conditions, however transformed they may seem to be. It is easy to lapse into the view that an ego or self is an independent agent, an isolated unit of existence, out of which social aggregates are compounded. The indebtedness of an ego to the prevailing social group is still primary. His language and the chief influences upon his thought are derived from the social group. That group is not to be thought of as an undifferentiated unity, however, for there are individual and class differences to be noted. Egos differ not only individually, with differences due to capacities, desires, and bodily features; they also differ because of their places in the social system. A social system dominated by property interests is made up of economic classes with conflicting interests. Ancient slavery, medieval feudalism, and modern capitalism register both similar and distinctive patterns of social conflict. It is always necessary to make the framework of reference clear and to indicate the areas of conflict. One ego may be frankly aligned with a dominant economic class, and another ego may challenge the entire status quo and criticize all existing socioeconomic relations. He may do so as a representative of those who work and in opposition to those who largely own the means of production. Again, in a given case he may resort to a framework of reference reaching beyond his own national boundaries. In any case, it should be borne in mind that an ego is always a historical product, and that is also true of the actual cases of philosophically prepared, abstractive egos, which should always be dated and located geographically for identification and understanding.

On Structures and Reality If experience is taken to be the subject matter for philosophical thought, the domain of existence must be accounted for and its rela-

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tionship to experience established. Is it correct to say that the actual world is an exemplification of ideal structures, discerned in and through experience? That may be a convenient formulation, but it also proves to be a misleading way of stating the relationship to the existing world of cognitive devices owing their origin to that world. A dogmatic idealist may proceed from ideal structures as the true and basic reality, the problem then being to make connection with the real world of passing events. But the truth is just the reverse: what is called the world of contingent events is the reality, and the structures are to be discovered there, using any and all cognitive devices, including the artifical devices designated as "ideal." This is not to deny that there are objective structures, for every event embodies relationships and can be described in terms of ideal relations, which are constituted in keeping with the variable events in natural experience. From one perspective, P', concerned with the growth of knowledge and experience, it is seen that structures are discovered in the analysis of real events. From another perspective, P " , presupposing the achievements of natural and social experience, one can operate abstractly with what is called "pure thought" and its constructive activities. Fictions play an important role in such activities. The point is then to determine how the conceptual patterns of construction— the ideal structures—are realized in the world of experience. For P', what is taken to be a discovery may be mistaken, totally or in part, and confirmation is required. For P " , the likelihood of error is reduced in practice, because of the greater degree of control by the thinker over his materials, but error is never eliminated completely. So-called pure structures with no application to real existence may still be of theoretical interest to us. But they do not have basic practical importance until there is an application to the natural or social world. They may, however, have secondary or derivative importance through application to other ideal constructions, and the latter may eventually have a realization in the world and therewith practical importance. It can also be said that there may be a value in understanding of the satisfaction of human interests, including those which are most abstract and remote from the practical world. The term "structure" is useful; as a general term it is broadly synonymous with "relational pattern" or "relational organization." One may speak of formal structures as well as of nonformal or material structures, or, as is frequently the case, of material and formal components of structures. The formal structures illustrated in the

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ideal systems of formal logic and pure mathematics are in turn indebted to the cognitive activities and motivations of human beings and the natural-social world. On the other hand, material structures always have components that are describable in formal terms, representing relationships ingredient in real event-structures. The defining relations in an actual structure are always associated with diverse details and circumstances, with considerable latitude for variation. Thus the relational complex comprising an employer and employed workers embodies the constant relationship "A employs B, C, D . . ." in its peculiar existential setting. It is suggested by such examples that the underlying ontology is not to be conferred by an a priori conception of essences and that the understanding of real structures requires attention to material facts as the basis and concomitant of all logical determinations. All real things or events have space-time relations, and space-time has formal characteristics. To be sure, a skeptic might challenge this statement, for as a universal statement it goes beyond that which has been actually observed. But such an objection merely illustrates the trivial and empty truth that the field of the observed is the observed and that what has not been observed is not to be treated as observed. The universality of space-time relations is rooted in the basic fact of existence underlying science and philosophy. That our experience progressively demonstrates the success of our predictions of the future would not convince a persistent skeptic, for whom it is possible in a vacuous sense that the entire realm of existence might cease to be and indeed "might not be at all." This kind of skeptical reservation would not be enough to undermine our confidence in the reaches of empirical knowledge, for there is no evidence to support it and very much evidence against it. Some philosophers have endeavored to discern structures intuitively in the stream of experience. Such intuitive discernment (whether as Wesensschau or by another name) was supposed to be emancipated from the difficulties of empirical knowledge and the natural world. It would have to be shown that the structures, allegedly nontemporal and eternal in a sense, could be justified by intuitive experience, whether pure or impure. A reflectively observed structure is there as that which is meant or referred to by the experience. If the entire realm of experience is viewed in isolation from its natural setting, with all positing of real existence suspended, and only essential structures of experience and its meant objects are consid-

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ered, it is misleading to ask whether the meant objects are continuous existents. It should not be said that they are eternal any more than they could be said to last three hundred years. Strictly speaking, all suggestions of actual reality, whether temporal or spatial, should be avoided. The structures discerned in pure experience belong to an ideal order and have the ontological status of fictions. Just as the purereflective (alias transcendental) knower is a child of the natural-social world who must breathe and derive his sustenance from that world, so does he owe his speech, power of thought, and fund of knowledge to that world. Furthermore, it is the actual natural-social world that provides the real basis and the motivation for all thought, including the turning to subjectivism of so many philosophers. The difficulties of materialistic thought are not overcome by a subjective philosophy. The belief that in the transcendental realm the basis has been provided on which all conceivable philosophical and scientific problems of the past are to be put and decided simply reverses the real order of events. The order is, first, the natural-social world, with man as an active agent in it affecting that world, and then, as a late development, the turning to subjectivity of numerous writers. It is not true that the ideal truths found subjectively are "first in themselves," so that they have a privileged status with respect to the real order of the world. To maintain that would simply be to give expression to wishful thinking. The term "first" must be clarified, when one mentions the difference between that which is "first for us" and that which is "first in itself." In other words, is structure prior to natural-social events; or are the latter events prior to structure: which is "first"? If one wishes to understand (or to "see" in an extended sense) the structure of capital, or of capitalist production, there must first have been an actual case of social and economic organization in existence; or one may proceed from a past case of actual existence. The structure would otherwise be a matter of ideal imagination, without any known application to the real world. The determination of ideal structures, as illustrated in purely formal science, may precede any application to the existing world by a considerable amount of time, or there may never be an application. In that case, the determination of structures is first in a qualified sense which must be carefully indicated. In a real, primary sense, the sociohistorical and the natural events are first. There was an indefinitely long evolutionary process and a long historical process before the sciences began to determine structures of real existence and of ideal possibilities

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which might be illustrated by the real world, thus adding to the humanly directive elements in the process of change. Marx's thought has been examined for an illustration of the role of structures, with special reference to his economic analysis. Thus the analysis of a commodity displays structural features of general significance for the explanation of value, money, and profit. The distinction between structure and superstructure is also pertinent here. These terms refer to the relationship between the basic economic factors of a given society and the cultural factors or institutions (intellectual, religious, moral, etc.) presupposing the economic activities. Since this relationship was clarified by Marx to allow for the effects of such factors upon the economic process, it would be unwarranted to portray the structure-superstructure relationship as operating in a fixed, one-way direction. Although Marx's economic analysis can be viewed as showing the nature and structure of capitalist production and distribution, it must also be viewed as based upon a most detailed factual knowledge of changing historical events. Real workers and employers are seen in their actual roles in their social system. The intellectual devices for analysis employed by Marx represent an important development of scientific and philosophical method. The issue recently raised by structuralists has been complicated by the reference to Marx's economic analysis. Hence one does not say enough about the method of structuralism until he indicates the type involved, whether pure-phenomenological, or phenomenological in a mixed or extended "existential" sense, or Marxist in any one of its versions, including its forms of revisionism. It is possible to find structures everywhere. That is the case if all events and collocations of events are regarded as containing arrangements of parts. Thus there are unique passing structures, for every event embodies a relational pattern. The continually changing real world has a variable structure. Each event—such as laughter, a sigh, a meeting of workers, or a musical concert—has its structure, which is disclosed by analysis. The structure of "a meeting as such" is to be distinguished from "this particular meeting, with its individual characteristics." Similarly, the structure of "a musical concert as such" is to be distinguished from "this concert by the New York Philharmonic Orchestra"; and similarly for the other cases. The general abstractive determination of the structure of "a meeting as such" selects relationships present in all events of that kind, without allowing for the individual factors peculiar to one

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particular case. How much is established thereby? A structure-philosopher may believe that he then has absolutely secure knowledge of the conditions of real existence, that he has knowledge of relationships necessarily present in all future events of that kind, and that furthermore such findings are valid for all possible knowers. Expressed in the language of phenomenology, this is one instance of a universal eidetic or essential science envisaged by Husserl in its most generalized form; and the eidetic structures were regarded as fitting into an a priori framework underlying the natural-social world, which was said to exhibit a remarkable teleology. It must be admitted that the examples of such a priori knowledge did not progress beyond the obvious and the trivial, with an understandable paucity of results. The desired "geometry of experience" (to express it analogically) was not realized, and all attempts to determine the conditions of future realities remained nugatory. It does not help much to assert that the principle of noncontradiction is a negative condition of possible existence, and it is not very helpful to know that there must be a spacetime structure, a meeting-place, various individuals with a reason for their collocation, and so on, in order to have a meeting. This is to be distinguished from questions about the structure of matter—of genes, for example—with which scientific inquiry is concerned and which are often fruitful and important. In such cases, there is no effort to oppose one type of knowledge to other types, and all available sources of experience are used collectively. The field for inquiry is not cut off transcendentally from the real source of all experience by an artifice of method which then presents the methodogenic problem of real existence. Scientific inquiry is motivated and influenced by the prevailing social system, and it is indebted to the previous development of scientific knowledge. Its problems are largely forced upon scholars by the nature of the world and man in all his activities. A partial suspension of beliefs is illustrated by each special science as a matter of procedure, and the ideal of a universal suspension of beliefs of pure philosophy remains in the background as an ideal warning against obscurity and dogmatism. The universal suspension of beliefs is thus an ancillary device with a practical function. It may, however, also become a mode of retreat from the world and its problems. Those who seek a more permanent realm of being, after devaluing and "bracketing" the natural world as a contingent realm, are apt to forget the most pressing problems of contemporary society,

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highlighted by frustration and suffering due to unequal opportunities and the threat to human existence resulting from the profit system and pollution of the environment. The quest for structures may simply go along with the process of renunciation of the real world, for which the turning to subjectivity is a preparation. The disregard of the most important human problems is not limited to pure philosophers, to be sure, for many specialized scientists are also far removed from them. In such cases, the specialization itself may be a large part of the reason. But there are also other reasons which may be traced to influences of the social system, to explain the disregard of major human problems, and this applies to philosophers as well. A philosopher can also be viewed as reacting to his social system, either actively or passively as a beneficiary of that system, and not only as an exponent of pure thought. If he lives and acts in accordance with a dominant social group, he can be regarded as a member of that group. No methodological device is likely to overcome the habits of thought of his social class, unless it is effectively based upon a dimension of radical reflection going far beyond the presumed radicalism of transcendental analysis. This applies equally well to scholars in general.

The Real Priority of Historical Event-Structures Proceeding from the static analysis of familiar structures to the emergence of new events, one sees the priority of historical eventstructures. The fact that every event is an embodied structure has been obscured by the abstract treatment of structures as though they were independent of events. Let us consider some historically conditioned examples of older and more recent standing. "Pollupolis" is a term presupposing a certain historical stage of our industrial society featuring pollution; the historical conditions leading to the function of a foreman in a factory or to the need and place for such a worker antedates the conceptual determination and definition of a foreman; and real, malfunctioning organic beings are prior conditions for determining the essence or structure of obstipation. Further examples include the ice age and Niagara Falls as antecedent natural events, and events involving human beings such as computers, time-loans, poverty, inflation, imperialism, and bankruptcy. It is not a timeless or supertemporal tornado that is first, either

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in time or in some "in itself" sense. Examples such as exploitation, blackmail, revolution, and radicalism have overflowing boundaries, defying neat little essence-determinations and depending upon the so-called contingent historical events. The essence-determiner or describer must be wary lest the natural-social backs upon which he rests should unseat him. His "inner" region for analysis is not as completely self-contained as he had believed it to be; it is a derivative domain, as artificial and confining in its way as any formal system. Although conceptual determinations may be proposed for which there are still no examples, it is nevertheless true that there is always an antecedently existing world, including a cultural tradition, as a basis for thought. In general, indefinitely many actual events, more or less uniquely individual, precede the essential-structural determinations. Most of the examples which have been adduced show the active interaction of sentient organic beings, socially conditioned and motivated, with the natural-social world. This is also seen in the extreme case of meanings and structures discerned by subjectivists, which can be attributed to real, effective human agents who add something to experience. The description and evaluation of those additions are precisely what is in question. The subjective analyst calls attention to subtle distinctions and relationships showing many of the creative activities of the human mind, but he fails to do justice to whole regions of experience because of his failure to be guided in his restricted method by the ever-growing knowledge of the facts of real existence. The method of phenomenological description as such requires and presupposes the results of ordinary experience and the sciences. Human experience is the resultant of natural, social, and individual factors; temporal priority is to be ascribed to nature and sociocultural conditions in the first place, and not to the subjective activities of an individual or group of individuals. In short, the abstractive determination of variable conceptual or ideal structures is based upon the real, unique event-structures of natural and human existence. The universe at a given time is the most general natural event-structure. There are micro-event-structures as well as intermediate types, illustrated by human beings and their activities, including constructions of thought with their idealities. The existing social system is itself an event, a changing historical organization, a passing event-structure. To idealize that structure might mean in effect to provide a way of conceiving the existing social rela-

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tions and the institution of private property as externalized in any one of their stages of development. Depending upon the standards selected for judgment, that development may be described as progressive or as retrograde—progressive if scientific and technological advances are considered in their potential value for all members of society, and retrograde if the degree of success in amassing wealth is the goal of individuals or groups of individuals. The degree of satisfaction of the needs of all human beings would be the most defensible ultimate standard for judgment. That this ultimate standard may be modified temporarily in order to make progress toward the goal of individuals or groups of individuals. The degree of satisfaction of the needs of all human beings would be the most defensible ultimate standard for judgment. That this ultimate standard may be modified temporarily in order to make progress toward the goal of universal human equality is a practical consideration of tactics, which does not signify an abandonment of the final standard. In any case, social change is not to be arrested or eternalized except in the realm of fictions.

Subjectivism and the Nonparticipating Observer A historical explanation must be included in the attempt to understand the significance of the subjectivism that has been so prominent in the philosophy of the recent past. It may be viewed historically as a later phase of the development of idealism as opposed to materialism. The influence of religion, and the complex interest in preserving the existing form of society, have important bearing upon the emergence and development of subjectivism. That function would mark it as destined to serve such interests for only a limited period in cultural history. But that is not the whole truth about subjectivism, for like idealism in the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition it has the merit of recognizing the active, contributive function of human knowing, in opposition to the comparatively passive role assigned to it by many other philosophers. Even though every sound and positive finding of subjective procedures may be restated in another, science-oriented framework in which the activities of thought are located in accordance with the factual knowledge of man's place in the cosmos, it remains true that in its best examples subjectivism has added to the under-

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standing of experience and knowledge. Only that addition must be critically reexamined from a larger methodological perspective. In medieval thought, even mysticism was in effect one of the means for combating the authoritarianism of the church, whose mediation was unnecessary for the salvation of the mystic, for the mystic claimed to make direct contact with the highest reality. In the recent past, the clamor for freedom of the individual was also expressed at times by a turning to subjectivity. As in the case of the mystics, however, the supporting philosophy was untenable in important respects. But it is desirable to undertake to salvage all that is sound in it, in a more complete framework of thought in keeping with logical principles and the scientific level of the time. It is also necessary to revise the terminology of subjectivism, so that there are no assumptive terms claiming more than the methods can accomplish. The chief claim for the value of subjectivism depends upon the results of its descriptive procedure. The difficulties in the way of empirical description are well known. Empirical description may be influenced by psychological, social, economic, and physical factors; there may be bias and dishonesty, or there may be simple mistakes. The evil effects of biased testimony purporting to be descriptive, in cases of industrial and political conflict, or where private interests are threatened, are graphic illustrations of the problem. Are such difficulties obviated by subjective inquiry? Does the retirement to the "inner" realm free the investigator from error and prejudice? It is undeniable that even pure subjectivists can make faulty reports or commit mistakes. The question is whether they are sufficiently free from their natural and social entanglements to make correct descriptions. The restriction of subjective inquiry to essences and their relations reduces the region of possible error, but it does not eliminate error entirely. Moreover, it must be recognized on grounds of fact that the cultural as well as the physical aspects of human beings are conditioned by extra-subjective processes; that language and the intellectual achievements of the past underlie and make possible the thought of the present, including reflective thought; that the technical achievements of a long tradition and an economic order capable of supporting it make what is called pure thought possible; and that the economic order plays a big and often decisive role in motivating scientific inquiry, on the one hand, and various modes of condoning the existing social system or evading its actual problems, on the other hand. Subjective inquiry has provided

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one such mode of escape. In short, the reflective thinker is a complex physical and socially conditioned entity. His thought processes and abstractive procedures, which purport to lift him above the real world, are themselves complex events in that world, for one cannot sever his relationships to nature and human society. The assumption of a nonparticipating observer has been made in pure phenomenology in order to make reports on the structure of experience in a detached way. Actually, there is no such thing as a nonparticipating observer, and there are always strands of connection to and from the social order. There is seen to be more than one dimension of participation, when one considers the human knower as a whole in his interrelationships with the natural-social world. If one maintains a natural attitude toward the objects of experience, living in the experience and reacting to the world, there can be no talk of nonparticipation. With the natural attitude, one may even try to revise or remake the world in part. All conduct is therewith conditioned by a world that is independent of any single human being and largely independent of all human beings. Reactions to the environment are selective, and one's conduct is largely influenced by personal and class interests or by what one is persuaded to regard as his interests. If this is true of the natural man, what can be said about the reflecting man, with or without the performance of an epoche and retirement to reflective consciousness? Nothing enters the realm of reflection without the prior accumulation of a process of experience, which is influenced by natural and social conditions. The nature of social classes and of economic relations remains unchanged for reflection. For one who accepts the practices of the social order in his natural experience, there is not likely to be any change when a suspension of beliefs has been instituted. A person who enjoys a preferred and secure place in society is not likely to place it in question seriously in a reflective examination or suspension of beliefs, which in effect leaves all actual existence unchallenged and unchanged. Too much has been claimed for the suspension of beliefs; no device of that kind has much to say for it if it merely tries to be a kind of impartial witness, seeing necessary (eidetic) structures and doing nothing about their real counterparts. First of all, the claim to nonparticipation is unwarranted; it is not borne out by the facts. Second, that observer is a kind of pure nonentity, incapable of doing anything practical to change the world.

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Like the conception of a life-world in phenomenology, the nonparticipating observer is a fiction. It may be a useful fiction when utilized critically, recognizing that all observers participate in one way or another in the real world and that any alleged nonparticipation on the part of a reflective investigator should be regarded as being merely an ideal warning to take note of all such avenues of participation.

The Question of the Way from "Here" to "There" The so-called problem of proving if not providing the existence of an external world is either methodogenic or a pseudo-problem, toyed with needlessly. But the real problem of accounting for the way from "here" (the knower) to "there" (the world) is not a theme for philosophy. Such questions must be examined to determine whether they are due to an assumed method and standpoint, detaching the thinker from the existing world. It is quite different if one proceeds from the actual domain of existence as comprising spatial and temporal events, motion, a material nature as the theme of the special sciences, and human beings with their actual behavior and potentialities as developed in a sociohistorical process. It can be misleading to speak of the domain of existence as "given," for that traditional term suggests a bifurcation of the knower and reality and is a linguisitc vestige of theology. It is all a matter of basic fact for philosophy, constituting its unavoidable point of departure. Also included in that protophilosophical basis is the omnipresent tradition, accommodating itself continually to changing conditions and always a force to be reckoned with. Even naturalistic philosophers have thought it necessary to grapple with the problem of accounting for existence. That has been due to failure to recognize the very assumptions concerning existence, man, and methodology. But it has also been due to socially conditioned motives leading them to effect a compromise with opponents of a science-oriented world view and to failure to consider fully the philosophical consequences of the established knowledge of man and natural existence. One who does not begin with such confining premises and motives is not likely to have the artificially induced problem of the existence of the world. It is not incumbent upon philosophy to undertake to do what the special sciences are equipped to accomplish in showing what is involved in experiencing the world physically, organically, psychologically, and socioculturally. The integration of

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scientific knowledge and its consequences for philosophical issues is, however, a proper theme for philosophy. But that is not to be confused with the assumptive question of showing philosophically how one gets from the knower to the world if no artificial separation has been instituted. In general, it is the independent physical world which is taken to be in need of philosophical instatement. It seems relatively easy for the thinker to push that world into any desired framework, with even more drastic consequences than would be possible with nuclear weapons. Such freedom of the imagination is not likely to affect the social world, however, for even the purest philosopher could not afford to interfere with such things as institutions of higher learning, the publication of books and articles, and, above all, salary schedules, with all that they involve. The social world is usually accepted with its inequalities and vested privileges; it is rarely held to be in need of justification philosophically, or of any philosophical account of getting from "here" (the individual worker, or the procurer of business, etc.) to "there" (in the social world, meaning the place of work, or of prospects for the procurer of business, etc.). After all, there are centers of information for bus lines, trains, and planes, and there is sufficient guidance for procurers of all kinds—all nonphilosophical. Most philosophers have nothing to say on this question, and they are inclined to leave unchallenged the relationships of individuals and social classes, with all their conflicts. On the other hand, a materialistic reinterpretation of the general suspension of beliefs is in a position to show how one can get from questioning everything to challenging all settled arrangements and privileges, as a necessary element in social change. One thinks of possible changes on the basis of the actual world, which is to undergo transformation. It will be in place to add some comments in clarification of the concept of possibility.

On Possibility and Potentiality The concept of possibility is epistemic. In accordance with the Kantian doctrine of the categories, it is a form of experience and knowledge and is supposed to be also a condition of the objects of experience and knowledge. But like probability, possibility is not ontological, and it is used because we do not have the knowledge of existence which is referred to in positive judgments about reality. To

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say that possibility underlies reality and that the real world is only one case out of an indefinitely large number of possible worlds is to apply formal-epistemic terms ontologically. Possibility is broader in its scope than probability, which is a quantification of a possibility. This conceptual tool does not condition reality; that would be to place the cart before the horse. The various concepts of possibility range all the way from empty possibility to what can be allowed as meaningful and hence possible in a restricted system or context. It is desirable to distinguish potentiality from the general concept of possibility. Anything that happens or develops is said to be an actualization of a potentiality. That is true analytically of any individual situation or event, as well as of reality as a whole. Not much is said thereby, for the present is indeed actualized out of the past and must have potentially involved the present. No matter what happens in the near future—even the destruction of life on this planet—that eventuality would have been potentially engendered by the antecedent conditions. Considered quite generally, possibility should not be misplaced. That occurs when the mind is viewed as conditioning reality by the imposition of pure forms, with possibility one of the basic forms. Potentiality is either analytically instated as true although trivial, or it signifies positive determinations which are effective in concrete individual cases. Thus, one person may contract tuberculosis and another person avoid it, although living under similar conditions. The knowledge of various determining factors, in accordance with scientific findings, will help to explain what potentiality means in each case. Both concepts, possibility and potentiality, are useful in their ways, but the terms can also be misleading when too much is claimed for them. It is easy to be deceived by words, for they can be used assumptively in so many ways.

The Question of Epistemological Transcendence If one thinks of possible social changes on the basis of the actual world, does that require some kind of epistemological transcendence of the present? This question appears to raise a serious difficulty on the basis of tacit subjectivistic premises. In other words, the talk of an epistemological breakthrough suggests that an artificial frame delimiting the field of experience has been transcended by a larger frame.

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Hence, if an attempt at the epistemological containment of ontology has been penetrated, that amounts to a breakthrough in an artificial frame. The epistemological limitation brings on what seems to be a dramatic exodus, so that after the transgression the redemption follows. But there is no such problem when one understandingly resorts to a plurality of diverse procedures. Would there be any point to speaking of an existential breakthrough? Only if there were built-in restrictions, including subjectivistic premises. In the latter case, one must pass beyond the subjectively limited sphere of existence to the infinitely larger independent domain of existence, which is all-comprehensive. The talk of a breakthrough may be assumptive in its way—as though the field of experience were really something sui generis and as though existence could only be regarded as correlated with the experience and knowledge of existence, or nonindependently, which would be an unwarranted dogma. The point to be noted is evident: procedures are always partial and selective; and there is talk of a breakthrough if a unitary procedure is used solely. Intermethodological judgments, or judgments from different methodological perspectives, do not involve breakthroughs in that sense. Thus it is possible to examine the subjective mode of inquiry from a historical or evolutionary perspective, and the historical perspective from the subjective or purely reflective point of view. Whether such intermethodological judgments are worth making must be determined for each case. On the other hand, it may be said that there is a kind of breakthrough when a thinker in a historical form of society seeks to introduce fundamental changes that would lead to a new social system. No artificial frame need be involved, and no epistemological restrictions or ontological assumptions. The desired breakthrough is in that case within the natural world, and it merely signifies a transformation of the existing social system, with a supplanting and modification of existing social relations and the introduction of new arrangements. The far-reaching changes affect institutions and ideas, with consequences for political, social, educational, religious, scientific, and philosophical thought.

The Sociohistorical World and the Materialistic Epoche From the subjectivistic reduction to pure experience nothing results for the real world, which continues to exist with all its conflicts,

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dislocations, suffering, and limited happiness. There is no superior vantage point for examining the problems of the social system that could dispense with objective methods and the established knowledge of the sciences. The nonparticipating observer places himself at the null-point of human activity, and that is the negation of all that is real. If the transcendental point of view is not to serve as a support for the existing social order, and if, hopefully, it is to be an aid in the treatment of human problems, it must be critically revised and fundamentally reinterpreted. But it can be used only in a narrow, selective manner. Prejudices of various kinds provide revealing examples. The methodological suspension of all beliefs is supposed to be a precondition for the weighing of evidence and for the achievement of objectively valid knowledge. There are prior questions to be answered before prejudices can be clarified and defined. The events of natural and social experience must be considered. There are historical, national, class, and individual factors, instating or preserving prejudices. Prejudgments of Norwegians versus Swedes and vice versa, and a host of others concerning Scotsmen, Jews, Italians, Negroes, and so on, would not be affected by a universal suspension of beliefs, for they are deeply rooted in social and economic circumstances. The only effective way to approach the problem of prejudice is by considering the actual historical causes. This is conspicuously illustrated by such complex phenomena as racial and national prejudices. AntiSemitism is causally connected with the Christian tradition, along with other factors. A relatively simpler illustration would be the depreciation of manual labor in the slave economy of ancient Athens. The attempts, consciously or unconsciously motivated, to justify slavery helped to preserve a group of prejudices. Modern attempts continue classical Greek reasons adduced in support of vested prejudices representing the interests of a slaveholding class. It is fair to ask how closely the ideal of objective knowledge would be approached in such cases, even if the attitude of radical (subjectivistic) reflection were adopted. In general, it is pertinent to ascertain whether the subjectivistic ideal of rigorous, absolute knowledge would draw attention away from sordid facts by a one-sided treatment of prejudice. The all-sided factual account of prejudice, making use of reflective analysis along with historical and scientific data, is intended to deal with concrete cases of prejudice and to correct as well as understand them—not only structurally, but as real events affecting our lives.

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Human beings should be considered at all stages of social development, from obscure and conjectural beginnings to more complex forms leading to the societies which are known historically. The ego or self, whether empirical or transcendental, is always a function of an organic body, is always an organization of physical matter and energy, and is always a result of historical development. If a factory worker, an investment procurer, or a fundamentalist preacher is taken as an example, one sees how little can be contributed by subjective analysis, whether pure or mixed existentially, and how thin the findings must be in any case. If the example is an expression of grief or an experience of anxiety, the most important thing is the real event itself and the whole complex of circumstances producing that event. The philosophical change to a subjective view, usually involving eternalistic elements, amounts to an avoidance of the real cases of grief and anxiety, which may be due to misfortunes resulting from alienation, economic insecurity, or war and its consequences. The vacuous subjective dimension of descriptive analysis cannot precede and must presuppose the course of the real world and actual experience, so that it always operates with borrowed contents. By its very nature it becomes a means of evading the pressing problems of mankind. In general, it can be viewed as one more way to search for and to find an alternative to changing the social order fundamentally, as a learned way to allow the status quo to stand in its basic relations. That is done while pronouncing noble-sounding but still vacuous ideals of freedom, happiness, harmony, and so on, at a time when there is still so much lack of freedom, so much unhappiness, and so much conflict. At a time when economic conflicts have developed to such a point that the continued existence of mankind is threatened by a possible terminal war, it is worse than impotent to pronounce categorical imperatives in the traditional style; it is a travesty, and a relic of philosophical thought that once had its restricted historical significance. Above all, it is necessary to make concrete reference to existing social relations: Does one propose to be a nonparticipant or to change those relations? Does one propose to continue the economic causes of the major problems confronting mankind—the profit system, wage labor, and the competitive conflicts leading to wars—or to change them, with the greatest possible satisfaction of the needs of all human beings the goal to be achieved? Just as socialist thinkers advocated the abolition of the ownership of the means of production by a dominant class, the anthropologist Lewis H. Morgan called in question the idea

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of property from his perspective. He asserted that "a mere property career is not the final destiny of mankind" and that "the dissolution of society bids fair to become the termination of a career of which property is the end and aim." 5 Such radicalism of thought was never achieved by pure philosophers and was rarely approached by any philosophers in the tradition. It is only a materialistic type of suspension and critical examination of beliefs that could become a methodological stage in a process leading to a real transformation of social relations. Impotent as a subjective procedure, it must be informed by factual knowledge disclosing the nature of the economic system and the nature of actual human problems, and it must be understood and given sufficient political as well as industrial expression if it is to be effective. For the materialistic reflective procedure there is no flight to subjective processes and essences. The structures discerned in human relations and in experience are always disclosed by means of the facts themselves, on the basis of a world in which human knowers—and philosophical thought—are recent and passing events in a cosmic process without beginning or end. The specialized epoche of pure subjectivism leads nowhere socially or historically. The materialistic reflective analysis under which the pure epoche may be ordered, with appropriate reinterpretation and elimination of dogmas and rigid elements, leaves nothing out. Nothing human is foreign to it; everything in real existence is proper to it; and all phases of experience and thought, including philosophy, are in its domain, which makes it truly universal. The presumed universality claimed for the subjective epoche is really an unfounded claim, for it operates on the surface of the world with abstract structures in a nonexistent, artificial realm. Viewed factually, every knowing being is conditioned by a social system and by a cultural tradition. Equally supported by factual knowledge is the truth that man and all his activities are located in the natural world. These are general truths. In particular, there are special conditions and circumstances constituting the setting for an individual human being or a social class, and these circumstances determine the starting point for their thought and action. The social setting differs in medieval Europe, in England in the seventeenth century, in France in the eighteenth century, and in England and America in the nineteenth or twentieth century. The point is to see the various ways in which a human being inherits from and reacts to traditions of culture and to existing social institutions and practices.

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From the physical and organic perspective, a human being is an organization of matter capable of being described by a group of sciences. From the sociohistorical perspective, he is an organization of matter conditioned by social realities: he is a member of a social class, with or without religious beliefs; he is indebted to an intellectual tradition; and he has his individual peculiarities, which may lead him to oppose his own social class. In the usual case there is not a total immersion in a tradition, and all its offerings are rarely absorbed. The diverse ways in which people select ideas for their purposes add to the complexity of their sociohistorical relationships. A person may derive ideas and thought patterns from extinct social orders, and he may inventively imagine conditions that probably have never existed. Although it is possible to formulate dominant cultural traits for a given period, allowance must always be made for individual and group differences. To view the matter concretely, it can be revealing to consider what a given philosopher says or implies about property relations and social classes and to ascertain whether there is any relationship between those views and his general philosophy. Are there any effects on his ontology, epistemology, and philosophy of values? The same line of inquiry could be directed to social scientists, mathematicians, and others. The relevance, if any, of such views to the problems that motivate them, the methods they adopt, and the solutions they arrive at would have to be determined. Some philosophers were explicitly concerned with questions about prevailing social relations and took a definite stand on them, either accepting them with qualifications or seeking to transform them fundamentally. In the recent past, Comte, Spencer, Huxley, Marx, Engels, and Lenin are conspicuous examples, and at the opposite extreme are those who renounced the existing world in toto. The domain of philosophy and its problems varies historically. The important question to be answered is how ideas and problems are related to the social order, and that requires historical inquiry. Regardless of whether the various thinkers are explicitly concerned with the existing social system in any way, they are impelled and motivated by conditions that are as independent of them as the natural world, and their intellectual reactions are as much a part of the process of history as the events, ideas, and interests providing the setting for their thought and possible action. The so-called perennial problems of the philosophical tradition, including what have been called "the great problems of thought and being," have been regarded as being above

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the "accidents" of history. A closer examination of those problems from a more complete historical perspective is accordingly called for. By means of assumptive reasoning and linguistic usage, philosophy has been lifted definitionally to a transcendent realm. Sociohistorical criticism and a clarification of meanings are necessary in order to return the subject matter of philosophy to its natural habitat. It is seen therewith that philosophy occurs as one item among many others in a cultural context. It is therefore important to formulate the question about relationships to the social order in a more general way, considering ideas and the social reality in general. Not all ideas are vital and real in their reference. Especially in philosophy there is a large amount of traditional material, maintained even where innovations and new motives occur. No one begins his thinking with a clean slate; there is always indebtedness to the past, including the most recent past, and there are present social motivations. This applies also to the most radical of pure subjectivists. The very apparatus for his procedure, and the entire content of the "inner" realm which he delineates, are themselves products or byproducts of a natural and cultural process of development, with indebtedness to society and the historical past. Nothing could be more false in fact than to suppose that one could make a completely fresh start, placing all existence in abeyance and making no use of the knowledge derived through natural experience. What such an attempt shows is not a new foundation for philosophy but rather what can or cannot be accomplished by means of a specialized, contrary-to-fact procedure. As a part of nature and the result of a long process of development, man is both causal and caused in his activity. No one can ever get away from his lineage, even if he confuses abstraction with existence by means of the seductive cloak of what he claims to be ontology. That tenuous term has been used to shield illicit thought processes, such as applying the term "being" where "existence" would hardly be condoned. This observation also applies to the expression "formal ontology," which is readily extended to apply to all ideal meanings, with the result that the domain of existence becomes greatly overpopulated.

The "Cooperation of Methods" and Methodological Pluralism Throughout the present chapter a place was provided for a rigorous methodological use of subjectivism, construed materialisti-

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cally, which can be employed along with other procedures for appropriate problems. That the subjectivist procedure can be reinterpreted critically and embraced to other scientific methods has been pointed out, for it is indeed an addition to scientific methods in its rigorous form. It would more properly called "radically reflective epistemic analysis" in its de-transcendentalized, nonidealistic, and critically revised form. The class of scientific methods is never closed, and all rational methods that are logically acceptable, including philosophical procedures, can be regarded as scientific.6 It is characteristic philosophical practice to embrace one type of procedure to a standpoint and to oppose it to all others, while making tacit use of their findings. The spectacle of a philosopher seeing only deduction as a method, in opposition to any or all inductive procedures, would be quaint. The principle of a plurality of logically acceptable methods is now well instated. Quite different, of course, is the more complex question of opposing total philosophies. To suggest that lions and lambs lie down together peacefully, that they cooperate, would be worse than foolish. One would not suggest, for instance, that a total subjectivistic philosophy cooperate with any one of its opponents, including a thoroughgoing materialism, or vice versa. That could appear possible only to those who have failed to understand the meaning of subjectivism and materialism as total philosophies. Taken as a universal philosophy, idealistic subjectivism simply fails, just as so many other attempts fail because of dogmas and inadequacies. But the same is not to be said about all types of methods with specialized functions which have been shown to be acceptable logically. Such methods, restated in naturalistic or materialistic terms, may be assimilated to a larger, science-oriented philosophy employing an open-ended methodology. The pluralism in this case is methodological, whereas the basic ontology is monistic in at least one sense of that term. But this conception of monism does not preclude diversity.7 When Foundation of Phenomenology8 was first published (1943), it was especially important for serious phenomenologists to avoid insulation and to come to terms with science-oriented philosophers, giving full recognition to the importance of their modes of inquiry, and also, on the other hand, that all descriptive findings be accepted in the total corpus of scientific knowledge, which includes philosophically achieved knowledge worthy of being designated scientific. The present writer would not be inclined now (in the 1970s) to speak of

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cooperation because of the enormous post-Husserlian literature ranging from "right" to "left"; it is sufficient for all purposes to place the emphasis upon methodological pluralism. But it may be possible that the use of the term "pluralism" could lead to misunderstanding because of hasty reading or fixed preconceptions if not for historical reasons. In short, one must interpret such terms as "cooperation" and "pluralism" with critical caution and not arbitrarily attach the thought of compromise to cooperation, or perhaps scattered diversity to pluralism. That would be as superficial as it would be mistaken. The very nature of phenomenology itself has become problematical in the larger literature of that philosophical tendency. The early and middle periods of Husserl, which were largely impelled by his logical interests, have been contrasted to the later development of Husserl, with interest turning to the problems of a constitutive phenomenology, the conception of a life-world, and the critique of science. The writings of the late period have been regarded by some scholars as opening up a new way to philosophical thought. A comparison of Husserl and Marx with respect to earlier and later phases of their development may appear suggestive, but as already indicated, it must be treated with caution. There is a vast difference between the two thinkers in their motivation, objectives, and style of thought, and in both cases the overdrawn contrasts have been misconstrued and misused. In the case of Marx, the contrast between the earlier and later periods has resulted in the distinction between humanistic and economic-revolutionary images, which have been opposed. In the case of Husserl, the possible setting for a materialistic realism has been declared to be indicated in Husserl's late period, on the basis of passages in his treatment of "passive synthesis." 9 However, such an interpretation neglects the overriding subjectivism of his philosophy. The term "phenomenology" is not intended to be restricted to Husserl's version of it. Anyone is free to use the term in any way he pleases, and a whole spectrum of possible usages has already appeared. Despite serious objections which have been raised at numerous points, Husserl's conception of a pure phenomenology is the most important version appearing in the subjectivistic literature, as a strict methodological discipline undertaking to determine a special science. It is also important historically as representing a novel form of idealism, responding to twentieth-century influences and events, in the universalized form of a supposedly complete philosophy.

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To order the phenomenological procedure among the methods of inquiry under the heading of general methodology is not to subordinate or compromise the whole notion of methodological pluralism in an unwarranted manner, as L. Rossi10 has suggested, on the ground that it is not really a pluralism if the phenomenological method winds up with a subordinate role. With the qualifications already indicated, there is sufficient reason to regard it as worthy of being recognized as a member of the group of acceptable methods, and it is not at all necessary that all procedures be equally fruitful or important to be associated as methods of inquiry and knowledge. China and Chile are both appropriate candidates for membership in the future pluralistic organization of the nations and peoples of the world, and membership in the class of methods of knowledge should be open to the many modes of inquiry proving useful or promising for the solution of the great variety of problems to be faced. The subsequent assimilation of the findings of phenomenological description to a materialistic, science-oriented philosophy undertakes at the same time to preserve its merits and findings. Originally achieved in an idealistic and subjectivistic setting, they can now be seen not to require that setting. An equivalent formulation can be provided by the conception of methodology oriented to the endless work and discovery of science, so that there is a place for a completely grounded and vastly generalized type of phenomenology, viewed as a descriptive and explanatory philosophy of experience. That enlarged discipline is instated on the ground of a natural and social world which is not only being interpreted, but also in part progressively changed by the contributive activities of human beings.

8 The Historical Outcome of Subjectivism

Some Problems of Phenomenology in the Recent Literature T n e literature of phenomenology, both in a narrow and in a JL broad sense of that term, has been added to enormously in recent years. It is necessary to bear in mind its historical background, because posthumously published writings of the initiators of modern phenomenology have continued to appear and have remained active forces. Among the precursors of phenomenology, Bernard Bolzano and Franz Brentano are preeminent. Their influence on Edmund Husserl was fully acknowledged by him in his teaching and publications. There has been an increasing interest in Bolzano. In earlier years, E. Winter published materials relating to the trial of Bolzano1 and a selected group of Bolzano's social-ethical writings.2 The full stature of this highly gifted thinker will be revealed by the forthcoming complete edition of his writings, planned by Winter and his associates. The publication of Bolzano's Foundation of Logic, with an introduction by F. Kambartel, presents selected portions of his best-known publication, the Wissenschaftslehre, and this has been added to by Rolf

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Georg, who has translated important portions of Bolzano's major work. 3 Interest in Brentano has also grown steadily and has been strengthened by publication of several of his writings under the editorship of Franziska Mayer-Hildebrand, including his book on the history of Greek philosophy, 4 which was discussed by H. Bergmann in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.5 The valuable correspondence of Brentano with H. Bergmann has been published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.6 R. M. Chisholm has included some translations from the writings of Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl in his book on realism and the background of phenomenology. 7 G. Bergmann's new book on Brentano and Meinong 8 is an indication of the growing interest in the writings of Brentano and the Brentanists. Above all, it is the concept of intentional experience as used by Brentano that has acted as an impetus to inquiry, despite Husserl's critical reaction to Brentano's analysis of experience. Husserl finally went so far as to state that Brentano never had a real understanding of the nature of intentionality in the later phenomenological sense of the term. The recent literature on phenomenology has included notable works by Edmund Husserl, published under the auspices of the Husserl Archives of Louvain, of which H. L. Van Breda was the director until his recent death. In addition to the reprinting of the first volume of the Ideas, with supplementary materials of considerable importance to students and scholars, the second and third volumes of that work were published for the first time in 1952 and were discussed by A. Schutz (in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1953) and by the present writer (in his Naturalism and Subjectivism). The publication of Husserl's Idea of Phenomenology helped to clarify the motives leading to the formulation of a transcendental phenomenology, especially his perplexity when dealing with the problem of transcendence. The availability of the original German text of the Cartesian Meditations and Paris Lectures and their English translations 9 is noteworthy, especially because of the controversial nature of the fifth meditation, to which Husserl attached so much importance. Among others, M. Merleau-Ponty, A. Schutz, and the present writer have reacted independently to the problem of the "exhibiting of another ego" on phenomenological grounds. The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology has met with widespread interest. Its reference to the conception of a life-world has become a prominent theme in the literature. Among

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those reacting to the central thought of the Crisis are M. MerleauPonty,10 J. Wild, 11 E. Pari, 12 A. Gurwitsch, 13 A. Schutz and T. Luckman, 14 and the present writer. 15 Also appearing in the series Husserliana is the important and revealing Erste Philosophie and the carefully compiled and edited Phenomenological Psychology. The editors have done well to include all versions and formulations of the relevant materials left by Husserl. These writings were presented in Freiburg lectures near the close of his academic career. The treatment of past philosophers in the Erste Philosophie is especially valuable for the understanding of the phenomenological philosophy, and the problem of existence confronts phenomenology in an acute form in the second volume of that work. Although much of Husserl's later writing had been anticipated, even if briefly, in his earlier works, the later formulations are more complete developments of a pure phenomenology and advance new lines of thought. The Phenomenological Psychology is all the more helpful because Husserl left no single systematic work on this fundamental theme. He combines methodological and programmatic sketches with descriptive analyses of thought and experience. This is also shown by his early work on the consciousness of inner time, an English translation of which has appeared. 16 It is a simple fact that Husserl did not value most of the so-called phenomenological literature of his time highly if at all. How he would judge the tremendous upsurge of a new literature called phenomenology in some sense could readily be imagined, for his chosen standards of rigorous inquiry were unyielding. But it has never been given to any one man or any one school to determine the molds within which philosophical thought is to move. In the last analysis, the movement of philosophy is an expression of the movement of history and is not limited to any one model or pattern, whether rational or irrational. It is helpful to consider examples of the new literature with respect to some of its major problems. To begin with, there is no general agreement over the meaning, scope, and function of phenomenology, versions of which range all the way from a simple descriptive philosophy of experience to a transcendental discipline, from a pure conception of experience without the usual premises or presuppositions to an existential standpoint harboring an ontology, and from supposedly autonomous types held to be prior to the knowledge of the existing universe to a materialistic philosophy providing the real foundation and framework for all descriptive studies. There are also mixed types,

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embracing motives long familiar in the literature of naturalism and materialism, with varying commitments to existence. Husserl's own quest to elaborate a domain of pure experience was complicated at times by his aim to have phenomenology function as a universal philosophy. From his point of view, phenomenology was both a method and a science—the final science. As an illustration of the divergent use of the term in the current literature, W. A. Luijpen's view may be cited.17 He takes phenomenology to mean philosophy and to be a method only if that term refers to the internal life of a philosophy as determined by its "primitive fact," its central reference point of fundamental inspiration. The "primitive fact" is described as the idea of existence, to express the essence of man conceived as "openness." In view of the diversity of motives and influences affecting writers, as well as the nature of the inquiry itself, it is understandable that an introduction to phenomenology presents weighty difficulties. Husserl called his Cartesian Meditations an introduction, and the subtitle of his Crisis refers to the book as an introduction to the phenomenological philosophy. His Encyclopaedia Britannica article was also intended to give an indication of the nature and program of phenomenology. Of course, it is the strictly Husserlian conception that is in question, and not the larger tendency. What Husserl referred to as an introduction proved to be a basic treatise, breaking new ground and grappling with major problems. A broad programmatic account could hardly give more than a thin sketch of the real nature of phenomenological inquiry, which is above all descriptive. An introduction to Husserlian phenomenology can be successfully accomplished with more than one possible avenue of approach. The present writer used the historical route in his book on the foundation of phenomenology.18 In view of the striking growth and changes in Husserl's thought, some degree of attention to its historical development is necessary for its understanding, for it can be correctly conceived only as a philosophy with an endless horizon before it, and not as a closed system. An introduction to phenomenology may aim at the inclusion of all writers who call themselves phenomenologists or all concerned with the analysis of experience. In some cases, the list turns out to be very large, as in the case of H. Spiegelberg's book on the phenomenological movement;19 this matter has been considered by the present writer in his discussion of that book20 and in his book on the aims of phenomenology,21 which includes an introduction to the enormous

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literature connected more or less with phenomenology. The attempt has been made repeatedly to go beyond the Husserlian method and framework, beginning with his contemporaries and collaborators from M. Scheler on. Wild's conception of phenomenology is a case in point; he speaks of Husserl's "disregard for existence," which may have been for the sake of understanding it, and he wonders if something is not lost when existence is turned into an object from a detached point of view.22 The point is, in his view, to find some way of penetrating into existence from the inside. His question "If we cannot escape from the world to know it from a distance objectively, how then can we know it?" is answered by transcendental phenomenology by means of an epoche that places the world in question so that it does not deal with such problems. The present writer's larger perspective of a diversified methodology that embraces the reflective procedure of a specialized descriptive phenomenology makes it possible to consider questions in terms of an unlimited number of systems, real and ideal. The attempt to broaden the conception of phenomenology signifies a departure from Husserl's requirements, limiting inquiry in accordance with a subjective procedure. The aim to extend the range of the analysis encounters serious difficulties from the outset. Is one to abandon or modify the conception of the epoche in order to operate with different degrees and modes of evidence? In reply to the question whether the ideal of certainty restricts inquiry too greatly, the pure phenomenologist is able to point out that the uncertain, the obscure, and the incomplete are by no means ruled out and that they are conspicuous characteristics of experience. The question whether there can be a pure phenomenology below the level of certainty requires clarification. Empirical certainty is not in question because of the suspension of all theses and beliefs. The incompleteness of natural perception is apprehended completely in reflection; the obscure is discerned as obscure, and whether that discernment is clear or not is an empirical question and is not to be answered by confusing two different points of view; and the uncertain is recognized as uncertain, without anything more than an analytic assurance that the corresponding acts of reflection are concerned with the uncertain. It does not follow that the recognition of uncertainty is an item of certainty in experience, or that the discernment of the obscure as such is an item of clearness in experience. In short, there may be indefinitely many degrees of the uncertain, the obscure, and the

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incomplete, and this in no way undermines the determination of essential structures of experience. In recent literature, the well-known motive of going beyond materialism and all thought conditioned by the sciences, which occupied entire generations of writers, attained its most extreme mode of expression in the effort to undercut all mundane points of view by means of a subjective philosophy. Although this motive persists and will no doubt continue to persist so long as there are social interests to keep it alive, it has had to undergo persistent revision because of the need to go beyond subjectivism, which could not be universalized. There would be no theoretical reason to proceed beyond a point of view if all questions could be answered or satisfactorily disposed of in its terms. It must be decided whether there are any questions requiring subjectivism for their answer. Since the actual types of subjectivism range from pure phenomenology to mixed and so-called existential types, care must be taken to identify the subjective philosophy involved. It is also true that there are different types of naturalism, ranging from a radical naturalism to a cautious type of agnostic or pantheistic naturalism, with a critical naturalism as an additional methodological type upsetting the usual classification. There are also different types of materialism, ranging from crude and mechanistic forms to evolutionary and dialectical views, with emphasis upon the real sociohistorical nature of human existence and the explanation of change in nature, human society, and thought. Thus, a radical subjectivism confronts a radical materialism, both of them conceived as extreme positions and as mutually irreconcilable. From the point of view of subjectivism, any type of naturalism or materialism appears to be dogmatic; whereas from the point of view of a thoroughgoing materialism, subjectivism is an abstractive, contrary-to-fact point of view, with its own essential limitations preventing it from becoming a general philosophy. The alleged deeper foundation of subjectivsim has been shown to be an unwarranted claim, because it is not free from presuppositions in every sense of the term. It actually turns out to involve the substitution of presuppositions in a new sense for the familiar presuppositions of natural experience and knowledge, in order to provide stability for the inner realm of pure experience. If the scope of the analysis of meaning (or intentional analysis) may be said to comprise the whole of pure phenomenology, existence becomes a prime problem, which is called a methodogenic problem

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by the present writer. The title "Phenomenology and the WorldProblem" has been prominent in the literature, especially following L. Landgrebe's presentation of it in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.23 It is one form of the basic problem of phenomenology and existence, which has been discussed by numerous writers, including R. Ingarden,24 A. Gurwitsch,25 Q. Lauer,26 and the present writer.27 The question is twofold: how can one account for existence on the basis of phenomenology, and how can pure phenomenology apply to existence or help to solve its problems? The setting for the problem of existence is provided by the concept of transcendence, in the sense that experience is always experience of something. Thus transcendence may be epistemic, and it may also be formal, material, or valuational. In some cases it has meant no more than "vacuous otherness," and it has had its theological uses, as abundantly illustrated in the literature. In the natural process of experience we view the world as pregiven, but in accordance with the reflective procedure of phenomenology the world is placed in question, and as an object of meaning it is viewed as the product of constitutive thought processes. Hence what was intitially acknowledged as a pregiven realm is reconsidered in the final program of constitutive phenomenology. Ontology then involves the investigation of acts of experience through which objects present themselves as existing, with perception playing a privileged role with respect to the external world. But how one can know in a particular case whether the object that presents itself as existing really exists is a matter for empirical confirmation. In addition to that question, there is the difficulty of accounting, with evidence, for the nature of the world and the human knower's real relationship to the natural and social world—a question which phenomenology is essentially incapable of answering. Phenomenology undertakes in its way to clarify the concept of existence. This has been said to be accomplished by confronting concepts with the entities to which they refer. In that case it must be made clear whether they are to be confronted really or essentially. If real confrontation is meant, then the empirical question of conformation is on one's hands. The latter, or essential confrontation, is a matter of meaning-analysis alone, and it is to be distinguished from the so-called problem of existence. The program of meaning-analysis finally leads to the question of the application of concepts to the physical and social world. The crucial question to be answered is whether

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phenomenology can remain within a self-contained realm of pure conscious experience or whether it must presuppose a preexisting and independently real world. In a dialogue with materialism, it must show whether a subjective conception of a life-world can disregard the fact that living beings were born of other living beings, who derive their sustenance from a precarious and cognitively independent world and who were products as well as active participants in the constitution of a sociocultural world. On the other hand, special critical points referring to the nature of phenomenological analysis must be examined carefully. This applies to the alleged uneasy union of a fixed concept of essence with an equally fixed concept of flowing. Whether that fairly represents the descriptive procedure of phenomenology, with its peculiar problems, must be considered. There are concepts of fixed entities and also concepts of things or events flowing. To argue that the things that become and flow are fixed in concept and that alongside the concept of the fixed a concept of flowing is placed is to add to the many misunderstandings that greeted and accompanied the development of phenomenology. Clearly, it is necessary and not only possible to use appropriate concepts in order to describe the nature of the purportedly fixed and the flowing. The attempt to force phenomenology into a dilemma involving analysis and the explication of meanings is also unsuccessful. According to this argument, if phenomenology ceases to be analytical it ceases to be phenomenology, and if it does not cease to be merely analytical, it does not get beyond an explication of meanings. 28 This argument could be met by viewing phenomenology as a specialized discipline, with its peculiar limitations and problems, and not as a total or universal philosophy. According to the point of view of phenomenology, a searching explication of meanings is of real philosophical importance and is not to be underestimated; furthermore, the term "analytical" is not to be construed narrowly, in opposition to the descriptive analysis of the processes of thought and experience. It is a well-known argument that one cannot be aware of the natural attitude (Einstellung) as such without resorting to another attitude. That is merely a verbal, dialectical argument, no better than supposing that one cannot investigate breathing without getting away from breathing. The force of such reasoning supposedly prevents one from carrying on pure reflection within the framework of the sciences, which means within the world of nature. The answer to this

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question must be given by means of a key for the translation of all phenomenological statements into materialistic terms, leaving it to the relevant sciences to provide the necessary evidence progressively. The answer may be tested with respect to the methodogenic problems of existence and value. In opposition to the traditional point of view, it may be maintained that the use of a critically controlled and radically reflective procedure is not incompatible with a materialistic ontology, the basic premises of which are explicitly formulated. That would depend upon the way in which a reflective procedure is construed ontologically, upon whether the reflection is regarded as a real event in the material-social world, and not as another kind of being, posited as underived and sui generis. What is most important is that justice be done to the complexity of experience and that the danger of oversimplificaton be avoided. But there is also the danger of missing realities of experience because of excessive attention to the complexity. If the reality in question is a competitive conflict in the business world or a workers' strike or a war, it would be easy to miss the most important facts by embarking upon an interminable line of descriptive inquiry with a host of fine distinctions and a special conceptual apparatus adjusted to the atmosphere of pure inquiry. Because of the abstraction from existence in general, it can be said truly that there are no politics in the transcendental dimension just as surely as that there are no morals in logic. There are some persistent dangers illustrated in the discourse of the phenomenologists. Sometimes misleading metaphors are suggested by linguistic usage. Thus, one may speak of being in the natural Einstellung, or in the phenomenological Einstellung, as though one had retired to another realm. The error promoted by the spatial metaphor is as primitive as the suggestion that things or events are literally in time or in space. It tends to support the reaction against the sciences, and it stands in the way of instating a rigorous conception of a philosophy of experience as an extension of scientific method. The talk of realms, multiple realities, and regional ontologies may also lead to misunderstanding, if the realm of being is restricted to the correlates (or intended reference) of experiences. Experiences can refer to fictions, and even to "impossible" objects, involving a contradiction. The use of assumptive language is always a source of danger. This is seen in the conception of science and philosophy as absolute and

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valid for all time; in the assumption that natural existence is contingent in the sense that it could be otherwise or even not be at all; in the eulogistic treatment of the subjective, with certainty and adequacy read into its meaning—in short, assumptive language extolling the subjective and depreciating the natural. The use of the phrase "freedom from presuppositions" suggests that nothing is assumed in subjective inquiry, which is demonstrably not the case. Such terms as "pure," "radical," "genetic," and "origin-analysis" have meanings borrowed from natural experience, even though they are intended to be used in a different sense; hence there is a danger of deception. This also applies to the term "constitutive," which may readily be misunderstood to mean "creative" (this was also pointed out by E. Fink).29 Furthermore, there is the danger of a restrictive, unitary model for the idea of philosophy and for philosophic method, instead of a conception in accordance with the actual nature of scientific inquiry and the variable historical role of philosophy. The difference between an unclarified and a radical phenomenology must be considered and should be distinguished from the difference between a naive and a critical mode of analysis. This may be illustrated by talk of a life-world which has to be judged, analyzed, interpreted, or described within the framework of a selected viewpoint. There are life-worlds for ordinary experience, varying from person to person, from group to group, and from time to time. There are also life-worlds as viewed on the basis of the sciences, especially the historical sciences, and they also vary from time to time and because of selection, interpretation, and understanding. Finally, all such life-worlds may be viewed from the perspective of pure or radical reflective analysis, which has its peculiar advantages for clarification as well as its limitations. More far-reaching than the principle of correlative analysis, acknowledged for the understanding of experience and its objects, is what may be called the principle of methodological duality, which distinguishes the cross-sectional mode of analysis of phenomenology from the longitudinal mode of analysis of the materialistic, historical view. To set aside the longitudinal view and to suggest that one could then do justice to the facts would be to oppose or to ignore established knowledge. The fundamental limitation of the cross-sectional view must be acknowledged in the spirit of the cooperation of rational methods. Since phenomenological analysis is a specialty, it is to be expected that most of its practitioners will also engage in other types of inquiry

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and employ different methods. The exclusive use of a subjective procedure has led to its overextension and to the claim that all philosophical problems could be handled in that way. The function of phenomenology can be determined by making clear the nature of the questions it is designed to answer. It would be unwarranted to maintain that all questions could be answered by means of this method or by means of any one of the existing methods. The case for the need to proceed beyond phenomenology is therefore a very strong one. On the other hand, writers may have various objectives in mind in arguing for this need. Thus, E. Fink has defended speculation,30 and has consigned phenomenology to a past historical context, as an expression of the interest in positivism. The dangers in question may be called errors of totalism: the phenomenological procedure when overextended becomes viewed as total philosophy. The reaction against phenomenology as a bygone historical development may, however, be another phase of the same type of error, if it treats phenomenology as a total philosophy to be brushed aside in toto, in the interest of another procedure not shown to be adequate. The correction of such errors has been achieved by means of a more comprehensive conception of methodology, together with recognition of the collective character of the unity of systems of knowledge. Totalism results in oversimplification and in failure to do justice to the diversity of questions and the problems of experience. Even within the confines of a descriptive pure phenomenology, leading ideas, hypotheses, and suggestions derived from the natural and social sciences and ordinary experience must be employed in order to give direction to the inquiry. Phenomenology would be seriously restricted without the use of such devices, and they have been acknowledged to at least a small extent under the heading of clues or guiding-threads for inquiry. The publication of the collected works of A. Schutz31 made his writings available in a convenient form; his primary interest was in the application of phenomenological analysis to social science. Also under discussion in the literature has been the relationship between phenomenology and Marxism, a theme long prominent in the work of the present writer. P. Naville has discussed this question,32 and so has Β. E. Bykhovskii.33 M. Merleau-Ponty's discussion of Marxism is now available in English translation.34 Tran-Duc-Thao has devoted a book to phenomenology and dialectical materialism.35 This has been a central theme for E. Paci and has been discussed increasingly in

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recent years in representative symposia and by individual writers.36 The confrontation of Marxist and subjectivistic ideas, mediated by existential lines of thought, as illustrated by J.-P. Sartre,37 has become an important theme in contemporary philosophy. The meeting of extremes turns out on inspection to be the meeting of currents of thought already tempered in a gradual process of adjustment and reacting to similar problems. But the basic principle of subjectivism, that existence is correlated with and restricted to knowing minds in some way, cannot be softened, and it remains an irreconcilable point of difference. To some extent, the subjectivistic trend in many countries has been added to in diverse ways after the fashion of a combined political and religious movement, with no general criteria beyond vague impulses from within. Individual participants may have strong aversions, but there is no clearly discernible line of demarcation negatively, any more than there is positively. The tenuous alignment of cogito-directed devotees is often far removed from the ideal of a rigorous science of philosophy, with firm standards of evidence for each step in a logical method of inquiry. Furthermore, the confrontation of subjectivism and Marxism in the recent literature has been frequently impelled by unclarified sociopolitical motives, so that there is ample evidence of the lack of a professed "neutrality" on the part of the scientists and scholars. 38 Phenomenology per se does not lead to Marxism. On Marxist premises and with Marxist methods, the full complexity of human experience may be approached and described, making use of all the devices for recognizing and analyzing specialized areas of experience and knowledge. On the other hand, specialized approaches have been treated as though they were sui generis; thus transcendental phenomenology has assumed the historical role of idealism, as the source of everything in a complete philosophy. As in the case of humanistic versions of Marxism, a variety of conceptions of Marxism is possible in the context of phenomenological as well as existential Marxism. There are as many possible versions of a "noematic Marx" as there are individuals, groups or classes, and standpoint philosophies. That is the way with subjectivists of different types, for their creativity is as endless as their subjective activities, all of them "intentional," with their meant objects as meant. Thus the Marxism that results is at the mercy of the creative subjectivist, who is capable of conceiving (or "constituting") revolutions as being in consciousness.

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An attempt at a phenomenological Marxism is condemned to be nugatory because of an initial falsification of the nature of phenomenology as well as Marxism. It serves only to add novelty to an area already oversupplied with confusion. The fiction of a life-world that has never existed or the extended use of the concept of existence to apply to the correlates of experience are among the unrewarding lines of thought involved. As for Pad's attempt, despite making use of his own interpretation of Husserl's thought, he could not be expected to overcome the limitations inherent in its subjectivism, which separates it on principle from everything Marx had to say about the real world or human society.

On the Meaning of Methodological Pluralism The term "pluralism" has been used by the present writer in connection with the larger perspective of a diversified methodology embracing the reflective procedure of phenomenology along with other procedures. In view of its ambiguity and the controversial nature of some of its meanings, it appears desirable to clarify further what may well be one of the crucial concepts in the appraisal of phenomenology. Although the term "pluralism" has been used to good advantage for the purposes of a science-oriented philosophy, it has been misunderstood and confused with pluralism in general, which has been subjected to pertinent criticism. Historically it bespeaks an open world, allowing for growth, risk, adventure, and the possibility of progress. If justice is to be done to the facts of human history, however, there should be recognition of the conflicts and failures of the social order. Although patterns of pluralism or diversity may be recognized in ontology, theory of knowledge, methodology, and the philosophy of values, that goes along with and does not rule out patterns of unity in all regions of existence and experience. Hence one can speak of a basic ontological unity as coexisting with diverse events and organizations of events in various regions, and also a diversity of methods, conceived as unified with respect to a dominant objective and program. In general, unity and diversity—or monism and pluralism—are dialectically interrelated, and they name selective features of reality. In the traditional literature of philosophy, ontological theories have provided an assumed a priori framework for the world, and they have been affected by motives stemming from social and historical condi-

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tions as well as by findings in the analysis of experience and knowledge. Reality is constituted by the process of events and their manifold organizations, all within the infinite domain of nature, both in relation to human beings and apart from all human relatedness. There is a great diversity of events, and there is no evidence that anything can be elevated above the process of becoming. If one speaks of that which is the same in or with regard to the particular occurrences, the problem of unification remains to be clarified and solved in an endless number of different contexts and also in general. It turns out that the unity to be achieved depends upon the nature of the available method of unification and also upon the general conditions—sociohistorical and scientific—determining the significance of the problem. The problem of diversity and unity is itself a changing problem, different in some respects for ancient Greeks, early modern thinkers, and contemporary philosophers. Hence it would be a gross oversimplification to speak of solving it conclusively for all time, for that would presuppose closure of experience and knowledge and a known fixed structure of reality. The pluralism that engaged the attention of philosophers early in the century represented a reaction against a closed absolute monism. James, reacting against the monistic view of absolute idealism as prominently illustrated by Royce, wanted frank recognition of the precarious and problematical aspects of experience. The monistic view of the absolutist was too "safe" to be true to the facts. But there is a variety of forms of pluralism, so that it would be unwarranted to use the term unqualifiedly, either in a eulogistic or in a pejorative sense. In addition to its emphasis upon the element of risk in human enterprise, pluralism must give a prominent place to the evidence of conflicts pervading human experience. It must also take account of the diversity of systems of formal thought, as shown by the various geometries and the multitude of systems, finite and infinite, which are determined by specially imposed conditions or by alternative principles of construction. An unlimited number of systems of formal thought are logically possible, with special assumptions peculiar to each system. The question of truth is involved therewith, and that is determined by the relationship of a thought system to reality in the basic sense of truth; and in a formal sense, truth is determined by the consistency of propositions with the assumed premises. An unsettling question could be raised at this point: Is the concept of truth itself "pluralistic"? Must the allowance for the "risk and adventure"

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that motivated pluralism also affect the meaning of truth itself? An endless, tenuous relativism might result from a hasty reaction to this question, which might not be met by an appeal to practice to provide a basis for experience and knowledge. The contrasting conception of an absolute monism may prevail for a time, but as amply shown historically, it collapses under pressure from within and from without. From within, logical criticism exposes the arbitrariness and shortcomings of its defense; from without, the experienced and known world refuses to be frozen in fixed molds of any kind. The history of idealism offers instructive illustrations, but also Spinoza, whose self-contained ontology was unfit to do justice to historical change. The supposedly absolute system of Royce succumbed to the criticism of the realists, and it was never plausible in view of the facts of experience. A world in conflict, precarious for human life and abounding in frustration and suffering—such a world is hardly a fitting candidate for membership in a spiritual system of being, resting finally in the lap of a supreme being. The use of rational arguments to support such a view resulted from an initial commitment to a religious philosophy. It could also serve as a means to preserve the existing order of society, with its class distinctions and special privileges. Such conservatism is shown, for example, by Royce's attitude toward trade unions, which he viewed with misgivings. For the rest, there is a vast difference between the abstractive treatment of absolute monism and the reaction of its defender to the concrete facts of human experience. Such facts as the relationship of capital and labor seem to vanish in the perspective of the absolute. The absolute monist may be seen to place himself precisely in his socioeconomic class and to voice characteristic views of a bourgeois member of society who appeals to decency, thoughtfulness, and respectability—all on the basis of unchallenged inequalities in the social order. The pluralistic critique of absolute idealistic monism by James showed a greater sensitivity to human problems. Thus James could write with enthusiasm about the role of labor in our society and could pay tribute to workers as virtually carrying the social world on their backs. He would have erected monuments to the workers who made the Boston subway possible rather than to military leaders. James regarded mankind as "drifting" toward a "more or less socialistic future." How he would have viewed some developments of American

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society and international policy after his death must remain a matter of conjecture. It is to his lasting credit that he at least gave evidence of a sympathetic attitude toward one aspect of an issue that has been increasingly coming to the forefront of philosophical attention in our time—the issue of labor and capital, or the profit system—even though he was far removed from a fundamental approach to its analysis and solution. That issue would suffice to burst asunder any watertight, formally contrived, and closed system, for the manifold egos occurring in the real world, including rich and poor, cruel and benevolent, and all other types resulting from the existing social system, must constitute an unhappy and untenable totality. The alleged absolute ego or self would only encounter hopeless difficulties in attempting to encompass them. It would be difficult to imagine a more frustrating occupation than the attempt to arbitrate labor disputes, which achieves at most a temporary, unstable solution. The absolute idealist could hardly be expected to volunteer for the adjudication of matters of dispute between the opposing parties. He is most successful in speaking abstractly and generally about everything, and he would have nothing to add to the dominant opinions of his social class about concrete human problems. What happened in the Royce-James period has been superseded by the development of phenomenology and the critical reaction which it brought on. Although phenomenology remains an incomplete philosophy in important respects, it takes its place as the high point of idealism if not its last stronghold. After attempting to free itself from the traditional charge of dogmatism, made in the past against idealism, by the use of a rigorous subjective procedure, it encountered insuperable difficulties in attempting to achieve a universal philosophy. The awareness of a problem of transcendent existence is an indication of the recognition of the limitations of subjectivism, for it involves the admission of an antecedent ("pregiven") realm, which no subsequent constitutive activity could conceal. The critique of phenomenological idealism has been accomplished, as in the case of the critique of its predecessors, from within and from without. The present writer has had both lines of criticism in view in his treatment of phenomenology, including a confrontation with Marxist thought. Phenomenology can never again be considered a candidate for a complete philosophy, even though it may be regarded, under carefully defined conditions and with appropriate changes, as a rigorous descriptive discipline with its own self-imposed limitations, as a

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specialty with its own peculiar merits. But such merits must be viewed in the light of a more complete methodology, embracing geneticevolutionary, sociohistorical, and other methodological approaches, as well as the special procedures of phenomenology, with its emphasis upon essential and formal structures. This pluralism of methods or procedures does not preclude a unified formulation or a unified philosophy of existence in every sense. In an important sense, the world is "one," and in an equally important sense, it is "many" or diversified. Both are undeniable and must be recognized in a philosophy attempting to do justice to the nature of the natural and social world, experience, and knowledge. A dogmatic monism may lead to the obscuring of differences which are actually disturbing, but a loose pluralism might result in the neglect of general truths about human beings and their problems. A sound philosophy, adequate for the purposes of human experience, must avoid both errors. It must be led by motives of unity and diversity, recognizing the limited, selective character of the questions involving them. Overextension is a familiar speculative error in traditionally rooted systematic philosophies. It may be merely motivated by the desire of a specialized scholar to subordinate other disciplines to his mode of inquiry, and in the area of philosophical thought that might mean attempting to take over all the sciences and reality as a whole as a subordinated domain. The way in which the resulting thought system applies to or avoids concrete social problems gives a clue to the motivation received from the existing social system, even if unconsciously. There is much at stake when thought systems respond to the influence of dominant social interests (a capitalist system in any one of its forms) or interests of a rising social class seeking to transform social relations (the working class in a revolutionary role). Total philosophies have reflected the interests of a ruling class in different ways—for example, by way of a philosophy of being, with change placed in question. On the other hand, the variable standard of a life of the greatest possible amount of pleasure could reflect the standpoint of a leisure class at various times. It could, however, also be invoked against a feudalecclesiastical class by appealing to the need to rehabilitate the flesh in eighteenth-century France. Political and socioeconomic philosophies, theories, and methods show their linkage to the social order most clearly, but with sufficient care it is always possible to trace out strands of connection to the existing society. No matter how specialized or remote scholars and scientists may appear to be, they derive from

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society and endeavor to make their return to it, in most cases without placing all existing social relations in question. Much philosophical thought is expressed on an abstract level, in detachment from real social conditions, with no clear understanding of the ways in which it is affected by social influences. Moreover, individual thinkers and writers are apt to retreat quickly from a critical position, when there is an evident application to entrenched interests, to a safer view expressed in generalities which are not likely to be judged true or false. But one concrete challenge of an existing practice or malpractice outweighs a whole collection of abstractions, for it is as safe as it is inconsequential to prate of goodness, justice, and so on, per se, without incurring the danger involved in offending private interests or in upsetting the status of one social class living actually or in effect as exploiters of another class. In this connection one is reminded of the words of Roger Bacon, who maintained that one individual has more reality than all the universale joined together. Similarly, one can speak of the superiority of even a single reference to a real problem of existence, as compared with the safe use of vacuous generalities and unattainable ideal goals that have long been ethereal props of the existing social order. Overextension must be avoided in the application of methods for the solution of problems or for the answer to questions. In the case of phenomenology, a subjective procedure is hopefully blown up to a size sufficient to handle all philosophical problems, past and present, if not also future. A correction may be achieved through recognition of the principle of methodological pluralism or diversity and the cooperation of logically acceptable methods, 39 conceived from the point of view of an open-ended, multisectional, and unified general methodology undertaking to do justice to all the complexities of existence and experience. Each type of method has its possible range of achievement, its own proper questions, and its own peculiar powers as well as limitations. The heat that may be engendered recurrently over "genesis versus structure" brings to the fore a pair of old acquaintances individually incapable of furnishing the organon for philosophy. The conception of a critically controlled methodological pluralism, operating within the framework of nature and human society, indicates primary conditions to be met by constructive thought on this issue. The universe of discourse is always to be viewed as open, in a changing, historical world, and it comprises diverse subuniverses of discourse, each relatively autonomous at

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most. But the freedom for imaginative and conceptual thought which is required if continued progress is to be assured does not in any way imply any real transcendence of nature and real, historical human existence.

The Outcome of the Epoche Husserl's discussion of the life-world in his Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,40 representing the last period of his philosophic thought, makes it clear that he is interested in "a radical reflection upon the great task of a pure theory of essence of the pregiven life-world" (p. 141). He is interested in "that subjective alteration of manners of givenness, of manners of appearing and of the modes of validity in them, which, in its constant process, synthetically connected as it incessantly flows on, brings about the coherent consciousness of the straightforward 'being' of the world" (p. 146, italics added). The question remains open as to the causes and conditions involved in bringing about the consciousness of the world—the real nature of the human knower, including the social relations, and also the real nature of the existing world. One must always bear in mind the mode of inquiry involved by what is called the radical mode of reflection, beginning with its peculiar presuppositions. A breakthrough to reality is supposedly achieved by the recognition of a pregiven life-world. The point of departure for the inquiry into the structure of what is called the pregiven life-world is an abstractive individual knowing being and not the real or actual social world, along with the infinite natural world. Thus Husserl indicates what can be discerned "among the objects of the life-world"; as he states it, "we also find human beings . . . in their particular social interrelations." It is "the universe of the subjective" which is to be investigated, a universe "in which the world, in virtue of the universality of synthetically bound accomplishments in this universe, comes to have its straightforward existence for us" (italics added). In his view, the subjective manifold goes on constantly, but it "remains . . . necessarily concealed" and must be "revealed" by a new method and science. The "self-enclosed universe" of subjectivity is said to reveal itself "as the all-encompassing unity of ultimately functioning and accomplishing subjectivity which is to account for the existence of the world—the world

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for us, our natural life horizon." Although this is presented as a question, he regards it as a legitimate and necessary task requiring the creation of a new science, differing from all previous objective sciences operating "on the ground of the world." The new science is concerned with "the universal how of the pregivenness of the world" or "with what makes it a universal ground for any sort of objectivity," and that is supported by an "ultimate bestowal of meaning" which is ascribed to subjectivity. The choice of a subjective instead of an objective procedure must be carefully considered and justified in connection with the enormous claims made for subjective analysis. It is important to clarify once more the different meanings of the subjective and the objective, to see the nature and locus of the Husserlian view. (1) The subjective may be conceived on the ground of the world, with reflection occurring on that basis and with all self-awareness and self-inspection construed in materialistic terms. Are there any "fateful" limits to such reflection, leaving profound, ultimate truths "concealed" from us? That depends upon the assumed nature of the subjective and of the objective, for they have changed historically and are represented in different versions in our time. (2) The objective may also be defined on the ground of the world, and that may be done uncritically or critically, with either intersubjective (social) or practical validation, or both combined. The point of departure may be taken to be an individual who must face the experience and judgment of other individuals, or it may be intersubjective, with no thought of beginning with individual knowing beings or of proceeding from an individual to society for the test of objectivity. (3) The subjective may be conceived radically, by means of a phenomenological reduction to the egological realm of one experiencing being. The objective would therewith refer to the meant correlates of thought processes. The alter ego and human society would then present a methodogenic problem, brought on by the adoption of a specialized method with its severely restrictive conditions. It could operate with a pregiven life-world, which then presents a "constitutive" problem for a subjective method. That problem could only be solved assumptively, not radically, and that would not be an acceptable solution. On the other hand, it could operate intersubjectively with a society of knowing beings, omitting the egological stage of inquiry, with the result that questions and problems peculiar to that stage would be ruled out. In that case the degree of radicalism of inquiry would be regarded as less thorough-

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going, as judged in the light of the precept that everything be made to be a question, "bis aufs Letzte," which means probing to the final sources of evidence in experience. But revisions of egological questions and problems could be formulated on the broader basis of intersubjectivity or of a society of experiencing egos. An unavoidable question to be answered will then be: Are there problems arising on the basis of any of these versions which could not be reformulated objectively without loss or residuum? A thoroughly critical or radical materialist advancing a descriptive philosophy of experience—a materialistic phenomenology—could maintain that his type of beginning and framework for methods would enable him to answer this challenge with a program preserving all sound findings of special, subordinate methods, and he would maintain that the same could not be said for a subjectivistic beginning. This is to say the opposite in principle of what W. E. Hocking asserted41 in defense of idealism—namely, that on the basis of matter or body, mind could not be explained and accounted for, whereas on the basis of mind it is possible to explain and account for matter or body. That declaration, operating as it does with assumptions concerning mind and matter, with a substantive mind exclulding the realm of matter or body, fails to do justice to the progress of science and science-oriented philosophy. It is also unwarranted as a claim for idealism, unless assumptive language and reasoning are to be regarded as a sufficient ground for acceptance. It is Husserl's contention that "the life which effects world-validity in natural world-life does not permit of being studied from within the attitude of natural world-life." Hence what he requires is "a total transformation of attitude, a completely unique, universal epoche." Without pausing to comment on the assumptive nature of the language employed in speaking of the life which effects world-validity, it may be observed that it could be rendered plausible only by construing world-validity in terms of life and its processes. Challenging the claim to complete uniqueness, one can ask whether the desired thoroughgoing epoche, or suspension of beliefs and judgments for the purposes of a critical inquiry, can be achieved by another method than pure phenomenology—and that apart from the question of how much in human existence is rendered inaccessible because of the very nature of the subjectivistic procedure. That would be on the ground of the world—that is to say, on the basis of physical and social existence. Then one would not incur the danger of supposing that a suspension

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of beliefs for the purposes of analysis could mean leaving the natural and social world, for that would be as confused in thought as it would be false and ruled out in fact. In any case, Husserl maintains that a thorougly new way of life is attained through his procedure of universal abstention, which "puts out of action . . . the total performance running through the whole of natural world-life" (p. 150). But this would hardly be a new way of life, or a transformation in any significant sense of social relations and actual human conduct. A more modest account of what may occur through the employment of the abstention would be to state that while engaging in description under the assumed artificial and contrary-to-fact conditions, something "higher" is being injected into what should be portrayed as a reflective procedure. In Husserl's mode of statement, "an attitude is arrived at which is above the pregivenness of the validity of the world"; "we thus have an attitude above the universal conscious life . . . through which the world is 'there' for those naively absorbed in ongoing life"; and this transcendental epoche is meant as a habitual attitude and is not a temporary act. What the present writer observed in his Foundation of Phenomenology concerning the danger of the phenomenological reduction being a way to the proverbial lion's den, with all footprints pointing inwards, might properly be recalled in the present context. If metaphysical capital is not to be made by means of a purportedly descriptive procedure, a broader meta-reduction should be instituted to extrude the injected elements suggested by "a new way of life," an attitude said to be "above the pregivenness of the world," and so on. It is wise to remind oneself that no "manner of being" belonging to us is likely to be given up through an intellectual device of suspension or abstention. Workers and employers remain unchanged despite any epoche that might be effected, and their noematic correlates, or their meant objects, will be correspondingly different, in accordance with their economic resources. When Husserl speaks of "the possibility of radically changing all human existence through this epoche which reaches into its philosophical depths," his language is simply vacuous so far as real social conditions are concerned. That he could not have made concrete reference to the German society of the time is understandable. But it is not at all likely that the "philosophical depths" would depart under any conditions from the level of generalities and lofty formulations, regardless of the naming or failure to name sordid problems of real existence.

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Through the epoche, with its habitual abstention, the "gaze of the philosopher" is said to become fully free, and above all, free of "the most hidden internal bond, namely, of the pregivenness of the world" (p. 151). This "liberation" then makes possible the "universal, absolutely self-enclosed and absolutely self-sufficient correlation between the world itself and world-consciousness." It is important to consider how much is assumed in the conception of the "absolutely selfsufficient" and in the "correlation between the world and worldconsciousness." The answer is given clearly and involves an "absolute subjectivity, as constituting meaning and ontic validity." This amounts to a form of absolute idealism, which in the present context disregards the problems raised in connection with the pregiven lifeworld. Contending that a new way of experiencing and thinking is opened to the philosopher through the epoche, Husserl locates it as being "above his own natural being and above the natural world," while insisting that he "loses nothing of their being and their objective truths" (p. 152). The philosopher is assured that he loses nothing by rising above his own natural being. Such declarations require cautious handling, with care taken to expunge the element of speculative enthusiasm, with its talk of absolutes and rising above one's natural being. What really happens with the adoption of the subjective procedure can then be rendered simply and directly: the philosopher changes his method to some extent with the use of the epoche, and only to that extent his world-life, of which thinking and inquiry are parts. The otherwise strange ascent above the natural (and therewith, it may be noted, the social realities) could then have a relatively innocuous but also very limited significance. That would be to call attention to the methodological meaning of the epoche, which is such that the world "is under our gaze purely as the correlate of the subjectivity that gives it ontic meaning, through whose validities the world 'is' at all." But the real being of the world cannot be ascribed to such "ontic validities." It would not help matters if this claim were defended by arguing that its opponents have failed to carry through the epoche, meaning in effect that the opponents are nonphenomenologists in the indicated subjective sense, for the questions at issue concern the nature of existence, the relationship of experience and existence, and the subjective procedure in the light of general methodology. The Husserlian claim must be rendered in a logically acceptable form. Viewing the world as the correlate of subjectivity may be considered meaningful as an ancillary type of inquiry, with appropriate changes

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and safeguards. A more thoroughgoing and complete reflection will show that it is only as a part of and by means of the natural world and society that the epoc/ie-instituting human being can describe, analyze, and endeavor to participate in changing the being of the world. In contrast to the proud claim of the subjectivist that he stands above the world, which has become a phenomenon for him, it may be urged that it is first of all necessary to know the nature of the world and to add to that knowledge continually, lest one's reflection be seriously inadequate, if not condemned to emptiness. In rethinking the epoche, Husserl states that his subject is now "not the world simply, but the world exclusively as it is constantly pregiven to us in the alteration of its manners of givenness" (P. 154). Givenness indeed! The language is assumptive and misleading, with that artifice known as an impartial nonparticipating philosopher as the selfchosen person who views the changing modes of givenness of the world, a person who is supposed to be worthy of his task because he has programmatically divested himself of all prejudices. Are we to regard the epistemic processes as fundamental, as conditioning the being of the world, or are we to look to the changing events in the natural and social world as the prior reality, with all the structural determinations of phenomenology merely superadded to the findings of the sciences and experience, insofar as the structural determinations are sound and applicable? It should not be forgotten that the phenomenological mode of questioning is narrow and selective and that it is as a matter of fact only possible on the basis of the real world—questioning, moreover, as conducted by material organisms capable of rational inquiry. Although Husserl now believes that he has corrected the "shortcoming" of his earlier version of the epoche, he is still conditioned by his own assumptions and motives, however concealed they may be because of what amounts to a subjective flight from reality. His procedure incurs the danger of being restricted to pure forms that remain at the periphery of the world or to trivialities if application to the world is made. It may at first appear encouraging to be informed (p. 156) that the surrounding life-world is to be considered concretely, "in its neglected relativity and according to all the manners of relativity belonging essentially to it." Is that a "relativity" in a real, effective sense? The actual world is the point of departure and at all times the final objective, and not detached epistemological analysis. It is not reassuring to learn that the ways are considered in which the validity of straightfor-

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ward experience "is sometimes in suspense (between being and illusion, etc.)." Husserl renounces the question of what the real world is like or "what the things actually are." Like positivists of his time, his exclusions remove him, whether safely or not, from all questions about social reality. Of course, what he is driving at methodologically is the realization of a universal epoche, which until now has proved to be a way to a limited selection of forms and structures so far as real existence is concerned. As a fully "disinterested" (uninteressierter) spectator of the world, taken "purely as subjective-relative world" in accordance with the epoche, the pure phenomenologist "takes a first, naive look around" and considers "whatever has been valid and continues to be valid for us as being and being-such in respect to how it is subjectively valid, how it looks, etc." (p. 157). Simple perceptual examples are chosen, and they are suitable for any period in history. There is the horizon belonging to the meant object, which every perception has "for consciousness"; there is the alteration of perspectives of the shape and also of the color; and there is the synthesis of identification or of unification. The same points are made repeatedly, with no progress toward concrete reality. The most interesting and important examples that might be chosen are not to be treated in this rudimentary way— examples of actual social relations, conflicts, or continually changing institutions; nor is the actual time (or temporality) to be arrested or conditioned by subjective processes, and least of all by pure subjectivity, by its very nature. It must be recognized that Husserl is clearly aware of the specialized nature of his questioning (p. 159, e.g.). It is nevertheless pertinent to compare a perception of a table, which is so amenable to the mode of questioning here, with an experience of an illegal act. An illegal act must be viewed in relation to the social system involved if its significance is to be grasped. The abstract generalities open to subjectivism would not take us very far in that direction. The larger domain of a materialistic philosophy of experience comprises the legal enactments of the various social systems and the efforts to change the laws or the systems as a whole, along with the causal factors underlying all of them. But there are ulterior purposes in attempting to lock the objects of the world in with the experiencing of the world, a correlation leading to idealism as a universal philosophy. It is therefore understandable that the real problems of human existence as well as experience are not considered therewith, and because of the

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repeated general talk about radical subjectivism and fundamental clarification they are not likely to be missed. Husserl points out (p. 164) that each individual "knows" himself to be living within the horizon of his fellow human beings. Furthermore, he knows that he and his fellows "are related to the same experienced things in such a way that each individual has different aspects . . . different perspectives, etc." In his view, no conceivable human being could ever experience a world in manners of givenness differing from "the mobile relativity" he has delineated, as a world pregiven in one's conscious life and in community with fellow human beings (p. 165). It is thus made clear that no real human being experiences a world with a whole set of cognitions. That the "correlation between world . . . and its subjective manners of givenness" never evoked philosophical wonder before Husserl, as he observes, may well be at least partly true. There is the danger, however, which has already been indicated, of overplaying and overextending the significance of otherwise interesting and specialized abstract descriptions. It is clearly tempting for such a philosopher to see what he can achieve metaphysically (or more), following his initial "neutral" analyses. That the seemingly nonmetaphysical principle of a subject-object correlation is readily exploited for idealistic purposes is suggested by the assertion (p. 166) that "whatever exists . . . has its manners of self-givenness and, on the side of the ego, its manners of intention." Husserl goes so far as to declare that the first "breakthrough" of "this universal a priori of correlation between experienced object and manners of givenness" affected him so deeply, early in his career, that his subsequent life-work was dominated by elaborating on this "a priori of correlation," finally leading to "the phenomenological reduction to absolute, transcendental subjectivity." If that can be called "neutral," it must be in a special, transcendental sense, following the phenomenological purification and transformation of consciousness and "whatever exists, whether it has a concrete or abstract, real or ideal meaning." The objective universe is said (p. 168) to "come to be" through a universal unity of synthesis—"the world which is and as it is concretely and vividly given (and pregiven for all possible praxis)." Husserl speaks of the "intersubjective constitution" of the world, which means "the total system of manners of givenness . . . and also of modes of validity for egos." Through this constitution the "world as it is for us becomes understandable as a structure of meaning

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formed out of elementary intentionalities" (italics added). Lest one never fully recover from a long sojourn in rudimentary subjective inquiry, it may be suggested that one focus attention on conspicuous parts of that world, where human suffering and many kinds of interpersonal problems abound. In the interest of truth and usefulness, a reflective procedure must be based upon objective, independent events located in the natural and social world. The subjectively constituted world is a falsifying construction unless it agrees with what can be ascertained as a matter of fact about the independent world, the world in which we are also active and contributive to a modest but increasing degree. In accordance with his procedure, Husserl is interested in the formation of structures of meaning out of "elementary intentionalities." Whether he is able to reach and shed pertinent light on social realities is the question to be answered. What is most important for contemporary society is the nature of social relations as they bear upon actual problems, and the "elementary intentionalities" never reach that far. Thus Husserl's rationalistic faith in his subjective procedure, which, viewed ideally, "would leave no meaningful question unanswered"—on his terms, of course—remains unfulfilled and devoid of real results. The purely subjective realm, achieved by the extrusion of all theses of real existence, is nevertheless assigned "the function of forming ontic meaning" (p. 169). This arrogation of function goes beyond Kant's dictum that "connection" does not lie in the objects, to the dogma that the world is finally seen to be a transcendentally constituted world. That no help is to be obtained from "scientific methods based on the natural world" shows the extent to which Husserl has cut loose from the sciences and the basic fact of the existence of an independent, antecedent (rather than "pregiven") world. His technical and artificial order of problems is still to be regarded as causally derived and conditioned by the realm of existence investigated by the sciences. All forms of inquiry, whether abstract or concrete, transcendental or materialistic, are unavoidably undertaken by natural beings, and in most cases that involves responding to interests in their social system, even if they may not be fully aware of the extent of that influence upon their thought. Husserl speaks of the subjective as "appearance tied together synthetically," as distinguished from the "ego-pole" and the "object poles" (p. 171), and he speaks of pursuing "the synthesis through which the manifold appearances bear within themselves 'that which

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is' as their 'object-pole' " (p. 170). The object-pole "is in the appearances not as a component part but intentionally, as that of which each, in its own way, is an appearance." The subjective is thus located in experience and is characterized as bearing within itself "that which is" as an "object-pole" of reference. The life-world is taken to begin with as it is "given perceptually," as undoubtedly existing. But, it will be asked, does the life-world really exist, whether it is taken in "pure ontic certainty" or not? The answer, which cannot be avoided by any special procedure, however radical it may seem to be, must be that only a concrete, sociohistorical world can be said to exist. Only such a past or present actuality can be spoken of in terms of existence, and to speak of "ontic certainty" is to ask for the evidence on the basis of real experiencing beings interacting with the natural world and with one another. For Husserl, subjectivity is "an ego functioning constitutively," and that is only "within intersubjectivity" (p. 172). What is called the synthesis of intersubjectivity "through which all ego-subjects . . . are oriented toward a common world," and the "general 'we' " in which all the activities are united, ought to allow for differences in socioeconomic status among the ego-subjects. Some ego-subjects exploit other ego-subjects, and there are numerous types of conflict. The world resulting from the constitutive process of the subjective philosopher should be conditioned by economic and social relations if it is to resemble the existing world or to apply to it significantly. The "general 'we' " in Nazi Germany was quite different from the "general 'we' " of the Iroquois Indians. In effect, such an abstract, undifferentiated conception may in practice become a means for obscuring the most important relations or facts about human society, a tendency not to be removed by a process of phenomenological reduction and constitution, with its very limited program and its penchant for elementary beginnings. Although the life-world may be investigated "within the reorientation of the transcendental epoche," one can restore the natural attitude at any time, and within it there can be inquiry concerning the "invariant structures of the life-world" (p. 173). This is understandable if one is looking for invariant structures of the life-world as an experiential world. The world of experience, however, is continually generating new relationships and relational patterns, so that the invariants of the entire process are bound to be very thin, and their significance will be judged in connection with the pressing problems

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of actual living. On the other hand, the concrete human problems are not to be fully understood without the use of idealizations. But the real ground of those idealizations is to be sought in the natural-social world as a complex dynamic process. In short, the actual occurrences of that world form the real basis for all intellectual efforts to understand it, and that is not to be circumvented by any far-flung, "deep" epistemological devices. Thus, even though the world of life is said to take up into itself all practical structures, including those of the objective sciences as cultural facts, "we refrain from taking part in their interests." It is one step further to refrain from ever taking account of them, because of a resolute insistence on ideal emptiness. That the world of life, with all practical structures included, "is related to subjectivity" may be regarded as true in an unimportant sense, for everything talked about is related to subjectivity, as being talked about. The real nature of that which is talked about is the important thing to be ascertained. One may never arrive within even remote sight of that goal if primary emphasis is placed upon the doctrine that, despite all changes, the world of life "holds to its essentially lawful set of types" as the "ground" of all sciences; and this ontology "is to be derived from pure self-evidence." It is necessary to enlarge one's vision to comprise the entire subject matter of the sciences and general experience. The world and man as described and progressively understood in the course of scientific progress and general experience are really in question, so that what is needed is serious attention to the bearing of that knowledge on philosophical thought. That will have a salutary effect in two respects—by exposing errors and outmoded conceptions and by providing an ever greater access to human and natural existence. In phenomenological inquiry the pregiven life-world becomes a transcendental phenomenon. Through the epoche a "transformation" is effected, with everything finding a place within the "universal a priori of the transcendental" (p. 174). Even though the reader is assured that he may return to his earlier Einstellung, everything finally remains only topically comprehensive in a most general way, which consistently manages to miss the nature of the world as really experienced. The alleged change from the "life of natural interest in the world" into the "attitude of the 'disinterested' spectator" raises the question of the possibility of such a spectator, especially where private and vested interests are served or involved. That a "radical reshaping of our whole way of looking at the world" (p. 175) would result will

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not be doubted, for care would be taken to be devoted to timeless essences while the actual events, including the historical modes of exploitation, with their intricate system of defenses of the existing social order by means of indoctrination and deception, would be viewed "disinterestedly," if at all. Unavoidably, the "ultimate presuppositions" in which the phenomenological problems are rooted can only be abstract and removed on principle from the problems of mankind. The epoche "denied us all natural world-life and its worldly interests" and "gave us a position above these." Thus to be above the natural world-life is simply not to touch them and to disregard them. All "existing actuality" is ruled out, for we who are now philosophizing are forbidden to engage in the pursuit of our own interests, but this also applies to participation in the interests of our fellow men. In reflecting upon difficulties to be faced in the criticism of his procedure, Husserl considers whether the phenomenologist is also establishing scientific truths, so that he might be charged with "the dangerous road of double truth," subjective as well as objective truth. The solution is readily provided: there is "a strange but self-evident result," and this is "the result of inquiry within the epoche," that the natural world-life "is only a particular mode of the transcendental life which forever constitutes the world." But the transcendental subjectivity living on in this mode "has not become conscious of the constituting horizons and never can become aware of them." It turns out that the proposed solution consists in the transcendental subjectivity methodologically outflanking and taking over the natural-social world. Despite protestations that might be made to the contrary, in view of apparently reassuring statements made in the Crisis volume and elsewhere concerning the objective world and the natural attitude, the final result proves to be a continuation of the tradition of speculative idealism. It amounts to advocating an idealism reminiscent of post-Kantians like Schelling, with intelligence slumbering in nature and with the dogma couched in terms like radical, self-evident, and constitutive. Hence it rarely comes out in the open and is for the most part concealed by the apparatus of a subtle and queston-begging assumptive argument. The reader is reassured once more that nothing is lost in "the reorientation of the epoche" (p. 176). With the adoption of the epoche the "essential subjective correlates" of that which is viewed as objective by those with the natural attitude are exhibited, "and thus the full and true ontic meaning of objective being, and thus of all objective

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truth, is set forth." How could it be maintained that nothing is lost thereby? Perhaps nothing would be lost within the artificial limits of the reflective inquiry involved, except the concrete world, including real social events and human relations. But perhaps even they may not have been lost, because they were never in the field of vision of those selected as investigators with the natural attitude, which was the point of departure for the epoche. The objective investigator faces the charge of taking the natural world for granted, so that he brings only "the constituted object-poles" into his field of inquiry, thus failing to see "the full concrete being and life that constitutes them transcendentally." In other words, he is viewed as operating on a naive and unclarified level. It is accordingly clear that the objectivist is being judged on the basis of subjective-transcendental premises, with the antecedent, independent field of existence (in which knowing beings, and that includes transcendentalists, are in reality a small part and a late event) viewed as "constituted" for ultimate explanatory purposes. The transcendental-constitutive standpoint could only be maintained logically in a greatly weakened and fundamentally transformed version as a methodological proposal, and it would be sheer dogmatism to advance it as an article of faith. That Husserl is not unaware of such criticism is shown by his discussion of a second difficulty that emerges—namely, that the epoche seems to be a turning-away from all natural human life-interests, which he regards as a misunderstanding of the transcendental epoche. He recognizes that there would be no transcendental inquiry without our living through perception and the perceived, memory and the remembered, and so on. The great difference brought about by the epoche is said to be due to its changing "the entire manner of investigation" and its reshaping the goal of knowledge "in the whole of its ontic meaning." This indicates how he recurrently lends support to a methodological version of phenomenology. The constructive elements of transcendental inquiry qua reflective inquiry could be salvaged in a materialistic setting, aided by a carefully clarified, nonassumptive language. The danger of a lapse into idealistic dogmatism is also recurrent, however. The "turning-away" from natural lifeinterests may turn out to be the continuation in a subjective setting of a widespread habit of specialized scholars who disregard the social realities which must be transformed for the sake of human life-interests. The transcendentalist then appears to go along with numerous scholars who operate with the natural attitude, and if he suspends

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beliefs concerning the natural world as a matter of reflective method, he still joins with such scholars in allowing the existing social order to be unquestioned in its concrete structure and practices. In the epoche, the reader is told (p. 177), one goes "back to the subjectivity which . . . already has the world through previous aims and their fulfillment," a subjectivity which "continues to shape the world through its concealed internal 'method.' " But the world is not really due to "aims and their fulfillment," as a matter of fact and established knowledge, and there is no need for the indicated kind of "concealment." It is unwarranted and misleading to regard the world of the naturalist or materialist as "ready-made," in contrast to that of the subjectivist, who is plainly not to be credited with its "making." The painstaking, cumulative progress of the sciences is not to be characterized truly with the use of such assumptive terms, and the impression of the sciences conveyed by the Crisis text also indicates a falsifying conception, for provision is abundantly made by them for human activities, all the way to the greatest possible transformation of the world in relation to the realization of human values on the greatest possible scale. It may be noted in this connection that some of the most important and significant advances in thought have been made outside the academic institutions, restricted as they are by the social system which they represent and are committed to preserve. In Husserl's view "the full concrete facticity of transcendental subjectivity" can be scientifically grasped through an eidetic method, by investigating "the essential form of the transcendental accomplishments" in all their types and social forms. This alleged concrete facticity must either be really concrete, naming social realities, or it must be abstracted from concrete situations, themselves in need of analysis by scientific procedures. It would be helpful to translate the proposed method into more innocuous terms, as a step toward eliminating errors due to concealed assumptions. For example, if the expression "radical reflection," naming one limited method among others, were to replace the tradition-laden, presumptuous term "transcendental," it could be more readily seen that what is called transcendental phenomenology is not at all capable of directing the whole cognitive enterprise or of providing "the full and true ontic meaning of objective being." It is indebted to other procedures and sources for the fund of knowledge making its own efforts possible, both for meanings and direction. Husserl's discussion of "the paradox of human subjectivity being

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a subject for the world and at the same time being an object in the world" is revealing (pp. 178ff.). By means of the method of epoche, everything objective is said to be transformed into something subjective. The "presupposed" existing world is regarded as the "ground" for scientific psychology, and this "is taken from us by the epoche." The world, or the objective, therewith becomes something subjective; it is regarded as the correlate of the subjective experiences and activities. The "manner of being" of the world is now a "unity of meaning." Everything that exists is resolved into "universal intersubjectivity," or mankind. Since mankind is a component part of the world, how could human subjectivity constitute the whole world as its "intentional formation"? Is this a paradox? Or is it a methodogenic problem, as the present writer maintains, resulting from the adoption of a specialized method, amounting in part to a planned falsification due to the use of abstractive devices and contrary-to-fact premises? To put it in that way, however, requires an enlargement of the framework of method and a consideration of the meaning of existence in relation to the findings of the sciences and experience. With the methodogenic nature of the problem of existence not recognized, the predicament of a subjectivist endeavoring to overextend his own procedure is understandable, a predicament leading him to suppose that there is a paradox to be clarified. What is to be said of the charge that "the subjective part of the world swallows up . . . the whole world and thus itself too" (p. 180)? A bizarre and unnecessary "problem" now becomes a "necessary" paradox, involving the "natural way of viewing the world" and something fictional-namely, a "disinterested spectator." Husserl makes so bold as to try to turn the tables on the natural or science-oriented view of the world when he asserts that "the universal obviousness of the being of the world" is to be transformed into "something intelligible." For the phenomenologist, "the obvious" is questionable, and the obviousness of the being of the world is "the greatest of all enigmas," to be resolved by the subjective route of inquiry. Husserl asks whether we can be "satisfied simply with the notion that human beings are subjects for the world . . . and at the same time are objects in this world." But what follows from not being satisfied? We must accept a great deal despite not being satisfied, while striving to improve man's position in the existing natural world; and as for the social world, dissatisfaction will hopefully continue to motivate change in the direction of the best possible transformation of its institutions for the

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benefit of all mankind. To ask whether, as scientists, we can "content ourselves with the view that God created the world and human beings within it," the answer must clearly be in the negative if we are speaking about scientists who are true to the ideals of scientific method. Furthermore, is Husserl right in asserting that "the philosophers" cannot be content with the naivete of positive religion? One should look at the mixed record of the beliefs and commitments of philosophers before making such a judgment, and it will be clear that philosophers do not constitute a homogeneous totality. As for the phenomenologist, whose attitude is designed to elevate him "above the subject-object correlation which belongs to the world," he is led, in self-reflection, to recognize "that the world exists for us . . . takes its ontic meaning entirely from our intentional life." The subjectobject correlation does not become less questionable when labeled "transcendental," and it is not to be exempted from critical objections by a sweeping use of the epoche, leading to the dismissal of everything natural and mundane. In general, there should be no backhanded thrusts on the part of empty-handed philosophers with regard to the existing world. Transcendental phenomenology, in contrast to a science-oriented view of the world, purportedly begins "without any underlying ground," and somehow it "achieves the possibility of creating a ground for itself through its own powers." These powers would encompass, one must suppose, the power of transforming the "naive world" into a "universe of phenomena." Such passages add to the difficulty of disentangling any sound rational elements from the methodological attempts of Husserl, a difficulty aggravated by his tendency to move from what appears at first to be a disarmingly simple and forthright proposal, building upon a subject-object correlation (meaning that only things in relationship to human knowers can be considered) to the unwarranted conclusion that ontological status in its most general sense can be achieved only in the context of knowing minds. All of this goes along with the dogmatic view that the only true and full ontic meaning of the world is to be obtained after the procedure of suspension and elimination of independent existence has been instituted. "I" and my "phenomena" are the theme of the first stage of inquiry, in the development of the method of transcendental phenomenology, under the heading of transcendental egology. Inasmuch as "I am but one I," Husserl is led to the problem of the "constitution of intersubjectivity—this 'all of us'—from my point of view, indeed 'in'

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me" (p. 182). The unreality of this problem, which is involved by an egological beginning, can be seen when one considers the ways in which human beings react to their social system and how they are influenced, developed, warped, or suppressed because of social conditions. Full account must be taken of such facts for any type of method concerned with human existence. It is a curious question to ask who we are, "as subjects performing the meaning- and validityaccomplishment of universal constitution—as those who, in community, constitute the world as a system of poles, as the intentional structure of community life." The world as a system of poles is understandable as an item in the abstract-ideal method of subjective analysis, which undertakes to probe to the elements of experience as viewed from its perspective. That a community is diversified in its structure, with numerous types of economic and social arrangements, and that real communities differ from one another should lead one to consult the facts at every point, so that the talk of structures may apply to actualities and not be restricted to thin invariants and abstract generalities, thus failing to reach the important truths about human organization and behavior. Husserl asks whether "we" can mean "we human beings" in the natural-objective sense, as real entities in the world, and whether such real entities are not themselves phenomena and object-poles, referring us back to the meaning-activities through which they have attained their "ontic meaning." This continues the theme of the "paradox," which exists only so long as one fails to see the actual nature and limits of the proposed subjective method. Human beings as real entities are not phenomena in the sense of transcendental phenomenology, except for a contrary-to-fact procedure; and as a matter of fact which is supported by the requisite evidence, they have not really attained their ontic meaning through intentional activities alone. If it is a matter of an analysis seeking to reconstruct the structural features of realities in the existing world, ontic meanings are to be discovered and are not to be conferred by any subjectivity. Another question asked by Husserl, whether the transcendental subjects functioning in the constitution of the world are human beings, receives a simple answer. Within the epoche, the philosopher and other human beings are valid only as "phenomena," as "roles for transcendental regressive inquiries." Each "I" is not merely an ego-pole but "an Τ with all its accomplishments and accomplished acquisitions, including the world as existing." Thus there is a great deal included in the conception of an ego. With the

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"world as existing" thrown in, we seem to be dealing with superbeings. The indicated achievements of a concrete "I" must be turned back for a more modest statement in order to avoid a metaphysical commitment which could not be validated by a descriptive philosophy of experience. The phenomenological elimination of everything factually human leaves one with subjective structures. Is this what our troubled world needs? If the answer is to be by way of the most radical thinkable criticism, that could be accomplished only on the basis of a real world which is being questioned continually and with the questioning also being examined and reexamined therewith. The human knowers involved must be taken in their full reality, as being in the natural-social world, so that all abstract-ideal cognitive formations may be referred back to the primary realities. That is a reversal of the direction of transcendental phenomenology, which faces hopeless "paradoxes" in its task of accounting for existence on the basis of subjectivity. Since causal explanation in the naturalistic sense is ruled out, the subjectivist cannot use the language or usurp the function of a real ontology. He can at best endeavor to contribute to the understanding and knowledge of existence in terms of a methodological version of phenomenology, with its self-imposed limitations, as distinguished from a speculative metaphysical version, which is also illustrated in the Husserlian texts. Thus there is clearly a systembuilding impulse manifested in extolling spirit in the Crisis volume, for example. The severe standard of evidence as requiring bodily presence in experience should be borne in mind. One cannot have it both ways; it is descriptive analysis or it is system-building. Added to that is the difficulty of reconciling the descriptive findings of subjective inquiry with the established knowledge of man and the universe, a difficulty making clear the need for a larger and more adequate methodology. . The epoche is said to create "a unique sort of philosophical solitude" which is required by a truly radical philosophy (p. 184). All of mankind becomes "a phenomenon with my epoche." That is to speak egologically, and to ask who devises the epoche would be to speak materialistically. Speaking egologically, "I stand above all natural existence that has meaning for me." It would be better to say "reflect on" instead of "stand above," in order to avoid a possibly misleading suggestion of a higher realm of being as a vantage point. Once one has taken the crucial step of deontologizing the world of experience by means of the epoche, the way is open for the ego, "starting from

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itself and in itself," to constitute transcendental intersubjectivity, "to which it then adds itself as a merely privileged member," as one among transcendental others. Unless one is deceived by the use of borrowed nontranscendental terms, what is really meant is that from a vacuous, fictional "ego in itself," a vacuous, fictional intersubjectivity is "constituted"—vacuously and fictionally. The entire account of the constitutive process, leading to the "world for all," is to be understood as representing a transcendental view, so that any bearing upon the real world would have to be shown. It could only be sheer dogmatism to declare the ideal or fictional to be prior to the real. If the "ultimate I" of a human being seems to be in place when the epoche is being carried out, it may well be neglected in submerged or exploited members of society, for such a luxury may well be beyond their reach. A reduction to the "absolute ego as the ultimately unique center of function in all constitution" (p. 186) again shows transcendental phenomenology to be a continuation of the tradition of idealism. To be sure, the world is recognized as pregiven and undoubted; and Husserl's text shows, as he has indicated in other writings, that the natural view of the world as "there" has its proper place or justification. He thinks that his "realism" is strong enough, in his understanding of the term and of what is involved. The ground under one's feet becomes insecure, however, as he details the stages of his procedure, ending in the attainment of a "correlation between the world and transcendental subjectivity as objectified in mankind" (p. 187). The method and its outcome can be fully understood only by means of an examination from another perspective of method and knowledge. In other words, the seeming finality of the epoche is to become subject to radical questioning in turn, with emphasis on the sociohistorical conditions of thought and motivation. The contention that pure phenomenological inquiry is "unmotivated" could be supported only by a specially fabricated conception of motivation, neglecting the fact that phenomenologists are motivated in departing from the natural view of the world. That their motivation is different at least in part from that of special scientists with the natural attitude is certainly true. Philosophers can no more deny the effects of motives and influences than the mathematician, the social scientist, or any artisan. If we consider what it is that leads most investigators to undertake their studies, we see that there is an awareness of problems and a strong, compelling desire to solve them. If the system of wage labor

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or the distribution of wealth were the problem, the investigator could be accurate in the handling of his subject matter as well as reflectively sound, while being intensely "interested" in an important sense of the term. To be sure, in practice that may mean serving entrenched socioeconomic interests. Could not more be accomplished by recognizing the fact that investigators, like all experiencing beings, are motivated and "interested"? All the precautions of a critical method could be observed therewith, and that would be preferable to the falsifying abstraction of an ideal, unmotivated, and "disinterested" observer (p. 240), whose specialized rigor and soundness are likely to be limited to pure thought. Transcendental problems are said to encompass finally all living beings insofar as they have life. There are the problems of the transcendental inquiry starting from the essential forms of existence in human society, in communities and states; there are "the problems of birth and death and of their meaning as world occurrences," and so on (p. 188). Is this the way to proceed, in order to understand human existence? If one were to take an actual type of historical society as an example, say feudalism or capitalism, in order to test the transcendental approach, the latter would be seen to be in effect a plea for an alternative to a real explanation or an alternative to concrete efforts toward basic social change. It is nevertheless Husserl's contention that transcendental phenomenology has access to all conceivable problems in previous philosophy and to all problems of being, "at some point along its way," in addition to the specialized problems of phenomenology. In order to test this contention, one might make a list of representative problems of traditional philosophy, problems conditioned by the degree of understanding of nature and society and by the relationship of thinkers to vested interests of the existing social system. Thus Hobbes can be viewed in relation to the issue of church versus state and as responding to the need to defend the cause of science as a prime requirement for the rising commercial and industrial society; Locke's motivation in relation to the need to react against the feudalecclesiastical tradition and the concept of authority, in the name of the rights of the individual; and Kant as well as Spencer, in addition to their other interests, as concerned with the problem of reconciling science and religion. French materialism in the eighteenth century offers an outstanding example of the sociohistorical motivation of philosophers, especially in the outspoken representation of the inter-

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ests of the bourgeois class. Although psychological atomism and the idea of atomistic individuals are understandable historically, they appear quaintly anachronistic when revived in a transcendentalized form in the twentieth century. The reflections of the ideally conceived and idealizing phenomenologist depend upon the positive knowledge of the nature of all the problems raised. To arrive at all the problems would involve reflecting on the course of philosophical thought and its problems in relation to history. Only by a vastly greater framework than that of transcendental phenomenology could one make the claim not only to arrive at but also to illuminate and explain them in their social setting and with respect to their significance for the present. In order to enable the phenomenologist to undertand his own difficulties more adequately, the difference between system-proper and system-strange questions or problems must be considered—that is to say, between questions meaningful and relevant with respect to the system of knowledge of phenomenology, and questions not meaningful or relevant with respect to it. A specialized system of knowledge admits questions which are meaningful in terms of its basic ideas and premises, and excludes others which are not meaningful on that basis. Questions referring to essences in the context of pure consciousness and its meant objects are relevant to transcendental phenomenology, and questions requiring actual empirical confirmation must be ruled out as not relevant in the present sense of those terms. It is always possible to appraise the system as a whole, with respect to its merits and limitations, by means of another system of knowledge and in the light of a larger system. Thus all specialized systems, including those operating with fictions transcending the scope of experience, are the objects of possible judgments in the system of human existence. This applies to the ego and knowledge of transcendental phenomenology. But Husserl maintains that, having arrived at the ego by means of the phenomenological method, "one becomes aware of standing within a sphere of self-evidence of such a nature that any attempt to inquire behind it would be absurd." In contrast to this sphere of self-evidence are the self-evidences of all objective sciences, including formal logic and mathematics. In his discussion of the danger of misunderstanding the "universality" of the phenomenological-psychological epoche (pp. 248f.), Husserl speaks of the "self-evidence of this sole genuine 'inner experience' " as the "most unconditioned of all selfevidence." This is contrasted to the external attitude, or the natural,

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anthropological subject-object attitude, or the psychomundane attitude; and in order to make the psychic accessible one must "bring its own being and everything 'involved' in it into view" by penetrating "from the externalized intentionalities into the internal ones which constitute the other intentionally." The use of schematic, pictorial terms may not only result in failure to "penetrate" to what is most important and necessary in the real world, but may also strengthen the belief that detached thought processes provide the means for understanding and ordering the world. Although the term being is used, the thoroughgoing subjective setting cuts it off from the being of actual experience. The ego of transcendental inquiry, with its sphere of self-evidence, is distinguished from the ego involved in the alleged self-evidences of the objective sciences, with their "background of incomprehensibility." As for what remains after the epoche, can it be said to exist concretely, with a locus in the order of nature? One can question the subjective residuum, both in terms of the transcendental system and with respect to the larger system of reality of which the transcendental system is a specialized part with its own peculiar premises. Arriving at the ego of phenomenology is not at all an emancipation from nature or human society—theoretically, speculatively, or practically. What the present writer refers to as the premises of pure phenomenology comprises basic principles and special assumptions setting off the transcendental realm and making subjective inquiry possible, including the role of experience and knowing, the subject-object correlation and the bestowal of meaning, the nature of essences and structures, the relationship to the natural view of the world, and so on. The talk of "meaning-bestowing" (p. 243) calls attention to its limited subjective role, normal and abnormal, without considering the indebtedness to natural and social conditions. Hence a general subjective program, assigning the bestowal of meaning to philosophically prepared abstractive egos, must be regarded as being merely a methodological device for special descriptive and explanatory purposes, if it is not to be rejected as leading to a dogmatic theory harboring a mythical ontology. As a matter of fact the subjective could not be considered to be self-sufficient without the spiritualizing of ontology. Abstractive egos must presuppose concrete persons and social relations capable of making possible the bestowal of meanings with which the egos operate, whether rightly or wrongly. For it must be conceded that abstractive egos, bound up as they are with a reflective procedure

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and the epoche, have no lines of defense against lies and the host of deceptive means characterizing so much of the social world. In World War I, for example, the belligerent nations professed the highest ideals and purest purposes, and philosophical apologists on both sides of the conflict, neglecting the economic causes, provided noblesounding formulations and fallacious arguments to justify the widespread slaughter. If an investigator is not to miss the real nature of experience and lose the most important sources of human problems in the generalities of purely subjective inquiry, he must discover the actual roots and sources of meanings as well as their nature by reference to the concrete objectivities involved. Terms such as recession, depression, prosperity, and free enterprise have various meanings motivated by entrenched interests, and nowhere is the force of the contribution by human beings to the meanings of our world of experience more in evidence than in the case of deceptions and indoctrination prompted by dominant interests. Husserl's objection to the "attack" on transcendental phenomenology as "Cartesianism, as if its ego cogito were a premise or set of premises" concerned only with objective knoweldge, is met by closer attention to the nature of what is assumed in his discipline (p. 189). As he views it, the point is not to deduce or secure objectivity but to understand it, and he goes so far as to assert that "no objective science . . . explains or ever can explain anything in a serious sense." In his view, "to recognize the objective forms of the composition of physical or chemical bodies and to predict accordingly—all this explains nothing but is in need of explanation," so that "the only true way to explain is to make transcendentally understandable"; and the natural sciences give us no true explanations or ultimate knowledge of nature. This unsurpassed boldness is certainly not supported by evidence in the literature, and the claim to true explanation is never justified by pertinent achievements. It remains vacuous. If Husserl had held to his assertion, with all due modesty, that "the point is not to secure objectivity, but to understand it," his methodological approach would in turn face the challenge of its degree of success in understanding objective reality. The case for the superiority of the special sciences would be overwhelming because of their great practical success and theoretical accomplishments, leaving to pure phenomenology its own field of inquiry, with its best specialized results to be seen in selected aspects of experience and the philosophy of logic. Apparently undisturbed by such considerations, Husserl declares

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that the natural sciences give no ultimate knowledge of nature because they do not "investigate nature at all in the absolute framework through which its actual and genuine being reveals its ontic meaning." If this is the kind of understanding envisaged in phenomenology, it turns out to be an understanding in need of understanding, with the "absolute framework" and "actual and genuine being" requiring clarification and reassurance to the reader that they are more than empty words or unfounded pretense. Husserl insists that "the objective world in the natural attitude and this attitude itself" lose nothing by being understood in terms of "the absolute sphere of being in which they ultimately and truly are." How can that be maintained, inasmuch as the absolute sphere of being is not a sphere of real being and belongs to the realm of thought-idealities? It is nothing but a fictional framework operating in fact on the basis of the real world, but only tangentially or backhandedly—a world which can only be grudgingly acknowledged as pregiven, always present, and yet regarded as in need of phenomenological constitution. The contention concerning the knowledge attained by means of the constitutive "internal" method, "through which all objective-scientific method acquires its meaning and possibility," remains an unsupported claim; and the belief that it has significance for the natural or other objective scientists is largely in need of even remote support. That there is no lack of confidence in Husserl here is shown by the declaration that his method is "the most radical and most profound self-reflection of accomplishing subjectivity." Revealing, however, is the kind of support adduced, which is a familiar kind of prop, citing obvious inadequacies in various theories of knowledge and in the philosophy of logic. But what results if one follows the indicated transcendental route? There are serious inadequacies in turn, even if in part different, with the actual world and the conflicts of mankind inaccessible and not understood in their "true being" as well as in their "natural being." It is inevitable that the subjectivistic claim to apodictic knowledge is found to be open to doubts affecting its vaunted superiority. While indicating the unavoidable difference between empirical and transcendental subjectivity, Husserl also notes that their identity is just as unavoidable but also incomprehensible. The point is that "I, myself, as transcendental ego, 'constitute' the world, and at the same time, as soul, I am a human ego in the world." Furthermore, my transcendental understanding "prescribes its law to the world" (p. 202,

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italics added). The consciousness of intersubjectivity becomes a transcendental problem by turning to my own inner experience, "to discover the manners of consciousness through which I attain and have others and a fellow mankind in general." It is the individual knower who can confer upon others the sense of being 'of my kind.' " If the transcendental ego "constitutes the world/' that may well be left as incomprehensible or as misleading language in the service of a metaphysical theory. But the same need not be the case for the substantive identity of empirical and so-called transcendental subjectivity, for they can be understood as realities in the natural world, with the processes of inquiry of phenomenology, like those of pure mathematics, recognized as events in the real world, which includes human bodies and all their activities. No descriptive results would be omitted thereby, for a place is provided by an open-ended methodology for all the valid activities of the abstract sciences and for their meant objects as instrumental and explanatory devices. The transcendental philosopher faces problems and paradoxes because of his standpoint and method. For the transcendentalist, the "totality of real objectivity," including the "prescientific objectivity of the life-world," becomes a problem, "the enigma of all enigmas" (p. 204). The inseparable way in which psychology and transcendental philosophy are allied, however, is clarified as an "alliance of difference and identity," so that it is no longer an enigma (p. 205). All real mundane objectivity is regarded as "constituted accomplishment." What are referred to as psychic being and objective spirit such as human societies and cultures become transcendental problems, and Husserl argues that it would be "absurdly circular to want to deal with such problems on a naive, objective basis through the method of the objective sciences." In opposition to this view, it may be pointed out that for a science-oriented materialistic philosophy with an openended conception of scientific thought and inquiry as growing and changing without limit, and thus including rigorous reflective analysis, the critical reconstruction and assimilation of what is called the transcendental is merely a special kind of problem which can be solved. The solution of that problem is no more difficult than the assimilation of formal thought, which presupposes real thought processes of existing human beings, a requisite historically conditioned social order, and an all-encompassing material universe. Excessive preoccupation with transcendental "purity" has resulted in reversing the true causal relationship. A unified overall method

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designed to do justice to the selective character of the various types and special procedures of inquiry is capable of achieving what a narrow and unyielding "absolute" method is unable to accomplish. The world-problem of transcendentalism cannot be solved except on the basis of logically unacceptable speculative assumptions and arguments. The shortcomings of the prevailing scientific thought at any given time are not cured by recourse to a rarefied subjective realm introducing new dogmas to replace outmoded idealistic myths. In undertaking the task of a pure explication of consciousness as such, the first objective is "to overcome the naivete which makes the conscious life in and through which the world is what it is for us—as the universe of actual and possible experience—into a real property of man, real in the same sense as his corporeity" (p. 233). It is precisely what is assumed which has to be carefully examined. Thus that "the world is what it is for us" through the conscious life is either to be taken analytically, in the sense that "the world for us" is "the world as experienced," or it is fraught with potential mischief by disengaging experience from all corporeal existence, with unlimited metaphysical potentialities packed away in the resulting pure experience. Quite different is the question of the starting-point for the analysis of experience. Husserl resorts to the cogito and intentionality, and he is critical of the "data . . . taken for granted to be immediately given from the start." The failure to build upon what is known about man's place in the cosmos and his interrelationship with sociohistorical development is due, either consciously or unconsciously, to motives leading to withdrawal from the real problems and relations of society—which means, in effect, at least tacit acceptance of the prevailing social order. The most extreme subjective radicalism fails to touch the problems of real human beings, individual and social, if man as a real being is not the point of departure and objective of the inquiry. This calls attention once more to the alleged "prejudices of the naturalistic tradition," which should be reconsidered in the light of the evidence bearing upon the nature of man and his activities. If a set of cosmological theorems representing the present level of scientific knowledge were drawn up, in a manner reminiscent of the memorable cosmological theorems of Ernst Haeckel presented in his Riddle of the Universe in 1899, and if another set were added to cover the areas of the human sciences and philosophy, they would provide an impressive perspective from which to view the antinaturalistic criticism advanced by Husserl, among many others. Inadequate or erroneous doctrines require a greater degree of adequacy or correctness,

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and not the dismissal of materialism as a general type of philosophical orientation. A parallel list of the main theorems of transcendental phenomenology would differ in important respects from the scienceoriented list, above all in the absence of the compelling and cumulative evidence provided by the sciences. It would include standpoint principles, rules of procedure, basic formulations of the nature of experience and its meant objects, and the idealistic outcome of phenomenological inquiry. A set of idealistic prejudices could be readily formulated, leading to the so-called radical and constitutive treatment of mundane existence and knowledge. To speak of coming to or dealing with the "problem of history" with the premises of phenomenology, and even with the introduction of what is called a pregiven life-world, is to declare what is essentially impossible as well as factually false. That attempt merely serves to reveal the hopelessness of a procedure that adapts the language of real science and experience to its own purposes and endeavors to account for the world and all science-oriented views of the world from what is claimed to be the "absolute" vantage point of a transcendental analysis. It is not a new phenomenology or a fundamentally new stage of phenomenology that results, but rather a desperate attempt to do what cannot be done on its premises. That there were good and sufficient historical reasons for Husserl's plight under the Nazi domination and his final inability to write about it with the necessary candor is certainly true. But it must not be forgotten that as a philosopher he turned away from problems pertaining to the real world during the Second Reich, and not only in his last years, even though he was painfully aware of the rising tide of racism that was to affect him personally. To view with profound respect, if not awe, the effort of so mature a philosopher to expose what he held to be the "naivete" and "prejudices" of the "natural view of the world" on the basis of dogmatic premises, incurring far greater difficulties, is one of the curious occurrences in the recent literature. Even more so is crediting him with coming to grips in a new way with the problem of history. That effort may well remain in the future enlarged museum of the history of philosophy as an example of pure chutzpah.

On Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity In his "Vienna Lecture" (Crisis, pp. 269ff.), Husserl turns his attention to the human spirit, the subject matter of the humanist disci-

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plines, in which human beings are conceived as persons. The important question to be borne in mind is whether there is to be a recognition of the nature and activities of real persons in a historical or existing society. What can be said of their abstract treatment, neglecting the social realities? That proves to be doubly inadequate, for it restricts the determination of structures to a small number of examples of great generality, so that the analysis is always remote from the actual world; and it is detached from the early source of information about a world that is continually changing. These limitations are most strikingly apparent when one considers the development of new forms and types of human existence. Husserl's thought of a "scientific medicine" for nations and society in general involves an analogy between body and spirit which could readily be misleading. He indicates the failure of the humanist disciplines to perform a service analogous to the service of the natural sciences, but he has no access to the explanation of that failure. Whereas the scientific understanding of the natural world is supported for the purposes of the industrial system, the humanist disciplines reflect and respond to a greater degree to the ideas, beliefs, interests, and values of the existing social order. There are understandable reasons why representatives of secular or religious institutions with vested interests would not condone radical change. It is relatively safe to couch one's alleged subjective radicalism in general terms, with a domain of inquiry separated on principle from the sordid social reality. What is called the crisis of the existing society is bemoaned vaguely and indeterminately, with no indication of its real nature. A flight from reality to a subjective-ideal realm is the outcome, which has the advantage of permitting survival under conditions in which dissent would not be tolerated. But the unqualified attempt to perpetuate such a method and standpoint under all conditions turns out to be a way of allowing entrenched interests to stand unquestioned in their actual nature, despite the subjective epoche. Nature and spirit are viewed by Husserl as the contending parties in a world made up of two spheres of realities. The social issues thus escape him, not only philosophically but also scientifically. It is fair to ask how any informed scholar claiming to be up to his historical age could neglect Marx and the evolutionists. The answer is largely to be found in the insulation due to a confining point of view and assumptions and in motives representing a socioeconomic class alignment, whether conscious or unconscious. Husserl undertakes to resolve the

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traditional bifurcation of nature and spirit as a continuator of transcendental idealism, so that real history is neglected. When speaking of the "European sickness" he criticizes the modern scientist for holding a purely self-enclosed, general science of the spirit to be not worth considering. Recalling the period of the rise of fascism and Nazism, can one avoid thinking concretely of the social forces and conditions that led to the conflicts and monstrous cruelties of that period? In order to understand them, one must look to economic causes first of all and to a variety of supporting causes, including political and psychological factors. The desired self-enclosed, general science of the spirit would not reach as far as the simplest activities of actual human life. The understanding of the term "nature" illustrates the characteristic subjective manner of viewing all objects. Thus nature in ancient Greece is not nature in the sense of natural science—that is, "the historical surrounding world of the Greeks is not the objective world in our sense but rather their 'world-representation,' " which means their own "subjective validity" with its gods, demons, and so on (p. 272). This should be restated in direct terms, for "subjective validity" may be misleading. If beliefs are in question, that should be pointed out explicitly, and grounds, motives, and cause should be considered. An object of belief is not therefore an object of nature, and it cannot be said to be an ingredient of nature unless there is sufficient evidence to instate it as such. Even though science is still young in our time and will long be relatively young in view of the endless progress to be made at any specified time, there is a vast difference between the beliefs of Greek antiquity and the established modern knowledge supporting a view of objective nature. Hence we cannot go along with Husserl in declaring "surrounding world" to be a concept with a place exclusively in the spiritual sphere. It could only be said to be "exclusively" in the spiritual sphere if one defined it in that way, and that would be unwarranted. The subjective setting of his conception of the world is brought into bold relief when he construes our surrounding world as a "spiritual structure in us and in our historical life" and when he argues that one who makes spirit as spirit his subject matter need not demand anything other than a purely spiritual explanation for it. The consequences of this view are clear and unmistakable—namely, that it is absurd to regard the surrounding world as alien to the spirit, and to want to buttress humanistic science with natural science so as to make it supposedly

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exact" (p. 272). The assumptive language and premises enable him to land on his supposed spiritual feet, no matter what the human problems may be. Taking natural science to be a title for what he calls "spiritual accomplishments," Husserl regards it as a theme for explanation by humanistic disciplines. In his view, it appears absurd and circular to undertake to explain natural science as a historical event in a naturalscientific way, for science, as spiritual accomplishment, itself belongs to the problem. Three observations may be made about this argument. For one thing, the term "science" should not be construed narrowly. There are physical, biological, and social sciences, as well as mathematical and philosophical sciences, with restrictions determined by the evidence of the events or realities of the selected subject matter and by conformity to logical principles and procedures— whereby it should be borne in mind that general methodology is open-ended and growing. Furthermore, the term "spiritual" should not be used as a loaded term, with a superior ontological status packed away in it. When examined for their evidence, such claims rapidly wither away, with only a voice or word sounds remaining. Finally, the historical event natural science, or science more generally, may be considered from the perspective of historical materialism, which is able to elucidate important questions about the significance, motivation, and use of the sciences, and in general to explain their role in history. That historical materialism itself has scientific dignity of the highest order may also be noted. There is no absurdity or objectionable circularity incurred in explaining the sciences from the perspective of historical materialism, for it has the function of dealing with all human activities, with rigorous methodological and scienceoriented standards, on the basis of a preexisting and independent natural world. All of that is in conformity to our established evidence concerning man and his place in the cosmos, as well as man and the sociohistorical conditions of his experience. For the rest, the alleged circularity is hardly an applicable term, because it is illustrated in one form or another by such disciplines as psychology, logic, and theory of knowledge, and they would be strangely incomplete if they were not reflexive in character. How strongly Husserl feels his antinaturalism is revealed by his language; because they are "blinded by naturalism," the humanists have failed to pose the problem of a universal and pure humanistic science. In general, they have missed what is aimed at in transcen-

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dental phenomenology, with its interest in a theory of the essence of spirit and in what is unconditionally universal in the spiritual sphere, the aim being to proceed to scientific explanations "in an absolutely final sense" (p. 273). The lofty status assigned to the pure study of the spirit and its proposed role in relationship to the special sciences will not be missed. This remains no more than a mere proposal with no fruitful effects. It is to be hoped that philosophers lacking in scientific education will not be led to imagine themselves to be directiongiving scientists and that they will realize their first concern to be the justification of their own thought as worthy of being designated scientific in the larger sense of the term. To regard the term "Europe" as referring to the unity of a spiritual life, with its purposeful activity and institutions, may well be to remain with generalities, and in any case it does not take one an appreciable distance in understanding Europe. What is it that binds together the constituent nations? Is it the "unity of a spiritual shape"? Only in "our Europe," the reader is told, is there a "remarkable teleology," which is involved with the "outbreak of philosophy" (p. 273). The sad history of European society and its record of exploitation, class conflicts, and wars has been recorded in a large literature devoted to various aspects of the periods of feudalism, precapitalist formations, and the stages of development of capitalism. It has been the theme of Marxist and academic scholars, and Eugene Sue has given a graphic portrayal of the protracted struggle for freedom in Europe from the time of Caesar to the nineteenth century in his Mysteries of the People. That is to deal with real history, and not a misplaced conception of an "inner teleology" that ignores class distinctions and directs its inquiry to philosophy without regard for the way in which it reflects the social system in which it arises. It may appear noble to speak of "universal mankind" (p. 274) and the "free shaping of its existence . . . through ideas of reason, through infinite tasks." But it would be far more noble from the point of view of the greatest possible realization of human values to make clear the causes of frustration and suffering and to participate in the next stage of progress toward the goal of freedom and happiness for all mankind. That is a goal which must always be defined anew with respect to the existing social conditions and alignments. When Husserl states that there is no zoology of peoples, for essential reasons, and that they are "spiritual unities" (p. 275), one may hesitate to apply such a designation to factory workers or to coal

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miners, for example. Instead of perfuming mankind with lofty phrases, the order of natural existence should be recognized as enveloping human beings and socioeconomic development, among many other things. The primary target of inquiry should not be the overextension of the zoological, any more than it need be vulnerable versions of naturalism or materialism, if one is interested in doing justice to the facts themselves, in the sense of actual events and real beings. What is called the spiritual telos of European humanity "lies in the infinite"; it comprises the telos of individual human beings and particular nations and becomes "a goal of the will." In detachment from all actual conditions, this is supposed to be instrumental in introducing a higher stage of development "under the guidance of . . . normative ideas." This formulation is in its broad outlines reminiscent of the tradition of post-Kantian idealism, with the telos simply foisted upon mankind and Europe. No less external and artificial are the norms and normative ideas, as applied to a higher development of mankind, all of which is as vacuous as it is unsupported by factual evidence about human existence. Nevertheless, Husserl informs the reader that "all this is not intended as a speculative interpretation of our historical development," and he declares it to be the expression of a presentiment arising through "unprejudiced reflection." This is told as a substitute for what should have been said but which he could not say on his explicit or implicit premises. Proceeding to the exposition, Husserl traces the "spiritual birthplace" to ancient Greece, in which there arose "a new sort of attitude of individuals toward their surrounding world," leading to philosophy (p. 276). It is here, as well as elsewhere, that the phenomenological view does not deal with real history for which one must never lose sight of the economic structure of society and the economic conditions of change in the superstructure of ideas, morals, and institutions. Husserl's view makes the "spiritual" (idea-) side of individuals to be central and definitive "for the surrounding world." To see the breakthrough of philosophy, in which all the sciences are contained, as "the primal phenomenon of spiritual Europe" could be rendered both flat and innocuous if by "spiritual Europe" is merely meant the superficial trivialities following from a group of assumed definitions. The supposition that the "historical movement that has been taken on by the style-form of European supranationality aims at an infinitely distant normative shape" is itself infinitely, if not essentially, removed from the facts. How the reader will judge the view that there is a

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constant directedness toward a norm which "inhabits the intentional life of individual persons" will depend upon its concrete interpretation. It is not enough to speak of a "norm" or of "individual persons" abstractly. Even if one granted the very thin and tenuous assumption that everyone unavoidably acts in accordance with norms, all the way from a resolute choice of a reasoned program to aimlessness, it should be clear that there are a great number of norms, many of them conflicting with one another, and that individual persons differ in their traits, preferences, and socially condition interests. It cannot be maintained in truth that all individuals have the same norms, unless they happen to be specially fabricated, abstract individuals in an idealized realm. Furthermore, not much is said by the contention that everyone has norms. One person's overriding norm may be garnering the greatest possible amount of profit, and another person, with nothing to sell but his labor power, can only be a means to the end of the profit-seeker. Conflicts resulting from the effective nature of norms are also abundantly illustrated by competing persons on the same social level, whether in the realm of business or in professional life. It may also be noted that the phenomenological procedure from individual persons and their norms to nations "with their particular social units and finally the nations bound together as Europe" incurs the danger of neglecting the important truth that individuals are social products as well as participants and contributors to their social systems. The "new sort of humanity" envisaged by Husserl (p. 277) is characterized by "a new type of communalization," whose spiritual life, communalized through the love and production of ideas and through real life norms, "bears within itself the future-horizon . . . of an infinity of generations being renewed in the spirit of ideas." This is again a continuation of traditional idealism. Hopefully, the individuals involved now and along the way will not have to eat or to be concerned with concrete interpersonal, class, and international conflicts. Husserl's support of his vision by the example of the development of philosophy and philosophical communities in the Greek nation shows how far removed he is from the actualities of Greek history, with its cultural development made possible by slave labor. The "common cultural spirit" which arose in ancient Greece, as portrayed by Husserl, draws "all of humanity under its spell" and thus constitutes a new type of historical development. This should be applied to the economic and political issues of the time in order to call

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attention to the distance between idealized, idyllic talk about man, his problems, and crises and the human problems of which Plato and Aristotle were fully aware. For Husserl, philosophy has a guiding function and an infinite task in the "ideally directed total society" (p. 289) conceived by him. That is the function of "free and universal theoretical reflection," encompassing all ideals and norms. Thus the function of philosophy is "archontic for the civilization as a whole." The actual succession of European economic, political, and cultural systems is supposedly absorbed and in effect circumvented in this purview, which is perhaps best allowed to remain abstract and vacuous. This is the setting for Husserl's feeling of certainty that "the European crisis has its roots in a misguided rationalism" (p. 290). Such a formulation could be acceptable only if rendered as a tautology, which would show that it says nothing—that is, the European crisis as conceived here has its "roots in a misguided rationalism," in a sense conforming to the specially defined "crisis." With what amounts to "A is A" one need not quarrel, but also one need not be convinced of anything thereby. Reiterating emphatically his opposition to an objective science of the spirit or of the soul, "objective in the sense that it attributes to souls, to personal communities, inexistence in the forms of spacetime," Husserl is sure that such a science will never exist (p. 297). In his view only the spirit exists in itself and for itself, and it can be treated rationally only in this way. Nature, on the other hand, as conceived by the natural sciences, is "only apparently self-sufficient." The reason given is that "true nature in the sense of natural science is a product of the spirit that investigates nature and thus presupposes the science of the spirit." The desired ontological status of spirit appears conveniently, and like the traditional absolute it is fully equipped with self-sufficiency and aseity—a sheer dogma whose future depends upon the fervor of its proponent. The old and worn out contention that nature as conceived by natural scientists is a product of the spirit investigating nature was seemingly laid to rest in the historical controversy between idealists and realists, naturalists and materialists. It is advanced without any apparent awareness of its assumptive character and of the required consideration of all the relevant evidence concerning the place of man and his thought processes in the natural and social world. This contention goes the whole way to idealism, post-Kantian and beyond, and is distinguished above all

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by its dogmatism. The account of the course of reflection has a familiar ring: "Only when the spirit returns from its naive external orientation to itself, and remains with itself . . . can it be sufficient unto itself" (p. 297). One may think of Hegel therewith without much of Hegel, and also of the way in which medieval mysticism had provided this kind of mythical pattern. Prominent in the motivation of Husserl's thought is the overcoming of objectivism and naturalism (materialism may also be added, along with evolutionism and Marxism, regarded by Husserl as dogmatic naivetes). This sets the scene for transcendental phenomenology, proceeding from one's own ego, with the ego as "the performer of all his validities" (p. 298). In portraying his conception of a new kind of science, he claims that all conceivable questions relating to being, norms, and "existence" find their place in it. This fervent claim is made in the name of intentional or transcendental phenomenology. The future contention that naturalistic objectivism and psychology, "because of its naturalism, had to miss entirely the accomplishment of the life of the spirit" is simply one more unfounded claim (p. 299). A discerning materialist or naturalist need not fail to recognize and appropriate in a scientific setting the positive descriptive insights of other scholars, however mistaken or objectionable their total philosophical views may be. The methodological and factual openness of such science-oriented investigators gives them an enormous advantage over the purity-directed subjective thinkers who begin by losing the real world. It is safe to say that they never succeed in regaining it, assuming that a program of restoration is ever seriously contemplated. In concluding his Vienna lecture, Husserl is apparently quite convinced that the "teleology of Europen history" can be discovered philosophically. Europe is viewed as a phenomenon to be grasped "in its central, essential nucleus" (p. 299). He seems to believe that he has shown "how the European 'world' was born out of ideas of reason, that is, out of the spirit of philosophy." Thus the "crisis" could be conceived as "the apparent failure of rationalism." The reader will decide whether a single reason or statement of fact was adduced to render that view plausible or whether it accords with his knowledge of the nature of historical change. The impression is unmistakable that the reader should avoid any "entanglement in 'naturalism' and 'objectivism,' " a warning repeatedly given, much as a religious devotee might be admonished to avoid the material world and its evils

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in order to concentrate on saving the soul—with the result that the status quo is allowed to stand unquestioned. As already indicated, the European tradition cannot be understood without consideration of the industrial transformation of society, with its system of wage labor, concentration of wealth, and a series of crises involving unemployment, poverty, insecurity, and war—truly a "remarkable teleology"! In total opposition to that point of view, Husserl speaks of the "rebirth of Europe from the spirit of philosophy through a heroism of reason that overcomes naturalism once and for all." The lecture closes with an exhortation to have courage "that does not fear even an infinite struggle," and in language reminiscent of Hegel he predicts that "out of the destructive blaze of lack of faith, the smoldering fire of despair over the West's mission for humanity, the ashes of great weariness, will rise up the phoenix of a new life-inwardness and spiritualization as the pledge of a great and distant future for man: for the spirit alone is immortal." This final declaration of faith is a fitting close of a fruitless discussion by the transcendental philosopher—fruitless because it is confined to empty generalities from within, through his standpoint and method, and from without, because of his unwillingness or inability at any time to declare himself concretely against the existing social system. Such a declaration would have been possible only in the years before 1933, the time of Hitler's accession to power, when Husserl became a hapless victim of the Nazi system. But in any case he lacked the necessary means for the understanding of society, which no amount of investigation in the style of the transcendental and life-world phenomenology could have supplied. Some further passages in a manuscript appearing as an appendix ("Philosophy as Mankind's Self-Reflection; the Self-Realization of Reason") in the Crisis volume are pertinent. With the exception of idealism, Husserl criticizes "the philosophies of all times" for not being able to overcome "naturalistic objectivism" (p. 337). But as for idealism, it "failed in its method." Phenomenology is obviously expected to provide what idealism had not been able to do with its method, and mention is again made of the important task of "overcoming" naturalistic objectivism. Even the "apodictically persisting conviction of one and the same world, exhibiting itself subjectively in changing ways, is . . . motivated purely within subjectivity," and its sense, the actually existing world, "never surpasses the subjectivity that brings it about." This dogma is central for Husserl, and it should be recalled when an "objective" and even an allegedly Marxist interpretation of phenomenology is undertaken, for example by Pad.

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Husserl's comment about the reason for calling his phenomenology transcendental is noteworthy. If subjectivity is regarded as "having the actual phenomenal world in intuitive validity," the phenomenological reduction is required for "putting transcendental phenomenology into action." It is the thoroughgoing use of the "reduction" and its constitutive program that distinguishes his conception of the transcendental, a procedure initially delimiting the sphere of inquiry and a source of difficulty and frustration when overextended in the interest of a general idealistic philosophy. A fundamental role is assigned to reason, which is taken to be "the specific characteristic of man," and man's personal life is described as "a constant becoming through a constant intentionality of development" (p. 338). What becomes is the person himself, and so the person's being is said to be forever becoming. Rather than restrict oneself to speaking to an abstract reason and an abstract person, it would be helpful to repeat this passage with respect to a factory worker, a stone cutter, or an elevator operator. What would the "stages of self-reflection" be like for such people? Or are they not "persons" in the phenomenological sense; and is it possible that Husserl is talking about his own idealized self or person when he views human personal life as proceeding "in stages of self-reflection and self-responsibility"? The "universally, apodictically grounded and grounding science" is said to arise as the "highest function of mankind," as "making possible mankind's development into a personal autonomy and into an all-encompassing autonomy for mankind." Phenomenology therewith assumes a position of leadership. Happily, the idealized ego seems to be in no danger of bursting with ego-inflation. But what really makes mankind's development possible? What does a hungry person do if he has no job or resources? Does he perform an epoche and strive to reach the uppermost level of "autonomy" and "self-responsibility"? Or does he try to solve problem of immediate survival in any way possible, while attempting to assist in changing the "objective" conditions in which he and so many others are enmeshed? But the understanding of those conditions is not to be achieved by means of a philosophy characterized by withdrawal, nonparticipation, and neutrality with respect to the real world. Characterizing philosophy as a thoroughgoing rationalism, Husserl states that "it is ratio in the constant movement of self-elucidation." Avoiding complete immersion in the cul-de-sac of subjectivism, one may object against regarding the process as self-elucidation. The

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opposing view may be urged that just as the special sciences aim at understanding the world and man, the aim of philosophy is also to contribute toward that understanding, with the additional aim to assist in the direction of human life on the basis of the present conditions, rather than toward the realization of an ideal goal, infinitely removed from the present. That can be done only insofar as the knowledge and achievements of the sciences, as well as the lessons derived from general experience, are respected. The actual historical role and significance of philosophers should not be neglected, for that is a theme which is itself worthy of the most serious scientific interest, in the larger sense of the term "science." Husserl's thought eventuates in a grandiose vision rivaling the speculative zeal of previous idealists. He speaks of the discovery of "the necessary concrete manner of being of absolute (transcendental) subjectivity in a transcendental life of constant 'world-constitution' "; of the new discovery of the "existing world," whose ontic meaning is transcendentally constituted, with a new meaning given to human existence as "the self-objectification of transcendental subjectivity"; and of the ultimate self-understanding of man as being responsible for his own human being (p. 340). The whole concrete being of mankind is said to be realized in "apodictic freedom" by becoming "apodictic mankind in the whole active life to its reason—through which it is human." This is tantamount to saying that the phenomenologist emerges here as a necessary means for the epistemological preparation of the ideal of human existence. Whether it would matter if attention were directed to a worker, employer, or gambler would help to distinguish this entire construction from a theological view in which the apodictic is guaranteed by faith. The conception of the apodictic as naming that which is "certain to me through immediate experience" (p. 335) is as narrow as it is specialized. There is an essential distinction between the subjective process of experience and the objective events which are not touched thereby. The existing world of events is merely affected to only a very small extent by experiencing beings; it does not have to wait for an epistemological sanction of apodicticity. The process of "immediate experience" constitutes a greatly restricted region of experience to begin with, and it is necessary to extend its scope to include the results of the experience of others. But even the restricted sphere of the immediate experience of an individual ego may be challenged as not being certain. For one thing, it presumes to establish descriptive

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findings with general validity for its future experiences and for those of other knowing beings. Since special assumptions are required in order to have the necessary generality and permanence, the guarantee of their certainty must be established. Furthermore, my experience, whether conceived as "reduced" phenomenologically or not, is indebted to the experience of others, and the question of certainty is again to be raised in a far more complex situation. The uncertainty of what is claimed to be apodictic becomes increasingly apparent upon inspection. The apodictic is questionable as a criterion when attributed to the pure reflection of phenomenology, for it can be used hypothetically only in subjective analysis, assuming the artificial conditions required by the method. It is also cut off thereby from application to most problems of human experience. Moreover, even transcendental phenomenologists can make mistakes in what may appear to be apodictic essence-determinations. In such cases, all that could be said would be that genuine essence-determinations had not been made, so that one must wait for the alleged genuineness to be confirmed. That would, however, incur to some extent the very element of precariousness and uncertainty imputed to empirical methods. Only if one undertakes to cut loose from the objective world as a matter of method, with implicit ontological and epistemological assumptions delimiting the subject matter of the inquiry, can one take mind to be the condition and constitutive principle for reality. Husserl goes the whole length of his wishful speculation in having reason be that which man "in his innermost being" is aiming for and that which alone can satisfy him or make him "blessed" (p. 341). He does not pause to consider whether all men actually and always aim in that way, and he sees the teleological being of man as "holding sway in each and every activity and project of an ego." It is through selfunderstanding in all this" that an ego can know the "apodictic telos," and this "ultimate self-understanding" is achieved in the form of philosophy—meaning undoubtedly, transcendental phenomenology in its last formulation by Husserl. Many years before, when looking back at earlier philosophers, Husserl spoke of the quiet museum of the history of philosophy, in which thinker after thinker resides, in contradistinction to his own professed ideal of practitioners of a rigorous science of philosophy. Unwittingly he therewith suggested a location for his own thought about man and the world. His thought suffers the fate of all who fail

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to do justice to the nature of the actual events of the existing world. This is seen clearly in his view of European history, for he does not seem to be at all aware of the need to account for a single change in society and in ideas because of changing circumstances, including the availability of raw materials, changing economic interests, inventions, and, in general, scientific progress in relationship to technology. He does not show any awareness of such an important theme in socioeconomic history as the struggle between labor and capital—for example, over the length of the working day and intolerable conditions in industry, a theme recounted by Marx in Capital in an illuminating and convincing chapter. Hence, although Husserl was aware of grievous suffering and cruelties in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, he had no access to the more deep-seated causes, requiring an objective analysis and historical study of the modern industrial system on a worldwide scale. Going the way to subjectivity by means of the phenomenological reduction and proceeding from there to a general philosophy of transcendental idealism could only signify the abandonment of the real problems, with idealized norms and the prospect of an unacceptably remote future to take their place. In order to be fully useful, abstractive analysis must proceed from concrete human societies and natural existence to the examination of relational structures, so that its validity and value are to be tested by application to the point of departure. Like the material universe, the sociohistorical realm of mankind is antecedent to methods of inquiry of any kind, whether conceived in the setting of idealism or of materialism. The instrumental function of such inquiry requires continual awareness of the emergence of new social relations and forms of experience. A method of describing and analyzing relational structures cannot be employed in isolation, not only because of the occurrence of novelty but also because of the need for specialized scientific modes of investigation. Although descriptive analysis may be devoted programmatically to an abstract realm, if it is not to condemn itself to abstract generalities and trivialities it must operate in cooperation with other devices and types of method. Taken literally, this signifies methodological diversity or pluralism, with a given procedure regarded as one part or phase of a complex unitary methodology, along with other types of procedure, inductive, experimental, deductive, and philosophical in character. It is possible in this way to speak of a unified

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methodology, for it is a unity that involves diversity; and all of this is within the confines of the existing material universe, from which no subtle doctrines of language, attitudes, or standpoints can pry one loose.

9 From the Perspective of Materialism

The Bugbear of Materialism

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he term "materialism" as used in the present context signifies due adherence to the findings of the sciences as well as the self-sufficiency of nature. It also allows for the activities and complexity of human experience by way of a critical philosophy deriving from historical materialism, a philosophy that provides for the examination of its own procedures. Unlike the suggestion of respectability attaching to the term "naturalism" in many places, there is little approval accorded the designation "materialism" in the Western academic world. The spirit of compromise that entered into the evolutionary movement and lived on in pragmatism allowed for religious values and even for the hope of a possible escape from nature. In that respect, naturalism as it appeared historically could be softened, a thoroughgoing materialism never, the dangers being frequently due to narrowness and uncritical use of the established scientific knowledge of the time. But it is also pertinent to consider the varieties of materialism as well as other types and tendencies in relation to the prevailing social system, and that is a continuing theme for historical materialism. The fact that Marx and Engels called them-

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selves materialists has added to the reasons for opposition to materialism as a type of philosophy.1 To attempt to tar all types of materialism with the same brush would be to incur a serious scholarly error. That error is illustrated by Sartre's treatment of materialism in his essay "Materialism and Revolution," 2 where he speaks of "materialism and the myth of objectivity" in connection with his proposal that materialism be reexamined. Materialism is charged with "eliminating subjectivity" by reducing man and the world to a system of objects linked together by universal relations. Support is thus given to the designation "myth of objectivity" by injecting a mechanistic model into the world view of materialism, which many recent writers on materialism would not allow. Sartre makes much of the rejection of metaphysics by dialectical materialism, but the whole play on the word "metaphysics" in which he engages is based upon a misrepresentation of the reasons for replacing a metaphysical by a dialectical view. To ask by what miracle the materialist would be able to reduce spirit to matter without recourse to metaphysics is a misleading question at best. If a spiritual substance is not assumed, it is pointless to ask about reducing it to matter. A materialist who is up to the intellectual level of his time depends upon the progress of the sciences, including the analysis made possible by historical materialism, for an explanation of what is called mind, basically meaning a complex form of behavior. Accusing materialism of being a metaphysics disguised as positivism, Sartre contends that as a metaphysics it destroys itself, for by rejecting metaphysics it deprives its own statements of any foundation. Unwarranted assumptions are therewith injected into the materialist position, making the latter deny "being" in effect, which it certainly does not do, following which charge it develops that materialism has destroyed itself. Encouraged by his own enthusiasm, Sartre argues that materialism also destroys the positivism "under which it takes cover." It is evidently a tenuous and persistent monster which is the object of attack. It would be difficult to find a less tenable argument anywhere. A curious feature of Sartre's argumentation is shown by his question whether the universe "in itself" supports and guarantees scientific rationalism. It seems to him that in order to compare the universe as it is to the scientific picture of the universe it would be necessary to assume the attitude of God toward man and the world. But the materialist, not being so shy, "leaves behind him science and subjec-

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tivity" and substituting himself for God, whom he denies, contemplates the universe. The fault lies with Sartre's statement of this point, involving as it does a false view of scientific verification—as though the verified scientific account of the world were an artificial picture to be compared with a reality "in itself." The possible suggestion that scientific explanation is a falsifying process cannot be overlooked. In any case, the point made by Sartre is metaphysical in the old sense, for he talks about a completed world and a complete science. When the materialist (as represented by Engels) states that his view of the world signifies nature as it is, without anything foreign added, Sartre indignantly accuses him of the "trick" of denying subjectivity and then thinking he has put an end to it. The "conception of nature as it is," however, is indeed a fundamental goal of scientific knowledge. If the question-begging character of such epithets as subjectivity is recognized, then Sartre's own "trick" is easily detected. It is an obsolete psychological ether that is extruded by materialism, as a matter of fact. This point may well have been missed by Sartre because of his failure to consider the method, evidence, and implications of scientific psychology. The materialist is accused of a play on the word "objectivity," "which sometimes means the passive quality of the object beheld and at other times the absolute value of a beholder stripped of subjective weaknesses." Sartre's own play on words, however, is on the term "subjectivity," which he, in the "objectivating" style of a true subjectivist, projects into his opponents. To suit his convenience, he has "the" materialist undertake a journey "into a world of objects inhabited by human objects" and upon returning tell us what he has learned. It turns out to be Hegel (as mediated by Engels) who took the journey in his place, for the report reads: "Everything that is rational is real; everything that is real is rational." But Hegel cannot be converted to materialism, nor materialism to the indicated type of rationalism. Sartre's readiness to contemplate destruction may be reminiscent of his early contact with phenomenology and its "world-destruction." Thus he has materialistic rationalism pass into irrationalism and destroy itself, which is simply an unfounded charge. He asks whether a "captive reason, governed from without, and maneuvered by a series of blind causes," can still be called reason. Phrases such as "captive reason," "blind causes," and, as he adds, "raw products of circumstances" are further examples of the prominent use of pejora-

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tive expressions. They function as linguistic tools in the misrepresentation of the scientific method and the real nature of the human knower. Reverting once more to the need to survey both the "inside" and the "outside" if one is to know whether our consciousness is a correct "reflection" of the world, Sartre insists that there must be internal and subjective criteria for judging the validity of the "reflection," that is, idealist criteria. It is Sartre, however, who adopts a metaphysical version of the "inside-outside" distinction. As the objectivistic materialist views it, everything is existentially "outside" if his complete program is to be realized in the future, for if the "inside" is anything at all, it must have a locus in the objective world. From one perspective, the "inside" is an "outside," for as an experiencing "inside" it has a locus in the physical universe. An experiencing subject, say hearing Beethoven's Fourth Symphony at different times, is not likely to react in the same way on each occasion. Not only does the world change physically and socioculturally, there are also his own changes, including his subjective processes—bodily, affective, and cognitive— all of them parts of the world. From another perspective, important in its own way, it is the human subject that is always acting and reacting in experience. The subject can be viewed descriptively as it functions in experience—in relation to other subjects, the social system, the natural world, and also reflectively—taking account of all modes of experience and intellectual processes. But the experiencing being should not be regarded as an etherealized subject, with traditional trimmings and trappings designed to lift it above the naturalsocial world. In actual fact, however, it is always conditioned by that world; and most important for our understanding, it is a feudal-conditioned, or a bourgeois-conditioned, etc., subject—in short, a complex historical event. Furthermore, it is not correct to speak of subjective criteria in the context of scientific method and to refer to the test of consistency (or "conformity") as idealistic. That is not an appropriate name for taking account of past observations, with all the safeguards of scientific inquiry. The materialist is said to be dogmatic in holding that the universe produces thought and in passing at once into idealist skepticism. It would be better to state that thought, or the thinking activity, evolves as human beings develop, and that would not be dogmatic. Not to recognize the implications of established knowledge concerning the development of thought may simply amount to ignorance or preju-

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dice. For the rest, dogmatism may be revealed in hurling unfounded charges of dogmatism. Sartre hastens to the conclusion that "all that remains is ruins." 3 The general summation of his case is theatrical; it consists of a series of unfounded and misleading assertions. Only the last sentence may be allowed to stand, for it can be answered without serious critical objections or reservations. Sartre cannot be a materialist, because that would mean meeting the requirements of a critical, science-oriented philosophy, for which one must be abreast of the scientific achievements of his time and have a clear grasp of the problems, issues, and methods of philosophy as they are rooted in historical experience and validly established knowledge. Finally, it is the aim of a complete philosopher to participate in his way in realizing the truth about human beings and their potentialities in relation to the problems of the present social system, and that requires a thoroughgoing critical analysis of human experience, practices, and institutions, giving due weight to socioeconomic conditions and motivation. This dimension of inquiry not only constitutes a rapidly developing specialty, but also, on the basis of its premises concerning the natural world and the real place of man in it, provides an all-inclusive framework for all experience, knowledge, and action.

On Lenin as a Materialist As the most influential Marxist since Marx and Engels and as an important continuator of materialism, Lenin merits the careful attention of all serious philosophical readers. In Lenin's words, "Marxism is materialism," 4 a philosophy going further than the materialism of the Encyclopedists of the eighteenth century and the materialism of Feuerbach by virtue of the application of materialistic philosophy to the field of history and the social sciences. Again, 5 materialism has carried the analysis of society to the very origin of the social ideas of man, "and its conclusion that the course of ideas depends on the course of things is the only deduction compatible with scientific psychology." The difficulty sociologists had previously found in distinguishing the important from the unimportant social phenomena is declared to be the root of subjectivism in sociology. An "absolutely certain criterion for such a distinction" is provided by materialism, "by singling out the 'relations of production' as the structure of

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society, and by making it possible to apply to these relations that general scientific criterion of repetition whose applicability to sociology the subjectivists denied." The science of the subjectivists "was at best only a description of social phenomena, a collection of raw material." On the other hand, the analysis of material social relations (i.e., such as take shape without passing through man's consciousness, when exchanging products men enter into relations of production without even realizing that social relations of production are involved in the act) make it at once possible to observe repetition and order and to generalize the systems of the various countries so as to arrive at the single fundamental concept: the "formation of society." It was this generalization that alone made it possible to proceed from the description of social phenomena (and their evaluation from the standpoint of an ideal) to their strictly scientific analysis, which, let us say by way of example, selects "what" distinguishes one capitalist country from another and investigates "what" is common to all of them.

This is an important statement concerning the method of Marxism and its distinction from the method of description as employed by subjectivistic sociologists. Such description is clearly not enough for the purposes of scientific inquiry. On the other hand, an ideally complete discipline would encompass everything, including the very laws which are discerned as the principles of unity of the facts. But this ideal is not in question. In actual practice we make use of hypotheses as aids in the determination of causes and the establishment of laws. The subjectivistic methodologist has an initial bias in favor of the priority of mind or conscious experience. In systematic philosophy he asks how objective, independent existence is possible; and in social philosophy, the evidence for a community, society, and other people is to be established. Structures are determined with no bearing upon actual social relations. The materialist as an objective methodologist begins with the world as an independently existing domain and with a form of society that is antecedent to any individual, and is in fact the most recent stage of social development, whose long history records many other forms of society. Neither the world nor human society depends on human conscious experience or on any individual, who is in most cases even unaware of the most elementary structures and laws of existence. Why should one engage in subjectivistic investigation at all, one may ask, if the real analysis of

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the materialist is admittedly true to the basic facts concerning mankind? The answer depends upon its fruitfulness. But a definition and assimilation of such procedures must be effected within the framework of the sciences and objective existence, resulting in a far greater realm for reflective analysis. The genetic method of the materialist and his determination of origins deals with things in natural time, meaning by that the temporal character of events which are recorded in terms of days and years. That time is not dependent upon man or human experience, for they are themselves temporal events, and it is a fact that there were temporal events before man existed, events characterized by change and "passingness." From the point of view of the subjectivist, a great deal is assumed by the materialist. The thoroughgoing subjectivist really makes two claims: (1) In order to analyze everything—the world of existence, time, human society, and thought—it is necessary to question everything, and that requires a universal suspension of belief and even of knowledge in order to "begin at the beginning." (2) Only a subjectivistic procedure that limits the inquiry initially to the experiences of an individual knowing being, along with the intended or meant objects, can make the desired universal analysis possible. Although the materialist may appear to agree with (1) because he must carry the process of questioning to all regions of experience and knowledge if a universal philosophy is to be achieved, it must be recognized that the questioning turns out to be different in most important respects from that of subjectivism. The premises, aims, methodology, and selection of facts—indeed, the very conceptions of existence, man, mind, and history—are radically different for the two opposing philosophies. Accordingly the materialist will deny (2), because of its dogmas, untenable arguments, and limitations, but he may allow it in a greatly modified form (2'), as a transformed, specialized, auxiliary procedure, preferably without use of the tradition-laden term "subjective"—for the purposes of reflective analysis in a materialistic setting. In his criticism of subjectivistic sociology, Lenin observes that the subjectivists separate social evolution from the evolution of natural history because man sets himself conscious aims and is guided by definite ideals.6 Their opposition to materialism was sufficient to promote an alternative with implications for social practice. That is most clearly seen in examples of extreme philosophical subjectivism, for to restrict oneself to the order of ideas signifies abandoning the consideration of real causes. Ideas concerning the family, property,

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slavery, justice, etc., must be considered in the context of historical society, which also means within in the frame of objectively independent existence. The direction of Lenin's thought is emphatically shown by his penetrating criticism of the "Narodnik":7 "But you, while you talk of 'living individuals,' as a matter of fact take as your starting point not the 'living individual,' with the 'thoughts and feelings' that are actually created by his conditions of life, by the given system of relations of production, but a marionette, and stuff its head with your own 'thoughts and feelings.' Naturally, such a pursuit only leads to pious dreams; life holds aloof from you, and you from life." This point should be considered in connection with the phenomenological reduction, which is bound to be historically conditioned in its particular content. Because of its restricted interest in invariant structures, a phenomenological reduction to subjective processes carried through in 1913 would not yield different findings than if it were carried through in 1933 or in 1975. It would surely be barren in important respects so far as reality is concerned, for reality is historical and always changing. Lenin asserts that "the theory of the class struggle is the first to . . . elevate sociology to the level of a science," by "laying down the methods by which the individual can be reduced to the social." This was achieved by the materialist definition of the concept "group." According to Marx's theory, each system of production relations is a separate social organism. The subjectivists' argument about a society in general is judged to be supported by meaningless arguments that do not go beyond petty-bourgeois Utopias, because the possibility of generalizing the most varied social systems into special forms of social organisms was not ascertained. That line of thought has been replaced by an investigation of definite forms of structure of society. It is a naive, mechanical view of history that is held by the subjectivists, with their "meaningless thesis that history is made by living individuals" and their refusal to examine "what social conditions determined their actions, and how greatly subjectivism was replaced by the view that the social process is a process of natural history— without which view . . . there could be no social science." Just as the reduction of "individuality" to general laws was accomplished for the physical realm long ago, it was firmly established for the social realm by Marx's theory in the last century. Lenin speaks of the dogmatic error of trying to embrace progress in general instead of studying the

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concrete progress of some concrete social formation. For the Marxist, ideals are formulated not as a demand of science but as a "demand of such and such a class, provoked by such and such social relations" which must be objectively investigated and "achievable in such and such a way." If ideals are not based on facts in this way, they will remain as merely "pious wishes." Agreeing with the justice of Sombart's remark that "in Marxism itself there is not a grain of ethics from beginning to end," Lenin adds that "theoretically, it subordinates 'the ethical standpoint' to the 'principle of causality'; practically, it reduces it to the class struggle." In general, his conception of the scope of materialism is as thoroughgoing as his critical treatment of opposing points of view is unsparing. The critique of subjectivism, for which Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism is especially noteworthy, is also pertinent for recent trends in philosophy. He writes: If you deny that objective reality is given to us through sensation, you have already surrendered your w e a p o n s to fideism, for you have embraced agnosticism or subjectivism. . . . If the perceived world is the only objective reality, then the door is closed on any other "reality" or quasi-reality. . . . If the world is matter in motion it can and must be infinitely studied in its infinitely complicated a n d detailed manifestations and ramifications of this motion, of the motion of this matter; but beyond it, beyond the "physical," beyond the external world, with which everyone is familiar, there can be nothing. 8

It should again be noted that for a strict methodologist making use of an epoche (a methodological suspension of judgments and beliefs) as a provisional, ancillary procedure to aid in clarifying the nature and grounds of experience and knowledge, there is no denial of objective reality. But for an idealistic investigator the procedure in effect amounts to avoidance if not a denial of the most important social problems—and that is demonstrably the case. In his appraisal of Haeckel, 9 Lenin states that he (Haeckel) showed that there is a base which becomes wider and firmer a n d beneath w h o s e weight all efforts of the thousand a n d one little schools of idealism, positivism, realism, empirio-criticism and other confusionism are smashed. This base is mturo-historical materialism. The conviction of the "naive realists" (rather of all humanity) that our sensations are images of the objectively real external world is a conviction growing m o r e and m o r e established a m o n g the

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mass of scientists. . . . The evolutionary advance of science, regardless of vacillations and hesitations, regardless of the unconscious nature of the scientists'

materialism,

notwithstanding

yesterday's

fad

of

"physiological

idealism" or today's fad of "physical idealism," completely brushes aside all puppet systems and contrivances, and makes way again for the " m e t a physics" of naturo-historical materialism.

Lenin observes, however, that Haeckel "ridicules all idealistic philosophers, especially all contrivances of 'special' schools from the point of view of science, without admitting the possibility of any other theory of knowledge besides that of naturo-historical materialism. He ridicules the philosophers from the standpoint of a materialist, without being aware that he himself holds the viewpoint of a materialist!" In connection with Franz Mehring's judgment of the merits and shortcomings of Haeckel's work, Lenin pointed out that Haecklel was unable to tackle social problems because of the limitations of naturo-historical materialism. As he expressed it, the latter must be expanded and modified before it can develop into historical materialism and serve in the struggle for the liberation of mankind. Lenin's language is unfortunate when he states 10 that the Machians took "sensation" not as an image of the external world but as a special "element." The term "image" involves unnecessary difficulties. Something—an event in the natural world—is out there, and it acts as a stimulus to our sense organs. The sensation that results is conditioned from without and within (i.e., by the body itself). It is also interpreted, and assimilated to one's general experience; and there are social influences bearing upon the mode of interpretation. Thus Lenin's thesis may be safeguarded without suggesting a kind of "picture" theory which he does not intend, to judge by other statements. His objection to the Machian "element" is well put: It is "a sensation in general, which belongs to no one, psychology in general, spirit in general, volition in general"—and he adds that "to relapse into pitfalls like these is inevitable for those who do not recognize the materialist theory that the human mind reflects the objectively real world." One may note therewith that the terms "reflection" and "image" may allow for degrees of approximation in our experience of reality and for degrees of correctness, the ideal limit being strict or adequate correspondence. Even when Lenin uses the term "resemble," he cannot literally mean that a law is a picture of an actuality, or a copy of it; he must mean correspondence, with correct

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correspondence meaning that the law in question can be confirmed as true. Lenin's excellent summary, in his "Conclusion," shows that he has sustained his argument throughout the book. The numerous repetitions of his central thesis concerning the basic nature of the issue of materialism and idealism, and what he regards as the perfidy of the Machians and others in serving the cause of idealism, add to rather than detract from the effectiveness of the book. At no time does the presentation of the material lose sight of this central theme. The strong polemical language used is not at all shocking or surprising to the reader of the writings of Marx and Engels, for they had been just as severe in controversy. Lenin's sweeping denunciation of professional philosophers will be judged by many to go too far, but it must be borne in mind that he was not discussing those specialists in the field of philosophy who make a lifework of interpreting important philosophers of the past, or again, the formal logicians, who are usually as far removed from the controversies of social life as are the pure mathematicians. Even so, he would expect such specialists to take a stand on the basic issue of materialism and idealism; he would refuse them the safe and convenient luxury of "neutrality." Anyone presuming to have a philosophy cannot avoid committing himself on the issue involved, which leads to the heart of social problems, and in Lenin's view the failure to do so means supporting the "reactionary" interests of idealism. Is that always the case, without exception? It is easy for Lenin to show how philosophers who have started out with the ideal of "neutrality" have ended up by serving the status quo via the party of idealism. What could one say about a philosopher who defends the ideal of a descriptive program in philosophy? Either his description is carefully circumscribed by a limited subjective procedure, in which case it cannot have access to the whole of philosophical thought, or it is more broadly conceived, is served by all kinds of description, "pure" and "natural," and is added to by theory, in which case it is unavoidable that a stand be taken on the issue of materialism and idealism. In the former case, one does not have a complete philosophy; it is at best an auxiliary discipline, a specialty. A complete philosophy cannot be purely descriptive and cannot be restricted to an "immanent" realm. It must comprise the findings of sound reflective analysis as well as the integration of the scientific knowledge of the time in relation to the needs of mankind "in its struggle for liberation." Interpreted concretely: it must unequivocally

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and explicitly commit itself with respect to all the traditional issues of philosophy that are still effective in any sense, and also consider the individual and social questions of its own time, insofar as they require a thoroughly critical approach and judgment. Nowhere is Lenin more cogent in his argument than in the discussion of the partisan character of philosophy. There are—and have long been—those "lofty" spirits that pride themselves on being "above" the sordid, mistaken issues of history. They do not deal positively with the existing world, and eternalism, subjectivity, or the realm of essence provide a secure retreat under what appear to be the normal conditions of a changing and precarious social order. It is an ironical fact that specialized scholars who turned from natural facts to a timeless, ideal realm of essence were cruelly prodded out of their refuge by the Nazis. Among others, this applies to Husserl, whose later publications could not have been known to Lenin. Had Husserl lived much longer than 1938, he might well have ended his life in the gas chambers of a concentration camp. In accordance with his philosophical commitments, Husserl could only have professed political neutrality at all costs. Yet he was not really neutral. At one time in his later period he expressed longing for a return to the monarchy in Germany, when things were "better" as he put it; and the Social Democrats as well as the Communists in the Second Reich were completely alien to him, with Marxism stigmatized as dogmatic from his point of view. He did not challenge the class arrangement of the time, by which the worker was to get a "fair" wage but was to be contented with his place in society. In his actual social and political opinions he was certainly not neutral. Neither was he neutral in his philosophical thinking, for he did his utmost to instate idealism as a general philosophy, straining his arguments beyond the point allowed by sound logic and established scientific knowledge. In so doing he went beyond the strictly descriptive realm of phenomenology, and he endeavored to do more thoroughly—he would say "radically"—what Schuppe and others had tried to do in setting up an immanence philosophy (one of Lenin's targets). It would not be possible to defend Husserl against criticism such as Lenin might well have directed against him if Lenin had been alive and philosophically active a generation later. One could only "rise above" materialism and idealism if both of them were wrong. But if the basic thesis of the objective nondependence of existence upon experience, knowing, or any supernatural

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cause is correct, materialism cannot be brushed aside. It must simply be brought up-to-date at all times because of the growth and change in our knowledge of social and natural existence. Lenin's contempt for "middle parties" is understandable and justified, as directed against neutrality concerning the practical issues on which philosophers must take a stand. Realism is included among the scorned standpoints. In affirming the thesis of objective independence, realism goes along with materialism. What are the reasons for setting it up as a separate point of view, amounting to an alternative to materialism? The reasons appear soon enough when the total output and biographies of various exponents of realism are examined. Lenin shows no patience with the subtle arguments of realists and does not go into the points at issue between different types of realism. It would be a serious mistake to condemn all such scholars unqualifiedly, for technical, specialized philosophy is not necessarily bad philosophy, even though it does not reach far enough. In its best examples it may contribute in a valuable way to the cause of the scientific philosophy which Lenin, like Dietzgen, undertakes to defend. Thus, the later realistic critiques of idealism may effectively add to Lenin's case. The question as to why the newrealists or the critical realists did not endorse materialism cannot be answered simply for all representatives. In general, most academic philosophers in the Western world who acknowledge materialism do so in a selective, specialized sense. Individual philosophers among the realists may be consciously or unconsciously desirous of avoiding a socially difficult stigma. In some cases, the simple continuation of a master's teaching is sufficient explanation of their alignment. But the significant lines are clearly indicated by Lenin. There is constant religious pressure against philosophers who express views that are wholly in accord with materialism. This holds all the more for Marxist materialism, against which the dominant cultural forces of our social system are directed. It is difficult to imagine how any open-minded student or scholar could read Lenin's forthright and sincere Materialism and EmpirioCriticism11 "without experiencing a gain in mental health. Complete, uncompromising honesty characterizes it throughout. Such books are all too rare. Lenin has helped to secure the very important place in the history of philosophy which Marx and Engels merit, and he has himself made a valuable and lasting contribution to the living literature of philosophy. His book deserves the careful attention of all

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serious readers of philosophical literature. Its severe polemical character should not prevent the reader from recognizing its merit. That philosophical issues matter so much, and that they are judged to be of such deciding importance as to call forth the full force of Lenin's critical powers, should attract rather than repel the reader. It is evident that he saw clearly the connection between knowledge and action and that he understood the historical reasons for party alignments in the field of philosophy. In a world now abounding in subtle and devious intellectual alternatives, impeding clear understanding and concerted action toward solving the world's major problems, Lenin's thought remains an important direction-giving force. Philosophically, it represents a substantial contribution toward the realization of a truly objective program of reflective analysis for which there are really no unclarified or unjustified prior commitments. From the historical-materialistic perspective of this type of analysis, the subjectively based types of philosophy can be viewed in their actual role and historical setting.

On the Current Role of Materialism Pure phenomenology purports to be a descriptive philosophy of experience of a unique kind, satisfying exacting standards for rigor, methodological radicalism, and structural analysis. It has been seen how this attempt eventuates in a universal philosophy with its own peculiar presuppositions and some historically familiar speculative dogmas, thus departing from its announced radicalism. A materialistic philosophy of experience undertakes to combine description with the knowledge established with evidence by the sciences and general experience. That growing fund of knowledge has direct bearing upon the understanding of the cognitive enterprise. It is essential for protophilosophical purposes, in providing awareness of the unavoidable premises of philosophical thought, which must also at all times take account of the growth and changes of scientific knowledge. The social, natural, and philosophical sciences are relevant. There must also be an awareness of the findings of general experience and of nascent sciences. All of these sources of knowledge have consequences for philosophy, sufficient to be direction-giving for sound inquiry and to aid in warding off effete modes of thought. A materialistic program that neglects to consider seriously the actual

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nature of society and its history is unable to achieve a complete critical examination of its own point of view and method, and it characteristically removes itself from the burning concerns of mankind. The designations "general experience" and "nascent sciences" are intended to indicate places for much relevant knowledge. But more than that: there is an indispensable place for the lessons learned from historical materialism, embracing the whole of human experience, with implications bearing upon all forms of knowledge. Since the organized and vested prejudices of the social system are poised against a mode of analysis whose radicalism goes far beyond the subjectively based methodical radicalism of pure phenomenology, it is all the more necessary to emphasize the significance of the perspective of materialism. In brief, the epoche of pure phenomenology is limited and abstractive, whereas the range of questioning materialistic philosophy is capable of being complete and really probing to the full evidences in experience bearing on the solution of human problems. The cherished "self-understanding" of the philosopher is incapable of realization in truth if the knowledge made possible by sociohistorical analysis is neglected, as frequently occurs. The vaunted cogito is an abstraction, with no real effects or accomplishments, but it is instituted by actual thinking beings in a more or less definite social setting. Only in that sense can it be said to be a function of an organic being and of the society to which it is indebted for activating and carrying through the processes of experience from which it is abstracted. The cogito is a variable, and its indebtedness to the objective material world is such that a knowledge of that world is required for the explanation of reflective experience. The cogito of the seventeenth century is clearly not the same as the cogito of the nineteenth or twentieth century. Although there are structural similarities, there are additional structures due to the historical development of society and the changes in experience and knowledge in the two periods. Thus, in addition to the advances in science and industry, there is an entire dimension of modes of deception to be noted in the more recent period, in contradistinction to the relatively simpler form of society in the earlier period. Deception, whether conscious or at least partially unconscious, has developed enormously. It should be borne in mind that the cogito must always have a sociohistorical home and must be located spatially and temporally. If the Greek cogito of the fourth century B.C. were in question, the modes of deception would be still

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simpler and more obvious, for in addition to the use of force, an economy based upon slave labor is unashamed in its self-justification (the views of Plato and Aristotle may be recalled in this connection). In the feudal period the defense of the existing class structure depended upon force, indoctrination, and otherworldly hopes. With the increasing secularization of education in the modern period, the modes of deception were added to by supporters and glorifiers of the new economic order. So long as freedom and equality did not apply concretely to all members of society, and so long as there was frustration for an entire class of human beings, the formulation of seemingly noble ideals amounted to a mode of deception. Increasing in subtlety and complexity in the modern period, one sees how hollow the slogans employed by revolutionary movements may turn out to be. Thus the slogan of liberty, equality, and fraternity was useful for enlisting more general support in the French Revolution, a slogan mistakenly construed as applying to all social classes. The twentieth century abounds in cases of the use of unfounded slogans and moral claims as modes of concealing ruthless competitive practices leading to wars. The atmosphere for World War I was prepared and sustained not only by economic and military measures but also by all possible cultural means, resulting in one of the bloodiest conflicts of history.12 The thinking was now increasingly carried on by trained secular personnel, including writers, teachers, and political leaders, to a large extent replacing the clergy, who were so active in molding minds in the feudal period. The church itself came to be a great secular power by the end of the Middle Ages. Its functions for the defense of the status quo were increasingly taken over by others in the modern period in a long process of criticism and underlying economic change. The cogito of Descartes and his reflections on method signified a declaration of emancipation from the authoritarianism restricting and interfering with scientific progress toward the understanding and control of the natural world. At the same time, his dualism effected a compromise with ecclesiastical authoritarianism, for the realm of the mind as he conceived it was validated by his concessions to theology, while leaving the realm of matter to scientific investigation. It is desirable to see the actual role played by Descartes, to save many neophytes and mature thinkers from the unprofitable task of destroying a dualistic arrangement without considering its historical significance. Descartes was anything but a Columbus who discovered a new world without realizing the nature of his discovery, as observed by Husserl, who

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paid tribute to Descartes while not hesitating to purify him of all commitments to the realm of matter. Far from extruding real history, the cogito is itself a changing product of a changing historical process. It is also true that active thinking beings reacting to problems of the existing social system are effective agents in causing changes, some of them epoch-making or revolutionary. Ideas and inventions are prime contributing causes of progress in the greater satisfaction of human needs. Scientists and philosophers are to be found among the apologists for vested interests, but also among those challenging them. Thus the cogito is not to be viewed as a self-contained, finished product, somehow available to human beings who are its passive recipients. There are masses of frustrated and exploited people, quiescent and acquiescent much of the time, just as there are members of the privileged classes who are primarily concerned with preserving the prevalent social order. To ignore this sociohistorical perspective, with its value for understanding real history and the diversified role of thought in actual fact, is to operate with a baseless and ultimately a sterile cogito. Let us now look concretely at the transformation of the epoche and the cogito in a materialistic setting. For present purposes, it is pertinent to have in mind the twentieth century, with World War I and the increased development of imperialism, a great depression in the 1930s eventuating in World War II and the "boom and bust" periods following it, restricted wars, a current economic depression in a large part of the world, and international tensions conspicuously caused by the conflict between socialistic or communistic and capitalistic countries. A set of brief formulations will enable us to summarize pointedly the nature of the broader, more radical, and far more relevant methodological approach indicated throughout the present volume. 1. Husserl presented his conception of "the principle of all principles" in his Ideas,13 to the effect that "seeing in general as primordial dater consciousness of any kind whatsoever is the ultimate source of justification for all rational statements." The principle of all principles in societies with class exploitation is: Do not abolish the prevailing class structure. It may be recalled that in the recent past the poor have been commended by scholars and representatives of religious interests to the beneficent care of the rich, with the thought that the poor were entitled to live in "frugal comfort."14 Most philosophers dealing with human values either satisfy their demands for social justice and happiness without considering the question of their realization, or they

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embark on a subtly contrived alternative to any fundamental disturbance of the existing class structure. The time is more than ripe for a frank recognition of the facts and for all that can be contributed in all fields of activity toward the social transformation that is the necessary condition for human equality and happiness. 2. The seemingly profound critique of objectivity and objective knowledge in the name of subjectivism has nothing to offer apart from an abstract domain of idealized entities which can only be added to by further idealized entities, in what appear to be acute analyses but are really a barren substitute for the problems of human life. In the beginning—and later—were events; man is a late emergent in the evolutionary process, and philosophical thinkers a relatively recent sociohistorical product. That indicates the locus of the diverse lines of thought projected by such thinkers, who unavoidably operate on the basis of their social systems. 3. The search for an alternative to the true explanation and equalitarian solution of social problems is ubiquitous in a society characterized by class distinctions and predominantly motivated by a desire for profit. In an industrial system, one person, or one class, can amass more of the wealth of society by appropriation of the fruits of labor of other persons or another class. That is to consider profit in its role in the basic industrial process, and without specifying the varieties of successful gambling, theft, fraud, the use of force, or diverse advantages derived from scarcity, whether of materials or talent and skill. For the true explanation of the nature of social relations, the understanding of the origin of profit in surplus value (on which no light can be shed by a subjective method of origin-analysis going back to rudimentary experiences!), the nature and role of money and capital, and the relations of capital and labor is a first condition to be met. The actual role of scholars, scientists, teachers, writers, the press, and other vehicles of communication must also be understood, for it has direct bearing upon the alignments and commitments of most philosophers, whether they are fully aware of it or not. 4. There is normally a diversity of possible approaches and theories to be considered in scientific thought and general experience, in numerous areas of inquiry. In the case of social problems it is especially important to ascertain whether alternatives are prompted by special interests. That type of motivation has its far-flung effects in social and philosophical thought, which can be shown by a study of representative cases and an abundant literature—among others,

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emphatically brought to widespread attention by Lenin's critique of examples of science-philosophical reasoning. The evolutionists, including "Social Darwinists" (whom the present writer prefers to call "pseudo-evolutionists") and numerous writers discussing the problem of capital and labor in America, for example, offer outspoken evidence of the influence of private interests upon purportedly objective thought. Of particular interest is the social significance of the various types of Marxist revisionism, which can be seen to be responses to motives of at least partial status quo preservation, frequently with political manifestations. 5. The descriptive-analytical interest in structures in experience has its justification as a stage in inquiry, but it must be subordinated to a more general methodology if the conditions as well as nature of experience are to be recognized in their full extension and complexity. Distinctions noted in phenomenological analysis deal with rudimentary and ideal phases of experience, and that is also true of much language-philosophical analysis, with distinctions based upon the nature of experience and language. In such cases it is always pertinent to remind oneself that it is human experience and human language that are in question, so that they are not to be understood as detached finalities. Their nature and function can be fully understood only by viewing them in the light of their evolutionary and sociohistorical development and in a materialistic setting. The complete study of the actual uses of language comprises all phases of experience, with special attention devoted to its uses in the forms of reasoning, persuasion, and deception occurring historically and in contemporary society. Structural findings can be increased without limit therewith, and their potential usefulness toward the satisfactory solution of human problems enhanced. The gap between abstract analysis and concrete reality is bridged by focusing attention upon relational events of current practical importance, especially events that condition human well-being and survival. Actual modes of reasoning, persuasion, and deception are connecting links between social realities and abstract structures, and the list of analyzed structures can be added to greatly by attention to existing human practices and problems. "Regressive" analyses, proceeding on the ground of the natural-social world from examples of language and argument employed to mold minds and influence conduct, may be carried through in cooperation with abstractive "progressive" analyses, beginning with the nature of experience, language, and logic. Both types of analysis supplement

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and add to one another, with new developments in experience and the world motivating further inquiry concerning relations and structures. 6. The dominant group in a social system with class distinctions is in a strong position to impress its will and policies upon all others. The intellectual atmosphere is saturated by the widespread use of linguistic and logical devices calculated to preserve the existing social order. Some examples of arguments employed by large corporations are pertinent. In the case of spokesmen for leading corporations in the field of energy production, it is not difficult to account for their commitments and patterns of behavior. Their presuppositions are supplied by the development of large-scale industry and capitalism. They never lose sight of the actual and potential profitability of their operations, and they are at all times concerned with warding off obstacles to that profitability. The bare structural bones uncovered by an ego-analysis or by the analysis of "I-thou" relations at best yield a very narrow and threadbare portrayal of the nature of man and human relations, not enough to begin to be of practical interest or to have a relevant bearing on human problems. The understanding of greed in general requires studies of greed in particular, based upon actual occurrences. The utterances emanating from the offices of well-known corporations are representative. Thus profits are defended by the chief officer of the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, who argues that "the notion of vast accumulations of profits waiting somewhere to be tapped is a dangerous fiction which conceals the fact that one of our most pressing needs is for greater profitability—to help finance the economic expansion on which higher productivity, higher employment, and higher tax revenues all depend."15 The standpoint involved, with its implicit premises and conclusion, can be understood objectively when viewed "in the third person" rather than "in the first person," so far as a self-interested, profit-seeking class is concerned. That also applies to scholars sharing and safeguarding the same premises for their reasoning, which means the status quo, but also to philosophers purporting to question everything "in the first person" without considering the sociohistorical framework. How far the defense of a subjective orientation has gone is shown by the attack on the "objectivity" of scientific knowledge. Such an attack would also sweep away any exposures of the difficulties and corrupting influences obstructing the achievement of objectively true knowledge

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of human practices in a social system committed to class exploitation, which would itself be an outstanding theme of objective knowledge. Thus a subjective attack on objectivity can signify an avoidance of the understanding of social relations, despite all of its favored abstract analyses and structural findings. There is always a safe place for such a philosophical approach in a social system committed to the preservation of its inequalities and special privileges. That a corporation spokesman not only opts for profits but even for ever greater profits is understandable, and no alert reader will be likely to miss the premises of his reasoning, calling for more jobs and employed workers— as though a blessing were being conferred on the propertyless workers by the altruistic profitseekers. That the workers in question are the real "origins" of further profits can be seen objectively "in the third person" by those who engage in objective, materialistic questioning requiring that one probe into the nature of social relations as they really are, with due regard to their historical origins. Further illustrations can be readily cited. The general pattern of reasoning is always the same, with some variations in modes of concealment or distraction; and they are usually expressed in moral defenses of privileges defended by means of laws which are actually promoted by dominant private interests. The close relationship between the state and corporate interests may be illustrated by the remarks of Senator William Proxmire in an address to Congress: We should appreciate the fact that profits are what drive this great economy. They provide the incentive for investment that is essential for acquiring the capital that in turn provides the technology that enables our country to grow more productive and efficient and support a higher standard of living. . . . If profits are too low, our economy cannot engender the capital essential for good jobs and an abundance of what we need for the good life.16

It is clear therewith that no fundamentally different type of socioeconomic organization would be likely to be envisaged or tolerated. With the main interests of the large corporations safeguarded through legal enactments, the corporate spokesmen, objecting to efforts toward "greater governmental intervention" by way of "higher taxes and other forms of profit control," declare that it reduces "the industry's capability."17 They are concerned with restricting the amount of governmental "interference" in what they appeal to as "free enterprise," a eulogistic designation purportedly referring to the profit

From the Perspective of Materialism

237

system with maximal freedom of competition. The warning against the danger of a "retreat from economic freedom" was sounded by another corporate spokesman, 18 who complained that "today, despite the demonstrated merits of the free enterprise system, government intervention is being substituted with accelerating frequency for the free choice of individuals in the marketplace" and referred to "the proliferation of government regulation," warning against "radical proposals" with respect to further regulation of industry in America.19 The motive of achieving greater freedom of operations led the Continental Oil Co. to argue20 that "one of the basic liberties for which the colonies fought was the freedom of enterprise—the freedom to develop without the economic constraints imposed by England" and that "in the two hundred years of America's growth, freedom of enterprise has been tightly interwoven with our other basic freedoms," resulting in "an unparalleled living standard" for our people. The existing economic system is therewith declared to be the most effective and efficient system ever devised. This note is also sounded by a spokesman for a large utility,21 who referred to "excessively harsh and unwarranted environmental standards." Critical readers with the requisite knowledge and logical equipment will not fail to examine such declarations and to recognize them as assumptive and unwarranted. Thus, the "free choice of individuals in the marketplace" has long been exposed as a misleading claim, for people with nothing to sell but their capacity to work do not have a free choice if they wish to maintain themselves and their families, under socioeconomic conditions beyond their present control, whereas employers as a class are in a position to secure the desired labor force on terms suitable for their goal of profitability. The term "radical" in "radical proposals" may be understood in that context as a condemnatory epithet, with the tacit assumption that it is injurious to our society to make the changes involved. If the talk of "an unparalleled living standard" for our people suggests that all the people share equally in its achievement, that is demonstrably false in fact. Furthermore, it is not enough to speak of "our basic freedoms" without taking account of all the relevant facts that bear upon the unequal realization of those "freedoms." How little regard profitseekers can have for the basic values of human life is shown by the protest against the "excessive" imposition of environmental standards. It is understandable that they are unwilling to think in terms of a radically different form of society, committed in fact to the

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The Search for an Alternative

maximum fulfillment of the needs and desires of all mankind. Once again it may be asked whether the subjective program of questioning everything even touches upon such realities. The answer is clearly in the negative. The broader phenomenological literature, basic concepts referring to human beings and social relations, remain largely on an abstract level, along with the idealities involved in structural analysis. Philosophical inquiry must be brought down to earth (meaning the natural-social world) and should never lose sight of that world if it is to make a worthy contribution to thought and action for the purposes of attaining a better world.

NOTES

Foreword 1. Μ. Farber, Naturalism and Subjectivism (Springfield, 111.: C. C. Thomas, 1959); 2d ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1967). 2. M. Färber, Phenomenology as a Method and as a Philosophical Discipline (Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Buffalo Publications in Philosophy, 1928). 3. M. Färber, Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1940); 2d ed. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968). 4. E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960). 5. M. Färber, Foundation of Phenomenology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1943); 2d ed. (New York: Paine-Whitman, 1962); 3d ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1967). 6. E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaßen und die transcendentale Phänomenologie (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954); Eng. trans, by D. Carr (Evanston, III.: Northwestern University Press, 1970). 7. R. W. Sellars, V. J. McGill, and M. Färber, Philosophy for the Future: The Quest of Modern Materialism (New York: Macmillan Co., 1949). 8. V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (New York: International Publishers, 1927).

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Notes

Chapter 1: Subjectivism, Phenomenology, Marxism, and the Role or Alternatives 1. Cf. E. S. Brightman, " T h e Definition of Idealism," Journal of Philosophy 30 (1933): 429ff.; and R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912). 2. Cf. J. Royce, The World and the Individual, 2d ser. Nature, Man, and the Moral Order (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), p. 289. 3. Cf. M. Färber, Naturalism and Subjectivism, 2d ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1968). Not only does this problem arise in various forms in the logical-analytical literature, but there is also evidence of unclearness in the reference to existence in the literature of naturalism and materialism, including Marxist revisionism. 4. In his important book Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (New York: International Publishers, 1927), V. I. Lenin asks, "Did nature exist prior to man?" and he rigorously defends what Marx and Engels had called a "premise" of their thought in The German Ideology (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1965). Thus they wrote (p. 42): "The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary . . . but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. . . . The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living, human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. Of course, we cannot here go into the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds himself—geological . . . and so o n . " Lenin wrote (ibid., p. 52): "Natural science positively asserts that the earth once existed in a state in which no man or any other living creature existed or could have existed. Inasmuch as organic matter is a later appearance, a result of a long evolution, it follows that there could have been no perceiving matter . . . no self which is 'inseparably' connected with the environment. . . . Hence, matter is primary, and mind, consciousness, sensation are products of a very high development. Such is the materialist theory of knowledge, which natural science instinctively holds." 5. E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954); Eng. trans, by D. Carr (Evanston, III.: Northwestern University Press, 1970). 6. As seen, e.g., in ibid. (Eng. trans.), sec. 35, pp. 135-137. 7. See, e.g., Marx and Engels, German Ideology. 8. Cf. A. Cornu, Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1 9 5 4 1971). 9. Cf. L. Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christenthums (Leipzig: O. Wigand, 1841), and Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft (Zurich: Verlag der literarische Komptoirs, 1843); also F. Jodl, Ludwig Feuerbach (Stuttgart: Fr. Frommans Verlag, 1921), pp. 22f.

Notes

241

10. The term "alternative" would be misleading, if it were supposed that there is an equally sound alternative to a correct analysis of a social system, or of human experience. Those who seek an alternative to such correct analyses shrink from accepting their consequences, and more congenial views are meant to replace them. That there may be defensible alternatives in a secondary sense, not involving important change, is illustrated in formal thought. On the other hand, the alternatives to revolutionary views are proposed in response to a variety of individual or socially entrenched interests. 11. Karl Marx, Capital, ed. F. Engels, trans. S. Moore and E. Aveling (London: William Glaisher, 1912).

Chapter 2: The Perspective of Phenomenology 1. I. Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, ed. P. Carus (Evanston, 111.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1912), p. 63. 2. E. Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. D. Carr (Evanston, III.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 170f. 3. E. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, ed. L. Landgrebe (Prague: Academia Verlag, 1939); Eng. trans, by J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks under the title Experience and judgment (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1973). 4. E. Husserl, Ideen (Halle: Verlag von Max Niemeyer, 1913); Eng. trans, by B. Gibson (New York: Macmillan Co., 1931). 5. Cf. M. Färber, Naturalism and Subjectivism (Springfield, 111.: C. C. Thomas, 1959); 2d ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1965), pp. 131ff., 256f. 6. E. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil. 7. Cf. Μ. Farber, Phenomenology and Existence (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), chap. 6. 8. Cf. E. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, p. 312. 9. Cf. Μ. Farber, Naturalism and Subjectivism, pp. 353f. 10. Cf. M. Färber, Basic Issues of Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), chaps. 4 and 6.

Chapter 3: The Retirement to Inner Experience 1. Thus Dilthey wrote: "History must be asked what philosophy is. It shows the change in the object, the differences in method; only the function of philosophy in human society and its culture is preserved in this change."

242

2.

3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Notes Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey's Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 7 (Leipzig, 1931), pp. 204ff. It should be noted, however, that a concrete account of philosophy in relation to changing economic and social conditions is required for the explanation of its diversified historical role. Carnap's judgment that most philosophy is poetry would not have been subscribed to by Schopenhauer, who observed that works of poetry can coexist peacefully like lambs, whereas philosophical works are born wild animals. Cf. Schopenhauer, Werke, vol. 6, "Über Philosophie und ihre Methode" (Leipzig, 1887), p. 5. Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) taught in the universities of Halle, Göttingen, and Freiburg. E. Husserl, in Logos 1, (1910-1911). See, e.g., his Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969), as well as his later volume The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. D. Carr (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1970). E. Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), vol. 2, sec. 1. E. Husserl's preface to his Ideas, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Macmillan Co., 1931). Ibid., sec. 1. E. Husserl, "Phänomenologie und Anthropologie," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2 (September 1941). E. Husserl, Ideas, sec. 3, chap. 3. Ibid., p. 225. Ibid., p. 13. Ibid., p. 234. E. Husserl, Experience and Judgment, trans. J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1973). To illustrate Husserl's usage, consider the following passages from Erfahrung und Urteil (Prague: Academia Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1939), pp. 288, 306f. (trans. J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973): "Every closed predicative judgment preconstitutes in itself a new objectivity, a state of affairs (Sachverhalt). This is 'what is judged' . . . it is itself an object and with respect to its genesis it is a logical object or an object of the understanding." "Let us proceed to the individual space-objectivities, natural objectivities, which are constituted out of . . . sense objects through apperception. They are constituted mediately through apperception out of sense data. The sense data do not belong in the constituted space-world, nor do their determinations of content or of time. But all these determinations serve as apperceptive representatives. The apperceptions are intuitions and enter into connection with one another; they form the unity of an intuition, of an experience of nature. The 'matter' of the space-thing is constituted thereby as

Notes

243

an apperceptive (constitutive) unity of the sensory temporality (as a representative). If therefore objects are constituted sensuously, in original constitution, although mediately, namely in the manner of 'physical' spatial objects, in such a way that immediate sensory objects serve with the immediately constitutive immanent time pertaining to them as apperceptive representatives for apperceived objects of a higher level, then there accrues to the latter, through apperceptive representation of an immanent time, an 'objective,' apperceived time." 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

Ibid., pt. 1. Ibid., pp. 410ff. Ibid., p. 8. E. Husserl, Ideas, pp. 21f. Ibid., p. 14. Article on phenomenology in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th ed. Cf. Eduard Spranger, "Der Sinn der Voraussetzungslosigkeit in den Geisteswissenschaften," in Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin 1929), pp. 10ff. 23. E. Husserl, "Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie," Revue internationale de Philosophie 1 (January 1939). See also Dorion Cairns' review of this study in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1 (September 1940), and Fritz Kaufmann's discussion of phenomenology and history, in Philosophy and Phenomenology Research 2 (December 1941).

Chapter 4: The Goal of a Complete Philosophy of Experience 1. Arthur Koestler, The Ghost in the Machine (New York: Macmillan Co., 1968), pp. xiff. 2. E. Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. D. Carr (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1970). 3. Lenin denied that there can be " a n 'impartial' social science in a society based on class struggle." He maintained that "in one way or another, all official and liberal science defends wage-slavery. . . . To expect science to be impartial in a wage-slave society is as silly and naive as to expect impartiality from manufacturers on the question whether workers' wages should be increased by decreasing the profits of capital." Cf. V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, vol. 11, The Theoretical Principles of Marxism (New York: International Publishers, 1935-1938), p. 3.

Chapter 5: Values and the Scope of Scientific Inquiry 1. O n the question of the transformation of normative into theoretical propositions, cf. M. Färber, The Foundation of Phenomenology, 3d ed. (Albany:

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Notes

State University of New York Press, 1967), pp. 157ff. 2. Cf. M. Farber, Basic Issues of Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

Chapter 6: For a Materialistic Philosophy of Experience 1. E. Husserl, First Philosophy (Erste Philosophie). 2. Κ. Marx, Capital, trans. S. Moore and E. Aveling, ed. F. Engels (London: William Glaisher, 1912), p. 788; Das Kapital, 8th ed. (Hamburg: Otto Meissners Verlag, 1919), p. 728. 3. The words of George Sand, quoted by Marx at the close of his Poverty of Philosophy, trans. H. Queich (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1920), pp. 190f. 4. K. Marx, Capital, p. xiv.

Chapter 7: The Philosophic Impact of the Facts Themselves 1. Cf. M. Färber, Naturalism and Subjectivism, 2d ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1968), pp. 297ff. 2. O. Liebmann, Kant und die Epigonen (1865, 1956). 3. Cf. M. Färber, Phenomenology and Existence (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 113ff. 4. Cf. M. Färber, "Humanistic Ethics and the Conflict of Interests," in P. Kurtz, ed., Moral Problems in Contemporary Society (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 256ff. 5. Lewis H. Morgan, Ancient Society (1877; reprint, Cleveland: World Book Co., 1963), p. 561. Frederick Engels called attention to the importance of Morgan's contributions in his The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State. 6. When the present writer spoke of the "cooperation of methods" in his Foundation of Phenomenology and later writings (cf. Naturalism and Subjectivism, for example, where it is discussed in connection with the idea of methodological pluralism), he had this thought in mind. There was no intention to effect a "compromise" by using the phrase "cooperation of methods." Originally, it was a warning to pure phenomenologists against overextension of their method, and it meant no more than the recognition of a plurality of procedures to solve diverse problems, including methodogenic problems. 7. Cf. M. Färber, Basic Issues of Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 153ff.

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245

8. Μ. Farber, Foundation of Phenomenology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943); 2d ed. (New York: Paine Whitman, 1962); 3d ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1968). 9. E. Husserl, Analysen zur passiven Synthesis (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966). 10. II Verri, no. 32 (Bologna, March 1970).

Chapter 8: The Historical Outcome of Subjectivism 1. Ε. Winter, Der Bolzanoprozess: Dokumente zur Geschichte der Prager Karlsuniversität im Vormarz (Brünn, München, Wien, 1944); E. Winter, Der Böhmische Vormärz in Briefen B. Bolzanos an F. Prihonsky (Berlin, 1956). 2. Bolzano-Brevier: Sozialethische Betrachtungen aus dem Vormarz, selected and ed. E. Winter (Wien, 1947). 3. Bernard Bolzano's Grundlegung der Logik, selections from the first two books of the Wissenschaftslehre, with an introduction by F. Kambartel (Hamburg, 1963); and Bolzano's Theory of Science, ed. and trans. R. George (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). 4. F. Brentano, Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie, ed. Franziska MayerHildebrand (Bern, 1963). 5. H. Bergmann, "Brentano on the History of Greek Philosophy," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (1965): 9 4 - 9 9 . 6. "Briefe Franz Brentanos an Hugo Bergmann," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 7 (1946): 8 3 - 1 5 8 . 7. Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, ed. R. M. Chisholm (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1960). 8. G. Bergmann, Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967). 9. E. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960); and The Paris Lectures, trans. P. Koestenbaum (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964). 10. M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 1962). 1 1 . J . Wild, Existence and the World of Freedom (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1963). 12. E. Paci, Funzione delle Scienze e Significato dell 'Uomo (Milano, 1963); Eng. trans. P. Piccone and J. E. Hansen, The Function of Science and the Meaning of Man (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972). 13. A. Gurwitsch, "The Last Work of Edmund Husserl," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 16 (1955-1956): 3 8 0 - 3 9 9 , and 17 (1956-1957): 370-398. 14. A. Schutz and T. Luckman, The Structures of the Life-World, trans. R. M. Zaner and Η. T. Engelhardt, Jr. (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University

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Notes

Press, 1973). 15. Μ. Farber, Phenomenology and Existence and Naturalism and Subjectivism. 16. E. Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, trans. J. S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964). 17. W. A. Luijpen, Phenomenology and Natural Law (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1967); and Phenomenology and Humanism: A Primer in Existential Phenomenology (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1966). 18. M. Färber, Foundation of Phenomenology, 3d ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1967). 19. H. Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960). 20. M. Färber, "The Phenomenological Tendency," Journal of Philosophy 59 (1962): 4 2 9 - 4 3 9 . 21. M. Färber, The Aims of Phenomenology (New York: Harper & Row, 1966). 22. J. Wild, Existence and the World of Freedom (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1963), p. 33. 23. L. Landgrebe, " T h e World as a Phenomenological Problem," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1 (1940): 3 8 - 5 8 . 24. R. Ingarden, Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt (Tübingen, 1964-1965); Eng. trans, of part 1, Time and Modes of Being, by H. Michejda (Springfield, 111.: C. C. Thomas, 1964); also Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst (Tübingen, 1962). 25. A. Gurwitsch, " T h e Problem of Existence in Constitutive Phenomenology," Journal of Philosophy 58 (1961): 625-632. 26. Q. Lauer, "Questioning the Phenomenologists," Journal of Philosophy 58 (1961): 6 3 3 - 6 4 0 . 27. M. Färber, Phenomenology and Existence and Naturalism and Subjectivism. 28. Cf. Lauer, "Questioning the Phenomenologists." 29. E. Fink, "L'analyse intentionnelle et le probleme de la pensee speculative," in Problemes actuels de la Phenomenologie, ed. H. L. Van Breda (Brussels: Desclee de Brouwer, 1951). 30. Ibid. 31. A. Schutz, Collected Papers, 3 vols. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962-1967); also The Phenomenology of the Social World, trans. G. Walsh and F. Lehnert (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1967); and Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, ed. R. M. Zaner (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). 32. P. Naville, Les Conditions de la Liberte (Paris, 1947). 33. Β. E. Bykhovskii, " T h e Deobjectification of Philosophy," Voprosy Filosofii, 1956, pp. 142-151. 34. M. Merleau-Ponty, Sense and Non-Sense, trans. H. L. Dreyfus and P. A. Dreyfus (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1964); also Adventures of the Dialectic, trans. Joseph Bien (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

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35. Tran-Duc-Thao, Phenomenologie et Materialisme Dialectique (Paris, 1951). 36. Recent publications include "Phenomenological Marxism" in the journal Telos, ed. Paul Piccone; and Joseph J. Kockelmans' "Phenomenology and Marxism" in Marxism, Revolution, and Peace, Proceedings of the Society for the Philosophical Study of Marxism, vol. 2 (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1975). 37. J.-P. Sartre, Critique de la Raison Dialectique (Paris, 1960). 38. F. N. Fedoseyev has discussed the much abused terms "subjectivism" and "objectivism" in an interesting article appearing in Marxist Dialectics Today, published by Social Sciences Today Editorial Board, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1974, pp. 27-47. While construing the term "objectivism" as referring to a mechanical materialism, he nevertheless uses the term "objective" in characterizing a true account of the world. This should be noted by writers using stereotyped catchwords as pejorative or eulogistic expressions, such as pluralism, monism, naturalism, materialism, and subjectivism, without regard to their various meanings. 39. Cf. M. Färber, Foundation of Phenomenology, 3d ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1967); Naturalism and Subjectivism; and Basic Issues of Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), esp. chap. 6, for a pertinent analysis of unity and diversity. 40. E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954); trans. David Carr (Evanston, III.: Northwestern University Press, 1970). 41. W. E. Hocking, Types of Philosophy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929).

Chapter 9: From the Perspective of Materialism 1. Philosophy for the Future: The Quest of Modern Materialism, a cooperative volume by R. W. Sellers, V. J. McGill, and M. Färber (New York: Macmillan Co., 1949), presents a clear statement of the nature of materialism as a critical science-oriented point of view, with a hopeful attitude toward human values and progress. To be sure, every science-oriented philosophy is dated to some extent and is unavoidably selective, emphasizing physical, organic, or sociocultural facts and problems, in keeping with the theme for inquiry or the special competence of the writers. The scope of a materialistic philosophy has already been indicated in the present volume, with the thesis that all sound descriptive findings in the analysis of experience may be incorporated within its domain and in its terms, as natural and sociocultural events. Structures in experience and cognitive devices must be manifested as natural-social events if they are

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to be regarded as real. 2. Published in the July-August 1947 issue of Politics, trans. R. Manheim; also included in J.-P. Sartre, Literary and Philosophical Essays, trans. A. Michelson (London: Rider & Co., 1955), pp. 185ff. 3. The conclusion in full is as follows: Materialism . . . "lays down the inalienable rights of reason with one hand and takes them away with the other. It destroys positivism with a dogmatic rationalism. It destroys both of them with the metaphysical affirmation that man is a material object, and it destroys this affirmation by the radical negation of all metaphysics. It sets science against metaphysics and, unknowingly, a metaphysics against science. All that remains is ruins. Therefore, can I be a materialist?" 4. V. I. Lenin, "The Attitude of the Workers' Party Towards Religion," in Selected works, vol. 11, The Theoretical Principles of Marxism (New York: International Publishers), pp. 663-674. He adds that Marxism, as materialism, explains the source of faith and religion among the masses materialistically and that "the roots of religion in modern capitalist countries are mainly social." The deepest root, he asserts, is the social oppression of the workers and their apparently complete helplessness in face of the blind forces of capitalism so that "no educational book can eradicate religion from the minds of the masses, who are crushed by the blinding toil of capitalism, until the masses themselves learn to fight this root of religion, the rule of capital in all its forms." 5. In "What the 'Friends of the People' Are," ibid. pp. 413-609. 6. Ibid., p. 446. 7. Ibid., pp. 623ff. 8. Collected Works of V. 1. Lenin, vol. 13, trans. David Kvitko with Sidney Hook (New York: International Publishers, 1927), p. 298. 9. Ibid., pp. 304ff. 10. Ibid., pp. 299ff. 11. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (New York: International Publishers, 1927). 12. See also Karl Marx's The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, trans. Daniel DeLeon (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1914), pp. 22f., on the use of the slogan "Property, Family, Religion, Order." 13. E. Husserl, Ideas, trans. B. Gibson (New York: Macmillan Co., 1931). See sees. 19 and 24. 14. A retiring White House press secretary who served under Presidents Nixon and Ford, w h e n participating in the television program "Face the Nation" on August 10, 1975, told of Mr. Ford's feeling of "compassion" for the unemployed, assuring listeners that he would do all that could be done to help them—obviously meaning within the present socioeconomic structure and without disturbing the present economic relations. 15. John E. Swearingen, in Span (an Amoco publication) 9, no. 4 (1971). The

Notes

16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

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same writer also states that "the public vastly overestimates the size of corporate profits." But he is no doubt right in adding that people "display little conception of how they are actually used," for that would require detailed knowledge of the huge salaries of officers and other expenditures of the corporation. As for the percent of profit a manufacturer makes on a dollar of sales, "the median guess is five times the actual amount, which averages about 5 percent after taxes." Besides raising the question of the nature of the balance sheet used, the reader will be sure to add: after noting the salaries and fringe benefits of what is called management, and the cost of contributing in various ways toward the future interests of the corporation and toward the perpetuation of the profit system. Quoted in "Management's View: Petroleum Industry Profits," The Orange Disc (Gulf Companies, Pittsburgh, Pa.) 21 no. 10 (March-April 1975): 30f. Arthur Okun, a former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, expresses a similar view in testimony before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, recommending "a public policy that permits—even promotes—profitability," adding that "domestic capability should be one of the most profitable areas in which to invest capital, develop technology, and commit human talent for the decade ahead." The Orange Disc draws the desired conclusion that "there is a chain reaction from profits through capital expenditures which in turn provide more jobs and a higher standard of living. Without profits, the reaction stops." As stated in the "Report of Exxon Corporation's Annual Meeting" in Exxon News, June 1975, p. 3. Published in the Texaco, Inc., "Report of the 1975 Annual Meeting," May 1975. According to the Mobil Oil Co., Congress "has taken punitive action against the oil industry and in the process has militated against the creation of new domestic jobs in that industry." In a special bicentennial issue of Time magazine, 1975. American Electric Power Co., Report on the Annual Meeting, June 1975.