The Routledge International Handbook of Universities, Security and Intelligence Studies [1 ed.] 1138572411, 9781138572416

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THE ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF UNIVERSITIES, SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE STUDIES

In an era of intensified international terror, universities have been increasingly drawn into an arena of locating, monitoring and preventing such threats, forcing them into often covert relationships with the security and intelligence agencies. With case studies from across the world, the Routledge International Handbook of Universities, Security and Intelligence Studies provides a comparative, in-depth analysis of the historical and contemporary relationships between global universities, national security and intelligence agencies. Written by leading international experts and from multidisciplinary perspectives, the Routledge International Handbook of Universities, Security and Intelligence Studies provides theoretical, methodological and empirical definition to academic, scholarly and research enquiry at the interface of higher education, security and intelligence studies. Divided into eight sections, the Handbook explores themes such as: • • • • • • • •

the intellectual frame for our understanding of the university-security-intelligence network; historical, contemporary and future-looking interactions from across the globe; accounts of individuals who represent the broader landscape between universities and the security and intelligence agencies; the reciprocal interplay of personnel from universities to the security and intelligence agencies and vice versa; the practical goals of scholarship, research and teaching of security and intelligence both from within universities and the agencies themselves; terrorism research as an important dimension of security and intelligence within and beyond universities; the implication of security and intelligence in diplomacy, journalism and as an element of public policy; the extent to which security and intelligence practice, research and study far exceed the traditional remit of commonly held notions of security and intelligence.

Bringing together a unique blend of leading academic and practitioner authorities on security and i­ntelligence, the Routledge International Handbook of Universities, Security and Intelligence Studies is an essential and authoritative guide for researchers and policymakers looking to understand the relationship between universities, the security services and the intelligence community. Liam Francis Gearon is Senior Research Fellow at Harris Manchester College, and Associate ­Professor at the Department of Education, University of Oxford, UK. He is also Conjoint Professor at the University of Newcastle, Australia.

TH E ROUTLEDGE INTER NATIONA L H A N DBOOK SERIES

ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION RESEARCH IN ASIA PACIFIC (2018) Edited by Yun-Kyung Cha, Seung-Hwan Ham, Moosung Lee ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF FROEBEL AND EARLY CHILDHOOD PRACTICE (2019) Edited by Tina Bruce, Peter Elfer and Sacha Powell with Louie Werth ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF LEARNING WITH TECHNOLOGY IN EARLY CHILDHOOD (2019) Edited by Natalia Kucirkova, Jennifer Rowsell and Garry Falloon THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL LITERACIES IN EARLY CHILDHOOD Edited by Ola Erstad, Rosie Flewitt, Bettina Kümmerling-Meibauer and Íris Susana Pires Pereira THE ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF UNIVERSITIES, SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE STUDIES Edited by Liam Francis Gearon THE ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON DIALOGIC EDUCATION Edited by Neil Mercer, Rupert Wegerif and Louis Major THE ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF YOUNG CHILDREN’S RIGHTS Edited by Jane Murray, Beth Blue Swadener and Kylie Smith

For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/RoutledgeInternational-Handbooks-of-Education/book-series/HBKSOFED

THE ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF UNIVERSITIES, SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE STUDIES

Edited by Liam Francis Gearon

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 selection and editorial matter, Liam Francis Gearon; individual chapters, the contributors The right of the Liam Francis Gearon to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalogue record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-138-57241-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-70208-6 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by codeMantra

CONTENTS

Contributors ix Introduction 1 Liam Francis Gearon PART I

Universities, security and intelligence studies: an academic cartography 5 1 The university-security-intelligence nexus: four domains Liam Francis Gearon

7

PART II

Universities, security, intelligence: national contexts, international settings

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2 American universities, the CIA, and the teaching of national security intelligence 81 Loch K. Johnson 3 The FBI, cybersecurity and American campuses: academia, government, and industry as allies in cybersecurity effectiveness Kevin Powers and James Burns 4 ‘What was needed were copyists, filers, and really intelligent men of capacity’: British signals intelligence and the universities, 1914–1992 John R. Ferris v

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5 Datafication and universities: the Convergence of spies, scholars and science 118 Richard J. Aldrich and Melina J. Dobson 6 The relationship between intelligence and the academy in Canada Angela Gendron

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7 ‘I would remind you that NATO is not a university’: navigating the challenges and legacy of NATO economic intelligence Adrian Kendry

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8 Understanding the relationships between academia and national security intelligence in the European context Rubén Arcos

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9 The German foreign intelligence agency (BND): publicly addressing a clandestine history Bodo V. Hechelhammer

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10 The figure of the traitor in the chekist cosmology Julie Fedor 11 How Russia trains its spies: the past and present of Russian intelligence education Filip Kovacevic 12 The Chinese intelligence service Nigel Inkster

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187 196

PART III

Espionage and the academy: spy stories

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13 The Cambridge spy ring: the mystery of Wilfrid Mann Andrew Lownie

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14 John Gordon Coates PhD DSO (1918–2006): conscientious objector, interrogator, intelligence officer, commando, saboteur, spy…academic 216 Paddy Hayes PART IV

Spies, scholars and the study of intelligence

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15 The Oxford intelligence group Gwilym Hughes

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16 A missing dimension no longer: intelligence studies, Professor Christopher Andrew, and the University of Cambridge Daniel Larsen

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PART V

University security and intelligence studies: research and scholarship, teaching and ethics

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17 What do we teach when we teach intelligence ethics? David Omand and Mark Phythian

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18 Secret and ethically sensitive research Joanna Kidd

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19 Intelligent studies: degrees in intelligence and the intelligence community 272 Scott Parsons 20 Experimenting with intelligence education: overcoming design challenges in multidisciplinary intelligence analysis programmes Stephen Marrin and Sophie Cienski

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PART VI

Security, intelligence, and securitisation theory: comparative and international terrorism research 21 The epistemologies of terrorism and counterterrorism research Quassim Cassam

301 303

22 Dynamics of securitization: an analysis of universities’ engagement with the prevent legislation Lynn Schneider

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23 Intelligence and the management of radicalisation and extremism in universities in Asia and Africa David Johnson

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PART VII

Universities, security and secret intelligence: diplomatic, journalistic and policy perspectives 341 24 Between Lucky Jim and George Smiley: the public policy role of intelligence scholars Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman vii

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25 But what do you want it for? secret intelligence and the foreign policy practitioner Claire Smith 26 Intelligence recruitment in 1945 and ‘Peculiar Personal Characteristics’ Michael Herman 27 ‘Men of the Professor Type’ revisited: building a partnership between academic research and national security Tristram Riley-Smith 28 Open source intelligence: academic research, journalism or spying? Chris Westcott 29 Overkill: why universities modelling the impact of nuclear war in the 1980s could not change the views of the security state John Preston

352 362

368 383

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PART VIII

Universities, security and intelligence: disciplinary lenses of the arts, literature and humanities 30 The art(s and humanities) of security: a broader approach to countering security threats Andrew Glazzard

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31 Dispelling the myths: academic studies, intelligence and historical research 414 Helen Fry 32 Stalin’s library Svetlana Lokhova

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33 A landscape of lies in the land of letters: the literary cartography of security and intelligence Liam Francis Gearon

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Supplementary national security and intelligence – outreach, commentary, critique: a global survey of official, policy and academic sources 453 Liam Francis Gearon Index 525 viii

CONTRIBUTORS

Richard J. Aldrich is a Leverhulme Major Research Fellow and a Professor of International Security at the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of W ­ arwick. He is the author of several books including The Black Door (2015), with Rory Cormac, and GCHQ (2nd ed. 2019). His recent work has appeared in International Affairs, Political Studies and West European Politics. Rubén Arcos  is a lecturer in communication sciences and director of the postgraduate course of Specialist in Strategic Communication, Hybrid Threats, and Security at Rey Juan Carlos University in Madrid. He is founding co-director of IntelHub, a joint initiative between the American Public University System, the University of Leicester in the UK and Rey Juan Carlos University in Spain. Arcos is the founder and chapter chair of the Association of Strategic and Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) for Spain. He is a freelance contributor to Jane’s Intelligence Review and deputy editor of The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs. He served for almost ten years as instructor and coordinating director of the first ever Master’s degree in Intelligence Analysis in Spain. Dr. Arcos has published extensively on intelligence studies, strategic communications and experiential learning in intelligence through simulations and games. He was appointed national member of NATO Task Group SAS-114 on ‘Assessment and Communication of Uncertainty in Intelligence to Support Decision-Making’. His latest books are The Art of Intelligence: More Simulations, Exercises, and Games (co-edited with ­William J. Lahneman) and Intelligence Communication in the Digital Era: Transforming Security, Defence and Business (co-edited with Randolph H. Pherson).  

James P. Burns is the 14th President of Saint Mary’s University of Minnesota. He joined Saint Mary’s after eight years at Boston College in administration. At Boston College, he led the Woods College of Advancing Studies and Summer Session as Dean, where amongst other programmes he inaugurated the Master of Science in Cybersecurity Policy and Governance. He has an academic background in ethics, leadership, law and policy, as well as developmental psychology, assessment and testing. He was also an Associate Professor in the Counselling Psychology Department in the Lynch School of Education at BC.

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Formerly, he served as the director of faculty outreach and programme assessment for Boston College’s University Mission and Ministry Division. Prior to joining Boston ­College, Burns was co-chairman and associate professor of the Graduate School of Psychology at the University of St. Thomas. He has also served as an assistant professor in counselling psychology and religion at Boston University. Dr Burns’ research has included morality and ethics in therapeutic settings, trauma and resilience, Thomistic ethics and leadership, and the neurocognitive and other correlates of sexual abuse and violence.  

Quassim Cassam  was born in Mombasa, Kenya. He was educated at Oxford and is now Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick, UK. He was previously Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy, University of Cambridge, Professor of Philosophy at UCL and Reader in Philosophy, University of Oxford. He has been a Professorial Fellow of King’s College, Cambridge, and a Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, Wadham College, Oxford. He has been a Visiting Professor at the University of California, Berkeley, and has also held the John Evans Distinguished Visiting Professor in Moral and Intellectual Philosophy at N ­ orthwestern University. He is a past President of the Aristotelian Society and has been a Mind Senior Research Fellow as well as an Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) Leadership Fellow. He is the author of five books, including The Possibility of Knowledge (Oxford, 2007), Self-Knowledge for Humans (Oxford, 2014) and Vices of the Mind: From the Intellectual to the Political (Oxford, 2019). His current research is on the philosophy of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Sophie Cienski is a Government and Public Services (GPS) Business Technology Analyst at Deloitte. Prior to Deloitte, Sophie worked as a Business Analyst for General Dynamics Information Technology (formerly CSRA). She holds a BSc in Intelligence Analysis from James Madison University, where she also minored in Geographic Science and received the United States Geospatial Intelligence Foundation GEOINT Certificate. Melina J. Dobson is currently a fellow at the Institute of Advanced Study, University of Warwick where she is working on a project on US Whistleblowers and Leakers in the context of new media, state accountability and legislation. She is also a visiting lecturer at the University of Buckingham where she teaches on intelligence and security. Her most recent publication appeared in the British Journal of Politics and International Relations (2019). Robert Dover is an Associate Professor of Intelligence and International Security at the University of Leicester. He got his first academic job at the University of Bristol in 2003 and has over 15 years’ experience in research and policy engagement and advisory and consultancy work with organisations such as the UK Cabinet Office, Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and National Crime Agency. Internationally, he has advised NATO, the Swedish government, and the European Parliament. In 2008, Dover won the Political Studies Association’s Wilfrid Harrison Prize for the Best Article in Political Studies, for his piece ‘For Queen and Company’ on the role of intelligence in the arms trade. Funding sources for his research have included the EU’s Horizon 2020 programme, the Economic and Social Research Council, the Arts and Humanities Research Council, the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, British Academy, and public authorities – such as the European Parliament and NATO. His research areas include the governmental use of intelligence, the impact of intelligence activity upon social relations, horizon scanning, the analytical function in intelligence, and the management of crises.

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He is on the editorial board of the Journal of Intelligence History and SageOpen and is a reviewer for many more. He co-convenes the Political Studies Association’s Security and Intelligence Studies Specialist Group. He has published one research monograph, six significant policy studies, four edited books, and more than 60 papers in peer reviewed journals, conferences, and edited collections. Julie Fedor is Senior Lecturer in Modern European History in the School of Historical and Philosophical Studies at the University of Melbourne. She holds a PhD from King’s ­College, University of Cambridge, and has taught modern Russian history at the Universities of Birmingham, Cambridge, Melbourne and St Andrews. She is the author of Russia and the Cult of State Security: The Chekist Tradition from Lenin to Putin (Routledge 2011); co-author of Remembering Katyn (Polity 2012); co-editor of Memory and Theory in Eastern Europe (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) and contributing co-editor of Memory, Conflict and New Media: Web Wars in Post-Socialist States (Routledge 2013) and War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (Palgrave Macmillan 2017). She is the founding editor of the Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society (www.jspps.eu). John R. Ferris is a Fellow of The Royal Society of Canada. He is Professor of History at The University of Calgary, where he also a Fellow of The Centre for Military, Strategic and Security Studies. He is Honorary Professor at The Department of International Politics, ­Aberystwyth University, and in The School of Law and Politics at Brunel University. He is an Associate Member of Nuffield College, Oxford. He has written and edited eight books, and over 100 academic articles, on diplomatic, intelligence, Imperial, international and strategic history and strategic studies. In particular, he works in the history of signals intelligence. He was Historical Cryptologic Scholar in Residence at The National Security Agency, Fort Meade, 2008–09, and presently is completing the authorised history of GCHQ, which will be published in the autumn of 2019. Helen Fry has written and edited over twenty-five books. Her work covers the social history of the Second World War, British intelligence, spies and espionage – with particular reference to intelligence gained from German prisoners via interrogation or bugging their private conversations in captivity. Her books include The Walls Have Ears: The Greatest Intelligence Operation of WWII; The London Cage: The Secret History of Britain’s WWII Interrogation Centre; Spymaster: The Secret Life of Kendrick (Thistle) and Churchill’s German Army (Thistle). She is currently writing a history of MI9 escape and evasion in Western Europe during WWII. Helen is deputy chair and a trustee of the Trent Park Museum Trust which is establishing a national museum to MI9’s wartime bugging operation at Trent Park (North London). She is Trent Park’s official historian. She is also an ambassador for the Museum of Military ­Intelligence being established at Milton Bryan in Buckinghamshire, the WWII Broadcasting Centre of the Political Warfare Executive’s black propaganda centre into Nazi-occupied Europe. She appears frequently on television and in documentaries, including Home Front Heroes (BBC1); David Jason’s Secret Service (Channel 4) for which she was also historical consultant; Spying on Hitler’s Army (Channel 4 and PBS), Churchill’s German Army (National ­Geographic) and Forbidden History: Kensington Palace (Channel 5). She is an Associate Editor for Eye Spy Magazine and writes occasionally for the Wall Street Journal. Her official ­website is www.helen-fry.com. She lives and works in London.  

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Liam Francis Gearon  is Senior Research Fellow at Harris Manchester College, and ­A ssociate Professor at the Department of Education, University of Oxford. A philosopher and theorist of education, Liam Francis Gearon is a specialist in critical, historical and contemporary analyses of education in multi-disciplinary contexts. Concurrently Conjoint Professor at the University of Newcastle, New South Wales, he was formerly Adjunct Professor at the Australian Catholic University and also previously Professor of Education at the University of Roehampton and Research Professor at the Faculty of Education, University of Plymouth. With a published doctorate in English Literature, he is the author and or editor of over thirty books and eighty peer-review articles and chapters. As Principal Investigator, he has led research projects with funding including the Arts and Humanities Research Council, the British Academy, the Leverhulme Trust, the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain and the Society for Educational Studies, with co-­investigator roles with the Academy of Finland. He has delivered keynote lectures, seminars and colloquia in Australia, Austria, Canada, Dubai, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Georgia (former Soviet Union), Hong Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, South Korea, Sweden, Turkey and the United States. He has in recent years convened two major international colloquia which have attempted to extend the theoretical boundaries of educational studies. With substantial funding from the Society for Educational Studies, these colloquia were both convened at Oriel College, Oxford: Writers and their Education (with Emma Williams) (2018); and, Education, Security and Intelligence Studies (2017). A Fellow of the Higher Education Academy (FHEA), Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts (FRSA) and member of the Royal Society of Literature, Liam Francis Gearon is a member of the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) Peer Review College and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Peer Review College, serving too on the Peer Review College of Research Councils UK Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF). A graduate of the Curtis Brown novel-writing course, he is the author of two novels, The Corridor of Centuries (2019) (London: Olympia) and a work of literary espionage set in Oxford and Arctic Norway Eleven Notebooks (2019) (Cambridge: Pegasus).  

 

 

 

 

Angela Gendron is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Security, Intelligence and Defence Studies (CSIDS), The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. Her current interest in intelligence and security matters derives from a former professional intelligence career with the British government. After a posting to Ottawa, she took early retirement in order to pursue academic interests and is now engaged in research, teaching and training in both countries. A grounding in philosophy and psychology has informed her more recent work on the privacy issues generated by new surveillance technologies including meta data-bases and remotely piloted air systems. In 2005, she was an early contributor to the emerging field of intelligence ethics. She has designed and delivered training courses on national security intelligence for newly emergent democracies such as Romania, Trinidad and Tobago and others; contributed academic papers to numerous conferences around the world on Islamist extremism and other mostly terrorism related topics; and published extensively in books and journals. A recent paper entitled ‘The Call to Jihad: Charismatic Preachers and the Internet’ appeared (2017) in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism.  

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Andrew Glazzard is Senior Director for National Security Studies at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a London-based think tank and research institute specialising in defence and security issues. He has written widely on security issues, especially in relation to terrorist propaganda and communication. He is project director of the Global Research Network on Terrorism and Technology, a consortium of eight research institutes working on terrorist use of Internet technologies in particular, and is working on several projects examining the use of strategic communications approaches to counter terrorism. Prior to joining RUSI, he worked in the UK government for over twenty years, mostly in the Ministry of Defence. He has also conducted research at Cambridge University and King’s College London, and taught at Royal Holloway, University of London. He has a PhD in English Literature from Royal Holloway.  

Michael S. Goodman is a Professor of ‘Intelligence and International Affairs’ in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, and Visiting Professor at the Norwegian Defence Intelligence School and at Sciences Po in Paris. He has published widely in the field of intelligence history, including most recently The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Volume I: From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis (Routledge, 2015), which was chosen as one of The Spectator’s books of the year. He is a series editor of Intelligence and Security, Hurst/Columbia University Press, and Intelligence, Surveillance and Secret Warfare, Edinburgh University Press, and is a member of the editorial boards of five journals. He has recently finished a secondment to the Cabinet Office, where he has been the Official Historian of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Volume II of his book The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee will be published in 2020. Paddy Hayes is the author of Queen of Spies; Daphne Park, Britain’s Cold War Spymaster (Duckworth/Overlook, London and New York, 2015/2016). Hayes is an intelligence historian specialising in the study of human espionage operations in the cold war intelligence conflict from the end of the Second World War to the present day. He commenced his close observations of the work of the intelligence services shortly before he launched his business intelligence service Construction Intelligence Services (CIS) in 1972. His work in commercial intelligence enabled him to travel widely and he used his travels to establish contact with intelligence practitioners from all of the major agencies involved in the cold war conflict. From these contacts, he has acquired an in-depth knowledge of the sources and methods used by intelligence services to identify and target potential sources, to recruit and run them and to manage the harvesting of the intelligence product safely and securely. Though he is now retired from his business, he continues to write and to lecture. His next book will be a ‘social history’ of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) during the cold war. The book will provide an in-depth look at the people who operated in Britain’s overseas intelligence service during this conflict. For the first time, the role of Britain’s women spies will be examined in detail. Paddy Hayes is an alumnus of the ­Harvard Business School’s OPM executive education programme (OPM 9 1984). He resides in Country Dublin. Bodo V. Hechelhammer, born in Darmstadt in 1968, studied modern history, medieval history and art history. He holds a doctorate in history, is a long-time employee of the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND) and heads the Historical Bureau there as chief historian.

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Michael Herman is a pioneer of the academic study of intelligence. His career has spanned the worlds of intelligence and academia in the United Kingdom and has done much to bring the two closer together. Born in 1929, Michael was educated at Scarborough High School before securing a scholarship to read Modern History at Queen’s ­College, Oxford, in 1946. His studies there were interrupted by two years’ National Service between 1947 and 1949, when Michael served in the Intelligence Corps in Egypt. He then returned to Oxford to complete his studies and was awarded a 1st class degree. In 1952, he joined the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) based in Cheltenham, where he was to remain in a succession of roles until 1987, a period that also included secondments to the Cabinet Office, as Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and to the ­Defence Intelligence Staff. On his retirement from GCHQ in 1987, Michael moved to Nuffield College, Oxford, initially as a Gwilym Gibbon Research Fellow, and it was here that he began to work on what would become his landmark study of intelligence organisations, roles and effects, Intelligence Power in Peace and War. This was published by Cambridge University Press and the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1996. On publication, Professor Christopher Andrew called it, “the best overview of the nature and role of intelligence that I have read. It is surely destined to become a standard work”. This was a prescient comment, as Intelligence Power quickly established itself as a key reference point for all those seeking to study the nature, roles and impact of intelligence as a state function, influencing a whole generation of academics drawn to its study. Michael has continued to publish regularly and promote the study of intelligence ever since. He was the founding Director of the Oxford Intelligence Group, which provided a valuable space in which to discuss intelligence and played a role in bringing together practitioners and academics. His recommendations for the future of the British system of intelligence appeared in 1997 as a Centre for Defence Studies publication and elsewhere. He gave evidence to the Butler review of intelligence into weapons of mass destruction in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq which influenced the review group’s recommendations around improving professional intelligence standards and training. A collection of his academic articles was published as Intelligence Services in the Information Age: Theory and Practice by Frank Cass in 2001. More recently, he has co-edited and contributed to a special issue of this journal, Intelligence in the Cold War: What Difference Did It Make? Subsequently published as a book, this collection posed key questions about the role of intelligence in the conflict that had dominated Michael’s career in intelligence, and reflected his deep interest in intelligence history and firm belief that theory needs to be grounded in thorough historical research. Apart from his lengthy Associateship at Nuffield, he has been an Honorary Departmental Fellow in the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University and a Senior Associate Fellow of St. Antony’s College, Oxford and has had other relationships elsewhere at home and abroad. In 2005, Michael was made an Honorary Doctor of Letters by the University of Nottingham and in June 2016 received the Lifetime Achievement Award from the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE).  

 

Gwilym Hughes is Director of the Oxford Intelligence Group and a Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford. He was a Royal Air Force Scholar at Pembroke College, Cambridge reading English. After graduating in 1977, he completed officer training at the Royal Air Force College Cranwell and subsequently served in a number of administrative roles, including at HQ No 1 Group (RAF Bawtry) during the Falklands conflict. In 1985, he was posted to the Defence Staff at the British Embassy in Paris and in 1992 as the Assistant Air Adviser to the xiv

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High Commission in Canberra. He has a master’s degree in Defence Administration from Shrivenham (Cranfield) and attended the Australian Joint Services Staff College. On retirement from the Royal Air Force in 1996, he was elected to the Bursarship of Nuffield College: a position he held for nineteen years before assuming the new post of Head of the Endowment Office and Investment Bursar. His work at Nuffield College coincided with a period of great change in higher education and much of his time was spent adopting and incorporating the new regulatory regimes that were imposed by central government as well as the concurrent internal reforms of the University. He founded the Oxford Intelligence Group with Michael Herman in 2004 and they co-edited a special edition of Intelligence and National Security in 2011 on intelligence in the Cold War. He has convened and chaired over a hundred meetings of the OIG since 2004 which have covered a wide range of intelligence topics, but his personal interests lie closest to where intelligence studies and social science meet, and he has particularly enjoyed finding common ground with colleagues at Nuffield College.  

 

Nigel Inkster CMG is Senior Advisor to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. From 2007 to 2017, he served as, respectively, Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk and Director of Cybersecurity and Future Conflict. Prior to joining IISS, he served for thirty-one years in the British Secret Intelligence Service, retiring as Assistant Chief and Director of Operations and Intelligence. He graduated from Oxford in 1974 with a BA (First Class) in Oriental Studies. David Johnson  is Professorial Fellow, St Antony’s College and Reader in Comparative and International Education in the University of Oxford. He is the director of the Centre for Comparative and International Education and was until its close in 2014, the Director of the Pluscarden Programme for the Study of Global Terrorism and Intelligence, St Antony’s College. He studies educational systems in the developing world and is particularly interested in countries affected by war and conflict. He has written widely on ethnicity, conflict and education. He has studied the impact of war on education in Sierra Leone and Sudan, of post-election violence on education in Kenya, and the threats of terrorism on educational provision in northern Nigeria. He is currently the Programme Research Lead for the ­ESRC-DFID Raising learning Outcomes in Education Systems Research Programme.  

Loch Kingsford Johnson is the Regents Professor Emeritus of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia, as well as a Meigs Distinguished Teaching Professor. He is the author of over 200 articles and essays; and the author or editor of thirty books on U.S. national security, including: Spy Watching: Intelligence Accountability in the United States (Oxford, 2018); National Security Intelligence, 2nd ed. (Polity, 2017); America and the Challenges of World Leadership (Oxford, 2014); The Threat on the Horizon (Oxford, 2011); and The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (Oxford, 2010). Professor Johnson served as special assistant to the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (1975–76); as a staff aide on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (1976–77); as the first staff director of the Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight, U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (1977–79); as a senior staff member on the Subcommittee on Trade and International Economic Policy, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (1980) and as special assistant to Chairman Les Aspin of the Aspin-Brown Commission on the Roles and Missions of Intelligence (1995–96).  

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Professor Johnson has served as secretary of the American Political Science Association and as president of the International Studies Association (ISA), South. He served as the senior editor of the international journal Intelligence and National Security (London) and is on the editorial advisory board for other journals, including Foreign Policy Analysis. In 2008–09, he was named a Phi Beta Kappa Visiting Scholar, and was a member of the Phi Beta Kappa National Board for the Visiting Scholar Program. He has also been a Distinguished Visiting Scholar at Yale ­University and at Oxford University. In 2012, the combined universities of the Southeastern Conference selected Professor Johnson as their Inaugural “SEC Professor of the Year” Award; and in 2014, the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association named him its “Distinguished Scholar”. At the University of Georgia, he has won the ­William A. ­Owens Award, the University’s highest research award in the social and behavioural sciences, and its Creative Research Award, as well as the Award for Excellence in Research and the Award for Excellence in Research (both bestowed by the School of Public and International Affairs). Born in Auckland, New Zealand, Professor Johnson received his PhD in political science from the University of California, Riverside. In post-doctoral activities, he was awarded an American Political Science Association Congressional Fellowship; has studied nuclear weapons policy at Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and has conducted research on Congress as a Carl Albert Visiting Fellow at the University of Oklahoma. At the University of Georgia, he led the founding of the School of Public and International Affairs in 2001, as well as the UGA Memorial Service Garden in 2005. His leisure time is devoted to family activities, sports (Alpine skiing, running, golf ), reading, chess and civic involvement.  

Adrian Kendry was appointed as NATO’s Senior Defence Economist in August 2001. Until 2012, Adrian coordinated all NATO economic intelligence, including NATO’s economic and energy security relations with Russia (after the 2002 inception of the NATO-Russia Council) and countering the financing of terrorism following the attacks of 9/11. In 2009, he became Head of Defence and Security Economics in the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, providing economic intelligence to the Secretary General (particularly on Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and Iraq). From 2012 to 2014, he directly advised Secretary General Rasmussen on economic security and transatlantic relations, including Afghanistan. Following retirement, Adrian leads the analysis of economic and resource security for the NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis programme (including regional security conferences in Madrid, Oslo and Helsinki in 2019). In February 2018, he accepted a Visiting Professorship in Economics and Security at the University of Winchester. Before NATO, he occupied the Admiral William Crowe Chair in Economics at the United States Naval Academy and a Visiting Professorship at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. The first two decades of his career were at the University of the West of England after his undergraduate and graduate degrees at Queen Mary University of London. Joanna Kidd is CEO and Director of Ridgeway Information Ltd, a spin-out company from King’s College London, founded with the objective of bringing collective experience and expertise in open source intelligence methodologies to both the public and private sectors. Joanna previously served as Director of the International Centre for Security Analysis, a research centre within the King’s Policy Institute at King’s College London. She has led large research projects on security and political issues in the Middle East and East Asia, as well as teaching open source intelligence and leading Internet training courses. Joanna’s prior experience includes working as a Defence Analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and serving as a Warfare Officer in the Royal Navy.  

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She has a PhD in War Studies, University of London, an MSc in International Relations, London School of Economics and a BA: Modern History, University of Oxford.  

Filip Kovacevic is Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Politics and International Studies at the University of San Francisco, teaching courses on East-Central European/Eurasian affairs, geopolitics and intelligence studies. He is on leave from the University of Montenegro where he has taught since 2005 and has been appointed to the position of Associate Professor. From 2003 to 2005, Kovacevic was a visiting professor at the Smolny College, the first liberal arts college in Russia, operating under the auspices of St. Petersburg State University. Kovacevic is the author of several books, dozens of academic articles, and hundreds of newspaper columns and media commentaries, mostly in Montenegrin language, on international affairs, Balkan political processes and contemporary critical theory. He is also a well-known civil society anti-corruption activist in the Balkans and has been invited to lecture throughout the EU, the ex-USSR and the US. He specializes in Russian and Eurasian intelligence history and spy fiction and his current research involves the publications of contemporary Russian intelligence authors and historians. Daniel Larsen holds a fixed-term University Lectureship in International Relations at the University of Cambridge and a fixed-term College Lectureship in History at T ­ rinity College, ­ ambridge, and Cambridge. He was previously a Junior Research Fellow at Trinity College, C he completed his MPhil and PhD at Christ’s College, Cambridge, under the supervision of Professor Christopher Andrew. His area of research is British and American intelligence and international history in the First World War era, and his first book is forthcoming with Cambridge University Press. He has published a number of articles in I­ ntelligence and National Security, Diplomatic History and the International History Review, and has been a co-convenor of the Cambridge Intelligence Seminar since 2013. Svetlana Lokhova  was recently a By-Fellow of Churchill College, University of ­Cambridge. She holds an MPhil and BA (Hons) in History from University of Cambridge. ‘A brilliant researcher at Cambridge University, who is about to publish a startling book on a previously undetected network of Soviet spies that infiltrated American universities in the early 1930s’: The Sunday Times. Svetlana’s interest in espionage history began whilst studying History at Cambridge University. Her ground-breaking Master’s dissertation remains the definitive account of the founder of the Soviet intelligence service, Felix Dzerzhinsky. Svetlana is responsible for a number of the most important archival discoveries made in recent years. Her revelations have generated substantial press coverage across the world. Svetlana identified the Cambridge ‘Sixth Man’ Cedric Belfrage featured on the BBC Television News and Radio. The story of Britain’s ‘Hollywood Spy’ was told on a specially commissioned programme. From her work on the ‘Mitrokhin Archive’, she found the identity of ‘MIKE’, a US Cold War KGB recruit, and revealed the KGB’s plans to recruit President Nixon’s chief physician. She has spoken about the Mitrokhin archive on US Public Service Radio, Radio Free Europe, the BBC and ABC (Australia). She was until recently a Fellow of the Cambridge Security Initiative jointly chaired by the former head of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove, and Professor Christopher Andrew, former Official Historian of the MI5. Svetlana’s critically acclaimed first book, The Spy Who Changed History, was published on 14 June 2018.  

 

 

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Andrew Lownie was educated at Magdalene College, Cambridge, where he was Dunster History Prizeman and President of the Union, before taking his Masters and doctorate at Edinburgh University. A Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and former visiting fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge, he has run his own literary agency since 1988. A trustee of the Campaign for Freedom of Information and President of The Biographers Club, he has written for the Times, Telegraph, Wall Street Journal, Spectator and Guardian and formerly served in the Royal Naval Reserve. His previous books include acclaimed lives of the writer John Buchan, the spy Guy Burgess which won the St Ermin’s Hotel Intelligence Book of the Year and The Mountbattens: Their Lives and Loves. Stephen Marrin  is an associate professor and Director of the Intelligence Analysis programme at James Madison University. Before his academic career began, he spent five years as an analyst with the CIA and the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Holder of a BA from Colgate University and MA and PhD degrees from the University of Virginia, he is editor of the journal Intelligence and National Security. David Omand GCB is a Visiting Professor in the War Studies Department, King’s College London and at PSIA Sciences-Po, Paris. During his career in British government service he has held senior posts in security, intelligence, and defence. He was UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator in the Cabinet Office from 2002 to 2005. He was a Permanent Secretary of the Home Office from 1997 to 2000, and before that Director of GCHQ (the UK Signals Intelligence and Cyber Security Agency) and also served in the Ministry of Defence as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Policy. He served for seven years on the UK Joint Intelligence Committee. He was a Principal Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence during the Falklands conflict and served for three years with the Diplomatic Service as the UK Defence Counsellor in NATO, Brussels. He was educated at the Glasgow Academy and read economics at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, where he is an honorary Fellow. He has honorary doctorates from the Universities of Glasgow and Birmingham. His first book Securing the State was published in 2010, and Principled Spying: the Ethics of Secret Intelligence (with Prof Mark Phythian) was published by Oxford University Press in 2018.  

 

Scott Parsons  is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Ethics at the United States ­M ilitary Academy at West Point. He is also a Signals Intelligence Officer in the United States Army having served in strategic, operational and tactical assignments for over twenty years, including three tours in Iraq and one in Afghanistan. Parsons has several teaching and research areas of focus. He specialises in the intersection of Just War Theory with Cyber Ethics, the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the Ethics of Autonomous Weapons Systems. He also teaches and conducts research in Character and Aristotelian Virtue Ethics. Parsons plans and organises conference workshops on the Ethics of War and Technology held at Pembroke College, Oxford University. He brings West Point Cadets to the conference workshops to interact with AI, cyber, legal and just war experts working at Oxford University and other universities around the United Kingdom and United States. Previous workshops include The Ethics of War: Drones and Contemporary Conflict (2016), The Ethics of Cyberwarfare (2017) and Artificial Intelligence: Ethical Considerations in War (2018). The 2019 conference workshop is tentatively titled: Robot Ethics.  

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Parsons is also a Research Fellow of Applied Ethics at the Woods College of Advancing Studies at Boston College and is an Advisory Board Member for the Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace based, Heritage in War Project.  

Mark Phythian is Professor of Politics in the School of History, Politics & International Relations at the University of Leicester. He is the author or editor of several books on aspects of intelligence, most recently Principled Spying: The Ethics of Secret Intelligence, co-authored with David Omand (Oxford University Press/Georgetown University Press, 2018), and a third edition of Intelligence in an Insecure World, co-authored with Peter Gill (Polity Press, 2018). He is the co-editor of Intelligence and National Security and a Fellow of the UK Academy of Social Sciences. Kevin R. Powers  is the founding director of Boston College’s M.S. in Cybersecurity Policy and Governance Program, and a Professor of the Practice at Boston College Law School and the University’s Carroll School of Management. With a combined twenty years of law enforcement, military, national security, business, higher education and teaching experience, he has worked as an analyst and an attorney for the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Navy and U.S. Department of Defense. He has also worked for law firms in Boston and Washington DC, and as general counsel for an international software company based in Seattle, Washington. Kevin is a research affiliate at the MIT Sloan School of Management, and he has taught courses at the U.S. Naval Justice School and the U.S. Naval Academy, where he was also the Deputy General Counsel to the Superintendent. From 2016 to 2017, he was the Panel Lead for the Collegiate Working Group to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE). Kevin also serves as a Board Member for the Boston College Law School Business Advisory Council, a regional bank and an international software company. John Preston is an ESRC Leadership Fellow for the Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security and Professor of Sociology at the University of Essex. His work is on Cold War civil defence, disasters and existential threat. He has been awarded grants from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) to work on topics related to these themes including preparedness, infrastructure failure and evacuations. John’s latest book (2019) is Grenfell Tower: Preparedness, Race and Disaster Capitalism. Tristram Riley-Smith is External Champion to the Research Council UK (RCUK) Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research (PaCCS) and Associate Fellow at the Centre for Science and Policy, University of Cambridge. He is also Director of Research at the University of Cambridge’s Department of Politics and International Studies. PaCCS has had over 1,200 projects in its portfolio and includes over thirty research institutions across the UK and overseas. The partnership covers areas as varied as terrorism, threats to infrastructure, ideologies and beliefs and the proliferation of weapons and technologies. Conflict, cyber-security and transnational organised crime have been the subject of particular focus for the partnership over the coming years. As the External Champion, Tristram works as a high-profile ambassador for the partnership, seeking to enhance opportunities for impact and knowledge exchange by connecting  

 

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researchers to policymakers, government, industry and civil society. Tristram has conducted a review of portfolio projects, run three National Security Fellowship Schemes, convened numerous policy seminars on such varied subjects as Religion & Security, the Governance of Drones, and Transnational Organised Crime. He has also facilitated placements for researchers within government agencies and continues to conduct clinics for researchers within the partnership network. Before commencing his role as External Champion, Tristram spent over twenty-five years working as a specialist in defence, security and infrastructure protection in Whitehall. He was posted as a Counsellor to the British Embassy in Washington DC in 2002 and in recent years has established and run a Centre for Science, Knowledge & Innovation. Before Whitehall, Tristram studied Social Anthropology at the University of Cambridge (Pembroke College). He conducted doctoral research in the Kathmandu Valley, working amongst the Newari artists who create images of Buddhist and Hindu gods, and post-­ doctoral research in Thailand. He has drawn on this training as a social scientist in writing his portrait of the USA in the opening decade of the 21st Century, The Cracked Bell: America and the Afflictions of Liberty (2010).  

 

Lynn Schneider is a doctoral student at the University of Oxford’s Department of Education. Her research focusses on education policy, especially in the field of higher education. Her previous research explored Syrian refugees’ experiences of accessing higher education in Germany. Her doctoral project is concerned with examining English universities’ response to the legal framework of counter-terrorism legislation and the broader political discourse of ‘radicalisation’. Here, she explores the ways in which universities are translating the Prevent Legislation of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act into higher education policies and practices, and investigates the factors that inform the implementation process. More broadly, the project contributes to interdisciplinary understanding of the changing relationship between universities and the state, the role of universities in securitization processes and the implications of the Prevent duty for the visions and values on which higher education ­governance and management are based. Claire Smith grew up in the south of England. She studied German and French at Queen Mary College, London University, before joining what was then called HM Diplomatic S­ ervice in 1979. In an unconventional career, she also worked for a major Swiss bank, the ­German Foreign Ministry and the UK Cabinet Office in between postings to Beijing, Bonn and Islamabad. She was a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Assessments Staff. Since 2007, Claire has run her own company, working on projects in the Gulf, francophone Africa and the UK. She has delivered postgraduate sessions on conflict resolution, security, diplomacy, foreign policy, consular work and intelligence at UK and overseas universities. Claire has been chair of governors of a primary school in the London Borough of Newham, chair of trustees at an English independent school and a non-executive director at a major consultancy. She was a member of the UK government’s Security Vetting Appeals Panel for eight years, and an Independent Member of a local government committee on Standards in Public Life. Claire has a Postgraduate Certificate in Business Administration and an MSc in Major Programme Management from Oxford.  

 

Chris Westcott was previously the Director of BBC Monitoring, responsible for more than 400 staff operating from bases in ten countries, analysing and supplying open source news, xx

Contributors

information and insight collected from media around the world. Earlier in his career, Chris led the development of BBC World Service’s digital media portfolio and joined its board in 2000. He was responsible for a sequence of major investments spanning online and mobile news services in forty-four languages, including the BBC’s first 24-hour news services in Arabic, Chinese, Russian and Spanish. He is a member of the British Council’s Digital Advisory Group, an academic visitor at Oxford University’s Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism and a Director of Ridgeway Information Ltd, an open source intelligence consultancy. His awards include a Webby and multiple BAFTAs. Prior to his BBC career, Chris was a research scientist at the UK Atomic Energy Authority’s labs at Harwell. Chris holds an MA in Metallurgy and Materials Science from the University of Oxford and a PhD in Chemistry from the University of Southampton.  

 

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INTRODUCTION Liam Francis Gearon

Universities have long played a significant intelligence role in the security of nation states. At Oriel College, University of Oxford, in 2017, I convened an international Colloquium on theme of this volume, Universities, Security and Intelligence Studies, part of a theoretical and practical conceptualisation of a complex, historical and contemporary relationship between universities and the security and intelligence agencies. The format was of an expert exchange of ideas amongst scholars, practitioners and policy-makers to explore in depth the critical academic cartography of a relationship between universities and security and intelligence agencies. The Oriel Colloquium followed from a security and intelligence seminar convened at the British Academy in November 2015, a special issue of the British Journal of Educational Studies on Education, Security and Intelligence Studies. and a multi-disciplinary and multi-institution 2016 seminar series on the same theme, including events hosted by the Oxford Intelligence Group (Nuffield College, Oxford), the Buckingham University Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Whitehall. Keynote speakers at the Oriel Colloquium included: Professor Christopher Andrew (Emeritus Professor of Modern History, University of Cambridge, and official historian of MI5); Professor Loch K. Johnson (Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia, author or editor of thirty books on security and intelligence studies, including The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence); Professor John Ferris (Professor of History, University of Calgary and (then) newly appointed official historian of GCHQ); Sir David Omand (Visiting Professor at King’s College, London, and former ­d irector of GCHQ) and Richard J. Aldrich (Professor of Politics and International Relations, University of Warwick, author of GCHQ and, with Rory Cormac, The Black Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence and British Prime Ministers). In addition to academic perspectives on security and intelligence studies, there were presentations from security and intelligence professionals: the former Senior Defence Economist to NATO and Adviser to the 12th NATO General Secretary; a speaker on national security resilience and counter-terrorism from the RUSI, Whitehall; a speaker from US ­M ilitary Intelligence at the United States Military Academy West Point; a former senior Cold War diplomat (Berlin Station); former CIA on the International Association for Intelligence ­Education and speakers from the British Council, the Cabinet Office (Civil Contingencies Secretariat), Home Office (former Chief Scientific Officer) and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (National Security Directorate). 1

Liam Francis Gearon

The Colloquium also maintained a special interest in the security and intelligence aspects of the arts, humanities and literature. Presiding over this section was Dr Alastair Niven LVO, OBE, a judge of the Booker Prize for Fiction in 1994 and of the Man Booker Prize in 2014, former Principal of Cumberland Lodge Windsor and President of English PEN, Alastair also uniquely held posts as Director of Literature at the Arts Council of Great Britain and Director of Literature at the British Council. Two notable literary agents for scholarly work and memoir on espionage were also represented: Andrew Lownie, founder-director of the Lownie Agency literary and author of Stalin’s Englishman, and Bill Hamilton, director of the A.M. Heath Literary Agency and literary agent for the estate of George Orwell. The Routledge International Handbook of Universities, Security and Intelligence Studies is the proximate culmination, then, of several years’ work in establishing a distinctive academic sub-field of universities, security and intelligence studies. The Handbook’s academic cartography here provides a critical overview of the historical, contemporary and likely future relationships between universities and the security and intelligence agencies. The Handbook is divided into eight sections which provide the prospective coordinates of a complex set of nascent research agendas as well as academic-practitioner interactions, all of which are interconnected by this relationship between universities, security and intelligence.

Part I  Universities, security and intelligence studies: an academic cartography This opening chapter provides the intellectual frame for our understanding of the ­university-security-intelligence nexus across four critical domains: the operational; the ­epistemological; the ethical; and the existential.

Part II  Universities, security, intelligence: national contexts, international settings This section (with chapters from Loch K. Johnson; James Burns and Kevin Power; John R. Ferris; Richard J. Aldrich and Melina J. Dobson; Angela Gendron; Adrian Kendry; Rubén Arcos; Bodo Hechelhammer; Julie Fedor; Filip Kovacevic; Nigel Inkster) covers a wide ­university-security-intelligence range – the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and the Commonwealth, continental Europe, Russia and China – of historical, contemporary and future-looking interactions.

Part III  Espionage and the academy: spy stories Part III (with chapters from Andrew Lownie; Paddy Hayes) provides two narrative ­h istorical– biographical accounts of individuals who represent the broader landscape between universities and the security and intelligence agencies.

Part IV  Academic analysis and field experience in security and intelligence: spies, scholars and the study of intelligence This section (with chapters from Gwilym Hughes; Daniel Larsen) shows the reciprocal interplay, a constant interchange, of personnel from universities to the security and intelligence agencies, and from security and intelligence agencies to universities, highlighted through 2

Introduction

the Oxford Intelligence Group (Nuffield College, Oxford) and the Cambridge Intelligence Seminar (Faculty of History and Corpus Christi College, Cambridge).

Part V  University security and intelligence studies: research and scholarship, teaching and ethics Part V (chapters from David Omand and Mark Phythian; Joanna Kidd; Scott Parsons; ­Stephen Marrin and Sophie Victoria Cienski) treats of important issues for the practical goals of scholarship, research and teaching of security and intelligence both from within universities and the security and intelligence agencies themselves.

Part VI  Security, intelligence and securitisation theory: comparative and international terrorism research This section (chapters from Quassim Cassam; Lynn Schneider; David Johnson) provides specific international and comparative theoretical focus on terrorism research as an important dimension of security and intelligence within and beyond universities.

Part VII  Universities, security and secret intelligence: diplomatic, journalistic and policy perspectives This section (chapters from Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman; Claire Smith; Michael Herman; Tristram Riley-Smith; Chris Westcott; John Preston) draws on a range of professional and academic expertise to explore the implication of security and intelligence in diplomacy, journalism and as an element of public policy.

Part VIII  Universities, security and intelligence: disciplinary lenses of the arts, literature and humanities Part VIII (chapters from Andrew Glazzard; Helen Fry; Svetlana Lokhova; Liam Francis Gearon) demonstrates the extent to which security and intelligence practice, research and study far exceed the traditional remit of commonly held notions of security and intelligence, and illustrates this with a diverse range of methodologically complex case studies from the arts, literature and the humanities. A careful read of the contributor biographies of these contributors to the Handbook shows (and reiterates the need for) a balance of academic and security and intelligence agency practitioner perspectives. These are some of the world’s leading academics in security and intelligence studies, recognised voices. This is symbiotically combined with the insights of practitioners with remarkable depth of national and international security and intelligence practice in the field. In this volume, such voices are drawn together throughout to provide unique insights into interactions between universities and the security and intelligence agencies, and highlights at least some of the (still unfolding) implications for the academic disciplines of security and intelligence studies. Further to illustrate the multidimensional case, positioning universities in relation to critical analysis but also heightening the need for cooperations with security and intelligence communities, a closing supplementary section provides a selective international overview of national security and intelligence outreach, commentary and critique. It does this through a global (if necessarily partial) survey of official, policy and academic sources. This closing 3

Liam Francis Gearon

section further reiterates the richness of our collective theme. It also illustrates the genuinely global developments of a relationship little charted in any systematic way in the relevant literatures. In all, what arguably makes this volume distinctive is the potential for high-level theoretical, methodological and practical outcomes of an interface rich in experience, insight and knowledge. The historic and contemporary relations between universities and the security and intelligence agencies are however far from uncontroversial. Indeed, they are deeply so, contested and contestable across a range of domains: the operational, the epistemological, the ethical and the existential. Outlining these matters further in the framing chapter which follows this introduction – and however contentious relations between universities and the security and intelligence agencies are likely to remain – there is an emergent shared frame of argument and analysis. We argue that the matters in this volume are not – far from – issues of academic abstraction or primarily historic interest, but relate to national and global contexts of acute, present-day and certainly future security threat. Today, these and unknown future threats relate as ever to the interests of nation states. Yet, there is, too, ever more evidence to show these threats transcending national borders. Across national and transnational terrains, peoples and their nations, the world itself, now and in the future, confronts a range of existential threats unlike those of the past. The threats have redefined academic and practitioner understandings of what security and intelligence mean, and what it means to study and research such subjects at universities. In addition to the cross-disciplinary scholarly insights which this volume provides, one practical hope for the future is that the combined knowledge and expertise of universities and the security and intelligence agencies may well provide, then, one component in addressing matters of existential threat.

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PART I

Universities, security and intelligence studies An academic cartography

1 THE UNIVERSITY-SECURITYINTELLIGENCE NEXUS Four domains Liam Francis Gearon Introduction The Bodleian is the main library of the University of Oxford. Its most famous hub is the large domed building of the Radcliffe Camera. The Bodleian’s centuries-old holdings of knowledge in the physical forms of books, journals and electronic sources cross the University’s four academic divisions, its departments and faculties, and its constituent colleges. The filmic and literary backdrop to the intrigues of John le Carré, the detection of Inspector Morse, the Bodleian is also one locus at the heart of the complex historic and contemporary relationship between universities and the UK’s security and intelligence agencies. Within view of the Radcliffe Camera is Brasenose College where John Buchan was an undergraduate, years before working for the War Propaganda Bureau, in 1915, the year of The Thirty-Nine Steps (Altenhöner, 2019; Buchan, 2004; Buchan, 2019; Lownie, 2003; National Archives, 2019; Sanders, 1975). Opposite is All Souls, where, from 1957 to 1967, philosopher Isaiah Berlin held the Oxford University Chichele Chair of Social and Political Theory, before becoming the inaugural President of Wolfson College. An émigré from the Russian Revolution, Isaiah Berlin’s intellectual life intermeshed with political life, including the security and intelligence agencies, variant accounts of which appear in biographies (Ignatieff, 2000). From 1945 to 1946, Berlin served at the British Embassy in Moscow, and in his memoire Personal Impressions describes meeting officials but the highlight of his duties seems to have been meeting with Boris Pasternak and Anna Akhmatova, whom he considered two ‘writers of genius’ (Berlin, 1988: x). As the anonymous 1997 Daily Telegraph obituary writes: ‘Stalin was furious that the meetings had taken place, saying, “I see that our nun [referring to Akhmatova] now receives foreign spies”’ (Telegraph, 1997). In a vein that, as we shall see, characterises the founder of the Bodleian Library, Deighton (2013) rightly designates the academic and intelligence interface of Isaiah Berlin’s life, defining him as a Cold War ‘don and diplomat’. One of the most notable narratives of Berlin’s life draws its title from an epigram of Immanuel Kant: ‘Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made’ (­Banville, 2013; Berlin, 2013). This perhaps is an apt analogy for the interactions between espionage and the Academy, where we find no straight path, but only a nascent pattern of interactions evidently emergent for centuries. 7

Liam Francis Gearon

Look back further, then, to a renowned collection of scholarship, to the early sixteenth century, and you will see a library whose fortunes would be turned by a scholar and a spy. A young undergraduate at Magdalen College (a BA at 18) and Fellow of Merton College (a probationary fellow at the same age), Thomas Bodley’s (1545–1613) great legacy is the ­Bodleian Library, since 1604 known by King James 1 decree as ‘The Library of the Foundation of Sir Thomas Bodley’, and from 1605 thence the Bibliotheca Bodkeiana (Clennell, 2006: 11). Bodley also had a successful political career, at home and abroad, one largely neglected by scholars (cf. Adams, 2011; Clennell, 2002; Trim, 1998). Here, he found royal approval in the diplomatic service of Queen Elizabeth I, between 1585 and 1597, making, according to his briefest of autobiographies, many a ‘diplomatic mission’ (Bodley, 2006). Politically focused on the Protestant cause in England and Europe, Bodley is referenced in contemporaneous state papers (Wernham, 1936). Martin’s (2016) Elizabethan Espionage here portrays diplomat Thomas Bodley as a man of Catholic counterintelligence on continental Europe. It was this Thomas Bodley who would save the library named after him and receive a knighthood, as current-day Chiefs of spy agencies do in recognition of public service. Having married a rich widow whose late husband made a fortune selling pilchards, on Bodley’s own comfortable retirement he set to further public good. Familiar with the locales where spies and scholars met, Bodley resolved to set up my staff at the library door in Oxon; being thoroughly persuaded, that in my solitude, and surcease from the Commonwealth affairs, I could not busy myself to better purpose, than by reducing that place (which then in every part lay ruined and waste) to the public use of students. (Bodley, 2006) The Bodleian Library details a large initial donation of two and a half thousand books, some of Bodley’s own. With Thomas James appointed librarian, opening on 8 November 1602, the next stage of the story makes Bodley and the library opening distinctive: In 1610 Bodley entered into an agreement with the Stationers’ Company of London under which a copy of every book published in England and registered at Stationers’ Hall would be deposited in the new library. Although at first the agreement was honoured more in the breach than in the observance, it nevertheless pointed to the future of the library as a comprehensive and ever-expanding collection, different in both size and purpose from the libraries of the colleges. (Bodleian, 2019) This would ultimately require more building space, and the ever-energetic Bodley set to planning an extension. Dying in 1613, he did not live to see the building works completed, though he would leave an extraordinary legacy. In terms of the university-security-intelligence nexus, the obvious historic resonance is that a former Oxford student, don, diplomat and spy returns to support the work of a university. The less obvious epistemological parallel lies in his negotiations with the Stationers’ Company, which made Oxford’s University Library a legal deposit for all published books. Bodley sees the importance of all sources of knowledge, and its systematisation. This sixteenth-century academic arrangement, one might argue, anticipates the indiscriminate breadth of twenty-first-century intelligence gathering (Lowenthal and Clark, 2015). Much publicised leaks by Julian Assange and Edward Snowden illustrate a modern variant on an old theme on the uses of knowledge gathering for security and intelligence purposes (Betts, 2009; Fidler 2015; Greenwald, 2015; Harding 2014; Johnson, Aldrich, Moran, 8

The university-security-intelligence nexus

Barrett, Hastedt, Jervis, Krieger, McDermott, Omand, Phythian and Wark, 2014). These two cases illustrate the expansive frame of security and intelligence of which universities are an important part to which little systematic analysis has been applied. It is illustrative to look at the widespread focus on intelligence gathering for such security purposes to see where and why the Academy is now irrevocably entwined, too, with these same security and intelligence purposes. Julian Assange, found of WikiLeaks, came to the fore in the light of exposés related to the conduct of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The continued range of documents, some classified, released into the public domain, show fairly unambiguously the extent of a blurring between civilian and military surveillance targeting by states and their agencies (WikiLeaks, 2019). Such developments have themselves spawned a literature on surveillance as a sub-field within security and intelligence studies (Ball, Haggerty and Lyon, 2014), though Foucault (1977, 2009, 2010) had long before analysed the deep state of security and surveillance. In more proximate terms, then, none of the post-Assange revelations were in fact either new and nor should they have been surprising. Just as Herman and Chomsky (1995), even before 9/11, had observed the determined and integrated public policy efforts of states to ‘manufacture consent’, post-9/11 readers of the California Law Review – to take one erudite example only – would have read an instructive article on the breakdown of public and private intelligence domains in the War on Terror (Michaels, 2008). Michaels writes: Unable to target or repel terrorists using conventional military tactics and munitions alone, the United States is acutely aware that today’s pivotal battlefield is an informational one. Teams of U.S. intelligence agents, acting as eavesdroppers, infiltrators, interrogators, and data-miners, must race against the clock to anticipate terrorists’ actions, frustrate their missions, and dismantle their infrastructure. Because the U.S. government does not know the who, what, where, and when of the next terrorist strike, but recognizes that might be hatched on domestic soil, its first step must be to cast a gather all sorts of data points, any one of which might be the clue intelligence agents to prevent another September 11-like catastrophe. In this regard, there is no better ally than the private sector. Its comparative over the government in acquiring vast amounts of potentially useful function both of industry’s unparalleled access to the American intimate affairs-access given by all those who rely on businesses their personal, social, and economic transactions-and of asymmetries insofar as private organizations can at times obtain information more easily and under fewer legal restrictions than the government can when it collects similar information. (Michaels, 2008: 901–902) Universities have here, in both public and private sectors, long been a part of this knowledge gathering. For those not reading articles in the California Law Review, this long-established partnership of private sector collaboration with the security and intelligence agencies would take a digestible narrative form with a spying scandal showing an ingrained interconnection which had actually been present since long before the Cold War (Betts, 2009; Laville and Wilford, 2012). So, in 2013, Edward Snowden, a one-time NSA employee, presented to the Guardian newspaper one of the largest leaks of secret information in modern times. It detailed widescale and apparently indiscriminate interception of communication by agencies such as 9

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GCHQ and the NSA, revealing mass surveillance across all aspects of society, far beyond security/intelligence-defined targets (Fidler 2015). Johnson et al. (2014) state in plain terms: …the NSA hired Edward J. Snowden to help with some of its computer work. At the time of his hiring in 2013, Snowden – a 29-year-old high school dropout from suburban Maryland and a former CIA computer specialist – was under contract as a data specialist with the giant defence firm Booz Allen Hamilton. In his short stint with the NSA, Snowden reportedly stole some 1.7 million classified documents from the agency’s computers. He leaked many of these documents over the next year to American and British journalists, as a protest against what he viewed as improper surveillance methods used by the NSA against American and British citizens. ( Johnson et al. 2014: 14) A 2013 BBC report at the time has former director of GCHQ Sir David Omand (contributor to this volume in a private capacity) stating this as the ‘most catastrophic loss to British intelligence ever’ (BBC, 2013). Nigel Inkster, former director of operations and intelligence at MI6 (also writing in this volume in a private capacity), was reported as saying that he ‘agreed with [Omand’s] assessment’ (BBC, 2013). Hyperbole predominates in the analysis: Fundamentally, privacy is being abolished – not eroded, not diminished, not encroached upon, but abolished. And being constructed in its place is a colossal digital new Stasi, driven by a creepy intoxication with what is now technically possible, combined with politicians’ age-old infatuation with bullying, snooping and creating mountains of bureaucratic prestige for themselves at the expense of the snooped-upon taxpayer. (Bradshaw, 2014) The constant refrain of surveillance agencies is that the leaks were dangerous components of national security, prospective surveillance justified (generally today) by a pervasive fear of terrorist attack. The leaks have led to the Five Eyes – USA, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – in terms of intelligence collection policy and practice (Walsh and Miller, 2016). One of the implications, ironically, is a breaking down of public–private and political-­ security interests. Here, the debate moves ‘beyond simplistic notions of privacy vs. security to a more detailed understanding of the policy and ethical dilemmas confronting policymakers and intelligence agencies’ (Walsh and Miller, 2016: 345). In an interview with the Guardian to mark the fifth anniversary of the phone-call that began the story that would lead his exile to Hong Kong and then Russia, Snowden attests to the ­significance of his own actions. Heightening public duty to tell of the permeation of security and intelligence in all our lives, he has bought into the hyperbole: ‘People say nothing has changed: that there is still mass surveillance. That is not how you measure change. Look back before 2013 and look at what has happened since. Everything changed’ (MacAskill and Hern, 2018). Yet, it is possible that the modern-day drama follows an old storyline. There had, for example, been an earlier email, to Glenn Greenwald, on 1 December 2012. This communication would frame No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State, spawn documentaries and even a Hollywood film. The framing around the use and abuse of political power, reports Greenwald, is as deep as antiquity: On December 1, 2012, I received my first communication from Edward Snowden, although I had no idea at the time that it was from him. The contact came in the form of an email from someone calling himself Cincinnatus, a reference to Lucius Quinctius 10

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Cincinnatus, the Roman farmer who, in the fifth century BC, was appointed dictator of Rome to defend the city against attack. He is most remembered for what he did after vanquishing Rome’s enemies: he immediately and voluntarily gave up political power and returned to farming life. Hailed as a ‘model of civic virtue’, Cincinnatus has become a symbol of the use of political power in the public interest and the worth of limiting or even relinquishing individual power for the greater good. The email began: ‘The security of people’s communications is very important to me…’ (Greenwald, 2014) That security and intelligence is not merely about knowledge of known but possible, potential and prospective enemies. Arguably, then, only the means not the principle is new. No one in the security and intelligence communities would therefore have been surprised by Snowden. And in universities, no one should be surprised that their own complex bureaucracies of knowledge creation, gathering and dissemination might just be of interest to a security and intelligence system looking anywhere and everywhere for knowledge of and the means for protection against threat. Speculative and targeted knowledge gathering about everyone and everything is undertaken now by organisations of staggering bureaucratic and hierarchical complexity – a notion which applies equally to universities and the security and intelligence community. This volume goes someway to demonstrate such national, regional and global security and intelligence interactions in relation to the Academy, adding a specific dimension to the literature of comparative international studies in security and intelligence (Davies and Gustafson, 2016; De Graaff, Nyce, and Locke, 2018; Farson, Gill, Phythian, and Shapiro, 2008; Kirchner and Dominguez, 2011). Universities are often the critical centre-point for the analysis of those power relations. Inside the Academy, the intellectual challenges can either form part of critique or be an element in the maintenance of power. Such analyses of power are particularly evident in elite studies (Bakir, 2018; Domhoff, 2017). And such analysis of power has on occasion made academics themselves a source of security and intelligence agency interest. The early deceased Columbia University sociologist C. Wright Mills (2000) is a good case. The 1956 publication of The Power Elite was his sociological analysis of power in ­A merica around the cornerstones of economy, military and politics: the ‘corporate rich’, the ‘warlords’ and the ‘political directorate’ (Genieys, 2016; Mills, 2000). Genieys significantly highlights the interaction between these elites, and indirectly shows the strong elite interface with universities. Thus: ‘Eisenhower’s presidency (1953–61) served as a conspicuous sign that political roles were interchangeable in these highest echelons of power since he was a former army general and chief of staff (1945–8) before becoming president of Columbia University (1948–50)’ (Genieys, 2016: np). By a few years, the book’s publication coincided with the formation of the CIA, and the insecurities of the Cold War. It was a book much read by America’s revolutionary enemies, many of which enemies, such as Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, were C. Wright Mills’ friends. He had met and talked with them and other Communist leaders on his 1960 trip to Cuban (Treviño, 2017). Much in the manner of Alexis de ­Tocqueville, another famous America sociologist examining the sources and tensions of democracy in the wake of revolution, Mills wrote a book on his Cuban experience, Listen Yankee. In contrast to de Tocqueville, however, Mills was very much under suspicion for his foreign visit, and he provides here a significant case study of a university professor of interest to the security and intelligence services (Alarcón, 2017; Mills and Mills, 2000). Mills’ theories of the elite and their ramifications are still assessed today and have led to a burgeoning in the study of power, elites and leadership (Williams, 2012). Few intellectuals can claim his proximity to power as well as writing about it. Mills died prematurely, at the 11

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age of 45, in March 1962. Alarcón (2017) narrates the atmosphere which defined the months before and after his Cuba visit and the publication of Listen, Yankee: Among the first to read the book were FBI analysts, since the bureau obtained the manuscript prior to its publication. Anticipating its impact, the FBI also tried, unsuccessfully, to convince the publisher, Ian Ballantine, to publish a negative perspective of the revolution by another author. Mills received numerous messages of support and appreciation of his book. He was also criticized, insulted and threatened. According to the FBI, a few days following the appearance of Listen, Yankee, someone sent Mills an anonymous letter warning him that ‘an American agent disguised as a South American would assassinate him on his next visit to Cuba’. In a memo dated November 29, 1960, the FBI noted that ‘Mills indicated he would not be surprised if this were true since he does not doubt that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other similar United States organizations do not approve of his activities. Mills has made several inquiries in regard to purchasing a gun for self-­protection.’ It is significant that the paragraph immediately following this quote is blacked out by the FBI and remains classified. (Alarcón, 2017) Mills is a dramatic case. Yet, analyses of political and intellectual power are indeed always integral to the universities-security-intelligence nexus. For example, during the 1960s and 1970s an important instance of this nexus was alleged CIA and FBI activity to destabilise and discredit pan-African movements as a source of perceived threat to state security on campus and beyond. Potash (2008) describes this as a ‘war’ and a ‘murderous targeting’ of prominent black leaders: ‘Tupac Shakur, Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, Panthers, Hendrix, Marley, Rappers and Linked Ethnic Leftists’. Such matters were assessed by the United States’ Senate Report on ‘domestic spying by the FBI, CIA and NSA’, the 1976 Church Committee (Church Committee, 1976; Johnson, 2018). Book II of the Church Committee Report – Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans – shows just how much counter-civil rights activity touched the United States’ campus, in part explaining long-term academic and student resistance to universities’ connections to such agencies (Zwerling, 2011). A preparatory volume of the Report (Church Committee, 1975) – Covert Action in Chile, 1963–1973 – shows that such intelligence activity was widespread too on campuses beyond United States’ jurisdiction. Such analyses are inevitably most highlighted in times of security crisis. 9/11 was subject to just such analyses, from many quarters (Chomsky, 2001; Williams, 2011). The wars which followed, which themselves prompted a climate of global terror, have thus only intensified such power debates. In these debates, security and intelligence are often framed through discourses of imperial power and historical analyses (for example) of western colonialism (Chomsky 2004, 2017; Žižek, 2009). In this milieu of discourse flux, a multi-polar world of political uncertainty produces a plethora of alternative power narratives. But they show a marked shift towards the global – to the rediscovery and increased prominence of anticolonial counter-narratives of the east and the global south gain (for instance, Bhabha, 1990, 2004; Césaire, 2000; Fanon, 2001; Mishra, 2013; Said, 1994). This identity power politics pervades all aspects of contemporary, rights-oriented modern societies. And all discourses which promote potential instability (a shift in power) become part of security and intelligence agency operations just as much as they pervade the discourse of knowledge and power in the Academy (Betts, 2009; Foucault, 2009). For this reason, we can see why university relations with security and intelligence agencies are a prism to see the broader spectrum of societal-security-intelligence tensions in open societies, 12

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between liberty and security ( Johnson, 2018). But consciousness of such issues is also now integral to recruitment to security and intelligence agencies themselves (for example, CIA, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c; FBI, 2011, 2015; 2019a, 2019b, 2019c). If social activism and ideas are security- and intelligence-sensitive, scientific research and its technological applications are more so (Galliot and Reed, 2016). An interest in scientific research has, of course, been of longstanding security and intelligence concern. The Manhattan Project put a historic principle of science-advancing-war to unprecedented effect (Ellsberg, 2019; Rhodes, 2012). Three years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as the Soviets accessed the same technology, the Eberstadt Report (1948) thus stated that ‘Failure to properly appraise the extent of scientific developments in enemy countries may have more immediate and catastrophic consequences than failure in any other field of intelligence’. From the Manhattan project to post-Snowden, decades after the Church Committee, the trajectory of cooperation is towards ever more integrated use of institutions such as universities for ‘leverage’, ‘talent’ and technology. The Report of the National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community, for example, recommends the latter: Assessing longer-term workforce needs within the context of a more competitive private sector and global marketplace and develop procedures to recruit and keep needed talent. Increase and augment IC R&D talent by emphasizing approaches to innovation sharing within the public and private sectors, universities, and research and national labs, and by developing an IC strategy and approach for creating R&D opportunities for non-U.S. citizens. (NCR, 2013) Part, then, of a wider picture of engagement, this and similar recommendations have had the impact of further legitimating already long-established security and intelligence agency use of institutions like universities, including the internationalisation of such practices, the systematic consideration of which is arguably a neglected part of the security and intelligence, and also higher education, literature (Kirchner and Dominguez, 2011; Rüegg, 2004, 2010). A lack of transparency in such interactions is at the heart of an almost intractable problem. And here, the Church Committee remains important in framing the dilemma. Thus in opening of the Report on Foreign and Military Intelligence, universities again feature – along with the private sector – as part of an important feature of security and intelligence, for both sides of the Cold War: Various exchange groups provide additional opportunities for Soviet intelligence gathering within the United States. Some 4,000 Soviets entered the United States as commercial or exchange visitors in 1974. During the past decade, the FBI identified over 100 intelligence officers among the approximately 400 Soviet students who attended American universities during this period as part of an East-West student exchange program.7 Also, in the 14-year history of this program, more than 100 American students were the target of Soviet recruitment approaches in the USSR. (Church Committee, 1976: 164) Their often covert nature however deemed to undermine the very values such activity was deemed to undergird: Over time national perceptions would change as to the nature and seriousness of the communist ideological and institutional threat. Time and experience would also give 13

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increasing currency to doubts as to whether it made sense for a democracy to resort to practices such as the clandestine use of free American institutions and individuals-­ practices that tended to blur the very difference between ‘our’ system and ‘theirs’ that these covert programs were designed to preserve. (Church Committee, 1976: 179) These covert relationships have, the Report stated, ‘attracted public concern and the attention of this Committee because of the importance Americans attach to the independence of private institutions’: ‘Americans recognize that insofar as universities, newspapers, and religious groups help mould the beliefs of the public and the policymakers, their diversity and legitimacy must be rigorously protected’. Yet, the Committee also recognised the ‘necessity of certain clandestine operations, particularly the collection of foreign intelligence’, and thus: To conclude that certain sectors of American life must be placed ‘off limits’ to clandestine operations inevitably raises questions not only on possible intelligence losses which would result from such a prohibition, but on whether the United States can afford to forego the clandestine use of our universities, our media, and our religious groups in competing with our adversaries. (Church Committee, 1976: 179–180) Moves along this trajectory have led to where we are today, where the lines of demarcation of security and intelligence interest, a positioning as difficult theoretically as it is pragmatically to define: since ‘when everything is intelligence, nothing is intelligence’ (Agrell, 2002). The latter statement is both true and contestable. As Agrell narrates from the experience of someone trying to establish ‘intelligence’ in his Swedish university: A few years ago I got the idea to establish a center for intelligence analysis at my university. We had a few relevant courses and a few individuals scattered among various institutions. To create some kind of platform would, in my opinion, be a first step toward establishing something more permanent that in the end might end up as a discipline. So I went to see my boss, the institute director. He was not negative, but he saw the obstacles. He said he would think about it and talk to the influential people in the faculties to get their opinion. After a few weeks he came back to me. The result was negative. First, there was no money for a project like this and, secondly, there were some serious doubts about the purpose. Or, as one of the senior professors had put it, ‘Intelligence?’ Isn’t that what we all are engaged in at the university?’ But there was still some hope; we could simply call it something else, like ‘knowledge management’. Business administration had a lot of funding for that. (Agrell, 2002) The dramatically shifted breadth of knowledge targeting and threat determination has undermined traditional interpretations of intelligence and security and seems, as here, to threaten the defences too of traditional disciplines. The universities-security-intelligence nexus demonstrates here one of the most powerful determinants of a shift in language around security and intelligence, a broadening which has not seemingly been accompanied by a deepening of understandings. Yet, this is not mere linguistic abstraction. The broadening of threat determinations and the necessary knowledge sources to deal with these factors (threats) alter irrevocably our understandings of what is meant by security and what we understand as intelligence. The multi-polar world in which we live today shows every sign in certain quarters towards 14

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reversals of retreating back towards old nationalisms, but the boundaries of threat cannot be contained by the limitations of the territory of state lines (Hazony, 2018; Vaughan-­Williams, 2012). Though defined by different purposes, knowledge and the use of knowledge to protect against threats (ranging from state to planetary stability and from societal to species survival) is foundational to the relationship between university and security-intelligence communities. So, too, are the interpretive frames which help shaping thinking about the meaning and import of knowledge (in intelligence terms, strategic analysis). Narrow in focus, a sub-field traversing and clearly defined by the relations of the universities to security and intelligence/studies, the universities-security-intelligence nexus nevertheless raises questions about and helps us to think on the deeper perspectives involved when we talk about security and intelligence. The universities-security-intelligence nexus has four overlapping domains: the operational; the epistemological; the ethical and the existential.

The universities-security-intelligence nexus This Handbook begins to map this universities-security-intelligence nexus. On the one hand, this is a step towards defining an emergent academic sub-field which traverses the academic disciplines of university/higher education, security and intelligence studies. On the other, the interface shows ethically fraught spheres of security and intelligence agencies’ engagements with universities. The latter is part of a wider relationship with national security and intelligence agencies and respective strategic users of security and intelligence knowledge for national governments and policymakers (see, for example, Cogan, 2004; ­Davies, 2004, 2010; Johnson, 2012; Zegart, 2007a, 2007b) (Figure 1.1). The overlapping (operational, epistemological, ethical, existential) domains of the ­universities-security-intelligence nexus can be provisionally defined as follows. The operational defines the different modus operandi of engagement between universities and security and intelligence agencies; the epistemological treats of knowledge as the critical currency of the universities-security-intelligence nexus; the ethical determines the framework for behavioural and moral judgements called into play, and called into question; the existential domain shows, at least in prospect, a common shared concern (put negatively) of forewarning and protection against threat and (put constructively) survival (of states, societies, even, today, species) as a shared strategic teleology or purpose. Such modelling transcends traditional notions of nation-limited models of security and intelligence. It is an evolving and transformative map of highly complex interaction. In this map – which this framing chapter itself attempts to shape – dramatic shifts in the coordinates

Global Universities

National Security and Intelligence Agencies

National Government and Public Policy

Figure 1.1  The Universities-Security-Intelligence Nexus – The Basic Model

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• The Operational Domain

• The Epistemological Domain

National Universities

National Security and Intelligence Agencies

National Governments

Global Human Concerns

•The Ethical Domain

•The Existential Domain

Figure 1.2  The Universities-Security-Intelligence Nexus – The Advancing Model

of threat have begun to alter definitions of security and intelligence themselves. From the insecurities of social identities to the death of species, from economic instability to environmental fragility, risk, threat and uncertainty have brought security to centre-ground (Dartnell, 2015; Fabre, 2018; Murray, 2018). These altered definitions retain traditional conceptions of national security but now extend notions of security and intelligence beyond former limits to incorporate global human threats in which universities play a critical role both in defining and addressing (Agrell, 2012; Balzacq, Léonard and Rusicka, 2016; Collini, 2017; Ridder-Symoens, 2008a, 2008b; Rüegg, 2004, 2010; Willets, 2017; Williams, 2016). These threat narratives represent real- and existential-level threats in a world characterised by a fragmentation as much as by globalisation. The advancing model (Figure 1.2) of the universities-security-intelligence nexus thus extends the focus from national to international policy and shows shared global concerns around shifting existential threats across university, security/intelligence and governmental domains. Each of these specific domains, in turn – the operation, the epistemological, the ­ethical, the existential – shows a marked interdependence and demonstrates how the ­universitiessecurity-intelligence nexus reveals patterns in the development of security and intelligence definition and focus, theoretical and pragmatic.

The universities-security-intelligence nexus: the operational domain The commonplace notion of the universities-security-intelligence nexus retains even today an aura of oft-glamorised secrecy, a world of the academy and the elite, of covert, derring-do and subversive operations. Exemplars abound of this secrecy as an aspect of societal elitism throughout the long history of intelligence (Andrew, 2018; Bakir, 2018; Cormac, 2018; Dorril, 2002; MacIntyre, 2016, 2018; Moran, 2013). The university aspects of this history are disparate but deeply embedded in the history of espionage. A few examples might suffice. Thus, British historian and literary assistant to Winston Churchill, Sir Frederick William Dampier Deakin (1913–2005), has a ­Second World War career in the Special Operations Executive, most famously working with 16

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Yugoslav partisans under Tito as counter-insurgents against German and Italian o ­ ccupying forces, and in 1950 is appointed the inaugural Warden of newly founded St  ­A ntony’s ­College, Oxford. It is St Antony’s which appears in John le Carré’s Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, where recruits to Cold War espionage are framed according to refined assessments of their university backgrounds, and an argument over whether this Oxford College is establishment or ‘red-brick’ (Le Carré, 2009: 27). St Antony’s, it seems, was allegedly, too, the site for intrigue amongst young researchers as staff. Sheila Fitzpatrick’s (2015) memoir A Spy in the Archives highlights the use of student exchanges to Cold War Russia as cover for other activities. It would be a pattern which would apparently continue into Fitzpatrick’s career as a historian, where she seems to interweave careers in espionage and the Academy (Fitzpatrick, 2015). Daphne Parks (1921–2010) had worked in various covert roles for the Foreign Office while serving in the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) from the late 1940s onwards. Her diplomatic assignments took her to early Cold War Moscow and to Leopoldville (Kinshasa), capital of the Congo, during the time when Patrice Lumumba was assassinated. She would rise in the diplomatic service ranks to High Commissioner at Lusaka at the heights of post-colonial struggle. There was even a posting (1969–1970) to Vietnam War era Hanoi. After retirement, in 1979, she became the Principal of Somerville College, Oxford, the year Somerville’s onetime chemistry undergraduate became the Prime Minister of Britain (Hayes, 2015). A multiplicity of exemplars could thus show security and intelligence agencies integrally related to elite universities. In the UK, the university educations of Director Generals of MI5, Chiefs of MI6 and Directors of GCHQ show as much (ODNB, 2019).1,2,3 However, the university educations of those in similar roles in the United States – FBI, CIA, NSA – show greater breadth of university educations (ANB, 2019; Kessler 2003),4,5,6 though the CIA has had a particularly ingrained relationship with the American Ivy League (Winks, 1987). Indeed, though, Winks’ (1987) Cloak and Gown, a study of CIA relations with American universities between 1939 and 1961. Historical in focus, Winks provides exemplars of embedded relations between universities and security and intelligence agencies. Focusing on notable individuals, Winks draws these relationships through a series of academic categories: the university – a designated recruiting ground for Ivy League intellectuals; the campus, using William L. Langer and Sherman Kent to illustrate how the CIA and Research and Analysis Branch predecessors taking on nomenclature and analytic propensities of the Academy into the CIA; the library, seen through the bookish Joseph Toy Curtiss, a project at Yale designated for the collection of primary source ‘war literature’, open in its call for materials, and covert in its secret wartime purposes; the athlete, through the picaresque Donald Downes focusing on prowess and endurance on sports – and battlefield; the professor, detailing through Norman Holmes Pearson, the intellectual, counterintelligence counterpoint to field action; the theorist, counterintelligence intellectuality being no better personified than by the poet, scholar and most enigmatic figure in American espionage, James Jesus Angleton; and, finally, the alumnus, with Winks showing how the university-security-intelligence nexus is a cycle, whereby students and professors retain links and influences on campus. Seen in such historic light, the universities-security-intelligence nexus can appear as an anomalous nostalgia for intrigue of another, wartime age. Ever more frequently dramatised, filmed and franchised, it is particularly curious that in a milieu where mass surveillance is resisted that master of covert operations should be iconic. Ian Fleming’s famous character remains here the most popular amongst global franchises, and the licence to kill seems a delight that traverses cultures as much as it does the decades, the rise and fall of James Bond’s Cold 17

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War enemies no obstacle to creating contemporary others. Eton and Sandhurst-educated Ian Fleming did not, however, attend university, and Bond, though cultured, could not be described as a bookworm. Interestingly, it is the university type of spy which security and intelligence agency chiefs are pleased to avow. So, a former Chief of Britain’s SIS (Bond’s employer) has stated a non-fictional preference for the fictional representation of the trade. Sir Alex Younger thus singled out ‘the merits of what he considered to be appropriate characters in fiction’: … I should make it clear that, despite bridling at the implication of a moral equivalence between us and our opponents that runs through novels, I’ll take the quiet courage and integrity of George Smiley over the brash antics of 007, any day. (McCrum, 2017) Yet, the filmic subterfuge of Bond is not so easily dismissed. Younger’s preference for Smiley over 007 may be a deflection of secret activity through the characters of fiction, or a deferring to the primacy of intellect in espionage, or ‘an elaborate tangle of misdirection, make-believe and conspiracy’ (McCrum, 2017). As Winston Churchill observed: ‘In the higher ranges of secret service work, the actual facts of many cases were in every respect equal to the most fantastic inventions of romance and melodrama’ ( Jablonsky, 1991). The arcane George Smiley – quintessential British scholar-spy, partly based on a onetime chaplain and later Rector of Lincoln College, Oxford – retains a very particular, understated, English sort of glamour. At Lincoln College today, hopes of sharing the allure seem to remain an aspiration. In an Oxford student newspaper, Catherine Edwards writes: I can’t be the only person who’s spent at least some of my time at Oxford hoping to be talent spotted by MI5…I choose to interpret this as proof that Lincolnites are just particularly good spies – ones who don’t get found out. She asks: ‘But just what is the deal with Oxford and spying?’ A Lincolnite answers by narrating the story of a famous alumnus: David Cornwell, better known under the pseudonym John Le Carré, was one of those working for both MI5 and MI6 at the height of the Cold War. His knowledge of ­German allowed him to work in Hamburg and carry out interrogations on those who had crossed to the West through the Iron Curtain. Even while studying at Lincoln College he was working undercover for the secret service, joining far-left societies to look out for anyone in league with the Soviets. His career came to an abrupt end when British double agent (and Cambridge student, not that I’m implying anything) Kim Philby exposed the identities of several British secret agents to the KGB. Le Carré became a full-time author, and his spy novels inspired by his time in the service were well received. The rowing boats belonging to Lincoln’s Boat Club are still named after perhaps his best known book, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy. (Edwards, 2013, np) She concludes: ‘So, if your tutor does approach you for a word about your “future options”, be aware they might not just mean choosing your…papers, and an altogether more dangerous and exciting path may be in store…’ (Edwards, 2013, np). In Britain, this elite aura is also tainted by treachery. The historical associations between universities and the security and intelligence agencies will forever bring to mind ‘the Cambridge Spies’. These are generally numbered as five: Guy Burgess, Kim Philby, 18

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Donald Maclean, Anthony Blunt and John Cairncross. They were, too, a self-conscious elite, befittingly intelligent, even hyper-intelligent, to varying degrees debauched (even by the standards of a more liberal age), and treacherous. Each in their own way had been born to privilege, and had access to the best of educations. The story of their betrayal is clear, secrets handed to the Soviets for decades. Burgess, Maclean and Philby were the first to be discovered. Burgess and Maclean defected in 1951 to the Soviet Union where their S­ oviet paymasters resided and where they were allowed to live the remainder of their lives in l­oneliness – bar the occasional visits by literary outliers like Graham Greene – and i­ronically under suspicion from the very Soviet authorities who recruited them for having too successfully infiltrated the security and intelligence services they deceived. Their anonymity shrouded by their elitism, Anthony Blunt, adviser to Her Majesty the Queen on matters of art, was stripped of his knighthood in 1979 by no less a figure than Prime Minister Thatcher, the year, we have seen, the loyal SIS officer Daphne Parks becomes the Principal of Somerville College, Oxford. Academic elitism, too, seemed to have been preparing for espionage. Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean were thus members of a Cambridge group called the Apostles founded in 1820 by George Tomlinson as an elite within an elite. Committed to secrecy, alleged members of the Apostles included Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore, John Maynard Keynes and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The group came to prominence in the post-First World War years with the club’s association with literary figures such as Leonard Woolf, Lytton Strachey, E.M. Forster and Rupert Brooke (Allen, 2010; Lubenow 2007; Rosner, 2014). Sinclair’s (1986) The Red and the Blue: Intelligence, Treason and the Universities brings all of this to light and shows an historical interconnectedness with elites and academic intelligence as a natural breeding ground to foment ties of espionage and the Academy. Accounts of esoteric academic elites have continued to mark later relations between universities and the security agencies. Thus in the early 1960s, the American writer and former Cambridge Apostle Michael Straight claimed that he had a covert relationship with the Soviets, naming Anthony Blunt, MI5 officer and prominent director of the Courtauld Institute, as the individual responsible for his recruitment. Other accusations have been labelled at links between the Cambridge Apostles and Soviet Intelligence. In The Fifth Man, Perry (1994) makes a case against Victor the 3rd Baron Rothschild, a friend of Burgess and Blunt. In The Jew of Linz, Cornish (1998) offers a well-spun tale that Ludwig Wittgenstein (in the same school as Adolf Hitler), making extravagant claims that the latter is the Jewish boy in Mein Kampf which impacted Hitler’s anti-Semitism, and that Wittgenstein, a Communist fellow traveller and Stalinist-sympathiser (like many of the Cambridge Left at the time), enacted a Hitlerite revenge by recruiting Blunt, Philby and others at Cambridge, that Wittgenstein was in effect the éminence grise of the Cambridge spies. Redoubtable as they are readable, such narratives are part of a frame of intrigue in which universities themselves are appropriately shadowy but seemingly ever-present figures. ­Further archival researches continue to highlight the historical depth of an intensifying contemporary interaction. Documents from the post-Cold War-opened KGB Archives thus reveal ­Cambridge and Oxford intellectuals described by the KGB, with mock monarchist ­overtones, as the ‘crown jewels’ of their intelligence networks (West and Tsarev, 1999). ­Pringle’s (2015) Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence provides a systematic reference source for tracing the breadth and showing the depth of such relationships between Russian ­security and intelligence services and the Russian intelligentsia (Fedor, 2013). Andrew and ­Gordievsky’s (1991) KGB history does more intertwining of espionage and intellectual narratives, a ­Cambridge academic co-authoring with a Soviet defector-spy. Andrew works then with the KGB ­archivist to further the historical narrative (Andrew and Mitrokhin, 2018). 19

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Such historical narratives are integral to the intelligence and security studies and the agencies themselves (Scott and Hughes, 2006). Established in 1909 to counteract a German threat, MI5’s own official history is itself narrated by Andrew (2010), a professorial fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, co-convenor of the Cambridge History Faculty’s Intelligence Seminar with Sir Richard Dearlove, former Master of Pembroke College, and former Chief of MI6 (CIS, 2019). MI5’s own self-narrated history highlights spy cases which show the long precedent of connections between spying and scholarship. Featuring prominently is Emil Klaus Fuchs, a German citizen who joined the German Communist Party in the 1930s and subsequently fled to Britain when the Nazis came to power, coming to the UK eventually to earn a doctorate in physics at Edinburgh University where he later obtained a teaching post. Briefly detained as a foreign alien at the outbreak of the Second World War, on release in 1941, he returned to Edinburgh, where his noted scientific expertise led to him being recruited to join ‘the Tube Alloys’ atomic weapons’ programme – the UK contribution to the Manhattan Project – a rush to the apply new atomic physics to create nuclear weapons before G ­ erman science did. Fuchs, codenamed REST, was also however covertly transferred to Soviet M ­ ilitary Intelligence (GRU). A GRU agent named Ursula Beurton (codenamed SONYA) handled Fuchs, the two meeting and exchanging secret documents in the innocuous-seeming anonymity of Oxfordshire’s Banbury (MI5, 2019a, 2019b). Though uncovered and later jailed, from 1943 Fuchs, would play a critical role in the Manhattan Project, developing ‘many of the designs, equations and techniques used to build the first atomic bombs’ (MI5, 2019a, 2019b). These singular exemplars reveal important narrative components of the university-­ security-intelligence nexus. As security and intelligence agencies would be subject to greater government accountability, this covert operational relationship between universities and security and intelligence agencies has come to be more open in terms of public profile and policy (Born, Leigh and Wills, 2011). Three configurations of the universities-­securityintelligence nexus are apparent: the covert or secret; overt or open; and a blended mix of the two. Thus, (I) in their historical origins, security and intelligence services have acted secretly, clandestinely, covertly across university campuses; (II) heightened calls for public and political accountability (at least in democracies) have meant more open or overt operations through campus liaison and recruitment, but the integration of heightened security across public policy has also meant universities are now also carrying overt responsibilities which take them, especially in the era of global terrorism threats, to new models of cooperation with security and intelligence agencies; and yet (III), given that the avowed secrecy of security and intelligence agencies is inevitably retained, in universities as elsewhere, today the covert and clandestine activity by necessity intermingles with openness and accountability (Leigh and Wegge, 2018). This is what is described as ‘ambient accountability’ relating the current functioning of intelligence services in Europe to the wider decline of state secrecy in the face of pressures over of democratic accountability (Bakir, 2018; Leigh and Wegge, 2018). The threefold – covert, overt, covert-overt – model (Gearon, 2015, 2016; Gearon and Parsons) on campus, again as elsewhere, relates security and intelligence community modus operandi to political accountability (Figure 1.3). These three historically and contemporaneously complex levels of interaction between the security and intelligence agencies and public bodies can be applied beyond but apply importantly to universities (Gearon, 2017a, 2017b; Gearon and Parsons, 2018). In sum, the covert illustrates the historically secret involvement of security and intelligence agencies with universities. In the UK and the USA, the historical secrecy of the covert is almost invariably related to the aura of establishment elite, a lack of public visibility and 20

The university-security-intelligence nexus

Limited accountability and openness

Accountability and openness

• Covert (secret, clandestine collection of intelligence)

• Overt (democratic accountability, enhanced openness)

• Covert-Overt (secret, clandestine collection intelligence gathering in a T political environment of democratic accountability, enhanced openness) Blurring of accountability/ openness

Figure 1.3  The Operational Domain (Gearon and Parsons, 2018)

a principled detachment from the political mainstream. In Britain, for example, the very existence of agencies such as the SIS was neither affirmed nor denied and therefore until recently an entirely secret fabric to the furtherance of political policy, and occasionally appearing to act at odds with it (Aldrich, 2019; Aldrich and Cormac, 2016; Aldrich, Cormac and Goodman, 2014; Davies, 2002). At a fundamental level, we know, too, that universities as institutions are places where security and intelligence personnel were educated and or recruited. In their respective origins, UK and US security and intelligence agency personnel at the highest levels have as students and professors been drawn from, retain links with and occasionally return to elite universities (Sinclair, 1986; Winks, 1987). Universities provided safe havens for scholars who would become spies, and, in retirement, a safe scholarly haven for those with careers in espionage. In an era of greater openness and accountability, security and intelligence community personnel are much less exclusively drawn from elite institutions, but the bond is retained (Bakir, 2018). In terms of universities, the recruitment outreach to students at the CIA today, for instance, there is a multiplicity of opportunities across all types of institutions at all undergraduate and postgraduate levels, and across all subject disciplines, and also for younger people (CIA, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c). The same pattern is true at the FBI, with ‘opportunities at every level’, high school, undergraduate and postgraduate: As the nation’s top law enforcement and intelligence organization, the FBI offers valuable work experience for students at every education level. With a variety of programs, internships, and entry-level career options, the FBI seeks the best and brightest students and recent graduates to bring their knowledge and skills to our diverse workforce. (FBI, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c) These patterns of open student and graduate recruitment now apply to the majority of security and intelligence agencies the world over. Elicited by historic and contemporary claims over security and intelligence agency accountability, there remain strong resonances of an incompatibility between campus and covert security/intelligence activity, drawn not least from the narratives of such activity 21

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( Johnson, 2018; Weiner, 2012a; 2012b). Increased openness and more emphasis on public/ political accountability explain much of the work by security and intelligence communities to address the issues raised by such negative perspectives (Davies and Gustafson, 2016; De Graaff, 2018; De Graaff, Nyce and Locke 2018; Godson, 1988, 1993; Leigh and Wegge, 2018). Security and intelligence agencies’ campus presences are thus part of a wider process of addressing accumulated public impressions of what is, we sometimes forget perhaps, a network of agencies which are there for public protections (CIA, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c; FBI, 2011, 2015, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c). The fact that we can know and compare the university educations of heads of security and intelligence agencies is a mark of this public openness. Providing a lecture to a Public Records Office conference, Sir Stephen Lander, then Director General of the Security Service, noted the irony of a head of MI5 talking openly at an academic conference: Given the perception in some quarters that the Intelligence Agencies are bent on keeping all they have done secret forever, I am conscious of the irony of a chief spook opening a conference advertised as designed to examine ‘the Open Government Initiative and the potential impact of the Freedom of Information Act’. Nevertheless, I am pleased to be able to open the conference because: intelligence records are public records within the meaning of the Act and it is right that, as temporary custodians, the Agencies should from time to time explain their approach to the management of their archives; my Service has made significant changes, with the help of the PRO, to our policies for retention and release of records over the last five years; and as a one-time historian, I can appreciate the academic interest of the original material that the Agencies hold. (Lander, 2001) Recruitment, at least in the United States, is also towards openness of agencies like the Federal Bureau of Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency on campus, the latter now having systematised programmes openly to integrate themselves in universities, though a move also open to objection (LeVine, 2012; Witanek, 1989; Zwerling 2011). Intensely evident post-9/11, the international growth of public and private university degree and research programmes in security and intelligence studies also shows an open interaction between universities and security and intelligence communities (Dover, Goodman and Hillebrand, 2015; Gearon and Parsons, 2018; IAFIE, 2019). In the same post-9/11 period, growth in security and intelligence studies was mirrored by new public policy responsibilities for universities to develop physically and ideologically protective counter-terrorist policies (Gearon 2018; Ghosh, Manuel, Chan, Dilimulati and Babaei, 2016; Mattsson, Hammaren and Odenbring, 2016; Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks and de Winter, 2015). The Covert Model reflects the traditional, historical model of a secret and clandestine collection of intelligence. Modelled on public and private universities, the so-called ‘spy schools’ (Gearon, 2015) such as the CIA University or the European Security and Defence College illustrate the development of secret higher education institutions within the intelligence sector. The covert-overt model, as it implies, reflects a modus operandi within universities where a milieu of enhanced openness and public accountability is combined with intensified, and seemingly intensifying instances, of students and staff at all levels using bone fide academic work as cover for espionage and or other subterfuge, ‘the science of spying’ (Golden, 2017). This gives another gloss to Golden’s (2018) Spy Schools. Here, Golden tells the story of intrigue and subterfuge on campuses not as rare and exotic but commonplace and rather runof-the-mill. Lacking the elite aura of CIA links with American Ivy League faculty, Golden’s picture is one of unremitting penetration by foreign students and visiting staff across US 22

The university-security-intelligence nexus

campuses conspiring covertly to obtain commercial and or military advantage to their home countries. The presence of the FBI on US campuses is justified to defend against such incursions. The practice of academic cover for other secret activities is well known and there are many individual cases but across the spectrum of enemies and allies. Historic revelations concerning anthropologists working undercover in counter-insurgency across South-East Asia during the Vietnam War era (Wakin, 2015), for example, have resurfaced in more recent guises (NYT, 2005; Golden, 2017, 2018). The arts and humanities have also long been used covertly to enhance ideological influence, for instance through the NATO Information Service (NATIS) or CIA involvement with the Congress for Cultural Freedom (Risso, 2014, 2019). Today, the potential of exposure for individual researchers is considerable, and is especially acute where boundaries between the covert and the overt are ill-defined. In security environments heightened by intensified state suspicions of threat, particularly from external university engaged in international work, suspicions are heightened. Perceptions are everything, and everything and everyone can potentially be drawn into the arena of ambiguous dual identity: if security and intelligence agencies operationally use academic cover, the critical risk in terms of safety can become acute – bone fide researchers on sensitive areas of investigation can, and have, thus become subject to and victims of security suspicion. In 2018, an academic researcher in security studies became one such case study. M ­ atthew Hedges, a Durham University doctoral student working on Middle Eastern security policy, was arrested, charged and subsequently given a life imprisonment term for spying in the United Arab Emirates while conducting his research. Later pardoned and released, the Hedges case highlights particular issues for academic security and intelligence researchers. Beyond direct security research directly, the widening of interpretation of what is considered security means that all areas of investigation are also potentially impacted. Thus, in Egypt, January 2016, Giulio Regeni, a twenty-eight-year-old Italian Cambridge doctoral student undertaking field work, researching labour movements, was found dead with evidence of torture before his death (Michaelson, Stephen and Kirchgaessner, 2016). Where a post-‘Arab Spring’ North Africa had seen hopes for moves towards democracy, the rise and fall of governments across the region led to a tightening of security across Egypt and a monitoring of non-governmental agencies, including universities, for signs of state-threatening instability. Giulio Regeni was arguably a victim of this wider security-sensitive geopolitics (Duyvesteyn, de Jong and van Reijn, 2015). Months later, across the eastern borders of Europe, 15 July 2016, Turkey faced and faceddown a coup d’état. In the days, weeks and months that followed, thousands were arrested, removed from positions of administrative, governmental and military power, or, to use the term that gains currency at the time, ‘purged’. What was notable were the range and extent of targeting of not simply military but cultural leaders, journalists, writers and educators, including university lecturers, professors, with deans in every Turkish university being removed (SAR, 2019). A year later, on and beyond the failed coup’s first anniversary, related actions continued, broadening and deepening security service targeting of cultural as much as directly political and military opposition. Within Europe’s borders, the EU too has instigated protections against state-threatening instability, where counter-terrorism policies are but one element of the European Agenda on Security (EAS), into which universities have been drawn. It is interesting to note – though in many respects unfair to highlight – that countries on the edge of the European Union’s borders such as Hungary and Poland have tightened security measures at these same borders, including migratory access from outside the EU to their respective universities, restricting 23

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movements in ways which are often castigated in relatively distant Brussels (Zaborowski, 2018). We do see, however, universities drawn in particular into the security fray, as here when the Hungarian Minister of Interior described public safety as ‘reliable and free of extremism’, addressing in 2017 graduate students of the National University of Public Service: In 2010, the Government set as its goal to make Hungary the safest country in Europe, in the interests of which it is making a huge effort … When this goal was set, “mass migration” had not yet begun and Hungary was not under migration pressure from hundreds of thousands of people, but the difficulties and challenges have not changed the Government’s determination … We are doing everything possible to ensure that Hungary is the safest country in Europe … We will not allow our security and future to be endangered; we will protect our borders from attacks by illegal migrants, charlatans and people smugglers... (Pintér, 2017) In these easterly border countries, the restrictions on academic liberty do not resemble the seemingly draconian steps of those other border nations outside Europe, nor might they be interpreted as restrictions at all but rather protections. However, we stand or whatever our positioning here – repressive or necessary measures – the securitisation is apparent. This same securitisation is rising everywhere across European universities and universities worldwide. Exemplars of actual life stories here make concrete more abstract conceptualisations of turmoil and tragedy, and a small part of a trans-continental evidential linkage between academic life and state security. Organisations such as Scholars at Risk provide a tragic plenitude of other international exemplars of students and academics embroiled in deeply repressive state security measures, irrespective of discipline or seniority within the Academy (SAR, 2019). We have today moved a long way from the historic elite of covert operations and the glamorised aura of true life and spy fictions to a more complex set of interactions. It is an era of greater accountability for security and intelligence agencies, one in which collaborations with universities have been justified particularly through contemporary foci on counter-terrorism measures, But the range of operational extensions in the ­university-security-intelligence nexus is notable, and has as yet untold implications as security threats themselves diversify, from national or state to global concerns with existential threat. It is also an approach which draws significant public research funding (GCRF, 2019; Technopolis, 2015; Tilley, Bouhana and Braithwaite, 2014). Ultimately, however, the implications of a shift away from elites in espionage and the Academy to one centred as firmly on developments in the spread of knowledge made readily available by universities through usual practices of publication and dissemination. As Sinclair (1986) notes: ­ merican One month before the Central Intelligence Agency was established in 1947, some A scientists disconcerted the Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal. They proved that other scientists might discover the state of national atomic research by reading Scientific American and other publications. They could reach the same conclusions on Russian atomic research by reading Soviet publications. Their testimony was used by the defence lawyers of the atomic spy, Klaus Fuchs, to demonstrate that he had merely supplied the Russians with information which was available in scholarly works. Universities could openly provide information that covert operations acquired only by stealth. (Sinclair, 1986: 1) Operationally, universities figure, then, in increasingly evident ways in the modern history of the security and intelligence agencies. It is through the prism of this historical development 24

The university-security-intelligence nexus

that we see today that the epistemological domain inextricably continues (and in ever more complex ways) to link security and intelligence agencies to the Academy.

The universities-security-intelligence nexus: the epistemological domain It is the quest for knowledge which ultimately unites security and intelligence communities with the aims and purposes of universities (Davies, 2002; Dulles, 2006; FBI, 2011, 2015; Herman, 1996; IAFIE, 2019; Johnson, 2012; ODNI, 2005). The traditional focus of security and intelligence agencies with knowledge of defined or suspected enemies of nations-states has been subject to an inexorable expansion, a broadening of security and intelligence concerns which require ever wider models of knowledge gathering (Figure 1.4). Uniting the Academy and the agencies, the epistemological domain combines (1) ­collective disciplinary and cross-disciplinary knowledge and (2) All-Source Intelligence – ­intelligence knowledge for protection from security threats. Hypothetically, this defines a range of knowledge collection theoretically without limit. On the security and intelligence agencies’ side, and in large measure because of the increasing complexity of the security and intelligence communities, the way such knowledge is gathered has become rigorously systematised. All-Source Intelligence is thus notionally divided into five ‘disciplines of intelligence collection’. If these disciplines of intelligence collection define the methods not the ends (or targets) of knowledge gathering, the means, too, show the extent of the epistemological range. Written by two former CIA officers, Mark M. Lowenthal and Robert M. Clark’s (2015) Five Disciplines of Intelligence Collection provides here the foremost guide to the history, evolution and current practice of intelligence gathering. The five disciplines of intelligence collection are: Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) ( Jardines, 2015: 5–43); ­Human Intelligence (HUMINT) (Althoff, 2015: 45–79); Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) (Nolte, 2015: 81–110); Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) (Murdock and Clark, 2015: 111–158) and Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) (Morris and Clark 2015: 159–208). There are alternative models but these tend to vary ordering and ­nomenclature rather than content (Figure 1.5).

(1) National and Global Universities The Epistemological Domain: (1) Collective disciplinary and cross-disciplinary knowledge (2) All-Source Intelligenceintelligence knowledge for protection from security threats

(2) National Security and Intelligence Agencies

Figure 1.4  The Universities-Security-Intelligence Nexus: The Epistemological Domain

25

The Five Disciplines of Intelligence Collection Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is the collection of information from human sources. The ­collection may be done openly, as when FBI agents interview witnesses or suspects, or it may be done through clandestine or covert means (espionage). Within the United States, HUMINT collection is the FBI’s responsibility. Beyond U.S. borders, HUMINT is generally collected by the CIA, but also by other U.S. components abroad. Although HUMINT is an important collection discipline for the FBI, we also collect intelligence through other methods, including SIGINT, MASINT, and OSINT. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) refers to electronic transmissions that can be collected by ships, planes, ground sites, or satellites. Communications Intelligence (COMINT) is a type of SIGINT and refers to the interception of communications between two parties. U.S. SIGINT satellites are designed and built by the National Reconnaissance Office, although conducting U.S. signals intelligence activities is primarily the responsibility of the National Security Agency (NSA). Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) is sometimes also referred to as photo intelligence (PHOTINT). One of the earliest forms of IMINT took place during the Civil War, when soldiers were sent up in balloons to gather intelligence about their surroundings. IMINT was practiced to a greater extent in World Wars I and II when both sides took photographs from airplanes. Today, the National Reconnaissance ­Office designs, builds, and operates imagery satellites, while the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is largely responsible for processing and using the imagery. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) is the analysis and visual representation of security related activities on the earth. It is produced through an integration of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) is a relatively little-known collection discipline that concerns weapons capabilities and industrial activities. MASINT includes the advanced processing and use of data gathered from overhead and airborne IMINT and SIGINT collection systems. Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT) is sometimes used to indicate data relayed by weapons during tests, while electronic intelligence (ELINT) can indicate electronic emissions picked up from modern weapons and tracking systems. Both TELINT and ELINT can be types of SIGINT and contribute to MASINT. The Defense Intelligence Agency’s Central MASINT Office (CMO), is the principal user of MASINT data. Measurement and Signatures Intelligence has become increasingly important due to growing concern about the existence and spread of weapons of mass destruction. MASINT can be used, for example, to help identify chemical weapons or pinpoint the specific features of unknown weapons systems. The FBI’s extensive forensic work is a type of MASINT. The FBI Laboratory’s Chem-Bio Sciences Unit, for example, provides analysis to detect traces of chemical, biological, or nuclear materials to support the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of terrorist activities. Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) refers to a broad array of information and sources that are generally available, including information obtained from the media (newspapers, radio, television, etc.), professional and academic records (papers, conferences, professional associations, etc.), and public data (government reports, demographics, hearings, speeches, etc.). Unlike the other INTs, open-source intelligence is not the responsibility of any one agency, but instead is collected by the entire U.S. Intelligence Community. One advantage of OSINT is its accessibility, although the sheer amount of available information can make it difficult to know what is of value. Determining the data’s source and its reliability can also be complicated. OSINT data therefore still requires review and analysis to be of use to policymakers. USN (2019)

Figure 1.5  The Disciplines of Intelligence Collection

The university-security-intelligence nexus

HUMINT

SIGINT

OSINT

MASINT

IMINT/ GEOINT

Figure 1.6  Access All Areas: The Disciplines of Intelligence Collection

Since this involves both knowledge and personnel responsible for gathering this knowledge, there is across all these ‘disciplines of intelligence collection’ an operational as well as epistemological ordering. All-Source Intelligence is the summation of the five disciplines of intelligence collection (Figure 1.6). The use of such a broad remit of knowledge collection (All-Source Intelligence) can be defined as the collective sum of all knowledge for protection from security threats. It is as optimistic and ambitious as it is problematic. The idea of security and intelligence being concerned with protection against threat is in principle simple enough. The epistemological richness of security and intelligence knowledge in an age itself over-rich in information presents multiple operational problems. Searching for knowledge of defined enemies and threats is focused; searching for knowledge of undefined or as yet undefined enemies and threats draws security and intelligence operations to academic expertise. In the case of the Academy, there is no cross-disciplinary, unified definition of purpose. Such purposes might range from serving the public good, to the advancement of specialist knowledge for its own sake, to applied knowledge for societal uses in commerce, economics, science and technology and so forth. The epistemological domain of the universities-security-intelligence nexus is important because it shows that all knowledge within the Academy is potentially of use as knowledge for protection from security threats, including but not limited to science and technology (Galliot and Reed, 2016). In other words, security and intelligence community concerns with protection from threat can set to use any aspect of work within the Academy. The epistemological domain here mirrors the ever-expanding modus operandi and greater complexity of its operational domain. As operations expand and modus operandi become more complex, so too does (and has) the epistemological focus; and one of the ways in which this has become evident is in the integrative securitisation of home and foreign public policy across numerous domains (Bakir, 2018; Miller, 2016; Thies, 2018). From nation-states to geopolitical regional groupings of countries to the inter-governmental agencies of the United Nations, security now permeates public policy (Kirchner and Dominguez, 2011). In the United States, the following is a good exemplar of a commonly expressed notion: National security threats in the twenty-first century, such as terrorism, proliferation, failing states, and climate change are fast, dynamic and complex. Meeting them successfully requires a capacity to integrate all aspects of U.S. national power – diplomacy, military, force, intelligence, law enforcement, foreign aid, homeland security, education, transportation, and health and human services – into a single system supporting a common mission. (Lederman, 2010: 363) 27

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This is what Christopher Wray (2018) in talking of economic and financial security – which ultimately impacts everyone – called a ‘whole-of-society’ response. The European Agenda on Security (EAS, 2015) calls too, in like measure, for ‘a more joined-up inter-agency and a cross-sectorial approach’ which given ‘the increasing nexus between different types of security threats, policy and action on the ground must be fully coordinated amongst all relevant EU agencies, in the area of Justice and Home Affairs and beyond’ (EAS, 2015: 4) in what has been called the ‘Security Union’ (Aggestam and HydePrice, 2016; Biscop, 2018; Lazaridis and Wadia, 2015; Mawdsley, Petrov and Chappell, 2018), while the European Council (2017) integrates pronouncements ‘on security and defence, social domain, education and culture, and climate change’ (EC, 2017). In a post-Cold War multi-polar world, the integrative model extends to international contexts such as in European Union relations with the United States, with NATO, and indeed towards a ‘global agenda for positive power’ (Rees, 2011; TFEU, 2012; also Balzacq, Bigo, Carrera and Guild, 2006; Biscop, 2005; Biscop and Whitman, 2012; Marsh and Rees, 2011; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2010; Thies, 2018). To the East, in the Russian Federation shows identical patterns of security permeating public policy. The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy (RFNSS) is legally framed by the Russian Federation Constitution, the Federal Laws 390-FZ ‘On Security’ (28 December 2010) and 172-FZ ‘On Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation’ (28 June 2014), ‘other federal laws, and statutory legal acts of the Russian Federation president’ (RFNSS, 2015). In its general provision, the current strategy is the basic strategic planning document defining the Russian Federation’s national interests and strategic national priorities, objectives, tasks, and measures in the sphere of domestic and foreign policy aimed at strengthening the Russian Federation’s national security and ensuring the country’s sustainable development in the long term. The Strategy is ‘intended to consolidate the efforts of federal organs of state power, other state organs, Russian Federation components’ organs of state power (hereinafter organs of state power), organs of local self-government, and institutions of civil society to create favourable internal and external conditions for the realization of the Russian Federation’s national interests and strategic national priorities’. It is ‘based on the unbreakable interconnection and interdependence of the Russian Federation’s national security and the country’s socioeconomic development’; making use of the following main concepts of the Russian Federation’s national security is: …the state of protection of the individual, society, and the state against internal and external threats in the process of which the exercise of the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens of the Russian Federation (hereinafter citizens), a decent quality of life and standard of living for them, sovereignty, independence, state and territorial integrity, and sustainable socioeconomic development of the Russian Federation are ensured. National security includes the country’s defence and all types of security envisioned by the Russian Federation Constitution and Russian Federation legislation – primarily state, public, informational, environmental, economic, transportation, and energy security and individual security. (RFNSS, 2015) Pynnöniemi (2018) shows how the evolution of such intensifications ‘highlight Russia’s vision of world politics as struggle for resources and power, as well as a heightened sense of 28

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danger toward Russia’. It is one other piece of evidence to demonstrate that Russia is but another instance of a nation heightening security by ensuring that security permeates all aspects of society. In inter-governmental context, this is also evident, as Kirchner and Dominguez (2011) have shown in their important overview of security governance in the world’s regional powers bases. The United Nations, specifically, for example, has ever-intensifying priority lists of transnational security threats ranging from drug trafficking, piracy and terrorism, to trafficking in person and transnational organised crime (UN, 2017). Terrorism is described as presenting a particular ‘threat to international peace and security’, undermining of ‘the core values of the United Nations’ and having a ‘devastating human cost of terrorism, in terms of lives lost or permanently altered, terrorist acts aim to destabilize governments and undermine economic and social development’. The United Nations’ ‘common universal legal framework against terrorism’ alone integrates manifold United Nations Security Council resolutions, including nineteen universal legal instruments against terrorism (UN, 2017). Thus, as nascent threats have emerged, security priorities responsively develop and these are reflected in national and inter-governmental public policy directives and legislation (Thies, 2018). A nascent principle seems emergent: the integration of security into public policy implies always the permeation of security in public life. This now includes significant legislative obligations for universities (for example CTSA, 2015). Universities have become part of the operational security apparatus of states. Yet in the expanding requirements for knowledge, this becomes de facto an epistemology without limit whose horizons expand exponentially. In the epistemological domain, the academic disciplines of security and intelligence studies have come to the fore in defining these developments and in so doing redefining their own fields of enquiry.

Security and the academic discipline of security studies The academic discipline of security studies is a modern manifestation of the ancient study of military strategy, defence and offence, the undertaking of war and the securing of peace. It has always been inextricably entwined with politics and what is today called international relations (Dunne, Kurki and Smith, 2016). In modern times, this has meant the seeking of knowledge by nations of the conditions for action in the face of organised external threat from other states and internal disorder within their own borders. Since antiquity, there has been a divide here between the scholarly and the military Academy (Gearon and Parsons, 2018). There have in other words been those who have done war and those who have reflected on it. Plato thus castigates Homer – and all poets – for conjuring the illusion of war without ever having known it, without having had need to act in the heat of battle, without having known victory or defeat over or by an enemy. Homer’s knowledge of war is dangerous because it is imagined. Von Clausewitz’s knowledge of war is insightful because he has seen it. The universities-security-intelligence nexus shows the path between doers and reflectors. There is some degree of overlap between civilian and military Academies. Those who have done security and intelligence in the field regularly connect with the civilian Academy; those who have been educated in the art and science of security and intelligence within the civilian Academy often head for the field (IAFIE, 2019). The present-day prominence of security studies emerged during the Cold War, particularly the possibilities of civilisation-impacting nuclear conflagration. Today, threats have proliferated and include those which similarly extend beyond traditional nation-state 29

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conflicts and rivalries. The prominence of existential threat on a global scale accounts for the pre-eminence of security studies as an academic discipline beyond its military origins (Hough, 2014). Alternative definitional configurations of security emerged in this period. Thus, if security studies had traditionally meant the study of war, some scholars offered interpretative alternatives. The end of the Cold War was the moment when the interpretive alternative flourished. The reasons were practical as well as geopolitical. In the narrow decade window between the end of the Cold War and 9/11, the military as well as the security and intelligence agencies found justifications for economic expenditure less easily justifiable. The post-Cold War hubris was encapsulated by Francis Fukuyama’s declaration of the ‘end of history’. Samuel Huntington contemporaneous counter-blast – The Clash of Civilizations – was a message few wished to hear in the new lexicon of peace and political progressiveness. The prospect of a perpetual peace is hardly the justification for increased security and intelligence expenditure. It was precisely in this period that an emergent group of scholars who came to be known as the Copenhagen School provided a striking and influential, if subsequently much critiqued, model of ‘securitisation theory’. Securitisation theory thus presents a means of exposure and explanation today because it is, as we have seen, the very term security which is used and which is presently, despite no little lack of analysis, proliferating, including into all aspects of national government home and foreign policy (Thies, 2018). Securitisation is more in the ascendancy than popular framings of hard and soft power (Nye, 2004, 2011). The state means now a state of security. Buzan (2007) puts this well in the second edition of his foundational People, States, Fear: The state becomes the mechanism by which people seek to achieve adequate levels of security against social threats. The paradox, of course, is that the state also becomes a source of social threat against the individual. The stability of the state derives from the assumption that it is the lesser of two evils (that is, that whatever threats come from the state will be of a lower order of magnitude than those which would arise in its absence). This assumption grows in force as society develops around the state, becoming increasingly dependent on it as a lynchpin for other social and economic structures. As the symbiosis of society and state develops along more complex, sophisticated and economically productive lines, the state of nature image becomes more and more unappealing as an alternative. regardless of its historical validity. As the historical distance grows between the state and the state of nature, the enormous costs of the reversion have to be added to the dubious benefits of existence in a state of nature. If the state of nature was unacceptable to thinly scattered and primitive peoples, how much more unacceptable would it be to the huge, densely-packed and sophisticated populations of today? The state, then, is irreversible. There is no real option of going back, and the security of individuals is inseparably entangled with that of the state. (Buzan, 2007: 20–21) Securitisation remains in the ascendancy. Balzacq, Léonard, Ruzicka (2016; Balzacq, 2010), of the ‘Aberystwyth School’ of security studies, note its increasing relevance to public policy: Securitization theory seeks to explain the politics through which (1) the security character of public problems is established, (2) the social commitments resulting from the

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collective acceptance that a phenomenon is a threat are fixed and (3) the possibility of a particular policy is created. (Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka, 2016: 494) The post-9/11 security environments have heightened what Rychnovska (2014) rightly assesses ‘the power of threat framing’ (also Croft and Moore, 2010; Glazzard, 2017). The Copenhagen School provided for non-security and intelligence specialists, as well as specialists in politics and international relations a new security agenda which gave the field a now familiar lexicon. Detailing the expansion of security concerns here from its traditional home in the military, to political, societal, economic and environmental fields (Albert and Buzan, 2011; Bagge Laustsen and Wæver, 2000; Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998; Buzan and Hansen, 2009; also Albert and Buzan, 2011; Buzan, 2007; Buzan and Hansen, 2009; Dunn Cavelty and Balzacq, 2016; Hough, 2014; Stritzel, 2007), before 9/11, Bagge Laustsen and Wæver’s (2000) sixth field of religion seemed to be and remains prescient. Munster (2016) reviews the relevant literature, the ‘schismatic history’ of the broader frame of critical security studies, schismatic in its fundamental break from narrow, traditional interpretations of security. Beyond the interpretive differences, such models often include explicit and politically engaged oppositions to state conflict and military actions (Emmers, 2018). Such academic and political critiques, perhaps not surprisingly, have come most forcefully not within security agencies but universities. These oppositions have themselves become part of the security agenda. Thus, for example, the covert surveillance of potentially state-destabilising academics is hardly a new phenomenon. Aforementioned legislation on security, often framed today around counter-terrorism agendas, has increasingly incorporated universities into security agendas (Figure 1.7). The risks of seeing threat everywhere and thus potentially undermining its analytic effectiveness are well explained by Taureck (2006). Following Buzan (2007), Taureck stresses the critical notion of existential threat in relation to the attribution of ‘securitization’: ‘If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or

(1) Security Sphere Traditional and Expansive Security Concerns/ Domains: Military Political Societal Economic Environmental Religious (Cultural) (Bagge Laustsen & Wæver 2000; Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1997; Dunn Cavelty & Balzacq, 2016)

(2) Academic Discipline of Security Studies

Figure 1.7  T  he Security Sphere and the Academic Discipline of Security Studies

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will not be free to deal with it in our own way)’ (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 24). Collins (2017, 2018) typically frames the sorts of existential threat that can be thus incorporated within the study of security: War and the threat to use force are part of the security equation, but the prevalence of threats is far-reaching for Security Studies … pandemic and environmental degradation to terrorism and inter-state armed conflict … It also investigates the deepening and broadening of security to include military security, regime security, societal security, environmental security, and economic security … traditional and non-traditional issues that have emerged on the security agenda, including weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, energy security, and health. (Collins, 2017, 2018) With security studies, this all concerns the avoidance, minimisation and management of threat. Here, the divides are between recognising, defining and assessing security threat, on the one hand, and, on the other, acting in response to it. The former is a ‘structural realism’, the latter a ‘motivational realism’; and in peace as in war, there are defensive and offensive motivation (Collins, 2017, 2018). If new theories of security have moved from the traditional and narrow focus on the military and war, the field’s divisions of emphasis can also be seen as refracted in universities by the simple refraction of departmental titles. While security studies often fall under the broad faculty or disciplinary heading of political science and international relations, the designation of a department of Peace Studies tells as much as the designation of War Studies. The former fits in with the expanding notions of security and threat, the latter with traditionally realist models, but beneath the disciplinary designations is always a political orientation. In large measure, this is seen in oppositional terms but also through alternative political framings of a discipline. So, Morgan (2017) identifies in liberal models, notions of ‘interdependence, cooperation, peace, and security’ and ‘major liberalist schools’ as ‘commercial or economic liberalism, human rights liberalism, international organization or institutions liberalism, and democratic liberalism’. So too Peace Studies, a founding and influential figure in this disciplinary focus emerged from East–West nuclear arms confrontations during the Cold War but with peace studies responding to ‘issues of socio-economic disparities and environmental constraints, such as climate change and poverty …conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping’ (Rogers, 2017). Part of the critical security project, the human security emphases of both scholars and policymakers have taken security even further from its traditional home. Persaud (2017) suggests that the United Nations is itself an indirect organ of the human security project and cites the United Nations Development Program’s 1994 Human Development Report (HDR), its Commission for Human Security, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, as well as the Millennium Development Goals, and the International Criminal Court as exemplars ( Jackson and Beswick, 2018). The critiques of the human security project in international public policy mirror those critiques of widened-focus securitisation theory, as being too broad to be useful (Huysmans, 1998; Knudsen, 2001; Wæver, 1999). Further critiques relate to the modelling of the United Nations itself, its competitive national interests useful too broad to be useful, charges that it is a reformist tool of global capitalism and neo-­colonialism (Gearon, 2019; Roux and Becker, 2019). Epistemologically, Snowden and Assange represented major (unprecedented) leaks of information about security and intelligence agency operations, but they also revealed an unquenchable, almost (certainly) indiscriminate quest for knowledge. Studies reveal ample evidence here which suggests that security and intelligence agency efforts and interests 32

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worldwide are pervasive and polymathic, or indeed multi-disciplinary, characterised by some as overly intrusively, privacy-invading marks of a surveillance society – universities produce most knowledge and this knowledge is one of the key interests of the security and intelligence services (Greenwald, 2015; Harding, 2014; Leigh and Harding, 2011). What is new knowledge, who found out what new knowledge there is and what people are doing with this new knowledge are all areas of interest to the security and intelligence services. This seemed to shock the public. It shocked no one with any knowledge of the security and intelligence agencies. Today, then, intelligence gathering is potentially about everything and everyone, and not merely defined enemies and adversaries (Wright and Kreissl, 2013; Technopolis, 2015). It is by such moves that universities – as loci for knowledge generation – have become a critically important element in the unfolding, widening and deepening of security/intelligence knowledge gathering. Here, it is knowledge (dissemination, exchange, production and protections thereof for commercial or economic, defensive or offensive purposes) itself which provides the lynchpin between European security and European universities. Not only are universities critical elements in a securitisation but the very aims and purposes of universities coincide with the processes of securitisation through intelligence collection, or through what are known as the ‘five disciplines’ of intelligence gathering (Lowenthal and Clark, 2015). The present-day process of extension of security and intelligence interest emerged, most scholars agree, in the modern or current sense and frame of securitisation, in the Cold War when intelligence came to be seen as essential to peacetime as to war (Dulles, 2006; Herman, 1996; Shulsky, 2001). In the Cold War, ideas and ideology were as critical as armaments. Risso’s (2014) study of the NATIS, for instance, demonstrates the extent of interest of intelligence services in cultural matters far distant from battlefield engagement or the nuclear arms race preoccupations of the time. Operationally and epistemologically, the extension of interest was to types of knowledge and types of people (Grey, 2016; Stonor Saunders, 2013). The same post-Cold War period was noted, too, for the reform of many central and eastern European security and intelligence agencies where particular histories of repressive secret police in historical context raise acute problems for security in the present: in Austria, in the Czech Republic, in Germany, in Greece, in Poland; the same too could be said of ­European countries such as Italy, Portugal or Spain (Karyotis, 2007; Krahmann, 2004). In other counties where strong liberal traditions of openness are part of the defining features of national governance and polity, there remains too precisely for these reasons of openness any suspicion of secret operations of organisations within the state (Bakker, 2014; Bellaby, 2012; De Graaff, Nyce and Locke, 2018; Leonard, 2015; Monar, 2015; Wright and Kreissl, 2013). In short, then, the relationship between security and the academic discipline of security studies is an ambivalent one. On the one hand, the traditional security sphere has focused on military strategy, defence and offence, the undertaking of war and the securing of peace, on the other, security studies examine these same topics from the distance of the Academy. Within the Academy, there is, to put matters simplistically, a divide between, on the one hand, those aligned towards the fulfilment of state-driven and or governmental policy in security in national and international contexts, and, on the other hand, those non-aligned to the fulfilment of such security policy objectives and more inclined to critique. The major caveat here is that both ‘sides’ of this interface are dependent upon academic critique: security today is dependent on academic critique. In some cases, the inclinations are obvious, as in departmental designations within universities (peace or war studies), where security studies are part of a faculty say of politics or international relations inclinations will vary; in think-tanks which draw on academic research to inform decision-making, the inclination or 33

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degrees of alignment can also be apparent through stated levels of institutional connection to government, even where – for example in the United Kingdom with the Royal United Services Institute and other think-tanks (RUSI, 2019) – there is a stated independence from governmental policymakers and decision-takers. The security and intelligence sphere themselves make plain the distinction, and here is a good example from the United States: ‘The intelligence agencies are not in business to be the Brookings Institution …They’re in business to provide clandestine information’ (Tenet, 1994). Even here, though, Tenet concedes, ‘there is a certain amount of overt information that is necessary to do that job’. When Tenet made this statement in the aftermath of the Cold War, a period of rapid re- and dis-orientation for security and intelligence agencies so long focused on the Soviet Union, a ‘certain amount of overt information’ may have sounded plausible, today, in large measure, though not exclusively due to technological advances, it is more than something of an understatement, with up to 90% of security knowledge coming from OSINT (Mugavero, Benolli and Sabato, 2015). This question of knowledge, its nature, its sources, shows how integral the operational domain of security is to the epistemological. The relationship between security and the academic study of security studies far from either defines or delimits this operational–­ epistemological interaction. The expanding nature of security threat has itself made security and the academic discipline of security studies dependent on accessing a greater range of knowledge than ever before. We can put this as a simple premise: as security threats have expanded within, beyond and between nation-states to shared global concerns, knowledge of what constitutes a security threat has indubitably expanded too. And this expansion has led to greater levels of incorporation of universities and their knowledge generation and dissemination into the security sphere. This expansion has not, obviously, been limited to universities but all spheres of public policy. Such moves in large measure justify the applicability of the notional securitisation to areas of public life not previously (seemingly) touched by security, from economics to cyber security and sport to societal stability in the rise of politically and religiously inspired extremism (MI5, 2019b). It is a reality which has intensely begun to fill scholarly, strategic and policy literature. One of the strongest exemplars is the ‘Gerasimov doctrine’, named after Russia’s Chief of the General Staff. In 2013, General Gerasimov published an article in the Military-Industrial Courier entitled, ‘The Value of Science is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations’ (Gerasimov, 2015). Gerasimov outlines past, present and prospective future strategies in the changing character of warfare. Focusing on what Kennan had classically defined as ‘political war’, the idea is that collective forces of the State are used as a hybrid strategy combining military force and collective subterfuge, where ‘a perfectly thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war’. Coming before the annexation of Crimea and insurgencies in the Ukraine, the West interpreted Gerasimov as speculative; after the events in Crimea and Ukraine, it began to look predictive. It is a vision which Galeotti (2018), who lays claim to the conceptual framing, calls ‘a new way of war’ – what Gerasimov had called ‘an expanded theory of modern warfare’, or even ‘a vision of total warfare’. Kennan’s notion of ‘political warfare’ envisioned the same, where: …the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures … and ‘white’ propaganda to 34

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such covert operations as clandestine support of ‘friendly’ foreign elements, ‘black’ psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states. (Kennan, cited by Galeotti, 2018) The idea in obvious ways pervades the modus operandi of security and intelligence agencies. Galeotti regrets the coining of a term which has ‘since acquired a destructive life of its own, lumbering clumsily into the world to spread fear and loathing in its wake’ (Galeotti, 2018). However, he suggests that ‘if Gerasimov and the generals think of “active measures” as a prelude to armed operations, the Kremlin’s national security specialists also regard them as an alternative’: The Russians may get much wrong, but they are aware that NATO is a formidable enemy, and the odds are that its Article 5 guarantee of mutual defense would hold. In effect, NATO member countries are out of bounds for direct military action. How can a country with an economy perhaps the size of Canada’s, an army that is still going through an expensive modernization and already bogged down in two wars, and precious little soft power compete with a larger, richer coalition of democracies? The answer is precisely by turning its democratic norms and institutions against itself, by opening existing fault lines, and by taking every opportunity to neutralize the West. (Galeotti, 2018) The point, argues Galeotti, is that: ‘If the subversion is not the prelude to war, but the war itself, this changes our understanding of the threat’. The operational response is maintaining ‘serious armed forces as a deterrent’ yet conjointly placing more emphasis ‘on counterintelligence and media literacy, on fighting corruption (always a boon for the political warriors) and healing the social divisions the Russians gleefully exploit’ (Galeotti, 2018). Debate over the past several years seems to have focused primarily on strategy to the neglect of the word ‘science’ which appears in Gerasimov’s paper. It is in the science where resides, then, the threat and its protective resolution, and science for the most part is undertaken by university research staff. Just as university researchers were central to the development of new warfare technologies in the Atomic Age, they were too, often rightly, subjects of suspicion in both the United States and the USSR ( Jerome, 2003; Lokhova, 2018). N ­ uclear weaponry, ‘the bomb’, changed, of course, all prior understandings of threat (Heuser, 1999). In 1982, ­Jonathan Schell’s 1982 book The Fate of the Earth foresaw a future, post-nuclear apocalyptic political and societal landscape reduced to ‘a republic of insects and grass’ (Schell, 2000). Nearly four decades later, environmentalists writing in Biological Conservation published a widely reported review of scientific papers on insect populations (a subject we imagine from security concerns), noting the rapid decline even in insect population, and a prospective ‘catastrophic collapse of nature’s ecosystems’ ­(Sánchez-Bayo and ­Wyckhuys (2019). At an abstract level, there is a recognisable overlap, then, between the Traditional Epistemological Domain (the military and war) and an Expansive Epistemological Domain (all aspects of knowledge as potential sources for and protection against existential threat). We can firmly say, however, that the changing nature of warfare means definitions around security which are, again, not mere abstractions. It is a product of the indiscriminate nature of modern warfare that civil and military knowledge are inseparable, as are policies directed towards protections against threat. A leading UK think-tank highlights this in discussing the relevance of cyber security to the civil nuclear industry: Since the stark illustration of the impact of a natural disaster at the Fukushima ­nuclear  plant in 2011, there is renewed concern that attacks on civil nuclear 35

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installations – including cyber-attacks – may prove attractive to terrorist organizations and to states. In addition, alleged US and Israeli involvement in the Stuxnet attacks on Iranian nuclear infrastructure may lead to reprisal attacks and an escalation of hostilities. Attacks could be carried out by individuals or organizations in places where the rule of law is poorly enforced, which impedes efforts at deterrence. The situation is further complicated by conflicting public and private sector perspectives on how to mitigate threats. (Chatham House, 2019) Science and technology remain critical components of civil and military security; and no more so than in the current renewal of nuclear threats to international stability (McEachern and O’Brien McEachern, 2019). The so-called ‘environmental security’ predicts the aftermaths and picks up the pieces after the prospective devastation (Hough, 2014). This further serves to exemplify importance of the scientific knowledge in the nexus of relations with security and intelligence. Yet now, in the early days of February 2019, as the US and ­Russia suspend commitments to late Cold War nuclear treaties, we hear language not heard in several decades: The Trump administration just announced it will officially withdraw from an aging nuclear missile treaty with Russia, a move that could kick-start an arms race and threaten the European continent – but also allow the US to better prepare for a war against China. (Ward, 2019) Given all of the foregoing, a further premise can be intimated. Security and intelligence focus has shifted from knowledge of the enemy to the prospective knowledge of everyone and everything. In this context, it seems that it is the nature of war itself which has changed. Or has it? Joseph Goebbels, we must recall, had explicitly too entered the lexicon of ‘total war’ – this brought all aspects of the Third Reich to bear on the war effort, civilian and military to the war effort. Goebbels was, significantly, in charge of both armaments and propaganda (Thacker, 2010). Yet, modern states have integrative powers undreamt of by the totalitarian. And here perhaps modern histories of totalitarianism are useful to bear in mind as much as our newly prominent discourses of power. Thus beyond obvious surveillance concerns (notional Orwellian scenarios of ‘Big Brother’, etc.), there are more serious security interplays in current-day process. Securing power by all means requires security, intelligence and a control over culture as well as the military. From colonialism to revolution, nothing in the realm of political action is possible without discourse, and the maintaining of power achieved or sought (a security) is impossible without reading. Intellectuals here therefore always play a part in the formation of ideology just as they are therefore as a consequence attacked first by regimes that see in the idea the power to instigate action (Arendt, 2004; Aron, 1957, 1967; Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1967; Popper, 2002; Talmon, 1962; Voegelin, 1999). What today has transformed discourse on the security of states is their global interdependence, and that the threats faced threaten them all. Humanity thus faces shared existential threats, and solutions can only be collective. The notion that it is humanity itself which itself is the threat provides an entirely new horizon for the universities-security-intelligence nexus. These same sorts of shifts in security studies are evident too in the origins and development of intelligence studies (Dover, Goodman and Hillebrand, 2015).

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Intelligence and the academic discipline of intelligence studies In his classic work On War, Carl von Clausewitz here appears to undervalue the role of (a narrowly conceived, battlefield) intelligence: ‘Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory, even more are false, and most are uncertain’ (Von Clausewitz, 2008: 64). The history of intelligence, like the history of security, has traditionally been coterminous with the history of conflict, the study of military strategy, defence and offence, the undertaking of war along with the securing and maintaining of peace. Intelligence has always therefore inevitably had then a state-driven or governmental and policy domain. Figure 1.8 gives an outline of the definition by the CIA for sixth- to twelfth-grade young people. Thus, the main purpose of intelligence is to provide information to policymakers that may help illuminate their decision options … The assumption is that good – that is, accurate, comprehensive, and timely – information will lead to more effective choices made by government officials. ( Johnson, 2012) Policymakers naturally receive from a wider variety of sources than security and intelligence agencies but what the latter provide is critical to the stability and thriving of nations, as Thies’s (2018) major reference resource on international foreign policy shows. This is part of what Johnson (2012) defines as a broader ‘situational awareness’, that is, ‘understanding events and conditions throughout the world faced by policymakers, diplomats, and military commanders’. Here, Johnson suggests, ‘when people speak of “intelligence” they are usually referring to information – tangible data about personalities and events around the globe’. It is, further, actionable information, as in the CIA’s definition of national

What is Intelligence? Quite simply, intelligence is the information our nation’s leaders need to keep our country safe. Our leaders, like the President, make policy decisions based on this intelligence. Since they don’t have time to read other countries’ newspapers or watch foreign TV newscasts, we do that for them – collecting current intelligence. We also gather information other countries may not wish to share openly. We collect this intelligence secretly through other means. Our policymakers need as much information as we can provide so they can make important, informed decisions. That’s why the President or members of the National Security Council or the President’s Cabinet members come to us with questions they need answered. We provide various types of intelligence: Current – looking at day-to-day events. Estimative – looking at what might be or what might happen. Warning – giving notice to our policymakers of urgent matters that may require immediate attention. Research – providing an in-depth study of an issue. Scientific and Technical – providing information on foreign technologies. CIA (2019c)

Figure 1.8  Briefing for 6th to 12th [?] grade young people

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security intelligence as ‘knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us – the prelude to Presidential decision and action’ (Central Intelligence Agency, 1991: 13). The distinction between ‘actionable’ and ‘(purely) academic’ knowledge is a fine line and the one which, as we shall see, significantly blurs the divide between security and intelligence agencies and universities. It is also a distinction which, as with the security sphere of operations, highlights the ethical problematics of the relationship (Figure 1.9). If security’s traditional focus has been on the understanding by nations of the conditions for action in the face of organised external threat and internal disorder within states, the gathering of intelligence has been an integral operational subset of collecting ‘knowledge of the enemy’ (FitzGibbon, 1977: 56). The so-called professionalisation of the security and intelligence agencies took considerable leaps forward in the aftermath of the Cold War. Operationally sharpened after the Second World War, with its focus on operational expediency in time of war, the Cold War provided for the subtle operational refinements of the security and intelligence community purpose, and in ways which heightened the usefulness of such agencies in an ostensible peace as much as in war (Holman, 1996). Michael Holman’s (1996) Intelligence Power in Peace and War is an important book because a former long-serving British intelligence officer turned academic outlined the importance of a wider understanding of intelligence. Now, a wider literature exists showing that the covert use of cultural or soft power was a feature, for instance, of not only intelligence gathering but intelligence-led political influence (another side’s propaganda) since the inception of the intelligence services. Indeed, with their professionalisation came a realisation of the potential scope of influence. NATIS is a case in point. It served as a means of effecting ideological change, cultural influence and through this political change through a variety of academic, artistic, literary and other means, including direct funding through intelligence budgets. Early Cold War ‘definitions’ – a preoccupation with which is also evidence of academic influence – of security and intelligence in the early literature from this period tended to focus however on the traditionalist and realist positions. Thus, Bimfort (1958) states:

(1) Intelligence Sphere (Agencies, Governments, Policy) (1) International conflict; (2) Secret knowledge; (3) Clandestine collection; (4) Truth seeking; (5) Contextual; (6) Covert action (Taplin, 1989) (2) Academic Discipline of Intelligence Studies

Figure 1.9  The Intelligence Sphere and the Academic Discipline of Intelligence Studies

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Intelligence is the collecting and processing of that information about foreign countries and their agents which is needed by a government for its foreign policy and national security, the conduct of non-attributable activities abroad to facilitate the implementation of foreign policy, and the protection of both process and product, as well as persons and organizations concerned with these, against unauthorized disclosure. (Bimfort, 1958) Cline’s (1994) entry on ‘Intelligence’ in the Encyclopedia of the American Military follows this line. Former Director of the CIA Allen Dulles’ (1963; 1965; 1985; 2006) The Craft of Intelligence outlines the early history of American intelligence but its major focus is on non-­classified matters of Cold War tradecraft and the specifics of counterintelligence in relation to the Soviet’s KGB. Felix’s 1963 A Short Course in the Secret War (Felix, 2001) similarly deals the intricacies of relationship between Cold War diplomatic service and spy covert operations. When Shulsky’s (1991) Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence is given a second edition, there is an almost nostalgic sense of loss for the old certainties. The military focus persisted into the last years of the Cold War and after it, showing how definitional issues had been shaped by the conflict between two ideologically opposed superpowers. Thus, it is with Taplin’s (1989) ‘Six General Principles of Intelligence’. Macartney’s (1988) Intelligence: A Consumer’s Guide here reiterated the traditionalist emphasis on the prime consumers of intelligence as military and defence establishments. Berkowitz and Goodman (1991) write, too, at the transition from the Cold War, a period which raises questions around security and intelligence agency purpose, but a shift from emphasis on covert operations to policy and strategic-related functions (Godson, 1993; Kibbe, 2017). Shulsky and Sims’ (1992) ‘What Is Intelligence?’ is a post-Cold War attempt to keep instated the traditionalist operational and epistemological model, which incorporates new, post-Cold War realities and breadth of definition (intelligence is ‘information collected, organized, or analyzed on behalf of actors or decision makers’), but balanced by Shulsky’s emphasis on operational ‘secrecy’ as the ‘essential key for understanding what intelligence is’. Shulsky’s open scepticism of the Sherman Kent derived ‘optimism of the social sciences of the 1940s and 1950s’ is a rejection of the expansive milieu of security and intelligence. Thus, Berkowitz (2003) asks: ‘Are secret intelligence operations compatible with democracy?’ Highlighting the increased sense of accountability, he argues that: ‘Intelligence policies are not fundamentally different from other kinds of policies, and intelligence operations are not inherently different from other kinds of operations democracies carry out’ and thus subject to comparable regimes of oversight, and it is in this oversight which he sees an approach for ‘reconciling democracy and secrecy and, thus, intelligence’. Writing in the early 1990s when the aims and purposes of security and intelligence were being questioned, as highlighted, in this immediate post-Cold War period, Troy’s (1992) ‘The “Correct” Definition of Intelligence’ seemingly follows the traditionalist line of Constantine FitzGibbon that intelligence is ‘knowledge of the enemy’. Yet, reading Troy now seems instructive, more so retrospectively: …human history has never known a period when there were no enemies. They will appear. Who they are, and the when and where of their appearance, may be difficult to foresee, but they will appear, especially in the present and foreseeable world of proliferating, armed nation-states where all kinds of combustible materials are close at hand. The intelligence community, however trimmed and re-oriented, must remain consciously on guard. (Troy, 1991: 450–451) 39

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Warner (2002) provides an insider perspective on the definitional uncertainties around intelligence, accentuated by a shift away from traditional, enemy-focused orientations. The post-9/11 decades have thus raised further serious, if inconclusive, questions about security and intelligence. Security and intelligence studies as academic disciplines as a result have themselves become enlivened. Loch Johnson, the noted member of the Church Committtee who challenged the famous CIA Director of Counterintelligence about acting beyond exective orders, reminisces from long experience: Starting in the 1970s, I began clipping articles on intelligence from the New York Times. Before the 9/11 attacks in 2001, my scrapbooks filled slowly, except for a few days or weeks during the height of an occasional intelligence scandal or failure, as with the congressional hearings into the Iran-contra affair in 1987. Often the newspaper was fallow for months with respect to stories on intelligence. Now, though, there is an article to clip almost every day and certainly every week, stimulated by the 9/11 attacks; the Iraqi WMD failure; squabbling in Washington, D.C., over the proper degree of legislative supervision for intelligence activities; controversy over warrantless electronic surveillance in the United States, disclosed in 2004; the intelligence reform drive from 2001 to 2005; and ongoing concerns about U.S. security vulnerabilities. Even popular magazines, such as The New Yorker, have dedicated more space than ever in recent years to reporting on intelligence subjects. The discipline of national security intelligence has come of age in the public conscience, as well as among journalists and policymakers and within an expanding pool of researchers in the nation’s think tanks and universities… ( Johnson, 2012) In a still unfolding milieu, Zegart (2007a, 2007b) suggests that security and intelligence studies remain somewhat orphans in the Academy, perhaps we might surmise because its parenthood lies more directly with the falling of the Twin Towers than the academic ivory tower. If 9/11 here brought some general acceptance of the need for security and intelligence agencies, it also brought to bear security and intelligence shortcomings (failing to prevent 9/11) to fore, raising criticism of intelligence collection ( Johnson, 2018). While some have clung to traditionalist models – ‘Intelligence is secret, state activity to understand or influence foreign entities’ (Warner, 2002) – there is a growing collective sense that the security and intelligence agencies are needing themselves to change their own operational and epistemological orientations. Sir Richard Dearlove embodies the university-security-intelligence nexus as a former director of MI6 and Master of Cambridge College, and argues that past models no longer hold: The internationalization of national security has eroded the distinction we have traditionally made between home and away, between our domestic and foreign security. For all national security organizations of every type, whether law enforcement, intelligence gathering or responsible for domestic security, the implications are far reaching. A hundred years after the foundation of the British Intelligence and Security Services (amongst the world’s oldest intelligence and security institutions with unbroken archives) it will be interesting to observe the extent to which this new global dynamic affects the development of such institutions. The whole sector is ready for some adaptive organizational and functional change to reflect the way a multiplicity of issues that we have traditionally treated separately have been joined up by advancing globally. There 40

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will be many vested interests that would prefer to stick with and make the best of existing arrangements, and it will take strong political leadership and clear professional vision to achieve significant reform. (Dearlove, 2010) The operational range and epistemological scope of modern security and intelligence agencies is one profound impact of such change. Recruitment of personnel from more exclusively university rather than military backgrounds led fairly directly, if slowly and by literal degrees, to the security and intelligence agencies learning from the Academy (Figure 1.10). Personnel moves between universities and the security and intelligence agencies today facilitate a core symbiotic relationship with deep historical roots. The career change of a key Yale historian to the CIA is critical, as Davis (2012) recounts: In the 1930s, Sherman Kent believed that life provided no more worthy professional calling than persuading Yale University undergraduates that an understanding of history was essential to development of a first-rate intellect. Professor Kent’s tools of persuasion included a reputation for tough grading, a colourful personal style, and an enthusiasm for drawing wisdom from the study of History 10, Development of European Civilization. It is war which instigates the move: With the onset of World War II, Kent, like most Americans, changed priorities to serving the nation’s defence. Not quite suited for the front lines of combat or espionage, in 1941 he joined a cadre of scholars in the newly formed Research & Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (forerunner of the Directorate of Intelligence). Kent showed uncommon talent for adapting scholarly methods to the rigors of producing intelligence analysis in support of the war effort, including cajoling egotistic professors to work as teams, meet heroic deadlines, and satisfy the needs of action-oriented ­customers. (Davis, 2012)

Intelligence Sphere Disciplines of Intelligence Collection OSINT HUMINT SIGINT MASINT GEOINT Governments

Figure 1.10  Intelligence Sphere, Governments and the Disciplines of Intelligence Collection

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Modelling intelligence on the Academy, Kent has visions of institutes for the study of intelligence. Kent did live to see the formation of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) which was established in 1975. In 2000, the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis was named after him. Across the United States today, he would see a post-9/11 burgeoning of university centres for security and intelligence studies. The self-definition of these fields highlights much. The fact that military academies are called academies is the self-evident connection between academic study and military action; as is the nomenclature of intelligence ‘disciplines’. If academic study has always been an essential part of military training and education, only in the recent past has it been an integral part of university teaching programmes and research. This progression from military strategy – the traditionalist and realist position on security – to the academic study of such matters in universities is a common feature of both security and intelligence studies (Dover, Goodman and Hillebrand, 2015; Williams and McDonald, 2018). If one reason for this is the proliferation of security threats necessitating a broader epistemological base for intelligence collection, the influx of academics to the security and intelligence agencies, particularly notable in the United States, has also meant the drawing of academic approaches and methods into the agencies. Sherman Kent’s most influential contribution was thus expounded in ‘The Need for an Intelligence Literature’ (Kent, 1955), published in the first volume of a CIA-funded academic journal Studies in Intelligence. The journal was itself a sign that the intelligence community had taken heed. As an historian, Kent knew the importance of the literature review. He was surprised to see its absence in the CIA: [Intelligence] has become… an exactly, highly skilled profession…. Intelligence today… has developed a body of theory and doctrine; it has elaborate and refined techniques…. What it lacks is a literature…. What I am talking about is a literature dedicated to the analysis of our many-sided calling, and produced by its most knowledgeable ­devotees… The literature I have in mind will, among other things, be an elevated debate. (Kent, 1955) Kent (1949, 1966, 1968) had himself already begun the process of developing this literature, stressing intelligence as critical to political policy. Others sought to bring to this professionalism and literature a methodological rigour drawn more from academic research than operational engagement, as with Random’s (1958) ‘Intelligence as a Science’. Contemporaneous divisions were evident between the academic use of intelligence for direct application to policy and a more nuanced and neutral academic engagement. In ‘The Function of Intelligence’, Willmoore Kendall (1949) therefore presented a counter argument, which formed what became known as the Kent–Kendall debate: One of Kent’s most finely honed doctrines addresses the relationship between producers and consumers of intelligence analysis. Effective ties, while manifestly essential for the well-being of both groups, were difficult to achieve. Kent’s recommended fix: to warrant scholarly objectivity, provide analysts with institutional independence; to warrant relevance, urge them to strive to obtain ‘guidance’ from policymakers. (Davis, 1991) Kendall agreed with Kent on the relationship, though, as Davis remarks, ‘on little else’: Kendall rejected what he depicted as Kent’s ideal of bureaucratic scholars processing information to understand the outside world for the benefit of bureaucratic policy 42

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planners. The function of intelligence as Kendall saw it was directly to help ‘politically responsible’ leaders achieve their foreign policy goals, in large measure by identifying the elements of an issue that were susceptible to US influence. Additionally, Kendall observed that if the intelligence mission was to illuminate decision making with the best that expert knowledge can provide, Kent’s aversions to taking account of domestic US politics and social science theory were self-defeating. (Davis, 1991) The debate gives the security and intelligence perspectives on academic contributions to intelligence gathering, but seems oblivious of other problematics, centrally, academic reaction against any university and security and intelligence agency collaborations. Debating this relationship is at the heart of the university-security-intelligence nexus. Forms of it appear in parallel discussions around critical terrorism studies (Freilich, C ­ hermak and Gruenewald, 2014; Gearon, 2018; Schmid, 2011; Schuurman and Eijkman, 2013; Young, and Findley, 2011). The divide between Academy and (broadly interpreted) espionage remains therefore central to the university-security-intelligence nexus and can be framed by a virgule: universities, security and intelligence/studies (Figure 1.11). Yet, how much has really changed? Often, the present we have been discussing has germs of origin in the past, a precedent. Every now and then, we need here reminders of the historical antecedence of a field, but to show also how fundamental divides persist. Marrin (2014) thus addresses the link between intelligence and the academic discipline of intelligence studies today by a critical review of a tense history: As the field of intelligence studies develops as an academic complement to the practice of national security intelligence, it is providing a base of knowledge for intelligence practitioners to interpret their past, understand their present, and forecast their future. It also provides the basis for broader understanding of intelligence as a function of government for other government and security officials, academicians, and the general public. In recent years there has been significant growth in the numbers and kinds of intelligence-­related educational and training opportunities, with the knowledge taught

(1) Academic Discipline of Intelligence Studies The Epistemological Domain: (1) Knowledge of the enemy and or threat (2) Knowledge of the means and methods of threat/ protection (2) Academic Discipline of Security Studies

Figure 1.11  The Epistemological Domain

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in these courses and programs derived from the body of intelligence studies scholarship. The question posed here is: to what extent is this body of knowledge sufficient as a basis for the development of intelligence studies as an academic discipline? (Marrin, 2014: 266) There is a timely pragmatism to justify this; as Gill and Phythian state: The academic study of intelligence continues to develop apace, with the evolution of this journal representing another indication of its vitality and geographical spread. Central to this development has been the idea of ‘intelligence studies’, yet three key questions about it remain. First, precisely what is ‘intelligence studies’; should it be considered to be, or should it aspire to become, a ‘discipline’; and who is it for? Perhaps understandably, more energy has been devoted to the question of what is ‘intelligence’ than what is ‘intelligence studies’. However the continuing growth in academic courses at undergraduate and postgraduate levels that combine historical and social science approaches to the study of intelligence, the increase in undergraduate degree programs in intelligence analysis aimed at those seeking to enter the profession, and the development of professional training courses internationally make this an opportune moment to reflect on our approaches. (Gill and Phythian, 2016: 5–6) Drawing on the new multi-polar context of security and intelligence in an insecure world: … Stephen Marrin has suggested that intelligence studies is an academic complement to the practice of national security intelligence. . . This view seems to suggest a particular understanding of the origins and development of intelligence studies that can be traced back to Sherman Kent’s argument of the early Cold War era about the need to develop a professional intelligence literature. Such a literature, reflecting on experience and providing guidance on best practice, is a fundamental attribute of a profession, which intelligence analysis was becoming in the United States by the 1950s. (Gill and Phythian, 2016: 5) Willmoore Kendall, Roger Hilsman, Washington Platt, Klaus Knorr and Thomas Hughes and others are all part of this lineage. Gill and Phythian (2016) present challenges, positing this perspective as ‘a restrictive view of intelligence studies as being concerned with developing academic knowledge’ useful predominantly for the intelligence professional and government security and intelligence agencies more broadly (Marrin, 2014: 266). However, they argue: …if the academic study of intelligence is viewed as being designed to complement professional practice, then it limits itself in ways that are undesirable both from the point of view of practice and, more broadly, of the academic duty to explain the role of intelligence within governance. They conclude: The academic field of intelligence studies must be cultivated for a wider audience, from which effective training may well be derived, but we should not place the cart before the horse. Arguably, accounts of the development of a literature of professional reflection should be distinguished from the later emergence of intelligence studies as an academic endeavour. 44

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They identify two aspects to this: First, there is the study of intelligence history, stimulated initially by the release of information relating to the role of intelligence in the Second World War and subsequently by the opening of archives as a consequence of the end of the Cold War and a resulting liberalization of official file release practices. Second, the study of intelligence as a social science project has developed by drawing on insights from politics, sociology, international relations, psychology, etc. which pose key questions about how we think about and understand intelligence - what it is, how it is conducted, by whom, with what effect, and with what degree of effective control. (Gill and Phythian, 2016: 6) This latter literature was stimulated by 1976 Church Committee revelations about covert CIA activity and subsequent highlevel political debate about its oversight and regulation (Bruneau and Boraz, 2007; Johnson, 2018). This relationship between intelligence, security and the state has post-Assange and post-Snowden broadened the entire scope of the relationship to incorporate whole society issues in unprecedented ways (Davies, 2010). As Gill and Phythian highlight ‘the genesis of intelligence studies suggests a broader set of concerns than acting simply as an academic complement to the practice of national security intelligence’. It is this broader set of concerns of security and intelligence in the public domain – brought there not by governments but by private, if highlight organised leaks of government uses of the security and intelligence agencies – that has brought universities to the fore. There has though been little systematic attempt to define the university-security-­ intelligence nexus, and hence the perceived need for this present volume. The complexity of an interdisciplinary broadening was recognised by Wark’s (1993) division of intelligence into eight dimensions of study and research: research, historical, definitional, methodological, memoirs, civil liberties, investigative journalism and popular culture (Wark, 1993; also Warner, 2014). Gill and Phythian (2016) substantially tighten this frame to four domains: research/historical, definitional/methodological, organisational/functional and governance/policy. This search for domains of interest as well definitions mirrors, if imprecisely, the widening and deepening of security as a concept and security studies as a project. Many prominent thinkers in the field make less of the divisions while recognising the historic and contemporary distinctions, in origins and orientations, such as, for example, Loch Johnson’s (2012) Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence. Farson, Gill, Phythian and Shapiro’s (2008) Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches does similar, except in focusing on the comparative studies between such security and intelligence agencies. This comparative approach is evident in Davies’ (2002) ‘Ideas of Intelligence, Divergent Concepts and National Institutions’. Given the predominance of the security and intelligence literature, at least in English, on UK and USA security and intelligence, the comparative project is usefully advanced by De Graaff, Nyce and Locke’s (2018) Handbook of European Intelligence; and beyond Europe by Davies and Gustafson’s (2016) Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage outside the Anglosphere; and again by Farson, Gill, Phythian and Shapiro’s (2008) Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches. De Graaff’s (2018) Intelligence Bibliography for the International Association for Intelligence Education shows the expansive and ever-expanding range of the field. Decades then subsequent to Kent and Kent–Kendall debate have seen the emergence of a considerable academic literature on intelligence, often in journals for the consumption of the professional intelligence communities, and – until recently – largely in the United States. One of the key features of this literature has been the struggle of definition, not simply an 45

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etymological but a practical concern: vocabulary identifies both an epistemological range (what intelligence should be concerned with in terms of a field of knowledge) but also, and necessarily, an operational sphere (what intelligence should be concerned with as a field of activity) (Gearon, 2015). What the university-security-intelligence nexus does is bring a formal institutional element into this.

The universities-security-intelligence nexus: the ethical domain The operational and epistemological domains of security and intelligence agency work raise evident ethical considerations when drawn into the Academy. The universities-security-­intelligence nexus is framed here by the particularities of modern, twentieth-century warfare, and the ethical milieu created in its wake (Walzer, 2006, 2015). Just as security and intelligence agencies have origins conterminous with modern wars, such warfare gave rise, too, to deep ethical problematics (Goldman, 2009, 2011; Omand and Phythian, 2018). This engagement with ethics has profoundly impacted and led to a constant reviewing of the aims and purposes of the security and intelligence agencies themselves (Demarest and Borghard, 2018). Across the Academy, this broader milieu of ethics and warfare accounts also for the contemporary cross-­disciplinary prominence of research ethics in universities. In the u ­ niversities-security-intelligence nexus, the ethical perspective is sharpened because the modus operandi of universities and security and intelligence agencies seems so different. Confidentiality, openness, transparency, ideas of protection from harm of the human subject, have (in practical terms) different meanings in both contexts. Boston researchers investigating the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’, for instance, had promised participants confidentiality, until this was challenged when UK security services asked for access to anonymised interviews, which they managed to achieve with the help of the FBI (Palys and Lowman, 2012). The operational and epistemological domains of the nexus therefore show ever greater layers of complexity when university endeavours meet security and intelligence demands (Gearon and Parsons, 2018). Research ethics in universities have themselves their origins, however, in twentieth-century security crises, not in the university laboratory but in the heinous experimentation of the death camps. The relationship of the latter to universities has commonly been traced back to Nuremberg (Hazelgrove, 2002; Shuster, Markman and Markman, 1997). In this same historical setting, there are also ethically problematic associations of intimidation and terror with the security apparatus which facilitated the Third Reich as a totalitarian state. In such and other instances, where countries have a history of autocratic, dictatorial and totalitarian regimes, this, for many, makes current-day associations between universities and security in such states difficult. Repression, secret police, surveillance, torture and mass execution associated with powerful state agencies in such regimes – in Europe and beyond – may even make any contemporary connection between universities and security and intelligence agencies seem, perhaps rightly, sinister and malign (Arendt 2004; Aron, 1957, 1967; Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1967; Popper, 2002; Talmon, 1962; Voegelin, 1999). For this reason, different national histories will determine the measure of response to any levels of collaboration around the universities-security-­ intelligence nexus (Davies and Gustafson, 2016; De Graaff, Nyce and Locke, 2018; Webber, Croft, Howorth, Tariff and Krahmann, 2004). In general terms, though, we can see that even in nations without such histories, such as the UK or the US, the Academy is ethically divided over relations to security and intelligence operations (Durodie, 2016; Glees, 2015; Zwerling, 2011). The broader ethical frame also presents a critical backdrop to any consideration of the ­universities-security-intelligence nexus. So, the United Nations’ formation out of war produced a now deep-rooted, if often faltering, human rights culture in an era-defining attempt by the 46

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international community to find a ‘global moral compass’ (Gearon, 2016; also Gearon, 2011, 2019; Gearon, Kuusisto and Musaio, 2019; Roux and Becker, 2019). The breadth of universal human rights aspiration and legislation extends to no less than all aspects of human life; it is for this reason that the attainment and stability of such rights has become a matter of ‘human security’ globally promoted largely through formal and non-formal education (Bednarszyk, 2017; Di Donato and Grimi, 2019; Gearon, 2019; Gearon et al., 2019; Persaud, 2017, 2018; Roux and Becker, 2019). This sort of breadth seems to transform traditional notions of security. Yet look to this same history of the United Nations to see parallels in the traditional and the expansive models of security. For instance, the formation of the Security Council (in 1945) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (in 1948) are not so distant in time or orientation (Di Donato and Grimi, 2019; Gearon, 2019; Schlesinger, 2003). And it is in the UN’s first Convention on Genocide (ratified 9 December 1948, the day before the Universal Declaration) that we see the war and rights conjoined. The traditional and the expansive models are there at this early stage of modern history. We might suggest that the origins of narrow and expansive models of security in modern times are writ large by the foundations of what Wyschogrod (1990) has called ‘man-made mass death’. So, while many claim the Nuremberg Trials as important in ethics, they are partial and symbolic, and what preceded them is not to be forgotten. The Nuremberg Trials prosecuted leading members of the National Socialist Government. The most in/famous of these, between November 1945 and October 1946, was the Trial of the Major War Criminals, accounts of which are numerous and include one notable version of events by Albert Speer (1976). The lesser known set of Nuremberg trials were held between October 1946 and August 1947, charged with lower level members of the Third Reich but still critically central participants in atrocity. One of this second set of trials included what came to be known as the ‘Doctors’ Trial’, in which twenty doctors and three medical administrators faced prosecution, charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity. The shock of the case resting on unprecedented infringements of the Hippocratic Oath, it showed how medical professionals deviated in extraordinary and vile ways from the norms of medicine. It also has often been remarked how university-educated men and women of culture and refinement from a country at the historic heart of the European Enlightenment could perpetrate such evils. The often-cited but worth repeating words of Israeli educational psychologist Haim Ginott, are called to mind writing about a letter annually received by teachers from their principal: I am a survivor of a concentration camp. My eyes saw what no person should witness: gas chambers built by learned engineers. Children poisoned by educated physicians. Infants killed by trained nurses. Women and babies shot by high school and college graduates. So, I am suspicious of education. My request is this: Help your children become human. Your efforts must never produce learned monsters, skilled psychopaths or educated Eichmanns. Reading, writing, and arithmetic are important only if they serve to make our children more human. (HM, 2019) The horrors of live human experimentation brought research ethics and professional practice to the fore. The simple narrative which emerges is that of the Nuremberg Code, concerning in essence the need for informed consent in medical procedure, including research. Ghooi’s (2011) critique suggests that the resulting Nuremberg Code was in essence a re-drafting of earlier (1931) Guidelines for Human Experimentation, not referred to by the prosecution, and is part of a wider scholarly examination of ethical codes before Nuremberg. However we interpret the historical detail, there is thus a direct Nuremberg Trials of major Nazi war criminals (1945–1946), the subsequent Medical Trial (1947) and the emergence of 47

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the Nuremberg Code. While there were antecedents in ethical codes for medical interventions, the Nuremberg Trials have rightly been considered a point of modern origin for modern medical ethics (Dhai, 2014; Harvard, 2019; Hazelgrove, 2002; Mallardi 2005; Ruyter, 1997; Vollmann and Winau, 1996; Weindling, 2001) (Figure 1.12). The barbarities of human experimentation in the death camps by highly educated scientists and medical staff cannot be doubted, but an absence of ethics in this narrative of horror was

The Nuremberg Code   1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved, as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that, before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject, there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person, which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment. The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with impunity.   2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random and unnecessary in nature.   3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem under study, that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment.   4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury.   5. No experiment should be conducted, where there is an a priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.   6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.   7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death.   8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required through all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment.   9. During the course of the experiment, the human subject should be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end, if he has reached the physical or mental state, where continuation of the experiment seemed to him to be impossible. 10. During the course of the experiment, the scientist in charge must be prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill and careful judgement required of him, that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.

Figure 1.12  Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council ­ ffice, Law No. 10, Vol. 2, pp. 181–182.  Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing O 1949. https://history.nih.gov/research/downloads/nuremberg.pdf

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not the province specifically and only of the Nazis. The development of chemical and bacteriological knowledge through human experimentation was evident, arguably acute, across Japan since the early 1930s, and is a lesser told but no less horrific narrative (Sass, 2003). The history of the science of human medical experiments to test the viability, resistance, effectiveness of weapons of chemical, bacteriological, nuclear and bacteriological mass destruction is evidenced in this period across Allied as well as Axis powers (Paxman and Harris, 2002). The disciplines of psychology, too, seem particularly prone to ethical abuse. In Soviet Russia, psychiatry and psychiatrists were used to bolster the ideological claims of the Revolution, counter-revolutionaries and dissidents in no small measure being categorised as mentally ill (Reich, 1983; Zajicek, 2018). Some medical experts charge the practice has been revised and re-instigated and a toxic mix of politics and psychiatry adopted as tools of coercion in post-Soviet countries and China (CCHR, 2016; Clark, 2014; van Voren, 2016, 2013), what Munro (2006) defines as a ‘psychiatric inquisition’. Lyons and O’Malley (2002) similarly analyse the ‘labelling of dissent’ as an interface of ‘politics and psychiatry behind the Great Wall’ (see also HRW, 2002; Munro, 2002). Given the importance of literature in Russian culture, Sirotkina’s (2002) conception of ‘diagnosing literary genius’ describes an alternative cultural history of psychiatry in Russia which pre-dates the Revolution. Again, though, the West, too, has faced similar charges: ‘Psychiatrists and psychologists have been used by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to facilitate mind control and torture’ (Levine, 2015). The MKUltra programme is documented by the Church Committee being most prominent and most documented, and included networks of American universities (Linville, 2016). More recently, there have been post-9/11 accusations of collusion between the American Psychological Association and the CIA directly or indirectly by making such key players in the counter-terrorism activities. A current milieu of terrorism and counter-terrorism has more broadly facilitated a surprising diversity of academic disciplines in contributing to a burgeoning sub-field of terrorism and counter-terrorism across universities worldwide – in plain terms, we can look at nearly every major discipline within the Academy and find some branch of it concerned with terroristic themes, often avowedly determined to support counter-terrorist efforts (Gearon, 2018). The involvement of academics working in totalitarian regimes continues to place universities as institutions at the heart of ethical consideration. The permeation of Nazi ideology across German universities was evident however from the 1933 book burnings across Germany, there being no limit to disciplines whose authors were targeted. The management and administration of German universities too is an important aspect of this, and the oft-cited case of the philosopher Martin Heidegger, Nazi-appointed rector of the University of Freiburg, is a significantly high-profile instance which simply highlights the wider integration of Nazism at all levels of Third Reich society. Ericksen (2012) here examines, for example, the complicity of universities in Nazi Germany, while Rabinbach and Bialas (2014) demonstrate how German academics across the humanities embraced Nazism. In the Soviet Union, Tromly (2013) shows how universities and the intelligentsia as a body were integral to the intellectual support of Stalin’s model of state communism. In an autocratic China, Marinelli (2009) shows the importance of importance of language and the control of ­ hinese discourse in Mao Zedong’s ‘Political Discourse on Intellectuals’, arguing that ‘in the C historical tradition the “correctness” of language has always been considered a source of moral authority, official legitimacy and political stability’: Political language has always had an intrinsic instrumental value, since its control is the most suitable way to express and convey the orthodox State ideology. Formalized 49

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language has also served as a device to standardize the range of expressiveness of ­Chinese intellectuals. (Marinelli, 2009: 491) Despite the expansion of Chinese higher education, some have argued the intellectual-­ repression model continued in post-Maoist China (Goldman, 2009). Today, the importance of ideological conformity is seemingly further enforced in China itself through state-­security and intelligence agency presence in its universities and abroad through the range of agency supported incursions into foreign universities (Golden, 2018). Since intellectual life is the lifeblood of all ideology, so, too, open, liberal societies also operate with their own discourses of security, and in the current globalised world order, the norm is ethical as much as it is linguistic and textual. Here, in general terms, the perpetration of organised horror in the first half of the twentieth century became in the second half of that century, and to the present, the motivational source of the legislative – and ­textual – order of international human rights which challenged the polity of a totalitarian past and modelled aspirational global governance on universal human rights. This is an ethical milieu which has deeply impacted all aspects of global society, just as it is now ingrained in universities worldwide (Di Donato and Grimi, 2019; Roux and Becker, 2019; Weiss and Wilkinson, 2018). In narrower terms, a new consciousness of the need for ethical procedures in medical and related human research, even that intended beneficially, permeates all aspects of the Academy. In the psychological and social sciences, for instance, the impact of research participants being given the power to ‘obey orders’ – the defence of many at Nuremberg – was highlighted by Zimbardo’s (1973) Stanford Prison Experiment: How we went about testing these questions and what we found may astound you. Our planned two-week investigation into the psychology of prison life had to be ended after only six days because of what the situation was doing to the college students who participated. In only a few days, our guards became sadistic and our prisoners became depressed and showed signs of extreme stress. (Zimbardo, 1973) Framed by a site of incarceration, we see a direct instance of problematic research ethics through an in situ security environment. In the years of the Vietnam War, subsequent revelations that anthropologists in the field of South-East Asia were covertly working on counter-insurgency intelligence gathering while legitimately collecting anthropological data drew the ire of the American Anthropological Association to their professional colleagues (Wakin, 2015). While the recruitment from universities to newly formed security and intelligence agencies was well known, the latter case brought the universities-security-intelligence nexus particularly to the fore, specifically the notion that academic endeavour could be the covert basis for secret enterprises eschewing academic openness and transparency. With the Church Committee, it was in precisely the same, late Vietnam War period that the United States Government was bringing its own security and intelligence agencies into public view to face greater scrutiny and public accountability (Leigh and Wegge, 2018). The mood facilitated the investigations, in part because of the residue of suspicion still fresh in the air after Watergate and not least because of the secret conduct of the War itself, revealed by the leaked Pentagon Papers (Sheehan, Smith, Kenworthy, Butterfield and Ellsberg, 1971). The Church Committee Report (1975–1976) remains the most wide-ranging enquiry into a nation’s security and intelligence apparatus with enduring implications for 50

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today. Its conclusions were spread over several book-length reports. Volume VI had particular relevance to the monitoring of extremist activity across the United States, including its campuses, with particular scrutiny being given to the FBI’s ‘COINTELPRO operation’, a campaign of counter-intelligence targeting dissident activists and intellectuals in civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements (AARC, 2019; see also Gearon, 2019). The widespread FBI focus on civil society occurred during the near half-century of J. Edgar Hoover’s directorship of the FBI (Bond Potter, 1998; Cox and Theoharis, 1988; Curt, 2001; Gentry, 2001; Gid, 1987; Summers, 2012). Running parallel to this campus-centred dissent, Scanlon (2014) details the contrasting range of domestic support for the Vietnam War, and sees in the counter- ‘pro-war movement’ the budding roots of American conservatism (see also Hayden, 2017; Tufekci, 2017) Cox and Theoharis’s (1998) framing of Hoover’s power as ‘the Great American Inquisition’ nevertheless shows how the territorial ambitions of the FBI shifted from the traditional law enforcement focus on crime to enforcing the diktats of political value. This intensified in the 1950s, but the ideological focus on the threat of Cold War Communism had its precursors in prior decades. It is particularly evident in intellectual alliances which traversed the Atlantic and marked ‘fellow traveller’ intellectual friends of Communism as security risks, and highlighted potential threats subversively embedded in previously conservative university institutions (Caute, 1988). McCarthyism and Un-American activities would look for communist sympathies in every area of American civil life, but particular focus would soon acutely shift to the political life of campuses which had become increasingly the focus of civil rights. During the 1960s counterculture, university campuses were to become particular foci for a range of home-grown radicalism focused on anti-Vietnam War protests (Grathwohl and Reagan, 2013; Means, 2016; Rafalko, 2011; Thomas, 2018). It also led to the shooting dead of unarmed student protestors on the campus of Ohio State University on 4 May 1970 (Means, 2016; Nixon, 1978; Thomas, 2018). Officially operating between 1956 and 1971, in the Hoover’s last two decades, COINTELPRO, or the Counter-Intelligence Programme of the FBI, was notable for its coordinated systematisation of civil society. It particularly resonates with security and intelligence agency interests on campuses today, intensified by but extending beyond ­counter-terrorist activity (Gearon, 2019; Kessler, 2003), extending beyond universities to what Michael’s (2008) outlines as an extensive pattern of ‘private-public intelligence partnerships’ (Schwarz, 2007). Nation of Islam, one of the groups targeted at the time, narrates the story. On 8 March 1971, while much of America watched the Muhammad Ali–Joe Frazier fight, activists known as the Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the FBI broke in to a small Bureau office in Pennsylvania and stole over a thousand documents, soon to be released to the press, of FBI targets, and the techniques used to discredit and disgrace. Alleged continuation of state-organised suppression of dissident and other organisations deemed to be destabilising: COINTELPRO tactics included discrediting targets through psychological warfare, planting false reports in the media, smearing through forged letters, harassment, wrongful imprisonment, extralegal violence and assassination. Covert operations under COINTELPRO took place between 1956 and 1971, however the U.S. Government has used covert operations against domestic political groups since its inception. The 1978 internal NSA Memo under the President Carter Administration ‘on preventing the organizing and coordinated unity between Black America and Black Africa’ makes for interesting reading and continues to this day. (NoI, 2019) 51

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There followed volumes of a general nature: Book I: Foreign and Military Intelligence; Book II: Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans; Book III: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans; Book IV: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence; Book V: The Investigation of the Assassination of President J.F.K.: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies; Book VI: Supplementary Reports on Intelligence Activities (AARC, 2019). In all, the Church Committee laid less blame on the intelligence agencies themselves for covert action and subterfuge than on the executive, though enduring too is the suspicion that powerful US security and intelligence agencies worked not infrequently beyond any authority but their own ( Johnson, 2018; Weiner 2012a, 2012b). There are, as we have noted, innumerable other instances in the history of modern security and intelligence where the edges have been blurred between legitimate overt academic activity being a covert cover for security and intelligence activity. Where wars and proxy wars have high degree of ideological force, as in the Cold War, in countries across the globe, intellectuals and thus often universities have come very much to the fore in political suppression; and, as such, universities as sources of both political knowledge and ideologically driven academic activity inevitably have moved to an operational and epistemological centre-stage. A prime example of this is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s ‘Information Service’ – or NATIS – which formulated strategy on shaping public opinion through covert work often with academics and intellectuals (Risso 2014), though this was poorly funded and nothing compared to the United States’ Congress for Cultural Freedom (Miller Harris, 2016; Reisch, 2013). Where the academic disciplines of both security and intelligence studies have become embedded into universities worldwide so the ethical domains of such operational engagements have today become acute. In the United States, the relationship between universities and security and intelligence agencies has been both more open and more imbued with secrecy; academic suspicion has encouraged the resistance of such intrusions into universities (Moran, 2013). The early 2000s’ move to develop Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence (ODNI, 2005) has led to the formation of the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE, 2019), where relations between universities and security and intelligence agencies have become as cordial as they are constructive and collaborative. In terms, for example, of recruitment, this is a two-way street, a high percentage, a substantial majority of all recruits to such university courses, enter the security and intelligence agencies, while in the other direction, such university courses provide employment opportunities for former members of the security and intelligence personnel to share their organisational knowledge and tradecraft skills in university environments. Such a close relationship raises natural questions of academic autonomy. In other cases where the academic disciplines of security and intelligence studies are incorporated within the Academy, there seems greater distancing, more room for critique. Yet here, the lack of direct connection may effect a lessening of access to hard-edged operational realities. These institutional peculiarities raise their own ethical issues, and are worthy of further comparative concerns. In brief, we may note that just as the UK and US security and intelligence agencies differ, say, from their European or global counterparts, for reasons of historical context (Davies, 2012; Davies and Gustafson, 2016), understandings and levels of acceptance of the universities-security-intelligence nexus will vary greatly. By way of illustration, we can return to Nuremberg. Thus, if we take the wider modern histories of eastern and western Europe and the dependence, say, of Communist, Fascist and Nazi regimes on terror created secret and much feared security and intelligence agencies ­(Arendt, 2004; Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1967; Popper, 2002; Talmon, 1962; Voegelin, 1999), such 52

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histories will shape both the current-day structures of the security and the intelligence agencies and as a result may engender greater suspicions of any proximity of the latter to universities (Davies and Gustafson 2016; De Graaff, Nyce and Locke 2018; Kolaszy ń ski, 2018; Webber, Croft, Howorth, Tariff and Krahmann 2004). Just, then, as research ethics gain traction across disciplines, so, too, over progressive decades, security and intelligence agency ethics have also come to greater prominence. The rise of ethics in the former is not, arguably, unrelated to the latter. If the fundamental principle of ethical engagement in university research is concerned with harm, its prevention or at least minimisation, this same principle has long been active in the security and intelligence agencies. Revelations of harm have thus directly prompted the development of ethical codes. In short, the ethical domain of the universities-security-intelligence nexus is a product of a milieu of moral sensitivity in an age of ethics and ethical codes. These are complex questions of moral and political philosophy as much as public policy. As regards the specific ethical domain of the universities-security-intelligence nexus, we can only set forth some brief, if significant, organising principles. Omand and Phythian (2018) account for accommodations amidst differences of respective positionings, their own being illustrative: Omand, a former director at GCHQ and now academic; Phythian, a security and intelligence studies professor collaborating academically if not operationally with the former. As they state, intelligence agency attempts to protect national security and also raises questions of human rights and freedoms, the abiding tension between liberty and security, between operational secrecy and accountability (Gill, 2017; Johnson, 2018). Omand and Phythian’s (2018) sanguine interpretation of ethics here is far from shared across the Academy. Bellaby (2016) suggests that there is a dire need for a more rigorous and ethical framework for security and intelligence agencies, his ‘ladder of intelligence ethics’ being underpinned by a core principle of harm. The principle is drawn from social science ethics, highlighting further how the Academy provides a critical voice for the security other. But the agencies are themselves self-critical and held to other forms of public account (again, Johnson, 2018). The anonymous CIA review of Bellaby’s book thus highlights lack of reference to public hearings such as the Church Committee which have brought security and intelligence agencies precisely to book for ethical shortcomings. The very existence of such CIA reviews shows the importance security and intelligence agencies place on (often reciprocal and corrective) interchange within both the Academy and the agencies. While a minority support such developments, recognising an historical and contemporary importance (Dirks, 2012), others such as LeVine (2012) or Zwerling (2011) are adamant in the opposition to any interface between universities and the security and intelligence agencies. Debates between the strongly opposed Glees (2015) and Durodie (2016) are another exemplar specific to the UK and the Government’s introduction of counter-terrorism measures which impact universities (CTSA, 2015; RG, 2015; UUK 2011, 2012, 2013, 2016). Crosston (2013) frames the sources of historical-political resistance within universities: Vietnam era and independent grassroots movements swept across college campuses, powered largely by liberal faculty that found no common ground with the intelligence community. More reasons were added on in the 1980s and 90s as to why the intelligence community and American college campuses should not mix: these ranged from the belief that secrecy was antithetical to academic freedom; objections about the IC’s supposed use of torture and assassination; efforts to recruit professors and students; and the IC’s assumed long-standing role in undermining democratic movements around the world. 53

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These discussions are part of wider debates around academic freedom and its political curtailment (Badley, 2009; Post, 2013; Raskin and Spero, 2006; Shore and Taits, 2012). In security and intelligence terms today, These arguments would remain and form a new 21st century anti-intelligence eruption across campuses in the wake of 9/11, initiated again by mostly liberal faculty suspicious of a perceived invasive push by intelligence agencies into America. But in this emergence there are sharp differences with the past. If the past had accurate assessments of intelligence community objectives and then extrapolated from them for faculty purposes, this new era of indignation makes many inaccurate assessments and then purposely exaggerates the ‘successes’ of the intelligence community on college campuses …[and] this manipulation powers a new generation of academic suspicion towards all things ‘intelligence.’ Not dealing with it openly means an attempt to heal the sickness from the academic side by treating the symptoms while ignoring the cause. (Crosston, 2013) This divide is apparent in other areas which touch on security and intelligence, and is particularly apparent in critical terrorism studies (Gearon, 2018). Post-9/11 counterterrorist realities have brought to the fore collaborations between universities and the security and intelligence agencies to the foreground in ways which have historical antecedence but which are different today, but never more problematic. Either through (in open, democratic societies) adopting legislative campus compliance measures or (in autocratic contexts) being the subject of repressive governmental and military actions, the universities-security-intelligence nexus can be regarded (depending on your largely political perspective) as part of the problem or part of the solution. For Crosston (2013), close collaboration is part of post-9/11 solution, where a ‘mutual diffusion of knowledge, methods, and research would ideally produce both a stronger Intelligence Studies discipline and new talented cadres for both communities’ (Crosston, 2013). Terrorism and counter-terrorism measures have made such developments acute and are in large measure part of the contemporary justification for increased security: ‘The emphasis is not just logical because of the continued relevance of traditional threats, but is also common sense when considering new challenges represented by emerging threat issues’ (Crosston, 2013). The problems of ‘sincere knowledge diffusion between the academic and intelligence communities’ go ‘beyond platitudes about confidential materials and top secret clearances, but hint at underlying prejudices on both sides that only exacerbate attitudinal bias’. We have seen however that legitimate ethical concerns are raised in relation to many aspects of such collaborations, and these, we must maintain, are not simply matter of historic prejudice or Crosston’s ‘attitudinal’ biases. The critical tension, in the European Union at least, is the inherent or perceived imbalance between the legal enshrining of law and European values around the four freedoms and enhanced security as a potential threat to those liberties it seeks to protect (Barnard, 2016; Christou, Croft, Ceccorulli and Lucarelli, 2010). Human rights and other libertarian groups invariably adopt an even less sanguine and accommodating outlook. Amnesty International’s (2017) Dangerously Disproportionate, for example, defines such securitising moves as symptomatic of an ever-expanding national security state across Europe. While acknowledging the ‘need to protect people from such wanton violence’ as ‘obvious and urgent’ and upholding ‘the right to life, enabling people to live freely, to move freely, to think freely … are essential tasks for any government’, these ‘are not tasks that should, or can, be achieved by riding roughshod over the very rights that governments are purporting to uphold’. Positing 54

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a profound shift in paradigm across Europe: a move from the view that it is the role of governments to provide security so that people can enjoy their rights, to the view that governments must restrict people’s rights in order to provide security. The Report examines the ‘national security landscape in Europe’ to demonstrate ‘a widespread and deep ‘“securitization” of Europe’, including through international, inter-­governmental moves beyond but impacting upon Europe, notably UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (UN, 2017, including nineteen international instruments countering terrorism). In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, 2019) has instigated measures which naturally integrate the security across United States’ campuses, just as the European Agenda on Security (EAS, 2015) ensures that security is part of the remit of public policy, including universities. The involvement of universities is here part of broader patterns of securitisation (Argomanis, 2009; Argomanis, Bures and Kaunert, 2014; Bakker, 2014; Den Boer, 2015), what Den Boer and Wiegand (2015) describe as a shift from security policy ‘convergence’ to ‘deep integration’. As with Amnesty International’s (2017) report, it is the irony, much noted, that illiberal actions often justify liberal ends (Chomsky, 2017). Didier and Tsoukala’s (2008) Terror, Insecurity and Liberty highlights precisely the same perceived justification of ‘illiberal practices’ by ‘liberal regimes’ directly following 9/11 (see also Aradau, 2004). In this context, security-conscious states provide security-justifying counter-­narratives. So the European Union maintains that enhanced security is freedom-protecting not ­f reedom-denying, that security is necessary and proportionate, and undergirded by five operationalised principles of European value: (1) ‘full compliance with fundamental rights’; (2) enhanced ‘transparency, accountability and democratic control’; (3) ‘application and implementation of existing EU legal instruments’; (4) ‘a more joined-up inter-agency and a cross-sectorial approach’; and (5) a conjoining of ‘all internal and external dimensions of security’ (EAS, 2015). In Europe as elsewhere, the resultant picture though is of security permeation across public, including higher education policy (Robertson, Olds, Dale, and Dang, 2016; Rüegg, 2010). This permeation makes the ethical domain ever more important. It is public perceptions of behaviour by security and intelligence agencies which engender the furore. This is all the more so when, unlike portrayals of spies in fiction and film, the public realise that the spy agencies are interested not merely in the designated evils of the malign other but in an era of indiscriminate surveillance prospectively about themselves. The universities dimension of these developments has not been entirely systematised. Indeed, until of late, as we have noted, popular conceptions of espionage and the Academy have tended towards association with renowned cases of intrigue and notorious instances of treachery. The often run-ofthe-mill (because pervasive) interactions in the university-security-intelligence nexus lack glamour but are no less dramatic. Despite the complexity, a simple framework identifies the core principle and principled components of ethical interaction between universities and the security and intelligence agencies, and can be framed across four areas: Academic Standards; Academic Freedom; Academic Engagement and Professional Conduct (Gearon and Parsons, 2018) (Figure 1.13). This ethical framework arises because of the epistemological and operational aspects of university relations with the security and intelligence agencies. The model shows evident tensions in the stated binaries of each of the four ethical principles. These binary oppositions within each of the arenas of academic ethics, suggestive of potential dilemmas and dichotomies, are not intended to preclude but indeed may be a basis for other, hybrid models. 55

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Academic Standards: Openness and Opacity

Academic Engagement: Scrutiny and Surveillance

Academic Ethics and Espionnage

Academic Freedom: Autonomy and Autocracy

Professional Conduct: Integrity and Illegality

Figure 1.13  Academic Ethics and Espionage (Gearon and Parsons, 2018)

Academic Standards, between Openness and Opacity, or the transparency with which knowledge is gathered, is a difficulty when one institutional nexus is committed to openness and peer-review and by necessity the other is dependent on operational secrecy. Academic Freedom is a tension between Autonomy and Autocracy, where governmental directed diktat is necessarily held in sway by scholarly commitments to independence of thought and judgement. Academic Engagement raises tensions between Scrutiny and Surveillance, where quality assurance measures and safety can, as with recent objections to UK counter-­ terrorism legislation by universities, elide into objections about staff needing to ‘spy’ on students, or even the converse (Durodie, 2016; Glees, 2015). Professional Conduct is a matter of managing the borderlines between Integrity and Illegality, a rarer but perhaps less exceptional than we know of straying into the grey areas of tradecraft, deception, larceny, theft, even, if the ends justify the means, never to be avowed extrajudicial torture and killing (Weiner, 2012a).

The universities-security-intelligence nexus: the existential domain The geopolitical framing of the security and intelligence agencies coincides with a century of global conflict and turmoil. We have seen how the widening of existential threats beyond these conventional arenas of war has broadened both the focus of security and intelligence agencies and, by turns, the remit of security and intelligence studies. The latter disciplines have begun to embrace wider notions that confront the contemporary security agenda with new threats (Collins, 2018; Fierke, 2015; Peoples, 2014; Williams and McDonald, 2018). This is also recognised and widely publicised by security and intelligence chiefs as part of a new climate of partial openness, as a former Director General of MI5 has remarked: 56

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…progress has been made in reducing our national vulnerabilities – there have been definite improvements – but I worry that, against the background of no attacks here, we risk becoming complacent. So my message is to broaden your thinking about security issues. (Manningham-Buller, 2004) Addressing a business community, she highlights this broadened conception of financial and economic security as ultimately part of societal security: A narrow definition of corporate security including the threats of crime and fraud should be widened to include terrorism and the threat of electronic attack. In the same way that health and safety and compliance have become part of the business agenda, so should a broad understanding of security… That insider knowledge being shared is a critical part of disaster planning and for protecting the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure: And where do we, the Security Service, fit in? Those of you who only know us from fiction may imagine that the only role of the Security Service is to pursue terrorists, spies and serious criminals. We certainly do that (this is exciting and rewarding work, though not quite in the way that it is presented in fiction) but we also give advice, based on our inside knowledge of the intelligence on the threat. (Manningham-Buller, 2004; MI5, 2019) In the sister SIS, its current chief Alex Younger used the site of his former university of St Andrews to give an assessment of threat which is broader and shows the need for evolution in the SIS itself, including greater public openness and sharing of common threats: Across the century of SIS’s existence, we have evolved continuously to confront each generation of threat: from the World Wars to the Cold War to the rise of transnational threats including international terrorism. Now, we are evolving again to meet the threats of the hybrid age. (Younger, 2018) At St Andrews University, Younger spoke of ‘the fourth generation’ of security and intelligence, its evolution taking ‘three forms’: First, when your defences as a country are being probed on multiple fronts at the same time, it can be difficult to see the totality of what your opponent is trying to do. Security in the hybrid world is therefore all about who can partner to the greatest effect… second, alongside our core mission of revealing the intentions of adversaries and giving the UK government strategic advantage overseas, our task now is to master covert action in the data age … the third driver for change in SIS: the need to ensure that technology is on our side, not that of our opponents. (Younger, 2018) The need for universities is framed, as it always has been, in the need to address such new demands through the recruitment of personnel who have the knowledge and skills to meet these demands: Ironically, the most profound consequence of the technological challenge is a human one. We are determined, of course, to attract people with an even higher level of 57

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technical skill to join our ranks, in the best traditions of Q. But my organisation will need to adapt even faster if it is to thrive in the future. And that will require people with new perspectives, capable of harnessing their creativity in ways that we can’t yet even imagine. (Younger, 2018) These security and intelligence agency public pronouncements retain the traditional epistemological models of threat, those which impact the nation, in this case the United Kingdom. These sorts of modelling for threat are ancient. Just as Edward Snowden in his first communication to Greenwald refers to Quinctius Cincinnatus, the fifth-century BC ­Roman farmer, to illustrate a wider framing of political power, Allison (2015) delves to the works of Thucydides, to ask a question which relates to the security of contemporary China and America. Through histories of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, Thucydides has thus defined a premise: When a rising power threatens to displace a ruling one, the most likely outcome is war. So Allison (2015) asks if America and China can avoid the ‘Thucydides trap’? Historically, world-threatening, existential threats are evident in this model, where nations work on superior weapons to overcome the technological inferiority of others. The afore-cited heads of two security and intelligence agencies have said as much. National agencies which work with Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Radiological defence will know this as intensely, for instance in the case of the UK Government’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL, 2019) or other similar scientific defence institutes worldwide, including those embedded as part of the security and intelligence agencies (Carroll, 2004; Paxman and Harris, 2002). It was the nuclear threat and moves to disarmament which have dominated much of the Cold War and which today are marked by a resurgence of concern as a largely bilateral conflict shifts to a complex multi-polarity (Vik Steen and Njølstad, 2019). The involvement of universities was apparent from the origins of this threat and continues today. Thus with a national, regional and global focus, the Federation of American Scientists, founded in 1945 as the Federation of Atomic Scientists, included those involved in the Manhattan Project. Renamed in 1946 as the Federation of American Scientists, today the organisation provides a ‘science-based analysis of and solutions to protect against catastrophic threats to national and international security’. FAS ‘works to reduce the spread and number of nuclear weapons, prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism, promote high standards for nuclear energy’s safety and security, illuminate government secrecy practices, as well as prevent the use of biological and chemical weapons’, driven by ‘the belief that scientists, engineers, and other technically trained people have the ethical obligation to ensure that the technological fruits of their intellect and labour are applied to the benefit of humankind’. FAS policy has major foci on the Government Secrecy Project and Nuclear Information Project. FAS staff and adjunct fellows comprise academics with expertise in ‘aeronautical engineering, biology, biochemistry, chemistry, environmental science, law, nuclear engineering, physics, and political science’. Its Board of Sponsors includes in excess of over 60 Nobel laureates and other influential figures from the scientific and international communities. At the individual level, particular scientists, for instance in the wake of the Iraq War investigation into weapons of mass destruction, became prominent. The death of expert David Kelly thus still resonates today more than a decade after his demise (Goslett, 2019). Yet, definitions of security have shifted from centrally and state-determined to a shared public discourse which has moved beyond the national to the global. The broadening and widening of security is even deeper than we suspect. And the implications are far from 58

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academic. Global terrorism has brought to public consciousness and shown how universities have become integrated into a nexus of collaboration with security and intelligence agencies through counter-terrorism policies across a range of domains. Yet, there are many other ways to configure threat. Securitisation theory helps show this in practical terms. Innumerable non-government organisations, not-for-profit bodies and think-tanks are thus set up to guard against the latest dangers, risks and threats, from biodiversity, climate change and environmental catastrophe to resurgent rekindling of a Cold War nuclear arms race. Between nations, war and its aftermath have themselves become, to quote Cecile Fabre (2018), ‘cosmopolitan’. War and peace thus break down the traditional boundaries of states and raise ethical issues which transgress territories. The rise of the United Nations and the development of human rights norms to undergird the value systems of a cross-cultural system of international law provide in effect a ‘global moral compass’ (Gearon, 2016). Yet as the history of the United Nations attests, knowing a global problem and resolving it through collaborations between nation-states with their own vested interests is rarely easy. Universities here are well placed as international global institutions of knowledge exchange at the forefront of issues which directly and indirectly engage and impact with these narrow and broad notions of security, often through collaborations with national governments and inter-governmental agencies such as the United Nations. The ‘Framework for Cooperation for the system-wide application of Human Security’ (UN, 2015) is one such initiative which draws together strands of predictive and protective measures in dealing with the problems of ‘human security’: For many people, today’s world presents an insecure threats on many fronts. Natural disasters, violent conflicts, persistent poverty, epidemics and economic downturns impose hardships and undercut prospects for peace and stability, as well as sustainable development. Crises are complex, entailing multiple forms of human insecurity. When they overlap, they can grow exponentially, spilling into all aspects of people’s lives, destroying entire communities and crossing national borders. (UN, 2019) The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security thus unifies around three freedoms – from want, from fear and freedom to live in dignity (UN, 2019). Merely one exemplar of a longstanding body rooted in such global, trans-territorial collaboration is the Millennium Project, dating back to 1996 and founded under the auspices of the American Council for the United Nations University. For more than two decades, its State of the Future reports are a comprehensive collection of internationally peer-reviewed collections ‘on methods and tools to explore future possibilities ever assembled in one resource’ (MP, 2019). These fifteen Global Challenges ‘provide a framework to assess the global and local prospects for humanity’ and are framed as questions:   1 How can sustainable development be achieved for all while addressing global climate change?   2 How can everyone have sufficient clean water without conflict?   3 How can population growth and resources be brought into balance?   4 How can genuine democracy emerge from authoritarian regimes?   5 How can decision-making be enhanced by integrating improved global foresight during unprecedented accelerating change? 59

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  6 How can the global convergence of information and communications technologies work for everyone?   7 How can ethical market economies be encouraged to help reduce the gap between rich and poor?   8 How can the threat of new and re-emerging diseases and immune micro-organisms be reduced?   9 How can education make humanity more intelligent, knowledgeable and wise enough to address its global challenges? 10 How can shared values and new security strategies reduce ethnic conflicts, terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction? 11 How can the changing status of women help improve the human condition? 12 How can transnational organised crime networks be stopped from becoming more powerful and sophisticated global enterprises? 13 How can growing energy demands be met safely and efficiently? 14 How can scientific and technological breakthroughs be accelerated to improve the human condition? 15 How can ethical considerations become more routinely incorporated into global decisions? Ultimately, these are all matters of security requiring combined intelligence to resolve. Not resolving them risks heightening security threats in unprecedented ways. Such modelling both confirms Copenhagen School notions of expanded threat and shows if anything considerable widening of security categorisations. Threats, then, which face humanity far exceed security and intelligence agency capacities to deal with them. Hence we witness the role global universities and related research organisations have in relation to security and intelligence agencies, an important historical and contemporary reality which is likely to intensify in the future (Duyvesteyn et al., 2015; Gheciu and Wohlforth, 2018).

Conclusion Universities are not the centre of the universe, nor are the security and intelligence services. The universities-security-intelligence nexus nevertheless throws considerable light on the existential threats they confront. The four domains of this nexus have been defined in outline as operational, epistemological, ethical and existential. These components which bring universities into ever tighter and more complex relationship with the security and intelligence agencies are but one aspect of the wider dimension of those threats which are common to humanity and not simply (as in traditional models of security and intelligence) to nations. We may return to the Chief of the UK’s SIS, Sir Alex Younger, who had said much to characterise the spy as more akin to the university scholar than the person of action, more George Smiley than James Bond. We know, naturally, that action has as much a part as intellect to play in the universities-security nexus. Unarguably, for instance, the most important university-security-intelligence collaboration of modern times, perhaps of all time, was the Manhattan Project. It took an Oppenheimer as much as an ­E isenhower to enact (Monk, 2014). Just as technology has always advanced through war, what was designed and created was, too, a modern-day meeting of science and security, a collation of a new sub-field of sub-atomic physics to the battlefield over the skies of Japan.

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The  nuclear technology which developed the weaponry used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 ended a war and created a new age. It is the one in which we are still living, and whose threats are in the current-day more ever-present and more dangerous perhaps than they ever were. Appropriately for this volume, the venue for the SIS Chief ’s address is his former University of St Andrews. He speaks of operational secrecy and spying, the role of universities in advancing a nation’s security, the close correspondence of intelligence and research knowledge, little of ethics, much of graduate recruitment, even more of survival, and the unpredictable nature of future threat: As Chief I rarely speak in public. I am a spy. And less is more. This is only my second public speech in four years; and you might have to wait quite a long time for another one. But I am speaking today because it is vital that people hear enough about SIS to know what we really do – as opposed to the myths about what we do – and because we want talented young people across our country to join us. While I am delighted to say that we recruit the very brightest talent, and have extraordinary young people working in our organisation, this is not something I will ever take for granted. We are going to need the most diverse and skilled officers possible in the years ahead. Because the reality of the world is going to become more ambiguous, and more complicated. (Younger, 2018) Such an address to a university audience by a former Chief of the SIS is at the heart of the universities-security-intelligence nexus. An emergent principle is concretised. Security has moved beyond traditional state apparatus. And, as noted, where security appears in public life, security tends increasingly to permeate public life. For all the reasons explored in the foregoing, universities are thereby drawn into this remit. It is shared interests in knowledge against known threats which have bound and will continue to bind university relations with security and intelligence agencies. Common threats are likely to raise the need for closer collaborations. These cooperations are not abstract notions but necessity. Such collaboration has always been as critical as it has been contentious. The ethics as we have seen for multi-layered complexities not only of professional and academic conduct but ideology and centuries-old residual resentments from wars and conquests which have long ended but whose ramifications are still lived realities for many millions. It makes security and intelligence collaborations difficult to leave completely the old, traditional patterns of nation-state protections. The universities-security-intelligence nexus today is arguably different though in principle even if in practice it is near impossible to foresee operating in practical collaborative terms; that is, the nexus and the threats it faces transcend nation-state boundaries. The ­balance of national and global interests remains a critical lynchpin in dealing with threats that depend on cooperation. The threats themselves (their breadth and depth) transform inherited understandings of what security and intelligence mean, from the survival of nations to the survival of species, including our own, and this is why the threats may be defined as existential, species – and not simply state-threatening (Kolbert, 2015; M ­ cKibben, 2019). If the universities-security-intelligence nexus was a need born of national, historical and geopolitical necessity – the wars of the past – in looking into the future, the relationship is likely to intensify and transform through acute enhancements of transnational existential threats.

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Notes 1  University Educations of Chiefs of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Dates of Appointment, Name, University, if applicable 1903–1909 William Melville – not applicable 1909–1923 Captain Sir Mansfield Smith-Cumming – Royal Navy 1923–1939 Admiral Sir Hugh Sinclair – Royal Navy 1939–1952 Major-General Sir Stewart Menzies – Eton 1953–1956 Major-General Sir John Sinclair, Naval Colleges at Osborne and Dartmouth 1956–1968 Sir Richard White – Christ Church, Oxford 1968–1973 Sir John Rennie, Balliol, Oxford 1973–1978 Sir Maurice Oldfield – Victoria University of Manchester 1979–1982 Sir Arthur Franks – The Queen’s College, Oxford 1982–1985 Sir Colin Figures, Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge 1985–1989 Sir Christopher Curwen Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge 1989–1994 Sir Colin McColl – The Queen’s College, Oxford 1994–1999 Sir David Spedding – Hertford College, Oxford 1999–2004 Sir Richard Dearlove – Queens’ College, Cambridge 2004–2009 Sir John Scarlett – Magdalen College, Oxford 2009–2014 Sir John Sawers – University of Nottingham 2014–present Alex Younger –St Andrew’s Sources: Burke’s Peerage (2019); Jeffery (2011); MI6 (2019); ODNB (2019). 2  University Educations of Directors General of MI5 Dates of Appointment, Name, University, if applicable 1909–1940 Maj Gen Sir Vernon Kell – Royal Military College, Sandhurst 1940–1941 (Acting) Brigadier ‘Jasper’ Harker – not applicable 1941–1946 Sir David Petrie – not applicable 1946–1953 Sir Percy Sillitoe – not applicable 1953–1956 Sir Dick White – Christ Church, Oxford 1956–1965 Sir Roger Hollis – Worcester College, Oxford 1965–1972 Sir Martin Furnival Jones – Gonville & Caius College, Cambridge 1972–1978 Sir Michael Hanley – The Queen’s College, Oxford 1978–1981 Sir Howard Smith – Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge 1981–1985 Sir John Jones – Christ’s College, Cambridge 1985–1988 Sir Antony Duff – Royal Naval College, Dartmouth 1988–1992 Sir Patrick Walker –Trinity College, Oxford 1992–1996 Dame Stella Rimington – University of Edinburgh 1996–2002 Sir Stephen Lander – Queens’ College, Cambridge 2002–2007 Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller – Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford 2007–2013 Sir Jonathan Evans – University of Bristol 2013-Present Andrew Parker – Churchill College, Cambridge Sources: Andrew (2010); Burke’s Peerage (2019); ODNB (2019); MI5 (2019).

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The university-security-intelligence nexus 3  University Educations of Directors of GCHQ Dates of Appointment, Name, University, if applicable 1921–1942, Alastair Denniston CMG CBE – University of Bonn; University of Paris 1942–1952, Sir Edward Travis KCMG CBE – Royal Navy 1952–1960 Sir Eric Jones KCMG CB CBE – Royal Air Force 1960–1964 Sir Clive Loehnis KCMG – Royal Naval College, Osborne; Royal Naval College, Dartmouth; Royal Naval College, Greenwich 1965–1973 Sir Leonard Hooper KCMG CBE – Worcester College, Oxford 1973–1978 Sir Arthur Bonsall KCMG CBE – Saint Catharine’s College, Cambridge 1978–1983 Sir Brian John Maynard Tovey KCMG – St Catharine’s College, Cambridge 1983–1989 Sir Peter Marychurch KCMG – Royal Air Force 1989–1996 Sir John Anthony Adye KCMG – Lincoln College, Oxford 1996–1997 Sir David Omand GCB – Corpus Christi College, Cambridge 1998 Sir Kevin Tebbit KCB CMG – St John’s College, Cambridge 1998–2003 Sir Francis Richards KCMG CVO DL – King’s College, Cambridge 2003–2008 Sir David Pepper KCMG – University of Oxford 2008–2014 Sir Iain Lobban KCMG CB – University of Leeds 2014–2017 Robert Hannigan CMG – Wadham College, Oxford; Heythrop College, London 2017–present Jeremy Fleming – not published Sources: Aldrich (2019); Burke’s Peerage (2019); ODNB (2019); GCHQ (2019).

4  University Educations of Directors of the FBI Dates of Appointment, Name, University, if applicable 1935–1972 J. Edgar Hoover – George Washington University 1972 Clyde Tolson (Acting) – George Washington University 1972 L. Patrick Gray (Acting) – US Navy; Gray Rice University 1973 William Ruckelshaus (Acting) – Princeton University; Harvard University 1973 –1978 Clarence M. Kelley – University of Kansas; University of Kansas City 1978 James B. Adams (Acting) – Baylor University 1978–1987 William H. Webster – Amherst College; Washington University 1987 John E. Otto (Acting) – University of Minnesota 1987–1993 William S. Sessions – Baylor University 1993 Floyd I. Clarke (Acting) – George Washington University 1993–2001 Louis Freeh; Rutgers University; New York University 2001 Thomas J. Pickard – St John’s University, New York 2013–2017 James Comey – College of William and Mary; University of Chicago 2017 Andrew McCabe – Duke University; Washington University 2017– Christopher A. Wray – Yale University Sources: ANB (2019); FBI (2019).

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Liam Francis Gearon 5  University Educations of Directors of the CIA Dates of Appointment, Name, University, if applicable 1946 Sidney W. Souers Purdue –University; West Lafayette; Miami University 1946–1947 Hoyt S. Vandenberg – United States Military Academy 1947–1950 Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter – United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland 1950–1953 Walter Bedell Smith – Butler University 1953–1961 Allen W. Dulles – Princeton University 1961–1965 John A. McConev – University of California, Berkeley 1965–1966 William F. Raborn, Jr. – U.S. Naval Academy 1966–1973 Richard M. Helms – Williams College, Massachusetts, 1973 James R. Schlesinger – Harvard University 1973–1976 William E. Colby – Princeton University; Columbia 1976–1977 George H. W. Bush – Phillips Academy 1977–1981 Stansfield Turner – US Naval Academy; Oxford University 1981–1987 William J. Casey – Fordham University; Catholic University of America; St John’s University 1987–1991 William H. Webster – Amherst College, Massachusetts; Washington University. 1991–1993 Robert M. Gates – College of William and Mary; Indiana University; Georgetown University 1993–1995 R. James Woolsey – Stanford University; Oxford University; Yale University 1995–1996 John M. Deutch – Amherst College; Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1997–2004 George J. Tenet – State University of New York at Cortland; Georgetown University School of Foreign Service; Columbia University Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at Georgetown University 2004–2006 Porter Goss – Yale University 2006–2009 Michael V. Hayden – Duquesne University 2009–2011 Leon Panetta – Santa Clara University, California 2011–2012 David Petraeus – United States Military Academy at West Point 2013-John Brennan – Fordham University; University of Texas at Austin, American University Cairo Sources: ANB (2019); CIA (2019). 6  University Educations of Directors of the NSA Dates of Appointment, Name, University, if applicable The Armed Forces Security Agency 1949–1951 RADM Earl E. Stone, USN – United States Naval Academy 1951–1956 MG Ralph J. Canine – Northwestern University 1956–1960 Lt Gen John A. Samford, USAF – Columbia University 1960–1962 VADM Laurence H. Frost, USN – U.S. Naval Academy 1962–1965 Lt Gen Gordon A. Blake, USAF – United States Military Academy 1965–1969 LTG Marshall S. Carter – United States Military Academy; Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1969-VADM Noel Gayler, USN – United States Naval Academy Lt Gen Samuel C. Phillips, USAF – University of Wyoming; University of Michigan 1973–1977 Lt Gen Lew Allen, Jr., USAF – United States Military Academy 1977–1981 VADM Bobby Ray Inman, USN – University of Texas

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The university-security-intelligence nexus 1981–1985 Lt Gen Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF – United States Military Academy at West Point; Cornell University; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, New York; George Washington University 1985–1988 LTG William E. Odom, USA – United States Military Academy; Columbia University 1988–1992 VADM William O. Studeman, USN – University of the South in Sewanee, Tennessee; George Washington University 1992–1996 VADM J. Michael McConnell, USN – North Greenville Junior College; Furman University; George Washington University; National Defense University; National Defense Intelligence College 1966–1999 Lt Gen Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF – Florida State University; Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California; Air War College, Alabama; Harvard University 1999–2005 Lt Gen Michael V. Hayden, USAF – Duquesne University 2005–2014 Gen Keith B. Alexander, U.S. Army – United States Military Academy at West Point; Boston University, Naval Postgraduate School; National Defense University 2014–2018 ADM Michael S. Rogers, U.S. Navy – Auburn University (1981) Naval War College 2018–present Paul Nakasone – National Defense Intelligence College, US Army War College; St John’s University of Southern California Sources: ANB (2019); NSA (2019).

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PART II

Universities, security, intelligence National contexts, international settings

2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES, THE CIA, AND THE TEACHING OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE Loch K. Johnson Introduction I come to the subject of national security intelligence as an outsider who has never served in any of America’s seventeen major spy agencies. I have had a rare opportunity, though, to learn much about these organizations, for I had a position as Senator Frank Church’s top staff aide during the well-known Senate inquiry of 1975–1976 conducted by the Church Committee (he served as the chairman) into alleged intelligence abuses, disclosed in a series of revelatory articles in the New York Times that preceded the investigation in the fall of 1974. From that unique vantage point, I was able to attend every meeting of the Church ­Committee (open and closed), as well as, to participate in many of the staff interviews with intelligence officials and the focused investigations into specific charges of abuse (such as a probe I led into the Huston Plan—an illegal master spy plan secretly ordered by President Richard M. Nixon in 1970). Furthermore, I was able to discuss with Senator Church (D-ID) and his colleagues, as well as with my staff associates and outside experts, the findings the inquiry uncovered during its sixteen-month probe. These experiences provided me a comprehensive overview of U.S. intelligence, augmented by frequent visits to the secret agencies that, all summed, provided a total immersion education into this heavily veiled government domain. I had no idea at the beginning of the investigation that the Church Committee would come across top-secret documents on assassination plots against foreign heads of state, planned though unsuccessfully pursued by the CIA (better known by insiders as ‘the Agency’), with ambiguous authority from the Eisenhower and Kennedy White Houses. The Committee ­ llende learned, as well about CIA covert actions aimed at preventing the election of Salvador A of Chile, and, if he were elected (as he was despite large expenditures of secret funds by the Agency to halt his assent to power), operations to destroy his regime. The New York Times articles also proved true: the CIA had spied extensively against American citizens involved in antiwar activities (Operation CHAOS). Furthermore, the Committee discovered efforts by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, or ‘the Bureau’) designed to ruin the lives of antiwar activists who opposed America’s involvement in the Vietnam War (1965–1973), along with the similar targeting of civil rights advocates, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., one of America’s leading theologians (Operation COINTELPRO). Military  intelligence, 81

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too, spied on antiwar demonstrators; and the National Security Agency (NSA) engaged in inappropriately authorized wiretapping (Operation MINARET) of American citizens, along with the interception of their cables sent overseas from the United States and received from abroad (Operation SHAMROCK). These were just some of the improper operations that came to the attention of the Church Committee ( Johnson, 1986). None of these activities had appeared in my textbooks, lectures, or seminar discussions during the four years of graduate school I spent studying A ­ merican politics and foreign policy. Even seasoned senators on the Committee were stunned by the revelations, as was the public when the panel held its public hearings in the fall of 1975 and issued its multivolume reports in March of the following year. Anyone who followed the proceedings understood that we were not in Kansas anymore. I found the subject of national security intelligence intrinsically fascinating—the hidden and classified side of American foreign policy that had not made it into the college curricula. I think everyone involved in the investigation felt the same way, from senators to secretaries on the Committee. I decided that, when I returned to academic life (I had taken a leave-ofabsence for the period of the inquiry), I would make further study of the intelligence agencies part of my scholarly and teaching endeavors. Over the next four decades, I maintained that interest and did what I could (with a small group of other scholars around the country, as well as in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, France, Germany, and the Netherlands) to fashion a sub-discipline in the academic field of International Affairs that is now known as Intelligence Studies. During these years, I interviewed hundreds of U.S. and Commonwealth intelligence officers from the highest reaches of their secret agencies to the middle and lower ranks; and I did my best to read everything I could find on the role of intelligence agencies in the shaping of American national security and foreign policy. In addition, I had the good fortune to serve for seventeen years as the senior editor of the international journal Intelligence and National Security (until 2019), published in the United Kingdom, which provided an opportunity to keep up with the latest scholarly research on matters related to intelligence. In 1978–1980, I was also staff director of the Intelligence Oversight Subcommittee, a part of the newly formed House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI or ‘hipsee’) in Congress; and in 1995–1996, I had the privilege of joining Les Aspin as his aide when he chaired the Commission on Intelligence, a panel that—after the Church Committee—was America’s second most extensive probe into the nation’s espionage operations and another great chance for me to observe these agencies in motion from a strategic perch (for a history of the Commission, see Johnson, 2011). Through the course of these practical experiences and my scholarly research, I came to understand that on occasion the U.S. intelligence agencies had run awry (as with ­COINTELPRO), but that they had also performed yeoman duty in helping to protect the nation against foreign threats and internal subversion: for example, by keeping track of ­Soviet armaments and intentions during the Cold War, as well as tracking and thwarting terrorists around the globe in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks against the United States. These secret agencies are bureaucracies, different from other segments of government primarily in the secrecy of their activities, but they are bureaucracies nonetheless, with all the foibles faced by every human enterprise (including organizations in the private sector, as the Enron scandal reminded us, among a long list of other examples). In short, organizations make mistakes—sometimes quite shocking ones, as with the CIA’s involvement in domestic spying, the Iran-contra scandal, and the use of torture and renditions after 9/11; however, they also (and I would say more often) fulfill their statutory mandates and serve the public well. The trick for good governance is to encourage the good acts and try to eliminate the 82

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bad ones, through vigorous, meaningful accountability—what is known more commonly as intelligence oversight ( Johnson, 2018). As the work of the Church Committee unfolded, a core concern persistently presented itself related to our investigative findings: to what extent were America’s secret agencies infiltrating (‘penetrating,’ in spy lingo) groups and organizations throughout our society? After all, Operation CHAOS (CIA spying on U.S. citizens), which had triggered the Church Committee investigation in the first place, disclosed in a stunning manner—on the front pages of the New York Times—how the Agency had sent its officers onto America’s campuses to spy against students, the vast majority of whom were peacefully protesting the war in Indochina, a right protected by the Constitution’s First Amendment. Had the CIA also infiltrated other domains of American society, say, the world of newspapers, television, and journalists; perhaps religious missionary groups that might provide cover for Agency spying overseas; maybe the Peace Corps and the Fulbright Scholarship program? The Church Committee found out that the intelligence agencies had been banned from using in any way the Peace Corps or the Fulbright Program, from their very inception. Assaying the infiltration of the intelligence agencies into other entities in society, though, proved more tangled. From the beginning, the Committee’s potential agenda of investigative topics was huge and seemed to expand each week. Yet, time was running out on how many subjects we could take up, so the Committee never had an opportunity to examine the CIA’s relationship with U.S. missionaries abroad or other religious figures, but we did look into the Agency’s ties with American journalists. In the limited time we had to understand this important relationship, the Committee found a thick web of associations, including the secret presence on the CIA payroll of accredited U.S. journalists—an astonishing finding, since members of this nation’s news media have long prided themselves on their independence from government and especially secret government, unlike Russian journalists with their well-known links to the KGB and their invariable support for the Kremlin’s foreign and domestic policies. A  year  after the Church Committee, in 1977, I had a chance to pursue this relationship further while on the HPSCI staff and helped Representative Aspin (D-WI) hold a series of public hearings on CIA-media relations. These hearings went far beyond the Church Committee in establishing details about this complicated association (see Johnson, 1986). I was eager, as well, to study the Agency’s relations with the nation’s campuses; but other duties intervened until I had a chance later, as a university professor, to carry out my own research on this topic, based chiefly on interviews with CIA personnel who knew about these academic ties and were willing to talk with me about them, so long as we stayed strictly away from classified materials (which I have always done in my research for obvious reasons: I don’t want to comprise U.S. national security, and I don’t want to go to jail). As with the media relationship, I found the connections between the intelligence agencies and the nation’s campuses richly interwoven, as illustrated by the CIA’s involvement with the nation’s institutions of higher learning.

CIA-campus relationships The bridges that link the CIA to America’s campuses are multiple and well-traveled ( ­Johnson, 1989). Some of the linkages appear benign and, arguably, even sensible and beneficial to both; others may raise eyebrows (O’Rand, 1992; Oren 2002; Rohde, 2013). Surely, an open and voluntary posture of cooperation between analysts and scholars toward an understanding of threats and opportunities facing the United States is acceptable to most observers, if only in the spirit of freedom of choice in one’s relationships within 83

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a democracy—a basic constitutional right. This comingling of spies and scholars goes on all the time at meetings of the International Studies Association (ISA), for example, to the benefit of both professions. Some academicians may wish to be helpful to the government out of a sense of patriotism and fulfillment of one’s duties as a citizen. Some of their colleagues might still frown on even this transparent level of information-sharing, though, perhaps because they think the CIA is basically an immoral organization—or at any rate its Directorate of Operations (DO, for which the Agency must answer)—and, therefore, any form of cooperation with the spy agency is ipso facto suspect. Or perhaps they might believe that the government and institutions of higher learning have such different agendas—muddling through by compromise and deal-making in the government’s case versus unalloyed truth-seeking on the nation’s campuses—that the twain should never meet. Most members of the academy, though, value academic freedom enough to tolerate at least open, voluntary relationships between spies and scholars. Ties that are secret—and, more controversial still, based on covert payments—are a different matter, or so many scholars (although certainly not all) would argue. Inflammatory as well for critics are a couple of other bonds that can arise between scholars and spies: CIA covert recruitment on campus, and the involvement of campus personnel in the Agency’s covert operations overseas. These and other related hot-button relationships warrant a closer look. Secret Ties. Scholars in the United States tend to believe, in my experience, that secret relationships between university personnel and government agencies are inappropriate. One ought to know if a campus teacher, researcher, or writer has such ties, which may bias classroom instruction and research findings. A secret relationship between a scholar and a spy may not ineluctably lead to a biased outcome. Still, some scholars might be tempted to spin their findings to meet the wishes of the CIA, especially when the Agency is paying the bill to support the professor’s research. With this possibility in mind, faculty in the academy (and researchers elsewhere) ought to be able to evaluate the existence of possible bias and this requires knowing about the nature of the relationship in the first place—especially when money is involved. Part and parcel of this debate is whether scholars should engage in classified research of any kind. The fact is that many do. Most observers are willing to accept some forms of this condition; after all, some topics (say, research on biological toxins as possible instruments of terrorism) need to be kept secret for fear that detailed information about toxins might fall into the wrong hands. Yet, critics usually maintain that, even in these cases, at least the existence of classified research being done by Professors John or Jane Doe should be a matter of open record. Again: no veiled spy-scholar relations on campus wherein students have no idea what kinds of research their professors are doing. Making napalm for the Department of Defense? Report and defend this involvement, or depart campus for a government weapons laboratory or a private arms manufacturer that has different expectations about openness. Scholars for Hire. When an association between a scholar and a spy is revealed to have been both secretive and paid, criticism takes on a sharper edge. Money can have the effect of placing the recipient in a position of dependency and potential manipulation, critics maintain, as they underscore the danger of vanishing scholarly independence. At least if Agency contractual payments are a matter of public record, others could judge whether this arrangement had tainted the research; secret payments, though, allow no judgments at all by fellow scholars or campus administrators. Even if CIA payment for services has been prohibited by a campus’s specific rules, scholars might still provide assistance to the Agency based on 84

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friendship ties, voluntary service to the nation, patriotism, ideology, a sense of status, a quest for adventure, or perhaps susceptibility to the charisma of a CIA recruiter. These motivations, though, have less the color of wrong than a hidden acceptance by a scholar of Agency cash on the barrelhead. Covert Recruitment. Some American universities are prepared to allow CIA recruiters on campus, but only if done openly—with a table set up and clearly advertised for that purpose at the student center on ‘Career Day.’ They object, however, to the idea of faculty and other campus personnel serving as secret recruiters, say, passing along information about student views expressed in class that may qualify (or disqualify) the individuals for recruitment consideration by the Agency. Eric Rosenbach, co-director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, has stated that his University does not allow ‘members of our community to carry out intelligence operations at Harvard Kennedy School’—a policy that presumably bans covert student recruitment activities (Roll). Such clandestine recruitment activity undermines the free and open atmosphere of a university, where students should feel that they can speak their views candidly without them being reported to a spy agency by their professor. With respect to foreign students enrolled in the United States—the heart of this debate, from the Agency’s point-of-view—many in academe feel that these visitors should not have to worry that they are under surveillance by the CIA as they pursue their studies in America. The threat of recruitment surveillance casts a chill over the unfettered pursuit of learning and an open expression of views that are the hallmark of a university setting. Campuses should be unwilling, continues this argument, to allow their leafy quads to become happy hunting grounds for CIA agent-recruitment safaris. In rebuttal, the Agency pleads its case that campuses are ideal locations to recruit foreigners in safety (in contrast to the back alleys of their home countries, where local counterintelligence officers lurk); and, moreover, that several of these foreigners are themselves spies from abroad and warrant no special protections (Golden). Participation in Covert Operations. Sometimes, the CIA has sought out faculty members not only to gather intelligence abroad but to write propaganda for use against America’s adversaries, and even to participate in aggressive covert actions. The chief concern expressed by those who oppose any such involvement by scholars is this: if it becomes widely believed that American professors and students are involved in espionage, counterintelligence, and covert actions, every U.S. scholar traveling overseas will be suspected of being a spy—a perilous burden to carry for 99% of those in American institutions of higher learning who have no such assignments as they pursue their legitimate research abroad. On the propaganda front, if a professor responds to a government request to write a book or a tract designed to advance a U.S. foreign policy position or objective, or blacken the reputation of an adversarial nation, how could the rest of his or her research ever be considered fully objective? Doubly damning would be a publication based on a screed of falsehoods. In Russia, the local scholarly line is, often as not, the Kremlin’s line; in the United States, the expectation is one of academic independence—a source of great pride for most researchers in all of the democracies.

Current guidelines Soon after his promotion to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in 1991, the CIA’s former top analyst Robert M. Gates spelled out the Agency’s primary interests in a partnership with academe (Gates, 1992; Johnson 1994; for earlier public pronouncement by Gates on 85

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this topic when he was the Deputy Director for Intelligence during the tenure of William J. Casey, DCI for the Reagan administration, see: Gates, 1986, 1987). These guidelines remain in place today. •

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Analysis. The most common form of contact between spies and scholars would continue to be consultation about world affairs. A Mongolian expert in the History ­Department at University X might be contacted for help on translating a foreign p­ olicy statement from the president of that nation; a nuclear engineer at University Y might be asked to read and comment on a CIA draft paper regarding the likely yields of North Korean uranium enrichment activities; a political scientist at University Z may be asked her opinion about the probable leadership succession in India. Conference Attendance. Gates noted, too, that the Agency would continue to hold occasional conferences (in a declassified format) to which outside scholars would be invited to the CIA’s heavily guarded headquarters at Langley, Virginia, near the township of McLean—say, a symposium on future global economic trends. It would also openly pay other professors and administrators to organize a conference (as has Texas A&M, for example, where former DCI George H.W. Bush presided over the gathering); or would send CIA officers to annual scholarly meetings, such as the ISA, which routinely has several intelligence personnel in attendance (sometimes leading the panel discussions). Funding Basic Research. Gates added that research funding, whether open or covert, would be ‘a very minor element’ in the CIA-campus relationship; nevertheless, funding remains an attractive draw for some scholars in an era when government money for research is at an ebb and university expectations for faculty grants and publications continue to flow. Scholars-in-Residence Program. The Agency would carry on its program to bring outside scholars to Langley (or one of the CIA’s nearby facilities), where they could engage in research related to intelligence history and other topics. The major difficulty with this program—and the reason why some prominent scholars have rejected the opportunity—is that a scholar’s research is then subject to review by the Agency’s Publication Review Board. The PRB can sometimes act as a harsh censure of the scholar’s work, extending demands for the omission of material beyond the obvious and reasonable need to ensure that no legitimately classified subjects are included in the final publication. At the time of DCI Gates’s remarks in the early 1990s, universities and colleges were able to invite CIA officers to campus as ‘scholars-in-residence’ for a semester, a year, or even longer. This was all done openly, with the idea of having students exposed to the experiences of men and women who had worked on the front lines of intelligence and could share this ‘ground truth’ with young scholars—similar to the State Department’s ‘Ambassador-in-Residence’ program. This attempt at outreach by the CIA has become a guttering candle in recent years, however, owing to a growing lack of interest on both sides. A serious downside to this program was that, company men or women all, the visiting intelligence officers often displayed little capacity to appraise objectively the Agency’s past errors and current shortcomings (as an independent scholar would). Debriefing. Finally, the CIA intended to maintain its practice since 1947 of interviewing (‘debriefing’), strictly on a voluntary basis, scholars who have traveled abroad. Sometimes, the Agency would engage as well in ‘pre-briefings,’ that is, conversations with scholars who wished to talk with its analysts about a country before they went overseas. Such meetings have a controversial side, as the CIA sometimes prompts the 86

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scholar to keep an eye out for certain information of interest to Langley analysts and operatives—arguably thereby converting a professor into an espionage agent for the United States. A companion subject in this exploration of relationships between spies and scholars is the question of proper approaches to the teaching of intelligence at U.S. colleges and universities, as well as by institutions of higher learning abroad.

The teaching of national security intelligence Two Core Models of Intelligence Instruction. Speaking broadly, a division has emerged between those who, on the one hand, view Intelligence Studies as a means for examining the role of information in the making of government decisions about foreign affairs and national security policy, especially the contribution of spy agencies to the river of information that runs through the White House and other high councils each day; and those who, on the other hand, view the discipline in a more clinical manner, namely, as an opportunity to train young scholars for careers in the secret services. Theory versus practice; education versus training (on these distinctions, see Marrin, 2012). The theoretical approach may incorporate intelligence in the classroom as a module in a mix of other topics related to decision-making in international affairs, such as the war powers, the treaty powers, economic statecraft, development assistance, and the soft powers of cultural and moral suasion. Or a whole course may be devoted to intelligence, but from a perspective that seeks to understand its dynamics; politics; successes and failures; oversight; the history of collection and analysis; counterintelligence; and covert action. Little time is spent on detailed tradecraft used in the field by intelligence operatives, or specialized analytic methods employed at headquarters. The idea is to understand the reasons why the nation has seventeen major spy agencies and how well they perform their duties, without getting into the weeds of their daily modus operandi. In contrast, and similar to a business school model, the clinical teaching of intelligence is career-oriented: giving students an edge in the competition for jobs and promotions in a nation’s intelligence hierarchy. The emphasis is on writing analytic papers like the ones prepared within the CIA; comprehending nitty-gritty deception operations essential to counterintelligence; laying out the methods of covert action—propaganda operations, political and economic manipulation board, paramilitary activities; and providing guidance on how to deal with congressional liaison challenges. Because it operated in stark relief from the more theory-oriented philosophies of intelligence teaching, one college well-known for its interest in Intelligence Studies and affiliated with a well-known European center of learning was, in its earlier years, scoffed at by the university’s other colleges as a nest of spies—a ‘spy school,’ in Professor Gearon’s phrase (2013: 271), whose students were temporarily on campus to study subjects such as electronic surveillance, lock-picking, government ­report-writing, and the crafting of agitprop—not to pursue a serious liberal arts education. Yet, course offerings like the ones that, at one time, had discredited that particular college have become increasingly common on campuses in the United States and elsewhere. As Gearon (2013) puts it bluntly, ‘…the very purposes of the university are increasingly seen as potentially serving the objectives of the security and intelligence agencies’ (271). Today, one can find in the United States several programs that openly embrace the teaching of intelligence as a practice. For example, Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence (IC/CAE) have sprouted up around the nation—at Howard University, along 87

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with the University of Texas at El Paso and at Tennessee State University (to mention only a few among many). Congress mandated these centers in 2005, as lawmakers charged the Intelligence Community or IC (America’s seventeen major intelligence agencies) ‘with the mission to create an increased pool of culturally, and ethnically diverse, multi-disciplinary job applicants’—an intelligence apprenticeship curriculum offered through the auspices of accredited universities across the United States and funded by the federal government. Since practical knowledge of spy craft is the lingua franca in these programs, the experience of former intelligence officers takes on great value in the curriculum; they often become the lead instructors in these degree offerings. The programs have also become a magnet for mid-career training credentials, with significant numbers of intelligence officers streaming toward America’s campuses to acquire advanced espionage training as part of their professional development—a much welcomed cash cow for some institutions of higher learning strapped for funding. Another relatively new organization that seeks to advance the notion that intelligence organizations and universities should be mutually supportive, united by a common interest in sound instruction for anyone interested in intelligence (spy professionals and ‘civilians’ alike), is the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE). Founded in 2004 at a gathering of over sixty Intelligence Studies educators—including both intelligence officers and academicians—at Mercyhurst College in Erie, Pennsylvania, the organization’s goals include (according to its website) ‘expanding research, knowledge, and professional development in intelligence education,’ as well as ‘advancing the intelligence profession by setting standards, building resources, and sharing knowledge in intelligence studies.’ In addition to IC/CAEs, several campuses in the United States feature ­intelligence-oriented courses and even degrees. At the University of Texas in Austin, for instance, a former, well-connected DO officer runs an exceptionally well-funded program where students write comprehensive group reports on aspects of intelligence, which are professionally printed in an eye-catching format (Sick & Inboden). A parade of former intelligence officers marches through this course as lecturers, punctuated by marquee keynote speakers from the IC and other lofty locations in Washington’s national security hierarchy. Perhaps the most avowedly practice-oriented Intelligence Studies program to surface in recent years in the United States is the new Masters of Applied Intelligence at Georgetown University. In an increasingly competitive marketplace, this program attempts to distinguish itself with the following branding (presented on its website): ‘Unlike other intelligence degrees, our program focuses on three key sectors, namely, homeland security, law enforcement, and competitive business intelligence.’ Among its course offerings: ‘Homeland Securities Technology,’ ‘Information Science for Competitive Intelligence,’ and ‘Electronic Intelligence Analysis.’ One of the challenges that lies ahead for intelligence scholars is to weigh which of these approaches has greater merit: the theoretical or the more practical. Or whether campuses can (and should) attempt to manage a combination of both the abstract and the clinical side of Intelligence Studies, just as some other professional schools attempt to achieve in the disciplines of business, journalism, and law—although, unlike intelligence as a profession, none of these other endeavors involves agencies that kill people, overthrow governments, or engage in torture (however torturous it may be to read legal briefs). This would require a higher campus tolerance for former intelligence officers joining the faculty ranks at universities and colleges, since few (if any) established faculty would have the requisite experience and skills to teach detailed spy tradecraft. A Third Model. An illustration of a third model of Intelligence Studies instruction— one in which theory and practice are explicitly combined, although mainly in the service 88

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of intelligence professionals—has evolved in Norway. Professors visiting from England and Scotland have joined forces with local scholars in Oslo to design an innovative bachelor’s degree in Intelligence Studies at the Norwegian Defence Intelligence School (NORDIS), offered to students for a concentrated period of two weeks, twice a year. This degree has been created to provide professional intelligence officers from a variety of Norwegian organizations, as well as a few students from ‘civilian society,’ an opportunity to develop their academic knowledge of intelligence without interrupting their career progressions. Another purpose of this program is to engender a better sense of community among the members of Norway’s security and intelligence bureaucracy. The Norwegian program is impressive, both because of its reliance on a multinational approach to pedagogy and because of its intention to provide (mostly) mid-career students with equal doses of hands-on practicums and more academic ‘liberal arts’ perspectives on the challenges posed by the existence of secret agencies inside the democracies—a blend of ground- and book-truth. The multinational team claims that this experimental project has succeeded so far, demonstrating that it is possible to merge professional training and high academic standards into what is now known as an academic program, based both on the professional knowledge that comes from experience and the research-informed knowledge that comes from the rigorous standards of academia. (Dylan et al., 2017: 959) At Leicester University in England, intelligence scholars have thought deeply about the prospects of furthering the education of professionals in the spy trade by providing them with a computer-based, distance-learning alternative to traditional college instruction. As its team of professors has reported, The education they receive as postgraduate students adds value to the training they have had within their organization by giving them the academic and intellectual tools to critically analyze the processes and methods they use, and to be able to place them into the wider context of the intelligence community and society in general. By way of this on-line approach, the Leicester group is attempting (in its words) ‘to square the circle of training versus education by educating practitioner-scholars who have a deeper understanding of the professional training they have received and the context within which they use it’ (Dexter, Phythian, & Strachan-Morris, 2017: 930). This on-line delivery of pedagogical content also allows the Leicester faculty (and others who may adopt this instructional methodology) to expand the discipline of Intelligence Studies beyond the Five Eyes c­ ountries—and, again, to generate an always welcome revenue stream into the University’s coffers.

Intelligence studies taught only by intelligence officers? At America’s universities, more common than a full-blown intelligence faculty is a professor who is a soloist: someone who has intelligence credentials of one kind or another and who offers courses each semester on the CIA and its sister agencies, usually with the instructor based in a department of history, international affairs, or political science. An example is the former CIA historian, Nicholas Dujmovic, who is now the director of the Intelligence Studies Program at the Catholic University of America, which offers a minor in this subject to undergraduates along with a ‘Certificate in Intelligence Studies’ (Larimer). He takes a strong position on the value of having former intelligence officers in the classroom, maintaining that ‘courses primarily about intelligence should ideally be taught by professors with the requisite academic qualifications who also have had at least fifteen years working in 89

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intelligence’ (Dujmovic: 941, emphasis added). I have known Professor Dujmovic for several years and I have no doubt his program is outstanding. Moreover, I have considerable respect for him and others who have served in the intelligence business. Yet, if his rule were applied to the nation’s universities, the discipline of Intelligence Studies would become largely a ­post-retirement track for former intelligence officers. Would that be a good or a bad outcome? As with all the issues presented here, individuals and institutions will have to make up their own minds about that question; neither Congress nor most professional scholarly associations are likely to resolve this question, or enter the fray. My own case is simple enough. I’ve never been an intelligence officer; my knowledge of the field comes from serving as an intelligence overseer in Congress and in the White House. I couldn’t teach the technical side—the nuts and bolts—of intelligence tradecraft even if I wanted to. My courses are more traditional political science and international affairs offerings, which attempt to orient students toward an empirical and theoretical understanding of the hidden side of American government: the behind-the-scenes activities of the spy agencies, and their interactions with the White House, the Intelligence Committees on Capitol Hill, and the National Security Council (NSC). Besides, my experiences with America’s Intelligence Community suggest that its agencies do a solid job already of providing new recruits with the requisite training on the day-to-day business of intelligence. I am always pleased when my students become gainfully employed somewhere—Foggy Bottom, Defense, the IC, Capitol Hill, the private sector—and I spend a considerable amount of time helping them find internships and writing letters of recommendation on their behalf, but I emphatically do not see myself as a recruiter for any government agency or business. Nor do I wish to try to replicate the hands-on methods training that those who are hired by the CIA will receive at ‘The Farm’ or learn at Langley’s own ‘CIA ­University’—which, like the NORDIS example in Oslo, has made great strides in combining practice and theory into its instruction. Gearon (2017: 475) refers to the CIA University as ‘the most explicit parallel or covert model of high education-level training, education and research.’ Nonetheless, I have too high a regard for those former practitioners who are teaching practical ‘methods’ courses on intelligence to look askance at their pedagogy. The instructors I know with this background are thoughtful and scholarly individuals who have much more to offer students than a few war stories. So I favor the blossoming of several approaches to the teaching of intelligence at colleges and universities. Let students and faculty gravitate to those places that embrace their own preferences regarding the proper balance between theory and practice. I would like to see, though, a few guidelines adopted by the IC and America’s institutions of higher learning that would help to clear the air about rules and e­ thics—advisable bright lines—that spies and scholars should honor on the nation’s campuses.

Conclusion When spies come to campus, sparks can fly. Unsettling questions arise about the sanctity of the university from not just government interference, but from secret government interference; about the covert recruitment of U.S. and foreign students in a setting they may have fairly assumed was safe from surveillance and probing by spy agencies; about the ethics of classified research in what is normally one of the nation’s most open institutions (see ­Harris); about turning faculty and students into espionage agents by covertly providing them with lists of intelligence queries to answer as they travel overseas and speak with foreign nationals; about the danger of painting all students, faculty, and university administrators traveling abroad as possible intelligence collectors—even covert action operatives; about 90

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the objectivity of faculty research, especially when professors turn out to have been secretly on the CIA’s payroll; about professors writing propaganda tracts for the Agency, when their universities expect them to be dedicated to the goal of unbiased scholarly research. The argument holds water, though, that professors, students, and administrators in the United States and in other democracies are individuals who should enjoy the right to have feelings of patriotism, who properly extol the virtues of academic freedom of expression and the opportunity to pursue one’s own research interests, and who therefore should be allowed to have a relationship with a government agency if they so wish. A University of Wisconsin law professor, Gordon D. Baldwin, has observed that ‘foreign intelligence gathering is vital to our common good,’ noting that if the CIA had been guided more extensively by university faculty members ‘we might all have profited’ (Trombley). A prominent political scientist, Ithiel de Sola Pool, remarked during the Vietnam War years of the 1960s: If you think that Washington could act better if it had a deeper comprehension of the social process at work around the world, then you should be demanding that the CIA hire and write contracts with our best social scientists. (Pool) Although critical of secret CIA-campus ties, in its final report the Church Committee acknowledged that the CIA ‘must have unfettered access to the best advice and judgment our universities can produce’ (91; see, also, Bergin). Two of my colleagues at the University of Georgia have said to me: ‘Maybe if the CIA secured the service of a few university types, it wouldn’t make such a bungling mess of its operations,’ and ‘This is up to each professor to decide for himself and should not be subject to a rule’ ( Johnson, 1980). Other colleagues of mine balk, though, at the suggestion of any association with secret agencies, even having a CIA scholar-in-residence on campus—­ especially if the person has an operations background. Agreement is hard to find, as well, on how guidelines in this domain ought to be updated, and in what form: by more detailed Agency regulations; by White House executive orders (NSC intelligence directives); by professional codes crafted on campuses across the country, either working together or individually; by professional associations like the ISA or the American Political Science Association (APSA); or perhaps by congressional statutory language? The latter would be the most enduring, but in today’s dysfunctional Washington politics, it is hard to imagine a consolidated response that would please both the nation’s universities and the CIA. The Intelligence Authorization Act of 1997 demonstrated that relationships between the CIA and journalists in the United States can be guided by statute. This law requires the head of the CIA to inform the House and Senate Intelligence Committees immediately if he or she recruits an accredited American journalist in a time of emergency to help carry out an intelligence operation on behalf of the United States (which in normal circumstances would be in violation of an internal Agency directive adopted by Langley in the late 1970s). If ­legislative languages were adopted to guide the proper relationship between U.S. intelligence agencies and America’s institutions of higher learning, its wording could sensibly prohibit—short of a national emergency—the following activities: • • • • •

Agency covert recruitment on campus; covert research relationships; the use of academic cover by intelligence officers; the tasking of faculty and students to collect intelligence; and the tasking of academicians for counterintelligence or covert action operations. 91

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A legislative reform effort along these lines would require much more interest and concern about the sanctity of America’s campuses from intelligence interventions than is even remotely present today, at a time when important questions of Russian manipulation of U.S. elections understandably dominate the agendas of the Senate and House Committees on Intelligence. Such sweeping legal changes in the domain of spies and scholars would no doubt require a major intelligence train wreck on campus to generate the kind of public attention necessary for the enactment of reform legislation in Washington. In the meantime, campuses will remain tempting CIA ‘penetration targets’—until university and public officials resolve to make a more concerted effort at formally defining the boundaries between spies and scholars.

Acknowledgment This article stems from a keynote address presented by the author at Oriel College, ­Oxford University, during a conference on ‘Universities, Security and Intelligence Studies’ ­(September 21, 2017). The author expresses his appreciation to the conference organizer, Dr. Liam Francis Gearon, for encouraging this line of research. A lengthier version of the piece appeared in Johnson (2019).

References Bergin, A. (2017) Academic Work Gives National Security an Intelligent Edge, Australian Policy ­Research Institute, August 23. Dexter, H., Phythian, M., & Strachan-Morris, D. (2017) The What, Why, Who, and How of Teaching Intelligence: The Leicester Approach, in L.K. Johnson, ed., Special Issue on Intelligence Teaching, Intelligence and National Security 32 (7), December, 920–934. Dujmovic, N. (2017) Less Is More, and More Professional: Reflections on Building an ‘Ideal’ Intelligence Program, in L.K. Johnson, ed., Special Issue on Intelligence Teaching, Intelligence and National Security 32 (7), December, 935–943. Dylan, H., et al. (2017) The Way of the Norse Ravens: Merging Profession and Academe in ­Norwegian National Intelligence Higher Education, in L.K. Johnson, ed., Special Issue on Intelligence Teaching, Intelligence and National Security 32 (7), December, 944–960. Gates, R.M. (1992) CIA and Openness, Remarks, Oklahoma Press Association, Oklahoma City, February 21. Gates, R.M. (1987) CIA and the University, speech, National Convention of the Association of ­Former Intelligence Officers, Tyson’s Corner, VA, October 10. Gates, R.M. (1986) Text of Speech at Harvard by Deputy CIA Director Outlining Policy Shifts, Chronicle of Higher Education 31, February 26: 26–29. Gearon, L. (2017) The Counter-Terrorist Campus: Securitisation Theory and University ­Securitisation—Three Models, 2 (1), August, 469–478, available at a13.https//doai.org/10.4102/ the.v2.13. Gearon, L. (2013) Education, Security and Intelligence Studies, British Journal of Educational Studies 60 (3), 263–279, available at www.tandfonline.com/toc/rbje20/63/3. Golden, D. (2017) Spy Schools: How the CIA, FBI and Foreign Intelligence Secretly Exploit America’s Universities, New York: Henry Holt. Harris, M. (2018) Sums for Spooks: Mathematicians Grapple with Ethics of Research Funding, Times Higher Education [UK], March 8: 14. Johnson, L.K. (2019) Spies and Scholars in the United States: Winds of Ambivalence in the Groves of Academe, Intelligence and National Security, January, 34 (1), 1–21. Johnson, L.K. (2018) Spy Watching: Intelligence Accountability in the United States, New York: Oxford University Press. Johnson, L.K. (2011) The Threat on the Horizon: An Inside Account of America’s Search for Security After the Cold War, New York: Oxford University Press.

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American universities and the CIA Johnson, L.K. (1994) Author’s Interview with Robert M. Gates, Washington, DC, March 28. Johnson, L.K. (1989) America’s Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society. New York: Oxford ­University Press. Johnson, L.K. (1986) The CIA and the Media, Intelligence and National Security 1 (1), May, 141–169. Johnson, L. K. (1980) CIA and Academe, questionnaire, the Department of Political Science, Athens: University of Georgia, March 15. Larimer, S. (2017) With Intelligence Program, Catholic Becomes Place to Learn [REDACTED], Washington Post, November 6, A17. Marrin, S.P. (2012) Intelligence Studies Centers: Making Scholarship on Intelligence Analysis Useful, Intelligence and National Security 27 (3), April, 398–422. O’Rand, A.M. (1992) Mathematizing Social Science in the 1950s: The Early Development and Diffusion of Game Theory, History of Political Economy, 24 (Supplement), 177–204. Oren, I. (2002) Our Enemies and Us: America’s Rivalries and the Making of Political Science, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Pool, I. de S. (1966) The Necessity for Social Scientists Doing Research for Governments, Background 10, August, 114. Rohde, J. (2013) Armed with Expertise: The Militarization of American Social Research during the Cold War, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Roll, N. (2017) The CIA Within Academe, Inside Higher Ed, October 3: 12. Trombley, W. (1976) CIA Agents on U.S. Campuses Alleged, Los Angeles Times, June 25, A10.

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3 THE FBI, CYBERSECURITY, AND AMERICAN CAMPUSES Academia, government, and industry as allies in cybersecurity effectiveness Kevin Powers and James Burns “Boston College is a leader in thinking and educating on these incredibly important ­[cybersecurity] issues, so this is a great place to have this [conference].” FBI Director James B. Comey, Boston Conference on Cyber Security (BCCS, 2017), March 8, 2017

Introduction Cybersecurity as a discipline is collegial and interdisciplinary by definition. Researchers and academics have acknowledged the need for a cross-disciplined, holistic, and unified approach in order for it to be successful both as a program of study and for its applicability to the profession (LeClair, Abraham & Shih, 2013). As such, cybersecurity is as much about knowledge acquisition and critical thinking as it is about people, processes, and technology. It’s not solely or even mostly an IT issue (as many uninitiated are wont to think); rather, it is a business issue that must be managed from the top-down by the Board of Directors and at the C-suite level, and not from the IT department on up (McAdams, 2004). One needs to only speak with cybersecurity professionals or attend any of the ubiquitous professional cybersecurity conferences throughout the world to appreciate the veracity of this claim. At the same time, those in the field find it odd that not many businesses or governments are actually implementing such enterprise cybersecurity programs (Carson, 2017). Instead, a significant portion of these businesses and many governments are assuming the risk (or turning a blind eye, not unlike the proverbial ostrich, due to the seeming complexity of the issue), simply hoping that they are not the next “Target” or “Equifax” in the headlines (ibid). And therein lies the problem; there’s a great deal of discussion about ‘what needs to be done,’ but there are too few cybersecurity professionals and leaders who are equipped with the necessary skill-sets to develop and implement the appropriate cybersecurity strategies that are needed by these same industries and governments. Furthermore, the necessary “skill-set” required by the very nature of the cyber issues being dealt with also demands that any approach taken be undergirded by ethical principles and practices (Himma & Tavani, 2008). Recognizing this problem, administrators at Boston College (“BC”) in the Woods College of Advancing Studies (WCAS) formed a “cybersecurity task force,” made up of 94

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representatives from academia, private industry, and government, to develop and implement a cybersecurity graduate program aligned with the current needs of industry and government. The goal was to provide students with a cybersecurity education and the “hands-on” training needed in order to identify, assess, and manage cyber risk, as well as to develop and implement a proactive, unified cybersecurity strategy to effectively defend, mitigate, and recover from a cyber-attack. After almost two years of planning and developing, Boston College launched its Masters of Science degree in Cybersecurity Policy and Governance (“CPG Program” or “Program”) with sixteen students, in January 2016. By fall 2018, the CPG Program had over 130 students. These students come from a variety of fields including law (e.g. in-house counsel, private firm and government attorneys, law students), business (e.g. financial services, banking, consulting, information technology, software development), national security, law enforcement, military, and critical infrastructure. The variation in backgrounds provides a rich complexity to both the student make-up and the complementary faculty body, which ensures the Program’s applicability to current issues. This essential variation is due, in part, to the needed partnerships that have been developed with private industry and government entities, many of which were established and fostered through the efforts of a connected and successful Program Director. Set forth below are the processes, successes, hurdles, and lessons learned in developing, implementing, and maintaining the CPG Program, all directed at ensuring that it is academically sound, while maintaining industry alignment.

An academic approach to cybersecurity In order to ensure that a sound educational approach was engaged, concrete steps were followed related to the development and implementation of the Program at the WCAS at B ­ oston College (the unit which currently houses the CPG Program). As such, the Program was subjected to an academic program development process (see Figure 3.1) entitled the ­Program Lifecycle (Tomic & Burns, 2014) which was developed in the Woods College. Part of this

Figure 3.1  Program Lifecycle

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process is to determine which academic programs best fit with Boston College’s mission, address current and likely future industry demand for graduates while also ensuring financial viability (ibid). In brief, the Program Lifecycle is broken down into four distinct phases: 1 Program Investigation: This phase seeks to determine what the likelihood of success of such a program would be from an academic, professional, and financial perspective. A great deal of benchmarking, financial modeling, forecasting, and trend analysis are completed. This phase seeks to answer, among other questions, does the program appear academically and financially viable? If this answer is affirmative, proceed to phase 2. 2 Program Development: This phase utilizes the data accumulated in phase 1 and applies it to the current set of institutional and local demographic variables. If the ‘climate’ continues to appear favorable, initial curriculum is proposed and vetted by academics, then industry expertise is brought to bear for the types of skills required. This phase also seeks to determine employment prospects. A program director is usually engaged at this phase and faculty (if not already in place) are hired, and objective goals, standards, and learning outcomes are established. This phase seeks to further answer questions of the program’s academic integrity and longer-term viability as well as its operational readiness. If all of this appears in place, the program is ready for launch. 3 Growth and Maturity: During this phase, the program is regularly evaluated in terms of academic rigor, and resources, how it is fairing compared to other (if any) programs in the area and more broadly, how it is fairing against internally set goals and objectives established in phase 2 and refined in an ongoing way in phase 3. The program is also assessed in terms of maturity relative to capacity, saturation, and scalability. Some basic questions asked in this phase are: how is the program performing overall relative to baseline and key benchmarks? What, if any, adjustments are needed in any areas? And if adjustments are necessary, how should these be carried out? 4 Decision Point: Reinvest/Reinvent/Sunset: Once a program nears or reaches its mature phase, several challenging questions need to be answered. These have to do with how close the program is to its originally forecast scalability and continued financial viability, and its continued place in the market considering market demands for same or similar knowledge and skill-sets, as well as how well it continues to serve and relate to the academy and the university in which it is housed. Essential questions asked in this phase include: how might the program best address a stagnant or declining market? In what ways does the program continue to serve students and industry demands as well as the academy from whence it was proposed? In answer to these questions and others, options are determined and decisions made which can include: reinvestment with ongoing slight to moderate revisions (e.g. increased marketing; greater alignment may be sought relative to industry needs; determination of changes to a small number of courses may be made, either in part or wholly, due to changes in systems thinking, governance strategies, and/ or technology), reinventing the program beyond moderate changes to include more sweeping changes (e.g. multiple, whole courses are replaced with new, more relevant courses; specific new or unique specializations are derived; additional courses may be added that lengthen the program of study; and even adjustments to the program name, domains of influence, and key objective and learning outcomes may be considered and adopted), or sunset/archive the program. The difficult decision may be reached that the program, even with reinvestment or wholesale revision, is no longer viable. As a result, the program is slated to be sunset (closed out completely and forever) or archived (in this sense, it is set aside for the foreseeable future but with a realization that it could be 96

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resurrected based on more favorable prospects for viability and clearly demonstrated need. In either case, under the current circumstances, the program is slated for teaching out of all currently enrolled students and the program is scheduled for closure.

The CPG Program in the Program Lifecycle In the CPG Program discussed in this chapter, the Program Lifecycle (referenced earlier) was utilized as a guide. The Dean (WCAS) at Boston College initiated the research and benchmarking for developing a cybersecurity graduate program in April 2014. This process provided a broad baseline from which it was determined that a specific and unique C ­ ybersecurity Task Force (CTF) should be convened in July 2014. This CTF included select BC faculty and staff from the School of Management, the Law School, the College of Arts and Sciences Computer Science Department, the Woods College, the IT department, and two industry representatives. At that meeting, among other things, the CTF discussed the varying options for offering a cybersecurity graduate program (e.g. should it be technology based? policy based? online? certificate of postgraduate study? etc.). The CTF agreed that it would be best to further research the market for such programs and develop an initial draft curriculum as a concrete starting point. It was also determined that the CTF would need a lead faculty to engage the process. In meetings from November 2014 to February 2015, the CTF met to discuss the next steps in developing the appropriate cybersecurity graduate program. These meetings focused on research accumulated by the faculty lead regarding market demand as well as the various academic and industry needs such a program would address. The ongoing research was furthered by additional Woods College faculty, administrators, and staff. This research and other materials (e.g. consultant reports and White Paper (EAB, 2014)) were utilized to develop and provide the CTF with the critical information needed to assist them in refining the proposed cybersecurity graduate program. The refined materials included drafts of the following: the initial program statement of purpose; objectives related to learning and career outcomes; admission standards; ­curriculum; and information gleaned from another Academic Task Force for a different, though complementary, graduate program recently launched at WCAS. (Woods ­College of Advancing Studies at Boston College, 2014) At the meetings, the CTF discussed and critiqued the most promising approach for developing the cybersecurity degree program that would best fit Boston C ­ ollege and its rigorous academic standards while fully engaging the profession. Interestingly, the discussion of the CTF exposed the breadth and depth of the discipline being addressed. This was especially true because the faculty lead and Dean intentionally brought together individuals with diverse backgrounds. Thus, the discussion ranged from technology to policy to law to ethics and a mix of all four. Several discussants strongly supported the idea of being more narrowly focused on one or the other areas. Ultimately, drawing from BC’s strong tradition in liberal arts and interdisciplinary education, along with the strength of its business and law schools, the CTF decided to develop a cybersecurity program focusing on cybersecurity policy, leadership, and technology. At this point, several members of CTF, though primarily the faculty lead, with the encouragement of the Dean, were able to connect with important private industry and government entities. The lead faculty did this to verify current cybersecurity needs in these fields (identifying any gaps) and to determine the ways in which a cybersecurity graduate program might best be able 97

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to fill any such gap. Before addressing our interactions with industry and governments, it is important first to understand how each understands and approaches the field of cybersecurity.

Approaches to cybersecurity Government At the time the CTF began its outreach to private industry and governments, there was no single, unified Federal standard governing or instructing U.S. public companies on cybersecurity requirements.1 The closest to providing any standardization was and remains the ­National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (“NIST”) Cybersecurity Framework (NIST, 2018b) which was published on February 12, 2014, and recently updated in April 2018. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework is a result of the February 2013 Executive Order titled “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity” and included over ten months of collaborative discussions with more than 3,000 security professionals from industry and governments. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework did not introduce new standards or concepts; rather, it leverages and integrates industry-leading cybersecurity practices that have been developed by varying organizations (e.g. NIST, COBIT, ISO). Per NIST, its Cybersecurity Framework “consists of standards, guidelines, and best practices to manage ­c ybersecurity-related risk. The Cybersecurity Framework’s prioritized, flexible, and cost-­ effective approach helps to promote the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure and other sectors important to the economy and national security” (NIST, 2018a). Furthermore, according to NIST, an information security program is a “[f ]ormal document that provides an overview of the security requirements for an organization-wide information security program and describes the program management controls and common controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements” (Dempsey et al., 2011). Along with an information security program, NIST also recommends that businesses and governments implement an incident response plan; “a predetermined set of instructions or procedures to detect, respond to, and limit consequences of a malicious cyber-attack against an organization’s information systems” (ibid). The NIST then points out that information security programs should not be implemented as an un-customized checklist or a ­“one-size-fits-all” approach for all businesses and/or governments as this is not only a poor business approach but it is itself risky and would pose its own set of ethical challenges ­(McBride, Carter, & Warkentin, 2012).

Industry To provide a better insight into how industry and governments interpret what constitutes “best practices” when implementing “an organization-wide information security program” pursuant to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, the CTF engaged cybersecurity experts and practitioners in the field in order to understand their respective thoughts and perspectives on the matter. Thus, according to Kevin J. Burns, the Chief Information Security Officer at Draper Labs and former Chief Information Security Information Officer for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, [t]he highest priority for any enterprise security program is that it aligns to the short and long-term business goals. The program should be built upon a hybrid model of bottom up, bi-directional in the middle, and most importantly top down adoption. These collaborations are a major shift from the siloes that previously existed and necessitate a 98

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change in attitude. Only when all within the business have bought into the program does it become successful. (Burns, 2018) Similarly, Kevin L. Swindon, who is the Corporate Vice President for Global Security at Charles River Labs and a former Supervisory Special Agent, Cyber Crimes, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) –Boston, reports that [w]ith the on-going trend of the convergence of physical and IT security and the fact that organizations are facing complex blended threats, it is now imperative that organizations take a holistic approach to protecting their assets. This needs to concentrate on three critical areas: risk; compliance; and preparedness. (Swindon, 2018) All three of these factors are essential to not only effectively but ethically respond to the reality of a holistic approach (Conklin, Cline & Roosa, 2014). Swindon, an adjunct faculty member who specializes in Cyber Investigations and Digital Forensics (a course he teaches by that name for the CPG Program), continued “[a] key factor in the success of any enterprise security program is the organization’s ability to respond to and mitigate a critical incident” and recommends that “[t]o ensure the organizations readiness, [an organization] must continually test their ability to respond and make practicing their preparedness a part of the corporate culture” (ibid). What is more, Cheryl Davis, who is a Senior Director for Strategic Initiatives at Oracle and a former Director of Cybersecurity at the National Security Council at The White House, expanded on the analysis of both Burns and Swindon, advising that an enterprise security program needs to take into account that cybersecurity is more than just an IT issue and recognize that cybersecurity risks impact the entire business. In the heat of an incident response where there are so many moving parts – from the technical response, to determining if notifications to regulators or law enforcement is necessary or required, to releasing any public messaging – all stakeholders must be aware of their incident response responsibilities and be active participants. (Davis, 2018) These points validate the need for ethical decision-making (and ethical design) made by industry executives and key advisors for all leaders but especially for leaders in cybersecurity given the heightened stakes (Messick & Bazerman, 2001). The importance of the aforementioned points is further underscored by the emphasis that many legal counsel experts are placing on cybersecurity, which further highlights the important role that legal knowledge has in any security program. For instance, Scott T. Lashway, a Partner at Holland & Knight, LLP’s Boston Office, believes that “cybersecurity risk lies at the intersection of humans, technology, and the law, and these circles represent the core aspects needing to be addressed by an effective security program” (Lashaway, 2018). As such, Lashway recommends that organizations should also seek legal advice as to all matters and risks presented by a security incident; from strategies and tactics of an investigation as well as compliance with the constantly growing morass of relevant laws and regulations, to seeing around every foreseeable corner to prepare for risks that have not yet materialized. (ibid) Moreover, providing his insights from a technology standpoint, Etay Maor, an Executive Security Advisor for IBM Security, stated that “for an effective enterprise security program, organizations should make cybersecurity a goal or a business differentiator and develop a cybersecurity culture on the strategic level that is then clearly represented in its program”  (Maor, 2018). 99

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In sum, the above-referenced cybersecurity experts and practitioners recognize and underscore the need that a successful cybersecurity program has for an interdisciplinary, holistic, and unified approach.

The academy interacts with industry and government In late-Fall 2014, members of the BC CTF, in conjunction with the Dean and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, began reaching out to senior executives in private industry and connected with local, State, and Federal governments to discuss not only their current needs regarding cybersecurity training and staffing, but also ways in which each could collaborate with the CTF in the development, implementation, and maintenance of the proposed graduate program in cybersecurity. The CTF focused on both industry and government because, as stated previously, today’s cyber-threats impact both; thus, each entity needs to work closely together with other entities to properly address the varying threats and attacks. From industry, the CTF focused on, inter alia, technology, banking, financial services, legal services, health care, government contracting, energy, insurance, and education. The executives and management of the companies and firms met with included, among many others, Fidelity, State Street, Bank of America, Citi Bank, Morgan Stanley, PwC, Gartner Consulting, Jones Day, Mintz Levin, Fish & Richardson, Ropes & Gray, Weil Gotshal, Venable, Lock Lorde, IBM Security, EMC/RSA, Symantec, FireEye, MITRE Corporation, Raytheon, LinkedIn, Lockheed Martin, National Grid, Partners HealthCare, Sanofi, Microsoft, The Comtrade Group, Massachusetts BIO Tech Council, US Steel, Draper Labs, AIG, and John Hancock. With regard to governments, although the CTF did meet with local and State government officials, the focus was mainly on U.S. Federal government agencies, because those agencies are, for the most part, the “leads” from which the local and State government agencies take direction or seek counsel for all matters pertaining to national security and cybersecurity. The government agencies the CTF worked with included the FBI, U.S. Attorney’s Office – Boston, U.S. Department of ­Justice – National Security ­Division, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Department of Defense (Navy, Army, Air Force, U.S. Naval Academy, Naval War College, U.S. Military Academy at West Point), The White House, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Federal R ­ eserve – Boston, U.S. Department of Energy, Commonwealth of ­Massachusetts (CIO, CISO, ­Departments of Homeland Security and Public Safety, ­Massachusetts State Police), and the City of Boston (CIO, Police and Fire ­Departments). Of note, and to ensure that through our outreach efforts the program was engaging these ­external parties in an ethical fashion when inviting their participation and counsel, the program leadership identified clearly the parameters and expectations both from the program side and from the partner side. Among other things, the program was very clear that this would be an a­ cademic degree program and as such ensuring the fullness of academic freedom for the f­aculty and that all decision-making functions would be from the program side (Conklin, Cline & Roosa, 2014). In more than hundred meetings and conference calls that occurred, the CTF and principally the lead faculty, who cataloged all of this, found an underlying theme – there is a lack of high-quality, appropriately designed academic programs focused on educating and developing cybersecurity professionals that can address the staffing needs of both industry and governments. Indeed, as noted by Cynthia J. Larose, Esq., a Partner and the Chair of the Privacy & Security Practice Group at the International Law Firm Mintz Levin, BC’s initiative in building its Cybersecurity Policy and Governance Program is at the right place at the right time. At least since 2015, the knowledge gap for industry has 100

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been widening, just as the global threats have been advancing. There is a critical need for security professionals that can cope with advanced threats and advanced adversaries and help to drive cybersecurity policy across enterprises. (Larose, 2016) This sentiment was echoed by Mike Steinmetz, who was then the Director of Digital Risk & Security for National Grid.2 Steinmetz pointed out that the proposed Masters of Science in Cybersecurity Policy & Governance at Boston College fills the essential ‘non-technical’ gap in the growing area of the national policy and governance which surrounds cyber security. Our company needs a balance of advanced skill sets, both technical and non-technical, that can only be satisfied by advanced educational opportunities such as those which will provided by BC’s cybersecurity program. (Steinmetz, 2016) These meetings along with all the feedback offered by the other private and government expert practitioners provided the refinement needed as the CTF began drafting the charter and then the curriculum for the CPG Program. It had been clearly identified that the building of such a program needed to be geared to the respective needs cataloged earlier. In fact, for all of the courses initially developed by academics for the CPG Program, the CTF shared the draft course descriptions with the appropriate expert practitioner that the CTF had been working with in order to obtain their review and suggestions. Nearly all provided critical feedback and suggestions. All were understood to be highly invested in the process and understood the importance of such collaboration. At the same time, the process highlighted the need for the program to ensure that there was a kind of “fire-wall” in place such that any government or industry partner (now or in the future) would not be involved in directing areas that are the purview of the academy, for example, the curricula or admissions processes. Of course, they offered input for many of these areas, but all decisions came from the program itself which continues to remain true. Following best practices, experts in the field assist us as thought partners but are not part of the decision-making process (Slaughter, 1988). After careful consideration and review by the CTF and the WCAS academic team, the CTF incorporated all of the appropriate, ethically grounded suggestions provided by the expert practitioners into the courses and curriculum. This accomplished the task of creating a truly robust, rigorous, and applicable set of courses (and thus program). It was then decided that the best way forward to achieve the lofty goals set by the CTF was to establish the ­Master of Science degree in Cybersecurity Policy and Governance. It was further determined that the best person to be the founding director of such a program would be the lead faculty who had completed so much of the early research and development. Because we understood both the Federal Government’s approach to cybersecurity and industry’s thoughts on what constitutes “best practices,” the CPG Program was built and inaugurated using the overarching themes as found in the Program’s “defining characteristics”: Our Master of Science in Cybersecurity Policy and Governance will prepare students to bridge the communication gap between IT security professionals and key business stakeholders, and to lead, design, and frame a business case for investment to senior e­ xecutives, Boards of Directors, and government officials. Taught by industry leaders and practitioners, students will learn, hands-on, to identify, assess, and manage cyber risk, and to develop and implement a proactive cybersecurity strategy to effectively defend, mitigate, and recover from a cyber-attack. Our program emphasizes skills in leadership, ethics, 101

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management, analytic problem solving, critical thinking, and communication to prepare students to meet and respond to the varying issues presented by the rapidly changing cyber ecosystem. (Woods College of Advancing Studies at Boston College, 2018) Remaining true to this Program Statement, the following curriculum was further refined in order to educate and train CPG students to become highly qualified cyber professionals with the ability to craft and implement a “unified” cybersecurity strategy to address the constant and varying cyber-threats faced by private industry and government: Core Courses (6): • • • • • •

Cyber Ecosystem and Cybersecurity Cybersecurity Policy: Privacy & Legal Requirements Network & Infrastructure Security Incident Response & Management Organizational Effectiveness: Governance, Risk Management & Compliancy Ethical Issues in Cybersecurity & the Ignatian Paradigm

Electives (4): • • • • • • • •

International Cybersecurity Cyber Investigations & Digital Forensics Privacy Law & Data Protection Managing Cyber Risk: Mobile Devices & Social Networking Establishing the Business Case & Resource Allocation Security in the Cloud Role of Intelligence: Enabling Proactive Security Applied Research Project

Not only did the CTF seek out expertise in building the curriculum for the CPG Program, but, once the program was officially launched, the director sought other ways to further collaborate with the industry and government partners. First and foremost, because it was found that there was a short supply of cyber experts in the academy who would be available to teach cybersecurity courses in the way planned by the CPG, the director worked to identify properly qualified cybersecurity experts from the field who were also known to be gifted instructors, presenters, or guest lecturers. All proposed faculty and lecturers underwent a pre-screening and vetting process. This process was highly successful due in large part to the effective collaboration that existed with the varying private industry and government partnerships, from IT to forensics and investigations to policy, law, risk assessment, governance, and incident response. Furthermore, because a number of these talented and highly qualified faculty were identified by our partners, they, along with the existing slate of adjunct faculty, allowed the CPG Program to create a significant and highly accomplished reserve of cybersecurity experts capable of teaching in the CPG Program, when needed. In addition to these opportunities created with our partners for the properly vetted faculty, other more typical partnership opportunities were identified. While none of the items listed below were required to become a partner with the Program, many of the partners spontaneously offered to create or take part in such engagements, including, though not limited to, the following: 102

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1 Paid Internships: Partners agreed to provide “hands-on” professional internships and mentoring for students enrolled in the program. 2 Scholarship(s) (Employee): Partners agree to provide funded scholarship(s) for select ­employee(s) enrolled in the program. 3 Scholarship(s) (Student): Partners agree to provide funded scholarship(s) for select ­student(s) enrolled in the program. 4 Endowed Chair and Professorship: Partners agree to provide funding for a professorship related to the company’s field of expertise. Endowed Chairs are named for the company or its designee (e.g. “[Company Name] Professor in Cybersecurity Studies”). 5 Facilities: Partners agree to provide use of their offices or other space to host labs, simulations, classes, lectures, meetings, and/or networking events. 6 Membership, Advisory Committee: Partners agree to provide advice and guidance for the continued development and maintenance of the program’s curriculum and partnerships by participation on such committees. 7 Academic and Professional Conferences: Partners assist in promoting, organizing, and/ or participating in industry and/or academic conferences created and implemented by the program.3 8 Promote Program: Partners agree to promote and introduce the program to their respective employees, as well as to national and international industry leaders and state and federal government officials. By leveraging these partnerships with private industry and governments, the CPG Program has been able to build a solid academic program in the field of cybersecurity studies that is aligned with its current needs. Although this has provided many opportunities for BC and the CPG students (e.g. mentors, internships, networking, and employment along with better attunement of graduates to real-life cyber issues), there are also challenges for the CPG unit, as part of an academic institution, related to such external partnerships.

Challenges with external partnerships One of the biggest challenges as well as criticisms leveled against such program collaborations, especially when such collaboration involves funding, relates to the ability to ensure and maintain academic freedom and thereby the academic integrity of the CPG Program as this becomes a transparency and ethical concern for both the academic community and also consumers of such programs (Behrens & Gray, 2001). The general concern is that through such engagements and collaboration, an academic program, without the proper oversight, would fall victim to becoming more of a “credentialing or trade” program than an academic one. This is a sincere concern demanding attention and response. Though it would not be possible to address completely all aspects of such concerns, any program would do well (as the CPG Program does) to make it clear in dealing with private industry and government partners, that the program is not willing to compromise its academic values or standards – the program is not going to betray its integrity in order to bring in revenue. In this regard, the CPG Program makes certain that partners understand that we are first and foremost an academic program that seeks alignment with industry’s needs (but that the CPG Program is not, as a result, solely focused on those needs). Another key area, which the CPG Program addresses and the one that keeps it in tune with the academy, is its focus on educating cyber professionals who will become leaders, communicators, critical thinkers, and analytical problem solvers. However, simply stating as much is not enough. 103

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For example, though the CPG Program currently is taught entirely by adjunct faculty, many of whom are experts from private industry and government, it continues to maintain academic integrity through regular faculty and program level evaluations. However, these assessments do not revolve solely around traditional evaluative categories of teaching, research, and service but are more expansive and focused on, enhancing teaching and learning models; translational, applied research; and alternative approaches to scholarship. This approach engages what might be considered the broader scholarly aspects advocated by Boyer (Boyer, 1990). These adjustments are necessary in part due to the fact that cybersecurity is a new field of study with limited traditional academics available to teach such courses. In addition, the fields more applied nature in general requires different ways of assessing faculty and program outcomes. Furthermore, in order to maintain the academic excellence of the CPG Program and avoid becoming a “credentialing or trade” program, it has sought out innovative ways to integrate currently tenured faculty in allied fields to teach in the Program alongside its adjunct faculty, who as mentioned come from industry and government. The program is also conscious of the ethical imperative to ensure that these faculty who come from outside of traditional academia are equipped with the professional development opportunities to ensure their success and student satisfaction (Lyons & Burnstad, 2007). This novel approach has shown early and great promise but continues to be evaluated to ensure that students are truly getting the best of both worlds, i.e. engaged, tenured faculty who work alongside adjunct faculty with the practical expertise of the field. This approach allows the CPG Program to buttress not only its academic credentials but also to enhance the subject matter expertise because these more traditional faculty (who are tenured at BC and/or other institutions) have the ability, resources, and time to complete the academic research and writing necessary to focus on today’s urgent cyber issues. Thus, the CPG Program has found itself consisting of both renowned thought leaders from industry and government as well as established scholars in the cybersecurity and allied field.

Conclusion and future directions The foregoing exploration of a recently launched and currently successful cybersecurity program allows for a deeper understanding and richer context of the framework related to the development, implementation, and maintenance of such an academic program. It is the one that was founded on the collaboration of the academy with private industry and governments. However, a cautionary note is warranted for those seeking to initiate a new cybersecurity program (similar to caveats related to the development and implementation of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework) and the aforementioned process should not be considered a simple “checklist” or “one-size-fits-all” approach. Rather, this chapter seeks to provide broad guidance based on the unique experience of a particular program developed under a singular set of variables. Thus, what worked at Boston College may not be applicable or implementable in a direct one-for-one manner in other locations or according to the same time frame. For example, the CPG Program began its collaborations at a time when private industry and governments were in dire need of cybersecurity professionals with the necessary skill-sets to combat the varying cyber-threats and, when needed, properly respond to and recover from a cyber-breach. It also began in a city and state that have displayed a great deal of interest and desire for the launch of such programs. In this setting, both industry and government were not only receptive to assisting in the development of the CPG Program, they were, and continue to be, active and willing partners who are invested in the Program. In this sense, the success of the CPG Program is also their success. 104

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Perhaps the best way any academic institution can benefit from this chapter, and the BC CPG Program experience, is to realize that when seeking to collaborate with industry and government partners, you must learn to trust and understand each other’s respective goals. When the CPG Program began its outreach, it was made clear to all potential partners that it was building an “academic” program aligned with but not dominated by the needs of industry and governments. The CPG Program remains committed to this foundational principle and is not willing to compromise on this because it seeks to maintain its academic integrity. A further point is that, in choosing partners, the CPG Program went to those companies and government agencies that had a culture consistent with BC’s mission of “service to others” and that were of the highest ethical standards. During the many outreach meetings, there were companies that did not agree with our academic approach to cybersecurity and/ or that wanted to use our Program to market their products. It is not the contention of the authors that these companies are by any means wrong for such an interest; rather, they were simply misaligned with the CPG Program’s mission. By way of comparison, the CPG ­Program’s chosen partners do not view cybersecurity solely as an internal business matter, but instead recognize that cybersecurity impacts our Nation and community-at-large and, thus, they are willing to share tried and true methods and best practices developed by them for the “greater good.” By sharing the CPG Program experience, we hope to demonstrate that academic collaboration with external partners in private industry and governments presents many unique and powerful opportunities for all involved but especially for a safer and more secure community. At the same time, it is acknowledged that to be successful, an emerging or renewing program must be aware of the many hurdles and challenges involved with such relationships, yet be unwilling to compromise on academic integrity, rigor, ethics, and other key values.

Notes 1 Although there were some local and State regulations pertaining to data protection and privacy, the CPG Program focus, as noted, was interested in the Federal Government’s approach to cybersecurity, as more often than not, Federal agencies take the lead in matters pertaining to cyber and national security. 2 Since providing his quote, Mr. Steinmetz has moved on from National Grid and is now the ­Cybersecurity Officer and Advisor to the Governor & Office of Homeland Security for the State of Rhode Island. 3 For example, each year, the CPG Program and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) jointly host the Boston Conference on Cyber Security (“BCCS”) at BC. The BCCS provides an ­opportunity for leaders in cybersecurity from the academic, analytic, operations, research, corporate, and law enforcement arenas to come together and coordinate their efforts to create a more secure cyber-space. Of note, since its inception in 2017, the Keynote addresses have been provided by former FBI Director James Comey, FBI Director Christopher Wray, and former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson. Other past speakers included Kevin Mandia, CEO of FireEye; David Wajsgras, President of Raytheon’s Intelligence, Information and Services Division; ­Cameron F. Kerry, of Sidley Austin LLP, former General Counsel & Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce; Gus P. Coldebella, of Fish & Richardson, former Acting General Counsel, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Brig. Gen. Kevin B. Kennedy, USAF, of the Pentagon’s CIO office; Thomas J. Curry, of Nutter McClennen & Fish, former U.S. Treasury Department Comptroller of the Currency; and Christopher R. Hetner, Senior Advisor for Cybersecurity to the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Other past participants include a roster of leading cybersecurity practitioners and academics, among them experts from the FBI’s Cyber Division, National Security Agency, U.S. Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, Internal Revenue Service, Secret Service, and Securities and Exchange Commission; companies including State Street Bank, Fidelity, Raytheon, Citi, National

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Kevin Powers and James Burns Grid, Eversource, Ropes & Gray, Microsoft, Symantec, CrowdStrike, IBM Security, Charles River Labs, Mintz Levin, Sidley Austin, PwC, FireEye, Citrix Systems, Jones Day, Charles River Associates, Holland & Knight, RSA, Dell EMC, Stanley Black & Decker, FTI Consulting, Stroz Friedberg, SecureWorks, and The MITRE Corp.; along with scholars and experts from Boston College, Boston College Law School, IT, Harvard, Oxford University, U.S. Naval Academy, and Brown University.

References Behrens, T.R., & Gray, D.O. (2001). Unintended Consequences of Cooperative Research: Impact of Industry Sponsorship on Climate for Academic Freedom and Other Graduate Student Outcomes. Research Policy 30 (2001): 179–199. Boyer, E. (1990). Scholarship Reconsidered: Priorities of the Professoriate. Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press. Burns, K. Email sent to Powers, K. May 30th, 2018. Carson, J. (2017). Majority of Companies Are Failing at Cyber Security Metrics, and Investing Blindly. The Lockdown. Available from: https://thycotic.com/company/blog/2017/11/22/­companies-fail-atcyber-security-metrics-invest-blindly/ [Accessed 10th January 2019]. Comey, J. (2017). Keynote Address. 8 March, Boston Conference on Cyber Security, Boston. Conklin, A., Cline, R., & Roosa, T. (2014). Re-engineering Cybersecurity in the US: An Analysis of Critical Factors. The 47th Hawaii International Conference on System Science Conference Proceedings 6–9th January 2014. Waikoloa, HI, USA. IEEE. Davis, C. Email sent to Powers, K. June 1st, 2018. Dempsey, K.L., Johnson, L.A., Scholl, M.A., Stine, K.M., Jones, A.C., Orebaugh, A., Chawla, NS., & Johnston, R. (2011). Information Security Continuous Monitoring for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Gaithersburg, MD. Special Publication (NIST SP) -800-137 National Institute of Standards and Technology. p. B-13 Available from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-137 [Accessed 10th January 2019]. Education Advisory Board. (2014). Multi-track Cybersecurity Pathways. Industry Future Series White Paper. Washington, DC: Education Advisory Board. Himma, K.E., & Tavani, H.T. (ed.) (2008). The Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. Available from: www.cems.uwe.ac.uk/~pchatter/2011/pepi/The_Handbook_of_Information_and_Computer_Ethics.pdf [Accessed 10th January 2019]. Larose, C. Email sent to Powers, K. August 15th, 2016. Lashaway, S. Email sent to Powers, K. June 1st, 2018. LeClair, J., Abraham, S., & Shih, L. (2013). An Interdisciplinary Approach to Educating an Effective Cyber Security Workforce. Information Security Curriculum Development Conference: Proceedings of the 2013 Information Security Curriculum Development Conference. New York: ACM. p. 71. Lyons, R.E., & Burnstad, H. (eds.). (2007). Best Practices for Supporting Adjunct Faculty. San ­Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Wiley. Maor, E. Email sent to Powers, K. May 29th, 2018. McAdams, A.C. (2004). Security and Risk Management: A Fundamental Business Issue. Information Management Journal 38(4), 36–44. McBride, M., Carter, L., & Warkentin, M. (2012) In One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Cybersecurity Training Should Be Customized. Institute for Homeland Security Solution. Available from: https://sites. duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/CyberSecurity_2page-summary_mcbride-2012.pdf [Accessed 10th January 2019]. Messick, D., & Bazerman, M. (2001). Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of Decision making, in Dienhart, J., Moberg, D., & Duska, R., (eds.), The Next Phase of Business Ethics: Integrating Psychology and Ethics, Research in Ethical Issues in Organizations, Volume 3. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp. 213–238. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2018a). Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Version 1.1. Maryland. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Available from: www.nist.gov/cyberframework [Accessed 10th January 2019]. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2018b). Cybersecurity Framework. Maryland. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Available from www.nist.gov/cyberframework [Accessed 10th January 2019].

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The FBI, cybersecurity and American campuses Slaughter, S. (1988). Academic Freedom and the State. The Journal of Higher Education 59 (3): 241–262. doi:10.2307/1981678. Steinmetz, M. Email sent to Powers, K. May 24th, 2016. Swindon, K. Email sent to Powers, K. June 4th, 2018. Tomic, A., & Burns, J. (2014). The Program Life Cycle Report. Chestnut Hill, MA: Boston College. Woods College of Advancing Studies at Boston College. (2018). M.S. in Cybersecurity Policy and Governance. Available from www.bc.edu/bc-web/schools/wcas/graduate/masters-programs/ms-­ cybersecurity.html [Accessed 10th January 2019]. Woods College of Advancing Studies at Boston College. (2014). The Development of a Graduate Program in Cybersecurity. WCAS Cybersecurity Task Force Working Paper. Chestnut Hill, MA. Woods College of Advancing Studies.

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4 ‘WHAT WAS NEEDED WERE COPYISTS, FILERS, AND REALLY INTELLIGENT MEN OF CAPACITY’ British signals intelligence and the universities, 1914–1992 John R. Ferris Introduction Until recently, British signals intelligence has been hidden in secrecy. In its best-known ­activity, the work of Bletchley Park during the Second World War, signals intelligence was linked closely to academics, and amongst the areas of the war where brains most created power. More generally, signals intelligence lies on the leading edge of several areas of technical and scientific development. Many of its activities have had great academic and social significance. Consequently, one would expect to see a close association between British signals intelligence and universities. An examination of this relationship illuminates both of these matters. Before 1914, the British fighting services knew that in case of war, they must create units to intercept wireless communications and attack enciphered ones.1 When war began, British authorities immediately had their best experts create sigint agencies. The Director of ­Naval Education, Alfred Ewing, an amateur cryptanalyst but experienced with radio and the construction of codes, formed a body, later best known as ‘I.D. 25’ and ‘Room 40’, which attacked German naval and diplomatic traffic.2 General F.J. Anderson, an experienced cryptanalyst from the Boer War, started an organisation, later called MI1(b), which attacked the diplomatic systems of all enemy and neutral states.3 Field commanders created codebreaking institutions in a more sporadic fashion.4 These organisations were staffed by amateurs, some being military and civilian academics, but most were civilian officials, private enthusiasts and military officers. The General Post Office (GPO) and Marconi, organisations with great capabilities in telecommunications, were the main technical drivers of these events. Universities played no role in these haphazard developments. Academics, however, dominated one sigint agency, which closely approached the model of signals intelligence agencies after 1945, far more than did Room 40. The blockade rested on Anglo-French seapower and control over transatlantic cables. Signals intelligence was central to economic warfare and its application to blockade, providing knowledge, evidence 108

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and means for leverage. Signals intelligence ensured that blockade struck as many enemies as possible and as few innocents. British censorship hampered the ability of enemy states to communicate with foreign governments, and their civilians or firms from conducting their business. It produced a host of data, which initially overwhelmed blockade intelligence. During 1915, however, Britain’s finest intelligence assessment body of the war, the War Trade Intelligence Department (WTID), solved this problem. It organised all intercepts on one index, structured around the names of individuals, sender and receivers, firms and ships, in alphabetical order. Ultimately, the index contained 1,000,000 names, cross referenced to highlight their connections. Whenever one wanted information on any name, every reference taken from 1,000,000,000 intercepts appeared on the index, which was updated constantly. Relevant files were retrieved immediately. WTID, alongside Hut Three at Bletchley Park a generation later, was the triumph of data processing for intelligence in the age of the card index. The WTID became the central element in the blockade through the war, enabling an elaborate machine to operate with remarkable efficiency.5 WTID also was the most academic of British intelligence agencies during this war. Room 40 grew from an old boys’ network amongst civilians, often given reserve ranks, centred on Cambridge, the City, and the professions. WTID rested on Oxford and the Temple. In ­December 1914, the chiefs of military and naval intelligence authorised postal censors to tackle transit mails passing to and from Europe and Latin America. The censors found vast amounts of business correspondence involving Germany. The chiefs assigned attack on this material to the civilians whom had led that investigation, Henry Penson, a well-known economist and statistician, and William Carless Davis, medieval historian, and later Regius Professor of M ­ odern History, from Worchester College and Balliol College. They haunted clubs and high tables in search of the right sort, whose first task was to find others of the same breed.6 One member of WTID described how a ‘small and amazingly harmonious body, contributing diverse experience and callings from many countries, established a ­free-masonry with hard-driven men in other departments’. Recruits were almost entirely ‘overage or unfit’, excluding anyone ‘who could turn to private account any knowledge that could come to him in his official capacity’. The WTID included ‘dons and barristers, men of letters and stockbrokers, solicitors and merchants’, some disabled officers, but no civil servants. In a few days, they were ‘acclimatized to the universal office-equipment of trestle-tables and desk-telephones, of card indices and steel filing-cabinets, of “in” and “out” trays, of rubber stamps and “urgent” labels’.7 WTID included dons from many—probably all—British universities, especially historians, such as Robert Sangster Rait, then The Professor of Scottish History and Literature at The University of Glasgow. Alexander Teixeira de Mattos, a Dutch national of Portuguese-Jewish descent and convert to Catholicism, famous as a translator into English of works by Danish, Flemish, Dutch, French, German and Norwegian authors, headed WTID’s ‘Intelligence Section’—­ before he became a British subject. Underneath this layer of educated men and women lay far larger numbers of more ordinary people. Penson defined a condition which has ruled British sigint ever since: ‘what was needed were copyists, filers, and really intelligent men of capacity’.8 After the war, Britain created a signals intelligence agency, The Government Code & Cypher School (GC&CS), supported by intercept organisations under the military services. GC&CS was unique in Whitehall. Like the National Physical Laboratory, its task was research, yet directed to aid British diplomacy every day. GC&CS was more like a university than a government department, focused on research and the dissemination of knowledge, divided into Senior Assistants and Junior Assistants. Seniors treated probationers as graduate students, or property. Several of its members were leading scholars, with public profiles: ­Emily Anderson as a translator of the letters of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Malcom Kennedy 109

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on the Japanese army, Alfred ‘Dilly’ Knox on the Greek poet, Herodas. GC&CS, military units and firms handled research and development. Universities were not involved in this process but were a major source of personnel, matched only by military officers. GC&CS recruited codebreakers from a charmed circle of the wartime cryptanalytical units, military and diplomatic officers, Oxbridge, London occasionally, and never the Scottish or ‘Provincial Universities’. Only gentlemen should read other gentlemen’s mail. Graduates were recruited through the Civil Service Commission (CSC). To an unusual degree, GC&CS was allowed to make the CSC a post office, rather than a gatekeeper. The head of GC&CS, Alistair Denniston, directly contacted by post or in person the placement officers or dons at universities, provided ‘slightly more intimate details of the work and of the type of men we require’, discussed and sometimes discouraged applicants, and monitored interviews. Following a conventional practice, the discussions of candidates (by the 1930s, often over twenty applicants for four positions) were objective and detailed. During the 1920s (but, apparently not the 1930s), contrary to convention, candidates met the Assessment Board before they sat the exams, to weed unpromising candidates from competition. GC&CS rejected unsuccessful candidates, rank-ordered acceptable ones and offered posts by that criterion, sometimes encouraging those not offered positions, to apply again. Only those who were offered positions learned what the work entailed. Standards were high. Joseph Hooper, later a Director of Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), rated fourth amongst seven candidates provisionally accepted in 1938.9 Accepted candidates remained probationers for two years, to enable weeding of incompetent cryptanalysts, though none were so expelled. The women’s colleges at Oxbridge usually received notice of GC&CS competitions, but sometimes were excluded, because a given post entailed service abroad during a war, or an internal candidate, in a temporary position, Marie Egan, (supported by all of her superiors) was certain to be offered a post, and Denniston ‘could not face the prospect of having our vacancies filled 100 per cent by women’.10 GC&CS looked at graduates with classical, linguistic or mathematical backgrounds. In many competitions, it had specific demands for expertise in matters like languages. GC&CS hired mostly masters of difficult languages, but it pursued all-rounders with intuition and synthetic faculties. GC&CS judged the ability of candidates by their aptitude for, rather than knowledge of, languages and mathematics, and especially their ability to solve cryptologic problems. All must be ‘men of sound character, in whom we can place implicit faith…we really require men with the type of mind of the student rather than men with administrative capabilities, for which there is very little scope’. The regulation that ‘a certain degree of mathematical aptitude is of the first importance while mathematical knowledge is of no importance’ suggests that the true test was of analytical, logical and magical capabilities. Denniston remarked, a man taking a First in any subject, thereby assuring us of intellectual ability, coupled with a taste for modern languages would be a suitable man for us…the man with a mathematical mind is probably the most suitable, but we have several distinguished classicists who are among our most able members.11 The fact that students need not understand ‘recurring decimals’ (numerals where the decimal representation, after a period of randomness, eventually repeats itself forever) shows that classicists and linguists were enabled to meet the upper demands of mathematical knowledge. The language examination consisted of ‘translation and restoration of completion of a faulty passage of the language’. That in English had the same paleographical feature, alongside ‘essay-writing’. 110

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The universities were also GC&CS’s source for expansion in case of war. GC&CS thought that in another war as in the last one, a few hundred people would conduct codebreaking. Since maintenance of standards was difficult when large numbers were hired in short periods, it opposed major and uncontrolled expansion, preferred quality over quantity and trusted its own methods for recruitment (good ones, incidentally). In 1923, GC&CS held that if it were to be enlarged greatly or rapidly, ‘the most that could be hoped for would be one cryptographer out of six, the remaining five drawing the same pay and being…useless but immovable’. After the Munich crisis, Denniston held during the precautionary period all authorities anxious to expand receive offers of service from men and women who are not employed often because they are unemployable. I am definitely opposed to taking on a staff of enthusiastic amateurs of whom one knows little or nothing and who may turn out complete failures; expansion should come from old hands and high tables.12 Despite his habit of hiring relatives, especially daughters, of people whose provenance he knew, Denniston better prepared his service for war than any other leader of intelligence in Britain, or the world. He filled the holes he saw through means that he knew.13 He aimed to double the staff doing what GC&CS already did, mostly in diplomatic cryptanalysis, no doubt assuming the services would expand their sections as they wished. He brought back an old guard from Room 40 and hired ‘men of the professor type’, either old hands with cryptanalytical experience, or else linguists.14 The largest addition were dozens of recruits from the women’s colleges of Oxbridge, many enrolled as ‘Linguist Cryptanalysts’—Junior Assistants with the tasks of clerical officers, keystrippers, bookbuilders and translators, but more room to rise. These choices were excellent. Though some of these men and women failed, most had a good to outstanding war. These candidates received brief codebreaking courses during 1939, including attack on standard manual systems for all and machines for the researchers, to determine suitability for the work and to spur personal preparations in the interim. The most celebrated acquisitions were four mathematicians enlisted to assault the Enigma cypher machine, whom Denniston recruited through the greatest piece of talent spotting in the history of cryptology. Later, they were augmented by others. The task involved many minds, but Alan Turing, Gordon Welchman and Max Newman, in particular, drove cryptanalysis into a new age, as they analysed the structure of electro-mechanical cypher machines like Enigma and the Lorenz SZ40/42, and determined how best to attack them. Welchman discovered the structure which sigint agencies would need to master this new era of signals intelligence, one which they follow in key respects today. These academics, and their colleagues, drove the creation of the greatest data processing system ever known to that time, in the codebreaking units of Hut 6 and Hut 8. Their work was a proximate cause for the creation of the computer, and of branches of mathematics allied to computing.15 Yet, the very success of these men leads the unwary to overestimate the role of the universities and of academics at Bletchley. Universities were not involved in these activities as institutions, but as passive suppliers of personnel, who were selected by various authorities at Bletchley. Mathematicians were essential to Bletchley’s success, and academics were the core of the cryptanalytic and analytic staff. Yet, other groups of people were equally necessary to success. The directors of Bletchley, and architects of its success, were old hands from GC&CS, including Denniston, but especially Josh Cooper, John Tiltman and Edward Travis, aided by their overlord, Stewart Menzies, the Chief of the Secret Service. Two businessmen, Nigel de Grey and Eric Jones, helped by military officers, created and directed the 111

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analytic organisation, Hut Three, which squeezed intelligence from the cryptanalytic take, and aided allied strategists and commanders. Cryptanalytic success hinged on the abilities of Harold ‘Doc’ Keene and Thomas ‘Tommy’ Flowers to design practicable codebreaking machines, and of the organisations from which they came, British Tabulating Machines and the GPO Research Station at Dollis Hill, to manufacture these devices. GC&CS and the military services created the radio interception services upon which success depended. National leaders gave Bletchley top priority over the resources needed for success. British academics were essential to this victory, but not sufficient for it. After 1945, Britain maintained a far larger signals intelligence agency than before the war, renamed Government Communications Headquarters. It was far less like an academic department than GC&CS had been, because signals intelligence had become industrialised. GCHQ’s major partners for research and development were private firms and government agencies, not the universities. The latter remained its chief source for graduate recruits, but they remained surprisingly small in number. The key to GCHQ’s success with personnel lay in exploiting the abilities of a few graduates, and far larger numbers of sixteen- to ­eighteen-year-old school leavers. After the war, authorities agreed that GCHQ required 200 ‘first class minds’, officers in the administrative class of the civil service, to cover all leadership and sigint tasks at GCHQ. Though these numbers rose, even in 1970, GCHQ perhaps had only 300 university graduates, few with advanced degrees from an organisation ­ embers. The graduates joined at higher rates and initially advanced faster than with 8,000 m civil ­servants in normal units, but at midcareer that status stalled. Opportunities to reach the highest levels of civil service were smaller than elsewhere. Only motivated people would take an administrative position at GCHQ, compared to other departments; yet for decades, GCHQ could not motivate them by describing its work. Until 1982, candidates without prior experience in sigint did not know what work GCHQ did, until they reached Cheltenham, signed the Official Secrets Act, were briefed and allowed to stay or go. The need for positive vetting further slowed appointments, leading applicants with multiple offers, often the best candidates, to choose another. The CSC always described GCHQ to applicants as a ‘Department of the Foreign Office’, presumably to counter the impression that it was an entirely technical unit, and offered optimistic calculations of salary and career prospects. From 1965, the CSC described GCHQ’s work as ‘specialized, but in its own particular field it is wide in scope, complex and varied, and by no means exclusively technical in nature. It should appeal to graduates who are seeking work which is both interesting and mentally extending. The range of activity is that normally to be found in any medium-sized Government Department and includes, for example, individual and team work, committee work, and contact with the Services and with other Government Departments’.16 GCHQ believed that this problem of secrecy had declined, because after ‘several years intensive effort, we have gained the active co-operation of most University Appointments Boards’, where some members were indoctrinated into its work.17 The initial system failed to acquire enough applicants, but in 1963, the Treasury authorised an improvement in strength, which GCHQ turned into a greater number of senior positions for its different areas. This decision provided the strength needed to function. After avowal of its status in 1982, GCHQ could also explain itself better to applicants. GCHQ’s brochures were well pitched to graduates, including photographs of young staff at work and play, its modern offices and stocks of high end kit. The brochures matched those of any contemporary department, but differentiated GCHQ from them. They told candidates how to contact GCHQ’s Graduate Appointments office. They described explicitly the value of arts, engineering, mathematics and sciences graduates, and GCHQ’s linguistic, administrative 112

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and policy making, and engineering, mathematical and scientific streams. These brochures emphasised the charms of Cheltenham, its ease of access to the rest of Britain, the quality of GCHQ’s sports facilities, alongside the intellectual challenges of the work. GCHQ recruited at universities through the CCS. Though Oxbridge remained the preferred background, openings were advertised at every university. Compared to the prewar period, more working-class people entered university than before, broadening the social pool for GCHQ’s candidates. Robert Churchhouse, for example, a cryptanalyst and computer systems analyst in GCHQ and later a key recruiter for candidates, stemmed from a working-class family in Manchester.18 From 1949, women received the same opportunities and pay as men. Recruitment and retention were not easy, the problems and solutions ­varying by specialisation. The reward of problem solving, especially with leading edge kit and techniques which were years ahead of civilian institutions, provided a delicious mixture of secrecy and superiority. Once within GCHQ, this reward attracted specialists of every persuasion, especially those with the scarcest of talents. Getting them there was the problem. Knowledge of mathematics replaced that of language as the core of cryptanalysis, though as ever, success occurred through problem solving, rather than grasp of theory. At universities, GCHQ looked for cryptanalysts only amongst mathematicians. It understood the emergence of a new study, mathematical cryptanalysis, better than civilian mathematicians initially did. Secrecy slowed the start and broke the continuity expected in an open field of mathematics, preventing masters from enlightening students. During his first degree at The University of Manchester, Churchhouse was taught by Jack Gold and Alan Turing. When asked what they had done during the war, these pioneers of mathematical cryptanalysis replied, ‘nothing very interesting’. Churchhouse had no education in mathematical cryptanalysis, until he began to practise it. When he returned to civilian life, however, he could guide his students in a recognised field.19 Members of GCHQ were plugged into the British academic computer network, and those of American civilian and intelligence computing. Max Newman and other veterans of Bletchley, especially Good, cooperated from ­Manchester. Good later rejoined GCHQ and, with Churchhouse, then moved to the Atlas Computer Laboratory at Harwell, a major national research institute. Churchhouse later became the Chair of Computing Mathematics at The University of Cardiff. The mathematicians at GCHQ worked with and hired the students of retired colleagues at any university, but preferably and primarily Oxbridge. Ultimately, the old boy network, friends and ex-colleagues in mathematics departments, enabled low profile talent spotting. Though CCS advertisements merely mentioned the need for high-quality mathematicians, that bait and guidance from professors and fellow students already in place attracted attention, in a rich, if narrow pool. Until the Internet, civilian competition was weak, except for the few appointments in universities, while GCHQ salaries were adequate. If one lived in one’s mind, Cheltenham was as good a place to be as any. Cryppies were happy to find GCHQ. It opened their minds and changed their lives. Recruiting and retaining scientists and engineers posed a greater problem. In 1944–1945, key members of Bletchley promoted a machine culture.20 It focused on a dying breed, mechanical engineers with academic training, but driven primarily by practical experience. That influence waned after the war, when a confusing environment emerged. As data processing machines moved from mechanical to electrical, academic training trumped hands-on expertise. Scientific knowledge was necessary to understand and exploit developments in comint and computers; yet, GCHQ worked beyond academic departments on the leading edge of these activities, or the secret spheres beyond them. GCHQ’s leaders were not sure what to do with engineering and scientific graduates, nor how to find them. In signals intelligence, 113

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the supply and demand of engineers and scientists did not mesh, outside competition was great, salaries were low and wastage high, though personnel received opportunities to work on the cutting edge, ahead of any non-classified person. Unlike mathematicians, GCHQ had to define its value to engineers and scientists. In 1972, via the CCS, it advertised a position for ‘Graduate Electrical Engineers’, in hindsight, amongst the best postgraduate positions of the time in an emerging area. This offer reflects GCHQ understanding of the work, and how to handle it. The role of the Government Communication Headquarters is to carry out research, development and production in the field of communications on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government. It has built up a research and development capability of unique scope and depth and engineers work on problems not found in other organisations, playing a part in producing devices that are in advance of those developed elsewhere. The activities involve all types of communication systems, from closed circuit television and telephone through microwave and satellite systems, to high frequency and very long range radio communications. Throughout the work on this range of systems there is an emphasis on their practical use and particularly on their security. Graduate Electrical Engineers will be given carefully planned and directed training and experience designed to enable them to undertake full professional engineering duties. They range from the initial interpretation of a non-technical statement of requirement through the management of design and development of the resulting contracts, installation, maintenance and logistic support, to the overall supervision of large projects or functional areas of engineering activity. The training and experience will cover the requirements of the Institution of Electrical Engineers and/or The Institute of ­Electrical and Radio Engineers for attaining corporate membership. Some of the training may be given at other government departments or by industrial contractors. A senior engineer will act as tutor and direct the training programme.21 GCHQ constantly stood below establishment in engineers and scientists and, for purposes of recruitment and retention, offered them better terms than cryptanalysts and linguists. Despite the heartburning, GCHQ ultimately acquired enough staff to solve the problem, augmented by its rare access to work from the worlds’ leaders, NSA and American firms. Machine and computer attack reduced the role of linguists in cryptanalysis. ‘­Crypt-linguists’, combining cryptanalytic and linguistic abilities, however, remained, while siginters needed many types of linguists, including first class, or interpreters, able to translate voice or text instantaneously and precisely; second class, able to translate complicated messages accurately, with time and dictionaries; and elementary or ‘applied’, able to capture military voice messages using limited and stereotyped vocabularies. GCHQ found linguists through variants of means which British departments, universities and colonial governments used to create language and area studies schools for diplomats, imperial officials and military officers between 1800 and 1945. In 1940, new needs for linguists swamped British sigint. Few organisations ever had needed so many linguists as GC&CS. Its internal priorities, and those of the government, gave GC&CS thousands of linguists, many university trained. GCHQ overcame the main lacunae through a course which converted hundreds of classicists into functional Japanese linguists within six months, rather than the two years demanded by academics.22 Professors, focused on the fine points of poetry, often overrate the linguistic requirements for sigint. GCHQ viewed languages with ruthless functionality, as tools for tasks, period. 114

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In 1945, GCHQ had excellent linguists, but few in the main emerging areas of Russian and Mandarin. National service overcame these weaknesses, enabling great days for linguists, and GCHQ. The services, aflush with money and able manpower, needed linguists as interpreters and intelligence officers, especially for sigint. They handled that work for GCHQ, without need for its direct involvement. Whitehall underwrote the greatest Chinese and Russian area studies schools in Britain which, focused on the highest end of studies, aided talent spotting. In 1963, the professors of Chinese languages at Oxford and Cambridge both were ex-siginters. The services also created excellent language schools, for training at all levels from elementary to advanced, against the tongues of the targets of the Cold War.23 After 1959, however, the end of national service eliminated manpower, and funding, for linguists. Thus, GCHQ established a central, independent and inexpensive position in government policy and resources for languages. The main source for translators were the universities, augmented by service schools. GCHQ, like the services, usually sidestepped special programmes organised by the universities, because of cost, but happily hired normal graduates. GCHQ improved the working of the service schools, and of languages in sigint. A new ‘Linguist Specialist’ class, fusing area and language studies, for ‘specialisation in the recovery of knowledge from cryptic material in foreign languages’, created intelligence analysts and culturally aware translators. Applicants were told that, initially, they would work within a team, but as they rose were ‘likely to assume increasing responsibility for the administration and the technical direction of the work’. They required linguistic ability of a high order. Candidates should be interested in the everyday use of language rather than in literature, and they should possess or be capable of acquiring a thorough knowledge of one or more modern foreign languages both written and spoken…the Commissioners will look for evidence of capacity to learn difficult languages. Versatility, breadth of interest, and an analytical approach are important qualities.24 Voice traffic became a fundamental target after 1945, and its interception posed particular problems of supply and demand. In 1956, GCHQ told the CSC that over the next three years, it must hire about 25 people with a near-perfect knowledge of certain foreign languages. The ability must include a thorough grasp of the present-day colloquial languages and an ability to reconstruct conversations which might be conducted at high speed, imperfectly heard, and containing specialized jargon. Most of these recruits would be needed for Russian, though a few would be required for other East European ­languages, and for Arabic. CSC replied that ‘even if modern language graduates of sufficient linguistic proficiency could be found, they were unlikely to find the type or work or the career prospects of the post attractive’. CSC suggested that GCHQ look to existing ‘bi-lingual candidates’, and concluded that it ‘may decide that they do not really want such a high degree of proficiency for what one suspects may be menial linguistic work’.25 Later, service schools and a leading member of GCHQ, and Chinese scholar, Arthur Cooper, concluded that specialised training could produce competent voice operators between twelve and forty-four weeks. GCHQ found voice linguists from three sources. Graduates from universities or service schools handled the most sensitive and important messages. Non-academic bi-lingual sources, deemed politically trustworthy, such as east European refugees or Hong Kong Chinese, working in 115

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segregated units, addressed less secret but linguistically complicated material. Training lower grade personnel in twelve to fourteen-week courses sidestepped financial limitations, simplifying GCHQ’s search for expensive applicants, and also its training needs.

Conclusion Between 1914 and 1992, academics were fundamental to developing new forms of signals intelligence during wartime, especially in the most taxing areas, cryptanalysis and data processing. Generally, however, relationships between British signals intelligence and universities were distant and sporadic. As research institutes, and sources of ideas, universities were tertiary in importance to GCHQ, mattering much less than those in the United States with the National Security Agency. GCHQ’s main partners were private firms or government research agencies. Links between GCHQ and universities were thin, outside of what were narrow areas before 1992, mathematics and computing science. Universities featured most as a source of educated personnel, but until 1992, GCHQ had few graduates. GCHQ had definite, but limited, needs, for people of great intelligence, with rare professional skills. In wartime, signals intelligence acquired such people, because its needs were a high priority, and civilians with such skills cooperated happily. In peacetime, finances constrained GCHQ’s employment of graduates, which it countered by using non-graduates well. That situation changed from 1980, as the rates of university graduates rose in Britain, increasing their supply for GCHQ, and perhaps absorbing school leavers who otherwise might have risen from the ranks. Today, GCHQ’s relationships with the universities are unlike what they were in 1992, just as with British society as a whole.

Notes 1 John Ferris, ‘Before Room 40: The British Empire and Signals Intelligence, 1989–1914’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 12/4, December 1989, pp. 431–457. 2 Patrick Beesley, Room 40: British Naval Intelligence, 1914–1918 (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1982). 3 James Bruce, ‘“A Shadowy Entity”: M.I.1.b. and British Communications Intelligence, 1914–1922’, Intelligence and National Security, 32/3, 2017, pp. 313–332. 4 John Ferris (ed.), The British Army and Signals Intelligence during The First World War (Army Record Society, Stroud, 1992). 5 Ferris, J.R., ‘Reading the World’s Mail: British Censorship, Communications Intelligence and Economic Warfare, 1914–1919’, in John Ferris (ed.) Issues in British and American Signals Intelligence, 1919–1932, United States Cryptologic History, X/X (Fort George G. Meade, MD: The National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, 2015, pp. 1–21). 6 John Ferris, ‘The War Trade Intelligence Department and British Economic Warfare during the First World War’, in Thomas Otte (ed.), British World Policy and the Projection of Global Power, c. 1830–1960 (CUP, forthcoming, 2019). 7 Stephen McKenna, While I Remember (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1921, pp. 163–165). 8 Meeting at Trade Clearing House, 11.3.16, ADM 137/2735. 9 Denniston to Creswell, 7.7.38, HW 72/9. 10 Denniston to Wilson, 16.5.38, HW 72/9. 11 Denniston to Guy, 25.2.38, FW 72/9. 12 Memorandum by GC&CS, undated, circa July 1923, AIR 2/246; Denniston to Sinclair, 21.10.38, HW 3/1. 13 Joel Greenberg, Alastair Denniston: Codebreaking from Room 40 to Berkeley Street and the Origins of GCHQ (Frontline Books, 2017), is the best account of Denniston’s career. 14 Denniston to Wilson, 3.9.39, FO 366/1059. 15 The literature on Bletchley is overwhelming, and there is no adequate single studies. Useful works include Christopher Grey, Decoding Organisation: Bletchley Park, Codebreaking and Organisation

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16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Studies (Cambridge: CUP, XX); F.H. Hinsley and Stripp, Alan (eds.), Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park (Oxford: OUP). CSC 2.9.49, ‘Recruitment under Normal Regulations to the Government Communication Headquarters (Department of the Foreign Office)’, Open Competition, 1950, CSC 6/55; CSC 9/65, ‘Recruitment to the ‘A’ Class and to the Departmental Specialist Class in Government Communication Headquarters (A Department of the Foreign Office)’, CSC 6/70. Rendle to Gedd, 5.6.63, CSC 5/1843. ‘Professor Robert Churchhouse: 1927–2018’, https://www.trinhall.cam.ac.uk/alumni/keep-in-touch/ obituaries/robert-churchhouse/. ‘Professor Robert Churchhouse: 1927–2018’, https://www.trinhall.cam.ac.uk/alumni/keep-in-touch/ obituaries/robert-churchhouse/. Christopher Smith, ‘Bletchley Park and the Development of the Rockex Cipher Systems: Building a Technocratic Culture’, War in History, 24/2, 2017, pp. 176–194. 2.72, GCHQ, ‘Graduate Electrical Engineers, CSC 6/77. Hilary Footit, ‘Another missing dimension? Foreign Languages in World War II Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 25/92, 2010, pp. 271–289. Tony Cash, The Coder Special Archive (Kingston upon Thames: Hodgon Press, September 2012); Reginald Hunt, Mandarin Blue, RAF Chinese Linguists in the Cold War, 1951–1962 (Oxford: Hurusco Books, 2008). CSC, 5.68, ‘Government Communication Headquarters (A Department of the Foreign Office). Language Specialist Class’, CSC 6/73. ‘Note of a Meeting held on 25th January, 1956, at the Civil Service Commission’, Minute by EJD Warne, CSC, to Mayes, 6/2/56, CSC 5/1105.

References Beesley, P. (1982) Room 40: British Naval Intelligence, 1914–1918. London: Hamish Hamilton. Bruce, J. (2017) ‘A Shadowy Entity’: M.I.1.b. and British Communications Intelligence, 1914–1922’, Intelligence and National Security, 32 (3): 313–332. Ferris, J. (1989) Before Room 40: The British Empire and Signals Intelligence, 1989–1914. The Journal of Strategic Studies, 12 (4): 431–457. Ferris, J. (ed.) (1992) The British Army and Signals Intelligence during The First World War. Stroud: Army Record Society. Ferris, J.R. (2015) Reading the World’s Mail: British Censorship, Communications Intelligence and Economic Warfare, 1914–1919. In Ferris, J. (ed.) Issues in British and American Signals Intelligence, 1919–1932, United States Cryptologic History, X/X. Fort George G. Meade, MD: The National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, pp. 1–21. Ferris, J. (2019, forthcoming) The War Trade Intelligence Department and British Economic Warfare during the First World War. In Otte, T. (ed.), British World Policy and the Projection of Global Power, c. 1830–1960. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Greenberg, J. (2017) Alastair Denniston: Codebreaking from Room 40 to Berkeley Street and the Origins of GCHQ. London: Frontline Books. Grey, C. (2012) Decoding Organisation: Bletchley Park, Codebreaking and Organisation Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hinsley, F.H. and Stripp, A. (eds.) Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McKenna, S. (1921) While I Remember. London: Thornton Butterworth, pp. 163–165. Smith, C. (2017) Bletchley Park and the Development of the Rockex Cipher Systems: Building a Technocratic Culture. War in History, 24 (2): 176–194.

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5 DATAFICATION AND UNIVERSITIES The convergence of spies, scholars and science Richard J. Aldrich and Melina J. Dobson Introduction In his widely read book Homo Deus, Yuval Noah Harari predicts the radical transformation of human society by digital technology (2016). Harari explores ‘dataism’ or ‘datafication’, a viewpoint that suggests data-flows are the fundamental building blocks of the universe. Dataism attaches equal or possibly even higher value to conclusions gained from data-flow than from human experience, since it is free from bias and offers advanced opportunities for data analysis. Dataism might even be categorised as a ‘new religion’, which considers the world, indeed the universe as simply a cosmic data-processing system. Dataists argue that datafication is the natural development of humankind – but will eventually supersede it. They add that this is because algorithms breach the divide between machines and living creatures. All biological forms produce data, and although Harari notes that not all output is of the same value – as human beings, we are much more adept at producing, inputting and sharing data. Dataists suggest that the final and lasting contribution of humankind will be the ‘Internet of All Things’ that will connect everything to everything, permitting the perfect sharing of information. Harari adds, almost as an aside, that this will require a necessary detachment from the confines of both privacy and secrecy. The data-flow becomes the invisible hand that guides decision-making from the everyday answering of emails to the big life decisions like getting married or moving house. The tariff is that you are required to freely share your own data with the global system of data-flow (Harari 2016, 449). Perhaps we are already seeing the first signs of this with groups like WikiLeaks promoting this idea of information freedom to an extreme degree (Fenster 2011). Harari’s predictions about an exponential increase in data, global data-flow and indeed AI are radical and perhaps deliberately designed to be provocative. However, he is not alone in predicting radical implications for the future, in which the amount of data and its analysis will alter patterns of decision-making and authority. The abundance of information continues to grow exponentially and as human beings, we are fast becoming overwhelmed by the amount of incoming information we receive daily. Harari states, ‘In ancient times having power meant having access to data. Today having power means knowing what to ignore’ (Harari 2016, 462). Algorithms, he argues, have the power to help us with this plight, and therefore he depicts the shift from a homo-centric to a data-centric life. 118

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The merger of intelligence and information What does this mean for intelligence? In the middle of the twenty-first century, we may well cease to refer to ‘secret intelligence’. Or at least if we do refer to it, the phrase will be used in a historical context to conjure up a world of espionage located in past centuries, characterised by stylish fedoras, secret ink and security panics about enemy carrier pigeons. Even now, in what Joshua Rovner has called the ‘Twitter Age’, the very idea of intelligence is merging with information and research. Not only are the walls between HUMINT, OPINT, SIGINT and new ‘INTs’ like SOCMINT collapsing, but many of these things are also merging with a wider world of ‘Big Data’. These contextual changes are driven not so much by the intelligence agencies but by the research wings of corporations and by adventurous academic projects in universities (Rovner 2013). How have these changes come about? Some might argue that despite much excited talk about ‘cyber’ and the Internet, little has changed and in fact, at its core, secret intelligence remains what it has always been – a special kind of information that constitutes the prelude to external policy-making (Warner 2002). Intelligence is still intended to help leaders avoid surprise and render decision-making more effective. Increasingly, intelligence services also engage in active efforts to shape the world as well as merely reporting about it, and while they now use cyber as well as real-world techniques, this covert action element has always been present. Indeed, as Christopher Andrew has recently demonstrated in his magisterial analysis of the secret world in past centuries, all these things seem to be a constant element of statecraft over millennia (Andrew 2018). However, since the end of the Cold War, the targets of intelligence have changed significantly. For much of the last century, the main threats were the innovative military developments of states which, by achieving remarkable ability to project force over long distances, presented decision-makers with the spectre of surprise attack. Typically, in the decades following the Second World War, vast resources were poured into gathering intelligence on nuclear strategic capabilities (Goodman 2007; Richelson 2006; Roman 1995). Alongside these concerns were efforts to attack the diplomatic and commercial communications traffic of ambassadors and emissaries involved in summits and negotiations, typically Versailles in 1919 or Maastricht in 1992, to secure positional advantage. The ability to read the traffic of states like Libya in the 1980s added greatly to the understanding of terrorism. Nevertheless, the unifying factor here was that this activity remained rooted in the world of states as both subject and object (Larsen 2010). Throughout the twentieth century, this matrix was slowly changing. Two sets of political and social theorists, ironically taking opposing positions, helped to trigger wide social and economic processes that began the move away towards a new intelligence focus on people rather than states. First, individuals like Lenin and Mao, later figures like Guevara, ­Guzman and Marighella, popularised a range of ideas about ‘Peoples War’. These ideas began a gravitational shift away from conventional forces and gradually accelerated a trend towards low intensity conflict, embracing guerrilla warfare, subversion, propaganda, insurgency and terrorism. This development has many causes – and perhaps had to do as much with the ­European retreat from empires and the rise of anti-colonial nationalism – as revolutionary politics. Nevertheless, even by the 1970s, the growing importance of a kaleidoscopic array of violent non-state actors was undeniable. Security agencies became more interested in militant but elusive individuals, often moving rapidly from one jurisdiction to another (Bunker 1999). Partly as a reaction to the ideas of socialism, at the other end of the spectrum, the ­t wentieth century produced proponents of neo-liberal capitalism like Hayek and Friedman. Their 119

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ideas did not find widespread political support until the 1980s, but when they did, the result was deregulation and a much more porous international system in which people, communications, ideas and above all money could move around the world almost without restriction ( Jones 2014). In its wake came an acceleration of global organised crime. Riding the wave of neo-liberal deregulation was an unprecedented rise in narcotics, the black economy and corruption which, in many cases, threatens to absorb entire governments. This, in turn, has also been a major contributor to ‘New Wars’, widely understood to be the rise of intra-state conflict and a blurring of conflict and organised crime, especially across the Global South (Duffield 2014; Kaldor 2013). These two major security trends, ironically underpinned by ideas from opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, had one important outcome for security agencies – they refocused the attention of intelligence agencies on violent non-state actors and troublesome people who were often remarkably mobile and elusive. In 2009, RAND spelled this out in a report commissioned by the US Department of Defense. Humans, they noted, were the natural terrain of the humanities. These subjects were entering a new era because of the ‘securitization’ of public life, which, in turn, encouraged government to harness academia for new purposes. They explained that the Pentagon was now less focused on the ‘physics of precision weapons’ and more concerned by the problems of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, which were areas that could be attacked using ‘social science’ precisely because they ‘involve people’. This opened the door to the re-purposing of many disciplines from medicine and anthropology to geography and sociology. In some disciplines, notably anthropology, this shift has been controversial (Davis and Cragin 2009). Other changes that we might broadly associate with a shift from a manufacturing to a service-based economy, globalisation and more recently the rise of platform capitalism have rendered this trend more important. Secret services have always collected information on people, as the well-ordered files of MI5 gradually appearing in the UK National archives bear testimony (Smith 2012). However, we are now in an era when the organisations that have the most information on people are no longer the intelligence agencies. They are the banks, the hotels, train companies, the supermarkets and the Internet service providers (ISPs). This development reflects the fact that in many countries, large parts of the national infrastructure with which individuals interface are now in private hands. The most obvious examples are telecom and ISPs, which are increasingly compelled by law to work with governments as intelligence collectors. Moreover, the growing emphasis on state–private partnerships to protect national infrastructure ensures that businesses such as airlines and banks are not only collectors of intelligence, but also important consumers, since they also fear attack. Meanwhile, state intelligence and security agencies have turned to contracting out a surprising range of their activities. Approximately, a third of CIA employees are private contractors and so we can no longer claim that intelligence is a predominantly state-based activity (Shorrock 2008). Even individual human beings now create and also collect great deal of data. In reality, much of this is not consciously created by human beings, but instead is collected by autonomous devices connected to the Internet (Harari 2016, 447). This has been accelerated by a changing model of capitalism that places a greater emphasis on the collection, processing and ownership of data, and which has seen the emergence of what has been termed ‘platform capitalism’, enterprises that have limited physical infrastructure on the ground but ever more storage space in the cloud. IBM has estimated that 98% of the data that we now have in the world has been collected in the last three years. The term ‘Big Data’ is much discussed 120

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and debated, but these numbers offer us some sense of the paradigm shift. The challenge of analysing this ocean of data is considerable, but the rewards for succeeding are equally significant, both for corporations and for security agencies (Lyon 2014). An obvious by-product of datafication is vastly more data about individual humans. This information has been called the electronic exhaust fumes of our lives. Much of it never goes away since storage costs are decreasing and, in any case, electronic data is remarkably difficult to erase (Ausloos 2012; Mayer-Schönberger 2011). This material is of interest to security agencies who wish to access it and store it. One of the most controversial aspects of the Snowden revelations was the practice of accessing the data held by companies like ­Google and Microsoft. In July 2009, President Obama gave the NSA approval for a remarkable $2 billion facility at San Antonio near Utah that stores unimaginable quantities of data. This facility stretches to 1.5 million square feet and cost $4 billion including its computer hardware. Its electricity bill is said to be $40 million per year and it uses 1.7 million gallons of water per day (Lee 2013). Much of the material it stores is mundane, but the ambition of this project is breath-taking. By interrogating this information with increasingly sophisticated algorithms, it is hoped to know almost everything about almost anyone of interest, so long as analytical techniques can keep pace with the expanding pool of data. Datafication not only blurs the boundaries between intelligence and information, it also blurs the boundaries between surveillance, scholarship and science. Using vast pools of information to intensify surveillance by exploiting interconnected datasets and creating new analytical tools draws to a much greater degree on academic expertise. The Snowden revelations, while fascinating, have focused attention mostly on encryption and privacy, distracting us from a much wider process in which a wide range of academic disciplines have been deployed for the purposes of wider data analysis, ranging from risk-management in policing, or population control in counterinsurgency. To hone the cutting edge of some of these new weapons of intelligence, governments are increasingly turning to universities.

Spies, scholars and science Spies, scholars and science have long been bedfellows. In the nineteenth century, the spies of empire were quite often the geographers and archaeologists despatched from European capitals to map frontiers and sketch fortifications – what we think of as ‘real spies’ were in short supply (Satia 2008). Universities were especially important to the growth of the United States intelligence community because of Washington’s relative innocence in the realm of intelligence (Gearon and Parsons 2018, 78). At the outset of the Second World War, President Roosevelt lacked a central intelligence machine for producing national assessments. Washington was forced to raid the East Coast universities for intellectual talent to create analytical centres developed by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner of the CIA (Winks 1996). The professors also strayed out into the field. In 1943, Time Life’s famous news photographer, John Phillips, was sailing on a supply ship towards the Middle East theatre accompanied by three members of OSS who, he recalls, were ‘an archaeologist, a professor of ancient history, and a museum curator’ (Phillips 1996, 233). This association did not stop in 1945 and during the Vietnam era, despite the collapse of the Cold War consensus, thousands of academics were still working under contract for the CIA on various projects. However, this essay seeks to suggest that the fundamental role of academics in intelligence is now rather different to the world of 1942. In contrast to previous scholarly writing on universities and intelligence, it argues that because of the increased datafication of the 121

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world, and the datafication of people in particular, government is now turning to universities and scholars not only to provide the breakthroughs in intelligence but to expand the very meaning of intelligence. As a result, a wider range of academic disciplines are now being harnessed across the humanities. Moreover, because of the growing privatisation of intelligence, a ready market has grown up for accelerating this activity. Consultants, often recent employees of the security agencies, are combing the university science parks to add value to their enterprises. Three examples are offered here.

Medicine The CIA was busy exploiting medicine as early as the 1960s. In 1965, concerns about the health of President Sukarno of Indonesia contributed to an abortive coup attempt. Often described as medical MASINT, the CIA had gone to considerable lengths to obtain a urine sample. The Soviets had gone even further, diverting the plumbing from Blair House, the US Ambassador’s residence in Moscow, so that they could secure medical intelligence on visiting dignitaries (Clemente 2006). During the 1980s, the intelligence services used stories about medicine as part of their active measures programme. They spread a fabricated narrative about HIV being man-made in a military laboratory in the United States, spawning a long-lasting conspiracy theory ( Jeppsson 2017). But these were episodic oddities. Medical science is now a more mainstream contributor to security, marked by the fact that the Defence Intelligence Agency created a National Center for Medical Intelligence at Fort Detrick in 2008 (NCMI 2009). This went unnoticed until the killing of Osama Bin Laden which underlined the importance of MEDINT. A safe house was created close to the Abbottabad compound, the suspected location of Bin Laden. Here, they catalogued visits to the compound, and gathered DNA samples from Bin Laden’s family by running a fake vaccine drive. To try and confirm his presence in the compound, the CIA recruited a local doctor to start a purported hepatitis B vaccination campaign with the objective of obtaining samples from children living in the compound. Meanwhile, the National Geospatial Agency gathered imagery of the site as well as individual visitors. Metadata in the form of GIS certainly played a key role in this particular operation. This was overlaid with meteorological data in planning the assault (Cozine 2013, 84–87). However, when the nature of the fake vaccination campaign was revealed, it exacerbated pre-existing local suspicions that a range of aid and education programmes, including a UN-sponsored polio vaccination programme, were all a Western conspiracy. Remarkably, in the five years after the revelation of the CIA campaign, over sixty vaccinators were killed, largely at the hands of the Pakistani Taliban. It is hard to establish a direct causal link between news of the fake vaccination campaign and the subsequent deaths but local observers insist that this is the case (Bowsher et al. 2016; Ingram et al. 2011; Rubenstein 2015).

Social anthropology There is no place where academics have been more obviously lifted out of the lecture theatre and placed on the battlefield than the weaponising of anthropology during the two wars that were fought in Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11. Again, this is not new, since both the Second World War and the Vietnam War saw the widespread deployment of both anthropologists and area studies specialists in the intelligence and special forces 122

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roles (Berger 1995; Price 2008, 2016). But the new anthropology has sought to provide something different entitled ‘Human Terrain Mapping’. Seeking to draw tribes and factions away from the enemy, or simply to govern more effectively in particular provinces, commanders turned to human terrain mapping in order to exploit local divisions and differences. Attention to ethnicity has delivered dividends. Famously, in Iraq’s Anbar Province in 2008, close attention to local rivalries and tribal politics allowed the United States to persuade a number of groups to turn decisively against al Qaeda. Often delivered by private companies and contractors, the presence in the field of anthropology remains controversial within the academic associations that govern this intellectual space. This is partly because, to the insurgent, all anthropologists now look like government forces (González 2009; Rosen 2011). The most heavily debated example is the Human Terrain System (HTS). Developed in 2005 and deployed in 2007, this sought ‘integrate and apply socio-cultural knowledge of the indigenous civilian population to military operations in support of the commander’s objectives’. Its immediate focus was the expanding wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. By 2009, HTS consisted of about 500 people, with some 10% at the doctoral level with others holding postgraduate qualifications. Initially, the teams were assembled by private companies owned by BAE Systems and CACI International, but since 2010, they have been incorporated into the US intelligence system as government employees located mostly at TRADOC at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas (Albro 2010; González, 2008, 2012). In the field, HTS consisted of combined teams of military personnel, linguists, area studies specialists and civilian social scientists embedded with army in combat zones at the brigade level. Their job was to analyse field data and other information, as it became available, in support of military decision-makers at these higher levels. Their work included independent research projects, such as polling and focus groups. Some universities expressed enthusiasm for this new field. Typically, Georgia Tech helped to build a Subject Matter Expert Network to improve training and research. The HTS technology director Colonel Daniel Wolfe described this as ‘leveraging several national cultural academic institutions as well as recognized experts’ in cultural terrain (Lobban 2009). In addition to several official components, the HTS programme also appears to have spontaneously generated interest from other research groups, inside and outside of the military, which maintain an active focus upon the programme concept. One example is the Laboratory for Human Terrain at Dartmouth College, concerned with the application of computational modelling to the development of ‘human terrain technology’, which it describes as ‘an emerging area of study with significant national security and commercial applications’. Some laboratories may have jumped on the HTS bandwagon without an official connection to HTS. Such research groups indicate the extent to which ‘human terrain’ is a term that is expanding beyond HTS, the programme, as a frame of reference for the development of future research and military priorities. In December of 2008, the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association set up a commission to thoroughly review the HTS programme, so that they might then formulate an official position on member participation in such activities. They eventually concluded that HTS includes potentially irreconcilable goals which, in turn, had led to irreducible tensions with respect to the programme’s basic identity. These issues include HTS simultaneously fulfilling a research function as a data source, as a source of intelligence and as performing a tactical function in counterinsurgency warfare. HTS managers insisted that the programme was not an intelligence asset. However, reviewers discovered that the programme was housed within a DoD intelligence asset and that it had reportedly been briefed 123

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as such an asset. Moreover, they asserted that the programme had placed researchers and their counterparts in the field in harm’s way. Overall, they concluded, ‘it can no longer be considered a legitimate professional exercise of anthropology’ (Lobban et al. 2009)

Communications studies So much of the transformation of intelligence is about things that do not seem to be intelligence at all. This confirms the fact that the spectrum of methods, modes and places that can be used to collect and analyse intelligence is expanding daily. Ken Robertson once defined intelligence as ‘other people’s secrets stolen secretly’, a process wherein the value of the espionage is enhanced by the fact that the victim has lost their secrets. Bletchley Park and ‘Enigma’ offer the perfect example (Robertson 1987, 46). But how do we conceptualise intelligence that is derived from open material and available to everyone – such as a twitter feed? Some of the world’s most important intelligence commentators have defined the security data derived from social media as ‘SOCMINT’, a whole new area of intelligence that governments are excited about. Yet, this work looks curiously like the sort of behavioural social science that academics longed to conduct in the 1970s, and would have conducted, if only they had enjoyed access to enough data and enough computer power. Much of the pioneering work in this field has been conducted in locations like MIT and University of Maryland rather than at the CIA or NSA (Omand, Bartlett and Miller 2012). In fact, the landscape of social media is classic humanities ‘Big Data’ territory since it potentially confronts the researcher with vast sources of information and vast methodological challenges. Bridging academia and government are often the new data-processing companies. It has also spawned numerous private companies full of data analysts, fresh from university, providing everything from arrest dossiers to more targeted advertising. Those who claim that Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) is an important part of the growing family of INT’s insist that it offers unique possibilities. Because social media offers the opportunity to monitor the sentiments of large groups, even entire cities, it not only offers real-time intelligence but may even be able to predict future trends. SOCMINT deploys a large amount of data that can be accessed, stored or disseminated relatively easily at low cost and so is likely to be adopted almost universally, since the entry-level cost, even for developing countries, is relatively low. SOCMINT appears to be remarkably useful as a tool for mass sentiment analysis; sometimes, it looks rather like the sort of material we might find in a political science journal like Electoral Politics. It will likely help intelligence agencies and policymakers anticipate ­longer-term trends and strategic change, such as the Arab Spring movement. This conjures up the possibility of predicting known unknowns – how stable will Jordan be in a week’s time? Will there be another Tiananmen Square event in Beijing tomorrow? Even partial progress on this kind of prediction is the holy grail for national intelligence, since these were secrets that no amount of traditional spying could reveal. SOCMINT presents opportunities for the intelligence agencies but also challenges. In many countries around the world, SOCMINT may be open to abuse, allowing regimes to sidestep social protest. In Europe, the agencies may experience difficulty in attracting data scientists, who can start in the private sector, likely with higher wages and no year-long security background check. One of the core questions for them is whether the intelligence community is meeting its human capital needs in the area of data science, which are likely to be viewed as a national security priority. Universities are increasingly STEM factories for facilitating this new activity. Here again, we are likely to see the convergence of security policy and education policy (Landon-Muaary 2016). 124

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Ethics, education and the future of global surveillance Educators have always had qualms about their interaction with the realm of national security. The best-known debates have concerned nuclear weapons and the personal angst of scientists like Oppenheimer and Teller – these have not only been analysed at length by biographers of science but they have also been explored by Hollywood (Sassower 1997). In the 1960s, disputes over the direction of nuclear science prompted the development of entire new journals such as the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. A decade later, concerns about the deployment of social science during the war in Vietnam led the foundation of the now famous serial, the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. Today, Gearon and Parsons hold that there has been an increased movement from ­covert involvement of education establishments to overt engagement, creating further covert–overt collaborations. For examples, in the United States ties have openly been created through programmes such as the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) (Gearon 2017). This could be attributed, in part, to the increased debate over the need for accountability and transparency in government. There is an inherent dichotomy between the intelligence services need for secrecy and the academics sector’s desire to share knowledge. Thus, Gearon and Parsons identified four ‘academic ethical principles’, namely ‘standards’, ‘freedom’, ‘engagement’ and ‘conduct’ (Gearon and Parsons 2018). This paper builds on these arguments and argues that the progression of datafication and the Internet of Things will intensify these tensions and will also mean that significant secrecy will become an increasingly difficult issue for both the intelligence agencies and the University sector. Recently, the mathematician Phillip Rogaway has suggested that, because of ‘datafication’, academics stand on the brink of something that looks remarkably like a second atomic era, and that the place of scientists and scholars within it requires careful reconsideration. Rogaway has suggested that in a world in which everything is now datafied, an algorithm is not just an algorithm. In a path-breaking essay ‘the moral character of cryptographic work’, he has suggested that much of the research that mathematicians are now undertaking has alarming consequences for the overlapping worlds of society and security, and that many researchers are not giving these issues due weight. These ethical concerns are given even greater force by the growing awareness that algorithms and codes are being used not only to watch the world but also to surreptitiously change it and manipulate it, including interference in elections (Rogaway 2015). In June 2013, Edward Snowden leaked an unprecedented cache of highly classified ­m aterial that mostly concerned the activities of two intelligence agencies, the US National Security Agency and the UK Government Communications Headquarters. Arguably, the revelations of Edward Snowden went well beyond surveillance. They conjured up a world that could not only be watched but could also be hacked. Snowden also revealed the naivety of the intelligence services in the security that they implemented to safeguard their own secrets. In the twenty-first century, so much intelligence-gathering has involved accessing the back-doors to computers and operating systems. This in itself has led to charges that governments have deliberately weakened widely used security architectures and have even compromised batches of hardware in the quest for intelligence, but at the cost of resilience for both corporations and citizens. More alarming are the cyber-weapons of the kind used to attack Iran’s nuclear programme in 2009 that were allegedly developed by countries such as the USA, the UK and Israel, but which are now being widely copied. These are the new aspects of the intelligence business, but they are better described as electronic covert action. Rather like Frankenstein, the creators of these new weapons are not sure they can control 125

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them. Could a few rogue operators turn off all the power plants in Europe on the coldest day of the year? Governments have been reluctant to address this question, but the answer is probably ‘yes’ (Segal 2016). Even scientists who are not working for government, directly or indirectly, are arguably contributing to this alarming new world of digital insecurity. Over the next ten years, ­billions of devices will be connected to the Internet, the so-called ‘Internet of Things’. Scientists and universities are at the forefront of this effort and the principle argument for this connectivity is human convenience. In ten years’ time, almost everything we buy in shop that costs more than £20 will have an IP address and will send data back to its maker. This reflects a new economic model in which the data derived from the customer is often as valuable as the price they have paid for the product. But the majority of these products are cheap and have little in-built security. Once I have connected my vacuum cleaner to the Internet, who will provide its software update in five years’ time? Once I have connected my toaster to the Internet, who will maintain its operating system and firewall? The answer is, of course, no one. This is as much a political economy problem as a technical problem, since there is no provision for security in the cost of these cheap devices. These issues, which will have an impact on all of us, are being shaped in a liminal space between corporations, universities and their science parks much more than in national security bureaucracies. Should I care that no one is thinking about the cybersecurity of my new fridge? Perhaps I should. In 2017, London suffered a catastrophic fire in the Grenfell Tower block that killed some seventy-two people – a fire that is reportedly to have begun in a faulty refrigerator. Would it be possible to hack a refrigerator and cause it to catch fire? In other words, the Internet of Things sounds like fun, but is actually a polite term to describe a nightmare universe of malware in which everyday objects may be turned against us. Do scientists have some moral responsibly for this universe that they are busily helping to create? Do universities consider these macro issues when they review an ethics application from one of their academics or a new research contract with a multi-national? Almost certainly not. Gearon (2015) rightly suggests that as the spectrum of security threats grow so will the necessity for intelligence studies.

Conclusion The nature of intelligence has changed remarkably since the end of the Cold War. Superficially, this reflects the surge towards counterterrorism, but more fundamentally, it is symptomatic of the effects of globalisation, technology and ideas over a rather longer period which has meant a growing focus on people, especially transnational violent people. Intelligence against transnational people, whether they are engaged in terrorism, crime, ­people-trafficking or weapons proliferation, is harder than collecting intelligence against old-fashioned static nation-state targets like the Russian navy, since they are more elusive. Confronted with these problems, governments turned to unexpected places in an attempt to discover new kinds of intelligence and new techniques. The latest advances partly reflect the level of anxiety about terrorist threats after 9/11 since states now spend breath-taking amounts of money in this area, typically in collecting and storing metadata that can be combed retrospectively. However, this relationship is dynamic. These target individuals are deliberately elusive and respond to each new wave of security innovation. Over the last few years, we have seen the emergence of terrorists who operate as individuals or in small isolated cell with little communication or web access. This has prompted governments to work with the private sector and with universities to find yet more ingenious ways of drilling down 126

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into deeper society where miscreants are hiding. Where is this taking academics who work in fields like the digital humanities? Are academics fully aware of the applications or ultimate consequences of their work? Few people are asking. Universities will therefore have a critical role to play at the interface of artificial intelligence and the security agencies. The ethical implications of this new technology will present many future challenges. Control of data is no longer a human activity; instead, algorithms and programmes store information in a myriad of different ways as soon as information is entered to a device. To what extent can artificial intelligence be trusted to make a decision that benefits humankind? Legislation on ownership and security surrounding personal items is weak and easily breached, if it exists at all. This begs the question as to whose responsibility it is to provide ethical protection for individuals who blindly entrust their information to the plethora of devices and the ‘invisible hand of data-flow’ (Harari 2016). It has arguably created a binary dependency. The human being cannot cope with the influx of data and therefore they entrust more data to automated systems in order to alleviate the pressure. The system depends on the information in order to continue to evolve and make more informed choices. Academics are at the forefront of these questions, but only limited attention is being directed to the role of universities and educational institutions. ‘Big Data’ and indeed artificial intelligence are constantly flagged up as key research priorities for scholars in almost every discipline and on almost every continent. But what are the consequences of accelerated research in these areas for privacy and indeed human rights more generally? Oddly, privacy and civil liberties are policed in detail at the microcosmic level of everyday research, but at a meta-level, there is little debate about the wider consequences of much research. How far are scholars fuelling a drive towards anticipatory and pre-emptive systems? Universities have traditionally been bastions of liberal and humane values. As we move from an era of ‘Big Data’ towards an era of Artificial Intelligence, universities will need to take a front seat in the debate about what kind of society we will inhabit and what sort of surveillance is acceptable.

References Albro, Robert. (2010) ‘Anthropology and the military: AFRICOM, ‘culture’ and future of Human Terrain Analysis,’ Anthropology Today 26(1): 22–24. Andrew, C.M. (2018) The secret world: A history of intelligence (London: Penguin). Ausloos, Jef. (2012) ‘The ‘right to be forgotten’ – worth remembering?’, Computer Law and Security Review 28(2): 143–152. Berger, Mark T. (1995) Under northern eyes: Latin American studies and US hegemony in the Americas, 1898–1990 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press). Bowsher, G., C. Milner, and R. Sullivan. (2016) ‘Medical intelligence, security and global health: the foundations of a new health agenda.’ Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 109(7): 269–273. Bunker, Robert J. (1999) ‘Unconventional warfare philosophers.’ Small Wars & Insurgencies 10(3): 136–149. Clemente, Jonathan D. (2006) ‘CIA’s Medical and Psychological Analysis Center (MPAC) and the Health of foreign leaders.’ International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 19(3): 385–423. Cozine, Keith (2013) Teaching the intelligence process: The killing of Bin Laden as a case study. ­Journal of Strategic Security 6(5): 80–87. Davis, Paul K., and Kim Cragin, eds. (2009) Social science for counterterrorism: Putting the pieces together. RAND: National Defense Research Institute. Duffield, Mark (2014) Global governance and the new wars: the merging of development and security. London: Zed Books. Fenster, Mark (2012) ‘Disclosure’s effects: WikiLeaks and transparency’ Iowa Law Review 97(3): 753–807. Gearon, L. (2015). ‘Education, security and intelligence studies’. British Journal of Educational Studies, 60(3): 263–279.

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Richard J. Aldrich and Melina J. Dobson Gearon, Liam F. (2017) ‘The counter-terrorist campus: Securitisation theory and university ­securitisation – Three Models’. Transformation in Higher Education. 2(13): 73–82. Gearon, Liam F., and Scott Parsons (2018) ‘Research Ethics in the Securitised University’. Journal of Academic Ethics. 17(1): 73–93. González, Roberto J. (2008) ‘Human terrain’ past, present and future applications.’ Anthropology Today 24(1): 21–26. González, Roberto J. (2009) ‘Going ‘tribal’: Notes on pacification in the 21st century. Anthropology Today 25(2): 15–19. González, Roberto J. (2012) ‘Anthropology and the covert: Methodological notes on researching military and intelligence programmes’, . Anthropology Today, 28(2): 21–25. Goodman, M.S. (2007) Spying on the nuclear bear (Stanford: Stanford University Press). Harari, Y.N. (2016) Homo Deus: A brief history of tomorrow. (London: Random House). Ingram, Alan, Maria Kett, and Simon Rushton. (2011) ‘Spies, vaccines and violence: Fake health campaigns and the neutrality of health’. Medicine, Conflict and Survival 27(2): 73–76. Jeppsson, Anders (2017) ‘How East Germany fabricated the myth of HIV being man-made.’ Journal of the International Association of Providers of AIDS Care ( JIAPAC) 16(6): 519–522. Jones, Daniel Stedman (2014) Masters of the universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the birth of neoliberal politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kaldor, Mary (2013) New and old wars: Organised violence in a global era. London: John Wiley. Landon-Murray, Michael (2016) ‘Big data and intelligence: Applications, human capital, and education.’ Journal of Strategic Security 9(2): 92–121. Larsen, Daniel (2010) ‘British intelligence and the 1916 mediation mission of Colonel Edward M. House.’ Intelligence and National Security 25(5): 682–704. Lee, Newton (2013) Counterterrorism and cybersecurity: Total information awareness (New York: Springer New York). Lobban, Kerry Fosher, et al. (2009) ‘AAA Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC) Final Report on The Army’s Human Terrain System Proof of Concept Program’. http://www.policyscience.net/CEAUSSIC_HTS_­ Final_Report.pdf accessed 11/12/18. Lyon, David (2014) ‘Surveillance, Snowden, and big data: Capacities, consequences, critique.’ Big Data & Society 1(2): 1–13. Mayer-Schönberger, Victor (2011) Delete: The virtue of forgetting in the digital age. (Princeton: Princeton University Press). NCMI (2009). DoD Instruction 6420.01, “National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI)”, March 20, 2009, http://ftp.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/i6420_01.pdf. Omand, D., J. Bartlett, and C. Miller (2012) ‘Introducing social media intelligence (SOCMINT).’ Intelligence and National Security 27(6): 801–823. Phillips, John (1996) Free spirit in a troubled world (New York: Scalo). Price, David H. (2008) Anthropological intelligence: The deployment and neglect of American anthropology in the Second World War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press). Price, David H. (2016) Cold War anthropology: The CIA, the Pentagon and the growth of dual use anthropology (Durham, NC: Duke University Press). Richelson, J.T. (2006) Spying on the bomb (New York: Norton). Robertson, K.G. (1987) ‘Intelligence, terrorism and civil liberties’. Conflict Quarterly 7(2): 43–62. Rogaway, Phillip (2015) ‘The moral character of cryptographic work’. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, December: 1162, available at: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b955/100d69e4a00f5913295b20f4ffe239652a61.pdf ?_ga=2.109112321.564871643.1552320704-1817391296.1552320704 (accessed 11 March 2019). Roman, P.J. (1995) Eisenhower and the missile gap (New York: Cornell University Press). Rosen, Lawrence (2011) ‘Anthropological assumptions and the Afghan War’. Anthropological Quarterly 84(2): 535–558. Rovner, Joshua (2013) ‘Intelligence in the Twitter age’. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 26(2): 260–271. Rubenstein, Leonard S. (2015) ‘Global health and security in the age of counterterrorism.’ Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 108(2): 49–52. Sassower, Raphael (1997) Technoscientific Angst: Ethics and responsibility (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press).

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6 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND THE ACADEMY IN CANADA Angela Gendron

Introduction Many states have come to regard the expertise and research of the higher education sector, as an invaluable resource in addressing the pressing global issues that confront them, especially when these are beyond a single country’s capacity to resolve. Given the educative function of academe and its potential for enhancing the knowledge and understanding of the Intelligence Community (IC) as well as its contribution to informed and factual public discussions of intelligence and security issues, it is perhaps surprising that the relationship between the two in Canada is not closer. This chapter probes the contributory factors which have shaped the relationship between ‘spies and scholars’ and looks ahead to possible future developments.

A culture of intelligence A nation’s institutions are shaped by its culture, political history and environment. It would therefore be surprising if the relationship between Intelligence and the Academy in Canada did not differ from that in other countries, even those with similar interests and values. A preference once expressed by the Canadian military for ‘information that is impartial, trustworthy and overt’ aptly captured the intelligence antipathy which long permeated the national culture. As a peaceable, middle power with no territorial ambitions, except perhaps to preserve its legacy claims in Northern and Arctic regions, Canada’s long held perception was that it was neither a threat to others nor a potential target for external attacks itself. Public understanding of Intelligence as a function of the state in Canada ‘has been historically very low’ (Lefebvre, 2009). Until recently, the same could have been said of those public servants and ministers not directly engaged in the intelligence effort. Blithe ignorance, indifference, suspicion and aversion have long characterised Canadian public perceptions of Intelligence, which, in the absence of broad public discussions and official Intelligence histories, have been shaped by the legacy and language of Cold War scandals and failures (Brunatti, 2018). 130

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Parties to the intelligence-academy relationship Intelligence The term ‘Intelligence’ is used here to refer to state agencies in Western democracies that engage in activities to acquire, analyse and assess secret and open-source information in order to give national political leadership a decision-advantage (Sims, 1995). This definition of Intelligence is primarily relevant to national level government-sponsored intelligence activities. In the United States and Canada, ‘intelligence’ is generally held to be any information, secret and open source, that is passed to government and on which it may act, as opposed to the UK where it refers to secret information, that is, information acquired against the wishes and generally against the knowledge of the originators or possessors (UK Government: MI5). Intelligence services in democratic societies aim to “acquire, interpret, and share privileged information” in order to meet national security needs, but in doing so, they also seek to be recognised as legitimate and credible organisations “shouldering an important responsibility for the public good” (CSIS Academic Outreach Programme, 2008). The public’s expectation that they will act in a way that protects citizens’ rights and freedoms means that Intelligence must pay regard to maintaining trust. Canada has three dedicated Intelligence organisations which work alongside ­operations-driven organisations that are both consumers and producers of intelligence such as border security and law enforcement including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and other specialised units within federal government departments. The ­Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is a civilian, domestic security intelligence agency charged with investigating, analysing and advising government departments and agencies on activities suspected of constituting threats to national security; the Communications ­Security Establishment (CSE) collects signals intelligence, while defence intelligence comes under the Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces. These intelligence capabilities are significantly augmented by allies and partners under various international arrangements. Canada is unique in not having a dedicated foreign intelligence service comparable to those of its closest allies. The 1984 Act of Parliament which established CSIS provided for an extended mandate which allowed it to gather human intelligence both at home and abroad to prevent threats to national interests. For a long time, however, its focus was on domestic threats and national security intelligence. This changed with the emergence of the global terrorist threat environment and the blurring of domestic and foreign intelligence boundaries. Canada accepted the need to look beyond its borders to safeguard both its own security and interests and those of its allies. Intelligence has traditionally been seen as a state-centric activity, given its statutory ­monopoly over the collection, processing and sharing of secrets that inform strategic decisions regarding relations with other nation states, national security and military aims. However, it is recognised that Intelligence now also includes operations-driven organisations concerned with the threats posed by both nationals and foreign persons. This wider IC is concerned more with the operational and tactical intelligence required to protect the security and rights of citizens although it also feeds into decision-making at the strategic level. Furthermore, while ‘secrets’ still remain at the core of what is considered to be the most valuable intelligence, the relative importance and accessibility of open-source information over the last two decades has prompted a global growth in the number of private, independent, non-state organisations engaged in the ‘business of intelligence’ as more broadly defined. 131

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In Canada, as elsewhere, clandestine intelligence activities as an element of a state’s national security effort are politically sensitive and financially costly. Where possible, exploiting open sources of information rather than using covert means is economically advantageous and the preferred option in a country which has traditionally been less focused on strategic intelligence than some of its closest allies. From the 1990s onwards, in line with government policy, CSIS expanded its collection of open-source information and engaged in information-sharing and partnerships with academe and other non-government and private sector entities in order to combat threats more efficiently and effectively. The purpose of its investigations had not changed, but the globalisation of threats, new technologies and the imperatives of counterterrorism had necessitated changes in the way it collected information outside Canada to enhance the timeliness of its finished assessments.

The academy The ‘Academy’ is used here to refer to those national and international scholars and higher education institutions in Canada and elsewhere that have dedicated departments of intelligence studies or offer modules on intelligence-related subjects as part of a core discipline such as international relations, history or political science, either at the undergraduate or post-graduate level. During the Cold War era, a few universities in the USA, UK, Canada, Germany and Israel offered individual courses on intelligence studies topics but for the most part, these concentrated on intelligence history. The prevailing aura of secrecy which attached to Intelligence meant that most academic programmes in international affairs, political science and even conflict studies made no reference at all to intelligence topics, causing British scholar Christopher Andrew to describe intelligence as the ‘missing dimension’ of international studies (Andrew and Dilke, 1984). That is changing. Scholars argue that it is precisely because intelligence has become such an important input into policymaking that it should be better understood by all students of politics, governance and international affairs as well as the public more generally (Goodman, King and Szaba, 1994). Not only are national Intelligence communities now more open to outsiders’ expertise, for example, academe and business (Treverton, 2001), but there is increasing recognition that the practices, training and career paths of government analysts need to improve. Dedicated university departments in the USA offer specialised degrees in intelligence studies at the undergraduate level, predominantly intended for students aiming to become Intelligence professionals. There is a variety of provision for intelligence training and education in the university sector as well as changes in analytic practices within the US IC. Other countries too have been acknowledging the need for expanded provisions: From 2013, Norway has offered an undergraduate degree to those working in the IC – an addition to its long-standing post-graduate studies programme; Germany is introducing a new twoyear multidisciplinary MA/MSc degree programme in Intelligence and Security Studies and similar initiatives are underway in France – all of which to a lesser or greater degree involve collaboration between academe and Intelligence. In the UK, following recommendations made in the Butler Report (Butler, 2004), the Cabinet Office collaborated with King’s College London to launch an innovative programme in 2006 which brings together analysts from across the British IC, including law enforcement. MA credits are awarded under the Erasmus scheme (Goodman and Omand, 2008, pp. 39–50). 132

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Canadian universities have been slow to respond: The impetus for change has been stymied by Budgetary and jurisdictional factors as well as lack of leadership. There is, for example, no equivalent to the federally chartered National Intelligence University in the USA that offers undergraduate and graduate studies in subjects relevant to intelligence professionals. Although the Royal Military College is a federally funded institution offering graduate degrees in defence and security studies, it is open only to military personnel. Otherwise, education in Canada comes under Provincial jurisdiction. Traditional academic intelligence studies programmes in Canada aim to comprehensively examine the historical, institutional, functional and political aspects of Intelligence as well as topical issues concerning the ethics of intelligence and developments in analytic techniques. There are no dedicated intelligence studies departments in Canadian universities: Typically, topics are covered within mainstream disciplines at the undergraduate level, while one or two universities offer an intelligence studies stream as part of a post-graduate degree in International Affairs. These programmes do not primarily aim to equip students for a career in Intelligence organisations just as those organisations make no requirement for entry-level analysts to have a degree with an intelligence studies component. The aura of secrecy that still surrounds Intelligence not only causes members of the public to wonder how intelligence can be a subject for academic study but seems to weigh heavily with university authorities who have little enthusiasm for enhancing the status of a field of study which is historically secretive, politically sensitive and policy driven. Too often, intelligence studies are regarded as controversial and risky. Canadian scholars therefore continue to struggle to win recognition for what is a legitimate, uniquely interdisciplinary and important academic field even as a subset of the more universally acceptable fields of security and conflict studies.

The basis of a relationship The readiness to assume that there is or should be a relationship between Intelligence and the Academy derives from a shared intellectual activity – collection and analysis of information. This is a core function of all Intelligence agencies whatever other differences there might be (Stout and Warner, 2018). Even if Intelligence services (which work for national governments) and scholars (who prize the independence of their research and teaching) undertake these “truth-seeking” activities for different purposes, it is likely to be central to any relationship in which they work together for the national good. Generally speaking, the ­relationship between the two in Canada has not been close, notwithstanding specific instances where co-operative relationships have been beneficial to the national interest. Typically, there will be no individual or institutional support for any intellectual endeavour that aims to bring about a closer relationship unless each party believes that the effort will meet either its practical or existential needs – calculations of which are affected by institutional practices and strategic policies resulting from shifts in the threat environment. Opportunities to co-operate can therefore be few and fleeting but will always depend on mutual respect and trust. Only well-established and trusted scholars are likely to be accorded the security clearances necessary to work with Intelligence and gain access to privileged information (as opposed to teaching intelligence studies) but some academics reject any close association with Intelligence for fear that it would taint the purity and objectivity of their work and constrain their academic freedom. Practitioners, for their part, often dismiss the research and products of intelligence scholars as too conceptual, theoretical and poorly tuned to the practical and policy needs of decision-makers. 133

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In seeking a closer relationship with Intelligence, the Academy expects easier access to an enhanced flow of privileged information which would have both practical benefits and serve its longer-term capacity-building aims. The most immediate of these would be support for more empirically based research and increased opportunities to contribute to Intelligence products. Beyond that, a closer relationship that confirmed the importance and relevance of intelligence studies to the IC community might be expected to raise the status of intelligence studies in the eyes of university authorities, governments and research funding bodies, thereby improving the prospects for more and better resourced programmes and tenured positions for scholars. For Intelligence, the primary purpose of a closer relationship with the Academy is to fill gaps in its immediate and longer-term information needs. However, engaging more closely also provides opportunities for Intelligence analysts and operatives to benefit from the deep knowledge, objectivity and scholarship that reside in university departments which can contribute to an understanding of complex events, shrouded intentions, geographic particularities and other ‘mysteries.’ A closer relationship provides opportunities for Intelligence to communicate to specialist academics an interest in specific, policy-tailored research topics as well as to inject a ‘practitioner’ perspective to intelligence studies programmes, thereby helping to inform and educate students who might become the Intelligence analysts of the future. More fundamental to the legitimacy and credibility of Intelligence is that lasting benefits accrue to the wider IC when the Academy is sufficiently engaged and resourced to provide informed and factual public discourse on the legal and ethical framework within which Intelligence works, so that it can provide a balanced view to counter the suspicion and conspiracy theories which so often percolate in the public arena and parts of the media.

The conceptualisation of intelligence studies There is a tension within the Academy about the purpose of intelligence studies. This not only has a bearing on the relationship with Intelligence, it also complicates much of the argument about intelligence studies and its place as a properly recognised field of learning. Is the purpose to be ‘an academic complement to the practice of national security i­ntelligence’ (Marrin, 2014, p. 1) concerned with improving the professional skills of intelligence practitioners and students who aspire to become so? Or should it be about what Intelligence does? Although the debate pits training versus education, practitioners need both. However, while it used to be the case that Intelligence provided training to its practitioners and the Academy provided an intelligence education, scholars are now increasingly involved in both. The ‘vocational’ or skills-based approach, which is well-established in the USA, gained momentum following a number of intelligence failures that were attributed to poor analysis. The aim was to hone the cognitive skills of Intelligence analysts and provide training in methodologies and analytic techniques to improve deficient performance caused, in the opinion of some scholars and practitioners, by the lack of a proper background in social ­science methods and models for testing data and assumptions (Bowman-Miller, 2014–2015). In an attempt to demonstrate greater relevance to the immediate needs of Intelligence, as well as attract students on grounds that such skills enhance their job prospects, U.S. scholars began placing more emphasis on including skills-based training in their programmes. The traditional interdisciplinary Canadian approach to intelligence studies focuses on the educative aspects, which aim to impart a deep knowledge and understanding of the real drivers of human affairs by building on mainstream disciplines such as history, political science and international affairs. Providing critical comment on the ‘business of intelligence’ 134

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requires academics to have an insightful, balanced approach which takes account of both the needs of Intelligence in terms of operational effectiveness, legitimacy and credibility, and the preservation of democratic values and human rights. Research undertaken by intelligence studies scholars in democratic political systems aims to advance knowledge for teaching purposes and the public good. It is based on information that is in large part open though sometimes difficult to obtain. This ‘public good’ aspect is critical in democratic societies where support for Intelligence depends upon the trust of those on whose behalf Intelligence powers are exercised. Trust depends on knowledge and understanding and to that end, it has been suggested that the academic study of intelligence should be seen as a ‘space between public opinion and the practice of intelligence, able to give objective, research-led insights into what [Intelligence] does, and whether it does so well, and lawfully’ (Glees, 2015). Canadians scholars are particularly concerned about legitimacy and the review mechanisms which govern their Intelligence organisations. Proposals to enhance the vocational content of intelligence studies programmes in C ­ anada have met with resistance from the IC as well as the Academy itself. The IC viewed such initiatives as an encroachment on its departmental training function: If vocational skills needed improving, this was best done in the workplace or in specialised training units attuned to organisational context and internal procedures. The Canadian Association of Professional Intelligence Analysts (CAPIA) provides a platform for serving Canadian intelligence analysts to pursue advanced training, continuing education and professional development (Lefebrve and Littlewood, 2012). Neither the national Intelligence agencies nor the broader IC require entry-level analysts to have a degree with an intelligence studies component. Furthermore, they tend to assume that applicants have already acquired the necessary cognitive and analytic skills during their degree studies. University authorities too are unlikely to support a larger training component being already sceptical about intelligence studies as a proper academic discipline. While cognitive skills training would be considered suitable for professional development courses, these would not necessarily qualify for degree standing. A cross-governmental approach to the training and development of Canadian intelligence analysts has in the past been mooted and trialled without success, but the collaborative ­government-academic initiatives being implemented by Canada’s close allies, aimed at achieving consistency and inculcating professional standards, might well cause a future re-think within Canada which tends to emulate measures adopted in the UK, Australia and other ‘Five-Eyes’ partners.

The winds of change National security policy background The environment in which organisations operate dictates their strategies and shapes their institutions. The history of mutual suspicion and distrust that had long characterised relations between Intelligence and the Academy began to change as Cold War tensions receded and the emphasis shifted away from state-sponsored espionage to terrorism. From the 1990s onwards, the complexity and diversity of emerging global threats, coupled with the proliferation of open-source information and the rise of the networked society, altered power relations amongst governments, organisations, groups and individuals. Changes in the Intelligence environment required adaptive practices and policies if coherence was to be achieved between institutional and operational demands. The need to know culture that emphasised secrecy gradually gave way to one which ­ostensibly valued and encouraged more open information-sharing and partnerships in 135

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response to the changing security environment. Closer relations with academics, the private sector and other non-governmental entities were now being perceived as potential ­burden-sharing arrangements that could help Intelligence achieve its aims as well as the knowledge requirements of other government departments and agencies. The major catalyst for change was the terrorist attacks against the United States in ­September 2001. Counterterrorism became a top priority as pressure from the United States led to the introduction of Canada’s first anti-terrorism legislation (Bill C-36) which was enacted in December 2001. This provided explicit powers for the IC to disrupt and prevent terrorist activities. The Government of Canada was concerned not only with the security of Canadians but its obligation to ensure that Canada did not become a base from which various threat actors could launch attacks against allies and partners worldwide. Canada’s 2004 National Security Policy (GoC, 2004) provided a framework for federal departments and agencies to work together with provinces, territories, first-line responders, the private sector and others to address current and future threats. An Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) was established to which staff from across the federal security and IC were seconded. In the absence of a federal detailed implementation Action Plan, however, there were few substantive changes across government generally. However, as public sector funding for intelligence and security initiatives became more readily available, and, in line with government policy, CSIS adopted a strategy for the exploitation of scholarship and expert knowledge which for a time warmed the relationship between Intelligence and the Academy. Initiatives were relatively passive and infrequent. Academics were kept at arm’s length from CSIS’ core operations. As the decade wore on escalating global threats from religiously motivated militants and other extremists, and the pressure to track and prevent attacks, increasingly focused resources on current tactical intelligence issues. Budgets became tighter, individuals and institutions became more risk averse and inward looking, and cost/benefit calculations regarding the relationship changed. For Intelligence, the measure of effectiveness had been reduced to the operational dimension and the prevention of terrorist attacks rather than the maintenance and expansion of a broader analytic capability to cover both tactical and strategic issues. Generalist rather than specialist analysts were required to ‘hit the ground running’ and cover everything. The number of experts capable of analysing deep social and cultural phenomenon steadily diminished. In the Academy, intelligence research was also being undercut by the lack of resources, particularly for area studies and language skills which, in some quarters, were regarded as anachronistic to modern research; yet, the need for Intelligence analysts to possess language skills, regional and cultural knowledge and the technical skills to exploit big data, had never been greater. When funding relationships between Intelligence and the Academy dried up, the option of looking outwards was easier than embarking on a fundamental review of the IC’s internal structures, management and policies. The experience Canada had gained as a member of the Global Futures Forum (GFF) from 2002 onwards provided the inspiration for the establishment of the CSIS Global Outreach programme in 2008.

The impact on academe The effects of the 9/11 attacks on the Academy were momentous: They ‘catapulted intelligence and security matters to the forefront of international relations’ (Rudner, 2009, p. 113) and led academics in many Western countries to anticipate a significant expansion in intelligence studies programmes. This happened to a much lesser extent in Canada than in the other key members of the ‘Five-Eyes’ community (UK/USA Agreement, 1946). Academics 136

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responded as best they could, given how few they were, by contributing to informed and factual public discourse on intelligence and security issues. The universities’ inexplicable lack of progress in developing academic programmes dealing with intelligence and security studies was both a surprise and disappointment. While Intelligence provided non-pecuniary support for early academic initiatives, ultimately it was the lack of funding and the reservations of university administrators and other academics in mainstream disciplines that prevented any significant expansion. Intelligence Studies was yet another competitor, and a suspect one at that, for scarce university resources but scholars continued to seek a closer relationship with Intelligence in the belief that this was essential in enhancing knowledge and understanding of the legitimate role of Intelligence in a democratic society. The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Bill C-36 proved to be highly controversial despite early government efforts to elicit and draw upon the substantive knowledge and legal expertise which resided in the Academy in support of its legislation. In the ensuing public debate about the democratic balance between public safety and individual rights, academic contributions enhanced public understanding of both the threat environment and the framework within which Intelligence and security agencies in Canada operated. Informative, objective and constructive academic comments and articles provided a counterbalance to media reports that were often ill-informed and inclined to feed the popular view that threat assessments were overstated in order to increase Intelligence powers. Scholars added intellectual weight to the reports of non-specialist journalists who, for the most part, were struggling to learnon-the-job under tight deadlines. As a general comment, a profound scepticism within the broader academic community about whether intelligence studies could be considered a legitimate intellectual discipline meant that intelligence studies scholars had to struggle for peer recognition and compete for scarce university resources with established disciplines. Furthermore, any market incentives to reduce the imbalance between student demand and the availability of places on intelligence studies programmes were effectively nullified by the constraints imposed by Provincial funding and the risk aversion of University authorities with respect to the durability of student demand.

The relationship: initiatives and impediments The aims and purposes of both parties in a relationship determine the extent to which mutual interests coincide. The opportunities for collaboration between Intelligence and the Academy have been constrained by structural, institutional, strategic and personal factors which have impeded any significant expansion of intelligence studies programmes in ­Canada and ultimately prompted CSIS to change the way it collected and assessed open-source information. Some collaborative initiatives have been launched but on balance, the potential area of co-operation between the two has shrunk.

Impediments Lack of trust The legacy of the Cold War was one of mutual suspicion and distrust between Intelligence and the Academy. Scholars interested in the emerging field of intelligence studies tended to equate intelligence with the oppressive and overweening powers of national Intelligence agencies. They were chary of developing a close or collaborative relationship with 137

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Intelligence lest their intellectual autonomy be called into question or academic freedom compromised by association with covert organisations: Young academics expected to question and be critical of those who wore the mantle of secrecy rather than co-operate with them. For its part, Intelligence was guarded in its dealings with academics and unwilling to share sensitive information about the organisation and operations of Intelligence with those who seemed bent on claiming that Intelligence activities threatened the core values of liberal democracy. Although the adversarial nature of the relationship changed as the Cold War era receded and the focus on espionage gave way to terrorism, there were nevertheless enough current examples of Intelligence scandals and failures to perpetuate academic distrust so that collaborative opportunities were lost.

Funding issues Expectations of a significant increase in intelligence studies programmes after the 9/11 attacks never materialised in Canada’s higher education system, largely because of the lack of funding. No direct federal funding or policy intervention could be expected since education in Canada is constitutionally under the exclusive jurisdiction of Provincial governments. There is no Federal Department of Education. Nor could intelligence studies scholars look to private endowments to fund new initiatives since, unlike in the USA, philanthropic donations in the academic domain do not readily gravitate towards Canadian national security and intelligence studies. Higher education in Canada is funded by Provincial authorities from transfer payments made by the federal government and taxes levied by the Provinces. Very often, resources will be allocated to universities without any direct Provincial intervention at the faculty or inter-departmental level. This reflects a reluctance to become involved directly in the allocation of resources amongst the various academic fields. Such a funding system is disadvantageous to international affairs and national security intelligence studies programmes because while the subject matter constitutionally falls under federal jurisdiction, it is the universities that deliver the teaching and they come under the jurisdiction of the Provinces. Universities that wish to establish new degree programmes must seek the approval of Provincial authorities. This took two years in the case of Carleton University’s proposed Master’s programme in Infrastructure Protection and International Security. A potential federal source of funding for intelligence studies which requires the joint agreement of Federal and Provincial governments is the Canada Council for Higher Education, a federal initiative which endows Canada Research Chairs across Canadian universities to the tune of C$300 million per annum. Of the 2,000 Research Chairs currently endowed, not one has gone to intelligence studies as such, although Laval University in Quebec has been awarded two for topics which are security related. The Kanishka Project, another potential source of federal funding, was established by the Government of Canada to encourage multidisciplinary scholarship on terrorism. Significant funding was made available to mobilise Canadian and international academic research projects but none of the projects funded through Kanishka were awarded for intelligence studies. Government financing for this project is no longer available. The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) provides federal funding for academic research on topics across all pertinent disciplines. Following the 9//11 attacks, the Minister responsible signalled an interest in promoting Security and Intelligence Studies across Canada: SSHRC managers duly designed programme support in consultation with the relevant scholarly community. Nevertheless, this initiative was ultimately vetoed by 138

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the governing Council of the SSHRC as being ‘too sensitive.’ (The Council comprised representatives from the various humanities and social science disciplines in universities across Canada.) This was a prime example, in its time, of the perceptions and myths which still surrounded intelligence as a legitimate topic for open debate and scholarship. More recently, the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS), established in 2012, was funded through a Partnership Grant from the SSHRC and a Contribution Agreement with Public Safety Canada led by a consortium of thirteen Canadian Universities. TSAS is an independent organisation, neither an arm of government nor an advocacy group, which supports research and the dissemination of research related to the threat of terrorism, security responses to terrorism and the impact of both terrorism and securitisation on Canadian society. Although focused on developments in Canada, it also encourages international collaboration with multiple partners in other countries. To date, TSAS has funded very few research studies relating to Intelligence as such. National Intelligence can play an important role in encouraging and supporting new academic initiatives in intelligence studies but direct financial support is not deemed appropriate (as distinct from the provision of funds for specific, transparent activities such as conferences, workshops, scholarships or research). Prospective funding sources have increased but it is still the case that funding practice tends to marginalise intelligence studies as distinct from security and terrorism. Although the federal government is constrained in what it can do directly to fund the expansion of intelligence and security studies programmes in Canadian universities, ministerial expressions of interest and support would go some way to countering the risk-averse tendencies of university administrators, as well as encouraging additional creative partnerships by Public Safety and other relevant government departments.

Approval of colleagues and university authorities Generally speaking, universities look for longer-term financial resourcing before agreeing to faculty and staffing commitments for public-interest initiatives. They have been hesitant to support programmes where there is uncertainty regarding the durability of student demand and furthermore, the allocation of resources between different academic disciplines requires a consensus amongst all members of faculty boards. Competition for teaching positions can be so intense that turf battles between faculty and departments can prevent the launch of new initiatives since they are perceived as additional contenders for scarce resources. While senior administrators, executive officials and deans may attempt to exert their influence, ultimately, the decision rests with the faculty board.

New initiatives A burgeoning global interest in intelligence topics from the mid-1980s onwards was given expression in an outpouring of academic research, scholarly writing, articles and commentary from journalists and retired practitioners who coalesced into epistemological communities. One such community of intelligence scholars in Canada founded the Canadian Association of Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) in 1985 to provide a forum for discourse amongst academics, practitioners, government officials, media representatives and other private and non-governmental bodies. Its Annual Conference and various workshops and other activities attracted attendees from across the world. Its perspective and composition owed much to the personalities and drive of its various Presidents and Board members 139

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but eventually lack of financial support and internal organisational differences caused it to return once again to the smaller, collegial association it had once been. The International Studies Association in the USA now attracts intelligence studies scholars to its Annual Convention where the Intelligence Studies section (also formed in 1985) now occupies a significant position within the broad field of international studies (Richards, 2016, p. 21). Canada’s early initiative in international collaborative information-sharing was a tribute to its intelligence studies community and the support, however limited, national agencies and particular individuals leaders within them, were able to give. Two Journals specialising in intelligence studies were also launched in 1985: Intelligence and National Security in the UK and The International Journal of Intelligence and ­CounterIntelligence in the USA. These were later followed by the Journal of Intelligence History launched in Germany in 2001 and The European Journal of Intelligence History in 2007. These publications together with the annual conferences of CASIS and the ISA provided an outlet for new research, intellectual discourse and teaching resources for academic intelligence studies programmes (Rudner, 2009, p. 113). Although by the end of the 1980s intelligence topics were being taught at various US colleges and universities across the USA, usually in departments of history or political science, it was not until the early 2000s, along with several other innovative programmes in the USA and UK, that a research centre was established in Canada at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) Carleton University, Ottawa.

Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies (CCISS) The Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies (CCISS) was established in 2002 as a new interdisciplinary research centre within NPSIA and was dedicated to the advancement of intelligence and national security research. It has since been renamed the Canadian Centre for Security, Intelligence and Defence Studies (CCSIDS). When CCISS was established, it was fortunate to benefit from Contribution Agreements with two federal government departments, viz. Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) and the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC), since renamed the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre. Funding was provided to commission research on (a) critical infrastructure protection policy with a broad scope that embraced threat and vulnerability assessments; domestic, c­ ross-border and international issues pertaining to energy infrastructure, security and resilience, and (b) trends in terrorism. Topics were negotiated with the Director, and academics were commissioned and paid a stipend to do research papers. CCISS raised additional revenue by organising workshops, conferences and other activities on a fee-paying basis. While it is normal for ­Canadian universities to take a percentage of such revenue (which can be as much as 50%), the Founding Director of CCISS negotiated an arrangement with University authorities by which that requirement was waived so that funds could be accumulated for future research initiatives. Other Canadian universities too have attempted to establish a place for themselves in the broader field: The University of Ottawa, for example, officially launched its new Centre for International Policy Studies in December 2007. The Centre aims to produce ‘­policy-relevant research on issues of international security and governance.’ The University of British ­Columbia’s Centre of International Relations is a long-standing independent research unit that supports research and teaching relating to international security and defence issues with an emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region. Political terrorism and Intelligence Services are concentrations offered by the University of New Brunswick’s Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society. 140

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In terms of the teaching of intelligence and security studies, NPSIA became the first ­ anadian School of International Affairs to offer a cluster of master’s-level courses on secuC rity and intelligence. These have attracted strong student interest. On completion of their studies, many of NPSIA’s graduates apply for positions in one of the three national Intelligence organisations or in the wider IC. Simon Fraser University (SFU) in British Columbia offers a unique, interdisciplinary and completely online Terrorism, Risk, and Security Studies Professional Master’s Program (TRSS) that addresses public safety and national security challenges. While many other universities now offer modules on intelligence, perhaps a key factor is whether there is a faculty member whose full-time teaching relates to intelligence and security. Since the scale and scope of academic research output in Canada will have a bearing on the potential utility of a closer relationship between the Academy and Intelligence, as well as on the quality of education available to students, the extent to which scholars can build intelligence knowledge and capacity for the future is critical. A notable contribution has come from the Department of National Defence which funds research projects on Defence and Security through its research unit, Defence, Research and Development Canada (DRDC). Natural Resources Canada has also played a major role in its support of research relating to energy infrastructure protection. Carleton University launched an innovative Master’s degree in Infrastructure Protection and International Security in 2010 designed jointly by its Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs.

The practice of open intelligence Between January 1990 and 2007, the CSIS’ approach to open-source collection and partnerships with academe and others lacked vigour: Generally, information flowed into the organisation in the form of journals, other professional publications and commercial databases, etc., and was then disseminated internally, although sometimes Internet searches might be made in response to requests from desk officers. Canada’s academics were occasionally solicited for their views and might then be selected to write backgrounders and studies as part of the Service’s Commentary series. However, something more was needed given the impact of the information revolution on intelligence collection, processing, analysis and dissemination, and the relationship between official Intelligence and non-government information brokers. The new threat environment, characterised as it was by accelerating change, increasing complexity and rising uncertainty made the task of monitoring threats from international terrorism, and providing information and foreknowledge to decision-makers, more difficult. The launch of the CSIS ‘Academic Outreach’ programme’ in 2008 represented a determined attempt to proactively seek out and nurture a global network of experts and specialists. Think tanks, universities, civil-society organisations, industry and foreign government were regarded as a knowledge bank from which CSIS could draw to meet its strategic and tactical intelligence needs. CSIS describes this initiative as ‘an experiment in developing a new relationship with the realm of research and myriad other sectors to draw maximum benefit from publicly available knowledge in support of CSIS and the rest of the Government of Canada’ (Academic Outreach Programme, 2008). The ‘Practice of Open Intelligence’ as it is called uses various tools and approaches to open up and deepen relationships with multiple specialists whose work examines a broad range of security developments. As an “Academic Outreach Programme,” it is something of a misnomer in that its outreach is not limited to academics but draws upon multiple global 141

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sources of expertise. It is now considered an indispensable part of the Service’s core analytic and collection mandate and the one which CSIS claims provides a model for other Canadian government departments as well as foreign governments. In an uncertain environment, the ability to be agile, flexible and creative has provided CSIS with new opportunities and avenues by which to fulfil its mandate and stay ahead of the competition from non-government information brokers. While much of the advanced knowledge it needs for security purposes is short-lived, the network enables CSIS to better handle valuable ‘finished’ information. Since research expertise tends to ebb and flow, it claims that maintaining a dialogue with a broad pool of experts worldwide enables it to identify the researchers whose work is ‘leading-edge.’ In producing open-source assessments to which decision-makers look for guidance, official Intelligence is itself facing competition from other information brokers. The key aims of the Outreach Programme are to provide an immediate remedy for specific knowledge gaps and improve in-house understanding of the security environment. In its global outreach, CSIS seeks two types of specialists – those with detailed knowledge relating to current collection priorities and those with a historical appreciation of politics and culture in particular areas of the world. It is in this latter category that Canadian academics have most to contribute but an increasing emphasis on counterterrorism and current intelligence needs over the last decade or so has tended to marginalise the potential input from Canadian scholars. While scholars cannot compete with the tide of ‘quick response policy research’ that CSIS requires for current intelligence needs, they can add value to strategic assessments by providing the depth and context necessary for understanding emerging issues and ‘mysteries’ – provided the Academy is sufficiently engaged with Intelligence to be aware of its longer-term needs and has the capacity to respond. Therein lies the problem. Canada’s intelligence studies community is so small and thinly spread (less than thirty nationwide) that it is inevitable that CSIS will need to tap into expertise outside Canada for some of the area specialisms required, given how drastically area and language studies in Canadian universities have been cut. Even where there is expertise, professorial products have a long gestation period and have come to be seen by practitioners as too conceptual, theoretical and lacking in policy relevance as compared to the more time-sensitive policy-tailored research of other information brokers. A closer relationship between Intelligence and the Academy in furtherance of the national interest would undoubtedly be helpful in overcoming those presentational problems, especially given the value of having independent, objective and thorough scholarship by Canadian nationals on strategic issues where its interests and values differ even from close allies. This should be a consideration in any calculations regarding the need to build capacity in the Academy for the future. The Expert Briefings CSIS holds almost weekly are demonstrably an effort to enhance the intellectual capabilities of government employees in the broad IC, to provide a common understanding of strategic developments and share knowledge. Major conferences to which Canadian and international experts are invited provide opportunities to discuss and share assessments on regional threats and future developments and, where possible, comprehensive reports on these events are made available to a wider audience on the CSIS website. Notably, CSIS utilises the services of a Scholar-in-Residence to challenge the assumptions in-house analysts make about the threats they monitor – a clear acknowledgement that the principles of sound scholarship remain as vital to Intelligence as to the Academy. The global outreach strategy is seen as having provided alternatives which have enhanced operational effectiveness in support of broader CSIS aims. In an age where knowledge as well 142

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as the ready access to it has become the ‘decision-maker’s currency’ (Coyne, Neal and Bell, 2014), time is too valuable to be spent on anything less than the most informative and essential information. Only by drawing upon the knowledge of trusted experts and specialists worldwide can the outreach team add value to the carefully prepared assessments which in the information age now compete with the more time-sensitive products of media and other non-governmental information brokers.

Conclusion The Academy in Canada with respect to intelligence studies is trailing behind peers in other countries. It is currently too small and under-resourced to contribute significantly to the knowledge needs of Canadian Intelligence. When it most expected the ground-swell of interest in intelligence and security matters following the attacks on 9/11 to put it on the path to expansion, institutional impediments and prejudices blocked the way. The CSIS Academic Outreach strategy of reaching out to international expertise has inevitably diminished the actual and potential scope of the relationship between Intelligence and the Academy. ­A lthough it has enabled it to fulfil its mandate to maintain operational effectiveness in support of broader Intelligence aims, in statistical terms academic contacts, whether in Canada or worldwide, are a small proportion of the Outreach total (no more than 10%). Intelligence studies scholars are too few and spread too thinly; student demand for programmes outstrips faculty resources. There is still doubt about the status of intelligence studies as an academic discipline as well as a lack of university commitment and resources. Some input from former intelligence practitioners and those who have held positions in the wider IC helps, but this is limited and as adjunct professors, they are excluded from formal faculty decision-making. More recent innovative research funding initiatives are slowly helping to build intelligence knowledge and capacity for the future but the focus on security and terrorism projects does little if anything for intelligence scholarship which is central to the educative function of academe in its contribution to sustaining broad public interest and support for Intelligence in a democratic society. Building public knowledge is especially valuable at a time when misinformation and cynicism are polarising societies. Countering loss of trust in government cannot be done by Intelligence alone. However, Intelligence can play a role in supporting those research activities which help shine a light on the proper functions of Intelligence – for example, by commissioning an official intelligence history and the regular release of official records. federal government leadership in co-ordinating and sponsoring partnerships could also pay major dividends. In terms of greater collaboration between Intelligence and the Academy, the growing interest amongst some of Canada’s closest allies for professionalising intelligence assessment may lead in the future to the development of a cross-government approach to the training and education of Canadian intelligence analysts which would increase collaboration between Intelligence and the Academy. This would take leadership and support from the federal government and an acceptance that Canada’s strategic interests would benefit from capacity-building measures in the Academy as well as Intelligence. The tendency to prioritise current intelligence is understandable given the terrorism threat, but a Canadian perspective on emergent global matters is vital for the overall longterm national interest and it is in this context that the value of the national Academy to the IC in terms of both subject matter expertise and in its potential to improve the quality and consistency of analysis should be recognised and supported. 143

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References Andrew, C. and Dilks, D. eds. The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, and London: Macmillan, 1984). Academic Outreach Programme. ‘The Practice of Open Intelligence’ (2008). Internal paper and discussions with Senior Co-ordinator. Brunatti, A. (2018) ‘Managing Reputational Risks,’ in D. Baldino and R. Crawley (eds.) Intelligence and the Function of Government, Ch 9, (2018), p. 206. Butler, R. ‘Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction,’ HC898, 14 July 2004, Available at: http://news.bbc.co./nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/14_07_04_butler.pdf, accessed November 18, 2019. Coyne, J., Neal, S. and Bell, P. ‘Reframing Intelligence: Challenging the Cold War Intelligence Doctrine in the Information Age,’ International Journal of Business and Commerce, Vol. 3, No. 5 (2014), pp. 53–68. Glees, A. ‘Intelligence Studies, Universities and Security.’ British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 63, No. 3 (September 2015), pp. 281–310, p. 299. Goodman, L., King, K. and Szaba, S. Professional Schools of International Affairs on the Eve of the 21st ­Century (Washington, DC: Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs, 1994). Goodman, M.S. and Omand, D. ‘What Analysts Need to Understand: The King’s Intelligence Studies Program.’ Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 52, No. 4 (2008), pp. 39–50. Government of Canada. ‘Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy,’ April 27, 2004. Lefebvre, S. ‘Canada’s Intelligence Culture: An Assessment,’ in Swenson, R. and Lemozy, S. (eds.), The Democratization of Intelligence: Melding Strategic Intelligence and National Discourse (Washington, DC: National Defence Intelligence College, 2009. Melbourne University Publishing Limited, 2018), pp. 79–94. Lefebrve, S. and Littlewood, J. ‘Guide to Canadian Intelligence Issues.’ Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2012), pp. 63–89. Marrin, S. ‘Improving Intelligence Studies as an Academic Discipline.’ Intelligence and National Security, (2014), p. 1. doi:10.1080/02684527.2014.952932S. Miller, B.H. U.S. Strategic Forecasting and the Perils of Prediction. International Journal of Industrial Chemistry, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Winter 2014–2015), pp. 687–701. Richards, J. ‘Intelligence Studies, Academia and Professionalization.’ The International Journal of Intelligence, Security and Public Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2016), pp. 20–33. Rudner, M. ‘Intelligence Studies in Higher Education: Capacity-Building to Meet Societal Demand.’ International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring 2009), p. 113. Sims, J. ‘What Is Intelligence? Information for Decision Making,’ in Godson, R., May, E.R., and Schmitt, G. (eds.), US Intelligence at the Crossroads (London, UK: Brassey’s, 1995, pp. 3–16). Stout, M. and Warner, M. ‘Intelligence is as Intelligence Does.’ Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 33, No. 4 (2018), 57–526. doi:10.1080/02684527.2018.1452593. Treverton, G. Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). UK Government: Security Service (MI5) and Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Defence Organisations. (2015). Available at: www.mi5.gov.uk/careers/working-at-mi5/. To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2018.1452593 UK/USA Agreement (March 1946) originally known as the Britain-United States (BRUSA) Agreement and later expanded to include the UK, USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.

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7 ‘I WOULD REMIND YOU THAT NATO IS NOT A UNIVERSITY’ Navigating the challenges and legacy of NATO economic intelligence1 Adrian Kendry Introduction In early April 2019, Foreign Ministers of NATO member states gathered in Washington DC to commemorate the 70th Anniversary of the Alliance. The meetings provided an opportunity to revisit the vital role played by the transatlantic alliance during the Cold War years in responding to the existential challenged posed uniquely by the Soviet Union. In the dystopian and more uncertain environment prevailing on both sides of the Atlantic, the gathering also considered the present and future roles of NATO in an era of multiple complex and confusing global challenges and threats (see Binnedijk, 2019; Posen, 2019). During the seventy years of its existence, NATO’s three primary core tasks (collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security) were underpinned by intelligence. This essay outlines the origins and development of NATO intelligence after 1949 and the circumstances and debate over the establishment of the NATO Economic Committee in 1957. The role and priorities of the NATO Economic Committee in the years before the attacks of 9/11 are outlined. From 2001 to 2010, the NATO Economic Committee was tasked with explaining and assessing economic security and stability in Afghanistan and also in Iraq after the 2003 invasion was instigated by the United States and a coalition of NATO member states and partners. This essay argues that NATO economic intelligence during 2001 to 2014 was a crucial but essentially neglected dimension of the NATO intelligence process both before and after the demise of the NATO Economic Committee in 2010. The essay concludes that the revitalisation of NATO economic intelligence is critical, given multiple disruptive and accelerating technological and security trends, accompanied by the substantial deterioration in NATO Russia relations since 2014 and ongoing instability in Afghanistan, the Middle East and North Africa and the Gulf.

The blending of intelligence, security and scholarship The perspective of the academic practitioner The appointment of a British academic (the holder of an endowed Chair in Economics at the United States Naval Academy Annapolis during the late 1990s) to the position of Senior 145

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Defence Economist at NATO Headquarters in late August 2001 was a remarkable departure from established practice. With neither formal affiliation to a Ministry of Defence nor a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the appointment of an academic professor was regarded with suspicion by some colleagues within the NATO International Staff 2 as well as amongst some members of the United ­K ingdom Delegation to NATO. These misgivings and reservations always constrained the work and influence of NATO economic intelligence, being greatly welcomed by some member states and tolerated by others. It was a constant challenge to convince the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the supreme NATO decision-making body comprising national Ambassadorial Representatives meeting in Permanent Session, that agreed economic intelligence of the Economic Committee was useful, relevant, effective and added value to the NATO decision-making process. During the period 2001 to early 2014, the author had a ringside seat in the economic intelligence arena and was frequently the ringmaster. From 2001 to 2010, he was primarily responsible for producing and coordinating agreed NATO economic intelligence. Subsequently during 2010 to 2012, he directed the Defence and Security Economics group that contributed targeted economic intelligence on Afghanistan, Libya and Syria to the Secretary General’s Private Office. From 2012 to early 2014, the author was part of a small team in the Economic Security Assessment Unit that provided reports on transatlantic economic security directly to the Secretary General.

From Annapolis to NATO August 2001 I arrived at NATO Headquarters from Annapolis via Washington DC less than four weeks before the devastating Al Qaeda attacks on the United States on September 11th. This transatlantic cataclysm disrupted NATO and transformed the role and modus operandi of the NATO Economic Committee. The incorporation of NATO economic intelligence into NATO political decision-making during the convulsive years and events in the first decade of the twenty-first century proved to be immensely challenging and extremely frustrating. These challenges and frustrations translated into unfulfilled potential and institutional difficulties in politically implementing agreed NATO economic intelligence. Opposition from some NATO member states and ultimately the underutilisation of NATO economic intelligence would sound the death knell of the Economic Committee. Following the author’s retirement in early 2014, the appointment of a (less senior) defence economist was initially encouraging but the disintegration of the Economic and Security Assessment Unit (ESAU) within the Emerging Security Challenges Division left a lacuna in the once substantial economic intelligence coordinated through the NATO Economic Committee. Currently nested within a strategic analytical capabilities team, economic intelligence at NATO is therefore essentially confined to the (impressive) efforts of one analyst who has endeavoured to maintain a flow of high-quality products to senior NATO committees. This work has focused particularly on the strategically crucial outlook for Russia’s economic and defence spending capabilities. Since 2014, the need for consistent, penetrating and perceptive NATO economic intelligence has been amply demonstrated by growing international political and economic turbulence and insecurity. Equally troubling has been the weakening of political, economic and security cohesion amongst the twenty-nine (shortly to be thirty) NATO member states. 146

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Sadly, it is no longer inconceivable to contemplate a world without NATO (Ruhle, 2018; Posen, 2019) in the dystopian, strident political and security climate at the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century. Restoring and strengthening NATO economic intelligence through the revitalisation of the Economic Committee would be a significant step in alleviating the global challenges posed by the diminution of economic intelligence.

The post-war promise: NATO economic intelligence 1949 to 1957 NATO’s inception took place in Washington DC on 4th April 1949. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed by twelve founding members with the cornerstone being the mutual self-defence clause of Article 5 that committed all allies to respond to the attack on one member state as though it was an attack on all. The commitment to sustaining and enhancing the economic security of the Alliance was articulated in Article 2 that included the following statement: ‘They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them’. Following the signing of the Treaty, the NATO founding members initially established the first headquarters in London. In 1950, the NATO Economic and Financial Working Group (GTEF) was created and met initially in London. In 1951, GTEF moved to Paris in order to align its work more closely with the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in strengthening the economies and security of Europe (in 1961, the OEEC became the global Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD]). From 1952 to 1967, NATO’s headquarters were located in central Paris. Economic intelligence (initially concerned with formulating an equitable distribution of defence spending amongst NATO member states) was collected and analysed by the Economic and Finance Division. The Division comprised two major committees: the Working Group on Comparison of Economic Trends in NATO and Soviet Countries; and the Committee of Economic Advisers (AC/127), otherwise known as the NATO Economic Committee after 1957.

The genesis of the economic committee 1957 In January 1957, the NAC, NATO’s sovereign decision-making body, debated and agreed the creation of a NATO Economic Committee while simultaneously maintaining the c­ ritical work of the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy (to be subsumed within the Committee of Political Advisers) since ‘the old Committee was composed of experts who had been meeting and were likely to meet for some time to come in more or less permanent session’ (Assistant Secretary ­General, Economics and Finance Division 1957). The creation of AC/127 reflected the zeitgeist of Western optimism that international economic cooperation would strengthen transatlantic security, undermine the Soviet economic system and support a reduction in Cold War tensions. As noted by the NAC, ‘The usefulness of the work of the Economic Committee would depend very much on the extent to which there was coordination between the economic problems of interest to NATO and the political aims of NATO’. The initial terms of reference (subsequently amended in the 1980s) specified that the Economic Committee would study and report to the Council on economic issues of special interest to the Alliance, particularly those which have political or defence implications or affect the economic health of the Atlantic Community as a whole. The Economic Committee could, and would, provide the NAC (in Permanent ­Session) with assessments that had been agreed by all nations (utilising the binding unanimity ­decision-rule incorporating the NATO ‘Silence Procedure’). 147

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The vitality of the NATO Economic Committee production and distribution process, reinforced by economic intelligence experts from NATO capitals, reached its zenith during the period 2001 to 2010. NATO “agreed” economic intelligence was regularly shared with the Private Office of the Secretary General, the NAC and the capitals in NATO member states (who increasingly contributed to the production of intelligence outputs that they ultimately benefited from). NATO classified economic intelligence assessments and sharing of information focused primarily on issues affecting economic stability and security and the well being of the ­A lliance. This analysis was intended to complement and not duplicate the work of the primary post-war international economic institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the OECD, World Bank (WB) and United Nations (UN). The Economic Committee outputs provided vital contributions to the analysis conducted by the NATO Military Intelligence Committee (MC161) and, more broadly, to the intelligence work of the International Military Staff. Furthermore, the Reinforced Economic Committee supported those member states whose domestic economic intelligence capabilities and resources were essentially modest. Inevitably, the primary focus of the Economic Committee during the Cold War period 1957 to 1987 was on Soviet economic and industrial capabilities, Soviet hard currency transactions and measures to combat the Soviet evasion of sanctions agreed within the Alliance.

Priorities of the economic committee 1957 to 2000 The Economic Committee met frequently with representatives (often economic counsellors) from all of the Delegations of the fifteen member states in 1957 and the nineteen countries at the end of 1999, supported by intelligence experts from NATO capitals in the regular cycle of regionally based economic intelligence meetings. These discussions prioritised: Assessments of the implications of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the formation of the E ­ uropean Union and economic tensions with COMECON (the Council for Mutual Economic ­Assistance 1949 to 1991) reflecting NATO’s Cold War confrontation with the Warsaw Pact. Analysis of the implications of the United States Strategic Defence Initiative (‘Star Wars’) programme as well as the Perestroika developments in the Soviet Union 1985 to 1989 The threat of the Strategic Defence Initiative (‘Star Wars’) programme imposed major financial and psychological costs upon the Soviet military industrial complex and provoked unsustainable Cold War military spending competition with the United States. The increasing economic and financial distress of the Soviet Union during this period was fundamental to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The Partnership for Peace programme engaged former Warsaw Pact members through conferences and workshops promoting economic and political reforms that would be vital for successful post-Communist transition. The 1994 NATO Partnership for Peace programme included thirteen states that subsequently joined NATO. Other distinctive partnerships were initiated with the Founding Treaties with Russia and Ukraine and the bold formation of the Mediterranean Dialogue partnership that consisted of the countries of the Maghreb (excluding Libya), Egypt, Jordan and Israel. Additional economic intelligence gathering focused on South Eastern Europe where the emphasis was on strategies and programmes to support defence conversion and human resettlement strategies in the former republics of Yugoslavia (particularly Bosnia-Herzegovina) following the end of the Yugoslav Civil War (1991 to 1995), the Dayton Peace Accord (1995) and the NATO bombing campaign instigated to end the Kosovo conflict (1999). 148

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The 9/11 attacks and aftermath During the first eight months of 2001, the Economic Committee focused its efforts on assessing instability in the South Caucasus (exemplified in the failure to resolve the frozen conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh) and the tensions and fragility in South Eastern Europe after the Dayton Agreement. Additionally, the Economic Committee assessed the outcomes and implications of the periodic meetings of the NATO Russia Permanent Joint Council Meeting (at Ambassadorial level) as well as the meetings of NATO Ukraine Commission (also at Ambassadorial level). The Economic Committee also advised the NAC on the ethnic, political and economic unrest in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (the Republic of North Macedonia will become the 30th NATO member state after the resolution of the prolonged dispute between Greece and Turkey over the name since the dissolution of Yugoslavia). On 7th September, Secretary General George Robertson delivered a speech in Oslo on ‘Building a Vision: NATO’s Future Transformation’. Little could he have imagined the consequences of the catastrophic attacks in the United States four days later that would transform NATO’s destiny and priorities in the following decade. During the afternoon of 11th September, unforgettable tensions, confusion and fears enveloped NATO Headquarters in Brussels (Brussels being six time zones ahead of New York City and Washington DC). Incomprehensible television images and reports of the scale and audacity of the attacks triggered urgent discussions between Secretary General George ­Robertson and the NATO Office of Security over the evacuation of all non-essential ­personnel from the Headquarters and the raising of NATO Security to its highest level. On 12th ­September, NATO declared Article 5 for the first and only time in its history. The cataclysm of 9/11 provoked profound discord and rifts within the Alliance after the initial transatlantic solidarity expressed in Article 5. This solidarity was increasingly undermined, firstly by the United States declaration of the ‘War on Terror’ and the arrival of US Special Forces into Northern Afghanistan and subsequently by the controversial and divisive steps taken in preparation for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In the tense post 9/11 environment in NATO, an interagency struggle amongst economic, financial and intelligence agencies in Washington DC initially created ambivalence over the role, direction and scope of the work of the Economic Committee. After a period of internal and external political pressure, the Committee, reinforced by intelligence specialists from NATO capitals (and notably the United States), was able to undertake important and valuable work on the economics and financing of terrorism and propose international measures necessary for effectively countering terrorism. The wider picture was more complicated with the analytical work on economic security in Middle East and North Africa constrained by increasingly sensitive relations with the seven member states of the Mediterranean Dialogue Partnership. The question of oil as a pretext to invade Iraq together with the flawed and distorted intelligence reports on the spurious links between Al Qaeda, Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction created tensions in not only North Africa and the Middle East but also within NATO Headquarters. The initial cooperation of the NATO Economic Committee with the NATO Special Committee (AC 46) (under the auspices of the NATO Office of Security) promised to deliver important and productive intelligence sharing. Such cooperation focused on how to engage Arab States in meeting the challenges of post-Saddam Iraq and to address the regional spread of Al Qaeda and Salafist terrorist organisations. 149

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Unfortunately, the Private Office of the Secretary General was greatly over-extended during these crucial months and unable to support and fully appreciate the value of NATO economic intelligence directed towards determining the origins and scale of donor funding (from private (and sometimes state) benefactors in the Greater Middle East and the Gulf States); the role and influence of the Madrasahs (religious schools); Islamist financing institutions and methods; and the importance of traditional Islamic methods of trading through the Hawala system. From 2003 to 2007, the legacy of the multinational (but primarily US and UK) invasion of Iraq seemingly strengthened the role of the Reinforced Economic Committee in its assessments and meetings on the Middle East. In reality, the meetings mainly supported the propagation of United States intelligence on the illusory successes of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the equally illusory progress in Iraqi Reconstruction. Some sceptical NATO Allies warned the Economic Committee of the wider and deeper insecurity that would accompany the Debaathification of Iraq with the resulting unemployment of thousands of displaced army and police personnel. Regrettably, these warnings went unheeded and the seeds of the terror perpetrated by the Islamic State and its self-declared Caliphate were sown. Following the invasion of US Special Forces into Northern Afghanistan in early ­October 2001 (Operation Enduring Freedom), NATO itself was mandated initially by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 1386) in December 2001 to establish the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and secure control of Bagram airfield outside ­K abul and Kabul itself. In October 2003, UNSCR 1510 extended the NATO/ISAF mandate throughout Afghanistan. No longer in a combat role, NATO continues to be engaged in a support and training mission in Afghanistan under the auspices of its Resolute Support Mission The regional economic intelligence meetings of the Economic Committee were rapidly expanded to include classified (and unclassified) discussions and papers on the economic security of Afghanistan and its neighbours and neighbouring regions. The oral and verbal reporting sought to highlight fundamental security issues including resistance to foreign engagement, pervasive corruption and the increasing appropriation of international donor aid by elites and warlords. Transfixed like rabbits caught in the headlights, NATO political and military leaders were (with a few honourable exceptions) resistant to recommendations from Economic Committee discussions that opium should be decriminalised in order to diminish the concentrated power of tribal warlords, opium revenues and patronage. Arguably, Afghanistan’s economic resilience and sustainable economic security remain tragically as fragile now as in 2014 when the following was stated in a comprehensive paper (Kendry 2014): Narcotics also help to sustain the financial balance sheets of those elites that have benefited from the ISAF economy. With the contraction in resources for patronage, there will be a redistribution of power involving the state and non-state actors in the struggle over land, highways and opium. Weak governance structures within the central and local governments will also force businesses to turn to local powerbrokers for protection

Rapprochement with Russia and the misplaced optimism The 2002 NATO Russia Summit in Rome engendered a heady optimism that in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, NATO and Russia could agree to cooperate on a number of important security concerns including addressing terrorist threats in Afghanistan and Central Asia. For the Economic Committee, this cooperation included ad hoc working groups on Budgetary 150

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and Macroeconomic Stabilisation, as well as regular meetings and exchanges in Brussels, Moscow and elsewhere, all taking place within the overall framework of the NATO Russia Council that had been established in Rome The fragile relationship with Russia after the foundation of the NATO Russia Council in 2002 highlighted the importance of energy security and politics in shaping NATO’s political engagement with Russia and the sensitive relations with pivotal former members of the Warsaw Pact, Georgia and Ukraine. The misplaced optimism that NATO-Russia relations had attained a plateau of relatively calm stability partly explained a request to the Defence and Security Economics Directorate from the NATO Medium Term Financial Budget team. As part of MTFB forecast for 2007–2011, DSED was asked to assess the financial implications of deleting the defence economics work on Russia and the former Soviet Union. The folly of this request was quickly revealed in the ensuing 2008 Russian invasion of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, disputed territories in the Republic of Georgia. Thereafter, and until the demise of the Economic Committee in 2010, NATO economic intelligence meetings focused even more closely on Russian political, military and economic ambitions in its ‘Near Abroad’ (former republics of the Soviet Union) and other countries and regions of interest (notably, Syria and South Eastern Europe).

Expanding NATO economic intelligence through enlargement The 1999 Expansion of NATO under Article 10 had increased membership to nineteen. This took place under NATO’s Article 10 (NATO Enlargement) and incorporated the former Warsaw Pact states of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, bringing vital additional intelligence capability to the NATO Economic Committee. These capabilities grew even faster with the 2004 Enlargement to twenty-six member states. The importance of the economic and political assessments made in the national Membership Action Plans provided a valuable background in support of the frequently incisive and revealing papers presented on neighbouring non-NATO countries and regions. In parallel, and particularly in the wake of the accession of seven new NATO members from the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004, the Economic Committee experienced a significant increase in analysis and shared intelligence focusing on estimations of Russia’s current and future economic and budgetary strength. An important dimension of this work was the use of the NOBLE (National Order of Battlefield Logistical Estimation) analytical framework that was used to construct plausible scenarios and sensitivity tests. It is worth noting that further meetings of the sub-group on NOBLE added significantly to the understanding of the important differences in measuring NATO and non-NATO n ­ ational defence spending through current exchange rates compared to purchasing power ­parity ­valuations. The debate emanating from these calculations continues to resonate in 2019 as part of the ongoing controversy over transatlantic burden sharing in NATO defence spending and the elusive quest for a minimum of 2% defence spending as a percentage of gross domestic p­ roduct (GDP) amongst all NATO European members3 (the United States accounts for more than t­ wo-thirds of total NATO defence spending and spends in excess of 3.5% of its GDP) (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966).

Turning off the taps: NATO’s response to the Russia–Ukraine energy security crisis The 2005 to 2006 Russia–Ukraine natural gas crisis originated in the growing geopolitical tensions between Ukraine and Russia and was manifested through the unresolved financial 151

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and transit dispute between Naftogaz Ukraine and Gazprom. This ‘gas war’ unnerved those NATO member states with a significant dependency on Russian natural gas and its transit through Ukraine. The NAC tasked the Defence and Security Economics Directorate and the Economic Committee to urgently develop informed analysis and evaluation of the consequences of this crisis for NATO. In 2007 to 2008, the dispute erupted once more over Ukraine’s gas debts to Russia and the consequent reduction of Russian gas supplies through Ukraine. The disruption to energy supplies for many NATO member states convincingly demonstrated that analysis and intelligence regarding energy security could not exclusively be the preserve of the European Union. Prior to the April 2008 Bucharest Summit, an Economic Committee paper on energy security and the relationship between Gazprom and Russian state capitalism was leaked to the Financial Times. The leak triggered an internal investigation to determine the source (the suspects comprising those NATO member states supporting NATO involvement in energy security and those who were opposed). Despite strong disagreements amongst NATO members over NATO’s role in energy security, an energy security cell (drawn from members of the Defence and Security Economics Directorate) was established in the Emerging Security Challenges Division. The wisdom of this decision has been amply demonstrated by the ongoing revolution in the supply of renewable and non-renewable energy supplies and prices. The continuing dependency of NATO European states on Russian gas and the revolution in shale gas and oil production in the United States exemplify the relevance of energy security analysis at NATO.

The end of the NATO Economic Committee 2010: dissolution and aftermath The glow of success emanating from the 2009 Strasbourg-Kehl 60th Anniversary Summit faded rapidly with the ensuing demand from the United States for NATO to undertake a radical pruning of its myriad of committees (more than 400). A ‘Star Chamber’ process was conducted that reflected prejudices and ignorance of the scope and importance of economic intelligence work from some national delegations. Additionally, a perverse and distorted belief prevailed that the unfolding global economic crisis demonstrated the irrelevance and failure of NATO economic intelligence. The Machiavellian machinations and arguments led to the demise of the NATO Economic Committee in July 2010 after forty-three years of economic intelligence in this format. Arguably, this was in spite, or perhaps because, of the severity of the global economic crisis. In 2009, the Defence and Security Economics Directorate provided the Secretary General and the NAC with a major written briefing on the continuing security implications of the global economic and financial crisis. The briefing recognised that NATO, while not per se an economic organisation, had a responsibility to provide timely and informed economic intelligence concerning the direct negative impact of the crisis on national defence budgets, the affordability of military equipment and contributions to NATO crisis management operations as well as the indirect negative impact on the broader deteriorating security environment (Kendry, 2009). After July 2010, the tragic loss of substantial NATO intelligence expertise, both in-house and external, regarding the strategic ambitions, economic and financial capabilities and military modernisation plans and preparedness of the Russian Federation, had a lasting legacy 152

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on the ability of the Alliance to respond in a timely and effective manner to the instability unfolding in Syria, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (notwithstanding the excellent, often unclassified, analysis offered by the remaining defence economist (see, for example, Christie, 2015, 2016a, 2016b).

Economic intelligence post-2010 Following the dissolution of the agreed NATO economic intelligence process, the Defence and Security Economics Directorate in the Political Affairs Division was tasked to provide high-quality in-house economic intelligence on Syria, Libya and Afghanistan that was ­d irectly transmitted to the Director of the Private Office (Kendry, 2011a, 2011b). These analyses were complemented by in-depth studies of the security and defence spending consequences of the global economic crisis and the formulation of NATO’s strategy in responding to the Changing Balance of International Economic Power (incorporating the rise of the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China). In 2012, Secretary General Rasmussen created an ESAU comprising a small team with a Special Adviser and the de facto Chief Defence Economist. The Unit was charged with the responsibility of providing direct oral and written advice on the relationship between economic performance and Allied defence spending and developing an economic and defence performance indicators handbook for the personal use of the Secretary General. The uneasy status of this Unit was underpinned by the diminution of resources and reduced access to the historically productive communication with relevant regional centres in the Political Affairs Division. The end of the formal intelligence sharing with the Director of Intelligence, International Military Staff increased pressure and ultimately contributed to the end of ESAU. The formation of the new Intelligence Division at NATO at the end of 2016 under the leadership of a former Director of German Federal Intelligence (BND) was accompanied by encouraging vitality in the Civilian Intelligence Economic Panel. However, multinational intelligence cooperation is invariably constrained by variations in national threat perception and the jealous guarding of national interests and culture, not to mention an inherent lack of trust fuelled by multifaceted political suspicions (Ballast, 2017). Elsewhere within NATO’s other headquarters in the United States (Norfolk, Virginia), the Strategic Foresight Analysis programme has been dedicated to projecting the major challenges to NATO’s security and stability through 2035 and beyond (NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis Report, 2017). At the NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis workshop in Cadiz in April 2018, the pivotal role of technological transformation in accelerating changing economic behaviour and disrupting the prevailing economic orthodoxy was explained. This transformation has profound implications for the acquisition, analysis and dissemination of economic intelligence. Central to this transformation are artificial intelligence, big data and the algorithmic revolution. Machines are increasingly demonstrating intelligence through the ability to find patterns by analysing large data sets. This associative intelligence is increasingly externalised in the intelligence virtual economy. One hugely important dimension of this Fourth Industrial (or Digital) Revolution is Financial Technology. Blockchain financial technological innovation (including digital currencies such as Bitcoins) is capable of transforming the global financial and economic architecture. But there are mounting concerns over cybercrime, and the misuse of financial technology. Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning Algorithms and Rare Earth Elements will therefore fundamentally influence the future course of global economic supremacy and 153

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security particularly through the intense competition between the United States and China for control of investment in artificial intelligence sectors and industry. The growing importance of shale gas and oil and other unconventional energy sources will shape the availability and exploitation of new technologies for weapons systems with huge implications for national defence budgets and investment. Some future wars will be fought in cyberspace where the speed of decision-making will need to be virtually immediate. However, the successful longer-term prosecution of such wars will require conventional military dominance. The focus and work of the NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis programme (with a significant contribution on economic and resource security) was channelled into Regional Security Assessments (RSA) at the Budapest conference and workshops in November 2018. Further RSA events on North Africa and the Sub-Sahara, Russia and East Europe and the Arctic and High North Region will take place in Madrid, Oslo and Helsinki in 2019.

Conclusion The future and acquisition of NATO economic intelligence critically depend on understanding the changing security environment inside and outside NATO and, in particular, recognising the more complicated and critical attitudes of the United States towards international cooperation, international trade agreements and the future of the Alliance itself. It has always been a matter of debate as to whether the Economic Committee would be identified primarily as an Intelligence Committee in the NATO intelligence structure or as a Senior Policy Advisory Group. The essay has argued for the former. The Economic Committee provided seminal and crucial analysis of vital security challenges including the funding of terrorism, Russia’s intentions and capabilities, the prospects for sustainable economic security in Afghanistan and the transformation of energy security. The revitalisation of economic intelligence is critical, given disruptive and accelerating technological and security trends, together with the substantial deterioration in NATO Russia relations since 2014. The timely and accurate investigations of Russia’s capacity to maintain its defence modernisation investment, the continuing impact of western sanctions (on Russia and elsewhere) and the wider instability in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East and the Gulf, constitute some of the many justifications for expanding NATO economic intelligence. The various initiatives undertaken to absorb economic intelligence in NATO’s transformed intelligence machinery have been reviewed but the uncompromising conclusion is that the death of the NATO Economic Committee was unnecessary and very damaging to NATO’s political and military decision-making processes. The diminution of capabilities and the erosion in NATO economic intelligence production have been profoundly disturbing taking account of substantial global economic uncertainty and instability (as noted by the WB and the IMF in 2019). This uncertainty and instability reflect multiple fears including the sustainability of Chinese indebtedness, the seeming intractability of the BREXIT process, the hardening of the United States attitudes towards international cooperation and international trade agreements and the increasingly political fragility of the Alliance itself. The future of NATO economic intelligence and its ongoing intelligence acquisition critically depends on understanding the changing security environment inside and outside NATO (Kendry, 2013). Different threat perceptions amongst NATO members (North versus South) will increasingly complicate decision-making and priorities towards intelligence and strategic 154

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communications. It is also increasingly apparent that differing threat perceptions and priorities towards defence and security spending amongst the elites and populations at large in NATO states add to the challenges confronting NATO cohesion and the role of economic intelligence.

Notes 1 The views expressed in this essay are solely those of the author and represent neither the official views of NATO nor former colleagues. The contents are entirely based on the personal observations and non-classified reflections of the author. 2 ‘I would remind you that NATO is not a university’ Senior NATO Official (2002). 3 Only four NATO European states spent 2% or above in 2018.

References Ballast, J. (2017) Trust (in) NATO: The Future of Intelligence Sharing within the Alliance, NATO Defence College Research Paper. Binnedijk, H. (2019) 5 Consequences of a Life without NATO, Defense News, 20 March. Christie, E. (2015) Sanctions after Crimea: Have they worked? NATO Review, July. Christie, E. (2016a) Does Russia Have the Financial Means for Its Military Ambitions? NATO Review, October. Christie, E. (2016b) The Design and Impact of Western Economic Sanctions against Russia. The RUSI Journal, Vol. 161, No. 3. Kendry, A. (2009) Allied Defence Budgets in the Light of the Global Economic Crisis. Keynote Address to the NATO Parliamentary Annual Session, Economics and Security Committee, Edinburgh. Kendry, A. (2011a). The Costs of the Civil War for Libya and the Qadhafi Regime: How Long Can It Continue Its Funding? Internal Paper NATO. Kendry, A. (2011b) The Impact of Sanctions on Syria: Short-term Economic Survival Precedes ­Eventual Collapse Internal Paper NATO. Kendry, A. (2013) The Nexus between Economics and Security: NATO’s Challenges and Opportunities in 2020 and Beyond Western, Economic Association International Conference, Seattle. Kendry, A. (2014) Transition and Afghanistan’s Economic Resilience and Sustainable Economic ­Security in 2014 and beyond. Internal Paper NATO. NATO Allied Command Transformation, 2017 NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis Report 2017, ­Norfolk, Virginia. Olson, M. and Zeckhauser, R. (1966) An Economic Theory of Alliances. The Review of Economic ­Statistics, August, pp. 266–279. Posen, B. (2019) Opinion: Trump Aside, What’s the US Role in NATO? New York Times, 10th March. Ruhle, M. (2018) A World without NATO? NATO Review.

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8 UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ACADEMIA AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT Rubén Arcos Introduction The academic study of intelligence has experienced an important growth and geographical expansion during the last decades, particularly after 9/11, with an increase offer of both graduate and undergraduate courses combining social science and historical approaches to the study of intelligence, and programs specialized in intelligence analysis and production as well (Gill and Phythian 2016: 5). The driving forces behind this growth, remarkable in the United States but that includes the United Kingdom – where back in 1988 some scholars already spoke of the emergence of a British School (Watt 1988) – and other European countries as well, might be found in the diversification of threats and intelligence objectives since the end of Cold War, the technological revolution and emergence of the cyberspace as a domain for military and intelligence operations, the increased public attention in response to jihadi terrorist attacks and the reaction of democracies to the challenge posed by global terrorism, the development of intelligence commissions or inquiries on Iraq’s weapons of Mass Destruction, or in the proliferation of intelligence-led institutions (Dover, Goodman, and Hillebrand 2014). The intelligence institution has also played an important role in some cases, providing an initial thrust by actively seeking the development of relationships with the academic community, or acting as a catalyst for moving the study of intelligence forward through the signing of collaboration agreements with universities, this being the case of countries like Spain. This chapter explores the specifics of the Academy’s collaborations with national securities agencies in European context.

European security and intelligence services European security and intelligence services are less open to academia than the United States Intelligence Community and the access to their archives is not provided easily (Palacios 2016). There are, however, some exceptions as illustrated by the declassification in 2017 of 156

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the July 2007 all-source intelligence assessment SIT-6577/07 ‘Worst Case Scenarios for the Narrower Middle East’ which probably is the most significant intelligence product declassified to date (Arcos and Palacios 2018). In the late seventies, a CIA Public Affairs brochure titled ‘CIA and the Academic Community’ for example openly stated that, …right now, American scholars are contributing valuably to intelligence support of the U.S. foreign policymaking process. We engage consultants from colleges and universities to help us solve research problems. We pay linguists for translation services. Private scholars join us frequently as guest speakers or instructors in Agency training courses. Several universities hold contracts with us for research in specialized areas. We share computer systems and the results of scientific research with some institutions […] Outside experts regularly review and comment on CIA analysts’ work. Scholar-in-residence and graduate fellow programs provide assistance to CIA specialists in nearly every academic discipline with a foreign affairs or national security focus’. (CIA 1978) The existence in European countries of relationships with academia with a similar level of development by that time is extremely unlikely, although certainly difficult to evidence due to a lesser degree of openness and the challenges that poses studying secret intelligence activities for scholars due to the above-mentioned lack of access to primary sources. The growth in the study of intelligence has led scholars to raise the foundational questions. What is intelligence studies? And, who is intelligence studies for? (See, for instance, Glees 2015; Gill and Phythian 2016; Richards 2016.) Anthony Glees has observed that there is a divide between ‘those who see the subject as offering a broad “education” in the nature of intelligence activity, and those who believe an intelligence degree should, largely and perhaps exclusively, consist of “training” students to be intelligence officers’ and conversely teaching intelligence analysis (Glees 2015: 288). From the latter approach, that should not be assumed that rejects the possibility and evident benefits of the critical and broad education approach to intelligence, intelligence scholarship is important for the practice of intelligence analysis in a similar way as medicine, public administration, and other professions where practitioners ‘have a knowledge infrastructure that studies what they do and how they could do it better to assist them in improving their practice’ (Marrin 2011: 147). Julian Richards has also pointed out the difference between this ‘academic complement to the practice of national security intelligence’ (Marrin 2016: 266) approach, and the ‘critical analysis of ’ approach, meaning ‘critical debate and education about some of the deeper issues revolving around the practice of intelligence within the contemporary state’ (Richards 2016: 27). For Gill and Pythian, intelligence studies is a ‘coherent subject area’, a field of study that benefits from interdisciplinarity and ‘much more than an academic complement to the practice of intelligence’ (Ibid.: 15). It is certainly desirable that intelligence studies is not viewed in a restrictive way and the benefits of education approaches are undoubtful, in part because there is a need for understanding and having well-informed public debates on intelligence issues, and effective oversight widely depends on having educated elected officials. Besides these debates, the scientific approach to intelligence analysis training assumes that intelligence analysis and analytic methods can be taught and learned, and consequently can be the subject of academic courses. Nevertheless, Rob Johnston’s study on the ‘Analytic culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community’, using an applied anthropological methodology – including interviews to 345 intelligence professionals – found that a number of intelligence agencies did not provide any basic analytic training or had only recently begun to provide it, 157

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‘relying instead on on-the-job experiences and informal mentoring’ and the focus of training tended to be on writing papers or preparing briefings (2005: 28–29). For Johnston, the greatest hurdle for formalizing methods for intelligence analysis that conversely could be made explicit, taught, and learned lay on the culture of tradecraft (an art or skill acquired through practice) of analytic practitioners and managers; in his words: ‘as long as intelligence analysis continues to be tradecraft, it will remain a mystery’ (Ibid.: 20). In Europe, at the transnational level, José Miguel Palacios, former head of the analysis ­d ivision in the EU INTCEN – formerly known as the EU Situation Centre (SITCEN) created in 2001– has explained that up until the year 2012, this EU analytical service had not a systematic formal training program on analytical training (Palacios 2016: 47). Now, receiving training on analytic methods and techniques has become a usual practice and is certainly one of the potential areas for interaction between academia and intelligence services. Academic approaches to intelligence analysis might include the conduction of in-house experiments to test the effectiveness of analytic techniques or for improving production and communication of analyses and assessments to intelligence customers. There is still however some resistance from intelligence agencies in Europe to develop this kind of interactions, being the existence of a culture of evaluation of analytical performance a trigger for potential interactions with academia. With the exception of the UK, Intelligence Studies in Europe and specifically intelligence analysis education and training face the problem of the limited number of European analytical products openly accessible for conducting research and develop scholarship based on the national intelligence analytical practices of European countries. Similarly, the intelligence communities with greater visibility in the intelligence literature became the mirror in which to look at small European intelligence agencies. There are however notable exceptions. In their remarkable ‘Handbook of European Intelligence Cultures’ (2016) – an edited volume providing insights on 32 European intelligence communities – De Graaf and Nyce observe that ‘the intelligence systems of the different European countries have a lot in common’ being each nation’s history of political regimes ‘the most distinctive driver of differences’ (De Graaf and Nyce 2016: xxxix). The ‘quantitative review’ developed by Van Puyvelde and Curtis (2016: 1040–1054) of the two main academic journals in the field of intelligence studies, Intelligence and National Security and International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, has evidenced that for the period 1986–2015, the main intelligence organizations discussed in both journals came from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia. German and French intelligence organizations were also included in the top ten countries by number of articles (Ibid.: 1046). In the European context, other journals that have joined INS and IJIC in the field of intelligence include Journal of Intelligence History (International Intelligence History Association), The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs (Routledge), Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence (RIEAS), and others. As discussed by Liam Gearon for the case of the UK, new security environments, and particularly terrorism and counter-terrorism, have impacted on the UK higher education policy as well as on university research agendas that can be summarized in three different and interrelated categories of impact: ‘disciplinary-epistemological, institutional, and operational’ (Gearon 2018: 32 and 50). For the academic field of intelligence studies, terrorism and associated intelligence failures have been a driver of disciplinary-epistemological impact but certainly not the only one. New technologies have driven a revolution of open sources that can be exploited for intelligence analysis purposes and challenge the government monopoly over intelligence information (Palacios 2017: 57), but also have brought new security issues 158

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in the form of cyber-attacks or massive disinformation campaigns affecting the basic democratic processes of Western liberal democracies. The development of intelligence functions in business for decision-making support in the industry has driven as well the introduction of academic courses in higher education institutions in Europe. France is being influential for other European countries like Spain in the field of Intelligence économique and specific European chapters of the Association of Strategic and Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) have been established. In 2011, the first volume of the academic journal Intelligence Studies in Business (Halmstad University, Sweden) was published. The journal publishes articles within areas such as Competitive Intelligence, Business Intelligence, Market ­Intelligence, Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Collective Intelligence and Geo-economics […] by focusing on business applications the journal do not compete directly with journals of Library Sciences or State or Military Intelligence Studies.1

Stakeholder management and outreach Academic research and education on issues of interest for the security and intelligence community position academic scholars as relevant stakeholders for intelligence organizations (Arcos 2013). Organizations of all kinds, both in government and business, have stakeholders, defined by R. Edward Freeman as ‘groups and individuals than can affect or are affected by, the achievement of an organization’s mission’ (1984: 52). From a managerial perspective, analyzing the stakeholder environment and attending to stakeholders are important, since the success and survival of the organization depend on providing value to key stakeholders (Bryson 2004). In the case of government organizations funded with public budgets, this is particularly important. The perceived value and satisfaction of the direct end-users of the service provided by the organization is certainly the most important and some stakeholders can be useful both by directly helping in the improvement of the organization’s performance or, indirectly, by helping in the creation of a supporting environment that might improve the organization performance through, for example, ‘changing the organization’s externally imposed mandates, funding sources, d­ ecision-making protocols or accountability mechanisms’ (Ibid.: 24). Also, for addressing successfully security challenges of the nature of those which posed hybrid threats and political influence campaigns, an approach is required that considers the participation of stakeholders. As explained elsewhere, the executive is first and foremost the primary and key ­stakeholder of the intelligence services according to a producer/consumer relationship by which intelligence agencies produce and disseminate finished intelligence to support the decision-making processes of policymakers, in response to intelligence needs that the ­intelligence ­organizations have to satisfy. But the stakeholder environment of the intelligence community includes as well lawmakers, citizens and the society that the security and intelligence organizations are charged to protect other intelligence and security organizations both at home and abroad, international organizations, the media, intelligence and security contractors, among others (Arcos 2013: 335–338). Although in recent years Europe has become more acquainted on the value of analytic outreach and developing relationships with academia, with some European countries developing initiatives aimed to encouraging intelligence education, building awareness, or even research partnerships involving government, universities, and private companies, the facts are that the United States Intelligence Community has a longer tradition of interaction, relationship building with academia, and cooperation in general with the aim of improving the analytic performance. It is significant that the U.S. Intelligence Community Policy System includes an Intelligence 159

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Community Directive promulgated in 2008 on Analytic Outreach, later amended in 2013, ­directing agencies and intelligence officers to conduct outreach, as an essential activity for the analytic process: ‘Insights obtained from Analytic Outreach provide depth and context to analysis of intelligence questions […] may also indicate new lines of inquiry or challenges, identify alternative perspectives, and validate analysis’ (Director of National Intelligence 2013: 2). Addressing complex and dynamic security challenges requires multi-faceted approaches from international policymakers, security and intelligence agencies, being key the participation of stakeholders. In Europe, violent extremism and radicalization are driving the cooperation with this regard (European Commission Migration and Home Affairs 2018). In its communication on ‘supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism’, the European Commission recognizes the value of research and the need for developing relationships and cooperation with academia between security practitioners and academia. Under the framework of EU funded research: ‘Several projects on radicalisation were launched under the Seventh Framework Programme for European Research and Technological Development (FP7). These projects targeted a better understanding of the drivers underlying radicalisation, as well as methodologies to assess the effectiveness of measures addressing them’. In addition: In order to further bridge the gap between academia and security practitioners in this field, the Commission has included research topics on radicalisation and inclusion in 2016 under the Horizon 2020 programme. There is also important research on religious diversity in Europe. The fresh evidence generated by these projects will strengthen the capacity of Member States to fine-tune existing policy approaches and develop new policies and practices. (European Commission 2016: 4) More recently, on April 2017, the EU and NATO established the Helsinki-based European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats – Hybrid CoE. According to its foundational Memorandum of Understanding, from ‘a comprehensive, multinational, multidisciplinary and academic-based approach’, the Centre ‘is expected to serve as a hub of expertise supporting the Participants’ individual and collective efforts to enhance their civil- military capabilities, resilience, and preparedness to counter hybrid threats with a special focus on European security’ (Hybrid CoE 2017: 2). Research and analysis oriented to countering hybrid threats, training, or engagement between government and non-government experts from different professional sectors and disciplines are part of the Centre’s mandate to accomplish its mission. The relationships with university academics include the publication of open source strategic analysis papers (Arcos 2019).

Academic ethos As noted by Edward Shils, as a consequence of possessing a presumed mastery of a body of knowledge, academics enjoy certain opportunities for influence which are not accessible in the same way to the ordinary citizen; and as consequence of this special position, teachers and researchers have obligations, the sum of which constitutes the academic ethos (Shils 1978: 166). The obligations, derive primarily, if not exclusively, from the first obligation inherent in the custodianship, pursuit, acquisition, and transmission of knowledge – namely the concern to establish the truth in accordance with methodical procedures, by systematic study, in accordance with the rules of evidence and logical principles of reasoning. (Ibid.: 168) 160

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A governmental agency might ask a university teacher/researcher to provide expert j­udgment or advise on an issue in which decision-making needs scientific knowledge or a second expert opinion. Analogously to intelligence analysts, the academic ethos should prevent and grant that personal political views and partisanship to do not influence those judgments. Academic freedom constitutes an important element of the academic ethos. From the perspective of the university teacher/researcher, academic freedom ‘comprises three elements: freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of teaching within the university or college; and freedom of extra-mural utterance and action’ (AAUP 1915). In the 1915 AAUP Declaration, John Dewey and the other members of the Committee on Academic Freedom devised three functions of the academic institution: the promotion of inquiry and advancement of human knowledge; delivering general instruction to the students; and production of experts for various branches of the public service (Ibid.). Relationship building with academia and academic outreach by intelligence organizations needs to be conducted assuming these functions of the academic institution. However, the fact that intelligence organizations use secrecy as a tool to advance their mission has factual consequences that limit the value that professional academic researchers can provide. Intelligence, as a specific kind of knowledge to facilitate decision-making in the field of national security, provides a competitive advantage. Antagonistically to academic inquiry, intelligence sources and methods, and finished intelligence are to be protected, not published and disseminated broadly. This principle has important implications for the advancement of knowledge in the field of national security intelligence. Primary research in the study of intelligence will be necessarily limited by (1) the records available in the public domain in the case of nations that have a declassification policy in force – in some European countries, there is not a democratic culture of releasing any classified documentation after a certain period of time – and (2) the readiness of the intelligence institution to provide information for academic purposes, thus making difficult the establishment of generalizations and the testing of hypotheses. Scholars in certain countries, and the citizen in general, find it easier to find information on the intelligence institution and historical events from an intelligence perspective, by accessing the public available information on the Internet and released intelligence records of other countries, remarkably those of the United States. Analytic and production practices, intelligence processes, and the overall intelligence doctrine of countries with superior openness policies become influential as a consequence. Openness leads to influencing knowledge and in intelligence practices. As stated earlier, academics are in a favored position for influencing others, helping build awareness and discuss issues of interest for the community, and transmit knowledge to stakeholders. This offers excellent opportunities from the perspective of intelligence agencies to participate in academic forums and explain the mission, functions, and value that the intelligence institution provides to society. There is, however, the risk that the intelligence organizations and their leaders misinterpret these opportunities and consider just from a publicity perspective. Informed open discussion and criticism is typical of academic forums, and there is not any reasonable motive to make an exception with the intelligence institution.

Trust-building and community making through conferences and events Beyond being a part of the academic career for scholars, events provide opportunities for community making and trust-building with other stakeholders. They become frameworks for gathering together stakeholders with different organizational and professional backgrounds (academics, practitioners, journalists, business people, and even policymakers) for 161

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sharing insights and perspectives (Arcos, Marrin, and Phythian 2018). Intelligence studies events promote relationship building, information and knowledge sharing between academics, professionals, and other intelligence stakeholders, and provide opportunities to resolve academic controversies between peers relevant for the development of the field. They become temporal hubs for connecting nodes and build networks of research and collaboration (Ibid.). At the national level, some European countries have been very active organizing events and academic forums on intelligence and security issues. The cases described below constitute a small sample that evidences the activity developed in Europe in recent years. In the case of Romania, the ‘Mihai Viteazul’ National Intelligence Academy has been organizing the Intelligence in the Knowledge Society’ International Conference, that, as stated in its website, ‘reunites practitioners and national and international academia, experts from different intelligence agencies across Europe and the globe, as well as security studies and intelligence researchers’. In Sweden, The Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) within the Swedish Defence University also organizes workshops with the participation of practitioners and academic from different countries. In Portugal, SIRP (Sistema de Informações da República Portuguesa) under the policy of ‘cultura de Informações’ that aims to provide awareness to citizens on the role played by the intelligence services organizes an annual international seminar in partnership with Universidade Nova de Lisboa and the Institute of National Defence (IDN) covering topic themes such as ‘communication strategies in the context of terrorism’ or ‘Asymmetric Threats and Strategic Planning’ in the last two editions. The Spanish CNI, under the CNI intelligence culture initiative, has organized annual seminars as well, being the future of European intelligence the topic theme of its 2010 edition, and the universities with which the service has signed agreements have organized four editions of an International Conference on Intelligence. Rey Juan Carlos University and Carlos III University organized the first one in 2008. Besides national services initiatives, universities in Europe, associations, and think-tanks regularly organize academic events and workshops on intelligence and security topics. On June 2016, the European Chapter of the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) organized its First Annual Conference in The Netherlands with the participation of practitioners and academics, with subsequent annual conferences being organized in Greece, the United Kingdom, and Romania.

Academic relationships and intelligence analysis methods The U.S. Intelligence Community greatly differs in size and resources from the intelligence systems of European countries. The foreign policy interests are neither the same. However, a brief look into the historical development of the intelligence-academia relationship in the U.S. though the released records can be useful for gaining understanding on the general nature of the relationship. In the end, the dissemination of academic research findings tends not to be constraint by geographical limits, particularly in our era of globalizations and digital communication, and scholars have access to the work of their colleagues around the world. There is a long history of engagement between academia and the U.S. intelligence community, indeed. As stated in a declassified secret paper on the ‘Relations between the CIA and the Academic Community’, From its inception in 1947–1948 into the decade of the sixties the Central Intelligence Agency was closely and cordially linked the American academic community. The linkage was individual, not institutional, a product of the circumstances, not only that 162

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former professors and professors on leave were prominent in the leadership of the OSS, the predecessor agency of the CIA, and of the latter itself when it was formed, but also that academia was the principal reservoir to which the Agency might turn for the talents and also much of the general background information it required to perform its mission. (CIA 1980: 1) The CIA established back in 1966 the position of coordinator of Academic Relations. In an October 14, 1981 memorandum on this subject, the Coordinator for Academic Relations and External Analytical Support stated that the ‘most important function is to assist in making the interface between the Agency and academia productive for the former and helpful for the latter’ (CAR 1981: 1). However, the degree of understanding on the purpose and interest in building and maintaining relationships with academia varied. An August 1983 internal memorandum from the then Deputy Director for Administration stated that, …the CAR’s role has waxed and waned. Several DCIs have had varying degrees of interest in developing closer ties to academia. Congressional and media criticism of the Agency has not helped. The position has drifted from one component or directorate to another. Most recently, it has been a part of the Office of External Affairs and now of Public Affairs. The position exists to make relations between the Agency and the academic world productive for the former and helpful to the latter. The emphasis, then, should be on substance rather than on publicity. The CAR is charged with coordinating attendance at professional conferences, identifying prospective Scholars in Residence to Agency components, arranging substantive exchanges between our analysts and their academic counterparts, representing the Agency- on the Interagency Committee on Foreign Area Research (chaired by the Department of State) and arranging for appropriate briefings to professional groups that visit Headquarters. On occasion, the CAR has served as a conduit between well known scholars and the DCI and DDCI. Finally, the CAR works closely with the Publications Review Board and assists the Office of Information Services in reviewing for release under FOIA materials that trace the Agency’s relations with academic institutions. (Fitzwater 1983: 1–2) DCI Admiral Stansfield Turner believed that ‘research on better ways for doing analysis’ was ‘a logical area for Agency people to work cooperatively and openly with individuals and ­civilian academic institutions’ for the aim of improving the analytic capabilities of the agency (Tuner 1977). In the 1970s, the U.S. Intelligence Community produced a paper based on discussions with IC analysts on the use of what was then called ‘new analytical methods’. The paper discussed the work done with this regard inside the CIA, DIA, INR, and DARPA projects (CIA 1975). Among other developments, the study highlighted the publication of the Notes on Methodology Newsletter and the Glossary of Terms and Techniques for the Political Analysis by the Office of Current Intelligence, as well the fact the Agency was sending analysts to academic conventions on the subject (Ibid.). The Survey described the role of the Analytical Techniques Group within the Office of Political Research as including ‘the adaptation of existing techniques used in universities and private industry, as well as the creation of new techniques and arrangements to suit the unique needs of intelligence production’ (Ibid.: 10). Bayesian analysis, role playing games, Delphi, or scenarios were some of the methods mentioned in the paper. The setting up in 1973 of a Center for the Development of Analytical Methodology within the Office of Research and Development and an Analytical 163

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Support Center in 1974 – supervised by the former – sponsored by the CIA, the IC Staff, and ARPA were also initiatives discussed in this Survey. According to the released records, the Center was later replaced by the Analytical Methodology Research Division, charged with the m ­ ission of conducting interdisciplinary research and exploratory development in the management and information sciences; the economic and political sciences; the behavioral and life sciences, mathematics and statistics; and military science; and specifically with ‘anticipating intelligence problems requiring Social, Behavioural and Information Science inputs’ (CIA 1977). Similarly, in a Memorandum for the DCI Turner, the former CIA Deputy Director, E. Henry Knoche, pointed out that development of analytic techniques for intelligence had been a high priority and the work done by the Methods and Forecasting Division in the Office of Regional and Political Analysis studying, testing, and adapting analytic techniques employed by academia and industry (Knoche 1977). Richards J. Heuer, Jr., who headed this division, edited the volume ‘Quantitative Approaches to Political Intelligence: the CIA experience’ that grew out from a 1977 International Studies Association’s panel. In the paper that opened the volume, Heuer discussed the similarities and differences between academic research and intelligence analysis and the need for adapting relevant methods to the ‘specific problem context and to the requirements of a governmental organization producing reports, often on deadlines, to be read by policymakers rather than by academics’ (Heuer 1978: 4). Creating in-house research divisions on methods and techniques for intelligence, analogously to experiences in the U.S. Intelligence Community, or through the means of internal intelligence schools within European agencies is one of the potential approaches for developing analysis and assessment capabilities. For example, Lars Borg reported that the Norwegian Defence Intelligence School (NORDIS) conducted a ‘case study during the 2014 NATO winter exercise in Norway’ to test the validity of the NORDIS structured intelligence analysis methodology (Borg 2017: 17). Alternative approaches for intelligence analysis methodology development in the European context may include funding selected academic research projects or through competitive calls within funded national or European research framework programs involving the participation of end-users and other stakeholders. International Associations like the IAFIE European Chapter also include in its mandate ‘developing, disseminating, and promoting theory, curricula, methodologies, techniques, and best practices for pure and applied intelligence’ (IAFIE-Europe 2015).

Cooperation in the field of research NATO Science and Technology organization (STO) through the conduction of cooperative research and information sharing constitutes an important framework for relations development with academia. The STO mission consists on generating and exploiting ‘a leadingedge S&T programme of work, delivering timely results and advice that advance the defence capabilities of NATO Nations, Partner Nations, and NATO in support of collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security’ (NATO STO leaflet 2018). As explained in its website, STO cooperative effort is addressed by six technical panels managing a range of scientific research activities, a specialized group in modeling and simulation, as well a support Committee for Information & Knowledge Management needs.2 The Systems Analysis and Studies panel’s mission is to ‘conduct studies and analyses of an operational and technological nature, and to promote the exchange and development of methods and tools for operational analysis as applied to defence problems’. An example of the work developed under the panel 164

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is the task group on ‘Assessment and Communication of Uncertainty in Intelligence to Support Decision-Making’ with participant members from Europe, the U.S., NATO CMRE, and Canada, as a leading nation. STO projects have different levels of classification from not requiring a security classification to the highest NATO secret level. EU research and innovation funding programs under FP7-Security (2007–2013) and the current Horizon 2020 (2014–2020) provide an important framework for cooperation in the field of security. EU CORDIS website includes 321 entries for funded security-related research by FP7-Security, involving research partnerships between universities, private companies, government departments, and international organizations. Recognizing that ‘research and innovation is essential if the EU is to keep up-to-date with evolving security needs’, the April 2015 European Commission’s ‘European Agenda on Security’ asserted that the Horizon 2020 Programme could ‘play a central role in ensuring that the EU’s research effort is well targeted, including factoring in the needs of law enforcement authorities by further involving end-users at all stages of the process, from conception to market’ (European Commission 2015: 11). The latest EU Horizon 2020 Working Programme, covering the years 2018–2020, identified ‘societal resilience’ as a major priority, asserting that ‘Europe is facing multiple and seemingly sudden changes on multiple fronts, such as large migration pressures, cyber-crime, security threats as well as hybrid threats. Such events require, more than ever, capacities for coordinated EU responses’ (European Commission 2018: 11). The dedicated focus area ‘Boosting the effectiveness of the Security Union’ for addressing these securities issues was budgeted over EUR 1 billion supporting the implementation of the Security Union – main concerns: reacting to and recovering from natural and man-made disasters; preventing, investigating and prosecuting crime including organised crime and terrorism; improving border entry security; protecting infrastructure against natural and man-made threats, including cyber-attacks; digital security, privacy and data protection; and space-related research. (Ibid.: 44) The ‘General Matters’ section of the security call for this working programme encourages the interaction between security organizations, academia, and industry by funding the creation of Pan-European networks, being the handling of hybrid threats a specific area in the field of security that has called for the establishment of an EU-funded network.

Outlook Preventing and responding to national security threats increasingly involve a number of actors being necessary in building trusted relationships, encourage, and strengthen cooperation to address complex phenomena. This is almost certain to continue driving in the Europe the cooperative action of academia with the security and intelligence organizations, in the context of research funding schemes for research, education, and training. The growth experienced by the field of intelligence studies in the preceding years is likely to continue to be a trend, as more scholars from European countries participate in academic forums for the study of intelligence. Secrecy will continue to be a challenge for academic researchers, but is likely that the future release of classified records in some European countries stimulates further scholarship and helps to reduce what has been referred to by Loch Johnson (2014) as a ‘challenge of incompleteness’. Secrecy is a necessary tool for intelligence but before the t­ wenty-first-century complex security challenges, too much secrecy conflicts with effectiveness. 165

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Notes 1 See https://ojs.hh.se/index.php/JISIB/about/editorialPolicies#focusAndScope 2 See www.sto.nato.int/Pages/sto-panels.aspx

References American Association of University Professors. (1915). Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure. Available at: www.aaup-ui.org/Documents/Principles/Gen_Dec_Princ.pdf. Arcos, R. (2013). Academics as Strategic Stakeholders of Intelligence Organizations: A View from Spain. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 26(2): 332–346. doi:10.1080/088506 07.2013.757997. Arcos, R. (2019). EU and NATO Confront Hybrid Threats in Centre of Excellence. Jane’s Intelligence Review 31(3):28–33. Arcos, R. and Palacios, J-M. (2018). The Impact of Intelligence on Decision-Making: The EU and the Arab Spring. Intelligence and National Security 33(5): 737–754. doi:10.1080/02684527.2018.14 34449. Arcos, R., Marrin, S., and Phythian, M. (2018). Building the Intelligence Studies Community: The Role of International Conferences and Events. Paper presented at the panel Assessing and Improving Intelligence Education. International Studies Association. 4–7 April, 2018. San Francisco, CA. Borg, L. C. (2017). Improving Intelligence Analysis: Harnessing Intuition and Reducing Biases by Means of Structured Methodology. The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs 19(1): 2–22. Bryson, J. M. (2004). ‘What to Do When Stakeholders Matter: Stakeholder Identification and Analysis Techniques.’ Public Management Review 6(1): 21–53. doi:10.1080/14719030410001675722. CIA. (1975). A Survey of the Community’s Use of New Analytical Methods. Approved for Release 2003/09/02. Available at: www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83M00171R001800110002-5. pdf. CIA. (1977). Establishment of Analytical Methodology Research Division (AMR/ORD). General Notice No. 91, 12 January 1977. Available at: www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88 B00553R000100180034-2.pdf. CIA. (1978). CIA and the Academic Community. Approved for Release 2010/07/26. Available at: www. cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91G01170R003505680019-1.pdf. CIA. (1980). Relations between the CIA and the Academic Community. Secret Paper 17 December 1980. Approved for Release 2007/03/03. Available at: www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/ CIA-RDP86B00985R000300090011-8.pdf. CIA. (1981). Academic Relations. Memorandum for the Director of External Affairs, OPP, from the ­Coordinator for Academic Relations and External Analytical Support, NFAC. 14 October 1981. ­Approved for Release 2007/08/24. Available at: www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/­CIARDP85M00364R002003810016-4.pdf. Coordinator for Academic Relations (CAR) and External Analytic Support. (1981). Academic Relations, Memorandum for the Director of External Affairs, OPP, 14 October 1981. Approved for Release 2007/08/24. Available at: www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/­CIA-RDP85 M00364R002003810016-4.pdf. De Graaff, B. and Nyce, J. M. with Locke, C. (eds.) (2016). Handbook of European Intelligence Cultures. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Dover, R., Goodman, M. S., and Hillebrand, C. (eds.). (2013). Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. European Commission. (2015). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – The European Agenda on Security. Strasbourg, 28.4.2015 COM(2015) 185 final. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0185&from=EN. European Commission. (2016). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Supporting the Prevention of Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism. Brussels, 14.6.2016 COM(2016) 379 Final. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education_culture/repository/education/library/ publications/2016/communication-preventing-radicalisation_en.pdf.

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Academia and national security intelligence in the European context European Commission. (2018). Horizon 2020 Work Programme 2018–2020, European Commission Decision C(2018)4708 of 24 July 2018. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ ref/h2020/wp/2018-2020/main/h2020-wp1820-intro_en.pdf (Last accessed: 24 February 2018). European Commission Migration and Home Affairs. (2018). Charter of Principles Governing the Activities of the Ran Center of Excellence. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/ files/ran_charter_en_0.pdf (Last accessed: August 27, 2018). Fitzwater, H. E. (1983). Position of Coordinator for Academic Relations. Internal Memorandum for Executive Director. 15 August 1983. Approved for release 2008/03/03. Available at: www.cia.gov/library/ readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85B01152R000200260002-8.pdf. Freeman, E. R. (1984). Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. Boston, MA: Pitman. Gearon, L. (2018). ‘Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Policy and Research in UK Universities (1997–2017): An Analytic-Structural Review of the Literature and Related Sources,’ Policy Reviews in Higher Education 2(1): 32–60. doi:10.1080/23322969.2018.1424561. Gill, P. and Phythian, M. (2016). What Is Intelligence Studies? The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs 18 (1): 5–19. doi:10.1080/23800992.2016.1150679. Glees, A. (2015). ‘Intelligence Studies, Universities and Security.’ British Journal of Educational Studies 63 (3): 281–310. doi:10.1080/00071005.2015.1076567. Heuer, R. J. (1978). ‘Adapting Academic Methods and Models to Governmental Needs.’ In Quantitative Approaches to Political Intelligence: The CIA Experience, edited by Richards J. Heuer, Jr. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1–10. Hybrid CoE. (2017). Memorandum of Understanding on the European Centre of Excellence for Countering ­Hybrid Threats. Helsinki, 11 April 2017. Available at: www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/­uploads/2017/08/ Hybrid-CoE-final-Mou-110417-1.pdf. IAFIE-Europe. (2015). Mission Statement of the IAFIE-Europe. Available at: www.iafie-europe.org/ node/2. Johnson, L. K. (2014). ‘The Evolution of Intelligence Studies.’ In The Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, edited by Dover, R., Goodman, M.S., and Hillebrand, C. London: Routledge, 3–22. Johnston, R. (2005). Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency. Knoche, E. H. (1977). Development of analytic techniques, Memorandum to the Director 13 April 1977. Approved for release 2004/07/08. Available at: www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/ CIA-RDP91M00696R000700030020-5.pdf. Marrin, S. (2011). Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the Gap between Scholarship and Practice. New York: Routledge. Marrin, S. (2016). Improving Intelligence Studies as an Academic Discipline. Intelligence and National Security 31 (2): 266–279. NATO. (2018). ‘NATO Science & Technology Organization: Enabling Innovation for Alliance ­Defence and Security’, Leaflet. Available at: www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_­ topics/20180522_1882-16_STO_TRIFOLD.pdf (Last accessed: August 28, 2018). Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2013). Intelligence Community Directive -ICD 205: Analytic Outreach. 28 August 2013. Available at: www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD%20 205%20-%20Analytic%20Outreach.pdf (Last accessed: August 28, 2018). Palacios, J-M. (2016). Intelligence Analysis Training: A European Perspective. The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs 18 (1): 34–56. Palacios, J-M. (2017). Opening Data Gates: Declassified Intelligence Offers Analytical Insight. Jane’s Intelligence Review 29 (4): 54–57. Richards, J. (2016). Intelligence Studies, Academia and Professionalization. The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs 18 (1): 20–33. doi:10.1080/23800992.2016.1150683. Shils, E. (1978). The Academic Ethos. The American Scholar 47 (2): 165–190. Available at: www.jstor. org/stable/41210373. Tuner, S. (1977). Intelligence Analysis. Memorandum for Mr. Knoche. 31 March 1977. Approved for release 2004/07/08. Available at: www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-­R DP91M00696R 000700030020-5.pdf. Van Puyvelde, D. and Curtis, S. (2016). ‘Standing in the Shoulders of Giants’: Diversity and Scholarship in Intelligence Studies. Intelligence and National Security 31 (7): 1040–1054. Watt, D. C. (1988). Intelligence Studies: The Emergence of the British School. Intelligence and National Security 3(2): 338–341.

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9 THE GERMAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (BND) Publicly addressing a clandestine history Bodo V. Hechelhammer Introduction The BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst) is the foreign intelligence service of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is one of three German intelligence services, which includes the Domestic Intelligence Service of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz Bf V), and the Military Counterintelligence Service (Militärischen Abschirmdienst, MAD). The BND is composed of roughly 6,500 employees working in domestic and international offices worldwide. Since 1947, the most important facilities have been located in Pullach, south of Munich, and the center of Berlin. In 2006, a new BND headquarters was established in the middle of capital and in the summer of the year 2018, everything relocated to Berlin. Officially founded as a higher German Federal Authority on April 1st, 1956, the BND emerged from its predecessor organization, the so-called Gehlen Organization (Org) immediately after the end of WWII. Today, it belongs to the German Federal Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt BKamt) which carries out both professional and technical supervision. Within the BKamt, ‘Division Seven’ is also responsible for the coordination of all three federal intelligence services. As a foreign intelligence service, the BND is mandated to acquire knowledge on foreign countries of importance to foreign security policy for the Federal Republic of Germany. The necessary information is collected and evaluated for this purpose. The BND is also permitted to operate foreign intelligence on German soil and since December 1990, intelligence activity has been regulated by a separate BND-Act (BND-Gesetz, BNDG). According to BNDG, the BND is an assigned service provider, tasked to supply the Federal Government, ministries and/or even the military (Bundeswehr) with relevant information. This may include comprehensive political, economic or technical developments, and military issues, as well as any abstract or concrete threats to the security of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Federal Government requires an accurate, situation-picture for policy development and requires a great deal of information as a result. In this regard, the BND is fundamental to German foreign and security policy. Despite its importance to current foreign and security policy, the intelligence service in Germany has a poor reputation historically speaking. Intelligence services in general, 168

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especially in dictatorships and corrupt regimes, were used and are still effectively used as a tool for repression and oppression. Crimes of the Gestapo, secret state police, the security services of the SS (Sicherheitsdienst, SD) under National Socialism, as well as those of the GDR Ministry of State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, MfS or Stasi) in the ­German Democratic Republic (GDR) are still a part of the collective memory. This historical backdrop is always present during discussions about intelligence services and their activity. As a result, the work inherent in clandestine operations usually has a negative connotation in the public discourse. Their work is often equated with snooping, betrayal or even crime. Shrouded by fear, the German intelligence service is often demonized. In an open democracy based on political transparency, anything established by the state which is anonymous and state-run, the very definition of an intelligence service, is a provocation on a sociopolitical scale. Within a free and democratic society, the public wants to know as much as possible. This includes how an intelligence service works, what orders they receive from the government and if they adhere to the law. And yet, this legitimate demand is nothing more than a contradictio in adiecto, a contradiction between the necessity of privacy within intelligence work and complete transparency within an open democracy. Whenever actions of the intelligence service become public, it results in feelings of tension and reservation by the Federal Government. This is due to the extraterritorial role intelligence plays within the administration. It is important to note that not only the current, but also the historical image of the BND appears blurred due to the secured information of missions, the complexities of the work involved and the very essence of the service. The BND carries out their work exclusive to public knowledge. Their regulatory control is also confidential across the government, the Parliament, the Federal Audit Office and Data Protection Supervisors.1 Results of their work are not disclosed, successes not publicized and failures must be publicly explained. Until a few years ago, due to existing secrecy regulations and protection laws of archives, old files including historical events of the forties, fifties and sixties remained virtually inaccessible to the public. In 1992, former BND president Konrad Porzner (1990–1996) described these inevitable consequences of the service. Specifically, that one could not: … talk about their successes, nor publicly justify or explain their actions even in well known individual cases, [that] the media mostly focuses on the mishaps of intelligence work [which is] often why an unclear picture of the work of the intelligence agency exists. (p. 17)2 In 2013, Gerhard Schindler, BND president (2011–2016) mainly but not exclusively, due to the consequences of the NSA and in the wake of Edward Snowden revelations beginning in summer 2013, diversely required the Federal Intelligence Service provide more transparency “not as an end in itself, but as a prerequisite for a widespread foundation of trust in society.”3 According to Schindler, trust could only be gained by transparency and primarily made possible when an intelligence service addressed its past. A marginal note: Gerhard Schindler officially revealed offices of the BND to the public for the very first time. When he prematurely retired due to political reasons in spring of 2016, the public feared that his transparency initiative would come to a standstill.4 Today, the BND is developing a new paradigm for dealing with its past. They are handling everything proactively at first, albeit strategically, in order to gain political room to grow. Answering questions about the history of the BND is no longer contrary to being a secret intelligence service. However, understanding that open-minded storytelling can be used, even by an intelligence agency, has been a decades-long and lengthy process. 169

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Moving closer to the past The German Federal Intelligence Service was officially founded on April 1, 1956 and originally emerged from the so-called Organization Gehlen. In 1950 prior to the BND’s official formation, the Bf V was founded as a domestic intelligence agency and in 1951, the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA) and the Federal Border Police (Bundesgrenzschutz, BGS) were established under the police force. In 1955, the military established the Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) and in 1956, the Department of Security in the Federal Armed Forces (the predecessor of MAD, Amt für ­Sicherheit in der Bundeswehr, ASBw) was established as military counterintelligence. With the institution of the BND, the establishment of key organizations dealing with domestic and foreign security in Germany was complete. The establishment of the BND differs from the establishment of many other federal authorities, especially in the field of domestic and foreign security. Before 1945, the German Foreign Intelligence Service was decentrally organized. The BND has no explicit predecessor and therefore no long-standing tradition as an institution before the end of WWII. However, it is important to note that within individual cases, there was continuity within the organization of personnel. The German Federal Intelligence Service was immediately developed after World War II under the aegis of American intelligence, initially with the US Army and then by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1949. It was developed as a secret American operation, and why its existence, its mission and personnel over the years were not publicly known and should have remained a secret. Unlike the CIA, which publicly materialized under the National Security Act on September 18, 1947, the BND was established on an entirely different paradigm. As an arguable result, ‘the intelligence service was surrounded by an ambiguous cloud’ (p. 15) as told by the first president of the Org. Reinhard Gehlen (1902–1979) in his biography. Reinhard Gehlen served as the president until 1956.5 The BND did not have an official written history prior to 1945. Despite this fact, the public disputes with the foreign intelligence service were dominated by their ambitions from the very beginning to unveil its history, and with it the BND’s purpose. This exposure was intended to disqualify the service, juridically, politically and morally, specifically in reference to the continuous use of personnel from the time of National Socialism. The BND maintained this primary instinct of secrecy. Only rarely and in exceptional cases, did they publicly comment on issues and allegations, which also resulted in a passive habit of dealing with its own past. The BND has positioned itself in the defensive when dealing with its history. Internally, there were certain phases where BND authorities became aware of its own history, or rather aware of the lack of knowledge about it. After the end of his BND presidency in 1968, Reinhard Gehlen on behalf of his successor Gerhard Wessel (1968–1978) compiled a written history of the intelligence service. He assembled relevant historical incidences as a side project and was assisted by a small team who called themselves the Bohlen-group, named after their departmental head. The group was assigned to compile material, including experiences, on the development and history of the German Foreign Intelligence Service from 1945 until 1968. Initially, a generalized research of documents was methodically conducted, from which main topics eventually developed. The goal was to produce a summarized study of the history of the service after the Gehlen era. Retrieving existing records, reviving fading memories, organizing them and bringing it all into context were considered necessary. Reinhard Gehlen used these historical compilations a few years later for his biography ‘Der Dienst’ (The Service). Published in 1971 and backed by historical evidence, his biography meant to legitimize his intelligence activities, and above all justify his actions. 170

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The last eyewitnesses of the original organization retired in the beginning of the 1980s, and an organic generational change took place in the workforce. At the same time, the first administrative agreement also took place between the BND and the Federal Archives regarding the archiving of BND documents.6 On April 1, 1983, the BND established its own organizational unit for archives in the BND. Former ‘first-generation’ employees were questioned as contemporary witnesses about their memories of the founding history and development of the agency. These contemporary witnesses would be able to clarify former indecipherable situations and close the historical gaps dealing with the organization’s past. To mark the beginning of this historical revival, and in the name of tradition, they planned to publish the ‘St. George-News’ internally in 1984. Named after the patron saint of the BND, the newsletter was to inform the staff on events which occurred during the foundation phase.7 Commissioned by the authorities, a BND employee implemented studies on key events such as the popular uprising in the GDR in 1953, the Cuba Crisis in 1962 or the Prague Spring in 1968. The BND’s management of its own secretive history was initially more of an internal testimony than a scientific investigation, and it took place beyond the public domain. ­A ­scientific investigation was also not possible. The restrictive handling of the BND historical files meant that its history had to be considered unexplored. Earlier publications were based predominantly on secondary literature and were classified and cited accordingly. Some older publications from the 1970s were also based on disputable references, such as journalistic publications for which the BND had supplied with information. A change in attitude about the past only began during the 1990s, but it would be a decade later, when these discussions finally led the BND to concretely think about different approaches. One of the main ideas considered a revision of their own history as part of a larger research project. The agency itself was not responsible for this new approach to the past, nor was it influenced by any domestic affairs. It was in fact motivated by a US political decision to increase transparency. In the end of the 1990s under President Bill Clinton (1993–2001), Washington pursued a ‘thawing of politics’ in regard to its own archives. This action was also noticed by German intelligence. The US policy of transparency made it possible to inspect old intelligence files, indirectly pertaining to the BND.8 The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998 would become a legal foundation for the release of thousands of old files. It enabled the ability to disclose relevant resource material regarding the Nazi past. This concerned US Intelligence, but would also involve the Gehlen Organization, the American-established organization preceding the BND.9 Within BND leadership, it became quickly clear that first-time free access to CIA, Org files would inevitably increase the requests for BND files. The discussion of its history and its prior role would also result in questions concerning the time under National Socialism. Questions about the organization’s continuity in personnel, the role of former service members and specifically early intelligence connections during National Socialism were potentially harmful. However, prioritized focus was on individuals who would possibly be revealed on account of the release of American records. In response, the BND requested if CIA files about the preceding BND organization could be reviewed by an external research institution before being made public. At the end of 2002, a special task force working on historical records was instituted. An overall assessment to evaluate the realization of such a project was needed, and to also determine whether the files would be handed over to the German Federal Archives.10 Nonetheless, the BND would decide against distribution of the records, and ultimately rejected a scientific research investigation. The grounds for the initial dismissal were security reasons, particularly relating to organizational security, and the 171

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security of its personnel. The confrontation with its past was to be appropriately observed, but not actively pursued. In 2002, the CIA honored their file sharing law and released the records of their connections to the BND predecessor. The US Army in 2004 followed suit, disclosing their corresponding existing documents. For the first time, an accurate picture about the beginning of the German foreign intelligence service could be drawn because of the data-files.11 The protective walls, erected by the authorities for preservation of their official secrets and resulting in the confinement of their own history for decades, had been torn down from the outside. Leading up to the BND’s fiftieth anniversary in 2006, considerations for the project were made public and the idea of a historical research project became more concrete. Since fall of 2004, discussions were held with a history professor regarding who would be responsible for tracing the history based off the BND records. The impetus for this initiative came from the head of the Federal Chancellery Frank Walter Steinmeier (1998–2005) and was given to its subordinate, the BND. All the while, the ongoing debate between the ­German Foreign ­Office and its past was growing very strong. Then, in July 2005, there was an official ­h istorical commission appointment by the foreign minister at the time, Joschka Fischer (1998–2005), and the first meeting took place within the Federal Chancellery.12 From 1998 to 2005, Ernst Uhrlau was appointed as the head of department responsible for all intelligence services for the BND within the Federal Chancellery. Immediately after his appointment, the BND ­h istorical research project was planned to finally take off. However, the project was not to come to fruition for a number of reasons. Questions of security and handling of archives, as well as financial demands played an essential role in its deferral.13 Making it even more difficult for scientific research to take place, starting from 2005, the BND had to increasingly deal with parliamentary procedures. In 2005, there was a journalistic scandal, where an expert was appointed by a Parliamentary Oversight Panel to clarify transactions made by the BND.14 A Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry was also added in early 2006, dealing with BND involvement in the Iraq War. For years, the Federal Government and the BND had publicly supported the historical project. The endorsement addressed the issue of balancing public interest about the use of the documents and the possible breach of security involved when disclosing the classified documents.15 In 2007, the FDP (Free Democratic Party) made a small request to the Federal Government about the historical project, asking that the issues and possible after effects of National Socialism would primarily ‘be the responsibility, of the security authorities themselves.’ The Federal Government, in turn, gave their support of the project ‘with the means at their disposal, since the security agency has a designated responsibility for the protection of the liberal democratic constitutional order.’16 Up until this point, the necessity of researching the history of the BND had been increasingly discussed among public and political spheres. In March of 2010, the President of the BND, Ernst Uhrlau, solidified the terms of the historical research project in an interview. All specific requirements needed were announced, including the terms of BND personnel as well as the 500,000 Euros given for the project provided by the Federal Chancellery.17 In April, the German government confirmed ‘that a systematic review of its history will be sought by the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND).’18 At the same time, the disclosure of (up until this point) classified documents by the intelligence would result in a careful balance between the public’s interest in using the files and the possibility of security interference and interference of third party interests, as well as potential hindrance of work in general for the agency.19 However, public interest in disclosing aspects of the BND has still been considered secondary in comparison to other interests. 172

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Another incentive led to an open discussion of the BND, along with these outlined factors, relating to how the archived material was being accessed. Requests for access to files were generally not provided due to confidentiality concerns and almost always considered as negative. After the first time a journalist and publicist sued the BND for denying access to documents in 2008, the usual blanket of refusal to provide old Federal Intelligence Service files was rejected in 2010 by a decision of the Federal Administrative Court in Leipzig.20 Although the Federal Administrative Court in general accepted the grounds for denying access to files, they deemed complete obstruction as illegal. With the implementation of this decision, the BND was now forced to examine all information for potential release.21

Cultural evolution in the middle of dealing with the past At the end of Ernst Uhrlau’s BND presidency in early 2010, he revisited the historical project, which he previously advocated during his role in the Federal Chancellery. A research department was established internally, and was from then on responsible for the overall project’s realization. External experts were also sought after, since a comprehensive scientific research of the BND history pro domo personnel could not be achieved and politically would not be effective in terms of the public’s demand for an independent processing. In this case as well, there was a fundamental concern in regard to funding the research because of its proximity to politics. The projects would not be supported by established forms of research funding, such as the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG), but directly by administrations themselves. Various administrative bodies would personally select historians and research projects, granting privileged and first time access to files not seen by other researchers. The contractual rights and obligations of these governmental authorized research projects are of particular importance as a result. On February 15th, 2011, an independent historical commission (Unabhängige Historikerkommission, UHK) consisting of four renowned experts was appointed to the BND. The commission was authorized to investigate the official history which included its predecessor organization, its personnel and the action profile from 1945 to 1968, as well as the way the service dealt with its past.22 The completion of the project was officially scheduled to take place at the end of 2018. After several extensions, the UHK had more than two million euros and eleven of their own appointed research assistants. The BND-internal research group supported the commission with basic scientific research, any administrative and organizational questions, and archival work research. The BND archive personnel also considerably supported the project. The relevant files were located in the BND registry, and because the BND is subordinate to the Federal Chancellery, a comprehensive agreement regarding file access was made with the head of the Federal Chancellery. In support of the historical research project, they also appointed a Federal Government Commissioner of the BND history project within the Federal Chancellery. Beyond rules and regulations of politics and science, the ability to have both transparency and freedom to do academic research within an intelligence service is very difficult. Especially since their nimbus, environment and mode of operation are systematically characterized by secrecy. To a certain extent, this tension between secrecy and transparency is irreconcilable in a democracy, and therefore must be continuously monitored and renegotiated. Along these lines, former UHK member Jost Dülffer recently publicly stated: ‘You can throw away the idea of a completely transparent intelligence service right in the garbage.’23 The cold war as a political backdrop for intelligence services is no longer prevalent. However, the framework, its methodologies, techniques and ethics have basically remained the 173

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same since then.24This provides challenges for every intelligence service. The ability to verify findings and results is regarded as conditio sine qua non for scholarship, adding a number of hurdles when researching an active secret intelligence service. Due to necessary regulations, a reliably sourced research project of an intelligence agency must also occur within a struggle between the systemic security protocol of an intelligence agency operating in the interest of the functioning service and the public’s desire for maximum transparency. Therefore within this project, the legal framework and protection of archives must be observed, as they are defined in the Federal Archives Act in § 11. However, an existing confidential status can be modified in individual cases. In the case of the BND historical records, an individual’s connection to National Socialism is one of these exceptions. The naming of informants of the BND informants is against the interest of the state (protection of informants) and against their general right to privacy. The protection of informants is one of the basic foundations for ensuring successful undertakings of the German Federal Intelligence Service. It not only protects the personal security of the informants, but it also allows for the continuance of intelligence gathering. This commitment of confidentiality and unlimited identity protection is still crucial for the BND today. It stands as the most effective means for informants to gather vital information and fulfill their service. Informants can only be revealed, in exceptional cases under justifiable circumstances. Exceptional cases are only mentioned if the protection of the source, which is a right of publicity, is weakened and if the public’s interest in revealing that source is more important. When making a decision about the release of a file, the source of the information must be taken into account if they come from other authorities or intelligence services in other countries. It’s a question of ownership. Refusal of releasing foreign documents would be considered as a breach of trust by the intelligence service in question and would affect future cooperation with the BND. Even though the UHK Commission of researchers had almost eight years of comprehensive knowledge of the files, the cited tension between desired transparency and necessary confidentiality remained. Each potential release by the UHK was pended and reviewed for clearance by the BND. This process reviewed, if and when applicable to which extent, the release of files affected public interest and third party privacy rights. It also reviewed, in individual cases, if the public interest in revealing the files could justify the limitations of these individual rights. In the case of a dissent between the parties, the intervention of an arbitration committee for mediation was also contractually agreed upon. For decades, the BND was directly influenced by prior intelligence service experiences of the war and post-war years, including the Cold War. The existence of dual, east and west German states intensified this inherited way of thinking. As it is with any intelligence service and agency, the protection of employees and the confidentiality of their identity and methodology are the highest security priority. Within this world of thought, the possibility for public discussion of the past is eliminated. A review of its own past can only occur gradually over time. A part of the BND’s rethinking of its image includes a critical, transparent and accountable engagement of its past and understanding of its history. Those responsible for this long process of cultural change were by those who recognized the need for a historical overview and by those who laid the groundwork for necessary access to relevant documents. This revaluation had been legally and politically influenced by various endogenous and exogenous factors. Only after its review could the proper climate for such a corresponding research project be put into action. The investigation of an intelligence agency’s past, and achieving the necessary access to its documents on both a political and academic scale, is difficult to achieve. However, the future challenge is a necessary one. Consequently, the originally temporary research group working 174

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on the history project of the BND became an official organizational unit of the BND in 2016. A novelty in the history of German intelligence, the BND historical office was officially established. The historical office is now the point of contact for the public, as well as for domestic and foreign authorities on all questions and concerns relating to the history of BND. This also includes information requests by the press which are guaranteed by law. In addition to supporting independent lectures, film documentaries and publications on the history of the intelligence service, the agency provides various pieces of collected historical intelligence objects for well-known national and international exhibitions. A small part of a historical collection will be on display in 2019 in the new BND headquarters’ visitor center in Berlin. A visitor center, open to those interested and to the public, is unique in the world of intelligence. Visitors will be able to inform themselves about the current foundation, and also about the history of the BND. The Federal Archives Act is an act which regulates access to BND files. In 2017, after ­a lmost thirty years, the Federal Archives Act was updated. This amendment alone has made it easier for the public, i.e. journalists, scholars, scientists, researchers and private individuals to access confidential documents. A protection-period for personal data in the archives has been reduced from thirty years to ten years post-mortem. For office-bearers or people of contemporary history, the protection-term is completely eliminated unless the privacy of that person would be affected as a result. Publicly, it was considered a problem that the new intelligence service revisions would provide an exception to-the-rule in its obligation to provide archive files, if there were compelling reasons to protect sources, methodologies and individuals employed by the service. The amendment also provides that all employees of the federation submit their files to the Federal Archive, within thirty years at the latest. For the first time, the BND was explicitly allowed to inform the public about information the service gathered from the review of its past and the collection of information in accordance to 1 Abs. 2 BNDG.25 This new approach to intelligence history is currently reflected in the academic training of security agencies. The Federal University of Applied Administrative Sciences (­Hochschule des Bundes für öffentliche Verwaltung, HSB) together with the University of the ­Bundeswehr University Munich (Universität der Bundeswehr München, UniBwM) will provide a Master’s degree program for the first time in intelligence and security studies (MISS) in 2019. It will be an independent intelligence and security-related university education. This is unique to Germany. The academic models are usually located abroad, in corresponding courses at King’s College in London, at the Sciences Po in Paris or at the National Intelligence University in the United States. The MISS program is reserved for members of the Federal Intelligence Service, i.e. BND, Bf V and MAD, the State Office for the ­Protection of the Constitution (Lf V) as well as members of the Bundeswehr, especially in the field of military intelligence. However, in addition, the course of studies will also be open to members of the ministerial administration in respect to security policy, the employees of the police authorities of the federal and state governments working in the field of state security, and members of the parliamentary administration who work in the parliamentary control of the intelligence services. Professorship positions as a result have been set up for the first time, an example being in intelligence governance, as well as in intelligence history. A professorship for intelligence history is unique in the German academic landscape.26

Quo Vadis? Within the architecture of German security, the BND plays a central role and is responsible for preserving a basic liberal-democratic order. This is why it is vital to understand its 175

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identity. The current political as well as historical image and self-perception are necessary components in its identity formation. By becoming aware of its past, the BND assures its immediate integrity, not its past motives. This is needed for current undertakings, and the agency’s ability to act in the present and plan for the future. Transparency of its past emerges as a political, social and moral necessity. Firm ascriptions of identity help build the confidence to continue to operate in the present.27 Important steps have been taken to increase historical transparency from 2011 to 2018. This includes the UHK’s research mission and the permanent establishment of a historical department in the BND. Thinking consequently and addressing the past is the beginning of a permanent commitment for the BND; this is not a finite, but an ongoing process. The public’s interest of politics and society, and its curiosity of BND activity will also continue to exist. For the BND, the exploration into its past is not only a historical opportunity, but a political necessity. It brings objectivity to the debate in regard to intelligence activity, and withdraws itself from a breeding ground for myths and legends. It places the BND in an environment where confidence in its current and future missions takes precedence and with it, the allowance for room to maneuver.

Notes 1 See Porzner, K. (1993) Bericht und Kritik. Der Bundesnachrichtendienst im Gefüge der ­öffentlichen Verwaltung, Die Verwaltung. Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht und Verwaltungswissenschaften. 26, 17–27; Geiger, H.-J. (2007) Wie viel Kontrolle ist möglich und nötig? ­Rechtliche ­Grundlagen und politische Praxis in Deutschland. In: W. K. Smidt, W. K., Poppe, U., Krieger, W. & M ­ üller-Enbergs, H. (eds.) Geheimhaltung und Transparenz. Demokratische Kontrolle der ­G eheimdienste im internationalen Vergleich. Berlin, LIT Verlag, 33–45. 2 See Porzner, K. (1993) Bericht und Kritik. Der Bundesnachrichtendienst im Gefüge der ­öffentlichen Verwaltung, Die Verwaltung. Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht und Verwaltungswissenschaften. 26, 17–27. 3 Greeting from BND President Gerhard Schindler at the Colloquium of the Independent H ­ istorical Commission (UHK) on BND history in Berlin on 2 December 2013. 4 See Schmiese, W. (2016) Der Mann, der den Geheimdienst öffnete. Available from: www.cicero.de/ innenpolitik/ruecktritt-von-bnd-chef-gerhard-schindler/60835 [Accessed 25th June 2018]. 5 See Gehlen, R. (1971) Der Dienst. Erinnerungen 1942–1971, Mainz, Hase & Köhler, 15. 6 See Hammer, E.-U. (2004) “Archivwesen” im Bundesnachrichtendienst und Bestand B 206 im Bundesarchiv. Von Quellen-/Methodenschutz und dem historischen Interesse. Mitteilungen aus dem Bundesarchiv. 12, 42–44. 7 See Hechelhammer, B. (2013), Die Sankt-Georgs-Medaille des BND. Stiftung, Bedeutung und Verleihungspraxis der Erinnerungsmedaille des deutschen Nachrichtendienstes. Orden und ­Ehrenzeichen. 84, 62–68. 8 See Eckert, A. (2004) Kampf um die Akten. Die Westalliierten und die Rückgabe von deutschem Archivgut nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 21. 9 See Hechelhammer, B. (2013) Möglichkeiten und Grenzen des Zugangs zu Unterlagen der ­Nachrichtendienste. Geschichtsaufarbeitung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes im Spannungsfeld zwischen Geheimhaltung und Transparenz. Mitteilungen aus dem Bundesarchiv. 1, 52–60. 10 See Bundestagsdrucksache (2010) Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Jan Korte u. a. (Drucksache 17/2008), 17/2864, 6.9.2010. 11 See Breitmann, R., Goda, N. J. W., Naftali, T. & Wolfe, R. (ed.) (2005) U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis. Cambridge, University Press, 376; Krieger, W. (2009) Geschichte der Geheimdienste. Von den Pharaonen bis zur CIA. München, C. H. Beck Verlag, 266. 12 See Mentel, C. (2012) Die Debatte um “Das Amt und die Vergangenheit”. In: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (ed.) Aus Parlament und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ), Frankfurt am Main, ­Societäts-Verlag, 32–34; Sabrow, M. & Mentel, C. (eds.) (2013) Das Auswärtige Amt und seine umstrittene Vergangenheit. Eine deutsche Debatte. Frankfurt am Main, Fischer Taschenbuchverlag.

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The German foreign intelligence agency (BND) 13 See Schöllgen, G. (2011) Am Ende ohne Akten? Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8.9.2011, 12. 14 See Schäfer, G. (2006) Gutachten. Vom Parlamentarischen Kontrollgremium des Deutschen Bundestages beauftragter Sachverständiger. Berlin, Deutscher Bundestag, 1. 15 See Bundestagsdrucksache (2010) Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der ­Abgeordneten Jan Korte u. a. (Drucksache 17/2008), 17/2864, 6.9.2010. 16 See Bundestagsdrucksache (2007) Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage Abgeordneten Max Stadler u. a. (Drucksache 16/7063), 16/7379, 3.12.2007. 17 See Carstens, P. (2010) Nicht nach Gutdünken verfahren. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19.3.2010. 18 See Bundestagsdrucksache (2010) Schriftliche Fragen mit den in der Woche vom 12. April 2010 eingegangenen Antworten der Bundesregierung, 17/1389, 16.4.2010. 19 See Bundestagsdrucksache (2010) Schriftliche Fragen mit den in der Woche vom 12. April 2010 eingegangenen Antworten der Bundesregierung, 17/1389, 16.4.2010. 20 See Bundesverwaltungsgericht (2010) Beschluss vom 19. April 2010, BVerwG 20 F 13.09. 21 See Bundesverwaltungsgericht (2011) Beschluss vom 23. November 2011, BVerwG 20 F 22.10. 22 See description of the researches of the UHK. Available from: http://uhk-bnd.de/page_id=17, [Accessed 10th April 2018]. 23 See Frank, J. (2018) Einen transparenten Geheimdienst können Sie gleich in die Tone treten. ­Available from: http://www.fr.de/kultur/bnd-und-nsa-einen-transparenten-geheimdienst-­ koennen-sie-in-die-tonne-treten-a-1571148,0#artpager-1571148-1, [Accessed 1st September 2018]. 24 See Krieger, W. (1997) Nutzen und Probleme der zeitgeschichtlichen Forschung über Nachrichtendienste. In: Krieger, W. & Weber, J. (eds.) Spionage für den Frieden? Nachrichtendienste in Deutschland während des Kalten Krieges München, Olzog Verlag, 9–22, 10. 25 See Wolff, P. (2017) Auskunfts- und Informationspflichten der Nachrichtendienste. In: Dietrich, J.-H. & Eiffler, R. (eds.) Handbuch des Rechts der Nachrichtendienste. Stuttgart, Richard Boorberg Verlag, 1657–1761, 1715. 26 See MISS. Available from: https://www.unibw.de/ciss/miss/miss [Accessed 18th December 2018]; Studium zum Spion (2017). Süddeutsche Zeitung online. Available from: https://www.sueddeutsche. de/muenchen/landkreismuenchen/neubiberg-studium-zum-spion-1.3793809. [Accessed 18th December 2018]. 27 See Wertgen W. (2001) Vergangenheitsbewältigung: Interpretation und Verantwortung. Ein ethischer ­B eitrag zu ihrer theoretischen Grundlegung. Paderborn, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 363.

References Dietrich, J.-H. & Eiffler, R. (eds.) (2017) Handbuch des Rechts der Nachrichtendienste. Stuttgart, Richard Boorberg Verlag. Hechelhammer, B. & Meinl, S. (2014) Geheimobjekt Pullach: Von der NS-Mustersiedlung zur Zentrale des BND. Berlin, Chr. Links-Verlag. Mentel, C. & Weise, N. (2016) Die zentralen deutschen Behörden und der Nationalsozialsmus – Stand und Perspektiven der Forschung, Bösch, F., Sabrow, M. & Wirsching, A. (eds.) München, Institut für Zeitgeschichte. Waske, S. (2009) Mehr Liason als Kontrolle: Die Kontrolle des BND durch Parlament und Regierung ­1955–1978. Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Wolf, T. (2018) Die Entstehung des BND. Aufbau, Finanzierung, Kontrolle. Berlin, Chr. Links-Verlag.

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10 THE FIGURE OF THE TRAITOR IN THE CHEKIST COSMOLOGY1 Julie Fedor

Introduction In December 2017, the director of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Aleksandr Bortnikov looked back on a century’s history of the Soviet and post-Soviet Russian security apparatus, in a high-profile interview with the newspaper Rossiiskaia gazeta. Bortnikov was criticized roundly in the oppositional media for a series of erroneous, misleading, and offensive statements made in the interview, including his suggestion that the Stalin-era Great Terror was a justified response to real conspiracies, and for his stubborn defense of the title of ‘chekist’—the generic term derived from the title of the original VChK 2 or Cheka created in December 1917, and still in use today to designate the staff of the present-day Russian security apparatus (see New Times 2017; Petrov 2018; Ponomarev 2017). Bortnikov’s interview illustrates the deep-seated ambivalence and denial that continue to characterize official attitudes toward the heavy historical baggage of this institution’s violent past. It highlights the ways in which today’s chekists, the self-proclaimed successors to the Soviet security and intelligence services, continue to perpetuate and update elements of the chekist worldview in contemporary Russia. We might think of this worldview as based on a distinctive cosmology, a moral universe with its own values, categories, tenets, and taboos (see Fedor 2011a). While the Soviet and Russian security and intelligence organs have usually been studied from a social science perspective, this article brings a humanities perspective to bear on this topic. A cultural history approach focused on the chekist cosmology and its historical roots can provide a fresh angle on the current and emerging ideological landscape in Russia, at a time when, in important ways, reconstituted chekist discourses and enemy images are shaping and sharpening the definitions of self/other and of political and national belonging in Russian public life. In this chapter, I focus on one element of this chekist cosmology: the figure of the traitor. I take as my point of departure a key claim made by Bortnikov in his 2017 interview, about the ways in which foreign powers bent on destroying Russia have made use of ‘traitors’ inside the country. Bortnikov asserted that in evaluating chekist history, […] [o]ne must take historical conditions into account. On repeated occasions our ­ atherland was the object of hostile incursions by foreign powers. The adversary tried F to defeat us either in open battle, or by relying on traitors inside the country, using their 178

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help to sow trouble, divide the nation, paralyse the state’s ability to react to emerging threats in a timely and efficient manner. For some, the destruction of Russia to this day remains an idée fixe. (Fronin 2017)

The figure of the traitor in the chekist cosmology In pointing to the presence of ‘traitors,’ Bortnikov was in keeping with an important and longstanding chekist tradition. The figure of the traitor (predatel’) is a fundamental element in the chekist moral universe. Time and again, narratives of betrayal and treachery have provided a crucial explanation and justification for chekist actions, both historical and contemporary; the figure of the traitor has comprised the chekist hero’s most significant and diabolical other, enabling definition of the chekist identity and stigmatization of the chekist’s opponents. It is no exaggeration to say that the very existence of the chekist is grounded in and predicated upon the existence of the traitor. In this chapter, I approach chekist political culture through an exploration of the framing of the figure of the traitor. I argue that the traitor is a key archetype in the chekist cosmology, and one which thus offers a useful lens for examining the distinctive culture surrounding the intelligence and security apparatus in contemporary Russian public life, and the ways in which it constructs and demonizes its opponents. First, a few remarks are in order on the existing literature around this topic. Various scholars have noted the importance of the formative and ongoing influence of the Soviet security apparatus in forming political culture in contemporary Russia (see e.g. Taylor 2018: 2, 23). Yet, such claims are usually made only in passing, and this is very much an understudied topic. What discussion does exist on the ‘chekist factor’ in contemporary politics is frequently superficial and/or crudely sensationalist (see e.g. Sedelmayer 2019). The lack of scholarship on the subject of chekism, past and present, in large part reflects the fact that the closed nature of this institution has made it an exceptionally difficult object of study. A generation has passed since the fall of Soviet communism, and yet our knowledge about the functioning of the institution at the heart of that system—the chekist state security ­apparatus—remains highly fragmentary and incomplete. This being said, we are now in a better position than ever before to investigate this institution’s history. The Soviet security apparatus’ power drew upon the vast archives that it created and controlled, and despite the fact that declassification of the Russian state security archives has been moving in a reverse direction since the mid-1990s, archival sources on this history are now accessible to an unprecedented degree, especially with the recent opening of the KGB archives in Ukraine (2015) and Latvia (2018). Scholars have begun to take advantage of the greater openness of the archival regimes in these countries (see, for example, Cohn 2017; Viola 2017). Meanwhile, great strides have been made when it comes to ­ astern advancing our knowledge of the history of the Soviet system’s filials throughout the E bloc, in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania, in particular (see, for example, Szwagrzyk 2005; Piotrowski 2006, 2008; Graczyk 2007; Glajar, Lewis and Petrescu 2016; Pucci 2018). Still, much work remains to be done, particularly, as I have argued elsewhere (Fedor 2011a, 2011b, 2019; Blacker and Fedor 2015), when it comes to understanding the chekist worldview and the ‘keywords’ of chekist political culture. In this chapter, I draw upon open-source materials—chekist memoirs, public statements, and media interviews—commenting on the theme of traitors and treachery. The ongoing salience of the ‘traitor’ trope in post-Soviet space is in striking contrast to the situation in the West, where the figure of the traitor and the language of treachery have 179

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largely faded away. Google Ngrams, for example, shows a sharp decline in the frequency of related terms in modern English. We might see this as part of a broader development: the declining importance of the concept of ‘honor’ in the modern Western world, a trend which became especially marked in the wake of the two world wars (see further the work of historian of emotions; Ute Frevert 2011). Traitors, treachery, and honor form a semantic cluster which is now largely viewed as outmoded and tends not to be taken or used seriously in public life in English-speaking countries. In the OED’s word frequency ranking system, the words ‘traitor’ and ‘treachery’ are both located in Band 5. Words in Band 5 ‘tend to be restricted to literate vocabulary associated with educated discourse, although such words may still be familiar within the context of that discourse.’ By contrast, these are terms that are used quite frequently in Russian public life (see further Radnitz 2018). The longevity of the language of treachery and betrayal in Russia and elsewhere in ­post-Soviet space in part reflects the important role played by Soviet state security discourses in shaping political culture in that region. One sphere in which otherwise archaic sounding references to ‘traitors’ do remain current in the Western world is that of the ‘secret world’ of intelligence, which is the world of the traitor par excellence. One still finds this language in the titles of British spy novels (Le Carré 2010) and popular espionage histories (MacIntyre 2018), or in media commentary on the nastier varieties of political in-fighting. But in post-Soviet Russia, we find a situation in which the figure of the traitor as well as other categories and values structuring the chekist moral universe are also prevalent in public life much more broadly. This is similar to the phenomenon discussed by Ute Frevert in her examination of the waning of the concept of honor. Frevert points out that while the notion of honor has generally been disappearing from modern cultures and societies, it tends to re-appear quickly in times of war and in militarized societies: ‘Wherever “obsolete classes” like military officers reclaim power, honour is back on the agenda’ (Frevert 2011: 84). In the Russian case, a chekist-led political system that has been dubbed a ‘spookocracy’ by the Economist (cited Marten 2017), we find what Brian B. Taylor calls a ‘set of habits and emotions that guide policy and decision-making’ that have been influenced in important ways by the Soviet security apparatus (Taylor 2018: 2). A strong preoccupation with the figure of the traitor is one such habit of mind; studying the framing of the traitor in Putin’s Russia can thus help to illuminate not just the chekist cosmology, but also the ideology and worldview of the Putin regime more broadly. A good starting point for this topic is the case of what is currently perhaps the world’s most famous traitor: former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal’, who was poisoned together with his daughter in Salisbury in March 2018, in a deadly nerve agent attack apparently carried out by the Russian security apparatus as revenge for betrayal (see Guseinov 2018) and in a show of the Russian state’s reach and indifference to the consequences of carrying out such an attack on foreign soil. We might think of this as an attempt to project what Mark Galeotti (2018a) has called ‘dark power’—a substitute for unattainable ‘soft power’ or ‘hard power.’ In one early comment on the case on Russian federal TV, on 9th March, anchor and leading media executive Kirill Kleimenov spoke at length on the case: I … don’t wish death on anybody. But I’d like to issue a warning, purely for pedagogical purposes, to all those dreaming of a career like that… The profession of traitor is one of the most dangerous in the world. Statistically it’s much more dangerous than being a narcotics courier. Very rarely do those who choose it live out their years peacefully … Alcoholism and drug addiction, stress, severe nervous disorders and depression are the traitor’s unavoidable professional ailments. (BBC Russkaia sluzhba 2018) 180

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Kleimenov went on to ‘joke’ that those ‘who simply hate their country in their free time’ should not choose England as their new country of residence: ‘Something’s not right there. Maybe it’s the climate. But too often in recent years strange incidents with bad outcomes happen—people are hanging themselves, getting poisoned, dying in helicopter crashes and falling out of windows on an industrial scale’ (ibid.). Mark Galeotti has provided an astute summary of the mixed messages and insinuations conveyed by Kleimenov’s commentary: ‘bullying braggadocio, threats, sarcasm, all underpinned by a sly wink and a hint that a traitor “got what he deserved”’ (Galeotti 2018c). Later, the Kremlin’s line on the case changed. On 16th March, the ex-GRU head Fedor Ladygin (1992–1997) claimed that Russian intelligence had never carried out attacks of this kind, and ‘never engaged in such repulsive idiocy as they’re trying to attribute to our county in Great Britain now’ (newsru.com 2018). Ladygin also came close to implying that killing would be too good for a traitor: ‘For an intelligence officer, a traitor dies immediately—he absolutely ceases to exist in memory; he’s erased from it. For a traitor, forgetting is death’ (ibid.). Putin’s take on the case also placed an emphasis on depicting Skripal’ as beneath contempt, and beyond the pale. In October 2018, President Putin said to a journalist, ‘Your colleagues are pushing the line that mister Skripal’ was practically some kind of human rights activist. He’s simply a spy—a traitor to the Motherland. You understand, there’s this concept: a traitor to the Motherland. He’s simply scum [podonok], and that’s all’ (Bolgova 2018 and Gazeta.ru 2018). Putin and other chekist commentators often frame such cases as morality tales. In ­December 2010, Putin emphasized the torments of conscience that were the lot of the traitor: How’s he going to live with this [betrayal] his whole life? How’s he going to look into his children’s eyes, the swine?! No matter what, and no matter what 30 pieces of silver these people get, they’ll stick in their throat, I assure you. Hiding for your whole life, not being able to have contact with loved ones—you know, a person who chooses this fate will regret this a thousand times. (812’online 2018) The moral of this story is that traitors always get what they deserve. As Putin put it in 2010, ‘traitors… will rot of their own accord [sami zagnutsia] … traitors always come to a bad end, from vodka or from drugs. Just recently there was one who ended his existence like that, somewhere abroad’ (seemingly a reference to the recent death of Sergei Tret’iakov in the US) (Pervyi kanal 2010). Former illegal Gevork Vartanian made a similar comment a few weeks previously, that [a]ll traitors come to a bad end—few of them live to go grey. These bastards often fall under the wheels of a car or drink themselves to death. Probably their conscience torments them: after all, how can you betray the Motherland, where you were born, where you grew up, where your friends are? (Merkacheva 2010) Whether the traitor self-destructs in a kind of slow suicide or falls victim to an ‘accident,’ the point is that the traitor represents the lowest of the low, whose death is barely worthy of our attention. The circumstances may be murky and suspicious, but who cares? Nobody—and this is a key message conveyed in the rhetoric on this topic. Vartanian emphasized that even the Americans look upon such traitors with contempt (Merkacheva 2010). On occasion, Putin has come close to suggesting that the right to pronounce a death sentence on traitors is governed by a kind of corporate code of honor adhered to by all 181

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intelligence agencies but not made explicit to outsiders. When asked in 2010 whether traitors living abroad would be ‘liquidated’ in the wake of the embarrassing exposure of a Russian network of illegals operating in the US, Putin responded: ‘I think it’s an improper question [….] and such decisions are not made at a press conference. Intelligence agencies have their own code, and all their staff follow it’ (cited Urban 2018). Certainly, Putin has emphasized the fact that betrayal is the most contemptible category of crime. On the centenary of the GRU in November 2018, for example, Putin proclaimed that there was ‘no greater disgrace [pozor] than to betray the Fatherland, betray one’s comrades.’ This view is echoed by other chekists. In his memoirs, former chekist F. L. Zhorin proclaimed that: ‘Since time immemorial betrayal of the Motherland has been considered the most repulsive, base, disgusting crime. A crime of extreme dishonor’ (Zhorin 2017). Consequently, the 1996 change to the Russian criminal code, whereby treason was no longer a capital offense, was reportedly an unpopular one, interpreted by some as ‘removing a key disincentive to work for a foreign government’ (Urban 2018; see also Soldatov 2011) (in any event, in 2006, the FSB was granted the right to carry out assassinations abroad (Soldatov 2017: 136)). There have been various second-hand reports that Putin personally considers betrayal and treachery to be particularly despicable acts. According to Ekho Moskvy chief Aleksei ­Venediktov, Putin once said to him during a conversation early in Putin’s first presidential term that he divided his opponents into two categories, ‘enemies’ and ‘traitors’; one could at least understand an enemy (Znak 2015), but in the case of a traitor, one should show no mercy (Taylor 2018: 28). Putin has also said that it was on the streets of Leningrad as a teenager that he learned that ‘treachery and betrayal were…the worst, most despicable thing’ (ibid.). Similarly, Galeotti writes that Putin has displayed a ‘particular hatred for those who betray their state and their service today. Broadly speaking, mere dissidents will be harassed, silenced or expelled, but those whom Putin considers turncoats tend to find themselves facing much more direct retribution’ (Galeotti 2018b: 50). Evgenii Satanovskii echoes this claim (Inosmi 2014) (see also Taylor 2018). Performative retribution against traitors, enacted through the high-profile cases of the poisonings of Skripal’ and of Aleksandr Litvinenko, also carries an ideological and political message. These two cases have been interpreted as aimed at sending ‘a deliberate signal … that treachery would never be forgiven’ (Urban 2018). In the case of Litvinenko, the radical extent of the victim’s ostracism was underlined by media interviews with Litvinenko’s father, in which he publicly disowned his son and asserted that his killing was justified: Had I known that my son was working for British intelligence, I wouldn’t have even said anything about his death. Our special services could simply have shot him, and they would have the right to do so. Traitors should be shot. That’s all there is to be said about it. (cited Limonov 2016) This calls to mind Soviet chekist practice, whereby family members of the victims of repressions were called upon to renounce and condemn their loved ones publicly. The harsh condemnation of treason and betrayal is not, of course, specific to chekist culture, or to Russian culture. Narvselius and Grinchenko (2018) trace this back to antiquity when ‘betrayal was shrouded in an aura of mysticism and sacral horror,’ and they point out that ‘Violation of oaths… has been almost universally classified as the moral nadir, and an unforgivable crime deserving the most severe punishment.’ But they note that betrayal ‘acquired a particular political salience in the modern era’ such that, enabling the definition of nations, for example, by virtue of its connection to notions of group belonging and loyalty. 182

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In the Russian case, a preoccupation with betrayal and treachery has been an important feature at various key turning points in twentieth-century history (see e.g. Fuller 2006). In contemporary Russia, and especially after the 2014 annexation of the Crimea, this preoccupation has been linked to a hardening of the boundaries, and with what Liliia Shevtsova (2014: 76) has called a ‘fusing of foes foreign and domestic into a single force,’ reflected in increasingly prevalent references to ‘national-traitors,’ most famously in Putin’s Crimean speech in March 2014 (Pavlova 2014). As we might expect, the war in Ukraine has been accompanied by a new salience of this label, applied to those protesting the war (see, for example, Saburova 2015; Solov’ev and Shafran 2014). As Andrei Soldatov has pointed out, the figure of the traitor was a key trope in Soviet espionage narratives, and was especially useful as a scapegoat on whom failures could be blamed (Soldatov 2011). The continuing use of this practice was very much in evidence after the exposure of the network of Russian illegals based in the United States in 2010, when pro-Kremlin media coverage emphasized the fact that the blame for this embarrassment lay squarely with a traitor. In federal TV coverage titled ‘Every failure is the result of betrayal,’ Yurii Kobaladze, the former head of the Russian foreign intelligence press bureau (1991–1999), commented that he was glad that the media was reporting on the illegals’ betrayal, because this would put an end to any speculation that the exposed agents may have been unprofessional: ‘They were exposed only because some bastard gave them up, and not because they’re incompetent’ (Pervyi kanal 2010). The former illegal Gevork Vartanian also gave an interview in which he observed that ‘Nothing will save you if a traitor points his finger at you… the traitor alone is to blame for everything’ (Merkacheva 2010). Vartanian further suggested that such cases were anomalies, and that it was recognized throughout the secret world that the Russian foreign intelligence service ‘is made up of unique, sincerely devoted people, and is one of the most effective… Hence the constant attempts to discredit Russian intelligence through all kinds of information campaigns’ (ibid.). The figure of the traitor ties in neatly with a national myth of invincibility. It is often claimed that Russia can only be defeated through recourse to traitors. Chekist memoirist Zhorin, for example, claims that Western special services realized as early as in 1946 that defeating the Soviet Union at war was impossible; the only potential path to success lay in recruiting domestic traitors and corrupting the country from within (Zhorin 2017). The traitor trope offers an especially powerful tool for discrediting and demonizing opponents, and for drawing a sharp boundary between loyalty and betrayal, leaving no room for shades of opposition or legitimate criticism. Dissidents were stigmatized and branded as traitors in this way during the Soviet period. In his memoirs, former leading Soviet chekist Filipp Bobkov frames dissent as ‘betrayal,’ and criticizes the Soviet leadership for having failed to take adequate measures against the US campaign to ‘assist dissent and treachery [predatel’stvo] among the Soviet people’ (Bobkov 1995: 36–37). The figure of the traitor features prominently in conspiratorial histories of the Soviet collapse, many of them authored by former chekists. Former USSR KGB chief (1988–1991) Vladimir Kriuchkov is quoted as having said that ‘Gorbachev was always a traitor to the country and the party’ (Shved 2013). Former GRU colonel Aleksandr Zhilin (now head of the Centre for the Study of Public Applied Problems of the National Security of the Russian Federation) has claimed that ‘Yeltsin destroyed [the KGB] personally, so that nobody would be able to detect how Russia was sold off, so that nobody could take the measure of the level of treachery at the very top’ (Rychkova 2018). Former chekist F. L. Zhorin’s entire memoir takes as its key theme the treachery of Gorbachev, condemned by Zhorin as bearing ‘the stigma of a filthy traitor… perhaps, the biggest for all of history’ (Zhorin 2017). The view 183

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that the Soviet collapse was brought down by high-level traitors is also widespread in the popular conspiracy theory literature, such as Starikov (2017) (he argues that this is a congenital feature of the Russian elite), and Prokhanov (2011) (who asserts that ‘the great country was destroyed by a tandem of traitors,’ Yeltsin and Gorbachev). Most recently, we see the emergence of new historical narratives, peddled on federal TV, whereby pro-Ukrainian traitors are placed in a single line stretching back through a long line of historical traitors, and ‘betrayal’ itself is described as an ‘ideology,’ whose adherents are genetically determined, a kind of degenerate strain in the nation’s gene pool which must be eradicated if the country is to survive (see Semin 2014, 2015). The notion that the Ukrainian nation is inherently predisposed to treachery has long been a staple of such propaganda, and this has only intensified since the beginning of the war, in a mechanism that Tanya ­Zaharchenko has dubbed the ‘geo-tagging [of ] treachery’ (Zaharchenko 2018). In such literature, the figure of the traitor is often heavily gendered and marked as feminine; and it is always presented as an object inspiring disgust, in a manner reminiscent of the operation of fascist discourses of the Other (on which see Miller 2004). Perhaps most frighteningly, once accused of betrayal, it is never possible to prove one’s innocence definitively; as Putin said in December 2014 on the topic of ‘national-traitors,’ ‘It’s difficult to give a scientific definition as to where opposition ends and the ‘fifth column’ begins’ (mk.ru 2014).

Conclusion The figure of the traitor becomes prominent at times of tension and real or perceived threats to group cohesion and boundaries. A rise in the frequency of references to traitors signals a growing potential for violence and conflict, a growing intolerance of pluralism, and a radical limiting of the positions available to a loyal and patriotic citizen. The label predatel’ can itself be used as an instrument of terror, especially when wielded by state leaders and mass media. The growing salience of the figure of the traitor suggests that we are at a tipping point, where the Other becomes the Enemy (see Vuorinen 2012), representing a new level of active threat and potentially justifying pre-emptive violence. When it comes to traitors and treachery, the stakes are high and radical measures are called for. The figure of the traitor in the chekist cosmology has taken different forms at different times, from the (often Jewish) dissident, to the Crimean Tatar or the Chechen accused of wartime collaboration, to the liberal oppositionist accused of being on the CIA pay roll. The predatel’ carries a heavy weight of historical baggage—it was (and remains) key to justifying Stalinist terror. And it remains perhaps the most important foil for the chekist hero.

Notes 1 The research for this chapter was supported under the Australian Research Council’s Discovery Early Career Research Awards (DECRA) funding scheme (project DE150100838). The views expressed herein are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Australian Research Council. 2 The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage, established on 20 December 1917.

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The traitor in the chekist cosmology Blacker, U. and Fedor, J. (2015) ‘Soviet and Post-Soviet Varieties of Martyrdom and Memory,’ Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 1:2: 197–215. Bobkov, F. (1995) KGB i vlast’. Moscow: Veteran MP. Bolgova, E. (2018) Putin o Skripale: on prosto shpion—predatel’ Rodiny, Komsomol’skaia pravda, 3 ­October, www.kp.ru/online/news/3254873/. Cohn, E. D. (2017) Coercion, Reeducation, and the Prophylactic Chat: Profilaktika and the KGB’s Struggle with Political Unrest in Lithuania, 1953–64. The Russian Review 76 (April): 272–293. Fedor, J. (2011a) Russia and the Cult of State Security: The Chekist Tradition, from Lenin to Putin. London and New York: Routledge. Fedor, J. (2011b) ‘Chekists Look Back on the Cold War: The Polemical Literature,’ Intelligence and National Security 26: 6 (December): 842–63. Fedor, J. (2019) ‘Soviet Narratives of Subversion and Redemption during the Second Cold War and Beyond’, in V. Glajar, A. Lewis, and C. L. Petrescu (eds.), Cold War Spy Stories. Lincoln: Nebraska University Press. Frevert, U. (2011) Emotions in History: Lost and Found. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press. Fronin, V. (2017) FSB rasstavliaet aktsenty. Rossiiskaia gazeta, no. 7454, 19 December, https:// rg.ru/2017/12/19/aleksandr-bortnikov-fsb-rossii-svobodna-ot-politicheskogo-vliianiia.html Fuller, W. (2006) The Foe Within: Fantasies of Treason and the End of Imperial Russia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Galeotti, M. (2018a) Babchenko’s Death and Russia’s Dark Power (Op-Ed). Moscow Times, 30 May, https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/babchenkos-death-and-russias-dark-power-op-ed-61632. Galeotti, M. (2018b) The Vory: Russia’s Super Mafia. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press. Galeotti, M. (2018c) Russia Pursues ‘Dark Power’ and the West Has No Answer. Raamop Rusland, 15 March, https://raamoprusland.nl/dossiers/kremlin/894-russia-pursues-dark-power-in-the-skripal-case. Gazeta.ru. (2018) Putin nazval Skripalia podonkom, gazeta.ru, 3 October, www.gazeta.ru/politics/ news/2018/10/03/n_12118981.shtml. Glajar, V., Lewis, A. and Petrescu, C. L. (eds.) (2016) Secret Police Files from the Eastern Bloc: Between Surveillance and Life Writing. Rochester, NY: Camden House. Graczyk, R. (2007) Tropem SB. Jak czyta ć teczki. Kraków: Znak. Guseinov, G. (2018) Glavnoe yazykovoe sobytie 2018 goda, ru.rfi.fr, 30 December. Inosmi. (2014) ‘Nastoichivost’ Putina: Predatel’stvo—samoe bol’shoe prestuplenie, Inosmi.ru, 16 ­October, https://inosmi.ru/politic/20141016/223717252.html. Le Carré, J. (2010) Our Kind of Traitor. New York: Viking Press. Limonov, E. (2016) Opiat anglichanka gadit. Izvestiia, 22 January, https://iz.ru/news/602327. MacIntyre, B. (2018) The Spy and the Traitor: The Greatest Espionage Story of the Cold War. City of ­Westminster: Penguin. Marten, K. (2017) ‘The ‘KGB State’ and the Russian Political and Foreign Policy Culture. Journal of Slavic Military Studies 30:2: 131–151. Merkacheva, E. (2010) Anna Chapman v provale ne vinovata, Moskovskii komsomolets, 22 November, www.mk.ru/politics/2010/11/22/546177-anna-chapman-v-provale-ne-vinovata.html. Miller, Susan B. (2004) Disgust: The Gatekeeper Emotion. London and New York: Routledge. Mk.ru (2014) Putin i piataia kolonna, mk.ru, 18 December, www.mk.ru/politics/2014/12/18/­putin-ipyataya-kolonna-slova-prezidenta-kommentiruyut-eksperty.html. Narvselius, E. and Grinchenko, G. (eds.) (2018) Traitors, Collaborators and Deserters in Contemporary ­European Politics of Memory: Formulas of Betrayal. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. newsru.com (2018) Eks-glava GRU o ‘dele Skripalia’: razvedka RF nikogda ne zanimalas’ takimi ‘gnusnymi glupostiami’, newsru.com, 16 March, www.newsru.com/russia/16mar2018/skripal_2.html. New Times (2017) O chem several Bortnikov. New Times, 20 December, https://newtimes.ru/articles/ detail/136373 Pavlova, S. 2014. Natsional-predateli Putina, Radio Svoboda, 19 March, www.svoboda.org/a/25302687. html. Pervyi kanal (2010) Liuboi proval—rezul’tat predatel’stva: neizvestnye podrobnosti shpionskogo ­skandala, Pervyi kanal, 14 November, www.1tv.ru/news/2010-11-14/133053-lyuboy_proval_­ rezultat_predatelstva_neizvestnye_podrobnosti_shpionskogo_skandala. Petrov, N. (2018) ‘Popytka sozdat’ krasivuiu istoriiu gosbezopasnosti provalilas. Novaia gazeta, no. 1, 10 January 2018, www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/12/30/75069-arhaika-i-pravovoy-nigilizm.

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Julie Fedor Piotrowski, P. (ed.) (2006) Aparat bezpieczeństwa v Polsce. Kadra kierownicza. Tom II (1956–1975). ­Warsaw: Institut Pamięci Narodowej. Piotrowski, P. (ed.) (2008) Aparat bezpieczeństwa v Polsce. Kadra kierownicza. Tom III (1975–1990). ­Warsaw: Institut Pamięci Narodowej. Ponomarev, A. (2017) Chekist rubanul, ne stesniaias’, Radio Svoboda, 20 December, www.svoboda. org/a/28928808.html. Prokhanov, A. (2011) Aleksandr Prokhanov: Gorbachev sam sozdal tot zagovor i formiroval spiski GKChP, Ekspress-gazeta, 19 August, www.eg.ru/politics/27147/ Pucci, M. (2018) ‘A Revolution in a Revolution: The Secret Police and the Origins of Stalinism in Czechoslovakia, 1945–1952,’ East European Politics and Societies 32:1: 3–22 Radnitz, S. (2018) The Real or Imagined Infiltration of Fifth Columns in the Post-Soviet Region, PONARS Policy Memo 548, November, www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/real-or-imaginedinfiltration-fifth-columns-post-soviet-region. Rychkova, E. (2018) V Rossii otmechaiut den’ chekista. Osnovatel’ VChK do sikh por ne vozvrashchen na Lubianku, Nakanune.ru, 20 December, www.nakanune.ru/news/2018/12/20/22528292/. Saburova, E. (2015) Antikrizisnyi marsh ili ‘Marsh predatelei’? Ekho Moskvy blog, 18 February, https:// echo.msk.ru/blog/kate_sabyrova/1495228-echo/. Sedelmayer, F. S. (2019) The Putin I Knew; the Putin I Know, New York Times, 4 February, www. nytimes.com/2019/02/04/opinion/the-putin-i-knew-the-putin-i-know.html. Semin, K. (2014) Biokhimiia predatel’stva: chto takoe tekhnologiia izmeny? Vesti.ru, 16 February, www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=1290645. Semin, K. (2015) Biokhimiia predatel’stva. Telekanal Rossiia, https://russia.tv/brand/show/brand_id/57584/. Shevtsova, L. (2014) The Russia Factor. Journal of Democracy 25:3 ( July). Shved, V. (2013) SSSR: vse moglo byt’ inache. Shef KGB znal o predatel’stve genseka, no promolchal, Stoletie, 28 December, www.stoletie.ru/versia/sssr_vso_moglo_byt_inache_967.htm. Soldatov, A. (2017) From the ‘New Nobility’ to the KGB. Russian Politics and Law 55:2: 133–146. Soldatov, A. (2011) Pochemu shpionov sudiat po zakonam voennogo vremeni, Ezhednevnyi zhurnal, 23 June, www.agentura.ru/press/about/jointprojects/ej/spyterms/. Solov’ev, V. and Shafran, A. (2014) Uchastniki Marsha Mira: kto oni? Anons novoi programmy, Vesti. fm, 22 September, http://radiovesti.ru/brand/60948/episode/1365240/. Starikov, N. (2017) Anatomiia predatel’stva elity. Starikov blog, https://nstarikov.ru/blog/74668. Szwagrzyk, K. (ed.) (2005) Aparat bezpieczeństwa v Polsce. Kadra kierownicza. Tom I (1944–1956). ­Warsaw: Institut Pamięci Narodowej. Taylor, B. D. (2018) The Code of Putinism. Oxford: OUP. Urban, M. (2018) The Skripal Files: The Life and Near Death of a Russian Spy. London: Macmillan. Viola, L. 2017. Stalinist Perpetrators on Trial. Scenes from the Great Terror in Soviet Ukraine. Oxford: OUP. Vuorinen, M. 2012. Enemy Images in War Propaganda. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Zaharchenko, T. (2018) ‘In the Ninth Circle: Intellectuals as Traitors in the Russo-Ukrainian War,’ in E. Narvselius and G. Grinchenko (eds.), Traitors, Collaborators and Deserters in Contemporary European Politics of Memory: Formulas of Betrayal. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 197–212. Zhorin, F. L. (2017) Ispoved’ chekista: tainaia voina spetssluzhb SSSR i SShA. Znak. (2015) Za deistviiami Kadyrova chuvstvuetsia ruka moskovskogo patsana, Znak, 19 May, www. znak.com/2015-05-19/aleksey_venediktov_surkov_pytaetsya_dokazat_putinu_chto_volodin_ ne_spravlyaetsya_s_konfliktami. 812’online (2018) Putin ‘predskazal’ sud’bu Skripalia eshche v 2010 godu, 812’online, 13 March, www. online812/ru/2018/03/13/010/.

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11 HOW RUSSIA TRAINS ITS SPIES The past and present of Russian intelligence education Filip Kovacevic

Intelligence is a tool in the political arsenal of all states and, for as long as there are different states, the need for intelligence will exist, and, therefore, also for the educational institutions preparing qualified intelligence professionals.1

In the early evening of Tuesday, June 21, 2016, the residents of central Moscow witnessed a strange sight. Close to thirty pitch black luxury Mercedes-Benz G-Class SUVs, also known as Geländewagen, cruised along the Moscow streets in a military-style formation. In each SUV, there were at least four young men loudly celebrating, yelling, and singing. Initially, nobody knew who they were. However, the video of the entire episode soon appeared on YouTube and thus came to the attention of the Russian and, indeed, wider international public (FSB Academy Graduates’ Geländewagen Column, 2016). Not surprisingly, it did not take long for a veritable scandal to break out. The first news reports were vague and described the merry-makers as the graduates of ‘the faculty of military intelligence’ (Lenta.Ru, 2016a). Considering that there is no such faculty in Moscow, the suspicion quickly fell on two Moscow-based higher education institutions providing intelligence education and training: the Academy of the Federal Security Service, also known as the FSB Academy, and the Academy of the Foreign Intelligence Service, also known as the SVR Academy. It turned out that the graduates in question were the newly minted FSB men. The behavior of the graduates provoked a very negative reaction among the Russian intelligence veterans, especially among the former KGB officers (Lenta.Ru, 2016b). The graduates were condemned for the socially immodest and provocative nature of their actions and for the fact that they essentially exposed their real identities. What they did was also seen as profoundly unethical and deemed an insult to the professional standards of a Chekist. Many wondered what, if anything, the FSB Academy taught them during the five years of training when they could come up with this kind of entertainment to celebrate their graduation. All the veterans consulted by various media outlets agreed that not only the boisterous and careless graduates should be sanctioned, but that their professors were to blame as well. The FSB leadership headed since May 2008 by Alexander Bortnikov, an ex-KGB officer and a long-time close associate of another, more famous KGB veteran, the Russian president 187

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Vladimir Putin, took note and offered the graduates a stark choice: either resign or take up security posts in the most remote Russian border regions, such as the Far East Chukotka and Kamchatka Peninsulas (Lenta.Ru, 2016c). Most agreed to do the latter. The professors of the FSB Academy were also subjected to disciplinary measures, including being fired (no names were publicly revealed, however). The FSB hierarchy attempted to contain the unwelcome consequences of the scandal and improve its tarnished public image. Still, there is no way around it: the scandal was definitely a low point in the decades-long history of Russian intelligence education and training.

The FSB Academy The historical narrative of Russian intelligence education and training marked an important milestone in September 2018. Exactly hundred years before, in September 1918, in the beginning months of the Russian Civil War, which pitted the Bolsheviks against various opponents, including the foreign interventionist troops, a decision was made by the Bolshevik leadership to set up a training course curriculum for the new officers of the VChK (Cheka) (FSB, 2018c). The first incarnation of the Soviet secret police, the VChK, which stood for the All-Russian Emergency Commission for Combatting Counter-Revolution and Sabotage, was founded less than a year earlier, on December 20, 1917 (according to the Gregorian calendar, newly implemented in Russia at the time). Ever since then, this day has been celebrated as the day of intelligence services in Russia and, during the Soviet period, the Chekists were even paid on the 20th of every month. The initial courses ranged widely, from basic literacy to intelligence and counterintelligence methods. Two and half years later, the executive decree of the VChK Presiding Council (Prezidium) No. 23–24 of January 29, 1921 established the first official structures of the future intelligence school (FSB, 2018e). Mikhail Romanovsky, an ethnic Pole and a long-time associate of another Pole, the VChK chief Felix Dzerzhinsky, was appointed the school’s first supervisor. The first classes under the new rules began on April 26, 1921. Interestingly, while in the beginning, as the expression of revolutionary fervor, the efforts were made to institute a clear break with all tsarist intelligence practices and personnel, over the next several years, it was concluded that the accumulated intelligence experience of the tsarist secret police could, after all, be useful for the new officers’ professional training. Accordingly, a group of the former officials of the old regime was offered the opportunity to teach at the school. However, the most popular teachers were the rising stars of the Soviet intelligence, such as, for instance, Artur Artuzov (Fraucci), who directed some of the most famous operations in the history of Soviet counterintelligence: Operations Trust and Tarantella (FSB, 2018d). Other popular teachers included the marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky who taught military strategy and Lenin’s wife Nadezha Krupskaya who taught revolutionary practice. In 1930, the school was named the Central School of the OGPU (the OGPU – the Joint State Political Directorate – replaced the VChK in 1923 with the formal establishment of the Soviet Union). The school greatly expanded its enrollment and professional capacities, including offering new courses and practical trainings. It began publishing its own textbooks, such as the 1931 edition of The Methodology of the Chekist Work (FSB, 2018e). The school’s name changed yet again. It became the Higher School of the NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs). The purges of the late 1930s decimated the school’s teaching personnel (Tukhachevsky was, for instance, accused of treason and shot) and the school had very little time to recover 188

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before the sudden German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. In addition, the war completely transformed the school’s curriculum. The school began training special groups for partisan warfare, sabotage, radio espionage, and cryptography. Its graduates took part in many daring WWII exploits, including the operations of the famous Soviet military counterintelligence units called the SMERSH (Death to the Spies) led by the general Pavel Sudoplatov. During the war, the school trained more than 7,000 officers and was awarded the prestigious Red Flag decoration by the Soviet government in 1945 (FSB, 2018f ). In the post-war period, the school curriculum continued to grow. More subjects of study were added, including more extensive focus on foreign languages and new technologies. The duration of the training was extended to three years and the school was opened for ­international collaboration. The first officers from the allied Eastern European Socialist states entered the school in the late 1940s and, overall, the school trained about 10,000 foreign officers during the Soviet period. With the formation of the KGB in 1954, the school was re-named the Higher School of the KGB, and, in 1962, it became the Felix Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB (FSB, 2018g). During the 1960s, one of the directors of the school was the well-known Soviet counterintelligence chief Yevgeny Pitovranov. The school underwent several substantial reforms in the 1970s and the 1980s with the goal of integrating innovative approaches and taking into consideration the changing geopolitical demands. It also opened additional faculties throughout Russia and the Soviet Union, in Leningrad (St. Petersburg), Novosibirsk, Kiev, Minsk, and Tashkent. The most famous of these faculties was the one in Minsk. Several powerful contemporary Russian political figures received their post-graduate education there, including the former chief of the FSB and the current head of the Russian National Security Council Nikolay Patrushev, the current head of the SVR Sergey Naryshkin, and the former Russian minister of defense and former Putin’s chief of staff Sergey Ivanov. Altogether, the KGB school in Minsk trained more than 40,000 graduates, out of whom 174 attained the rank of general in the Soviet intelligence (Sharay, 2004). It can be said that its educational success rivals that of the mother institution in Moscow. However, the current FSB chief Alexander Bortnikov is the graduate of the Moscow school, while the Russian president Vladimir Putin received his intelligence training at the SVR Academy, which will be discussed in the next section. After the KGB chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov played one of the leading roles in the attempted coup against the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991, the fate of the KGB as an organization was sealed. Gorbachev’s new appointee for the KGB chairman Vadim Bakatin dissolved the KGB in November 1991. Each of the fifteen Soviet republics, including Russia, was now on the path to develop its own independent intelligence services. In accordance with these changes, the Felix Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB was first re-named the Academy of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation in August 1992 and then, when the FSB was formed in April 1995, it became the FSB Academy. Today, the FSB Academy’s building complex is located in southwest Moscow at the address Michurinsky prospekt No. 70. Interestingly, there are no traffic or other signs indicating that the building complex is, in fact, the FSB Academy and some buildings have no windows facing the street. The entrance on the FSB Academy grounds can be obtained only with a special permission, and, according to some news reports, most textbooks are classified (RBC, 2012). However, the general information about the FSB Academy is publicly accessible and can be found either on its website or in the (not so frequent) media descriptions of its work. The FSB Academy is made up of two institutes, one separate faculty, and more than fifty departments (FSB, 2018b). The two institutes are the Institute of Cryptography, 189

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Communication, and Informatics (IKSI) and the Institute of Operative Training. The IKSI is further divided into four faculties: applied mathematics, telecommunication, informational security, and operative-technical. The Institute of Operative Training includes two faculties: investigative and counterintelligence. The separate faculty is the Faculty of Foreign Languages. This is the only educational unit within the FSB Academy which admits female students. One can therefore say that the FSB remains very conservative regarding gender roles and relations. Overall, the FSB Academy offers eight specific majors, fourteen undergraduate programs, and more than hundred various programs for professional training. In order to staff the programs, it employs close to forty members of the Russian Academy of Sciences, more than 150 full professors, and about 500 other faculty members (FSB, 2018h). In terms of its scope, range, and quality, the education offered at the FSB Academy is comparable to the education offered by the best-known Russian educational institutions, such as the Moscow and St. Petersburg State Universities as well as the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). It is worth pointing out that those who graduate from the Institute of Operative Training have an equivalent of the law degree. Moreover, the graduates of the IKSI are considered Russia’s top cybersecurity experts. This is where the FSB gets its hackers and counter-hackers. The FSB Academy has its own system of admission and enrollment. The main role is played by the municipal (territorial) centers of the FSB which do the recruiting and the testing, including physical and psychological tests. According to the ex-director of the FSB Academy, general Valentin Vlasov, who was in charge from 2000 to 2007, one of the mandatory requirements is to be able to run 100 meters under 14 seconds (Loriya, 2003). Another important thing is the background check, which may take several months. In this respect, family ties are of major importance and, according to some accounts, the majority of the applicants come from the families which already have somebody working in the Russian intelligence and military structures.2 The FSB also runs the so-called ‘educational Olympics’ for high school students (typically, high school sophomores and juniors). The students are tested in the subjects ranging from math and physics to foreign languages and social sciences (FSB, 2018a). The ‘educational Olympics’ are held every year from December to February all across Russia, from Kaliningrad to Khabarovsk. According to an FSB promotional video, more than 15,000 high school students took part in the ‘Olympics’ in 2013 (FSB Promotional Video, 2014). Doing well on the tests is considered prestigious and many ambitious high school students take them, even if they are not planning on a career in intelligence. On the other hand, those who do want to pursue the intelligence career typically enroll in the FSB Academy after graduating from high school or after mandatory service in the military. Considering that the FSB Academy includes intensive military training, it can also be substituted for the military service, though it is likely that those who have already served in the military will find it easier to deal with the physical aspects of the training. Indeed, the failure rates are fairly high, including up to 10% in the first year (Loriya, 2003). The education is entirely free, but all graduates must sign a five-year contract with the FSB after graduation. The Moscow-based students live at home, while all the others live in the dorms within the FSB Academy complex. They also have three meals a day provided at no charge at the FSB Academy cafeteria. The current head of the FSB Academy is general Yevgeny Sysoyev (b. 1959), a former FSB deputy director in charge of the Russian National Counterterrorism Committee, one of the highest post in Russian intelligence. Sysoyev was appointed by the president Putin on December 28, 2018 (FSB, 2019). He appears to have no previous teaching experience in contrast to his predecessor Viktor Ostroukhov who directed the FSB Academy from 2007 until 190

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2019. Ostroukhov was a professor of law and even took part in the FSB promotional video mentioned earlier. While the portrait of Putin benignly looked on, Ostroukhov described the tasks of the FSB in the following way: protecting national security, fighting international terrorism and extremism, counteracting the subversive activities of the intelligence agencies of other states, fighting economic crime and corruption, defending state borders, providing informational (cyber) security, and continuing professional traditions with honor and integrity.3 He concluded by calling on the young people of Russia to enroll in the Academy and become the ‘defenders of the Motherland.’ There is no doubt that Sysoyev will follow the same path. He even seems to be much better connected at the top of the Russian political pyramid than Ostroukhov. It is likely that his appointment signals the increased importance of the FSB Academy for the stability of the Putin regime.

The SVR Academy In the Russian intelligence circles, there is a joke about the enrollment in the SVR Academy. During the oral entrance examination, the applicant Ivanov did not answer any of the questions posed to him by the examination committee and remained completely silent. The committee decided to enroll him immediately in the second year of the Academy (Loriya, 2003). While it may never be known whether Vladimir Putin’s enrollment in the SVR Academy went along the same lines, it is certain that he is its most famous graduate. According to the Russian historian Roy Medvedev, Putin attended the SVR Academy in 1985 (Medvedev, 2001). At the time, the Academy was called the Yuri Andropov Red Banner Institute and, just like today, it was a very secretive post-graduate school with the main task of preparing intelligence officers for service abroad. The history of the Institute goes back to the purges of the late 1930s when the Soviet leadership, suspicious of the extensive foreign penetration of the existing intelligence apparatus, decided to set up a completely new educational institution for foreign intelligence professionals. The first name of the new institution was the School for Special Tasks, which, after WWII, was first changed to the Higher Intelligence School (also, referred to as the 101st School) and, later, to the Red Banner Institute of the KGB. Because of its location in the wooded area north of Moscow (the Mytishchinsky region), the Institute was also informally called ‘The Forest School.’ In 1984, after the death of the Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, the longest serving KGB chief (1967–1982), the Institute was re-named after him. Not long afterwards, the KGB major Vladimir Putin from Leningrad entered the Institute as a trainee. In his book The Time of Putin, Roy Medvedev gives a long excerpt from the reminiscences of the colonel Mikhail Frolov, who was Putin’s teacher and senior officer at the Institute (Medvedev, 2001). This excerpt is interesting not only because it discusses Putin’s training at the Institute, but also because it provides a rare glimpse into the operations of the Institute itself. For instance, in order to ensure a high level of secrecy, the real family names of the trainees were replaced with pseudonyms, so Putin was referred to as Platov (the first letter of the family name remained the same). According to Frolov, the Institute was the place where, in addition to studying in depth at least one foreign language and the practical aspects of intelligence operations (typically taught by the veteran KGB officers, including the so-called illegals), the students themselves were ‘studied’ by the staff. In other words, their psychological and physical readiness for intelligence work was accessed in minute detail. 191

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Frolov, for instance, claimed that his report on Putin’s psychological characteristics was four typed pages long. While the report still remains classified, Frolov revealed that he thought Putin had all the qualities needed for the work in the field, including self-discipline, calmness, and confidence. Frolov stated that Putin did especially well in the class whose main objective was to teach the art of recruitment, in his words, ‘how to choose the appropriate persons, how to pose them the questions which were of interest to our country and its leadership, [and] in a sense, how to be a [good] psychologist’ (Medvedev, 2001). From all available evidence, it seems that this remains one of the main objectives of the SVR Academy’s curriculum even today. Not long after Putin left for his first and only foreign intelligence assignment in the German Democratic Republic, the Institute was shaken by a dramatic spy scandal. It was discovered that one of its key officials, the Institute’s Communist party secretary Vladimir Piguzov, was a long-time CIA informant. Piguzov was recruited by the CIA in Indonesia in 1974 (allegedly, via the use of the sexually compromising materials) and, for almost ten years, passed on top secret information, including the information about the identities of those being trained at the Institute, to the CIA officers based in Moscow (Kolobayev, 1999). Reportedly, Piguzov’s actions led to the disclosure of the entire global network of the KGB officers, both those under a legal cover and those working ‘illegally.’ Obviously, this severely limited the scope of all subsequent KGB foreign intelligence operations in the 1980s and early 1990s. In addition, Piguzov also provided the key pieces of evidence for pinpointing a KGB mole within the CIA, David Henry Barnett, who was convicted of espionage in 1980 (after William Campiles, the second spy conviction in the history of the CIA), sentenced to eighteen years in prison but paroled in 1990. In an ironic twist of fate – all too common in the world of international espionage – Piguzov himself was betrayed by a mole, Aldrich Ames, who worked for the KGB (Earley, 1997). However, the Soviet military court was far from being as lenient as the U.S. federal court had been in the case of Barnett. Piguzov was sentenced to death and executed in 1986. And yet, this did not stop spy scandals at the Institute. As the Soviet system was falling apart in the late 1980s and early 1990s, certain KGB officers saw transferring the so-called family jewels to Western intelligence as a ticket to personal enrichment. Such was the case of the KGB major Mikhail Butkov who was on a foreign intelligence assignment in Norway under a journalistic cover. As one of the Communist party officials at the Institute, Butkov had access to personal dossiers of the trainees as well as to the reports of their subsequent assignments. According to an SVR veteran Sergey Zhakov, the publication of Butkov’s book KGB in Norway affected the personnel and operations of the post-Soviet Russian foreign intelligence in Western Europe for the following decade (Zhakov, 2000). Plagued by scandals and abandoned by many promising teachers, while also faced with the lack of interest among the prospective trainees, the Institute was on the brink of closure in the early 1990s. However, thanks to the efforts of the long-time Soviet academic, diplomat, and later Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, who was appointed the director of the newly formed SVR in 1991, the Institute was able to survive through the Scylla and Charybdis of post-Soviet political and economic transition. In October 1994, in accordance with the (secret) decree of the Russian president Boris Yeltsin No. 1999, the Andropov Red Banner Institute became the Academy of the SVR. Today, more than twenty-five years after the Soviet break-up, the situation at the SVR Academy seems to have stabilized. The Academy regularly celebrates its anniversaries publicly, the latest being the celebration of its eightieth birthday. The basic (very schematic) information about the Academy can be found on the official website of the SVR (SVR, 192

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2018). In contrast to the FSB Academy, the SVR Academy provides only post-graduate education. It invites applications from all citizens of the Russian Federation, especially those who are skilled in foreign languages. The official age limit is 30 and the training lasts from one to three years depending on the assignment. According to media reports, the SVR Academy also trains the so-called illegals, those sent to collect intelligence abroad without an official cover identity (Kondrashev, 2015). For instance, one of the best-known recent Russian illegals Mikhail Vasenkov (aka Juan Lazaro), who lived in the U.S. for more than thirty years and was arrested with the group of nine other illegals by the FBI in July 2010 and later exchanged, was a graduate of the Academy. It is reasonable to expect that at this time when many SVR officers who worked under the diplomatic cover have been expelled from the U.S. and the EU member states, the SVR Academy will place much more emphasis on training the illegals (BBC News, 2017).4 The application procedure for the SVR Academy is not very complicated. There are two questionnaires on the SVR website which need to be filled out and delivered either in person or by mail (SVR, 2018). Interestingly, electronic submissions are not accepted, and the reason given is that they could be intercepted by foreign intelligence agencies, thus disclosing the real identity of the applicant. The first questionnaire consists of basic biographical information and requires listing all foreign trips (their destination, length, and purpose) and stating whether or not any close family members live abroad. The second questionnaire is more invasive of personal privacy, because it requires describing all previous illnesses and medical conditions, including psychological issues. It also inquires whether any close family member committed suicide or died in an accident. If the applicant’s qualifications and family background are assessed to be satisfactory, he or she is invited for an interview. The gender ratio of applicants is not publicly known, but some reports in the press indicate that women remain underrepresented (Merkachova, 2013).5 The entire application process, which includes the polygraph examination, lasts about six months. Interestingly, considering that the course curriculum is classified, the SVR Academy cannot issue official diplomas, which makes the transition to other types of employment more difficult for its graduates. There is no doubt, however, that the prestige of the SVR Academy as well as of other Russian higher education intelligence institutions has increased greatly since Putin’s election to the presidency in 2000.

Conclusion It is a truism to say that different countries have different intelligence cultures (Graaff & Nyce, 2016). A key component in the creation of an intelligence culture is the way intelligence officers are educated and trained. In contrast to most Western states, Russia has had a long tradition of higher education intelligence institutions being separate and autonomous units within the state educational system (Gearon, 2015; Glees, 2015). The rationale for this institutional arrangement is to be found in the nature of the Russian political life. In both its Soviet and post-Soviet political incarnations, the Russian state has believed its existence to be constantly under the threats of internal and external subversion. In order to contain and repel these threats successfully, it has found it necessary to invest in the training of a prestigious professional intelligence officer corps – the Chekists – who would be the state’s most valiant and selfless defenders. The FSB and SVR Academies and their Soviet predecessors are the institutional forms of this decades-long investment, both financial and ideological. As I have shown, notwithstanding the noble intentions and considerable investments, the Russian record on this score has been far from ideal. In real life, the Chekist behavior fell 193

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short of Felix Dzerzhinsky’s vision of individuals with ‘cool head, burning heart, and clean hands.’ There have been Western double agents even within the Academies themselves, let alone within the Russian intelligence community in general. Still, the established institutional forms of intelligence education and training survived all the personnel and even regime changes relatively intact. My assessment is that the manner in which Russia trains its spies is unlikely to change any time soon.

Notes 1 The quote is attributed to a high-level Russian intelligence officer who preferred to remain anonymous (RIA Novosti 2003). Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Russian language are my own. 2 According to publicly available information, two-thirds of the applicants to a similar intelligence education institution in Minsk, Belarus come from the military and intelligence families. 3 Ostroukhov’s statement begins at 4.29 of the video. 4 For instance, the best-known Russian fictional intelligence officer Max Otto von Stierlitz (the code name for Vsevolod Vladimirovich Vladimirov) is an illegal. His popularity in Russia rivals that of James Bond in the West. Stierlitz is the main character in Yulian Semyonov’s novel about the Russian undercover spies in Nazi Germany (Semyonov 1973) and was made widely known via the early 1970s Soviet TV series Seventeen Moments of Spring. There are speculations that watching this TV series influenced Vladimir Putin to enter the KGB. 5 For this and other texts about the work of the SVR, Eva Merkachova, a journalist at the popular Russian semi-tabloid daily newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets, was awarded an annual SVR prize in 2017.

References BBC News. (2017) Was the Soviet James Bond Vladimir Putin’s Role Model? Available from: bbc. com/news/magazine-39862225 [Accessed 7th June 2018]. Earley, P. (1997) Confessions of a Spy: The Real Story of Aldrich Ames. New York, G. P. Putnam’s Sons. FSB. (2018a) Grafik provedeniya Mezhregionalnoy olimpiady shol’nikov [The Schedule of the ­Inter-Regional High School Students’ Educational ‘Olympics’. Available from: www.academy.fsb. ru/news/news_2017_12_07.html [Accessed 26th May 2018]. FSB. (2018b) Informatsiya ob Akademiyi FSB Rossiyi [Information on the FSB Academy]. Available from: www.academy.fsb.ru/inform.html [Accessed 25th May 2018]. FSB. (2018c) Istoriya Akademiyi: Pervyye gody posle revolyutsiyi [The History of the Academy: The First Years after the Revolution]. Available from: www.academy.fsb.ru/i_hist_1.html [Accessed 25th May 2018]. FSB. (2018d) Istoriya Akademiyi: Lyudi, stoyavshiye u istokov obrazovaniya v organakh bezopasnosti [The History of the Academy: The Individuals who Originated Intelligence Education]. Available from: www.academy.fsb.ru/i_hist_2.html [Accessed 25th May 2018]. FSB. (2018e) Istoriya Akademiyi: Zarozhdeniye shkoly [The History of the Academy: The Founding of the School]. Available from: www.academy.fsb.ru/i_hist_3.html [Accessed 25th May 2018]. FSB. (2018f ) Istoriya Akademiyi: V gody surovykh ispytaniyi Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny [The History of the Academy: During the Brutal Challenges of the WWII]. Available from: academy. fsb.ru/i_hist_5.html [Accessed 25th May 2018]. FSB. (2018g) Istoriya Akademiyi: Noviy etap razvitiya obrazovaniya [The History of the Academy: New Stage in the Development of Education]. Available from: www.academy.fsb.ru/i_hist_7.html [Accessed 25th May 2018]. FSB. (2018h) Istoriya Akademiyi: Sovremeniy etap [The History of the Academy: Contemporary Developments]. Available from: www.academy.fsb.ru/i_hist_8.html [Accessed 15th May 2018]. FSB. (2019) Nachal’nik Akademiyi FSB Rossiyi: Sysoyev Yevgeny Sergeyevich [The Head of the FSB Academy: Yevgeny Sergeyevich Sysoyev]. Available from: http://www.academy.fsb.ru/i_­ rukovodstvo.html [Accessed 29th July 2019].

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How Russia trains its spies FSB Academy Graduates’ Geländewagen Column. (2016) Available from: www.youtube.com/ watch?v=8TkLbRUZ4QA [Accessed 15th May 2018]. FSB Promotional Video. (2014) Available from: www.youtube.com/watch?v=gq_ascVx4P4&feature=youtu. be [Accessed 26th May 2018]. Gearon, L. (2015) Education, Security and Intelligence Studies. British Journal of Educational Studies 63 (3), 263–279. Glees, A. (2015) Intelligence Studies, Universities and Security. British Journal of Educational Studies 63 (3), 281–310. Graaff, B. de & James M. Nyce (eds.). (2016) Handbook of European Intelligence Cultures. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Kolobayev, A. (1999) Seks-kontigent zashchishchaet rodinu [The Sex Regiment Protects the ­Motherland]. Soversheno sekretno. Available from: www.sovsekretno.ru/articles/id/289 [Accessed 7th June 2018]. Kondrashev, A. (2015) Alma-mater shtirlitzev: kogo berut v Akademiyu vneshney razvedki [The Alma Mater of the ‘Stierlitzes’: Who is Recruited by the SVR Academy] Argumenty Nedely. ­Available from: argumenti.ru/espionage/n514/424086 [Accessed 7th June 2018]. Lenta.Ru. (2016a) Budushchiye razvedchiki prokatilis’ po Moskve na desyatkakh [Future Intelligence Officers Rode Through Moscow in Mercedes SUVs]. Available from: lenta.ru/news/2016/07/01/ vip/ [Accessed 15th May 2018]. Lenta.Ru. (2016b) FSBwagen: Chto stoit za skandalnym avtoprobegom vypusnikov Akademiyi FSB [FSBwagen: What is Behind the Scandalous Ride of the FSB Academy Graduates]. Available from: lenta.ru/articles/2016/07/04/fsbwagen/ [Accessed 15th May 2018]. Lenta.Ru. (2016c) Posle zayezda na Gelandewagen oficerov FSB soslali na Chukotku i Kamchatku [After the Ride in Mercedes SUVs, the FSB Officers Sent to Chukotka and Kamchatka]. Available from: lenta.ru/news/2016/07/20/kamchatka/ [Accessed 15th May 2018]. Loriya, E. (2003) Valentin Vlasov: Chechenskiy yazyk u nas pripodayut s 1993 goda [Valentin Vlasov: The Chechen Language Is Taught Here Since 1993]. Izvestia. Available from: nomad. su/?a=10-200301250019 [Accessed 4th June 2018]. Medvedev, R. (2001) Vremya Putina [The Time of Putin]. Moscow, Prava cheloveka. Available from: biography.wikireading.ru/186947 [Accessed 7th June 2018]. Merkachova, E. (2013) V sluzhbu vneshney razvedki pytayutsa ustroyit lyudi-nevidimki [The Invisible Men Are Trying to Get a Job in the SVR]. Moskovskiy Komsomolets. Available from: mk.ru/social/article/2013/10/03/925334-v-sluzhbu-vneshney-razvedki-pyitayutsya-ustroitsya-­ lyudinevidimki.html [Accessed 8th June 2018]. RBC. (2012) Sekretniye materiyali [Secret Materials] Available from: www.rbc.ru/­society/15/11/2012/ 5703ffa99a7947fcbd4428b1 [Accessed 4th June 2018]. RIA Novosti. (2003) Akademiyi vneshney razvedki ispol’nyaetsa 65 let [The SVR Academy Celebrates the 65th Anniversary]. Available from: svr.ru/smi/2003/10/ria-gl20031022.htm [Accessed 5th June 2018]. Semyonov, Y. (1973) Seventeen Moments of Spring. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Fredonia Books. Sharay, N. (2004) INB: Zdes’ gotovyat chekistov [INB: The Chekists are Educated Here]. Express ­Novosti. Available from: www.expressnews.by/75.html [Accessed 4th June 2018]. SVR. (2018) Sluzhba vneshney razvedki RF [The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian ­Federation]. Available from: //svr.gov.ru/svr_today/sotr.htm [Accessed June 5th 2018]. Zhakov, S. (2000) Akademiya vneshney razvedki: ‘kuznitsa’ novykh kadrov ili otryzhka ‘sovkogovo’ proshlogo? [The SVR Academy: The ‘Smithy’ of New Cadres or the Remnant of the Soviet Communist Past]. Available from: www.compromat.ru/page_25981.htm [Accessed 7th June 2018].

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12 THE CHINESE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Nigel Inkster

Introduction Although intelligence and security agencies around the world share some basic features, they are the product of particular historical experiences and serve regimes with different ideological and political priorities. As a result, they often have their own distinctive cultures. In countries like the USA, the UK and Russia, intelligence work is seen as a prestige occupation with the intelligence agencies able to recruit high-quality applicants. In other parts of the world, intelligence work tends to be seen more as the preserve of ‘other ranks’ rather than officers, to use a military analogy. Agencies in this latter category tend to be much less integrated into and less influential within their own policy elites who tend to eschew ownership of their activities unless compelled by specific circumstances to do so. Intelligence agencies are also characterised by certain operational ‘signatures’. Some prefer to work primarily through legal residencies, while others place greater reliance on ­non-official cover (NOC) operations. The Russian SVR has inherited the KGB emphasis on classic techniques such as the use of dead-letter boxes and all the associated tradecraft. Some agencies use coercive techniques to recruit agents, while others – predominantly western – eschew such techniques in favour of positive motivation. Some services take a pride in getting back agents and officers who have been compromised, while others are content to leave them to their fates. The Chinese intelligence services are no exception in having a culture defined by their early experiences and political context. The role of intelligence in statecraft has had a long history within China beginning with Sunzi’s Bingfa, generally translated into English as The Art of War. Sunzi’s precise identity has remained elusive to the point where some sinologists doubt his actual existence. But a balance of evidences suggests that he probably did exist, serving as a general in the state of Wu during the latter part of the Spring and Autumn period – 777 to 476 BCE – that followed the breakup of the Zhou empire and resulted in a lengthy period of contestation between successor Chinese states. Sunzi’s writing on espionage suggests that even by then, the use of spies – 间 – was well established. His discussion of the (five) different kinds of spy includes what in modern parlance would be considered penetration agents, double agents and those involved in deception operations. As Frederick the First of Prussia was to do many centuries later, Sunzi advocates 196

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rewarding spies well for their efforts and highlights the need to deal with them fairly and straightforwardly. And he emphasises the importance of intellectual subtlety in analysing their ­reporting – 非激妙不能得间之宝 – a statement that has echoes of the observation by former KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov that although the KGB had many good agents, their utility had been much reduced by the imperative to analyse their product through a filter of ideological preconception (Andrew, 1995; MacFarquhar, 1974–2011).

The Chinese intelligence service The US sinologist and intelligence expert James Mulvenon has observed, only part in jest, that the value of any western article on China is inversely proportionate to the number of references to Sunzi contained therein. It is certainly the case that western writers with no China expertise have often sought to bolster their credentials by quoting Sunzi with a degree of respect bordering on veneration. It is however open to debate whether Sunzi’s writings on espionage have any more relevance for contemporary Chinese intelligence culture than, say, the history of Francis Walsingham’s intelligencers has had on contemporary British intelligence culture. Rather, the foundations of modern Chinese intelligence culture are to be found in the early struggles of the Chinese Communist Party to establish itself in the face of relentless hostility by the ruling Guomindang (KMT) and in the CCP’s experiences during the Sino-Japanese War. The CCP’s role in defeating Japan has become an important part of the Party’s foundation myth and it is in fact this conflict that has served as the main repository of case-lore for China’s intelligence agencies. The CCP has portrayed the anti-Japanese war as a glorious episode in its history, airbrushing out the inconvenient reality that most of the actual fighting was done by KMT forces, while the CCP largely focused on rebuilding its capacity and support base. CCP intelligence officers working in what was first the Special Section, then renamed the Social Affairs Department, however had a good war both against Japan and the KMT whose intelligence agency they comprehensively outmatched during the four-year civil war that ensued after the Japanese surrender. A case in point was the fact that of Li Kenong, appointed in 1946 to head the Social Affairs Bureau and who in the 1930s secured a position as a communications officer in the KMT intelligence service. Another was Pan Hannian who, working under journalist cover in Shanghai, collected valuable intelligence on both the KMT and Japan whilst simultaneously serving as a conduit for sharing with the Japanese military intelligence service information on KMT military dispositions obtained as a result of CCP participation in the Second United Front, established after the 1936 Xian Incident (Endo, 2016). The CCP is a Leninist organisation born and nurtured in a climate of clandestinity, conspiracy and institutional paranoia, its existence justified only by the existence of opponents, real or imaginary. This latter characteristic was manifested in a prolonged series of ­counter-espionage campaigns conducted in the CCP base areas between 1943 and 1946 by Kang Sheng – later to achieve notoriety during the Cultural Revolution when he used his position as the head of what had then become the Investigation Department of the CCP (ID/CCP) to persecute Mao Zedong’s political opponents. In the words of David Chambers, During the campaigns, virtually every cadre who had operated underground in ­Kuomintang or Japanese-held areas became vulnerable to suspicions they may have been recruited by the enemy to penetrate the CCP. The application of relay interrogation, sleep deprivation, physical torture and peer pressure techniques produced countless false 197

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confessions. Fortunately for the CCP, these excesses were recognised relatively quickly and the vast majority of those accused of treachery were officially cleared by the time the Seventh CCP Congress met in spring 1945. (1986) For some cadres however, lingering suspicions resulted in their incarceration in the mid1950s with most dying in prison. Such was the case with Pan Hannian – possibly because his knowledge of CCP-Japanese intelligence collaboration was deemed inconvenient. It was not until the early 1980s, following the chaos of the Cultural Revolution during which time Chinese intelligence operations ground to a virtual halt, that Pan and many of his colleagues were rehabilitated – a process that had the effect of unleashing a series of memoirs and histories about CCP intelligence work during that era which cemented it in public perceptions as the defining era for Chinese intelligence culture. It is worth remarking that this concession to openness has not extended into the present day. Within China, there is no reporting of contemporary intelligence activities either in the realms of fact or fiction. Any intelligence organisation has to manage the tension between intelligence collection and counter-espionage. Too great a focus on the latter can lead to a climate of risk aversion in which good sources are viewed with suspicion and their product discounted. Such has been the case with the CIA during the period in the Cold War during which James Jesus Angleton theorised about widespread – but in reality non-existent – Soviet penetrations of the US intelligence community: and with the so-called ‘agent scrub’ that took place in the mid-1990s under DCI John Deutch – who distrusted HUMINT and believed that CIA should focus on technical collection – during which numerous productive sources were discontinued for often spurious reasons. Within China’s Leninist political culture, this tension between collection and counter-­ espionage was particularly acute during the first thirty years of the People’s Republic. During that period, China’s intelligence agencies were mainly focused on combatting perceived threats to the CCP with a particular focus on the KMT, and were caught up in the highly politicised environment shaped by Mao Zedong’s obsession with class struggle. The PRC was internationally isolated in the face of a US-led decision to recognise ­Chiang Kai-shek’s Taiwan-based regime and largely dependent for international support on a relationship with the Soviet Union that was far from straightforward and which, following Krushchev’s 1956 denunciation of Stalin – a particular affront to Mao Zedong who had learned all he knew about Marxism from Stalin with a particular focus on the need for continued Party renewal through political struggle – quickly became toxic. It is unclear to what extent during that period the Soviet Union shared with China some of the rich flow of intelligence it was then receiving from sources such as the ‘Cambridge Five’ though normal Soviet intelligence practice, which was to take rather than give, would suggest that this would have been limited at best. Following the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, the Party’s intelligence apparatus, which in 1955 was renamed the ID/CCP, was formally responsible for foreign intelligence collection but in reality spent most of its time dealing with threats to the CCP. The ID/CCP in practice had little scope to undertake foreign intelligence collection outside China and most of such casework was actually run in China by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), a state organisation responsible for public order but also for counter-intelligence and counter-espionage work. Known cases conducted during that era include Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a young interpreter who was infiltrated into US government service in China before the establishment of the People’s Republic. Chin moved to the USA where he joined the CIA-controlled Foreign Broadcast Information Service, from where he provided his MPS 198

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case officers with high-grade intelligence on Sino-US relations and other topics until his retirement in 1981. Chin was subsequently betrayed by a defecting Chinese intelligence officer in 1985 but committed suicide before he could be tried.1 Another well-known case is that of the young French diplomat Bernard Boursicot, recruited in Beijing through his relationship with transgender Chinese opera star Shi Beipu. This case, which subsequently formed  the basis for the modern opera M. Butterfly, was primarily noteworthy in that it formed an exception to the then-prevailing ban on the use of ‘honey-traps’, an attitude that would subsequently undergo a marked change. China’s intelligence agencies were not immune from the institutional chaos brought about by Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution. The ID/CCP, used by Kang Sheng as a v­ ehicle for persecuting Mao’s political opponents, was taken over by the People’s Liberation Army, the one Chinese institution that has been able to impose some semblance of order on a country ravaged by factional fighting. The PLA had two intelligence agencies, the Second Department of the PLA General Staff (2/PLA) which performed a standard G2 role, and the Third Department (3/PLA) responsible for signals intelligence. The CCP signals intelligence capability was largely home-grown, benefitting from only minimal Soviet assistance. It had played a significant part in the Sino-Japanese and civil wars but had little ability to collect intelligence much beyond China’s geographical boundaries. The PLA did, however, have access to foreign information by virtue of a network of Defence Attaches which expanded rapidly as China established diplomatic relations with a growing range of countries during the 1970s and 1980s. Most of this collection was open source but still valuable to a nation as isolated and starved of information as China had become. But it was gradually supplemented by a series of NOC operations with a particular focus on US military technology ­( Dorfman 2018; Gang, 2018; Hanna, Mulvenon and Puglisi, 2013; Inkster, 2016; ­Lindsay, Ming Cheung and Reveron, 2015; McGregor, 2010; Romaniuk and Burgers, 2018; USCESR, 2016; Wright and Hope, 2019; Wise, 2011). In 1983, the re-established ID/CCP was merged with the counter-intelligence and ­counter-espionage departments of the MPS to form a new Ministry of State Security (MSS – in Chinese 国家安全部，normally shortened to 国安部). The new organisation’s remit was to ‘ensure the security of the state through effective measures against enemy agents, spies and counter-revolutionary activities designed to sabotage or overthrow China’s socialist system’. This remit makes no mention of foreign intelligence collection but in practice, this was a significant part of the MSS’ remit. Deng Xiaoping, however, insisted that the MSS not be permitted to establish legal residencies within Chinese diplomatic missions, so initially MSS officers sought cover either with media organisations such as Guangming Daily or the New China News Agency (NCNA) or adopted business cover, either within China’s Stateowned Enterprises (SOEs) or private sector corporations including front organisations set up and controlled by the MSS of which there are estimated to be at least 3,000. The MSS also makes use of sleeper agents in the form of individuals who move overseas either as migrants or refugees and establish themselves in a target country. A documented example of this latter category is that of the former Chinese academic Wu Bin who, having been arrested in China for espousing dissident views, was offered the chance to avoid a prison sentence by moving to the USA and establishing himself as a businessman. In 1993, Wu, who also established an operational relationship with the FBI, was indicted for smuggling advanced night-vision equipment to China via Hong Kong (Pomfret, 1999). It is clear that since the mid-2000s, the MSS has been able to establish legal residencies in Chinese diplomatic missions and that these are used to undertake a range of operational activities both against host country targets and against Chinese diaspora communities such as Uighur and Tibetan activists. 199

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No information has ever been published by the Chinese state about the size, scope or budgets of the MSS but from a variety of sources, including the now-banned Falungong _quasi-religious movement which initially had many adherents within the Chinese security ­establishment2, it has been possible to derive a reasonably accurate picture. The overall number of MSS cadre officers is likely to be in the region of 100,000 with up to 40,000 deployed overseas and the remainder within China. The MSS headquarter in Beijing comprises some eighteen bureaux covering different aspects of intelligence collection, analysis, ­counter-intelligence, counter-­ espionage, counter-terrorism, communications, technical imagery and administration. There is a separate intelligence bureau dedicated to intelligence work in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao; a bureau dedicated to monitoring Chinese students and institutions overseas; a social research bureau responsible for collecting and analysing public opinion within China; and a bureau that creates and manages MSS front companies. The MSS has its own think-tank, the China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) – otherwise designated as MSS Bureau 8 – and two training institutes; the University of International Relations in Beijing which provides academic tuition to MSS trainees; and the Jiangnan Social University in Suzhou which provides training in operational tradecraft (Secret China, 2012). Much MSS operational activity is undertaken not at headquarters level but rather by the State Security Bureaux (SSBs) to be found in every Chinese province, autonomous region and directly administered municipality. Of the SSBs, those most involved in foreign intelligence operations tend, unsurprisingly, to be located in areas with long-established overseas connections. Of these, the Shanghai SSB appears to focus on collection against the USA and allies, the Zhejiang SSB against Northern Europe, the Qingdao SSB against Japan and ­Korea, the Fujian SSB against Taiwan, the Guangzhou SSB against Hong Kong and ­South-east Asia, and the Beijing SSB against Russia and Eastern Europe. These do not, however, constitute hard and fast demarcation lines and SSBs appear to have a remit to pursue whatever operational opportunities come their way. MSS officers working in SSBs have a range of covers including posts within provincial government organisations, universities and think-tanks and a wide range of private-sector companies. A seemingly widespread practice is to allow MSS officers to set up and run their own commercial operations to provide operational support and cover. Such arrangements are mirrored by 2/PLA most of whose covert collection activities are conducted by NOC officers situated in Chinese defence corporations such as Norinco and Polytechnologies or operating their own cover companies. A key priority for China’s civilian and military intelligence services was to support C ­ hina’s economic modernisation programme. This activity became formalised in 1986 through Plan 863. This plan, first proposed by China’s nuclear weapons scientists and initially focused on military technology, quickly morphed into a more general project designed to eliminate China’s dependence on western technology in a range of areas deemed to be of strategic importance, specifically: bio-technology, space, information technology, lasers, energy, automation and new materials. Plan 863, which was incorporated into the country’s five-year planning process, had a significant overt dimension but covert collection, by no means all of it undertaken by China’s intelligence agencies, was and remains a significant component of the plan. A further driver for Chinese espionage against the West – and other technologically advanced nations such as Japan and South Korea – was a growing awareness of how militarily backward China had become as evidenced by US use of information operations and ­precision-guided missile technology during the First Gulf War. Within the USA, which was at the centre of this collection effort, China’s intelligence agencies were able to make use of a Chinese diaspora community that was well represented 200

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within the US hi-tech and defence sectors. Approaches to individuals within those sectors appealed to their sense of cultural and ethnic solidarity and induced feelings of guilt by pointing out that they had enjoyed comfortable and privileged lifestyles, while their compatriots had lived in poverty. Much of this initial collection effort involved small-scale incremental collection – what former FBI assistant director for counter-intelligence Dave Szady referred to as the ‘thousand grains of sand’ approach – most of which did not rise to a level that would justify the deployment of substantial resources to investigate or prosecute. The situation was further complicated by ambiguities in US law relating to espionage and the transmission of classified information, the latter not necessarily a criminal offence. As depicted by David Wise in his book Tiger Trap, based on research of US court records and interviews with former FBI officers, the result was that few prosecutions of suspect Chinese spies were successful, while China succeeded in acquiring some important items of military technology including the W88 miniaturised nuclear warhead – the acquisition of which took two decades according to a 1999 report to the US Congress – the Quiet Electric Drive submarine propulsion system and the B1 and B2 bombers (Wise, 2011).

Technology as a game-changer Though China’s intelligence agencies were successful in exploiting the lack of constraints in an open society to collect valuable scientific and technical intelligence, progress was relatively slow and focused on a few key items of predominantly military technology. There is little evidence to suggest that the MSS and 2/PLA were notably successful in collecting high-grade political or strategic intelligence of a kind that would fundamentally influence Chinese strategic decision-making. But starting shortly after the turn of the millennium, the information revolution led to a step-change in collection capabilities. It is likely that broad-spectrum technical collection that has become a hallmark of China’s intelligence agencies began with efforts by the MSS to monitor and counter the activities of Falungong which by then had adherents in some seventy countries. But as it became apparent that huge volumes of sensitive and often classified data were being stored in the USA and other western states on computer networks that were defended either poorly or not at all, a vast collection effort was set in train. This collection effort was primarily driven by China’s signals intelligence agency 3/PLA. As mentioned earlier, for much of its early history, 3/PLA had been a standard military signals intelligence operation with little capacity to collect much beyond China’s borders. Their capabilities began to expand in the 1980s during which time 3/PLA operated two US-installed SIGINT stations at Qitai and Korla in Xinjiang to collect telemetry on Soviet missile tests and space launches and to monitor anti-ballistic missile and nuclear warhead tests. During the 1990s, 3/PLA established a chain of listening stations along the coast of Myanmar including Great Coco Island in the Andaman Sea. It also established two listening stations in Cuba at Bejucal and Santiago de Cuba. In addition, 3/PLA began to conduct SIGINT collection operations out of Chinese embassies whilst also conducting a growing range of tactical naval collection operations (Inkster, 2016). Nothing has ever been made public in China about the structure or budgets of 3/PLA but the basic unit of operation was the technical reconnaissance bureau (TRB), some of which were located centrally in Beijing, Shanghai, Qingdao and Wuhan and others distributed around the country in support of China’s military regions. 3/PLA has affiliations to a number of academic institutions including the National Defence Technical University which acts as a feeder institute for staff with technical expertise and the Luoyang Foreign Languages Institute which trains linguists. 201

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In 2015, 3/PLA was incorporated into the new Strategic Support Force which combines SIGINT collection, electronic and information warfare and space warfare. The early days of Chinese technical collection comprised a mixture of activities undertaken by the intelligence agencies and by a wide array of non-official hacker groups often operating on behalf of state or private corporations. The picture was further complicated by the fact that 3/PLA cyber units often moonlighted for the commercial sector. The range of targets covered was extremely broad, including government websites around the world, the websites of private corporations and dissident groups (Inkster, 2016). Chinese cyber actors rarely took much trouble to conceal their activities or their origins –many of their exploits targeted items of technology prioritised in China’s five-year planning cycle and their execution was aligned with the rhythms of the Chinese working day. Many targets, particularly private sector corporations, experienced ‘noisy’ and repetitive attacks suggestive of exploits by a number of competing actors. China’s externally focused cyber exploits to some degree reflected the anarchic nature of cyber behaviour inside China. One former employee of a private security organisation, in a post long since expunged from Chinese social media, has described a situation in which modern information technologies are used by bosses to spy on their employees, by employees to spy on each other, by wives to spy on their husbands to find out whether they have a mistress, by mistresses to spy on their ­sugar-daddies to find out if they have other mistresses and by corporations to spy on each other, often using data bought from local branches of the intelligence agencies or law enforcement. A particular source of animus for the US government was the pervasive nature of Chinese industrial cyber espionage focused on IP theft which, in 2015, became the focus of intensive negotiations leading to the signing by Presidents Xi and Obama of an agreement to not engage in cyberattacks for commercial advantage. What brought the Chinese to the negotiating table was a threat by the US government to sanction Chinese corporations deemed to have benefitted from stolen US IP. Prior to these negotiations, US officials had sought to persuade their Chinese counterparts of the need to distinguish between espionage conducted for reasons of national security and for commercial advantage. Such arguments ran aground in the face of a Chinese definition of national security much more all-embracing than that of the USA: for China, failure to maintain a high tempo of economic development could easily turn into the kind of social unrest that might prove fatal to the CCP’s hold on power. And although this was never formally articulated, in private conversations Chinese officials made clear that economic cyber espionage was seen as justifiable retribution for the indignities suffered by China at the hands of the West during the so-called Century of National Humiliation. The 2015 Xi-Obama agreement coincided with Xi Jinping’s reforms of the PLA as described earlier which inter alia led to 3/PLA being required to reduce their involvement in industrial cyber espionage and to focus on developing military cyber capabilities. In the immediate aftermath of the agreement, there was an apparent diminution of cyber exploits directed against the Five-Eyes – whose capacity for cyber attribution had been convincingly demonstrated by the February 2013 indictment of five officers from the Shanghai-based 3/PLA Unit 61398 complete with photographs of the individuals and the premises from which they had operated. But before too long, it became apparent that entities working for the MSS, given names such as APT 10/Stone Panda and APT3 (APT stands for advanced persistent threat) by the FBI, had moved to occupy the vacuum with a focus on technologies that, under China’s broad definition, could be seen as dual-use. Such attacks were directed less against individual organisations than against the managed service providers servicing multiple corporate clients and resulted in the theft of huge volumes of technology and trade secrets from most major industrial powers (Inkster, 2016). 202

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A further contributory factor to China’s growing intelligence reach has been a significant global expansion of Chinese telecommunications projects as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Particularly in the developing world, China’s ICT national champions ZTE and Huawei have provided core backbone infrastructure, often on a build-operate-maintain basis. Such infrastructure is often accompanied by the provision of surveillance technologies that have become pervasive within China in ways that potentially enable China to promote such capabilities and behaviours as globally normative (Inkster, 2016). For China’s intelligence services, this infrastructure development offers the same intelligence advantages the UK enjoyed when Cable and Wireless wired the world for telegraphy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the USA in the early twenty-first century when almost all global Internet traffic originated in or transited US networks. The provision of such capabilities also enables China’s intelligence agencies to leverage cooperation with their counterparts in developing world countries and to enjoy ‘hunting rights’, i.e. the ability to undertake independent operations with the concurrence of the host government as long as such operations do not infringe that government’s own interests. This pervasive collection effort will have provided China with far greater volumes of intelligence than they could have imagined possible before the information revolution, and with few of the risks associated with HUMINT operations. But technical collection can never eliminate the need for HUMINT altogether. In some cases, the intervention of a human agent will be the key to accessing certain databases, especially those that are afforded better levels of protection. And some strategic intelligence depends on understanding not just what adversaries are thinking but why they are thinking it, information that only a human source can provide. China’s intelligence agencies have hence continued to develop human sources and have been able to utilise ICT to help them do it. Initially, Chinese agencies were circumspect about making approaches to foreigners – the Boursicot case required the approval of then-Premier Zhou Enlai – but as time has gone by, they have demonstrated growing self-confidence and willingness to take risks and appear to be subject to few if any political constraints. They have shown a willingness to spend substantial sums of money often for uncertain returns, as evidenced by the case of former US State Department employee Candace Marie Claiborne, paid tens of thousands of dollars by the Shanghai SSB in return for what appears to have been minimal intelligence product.3 And from the number of ‘honey trap’ approaches deployed against foreign targets, one of which led to the suicide of a young Shanghai-based Japanese diplomat, it suggests that any vestige of the prudery that had characterised the CCP in its early years in power has long since evaporated. The ability of China’s intelligence agencies to target foreigners has been notably assisted by the fact that most of their potential targets have social media profiles that reveal much about their lives, material circumstances and hence potential vulnerabilities. A case in point is that of former CIA officer Kevin Mallory, identified by the MSS due to a LinkedIn profile which, though not specifically identifying him as CIA, made this fact abundantly clear to anyone with expertise in the security and intelligence sector. Mallory was out of work and in debt when he was invited to China by an individual purporting to work for a think-tank, was tasked, paid and provided with a mobile phone modified with software to enable secure text messaging and document transmission. The FBI has claimed to be investigating three comparable cases.4 MSS targeting efforts against the USA were also greatly facilitated by cyberattacks on the database of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) that took place between 2014 and 2015. This database, widely known to be poorly defended, contained sensitive personal information about some 21.5 million 203

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federal employees including issues such as marital and financial problems. Because the CIA did not put its staff on the OPM system, any CIA officer under State Department cover became immediately identifiable.5 A key driver for Chinese efforts to recruit foreign and in particular US sources is the need to protect themselves against hostile penetration. As mentioned earlier, paranoia is both a necessary and inevitable state of mind in a Leninist regime and the threat from ‘hostile foreign forces’ and peaceful evolution have been constant concerns for China’s leadership. As a vanguard elite that has never submitted itself to popular suffrage, the CCP has never been able to trust its own population and has devoted significant resources to the use of technical capabilities to exercise social control and root out dissent. The Internet and social media are comprehensively monitored to exclude content that challenges the CCP narrative and artificial intelligence is being deployed to perfect a grid management security system for monitoring and controlling urban areas including through facial recognition technologies in which China has become a world leader (Gang, 2018). The Social Credit programme seeks to allocate scores to individual citizens based on a combination of their real-life and on-line behaviours with a view to shaping these behaviours through rewards and sanctions. While such programmes are widely decried in the west as ‘Orwellian’, it is important to note that most ordinary Chinese welcome any development that helps address what has become a chronically low-trust environment characterised by pervasive financial scams and the counterfeiting of goods including baby milk formula. China has also sought to promote its concept of national security as an all-of-nation responsibility with an annual National Security Day, accompanied by cartoons illustrating cases such as a naïve young Chinese girl beguiled by a foreign boyfriend into divulging state secrets – which in China can mean virtually any information at all. Much of the infrastructure of domestic surveillance is managed by the MPS. In 2016, some Hong Kong Chinese media suggested that China’s intelligence community was about to undergo reform whereby the MSS would relinquish their responsibilities for ­counter-intelligence and counter-espionage to the MPS where they had originally been situated. There is nothing to indicate that this has actually happened but the MPS does appear to be assuming greater responsibilities for maintaining national security both inside China and on its periphery. When journalists from the Wall Street Journal were investigating the Chinese connection to the 1MDB scandal, they uncovered a Malaysian government document which quoted Sun Lijun, then Director of the Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Affairs Office of the MPS as saying that the journalists would be subjected to full-spectrum surveillance including eavesdropping (Wright and Hope, 2019). However, the MSS is the lead agency in dealing with foreign espionage cases and it was they who were responsible for rounding up and either executing or imprisoning some thirty CIA agents in China between 2010 and 2012 due to the compromise of an agent communications system that had been earlier deployed in the Middle East (Hoffman, 2017). In at least one case, the MSS is reported to have responded with extreme brutality, summarily executing a CIA agent and his pregnant wife outside their work unit. One area where China’s intelligence services play only a partial role is in China’s growing overseas influence operations. These activities have been thrown into stark relief by a series of reports in countries such as New Zealand and Australia showing Chinese efforts to manipulate domestic political processes and by concerns in a growing range of countries about Chinese efforts to constrain critical commentary about China. These activities are conducted mainly by two CCP organs, the United Front Work Department whose primary task is to develop relations with non-Party entities both in and outside China; and the Propaganda 204

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Department whose role is to promote the Party narrative. They reflect China’s concept of national security which, as Samantha Hoffman argues, is better thought of as Party-state security. In her words, ‘state security is not simply the protection of a geographical space, but also the protection of the CCP’s ideological and political security, which is not bounded by geography’ (Hoffman, 2017). China’s intelligence agencies have a role to play, primarily in pressurising the families of critics living outside China, where possible abducting Chinese critics in locations such as Hong Kong and Thailand, and organising intimidation of CCP critics. But thus far, there has been no sign of these agencies engaging in the kind of ‘active measures’ influence operations conducted by the Russian FSB in relation to the US presidential and other western elections.

Political and legal oversight China’s civilian intelligence and security agencies, the MSS and MPS, are, as ministries, formally accountable to China’s State Council, the country’s top-tier state institution. Neither has ever been a ‘power ministry’ – and since Xi Jinping assumed office in 2013, the political standing of the MSS has been diminished by a series of scandals resulting in the resignation or dismissal of three vice-ministers. More significant for these ministries in terms of political oversight is a CCP organ the Political and Legal Committee (中共中央政法委员会 – ­normally abbreviated to 中央政法委) responsible for the civilian intelligence and security agencies, the Procuratorate and Ministry of Justice. China’s military intelligence agencies and the ­para-military People’s Armed Police (PAP) are answerable to the Central Military Commission, also a CCP organ headed by Xi Jinping. It is noteworthy that the Political and Legal Committee is currently headed not by a member of the Politburo Standing Committee but by a less senior Politburo member. This apparent downgrading is almost certainly a consequence of the CCP factional struggle which led in 2015 to the arrest and prosecution for corruption of former head of the Political and Legal Committee Zhou Yongkang, a Politburo Standing Committee member who, it emerged, had used his power to instruct the MSS covertly to monitor the communications of individual CCP leaders, almost certainly including those of Xi Jinping himself. The purpose of the Political and Legal Committee is not to exercise detailed oversight of the intelligence agencies but rather to ensure that their activities and conduct are aligned with the CCP’s objectives and priorities. The other central organisation that, in principle, should exercise a role in overseeing the intelligence and security agencies is the National Security Commission – 中央国家安全委员会 – established in 2013 as part of Xi Jinping’s broader effort to take a firmer grip on the levers of government. There has been much foreign speculation that this new body would equate with the long-established US National Security Committee (NSC) in defining policy for major national defence, security and foreign policy issues and Xi Jinping’s first speech to the newly formed body, in which he articulated a concept of ‘big security’. But as has been the case with the plethora of Leading Small Groups either reinvigorated or established by Xi Jinping since he took office, little information has emerged about this entity’s activities or remit. Xi’s tenure of office has also witnessed a plethora of new legislation pertinent of the activities of ­ ounter-terrorism China’s intelligence and security agencies. These are: a National Security Law; a C Law; an Intelligence Law; a Cybersecurity Law and a Counter-espionage Law. Such laws need to be seen in the overall context of China’s approach to law which is conditioned both by traditional Chinese and Marxist–Leninist perceptions. Traditional ­Chinese law has never been permissive, as evidenced, for example, by Article 386 of the Qing 205

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legal code which prescribes unspecified severe punishments for ‘inappropriate behaviour’ – 不应为，重 – not further defined. Under Marxism–Leninism, the law is not seen as having any intrinsic value but rather serves as just another instrument the CCP can use to achieve its ideological objectives. As the leaked Central Document No. 9 made clear, western concepts of rule of law and judicial independence are viewed as threats to the CCP’s hold on power (Inkster, 2016). China’s Intelligence Law represents the first ever official reference to China’s intelligence agencies though it does not identify these by name or say anything meaningful about their remit, size, resources or budgets. Nor does it specify the role and functions of the central organs that oversee the work of these agencies. These agencies are required to operate in accordance with Chinese law and there are supposedly remediation mechanisms available to those who perceive themselves to have been victims of wrongful acts – though these are not spelt out. All individuals and entities are required to provide the intelligence and security agencies with assistance as required and it is an offence to obstruct their work. The requirement to assist the work of China’s intelligence agencies has attracted particular attention in relation to the controversy that has arisen over the aspirations of ICT national champion Huawei in building 5G mobile networks in western states, seen by a growing number of governments as posing an unacceptable security risk. Huawei has denied that it would ever accede to Chinese government requests to interfere with these networks but both practice and the law as drafted would seem to indicate that in reality, they would have no choice. The most noteworthy aspect of the Counter-intelligence Law is that its scope extends beyond traditional definitions of espionage to include inter alia ‘fabricating or distorting facts, publishing or disseminating words or information that endanger state security’.

Conclusion As China’s global influence has grown, so too has the role of China’s intelligence and security agencies. From organisations that were risk-averse and had little impact internationally, these agencies have now attained first-division status and their activities are having a growing impact on states which until recently had little experience of them. There are indications that China has developed intelligence cooperation with states such as Russia and Iran which, while not sharing China’s ideology, do share a common interest in pushing back against the USA and the liberal international order it has championed. As China has become more globally preponderant, so too has its global exposure and the risks to the Party-state structure and it is to be expected that China’s intelligence agencies will become more active and less constrained in promoting and defending China’s interests and combatting threats to them. The challenge posed by China’s intelligence agencies needs to be understood within the context of a regime that relies on a wider range of covert capabilities to promote and protect its interests than is true for most states. China’s intelligence agencies are hence just one club in a golf bag, used in a game of golf where the only rule is that the CCP either wins or risks obliteration. In that sense, China presents a unique challenge and one with which other states will struggle to deal.

Notes 1 Espionage: A Spy’s Grisly Solution, Time, 3 March 1986. The defector in question was Yu Qiangsheng, a senior officer in the Beijing State Security Bureau’s counter-espionage division and brother of Yu Zhengsheng who served on the Politburo Standing Committee from 2012 to 2017.

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The Chinese intelligence service 2 China Sect Penetrated Military and Police Security Information Spurred Crackdown, John Pomfret, The Washington Post, 7 August 1999. https://culteducation.com/group/1254-­falungong/6987-china-sect-penetrated-military-and-police-security-infiltration-spurred-crackdown. html 3 Former State Department Employee Pleads Guilty to Conspiring with Foreign Agents, United States Department of Justice, 24 April 2019. www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-statedepartment-employee-pleads-guilty-conspiring-foreign-agents 4 How a Former CIA Officer Was Caught Betraying His Country, Anderson Cooper, CBSN, 23 December 2018. www.cbsnews.com/news/chinese-spy-how-a-former-cia-officer-was-caughtbetraying-his-country-60-minutes/ 5 Inside the Cyber Attack That Shocked the US Government, Brendan I. Koerner, Wired, 23 ­October 2016, https://wired.com/2016/10/inside-cyberattack-shocked-us-government/

References Andrew, C. (1995) For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush, Christopher Andrew. New York: HarperCollins. Chambers, D.I. (2012) Edging in from the Cold: The Past and Present State of Chinese Intelligence Historiography, Studies in Intelligence, 56 (3). www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-­intelligence/ csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-56-no.-3/edging-in-from-the-cold-the-past-and-­ present-state-of-chinese-intelligence-historiography.html Dorfman Z. (2018) Botched CIA Communications System Helped Blow Cover of Chinese Agents. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/15/botched-cia-communications-system-helpedblow-cover-chinese-agents-intelligence/ Endo, K. (2016) Mao Zedong: The Man Who Conspired with the Japanese. https://u.osu.edu/mclc/ 2016/07/02/truth-of-mao-zedongs-collusion-with-the-japanese-army-1/ Gang, Q. (2018) China under the Grid, China Media Project. http://chinamediaproject.org/2018/12/07/ china-under-the-grid/ Hanna, W.C., Mulvenon, J. and Puglisi, A.C. (2013) Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernisation. New York: Routledge. Hoffman, S. (2017) China’s State Security Strategy: ‘Everyone Is Responsible’. The Strategist. www. aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-state-security-strategy-everyone-is-responsible Inkster, N. (2016) China’s Cyber Power. London: Routledge. Lindsay, J.R., Ming Cheung, T., and Reveron, D.S. (eds.) (2015). China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy and Politics in the Digital Domain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. MacFarquhar, R. (1974–2011) The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Vols. 1–3. New York: Columbia University Press. McGregor, R. (2010) The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers. London: Allen Lane. Pomfret, J. (1999) China Sect Penetrated Military and Police Security Information Spurred ­Crackdown. The Washington Post. https://culteducation.com/group/1254-falun-gong/6987-chinasect-­penetrated-military-and-police-security-infiltration-spurred-crackdown.html Romaniuk, S.N. and Burgers, T. (2018) How China’s AI Technology Exports Are Seeding Surveillance Societies Globally, The Diplomat. https://thediploma.com/2018/10/how-chinas-ai-technologyexports-are-seeding-surveillance-societies-globally/ Secret China (2012) 看中国， 红墙背后的黑手， 解密中共国安部。 王海天 31 January 2012. www. secretchina.com/news/gb/2012/01/31/438585.html/ Time (1986) Espionage: A Spy’s Grisly Solution, Time, 3 March 1986. http://content.time.com/time/ magazine/article/0,9171,960791,00.html USCESR (2016) China’s Intelligence Service and Espionage Operations, United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Washington. Wise, D. (2011) Tiger Trap: America’s Secret Spy War with China. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Wright, T. and Hope, B. (2019) WSJ Investigation: China Offered to Bail Out Troubled Malaysian Fund in Return for Deals. Wall Street Journal. www.wsj.com/articles/how-china-flexes-itspolitical-muscle-to-expand-powere-overseas-11546890449

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PART III

Espionage and the academy Spy stories

13 THE CAMBRIDGE SPY RING The mystery of Wilfrid Mann Andrew Lownie

Introduction One of the intriguing bit players in the Cambridge Spy Ring is the nuclear physicist ­Wilfrid Mann, a colleague of Maclean, Burgess and Philby in the Washington Embassy, who was first named as a Soviet agent, along with Anthony Blunt, in Andrew Boyle’s (1979) The Climate of Treason. Opinion still remains divided on whether Mann, codenamed ‘Basil’, was ever a Russian spy with evidence for and against him. This chapter examines some of this evidence.

The mystery of Wilfrid Mann Citing confidential information from a CIA source, Boyle claimed that the Israelis ‘passed on to Angleton the name of the British nuclear scientist whom they had unearthed as an important Soviet agent’ just after the Second World War as ‘the price for uninterrupted but informal cooperation with US intelligence’ (Boyle, 1979: 308). Angleton decided to run the operation out of his hip pocket for at least a couple of years. My further understanding is that, besides Angleton and Bedell Smith (who became Director of the CIA in 1950), only Scotty Miler and Jim Rocca were aware of the full game. Whether Hoover himself was fully informed is questionable. What can be said is that the FBI did learn eventually that ‘Basil’ was working under CIA control as a double agent. It is impossible to be more precise than this because no complete chronological record of the operation was kept; next to nothing was committed to paper – or to the supposed hierarchical order of the US Intelligence community. (Boyle, 1979: 308). In the book, Boyle argued that Mann was used to help Maclean interpret for the Soviets information on the latest developments in nuclear physics, which without Basil’s help would have been Greek to Maclean. According to Boyle, quite separately in late 1948, American crypto-analysis revealed a Russian source inside the British Embassy who had passed classified information during the final stages of the Second World War. ‘Basil’ was identified and ‘broke 211

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down quickly and easily, confessing that he had become a covert Communist in his student days and a secret agent for the Soviets not long afterwards’ (Boyle, 1974: 310). He was given the choice of continuing to work for the Russians under CIA direction, or ‘take whatever penalties were visited on him by American law’ (Boyle, 1974: 310). In return for protection and the promise of American citizenship, ‘Basil’ agreed to be played back against the Russians providing Maclean only with useless or wrong information for passing on to the Soviets. Boyle claimed that ‘Basil’ ‘had indicated plainly that the Soviet spymasters also had their own man inside the British Secret Service, and Angleton intended to use “Basil” next to test the slight suspicions he had long nursed about Philby’.1 ‘Until October 1948 the British scientist continued to see Donald Maclean as regularly as ever, advising him which nuclear programme files, and which items on those files, should be extracted from the US Atomic Energy Commission’s headquarters whenever the First Secretary used his special unauthorized pass to gain entry unattended. The information thus obtained was carefully monitored by the A ­ mericans before ‘Basil’ handed it to Maclean, for transmission to the Russians’ (Boyle, 1974: 3101). Though Boyle did not name Mann, he was easily identified – his second name was Basil – and questions were asked in the House of Commons. Mann denied the accusations, publishing a book in 1982 Was There a Fifth Man? challenging some of the evidence that Boyle had produced (Mann, 1982). He denied that he was in Chalk River or New York during Maclean’s posting to Washington and, in any case, was not working on atomic secrets at this stage but setting up a radio-standards activity laboratory and working on the peaceful use of atomic power (Mann, 1982: 50). In fact, Mann served from 1943 to 1945 in the Scientific Office of the Ministry of Production in Washington living, according to FBI interviews, just outside Washington in Alexandria and Arlington. Maclean served in the Washington Embassy from April 1944. Boyle refused to apologise for the alleged libel and Angleton to provide testimony when Mann wanted to sue. The matter was dropped. Boyle’s account is supported by former US intelligence officer William Corson (1977) in his history of the Washington intelligence community The Armies of Ignorance. He wrote that Israeli intelligence had provided ‘some remarkable results and intelligence coups’ and that Burgess, Maclean and Philby were identified earlier than 1951 and manipulated giving them ‘intelligence disinformation to mislead the Soviets’ – something not commonly accepted by intelligence historians (Corson, 1977: 327–328). Wilfrid Mann was born in London in 1908 and educated at St Paul’s School before going on to receive a degree in maths and physics from Imperial College in 1929, where he became a lecturer. He went on to do graduate work during the academic year 1932 in Copenhagen – he says working under Martin Knudsen on the kinetic theory of gasses rather than under the nuclear physicist Niels Bohr as Boyle claimed – and then 1936 – 1938 as a Commonwealth Fellow working on cyclotrons at the radiation laboratory at Berkeley, California. Mann’s work with accelerated helium atoms on copper and zinc targets led to the discovery of the radioisotopegallium-67 which is still used in nuclear medicine. At Imperial, he had come under the influence of GP Thompson, the British physicist in charge of the Tube Alloys project – the British nuclear programme, later incorporated into the joint British and American Manhattan Project – completing a doctorate under Thompson’s supervision in 1934. He went to work for the project first at Shell Mex House in the Strand and then from 1943 to 1945 at the British Commonwealth Scientific Office in Washington. After two years with the British nuclear programme at Chalk River in Canada, where he was close friends with the Italian nuclear physicist, Bruno Pontecorvo, who defected 212

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to the Soviet Union in 1950, he returned to Washington in 1948 as atomic affairs attache. From 1946 to 1951, Mann was the UK delegate to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. As the British scientific intelligence liaison officer, he maintained close relations with the CIA’s James Angleton – the two sons were close friends – and worked closely with Geoffrey Paterson and Peter Dwyer, the respective MI5 and MI6 Washington representatives. Mann’s office was in the ‘Rogues Gallery’, the secure area of the Embassy, and next door to those of Philby and Burgess. Here, he held the British decrypts of Soviet signals traffic relating to atomic bomb experiments, decrypts he shared with the CIA – and it appears also the KGB. Confirmation of Donald Maclean’s treachery came from intercepted Soviet communications in April 1951 and coincidentally on the 18th of that month, Mann was replaced by Dr Robert Press as the MI6 scientific intelligence officer. He was never employed by the British again, subsequently working from 1951 to 1980 as the head of the radioactivity section at the National Bureau of Standards in Washington. After the flight of Burgess and Maclean, Mann was investigated by the FBI – much of his file has been retained on national security grounds – where his criticisms of America’s position in the Korean War, his anti-Americanism and close friendship with Bruno P ­ ontecorvo were noted and he was regarded as a difficult colleague but was cleared of Communist associations.2 In May 1952, Charles Johnston, Regional Security Officer in London, wrote to Don Nicholson, Chief, Division of Security at the State Department of Mann’s wartime service that Mann was ‘a man of the highest character and integrity’ and at the Ministry of Supply, ‘His character integrity and ability were entirely satisfactory’.3 According to his memoirs, Mann ‘became of low-key interest to the KGB’4 in February 1961 when he was approached by a Mr S of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, later identified as a KGB officer. Over the next two years controlled by the American authorities, he had ‘a series of lunch-time meetings with S’5 which were ‘frank but had never reached a point where he had asked me for any but published material, nor had I ever responded to his offers to repay me for expenses’.6 For some commentators, this was the episode which Boyle had confused when Mann was ‘played back’ to the Russians supplying them with innocent or false information. For other writers, it was merely a suitable cover for any contact with Russian intelligence officials which might be discovered. In August 1975, a front page story appeared in the Times headlined ‘CIA gave technological support to Israel to make atomic bomb after 1956 Suez war’. According to Ted Szulc, the former foreign and diplomatic correspondent of the New York Times, the support was provided by the CIA’s Counterintelligence Staff then headed by James Angleton. ‘Several nuclear scientists were secretly sent to Israel to work with Dimona scientists. The most important of them was a British-born physicist, now an American citizen working for the United States Government in Washington, with special and esoteric ties to the CIA’.7 Though Mann denied his involvement, interviewed by Szulc, Angleton confirmed that the British scientist was Mann but asked him not to be identified for fear of him committing suicide (Holzman, 2008: 167). After the 1979 Boyle story broke, after representations by Mann, a press release was issued by the Office of the Secretary of Commerce Dr Wilfrid B Mann has been a longstanding and esteemed employee of the National Bureau of Standards. The Department of Commerce has no question concerning his loyalty to the United States. 213

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Significantly, no other government department supported the statement in spite of Mann’s claim that it ‘spoke for every Department, Agency and Bureau in the Federal Executive, including the CIA and FBI’.8 In spite of representations to the British government, the ­Attorney General would only say that there was no reason to refer Mann to the Director of Public Prosecutions.9 Interestingly almost a year before Boyle’s book was published, the Secretary of the ­Cabinet wrote to the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary about Mann “neither we nor the Americans have evidence to support Boyle’s suggestion that…was ever a Russian spy.”10 Mann, who became an American citizen in 1959, declined all interview requests and died in a Baptist retirement home in Baltimore in March 2001. The story of Mann, the Russian spy, seemed to be dead. However, in the course of researching my biography of Guy Burgess (Lownie, 2015), I uncovered fresh evidence of Mann’s activities in the private papers of Sir Patrick Reilly, Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Foreign Office Under Secretary in charge of intelligence at the time of Burgess’s defection in 1951. Reilly wrote in his unpublished memoirs ‘That “Basil” who can easily be identified, was in fact a Soviet spy is true: and also that he was turned round without difficulty’ (Dan, 2003: 323). My discovery backs up Ultimate Deception: How Stalin Stole the Bomb, by Jerry Dan (real name Nigel Bance), a book based on interviews with a KGB officer Vladimir Barkovsky, formerly deputy director of the department within the KGB which handled all scientific and technical intelligence and KGB documents, which revealed Mann to have been recruited – possibly through homosexual blackmail – in the late 1930s and given the codename MALONE because of his Irish connections (Dan, 2003: 323). Interviewed for the book, Mann confirmed to Dan that he had been a Russian spy (Dan, 2003: 331). According to Ultimate Deception, Mann was in regular contact during and immediately after the Second World War with Russian intelligence officers and KGB officers confirm that he was a Soviet agent of great influence – ‘rated in Moscow as equal to Philby in importance’ (Dan, 2003: 8). He supposedly passed to his Russian case officer the precise details of British cooperation with the United States on atomic matters, revealed that Britain had given up the right of veto on the dropping of an atomic bomb and accepted that two-thirds of all uranium oxide mined in the Belgian Congo and South Africa should go through American ports (Dan, 2003: 321–322). Other documents he supplied – reproduced in the book – included a transmission dated 23rd August 1945 ‘Report of NKGB resident in London on the intensification of activities of British Intelligence against the USSR’ telling Moscow that the British and French were about to establish the ‘Anglo-French Liaison Bureau’, a secret MI6 bureau in Paris to monitor Soviet atomic developments. On a trip to London in February 1948, he gave the rezidentura the technical details of a fleet of adapted long-range US bombers on constant alert in the north Pacific to check the fallout from any Russian nuclear explosion. According to Ultimate Deception, the Russians never entirely trusted Mann and suspected that he was being ‘played back’ to them. The discovery of Reilly’s account of ‘Basil’ appears to confirm that Mann’s accusations were correct though how Mann was used is not clear. Those who defend Mann say that his name does not appear in Guy Liddell’s diary, the Venona decrypts nor the Mitrokhin Archive, that he was several times security cleared and his FBI file is not designated R for Russian espionage. They believe that Angleton misled Boyle to protect his own reputation over Philby. However, the fact Mann’s name has not cropped up in Liddell, Venona and Mitrokhin does not necessarily mean that he did not spy for the Russians but simply there is no record. 214

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He could, for example, have been run by Russian military intelligence, the GRU, or outside the rezidentura. The spy writer Nigel West claims that in 2003, documents were retrieved from the KGB archive suggesting ‘that Mann may have been a Soviet spy codenamed MALLONE’ (West, 2014: 328).

Conclusion MI5, when I approached them, claimed that they ‘hold no files relating to Wilfrid Mann that fall within this category’, i.e. ‘files that are still in existence and at least 50 years old, if to do so would not damage national security’.11 The CIA, in response to a Freedom of Information request, wrote that they could ‘neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records response to your request’ and it was being denied under various national security FOIA exemptions. The intelligence role Wilfrid Basil Mann played is likely to remain a secret until more files in London, Washington – and perhaps Moscow – are opened.

Notes 1 Boyle (1974, p. 310). Angleton’s genuine shock at learning of Philby’s treachery in 1951 makes this scenario unlikely. 2 FBI file, Wilfrid Mann, A H Belmont to CH Stanley, 17 January 1952. 3 Ibid., Charles Johnston to Don Nicholson, 16 May 1952. 4 Mann, p. 96. 5 Ibid., p. 97. 6 Ibid., p. 102. His version of the discussions can be found pp. 98–102. 7 Times, 21 August 1975. 8 Mann, p. 115. 9 Observer, 30 December 1979, p. 4. 10 John Hunt to Bryan Cartledge 31/1/79 PREM 16/2230. The file covers the briefing for the Prime Minister on the Blunt case from July 1974 to January 1979. 11 Letter to Andrew Lownie from MI5, 16 March 2015.

References Boyle, A. (1979) The Fourth Man. New York: The Dial Press. Corson, W. (1977) The Armies of Ignorance. New York: The Dial Press. Dan, J. (2003) Ultimate Deception. Porlock: Rare Books & Berry. Holzman, M. (2008) James Jesus Angleton. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Lownie, A. (2015) Stalin’s Englishman: The Lives of Guy Burgess. London: Hodder. Mann, W. B. (1982) Was There a Fifth Man? Oxford: Pergamon Press. West, N. (2014) Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence. New York: Scarecrow.

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14 JOHN GORDON COATES PHD DSO (1918–2006) Conscientious objector, interrogator, intelligence officer, commando, saboteur, spy…academic Paddy Hayes Introduction For someone with intelligence officer, commando, saboteur and spy on his CV to have commenced his military career, a registered ‘conchie’ (conscientious objector), months after his country had gone to war, does not exactly fit the expected profile but there was relatively little about John Coates that did. In a series of conversations between this author and Robin Coates, John Coates’ son, it became clear that Robin thought that his father, Fred Coates,’ left-wing political orientation was a strong influence on John Coates. Somewhat surprisingly for a comfortably off b­ usiness executive, Fred Coates was the holder of staunchly socialist views and a stalwart of the ­Independent Labour Party.1 The pacifist aspect may have stemmed from John Coates’ education in the Abbotsholme School in Rochester in Staffordshire (for which he’d won an 80% scholarship). Abbotsholme’s environment of the time favoured the socialist/pacifist thinking associated with its original co-founders, Cecil Reddie* and Edward Carpenter.† This was not all the young Coates learned in Abbotsholme, where he had become head boy. Included in the curriculum were the practical subjects of animal husbandry and ­carpentry; useful languages like English, French and German in place of the Classics (Latin and Greek), and an emphasis on the Fine Arts, then usually taught only in cathedral schools and art colleges. Coates also spent three full terms in schools overseas, two in Germany and one in France. To add some spice, there was a thread of interest in magic and the ­occult ­r unning through the establishment which also engaged Coates’ long-term interest. He joined The Kindred of Kibbo Kift,2 a secret society devoted to engendering global peace coupled with overtones of other-worldliness and the occult.3 The left-wing thread was to continue when Coates went up to Cambridge (Downing College 1937). The university had nurtured its eponymous spy ring through their days of

*  REDDIE, Dr Cecil (1858–1932), Reforming educationalist. † CARPENTER, Edward (1844–1929), Socialist poet, philosopher, anthologist, educationalist and early activist for rights for homosexuals.

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la douceur la vivre4 and was still home to many left-wing thinkers and during his time there Coates was friends with a number. He was an admirer too of the influential historian and Marxist, E J Hobsbawm.‡ 5

Coates It was while in Cambridge that the first great tragedy of his life struck Coates. It was June 1939; Coates’ younger brother Michael was staying with him in Cambridge for a few days. One evening, John Coates returned to his set and found Michael lying there, unresponsive. He had choked on his own vomit and was dead. Michael’s death impacted John Coates severely. He was the older brother who ‘had got it all,’ handsome and intellectually gifted, whereas Michael was a tradesman, simply ‘making do.’ The fact of him not being present and able to prevent his brother’s death must have been a big burden to carry. Despite that, he graduated well the following year and registered as a conscientious ­objector. Coates’ later explanation for this decision was that at the time, he was ‘simply mixed up.’ He followed this by enlisting in the Royal Army Medical Corps in 1940. This was at the time of the Dunkirk evacuation with Britain facing great peril. This reality appeared to sink home for within a year he was commissioned into the Intelligence Corps6 and was assigned to the London Cage as a POW interrogator. The London Cage was reserved for what today would be termed ‘high-value’ prisoners. The treatment of the POWs was tough, verging on the brutal. It included isolation, sleep deprivation, being forced to stand in the same position for hours and undertaking tasks such as cleaning their cells with a toothbrush though it stopped short of full-on Gestapo-style torture. After some months in the Cage, he transferred to the fighting army. His time as a conchie was over. The fighting army posted him to the 61st Infantry Division, a unit that never did any fighting in its six-year existence. When Coates joined as an intelligence officer, the 61st had been moved to Northern Ireland where its role was to defend the province against the ­threatened German invasion. When the invasion failed to materialise, Coates decided that having made the decision to become a fighting soldier he would see it through. So, fearing perhaps that the army’s view of him was coloured by his record as an objector, he volunteered for the commandos. His first unit was 4 Commando with whom he trained in Achnacarry in the Scottish Highlands. Coates was young and fit; in 1938, he’d spent his three-month summer vacation on a cycling tour of Germany, Austria, Italy and Czechoslovakia, something that may have had a part to play in his eventual decision to join the fight against fascism.7 Coates was never to deploy with 4 Commando. A chance encounter on a train with an officer on the staff of Vice-Admiral Lord (Louis) Mountbatten§ led to an interview with the Vice-Admiral himself and a transfer to the international 10 Commando as its intelligence training officer. While this was better than whiling away the hours climbing hills in Scotland it still wasn’t fighting, more to the point he was constantly seeing his pupils embarking on dangerous missions, leaving him behind. So after about a year of that, he volunteered for 30 Commando ( Jeffreys-Jones 2015).8 In 30 Commando, Coates had found the action he craved, participating in the Allied ­invasion of mainland Italy (Avalanche). This took place in September 1943 and was a ‡  HOBSBAWM, Eric John Ernest CH FRSL FBA (1917–2012), Historian and Marxist intellectual. §  MOUNTBATTEN, Admiral of the Fleet Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma, KG GCB OM GCSI GCIE GCVO DSO PC FRS (1900–1979).

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form of ‘dress rehearsal’ for the D Day landings in Normandy, scheduled for the following year. This was also his introduction to the sharper end of the intelligence business, for 30 ­Commando was primarily a combat intelligence-gathering unit. The details of what it got up to remain secret, however given that one of its members was a Lithuanian-Scottish safe-cracker, we can get some flavour of the work they did. After the invasion, Coates decided to seek even more intensive action by volunteering for the Special Operations Executive (SOE). SOE’s role was to organise sabotage and resistance in the enemy occupied territories. Coates’ aptitude for languages and his experience as a commando made him a natural fit. After completing his SOE training, Coates parachuted into Croatia where he worked with Tito’s partisans in their campaign against the German occupying forces, a campaign characterised by exceptional brutality. He was withdrawn after a few months and then reinserted. The following account of his latter action is taken from the archives of the Military Intelligence Museum in Chicksands. In September 1944 Captain Coates and two Hungarian-Canadians were parachuted into Croatia; their mission (Operation DIBBLER) was to cross into Hungary to create passive resistance, undertake sabotage and prevent vital installations from being ­estroyed during a German retreat…..The three were eventually dropped near Pcs in early ­September 1944; they were arrested soon after their arrival. One of their number was badly beaten while Coates and the other agent were taken to a prison camp at ­Zugliget in Budapest. While in prison Coates, despite having been extensively interrogated and tortured, managed to arrange the escape of three British officers before escaping himself; he eventually managed to reach the Soviet lines where he was further interrogated by his ‘liberators.’ He was repatriated to Bari in March 1945. Captain Coates was awarded the Distinguished Service Order.9 By this stage of the war, German interrogators had lost whatever vestiges of squeamishness they may have once possessed. Coates felt the full brunt of this, including the administration of electric shocks to his toes. Most people break under torture. Coates, ironically a former interrogator, whose main method had been to ‘verbally browbeat’ the prisoner, didn’t talk, never offering up any information that would lead to the arrest of his comrades. His treatment at the hands of the Russians, after his escape, was no picnic either, his citation for the DSO intimating that it was for bravery while he was in the custody of both the Germans and the Russians. Of John Coates’ bravery, there was no doubt. When he returned to duty in London, Gubbins,¶ the director of SOE asked him if he would be prepared to go back to Hungary to liaise with the indigenous forces and help lay the groundwork for the post-war administration. Coates accepted but the mission was ­vetoed by Churchill (Aldrich & Cormac 2016)10 on the grounds that if Coates’ presence was discovered by the Russians, it would be seen to be in breach of the Churchill/Stalin percentages agreement.11 This prohibition was later to be disregarded with Coates ‘going back and forth’ to Budapest and to Prague over 1945.12 Coates took time out to wed in 1946, marrying Norma ‘Bobbie’ Stuart Bishop.** The couple had met at a wartime dance while both were posted to Wales. Attractive, vivacious and self-reliant (but emotionally fragile), Bishop had joined the Women’s Royal Air Force ¶ GUBBINS, Major-General Sir Colin McVean, MC, DSO, KCMG (1896–1976); Director of SOE 1943–1946. **  BISHOP, Norma ‘Bobbie’ Stuart (1921–1978): Women’s Royal Air Force (WRAF).

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(WRAF) shortly before the war. Despite leaving school at fifteen, Bishop had been commissioned and posted to the Spitfire training establishment at RAF Montfort Bridge. The two were passionately in love. The couple’s first home was in Bad Salzuflen in the British zone in Occupied Germany, where Coates had been transferred by SOE. He was working in an SOE unit known as ME42. The initial purpose of ME42 was to trace any missing SOE agents still surviving in post-surrender Germany, establishing what had happened and then providing appropriate security clearance with Allied Counterintelligence. It was also to assist in identifying any threats to the occupying forces from such German underground groups (Werewolf and the like) as were still active. Coates also helped track down Nazi-era scientists whose expertise was of potential value to Britain’s defence industries. It was while he was with ME42 that Coates was introduced to SIS, for alongside it in Bad Salzuflen was the SIS headquarters for Germany, then headed by Simon Gallienne.†† He and Coates were to become lifelong friends, with ME42 coming under SIS control in 1946 as SOE was wound up. Sadly, tragedy was to strike. In April 1947, their first child, a boy, was stillborn. By his mother’s account, ‘his heart stopped beating just five minutes before he was born.’ Coates and his wife were devastated, his wife blaming the ‘army doctors’ for her baby’s death. Their son Robin feels that the loss of the baby had a significant impact on both his parents but more so on his mother, ultimately contributing to her early passing. The following month, Coates formally switched from SOE to SIS, recording in his diary ‘at this point I started work with the FO.’13 Almost twelve months later, on 5th April 1948, his son, Robin, was born. The birth coincided with Coates’ next posting which was to The Hague. In the 1930s, the SIS station in The Hague had been akin to a forward European ­operating base for SIS. After the war, it retained its importance, becoming inter alia a reception centre for processing any defectors who came over from the East.14 Coates’ posting there suggests that he had by then become a member of SovBloc, the section in SIS that dealt with the Soviet Union and (in the view of its members at least) was the ‘cream of SIS.’ Coates’ time in The Hague was cut short when his wife Bobbie succumbed to a severe attack of post-natal depression which necessitated being admitted to the Holloway Sanatorium (‘for the cure and care of mental and nervous invalids of the educated classes,’), located in Virginia Water in Surrey. Coates meanwhile returned to London from where he was sent to Cambridge to learn Russian. This was not necessarily with a view to serving in Moscow, as many SovBloc ­officers became fluent in the language without ever intending to serve in the Soviet Union. Coates, a natural linguist in any event, attended the year-long intensive course in the Joint Services School of Linguistics ( JSSL) in the university. His nominal cover was as a foreign office official taking a certificate course in Russian. He would have been in with a mixed bag of genuine Foreign Office diplomats, national servicemen destined for a stint in the Royal Signals, a few fellow SIS officers, career officers from the three armed services and random others. When the tuition was completed, he went to Paris to live with an émigré Russian family for six months, speaking only in Russian and French. During the day, he received additional one-to-one tuition in Russian from professors in the Sorbonne. The teaching programme was effective though suffering from the drawback that the idioms and expressions used by the émigré families in Paris were based on Tsarist times and sounded quaint to the modern Russian ear.15 ††  GALLIENNE, Lt Col Reginald Simon OBE (1915–2002); Intelligence Corps, SIS 1943-c.60, Bad Salzuflen, Controller/Western Area.

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Coates spent the next two years based in Broadway, the Head Office of SIS at the time. He did however make two visits to the US, both to Washington where he recounts (in his ­d iary) socialising with Kim Philby ‡‡ including attending at least one lunch with the CIA’s Jim ­A ngleton§§ in Philby’s company. The first visit was in June of 1950, the second on November of the same year. The first lasted about a month, the second for three weeks. The timing is interesting, leading up, as it did, to the Burgess and Maclean affair. At the time, US army signals experts were engaged in decrypting a number of the secret wartime messages sent from the Soviet consulate in New York to Moscow. Due to a mistake by Soviet signallers, some messages were open to being decrypted. This had already led to the uncovering of one Soviet agent, Klaus Fuchs. Early in 1948, another set of messages ­began to point towards the existence of a further British wartime Soviet agent, this one with the codename Homer. Soon, suspicion started to point towards Donald Maclean,¶¶ a serving FO diplomat. This led to him and fellow betrayer Guy Burgess fleeing to Moscow in May of 1951. The episode had a calamitous effect on Anglo-US intelligence relations and led to Philby’s forced retirement from SIS. No evidence has surfaced to suggest that Coates’ two visits to Washington were connected with any suspicions SIS may have been secretly harbouring about Philby’s loyalty but the timing is interesting. Coates’ diary indicates that the first visit was to attend a course of some sort; there is no explanation offered for his reason for making the second.16 ­Neither does his diary contain any explanation as to why he maintained contact with Philby after the betrayer was forced to resign from SIS (Philby’s address appears a couple of times in Coates’ diaries from that time).17 Strictly speaking, there was no specific reason why he should not have been in contact; he was not the only SIS officer to have stayed in touch with the betrayer.

Vienna In 1952, Coates was posted to Vienna. Before he could take up his position, he first had to find a safe home for his two pistols, cosh and bayonet which he kept in his home. One of the pistols was a tiny Colt .25 ‘vest’ (waistcoat) automatic, designed to be carried concealed on the person and to withstand a cursory search at least. It was the type of weapon an agent might use in a close-quarter assassination or perhaps to help escape from a sticky situation. It was said that the only means of guaranteeing its effectiveness was to shove it up the nostril of the intended target and pull the trigger. The other weapon was a more substantial piece, a Browning .32 automatic, a standard-issue personal firearm of the period, usually worn in a belt holster. Coates held a firearms certificate for both weapons, issued in June 1947 (the month he joined SIS) and renewed in 1950 for a further three years.18 Whether the weapons were issued in connection with his SIS duties or a hangover from his time in SOE/ME42, we cannot say for certain. It was probably the latter; SOE was known to use the .2519 and peacetime SIS officers were not routinely armed and would not have required a personal firearms certificate in any event. He left the Browning in the care of his parents and the Colt with his sister-in-law, Pat.20

‡‡  PHILBY, Harold Adrian Russell ‘Kim,’ (1912–1988); agent of Russian Intelligence Service 1934–; (SIS nominally 1940–1951). §§  ANGLETON, James Jesus ‘Jim,’ (1917–1987) OSS, CIA, head of counterintelligence. ¶¶  MACLEAN, Donald Duart (1913–1983); agent of Russian Intelligence Service 1935– (defected).

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Austria was still occupied by the Four Powers and, like Germany, divided into four ­ ilitary-occupation zones, with overall control shared between the occupying forces and an m elected Austrian government. Understandably, espionage was rife with the Russians complaining ( justifiably) that the Western Allies treated the Austrians as friends and the Soviets as enemies. Coates would replace the experienced Charles Gardiner*** who was moving to Frankfort. The first thing Coates needed to do was to get his head around the key SIS operation in the city for which he now assumed responsibility. This was the Vienna Tunnel operation, codenamed Conflict (aka Silver). The op was originally conceived by Peter Lunn,††† though he had since departed Vienna for Berne. Lunn had figured out a way to tap into all telephone and telegraph communications between the Soviet High Commission in the Imperial Hotel and the Soviet Central Commandant in the Epstein Palace and between those two locations and the Kremlin. Apart from the tunnel, the principal current intelligence priority remained anything connected with Soviet plans to mount an attack on the west. In operations mirroring those in East Germany, the SIS station (Coates was joined in 1953 by Christopher Herdon ‡‡‡) ran scores of agents in the Eastern bloc countries bordering on Austria, in Hungary, ­Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. A radio transmitter was established in the SIS sub-station in ­K lagenfurt and used for communicating with Czechoslovakian-based agents.21 One of the Vienna station’s more unusual assets was a warrant officer called Alec Melton.§§§ Melton’s exact role is unclear; he may have been attached to the SIS station or simply have been co-opted to work with it. In the event, he made a number of unofficial trips into the Soviet zone (which he referred to as ‘swanning’) where he offered lifts to hitch-hiking ­Russian soldiers and gossiped with them about their units and so on. It was low-level stuff in the main though on at least one occasion, he went to Prague, then firmly under communist control, a trip that might have involved meeting an SIS source. His movements in Prague were monitored by the Soviets, to who he was obviously ‘a person of interest.’ He told Masha Poustchine,¶¶¶ a White Russian-born interpreter working with the British forces, and who accompanied him on many of his ‘swanning’ missions (Melton did not speak Russian), that the reason he took up intelligence work was ‘that the more we knew about the Russians the more chance there was for peace and better relations’ (Williams 1980).22 Coates possibly shared that view for the two were close. Coates invited Melton to be godfather to his second son Nigel and, in turn, Coates was the best man at Melton’s wedding to Barbara Mowat in 1960. The christening was an all-Office affair, Coates’ secretary, Christina Hynek, being the boy’s godmother. Melton later ended up as the doorman in the Sudanese Embassy in London,23 a position quite possibly facilitated by SIS which had a department for that sort of thing. In Christmas 1954, Coates completed his tour in Vienna and returned to head office in London where he remained a member of SovBloc until his next posting two years later. *** GARDINER, Charles CBE (original name Israel GOLD), (1915–d) HM Forces/SOE, SIS 1946–1980, ­Vienna, Frankfort, Seoul, Berlin, Lagos, Nairobi. ††† LUNN, Peter Northcote, CMG, OBE (1914–2011); Royal Artillery, SIS 1941–1972, Vienna, Berne, Berlin, Bonn, Beirut. ‡‡‡ H ERDON, Christopher de Lancy OBE (1928–2018) Royal Navy, SIS 1951–1983, Vienna, Baghdad, Beirut, ­A mman, Aden, Rome (later editor of The Tablet). §§§  MELTON, Alec (1915–1995) HM Forces, SIS (co-opted). ¶¶¶ W ILLIAMS, Lady Masha (née Poustchine) (1914–1994); Interpreter (later author and co-founder of the ­Diplomatic Wives Association).

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Moscow rules This was to Moscow where he would replace Roland Carter**** who had departed for ­ ermany the previous February. Coates arrived on post in September 1956 and reported G to his station head, the indomitable Daphne Park.†††† Moscow was a tough station in every sense of the word. For a start, life in the Russian capital was mind-numbingly dull. Soviet communist orthodoxy of the time placed little emphasis on the need for leisure time facilities for the people. There were about half a dozen restaurants that might be patronised but they were expensive. There were no dance halls, cafes or other places where the young might let off steam and only one late night bar, which was located in Vnukovo Airport. Cinema was ­ ffending dominated by turgid propaganda films; theatre was hidebound, paralysed by fear of o officialdom. Coates’ ambassador, William Hayter,‡‡‡‡ complained that the theatres were still putting on the same productions of the same plays that they were during his previous stint in the city before the war. Single staff did what single people did in these circumstances; they partied on cheap alcohol purchased in the embassy commissariats. The operational aspect presented challenges of its own. Harold Shergold,§§§§ head of ­SovBloc, worked on the assumption that the KGB was unaware that Coates was SIS. In that assumption, he was wrong; George Blake,¶¶¶¶ released from North Korean captivity in 1953, had returned to duty and had been posted to Y section which was dealing with the transcripts from the Vienna Tunnel operation. As such, it is highly likely that he and Coates would have met when Coates was running that operation; at the very least, Blake would have seen Coates’ name on documents and passed it on to his Soviet handlers. As a consequence, Coates would have been subjected to the intensive monitoring reserved for known enemy intelligence officers over and above the standard surveillance afforded all embassy staff. ­Adding to the operational difficulties was that even making anything but the most superficial contact with Russians was next to impossible. Less than a month after Coates arrived, the political temperature changed. The situation over the Suez Canal which had been bubbling away for the previous year came to the boil when the Egyptian president, Gamal Nasser, announced the nationalisation of the canal. Britain and France decided to invade Egypt and restore British control of the canal. At about the same time, the citizens of Budapest, led initially by the students, had taken to the streets in open revolt against communist rule. They had engaged with Soviet troops who initially withdrew. However, the news of the impending Franco/British assault on Egypt allowed Khrushchev to rethink his strategy. He dispatched General Ivan Serov,***** to Budapest with orders that he and the Soviet ambassador, Andropov,††††† should use the appearance of negotiating a Soviet withdrawal to apprehend the rebel leaders, while the Red

   ****  CARTER, Roland (1924–); HM Forces, SIS 1953–1979, Moscow, Berlin, Helsinki, Ulan Bator, Kuala Lumpur, Pretoria.     †††† PARK, Daphne CMG, OBE (1921–2010) HM Forces/SOE FIAT, SIS 1948–1979, Paris, Moscow, ­L eopoldville (Kinshasa), Lusaka, Hanoi, Ulan Bator.     ‡‡‡‡ HAYTER, Sir William Goodenough, KCMG (1906–1995); Diplomatic Service 1930–1958, Vienna, ­Moscow, Nanking, Washington, Paris, Moscow (later Warden of New College, Oxford).   §§§§  S HERGOLD, Major Harold Taplin ‘Shergie’ CMG OBE (1916–2000) Intelligence Corps, SIS 1­9 49–1974, Bad Salzuf len, H/SovBloc (later interview panel for potential recruits).  ¶¶¶¶ BLAKE (Behar), George (1922–) RNVR, SIS 1944–1961, The Hague, Hamburg, Seoul, Berlin (KGB 1953–). ***** SEROV, Ivan Alexandrovich, (1905–1990); Chairman KGB 1954–1958, Director GRU, 1958–1962. ††††† A NDROPOV, Yuri Vladimirovich (1914–1984); Chairman KGB, 1967–1982, General Secretary CPSU 1982–1984.

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Army organised itself for an all-out assault. On 5th November, the assault commenced with no holds barred, the same day that British and French paratroopers landed on Suez. Coates, who spoke Hungarian, was focused on events in Budapest where he still had extensive contacts and spoke the language. However, instead of sending him to reconnoitre the situation, London dispatched John Bruce Lockhart ‡‡‡‡‡ (who had no special contacts and who did not speak the language) to Budapest with orders to report back on developments. A  proposal by Coates and the other service attachés to send a team to the Carpathian Mountains to see if the Russians were sincere in their protestations about withdrawing was firmly vetoed by the Soviets.24 As history shows, the invasion of Suez was a massive miscalculation on the part of British PM Anthony Eden. Perhaps his biggest mistake (of many) was to underestimate the anger of the US President, Dwight Eisenhower, still smarting from his wartime treatment by a xenophobic Fleet Street press. Faced with an oil embargo and a run on sterling, which Washington would do nothing to alleviate, and amid howls of protest from almost every quarter, Eden had no choice but to capitulate. He announced that all troops would be withdrawn immediately. It was an utter humiliation, the last throw of Britain’s imperial dice. In Budapest, the Russians, never ones to pass up on an own-goal of that dimension, quickly mopped up the students and reinstalled a puppet regime that would remain in place for the next thirty-three years. What Coates thought of this we can only imagine. The following year, in August, Coates wife, Bobbie, gave birth to their second son ­Nigel. She had moved to Berlin for the confinement. Five months later, in December, his tour ­completed, Coates and his family returned to London. Shortly after the birth, Bobbie ­suffered another of post-natal depression requiring hospitalisation. Of nervous disposition anyway, she was becoming increasingly vulnerable. It was around this time that she started to consume alcohol to excess.

Last post – Helsinki Coates’ next overseas post was to be his final one for SIS. It was to Helsinki. While the city was not in the first rung of capitals for a diplomatic posting, it was of significant interest to the intelligence services. The border-crossing between Finland and Russia was one of the very few direct entry points between Western Europe and the Soviet Union making ­Helsinki a useful spot to keep an eye on movements between the two countries. Coates arrived in the city in October 1960, meeting up with Roland Carter who had preceded him in Moscow a few years earlier. The cold war remained icy though the threat of an invasion ‘out of the blue’ had diminished with Stalin’s passing. Much of the work undertaken by the station was technical in nature, looking for opportunities to install listening devices in ­Eastern bloc embassies, talent spotting and the like. In December 1961, KGB officer Anatoli Golitsyn defected to the CIA in Helsinki, ­bringing with him details of alleged KGB sources in British Intelligence. In August 1962, nine months later and three months before his tour was due to finish, Coates resigned from SIS. He was forty-four. Establishing why he decided to hand in his musket is difficult since he never shared with his family the reason behind his decision. It may be because he was somehow tainted ‡‡‡‡‡‡ LOCKHART, John Bruce CMG OBE (1914–1995); Intelligence Corps, SIS 1942–1965, Cairo, Baghdad, Paris, Bad Salzuflen, Washington, D/SovBloc, D/MEA, VCSS.

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by Golitsyn’s revelations about KGB penetration of Western intelligence services. Already, largely fruitless, searches for moles inside the CIA and in SIS and MI5 were underway. It have been far more innocent, a fear that he was unlikely to be destined for high office in SIS. This could have been prompted by the revelation the previous year of George Blake’s betrayal. Following Blake’s conviction, John Quine,§§§§§ SIS head of counterintelligence, had undertaken an exercise to determine which SovBloc officers had been compromised by Blake. Those ‘burnt’ had their files stamped with the words ‘CRUET Red,’ and those considered clean were labelled ‘CRUET Green.’ Coates was undoubtedly a ‘red.’ That labelling was enough to cause a number of officers to resign voluntarily including, for example, John Sackur ¶¶¶¶¶ and ­ erhaps Coates felt Alan Urwick,****** both of whom had served alongside Blake in Berlin. P the same. Against that it might have been because he favoured doing something else with his life. He was still young enough to forge a second career and a life in academia might have seemed attractive. In Cambridge, he had obtained a double first in Part 1 of the languages Tripos and then completed his degree in French and German. Languages were his passion; he was ultimately able to speak twelve in varying degrees of fluency. Or the resignation may have been for family reasons; both of his sons were experiencing illness. Nigel had suffered a bout of para-typhoid (from which he recovered), while his firstborn, Robin, was going through a serious nervous breakdown. The breakdown had been a year in the coming and it would take another couple of years to clear finally. So it could well have been that Coates felt he needed to be around more than was possible for an active intelligence officer. For whatever reason, he resigned and was granted a pension of c £600 PA. Coates and family decamped to the town of Moscow in Idaho where he lectured students of the U ­ niversity of Idaho in foreign languages. Despite being offered tenure, he returned to ­Britain after a year and commenced process of seeking funding for his doctorate in Cambridge. In 1968, he was appointed the Dean of Students in the University of East Anglia (UEA). The Vice-Chancellor at the time was Frank Thistlethwaite,†††††† and he and Coates knew each from Cambridge. Coates held the position until he reached retirement age in 1983. He mainly taught Russian but was also an expert in Finno-Ugrian. In the 1970s, he was one of the first western visitors to Komi (at that time an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) becoming well known there during his two months’ sabbatical stay. In some respects, it was as surprising that the Soviets, aware of his background, granted him a visa as it was that SIS permitted him to travel. His time in UEA was not without controversy. In 1971, as student unrest swept through Britain’s universities, turmoil erupted in UEA fed by the discovery of ‘secret files’ exchanged between the Dean of Students (Coates) and the university’s residence manager. Coates’ known background as a ‘military intelligence officer’ fed into a belief that the student population was being subjected to high levels of state surveillance led by the local Special Branch with whom Coates was allegedly ‘in cahoots.’ This was given credence when he was   §§§§§  QUINE, John (1920–2013); Royal Navy Coastal Forces, SIS 1947–1975, Tokyo, Warsaw, Nairobi, ­Pretoria, Mauritius.   ¶¶¶¶¶  SACKUR, Christopher John (1933–1986) SIS 1957–1969, Berlin, Leopoldville (Kinshasa) Salisbury ­(expelled as persona non grata). ****** U RWICK, Alan Bedford, KCVO, CMG (1933–2016); SIS 1952–1963, Berlin, Brussels, Moscow, ­Baghdad; FCO 1963–1989, Amman, Washington, Cairo, Madrid, Amman, Cairo, Ottawa (later ­Serjeant-at-Arms House of Commons). †††††† THISTLETHWAITE, Frank CBE (1915–2003), Royal Air Force, War Cabinet, Cambridge University, University of East Anglia.

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spotted taking surreptitious photographs at a student demonstration. Whether justified or not, Coates was not going to take the accusations lying down and he threatened robust legal action against some members of the academic staff, forcing the withdrawal of the accusation. Coates may well have been in contact with Special Branch, he disclosed to John ­Deverill,‡‡‡‡‡‡ whom he knew from their service together in Moscow, that the authorities felt that there was a possibility of Soviet influence behind the student protests. Given what is now known, this may not have been as farfetched a notion as once imagined. But in an extraordinary turn of events, at the same time as he was being accused of being a Special Branch stooge, the same Special Branch had approached Coates’ deputy, Douglas Baker (Assistant Dean of Students) and asked him to monitor Coates and report on him to the police.25 Coates’ wife Bobbie became convinced she was being followed, though on the surface that would have made little sense. Sense or not, it led to her being admitted to a mental hospital, for the third time in her life and contributed to the break-up of the Coates marriage some years later. The break-up deeply upset Coates, at one stage sobbing helplessly when out to dinner with his two sons while trying to explain to them the reasons for the end of their parents’ marriage.26 Her excessive alcohol consumption combined with her prescribed barbiturates exacerbated her already fragile mental state and ultimately became something Coates could not live with. It was a sad end to a romance that had once blazed with the intensity of a furnace. In 1978, Bobbie died from a stroke. In December 2006, twelve days before his own death on Christmas Day, Coates’ younger son Nigel died. Nigel’s untimely death saw the end of someone who the family believed had the ability to become a world-class musician focusing on classical guitar, flamenco and jazz. He had succumbed to a lifetime’s addiction to alcohol. He left behind two long-term ­relationships, each producing one child, a son and a daughter, respectively. John Coates did not remarry after Bobbie’s death but he did find love again. This time in the form of Ms Frances Cooley, a former PhD student of his, whom he met shortly before Bobbie’s death, but after they had separated. Coates and Ms Cooley settled down and lived together in Wales until he passed away. By any measure, John Coates was an unusual man. He was intellectually bright but also clever in everyday matters. He was good-looking and could be both charming and ­charismatic, useful qualities in a spy. He was also determined, focused and courageous. Robin thought that his father could be a bit caught up with his own brilliance; he was certainly secretive, never ‘owning-up’ to his sons about his membership of SIS, something that most officers did when their children were adults, particularly after retirement. And those years of misleading one’s children ‘about what daddy does’ can have consequences.27 He could also be intolerant of weaknesses in others. He used to display his wife’s empty gin bottles in an attempt to get her to stop. In fairness, he probably wasn’t the first spouse to attempt that. Nor the first to fail. Politically, he was somewhat of a contradiction; his son describes him as being a convinced left winger ‘almost to the point of being a fellow-traveller of Philby’s’ but who d­ etested communism. SIS was home to many philosophies amongst its staff but ‘extreme’ left-wing thinkers were a small and endangered species.

‡‡‡‡‡‡ DEVERILL, Wing Commander John Joseph; Royal Air Force, MECAS (Arab Legion Air Force), ­Moscow (assistant air attaché), British Forces Aden (later Royal Society).

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A former colleague who served alongside him in Vienna describes him as being ‘able to dominate any gathering’ but without ‘giving away his own thoughts’ for ‘you never knew what was really going on behind his face.’ He was also (according to this former colleague) a ‘prodigious drinker,’ something that can go with the territory.28 Of his achievements as a spy, we can say very little. He was not amongst those honoured with the award of an OBE, SIS’s standard ‘battle honour.’ This is understandable. SovBloc’s successes against its KGB adversaries in the cold war were most notable for their scarcity. SIS found itself not so much in the business of recruiting KGB sources as keeping a welcome mat out for those KGB members who might be considering defection, and that it did quite well. Its most notable successes occurred after Coates’ time but its relative failure was of an i­nstitutional nature, not something the responsibility for which could be laid at John Coates’ door.

Conclusion We can say that John Coates was a conscientious objector who renounced his beliefs, later describing himself as having been ‘mixed up.’ He was a soldier who fought for his country with courage and fortitude. An undercover saboteur who withstood Gestapo torture and an MI6 spy who inspired loyalty and devotion amongst his fellows. We can say that he was a family man unable to provide the emotional support his family, and in particular his wife, so badly needed. A family man whose youngest son drank himself to death and who’s other (older) son suffered a nervous breakdown in his mid-teens. A man who excluded that same family totally from his secret life. And at the end, he was accused of ‘collaboration’ with the secret-state by students and fellow academics while at the same time being suspected of being a ‘Communist fellow-­ traveller’ by the same secret-state. A typical spy one might say.

Acknowledgement The author acknowledges the generous assistance of John Coates’ son, Robin Coates, in the preparation of this article. John Coates kept a personal diary for most of his adult life which shed considerable light on that life and career. And, of course, Robin’s personal memories of his parents, shared with the author, were of immense value. Robin did not follow his father’s path into the Diplomatic Service but became a lecturer and teacher and a housing ­administrator. He is currently a local councillor and trade union activist.

Notes 1 Robin Coates 2 The Kindred of the Kibbo Kift was a camping, hiking and handicraft group with ambitions to bring world peace. It was the first of three movements in England associated with the charismatic artist and writer John Hargrave (1894–1982). (courtesy Wikipedia) 3 Per Robin Coates 4 Lit; the sweetness of life, the sweetness of living; the phrase was used by Prime Minister Harold ­M acmillan to describe his undergraduate life in Oxford. It came to represent the gilded lives of the wealthy country house set in Britain. 5 Robin Coates 6 Supplement to the London Gazette, 2 September 1941, p. 5097. 7 Robin Coates

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John Gordon Coates PhD DSO (1918–2006) 8 Jeffreys-Jones (2015) Inter-Allied Commando and Security Training in Gwynedd: The Coates Memoir, Intelligence and National Security. 9 Courtesy of the Military Intelligence Museum, Chicksands. 10 Aldrich and Cormac (2016) The Black Door. 11 In 1944, Churchill and Stalin concluded what Churchill later claimed was a definitive ­a greement on how post-war spheres-of-influence in Europe would be determined (expressed as percentages). The status of the agreement is the subject of disagreement between historians with most of its supposed provisions being ignored. The exception appears to be Greece which Stalin accepted would come under exclusive British ‘sphere-of-interest.’ Stalin stuck to this and so the Soviet Union did not interfere materially in the Greek civil war. Hungary was one of those countries that was ­supposed to remain under joint Russian and British interest. That was never going to happen. 12 Robin Coates 13 John Coates never explicitly confirmed to his son Robin that he had been a member of the Secret Intelligence Service. Nor does SIS confirm the identities of members or former members other than in exceptional circumstances. The author’s assertion that John Coates was a member is based on a number of separate pieces of information which cumulatively justify that conclusion. They are, (1), he is listed as SIS in Lobster Magazine (No 29, 1/09/1995) which while not a guarantee is, at the very least, based on Steven Dorril’s track record, a pointer. The author’s own analysis of Coates’ Diplomatic Service posts (The Hague, Vienna, Moscow, Berlin, and Helsinki) tends to confirm this analysis. (2) Coates’ personal file (P/F) relating to his service in SOE is not available in The National Archive (TNA). SOE personal files can be absent for a number of reasons, for example some were lost during a fire which destroyed many SOE records in 1946. It is, however, SIS practice to withhold from the TNA the P/Fs of its officers dating from the time of their service in SOE, so its absence can be seen as another pointer. (3) The names of close colleagues mentioned in his diaries confirm that he was in regular contact with confirmed SIS officers including the ­former Chief, Dickie Franks, Simon Gallienne, Kim Philby, Peter Lunn, Christopher Herdon, John Wyke, ‘Terry’ O’Bryan Tear, Kenneth Cohen and others including Frank Wisner of the CIA. (4) Coates’ diary entries for 1950 refer to two visits made to Washington from the UK in 1950. On both occasions, he speaks of meeting Kim Philby and of socialising with him. No other embassy officials are mentioned. (5) Private information of the author. 14 Private information of the author. 15 According to Julian Harston, a former consul-general in Hanoi, Daphne Park (also SIS and a product of the same language programme as Coates) “spoke Russian as taught by White Russian émigrés in Paris, which for the young Soviets [in the Hanoi embassy] was fascinating. A voice from history was how one young second secretary described it.” 16 John Coates’ diary entry, courtesy of Robin Coates. 17 John Coates’ diary entry, courtesy of Robin Coates. 18 Firearms Certificate No 91484, granted 14/06/1947, renewed for three years on 14/06/1950 ( John Coates diary reference courtesy of Robin Coates). 19 While working with SOE in Bombay in WWII, Molly Ingram was offered a Colt.25 pistol as her personal weapon, she chose a Browning.32 instead. “Ingram, Mary Isabella: my MI5 and Special Operations Executive recollections,” interviewed by Dr David A T Stafford 3rd February 1983, University of Victoria Digital Collections. 20 John Coates’ diary entry, courtesy of Robin Coates 21 Private information of the author 22 Masha Williams (1980) White Among the Reds, (1980) pp. 121–123 23 Robin Coates 24 Wing Commander John Deverill (then assistant air attaché in Moscow) to author. 25 Douglas Baker 26 Robin Coates 27 The author has had many conversations with the adult children of former spies. In almost every instance, the legacy of their parents lying to them about their father’s (usually) true occupation left an indelible mark. “If they lied to me about that what else did they lie to me about?” sums it up. 28 Private information of the author

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References Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, R. (2015) Inter-Allied Commando and Security Training in Gwynedd: The Coates Memoir. Intelligence and National Security, 30 (4): 545–559. doi:10.1080/02684527.2014.989686 Richard Aldrich, R. and Cormac, R. (2016) The Black Door. London: William Collins. Masha Williams, M. (1980) White among the Reds. London: Shepeard-Walwyn.

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PART IV

Spies, scholars and the study of intelligence

15 THE OXFORD INTELLIGENCE GROUP Gwilym Hughes

Introduction This paper covers three parts: the early years of intelligence seminars in Oxford and the formation of the Oxford Intelligence Group at Nuffield College in 2004, the themes that the OIG has ‘discovered’ over the fifteen years of its existence and the terms of engagement between academic research groups and the intelligence community – the scholar practitioner interface. The Oxford Intelligence Group was invited by the convenors of the 2017 Oriel Colloquium to consider ‘The narrative of UK centres for security and intelligence studies: ­inter-agency remit, responsibilities, research’. In the event, others were better able to give an account of the rise of Intelligence Centres in UK academic institutions with the aim of training scholars in the subject or educating people from the intelligence community, and sometimes both. From the standpoint of the OIG, only an external perspective can be expected because it is not one of these centres; it was formed and is led by non-academics, it is not part of Oxford University and it neither trains people nor teaches to a published syllabus. So, for an entity without students, without funding and, one might say, without responsibilities, the invitation from the Society for Educational Studies was an opportunity to reflect on its place in the important, often ignored and always niche subject of intelligence studies. This paper describes how the OIG has been self-questioning since inception but the Oriel Colloquium was the first time the group was itself the subject of inquiry rather than the means of inquiry. The group was posted in the colloquium programme under the rubric of ‘OIG’ rather than the names of its speakers and this was another reminder that anonymity and obfuscation can sometimes add an entirely false frisson when approaching the subject. Liam Gearon’s continuing interest in the OIG as the convenor of the colloquium and editor of the collected papers from the conference has been a huge motivation to me in producing this account, for the record, of the Oxford Intelligence Group and its contribution to the recent history of intelligence studies in Oxford.

Intelligence studies in Oxford and the formation of the OIG The OIG was formally established in October 2004 to take forward the work of previous seminars on intelligence (in the political, military and general security sense of 231

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that term), initiated by Michael Herman and others and held in Oxford at St ­A ntony’s ­C ollege between 2000 and 2003, at Rhodes House in 2003–2004 and at Nuffield C ­ ollege in 2004. It is worth noting that, unlike Business Studies (for example), ‘Intelligence Studies’ is not a subject that is taught at Oxford University. This means, in practice, that undergraduates cannot take options in intelligence and that taught master’s degrees are not available. In a reversal of the undergraduate process, postgraduate candidates apply to University departments such as Politics and International Relations (Social Sciences) or History (Humanities). It is usual for the research degree of Doctor of Philosophy (DPhil) to be preceded by a taught master’s degree (MSc or MPhil). It is almost inconceivable for young academics to consider a university career without a DPhil. It can be seen that there are considerable barriers to entry for ‘new’ subjects absent a pre-existing commitment from the University, through a relevant department, to appoint senior academics (professors) to conduct research and supervise doctoral students, who teach options to undergraduates who become interested in Masters’ courses. For a discussion of modern academia and the pressure on young scholars to fit into existing sub-disciplines, see Billig (2013). In the twenty-first century, dominant subjects such as Sociology do evolve to embrace, for example demography, but this appears to be the result of harmony with existing scholarly activity rather than the product of strategic planning at the University level. Oxford’s institutional connection with intelligence is weak. Certainly, in WWII, War Office departments found homes around the universities. For example, the important Geographical Handbook Series of the Naval Intelligence Division was produced in both Oxford and Cambridge from 1941 to 1946. Such activities, in Oxford at least, were undoubtedly helped by the absence of bombing raids. Balliol was requisitioned at the start of the war – but so was Blenheim Palace. Individual academics and future heads of Colleges served in wartime intelligence and at the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park but overall, it would be no more accurate to claim an intelligence connection for Oxford than it would be for the Dukes of Marlborough. Nevertheless, the innovation of graduate-only colleges that had begun with the founding of Nuffield College in 1937 is a crucial development within the University that was intended to promote advanced studies. In the case of Nuffield College, the study of Social Science, where several of the College’s fellows went on to establish reputations in intelligence-related studies (including Professor Lawrence Freedman and Professor Philip Bobbitt). And St Antony’s College (founded 1950), specialising in area studies and international relations, including Soviet Studies. I am grateful to Michael Herman for his notes on early intelligence studies at ­O xford, which have been placed in the OIG archive at Nuffield College. Herman had spent 1988–1989 at Nuffield College, after a career in intelligence, as the recipient of a Gwilym Gibbon Research Fellowship (a scheme which funded non-stipendiary research fellowships for the civil service and armed forces). His research led to the publication of his seminal book ‘Intelligence Power in Peace and War’ (Herman, 1996). But at that time, St Antony’s seemed the more natural location for intelligence studies. Thanks to a private benefaction, the college was able to host a two-day intelligence conference ‘Intelligence Services in a Changing World’ in September 1999, and Herman records that this: was on a grand scale: with around 100 participants from 16 countries, including two former members of the KGB, and an important and sadly under-publicised book of the papers and summaries of the (recorded) discussions. It was Oxford’s most substantial contribution to academic intelligence studies, before and since. 232

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Subsequently, after the success of the conference, the same donor funded a continued intelligence programme in the form of evening seminars in St Antony’s for one term in each of the next three years. The money also funded Herman as a Senior Associate of St Antony’s and enabled him to add discussion dinners to follow the seminars, and some additional dinners of this kind were held in the non-seminar terms. The first Warden of St Antony’s College (Sir William Deakin) had intelligence connections in his war service with the Special Operations Executive, and the college had acquired the unsought for reputation as a recruiting ground for MI6. Certainly, some anti-Soviet sentiment could be associated with S V Utechin (1921–2004) and others at the college, but this romantic connection had no real substance, beyond a rather disparaging mention (for being ‘red brick’) in ‘Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy’ by John le Carré (1974). Despite this, the Warden of the day was understandably concerned that the college’s former intelligence image should not be perpetuated and as a result, the programme was not continued beyond the intended three years. For more on Herman’s career and influence on intelligence studies, see Phythian (2017). For a short time afterwards, the Herman discussion dinners were held at Rhodes House but their non-university status in a non-university institution weakened the offer. It was during this period that Gwilym Hughes, Fellow and Bursar of Nuffield, proposed that the seminars be re-started at Nuffield College, but under a new identity – that of the Oxford Intelligence Group. Approval was obtained from the Warden and Fellows to invite Lord (Robin) Butler as the first speaker in June 2004. The OIG was formally constituted the following year with a Steering Committee of external advisors chaired by Dennis Trevelyan, a former Principal of Mansfield College. Hughes became the OIG Director working closely with Herman (the ‘Founder Director’) to plan the programme of seminars and to be the convenor at Nuffield. One further detail is necessary – unlike all the other groups discussed in this paper, the OIG has never had any external funding for its routine activities. In fifteen years and over hundred events, just three conferences have accepted external funding. Everything else was funded by Hughes’ own academic research allowance generously made available by Nuffield or by the College donating facilities and guest rooms. It would be wrong to present the OIG as the only intelligence group in Oxford in the 2000s. Further funding at St Antony’s led to the Pluscarden Programme for the Study of Global Terrorism and Intelligence (PP) and a major Leverhulme Trust grant to Professor Sir Hew Strachan established the University’s Changing Character of War programme (CCW) in 2003–04. The Pluscarden programme at St Antony’s was well funded and directed with distinction by Professor Steve Tsang. This begged the question of why the OIG and PP should not join forces under the leadership of a tenured academic – a question which T ­ revelyan and Hughes did discuss directly with Tsang (in the knowledge that this would have been ­Herman’s preferred outcome – as a step on the path to full academic recognition for the subject). But the union was not consummated partly because the OIG valued its options to keep intelligence studies distinct from the ‘global war on terrorism’ and partly because St ­A ntony’s, as already noted, had no appetite for further dinners with Herman. A ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ was reached where both groups would cross-publicise events and run occasional joint ventures (e.g. a day conference at St Antony’s on 17 June 2008 entitled ‘Objectivity in Intelligence analysis: lessons from other disciplines’). This friendly relationship persisted until 2011 when Tsang left Oxford for a post at the University of Nottingham, after which the Pluscarden Programme became less active and gradually moribund. Equally friendly relations exist with CCW which achieved the spectacular feat of surviving beyond Strachan’s initial five-year Leverhulme grant and remains a flourishing presence in the University, based at Pembroke College. Strachan and his colleague Dr Rob Johnson tended to use the OIG as 233

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the unofficial ‘intelligence wing’ of the CCW, for example when hosting the visiting Humanitas Professor in Intelligence Studies, General Michael Hayden (former ­Director CIA). The record of the CCW is available at its website www.ccc.ox.ac.uk and is not the subject of this section. What does deserve mention is the crisis which engulfed Oxford when S­ trachan moved to St Andrew’s University in 2014–2015. The impending loss of Strachan as the Chichele Professor in the History of War (extraordinary enough given the significance of the date but made more shocking as it was without replacement) brought home the unfortunate fact that the entire field of study of war, armed conflict, human and international security at Oxford was far too dependent on just one post. Cross departmental talks were held during 2014 searching for more explicit leadership of what one observer called: a constellation of prestigious research groups; for example the CCW programme, the Intelligence study group [OIG], and the Oxford Institute for Ethics and Law of Armed Conflict …In effect we have unconsciously developed a virtual department of ‘war and peace’ studies of global significance. It has been an extraordinary success that has been achieved so far on a shoestring resource. No new posts were established but the crisis led to the creation of ‘War and Peace at Oxford’ – a pan-University interdisciplinary network which acknowledges that ‘these issues do not – and cannot – fall within the domain of any single academic discipline. Rather, the range of groups and institutions represented in the War and Peace at Oxford Network is a reflection of the scale and diversity of the intellectual and policy challenges faced in today’s world. The War and Peace at Oxford Network opens up some of the many and varied ways in which historians, political scientists, economists, theologians, anthropologists, geographers, area studies specialists, psychologists, evolutionary theorists, and lawyers are bringing their diverse approaches and perspectives to bear on the immense challenges of war, peace, conflict and security in the 21st century’. The OIG is a member of this network – but intelligence studies is otherwise absent from the website www.warandpeace.ox.ac.uk.

Themes and discoveries Phase one: 2004–2010 The OIG undoubtedly acquired a certain prestige from being located at Nuffield College. The connection obliged the Group to recognise and respect the academic reputation of Nuffield as a place for the ‘study by co-operation between academic and non-academic persons of social (including economic and political problems)’ (Nuffield College Charter, 1959). Within the College itself, some fellows were openly supportive but most were indifferent. There was some sensitivity about the subject and (wrongly) assumed connections to government. It was explained to me by some colleagues that this would make academic objectivity ‘impossible’. But the College was happy to report OIG seminars and conferences in its annual reports and reaped a real benefit after the 2006 Charities Act when the OIG’s open seminars significantly boosted the statistic of public engagement and benefit that the College was newly obliged to report. As has been described, a big impetus for the foundation of the OIG was the result of giving Lord Butler a forum to talk about his recently completed review of intelligence on weapons of mass destruction (Butler, 2004). As a former Secretary to the Joint Intelligence Committee ( JIC), Herman had given evidence to the Inquiry and it was understood that Butler would be advising the intelligence community to ‘get out more’. Butler was Master 234

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of University College, Oxford, so an invitation to a discussion group at Nuffield College on 17 June 2004 was consistent with this injunction and, as it turned out, an opportunity for Butler to be frank about his own analysis of the causes of intelligence failures. Just as a former Master of University College (Beveridge, 1942) had listed the five giants blocking the road of post-war reconstruction, Butler identified traps placed in the path of good intelligence analysis. We can summarise Butler’s five ‘intelligence giants’ as: • • • • •

The tendency to compensate for past errors. The assumption that intelligence targets share our rationality (or weltanshauung). The contamination of sources and channels of intelligence. The assumption that overestimation carries less risk than underestimation. Political pressure and group think.

So, the OIG started off with some very significant advantages, an attractive venue at ­Nuffield College and the ability to preface future invitations with – ‘Robin Butler has spoken to the Group, and we should like to hear from you too’. And there was an agenda that the intelligence community was ready (some more willing than others) to discuss. The giants of professional competence were generally at the fore, often with the co-operation of the Cabinet Office. For example, Sir Richard Mottram the JIC Chairman and Intelligence/Security Co-ordinator 2005–2007 speaking in 2008 on ‘Life After Butler’, and Sir David Omand (Director GCHQ 1996–1997) in a similar vein ‘Understanding in Intelligence: is it unique?’ The pattern established in the first phase of the OIG was for two seminar/dinner discussions to be held in each of the autumn and spring terms with a day workshop in the summer term. These would be supplemented on an ad hoc basis as opportunities arose, such as when Sir Arthur Bonsall (Director GCHQ 1973–1978) led a remarkable workshop in 2007 on ‘Bletchley Revisited’. The summer workshop of 2009 was ‘Cold War Workshop – Did ­Intelligence Matter?’ and was intended to contribute to the following questions: • • •

What were the effects of the ‘intelligence war’ between East and West? Did it make the cold war hotter or colder? How near did intelligence on each side get to telling truth to power? What effects did intelligence have on each side? To what extent was government policy on either side intelligence driven?

This was to lead to the only publication to arise directly out of the OIG as the collected papers of the workshop in the ‘Intelligence in the Cold War: What Difference did it Make?’ (Hughes and Herman, 2011). In my introduction of the volume, I noted that, ‘There is a lack of evidence to connect the production of intelligence with the framing or the changing of government policy on either side’ (Hughes, 2011, p .755). That was changing, as the Colloquium at Oriel in 2017 was later to examine. The interest of this paper is the explicit reference to policy making and the ‘telling of truth to power’ question, to which I will return.

Phase two: 2010–2018 In my report to the OIG Steering Group in October 2013, I observed that: The OIG has, in particular, been encouraged by the Politics Group at Nuffield, but the academic community in Oxford is not static, the work of the OIG needs to be further/ 235

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repeatedly/better explained to the wider membership of the College and the University to dispel any concerns about what it is and to promote intelligence studies as a relevant subject for social science scholars. While the OIG has had some success in providing a (relatively comfortable?) platform for the most senior members of the British intelligence establishment to talk about their work [but] it has arguably had less success in presenting academic research into these areas. The seminars and workshops of the OIG have covered comparative studies, historical research and the problems of producing intelligence in the global crisis that followed the attacks on the US in 2001. The study of intelligence is something that senior and recently retired intelligence practitioners have shown willing to support in the spirit of the post-Butler need for more transparency and to educate newer members of their profession. Established academics working in this field include historians – who have recently been allowed to write histories of the Security Service (Andrew), Secret Intelligence Service ( Jeffrey), and the Joint Intelligence Committee (Goodman). Younger academics are perhaps bringing more of a multi-disciplinary approach to deal with the complexities of the subject. OIG seminars are open to all with speakers generally speaking under the Chatham House rule but seminar dinners are by invitation which gives reassurance to speakers that they can be more forthcoming in their answers to questions (giving valuable background and context to scholars of intelligence matters and a particular strength of the OIG). The counter side of that is the risk of being seen as ‘the establishment talking to itself ’. Dennis Trevelyan retired as the chair of the Steering Group in 2013, and David King (former Defence Intelligence Service and CCW member) was elected as the new chair. Michael Herman also retired as an active director of the OIG but continued to help and advise from the back benches as the Group charted its future direction. There was to be a small executive committee comprising Hughes (Director), King (Chair) with Stephen Gale (ex-GCHQ) and Dr Chris Westcott (formerly Director, BBC Monitoring). The group was later joined by Dr Joanna Kidd, an expert open source researcher from King’s College London. This small group is now responsible for thematic ideas and sourcing ideas for speakers. The developing interests of the OIG can be tracked by the annual conferences held at Nuffield in the period from 2010: 2010 Do we need intelligence Doctrine? 2011 The Ethics of National Security Intelligence 2012 Cyber Security and Social Science 2013 Intelligence in Neutral Countries in WW1 and WW2: What effect did it have? 2014 Snowden, the media and the State 2015 Decoding the Human: Social Science Approaches to Cyber Espionage and Cybercrime 2016 Forensic and Open Source Intelligence: Using Social Science Methodologies In March 2011, the OIG co-hosted a two-day conference funded by the International ­Intelligence Ethics Association (IIEA) on ‘The Ethics of National Security Intelligence’; this was the first IIEA annual conference held outside the US and was intended to have a distinctly European flavour, with an emphasis on ‘soft’ issues such as ‘trust and the internet’ and ­‘cyber security and human behaviour’. Retrospectively, one can identify a number of themes (sentiment analysis, use of social media and predictive threat analysis) which presaged the controversial use of ‘soft cyber power’ by Russia in the 2016 US election. 236

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In 2014, the OIG embarked on its most ambitious project to date: the year-long project of ‘Snowden, the Media and the State’ – originally conceived as a joint programme of the Oxford Intelligence Group and the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. The revelations of Edward Snowden, published in 2014 by the Guardian and New York Times newspapers about the secret work of government intelligence agencies in the United States and the United Kingdom, had a major impact on the relationship between the state and the media and, it could be argued, between the state and the individual citizen as well. Practitioners, including Sir David Omand and General Keith B Alexander (Director, NSA 2005–2014) claimed that the dissemination of illegally obtained information had done the greatest damage to our combined nations’ intelligence systems that we have ever suffered. Others suggested that the liberal democracies can only benefit by being made aware of how surveillance by the state may be undertaken. Both sides in this debate were able to exploit ethics and principles in support of their position but it was virtually impossible to detect any common ground between them. (Luke Harding, the Guardian journalist, claimed that he had to stop sharing platforms with Omand after bruising experiences with the establishment’s principal intellectual). Nuffield College has a long history of hosting Guardian Research Fellows following a benefaction from the Scott Trust. Normally, the fund covers the cost of a bi-annual ‘sabbatical’ for a journalist to produce a piece of original research which is presented in an endof-year lecture. As Bursar, I was very familiar with this post (and with the difficulties and tensions involved with prising active journalists away from the ‘front line’ for a year). In a joint effort with Dr David Levy of the Reuters Institute, we drew up a plan to use the Guardian Fellowship as a resource for the OIG to explore the consequences for the intelligence community of the Snowden revelations. Somewhat to my surprise, the plan was well received and Nuffield acquired not one but two Guardian Fellows for 2014–2015 in the shape of Luke Harding and Ewen MacAskill, the two most involved of the Guardian’s team in the story of Snowden and the release of his material. All of the academic year’s six seminars and lectures were to be focussed on this single topic together with a summarising workshop. The ambition was to provide the first scholarly analysis of the consequences of Snowden’s revelations for government, the media and the intelligence community. Investigating precisely why the revelations were so controversial, the lecture series explored the ‘Snowden effect’ on the public consciousness of intelligence activity in contemporary society. There was a special focus on issues of governance and lawfulness, on whether there should be limits on the public’s right to know (via the media) what tasks intelligence agencies are willing and able to undertake, and ultimately whether any secret activity by the state can ever be truly compatible with a fundamental respect for human rights, democracy and lawfulness. In June 2015, the final workshop coincided with the publication of the Anderson Report: ‘A Question of Trust’ (Anderson, 2015) which was to lead to the reform of statutory investigatory powers. Representing the OIG, I was included in the Home Office panel of advisors on the replacement legislation. In its own review of the year, the OIG steering group noted that the series had started with mutual incomprehension and mistrust and had ended with Harding and MacAskill, and their editor Alan Rusbridger, attending events at which the legal and technical concerns of the intelligence agencies were also represented. Trust was not necessarily universal, but a more realistic view of each side’s position had been established. In identifying and following these themes, the OIG was arguably placing itself at the forefront of new approaches to intelligence studies by linking the subject to social science approaches and the developing ‘civilianisation’ of a wider intelligence community. It identified the increasing importance of reservists and open source intelligence and, for example, 237

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‘forensic intelligence’. This refers to the timely and methodical processing of data derived from forensic science to generate intelligence products. It examines crimes or incidents in ways which allow patterns and links to be hypothesised on otherwise unconnected incidents. While it has its precedent in fingerprint databases, forensic intelligence exploits the combined data types that are forensically derived combined with other data sources within a full intelligence process rather than merely supporting single investigations. Used in this way, forensic intelligence can provide powerful support to operational activity whether that be against organised crime in the UK or against overseas threats. In sociology and demography, social scientists are also using forensic methods applied to genetics and epigenetics to analyse very large data in order to gain insight into the interaction between individuals and their environment. This work (in which Oxford University is at the forefront) is attracting significant research funding interest. So, in 2016, the OIG Forensic Intelligence ­Workshop was an early foray into the common themes that are to be found in forensic and open source intelligence, bringing sociology and forensic genetics research into the discussion. This was probably the first time such connections were explicitly made, and the process had the ­impact of identifying new areas of multi-disciplinary co-operation.

Terms of engagement ‘Intelligence work has one moral law – it is justified by results. Even the sophistry of ­W hitehall paid court to that law’ (Le Carré, 1963). The existence of Nuffield College is testimony to the mid-twentieth-century notion that an institute of advanced study might help to solve the problems of government and society by bringing together academic and non-academic persons (practitioners). This was a response to the increasing demand (primarily in western democratic states) for more expert-influenced policy making and more public accountability. The OIG visibly sits in this tradition, but that also means that the OIG must confront the ‘scholar-practitioner interface’ issues that are inherent in the social sciences. The dual aspiration to understand and to challenge the world in which early modern social science was born marked it with a profound ambivalence about power and policy making – ‘the development of social science is a story of repeated oscillations between the embrace of active, indeed assertive, participation in policy making, and retreat into the ostensibly neutral posture of scientific objectivity’ (Anderson, 2005, p. 39). The final part of my paper is concerned with an examination of the scholar–practitioner interface as experienced specifically in the field of intelligence studies. I use the case study of torture-tainted intelligence to illustrate what I call the terms of engagement, when ‘expert opinion’ and executive actors appear to be separated by a gulf between theory and practice. And, as quoted in Whitehead (2014), it is worth noting here Yogi Berra’s advice: ‘In theory there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice there is’. The track record of ‘telling truth to power’ teaches us that free-reigning scholarship is not always helpful to those who have the responsibility of governing. The fate that befell Thomas Beckett in 1170 was eerily present on 8 June 2018 when, as reported in the New York Times, the Senate Judiciary Committee heard testimony from former FBI Director, James Comey. When he was asked by Senator Angus King if he took President Trump’s hope that he would drop the Flynn-Russia investigation as a directive, Comey responded, “Yes, yes. It rings in my ears as kind of ‘Will no one rid me of this meddlesome priest?’” (New York Times, 2018). Writing on what he calls ‘Russia’s war with the West’, Luke Harding makes the point that President Putin does not necessarily have to personally order offensive operations such as the murder of Alexander Litvinenko (Harding, 2017). Like the knights 238

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serving Henry II, it can be enough for the state’s intelligence service to interpret the leadership’s wishes from veiled messages. It is that which makes Comey’s remark so significant (and chilling for western democracy). In its normative voice (since Machiavelli), the literature also tends to make the tacit assumption that the scholar is speaking directly to the ‘prince’ (Lowenthal and Bertucci, 2014). This is not the case in intelligence studies. Here, the relationship is more triangular, where it is the intelligence agencies who are advising government, and the scholars are trying to understand what contribution intelligence has made in the past, and how it continues to be used by government to shape policy and inform executive action. Now, the obvious point to make is that this business is secret. Scholars may address government directly on matters of policy, but they do not know what the intelligence community is saying. Being inside the intelligence community has been described as a ‘magic circle’. Outsiders cannot possibly know what they are talking about and a tradition of self-sufficiency, fuelled by well-justified professional pride, supports a tradition of discouraging any dealings with academia. When the OIG has sought to foster direct participation from the intelligence agencies and those connected with them, the results have been patchy, for what on reflection are understandable reasons. Intelligence insiders, whether in post or recently retired, are not able to reveal classified information, even if they are aware that such information could usefully inform an academic study. Secret Intelligence Service and the Security Service staff have the further inhibition of not wanting to be ‘outed’ in what is effectively a public forum. Meanwhile, the legislation under which the agencies work (the Intelligence Services Act 1994) defines and limits the purposes for which they may disclose information; those purposes do not include satisfying the curiosity of academics. It has been the OIG experience that the agencies (especially GCHQ) will engage when it is in their direct interests to do so and when they have something that they are permitted (and want) to register in the public domain, but those involved in the study of intelligence should not expect regular and consistent engagement nor be surprised or disappointed when it doesn’t happen. Of course, the agencies have profound engagement with academia on subjects that impact on their work such as computing, mathematics, “cyber” and so on, but less so on intelligence studies. As noted, the exceptions appear to be officially sanctioned ‘cross over’ to academia of ex-practitioners such as Herman. Intellectuals and ‘thinkers’ but not university-licenced (peer-reviewed, tenure tracked) scholars. There is a tension here with the equally obvious advantage of tracking academic innovations. The American, Washington-based, system of diplomats, military officers and other ‘experts’ moving from think tanks to government and back again creates an environment where practitioners can go to find useful knowledge (Whitehead, 2014). In the UK, there are the well-established and prestigious research institutes such as Chatham House and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), but the revealed preference is also to recruit academics and experts into the expanded technical branch of Military Intelligence (a British tradition going back to the ‘T Branch’ of the 1940’s). This helps government keep the business ‘in house’ but it does not produce much academic investigation. Others in this volume have commented on the changes that ‘open source’ intelligence has brought about. Intelligence studies need to be conducted, therefore, in the knowledge that scholarly ‘truth’ may not be the same ‘truth’ that intelligence analysts are producing. And, indeed, that neither may be palatable to governments which prefer a narrative that is consistent with public opinion and political expediency. Nor does ‘good’ scholarship want to be misappropriated to support bad policy. The OIG has previously compared this situation with national statistics – and it is noteworthy how that scientific branch of government needs to have an independent Board and Chairman to resist the (frequent) misuse of statistics by government ministers. For 239

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all these reasons, it is difficult for academics to know if their work has influenced the intelligence community by, for example, changing ‘best practice’ and if so to objectively assess the evidence and measure the outcomes. It is possible to study, for example, the legalisation of some previously banned narcotics and test the academic argument that public health and taxation produce fewer social evils than the ‘war on drugs’ but the ‘war on terror’ has presented different problems and more ambiguous results, as the following case study examines.

Torture-tainted evidence – a case study Ethical considerations of intelligence activity have been a feature of OIG activity since the first Butler seminar of 2004. Speaking at a meeting of the Society of Editors in London on 28 October 2010, Sir John Sawers, Chief of the SIS, described torture as illegal and a­ bhorrent. The UK had a legal duty, he said, to ensure that any partner service would respect human rights, but this is not always straightforward: if we hold back and don’t pass that intelligence, out of concern that a suspect terrorist may be badly treated, innocent lives may be lost that we could have saved … these are not abstract questions just for philosophy courses or searching editorials, they are real constant operation dilemmas. Sir John may have had in mind Bufacci and Arrigo (2006) who refute the ‘ticking bomb’ argument (to the satisfaction of academic standards) by showing that torture interrogation fails to fulfil its initial purpose as a low-cost life saver, while its long-term potential is the devastation of democratic institutions. The UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) has been ratified by 153 states, including the US subject to certain declarations, reservations and understandings (Garcia, 2009). In the light of undertakings required by the Convention, States must consider whether the passive receipt and use of torture-tainted ­intelligence from detainees held overseas violates this obligation of international law. In July 2010, Prime Minister David Cameron announced an inquiry by Sir Peter Gibson ‘to examine whether, and to what extent, the UK government and its intelligence agencies were involved in improper treatment of detainees held by other countries in counter-terrorism operations overseas, or were aware of improper treatment of detainees in operations in which the UK was involved’. The inquiry never happened – halted by the Justice Secretary, Kenneth Clarke due to ongoing police investigations, and then handed over to Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) in 2013 (which at the time included Lord Butler). The ISC did not report until 2018 and despite the confidentiality limitations imposed on the report, it was made clear that something went seriously wrong with the way the UK conducted itself between 2004 and 2009. The report details incidents where UK personnel witnessed, knew or suspected detainee mistreatment, and also more than seventy cases of British involvement in extraordinary rendition, a much higher number than had previously been revealed publicly (ISC, 2018). Clarke, now the chairman of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, wrote in the Financial Times on 6 July 2018 calling, ironically, for a new independent judge-led inquiry as the only way to reveal the full truth of Britain’s involvement in extraordinary rendition, torture and the deficiencies of the guidelines, the so-called ‘consolidated advice’ issued to the agencies. The willingness by states to permit the use of information obtained by torture in executive actions was the subject of an expert meeting on the use of torture-tainted information at the Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT) in Geneva in 2013. Knowing of the OIG’s past work in intelligence ethics, the APT invited me, as OIG Director, to participate 240

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in the meeting alongside Mr Juan Mendez, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, and other organisations and individuals with legal and practical expertise. As is nearly always the case, the meeting quickly disposed of the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario as a fantasy. But it was recognised that governments see theirs as an absolute duty to protect the life of citizens even if that contradicts other duties and norms. And that there are some terrorist actions which seem to arouse a disproportionate public fear (not least the so-called ‘lone wolf ’ attacks such as the Boston marathon bombing). This has resulted in the UK accepting information that was the result of torture because, in the view of the UK courts, there is no rule in the UN Convention against the passive receipt of torture-tainted information. The expert meeting emphasised the importance of establishing an ‘exclusionary rule’ which would devalue tainted information and remove the incentive to use torture. In his subsequent report to the UN HCR, Mr Mendez (2014) strongly argued that the exclusionary rule should apply to all actions by executive agencies and that the standards contained in the exclusionary rule must also apply when agencies collect and share information with third parties. Mr Mendez concluded that governments cannot condemn the evil of torture and other ill-treatment at the international level while condoning it at the national level. It is hypocritical of states to condemn torture committed by others while accepting its products. Any use of torture-tainted information, even if the torture has been committed by agents of another State, is an act of acquiescence in torture that compromises the user State’s responsibility and leads to individual and State complicity in acts of torture. In this case study, an expert meeting directly informed the United Nations through the Special Rapporteur. The meeting report (APT, 2014) stands on its own as a statement of the issues relevant to the use of torture-tainted information by executive actors, and acts as a guide for national practitioners in the consideration of their own policies and practices. It is possible that the report did influence the re-framing of the UK’s ‘consolidated guidance’ referred to by the ISC. Finally, in answer to the ‘why’ of the OIG, the reflections contained in this paper enable some arguments to be made more objectively than has perhaps been the case previously. From 2004 to around 2010, the OIG presented itself as a friendly but critical observer of the intelligence community’s efforts to rectify perceived failings, as revealed in the Butler Report. This approach may have contributed to the rehabilitation of intelligence analysis by challenging hidden assumptions and institutional biases that are known to produce ‘groupthink’. In the course of doing this work, the OIG evolved into a network of knowledgeable and interested individuals as much as it was a ‘shoe string research centre’. It stands out as an entity that regularly brings together undergraduates, masters and doctoral students, senior academics, practising journalists, military, law enforcement, diplomats and intelligence professionals both past and present from the UK and overseas. By curating and using this network, the OIG has developed a capability to identify important themes and questions that it then seeks to work with others to scope and inform – all of this speaks, of course, to the centrality of the study of intelligence. This approach respects the differing methods of the specialisations involved and has brought the intelligence community alongside some original academic research without compromising or contaminating the scholarship with the concepts and methods of the practitioners.

Acknowledgements The OIG is not connected to or funded by any government department; this work is the personal opinion of the author and does not represent the views or policies of Nuffield College in any way. 241

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References Anderson, D. 2015. A Question of Trust. Report of the Investigatory Powers Review. London: HMSO. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications. Anderson, L. 2005. Pursuing Truth, Exercising Power: Social Science and Public Policy in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Columbia University Press. APT. 2014. Beware the Gift of Poison Fruit; Sharing Information with States that Torture. [Online]. Report of the Association for the Prevention of Torture based on a consultation meeting in Geneva in November 2013. Available at: www.apt.ch [Accessed 22 February 2019]. Beveridge, W. 1942. Social Insurance and Allied Services (Cmd 6404). London: HMSO. Billig, M. 2013. Learn How to Write Badly: How to Succeed in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bufacci, V. and Arrigo, J-M. 2006. “Torture, Terrorism and the State: A Refutation of the Ticking Bomb Argument”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Volume 23, No. 3, 355–373. Butler, R. 2004. Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (HC 898). London: HMSO. Garcia, M. 2009. The U.N. Convention against Torture: Overview of US Implementation Policy Concerning the Removal of Aliens. Washington. Congressional Research Service, 7–5700. Harding, L. 2017. A Very Expensive Poison: The Assassination of Alexander Litvinenko and Putin’s War with the West. London. Penguin Random House Herman, M. 1996. Intelligence Power in Peace and War. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. Hughes, G. 2011. “Intelligence in the Cold War”. Intelligence and National Security. Volume 26, No. 6, 755–758. Hughes, G. and Herman, M. 2011. “Intelligence in the Cold War: What Difference Did it Make?” Intelligence and National Security, Volume 26, No. 6. ISC. 2018. Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition 2001 to 2010. HC 1113. London: HMSO. Available at: www.isc.independent.gov.uk [Accessed 22 February 2019] Le Carré, J. 1963. The Spy Who Came in from the Cold. London: Victor Gollancz, 13. Le Carré, J. 1974. Tinker, Sailor, Soldier, Spy. Penguin Kindle edition. loc 492. Lowenthal, A. and Bertucci, M. 2014. Scholars, Policymakers, and International Affairs: Finding Common Cause. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. Mendez, J. 2014. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Geneva. United Nations Human Rights Council 25th Session, 4 March 2014. Agenda Item 3. Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development. New York Times. 2018. “Trump’s Meddlesome Priest”. Available at: http://nytimes.com [Accessed 18 February 2018]. Nuffield College, 1959. Charter Statutes and By-Laws. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 7. Phythian, M. 2017. “Profiles in Intelligence: An Interview with Michel Herman”. Intelligence and National Security, [Online]. Volume 32, No. 1, 1–8. Available at: www.tandfonline.com [Accessed 17 February 2019]. University of Oxford. 2019. War and Peace at Oxford. Available at: www.warandpeace.ox.ac.uk ­[Accessed 17 February 2019]. Whitehead, L. 2014. On the Scholar-Practitioner Interface: Separation and Synergy. In Scholars, Policymakers, & International Affairs: Finding Common Cause. Edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal and Mariano E. ­Bertucci, 220–239.

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16 A MISSING DIMENSION NO LONGER Intelligence Studies, Professor Christopher Andrew, and the University of Cambridge Daniel Larsen Where not otherwise referenced, this chapter is based on an oral history conducted with Professor ­Christopher Andrew in 2019 and the author’s own experience at the university since autumn 2008.

Introduction For centuries, the University of Cambridge has never been far from the world of intelligence. From Christopher Marlowe in the time of Elizabeth I to many of the codebreakers of the twentieth century, Britain’s second oldest university has long been a key source of personnel for the country’s intelligence organizations. In the Cambridge Spies, the university has also served as a recruiting ground for the most significant British agents that owed their allegiance to a foreign power. Yet although Cambridge’s history with the intelligence world has been long, few if any figures in that history realized their place in a much larger and longer Cambridge story. Until relatively recently, perhaps the most defining feature of the intelligence world has been its ignorance of its past. Always enveloped in secrecy, the intelligence wheel has been reinvented many times in many places, almost invariably unaware of what has come before.1 The University of Cambridge has more recently played a major role in ending that state of ignorance. Over the past four decades, a new and growing academic subdiscipline has shone a light into the secrecy of the past and, to an extent, into the practices of the present. The study of intelligence has gone from being dismissed as an unserious endeavour to becoming an integral part of the academic landscape—a transformation to a significant extent begun in Cambridge. The university’s impact on intelligence studies, although not wholly so, in its largest part takes a biographical form—that of its now Emeritus Professor of Modern and Contemporary History, Christopher Andrew. One of the towering figures of the field, Professor Andrew has played a major role in so many of the discipline’s milestones: its first serious publications, its first academic journal, its first undergraduate course, its first weekly research seminar, and, most recently, its first extensive synthesis of what is now a thriving scholarly field. His graduate students have gone on to establish their own centres of research elsewhere, and indeed, a very large fraction of those currently working on the subject, especially in the UK, can trace their academic lineage back to the courts of Corpus Christi College in Cambridge. 243

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Forging a new field Christopher Andrew’s ground-breaking publications in the 1980s helped to launch intelligence studies as an academic field. He had become interested in intelligence matters somewhat by chance: his PhD research had examined French foreign policy before the First World War, focussing on Théophile Delcassé, French Foreign Minister from 1898 to 1905. He had noticed, however, that Delcassé seemed to have an intimate knowledge of German diplomatic telegrams—a knowledge unexplainable except by the activities of French intelligence. The book based on his thesis contained what appears to have been the first reference to French codebreaking in that period, although as a rather minor point.2 (Indeed, reviews of the book at the time made no mention of this aspect.)3 From the late 1960s into the early 1980s, he had what he calls a period of “progressive discovery”. Armed with the security of a tenured position at Cambridge from 1972, he began with an interest in the Zinoviev letter and became intrigued by the increasing openness about the secrets of Bletchley Park after the publication of The Ultra Secret in 1974. He came to learn that many of the former codebreakers of the Second World War resided very close to his house in the Newnham area of Cambridge—including one who lived literally across the street. Although he realized that the British had been breaking Soviet codes following the First World War, it took quite some time for him to appreciate that there were, in fact, sufficient traces of the intelligence services in British archives to put any overarching narrative together. But with the publication beginning in 1979 of the multivolume official history British Intelligence in the Second World War by Sir Harry Hinsley4 —who had been his doctoral supervisor for the third year of his PhD5 —the then-Dr Andrew soon found himself putting together a two-part radio series, “The Profession of Intelligence”, which aired in March 1980 on BBC Radio 4. These were so successful as to create a demand for a longer, more expansive series, and so a four-hour, five-part series with the same name aired on Radio 4 in August 1981 and March 1982.6 Around the same time, he became the Deputy Chair of a new Study Group on Intelligence, which met (and still meets) three times per year. By this point, the radio series helped to give him the platform needed to bring together a range of authors for an edited volume, and he had decided that a scholarly book on the subject would be possible. Intelligence studies as a nascent academic field can be said to have been born when these two projects came to fruition as The Missing Dimension, co-edited with David Dilks, in 1984 and then Secret Service in 1985. These were rapidly followed by the founding of the academic journal Intelligence and National Security in 1986. The Missing Dimension took as its title a line from The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, which then-Dr Dilks had edited, and popularized the phrase that dominated intelligence studies for much of the following few decades. This volume, published by the University of Illinois Press, brought together nearly a dozen authors from an array of backgrounds who wrote on topics spanning eight different countries.7 The following year’s Secret Service—­ released as Her Majesty’s Secret Service in the United States in 19868 —caused a meaningful stir on both sides of the Atlantic, seeing advertisements and reviews in a number of newspapers9 and a public interview on BBC Radio 4.10 Both of these books had been published in an atmosphere in which previous writings had ­ avid Kahn tended to be of variable and often poor quality. Although non-academic writers D and Patrick Beesly had written what Drs Andrew and Dilks called “important contributions”, other popular efforts ranged from the unreliable to the ridiculous.11 Secret Service might well be the only book in history to have its endnotes take a central role in its marketing: to set itself apart from the competition, the original book jacket’s third sentence promised the reader “[d]etailed references to a wide and novel range of sources”.12 244

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Although Dr Andrew would later develop a warmer relationship with the British intelligence services, it was not necessarily so from the beginning. These first works were written in a period in which British intelligence sought to keep its history, apart from the Second World War, tightly concealed (the organizations, after all, were officially undeclared, as they remained until 1994). The preface to Secret Service blasted the intelligence services unsparingly for their refusal to release intelligence documents from the First World War and interwar periods. Pointing to Hinsley’s official history and accompanying archival releases for the Second World War, Dr Andrew wrote that the government’s arguments for secrecy were “exaggerated” and carried “to preposterous lengths”: the “proposition that the release of documents on British intelligence operations in Germany during the Agadir crisis of 1911… might threaten national security in the 1980s is so absurd that probably only ­W hitehall is capable of defending it”. In large part, the book had to rely on painstakingly assembled intelligence documents that had seeped out to Foreign Office, Treasury, or other departmental files, or had ended up deposited in private papers (from which, thankfully, he wrote, the government “is nowadays reluctant to make itself ridiculous by reclaiming them”).13 It would take another decade before the HW and KV series (that is, papers inherited by the Government Communications Headquarters and the Security Service) at the National ­A rchives in Kew began to see the light of day.14 This demonstration that good scholarly research into intelligence history could be achieved notwithstanding these governmental barriers helped lead to the founding of Intelligence and National Security. The first academic intelligence studies journal, and probably still the best known, the journal was the brainchild of Professor Michael Handel then of the U.S. Army War College, who organized a lunch with Dr Andrew and publisher Frank Cass. Dr Andrew would serve as co-editor of the journal for its first decade.15 The opening editorial of the first issue in 1986 is a window into the pioneering attitude that founded it: Few areas of modern history and political science remain so obscure as the development of intelligence communities and their influence on policy. In many countries this ­subject still remains partly, if not wholly, taboo. This is particularly true of peacetime intelligence work. Despite recent studies of Second World War intelligence, for example, little has yet been published on intelligence work between the wars. While recognising that current intelligence operations usually require secrecy as a condition of their success, Intelligence and National Security will attempt to lift some of the official veils which still pointlessly conceal the past history of intelligence. Intelligence and National Security starts from two premises: first, that its subject matter is a proper field for scholarly research; second, that any analysis of modern foreign or security policy which leaves intelligence out of account is certainly incomplete and possibly distorted.16 Much has changed because of these efforts. These two premises, stated so boldly three ­decades ago, now seem obvious and uncontroversial to readers today.

Expanding the field Having broken new ground with his research and then helped to create a publication venue that invited others to follow, Dr Andrew continued to till this new ground energetically. Another edited volume came out the following year,17 along with a number of significant articles, before he began a major collaboration on the KGB with Soviet defector Oleg Gordievsky, 245

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who had been a colonel in the KGB but who was a secret agent for the Secret Intelligence Service from 1974 to 1985. This resulted in three volumes, one of history and another two of translated KGB documents, published during 1990–1992.18 Although the British government had no involvement in the creation of these works, the volumes nevertheless came out with tacit government approval: “there is absolutely no doubt that if H.M.G. had not wished [the publication] to happen, then it would not have happened”. While his research was gaining steam, perhaps even more consequential for the discipline were the graduate students who sought to follow him into this exciting new arena of discovery. For some time, he hesitated to encourage any PhD students to follow his plunge into intelligence for fear that the archival material “might give out” before a thesis could be completed. But with Secret Service showing it could be done, that concern began to wane. His first PhD student on an intelligence subject (his earlier research students had written only on French topics) was Richard Popplewell, who completed his dissertation in 1988 on British intelligence and India, a topic that also had the advantage of more open archives.19 What began as a few lone intelligence history wolves steadily evolved into a steady cohort of graduate students studying intelligence history. A number of these students remained within academia, and Professor Andrew also served as an important friend and mentor to other younger academics looking to break into the field. These individuals, in turn, have proliferated their own graduate students, and thus have much of the present academic world of intelligence studies, especially in the UK, been populated. Succeeding with his earliest graduate students’ forays into intelligence history, Professor Andrew moved intelligence studies into undergraduate teaching, beginning the first university intelligence history course. “The Secret World”, a course for third-year undergraduate historians began at Cambridge in 1992, following something of a trial run during visiting fellowships at the Universities of Toronto and Harvard the year before. The Secret World course also integrated the graduate students into its teaching—they supervised undergraduate essays one-on-one according to their areas of expertise, with students typically needing three or more supervisors to assemble a term’s worth of supervisions. The course was enormously popular with the students: those attending his lectures easily filled a large seminar hall, and the course often existed as the faculty’s most popular third-year course option. While “The Secret World” was flourishing in its early years, the course rapidly evolved to take advantage of the latest research being done, including that produced by his research students and the continual raft of new knowledge being assembled in Intelligence and National Security. To this, Professor Andrew’s own industriousness continued to produce new insights, most notably in the form of his seminal For the President’s Eyes Only in 1995, which offered a sweeping history of intelligence and American presidents from Washington to Bush.20 The dramatic, two-volume The Mitrokhin Archive, based on documents secretly exfiltrated from a Russian archive by archivist Vasili Mitrokhin, followed. Mitrokhin, a Russian defector, insisted on the publication of the contents of his archive as a condition of making them available to the British government; the British government put him in touch with Professor Andrew. The blockbuster publication of the first volume in 1999, which featured a serialization in The Times, caused a sensation, particularly because of a media circus that surrounded its naming of a group of previously unprosecuted Soviet spies in the UK. This media circus provoked a significant parliamentary inquiry.21 The next major step forward for the field was the founding of the ground-breaking ­Cambridge Intelligence Seminar, which also began in 1999. From the beginning, the seminar existed in its present weekly format, and was originally designed with the research 246

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students in mind: in the early years, sessions tended to be more evenly allocated between graduate research and invited visiting speakers. Notable speakers in these early years included Oleg Gordievsky, who gave first-hand accounts of the KGB, and Russian dissident ­A lexander Litvinenko, who was subsequently assassinated by the Russian government in 2006. The 2000s saw a remarkable turnaround for British intelligence. While in 1985 Professor Andrew had excoriated the intelligence services for pointlessly trying to keep their First World War secrets, in 2003, he was commissioned to write an official history for the Security Service (MI-5). With privileged access to the Security Service Archive and assisted in his research by his colleague Dr Peter Martland and his former research student Dr Calder Walton, the 2009 The Defence of the Realm became a major milestone in the history of British intelligence.22 This new openness of British intelligence towards its history also led to a new committee that brought government and the academic community together. Soon after Professor Andrew began working on the official history, he also served as a founding member of a new “Consultative Group on Security and Intelligence Records” (CGSIR), a British interdepartmental committee which existed from 2004 to 2011. This committee, with representatives from the intelligence agencies, a number of government departments, and the academic community, had goals that lay in “facilitating the use of records that are already available, disseminating work in progress, identifying forthcoming releases, taking forward consideration of records on particular topics for possible release, [and] undertaking an annual review of releases”. The group provided a communication bridge between academics and the intelligence agencies over the growing mass of British intelligence documentation making its way into the public domain.23 Professor Andrew also began to expand the running of the Intelligence Seminar, which has now seen a wide and changing range of co-convenors—Dr Martland, Dr Walton, a number of other graduate students who remained in Cambridge in a postdoctoral capacity, an array of academics, and a handful of others, including a former head of the Secret Intelligence Service, Sir Richard Dearlove, who from 2004 to 2015 was the Master of Pembroke College, Cambridge. These individuals have all helped to bring to the Seminar a wide array of speakers from a variety of backgrounds, including the academy, government, and private enterprise.

Maturing the field and conclusion The active research community on intelligence in Cambridge has slowly become smaller since Professor Andrew’s formal retirement in 2011, but even so the University remains an active hub of important intelligence research. The Seminar continues its weekly meetings, and in recent years, the Seminar has also organized or co-organized a number of conferences, with topics including the Cambridge Spies, the history of intelligence from 1500 until the First World War (organized with the German Historical Institute in London), and the intelligence practice of horizon scanning (organized with the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency). There is also the Cambridge Security Initiative, started by Professor Andrew and Sir Richard Dearlove in 2013 but now chaired by Sir Richard. It has operated as a think tank and has in recent years run an annual International Security and Intelligence Programme and Conference, a summer programme for undergraduate students paired with an academic conference. Cambridge has also recently been home to the first attempts to synthesize the field of intelligence history as a whole. Intelligence studies has witnessed a remarkable transformation 247

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in just a few short decades: in 1986, intelligence was “obscure” and “taboo”. By 2018, the field was mature enough to make possible Professor Andrew’s The Secret World: A History of Intelligence, the first scholarly attempt at a history of intelligence covering all of recorded human history. This impressive scholarly tome, reaching nearly a thousand pages, features a full fifty-seven-page bibliography of secondary sources—almost all published in the past thirty years. (The endnotes, moreover, though every bit as extensive as those in Secret Service, now go unremarked in the book’s marketing.)24 This work will also, in the not-too-distant future, be complemented by multiple edited volumes constituting the Cambridge History of Intelligence, an ambitious project that not too long ago would have been unthinkable. Never again will it be possible for intelligence agencies to lack access to the history of those who have come before them, nor for historians to neglect intelligence wholesale as they had done for so long. Although much research remains to be done, an enormous amount has been accomplished. In so many areas, the “missing dimension” is missing no longer. Intelligence has had a centuries-long history amongst the narrow streets and the grand old colleges of Cambridge. This small, remarkable university town has been home to a very long intelligence story—one that has featured spies, codebreakers, traitors, and now historians. It is this most recent chapter, however, that has at long last written that story down, and in so doing, has changed intelligence forever.

Notes 1 Andrew, The Secret World: A History of Intelligence (London: Penguin, 2018). 2 Christopher Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale: A Reappraisal of French Foreign Policy, 1898–1905 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1968); Mark Phythian, “Profiles in Intelligence: An Interview with Professor Christopher Andrew”, Intelligence and National Security 32/4 (2016), 395–410 at 396–397. 3 Jonathan E. Helmreich, Review of Andrew, Théophile Delcassé, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 386/1 (1969), 187–188; Hans A. Schmitt, Review of Andrew, Théophile Delcassé, American Historical Review 75/2 (1969), 513–514. 4 F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War (4 vols, London: H.M.S.O., 1979–1990). 5 Phythian, “Profiles in Intelligence”, 397. 6 BBC Genome Project database, https://genome.ch.bbc.co.uk (queried March 2019). 7 Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (eds.), The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century (Urbana, Chicago: University of Illinois Press 1984). 8 Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (London: Heinemann 1985). 9 See, for example, John Gross, “Books of the Times”, New York Times, 11 February 1986, C16. 10 BBC Genome Project database, https://genome.ch.bbc.co.uk (queried March 2019). 11 Andrew and Dilks, Missing Dimension, 2. 12 Andrew, Secret Service. 13 Andrew, Secret Service, xv–xvii. 14 See National Archives Discovery Catalogue, HW and KV series. 15 Phythian, “Profiles in Intelligence”, 402. 16 Editorial, Intelligence and National Security 1/1 (1986). 17 Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes (Eds.), Intelligence and International Relations, 1900–1945, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1987). 18 Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from ­L enin to Gorbachev (London: HarperCollins, 1990); Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from The Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations 1975–1985 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991); Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky (eds.), More Instructions from The Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Global Operations 1975–1985 (London: Cass, 1992). 19 Richard J. Popplewell, “British Intelligence and Indian ‘Subversion’: The Surveillance of Indian Revolutionaries in India and Abroad, 1904–1920”, PhD Thesis, Cambridge University Library,

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20 21 22 23 24

1988; Richard J. Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire 1904–1924 (London: Frank Cass, 1995). Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (London: HarperCollins, 1995). Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive (2 vols., London: Allen Lane, 1999 and 2005); “Mitrokhin Inquiry Report”, Intelligence and Security Committee, June 2000. Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 2009). The records of CGSIR are available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/­consultativegroup-on-security-and-intelligence-records (accessed March 2019). Andrew, The Secret World.

References Andrew, C 1968, Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale: A Reappraisal of French Foreign Policy, 1898–1905, St. Martin’s Press, New York. Andrew, C 1985, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community, Heinemann, London. Andrew, C 1995, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush, HarperCollins, London. Andrew, C 2018, The Secret World: A History of Intelligence, Penguin, London. Andrew, C and D Dilks (eds) 1984, The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago. Andrew, C and O Gordievsky 1990, KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, HarperCollins, London. Andrew, C and O Gordievsky (eds) 1991, Instructions from The Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations 1975–1985, Hodder & Stoughton, London. Andrew, C and O Gordievsky (eds) 1992, More Instructions from The Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Global Operations 1975–1985, Cass, London. Andrew, C and V Mitrokhin 1999 and 2005, The Mitrokhin Archive, 2 vols, Allen Lane, London. Andrew, C and J Noakes (eds) 1987, Intelligence and International Relations, 1900–1945, University of Exeter Press, Exeter. BBC Genome Project database, https://genome.ch.bbc.co.uk, queried March 2019. Gross, J 1986, “Books of the Times”, New York Times, 11 February 1986, C16. Helmreich, J 1969, Review of Christopher Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 386/1, 187–188. Hinsley, F 1979–1990, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 4 vols, H.M.S.O., London. Phythian, M 2016, “Profiles in Intelligence: An Interview with Professor Christopher Andrew”, ­Intelligence and National Security 32/4, 395–410. Popplewell, R J 1988, “British Intelligence and Indian ‘Subversion’: The Surveillance of Indian ­Revolutionaries in India and Abroad, 1904–1920”, PhD Thesis, Cambridge University Library. Popplewell, R J 1995, Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire 1904–1924, Frank Cass, London. Schmitt, H A 1969, Review of Christopher Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale, American Historical Review 75/2, 513–514.

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PART V

University security and intelligence studies Research and scholarship, teaching, and ethics

17 WHAT DO WE TEACH WHEN WE TEACH INTELLIGENCE ETHICS? David Omand and Mark Phythian

Introduction ‘Over the past 5 years, UK law enforcement and intelligence agencies have foiled as many as 25 Islamist-linked plots. That would mean without their vigilance and hard work, we could have seen one attack every 2 months’ (Javid, 2018). ‘The al-Qaeda superspy: how Aimen Dean went from making bombs for Osama bin Laden to working for MI6’; ‘UK human rights panel to investigate police use of child spies’; ‘Britain “must be ready to launch cyberattack”’; ‘MI5 told Ulster force to prioritise sources’; ‘Russian charged with spying tried to infiltrate circles in US, officials allege’; ‘How the GRU spy agency targets the west, from cyberspace to Salisbury’; ‘Isis sympathiser “told undercover officers of suicide plot to kill PM”’; ‘Hamas used fake dating apps to spy on troops, Israel alleges’ (Campbell, 2018; Cobain & Bowcott, 2018; Gayle, 2018; Haynes, 2018; Holmes, 2018; Roth, 2018; Swaine & Beckett, 2018; Quinn, 2018). As the statement by Home Secretary Sajid Javid and this selection of newspaper stories, all taken from a short period in mid-2018, suggest, there is no escape from ethics for the world of secret intelligence. Ethics provides a guide to the standards of behaviour we should adopt and expect of others, determines what actions are acceptable or unacceptable, and how we respond to developments at multiple levels; “what is a cause of pride or shame, or anger or gratitude, or what can be forgiven and what cannot” (Blackburn, 2001, p. 1). But intelligence also represents a distinctive ethical realm which requires careful consideration in thinking about standards of behaviour and acceptability. Ethics is clearly an important dimension of intelligence practice, but how should we approach the teaching of it? What do we teach when we teach intelligence ethics? This chapter sets out to suggest some answers to these questions. All professions have codes of ethics. Having one is close to a defining condition for a profession to be accepted as such. Professional codes of ethics are often incorporated into enforceable regulation. As a result, we are more inclined to trust solicitors not to embezzle, teachers not to seduce students, and scientists not to cheat on their results. What, then, are the ethical standards that we want the intelligence profession to uphold and the ethical considerations we want intelligence officers to operate by as they work on our behalf to protect society from those who wish to cause us harm? If the business of intelligence can be characterized as involving ‘stealing secrets’ (Omand & Phythian, 2018, Chapter 1), then what it is right for intelligence officers to do in their pursuit of other people’s secrets? Which secrets 253

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are acceptable to seek to steal, and from whom? How should this activity be regulated and overseen? There are, of course, those who take the view that linking the practice of intelligence to ethical codes of behaviour is oxymoronic, but they are themselves taking an ethical position in arriving at this conclusion. Teaching intelligence ethics is fundamentally about helping students (and practitioners) to think about these issues and questions. At the outset, it is important to recognize that in our experience, there are broadly two types of students studying intelligence and the relationship between ethics and intelligence. Firstly, there are those mainly pursuing postgraduate taught degrees in disciplines ranging from history, international relations, war studies, political science, criminology, and law for whom a discrete module or modules on intelligence are part of the broader programme. Increasingly, intelligence is also gaining visibility at the undergraduate level on this basis, although in the UK, this is rather different from the rise of undergraduate curricula in the United States, where there are a significant number of undergraduate courses in intelligence which are viewed as forms of pre-professional preparation for entry into intelligence roles (see, for example, Landon-Murray, 2013; Coulthart & Crosston, 2015). At the postgraduate level, there is a growing number of awards in intelligence and security, or variants of this. Whether studying intelligence as a named award or as one element of a broader programme of study, intelligence ethics is likely to be a subject for which there is limited space alongside the study of the meaning of intelligence, collection, analysis, covert action, intelligence failure, and oversight and accountability. However, there is considerable scope to emphasize the ethical dimensions of each of these areas rather than treating ethics solely as a separate topic. Moreover, students who take an intelligence module as part of a broader programme are highly likely to be engaging in ethical evaluation in relation to other subjects elsewhere and earlier in their programmes of study in ways that can be built upon in studying ethics and intelligence. Embedding ethical consideration in this way emphasizes its universality and avoids the risk of its being viewed as a bolt-on optional extra. A second type of audience comes from those already within the profession of intelligence and security (broadly understood, to include national intelligence agencies and criminal intelligence, and those working on intelligence in prisons, borders, customs & excise, social security, etc.), especially younger officers starting out on their careers, who need to be provided with the wider background in which they can understand the purpose and significance of the ethical codes and guidance they will have been given by their agency or department and who take short courses as part of their continuing professional development.

Framing the ethical issues The question of how far the liberal democratic state should authorize its agents to go in seeking and using secret intelligence is one of the big unresolved issues of public policy in the early twenty-first century and sits at the heart of broader debates concerning the relationship between the citizen and the state. Publics need, want—and demand—protection from a range of serious threats, including those posed by terrorism and serious criminality. They also want to be safe in using cyberspace and to have active foreign and aid policies to help resolve outstanding international problems. Secret intelligence is widely accepted as essential to these tasks and a legitimate function of the nation-state, indeed one on which its legitimacy ultimately rests. Yet, the historical record shows that both human and technical collection can pose significant ethical risks and that Western intelligence officers have in the past acted in ways that seem to undermine the values they existed to defend. Hence, a key starting point for teaching is that for a liberal democracy to devise a suitable ethical code to govern its secret intelligence work is not at all straightforward. The very purpose 254

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of acquiring intelligence is to improve governmental decision-making by reducing ignorance about the activities of those who mean harm, the dictators, terrorists, cyber attackers, narcotics gangs, pirates, people traffickers, and other serious criminals. Secret intelligence work involves achieving that objective in respect of information that those adversaries are determined to prevent the authorities knowing. They will go to extraordinary, often very violent, ends to keep their secrets. Hence, they must be stolen, a fact that marks out intelligence as a fundamentally different realm where a distinctive ethical framework must be applied. However, before it can be applied, it has to be devised and once applied it must be kept under review. Overcoming the will of the person with the secret (‘stealing secrets’) requires manipulative behaviours that in one way or another contravene everyday ethical norms and certainly the most uncompromising ethical standard set by the eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant via his concept of the categorical imperative, set out in his 1785 work, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. This cautioned that in our lives, we should always treat other people as ends and never as means. As Kant put it: “Act always so that you treat humanity whether in your person or in that of another always as an end, but never as a means only” (Kant, 1970, p. 18). To apply this standard to the conduct of intelligence is to set a test it cannot pass. Moreover, the sources of tension and suspicion that arise from the nature of the international system and from the nature of the state mean that intelligence is likely to be less effective and citizens consequently less secure if intelligence were to be expected to conform to these expectations. Nevertheless, in the teaching of intelligence ethics, students clearly need to be introduced to (or reminded of ) the classical traditions of moral philosophy which provide the frameworks by which we consider ethical questions and navigate ethical dilemmas. Today’s professional ethical codes are mostly a mix of teleological consequentialist reasoning (judging the rightness of an act by its results such as saving life); deontological prohibitions and injunctions imported from religious or other codes (such as the commandment, thou shalt not commit murder); and aretaic personal value ethics (how one decent human being should behave towards another, involving ideas of honour, integrity, and honesty). It is important that students are able to discuss real intelligence cases through the lenses of traditional moral philosophy. It follows from this definition of the purpose of secret intelligence that to overcome the will of the person with the secret ethically problematic methods will have to be employed: using covert surveillance; recruiting agents and informants; eavesdropping and intercepting communications; and hacking computers. The use of these will be informed by the understanding of the importance of the secret and the level and nature of protection afforded to it. In short, intelligence work is mostly about finding the appropriate way for each of those targets of stealing their secrets, ideally without the targets realizing that their secrets are no longer safe. For both academic and professional students, there are two essential outcomes to be achieved in teaching the subject of intelligence ethics. The first is to equip the student with the means to discuss critically the essential dilemma, and so engage meaningfully in national debates about the nature and regulation of intelligence practice. The key question to be posed is in what way can it be right for a civilized society to authorize the use of methods to protect its citizens and interests that in terms of everyday personal behaviour would be regarded as ethically problematic? In the context of the family, this might be the equivalent of opening the family’s correspondence, reading their emails, listening at keyholes, and suborning friends to tell tales on family members. Part of this teaching task must involve the students becoming familiar with the historical record to understand the uses to which secret intelligence has been put in the past and the context within which such decisions would have been taken and so how they would have been justified. That leads naturally to the discussion 255

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of how and why ethical mores have developed over the generations under the pressure of social changes and also to the examination of extreme cases involving the loosening of ethical constraints that history shows us can be expected when a nation faces an existential threat. The second outcome is facilitation of critical consideration of the specific issues for intelligence ethics that the contemporary world presents. The potential utility of concepts such as ‘necessity’, ‘proportionality’, and ‘discrimination’ that have come down to us via the Just War tradition regarding the use of armed force, one that deals with questions of when it is right to go to war and how wars should be conducted, can be used to examine how far ethically desirable results, such as public protection from extreme terrorist outrages, can be achieved by methods that in themselves are ethically problematic. The historical tradition for intelligence agencies has been consequentialist, justifying to themselves and their political masters the ethical rightness of their actions by the harms that their interventions prevented. As John Stuart Mill wrote, “The only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (Mill, 1859, Chapter 1): that leads students naturally to discuss the idea of proportionality—that the ethical risks run by an operation should bear a relationship to the extent of harm to be prevented. This gives rise to the principle that the greater a danger to society, the greater the ethical risks that can be run to prevent it. This also leads to discussion of the part played by understandings of imminence in reaching these judgements. This, in turn, highlights the ethical problems that arise from the preventive paradigm in which intelligence operates; it is concerned with finding out about and preventing things that have not yet happened (and so may never happen—a possibility that increases the less imminent the risk). In balancing these complex judgements, in our experience, almost all students on reflection resile from the proposition that the prevention of very serious harm to the public, for example from a ‘ticking bomb’ about to detonate in a crowded city, would provide moral justification for the torture of the suspect to reveal the bomb’s location (on this, see Brecher, 2007). The ethical considerations underlying the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (and the European Convention on Human Rights) prohibit torture for any reason. So the students can see the case for the importation of the human rights canon into the consequentionalist tradition. In that way, human rights can be used to provide an essential deontological end point to the consequentialist slide into ever more ethically risky behaviour. Another proposition of John Stuart Mill’s that is relevant to thinking about the ethics of intelligence and provokes lively classroom discussion is that: “A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury” (Mill, 1859, Chapter 1). Thus, for example, failure to use intrusive methods to collect intelligence on a terrorist suspect out of respect for their privacy can carry ethical consequences and those who imposed the restriction would be answerable should the suspect go on to commit an act of terrorism. A recent example involves the judgement made by MI5 that one of their suspects, although known to them to have violent jihadist sympathies, did not meet the ethical and legal threshold that would have justified an interception warrant on his communications. A warrant was finally applied for when new information on him arrived and was signed on the very day when he murdered Fusilier Lee Rigby in ­Woolwich in 2013 (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2014). This is the territory of allegations of intelligence failure. Such cases are indicative of the complexity of the ethical environment in which intelligence must operate and the need, as in that case, for the agencies to have clear ethical thresholds and to be able to defend them. It is important that, as in the case of Fusilier Lee Rigby, there is an independent investigation when serious allegations of failure are made (in that case, the oversight committee backed the cautious approach taken by MI5). 256

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Law and ethics A key question for students exploring the relationship between intelligence, the state, and the citizen is how far we can speak in terms of an inherent tension between law and secret intelligence? The rule of law is a fundamental principle by which liberal democracies set store; yet, intelligence activity with its moral exceptionalism does not easily fit under the rule of law. Conversely, just because a valid legal justification can be found for an intelligence operation does not necessarily make it ethically sound (or politically wise). There has been an improved understanding that legality and ethicality are independent judgements rather than necessarily synonymous in the wake of debates surrounding the George W. Bush White House legal advisers’ judgement that what they characterized as ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ were legally permissible in the exceptional circumstance after 9/11. Now that the nature of these techniques, including waterboarding, has been exposed to wider scrutiny, they have been roundly condemned as amounting to torture in all but name. We can see the danger of reliance on partisan legal advice illustrated in questions asked of Gina Haspel, nominated as the first female head of the CIA having previously been linked to a CIA ‘black site’ where detainees were subjected to these techniques, by Senator Mark Warner, Vice-Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in May 2018, and the answers provided by Haspel (see Box 1). Indeed, there are a range of ethical approaches and issues wrapped up in these questions and answers that can be unpacked and explored in the classroom. It is also important for students to consider the need for international reach in providing national security and thus how far intelligence in the future can be left as a matter for national legislation exclusively (there is currently no international law prohibiting espionage

Box 1: Questions for the record submitted to DCIA nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Mark Warner, 14 May 2018 Question: (U) With the benefit of nearly twenty years of hindsight, and from your perspective as the nominee to be Director of the CIA, do you believe the agency’s use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” was consistent with American values? Do you believe the rendition, detention, and interrogation program was a mistake? (U) What will you do when faced with an order that, while technically legal, is contrary to your sense of moral values? If the President orders you to carry out some morally questionable program, for example, but OLC writes an opinion noting the legality of the morally questionable actions, what will you do? Response: (U) As the Director, one would refuse to undertake any proposed activity that is contrary to my moral and ethical values. As I was able to describe in detail during the classified session, in my role as a Deputy and now Acting Director, every operation I review must not only meet those high standards, the activity must also be consistent with CIA’s mission, expertise, and (Continued)

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the law. I do not and would not hesitate to reject a proposal that fails to meet this threshold. The American people have placed a great deal of trust in CIA, and we work to earn that trust every day. (U) Over the last seventeen years, the agency and I have learned the hard lessons since 9/11. While I won’t condemn those that made these hard calls, and I have noted the valuable intelligence collected, the program ultimately did damage to our officers and our standing in the world. With the benefit of hindsight and my experience as a senior agency leader, the enhanced interrogation program is not one the CIA should have undertaken. The United States must be an example to the rest of the world, and I support that.

and none expected). International norms, or even laws such as the European Data Protection Regulation, can be expected increasingly to bear on the protection of personal data. International human rights obligations, in particular, are likely to impose limits on what democratic nations can do openly to access the personal data of each other's citizens and the personal data of their own citizens held by companies based in a foreign jurisdiction. So far, we have focused on the ethics of intelligence collection (‘stealing secrets’) but teaching about ethics and intelligence needs to move beyond this to also address the ethics of the use of intelligence. National security professionals have always argued that the difficult and sometimes dangerous job of intelligence officers requires licence to break normal conventions precisely so that governments have the option of doing in the dark what ethically they would not want to be seen doing in the daylight. The ethical issues here are not just for those policy makers authorizing action on the basis of secret intelligence. Intelligence officers themselves must make ethical judgements about their degree of belief in the i­ntelligence— for example, how sure does an analyst have to be before reporting on the location of a ­terrorist suspect if there are likely to be consequences for the individual, ranging from being put on a no-fly list to being targeted by a drone strike in some far-off battlefield? Once again, the central question here is whether society can legislate for one set of rules for those we employ to defend us that differ from those we want to see applied in our everyday life.

Lessons from Just War theory This sense in which intelligence involves a sense of moral exceptionalism can be considered in greater depth by applying thinking originating in Just War theory. By studying how over the centuries the Just War philosophers have sought to reconcile the essential wrongness of causing harm to others with the essential rightness of protecting their community and the innocent and weak beyond it from the aggression of others, students can obtain useful ­insights that can be applied to the practice of intelligence. Following Michael Walzer, we can suggest that the rightness of intelligence activity, like the use of armed force, should be judged twice (Walzer, 1980). Are the causes just, and are the methods employed just? We therefore distinguish between the classes of target or requirement that an intelligence agency may justly plan its collection capabilities around and the manner in which intelligence officers conduct themselves thereafter in much the same way as classic Just War theory distinguishes between just causes of war and the just conduct of war. From such considerations, the key vocabulary of necessity, proportionality, right authority, imminence, and last resort emerges, one that can be applied to inform debates 258

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around ethical issues in intelligence. The ideas of the justice of war ( Jus ad Bellum) and justice in war ( Jus in Bello) can be seen as having intelligence equivalents ( Jus ad Intelligentiam and Jus in Intelligentia). But this too is a complex area and we see these as concepts to be used intelligently to unpack the ethical dilemmas, not as a check-list to be ticked off on the way to approving an operation (Omand & Phythian, 2018, Chapter 3). The analogies between Jus ad Bellum and Jus ad Intelligentiam and between Jus in Bello and Jus in Intelligentia are illuminating but not perfect. There is, we think, some risk that while the same terms are being used across discussions of war and intelligence, their meaning becomes widely different in each. The extension of the principles could therefore extend a legitimacy that is unwarranted. One issue that arises in attempting this parallel concerns the fact that war is an exceptional state, while, in the contemporary world, intelligence activity is a constant state of affairs. Hence, decisions to go to war involve a shift from a deeply embedded norm that has no intelligence equivalent. We do not talk of “going to intelligence” or “resorting to intelligence” as we do of “going to war” or “resorting to war” (Omand & Phythian, 2018, Chapter 3). In the UK context, the three statutory purposes of the British security and intelligence services—maintaining national security, detecting and preventing serious crime, and safeguarding economic well-being from threats outside the UK—provide a statutory Jus ad Intelligentiam as a very broad-based legitimating mission statement. But to provide the equivalent to Jus ad Bellum requires a test that is designed to allow judgements to be applied in each specific case where this occurs. Governments could do this with their sets of intelligence requirements, but for good reason, these remain classified. The best that could be done would be to seek more detail, for example in published National Security Strategies, of what the priority threats are that justify intelligence capability. Even the most thoughtful attempts to apply Just War theory to thinking about intelligence have been rather vague about what Jus ad Intelligentiam would actually mean in practice. In a sense, this is inevitable if we understand this judgement as relating to specific targets. The best we can suggest to students is a general statement that the just cause has to be in accordance with the constraints of statute law, transparent to the public, and with the intended meaning of terms such as “national security” explained in published government documents. These, of course, will vary from state to state. For these reasons, we argue that thinking about the ethics of intelligence in terms of a Jus in Bello equivalent—that is, how intelligence should be conducted in specific contexts—offers much more promise than a Jus ad Bellum equivalent, albeit it is not without its own problems. In brief summary, and bearing in mind the caveats set out earlier, the following Just War derived concepts have an important place in facilitating thinking about the ethical dilemmas generated by the need for intelligence: •

• • •

right intention—acting with integrity and having no hidden political or other agendas behind the authorization of intelligence activity or the analysis, assessment, and presentation of intelligence judgements to decision-makers; proportionality—keeping the ethical risks of operations in line with the harm that the operations are intended to prevent; right authority—establishing the level appropriate to the ethical risks that may be run and that will then allow for accountability for decisions and oversight of the process; reasonable prospect of success—having adequate justification for individual operations based on sound probabilistic reasoning that also prevents general fishing expeditions or mass surveillance; 259

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•

•

discrimination—determining the human and technical ability to assess and manage the risk of collateral harm, including privacy intrusion into the lives of those who are not the intended targets of intelligence gathering; necessity—finding no other reasonable way to achieve the authorized mission at lesser ethical risk but still applying any intrusive investigation with restraint.

A contemporary example of the application of these concepts that students need to engage with is the argument put forward by some proponents of digital intelligence methods that privacy rights are only engaged when a human analyst sees the material. Even although computers are not (yet) conscious, the planning and computer access to collect or store large quantities of data, almost all of which is of no conceivable intelligence interest, engages the privacy rights of all those whose data may be accessed (even if it never is). Students unfamiliar with the corpus of human rights development will need reminding that privacy is not an absolute right comparable to the right not to be subject to torture. The validity of a balancing act against other rights, such as the right to security, will therefore depend crucially on the filtering and selection algorithms being sufficiently targeted, using seeds or precise search criteria, to have a reasonable prospect of success in providing important intelligence leads that would not otherwise have been obtainable (thus also passing both the tests of proportionality and necessity). As digital intelligence methods continue to develop (including the application of advanced facial recognitions systems and data from the Internet of Things), such reasoning will become even more important in order to avoid unacceptable violation of the privacy of the innocent and especially the slide into ‘mass surveillance’ which would be unlawful in the UK as well as unethical. An important argument to address, especially in teaching those already within the profession of intelligence, is that the sources and methods being employed to try to obtain a secret must remain hidden, or the person with the secret will easily be able to dodge the attentions of those trying to obtain it. But the definition of what is truly secret has changed in recent years (not least under the pressure of whistleblower and other disclosures). The new transparency that the US and UK governments have had to adopt, for example admitting to using equipment interference (computer network exploitation and hacking) and data mining of bulk personal databases, was the price of obtaining legislative agreement, and securing the societal consent on which its legitimacy ultimately relies, to allow these techniques to be used. Going forward, the boundary of secrecy, we suggest, is now to be drawn more narrowly around which digital gathering methods are being applied to which targets, not to the general nature of the sources and methods themselves. An interesting exercise for students is to envisage what advances in intelligence gathering digital technology might bring in the future and how society might best regulate their deployment. A good example is the coming combination in a domestic setting of high resolution digital cameras fitted to mini-drones connected to very powerful facial recognition software capable of recognizing individual suspects on a watch list. Such a system might well add significantly to security for a major public event, such as a rock concert or major sporting event at a time of high terrorist threat, but would it ever be justifiable for everyday use in cities and town centres? In an ideal world, the domains of ethically acceptable behaviour and legally allowable behaviour would closely overlap. An important learning point for students is that this is rarely the case, partly because the legal environment takes time to change and be brought up to date with changes in intelligence technology and social attitudes. A good example is to be found in the long gap between the development of modern digital methods of accessing 260

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information about subjects of interest, such as terrorists or serious criminals, and the introduction of comprehensive legislation to regulate and oversee such activity. The material provided to journalists by Edward Snowden in 2013 illustrates the use of such techniques by the US and the UK and their close partners (Greenwald, 2014) and, it is assumed, the intelligence services of Russia, China, and other advanced nations. But it was not until the end of 2016 and intensive public debate that consensus was arrived at in the UK on which forms of digital intelligence access should be regarded as unacceptable on ethical grounds of privacy and which should be so allowed, and in that case under what regulation and oversight to prevent abuse. The secrecy that attaches to intelligence is at the root of a number of the ethical tensions that intelligence practice generates in liberal democratic contexts. The reassurance that intelligence agencies and professionals within them are behaving in manners that the public would consider acceptable is provided, in the context of secrecy, by the operation of oversight and accountability mechanisms. Consideration of the roles and effectiveness of oversight arrangements should, therefore, be a key element of the teaching of intelligence ethics. Over recent decades, as they have become more firmly embedded in the national political architecture and as the latitude afforded by them has expanded, they have produced a series of detailed reports that are the vital raw material for the study of intelligence ethics.

The case study approach Much intelligence teaching relies on drawing and understanding lessons from the past. In particular, the study of intelligence failures such as over the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the outbreak of the 1973 Yom Kippur war, the 1982 Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands, and the flawed intelligence assessments in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 has been central to intelligence studies. Studying intelligence successes is harder since intelligence agencies often want to keep these secret so that the techniques can be re-used, although learning from those that are publicized is equally important. Stephen Marrin has made the point that the question of the causes of intelligence failure occupies a central place in the study of intelligence in a similar way that the question of the causes of war is central to the study of International Relations (Marrin, 2007). This distinctly post mortem character of much of the focus of intelligence teaching means that a case study approach is particularly valuable here and a literature has developed that offers guidelines on case study selection and usage (for example, Caddell & Caddell, 2017). Teaching ethics relies on extensive use of actual examples, as well as hypotheticals, to facilitate thinking about ethical contexts and potential dilemmas; hence, the case study approach has an important place here. As we highlighted in the opening paragraph, current events continue to provide headlines on issues relating to intelligence ethics that students will want to discuss in class (of course, some of these stories are misleading and students need to be duly warned). To take some further examples, in 2018, the British government issued an unreserved apology for its decision to allow MI6 to pass to the CIA intelligence on the whereabouts of Libyan dissident Abdel Hakim Belhaj leading to his extraordinary rendition back to Col. Gaddafi’s Libya and his subsequent detention and torture by the regime. The US Senate was deeply divided over the nomination of Gina Haspel as the CIA Director, given her earlier involvement in the Bush-era coercive interrogation programme, as we highlighted. Continuing controversy dogs the British Government’s decision to set up an independent body to investigate deaths during the Troubles in Northern Ireland. A 261

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long-running public inquiry is under way into the activities of undercover police officers from Scotland Yard who infiltrated protest groups and carried out sexual affairs with members of the groups. Court cases, including at the European Court of Justice and the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal, have resulted from challenges on privacy grounds to the access and retention of bulk data on the communications of very large numbers of people and often provide a level of detail and serious reasoning missing from media accounts. The advantages of developing well-evidenced case studies on subjects such as these are that there is a significant amount of information contained in documents resulting from official investigations, whether by formal oversight bodies or specially constituted commissions, or other official documents which, while they may not amount to a full account, nevertheless provide a rich basis for discussion of the ethical bases and acceptability of agency or individual actions (as the inclusion of the Haspel Q&A, mentioned earlier, briefly illustrates). At the same time, a disadvantage is that widely publicized cases mostly focus on the exceptional decisions at the margins of intelligence work and the inevitable mistakes made and can blind the student to the day-in day-out work of intelligence agencies in gathering intelligence to support foreign policy and military operations and planning.

Other classroom sources It is easy for one-sided discussions of secret intelligence to predominate given the strange fascination that the subject continues to exert over the public through books, films, and television, often at the outer extremes of fiction. Nevertheless, if we are sufficiently selective, we can make careful use of film, television, and novels in teaching intelligence ethics in drawing from them hypothetical scenarios around which we can base discussion. A good example would be the 2006 film The Lives of Others by Florian von Donnersmark, depicting the corrupting effect of the pervasive surveillance of the Cold War Stasi in East Germany. Even fictional contexts that seem implausible in significant respects can be useful as starting points to establish clear ethical lines before proceeding to less clear, more problematic cases. An example would be the frequent use of torture and violence on terrorist suspects in the 24 TV series starring Kiefer Sutherland as the US agent Jack Bauer. Much of the fictional output of the author John le Carré relies on a pessimistic realism rooted (however loosely) in his professional experience from the Cold War that long predated the avowal of the UK intelligence agencies and their operation under the domestic rule of law. Nevertheless, the novels provide narratives of ethical choices, which would include such core ethical dilemmas as: how and when manipulative and exploitative behaviour towards others, including spying on friends, is justified; questions of invasions of personal privacy; deception through sting and false flag operations; the ethical issues that abound when sharing intelligence with countries that have different moral attitudes to the use of intelligence, such as for interrogation or targeted killing and so on. Used carefully fictional scenarios can also illuminate discussion of how intelligence analysts also need to have regard to ethics in ensuring that personal views and motives do not contaminate their professional judgements and in assessing the degree of confidence they ought to have in those judgements before reporting them and thus potentially precipitating action being taken. Using hypotheticals is a key part of ethical thinking, so the fact that ethical dilemmas drawn from popular culture are fictional does not itself disqualify them from being useful in classroom environments provided that the students are reminded that these are fictional representations and not documentary accounts of the everyday work of intelligence agencies. 262

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Conclusion An important message in teaching intelligence ethics concerns the relationship between ethics and law. On the one hand, there is the message that sufficient transparency on the part of government agencies in a democracy is needed to allow the rule of law to be observed so that the citizen can know how the law may apply to them, for example in relation to their on-line privacy. Thus, the law must keep up with intelligence developments so that intelligence officers are not faced again with the dilemma GCHQ faced in the early years of the century of properly obtaining legal cover for advanced digital operations under pre-existing statutes but subsequently being found not to have operated fully under the rule of law given that such use of the laws in question would not have been clear to Parliament and public (since the digital techniques themselves did not exist at the time these laws were passed). On the other hand, it is also an important message that even if law can be identified to justify the legality of an intelligence operation, it is still necessary to think separately about whether the act is ethically acceptable. As we noted earlier, not everything that is lawful may, at any one time, be regarded as ethically acceptable by society. There are plenty of examples outside the world of secret intelligence to draw on in illustrating this point, not least the controversies over the lawful tax avoidance strategies of global companies that result in levels of tax being paid in the UK that would be widely regarded as unethical in terms of corporate social responsibility. The requirement to exercise restraint in the use of the coercive powers of the state is an ethical injunction: not every intelligence operation that may be possible and can be made lawful should necessarily be carried out. Each requires consideration of the potential gain set against the ethical risks being run (for example to potential agents and their families or to the collateral invasion of personal privacy of those not the target of the operation). It is an important part of recruitment and subsequent training that intelligence officers are helped to develop ways of behaving well under difficult circumstances, even when knowingly encouraging betrayal or intruding on the privacy of private communications and family life. Experimental psychology nevertheless also demonstrates that even those who see themselves as highly moral actors can be led to behave in unacceptable ways when placed in an unhealthy environment. So ethical issues in intelligence have a situational as well as a personal dimension, not least when it comes to designing organizational structures, and statutory safeguards and internal processes to ensure that future governments cannot misuse the powerful intelligence capabilities that the UK intelligence and security agencies must continue to possess. At the end of a course on intelligence ethics, students should be in a position to discuss how society navigates the inevitable tensions and how these can be mitigated; specifically, what a social contract ought to look like between the public, their representatives in elected government and its intelligence agencies, and the private corporations that increasingly manage and use our personal information. In the end, liberal democracies need the consent of the public to confirm the ethical soundness of the activities carried out in their citizens’ names and in their interest. We find support therefore for a 3-R approach: all activities should be conducted within the rule of law, there is regulation and proper democratic accountability through both judicial and legislative oversight, and authorities should exercise restraint to respect the privacy of the individual and apply the principles of proportionality and necessity at every stage.

References Blackburn, S. (2001) Ethics: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brecher, B. (2007) Torture and the Ticking Bomb. Oxford: Blackwell’s.

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David Omand and Mark Phythian Caddell, J. Jr. and Caddell, J. Sr. (2017) Historical Case Studies in Intelligence Education: Best Practices, Avoidable Pitfalls. Intelligence and National Security, 32(7): 889–904. Campbell, M. (2018) The al-Qaeda superspy: How Aimen Dean went from making bombs for Osama bin Laden to working for MI6. Sunday Times, 27 May; www.thetimes.co.uk/article/al-qaeda-­ double-agent-how-aimen-dean-went-from-working-for-osama-bin-laden-to-mi6-superspy7nhk3pkrm. Cobain, I. and Bowcott, O. (2018) MI5 told Ulster force to prioritise sources. The Guardian, 27 June. Coulthart, S. and Crosston, M. (2015) Terra Incognita: Mapping American Intelligence Education Curriculum. Journal of Strategic Security, 8(3): 46–68,http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/­ viewcontent.cgi?article=1459&context=jss. Gayle, D. (2018) UK human rights panel to investigate police use of child spies. The Guardian, 7 ­August; w w w.theg uard ian.com/uk-news/2018/aug/07/uk-human-r ights-panel-to-investigatepolice-use-of-child-spies. Greenwald, G. (2014) No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA and the Surveillance State. London: Hamish Hamilton. Haynes, D. (2018) Britain “must be ready to launch cyberattack”. The Times, 18 May. Holmes, O. (2018) Hamas used fake dating app to spy on troops, Israel alleges. The Guardian, 4 July. Intelligence and Security Committee (2014) Report on the Intelligence Relating to the Murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby. HC 795. London: HMSO. Javid, S. (2018) Launch of UK Counter-Terrorism Strategy, www.gov.uk/government/speeches/ home-secretary-announces-new-counter-terrorism-strategy. Kant, I. (1970) Kant: Political Writings. In Reiss, H. (ed.). Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–40. Landon-Murray, M. (2013) Moving US Academic Intelligence Education Forward: A Literature ­Inventory and Agenda. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 26(4): 744–776. Marrin, S. (2007) Intelligence Analysis Theory: Explaining and Predicting Analytic Responsibilities. Intelligence and National Security, 22(6): 821–846. Mill, J.S. (1859) On Liberty. London: Penguin Classics. Omand, D. and Phythian, M. (2018) Principled Spying: The Ethics of Secret Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press and Washington: Georgetown University Press. Quinn, B. (2018) Isis sympathizer ‘told undercover officers of suicide plot to kill PM’. The Guardian, 20 June. Roth, A. (2018) How the GRU spy agency targets the west, from cyberspace to Salisbury. The Guardian, 6 August. Swaine, J. and Beckett, L. (2018) Russian charged with spying tried to infiltrate conservative circles in US, officials allege. The Guardian, 20 July. Walzer, M. (1980) Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

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18 SECRET AND ETHICALLY SENSITIVE RESEARCH Joanna Kidd

Introduction The acquisition of knowledge through research is widely understood to be one of the main purposes of a university.1 In general, this academic research, irrespective of subject discipline, will be funded by a learned society, government research council or charitable body with the intention that its methodology and findings be published so as to benefit society as a whole. However, in certain cases, the research findings may be so sensitive, especially in terms of its security impact, that this norm is broken: although the research does produce new knowledge, its sensitivity to its funders means that it will not be published openly by the academics responsible. This chapter explores some of these issues.

Secret and ethically sensitive research It may seem unlikely that university researchers, following standard academic research methods encompassing strict ethical guidelines,2 using no direct human participants and without the need for security clearances, would be able to produce research of such sensitivity. Reference to the on-going information revolution, defined as the development of technologies (e.g. computers, digital communication, microchips) from the 1950s onwards, may provide an explanation. This revolution, which is still in progress, has led to a dramatic reduction in the cost of obtaining, processing, storing and transmitting digital information in all forms (text, graphics, audio and video). It has facilitated the Internet, the World Wide Web and the concomitant vast increase in the volume and variety of information and the speed with which such information changes. Much of this digital information is ‘open source’, i.e. in the public domain, albeit in many variants: multiple languages; multiple formats, audio, visual and text; and multiple data sizes. Increasingly, more of this information is generated by individuals rather than institutions, on social media platforms. In addition, such social media usage is now a worldwide phenomenon, with Internet penetration in 2018 ranging from 36% in Africa, 49% in Asia, 65% in the Middle East to 95% in North America.3 As a consequence of these developments, it is possible for researchers (based in universities or elsewhere) to access a vast range of publicly available information. Such information can be ‘collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience 265

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for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement’.4 This is the United States’ Department of Defense’s 2006 definition of open source intelligence (OSINT).5 OSINT is not new: non-digital open sources of information, for example newspapers, have been exploited to produce intelligence for centuries. Furthermore, the invention of radio in the early twentieth century and the increase in range and speed of its open source information dissemination6 led to the creation of institutions dedicated to the production of OSINT, e.g. BBC Monitoring and the United States’ Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). The current information revolution, however, has widened the amount of open source information available. As importantly, the speed at which this information can be collected and analysed has been increased greatly, thereby enabling individual or small teams of researchers to attempt the same tasks carried out by the existing, large OSINT organisations. The recent example of Bellingcat’s open source investigation into the Skripal poisoning in Salisbury in 2018 being a case in point of what now can be achieved by a small, dedicated team.7 Two skillsets are required to carry out this type of investigation or intelligence task: collection, analysis and verification of open source information; and subject expertise on topics such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, radicalisation and terrorism or area studies. Both skillsets can be found in universities, albeit not necessarily in just one department or even faculty. The latter skillset – subject expertise – can be found in abundance in many social science faculties, in particular in departments of international relations. Surprisingly, the first skillset does not necessarily require the academics to be data scientists. Although collection and processing of information may require an automated approach, this is not necessarily needed in every case. Open source information of interest may not be available in abundance due to the clandestine nature of the subject matter and the main skill needed is the ability to locate the scant information on activities such as WMD proliferation and terrorism that leak into open sources. This ability is dependent on an interdisciplinarity endeavour, suitable for an academic environment, often requiring a team of linguists and cultural experts to collect, verify and analyse the open source information with confidence. In addition, these open sources of information are increasingly not found in text alone; much information is now in audio, video or ground-based imagery.8 In order to analyse these formats of open source information, additional expertise may be needed from departments including film studies, history of art and psychology. One should note at this point that the conduct of such investigatory or intelligence task research at universities is probably conducted in accordance with the main principles of UK academia’s core ethical guidelines for research: that wherever possible, participation in research should be voluntary and appropriately informed; and that research should be conducted with integrity and transparency.9 Therefore, it is unlikely that Internet-based research is carried out by academics assuming false identities when online as this practice would contravene these principles. Instead, academics may either use their university identity or perhaps at most anonymise their identity. Similarly, academics would usually not take active participation in online chat rooms; one would assume that they would observe conversations rather than engaging actively in such conversations in order to obtain information of interest.

Examples of open source information on sensitive security subjects A few examples, provided below, may be able to support the contention that information on sensitive security subjects such as terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation is available in open sources. It should be noted that these examples were retrieved, firstly, from the surface web using a combination of keyword searches in multiple languages (including Arabic, 266

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Dari, Farsi, French, Mandarin and Taijk) through search engines such as Google, Yandex and Baidu. These searches were supplemented by, secondly, searches on business-to-business websites such as Alibaba (see below) and Istgah.10 Thirdly, keyword searches were conducted in the deep web on databases including the Web of Science.11 Fourthly, a range of specific grey literature sources, most online but some hard copy, were monitored for relevant information.12 Other available open sources of information, such as satellite imagery and videos, were not used due to time constraints, although it should be noted that these can provide a rich stream of relevant information in some cases. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) goals included encouraging mass support not just for its campaigns in the Middle East and Europe and also for individual supporters to undertake attacks themselves. In furtherance of this goal, ISIS issued guidance quite openly on how to do so. Issues of its French-language magazine Dar al Islam, widely available online, in 2014–2016 contained a series of articles about security and operational practice for ISIS supporters wanting to undertake a terrorist act. Notably, a six-page article in the magazine’s sixth edition published in September 2015 was entitled, ‘Prepare yourself against them with all the force you can muster’.13 The article described, with the use of copious photographs, how to maintain a Kalachnikov AK47/AKM, a Glock pistol, a Toula-Tokarev pistol and an F-1 Russian grenade for use in an attack against the French state. A later 15-page article in the series was entitled, ‘Security Information’.14 The article was split into sections on an introduction to secure communications (e.g. TOR, HTTPS and SSL); PGP and TAILS OS for encryption and de-encryption; secure chat, using XMPP, JABBER and OTR. In order to convey their message and instructions to their supporters on a wide scale, ISIS had in addition, perhaps unwittingly, thereby put details of its operating methods into the public domain where interested academic researchers capable of reading French could collect this information. This information could then be verified and analysed by these academic ­researchers to gain insight into ISIS’s tactics. On a strategic level too, open source information can be found, verified and analysed to produce research on security issues. It may seem improbable that information on matters such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons can be found in open sources, but three factors combine to facilitate this. The first factor is the landscape of open source information. Even in covert matters, human activity involves some form of communication; some of this communication is being digitised and some of this digital information is in the public domain and can be found online. The volume of online information is so large, and is changing so rapidly, that few states can control fully this information that relates to their activities. North Korea is possibly the only state to be willing and capable of exercising the immense censorship necessary to do so. An old example of a state failing to control online information is a 1995 agreement on scientific co-operation between the Scientific Studies and Research Centre in Syria and the Indian Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, which was hosted online in English on the latter’s website.15 Although much of the proposed co-operation was wholly legitimate (e.g. work on photovoltaic technology), some of the areas identified for joint co-operation in research and development, exchange of scientists and technology transfer were of some security concern, e.g. composite materials facilities and a pilot plant for the production of chemical intermediates. A second and related factor is that even individuals involved in the development of a state’s nuclear capabilities, who understand the covert nature of their work, may still enjoy talking about that work. The temptation to brag, and to brag online, may be too great to resist. A 2011 report on Iran by the UN’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), illustrates that this type of covert work may be found in open sources. The 267

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IAEA stated in the report that ‘The Agency has also found, through open source research, other Iranian publications which relate to the application of detonation shock dynamics to the modelling of detonation in high explosives, and the use of hydrodynamic codes in the modelling of jet formation with shaped (hollow) charges. Such studies are commonly used in reactor physics or conventional ordnance research, but also have applications in the development of nuclear explosives’.16 It is likely that these publications were posted online by individuals keen to demonstrate their research prowess. A further example of an individual disclosing sensitive information can be found in hard copy. In 1997, a book entitled ‘Dr A.Q. Khan on Science and Education’ came out which was a collection of Khan’s articles and was published in English in Lahore.17 Dr A. Q. Khan is the self-proclaimed ‘father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb’, and the book’s Chapter 19 was entitled, ‘Prospects of promoting science and technology in IDB member countries’. The IDB is the Islamic Development Bank (now IsDB) based in Saudi Arabia and aims to ‘equip people with the tools they need to build a sustainable future for themselves, their communities and their countries, putting the infrastructure in place to enable them to reach their full potential’.18 In 1997 and 2003, the IDB sponsored Symposia on Advanced Materials held at Khan’s Kahuta Laboratories in Pakistan. Both symposia included presentations of relevance to the development of nuclear weapons, and it is interesting to note that in Chapter 19, mentioned earlier, Khan stated quite openly that he envisaged that the IDB could be used to provide financial support to programmes seeking to develop ‘sensitive technologies’. Of course, the open source information found in an ‘old fashioned’ hard copy book may not be able to be accessed swiftly. However, online information can be accessed almost as soon as it is produced. One of many billions of possible examples are the presentations that were made at the Saudi Sustainable Energy Symposium, held at The Ritz Carlton Hotel in Riyadh on 23rd and 24th April 2013. This symposium, according to its then website, lay the groundwork for the initiation of the localisation process of the manufacturing and services opportunities along the nuclear and renewables value chains in the Kingdom of Saudi ­A rabia.19 The presentations were downloadable online directly after the symposium finished. However, it should be noted that this speed of information collection came at the cost of its temporary nature: the website no longer exists and so its information cannot be accessed. The third factor, enabling sensitive information to be found in open sources, is that if someone has something to sell, they will need to alert potential buyers and, in some cases, the consequent advertising will take place online, however sensitive the material to be traded. The development of nuclear weapons still requires a vast range of advanced materials, some of which may be manufactured by commercial companies rather than state-controlled institutions. Commercial companies with products to sell need to advertise their wares in marketplaces. In some cases, the number of potential buyers may be so small that sellers can reach them by face-to-face communications. However, should the seller not be able to reach buyers in such a direct and discreet manner, an obvious way to advertise is online. Online advertisements can be placed either on the company’s website or on one of the numerous ­online business-to-business websites, such as general marketplaces like Alibaba (www.alibaba. com/) or an industry-specific site, e.g. Middle East Steel (www.mesteel.com/start.htm) for the purpose of attracting custom. It is not unknown for materials used in the production of fissile material to be advertised on these sites. Thereby, these advertisements are in the public domain and can be found by academic researchers, amongst other interested parties. An example of such advertising can be shown by a simple search for the term ‘uranium’ on Alibaba. When conducted by the author in January 2019, this search yielded sixty-eight adverts for uranium. One of these adverts was placed by a ‘Mr George Mae’, from Ukraine, who stated 268

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that, ‘We offer u 235 for those willing to use for research… our product is meant for those who want to use to carry not research in their field of studies’ (sic). As noted earlier, the process of collecting open source information on security issues both tactical and strategic will require a range of skills, including linguistic, technical and cultural ones, all of which can be found in universities. These collected sources will have to be analysed and verified carefully, tasks which one would expect academic researchers to be able to accomplish. Moreover, in some cases, for example nuclear non-proliferation, the expertise required will be considerable and the combination of expertise may be found only in universities. Which other type of entity could provide Japanese and Tajik translation, accurate interpretation of an array of imagery and understanding of the uses of hafnium-free zirconium, for example? One can assume, perhaps, that external funders such as governments may be interested in commissioning universities researchers to conduct open source research on sensitive security topics.

Challenges to sensitive academic research Despite the opportunities outlined earlier that the on-going information revolution presents to researchers, challenges to conducting this research do remain. The most obvious challenges to conducting sensitive research through open source information stem from the four chief characteristics of that information: its volume, velocity, variety and veracity. As described earlier, the massive increase in the amount of open source information that can be accessed by a single researcher has given the latter the opportunity to find sensitive security material. However, it also poses a considerable challenge to finding this material as this material gives a low signal to noise ratio, requiring a great deal of time to retrieve. Although automated means of collection can be used to speed this retrieval process, this is likely to come at the cost of losing accuracy. This challenge is compounded by the ephemeral nature of most online open source information – so many sources have a very short life-span that much information is uncaptured even by automated means of collection.20 The variety of open source information poses a third challenge: information in text formats may be in a range of different languages; and information from audio and visual sources can take many different formats and consequently can take a wide set of skills to be able to collect and analyse. Fourthly, the veracity of open sources of information may take a substantial amount of effort to confirm, especially when one considers the low-entry cost for publishing material online as well as the formidable array of misinformation, disinformation and propaganda on the web. Although substantial, all four of these challenges can be met to a certain extent by a combination of expert teams of researchers, software and time. However, perhaps the foremost challenge to academics engaging in sensitive research using open source information lies elsewhere. Due to its sensitive findings, which may well be of considerable security value to its funders, such research will rarely be published openly due to its very sensitivity. Therefore, although it will in many cases produce new knowledge, it might not be deemed to contribute sufficiently to universities’ core aim of spreading knowledge. If universities judge that the widespread dissemination of research is an overwhelming priority, then they may be unwilling to provide support and encouragement to academics to engage in sensitive research, however much the latter is valued by external organisations. Moreover, academics engaged in such work will have less time to devote to research that can be published and thereby may diminish their career prospects in an environment where successful publications are a key metric in universities’ assessment of academics’ productivity. Therefore, if such sensitive research is to be conducted by universities, it is 269

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probably essential that wholehearted support is provided and maintained by the leadership of the university; should such support not be forthcoming, this type of research is unlikely to be housed in a university.

Conclusion These university-based challenges may be so great as to outweigh the advantages of academics engaging in sensitive research. This would be a pity, as one of the UK Research Councils’ six key principles for ethical research is that ‘research should aim to maximise benefit for individuals and society and minimise risk and harm’.21 Although this principle is open to a wide set of interpretations, one would hope that universities would consider sensitive research in support of aims including the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the countering of terrorism could be defined as maximising benefit for individuals and society and minimising risk and harm. Unfortunately, given the tight criteria by which UK universities are measured and assessed, there may not be space for such a broad interpretation of the benefits of academic research to be taken by university leadership.

Notes 1 See, for example, Oxford University, 2013, 2013–2018 Strategic Plan (online), point 1, which states that, ‘The University of Oxford aims to lead the world in research and education’. Available from: www.ox.ac.uk/about/organisation/strategic-plan?wssl=1 (accessed August 2018). See also, Birmingham University, 2015, Strategic Framework 2015–2020 (online), p. 2, which states, ‘As an institution dedicated to learning, we contribute to the growth and spread of the knowledge and ideas which will help transform the world’. Available from: www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/ strategic-framework/strategic-framework-2015-2020.pdf (accessed August 2018). 2 For a framework of research ethics, see the UK Economic and Social Research Council, Research Ethics: Our core principles (online). Available from: https://esrc.ukri.org/funding/guidance-for-­ applicants/research-ethics/our-core-principles/ (accessed September 2018). 3 World Internet Usage and Population Statistics, June 30, 2018 – Update, www.internetworldstats. com/stats.htm (accessed January 2019). 4 Definition of OSINT, United States’ Defense Authorization Act, 2006, Sec. 931. 5 Definition of OSINT, United States’ Defense Authorization Act, 2006, Sec. 931. 6 It should be noted that radio enabled information to be spread faster and at a greater range than ­information from newspapers, even when the latter were transported by rail. This point is illustrated in the names of many of the great nineteenth-century newspapers, which remained ties to the cities in which they were published: the New York Times, the Frankfurter Zeitung, the Manchester Guardian. As their names imply, they were produced on a regional basis. The early twentieth-­century radio companies had a greater, national reach: the British Broadcasting Company, for example. 7 See, for example, Bellingcat Investigation Team, ‘Third Skripal Suspect Linked to 2015 ­Bulgaria Poisoning’, 7 February 2019. Available from: www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-­europe/2019/02/07/ third-skripal-suspect-linked-to-2015-bulgaria-poisoning/ (accessed February 2019). 8 For an illustration of the shift from text to visual information, even in text-rich publications such as newspapers, see the video, Youtube, ‘Every single New York Times front page since 1852 (notice the sudden rise of picture use!)’, 5 November 2017. Available from: www.youtube.com/ watch?v=_Ayzyw-wqg8 (accessed February 2019). 9 ESRC, ‘Our core principles’. Available from: https://esrc.ukri.org/funding/guidance-for-­applicants/ research-ethics/our-core-principles/ (accessed September 2018). 10 Istgah business-to-business website. Available from: www.istgah.com/ (Farsi) (accessed February 2019). 11 The Web of Science Service for UK Education. Available from: https://wok.mimas.ac.uk/ ­(accessed February 2019).

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Secret and ethically sensitive research 12 Grey literature being defined as regardless of media, including but not limited to, research reports, technical reports, economic reports, trip reports, working papers, discussion papers, unofficial government documents, proceedings, preprints, research reports, studies, dissertations and theses; trade literature, market surveys and newsletters. This material cuts across scientific, political, socio-economic and military disciplines. 13 Dal Al-Islam, Number Six, pp. 34–40, Dhou-L-Hijjah 1436 (about September 2015). ­Available from: https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/the-islamic-state-e2809cdc481r-al-­islc481mmagazine-6e280b3.pdf (French) (accessed June 2016). 14 Dal Al-Islam, Number Nine, pp. 38–52, (French), Rajab 1437 (about April 2016). Available from: https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/dacc84r-al-islacc84m-magazine-9.pdf (accessed June 2016). 15 Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, India, 17 January 1995, Protocol for Scientific and Technical Co-operation between the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, India and the Scientific Studies and Research Centre, Syria (online). Available from: www.csirwebistad.org/pdf/opp38.pdf (accessed June 2004). 16 The Board of Governors, IAEA, 8 November 2011, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (online), GOV/2011/65. Available from: www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2011-65.pdf (accessed ­September 2018). 17 ‘Dr A.Q. Khan on Science and Education’, ed. S. Shabbir Hussain and Mujahid Kamran, 1997, ISBN: 9693508211. 18 Islamic Development Bank, ‘What we do’. Available from: www.isdb.org/what-we-do (accessed February 2019). 19 These presentations were available to download at the Vimeo website: http://vimeo.com/ user18597137/review/68035815/0d29d514d8 (accessed April 2013). 20 It should be noted that there are means to try to access online information that did exist once but has been removed subsequently. The Internet Archive (https://archive.org/about/), a nonprofit endeavour, is building a digital library of Internet sites and other cultural artefacts in digital form that can be accessed freely. However, it does not archive all websites as some do not enable this process; furthermore, the Internet Archive does not attempt to download every single change made to every website that it is able to archive. Some national governments also maintain searchable archives of their national web domains. The UK, for example, has since April 2013 run a ‘Non-Print Legal Deposit UK Web Archive’ which includes millions of websites obtained through annual archiving of the entire UK domain, but is available only at the six legal deposit libraries and it archives these domains only once a year (more information can be found at: www. bl.uk/collection-guides/uk-web-archive, accessed February 2019). 21 ESRC, ‘Our core principles’. Available from: https://esrc.ukri.org/funding/guidance-for-applicants/ research-ethics/our-core-principles/.

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19 INTELLIGENT STUDIES Degrees in intelligence and the intelligence community Scott Parsons

Introduction Historically, agencies in the Intelligence Community (IC) have encouraged interested ­recruits to major in history, international studies, national security, political science, statistics, accounting, or in law. While this may still be true, in the last ten to fifteen years, many ­universities and colleges have begun offering degrees in intelligence studies. In fact, many universities offer not only bachelor’s degrees, but also master’s degrees in intelligence. ­Agencies in the IC are interested in these intelligence degrees as they provide the IC recruit a good foundation for starting their career. Since the first intelligence-related degree was offered twenty-six years ago, the field of colleges and universities offering intelligence degree-granting programs has grown exponentially. In the last six years, the growth has been especially pronounced. The first school to offer a degree in intelligence was Pennsylvania’s Mercyhurst University (then Mercyhurst College) in 1992 (Campbell, 2009; Coulthart and Crosston, 2015; Landon-Murray, 2013; Spracher, 2009). In the initial two decades following the opening of Mercyhurst’s intelligence program, the field of colleges and universities offering intelligence degrees was slow growing. In fact, it was not until 2001 that another school offered a degree in intelligence. The first surge in growth came as a response to the 9/11 attacks. From the period 2001 to 2012, there was an average of one new program a year offering a bachelor’s degree in intelligence (Coulthart and Crosston, 2015). Two important studies were done on the number of schools offering intelligence ­degree-granting programs. The first was a 2009 study by Stephen Campbell. Campbell found that the number of intelligence courses offered at colleges and universities tripled from 2001 to 2008 (Campbell, 2009; Dujmovic, 2016). The initial offering of three programs in 2001 went to nine programs in 2008. A second influential study was published in 2015 by ­Stephen Coulthart and Matthew Crosston. Coulthart and Crosston’s data set was from 1992 to 2012. They determined that by 2012, there were seventeen intelligence programs offering ­t wenty-six intelligence degrees (Coulthart and Crosston, 2015). Since Coulthart and Crosston published their study, there has been an exponential increase in the amount of universities and colleges that offer intelligence-related degree

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programs. Coulthart and Crosston’s study covered the twenty-year period of 1992–2012. In less than six years since their study concluded, the number of programs and universities offering a degree in intelligence increased from seventeen intelligence programs offering twenty-six intelligence degrees to twenty-eight intelligence programs offering forty-one intelligence degrees.1 While colleges and universities continue to develop and expand distance-learning programs, online degree-granting programs in intelligence are also growing at a rapid rate (Campbell, 2009; Spracher, 2009). In fact, almost all of the programs found in both my study (Figure 19.1) and Coulthart and Crosston’s 2012 study (Figure 19.2) offered their intelligence Institution

Degree

Degree(s) Name

American Public University System includes American Military University (AMU) and American Public University (APU)

B.A.

Intelligence Studies

M.A.

Intelligence Studies

D.S.I.

Strategic Intelligence

B.S.S.

Intelligence, Security Studies, and Analysis

B.I.S.S.A.

Intelligence, Security Studies, and Analysis

M.S.S.

Intelligence, Security Studies, and Analysis

Augusta University

M.A.I.S.S.

Intelligence and Security Studies

Bellevue University

B.S.

* Intelligence and Security Studies

M.S.

* Intelligence and Security Studies

California State University – Bakersfield

B.A.

Global Intelligence and National Security Studies

The Citadel

B.A.I.S.S.

Intelligence and Security Studies

Coastal Carolina University

B.A.

Intelligence and National Security Studies

Angelo State University

Dakota State University

B.S.

Cyber Leadership and Intelligence

Embry-Riddle University

B.S.

Global Security and Intelligence Studies

B.S.

Cyber Intelligence and Security

M.S.

Security and Intelligence Studies

M.S.

Cyber Intelligence and Security

Fayetteville State University

B.A.

Intelligence Studies

Florida Institute of Technology

B.A.

Intelligence Studies

George Mason University

M.S.

Geoinformatics and Geospatial Intelligence

Georgetown University

M.P.A.

Applied Intelligence

Henley Putnam University

B.S.

Intelligence Management

Figure 19.1  C  hart of Intelligence Programs (September 2018). Bold Indicates New School or New ­P rogram/Degree. *Asterisk Indicates Program Name Change

273

Scott Parsons

M.S.

Intelligence Management

Institute of World Politics

M.A.

Strategic Intelligence Studies

James Madison University

B.S.

Intelligence Analysis

Johns Hopkins University

M.S.

Geospatial Intelligence

King University

B.A.

Security & Intelligence Studies

Mercyhurst University

B.A.

Intelligence Studies

M.S.

Applied Intelligence

B.S.I.

Intelligence

M.S.S.I.

Strategic Intelligence

M.S.T.I.

Technology Intelligence

Northeastern University

M.A.

Strategic Intelligence and Analysis

Notre Dame College

B.A.

* Intelligence Studies

M.A.

National Security and Intelligence Studies

Point Park University

M.A.

* Intelligence and Global Security

University of Arizona (South)

B.A.S.

Intelligence Studies

University of Detroit Mercy

M.S.

Intelligence Analysis

University of South Florida

M.S.

Intelligence Studies

University of Texas – El Paso

M.S.

Intelligence and National Security Studies

Utica College

B.S.

Criminal Intelligence Analysis

National Intelligence University

Figure 19.1  (Continued)

programs, at least partially, online. Interestingly, more than half of the programs offered all their programs online. American Military University, the first program to offer a doctorate in intelligence, offers their degrees entirely online. The IC is not the only career field that is interested in hiring people with degrees in intelligence. Consumers of intelligence education span the military, intelligence agencies, law enforcement, homeland security, and the business community (­C ampbell, 2009). These career fields and organizations hire graduates into the intelligence profession and send them for continued training and education throughout their careers (Campbell, 2009). This chapter proceeds as follows: I begin by providing a quick history of intelligence instruction and education. The second section discusses why the IC is not the only industry interested in intelligence degrees. The third section looks at ways to obtain intelligence degrees inside of the IC. In the fourth section, I discuss the methodology of my research on the programs and intelligence degrees offered through August 2018. In the final section, I look at the changes that have occurred in obtaining intelligence degrees in colleges and universities outside of the IC and contrast that with Coulthart and ­Crosston’s study.

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Degrees in intelligence and the intelligence community

Institution

Degree

Degree(s) Name

American Military University

B.A.

Intelligence Studies

M.A.

Intelligence Studies

B.S.S.

Intelligence, Security Studies, and Analysis

M.S.S.

Intelligence, Security Studies, and Analysis

B.S.

International Security and Intelligence Studies

M.S.

International Security and Intelligence Studies

California State University-Bakersfield

B.A.

Global Intelligence and National Security

Coastal Carolina University

B.A.

Intelligence and National Security Studies

Embry-Riddle University

B.S.

Cyber Intelligence and Security

M.S.

Security and Intelligence Studies

Fayetteville State University

B.A.

Intelligence Studies

Henley Putnam University

B.S.

Intelligence Management

M.S.

Intelligence Management

Institute of World Politics

M.A.

Strategic Intelligence Studies

James Madison University

B.S.

Intelligence Analysis

Johns Hopkins University

M.S.

Intelligence Analysis

Mercyhurst University

B.A.

Intelligence Studies

B.A.

Business and Competitive Intelligence

M.S.

Applied Intelligence

B.A.

National Security and Intelligence Studies

M.A.

National Security and Intelligence Studies

B.S.

Intelligence and National Security

M.A.

Intelligence and National Security

University of Arizona (South)

B.A.S.

Intelligence Studies

University of Detroit Mercy

M.S.

Intelligence Analysis

University of Texas – El Paso

M.S.

Intelligence and National Security Studies

Angelo State University

Bellevue University

Notre Dame College

Point Park University

Figure 19.2  Coulthart and Crosston’s Chart of Intelligence Programs (1992–2012). Bold Indicates the School or Program is no longer offered in 2018

Intelligence instruction and education At one time, intelligence education and training were offered almost exclusively through military intelligence (MI) training schools and in intelligence agencies through seminars, mini-courses, and on-the-job training. All branches of the US Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard) have MI professionals that work in the IC, such as the National Security Agency (NSA), The National Geospatial Intelligence

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Agency (NGA), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). MI specialists go to intelligence training together to learn their specific intelligence discipline such as Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), and Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT). In many cases, the MI students can earn college credits toward a bachelor’s degree through institutions like American Military University or an associate degree through institutions like Cochise College and Fayetteville Technical Community College. Because the MI training is in a classified environment, before the education begins, each student must have their relevant security clearance granted 2 to receive their intelligence training (Gearon and Parsons, 2018). The training that the MI specialists receive is effectively part of an in-house college program that takes place in a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) so that the intelligence training can take place at the classified level (Gearon and Parsons, 2018). While the initial introductory intelligence training that military members receive occurs before they start their intelligence careers, the intelligence training and education that members of the military receive does not end with their entry-level training (Gearon and Parsons, 2018). In fact, their intelligence training and education continues throughout a military member’s career. The intelligence training and education occurs for both officers and enlisted members and focuses on their specific intelligence discipline while still building on their overall intelligence education (Gearon and Parsons, 2018). While the MI schools have in-house intelligence ‘universities’, so too do the various intelligence agencies in the IC (Gearon and Parsons, 2018). Each agency has in-house intelligence ‘universities’ where the employees (both military and civilian intelligence professionals) can take intelligence-related courses, though few of them award degrees (Gearon and Parsons, 2018). The benefit of having these ‘universities’ within an SCIF and classified environment means that the courses are taught using classified examples and the research is done through each agency’s classified databases (Gearon and Parsons, 2018). The research and course work in the agencies’ intelligence courses are designed to benefit the IC employees both academically and operationally (Gearon and Parsons, 2018). The only difference is that the courses offered at the agencies are mostly voluntary and the MI training is not. The intelligence foundation provided by MI programs is better termed intelligence training rather than the intelligence education that civilian universities provide. The civilian universities offer degrees in intelligence instead of certificates of completion that military members receive after passing benchmark evaluations throughout their training. What I have described so far is what many intelligence experts and educators call intelligence training. This is distinguished from intelligence education. Intelligence training develops practical skills used in day-to-day intelligence activities (Campbell, 2009; Marrin, 2009). Think of intelligence training as what intelligence professionals need to know to complete assigned missions and tasks. Intelligence training is what members of the military get before starting their career in the IC and what they get as continuing education throughout their career. On the other hand, the purpose of intelligence education is to develop cognitive models, as well as develop ‘knowledge of political science and history that helps to contextualize the role of intelligence within policymaking over the long term’ (Campbell, 2009; Marrin, 2009). Intelligence education is the theoretical space that puts the intelligence skills into perspective within the larger framework and inner workings of the IC. Thinking of intelligence training and intelligence education in this way, even though both civilians and members of the military get intelligence training, there is a space within the IC that focuses on and provides intelligence education. While the military and the 276

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agencies in the IC offer in-house college-level courses in intelligence, the DIA has taken this to a completely new level (Gearon and Parsons, 2018). The DIA has a university operating in the classified realm called the National Intelligence University (NIU). The NIU offers both bachelor’s and master’s degrees (NIU, 2017a). What is not commonly known is that individuals in the IC are obtaining bachelor’s and master’s degrees in security and intelligence studies from the NIU and have been doing so since the early 1980s. The NIU (formerly known as the National Intelligence School and the National Defense Intelligence College) has been offering intelligence courses and academic programs since the early 1960s (NIU, 2017b). The Middle States Commission on Higher Education accredits the NIU (NIU, 2018). There is a more in-depth look at the NIU’s intelligence degree programs further along in this chapter. The IC also moved its focus on intelligence education and training outside of MI training, in-house intelligence programs, and the classified university programs of the NIU, to colleges and universities around the country. Current and former members of the IC are frequently guest lecturers and co-lecturers for courses (Gearon and Parsons, 2018). One example is Columbia University in the City of New York. Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs offers a variety of intelligence and security-focused courses, such as ‘Strategic Intelligence and Political Decision Making’ and ‘Intelligence Estimates and National Security’ (Columbia University, 2018). In Professor Albert Bininachvili’s ‘Strategic Intelligence and Political Decision Making’ course, he brings in four to six guest lecturers each semester who are practitioners that are subject-matter experts in the IC in a variety of intelligence fields to include SIGINT, HUMINT, and GEOINT (Gearon and Parsons, 2018). 3 Professor Bininachvili also devotes a lesson on the Intelligence Cycle, also known as the intelligence process (Direction, Collection, Processing, Analysis, Dissemination, & Feedback). In Professor Abraham Wagner’s course ‘Intelligence Estimates and National Security’, he discusses the IC's most authoritative written judgments on national security issues in an unclassified setting (Campbell, 2009). There are a variety of additional intelligence-related courses at Columbia University, such as Intelligence and Foreign Policy, Intelligence and War, Intelligence and Connected Systems, and Business Intelligence (Campbell, 2009). Having actual members of the IC come and teach these courses at universities, while still only taught at the unclassified level, gives the students a different perspective when the instructor is able to use vignettes, case studies, and exemplars to illustrate important points (Gearon and Parsons, 2018). Having the members of the IC lecturing in the course serves the dual purpose of allowing the guest lecturer to see which students might be good candidates for their, or other, agencies in the IC. Thus, this practice serves as a recruiting tool (IAFIE, 2018). Members from most of the intelligence agencies in the IC are developing special relationships with universities. One way agencies in the IC do so is by assigning representatives to universities called Security Education Academic Liaison (SEAL) (Bing, 2017; Gearon and Parsons, 2018) who collaborate with these universities in order to pick the brightest students for employment in the IC (DIA, 2015; Gearon and Parsons, 2018). Not only are universities using intelligence officers as guest lecturers or sending SEALs to select the brightest students for an intelligence career, but IC agencies are also assigning officers’ tours of duty in selected universities (Hedley, 2005). The CIA Officer-in Residence (OIR) Program was established in 1985 to place officers in teaching and research positions at universities (Hedley, 2005). The OIR tours of duty are not covert or clandestine positions but are open and publicized. In fact, the CIA understands the need for openness and goes out of their way to make sure that the 277

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OIRs are identified as agents. The CIA encourages faculty, staff, and students around the universities to work with the agents (Hedley, 2005). The OIRs are even encouraged to hang their CIA awards on their office walls in an attempt at transparency (Hedley, 2005). Like the guest lecturers at Columbia University, OIRs teach courses on intelligence. This began in the late 1980s, when the CIA OIRs at both Boston University and Georgetown offered courses devoted strictly to intelligence (Gearon and Parsons, 2018). This tradition continues with newly selected OIRs developing their own syllabus for any intelligence course they teach (Hedley, 2005). While the focus of their courses is not on tradecraft, they do discuss the issues and challenges of the intelligence process and how it works (Hedley, 2005). Another way the IC is developing relationships with US colleges and universities is through the Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence (IC CAE). The IC CAEs are set up at US colleges and universities through a grant program (DIA, 2018). IC CAE Grant Program is for the benefit of all US intelligence agencies, but the larger agencies such as the NSA, NGA, DIA, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) play key roles on the Senior Advisory Board of the program (DIA, 2018). Only universities can apply to the IC CAE Grant Program; individuals cannot apply. The reason that universities are applying to the IC CAE Grant Program is that the grant program provides not only funding to support an intelligence education program at the institution, but also provides needed contacts and expertise to help develop the program (DIA, 2018). The IC CAE Grant Program Office sends out a Broad Agency Announcement, which is a call for applications, every few years. The announcements have come out in 2006, 2009, 2011, and 2014. The most recent announcement was in 2014 (DIA, 2018). Universities can submit their application to become an IC CAE through grants.gov (DIA, 2018). Initially, the reason that there were not many intelligence programs outside of the IC was that there was a shortage of practitioners and educators with IC experience teaching in civilian institutions (Campbell, 2009; Rudner, 2009). However, after the September 11 attacks increased the need for intelligence and intelligence professionals, military and government employees working in the IC would take up teaching positions in US colleges and universities after they retired from governmental service (Rudner, 2009). These former intelligence practitioners would develop curricula and introduce intelligence-related courses (Rudner, 2009), and eventually, programs that granted degrees in intelligence. Every year, more of these experienced retirees are taking up positions in higher education resulting in an explosion of programs since 2012 (see Figure 19.1).

Intelligence degrees not just for the IC It is not just the military, intelligence agencies, Homeland Security, law enforcement agencies, and counterterrorism organizations interested in intelligence education. Perhaps surprisingly, the business community is interested in intelligence education as well. Business Intelligence is an important growing field. Risk and vulnerability assessment are growing more popular across the business community and some universities are offering programs and include courses that teach intelligence analysis to help protect businesses, as well as, help them get ahead. Many business organizations in larger cities like New York, Boston, Chicago, Houston, Dallas, and Los Angeles like to hire former intelligence analysts (Ulsch, 2018). Corporations

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such as banks, cybersecurity companies, insurance companies, technology companies, and healthcare companies frequently hire qualified intelligence analysts to be analysts within their respective fields (Ulsch, 2018).4 Often, these analysts still have valid government security clearances. With a bachelor’s degree or a master’s degree in intelligence, you may increase your chances in being hired within the business community. Employees in large business corporations routinely have security clearances. In fact, businesses, such as Facebook, actively recruit potential employees that hold national security clearances (Frier and Allison, 2017). As our national intelligence agencies share intelligence with other nations’ agencies, so too do businesses and corporations. Business intelligence and risk management cells (or departments) share intelligence and information with their counterparts at other corporations and companies within their field as do US intelligence agencies with other governments’ intelligence organizations and agencies (Frier and Allison, 2017). Companies like Facebook are looking to hire people with security clearances so that they can access classified information from the US Government as a way to protect themselves from foreign businesses and governments. Facebook is seeking to hire people with security clearances to help prevent foreign powers from manipulating future elections through their social network (Frier and Allison, 2017). While security clearances go inactive when access is not needed or between intelligence jobs, they can be reactivated if a job requires it if it is within a five-year window between when the security clearance is renewed and lapses. Just because a company hires a person with a security clearance, it does not guarantee access to classified information. The business that the individual works for must also have a security clearance (Frier and Allison, 2017) and access to the relevant agency in the IC. According to Alan Edmonds, a national security lawyer, private sector employees with security clearances can “access government databases that contain classified information on individuals and organizations and meet with intelligence officials to review documents” (Frier and Allison, 2017). This also encourages private sector businesses to share information in both directions with agencies within the IC (Frier and Allison, 2017).

Obtaining intelligence degrees inside of the IC The NIU is a degree-granting institution that has a far-reaching mission to educate intelligence specialists in current and future national security challenges (NIU, 2017b). The NIU is unique in that it is the only institution of higher education in the nation that allows its students to study and complete research in the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmentalized Information (TS/SCI) arena (Gearon and Parsons, 2018). The parent organization of the NIU is the DIA. For many years, the NIU was located within an SCIF at the DIA headquarters located at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling. The NIU has outgrown the facilities within DIA and now has its own primary campus away from Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling called the Intelligence Community Campus-Bethesda (ICC-B) and has five additional campuses around the world (NIU, 2017b). Because the NIU grants degrees in a classified setting, admission requirements are quite strict. All prospective NIU students must meet the following requirements: (1) be US citizens who are members of the US Armed Forces or are federal government employees; (2) be nominated by their parent organization within the IC; and (3) possess a TS/SCI security clearance prior to enrollment (NIU, 2018). The IC covers the cost of attending and obtaining a degree from the NIU so there is no cost to the student (NIU, 2018).

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There are three different degree programs in intelligence and security studies that NIU offers: the Bachelor of Science in Intelligence (BSI), the Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI), and the Master of Science and Technology Intelligence (MSTI) (NIU, 2017a). The BSI degree focuses on core intelligence concepts, issues, and methods. This four-year program enables students to become a bona fide professional on issues of ­national-level intelligence and its consumer (NIU, 2017a). The MSSI degree is designed to prepare students for the complexity of intelligence work in the twenty-first century. The forty-three-credit curriculum focuses on three main themes: Globalization, Future-focused Intelligence, and Intelligence for National Security (NIU, 2017a). You can obtain the degree at the NIU main campus or through a cohort at several intelligence agencies. You can be part of the DIA Cohort, the NSA Cohort, the NGA Cohort, or through the European Academic Cohort ­located at the University’s Academic Centre at the Joint Analytic Centre at RAF Molesworth, U.K. (NIU, 2017a). Lastly, the MSTI degree prepares students to recognize the impact of technological change on national security and intelligence. MSTI students study one of four core concentrations established to focus their education to their area of thesis research. The four concentrations are Weapons of Mass Destruction, Information Operations and Cyber, Emerging and Disruptive Technologies, and Geostrategic Resources and the Environment (NIU, 2017a). What stands out about the NIU is that their intelligence degree programs are in a classified environment. Their thesis and research are at the classified level using classified systems and databases, including the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System ( JWICS), the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SPIRNet), and NSAnet. Being a student in the classified environment has two benefits: (1) it allows one to conduct research and analysis in a very similar method and environment that they will do so when they begin or continue their career in the IC; (2) it allows one to be a subject-matter expert on a particular classified topic that will serve them well in their field within the IC (Gearon and Parsons, 2018).

Methodology of research on increase in intelligence degrees After reading Coulthart and Crosston’s article, I was curious to see how many new programs were offered since the end of their study in 2012. For my research on programs offering a degree in intelligence, I used their two-step vetting process (Coulthart and Crosston, 2015). Like Coulthart and Crosston, the first step was querying search engines using the same search terms and criteria (“intelligence studies” + degree) that they did for their research (Coulthart and Crosston, 2015). Coulthart and Crosston chose an open search string to minimize missed programs (Coulthart and Crosston, 2015) and I followed their methodology for the same reason. I also followed their rule on determining if each program was an intelligence program: the program had to offer a degree with the word ‘intelligence’ in the title (Coulthart and Crosston, 2015). For instance, a program that offered a degree in Intelligence Studies and National Security Studies would be included, but a program that offered a degree in National Security Studies would not be included. Like Coulthart and Crosston, to supplement the screening criteria, I checked each program’s website to determine what depth the program focuses on intelligence education (Coulthart and Crosston, 2015). The one exception to the criteria of having ‘intelligence’ in the title was ‘Artificial Intelligence’. I received dozens of hits in my searches for ‘Artificial Intelligence’ (AI). While AI is an important emerging field, and has national security implications similar to cybersecurity, it does not fit into the traditional notion of intelligence studies nor in intelligence

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analysis. Furthermore, while my research focused on US schools offering degrees on intelligence, I did find schools offering undergraduate degrees, graduate degrees, and certificates in ­Intelligence in Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Poland, Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. These schools and programs were similarly excluded from my study. The second step was that I focused my analysis only on bachelor’s degrees or higher programs of study in intelligence (Coulthart and Crosston, 2015). Furthermore, I excluded intelligence offerings that fit within a broader degree such as a major, a minor, or certificate in intelligence such as Ohio State University’s major in BS in International Studies with a major in Security & Intelligence, Buffalo State University’s Minor in Intelligence Studies, and University of Utah- Salt Lake City’s Certificate in GEOINT. Also excluded were associates degrees in intelligence. An example is Cochise College’s Associates ­Degree in Intelligence Operations Studies, which was also found in Coulthart and Crosston’s study.5 From my search results, only these three programs offered an associate degree (two are new since Coulthart and Crosston’s study), two programs offered majors, two programs offered minors, and twenty-one offered certificate programs in intelligence.6

Trends and observations on the increase in intelligence degrees There are some interesting increases in universities and colleges offering intelligence degrees outside of the IC when considering Coulthart and Crosston’s Chart of Intelligence Programs from 1992 to 2012, until now. Here are some of the findings. When comparing Coulthart and Crosston’s Chart of Intelligence Programs (1992–2012)7 with the Chart of Intelligence Programs (September 2018),8 you will see an increase from seventeen schools with twenty-six intelligence degree programs in 2012 to twenty-eight schools with forty-one intelligence degree programs. This is an increase in eleven schools and fifteen intelligence degree programs. When Coulthart and Crosston did their study, they found that, from 2009 through their search into 2012, at least one program a year introduced a new intelligence degree (Coulthart and Crosston, 2015). Like Coulthart and Crosston’s findings, there is still a trend of more than one new degree program being introduced a year through 2018. Also, like Coulthart and Crosston’s findings (Coulthart and Crosston, 2015), it is still the case that nearly all programs found in Figure 19.1 offer some or all of their content online. One notable new addition to the chart is America Public University’s Doctor of Strategic Intelligence. As of September 2018, this is the only doctoral program in intelligence. One surprising change to the September 2018 chart is that Mercyhurst University, the first university to offer a degree in intelligence, no longer offers their BA in Business and Competitive Intelligence. This BA has become a Graduate Certificate in Business Analytics and Intelligence. Mercyhurst University still offers their BA in Intelligence Studies and MS in Applied Intelligence. While Johns Hopkins has lost its MS in Intelligence Analysis, it has gained an MS in GEOINT and three different certification programs in intelligence that are coupled with different master’s programs. Johns Hopkins offers a certificate in intelligence combined with an MA in Global Security Systems, an MS in Government Analytics, or an MA in Public Management. The NIU also offers a new master’s degree to their intelligence programs. The MSTI has been added to their offerings of a BSI and MSSI.

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The September 2018 chart also shows that the range of intelligence degrees is widening. In Coulthart and Crosston’s Chart (Figure 19.2), most of the degree names were in Intelligence Studies or Intelligence Management. While there are still intelligence studies programs on the 2018 Chart of Intelligence Programs, there are also degrees offered in Strategic Intelligence, Global Intelligence (or Global Security and Intelligence), Cyber Intelligence (or Cyber Leadership and Intelligence), Geospatial Intelligence, Applied Intelligence, Technology Intelligence, and Criminal Intelligence Analysis. Additionally, when looking at Coulthart and Crosston’s Excluded Programs for Analysis 1992–2012 (Figure 19.4), there were ten schools that, while they did not offer actual degrees in intelligence, did offer either an associate degree, a minor, a specialization, or a combination in intelligence studies. Compare that to the Excluded Programs for Analysis as of September 2018 (Figure 19.3) which shows twenty-five schools that offered an associate degree, a minor, a specialization, or a combination in intelligence studies. Interestingly, Institution

Exclusion Reason

Buffalo State University

Not Bachelors or Higher: Minor

California State University - Fullerton

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

California State University - San Bernardino

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

Chandler – Gilbert Community College

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

Cochise College

Not Bachelors or Higher: Associates Degree

Eastern Kentucky University

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

Fairleigh Dickinson

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

Fayetteville Technical Community College

Not Bachelors or Higher: Associates Degree Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

Florida State University

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

George Mason University

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

Herkimer County Community College

Not Bachelors or Higher: Associates Degree

Michigan State University

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

Ohio State University

Not Bachelors or Higher: Major

Penn State World Campus Online

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

Salve Regina

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

Southern Methodist University

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

Texas State University

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

University of California – Riverside

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

University of California – San Diego

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

University of Central Florida

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificates Not Bachelors or Higher: Minor

University of Cincinnati

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

University of Maryland

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

University of Nebraska - Omaha

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

University of Pittsburgh

Not Bachelors or Higher: Major

University of Utah- Salt Lake City

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

University of West Florida

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

Figure 19.3  E  xcluded Programs for Analysis (in September 2018). Bold Indicates New School or New Program/Degree offering a Certificate/Major/Minor in Intelligence

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four of the schools that were listed on Coulthart and Crosston’s Excluded Programs for Analysis 1992–2012 (Figure 19.4)—Georgetown University, King University, University of South Florida, and Utica College—now offer degrees in intelligence studies and thus appear on the September 2018 Chart of Intelligence Programs (Figure 19.1). This means that nineteen of the twenty-five schools offering an associate degree, minor, or specialization in intelligence studies are new since 2012. Of the t­ wenty-seven schools that offer forty different degrees in intelligence studies, ten of these schools additionally offer fourteen certificates, minors, or specializations in intelligence studies (Figure 19.5).9 Institution

Exclusion Reason

Cochise College

Not Bachelors or Higher: Associates Degree

Eastern Kentucky University

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

Fairleigh Dickinson

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

Georgetown University

Not Bachelors or Higher: Concentration

King University

Not Bachelors or Higher: Minor

Ohio State University

Not Bachelors or Higher: Specialization

Salve Regina

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

University of South Florida

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

University of Utah- Salt Lake City

Not Bachelors or Higher: Certificate

Utica College

Not Bachelors or Higher: Minor

Figure 19.4  C  oulthart and Crosston’s Excluded Programs for Analysis (1992–2012). Bold Indicates the School or Program has Moved Up from a Certificate or Minor in 1992–2012 to a Bachelor’s Degree in 2018 as confirmed by not appearing on Figure 19.3  and appearing on Figure 19.1

Institution

Additional Certification

The Citadel

Intelligence Analysis Certificate

Coastal Carolina University

Minor Intelligence and National Security Studies

Fayetteville State University

Minor in Intelligence Studies Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) Certificate

George Mason University

Certificate Program in Intelligence

Henley Putnam University

Certificate in Strategic Intelligence

Institute of World Politics

Certificate in Intelligence

Johns Hopkins University

Certificate Programs in Intelligence

Mercyhurst University

Certificate Program in Intelligence Business Analytics and Intelligence Graduate Certificate [used to be a BA program] Applied Intelligence Graduate Certificate

National Intelligence University

Specialized Graduate Certificates in Intelligence

Utica College

MS in Cybersecurity Cyber Intelligence Specialization Online Certificate of Advanced Studies - Monitoring, Surveillance, and Intelligence Operations

Figure 19.5  C  hart of Intelligence Degree Programs that also have Minors/Majors/Certificates (in September 2018)

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Further analysis from the Excluded Programs found that there was an increase in the number of associate degrees in intelligence. The first is Cochise College’s Associates Degree in Intelligence Operations Studies found in Coulthart and Crosston’s study, and there are two new associate degrees in Intelligence Studies. One is granted by Fayetteville Technical Community College and the other by Herkimer County Community College. When comparing Coulthart and Crosston’s study of excluded programs through 2012 (Figure 19.4) and my study through 2018 (Figure 19.3), there are several interesting changes. First, there is an increase from ten programs in 2012 to twenty-six programs in 2018. This is not just a gain of sixteen programs, but actually of twenty-one programs as five programs on the excluded list in 2012 now have bachelor’s degrees or higher in intelligence and have moved from the 2012 excluded list to the 2018 Chart of Intelligence Programs (Figure 19.1). Second, twenty new schools have emerged on the list since 2012, two of which, Fayetteville Technical Community College and University of Central Florida, offer two excluded options that include an associate degree, a minor, and a certification.

Conclusion Since 2001, there has been an increase in university programs offering degrees in intelligence. In some cases, programs are now offering more than one intelligence degree. While slow and steady growth characterized the increase in the early 2000s, the last five years alone have seen significant growth. Based on my analysis, I think it is fair to hypothesize that the growth in programs and institutions will continue into the next ten to twenty years. In fact, there may be an exponential growth in university offerings in intelligence due to the increased interest in cyber and AI. While there will remain a need for traditional intelligence analysts, there will be a demand for intelligence analysts that work with, and are skilled in, both cyber and AI. Due to this fact, I predict an increase in joint/dual-­ programs in cyber intelligence analysis and AI analysis. Furthermore, due to the increased global need of analysts with the growth of AI and cyber across business sectors, large corporations might offer grants and/or scholarships to entice potential recruits to take university programs and degrees in intelligence analysis with a concentration in these emerging intelligence fields. Corporations could further offer paid tuition, tuition assistance, and/ or time off so their currently employed analysts can obtain an advanced degree in intelligence. In addition to the private sector, agencies in the IC will also increase programs, money, and opportunities for intelligence. It is likely that the IC CAEs will increase their grant program to include money to universities to open joint/dual-programs that specialize in AI and cyber intelligence analysis. The expansion of the intelligence university degree programs will further draw the u ­ niversity-security-intelligence nexus even tighter, more interconnected, and larger in scope.

Notes 1 Data collected in my study was through August 2018. 2 The different types of security clearances used by intelligence professionals are secret (S), top secret (TS), and sensitive compartmented information (SCI). 3 The author was a student of Professor Bininachvili’s Strategic Intelligence and Political ­Decision-Making course and has subsequently been a guest lecturer for the SIGINT portion of the course several semesters between 2014 and 2018.

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Degrees in intelligence and the intelligence community 4 Some of the examples Mr. Don Ulsch provided that hire former intelligence analysts were: ­JPMorgan, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citibank, Goldman Sachs, FireEye, KPMG, PwC, D ­ eloitte, KnowBe4, CyberArk, Allstate, Berkshire Hathaway, Liberty Mutual, Progressive, State Farm, Apple, Cisco, Facebook, Microsoft, Aetna, McKesson Corporation, and United Healthcare Group. 5 For a list of excluded programs from Coulthart and Crosston’s study from 1993 to 2012, see ­Figure 19.4, and for programs excluded from my study from 2012 to 2018, see Figure 19.3. 6 Same as Note 5. 7 For Coulthart and Crosston’s Chart of Intelligence Programs (1992–2012), see Figure 19.2. 8 For my Chart of Intelligence Programs (September 2018), see Figure 19.1. 9 Some of the programs on the 2018 Chart of Intelligence Programs (Figure 19.1) also have ­additional offerings such as certificates, minors, or specializations in intelligence education (see Figure 19.5).

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Scott Parsons Rudner, M. (2009) ‘Intelligence Studies in Higher Education: Capacity- Building to Meet S­ ocietal Demand’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 110–130. doi: 10.1080/08850600802486960 Spracher, W. (2009) National Security Intelligence Professional Education: A Map of U.S. Civilian University Programs and Competencies, PhD, George Washington University. Ulsch, D. (2018) Managing Partner, MacDonnell Ulsch Cyber Advisory, Conversation with the ­Author, 20 June, Personal Communication.

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20 EXPERIMENTING WITH INTELLIGENCE EDUCATION Overcoming design challenges in multidisciplinary intelligence analysis programs Stephen Marrin and Sophie Cienski Introduction Designing the educational curricula for undergraduate intelligence analysis programs is inherently difficult, as they entail highly complex, interwoven degree structures that integrate liberal arts knowledge with professional skills in novel combinations. Undergraduate intelligence analysis programs, specifically, have attracted increasing attention from institutions of higher learning due to their interdisciplinary approach to education combined with the utility and marketability of their graduates. But academic studies of intelligence education programs have not yet used the educational literature to create a conceptual baseline for evaluation purposes. Accordingly, this study uses concepts from existing educational literature to develop an evaluative framework for intelligence analysis programs in the United States and then applies that framework to James Madison University’s intelligence analysis program as a case study. It finds that challenges and tensions can arise from efforts to combine liberal arts with professional education, which highlight difficulties of achieving both simultaneously due to the tradeoffs involved. In the end, while each undergraduate intelligence analysis program provides its own unique blend of knowledge and skills to its students, the quality of the program will be determined by the depth and breadth of knowledge that the students acquire along with an overlay of useful skills to help them exploit that knowledge to best effect.

Overcoming design challenges in multidisciplinary intelligence analysis programs Designing educational curricula for undergraduate intelligence analysis programs can be challenging, as they entail highly complex, interwoven degree structures that combine liberal arts knowledge with professional skills in non-traditional ways. These new forms of intelligence education have been created—like other new academic programs before them— to better orient the educational resources of the university toward emerging societal needs and address the demand from the professional labor force. Undergraduate intelligence analysis programs, specifically, have attracted increasing attention from institutions of higher education. 287

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In the United States, undergraduate intelligence analysis programs were a response to the increased post-9/11 demand for analysts and intelligence analysts in both the public (national security, military, homeland security, law enforcement) and private sectors. They provide students with professional knowledge and skills for becoming intelligence analysts, with many of the graduates hired by a wide variety of organizations in and out of government, thus demonstrating the utility and demand for the degree. Universities that have developed undergraduate intelligence analysis degree programs include: Angelo State University, Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, Indiana State University, James Madison University, Mercyhurst University, Notre Dame College, Point Park University, and York College (Coulthart and Crosston, 2015). Universities in other countries such as Britain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and others are creating or considering the creation of these kinds of undergraduate intelligence analysis programs as well. Each undergraduate intelligence analysis program is uniquely complex, combining knowledge and skills in different ways and to varying extents. Each program has integrity on its own terms, but integrating just the right kind of disciplinary knowledge with just the right amount of professional skills is difficult because it is not clear what an optimal undergraduate intelligence analysis educational curriculum should consist. As such, these programs are functionally educational experiments. Tradeoffs limit the extent to which any single program can provide more knowledge relative to traditional academic degrees, or provide more skills relative to existing training programs. This presents a real-world policy problem: how best design and implement an undergraduate degree in intelligence analysis?

Inadequate conceptual foundation Unfortunately, academic studies of intelligence education have not yet used the educational literature to create a conceptual baseline for evaluation purposes. In the intelligence studies literature, there is an ongoing discussion about the structure and content of different kinds of intelligence education programs and—even more specifically—what the optimal curriculum for an intelligence analysis program should be (Rudner, 2008; Campbell, 2011; Landon-Murray, 2013; Kilroy, 2017). A wide variety of different kinds of intelligence education exist in academia. There are undergraduate liberal arts degrees—usually in politics and history—that include courses about intelligence (i.e. intelligence studies).1 There are degrees at the undergraduate and postgraduate levels that combine intelligence studies and intelligence school (knowledge and skills for intelligence) in various combinations. Each of these kinds of education has both comparative advantages and opportunity costs based on their respective strengths and weaknesses (Davies, 2006; Goodman and Omand, 2008; Breckenridge, 2010). While an evaluation of all kinds of intelligence education programs is beyond the scope of this chapter, the literature does provide the parameters of what an undergraduate intelligence analysis degree should consist of. For a professional education in intelligence analysis specifically, previously identified as being provided in “intelligence schools,” there are three kinds of useful knowledge: substantive knowledge, disciplinary knowledge, and procedural knowledge (Marrin, 2011). Intelligence analysts should possess substantive knowledge about the subjects they are ­studying—the ­intelligence analyst’s “target”….the country, group, people, culture, to include area studies, language, etc.—because it gives them a base of knowledge to work with in describing, explaining, evaluating, and forecasting situations and events. ­Disciplinary knowledge—consisting of theoretical frameworks and knowledge derived from traditional academic disciplines (political 288

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science, economics, anthropology, history, sociology, p­ sychology/­political ­psychology, criminal justice, business)—provides them with a frame of reference to use in understanding and interpreting substantive knowledge. Procedural knowledge—to include knowledge about intelligence analysis—provides contextual knowledge about the working conditions and environment of the intelligence analyst. These are the issues that the analyst needs to be aware of that could affect performance over time. They can be broken down into issues at the individual, group, organizational, community, and profession levels, in addition to engagement between the analyst and a variety of societal stakeholders to include policymakers, decision makers, congressional overseers, the media, and the public. This is the knowledge about intelligence analysis that is “social context” for the prospective intelligence analyst. Finally, procedural knowledge also includes skills such as analytic tradecraft, methods, structured analytic techniques, and other kinds of tools including technology, as well as writing and briefing skills. Designing a program that combines substantive knowledge, disciplinary perspectives, intelligence studies knowledge, and analytic skills is quite a difficult challenge. If there is too much orientation to skills, the program could be criticized for providing training rather than education. According to Anthony Glees, professor and director of the Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies at Buckingham University, orienting to training would be “the wrong thing to do” because “without intellectual depth, the subject has no purchase on the academy or on society more generally” (Glees, 2015, 289). As Glees goes on to add, “good analysts need broad minds, not narrow ones.” But too much of an orientation to knowledge and the graduates of the program could be less marketable. Too much of an orientation to intelligence studies would make the program exceptionally narrow, but too little would make it too broad. And so on. Some argue that undergraduate intelligence analysis degrees should not exist because they do not provide an educational advantage over their alternatives (Landon-Murray and ­Coulthart, 2016; as cited in Dujmovic, 2017). Educationally speaking, a degree in a traditional academic discipline would provide more substantive knowledge and disciplinary perspective than an undergraduate degree in intelligence analysis, while a training program would provide more skills. For that reason, undergraduate degrees in intelligence analysis may not be necessary because—as Nicholas Dujmovic, former CIA officer and director of the intelligence studies program at Catholic University of America, says—most entrylevel intelligence analysts possess conventional university degrees from traditional academic departments, and are then trained to do intelligence analysis after being hired (Dujmovic, 2016, 2017). This poses an existential challenge for undergraduate intelligence analysis programs; how to justify their value in light of other kinds of educational options. Yet, the discussion taking place in the intelligence literature about the role, function, and structure of intelligence analysis programs has been episodic based primarily on the perspectives and experiences of those in single programs, or cross program comparisons, rather than the role and function of professional education more generally. As a result, the intelligence education literature is skimming the experiential surface of those representing different kinds of programs, but is not grounding those debates in the appropriate conceptual and theoretical foundations. To address this gap in knowledge, it is important to analyze intelligence analysis programs within a larger educational context. Fortunately, the literature on educational programs has been developing criteria for evaluating undergraduate professional education programs for decades. 289

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Building and evaluating professional education programs The criteria for evaluating undergraduate intelligence analysis programs used in this chapter are derived from the educational literature on professional education programs in general. A professional education is designed to ensure that students receive an appropriate interdisciplinary educational foundation and professional skills before graduating and entering the profession or skilled workforce. Educational requirements differ based on the kind of profession being addressed. Major professions, such as medicine, law, and the other learned professions, are the oldest and most formal of all professions. They require both an undergraduate liberal arts foundation and graduate-level professional education prior to entry into the profession. As such, the major professions serve as the ideal state for professional education. By way of contrast, the minor professions, also known as “semi-professions” or “quasi-professions,” require less education. This education can be completed at the undergraduate level because, according to Nathan Glazer, professor emeritus of sociology and education at Harvard University, “practitioners of the minor professions do not possess knowledge at the same level of technical complexity and of the same importance to an individual’s life as that possessed by the classic major professions” (Glazer, 1974). Examples of minor professions with an undergraduate professional education include: “education, business, nursing, engineering, journalism, social work, architecture, library science, and pharmacy” and many others (Stark, 1998, 355). Arguably, intelligence analysis is an emerging minor profession in the “information field” which characterizes those professions involved in the acquisition, interpretation, and communication of information, to include education, journalism, and library science (Stark, 1998, 368). While intelligence analysis has not yet achieved recognition of its status as a distinct profession, universities have begun to develop the educational foundation necessary for entry into that field, as they have for other fields in other kinds of undergraduate professional programs. As Robert Burton Clark, professor emeritus of higher education and sociology at UCLA, has pointed out, universities have, at times, worked to prepare students for “professions that as yet did not exist,” and that may be what is happening in terms of the development of undergraduate intelligence analysis programs (Clark, 1989, 29). Professional education requires a holistic approach and understanding which entails the integration of knowledge from a number of academic disciplines optimally in an interdisciplinary educational foundation. The integration of professional education with that of the liberal arts disciplines has been called the “third way” by Richard Freeland, former president of Northeastern University, in his advocacy for “practice-oriented education” that “systematically integrates liberal education, professional education, and off-campus experience to produce college graduates who are both well-educated and well prepared for the workplace” (Freeland, 2004). Individual academic disciplines, which—according to Andrew Abbott, professor of sociology at the University of Chicago—provide “a conception of the proper units of knowledge” and serve as “crucial supports for and definition of academic and intellectual identity,” remain important even in professional education due to their emphasis on specialization (Abbott, 2002, 210; Strober, 2006, 315). But many professional education ­programs—such as those in education studies, public policy analysis, and library science— use multi- or interdisciplinary approaches because complex societal challenges are rarely within a single disciplinary focus (Strober, 2006, 319; Stark et al., 1986, 356). As a result, it becomes essential to employ an integrated approach that combines knowledge, understanding, and applications from multiple disciplines. The same is true of undergraduate intelligence analysis programs. 290

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Determining criteria for evaluating undergraduate intelligence analysis programs entails identifying the objectives and purposes of professional education and applying salient measures of effectiveness to see how successfully the objectives and purposes have been met. Studies of professional education have identified a range of criteria useful for evaluation purposes. In one of those studies, Joan Stark and Malcolm Lowther, professors of education at the University of Michigan, identify key components of professional education as including conceptual competence (understanding the substantive knowledge and theoretical foundations of the profession), technical competence (ability to perform skills required of the profession), integrative competence (ability to meld substantive knowledge or theory and skills), and career marketability (becoming marketable due to acquired education and training) (Stark & Lowther, 1988). Stark later reframes the first two as “academic content” and “necessary professional skills,” and then adds “context of the profession” to integrative competence and career marketability as all necessary for “preparing the graduate to enter practice at a basic competency level” (Stark, 1998, 355–356). Accordingly, these five criteria can be used to evaluate the extent to which undergraduate professional programs are achieving their respective purposes. The intelligence analysis program at James Madison University can serve as an illustrative case study.

Designing and implementing JMU Intelligence Analysis program The James Madison University Intelligence Analysis ( JMU IA) program—and its associated undergraduate Bachelor of Science degree in Intelligence Analysis—combines a multidisciplinary liberal arts educational foundation with pre-professional knowledge and skills for prospective analysts. The program’s six full-time faculty members teach more than 250 ­students in the major. The program is within the School of Integrated Sciences, which is oriented to applied, project-based learning. While the School focuses primarily on science and technology, it also has faculty members from a wide range of disciplines (political scientists, anthropologists, economists, and lawyers) who provide the students with contextual understanding. The JMU IA program was initially designed in 2007 as a multidisciplinary liberal arts degree without much incorporation of professional knowledge and skills. As designed, the original degree was a “Bachelor of Science in Information Analysis” with the goal of “integrating coursework from three disciplines: Philosophy, Business, and Computer Science” (US State of Virginia). At the core of the initial design of the IA program was an emphasis on enhancing competence in critical thinking and analytic methodology combined with familiarization with technology. The purpose of the program was to meet the increased demand for analysts—and specifically intelligence analysts—in both the national security and competitive (business) intelligence domains. To that end, initially the IA program had two concentrations (national security and competitive intelligence) to ensure that the students were familiar with the requirements in each domain. Students, regardless of domain, were taught to “apply the principles of logic and reasoning, data mining and data synthesis with the influences of cultural and political factors to arrive at a holistic” understanding as well as “different technologies that facilitate the collecting and evaluation of data” ( JMU Undergraduate Catalog, 2008–2009). Over time, aspects of the program have changed as it has grown from sixty students to more than 250, and it has become more oriented to professional education. For example, in 2011, the name of the program was changed from “Information Analysis” to “Intelligence Analysis,” largely due to an effort to clarify that the emphasis of the program was on analysis rather than “information technology.” Around the same time, 291

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the program acquired its first former intelligence analyst as a faculty member, and the orientation of the program began to incorporate more professional knowledge and skills than it had previously (Walton, 2017). The subsequent expansion of the program and addition of new faculty members with an orientation to professional education led to the teaching of more practical skills linked to the use of structured analytic techniques, analytic writing and presentation, construction and implementation of analytic teams, project management, and various kinds of simulated real-world projects. Another change in the IA degree over time has been the broadening of the multidisciplinary knowledge foundation provided to students. Originally, the intent was to prepare students for the analytic challenges in national security and competitive intelligence analysis by integrating coursework from three disciplines (philosophy, business, and computer science). Since then, as the program has expanded, so have the intelligence domains and academic disciplines represented in the program. For example, intelligence analysts can be found in national security, military, homeland security, law enforcement, private sector security, competitive (business), geospatial, and cyber intelligence domains. To support the wider range of domains, the academic disciplines taught in the program now include the original three plus political science, history, geography, data science, technology, law, and ethics, as well as skills based on previous professional expertise. This also serves the purposes of both liberal arts education and professional education because, according to Stark and Lowther, “an enlarged understanding of the world and the ability to make judgments in light of historical, social, economic, scientific, and political realities is demanded of the professional as well as the citizen” (Stark & Lowther, 1988, 24). To that end, courses that provide this knowledge foundation now introduce a wider range of intelligence domains as well as applications of technology in a networked world. In addition, to enhance academic content relevant to the future analyst, the national security and competitive intelligence concentrations have been eliminated. Now, students are required to complete a minor or a double major in another field.2 As Stark has pointed out in the context of other information fields, “the best route to the needed conceptual competence may be a broad education directed at understanding society” rather than a narrow base of knowledge associated with professional skills (Stark, 1998, 373). JMU’s Program fulfills this by requiring that students complete a minor or double major in another field, layered on top of their liberal arts general education requirements.3 This provides the opportunity for students to choose which domain or domains in which they are most interested, and orient their knowledge and skills in that direction. For example, a knowledge foundation for national security intelligence analysis can be acquired with a minor (or double major) in political science, area studies, languages, or a wide range of other fields. Meanwhile, knowledge for military intelligence analysis can be acquired through the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) minor in military science, while knowledge for homeland security or law enforcement intelligence analysis could be acquired through a minor in justice studies or criminal justice. For students interested in competitive or private sector security intelligence analysis, they can minor in economics or business. As for geospatial and cyber intelligence analysis, students can minor in either geographic sciences or computer science. This list is not exhaustive, with many other fields potentially useful in an intelligence analysis context, to include: anthropology, history, sociology, and psychology. To enhance necessary professional skills, JMU IA program requires a four-course ­sequence in analytic methodology that gives students an introduction to the methods that an analyst could use when assessing a real-world situation or problem. Noel Hendrickson, professor at James Madison University, has a PhD in philosophy and developed a new approach to the 292

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theory and practice of reasoning specifically for the challenges of intelligence analysis. This new approach entails a normative vision for how to think critically, including: hypothesis testing to understand what happened, causal analysis to explain why it happened, counterfactual reasoning to explain what could happen next, and strategy assessment to identify what could be done about it (Hendrickson, 2008, 2018). Several of these courses are also taught by faculty members with previous experience as intelligence analysts, using a more professional orientation through the teaching and application of Structured Analytic Techniques (Walton, 2017). Also oriented to skills development, JMU IA program requires a three-course sequence in technology. Students take technology courses in programming, data mining, and visualization. These courses focus on key elements from data science in the processes used by intelligence analysts, including collecting, manipulating, processing, cleaning, and crunching textual, numerical, and spatial data to create meaningful insights. Additionally, students apply technology tools, such as Python (programming language), Tableau (visualization platform), Analyst’s Notebook (data analysis software), RapidMinr (machine learning), and ArcGIS (geospatial analysis). The goal of these courses is not training, or developing proficiency with specific tools, but rather general familiarization with different types of technological tools to ensure both deeper understanding and a longer shelf life for the knowledge provided. As part of the development of necessary professional skills, the IA program also enhances students’ competence in communications through short writing and briefing assignments, longer research papers, a dedicated research design and writing course, and application in a capstone course that requires a paper and public presentation. Special emphasis is placed on the presentations so that students learn how to convey a complex message, primary requirements of formal presentations, and how to use visual aids to effectively and positively enhance the message. Students are also taught how to adapt to problems through simulations which include less time to brief than expected, technical difficulties (give a presentation without visual aids), or new information requiring a reassessment of the analytic judgment and new presentation developed within an hour. Students learn to and even become adept at remaining calm in the face of sudden challenges, thus increasing their adaptability and confidence. As for context of the profession, there is also a three-course sequence related to professional development for prospective future intelligence analysts. The courses consist of an introduction to intelligence analysis, an exploration of various issues in intelligence analysis, and law and ethics for the intelligence analyst. As Stark and Lowther emphasize, the graduate from professional schools should be oriented to “improving the knowledge, skills, and values of the profession” as a way to develop a professional identity (Stark & Lowther, 1988, 25). To that end, these courses provide students with essential contextual knowledge about the theory and practice of intelligence analysis as a profession, to include its purpose, history, methods, processes, ethics, existing challenges, and recommendations for future improvement. These courses provide students with professional acculturation and socialization as a way to develop professional identity and avoid “entry shock” due to a misalignment between expectations and the realities of intelligence analysis outside of the classroom ( Johnston, 2005). Integrative competence, or the integration of theory (knowledge) and practice (skills), is developed and demonstrated in JMU’s capstone sequence, a two-semester, project-based sequence. During the first semester, the students produce a project proposal by: developing a research question oriented to a particular issue, question, or problem; conducting a literature review; identifying methods they could employ to develop insight that could answer the question; and identifying technology they could use to assist in the acquisition 293

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or interpretation of data, or its communication to others. The second semester focuses on the production of analysis by employing methods and technology, identifying an analytic judgment, developing the argument to support that judgment, and communicating it effectively to others in both writing and a formal presentation. The formal deliverables include an analytic paper intended for a client or consumer, an appendix providing highly detailed description of processes employed in the development of the analysis, and a reflective essay explaining what was learned through the experience of designing and implementing the project. Finally, in terms of career marketability, most graduates of the program are hired as analysts within a year of graduation. Each year, some graduates are hired by the federal government but not all of them as intelligence analysts. Many work for large defense contractors or smaller technology firms that support the federal government’s operations, with about as many working for a variety of consulting firms or other companies in the private sector. Many students decide that while they want to be analysts, they do not want to be intelligence analysts, and as a result, only 10%–20% of program graduates become intelligence analysts. This is considered a success precisely because the students get a solid multidisciplinary educational foundation before they graduate and then choose the analytic career path that works best for them. In summary form, the JMU IA program provides its students with all the components of an undergraduate professional degree: academic content, necessary professional skills, context of the profession, integrative competence, and career marketability. But it, like all professional education programs, is also challenged by a series of tradeoffs in both the design of the curriculum and its implementation.

Ongoing challenges and tensions Undergraduate intelligence analysis programs, like other professional programs more generally, face many challenges integrating and fusing the knowledge and skills required for the future professional. The decisions made in the design stages for the program can directly affect purpose, outcomes, structure, coherence, and operation. Some of these tradeoffs can also be characterized as “tensions” in designing the curriculum (Stark et al., 1986, 231). Tensions arise because there are many ways to combine different kinds of knowledge and skills, and there are likely to be disagreements over the dominant emphasis and values. As Stark et al. have pointed out, “internal tensions, frequently expressed in debates” including those about “the balance of theory and practice…may vary in magnitude and direction for different fields” (Stark et al., 1986, 241). According to Lewis Mayhew, professor of education at Stanford University, a particularly vexing problem for professional education is the place of theory and skill. Professional service requires mastery of a body of knowledge as well as professional craftsmanship. But the question as to which a professional school should emphasize has had almost a pendulum-like quality. swinging between too much emphasis on theory and too much emphasis on practice ­(Mayhew, 1971). These kinds of tensions regarding theory and practice have manifested themselves in the JMU IA program as well. Members of the IA faculty come from a variety of backgrounds and disciplines, and possess a wide range of visions for content, scope, design, and teaching 294

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styles. The diverse disciplinary and professional perspectives have value, in that they provide students with many ways of thinking about, framing, and doing analysis or intelligence analysis. But the conflicting perspectives tend to create tensions on the margins as faculty members and students pull the program in different directions. On the one hand, faculty members from conventional academic disciplines who do not have professional experience or training tend to view the program as primarily a multidisciplinary liberal arts and sciences major, supplemented with a limited amount of professional education. On the other hand, faculty members with previous professional experience emphasize professional knowledge or skills over foundational knowledge and tend to teach to application rather than knowledge or concept. Meanwhile, the majority of students appear to prefer the more applied approach by the former professionals, perhaps because they tend to think of the program as providing a terminal professional degree even though it does not yet exist in the field. Each of these perspectives produces different sets of expectations—and tensions—to the mix of theory and practice. As the JMU IA program has shifted its orientation over time from more foundational multidisciplinary education to more professional in character, it has not defined its educational outcomes in terms of practitioner proficiency in the same way that a program oriented to training would. But faculty members with prior experience as analysts tend to emphasize the significance of skills even in an educational context because—for them—that is the characteristic that helps to develop good analysts. Tensions between faculty members arise in integrative, inherently interdisciplinary courses. For example, in the capstone project course sequence, discussions and disagreements can develop on the extent to which the emphasis should be on substantive knowledge acquisition, development of professional skills, application of existing knowledge or skills, professional proficiency, or self-reflection as part of the development of professional identity. Emphasizing one will have the effect of reducing the ability to achieve the others as, for example, an emphasis on professional proficiency (closest to training on the requirements of an entry-level analyst) may impede the acquisition of core knowledge and skills, and vice versa. In addition, tensions can also arise between faculty members and students as a byproduct of courses oriented to foundational knowledge rather than applied skills (Stark et al., 1986,  241). For example, the JMU IA technology courses, as well as the law and ethics course, have been taught with an orientation to foundational knowledge rather than mastering of skills in an applied context. But many students with a vocational orientation prefer these courses to be more oriented to skills development, while the IA faculty members— who represent both perspectives—have not developed a consensus on the way in which the courses should be taught. These tensions are a direct result of the differing missions of the liberal arts component of the university and that of professional requirements. According to Mayhew, “the professional school itself has high interest in producing technically competent practitioners, and at times seems to wish to achieve this at the expense of other educational preparation” (Mayhew, 1971). This problem is reinforced by students who view the IA degree as a terminal professional degree and, as such, are more receptive to courses emphasizing practice over concept, even if those concepts would have more practical, long-term value for the prospective practitioner. Because these tensions are an intrinsic byproduct of professional education, they cannot be eliminated or resolved, but they can be managed effectively in a way that harnesses them as strengths rather than weaknesses. For example, JMU IA program, by emphasizing 295

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multidisciplinary knowledge and skills in various combinations and putting less focus on practitioner proficiency, enhances graduate adaptability, which is characterized in the educational literature as “adaptive competence.” Adaptive competence is where “the graduate anticipates, adapts to, and promotes changes important to the profession’s societal purpose and the professional’s role…by promoting the need to detect and respond to changes and make innovations in professional practice” (Stark & Lowther, 1988, 25). From the multidisciplinary courses of varying disciplines and domains, to the combination of skills and substance, to the diversity of faculty visions, the students must adapt to each approach across the courses in the major. This, in a sense, mirrors the professional requirements and expectations for an analyst, regardless of intelligence domain space. As such, the IA graduate possesses a degree of intellectual agility and openness to new ideas and approaches that may be lacking in the graduate of either a traditional liberal arts program (oriented to knowledge) or a training program (oriented to skills).

Implications for designing undergraduate intelligence analysis programs As the JMU IA program shows, there is significant value to intelligence analysis as an undergraduate professional degree. By providing a combination of subject matter knowledge through disciplinary perspective, and both procedural knowledge and skills, the IA program is able to provide students with value along all five of the criteria used to evaluate undergraduate professional degrees. The multidisciplinary knowledge-oriented aspects of the program are supplemented with skills that prepare students for entering the professional workforce. The broad exposure to many of the intelligence domains (national security, military, homeland security, law enforcement, private sector security, competitive intelligence, cyber, geospatial, etc.) ensures that the graduates possess adaptability, versatility, and enhanced marketability. This demonstrates, contrary to those who suggest that these kinds of undergraduate educational degrees do not have value and should not exist, that—in fact— they have significant potential value both in terms of the education provided as well as the job opportunities available after graduation. But at the same time, the JMU IA program may be characterized more as an undergraduate professional degree in analysis generally, or perhaps as an “interprofessional” intelligence analysis degree, rather than a professional degree for intelligence analysis specifically. The reason is because intelligence analysis itself is not yet a profession. Intelligence analysts within each domain are considered a specialization within a broader domain profession, but there is no overarching professional architecture for intelligence analysts across domains. This is problematic in terms of developing a common professional education foundation as the definition of “intelligence” varies across those domain spaces, along with the role and function of the analyst. In other words, intelligence analysis is not a single kind of career or profession, but many kinds depending on the domains being considered. As such, JMU IA degree, with its orientation to the analytic common denominator across all kinds of intelligence analysts, may be more of an “interprofessional degree” in analysis providing an educational foundation for multiple professions simultaneously. One implication for those who design, implement, and evaluate intelligence education in its wide variety of forms is that the nature and degree of specialization is important for determining the degree’s relative comparative advantages. As Mayhew highlights in an article about education more generally, one key question is “how much and at what point preparation for specialization should be undertaken” (Mayhew, 1971). Specialization in intelligence analysis would be specific to the domain in question as it is practiced differently in each of 296

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the domain spaces. An intelligence analysis degree that is specific to an intelligence domain space is likely to be too niche in terms of marketability for any university other than those that have close and direct relationships with specific government organizations. Even then, in those cases, a specialization within an existing disciplinary program might be more appropriate, such as a concentration in intelligence analysis within a politics program for those who want to go into national security intelligence analysis, or within a criminal justice program for those who want to go into law enforcement intelligence analysis. But for those programs that do not have close relationships with hiring authorities, while most graduates will become analysts (broadly defined), most will not become intelligence analysts. In that case, it makes more sense to give the students a broader educational foundation and a wider range of applicable skills so that they can pursue the career or postgraduate opportunities that make the most sense for them. Yet at the same time, those who are considering designing, implementing, or evaluating educational programs with an emphasis on intelligence analysis should keep in mind that the integration of knowledge and skills is a perennial challenge due to the tradeoffs involved. There can be significant impacts resulting from each aspect of design choice, from kind of knowledge or discipline emphasized, to ratio of knowledge to skills, to degree of emphasis on professional education. The productive tensions between an emphasis on knowledge and skills are intrinsic to all professional education programs. The decisions related to the balance of knowledge and skills in an undergraduate intelligence analysis degree is an important one, with significant implications for the graduates of that program for their relative positioning on the job market after graduation. From the student’s perspective, the value proposition of an undergraduate intelligence analysis program in an academic context is the provision of skills which enable the prospective intelligence analyst to acquire a job on graduating, which means the closer it gets to training the better. However, training in skills development and acquisition can be purchased from the private sector, or in non-degree granting programs or institutions. Vocationally oriented academic programs which emphasize skills development and proficiency over breadth and depth of knowledge are most directly challenged by the new private sector options being offered to prepare individuals for careers in intelligence analysis. For example, the ten-week full-time “Intelligence Analysis Career Training” program offered by Wright State Research Institute gives students the same instructional time as ten academic intelligence-related courses and includes sponsorship for a security clearance as part of the $10,000 cost (Wright State Research Institute). Training programs like this will require that academic programs in the future clearly differentiate their value added from non-degree granting programs. For that reason, the quality of the academic program should not be determined by the extent to which it provides skills or proficiency in tools to students but rather how the program combines these skills with knowledge-based courses. In the end, while each undergraduate intelligence analysis program provides its own unique blend of knowledge and skills to its students, the quality of the program will be determined by the depth and breadth of knowledge that the students acquire along with an overlay of useful skills to help them exploit that knowledge to best effect. The highest quality academic programs are going to be those that provide the students with deep disciplinary knowledge, broad substantive knowledge (with the opportunity to specialize in an area if the student so chooses), and significant knowledge about intelligence analysis in addition to the key skills of the intelligence analyst. Optimizing the educational outcomes will require understanding the tradeoffs associated with design choices and working to overcome the limitations in creative ways. 297

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Notes 1 “Course” in this context is American vernacular, which equates to “module” in Britain. 2 In the American educational system, a major is the focus of the degree, requiring up to ­t wenty-five courses (or modules) for graduation. But American universities require approximately forty courses (modules) to graduate. For that reason, students can either take a series of optional courses (electives) for the rest of their degree, take a second major (frequently requiring fewer courses), or a minor (which is a linked set of up to seven courses from another department). 3 General education requirements in American universities consist of approximately thirteen courses (modules) taken across a wide range of academic disciplines to ensure that students have a broad liberal arts and sciences foundation for their majors.

References Abbott, A. (2002). The Disciplines and the Future. In: S. Brint, ed., The Future of the City of Intellect. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Breckenridge, J. (2010). Designing Effective Teaching and Learning Environments for a New ­Generation of Analysts. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 23(2), pp. 307–323. Campbell, S. (2011). A Survey of the U.S. Market for Intelligence Education. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 24(2), pp. 307–337. Clark, B. (1989). The Academic Life: Small Worlds, Different Worlds. Educational Researcher, 18(5), pp. 4–8. Coulthart, S. and Crosston, M. (2015). Terra Incognita: Mapping American Intelligence Education Curriculum. Journal of Strategic Security, 8(3), pp. 46–68. Davies, P. (2006). Assessment BASE: Simulating National Intelligence Assessment in a Graduate Course. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 19(4), pp. 721–736. Dujmovic, N. (2016). Colleges Must Be Intelligent about Intelligence Studies, [Online], Washington Post. Available at: www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/12/30/colleges-mustbe-intelligent-about-intelligence-studies/. Dujmovic, N. (2017). Less Is More, and More Professional: Reflections on Building an ‘ideal’ Intelligence Program. Intelligence and National Security, 32(7), pp. 935–943. Freeland, R. (2004). The Third Way. The Atlantic Monthly, 294(3), pp. 141–147. Glazer, N. (1974). The Schools of the Minor Professions. Minerva, 12(3), pp. 346–364. Glees, A. (2015). Intelligence Studies, Universities and Security. British Journal of Educational Studies, 63(3), pp. 281–310. Goodman, M. and Omand, S. (2008). What Analysts Need to Understand: The King’s Intelligence Studies Program. Studies in Intelligence, 52(4), pp. 1–12. Hendrickson, N. (2008). Critical Thinking in Intelligence Analysis. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 21(4), pp. 679–693. Hendrickson, N. (2018). Reasoning for Intelligence Analysts. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. James Madison University. JMU Undergraduate Catalog, (2008–2009). www.jmu.edu/catalog/08/ programs/isat.html#InformationAnalysis. Johnston, R. (2005). Analytic Culture in the United States Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study. Washington: Central Intelligence Agency. Kilroy, R. (2017). Teaching Intelligence Analysis: An Academic and Practitioner Discussion. Global Security and Intelligence Studies, 2(2), pp. 71–84. Landon-Murray, M. (2013). Moving U.S. Academic Intelligence Education Forward: A Literature Inventory and Agenda. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26(4), pp. 744–776. Landon-Murray, M. and Coulthart, S. (2016). Academic Intelligence Programs in the United States: Exploring the Training and Tradecraft Debate. Global Security and Intelligence Studies, 2(1), p. 3. Marrin, S. (2011). Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the Gap between Scholarship and Practice. ­L ondon: Routledge. Mayhew, L. B. (1971). Changing Practices in Education for the Professions. Atlanta: Southern Regional Education Board. Rudner, M. (2008). Intelligence Studies in Higher Education: Capacity-Building to Meet Societal Demand. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 22(1), pp. 110–130.

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Experimenting with intelligence education Stark, J. (1998). Classifying Professional Preparation Programs. The Journal of Higher Education, 69(4), pp. 346–364. Stark, J. S., and Lowther, M. A. (1988). Strengthening the Ties That Bind: Integrating Undergraduate Liberal and Professional Study. Report of the Professional Preparation Network. Stark, J., Lowther, M., Hagerty, B. and Orczyk, C. (1986). A Conceptual Framework for the Study of Preservice Professional Programs in Colleges and Universities. The Journal of Higher Education, 57(3), pp. 231–264. Strober, M. (2006). Habits of the Mind: Challenges for Multidisciplinary Engagement. Social Epistemology, 20(3–4), pp. 315–331. US State of Virginia. State Council of Higher Education for Virginia. Agenda Book. Page A 17. Walton, T. (2017). How Intelligence Analysis Education Tries to Improve Strategic Analysis. In: T.  ­Juneau, ed., Strategic Analysis in Support of International Policy Making, pp. 37–56, Lanham: ­Rowman and Littlefield. Wright State Research Institute. Intelligence Analysis Career Training. https://iacareertraining.org/ category/overview/.

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PART VI

Security, intelligence, and securitisation theory Comparative and international terrorism research

21 THE EPISTEMOLOGIES OF TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM RESEARCH Quassim Cassam Introduction What leads a person to turn to terrorism or political violence?1 This question, posed by Marc Sageman (2017b), has preoccupied the intelligence community, policy makers, and terrorism scholars. Three epistemological perspectives on Sageman’s question can be distinguished: scepticism, particularism, and generalism. In this context, scepticism is the view that while the question is legitimate, it is not one to which we now know or ever will know the answer. One reason is that the identification and evaluation, by means of large-scale observational studies, of the causes or risk factors of involvement in terrorism is not feasible. In the absence of such testing, theories that purport to answer Sageman’s question are unverified hypotheses rather than expressions of genuine knowledge. Some sceptics have gone further and questioned the idea that terrorism is, even in principle, an object of knowledge. On this view, as Stampnitzky (2013) characterises it, ‘if terrorists are evil and irrational, then one cannot – and indeed should not – know them’ (p. 189). A different epistemological perspective is that of the particularist.2 For particularism, one can ask why a given person turned to political violence and may hope for an answer. One person’s turn to political violence might be understandable, at least in retrospect, in the light of his biography but what makes his turn to violence intelligible may have little bearing on another person’s turn to political violence. For the particularist, the turn to political violence is best explained and understood by reference to specific and idiosyncratic features of a person’s life history. There is no general answer to the question why people turn to political violence because people who move in this direction are historically specific particulars with their individual trajectories and interactions with different environmental factors. Pathways to terrorism are not unknowable but they are, as Heath-Kelly (2017) notes, ‘individualised and disconnected’ (p. 300). Generalism accuses scepticism of grossly exaggerating the practical obstacles that stand in the way of testing general theories of terrorism. For example, hypotheses about what causes the turn to political violence can be evaluated by debriefing known terrorists and studying trial testimonies and pre-trial interrogations.3 From an epidemiological perspective, such

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retrospective observational studies have their limitations but are not without value.4 As for the supposed particularity of pathways to terrorism, the possibility cannot be ruled out that different individuals’ pathways to political violence have identifiable common features, including some that are causally significant.5 Judicious abstraction from irrelevant individual differences is a feature of all theorising and there is no a priori reason to suppose that there is no general answer to Sageman’s question. Knowledge in this domain is not easy but far from impossible. Generalism is the most popular of the three epistemological perspectives. Arguments between proponents of rival answers to Sageman’s question are arguments between different general theories of terrorism. Although there are many such theories, they cluster around three broad approaches: politico-rational, psycho-ideological, and socio-situational. While these labels might be unfamiliar, the approaches to which they apply are not. Though by no means mutually exclusive, the three approaches emphasise different factors in accounting for the turn to political violence. Each offers an answer in general terms to Sageman’s question and each is at odds with the notion that the answer to Sageman’s question is unknowable or that there is something wrong with the pursuit of generality. In what follows, the strengths and weaknesses of the three varieties of generalism will be assessed. This will be followed by further discussion of scepticism and particularism.

Politico-rational approaches The key theses of the politico-rational approaches are that terrorism is fundamentally ‘a mode of political action’ (Kundnani, 2012: p. 21) and in many cases a collectively rational strategic choice that is the result of ‘logical processes that can be discovered and explained’ (Crenshaw, 1990: p. 7). On this account, most terrorists and terrorist organisations have political objectives and see terrorism as an effective means of achieving their objectives. This was true of the I.R.A. in Northern Ireland, the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the Red Brigades in Italy, and many other such organisations. The political dimension of terrorism would go without saying if it were not for the fact that recent work on this subject has tended to focus on Islam-related terrorism, which is taken by some to have religious rather than political objectives. According to Laqueur (2004), for example, ‘Osama bin Laden did not go to war because of Gaza and Nablus’ (p. 52) and Al-Qaeda was founded ‘because of a religious ­commandment – jihad and the establishment of shari’ah’ (p. 51). Even if Laqueur is right about Al-Qaeda, this would only serve to distinguish it from the majority of terrorist organisations. The claim that Al-Qaeda’s objectives are primarily religious has also been disputed. Osama Bin Laden might not have gone to war because of Gaza and Nablus but his objectives did include the expulsion of American forces from the Middle East and this is a recognisably political objective. There is, no doubt, scope for further discussion about what counts as a ‘political’ objective or as a mode of political action. It might also be argued in defence of Laqueur’s view that the presence of American forces in the Middle East, and in particular in Saudi Arabia, was offensive to Bin Laden for reasons that were ultimately religious. Nevertheless, the suggestion that terrorism is, by and large, a political phenomenon seems well-founded. Politico-rational approaches are also opposed to the notion that terrorists are irrational. Richards (2011) claims that ‘terrorism involves the perpetration of rational and calculated acts of violence’ (p. 151). The form of rationality that is at issue here is instrumental. Instrumental rationality is a matter of employing means that are suitable to one’s ends. Suitability is a matter of efficacy not morality. Crenshaw (1990) notes that for politico-rational accounts of 304

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terrorism, ‘efficacy is the primary standard by which terrorism is compared with other methods of achieving political goals’ (p. 8). Even if the means employed by terrorists turn out to be inefficacious, it still doesn’t follow that terrorists are irrational. They presumably believe that terrorism is an effective means of achieving their goals and this is not an obviously irrational belief given that there are historical examples of political goals having been achieved by terrorism. There remains the possibility that the goals of terrorist organisations are irrational but this claim is hard to justify in most cases. Goals can be misguided without being irrational. Critics of the politico-rational approach make two points. The first is that clear-cut cases of terrorism ‘working’ are few and far between. English (2016) has written of ‘the profound uncertainty of terrorism achieving its central goals’ and contrasted this with the near certainty that ‘terrible human suffering will ensue from terrorist violence’ (p. 265). There is also the consideration that the mismatch in some cases between terrorists’ means and their ends is so great as to raise serious questions about their rationality. For example, there is ample evidence that Bin Laden’s overarching goal was the disintegration of the United States. The idea that this goal is achievable by the actions of an organisation like Al-Qaeda borders on the delusional. Nagel (2016) argues that organisations like Al-Qaeda have little understanding of ‘the balance of forces, the motives of their opponents and the political context in which they are operating’ and ‘it is excessively charitable to describe them as rational agents’ (p. 19). They employ violent means which they believe will induce their opponents to give up, but ‘that belief is plainly irrational, and in any event false, as shown by the results’ (p. 19). If Nagel is right, then there is less to the politico-rational approach than meets the eye. A more balanced view is that this approach is plausible in some but not all cases. Terrorism is often a mode of political action and, and such, is not necessarily irrational in an instrumental sense. There remains the question of how to account for the actions and beliefs of those individuals or organisations to which Nagel’s description applies. To the extent that terrorists are delusional about the suitability of their means relative to their goals, how is this to be accounted for? It is at this point that psycho-ideological approaches come into their own. If terrorists are irrational, one might think that their irrationality has a psychological or ideological explanation. It is to this idea that we now turn.

Psycho-ideological approaches The most well-known psycho-ideological approach claims that terrorists do what they do and believe what they believe not because they are rational agents pursuing reasonable political objectives but because they have been radicalised. The key to understanding the turn to political violence is therefore to understand the radicalisation process. This is described by Neumann (2013) as ‘the process whereby people become extremists’ (p. 874). Radicalisation can be ‘cognitive’ or ‘behavioural’.6 The former consists in the formation of extremist beliefs, whereas the latter is the turn to political violence or the use of extremist methods. Although cognitive radicalisation is no guarantee of behavioural radicalisation, it is seen as a necessary condition of behavioural radicalisation and as a cause of political violence. Accordingly, it is argued, counterterrorism programmes should concentrate on countering radicalisation in the cognitive sense. In what sense is radicalisation ideological and in what sense it is psychological? On one view, a key factor in the radicalisation process is ideology. On this account: What makes some individuals resort to political violence while others do not is, in many cases, impossible to understand without looking at the ideological assumptions which they have come to accept and believe in. (Neumann, 2013: p. 881) 305

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Radicalisation is also conceived of as a personal journey from one condition (not being an extremist) to another (being an extremist). Why do some people who are exposed to extremist ideas make this journey while others do not? Psycho-ideological approaches account for this by reference to psychological motives or a psychological predisposition. For example, the radicalisation of some individuals but not others is attributed by the United Kingdom’s 2011 Contest strategy for countering terrorism to the fact that some individuals but not others are ‘vulnerable to radicalisation’ (p. 63). As long as this vulnerability is conceived of in psychological terms, as a psychological disposition, the resulting model of radicalisation is not just ideological but psycho-ideological. Amongst many criticisms of this approach, one is that there is no compelling evidence of a psychological disposition to be radicalised.7 If the only evidence that a person is vulnerable to radicalisation is that they have in fact been radicalised, then positing a psychological disposition has no explanatory power. Vulnerability to radicalisation, if one insists on speaking in these terms, is environmental rather than psychological. It has more to do with influences to which a person is exposed than with their psychology. A further potentially misleading implication of talk of ‘vulnerability’ is that radicalisation is something that happens to people rather than an expression of their own agency.8 On this ‘contagion’ model, extremist ideas are a disease that vulnerable individuals contract by contact with infectious agents in the form of so-called ‘radicalisers’. Yet, there are many examples of politically violent individuals who have not been radicalised by external agencies. They have self-radicalised and their actions are an authentic albeit unfortunate expression of their own agency. Another concern about psycho-ideological approaches is that they conceal or ignore the politics of terrorism. According to Kundnani (2012), for example, answers to the question of what drives the radicalisation process ‘exclude ascribing any causative role to the actions of western governments or their allies in other parts of the world’ (p. 5). This leads to the idea that ‘individual psychological or theological journeys, largely removed from social and political circumstances’ (p. 5), are the root cause of radicalisation. In reply, one might point out that while government agencies that ascribe political violence to radicalisation might indeed be seeking to divert attention from the role of their own policies and actions in triggering a violent response, it doesn’t follow that more nuanced accounts of the radicalisation process are committed to ignoring the causal role of government actions. Such accounts can acknowledge that some individuals radicalise in response to government action. To say this is not to reject the very idea of radicalisation or to suggest that radicalisation is a myth. The point is rather to explain in political rather than psychological or theological terms how and why radicalisation occurs. On this understanding, however, the dividing line between the radicalisation model and politico-rational approaches is no longer clear-cut. A different objection to psycho-ideological approaches is that cognitive radicalisation is neither necessary nor sufficient for violent action. Borum (2011) notes that ‘most people who hold radical ideas do not engage in terrorism, and many terrorists …. are not deeply ideological and may not “radicalize” in any traditional sense’ (p. 8). Assuming that radicalisation in the cognitive sense neither guarantees nor predicts political violence, there is no reason to regard it as the cause, or a cause, of political violence. By the same token, it doesn’t explain political violence. Accordingly, counterterrorism programmes should focus on countering terrorism rather than cognitive radicalisation. Radical beliefs are not a proxy for terrorism. It is true, of course, that behavioural radicalisation is necessary and sufficient for political violence but that is because behavioural radicalisation is the turn to political violence. These objections to the psycho-ideological approach raise difficult questions about the nature of causality and causal explanation. The fact that cognitive radicalisation is neither 306

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necessary nor sufficient for political violence does not prove that the two aren’t causally linked. Nor does this conclusion follow from the fact that only a small proportion of the cognitively radicalised turn violent. For comparison, it is helpful to think about the link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer. The link is causal; yet, studies suggest that only 172 out of 1,000 current male smokers will eventually get lung cancer.9 Which individuals will get cancer is almost impossible to predict and it is not the case that everyone who gets lung cancer smoked. Yet, smoking causes lung cancer. In the smoking case, relevant considerations in relation to the causal claim include the following: although lung cancer is not an inevitable consequence of smoking, it is nevertheless the case that smoking substantially increases the risk of getting lung cancer: only thirteen out of 1,000 non-smoking males will get lung cancer. Since smoking is a risk factor for cancer, an effective way to reduce cases of lung cancer is to reduce levels of smoking. If lung cancer is the problem but it is possible to smoke without getting lung cancer, it doesn’t follow that health programmes should target lung cancer rather than smoking. Targeting a risk factor for lung cancer is a way of targeting lung cancer. Woodward (2009) makes the point that ‘if C causes E then if C were to be manipulated in the right way, there would be an associated change in E’ (p. 234). If levels of smoking were to be manipulated in the right way, then there would be an associated change in levels of lung cancer. This can be so even if cigarette smoking doesn’t necessitate lung cancer. Furthermore, there is a reasonably well-understood physiological mechanism relating smoking with lung cancer. The existence of this mechanism can justify the hypothesis that a heavy smoker who develops lung cancer did so as a result of their smoking, even though, for all we know, they might have got lung cancer anyway. On this account of causation, the relevant questions for the psycho-ideological approach are: is cognitive radicalisation a risk factor for political violence, one that raises the probability of a person turning to political violence? Would there be a change in levels of political violence if the extent of cognitive radicalisation were to be manipulated in the right way? And is there a well-understood mechanism that links cognitive radicalisation to political violence? Critics of talk of radicalisation suspect that the answer to these questions is ‘no’. It’s not clear that they are right, at least in relation to the first two questions. Nevertheless, given that only a small proportion of cognitively radicalised individuals will become terrorists, the question can be still asked of those who do become violent ‘why these particular individuals and not others?’. As Laqueur (2004) asks, ‘how to explain that out of 100 militants believing with equal intensity in the justice of their cause, only a very few will actually engage in terrorist actions?’ (p. 53). This is not a question to which radicalisation-focused theories of terrorism have, or should claim to have, an answer. Cognitive radicalisation is insufficient to explain why particular individuals commit terrorist acts. As Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010) note, there is no getting away from ‘the inherent unpredictability of who becomes violent and who doesn’t’ (p. 893). This is still compatible with viewing cognitive radicalisation as a risk factor for political violence and as causally implicated in political violence.10 In the same way, saying that smoking is a risk factor for lung cancer, and a cause of lung cancer, is compatible with accepting the inherent unpredictability of who amongst all the smokers is going to get lung cancer. We don’t know why this particular individual developed lung cancer and his chain-smoking brother did not. Whatever the relationship between cognitive and behavioural radicalisation, there is also the challenge of explaining cognitive radicalisation. Even if exposure to extremist ideas is a relevant factor, there is still the question why, amongst all the people who are exposed to such ideas, some individuals accept them, while others do not. The challenge with respect 307

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to a person who becomes cognitively radicalised is to understand ‘why these ideas have a traction with this individual’ (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010: p. 894). Could it be that extremist ideas resonate with particular personality types or with people with particular psychological characteristics? The jury is still out on these issues but aside from psychological factors, account also needs to be taken of personal experiences and socio-situational factors in radicalisation. It is to the latter that we must now turn.

Socio-situational approaches Kamtekar (2004) describes situationism as the view that ‘people’s situations, rather than their characters, are explanatorily powerful factors in explaining why different people behave differently’ (p. 458).11 The fundamental attribution error consists in overestimating the role of personality traits and underestimating the role of situations in explaining how people behave. If the fundamental attribution error is an error, then theories that try to explain why some people become terrorists while others do not in terms of differences in personality are guilty of it. This is the basis on which Sageman (2008) rejects psychological or p­ ersonality-based accounts of terrorism.12 Such accounts neglect social and situational factors in radicalisation. As for ideological accounts, the problem with these is that very few people who are exposed to extremist ideologies accept them. Psycho-ideological approaches fail to account for the low base rate of radicalisation as a result of exposure to extremist messages. What, then, are the social and situational factors that account for the turn to political violence? Two key factors, at least in the case of global Islamic terrorism, are friendship and kinship. In this context, becoming a terrorist is usually ‘a collective process based on friendship and kinship’ (Sageman, 2008: p. 84) involving a “bunch of guys” who collectively decide to join a terrorist organisation. Social bonds come before any ideological commitment. Reference to friendship and kinship groups will not account for loners who self-radicalise and commit terrorist acts.13 However, what accounts for their acts is not fundamentally different from what accounts for terrorist acts carried out by a bunch of guys. In both cases, the key is self-categorisation.14 Even “lone wolf ” terrorists imagine themselves to be part of a larger social category such as ‘defender of Islam’. Hence, the first step in the turn to political violence consists in what Sageman (2017a) sees as the ‘activation of a politicized social identity, which generates an imagined political protest community’ (p. 117). The second step involves the activation of a martial social identity. This happens when ‘a few exasperated activists step up and volunteer to defend their imagined community’ (p. 143). They self-categorise as soldiers and this ‘means that violence is imminent because people with this social identity are likely to act out who they believe they are’ (p. 145). This social identity perspective offers a more nuanced account of the radicalisation process than psycho-ideological accounts but some important questions remain unanswered. Amongst those with a politicised social identity, only a few will self-categorise as soldiers but why these particular individuals and not others? To ask Laqueur’s question again, how are we to explain the fact that out of hundred people with a politicised social identity, only a few will self-categorise as soldiers and actually engage in terrorist actions? For that matter, how are we to explain the fact that a given bunch of guys exposed to extremist messages takes them on board, while another bunch of guys from a similar background does not? One might wonder, though, whether it is reasonable to expect an answer to these questions. One view, that of the sceptic, is that when one gets down to specifics, it is necessarily a mystery why a particular individual turned to political violence, while others exposed to the same influences did not. A different view is that of the particularist, who adopts a biographical 308

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approach and sees a particular individual’s turn to political violence as ultimately intelligible not in terms of the operation of socio-situational mechanisms of radicalisation but in the light of the specifics of their life history. No single person is exactly like another and this is not a reality from which even socio-situational approaches can escape. The remaining question, therefore, is whether there is anything to be said for scepticism or particularism.

Particularism and scepticism Particularism is a theory that is grounded in the metaphysics of particulars. According to Gorovitz and MacIntyre (1975), complex particulars ‘interact continuously with a variety of uncontrollable environmental factors’ and we can never know ‘what historically specific interactions may impact on such historically specific particulars’ (p. 16). Terrorists are complex particulars and, apart from the difficulty of knowing which interactions with other people have impacted on them, there is also the difficulty of knowing how such interactions have impacted on them. This is one factor that accounts for the fact that Laqueur’s question is so hard to answer. The problem is that people who are exposed to very similar socio-situational influences can react to them very differently. Yet, it wouldn’t be correct to conclude, with the sceptic, that there is no possibility of illumination. In some cases, it is possible to understand in retrospect how a particular individual became politically violent, even though there is no saying whether another individual placed in exactly the same circumstances would have done the same thing. There is no general formula for the turn to political violence. Another aspect of particularism derives from the work of the philosopher Karl Jaspers, who distinguishes between explanation and understanding ( Jaspers, 1997).15 Explanation is concerned with the formulation of general rules and theories based on repeated observation. Understanding is not concerned with general rules or theories and is achieved by empathy. It is only concerned with the individual and requires a proper engagement with the individual’s subjectivity. Engaging with a terrorist’s subjectivity means imagining their situation as if it were one’s own. It means making sense of their cognitive or behavioural radicalisation by reference to their history, relationships, and situation rather than by appealing to general mechanisms of radicalisation. Their pathway to political violence might turn out to be totally unique and idiosyncratic but may nevertheless be intelligible. There is, for example, the well-documented case of Anwar Al-Awlaki.16 Perhaps few others came to be radicalised in the way that he did, and the factors responsible for his turn to violence include some that were wholly contingent and accidental. It is nevertheless possible to make sense in biographical terms of his turn to political violence. This raises a more general question about the very idea of ‘the radicalisation process’. The use of the definite article implies that there is a single process and encourages the notion that ‘studying radicalisation is about discovering the nature of that process’ (Neumann, 2013: p. 874).17 The particularist’s hypothesis is that there are multiple idiosyncratic pathways to radicalisation rather than a single process. There is simply no such thing as ‘the radicalisation process’. By way of analogy, consider the process by which someone makes the transition from not supporting a particular soccer team to supporting that team. If the team in question is Arsenal, then one might say that someone who makes this transition has been ‘Arsenalised’ but one would not suppose that there is such thing as ‘the Arsenalisation process’. There are any number of idiosyncratic and highly personal pathways to Arsenalisation, and a particular person’s Arsenalisation might be intelligible in the light of their biography. Yet, there is no general theory of ‘Arsenalisation’. Why should one expect there to be? 309

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One response to this question might be to point out that while a particular person’s radicalisation or Arsenalisation might be due to idiosyncratic factors, there are nevertheless identifiable risk factors for both. In that case, there is something that can be said in general terms about both processes and scope for some broad generalisations. However, even if living close to the Arsenal stadium in London is a risk factor for Arsenalisation, many people who live in that part of London do not support Arsenal, and Arsenal has supporters who live nowhere near the stadium. Risk factors for behavioural radicalisation are no more precise and of equally limited predictive value.18 Generalism about radicalisation is bound up with the idea that radicalisation is a process that can be studied and modelled in the way that other more familiar physical and social processes can be studied and modelled. The question whether this assumption is defensible is worthy of further study. What does seem clear is that Laqueur’s question is one that no general theory of the turn to political violence is in a position to answer. Once the nature and limitations of such theories are understood, that should come as no surprise.

Notes 1 See Sageman (2017b). In Sageman’s terminology, political violence is the ‘deliberate collective attempt to use force against people or objects for political reasons’ (p. 14). Turning to political violence is ‘what is commonly thought of as becoming a terrorist’ (p. 10). 2 See Cassam (2018) for an account and defence of this approach. 3 Sageman (2017b), p. xix. 4 For a helpful discussion of some of the methodological issues, albeit in a different context, see Howick (2011), Chapter 5. 5 For example, Neumann (2011) identifies three drivers ‘that seem to be common to the majority of radicalization trajectories’ (p. 15). 6 See Sageman (2017a), p. 90. 7 There are overviews of the evidence in Victoroff (2005) and Horgan (2014). 8 See Richards (2011), pp. 150–152. 9 Villeneuve and Mao (1994). 10 See Neumann (2011). 11 Ross and Nisbett (2011) is the locus classicus of situationism. 12 Sageman (2008), pp. 17–18. 13 On the priority of social bonds, see Sageman (2008), p. 70. 14 Sageman (2017a), p. 114. 15 Jaspers (1997), pp. 301–305. Hoerl (2013) provides a clear account of Jaspers’ ‘epistemic particularism’. 16 Shane (2015). For an account of the relevance of Al-Awlaki for particularism, see Cassam (2018). 17 Neumann (2011) emphasises that ‘there isn’t a simple formula or template that would explain how people radicalize’ (p. 15). 18 This is not to say, as Neumann 2016 claims, that failures of prediction in relation to terrorism necessarily ‘reveal a lack of intellectual rigour’ (p. xvii). Such failures are regarded by particularism as unavoidable.

References Borum, R. (2011) Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories. Journal of Strategic Security. 4 (2), 7–36. Cassam, Q. (2018) The Epistemology of Terrorism and Radicalisation. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. 84, 187–209. Crenshaw, M. (1990) The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice, in Reich, W. (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Washington, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 7–24.

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The epistemologies of terrorism English, R. (2016) Does Terrorism Work? A History. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Githens-Mazer, J. and Lambert, R. (2010) Why the Conventional Wisdom on Radicalization Fails: The Persistence of a Failed Discourse. International Affairs. 86 (4), 889–901. Gorovitz, S. and MacIntyre, A. (1975) Toward a Theory of Medical Fallibility. The Hastings Center Report. 5 (6), 13–23. Heath-Kelly, C. (2017) The Geography of Pre-Criminal Space: Epidemiological Imaginations of Radicalisation Risk in the UK Prevent Strategy, 2007–2017. Critical Studies on Terrorism. 10 (2), 297–319. Hoerl, C. (2013) Jaspers on Explaining and Understanding in Psychiatry, in Stenghellini, G. and Fuchs, T. (eds.), One Century of Karl Jaspers’ General Psychopathology. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 107–120. H.M. Government (2011) CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism. London, The Stationery Office. Horgan, J. (2014) The Psychology of Terrorism. Abingdon, Routledge. Howick, J. (2011) The Philosophy of Evidence-Based Medicine. Oxford, BMJ Books. Jaspers, K. (1997) General Psychopathology, Volume 1. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press. Kamtekar, R. (2004) Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of our Character. Ethics. 114 (3), 458–491. Kundnani, A. (2012) Radicalisation: The Journey of a Concept. Race & Class. 54 (2), 3–25. Laqueur, W. (2004) The Terrorism to Come. Policy Review. Available from: www.hoover.org/­research/ terrorism-come [Accessed 30 January 2019]. Nagel, T. (2016) By Any Means or None. London Review of Books. 38 (17), 19–20. Neumann, P. R. (2011) Preventing Violent Radicalization in America. Bipartisan Policy Center. Available from: http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf [Accessed 30 January 2019]. Neumann, P. R. (2013) The Trouble with Radicalization. International Affairs. 89 (4), 873–893. Neumann, P. R. (2016) Radicalized: New Jihadis and the Threat to the West. London, I. B. Tauris. Richards, A. (2011) The Problem with “radicalization”: The Remit of ‘Prevent’ and the Need to Refocus on Terrorism in the UK. International Affairs. 87 (1), 143–152. Ross, L. and Nisbett, R. E. (2011) The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social Psychology. London, Pinter & Martin Ltd. Sageman, M. (2008) Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press. Sageman, M. (2017a) Misunderstanding Terrorism. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press. Sageman, M. (2017b) Turning to Political Violence: The Emergence of Terrorism. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press. Shane, S. (2015) Objective Troy: A Terrorist, A President, and the Rise of the Drone. New York, Tim ­Duggan Books. Stampnitzky, L. (2013) Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented “Terrorism”. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Victoroff, J. (2005) The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches. The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 49 (1), 3–42. Villeneuve, P. J. and Mao, Y. (1994) Lifetime Probability of Developing Lung Cancer, by Smoking Status, Canada. Canadian Journal of Public Health. 85 (6), 385–388. Woodward, J. (2009) Agency and Interventionist Theories, in Beebee, H., Hitchcock, C. and ­Menzies, P. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 234–264.

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22 DYNAMICS OF SECURITIZATION An analysis of universities’ engagement with the Prevent legislation Lynn Schneider

Introduction This chapter explores the ways in which universities translate the Prevent duty into ­IT-related higher education policies and practices. Those charged with the implementation of Prevent at their universities are conceptualized as the ‘securitizing audience’. A document ­review of ­IT-related policies across the English university sector, as well as interviews with five IT security experts and members of university Prevent Committees, explores how universities position themselves in the process of securitization operating through the P ­ revent policy. Specifically, I draw out the different approaches to web filtering and monitoring, the relationship between universities and intelligence agencies and the way in which information gathering on students’ online activity has changed under Prevent. The research finds that despite a critical attitude towards Prevent, some universities have become active agents of securitization, not only by adapting and perpetuating the rhetoric that conceptualizes thoughts, students and universities as potential threats to national security, but also by engaging in filtering and monitoring activities that conflate welfare and securitization.

Prevent and the securitization of education Breeding grounds of terror Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA) places a duty on certain public and other bodies, referred to as ‘specified authorities’, to have ‘due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ (HM Government, 2015a). Since September 2015, ‘relevant higher education bodies’ (RHEBs; listed in Schedule 6 subsection 3 of the Act) became subject to this statutory Prevent duty. The objective of Prevent is to ‘ensure that all specified authorities assess the level of risks that people within their functional responsibilities may be drawn into terrorism, and have suitable policies and procedures in place to mitigate those risks’ (HM Government, 2015c). While the government requires all specified authorities to carry out Prevent risk assessments and to develop action plans that cover staff training and other areas, the ‘guidance specifically for the HE sector highlights a number of additional areas specific to RHEBs which need to be taken into account’, most 312

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notably with regard to ‘policies and procedures for managing events on campus, arrangements for welfare and chaplaincy support, and policies relating to the use of IT equipment’ (HM Government, 2015c). Until the formation of the Office for Students in 2018, the monitoring of compliance with the Prevent duty was carried out by the Higher Education and Funding Council for England (HEFCE). The monitoring process requires higher education institutions to submit annual returns in order to prove that robust policies and procedures are in place to mitigate the risk of students being drawn into radicalization. The decision to oblige universities legally to assume a role in the government’s Prevent agenda can be traced back to three arguments that identify the security risks pervasive in the sphere of higher education. The first relates to ideology. Framed as the precondition for radicalization, extremism and eventually terrorism, the Prevent policy emphasizes the threat deriving from the development of dangerous thoughts. The strategic objective of Prevent is to ‘respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat that we face from those who promote it’ (HM Government, 2015b, para. 6 – my emphasis). The identification of ideology as a risk is justified on the grounds that ‘terrorist groups often draw on extremist ideology’ (HM Government, 2015b, para. 7). Such an identification renders the person who holds or could develop those thoughts as the focus of securitization. This conclusion, in turn, leads to the second argument that young people are particularly vulnerable to be ‘exploited by radicalising influences’ (HM Government, 2015b, para. 19). Beyond the notion that young people are at risk, they are also perceived as the risk, as they ‘…continue to make up a disproportionately high number of those arrested in this country for terrorist related offences and of those who are travelling to join terrorist organisations’. For this reason, the government expects universities to be ‘vigilant and aware of the risk’ posed by their students, who are mainly young people (HM Government, 2015c, para. 1). The third argument addresses the risk that university campuses pose to national security. Most notably advocated by academics associated with neoconservative or right-leaning think tanks like the Social Affairs Unit, and the Centre for Social Cohesion/Henry Jackson Society, the argument emphasizes that universities are likely to be major sites of extremism, radicalization and recruitment (Glees and Pope, 2005; Sutton, 2015). For example, Glees, head of the Buckingham University Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies and frequent contributor to the Social Affairs Unit, has labelled universities as ‘breeding grounds of terror’ (Glees, 2011), a metaphor that has been picked up frequently by the media and that has become a central justification for the government’s need for new legislation. These three arguments offered a broad conceptual framework for the claim that a more rigorous intervention in higher education policy and regulations was required, in order to address the government’s concern ‘that some universities have failed to engage’ with their social responsibilities and have let ‘terrorist ideologies and those that promote them, go uncontested’ (HM Government, 2011, p. 75). The government subsequently emphasized the urgency with which ‘this lack of engagement must be addressed’ (HM Government, 2011, p. 76) and repeatedly highlighted universities’ status as publicly funded bodies and charities, and the resulting social responsibility to ‘work for the public benefit’ (HM Government, 2011, p. 72). Academics have argued that the incorporation of the higher education sector into the Prevent legislation has led to universities being ‘drawn into the security apparatus of the state’ (Saeed and ­Johnson, 2016, p. 37). Others have added that Prevent goes beyond the coercive ‘security laws and measures of surveillance, restraint and control’ that are normally exercised through the ‘conventional security apparatus of state-led policing, prosecution and punishment’, because 313

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it assigns ‘to civil society institutions the responsibility to identify and report individuals at risk for possible referral to government de-radicalization programmes’ (Zedner, 2018, p. 546). This approach to ‘soft power security’ dilutes ‘the state’s primary security function by engaging the public to the tasks of countering terrorism’ (Zedner, 2018, p. 546). Moreover, Gearon (2017) finds that ‘universities have become a focus of security concerns and marked as loci of special interest for the monitoring of extremism and counter-­terrorism efforts by intelligence agencies worldwide’ (p. 2). While the ‘historic and contemporary relationship of European universities to security runs deeper and wider than current counter-terrorist measures’ (Gearon and Parsons, 2018, p. 75), this chapter inquires into the specific ways in which this already existing relationship may be affected by the Prevent duty. Here, I aim to explore how universities respond to the securitization of education, and discuss the extent to which universities’ engagement with the objectives of the Prevent policy inform the relationship between academia and intelligence services. In this way, the chapter further explores the notion that ‘an emergent securitised concept of university life is important because de facto, it will potentially effect radical change upon the nature and purposes of the university itself ’ (Gearon, 2017, p. 1).

Securitization theory and Prevent Traditional scholarship on securitization, most prominently developed by the C ­ openhagen School, understands securitization ‘as the process by which a “securitizing actor” through speech acts that employ the rhetoric of existential threats, transforms a seemingly ­non-security issue to an urgent security concern’ (Wæver, 1989). The extent to which an entity is perceived to require securitization stems from the interaction between a securitizing actor and its audience (Balzacq, 2005). Second generation scholarship is built on the notion that securitization is an ‘intersubjective process’ (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998, p. 30) because ‘security threats are produced through a social process of constructing shared understandings regarding their existence and character within a group’ (Côté, 2016, p. 542). An increasing emphasis on this intersubjective process resulted in a stronger theoretical focus on the context in which the securitization process occurs and the audience that is targeted by the securitizing agents. Most notably, Buzan et al. (1998), Balzacq (2005), Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka (2016) and Stritzel (2014) have emphasized that ‘audience acceptance’ is essential for the success of securitizing moves and hence the whole process of securitization. This is supported by Côté (2016) who finds that ‘audiences actively participate in the intersubjective construction of security meaning’ (p. 564). The way in which the audience responds to a securitizing move has strong influence on the effects. For example, in some cases, the audience, through its actions, can go ‘well beyond the original intentions of securitizing actors, thus intensifying the urgency and extremity of securitization’ (Côté, 2016, p. 547). Similarly, the rejection of the securitization process by the audience can lead to significant changes of securitizing moves and policies or to the termination of the securitizing efforts altogether. In this way, it has been argued that the ‘acceptance of a securitizing move is, itself, a security action’ (Côté, 2016, p. 544). Despite this recognition of the central function of the audience in the process of securitization, efforts to provide theoretical frameworks to better understand the ways in which the audience is embedded in and impacts the securitization process are currently sparse. A useful operational conceptualization is offered by Côté (2016), who defines audience through its ‘capacity to authorize the view of the issue presented by the securitizing actor and legitimize 314

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the treatment of the issue through security practice’ (p. 548). This definition is particularly suitable to better understand the role universities play in the process of the securitization of education. This definition furthermore facilitates the identification of those charged with the implementation of the Prevent duty at their universities as the audience of securitization in a localized context.

The audience in the securitization of higher education Côté’s definition of the audience is focused on agency – on the ability to legitimize or to reject certain securitization moves. This understanding of audience agency is particularly relevant in the university sector. In fact, the Prevent policy itself emphasizes that universities, as ‘autonomous bodies’, are free in their decision of ‘how best to implement their responsibilities… they will need to interpret the statutory duty in their own context’ (HEFCE, 2015, para. 10). In a similar vein, the policy emphasizes that it ‘does not prescribe what appropriate decisions would be – this will be up to institutions to determine’ (HM Government, 2015c, p. 3). This is particularly emphasized with regard to universities’ implementation of Prevent in the IT area. Here, universities are explicitly asked to develop policies that ‘contain specific reference to the statutory duty’ and that enable them to ‘identify and address issues where online materials are accessed for non-research purposes’ and to have ‘clear policies and procedures for students and staff working on sensitive or extremism-related research’ (HM Government, 2015b, para. 28). However, they are merely expected to ‘consider the use of filters as part of the overall strategy to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ (HM Government, 2015b, para. 27 – my emphasis). Given these non-binding recommendations, an investigation of the decision-making process surrounding web filtering and monitoring provides a particularly worthwhile example of the mechanisms of securitization in the university sector. Publicly, Prevent has received a negative response from students, academics and university governance. In fact, based on the concern that Prevent stifles free speech and academic freedom and treats students as suspects, over 500 faculty members openly criticized the CTSA, urging the government to withdraw the policy from the field of higher education in order to enable institutions to carry out their function of fostering critical thought and debate (The ­Guardian, 3 February 2015). However, HEFCE’s Analysis of Prevent annual reports from higher education providers for activity in 2015–2016 emphasized that no universities failed to demonstrate due regard to the duty (HEFCE, 2017, p. 4), which indicates that universities did accept the government’s securitizing moves. While a few studies attempted to predict universities’ responses to the Prevent duty (McGovern, 2016; Thornton, 2011; Durodie, 2016; Fischbacher-Smith, 2016), empirical studies of its effects are almost non-­ existent. Most notably, Qurashi’s reflection on his engagement as an academic expert in the Prevent group of his university finds that critically oriented academic expertise complicates the straightforward implementation of the legal duty, a state-centric orientation in the Prevent group constrained the horizon of discussion, and a crisis of knowledge at the heart of counter-terrorism replaces expertise and evidence with ideology. (Qurashi, 2017, p. 197) An exploration of the various approaches that universities employ in the area of IT therefore provides valuable insight into the ways in which universities position themselves as audiences within the process of securitization. 315

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Research design Given the controversial nature of the Prevent duty, particularly regarding universities’ ­approaches to web filtering, monitoring and reporting, this research project’s primary ­concern was to ensure that individual institutions’ reputation was not harmed as a result of ­participation. In the past, institutions have been publicly named and shamed for their chosen approaches,1 often in a hasty and not particularly nuanced manner. For the purposes of this study, all research participants have been guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality. All interviewees and their institutions, as well as publicly available data that is presented in this research are anonymized to ensure that participants’ insights cannot be linked to individual institutions. The five research participants that are affiliated with universities are therefore referred to as P1–P5. The original research design envisaged a statistical analysis of the sector-wide approach to policy-making under Prevent. The data deriving from a review of ninety Freedom of Information Requests (FOIs) and hundred IT-related policy documents provides valuable insight into the various approaches that universities can employ in order to comply with Prevent. However, as of yet, information is not detailed enough to generate a statistical overview that reflects the reality of universities’ approaches to web filtering/blocking and monitoring/reporting across the English university sector. The primary reason for this is universities’ varying level of transparency regarding their approach to implementing ­Prevent. FOIs are often rejected on the grounds of national security concerns and ­IT-related policies are either not made publicly available or the university does not have a web filtering and monitoring policy. Only very few universities openly state that they employ active monitoring and filtering mechanisms and provide a comprehensive overview of their procedures. However, in one case, a university disclosed a detailed flowchart of their IT monitoring process, which also constitutes part of their publicly available Information Security Policy. This states that users who try to access extremist material receive a notification that access to the site invokes the process of monitoring, at least in cases where access has not been granted through the Access to Sensitive Material policy and communicated to IT Services. Following the monitoring process, the IT Services anonymize the data manually and provide this anonymized information to the Director of Student Services, who is charged with the decision to determine whether further action is warranted. When necessary, IT Services provide more detailed and un-anonymized information, which is also made available on request to external agencies like the Police and Security Services. Although it remains unclear how many universities are using similar mechanisms, this university policy provides important insight into the possibility of information gathering and sharing under Prevent. Nonetheless, most universities’ statements regarding their IT solutions remain vague. Both policy documents and FOIs frequently state that ‘the university reserves the right to block specific internet sites’, or ‘reserves the right to monitor email, telephone and any other electronically mediated communications, whether stored or in transit, in line within the relevant regulatory and legislative rules/laws’ in order to ‘prevent a breach of the law or investigate a suspected breach of the law, the University’s polices and contracts’. In such cases, it is impossible to evaluate whether these policies were articulated with specific reference to the Prevent duty. In other cases, universities have noted that ‘you must not create, download, store or transit unlawful material, or material that is indecent, offensive, defamatory, threatening, discriminatory or extremist. The University 316

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reserves the right to block or monitor access to such material’. Unsurprisingly, many universities have not yet made a final decision on their approach to filtering and monitoring. While the OfS’s Monitoring of the Prevent Duty 2016–2017 progress report and future development finds that ‘the majority of providers have now taken a decision on whether to implement web filtering and monitoring’ (p. 31), those decisions seem not to have been translated into many policy documents. For example, another policy document states that ‘the university has a generic web filtering policy, which has not been extended to cover Prevent as yet. This is currently under discussion by University management’ and a further university declares that it ‘does not currently filter (acceptable under our Prevent obligations) though we have considered it, and consequently don’t have a policy. We are looking to run a pilot but it is not yet developed’. In another case, ‘the University Management Board has decided not to introduce web filtering at the current time but will keep the position under review’. Even explicit statements that filtering and monitoring of web usage are not implemented are not always reliable. One university that was approached for qualitative interviews due to its decision not to employ any of the suggested filtering or monitoring approaches eventually explained that ‘We do now filter and block websites like everyone else (mostly) and there was no particular decision or debate involved, it just took a while to get round to it’. Additionally, repeated formal requests to the Office of Students to access the data on web filtering and monitoring provided by universities through annual returns have remained unanswered. Given the challenges to quantiative analysis posed by the nature of the aforementioned data sources, the present chapter will present some of the data deriving from qualitative interviews with five experts in the area of Prevent and Information Security at their universities. Interview participants were selected on the basis of their involvement in policy-making and with a view to comparing different approaches to IT policy and procedures. The five approaches identified in advance of the interviews (on the basis of IT Acceptable Usage Policies and/or responses to FOI requests) were: 1 The university reserves the right to monitor (Participant P1 – Head of Information Security). 2 The university does not filter/block or monitor under Prevent (P2 – Chief of Information Security). 3 The university filters/blocks but does not actively monitor under Prevent (P3 – Prevent Lead). 4 The university filters/blocks and actively monitors under Prevent (P4 – Prevent committee member). 5 The university does not filter/block but actively monitors under Prevent (P5 – Head of Information Security).

Agents of securitization? Universities’ role in intelligence gathering and sharing The (ir)relevance of policies: ‘We can put anything in a policy and call it a policy’ The initial research design was informed by the assumption that securitization of higher education can be studied and understood through an analysis of relevant, Prevent-related policies. While an analysis of educational policies has provided my research with interesting data on transparency and a broad overview of the different approaches that universities can 317

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employ in their efforts to implement the Prevent duty, the reality shows that they barely provide enough information to get the full picture. This has been emphasized by P1, particularly when asked about unclarities in their policies: Q:  Your policy just states that the university ‘has the right to monitor all usage of the IT

communications and computer systems at any time and without notice’. So what does that mean? That usage is monitored? A:  Well it’s quite interesting actually, because it’s a legally dubious statement. Now, we did consult with our solicitors, and we decided to put it in there. But actually, under the human rights act and under certain case law, we don’t have a blanket right to. Q:  I was wondering about that, and also about the statement that students should have no expectation of privacy… what then is the scope and purpose of that policy? Why is that statement here? A:  I mean, I think, for one thing, we can put anything in a policy and call it a policy. But if it contravenes human rights, and if it contravenes case law, then its effectively meaningless… I mean, to be honest, policies are… they are meaningless to a certain extent without enforcement. Q:  Going back to the phrasing ‘having’ or ‘reserving the right to’ – does that mean that you are employing monitoring or not? A:  You have the statement, but how you actually implement something (…) would be what tools we use, who has responsibility, who would then notify. But at the moment we don’t really do that active monitoring. While a nuanced understanding of the ways in which universities implement the Prevent duty requires detailed insights into universities’ standards and procedures, very few of them include such information in their publicly available material. For example, when universities state in their policies that they ‘do not use filtering or blocking services’, this might mean that the university did not purchase any solutions that are offered by JISC (the technological service provider for universities in the UK, including in cyber security) in order to meet the requirements of the Prevent duty. However, this does not mean that the university does not have the ability to monitor and report information on web usage per se. This became clear in an interview with P2: Q:  Why did the university decide to not purchase any filtering and monitoring solutions

provided by JISC? A:  Well, one of the reasons is that it would be relatively expensive in order to cover all ac-

tivity across our university. And we have to take that into account. Q:  Would you be able to share information on students’ online activity with intelligence

agencies in an ongoing investigation? A:  We would. I think all universities nowadays have, and that’s of course mainly for tech-

nical reasons, they have the technology to keep information on the logs. So that means that we have information that a certain user undertakes some sort of activity, so for example that an email was sent, but you wouldn’t know what is in it. If we would get a request from an intelligence agency, then they might have more knowledge about for example a visited website or any other activity, but they would need us to identify that individual. And I think that is what every university or most can do, having activity logs is more a by-product of IT systems than something that is related to active monitoring. 318

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The different faces of monitoring: ‘We are not intelligence agents’ If some universities already have the technology in place to monitor their students’ web behaviour, what prevents them from doing so? The same Chief of Information Security subsequently explained that in fact, it is possible to carry out more targeted monitoring and content inspection, but we would only do that under very specific circumstances, either when there’s reason to believe that there is a serious breach of our own policy, or if we have to comply with requests from the police or an intelligence agency. (P2) The same has been confirmed by another Head of Information Security, whose university had not purchased any filtering or monitoring solution. ‘Well we do have the capacity to log peoples’ internet usage. And we keep those logs for a number of months. But we don’t actively monitor. Unless we had suspicions. And typically that would be disciplinary or a request from the police or the intelligence services to actually provide information on that. And filtering we don’t, which is a current policy decision, I am not going to say if I completely agree with this or disagree with this, but we have no active filtering on our internet usage’ (P 1). The participants’ repeated emphasis on the distinction between active, or rather proactive, content monitoring and the targeted monitoring and content inspection that occurs as a result of formal requests by police and intelligence agencies seemed to be related to the stance they took regarding universities’ involvement in intelligence gathering. As P2 puts it: ‘you see, the difference between active monitoring and what we do is that we only respond to requests. We are not contacting the MI5 because we have already actively looked at our students’ internet activity. They approach us. We don’t work for them or do we do their work for them, we couldn’t do the whole business of profiling. We are not intelligence agents’. At the same time, P3 stated that We have a record. So we can track back. So if there was a concern… Nobody is actively monitoring it but if we had a particular concern, either about a particular work station or about a student ID or something, we would be able to go back a certain time, to check what pages they have accessed. But that is a matter of being able to protect our students, to identify if they need help and how we can provide support. P3 clarified that those technological means were in use before the implementation of the Prevent duty and not a result of the university’s effort to comply with current legislation, something that has been confirmed by other participants. Despite this, the ability to access information on students’ online activity has indeed been utilized by universities in the name of welfare and student protection under Prevent, and not merely as a way to respond to requests by intelligence agencies. This has further been confirmed by P2 who, as a result of the broader safeguarding approach of the university, would consult the record if we had concerns about a student for other reasons, not because of what he, or she, did online, but because of other red flags, then we might do 319

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some research, to see what they have been looking at online. But then we would only report the student if we would find something serious. This shows that at least some universities do not only distinguish between active monitoring and targeted monitoring as a response to requests, but also between proactive monitoring and targeted monitoring as a response to Prevent-related concerns. While targeted m ­ onitoring seems to be associated with intelligence gathering, proactive monitoring has been conceptualized within – and justified on the grounds of – the broader ‘welfare’ approach that is deployed as part of the Prevent policy. This conceptual conflation of securitization, intelligence gathering and welfare can also be observed in the context of some of the participants’ rationale for employing blocking services.

The blurred lines of welfare and security: ‘We block, so we don’t know who wants to see it’ Amongst those interviewed, there appeared to prevail the feeling that web blocking is in fact undesired for those involved in counter-terrorism-related intelligence gathering: I think the security services… they want people to access the material. Because then they know who is accessing it. So they want people to find the material so they know who to trace… Although the politicians talk about shutting down these sites, the sites are actually useful for the security services, for gathering intelligence. So they also wouldn’t want us to block them, because if we don’t, we can give them more important information. (P3) In this context, another conversation on the relationship between universities and intelligence agencies was revealing: Q:  What is the nature of the requests you receive from intelligence agencies? A:  They rarely give you all the details if it’s terrorism related. I generally follows up leads, or

related parties, or… they don’t admit it, but I think intelligence agencies put extremist material online to get people to view it and then they can log the IP addresses. And then they want to know from us, because if it happened here, the general IP address would be the university… they would typically ask for the name and contact details… But they can also ask for active surveillance. And they can ask for enhanced monitoring of an individual, or what they are doing on our network. (P1) One participant felt particularly uncomfortable about the role universities are expected to play in counter-terrorism-related intelligence gathering and explained that the chosen approach to web blocking was actually informed by an active effort to re-establish the boundaries between welfare and securitization: monitoring could be understood as intelligence gathering. So actually, in a sense we are being fair, by blocking… we block, so we don’t know who wants to see it, whereas they could accuse us of gathering intelligence if we weren’t blocking but then monitor and report… we wouldn’t get involved. It’s very clearly about safeguarding for us. It’s about preventing them from seeing things that could make them more vulnerable. (P3) At the same time, the interview revealed that as a result of the broader safeguarding approach, the university 320

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has a way to see, if somebody has a concern about a student’s behaviour, or about what they say and so on, so if a student is thought to be vulnerable, or say, if we think he or she could be exploited by terrorists, then we could check what that student is up to, what web pages are visited. (P3) This statement suggests that the Prevent duty has blurred the lines between safeguarding and securitization, despite an ongoing effort by universities to draw distinctions between active monitoring and passive responses to intelligence gathering. Here, the university’s decision to employ web blocking appears to be a way of resistance against the security apparatus of the state by preventing themselves from obtaining information that would tighten the institution’s relationship with intelligence agencies. This interpretation is supported by P5’s statement: if you know things, you will be expected to share. Not because they are snooping, that’s not what Prevent is about, but we have the duty to see and to learn of signs of vulnerability (…)universities have a duty to care to prevent terrorism, and in order to care, we need information. And intelligence agencies basically need information for the same reason. And I believe now many universities know more about which students are at risk so they can actually share more. (P5) Similarly, P1 expects that ‘if we were doing more active monitoring it might have more of an impact, and we would have to look at how and when to report concerns about material to the Registrar and the Prevent board’. And while they find that Prevent did not change the volume of interaction with intelligence agencies at their university, they did notice that under Prevent, ‘the police… try to get us share intelligence… like they would want to know if a person is attending guest lectures that could be viewed as extremist, or if we were doing more proactive monitoring…’. At the same time, they acknowledge that ‘I don’t think we have as much interaction with intelligence agencies as some other higher education institutions. If you speak to certain peers in other universities, they have a lot more interaction’, which to them seemed related to ‘research activities, and also other universities with higher Muslim population in areas like the West-Midlands and places like that where there is a higher concentration of Muslims’ (P1). Despite the general claim that Prevent did not impact already existing relationship between universities and intelligence agencies in a significant way, it appears that Prevent changes the scope of internal information gathering in the name of welfare and protection, and this eventually shifts the capacity as well as expectation of universities to become actively involved in intelligence gathering and sharing.

Web filtering, monitoring and academic freedom: ‘We can’t say that you won’t potentially be investigated by the intelligence services’ The blurring of line between welfare and securitization becomes particularly apparent in the context of internal, welfare-related information gathering and the various ways in which universities are expected to share this with law enforcement and intelligence agencies. This came out most strongly in a conversation with P5, whose university decided to employ active monitoring solutions under Prevent: A:  We don’t make a big fuss about that, we don’t want to upset our students or anyone, but

our IT team does get notifications when certain extremist related webpages are visited. 321

Lynn Schneider Q:  So they don’t get a notification that they are monitored? A:  No, I mean, they can read under our policies and regulations that they are not allowed to

access certain material under Prevent, unless of course, we have approved this – there is a security-sensitive research policy for that – and they know that we can use monitoring if they read the handbook. Q:  So those who do the research won’t be monitored when they visit those webpages? A:  No they will, the system does not separate. But then we can check, if something suspicious comes up, if it’s just research or something that we should be concerned about. Q:  What would happen if you let students know that you are monitoring? Some universities do give their students a heads-up on that. A:  Yes, but that’s naïve in a way – if somebody really wants to access something, they could then do it elsewhere, and then we wouldn’t know about it and we couldn’t provide the safeguarding that we have to under Prevent. Q:  Is there a difference between covert monitoring and monitoring under Prevent? A:  Yes, I mean, it’s similar in some ways because covert monitoring is allowed when you have reasons to suspect somebody does something criminal or somebody seriously breaches our policies – and with Prevent, accessing such material would be potentially both. But usually covert monitoring happens on formal request. Q:  Why did you decide not to block those sites? A:  Well… web blocking is very problematic in many ways, we are a research institution and we have to uphold free speech. And you know, those blocking lists are quite controversial because not all of the things that are blocked are technically illegal. And we do take freedom of speech and so on very seriously. This excerpt of the interview further indicates a conflated notion of securitization and safeguarding, translated in monitoring procedures that hardly differ from covert intelligence gathering on request of external agencies. At the same time, it provides critical insight into some of the difficulties that are associated with the blocking of web content. Similarly, P1 notes that it was largely because of academic freedom, there was a fear that introducing blocking would restrict research… we do have some researchers that do terrorism related research, so they look into extremist material… that they would be hampered… certain academics do feel very strongly who is deciding what is illegal regarding extremist material… they were saying, well who is making that decision? Is it the Counter - Terrorism Unit? Is it the Home Office? It is, and in some cases the actual provider themselves, and sometimes, it depends on where you get those lists. (P1) Interestingly, this interviewee also said that they consider introducing web filtering in order to ‘block clearly illegal content’. When I asked about the implications for research activity at the university, he responded You can’t, just because you are researching it, you know it’s still illegal… they would be unlikely to prosecute if someone was a researcher that has gone through certain ethics committees. But when people apply to do that kind of research they get a certain sense of the caveats in terms of ‘you do realise we can’t say that you won’t potentially be investigated by the intelligence services’. 322

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Despite universities’ visible efforts to uphold the principles of academic freedom, such statements raise serious concerns regarding the implications for security sensitive research, particularly regarding the alienation of scholars of sensitive research topics.

Securitizing agents or securitizing audience? Despite all the participants’ ability to reflect critically on the implications of web filtering and monitoring under Prevent, there seemed to be overall acceptance of the notion that they have to play a role in countering terrorism, either solely though providing ‘welfare’ for ‘vulnerable students’, or through a combination of proactively detecting and sharing information on ‘students at risk’ and providing ‘support’ at the same time. In fact, this was critically observed by P4, who openly conveyed their negative attitude towards Prevent. Q:  How did you make decisions about Prevent at your university? Was there any form of

collective debate? A:  In the beginning there was, and there were also some academics who were particularly

upset about Prevent, and you know the whole thing that we have to protect our students. Because they are adults, and the whole vulnerability thing is not really suitable for adults, even if they are young. I mean, not everybody buys into this idea that suddenly universities, or their students are… not dangerous… but say, ‘at risk’. Q:  How did those critical accounts feature in the way in which Prevent was implemented at your university? A:  Well I think, and that’s something you can’t read in policies, but I know that lots of academics are very concerned about the whole profiling thing, and they say they can’t detect who is at risk, because they are academics. And I think that’s good because that means that there won’t be any overly anxious concerns raised about students, it means that on that level there is a lot of consideration. Q:  But you are still framing Prevent as a welfare issue? A:  That was just the easiest way, and after all, what are the options? It is the safest approach, and I think all universities do so. And it’s also about time and resources, and I don’t think it will make a big difference, you know if you don’t do it, you take a risk – what if something happens at your university and somebody does become radicalised? I don’t think the risk is high with us, but other universities simply cannot afford to be unworried about these things. This account sheds light into the way in which the controversial nature of Prevent has been accepted on the grounds of pragmatic and bureaucratic reasons. Despite the critical attitude towards Prevent’s welfare approach, it is clear that P4 accepts the essential argument that supports the securitization of higher education: that some students constitute a risk, and that it is universities’ role and responsibility to mitigate this risk by following the Government’s Prevent agenda. This notion was shared with all other participants, who – despite calling into question the extent to which ‘vulnerability’ is a suitable concept – all adopted the rhetoric of ‘welfare’, ‘safeguarding’ and ‘having responsibility’.

Conclusion This chapter has provided qualitative insight into some of the ways in which universities have come to implement web filtering and monitoring solutions as part of their engagement with the Prevent duty and explored the implications of those approaches for the relationship 323

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between universities and intelligence agencies. From a theoretical perspective on the process of securitization, the findings reveal that the ‘securitizing audience’ in the field of higher education, despite some concerns regarding Prevent, largely accept the rhetoric employed by the government, and assume the responsibility assigned to them as a result of identifying university campuses and students as security risks. This was particularly visible in some of the approaches related to web filtering and monitoring. Here, it was found that – despite some of the participants’ efforts to distinguish between different modes of monitoring – a conflation of vulnerability and securitization has led to a blurred line between intelligence-related monitoring and welfare-related monitoring. The findings emphasize that the relationship between universities and intelligence agencies has not been established through Prevent; however, intensified information gathering activities under Prevent increasingly attribute responsibilities to IT staff that would typically be considered as within the scope of intelligence agents. The findings furthermore indicate a changing understanding of the scope and circumstances under which universities are expected to share their information on students with external parties. This supports the argument that at least some universities have been drawn into the security apparatus of the state, not only by virtue of accepting and perpetuating the dominant securitization discourse, but also through their active involvement in activities that go well beyond traditional measurements of welfare and safeguarding. At the same time, it is emphasized that this qualitative research project does not aim to generalize throughout the whole university sector. Further research into the various ways in which universities engage with the objectives of the Prevent duty is required in order to understand better their role and agency in the process of the securitization of higher education.

Note 1 www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jan/20/university-warns-students-emails-may-be-­ monitored-kings-college-london-prevent.

References Balzacq, T. (2005) ‘The three faces of securitization: Political agency, audience and context’, European Journal of International Relations, 11(2), pp. 171–201. Balzacq, T., Léonard, S. and Ruzicka, J. (2016) ‘‘Securitization’ revisited : theory and cases’, International Relations, 30(4), pp. 494–531. Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and De Wilde, J. (1998) Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Bouldner: Lynne Rienner. Côté, A. (2016) ‘Agents without agency : Assessing the role of the audience in securitization theory’, Security Dialogue, 47(6), pp. 541–558. Durodie, B. (2016) ‘Securitising education to prevent terrorism or losing direction?’ British Journal of Educational Studies, Routledge, 64(1), pp. 21–35. Fischbacher-Smith, D. (2016) ‘Framing the UK’s counter-terrorism policy within the context of a wicked problem’, Public Money and Management, 36(6), pp. 399–408. Gearon, L. (2017) ‘The counter-terrorist campus : Securitisation theory and university securitisation – Three models’, Transformation in Higher Education, 2(0), pp. 1–9. Gearon, L. and Parsons, S. (2018) ‘Research ethics in the securitised university’, Journal of Academic Ethics, 17(1), pp. 73–93. Glees, A. (2011) Universities: The breeding grounds of terror – Telegraph, The Telegraph. Available at: www. telegraph.co.uk/education/universityeducation/8560409/Universities-­T he-breeding-groundsof-terror.html (Accessed: 13 January 2019). Glees, A. and Pope, C. (2005) When Students Turn to Terror: Terrorist and Extremist Activity on British Campuses. London: Social Affairs Unit.

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Dynamics of securitization HEFCE (2015) The Prevent duty: Monitoring framework for the higher education sector. Available at: www.­ kcgaudit.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/HEFCE_2015_32-Prevent.pdf (Accessed: 9 N ­ ovember 2017). HEFCE (2017) Analysis of Prevent annual reports from higher education providers for activity in Licence, Open ­G overnment 2015–2016. Available at: www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ version/3/. HM Government (2011) PREVENT strategy. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/ prevent-strategy-2011. HM Government (2015a) Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, (1), pp. 1–149. Available at: www. legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/pdfs/ukpga_20150006_en.pdf. HM Government (2015b) Prevent duty guidance: For higher ducation institutions in England and Wales, 12 March 2015, (March). Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance. HM Government (2015c) Revised prevent duty guidance : For England and Wales. Guidance for specified authorities in England and Wales on the duty in the Counter-Terrorism and regard to the need to prevent people. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-strategy-2011. McGovern, M. (2016) ‘The university, Prevent and cultures of compliance’, Prometheus (United ­Kingdom), Routledge, 34(1), pp. 49–62. Qurashi, F. (2017) ‘Just get on with it: Implementing the prevent duty in higher education and the role of academic expertise’, Education, Citizenship and Social Justice, 12(3), pp. 197–212. Saeed, T. and Johnson, D. (2016) ‘Intelligence, global terrorism and higher education: Neutralising threats or alienating allies?’ British Journal of Educational Studies, 64(1), pp. 37–51. Stritzel, H. (2014) Security in Translation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Sutton, R. (2015) Preventing Prevent? Challenges to Counter-Radicalisation Policy on Campus. London: The Henry Jackson Society. The Guardian (2015) University professors decry Theresa May’s campus anti-terrorism bill, 3 February. Available at: www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/feb/03/professors-letter-protest-counter-terrorism-campuses. Thornton, R. (2011) ‘Counterterrorism and the neo-liberal university: Providing a check and b­ alance?’ Critical Studies on Terrorism, 4(3), pp. 421–429. Wæver, O. (1989) Security, the speech act: Analysing the politics of a word. Working Paper 19. ­Copenhagen: Center for Peace and Conflict Research. Zedner, L. (2018) ‘Counterterrorism on campus’, University of Toronto Law Journal, 68(4), pp. 545–587.

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23 INTELLIGENCE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF RADICALISATION AND EXTREMISM IN UNIVERSITIES IN ASIA AND AFRICA David Johnson Introduction According to the Global Terrorism Index (2018) that provides a barometer to the impact of terrorism, countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, and Somalia are amongst the most affected. Indeed, the terrorist groups responsible for the most deaths in 2017 included the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Al-Shabaab in East Africa, and Boko Haram in West Africa. It is right, therefore, that this chapter looks at the factors that contribute to radicalisation and recruitment in these world regions. Here, while it is critical that the impact of the terrorist activities of these groups – the loss of human life, and the consequence on the social and economic fabrics of the societies in the countries that they target – is recorded, so too perhaps is an analysis of their strategies and tactics. While it is easy to assume that the lifeblood of these groups is uneducated, disaffected, and unemployed youth, studies such as Terrorism in Tunisia (2006) based on court records and interviews found that 40% of Tunisian terrorists hold a university degree. And perhaps more significantly, as the tactics of terrorism range from the crude to the more sophisticated, that university campuses offer a space for the sharpening of the philosophies that drive such groups and the replenishment of the leadership that sustains them. The fact that a former law student from the University of Kenya was implicated in planning the attack on an institution of higher education in that country in 2015 illustrates this point. This chapter looks at a small sample of selected universities in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Kenya and explores whether, at least in some small part, they have becomes sites for the propagation of extremist ideologies, of recruitment for extremist groups, and for the exportation of extremist thought and activities. And if there is such evidence, to consider the sufficiency of the measures that international intelligence agencies and universities in these countries are putting in place to redress the situation. Although the strong form of the thesis that universities are somehow responsible for breeding terrorism (Glees & Pope, 2005) has been debunked (Saeed and Johnson, 2016),

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there are concerns that they are increasingly exploited as sites in which some students at least come into contact with extremist ideologies; that they are spaces for the active recruitment and radicalisation of students; and worryingly, spaces where the tools of terrorism are forged.

Universities as sites of radicalisation A growing number of unrelated incidents in which university students have been implicated have raised once again the question whether more should be done to monitor the spaces in which radical thought is promoted and extremist ideas and activity might fester. The incidents themselves are worth revisiting if only to make the case that it is not the primary mission of the university – to pursue philosophical and scientific truths that is in question, more whether the relatively free physical spaces they provide are exploited for darker purposes; but so too are the theoretical arguments and perspectives that constrain the responses of intelligence agencies and higher education authorities. The definition of ‘radicalisation’ has befuddled social scientists as much as it has intelligence agencies especially when the question is posed in respect to the relationships between universities and national security. For universities, the promotion of ‘thought’ – in a variety of directions including radical thought – is their raison d’etre. For national security agencies, the expression of radical thought that might lead to extremist action is a dangerous threat to national security. The result is, of course, what appears to be an irreducible tension. That is, how might universities thread the fine line between the need for intelligence aimed at keeping populations safe, and human rights and academic freedoms to which those working in them they are entitled? (Tsang, 2008). There are a number of key arguments here that need unravelling and Hardy (2018) attempts to shed light on some of these. He makes a distinction between radical ideas that have advanced the scientific and humanities fields and those that lead to extremist and violent behaviour (Gill, 2007; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005; 2007; Taarnby, 2005). Hardy questions what is meant by extremist views – whether they are those that run against the grain of society’s core values, or those that subscribe to coherent and recognised ideologies, or those inherently political or religious. He admits that the answers are unclear but argues that To warrant state intervention, extremist views should justify, encourage or at the very least condone the use of violence to achieve some significant political or religious change. Ideas and opinions that are contrary to a society’s core values but create no risk of harm should be supported as part of a healthy, functioning democracy that values freedom of expression. This might seem an obvious dividing line, but the relationship between extremism, violence and free speech remains uncertain. (2018: 79) Drawing on the work of Neumann (2013), he suggests that confusion arises in the conflated use of the words ‘extreme’ and ‘radical’ to describe ideas that are not related to terrorism and like Neumann (2013) draws a distinction between ‘cognitive radicalisation’ which focuses on extremist beliefs and ‘behavioural radicalisation’ that focuses on extremist behaviour. For intelligence agencies or universities who comply with security measures aimed at national protection (see Schneider, this volume), working out how to monitor radicalisation

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(if  that is at all possible) is a complex proposition. What can be agreed on at least is that radicalisation is a ‘gradual process’ that involves a number of stages and that people do not become radical overnight (Christmann, 2012: 10). This view has given rise to the development of a number of models that attempt to capture the process of radicalisation. Hafez and Mullins (2015), for example, describe the process as ‘socialisation into an extremist belief system that sets the stage for violence even if it does not make it inevitable’ (Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 960). Radicalisation ‘involves adopting an extremist worldview, one that is rejected by mainstream society and one that deems legitimate the use of violence as a method to effect societal or political change’ (Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 960). Earlier models have included specific references to religious radicalisation. The so-called ‘NYPD Model’ outlines four stages: pre-radicalisation, self-identification through an early exploration of Salafi Islamism, indoctrination through the adoption of Jihadi-Salafi ideology, and jihadisation by accepting the duty to participate in militant action (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Gill (2007) offers a ‘pathway’ model that includes exposure to propaganda, the experience of a ‘catalyst’ event, pre-existing social ties which facilitate recruitment, and in-group radicalisation. Mogghadam (2005) describes a ‘staircase’ model that consists of six steps, beginning on the ‘ground floor’ with psychological interpretation of injustice, then ascending through greater moral engagement and categorical thinking towards an ultimate violent act. Increasingly though, according to Hardy (2018), scholars are moving away from a linear approach towards behavioural, relational, and multi-causal models ( Jensen, Atwell Seate, & James, 2018; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010; Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Koehler, 2017; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008) in favour of more coherent conceptual models. Koehler (2014, 2017), for example, condenses the various frameworks into a conceptual model that describes the gradual adoption of a violent radical ideology that leads to the person’s worldview being ‘gradually rewritten, restructured and redefined’ (Koehler, 2017: 75). The dramatic change in the ‘understanding of core political concepts and values’ is said to lead to violence that becomes the only option to resolve the resulting psychological tension. Helpful as these theories are to the understanding of radicalisation, they do not offer much to universities or intelligence agencies tasked with reducing threats to violent e­ xtremism – apart perhaps from the suggestion that universities and security agencies should be on the lookout for short- or medium-term changes in the thinking and behaviour of students. This is not a plausible proposition. Observing and predicting the outcomes of human behaviour is far from an exact science. In spite of the theoretical plausibility of the ‘staged’ models of radicalisation advanced, it is the university as ‘space’ where events and activities, over the short term or long that spark or sustain cognitive and behaviour radicalisation that continue to divide opinion and intelligence and national security policy. The argument, it would seem, is not about the monitoring of individuals and of individual beliefs; these cannot be reduced to simple profiles (Horgan, 2008, 2014; Silke, 1998), nor, however important that is for understanding the processes of radicalisation, its antecedents or causes (Campelo et al., 2018; Desmarais et al., 2017; Sieckelinck & Gielen, 2018). It is perhaps more about history, strategy, and opportunity. We look at some of the evidence.

The many facets of radicalisation and recruitment Campus radicalism is not a new phenomenon and it is interesting to look at its origins and the manner in which it takes root. There appears to be a number of facets to the radicalisation 328

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and recruitment of university students to the activities of terrorist organisations. These are the occupation of intellectual spaces by powerful ideologies, the domination of intellectual spaces by powerful insider and outsider networks, and the use of popular media and other technologies that overcome geographies.

Powerful ideologies A significant strategy in the radicalisation of students has been the ‘occupation’ of intellectual spaces by one or more fundamentalist groups in countries other than those from which they emanate. In Indonesia and Malaysia for example, Hizbut Tahrir, the political movement originating from Palestine whose basic tenet is to set up an Islamic caliphate, took root in 1983. Since then, it has worked to extend its ideology to countries and especially campuses in these countries. The Indonesian Ministry of Law and Human Rights revoked HTI’s organisation licence on 19 July 2017. The decision is widely thought of as controversial and the case is being heard in the courts. What is clear however is the massive support base that the organisation has mustered and the likelihood that its banning will ‘push the ideology of a largely toothless organisation through other avenues’ and as such allow it to become a legitimate political threat. In Indonesia as elsewhere, the contradictions between the desire to close down spaces where radicalism is evident, and to allow free debate, play out strongly on university campuses. Limiting space, even where radical or extreme ideas are evident, might ironically lead to the opening up of different, harder to monitor spaces that offer other opportunities to fashion unstoppable threats. The Indonesian case reveals how the intellectual leadership of groups such as Hizbut Tahrir that is drawn from the very intellectual base that the government seeks to constrain fuels open political violence (riots) that in themselves are radicalising events. The argument illustrates the difficulty for the ‘policing’ of university spaces. There are similarities in the spread of violent extremist ideologies and the extent to which they ‘reach-in’ in universities in Malaysia. In 2015, the chief assistant director of the counter terrorism division of the Royal Malaysia Police announced that Islamic militant groups including ISIS had been targeting Malaysian students in Higher Education. Sixty-one Malaysian nationals had been identified as being involved in three ‘outsider’ groups – Jabhat A-Nusra, Ajnad Al-Sham, and ISIS. The Malaysian authorities are especially concerned about the spread of ISIS-inspired violent extremist ideology of jihadi Salafism to the country’s Muslim community, particularly amongst youth. What exactly can be done about it remains a matter of concern. Should radical thought be given ‘space’ for noisy articulation, the focus for security being the monitoring of activity that might follow? Or shutting down what might be important safety valves? It seems whatever the decision, extremist groups use it as an opportunity to consolidate. In Kenya, as in Indonesia and Malaysia, it is clear too that ideology and the ‘outsider’ phenomenon are seen to be the greatest threat to the stability of national institutions. Kenya admits more than 5,000 foreign students each year, mainly for study in private institutions, and mostly from the Eastern Africa region. It is clear that the most powerful terrorist group currently in Africa, Al-Shabaab, a Salafist militant group affiliated with Al-Qa’ida, recruits much of its leadership and foot soldiers from Kenyan universities. The group targets national as well as foreign students, including those from Somalia. It is also 329

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thought to be the case that radical Somalian students in Kenyan universities use these spaces to extend the ideology of militant Salafism. Although all foreign students are required to have the so-called Kenyan student pass before admission, many do not; and this has created a security lapse.

Powerful networks It is a fact that powerful ideologies are unlikely to function without powerful networks. A favoured mechanism employed by ISIS to propagate its message in universities is through the usrah group. University students join usrah groups (small discussion groups) not only to expand their religious understanding but also to seek guidance. Traditionally, an usrah group follows a particular teaching or idealism espoused by certain groups. There is evidence that some of these teachings and narratives are extremist in nature. Several youth arrested in Beirut in 2012 claimed to have been exposed to the ideology of Islamic State through powerful leaders of the usrah groups. There are suggestions that these groups exert control through mechanisms like the bai’ah system (oath of allegiance to the leader) that compels recruits to be secretive and obedient to the group’s leader.

Powerful technologies Technology is increasingly seen as an important factor contributing to radicalisation. ­I slamic State has been hugely successful in recruiting young fighters from around the globe by posting slick propaganda videos on YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook ­(Greenberg, 2016; Klausen, 2015; McDowell-Smith, Speckhard, & Yayla, 2017). As Greenberg (2016: 166) explains, this strategy ‘speaks directly to the youth it is targeting for recruitment, using the medium that works best for these youth’. According to Hardy (2018), Islamic State’s global reach would not have been possible without the Internet. However, the causal link between viewing extremist material on the Internet and radicalisation remains unclear. Hardy (2018) argues that it is more common for individuals to view extremist material online while being radicalised through group networks and social relationships. It is less common for them to ‘self-radicalise’ purely through exposure to extremist material online, without any human connection. As Conway (2017: 77) explains, there is ‘no yet proven connection between consumption of and networking around violent extremist online content and adoption of extremist ideology and/or engagement in violent extremism and terrorism’. But the anecdotal evidence is revealing: In December 2014, police arrested two university students who were en route to Syria to join ISIS, including a twenty-seven-year-old woman who had married an ISIS fighter through Skype. The female suspect studied at a private institution in the Klang Valley. The second suspect, a twenty-two-year-old male student of a public university in Perlis, was arrested at Kuala Lumpur International Airport. Both suspects reportedly gained sympathy for the ISIS struggle after watching propaganda videos on YouTube. It seems that IS has also tailored its message to recruit female university students. The group has used the romanticised notion of jihad and the symbolic heroicness latent in the image of the IS fighter to lure young women into engaging in IS activities. It is without doubt that platforms such as YouTube, social media networks (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram), and chat applications (WhatsApp and Telegram) have become a significant tool in the armoury of the recruitment strategies of terrorist organisations. 330

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Recruitment It is worth making the case that active recruitment to fight in the ranks of terrorist organisations is a different strategy to building a broad mass base for the struggle for Jihadism. We have looked at the tactics employed to radicalise university students. We now turn to the tactics used by terrorist organisations for the recruitment of students to swell the ranks of Jihadists. The use by radical groups of university spaces for recruitment ‘to the cause’ was highlighted by an Indonesian State Intelligence Agency study in 2018. The study suggested that an estimated 39% of university students have been exposed to radical groups. Universities in fifteen provinces were classified as ‘high risk’. The intelligence agency’s head said that radical Islamic groups were targeting universities for new recruits to their cause and that the agency was closely monitoring three universities thought to be at risk of becoming a base for radical groups. The use of scientific facilities to shape the tools of terrorism is even more worrying. Research carried out by the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) in Indonesia claimed that seven universities, including Universitas Indonesia, are exposed to radicalism with science and medical science students most likely to be exposed. It is perhaps not surprising then that in the aftermath of two suicide bomb attacks in Surabaya and East Java in May 2018 in which Christian Churches were targeted, three suspected terrorists were arrested at the state University of Riau in Pekanbaru. The national police’s elite counter-terrorism unit reported that they had discovered two pipe bombs on the campus, allegedly to be used to target the Regional People’s Representative Assembly, the local parliament in Riau, and the national parliament in Jakarta (Nurdiani, 2018). The argument that universities provide a skilled cadre that is essential to the ‘business’ of terrorism including the movement of goods and services is further illustrated in the case of Malaysia, where two students from Al-Madinah International University were arrested in 2017 for channelling funds to support the international terrorist activities of ISIL. Malaysia and Indonesia are seen by IS as rich grounds for recruitment, especially of science students in institutions of higher learning, because of their technical expertise. A much stronger claim of the university being a recruiting ground for terrorist organisations is illustrated by reports from the Intelligence Services in Kenya. A police report released in April 2018, and other reports by the Commission for University Education (CUE) and government security services indicated that a significant number of youths who have been pursuing degrees in Kenyan universities have been recruited and that ‘universities had become centres of radicalisation and recruitment by recruiters from Somalia and Syria’. ­Police reports indicate that at least fifty-eight Kenyan students had abandoned universities to join terrorist groups in Somalia, Libya, and Syria since 2015 and there is concern that those who join Islamic State and al-Qaeda linked organisations will be used to launch attacks on Western targets in Kenya and neighbouring countries. Indeed, this fear is underlined by a United States security alert for Kenya issued in February 2019, citing ‘credible information that Westerners may be targeted by extremists in three towns in Kenyan’. This comes at a time when Kenya is on high alert following an al-Shabaab terror attack earlier in 2019 that left twenty-one people dead at a Nairobi-based hotel complex. Following the rising profile of universities as a key component in terrorism organisations, Kenya’s Ministry of Education and CUE have been pushing for tighter measures to improve security within universities, including curtailing the potential for student radicalisation. But it is not only the physical spaces that universities offer that are being exploited and that arguably need to be monitored. A more difficult prospect is the virtual spaces occupied by university students that offer opportunities for their recruitment. 331

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In Malaysia, three students from public universities were detained in 2016 and four more, including two female students who were planning to travel to Turkey before entering Syria and Iraq, were arrested in the first three months of 2017. Four private university students were also detained – two with connections to graduates from Monash University Malaysia who were directly involved in the Dhaka restaurant bombing in July 2016 (Aslam, 2019). The following quotation from security forces in Kenya is sobering and leads us to examine the different facets of radicalisation and recruitment in university spaces: Gone is the era where terrorist groups targeted vulnerable youths who were illiterate and from poor backgrounds. The changing face of terror has seen the recruitment and radicalisation of university students…With globalisation and the paradigm shift in the digital world, terrorists have exploited social media, among other platforms, to lure university students. If the means of recruitment have changed, so too have the modes of radicalisation. We turn next to examine this phenomenon.

Managing the threat We turn now to look at the measure proposed or employed to manage the threats of radicalisation and recruitment in universities in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Kenya. In June 2018, a new joint task force has been established by Indonesia’s Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education and the country’s National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) to develop guidelines to combat Islamic radicalism that appears to be gaining wider support on campuses. The task force is charged to set up procedures to ‘monitor and counter’ emerging radical thinking and behaviour amongst university students and lecturers. Although its exact role and how it might fulfil its mission are still unclear, the thinking is that the agency and universities needed to exchange intelligence. Even so, a number of strategies to manage the threat of radicalisation and recruitment are emerging. These include the monitoring of activities on campuses, radicalisation prevention activities, curfews, and zero tolerance policies. The University of Indonesia has said that it will take firm action if students or lecturers are found to be involved in radicalism or are members of banned Islamic organisations such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. The head of public relations went on record to say that the university routinely monitors activities on campus and runs radicalism prevention schemes, beginning with the orientation of new students. But has also acknowledged that universities did not have the skills to identify radical movements or detect how they spread their ideology. In some universities, strict measures are imposed on campus activities. The University of North Sumatra in Riau’s neighbouring province imposed a ban on campus activities after 10pm ‘to anticipate anything related to radicalism’ and a similar curfew was announced at Hasanuddin University in Makassar, capital of South Sulawesi province. In other institutions in Indonesia, the use of social media on campuses is monitored in collaboration with the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology. A spokesperson for one of the universities explained that the data usage of lecturers and students are recorded and that a record of their cellular phones are kept and their social media presence tracked. 332

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He insisted however that the ministry was not invading students’ privacy or restricting ­academic activities. New students are asked to register their social media accounts at their universities and the ministry conducts background checks in collaboration with ­anti-corruption agencies. Unsurprisingly, these measures are being criticised by academics and human rights groups who claim that they would harm freedom of speech on campus. But universities and education councils in Indonesia seem to be determined to wage war on extremism. Zero tolerance policies have been applied in some universities. In May 2018, a law professor at a public university in Semarang, Central Java, was dismissed from his position following an ethics code probe. It was alleged that he expressed support for terrorist groups on social media. A dean and three lecturers at the Institute of Technology, a public university in Surabaya, were also dismissed on the same grounds. In Malaysia, given the growing number of people, including young university students, arrested for having ties with IS, the government is looking at a strategy that competes for the use of university spaces. In respect of securing the ‘ideological space’, it feels that it needs to provide more freedom for students to express their views, ideas, and desires. This freedom and inclusion in the system, it feels, would dissuade them from looking at alternative avenues. One such programme is the ‘Mahasiswa IslamTolak Keganasan’ (Muslim University Students Reject Terrorism), which was launched in 2015 by the Malaysian Department of Islamic Development. The programme offers spaces that allow students to convey their ideas on religion and politics. More unlikely avenues have included suggestions that ‘university staff should provide students with activities that offer them recreation and distraction from potential radical outlets. This includes activities such as aerobics, paintball and horseback riding’. Like Indonesia, a favoured approach to combating threats is the monitoring of activities on campuses. A useful suggestion is the training of university administrators in charge of managing students to help spot potential problems. More direct approaches to prevention include background checks on students and the monitoring of their activities on the Internet. Associated with this is the monitoring of students who are known to have extremist views on Islamic issues. And in a bold attempt to reclaim space, there are suggestions that the university campus should be a restricted area and closed off to any unauthorised activities. In this, that security at university access points be enhanced. Reminiscent of ‘Prevent’ strategies elsewhere, like the United Kingdom for example, that class attendance be monitored. Foreign students must achieve at least 80% attendance and must pass all subjects taken in the past year. Where classes are missed, that could lead to a police report and the possible cancellation of the students’ visa. This, the authorities claim, is to prevent students from getting involved in clandestine or undesirable activities. There are strong appeals for universities to partner with the police and the special branch to monitor extremist activities. Interestingly too is the identified need to establish usrah or religious studies that promote religious moderation, and programmes that counter IS narratives and expose the group's atrocities. For instance, in 2014, the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) ran a programme that highlighted IS crimes and brutalities. Parents are seen to be important stakeholders and the feeling is that they should be involved in detecting early signs of radicalisation. In an effort to combat ISIS recruitment of Malaysian youth and others, the police decided in October 2014 to shut down pro-ISIS websites. At the time, there were about twelve locally registered websites used by militant recruiters. These sites have been glorified by several 333

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terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, and have been responsible for convincing a number of Malaysians to join these militant groups. The police now work with the MCMC to monitor sites that are used not simply to recruit fighters but that also promote terrorism and extremist beliefs. The MCMC run workshops and programmes in the community, including at mosques and for the children and youths in their community during school holidays. Through this programme, young people are called to participate in conversations about ISIS and why its members are called ‘terrorists’. In other attempts to counter the ideology of Jihad, JAKIM has set up an inter-agency Jihad Concept Explanation Action Committee. According to JAKIM Director-General Othman Mustapha, The committee’s aim is to formulate a clear plan of action to address misconceptions about the concept of jihad (holy war), including conducting various programs on the ground in collaboration with the National Blue Ocean Strategy to ensure a more structured and comprehensive implementation. [29] The agencies involved in the committee include the Home Ministry’s Malaysian Civil Defence Department, Prime Minister Department’s National Security Council (NSC), Police, Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia (IKIM), Al-Hijrah Media Corp, and the Institute of Islamic Strategic Research Malaysia (IKSIM). JAKIM also works closely with the MCMC and local universities in tackling the ISIS propaganda narrative online. The government has also produced a White Paper to strengthen existing laws such as the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 (SOSMA), Prevention of Crime (Amendments and Extensions) Act 2013 (POCA), and the Penal Code to specifically handle militant activities. The Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) and the Special Measures Against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Act (SMATA) were recently tabled in the Parliament. The POTA would allow authorities to detain suspects indefinitely without trial and a Prevention of Terrorism Board would be instituted to make decisions on detention or restriction orders as well as hold a registrar containing fingerprints and photographs of those detained. The SMATA would enable authorities to seize travel documents of citizens or foreigners believed to be engaging in or abetting terrorist acts. The Kenyan Ministry of Education and the CUE are seeking to put in place measures to improve security within and around universities and constituent colleges. An important driver is the prevention of a recurrence of the fatal Garissa terror attack in 2015, and at curtailing the potential for student radicalisation and general criminal activity. The terror attack of Garissa University College in April 2015 where 148 people were killed and at least 79 others were injured revealed a lack of capacity in Kenyan universities to deal with safety and security risks. As part of the measures, all universities and constituent colleges are required to implement biometric identification systems and automate students’ records. These measures were proposed in 2016. Furthermore, a universities' security committee and representatives from the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government and from the National Intelligence Service (Kenya) have been tasked with drafting national minimum standards and guidelines on safety and security in universities, to be ratified and used to audit universities on security. Other proposed security measures include improved surveillance, security screening, and installation of security cameras/alarms in all the institutions. A status report on implementation of the biometric identification systems and automation of students’ records obtained 334

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from fifty-six universities and university colleges indicated that the majority of universities had initiated the process of implementing the requirements on security. However, a majority of public universities and public constituent colleges indicated that the implementation process was hampered by budgetary constraints. A Report by CUE in May 2018 highlighted: …poor collaboration between universities/constituent colleges and the national security council; the fact that universities are serving as hideouts and convergence points for criminals especially in hostels; radicalisation with cases of active radicalisation cells in universities; students colluding with each other to hide crime; prostitution in university hostels; increased cases of organised crime involving students or where institutions act as centres of crime; ethnic and political alliances where national politicians engage university students during political campaigns; and general laxity or lack of attention to security concerns in universities and constituent colleges. (Ligami, 2018) As mentioned earlier, concerned by criminal and terror networks, Kenyan authorities are tightening up regulations relating to the entry of foreign students. All foreign students were obliged from January 2018 to obtain police clearance before being considered for admission into a Kenyan higher education institution. In terms of the new regulations, foreign students are required to write a letter addressed to the immigration director indicating the course they intend to pursue and its duration. They will also be required to provide copies of their academic certificates, proof of funds, and a commitment letter from their sponsor.

Appraising the response According to the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), universities have a significant role to play in fighting global terror by guaranteeing solid education and boosting access to students seeking education to improve their livelihoods. DAAD argues that terrorism should never stop students and higher education institutions from fulfilling their mission towards personal and national development, and claims that ‘access to a solid education is a strong weapon against any form of terrorism’. The organisation argues therefore that universities should play a greater role in combatting rising cases of extremism in students by countering radicalisation and encouraging peaceful coexistence. DAAD has been at the centre of a major project in Kenya aimed at supporting survivors of the 2015 terror attack at Garissa University. At least 300 students of Garissa University College who survived the April terror attack have since been supported by the German government via scholarships for the continuation of their studies. But combatting extremism, especially in the light of some of the measures proposed by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Kenya mentioned earlier, will always draw the opposite response. Organisations representing the heads of universities in ten European countries have recently signed a declaration in Vienna, warning against tendencies to restrict academic freedom and threats to democracy, and defining the role of higher education in society. Representatives of rectors’ conferences from Germany, Italy, Croatia, Poland, Switzerland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Serbia, and the Czech Republic met to take stock of growing trends in society towards ‘pseudo-science’ and ‘pseudo-facts’. In their ‘Vienna Declaration’, the rectors stress the significance of the Magna Charta Universitatum, and refer to the holistic concept of education emphasised in the Charta. The Vienna Declaration emphasises higher education’s contribution to society in promoting intercultural understanding, equal access to education, and active citizenship, as well as ethical 335

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education and strengthening social responsibility but acknowledges also that ‘movements’ that are evolving both in and beyond Europe are threatening the democratic character of higher education institutions. In another international campaign to involve youth in a campaign to reject violent extremism, UNESCO has launched a project in the North African countries of Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan. The project aims to empower youth in the fight against extremism and strengthen the capacities of universities and other educational institutions to contribute to national prevention efforts. Funded by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre and the government of C ­ anada, UNESCO’s pilot project is entitled ‘Youth Preventing Violent Extremism’. The project aims to promote ‘global citizenship education’ as a tool to prevent extremism and strengthen the capacities of national education systems to appropriately and effectively contribute to ­national prevention efforts. According to UNESCO, ‘Global citizenship education’ empowers students to become active local and global promoters of peaceful, tolerant, inclusive, secure, and sustainable societies by instilling the values, attitudes, and behaviours that support creativity, innovation, and a commitment to peace, human rights, and sustainable development (UNESCO, 2017). But it is a contested term that fails to recognise the realities in society and contradictions embodied by the term. Indeed, there is an argument that ‘global citizenship education’ can in fact contribute to youth radicalisation and terrorism engagement once the disjuncture between global citizenship values and local and global economic and socio-political realities becomes clear. What is important, however, is the recognition by UNESCO that the problem of extremism, and the radicalisation and recruitment of young people into organisations that promote violent extremism, needs to be tackled long before they enrol in universities. Johnson (forthcoming) discussed an international study into the context, culture, and curriculum of fourteen countries. He argues that what is taught in the classroom is key to safeguarding a peaceful future. But education systems around the world are currently failing to tackle the prejudice that can lead to a dehumanisation of others and the justification of violence. Generations of schoolchildren continue to receive information that misrepresents minorities, fails to explicitly condone violence, and creates an identity rooted in exclusivity and superiority. This misinformation is a major obstacle to tackling today’s most demanding challenges. With prejudicial views being systematically transferred to the next generation, extremism will continue to find a place in society. Reversing this requires a global commitment to remove content in curricula that reinforces hatred, nurtures independent thinkers with skills to challenge binary, reductionist hate speech, and recognises the importance of an education that challenges prejudice. There has been a long-term intention towards reform worldwide. But change is ­time-critical; intention alone cannot prevent future conflicts. The study, based on research conducted in forty-seven schools in sixteen states, in which it speaks to 614 students, shows the true scale of the problem. Each country has unique challenges; none is without flaws. It shows that classrooms have significant influence on young peoples’ lives, shaping their view of the world around them. As school attendance rates continue to rise globally, education is a tool for developing students’ resilience to the pull of extremist ideology, offering a counter-narrative. Textbooks and classroom resources were analysed to understand the content of curricula in each country. The findings illustrate how effective international pressure has been in revising curricula and removing unacceptable content from textbooks. However, often it is not the content that is of greatest concern, but the way subjects are taught in classrooms. As such, this research explored the culture of teaching in the various countries, and the extent 336

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to which teacher attitudes shaped the worldviews of their students. It reveals how many teachers lack confidence in preparing students for the challenges of the outside world. The great paradox of education is that it can be used for good or ill. Extremist groups violently attack educational institutions. But they also use the educational systems they control to indoctrinate the young. State education systems can also make young people more vulnerable to radicalisation, while not necessarily promoting extremism. Understanding these trends is essential for informing policy to help win this urgent battle for young minds.

Conclusion The paper shows that universities offer spaces that are contested by extremist groups seeking to use them for radicalisation, recruitment, and sometimes as violent ideological and religious battlegrounds as we have seen in the case of Kenya. The number of unconnected illustrations of the susceptibility of young people to the lure of extremism (for whatever reason) and the tactics and strategies of extremist groups to increase their ranks reveals the extent of the problem (Ajala, 2019). But tackling the problem is a fine balance between the protection of rights and freedoms and intelligence that might undermine such freedoms. How do we deal with these dilemmas? I draw here on some of the lessons learned in studies on the role of education in combating extremism. In a number of proposals to reduce violent extremism through education, governments need to better understand the scale of the challenge. In the study by Johnson (forthcoming), it is clear that all fourteen states in both developing and developed countries, researchers identified clear cases of education failing to equip young people with the skills to resist extremist ideology. Political failure to reform education systems, curriculum content, and classroom culture was at the heart of the issue. These failings, it is fair to argue, carry through to higher education and tackling them at that stage may be too late. In the higher education systems studied in this chapter, there are clear discrepancies between ministry agendas and realities on educating against extremism. In many countries, curriculum frameworks or policies handed down by the government promote critical thinking and tolerance, or the instruction to contest extremist ideologies. But teachers and university lecturers are unclear on how to translate these ideals to effective pedagogy. A failure to equip teachers to enact changes in the curriculum has meant that reform that looks good in theory has not made a difference in practice. Instead, the personal biases and agendas of unsupported or radical teachers or lecturers have prevailed. It is the case too that education systems regularly conflate religion with national identity and good citizenship. This politicised use of religious education is evident in varying degrees across the countries studied in this chapter. Textbooks and other sources of material used in higher education and schools are characterised by omissions and ambiguity on contentious topics, more than any directly prejudicial content. This contributes to the failure of education systems in preparing young people for the realities of a diverse and globalised world. Materials used are damaging in what they fail to say about the other side in the decades-long conflict, as much as open bias or dehumanisation. There is a growing international consensus around the importance of education in promoting tolerance and building resilience against extremist ideologies. But much more is yet to be done. In tackling the problem early, too many countries still teach prejudicial and discriminatory content in their schools. And yet, many more have expressed a desire for reform, though they have taken little action, and are failing to convert words into deeds. Teaching open-mindedness around religion, belief, and culture will require difficult discussions to be had. 337

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While open-minded education must be a central plank of government approaches, it is teachers and lecturers who put policy into practice and play a crucial role in forming the behaviours and attitudes of young people. Teaching styles in both schools and in higher education institutions in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Kenya are based on teacher-centred learning rather than student-centric practice which fails to enable students to deal with difficult and challenging ideas. But to return to the bigger debate, that is tackling the presenting threat of violent extremism, of radicalisation on university campuses and of the active, open recruitment of university students to the Jihadist and other extremist movements, here the response is at best tentative. We have seen in this chapter a number of policy-directed responses aimed at closing down spaces, or reclaiming spaces currently occupied by extremist ideologies. We have seen an increasing awareness of the importance of intelligence and the need for coordinated and coherent responses. We have seen evidence of better policing and zero tolerance stances. The debate on whether the university as ‘space’ – where radical, new, and challenging scientific thought is fashioned – should continue to be ‘free space’ even when it is contested by those seeking to ferment extremist ideologies that threaten world peace and stability will sadly continue.

References Ajala, I. (2019) Tunisian terrorist fighters: A grassroots perspective. Behavioural Science of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 11(2), 178–190. Aslam, M. (2017) Report in World University News, www.universityworldnews.com, Number 0457, April 2017. Campelo, N., Oppetit, A., Neau, F., Cohen, D., & Bronsard, G. (2018) Who are the European youths willing to engage in radicalisation? A multidisciplinary review of their psychological and social profiles. European Psychiatry, 52, 1–14. Christmann, K. (2012) Preventing religious radicalisation and violent extremism: A systematic review of the research evidence. London: Youth Justice Board. Conway, M. (2017) Determining the role of the internet in violent extremism and terrorism: Six suggestions for progressing research. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40(1), 77–98. Desmarais, S., Simons-Rudolph, J., Shahan Brugh, C., Schilling, E., & Hoggan, C. (2017) The state of scientific knowledge regarding factors associated with terrorism. Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 4(4), 180–209. Gill, P. (2007) A multi-dimensional approach to suicide bombing. International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 1(2), 142–159. Glees, A., & Pope, C. (2005) When students turn to terror: Terrorist and extremist activity on British campuses. London: The Social Affairs Unit. Greenberg, K. (2016) Counter-radicalization via the internet. Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 668, 167–179. Hafez, M., & Mullins, C. (2015) The radicalization puzzle: A theoretical synthesis of empirical ­approaches to homegrown extremism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38(11), 958–975. Hardy, K. (2018) Comparing theories of radicalisation with countering violent extremism policy. Journal for Deradicalisation, 15, 76–109. Horgan, J. (2008) From profiles to pathways and roots to routes: Perspectives from psychology on radicalization into terrorism. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 618, 80–94. Horgan, J. (2014) The psychology of terrorism. London: Routledge. Jensen, M., Atwell Seate, A., & James, P. (2018) Radicalization to violence: A pathway approach to studying extremism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 1–24, doi: 10.1080/09546553.2018.1442330 Klausen, J. (2015) Tweeting the jihad: Social media networks of Western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38(1), 1–22. Koehler, D. (2014) The radical online: Individual radicalization processes and the role of the internet. Journal for Deradicalization, 15, 116–134.

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Extremism in universities in Asia and Africa Koehler, D. (2017) Understanding deradicalization: Methods, tools and programs for countering violent extremism. Abingdon: Routledge. Ligami, C. (2018) Report in World University News, www.universityworldnews.com, Number 0511, June 2018. McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2008) Mechanisms of political radicalization: Pathways toward terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 20(3), 415–433. McDowell-Smith, A., Speckhard, A., & Yayla, A. (2017) Beating ISIS in the digital space: Focus testing ISIS defector counter-narrative videos with American college students. Journal for Deradicalization, 10, 50–76. Moghaddam, F. (2005) The staircase to terrorism: A psychological exploration. American Psychologist, 60(2), 161–169. Neumann, P. (2013) The trouble with radicalization. International Affairs, 89(4), 873–893. Nurdiani, R. (2018) Report in World University News, www.universityworldnews.com, Number 0513, July 2018. Saeed, T., & Johnson, D. (2016) Intelligence, global terrorism and higher education: Neutralising threats or alienating allies? British Journal of Educational Studies, 64(1), 37–51. Sageman, M. (2007) Leaderless jihad: Terror networks in the twenty-first century. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Sieckelinck, S., & Gielen, A. (2018) Protective and promotive factors building resilience against violent radicalisation (RAN Issue Paper). Amsterdam: Radicalisation Awareness Network. Silber, M., & Bhatt, A. (2007) Radicalization in the West: The homegrown threat. New York: New York City Police Department. Silke, A. (1998) Cheshire-cat logic: The recurring theme of terrorist abnormality in psychological research. Psychology, Crime and Law, 4(1), 51–69. Taarnby, M. (2005) Recruitment of Islamist terrorists in Europe: Trends and perspectives. Aarhus: Centre for Cultural Research. The Global Terrorism Index (2018) Institute for Economics and Peace and the National Consortuim for the study of terrorism and responses to terrorism. Maryland. Tsang, S. (ed.) (2008) Intelligence and human rights in the era of global terrorism. Stanford: Stanford University Press. UNESCO (2017) Promotion and Implementation of Global Citizenship Education in Crisis Situations. Paris: UNESCO. Wilner, A., & Dubouloz, C. (2010) Homegrown terrorism and transformative learning: An interdisciplinary approach to understanding radicalization. Global Change, Peace & Security, 22(1), 33–51.

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PART VII

Universities, security and secret intelligence Diplomatic, journalistic and policy perspectives

24 BETWEEN LUCKY JIM AND GEORGE SMILEY The public policy role of intelligence scholars Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman Introduction The study of intelligence, as an academic field, continues to grow, as does the public’s ­fascination with it. Yet, lots of empirical gaps remain, often for good and necessary reasons. The layers of secrecy have historically ensured that the intelligence community is insulated and denied access (intentionally or otherwise) to the world of academia and all the research resources and findings present within it. We would naturally expect that there would be very limited prospects for research impact in this field of government activity (particularly for those who study it) and yet, as shown by the analysis of this chapter, the opposite is true. This chapter primarily concerns the impact academia can have on the government’s ­analytical function.1 In doing so, it aims to speak to several important agendas for researchers engaged in the arts, humanities and social sciences aiming to generate ‘research impact’ and policy relevance. Narrowly, it evaluates the generation of impact with the UK’s government’s central machinery for analysis, and it does this via a series of UK research council funded projects, collectively known as ‘Lessons Learned’. More widely, the chapter aims to speak to agendas of those seeking to engage with government and a public accountability both for the research council money we secured for this project and also in terms of how academia has been engaging with government. The ‘Lessons Learned’ projects we focus on have gone through four iterations, ­beginning in 2008. The first iteration was initially funded by an internal university grant which covered the development of a requirements-led seminar series held at the Cabinet Office and Foreign Office (Dover & Goodman 2011). 2 This then became an AHRC-funded project that was run in conjunction with the Ministry of Defence and the ­Cabinet Office to provide advice on developments in academic literature, as well as support r­ equirements-led papers and seminars. For the third iteration, we made applications to our respective university’s enterprise projects to secure funding for a fractional appointment to work on matching government needs and academic capabilities. For the fourth iteration, the AHRC funded the project again, this time partnered only with the Cabinet Office, which had a tighter set of terms around the provision of policy-related academic papers and seminars, but with the addition of the right of initiation of projects from the academic organisers. We refer to these four iterations collectively as ‘Lessons Learned’ because they all 343

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retain the core concepts of: (1) matching government analysts with appropriate academic expertise, (2)  providing open source challenge to government and (3) promoting interchange ­between the two communities that ensured the relationship incorporates sufficient ­elements of uploading as well as downloading to and from the academic community. Within the ‘lessons learned’ project – it should be noted – we actively approached the scholars for this work – rather than issuing an open call – based on two criteria: (1) subject matter expertise, and (2) a track record of communicating their research to policy officials or those outside of academic circles but within discrete settings. We faced the challenge of these incentive structures with those who contributed to the ‘lessons learned’ project and we settled upon a pattern of contributors editing and revising their existing research for ­W hitehall stakeholders, rather than the creation of original research to fit a task, as this fell outside of impact criteria, they could claim credit for with their institution.

The mechanics of research impact with the security community The practical business of government intelligence and security exists, in the main, in c­ onditions of (necessary) secrecy, and consequently there are additional challenges to recording impact than might otherwise be the case with less security focussed parts of government. There has historically been a measure of ad-hoc interaction between the UK Government’s analytical community with individual academics and, of course, with those in privileged or knowledgeable positions outside of the community, but without the necessity to acknowledge that work. Universities – being public institutions, albeit funded in an increasingly private way – are a key source of knowledge and innovation for the country. It is not a new territory to make the case that there are untapped synergies between academia and the security communities.

The value derived and the impact generated Driving our approach were a series of considerations about how both communities could ­derive mutual benefit and, by extension, generate impact: (i) engagement with academics who have conducted research on similar topics to those being investigated by intelligence analysts using open source data has the benefit of providing critical checks and balances, as well as enrichment of a fragmentary dataset; (ii) engagement between academia and analysts from a closed intelligence community provides a forum for challenging conventional wisdom and assessments made largely on the basis of intelligence, and to reduce mirror imaging and group-think in a unique forum; (iii) engagement with academia provides a valuable analytical resource: it can provide trends analysis based on statistical data capture applicable to a range of thematic topics using both random and structured sampling; and (iv) ­engagement with the academic community may serve to enrich knowledge and the intelligence ­picture, providing information and knowledge left gapped by intelligence coverage. The definition of intelligence varies considerably. The classic definition was provided by Sherman Kent nearly seventy years ago. Kent’s definition divides intelligence into three parts: intelligence as knowledge, intelligence as an organisation and intelligence as an activity (Kent, 1949). This gives us some insight into the nature of intelligence: it is an organisational activity that produces knowledge. Both the intelligence and academic communities seek to advance knowledge and to do so via the selection of, and discrimination between, various sources of information. Both communities try to make robust assessments that have utility in the real world. As such, both spheres share a common core purpose, albeit delivered to different ends. 344

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For the less sensitive areas of government, interaction with the UK’s academic community has been widely encouraged, and schemes put in place to facilitate it. There have been successive moves in central government to encourage civil servants not only to seek outside expert views, but to have the implementation of policies tested by expert outsiders. In 2013, the UK Government established a network of seven independent centres to inform government decision-making through the provision of independently assessed evidence. The ‘What Works Network’ covers a range of policy areas, including: crime, health care, social care and education. Amongst others, the London School of Economics acts as a host for the What Works Centre dedicated to looking at local economic growth (UK Government, ­August 2015). In 2015, the What Works initiative expanded further in its outreach to academia by establishing a Cross-Government Trial Advice Panel, funded by the Economic and Social ­Research Council (ESRC).3 The panel, comprising twenty-five academics, was established to educate civil servants in the use of experimental and quasi-experimental research methods (Cabinet Office, 2015). By 2015, a considerable infrastructure had been put in place by the Cabinet Office to encourage civil servants to seek external expertise, including academia, to inform a wide range of policy making areas under the Open Policy Making initiative, using the ‘latest analytical techniques, and taking an agile, iterative approach to implementation’ (UK ­Government, 2015). These clearly demonstrate a significant effort by the UK Government to utilise external expertise from, amongst others, the academic community. However, engagement between the spheres of policy making and the academic community is unlikely to be replicated at an equal scale between academia (and particularly those parts which study intelligence) and the national security community, largely due to the obvious requirement for secrecy and the protection of sensitive information. Two major reviews into issues of National Security have highlighted the importance of more engagement between the two spheres. In 2004, the first major review into the intelligence underpinnings of the Iraq War (Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, more commonly known as the Butler Report) made several recommendations encouraging the value of engagement between the national security ­community and academia. The first recommendation was to provide an outlet for analysts within a closed national security community to challenge conventional wisdom, received options and assessments based largely on actively gathered intelligence. It was from this recommendation that the ‘lessons learned’ project sprang, and the benchmark against which we set for the project. Our interaction has included a number of disparate aspects, funded by a variety of b­ odies. They include several ESRC and AHRC-funded seminar series which brought together academics and government security practitioners to have structured discussions around the development of intelligence activity in the twenty-first century. The more significant interaction occurred via an RCUK Global Uncertainties grant in partnership with the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Office. The grant was used to commission academic research into subjects of use and relevance to both departments. Topics were either pre-selected by the government, or via a process in which topics could be suggested. The principal findings were based upon the use of ‘contemporary historical’ events (ranging from sixty years to a few months) for two purposes: reflecting examples of good and bad analyses with the objective of identifying process lessons; and using the history and evolution of a given event to provide high-level context to an ongoing issue. The research output was exhibited in two ways: the publication of an edited collection of papers by Georgetown University Press called Learning from the Secret Past; and the publication on the AHRC’s Policy Publications site of a series of commissioned reports.4 345

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Taken together, the benefit accrued – or the real-world impact – of these provides the potential to reduce the cognitive biases of ‘mirror-imaging’ and ‘group-think’, allowing analysts to discuss assessments and theories with subject matter experts who may provide a different perspective based on a different body of source material. Whilst not formally part of the challenge function another aspect of our involvement – the King’s Intelligence Studies Programme (of which one author leads and the other has been involved) – is a good example of a higher education platform where government analysts are encouraged to move beyond the tunnel vision of their specific day jobs to reflect upon their activity in a wider context (Goodman & Omand, 2008). Engagement with academia for the purpose of challenge analysis may benefit a closed national security community by providing an additional avenue for systematic and structured challenges. Whilst there is a wide difference in research methodology across different areas of academia, it can be broadly said that professional academics will have achieved a high ­degree of proficiency in terms of research practice, critiquing evidence and argument through doctoral training, peer review and professional engagement within the academic community. There are certainly de-minimis standards for UK PhD students in research-intensive ­universities – that is driven by research council recognition – around research training and the rigours of peer review enforce these standards for career academics. Butler recommended that challenge analysis should be a systematic function of the UK’s intelligence assessments: “Challenge should be an accepted and routine part of the assessment process as well as an occasional formal exercise, built into the system” (Butler, 2004). Whilst we have aspired to embed such a system, by pushing it from the academic side, we have little evidence that this is occurring within the practitioner community. The second key benefit outlined by Butler is the potential for widening the range of information available to the analysts within the closed national security community: “We emphasise the importance of the Assessments Staff and the JIC [ Joint Intelligence Committee] having access to a wide range of information, especially in circumstances where information on political and social issues will be vital” (Butler, 2004). Academics within research-intensive universities are likely to have more time in which to produce in-depth assessments and have the freedom to conduct structured fieldwork. Furthermore, the range of sources of information available to academics, unencumbered by any restrictions of official secrecy, is potentially wider than that of a closed national security community. In our dealings with Whitehall and other law enforcement communities (broadly defined), there have been significant challenges for officials to get hold of research materials that academics think of as their bedrock, such as electronic journal holdings ( JSTOR and similar), which are blocked by financial and structural considerations, and that when access is granted, the size of these databases is often overwhelming for the analyst fresh to them. Following extensive consultation within the intelligence community and external subject matter experts, the Blackett Review of High Impact Low Probability Risks (2011) identified several recommendations to strengthen the government’s approach to assessing strategic shocks which could, in turn, be applied more widely across government. While the recommendations of the Blackett Review built upon the practices that existed within the community, one of the key factors in the review was the need for the UK Government to include a greater measure of external expertise in their assessment processes. Of the eleven recommendations identified by the Blackett Review, six concern engagement between closed intelligence communities and academia, three of which were specifically addressed to the Cabinet Office, where the central analytical function of the community sits. The Blackett Review highlighted 346

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many benefits for the intelligence community of engaging more fully with the academic community: to inform key risk assumptions; to inform judgements and analysis; to better detect early signs of strategic shock or surprise; to inform the development of internal and external risk communication strategies; and to strengthen the scrutiny of the National Risk Assessment. Although these recommendations were identified in the context of a specific type of risk assessment, the recommendations are widely applicable to other areas of assessment and analysis across the UK Government, and should be seen in their widest context.5 The range of possible benefits that can be imputed through the Butler and Blackett reviews are certainly sufficient to warrant a further and deeper exploration into the operational ­elements of an enduring relationship between the two communities. Part of that analysis comes from making a comparison between fundamental elements of the activities of the two communities, and part comes from understanding where the differences in source information and methodological approaches may lead to limitations in engagement. Elsewhere, we have explored these issues in depth, but the bottom line is that each community has much to gain from the other (Dover, Goodman & White, 2017).

The benefits of greater engagement Our interaction with the security community has extended for more than a decade. Based on this long and continuing engagement, a number of important benefits can be identified in trying to get the two communities to work together more effectively. This section will consider these, as well as highlighting some of the obstacles that need to be overcome or, at least, borne in mind when considering such engagement in the future. As argued in the Butler Report, the main benefit to the closed national security community from enhanced cooperation comes in the form of challenge analysis. Engaging with individuals who have conducted research on similar topics using open source data has the benefit of providing quality control, corroboration or confirmation methods, as well as the enrichment of the national security community’s fragmentary dataset. In this way, and if organised effectively, engagement with academia offers a closed national security community the benefit of an additional open source capability drawn from organisations specifically geared to providing all source analysis. Systematic engagement with academia may also provide the benefit of external peer review, particularly on technical issues (Butler, 2004). It is a missed opportunity that there is no intelligence and security version of the UK Defence Academy’s Staff College (an idea that was initially mooted by academics to the Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis (PHIA) in 2008 and subsequently published in IISS’s Strategic Balance) as a means by which to place these symbiotic relationships on a firmer footing. We have argued – in print, very recently – that this is something that requires urgent reform and investment (Devanny, Dover, Goodman & Omand, 2018). A related area of potential benefit is in the provision of an alternative avenue of corroboration and validation. Engagement with the academic community offers the government’s analytical community a substantial intellectual resource capable of providing key contextual insight. This can be provided in the following ways: 1 Trends analysis based on statistical data capture applicable to a range of thematic topics using both random and structured sampling. Similarly, with qualitative research methods, of historical trends and essential context. 2 Corroboration or validation from academic research that has undergone more rigorous testing and research techniques. 347

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3 Corroboration or validation from academic research conducted at a more granular level in terms of topic matter. 4 Corroboration or validation analysis from academic research derived from a wider or alternative pool of information. Finally, a key benefit is the enrichment of knowledge and the intelligence picture. The national security community’s necessity to respond to short-term customer-placed requirements will inevitably leave significant gaps in the knowledge generated by intelligence coverage. Whilst the knowledge enrichment that can be provided by academia is likely to be more contextual and environmental than the core business of intelligence, it still has its necessary place and value in the ability to correctly interpret information about other regions and cultures. The government’s national security community could quite feasibly increase its contacts across a wide range of disciplines, research organisations, universities and think tanks both in the UK and abroad. In doing so, it may be able to leverage or influence the direction of researchers without necessarily having to provide funding, although the reciprocity of the relationship is likely to have to be proved over the medium term to sustain such an arrangement. Access to the views of the national security community on mutual topics of interest, and the chance to use academic research to inform and impact upon decision-making on issues of national security, is likely to be incentive enough to achieve involvement from a sufficient portion of the relevant academic community. However, the benefit of engagement is not all balanced on the side of the national security community. Academia and academics stand to benefit in several ways through closer interaction between the two worlds. Like the national security community, the first benefit to academia comes in corroboration and challenge analysis. For academics, engagement with individuals who are analysing similar topics using classified data has the benefit of providing them with informal measures of quality control, corroboration or confirmation to academic hypotheses and judgements. Similarly, to the benefits that a closed analytical community could derive from engagement with academia, academia may gain the benefit of external peer review, the reduction of their own collective group-think and mirror imaging, and the provision of a unique arena for challenging from those with unique and unrepeatable datasets. However, this is obviously heavily contingent on the ability and willingness of a closed analytical community to be able to communicate assessments in confidence at an unclassified or open level. Such willingness is very closely aligned with issues of trust. This will be ­dependent on the internal risk versus benefits assessment of the closed analytical community, and places the academic in a supplicant position as regards knowing or understanding the quality of information they are receiving. The second benefit comes from the enrichment of knowledge. Where a closed national ­security community could benefit from being able to close information and knowledge gaps by steering or influence academic research, the academic community can equally gain from this process by being given a unique insight into areas of research that would have an impact and benefit for national security and official policy. This could provide a high impact for future academic research commissioned or approved by academic funding bodies and higher ­education institutions. There is a pressure within academic departments to be connected more with external stakeholders, and thus for most academics, whilst the intellectual ­advantages of engaging with the national security community will be very real, the necessity and demand to be impacting on the practitioner community will also play a part in driving engagement with the national security community. 348

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Navigating the divide: overcoming obstacles and developing best practice The crossover of the two communities is not without fundamental pressures and tensions: it does not necessarily follow that scholarship can be directly applied to the business of the national security community. Academic output is not geared to directly influence ­decision-making or government policy, nor is it necessarily written in a way that assists the official in making such decisions. Gaining the maximum benefit of closer interaction ­between academics and government analysts is likely to require sensitive negotiation. There are three key complications or obstacles to engagement between the two communities: the need for secrecy; the need for speed and the changing requirements of the intelligence community. The simplest, and arguably most effective, forms of engagement are those involving ­in-house talks, lectures and discussions either held at a location in the academic community, or within the national security community. These events may be of varying size, depending on the complexity of the topic, the range of subject matter experts available and the level of interest. It is reasonable to assume that specifically tailored and structured in-house events could offer high-level cost-effectiveness in terms of the time available to government analysts. In this way, engagement between the two communities takes the form of a flexible liaison resource with the ability to gain high impact tailored to specific targeting.

Conclusion Systematic engagement with outside agencies, be they private industry, public bodies or third sector organisations, is increasingly the norm for British academics. There are good moral, intellectual and practical reasons to promote this impact, in addition to the contractual compulsion engaged that is generated by the presence of the impact agenda in the Research Excellence Framework in the 2014 exercise and the one that reports in 2021. We have focussed our attention on a narrow field of inquiry: that of intelligence studies scholars interacting with national security practitioners, but the lessons we outline in this chapter, and those which are left to be drawn from our data, contribute to the wider understanding of how research impact works and how it can be optimised. These lessons are not unique to national security; indeed, we think that they are capable of being applied to all controlled professions, be they security-based, those involving vulnerable people or those involving economics, trade or intellectual property: any sector where the practitioner partners have an obligation of confidentiality. We have focussed on a disciplinary area where it should be more difficult to secure access, precisely because the partner organisations are the objects of our research. For those academic disciplines who do to share these referent objects, we would expect that impact partnerships should be more straightforward to form, but that the lessons we have drawn would still be relevant. There are many synergies and benefits to be drawn for both the national security and academic communities from working more closely together. There are also some significant challenges to be faced in embedding the relationship further, and these challenges threaten to overshadow the utility of the engagement. A number of important points emerge: The recommendations of Blackett and Butler strongly suggested a systematic approach to academic engagement, but this is yet to be achieved in any meaningful way, even with the presence of the ‘lessons learned project’. Whilst ‘lessons learned’ provides one avenue through which Whitehall officials can access academic expertise, help and support, the lack of process around how to approach academic support generally can be a source of frustration to officials. 349

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One option would be a more iterative and ongoing support than the production of a context piece or discreet essay that constitutes open source challenge. For the ‘lessons learned’ project, this was clearly a challenge beyond our remit or funding, but for the wider issue of academic engagement, it clearly is essential. The challenges that come with this are security vetting, line management, university management alignment and that currently there are no incentive structures in place within academia to promote this as a valuable way of working for academics. Whilst this chapter has largely focussed on research impact, there are clearly further benefits in education and training opportunities within the UK’s university systems to members of the intelligence, security and law enforcement community (Goodman & Omand, 2008). The engagements enjoyed, for example, by King’s College London with the Ministry of Defence at the UK Defence Academy and the Royal College of Defence Studies, by Brunel University with the UK Ministry of Defence, and the University of Leicester with the NATO Defense College, have produced very strong research and professional exchange (built upon a long history of interaction with academia) and should be replicable by the national security community, even if only in a virtual form due to the financial resource required in such initiatives. In research terms, the benefits of the collaboration between the security community and academia are mostly instrumental in nature: improved information resources, methods and validation techniques for both communities. Some of the benefits can be located in professional enrichment: from working with skilled professionals from outside of a respective community bubble, and in improving professional techniques. However, significant barriers to developing a closer relationship between the two worlds are likely to remain: security, timeliness, money, organisation and motivation are hindrances that require a recalibration of existing relationships, culture and system. The clichéd claim that these changes need to occur solely in the national security community is too simple. Changes are equally required in individual scholars, their universities and the funding councils, with the emphasis falling on the last two. Yet, the intellectual justification for trying to square these bureaucratic circles, and the benefits that stand to be gained by both worlds are considerable. Enhanced engagement between the two worlds is already increasing, with the development of a security research hub, hosted by a consortium of universities led by Lancaster University, and – as previously noted – in the academic boards being established in the MoD and FCO as well as the NCA’s Specials Programme (Lancaster University, 2015). Such initiatives have the power to alter the course of research undertaken by the fields of intelligence studies, defence studies and international relations, increasing and enriching the pool of knowledge available to inform national security decision-making. Despite some difficulties and obstacles in managing an engagement relationship between academia and the national security community, in an era of diversifying national security threats to the United Kingdom interaction between these two worlds should be the rule, rather than the exception.

Notes 1 It should be noted that ‘intelligence analyst’ is now a recognised government vocation and profession: www.gov.uk/government/organisations/civil-service-intelligence-analysis-profession/ about (accessed 7th November 2016). 2 Requirements is the technical term for a request for information and/or analysis within government. 3 The ESRC is one of the national research councils, funded centrally but administered outside of government control.

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References Butler (2004), Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, (HMSO: London). Cabinet Office (2015), The Cross-Government Trial Advice Panel, HMSO: London www.gov.uk/ government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f ile/451336/the_Cross-Government_ Trial_Advice_Panel.pdf (accessed 6 November 2015). Devanny, J; Dover, R; Goodman, M & Omand, D (2018), Why We Need Greater Professionalisation of the Craft of Intelligence Analysis: Creating Britain’s Intelligence Analysis College, RUSI Journal, 163/3, 78–89. Dover, R & Goodman, M (2011), Learning Lessons from the Secret Past, (Georgetown University Press: Washington). Dover, R; Goodman, M & White, M (2017), ‘Chapter 25: Two Worlds, One Common Pursuit: Why Greater Engagement with the Academic Community Could Benefit the UK’s National Security’ in Dover, R; Dylan, H & Goodman, M (Eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Security, Risk and Intelligence (Palgrave: London), 461–477. Goodman, M & Omand, D (2008), What Analysts Need to Understand: The Kings Intelligence Studies Programme, Studies in Intelligence, 52/4, 57–65, (December 2008). Goodman, M (2015), Writing the Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research: www.paccsresearch.org.uk/blog/writing-the-official-­h istoryof-the-joint-intelligence-committee/ (accessed 7 November 2016). Goodman, M (2015), The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee: 1, (Routledge: Abingdon). Jervis, R (2010), Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War, (Cornell University Press: New York). Johnston, R (2005), Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study, (CIA: Langley). Kent, S (1949), Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, (Princeton University Press: Princeton). Lancaster University (2015), National Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, www.­ lancaster.ac.uk/security-lancaster/news-and-events/news/2015/national-centre-for-researchand-­evidence-on-security-threats/ (accessed 5 November 2015). National Crime Agency, Special Officer Scheme, www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/careers/specials ­(accessed 7 November 2016). Stern, N (2016), Research Excellence Framework Review: Building on Success and Learning from Experience, (HMSO: London). UK Government (August 2015), The What Works Network, HMSO: London www.gov.uk/guidance/ what-works-network (accessed 6 November 2015). UK Government (2015), Open Government Blog, https://openpolicy.blog.gov.uk/tools-and-­techniques/ (accessed 6 November 2015). UK Government (2016), Horizon Scanning Programme Team, www.gov.uk/government/groups/­ horizon-scanning-programme-team (accessed 7 November 2016).

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25 BUT WHAT DO YOU WANT IT FOR? SECRET INTELLIGENCE AND THE FOREIGN POLICY PRACTITIONER Claire Smith Introduction This chapter is based on a short presentation given by the author to open a seminar at the Society for Educational Studies’ Oriel Colloquium on Universities, Security and Intelligence Studies, 21–22 September 2017. The purpose of the presentation was to generate debate. All intelligence reports should come with caveats. This chapter comes with several caveats. It is intended as a provocation, a catalyst for discussion. It is a purely personal view and neither reflects UK government policy nor the views of any other organisation for which the author has worked or continues to work. This chapter is designed to stimulate debate, and makes no claims to be the definitive answer to the question. The presentation’s main thesis is that secret intelligence is highly contingent. For some states and actors, it is never necessary. Users of secret intelligence need to understand something of how it is obtained, what it is not and can never be; why it can be more irksome and unhelpful than illuminating and valuable. Without a setting and framework to shape and tame the production, dissemination and understanding of intelligence, it loses its value to policy-makers and decision-takers. There are sufficient examples of intelligence misunderstood (Butler, 2004) and ­m isapplied to act as further caveats. With a sober and informed awareness of nature and purpose of intelligence, practitioners can move to a consideration of when, where, how, why and if intelligence can support foreign policy formulation and the practice of diplomacy. This chapter fits within the theme of intelligence and education, because it owes a great deal to the postgraduate students encountered over the last eleven years as a guest speaker at universities in the UK. The author’s own career was unconventional, mostly enjoyable and highly varied. Most retired UK public servants publishing articles and books have seen the situation from the mountain top and with a dominant counter-terrorism and conventional security emphasis (Hennessy, 2007; Manningham-Buller, 2007; Mottram, 2007; Omand, 2010; Tebbit, 2007). The author makes no claims to be an academic or a researcher and has not spent a long career acquiring deep academic knowledge of the evolving field of intelligence studies

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(cf. Aldrich, 2010; Andrew, 2009). The author is the product of her time, age, professional formation. This chapter is a different contribution, idiosyncratic, deliberately intended to deepen and extend debate, perhaps to be genuinely educational.

Secret intelligence and the foreign policy practitioner These ideas are largely the product of talking to postgraduate students at UK universities as a guest speaker. I have never been employed by a university, but talking to postgraduate students is one of two consistent activities in my post-bureaucracy existence.1 These postgraduate programmes have covered international relations, security studies, conflict resolution, diplomacy, business studies and management. I have been invited as a former practitioner, not as a researcher or academic. These observations are themselves the products of a learning cycle, where my reflections shape the next phase of my practice, where I invite students through my presentations to consider some of the political, practical and operational realities of the theories they study. These encounters with students then redefine the next iteration of presentations. Along the way, my own recent postgraduate study in a very different discipline2 was itself transformational, furnishing me with alternative ways of structuring and shaping complex foreign policy and security problems. It provided another arena in which to test and refine my own thinking. I have deployed a number of these frameworks in my work, often in case studies, offering students new approaches and encouraging cross-­curricular conversations. Given the significance of the students I have encountered, they and the institutions which have invited me deserve some introduction. Almost all the programmes were at the postgraduate level. None of the institutions belong to the Russell Group.3 The students come from a wide range of nationalities, educational backgrounds and professional formation, age and practical experience of the topics addressed. Many have combined work with study. They have provided a valuable counterpoint to the UK’s classic intelligence backdrop of an Anglophone, four or five eyes community of collaboration.4 Very early in my encounters, I discovered that most of the material published by the most senior retired UK practitioners was of little relevance to my evolving approach of encouraging enquiry and exploration rather than telling and instructing. Rooted in UK-centric ­experience and greatly preoccupied with counter-terrorism, these publications did not meet the needs of the students I was encountering. I have drawn on one exception, a book written by a foreign policy and intelligence practitioner of an earlier period, Percy Cradock, Know your Enemy: How the JIC saw the World (Cradock, 2002). My choice of this source was personal: Sir Percy was my first ambassador. My own career shared some elements of his ­experience but at a more modest level: China, the former German Democratic Republic, and the Joint Intelligence Committee. Most of these experiences cannot be replicated: the GDR is no more, the Cultural Revolution a topic largely reserved for post-doctoral study rather than the defining event of the era and of Sino-UK bilateral relations, of Chinese ­domestic politics, and millions of individual lives, deaths and survivals. My public sector working life was a product of its time and my own work a product of my education and experience. Briefly, I grew up in a period of positive European encouragement: to learn European modern languages, in my case, French, German and Spanish; to travel to Europe, which I did, visiting Germany regularly from the age of fourteen. There was personal, public, institutional and financial encouragement towards higher education. A degree in French and German then required extensive study of literature, literary

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translation and literary analysis. I arrived in Germany for my compulsory year abroad not knowing the vocabulary required to open a bank account. It did not matter: that was the point of the year abroad. Being told by a French bureaucrat a few years later during a short course at ENA that I spoke French like his great-aunt was disconcerting. However, it accurately reflected the age, disposition and style of one of my teachers. Encouragement to public service was another significant strand from school onwards, to apply for what was then called the Civil Service Administrative Stream. From 1979 to the present, a series of postings and experiences: Cambridge and Hong Kong as a language student, China, London, Zurich, Bonn and Islamabad in the FCO. Nothing has been wasted. My first degree led me to work in a Swiss bank and to translate a friend’s PhD thesis;5 that quaint French was fine in Francophone Africa in my post-FCO life when my actual age caught up with my French-speaking age. Bonn saw me on loan to the German Foreign Ministry before a more conventional posting to the Embassy. Turning to the title of this chapter, what does the diplomat, the foreign policy practitioner want secret intelligence for? Let me define my selected characteristics of foreign policy and diplomacy: •

• • • •

the maintenance of purposeful relationships with other significant actors in the world. Like other forms of maintenance, most of it is unspectacular low-profile but necessary and likely to be bitterly regretted if neglected; exploring the art of the possible, ideally on a regular and systematic basis, but in reality, likely to be dictated by the demands of the moment; signalling intent, potentially to warn and deter; dispute resolution, whether for selfish or altruistic reasons, but probably a mixture of both; forming alliances, temporary and permanent.

Underpinning all these is the need to understand and anticipate the actions of others, then to seek to influence and shape them, rather than merely respond. I have carefully avoided defining and describing foreign policy, concentrating on how it is pursued rather than what it is. What we probably all know but may overlook is that legacy shapes present attitudes and approaches. Some call it history rather than legacy. I would add that some of this legacy is emotional, not rational. Some of that emotional legacy provides rich opportunities for calculated and calibrated dredging up and deployment of old grudges and ­g rievances. Some of that legacy retains a certain rawness, immediacy and impact. I would cite ­Germany in 2019, in its present manifestation the partial product of a rapid, brave, necessary but not entirely straightforward reunification. In 2019 Germany, the experiences of 1933–1945 and the post-war separations, state and personal, still leave deep traces. Earlier Germanies continue to form attitudes and responses not wholly explicable through objective analysis. The meaning and experience of intelligence and the services which produce it form one of those traces. Failing to grasp this diminishes any understanding of current ­German attitudes t­ owards the production and use of intelligence. Deeper considerations of this topic lie outside the boundaries of this chapter, and extend beyond the German case study, but certainly inform decisions about how governments decide whether to obtain secret intelligence at all and on what terms. A richer understanding of legacies comes from ­incorporating interpretations offered by literature and the arts, an approach I have occasionally adopted in my university practice, but more frequently in my own sense-making (cf. Böll, 1952; le Carré, 1974, 1979). 354

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There are many ways to structure a study of the post-war German experience. ­ nderstanding the legacies of others, in this case, German legacies, suggests turning to U contemporary German interpretations. The immediate post-war works of Heinrich Böll offer a perfect starting point. Of Böll’s works of the immediate post-Second World War decade, the short story Nicht nur zur Weihnachtstzeit (1952), published in a collection entitled Satiren (Satires6), depicts and mocks post-war sentiment through humour, satire and parody in just over thirty pages of beautifully crafted prose. In the short story, the only effect of the war on Tante Milla is to endanger her beloved traditional German Christmas tree: her protective husband has kept all other unpleasant manifestations of the war from her. Even Tante Milla has to accept that keeping glass Christmas tree ornaments intact is impossible during the unpleasantness of air raids. Narrated by her nephew, the short story describes how attempting to dismantle the tree after the Christmas period of 1946–1947 provokes a psychological crisis. Tante Milla screams solidly for a week, refuses to eat, sleep, drink or speak, to the ­bewilderment of ­doctors and psychiatrists. Her husband Franz decides to re-instate the Christmas tree, and Tante Milla stops screaming. The only way to prevent a relapse is to make every day ­Christmas, with various consequences for the entire family. Tante Milla and her Christmas tree obsession raise post-war themes of painful significance. The narrator admits with hindsight that the family should have realised ‘something was wrong’ with Tante Milla’s Christmas tree fixation. After the war, she insists the tree be re-instated, so ‘everything is just as it was before’. Cousin Franz, a pious boxer, had already warned the family about Tante Milla’s unhealthy Christmas tree fixation, but was ignored because of his profession and his refusal to take any part in the oppressively traditional but largely secular rituals around the tree. Franz calls for the house and Tante Milla to be exorcised, aware of the presence of evil, but again is ignored. Concerned about the effect on his young relatives of taking part every evening in Christmas festivities, Franz seeks protection for them from social services, but as the narrator explains, prosperous people’s children do not end up in the care of social services. A poor man, unmarried, out of place in a solid middle-class business family, Franz’s own religious faith and observance lead him to join a ­monastery. Visiting Franz, the narrator finds him looking more like a convict than a ­religious: life itself is a punishment, Franz tells him. By contrast to the retired priest who joins the fake Christmas celebration every evening and exchanges platitudes with Tante Milla about the good old days, Franz embodies complex contemporary debates about faith and a Church confronted with behaviour at best dubious, ultimately evil; who lives, who dies; burdens of guilt and doubt in survivors. The narrator’s style, rich in euphemism, circumlocution, avoidance of painful facts ­wherever possible, forms part of the satire. He admits that by mentioning the war, ‘he runs the risk of making himself unpopular’, but excuses this because the war plays a part in the story. His carefully benevolent description cannot hide his uncle’s successful profiteering in the war or his cousin’s avoidance of military service. Themes of pretence, playing a part, selective nostalgia, family disintegration, faith and ­piety, mental illness, refusal to confront painful truths, playing with language are part of a satire which simultaneously amuses and discomforts the reader. Re-reading it after forty years, I found that this one short story evoked a post-war Germany of uncomfortable p­ ersonal and societal reckoning and questioning more vividly than factual historical or ­sociological studies. The most common linkage to political events observed by critics and commentators in Muriel Spark’s short novel, The Abbess of Crewe (Spark, 1974), is Watergate (Stannard, 2009, p. 242). An election, eavesdropping, breaking and entering to steal documents potentially to 355

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discredit an opponent, an eventual holding to account of the embattled leader – it appears too obvious to dispute. Yet, questions of the morality of eavesdropping, gathering clandestine information to deceive and mislead, disregarding the consequences of that manipulation in the pursuit of a more pressing objective lead back to Muriel Spark’s wartime employment in what she describes (Spark, 1992, p. 147), as ‘Black Propaganda or Psychological Warfare, the purposeful deceit of the enemy’. The unit in which she worked ran two radio stations purporting to be official German broadcasters, conveying ‘detailed truth with believable lies’ (Spark, 1992, p. 148). One source of material for these believable lies was German POWs: like the nuns in the convent and its garden in The Abbess of Crewe with its ‘secret police of poplars’ (Spark, 1974, p. 7), their accommodation and indeed the trees under which they walked were bugged. Acknowledging that the work in which she was involved was morally problematic, Muriel Spark cites the Stauffenberg plot against Hitler. The unit in which she worked know about it two months in advance from intercepted POW gossip. Moreover, black propaganda had encouraged the generals’ resistance to Hitler, leading them to believe that the Allies would seek peace once Hitler and the Nazi leadership were removed. According to the man heading the unit in which Muriel Spark worked, Sefton Delmer (Spark, 1992, p. 151), he regretted the manner of the German generals’ deaths but had no misgivings about the unit’s contribution to the failure of their plot and their execution: But I cannot say I have any compunction about having raised false hopes in them. For these men and their caste were the original patrons and sponsors of Hitler’s movement. They were the profiteers of the Reich. And they only rose against him when it was clear that he and his war of conquest were doomed. (Spark, (1992), p. 151, quoting Delmer, p. 121 (1962)) Delmer’s attitude exemplifies an ultimate form of contingency – at this time and in this situation, these clandestine and manipulative acts were justified. He changes his view after 1945, acknowledging problematic consequences of the unit’s activities (Delmer, 1962, Part 1 Chapter 1; Part Two). A similar but less extreme approach is taken by the roving Sister Gertrude in The Abbess of Crewe. Pragmatic and cynical, she pursues her own objectives, interpreting doctrine to suit the needs of the situation. A tribe of cannibals is ‘to be converted to the faith with dietary concessions and the excessive zeal of the vegetarian heretics suppressed’ (Spark, 1974, p. 42). When consulted about dissent in the convent, she insists ‘a rebellion against a tyrant is only immoral when it hasn’t got a chance’ (Spark, 1974, p. 43). This short novel treats perennial preoccupations with the morality of clandestine activity, privacy, control, orthodoxy, doctrine, personal ambition, deception and manipulation. As in Böll’s Nicht nur zur Weihnachtszeit (Böll, 1952), parody, satire and humour contribute to the reader’s enjoyment of the works for their intrinsic value as literature, but also lead to reflection and questioning. Accepting them as literature and not be to cited as research sources, they nevertheless illuminate critical questions. Where literature has applied one set of filters, selecting, sorting, editing, distilling, ­h ighlighting and intensifying events and emotion, dramatisation provides another perspective. I have recommended to students the BBC serialisation and dramatisations of Tinker Tailor Solder Spy (1979); and Smiley’s People (1982), to introduce a Soviet-era world. Created before most of the students were born, costumes, locations and filming techniques emphasise differences between the contemporary world and that time. In these examples, fine acting and the timespan of a series rather than a film create an absorbing experience without losing 356

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completely the tension, complexity and ambiguity of the novels, double-distilling them for greater potency. What was the intelligence operating environment at the time of the Cold War? These series offer some versions of the answers. Returning to the title of the chapter, what is secret intelligence? For the purpose of this chapter, secret intelligence is information obtained by governments usually without the knowledge of the target, to obtain privileged insights not available by other means. I want to put to one side all forms of secret intelligence which have no immediate relevance to foreign policy formulation. I shall mention in passing terrorism distraction: I see it distorting and dominating in a misleading way many of the considerations of intelligence most applicable to foreign policy. The reasons for that opinion require another chapter. What makes this intelligence secret? Why is it needed? Let’s address the contingent nature of secrecy. The present leadership of a state, or its chosen form of government, chooses to categorise vast swathes of information as state secrets and protects that information accordingly. Their motives are several: doctrinal in the case of states run by communist parties, remaining in power to bring about the eventual achievement of the communist ideal; a requirement for some to conceal activity which directly contravenes treaty obligations, such as the development and deployment of chemical weapons; in others, a self-preserving need to conceal embarrassing information revealing the chasm between the official version of a glorious nation enjoying the fruits of the wise and benevolent leadership with the daily lived reality of deprivation, cruelty and paranoia. Liberal societies are reluctant to admit that such dictatorships and autocracies enjoy several advantages. Coupled with draconian penalties for revealing this highly protected information, these systems enjoy considerable scope to conceal and deceive. The only way of obtaining insights is through clandestine means, through secret intelligence. What does that mean in practice? An encounter with a student produced the hydrocarbon exploration analogy. What calculations are you making about risk and reward? The geological surveys tell you that there should be exploitable reserves of oil and gas of sufficient quality and quantity to justify project finance. Neighbouring fields are highly productive. There is demand for the product. Every one of your test drills fails. How long do you persist, and at what financial and opportunity cost? Some operating environments are more hostile than others, raising costs and heightening risk. Exploring for secret intelligence may prove an equally expensive, time-consuming and ultimately fruitless exercise. That needs to be understood by those who commission and use intelligence. Or you persist and are ultimately successful. Then comes the so what? question. What if your intelligence services succeed in obtaining some of those highly privileged insights? What are you going to do now? Back to our first question: what do you want intelligence for? The onus is still on the policy-maker and decision-taker to respond, and those responses to intelligence will affect its ultimate usefulness. If senior decision-makers have already made up their minds on a policy or course of action, or believe that have a good understanding of other actors, they may disregard any disconcerting contradictory material. They may simply be too busy to pay attention to a potential new problem, being fully preoccupied with other worries of the moment. As Percy Cradock (Cradock, 2002, p. 297) puts it: The transition from intelligence to policy is often an uncertain one…decisions lie with ministers: they have the privilege of interpreting the facts differently or ignoring them altogether… It is also in the nature of government, with its day to day pressures and concern with immediate issues, that strategic warnings are not always acted upon. 357

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Or as Peter Hennessy writes, (Hennessy, 2012): ‘There are limits to the width and sustainability of human concentration, and every hugely busy Prime Minister has to ration his or her attention’. (p. xxii) Consider the costs of secret intelligence: collecting it undetected, validating it, understanding it, making sense of it, evaluating it, integrating it, protecting it, educating the users. One student asked an excellent question: why not just collect it when you need it? This illumination from a student has become the ballerina and the doughnut case study. The ballet dancer may despair of ever receiving the call to perform a significant role. A regime of rigour and practice seems pointless without the prospect of an audience. Sloth and gloom take over. The dancer neglects the barre and the studio in favour of doughnuts and another hour in bed. When the call to appear comes, the dancer is out of condition, unable to perform. One of the frequently cited justifications for requiring intelligence is threat. Let’s consider threat to the nation. The greatest threats to your nation could be inundation, famine and the unchecked spread of infectious diseases. I doubt secret intelligence will help. One of the most rewarding and productive case studies I have tackled with postgraduate students is the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone. Addressing the causes suggested that secret intelligence would not have pre-empted or mitigated any of them. Another conclusion we drew was the importance of non-state actors in mitigating and resolving the nexus of problems, including private philanthropic foundations. No secret intelligence there. A protracted and sapping border dispute may be the principle threat to national and regional stability and prosperity. Failure to resolve it stems not from a frustratingly partial understanding of the motivations, aims and objectives of the counterparty but from a tangle of long-standing grievances, an absence of better and less bloody ways for young people to earn money and gain status than fighting; a lack of accepted mediators; lack of interest from key external actors. Why would you need privileged insights from secret intelligence to address this problem? Another provocation is that the bulk of foreign policy formulation, dispute resolution and diplomacy requires unspectacular, consistent, sustained professional effort; what Percy ­Cradock calls ‘a capacity, based on a careful study of culture, history and practice, to enter into the mind of a foreign leader and speculate in a relatively informed way on his likely reactions in certain situations’ (Cradock, p. 291). This is a highly unpopular view in an era of diplomacy on the cheap, where blogs and tweets are the chosen means of communication. Neglecting emergent foreign policy problems may produce crises. It is then too late for the slow and solid approach. Crises are, of course, so much more exciting and dramatic than the slow slog of relationship building and daily maintenance. They can be photogenic, appeal to a sense of the dramatic and to the superhero complex. They can become addictive. The underlying wicked problems continue to fester inconveniently after the high-profile visitors have left. I have enjoyed very productive sessions with groups of students as we look at foreign policy problems of their choice. We apply some frameworks from other disciplines, and ask ourselves some hard questions about motives and focus. We have consistently concluded that a number of options are yet to be explored, much less exhausted. We do not need privileged insights to reach that point. Moving to what Mark Lowenthal (2018) calls ‘the governance vectors of secret intelligence, difficult contradictions confront democratic societies’: Good governance of intelligence is important in any state because of the power inherent in knowing things that others do not know or carrying out actions that will also be largely unknown. But good governance of intelligence is much more important in 358

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democracies. First, many aspects of intelligence run counter to concepts or values that are central to democracies… … Second, and closely related to this first set of issues, intelligence agencies function in democracies by permission- by permission of elected officials in the executive and legislature and thus by permission and acceptance of the public Lowenthal. (2018) Let us leave to one side the question of whether good governance of intelligence is more important in one form of political system or another, not least because discussions about intelligence governance in many settings will be totally absent. The important thought is that wider society in democracies should or could be asking the same question as I have posed: what do you want it for? Setting aside moral and ethical reservations or objections to obtaining secret intelligence at all, society may ask the same uncomfortable questions of governments as the thoughtful postgraduates about exhausting all other possibilities before turning to secret intelligence. We have however applied the disciplines and habits of intelligence analysis to our problems with great success. Such basic considerations as identifying the source of information; asking who is telling me this now and for what reason; who funds the person or organisation telling me this; how reliable is this source of information; is it new information or a repackaging of the old; is this circular reporting; what are my informants’ motives; accepting the limits of what is knowable, and living with incompleteness and ambiguity. I would suggest that the present North Korean nexus of issues offers a valuable case study for this approach. Where and how can secret intelligence illuminate the following elements? • • • • • • • • • • • •

the aims and intentions of a secretive dynastic dictatorship; credible and imaginative internationally agreed initiatives to manage aspirant nuclear states; past and current incentives to become a nuclear power; aims and objectives of key external actors; highly contested options, including use of military force; sanctions; unconventional sources of leverage and influence; mapping potential scenarios; competing objectives and ambitions in the region and internationally; future scenarios in the region; legacy questions; and an agreed definition and description of success, with timescales.

Considering which of these factors requires or will be improved by the deployment of secret intelligence returns us to our opening question: what do you want it for? What will you do with this intelligence if and when you acquire it? How will you integrate it into your ­consideration of the problem and how will it inform your policy choices? Back to contingency, this exercise is greatly influenced by the identity of you. For ­example, whether you are a current or permanent member of the UN Security Council; an Asian or non-Asian state; one with a large Korean diaspora population; or one with a strong ­t rading, economic or security relationship with Korea, north or south. You may be a ­non-state actor, yet more influential than a conventional nation state. Lacking the classic intelligence and security services to provide traditional privileged insights, you may however have both access to vast caches of information and the technical ability to interrogate and marshal that information to yield extraordinary results. That is another debate. 359

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Conclusion Universities remain very good places to ask questions such as the one I have posed, but not all universities appear ready to engage with thinking about intelligence, its role, purpose, limitations and benefits. An encouraging evolutionary phase of thoughtful consideration has been partly side-tracked in the rush to be relevant and utilitarian, applied and vocational. The cross-disciplinary approach taken in some disciplines could extend to thinking about intelligence as I have done through literature and dramatisations. Weaving practitioner ­experience into an academic framework of theory is another option. Being prepared to ask the most basic but testing questions such as ‘what do you want it for?’ sharpens minds. The answers to those questions will always be richer when a wider group of practitioners, thinkers and writers contribute regularly to the process.

Notes 1 FCO 1979–2006. 2 MSc in Major Programme Management, Oxford. 3 The Russell Group describes itself on its website, https://russellgroup.ac.uk/about/, accessed 02.01.2019, in these terms: it represents twenty-four leading UK universities which are committed to maintaining the very best research, an outstanding teaching and learning experience and unrivalled links with business and the public sector. 4 The Five Eyes brings the UK, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand into the world’s most complete and comprehensive intelligence alliance. The Five Eyes (FVEY) is widely regarded as the world’s most significant intelligence alliance. The origins of it can be traced back to the context of the Second World War and by its necessity of sharing vital information mainly between Britain and the United States so both countries could enhance their close war effort. https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-five-eyes-the-intelligencealliance-of-the-anglosphere, accessed 02.01.2019. 5 Horlemann, R. (2003) Hong Kong’s Transition to Chinese Rule: The Limits of Autonomy, ­( English-language series of the Institute of Asian Affairs. 6 All translations from the original German are the author’s.

References Aldrich, R.J. (2010) GCHQ. London: Harper Collins. Andrew, C. (2009) The Defence of the Realm: the Authorized History of MI5. London: Penguin. Böll, H. (1952) Nicht nur zur Weihnachstzeit. Cologne: Kiepenheuer and Witsch. Butler Report (2004) Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, House of Commons HC 898, 76, 14 July 2004. Cradock, P. (2002) Know your Enemy: How the JIC saw the World. London: John Murray. Delmer, S. (1962) Black Boomerang: An Autobiography. London: Secker and Warburg. Hennessy, P. (2012) The Secret State: Preparing for the Worst, 1945–2010. London: Penguin. Le Carré, J. (1974) Tinker, Tailor, Solder, Spy. London: Hodder and Stoughton. Le Carré, J. (1979) Smiley’s People. London: Hodder and Stoughton. Lowenthal, M. (2018) The Future of Intelligence. Cambridge: Polity Press. Manningham-Buller, E. (2007) The International Terrorist Threat to the United Kingdom, in Hennessy, P. (ed.), The New Protective State: Government, Intelligence and Terrorism. London: Continuum, pp. 66–73. Hennessy, P. (ed.) (2007) The New Protective State: Government, Intelligence and Terrorism. London: Continuum. Mottram, R. (2007) Protecting the Citizen in the Twenty-First Century, in Hennessy, P. (ed.), The New Protective State: Government, Intelligence and Terrorism. London: Continuum, pp 42–65. Omand, D. (2007a) Reflections on Secret Intelligence, in Hennessy, P. (ed.), The New Protective State: ­G overnment, Intelligence and Terrorism. London: Continuum, pp. 97–122. Omand, D. (2007b) The Dilemmas of Using Secret Intelligence for Public Security, in Hennessy, P. (ed.), The New Protective State: Government, Intelligence and Terrorism. London: Continuum, pp. 142–169.

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Secret intelligence and the foreign policy practitioner Omand, D. (2010) Securing the State. London: Hurst. Spark, M. (1974) The Abbess of Crewe. London: Penguin. Spark, M. (1992) Curriculum Vitae Autobiography. London: Constable and Company. Stannard, M. (2009) Muriel Spark The Biography. London: Orion. Smiley’s People (1982) BBC TV, Jonathan Powell, 20 September to 25 October. Tebbit, K. (2007) Chapter 4, in Hennessy, P. (ed.), The New Protective State: Government, Intelligence and Terrorism. London: Continuum, pp 74–96. Tinker Tailor Solder Spy (1979) BBC TV, Jonathan Powell, 10 September to 22 October.

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26 INTELLIGENCE RECRUITMENT IN 1945 AND ‘PECULIAR PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS’ Michael Herman

Introduction In the last months of 1945, two senior British civil servants corresponded about the size, structure and pay of the postwar signals intelligence (Sigint) organization that was to become GCHQ (the Government Communications Headquarters), the continuation to the prewar Government Code and Cypher School (GC and CS) and its greatly expanded wartime version at Bletchley Park. One of the two officials, J.I.C. Crombie, was the Foreign Office’s Principal Establishment and Finance Officer with the grade of Assistant Under-Secretary of State, the antique title of Chief Clerk, and an annual salary of £1,700. In considering Bletchley’s postwar resources, he was continuing the Foreign Office’s prewar sponsorship of GC and CS, though unusually for its Chief Clerk, he was a home civil servant with a Treasury background and not from the diplomatic service.1 The other civil servant, A.J.D. Winnifrith, was younger though still quite senior: an Assistant Secretary in the Treasury, on a scale of £1,150–£1,500, who exercised the Treasury’s responsibility for controlling civil service costs and numbers.2 They had been to Cambridge and Oxford and had joined the civil service through what was then its academic competition, and were fliers rising to the top. Sir James Crombie retired in 1962 after eight years as the Chairman of the Board of Customs and Excise: Sir John Winnifrith was the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food from 1959 to 1967 before taking a clutch of post-retirement appointments. Thus in their careers, they were exemplars of the subsequently maligned mandarins or ‘gifted Oxbridge amateurs’ of the British administrative class, at the top of the civil service tree,3 and were creating a virtually new peacetime organization in 1945 at a time of extreme national stringency. Bletchley’s postwar bid was for 260 ‘officer grade’ staff to replace the 1939 complement of 35, and 750 subordinates replacing 133. (Bletchley’s maximum official wartime complement was quoted as 8,902 civilians and military.)4 The country was economically and financially ruined, with rescue from Marshall Aid not yet on the horizon: food rationing was to continue well into the next decade. The historian coming to this correspondence might therefore expect these standard-issue mandarins to greet Bletchley’s proposal with disdain and questioning, penny-pinching and cutting everything by half, but he could not be more wrong. At the outset, Winnifrith expressed his support for Bletchley’s 362

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substantial postwar bid: ‘the scope of the School’s [GC and CS’s] activities has enormously increased, and we cannot afford to starve them.’5 What followed, in the usual Whitehall style of personal letters addressed by surnames, was in effect a teach-in between the two officials, with Bletchley interventions, on the requirements of a viable peacetime intelligence organization. It ranged widely, but a central point was that Bletchley’s successes sprang from the special talent deployed there: how then was this talent to be recruited and nurtured in peacetime? Winnifrith wrote that the prewar pay and careers at GC and CS had been a muddle (through no proper planning of recruitment, age structures and promotion) and something better was needed. It was probably the first time a new intelligence organization had been conceived by administrators in quite this way. British public administration for most of its functions was still wedded to the hierarchy of the three main ‘generalist’ civil service classes with entrance by examination, though there was another class for scientists, as well as some specialist functions like statisticians and tax inspectors with their own pay and structures. There was thus a range of career models to follow, but where were GCHQ’s key elements to be fitted amongst them? This paper outlines the arrangements agreed in 1945 to recruit for GCHQ’s skills and abilities, and their subsequent modifications.

Recruitment and ‘Peculiar Personal Characteristics’ The Treasury’s starting point was to accept that, as before the war, ‘the staff of the School will have to continue to be specialists, not interchangeable with the rest of the Government Service.’6 It recognized that ‘persons entering the School must regard this as their life [sic] work,’ and hence ‘the prospects must be sufficient to attract candidates of the same calibre as would be recruited for the Administrative and Technical Classes.’ 7 It wrote of the organization’s people that ‘their work is of an exhausting and highly intellectual character’ for which they would need ‘considerable academic qualifications,’8 and it concluded that ‘neither the Administrative nor the Scientific examinations would produce the right type of candidate who has to have peculiar personal characteristics to make him suitable for the work of the School.’9 (Women were not mentioned, except for a reminder that by the civil service rules of the time they would be paid less.) Special ability or flair (the ‘peculiar personal characteristics’) was a prime concern. It was not defined in these exchanges, but the requirement was based on the wartime achievements of the mathematicians and chess players in breaking German machine ciphers, developed from the School’s prewar model of diplomatic ­codebreaking and linguistics. This flair was discussed as an individual quality, though it had often been harnessed at Bletchley in teams, and had also had the wider role of technical leadership. Of Hugh A ­ lexander, a leading Bletchley cryptanalyst and head of GCHQ’s postwar cryptanalytic division for ­t wenty-one and a half years,10 his successor wrote of his wartime and postwar career that On the technical side Hugh put in more individual work than any head of division has a right to; but his most important contribution was by encouragement and suggestion, by clear-cut views which simplified the problem, by going around sections, looking over people's shoulders, asking questions, having ideas; and more than anything else by sheer infectious enthusiasm.11 This cryptanalytic flair and its wider effects was one component of the wartime successes, but Bletchley also recognized that its wartime codebreaking had been matched by an effective 363

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production and distribution system that was geared to the scale and speed of decryption and gave it much of its operational value. A senior cryptanalyst, Gordon Welchman,12 had not only contributed to codebreaking but had also emerged as the leader of the mechanization that enabled Bletchley by the end of 1942 to be reading some four thousand high-grade German signals a day, with slightly smaller numbers of Italian and Japanese, and managing a worldwide intelligence production line from them (Hinsley and Stripp, 1993: v). Equally important, the postwar proposals also recognized Bletchley’s development of the other areas of signals analysis and exploitation that had been part of its development from a prewar codebreaking organization into a broader signals exploitation centre. Of this, one example was given not long ago in Sir Arthur ­Bonsall’s published account of the wartime exploitation of ‘low grade’ German Air Force (GAF) codes:13 the success in exploiting apparently unprofitable material that was often repeated in later years against Cold War targets. Flair ranged widely: Bonsall described Josh Cooper, a long-serving Sigint polymath with a personal technical influence akin to Alexander’s, but not just in codebreaking. As Bonsall put it, ‘with his wide-ranging knowledge, he [Cooper] was eminently suited to guide and inspire his young and individualistic staff, encouraging and assisting them to devise solutions to what were entirely novel problems.’14 Flair for Sigint exploitation merged, in turn, into the skills of intelligence officers and then into the qualities of direction and policy-making: Bonsall as a young man at Bletchley became an expert on GAF codes, but also rose to run his section, and in later life became GCHQ’s Director. Cooper was similarly influential in its postwar Directorate. In 1945, the civil servants accepted Bletchley’s contentions that the new Sigint centre would need people with a puzzle-solving flair, wider than cryptanalysis though related to it: but also that running it would need people ‘as good as those whom it is desired to attract to the Administrative and Scientific Grades [of the main civil service].’15 This was a source of disagreement with Bletchley’s initial proposals in 1945 that the 260 ‘officer class’ posts would all belong to a single recruitment and grading system. The ­Treasury and Foreign Office insisted on the contrary to distinguishing between those with the policy and managerial qualities of the administrative class and those with the technical flair of the Sigint profession, and Bletchley accordingly accepted that their originally proposed officer-level posts, apart from being reduced in total, would not be in one class but would instead be divided into two separate ones, A and B. There would be fifty-nine As with pay and careers close to those of Whitehall’s main administrative class to ensure that, in the Treasury’s words, the School had ‘the required number of first class brains’ for which ‘they must look for candidates of the same intellectual qualifications possessed by candidates for the Administrative Grade of the Home Civil Service.’16 The other 104 posts would be in the B class and would have ‘good intellectual qualifications possessed by university entrants who, whilst unsuitable for the administrative grade, might have made a successful career in, say, education’:17 their pay scale would be rather less. There would be a linkage between the two through a common cadet grade for recruitment. Recruits would all be Junior Assistants ( JAs, the title of the prewar entry grade for GC and CS), and some would become As, though most would become Bs, with conditions comparable with those of the civil service’s specialists. Below them, the intelligence production machine would be supported by a C class and clericals, with conditions based on those of the civil service’s main executive and clerical classes, also with some provision for graduate entry. In these arrangements, it is surprising that the Treasury’s rather unenthusiastic description of the B class (‘might have made a successful career in education’) was not contested more 364

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vigorously. GCHQ had argued that these people needed academic qualifications very little below those of Class A, but it perhaps accepted the A and B package as offered, in order to secure good Bletchley people who were contemplating staying in the postwar organization but would not wait very long for offers. It was common ground that GCHQ would need some ‘absolute flyers,’18 but neither party pushed the question whether a hypothetical applicant with the ‘absolute flyer’ potential of another Turing (great technical brilliance, complete disinterest in management) would be offered a career as an A or as a B. Over the roles of the As and Bs, this subsequently became a running controversy, but with this exception, these arrangements at the end of 1945 provided GCHQ with a stable senior structure for the Cold War. Along with the other features agreed at this stage, they established GCHQ as part of the national civil service, albeit a specialized one, with many of the service-wide features, such as recruitment by open competition supervised by the Civil Service Commission, and the encouragement of national staff associations – something that led eventually to government’s controversial ‘de-unionization’ of GCHQ in 1984 and its restoration in 1997. In this setting, GCHQ’s postwar management worked hard and successfully for the next forty years to gain a Whitehall reputation as a well-run department, run as far as possible on normal civil service lines. In some ways, it was a strange aim for an organization whose work was still unacknowledged, but a sensible one for the conditions of the time, and one that distinguished it from its smaller sister agencies the Security Service and Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), which remained (and perhaps remain) crown servants but technically not part of the civil service, and free on this account from some of the pressures for conformity. Though not part of the senior structure discussed here, it should be mentioned in passing that the large civil service classes established in 1945 for GCHQ’s non-graduate and clerical entry probably brought a bigger share of flair and weight to postwar Sigint production than was foreseen when their supporting role was planned. Throughout the Cold War, there were significant contributions from non-graduates who had left school at eighteen, in some cases earlier, but the input of the highest fliers was still essential. To return to the A and B classes and their creation in 1945 to meet GCHQ’s peacetime requirements for both flair and management: at the beginning of the 1950s, there was an important lurch in the recruitment agreed for them. It was decided then that, though the recruitment of JAs was producing enough B class specialists, it was not providing enough potential policy-makers and managers, and the Treasury was persuaded to replace the single cadet grade by separate A and B streams (A4s and B4s) with separate recruitment competitions, pay scales and prospects. It would need research to determine exactly how this was decided, and by whom, but one can guess that it reflected the influence of Eric Jones (later Sir Eric) who was to become GCHQ’s Director in 1952. Before the war, he had left school at fifteen, joined the family textile firm, then formed his own company; and as a wartime RAF officer, he was drafted to Bletchley and made an outstanding contribution there in running the reporting and assessment machine for the German army and air force decrypts. In this key operation, he had resolved what had been endemic inter-service conflicts with firmness and common sense, and no claims to the special skill and knowledge of those he was supervising. He stayed with Bletchley in 1945 and after an important year as GCHQ’s first liaison officer in Washington, he returned and in 1950 became the Deputy Director.19 It would have been consistent with his attitude throughout his career for him to be influential in this period towards recruiting more potential managers. However it was brought about, JA recruitment was replaced by the separate A and B cadets, and one JA of outstanding ability (Tovey, a future Director)20 was regraded as the first A4. The first public competition to recruit ‘managerial types’ to this grade was held in 365

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1952. In the two annual competitions that followed, a total of six A4s were recruited up to the mid-1950s, four with degrees in history, one in English and one in Oxford ‘greats’ (classical languages and history with philosophy). Two had trained as Russian linguists during their military conscription. Of the six, one (a bizarre selection) resigned and another was regraded; the other four eventually rose to senior positions, two at the Directorate level. All had been trained as generalists, with an emphasis on the output end of the production line as well as introductions to management and policy issues.21 More A4 recruitment followed, but the focus on these new ‘managerial types’ remained controversial and associated with more type-casting into the two classes – the As as ‘­managers’ and the Bs as ‘researchers’: distinctions that caused debate over individual posts and upset people in both streams. At one stage, the senior staff association, the GCHQ branch of the civil service’s First Division Association, took issue with the distinction, with a climax in a packed meeting in the mid-fifties – probably the biggest and most heated meeting that unspectacular body ever had in its life – at which it was forcibly argued that GCHQ’s success depended on flair, and those who had it would provide all the management talent needed. A more extreme position, though not without some wartime justification, was that educational qualifications of any kind were poor predictors of Sigint ability, and everyone should start at the bottom. This blew over: memories faded of Bletchley’s wartime informality and rise by technical merit, and the separate cadet streams became accepted. But official positions also softened, as eventually did Whitehall’s attachment to different pay and structures for specific skills. GCHQ devised its own tests of potential Sigint abilities for the B4’s selection, and someone sensibly suggested that they should also be taken by the A4 candidates. The two competitions then coalesced, and candidates were considered for both streams, and eventually the two classes of cadets were merged again into one, as in 1945, though under a new title. In the 1980s, the Treasury’s control over gradings weakened, and the three main civil service classes were rebranded into a common structure with more scope for departmental variations within them. GCHQ’s A and B posts became assimilated to these new gradings, and the ­d istinctive labels disappeared. The internal debates continued about Sigint flair and its importance, but now in the context of individuals’ recruitment and careers, rather than posts and structures; and by the end of the Cold War, the department was offering more varied ­careers, to general satisfaction. Nevertheless, the earlier conformity to civil service orthodoxy had served a purpose. GCHQ had become recognized as a fully fledged government department responsible to a Secretary of State (the Foreign Secretary), its Director a full member of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and no longer in its predecessor’s prewar position as a satellite of the SIS and the Foreign Office.

Conclusion This was only a tiny part of GCHQ’s history, and everything about it is now greatly changed. But one guesses that it still needs people with the qualities demonstrated by Alexander and Cooper at Bletchley and afterwards and discussed by Crombie and Winnifrith in 1945: the ‘absolute flyers’ with the flair embraced within Winnifrith’s ‘peculiar personal characteristics.’ Other intelligence agencies probably identify and seek their own distinctive kinds of flair. Those seeking to understand intelligence in all its aspects should give attention to flair, and the prosaic arrangements on which its recruitment depends. They can make the ­d ifference between intelligence’s success and failure, sometimes, for those it supports, ­between life and death. 366

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Notes 1 Sir James Crombie KCB KBE CMG 1902–1969. Aberdeen University, Cambridge, Home Civil Service 1926–1962 (War Office, Treasury, Ministry of Food, Foreign Office, Customs and Excise). 2 Sir John Winnifrith KCB (CB) 1908–1993. Oxford, Home Civil Service 1932–1967 (Board of Trade, Treasury and War Cabinet, Agriculture Fisheries and Food). 3 Crombie had a Scottish education which included a degree at Aberdeen before a year at ­Cambridge. Success for Scottish students in the civil service examination was not unusual. 4 Winnifrith to Crombie, 13 October 1945 (date emended and unclear, probably 15), National Archives Kew, FO 366/1518, attachment page 1. The expression ‘officer grade’ was not used elsewhere in the correspondence and was perhaps a prewar usage. It survived for many years afterwards in one of the other agencies. 5 Ibid, attachment page 2. 6 Ibid, attachment page 3. 7 Winnifrith to Crombie, 29 October 1945, National Archives Kew, FO 366/1518, attachment page 4. 8 Note 4 above, attachment page 4. 9 Ibid, attachment page 4. 10 C.H.O’D Alexander 1909–1974. Mathematician, British Chess Champion, schoolmaster, ­Bletchley/GCHQ 1940–1971. 11 Hugh Denham, In memoriam: Conel Hugh O’Donel Alexander (NSA/gov declassified, accessed 29 June 2017). 12 William Gordon Welchman 1906–1985. Cambridge mathematician, Bletchley, post-war US industry. ­ ilfred 13 Sir Arthur Bonsall, Another Bit of Bletchley ( Bletchley Park Trust 2009), pp. 6–14. (Arthur W (‘Bill’) Bonsall KCMG CBE 1917–2014. Cambridge, Bletchley/GCHQ 1940–1978, Director 1973–1978). 14 Ibid, page 39 ( Joshua E.S.Cooper CB CMG 1901–1981. London University, GC and CS/GCHQ 1925–1961). 15 Note 4, attachment page 1. 16 Winnifrith to Crombie, 31 December 1945, National Archives FO 366/1518, attachment page 1. 17 Ibid, attachment page 2. 18 Note 7, attachment page 1. 19 Sir Eric Jones KCMG CB CBE 1907–1986. Textile business, RAF 1940, Hut 3 Bletchley 1943, GCHQ 1945, Deputy Director 1950, Director 1952–1960. 20 Sir Brian Tovey KCMG 1926–2015. London University, GCHQ 1950, Director 1978–1983. 21 Personal recollections.

Reference Hinsley, F.H. and Stripp, A. (eds.), (1993) Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park. Oxford: ­Oxford University Press.

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27 ‘MEN OF THE PROFESSOR TYPE’ REVISITED Building a partnership between academic research and national security Tristram Riley-Smith Introduction In October 2008, a report was produced for the United Kingdom Government on How academia and government can work together (Council for Science & Technology, 2008). This asserted that a healthy engagement between academics and policy-makers is essential to the provision of informed, evidence-based, world-class policy-making. But it concluded that such engagement was not sufficiently strong: the UK was struggling to make the ­relationship work. History contains some notable instances where these two worlds have worked together with great consequence, most notably at times of peril. The war-time work of mathematicians, cryptanalysts and linguists at Bletchley Park provides a powerful ­example: their code-breaking skills are credited with shortening the Second World War by up to four years (Lockstone, n.d.). These were the ‘men of the professor type’ that Commander Alistair Denniston (operational head of the Government Communication and Cypher School) looked to recruit in August 1939 (Erskine, 1986: p  50). The US had its own champion of scholarship in the head of the Office of Strategic S­ ervices (OSS): ­W illiam J. Donovan had a high regard for the professors in his Research & ­A nalysis Branch, ‘placing them above diplomats, scientists, and “even lawyers and bankers”’ (Winks, 1996, p 67). These initiatives laid the foundations for partnerships that exist to this day. All members of the Heilbronn Institute for Mathematical Research, at the University of Bristol, devote half their time to pursuing research directed by the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ, successor to Bletchley Park); and two professors of history (William L. Langer from Harvard and Sherman Kent from Yale) moved on from OSS to set up and run the Office of National Estimates within the CIA.1 But knowledge exchange between academia and Britain’s Security and Intelligence Agencies (SIA) appears stilted, with no evidence that the National Security (NS) mission is overcoming those obstacles to effective engagement identified more broadly by the Council for Science and Technology. 2 This challenge led to a Visiting Fellowship at ­Cambridge University’s Centre for Science and Policy (CSaP), where I had the opportunity to explore 368

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What is National Security? In 1983, Richard Ullman argued that ‘security’ – in the US, at least – was too focused on military issues. He redefined security as being concerned with actions or events that threatened to degrade citizens’ quality of life and/or which threatened significantly to narrow policy choices for governmental or non-governmental organisations (Ullman, 1983, p 133). Today, it is commonplace for Western Governments to approach National Security in these broader terms, reflecting the proliferation of non-military threats to national wellbeing. This is seen in HMG’s National Security Capability Review, which considers: threats from terrorism, extremism and instability; the resurgence of state-based threats; the erosion of a rules-based international order; the impact of technological developments (especially cyber threats); the growth in ­serious and organised crime; and the threat of disease and natural hazards (HMG, 2018, p 5).

that borderland visited by the Council for Science and Technology. My particular aim was to gain a better understanding of the obstacles to effective engagement between academic research and NS, before going on to develop options for improvement. This chapter presents the insights from that year-long research, where a key input was over seventy-five interviews conducted with academics, Government officials and private sector representatives (Riley-Smith, 2013). It also draws on the experience of putting those insights into practice, as Champion of the UK Research Councils’ Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research (PaCCS) – formerly known as the Global Uncertainties Programme. In both cases, the parameters of inquiry were determined by the themes of the Research Councils’ Programme – Counter-Terrorism, Cybersecurity, Transnational Organised Crime, Threats to Critical Infrastructure, Ideologies and Beliefs and the Proliferation of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons. In this chapter, I go on to focus on one Knowledge Exchange mechanism, based on a scheme that organises – over five days – brief encounters between NS practitioners and fifty or more researchers.

Obstacles to engagement and impact My research revealed a range of cultural and logistical obstacles hampering effective engagement (see Annex 1). The issues cohere into themes of Culture, Communications and Confidence, all of which militate against establishing open, productive and trusting relationships. These findings have been reinforced in Policy Workshops in 2015 and 2016 that brought together academics and officials (Riley-Smith, 2016a, 2016b).

Culture There is a strong perception that cultural issues (that cluster of habits, traditions, values, narratives and prejudices embedded in both academia and HMG) get in the way of effective engagement and delivery. This repeatedly emerged as a set of stereotypes, described below: 369

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The Ivory Tower the world of the researcher as viewed by the official •

• • •

Academics favour research over application – ‘preferring a voyage of discovery to a journey!’ They lack discipline, with a tendency to drift away from the project plan to what interests them. Pull-through to much-needed capabilities is rarely achieved, with academics incentivised to publish rather than generate products and services. There is a surprising lack of collegiality amongst academics. Industry partners are typically more collaborative, even with their own competitors. The research world divides into ever-narrower specialisms, and academics struggle with multi-disciplinary collaboration.

The Mandarin Palace the world of the official as viewed by the researcher • • •

•

Civil Servants are risk-averse, heaping up and over-specifying short-term requirements and expecting every research project to deliver results rather than taking a portfolio view. They tend to ignore what academic best practice and the evidence base have to offer.3 At worst, they expect scientists to rubber-stamp political decisions. Officials lack strategic vision. When commissioning research, they ‘fire and forget’ rather than working collaboratively. Industry partners typically link research to a strategic roadmap with regular check-point meetings (or even the co-location of teams). They are also over-reliant on departmental relationships with a small band of trusted academics or consultants.

Communications It was apparent from conversations with interviewees on both sides of the divide that there are problems in communicating with one another. These cohere around difficulties in ‘Docking’ (making relevant connections) and ‘Translation’ (understanding what the other side is saying).

Docking making connections • •

•

Each domain appears opaque to the other: it is difficult to know who does what ‘on the other side’, and how to reach them. Officials and their data are difficult to reach. If contact is made, it rarely lasts (not helped by posting policies for ‘generalist’ civil servants). There are also substantial challenges to getting the information needed to underpin research.4 It is surprisingly difficult to gain access to up-to-date knowledge about research expertise, and the relevance/applicability of an academic sub-discipline can be overlooked. There has been a reduction in the number of Government scientists best-placed to know what is happening in the research-base.

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Translation understanding the other side(s) • •

The worlds of Government and Academia don’t share the same lexicon: they have developed their own short-hand and sub-texts to support internal communications. In fact, language barriers exist within these worlds: • the drive towards research excellence leads academics to specialise in a narrow field, developing their own jargon in the process; • Government Departments also develop their own style (as anyone who has wrestled with the acronym-rich code of Ministry of Defence drafts can attest).

Confidence A recurring theme in conversations with researchers working in Counter-Terrorism, ­Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection or Transnational Organised Crime is that they find it difficult to connect and build trusting relationships with relevant officials. NS agencies and departments are perceived by academics as being over-secretive and impenetrable: it is difficult to reach relevant decision makers, and there is more ‘take’ than ‘give’.5 Denial of access to relevant but sensitive information is especially frustrating for researchers and can lead either to failed initiatives or sub-standard and inadequate research. A risk-averse and hard-pressed NS community is unwilling to countenance efforts to anonymise data, expressing fears that this doctored information can be unpicked. There can also be confusion and suspicion over control of publication and Intellectual Property Rights. The following quotes from interviews give a sense of the feelings amongst researchers: •

•

‘We cannot have our research evaluated on invisible outputs. We do invisible work, but that’s called consulting and we charge out at a completely different rate. I’m happy to apply restrictions of outputs if we’re being paid £1m by an American company under a consultancy contract. But the Security and Intelligence Agencies need to recognise this is a cultural issue: this is 2012, not 1950!’ ‘There is no balance in the relationship: lots of nice people come to our Labs, ask lots of interesting questions, and depart without giving anything back. This pattern is repeated. There has to be a trade. It can’t be a one-way process. Government has got two things that researchers like – real-world problems and data that is not normally available to them. But this doesn’t happen’.

The impasse is not helped by the fact that few academics are well-versed or well-trained in handling classified material, and too few are security-cleared. Academics can be constrained by fear of Freedom of Information requests, and some are affronted by the need for security clearances: they may object, on ethical grounds, to being involved in defence-related work; some think it is antithetical to the principles of open, academic research; others are concerned they will be let into a secret they already know (closing down knowledge that was open). 371

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Building partnership The conclusion reached from the Discovery Phase of my Fellowship was that action was needed to improve the quality of engagement between academic researchers and NS ­policy-makers and practitioners. There are, of course, many examples of research delivering great benefit to NS; in 2017, for instance, Government reached out to industry and universities to find innovative solutions to aviation security.6 Nevertheless, there was an almost universal view expressed by interlocutors on both ‘sides’ that benefits would derive from improved levels of understanding and knowledge exchange. Relationships of trust should be nurtured, breaking down cultural barriers (including those associated with excessive secrecy) and improving channels of communication. The second half of the 2012 Fellowship focused on experimenting with a number of practical mechanisms. This included testing the feasibility of an NS Data Release Scheme that provided an important counterweight to the entrenched view that sensitive data cannot be used to support Research and Development.7 A central finding to emerge at the end of the year-long project was the need for a ‘WholeLife Approach’ to engagement. We identified four phases to this approach, allowing trust and confidence to build incrementally (while recognising that this was an iterative, dynamic and continuous process: new players, new requirements and new research insights will inevitably lead to these phases being revisited over and over again): • • • •

Access: Make requirements and capabilities visible and available for scrutiny. Exchange: Develop face-to-face relationships in order to build trust and enrich understanding of the opportunities for productive and innovative research. Commitment: Establish longer-term strategic relationships, where all partners invest time and effort to support research. Delivery: Turn research into capabilities in order to generate new products, services, tools, techniques, advice and guidance.

Another key finding from the Fellowship was around the role of the go-between in ­helping the extract impact from research. Combining the roles of Advocate, Ambassador, Bridge, ­Broker, Translator and Tutor, the go-between makes connections and makes them work. Since 2013, I have performed just such a role, acting as a champion for the PaCCS8 programme, using this platform to promote that ‘Whole Life Approach’ to engagement. I have been able to draw upon a long list of solutions for improving engagement (many of which were proposed by interviewees in the course of the Fellowship). The adage ‘variety is the spice of life’ seems appropriate here, with a wide range of options from which to choose [see Annex 2]. I set out below an analysis of one such mechanism – knowledge exchange through speed-dating.

Knowledge exchange: speed-dating exercises It has long been recognised that academic research has the potential to deliver innovative impact in the real world, although the focus is all too often limited to the transmission of technology and IP. In a survey that involved responses from over 22,000 academics, Hughes and Kitson9 have shown that knowledge exchange is more likely to involve

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people-based, problem-solving and community-orientated activities. Their research also identifies a cluster of factors that limit the knowledge exchange process around a lack of time, insufficient internal capability to manage relationships and insufficient information to identify partners. The Fellowship Scheme developed by CSaP overcomes all three of these challenges by establishing a brokerage service, typically working with a senior Civil Servant (the CSaP Fellow) to work up a set of questions and then arranging five days of meetings with a diverse range of academic researchers to explore these. The daisy-wheel below illustrates the range of connections made in the course of 2016–2017, with c. 1,000 meetings being arranged. In the lifetime of the scheme, over 300 Fellows have met over 1,500 Cambridge researchers, in over 8,500 encounters. Cleevely (2018), the founder of CSaP, has described 90% of Fellows reporting improved networks and fresh perspectives, and 33% claiming that the programme delivers a direct impact on their work (Figure 27.1).

Figure 27.1  T  he range of connections made in the 2016–2017 Fellowship Scheme at the Centre for Science and Policy at the University of Cambridge

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That emphasis on impact10 links to a key assumption underpinning this chapter: the reason for enhancing partnership between Academic Research and NS is to make a difference, bringing benefit to policy-makers and practitioners involved in promoting the security of the citizen. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts that ‘Everyone has a right to life, liberty, and security of person’ (UN, 1948: p 2). But the security of millions is threatened every day, at local, national and global levels. The UK’s research establishment is well-placed to make a difference here. Our academic excellence remains one of the jewels in the nation’s crown. Although the UK has only 0.9% of the world’s population, it accounts for 15.9% of the world’s most highly cited research articles. UK researchers can help to address these issues, for instance, by: • • • • •

understanding the causes and spread of conflicts, and potential for reconciliation; discerning and/or interpreting the motivations of terrorists and criminals; developing novel sensors in physical and cyber space; horizon-scanning to anticipate and forestall future threats; presenting the complexities of ethical, legal and human rights issues arising from security policy and operations.

In order to support this goal, I ran three CSaP Fellowship Schemes (with funding from the Airey Neave Trust and RCUK’s Global Uncertainties Programme) focused on NS issues. In a departure from CSaP, each programme involved up to four Fellows (nominated by ­Government Departments and Agencies), and I drew on academic talent from universities across the country (although Oxbridge dominated). On average, the Fellows met more than fifty-eight researchers in each scheme, spread over five days. This was achieved through a combination of single, team- and panel-based encounters, reducing the total number of encounters to seventy-nine. The three themes (with sample questions), together with an analysis of the source of ­inputs (in terms of research institutes and their disciplines), feature in the tables below: Themes

Sample Questions

CyberSecurity

• What are the biggest threats/risks to society given growing dependence on cyber? • What is the impact on creativity when every action, thought & deed is public and subject to peer-review? More majority compliance than radical thinking? • How can we support the ‘pull-through’ of research into applied products and services that deliver better Information Assurance and cybersecurity? • Are cyber risks perceived differently by individuals in different business sectors and nations/cultures? How do we adapt awareness and products to suit? • What emerging technologies pose a significant threat to current detection capability? • How can we improve strategies and methods for working with energetic materials in a research and training environment? • How could we detect bomb factories and related clandestine activity with better reliability? • How can we improve human performance to reduce the risk of human error in screening processes?

Detecting IEDs

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Sample Questions

Horizon-Scanning: • Can we derive insights into the emergence of terrorist events from other Terrorist Threats disciplines or sectors that look at complex systems (e.g. epidemiology, ecology, and economics)? • Where will the next terrorist operating spaces emerge? • What grievances or ideologies will motivate people to engage in terrorism? • How will terrorists behave differently in the future?

Sourcing the inputs: universities and disciplines Research Establishment

No.

Discipline

No.

University of Cambridge University of Oxford University of St Andrews University of London Industry (various) Brunel Queen’s University Belfast University of Warwick

53 45 15 12 7 3 3 2

30 26 25 15 14 13 10 10

Durham University Manchester Metropolitan University Smith Institute Lancaster National Physical Laboratory Imperial University of Southampton Cranfield University University of Bristol Bath University of Glasgow Design Council Aberdeen Open University UWE

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1

Computer Science Politics and International Studies Engineering Physics Terrorism Studies Business/Management/Risk Studies Mathematics Social Sciences (inc Econ’s, Geog’phy & Soc Anth) Biology / Biotechnology Chemistry Philosophy Behavioural Science (inc Psychology) Systems Science / Complexity Law History/Military/War Studies Risk and Resilience Communications Materials Science Design and Innovation Forensic Science

6 5 4 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1

University of East London University of Sheffield University of Manchester University of Liverpool Bournemouth University Exeter Surrey University of Westminster University of Hull

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

TOTAL

175

TOTAL

175

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It is, of course, difficult to qualify, quantify and measure impact, especially if Government officials are disinclined to deliver feedback. Sometimes, this happens for security reasons, but more often, it is because they have higher-priority demands on their time. This has unfortunate consequences, where ‘impacts’ are limited to rare events judged to be of great import, with a degree of sensationalism replacing a more methodical, business-as-usual approach to the delivery of impact. The Fellowship Scheme provides a light-touch framework not only for supporting Knowledge Exchange but also creating the foundations for delivering and evaluating i­ mpact. The programme scored highly in terms of value-for-money, with the eleven Fellows producing an average rating of 4.5 out of 5. We also asked each Fellow to score the usefulness of these meetings from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high), and the results prove to be very positive, as can be seen from the graph below (Figure 27.2). 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79

Figure 27.2  Average scores from 79 encounters

This PaCCS Fellowship programme, with its focus on engagement, fitted into a broader set of activities designed to promote trust-building and knowledge exchange between academic researchers and NS practitioners: •

•

•

The PaCCS Communications Strategy (with website and Twitter channel) and the Champion’s Clinics improved access to information about Government requirements and University research; the latter generated 152 introductions over 22 months. PaCCS Placement Schemes deliver a greater level of commitment from both sides, with post-doctoral students embedded into Government Departments on three-month projects. PaCCS Policy Briefings and the PaCCS Academic Marketplace promote the delivery of intellectual and instrumental benefits. 376

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Conclusion There is strong evidence to support the assertion that more needs to be done to build bridges between academic researchers and policy-makers and practitioners working in the NS sphere. I would agree with Gearon and Parsons that ‘security and intelligence relations with universities are likely not only to endure but to intensify’ (2018, p 17), because there is no evidence that Article 3 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights is going to be fulfilled in the near future. Omand and Phythian provide a compelling list of challenges that need addressing: ‘[T]here always will be potential threats to the state and society that the government must counter; not least they come from the activities of other states in a competitive international system and from a kaleidoscope of non-state groups that include terrorists, organized criminal gangs, cyber criminals, child abuse networks, people and narcotics traffickers, and illegal weapons proliferation networks. Collectively, if the risks are not well managed, the very health of society is undermined’ (2018, p 225). I have identified a broad spectrum of mechanisms to deliver knowledge exchange, ranging from relatively low-cost and light-touch processes for increasing levels of access and engagement to more costly and complex processes for building commitment and ­delivering value. The honest broker has an important role to play in delivering these processes, supporting ethical ground-rules11 and developing metrics to help evaluate impact. The programme of speed-dating, described earlier, illustrates the way in which simple and low-cost processes can be put into place by a Centre designed to deliver this service. There is an important contribution to be made by academic placements into NS agencies as well as research teams established within academia but working closely with policy-makers and practitioners on the development of relevant research projects. There are some creditable examples out there, including Cybersecurity Research Institutes funded by EPSRC, CPNI and GCHQ, focusing on the Science of Cyber Security; Trustworthy Industrial Control Systems; and Automated Program Analysis & Verification. Social and Behavioural Scientists are making their own contribution through CREST, the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats: this national hub for understanding, countering and mitigating threats has six academic partners – Bath, Birmingham, Cranfield, Lancaster, Portsmouth and University of the West of England; when founded in 2015, it received a grant of £4.35m from the UK Security & Intelligence Agencies and £2.2m from the academic institutions themselves. CREST is delivering high-quality research that is informed by customer needs, with outputs made available to a wide audience12 under three themes: Understanding Who & Why, Better Intelligence Gathering & Decisions and Protecting Ourselves. It should be recognised that the principles underpinning the fruitful exchange between academic research and the NS domain do not need to be restricted to the Governmental customer base. My work as the Global Uncertainties Champion saw many examples of engagement with non-governmental organisations and companies and involved in security challenges: such interlocutors can prove more flexible and engaging than their counterparts in Government. We should also expect accepted definitions of the challenge to change over time. The work underpinning this chapter was inevitably framed by the questions posed by NS ­policy-makers and practitioners. But there is a strand of thought – best summarised as Liberal Internationalism and dating back to the Enlightenment writings of Kant, Condorcet and Adam Smith – which focuses on common or human security. Rothschild (1995) has 377

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explored this, together with the emergence of an ‘extended’ security in the 1990s, applied to groups, individuals, international systems and even the biosphere. At a time of growing security challenges around the world, there is every incentive for us to build on the vision of Alistair Denniston and reach out to the men and women ‘of the professor type’.

Acknowledgements The findings in this chapter emerge from generous grants from ESRC (ES/K000624/1 – National Security through Partnership: Building Bridges between Research, Policy and Practice and ES/L002582/1 – External Champion to RCUK Global Uncertainties Programme) and the Airey Neave Trust (which funded a National Security Fellowship Scheme in 2013 at CSaP – ­Cambridge University’s Centre for Science and Policy). This work would not have been possible without support from HMG’s Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) and CSaP. Special thanks go to Professor Nick Jennings (Chief Scientific Advisor at CPNI), Dr Robert Doubleday (Director of CSaP), Henry Rex and Alex Nichols (GU Champion’s Office).

Annex 1: Prioritised list of issues raised by seventy-six interviewees (Number in brackets indicates number of interviewees raising the issue)   1 Yes Minister and Ivory Towers. (25) Cultural blocks to delivery seem to exist in both academia and HMG.   2 100 Years of Solitude. (21) NS agencies and departments are perceived by academics and researchers as over-­ secretive, a closed shop, impenetrable; it is difficult to reach relevant decision makers or experts, and there is more ‘take’ than ‘give’.   3 Resourcing Challenges. (20) HMG stakeholders lack the resource to make an effective contribution to projects with a culture of ‘fire and forget’ (including no hospitality budget to network!), and annualised Government budgets fail to align to university/research time-scales; by extension, there is a ready assumption that academics will work for HMG pro bono and the change in universities to full-cost funding hasn’t fully registered. There is also a tendency to try to pack too much into a project (‘log-rolling’).   4 Trust Dies, But Mistrust Blossoms. (20) There are problems building relationships of trust between stakeholders in Government and academia. HMG is perceived to be untrusting, ignoring what academia/best ­practice/evidence base has to offer. HMG can expect scientists to rubber-stamp political decisions; and has a tendency to use established academics or consultants (comfort over quality). Denial of access to relevant but sensitive data is particularly frustrating and can lead to failures, but there are concerns that anonymised data can be unpicked.   5 Ships Passing in the Night. (19) Insufficient opportunities or mechanisms exist for communicating, and those that are in place are sub-optimal. 378

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  6 The Coal-Face Syndrome. (16) HMG stakeholders are perceived by academics and researchers (and some of their own people) to lack strategic vision, tending to over-specify and over-circumscribe a set of short-term requirements; in a new sphere like cybersecurity, academics perceive there to be a lack of any sort of strategic direction to help guide research; they are risk-averse, always expecting a result from research and failing to take a portfolio view.   7 Making the Possible Impossible. (10) There is too much bureaucracy – on both sides – when instigating research.   8 Academics not great at team-working or multi-disciplinary collaboration. (9) There can be – as perceived by Civil Servants – a surprising lack of collegiality and competitiveness. They can lack discipline: they drift from aims of a project to what interests them.   9 HMG procurement processes. (7) These are seen to be unhelpful, freezing out quality and small teams. 10 Post-Docs from Overseas. (4) NS stakeholders see problems with commissioning research given the preponderance of foreign post-doc students, given requirements for managing protectively marked material. 11 Silos and Specialists. (4) There are too many silos and specialists on both sides, including lack of multi-­d isciplinary journals. 12 Academics not well-versed or well-trained in handling classified material. (3) 13 Different time-horizons in Government and academia when managing science. (3) 14 Technology Strategy Board13 processes are flawed. (2) Narrow requirements, too many awards, over-conformist, discourage interaction ­between winners. 15 The down-side of the Civil Service generalist tradition. (1) It leads to technophobia, and an absence of ‘systems thinking’. 16 Too much attention on repeats of past threats, little or none to new ones. (1) 17 Using Centre for Defence Enterprise for security calls could be unhelpful. (1) Given ethical concerns over defence. 18 Academics can be constrained by fear of Freedom of Information requests. (1) 19 Indiscriminate cuts of Research Council budgets. (1) Can lead important research themes under-resourced at the expense of trivial.

Annex 2: Mechanisms for Knowledge Exchange: variety is the spice of life There are different methods and models for building partnerships. The list below includes solutions proposed by interviewees in the Fellowship Report, together with examples (highlighted in bold) that have been road-tested within PaCCS. These are ordered against the four steps to a ‘Whole Life’ approach to the challenge. 379

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Access • • • • • •

PaCCS Communication Strategy (website, Twitter channel, Blogs, News-Letter, etc.). Outreach (presenting needs and capabilities) Research Calls and Grand Challenges Databases (e.g. Gateway-to-Research or call-specific Offers of Collaboration) Academic RiSC; PaCCS Champion’s Clinics.

Exchange •

• •

Programmes that enable NS stakeholders to meet multi-disciplinary teams of academics to develop high-value applications in response to specific strategic challenges: • Sandpits/Ideas Factories • PaCCS Policy Workshops, seminars and conferences; • ‘speed-dating’ events and panels (e.g. CSaP / GU Fellowship Schemes) & Brains Trusts PhD Scholarships and Summer Schools Professors of Practice.

Commitment • •

•

•

Internships and Placements Recruitment of academic advisors, eg • AHRC-ESRC FCO Knowledge Exchange Fellows • Blackett Groups, Scientific Advisory Panels/Committees & Chief Scientific Advisors Centres of Excellence and Interface Units (with more university facilities for securitysensitive work): • NS Research Institutes • Catapult Centres. Data-Release Facilities: to make HMG data available to researchers.

Delivery •

• •

• • •

Provide public funding of higher-risk, innovative projects: • sponsor more incubators and accelerators, • encourage spin-outs, with ‘Open Innovation’ & ‘Easy IP’ schemes; Promote IP/IPR agreements (e.g. via Lambert Tool-Kit); Build coalitions of NS policy-makers/practitioners, academics and industry, to produce innovative solutions to specific strategic challenges; • Joint Security and Resilience Centre • Defence and Security Accelerator • National Security Innovation Fund. PaCCS Policy Briefings and Reports14 PaCCS Academic Marketplace; Establish a Royal Society of Applied Science & Technology.

Notes 1 “When Kent wrote his influential study on Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, he provided the text by which succeeding generations of fledgling analysts were schooled” (Winks, 1996, p 450).

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‘Men of the Professor Type’ revisited 2 It should be emphasised that my concern here is not with that aspect of the “securitised university” (Gearon & Parsons 2018), where the campus becomes an arena for covert operational activity, but rather with the more mundane – if sometimes sensitive – business of transferring knowledge and insight from researchers to benefit national security. 3 See Mark Henderson (2012). The author describes the phenomena in Government of ­evidence-shopping, imaginary evidence, clairvoyant evidence, mishandled evidence and secret evidence. 4 This reinforces stereotypes. Academics resent the refusal of Civil Servants to share data (confirming the impression that they can’t trust researchers); and officials end up dismissing as over-­ theoretical and speculative those papers that arise from data-poor scholarship. 5 This compares unfavourably with the experience of more effective collaboration between UK universities and well-funded American Federal Agencies such as DARPA, the Department of Homeland Security and the US Intelligence Community. 6 www.gov.uk/government/news/government-announces-fund-to-revolutionise-airport-­ screening. 7 There is a risk that the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), that came into force across the European Union on 25 May 2018, will reinforce the view that Data Controllers are prevented from making information available to researchers. This needs to be resisted. Article 14 of GDPR (https://gdpr-info.eu/art-14-gdpr/) makes helpful provisions for proportionate and controlled sharing of personal data for historical and scientific research. 8 PaCCS (formerly called the Global Uncertainties Programme) has been instigated by the UK’s Research Councils to improve understanding of current and future security challenges. Research funding has been allocated to themes of national importance (Conflict, Cyber-Security and Transnational Organised Crime); and a typical PaCCS research call promotes both multi-disciplinary research and partnership with non-academic stakeholders (to increase opportunities for impact). 9 See Hughes and Kitson (2012) and Kitson et al (2010). 10 The Research Excellence Framework (REF) for 2014 allocated 20% of its score to impact (defined as “an effect on, change or benefit to the economy, society, culture, public policy or services, health, the environment or quality of life, beyond academia”). HMG’s recent Industry Strategy aims to raise this to 25% for the next REF process, scheduled for 2021 (HMG 2017: p 79). 11 Valuable insights into an ethical framework for knowledge exchange within the NS arena are available from HMG (2010) and Gearon and Parsons (2018), and Omand and Phythian (2018). Gearon and Parsons focus on circumstances involving sensitive and/or classified research questions, and explore questions of Standards, Freedom, Engagement and Conduct (pp. 13–17). 12 https://crestresearch.ac.uk/category/resources/articles-books/. 13 Now Innovate UK, part of UK Research and Innovation. 14 Examples include the Evidence Review entitled “Countering Violent Extremism through Communications and Media Strategies”, commissioned by BBC Media Action and undertaken by Dr Kate Ferguson of UEA (Ferguson, 2016).

References Cleevely, D. (2018) Two Cultures – can policy makers and academic institutions ever work together effectively? University of Cambridge Lecture, Centre for Science & Policy, 11 June. Council for Science and Technology (2008) How academia and government can work together. Available from: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.cst.gov.uk/reports/f iles/academiagovernment.pdf Erskine, R. (1986) GC and CS Mobilizes ‘Men of the Professor Type’. Cryptologia, 10 (1): 50–59. Ferguson, K. (2016) Countering violent extremism through media and communication strategies. A review of the evidence. www.paccsresearch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Countering-­ Violent-Extremism-Through-Media-and-Communication-Strategies-.pdf Gearon, L.F., and Parsons, S.J. (2018) Research Ethics in the Securitised University. Journal of Academic Ethics. Available from: doi:10.1007/s10805-018-9317-2 Henderson, M. (2012) The Geek Manifesto. London: Bantam Press. HMG (2010) Principles of scientific advice to government. Government Office of Science. Available from: www.gov.uk/government/publications/scientific-advice-to-government-principles/principlesof-scientific-advice-to-government

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Tristram Riley-Smith HMG (2017) Industrial Strategy White Paper: Building a Britain Fit for the Future. London: HMSO. HMG (2018) National security capability review. Available from https://assets.publishing.service.gov. uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/705347/6.4391_CO_National-­ Security-Review_web.pdf Hughes, A., and Kitson, M. (2012) Pathways to Impact and the Strategic Role of Universities: New Evidence on the Breadth and Depth of University Knowledge Exchange in the UK and the Factors Constraining its Development. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 36 (3): 723–750. Kitson, M., Hughes, A., Abreu, M., Grinevich, V., Bullock, A., and Milner, I. (2010) Cambridge Centre for Business Research Survey of Knowledge Exchange Activity by United Kingdom Academics, 2005–2009, [data collection], UK Data Service. Lockstone, K. (n.d.) The Influence of ULTRA in the Second World War. Available from: www.cix. co.uk/~klockstone/hinsley.htm Omand, D., and Phythian, M. (2018) Principled Spying. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Riley-Smith, T. (2013) Improving the relationship between National Security challenges and academic research, www.csap.cam.ac.uk/links/13/435/ Riley-Smith, T. (2016a) Innovation challenges in cyber security, www.paccsresearch.org.uk/policybriefings/cyber-security/ Riley-Smith, T. (2016b) Transforming research into technology: Innovation for defence and security, www. paccsresearch.org.uk/policy-briefings/innovation-defence-security/ Rothschild, E. (1995) What is Security? Daedalus, 124 (3): 53–98. Ullman, R.H. (1983) Redefining Security. International Security, 8 (1): 129–153. UN (1948) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. United National General Assembly Resolution 217A). Available from: www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf Winks, R.W. (1996) Cloak and Gown. Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1961. London: Yale University Press. Recommended reading Adler, E. (1997) Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations. Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 26 (2): 249–277. Adler, E. and Barnett, M. (1998) Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Buzan, B. and Hansen, L. (2007) (eds.) International Security. London: Sage Publications. Gill, P., Corner, E., Conway, M., Thornton, A., Bloom, M., and Horgan, J. (2017) Terrorist Use of the Internet by the Numbers: Quantifying Behaviors, Patterns, and Processes. Criminology and Public Policy, 16 (1): 99–117. Kent, S. (1949) Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Krause, K., and Williams, M.C. (1996) Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods. Mershon International Studies Review, 40 (2): 229–254. Leal, S., Vrij, A., Vernham, Z., Dalton, G., Jupe, L., Harvey, A., and Nahari, G. (2018) Cross-Cultural Verbal Deception. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 23 (2): 192–213. Lee, B.J. (2017) It’s Not Paranoia When They Are Really out to Get You: The Role of Conspiracy Theories in the Context of Heightened Security. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 9 (1): 4–20. McSweeney, B. (1996) Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School. Review of International Studies, 22: 81–93. Montesquieu (1973) De l’espirt des lois. Paris: Garnier. Morris, C. (1983) Navy Ultra’s poor relations. In Hinsley, H. and Stripp, A. (eds.) Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Neumann, I. (1996) Collective Identity Formation: Self and Other in International Relations. ­European Journal of International Relations, 1 (3): 139–174. Taylor, P.J., Holbrook, D., and Joinson, A. (2017) Same Kind of Different: Affordance, Terrorism and the Internet. Criminology & Public Policy, 16 (1): 127–133. Waever, O., Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M., and LeMaitre, P. (1993) Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe. London: Pinter. Wendt, A. (1994) Collective Identity Formation and the International State. American Political Science Review, 88 (2): 384–396. Woolf, L.S. (1916) International Government. New York: Brentano.

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28 OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE Academic research, journalism or spying? Chris Westcott

Introduction The gathering, analysis and dissemination of information is one of the defining c­ haracteristics of Homo sapiens. As such, what we now call open source intelligence (OSINT)1 has been practised for millennia. Viking explorers, Roman legionnaires and Silk Road traders were familiar with the process of observing the world around them, attempting to u ­ nderstand it and then explaining what they knew to others. So, what has changed to now make OSINT a formal intelligence2 discipline? What, if anything, warrants the attention of twenty-first-­century academics, businesses, journalists and intelligence officers? Why is the question posed in the title of this chapter of growing importance to governments and their citizens alike, when twenty years ago, it would, at best, have seemed far-fetched or irrelevant? As this chapter will argue, the answer lies in OSINT’s most recent revolution: the inexorable rise of the digital domain for information storage and dissemination. In its own way, OSINT has become an exemplar of the power of digitally driven change; from Negroponte’s ‘disintermediation’ (Negroponte, 1997), through the oft-quoted Moore’s Law (Bell, 2016), to the lesser known, but arguably as significant, Metcalfe’s Law (Kosner, 2012). The result of these changes has been a seismic shift in OSINT processes, the people undertaking them and the products they produce. No longer the preserve of nation states and large corporate entities, OSINT is now also practised by non-state actors (both ‘good’ and ‘bad’), academia, journalists, start-ups and even individuals. The author himself has been party to these changes, both as a journalist and a manager responsible for launching BBC news websites in over forty languages; as the Director of BBC Monitoring (BBC News, 2018) for a dozen years; and latterly as the Director of an OSINT company spun out of Kings College, London, and an academic supervisor of v­ isiting Journalism Fellows at the Reuters’ Institute for the Study of Journalism in Oxford. The common thread in all those roles has been rapid shifts in landscape, be it media or OSINT, driven by technology-enabled change. This chapter will attempt to navigate that evolving OSINT landscape, to find a route through to answering the title’s question, pointing out in the process some of the challenging terrain of this new world, along with some of it sunny uplands. And, in a nod to the modern mantra of measuring outcomes, not just outputs, the chapter will conclude with a discussion of the value – more exactly the balance of benefits and risks – of all this activity. But first, how did we get to where we are today? 383

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A brief history of OSINT: more than one revolution Until the advent of the printing press, word of mouth was the predominant method of ­human communication. If something was written down in anything more permanent than marks in the dirt or scratches on a stick, then two things needed to be true. The information encoded had to be invariant enough to have not changed during the act of writing it down, and to be of sufficient value to warrant the cost of the scribe and the subsequent transport from author to reader. The barrier to entry into this manuscript world was literacy. It had a value, accrued benefits to those who had it or controlled access to it, and posed risks to those who didn’t. These three factors: the rate of change of information, the cost of storage and distribution and the scale and control of barriers to entry still pertain today. As we will see, OSINT ­operates now, as it has always done, within these parameters. In the Western tradition, the printing press broke the Church’s control over the barrier to entry to the written word. But, as many revolutionaries forget, the old world didn’t d­ isappear entirely: the Bible is now reputedly the most published book in the world. A desire to ­harness the rate of change of information – and to derive value from it – was the genesis of the newspaper, and with it a new source of information for citizens and nation states. By the early nineteenth century, OSINT (although it wasn’t called this) no longer just relied on travellers’ tales, traders, military and diplomatic reporting. Newspapers like The Times of London and Boston’s Transcript were now providing ‘the first cut of history’. But it wasn’t until the invention of the telegraph and its widespread adoption from the middle of the nineteenth century that a new information revolution – and hence OSINT revolution – occurred. As in the twentieth century, war provided the spur. For the UK, France and Russia, that conflict was the Crimean War (1853–1856).3 At the start, war correspondents, diplomats and the military relied on the despatch – transported by hand on land and sea – to communicate. The barrier to entry was huge and the information flow sporadic and slow. By the end of the war, a newly laid British undersea telegraph cable reduced the transit time for information from weeks to hours. A barrier to entry had been decimated and with it the cost of information transfer. Information volume increased (although tiny by current measures) and with it the size of the addressable audience. While the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary remained the most significant UK recipients of information from the Crimea, they were no longer the only audience. MPs, and most crucially ­newspaper readers, were equally well informed and in some cases (presaging a modern information ­conundrum  – the ‘CNN effect’ (Livingston, 1997)) better informed. William Howard ­Russell’s reports and Roger Fenton’s photographs in The Times of London changed public opinion. There was rioting in Trafalgar Square and the Earl of Aberdeen’s government fell to be replaced by Viscount Palmerston. Although the next OSINT – and information – revolution didn’t really get underway until the 1930s with the widespread adoption of radio, its origin in the wireless telegraphy of Guglielmo Marconi at the turn of the century links it back, in turn, to the telegraph of the mid-1800s. Before the Second World War, radio – and, in particular, long-distance shortwave (SW) transmissions – was the Internet of its age. SW radio – the first global medium – was quickly adopted by many countries. In the UK, the BBC’s Empire Service started transmissions in English in 1932 and in first Arabic, and then German, in 1938 (Webb, 2015). Unsurprisingly, dictators soon realised the propaganda value of the new medium, with Adolf Hitler’s Germany and Benito Mussolini’s 384

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Italy to the fore in establishing radio networks broadcasting to their own populations, the wider Europe, and in the case of Italy, to North Africa and (the then) Abyssinia. The UK response in the summer of 1939 was, in part, to attempt to better understand these new open sources by establishing a BBC run monitoring service (latterly BBC M ­ onitoring). In the USA, even before Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt acted to counteract the rising use of radio by Japan, allocating funding in February 1941 for the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to create the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service (FBMS). The US declaration of war on Japan and the declaration of war by Germany on the US raised the stakes and with it the funding of FBMS, which quickly changed its name to the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS).4 Working together by 1943, BBC Monitoring (BBCM) and FBIS developed new and novel operating procedures for dealing with open sources at volume and speed, processes which served the wider OSINT community and its users well throughout the analogue era. For more than sixty years, the broadcast model dominated open sources, whether the medium was radio, newspapers and, from the 1950s to 1960s, TV. Inherent to the model, open source monitors and analysts could assume that all recipients of a particular source were reading, hearing or watching the same content, and, in the case of radio and TV, that they were doing so at the same time. While audience sizes varied from the mass audiences of radio and TV through to the limited number of readers for grey literature5 and samizdat style publications, the ‘one to many’ broadcast paradigm was in the ascendancy. This dominance established a series of characteristics that defined the ownership and scale of both open source providers and open source collectors. With the exception of grey literature, open source providers were largely either corporate or state entities: newspapers, commercial broadcasters, news agencies and state and public service broadcasters. The barriers to entry into this world were large – often both financial and regulatory – while the cost of distribution was either fixed or marginal. Our third OSINT parameter, the rate of change of information, progressively increased during the period in question, reaching its apogee with the development of continuous radio and TV news services (Neilsen & Sambrook, 2016) that transformed news consumption and ­journalism from the 1980s. OSINT organisations were similarly constrained by the same characteristics that defined the open source producers. The significant barriers to entry – for example, the need to work closely with customers in the secret world of human and signals intelligence – limited players to a few trusted commercial enterprises, state and public sector entities. Our second characteristic, the cost of storage and dissemination, became for OSINT ­organisations the cost of storage and collection. With the burgeoning number of sources came a concomitant need for 12m satellite dishes, 50m high radio reception masts, t­eleprinter machines and reel to reel tape recorders, to name but a few. Add to that our third characteristic – the rate of change of information – which multiplied many-fold in the final decades of the twentieth century, and the economics and logistics of doing OSINT at scale and speed started to become onerous. ‘Difficult choices’ and ‘prioritisation’ became the new buzzwords as finite revenues collided with a steady increase in the number and range of open sources available. As just one example amongst many, BBCM had all but shut down its monitoring of Afghanistan just before 9/11. And then digital came of age, and the Internet changed OSINT again. The rate of change of information multiplied beyond calculation and new sets of open sources that changed in real time came into existence. Yes, the cost of storage and 385

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dissemination kept dropping as new software exploited the Moore’s law benefits of ever cheaper and faster hardware, but there was always more information to be stored and yet more to be disseminated and collected. Crucially, the barriers to entry fell away. In democracies, you didn’t need a licence from the government to access the Internet, just enough money to have a computer and an Internet connection. That epochal transition enabled individuals to be both a digital consumer and a digital producer. Now everyone can be a newspaper, radio or TV station. At first, the digital consumer side of the two-way Internet superhighway was the most trafficked and the most helpful to traditional OSINT organisations. No longer did they always need a 50m mast to hear a foreign radio station, a 12m satellite dish to watch TV or to trudge the streets of a far-away city buying newspapers and magazines. They could sit in their office, call up a webpage and click ‘play’. This welcome but fleeting OSINT ‘digital dividend’ didn’t last long. Firstly, the lowered entry barrier for extant OSINT operations also lowered the barrier for everyone else. Now anyone with a computer and Internet connection could observe open sources, be they a journalist, an academic or an interested member of the public (Keefe, 2013). Second, the digital instantiations of the analogue broadcast paradigm soon had their own ‘digital native’ ecosystems of online forums, chats, votes and interactivity to further complicate the OSINT picture. Third, the producer side of the two-way digital street rapidly filled as everyone from Al Qaeda members on bulletin boards, Iranian bloggers and Russian policemen with access to a web server became ‘publishers’. Open sources exploded and with it the old OSINT model of observing and understanding ‘broadcast’ sources came under unmanageable strain. No matter how fast the unit cost of collection and storage fell, it never broke even with the increased costs of collecting, storing and attempting to analyse the burgeoning digital Tower of Babel. While the new digital sources no longer conformed to the norms of the traditional broadcast world: editions, a broadcast schedule and so on, they were however still ‘broadcasting’ in the sense of being one to many interactions. That ceased to be the case when social media arrived on the scene. The social media entrepreneurs, feeling their way to making money from Metcalfe’s Law (Kosner, 2012), added a new paradigm to the increasingly cluttered OSINT landscape – that of the ‘many to many’ interaction. Thus, within less than a decade,6 OSINT had gone from grappling with a volume ­problem in the latter years of analogue broadcast’s dominance with its ‘one to many’ p­ aradigm ­dominated by the synchronous nature of radio and especially TV, through digital distribution of the same essentially analogue product, onto the asynchronous pure digital broadcast model of the blog and bulletin board, and thence to the digital ‘many to many’ paradigm of social media. As with all revolutions, some fared better than others. Professions established and d­ efined in the analogue world quickly found themselves on widely varying trajectories. Print journalism soon became grievously wounded, while some academics, notably the agile amongst the ranks of social scientists, grasped the opportunities afforded by the new digital humanities. Encapsulating both the opportunities and threats of the digital domain, the disciplines of human intelligence, signals intelligence and geospatial intelligence oscillated between

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supreme indifference, protestations that ‘the end of the world is nigh’ and plans to hoover up the digital footprints of millions of us. So how is the digital open source landscape shaping up for these professions? How are the journalist, the academic and the intelligence officer approaching open sources in the digital age? Are they effectively doing the same job and using the same techniques with only the names on the doors changed? Can OSINT be simultaneously an academic, journalistic and intelligence discipline, and if so what do the interfaces between these professions look like now and in the foreseeable future?

OSINT and journalism Journalism’s public purpose is often described as ‘to hold power to account’ (Greenslade, 2013b). One of the seats of power that journalists seek to hold to account is the world of secret intelligence. To do so, journalists often publish what the intelligence world would rather not: secrets. As John Lloyd has described (Lloyd, 2017), this basic tension permeates what otherwise are two professions with many similarities and many relationships. These relationships themselves have come under fire from within the journalism profession, most notably by Glenn Greenwald who has advocated a more adversarial style to deliver on journalism’s public purpose (Greenslade, 2013a), a viewpoint derived from his participation in publicising the revelations of Edward Snowden (Harding, 2014). While relationships between journalists and intelligence agencies may have served both parties well at times, they do hide a dirty secret: some journalists spy for intelligence agencies (Forsyth, 2015), and intelligence agencies, exploiting the similarities of the two professions, sometimes use journalistic cover for their agents (Knightley, 1987). Journalism clearly comes off worst when journalists spy and spies claim to be journalists. Many repressive regimes lock up journalists on the grounds of being spies and non-state ­actors such as Al Qaeda and ISIS kill bone fide journalists without compunction. Against this at best uncomfortable and at worst tragic backdrop, it’s perhaps not surprising that journalism has been reluctant to recognise that some of its sources and methods are indistinguishable from the OSINT conducted by the ‘secret state’ (Hennessy, 2010), and that increasingly the secret state employs all source analysis drawing upon, amongst other sources, journalism. Whilst this reluctance was tenable in the analogue era when few journalists had access to a 12m satellite dish, a 50m radio mast or the time to search through paper records, it looks increasingly untenable in the digital era when every journalist has a computer. As examples, in the digital domain (Weinbaum et al., 2017), journalists have reported a ‘private’ telephone conversation between Turkey’s President Erdogan and his son (Day, 2016), telephone conversations (Служба безпеки України, 2014) and social media posts claiming responsibility for shooting down a plane in the Ukraine, later identified as M ­ alaysian ­A irlines flight MH17 (BBC News, 2014), and unusual bidding processes for the running of a children’s summer camp in Russia where fourteen children died in 2016 (Valeeva, 2017). These examples and others show that journalism and OSINT share sources and methods to an increasing degree, and that valuable insights into capabilities and intent can be gleaned even from societies not noted for their openness. The rise of the importance of data, data analysis and data journalism is also apparent – a reflection of at least two of our OSINT ­constraints: the rate of change of information and the cost of storage and dissemination.

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OSINT and academic research Nuclear proliferation has been a subject of academic study from shortly after the first atomic bombs exploded in 1945.7 The theory and practice of nuclear safeguards, mutually assured destruction and nuclear deterrence have all been major topics for intellectual endeavour. But the nuts and bolts of nuclear weapons development and testing, and the science and engineering of nuclear materials have always been some of the most closely guarded of any nation’s secrets (Hennessy, 2007). So, it may come as a surprise to find academic researchers taking advantage of the digital domain to undertake complex and insightful OSINT into nuclear weapons (James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, n.d.). In the analogue world, there were a number of significant barriers to entry which have now fallen away. The most notable is the open availability of high-resolution satellite ­imagery, once the preserve of intelligence agencies who could launch their own satellites – or who could partner with those countries who could afford to do so. The falling cost of information storage and dissemination, coupled with scientists’ ­desire to publicise and publish their work (a trait they share with journalists!) means that it is ­possible to interrogate the lesser travelled multilingual byways of the information superhighway (Ridgeway Information Ltd, n.d.), discovering which scientists are working on nuclear projects, who their colleagues are, what the projects are and where the research is being conducted (Anon., n.d.a). Human trafficking (Brewster et al., 2014) and money laundering investigations (Watters, 2013) are just two more topics of academic OSINT research that exploit sources and methods once the preserve of intelligence organisations. Recognising the OSINT impact of the social media’s ‘many to many’ paradigm has led a former senior member of the UK intelligence community, and now a noted academic, to coin the term SOCMINT – social media intelligence (Omand et al., 2012). As applications of SOCMINT grow both in law enforcement and intelligence (Rovner, 2013), academics are working on areas as diverse as threat detection using tweets (Spitters et al., 2014) and developing a structured approach to analysing the social networks of individuals (Dorofeev et al., 2015) (the latter, interestingly carried out in Russia – itself a piece of OSINT!). All is not rosy in this area of OSINT though, as the recent controversy over the roles of Facebook and Cambridge Analytica in the 2016 US Presidential campaign has amply demonstrated. While the boundaries of personal and public spaces are well encoded in custom, s­ tatute, civil and criminal law in the physical world, there remains something of a ‘wild west’ about the digital equivalents. As Harvard’s Professor Shoshana Zuboff (Zuboff, 2019) has ­eloquently described, while state surveillance has been much described and legislated, there has – of yet – been much less debate by the general public and legislators of ‘surveillance capitalism’.

OSINT and secret intelligence Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA’s ‘bin Laden unit’, has been quoted (Glasser, 2005) as saying that, ‘90 percent of what you need to know comes from open-source intelligence’. This claim, and the figure used, is just one instance in a series dating back more than seven decades. A cursory online search will find a Statewatch article (Hayes, 2010) from 2010 which notes that ‘The CIA has even been quoted as saying that 80% of its intelligence comes from Google’. 388

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Following the reference to this statement takes the researcher to a citation for a paper published by the EU Joint Research Centre in 2008 (Best, 2008), but there the trail runs cold. But what does the CIA have to say on the matter? In a section of their website given over to book reviews (yes, really) in comments on a 2014 book on OSINT, Hayden Peake writes (Peake, 2016): Allen Dulles contributed to this view in his 1947 Senate testimony when he said the ‘proper analysis of intelligence obtainable by these overt, normal, and above-board means would supply us with over 80 percent, I should estimate, of the information ­required for the guidance of our national policy. A more accurate formulation would have reversed the terms ‘intelligence’ and ‘information’. (US Senate Armed Services Committee on Armed Services, 1947) This intriguing entry although providing an original source for the much repeated and embellished claim sheds only limited light on the role and value of OSINT to otherwise secret intelligence (Gibson, 2014). It also stands in stark contrast to the lack of any reference at all to OSINT, FBIS (see Note 4) or open sources in the index of one of the most widely read histories of the CIA (Weiner, 2008). Even that data point, however, may on its own be misleading, since the 2005 US WMD Commission in reviewing the US Government’s activities in Iraq recommended the c­ reation of an open source directorate in the CIA ‘to greatly enhance the availability of open source information to analysts, collectors, and users of intelligence’ (The Commission on the ­Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2005). A similar ‘name check’ for open sources – although without a recommendation on ­resourcing for their provision – also appeared in the UK’s assessment of Iraq: the ‘Butler ­Report’ (Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, 2004), paragraph 34 recording that: In the UK, assessment is usually explicitly described as ‘all-source’. Given the imperfections of intelligence, it is vital that every scrap of evidence be examined, from the most secret sources through confidential diplomatic reports to openly published data. Intelligence cannot be checked too often. Unhelpfully, some other nations are less forthcoming about the relationship between their secret intelligence and their OSINT, glimpses only coming sparingly from defectors and long-term observers of the intelligence activities of potential adversaries. Before the Second World War, the forerunner of the GRU used only open sources to research the armed forces of nations beyond Russia’s immediate list of potential allies and adversaries (Haslam, 2015b) – presumably a reflection of an uneasy mix of ideology and ­economic reality. The ideological propensity for secrecy was still visible post-war with ­reported deficiencies in the KGB’s methods for identifying intelligence officers working under diplomatic cover. With the culture valuing secrecy over open sources, a reflection of esteem rather than efficiency and effectiveness, ‘Kagebisty tended to be dismissive of the CIA’s practice of spending so much time and effort reading newspapers’ (Haslam, 2015a). Although arrests in the USA and Russia indicate that the much discussed Chinese intelligence strategy of a ‘thousand grains of sand’ doesn’t necessarily operate in isolation from more internationally recognised approaches (Mattis, 2011), Nigel Inkster (Inkster, 2016a) does draw out two tantalising open source examples: Chinese defence attachés, members of the second Department of the PLA General Staff, who focus on OSINT, and a reported 389

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1991 book by two Chinese intelligence officers asserting that ‘the majority of intelligence requirements can be met through the accumulation of open-source material’ (Inkster, 2016b). The author’s own experience has shown how OSINT plays different roles in different circumstances, indeed as do the other intelligence disciplines. At one level, OSINT provides all important cultural and linguistic contexts for secret intelligence (Omand, 2015a). At the other end of the spectrum, the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2011 explicitly credited OSINT with discovering evidence of Iranian work on ‘detonation shock dynamics’ which has applications in the development of nuclear explosives (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2011). Sitting somewhere in the middle is the revelation that MI6s Daphne Park made her first agent recruitment when she provided her source with what appeared to be sensitive information (Corera, 2012). In fact, it had come from BBC Monitoring’s Summary of World Broadcasts. The irony – not lost on OSINT practitioners – is that while their sources are open and some of their methods and tools are used increasingly by journalists and academics, their output may not be. As a rough rule of thumb, the more valuable an OSINT analysis is, the more likely it is to be classified as a ‘secret’ (Anon., n.d.b). Although the CIA’s own definition of OSINT includes the codicil that ‘information does not have to be secret to be valuable’ (see Note 1), it clearly helps.

Conclusion As a pictorial representation of this chapter’s preceding three sections would illustrate, the world of OSINT is a series of intersections. OSINT, a discipline in its own right, overlaps with journalism, academic research and secret intelligence. The resulting Venn diagram is both complex and ever changing. What was once the preserve of state-run secret intelligence can transition in an inkling to the OSINT world where it can be undertaken by businesses, academics and/or journalists. A February 2017 New York Times article (Fisher & Patel, 2017), essentially a piece of detailed photographic analysis of a single photo of Kim Jong-un, suffices to show how the secret world of nuclear weapons development can transition, thanks to OSINT, through academia into front page journalism. These transitions reflect both changes in the three OSINT constraints introduced in this chapter and a range of other factors: the resources states and businesses are willing to apply to intelligence (OSINT is arguably the lowest cost ‘INT’), availability (why apply scarce secret sources to a problem when the answer might be in plain view?) and the nature of the intelligence problem seeking a solution (Treverton, 2014). Our increasingly digitally mediated world has percolated at different rates into the professions and organisational structures discussed in this chapter. Some impacts – such as those on journalism and the print media – are visible and well-rehearsed. Others, for example the benefits and risks to ‘traditional academia’ of working in the digital domain, are rising in salience both within and without the stakeholders impacted. And while some parts of some secret states have been admirably open about digital impacts on secret intelligence (Omand, 2015b), this world, of necessity, largely plays out its analysis of benefits and risks behind rolls of barbed wire. OSINT has clearly delivered value to its users for more than a millennium, transcending the revolutions of print, the telegraph and analogue broadcast media. But even in the latter years of the twentieth century at the apogee of the analogue era, OSINT’s constraints limited the number and affiliation of its producers, collectors and analysers. So, it’s perhaps not surprising that OSINT’s transition to the digital domain has not been without incident, as now – at least theoretically – anyone with a connected device can play. 390

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Just as those who consider themselves professional journalists have seen their thinning ranks joined by citizen journalists, so OSINT professionals in law enforcement and intelligence have witnessed the rise of a number of start-ups (Massie, 2015), including spin outs from academia (Ridgeway Information Ltd., 2017). These new entrants are further blurring the old intersections between the relevant professions, the secret and open worlds and the public and private sectors, with some even eschewing the use of the phrase OSINT. What will come next? While this decade, the third of the digital revolution, should have seen the world well down the classic transition curve of ‘forming, storming, norming and performing’, the recent controversy over the use of ‘open sources’ by Cambridge Analytica shows that this is not so everywhere. Many have either applauded or been quiescent as leaks and thefts have enabled all of us to openly access previously secret sources. WikiLeaks, the Snowden revelations, Mossack Fonseca, to name but a few, have radically changed the location of the open source/secret source intersection. But many of the same people who delight in openly accessing the ‘secrets’ of others are deeply unhappy when information about themselves, that they consider private, is retrieved and actioned by others. Although this concern has historically been directed at what our governments know about us, in the digital domain, the concern now properly extends to what our broadband, mobile and social media providers know. This, of course, is a familiar condition to anyone who lives or works in societies which fall in the lower reaches of the various freedom indices. Control of access to information, and the nature of the information that can be accessed, remains a defining factor of such countries. Open source work under these circumstances, whether it be in data journalism, academia or business, remains at best a difficult and risky undertaking. The boundary between open sources and secrets is tightly drawn by the state, heavily in its favour and with little opportunity to move it. In democracies, however, this is properly a matter for public debate and democratically enacted legislation. Even here, open source practitioners in business, academia and journalism might give pause to consider whether their current largely unfettered access to the deep and dark webs, Facebook, Twitter, VK, Weibo, etc., will always be so. Similarly, OSINT professionals in law enforcement and secret intelligence might find ever higher barriers to entry to open sources on ‘persons of interest’. Given the propensity of politicians to feel the need to do ‘something’, might the EU’s ‘right to be forgotten’ legislation be an early straw in a chilling wind that will redefine what is open and what is secret?

Notes 1 This chapter adopts the CIA definition of OSINT (Central Intelligence Agency, 2010) as ‘drawn from publicly available material, including the internet; traditional mass media; specialised journals, conference proceedings and think tank studies; photos and geospatial information’. 2 This chapter adopts Sir David Omand’s definition of intelligence, whose purpose ‘is to help improve the quality of decision making by reducing ignorance’, in ‘The Importance of BBC Monitoring for Intelligence’, Imperial War Museum, 2015 (Omand, 2015a). 3 For the USA, an equally seminal event was the Civil War (1861–1865) where again the telegraph transformed the ownership and distribution of information – the raw material of OSINT. 4 Interestingly, the acronym remained unchanged in 1947 when it became part of the newly formed CIA and was renamed as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

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References Anon, n.d.a. Private Communication. s.l.:s.n. Anon, n.d.b. Private Communication. s.l.:s.n. BBC News, 2014. ‘How it trended – the MH17 blame game’, #BBC Trending, 18th July 2014. [Online] Available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-28371461[Accessed 7 January 2019]. BBC News, 2018. BBC Monitoring: The ears that listened to history in the making. [Online] Available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-berkshire-44239787 [Accessed 7 January 2019]. Bell, L., 2016. What is Moore’s Law? WIRED explains the theory that defined the tech industry. Wired, 28 August. Best, C., 2008. Open Source Intelligence. [Online] Available at: “Open Source Intelligence”, Clive Best, EU Joint Research Centre, Available at: http://media.eurekalert.org/aaasnewsroom/2008/ FIL_000000000010/071119_MMDSS-chapter_CB.pdf Brewster, B., Ingle, T. & Rankin, G., 2014. Crawling Open-source Data for Indicators of Human Trafficking. s.l., IEEE/ACM 7th International Conference on Utility and Cloud Computing. Central Intelligence Agency, 2010. INTellingence: Open Source Intelligence. [Online] Available at: www. cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/open-source-­ intelligence.html [Accessed 7 January 2019]. Corera, G., 2012. MI6: Life and Death in the British Secret Service. s.l.:Weidenfeld and Nicholson. Day, M., 2016. Bilal Erdogan: Italy names Turkish president’s son in money laundering investigation allegedly connected to political corruption. The Independent, 17 February. Dorofeev, A., Markov, A. & Tsirlov, V., 2015. Structured Approach to the social network analysis of Information about a certain individual. St Petersburg, EGOSE ‘15 Proceedings of the 2015 2nd International Conference on Electronic Governance and Open Society: Challenges in Eurasia. Fisher, M. & Patel, J. K., 2017. What One Photo Tells Us About North Korea’s Nuclear Program. The New York Times, 24 February. Forsyth, F., 2015. The Outsider, My Life in Intrigue. s.l.:Bantam Press. Gibson, S. D., 2014. Exploring the Role and Value of Open Source Intelligence. In: C. Hobbs, M. Moran & D. Salisbury, eds. Open Source Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: New Approaches and Opportunities. s.l.:Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 9–23. Glasser, S. B., 2005. Probing Galaxies of Data for Nuggets. The Washington Post, 25 November. Greenslade, R., 2013a. Greenwald vs Keller - adversarial journalism vs mainstream journalism. The Guardian, 29 October. Greenslade, R., 2013b. Why the journalistic elite is failing to hold power to account. The Guardian, 20 September. Harding, L., 2014. The Snowden Files. s.l.:Faber and Faber. Haslam, J., 2015a. In: Near and Distant Neighbours: A New History of Soviet Intelligence. s.l.:Oxford ­University Press, p. 254. Haslam, J., 2015b. In: Near and Distant Neighbours: A New History of Soviet Intelligence. s.l.:Oxford ­University Press, p. 64. Hayes, B., 2010. Spying on a see-through world: the “Open Source” intelligence industry. [Online] Available at: http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=29869 [Accessed 7 January 2019]. Hennessy, P., 2007. Cabinets and the Bomb. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hennessy, P., 2010. The Secret State: Preparing for the worst 1945–2010. s.l.:Penguin. Inkster, N., 2016a. In: China’s Cyber Power. s.l.:Routledge, pp. 57–58. Inkster, N., 2016b. In: China’s Cyber Power. s.l.:Routledge, pp. 61–62. International Atomic Energy Agency, 2011. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. [Online] Available at: www.iaea. org/sites/default/files/gov2011-65.pdf [Accessed 7 January 2019]. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, n.d. [Online] Available at: www.nonproliferation.org/ [Accessed 7 January 2019].

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Open source intelligence: academic research, journalism or spying? Keefe, P. R., 2013. Rocket Man. The New Yorker, 25 November. Knightley, P., 1987. The Second Oldest Profession. s.l.:W W Norton. Kosner, A. W., 2012. Facebook values itself based on Metcalfe’s law, but the market is using Zipf ’s. Forbes, 31 May. Livingston, S., 1997. Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of ­Military Intervention, Harvard: John F. Kennedy School of Government’s Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University. Lloyd, J., 2017. Journalism in An Age of Terror. Oxford: IB Taurus and Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford. Massie, C., 2015. Watch out for Bellingcat. [Online] Available at: www.cjr.org/business_of_news/­ bellingcat_brown_moses.php [Accessed 7 January 2019]. Mattis, P., 2011. China’s Misunderstood Spies, The Diplomat. [Online] Available at: https://thediplomat. com/2011/10/chinas-misunderstood-spies/ [Accessed 7 January 2019]. Negroponte, N., 1997. Reintermediated. Wired, 1 September. Neilsen, R. & Sambrook, R., 2016. What is Happening to Television News? Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford. Omand, D., 2015a. The Importance of BBC Monitoring for Intelligence. [Online] Available at: www.iwm. org.uk/sites/default/files/images/gallery/The%20Importance%20of%20BBC%20Monitoring%20 for%20Intelligence%20by%20David%20Omand.pdf [Accessed 7 January 2019]. Omand, D., 2015b. Understanding Digital Intelligence and the norms that might govern it, s.l.: Centre for International Governance Innovation and Chatham House. Omand, D., Bartlett, J. & Miller, C., 2012. #Intelligence, London: Demos. Peake, H., 2016. Intelligence in Public Literature Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf. [Online] Available at: www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/ vol-59-no-4/intelligence-officers-bookshelf.html [Accessed 7 January 2019]. Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, 2004. Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction. s.l.: House of Commons. Ridgeway Information Ltd., 2017. About Ridgeway. [Online] Available at: www.ridgeway-­information. com/about.html [Accessed 7 January 2019]. Ridgeway Information Ltd, n.d. Non Proliferation. [Online] Available at: www.ridgeway-information. com/nonproliferation.html [Accessed 7 January 2019]. Rovner, J., 2013. Intelligence in the Twitter Age. International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 26(2), pp. 260–271. Spitters, M., Eendebak, P., Worm, D. T. H. & Bouma, H., 2014. Threat detection in tweets with trigger patterns and contextual cues. s.l., IEEE Joint Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference, pp. 216–219. The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2005. Recommendation 9, ‘The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Report to the President of the United States, 31st March 2005., Washington: s.n. Treverton, G., 2014. The Future of Intelligence: Changing Threats, Evolving Methods. The Future of Intelligence Challenges in the 21st Century, Routledge, 2014., p. 27. US Senate Armed Services Committee on Armed Services, 1947. Hearings on the National Defense ­Establishment, 1st Session, 1947, p. 526, Washington: s.n. Valeeva, A., 2017. Open Data in a Closed Political System: Open Data Investigative Journalism in Russia. Oxford: Reuters Institute for the study of Journalism, University of Oxford. Watters, P., 2013. Modelling the effect of deception on investigations using open source intelligence (OSINT). Journal of Money Laundering Control, 16(3), pp. 238–248. Webb, A., 2015. London Calling. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Weinbaum, C., Berner, S. & McClintok, B., 2017. SIGINT for Anyone: The Growing Availability of Signals Intelligence in the Public Domain. s.l.: RAND. Weiner, T., 2008. Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. s.l.:Anchor Books. Zuboff, S., 2019. The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power. s.l.:Public Affairs. Служба безпеки України, 2014. SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, “Boeing-777” plane crash. [Online] Available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=BbyZYgSXdyw [Accessed 7 ­January 2019].

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29 OVERKILL Why universities modelling the impact of nuclear war in the 1980s could not change the views of the security state John Preston Introduction In the Cold War of the 1980s, Stan Openshaw (University of Leeds) and his academic ­colleagues produced original and sophisticated computer models which concluded that the UK government had vastly underestimated casualties and property damage in the event of a nuclear attack. The academics believed that these models would lead to policy acceptance that any military move which might provoke a nuclear attack would be unacceptable as casualties could be in the order of 80%. However, Openshaw was unaware that the UK government had already considered that a lower threshold of destruction would be an existential threat to the nation and were already developing authoritarian plans for national reconstruction. In conclusion, governments in crisis operate in the ‘state of exception’, considering state logics and brutally pragmatic forms of response that academics often misjudge in their conceptions of policy impact.

The end of the United Kingdom? The idea that a Western nation state might not survive due to an attack by a foreign power seems to be completely alien in the present day. In the 1980s, however, the idea that the United Kingdom (UK) could cease to exist as a viable nation was debated in parliament, frequently behind closed doors in government, in military departments and even in our universities. The threat of nuclear war, it was largely argued, would mean that the UK as a functioning state could come to an end. Whether this would occur in practice, and under what terms, was a debate which universities were engaged in at various levels. This ­debate was not just conducted through student societies such as local C.N.D. (Campaign for ­Nuclear ­Disarmament) groups who considered a nuclear war to be not survivable even for ­government. Academics, who modelled the probability of ‘overkill’, and the almost complete annihilation of the working population, were also involved in this analysis. In this chapter, I analyse one aspect of the debate around national survival during this period, between the university scientists who modelled nuclear attack (particularly Openshaw) and the government (particularly the Home Office). In doing so, I consider the work of Openshaw through

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his academic outputs (Openshaw and Steadman, 1983a, 1983b; Openshaw, ­Steadman and Greene, 1983) and how estimates of casualties and damage were reflected in the Home ­Office’s plans for nuclear attack. In analysing the Home Office’s response (which would not have been known to Openshaw), I consider a number of Home Office documents from The National Archives (TNA) from the early 1980s. The contention in this chapter is that an analysis based on emphasising the substantive impacts of nuclear war damage was unknowingly naïve given the discussions in the Home Office on what was necessary for national survival. Whilst the Home Office did care about population survival, this concern was tempered by a belief that the nation state could continue in a reduced form but in a form that might be unrecognisable to academics who considered concepts of democracy and due process to be inviolable. Although the variables which defined the Home Office and university estimates were similar (casualties, fire damage and infrastructure destruction), the ultimate outcomes were different. For the university modellers, their purpose was to identify the true devastation of a nuclear attack, and to critique the assumptions and methodologies of the Home Office model. For the Home Office, the task was also one of scientific accuracy but they were also minded to consider the wider purposes of state survival. This means that the Home Office considered dramatic anti-democratic and even anti-humanistic possibilities of state survival which were not dreamed of by the university critics who, whilst challenging the purposes of civil defence, did not consider that radically extreme measures might be a possibility that the state would take seriously. Therefore, emphasis on the extent of devastation could not have an impact on a security state that had already considered that a much lower level of damage would be sufficient to trigger a significant existential threat and had made tentative plans to deal with this. It must be stated that the chapter is not intended to critique the science behind the work of Openshaw and colleagues which remains as a bold challenge to the military thinkers of the early 1980s. This work was ground-breaking in terms of introducing aspects of computer modelling to unfamiliar geographical problems. Rather, this analysis is intended to serve as a reminder that the concerns of the security state, in crisis, can be entirely different from those which liberal society, and particularly academics, might find to be palatable in terms of democracy and due process. The experimental, brutal, pragmatism conducted behind closed doors in the Home Office of the 1980s was such that notions of academic impact (at least in terms of increasingly horrific casualty estimates) would have little effect. Unknown to Openshaw, the effective tolerable limit for UK national survival had already been breached within Home Office assessments even without his new estimations. It is important to separate a theorised perspective – that modern government is brutally pragmatic in the ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2005) – from conspiracy theories. It is often considered that the government departments of the period were using civil defence and models of nuclear survival to mislead the general public whilst keeping the true models of nuclear attack to themselves. This conspiratorial perspective affords too much agency to the state. Firstly, with regard to civil defence and modelling of civilian casualties, the state is subject to strong path dependence in terms of how interlocking agencies constrain (and sometimes enhance) policy direction. In terms of the British state, for example, the government had a historical tendency towards secrecy over matters of civil defence, nuclear war and the collapse of national infrastructures which was very different to the more open, civil society, approach that prevailed in the United States (Kitagawa, Preston and Chadderton, 2016). There was little openness in terms of discussing nuclear, or military matters, with academics in the 1980s. However, suppression of information was not necessarily a common purpose

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across government departments. Again, in the UK while some departments ­(Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office) wished to maintain civil defence secrecy in the 1980s, others (such as the Home Office) desired a more open and widely disseminated policy but their limited strength in Cabinet gave them little success (Preston, 2014). It would therefore have been very difficult for part of the state in the 1980s to break with previous policies of secrecy, particularly with opposition from other government departments. Secondly, given the circumstances of absolute nuclear annihilation, the state was hugely conflicted in terms of its aims in terms of prioritising its own survival as opposed to the survival of citizens. It faced a truly existential crisis not just of life but of the existence of the nation. The state was not necessarily consciously keeping the public in the dark about nuclear war and civil defence (although internal pressures from the MOD would lead the British State to behave in this way) but literally had very few options in terms of the extent of devastation it was facing.

Modelling nuclear attack: the work of Openshaw The work of Stan Openshaw, an early pioneer of computational geography at the University of Leeds, and his academic co-author Philip Steadman, on nuclear war in the early 1980s, provided an academic rebuttal to civil defence guidance of the time, particularly Protect and Survive (H.M.S.O., 1980). Additionally, it can be positioned alongside forms of protest that sought to dismiss the government’s efforts to defend the population under nuclear attack arising from C.N.D. and other counter-cultural movements. Openshaw’s work was not politically motivated, and in principle not oppositional to the concept of civil defence, but rather aimed to provide a robust academic assessment of casualties and damage following a nuclear attack. In producing the ‘Openshaw-Steadman nuclear war casualty prediction models’ (Openshaw and Steadman, 1983b, p. 197), they aimed to provide academic objectivity in an area where they saw that the public had often been misled. In particular, they aimed to bring a spatial analysis to the science of casualty estimation (Openshaw and Steadman, 1983b, p. 201). Openshaw and Steadman (1983a) believed that university academics had not been particularly concerned with the mostly secretive nuclear attack models devised by government. They wanted to question the estimates arising from these nuclear models as an area where academics could make an impact on public debate as opposed to the secrecy of government through which ‘The public, it seems are not to be told about the risks they face…’ (Openshaw and Steadman, 1983a, p. 206). In critiquing these models, they aimed to use the methods of urban and regional modelling to test the military assumptions of governments. Although Openshaw, Steadman and Greene (1983) made it entirely clear that the extent of their analysis tended towards the apocalyptic by entitling their work on the chances of the UK surviving a nuclear attack ‘Doomsday’, their task was scientific objectivity. Whilst acknowledging that other studies of such attacks might exist in the MOD or the Home Office (Openshaw, Greene and Steadman, 1983, p. 1), they had not been made available to the public. What they could do was to consider what little they knew about the assumptions behind the computer modelling at the Home Office to compare it to their own modelling. The results of the investigation by Openshaw et al. (1983) were sobering: …even a moderate, realistic, level of attack would be likely to result in at least fourfifths of the country’s population being killed and injured by the direct effects, 65 per cent of all buildings in the country being seriously damaged, set on fire or demolished,

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and 70 per cent of the inhabited land are of Britain being subjected to levels of radiation from fallout which would be fatal to any person (and most animals) in the open. (p. 5) The authors considered that this analysis was more rigorous than that undertaken by the Home Office. The computer model devised by Openshaw was sophisticated for 1983 and the analysis was conducted in the FORTRAN language on a main frame computer (IBM 370/168) which had eight megabytes of memory. The IBM 370/168 was a computer in wide use at that time including in the United States Department of Defence (Department of ­Defence, 1978), so it was possible to imagine that governments would be conducting analysis on similar machines. The procedure that Openshaw adopted involved dividing the UK into discrete squares of one kilometre in area. This segmented the country into roughly a quarter of a million squares which were then allocated an aggregate population based on 1971 census data. Bomb targets, related to government planning assumptions, were based on Ordnance Survey maps allocated to the quarter of a million squares and each bomb target had attributes for the expected missile including yield and groundburst/airburst, which then allowed for the calculation of casualties, blast damage and other effects (Openshaw, Greene and Steadman, 1983, p. 113) to provide (in a moderate case) the grim statistics described earlier. The authors considered that their model was robust. In contrast, the Home Office model used ‘…inappropriate data and overoptimistic assumptions’ which meant that it ‘… predicts very much lower casualty estimates than ours’ (Openshaw, Greene and Steadman, 1983, p. 197). Their criticisms were based upon various omissions by the Home Office (in not accounting for thermal radiation burns, in not assuming that successive attacks might be more damaging given previous damage to shelter) and underestimations (in underestimating blast pressure, in assuming that properties can be similarly protected against damage and in minimising the impact of radiation dose) in the model. In other work, they reported that blast effects had been substantively underestimated by the Home Office (Openshaw and Steadman, 1983a, p. 218). They conceded that their models were beset with uncertainties, but that the bias in their models was downwards in terms of casualties and once other factors were taken into consideration including lack of resources, disease, famine, spread of fallout from the continent and attacks on nuclear power stations, the effects of the damage would be much greater. In terms of modelling their most extreme, but technically viable, nuclear attack scenario ‘Hard Luck’ predicted that the survival rate of the population after two weeks would only be 20% at the maximum.

Hard Luck: the home office and societal continuity Openshaw had an expectation that scientific objectivity from a university source would be invaluable to ‘Emergency Planning Officers, DHSS…[Department of Health and Social Security]…“war-planners”, Home Office scientific advisers and other civil defence w ­ orkers’ (Openshaw, Greene and Steadman, 1983, p. 6) and that such objectivity would lead to those groups reconsidering the viability of civil defence. Their advice, they believed, could even lead to a rethinking of decisions under crisis to reduce the possibility of nuclear war (­Openshaw and Steadman, 1983b). Indeed, there was a similar view amongst Home Office scientists, who did consider that the prospects for the country in a nuclear attack looked bleak, but how the Home Office defined that problem was markedly different to what Openshaw expected. What critics such as Openshaw underestimated was that the Government had very different (actually lower) criteria for what was meant by national survival in a

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nuclear war. However, this did not mean that the government was wholly cynical concerning civil defence. In the conclusion to their book, Openshaw, Greene and Steadman (1983) make two conclusions regarding civil defence and the aims of the state: …the number of short term-deaths and injuries averted at present precautions would be very few in comparison to the total death toll…defence of the population is only one of their concerns and a minor one at that. (p. 242) In these two statements, Openshaw et al. and the Home Office would be primarily in agreement although the academics would not have known it at the time. That was because the Home Office was concerned about the scale of the attack and the efficacy of civil defence but their concerns were wider than defence of the population. Indeed, the claim that Openshaw and S­ teadman (1983a) make that ‘It is very questionable whether any kind of recovery, or partial recovery would be possible after a large-scale nuclear attack’ (Openshaw and S­ teadman, 1983a, p. 224) was almost identical to the thinking of social scientists commissioned by the Home O ­ ffice (Preston, 2014). Even if the population as a whole did not s­urvive, then the survival of government, and the continuity of the nation state, was considered to be important. Home Office social scientists believed that it was quite likely that the UK population would be too physically and psychologically damaged to consider reconstructing a nation state and that the chances of a viable nation surviving a nuclear attack were in the balance. There was a real, and scientifically substantiated, fear by the Home Office that even a nuclear attack that resulted in a small number of casualties in an area would result in a society that could not rebuild itself (Preston, 2014). To expand on this point, social scientists and psychologists who were employed by the Home Office to construct reports on the prospects for national survival were convinced that, without a significant change in the basic structures of society in the UK, there was little chance that there could be regeneration to a fully functioning nation state. In the computer model of nuclear attacks devised by Openshaw and Steadman (1983b), two scenarios were proposed – ‘Hard Rock’ (based on a real 1982 Home Defence exercise) in which up to 350 MT (Megatons) of nuclear weapons hit the UK without strategic targeting and the more realistic (according to Openshaw and Steadman) ‘Hard Luck’ where weapons are more strategically targeted. In ‘Hard Rock’, 80% of the population would survive a fortnight, whereas in ‘Hard Luck’, only a maximum of 20% would be alive after two weeks. The Home Office considered that even an attack of the ‘Hard Rock’ type (with 20% casualties) would result in the prospects for economic and social regeneration being severely compromised (Home Office, c.1982a). Moreover, in areas where casualty rates were above 50%, it was predicted that the region would effectively be eternally lost in terms of the ability of citizens to achieve social reconstruction (Home Office, c.1982a). A ‘Hard Luck’ scenario was beyond the bounds of what the Home Office considered reasonable for the UK to ever recover from socially or economically. Even ‘Hard Rock’ was an ontologically different type of disaster, a ‘macro d­ isaster’ (Home Office, c.1982a) with macro-social consequences in terms of ­permanently destroying social cohesion. ‘Hard Luck’, although worse, did not change things for the Home Office as social cohesion and national survival (in the terms we recognise it) were already compromised. Openshaw and colleagues at Leeds University did not know it but their modelling already represented ‘overkill’ in terms of how the Home Office was thinking about prospects for societal reconstruction after nuclear war. Although technically useful, and provocative to the general public, there was no possibility of this research changing minds in the Home Office as it was already conceded that an attack of much lower magnitude predicted by the scientists 398

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would mean the end of the UK as a plausible nation state. In these circumstances, the Home Office set about to consider how a nation could be reconstructed in terms beyond which would be democratic or necessarily humanitarian with the emphasis on a scientific pragmatism. Foreshadowed by the grim advice in ‘Protect and Survive’ (H.M.S.O., 1980) which included burial of the dead, plans for subsequent advice would highlight that civil defence was necessary primarily to prevent death (Home Office, 1982). As the psychological d­ emands on the population would be so traumatic as to make recovery through standard legal and economic systems impossible (Home Office, c.1982b), the Home Office experimented with alternative methods of social control. One of these was the imposition of martial law with a return to the death penalty for transgressing activities which would hamper recovery (Home Office, 1982b). In one exercise (‘Exercise Regenerate’), it was even considered that psychopaths, due to their lack of empathy and lack of qualms around using violence, could make excellent recruits to the police and other agents of social control (Home Office, c.1982c). Their lack of moral code was believed to be advantageous to the types of social control which would be necessary after a nuclear war. Another strategy was to strategically use food stocks to force the population to work for reconstruction, albeit at starvation rations. It was predicted that a nuclear attack on the scale of ‘Hard Rock’ would destroy agriculture for years and that there was no possibility of food stocks feeding the population even in the short term (Home Office, 1984). In these circumstances, it was planned only to provide subsistence rations to obedient workers, the police and the military for the purposes of social and economic reconstruction (Campbell, 1982, p. 279). In summary, the Home Office had already considered that the magnitude of a nuclear attack even on a scale less extreme than that modelled by Openshaw et al. would be enough to put the UK into a major risk of existential threat. In those circumstances, there could be no conception of survival of a nation under conditions of democracy or capitalism. The nation would need to survive by other means. Accordingly, the state conducted thought ­experiments which would recommend feudal types of feeding and law enforcement and even suggested the use of psychopaths as agents of the state. This authoritarian pragmatism on behalf of the Home Office was what would apparently be required if the task was to restore the UK to any notion of a functioning nation state.

Conclusion: the practice of security under existential threat The nuclear attack modelling being conducted by Openshaw and colleagues in the 1980s was being carried out without awareness of the fact that there was a very private government discourse. While there were reports that government had tried to make plans for the provision of food for the population (for example), the ludicrous nature of such plans (that they would never keep a person alive) was taken to be evidence that such plans were unrealistic and ‘fantasies’. The truth was that these plans reflected pragmatism on the part of government, a state perspective that (in the final analysis) would be reluctantly prepared to sacrifice some of its barely surviving citizenry rather than to lose the nation. The wider ideal, of national continuity, was considered to be the ultimate goal of government. I refer to this as the ‘collapsible state’ (Preston, 2009), a state that can consolidate until sufficient power has been restored to rebuild a full and functioning government. A ‘collapsible state’ divides the ‘core state’ (survival of central government with sufficient force to maintain continuity) from its functions and even its population. This is not to imply some kind of notion of ‘deep state’. Although some academics were occasionally brought into the periphery of the state so that their work on social and psychological robustness could be used, they were never party to the activities of 399

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the ‘core state’. It is here that concepts of welfare, democracy and ultimately citizenry can be abandoned for the protection of the sovereign state. The state displays a ruthless pragmatism in relating to its population for its continued survival, or at least the survival of the nation. Whilst the debate conducted by Openshaw and his authors was constructed with a belief that knowing the true extent of a nuclear war would alter public minds and public policy, in reality the Home Office had already considered that a substantially lower rate of destruction than Openshaw had predicted would, in any case, result in an existential threat to national survival, or at least the survival of the nation state. In these extreme circumstances, the state’s notion that it needs to protect the welfare and security of its citizens disappears, alongside ideas of justice and social justice (Preston, Chadderton and Kitagawa, 2014). In doing so, the state experiments with new regimes of security that are not necessarily democratic whilst attempting to insert these into existing democratic legal structures (through planning for states of emergency) so that in the event of a crisis, these can be deployed. The experimental nature of a ‘post-nuclear’ state of exception in the UK can be conceptually related to Agamben’s (2005) division between application and norm in the ‘state of exception’: …the state of exception is the opening of a space in which application and norm reveal their separation and a pure force-of-law realises…In this way, the impossible task of welding norm and reality together, and thereby constituting the normal sphere is carried out in the form of the exception… In every case the state of exception marks a threshold at which logic and praxis blur with each other and a pure violence without logos claims to realize an enunciation without any real reference (p. 40) The boundaries in which state security operates, in times of crisis, operate in the threshold at which ‘logic and praxis blur’. In an ultimately existential threat, conceptions of the logics of welfarism, democracy and due process are instantly anachronistic to the state which returns to the practical and pragmatic. Today, we might consider that conceptions of martial law, subsistence rationing, using food for social control and recruiting psychopaths to the police are absurd notions. For the plausibly post-nuclear British state in the 1980s, though, these were concrete, if experimental suggestions. The question became one of a practical, free thinking, political philosophy in terms of how a nation state is constructed not just following war or ­crisis, but following an apocalyptic event. The contemporary lesson is that for academics in universities who wish to inform state policy on security, there needs to be awareness, and a lack of naivety, concerning the strategic pragmatism of the state, particularly in crisis. Academics tend to believe that if they produce technically sophisticated, objective, research that shakes assumptions, then it will be adopted in policy and practice. In the UK, in particular, there is an emphasis by universities and funding councils on the importance of research impact, especially in terms of UK government policy. However, as has been shown, the ground-breaking technical work of Openshaw and colleagues in modelling the impact of nuclear attack could not change the views of the Home Office as they were already though the looking glass, operating in Agamben’s (2005, p. 40) ‘…threshold at which logic and praxis blend with each other’.

References Agamben, G. (2005) State of Exception. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Campbell, D. (1982) War Plan UK. London: Paladin. Department of Defence (1978) Department of Defense appropriations for fiscal year 1978: hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Ninety-fifth Congress, first session, on H.R. 7933, 1978.

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Overkill H.M.S.O. (1980) Protect and Survive: This Booklet Tells You How to Make Your Home and Family as Safe as Possible under Nuclear Attack. London: HMSO. Home Office (1982) Cabinet Working Group on Shelter and Evacuation: interim report on an official evacuation scheme; planned evacuation options, Home Defence Planning sub-committee, 21st December 1982, Available from: The National Archives (HO322/998). Home Office (1984) Letter from Sir Robert Armstrong to Sir Keith Joseph (31st January 1984) Development of Civil Defence Policy: Civil Defence: the next five years. Available from: The National Archives (HO322/1143). Home Office (c.1982a) Home Office Working Group on Shelters: draft research papers by Sally ­L eivesley and Jane Hogg on psychological aspects of population response to war, Available from: The National Archives (HO322/1004). Home Office (c.1982b) Research paper on law and order after a nuclear strike (and associated letters), ‘Letter from Home Office Home Defence College, 15th April 1982 (HO322/1008). Home Office (c.1982c) Exercise Regenerate, Available from: The National Archives (HO338/164). Kitagawa, K., Preston, J., & Chadderton, C. (2016) Preparing for disaster: A comparative analysis of education for critical infrastructure collapse. Journal of Risk Research, 20(11), 1450–1465. Openshaw, S., & Steadman, P. (1983a) Predicting the consequences of a nuclear attack on Britain: Models, results, and implications for public policy. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 1(2), 205–228. Openshaw, S., & Steadman, P. (1983b) The geography of two hypothetical nuclear attacks on Britain, Area, 15(3), 193–201. Openshaw, S., Steadman, P., & Greene, O. (1983) Doomsday: Britain after Nuclear Attack. Oxford, ­Oxfordshire, England: B. Blackwell. Preston, J. (2009) Preparing for emergencies: Citizenship education, ‘whiteness’ and pedagogies of security. Citizenship Studies, 13(2), 187–200. Preston, J. (2014) The strange death of UK civil defence education in the 1980s. History of Education, 44(2), 225–242. Preston, J., Chadderton, C., & Kitagawa, K. (2014) The ‘state of exception’ and disaster education: A multilevel conceptual framework with implications for social justice. Globalisation, Societies and Education, 12(4), 437–456.

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PART VIII

Universities, security and intelligence Disciplinary lenses of the arts, literature and humanities

30 THE ART(S AND HUMANITIES) OF SECURITY A broader approach to countering security threats Andrew Glazzard Introduction Security, in the sense of protecting people and states from threats such as terrorism, ­covert activity by hostile nations and political subversion, is generally conceived as a science rather than an art. It is certainly the case that, in the UK at least, the academic disciplines judged to be relevant to security threats are assumed to be the natural and social sciences: the UK’s 2018 National Security Capability Review proclaimed that Britain’s ‘scientific output is among the best in the world across the range of disciplines relevant to security’ and ­a nnounced the creation of a new national security science and technology strategy (­Cabinet Office, 2018: p. 13). However, governments worried about security threats need to pay ­attention to the arts and humanities, both to understand the threats and to develop responses. A security threat such as Islamist terrorism is not simply a matter of quantifiable resources, capabilities and techniques: it involves ideas, emotions and imaginations. In this chapter, I suggest three aspects of security threats which are susceptible to study by arts and humanities disciplines. I then outline how governments might broaden their conception of security threats to ensure that security interventions do not become ­reductively technical exercises in developing and deploying counter-measures. I do so by discussing two types of security intervention, both focused on threats from violent ­extremism and terrorism, in order to demonstrate the utility of the arts and humanities to security problems.

Understanding threats and threat actors: representation, narrative, creativity Those who threaten our security – ‘threat actors’, in security parlance – evidently need material and immaterial resources (Martin, 2019). The terrorist needs guns and explosives, but also money and communication networks; a hostile state planning to subvert the democratic system of an adversary or to steal secrets needs targeting information, technological capabilities and personnel. These resources can be measured and quantified. And they can be opposed with counter-measures that are similarly quantifiable – border security officers, bollards, computer network firewalls, financial investigators and so on. 405

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But is that all there is to it? An understanding of the actual capabilities and intentions of an adversary is the first step to understanding any security threat, but a threat is only a threat if it can achieve potency in terms of effect or, in risk management language, impact and consequences.1 This is particularly clear with terrorism, which, by definition, is a means to create fear far beyond the direct effect of an event. That is one reason why terrorists invest so much resource in propaganda: the Islamic State group, for example, sees propaganda events as media ‘missiles’ which explode not on the streets but in the minds of its targets, intimidating them but also infuriating them so that they engage in counter-productive responses (Winter, 2017: pp. 17–18). A capable terrorist group knows that achieving its effects depends not only on bombs and bullets and facilitation networks, but also on communication and imagination. The impact of terrorism thus depends not only on the resources of the terrorist group itself but also on the willingness of mediators to represent it in news reports and documentaries, but and also, potentially, in plays, films, television serials and novels. Most of us have never met a terrorist, so our idea of what a terrorist is and what he or she does is shaped if not created by how terrorists are represented in our channels of information and entertainment.2 Representation is not, simply, what terrorist authors do to present themselves to us through their propaganda activities (including, of course, their use of violent events as ­propaganda – what nineteenth-century anarchists called ‘propaganda of the deed’ (Bolt, 2012)). We must also consider representation by others – e.g. the way the news media report on terrorism, or how governments in their communications seek to represent their violent adversaries. And we might also consider more obviously cultural responses, in films and novels, television dramas and popular songs. The threat actors, then, are representing themselves and being represented in a complex and dynamic ecosystem of communication and culture, and their success is determined by how much attention they are able to gain and how effective they are in influencing other producers of cultural capital (such as journalists, politicians, screen-writers) to present them and their activities according to their intentions (Williams, 2018). As an aside, we might note that twenty-first-century Salafi-Jihadist terrorists like Al Qaida and the Islamic State are often judged to be highly successful in persuading third parties to carry their communication burden for them (Nacos, 2016). Terrorism is a highly mediated security threat, in that representation particularly through mass media is crucial to its effect, but that is not to say that other security threats do not require or exploit mediation. When hostile state actors, for example, attempt to influence opinion or behaviour, such as voting decisions, trust in institutions or perceptions of veracity of information sources, they are likely to need to exploit communications channels. Some of this activity can be reduced to quantifiable resources, such as numbers of botnets or payments made to agents of influence, but those resources would be ineffective without the capacity to reach the minds of target audiences. In the technocratic language of risk assessment, a threat (which is a product of intention and capability) is only likely to succeed if the target is vulnerable to attack.3 In security risk management, vulnerability is usually conceived in terms of physical or technological protection, such as bollards or firewalls (Martin, 2019), even though in a different but related field, that of preventing and countering violent extremism (i.e. countering radicalisation), ‘vulnerability’ is increasingly used in the field to denote psychological or cognitive vulnerability to extremist ideologies. But even where the threat actor’s capabilities are highly material or technological, the target’s vulnerability to attack may be psychological, social or cultural, as well as physical or technological. To take one example that was highly topical at the time of writing, it has been stated plainly in indictments brought in the United States that the GRU, Russia’s military ­intelligence service, attempted to subvert America’s presidential elections in 2016 through a combination 406

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of cyber attacks, infiltration or suborning of co-opted agents and so-called active measures (propaganda and information warfare to achieve political objectives c­ overtly) (Department of Justice, 2018). Clearly, these activities were aimed at influencing very large numbers of people, including through channels of communication, suggesting that the vulnerabilities which the GRU sought to exploit were psychological, social and cultural. I­ ndeed, experts in the Russian state’s use of covert influence and its preference for s­ o-called hybrid ­warfare – combining conventional tactics with insurgency and subversion – often point to its ­sophisticated analysis of the weak points in the cultures and societies of their adversaries (Lanoszka, 2016; Patrikarakos, 2017). Although their aims are entirely different, the methods employed by contrasting threat actors such as the Islamic State and the GRU are comparable when it comes to influencing sections of a target population. Both seek to influence their adversaries’ politics and society through communication: the GRU’s active measures are not so different from the Islamic State’s ‘information missiles’. It is one thing to acknowledge that representation is important, but another to understand how threat actors use techniques of representation. One category of technique – ­narrative – has attracted particular interest with respect to terrorism in recent years, as a result of ­g rowing concern that about the appeal that international terrorist groups, especially Al Qaida and the Islamic State, appear to be able to exert through their public and private communication. Terrorism experts are inclined to use ‘narrative’ with a great deal of imprecision to mean anything and everything from ideology or worldview, to message or collection of messages, to storytelling or an actual story.4 But terrorists clearly do tell stories, and often with great effect, in addition to encoding their values and belief systems in forms that are more loosely designated as narratives (Glazzard, 2017). However we define it, narrative appears to be crucial not just to security threats like terrorism, but more generally to political or ideological projects such as nation-building, justifying wars or maintaining political legitimacy at times of national crisis. Narrative, in both the narrow sense of storytelling and the broader sense of explanatory communication, is used to influence the thinking and behaviours of allies and adversaries alike. One reason for the importance of stories in terrorist propaganda is their capacity for ­a ffective engagement, both through their aesthetic appeal (the pleasure we take in the artistic shaping of material) and their emotional appeal – which, in storytelling, is achieved through a reader or audience’s identification with characters and the situations in which they find themselves. We might engage with a story like Anna Karenina by identifying with attractive if flawed characters such as Anna or Konstantin Levin, vicariously experiencing their pleasures and pains. Similarly, when hearing Anwar al-Awlaki, the notorious ideologue of Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), encode his exhortations to jihad in stories of the companions of the Prophet Mohammed, we might identify with the heroes in ways which inspire us to action or cause us to reconsider our values and assumptions. Narrative’s capacity for empathy – projecting our own feelings into other people – is often identified as its most powerful and positive quality, but the value of narrative to threat actors like terrorists should remind us that it is not reserved for those with benign intentions. Indeed, a strand of research into human creativity focuses on the application of what are normally seen as positive skills and attributes, such as innovation and ingenuity, to harmful ends. This concept of ‘malevolent creativity’ has been picked up to a limited extent in terrorism studies, although this work has tended to focus on the tactical, technical and material innovations of terrorists in, for example, developing innovative methods for manufacturing and deploying explosive devices (Cropley et al., 2008; Gill et al., 2013). There is a gap in the research literature on malevolent creativity in terrorist propaganda, which is all the more surprising given that 407

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representation through words, images, films, music and staged events is so obviously and inescapably creative. The study of terrorist propaganda has until recently suffered from a narrow, instrumentalist view of it as a straightforward means of influencing ‘vulnerable’ populations through rhetorical persuasion, with little regard to broader aesthetic questions or the performative functions of propaganda. Researchers are only just beginning to recognise the significance of, for example, Usama bin Ladin’s poetry and the Islamic State’s appropriation of Western cultural icons, although more longstanding security threats, such as terrorism in Northern I­ reland, have a longer history of academic attention to cultural production such as the Province’s iconic murals celebrating militants on both sides of the political divide (Goalwin, 2013). Security practitioners and policy-makers would benefit in knowing how terrorists use techniques of, for example, storytelling and poetics in textual propaganda, iconography and composition in visual propaganda, mise-en-scène in films and videos and so on (Kendall, 2015; Cresswell and Haykel, 2017; Ostovar, 2017; Stenersen, 2017). As Elisabeth Kendall has pointed out, security analysts are apt to skip over the poetry in jihadist publications in order to focus on ‘more direct pronouncements, rulings and position statements’ – even though poetry continues to flourish in the ­Arabian Peninsula which has an ancient tradition of oral culture, and where jihadists are enthusiastic and often highly accomplished versifiers (Kendall, 2015: p. 247). Although academic enquiry into security threats such as terrorism originated with historians such as Walter Laqueur (1987), the field is now dominated by social scientists, especially in psychology and political science. Indeed, in several recent meta-analyses of scholarship on terrorism, the primacy of social science disciplines appears to be taken for granted.5 But the use by terrorists of representation, narrative and creativity – acknowledged by social ­scientists like John Horgan and Thomas Hegghammer – remains curiously under-researched in fields such as literature and art history. We might speculate that this is down to latent ­prejudices in both the academy and in governments that the arts and humanities are not really concerned with real-world problems like terrorism. The next section turns to the potential benefits of including insights from arts and humanities disciplines in our study of, and response to, security threats.

A broader approach to security threats: countering terrorist propaganda A glance at most governmental security strategies would show that security threats are not always conceived in narrow, materialist terms. Indeed, when it comes to Islamist terrorism, Western governments tend to emphasise the threat’s ideological dimension – hence the ­pervasiveness of the concept of radicalisation, despite significant academic concern over the concept’s validity (Sedgwick, 2010). And yet, Western counter-terrorism strategies tend at the same time to privilege practical and technical counter-measures, such as detection and removal of terrorist content from websites and social media (H.M. Government, 2018: pp. 10, 33). But even where the cultural or creative dimension of security threats appears to be acknowledged, governments are apt to fall back on mechanistic responses. The doctrine of ‘counter-narrative’, for example, which appropriates a term from literary studies and thereby suggests an awareness of what we might call terrorist aesthetics, is usually swiftly translated into practical, reactive measures such as ‘counter-messaging’ (rebuttal), ‘alternative narrative’ (creating and deploying counter-propaganda that seeks to present a more wholesome image of the target’s place in society) and ‘strategic communication’ (adopting the tools of information warfare and counter-insurgency to influence populations to adopt desired attitudes and behaviours) (Ferguson, 2016). The problem with such approaches is that they 408

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tend to over-simplify both problem and response. The UK government’s counter-terrorism strategy, for example, commits to ‘preventing the dissemination of terrorist material and building strong counter-terrorist narratives in order to ensure there are no safe places for terrorists online’. ‘Counter-terrorist narratives’ suggest government-sponsored and approved communications interventions which, as a means of countering terrorist threats, rest on ­entirely unproven assumptions. Moreover, there are good reasons to suspect that, when they come from governments, communications interventions may be particularly ineffective  – and could actually be counter-productive (Ferguson, 2016). A broader approach to understanding a security threat such as terrorist propaganda would recognise (a) that the propaganda may be directed at and/or engage numerous audiences; (b) that it may deploy a wide range of mediums, forms and genres, including but not restricted to narratives; (c) that narrative content cannot be reduced to a simple message, though it may contain messages and is likely to perform ideological functions; (d) that the propaganda ­(including its narrative content) may work on several levels – aesthetically and affectively as well as rationally and rhetorically; and (e) that the propaganda may be received differently from what how the author intended.6 A similarly broad approach to countering terrorism in the communication sphere would recognise (a) the importance of what Aristotle called ‘ethos’, i.e. who is speaking and how they are perceived; (b) that narrative is a powerful form of communication, and can produce a wide range of social, political and emotional effects, but it tends to embrace, even if inadvertently, complexity and polyphony rather than dogma or direct persuasion; (c) that simple rebuttal or proposing competing, alternative belief or value systems – what are sometimes described as the ‘hypodermic needle’ model of communications – may be ineffective in terms of rational persuasion, let alone in terms of producing an emotional and affective change (Archetti, 2015: p. 50); and (d) that any broad-based communications, including those for the purpose of counter-terrorism, will exist in a complex ecosystem of communication. What this means in practice is that, while there is very little evidence about the effectiveness of existing approaches to counter-terrorist communication, this does not mean that any such communication is doomed to failure. Far from it: we know from research (much of it in arts and humanities disciplines) that mass communication can change and has changed public attitudes and behaviour in fields such as public health, public safety and peacebuilding (McCombs, 2014). Indeed, it is sometimes said that companies would not spend vast sums on advertising without being reasonably confident that it could influence consumer behaviour. Governments or public authorities have been responsible for successful public communication campaigns but if they are not perceived as a neutral or authoritative source, their roles may be disguised or concealed. In a contentious field such as counter-terrorism/countering violent extremism, it is now commonly assumed that governments are not on the whole credible sources, and those that we know are active in counter-terrorist communications appear increasingly to operate through surrogates. Whether or not there is a government sponsor in the background, a broad base of research does show that broadcast drama such as soap operas can be effective vehicles of inspiring ­behavioural change. Famous examples include the long-running BBC radio programme The Archers, initially conceived as a method of increasing agricultural productivity with the active involvement of the UK’s Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Donovan, 1991: p. 8), and the topical social-interest storylines in the BBC television soap opera Eastenders, credited with helping to shift British attitudes towards HIV-AIDS (Cody et al., 2008, cited in Ferguson, 2016). And we should also learn from the fact that artistic production can exert malign i­nfluence too – evidenced by the fact that the dystopian novel The Turner Diaries by the right-wing extremist William Luther Pierce has been implicated in at least 200 murders (Berger, 2016). 409

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These examples suggest that governments may usefully pay attention to broader forms of cultural production, beyond ‘hypodermic’ strategic communication, in order to counter security threats such as terrorism. Direct, instrumental campaigns of public communication disguised as soap operas (as with the early episodes of The Archers) may be more difficult to achieve now than in the 1950s, to say nothing of the potential ethical issues that would arise, but governments may help to counter security threats less directly by facilitating or opening up space for cultural producers, or by investing in institutions of soft power such as national broadcasters. And the education sector has a large role to play in a broader approach to ­security threats, in terms of the considerable soft power that resides in higher education, and more directly as agents of attitudinal and behavioural change.

Countering security threats through education: critical thinking and complexity In the face of ideological threats from terrorist propaganda, state disinformation and the like, some practitioners and researchers working in security fields have proposed various pedagogical approaches as a means of reducing the vulnerability of individuals. Examples include developing digital/media literacy and critical thinking skills in young people in order to combat state disinformation and extremist (Reynolds and Parker, 2018). A 2011 research brief from the Department for Education, for example, urged teaching professionals to build resilience to extremism amongst young people by teaching ‘critical thinking skills to appreciate different perspectives and come to their own view’ (Bonnell, Copestake and Kerr et al., 2011). A short section in this chapter cannot do justice to the extensive literature on critical thinking and information and media literacy, but an examination of their application to security threats reveals a surprisingly low profile for arts and humanities disciplines, even though the terms ‘criticism’ and ‘literacy’ ultimately derive from those disciplines. An ironic consequence is a lack of critical thinking about critical thinking. In their thoughtful and insightful paper, Miller and Bartlett (2012), for instance, posit a new concept of ‘digital fluency’, an expansion of digital literacy (critical thinking about digital information) to include more technical knowledge derived from the information sciences, as a more inclusive method of increasing individual resilience in schoolchildren to, amongst other threats, state disinformation, hate speech and extremist propaganda. But although they ­acknowledge that teaching digital fluency may require the inclusion of English, history and religious studies, their paper appears to assume that dealing with digital risks is a largely technical activity: ‘The key to harnessing and exploiting the internet is to spot the fakes: to know how to tell the truth from the lies, and how to negotiate the grey ­a reas of comment, opinion and p­ ropaganda in between’ (Miller and Bartlett, 2012: p. 36). A ­l iterary critic, philosopher or historian might argue that the difference between truth and lies is not quite so easy to discern, and it is not just comment, opinion and propaganda that lie in the grey areas. But this is not to say that the arts and humanities are entirely missing from pedagogical interventions against terrorist and violent extremist threats. The Being Muslim Being British project, for example, funded by the European Commission and the Home Office from 2007 to 2010, used an approach derived from psychology: ‘value complexity’ or ‘integrative complexity’, meaning the cognitive ability to absorb and navigate multiple viewpoints and multiple values to increase resilience to violent extremism in young Muslims – with encouraging results (Liht and Savage, 2013). While the measurement of the effect of the intervention 410

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used social scientific techniques such as psychometrics, the project’s approach was informed by the philosophy of Isaiah Berlin and the intervention itself included films and workshops inspired by the pedagogical work of the Brazilian drama theorist Augusto Boal, who in the ‘Theatre of the Oppressed’ pioneered a dynamic, constructive and highly interactive method of theatrical creation and performance. The fact that philosophy and drama may be helpful as a means of primary prevention of violent extremism – that is, increasing the resilience of the general population – might come as no surprise to those who have studied the life histories of the most committed Islamist terrorists. As Gambetta and Hertog observed in a famous (2009) study, graduates of engineering and other STEM subjects seem strikingly over-represented amongst known Islamist terrorists (Gambetta and Hertog, 2009). It is important not to overstate or extrapolate too far from this finding, not least as Usama bin Ladin (himself an engineer) also wrote poetry, and the leader of the Islamic State group completed a PhD in religious studies, writing his thesis on a medieval commentary on an early Islamic poem (Kendall, 2015; McCants, 2016: p. 76). More importantly, the overwhelming majority of engineering students do not go on to become terrorists. But it is at least possible that an education which explicitly develops capacity for empathy, and tolerance of complexity and ambiguity – as well as conventional critical thinking skills – may reduce the attractiveness of those who appeal to our natural instincts for simplicity, polarisation, group identity and non-negotiable (or ‘sacred’) values in order to radicalise and recruit (Conway and Conway, 2011; Atran, 2016). Finally, we might note that pedagogic interventions derived from arts and humanities disciplines may also be applicable to security practitioners and policy-makers as well as those potentially vulnerable to influence by threat actors. Hart and Simon (2006) highlighted the failure of the US education system to provide the intelligence community with recruits intellectually capable of taking on Al Qaida – ‘a new, highly distributed and strongly motivated adversary operating within a framework of values, beliefs and experiences alien to the average American’. The authors bemoaned the lack of language skills, the decline of ­g raduate-level history students and a general lack of critical thinking skills. We can extend their argument further: understanding an enemy with a very different framework of values and beliefs may need skills of sympathy and empathy, a tolerance of ambiguity, an appreciation of subjectivity and an ability to negotiate not just complex information and data but also complex values and beliefs. These are all things for which we look to the arts and humanities, and this suggests at the very least that security organisations should recruit their analysts and practitioners from a broad range of disciplines, as well as utilising research from across the academy to help them understand threats and craft their responses.

Notes 1 ‘Impact’ is sometimes used to mean the size or severity of an event that might occur (or has occurred, if the risk has materialised). ‘Consequences’ are the range of impacts that an event may have (Hopkin, 2012; Martin, 2019). 2 Representation is an enormously important concept across the arts and humanities, and the study of representation, originating with Plato and Aristotle, has produced a vast literature. In this chapter, I understand representation in Aristotelian terms as simply expressing one thing (what ­A ristotle called the ‘object’, which may be real or imaginary) in the form of another, using a particular method of expression (what Aristotle called manner), and doing so in a medium such as words, images or music. To illustrate with a simple example, Mona Lisa is a representation of a woman through the medium of painting, and what we consider to be Da Vinci’s distinctive artistry is the manner. However, representation has also been conceptualised and problematised, especially since the rise of structuralism and post-structuralism (Mitchell, 1995).

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Andrew Glazzard 3 The origin of this conceptualisation of threat is commonly held to be a paper published at the height of the Cold War by the American political science academic J. David Singer (1958). 4 For example, the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy has identified the Islamic State’s “narrative” as “the main extremist ideology behind radicalisation in the UK” (p. 19), demonstrating a clear conflation of ‘narrative’ with ‘ideology’ (H.M. Government, 2018). 5 Khusrav Gaibulloev and Todd Sandler (2019), for example, see fit to include only economists and political scientists in their survey of recent scholarship on terrorism, while Bart Schuurman’s excellent survey (2018) does not consider disciplinary issues but appears to assume that quantitative approaches are something of a gold standard. 6 Indeed, in literary criticism, a range of theoretical schools, from the New Criticism of the mid-twentieth century to post-structuralism, propose that it is not possible or meaningful to judge a text on the basis of the presumed intention of the author. The founding New Critical text is Wimsatt and Beardsley’s ‘The Intentional Fallacy’ (1946). More generally, Reader Response theory proposes that the primary relationship is between the text and the reader, rather than the author and the text.

References Archetti, C. (February 2015) Terrorism, Communication and New Media: Explaining Radicalization in the Digital Age. Perspectives on Terrorism 9 (1), 49–59. Atran, S. (2016) The Devoted Actor: Unconditional Commitment and Intractable Conflict across Cultures. Current Anthropology 57 (Supplement 13), S192–S203. Berger, J.M. (2016) The Turner Legacy: The Storied Origins and Enduring Impact of White Nationalism’s Deadly Bible. ICCT Research Paper. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. Bolt, N. (2012) The Violent Image: Insurgent Propaganda and the New Revolutionaries. New York: C ­ olumbia University Press. Bonnell, J., Copestake, P., Kerr, D. et al. (2011) Teaching approaches that help to build resilience to extremism among young people. Oxford Policy Management and National Foundation for Educational Research/Department for Education. Cabinet Office (2018) National Security Capability Review. Cabinet Office. Cody, M.J., Fernandes, S. and Wilken, H. (2008) Entertainment-Education Programmes of the BBC and the BBC World Trust. In Singhal, A., Cody, M.J., Rogers, E.M. and Sabido, M. (eds.), ­Entertainment-Education and Social Change: History, Research, and Practice. London: Lawrence Elbaum Publishers, pp. 243–260. Conway, L.G. and Conway, K.R. (2011) The Terrorist Rhetorical Style and its Consequences for Understanding Terrorist Violence. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide 4 (2), 175–192. Cresswell, R. and Haykel, B. (2017) Poetry in Jihadi Culture. In Hegghammer, T. (ed.), Jihadi Culture: The Art and Social Practices of Militant Islamists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 22–41. Cropley, D.H., Kaufman, J.C. and Cropley, A.J. (2008) Malevolent Creativity: A Functional Model of Creativity in Terrorism and Crime. Creativity Research Journal 20 (2), 105–115. Department of Justice (2018). United States of America vs Viktor Borisovich Netyksho et al., (18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1030, 1028A, 1956, and 3551 et seq.) Available at www.justice.gov/file/1080281/ download. Donovan, P. (1991) The Radio Companion. London: Grafton. Ferguson, K. (2016) Countering violent extremism through media and communication strategies: A review of the evidence. Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research. Available at: www.paccsresearch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Countering-Violent-­E xtremismThrough-Media-and-Communication-Strategies-.pdf. Gaibulloev, K. and Sandler, T. (2019) What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11. Journal of Economic Literature 57 (2), 275–328. Gambetta, D. and Hertog, S. (2009) Why are There So Many Engineers Islamic Radicals? European Journal of Sociology 50 (2), 201–230. Gill, P., Horgan, J., Hunter, S.T. and Cushenbery, L.D. (2013) Malevolent Creativity in Terrorist ­Organizations. Journal of Creative Behaviour 47 (2), 125–151. Glazzard, A. (2017) Losing the plot: Narrative, counter-narrative and violent extremism. ICCT ­Research Paper, The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. Available at: https:// icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ICCT-Glazzard-Losing-the-Plot-May-2017.pdf.

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The art(s and humanities) of security Goalwin, G. (2013) The Art of War: Instability, Insecurity, and Ideological Imagery in Northern Ireland’s Political Murals, 1979–1998. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 26 (3), 189–215. Hart, D. and Simon, S. (2006) Thinking Straight and Talking Straight: Problems of Intelligence ­A nalysis. Survival 48 (1): 35–60. H.M. Government (2018) CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism. London: HMSO. Hopkin, P. (2012) Fundamentals of Risk Management: Understanding, Evaluating and Implementing Effective Risk Management. London, Philadelphia, New Delhi: Kogan Page. Kendall, E. (2015) Yemen’s al-Qa’ida and Poetry as a Weapon of Jihad. In Kendall, E. (ed.), Twenty-first Century Jihad: Law, Society and Military Action. London: IB Tauris, pp. 247–269. Lanoszka, A. (2016) Russian Hybrid Warfare and Extended Deterrence in Eastern Europe. International Affairs 92 (1), 175–195. Laqueur, W. (1987) The Age of Terrorism. Boston: Little, Brown. Liht, J. and Savage, S. (2013) Preventing Violent Extremism through Value Complexity: Being ­Muslim Being British. Journal of Strategic Security 6 (4), 44–66, available at: https://scholarcommons. usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss4/3. Martin, P. (2019) The Rules of Security: Staying Safe in a Risky World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McCants, W. (2016) The ISIS Apocalypse. New York: Picador. McCombs, M. (2014) Setting the Agenda: Mass Media and Public Opinion. Second edition. Cambridge: Polity Press. Miller, C. and Bartlett, J. (2012) ‘Digital Fluency’: Towards Young People’s Critical Use of the Internet. Journal of Information Literacy 6 (2), 35–55. Mitchell, W.J.T. (1995) Representation. In Lentricchia, F. and Mclaughlin, T. (eds.), Critical Terms for Literary Study. Second edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 11–22. Nacos, B.L. (2016) Mass-Mediated Terrorism: Mainstream and Digital Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism. Third ­edition. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Ostovar, A. (2017) The Visual Culture of Jihad. In Hegghammer, T. (ed.), Jihadi Culture: The Art and Social Practices of Militant Islamists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 82–107. Patrikarakos, D. (2017) War in 140 Characters: How Social Media Is Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century. London: Hachette UK. Reynolds, L. and Parker, L. (2018) Digital Resilience: Stronger Citizens Online. London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Schuurman, B. (2018) Research on Terrorism, 2007–2016: A Review of Data, Methods, and ­Authorship. Terrorism and Political Violence, Mar 2:1–16. Sedgwick, M. (2010) The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion. Terrorism and Political Violence 22 (4), 479–494. Singer, J.D. (1958) Threat-Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 2 (1), 90–105. Stenersen, A. (2017) A History of Jihadi Cinematography. In Hegghammer, T. (ed.), Jihadi Culture: The Art and Social Practices of Militant Islamists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 108–127. Williams, J. (2018) Stand Out of Our Light: Freedom and Resistance in the Attention Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wimsatt, W.K. and Beardsley, M.C. (1946) The Intentional Fallacy. The Sewanee Review, 54 (3), 468–488. Winter, C. (2017) Media Jihad: The Islamic State’s Doctrine for Information Warfare. London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation.

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31 DISPELLING THE MYTHS Academic studies, intelligence and historical research Helen Fry

Introduction Secret intelligence organisations are shrouded in myth and mystery, often self-created, and this attracts a certain public curiosity, fuelling speculation, rumour and conspiracy theories. Perhaps this is why, with some expertise in aspects of wartime intelligence, I am often asked whether I have a background in spying. Although I reply no, the response always comes back: ‘You would say that.’ It is rather disquieting to think that people suspect me of being a spy, but it betrays the continued public fascination with spies and spying that shows no sign of dissipating. Their legendary status has been secured by the bestselling novels of Ian Fleming, John le Carré and Frederick Forsyth. Because these spy fiction writers were all involved in intelligence and espionage in their real lives, it makes it particularly difficult to dispel the myth that to be writing about intelligence requires a background in it. I came to the field of intelligence studies quite accidentally, as the result of a promise I made to the Second World War veteran Fritz Lustig (1919–2017). I had already written a number of books about the 10,000 Germans who fought for Britain during the Second World War. As refugees from Nazi oppression, many were eventually drafted into secret operations, intelligence or special forces because of their fluency in German (Fry, 2015).1 Lustig was one of them. He never saw action on the frontline, but worked as a secret listener at two clandestine sites in Buckinghamshire: Latimer House, near Chesham and Wilton Park at Beaconsfield. Having signed the Official Secrets Act, he could not talk about his work for decades, not even to his family (Lustig, 2017).2 Just like the personnel who first arrived at Bletchley Park, Lustig had no idea of his new role at Latimer House until he arrived there. He received a railway ticket for Chalfont and Latimer on the Metropolitan Line and was told that he would be met by an army driver. It was only the following morning, when he came before his new commanding officer, that he was finally told the nature of his work. That was Colonel Thomas Joseph Kendrick, a long-serving SIS/MI6 spymaster during the 1920s and 1930s and the head of the wartime Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre, known as CSDIC (Fry, 2014).3 The unit’s deliberate obscure name masked its secret activities within MI9, later MI19.4 Kendrick told Lustig that what he would be doing would be more important than firing a gun in action or fighting on the frontline (Lustig, 2017).5 This was welcome news because Lustig wanted to 414

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fight the Nazis, but as an ‘enemy alien,’ had only been able to join the British army’s labour unit, the Pioneer Corps (Lustig, 2017).6 From 1943, Lustig was one of approximately a hundred German-Jewish refugees who transferred to the Intelligence Corps and posted to one of CSDIC’s sites at Trent Park (Cockfosters, North London), Latimer House or Wilton Park (Fry, 2013).7 For the duration of the war, they secretly bugged the conversations of over 10,000 German prisoners of war (Fry, 2019).8 Their work has now been recognised by Historic England as ‘of considerable national and international historical interest which bears comparison to the code-breaking work at Bletchley Park (2017).’9 At the end of the hostilities, they were thanked for their efforts but not given any precise feedback, as Lustig commented: ‘We had no idea if anything we did affected the outcome of the war.’10 With the bulk of files declassified between 1999 and 2004, I promised Lustig in 2006 that I would work on them and assess their impact for the war. Neither of us could have predicted that his initial desire to understand the significance of his wartime work would embark us on a journey for years to come. It would lead to a number of books,11 two documentaries together,12 and the campaign to save Trent Park as a national museum to the secret listeners.13 It was the beginning of my journey into writing the history of MI9 and MI19, that has included the first fully comprehensive account of a controversial wartime interrogation centre called the London Cage (Fry, 2017).14 More about the challenges of researching the London Cage shortly.

Prisoners of War and Intelligence The clever handling of Hitler’s generals by MI9 continues to captivate the public imagination. Giving fifty-nine German generals and nearly forty senior German officers a life of relative luxury in the mansion house at Trent Park arguably led to one of the greatest intelligence coups of the war (Fry, 2013).15 From their bugged conversations, British intelligence gained the first concrete proof of Hitler’s secret weapon programme at Peenemünde on the Baltic coast (i.e. V-1, V-2 and V-3).16 The direct consequence of this intelligence led British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to order reconnaissance flights over Peenemünde, and the aerial photographic films brought back to RAF Medmenham to be analysed.17 The true nature of Peenemünde became clear and Churchill sanctioned Operation Crossbow on 17/18 August 1943 to bomb Germany’s secret weapon establishment. It is one prime example where wartime intelligence had a material effect on the ground. It is doubtful whether, had this weapon programme not been discovered in time, the Allies could not have successfully mounted the D-Day landings and could have lost the war. The stakes could not have been higher. The full ramifications of the bugged conversations at each of the covert CSDIC sites are yet to be fully assessed by historians across all aspects of the war: from intelligence gleaned ahead of the Battle of Britain,18 to commando raids, to intelligence on U-boat operations and Battle of the Atlantic (Nudd, 2017),19 Hitler’s secret weapon programme,20 German campaigns on the Russian front, atrocities, D-Day and Ardennes, to cite a few examples.21 CSDIC had American intelligence officers attached to it, working primarily as interrogators. They were from the newly formed Office of Strategic Studies (OSS), the forerunner of the CIA, and arrived at Trent Park within two weeks of the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. They received training in CSDIC’s methods to become part of the joint cooperation (Fry, 2019),22 and are an important early example of the special ­A nglo-American intelligence relationship that was cemented during this period. Prisoners of war are often overlooked in mainstream studies on the Second World War because they are seen as unglamorous and uninteresting; yet, British intelligence believed 415

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that they were one of the most important sources of intelligence.23 The story of the German generals at the hands of British intelligence has dispelled that myth. An academic study of the MI9 and MI19 files demonstrates the sheer significance of intelligence gained from prisoners of war, not only for shortening the war and its outcome, but for historic understandings of that war. The work of MI9/MI19, like much intelligence-gathering, was often pedestrian: men and women at their desks for twelve-hour shifts or more, processing lots of snippets of intelligence from difference sources. Perhaps the vast bulk of transcripts of bugged ­conversations – an eye-watering 74,000 of them – do not always make for interesting reading, but the gems are there. It is vital for historians to automatically defer to these files when writing any aspect of the Second World War. These files promise to shift the understanding of the Second World War and reveal new understandings for intelligence studies. Formed in December 1939, MI9 was tasked with gathering intelligence during the war from prisoners of war, whether enemy prisoners captured in action, or Allied personnel via escape and evasion.24 MI9 had a branch that dealt with British prisoners of war in POW camps or evading capture behind enemy lines. Its American counterpart was MIS-X (Froom, 2015).25 Allied prisoners were given a mandate to try to escape and return to Britain to fight another day. MI9 entered the realm of fiction after the war via James Bond creator, Ian Fleming. Declassified files at the UK National Archives show that Fleming, as a personal assistant to the Director of Naval intelligence from 1939, was responsible for the section at the Admiralty that gained intelligence from prisoners of war. It was Fleming who recruited the naval intelligence team attached to CSDIC, which came under the umbrella of MI9.26 He was the brainchild behind many clandestine Second World War operations, one of which, Goldeneye, became the basis for the bestselling film of the same name.27 Without diminishing Fleming’s creativity and inventiveness as a writer after the war, he was actually drawing, not merely on his imagination, but the wartime exploits of MI9. To cite an example, MI9’s Christopher Clayton Hutton and Charles Fraser-Smith created imaginative ways of hiding escape aids in ordinary items (Clayton Hutton, 1960; Fraser-Smith, 1991).28 The gadgets were dispatched in special parcels to Allied prisoners in camps in ­Germany and Italy from MI9’s headquarters at Wilton Park in Buckinghamshire. Popular items included compasses and silk maps hidden inside a shaving brush or pencil, or foreign currency in a tube of toothpaste (Froom, 2015).29 It is widely believed that Fraser-Smith was the inspiration behind Ian Fleming’s character ‘Q’ in the Bond novels (Porter, 1989),30 but in reality, it was probably a combination of Fraser-Smith and Clayton Hutton. In fiction, Q has become the much-loved eccentric English boffin and inventor of spy gadgets, providing the public with amusement from his oft bizarre but clever inventions (Foot & Langley, 1979).31 The role of an academic is to separate fact from fiction but, as research in this field demonstrates, there can often be little difference between the two. With the death of veteran secret listener Fritz Lustig in December 2017, and the passing of eyewitnesses into history, it is imperative to secure the legacy of MI9’s enormous intelligence contribution to the war in both academic studies and the wider national consciousness. The creation of a national museum at Trent Park will be one way to achieve that alongside academic assessments of the files and publications.

Open Source Researching MI9 – a branch of military intelligence as secret as MI5 and MI6 – has not been without its challenges. The first research priority is always to establish the scope of open sources and where they are located, i.e. the official declassified files at the National Archives 416

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or material held in other institutions and archives that are open to academics and members of the public. Perhaps unexpectedly, open source can be one of the first problems for academics because there is a vast amount of declassified material available in legitimate open sources that the intelligence services are unaware of and have been released into the public domain. The intelligence services can become nervous when material is published about them, unaware that it has actually been declassified. This is not unsurprising given that their focus is on contemporary operations, with little in-depth knowledge of their own history. To cite an example from my own research (which is not a criticism): a former head of an intelligence service knew nothing about the bugging of Hitler’s generals at Trent Park during the Second World War. This operation had been so vital to the outcome of the war that I had assumed its legacy had passed down the generations through the various branches of the intelligence services. A proper trail of references in footnotes should alleviate concerns that official secrets are being betrayed, intentionally or otherwise. Ironically, academics can become more expert in the history of espionage and a particular intelligence service than the services itself. A second scenario inadvertently emerges that can cause equal disquiet in intelligence circles. The process of constructing detailed research can provide a broad picture of historic methods of intelligence-gathering. Writing about a single-faceted aspect of espionage and intelligence operations appears to cause no difficulty. The problem arises when it is multi-faceted, involves numerous intelligence services and crosses several operations. The linking and connections can provide a well-documented account which the general public, or rival intelligence services, would not ordinarily be able to piece together. It can bring with it a fear that academics might inadvertently discover and betray something that is still classified, or intelligence methods still being used today. Reverting to the example of MI9, it is possible from a comprehensive study of files within WO 208 and AIR 40 at the National Archives (London) to reconstruct a comprehensive history of MI9, its methods of intelligence-gathering and organisational structure. It would be a regrettable scenario if academics start censoring the volumes of open source material that they can draw upon for fear of jeopardising contemporary operations. They are not privy to current operations and methodology, but are using legitimate open sources to thoroughly research and analyse their subject. There are rumours within research circles that as soon as MI5 releases any of its files into the National Archives in the UK, amongst the first to request them are members of the intelligence agencies of other countries. Is this all a storm in a teacup? There is an angst that academics might know more than they have written about. It then becomes a guessing game which can place an academic under suspicion of having knowledge of classified information, which can be totally unfounded. WikiLeaks and the case of Edward Snowden, the National Security Agency employee turned whistle-blower, have done little to help the field of intelligence studies in this respect. The vast amount of files that Snowden deliberately released into the public domain were drawn from diverse areas of various intelligence databases, and it is said that he has revealed such a comprehensive picture of twenty-first-century intelligence-gathering and methodology so as to jeopardise Western security.32 Snowden, who has taken asylum in Russia, is a whole case study of its own, but there is one major important difference between Snowden and academics of intelligence studies: Snowden released highly classified material. The picture is complicated by the fact that not all files have been released into the National Archives. Even after seventy years or more, some subjects are deemed too sensitive to release or still a matter of national security. One example is the death of the Duke of Kent who was killed in a plane crash in Scotland on 26 August 1942.33 It has always been reported 417

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as an accident, but the full facts have never been released, with precious few official files about it in the National Archives. This has led to a number of conspiracy theories. Rudolf Hess is another case shrouded in controversy and mystery. The reason for the flight of Hitler’s deputy and designated successor to Scotland on 10 May 1941 continues to fuel conspiracy theories. In recent years, there has been research to suggest that he was lured to Britain by MI6 (Smith, 2004).34 The problem with Hess is that, again, not all files have been released and it is impossible to make a proper analysis. A few years ago, I made a Freedom of Information (FOI) Request for the remaining Hess files to be released – in particular, the files from the four days that he was held in the Tower of London after being transferred from Scotland en route for his detention at Mytchett Place, Aldershot (McGinty, 2011).35 The official response, after considerable consideration, was that these files can never be released and are not subject to appeal. However, some insight into the treatment of Hess in the Tower can be gleaned from the memoirs of Charles Fraser-Smith of MI9 (Fraser-Smith, 1999).36 Within hours of Hess being brought to the Tower, Fraser-Smith received a phone call from MI5 asking if he could copy the uniform of a very senior German officer (Fraser-Smith, 1999).37 He replied, ‘yes,’ and was asked to call at MI5 headquarters the following evening. A car came to pick him and an experienced tailor from Courtaulds. Fraser-Smith (1999) recalled that they were ushered into a bare room with a plain table and very little else that I remember. On it, laid out as for a dress parade, was the immaculate uniform of an officer in the Luftwaffe. It was obvious that this belonged to someone in a senior administrative capacity, or a political bigwig. It still did not strike me, until one of the MI5 people present took me aside and whispered in my ear, that it was Hess’s. “Get your chaps to buck up,” he told me sternly. “We’ve given Hess something to ensure that he doesn’t wake up until morning. But this is his uniform, and we must have it back to him in the next four hours” (p. 137).38 Is this the source of embarrassment or sensitivity – that Hess was drugged by the intelligence services? The possibility that Hess may have been issued with truth drugs during his captivity on British soil is still open to debate (Lomas, 2018).39 A duplicate of Hess’ uniform was duly made within the time constraint. ‘What it was used for – if it was used,’ wrote Fraser-Smith (1999), ‘is something I shall be interested to know one day’ (p. 128).40 No explanation was ever given. His job was done and the whole scenario remained speculation. British intelligence may have intended to send a double of Hess back to Germany to penetrate the Nazi high command. If so, the plan was abandoned as the Hess saga developed. The reasons for the retention of the Hess files remain a mystery. As such, the subject of Hess will continue to court fascination, precisely because we do not know if he really survived the war, died accidently in British custody or whether it was the real Hess who stood trial at Nuremberg in 1946. Even declassified files contain a section, names, a page or pages that have been withheld under Section 3.4 of the Official Secrets Act.41 Whilst protecting a person, or methods of operations which could be used today, it does mean that historians cannot write a full picture. Creating a ‘think tank’ to liaise with the official historian of each intelligence service could be a helpful way of raising concerns and awareness in both directions. It would give a positive forum for understanding material that historians are working with and the origins of that material. Relevant historical lectures would be a helpful addition to training programmes. 418

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Few, if any, academics wish to betray national secrets but can the intelligence services take that chance? For me, it is about telling the stories we are allowed to tell and translating them to the public who have a yearning for new intelligence stories. National pride and patriotism drive this public fascination, but also the image of the enigmatic spy who seems to transcend even the boundaries of fiction. Perhaps there is something of each of us in the spy and that’s the enduring magic. But there is an important flipside of this. A historic study of MI9’s wartime escape lines can poignantly remind us that when democracy, liberty and freedom are on the line, humanity can, and will, transcend its own tribal barriers. MI9 relied on thousands of ordinary local helpers in Nazi-occupied countries – women and men – who sheltered Allied airmen and personnel and smuggled them out via various clandestine escape lines at great risk to themselves and their families. Resistance in Europe to enemy occupation also happened in the First World War with La Dame Blanche intelligence network. Here, ordinary Belgians helped British intelligence behind enemy lines and sent vital intelligence out from behind the wire, particularly on German troop movements by train to the frontline.42 It happened again in the Second World War with the Clarence Service, an intelligence network operating primarily out of Liege in Belgium, led by Hector Demarque and Walthère Dewé. MI6’s official website describes the Clarence Service as ‘one of the most successful SIS networks in Belgium during the war.’43 These clandestine networks serve as a reminder that, despite contemporary political changes and upheaval within Europe with the United Kingdom leaving the European Union, Europe has not been abandoned, neither have ties been severed between the United Kingdom and Europe. The loyalties run deep and are historic – forged behind the battlefields of Europe in two of the bloodiest world wars of the twentieth century. The lessons of history are very relevant today. Rather than being a hindrance to the intelligence services, history and intelligence studies can be a vehicle for stability and peace in a time of instability, transition and change.

Sensitivities Research in intelligence studies remains a complicated affair. When I embarked on research for my book, The London Cage, I was already aware of controversies surrounding its reputation. There were allegations that torture was used as well as other breaches of the Geneva Convention. These rumours stretched as far back as 1946 when Nazi war criminals, being held in the cage on charges of war crimes, accused the British of torture (Fry, 2017).44 Their allegations were so serious that they threatened to derail the prosecution’s case against some of the worst Nazi war criminals ever held by the British. Their war crimes were being investigated by Colonel Scotland’s teams. SS commander Fritz Knochlein was a prime example. Scotland described Knochlein as: ‘A Nazi of the first order, the worst order, a German who had dedicated himself to brutality; irresponsible in the possession of power, ruthless in execution.’45 The rumours of torture rumbled on into the 1960s and were the subject of enquiries by the MP Jeremy Thorpe.46 They emerged again in the national press in 2005 (Cobain, 2005).47 I was tasked with writing its full history for the first time. Scotland’s own memoirs had been heavily censored by MI5 and the War Office in the early 1950s and a heavily redacted sanitised version came out in 1957.48 My aim was to recreate ‘life inside the cage’ – a vivid picture as if the reader was there as an observer – and to address the decades of rumours about mistreatment and torture there. Would that be achievable? In this case, it was possible to reconstruct a pretty comprehensive account of daily life in the cage – the fears of the 419

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prisoners, the challenges facing the interrogators and the brilliance of its controversial commanding officer, Colonel Scotland. Feedback from readers suggests that, against all the odds, many are warming to Colonel Scotland – the man who sanctioned unorthodox methods of interrogation (Fry, 2017).49 Maverick and controversial, he may have been, but it is hard to deny that his brilliance as an interrogator and commander of human psychology transcends even the darkest parts of the book. However, I was not expecting to come up against barriers during my own research. Sensitivities began to emerge that did not immediately make sense. The cases of four suicides in the cage are one example; their names have never been made public. One of the suicides was the subject of a short piece in the Evening News on 7 March 1946, which stated ‘because of his complicity in war crimes, the name and nationality of this man will be kept secret’ (Fry, 2017).50 Today, with the benefit of computer technology and capabilities to carry out international searches on the Internet, how difficult could it be to find the name of this particular suicide prisoner? The death indexes had to be the starting point. But, as I soon discovered, the national indexes have tens of thousands of entries for deaths in the first quarter of 1946 – even when limiting it to a German surname. I have always believed that ‘the devil is in the detail,’ and this proved a helpful dictum in this research. The breakthrough came quite accidentally when I was working through the declassified files of the London Cage. Colonel Scotland made a somewhat sarcastic, dismissive comment in his official summary report of an SS prisoner when he wrote: ‘after the unfortunate demise of SS Ostubof Tanzmann at the London District Cage… (alias O’Leut. S. Koch)…’51 The use of the word ‘demise’ is loaded language. Tanzmann was definitely held in the cage in March 1946, even though his interrogation reports are missing. A few pages later, ­Scotland made a second reference: ‘Since Tanzmann committed suicide, we have not tried to trace the wanted men…’52 I had finally confirmed that one of the suicides was Helmut Tanzmann. Now for a copy of the death certificate, it was not possible to order the death certificate because there is not a single entry in the national death indexes to Tanzmann in 1946 in the Kensington district, nor widening the search to any area in the United Kingdom, or for the years either side, or on any genealogical research site. Further research revealed that Tanzmann is buried in the German military cemetery at Cannock Chase, north of England. How was Tanzmann buried without a death certificate? Tanzmann’s alias, revealed on his false identity papers at his capture, was S. Koch.53 There is no entry in the death indexes for S. Koch. However, the national index did have an entry for Hans Erich Koch in the first quarter of 1946. It was worth a shot. I ordered and paid for the certificate, only to discover that it had been lost in the post. After much persuasion, a duplicate was issued. In summary, Tanzmann’s death had been registered under Hans Koch and buried as Helmut Tanzmann. Not an easy case to solve without persistence. Even the mention of the London Cage at a local archive elicited the response: ‘It’s sensi­ oroner’s tive, you know.’ The stumbling blocks go further because when I asked to see the C records for Tanzmann/Koch, and another suicide I identified of Hans Ziegler, I had clearly stepped on something sensitive. On 23 February 1948, Ziegler was found dead in his room. According to the death certificate, the forty-nine-year old had committed suicide at 7 ­Kensington Palace Gardens – one of the houses used for the London Cage. Dr H. Stafford, the same London Coroner who had conducted the inquest into Tanzmann’s suicide, concluded that Ziegler had died ‘from a haemorrhage wound of the neck, self-inflicted, and did kill himself while the balance of his mind was disturbed.’54 In Scotland’s unpublished memoirs, he says that Ziegler had acquired a razor blade, cut his jugular vein and bled to death.55 420

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When I made further enquiries, I was informed that Coroner’s reports for that period have been destroyed and only the most important are kept. I wondered if the files might have been misfiled and made a FOI request. That followed with a swift response that coroners are exempt from FOI. It is as far as I have been able to progress with the suicides. Two of the four suicides remain unnamed. Are academics of intelligence studies to enter into the world of the ethics of research? To illustrate the point, if my research into the suicides had confirmed misadventure due to methods of torture or mistreatment at the London Cage, what could be the consequences seventy years later? In this age of increased legal challenges and compensation, it could open a path for relatives of Nazi war criminals and prisoners to make claims against the British government for their ill-treatment, manslaughter or even murder. If a legal challenge was successful, it could mean compensating the descendants of some of the worst Nazi war criminals ever held in England. Whilst it is clear that the State did not authorise the mistreatment and torture of prisoners at the London Cage, it looks as if certain departments have subsequently been responsible for covering up the truth. There is another aspect to this – if it was proved that statements were obtained from Nazi war criminals, like Fritz Knochlein, through duress, then it undermines the guilty verdict that sent many of them to their deaths; and not only them, but it calls into question the verdicts of all Nazi war criminals that faced justice after the war. Importantly, a democratic society prides itself on upholding the judicial system and on undermining that system would call into question the ability of bodies like the International Criminal Court in the Hague in the Netherlands to continue to bring war criminals to justice today. There is a final challenge here for historians and academics. If something is discovered that might still be classified, and you are not aware that it is classified, how do you know if it is acceptable to publish it? The source could be an eyewitness testimony or an unpublished manuscript lying in an attic. This underlines the importance of former intelligence staff having signed the Official Secrets Act and destroying sensitive papers. It is not what historians want to hear, eager for any scraps to fill in the intelligence picture. In such a case, I try to use that oral tradition to find the documentary evidence to substantiate the story. But the fact that some areas of our intelligence history remain classified is, perhaps, what makes it such a compelling and challenging subject to research. Perhaps of more concern is the nervousness in intelligence circles that you know more than you actually do.

Conclusion One of the most valuable areas of work by academics in intelligence studies is keeping memory and history alive. It enables society to learn from the lessons of history. The L ­ ondon Cage may yet be the most sensitive area that I have written about, but it has proved to be extraordinarily helpful in understanding the moral dilemmas and complex layers of ­decision-making that face our intelligence services. The principles and challenges can be the same in the Second World War as in the contemporary age of global terrorism. Rather than seeing academic studies in intelligence as a threat to contemporary espionage and operations, it can be a useful and constructive tool for understanding the context and development of methods used today. The importance of learning from the past was succinctly summed up in a book review of The London Cage on the CIA website: ‘This is precisely the reason intelligence professionals should read The London Cage: it is they who will be tasked to build and run future interrogations programs, and Dr Fry’s books offers an important historical analogue for the work’ (Seeger, 2018).56 421

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Notes 1 Fry, Helen (2015) Churchill’s German Army. 2 Lustig, Fritz (2017) My Lucky Life, pp. 148–149; and interviews for Fry, Helen (2013) The M Room. 3 Fry, Helen (2014) Spymaster, p. 215; and TNA, WO 208/4970. 4 TNA, WO 208/4970 provides an outline history of the bugging unit, including details of its set up and sites. War diary entries are found in MI9’s Official War Diary (TNA, WO 165/39) and from 1942, MI19’s Official War Diary (TNA, WO 165/41). 5 Lustig, Fritz (2017) My Lucky Life, p. 149, and Fry, Helen (2019) The Walls Have Ears. 6 Lustig, Fritz (2017) My Lucky Life, pp. 128–143; and Fry, Helen (2015) Churchill’s German Army. 7 Fry, Helen (2013) The M Room, pp. 118–124, and Fry, Helen (2014) Spymaster, pp. 348–357. 8 Interviews by Helen Fry with former secret listener Eric Mark for Fry, Helen (2019) The Walls Have Ears. See also Neitzel, Sönke (2007) Tapping Hitler’s Generals and Fry, Helen (2013) The M Room. 9 Historic England’s report (February 2017) to Enfield Council planners on Trent Park, the former Middlesex University site. Copy available from Enfield Council or Trent Park Museum Trust. 10 Interviews with Helen Fry (2019) The Walls Have Ears. 11 Fry, Helen (2019) The Walls Have Ears; Fry, Helen (2014) Spymaster; Fry, Helen (2017) The London Cage, and Fry, Helen (2020) MI9: Escape and Evasion in Western Europe. 12 Spying on Hitler’s Army (Channel 4 and PBS: 2013); and episode 3, David Jason’s Secret Service (Channel 4: 2017). 13 www.trentparkmuseum.org.uk; also ‘Last Chance for Museum of Secret Listeners,’ BBC London, 12 April 2016; and ‘The Fight to Save Trent Park,’ in The Evening Standard, 25 April 2016. 14 Fry, Helen (2017) The London Cage. 15 Fry, Helen (2013) The M Room, pp. 139–155. 16 TNA, WO 208/4165. 17 TNA, AIR 40/1192 and AIR 40/2839. 18 TNA, AIR 40/3070. 19 Derek Nudd (grandfather was the head of the Naval intelligence section at CSDIC) has researched intelligence gained from U-boat POWs in 1943. See Nudd, Derek (2017) Castaways of the Kriegsmarine. 20 TNA, WO 208/4165 and AIR 40/1192. 21 TNA, WO 208/4163, WO 208/4167 and WO 208/3504. 22 TNA, WO 208/4970. See Fry, Helen (2019) The Walls Have Ears. 23 TNA, AIR 40/2636. 24 TNA, WO 165/39. 25 Froom, Phil (2015) Evasion & Escape Devices, pp. 15–46. 26 TNA, ADM 223/257. See also Fry, Helen (2014) Spymaster, p. 381. 27 For example, Goldeneye: TNA, ADM 223/490; and the formation of 30 AU Commando: ADM 202/308 and ADM 223/501. 28 Fraser-Smith, Charles (1991) The Secret World of Charles Fraser-Smith; and Clayton Hutton, ­Christopher (1960) Official Secret. 29 Froom, Phil (2015) Evasion & Escape Devices, pp. 107–127 and pp. 277–301; and Bond, Barbara (2015) Great Escapes. 30 Porter, David (1989) The Man who Was Q. 31 M. R. D. Foot & Langley, Jimmy (1979) MI9; and Neave, Airey (2010) Saturday at MI9. 32 Gordon Corera, report for BBC Newsnight, October 2013; see also ‘British Spies moved after Snowden Files Read’, BBC, 14 June 2015. 33 TNA, PREM 4/8/2A. 34 Smith, Michael (2004) Foley. 35 McGinty, Stephen (2011) Camp Z, p. 54 and TNA, FO 1093/11. Thomas Joseph Kendrick (of MI6) was one of Hess’s three minders at Mytchett Place: see Fry, Helen (2014) Spymaster, pp. 281–329. 36 Fraser-Smith, Charles (1999) The Secret War of Charles Fraser-Smith. 37 Ibid., p. 136. 38 Ibid., p. 137. 39 As questioned by Dan Lomas (2018) ‘The Drugs don’t Work’. 40 Fraser-Smith, Charles (1999) The Secret World of Charles Fraser-Smith, p. 138. 41 Numerous examples could be cited, but one example is TNA, WO 208/4300/1.

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Landau, Henry (2015) The Spy Net, and Smith, Michael (2011) Six. www.sis.gov.uk. Fry, Helen (2017) The London Cage, pp. 148–153. TNA WO 208/5381. TNA WO 208/5572. Cobain, Ian (2005) ‘The Secrets of the London Cage’ and Cobain, Ian (2013) Cruel Britannia. TNA, WO 208/5381. Fry, Helen (2017) The London Cage, pp. 64–67, & pp. 71–74. Fry, Helen (2017) The London Cage, illustration 20. TNA, WO 208/4670. Ibid. Ibid. Death certificate signed on 25 February 1948. TNA, WO 208/5381. Studies in Intelligence, vol. 62, No. 1, March 2018, pp. 55–57, review by J.R. Seeger.

References Bond, B. (2015) Great Escapes: The Story of MI9’s Second World War Escape and Evasion Maps. London: Time Books. Clayton Hutton, C. (1960) Official Secret: The Remarkable Story of Escape Aids, their Invention, Production and the Sequel. London: Max Parrish. Cobain, I. (2013) Cruel Britannia: A Secret History of Torture. London: Portobello Books. Cobain, I. (2005) ‘The Secrets of the London Cage’, in The Guardian, 11 November 2005. Fraser-Smith, C. (1999) The Secret War of Charles Fraser-Smith. London: Michael Joseph. Fraser-Smith, C. (1991) The Secret World of Charles Fraser-Smith. London: Paternoster Press. Foot, M. R. D. and Langley, J. (1979) MI9: Escape and Evasion 1939–1945. London: BCA. Froom, P. (2015) Evasion & Escape Devices Produced by MI9, MIS-X & SOE in World War II. London: Schiffer Publishing. Fry, H. (forthcoming 2020) MI9: Escape and Evasion in Western Europe. New Haven: Yale University Press. Fry, H. (2019) The Walls Have Ears: The Greatest Intelligence Operation of WWII. New Haven: Yale University Press. Fry, H. (2017) The London Cage: The Secret History of Britain’s WWII Interrogation Centre. New Haven: Yale University Press. Fry, H. (2015) Churchill’s German Army. London: Thistle Publishing. Fry, H. (2014) Spymaster: The Secret Life of Kendrick. London: Thistle Publishing. Fry, H. (2013) The M Room: Secret Listeners who Bugged the Nazis. London: Marranos Press. Landau, H. (2015) The Spy Net. London: Biteback Publishing. Lomas, D. (2018) ‘The Drugs don’t Work: Intelligence, Torture and the London Cage, 1940–1948’, in Intelligence and National Security, doi:10.1080/02684527.2018.1478629. Lustig, F. (2017) My Lucky Life. London: privately published. McGinty, S. (2011) Camp Z: The Secret Life of Hess. London: Quercus. Neave, A. (2010) Saturday at MI9: The Classic Account of the WWII Allied Escape Organisation. London: Pen & Sword. Neitzel, S. (2007) Tapping Hitler’s Generals: Transcripts of Secret Conversations, 1942–1945. London: Frontline. Nudd, D. (2017) Castaways of the Kriegsmarine: How Shipwrecked German Seamen Helped the Allies win the Second World War. London: Createspace. Porter, D. (1989) The Man who Was Q: The Life of Charles Fraser-Smith. London: Paternoster Press. Smith, M. (2011) Six: A History of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service. London: Dialogue. Smith, M. (2004) Foley: The Spy who Saved a 10,000 Jews. London: Politico’s Publishing.

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32 STALIN’S LIBRARY Svetlana Lokhova

Introduction As was his habit, Joseph Stalin carried the book he was editing with him to his daily Red Army High Command briefing. The meeting began around midnight, as was the custom. At this meeting, around mid-April 1942, Stavka (High Command) reported more bad news to their Supreme Commander. The Soviet offensive to liberate the besieged city of Leningrad had collapsed into chaos. In heavy fighting in the district of Molvotitsy, the Red Army had suffered huge losses. This latest debacle unfolded despite earlier signs of success. An offensive by the Soviet army had surrounded a large pocket of German forces, but a seeming victory had turned into defeat. In the smoke-filled room, Stalin sat quietly as was his habit, sucking on his pipe. He passed the time jotting notes and doodles on any paper that came to hand. During the slew of depressing news, Stalin wrote in a sign of his grim determination to resist on the title page of the play ‘We will endure’. As the meeting dragged on towards dawn, he filled up the entire back page with comments such as the name of the battle, Molvotitsy. He ringed the name and made a reminder to himself to follow up with questions with his close confident the ex-Tsarist officer Marshall Boris Shaposhnikov. This chapter provides critically important and little explored aspect of understanding of Stalin’s literary and cultural interests for understanding the mind and methods of a man who shape the twentieth’s century’s history. Drawing directly from the records of Stalin’s personal collection of books, and related archival sources, ‘Stalin’s Library’ highlights the methodological significance of archival sources in the history of security and intelligence.

Stalin’s library The actual book that he wrote on was unimportant to Stalin; it just happened to be in his hand as he hurried into a meeting. The text was a draft of a new play about the life of Tsar Ivan IV ‘Grozny’ by Alexei N. Tolstoy, known amusingly as the ‘Comrade Count’. Ivan IV is more familiar to English-speaking readers as Ivan the Terrible. Stalin was critiquing the work. He was one of the few senior Bolsheviks with the education to perform such a task. Stalin was pedantic (as all good literary editors should be!) and with a stroke of his pencil, he adjusted the character of Ivan’s dialogue to be more commanding.1 Stalin expected the Tsar 424

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on stage to speak with a clear and authoritative voice. Tolstoy got off lightly. Stalin commented about another playwright ‘What is this sad and tedious gibberish?’ As the Stavka meeting progressed, Stalin learned of the destruction of three more Soviet armies. By April, it was clear that 1942 was going to be another tough year for the Soviet Union. He wrote in blue pencil the numbers of his newly devastated legions. Across the entire front, the supply situation was grim. He wrote in capital letters of the desperate need for oil, explosives and other raw materials. The Soviets understood that the strategic objective of the German summer offensive would be to cut them off from their oil fields. However, Stalin’s mind wandered. He doodled what looked at first sight like musical clef symbols, an elaborate Cyrillic D inside a diamond. The symbol was that of Dynamo Moscow, the football club. On the same page, six times he wrote the word ‘Teacher’. This simple word is central to one of the myths that now surrounds Stalin. The legend is that Stalin saw Tsar Ivan the ‘Terrible’ as his ‘teacher’ in terror.2 Stalin sent the copy of the play, with his doodles, to his library. On his death, the ­Soviets preserved some of the library. The archive has many surprises. The Russians made the material available online. Stalin was an avid reader, but only began collecting books in 1925 when he found the time to acquire a working library. Before 1925, he was either on the run from the Tsarist secret police or involved in the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War. A library was essential to him, so he outlined detailed plans for its organisation. In May 1925, he instructed his assistant and secretary, Ivan Tovstukha, to take up this task and installed the first librarian on the staff of the Secretary-General. Stalin wrote on a sheet of paper from a student’s notebook some surprising instructions to the new librarian, particularly as to his reading priorities. Stalin favoured reading philosophy over politics. My advice (and request): 1 Classify books not by authors, but by: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u

philosophy; psychology; sociology; political economy; finance; industry; agriculture; co-operatives Russian history; the history of other countries; diplomacy; external and internal trade; military affairs; the national question; congresses and conferences; condition of workers; condition of the peasants; Komsomol [young Communist league]; the history of other revolutions in other countries; the1905 Revolution; the February Revolution of 1917; 425

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v the October Revolution of 1917; w Lenin and Leninism; x the history of the Russian Communist Party (b) [Bolshevik] and the Communist International; y discussions in the Russian Communist Party (articles, brochures); • • • • • • •

Section 1 trade unions; Section 2 fiction; Section 3 criticism; Section 4 political magazines; Section 5 natural science journals; Section 6 All kinds of dictionaries atlases and encyclopaedias; Section 7 memoirs.

2 To remove books from the aforementioned classification (and arrange separately): a) Lenisn  b)  Marx  c) Engels  d) Kautsky  e) Plekhanov f ) Trotsky  g) Bukharin  h) ­ Zinoviev  i) Kamenev  k) Lafargue  l) Luxemburg  m) Radek. 3 All the rest are classified by authors, putting aside: all sorts of textbooks, small journals, anti-religious waste paper, etc. J. Stalin.3 As a break from his work, Stalin enjoyed reading the classics of fiction—Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Gogol, Chekhov, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Schiller, Heine, Hugo, Thackeray and Balzac.4 In the 1930s, he became the chief patron of Soviet literature. He read and edited the post-­revolutionary writings of Maxim Gorky, Alexander Fadeev, Aleksei Tolstoy, Iliya Ehrenburg, Isaac Babel and Mikhail Sholokhov. Stalin maintained close relationships with the twenty leading Soviet writers, corresponding with them regularly. He treated Maxim Gorky, in particular, with respect even deference. Gorky was genuinely fond of Stalin ending one letterform abroad: Be healthy and take care of yourself. Last summer, in Moscow, I expressed my feelings to you in the feelings of my sincere, comradely sympathy and respect for you. Let me repeat it. This is not a compliment, but a natural need to tell a friend: I sincerely respect you, you are a good person, a strong Bolshevik. The need to say this is not often satisfied, you know that. Moreover, I know how difficult it is for you. I firmly shake hands, dear Joseph Vissarionovich. 12.XI.31. A. Peshkov.5 In turn, Stalin encouraged Gorky to use his influence through his writing to push through political messages. Gorky was urged to write a compelling novel exposing the evils of ‘wreckers’ who sabotaged the industrialisation plans. On Stalin’s death in 1953, some 14,000 books, mostly fiction, art books and atlases, were dispersed to other libraries, leaving a residue of 5,500 items, including some 400 that he annotated.6 Stalin would underline key passages in red or blue pencil, sometimes huge sections. When he disagreed with authors, he would write phrases such as ‘hmmm’ ‘ha-ha’ or ‘liar’. As Stalin kept no diary nor wrote an autobiography, the marginalia in his library are the closest a historian can get to an insight into his innermost thoughts. When it came to conflicting interpretations of philosophy which set his head spinning, he would sometimes express his exasperation by writing ‘oh mama!’ 7

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The library was his ‘Wikipedia’, a storehouse of accumulated knowledge to help Stalin study the masters of statecraft. None of the socialist sages had much advice for him—for they had never thought beyond the revolution. Despite his books, Stalin ploughed his own path as he oversaw a gigantic social experiment to industrialise a backward agrarian society in a rush which had never been attempted before. The centralised Soviet system meant that almost all decisions, however minor, arrived eventually at Stalin’s desk for final approval. To reach a decision, Stalin might read a book. He would certainly consult with experts in the specialist fields to help make his decisions. Before each meeting, he would read up on the subject to be informed. A family friend, the air warfare weapons designer A. E. Nudelman recalled his meetings with Stalin. He was surprised at the depth of Stalin’s knowledge in the specialist field of auto-cannons and air-to-ground rockets. One long book Stalin ploughed through underlining passages was a mind-numbing encyclopaedia of machine tool manufacturing. The library and the marginalia are a vital source for historians seeking to gain insights into the thoughts of this colossus of the twentieth century if interpreted correctly. All too frequently, they are not. Some of the most obvious falsifications of history are based on the marginalia in the books in the library. Stalin would no doubt write ha-ha if he read much of what historians write about him. One Russian historian, Eduard Radzinsky’s central idea is that Ivan Grozny was Stalin’s teacher in terror, based on the jottings on the Tolstoy play.8 The claim is easily dismissed simply by using the primary source evidence available online. Even without being a native Russian speaker, one can see that Stalin was making notes about anything other than Ivan the Terrible. His other jottings which surround the word ‘Teacher’9 show that he was worried about the production of nitroglycerine and losses suffered by the Soviet 5, 33 and 55 armies. He just happened that day to jot on a play while making notes in a meeting. Radzinsky conveniently ‘forgets’ to mention the existence of other words on the same page. Furthermore, he omits the crucial fact that Stalin wrote ‘teacher’ on pages of many of his books in his library including ones by an obscure French General of Artillery and nine times on the cover of a book about the planned economy.10 No one would ever dream of suggesting that these authors were Stalin’s ‘Teacher’! Where Radzinsky leads, Simon Sebag Montefiore follows. The title of his much-­acclaimed book Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar demonstrates how much he bought into Radzinsky’s myth. Montefiore is quoted saying that Stalin saw ‘Ivan the Terrible as his true “teacher”’. He scribbled on a new biography of Ivan the Terrible: teacher teacher’.11 Montefiore contends that ‘Ivan the Terrible was his hero. Stalin made notes in all his books, and I have been through his library in the archive’.12 Well, there is no excuse to mislead one’s readers in this way. Sadly, the Radzinsky/ Montefiore myth which has no basis in historical fact now forms part of the Russian schools’ history curriculum as well as Western popular thinking. The clumsy efforts to link historical figures to Russian political leaders continue to this day. On January 24, 2019, in an article, The Daily Beast told its readers that ‘A TSAR IS REBORN Putin R ­ ehabbed Stalin, Now He is Burnishing the Rep of Ivan the Terrible’.13 ‘Ivan Grozny’ translates into English as Ivan the Formidable; terrible is a complete mistranslation. Ivan was a great Tsar who expanded the Kingdom of Muscovy and defended his kingdom against foreign invaders. Of course, the blood-soaked stories of Ivan and his ‘secret police’, the sinister Oprichniki, torturing boyars are excellent entertainment. The Tolstoy play had been commissioned to support the revival in Russian nationalism encouraged during the crisis of the Great Patriotic War. Since 1940, a campaign to bolster Russian ethnic nationalism had been officially sponsored through newly commissioned films and

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plays. By 1942 ethnic Russians were dying in their millions, alongside other nationalities defending the Motherland, so the government-sanctioned substantial efforts bolster ethnic domestic morale. Loosely based propaganda films and plays about Russian historical heroes who had fought off foreign invaders such as Ivan Grozny, Boris Godunov, Alexander Nevsky, etc., were released in a steady stream. They were conscripted to the cause of the Soviet Union in its fight to the death with Nazi Germany. Given their importance, Stalin found the time to be personally involved in many of these efforts. However, should anyone believe Stalin viewed Ivan the Terrible as his teacher? Given the overwhelming evidence against and no facts in support, of course not. The notion is risible. Stalin was a Communist. He saw Marx, Engels and Lenin as his teachers. In his archives, I discovered a more plausible explanation for the jotting at this stressful time when Stalin wrote ‘teacher’. He was reaching back in his memory to his early days as a revolutionary trade union activist. Stalin’s career as a revolutionary leader began in the Georgian Black Sea port of Batum (now Batumi), wherein 1902, he led a strike in the Rothschild and Mantashev oil refineries which won a substantial pay rise for workers. A contemporary intelligence report on Stalin, later found in a Tiflis police station, identifies him as the strikeleader and describes his face as pockmarked from childhood smallpox. The report, with the unflattering description, was repeatedly reprinted during Stalin’s years in power. As late as 1937, in a book called ‘Batum Demonstration of 1902’, Stalin was unconcerned with being described as pockmarked. In 1901–1902, he had worked underground in Batum, Georgia, organising strikes and running printing presses. The Rothschild family owned a valuable oil concession in the city but exploited the workers to maximise their return. Stalin argued that the workers should have humane working conditions, paid holidays and access to education. At this early stage in his career, he realised that increasing worker literacy was a necessary first step on the road to revolution. The Okhranka report on the Batum unrest in 1902 when Stalin was arrested as one of the leaders states that the workers called Dzhugashvili ‘teacher of the workers’, and his second in command was called (inspirationally) ‘assistant to the teacher of the workers’14! Later, the secret service document reveals that the price to meet the teacher was 2.5% of monthly pay as a donation for the workers’ cause. Stalin was proud of the phrase ‘Teacher of the Workers’ and never forgot that it was given to him. The word ‘Учитель’ or ‘Teacher’ appears in a number of his doodles, especially during times of high stress such as in the middle of the Second World War. Nor, despite the greater horrors of the Civil War, famine and the two World Wars, did Stalin forget the bloodbath which followed the strikes when the army opened fire on the unarmed workers in Batum. Stalin saw himself as a guide to his people leading them to a better future. Sometimes, the price was high. The Batum unrest that he organised cost fifteen workers their lives and dozens more were wounded. The struggle against the Nazi invaders cost twenty-seven million Soviet lives. One book labelled SECRET that Stalin edited closely was the Red Army staff guide to the Battle of Moscow written by Marshall Boris Shaposhnikov.15 The book was a limited edition sent to the military and political elite to pass on the lessons learned of the defeat of the German advance on Moscow. Not only does the text support the new interpretation of doddles in the Ivan Grozny play, it also provides a significant challenge to accepted views of Stalin. With his red pencil, Stalin removed each of the many observations that credited him with the significant role in this pivotal battle or indeed any major part in the decisive action. In a severely damaging blow to the accepted view that he was obsessed with his personality cult in the draft, there is clear documentary evidence that he is exercising the suggestion that his role in 1941 as the saviour of Moscow and the USSR. After Stalin’s 428

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death, Nikita Khrushchev’s 1956 ‘Secret Speech’ to the Twentieth Party Congress famously denounced Stalin’s cult of personality, saying, ‘It is impermissible and foreign to the spirit of ­Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics akin to those of a god’.16 As part of the process of de-Stalinisation, the library was broken up and dispersed. Stalin was autodidactic and maintained a life long love of learning from books. He read around 500 pages each day beyond his arduous work schedule. His son Vasili did not inherit his father’s attribute, and Stalin admonished him for his laziness. He was a reluctant reader. To encourage his son to read, Stalin would gift books he thought would interest him with the phrase to ‘Vaska the Red’.17 One such was ‘War in the Air, 1936’ by Major Von Helders, which was first published in English in 1932 and in Russian in 1934.18 The author, writing under a pseudonym, was the German General Der Flieger, Dr Robert Knauss. Knauss was Germany’s leading air war theorist commanding the Luftwaffe’s Air War Academy. In the book, the author fantasises about a bloody air war confrontation between England and France. Writing under the pseudonym ‘Major Helders’, and using detailed descriptions of battles, strategies and weaponry, Knauss’ ‘aim is for the reader to realise that air power in general and “flying fortress” bombers, in particular, would decide the outcome of the next war’.19 The book was issued to the VVS to study specific technology and military tactics. As a doting father, Stalin indulged his twelve-year-old son’s interest in becoming a military pilot. Even in old age according to his daughter Svetlana, he was still admonishing Vasili, who by then preferred hard drinking to reading: ‘“I am seventy years old”, his father told him, “and I am still learning”,20 and pointed to the books he read—history, military affairs, literature’. Stalin ordered books for his daughter, mostly classics from a Soviet book club and biographies of female heroes of the patriotic war. For his eldest son Yakov, he picked out science books. The archives preserve the order forms. As he grew up, Stalin was one of the lucky small minorities of the Tsar’s subjects who learned to read and write. He was destined to be a priest winning a prized place at a seminary. It was here he gained access to banned revolutionary literature which broadened his mind beyond the religious tracts he was supposed to study. Political books changed his life, and he was more than a reader. In his youth, Stalin (real name Dzhugashvili) was a published poet of romantic Georgian poetry. Aged just twelve, he organised a group of fellow students with whom he shared this poetry: At nine o’clock in the evening in the dining room, the inspector saw a group of pupils who crowded around Dzhugashvili reading something to them. When he approached them, Dzhugashvili tried to hide his notes and only after persistent demands, the Inspector discovered his manuscript. On another occasion, the same inspector, as they say in the police, used ‘measures of physical influence’. By force, he took the notebook from the seminarian Dzhugashvili, from where he read his poems to fellow students. Then, ‘He brought kerosene and made the wicked people burn this seditious notebook’.21 In 1895, when Joseph Dzhugashvili was only seventeen years old, his poems caught the eyes of the great Georgian poet Ilya Chavchavadze. He immediately appreciated the talent of the young poet and in the same year published five of his poems in the newspaper Iberia that he edited. In 1896, his poem was published in the newspaper Kvali. In 1901, a book on the theory of Georgian literature was published in Georgia, in which the poems of the future leader featured amongst the best examples of Georgian classical literature. Moreover, in 1907, the Georgian Chrestomathy or collection of the best examples of Georgian literature was published, the first volume of which contained Stalin’s verses. Revolution replaced poetry soon after. 429

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It is hard to imagine many other strike organisers passing out reading lists of recommended books as Stalin did in Batum. The deliberate policy of the autocratic monarchy was to limit literacy amongst its subjects to prevent the spread of revolutionary ideas. The policy included extreme measures such as limiting access to schools by levying prohibitive taxes. Only an estimated 24% of the population as a whole could read before the Revolution. Fewer women could read than men perhaps less than 10%. Widespread literacy is an acknowledged pre-requisite for any country to begin industrialisation successfully. Of course to the small number of Russian followers of Marx, the crucial development of the proletariat and eventual establishment of communism was dependent on industrialisation and worker education. They launched a Communist revolution in the name of a class of people that are yet to develop in their country. The rise in literacy in under fifteen years to almost 90% of the population was an astounding achievement of the early years of the Bolshevik government. Stalin is in part the sum of his books in his library. Understanding his library is essential in gaining insights into the man. The books speak for themselves, often more reliable witnesses than human memory. The books were immeasurably valuable to Stalin as he rarely travelled abroad yet through reading became a master of international relations. He learned most about the ways of the world outside the Soviet Union from books, maps and, of course, his excellent intelligence network. Sometimes in his choice of reading, he fell victim to conmen. As Japan expanded its empire through conquest in China and Manchuria, Stalin needed to gain an insight into Japanese intentions towards the Soviet Union. Japan had been one of the most aggressive interventionist powers during the Civil War occupying swathes of the Far East. Surprising everyone, they stationed 70,000 troops as well as bringing in 50,000 colonists into natural resource-rich Siberia. Moreover, they were the last and most reluctant foreign power to leave. It was an open secret that certain sections of the Japanese military were itching to attack the Soviet Union. Based on one book he read on Japan, Stalin developed a deep loathing for Japanese society. Amongst the most heavily annotated books in his library is a Russian translation of the bestseller ‘The Menace of Japan’,22 first published in 1933, by an alleged Irish professor Taid O’Conroy, who claimed to have spent fifteen years living in Japan. He claimed to have married a Japanese princess whom he described as the most beautiful woman in Asia. She was perhaps a waitress or according to some less kind accounts a ‘hostess’.23 Though the publisher’s blurb describes the book as a ‘cold, logical thesis’, it also contains ‘authenticated stories’ of ‘unspeakable cruelty’ and ‘sex orgies’. Stalin wrote, ‘What scum’24 against the story of a schoolboy being viciously beaten for opposing the Japanese invasion of Siberia during the Civil War. He commented, ‘What scoundrels’ on O’Conroy’s claim that Japanese wives were expected to prepare the bed and serve sake when their husbands had sex at home with a prostitute. O’Conroy concludes his book: ‘I say that Japan wants war’. Stalin was not the only world leader O’Conroy took in. O’Conroy visited the President of the United States Calvin Coolidge at the White House as part of an elaborate netsuke scam. Missed by all Stalin’s autobiographers is his deep involvement in the development of the Soviet intelligence services. Stalin was a self-taught world class spymaster. The material found in his archive transforms our understanding of both Stalin and Soviet intelligence even more profoundly than the revelation of the ULTRA Secret forty years ago that changed our view of Sir Winston Churchill. No one would nowadays dream of writing a book, or even an article, on Churchill in the Second World War without acknowledging his passion for ULTRA. But not a single biography of Stalin or study of his foreign policy mentions that his enthusiasm for code-breaking and signals intelligence (SIGINT) in peace, as well as war, was as high as Churchills. As we can see, in the early years, he gained 430

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experience by reading books published abroad but by the late 1940s, he was relying solely on his experience. The pupil had become the master. Vast quantities of raw intelligence material flowed across Stalin’s desk. His archive contains quantities of confidential material acquired or intercepted telegrams from all the great powers. He read translated document stamped with the impressive sounding ‘Property of His Britannic Majesty’, intercepts from the Japanese Embassy in Moscow and US State Department documents.25 He studied intelligence practices and showed a deep interest in English-language writing on espionage which has also passed unnoticed by his biographers. He edited for Soviet army intelligence officers a Russian translation of a history of espionage (including a mildly salacious chapter on Mata Hari). The GRU (Soviet Military ­Intelligence) handbook drew on a book published on both sides of the Atlantic in 1928 by the ­A merican spy expert Richard Wilmer Rowan. Rowan is generally reckoned to be the leading ­A nglophone writer on espionage of his generation. Rowan identifies espionage as a significant hidden dimension of twentieth-century international relations which he calls the ‘­Sinister Front’. Rowan’s work helps to explain Stalin’s exaggerated assessment of the interwar ­Western intelligence offensive against the Soviet Union. According to Rowan: It is of curious note that espionage does not subside simply because hostilities are past. ­Nations of only potential antagonism, who are happily far off from a state of war, and who may even have been devoted allies in a recently concluded struggle, will spy upon each other with all the vigour of inveterate foes. The regiments of the secret service are sometimes reduced but never demobilised. No treaty of peace has ever sent them home rejoicing. The Treaty of Versailles had yet to be drafted, and the Teutonic bail bond fixed when all the triumphant Allies set straightway to work, spying upon one another as if that were the only known way to safeguard a victor’s share of the spoils.26 Published literature on foreign espionage in Britain was rare between the wars, but S­ talin had translated for him ‘Alone Against England’,27 the purported memoirs of Karl Ernst (writing as Ernst Carl), a key figure in the pre-First World War German spy network in England, arrested at the outbreak of war. Stalin cannot have realised that this account was fraudulent, written by another German author attempting to cash in on Karl Ernst’s notoriety. It was thought genuine, or otherwise, no one would translate it for him. Stalin did not understand foreign languages. Stalin was intensely irritated by his personal translation of the 1932 international bestseller Memoirs of a British Agent by Robert Bruce Lockhart.28 The Soviets were seemingly unfamiliar with double-barrelled names so wrote Bruce Lockhart without a space. Stalin would use his blue pencil to correct the error. The book tells of Bruce Lockhart’s failed effort to sabotage the Bolshevik Revolution in Moscow in 1918; his co-conspirators were double agents working for the Bolsheviks. The Cheka (first Soviet security service) and Stalin believed that its first significant success against Western intelligence services was the disruption in the summer of 1918 of the ‘Lockhart Plot’ to overthrow the young Bolshevik regime. It became an article of faith for successive generations of Soviet intelligence officers, as for Stalin, that, in the words of a KGB history published in 1979, ‘One could say without exaggeration that the shattering blow dealt by the Chekists to the conspirators was equivalent to victory in a major military battle’.29 Stalin continued for more than a decade to meditate on the lessons of the Lockhart Plot. Although Stalin underlined about a quarter of the pages in the book, he did not mark any references to himself. Lockhart identified Lenin and Trotsky as the two key figures of the early Bolshevik regime and wrote that if anyone had told him in 1918 that Lenin’s successor would be Stalin, he would have burst into laughter. Stalin’s annotations ignore the insult and suggest that he was particularly interested in the motives 431

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of the British government he underlines reports of wrangling in the British cabinet and Trotsky’s dealings with Dzerzhinsky’s deputy, Yakov Peters. Dzerzhinsky invited Lockhart to tour the aftermath of the savage fighting between the Bolsheviks and the anarchists, providing the British spy with a car and armed escort. What seems to have alarmed Stalin was the close friendship between Trotsky and a British secret service officer. Trotsky even gave Lockhart his personal phone number. The British were the Soviet Union’s mortal enemy. It was extraordinary that Trotsky was on such good relations with the secret representatives of imperialist capitalist powers. Furthermore, Lockhart’s breathless account of his dealings with the Cheka reveals a catalogue of incompetence. Far from being a crack counterintelligence organisation that were more ‘Keystone cops’ if true, Lockhart was able to flush an incriminating notebook down a toilet while he was under arrest at Lubyanka under the very eyes of his guards. His chief interrogator Peters brought Lockhart’s lover Moura to his cell as a birthday present to himself and failed to spot the pair exchanging notes. It was not what Stalin wanted to read about how his intelligence services dealt with a captured foreign spy trying to stage a coup! Stalin continued to add to his intelligence library both before and after the Second World War. On 18 September 1948 in his paper-strewn office in the Kremlin, the now grey-haired Joseph Stalin read a newly acquired confidential US report. He carefully underlined nearly half of the document with his distinctive blue pencil and made notes. The title made him smile: ‘What Stalin Thinks’.30 This ambitious work was the brain-child of President Harry S. Truman. The top intelligence officer, Rear Admiral Ellis Zacharias, had been tasked with decrypting Stalin’s innermost thoughts. It is uncertain what President Truman made of the completed report, but at least one reader, the subject, was fascinated. Stalin sucked pensively on his pipe while reading the conclusions. He smiled wryly at the American’s comment ‘Stalin is Russia’. The naiveté was most amusing to the Georgian-born man of the mountains. The Americans’ failing was to reduce the analysis of an entire country and its complex political system to the whims of one individual. President Truman planned to sit down at a summit that summer with Uncle Joe. He needed to stage-manage a diplomatic triumph. 1948 was an election year, and the incumbent was trailing disastrously in the opinion polls. With public opinion set firmly against him, Truman could not risk a foreign policy debacle to add to his domestic woes. The goal was to defuse the growing tension between the great powers. If a summit ensured his election, Truman was all for it. However, was Stalin the man to play along with Truman’s self-serving plan? A successful outcome had to be in the bag before Truman would even consider inviting Stalin to fly to Washington. Zacharias was called upon to recreate Stalin’s thought process. The Admiral set himself the task of identifying the problems that are now occupying ­Stalin’s mind. Zacharias assured the President that he had been able to resolve what Winston ­Churchill called ‘a mystery surrounded by an enigma’. There was no summit. The MGB gave the report to Stalin as a part of a rich bounty of intelligence treasures. Close to seventy years old, suffering from a debilitating heart condition, Stalin was selftaught and remained unchallenged as a spymaster. Since assuming power, he had read thousands of such reports. Intelligence flooded across his desk, much produced by the intelligence services of foreign countries. He had read the clipped diplomatic language of the British SIS, the bellicose language of Imperial Japan and the naive thoughts of the State Department. Stalin managed his foreign affairs by ensuring an information advantage over his allies and opponents. Throughout his life, he sent the most important documents to cross his desk to his archive which stores hundreds of intelligence reports. After reading and annotating each intelligence report, he wrote in the corner ‘to my archive’ as an order to his secretary. 432

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On these reports, Stalin wrote candid comments. His underlinings in the documents and his comments reveal what Stalin thought. These insights, of course, escaped the skilled Zacharias. The Rear Admiral had used his techniques to predict the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but he lacked the documents he needed to assess the inner thoughts of Stalin.

Conclusion To counter America’s Soviet spy mania in the early years of the Cold War, Stalin relied on the publication of Annabelle Bucar’s The Truth about American Diplomats.31 Bucar defected to the Soviet Union leaving her job at the US Embassy in Moscow, saying that she had developed a ‘real understanding of the country [the USSR] and its fine people who are doing their utmost toward making the world a better place to live in’.32 Bucar felt that the policy of the Embassy was directed against these people, so she considered that further work in the Embassy was incompatible with her views. Her tell-all book upset the State Department. ‘The book itself purports to reveal the “truth” about the intelligence activities of the Embassy and viciously attacks those members of the Foreign Service whom she describes as forming an “anti-Soviet clique” holding responsible positions in the Department and the Moscow Embassy’.33 In reply, Moscow said Bucar ‘unmasks the character of the American diplomats, their bestial hatred for the USSR and their criminal espionage activity on the territory of our country’. The State Department guessed that the MGB had ghost written Bucar’s book as the revelations it contained went far beyond what she could possibly have known. They never suspected that the final edits were those of one J Stalin. The Head of the MGB Viktor Abakumov had written to Stalin asking his permission to publish the book enclosing a draft.34 The goal of publication was to embarrass the US both at home and abroad as well as counter the constant stream of revelations from Soviet defectors and former spies in the US press. Stalin was now the master of espionage with decades of experience. With his blue pencil in hand, he set to work to fine-tune the book. Bucar, with Stalin’s help, opened to public eyes a view of American espionage activity that was at best morally dubious.

Notes 1 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii (Thereafter RGASPI). [Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History]. F. 558. Op. 3. D. 350. 2 Ibid. 3 Medvedev R.A. (2005) Lyudi i knigi. Chto chital Stalin? Pisatel’ i kniga v totalitarnom obshchestve. Moscow: Prava cheloveka. 4 Stalin’s Library Catalogue, www.stalindigitalarchive.com/frontend/node/135127. 5 Peshkov is Gorky’s real name. http://magazines.russ.ru/novyi_mi/1997/9/stalin.html. 6 www.stalindigitalarchive.com/frontend/guide-to-fond-558-opis’-3. 7 RGASPI F. 558. Op. 3. 8 Radzinsky, E. Titany i tirany. Ivan IV Groznyy. Stalin, Moscow: AST. 9 RGAPSI F. 558. Op. 3. D. 350. 10 RGAPSI F. 558. Op. 3. 11 Sebag-Montefiore, S. (2010) Stalin: the Court of the Red Tsar. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson (Kindle edition). 12 www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/116183/stalin-by-simon-sebag-­m ontef iore/978140 0076789/. 13 www.thedailybeast.com/putin-rehabbed-stalin-now-hes-burnishing-the-rep-of-ivan-the-terrible. 14 RGAPSI. 15 RGAPSI F. 558. Op. 3. 16 Khrushchev’s speech to twentieth Party Congress Marxists.org. 17 RGAPSI F. 558. Op. 3.

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RGAPSI F. 558. Op. 3. www.lwcurrey.com. Alliluyeva, S. (1989) Dvadtsat’ pisem k drugu, Moscow: Kniga. RGAPSI F. 558. Op. 11 d. 1291. RGAPSI F. 558. Op. 3. Contazzi, H Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, Volume 4 Routledge. RGAPSI F. 558. Op. 3. Lokhova, S. (2017) The Spy Who Changed History. London: William Collins. RGAPSI F. 558. Op. 3. RGAPSI F. 558. Op. 3. RGAPSI F. 558. Op. 3. Andrew, C. (2000) The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB. New York: Basic Books. RGAPSI F. 558. Op. 3. RGAPSI F. 558. Op. 3. Foreign Relations of the United States Vol 5 U.S. Government Printing Office, (1976). Life Magazine December 8 1954. RGAPSI F. 558 op. 1 d. 5754.

References Alliluyeva, S. (1989) Dvadtsat’ pisem k drugu. Moscow: Kniga. Bucar, A. (1952) The Truth about American Diplomats, Literaturnaya Gazeta. Moscow: USSR Bulgakov, M.A. (2007) The Master And Margarita. London: Penguin. Davies, R.W. and Khlevniuk, O.V. (2003) The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931–36. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Denisov, V.N. and Murin, Iu. G. (1993) Iosif Stalin v obiiatiakh semi: Iz lichnogo arkhiva. Moscow: Rodina. Fitzpatrick, S. (2007) Stalinism: New Directions. London and New York: Taylor & Francis (Kindle edition). Ilizarov, B. (2003) Tainaia Zhizn’ Stalina: Po Materialam Biblioteki i Arkhiva. Moscow: Veche. Khlevnyuk, O. (2008) Master of the House: Stalin and His Inner Circle. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Lockhart, R.H. (2011) Memoirs of a British Agent. London: Frontline Books. Loginov, V. (2000) Teni Stalina. Moscow: Sovremennik. Mlechin, L. (2001) KGB. Predsedateli organov gosbezopasnosti. Rassekrechenie sudbi. Moscow: Zentrpoligraf. Ostrovsky, A. (2004) Kto stoyal za spinoy Stalina. Warsaw: St Petersburg. Radzinsky, E. (2003) Stalin. Moscow: Vagrius. Rayfield, D. (2005) Stalin and his Hangmen. London: Penguin (Kindle edition). Sebag-Montefiore, S. (2010) Stalin: the Court of the Red Tsar. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson (Kindle edition). Service, R. (2006) Stalin. A Biography. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (Kindle edition). Soyma, V. (2005) Zapreshenny Stalin. Moscow: Olma Press. Stalin, I.V. (1951) Sochineniya, Vol. 13. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoye izdatel’stvo 1 politicheskoy literatury. Zhukov, Y.N. (2008) Inoy Stalin. Moscow: Vagryus.

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33 A LANDSCAPE OF LIES IN THE LAND OF LETTERS The literary cartography of security and intelligence Liam Francis Gearon Introduction Literature is a lie which seeks to tell a truth. Espionage is a trade dependent on deceit. Where the two professions meet, the dissembling knows no limit. As David Cornwell, the non-­­­de-plume of John le Carré, has written: ‘I’m a liar, born to lying, bred to it, trained to it by an industry that lies for a living, practised in it as a novelist’ (Kerridge, 2015). The curiously entangled relationship between literature, security and intelligence is, then, not surprisingly replete with twists and turns of plot and an odd array of dual-facing characters. In the complex interplay of spy fact and spy fiction, many practitioners of the former have engaged in writing the latter. Eric Ambler, John Bingham, John Buchan, Ian Fleming, Graham Greene, John le Carré, Eliza Manningham Buller, Somerset Maugham and Arthur Ransome are well-known to the list (Burton, 2016; Hannabuss, 2016). And for writers of spy fiction who – except perhaps in their authorial dreams – were never spies, the real and imagined adventures and misadventures of actual spooks by necessity provide the storyline. Look glancingly at the relationships between the factual worlds of the security and intelligence agencies – the spies – and their fictional representations and we see numerous ironies. Perhaps the most curious being that few seem wholeheartedly to believe governments who employ secret bands of men and women in the security agencies to uncover the truth, so that politicians can act on their intelligence, while many seem enthral to and are willing to suspend disbelief when reading novelists who are paid to lie. Some spy writers have worked consciously to highlight actual as well as imagined security and intelligence concerns. A good example of where the real and imagined themselves are blended is in ‘the narrative threat of nations’, such as in classic stories of foreign invaders by Erskine Childers (The Riddle of the Sands) and William Le Queux (The Invasion of 1910). ­Others such as Ian Fleming create characters like James Bond who single-handedly save the free world from jeopardy, written by an author who had known active secret service in wartime naval intelligence (Harling, 2015). Such authors, in turn, impact the world they represent. Le Queux, in particular, might be said to have been responsible for enhancing the milieu of threat which led to the formation of MI5 (Andrew, 2010, 2018). Others are by turns alarmed or flattered to see their own 435

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worlds of secrecy in the lie of fiction. The KGB and Politburo had strong views about the anti-­Soviet propaganda of 007, strong enough to create a series of Soviet counter-fictions (Connick, 2017). For both John F. Kennedy and Lee Harvey Oswald, Ian Fleming allegedly provided the bedside reading the evening before the President’s assassination, part of a sphere of influence and intrigue that unites the reading public and political elites (Rakison, 2018). The importance of fiction to the genuine jeopardy of geopolitics was clear in an event marking the hundredth anniversary of the birth (in 1908) of an author who lived until only the age of 56, an Imperial War Museum exhibition on the fictional Bond and the real-life Fleming (Burns, 2008). Some intelligence agencies are systematic in their attempts to comment on writing of all sorts that centres on security. Their interests extend to academic analyses of real-life geopolitical contexts as well as the fictional constructions of prose; the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) interest in the narratives of power made by the American sociologist C. Wright Mills is a good exemplar (Alarcón, 2017). The Church Committee had similarly identified widespread security and interest of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and FBI on campus, both within and far beyond the borders of the United States (Church Committee, 1975, 1976). The CIA, for its part, with its own self-declared ‘University’, has long published an ‘Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf ’ to review literature of relevance to the agency (CIA, 2019). From whatever perspective we look, the interface between literature, security and intelligence is rarely incidental. In many cases, books, like other forms of media, have been used as a direct part of ideological and intelligence apparatus, particularly in the history of propaganda, and it is the literary collective as much as particular literary and academic authors who are subjects of security interest, whether the protection of states or political doctrine (Chomsky, 2008; Herman and Chomsky, 1995; Johnson and Parta, 2014; Kind-Kovacs, 2014; Nelson, 2003; Parnica, 2016; Wilkinson, 2009). Books and their authors are often therefore an integral part of the targeted action as perceived physical or ideological threat. Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and Maoist China are important cases here. Indeed, dictatorial regimes the world over have long targeted authors alongside intellectuals who are the first threats to be eliminated or undermined, either through cultural and social exclusion through censorship and imprisonment or through the expedients of execution (Power, 2010). Read, for instance, the chilling double-entendre of Bytwek’s (2004) Bending Spines for an account of how a synthesis of books and brutality were at the root of Nazi and other forms of totalitarianism. To a lesser extent and often more subtly (or covertly), such methods of cultural influence have not been unknown in western democratic states too (Miller Harris, 2016; Reisch, 2013; Risso, 2014; Rockhill, 2014, 2017; Stonor Saunders, 2013; Whitney, 2018; Wilford, 2003, 2009). Literature might here be considered an element of what Nye (2004) conceptualised as ‘soft power’ or the cultural and diplomatic means of influence (Chitty, Ji, Rawnsley and Hayden, 2016). The coordinated use of both soft and hard power is required to effect geopolitical dominance (Coll, 2017; Prados, 2006; Weiner, 2012a, 2012b). While propaganda itself can itself be considered a weapon of war, books and bombshells often share then the same ideological trajectory, one reinforcing or even anticipating the other, most particularly during times of war (Bernays, 2004; Cooke, 2014; Welch, 2015, 2016). It is why Taylor (2003) calls propaganda the ‘munitions of the mind’, and O’Shaughnessy (2005) defines it as a ‘weapon of mass seduction’. The cultural always forms a backdrop to conflict (also O’Shaughnessy, 2017, 2018). Through authorial production, geopolitical impact and academic commentary, literature here permeates the fictionalised and the factual. Beyond mere propaganda, where the lies and 436

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truths of literature have perceived influence over peoples, authors and their writings, they have become integral to colonial and postcolonial narratives and counter-narratives (Arnold, 2009; Bhabha, 2004; Césaire, 2000; Fanon, 2001; Foucault, 2009, 2010; Mishra and Hodge, 2005; Said, 1994; Spivak, 2003, 2012; Thiong’o, 2011). Today, these narratives still matter and can be seen as part of a more subtle (if no less pervasive) sphere of security and intelligence influence into the world of letters, the arts and through these to the Academy (Albert and Buzan, 2011; Bagge Laustsen and Wæver, 2000; Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998; Buzan and Hansen, 2009; also Albert and Buzan, 2011; Buzan and Hansen, 2009; Dunn Cavelty and Balzacq, 2016; Hough, 2014; Stritzel, 2007). The diversification of security and intelligence domains into the cultural and the world of letters make it therefore an integral part of wider ideological and political struggles. Modern security and intelligence theorists have long-known that books – and in the widest sense, narrative – can subvert governments or uphold them, defend or embolden beliefs and values, or further their collapse (Berger, 2016; Croft and Moore, 2010; Glazzard, 2017; Karolides, Bald and Sova, 2011). The twentieth century was the era, however, when such means of cultural persuasion came of age (Welch, 2015). It was, not surprisingly, when security and intelligence agencies also came of age (Aldrich, 2010; Andrew, 2010, 2018; Jeffery, 2011; Weiner, 2012a, 2012b). In no small measure due to the emergence, too, of the means of mass communication for the purposes of persuasion, lesser told is the story of the many organised, strategic encounters of literature and culture with the sources of security, intelligence and power. The chapter here examines these twentieth-century backgrounds to state-organised,­ ­security-focused and intelligence-inclined uses of literature. Analysing the landscape of lies and dissembling that have cut vast swathes through the land of letters, it outlines a complex entanglement of the arts and the Academy through the byways of espionage and intrigue, the beginnings of a literary cartography of security and intelligence.

A landscape of lies in the land of letters The organised use of literature, authors and their books for ideological, security and ­intelligence purposes has been a characteristic of democratic and autocratic regimes alike. Exemplars used here demonstrate this premise from twentieth-century Britain (the War Propaganda Bureau), Nazi Germany (the Nazi Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and ­Propaganda), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the Union of Soviet Writers), the United States (the Congress for Cultural Freedom) and Maoist China (the Cultural Revolution).

War Propaganda Bureau Centenary commemorations of the First World War’s close provide additional and inherent justification for this analysis of the political appropriation of writers as educators of a reading public. If, then, Nazi history saw the use of writers as targets for the flames, and developed through the Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda a constructive use for culture in the promotion of ideology, a quarter of a century earlier, at the opening of the First World War, in 1914, at the central location of Buckingham Gate, Wellington House became the centrepiece for literary counter-intelligence and propaganda (a word which did not then have the negative connotations it might have now). Thus, the British Government established its own (and secret) War Propaganda Bureau. This covert literary-governmental initiative would thereby provide a direct political role for many writers of note to contribute 437

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covertly to the war effort. The list of authors is impressive. Some of the most popular authors of the time worked for the newly formed War Propaganda Bureau: Arnold Bennett, G.K. Chesterton, Arthur Conan Doyle, John Galsworthy, Thomas Hardy, Rudyard Kipling, Ford Maddox Ford, John Mansfield, G.M. Trevelyan and H.G. Wells (Adamson, 2003; ­Malvern, 2004; Messenger, 1992; Taylor, 1999). On discovering that the Germans had a similar bureaucratic-political role for writers, then Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George had thus called on Britain’s leading literary talents to promote the national interest. Their anonymised pamphlets – the Bureau was a secret literary organ of Government established only five years after the 1909 formation of MI5 and MI6 – were influential reports, most notably the 1915 Report on Alleged German Outrages, or the Bryce Committee Report named after James Bryce, the Committee Chair. The Bryce Report did more than any other single work to galvanise the sense of patriotic justification for the War in the public consciousness. Its objectives were also directed to garnering support across the British Empire and to other overseas territories, unifying in some senses then home-front and foreign policy through literary-political efforts. Led by Charles Masterman, the War Propaganda Bureau’s targeted objectives were also politically directed towards British Allies like America, succeeding eventually in gaining United States’ entry into the First World War. These were no small efforts. The 1915 Report of the Bureau declared that it had published over two and a half million booklets, in seventeen languages; by 1916, these numbers had risen to seven million documents. Despite this, there was a recognised lack of coordination in the Bureau, crossing as it did the responsibilities of other Departments of State, with the War Propaganda Bureau being subsumed into the Foreign Office and then, by 1917, having activities managed under the auspices of the new Ministry of Information. The latter was placed for a short while under the directorship of the famous author of the Thirty-Nine Steps John Buchan, with Buchan answering directly to the Prime Minister. Prose, polemic and propaganda seamlessly met here in a role of public political education. Until its closure at the end of 1918, the Ministry of Information, for a while under a collaborative team which included not only Masterman and Buchan but the newspaper magnate Lord Beaverbrook (Buchan, 2019; Sanders, 1975). The political appropriation of writers for security and intelligence purposes would continue in manifold, less structured ways. The joint authorial and espionage endeavours of Graham Greene (Sherry, 2004) and John Le Carré (2018) are well-known Frederick Forsyth’s (2016), only recently made public by the latter’s autobiography. All cases illustrate a fictional-factual interface and reveal a curious intertextual imbalance: each of these politically engaged authors arguably had more impact on public consciousness through their imaginative writings than by any of their covert intelligence activities. The stories behind some covertly appropriated authors are far less widely known. Thus, contemporaneous to the War Propaganda Bureau, and working as a journalist undercover for the ‘Foreign Office’ (a much used cover for Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service) was A ­ rthur Ransome. Later, the author of the renowned children’s book Swallows and Amazons, ­Ransome’s foreign missions took him most frequently to Russia before, during and after the Revolution which led to Britain’s one-time allies to withdraw from the First World War. Reporting on the Russian Revolution and its aftermath, Ransome was trusted and on close terms with Lenin and Trotsky. With communist sympathies which made him at times suspect by the British authorities who had sent him to spy, Ransome’s real-life journalism conjointly undertaken with British Secret Intelligence Service liaisons were as intriguing as any fictions of Greene, Kipling or Le Carré (Chambers, 2010; from the same period, see also Lockhart, 2011). 438

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The Nazi Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda The burning of books might seem today a peculiar pastime for students and academics. Yet, the Nazi Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, had recognised that without university collaboration the Nazis would be unable to synchronise cultural alignment with the political consciousness and ideology of National Socialism (Longerich, 2016; Thacker, 2010). In the 1920s, Goebbels found a powerful intellectual ally in National Socialist German Students’ Association. Such alliances presaged the highly coordinated book burning across German university cities in May 1933. Indeed, archival evidence showed, almost in the manner of peer review, that professors and students worked together to assess which books in their libraries could be categorised as ‘un-German’ and thus fit for the flames (Adamson, 2003; USHMM, 2019). There had been notable nineteenth-century precedence for German university involvement in book burning, as the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum highlights in discussion of events surrounding the tercentennial commemoration in 1817 to mark Martin Luther’s posting of his Ninety-five Theses in 1517. Part of that Reformation-defining move protested against papal authority which in previous centuries had ordered through the Inquisition not simply the burning of heretical works but the burning of their authors. The 1817 book burnings were the part of the political efforts of students to work for a unified Germany through the targeting of literature deemed against this national ­Germanic spirit. In 1933, the Nazi German Student Association’s Main Office for Press and Propaganda similarly called for ‘Action against the Un-German Spirit’: On April 8 [1933] the students’ association…drafted its twelve ‘theses’ – a deliberate evocation of Martin Luther’s 95 Theses: declarations which described the fundamentals of a ‘pure’ national language and culture. Placards publicized the theses, which attacked ‘Jewish intellectualism’, asserted the need to ‘purify’ the German language and literature, and demanded that universities be centers of German nationalism. The students described the ‘action’ as a response to a worldwide Jewish ‘smear campaign’ against Germany and an affirmation of traditional German values (USHMM, 2019). On 10 May 1933, and on other occasions in June of that year, it is estimated that in the r­ egion of 25,000 ‘un-German’ books were burnt. On the most intense day of book ­burning – 10  May  – Joseph Goebbels delivered an address at Berlin’s Opernplatz to an audience of 40,000 declaiming the ‘decadence and moral corruption’ of ‘un-German’ and Jewish authors. The literary-political adversaries of Nationalism Socialism ranged widely, from ­Communist sympathising socialists such as Bertolt Brecht and August Babel, to Karl Marx himself, but also included noted, and perceived to be decadent authors such as the Americans Ernest Hemingway, Jack London, Theodore Dreiser and perhaps surprisingly Helen Keller, the latter for her support of peace, social justice and workers’ rights. Those authors either supportive of the Weimar Republic or critical of fascism were also set to the flames, including Thomas Mann, the 1929 Nobel Prize Laureate in Literature. Erich Maria Remarque’s defining autobiographical war novel All Quiet on the Western Front, drawn from Remarque’s own experiences in the Trenches, was denounced as anti-German and pacifistic as ‘a literary betrayal of the soldiers of the World War’ (USHMM, 2019). Authors with Jewish heritage, however, outnumbered all others in the flames, and included literary celebrities of their day such as Max Brod and Stefan Zweig, many of whose lives were directly impacted by the Holocaust. Thus, as has often been remarked, Heinrich 439

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Heine’s prescient lines from his 1821 play Almansor read now as prophetic: ‘Where they have burned books, they will end in burning human beings’. There is some terrible irony that Heine’s own works were themselves burnt in the fires of 1933. These book burnings provide not only merely a precedence for the events of 1933 but in a sense an anticipation of now often remarked commentary on the shift towards nationalism across Europe, and forms of extremism, including resurgences of the Neo-Nazism and the Far Right about which commentators have drawn obvious parallels. Joseph Goebbels, Nazi Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, recognised, as Adolf Hitler had in Mein Kampf, that ideology drives all militarism (O’Shaughnessy, 2016). Under the banner of Total War, books would play a critical role in the formation of the Third Reich. Indeed, there are few totalitarian regimes where a book, here Mein Kampf, would be the centre-point for a movement and a state (Bachrach and Luckert, 2009). The person of Hitler as an author on propaganda and a political strategist who knew the ultimate power of persuasion would help self-create his own myth of the Fuhrer (Kershaw, 2001). Mein Kampf and its author incorporated the epicentre of Nazi ideology, and by active measures placed all other works in opposition to ‘un-German’ culture to the ideological periphery and the flames. Winning hearts and minds was the preamble to war (Evans, 2006). Fire was to be preparatory to physical persecution, the cleansing of literature and culture. The ‘fire oath’ was thus the symbolic passion of Joseph Goebbels’ Opernplatz’s speech ­denouncing ‘decadence and moral corruption’, affirming ‘decency and morality in family and state’. Books consigned to the flames in May and subsequent summer months of 1933 were diverse, Jewish authors foremost but also including any deemed ‘un-German’. The peer-­review effort to find and expunge university libraries of such works represented a concerted effort by both students and professors (Adamson, 2003; USHMM, 2019). The removal of these sources of influence which accounted for the Reich’s rise also led to its downfall, while after the Second World War culture and education (at all levels, formal and informal), too, became the basis for ‘de-­Nazification’ (Shirer, 1991; Taylor, 2012).

The Union of Soviet Writers In post-Revolutionary Russia, Trotsky’s (2005 [1924]) Literature and Revolution defined the role of authors in revolutionary struggle: ‘the development of art is the highest test of the ­v itality and significance of each epoch’ (Trotsky, 1924). For Trotsky, ‘fictional narrative’ could not be read ‘apart from the social and historical reality represented in such literary texts’. If Trotsky fundamentally disagreed with the Formalist priority of artistic form over sociohistorical content and context, he did recognise that ‘…one cannot always go by the principles of Marxism in deciding whether to reject or to accept a work of art’: ‘A work of art should, in the first place, be judged by its own law, that is, by the law of art’ (Trotsky, 1924). However, he states, ‘Marxism alone can explain why and how a given tendency in art has originated in a given period of history; in other words, who it was who made a demand for such an artistic form and not for another, and why’ (Trotsky, 1924). Keach (2005) describes ‘Trotsky’s optimism about the future of art and culture’ retaining an unbreakable sense of ‘where human history is headed’: ‘It grows out of that tenacious honesty about cultural accomplishment and political struggle that often seems to contradict his exuberant belief in the possibilities of socialist art, but is actually its precondition’ (Trotsky, 1924). Thus, for example: To speak of the bourgeois character of that literature which we call non-October, does not therefore necessarily mean to slander the poets who are supposedly serving art and 440

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not the bourgeoisie. For where is it written that it is impossible to serve the bourgeoisie by means of art? Just as geologic landslides reveal the deposits of earth layers, so do social landslides reveal the class character of art. Non-October art is struck by a deathly impotence for the very reason that death has struck those classes to which it was tied by its whole past. Without the bourgeois landholding system and its customs, without the subtle suggestions of the estate and of the salon, this art sees no meaning in life, withers, becomes moribund, and is reduced to nothing (Trotsky, 1924). The All-Russian Association of Proletarian Writers had been a critical vehicle for the achievement of these goals. In 1932, the Union of Soviet Writers, by diktat of the C ­ entral Committee of the Communist Party, consolidated these literary-political purposes by ­promoting social realism as defining of anti-imperialist literature (Figes, 2003; Garrard and Garrard, 1990; Matlock, 1956). Andrei Zhdanov, a close ally of Stalin, a founder of the Union of Soviet Writers’ and amongst the Soviet’s Union’s most influential cultural figures, relayed a message from Josef Stalin to the inaugural, 1934, Congress: that not only writers but all artists are to be ‘engineers of the human soul’ (Figes, 2003). This became the pervading and enduring message, one which still resonates today. With the Congress debate on socialist realism and modernism, the literature of modernity becomes integral to the history of totalitarianism (Adamson, 2003). Maxim Gorky, Karl Radek, Bukharin, Zhdanov himself, spoke. Zhdanov lectured on ‘Soviet Literature – Richest in Ideas, Most Advanced ­Literature’, Gorky on ‘Soviet Literature’, Radek on ‘Contemporary World Literature and the Tasks of Proletarian Art’. Resolutions followed. Those outside the pale of ‘socialist realism’ were denounced as ‘social fascists’, and this ­political-aesthetic came to dominate arts policy in the Soviet Union until the end of the Cold War, the arts and literature became points of obvious cultural as well as political ­resistance. The most famous cases were those of Boris Pasternak, author of Doctor Zhivago, whom the Soviets had renounce his Nobel Prize in Literature, and Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, another ­m ajor Russian writer, forced into exile. Zhdanovism came to mean the alignment of artists and writers to the Communist Party line in politics and in aesthetics (MOL, 2019). The ‘Resolution on the Report of Maxim Gorky … and the Report on the Literature of the National Republics’, adopted at the Morning Session on August 23, 1934, stated: … the First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers places on record that, as a result of the victorious building of socialism and the ‘rout of the class enemies of the proletariat and toilers of the U.S.S.R, the Soviet literature of the peoples of the Soviet Union has grown into a mighty force for socialist culture and for the education of the toiling masses in the spirit of socialism. Under the leadership of the heroic Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with Comrade Stalin at its head, and thanks to the Party’s daily help, the writers of all peoples of the U.S.S.R. have come to their first congress as a collective body, which, in its ideas, organization and creative work, has rallied around the Party and the Soviet power into a single union of Soviet writers (MOL 2019). The Congress noted the outstanding part taken in these endeavours by the great proletarian writer, Maxim Gorky, through enabling ‘measures for aiding Soviet writers in their creative work, for helping young writers and strengthening the tie between the writers and the toiling masses, so that the whole activity of the Union of Soviet Writers may secure a further growth of creative work in all spheres of Soviet literature and the creation of works of high quality, infused with the spirit of socialism’. 441

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The ‘Resolution on the Report of Karl Radek on International Literature’, adopted at the same Morning Session of August 26, 1934, stated: …despite the cruel repressions that are meted out to the working class and toiling intelligentsia of foreign countries by the ruling capitalist class; despite the orgy of fascism and bloody reaction; despite the fact that a number of the best representatives of revolutionary literature are incarcerated in fascist jails and are being subjected to direct physical destruction, the forces of revolutionary literature are growing just as are the forces of the working class, and its militant voice resounds ever more loudly, rousing the oppressed masses to struggle against capitalist slavery’ (MOL 2019). Here, the Congress called upon ‘its brothers, the revolutionary writers of the whole world, to fight with all the force of the writer’s pen against capitalist oppression, fascist barbarism, colonial slavery, against the preparations for new imperialist wars, in defence of the U.S.S.R. – the fatherland of toiling humanity’ (MOL, 2019). In the context of global literature, the ‘tremendous cultural force’ of Soviet writing had become ‘a literature of all peoples, a literature which expresses the great work of the toiling masses of the Soviet Union in creating a new, socialist system-our writers have traversed a glorious path’, convincing in so doing ‘the best representatives of literature abroad that literature and art cannot really flourish except where socialism is victorious’. The Congress, ‘firmly convinced that the future belongs to international revolutionary literature’ because of its integral connection to ‘the struggle of the working class for the liberation of all mankind’, the gathering itself was genuinely international. Foreign writers who had spoken were listed as: Comrades Martin Andersen Nexö, André Malraux, Jean-Richard Bloch, Yakub Kadri, Willi Bredel, Theodor Plivier, Hu Lan-chi, Louis Aragon, Johannes Becher and Annabel Williams Ellis. Non-attending writers with sympathies to this Soviet ­literary path were listed too, the Congress sent ‘fraternal greetings to Romain Rolland, André Gide, Henri Barbusse, Bernard Shaw, Theodore Dreiser, Upton Sinclair, Heinrich Mann and Li Sing’ as ‘courageously fulfilling their noble duty as the best friends of toiling humanity’.

The Congress for Cultural Freedom During the Cold War, the United States’ (newly created 1947) CIA knew from the outset the importance of academics in the war of ideas by recruiting from the Ivy League universities, as well as a continued interest in the campus more generally (Weiner, 2012a; Witanek, 1989; Winks, 1987; Zwerling, 2011). The CIA’s own open access but still redacted account of ­the Congress Congress for Cultural Freedom shows how, within two years of its formation, the CIA poured untold hundreds of millions of dollars into winning what came to be known as the Cultural Cold War, including covert collaborations with writers, philosophers and academics (Miller Harris, 2016; Reisch, 2013; Risso, 2014; Rockhill, 2014, 2017; Stonor Saunders, 2013; Weinberg, 2017; Whitney, 2018). One of the CIA’s most notable achievements was the now well-­documented involvement in the publication of Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago (Finn and Couvee, 2015). The CIA narrates the centrepiece of this involvement in detail from still partly classified files on the origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom. The Congress was a meeting of significant, ant-Communist intellectuals, including some notable writers, in June 1950 in the strategically significant location of West Berlin, Berlin then still being a very much divided city between Soviet Occupied East and West, the border of which provided many a scene from espionage fiction, including the iconic opening pages of The Spy Who came in from the 442

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Cold. Anti-Soviet sentiment was made real by the visceral impacts of the Occupation. Though the Berlin Wall would not be constructed for another decade (and is the defining architecture of le Carré’s novel), anti-Communist sentiment was heightened by the fact that the day before the Congress for Cultural Freedom opened Communist North Korea had just invaded South Korea. The abiding intention of the Congress was to counter the notion that – as we have seen from extracts of the inaugural Congress of the Soviet Writers Union – Communism was more congenial to literature and the arts than the bourgeois West. In political, that is CIA, terms, the Berlin conference ‘helped to solidify CIA’s emerging strategy of promoting the non-Communist left – the strategy that would soon become the theoretical foundation of the Agency’s political operations against Communism over the next two decades’. The immediate motivation for founding the Congress came from an event hosted just over a year earlier in March 1949 at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York. The CIA is less than impressed by the anti-American sentiments expressed there, and the ironies border on the offensive: In March 1949, New York’s Waldorf-Astoria Hotel played host to one of the strangest gatherings in American history. Less than four years after Allied troops had liberated Hitler’s concentration camps, 800 prominent literary and artistic figures congregated in the Waldorf to call for peace at any price with Stalin, whose own gulag had just been restocked with victims of his latest purge. Americans, including Lillian Hellman, Aaron Copland, Arthur Miller, and a young Norman Mailer, joined with European and Soviet delegates to repudiate ‘US warmongering’. The Waldorf event had been part of a broader political initiative which ran in conjunction with the Union of Soviet Writers, the 1948-formed but short-lived Communist Information Bureau or Cominform, established as the Cold War began to help shape western opinion by what would today be called soft power. The philosophy professor Sydney Hook of New York University was a leading mover in the Berlin Congress, a decade earlier he and the famous American philosopher and educationalist John Dewey had formed Committee for Cultural Freedom, which attacked both Communism and Nazism. Hook had also established Americans for Intellectual Freedom who attended and (at least intellectually) harassed speakers at the Waldorf event. Seeing the success of this move, in Washington Frank Wisner, later CIA Director, led the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). The Department of State was drawn in and plans were drawn up. This sort of procedure, and the covert funding which went with it, has already begun in the aftermath of the Second World War with the OPC funding bodies such as the National Committee for Free Europe (Kádár Lynn, 2013; Parnica, 2016). Reactions in the US Government to the Berlin conference initially ranged from pleased to ecstatic. Wisner offered his ‘heartiest congratulations’ to all involved. OPC’s political sponsors were also gratified. Defense Department representative Gen. John Magruder deemed it ‘a subtle covert operation carried out on the highest intellectual level’ and ‘unconventional warfare at its best’ in a memo to Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson (Warner, 2008). There was little covert about the enactment of arguably the most systematic use of culture for the determination of ideological purity and state security in modern history, though its origins are a masterclass in political deception. 443

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The Cultural Revolution China’s Cultural Revolution has its most accepted point of direct origin during the 1950s when Chairman Mao – following the death of Stalin and noting Khrushchev’s criticism of his former leader – encouraged open critique of the Communist Party, to ‘let a thousand flowers bloom’, an adaptation of a Chinese poem which encouraged the blooming of ‘a thousand schools of thought’. Mao Zedong encouraged critics and then ‘betrayed them just when their advice might have prevented a calamity’ (King, 2012). Mao’s idea was pronounced in his speech before the Supreme State Conference, seeming to free intellectuals and artists so long as they did not engage in ‘destructive acts’, a speech in which even directly reference Hu Feng, a Chinese writer detained for dissent in 1955 for accusing Mao of instigating the political manipulation of the arts: Among these hundred flowers blooming forth there are…all kinds of different flowers. They include flowers of different types. For example, among the hundred schools contending, idealism is present. Let a hundred flowers bloom. It may be that Hu Feng is locked up in his cell, but his spirit still roams the country, and we might still see some more works like his appear. It is all right if you don’t engage in destructive acts. What was it about Hu Feng? He organized a secret group; and that was something he should not have done. If only he had not organized a secret group…. What do a few flowers matter in a land of our size – nine million square kilometers? What’s so upsetting about a few flowers? Let them bloom for people to look at, and perhaps criticize. Let them say, ‘I don’t like those flowers of yours!’ By 1957, a trickle of criticism had become a flood and Mao had had enough. His ire was particularly evident in a ‘democratic wall’ erected at Beijing University with c­ ounter-revolutionary posters declaring the incompatibility of communism and freedom in the arts and intellectual life (Fürst, Pons and Selden, 2017). Once the flood of criticism was forthcoming, dissenters were exposed; many were imprisoned in re-education camps or executed in what Brown (2004) has described as a functional interface of language, power and violence. The ‘thousand flowers’ moment though, as did the Cultural Revolution, have its origins earlier (Bridgham, 2009a, 2009b). As Dikötter (2017) argues, as early as 1942, ‘Mao had brushed aside the idea that art could exist for arts’ sake’ (Dikötter, 2017: 27). Dikötter gives the story of Liang Shuming. Shuming was a thinker appointed to an appointment in philosophy in Peking University. In a 1938 visit to Yan’an presented the Chairman of the ­Communist Party with one of his books, flattering Mao and garnering the latter’s soon to be short-lived favour when, after the Communist Party takeover of China, Shuming had (across 1952–1953) dared to criticise the consequences of land reform. Mao subsequently wrote a pithy denunciation of Shuming: ‘There are two ways of killing people: one is to kill with the gun and the other with the pen. The way which is most artfully disguised and draws no blood is to kill with the pen. This is the kind of murderer you are’ (Dikötter, 2017: 29). As Dikötter dramatically states: ‘Thought was written out of the Constitution’ (Dikötter, 2017: 30). Kang Shen is another important exemplar. Trained in Moscow by Nicolai Yezhov, NKVD head of secret police, where he collaborated in Stalin’s 1934 purges of Chinese students, Shen was sent to Yan’an by Stalin where Kang Shen befriended Mao and became responsible for the brutalisation and suppression of intellectuals, until his removal from a role he apparently took to lengths too extreme then even for the Party. Although like Stalin Mao felt a personal as well as political suspicion of intellectuals, he kept some like Kang Shen on board. At the 444

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1956 Eighth Party Congress, responding to discussion around the publication of a suspect historical novel, Kang Shen handed Mao a short note which Mao subsequently read to the Congress: ‘Using novels to carry out anti-party activities is a great invention’ (Dikötter, 2017: 30). As in Stalin’s case with the Union of Soviet Writers, suspicion of independent intellectual thinking elided into disparagement of wayward literary outputs. Mao would also recognise that two could play at that game, later clearly echoing Shen: ‘Writing novels is popular these days, isn’t it? The use of novels for anti-Party activity is a great invention. Anyone wanting to overthrow a political regime must create public opinion and do some preparatory ideological work. This applies to counter-revolutionary as well as revolutionary classes’ (Dikötter, 2017: 30). A decade later, the most organised and systematic political repression of artistic and intellectual life in modern history was to ensue, a movement which came to be known as the Cultural Revolution (Dikötter, 2017). Preceding the Cultural Revolution, Mao had already appointed a Group of Five in charge of purifying literature, the arts and culture in July 1964. The consequences of the all-out assault on the arts, intellectuals, the culture of universities brought on by the pursuit of ideological purity was far-reaching and costly in economic and human terms, with conservative estimates suggesting over a million dead. Its consequences were acknowledged in the aftermath of Mao’s death by the new leadership: In 1979, three years after the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the ­Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping visited the United States. At a state banquet, he was seated near the actress Shirley MacLaine, who told Deng how impressed she had been on a trip to China some years earlier. She recalled her conversation with a scientist who said that he was grateful to Mao Zedong for removing him from his campus and sending him, as Mao did with millions of other intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution, to toil on a farm. Deng replied, ‘He was lying’. Today, of all the historical contexts considered in this chapter, the one relating to Mao’s legacy is perhaps still most directly alive: …in recent years, individuals have tried to reckon with the history and their roles in it. In January, 2014, alumni of the Experimental Middle School of Beijing Normal University apologized to their former teachers for their part in a surge of violence in August, 1966, when Bian Zhongyun, the deputy principal, was beaten to death. But such gestures are rare, and outsiders often find it hard to understand why survivors of the Cultural Revolution are loath to revisit an experience that shaped their lives so profoundly. One explanation is that the events of that period were so convoluted that many people feel the dual burdens of being both perpetrators and victims (Osnos, 2016). The new China under Xi Jinping bears little comparison to the China of Mao; despite the widespread allegations of political repression and freedom of expression, to make a shorthand comparison is, as Osnos writes, to ‘run the risk of relieving the Cultural Revolution of its full horror’. Yet: …there are deeper parallels between this moment in China and the time in which Xi came of age, as a teenager in the Cultural Revolution, which illuminate just how enduring some of the features of Mao’s Leninist system have proved to be. Xi, in his constant moves to identify enemies and eliminate them, has revived the question that Lenin 445

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considered the most important of all: ‘Kto, Kovo?’ – ‘Who, whom?’ In other words, in every interaction, the question that matters is which force wins and which force loses. Mao and his generation, who grew up amid scarcity, saw no room for power-sharing or for pluralism; he called for ‘drawing a clear distinction between us and the enemy’. ‘Who are our enemies? Who are our friends?’ This, Mao said, was ‘a question of first importance for the revolution’. China today, in many respects, bears little comparison with the world that Mao inhabited, but on that question Xi Jinping is true to his roots (Osnos, 2016). Continued, contested new narratives of threat thus colour China’s internal as well as international relations, with China here asserting an economic and political influence which had yearned for and never received either from its Stalinist neighbour or the ‘imperialist’ West focused on the Soviet Union.

Conclusion In general terms, such instances of the security and intelligence uses of literature give some empirical justification to the framings of cultural theorists on the close and controlling interplay of politics and aesthetics (Adorno, Benjamin, Bloch, Brecht and Lukacs, 2007). Jameson had described these uses of literary and other forms of arts culture as a ‘political unconscious’ ( Jameson, 2002). This chapter might also be placed into the wider domain of discussions of literature and the humanities in democracies which have of late become very much in vogue (Levenson, 2017; Nussbaum, 1997, 2012; Small, 2013). There is a wider literature, too, of significance, that on communication and coercion, of opinion and influence in democracies which dates to Walter Lippmann’s (1922) Public Opinion (Trudel, 2017). At the dawn of an era of coercion and propaganda, in 1922, Lippmann had perceptively written: ‘…the stereotyped shapes lent to the world come not merely from art, in the sense of painting and sculpture and literature, but from our moral codes and our social philosophies and our political agitations…’ (Lippmann, 1922; Illing, 2018). At the time, the era of mass communication seemed only to be opening its horizons: Since Public Opinion is supposed to be the prime mover in democracies, one might reasonably expect to find a vast literature. One does not find it. There are excellent books on government and parties, that is, on the machinery which in theory registers public opinions after they are formed. But on the sources from which these public opinions arise, on the processes by which they are derived, there is relatively little. The existence of a force called Public Opinion is in the main taken for granted, and American political writers have been most interested either in finding out how to make government express the common will, or in how to prevent the common will from subverting the purposes for which they believe the government exists ­( Lipmann, 1922). Today, as has been shown, the literature is wider and deeper. We know that across all ­societies – open and autocratic – it is narrative in the widest sense of story which makes sense of and cements social bonds, as well as disrupts them. In various guises, it is a story – the lies of fiction and dissembling of ideology – which delivers the narrative threat of nations. It is a story which provides warning and undergirds the demands of survival. In an era of globalisation, literature, too, transcends national borders and still conveys the narrative of threat. As 446

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an important member of the United States’ Committee on Public Information during the First World War, Lippmann’s work has resonances with Britain’s War Propaganda Bureau, and influenced his thinking on public opinion (which in broad terms he held in low regard for its malleable nature) (Steel, 1999). Lippmann is arguably, too, a precursor to the sorts of mind-sets seen in the case studies outlined in this chapter. In our narrower terms, though, and drawing on the provided exemplars – the War Propaganda Bureau; the Nazi Ministry for Propaganda; the Union of Soviet Writers; the Cultural Revolution; the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Cultural Revolution – one notable feature of this literary cartography of security and intelligence are clearly distinctive types of literary-operational workings amongst different types of governments, ideologies and societies. Those of the latter which are politically open and democratic have used literature and literary organisations in covert ways; whereas governments, ideologies and societies which are autocratic, dictatorial and culturally closed have used literature and literary organisations in overt ways. Both politically open and politically closed societies also use a blend of covert and overt operational methods in the use of literature for security and intelligence purposes. The growing autonomy of security and intelligence agencies came to be recognised through their evidently emergent influence in global political life. A conscious statement of this is made by John le Carré in The Pigeon Tunnel when he claims that the United States ‘has delegated great swathes of its own foreign policy to its spies’. Foreign policy influence is one thing, but there are, we have shown, diverse spheres, too, of cultural production, consumption and commentary in which writers have themselves played a conscious or unconscious, overt or covert, and, in the round, considerable influence. The lies of literature and the dissembling of espionage seem still to have some current-day relevance. How security and intelligence purposes are represented in the fiction of your allies is also deemed of present-day importance. A Chief of the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service, Sir Alex Younger (2017), thus singled out ‘the merits of what he considered to be appropriate characters in fiction’: ‘… I should make it clear that, despite bridling at the implication of a moral equivalence between us and our opponents that runs through novels, I’ll take the quiet courage and integrity of George Smiley over the brash antics of 007, any day’. On spy literature, he said: We have attracted some great writers; some have become famous, many more have set aside their vocation and remained in the Service. Some of the operational correspondence I have seen during my career would grace many an anthology were it not for its classification. Spy fiction here seems to have some, if qualified, uses in the real world of espionage: Despite inevitable tensions between the secret and published world, the relationship has generally been of mutual benefit. Literature gains an edgy genre. We are painted in the minds of a global audience as some form of ubiquitous intelligence presence. This can be quite a force multiplier, even if it means we are blamed for an astonishing range of phenomena in which we have no involvement at all (Younger, 2017). ‘It is a reminder’, suggests Ewen MacAskill (2017), ‘if ever one was needed, of how good fiction can question the way that governments work’. Analyses of this sort tend, however, to neglect the way fictions can assist governments and have done so across regimes which are open as well as autocratic. 447

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A landscape of lies in the land of letters Taylor, P.M. (1999) British Propaganda in the 20th Century. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Taylor, P.M. (2003) Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Era. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Taylor, F. (2012) Exorcising Hitler: The Occupation and Denazification of Germany. London: Bloomsbury. Thacker, T. (2010) Joseph Goebbels: Life and Death. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Thiong’o, N.wa (2011) Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature. London: Heinemann. Trotsky, L. (1924) Literature and revolution. Marxists.org, www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1924/ lit_revo/ Trudel, D. (2017) Revisiting the Origins of Communication Research: Walter Lippmann’s WWII Adventure in Propaganda and Psychological Warfare. International Journal of Communication, 11, 3721–3739. USHMM (2019) United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, www.ushmm.org/ Warner, M. (2008) Cultural cold war: Origins of the congress for cultural freedom, 1949–1950. CIA Library, www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol38no5/pdf/ v38i5a10p.pdf Weiner, T. (2012a) Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. London: Penguin. Weiner, T. (2012b) Enemies: A History of the FBI. London: Penguin. Welch, D. (2016) Persuading the People: British Propaganda in World War II. London: The British Library. Welch, D. (ed.) (2015) Propaganda, Power and Persuasion. London: British Library. Whitney, J. (2018) Finks: How the C.I.A. Tricked the World’s Best Writers. Berkeley, CA: OR Press. Wilford, H. (2003) Calling the Tune? The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War. London: Frank Cass. Wilford, H. (2009) The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wilkinson, N. (2009) Secrecy and the Media: The Official History of the United Kingdom’s D-Notice System: The Official History of the D-notice System. London: Routledge. Winks, R.W. (1987) Cloak and Gown, Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1961. New York: William ­Morrow and Company, Inc. Witanek, R. (1989) The CIA on Campus. Covert Action Information Bulletin 31, Winter, 25–28, https:// archive.org/details/DomesticSurveillanceCovertActionInformationBulletinNo.31 Younger, Sir A. (2017) MI6 boss: George Smiley a better role model for agents than James Bond: Sir Alex Younger, known in agency circles as C, says 007’s ‘brash antics’ give a misleading portrayal of life in the service. The Guardian, www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/sep/28/ mi6-boss-george-smiley-better-role-model-agents-james-bond Zwerling, P. (ed.) (2011) The CIA on Campus: Essays on Academic Freedom and the National Security State. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.

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SUPPLEMENTARY National security and intelligence – outreach, commentary, critique: a global survey of official, policy and academic sources Liam Francis Gearon

Introduction This Supplementary provides a sample global survey of national security and intelligence agency outreach, commentary and critique. Each short entry demonstrates to varying degrees elements of the four domains discussed in Chapter 1: the operational (degrees of openness and accountability); the epistemological (the extent and focus on forms of security intelligence gathered); the ethical (consciousness of operational compliance with legal and state/international laws); and the existential (including statement of current threat, threat prioritisation and the anticipation of future internal/national, regional and global threats). Publicly facing national security and intelligence information (and the extent to which this is available as an open source) demonstrates public outreach of which universities are a high priority across all four domains. Such public security and intelligence outreach is a­ pparent within established as well as emergent democracies. Where public outreach is open and transparent (at least publicly advertised through online sites), universities feature e­ specially strongly across many security and intelligence agencies in contributing to the ­operational and epistemological domains. On the operational domain, this is evident through recruitment outreach to graduates and postgraduates in terms of career opportunities within ­security and intelligence agencies. On the operational and epistemological domain, universities also feature particularly strongly across the agencies in identifying related recruitment needs in knowledge terms for cross-disciplinary academic and research expertise. In turn, in addition to outreach, both official/governmental security and intelligence sources as well as universities, research establishments and think tanks provide analysis, ­commentary and critique on security and intelligence matters. These principles of practical interconnection are demonstrated in this Supplementary by direct citations from a global sample of official, policy and academic sources. The methodology of sample selection is based on three categories: 1 Official – governmental sources of outreach on security and intelligence. 2 Policy – Policy, think tank and journalistic analysis, commentary and critique on ­security and intelligence. 3 Academic – analysis, commentary and critique on security and intelligence. 453

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Information samples of relevant material have been selected using the latter threefold set of – official, policy and academic – publicly available open sources: 1 Official governmental sources of outreach on security and intelligence. 2 Policy analysis, commentary and critique on security and intelligence from selected sources of public sector expertise: i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix x xi xii xiii xiv xv xvi xvii xviii xix xx xxi xxii xxiii xxiv xxv xxvi xxvii xxviii xxix xxx xxxi xxxii xxxiii xxxiv xxxv xxxvi xxxvii xxxviii xxxix xl xli xlii

Africa Intelligence Amnesty International Assassination Archives and Research Center (AARC) BBC Country Profiles Bodleian Library Oxford British Library Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Center for Strategic and International Studies Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs CIA World Factbook Columbia Gazeteer of the World Congressional Research Service DCAF’s International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) Europa World Plus European Council on Foreign Affairs European Network of National Intelligence Reviewers (ENNIR) Federation of American Scientists Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Global Security.org Hoover Institution Human Rights Watch IHS Jane’s Imperial War Museum London International Association of Intelligence Education Jamestown Foundation Library of Congress National Security Archive National Security, Espionage, and Intelligence in American History NATO Watch Country Profiles Oxford Constitutions of the World Peace Research Institute Oslo Political Risk Yearbook Public Intelligence Rand Corporation Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) Russia International Affairs Council (RIAC) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) United Kingdom Defence Journal United Kingdom Government Foreign and Commonwealth Office United Kingdom National Archives United Nations Content Collection/ Oxford Public International Law United Nations Security Council 454

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xliii xliv xlv

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum United States State Department Background Notes Yale Avalon Project – Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy

3  Academic analysis commentary and critique on security and intelligence from selected book series/journals: i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix x xi xii xiii xiv xv xvi xvii xviii xix xx xxi xxii xxiii xxiv xxv xxvi xxvii

Armed Forces & Society Civil Wars Contemporary Security Policy Defence Studies European Journal of International Security European Security Georgetown Security Studies Review Journal of Intelligence History Harvard International Review Intelligence and National Security International Journal of Conflict and Violence International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs International Security Journal of Conflict Resolution Journal of Global Security Studies Journal of Peace Research Journal of Strategic Studies Routledge Global Security Studies (Routledge book series) Security Dialogue Security Studies Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Studies in Intelligence (CIA site journal) Studies in Intelligence (Routledge book series) Terrorism and Political Violence Washington Quarterly Yale Review of International Studies

National security and intelligence agency – outreach, commentary, critique: a global survey of official, policy and academic sources The Five Eyes: United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The Five Eyes (FVEY) is widely regarded as the world’s most significant intelligence alliance. The origins of it can be traced back to the context of the Second World War and by its necessity of sharing vital information mainly between Britain and the United States, so that both countries could enhance their close war effort. The FVEY was formally founded in the aftermath of the Second World War, through the multilateral agreement for cooperation in signals intelligence (SIGINT), known as the UKUSA Agreement, on 5 March 1946. Initially, compromising only the UK and the United States, it expanded to also include Canada in 1948 and Australia and New Zealand in 1956, all of these last three English-­ speaking countries, members of the Commonwealth of Nations and with similar political 455

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systems when compared to Britain. Thereby, the ‘Five Eyes’ term was created from the lengthy ‘AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/ Eyes Only’ classification level that included the ‘eyes’ that could have access to high-profile papers and information (UKDJ, 2019).

Policy source UKDJ (2019) The Five Eyes: United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-five-eyes-the-intelligence-alliance-of-theanglosphere/

Academic sources Leigh, I. and Wegge, N. (2018) Intelligence Oversight in the Twentieth-First Century: Accountability in a Changing World. London: Routledge. Tossini, J. V. (2017) The Five Eyes – The Intelligence Alliance of the Anglosphere, UK Defence Journal, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-five-eyes-the-intelligence-allianceof-the-anglosphere/

United Kingdom United Kingdom security and intelligence Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) (MI6) At the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) – otherwise known as MI6 – our mission is clear. We work secretly overseas, developing foreign contacts and gathering intelligence that help to make the UK safer and more prosperous. We help the UK identify and exploit opportunities as well as navigate risks to our national security, military effectiveness and economy. We work across the globe to counter terrorism, resolve international conflict and prevent the spread of nuclear and other non-conventional weapons. We are here to help protect the UK’s people, economy and interests (SIS, 2019).

Official source SIS (2019) Secret Intelligence Service, www.sis.gov.uk/

Academic source Jeffery, K (2011) MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1949. London: Penguin.

Security Service (MI5) MI5’s mission is to keep the country safe. For more than a century, we have worked to ­protect our people from danger whether it be from terrorism or damaging espionage by hostile states.

Official source MI5 (2019) www.mi5.gov.uk/ 456

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Academic source Andrew, C. (2010) The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5. London: Penguin.

Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) Employing over 6,000 people from a range of diverse backgrounds, we strive to keep Britain safe and secure by working with our partners in the SIS (MI6) and MI5.

Official source GCHQ (2019) www.gchq.gov.uk/who-we-are

Academic sources Aldrich, R.J. (2010) GCHQ. London: Penguin. Leigh, I. and Wegge, N. (2018) Intelligence Oversight in the Twentieth-First Century: Accountability in a Changing World. London: Routledge.

The United States United States security and intelligence The U.S. Intelligence Community is composed of the following seventeen organisations: Two independent agencies – the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Eight Department of Defense (DoD) elements – the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and intelligence elements of the four DoD ­services; the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. Seven elements of other departments and agencies – the Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence; the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis and U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence; the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Agency’s Office of National ­Security Intelligence; the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Official Source for all summaries which follow: Office of the Director of National ­Intelligence (ODNI, 2019).

Air Force Intelligence The U.S. Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (USAF ISR) enterprise is America’s leading provider of finished intelligence derived from airborne, space and cyberspace sensors. The USAF ISR Enterprise delivers decision advantage in order to enable commanders to achieve kinetic and non-kinetic effects on targets anywhere on the globe in support of national, strategic, operational and tactical requirements. The AF/A2 is the USAF’s Senior Intelligence Officer and is responsible for functional management of all Air Force global integrated ISR capabilities, including oversight of planning, programming and budgeting; developing and implementing the Air Force policies and guidance for 457

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managing Air Force global integrated ISR activities; and professional development, training, education, readiness and deployment of 50,000 military and civilian United States Air Force ­intelligence personnel (ODNI, 2019).

Official source USAF (2019) United States Air Force, www.25af.af.mil/

Army Intelligence U.S. Army Intelligence (G-2) is responsible for policy formulation, planning, programming, budgeting, management, staff supervision, evaluation and oversight for intelligence activities for the Department of the Army. The G-2 is responsible for the overall coordination of the five major military intelligence (MI) disciplines within the Army: Imagery Intelligence, ­Signals Intelligence, Human Intelligence, Measurement and Signature Intelligence, and Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures (ODNI, 2019).

Official source AI (2019) Army Intelligence, www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/

Central Intelligence Agency The CIA is responsible for providing national security intelligence to senior U.S. ­policymakers. The CIA director is nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. The director manages the operations, personnel and budget of the CIA and acts as the National Human Source Intelligence manager. The CIA is separated into seven basic components: Directorate of Analysis, Directorate of Operations, Directorate of Science and Technology, Directorate of Support, Directorate of Digital Innovation, Mission Centers and Offices of the Director. They carry out “the intelligence cycle”, the process of collecting, analysing and disseminating intelligence information to top U.S. government officials (ODNI, 2019).

Official source CIA (2019) Central Intelligence Agency, www.cia.gov/index.html

Coast Guard Intelligence Coast Guard’s broad responsibilities include protecting citizens from the sea (maritime safety), protecting America from threats delivered by the sea (maritime security) and protecting the sea itself (maritime stewardship). The Coast Guard’s persistent presence in the maritime domain, due to its diverse mission sets and broad legal authorities, allows it to fill a unique niche within the Intelligence Community. Because of its unique access, emphasis and expertise in the ­maritime domain, Coast Guard Intelligence can collect and report intelligence that not only supports Coast Guard missions, but also supports national objectives. Coast Guard Intelligence strives to create decision advantage to advance U.S. interests by providing timely, actionable and relevant intelligence to shape Coast Guard operations, planning and decision-making, and to support national and homeland security intelligence requirements (ODNI, 2019). 458

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Official source CIA (2019) Central Intelligence Community, www.cia.gov/index.html

Defense Intelligence Agency The DIA is a Department of Defense Combat Support Agency. With more than 16,500 military and civilian employees worldwide, DIA is a major producer and manager of foreign MI and provides MI to warfighters, defence policymakers and force planners, in the DOD and the Intelligence Community, in support of U.S. military planning and operations and weapon systems acquisition. The DIA director serves as a principal adviser to the secretary of defence and to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters of MI. The director also chairs the Military Intelligence Board, which coordinates activities of the defence ­intelligence community (ODNI, 2019).

Official source DIA (2019) Defence Intelligence Agency, www.uscg.mil/

Department of Energy The U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence is responsible for the intelligence and counterintelligence activities throughout the DOE complex, including nearly thirty intelligence and counterintelligence offices nationwide. The mission is to protect, enable and represent the vast scientific brain trust resident in DOE’s laboratories and plants. The office protects vital national security information and technologies, representing intellectual property of incalculable value, and provides unmatched scientific and technical expertise to the U.S. government to respond to foreign intelligence, terrorist and cyberthreats, to solve the hardest problems associated with U.S. energy security and to address a wide range of other national security issues (ODNI, 2019).

Official source DE (2019) Department of Energy, www.energy.gov/intelligence/office-intelligence-and-counter intelligence

Department of Homeland Security The Office of Intelligence and Analysis is responsible for using information and intelligence from multiple sources to identify and assess current and future threats to the U.S. DHS ­Intelligence focuses on four strategic areas: promote understanding of threats through intelligence analysis; collect information and intelligence pertinent to homeland security; share information necessary for action and manage intelligence for the homeland security enterprise. The Under ­Secretary for I&A also serves as DHS’ chief intelligence officer and is responsible to both the secretary of Homeland Security and the director of National Intelligence (ODNI, 2019).

Official source DHS (2019) Department of Homeland Security, www.dhs.gov/office-intelligence-and-analysis 459

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Department of State The Bureau of Intelligence and Research provides the Secretary of State with timely, objective analysis of global developments as well as real-time insights from all-Source intelligence. It serves as the focal point within the Department of State for all policy issues and activities involving the Intelligence Community. The INR Assistant Secretary reports directly to the Secretary of State and serves as the Secretary’s principal adviser on all intelligence matters. INR’s expert, independent foreign affairs analysts draw on all-Source intelligence, diplomatic reporting, INR’s public opinion polling and interaction with U.S. and foreign scholars. Their strong regional and functional backgrounds allow them to respond rapidly to changing policy priorities and to provide early warning and in-depth analysis of events and trends that affect U.S. foreign policy and national security interests (ODNI, 2019).

Official source DS (2019) Department of State, www.dhs.gov/office-intelligence-and-analysis

Department of the Treasury The Office of Intelligence and Analysis was established by the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal 2004. OIA is responsible for the receipt, analysis, collation and dissemination of foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence information related to the operation and responsibilities of the Department of the Treasury. OIA is a component of the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI). TFI marshals the Department’s intelligence and enforcement functions with the twin aims of safeguarding the financial system against illicit use and combating rogue nations, terrorist facilitators, weapons of mass destruction proliferators, money launderers, drug kingpins and other national security threats (ODNI, 2019).

Official source DT (2019) Department of the Treasury, www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/ offices/Pages/Office-of-Intelligence-Analysis.aspx

Drug Enforcement Administration The Drug Enforcement Administration is responsible for enforcing the controlled substance laws and regulations of the United States. DEA’s Office of National Security Intelligence (ONSI) became a member of the IC in 2006. ONSI facilitates full and appropriate ­intelligence coordination and information sharing with other members of the U.S. Intelligence Community and homeland security elements. Its goal is to enhance the U.S.’s efforts to reduce the supply of drugs, protect national security and combat global terrorism. DEA has twenty-one field divisions in the U.S. and more than eighty offices in more than sixty countries worldwide (ODNI, 2019).

Official source DEA (2019) Drug Enforcement Administration, www.dea.gov/ 460

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Federal Bureau of Investigation The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as an intelligence and law enforcement agency, is responsible for understanding threats to our national security and penetrating national and transnational networks that have a desire and capability to harm the U.S. The Intelligence Branch is the strategic leader of the FBI’s Intelligence Program and drives collaboration to achieve the full integration of intelligence and operations, and it proactively engages with the Bureau’s partners across the intelligence and law enforcement communities. By overseeing intelligence policy and guidance, the Intelligence Branch ensures that the FBI’s intelligence production remains objective and strikes the correct balance between strategic and tactical works (ODNI, 2019).

Official source FBI (2019) Federal Bureau of Intelligence, www.dhs.gov/office-intelligence-and-analysis

Marine Corps Intelligence The U.S. Marine Corps produces tactical and operational intelligence for battlefield support. Its IC component comprises all intelligence professionals in the Marine Corps responsible for policy, plans, programming, budgets and staff supervision of intelligence and supporting activities within the USMC. The department supports the commandant of the Marine Corps in his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, represents the service in Joint and ­Intelligence Community matters, and exercises supervision over the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. The department has service staff responsibility for geospatial intelligence, advanced geospatial intelligence, signals intelligence, human intelligence and counterintelligence, and ensures that there is a single synchronised strategy for the development of the Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise. The Marine Corps’ director of intelligence is the commandant’s principal intelligence staff officer and the functional manager for intelligence, counterintelligence and cryptologic matters (ODNI, 2019).

Official source MCI (2019) Marine Corps Intelligence, www.hqmc.marines.mil/intelligence//

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency provides timely, relevant and accurate geospatial intelligence in support of national security objectives. Information collected and processed by NGA is tailored for customer-specific solutions. By giving customers ready access to geospatial intelligence, NGA provides support to civilian and military leaders and contributes to the state of readiness of U.S. military forces. NGA also contributes to humanitarian efforts such as tracking floods and fires, and in peacekeeping. NGA is a Department of Defense Combat Support Agency. Headquartered in Springfield, VA, NGA operates major facilities in the St. Louis, MO and Washington DC areas. The agency also fields support teams worldwide (ODNI, 2019).

Official source NGIA (2019) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, www.nga.mil/Pages/Default.aspx 461

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National Reconnaissance Office The NRO designs, builds and operates the nation’s reconnaissance satellites. NRO products, provided to an expanding list of customers like the CIA and the DoD, can warn of potential trouble spots around the world, help plan military operations and monitor the environment. As part of the Intelligence Community, the NRO plays a primary role in achieving information superiority for the U.S. Government and Armed Forces. A DOD agency, the NRO is staffed by DOD and CIA personnel. It is funded through the National Reconnaissance Program, part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (ODNI, 2019).

Official source NRO (2019) National Reconnaissance Office, www.nro.gov/

National Security Agency (NSA) The National Security Agency/Central Security Service is the nation’s cryptologic organisation that coordinates, directs and performs highly specialised activities to protect U.S. information systems and to produce foreign signals intelligence information. A high-technology organisation, NSA is at the forefront of communications and information technology. NSA is also one of the most important centres of foreign language analysis and research within the U.S. government and is said to be the largest employer of mathematicians in the United States and perhaps the world. Founded in 1952, NSA is part of the DoD and a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The Agency supports military customers, national ­policymakers, and the ­counterterrorism and counterintelligence communities, as well as key international allies. Its workforce represents an unusual combination of specialties: analysts, engineers, physicists, mathematicians, linguists, computer scientists and researchers, as well as customer relations specialists, security officers, data flow experts, managers, administrative officers and clerical assistants (ODNI, 2019).

Official source NSA (2019) National Security Agency, www.nsa.gov/

Navy Intelligence Under the direction of the Director of Naval Intelligence, the U.S. Navy’s intelligence team is the leading provider of maritime intelligence to Navy and joint/combined warfighting forces, as well as national decision makers and other partners/consumers in the U.S. National Intelligence Community. Naval Intelligence comprises active duty and reserve military and civilian personnel, serving at sea and ashore around the world (ODNI, 2019).

Official source NI (2019) Navy Intelligence, www.oni.navy.mil/

Canada Canadian security and intelligence Canadian Security Intelligence Service Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is a federal institution that is part of the Public Safety Canada portfolio. The CSIS is at the forefront of Canada’s national security system. 462

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CSIS’s role is to investigate activities suspected of constituting threats to the security of ­Canada and to report on these to the Government of Canada. CSIS may also take measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada in accordance with well-defined legal requirements and Ministerial Direction (CSIS, 2019).

Official source CSIS (2019) Canadian Security Intelligence Service, www.canada.ca/en/security-­intelligenceservice.html

Public Safety Canada Public Safety Canada was created in 2003 to ensure coordination across all federal departments and agencies responsible for national security and the safety of Canadians. Our mandate is to keep Canadians safe from a range of risks such as natural disasters, crime and terrorism. Public Safety Canada works with five agencies and three review bodies, united in a single portfolio and all reporting to the Minister of Public Safety. The Minister of Border Security and Organized Crime Reduction works to ensure that Canada’s borders are well managed in a way that promotes legitimate travel and trade while keeping Canadians safe. The Minister plays a key role in coordinating efforts to reduce gang violence and tackle organised crime. We also work with other levels of government, first responders, community groups, the private sector and other nations, on national security, border strategies, countering crime and emergency management issues and other safety and security initiatives, such as the ­National Information Exchange Model. This ensures that the government’s approach to Canada’s safety is highly organised and prepared to confront threats to national security. Public Safety coordinates an integrated approach to emergency management, law enforcement, corrections, crime prevention and border security. Public Safety Canada has five Regional Offices representing the Atlantic, Quebec, ­Ontario, the Prairies and British Columbia and the North. Our regional offices are the primary point of contact for the Department at the regional level. The Public Safety Canada Departmental Code of Conduct provides guiding principles for ethical behaviour and decision-making for Public Safety employees. All employees are ­required to adhere to the Code as a term and condition of employment (PSC, 2019).

Official source PSC (2019) Public Safety Canada, www.publicsafety.gc.ca/index-en.aspx

The public safety portfolio A cohesive and integrated approach to Canada’s security requires cooperation across government.

Public safety partner agencies The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) manages the nation’s borders by enforcing ­Canadian laws governing trade and travel, as well as international agreements and conventions. CBSA facilitates legitimate cross-border traffic and supports economic development while stopping people and goods that pose a potential threat to Canada (CBSA, 2019). 463

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Official source CBSA (2019) Canada Border Services Agency, www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/menu-eng.html The CSIS investigates and reports on activities that may pose a threat to the security of Canada. CSIS also provides security assessments, on request, to all federal departments and agencies (CSIS, 2019).

Official source CSIS (2019) Canadian Security Intelligence Service, www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligenceservice.html

The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) helps protect society by encouraging offenders to become law-abiding citizens while exercising reasonable, safe, secure and humane control. CSC is responsible for managing offenders sentenced to two years or more in federal correctional institutions and under community supervision (CSC, 2019).

Official source CSC (2019) Correctional Service of Canada, www.csc-scc.gc.ca/index-en.shtml

The Parole Board of Canada (PBC) The Parole Board of Canada (PBC) is an independent body that grants, denies or revokes parole for inmates in federal prisons and provincial inmates in province without their own parole board. The PBC helps protect society by facilitating the timely reintegration of ­offenders into society as law-abiding citizens (PBC, 2019).

Official source PBC (2019) Parole Board of Canada, www.canada.ca/en/parole-board.html

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) enforces Canadian laws, prevents crime and maintains peace, order and security.

Official source RCMP (2019) Royal Canadian Mounted Police, www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en

Australia Australian security and intelligence The Australian Intelligence Community The Australian Intelligence Community, or AIC (2019), is an informal term used to describe the six Australian security and intelligence agencies, and the official source for the summaries which follow. 464

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The Office of National Assessments (ONA) The Office of National Assessments (ONA) produces all-Source assessments on international political, strategic and economic developments to the Prime Minister, senior ministers in the National Security Committee of Cabinet and senior officials of government departments. ONA operates under its own legislation. ONA also has the responsibility for coordinating and evaluating Australia’s foreign intelligence activities (AIC, 2019).

Official source ONA (2019) Office of National Assessments, www.oni.gov.au/what-we-do

The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) is Australia’s national security ­service. ASIO’s main role is to gather information and produce intelligence that will enable it to warn the government about activities or situations that might endanger Australia’s ­national security (AIC, 2019).

Official source ASIO (2019) Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, www.asio.gov.au/

The Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) The Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) is Australia’s overseas secret HUMINT (human intelligence) collection agency. Its mission is to protect and promote Australia’s vital interests through the provision of unique foreign intelligence services as directed by ­Government (AIC, 2019).

Official source ASIS (2019) Australian Secret Intelligence Service, www.asis.gov.au/

The Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) The Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) is responsible for collection, analysis and distribution of foreign signals intelligence (known as sigint), and is the national authority on ­communications and computer security (known as infosec) (AIC, 2019).

Official source ASD (2019) Australian Signals Directorate, https://asd.gov.au/

The Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) The Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) is an intelligence assessment agency that provides services and advice at the national level. Its mandate is to support Defence and ­Government decision-making and assist with the planning and conduct of Australian ­Defence Force operations. 465

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Official source DIO (2019) Defence Intelligence Organisation, www.defence.gov.au/dio/index.shtml The Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGIO) was established by amalgamating the Australian Imagery Organisation and Directorate of Strategic Military Geographic Information, and the Defence Topographic Agency to provide geospatial intelligence, from imagery and other sources, in support of Australia’s defence and national interests.

Official source AGIO (2019) Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation, www.defence.gov.au/dio/ index.shtml AIC (2019) Australian Intelligence Community, www.igis.gov.au/australian-intelligencecommunity

New Zealand New Zealand security and intelligence New Zealand Security Intelligence Service The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) is a public service agency that contributes to New Zealand’s safety and security. The NZSIS investigates threats to New Zealand’s national security, collects foreign intelligence and provides a range of protective security services to Government agencies. Mandated to contribute to: • • •

The protection of New Zealand’s national security. The international relations and well-being of New Zealand. The economic well-being of New Zealand.

Through: • • •

Collecting and analysing intelligence in accordance with the Government’s priorities. Providing protective security services, advice and assistance to the New Zealand ­Government and others. Assisting the Government Communications Security Bureau, New Zealand Defence Force and New Zealand Police to carry out their functions.

NZSIS is part of the New Zealand Intelligence Community (NZIC).

New Zealand intelligence community (NZIC) The NZIC contributes to building a safer and more prosperous New Zealand. Core agencies work together to ensure that New Zealand is protected from harm, and that decision makers have intelligence which gives New Zealand an advantage, and enhances our international reputation and interests. The other core agencies of the NZIC include the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) and the National Assessments Bureau (NAB) (NZSIS, 2019). 466

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Official source DPMC (2019) Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, https://dpmc.govt.nz/ our-business-units/national-security-group/intelligence-and-assessments

Government Communications Security Bureau The GCSB ensures the integrity and confidentiality of government information, collects foreign intelligence bearing on New Zealand’s interests and assists other New Zealand government agencies to discharge their mandate (NZIC, 2019).

Official source GCSB (2019) Government Communications Security Bureau, www.gcsb.govt.nz/ The NAB in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) provides ­a ssessments on events and developments of significance to New Zealand’s national security, international relations and well-being and economic well-being, and advises on the setting of intelligence priorities and on best practice in relation to the assessment of intelligence. NAB provides context to information from a wide range of public, diplomatic and intelligence sources including that from international sources and partners. NAB has a lead role to provide a perspective of what that intelligence means for New Zealand. NAB does not collect intelligence.

Official sources DPMC (2019) Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, https://dpmc.govt.nz/ our-business-units/national-security-group/intelligence-and-assessments NZSIS (2019) New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, www.nzsis.govt.nz/about-us/ new-zealand-intelligence-community/

The Russian Federation The Russian Federation security and intelligence The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy I General provisions 1

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The current Strategy is the basic strategic planning document defining the Russian Federation’s national interests and strategic national priorities, objectives, tasks and measures in the sphere of domestic and foreign policy aimed at strengthening the Russian Federation’s national security and ensuring the country’s sustainable development in the long term. The legal basis of the current Strategy consists of the Russian Federation Constitution, the Federal Laws 390-FZ “On Security” dated 28 December 2010 and ­172-FZ “On Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation” dated 28 June 2014, other federal laws and statutory legal acts of the Russian Federation president. The current Strategy is intended to consolidate the efforts of federal organs of state power, other state organs, Russian Federation components’ organs of state power (hereinafter organs of state power), organs of local self-government and institutions 467

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of civil society to create favourable internal and external conditions for the realisation of the Russian Federation’s national interests and strategic national priorities. The current Strategy is the basis for shaping and implementing state policy in the sphere of safeguarding the Russian Federation’s national security. The current Strategy is based on the unbreakable interconnection and interdependence of the Russian Federation’s national security and the country’s socioeconomic development. The current Strategy makes use of the following main concepts: • the Russian Federation’s national security (hereinafter national security) – the state of protection of the individual, society and the state against internal and external threats in the process of which the exercise of the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens of the Russian Federation (hereinafter citizens), a d­ ecent quality of life and standard of living for them, sovereignty, independence, state and territorial integrity, and sustainable socioeconomic development of the Russian Federation are ensured. National security includes the country’s defence and all types of security envisioned by the Russian ­Federation Constitution and Russian Federation legislation – primarily state, public, informational, environmental, economic, transportation, and energy security and individual security; • the Russian Federation’s national interests (hereinafter national interests) – ­objectively significant requirements of the individual, society and the state with regard to ensuring their protection and sustainable development; • threats to national security – the set of conditions and factors creating a direct or indirect possibility of harm to national interests; • the safeguarding of national security – the implementation by organs of state power and organs of local self-government in conjunction with institutions of civil society of political, military, organisational, socioeconomic, informational, legal and other measures aimed at countering threats to national security and satisfying national interests; • the Russian Federation’s strategic national priorities (hereinafter strategic national priorities) – the most important areas of the safeguarding of national security; • the system for safeguarding national security – the set of organs of state power and organs of local self-government carrying out the implementation of state policy in the sphere of safeguarding national security and the instruments at their disposal.

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State policy in the sphere of the safeguarding of national security and the socioeconomic development of the Russian Federation contributes to the implementation of the strategic national priorities and the effective protection of national interests. A solid basis has been created at this time for further increasing the Russian ­Federation’s economic, political, military and spiritual potentials and for enhancing its role in shaping a polycentric world. Russia has demonstrated the ability to safeguard sovereignty, independence, and state and territorial integrity and to protect the rights of compatriots abroad. There has been an increase in the Russian Federation’s role in resolving the most 468

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important international problems, settling military conflicts, and ensuring strategic stability and the supremacy of international law in interstate relations. Russia’s economy has demonstrated the ability to maintain and strengthen its ­potential in conditions of world economic instability and the application of the ­restrictive economic measures introduced against the Russian Federation by a number of countries. Positive trends have been observed in resolving tasks relating to the strengthening of citizens’ health. Natural population growth and an increase in average life ­expectancy can be seen. Traditional Russian spiritual and moral values are being revived. A proper attitude towards Russia’s history is being shaped in the rising generation. We are seeing the consolidation of civil society around the common values that shape the foundations of statehood such as Russia’s freedom and independence, humanism, interethnic peace and accord, the unity of the cultures of the Russian Federation’s multi-ethnic people, respect for family and faith traditions, and patriotism. The strengthening of Russia is taking place against a backdrop of new threats to national security that are of a multifarious and interconnected nature. The R ­ ussian Federation’s implementation of an independent foreign and domestic policy is giving rise to opposition from the United States and its allies, who are seeking to retain their dominance in world affairs. The policy of containing Russia that they are implementing envisions the exertion of political, economic, military and informational pressure on it.

Official source RFNSS (2019) The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy, www.ieee.es/­Galerias/ f ichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy31Dec2015.pdf

Academic source Fedor, J. (2013) Russia and the Cult of State Security: The Chekist Tradition, From Lenin to Putin. London: Routledge.

Continental Europe and the European Union The European Union European Agenda on Security Why a new European Agenda on Security? The EU and its Member States face several new and complex security threats, highlighting the need for further synergies and closer cooperation at all levels. Many of t­oday’s ­security concerns originate from instability in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and changing forms of radicalisation, violence and terrorism. Threats are becoming more varied and more international, as well as increasingly cross-border and cross-sectorial in nature. These threats require an effective and coordinated response at the European level. The European Agenda on Security sets out how the Union can bring added value to support the Member States in ensuring security. 469

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Whilst the EU must remain vigilant to other emerging threats that also require a coordinated EU response, the Agenda prioritises terrorism, organised crime and cybercrime as interlinked areas with a strong cross-border dimension, where EU action can make a real difference. The Agenda builds on the actions undertaken in the last years, under the previous internal security strategy, thus ensuring consistent and continued action. The European Agenda on Security aims to strengthen the tools that the EU provides to national law enforcement authorities to fight terrorism and cross-border crime. In particular, the Agenda focuses on improving information exchanges and operational cooperation ­between law enforcement authorities. It also mobilises a number of EU instruments to ­support actions through training, funding and research and innovation. Finally, the Agenda sets out a number of targeted actions to be taken at the EU level, to step up the fight against terrorism, organised crime and cybercrime. Tackling security threats whilst upholding European values To maximise the benefits of existing EU measures and, where necessary, deliver new and complementary actions, all actors involved have to work together based on five key principles: • • • • •

Ensure full compliance with fundamental rights. Guarantee more transparency, accountability and democratic control. Ensure better application and implementation of existing EU legal instruments. Provide a more joined-up inter-agency and a cross-sectorial approach. Bring together all internal and external dimensions of security.

Official source EU (2019) European Union, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/europeanagenda-security_en

Austria Austrian security and intelligence Federal Ministry of the Interior The Federal Ministry of the Interior in Austria (Bundesministerium für Inneres, BMI) is primarily responsible for the internal security of Austria. Since its reorganisation in 2003, the Ministry is organised into four sections: Section I covers tasks linked to human and financial resources, controlling, internal administration, international affairs, security policy and coordination of the MoI’s EU activities, public relations and procurement. Section II covers all police issues, border control, civilian crisis management and disaster management, and houses the criminal intelligence service, the security academy responsible for the education of police officers and their training. Section III covers legal matters and houses the office of the human rights advisor, asylum policies and residence, as well as nationality issues; another important part of work is the administrative coordination of federal elections. Section IV is responsible for ICT Infrastructure, its services and ­applications as well as all tasks regarding real estate management. The Federal Ministry of the Interior covers a whole range of duties for Austria which reach beyond the core security tasks of police matters.

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Official source MOI (2019) Ministry of the Interior, www.bmi.gv.at/

Belgium Belgium security and intelligence State Security Service (VSSE) General intelligence and security service The Belgian Intelligence and Security Landscape In Belgium, there are a large number of players in the intelligence and security landscape in terms of policy, intelligence gathering and assessment. There are two intelligence and security services in Belgium: State Security, the civil intelligence service, and the General Intelligence and Security Service, its military counterpart. State Security (SS, 2019), which comes under the minister of Justice and the minister of the Interior, carries out various missions, amongst others the collection and analysis of ­information that reveals a threat to the continued existence of the democratic, constitutional and welfare state, and informing the government thereof (threats related to terrorism, extremism, espionage, proliferation, sectarian organisations, interference, criminal organisations). Moreover, the service is responsible for vetting procedures. State security can also lend assistance and technical support in the framework of judicial investigations. The MI service (www.mil.be/is), which comes under the minister of Defence, is part of the Armed Forces. Its first role consists in collecting and analysing intelligence related to any activity that threatens the inviolability of the national territory, the military defence plans, the performance of the roles of the armed forces or the security of Belgian nationals abroad. Moreover, the MI service must ensure the military security of the personnel coming under Defence, military installations, military secrets and the scientific and economic potential. Besides, it must neutralise any cyberattacks and identify their perpetrators just like its civil counterpart; the MI service carries out vetting procedures regarding individuals who are supposed to be given access to secret information in their professional lives. The MI service can also lend assistance or technical support to the judicial authorities. More recently, the 29 January 2016 Act has been passed, explicitly entrusting the civil and military intelligence services with the collection, analysis and processing of the intelligence related to the activities of foreign intelligence services on Belgian soil. Furthermore, there is the Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment (CUTA). This coordination unit draws up specific and strategic evaluations of terrorist and extremist threats in and to Belgium. It largely proceeds on the basis of intelligence obtained from the supporting services (the two intelligence services, the police and departments of the ministries of the Interior, Finance, Mobility & Transport and Foreign Affairs). The threat assessments are intended for the political, administrative and judicial authorities that are invested with responsibility for security. The CUTA is under the joint authority of the minister of Justice and the Interior. At the political level, the National Security Council (former Ministerial Committee for Intelligence and Security) has been created by the Royal Decree of 28 January 2015. The NSC is part of the Government and is chaired by the Prime Minister. It is also made up of the Ministers of Justice, Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs and the other deputy Prime 471

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Ministers. The other members of the Government as well as the Administrator general of State Security, the Chief of the GISS, the director of the CUTA and other top level representatives of the police and the judiciary can be invited on an ad hoc basis.

Official source ENNIR (2019) Belgian Intelligence and Security Landscape, www.ennir.be/belgium/ belgian-intelligence-and-security-landscape SS (2019) Security Service, www.suretedeletat.belgium.be

Academic source Leigh, I. and Wegge, N. (2018) Intelligence Oversight in the Twentieth-First Century: Accountability in a Changing World. London: Routledge.

Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnia-Herzegovina security and intelligence Intelligence and security agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina On 22 March 2004 based on the Article IV.4.a of the Constitution of Bosnia and ­Herzegovina, Parliament Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the session of House of Representative and House of People, adopted Law on Intelligence and Security Agency of Bosnia and ­Herzegovina. This law came into force eight days after being published in the Official ­Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, number 12 from 14 April 2004, and the Agency started with its work on 01 June 2004. Hence, in line with the Law, the Intelligence and Security Agency was established, responsible for collecting, analysing and distributing intelligence with the aim of protection of security, including sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is important to emphasise that the Agency carries out its duties in accordance with regulations of Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including regulations of European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Main Freedoms and its Protocols, international contracts and agreements that Bosnia and Herzegovina signed or acceded to. According to the Law, the Agency is civilian intelligence and security institution that has status of independent administrative organisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Agency has a status of legal entity. The Agency has combined civilian intelligence and security institutions which were acting formerly in the Entities of BiH – Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republic of Srpska. Law forbids all other civilian intelligence and security structures to be established or to act accordingly in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Official source OBA (2019) Intelligence and Security Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, www.osa-oba. gov.ba/nase.html

Academic source Friedman, F. (2006) Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Polity on the Brink. London: Routledge. 472

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Bulgaria Bulgarian security and intelligence State Intelligence Agency (SIA) The State Intelligence Agency (SIA) is a security service, which obtains, processes, analyses and provides the state leadership with intelligence, assessments, analyses and prognoses, related to the national security, interests and priorities of the Republic of Bulgaria. SIA is part of the intelligence community, defined in the National Security Strategy as a system of state bodies that provide information and analysis, assess the risks and threats to the national security, and plan and implement due countermeasures. The Agency also takes part in the activities of the intelligence communities of the ­European Union (EU) and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). SIA cooperates with the other state institutions and structures that are part of the national security system, which perform functions in the sphere of diplomacy, defence, intelligence, counterintelligence, criminal investigation, law enforcement and security. The mission of SIA is to protect the national security and the interests of the Republic of Bulgaria, but also to support the state leadership in their efforts to fulfil the national ­priorities, by providing the latest and most reliable intelligence and analysis of events and developments pertaining to the national security, foreign policy, economy and the s­ afeguarding of the constitutional order. To this end, SIA carries out intelligence operations and obtains, stores, summarises, ­analyses and provides intelligence information. Intelligence information is any information, obtained by the Agency about foreign countries, organisations and individuals, or Bulgarian organisations and individuals related to these, which is of significance for the national security of the Republic of Bulgaria. Different information materials – such as reports, analyses and briefings – are prepared on the basis of the acquired intelligence information and provided to the state leadership. The Agency supplies intelligence information to the Speaker of the National Assembly; the President of the Republic; the Prime Minister and the Members of Cabinet; and other government agencies in accordance with their competence. The Agency supplies intelligence reports, identical in volume and content to the ­President of the Republic, the Speaker of the National Assembly and the Prime Minister. SIA reports directly to the Council of Ministers, while it performs tasks set by the Prime Minister and by the President of the country, in consultation with the Prime Minister. The Agency does not carry out assignments of domestic political nature. SIA’s functions are: • •

•

protection of national security and the interests of the Republic of Bulgaria related to its national security; intelligence and analytical support for the prevention, detection and counteraction of any harm in the area of national security, foreign policy, the economy and the s­ afeguarding of the constitutional order; provision of assistance to the authorities in pursuing the priorities of the Republic of Bulgaria in the field of national security, foreign policy, the economy and the safeguarding of the constitutional order.

When performing its functions, the Agency maintains information exchange and interaction with other government authorities and cooperates with similar foreign authorities and services. 473

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SIA operates in accordance with the following basic principles: • • • • • • •

compliance with the Constitution, the laws and any international treaties to which the Republic of Bulgaria is a party; respect for and safeguarding of human rights and the fundamental freedoms; protection of information and its sources; objectivity and impartiality; cooperation with members of the public; political neutrality; combination of covert and overt forms and methods of operation.

Official source DAR (2019) State Intelligence Agency, www.dar.bg/en/about-us/mission

Academic source Nikolow, S. (2013) Bulgarian Intelligence and Its Reforms. Research Institute for E ­ uropean and American Studies, www.rieas.gr/researchareas/2014-07-30-08-58-27/balkan-studies5/2076-bulgarian-intelligence-service-and-its-reforms

Croatia Croatian security and intelligence Security and Intelligence Agency (SOA) The work consists of special forms of collecting information relevant to national security, followed by processing and analysing such information for the purpose of providing intelligence support to policymakers and competent state bodies. We collect and analyse information with the aim of detecting and preventing the a­ ctivities of individuals or groups that are directed: against the independence, integrity and ­sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia or aimed at the violent overthrow of the constitutional order; threatening to violate human rights and basic freedoms or to endanger the fundaments of the economic system of the Republic of Croatia. SOA also collects and analyses political, economic, scientific-technological and securityrelated information concerning foreign countries, organisations, political and economic ­a lliances, groups and persons and other information relevant to national security. In fulfilling our tasks, we develop partnerships with a large number of security ­intelligence services from other countries and participate in the work of several international security intelligence forums and organisations. We consider these partnerships extremely important, as modern security challenges, like terrorism and organised crime, have a transnational character and no country can cope with them on its own, but only by way of international cooperation. In addition, through international cooperation, we receive information and gain insight into certain phenomena and processes that could not be covered by our own resources, but might represent a threat to Croatia’s interests, such as piracy at sea, organised criminal groups from other continents and global terrorism.

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Official source SOA (2019) State Intelligence Agency, www.soa.hr/en/

Academic source Lefebvre, S. (2012) Croatia and the Development of a Democratic Intelligence System (1990–2010). Democracy and Security, 8(2): 115–163.

Czech Republic Czech Republic security and intelligence Czech Security Information Service The Security Information Service (BIS) is an intelligence institution active within the Czech Republic. It is responsible for acquiring, collecting and evaluating information of major impact on the security of the country, protection of its constitutional setup and economic interests.

Official source BIS (2019) Czech Security Information Service, www.bis.cz/en/

Academic source Lefebvre, S. (2011) The Czech Experience with Intelligence Reforms, 1993–2010. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 24(4): 692–710.

Denmark Danish security and intelligence Danish Security Intelligence Service (PET) In its role as national intelligence and security authority, PET is responsible for identifying, preventing, investigating and countering threats to freedom, democracy and security in Danish society. This applies to threats in Denmark as well as threats directed at Danish ­nationals and Danish interests abroad.

Official source PET (2019) Danish Security Intelligence Service, www.pet.dk/English.aspx

Academic source Møller Pedersen, A. and Jørgensen, R.K. (2014) National intelligence authorities and surveillance in the EU: Fundamental rights safeguards and remedies. Danish Institute for Human Rights, https://fra.europa.eu/en/project/2014/national-intelligence-authorities-andsurveillance-eu-fundamental-rights-safeguards-and/publications

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Estonia Estonian security and intelligence The Security Police Board The Security Police Board is a government agency within the area of administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, whose task is to ensure the security of the state by using information gathering and prevention tools and investigating offences to the extent established by the Government of the Republic Regulation. The broader role of the Security Police Board as a government agency of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ensures the internal security of the state by using information collection and prevention tools, and investigates offences to the extent established by the Government of the Republic Regulation.

Official source SPB (2019) The Security Police, www.kapo.ee/

Finland Finnish security and intelligence Finnish Security Intelligence Service (SUPO) Security police has existed as an institution in independent Finland since 1919, first as a temporary government agency. Supo has functioned in its current form since the beginning of 1949. The duties and operations of Supo differ from those of other police units, because Supo focuses on preventing threats to national security. Supo also provides security information to substantiate the decisions of national leaders and other public authorities. Supo differs from other police units insofar as its work does not prioritise preliminary investigations or gathering of intelligence for the purpose of launching such investigations. With the new legislation, Supo would be transformed from a security police into a ­modern European security and intelligence service. The legislation would put Supo on an equal footing with its European colleagues in terms of competences. The purpose of intelligence is to gather information about threats in advance in order to effectively prevent them. Finland’s security environment has deteriorated rapidly in recent years. Quick changes call for a more efficient capability to detect and combat serious threats to national security. Intelligence gathering is often the best and sometimes the only way to get information about these threats. It is done to ensure that the Finnish state leaders are provided with ­relevant ­information on the basis of which decisions may be taken, and that the authorities are ­provided with a real-time, true picture of national security threats. In the current global political situation, the threats to Finland’s national security are more diverse than before. They include inter alia terrorism, influencing operations targeting the national infrastructure or attacks to data networks, and hybrid threats. To be able to forecast future threats to Finland’s national security, we need intelligence information from different sources.

Official source SUPO (2019) www.supo.fi/about_supo 476

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France French security and intelligence National Defense General Secretariat (SGDN) General Directorate for External Security (DGSE) Official sources SGDN (2019) National Defense General Secretariat, www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/ (In French) DGSE (2019) General Directorate for External Security, www.defense.gouv.fr/english/dgse (In French)

Academic source Leigh, I. and Wegge, N. (2018) Intelligence Oversight in the Twentieth-First Century: Accountability in a Changing World. London: Routledge.

Germany German security and intelligence Federal Intelligence Service (BND) Intelligence collected by the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) contributes to foreign and security policy-making at the national level and helps to protect German interests all over the world. In order to do so, the BND uses intelligence resources at its disposal to collect information unobtainable by any other means. There are two other intelligence services in Germany: The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution works together with equivalent offices on the state level in collecting information about threats to the domestic democratic order or to the public security in Germany. The Federal Office for Military Counter-Intelligence performs tasks in Germany and abroad relating to the protection of the constitution under responsibility of the Federal ­M inistry of Defence.

Official source BND (2019) www.bnd.bund.de/EN/Home/home_node.html

Academic source Krieger, W. (2010) The German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND): Evolution and Current Policy Issues. In Johnson, L. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (pp. 791–807). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Greece Greek security and intelligence National Intelligence Service (EYP) EYP’s mission – always within the framework of the Constitution and legislation – is the quest for collection, processing and disclosure of intelligence to all competent authorities, relating to: 477

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• •

•

The protection and promotion of the political, financial, military and – generally – the State’s national strategic interests. The prevention and confrontation of activities constituting a threat against the democratic regime, fundamental human rights, the territorial integrity and national security of the Greek State, as well as national wealth. The prevention and confrontation of the activities of terrorist organisations and other groups of organised crime.

At times of war, mobilisation or direct threat against national security, EYP is subordinate to the Head of the National Defence General Staff who, through EYP’s Director ­General, ­exercises full control over all matters relating to the Service’s contribution towards the ­defence and security of the State. In the event of any action aiming to violently abolish the democratic regime, EYP, by decision of the Governmental Council for Foreign Affairs and Defence (KYSEA), operates as a central service for the management of all State Intelligence (EYP, 2019).

Official source EYP (2019) Greek Government, www.nis.gr/portal/page/portal/NIS/Mission

Policy source Gürsoy, Y. (2018) The recent crisis between Greece and Turkey: Two NATO allies on the brink of war, again. The Foreign Policy Centre, https://fpc.org.uk/the-recent-crisisbetween-greece-and-turkey/

Academic source Nomikos, J.M. (2013) Combating Illegal Immigration, Terrorism, and Organized Crime in Greece and Italy. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26(2): 288–303.

Hungary Hungarian security and intelligence Military National Security Office The integration of the Military Intelligence Office and the Military Security Office constituted a milestone in the structural reorganisation of the Hungarian national security services. As a result of this integration, the Military National Security Service, a renewed and reinforced member of the Hungarian national security community, was established on 1 January 2012. The mission of the integrated military intelligence and counterintelligence service is to prevent, detect and avert the efforts and activities threatening the security of Hungary; to provide information supporting political and military decision-making. One of the most ­ inistry of important responsibilities of the MNSS is to ensure the legal operation of the M Defence and the Hungarian Defence Forces as well as to provide intelligence support and protection to the Hungarian personnel serving in international crisis management and peace support operations (KNBSZ, 2019). 478

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Official source KNBSZ (2019) Military National Security Office, http://knbsz.gov.hu/en/index.html

Italy Italian security and intelligence Security Intelligence Department (DIS) The President of the Council of Ministers and the Delegated Authority exercise their ­functions through the DIS – Dipartimento informazioni per la sicurezza [Security Intelligence Department]. In order to ensure a fully unified approach to intelligence collection, analysis and operations, the DIS: • • •

coordinates all intelligence activities, including national cybersecurity, and review results; submits relevant information collected by the Agencies to the President of the Council of Ministers and provides strategic analysis and assessments to policymakers; ensures the exchange of information between AISE/AISI and police forces.

Moreover, the DIS: • • • •

oversees, through the Central Inspection Office, the activities carried out by AISE and AISI; ensures the application of the directives issued by the President of the Council of ­M inisters regarding the administrative protection of State secrets and classified documents; sees to the management of the personnel and logistics for DIS, AISE and AISI; sees to institutional communication and the promotion of the culture of security.

The DIS includes the Central Inspection Office, the Central Archives Office, the Central Secrecy Office (UCSe) and the Intelligence Academy (DIS, 2019).

External Intelligence and Security Agency (AISE) The AISE – Agenzia informazioni e sicurezza esterna [External Intelligence and Security Agency] – is responsible for safeguarding national security against threats originating abroad, protecting Italy’s political, military, economic, scientific and industrial interests. In particular, the AISE: • • •

collects relevant intelligence; counters espionage and other hostile activities abroad; counters WMD proliferation.

Internal Intelligence and Security Agency (AISI) The AISI – Agenzia informazioni e sicurezza interna [Internal Intelligence and Security Agency] – is responsible for safeguarding national security from threats originating within Italy’s borders, and for protecting Italy’s political, military, economic, scientific and industrial interests. The AISI: 479

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• • •

collects relevant intelligence; counters espionage and other hostile activities within national borders; counters subversion, criminal and terrorist activity in Italy (DIS, 2019).

Official source DIS (2019) Security Intelligence Department (DIS), www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/ english/about-us.html

Luxembourg Luxembourg security and intelligence State Intelligence Service (SRE) The law of July 5, 2016 governing reorganisation of the State Intelligence Service clearly defines the agency’s mission and delimits very precisely the context in which it is authorised to carry it out: the existence of a threat, or the possibility of one, to national security. This means any event or activity capable of undermining the independence and sovereignty of the state, the security and the functioning of its institutions, fundamental rights and civil liberties, the security of individuals and property, the scientific and technical capabilities or the economic interests of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. The scope of the agency’s mission also comprises the security of foreign states or of international and supranational organisations with which Luxembourg has agreements. The law defines the nature of potential threats to national security: • • • • •

Espionage and interference; Violent Extremism; Terrorism; Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or goods linked to defence and related technologies; Organised crime and cyberthreats insofar as they are related to one of the preceding types of threat.

On the one hand, the legislation clearly defines and restricts the scope of action of the SRE in relation to other bodies responsible for security within the country, while, on the other, it provides assurance to its inhabitants that intelligence activities are undertaken in a clear and precise legal framework. Absence of political surveillance The law is very clear on this point: the SRE is not authorised to conduct domestic political surveillance. Carefully delineated operational methods Intelligence methods can arouse certain public curiosity. While the collection of intelligence entails techniques and resources not available to the general public, the legislation clearly defines what methods may be used. They are subjected to strict conditions and precise criteria, and to constant supervision at multiple levels. They must comply with three essential principles: legitimacy (a threat that justifies the investigation), proportionality (the means employed must be proportionate to the threat) and subsidiarity (more intrusive methods are used only if less intrusive ones are incapable of achieving the goal in question). 480

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The principle of minimal intrusion into private life The legislation reflects the political intention to distinguish between three levels of authorisation for intelligence gathering based on the level of intrusion into the private life of individuals targeted by the operations. This rule states that measures should involve the lowest possible level of intrusion into their private life, while taking into account the principle of proportionality. Means involving the lowest level of intrusion must be authorised in writing by the director of the SRE in response to a written request setting out their reasoning by the SRE agent responsible for the investigation. The most intrusive operational methods, such as monitoring of telephone or postal communications, must be supported in advance by a special commission consisting of the president of the Supreme Court of Justice, the president of the Administrative Court and the president of the Luxembourg District Court. They must then be authorised by the ministerial committee, currently made up of the Prime Minister and the two Deputy Prime Ministers. In the event of a threat of espionage, terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or defence-related goods, the SRE may, with the support of the special committee and upon authorisation by the ministerial committee, employ exceptional investigative methods, notably access to IT systems or to bank transactions (SRE, 2019).

Official source SRE (2019) State Intelligence Service, https://sre.gouvernement.lu/en/service.html

Netherlands Dutch security and intelligence General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) Welcome to the Official Source of the AIVD, the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands. A “secret service” on the Internet – that may sound like a contradiction in terms, but it isn’t. The AIVD is not nearly as secretive as its predecessor, the BVD. In fact, the service tries to be as open as it can. For example, the annual report it publishes on its work and areas of interest is more detailed every year. In some ways, though, the AIVD has to remain secret. That is why you will not find details of any sources of the information on this Official Source, for instance, or the names of AIVD staff. The service can only talk about its work and methods in general terms, so this Official Source cannot provide specific information about matters currently under investigation. AIVD comprises: Intelligence Directorate The Intelligence Directorate conducts investigations, issues information and mobilises third parties to safeguard the democratic legal order and national security, to actively reduce risks itself, and to contribute to the formulation of Dutch foreign policy. Operations Directorate The Operations Directorate carries out operational activities to support investigations on behalf of the Intelligence Directorate. The National Signals Security Bureau (Nationaal Bureau voor Verbindingsbeveiliging, NBV) and the Joint Sigint Cyber Unit ( JSCU) both fall under this directorate. 481

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Netherlands National Communications Security Agency, NBV A unit of the AIVD, the Netherlands National Communications Security Agency (NBV) promotes the protection of crucial government information. As a government partner and advisor, and because of its unique qualities when it comes to information security, the NBV makes an active and tangible contribution to national security in the Netherlands. Joint Sigint Cyber Unit In the JSCU, the AIVD and MIVD have joint forces. The two services have combined their expertise and resources in the field of Signals Intelligence (Sigint) and Cyber activities. With the interception of (tele) communications, the JSCU supports teams that investigate threats to the Netherlands and the armed forces. In the framework of the National Cyber Security Strategy, JSCU specialists are also helping to safeguard the Dutch Internet. Security Screenings & Business Administration Directorate This directorate is not only responsible for security screenings, but also for internal products and services as well as for information management. Business Unit Security Screenings This unit safeguards our national security by screening or ‘vetting’ individuals who (wish to) hold a so-called position involving confidentiality, by advising designating ministers when they are compiling draft lists of such positions, and by ensuring on behalf of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations that actual designations are reasonable and proportionate (AVID, 2019).

Official source AVID (2019) General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), https://english.aivd.nl/ about-aivd/the-aivd-who-we-are

Norway Norwegian security and intelligence The Norwegian Intelligence and Security Landscape There are four organised intelligence and security services in Norway: the Norwegian P ­ olice Security Service, the Norwegian National Security Authority, the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Norwegian Defence Security Department. The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) is Norway’s national security service, and its responsibilities include collecting and analysing information and implementing countermeasures against matters that threaten national security. The service is organised as a special police service parallel to the regular police, and the service reports to the Minister of Justice. PST’s primary responsibility is to prevent and investigate crimes that may pose a danger to national security. The service has adopted various methods and procedures in its approach to this task. Key methods include gathering of information on individuals and groups that may pose a threat, preparing various analyses and threat assessments, investigating relevant matters and other operative countermeasures, as well as offering general advice. The NIS is Norway’s only foreign intelligence service. The NIS reports to the Minister of Defence. The NIS collects information about situations and conditions outside the nation’s borders. The purpose is to help provide Norwegian authorities with a solid foundation on which to make decisions in matters that concern foreign, security and defence policies. 482

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The primary tasks assigned to the NIS are conferred by statute in Section 3 of the Intelligence Service Act, which states that the service shall procure, process and analyse information regarding Norwegian interests viewed in relation to foreign states, organisations or private individuals, and in this context prepare threat analyses and intelligence assessments to the extent that this may help to safeguard important national interests. The Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) is a cross-sectoral professional and supervisory authority within the protective security services in Norway. The NSM shall coordinate protective security measures and oversee the state of security in the types of activities that are subject to the Security Act. The service has in accordance with the Security Act the overall responsibility for areas such as security administration, physical protection, document security, personnel security, IT security certification and monitoring. The Defence Security Department (FSA)’s primary responsibility is the protective security service and operative security of the Armed Forces, including responsibilities related to the Armed Forces’ security intelligence. The FSA shall, on behalf of the Chief of Defence, counteract security threats associated with espionage, sabotage and terrorist acts that may affect military activities and/or national security. In terms of the exercise of protective security services in the Armed Forces pursuant to the Security Act is the FSA under the National Security Authority, also in matters of personnel security. The FSA is the largest security clearance authority in Norway and handles approximately 20,000 security clearance cases annually (ENNIR, 2019).

Official source ENNIR (2018) Norway. European Network of National Intelligence Reviewers, www. ennir.be/norway/norwegian-intelligence-and-security-landscape

The Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) The NIS is Norway’s only foreign intelligence service. NIS collects information about situations and conditions outside the nation’s borders. The purpose of intelligence services is to help provide Norwegian authorities with a solid foundation on which to make decisions in matters that concern foreign, security and defence policies. The primary tasks assigned to the NIS are conferred by statute in Section 3 of the Intelligence Service Act, which states that the service shall procure, process and analyse information regarding Norwegian interests viewed in relation to foreign states, organisations or private individuals, and in this context prepare threat analyses and intelligence assessments to the extent that this may help to safeguard important national interests, including design of Norwegian foreign, defence and security policy, contingency planning and correct handling of episodes and crises, long-term planning and structural development of the Norwegian Defence Establishment efficiency of the operational departments of the Norwegian Defence Establishment: • • • • •

support for defence alliances in which Norway participates, Norwegian forces that participate in international operations, procurement of information concerning international terrorism, procurement of information concerning supranational environmental problems, procurement of information concerning different forms of proliferation of weapons of mass. 483

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• •

destruction and equipment and materials needed to produce such weapons, and the basis for Norwegian participation in and follow-up of international agreements on disarmament and arms control measures.

Official source NIS (2019) Norwegian Intelligence Service, https://eos-utvalget.no/english_1/services/ the_eos_services/the_norwegian_intelligence_service/

Poland Polish security and intelligence The Internal Security Agency The Internal Security Agency is a government institution which protects the Republic of Poland and its citizens.

Official source ISA (2019) Internal Security Agency, www.abw.gov.pl/en/our-mission/14,Our-Mission. html

Portugal Portuguese security and intelligence Portuguese Internal Intelligence Service (SIS) SIS is tasked with producing security intelligence to assist political decision makers. We aim to anticipate phenomena and knowing the threats to collective security, such as: • • • • • • • • • •

Transnational Terrorism Classic Espionage Economic Espionage Organised Crime Ideological and Religious Extremism Money Laundering International Trafficking of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) – Proliferation Trafficking of Human Beings and Illegal Migration Cybercrime New Types of Crime

To counter these threats, SIS counts on the support of all the security and law enforcement agencies and the public authorities in general. The former have a special duty to collaborate with SIS, while the latter have a generic duty of providing support when such is justifiably requested. In turn, SIS discloses to the competent criminal investigation and law enforcement authorities any information that is pertinent in terms of assisting with preventing criminal activities. We are not authorised to restrict fundamental rights, freedoms and guarantees; intercept communications; make arrests; carry out criminal proceedings or investigations; carry out acts that fall under the courts or law enforcement bodies. 484

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SIS works within the ethical framework of a modern democracy, fully accountable to the Prime Minister, the Portuguese law and under parliamentary scrutiny. SIS exists to protect the country, its people and its interest (SIS, 2019).

Official source SIS (2019) Portuguese Internal Intelligence Service, www.sis.pt/en

Romania Romanian security and intelligence Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) The Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) is the state institution specialised in foreign information on national security, defence of Romania and its interests. Mission As part of the national security system, our work starts where others cannot move ­forward. To achieve our goals, we are ready for any sacrifice. We fulfil our mission by: • • •

gathering information relevant to Romania’s national security, information that ­provides the basis for decision-making for state authorities; early warning of risks and threats, as well as strategic assessments of the international security environment; conducting operations to defend and promote Romania’s interests.

‘Stock’ Patriotism We put the country before everything, the duty before our own, we are proud to know that everything we do is for Romania. Integrity We assume the highest standards of ethics, honesty and fairness. By respecting our beneficiaries, we respect ourselves. Professional Excellence We have high quality standards. We act with professionalism and pragmatism. We’re doing the best, because that is the only way we can achieve our goals. We manage to be an elite institution only through elite people. The peace and security of our fellow citizens also depend on the extent to which we are prepared to sacrifice our peace, security and time. We believe in each other and form a team, even though we are often alone in the mission. Altruism, anonymity, sacrifice is the way we chose to live, because working in SIE is not just a way of winning your existence, it is a way of life. Cooperation The SIE is organised as an autonomous administrative authority with legal personality, a component of the national security system of Romania. SIE is part of the National Intelligence Community (CSAT No. 146/2005) and is represented in the Coordinating Committee for the National Intelligence Community by the Director of the Institution and the Operational Council of the National Intelligence Community by the deputy for the 485

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operative activity. The cooperation of the SIE with the other structures with responsibilities in the field of national security is materialised by an operative exchange of information on the issues of common interest, as well as in other aspects or forms of work that contribute to ensuring national security. Given the indivisible nature of security and the preponderance of the external factor in the creation of asymmetric threats, the Foreign Intelligence Service is part of a complex system of contacts and exchanges in the international intelligence community. SIE’s contributions to the various forms of external cooperation are translated not only into successful operations to counteract threats to our country, but also in strengthening Romania’s profile contributing to European and Allied security. Communication In establishing a link with civil society and the media, the SIE ensures the necessary balance between the citizen’s right to be informed under transparency and the obligation to keep secrets on those data which, according to the law, cannot be made public. Inevitably, there are a number of restrictions determined by the specificity of the activity, which is also found in all intelligence services in the democratic states (SIE, 2019).

Official source SIE (2019) Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE), www.sie.ro/

Academic sources Leigh, I. and Wegge, N. (2018) Intelligence Oversight in the Twentieth-First Century: Accountability in a Changing World. London: Routledge. Matei, F.C. (2007) Romania’s Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of ­Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 20(4): 629–660.

Serbia Serbian security and intelligence Republic of Serbia Security-Intelligence System The Republic of Serbia Security-Intelligence System includes Security-Information Agency, Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency. Harmonisation of the activities of the security services is performed by Coordination Bureau (SSIS, 2019).

Official source SSIS (2019) Republic of Serbia Security-Intelligence System, www.voa.mod.gov.rs/en/#. XIVw3odCdjo

Academic source Milosavljevic, B. (2017) Proposed solutions for improving the legal framework on the S­ erbian security and intelligence system. Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, www.bezbednost.org/ All-publications/6521/Proposed-solutions-for-improving-the-legal.shtml 486

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Slovakia Slovakian security and intelligence Slovak Information Service (SIS) The Slovak Information Service is a state authority that uses the most sophisticated human and technical resources to protect the Slovak Republic and its interests (SSI, 2019).

Official source SSI (2019) Slovak Information Service, www.sis.gov.sk/about-us/introduction.html

Academic source Altenhöner, F. (2012) SS-Intelligence, Covert Operations and the Slovak Declaration of Independence in March 1939. Journal of Intelligence History, 8(2): 15–24.

Slovenia Slovene security and intelligence Slovene Security and Intelligence Agency (SOVA) The Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency (SOVA) is the central civilian intelligence and security service established after the international recognition of the independent and sovereign state of Slovenia. Its basic activity is to protect national interests in the security, political and economic fields, i.e. to provide national security. Its organisational structure is designed so as to meet the requirements of its mission. The Agency’s remit and authority, forms of its cooperation with other state agencies as well as the established forms of oversight of its work are set forth in the National Security Programme adopted by the National Assembly. The Agency carries out its work under the oversight of the legislative, judicial and executive branches of power as well as of the public and internal control mechanisms, which is distinctive of the modern security and intelligence services operating in democracies. The development of the Agency is directed towards creating a modern and dynamic service, in which up-to-date information and analytical methods combined with state-of-the-art information technologies have an important role. SOVA promotes expert development of its employees, organisational culture and a cost-effective and rational use of resources (SOVA, 2019).

Official source SOVA (2019) Slovene Security and Intelligence Agency, www.sova.gov.si/en/

Academic source Ferš, D. (2002) From Security and Intelligence Service to Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency, National Security and the Future, 3 (1–2), www.nsf-journal.hr/Online-Issues/ Case-Studies/id/1122/from-security-and-intelligence-service–-to-­s lovene-intelligenceand-security-agencybrvolume-3-number-1-2-spring-summer-2002#.XIeBUodCdjo 487

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Spain Spanish security and intelligence National Intelligence Centre (CNI) The National Intelligence Centre (CNI) is the public institution responsible for providing the Prime Minister and the Government of Spain with information, analysis, studies or proposals that enable the prevention and avoidance of any danger, threat or aggression against the independence or territorial integrity of Spain, its national interests and the stability of its institutions and the rule of law. Act 11/2002 of 6th May regulates the nature, goals, principles, structure, legal and administrative system of the Spanish National Intelligence ­Centre. Additionally, Organic Law 2/2002, also of 6th May, establishes a preliminary judicial ­control of its activities (CNI, 2019).

Official source CNI (2019) National Intelligence Centre, www.cni.es/en/welcometocni/

Academic source Matei, F.C., de Castro, A., Halladay, G. and Halladay, C. (2018) On Balance: Intelligence Democratization in Post-Franco Spain. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 31(4): 769–801.

Sweden Swedish security and intelligence Swedish Security Service (SSS) The Security Service prevents and detects offences against national security, fights terrorism and protects the central Government. The purpose of our activities is to protect the democratic system, the rights and freedoms of our citizens and national security. We engage in five areas of activity: • •

•

•

•

Counter-espionage, which refers to the prevention and detection of espionage and ­unlawful intelligence activities. Counterterrorism, which refers to the prevention and detection of terrorism targeting Sweden or foreign interests in our country, acts of terrorism in other countries and the existence of international terrorist networks in Sweden. Protection of the Constitution, which refers to the prevention and detection of illegal activities which, through the use of violence, threat or force, aim to attain political goals or prevent citizens from exercising their constitutional rights and freedoms. Protective security, which involves advice to and inspection of companies and government agencies, in the interest of protecting information of importance to national ­security and of preventing terrorism. This also includes performing records checks ­following requests from the authorities concerned. Dignitary protection, which refers to security and guarding services for the central Government, the Royal Family, foreign diplomatic representatives, state visits and ­similar (SSS, 2019). 488

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Official source SSS (2019) Swedish Security Service, www.sakerhetspolisen.se/en/swedish-security-­service/ counter-espionage/recruiting-an-agent.html

Academic source Petersson, M. (2012) Sweden and the Scandinavian Defence Dilemma. Scandinavian Journal of History, 37(2): 221–229.

Switzerland Swiss security and intelligence Federal Intelligence Service The Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) is a Swiss security policy instrument with a mission that is clearly defined in legal terms. Its core tasks are prevention and situation assessment for the political leaders. Domestically, the FIS is concerned with early perception and prevention of terrorism, violent extremism, espionage, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery system technology as well as cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. Internationally, the FIS obtains information relevant to security policy from abroad and evaluates it. In this way, it contributes decisively towards comprehensive assessment of the threat situation. At the federal level, the FIS primarily provides products for the Federal Council, the departments and the military command. The FIS also helps the cantons maintain inner security and supports the federal law enforcement authorities. The preventive activity of the FIS must be clearly distinguished from the repressive role of the law enforcement authorities. The FIS is not a law enforcement authority. Its core tasks are prevention and situation assessment on behalf of the political leaders. The legal foundations On 25 September 2016, the Swiss electorate voted in favour of the new Intelligence Service Act, which came into force on 1 September 2017, together with the Ordinance on the Federal Intelligence Service (FISO), the Ordinance on the FIS Information and Storage Systems (ISSO-FIS) and the Ordinance on the Supervision of Intelligence Activities (OSIA). The Act reformulates the FIS’s responsibilities for providing a comprehensive situation assessment. It also allows for the protection of national interests of strategic importance, such as critical infrastructure and the Swiss financial and industrial sectors. The FISO safeguards the individual freedom of Swiss citizens. The state must exercise the utmost restraint with regard to any intrusion on personal privacy. The new information gathering resources introduced by the FISO are to be used only after prior approval by the Federal Administrative Court, the Federal Council Security Committee and the Head of the DDPS. In addition, the FIS will be subject to much stricter supervision. Supervision and control All FIS activities are subject to continuous checks. The FIS is supervised by an independent supervisory authority, the Federal Council, Parliament and the Federal Administration (FIS, 2019).

Official source FIS (2019) Federal Intelligence Service, www.vbs.admin.ch/en/ddps/organisation/administrativeunits/intelligence-service.html 489

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Academic source Guitton, C. (2017) Beyond Appearances: Cooperation, Structure, and Constraints of the Swiss Intelligence Service. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 12(2): 175–189.

Ukraine Ukrainian security and intelligence The Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) The SSU is a special-purpose law-enforcement agency, which provides state security of Ukraine and is subordinated to the President of Ukraine. The activities of the SSU, its bodies and officers are based on the principles of legality, respect for human rights and dignity, non-partisanship and responsibility before the people of Ukraine. The SSU in its operational activities is committed to the principles of single command and collegiality, publicity and secrecy. The armed aggression of Russia in the East of the state and the annexation of Crimea caused development of new approaches to the reforming and further activities of our state security sector agencies. Joint groundwork in the light of foreign experience resulted in drafting and approval by the Decree of the President of Ukraine of March 14, 2016 #92/2016 of the “Concept of the Security and Defense Sector Development”, which defines the ideology of security and defence capabilities of Ukraine in midterm, which were formed on the basis of assessment of the security environment, financial and economic capabilities of the state, conducted in the process of the security and defence sector of Ukraine complex inspection. According to its provisions, the SSU is responsible for: •

•

•

•

•

the counterintelligence protection of state sovereignty, constitutional order, territorial integrity, economic, scientific and technical, defence capabilities, information security of Ukraine, vital interests of the state, rights and freedoms of the citizens from ­foreign secret services intrusions, separate organisations, groups and persons, which pose a threat to the national security of Ukraine; counteraction to intelligence, reconnaissance and sabotage activities and other illegal activities of the foreign secret services, separate organisations, groups and persons, which pose a threat to the national security of Ukraine; counterintelligence protection of state authorities, scientific and technical, defence ­capabilities, defence-industry and transport complexes, national system of telecommunications and its facilities, critical infrastructure facilities of strategic importance; prevention, detection and solving of crimes against peace and human security, which are committed in the cyberspace; taking counterintelligence, operational and search measures, directed at combating cyberterrorism and cyberespionage; counteraction to cybercrimes, possible results of which pose a threat to the vital interests of Ukraine; investigation of cyber incidents and cyberattacks on the state electronic information resources, the information, which is to be protected according to the law, critical information infrastructure and its separate facilities; testing of preparedness to protect critical informational infrastructure facilities from possible cyberattacks and cyber incidents; 490

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• •

• •

• • • •

ensuring of response to the computer incidents in the state security sphere; taking of complex administrative law, organisational, operational and search, operational and technical actions on counteraction to terrorist activities, including international, and terrorism financing; counteraction to crimes, which pose a threat to state security of Ukraine (with further staged optimisation as required by law of the SSU responsibilities in this area); detecting and counteraction to transnational and interregional organised criminal groups, combating signs of the organised crimes in different areas (with further staged optimisation as required by law of the SSU responsibilities in this sphere); counteraction to special information operations and influences of the foreign secret ­services, organisations, groups and persons; combating trafficking and illegal use of eavesdropping equipment; conducting of information and analytical activities in the interests of the state security of Ukraine; prevention of crimes against state security of Ukraine (SSU, 2019).

Official source SSU (2019) Security Service of Ukraine, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/pages/36

Academic source Saumets, A. and Sazonov, V. (2016) The Crisis in Ukraine and Information Operations of the ­Russian Federation. Cultural, Peace and Conflict Studies book series volume 6, Estonian Journal of Military Studies, 1–246.

Asia Afghanistan Afghan security and intelligence National Directorate of Intelligence Intelligence agencies in Afghanistan are outstandingly failing to collect information of high value beneficial for Afghan’s domestic security. Deploying under-trained and inexperienced intelligence officers with limited knowledge of technical tools or key operational skills results in the collection of inadequate information [as well as inefficient] flow and management. With amateurish operational skills, these agents are unable to collect vital information for state security; some, even in the best of their experience, collect poor quality intelligence. Information collected from major known terror outfits and key government institutions could force policymakers and military leadership to make wrong decisions. The main objective of intelligence gathering is to maintain a swift flow of information, but the NDS officers are not well versed in this task. For example, the successful capture of Kunduz (a province in northern Afghanistan) by the Taliban did not occur because of their weapons superiority or technical expertise in battlefield; it happened because of massive failure of intelligence coop­ fghanistan eration and coordination between the NDS, the National Security Agency of A (NSA), the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Interior Ministry (MoI) (Mishra, 2018).

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Policy source Mishra, A. (2018) Strengthening Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS): Is it equipped to counter ‘emerging’ threats? Modern Diplomacy, https://modern diplomacy.eu/2018/02/27/strengthening-afghanistans-national-directorate-securitynds-equipped-counter-emerging-threats/

Policy source AO (2019) Afghanistan Online, www.afghan-web.com/security/

Academic source Croll, S. (2005) Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden. London: Penguin.

China Chinese security and intelligence Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Military Commission (CMC) Ministry of State Security (MSS) The Communist Party of China (CPC) is the party in power in the country. The CPC has both central and local organisations. At the top is the Central Committee and, while when it is not in session, the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee exercise the power of the Central Committee. Both the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee are elected by the plenary session of the Central Committee. The CPC is a unified entity organised according to its programme, constitution and the principle of democratic centralism. The Constitution of the CPC stipulates that any Chinese worker, farmer, member of the armed forces, intellectual and any advanced element of other social strata who has reached the age of eighteen and who accepts the programme and constitution of the CPC and is willing to join and work in one of the Party organisations, carry out the Party’s decisions and pay membership dues regularly may apply for membership in the CPC. Central Military Commission The Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China is the highest state military organ with the responsibility of commanding the entire armed forces in the country. Led by a chairman and consisting of vice chairmen and members, the Commission is elected for a term of five years and can stand for re-election. The chairman of the Central Military Commission is elected by the NPC, and the selection of other members is decided by the NPC and its Standing Committee on the basis of the nomination by the chairman. The State Central Military Commission follows the system of chairman responsibility in work, while the chairman is responsible to the NPC and has the right to make final decisions on affairs within its functions and powers (PPC, 2019).

Official source PPC (2019) The People’s Republic of China, www.gov.cn/english/ 492

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Ministry of State Security (MSS) The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, namely the Central People’s ­Government, is the highest executive organ of State power, as well as the highest organ of State administration. The State Council is composed of a premier, vice-premiers, State councillors, ministers in charge of ministries and commissions, the auditor-general and the secretary-general. The premier of the State Council is nominated by the president, reviewed by the NPC, and appointed and removed by the president. Other members of the State Council are nominated by the premier, reviewed by the NPC or its Standing Committee, and ­appointed and removed by the president. In the State Council, a single term of each ­office is five years, and incumbents cannot be reappointed after two successive terms. The State Council follows the system of premier responsibility in work while various ministries and commissions under the State Council follow the system of ministerial responsibility. In dealing with foreign affairs, State councillors can conduct important activities on behalf the premier after being entrusted by the premier of the State Council. The auditor-general is the head of the State Auditing Administration, in charge of auditing and supervising State finances. The secretary-general, under the premier, is responsible for the day-to-day work of the State Council and is in charge of the general office of the State Council. The State Council is responsible for carrying out the principles and policies of the CPC as well as the regulations and laws adopted by the NPC, and dealing with such affairs as ­China’s internal politics, diplomacy, national defence, finance, economy, culture and education. Under the current Constitution, the State Council exercises the power of administrative legislation, the power to submit proposals, the power of administrative leadership, the power of economic management, the power of diplomatic administration, the power of social ­administration and other powers granted by the NPC and its Standing Committee (CFF, 2019).

Official source CFF (2019) China Fact File, www.gov.cn/english/2013-03/15/content_2354765.htm

Policy source RUSI (2019) Royal United Services Institute, Various Current Materials on Chinese S­ ecurity and Intelligence, https://rusi.org/search/node/china

Academic sources Diamond, L. and Schell, O. (eds.) (2018) Chinese Influence and American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance. Stanford: Hoover Institution. Mattis, P. (2019) China. Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/analyst/peter-mattis/

India Indian security and intelligence Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) India’s RAW is the country’s premier intelligence agency. Established to satisfy the need for increased intelligence that was identified during the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War and during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, RAW was created in 1968 to handle India’s external intelligence affairs. 493

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Currently, RAW operates under the Prime Minister’s Office, and was intentionally e­ stablished as a ‘wing’ versus an ‘agency’ in order to bypass agency reporting requirements to Parliament’s Right to Information Act. Accordingly, it is hard to find detailed information about the organisation. Since its inception, RAW is credited with providing intelligence support to many significant operations on foreign soil. However, as with all of India’s intelligence organisations, RAW is not without flaws. RAW is known for not working in cooperation with the Intelligence Bureau (IB) or other Indian intelligence agencies. This lack of cooperation and coordination has led to multiple inquiries into RAW’s true analytic capabilities and their overall relevance to the protection of Indian interests. History Prior to 1968, India’s IB was responsible for all of India’s internal and external intelligence activities; however, the bureau was not equipped to handle the demands of both missions. This became apparent when India’s lack of Foreign Intelligence collection against China resulted in India’s defeat during the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War. Three years later, the Indo-Pakistani War reinforced India’s need for a separate and distinct external intelligence organisation. In 1968, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi appointed R. N. Kao as the first director of RAW. With 250 employees and a budget of $405,600, RAW undertook two primary missions: • •

Maintain awareness of the political and military activities of neighbouring countries, primarily China and Pakistan. Promote the control of military equipment supplies into Pakistan.

Under Kao’s leadership, from 1968 to 1977, RAW provided intelligence support, which resulted in many successful operations; the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, the defeat of Pakistan during the Kargil conflict of 1971, the accession of Sikkim in 1975 and the increase of Indian influence in Afghanistan. With all of the organisation’s successes throughout its first decade, RAW quickly grew in both personnel and financing. By the mid-1970s, reports indicate that RAW’s budget had jumped to $6.1 million and their workforce increased to several thousands. Additionally, as intelligence gaps were identified, Kao petitioned the Indian government to establish the Aviation Research Center (ARC), which would be responsible for providing aerial reconnaissance of neighbouring countries. This capability allowed RAW to better prepare for impending conflict by obtaining overhead images of installations and activities along the Chinese and Pakistani borders. Attached Bodies or Autonomous Bodies Aerial Reconnaissance Centre The ARC is responsible for collection of high-quality overhead imagery of activities and installations in neighbouring countries. Special Frontier Force A paramilitary force in India, the Special Frontier Force is headed by the inspector general who reports to the director general of security for RAW. While the force has functions independent of RAW, it is often fielded to support covert and overt RAW missions. National Technical Facilities Organization/National Technical Research Organization 494

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The function of the NTRO is suspected to be technological espionage. There are also indicators to suggest that they perform imagery and communications analysis via varying platforms (RAW, 2019).

Official source RAW (2019) Research and Analysis Wing, www.allgov.com/india/departments/ministryof-youth-affairs-and-sports/research-and-analysis-wing?agencyid=7606

Academic source Shaffer, R. (2017) Indian Intelligence Revealed: An Examination of Operations, Failures and Transformations. Intelligence and National Security, 33(4): 598–610.

Indonesia Indonesian security and intelligence State Intelligence Agency (BIN) Awful, secretive, mysterious, closed, clandestine and even violent. That is the spontaneous ­impression that often arises from the public mind set, when asked about the world of ­Intelligence. Sometimes, this lay mind set is still followed by cynicism towards the ­Intelligence profession, as reflected in the expression ‘Malay intel’ or ‘Malay mirror’. Not surprisingly, such thinking is still developing amongst the people, because the world character of Intelligence prioritises the principle of secrecy, anonymity and clandestine ways of working. Entering the era of openness, Intelligence is challenged to change the ‘mysterious’ character inherent in a more impressive ‘open’ character with the public. Public associations when talking about Intelligence, of course, cannot be separated from the existence of the institution of the State Intelligence Agency (BIN). This is justified, because BIN is the only institution whose position is ‘State Intelligence’. Internally, the BIN Office is known as the Soekarno Hatta Kasatrian Complex, although the people around Compound are more familiar with the BAKIN Complex. Indeed, the office located on Jalan Seno Raya, Pejaten Timur – Pasar Minggu, South Jakarta, was once the Office of BAKIN. The first impression when entering the BIN Complex, it was stated that security issues were a major concern. This office is surrounded by an iron fence that limits public roads to the streets of the office environment. From Jalan Seno Raya which is parallel to the PasarKalibata railroad track, there is a high fence covered by thick bamboo trees, as if hiding BIN office buildings. From Jalan Seno Raya, it is also seen towering the existence of the ­Soekarno-Hatta Statue, right in front of the main entrance to the BIN office complex. This ‘Father of the Nation’ statue was built when BIN was led by General (Ret.) AM. Hendropriyono (2004) and was inaugurated by the President at the time, ­Megawati ­Soekarnoputri. The making of the statue aims to commemorate the services of the ­Indonesian Proclamator who succeeded in uniting the Indonesian people. The existence of the ­Soekarno-Hatta Statue in front of the office makes it easy to get to know the intelligence compound that is the Headquarters of BIN. In the institutional context, the atmosphere of the BIN office environment is very impressive in establishing authority. Authority must not always be translated into images of 495

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awesomeness or even violence. Authority also contains the value of harmony of relations between institutions and stakeholders, including the general public. The environment and comfort of the BIN Office need to be promoted to change the contrasting atmosphere of ‘image intelligence’ so far (BIN, 2019).

Official source BIN (2019) State Intelligence Agency, https://translate.google.co.uk/translate?hl=en&sl=id&u= http://www.bin.go.id/&prev=search

Academic source Power, T.P. (2018) Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 54(3): 307–338.

Japan Japanese security and intelligence Public Security Intelligence Agency Intelligence is an indispensable foundation for the whole process of government policy ­implementation, from policy formulation to adoption. In particular, it is essential that the full capabilities of government as a whole be focused towards the gathering and analysis of intelligence concerning threats to national survival as well as the lives, physical safety and assets of the people. The Public Security Intelligence Agency investigates organisations that may engage in violent subversive activities. Intelligence gathered in the course of this process is analysed, and the resulting intelligence products are provided to the relevant organs. In this way, the Agency contributes to government policy (PSIA, 2019).

Official source PSIA (2019) Public Security Intelligence Agency, www.moj.go.jp/psia/English.html

Academic source Kobayashi, Y. (2015) Assessing Reform of the Japanese Intelligence Community. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 28(4): 717–733.

South Korea South Korean security and intelligence Korean Central Intelligence Agency After the government was set up on August 15, 1948, intelligence activities were centred around government agencies including the military which had their own domestic, foreign or communication intelligence functions. The non-centralised nature of the intelligence community imposed undue limitations and gave rise to significant inefficiencies in intelligence work including a higher incidence of intelligence errors, overlapping duties and overly heated competition. These limitations 496

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sparked debate about the need to establish a seamless, consolidated national intelligence agency. This debate led to the establishment in 1961 of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency with the promulgation of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency Act. Significance of Establishment Establishment of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency was significant in the following respects: • • •

•

Launch of a central national intelligence agency increased the efficiency of formulation and execution of national security policy. Consolidation of all intelligence functions into one organisation enabled efficient management of human and material resources. Under a single agency, an integrated and systematic approach to collecting and analysing overseas intelligence became possible. This also facilitated the training of specialised intelligence officers and allowed the establishment of an intelligence training and technology research scheme. Protects national security by investigating espionage and pro-North Korean operatives

The NIS strives to protect liberal democracy by apprehending and prosecuting spies and proNorth Korean operatives who pose threats to national security and seek to instigate societal conflict and unrest. Conducts joint interrogation of North Korean defectors and supports their quick ­settlement in the South Korean society There has been an exodus of North Koreans making their way to the South after fleeing the North. By joint interrogation with other agencies, the NIS detects North Koreans operatives coming to South Korea under the guise of defectors. The NIS then helps those cleared of such suspicion quickly settle down in the South Korean society. Improves security investigation competencies In order to effectively respond to the increasingly sophisticated and wide-ranging activities by spies and pro-North Korean operatives, the NIS has bolstered its security investigation competencies by developing new scientific investigation techniques and other means (GS, 2019).

Policy source GS (2019a) Global Security, www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/rok/kcia.htm

Academic sources Glosserman, B. and Snyder, S.A. (2015) The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian ­Security and the United States. New York: Columbia University Press. McEachern, P. and O’Brien McEachern, J. (2019) North Korea, Iran and the Challenge to the International Order. London: Routledge.

North Korea North Korean security and intelligence According to a 2017 report from the U.S. Department of Defense North Korean intelligence and security services collect political, military, economic and technical information through open sources, human intelligence, cyber intrusions and 497

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signals intelligence capabilities. North Korea’s primary intelligence collection targets remain the ROK, the United States and Japan. They likely operate anywhere North Korea has a diplomatic or sizable economic overseas presence. The Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) is North Korea’s primary foreign intelligence service, responsible for collection and clandestine operations. The RGB c­ omprises six bureaus with compartmented functions, including operations, reconnaissance, technology and cyber capabilities, overseas intelligence, inter-Korean talks and service support. The Ministry of State Security (MSS) is North Korea’s primary counterintelligence service and is an autonomous agency of the North Korean Government reporting directly to Kim Jong Un. The MSS is responsible for operating North Korean prison camps, investigating cases of domestic espionage, repatriating defectors and conducting overseas counter-­ espionage activities in North Korea’s foreign missions. The United Front Department (UFD) overtly attempts to establish pro-North Korean groups in the ROK, such as the Korean Asia Pacific Committee and the Ethnic Reconciliation Council. The UFD is also the primary department involved in managing inter-Korean dialogue and North Korea’s policy towards the ROK. The 225th Bureau is responsible for training agents to infiltrate the ROK and establish underground political parties focused on fomenting unrest and revolution (FAS, 2017).

Policy source FAS (2017) Federation of American Scientists, https://fas.org/irp/world/dprk/index.html

Academic source Chang, K. and Lee, C. (2018) North Korea and the East Asian Security Order: Competing Views on What South Korea Ought to Do. The Pacific Review, 31(2): 245–255.

Pakistan Pakistan security and intelligence Intelligence Bureau (IB) Military Intelligence (MI) Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Overview of Intelligence Services Pakistan has three main intelligence services: IB, MI and ISI. The common goal of these agencies is to look after interests and preserve national security of Pakistan on both external and internal fronts. Intelligence Bureau (IB) Primary job of IB is to monitor politicians, political activists, suspected terrorists and suspected foreign intelligence agents. The IB keeps tabs on political operatives from countries it considers hostile to Pakistan’s interests. IB is headed by Director General Intelligence Bureau and is part of the Interior Ministry of Pakistan. IB reports directly to the Prime Minister’s office. 498

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Military Intelligence (MI) MI is tasked with counterinsurgency operations, identifying and eliminating sleeper cells, foreign agents and other anti-Pakistani elements within Pakistan. Additional functions ­involve monitoring high-level military and political leaders and safeguarding critical facilities such as military and non-military installations. MI also has limited external role as well. Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) ISI is one of the best and very well-organised intelligence agency in the world. It was founded in 1948. In 1950, it was officially given the task to safeguard Pakistani interests and national security inside and outside the country. The ISI is tasked with collection of foreign and domestic intelligence; coordination of intelligence functions of the three military services; surveillance over its cadre, foreigners, the media, politically active segments of Pakistani society, diplomats of other countries accredited to Pakistan and Pakistani diplomats serving outside the country; the interception and monitoring of communications; and the conduct of covert offensive and wartime operations (PI, 2019).

Policy source PI (2019) Pakistani Defence.com, www.pakistanidefence.com/Info/Intelligence.html

Policy source GS (2019b) Intelligence Bureau Pakistan. Global Security.org, www.globalsecurity.org/ intell/world/pakistan/ib.htm

Academic source Behuria, A.K. (2016) India and Pakistan: Will They Move beyond ‘Sharing of Intelligence’? Strategic Analysis, 46(3): 204–209.

Philippines Philippines security and intelligence National Bureau of Intelligence The main objective of the National Bureau of Intelligence is the establishment and maintenance of a modern effective and efficient investigation service and research agency for the purpose of implementing fully principal functions under the Republic Act.

Official source NBI (2019) National Bureau of Intelligence, https://nbi.gov.ph/

Academic source De Castro, R. (2014) Philippine Strategic Culture: Continuity in the Face of Changing ­Regional Dynamics. Contemporary Security Policy, 35(2): 249–269. 499

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Taiwan Taiwanese security and intelligence National Security Bureau The National Security Bureau (NSB), the Republic of China (Taiwan) – the Bureau’s missions are: (1) collecting and acting upon intelligence related to national security; (2) strategising and executing special service tasks; (3) regulating and developing cryptology-related technology. The Bureau shoulders the vital responsibilities of protecting our nation and maintaining the stable development of our nation (NSB, 2019).

Official source NSB (2019) National Security Bureau, www.nsb.gov.tw/En/En_index01.html

Academic source Hersman, R.K.C. and Peters, R. (2006) Nuclear U-Turns Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback. Nonproliferation Review, 13(3): 1746–1766.

Africa and the Middle East Algeria Algerian security and intelligence Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS) Policy source Reuters (2016) Algeria’s Bouteflika Dissolves DRS Spy Unit, Creates New Agency, www.reuters.com/article/us-algeria-security/algerias-bouteflika-dissolves-drs-spy-unitcreates-new-agency-sources-idUSKCN0V31PU

Academic sources Davies, P. and Gustafson, K. (2016) Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage outside the Anglosphere. Washington: Georgetown University Press. Fanon, F. (2001) The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin.

Egypt Egypt security and intelligence General Intelligence Service (GIS) Egypt: Behind Dismissal of Spy Chief The General Intelligence Service (GIS) is an Egyptian intelligence agency responsible for providing national security intelligence, both domestically and transnationally, with 500

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a counterterrorism focus. It is an independent sovereign security and information body ­a ffiliated to the Presidency. The GIS is part of the Egyptian intelligence community, t­ogether with the Office of Military Intelligence Services and Reconnaissance and National Security. The decision to set up an Egyptian intelligence service was taken by President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954, and placed under the command of Zakaria Mohieddin. The agency’s importance rose when Nasser assigned its command to Salah Nasr, who held the post of director of the GIS from 1957 to 1967 and thoroughly reorganised the agency. Under Nasr’s supervision, the GIS relocated to its own building and established separate divisions for Radio, Computer, Forgery and Black Operations. To cover the agency’s expenses, Nasr set up Al Nasr Company, ostensibly an import-export firm, as a front organisation. He played a very important role helping Algeria, Southern Yemen and many Arab and African states gain independence. Although the Egyptian foreign ministry was officially responsible for foreign affairs, GIS initiated and aided many Arab and African movements for independence as a part of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s anti-imperialist policies. Nasr established good relations with other intelligence agencies across the globe, which helped providing Egypt with wheat and establishing industries such as Al Nasr Company for Motor Cars. One of his constructions is the Gezeera Tower in Cairo. For several years, the name of GIS director was a secret only known to high officials and government newspapers chief editors. However, Major-General Omar Suleiman, who was the head of the GIS from 1993 to January 2011, was the first one to break this taboo. His name was published before he himself became a known face in media after being envoyed by former Egyptian president Mubarak to Israel, USA and Gaza on several occasions. The Director of the General Intelligence directly reports to the President (EIS, 2019).

Official source GOE (2019) Government of Egypt, www.egypt.gov.eg/english/home.aspx

Policy source EIS (2019) Egypt: Behind Dismissal of Spy Chief. Egypt Institute for Studies, https:// en.eipss-eg.org/egypt-behind-dismissal-of-spy-chief/

Academic source Piazza, B.A. (2018) The Foreign Policy of Post-Mubarak Egypt and the Strengthening of Relations with Saudi Arabia: Balancing between Economic Vulnerability and Regional and Regime Security. The Journal of North African Studies, doi:10.1080/13629387.2018.1454650

Iran Iranian security and intelligence Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) Iran’s feared intelligence ministry launches official source One of Iran’s most feared and secretive state agencies has softened its tone and pulled back the curtain on some of its activities in what appears to be an attempt to improve its public 501

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image. The country’s Intelligence Ministry has launched a new Official Source with a variety of content apparently aimed at informing, reassuring and protecting ordinary Iranians. Its debut offerings include an interview with Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehi – who notes that all ‘antirevolutionary’ moves are being closely monitored – as well as analyses of U.S. and Israeli intelligence services and information about ‘human rights abuses by the U.S. government’, and ‘Egypt’s new ties with the Zionist regime’. Somewhat ironically for an agency that has admitted hacking into the email accounts of opposition members, it also offers tips on how to protect online data. The Intelligence Ministry says that the aim of its new Official Source is to forge better ties with both the media and ordinary Iranians. The move also appears to be part of a larger effort by the Islamic republic to expand its online presence and confront what it has described as a ‘soft war’ by its enemies (RFEL, 2019).

Official source Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) PRI (2019) Official website of the President of the Republic of Iran, www.president.ir/en

Policy sources After the 1979 revolution, the Organization of Intelligence and National Security was ­d issolved and the Bureau of Intelligence was formed by the Prime Minister. In 1983, the law of the establishment of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security was approved by the Parliament (IDP, 2019).

Policy sources RFEL (2019) Radio Free Europe Liberty, www.rferl.org/a/irans-intelligence-­m inistrylaunches-Official Source/24744834.html IDP (2019) Iran Data Portal, http://irandataportal.syr.edu/ministry-of-intelligence-andsecurity-mois

Academic source Akbarzadeh, S. (2017) Iran’s Uncertain Standing in the Middle East. The Washington ­Quarterly, 40(3): 109–127.

Iraq Iraqi security and intelligence Iraqi National Intelligence Service The Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) is an intelligence agency of the Iraqi government that was created in April 2004 on the authority of the Coalition Provisional Authority. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority Paul Bremer disbanded Iraq’s military and security services. As the security situation within Iraq deteriorated and Iraqi resistance to the occupation became stronger and more violent, the need for a secret service became more pressing. In December 2003, The Washington Post reported that Iyad Allawi and Nouri Badran, members of both the Iraq Interim Governing 502

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Council and the Iraqi National Accord political party, flew to the U.S. to discuss details of setting up a new secret service with the help of the CIA. The agency was to be headed by Badran and recruit many agents of Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Intelligence Service. The main objective of the new organisation was to counter the insurgency. The hiring process was aided by CIA polygraph. In January 2004, The New York Times reported that the creation of the new agency was under way. It was to employ between 500 and 2,000 staff and be financed by the U.S. government. Ibrahim al-Janabi was said to be the main candidate for leading the spy agency. These efforts drew criticism from Ahmed Chalabi, another formerly exiled Iraqi politician who had good connections with the CIA, who voiced worries that the new agency might be used for the restoration of the old Ba’athist security apparatus and follow the well-established pattern of government repression.

Official source Iraqi National Intelligence Service, www.inis.gov.iq

Policy source Revolvy, www.revolvy.com/page/Iraqi-National-Intelligence-Service

Academic source Gaub, F. (2016) An Unhappy Marriage Civil-Military Relations in Post-Saddam Iraq. ­Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/13/ unhappy-marriage-civil-military-relations-in-post-saddam-iraq-pub-61955

Israel Israeli security and intelligence Mossad The secret history of Mossad, Israel’s feared and respected intelligence agency In December 1949, Israel’s co-founder David Ben-Gurion created a new agency for ­intelligence operations outside the country’s borders: he later named it the Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations. More commonly, though, it was known simply as ‘the Institute’ – the Mossad. With the establishment of the Mossad, Israeli intelligence services coalesced into the three-pronged community that survives in more or less the same form today: Aman, the MI arm that supplies information to the Israeli Defence Force; the Shin Bet, responsible for internal intelligence, counter-terror and counter-espionage; and the Mossad, which deals with covert activities beyond the country’s borders. It was a victory for those who saw the future of the Israeli state as more dependent upon a strong army and intelligence community than upon diplomacy. Ben-Gurion kept all of the agencies under his control. It was an enormous concentration of covert, and political, power. Yet from the beginning, it was kept officially hidden from the Israeli public. Ben-Gurion forbade anyone from acknowledging, let alone revealing, that this sprawling web of official institutions even existed. In fact, mentioning the name Shin 503

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Bet or Mossad in public was prohibited until the 1960s. Because their existence could not be acknowledged, Ben-Gurion prevented the creation of a legal basis for those same agencies’ operations. No law laid out their goals, roles, missions, powers or budgets, or the relations between them. In other words, Israeli intelligence from the outset occupied a shadow realm, one adjacent to, yet separate from, the country’s democratic institutions. A deep state.

Policy source New Statesman, www.newstatesman.com/world/middle-east/2018/08/secret-history-mossadisrael-s-feared-and-respected-intelligence-agency

Official source www.mossad.gov.il/eng/pages/encontactus.aspx

Academic source Bar-Zohar, M. and Mishal, N (2015) Mossad: The Great Operations of Israel’s Secret Service. New York: Robson.

Jordan Jordan security and intelligence General Intelligence Department (GID) GID was established in accordance with the Act 24 of 1964 which outlined the duties and responsibilities of GID, namely to safeguard the security of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan domestically and abroad by means of carrying out necessary intelligence operations. As per Article 127 of the Constitution, His Majesty the King appoints DGID per a Royal Decree. Officers are also appointed by a Royal Decree upon the recommendation of the Director General. Applicants joining the service must be in possession of educational qualifications and need to pass a security check. Once enrolled in the service, the new recruits undergo necessary training to carry out their assigned duties ( Jordan, 2019).

Official source Jordan (2019) General Intelligence Department, https://jordan.gov.jo/wps/portal/Home/­ GovernmentEntities/Agencies/Agency/­G eneral%20Intelligence%20Department?name Entity=General%20Intelligence%20Department&entityType=otherEntity

Libya Libyan security and intelligence Libyan Secret Service One of the first systems to be created by the NTC after the premature liberation of Libya was the Libyan Intelligence System. Their foremost task at the time, according to the NTC, was 504

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to “root out Gaddafi’s loyalists”. Probably due to the nature of their organisation, nothing was heard of them ever since, leading to the Guardian to report some sort of ‘confusion over who has control of Libya’s security forces’. Of course, the question of who really has control of Libya (and of the whole region for that matter) is politically incorrect to ask, replacing one tyranny with another in the name of “unintended mistakes” that no one cares to correct. Law 7/2012: Establishing The Libyan Intelligence System It was not until the 6th of February 2012 that the NTC had finally published some information about the secret organisation. In its Law 7 (of 2012), regarding the establishment of Libyan Intelligence System, there are 103 articles detailing the organisation’s structure and its duties. Article (1) states that the organisation is known as the Libyan Intelligence System, and that its employees are those subject to Law 7 and others who are subject to Law 12/2012. Article (2) states that the various departments and divisions of the organisation shall be determined by decisions issued by the president of the Libyan Intelligence System. Article (3) states that the system’s objective is to achieve Libya’s security and safety via the following: • • • • • • • •

Protection of Libya’s secrets and the prevention of their leakage. Resisting foreign intelligence activity against the safety and security of Libya. Surveillance of foreign bodies, individuals and organisations alike. Follow-up of suspicious activities hostile to the safety of Libya. Counterintelligence. Ensuring the safety of Libya’s interests abroad. Opposing hostile activities from hostile countries aiming at the identity, values and the principles of the Libyan society. Exposing strategies and hostile plots that aim to destabilise the security and the national unity of Libya.

Article (4) calls for all other departments and organisations to cooperate with the Libyan Intelligence System to implement its objectives in accordance with its duties as assigned by the law. Article (6) states that the head of the Intelligence System is a “Minister” and that his deputies are “Deputy Ministers”, the appointment of whom shall be decided by the government.

Policy source European Council on Foreign Affairs, www.ecfr.eu/mena/mapping_libya_conflict Temehu, www.temehu.com/secret-service.htm

Morocco Moroccan security and intelligence Country reports on terrorism 2017 – Morocco Overview: Morocco has a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that includes vigilant security measures, regional and international cooperation, and counter-radicalisation policies. In 2017, Morocco’s counterterrorism efforts effectively mitigated the risk of terrorism, although the country continued to face sporadic threats, largely from small, independent 505

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terrorist cells, the majority of which claimed to be inspired by or affiliated with ISIS. During the year, authorities reported a decrease in the number of terrorist-related arrests (186) for the first time since 2013. Following the August attacks in Barcelona, Morocco assisted the Spanish investigation and promised to expand cooperation to track terrorists of Moroccan origin radicalised abroad. The government remained concerned about the threat posed by the return of ­Moroccan foreign terrorist fighters (estimated at approximately 1,660) and their families. Morocco participates in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and, in September, renewed its term as co-chair of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) with the Netherlands. Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security Morocco effectively investigates, prosecutes and sentences defendants charged under its comprehensive counterterrorism legislation enacted in 2003 and expanded in 2015. The legislation is in line with UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2178 (2014). Moroccan law enforcement units, coordinating with the Ministry of Interior, aggressively targeted and effectively dismantled terrorist cells by leveraging intelligence collection, police work and collaboration with international partners. The Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation (BCIJ), which reports to the General Directorate for Territorial Surveillance and operates under the supervision of the public prosecutor of the Court of Appeals, is the primary law enforcement agency responsible for counterterrorism law enforcement. The General Directorate for National Security has primary responsibility for conducting border inspections at ports of entry such as Casablanca’s Mohammed V Airport. Law enforcement officials and private carriers worked regularly with the United States to detect and deter individuals attempting to transit illegally and to address watch-listed or mala fide travellers. Moroccan airport authorities have excellent capabilities in detecting fraudulent documents, but lacked biometric screening capabilities. In addition, police, customs officers and ­Gendarmerie Royal operate mobile and fixed checkpoints along the roads in border areas and at the entrances to major municipalities. Moroccan naval and coast guard units monitor and patrol Morocco’s extensive coastal waters, including the Strait of Gibraltar, to interdict illicit traffickers. Morocco participated in a wide range of U.S.-sponsored programmes to improve its technical and investigative capabilities, including financial investigation, intelligence analysis and cybersecurity. Through the Trilateral Initiative funded by the Department of State’s ­A ntiterrorism Assistance programme, Morocco and the United States continued to deliver critical incident management training to African partners. In partnership with the ­Department of Defense and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Morocco’s Royal Armed Forces are taking tangible steps to protect critical infrastructure from cyberattacks, control and ­protect logistical hubs, and ensure readiness to prevent or respond to a catastrophic chemical, biological or nuclear terrorist attack. Moroccan authorities reported disrupting a number of alleged terrorist cells throughout the year, announcing that they had arrested 186 individuals and broken up nine cells ­planning to attack a range of targets, including public buildings and tourist sites. •

•

In March, BCIJ dismantled a fifteen-person cell dispersed amongst ten cities, which planned to perpetrate attacks using explosives on soft targets and assassinate public and military officials. In August, cooperating with Spanish counterparts, Moroccan authorities arrested two suspects related to the Barcelona and Cambrils attacks, including one who was allegedly planning to attack the Spanish Embassy in Rabat. 506

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•

In October, BCIJ dismantled a cell linked to ISIS in Fes, arresting eleven suspects and uncovering a cache of guns, ammunition, knives and explosive material at the alleged leader’s house in Khouribga.

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Morocco has a comprehensive CVE strategy that prioritises economic and human development in addition to oversight of the religious sphere and messaging. Morocco has accelerated its creation of education and employment initiatives for vulnerable youth. To counter religious extremism, Morocco promotes its moderate interpretation of the Maliki-Ashari school of Sunni Islam. The Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs has developed an ­educational curriculum for Morocco’s nearly 50,000 imams, as well as the hundreds of ­A frican and European imams studying at Morocco’s international imam training centre in Rabat, which expanded its capacity to 1,800 students in 2017. In Fes, Morocco hosts the ­Institute for African Islamic Religious Scholars, which brings together religious scholars from more than thirty African countries to promote scholarship and to counter terrorist ideology. Domestically, the royal Mohammedan League of Ulema (Rabita Mohammedia) counters radicalisation to violence by producing scholarly research, ensuring conformity in educational curricula, and conducting youth outreach on religious and social topics. In the prisons, the Department of State has supported General Delegation for Prison ­Administration and Reintegration (DGAPR) efforts to modernise prison management, ­develop prisoner classification tools that keep terrorists segregated from the mainstream prison population and construct new more secure facilities. To rehabilitate returning foreign terrorist fighters, the DGAPR worked closely with National Center for Human Rights and religious leaders from Rabita Mohammedia. In August, the King pardoned fourteen detainees following their renunciation of terrorist views after their successful completion of the DGAPR’s rehabilitation programme. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) continued to address youth marginalisation in areas known for recruitment by terrorist organisations by helping youth stay in school, develop skills and become active in their communities. In addition, ­USAID’s Community Oriented Policing Activity provided opportunities for dialogue that has ­resulted in greater trust and a freer flow of information between police and communities. International and Regional Cooperation Morocco rejoined the African Union in 2017. Morocco is a founding member of the GCTF and is a current co-chair. In 2017, Morocco was a co-chair of the GCTF Foreign Terrorist Fighters working group with the Netherlands. The United States and ­Morocco were co-leading the Initiative on Addressing Homegrown Terrorism in partnership with the ­International Institute for Justice and Rule of Law (IIJ). Morocco is a member of the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative. In ­December, Morocco co-sponsored UN Security Council resolution 2396 on returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters. Morocco is an active member of the Organization of Islamic C ­ ooperation and the Arab League. Morocco, a Major Non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally, is a stable security-­ exporting partner that trains security, military and law enforcement officials from sub-­Saharan Africa and participates actively in the 5+5 Defense Initiative to address Mediterranean security issues. Morocco hosts the annual multilateral AFRICAN LION exercise and participates in multilateral regional training exercises, such as the maritime-focused PHOENIX ­EXPRESS and OBANGAME EXPRESS and the FLINTLOCK special operations exercise. Morocco 507

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is also an active member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. Political disagreement between Morocco and Algeria over the status of Western Sahara remained an impediment to bilateral and regional counterterrorism cooperation in 2017 (UN, 2019).

Official source UN (2019) United Nations Refugee Agency/ United States State Department, www.­ refworld.org/docid/5bcf1f91a.html

Official source ECFA (2019) Morocco, the EU and the migration dilemma. European Council on Foreign Affairs, www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_morocco_the_eu_and_the_migration_dilemma

Nigeria Nigerian security and intelligence Defence Intelligence Agency The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established in 1986 to provide an efficient system of obtaining MI for the Armed Forces/Ministry of Defence. This function is carried out through the defence sections. Part of the objectives of the Section includes promotion of Nigeria’s Defence Policy and enhancement of military cooperation with the host nations. The defence sections also assist in the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Nigeria and protect the lives of her citizens.

Official source DIAN (2019) Defence Intelligence Agency – Nigeria, www.dia.gov.ng/

Academic source CHN (2019) Nigeria. Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, www. chathamhouse.org/research/regions/africa/nigeria

Palestinian authority Palestinian security and intelligence The Palestinian Security Services (PSS) In accordance with the Oslo Accords, the PA is not permitted a conventional military but maintains security and police forces; PA security personnel have operated almost exclusively in the West Bank since HAMAS seized power in the Gaza Strip in 2007 (CIAP, 2019).

Official source CIAP (2019) CIA World Factbook, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/we.html 508

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Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabian security and intelligence Saudi Arabia has said that it is creating government bodies to boost oversight of its intelligence operations, in the wake of international outrage over journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s murder. The kingdom has said that Khashoggi was killed inside its Istanbul consulate on October 2 in a “rogue operation” led by the then Deputy Intelligence Chief Ahmad al-Assiri and Royal Court Adviser Saud al-Qahtani, both of whom have been sacked. King Salman subsequently ordered a restructuring of the main intelligence agency under the supervision of his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), who has faced global criticism over the journalist’s murder even though the government denies he was involved. A committee headed by the prince has approved the creation of three departments to ensure that intelligence operations are in line with the national security policy, international human rights law and ‘approved procedures’, the official Saudi Press Agency said on ­Thursday (Aljazeera, 2018).

Policy source Aljazeera (2018) Saudi Arabia modifies intelligence service after Khashoggi murder. A ­ ljazeera. www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2018/12/saudi-arabia-modif ies-intelligenceservice-khashoggi-murder-181221052015064.html

Academic source Girod, D. and Walters, M.R. (2010) Imperial Origins of the Oil Curse. Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea, 8(1), 13–28.

Syria Syrian security and intelligence General Intelligence Directorate The GID is the main civilian security service in the country, and is directly subordinate to the president without going through any state body or ministry, except when coordinating with the National Security Bureau. The GID is divided into three main departments. The internal security division is in charge of internal surveillance of the population in general (this overlaps with the Political Security Directorate’s responsibilities). It is tasked with counter-espionage and control over opposition political groups, foreigners and religious and ethnic minorities (like the Muslim Brotherhood). The Directorate deals with the fight against corruption and drug trafficking. The other two deal with issues abroad: one is the external security department, which is in charge of controlling and eliminating opponents abroad, controlling and protecting Syria’s diplomatic offices, and espionage; the second deals with Palestine, controlling the activities of Palestinian groups in Syria and Lebanon. The GID has twelve central branches in addition to active sub-branches in each province. Political Security Directorate (Idarat al-Amn as-Siyasi) 509

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Although administratively the PSD is subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior, it does not report to it. It reports directly to the president and has supervisory authority over the Minister of Interior, his officers and staff, including the police. This directorate’s most important branches deal with political parties, hotels, clubs, restaurants, students, employees, parties, and commercial and industry licencing. In general, it focuses on organised political forces and possible political activities, along with monitoring and overseeing government institutions. Its tasks include fighting against all political opposition, dissidents and political parties that could undermine the current leadership; controlling and censoring the press and mass media; and monitoring foreigners in Syria and their communication with locals. Covering the entire country and all segments of society and interacting directly with ­citizens, the PSD is now the most extensive directorate. It prepares special reports and studies based on a wide network of informants. The Directorate has branches in Damascus, as well as thirteen branches located in the rest of the provinces. Military Intelligence Directorate (Shu’bat al-Mukhabarat al-’Askariyya) The MID is the foremost and largest MI body in Syria. Despite the fact that the Directorate is theoretically under Defense Ministry jurisdiction, it reports directly to the president, and the Ministry does not have authority over it. Moreover, the MID is involved in the process of appointing the Defense Minister, his deputies and his chiefs of staff. Its own chief is appointed by the president. Its main responsibility is to obtain primary MI on Syria’s adversaries and to monitor the security of military personnel and installations. The Directorate oversees other security services’ activities and monitors their behaviours to check their loyalty. Additionally, it is ­believed that the MID is responsible for providing Palestinian, Lebanese and Turkish extremist groups with military and logistical support, and for monitoring political dissidents abroad. Air Force Intelligence Directorate (Idarat al-Mukhabarat al-Jawiyya) The Air Force Intelligence is known for being the most loyal state body and possessing the strongest manpower and best technical skills of all the security services. It was established during the early days of Hafez al-Assad’s stint as the commander of the Air Force. Not coincidently, it is also treated as the most influential and powerful security service in Syria since Hafez al-Assad’s time. Despite its being theoretically subordinated to the Defense Ministry in terms of its administration, finances and armaments acquisition, the minister does not have any authority over it. The AFI, along with the MID, watches over the minister’s work and plays an important role in his appointment. Initially, the prime goal of Air Force Intelligence was to protect Syria’s military weaponry, in addition to the president’s aeroplane, his safety while abroad and the security of embassies. With time, its responsibilities expanded beyond military matters. The Directorate has also become involved in combat missions against anti-regime groups. It managed the operations against the Muslim Brotherhood revolt in Hama in the 1980s and against Hizb at-Tahrir in December 1999, played an important role in arresting the regime’s civilian ­opponents and organised secret operations abroad. The Directorate has six subordinate branches in Damascus, its own investigations branch and six branches in the provinces. (RIAC, 2019)

Source Russia International Affairs Council (RIAC) http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-­ comments/analytics/major-challenges-for-the-military-and-security-services-in-syria/ 510

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Sudan Sudan security and intelligence National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) Policy source Africa Intelligence (2019) Africa Intelligence, www.africaintelligence.com/info/presentation

Turkey Turkish security and intelligence The National Intelligence Organization The National Intelligence Organization was created by the National Intelligence Organization Act. It originally reported to the Prime Minister. In 2017, the National Intelligence Organization was subordinated to the Presidency (GT, 2019).

Official source GT (2019) Government of Turkey, www.mit.gov.tr/eng/gorev.html

Academic source Gürsoy, Y. (2018) The recent crisis between Greece and Turkey: Two NATO allies on the brink of war, again. The Foreign Policy Centre, https://fpc.org.uk/the-recent-crisisbetween-greece-and-turkey/

South Africa South African security and intelligence State Security Agency President Jacob Zuma, when appointing his Cabinet in May 2009, tasked the Ministers of State Security, Police, Defence, Home Affairs, Justice and Correctional Services to review the structures of the civilian intelligence community with the aim of developing a more effective and efficient intelligence architecture. The State Security Agency (SSA) is the new organisation that has been created as part of this review process. The SSA is being developed through a phased approach with the ­u ltimate aim of improving efficiency and effectiveness. The mandate of the SSA is to provide the government with intelligence on domestic and foreign threats or potential threats to national stability, the constitutional order, and the safety and well-being of our people. Examples of such threats are terrorism, sabotage and subversion. This allows the government to implement policies to deal with potential threats and to better understand existing threats and thus improve their policies. The final organisational structure will see the following structures collapsed into the SSA as branches, with each branch led by a head, accountable to the Director General: • •

The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) The South African Secret Service (SASS) 511

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• • • •

The South African National Academy of Intelligence (SANAI) The National Communications Centre (NCC) The Office for Interception Centres (OIC) Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd (COMSEC)

Amongst the areas of focus of the SSA are the following matters of national interest: •

•

•

•

•

Terrorism, which refers to deliberate and premeditated attempts to create terror through symbolic acts involving the use or threats of lethal force for creating psychological e­ ffects that will influence a target group or individual and translate it into political or material results. Sabotage, which refers to activities or purposeful omissions conducted or planned for purposes of endangering the safety, security or defence of vital public or private ­property, such as installations, structures, equipment or systems. Subversion, which includes activities directed towards undermining by covert unlawful acts, or directed towards, or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or overthrow by violence of the constitutionally established systems of government in South Africa. Espionage, which refers to unlawful or unauthorised activities conducted for acquiring information or assets relating to sensitive social, political, economic, scientific or m ­ ilitary matters of South Africa or for their unauthorised communication to a foreign state. Organised Crime, which includes analysis of the origins and reasons behind organised crime, the identification of key role players, the nature and extent, as well as the modus operandi of organised crime syndicates.

Official source GSA (2019) State Security Service, www.ssa.gov.za/

Academic source O’Brien, K. (2012) The South African Intelligence Services. London: Routledge.

Central and South America Argentina Argentinian security and intelligence Argentina’s spy agency regroups, wins back power under Macri BUENOS AIRES (Reuters) – A little over a year since Argentina’s spy agency was ­shackled in the wake of the mysterious death of a star prosecutor, President Mauricio Macri is backing its quest for broader powers that critics fear will revive unfettered domestic ­spying. Argentina’s spies are pressing Macri to remove restrictions imposed by former president Cristina Fernandez after public investigator Alberto Nisman was found dead in his home in 2015, a Source in the judiciary said. Fernandez accused a rogue agent of playing a role in Nisman’s murder, which came days after he accused her of covering up Iran’s alleged role in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish centre in Buenos Aires. Fernandez overhauled the country’s spy agency in response, branding it the FIS, or AFI. 512

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Policy source Misculin, N. (2016) Argentina’s spy agency regroups, wins back power under Macri. ­Reuters, www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-spying-idUSKCN1002L3

Academic source Estévez, E.E. (2014) Comparing Intelligence Democratization in Latin America: Argentina, Peru, and Ecuador Case. Intelligence and National Security, 29(4): 552–580.

Bolivia Bolivian security and intelligence DCAF Bolivia Country Profile The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is dedicated to making states and people safer through more effective and accountable security and justice. Since 2000, DCAF has facilitated, driven and shaped Security Sector Reform (SSR) policy and programming around the world. DCAF’s International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) provides practical support to the international community in its efforts to improve security and justice, primarily in conflict-affected and fragile states. It does this by working with a group of member states and institutions to develop and promote good security and justice reform practices and p­ rinciples, and by helping its members to build their capacity to support national and regional security and justice reform processes.

Policy source DCAF (2019) DCAF Bolivia Country Profile, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/ReSource-Library/ Country-Profiles/Bolivia-Country-Profile

Brazil Brazilian security and intelligence The Brazilian Intelligence System (SISBIN) The Brazilian Intelligence System (SISBIN) was created by law, in December 1999, with the goal of integrating planning actions and execution of Intelligence activities in Brazil. Under the coordination of ABIN, SISBIN is responsible for the process of obtaining and analysing Intelligence information and the production of knowledge necessary to the decision-making process of the Executive Power, besides acting in the protection of sensitive and strategic information of the Brazilian State. At present, SISBIN consists of thirty-nine agencies and twenty ministries. In its origin, the system consisted of twenty-one agencies, as established by decree number 4.376, from September 13, 2002, which regulated the law that created SISBIN. Each SISBIN agency acts towards obtaining and sharing strategic information within its field of competence and helps in the joint production of Intelligence. This knowledge ­supports Intelligence reports intended for use by the Presidency of the Republic or by member agencies (BG, 2019). 513

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Official source BG (2019) Brazilian Government, www.abin.gov.br/en/atuacao/sisbin/

The Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) The history of intelligence activity in Brazil originated in 1927, when it created the N ­ ational Defense Council, a body directly overseen by the President. Until then, the activity was exercised only by the military ministries. Several reforms were then introduced into the activity information along the national political process. Amongst them: • • • •

1946: Federal Information and Counter Information (SFICI) 1964: National Information Service (SNI) 1970: National Information System (SISNI) 1990: Secretariat of Strategic Affairs (SAE)

Only in 1999 did the Brazilian president establish the Brazilian Intelligence System (SISBIN) and created the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN). The creation of the agency allowed the Brazilian state to institutionalise intelligence activity through coordinated action of the information flow necessary for government decisions. All information regarding the exploitation of opportunities, the antagonisms and the real or potential threats for the highest interests of society and of the country should be coordinated by SISBIN and ABIN (TBB, 2019).

Policy source TBB (2019) The Brazilian Intelligence Agency, https://thebrazilbusiness.com/article/agenciabrasileira-de-inteligencia

Academic sources Kirchner, E.J. and Dominguez, R. (eds.) (2011) The Security Governance of Regional Organizations. London: Routledge. Cepik, M. and Antunes, P. (2010) Brazil’s New Intelligence System: An Institutional Assessment. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 16(3): 349–373.

Chile Chilean security and intelligence National Intelligence Agency (ANI) Article 38 of Law No. 19,974 of 2004, on the State Intelligence System and created by the National Intelligence Agency, provides that ‘The following shall be considered secrets and restricted circulation for all legal purposes: and records held by the bodies that make up the System or its staff, whatever their position or the nature of their legal relationship with them. Likewise, said character will have those other antecedents of which the personnel of such organisms take knowledge in the performance of their functions or with occasion of these’ (GC, 2019). 514

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Official source GC (2019) Government of Chile, Transparent Government Law No. 20,285 – on Access to Public Information Agencia Nacional de Inteligencia, National Intelligence Agency (ANI), https://translate.google.co.uk/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.interior.gob.cl/trans parenciaactiva/ani/index.html&prev=search

Academic article Matei, F.C. and Castro Garcia, A. de (2018) Chilean Intelligence after Pinochet: Painstaking Reform of an Inauspicious Legacy. Journal International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 30(2): 340–367.

Colombia Colombian security and intelligence Administrative Security Department In 2011, the President of the Republic of Colombia disbanded the Administrative Department of Security, distributing its functions amongst the organisations indicated therein. National Security Archive (2019a) Colombia Project. National Security Archive, https:// nsarchive.gwu.edu/project/colombia-project

Cuba Cuban security and intelligence Directorate of Defense, Security and Protection (DDSP) Soldier of Ideas ‘Revolution is to help each other, revolution is to help everyone, revolution is to understand, revolution is to understand better and better what our obligations are to others, to the homeland; revolution is to understand better and better the great ideals, the great purposes, the great goals that our people have proposed’. Speech delivered at the Graduation Ceremony of 300 Revolutionary Instructors for ­Domestic Schools, held at the “Chaplin” Theater, March 16, 1962 (Fidel, 2019).

Official source Fidel (2019): Soldier of Ideas, https://translate.google.co.uk/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http:// www.minrex.gob.cu/en&prev=search

Policy source Cuba Confidential (2019) Posts on Security and Intelligence Matters, https://cubaconfidential. wordpress.com/tag/direccion-general-de-inteligencia-dgi/

Academic sources Blight, J.G. and Welch, D.A. (1998) Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis. London: Routledge. 515

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Ginter, K. (2013) Truth and Mirage: The Cuba-Venezuela Security and Intelligence ­A lliance. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26(2): 215–240. Gioe, D., Scott, L. and Andrew, C. (eds.) (2014) An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis. London: Routledge. Latell, B. (2012) Castro’s Secrets: The CIA and Cuba’s Intelligence Machine. London: Palgrave.

El Salvador El Salvadorian security and intelligence Public Intelligence Country Report on El Salvador This Handbook provides basic reference information on El Salvador, including its geography, history, government, military forces and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarise military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to El Salvador. This product is published under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program (DoDIPP). This handbook has been published as a joint effort within the DoD. This product reflects the coordinated U.S. Defense Intelligence Production Community position on El Salvador (Public Intelligence, 2019).

Policy source Public Intelligence (2019) Public Intelligence El Salvador Country Handbook, https://public intelligence.net/mcia-elsalvador-handbook/

Academic source Wilkinson, M. (2008) Security and Democracy in El Salvador: An Undeniable Connection. Stanford Journal of International Relations, Fall/Winter, https://web.stanford.edu/group/sjir/ pdf/El_Salvador_%20REAL_final_v2.pdf

Guatemala Guatemalan security and intelligence Policy sources GDA (2019) Guatemala Documentation Project, National Security Archive, https://ns archive.gwu.edu/project/guatemala-project National Security Archive (2019b) Guatemala Project. National Security Archive, https:// nsarchive.gwu.edu/project/guatemala-project

Honduras Honduran security and intelligence International law enforcement, counter-narcotics and rule of law programmes, in partnership with Honduran government institutions and non-governmental organisations, help build the institutional capacity of the Government of Honduras to combat threats within Honduras before they spread north to the United States, including drug trafficking and illegal migration. These programmes are consistent with security and governance priorities of the U.S. 516

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Strategy for Central America and the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), and complement efforts under the Central American governments’ Alliance for Prosperity (Honduras, 2019).

Official source Honduras (2019) US Department of State Country Profile Honduras, www.state.gov/j/inl/ regions/westernhemisphere/219171.htm

Mexico Mexico security and intelligence Central National Intelligence (CNI) Mexico Forms New National Intelligence Center Interior Minister Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong recently announced to the press plans to form a new agency analogous to the United States’ CIA. The principle mission of the new National Intelligence Center (Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, CNI) will be to fight organised crime. To optimise efficiency, the agency will act as a central collection point for information generated by all other intelligence and justice entities in the country, including the police, military, Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de la República, PGR) and other federal and state agencies. As Osorio Chong explained, it will “work towards the necessary bringing together of all information”. Mexican intelligence experts have already been consulting for some months now with their Colombian, French, Spanish, UK and U.S. counterparts on issues related to the formation of this new agency. The CNI will be structured within the Interior Ministry (Secretaría de Gobernación, Segob), and will report to the existing Mexican Center for Investigation and National Security (Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional, CISEN). The agency’s creation follows President Peña Nieto’s campaign promises to demilitarise government strategies in fighting organised crime ( JIM, 2019).

Official source CNI (2019) Central National Intelligence, www.gob.mx/cni

Policy sources JIM (2019) Justice in Mexico, https://justiceinmexico.org/mexico-forms-new-nationalintelligence-center/ Strauss (2019) Evolving Threats and Capabilities: The Future of Mexican Intelligence Agencies, www.strausscenter.org/strauss-events/evolving-threats-and-capabilities-the-future-ofmexican-intelligence-agencies.htm

Nicaragua Nicaragua security and intelligence Security and Intelligence Directorate (DIS) Will Nicaragua Become Russia’s ‘Cuba of the 21st Century?’ 517

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The victory of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in the summer of 1979 made Nicaragua an essential element of the Soviet Union’s zero-sum competition against the United States in the so-called ‘Third World’. By the mid-1980s, annual Soviet aid to the Latin American country stood at $250 million (1984) in military support and $253 million (1982) in economic assistance. Following Moscow’s temporal withdrawal from the scene after 1991, a renewed wave of cooperation ramped up between 2007 and 2017, turning ­Nicaragua into Russia’s “main partner and ally in the Central American sub-region”, according to Russian ambassador to Nicaragua Andrei Budaev (Interaffairs.ru, July 25, 2017). The intensification of multidimensional cooperation between these two states inspired arguments in Spanish-language media that Nicaragua is rapidly turning into ‘Russia’s Cuba of the 21st ­century’ (ISSAT, 2019).

Policy source ISSAT (2019) Country Profile Nicaragua, https://issat.dcaf.ch/mkd/Learn/ReSourceLibrary/Country-Profiles/Nicaragua-Country-Profile

Academic source JF (2019) The Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/program/will-nicaraguabecome-russias-cuba-of-the-21st-century/

Peru Peruvian security and intelligence National Intelligence Service Peru Security Doctrine Historically, the major security challenges to the country and its military were external in nature, usually involving issues of borders and territorial disputes. Peru engaged in more foreign wars after independence than any other Latin American country, although most occurred in the nineteenth century. The conflicts were with Colombia, 1828; Argentina, 1836–1837 and Chile, 1836–1839; Bolivia, 1827–1829, 1835 and 1841; Ecuador, 1858–1859; Spain, 1863–1866; Chile, 1879–1883. Most of the nineteenth-century conflicts went badly for Peru. The most disastrous was the War of the Pacific against Chile. In many ways, this conflict could be considered more significant than the gaining of independence, given the war’s impact on the development of present-day Peru. In the twentieth century, the ­Peruvians had engaged in two wars and two significant border skirmishes. In the Leticia War of 1932–1933, named after the Amazonian city, Peruvian army and naval units were unable to keep Colombia from holding onto territory originally ceded by Peru in 1922 in the Salomon-Lozano Treaty. The 1941 war with Ecuador, however, was a major success for Peruvian forces, but skirmishes continued into the 1990s. From 1821, when Jose de San Martin declared independence from Spain, through 1991, military officials have served in the top political office more often than civilians, that is, fifty-two out of eighty-one heads of state, for ninety-eight out of 171 years. Furthermore, the military has been instrumental in helping to bring to power by force almost half of the twenty-nine civilian presidents.

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The constitution of 1979 was approved by an elected civilian Constituent Assembly during Peru’s longest sustained period of institutionalised military rule (1968–1980); however, the constitution could not have been promulgated or put into effect on July 28, 1980, when power passed to an elected civilian president, without the acquiescence of the armed forces (Fuerzas Armadas – FF.AA.). The receipt of the presidential sash by Alberto K. Fujimori on July 28, 1990 represented the first time since 1903 that three elected civilians in succession had become head of state without interruption by military action. Put another way, the 1980–1991 period represented the longest sustained era of electoral politics in Peru since that of 1895–1914, the country’s only other time of continuing civilian rule through regular elections. Peru’s elected presidents increasingly used the state of emergency decree to try to cope with the country’s difficulties, primarily the insurgency. Under the constitution of 1979, the president could declare states of emergency to deal with threats to public order. These presidential decrees permitted military authorities to temporarily assume political as well as military control of the districts, provinces, departments or regions specified. Constitutional guarantees of sanctity of domicile, free movement and residence, public meetings and ­f reedom from arrest without a written court order would be suspended. The government abdicated its responsibilities when it placed the handling of the counterinsurgency almost entirely in the hands of the Armed Forces during the 1980s. The government did not design a clear and appropriate anti-subversive strategy and closed its eyes to repressive excesses by the security forces. The military thus assumed the principal responsibility for counterinsurgency, which allowed it to win legitimacy in the public’s eyes. This situation changed during the 1990s, when political power and the Armed Forces forged close links in order to combat terrorism. With the active participation of the National Police, there were achievements in countersubversion, such as the capture of the founder and the top leader ship of Shining Path and the successful rescue of the hostages from the Japanese embassy several years later. These underscored the importance of coordinated efforts amongst the government, the Armed Forces, the National Police and the intelligence services. Nevertheless, much of the legitimacy gained in countersubversion was lost due to a series of excesses committed by some members of the intelligence services (GS, 2019).

Policy source GS (2019) Peru. Global Security, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/peru/doctrine.htm

Academic source Estévez, E.E. (2014) Comparing Intelligence Democratization in Latin America: Argentina, Peru, and Ecuador Case. Intelligence and National Security, 29(4): 552–580.

Venezuela Venezuelan security and intelligence Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN) Official source SEBIN (2019) www.presidencia.gob.ve

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CIA world factbook country profile Venezuela Venezuela was one of three countries that emerged from the collapse of Gran Colombia in 1830 (the others being Ecuador and New Granada, which became Colombia). For most of the first half of the twentieth century, Venezuela was ruled by generally benevolent military strongmen who promoted the oil industry and allowed for some social reforms. Democratically elected governments have held sway since 1959. Under Hugo Chavez, president from 1999 to 2013, and his hand-picked successor, President Nicolas Maduro, the executive branch has exercised increasingly authoritarian control over other branches of government. In 2016, President Maduro issued a decree to hold an election to form a Constituent Assembly. A 30 July 2017 poll approved the formation of a 545-member Constituent Assembly and elected its delegates, empowering them to change the constitution and dismiss government institutions and officials. The U.S. government does not recognise the Assembly, which has generally used its powers to rule by decree rather than to reform the constitution. Simultaneously, democratic institutions continue to deteriorate, freedoms of expression and the press are curtailed, and political polarisation has grown. The ruling party’s economic policies have expanded the state’s role in the economy through expropriations of major enterprises, strict currency exchange and price controls that discourage private sector investment and production, and overdependence on the petroleum industry for revenues, amongst others. Current concerns include human rights abuses, rampant violent crime, high inflation and widespread shortages of basic consumer goods, medicine and medical supplies (CIA, 2019).

Official sources CIA (2019) www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ve.html CRS (2019) Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research S­ ervice, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44841.pdf

Policy source BBC (2019) El Helicoide: From an icon to an infamous Venezuelan jail. BBC Report, www. bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-46864864

Academic sources Estévez, E.E. (2014) Comparing Intelligence Democratization in Latin America: Argentina, Peru, and Ecuador Case. Intelligence and National Security, 29(4): 552–580. Ginter, K. (2013) Truth and Mirage: The Cuba-Venezuela Security and Intelligence ­A lliance. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26(2): 215–240.

References Africa Intelligence (2019) Africa Intelligence, www.africaintelligence.com/info/presentation AGIO (2019) Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation, www.defence.gov.au/dio/index.shtml AI (2019) Army Intelligence, www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/ AIC (2019) Australian Intelligence Community, www.igis.gov.au/australian-intelligence-community Akbarzadeh, S. (2017) Iran’s Uncertain Standing in the Middle East. The Washington Quarterly, 40(3): 109–127. Aldrich, R.J. (2010) GCHQ. London: Penguin.

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National security and intelligence Aljazeera (2018) Saudi Arabia modifies intelligence service after Khashoggi murder. Aljazeera. www. aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2018/12/saudi-arabia-modifies-intelligence-service-khashoggimurder-181221052015064.html Altenhöner, F. (2012) SS-Intelligence, Covert Operations and the Slovak Declaration of Independence in March 1939. Journal of Intelligence History, 8(2): 15–24. Andrew, C. (2010) The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5. London: Penguin. AO (2019) Afghanistan Online, www.afghan-web.com/security/ ASIS (2019) Australian Secret Intelligence Service, www.asis.gov.au/ Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, www.asio.gov.au/ AVID (2019) General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), https://english.aivd.nl/about-aivd/ the-aivd-who-we-are Behuria, A.K. (2016) India and Pakistan: Will They Move beyond ‘Sharing of Intelligence’? Strategic Analysis, 46(3): 204–209. BG (2019) Brazilian Government, www.abin.gov.br/en/atuacao/sisbin/ BIN (2019) State Intelligence Agency, https://translate.google.co.uk/translate?hl=en&sl=id&u=http:// www.bin.go.id/&prev=search BIS (2019) Czech Security Information Service, www.bis.cz/en/ Blight, J.G. and Welch, D.A. (1998) Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis. London: Routledge. CBSA (2019) Canada Border Services Agency, www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/menu-eng.html Cepik, M. and Antunes, P. (2010) Brazil’s New Intelligence System: An Institutional Assessment. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 16(3): 349–373. CFF (2019) China Fact File, www.gov.cn/english/2013-03/15/content_2354765.htm Chang, K. and Lee, C. (2018) North Korea and the East Asian Security Order: Competing Views on What South Korea Ought to Do. The Pacific Review, 31(2): 245–255. CHN (2019) Nigeria. Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, www.chatham house.org/research/regions/africa/nigeria CIA (2019) Central Intelligence Community, www.cia.gov/index.html CNI (2019) National Intelligence Centre, www.cni.es/en/welcometocni/ Croll, S. (2005) Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden. London: Penguin. CSC (2019) Correctional Service of Canada, www.csc-scc.gc.ca/index-en.shtml CSIS (2019) Canadian Security Intelligence Service, www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligenceservice.html Cuba Confidential (2019) Posts on Security and Intelligence Matters, https://cubaconfidential.word press.com/tag/direccion-general-de-inteligencia-dgi/ DE (2019) Department of Energy, www.energy.gov/intelligence/office-intelligence-and-counter intelligence DEA (2019) Drug Enforcement Administration, www.dea.gov/ De Castro, R. (2014) Philippine Strategic Culture: Continuity in the Face of Changing Regional Dynamics. Contemporary Security Policy, 35(2): 249–269. DGSE (2019) General Directorate for External Security, www.defense.gouv.fr/english/dgse DHS (2019) Department of Homeland Security, www.dhs.gov/office-intelligence-and-analysis DIA (2019) Defence Intelligence Agency, www.uscg.mil// Diamond, L. and Schell, O. (eds.) (2018) Chinese Influence and American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance. Stanford: Hoover Institution. DIAN (2019) Defence Intelligence Agency – Nigeria, www.dia.gov.ng/ DPMC (2019) Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, https://dpmc.govt.nz/our-business-units/ national-security-group/intelligence-and-assessments DS (2019) Department of State, www.dhs.gov/office-intelligence-and-analysis ECFA (2019) Morocco, the EU and the migration dilemma. European Council on Foreign Affairs, www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_morocco_the_eu_and_the_migration_dilemma EIS (2019) Egypt: Behind Dismissal of Spy Chief. Egypt Institute for Studies, https://en.eipss-eg.org/ egypt-behind-dismissal-of-spy-chief/ ENNIR (2018) Norway. European Network of National Intelligence Reviewers, www.ennir.be/ norway/norwegian-intelligence-and-security-landscape Estévez, E.E. (2014) Comparing Intelligence Democratization in Latin America: Argentina, Peru, and Ecuador Case. Intelligence and National Security, 29(4): 552–580. EYP (2019) Greek Government, www.nis.gr/portal/page/portal/NIS/Mission

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Liam Francis Gearon FAS (2017) Federation of American Scientists, https://fas.org/irp/world/dprk/index.html Federation of American Scientists, https://fas.org/irp/world/china/index.html Fedor, J. (2013) Russia and the Cult of State Security: The Chekist Tradition, From Lenin to Putin. London: Routledge. Ferš, D. (2002) From Security and Intelligence Service to Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency, National Security and the Future, 3 (1–2), www.nsf-journal.hr/Online-Issues/Case-Studies/ id/1122/from-security-and-intelligence-service–-to-slovene-intelligence-and-security-agencybr volume-3-number-1-2-spring-summer-2002#.XIeBUodCdjo Fidel: Soldier of Ideas, https://translate.google.co.uk/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.minrex. gob.cu/en&prev=search Ginter, K. (2013) Truth and Mirage: The Cuba-Venezuela Security and Intelligence Alliance. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26(2): 215–240. Gioe, D., Scott, L. and Andrew, C. (eds.) (2014) An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis. London: Routledge. Latell, B. (2012) Castro’s Secrets: The CIA and Cuba’s Intelligence Machine. London: Palgrave. FIS (2019) Federal Intelligence Service, https://www.vbs.admin.ch/en/ddps/organisation/administrativeunits/intelligence-service.html FSA (2019) Federation of American Scientists, https://fas.org/irp/world/china/index.html GCHQ (2019) www.gchq.gov.uk/who-we-are GDA (2019) Guatemala Documentation Project, National Security Archive, https://nsarchive.gwu. edu/project/guatemala-project Ginter, K. (2013) Truth and Mirage: The Cuba-Venezuela Security and Intelligence Alliance. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26(2): 215–240. Gioe, D., Scott, L. and Andrew, C. (eds.) (2014) An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis. London: Routledge. Girod, D. and Walters, M.R. (2010) Imperial Origins of the Oil Curse. Journal of Arabian Studies: ­Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea, 8(1): 13–28. Glosserman, B. and Snyder, S.A. (2015) The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States. New York: Columbia University Press. GOE (2019) Government of Egypt, www.egypt.gov.eg/english/home.aspx GS (2019a) Global Security, www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/rok/kcia.htm GS (2019b) Intelligence Bureau Pakistan. Global Security.org, www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/ pakistan/ib.htm GSA (2019) State Security Service, www.ssa.gov.za/ GT (2019) Government of Turkey, www.mit.gov.tr/eng/gorev.html Guitton, C. (2017) Beyond Appearances: Cooperation, Structure, and Constraints of the Swiss Intelligence Service. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 12(2): 175–189. Gürsoy, Y. (2018) The recent crisis between Greece and Turkey: Two NATO allies on the brink of war, again. The Foreign Policy Centre, https://fpc.org.uk/the-recent-crisis-between-greece-and-turkey/ Hersman, R.K.C. and Peters, R. (2006) Nuclear U-Turns Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback. Nonproliferation Review, 13(3): 1746–1766. IDP (2019) Iran Data Portal, http://irandataportal.syr.edu/ministry-of-intelligence-and-security-mois ISA (2019) Internal Security Agency, www.abw.gov.pl/en/our-mission/14,Our-Mission.html ISSAT (2019) Country Profile Nicaragua, https://issat.dcaf.ch/mkd/Learn/ReSource-Library/ Country-Profiles/Nicaragua-Country-Profile JF (2019) The Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/program/will-nicaragua-becomerussias-cuba-of-the-21st-century/ JIM (2019) Justice in Mexico, https://justiceinmexico.org/mexico-forms-new-national-­intelligencecenter/ Jordan (2019) General Intelligence Department, https://jordan.gov.jo/wps/portal/Home/Government Entities/Agencies/Agency/­G eneral%20Intelligence%20Department?nameEntity=General%20 Intelligence%20Department&entityType=otherEntity Kirchner, E.J. and Dominguez, R. (eds.) (2011) The Security Governance of Regional Organizations. ­L ondon: Routledge. KNBSZ (2019) Military National Security Office, http://knbsz.gov.hu/en/index.html Kobayashi, Y. (2015) Assessing Reform of the Japanese Intelligence Community. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 28(4): 717–733.

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National security and intelligence Krieger, W. (2010) The German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND): Evolution and Current Policy ­Issues. In Johnson, L. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (pp. 791–807). ­Oxford: Oxford University Press. Latell, B. (2012) Castro’s Secrets: The CIA and Cuba’s Intelligence Machine. London: Palgrave. Lefebvre, S. (2011) The Czech Experience with Intelligence Reforms, 1993–2010. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 24(4): 692–710. Lefebvre, S. (2012) Croatia and the Development of a Democratic Intelligence System (1990–2010). Democracy and Security, 8(2): 115–163. Leigh, I. and Wegge, N. (2018) Intelligence Oversight in the Twentieth-First Century: Accountability in a Changing World. London: Routledge. Matei, F.C. (2007) Romania’s Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 20(4): 629–660. Matei, F.C., de Castro, A., Halladay, G. and Halladay, C. (2018) On Balance: Intelligence Democratization in Post-Franco Spain. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 31(4): 769–801. Mattis, P. (2019) China. Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/analyst/peter-mattis/ McEachern, P. and O’Brien McEachern, J. (2019) North Korea, Iran and the Challenge to the International Order. London: Routledge. MCI (2019) Marine Corps Intelligence, www.hqmc.marines.mil/intelligence// Milosavljevic, B. (2017) Proposed solutions for improving the legal framework on the Serbian security and intelligence system. Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, www.bezbednost.org/All-publications/ 6521/Proposed-solutions-for-improving-the-legal.shtml Misculin, N. (2016) Argentina’s spy agency regroups, wins back power under Macri. Reuters, www. reuters.com/article/us-argentina-spying-idUSKCN1002L3 Møller Pedersen, A. and Jørgensen, R.K. (2014) National intelligence authorities and surveillance in the EU: Fundamental rights safeguards and remedies. Danish Institute for Human Rights. National Security Archive (2019a) Colombia Project. National Security Archive, https://nsarchive. gwu.edu/project/colombia-project National Security Archive (2019b) Guatemala Project. National Security Archive, https://nsarchive. gwu.edu/project/guatemala-project NBI (2019) National Bureau of Intelligence, https://nbi.gov.ph/ NGIA (2019) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, www.nga.mil/Pages/Default.aspx NI (2019) Navy Intelligence, www.oni.navy.mil/ NIS (2019) Norwegian Intelligence Service, https://eos-utvalget.no/english_1/services/the_eos_ services/the_norwegian_intelligence_service/ Nomikos, J.M. (2013) Combating Illegal Immigration, Terrorism, and Organized Crime in Greece and Italy. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26(2): 288–303. NRO (2019) National Reconnaissance Office, www.nro.gov/ NSA (2019) National Security Agency, www.nsa.gov/ NSB (2019) National Security Bureau, www.nsb.gov.tw/En/En_index01.html NZSIS (2019) New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, www.nzsis.govt.nz/about-us/newzealand-intelligence-community/ O’Brien, K. (2012) The South African Intelligence Services. London: Routledge. ODNI (2019) Office of the Director of National Intelligence, www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/ members-of-the-ic PBC (2019) Parole Board of Canada, www.canada.ca/en/parole-board.html PET (2019) Danish Security Intelligence Service, www.pet.dk/English.aspx Petersson, M. (2012) Sweden and the Scandinavian Defence Dilemma. Scandinavian Journal of History, 37(2): 221–229. PI (2019) Pakistani Defence.com, www.pakistanidefence.com/Info/Intelligence.html Piazza, B.A. (2018) The Foreign Policy of Post-Mubarak Egypt and the Strengthening of Relations with Saudi Arabia: Balancing between Economic Vulnerability and Regional and Regime ­Security. The Journal of North African Studies, doi:10.1080/13629387.2018.1454650 Power, T.P. (2018) Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline. Bulletin of ­Indonesian Economic Studies, 54(3): 307–338. PSC (2019) Public Safety Canada, www.publicsafety.gc.ca/index-en.aspx PSIA (2019) Public Security Intelligence Agency, www.moj.go.jp/psia/English.html

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Liam Francis Gearon RAW (2019) Research and Analysis Wing, www.allgov.com/india/departments/ministry-of-youthaffairs-and-sports/research-and-analysis-wing?agencyid=7606 RCMP (2019) Royal Canadian Mounted Police, www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en Reuters (2016) Algeria’s Bouteflika dissolves DRS spy unit, creates new agency. Reuters, www. reuters.com/article/us-algeria-security/algerias-bouteflika-dissolves-drs-spy-unit-creates-newagency-sources-idUSKCN0V31PU RFEL (2019) Radio Free Europe Liberty, www.rferl.org/a/irans-intelligence-ministry-launchesOfficial Source/24744834.html RFNSS (2019) The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy, www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/ OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf RUSI (2019) Royal United Services Institute, Various Current Materials on Chinese Security and Intelligence, https://rusi.org/search/node/china Saumets, A. and Sazonov, V. (2016) The Crisis in Ukraine and Information Operations of the Russian Federation. Cultural, Peace and Conflict Studies book series volume 6, Estonian Journal of Military Studies, 1–246. SGDN (2019) National Defense General Secretariat, www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/ Shaffer, R. (2017) Indian Intelligence Revealed: An Examination of Operations, Failures and Transformations. Intelligence and National Security, 33(4): 598–610. SIE (2019) Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE), www.sie.ro/ SIS (2019) Portuguese Internal Intelligence Service, www.sis.pt/en SOA (2019) State Intelligence Agency, www.soa.hr/en/ SPB (2019) The Security Police Board, www.kapo.ee/ SRE (2019) State Intelligence Service, https://sre.gouvernement.lu/en/service.html SSI (2019) Slovak Information Service, www.sis.gov.sk/about-us/introduction.html SSIS (2019) Republic of Serbia Security-Intelligence System, www.voa.mod.gov.rs/en/#.XIVw 3odCdjo SSS (2019) Swedish Security Service, www.sakerhetspolisen.se/en/swedish-security-service/counterespionage/recruiting-an-agent.html SSU (2019) Security Service of Ukraine, https://ssu.gov.ua/en/pages/36 SUPO (2019) Finnish Security Intelligence Service, www.supo.fi/about_supo Strauss (2019) Evolving Threats and Capabilities: The Future of Mexican Intelligence Agencies, www. strausscenter.org/strauss-events/evolving-threats-and-capabilities-the-future-of-mexican-intelligenceagencies.htm TBB (2019) The Brazilian Intelligence Agency, https://thebrazilbusiness.com/article/agenciabrasileira-de-inteligencia UKDJ (2019) The Five Eyes: United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-five-eyes-the-intelligence-alliance-of-the-anglosphere/ UN (2019) United Nations Refugee Agency/ United States State Department, www.refworld.org/ docid/5bcf1f91a.html USAF (2019) United States Air Force, www.25af.af.mil/

524

INDEX

Note: Page numbers followed by “n” refer to notes. Abakumov, V. 433 Abbess of Crewe, The (Spark) 355–6 Abbott, A. 290 Aberystwyth School 30 academic approach to cybersecurity 95–7 academic discipline of intelligence studies 37–46 academic discipline of security studies 29–36 Academic Engagement 55, 56 academic ethos 160–1 academic freedom 56, 321–3 academic research, open source intelligence and 388 Academic Standards 55, 56 Academic Task Force 97 academy interaction with industry and government 100–3 Academy of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation 189 Act of Parliament (1984) 131 Afghanistan 122, 123; National Directorate of Intelligence 491–2 Agamben, G. 400 Agrell, W. 14 AHRC-funded projects 343, 347 AIC see Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) AIG 100 Airey Neave Trust 374 AISE see External Intelligence and Security Agency (AISE) AISI see Internal Intelligence and Security Agency (AISI) Ajnad Al-Sham 329 Akhmatova, A. 7

Alarcón, R. 12 Aldrich, R.J. 1, 118 Alexander, H. 363 Alexander, K.B. 237 Algeria: Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS) 500 Al-Hijrah Media Corp 334 Alibaba 267 Allison, G. 58 All Quiet on the Western Front (Remarque) 439 All-Russian Association of Proletarian Writers 441 All-Russian Emergency Commission for Combatting Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (VChK) 188 Al-Madinah International University 331 Almansor 440 Al Qaeda 123, 145, 149, 304, 305, 331, 334, 387, 407, 411 Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 407 Al-Shabaab 329–30 ‘Ambassador-in-Residence’ program 86 Ambler, E. 435 American Anthropological Association 50 American Council for the United Nations University 59 American Military University 276 American Political Science Association (APSA) 91 American Psychological Association 49 American universities, teaching of national security intelligence in 81–92; CIAcampus relationships 83–5; core models of intelligence instruction 87–8; current

525

Index guidelines 85–7; Intelligence Studies taught by intelligence officers 89–90; third model 88–9 America Public University 281 Ames, A. 191 Amnesty International 54, 55 Analytical Support Center 163–4 Anderson, E. 109 Anderson, F.J. 108 Anderson Report 237 Andrew, C.M. 1, 19, 20, 119, 132, 243–9 Andropov, A. 191 Angelo State University 288 Angleton, J.J. 17, 198, 211, 213, 220 Anna Karenina 407 Anti-Terrorism Bill C-36 (2001) 137 anti-Vietnam War movements 51 Apostles 19 APSA see American Political Science Association (APSA) APT see Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT) AQAP see Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Aragon, L. 442 Archers, The 409, 410 Arcos, R. 156 Argentinian security and intelligence 512–13 Aristotle 411n2 Armies of Ignorance, The (Corson) 212 Arrigo, J.-M. 240 Arsenalisation 309, 310 Art of War, The 196 Artuzov, A. 188 ASD see Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) ASIO see Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) ASIS see Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) Aspin, L. 82, 83 Assange, J. 8, 9, 32 Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT) 240–1 Association of Strategic and Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) 159 Atomic Age 35 audience in securitization of higher education 315 Australia 82; Defence Intelligence Organisation 465–6; Office of National Assessments 465 Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) 464 Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) 465 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) 465 Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) 465 Austria 33; Federal Ministry of the Interior 470–1

Bachelor of Science in Intelligence (BSI) 280 BAE Systems 123 Bagge Laustsen, C. 31 Baidu 267 Baker, D. 224 Baldwin, G.D. 91 Balzacq, T. 30–1, 314 Bank of America 100 Barbusse, H. 442 Barkovsky, V. 214 Barnett, D.H. 192 Bartlett, J. 410 Bauer, J. 262 BBC Monitoring (BBCM) 385; Summary of World Broadcasts 390 BC see Boston College (BC) Beardsley, M.C. 412n6 Beaverbrook, L. 438 Becher, J. 442 Beckett, T. 238 Beesly, P. 244 behavioural radicalisation 305–7, 309, 310, 327 Being Muslim Being British project 410 Belgium: State Security Service (VSSE) 471–2 Bellaby, R. 53 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 203 Bending Spines (Bytwek) 436 Bennett, A. 438 Berkowitz, B. 39 Berkowitz, D. 39 Berlin, A. 41 Berlin, I. 7, 411 Bibliotheca Bodkeiana 8 Big Data 119, 120–1, 127 Billig, M. 232 Bingham, J. 435 Bininachvili, A. 277 Bin Laden, O. 304 bin Ladin, O. 408 Biological Conservation 35 Bishop, N. ‘Bobbie’ S. 218–19, 223 Blackett Review of High Impact Low Probability Risks 346–7 Blake, G. 224 Bletchley Park 108, 415 ‘Bletchley Revisited’ 235 Bloch, J.-R. 442 Blunt, Anthony 19 BND-Act (BND-Gesetz, BNDG) 168 Boal, A. 411 Board of Directors 94 Board of Sponsors 58 Bobbitt, P. 232 Bodleian Library 7, 8 Bodley, T. 8 Bolivian security and intelligence 513 Böll, H. 355, 356 Bolshevik Revolution 425

526

Index Bonsall, Sir A. 235, 364 Borg, L.C. 164 Bortnikov, A. 178, 179, 187, 189 Borum, R. 306 Bosnia and Herzegovina: Intelligence and Security Agency 472–3 Boston College (BC) 94–5; CPG Program 95–7, 99, 100–5; CPG Program in Program Lifecycle 97–8 Boston’s Transcript 384 Boston University 278 Boursicot, B. 199 Boyer, E. 104 Boyle, A. 211–14 Brasenose College 7 Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) 514 Brazilian Intelligence System (SISBIN) 513–14 Bredel, W. 442 BREXIT 154 BRI see Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) British Intelligence in the Second World War (Hinsley) 244 British Secret Intelligence Service 438 British signals intelligence (1914–1992) 108–17 Broad Agency Announcement 278 Brod, M. 439 Brooke, R. 9 Brunel University 350 Bryce Committee Report 438 BSI see Bachelor of Science in Intelligence (BSI) Bucar, A. 433 Buchan, J. 7, 435, 438 Buckingham University Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies 1 Bufacci, V. 240 Buffalo State University 281 Bulgaria: State Intelligence Agency 473–4 Buller, E.M. 435 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 125 Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 125 Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) 168–77; cultural evolution 173–5; moving closer to the past 170–3; quo vadis 175–6 Bureau of Intelligence and Research 460 Burgess, G. 18, 19, 220 Burns, K.J. 94, 98, 99 Bush, G.H.W. 86 Butkov, M. 191 Butler, R. 233, 234–5, 240, 346 Butler Report 132, 347, 348, 389 Buzan, B. 30, 31, 314 Cabinet Office 343, 345, 346 CACI International 123 Cairncross, J. 19 California Law Review 9 Cambridge History of Intelligence 248

Cambridge Security Initiative 247 Cambridge Spy Ring 211–15 Cameron, D. 240 Campbell, S. 272 Canada 82; Correctional Service of Canada 464; Defence, Research and Development Canada (DRDC) 141; Department of National Defence 141; intelligence–academy relationship in 130–43; basis of 133–4; culture of intelligence 130; impediments 137–9; initiatives 137; intelligence studies, conceptualisation of 134–5; new initiatives 139–40; open intelligence, practice of 141–3; parties to 131–4; Public Safety Canada 463; Public safety partner agencies 463–4; public safety portfolio 463; Royal Canadian Mounted Police 464 Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) 463–4 Canada Council for Higher Education 138 Canadian Association of Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) 139 Canadian Centre for Security, Intelligence and Defence Studies (CCSIDS) 140 Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies (CCISS) 140–1 Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) 131, 132, 462–3; Academic Outreach Programme 141–2 Career Day 85 Carl, E. 431 Carleton University 138; Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering 141; Master’s degree in Infrastructure Protection and International Security 141 Carlos III University 162 Carpenter, E. 216 Carter, R. 222 case study approach 261–2 CASIS see Canadian Association of Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) Cassam, Q. 303, 310n2 Cass, F. 244 Castro, F. 11 Catholic University of America 289 CATS see Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) CBSA see Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) CCISS see Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies (CCISS) CCP see Chinese Communist Party (CCP) CCSIDS see Canadian Centre for Security, Intelligence and Defence Studies (CCSIDS) CCW see Changing Character of War programme (CCW) Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) 162 Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) 42

527

Index Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 81–92, 120–2, 124, 191, 198, 204, 389, 436, 458; campus relationships 83–5; covert recruitment 85; participation in covert operations 85; scholars for hire 84–5; secret ties 84; Directorate of Operations (DO) 84; Officer-in Residence Program 277–8; Publication Review Board (PRB) 86; and university–security– intelligence nexus 12, 17, 21–4, 37, 45, 49, 53 Central MASINT Office (CMO) 26 Central School of the OGPU see Higher School of the NKVD Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) 377 Centre for Social Cohesion/Henry Jackson Society 313 Certificate in Intelligence Studies 89 CGSIR see Consultative Group on Security and Intelligence Records (CGSIR) challenge analysis 346, 347, 348 Chambers, D.I. 197–8 Changing Character of War programme (CCW) 233, 234 Charities Act 2006 234 Chart of Intelligence Programs 281–3 Chatham House 239 Che Guevara 11, 119 Chekists 187, 193 Chesterton, G.K. 438 Childers, E. 435 Chile: National Intelligence Agency (ANI) 514–15 China 49; Article 386 of the Qing legal code 205–6; Belt and Road Initiative 203; Central Military Commission 205, 492; Communist Party of China 492; Intelligence Law 206; Ministry of Justice 205; Ministry of Public Security (MPS) 198; Ministry of State Security (MSS) 199–200, 203, 493; National Security Commission 205; Political and Legal Committee 205; Procuratorate 205; Social Affairs Department 197 China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) 200 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 197–9, 204, 206 Chinese intelligence service 196–207; political and legal oversight 205–6; technology, as game-changer 201–5 Chin, L. W-T. 198–9 Chomsky, N. 9 Church Committee 436; and national security intelligence 82, 83; and university–security– intelligence nexus 12–14, 45, 49, 50 Church Committee Report (1975–1976) 13, 14, 50–1 Church, F. 81

Churchhouse, R. 113 Churchill, Sir W. 18, 227n11, 415, 430 CIA see Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ‘CIA and the Academic Community’ 157 CICIR see China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) Cienski, S. 287 Citi Bank 100 Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the FBI 51 civil security 36 Civil Service Administrative Stream 354 Civil Service Commission (CSC) 110, 115 Claiborne, C.M. 203 Clarence Service 419 Clark, R.B. 290 Clark, R.M. 25 Clarke, K. 240 Clash of Civilizations, The (Huntington) 30 Clayton Hutton, C. 416 Cleevely, D. 373 Climate of Treason, The (Boyle) 211 Cloak and Gown (Winks) 17 CMO see Central MASINT Office (CMO) C.N.D. (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) 394, 396 Coast Guard Intelligence 458–9 Coates, J.G. 216–27; last post – Helsinki 223–6; and Moscow rules 222–3; in Vienna 220–1 Coates, N. 223, 225 Coates, R. 216, 219, 224, 225 Cochise College 276, 281 cognitive radicalisation 307, 327 Cohen, K. 227n13 ‘COINTELPRO operation’ 51 Cold War 119, 126, 130, 132, 137, 156, 174, 198; Communism 51; military spending competition 148; Soviet armaments and intentions during 82; and university– security–intelligence nexus 11, 13, 17–19, 28–30, 32–4, 36, 38, 39, 52, 58, 59 ‘Cold War Workshop – Did Intelligence Matter?’ 235 Collins, A. 32 Colombia: Administrative Security Department 515 Columbia University 277 Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC) 414–16 COMECON (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) 148 Comey, J. 238 COMINT see Communications Intelligence (COMINT) Commission for Human Security 32 Commission for University Education (CUE) 331, 334, 335 Committee on Academic Freedom 161

528

Index Commonwealth of Massachusetts 100 communications, and national security 370–1 Communications Intelligence (COMINT) 25, 26 Communications Security Establishment (CSE) 131 communications studies 124 Communist Party of China (CPC) 492 community making 161–2 Comtrade Group, The 100 Congress for Cultural Freedom 23, 442–3 Consultative Group on Security and Intelligence Records (CGSIR) 247 Convention on Genocide (United Nations) 47 Conway, M. 330 Cooley, F. 225 Coolidge, C. 430 Cooper, J. 111, 364 Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment (CUTA) 471 Copenhagen School 30, 31, 314 Cormac, R. 1 Cornish, K. 19 Cornwell, D. see le Carré, J. Corpus Christi College 243 Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) 464 corroboration 347–8 Corson, W. 212 Côté, A. 314, 315 Coulthart, S. 272–3, 280–4 Council for Science and Technology 369 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) 507 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA): Section 26, 312 Covert Action in Chile 1963–1973 (Church Committee) 12 Covert-overt model 22 Cox, J.S. 51 CPC see Communist Party of China (CPC) Cradock, P. 353, 356–7, 358 Craft of Intelligence, The (Dulles) 39 Crenshaw, M. 304 CREST see Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) Crimea 34 Crimean War 384 Croatia: Security and Intelligence Agency (SOA) 474–5 Crombie, J.I.C. 362 Cross-Government Trial Advice Panel 345 Crosston, M. 53, 54, 272–3, 280–4 crypt-linguists 114 CSaP Fellowship Schemes 374 CSC see Civil Service Commission (CSC); Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) CSDIC see Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC)

CSE see ications Security Establishment (CSE) CSI see Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) CSIS see Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) CTF see cybersecurity Task Force (CTF) CTSA see Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA) Cuba: Directorate of Defense, Security and Protection (DDSP) 515–16 CUE see Commission for University Education (CUE) cultural obstacles to national security 369–70 Cultural Revolution 444–6 culture of intelligence 130 Curtis, S. 158 Curtiss, J.T. 17 CUTA see Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment (CUTA) CVE see Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) cybersecurity 94–105; academic approach to 95–7; academy interacts with industry and government 100–3; challenges with external partnerships 103–4; future directios of 104–5; government approaches to 98; industry approaches to 98–100 Cybersecurity Task Force (CTF) 94–5, 97, 98, 100–2 Cypher School 232 Czech Republi 33 Czech Security Information Service 475 DAAD see German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) Dan, J. 214 Dangerously Disproportionate (Amnesty International) 54–5 Danish Security Intelligence Service (PET) 475 datafication 118–27; education and 125–6; ethics of 125–6; global governance, future of 125–6; merger of intelligence and information 119–21; spies, scholars and science 121–4; communications studies 124; medicine 122; social anthropology 122–4 dataism see datafication Davies, P. 45 Davis, C. 99 Davis, J. 41, 42–3 Davis, W.C. 109 Dayton Peace Accord (1995) 145, 148, 149 DCI see Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) DEA see Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Deakin, Sir F.W.D. 16–17, 233 Dearlove, Sir R. 20, 40–1, 247 Debaathification of Iraq 150 debriefing 86–7

529

Index Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) 465–6 Defence of the Realm, The (Andrew) 247 Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) 58 Defense Intelligence Agency 26 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 276, 277, 459 De Graaff, B. 45 Delcassé, T. 244 Delmer, S. 356 Demarque, H. 419 Den Boer, M. 55 Denniston, A. 110–11 Department for Education 410 Deutch, J. 198 Dewé, W. 419 Dewey, J. 161 DIA see Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) diagnosing literary genius 49 Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, The 244 Didier, B. 55 digital fluency 410 DIO see Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 85, 86 Dobson, M.J. 118 docking 370 Doctors’ Trial 47 Doctor Zhivago (Pasternak) 442 Doe, Jane 84 Doe, John 84 Domestic Intelligence Service of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz: Bf V) 168 Dominguez, R. 29 Donnersmark, F. von 262 Donovan, W.J. 368 Dorril, S. 227n13 Doyle A.C. 438 Draper Labs 100 Dr A.Q. Khan on Science and Education (Khan) 268 Dreiser, T. 439, 442 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 460 DSTL see Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) Dujmovic, N. 89, 90, 289 Dülffer, J. 173 Dulles, A. 39 Durodie, B. 53 Dzerzhinsky, F. 188, 194 Dzhugashvili, J. 429 EAS see European Agenda on Security (EAS) Eberstadt Report (1948) 13 Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) 345, 350n3

Eden, A. 223 Edmonds, A. 279 educational Olympics 190 education, countering security threats through 410–11 Edwards, C. 18 Egan, M. 110 Egypt: General Intelligence Service (GIS) 500–1 Eisenhower, D.D. 81, 223 electronic intelligence (ELINT) 26 Elizabethan Espionage (Martin) 8 Ellis, A.W. 442 El Salvadorian security and intelligence 516 Embry Riddle Aeronautical University 288 EMC/RSA 100 English, R. 305 enrichment of knowledge 348 Enron scandal 82 environmental security 36 Ericksen, R.P. 49 Ernst, K. 431 ESRC see Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Estonia: Security Police Board 476 ethical issues, framing 254–6 EU see European Union (EU) European Agenda on Security (EAS) 23, 28, 55, 165, 469–70 European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats – Hybrid CoE 160 European Commission 165, 410 European Convention on Human Rights 256 European Council 28 European Data Protection Regulation 258 European Journal of Intelligence History 140 European Security and Defence College 22 European security and intelligence services 156–9 European Union (EU) 23, 28, 54, 56, 469–70; Horizon 2020 Working Programme 165; INTCEN (SITCEN) 158 Ewing, A. 108 Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association 123 existential threat 31–2 existential threat, practice of security under 399–400 External Intelligence and Security Agency (AISE) 479 Fabre, C. 59 Facebook 279 FAS see Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Fate of the Earth, The (Schell) 35 Fayetteville Technical Community College 276 FBI see Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) FBIS see Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)

530

Index FBMS see Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service (FBMS) FCC see Federal Communications Commission (FCC) FDP see Free Democratic Party (FDP) Federal Archives Act 174, 175 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 81, 100, 201, 202, 436, 461; ‘COINTELPRO operation’ 51; and university–security– intelligence nexus 12, 17, 21–3, 26, 46 Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 385 Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA) 170 Federal University of Applied Administrative Sciences (Hochschule des Bundes für öffentliche Verwaltung, HSB) 175 Federation of American Scientists (FAS) 58 Federation of Atomic Scientists 392n7 Fedor, J. 178 Felix, C. 39 Felix Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB see Academy of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation Feng, H. 444 Fenton, R. 384 Ferguson, K. 381n14 Ferris, J.R. 1, 108 Fidelity 100 Fifth Man, The (Perry) 19 Finnish Security Intelligence Service (SUPO) 476 FireEye 100 First Amendment of the US Constitution 83 First Gulf War 200 First World War 245, 247, 419 Fish & Richardson 100 FitzGibbon, C. 39 Fitzpatrick, S. 17 Five Disciplines of Intelligence Collection (Lowenthal and Clark) 25–7 Fleming, I. 17–18, 416, 435, 436 Flieger, D. 429 Flowers, T. ‘Tommy’ 112 FOIs see Freedom of Information Requests (FOIs) Ford, F.M. 438 Foreign and Commonwealth Office 396 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) 198, 266, 385, 389 Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service (FBMS) 385 foreign policy practitioner 352–60 forensic intelligence 238 Forrestal, J. 24 Forster, E.M. 19 Forsyth, F. 414, 438

For the President’s Eyes Only (Andrew) 246 Foucault, M. 9 Fourth Industrial (or Digital) Revolution is Financial Technology 153 ‘Framework for Cooperation for the systemwide application of Human Security’ (UN) 59–60 France 82; General Directorate for External Security 477; National Defense General Secretariat (SGDN) 477 Franks, D. 227n13 Fraser-Smith, C. 416, 418 Frederick the First of Prussia 196 Free Democratic Party (FDP) 172 Freedman, L. 232 Freedom of Information Requests (FOIs) 316 Freeland, R. 290 Freeman, E. 159 Frevert, U. 180 Friedman, M. 119 Frolov, M. 191–2 Fry, H. 414 FSB Academy (Academy of the Federal Security Service) 187, 188–91 Fuchs, E.K. 20, 24, 220 Fukuyama, F. 30 ‘Function of Intelligence, The’ (Kendall) 42 Funding issues, in intelligence–academy relationship 138–9 GAF see German Air Force (GAF) codes Gaibulloev, K. 412n5 Galeotti, M. 34–5, 180, 181 Gale, S. 236 Gallienne, S. 219, 227n13 Galsworthy, J. 438 Gambetta, D. 411 Gartner Consulting 100 Gates, R.M. 85–6 GC&CS see Government Code & Cypher School (GC&CS) GCHQ see Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) GCSB see Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) GDPR see General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Gearon, L.F. 1, 7, 87, 90, 125, 126, 158, 314, 368, 377n11, 435, 453 Gehlen Organization 168 Gendron, A. 130 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): Article 14, 381n7 generalism 303–4, 310 General Post Office (GPO) 108 Geneva Convention 419 Genieys, W. 11

531

Index Geographical Handbook Series of the Naval Intelligence Division 232 GEOINT see Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) George, D.L. 438 Georgetown University: Masters of Applied Intelligence 88 Georgetown University Press 345 Georgia Tech 123 Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) 25, 26, 276, 281 Gerasimov doctrine 34 Gerasimov, V. 34–5 German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) 335 German Air Force (GAF) codes 364 German Federal Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt, BKamt) 169 German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) 173 Germany 33, 82; Bundesnachrichtendienst 168–87, 477 Ghooi, R.B. 47 Gibson, Sir P. 240 Gide, A. 442 Gill, P. 44–5, 157, 328 Ginott, H. 47 Githens-Mazer, J. 307–8 Glazer, N. 290 Glazzard, A. 405 Glees, A. 53, 157, 289, 313 global citizenship education 336 global governance, future of 125–6 Global Terrorism Index 326 Global Uncertainties Programme see Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research (PaCCS) Godunov, B. 428 Golden, D. 22–3, 85 Gold, J. 113 Golitsyn, A. 223 Goodman, A.E. 39 Google 121, 267 Google Ngrams 180 Gorbachev, M. 189 Gordievsky, O. 19, 245–6, 247 Gorky, M. 441 Gorovitz, S. 309 government approaches to cybersecurity 98; academy interaction with 100–3 Government Code & Cypher School (GC&CS) 109–12 Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) 112–16, 239, 263, 362, 365, 366, 457 Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) 467 Government Secrecy Project 58

GPO see General Post Office (GPO) Great Coco Island 201 Greece 33; National Intelligence Service (EYP) 477–8 Greenberg, K. 330 Greene, G. 435, 438 Greene, O. 396, 398 Greenwald, G. 10–11, 58, 387 Grey, N. de 111 Grinchenko, G. 182 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant) 255 Grozny, I. 427, 428 GRU see Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) Guangming Daily 199 Guardian 9, 10 Guatemalan security and intelligence 516 Guomindang (KMT) 197 Gustafson, K. 45 Guzman, J. 119 Hafez, M. 328 Hamilton, Bill 2 Handbook of European Intelligence (De Graaff, Nyce and Locke) 45 Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches (Farson, Gill, Phythian and Shapiro) 45 Handel, M. 245 Hannian, P. 197, 198 Harari, Y.N. 118 Harding, L. 237, 238 ‘Hard Luck’ 397–9 Hardy, K. 327, 328, 330 Hardy, T. 438 Harston, J. 227n15 Hart, D. 411 Hasanuddin University 332 Haspel, G. 257–8, 261, 262 Hawala system 150 Hayden, M. 234 Hayek, F. 119 Hayek, P. 216 Hayter, W. 222 HDR see Human Development Report 1994 (HDR) Heath-Kelly, C. 303 Hechelhammer, B.V. 168 Hedges, M. 23 HEFCE see Higher Education and Funding Council for England (HEFCE) Hegghammer, T. 408 Heidegger, M. 49 Heine, H. 439–40 Hemingway, E. 439 Henderson, M. 381n3 Hendrickson, N. 292–3 Hennessy, P. 358

532

Index Herdon, C. 221, 227n13 Her Majesty’s Secret Service 244 Herman, E.S. 9 Herman, M. 232–4, 239, 362 Hertog, S. 411 Hess, R 418 Heuer, R.J., Jr. 164 Higher Education and Funding Council for England (HEFCE) 313, 315 Higher Intelligence School see SVR Academy (Academy of the Foreign Intelligence Service) Higher School of the KGB see Academy of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation Higher School of the NKVD 188 Hilsman, R. 44 Hinsley, Sir H. 244, 245 Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence (Pringle) 19 Hitler, A. 384 Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 329, 332 Hoerl, C. 310n15 Hoffman, S. 205 Holman, M. 38 Home Office 410 Homer 29 Homo Deus (Harari) 118 Honduran security and intelligence 516–17 Hong Kong 205 Hooper, J. 110 Hoover, J.E. 51 Horgan, J. 310n7, 408 Horizon Scanning Programme Team 351n5 Horizon 2020 Working Programme 165 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) 82, 83 Howard University 87 Howick, J. 310n4 HPSCI see House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) Huawei 203, 206 Hughes, A. 373, 381n9 Hughes, G. 231, 233, 236 Hughes, T. 44 Human Development Report 1994 (HDR) 32 Human Intelligence (HUMINT) 25, 26, 203, 276 Human Terrain Mapping 123 Human Terrain System (HTS) 123 HUMINT see Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Hungary: Military National Security Office 478–9 Huntington, S. 30 Hussein, S. 145 Hut Three 112 Hynek, C. 221

IAEA see International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) IAFIE see International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) IBM 370/168, 397 IBM Security 100, 120 IC see Intelligence Community (IC) IC/CAE see Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence (IC/CAE) ICC-B see Intelligence Community CampusBethesda (ICC-B) IDB, IsDB see Islamic Development Bank (IDB, IsDB) ID/CCP see Investigation Department of the CCP (ID/CCP) ‘Ideas of Intelligence, Divergent Concepts and National Institutions’ (Davies) 45 IDN see Institute of National Defence (IDN) IIEA see International Intelligence Ethics Association (IIEA) IKIM see Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia (IKIM) IKSIM see Institute of Islamic Strategic Research Malaysia (IKSIM) IKSI see Institute of Cryptography, Communication, and Informatics (IKSI) Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) 26 IMF see International Monetary Fund (IMF) IMINT see Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) India: Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) 493–5 Indiana State University 288 Indian Council of Scientific and Industrial Research 267 Indonesia: Ministry of Communication and Information Technology 332; Ministry of Law and Human Rights 329; Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education 332; Prime Minister Department’s National Security Council (NSC) 334; State Intelligence Agency (BIN) 495–6; treat management 332–3 industry approaches to cybersecurity 98–100; academy interaction with 100–3 Inkster, N. 10, 196 Institute of Cryptography, Communication, and Informatics (IKSI) 189–90 Institute of Islamic Strategic Research Malaysia (IKSIM) 334 Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia (IKIM) 334 Institute of National Defence (IDN) 162 Institute of Operative Training 190 Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre 140 Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) 140 intelligence: and academy relationship, in Canada 130–43; definition of 37, 39;

533

Index forensic 238; and information, merger of 119–21; national security 37–8, 45, 81–92; recruitment 362–6; secret 119 Intelligence: A Consumer’s Guide (Macartney) 39 Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans (Church Committee) 12 Intelligence and National Security 82, 158, 244–6 Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) 240 ‘Intelligence as a Science’ (Random) 42 Intelligence Bibliography (De Graaff ) 45 Intelligence Committees on Capitol Hill 90 Intelligence Community (IC) 130, 134, 141, 143, 156, 157, 185, 272–85 Intelligence Community Campus-Bethesda (ICC-B) 279 Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence (IC/CAE) 52, 87–8, 278 intelligence degrees 272–85; inside of the IC, obtaining 279–80; instruction and education 275–8; methodology of research 280–1; trends and observations 281–4 Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage outside the Anglosphere (Davies and Gustafson) 45 ‘Intelligence in the Cold War: What Difference did it Make?’ 235 Intelligence Oversight Subcommittee 82 Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Holman) 38 Intelligence Services Act 1994 239 Intelligence Studies 158; conceptualisation of 134–5; degrees on 272–85; instruction and education 275–8; taught by intelligence officers 89–90 Intelligence Studies in Business 159 Interagency Committee on Foreign Area Research 163 Internal Intelligence and Security Agency (AISI) 479–80 International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) 52, 88, 125, 162 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 267–8, 390 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 32 International Criminal Court 32, 421 International Intelligence Ethics Association (IIEA) 236 International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 140, 158 International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, The 158 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 148 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 150 International Studies Association 140 Internet Archive, The 271n20 Internet of All Things 118 Internet of Things 126, 260

Invasion of 1910, The (Le Queux) 435 Investigation Department of the CCP (ID/CCP) 197–9 I.R.A. 304 Iran: Iran-contra scandal 82; Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) 501–2 Iraq 122, 123; Debaathification of 150; Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) 502–3 Iraq War 58, 345 ISAF see International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) ISC see Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) ISIL see Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) ISIS see Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Islamic Development Bank (IDB, IsDB) 268 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 267, 329, 330, 332 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 326 Israel: Mossad 503–4 Istgah 267 ITAC see Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) Italy 33, 304; External Intelligence and Security Agency 479; Internal Intelligence and Security Agency 479–80; Security Intelligence Department (DIS) 479 Ivanov, S. 189 Ivory Tower, The 370 Jabhat A-Nusra 329 JAKIM 334 James Madison University 288 James Madison University Intelligence Analysis ( JMU IA) program: designing and implementing 291–4 James, T. 8 Japan 60–1, 200, 430; Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA) 496 Jaspers, K. 309, 310n15 Javid, S. 253 Jew of Linz, The (Cornish) 19 Jiangnan Social University 200 JIC see Joint Intelligence Committee ( JIC) JMU IA see James Madison University Intelligence Analysis ( JMU IA) program John Dewey Committee for Cultural Freedom 443 John Hancock 100 Johnson, D. 326 Johnson, L.K. 1, 10, 37, 40, 45, 81, 165 Johnson, R. 233–4 Johnston, C. 213 Johnston, R. 157, 158 Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling 279 Joint Intelligence Committee ( JIC) 346

534

Index Joint Services School of Linguistics ( JSSL) 219 Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System ( JWICS) 280 Jones, E. 111, 365 Jones Day 100 Jordan: General Intelligence Department (GID) 504 journalism, open source intelligence and 387 Journal of Intelligence History 158 Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence 158 JSSL see Joint Services School of Linguistics ( JSSL) justice in war ( Jus in Bello) 259 justice of war ( Jus ad Bellum) 259 Just War theory 258–61 JWICS see Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System ( JWICS) Kadri, Y. 442 Kahn, D. 244 Kai-shek, C. 198 Kamtekar, R. 308 Kant, I. 255 Keene, H. ‘Doc’ 112 Kelly, D. 58 Kendall, E. 408 Kendall, W. 42–5 Kendrick, T.J. 414 Kendry, A. 145 Kennedy, J.F. 81, 436 Kennedy, M. 109 Kenong, Li 197 Kent, S. 17, 39, 41–5, 344 Kenya 329–30; Ministry of Education 331, 334; Ministry of Interior 334 Keynes, J.M. 19 KGB in Norway (Butkov) 191 Khan, A.Q. 268 Khrushchev, N. 429 Kidd, J. 236, 265 Kindred of Kibbo Kift, The (Coates) 216 King, A. 238 King, D. 236 King, M.L., Jr. 81 King’s College London 132, 350 King’s Intelligence Studies Programme 346 Kipling, R. 438 Kirchner, E.J. 29 Kitson, M. 373, 381n9 Kleimenov, K. 180, 181 Knauss, R. 429 Knoche, E.H. 164 Knochlein, F. 419, 421 Knorr, K. 44 Know your Enemy: How the JIC saw the World (Cradock) 353 Knox, A. ‘Dilly’ 110

Knudsen, M. 212 Kobaladze, Y. 183 Koch, S. 420 Koehler, D. 328 Kovacevic, F. 187 Kriuchkov, V. 183 Krupskaya, N. 188 Krushchev, N. 198 Kryuchkov, V. 189, 197 Kundnani, A. 306 Lacquer, W. 304, 307–10 Ladygin, F. 181 Lambert, R. 307–8 Lan-chi, H. 442 Lander, Sir S. 22 Langer, W.L. 17, 368 Laqueur, W. 408 Larimer, S. 89 Larose, C.J. 100–1 Larsen, D. 243 Lashway, S.T. 99 Latimer House 415 Latin America 109 Latvia 179 law and ethics 257–8 le Carré, J. 7, 17, 233, 262, 414, 435, 438, 447 Leicester University 89 Lenin, V. 119 Léonard, S. 30–1 Le Queux, W. 435 Lessons Learned’ project 343, 344 Leverhulme Trust 233 LeVine, M. 53 Levy, D. 237 Libyan Secret Service 504–5 LinkedIn 100 Lippmann, W. 446, 447 Listen Yankee (Mills) 11, 12 literary cartography 435–47; Congress for Cultural Freedom 442–3; Cultural Revolution 444–6; Nazi Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda 439–40; Union of Soviet Writers 440–2; War Propaganda Bureau 437–8 Litvinenk, A. 238 Litvinenko, A. 182, 247 Lives of Others, The 262 Lloyd, J. 387 Locke, C. 45 Lockhart, J.B. 223 Lockhart, R.B. 431–2 Lockheed Martin 100 Lock Lorde 100 Lokhova, S. 424 London Cage 415, 419–21 London, J. 439

535

Index London School of Economics 345 Lowenthal, M.M. 25, 35–359 Lownie, A. 2, 211 Lowther, M. 291, 293 LTTE 304 Lunn, P. 221, 227n13 Luoyang Foreign Languages Institute 201 Lustig, F. 414, 416 Luxembourg: State Intelligence Service (SRE) 480–1 Lyons, D. 49 Macartney, J. 39 MacAskill, E. 237, 447 MacIntyre, A. 309 Maclean, D. 19, 212, 213, 220 ‘Mahasiswa IslamTolak Keganasan’ (Muslim University Students Reject Terrorism) 333 Malaysia: Civil Defence Department 334; Department of Islamic Development 333; ‘Mahasiswa IslamTolak Keganasan’ (Muslim University Students Reject Terrorism) 333; threat management 333 Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) 333, 334 Mallory, K. 203 Malraux, A. 442 Mandarin Palace, The 370 Manhattan Project 13, 20, 60 Mann, H. 442 Mann, T. 439 Mann, W.: mystery of 211–15 Mansfield, J. 438 Maor, E. 99 Mao, Y. 310n9 Mao Zedong 49, 119, 197–9, 444, 445 Marighella, C. 119 Marine Corps Intelligence 461 Marinelli, M. 49–50 Marlowe, C. 243 Marrin, S. 43–4, 261, 287 Marshall Aid 362 Martin, P.H. 8 Martland, P. 247 Marxism–Leninism 206, 429 MASINT see Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) Massachusetts BIO Tech Council 100 Masterman, C. 438 Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI) 280 Mattos, A.T. de 109 Maugham, S. 435 Mayhew, L. 294–6 McCarthyism 51 MCMC see Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC)

Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) 25, 26 medicine 47, 120, 122, 157, 290, 520; nuclear 212 Medvedev, R. 191 Mein Kampf 440 Melton, A. 221 Memoirs of a British Agent (Lockhart) 431 Mendez, J. 241 Menzies, S. 111 Mercyhurst College 88, 272 Mercyhurst University 272, 288 Merkachova, E. 194n5 Metcalfe’s Law 383, 386 Mexico: Central National Intelligence (CNI) 517 MGIMO see Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) MI see military intelligence (MI) Michaels, J.D. 9 Microsoft 100, 121 Middle East Steel 268 Middle States Commission on Higher Education 277 ‘Mihai Viteazul’ National Intelligence Academy 162 Military Counterintelligence Service (Militärischen Abschirmdienst, MAD) 168 Military-Industrial Courier 34 military intelligence (MI) 275–6 military security 36, 471, 478 Mill, J.S. 256 Millennium Development Goals 32 Millennium Project 59 Miller, C. 410 Mills, C.W. 11–12, 436 Ministry of Defence (MOD) 96, 146 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 146 Mintz Levin 100 Missing Dimension, The (Andrew) 244 MITRE Corporation 100 Mitrokhin Archive, The (Andrew) 246 MKUltra programme 49 MOD see Ministry of Defence (MOD) Monash University Malaysia 332 Montefiore, S.S. 427 Moore, G.E. 19 Moore’s Law 383 Morgan Stanley 100 Moroccan security and intelligence 505–8 Moscow rules 222–3 Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) 190 Moscow University 190 Moskovsky Komsomolets 194n5 motivational realism 32 Mottram, Sir R. 235

536

Index Mowat, B. 221 Mozart, W.A. 109 MSSI see Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI) Mullins, C. 328 multidisciplinary intelligence analysis programs, overcoming design challenges in 287–98; inadequate conceptual foundation 288–9; JMU Intelligence Analysis program, designing and implementing 291–4; ongoing challenges and tensions 294–6; professional education programs, building and evaluating 290–1; undergraduate intelligence analysis programs, implications for designing 296–397 Mulvenon, J. 197 Munro, R. 49 Munster, R. van 31 Mussolini, B. 384–5 Myanmar 201 myths, dispelling 414–23; open source 416–19; prisoners of war and intelligence 415–16; sensitivities 419–21 NAC see North Atlantic Council (NAC) Nagel, T. 305 Narvselius, E. 182 Naryshkin, S. 189 Nasser, G. 222 National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI) 122 National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) 331, 332 National Defence Technical University 201 National Defense Intelligence College see National Intelligence University (NIU) National Geospatial Agency 122 National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 461 National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) 275–6 National Grid 100 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): Cybersecurity Framework 98, 104 National Intelligence 139 National Intelligence School see National Intelligence University (NIU) National Intelligence University 133 National Intelligence University (NIU) 277, 281 National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) 462 National Security Agency (NSA) 17, 82, 116, 121, 124, 125, 276, 417, 462 national security and academic research, relationship between 368–81; building 372; knowledge exchange 372–6, 379–80; obstacles to engagement and impact: communications 370–1; confidence 371; culture 369–70 National Security Capability Review 405

National Security Council (NSC) 90 national security, definition of 369 national security intelligence 37–8, 45; relationship with academic (European context) 156–66; academic ethos 160–1; academic relationships and intelligence analysis methods 162–4; cooperation in the field of research 164–5; European security and intelligence services 156–9; stakeholder management and outreach 159–60; trust-building and community making through conferences and events 161–2; teaching of, in American universities 81–92; CIA-campus relationships 83–5; core models of intelligence instruction 87–8; current guidelines 85–7; Intelligence Studies taught by intelligence officers 89–90; third model 88–9 National Socialist German Students’ Association 439 Nation of Islam 51 NATIS see NATO Information Service (NATIS) NATO see North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) NATO Defense College 350 NATO Information Service (NATIS) 23, 33, 38, 51 NATO Russia Council 151 NATO Ukraine Commission 145 Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) 140 Nazi Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda 439–40 Nazism 49 NCMI see National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI) NCNA see New China News Agency (NCNA) ‘Need for an Intelligence Literature, The’ (Kent) 42 Netherlands 82; General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) 481–2 Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS) 139 Neumann, P.R. 305, 310n5, 310n10, 310n18, 327 Nevsky, A. 428 New China News Agency (NCNA) 199 Newman, M. 111, 113 New York Times 81, 83 New Zealand 82; Government Communications Security Bureau 467 New Zealand intelligence community (NZIC) 466–7 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) 466 Nexö, C.M.A. 442 NGA see National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA)

537

Index Nicaragua: Security and Intelligence Directorate (DIS) 517–18 Nicholson, D. 213 Nicht nur zur Weihnachtszeit (Böll) 355, 356 Nigeria: Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) 508 Nisbett, R.E. 310n11 NIST see National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) NIU see National Intelligence University (NIU) Niven, A. 2 Nixon, R.M. 81 NOBLE (National Order of Battlefield Logistical Estimation) analytical framework 151 No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State 10–11 NORDIS see Norwegian Defence Intelligence School (NORDIS) Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) 140, 141 North Atlantic Council (NAC) 146 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 28, 35; Article 2, 147; Article 5, 145, 147, 149; Article 10, 151; August 2001 146–7; CMRE 165; Committee on Soviet Economic Policy 147; Defence and Security Economics Directorate 152; Economic and Financial Working Group (GTEF) 147; Economic and Security Assessment Unit (ESAU) 146; Economic Committee 145–52, 154; dissolution and aftermath 152–3; 1957, genesis of 147–8; 1957 to 2000, priorities of 148; economic intelligence, challenges and legacy of 145–55; 9/11 attacks and aftermath 149–50; enlargement 151; post2010 153–4; rapprochement with Russia and misplaced optimism 150–1; response to the Russia–Ukraine energy security crisis 151–2; 1949 to 1957 147; Information Service 51; Medium Term Financial Budget (MTFB) 151; Military Intelligence Committee 148; Office of Security 145, 149; Reinforced Economic Committee 148, 150; Resolute Support Mission 150; Science and Technology organization (STO) 164, 165; Silence Procedure 147; Special Committee 145; Strategic Foresight Analysis programme 153, 154 Northern Ireland 46, 304 North Korea 267; security and intelligence 497–8 Norway: Norwegian Intelligence and Security Landscape 482–3; Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) 483–4 Norwegian Defence Intelligence School (NORDIS) 89, 90 Notre Dame College 288

NPSIA see Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) NRCan see Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) NRO see National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) NSAnet 280 NSA see National Security Agency (NSA) NSC see National Security Council (NSC) nuclear attack, modelling 396–7 Nuclear Information Project 58 Nudelman, A.E. 427 Nuffield College 232, 234, 235, 237, 238 Nuremberg Code 47, 48 Nuremberg Trials 47–8 Nyce, J.M. 45 NYPD Model 328 NZIC see New Zealand intelligence community (NZIC) NZSIS see New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) Obama, B. 121, 202 O’Conroy, T. 430 OECD see Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) OEEC see Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) Office for Students (OfS) 313; Monitoring of the Prevent Duty 2016–2017 progress report and future development 317 Office of Intelligence and Analysis 459, 460 Office of National Assessments (ONA) 465 Office of National Security Intelligence (ONSI) 460 Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 203, 204 Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) 443 Office of Research and Development: Center for the Development of Analytical Methodology 163 Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 121 Office of Strategic Studies 415 Officer-in Residence (OIR) Program 277–8 Official Secrets Act 112, 414, 421; Section 3.4, 418 OfS see Office for Students (OfS) OIG see Oxford Intelligence Group (OIG) OIR see Officer-in Residence (OIR) Program O’Malley, A. 49 Omand, Sir D. 1, 9, 10, 53, 235, 237, 253, 377, 381n11, 391n2 ONA see Office of National Assessments (ONA) ONSI see Office of National Security Intelligence (ONSI) On Warl (on Clausewitz) 37 OPC see Office of Policy Coordination (OPC)

538

Index Open Policy Making initiative 345 Openshaw, S. 394–400 open source information, on sensitive security subjects 266–9 open source intelligence (OSINT) 25, 26, 34, 141–3, 266, 383–92; and academic research 388; history of 384–7; and journalism 387; and secret intelligence 388–90 Operation CHAOS 81, 83 Operation COINTELPRO 81, 82 Operation Crossbow 415 Operation DIBBLER 218 Operation Enduring Freedom 150 Operation MINIRET 82 Operation SHAMROCK 82 Operation Tarantella 188 Operation Trust 188 Opernplatz, J.G. 36, 439, 440 OPM see Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 147, 148 Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 147 Oriel Colloquium 1, 2, 231, 352 OSINT see open source intelligence (OSINT) OSS see Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Ostroukhov, V. 190–1 Oswald, L.H. 436 Othman Mustapha 334 Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence ( Johnson) 45 Oxford Intelligence Group (OIG) 1, 231–41; formation of 231–4; Steering Group 235–6; terms of engagement 238–41; themes and discoveries: phase one: 2004–2010 234–5; phase two: 2010–2018 235–8 Oxford’s University Library 8 Oxford University 238 PaCCS see Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research (PaCCS) Pakistan: Intelligence Bureau (IB) 498; InterServices Intelligence (ISI) 499; Military Intelligence (MI) 499 Palacios, J.-M. 158 Palestinian Security Services (PSS) 508 PAP see People’s Armed Police (PAP) Park, D. 222 Parks, D. 17, 19 Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry 172 Parsons, S.J. 125, 272, 368, 371n11 particularism 303, 308–9 Partners HealthCare 100 Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research (PaCCS) 369, 376, 381n8 Partnership for Peace programme 148

Pasternak, B. 7 Patrushev, N. 189 Peace Studies 32 Peake, H. 389 peculiar personal characteristics 362–6 Pembroke College 233 Penson, H. 109 Pentagon Papers 50 People’s Armed Police (PAP) 205 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 199 People, States, Fear (Buzan) 30 Perestroika 148 Perry, R. 19 Persaud, R.B. 32 Personal Impressions (Berlin) 7 Peru: National Intelligence Service 518–19 Peters, Y. 432 PHIA see Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis (PHIA) Philby, K. 18, 19, 220, 225, 227n13 Philippines: National Bureau of Intelligence 499 Phillips, J. 121 PHOTINT see photo intelligence (PHOTINT) photo intelligence (PHOTINT) see Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) Phythian, M. 44–5, 53, 157, 233, 253, 377, 381n11 Pierce, W.L. 409 Pigeon Tunnel, The (le Carré) 447 Piguzov, V 192 Pitovranov, Y. 189 PLA see People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Plan 863, 200 Plato 29, 411n2 Platt, W. 44 Plivier, T. 442 Pluscarden Programme for the Study of Global Terrorism and Intelligence (PP) 233 POCA see Prevention of Crime (Amendments and Extensions) Act 2013 (POCA) Point Park University 288 Poland 33; Internal Security Agency 484 political warfare 34–5 politico-rational approaches ro terrorism/ counterrorism 304–5 Pontecorvo, B. 212–13 Pool, I. de S. 91 Popplewell, R.J. 246 Portugal 33, 162 Portuguese Internal Intelligence Service (SIS) 484–5 Porzner, K. 169 POTA see Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) Potash, J. 12 Poustchine, M. 221 Power Elite, The (Mills) 11 Powers, K. 94

539

Index PP see Pluscarden Programme for the Study of Global Terrorism and Intelligence (PP) Press, R. 213 Preston, J. 394 Prevent Duty, and securitization of education: audience in securitization of higher education 315; breeding grounds of terror 312–14; securitization theory 314–15 Prevention of Crime (Amendments and Extensions) Act 2013 (POCA) 334 Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) 334 Primakov, Y. 191 Pringle, R.W. 19 prisoners of war and intelligence 415–16 Private Office of the Secretary General 148, 150 Professional Conduct 56 Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis (PHIA) 347 Program Lifecycle, CPG Program in 97-8 Prokhanov, A. 184 Protect and Survive (Openshaw) 396, 399 psychiatric inquisition 49 psycho-ideological approaches to terrorism/ counterrorism 305–8 Public Intelligence Country Report on El Salvador 516 Public Opinion (Lippmann) 446 public policy role, of intelligence scholars 343–51; best practice, developing 349; greater engagement, benefits of 347–8; mechanics of research impact with security community: value derived and the impact generated 344–7; obstacles, overcoming 349 Public Safety Canada 463 Putin, V. 181, 182, 189, 191, 192, 238 PwC 100 Pynnöniemi, K. 28 Quinctius Cincinnatus 58 Quine, J. 224 Qurashi, F. 315 Radek, K. 441, 442 radicalisation 305–10; behavioural 305–7, 309, 310, 327; cognitive 307, 327; facets of 328–32; powerful ideologies 329–30; powerful networks 330; powerful technologies 330; recruitment 331–2; universities as sites of 327–8 Radzinsky, E. 427 Rait, R.S. 109 RAND 120 Ransome, A. 435, 438 Raytheon 100 RCMP see Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) RCUK’s Global Uncertainties Programme 374 Reader Response theory 412n6

recruitment 331–2; intelligence 362–6 Red and the Blue: Intelligence, Treason and the Universities, The (Sinclair) 19 Red Banner Institute of the KGB see SVR Academy (Academy of the Foreign Intelligence Service) Red Brigades 304 Reddie, C. 216 REF see Research Excellence Framework (REF) Regeni, G. 23 Regional Security Assessments (RSA) 154 Reilly, Sir P. 214 relevant higher education bodies (RHEBs) 312 Remarque, E.M. 439 Report of the National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community 13 Report on Alleged German Outrages 438 Report on Foreign and Military Intelligence (Church Committee) 13 Research Excellence Framework (REF) 381n10 Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) 292 response, appraising 335–7 Reuters Institute 237 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction see Butleer Report Rey Juan Carlos University 162 RFNSS see Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy (RFNSS) RHEBs see relevant higher education bodies (RHEBs) Richards, A. 304, 310n8 Riddle of the Sands, The (Childers) 435 Riley-Smith, T. 368 Risso, L. 33 Robertson, G. 145 Robertson, K.G. 124 Rogaway, P. 125 Rolland, R. 442 Roll, N. 85 Romania 162; Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) 485–6 Romanovsky, M. 188 Roosevelt, F.D. 121, 385 Ropes & Gray 100 Rosenbach, E. 85 Rossiiskaia gazeta. 178 Ross, L. 310n11 ROTC see Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Rothschild, E. 377–8 Rovner, J. 119 Rowan, R.W. 431 Royal Army Medical Corps 217 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 131, 464 Royal College of Defence Studies 350

540

Index Royal Malaysia Police 329 Royal Military College 133 Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 1, 34, 239 RSA see Regional Security Assessments (RSA) Rusicka, J. 30–1 RUSI see Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Russell, Bertrand 19 Russell, W.H. 384 Russell Group 353 Russian Academy of Sciences 190 Russian Civil War 188 Russian Federation 35, 36, 49; NATO’s rapprochement with 150–1; training to spies 187–94 Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy (RFNSS) 28–9, 467–9 Russia–Ukraine energy security crisis, NATO’s response to 151–2 Rychnovska, D. 31 Sackur, J. 224 Sageman, M. 303, 304, 308, 310n1, 310n3, 310n6, 310n12, 310n13, 310n14 Sandler, T. 412n5 Sanofi 100 Saudi Arabian security and intelligence 509 Saudi Sustainable Energy Symposium (2013) 268 Sawers, Sir J. 240 Scanlon, S. 51 scepticism 308–9 Schell, J. 35 Schindler, G. 169 Schneider, L. 312 Scholars at Risk 24 scholarship 8, 20, 103; Canadian and international academic research projects 138; intelligence studies 44, 143, 157; securitization 313–4 Scholars-in-Residence program 86 School for Special Tasks see SVR Academy (Academy of the Foreign Intelligence Service) Schuurman, B. 412n5 Scientific Studies and Research Centre, Syria 267 SCIF see Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) SCIP see Association of Strategic and Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) Scott Trust 237 SEAL see Security Education Academic Liaison (SEAL) Second World War 38, 41, 108, 119, 122, 189, 211, 232, 415, 416, 419

secret and ethically sensitive research ­ 265–71; challenges to 269–70; open source information 266–9 secret intelligence 119, 352–60; open source intelligence and 388–90 Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) 17, 21, 60, 61, 219–21, 223, 239, 246, 365, 456 Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SPIRNet) 280 Secret Service 244–6, 248 Secret World: A History of Intelligence, The (Andrew) 248 “Secret World, The” 246 securitization 312–24; academic freedom 321–3; of education, Prevent Duty and: audience in securitization of higher education 315; breeding grounds of terror 312–14; securitization theory 314–15; monitoring 319–20; (ir)relevance of policies 317–18; research design 316–17; web filtering 321–3; welfare and 320–1 Securitization theory 30–1, 59 securitizing agents 323 securitizing audience 323 Security and Intelligence Agencies (SIA) 368 Security Education Academic Liaison (SEAL) 277 Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 (SOSMA) 334 security threats: countering terrorist propaganda 408–10; through education, countering 410–11 Semyonov, Y. 194n4 Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) 276 sensitivities 419–21 Serbia: Republic of Serbia Security-Intelligence System 486 Serov, I. 222 Seventeen Moments of Spring 194n4 SFU see Simon Fraser University (SFU) Shane, S. 310n16 Shaw, B. 442 Sheng, K. 199 Shergold, H. 222 Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis 42 Shevtsova, L. 183 Shi Beipu 199 Shils, E. 160 Short Course in the Secret War, A (Felix) 39 Shulsky, A.N. 39 SIA see Security and Intelligence Agencies (SIA) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) 25, 26, 201, 202, 276, 430 Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence (Shulsky) 39

541

Index Simon Fraser University (SFU) 141 Simon, S. 411 Sims, J. 39 Sinclair, A. 19, 24 Sinclair, U. 442 Sing, L. 442 Singer, J.D. 412n3 Sino-Japanese War 197 Sirotkina, I. 49 SIRP (Sistema de Informações da República Portuguesa) 162 SIS see Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) situational awareness 37 ‘Six General Principles of Intelligence’ (Taplin) 39 Skripal, S. 180–2, 266 Slovak Information Service (SIS) 487 Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency (SOVA) 487 SMATA see Special Measures Against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Act (SMATA) SMERSH (Death to the Spies) 189 Smiley, G. 18 Smiley’s People 356 Smith, C. 352 Snowden, Edward J 8, 9–10, 32, 125, 261, 387, 417 Snowden effect 237 ‘Snowden, the Media and the State’ 237 Social Affairs Unit 313 social anthropology 122–4 Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) 124 Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) 139–40 Society for Educational Studies 231 socio-situational approaches to terrorism/ counterrorism 308–9 SOCMINT see Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) Soldatov, A. 183 Solzhenitsyn, A. 441 SOSMA see Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 (SOSMA) South Africa: State Security Agency (SSA) 511–12 South Korea 200; Korean Central Intelligence Agency 496–7 SOVA see Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency (SOVA) Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) 20, 389, 406, 407, 431 Spain 33; National Intelligence Centre (CNI) 488 Spark, M. 355–6 Special Measures Against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Act (SMATA) 334 speed-dating exercises 372–6

Speer, A. 47 SPIRNet see Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SPIRNet) Spy in the Archives, A (Fitzpatrick) 17 Spy Schools (Golden) 22 Sri Lanka 304 SSBs see State Security Bureaux (SSBs) SSHRC see Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) SSS see Swedish Security Service (SSS) Stafford, H. 420 stakeholder management 159–60 Stalin, J. 227n11 Stalin’s library 424–34 Stampnitzky, L. 303 St Andrew’s University 234 Stanford Prison Experiment 50 St Antony’s College 17 Starikov, N. 184 Stark, J. 291–3 state communism 49 State Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Lf V) 175 State of the Future 59 State Security Bureaux (SSBs) 200 State Street 100 Stationers’ Company 8 Steadman, P. 396, 398 Steinmeier, F.W. 172 Steinmetz, M. 101 Stierlitz, Max Otto von 194n4 St. Petersburg State University 190 Strachan, Sie H. 233, 234 Strachey, L. 19 Straight, M. 19 Stritzel, H. 314 structural realism 32 Studies in Intelligence 42 Sudan: National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) 511 Sunzi 196–7 SUPO see Finnish Security Intelligence Service (SUPO) SVR Academy (Academy of the Foreign Intelligence Service) 187, 191–3, 196 Sweden 162 Swedish Security Service (SSS) 488–9 Swindon, K.L. 99 Switzerland: Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) 489–90 Symantec 100 Symposia on Advanced Materials (1997 and 2003) 268 Syria 267; General Intelligence Directorate (GID) 509–10 Sysoyev, Y. 190–1 Szady, D. 201

542

Index Taiwan: National Security Bureau (NSB) 500 Tanzmann, H. 420 Taplin, W.L. 39 Taureck, R. 31 Taylor, B.B. 180 teaching intelligence ethics 253–63; case study approach 261–2; classroom sources 262; ethical issues, framing 254–6; Just War theory 258–61; law and ethics 257–8 Tear, ‘Terry’ O. 227n13 technical reconnaissance bureau (TRB) 201 technology, as game-changer 201–5 Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT) 26 Tenet, G.J. 34 Tennessee State University 88 Terror, Insecurity and Liberty (Didier and Tsoukala) 56 terrorism/counterrorism in research, epistemologies of 303–10; particularism 308–9; politico-rational approaches 304–5; psycho-ideological approaches 305–8; scepticism 308–9; socio-situational approaches 308–9 Terrorism, Risk, and Security Studies Professional Master’s Program (TRSS) 141 terrorist propaganda, countering 408–10 Thailand 205 Theoharis, A. 51 The Spy Who came in from the Cold 442–3 Thies, C.G. 37 Third Reich 36, 46, 47, 49 Thirty-Nine Steps, The 7 Thistlethwaite, F 224 Thompson, G.P. 212 Thorpe, J. 419 Threat: actors 405–8; management 332–5; understanding of 405–8 Thucydides 58 Tiger Trap (Wise) 201 Tiltman, J. 111 Time of Putin, The (Frolov) 191 Times of London, The 384 Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy (Carré) 17, 356 Tocqueville, Alexis de 11 Tolstoy, A.N. 424, 425 Tomlinson, George 19 Tovstukha, I. 425 traitor in chekist cosmology, figure of 178–84 translation 371 Travis, E. 111 TRB see technical reconnaissance bureau (TRB) Treasury 362, 363 Treaty of Versailles 431 Trent Park 415, 416 Tret’iakov, S. 181 Trevelyan, D. 233, 236 Trevelyan, G.M. 438

Trial of the Major War Criminals 47 Trombley, W. 91 Troy, T.F. 39 TRSS see Terrorism, Risk, and Security Studies Professional Master’s Program (TRSS) trust, and intelligence–academy relationship 137–8 trust-building 161–2 TSAS see Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS) Tsoukala, A. 55 ‘Tube Alloys’ atomic weapons’ programme 20 Tukhachevsky, M. 188 Turing, A. 111, 113 Turkey: National Intelligence Organization 511 Turner Diaries, The (Pierce) 409 Turner, S. 163, 164 Twitter Age 119 Uhrlau, E. 172 Ukraine 34, 179, 268–9; Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) 490–1 UK see United Kingdom (UK) Ullman, R.H. 369 Ultimate Deception: How Stalin Stole the Bomb (Dan) 214 Ultra Secret, The 244 UN see United Nations (UN) UNCAT see UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) 240 UNESCO 336 Union of Soviet Writers 440–2 United Kingdom (UK) 34, 35, 82; Critical National Infrastructure 57; Defence Academy’s Staff College 347; Department of the Foreign Office 112; end of 394–6; Government Communication Headquarters 457; Intelligence and National Security 140; Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 409; Secret Intelligence Service 456; Security Service 46, 456–7 United Nations (UN) 27, 29, 32, 46–7, 59; Convention on Genocide 47 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission 213 United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre 336 United Nations Development Program 32 United Nations Security Council 29, 47, 359 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR): UNSCR 1386 150; UNSCR 1510 150 United States (US) 34–6, 46, 50, 122, 123, 131, 254; American universities, teaching

543

Index of national security intelligence in 81–92; Armed Forces 275; Central Intelligence Agency see Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Coast Guard Intelligence 458–9; Congress for Cultural Freedom 52; Defense Intelligence Agency 459; Department of Defense (DoD) 84, 100, 120, 123, 266, 397; Department of Energy 100, 459; Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 55, 100, 459; Department of Justice, National Security Division 100; Department of the Treasury 100, 460; Drug Enforcement Administration 460; Federal Bureau of Investigation see Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Federal Reserve 100; First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 83; Intelligence Community 156, 157, 163; Intelligence Community Policy System 159–60; Marine Corps Intelligence 461; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 461; National Reconnaissance Office 462; National Security Agency see National Security Agency (NSA); National Security Committee (NSC) 205; Navy Intelligence 462; Operation Enduring Freedom 150; Secret Service 100; State Department 86, 203, 204, 432, 460 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 439 United States Strategic Defence Initiative (‘Star Wars’) programme 148 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 47, 256; Article 3, 374, 377 Universidade Nova de Lisboa 162 University Educations of Chiefs of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) 62 University Educations of Directors General of MI5, 62 University Educations of Directors of GCHQ 63 University Educations of Directors of the CIA 64 University Educations of Directors of the FBI 63 University Educations of Directors of the NSA 64–5 University of British Columbia: Centre of International Relations 140 University of Cambridge, intelligence studies at 243–9 University of Chicago 290 University of Georgia 91 University of Harvard 246 University of Illinois Press 244 University of Indonesia 332 University of Kenya 326 University of Leicester 350 University of New Brunswick: Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society 140 University of North Sumatra 332

University of Nottingham 233 University of Ottawa: Centre for International Policy Studies 140 University of Riau 331 University of Texas 88 University of the Bundeswehr University Munich (Universität der Bundeswehr München, UniBwM) 175 University of Toronto 246 University of Utah- Salt Lake City 281 university–security–intelligence nexus 7–65; academic discipline of intelligence studies 37–46; academic discipline of security studies 29–36; advancing model 16; basic model 15; epistemological domain 25–9; ethical domain 46–56; existential domain 56–60; operational domain 16–25 UNSCR see United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) UN Security Council Resolution 2178 55 Urwick, A. 224 US see United States (US) U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 507 USAID see U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) U.S. Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (USAF ISR) 457–8 U.S. Army Intelligence 458 U.S. Attorney’s Office, Boston 100 U.S. Intelligence Community 26 USSR see Russian Federation US Steel 100 Utechin, S.V. 233 Van Puyvelde, D. 158 Vartanian, G. 181, 183 Vasenkov, M. 193 Venable 100 Venediktov, A. 182 Venezuela: Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN) 519; CIA world factbook country profile Venezuela 520 Victoroff, J. 310n7 Vienna 220–1 Vienna Declaration 335–6 Vietnam War 50, 91, 122 Villeneuve, P.J. 310n9 Vlasov, V. 190 von Clausewitz, C. 37 vulnerability 306 Waever, O. 31 Wagner, A. 277 Walsingham, F. 197 Walton, C. 247 Walzer, M. 258

544

Index War and Peace at Oxford Network 234 Wark, W.K. 45 Warner, M. 40, 257–8 war on drugs 240 war on terror 145, 149, 240 War Propaganda Bureau 7, 437–8 War Studies 32, 33, 254 War Trade Intelligence Department (WTID) 109; Intelligence Section 109 Was There a Fifth Man? (Mann) 212 WCAS see Woods College of Advancing Studies (WCAS) weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation 266 web filtering 321–3 Web of Science 267 Weil Gotshal 100 Welchman, G. 111, 364 Wells, H.G. 438 Westcott, C. 236, 383 West, N. 215 ‘What Is Intelligence?’ (Shulsky and Sims) 39 What Works Centre 345 What Works Network 345 Whitehead, L. 238 White House 90, 100 Wiegand, I. 55 WikiLeaks 417 Wilton Park 415, 416 Wimsatt, W.K. 412n6 Winks, R.W. 17 Winnifrith, A.J.D. 362, 363 Wise, D. 201 Wisner, F. 227n13, 443 Wittgenstein, L. 19 WMD see weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation Wolfe, D. 123

Woods College of Advancing Studies (WCAS) 94, 97, 101 Woodward, J. 3047 Woolf, L. 19 Working Group on Comparison of Economic Trends in NATO and Soviet Countries 147 World War II (WWII) see Second World War Wray, C. 28 WTID see War Trade Intelligence Department (WTID) Wyke, J. 227n13 Wyschogrod, E. 47 Xian Incident (1936) 197 Xiaoping, D. 199 Xi Jinping 202, 205, 445 Yandex 267 Yezhov, N. 444 York College 288 Younger, Sir A. 18, 57–8, 60, 447 Yugoslav Civil War 147 Yuri Andropov Red Banner Institute 191 Zacharias, E. 432 Zaharchenko, T. 184 Zegart, A.B. 40 Zhakov, S. 192 Zhdanov, A. 441 Zhdanovism 441 Zhilin, A. 183 Zhorin, F.L. 182, 183 Zhou Enlai 203 Ziegler, H. 420 ZTE 203 Zuboff, S. 388 Zweig, S. 439 Zwerling, P. 53

545